German Council on Foreign Relations

No. 34
November 2023

POLICY BRIEF

EDINA III

Preventing
the Next War
Germany and NATO Are
in a Race Against Time

Christian Mölling
Head of the Center for
Security and Defense

With its imperial ambitions, Russia represents the greatest and most­urgent threat to NATO countries. Once intensive fighting will have ended
in Ukraine, the regime in Moscow may need as little as six to ten years toreconstitute its armed forces. Within that timeframe, Germany and NATOmust enable their armed forces to deter and, if necessary, fight against
Russia. Only then will they be in a position to reduce the risk of another
war breaking out in Europe.
– Germany and NATO can only reliably influence their own ability to­deter and defend – not whether Russia wants to wage another war.

Torben Schütz
Associate Fellow, Center
for Security and Defense– The time Russia needs to reconstitute its armed forces determines­NATO’s need for speed. The alliance must be able to fend off a Russian
attack in six years. The longer timeline already increases the risk of war.
– NATO’s strategy paths range from “Better safe than sorry” to “Fightingwith the army you have.” With all of them, the risk of war is different,
but so are the political and economic payoffs. Additional geostrategic
options can buy NATO time.
– Germany must deliver a quantum leap: Within the shortest time­possible, it must build up the Bundeswehr in terms of personnel,
expand arms production, and improve resilience. This will only bepossible if there is a change of mentality in society.

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Preventing the Next War

STRATEGIC REEVALUATIONOF RUSSIA
The question for NATO and Germany no longer
is whether they will ever need to be able to fight a
war against another country, but only when. In its
new strategic concept, NATO describes Russia as
the greatest and most urgent threat to the security of its 31 allies and for peace and stability in theEuro-­Atlantic area.1 In contrast to earlier analyses, the­alliance no longer rules out a Russian attack.
It is Russia that defines this timeframe through a combination of long-held motivation and increasing war
capability. The window for a possible Russian attack
will open as soon as Russia believes that an attack, forinstance on the Baltic states, could meet with success.
Strong Motivation
Russia has consistently shown its aggressive motivation over two decades. President Vladimir Putin and
Kremlin elites and intelligentsia have long cherished
the ambition to restore Russia’s powerful empire andpush back the influence of NATO and the EU.2 The
historical categories in which they think are basedon analogies with the Tsarist empire and the ­Soviet
Union. In their thinking, Russia exists well beyond its
current borders (a concept called Rusky Mir) – it extends to any place where Russians have ever lived inor where the Russian empire or the Soviet Union haveever ruled. Putin does not consider the borders established after the break-up of the Soviet Union to bebinding.3 Countries belonging to NATO today include
the Baltic States, which used to be part of Russia and the Soviet Union.
Putin’s ideology and interpretation of history a­ lready
motivated the wars in Chechnya and Georgia.
­Russia’s constitution includes a provision to reintegrate B­ elarus into the Russian state; this is currently

POLICY BRIEF

being implemented. In 2014, Putin started the war in
Ukraine. Despite having failed to achieve even one ofits war goals to date, Moscow has escalated the conflict into Europe’s largest war in 75 years.
It has also repeatedly threatened individual ­NATO
countries and NATO as a whole with the use of­nuclear weapons.4
Increasing War Capability
Even after nearly two years of combat in Ukraine,
the Russian war capability is greater than the current
impression suggests. The Russian land forces suffered the greatest losses in terms of personnel andmateriel; they will represent the main reconstitution
effort. While the air force has also lost qualified personnel, its losses in terms of materiel are relatively minor (about 10 to 15 percent). At the same time,
both s­ ervices have demonstrated their adaptability.
­Russia’s navy has suffered heavy losses in its Black See
Fleet, but the Baltic, Pacific and Northern fleets continue to be ready for use. Both the strategic missile
force and the cyber and space forces are likely to haveremained largely intact.
Russia can train about 280,000 recruits per year. In
six years, this adds up to nearly 1.7 million and in ten
years to 2.8 million people with military training. By
training in the units that currently fight in Ukraine,
recruits will benefit from their combat experience.5
Currently, Russia is using revenue from its oil and gas
exports to transform its arms industry into a war industry. It has boosted output in some segments andkept important workers in production. At the sametime, it has managed to circumvent Western sanctions on components considered crucial to the war
effort like microchips or ball bearings and raw materials. In addition, Russia imports arms and munitions
from allied states such as Iran and North Korea.

1NATO (Ed.), NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, RN 6 und 8, no place.

2

Yaroslav Trofimov, How Far Do Putin’s Imperial Ambitions Go?, in: The Wall Street Journal (June 24, 2023) https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-far-doputins-imperial-ambitions-go-11656085978 (accessed November 8, 2023), as well as LMU Newsroom, { Interview with the historian Martin Schulze
Wessel} Putin ist in seinen historischen imperialen Denkmustern gefangen. (August 23, 2023) https://www.lmu.de/de/newsroom/newsuebersicht/
news/putin-ist-in-seinen-historischen-imperialen-denkmustern-gefangen.html (accessed November 8, 2023)

3

See for instance Michael Stürmer, Der Kreml-Herr lässt die Europäer frösteln, in: Die Welt (January 19, 2016) https://www.welt.de/debatte/
kolumnen/Weltlage/article151183437/Der-Kreml-Herr-laesst-die-Europaeer-froesteln.html (accessed November 8, 2023). Putin put forward
the first elements of his idea of a great Russia, which has citizens who cannot live in Russia, early on. The first time he spoke of this was at theBergedorf Round Table in 1994. Available in: Körber Stiftung (ed.), Protokoll, Bergedorfer Gesprächskreis 101, Russland und der Westen, 1994,
no place and date, available on request from the Foundation.

4

Anna Clara Arndt and Liviu Horovitz, Eine Chronologie der nuklearen Anspielungen Moskaus im Krieg gegen die Ukraine, Working Paper SWPInternational Security Division, AP NR. 2, May 2022, Berlin, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, May 2022; ,Sten Hankewitz,
Putin vaguely threatens the Estonian town of Narva, in: Estonian World (June 11, 2022) https://estonianworld.com/security/putin-vaguelythreatens-the-estonian-town-of- narva (accessed November 8, 2023)

5

See for instance Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the Second Year of Its Invasion of Ukraine, RUSI
– Special Report, London, May 19, 2023, https://static.rusi.org/403-SR-Russian-Tactics-web-final.pdf (accessed November 8,2023); Jack Watling und Nick Reynolds, Stormbreak: Fighting Through Russian Defences in Ukraine’s 2023 Offensive, RUSI – Special
Report, London, September 2023, https://static.rusi.org/Stormbreak-Special-Report-web-final_0.pdf (accessed November 8, 2023)

No. 34 | November 2023

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POLICY BRIEF

Preventing the Next War

Fig. 1 – Risk of War, War Capability, and Total Defense
Total defense = war capability without an aggressive motivation.
Both terms are used in this policy brief. War capability is an analytical term.

RISK OFOF WAR

MOTIVATIONWARCAPABILITY /TOTALDEFENSE

Resilience: The willingness andability of a society to contributeto a war effort despite the­restrictions and losses a conflictentails. A society’s resilience –mental and physical – is essential
to maintain morale and cohesion.

Military Capability:
It depends on the­organization, materiel,and personnel of thearmed forces.

WAR
CAPABILITY /TOTALDEFENSEThis includes safeguarding
infrastructures (transport, energy,
digital, health) but also a publicdemonstration of belief in one’s
cause and in the ability to getthrough the conflict.
Industrial base: Ensures that the armed forces
are supplied with military equipment and services
such as repairs under all circumstances. In
high-intensity conventional warfare, the needsof the armed forces exceed the capacity andinnovative capability of industry in peacetime.

Source: Authors’ own compilation

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Preventing the Next War

Russia faces fewer major challenges than the Westregarding the resilience of its society. The regime­violently suppresses every emergence of civil ­society.
Society’s willingness to accept the loss of h
­ uman life isobviously great, as the war in Ukraine has already cost
Russia over 250,000 dead and wounded. Economically, the state appears to be able to continue financing
its war.6
Russia’s Window of Opportunity: 6 to 10 Years
Experts and intelligence services estimate that it willtake Russia six to ten years to rebuild its army tothe point where it could dare to attack NATO. The
clock will start ticking as soon as intense fighting in
Ukraine comes to a halt. Then Russia can redirect its
current production toward the reconstitution of thearmed forces.7

NATO: SPEED DETERMINES THE
RELEVANCE OF EFFORTS
NATO has changed its defense plans (see box on theright). However, there is no agreement regarding themost important factor: speed. Until when should theplans be implemented? In order to prevent a possible war, the window of opportunity for Moscow must
not open. Russia must recognize a conflict with ­NATO
as hopeless from the outset and at all times. To ensure this outcome, NATO should quickly increase its
war capability and communicate this visibly to ­Russia.
This is even more important because there is little
hope of changing the Russian regime’s motivation orof ­activating society against the regime.
A Race Against TimeThe timeline for implementing these plans can beclearly established: It is defined by the time that theRussian armed forces will need for their reconstitution, meaning six to ten years after the end of high-­
intensity fighting in Ukraine.
NATO must complete its own repositioning at least
one year before Russia reaches war capability. This
would offer the Kremlin the chance to recognize intime that the Russian window of opportunity for a
successful attack on NATO has not opened. Given the
Russian time of reconstitution, NATO must therefore

NATO’S RESPONSE
NATO has changed its defense plans: Should
Russia attack, NATO now intends to stop it
right on the border of the allied territory. This
is to prevent Russian troops from committing
atrocities against the civilian population. The
alliance also wants to preempt the risk of a
“fait accompli”: If Russia were to succeed in
capturing a larger territory, it could propose aterritorial deal to the NATO states that could
divide the alliance politically.
To be able to defend „every meter of NATOterritory,“ according to the formula chosen by
US President Joe Biden, German Chancellor
Olaf Scholz, and others, NATO at its summit
meetings in Madrid 2022 and Vilnius 2023
reorganized its defense planning. At the heartof the new plan are:
• NATO’s New Force Model: 300.000 troops
are to be maintained in high readiness.
• Regional defense plans: They specify which
member of the alliance carries which kind of
responsibility for defense in which area andtherefore needs to supply military force tothat end.

reach war capability within five to nine years to beable to deter Russia from going to war.
Any troops or systems that NATO countries deploy
only a short time before Russia’s reconstitution isachieved will not impact Russia’s considerations.
­Russia would underestimate NATO’s combat readiness and could be tempted to start a war.
Strategy Paths: Opting for Security or for Risk
Rapid implementation of NATO defense plans achieves
a greater and earlier deterrence effect. On the downside, there are the political-economic costs and themilitary and industrial consequences of an accelerated
military build-up. The tension between both aspects

6

See for instance Darya Korsunskaya and Alexander Marrow, Russia‘s optimistic fiscal plans risk budget revenue shortfall, Reuters.com(October 19, 2023) https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/russias-optimistic-fiscal-plans-risk-budget-revenue-shortfall-2023-10-19(accessed November 8, 2023)

7Interviews with intelligence services, defense planners in the Bundeswehr an in NATO, and public sources. For instance, Estonian Foreign ­Intelligence Service, International Security and Estonia 2023, (January 2023), pp 11-12, https://www.valisluureamet.ee/doc/raport/2023-en.pdf(accessed November 8, 2023)

No. 34 | November 2023

POLICY BRIEF

defines the bandwidth for NATO’s strategy paths. The
following table outlines five options and describes
their advantages and disadvantages. The differences
between them are the time factor and the risk of war.
If the assumption is that NATO still has a decade until
it must be able to deter Russia, the required effort becomes easier to digest in political terms: The burden on
public budgets is spread over the terms of several governments. The build-up of force structures and procurement can be continued as planned. Industry canmaintain its production plans. NATO countries would
also have more time to build up their total defense.
However, if Moscow manages to have its armed
forces ready after only six years, NATO will find it­increasingly impossible to catch up.
The reason is that it takes a long time for plans to become reality in Europe: At least two years are needed
to set up new production lines for missiles or tanks
or to establish larger military units. The more speed
is needed, the more the standards for instance fortraining or weaponry will have to change. An army
formed within five years is different from one thathas nine years to be available. Qualitatively, it will beat the current level, but in quantitative terms, thestructures will be replenished, and it will be possible
to create reserves.
These assumptions result in two scenarios with a totalof six points in time and time frames, which are shownin Figures 3 and 4.

5
Preventing the Next War

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Preventing the Next War

Fig. 2 – Strategy Paths for NATO and its Member States
S T R AT E G Y
PAT H

DESCRIPTIONA DVA N TAG E S

D I S A DVA N TAG E SRISK OFWA R

A•	Early and massive investment
in NATO capabilities: Europe
invests within the next twoyears•	More acceptance for militaryspending while the public is
still highly aware of the war in
Ukraine and Russia’s threats•	High costs at a time of
economic difficulties

Very low•	Industrial capability goals forthe next 5 to 10 years•	The focus on speed favors simple
solutions such as scaling up
procurement of standardized
products

S E C U R I T Y S T R AT E G I E S

BETTER
SAFE THANS O R RY

B
CONTROLIS BETTER• Investment and force
generation happen in time
for NATO to build up its
own capabilities before
Russia achieves an earlyreconstitution•	The level of defense capability
must be maintained after early
achievement•	High complexity due to theneed to coordinate measures•	Weapons systems are improved
incrementally•	Companies have to adapt
their production plans• Powerful signal to Russia•	Armed forces must copewith very rapid changeover• C omparatively lower expenditure
or expenditure spread over a longer
period than with strategy A• A
 s attention for the Ukraine
war decreases it becomes
more challenging to justify therequired efforts to the public

Low• Investments in lengthy armaments
projects become more likely, which
entails the risk of delays

Medium tohigh• P rojects and structures canbe better planned and target
achievement monitored• A weaker but possibly sufficientsignal toward Russia

C
P L AY W I T H
FIRE• Investment happens along atimeline that allows NATO tobuild up its own capabilities
before Russia achieves a latereconstitution• R educed expenditure stretchedover a longer period of time• L ess pressure on armed forces
and industry to adapt projects
and structures• A
 s there is little awareness yetof Russia’s arms build-up, it isdifficult to justify the required
efforts to the public

R I S K S T R AT E G I E S• P ath dependency of industry andarmed forces prevents a more agile
defense sector• P ossibility of miscalculation of
Russian reconstitution with little time
to react
D
BOILINGFROG

E
YO U G O TO
WA R W I T H
THE ARMY
YO U H AV E

•	Investment will only be
started once the Russianreconstitution has alreadybecome visible and is taking
place faster than NATO isincreasing its capabilities.
At this point in time, NATOat least sets itself the goalof achieving the deterrent
effect in time•	Cost relief for the present, buthigher expenditure at a later date

• Investment will only beapproved once the Russian
threat has become manifest in
public discourse. The Russianreconstitution, which isalready well advanced, opens
the window of war• Cost relief for the present• T he Kremlin has a clear
incentive not to waste any
time, as its advantage willdwindle from this moment on

Source: Authors‘ own compilation•	Public acceptance increases as theRussian arms build-up becomes
noticeable• P ublic acceptance increases as theRussian arms build-up becomes
highly visible•	Delaying investment incapabilities by seven years could
make it technically impossible toachieve a deterrent effectVery high•	In this situation, Russia might betempted to attack in order to preempt the build-up of NATO forces• T he risk of war increases. Investment
comes too late to provide deterrence,
and a window of opportunity opens
for Russia• H ighest risk of losing the war anddividing NATO• H
 igh costs for high-tech projects thathave been started but now have to beabandoned

ExtremelyhighNo. 34 | November 2023

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Preventing the Next War

WA R C A PA B I L I T Y

Fig. 3 – NATO Security Strategies A & B

X
Today

S T R AT E G Y A

S T R AT E G Y BNATO countries immediately and significantly build up
their war capability to send
the earliest possible signal
to Russia

NATO countries start building
up war capability immediately in order to be ready for
war one year before Russia
achieves its reconstitution

0

3

Rapid
­reconstitution
in Russia

Slowreconstitution
in Russia

6

10

5

YEARS

End of main
combatactivities
in Ukraine

S T R AT E G Y D

S T R AT E G Y ENATO only reacts in thewake of a dramatic event
but now aims for maximum deterrence effect,
i.e. the earliest defense
capability that is still
possible

NATO only reacts
in the wake of a­dramatic event,but is unable toachieve a sufficientwar ­capability

Rapid­reconstitution
in RussiaX
YEARS

S T R AT E G Y CNATO countries start building
up war capability in order tobe ready for war one year
before Russia achieves a latereconstitution

0
End of main
combatactivities
in Ukraine

6

Slowreconstitution
in Russia

X
Political
event

9

10

YEARS

Source: Authors’ own compilation

WA R C A PA B I L I T Y

Fig. 4 – NATO RISK STRATEGIES C, D, & E

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Preventing the Next War

EXTENDED OPTIONS
Irrespective of the strategy path chosen, there are
four areas in which NATO can take additional action
to improve its position vis-à-vis Russia:
Option I: Gain Time
NATO must make use of the time left until the intensive fighting in Ukraine ends and Russia can begin the reconstitution of its armed forces. This means
boosting support for Ukraine to the extent that the
Ukrainian armed forces have a chance of inflicting a
defeat on Russia on Ukrainian territory with their next
offensives. This would not only further reduce Russia’s combat power. NATO could thereby also demonstrate its resolve und hope that a Russian defeat willchange the Kremlin’s strategy. Nevertheless, NATOmust strike a balance between supporting Ukraine
and reinforcing its own combat capability.
Option II: Integrate Ukraine into
the European Ddefense Sector
Europe should immediately begin to work with Ukraine
to plan and implement the country’s long-term integration into Western defense and armaments. Ukraine
is already part of the Western defense system. The
announced membership in EU and NATO will further
strengthen this connection. Given that the conflictwith Russia is likely to continue for decades, Ukraine’s
location on the border to Russia and B­ elarus meansthat the country will continue to be of outstanding
geostrategic importance to Europe’s security.
Option III: Establish a More Balanced
Relationship with the United States
All these plans are overshadowed by the concern that
the United States could reduce its support for the defense of Europe. For this reason, Europeans should
use the necessary efforts to achieve their own war
capability to also establish a more balanced relationship with the United States. The moment is favorable:
The United States expects Europe to become more
self-reliant, and if Europe can refute the accusationof an unfair burden-sharing, it would help President
Biden in his reelection campaign.
Option IV: Hamper Russia’s Production
The hopes attached to the sanctions have been disappointed in many cases. Nevertheless, trade restrictions offer an opportunity to impede the developmentof the Russian war economy. To this end, the Western8

measures need to be fully implemented and extended
to a much broader range of goods. Currently, Russia’sarmaments are not based on high-tech but on mass
production. Technology that may seem outdated to
the West is sufficient for Russia’s warfare.

GERMANY NEEDS TO TAKEA QUANTUM LEAPThe German government wants to turn the­Bundeswehr into Europe’s strongest army and the
backbone of allied defense. Yet its plans for military
renewal known as “Zeitenwende” are faltering. To
reach its goals, Germany will have to take a quantum leap in the reconstruction of the Bundeswehr,
the renewal of the defense industrial base, and thestrengthening of society’s resilience.
A Security Decade
The change of mentality, which has often been called
for, will only happen if overall defense becomes a partof everyday life in politics, the economy, and civil society. The current narrowing of the debate to a classic
war is wrong. On the one hand, there are risks apartfrom a possible Russian attack that ­Germany must urgently prepare for. On the other hand, a ­Russian attack would not only be aimed at military targets butat the entire range of weaknesses shown by Western
societies. As a result, the question is not only how
politics and society will deal with Germans getting
killed or wounded in the event of war, both practically and mentally. It is also about improving the protection against cyberattacks and disinformation, as
can be seen today in Russia’s war on Ukraine and the­Israel-Hamas conflict.
The German government could set a starting point
for the required change in everyday life by proclaiming a “Security Decade”8 together with the Bundestag
as well as the governments and parliaments of thefederal states: a ten-year social contract to prepare
Germany for possible future conflicts. This would redefine the strategic framework for Germany’s actions.
At the same time, the time horizon in which important
players, including ministries, parliaments, the Courtof Auditors and other experts, consider and evaluate
the state’s tasks and expenditure would be extended
beyond the legislative period. In order for a new policy to emerge, it is also necessary to make additional
funds available for the Security Decade.

For more details on this, see Sören Hellmonds, Christian Mölling, Torben Schütz, Zeitschleife statt Zeitenwende.
Die Bundeswehr bleibt in der strukturellen Unterfinanzierung, in: DGAP Policy Brief 15/2023 (June 15. 2023)

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Preventing the Next War

The change in everyday life could be widely advertised, for example by using the motto: “Less­regulation, more investment.” This could include aten-year moratorium on non-essential regulations
and a preference given to investments in total defense. In addition to the armed forces and industry,
total defense also includes disaster protection andother elements that make the relevant systems more
resilient. This requires investment across the board.

career opportunities. A personnel strategy should focus on creating a sense of purpose. At the same time,it should give older officers an opportunity to takehonorable early retirement. This strategy should belinked to efforts to strengthen the resilience of theentire population. Consideration should also be given
to shortening training for the reserve. Here, too, thetraining of the Ukrainian army by the German Armed
Forces offers valuable lessons.

Armed Forces
It is obvious that the reconstruction of the ­Bundeswehr
at the current pace will come too late for NATO, even
if Russia’s reconstitution also happens slowly. Afterthe shock caused by Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine
in 2014, the Bundeswehr drew up plans in 2016 toachieve its NATO goals within approximately 15 years– in the early 2030s. Half of this period has now
elapsed without any substantial improvement. The
first of the three divisions earmarked for reinforcing
NATO’s deterrence will not be ready for deployment
in 2025 as planned. A second division planned for 2027
faces a similar fate.

Procurement and the arms industry
Traditionally, Germany does not have a defense­industrial policy framework to define cooperation
between the federal government and industry. Yet
Germany must now act swiftly to create the political preconditions that are necessary to ensure the­security of supply of the armed forces.

New planning: The German government must adapt
the procurement system and the force structure
to the goal of fulfilling its commitments in a ­timely­manner.9 It is important to clearly identify what is
feasible within the next few years. Priority should
be given to investments which immediately increase
Germany’s war capability, such as the procurement of
ammunition, spare parts, and logistics, as well as of
rapidly deployable capabilities such as small drones.
Building on the experience gained from training the
Ukrainian army, military training should be adapted to
the reality of the modern battlefield. Training should
include supposedly trivial activities that are currently overregulated or even prohibited, such as flying
tactical drones over practicing personnel or digging
trenches. A moratorium on regulations that are notessential for the protection of life and limb can generate more leeway for procurement and training, but
only if change filters down to everyday life.
In the long term, the greatest challenge for the
Bundeswehr is to recruit enough personnel, including
a reserve. While there currently is a shortage of new
soldiers, many who do serve with Germany’s armed
forces struggle with a lack of meaning or a lack of

9

Quantity over quality: When it comes to equipment,
the Bundeswehr should rely on tried and tested systems that can be produced quickly in large quantities.
Generally, the technical quality of existing weaponssystems will be sufficient to perform adequately
against Russia. Nevertheless, their further development can – and must – continue, but incrementally.
This also has the advantage of creating an alternative innovation path to risky large-scale projects whilebuying time to push forward with them. In any case,given the concrete danger to Germany and NATO,the planned Main Battle Tank System (MGCS) and the­Future Air Combat System (FCAS) will not be ready intime, as their production will only start in another 12
to 15 years.
Expand production capacity: It takes at least two
years to set up new production lines for tanks or missiles. Germany should now order all the materiel itneeds to fully equip its armed forces, including reserves and consumables such as ammunition or spareparts. While the industry gains investment security,
the Bundeswehr will obtain better prices. Industry
and, above all, its many suppliers, need such guarantees today if they are to considerably expand production in two years’ time. In addition, the government
and parliament should work to allow companies easieraccess to credit and to accelerate the approval process
for new factories. Refurbishing old ­materiel that is still
usable is yet another way to increase quantity. Germany and its allies should also build up a strategic reserveof raw materials – at national or European level.

See Debatte über »Kriegstüchtigkeit«. SPD-Fraktionschef geht auf Distanz zu Verteidigungsminister Pistorius, in Spiegel online (November 5, 2023)
https://www.spiegel.de/politik/debatte-ueber-kriegstuechtigkeit-spd-fraktionschef-geht-auf-distanz-zu-boris-pistorius-a-4a304059-b199-4158a46e-7fdc5ea1a042 (accessed November 8, 2023)

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Cooperation: As an offer to other NATO countries,
Germany could order more materiel – for instancearmed vehicles – than the Bundeswehr ­currently
needs. The goal would be to increase economies ofscale and interoperability. Other NATO countries
could then lease or buy the systems from a pool.
Resilience
When it comes to the resilience of society, too little isbeing done and planned. Although both the federal andstate governments are drawing up a new directive on
civil protection, they have not budgeted any funds forit. The budget for disaster relief is even ­facing cuts.10
Resilience initiative: Resilience happens at the ­microlevel, with the support of citizens, municipalities,
public institutions, associations, and businesses. It is
important to involve the public closely in the organization of the “Security Decade,” as a sense of ownership will strengthen people’s capacity and motivation
for resilience. Topics that are important for resilience
include urban planning, energy supply, transportationroutes, and much more that directly affects people.
Their participation can be ensured through competitions, education, training camps, and many other­interactive formats.
More resources for civil defense: The federal andstate governments must visibly increase their investment in civil defense, including in disaster andpopulation protection, security of supply, and the protection of critical infrastructures. A national spending
target for civil defense could be adopted to ensuresufficient financing. Public contracts to equip civil defense and critical infrastructure should be prioritizedwhen public contracts are awarded. This would apply,
for example, to the construction of roads and bridges
and to the energy supply. As an integral part of total defense, the relationship between the state, theeconomy, and society should be redefined, as many
infrastructures are privately owned.
Resilience internship: Instead of compulsory military service, there should be a mandatory internshipfor all people aged 18 to 65 living in Germany to givethem experience in areas relevant to total defense.
This would create an incentive to identify appropriate
areas in the private sector and society. At the sametime, it would help identify the activities that are necessary for the country’s ability to function. In this domain, everybody can find a meaningful role to play inthe event of a crisis.
10

Terms such as civil protection or civil defense are also used to refer to the different responsibilities of the federal
government, the federal states, and private actors. In this policy brief, these terms are used synonymously.

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peace, and the rule of law. It is ­nonpartisan
and nonprofit. The opinions expressed inthis publication are those of the author(s)and do not necessarily reflect the views of
the German Council on Foreign Relations(DGAP).
DGAP receives funding from the German
Federal Foreign Office based on a resolutionof the German Bundestag.
Publisher
Deutsche Gesellschaft für
Auswärtige Politik e.V.
ISSN 2198-5936
Editing Bettina Vestring

ABOUT THE PROJECTThe EDINA (European Defense in A New Age) project focuseson the European Defense Technological and Industrial Base(EDTIB)1 in the new era of European defense. It highlights theimpact of the Russian aggression on Europe’s defense industry
and analyzes the structural drivers and constraints that influence the future trajectory of the continent’s industrial base.

Layout Lara Bührer
Design Concept WeDo
Author picture(s) © DGAPThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons­Attribution – NonCommercial – NoDerivatives 4.0­International License.