European Asylum Support Office

Syria
Exercise of authority inrecaptured areas
Country of Origin Information Report

January 2020
SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION

European Asylum Support Office

Syria
Exercise of authority inrecaptured areas

Country of Origin Information Report

January 2020

More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu).
PDF: ISBN: 978-92-9485-161-1

doi: 10.2847/651962

BZ0220014ENN© European Asylum Support Office (EASO) 2020
Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged, unless otherwise stated.
For third-party materials reproduced in this publication, reference is made to the
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Cover photo: © Amer Almohibany/AFP/Getty Images, A Syrian child stands in a school thatwas partially damaged in a reported air strike on March 7, 2017, in the rebel-held town of Utaya,
in the eastern Ghouta region on the outskirts of the capital Damascus, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT ON SYRIA: EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY IN RECAPTURED AREAS— 3

Acknowledgements
EASO would like to acknowledge the Norwegian Country of Origin Information Centre, Landinfo, as
the drafter of this report.
The following departments and organisations have reviewed the report together with the EASO COI
Sector:
The Netherlands, Office for Country Information and Language Analysis, Ministry of Justice
ACCORD, the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation
It must be noted that the review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts or organisations
contributes to the overall quality of the report but does not necessarily imply their formal
endorsement of the final report, which is the full responsibility of EASO.

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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT ON SYRIA: EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY IN RECAPTURED AREAS

Contents
Acknowledgements................................................................................................................................. 3Contents .................................................................................................................................................. 4
Disclaimer................................................................................................................................................ 6
Glossary and Abbreviations .................................................................................................................... 7
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 8
Methodology ...................................................................................................................................... 8
Sources ............................................................................................................................................... 8
Quality control .................................................................................................................................... 8
Structure and use of the report .......................................................................................................... 9
Map ....................................................................................................................................................... 10
1. Background ....................................................................................................................................... 11
2. Reconciliation agreements ............................................................................................................... 12
2.1

Criticism of the reconciliation agreements ......................................................................... 12

2.2

Sieges ................................................................................................................................... 13

2.3

De-escalation zones ............................................................................................................. 13

2.4

Different reconciliation agreements ................................................................................... 15

2.5‘Sorting out of affairs’ (taswiyat al-wada)........................................................................... 16

2.5.1

The process of sorting out affairs for individuals ............................................................ 16

2.5.2

Non-individual agreements ............................................................................................. 18

2.5.3

Groups and individuals that are denied or do not enter into agreements ..................... 18

2.6

Corruption ........................................................................................................................... 20

2.7

Military service .................................................................................................................... 20

2.7.1

Forms of military service ................................................................................................. 21

3. After the reconciliation agreement .................................................................................................. 22
3.1

Damascus and Ghouta/Rural Damascus ............................................................................. 22

3.1.1

Darayya............................................................................................................................ 22

3.1.2

Muadamiyat al-Sham ...................................................................................................... 23

3.1.3

Qudsaya........................................................................................................................... 24

3.1.4

Madaya/Zabadani ........................................................................................................... 25

3.1.5

Douma ............................................................................................................................. 28

3.1.6

Yalda, Babila and Bayt Sahm ........................................................................................... 30

3.1.7

Qadam ............................................................................................................................. 31

3.1.8

Yarmouk and Hajar al-Aswad .......................................................................................... 32

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT ON SYRIA: EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY IN RECAPTURED AREAS

3.2

— 5

Daraa ................................................................................................................................... 34

3.2.1

Al-Sanamayn.................................................................................................................... 34

3.2.2

Daraa city ........................................................................................................................ 35

4. Recaptured areas .............................................................................................................................. 38
4.1

Aleppo.................................................................................................................................. 38

4.2

Homs .................................................................................................................................... 39

4.2.1

Al-Waer ........................................................................................................................... 39

4.2.2

Baba Amr ......................................................................................................................... 40

Bibliography .......................................................................................................................................... 41
Terms of Reference ............................................................................................................................... 53

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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT ON SYRIA: EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY IN RECAPTURED AREAS

Disclaimer
This report was written according to the EASO COI Report Methodology (2019) 1. The report is basedon carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced.
The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed with utmost
care. However, this document does not claim to be exhaustive. If a particular event, person ororganisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has not taken place orthat the person or organisation does not exist.
Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particularapplication for international protection. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative of aparticular legal position.
‘Refugee’, ‘risk’ and similar terminology are used as generic terminology and not in the legal sense as
applied in the EU Asylum Acquis, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the
Status of Refugees.
Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may bemade of the information contained in this report.

1 The EASO methodology is largely based on the Common EU Guidelines for processing Country of Origin Information (COI),

2008, and can be downloaded from the EASO website: http://www.easo.europa.eu.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT ON SYRIA: EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY IN RECAPTURED AREAS

Glossary and Abbreviations
GoS

Government of Syria

HTS

Hay’at Tahrir al-ShamIS

The Islamic State (IS); also known as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant(ISIL), Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), or Daesh.

NDF

National Defence Forces

SAA

Syrian Arab Army

SANA

Syrian Arab News Agency

SARC

Syrian Arab Crescent

SOHR

Syrian Observatory of Human Rights

UNOCHA

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

UNRWA

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the
Near East

— 7

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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT ON SYRIA: EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY IN RECAPTURED AREAS

Introduction
This report was drafted by Country of Origin Information (COI) specialists from the Norwegian Countryof Origin Information Centre, Landinfo, as listed under the Acknowledgements section.
This report concerns the Syrian territories, which have been outside the control of the Government of
Syria (GoS) and returned to GoS control through so-called reconciliation agreements. It explores how
these agreements were reached, their consequences for the population of the respective areas, aswell as how GoS exerts its control in the aftermath. Not all areas/cities are included, but rather aselection that serves to illustrate the different developments.

Methodology
This report is produced in line with the EASO COI Report Methodology (2019) 2 and the EASO COI
Writing and Referencing Style Guide (2019). 3
The report covers the period from 2014 until October 2019. The drafting of this report was finalisedon 1 October 2019. Some additional information was added during the finalisation of this report in
response to feedback received during the quality control process until 28 October 2019.
Terms of Reference for this report can be found in the annex of this report.

Sources
The sources used in this report include local and regional media coverage of the signing of the socalled reconciliation agreements, as well as analyses of and comments on these agreements byacademics with in-depth knowledge of Syria.
The report also draws heavily on conversations and interviews conducted by Landinfo withinternational organisations and local actors on its fact-finding missions in the spring of 2018 and in
April 2019. These sources are further described in the Bibliography section.
In the context of the Syrian conflict, media coverage in both Syrian and international media must be
carefully weighed against each other; a major research challenge. The topics addressed in this report
are highly politicised, and many media are openly or secretly affiliated to one of the sides in theconflict. This means that there will often be conflicting information about a given incident, andLandinfo has, as far as possible, attempted to provide as multi-faceted a description of the situationas possible. It was difficult or impossible for Landinfo to verify some of the information conveyed by
the media. However, Landinfo has tried to verify the information to the best of its ability.

Quality control
In order to ensure that the report respects the EASO COI Report Methodology, a review was carriedout by COI specialists from the countries and organisations listed as reviewers in the
Acknowledgements section.

2 EASO, EASO Country of Origin Information (COI) Report Methodology, June 2019, url

3 EASO, Writing and Referencing Guide for EASO Country of Origin Information (COI) Reports, June 2019, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT ON SYRIA: EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY IN RECAPTURED AREAS— 9Structure and use of the report
This report starts with a brief introduction to the areas covered and then describes the so-called
reconciliation-agreements, which constitute the formal framework for reintegrating these formerly
opposition-held areas into the state. It describes the different variants of the agreements, and theirmain implications for the population.
It then examines in some detail how these agreements have worked out in a number of towns anddistricts, highlighting both similarities and differences in their implementation and the reasons forthese. The last chapter provides a couple of examples of recaptured areas where no reconciliationagreement governs their reintegration into the state.
The situation in Syria remains unstable, even in parts of the country where the state has been incontrol throughout the conflict and in areas formerly held by the opposition. This should be borne inmind while reading the report, as this provides an important insight into the strategy of the Syrian
state for dealing with these areas, and the impacts on the population.

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Map

Map 1: Syria, ©United Nations 4

4 Syria, Map No. 4204 Rev. 3, April 2012, United Nations, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT ON SYRIA: EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY IN RECAPTURED AREAS— 11

1. BackgroundThe uprising in Syria started in spring 2011 and developed into a civil war in a relatively short space oftime. Areas of the country were captured by different armed groups in opposition to the Governmentof Syria (hereinafter GoS), and many of these areas were outside the control of the GoS for several
years. At the same time, the Islamic State (IS) took control of large parts of the country, from theTurkish border at Jarablus, to Mari, as well as both sides of Lake Asad, al-Tabqa and Raqqa, and theareas on both sides of the Euphrates river down to the Iraqi border at al-Qaim. GoS managed
throughout this period to keep control over a small pocket of land on the western side of the river at
Deir Ez Zor, including parts of the city itself. 5
The aforementioned previously IS-held areas were eventually captured from IS by US-backed Kurdish
forces, and as of October 2019, still remained outside GoS control, except for the areas south of theEuphrates River, which is mostly desert. As of October 2019, Idlib governorate, as well as parts ofHama, Latakia and Aleppo governorates were still outside GoS’ control. 6
Other areas of the country that were previously outside GoS control, such as Daraa in the south, andareas in Rural Damascus, are now back under government control. 7 This report describes how the GoS
regained control of these areas through so-called reconciliation agreements, and how this has
affected the local population.

5 Liveuamap, Syria, 18 October 2015, url
6 Liveuamap, Syria, 1 October 2019, url
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2. Reconciliation agreements
GoS has entered into reconciliation agreements (Arabic: ittifaqat musalaha) with different actors inmost of the areas the government forces have recaptured from various anti-government groups inthe last few years.
During the first years of the war, the government pursued a strategy of negotiating local ceasefire
agreements; subsequently it did so with the encouragement of UN Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura.
He and others believed that this would reduce acts of violence 8, in a war where neither party seemed
to be winning. 9
The agreements were often brokered with Russian or Iranian help, but they were also negotiateddirectly by GoS in some places. In many cases, local people in influential positions negotiated the deals
on behalf of the rebel groups. 10
GoS established a dedicated ministry for reconciliation as early as 2012, and Ali Haidar was appointed
Minister of State for National Reconciliation Affairs. 11 Reconciliation agreements became a main
component of the strategy to recapture areas when Russia became increasingly involved in the war in
2015. 12 In February 2016, Russia established the Russian Centre for the Reconciliation of Opposing
Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic, operated from Hmeimim military air base outside Jableh, on the
Mediterranean Coast. 13 The name was later changed to the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of
Opposing Sides and Refugee Migration Monitoring. 14
The agreements have a number of characteristics in common, although they vary from outrightcapitulation agreements to more genuine reconciliation agreements. The balance of power on the
ground largely determined the content of the agreements. 15 In strategically important areas for the
GoS, and areas where it has been under pressure, GoS has been more willing to make concessions
than in areas where the opposition has been more divided and incapable of acting concertedly. 16
Another factor that has reportedly influenced the negotiations on the many different agreements has
been pressure from a population tired of war; a population that has had to live under prolonged sieges
and bombardment in many cases. 17

2.1 Criticism of the reconciliation agreements
The Syrian opposition has long criticised these agreements, claiming that they are not aboutreconciliation, but are outright capitulation agreements. Nor does GoS attempt to conceal the fact

8 Sosnowski, M., Besiege, bombard, retake: Reconciliation agreements in Syria, Middle East Eye, 28 March 2018, url
9 Reuters, Syrian opposition must accept it has not won the war, 6 September 2017, url

10 Adleh, F. and Favier, A., “Local reconciliation agreements” in Syria: A non-starter for peacebuilding, European University
Institute, June 2017, url, p. 811 Adleh, F. and Favier, A., “Local reconciliation agreements” in Syria: A non-starter for peacebuilding, European University
Institute, June 2017, url, p. 6
12 Adleh, F. and Favier, A., “Local reconciliation agreements” in Syria: A non-starter for peacebuilding, European University
Institute, June 2017, url, p. 1
13 Adleh, F. and Favier, A., “Local reconciliation agreements” in Syria: A non-starter for peacebuilding, European University
Institute, June 2017, url, p. 7
14 See Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, Bulletins of the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides and Refugee
Migration Monitoring in Syrian Arab Republic, n.d, url
15 Hinnebusch, R., and Imady, O., Syria’s reconciliation agreements, Centre for Syrian Studies. University of St. Andrews, 12
February 2017, url, p. 1
16 Hinnebusch, R., and Imady, O., Syria’s reconciliation agreements, Centre for Syrian Studies. University of St. Andrews, 12
February 2017, url, pp. 7-10
17 Hinnebusch, R., and Imady, O., Syria’s reconciliation agreements, Centre for Syrian Studies. University of St. Andrews, 12
February 2017, url, p. 2

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT ON SYRIA: EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY IN RECAPTURED AREAS— 13

that its motivation for entering into such agreements is to regain control of areas held by the armed
opposition. 18
One of the opposition’s main objections has been that GoS fails to fulfil its obligations under theagreements, and that it uses them to exact revenge on members of the opposition who sign suchagreements. In other areas, it may be a case of GoS not honouring its promise to restore
infrastructure, or of militias being given free rein. 19
Chapter 3 provides more discussion on criticism of the agreements, along with a description of thedifferent areas and reconciliation processes.

2.2 Sieges
A common characteristic of all the areas with reconciliation agreements in place is that during theperiod before signing the agreements, they were under siege, in many cases, for several years. 20 The
circumstances surrounding such sieges varied from one area to the next, and with time. In many cases,
it was at times possible for the population to cross over from a rebel-held area under siege to areas
under GoS control. This was possible for individuals who had no outstanding issues with thegovernment, primarily women and children, but also students. 21
An economy based on smuggling goods emerged in many of the former rebel-held areas, a highly
profitable business for all parties in the conflict. 22

2.3 De-escalation zones
As of spring 2017, four major areas in Syria were not under GoS control, in addition to the areas
controlled by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and IS:•

Idlib province (including parts of Aleppo, Hama and Latakia provinces)•Large parts of Daraa province and some of Quneitra•

Ghouta east of Damascus•

Northern parts of Homs province 23

The context here was that GoS, with the aid of Russia and Iran, had retaken the last rebel-held pocketsof Aleppo in 2016, which was seen as a serious setback for the opposition. 24
At that time, several rounds of negotiations had been attempted to try to bring an end to the war,
without lasting results being achieved. After Russian forces became heavily involved on the GoS sidein 2015, they slowly and gradually succeeded in stopping advances by the rebel groups. The loss of
Aleppo led to a much stronger willingness to reach a negotiated solution to the war, particularly on
the part of Turkey, the rebels’ foremost supporter 25, which had realigned with Russia. 26

18 Ezzi, M., How the Syrian regime is using the mask of ‘reconciliation’ to destroy opposition institutions, Chatham House,
June 2017, url
19 Hall, N., The aftershocks of reconciliation in Syria: Reflections on the past year, Atlantic Council, 17 April 2019, url; Reuters,
Syrian city’s rebel district still in ruins years after Assad victory, 18 August 2017, url
20 AI, ‘We Leave or We Die’: Forced Displacement under Syria’s ‘Reconciliation’ Agreements, 2017, url, p. 6
21 Landinfo interviews with an International organisation (a) in Damascus, March 2018 and April 201922 Asfar, R., The lucrative business of smuggling supplies into Syria’s besieged Eastern Ghouta, PRI, 27 April 2017, url
23 Based on reading of the map in ISW, Syria Situation Report: May 10 – 18, 2017, 19 May 2017, url
24 Naharnet, Aleppo recapture deals setback to Gulf rebel backers, 23 December 2016, url
25 NO-Landinfo drafter assessment
26 Hinnebusch, R., and Imady, O., Syria’s reconciliation agreements, Centre for Syrian Studies. University of St. Andrews, 12
February 2017, url, p. 2

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The foreign ministers of Russia, Iran and Turkey agreed to meet for initial peace talks in Astana, thecapital of Kazakhstan, in December 2016, and, in January 2017, representatives of 12 anti-government
factions participated in negotiations for the first time. Their delegation was led by Muhammad
Alloush, the leader of Jaysh al-Islam, an organisation that controlled large parts of Eastern Ghouta
outside Damascus. 27
The Astana process resulted in an agreement that was signed by representatives of Russia, Iran andTurkey in May 2017. It stipulated the establishment of four ‘de-escalation zones’ in areas notcontrolled by GoS, listed above. 28 Many rebel representatives walked out of the agreement, and USA
was also not involved in the negotiations beforehand. Initially, the agreement was supposed to leadto a complete ceasefire and ensure access to emergency relief and other humanitarian aid in theseareas. It also envisaged agreement at a later stage on how the ceasefire would be monitored andcomplied with in practice. 29
An important point in both this and earlier agreements was that some ‘terrorist organisations’ would
not be covered by the agreement. In practice, this meant that Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) (formerly
known as the al-Nusra Front, the Syrian branch of Al-Qaeda), and Islamic State (IS) were not parties tothe agreement, and that they continued to be legitimate targets for Syrian, Russian and Iranianforces. 30 Both HTS and IS groups are designated as sanctioned organisations by the UN Security Council
for involvement in terrorism. 31
Agreement was eventually reached on the delimitation of the zones, and in Idlib, Russian, Iranian andTurkish forces established checkpoints to ensure that the agreement was respected. 32 In autumn 2017
and early 2018, GoS and Russian forces intensified both the siege and bombing of Eastern Ghouta,
and in spring 2018, the area was captured by GoS. 33 Later that same year, the rest of Daraa provincealso came under GoS control. 34As of summer 2019, Idlib is the only one of the four de-escalation zones
that still remains. 35 The area faces a highly uncertain future 36, especially because HTS largely
controlled the entire province as of October 2019 reporting. 37 The group took control of the area inJanuary 2019, after other rebel groups more or less collapsed, 38 and withdrew to the Afrin area, whichis controlled by Turkey 39 and rebel groups that it supports. 40

27 Guardian (The), Russia in power-brooking role as peace talks begin in Astana, 23 January 2017, url; Reuters, Syria attack

triggered Western action, bur on the ground Assad gained, 16 April 2018, url
28 Hinnebusch, R., and Imady, O., Syria’s reconciliation agreements, Centre for Syrian Studies. University of St. Andrews, 12
February 2017, url, pp. 2-3
29 WSJ, Russia, Turkey and Iran Sign Syria ‘De-Escalation Zone’ Deal, 4 May 2017, url; AP News, Russia, Iran, Turkey sign on‘de-escalation zones’ in Syria, 4 May 2017, url
30 Hanna, A., Russia muscles in on de-escalation zones, Chatham House, October 2017, url; Al Jazeera, Syria’s de-escalation
zones: ‘We don’t trust Russia’, 9 May 2017, url
31 UN Security Council, United Nations Security Council Consolidated List [Generated 8 January 2020], n.d., url
32 Karasapan, O. M., The Idlib agreement and other pieces of the Syrian puzzle, Brookings Institution, 17 September 2018,
url; RI, Losing Their Last Refuge; Inside Idlib's humanitarian nightmare, September 2019, url, p. 833 Telegraph (The), Syrian flag flying over onetime rebel stronghold Douma as Russians announce victory in Eastern Ghouta,
12 April 2018, url
34 Maayeh, S., and Hares, N., The fall of Daraa, Foreign Affairs, 23 July 2018, url
35 Karasapan, O. M., The Idlib agreement and other pieces of the Syrian puzzle, Brookings Institution, 17 September 2018,url
36 Middle East Institute, Idlib’s Uncertain Future, n.d., url; Portal (The), Uncertain future for Idlib as Turkey-Russia talks dragon, 21 May 2019, url; New Turkey (The), Idlib’s Crumbling Ceasefire is a Frightening Prospect for Civilians, 7 august 2019, url
37 Washington Post (The), Islamic State leader Baghdadi hid among rivals and enemies in rebel-held Syrian province, 28
October 2019, url
38 Walker, P. J., Consequences of the HTS take-over in northwest Syria, Atlantic Council, 30 January 2019, url
39 Al-Hilu, Khayrallah, Afrin Under Turkish Control: Political, Social and Economic Transformations, European University
Institute, 25 July 2019, url, p. 3
40 BBC, Syria war: Why does the battle for Idlib matter?, 4 June 2019, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT ON SYRIA: EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY IN RECAPTURED AREAS— 15

2.4 Different reconciliation agreements
Below is an overview, with examples, of what the reconciliation agreements looked like; however, thelist is in no way exhaustive. The content of the agreements was largely determined by the balance ofpower on the ground in areas where such agreements have been signed. In a 2017 report, prominent
Syria researchers Raymond Hinnebusch and Omar Imady outlined four different types of agreements:
•

•

•

•

The most unbalanced form described consisted of agreements whereby the population of agiven area was evacuated and the demographic balance changed. We find an example of suchan agreement in Zabadani, a city located close to the Lebanese border in Rural Damascus
governorate. 41 The area is of high strategic importance, not just to GoS, but also to the
Lebanese Hezbollah, which has made active contributions to the war on the GoS side. 42 In thiscase, the agreement included the evacuation of Fuah and Kafriya, two besieged progovernment Shia villages in Idlib province, in other words a form of population exchange. 43
The inhabitants of Zabadani were evacuated to the neighbouring city of Madaya, which at thetime was also outside GoS control 44, or to rebel-held areas in Idlib province. The inhabitantsof Fuah and Kafriya were evacuated to Aleppo, which is controlled by GoS. 45 The agreement
was brokered by Ahrar al-Sham and HTS, on the one hand, and GoS, Hezbollah and Iran, on
the other. 46
A ‘somewhat less punitive’ agreement described is one where parts of the population wereallowed to stay in the area, while militant groups and others who did not accept GoS
conditions were evacuated 47, usually to Idlib province. 48 Some were undoubtedly evacuatedagainst their will, for example members of the White Helmets organisation, which GoS
accuses of being terrorists. 49 Local religious Islamist leaders, who previously worked with the
opposition as part of the Sharia legal system, were in some cases co-opted by GoS. Some ofthem have later took part in negotiations on similar agreements elsewhere. 50
A ‘more balanced’ type of agreement described is one where the rebels remain in control ofan area, but surrendered heavier weapons. They also pledged not to attack GoS forces. In
return, GoS committed to lifting the blockade, returning displaced people and restoring
services for the population. Hinnebusch and Imady mentioned Barzeh in Damascus as an
example of a place where this type of agreement was signed in June 2014. An important factor
in relation to agreements where GoS was willing to make significant concessions to the rebels
is that the rebels have enjoyed a relatively strong position, and that the areas they hold are
strategically important. 51
The fourth variant described is a type of agreement that can hardly be called a reconciliationagreement 52, but that is more a ceasefire agreement. In these cases, the opposition controlled
an area with one or more natural resources on which GoS is completely dependent. An

41 Hinnebusch, R., and Imady, O., Syria’s reconciliation agreements, Centre for Syrian Studies. University of St. Andrews, 12
February 2017, url, p. 7
42 Alami, M., Hezbollah’s military involvement in Syria and its wider regional role, March 2017, url, p. 18
43 Arfeh, H., The institutionalization of demographic change in Syria, Atlantic Council, 4 April 2019, url
44 AI, ‘We Leave or We Die’: Forced Displacement under Syria’s ‘Reconciliation’ Agreements, 2017, url, p. 61
45 Reuters, Evacuations from besieged Syrian towns end after two-day halt, 21 April 2017, url
46 Arfeh, H., The institutionalization of demographic change in Syria, Atlantic Council, 4 April 2019, url
47 Hinnebusch, R., and Imady, O., Syria’s reconciliation agreements, Centre for Syrian Studies. University of St. Andrews, 12
February 2017, url, p. 8
48 Time, Idlib could be the last major battlefield of the Syrian civil war. But Assad won’t take it easily, 16 August 2018, url
49 Al Aswad, H., Daraa’s White Helmets: Far from safe and fleeing for Northern Syria, Middle East Eye, 1 August 2018, url
50 Hinnebusch, R., and Imady, O., Syria’s reconciliation agreements, Centre for Syrian Studies. University of St. Andrews, 12
February 2017, url, p. 851 Hinnebusch, R., and Imady, O., Syria’s reconciliation agreements, Centre for Syrian Studies. University of St. Andrews, 12
February 2017, url, p. 8
52 NO-Landinfo drafter assessment

16 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT ON SYRIA: EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY IN RECAPTURED AREAS

example given is Wadi Barada outside Damascus, where rebels controlled the water spring
supplying the whole of Damascus. Here, an agreement was signed that stipulated that GoS
would not intervene in the city or the area at all, in return for the rebels ensuring that thewater supply would function as normal. After the rebels had repeatedly cut off the watersupply to pressure GoS into meeting their demands, including the release of prisoners, GoS
invaded the area. The same has happened in other places, such as Aleppo, where rebels
controlled an important power plant. 53

2.5 ‘Sorting out of affairs’ (taswiyat al-wada)‘Sorting out of affairs’ or legalising one’s status (Arabic: taswiyat al- wada) are the terms GoS uses to
describe the process of reconciling with the government as an individual, as a result of the different
reconciliation agreements 54, or through individual agreements, for persons who wish to return to Syria
after having left illegally, such as via an unofficial border crossing. 55 For GoS, these agreements wereabout regaining control of the parts of the country that have been outside government control. 56
For the part of the population that chose to stay in an area covered by an agreement, this ‘sorting out
of affairs’ primarily concerns two things:•

If they have been part of an armed group that has fought GoS, authorities must clarify whether
they will be allowed to stay, and, if so, on what terms. 57•

Men of conscription age must serve in the military, and those called up for service in thereserve force must complete it.58

2.5.1 The process of sorting out affairs for individuals
Though this process can vary in practice, under all circumstances 59, representatives of a security
service were reported to be present to receive applications to sort out/clarify individuals’ outstanding
issues with GoS. 60
A source from August 2018 indicated that prior to this, a committee comprising GoS representatives
and local intermediaries registers the names of activists and rebels who wish to remain in the area inquestion. 61 Who was assigned the role of being the local intermediaries varied. Sometimes,
representatives of local rebel groups were part of the negotiation committee, but also well-known
figures such as local doctors or members of the local council usually took part. The local GoS
participants were often individuals with formal influence and status, for example, mayors, governors

53 Hinnebusch, R., and Imady, O., Syria’s reconciliation agreements, Centre for Syrian Studies. University of St. Andrews, 12
February 2017, url, pp. 10-11
54 SANA, Taswiyat awda’ 510 ashkhas min madinat al-Sanamayn baynahum 150 musallahan sallamu anfusahum waaslihatahum lil-jihat al-mukhtassa [510 persons from the city al-Sanamayn assessed their situation, including 150 armed
persons who surrendered and handed in weapons to relevant agencies], 25 December 2016, url; Haid, H., The details of‘reconciliation deals’ expose how they are anything but, Chatham House, August 2018, url
55 Syrian Embassy in Stockholm, Al-qism al-qusuli, khidamat ukhra: khamisan: taswiat al-wada’a bi-sabab al-mughadara ghayr
al-shari’ya (The Consular section, other services: Fifth: Sorting out/legalizing the status for having left the country illegally),n.d., url
56 Adleh, F. and Favier, A., “Local reconciliation agreements” in Syria: A non-starter for peacebuilding, European University
Institute, June 2017, url, p. 1
57 Haid, H., The details of ‘reconciliation deals’ expose how they are anything but, Chatham House, August 2018, url
58 Ezzi, M., How the Syrian regime is using the mask of ‘reconciliation’ to destroy opposition institutions, Chatham House,
June 2017, url
59 NO-Landinfo drafter assessment
60 Haid, H., The details of ‘reconciliation deals’ expose how they are anything but, Chatham House, August 2018, url
61 Haid, H., The details of ‘reconciliation deals’ expose how they are anything but, Chatham House, August 2018, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT ON SYRIA: EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY IN RECAPTURED AREAS— 17

and other government officials. Clan and tribal leaders participated in areas of the country where they
were influential. 62
Haid also reported in 2018 that simultaneously with names being registered, local pro-GoS
intermediaries and the part of the security service responsible for the area started opening offices toconsider applications from individuals who wished to surrender. 63
The formal process known as ‘resolving status’ typically involves interrogation about previous
opposition activities (such as participating in protests, relief work in rebel-held areas or fighting withrebels), many of which fall under the GoS expansive definition of ‘terrorism’. Additionally, it involves
a pledge to abstain from these actions in the future. Thereafter, the individual receives a clearance
paper and the security agencies supposedly removed him/her from their lists of wanted persons. 64

2.5.1.1

Who needs to apply?

There were contradictory reports on who needs to undergo the ‘sorting out of affairs’ clarification
process, according to a prominent researcher at Chatham House, Syrian national Haid Haid. He
mentioned in his 2018 article that some sources claimed that everyone between the ages of 18 and55, both women and men, must complete the required forms, while other sources claimed that only
‘those who were affiliated with anti-regime groups or their international supporters, such as civilsociety, armed groups, media or the political opposition’ needed to do so. 65
Landinfo assesses that this reflects genuine differences in the requirements that apply from one area
to the next, dictated by factors such as the degree of Russian involvement in the process and the levelof anti-government activities in the area. 66

2.5.1.2

Document requirements

Landinfo does not know whether a standardised set of forms is used, or whether the forms that need
to be completed vary from one area to the next. However, Landinfo assessed that the information theapplicants need to provide is more or less the same in the various areas. 67
A source describing procedures in Deir Ez Zor mentioned that everyone must bring a copy of theirnational ID card (both sides), as well as two passport photos, which must be submitted together withthe reconciliation application forms 68, while another source describing the procedures in Dara’a wrotethat one should bring a personal photo and an ID card. 69
Haid wrote in August 2018 that based on his information, the first application form contains questions
about the applicant’s personal data, contact details, career history, political orientation, criminal
record, if applicable, and travels abroad. The form also reportedly includes questions about relatives
who are active opponents of the GoS. 70
According to Haid, the second form includes twelve questions ‘directly related to the applicant’s rolein any anti-regime activities, including demonstrations, armed rebellion and terrorist activities’. The

62 Adleh, F. and Favier, A., “Local reconciliation agreements” in Syria: A non-starter for peacebuilding, European University

Institute, June 2017, url, pp. 7-8
63 Haid, H., The details of ‘reconciliation deals’ expose how they are anything but, Chatham House, August 2018, url
64 International Crisis Group, Lessons from the Syrian State’s Return to the South, 25 February 2019, url, p. 2
65 Haid, H., The details of ‘reconciliation deals’ expose how they are anything but, Chatham House, August 2018, url
66 NO-Landinfo drafter assessment
67 NO-Landinfo drafter assessment
68 Hassan, M., How Russia and the regime manipulate the reconciliation process in Deir Ez-Zor Governorate, Chatham House,
February 2019, url
69 International Crisis Group, Lessons from the Syrian state’s Return to the South, 25 February 2019, url, p. 2
70 Haid, H., The details of ‘reconciliation deals’ expose how they are anything but, Chatham House, August 2018, url

18 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT ON SYRIA: EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY IN RECAPTURED AREAS

applicant ‘is also asked about rebel groups in their areas, including the names of the leaders, theirlocations and activities, and the location of weapons’ and weapon depots.
According to Haid, the last section of the document enquires about secret tunnels, the names andlocations of people kidnapped by rebel groups, the names, affiliations and roles of foreign membersof rebel groups, their location and/or foreign governments supporting them. 71
Finally, Haid reported that the applicant is asked to sign a statement ‘pledging not to carry out any
actions against the state and its armed, security and auxiliary forces [pro-government militias] throughthe use of demonstrations, social media, anti-regime publications and media platforms, or armed
rebellion’. 72

2.5.1.3

Processing of applications

These papers are then sent to the branch of the security service responsible for the area, where theinformation is reportedly cross-checked against the information already available about the applicant.
The information is ‘usually’ verified through local informants affiliated to the service. Haid noted thatcross-checking of the information with the other intelligence branches ‘rarely’ occurs, given the rivalry
between them. 73 Landinfo does not know whether this verification process is carried out in all cases.
One source reported that once the verification process is completed, the applicant is provided with adocument to prove that he has successfully undergone the clarification process. This document isusually required to pass through the country’s numerous checkpoints. 74 One source mentions thatapplicants are first issued a temporary document that is only valid for a short period. They are also
warned against leaving the area. After 7-10 days, a new document is issued, stating that the individual
is no longer on the authorities’ wanted list. 75 Landinfo could not verify if this document is valid at all
checkpoints run by the different parts of the Syrian security apparatus.

2.5.2 Non-individual agreements
There is an example reported of a reconciliation agreement in the town of al-Sanamayn in Deraa
where the parties agreed that the population must clarify their relationship with the government, but
in the form of collective agreements (see section 3.2.1). This was applied to clans and large families,
where representatives of these groups negotiated on behalf of the groups, without the individuals
themselves being involved. 76

2.5.3 Groups and individuals that are denied or do not enter into agreements
Not everyone can be party to a reconciliation agreement. This applies to individuals that have ‘Syrian
blood on their hands’ as well as to those that are considered by GoS to be affiliated with terroristgroups like IS or HTS. Another condition of the reconciliation process is that it ‘shall not overturncriminal sentences that are unrelated to current events in Syria, or which are related to the rights ofother Syrian civilians’. 77 While the source above referred to the reconciliation-process in Deir Ez Zor,
Landinfo assesses that the same conditions are used in connection to similar processes in other places
in Syria. 78

71 Haid, H., The details of ‘reconciliation deals’ expose how they are anything but, Chatham House, August 2018, url
72 Haid, H., The details of ‘reconciliation deals’ expose how they are anything but, Chatham House, August 2018, url
73 Haid, H., The details of ‘reconciliation deals’ expose how they are anything but, Chatham House, August 2018, url

74 Haid, H., The details of ‘reconciliation deals’ expose how they are anything but, Chatham House, August 2018, url

75 Hassan, M., How Russia and the regime manipulate the reconciliation process in Deir Ez-Zor Governorate, Chatham House,

February 2019, url

76 Al Tamimi, A. J., Reconciliations: The case of al-Sanamayn in North-Deraa, 27 April 2017, url

77 Hassan, M., How Russia and the regime manipulate the reconciliation process in Deir Ez-Zor Governorate, Chatham House,

February 2019, url

78 NO-Landinfo drafter assessment

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT ON SYRIA: EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY IN RECAPTURED AREAS— 19

Those who refuse the reconciliation agreement with GoS, as was the case for around 10 000 persons
from Daraa and Quneitra governorates, were evacuated to areas under the armed opposition’scontrol in Idlib and northern Aleppo governorates. According to OHCHR ‘the evacuees included
fighters and their families, as well as some who identified as journalists and humanitarian workers
who claimed to fear being targeted and/or detained by GoS should they decide to remain in Dar’a’. 79

2.5.3.1

IS (Islamic State)

Sources reported that persons suspected of IS affiliation are not offered such reconciliationagreements, although GoS has on several occasions struck deals with the group and participated in
the evacuation of its members. 80 In May 2018, IS soldiers and their families were evacuated from
Yarmouk Camp and Hajar al-Aswad in Damascus to areas that were then under IS control in the desert
in Badiya, the huge area bordering on Jordan and Iraq. 81

2.5.3.2

HTS (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham)According to a 2016 source, members of HTS, formerly known as the al-Nusra Front and the Syrian
branch of al-Qaeda, are also not included in reconciliation agreements. 82 Members of this group andtheir families have been evacuated from different parts of the country to Idlib province, large parts ofwhich have been under HTS control since 2018. 83

2.5.3.3

The White Helmets

The Syrian government considers this group, also known as Syria Civil Defence, to be a terrorist
organisation. 84 The group itself denies this, emphasising that it is impartial, but it only works in rebelheld parts of the country. Members of the group have usually been evacuated to Idlib 85, but in July
2018, a few hundred people, including family members, were evacuated from the Golan Heights to
Jordan by the Israeli military. 86

2.5.3.4

Media activists and opposition journalists

This is a diverse group that includes many different profiles, from genuinely independent activists tojournalists affiliated to various opposition media; and Landinfo assesses that it is usually not the
government that explicitly denies persons in this group permission to stay, but rather the individuals
themselves who ‘choose’ to leave. 87 They fear that information they have written or communicatedin other ways will be used against them by the authorities 88 although a 2014 source reported thatjournalists in Syria used pseudonyms to avoid targeting by Islamic State and the GoS. 89

2.5.3.5

Others

Sources reported cases of persons who have applied for reconciliation where GoS has denied theserequests. Some 200 persons from Babila, Yalda and Bayt Sahm were denied reconciliation for‘providing false information’, but the security services did not provide any indication as to which
79 OHCHR, The “unreconciled” concerns of civilians in Dar’a Governorate, May 2019, url, p. 3

80 Sabbour, O., How the Assad regime has exploited “evacuation deals” to redirect Isis against the rebels, 2019, url; Al Masdar

News, Breaking: ISIS agrees to surrender all its territory in rural Hama to the Syrian Army, 21 September 2017, url
81 Asharq Al Awsat, ISIS militants evacuated from Southern Damascus to desert, 21 May 2018, url
82 Araabi, S. and Hilal, L., Reconciliation, Reward and Revenge Analyzing Syrian De-escalation Dynamics through Local
Ceasefire Negotiations, Berghof Foundation, 2016, url, p. 31
83 Radio Free Europe, Dozens killed in blast in Syria’s Idlib, 12 August 2018, url
84 France 24, Syrian government lambasts evacuation of White Helmets as ‘criminal’, 23 July 2018, url
85 AP, Syrian White Helmets evacuated to Jordan through Israel, 22 July 2018, url
86 BBC, Syria conflict: White helmets evacuated by Israel, 22 July 2018, url
87 NO-Landinfo drafter assessment
88 Syria Direct, At least 270 journalists and media workers stranded in southwestern Syria as murky reconciliation deal
unfolds, 10 July 2018, url; OHCHR, The “unreconciled” concerns of civilians in Dar’a Governorate, May 2019, url, p. 3
89 Sabbagh, R., Syria: Inside the world’s deadliest place for journalists, 3 December 2014, url20 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT ON SYRIA: EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY IN RECAPTURED AREAS

information was considered false, nor how this conclusion was reached. They were asked to resubmit
the forms at the local security-branch in charge of the area, which likely implied being detained. 90 It
has not been possible to obtain information about the fate of these persons.
The opposition outlet Enab Baladi likewise reported in September 2018 that around 400 persons fromthe Homs area were denied reconciliation. Several reasons for this were given by the National
Security, among them that some of the persons in question would have joined Jabhat al-Nusra, later
HTS, the Muslim Brotherhood, Ahrar al-Sham and Faylaq al-Sham. Others were accused ofparticipating in videos shot during the fight against GoS-forces. It was not known which reprisals these
persons would face. 91

2.6 Corruption
It has been claimed that persons unqualified to sign reconciliation agreements, including persons who
have held leading positions in IS, have nonetheless been allowed to undergo the process in exchange
for sums of up to 20 million Syrian pounds (just under 100 000 USD). This money reportedly went toboth Russian intermediaries, who facilitated many of the agreements, and leaders of intelligence
branches in the districts concerned, in this case Deir Ez Zor. 92
The same report stated that another incentive for allowing such persons to undergo the reconciliation
process and ignoring this corruption is that GoS would like to have them on its side to use asintermediaries in connection with future negotiations. Hassan mentioned an example in his February
2019 report involving four tribal figures in Deir Ez Zor province who had previously represented a‘tribal office’ affiliated with IS. They were allowed to undergo reconciliation and were then permitted
to work as intermediaries between the GoS and those wanting to undergo reconciliation. 93
One 2016 source reported that persons who stayed behind in formerly rebel-held parts of the country
have subsequently been smuggled out of these areas to the wider Idlib area with the help of corrupt
security service officers. 94

2.7 Military service
Military service is mandatory for all men between the ages of 18 and 42 95, and draft evasion is acriminal offence. Through the years of conflict, the government has granted amnesty for draft evaders
on a number of occasions. This means that they will not be punished but have to report to theirenlistment office to start their military service. 96
In the south, in areas where reconciliation agreements have been signed, local agreements included
a conscription ‘grace period’ of six months to take care of practical matters before starting their periodof military service. 97
However, one source claimed that the process is different for mid-service GoS military/security force
defectors than for civilians, including those who have not served their military service. For non90 Haid, H., The details of ‘reconciliation deals’ expose how they are anything but, Chatham House, August 2018, url

91 Enab Baladi, Al-nidham yarfud taswiat awda’a 400 shakhs fi rif Homs (The regime refuses the settling of the status of 400

persons from outer Homs), 24 September 2018, url

92 Hassan, M., How Russia and the regime manipulate the reconciliation process in Deir Ez-Zor Governorate, Chatham House,

February 2019, url

93 Hassan, M., How Russia and the regime manipulate the reconciliation process in Deir Ez-Zor Governorate, Chatham House,

February 2019, url

94 Syria Direct, After relentless bombardment, two northwest Damascus towns give up and the evacuations begin, 13 October

2016, url
95 TIMEP, TIMEP brief: Conscription law, 22 August 2019, url
96 Norway, Landinfo, Syria: Reaksjoner mot desertører og personer som unndrar seg militærtjeneste (Syria: Reactions against
deserters and draft evaders), 3 January 2018, url, pp. 12-13
97 International Crisis Group, Lessons from the Syrian state’s Return to the South, 25 February 2019, url, p. 10

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT ON SYRIA: EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY IN RECAPTURED AREAS— 21

civilians who meet the conditions, the reconciliation process starts immediately. They are given 30
days to clarify their status, before being sent back to the same unit or to a new unit to continue theirservice. 98

2.7.1 Forms of military service
Under Syrian law, it is not possible to serve a period of military service in other places than in theregular armed forces, the Syrian Arab Army (SAA). However, a number of militias have emerged whose
ties to the SAA and the GoS are so close that, in practice, it is possible to join one of the militias rather
than to serve in the ordinary manner. 99

2.7.1.1

Pro-government militias consisting of former rebels

In several places, armed rebel groups have switched sides in the conflict as part of a reconciliationagreement. The most well-known examples are in Daraa province, where many local rebel groups
have been incorporated into the 5th Corps of the SAA (see section 3.2). The 5th Corps is a special army
branch that Russian forces actively helped to establish and that recruits from other parts of the
population than the regular SAA branches. It consists of individuals who have already completed theirmilitary service, civil servants, former militia members and, notably, former rebels. 100

98 Hassan, M., How Russia and the regime manipulate the reconciliation process in Deir Ez-Zor Governorate, Chatham House,

February 2019, url

99 For more information about pro-regime militias, see: Norway, Landinfo, Syria: Regimelojale militser (Militias loyal to theregime), 2 November 2017, url, p. 15
100 Al Jabassini, A., From insurgents to soldiers: The fifth assault corps in Daraa, southern Syria, 2019, url, pp. 5, 8

22 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT ON SYRIA: EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY IN RECAPTURED AREAS

3. After the reconciliation agreement
The aim of the reconciliation agreements for GoS and the Russian forces is to have the areas
concerned reincorporated into the state 101, which will also entail the re-establishment of public
services such as power supply and other services. The population in the areas expects the security
situation to improve, and thereby to be ensured access to food and other vital supplies. 102 Men of
conscript age in the area must undergo military service, one way or another. 103
This part of the report looks more closely at the situation after the signing of reconciliationagreements. How GoS treats these areas varies considerably, and each respective area is therefore
discussed separately. Not all cities are included, but rather a selection that serves to illustrate thedifferent developments.

3.1 Damascus and Ghouta/Rural Damascus
This is a large area, in which the last parts of Eastern Ghouta were captured by the SAA in spring2018. 104 By then, cities in Western Ghouta, such as Darayya and Muadamiyat, had already signed
reconciliation agreements, but with widely varying outcomes. 105

3.1.1 Darayya
SAA took over this city in Western Ghouta in 2016, after a prolonged siege. When the conflict in Syria
broke out, the city, which is situated seven kilometres from the centre of Damascus, had a populationof 80–250 000 106, which had been reduced to between 2 500 to 4 000 people by August 2016. 107
During the siege, many of the city’s inhabitants fled to the neighbouring city of Muadamiyat 108, or toparts of Damascus and the surroundings under GoS’ control. 109 Locals were in practice forced to sign
an agreement with GoS, given GoS’s military superiority and a population that was completely
exhausted after years under siege. In the agreement between local rebels and GoS, the inhabitants
were given two options. They could either go to Idlib or be evacuated to a reception centre outside
Damascus, in an area controlled by GoS. The majority of the remaining population chose to go to Idlib,
while the rest were evacuated to the reception centre in al-Horjila. 110
This means that Darayya is one of the places that were emptied of people; even those who left thearea before the sieges began have not been allowed to return. People with military contacts wereallowed to go to the area to check on their properties, but reportedly found their homes empty. 111
Other sources also reported pillaging after the evacuation. 112

101 Adleh, F. and Favier, A., “Local reconciliation agreements” in Syria: A non-starter for peacebuilding, European University

Institute, June 2017, url, p. 1
102 Hinnebusch, R., and Imady, O., Syria’s reconciliation agreements, Centre for Syrian Studies. University of St. Andrews, 12
February 2017, url, p. 3
103 Adleh, F. and Favier, A., “Local reconciliation agreements” in Syria: A non-starter for peacebuilding, European University
Institute, June 2017, url, p. 12
104 Telegraph (The), Syrian flag flying over onetime rebel stronghold Douma as Russians announce victory in Eastern Ghouta,
12 April 2018, url
105 AI, ‘We Leave or We Die’: Forced Displacement under Syria’s ‘Reconciliation’ Agreements, url, p. 30; Reuters, Former
Syrian rebels flee, hide from army conscription, 10 August 2017, url
106 AI, ‘We Leave or We Die’: Forced Displacement under Syria’s ‘Reconciliation’ Agreements, 2017, url, p. 18
107 AI, ‘We Leave or We Die’: Forced Displacement under Syria’s ‘Reconciliation’ Agreements, 2017, url, p. 8
108 AI, ‘We Leave or We Die’: Forced Displacement under Syria’s ‘Reconciliation’ Agreements, 2017, url, p. 20
109 Guardian (The), Iran repopulate Syria with Shia Muslims to help tighten regime’s control, 14 January 2017, url
110 AI, ‘We Leave or We Die’: Forced Displacement under Syria’s ‘Reconciliation’ Agreements, 2017, url, p. 31
111 AI, ‘We Leave or We Die’: Forced Displacement under Syria’s ‘Reconciliation’ Agreements, 2017, url, p. 32
112 Al Modon, Fourth division, Shiite militias accused of looting Daraya, 9 September 2016, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT ON SYRIA: EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY IN RECAPTURED AREAS— 23

3.1.1.2 Consequences for the population
In 2017, sources reported that Iraqi Shia families were repopulating the area 113; probably militia
members and their families 114, as the move was overseen by the Hizbullah al-Nujaba-militia. 115 The
displacement of the original, mainly Sunni population by Shia militia members and their families is avery sensitive issue that no GoS representatives will confirm is taking place. 116 The Guardian also
claimed that the offices of the city’s property register were burned down, making it difficult for manyof the original inhabitants to reclaim their properties. 117
Citing the official Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), Reuters reported in summer 2018 that the
population had been allowed to return to Darayya, but could not confirm how many this concernedor who they were. 118 As of March 2019, the area was still characterised by extensive destruction. 119
Sources quoted by Human Rights Watch claimed, however, that only individuals who had registeredwith the authorities in advance were allowed to return. They were given the chance to enter Darayyathrough a specific checkpoint, and for one day only, to check on their properties. 120 Human Rights
Watch also reported that GoS unlawfully demolished houses of residents ‘without providing notice,alternative housing, or compensation’. 121
In December 2018, SANA reported that several hundred families had returned to Darayya over a few
days, according to the city’s mayor Marwan Obayd, who said that the water supply for the area would
soon be restored, and that generators had been brought in to secure the power supply. He also said
that four schools with a capacity of 4 000 pupils were up and running, and that there were plans torehabilitate or build ten more schools. 122
Landinfo is unable to confirm which parts of Darayya this concerned, since several other sources
reported that the city would be rebuilt in accordance with Decree 66/2012. 123 The purpose of thedecree was ‘to redevelop areas of unauthorised housing and informal settlements [slum]’ (Mudiriyyat
tanfidh al-marsum 66, 2012) 124, while critics claimed that it was an instrument aimed at forcing theoriginal population to relocate. 125

3.1.2 Muadamiyat al-Sham
This is the neighbouring city to Darayya, where a reconciliation agreement was signed in October
2016, resulting in 420 armed rebels and their families being evacuated to Idlib. In addition, 200 rebels
from Darayya, al-Mazza and Kafr Sousa and their families, who had previously fled to Muadamiyat,

113 Guardian (The), Iran repopulate Syria with Shia Muslims to help tighten regime’s control, 14 January 2017, url
114 NO-Landinfo drafter assessment

115 Syrian Observer (The), Iraqi Shiite Militias Seeking Demographic Change in Syria, 7 September 2016, url; Now, Iraqi families

moving into Damascus suburb, 14 November 2016, url
116 NO-Landinfo drafter assessment
117 Guardian (The), Iran repopulate Syria with Shia Muslims to help tighten regime’s control, 14 January 2017, url
118 Reuters, Thousands of Syrians start returning to Daraya: state media, 28 August 2018, url
119 PAX (Author), published by ReliefWeb: Siege Watch: Final Report – Out of Sight, Out of Mind: The Aftermath of Syria’s
Sieges, 6 March 2019, url, p. 53
120 HRW, Syria: Residents blocked from returning, 16 October 2018, url
121 HRW, World Report 2019 - Syria, 17 January 2019, url
122 SANA, Hundreds of families return to the liberated Daraya city in Damascus countryside, 12 December 2018, url
123 New Humanitarian (The), Decree 66: The blueprint for al-Assad’s reconstruction of Syria, 20 April 2017, url; AI, ‘We Leaveor We Die’: Forced Displacement under Syria’s ‘Reconciliation’ Agreements, 2017, url, p. 33; Al Iqtisadi, Muhafadhat Dimashq
tu’linu ’an mukhattat Basiliya Siti al-tandhimi al-mufassal (Damackus province announces detailed regulation plans for Basilia
City), 16 July 2018, url
124 Mudiriyyat tanfidh al-marsum 66, Al-marsum al-tashri’i raqm 66 li-am 2012, 18 September 2012, url
125 New Humanitarian (The), Decree 66: The blueprint for al-Assad’s reconstruction of Syria, 20 April 2017, url; AI‘We Leaveor We Die’: Forced Displacement under Syria’s ‘Reconciliation’ Agreements, 2017, url, p. 33

24 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT ON SYRIA: EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY IN RECAPTURED AREAS

were evacuated. At the time that the agreement entered into force, the city had been under siege forten months, and the humanitarian situation was desperate. 126
Unlike in Darayya, Muadamiyat was not emptied of its population, and, according to figures provided
by the chair of the reconciliation committee, more than 2 500 rebel soldiers and draft evaders
remained in the city to ‘have their situation clarified’. 127

3.1.2.1

Consequences for the population

After the reconciliation agreement, responsibility for the city reportedly rested with the 4th Armoured
Division under the command of Maher al-Assad. In July 2019, responsibility was taken over by the
military intelligence branch led by Kafah Malham. The city’s reconciliation committee was said to havebeen informed of this at a meeting with Ali Mamlouk 128, one of the most powerful men in Syria andhead of the National Security Bureau; he was promoted to vice-President a couple of weeks after thismeeting. 129
IDP integration to places of return has not been easy and there has been ‘no massive return’ to areasof origin that have been retaken by GoS; however, a source described Muadamiyat and theneighbouring city of Qudsaya as exceptions, because the population has returned to a far greater
extent there. Many of the inhabitants of these areas returned, likely due to cheaper rents in adjacentcities than in Damascus city. 130
According to pro-opposition sources reporting in June-July 2019, the Syrian government continued toarrest persons perceived to be involved in activities against the government 131 and security clearanceswere imposed on residents and IDPs that travelled to or out of the city. 132

3.1.3 Qudsaya
Al-Hamah and the neighbouring town of Qudsaya signed an agreement with GoS in October 2016,
after which around 2 500 people from both towns were evacuated to Idlib, including both rebel
soldiers and their families. Persons who had ‘only’ evaded military service but not joined an armed
group were not allowed to leave the area. 133 After the evacuation, more than 200 000 people
reportedly remained in the town. 134
Prior to the signing of the reconciliation agreement, the local population had held several
demonstrations in which they rejected the violence from both the GoS and opposition sides. People
encouraged the rebels to sign an agreement to spare the town from more warfare. 135

126 Siege Watch, Second quarterly report on besieged areas in Syria, May 2016, url, p. 27

127 Al Hurra, Ijla’ 620 musallahan min Mu’addamiyyat al-Sham qurba Dimashq (620 armed evacuated from Mu’addamiyyat
al-Sham near Damascus), 19 October 2016, url
128 Nida Suriya, Tatawwurat kabira fi Mu’addamiyyat al-Sham...’Rusia tantazu’ha min Iran wa ‘Ali Mamluk yajtama’u bimumathili al-madina (Major developments in Muadamiyyat al-Sham…Russia takes over from Iran and Ali Mamlouk meets
representatives from the city), 2 July 2019, url
129 Khalifeh, P., Syria war: Why did Assad restructure the military-security apparatus?, Middle East Eye, 17 July 2019, url
130 Adleh, F. and Favier, A., “Local reconciliation agreements” in Syria: A non-starter for peacebuilding, European University
Institute, June 2017, url, p. 10
131 Syrian Observer (The), Assad’s Security Advisor Demands Local Committees Forget ‘Detainees Issue’, 4 July 2019, url
132 SOHR, The regime forces clamp down even more on Muadamiyat al- Sham west of the capital Damascus through forcing
residents and displaced people to obtain security approvals, 22 June 2019, url
133 Syria Direct, After relentless bombardment, two northwest Damascus towns give up and the evacuations begin, 13
October 2016, url
134 Syria Direct, Rebels leave, but roads still closed as regime governor calls Qudsaya agreement a ’pardon, not areconciliation’, 18 October 2016, url
135 Al Monitor, Militants from Syria’s Qudsaya prepare to leave for Idlib, 14 October 2016, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT ON SYRIA: EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY IN RECAPTURED AREAS— 25

It is worth noting that the governor of Rural Damascus, Ala Ibrahim, stated that the agreement enteredinto in Qudsaya and al-Hamah was not a reconciliation agreement, but an agreement on
forgiveness/amnesty (musamaha). 136

3.1.3.1

Consequences for the population

Shortly after the reconciliation agreement was signed, the area was opened up and food supplies
allowed back in 137, but the checkpoints into and out of the area were still heavily manned. 138 Qudsaya
was reportedly under the control of the 101st Brigade of the Republican Guard since the beginning of
the agreement, and in October 2018, the Syrian Observatory of Human Rights (SOHR) reported that it
was in the process of disbanding militias affiliated to the National Defence Forces (NDF) 139 in thearea. 140 In April 2019, however, the same source reported that the NDF, whose members are from
Qudsaya, was still present in the city and carried out patrols and manned checkpoints together with
the Republican Guard. 141
In the same way as other places, draft evaders here have to complete military service. 142 In connection
with the reconciliation process, in which members of armed rebel groups who chose to stay had toclarify their status with GoS, they were reportedly given a promise that they would not be sent to thefront lines, but be allowed to serve their military service nearby. In October 2018, SOHR reported thatthe leadership of the 101st Brigade was carrying out a campaign in Qudsaya to locate people wanted
for evasion of both initial military service and service in the reserve force. 143 In July 2019, the same
source reported that in June the security service had arrested two former commanders of the rebel
faction Shuhada al-Asimah Brigade, who had both signed reconciliation agreements and joined theRepublican Guard. They accused the men of killing informants and members of the GoS during thetime when the armed faction had been in control of parts of the area. 144

3.1.4 Madaya/Zabadani
These two neighbouring towns are situated on the outskirts of Rural Damascus governorate, not far
from the Lebanese border. Developments in the two towns are closely related, and they were part ofwhat was known as the Four Towns Agreement together with Fuah and Kafriya. The two latter towns
are in Idlib province, and the population is predominantly Shia. 145 Both were controlled by GoS andbesieged by rebels and HTS. 146

136 SANA, Muhafidh Rif Dimashq yatalla’u ala waqi’ al-khidamat fi Qudsaya ba’da ikhlaiha min al-silah wal-musallahin wa-

awdat al-hayat al-tabi’iyya ilayha (Governor of Rif Dimashq inspects services in Qudsaya after the city has been emptied of
weapons and armed persons, and has returned to normal daily life), 17 October 2016, url
137 Syria Direct, After relentless bombardment, two northwest Damascus towns give up and the evacuations begin, 13
October 2016, url
138 CBS News, 'Reconciliations' provide relief from fighting in towns near Damascus, 21 November 2016, url
139 The NDF (National Defence Forces, Arabic: Quwat al-difa’ al-watani) is made up of a number of pro-government militiasthat have fought together with the SAA. They have often been referred to, somewhat imprecisely, as shabiha – ghosts. See
Norway, Landinfo, Syria: Regimelojale militser (Militias loyal to the regime), 2 November 2017, url, p. 8
140 SOHR, Regime’s intelligence raid Damascus suburbs and the republican Guard pulls the ‘reconciliation’ fighters towards
their barracks, 12 October 2018, url
141 SOHR, Tafjir yastahdif dhabit min al-mukhabarat al-siyasiya fi quwat al-nidham fi dahiyat Qudsaya wa-yatasabbab bimaqtalihi (An explosion targeting an officer from the political intelligence of the Syrian regime in the outskirts of Qudsaya
caused his death), 16 April 2019, url
142 NO-Landinfo drafter assessment
143 SOHR, Regime’s intelligence raid Damascus suburbs and the republican Guard pulls the ‘reconciliation’ fighters towards
their barracks, 12 October 2018, url
144 SOHR, The regime’s security services arrests commanders and fighters of those who stuck “reconciliation and settlement”
deals in the south of Damascus, 23 July 2019, url
145 AI, ‘We Leave or We Die’: Forced Displacement under Syria’s ‘Reconciliation’ Agreements, 2017, url, p. 60
146 UNOCHA, Turkey/Syria: Four towns evacuation (as of 20April 2017), 20 April 2017, url, pp. 1-3

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Sources reported in 2015 that the people of Zabadani were forced to flee to Madaya, some of whomwere also reportedly from Bludan, a nearby town. There were also reports of negotiations on areconciliation agreement in the same year, but this was allegedly blocked by Hezbollah with support
from Iran. The aim was to be in full control of the town, which is in a strategic location 147 and has been
important to the group since long before the uprising started in 2011. 148 The year before, the local
reconciliation committee had to mediate between two pro-GoS groups when conflict broke out in
connection with the attempt to reach an agreement. 149
When the agreement was finally signed in 2017, a source claimed it had been brokered by Qatar and
Iran, without the involvement of Russians or GoS. 150 Another source claims that it was signed byjihadist group Ahrar al-Sham and HTS, on the one hand, and Hezbollah, Iran and GoS, on the other. 151
It stipulated that the population of Fuah and Kafriya had to leave their homes, while the populationof Madaya was given the choice of leaving the town or being reconciled with GoS. 152 The agreement
seemed to be in jeopardy when on 15 April 2017 a bomb killed more than one hundred bus passengers
on their way from Fuah and Kafriya to Aleppo, but the evacuation was completed. 153 The majority ofthe population of Madaya chose to stay and reconcile with GoS; while just over 2 000 people werereportedly bussed to Idlib, and around 40 000 stayed. 154 According to the same source, the plan was
to empty Zabadani of its population.
The agreement included the release of several hundred prisoners on both sides. Prisoner exchanges
are not unusual in reconciliation agreements, although these also take place outside the frameworkof such agreements. 155 The high number of prisoners exchanged in this example was notable: 1 500
prisoners were released and sent to Idlib in July 2018 156, while 750 prisoners had been sent to thesame place in December 2017. 157

3.1.4.1

Consequences for the population

Antagonists of GoS both expected and feared that the Four Towns Agreement would be the first stepin the direction of population resettlement, where rebel-held areas with a Sunni majority population
would be completely evacuated and repopulated by other groups loyal to the government. In thiscase, the assumption was that the areas would be repopulated by Shias, including from the two towns
in Idlib and elsewhere. 158 Iran reportedly pushed for such a population resettlement at one point. 159
The two towns in Idlib, Fuah and Kafriya, were emptied in summer 2018 when the last of the
inhabitants left. They were initially taken to Aleppo, but Landinfo has found no evidence that the
population of the two towns have been relocated in Zabadani or Madaya. 160 A source claimed that a

147 Al Monitor, Syrian regime displaces Zabadani residents, 15 September 2015, url

148 Alami, M., Hezbollah’s military involvement in Syria and its wider regional role, March 2017, url, p. 19; Tokmajyan, A.,

Hezbollah’s military intervention in Syria, December 2014, url, p. 110
149 Adleh, F. and Favier, A., “Local reconciliation agreements” in Syria: A non-starter for peacebuilding, European University
Institute, June 2017, url, p. 7
150 Beals, E., Syria’s cruel ‘reconciliations’, The Daily Beast, 9 December 2017, url
151 Arfeh, H., The institutionalization of demographic change in Syria, Atlantic Council, 4 April 2019, url
152 France 24, Thousands of Syrian evacuated under Qatar – Iran deal, 14 April 2017, url
153 BBC, Syria war: ‘At least 68 children among 126 killed’ in bus bombing, 17 April 2017, url
154 France 24, Thousands of Syrian evacuated under Qatar – Iran deal, 14 April 2017, url
155 SOHR, Sednaya prison continues to claim the lives of Syrians by killing 2 citizens under torture after being arrested byregime’s intelligence previously, 18 August 2019, url
156 Al Monitor, Prisoners exchanged for evacuees from pro-regime towns in Syrian north, 25 July 2018, url
157 Beals, E., Syria’s cruel ‘reconciliations’. 9 December 2017, url
158 Guardian (The), Iran repopulate Syria with Shia Muslims to help tighten regime’s control, 14 January 2017, url
159 Araabi, S. and Hilal, L., Reconciliation, reward and revenge – Analyzing Syrian de-escalation dynamics through local
ceasefire agreements, Cambridge, MA: Conflict Dynamics International, 2016, url
160 NO-Landinfo drafter assessment

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT ON SYRIA: EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY IN RECAPTURED AREAS— 27

large part of the population then lived in Hisya and al-Basit in the Homs district, the Aleppo area,
including the two Shia towns of Nubl and Zahra, as well as in Damascus. 161
In November 2018, the leader of the local council in Zabadani stated that 4 500 families had returnedto the town, and that 600 homes had been rehabilitated. He also stated that major rehabilitation work
was under way on all parts of the town’s infrastructure. 162 From an unofficial Facebook page dedicatedto the town, such as Mahalliyyat fi al-Zabadani (‘local [events] in al-Zabadani’) 163, it is evident thatsome of the town’s inhabitants were still in Lebanon. A Facebook post, dated 29 July 2019, described
the poor conditions for Syrians in Lebanon, and claims that more and more of the town’s population
are returning home. It also claimed that many young men (shabab) who are supposed to have servedin the military or the reserve force are returning. They were granted authorisation (taklif) at the borderand told to contact the enlistment office in Zabadani within 15 days to complete their compulsory
military or reserve service. 164 Other posts from October 2019 posted by the same Facebook accountindicated more returns from Lebanon to Zabadani. 165 Landinfo has been unable to verify thisinformation.
It is also evident that the repairs to the town’s water pipes are far from completed. 166 A post from late
May 2019 refers to widespread dissatisfaction with the water supply. 167
According to residents and refugees from Zabadani interviewed by the European Institute of Peace(EIP) during autumn 2018 and February 2019, the majority of returns to Zabadani were reportedly of
persons from the Damascus area or from nearby Bludan town, who were supportive of the GoS andhave left the town before it fell to the armed opposition in 2012. Local sources noted that these
returnees weren’t subjected to the reconciliation process. Refugees interviewed by EIP claimed thataround 350 persons had returned from Lebanon to Zabadani, during July-September 2018. 168
Refugees from Zabadani interviewed by EIP claimed that there been cases of GoS arresting individuals
who undertook reconciliations required for returning to the town, most of them being subsequently
released, while others remained missing. Arrests of those who made contact with relatives in Idlib
were also reported. 169
The situation in Madaya is different, given that a substantial proportion of the population did not leave
the city. The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) noted in a May 2019 report that ‘Madaya
is full of residents, while activity in its commercial district is picking up again’. 170 Several local
community Facebook pages give the impression that people go about their daily lives and show a lot
more people on the streets and cars on the roads than corresponding pages for Zabadani. 171
SOHR reported in October 2018 that the Syrian intelligence services reportedly arrested over 40
civilians in Madaya for unknown reasons.172

161 Al Tamimi, A., Exile from Kafariya: Interview, 10 September 2018, url

162 SANA, Al-Zabadani municipality: 4,500 families returned to city, maintenance work continues, 11 November 2018, url
163 Mahalliyyat fi al-Zabadani (Local news in Zabadani) [Facebook], url

164 Mahalliyyat fi al-Zabadani, [Facebook], posted on: 29 July 2019, url

165 Mahalliyyat fi al-Zabadani, [Facebook], posted on: 10 October 2019, url; Mahalliyyat fi al-Zabadani, [Facebook], posted

on: 4 October 2019, url;
166 NO-Landinfo drafter assessment
167 Mahalliyyat fi al-Zabadani, [Facebook], posted on: 29 May 2019, url
168 EIP, Refugee Return in Syria: Dangers, Security Risks and Information Scarcity, May 2019, url, pp. 25-26
169 EIP, Refugee Return in Syria: Dangers, Security Risks and Information Scarcity, May 2019, url, pp. 25-26
170 Samaha, N., Can Assad Win Peace?, ECFR, May 2019, url, p. 14
171 Majlis baladiyat Madaya (The municipal council of Madaya), [Facebook], posted on: n.d. url; Madaya, [Facebook], posted
on: n.d., url
172 SOHR, In the Eastern Ghouta, regime’s intelligence arrest 45 people and informs about 100 others that they must checkwith their security branches in Damascus, 17 October 2018, url

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3.1.5 Douma
Douma is the biggest city in Eastern Ghouta, and it had been besieged for several years before anagreement was negotiated in April 2018. 173 Negotiations had been ongoing since the month before,
but the Jaysh al-Islam rebel group, which controlled Douma, broke the negotiations on 6 April. The
aerial bombardment of the city was immediately resumed. The day after, a chemical attack was
carried out allegedly with chlorine gas, according to some sources. 174 Other sources cited by the
Independent said that no such attack took place 175, but negotiations on an agreement were almost
immediately resumed, and a spokesperson from Jaysh al-Islam stated that it was due to the presumed
gas attack. 176
According to Russian forces, which contributed actively to negotiating the deal, a total of 21 145 rebel
soldiers and their families left the city. The last of them left Douma on 13 April 2018. 177
In the period leading up to this, Douma and the other cities in Eastern Ghouta had been underintensive bombardment from the SAA and Russian forces. 178 In March 2018, humanitarian corridors
were opened for the population of some of the towns. The corridors, which were initiated by Russianforces, led to reception centres where the inhabitants who fled were registered and given food andwater. Before being allowed into the centres, they had to undergo a quick screening, due to fears that
IS members were hiding among the civilians. 179 They were later screened by representatives of Syrian
authorities present in these centres, and those who sought refuge there were not allowed to leave
the centres before being granted permission by the authorities. An international organisation
informed Landinfo that eleven such centres were established to receive refugees from Eastern
Ghouta, not just from Douma. Several of them were run by the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC). 180
The centres quickly became very crowded, as people were waiting to be screened, which was
confirmed in Landinfo’s meetings with various actors in Damascus in March 2018. A representative of
an international organisation described the situation in one of the centres as ‘apocalyptic’.181 Motherswith children under the age of 15 were prioritised in the screening, and were allowed to leave thecentres if they found a sponsor who could guarantee for them. 182 It was reported in April 2018 that
166 644 people fled from Douma via the humanitarian corridors. 183

3.1.5.1

Consequences for the population

The level of destruction in Douma and the rest of Eastern Ghouta is enormous, which Landinfo also
observed during a visit in April 2019. Despite this, an international organisation that Landinfo met
estimated that around 300 000 people are living in the city districts and cities in Eastern Ghouta,
including Douma. The same organisation confirmed that access to the areas was much better now
than before, but that people still have to apply for permission every time they want to visit the area. 184
This was confirmed by another international organisation, which stated that around half of its
173 Guardian (The), Douma inhabitants prepare to leave after deadly chemical attack, 9 April 2018, url
174 BBC, What we know about Douma ‘chemical attack’, 10 July 2018, url

175 Independent (The), The search for truth in the rubble of Douma – and one doctor’s doubts over the chemical attack, 17
April 2018, url
176 Telegraph (The), Syrian flag flying over onetime rebel stronghold Douma as Russians announce victory in Eastern Ghouta,
12 April 2018, url
177 CROSS, Briefing by Center for reconciliation of Opposing sides in Syria (April 14, 2018), 14 April 2018, url
178 Telegraph (The), Syrian flag flying over onetime rebel stronghold Douma as Russians announce victory in Eastern Ghouta,
12 April 2018, url
179 NO-Landinfo interview with International organisation c, Damascus, March 2018
180 NO-Landinfo interview with International organisation a, Damascus, March 2018
181 NO-Landinfo interview with International organisation b, Damascus, March 2018
182 NO-Landinfo interview with International organisation a, Damascus, March 2018
183 Telegraph (The), Syrian flag flying over onetime rebel stronghold Douma as Russians announce victory in Eastern Ghouta,
12 April 2018, url
184 NO-Landinfo interview with International organisation c, Damascus, April 2019

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT ON SYRIA: EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY IN RECAPTURED AREAS— 29

requests for access to Eastern Ghouta were granted by GoS. The same organisation pointed out that
it is more difficult to fund aid for the area than it was before GoS took control. 185
GoS has reopened schools in different places in the area 186, but Landinfo has been unable to confirm
whether all children in the area are offered schooling.
There are major challenges associated with civil registration in both Douma and the rest of Eastern
Ghouta, after the area has been controlled by rebel groups for several years. Legal experts from SARC
were present at the reception centres to start the process of issuing identity papers recognised by
GoS. 187 Papers issued by local councils in the area are seen as an indication that an event has takenplace, but it is still necessary to go through the courts to register births, marriages, divorces, deaths
etc.188
Up until the end of April 2019, the inhabitants who remained in Douma and people from the outside
who wanted to visit the area needed security clearance to pass the checkpoints on the outskirts of thecity. People living in Douma had to apply to the officer responsible for the city to leave the area, andstate their reason for leaving. According to the opposition website Enab Baladi, these regulations werelifted on 26 April 2019, and the information was published on the local council’s website. The
regulations were lifted due to efforts of the governor of Rural Damascus province 189, Ala Munir
Ibrahim, and Muhammad Khayr Saryul, a member of parliament from Douma. 190
The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (CoI) noted in areport covering the period January to July 2019 that in Douma the majority of residents were required
to obtain permission to travel to Damascus. According to interviewees by CoI, GoS checkpoints were
present throughout the city and soldiers manning the checkpoints reportedly had access to acomputerized system to track movements of civilians. Residents also alleged that the GoS forces weremonitoring their phones. 191 According to other sources, as of July 2019 inhabitants who wished toleave Douma still needed to apply for a permit. 192
The CoI noted in the report that government forces conducted a campaign of arbitrary arrests uponsecuring control of Douma. 193
One source reported campaigns of arrests mainly targeting people who are to undergo military
service. 194 Landinfo assumes that the arrests concern people who have failed to report for service atthe stated time. 195 The same source reported that persons who worked with the local council during
the blockade, persons affiliated to Syria Civil Defence (the White Helmets) and persons who have been

185 NO-Landinfo interview with International organisation b, Damascus, April 2019
186 NO-Landinfo interview with International organisation c, Damascus, April 2019

187 NO-Landinfo interview with Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC), Damascus, April 2019

188 For more information about civil registration, see Norway, Landinfo, Syria: Identitetsdokumenter og pass (ID documents

and passports), July 2017, url, pp. 18-20
189 Enab Baladi, Ba’da am… quwat al-Asad tasmahu bi-harakat ahali Duma duna muwafaqa amniya (After a year … Asads
forces allows local population from Duma freedom of movement without security clearance), 26 May 2019, url
190 Majlis al-sha’b (People’s Assembly), Adu majlis al-sha’b: Muhammad Khayr Saryul bin Subhi walidatuhu Fatima (Memberof People´s Assembly: Muhammad Khayr Saryul son of Subhi his mother is Fatima), n.d., url
191 United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, 11 September 2019, url, pp. 13-14
192 Baladi, Al-nidham yutaba’ al-siyasa al-‘iqab al-jama’i fi ghuta Dimashq (The regime pursue the politic of mass obstructionin the Ghouta of Damascus), 27 June 2019, url; Enab Baladi, Tashdid amni ala al-kharijin min al-Ghuta ila Dimashq (Increased
security for those travelling from Ghouta to Damascus), 7 July 2019, url
193 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/40/70], 31 January 2019, url, p. 15
194 Televiziyon Suriya, Ba’da ‘am min saytarat nidham al-Asad ’ala Duma... ma zala al-hisar mustamirra (One year after the
Asad regime took control over Douma…siege continues), 12 April 2019, url
195 NO-Landinfo drafter assessment

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affiliated to an armed rebel group are also being arrested. Persons who have signed reconciliationagreements with GoS were also reported to have been arrested. 196
Sources also reported problems with the water and power supply.197 The CoI stated that in residential
areas of Douma, the GoS did not supply electricity and the water was not potable. 198
Another source provided a description of the markets in Douma during Ramadan, which stated that,
although there were goods available, including meat and vegetables, the prices were so high thatpeople could not afford to shop, and the markets were therefore quiet. 199

3.1.6 Yalda, Babila and Bayt Sahm
These villages, which are now regarded as districts of Damascus, are located on a belt east of the
Yarmouk area and Hajar al-Aswad (see section 3.1.8). They belong to Rural Damascus governorate,
however, even though they are just a few kilometres from the centre of Damascus. 200
The villages entered into agreements with GoS almost simultaneously in spring 2018, after GoS hadlaunched a major offensive against rebel-held areas in Eastern Ghouta. 201 Russian forces reportedly
played an active role in brokering the agreements. 202 This was not the first time rebels in the threevillages had signed agreements with GoS. Already in spring 2014, the parties had agreed on a ceasefire
in the three villages 203, but supplies to the towns went through channels loyal to GoS, and there wereconcerns that the aid was only received by those loyal to GoS or was lost in corruption. 204
An important factor in these villages was the role that local Muslim clerics played in the negotiations
with GoS. 205 Already in 2014, three clerics negotiated the ceasefire agreement, and managed toinclude emergency aid deliveries, the release of prisoners, and the transfer of sick people andresidents’ access to official documents. All three had been affiliated to opposition groups in the threevillages, and were partly active in the administration of the areas during the period outside GoS
control. 206

196 Televiziyon Suriya, Ba’da ‘am min saytarat nidham al-Asad ’ala Duma... ma zala al-hisar mustamirra (One year after the

Asad regime took control over Douma…siege continues), 12 April 2019, url
197 Nida Suriya, Mu’ana kabira ya’ishuha ahali Duma bi-Rif Dimashq bi-sabab ihmal nidham al-Asad.. birmil al-miyah bi-1000
lira suriyya (Population in Douma in Rif Damackus lives with major suffering due to the neglect of Asad regime… a bucket ofwater costs 1000 syrian pound), 30 July 2019, url; Televiziyon Suriya, Ba’da ‘am min saytarat nidham al-Asad ’ala Duma... mazala al-hisar mustamirra (One year after the Asad regime took control over Douma…siege continues), 12 April 2019, url
198 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/42/51], 15 August 2019, url, p. 14
199 Hassan, L., Fi dhull saytarat al-nidham… aswaq Duma mahjura fi ramadan (In the shadow of the Regime´s control …
markets in Douma are deserted during Ramadan), 5 May 2019, url
200 Marefa, Muhafadhat Rif Dimashq (The Governorate of Rif Dimashq), n.d., url
201 Xinhua, Deal reaches for evacuation of rebels from 3 towns south of Syria’s Damascus, 29 April 2018, url
202 Zaman Al Wasl, Damascus: Military Security arrests former rebel commanders who agreed to reconciliation deal, 24 July
2019, url
203 Al Saidawi, H., How Syria’s regime used local clerics to reassert its authority in Rural Damascus governorate, Carnegie
Middle East Center, 27 March 2019, url
204 Hinnebusch, R., and Imady, O., Syria’s reconciliation agreements, Centre for Syrian Studies. University of St. Andrews, 12
February 2017, url, p. 9
205 Ezzi, M., How the Syrian regime is using the mask of ‘reconciliation’ to destroy opposition institutions, Chatham House,
June 2017, url
206 Al Saidawi, H., How Syria’s regime used local clerics to reassert its authority in Rural Damascus governorate, Carnegie
Middle East Center, 27 March 2019, url

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3.1.6.1— 31

Consequences for the population

After a deal had been negotiated in spring 2018, around 8 400 people left the three villages in early
May, according to SOHR. 207 Another source said that about three hundred civilians left, while the rest
were rebel soldiers and their families, who did not want to sign reconciliation agreements with GoS. 208
In the negotiations, the clerics passed on guarantees from the GoS, including promises to not punish
local residents and that those who had evaded military service would be granted a grace period before
having to report for service. 209
After GoS regained control of the three villages, the clerics’ mosques were re-affiliated to the Ministryof Religious Endowments (waqf/awqaf) and they regained their former positions in the towns. The
clerics continued to act as middlemen between the GoS and the local communities. 210
In summer 2019, reports were received that the Palestine Branch of the military intelligence service
had arrested three former rebel commanders who had signed reconciliation agreements with GoS. 211
Other unarmed members of the opposition and their family members had reportedly also beenarrested, even though they had all signed reconciliation agreements. 212

3.1.7 Qadam
Qadam is not part of Eastern Ghouta, but belongs to the city of Damascus. The district is situated a
few kilometres from both Darayya and the centre of Damascus, bordering on the city districts ofYarmouk and Hajar al-Aswad. 213 Qadam is a special case, where an agreement between rebel groups
and GoS was signed already in 2014, stipulating that the rebels would only stay in the western part of
the area. This was before the Russian military intervention in Syria and before the reconciliationagreements, so the 2014 agreement did not entail disarmament of the rebels, nor the possibility ofthem clarifying their situation (taswiyat al-wada; see section 2.5). 214
Islamist and jihadist groups enjoyed a strong position in this area, and in 2015, IS took control of partsof Qadam, while other parts were controlled by HTS (al-Qaeda) and Ajnad al-Sham. 215 In 2016, a new
agreement was signed, and some members of militant groups were evacuated to Idlib province, whileothers remained and joined pro-GoS forces. 216
After agreement was reached between GoS, on the one hand, and HTS and others, on the other, about
1 300 jihadists and their families were evacuated to Idlib in March 2018. 217 When GoS forces in March2018 attempted to take over the parts of Qadam vacated by HTS, they were attacked by IS 218, which

207 Straits Times (The), Syria rebels exit towns near Damascus, leaving only ISIS, 11 May 2018, url

208 Al Saidawi, H., How Syria’s regime used local clerics to reassert its authority in Rural Damascus governorate, Carnegie

Middle East Center, 27 March 2019, url
209 Al Saidawi, H., How Syria’s regime used local clerics to reassert its authority in Rural Damascus governorate, Carnegie
Middle East Center, 27 March 2019, url
210 Al Saidawi, H., How Syria’s regime used local clerics to reassert its authority in Rural Damascus governorate, Carnegie
Middle East Center, 27 March 2019, url
211 Despite the name, the Palestine Branch does not just target Palestinians in Syria but is one of the biggest branches of themilitary intelligence service, with Islamist movements as its main focus. SNHR, Syrian security branches and persons incharge, n.d., url
212 Zaman Al Wasl, Damascus: Military Security arrests former rebel commanders who agreed to reconciliation deal, 24 July
2019, url; HRW, Syria: Detention, harassment in retake areas, 21 May 2019, url
213 Marefa, Hayy al-Qadam (Al-Qadam neighborhood), n.d., url
214 Al Monitor, The peculiar case of Syria’s al-Qadam neighbourhood, 2 September 2015, url; NO-Landinfo drafter assessment
215 Al Monitor, The peculiar case of Syria’s al-Qadam neighbourhood, 2 September 2015, url
216 AFP, Syria rebels leave al-Qadam south of Damascus, Zaman Al Wasl, 13 March 2018, url
217 AFP, Syria rebels leave al-Qadam south of Damascus, Zaman Al Wasl, 13 March 2018, url
218 Syrian Observer (The), ISIS takes place of HTS in al-Qadam south of Damascus, 29 March 2018, url

32 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT ON SYRIA: EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY IN RECAPTURED AREAS

managed to hold the area for some time. In April 2018, GoS regained control of Qadam 219, and as of
October 2019 remained in control of the district. 220

3.1.7.1

Consequences for the population

Qadam saw extensive destruction, notably after the clashes with IS in 2018. 221 Parts of the population
who had fled the area early in the conflict returned in 2016 222, but fled again when the agreement
between GoS and the rebels broke down, or when a deal between the rebels and GoS concluded in2017 was implemented in the spring of 2018. 223
Some areas in Qadam were reportedly zoned for reconstruction under Decree 66/2012, issued byBashar al-Assad, under the name Basilia City. Critics of GoS see the decree and Law 10/2018 aspunishment against areas where the civil uprising in 2011 quickly gained strong support. The law
provides for the possibility of expropriating land and establishing public-private companies to develop
the areas. The critics also pointed out that these private-public projects would benefit Russian
investors, on the one hand, while in other places, there were fears of large-scale acquisitions by
Iran. 224 For its part, GoS claimed that it was an expedient way of rebuilding the country, while also
addressing the problem of houses built in areas not zoned for housing. 225

3.1.8 Yarmouk and Hajar al-Aswad
These are also districts of Damascus, and before the conflict broke out, Yarmouk was home to one of
the largest Palestinian refugee camps in Syria, housing almost 160 000 United Nations Relief andWorks Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)-registered Palestinian refugees. A
large number of Syrians also lived in the area, which had the status of an ‘unofficial’ refugee camp,which means that, in practice, GoS was responsible for the infrastructure there to a far greater extent
than in official camps. 226
Yarmouk camp was the scene of major protests already in 2011, and in June that year, theheadquarters of one of the pro-GoS Palestinian factions (PFLP-GC) in the camp was burned to theground by furious protesters. 227 Fierce fighting erupted in December 2012, causing around 140 000
Palestinians and thousands of Syrians to flee the area. 228 In summer 2013, Yarmouk was besieged by
GoS. 229 and UNRWA was unable to access the camp until six months later. 230
In 2015, IS and other Islamist-jihadi groups took control of large parts of the camp 231, which again
caused thousands to flee to the neighbouring districts of Babila, Bayt Sahm, Yalda and Tadamon, withthe result that UNRWA was only able to provide limited medical services in these districts. 232

219 Siege Watch, Tenth quarterly report, part 2 – The culmination of ‘Surrender or die’, June 2018, url
220 Liveuamap, Syria, 1 October 2019, url

221 Xinhua, Destruction seen in captured areas in S Damascus, 30 April 2018, url

222 AP, Amid truce, Syrians return to gutted Damascus ghost towns, Islamic State ranks exit Palestinian ghetto, Japan Times(The), 16 January 2016, url
223 AFP, Syria rebels leave al-Qadam south of Damascus, Zaman Al Wasl, 13 March 2018, url
224 Asharq al-Awsat, Rusiya tunafisu Iran ’ala i’mari Suriya wa-tajmudu “al-dahiya al-janubiyya” fi Dimashq (Russia competes
with Iran in the rebuilding of Syria and is inflexible in the southern outskirts of Damascus), 20 September 2018, url
225 Syrian Law Journal, The new urban renewal law in Syria, 14 May 2018, url
226 UNRWA, Yarmouk (unofficial camp), n.d., url; UN, The question of Palestine. Almost all UNRWA installations in Yarmouk
and Dera’a camp in Syria severely damaged or destroyed – Press release, 1 December 2018, url; NO-Landinfo interview with
UNRWA, Damascus, April 2019
227 Baitari, N., Yarmouk refugee camp and the Syrian uprising: A view from within, Autumn 2013, url
228 UNRWA, The crisis in Yarmouk camp, n.d., url
229 Hall, N., Palestinian refugees and the siege of Yarmouk, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 13 March 2014, url
230 UNRWA, Yarmouk (unofficial camp), n.d., url
231 Al Khalidi, S., Islamic State withdraws from Yarmouk camp, Nusra remains: residents. Reuters, 15 April 2015, url
232 UNRWA, Yarmouk (unofficial camp), n.d., url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT ON SYRIA: EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY IN RECAPTURED AREAS— 33

In spring 2018, the Syrian government launched an offensive to recapture these areas after having
regained control of the other areas in and around Damascus that had been outside GoS control. In
early May, a new agreement was entered into, and up to five thousand people were evacuated to
Jarabulus, north of Aleppo, controlled by armed groups backed by Turkey. 233 Other sources quoted
much higher figures and claimed that some of the evacuees were allowed to go to Daraa and notnorthern Syria. 234 With this, the capital city and the surrounding areas were completely cleansed ofarmed resistance against GoS. 235

3.1.8.1

Consequences for the population

Sources Landinfo met with in Damascus in spring 2019 agreed that the level of destruction in Yarmouk
is extensive. UNRWA stated in a meeting with Landinfo that all the organisation’s buildings in the camp
had been damaged. According to estimates, between 40 and 60 % of the camp was completely
destroyed. 236
There were also reports of inhabitants remaining in the area, but how many is unknown. Estimatesvaried from 90 families to up to 4 000 people. UNRWA told Landinfo that it does not know the identityof these individuals, except for some elderly Palestinian refugees who stayed in the camp throughout
the siege and conflict. 237
Sources in 2019 reported that it is possible for people from Yarmouk to enter the camp to check thecondition of houses or other property. To do so, they have to leave their ID card at one of thecheckpoints on the way into the camp and pick it up on their way out. 238 One source claimed that
Palestinians who wish to leave the southern districts of Damascus need permission from the security
forces. 239
Around 6 000 people from Yarmouk fled to the neighbouring districts of Yalda, Bayt Sahm and Babila.
UNRWA provides services here on a weekly basis, with doctors and dentists working out of mobile
clinics. 240
Several sources reported arrests, including of individuals who have signed reconciliation agreementswith GoS. 241 In addition, relatives of individuals who were evacuated to Northern Syria (Idlib) werereportedly arrested. 242
The reconstruction of the camp and the surrounding areas is a source of concern for impatient
residents waiting to start rebuilding their homes. There are widespread fears that all or parts ofYarmouk will not be rebuilt, and that the area will be expropriated under Law 10 and turned into moreexclusive residences and commercial areas. 243
233 OHCHR, Between a Rock and a Hard Place – Civilians in North-western Syria, June 2018, url, p. 1

234 Suriya ala tul, Muqatilu al-mu’arada yughadiruna akhir mu’aqalihim fi al-asima al-suriyya (Rebel soldiers leave last positionin the Syrian capital), 5 May 2019, url
235 Reuters, Syria’s army recaptures last insurgent area near Damascus, 21 May 2018, url
236 NO-Landinfo interview with UNRWA, Damascus, April 2019; NO-Landinfo interview with Abed al-Majid, Khalid, Allianceof Palestinian Resistance Forces, Damascus, April 2019237 NO-Landinfo interview with UNRWA, Damascus, April 2019238 Macharis O. and Asfar, R., Palestinian refugees of Syria’s Yarmouk camp: Challenges and obstacles to return, 17 January
2019, url; NO-Landinfo interview with UNRWA, Damascus, April 2019239 Syria Direct, On the anniversary of the peace deal in Southern Damascus “there is no amnesty, no reconciliation”, 21 May
2019, url
240 NO-Landinfo interview with UNRWA, Damascus, April 2019
241 Syria Direct, On the anniversary of the peace deal in Southern Damascus “there is no amnesty, no reconciliation”, 21 May
2019, url; SOHR, The regime’s security services arrests commanders and fighters of those who stuck “reconciliation andsettlement” deals in the south of Damascus, 23 July 2019, url
242 SOHR, The regime’s security services arrests commanders and fighters of those who stuck “reconciliation and settlement”
deals in the south of Damascus, 23 July 2019, url
243 Al Shimale, Z., ‘No way back’: The law that stops displaced Syrians from ever going home, Middle East Eye, 8 April 2019,
url

34 —

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT ON SYRIA: EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY IN RECAPTURED AREAS

3.2 Daraa
Large parts of Daraa province had been outside GoS control when the government forces launched an
offensive to regain control of the entire province in spring/early summer 2018. 244 However, GoS hadcontrol of large sections of the M5 motorway, which goes from Damascus to Mafraq in Jordan via the
Jabir checkpoint and parts of Daraa city had been under GoS control throughout the uprising andsubsequent war. The result was that the area was split into two parts, straddling a wedge of land in
the middle controlled by GoS. 245
Daraa stands out as an area where Russian forces have been heavily involved in many of thereconciliation agreements that have been signed 246, and where many former rebels have joined
various pro-GoS groups as part of reconciliation agreements, notably the Syrian Army group known as
the 5th Corps. 247 Russian forces were instrumental in the establishment of this branch of the army, andcontinue to exert great influence on it. 248
In addition, many former rebels who have not formally joined other groups, but kept their light
weapons. The combination of these factors created a complicated, unstable situation in thegovernorate 249, with frequent security-related events for which responsibility is uncertain. 250

3.2.1 Al-Sanamayn
The city of al-Sanamayn is situated along the motorway between Damascus and Amman 251, and was
one of the first in the country to enter into a reconciliation agreement. 252 The agreement was signed
in December 2016, after parts of the city had been under siege several times. Al-Sanamayn is special
because parts of the city have been under GoS control throughout the conflict, while various rebel
groups have controlled other parts. Rebel groups continued their armed presence in the city after thereconciliation, but stopped attacking the government forces. 253
Nor was the reconciliation agreement meant to include all the inhabitants; the idea was rather that
all the families and clans had representatives who carried out a ‘sorting out of affairs’ (taswiyat alwada; see sections 2.4 and 2.5). 254 In total, 510 people from the city underwent this process, 150 ofwhom were said to have been armed rebels. 255

3.2.1.1

Consequences for the population

After the reconciliation agreement was signed in December 2016, the sieges were lifted in the partsof the city that had been under rebel control. Most public services in Al-Sanamayn continued to beprovided by the GoS throughout, such as identity papers, since only parts of the city had been held by

244 Maayeh, S., and Hares, N., The fall of Daraa, Foreign Affairs, 23 July 2018, url
245 Liveuamap, Syria, 1 May 2018, url

246 Makki, D., As violence flares up in Daraa, control can be an illusion, 3 July 2019, url

247 Al Jabassini, A., From rebel rule to a post-capitulation era in Daraa southern Syria: The impacts and outcomes of rebel
behaviour during negotiations, 2019, url, pp. 10-11
248 Al Jabassini, A., From rebel rule to a post-capitulation era in Daraa southern Syria: The impacts and outcomes of rebel
behaviour during negotiations, 2019, url, pp. 5-6
249 NO-Landinfo drafter assessment
250 AFP, Cradle of Syria’s uprising turns into ‘chaotic’ south, Al Monitor, 29 August 2019, url
251 Based on reading of UNOCHA, Dar’a governorate. Reference Map, December 2015, url
252 Syrian Observer (The), Sanamayn City under siege, 21 May 2019, url
253 Al Tamimi, A. J., Reconciliations: The case of al-Sanamayn in North-Deraa, 27 April 2017, url
254 Al Tamimi, A. J., Reconciliations: The case of al-Sanamayn in North-Deraa, 27 April 2017, url
255 SANA Syrian News Agency, Taswiyat awda’ 510 ashkhas min madinat al-Sanamayn baynahum 150 musallahan sallamu
anfusahum wa-aslihatahum lil-jihat al-mukhtassa (510 persons from the city al-Sanamayn assessed their situation, including
150 armed persons who surrendered and handed in weapons to relevant agencies), 25 December 2016, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT ON SYRIA: EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY IN RECAPTURED AREAS— 35

rebels. 256 As of May 2019, armed rebels without heavy weapons were still in control of parts of thecity 257, and there have been clashes, though these conflicts have been resolved very quickly. 258
In May 2019, several sources reported that the Syrian government had besieged parts of the city after
government forces had allegedly been fired on by unknown gunmen. 259 The cause of the clashes wasreportedly because a security branch belonging to the GoS had arrested a former leader of an
opposition faction in the city. 260
Speculations diverged as regards why this conflict has escalated. Those opposed to reconciliationagreements claimed it is the GoS’ strategy to gain full control of the city, while another source claimed
that the security branch is trying to put an end to ordinary crime, and that it is not politicallymotivated. 261 Another source reported that the events were in relation to the higher level of conflictin Daraa governorate in general, where a number of GoS security force members and individuals who
have entered into reconciliation agreement have been killed. 262
The siege was lifted after eight days, when a delegation of local dignitaries and Russian military
personnel visited the city to negotiate with the GoS. 263

3.2.2 Daraa city
Daraa city is where the first protests against the GoS broke out in spring 2011, and different rebel
factions controlled parts of the city for many years. Daraa city and the rest of the governorate standout from other parts of Syria in that jihadist factions such as HTS and Ahrar al-Sham have enjoyed little
support. One of the reasons was the city’s proximity to Jordan, where the Military Operations Centerrun by US and Jordanian forces 264 actively promoted more moderate groups at the expense of Islamistgroups. 265
Already in 2017, Daraa was included in a plan drawn up by Russia, Turkey and Iran that establishedseveral de-escalation zones. 266 In June 2018, however, GoS launched a major offensive on Daraa 267,
after the last areas in Damascus and Eastern Ghouta outside GoS control had been recaptured. 268 As
a result of the offensive, GoS took control of all the areas in the southern part of the country, except
an area in the desert near the Jordanian border, across the border from the US Tanf base. An IS pocket
between this area and al-Suwayda was captured by GoS forces in mid-November 2018. 269
Russia played a central part in the negotiations on the different reconciliation agreements, which
formed the basis for GoS recapturing Daraa. Although Daraa had seen a lower level of conflict than
the rest of the country 270, around 15 000 people chose to leave the province and go to Idlib. Five

256 Al Tamimi, A. J., Reconciliations: The case of al-Sanamayn in North-Deraa, 27 April 2017, url

257 Landinfo has not found any sources indicating that the situation has changed. NO-Landinfo drafter assessment
258 Syrian Observer (The), Sanamayn City under siege, 21 May 2019, url

259 SOHR, Public tension and discontent continue in al-Sanamayn City as the suffocating siege by regime forces on the citizens

continues for the 5th consecutive day, 20 May 2019, url; Syrian Observer (The), Sanamayn City under siege, 21 May 2019, url
260 SOHR, Public tension and discontent continue in al-Sanamayn City as the suffocating siege by regime forces on the citizens
continues for the 5th consecutive day, 20 May 2019, url
261 Syrian Observer (The), Sanamayn City under siege, 21 May 2019, url
262 AFP, Cradle of Syria’s uprising turns into ‘chaotic’ south, Al Monitor, 29 August 2019, url
263 SOHR, After 8 days of tight siege… the regime forces lift the siege imposed over al-Sanamayn city after meeting with
dignitaries from Hauran with the Russian forces, 23 May 2019, url
264 Sayigh, Y., The Syrian regime has several military options as it advances after the Aleppo victory, Carnegie Middle East
Center, 19 December 2016, url
265 Al-Koshak, O., Mapping Southern Syria’s armed opposition, 13 October 2015, url
266 Beals, E., De-Escalation and Astana, Atlantic Council, 15 September 2017, url
267 OHCHR, The “unreconciled” concerns of civilians in Dar’a Governorate, May 2019, url, p. 3
268 HRW (Human Rights Watch), Syria: Detention, harassment in retake areas, 21 May 2019, url
269 Liveuamap, Syria, 18 November 2018, url
270 FT, Assad forces retake Syrian rebel stronghold of Deraa, 12 July 2018, url36 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT ON SYRIA: EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY IN RECAPTURED AREAS

thousand of them were said to have been armed rebels, while the rest were family members of antigovernment activists. 271

3.2.2.1

Consequences for the population

Daraa is one of the places in Syria where Russia has had the strongest influence on the reconciliationagreement, and among the places where many former rebels chose to stay, unlike in other parts of
Syria. 272 Notably, many subsequently joined the 5th Corps 273 (see also section 2.7.1.1), although several
hundred former rebels who underwent a reconciliation process also joined the 4th Armoured Division.
This was reportedly a reaction to Russia dissolving the 5th Corps in the western part of thegovernorate. 274
Many places in both the city and governorate were still under the control of former rebels, but as partof the GoS power structure through the Russian supervised 5th Corps. 275 As a consequence of thereconciliation agreements, regular Syrian forces and the police were not allowed to enter areas thatwere controlled by armed rebel groups. 276
For many years, the number of political assassinations in Daraa was reported to be far higher than inother parts of the country. 277
As of October 2019, this assassination trend was continuing and appeared to have escalated278, also
since GoS regained control of the city and province in summer 2018. The reasons for the assassination
trend were reportedly complex; not all of them were politically motivated but some also appear to be
due to personal vengeance. Very few of these incidents resulted in penal sanctions by the state, giving
the appearance for the civilian population that the city and governorate were only loosely controlled
by GoS. 279
Another result of the situation described above was that on several occasion armed clashes havebroken out between different branches of the army and groups that were all part of GoS. 280
OHCHR reported that civilians and former opposition fighters who signed reconciliation agreementswith GoS and who took up positions in local administration or military forces, have been killed byunknown perpetrators in what appeared to be targeted killings. 281
Several sources reported arrest campaigns, including of individuals who signed reconciliationagreements with GoS. 282 Many of these campaigns were mainly focused on persons wanted for draft
evasion. After signing a reconciliation agreement, draft evaders will usually be granted a grace periodof six months before having to enlist (see section 2.7). One of the reasons for the arrests may bedisagreement about when this grace period starts and ends, and about which terms of the271 Al Jabassini, A., From rebel rule to a post-capitulation era in Daraa southern Syria: The impacts and outcomes of rebel

behaviour during negotiations, 2019, url, p. 11

272 AFP (Agence France Presse), Cradle of Syria’s uprising turns into ‘chaotic’ south, Al Monitor, 29 August 2019, url

273 Al Jabassini, A., From rebel rule to a post-capitulation era in Daraa southern Syria: The impacts and outcomes of rebel

behaviour during negotiations, 2019, url, pp. 12-14
274 Al Jabassini, A., From rebel rule to a post-capitulation era in Daraa southern Syria: The impacts and outcomes of rebel
behaviour during negotiations, 2019, url, p. 14
275 Hall, N., The aftershocks of reconciliation in Syria: Reflections on the past year, 17 April 2019, url
276 Makki, D., As violence flares up in Daraa, control can be an illusion, Middle East Institute, 3 July 2019, url
277 Haid, H., The war of assassinations in Syria, 18 March 2016, url; AFP, Cradle of Syria’s uprising turns into ‘chaotic’ south,
Al Monitor, 29 August 2019, url
278 Abu Al Khair, Activists report a surge in assassinations in Daraa, 24 October 2019, url
279 Makki, D., As violence flares up in Daraa, control can be an illusion, Middle East Institute, 3 July 2019, url
280 Syrian Observer (The), Fifth Corps attacks Assad intelligence in Daraa, 2 April 2019, url
281 OHCHR, The “unreconciled” concerns of civilians in Dar’a Governorate, May 2019, url, pp. 9-10
282 Middle East Monitor, Syrians protest in Daraa over military conscription, 31 January 2019, url; Euronews, Syrians detained,
killed in southern cradle of revolt – UN, 21 May 2019, url; Al Jumhuriya, “Reconciling” with the regime: A deadly game, 5
February 2019, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT ON SYRIA: EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY IN RECAPTURED AREAS— 37

reconciliation agreements must be implemented before the person concerned has to agree to beenlisted. 283
OHCHR confirmed 380 incidents between 26 July 2018 and 31 March 2019 in which civilians in Daraa
governorate were arrested and detained by GoS security forces either from their homes or atcheckpoints. In another 150 incidents documented by OHCHR, arrested persons were released afterfew days in detention. The reasons behind the arrests were unclear, with some reportedly due to‘suspicion of terrorism’. 284
Others were also arrested, such as media-activists and humanitarian workers. According to Human
Rights Watch, most of these arrested individuals were arrested were not charged. 285
The CoI reported that in Daraa governorate services and utilities, including electricity, water and gas,
were not available for most residents. 286

283 Middle East Monitor, Syrians protest in Daraa over military conscription, 31 January 2019, url
284 OHCHR, The “unreconciled” concerns of civilians in Dar’a Governorate, May 2019, url, p. 8285 HRW (Human Rights Watch), Syria: Detention, harassment in retake areas, 21 May 2019, url

286 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/42/51], 15 August 2019, url, p. 13

38 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT ON SYRIA: EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY IN RECAPTURED AREAS

4. Recaptured areas
The SAA and allied forces have recaptured some parts of the country, and the agreements that finallyended the fighting must be regarded as outright surrender agreements.287 The manner in which these
deals are implemented on the individual level is ‘highly underreported’.288

4.1 Aleppo
Aleppo was a divided city from 2012, when the eastern part of the city came under opposition
control. 289 This area was, in turn, connected to other rebel-held parts of the province surrounding thecity, extending all the way to the Turkish border. 290 The district of Sheikh Maqsud, a part of Aleppo,
was controlled by the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) party, in agreement with GoS, but washanded back to GoS in February 2018 as Turkey attacked the Afrin-region. 291
In 2016, GoS intensified its siege of the rebel-held neighbourhoods, and in July 2016, it was estimatedthat around 275 000 people lived in the besieged parts of the city. 292 In December that year, talks
were initiated between Ahrar al-Sham, an Islamist jihadist rebel group, and a Russian negotiator. This
resulted in an agreement whereby all rebels and their families were evacuated from the city, together
with the vast majority of the remaining civilians, about 37 000 people. 293
The head of the Russian Reconciliation Centre for Syria, headquartered at the Hmeimim Air Baseoutside Tartus, told the Russian news agency Sputnik in June 2017 that more than 3 000 Aleppo rebels
had been pardoned since August 2016. They were said to be among the 6 000 rebels identified by thecentre. 294 It is not clear what this pardoning entails, however, or how it occurred.
When the fighting stopped in December 2016, massive destruction had affected the eastern parts ofthe city, and almost no civilians remained in these areas after the evacuations. As of an August 2019
article, almost three years later, the rebuilding of the city had not yet started, and the original
population was spread around the other parts of the city and the rest of the country. 295 Some small
parts of the old historic centre have been reconstructed, but these are not residential areas. In otherplaces, individual have repaired their homes or businesses to the best of their abilities, and some cafés
have opened, but no organised reconstruction project has been initiated. 296
According to August 2019 reporting, Aleppo is so close to the rebel-held areas that the western partsof the city are regularly subjected to missile attacks. In addition, the airport has been restored but is
not open for regular flights. 297

287 Hinnebusch, R., and Imady, O., Syria’s reconciliation agreements, Centre for Syrian Studies. University of St. Andrews, 12

February 2017, url, p. 1; NO-Landinfo drafter assessment
288 Haid, H., The details of ‘reconciliation deals’ expose how they are anything but, Chatham House, August 2018, url
289 AI, ‘We Leave or We Die’: Forced Displacement under Syria’s ‘Reconciliation’ Agreements, 2017, url, p. 34
290 Liveuamap, Syria, 15 November 2015, url
291 Reuters, Kurdish YPG militia urges Syrian army to help it stop Turkey, 22 February 2018, url
292 BBC, What’s happening in Aleppo?, 23 December 2016, url
293 AI, ‘We Leave or We Die’: Forced Displacement under Syria’s ‘Reconciliation’ Agreements, 2017, url, p. 8294 Sputnik, 6,000 militants identified in Aleppo with Russian reconciliation center’s help, 14 June 2017, url
295 AP, Syria’s Aleppo symbol of Assad’s wins and of enduring war, 13 August 2019, url
296 New Humanitarian (The), In Syria’s Aleppo, a slow rebuild begins, 30 January 2019, url
297 AP, Syria’s Aleppo symbol of Assad’s wins and of enduring war, 13 August 2019, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT ON SYRIA: EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY IN RECAPTURED AREAS— 39

4.2 Homs
In the city of Homs, Baba Amr district was especially destroyed in the war.298 The armed opposition
enjoyed strong support in both Baba Amr299 and al-Waer districts, and while Baba Amr was recaptured
in 2012, al-Waer was outside government control for prolonged periods. Like other areas, both alWaer and Baba Amr were besieged by GoS for extensive periods. 300

4.2.1 Al-Waer
The area first came under siege back in October 2013, at which time it was home to 70 - 100 000
people. 301 After the Baba Amr district was captured by GoS in spring 2014, al-Waer was the last partof Homs under rebel control. As a result, many rebels from other areas sought refuge in al-Waer, andan opposition source claims that, already in 2012, the population had reached 350 000. 302
Negotiations on an agreement for al-Waer started already in mid-2014, and a number of ceasefires
were agreed in 2015 and 2016. The first round of evacuations took place in 2016 303, but they only
included a small number of rebels and their families, who were evacuated to an area in the northernpart of Homs province. 304
In February 2017, the Syrian army launched a new offensive on the area, and a month later, local
representatives of the rebels met with Russian officers to try to broker a deal. As a result of theagreement that was signed 305, more than 20 000 civilians were evacuated from the area between
March and May 2017 306 to Idlib province and Jarabulus in the northern part of Aleppo province. 307 The
evacuees reportedly included around 3 700 armed rebels. 308

4.2.1.1

Consequences for the population

Some of the inhabitants chose to remain in the district. According to the governor of Homs
governorate, 1 150 rebels chose to stay put and surrendered their weapons as part of a GoS amnesty
initiative. 309 Landinfo assumes that draft evaders will have to complete their military service at somepoint (see section 2.5). 310
A group of around 600 people among those who were evacuated to the Jarabulus area chose to returnto Homs shortly afterwards, due to the very difficult situation in the camps they were placed in. Local
rebels allegedly tried to stop them, but they were eventually allowed to leave. 311
In November 2017, a source estimated the population of al-Waer to around 45 000.312 In October
2018, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) stated that 1 400 schools had opened in Homs
(including al-Waer), and that the organisation has trained more than 4 000 teachers in Homs alone. 313

298 Reuters, Former Syrian rebels flee, hide from army conscription, 10 August 2017, url

299 Lund, A., What would the fall of Homs mean?, Carnegie Middle East Center, 24 April 2014, url

300 AI, ‘We Leave or We Die’: Forced Displacement under Syria’s ‘Reconciliation’ Agreements, 2017, url, p. 48
301 AI, ‘We Leave or We Die’: Forced Displacement under Syria’s ‘Reconciliation’ Agreements, 2017, url, p. 9302 SNHR, Al Wa’er neighbourhood residents join 12 million forcebly displaced Syrians. SNHR, 18 April 2017, at url
303 AI, ‘We Leave or We Die’: Forced Displacement under Syria’s ‘Reconciliation’ Agreements, 2017, url, p. 9

304 Reuters, Syrian rebels evacuated from opposition-held district in Homs, witnesses say, 22 September 2016, url
305 AI, ‘We Leave or We Die’: Forced Displacement under Syria’s ‘Reconciliation’ Agreements, 2017, url, p. 48
306 AI, ‘We Leave or We Die’: Forced Displacement under Syria’s ‘Reconciliation’ Agreements, 2017, url, p. 9

307 AI, ‘We Leave or We Die’: Forced Displacement under Syria’s ‘Reconciliation’ Agreements, 2017, url, p. 9; Anadolu Agency,

19 April 2017, Over 2,100 people leave Syria’s al-Waer for Jarablus, url
308 Reuters, Syrian rebels leave last opposition district in Homs, 21 May 2017, url
309 Reuters, Syrian rebels leave last opposition district in Homs, 21 May 2017, url
310 NO-Landinfo drafter assessment
311 AI, ‘We Leave or We Die’: Forced Displacement under Syria’s ‘Reconciliation’ Agreements, 2017, url, p. 58
312 Irish Times (The), Stories from Syria: One family’s defiant stand in al-Waer, 6 November 2017, url
313 UNICEF, Children return to school in Homs, Syria supported by UNICEF, 22 October 2018, url40 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT ON SYRIA: EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY IN RECAPTURED AREAS

4.2.2 Baba Amr
This district in the old centre of Homs became a symbol of the uprising in Syria at an early stage, andit was one of the first districts to be seized by rebels in autumn 2011. 314 The population before theuprising was around 80 000. 315 It is also one of the places in Syria experiencing the greatest
destruction. GoS regained control of the area through an agreement stating that the rebels would
withdraw to other rebel-held areas nearby; not as a result of a reconciliation agreement. 316 By then,the area had been besieged by GoS and subjected to massive bombardment from February to 1 March
2012, when the army moved in and took control of the area. 317

4.2.2.1

Consequences for the population

The district was reported to be in ruins 318 and it is assumed that it will be rebuilt in accordance withthe much discussed Law 10, which allows local authorities to enter into partnerships with privatecompanies to reconstruct destroyed areas that were not originally zoned for residential purposes. 319
Despite the massive scale of destruction, some people have returned to the district. In 2016, UNHCR
estimated that 3 000 people had returned, in addition to 200 internally displaced families from otherparts of the country. 320 Another source stated that 450 families had returned to the district by the endof 2017. 321

314 Lund, A., What would the fall of Homs mean?, 24 April 2014, url

315 UNHCR, Returnees and displaced in the neighbourhood of Baba Amr, Homs, 25 July 2016, url
316 Reuters, Syrian city’s rebel district still in ruins years after Assad victory, 18 August 2017, url
317 Guardian (The), Battle for Baba Amr – timeline, 1 March 2012, url

318 Al Souria Net, Al-nidham yuqarru al-mukhattat al-tandhimi li-Baba Amru wa-yanhi hilm sukanihi bil-awda ilayha (Regime

decides operational plan for Baba Amru, ending inhabitants dream of returning), 6 September 2015, url

319 SLJ, The new urban renewal law in Syria. Syrian Law Journal, 14 May 2018, url

320 UNHCR, Returnees and displaced in the neighbourhood of Baba Amr, Homs, 25 July 2016, url

321 Hogan, C., In a war-weary Syrian city, a wedding celebration, National Geographic, 16 February 2018, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT ON SYRIA: EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY IN RECAPTURED AREAS— 41

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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT ON SYRIA: EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY IN RECAPTURED AREAS

Terms of ReferenceHow does the government treat the civilian population in reconquered areas?

Which groups of individuals are called for military service?

Which groups are targeted for arrest/violence?



Are IDPs able to return to their hometowns after government reconquest?

How are the IDPs treated upon return?

— 53

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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT ON SYRIA: EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY IN RECAPTURED AREAS

doi: 10.2847/651962