December 2022

Colombia:
Country Focus

Country of Origin Information

Manuscript completed in December 2022
Neither the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) nor any person acting on behalf of the
EUAA is responsible for the use that might be made of the information contained within thispublication.
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2022
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ISBN 978-92-9400-729-2 doi: 10.2847/257040 BZ-03-22-090-EN-N© European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), 2022
Cover photo: Meghan Myres © El hijo de la inquietud, Traditional and digital mixed media
painting, 2022.
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. For any use or reproductionof photos or other material that is not under the EUAA copyright, permission must be sought
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COLOMBIA: COUNTRY FOCUS

Acknowledgements
This report was drafted by the EUAA. The following national asylum and migration
departments reviewed this report:•

Belgium, Centre for Documentation and Research (Cedoca), Office of theCommissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons (CGRS)•

Sweden, Unit for Migration Analysis, Swedish Migration Agency

Additionally, Colombia expert Jeremy McDermott was engaged as an external reviewer. Mr.
McDermott is the co-director and co-founder of Insight Crime, having has over two decades ofexperience reporting from Latin America. A retired military officer, he became a war
correspondent working in the Balkans, the Middle East, and then Colombia, including for theBBC, the Daily Telegraph, and The Economist. He specialises in drug trafficking, organised
crime and conflict in Colombia. His organisation, Insight Crime, is a think thank that seeks todeepen and inform the debate about organised crime and citizen security in the Americas
through reporting, analysis, investigations, and policy on challenges in the region.

3EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMContents
Acknowledgements............................................................................................................ 3Contents ............................................................................................................................ 4
Disclaimer .......................................................................................................................... 7
Glossary and abbreviations ................................................................................................ 8
Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 14
Methodology...............................................................................................................................................14
Defining the terms of reference ......................................................................................14
Collecting information.........................................................................................................14
Sources ....................................................................................................................................15
Research challenges ...........................................................................................................15
Quality control ....................................................................................................................... 17
Structure and use of the report............................................................................................................ 17
Map...................................................................................................................................19
1. Country overview .......................................................................................................... 20
2. Background and political developments ....................................................................... 222.1. Conflict background.......................................................................................................................222.2. State structure..................................................................................................................................23
2.2.1. Legislative branch ...................................................................................................23
2.2.2. Executive branch .....................................................................................................24
2.2.3. Legal system and judicial branch ......................................................................24
2.2.4. Security forces ..........................................................................................................25
2.3. Political developments in 2022 ................................................................................................. 27
2.3.1. Protests and social unrest under President Iván Duque...........................28
2.3.2. Election-related violence in 2022 elections ..................................................29
2.4. Humanitarian overview ................................................................................................................ 30
3. Implementation of the 2016 Peace Agreement with the FARC-EP................................. 32
3.1. Peace Agreement components and Victims Law 1448.....................................................32
3.2. Comprehensive System of Truth, Justice, and Reparation..............................................34
3.3. President Petro’s Paz Total plan (Total Peace) ....................................................................35
4. Overview of violence and conflict dynamics ................................................................. 38

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EUAA COI REPORT - COLOMBIA: COUNTRY FOCUS

4.1. Dynamics in 2012-2021.................................................................................................................38
4.2. Dynamics in 2022.......................................................................................................................... 40
4.3. Total Peace plan..............................................................................................................................44
5. Illegal armed groups..................................................................................................... 46
5.1. Presence ............................................................................................................................................ 47
5.2. Motivations and strategy for exerting control and targeting civilians ......................... 50
5.3. Main structures and activities .....................................................................................................52
5.3.1. Paramilitary successor groups, including the Autodefensas Gaitanistas
de Colombia ..........................................................................................................................52
5.3.2. Ejército de Liberación Nacional .........................................................................59
5.3.3. FARC dissident groups..........................................................................................64
5.3.4. Other criminal groups, organised crime and urban street gangs ..........69
5.3.5. Mexican cartels ......................................................................................................... 71
5.3.6. Venezuelan armed actors ..................................................................................... 71
5.4. Interaction dynamics between armed groups ...................................................................... 72
5.5. Engagement with security forces .............................................................................................. 75
5.6. Collusion between state forces and illegal and criminal armed groups ..................... 77
5.7. Civilians caught in the middle..................................................................................................... 78
5.8. Capacity and willingness of illegal armed groups to track and trace targets .......... 80
6. Impact on civilians........................................................................................................ 84
6.1. Homicides ..........................................................................................................................................85
6.1.1. Armed attacks, military operations, and civilian deaths ............................ 87
6.2. Massacres ..........................................................................................................................................88
6.3. Kidnapping.........................................................................................................................................89
6.4. Enforced disappearances ............................................................................................................89
6.5. Forced recruitment, including of children/youth................................................................. 90
6.6. Sexual and gender-based violence..........................................................................................92
6.7. Anti-personnel mines, explosive remnants of war, and unexploded ordnance.......92
6.8. Attacks on health infrastructure.................................................................................................93
6.9. Displacement....................................................................................................................................94
6.9.1. Intra-urban displacement......................................................................................96
6.10.

Confinement..........................................................................................................................98

7. Profiles ........................................................................................................................ 101

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

7.1. Social leaders and human rights defenders.........................................................................101
7.1.1. Nature of the targeting........................................................................................104
7.1.2. Geographical distribution ...................................................................................105
7.1.3. Main perpetrators .................................................................................................. 107
7.1.4. State treatment.......................................................................................................108
7.2. Former members of FARC-EP ..................................................................................................109
7.3. Victims of extortion......................................................................................................................... 111
7.3.1. Gota a gota loans................................................................................................... 114
7.4. People involved in crop substitution....................................................................................... 115
7.5. Journalists ......................................................................................................................................... 116
7.6. Ethnic groups................................................................................................................................... 118
7.6.1. Indigenous communities...................................................................................... 118
7.6.2. Afro-descendant communities..........................................................................120
7.7. People involved in the justice system, including officials and crime witnesses...... 121
7.8. Women.............................................................................................................................................. 122
7.9. Children and youth ....................................................................................................................... 124
7.10.LGBTIQ.............................................................................................................................................. 125
8. State protection........................................................................................................... 127
8.1. Justice system................................................................................................................................ 127
8.2. Reporting crime ............................................................................................................................. 128
8.3. Mechanisms for state efforts to protect individuals.......................................................... 128
8.3.1. Early Warning System (SAT, Sistema de Alertas Tempranas) ...............130
8.3.2. National Protection Unit (UNP, Unidad Nacional de Protección) .......... 131
8.4. Police and Attorney-General’s Office (Fiscalía General de la Nación, FGN) ........... 138
Annex 1: Bibliography......................................................................................................140
Oral sources, including anonymous sources ...............................................................................140
Public sources .......................................................................................................................................... 141
Annex 2: Terms of Reference .......................................................................................... 172

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EUAA COI REPORT - COLOMBIA: COUNTRY FOCUS

Disclaimer
This report was written according to the EUAA COI Report Methodology (2019). The report isbased on carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced.
The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed withutmost care. However, this document does not claim to be exhaustive. If a particular event,person or organisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has
not taken place or that the person or organisation does not exist.
Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particularapplication for international protection. Terminology used should not be regarded asindicative of a particular legal position.
‘Refugee’, ‘risk’ and similar terminology are used as generic terminology and not in the legal
sense as applied in the EU Asylum Acquis, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.
Neither the EUAA, nor any person acting on its behalf, may be held responsible for the use
which may be made of the information contained in this report. On 19 January 2022 theEuropean Asylum Support Office (EASO) became the European Union Agency for Asylum(EUAA). All references to EASO, EASO products and bodies should be understood as
references to the EUAA.
The drafting of this report was finalised on 21 November 2022. Any event taking place after
this date is not included in this report. More information on the reference period for this report
can be found in the methodology section of the Introduction.

7

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMGlossary and abbreviations
Term

Definition

AFP

Acuerdo Final para la terminación del conflicto y la construcciónde una Paz estable y duradera (2016 Final Agreement for Ending
Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace)

AGC

Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (Gaintanista Self-defense
Forces of Colombia); This report uses the term AGC. AGC is also
known as Clan del Golfo, Urabeños, Clan Úsuga; criminal armed
group having historic links to paramilitary groups

APM

Anti-personnel mines

AUC

Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defence Forces ofColombia); far-right paramilitary and drug trafficking organisationthat later demobilised and some groups fragmented and werelater recycled into other armed groups such as the AGC

Bacrim

A label created by the Colombian government for criminal bands
or gangs that include recycled former paramilitary groups but thatlack any apparent political agenda; also bandas criminales

banda

Organised criminal group, sometimes used interchangeably withcombo; depending on the context, can mean a small gang or ahigher level grouping in the gang hierarchy

Bandas criminales

See Bacrim

Bloque Oriental

Eastern command, a FARC dissident group led by Iván Mordisco;
Referred to as First Front in this reportcampesino

Small-scale farmers of peasantsLos Caparrapos

Also called Los Caparros but referred to as Los Caparrapos in thisreport; a paramilitary successor spin-off group of the AGC thatbroke away in 2017

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EUAA COI REPORT - COLOMBIA: COUNTRY FOCUS

Term

Definition

CITREP

Circunscripciones Transitorias Especiales de Paz (Special
Transitory Peace Seats)

CDF-EB

Comandos de la Frontera-Ejército-Bolivariano; sub-group of FARC
dissidents connected to Segunda Marquetalia; also called Los
Comandos de La Frontera (Border Command) (formerly La Mafia)

CEV

Commisión para el Esclarecimiento de la Verdad, la Convivencia yla No Repetición (Truth Commission)

CNGS

La Comisión Nacional de Garantías de Seguridad (National
Commission on Security Guarantees)

COCE

Comando central; central command of the ELN

combo

A term used to mean a gang

ComunesName of the political party formed by the FARC-EP after theirdemobilisation and transition into politics in 2017. The party was
originally called FARC, meaning Fuerza Alternativa
Revolucionaria del Común (Revolutionary Alternative Common
Force), but the name was changed to Comunes in 2021 to rebranditself and avoid usage of the FARC acronym associated with thearmed group

CNTI

La Comisión Nacional de Territorios Indígenas

DPC

Defensoría de Pueblo de Colombia (Office of the Ombudsperson)

ELN

Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army)

EPL

Ejército Popular de Liberación (Popular Liberation Army) formerly
Maoist/leftist armed group that demobilized in 1991 which became
the criminal group called Los Pelusos. Referred to as EPL in thisreport.

9EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

TermDefinition

ESMAD

Escuadrones Móviles Antidisturbios (Mobile Anti-DisturbanceSquadron); Riot police within the Colombian National Police

ERW

Explosive Remnants of War

Falsos positivos

False positives; Killings carried out by state security forces who
falsely reported civilians as guerrillas; mostly occurring in 20022006

FARC dissidents

Also called FARC-EP dissidents, post-FARC groups, Ex-FARC
mafia; formed by former FARC members who did not sign on to
the 2016 peace accord between FARC-EP and the government

FARC-EP

Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército delPueblo (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army);
left-wing Marxist-Leninist guerrilla group that fought against thestate of Colombia for 52 years until the 2016 peace accord

FGN

Fiscalía General de la Nación (Attorney General’s Office)First Front

FARC dissident structure also called Joint Eastern Command,
Bloque Oriental, and now includes factions that were under thecommand of Gentil Duarte; led by Iván Mordisco; Referred to asFirst Front in this report.

Gentil Duarte

The leader of a dissident faction of the FARC-EP which refused toadhere to the 2016 peace accord. He is now dead and the faction
he led is headed by Iván Mordisco under First Front.

gota a gota

‘drop by drop’ informal loans offered by loansharks run by armed
or criminal groups

HRD

Human rights defender

IACHR

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights

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EUAA COI REPORT - COLOMBIA: COUNTRY FOCUS

Term

Definition

INMLCF

Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses (National
Institute for Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences)

ICRC

International Committee of the Red Cross

IDP

Internally displaced person

JAC

Juntas de Acción Comunal (Community Action Councils,
Community Action Boards, or Neighbourhood Action Committees)

JEP

Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz (Special Jurisdiction for Peace)

Mafia Sinaloa

Mafia Sinaloa is a former incarnation of the Border Command
FARC-dissident group CDF-EB; local Colombian criminal groupmade up of members of La Constru and FARC

megabandas

Venezuelan crime syndicates such as the Tren de Aragua gangmestizo

A person of mixed Indigenous-Spanish origin

Military target

A term used by armed groups or the state to demarcate a person
deemed to be an opponent

La Oficina deEnvigado

Urban organised crime structure initially founded by Pablo
Escobar

OAS

Organization of American States

ONIC

Organización Nacional Indígena de Colombia

PDET

Programas de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial (Development
Plans with a Territorial Focus)

Los Pelusos

Also called EPL, formerly Maoist group turned criminalorganisation; referred to as EPL in this report.

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

TermDefinition

PNIS

Programa Nacional Integral de Sustitución de Cultivos Ilícitos(National Comprehensive Programme for the Substitution of Illicit
Crops)

Los Puntilleros

Paramilitary successor group with roots in AUC

Los Rastrojos

Paramilitary successor group formerly called Rondas Campesinas
Popularessapo

An informant

SAT

Sistema de Alertas Tempranas (Early Warning System);government alert system for risks of human rights violations; runby the Office of the Ombudsperson

SegundaMarquetalia

A dissident faction of FARC-EP which broke away from the 2016
peace accord in 2019

sicario, sicariato‘Hitman’; hired killer

Sinaloa Cartel

Mexican drug cartel

SIVJRNR

Sistema Integral de Verdad, Justicia, Reparación y Garantías de
No Repetición (Comprehensive System for Truth, Justice,
Reparation and Non-Repetition)

La Terraza

Organised crime structure in Medellín

UARIV

Unidad para la Atención y Reparación Integral a las Víctimas delConflicto Armado (Victims Unit)

RUVRegistro Único de Víctimas

UBPD

Unidad de Búsqueda de Personas dadas por Desaparecidas (Unitfor the Search for Persons Deemed Missing)

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EUAA COI REPORT - COLOMBIA: COUNTRY FOCUS

Term

Definition

UNP

Unidad Nacional de Protección (National Protection Unit)

UXO

Unexploded ordnancevacunas‘Taxes,’ ‘rents,’ or ‘protection fees’ charged by armed groups
through extortion13

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Introduction
This EUAA COI Country Focus report on Colombia is intended to provide an overview of the
key relevant issues for the assessment of claims for international protection. The reportprovides an overview of the armed conflict, peace process and status, main illegal armed andcriminal groups, key security developments and dynamics in Colombia during the reference
period, and an overview of main targeted profiles and state protection.

Methodology
Defining the terms of reference
The terms of reference for this report were based on a survey in which national asylum
authorities of EU+1 and IGC countries 2 had the opportunity to express their information needs
on Colombia. Requested topics and questions were then formulated into the terms ofreference to be addressed in this Country Focus report which can be found in Annex 2.
The reference period for this report is January 2021 to 7 November 2022, but also includes
general information to provide background and contextual information to the current situation.
The drafting period finished on 7 November 2022, peer review occurred between 7-20
November 2022, and additional information was added to the report as a result of the quality
review process during the review implementation up until 21 November 2022. The report wasinternally reviewed subsequently.
This report was finalised on 21 November 2022, however, on 28 November 2022, Indepaz, aColombian think tank that studies the conflict and has been used as a source in this report,
released a new report on armed groups covering 2021 and the first half of 2022. In an effort toensure currency, some selected information was included in this new report just prior to its
publication by EUAA.

Collecting information
This report is based on publicly available information in electronic and paper -based sources
gathered through desk-based research. This report also contains information from multiple
oral sources with ground-level knowledge of the situation in Colombia who were interviewed
specifically for this report. For security reasons, oral sources are anonymised unless they havechosen to be named in relation to the organisation represented.

1

EU Member States plus Norway and Switzerland
IGC participating states are: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the Uni ted
States.
2

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EUAA COI REPORT - COLOMBIA: COUNTRY FOCUS

SourcesPublic sources
Public sources in English and Spanish have been consulted across a range of types of sources
such as:
•

•

•

•

•

•

International organisations: United nations organisations such as the UN Verification
Mission in Colombia, UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR),UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); UN Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), and the UN Security Council; Organisation ofAmerican States (OAS) and its Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR);Internationally based civil society organisations who conduct human rights monitoringwith a focal point in Colombia such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International (AI),Frontline Defenders;
Colombian government institutions such as the Victims Unit, Ombudsperson’s Office,Attorney General’s Office, Ministry of Defence, Special Jurisdiction for Peace, Truth
Commission;
Local and international think tanks and analytical organisations that monitor and reporton conflict, armed groups, crime, and human rights, including the situation of ethnic
groups, women, and children/youth in Colombia, such as: Fundación Ideas para la Paz(FIP), Pares, Somos Defensores, Indepaz (Instituto de estudios para el desarrollo y lapaz), International Crisis Group, Insight Crime, and the Washington Office of Latin
America (WOLA), Colombian Organized Crime Observatory (OCCO);
US and European governmental publications that report on human rights in Colombia,
including the US Department of State (USDOS), Freedom House, the European
Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS),News media from both Colombian and international sources.

Oral sources
In addition to using publicly available documentary sources, multiple oral sources were
contacted for this report based on their field knowledge of the situation of conflict inColombia. Some sources who were interviewed chose to remain anonymous for security
reasons. Sources were assessed for their background, publication history, reputability, current
ground-level knowledge and experience, seriousness of their research, and recognition of
their credentials by peers, the media, and international bodies. Oral sources are described in
the bibliography in Annex 1.

Research challenges
Colombia has dozens of active armed groups and hundreds of active local gangs. This reporthighlights only the main categories and groups, but there are many localised sub-groups or
smaller factions which are too numerous to cover in detail within page and time constraints ofthe current report. Additionally, armed groups frequently change names or composition, forexample, as the conflict dynamics shift, leaders are killed, or groups merge or hybridize.
Information presented in this report captures only a snapshot in time and space. It aims to15

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

highlight only the most significant groups to illustrate general dynamics and trends; local
situations in Colombia are highly variable and under constant change. This cannot account for
all specific local conditions.
Obtaining consistent statistical information on human rights violations, crime, and conflict inColombia is difficult, due to the multitude of actors gathering information using different
methodologies and definitions. Information on violations such as homicides, displacement,
confinement, recruitment, targeted killings and other human rights abuses has been provided
from a selection of key sources from the government, the UN, and civil society in Colombia.
However, within these sources, discrepancies between local reporting on exact numbers
arises due to differences in approaches mentioned. Hence, it is not always possible to provide
harmonised figures, but rather provide an overall picture of key trends.
Due to the nature of the conflict, research and tracking of civilian deaths and homicides inColombia is not statistically clear among sources. This can be because of differences in how
forms of violence/victimisation are defined, or because of the difficulties establishing whether
deaths are related to armed conflict or criminality, as well as whether victims are civilians or
combatants. The Colombian National Institute for Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences(INMLCF, Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses), which is one of thegovernment entities that tracks homicides, defines homicides as being when a person kills
another, without distinguishing a motive. 3 Colombia’s post-conflict Truth Commission defines
people killed within the armed conflict as homicides, but does not distinguish civilian fromcombatant deaths. Information in this report presents information on homicides from a variety
of sources.
Note on terminology
This report uses various terms to refer to different illegal armed and criminal groups. There isa plethora of such armed groups and splinter factions, particularly within the dissident groups
which split from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP,
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo). For this reason, themost common umbrella terms have been used in this report reflect the main groupings ofarmed and criminal actors:
1) ‘Post-paramilitary’ groups such as the Gaintanista Self-defense Forces of Colombia(AGC, Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia) have their genealogy in the United SelfDefense Forces of Colombia (AUC, Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia), a right-wingparamilitary organisation. AGC is frequently called other names in sources, such asClan del Golfo, Urabeños, or Clan Úsuga. For the sake of readability and consistency,
all references to this group in the report use the term AGC.
2) ‘Guerrilla’ groups, refers to those of left-wing insurgent origin, but typically now
meaning the National Liberation Army (ELN, Ejército de Liberación Nacional) since
FARC demobilisation;3) ‘Post-FARC dissident’ groups, who are also called FARC dissidents or Ex-FARC mafia;
these groups splintered from FARC during the peace process and continue theirarmed activities now on a more criminal basis;
3

Colombia, IMNLCF, Forensis: Datos Para La Vida 2020, April 2022, url, p. 85

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EUAA COI REPORT - COLOMBIA: COUNTRY FOCUS

4) ‘Criminal’ groups is a term used to refer to those that are essentially organised crimegroups and gangs that have no particular political heritage.

Quality control
This report was written by the EUAA COI Sector in line with the EUAA COI Report Methodology(2019) 4 and the EUAA COI Writing and Referencing Style Guide (2019). 5 The report has been
peer-reviewed by COI experts from Belgium and Sweden. Jeremy McDer mott, expert on
Colombian criminality and armed groups, was also engaged as an external reviewer. Some
comments made by the external expert reviewer on the content or to address information gaps
have been integrated into this report and are cited as such. All the comments from reviewers
were reviewed and were implemented to the extent possible, under time constraints. The peerreviewers read both Spanish and English and were able to assess the quality of sources used.

Structure and use of the report
This report is intended to capture a general overview of the main issues relevant tointernational protection in the assessment of claims from Colombia. The report is structured tofacilitate the consideration and logical assessment of claims for international pr otection,
providing a general introduction to the country, followed by key issues of importance on theconflict, civilian impacts, state protection, and humanitarian issues:
•
•

•
•

•

•

•

4
5

Chapter 1 provides a brief overview of the country’s demographics and main
characteristics.
Chapter 2 provides background information on the conflict in Colombia and politicaldevelopments as of 2022, as well as background descriptions of the state’s structure,such as the legislative, executive, and judicial branches and the security forces. It also
provides a general snapshot of the humanitarian situation.
Chapter 3 gives an overview of the implementation of the 2016 peace accord with the
FARC-EP and current developments with President Petro’s ‘Total Peace’ initiative.
Chapter 4 considers the dynamics of violence and conflict from 2012 to 2021 to cover
the period of the peace accord and subsequent developments after FARC -EP’sdemobilisation, as well as developments and trends in 2022, with a focus on theelection of President Petro in summer 2022.
Chapter 5 focuses on illegal armed groups, including their territorial presence,characteristics, modus operandi, and interaction dynamics, as well as information on
the willingness and ability of such groups to track targets in Colombian territory.
Chapter 6 provides an overview of the types of human rights violations and civilian
impacts that occur in the conflict and that affect the population, with an emphasis on
recent years.
Chapter 7 covers selected profiles of civilians who are often targeted by armed andcriminal groups, such as social leaders, former FARC combatants, extortion victims, aswell as vulnerable groups such as women, children, youth, and LGBTIQ.

EUAA, EUAA Country of Origin Information (COI) Report Methodology, June 2019, url
EUAA, EUAA COI Writing and Referencing Style Guide, 2019, url

17

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM•

Chapter 8 deals with the state’s capacity to provide protection and justice for crimes
against civilians, including protection from targeted violence through institutions suchas the National Protection Unit.

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EUAA COI REPORT - COLOMBIA: COUNTRY FOCUS

Map

Figure 1: Map of Colombia6

6

UN, Colombia, 1 March 2026, url

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1. Country overview
Colombia is a unitary republic governed through elected democracy under a system withdivided governmental powers (executive, legislative, judicial) with a written constitution whichis the source and origin of all Colombian law.7 The country is rich in natural resources and oil
reserves.8 Colombia is the fourth largest country in South America and among one of the mostpopulated9 with 49 million people.10 It is a majority Roman Catholic country with Spanish as its
central language, along with 64-65 official indigenous languages. The population is majority
Mestizo (mixed Spanish and Indigenous) as well as White (87.6%), 11 with smaller populations ofAfro-Colombian (6.8 % to 10.6 %) and Indigenous (3.4 to 4.3%). 12 It has the second largest AfroColombian population in Latin America after Brazil.13 Colombian society is described as ‘highly
stratified’ between classes of wealthy and poorer populations, 14 with the second highest levelof inequality in the region.15
The country is bordered with Venezuela and Brazil to the east, with Ecuador and Peru to thesouth, with Panama and the Pacific Ocean on the west and to the North by the Atlantic Ocean
through the Caribbean sea.16 Colombia is organised into departments, districts, municipalities
and indigenous territories.17 There are 5 regions, 32 departments (departamientos) and theCapital District of Bogotá, and 1 123 municipalities (municipios).18 Below municipios there are
sub-divisions called comunas (urbanos) and corregimientos (rurales), which are divided intoneighbourhoods (barrios in urban areas and veredas in rural areas).19 At the departmental andmunicipal levels of government there is executive power in the leadership of governors andmayors, elected for four-year terms by popular vote. Each department has a departmental
assembly and municipalities have elected municipal councils. There are also 811 indigenous
territories with about 1.5 million people (3.4 % of the population). The land area covered byindigenous territories can range from 30 to 70 % of the territory of some departments.20 Theseterritories have autonomy and indigenous-focused institutions allowing greater access torepresentation for minority and indigenous communities at local levels although they remainchallenged in their implementation.21
For more than 50 years, FARC-EP, the oldest and largest guerrilla group in the western
hemisphere was in conflict with the government, until 2016 when a peace agreement wasreached. A range of other paramilitary and criminal groups also became active, and although
7

Globalex, Introduction to Colombian Governmental Institutions and Primary Legal Sources, May 2007, url
BBC News, Country Profile – Colombia, 8 August 2018, url
9
BBC News, Country Profile – Colombia, 8 August 2018, url
10
MRG, Colombia, June 2020, url; US, World Factbook – Colombia, [updated] 9 August 2022, url
11
US, World Factbook – Colombia, [updated] 9 August 2022, url
12
MRG, Colombia, June 2020, url; US, World Factbook – Colombia, [updated] 9 August 2022, url
13
MRG, Colombia, June 2020, url
14
BBC News, Country Profile – Colombia, 8 August 2018, url
15
UN OHCHR, Situation of human rights in Colombia [Year 2021] (A/HRC/49/19), 17 May 2022, url, para. 6
16
MRG, World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples - Colombia, June 2020, url
17
Colombia, Constitution of 1991 (Amended 2015), url
18
Colombia, DANE, Departamentos y municipios de Colombia, 15 July 2022, url
19
Medellín, Datos generales de la ciudad, url
20
OECD, Colombia, February 2019, url
21
MRG, World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples - Colombia, June 2020, url
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EUAA COI REPORT - COLOMBIA: COUNTRY FOCUS

the FARC-EP peace agreement has been significant, other armed and criminal groups now
perpetuate insecurity in the country where FARC-EP used to be present.22 Colombia is among
the most long-standing democracies in Latin America, despite a long history of widespread
human rights violations and violence, which pose challenges to the government’s capacity toconsolidate the 2016 peace agreement with the leftist guerrilla group the FARC-EP andguarantee citizen security.23

22
23

UN OHCHR, Situation of human rights in Colombia [Year 2021] (A/HRC/49/19), 17 May 2022, url, paras 48-65, 106
Freedom House, Colombia 2022, February 2022, url; BBC News, Country Profile – Colombia, 8 August 2018, url

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

2. Background and political developments
2.1.

Conflict backgroundIn 2016, the government of Colombia signed a historic peace deal with the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias deColombia – Ejército del Pueblo), marking the end of a 52-year armed struggle against the
FARC-EP that lasted from 1964-2016, and earning then-President Manuel Santos the Nobel
Peace Prize.24 The FARC-EP was a Marxist-Leninist guerrilla insurgency created in 1964 in thearea of Marquetalia (Tolima department) by small-scale farmers and peasants who fought tooverthrown the government demanding more land rights. 25 The 2016 signing of the Final
Agreement for Ending Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace (Acuerdo Final para laterminación del conflicto y la construcción de una Paz estable y duradera) was a significant
achievement, and the demobilisation of the FARC-EP and the creation of its new political party(Comunes) are among the most significant outcomes of the peace process, as well as thecreation of the 16 Special Transitory Peace Electoral Districts to increase political participationof conflict victims, and the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms. 26 The agreement
resulted in the demobilisation of 13 000 FARC-EP members and their transition to civilian life.27
Colombia’s 2022 Truth Commission (CEV, Commisión para el Esclarecimiento de la Verdad, laConvivencia y la No Repetición) findings about the period between 1985 to 2018 indicatedthat there were 450 000 fatalities due to broader armed conflict in Colombia [not only due tothe FARC-EP], 80 % of which were civilians. The main perpetrators were paramilitary groups(45 %), guerrilla groups (27 %) and the state (12 %). There were over 110 000 forced
disappearances, 50 000 kidnapping victims, and over 30 000 children and youth recruited toarmed groups. Sexual violence has been used widely as a weapon against women, children,
Afro and Indigenous groups and LGBTIQ persons. Forced displacement due to the conflict has
affected at least 8 million Colombians since 1985. 28
The Truth Commission noted that massacres and extrajudicial ‘false positive’ executions were
two homicide modalities requiring special attention. 29 Massacres are defined by the UN and
Colombian human rights NGO, Indepaz,30 as three or more victims intentionally killed byhomicide in the same time and place.31 The Ministry of Defence 32 and the National Centre for
Historical Memory define a massacre as the intentional homicide of four or more people in astate of helplessness in the same time and location. 33 There were 4 237 massacres between
24

BBC News, Colombia profile – timeline, 8 August 2018, url
BBC News, Who are the Farc?, 24 November 2016, url
26
UN OHCHR, Situation of human rights in Colombia [Year 2021] (A/HRC/49/19), 17 May 2022, url, para. 2
27
UNVMC/UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General (S/2022/1090), 27 December 2021, url, para. 106;28
Colombia, CEV, Truth Commission of Colombia – Executive Summary, July 2022, url
29
Colombia, CEV, Truth Commission of Colombia – Executive Summary, July 2022, url
30
Indepaz, Masacres en Colombia Durante El 2020, 2021 y 2022, [31 October 2022], url
31
New York Times (The), Colombia Sees Surge in Mass Killings Despite Historic Peace Deal, 13 September 2020,
url
32
Colombia, Ministerio de Defensa, Logros de la politica de defensa y seguridad, September 2022, url, p. 10
33
Colombia, Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, Bases de datos, n.d. url
25

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EUAA COI REPORT - COLOMBIA: COUNTRY FOCUS

1958 to 2021, with half being committed by paramilitaries, according to the National Centre for
Historical Memory.34 ‘False positives’ (Falsos positivos) were executions committed entirely byState agents, often in alliance with paramilitary organisations who falsely reported civilians to
be guerrillas, according to the Truth Commission. 35 In 2002, there was a government policy
enacted to reward high kill counts and a system of monetary compensation within the army inexchange for such killings. Promotions were contingent on high kill counts and the army
perpetrated murders and disappearances of thousands of innocent poor and mentally ill
Colombians reported as enemy combatant guerrillas. 36 ‘False positive’ executions numberedover 8 200 between 1958-2016, with more than 6 402 happening between 2002-2008. 37
However, Jeremy McDermott added that ‘False positives’ usually only refer to those killing
carried out under the Uribe administration [2002-201038], where extrajudicial executions wererewarded with promotions and days off.39
Most victims of the conflict were civilians, and wherein from mainly rural Indigenous and AfroColombian people.40 Since the peace deal was signed, over 9.3 million Colombians have beenrecognised by the government as victims of the armed conflict. 41

2.2.
2.2.1.

State structure
Legislative branch

Colombia has a bicameral Congress with 102 senators and 181 House representatives elected
every four years through a proportional representation system. 42 Former FARC-EP guerrillas
who formed the party Comunes after the peace agreement have a temporary guarantee offive seats in both houses until 2026. There are also 16 seats for peace constituencies(Circunscripciones Transitorias Especiales de la Paz, CITREP) that represent conflict victims in
167 of the most-affected municipalities and whose representatives must be certified conflictvictims and are intended to increase representation in these areas. 43 These Curules de Paz(‘peace seats’) are strategically located in the regions where armed actors have caused highnumbers of victims and represent a step forward for political participation, however, there
have been obstacles in implementation during the Duque government, 44 and there were34

Colombia, CEV, Truth Commission of Colombia – Executive Summary, July 2022, urlColombia, CEV, Truth Commission of Colombia – Executive Summary, July 2022, url; ABColombia, Truth
Commission of Colombia: Executive Summary, url; For the full findings in Spanish, see: Colombia, CEV, Hay futuro si
hay verdad, August 2022, url
36
Perry, J., Can the Government Police Itself? Colombia’s False Positives Scandal, 5 August 2022, url
37
Colombia, CEV, Truth Commission of Colombia – Executive Summary, July 2022, url; ABColombia, Truth
Commission of Colombia: Executive Summary, url; For the full findings in Spanish, see: Colombia, CEV, Hay futuro si
hay verdad, August 2022, url
38
BBC News, Profile: Alvaro Uribe Velez, 28 July 2010, url
39
McDermott, J., Comment made during the review of this report, 14 November 2022
40
Colombia, CEV, Truth Commission of Colombia – Executive Summary, July 2022, url; ABColombia, Truth
Commission of Colombia: Executive Summary, url; For the full findings in Spanish, see: Colombia, CEV, Hay futuro si
hay verdad, August 2022, url
41
Colombia, Unidad para las Víctimas, n.d., url
42
Freedom House, Colombia 2022, February 2022, url
43
Freedom House, Colombia 2022, February 2022, url; EU Election Observation Mission, Colombia 2022 – Final
Report, url, p. 23
44
WOLA, Victim Seats in Congress Could Help Advance Peace in Colombia, 11 March 2022, url
35

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

reports that some candidates withdrew candidacy before the elections due to security
concerns.45 There are also seats reserved for ethnic groups, minorities, and Colombians living
abroad.46 Freedom House described Duque’s governing coalition as a ‘fragile working
majority’ during his term.47 Congressional elections were held in March and the new Congress
was inaugurated on 20 July 2022.48

2.2.2.

Executive branch

The executive branch dominates the other branches of government through the powers of the
President, Vice-President, ministers, and directors of agencies.49 The head of government is
the President, who is directly elected to a four year term without re-election (since a 2015
amendment).50 In the March 2022 presidential elections, three main coalitions ran [(Pacto
Historico – leftist/Gustavo Petro), Coalición Centro Esperanza (centre/Sergio Fajardo), andEquipo por Colombia (right/Federico Gutiérrez)]. Former President Uribe’s Centro Democrático
did not participate, nor did Partido Liberal, one of the traditionally strong parties within
Congress.51 In early August 2022, Gustavo Petro (of the Pacto Histórico party) was
inaugurated as President of Colombia.52

2.2.3.

Legal system and judicial branch

Colombia’s judicial branch is composed of the country’s highest courts: the Constitutional
Court (Corte Constitutional), Supreme Court (Corte Suprema de Justicia) having jurisdiction
over civil and criminal law, the Council of State (Consejo de Estado) handling administrativelaw, Superior Judicial Council (Consejo Superior de la Judicatura), the Attorney General’s
Office (Fiscalía General de la Nación), and lower courts for administrative and civil matters.53
There are four government bodies that are crucial to the adherence to the rule of law bygovernment officials at all levels to prevent, investigate, and punish irregularities:
1) Office of the Attorney General (FGN, Fiscalía General de la Nación 54 ): an autonomous
organisation under the judicial branch that prosecutes crime;2) Office of the Prosecutor General (PGN, Procuraduría General de la Nación 55): acting as
the guardian of constitutional rights and liberties and the rule of law, the PGN may also
take action to hold to account public officials for discipline issues in relation to official

45

EU Election Observation Mission, Colombia 2022 – Final Report, url, p. 23
Globalex, Introduction to Colombian Governmental Institutions and Primary Legal Sources, May 2007, url
47
Freedom House, Colombia 2022, February 2022, url
48
UNVMC/UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General (S/2022/267), 28 March 2022, url
49
Globalex, Introduction to Colombian Governmental Institutions and Primary Legal Sources, May 2007, url
50
Freedom House, Colombia 2022, February 2022, url; Harvard Law School Library, Colombian Legal Research, 12
October 2022, url
51
EU Election Observation Mission, Colombia 2022 – Final Report, url, p. 7
52
Reuters, Former rebel Petro takes office in Colombia promising peace and equality, 7 August 2022, url;
UNVMC/UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General (S/2022/513), 27 June 2022, url, para. 3
53
FIU, Colombia, n.d., url; For a graphical chart of the judicial branch, see: Harvard Law School Library, Rama
Judicial del Poder Público, 12 October 2022, url
54
Colombia, Fiscalía General de la Nación, n.d., url
55
Colombia, Procuraduría General de la Nación, url
46

24

EUAA COI REPORT - COLOMBIA: COUNTRY FOCUS

duties.56 PGN is also the office primarily responsible for investigating allegations ofhuman rights violations by security forces (except in the context of conflict);57
3) Office of the Ombudsperson (Defensoría del Pueblo 58): an independent body with themandate to defend and protect human rights and liberties under the Constitution andthe law;
4) Office of the Comptroller General (Controlaría General de la República59): Supervises
the management and auditing of revenues, expenses and government transactions
and calls on the Prosecutor General to file legal actions that may apply. 60
The ordinary court structure has the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia),
followed by Judicial District Superior Tribunals (Tribunales Superiores del Distrito Judicial), andlower courts (Juzgados). There are also special tribunals for the military, for certain authorities
of indigenous peoples and through the 2016 Peace accord.61 Under the 2016 Peaceagreement, two key transitional justice mechanisms were developed, the Special Jurisdiction
for Peace (Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz, JEP) [which has jurisdiction over conflict-related
crimes 62] and the Truth Commission. Both began gathering evidence in 2018.63 Transparencia
Colombia reported that the judicial sector is among the main government sectors affected bycorruption, as well as the security forces. 64 Efforts to reform the judiciary have beenchallenged by problems of corruption, inefficiency, and impunity. 65
For more information see the section on the judicial system.

2.2.4.

Security forces

Colombia has the second largest military in the Americas, including intelligence agencies, andspecialised units for organised crime.66 The police are responsible for internal law
enforcement and fall under the Ministry of Defence, however, it also shares investigative
functions with the Attorney General’s office. The army shares ‘limited responsibility for law
enforcement and maintenance of order within the country,’ for example military logisticalsupport and security for criminal investigations in ‘high-conflict’ or ‘remote areas’.67 The
security forces includes the army, navy, air force and police, numbering close to 500 000
active members [approximately 300 000 in the military, marines, and air force 68]. Each has its
own intelligence branch.69 The Colombian military relies on conscripted males who are
required to serve unless they have an exemption; while those exceptions have expanded inrecent years, those who do enlist often ‘have no other option’. Crisis Group observed that
56

Globalex, Introduction to Colombian Governmental Institutions and Primary Legal Sources, May 2007, url
USDOS (United States Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 – Colombia, 12April 2022, p. 5
58
Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, n.d., url
59
Colombia, Controlaría General de la República, url
60
Globalex, Introduction to Colombian Governmental Institutions and Primary Legal Sources, May 2007, url
61
Harvard Law School Library, Colombian Legal Research, 12 October 2022, url
62
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 – Colombia, 12 April 2022, url, p. 5
63
Freedom House, Colombia 2022, February 2022, url
64Transparencia por Colombia, Así se mueve la corrupción 2016 -2020, November 2021, url; p. 47
65
Insight Crime, Colombia Profile, 21 January 2021, url
66
GITOC, Organized Crime Index – Colombia 2021, url, p. 5
67
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 – Colombia, 12 April 2022, url, p. 1
68International Crisis Group, Trapped in Conflict, 27 September 2022, url, p. 19
69
Insight Crime, Colombia Profile, 21 January 2021, url
57

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

professionalism levels are low among the rank and file. 70 The military is described as alabyrinthine bureaucracy with personnel, equipment, and budgetary constraints that hamper
law enforcement’s effectiveness and presence in Colombia’s difficult terrain. 71 The Global
Organized Crime Index similarly states that law enforcement is impeded due to the country’s
difficult geography, large terrain, weak international borders, inaccessible remote areas,
sometimes poor communication between intelligence and judicial bodies, and corruption,
which have permitted criminal groups to ‘consolidate control’ in certain areas where security
forces have difficulty reaching and maintaining a presence. 72 The government invests heavily
in the security forces (12 % of the general budget / 4 % of GDP). Under Duque, the security
response was focused on capture-and-kill operations against high value targets and heads ofarmed groups; despite this, homicides, massacres, and displacement increased between
2017-2021.73 Fundación Ideas para la Paz (FIP) 74 similarly stated that such operations have not
reduced crime.75 Adam Isacson, Director for Defense Oversight at the Washington Office on
Latin America (WOLA),76 reported that the mismatch between security spending and continued
insecurity is explained by chronic state absence in certain areas from rural borders to poor
urban neighbourhoods, and weak state institutions linked to the security sector such as the
judicial system.77
Corruption was reported among all government entities by Transparencia Colombia, and mostallegations of corruption were against the security forces between 2016-2020.78 There were‘alarming allegations’ of high-level corruption within the armed forces reported during summer
2022.79 Corruption in the ranks is also a problem, and there were reports that criminal groupenlist members of the security forces to inform on colleagues and collaborate or participate inillicit activities.80
With the election of President Petro, there was an overhaul of the top ranks, and theappointment of new commanders-in-chief forced the resignation of 52 generals from thearmed forces and police.81 Under the Colombian system if a general is appointed to head thepolice or the military, then all those equal or senior to him have to resign. Petro deliberately
70

International Crisis Group, Trapped in Conflict, 27 September 2022, url, pp. 19-20
International Crisis Group, Trapped in Conflict, 27 September 2022, url, pp. 19-20
72
GITOC, Organized Crime Index – Colombia 2021, url, p. 5
73
Isacson, A., Razon Pública, ¿Cómo pasar del gasto en defensa a la seguridad para los colombianos?, 18
September 2022, url
74
FIP is an independent think tank created in 1999 ranked among the most influential in the Americas, focusing on
peace and security and institutional capacity. FIP, Quienes Somos, N.d., url
75
FIP, 3 November 2022, Interview with EUAA
76
WOLA is a US-based research and advocacy organisation focused on human rights in the Americas. WOLA,
About Us, url
77
Isacson, A., Razon Pública, ¿Cómo pasar del gasto en defensa a la seguridad para los colombianos?, 18
September 2022, url
78Transparencia por Colombia, Así se mueve la corrupción 2016-2020, November 2021, url; pp. 43, 47; WOLA,How the Petro Government and Minister Ivan Velazquez can make Colombians safer, 3 August 2022, url
79
WOLA, How the Petro Government and Minister Ivan Velazquez can make Colombians safer, 3 August 2022, url
80International Crisis Group, Trapped in Conflict, 27 September 2022, url, p. 21; For example: El Espectador, Las
pruebas que salpican a cinco oficiales del Ejército en escándalo de corrupción en la Cuarta Brigada, 9 January2022, url; Cambio, “Esta es la puta guerra”: General reconoce alianza con narcotraficantes para enfrentar
disidencias de las Farc, 11 February 2022, url; El Espectador, Las sombras de la mafia que persiguen al general (r)Barrero Gordillo, 20 February 2022, url; See also: WOLA, How the Petro Government and Minister Ivan Velazquez
can make Colombians safer, 3 August 2022, url
81
SWP, Colombia’s Path to “Total Peace”, September 2022, url, p. 2
71

26

EUAA COI REPORT - COLOMBIA: COUNTRY FOCUS

chose junior generals in the police and military, those with clean human rights records, thus
forcing the resignations of all the more senior officers. 82

2.3.

Political developments in 2022

In 2022, Colombia held legislative elections on 13 March, presidential elections on 29 May,and the final presidential run-off election on 19 June 2022.83 President Iván Duque’s Centro
Democrático party governed from 2018 to August 2022 as a traditional right-wing/centre-rightparty with links to the ‘emblematic’ right-wing figure and former president, Álvaro Uribe. 84
Duque was elected in 2018 following a run-off election win against Gustavo Petro [who would
later win in the 2022 elections].85 According to the EU Parliamentary Research Service, both
Uribe and the Centro Democrático were ‘vociferous opponents’ of the peace accord
negotiated between President Santos and the FARC-EP and many Colombians ‘remain
dissatisfied with the leniency that FARC-EP members received under the accords’ such as
avoiding jail sentences.86 The political environment in 2021-2022 was highly polarised during
the presidency of Iván Duque with increasing popular demand for change. In 2021, a third
wave of social protests (Paro Nacional or National Strike) erupted in reaction to an April 2021
tax reform bill. The Bill was withdrawn but the protest movement continued into June 2022
and evolved to demand other issues such as denouncing government. According to the EU
Election Observation Mission to Colombia, the 12 months prior to the 2022 elections werereportedly the ‘most violent’ since 2014, with 100 community leaders and Peace Accord
signatories assassinated in the first six months of the year. 87 In early August 2022, Gustavo
Petro (of the Pacto Histórico party) was inaugurated as President of Colombia; 88 the first leftist
president elected in the country’s history. 89 Petro is himself a former member of thedemobilised leftist guerrilla group, M-19.90 He was elected under ‘mostly peaceful conditions’and won 50.4 % of the vote in a second round run off. The elected vice-president is Francia
Márquez, the first Afro-Colombian elected to the post in Colombian history.91 Petro has few
links to the traditional political centre-right establishment and has called for the maximal
implementation of the 2016 peace accord, announced peace talks with the ELN and otherarmed groups, re-establishing diplomatic relations with Venezuela, while establishing policy

82

McDermott, J., Comment made during the review of this report, 14 November 2022
EU Election Observation Mission, Colombia 2022 – Final Report, url, p. 6
84
Uribe is described as a polarizing figure who used the military to suppress the FARC during the conflict withthem; however his administration had alleged ties to the AUC paramilitary group and Colombia suffered some of
the most egregious human rights violations while he was president. COHA, Alvaro Uribe: The Most Dangerous Man
in Colombian Politics, 20 October 2017, url
85
Freedom House, Colombia 2022, February 2022, url
86
EU, EPRS, Peace and Security in 2019 – Evaluating the EU’s efforts to support peace in Colombia, May 2019, url,
p. 42
87
EU Election Observation Mission, Colombia 2022 – Final Report, url, p. 6
88
Reuters, Former rebel Petro takes office in Colombia promising peace and equality, 7 August 2 022, url;
UNVMC/UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General (S/2022/513), 27 June 2022, url, para. 3
89
Reuters, Former rebel Petro takes office in Colombia promising peace and equality, 7 August 2022, url
90
Reuters, New Colombia government to propose incentives to crime gang members who disarm, 3 August 2022,
url
91
UNVMC/UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General (S/2022/513), 27 June 2022, url, paras. 3-4
83

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

priorities around support for Colombia’s peace and reconciliation processes, addressing land
inequality/reform, rural inclusion and poverty. 92
Colombia continued to be ‘severely affected’ by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2021, with about
130 000 deaths and more than 5 million reported cases.93 Colombia had one of the longest
COVID-19 lockdowns in the world, affecting the number of Colombians in extreme poverty,
which grew by more than 3.5 million in 2020 alone.94 The pandemic weakened the middle
class in Colombia. It also increased common street crime which further eroded public safety, 95
and restrictions to control it increased poverty and inequality in Colombia. 96 The pandemic
also led to a momentary decline in reported killings however, once the health crisis settled,
security again deteriorated armed groups were empowered to step into the void left by anabsent state pre-occupied with COVID-19 and a locked-down population.97 These groups
strengthened parallel or criminal governance in certain parts of the country as a result. 98
Illegal armed groups took advantage of this in many rural areas and especially in Pacific
Coastal areas, where they enforced their regulations on the population through confinementand displacement and sought to expand control of territory, communities, and illicit
economies.99 They also enforced lockdowns and even delivered some aid to those in theirareas of influence.100 On 30 June 2022, the government announced the end of the COVID-19
health emergency. The pandemic generated a health crisis, economic and social devastation,
particularly for Colombians in situations of displacement, confinement, lost livelihoods, or
people migrating.101

2.3.1.

Protests and social unrest under President Iván DuqueFollowing decades of social, economic, and political turmoil, high unemployment, criminality
and inequality, these patterns were exacerbated during Duque’s presidency by COVID -19
restrictions and reports of government corruption. This erupted into social unrest and in a
2021 ‘National Strike’ (Paro nacional) protest that saw outbreaks of violence among
demonstrators, police, and criminal actors.102 Large scale protests occurred between AprilJune 2021 against Duque’s proposed tax reforms,103 economic inequality, police violence, andlack of protection.104 Although these protests were largely peaceful, there were reports somewere violent and included attacks on police officers, public infrastructure and involved
blockades.105 NGOs reported that protests were met with police force to break up
92

US, CRS, Colombia: Presidential Elections in 2022, 24 June 2022, urlFreedom House, Colombia 2022, February 2022, url
94
ABColombia, COVID 19 pandemic exacerbates poverty and inequality in Colombia, 20 October 2021, url
95
EU Election Observation Mission, Colombia 2022 – Final Report, url, p. 6
96
HRW, World Report 2022 – Colombia, 16 December 2021, url
97
ACLED, Understanding the Killing of Social Leaders in Colombia During COVID -19, 5 October 2020, url; Pares,
Plomo es lo que hay, 7 April 2022, url
98
McDermott, J., Comment made during the review of this report, 14 November 2022
99
ABColombia, COVID 19 pandemic exacerbates poverty and inequality in Colombia, 20 October 2021, url
100
McDermott, J., Comment made during the review of this report, 14 November 2022
101
UNHCR, Colombia: Monitoreo de protección (enero-junio 2022), June 2022, url
102
GITOC, Colombia’s National Strike, July 2021, url, p. i, 6-9
103
HRW, World Report 2022 – Colombia, 16 December 2021, url; Front Line Defenders, Global Analysis 2021, 23
February 2022, url, p. 30; for a timeline of 2021 events see: GITOC, Colombia’s National Strike, July 2021, url, p. 9
104
HRW, Colombia: Egregious Police Abuses Against Protesters, 9 June 2021, url
105
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2021 – Colombia, 12 March 2022, url, pp. 18-19
93

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EUAA COI REPORT - COLOMBIA: COUNTRY FOCUS

demonstrations, including use of live ammunition.106 The police response was described byhuman rights organisations as using ‘excessive, often brutal, force’107 or ‘harsh repression,’108
including using live ammunition.109 This activity was especially by the anti-riot police squadron(Escuadrones Móviles Antidisturbios, ESMAD).110 There were reports of hundreds being injured
and reports ranged from 25111 to 47 protesters killed, including of human rights defenders(HRD).112 Some NGOs claimed up to 74 deaths and 111 people missing during the strikes. 113
Investigations into the deaths of protesters have been slow.114 Organised crime and illegal
armed groups also took advantage of the social unrest and COVID lockdowns in certain partsof the country to indulge in crime, looting and extortion of the local population in the absenceof police.115

2.3.2.

Election-related violence in 2022 elections

Colombia’s 2022 elections were described by the EU Observation Mission as ‘peaceful for themost part’ although the impacts of armed strikes by the ELN and AGC during the year andincreased violence imposed in rural areas by armed groups impacted freedom of movement
and campaigning.116 ACLED reported that targeting of civilians increased in the months leading
up to the legislative elections, and in January 2022 reached the highest levels s ince theprevious elections in 2018.117 The Electoral Observation Mission of Colombia also reported 581
violent acts against social, political, and community leaders in the pre-electoral period of 20212022 legislative elections, an increase since the previous elections.118 Targeting of politicalcandidates and incumbent officials was also reported. 119 There were alleged plots toassassinate Gustavo Petro and candidate Rodolfo Hernández that prompted the cancellationof some events,120 as well as three separate attacks on candidates from the Comunes party,
two of whom were killed.121 Hooded men threatened presidential candidate Sergio Fajardo. 122
Pares reported that there were 163 victims of electoral violence, mainly public servants
supporting the election.123 Women candidates, activists, and human rights defenders havebeen particularly targeted.124

106

HRW, Colombia: Egregious Police Abuses Against Protesters, 9 June 2021, url; USDOS, Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices 2021 – Colombia, 12 March 2022, url, pp. 18-19
107
HRW, World Report 2022 – Colombia, 16 December 2021, url
108
Front Line Defenders, Global Analysis 2021, 23 February 2022, url, p. 30
109HRW, World Report 2022 – Colombia, 16 December 2021, url
110
HRW, Colombia: Egregious Police Abuses Against Protesters, 9 June 2021, url
111
HRW, World Report 2022 – Colombia, 16 December 2021, url
112
Front Line Defenders, Global Analysis 2021, 23 February 2022, url, p. 30
113
GITOC, Colombia’s National Strike, July 2021, url, p. i
114
Reuters, Families of protesters killed in Colombia face long wait for justice, 13 September 2021, url
115
GITOC, Colombia’s National Strike, July 2021, url, pp. 13-18
116
EU Election Observation Mission, Colombia 2022 – Final Report, url, p. 24, 41
117
ACLED, Colombia: Legislative Elections, 25 March 2022, url
118
Telesur, Colombia: 2022 is the Most Violent Pre-electoral Period on Record, 14 May 2022, url
119
ACLED, Colombia: Legislative Elections, 25 March 2022, url
120
EU Election Observation Mission, Colombia 2022 – Final Report, url, p. 24
121
Infobae, Partido de ex-FARC denuncia ataques con dos muertos previo a comicios en Colombia, 25 February2022, url
122
ACLED, Regional Overview - South America (12-18 February 2022), 24 February 2022, url, p. 2
123
Caracol Radio, Cada dos días hay una víctima de violencia electoral en Colombia: Pares, 13 March 2022, url
124
ACLED, Regional Overview - South America (12-18 February 2022), 24 February 2022, url, p. 2; GIWPS, ViolenceTargeting Women in Politics: 10 Countries to Watch in 2022, 28 January 2022, url

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2.4.

Humanitarian overview

Colombia hosts one of the world’s largest internally displaced persons (IDP) populations due
to armed conflict over the last fifty years, resulting in ‘severe protection issues’, forced
displacement, confinement, threats, killings, forced recruitments and gender-based
violence.125 According to UNOCHA, there were 7.7 million ‘people in need’ of humanitarianassistance in Colombia in 2021, excluding the 1.8 million Venezuelan migrants and refugees inColombia.126 The key drivers of humanitarian need in Colombia in 2021-2022 are reported tobe the increasing socio-economic needs in both peripheral and urban areas due to the
COVID-19 pandemic, the expansion and consolidation of non—state armed groups in someregions, natural disaster impacts, social unrest, and the need to integrate Venezuelan
migrants and refugees,127 which number 2.5 million.128 The humanitarian crisis in Colombia
continues across large areas of the territory due to violence, natural disasters, and mixed
migration causing high humanitarian needs particularly in areas most affected by conflict.
Emergency needs are high in the departments of the Pacific zone (Nariño, Cauca, Valle delCauca, and Chocó), Northwest (Antioquia, Córdoba, southern Bolívar, and Sucre), the borderwith Venezuela (La Guajira, Norte de Santander, Arauca, and Vichada), and the southern
centred departments (Putumayo, Caquetá, Meta, Guaviare, Amazonas, Guainía, andVaupés).129
COVID-19 negatively impacted food security and nutrition with 1.6 million Colombians in asituation of ‘severe’ food insecurity and 22 million Colombians with ‘moderate’ foodinsecurity.130 During the COVID-19 pandemic in 2019-2020, the share of the Colombian
population living in poverty 131 was 35.7 % (2019) and rose to 42.5 % (2020). In 2021, thepoverty level improved slightly (decreasing to 39.3 %). Extreme poverty also improved slightly
in 2021, moving from 15.1 % down to 12.2 % of the population living in these conditions.
Poverty in 2021 was still worse than pre-pandemic levels.132 Fifty percent of Colombia’s
workforce is in the informal sector and the pandemic and COVID-19 lockdowns caused
increases in poverty, food insecurity, and malnutrition as a result. 133
According to Doctors Without Borders, humanitarian organisations have access difficulties dueto the placement of mines by armed groups, as well as violence, displacement, sexual assau lt
and kidnappings, which are ‘rampant’ in conflict-affected areas.134 ACAPS also lists Colombia
125

DRC, Factsheet – DRC Colombia, 2022, url
UNOCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview 2022 – Colombia, url
127
UNOCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview 2022 – Colombia, url
128International Crisis Group, Hard Times in a Safe Haven: Protecting Venezuelan Migrants in Colombia, 9 August
2022, url
129
DRC, Factsheet – DRC Colombia, 2022, url
130
UNOCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview 2022 – Colombia, url
131
The Colombian government defines ‘poverty’ as living on $3 per day and ‘extreme poverty’ as living on $1.36 aday. Reuters, Colombia poverty declined in 2021, but still above pre-pandemic levels, 26 April 2022, url
132
Reuters, Colombia poverty declined in 2021, but still above pre-pandemic levels, 26 April 2022, url; Colombia
Reports, Colombia’s poverty rate down to 39.3% as economy recovers from pandemic, 27 April 2022, url
133
New Humanitarian (The), Why Colombia’s next president will have to hit the humanitarian ground running, 15June 2022, url
134
New Humanitarian (The), Why Colombia’s next president will have to hit the humanitarian ground running, 15June 2022, url
126

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EUAA COI REPORT - COLOMBIA: COUNTRY FOCUS

to have ‘very high constraints’ for humanitarian access during 2022, alongside countries such
as Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Ethiopia, Mali, among others. This is due to armed and criminalgroups, land mine contamination, clashes, poor roads, frequent natural hazards, drugtrafficking activity, and confinements, and remote communities in need. 135 For more
information, see the sections on confinement and displacement.

135

ACAPS, Humanitarian Access Overview, July 2022, url, pp. 5, 7, 10, 22

31EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

3. Implementation of the 2016 Peace
Agreement with the FARC-EP
3.1.

Peace Agreement components and Victims Law
1448

The Peace accord between the government of Colombia and the FARC-EP, titled the ‘2016
Final Agreement for Ending Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace’ contains six key
components:(1) Comprehensive rural reform in order to eradicate poverty, promote equality and encourage
the exercise of citizenship rights;(2) Broadening political participation and incorporating new voices;(3) End to the conflict with the FARC-EP and reincorporation of FARC-EP members into civilian
life; security guarantees in the fight against criminal organisations responsible for homicides,
massacres, and targeting of human rights and social advocates, such as paramilitary
successors and criminal organisations. Additional institutional measures are included for thispurpose such as the National Commission on Security Guarantees, Special Investigation Unit,
Elite Corps of the National Police, and measures to fight corruption.
(4) Addresses the problem of illicit drugs/crops and their association with drug trafficking andorganised crime;(5) Creation of the ‘Victims Accord’ that provides compensation, reparations and justicemechanisms for the investigation and punishment of serious violations of human rights andinternational humanitarian law and the clarification of the truth for victims of the conflict. The
system is composed of the Truth, Coexistence and Non-recurrence Commission, the Special
Unit for the Search for Missing Persons, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, the comprehensive
reparations measures and guarantees of non-recurrence, as well as verification mechanisms
to support the implementation of the peace agreement.
(6) Creation of a Commission for monitoring implementation of the peace agreement
composed of members of the National Government, FARC-EP, as well as international
monitoring components.136
The overall implementation of the peace accord has encountered obstacles. 137 For instance,
prior to becoming president, and as a candidate in the 2018 elections, Iván Duque was the136

Colombia, Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace, 24 November 2016,
url, pp. 7-8
137EU, EPRS, Peace and Security in 2019 – Evaluating the EU’s efforts to support peace in Colombia, May 2019, url,
p. 44

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EUAA COI REPORT - COLOMBIA: COUNTRY FOCUS

only candidate who was openly opposed the 2016 peace accords,138 and his Centro
Democrático party campaigned against it.139 Human rights organisations and think tanks
reported that under Duque, there was a lack of political will to implement it. 140 A quantitative
analysis of the Peace Accord implementation by the KROC Institute of International Studies,
which officially monitors the implementation of the agreement, 141 found that of the 578
stipulations in the agreement, 30 % have been completed, 19 % are in intermediate
completion, 37 % are at a minimum level, and 15 % have not yet been initiated. Over the past
three years, KROC observed that implementation has been ‘linear’ with ‘few changes in
implementation status’.142 A central pillar or the agreement is comprehensive rural reform andland rights, intending to close the inequality gap affecting rural areas. 143 Progress has been
made such as the creation of 16 special temporary peace districts for victims of the armed
conflict. However, components of the Peace Agreement have been ‘implemented
inconsistently’ especially those related to rural reform, political participation, illegal drug
problems, crop substitution and ethnic issues. 144 Gaps in implementation of the peaceagreement have contributed to increasing targeted killings in some areas of Colombia. 145
In 2011, in recognition of the scope of the population impacted by conflict, then -President Juan
Manuel Santos signed into law the Victims and Land Restitution Law (Ley de Víctimas yRestitución de Tierras) or Law 1448 of 2011. This law provides for protection and restitution forvictims of the armed conflict and survivors of human rights violations, including state abuses
since 1985.146 In practice, implementation of the law has remained slow with 12 300 rulings
issued out of 133 000 files claimed (September 2021). 147 Many victims are unable to accesscompensation due to lack of formal documentation of their land claims, or difficulties proving
their status as ‘victims’.148 Of the 8 million registered war victims, 12 % have received financial
aid in the past 10 years. The law has been extended to 2031 and the new Petro government
estimated it would require 68 billion dollars to make necessary reforms to allow for effective
reparations and almost a century to provide reparations to the current victims.149 According tothe Victims Unit (Unidad para las Víctimas), which monitors progress on the Victims’ Law 1448,
the following difficulties continue to create obstacles to implementation of protection andprevention guarantees: new victimisations, vulnerability of historically affected populations,

138

EU, EPRS, 2018 elections in Colombia: A test for peace?, May 2018, url, p. 3, 6International Crisis Group, Risky Business: The Duque Government’s Approach to Peace in Colombia, 2 1 June
2018, url, p. 1; FP, Can Colombia’s President Achieve “Total Peace?,” url
140
WOLA, Colombia’s Peace Accord is Not Weak, It’s Duque Who Insists on Weakening It, 6 October 2021, url; BTI,
Colombia’s Partial Peace and Its Discontents, 14 December 2021, url
141
KROC Institute monitors implementation in real time and produces regular reports on progress: KROC Institution,
Colombia Data Visualizations, n.d., url
142
KROC Institute, Five Years After the Signing of the Colombian Final Agreement: Reflections from Implementation
Monitoring, 2 June 2022, url
143
UN OHCHR, Situation of human rights in Colombia [Year 2021] (A/HRC/49/19 ), 17 May 2022, url, para. A.
144
OAS, IACHR, Annual Report 2021 – Chapter 5: Colombia, 2022, url, paras. 9-10; see also: WOLA, A Long Way to
Go: Implementing Colombia’s peace accord after five years, 23 November 2021, url; UN OHCHR, Situation ofhuman rights in Colombia [Year 2021] (A/HRC/49/19), 17 May 2022, url
145
Al Jazeera, Colombians call for end to impunity as activist killings continue, 16 July 2022, url
146
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 – Colombia, 12 April 2022, url, p. 12; AI, Colombia:
The Victims and Land Restitution Law, April 2012, url
147
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 – Colombia, 12 April 2022, url, p. 12; HRW, World
Report 2022 – Colombia, 13 January 2022, url
148
Justice for Colombia, Colombia extends Victims Law until 2031, 19 November 2020, url
149
Colombia Reports, Colombia needs $68B before 2031 for war victims to rebuild lives, 23 August 2022, url
139

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

and the weakness of state institutions to provide a sustained effective presence in certain
regions with large numbers of victims.150
Land ownership is highly concentrated and unequally distributed in Colombia, and this land
tenure inequality was one of the underlying grievances of the FARC -EP insurgency meant toaddressed through land reform in the 2016 peace deal. 151 Progress on land reform andrestoration of stolen lands has been slow.152 The state still does not have strong presence inmany parts of the country, including those where criminal groups made land grabs, working intandem with local elites and business interests. 153

3.2.

Comprehensive System of Truth, Justice, andReparation

The Comprehensive System of Truth, Justice, and Reparation and Non-Repetition (Sistema
Integral de Verdad, Justicia, Reparación y No Repetición, SIVJRNR) was created under thepeace agreement to provide for restorative and remedial measures for uncovering the truth
about the armed conflict in Colombia, guarantee justice in cases of serious human rights
violations, and provide legal security for those who participate in the process with the aim ofpromoting reconciliation.154 The mechanisms within the SIVJRNR are the Truth Commission(Commisión para el Esclarecimiento de la Verdad, la Convivencia y la No Repetición, CEV), theSpecial Jurisdiction for Peace (Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz, JEP), and the Unit for
Disappeared Persons in the Context of the Armed Conflict (Unidad de Búsqueda de Personas
Dadas por Desaparecidas en el Contexto y en Razón del Conflicto Armado, UBPD). 155
In the summer of 2022, the CEV presented its final report on the period analysed from 1958 to2016 taking into account 30 000 interviewees and more than 1 000 reports from organisations
among their sources.156 The JEP has been gathering evidence and prosecuting the mostserious human rights abuses by the FARC-EP and the military prior to 2016 and in 2021
ordered the government to implement plans in the peace accord to protect people at risk,
including former FARC-EP fighters.157 The JEP has accredited more than 328 000 victims. 158
Critics of the JEP from the right-wing and military establishment claim the tribunal will hurt

150

Colombia, Comisión de Seguimiento y Monitoreo a la Implementación de la Ley 1448 de 2011, “Ley de Víctimas yRestitución de Tierras”, Noveno informe de seguimiento al Congreso de la República 2021 -2022, 22 August 2022,
url, p. 86; See also: Canada, IRB, Colombia: Fact-finding Mission Report, March 2020, url
151International Crisis Group, Leaders Under Fire, 6 October 2020, url, p. 16
152International Crisis Group, Leaders Under Fire, 6 October 2020, url, p. 16
153
McDermott, J., Comment made during the review of this report, 14 November 2022
154
Colombia, SIVJRNR, 2019, url, pp. 2-3
155
Colombia, SIVJRNR, 2019, url, pp. 2-3
156
Colombia, CEV, Hallazgos y recomendaciones para la no repetición, August 2022, url; Insight Crime, Colombia’s
Truth Commission Signposts Road to Peace for President-Elect to Follow, 12 July 2022, url
157
HRW, World Report 2022 – Colombia, 13 January 2022, url
158
UN OHCHR, Situation of human rights in Colombia [Year 2021] (A/HRC/49/19), 17 May 2022, url, para. 58

34

EUAA COI REPORT - COLOMBIA: COUNTRY FOCUS

institutional morale.159 The JEP has launched 7 macro-cases dealing with serious human rights
violations and war crimes,160 and which affected hundreds of thousands of victims:161
1) Case 001 – Kidnapping, serious deprivation of liberty and other crimes by the FARC-EP(21 296 victims and 3 235 perpetrators);
2) Case 002 - Serious human rights violations of mainly indigenous, Afro-Colombian, andpeasant communities, women and LGBTI people in 3 municipalities of Nariño (105 241
victims);
3) Case 003 – Killings and enforced disappearances presented as combat casualties bystate agents (1 444 victims, 6 402 killed; 88 members of the security forces referred tothe investigation/prosecution unit);
4) Case 004 - prioritises the territorial situation based on events of the conflict that
occurred in the region of Urabá between 1986 and 2016 (43 385 victims);
5) Case 005 - Prioritizes human rights violations and serious breaches of International
Humanitarian Law in the context of the internal armed conflict in 17 municipalities
located in northern Cauca and southern Valle del Cauca (180 000 victims);
6) Case 006 - This case analyses the situation of victimisation of members of the politicalparty Unión Patriótica between 1984 and 2016, mainly by paramilitaries and stateagents, who acted in a large-scale systematic way with 5 733 people killed or
disappeared in attacks (297 victims);
7) Case 007 – Recruitment of children for use in armed conflict (18 677 victims of use by
FARC-EP).162
In March 2022, it announced its intention to launch three new cases, dealing with crimes
committed by the FARC, the military and state agents, and one on violations against
Indigenous and Afro-Colombians.163 In 2021, the JEP issued charges of crimes against
humanity and war crimes against a retired general, and a second set of indictments against 15
soldiers for their respective roles in killings and disappearances during the years 2002 to
2008.164

3.3.

President Petro’s Paz Total plan (Total Peace)

Petro’s new government has pledged to uphold the 2016 peace agreement, 165 has revived
peace talks with ELN, and is exploring dialogue with criminal groups under the concept of Paz
Total, his ‘Total Peace’ plan’.166 The Petro Government’s ‘Total Peace’ concept is one of its key
priorities and involves the implementation of the FARC-EP peace agreement in addition to
resuming peace talks with the ELN, and exploring ‘submission to justice agreements, through
159

NPR, Colombia’s tribunal exposes how troops kidnapped and killed thousands of civilians, 28 June 2022, urlColombia, JEP, Los grandes casos, n.d., url; WOLA, What Macro-Cases has Colombia’s Special Jurisdiction for
Peace (JEP) Opened? 12 March 2020, url
161
WOLA, A Long Way to Go: Implementing Colombia’s peace accord after 5 years, 23 November 2021, url, p. 47
162
Colombia, JEP, Los grandes casos, n.d., url; WOLA, What Macro-Cases has Colombia’s Special Jurisdiction for
Peace (JEP) Opened? 12 March 2020, url
163Foundation Hirondelle, First rift between Colombia’s peace tribunal and the victims, 14 March 2022, url
164
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 – Colombia, 12 April 2022, url, pp. 3-4
165
UNVMC/UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General (S/2022/513), url, paras. 3-4
166
Reuters, New Colombia government to propose incentives to crime gang members who disarm, 3 August 2022,
url
160

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

which other illegal actors cease violence in exchange for legal ben efits’.167 Within the plan,
there are ‘promises that the government will suspend the capture of members of armed
groups and offer benefits, such as reduced sentences and a guarantee of no extradition, tomembers who reveal information on narcotrafficking routes and hand over earnings fromillegal sources, such as cocaine trafficking.’ 168
Shortly after taking office in August 2022, Petro’s government proposed a multilateralceasefire with all illegal armed groups that agree to negotiate theirdisarmament/demobilisation.169 He also suspended arrest warrants and extradition requests
against ELN peace negotiators.170 Some of these illegal armed groups are seeking the sameguarantees offered to the demobilised FARC-EP under the Peace Agreement of 2016, as wellas the suspension of extraditions to the US for drug trafficking crimes. 171 AGC had announced
a unilateral ceasefire as an act of goodwill following Petro’s inauguration in August 2022. 172
The FARC-dissident group (Segunda Marquetalia) also announced its willingness to discussdemobilisation and disarmament.173 Colombia Reports indicated that ELN, AGC, some FARC
dissidents were interested in talks, but also organised criminal groups: La Oficina de Envigado(Medellín), Los Pachenca, and La Cordillera. 174 Independent media journalism site, La Silla
Vacia, stated that self-declared ‘unilateral ceasefire’ announcements by these illegal armed
groups are gestures that are ‘not easily verifiable,’ remain dependent on ‘goodwill’ of thesegroups, and although clashes between groups and armed forces may have declined recently,
the website contacted sources in eight regions of Colombia who reported that armed groups
continued to ‘kill and torture’the population.175 For more information see the section on conflict
dynamics, especially regarding Total Peace
Regarding talks with the ELN, Colombia’s High Commissioner for Peace and representativesof the UN and Norway met with the ELN in August 176 and separately with a FARC dissident
faction also in view of exploring peace talks.177 The government agreed to recognize thelegitimacy of the ELN delegation and suspended arrest warrants and extradition orders
against those members of the delegation.178 The ELN and Colombian government agreed to
begin peace negotiations in November 2022, with Norway, Venezuela, and Cuba as
observers.179

167

UNVMC/UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General (S/2022/715), 27 September 2022, url; See also: USIP,
Colombia’s New Administration Raises Hopes for ‘Total Peace’, 12 July 2022, url
168
FP, Can Colombia’s President Achieve “Total Peace?,” url
169
Colombia Reports, Petro proposes multilateral ceasefire with Colombia’s illegal armed groups, 28 August 2022,
url ; Guardian (The), Colombia says 10 armed groups including FARC dissidents agree to ceasefire, 28 September
2022, url
170
SWP, Colombia’s Path to “Total Peace”, September 2022, url, p. 1
171
Reuters, Colombia illegal armed groups propose ceasefire with incoming government, 21 July 2022, url
172
Colombia Reports, Peace talks with Colombia’s ELN guerrillas ‘about to be resumed’: Petro, 8 August 2022, url
173
Colombia Reports, Peace talks with Colombia’s ELN guerrillas ‘about to be resumed’: Petro, 8 August 2022, url
174
Colombia Reports, Petro proposes multilateral ceasefire with Colombia’s illegal armed groups, 28 August 2022,
url
175
La Silla Vacia, El cese al fuego de los grupos ni es verificable ni tiene a salvo a poblaciones, 10 October 2022, url
176
Reuters, Colombia advances towards restarting peace talks with ELN, 12 August 2022, url
177
UNVMC/UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General (S/2022/715), 27 September 2022, url, paras. 98-99
178
UNVMC/UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General (S/2022/715), 27 September 2022, url, paras. 98-99
179
Axios, Colombia to restart peace talks with last remaining major rebel group, 11 October 2022, url; Al Jazeera,
Colombia and ELN rebels agree to restart peace talks, 4 October 2022, url

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EUAA COI REPORT - COLOMBIA: COUNTRY FOCUS

On 26 October 2022, Congress approved a bill supporting Petro’s ‘Total Peace’ plan aimed at
dismantling illegal armed groups and allowing such negotiations to begin. 180 More than 20
groups had expressed interest in negotiating. 181

180

FP, Can Colombia’s President Achieve “Total Peace?,” url; El País, Las cinco claves de la ley de la paz total deGustavo Petro, 27 October 2022, url
181
Colombia Reports, Colombia’s congress gives green light to Petro’s “Total Peace” policy, 27 October 2022, url

37EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

4. Overview of violence and conflict
dynamics
This section provides a brief overview of the conflict dynamics from 2012-2021, encompassing
the transitional period after the 2016 peace accords. The second sub-chapter covers
developments in 2022, including the election of President Petro. For information on illegal
armed groups mentioned in these sections, see illegal armed groups.

4.1.

Dynamics in 2012-2021

Initially, after the signing of the Final Peace Agreement in 2016, there was a decrease in
conflict-related violence. However, in the years since, violence has increased again in regions
historically affected by armed conflict and the growth in crime represents the main obstacle tolasting implementation of the agreement.182 As the FARC-EP demobilised and moved out of its
traditionally held territory, warring factions of armed groups and criminal organisations have
expanded their presence and activities in these areas, competing for control. 183 Actors in theconflict after 2016 were no longer defined clearly as ‘guerrilla’ or ‘paramilitary’, as in the past,and have been recycled into new formations. 184 Since proliferating post-2016, these groups
are more fragmented and hybridised and fight over control of illicit economies and territories,
rather than for ideological purposes.185 In addition, the absence and limited presence of thestate and civil authorities in many of these areas has intensified disputes between these
armed groups and criminal organisations who vie for ‘social, territorial, and strategic control,
further aggravating violence against civilians, hindering governance and altering the lives ofentire communities’.186 International Crisis Group assessed that in a growing number of rural
areas, ‘violence and coercion are as bad or worse than before the peace agreement’ andcompetition between groups and associated homicides are at risk of worsening anddestabilising seemingly stable regions.187 Affected communities blame the absence and limited
capacity of the state for failing to deal with the situation; a state that is not seen as trusted.188
The UN remarked that there is an especially urgent need for the government promote the‘comprehensive presence’ of the state in rural areas of Amazona, Antioquia, Arauca, Bolívar,182

UNVMC/UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General (S/2022/1090), 27 December 2021, url, para. 48; International
Crisis Group, Tackling Colombia’s Next Generation in Arms, 27 January 2022, url
183
Front Line Defenders, Global Analysis 2021, 23 February 2022, url, p. 31; UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial:
Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 202 2, url, para. 6
184
Somos Defensores, 12 January 2022, Correspondence on file with EUAA
185
FIP, 3 November 2022, Interview with EUAA; Somos Defensores, 12 January 2022, Correspondence on file withEUAA
186
UNVMC/UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General (S/2022/1090), 27 December 2021, url, para. 48; see also:
Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021, url, p.
321; Al Jazeera, Colombians Call for End to Impunity as Activist Killings Continue, 16 July 2022, url
187International Crisis Group, Tackling Colombia’s Next Generation in Arms, 27 January 2022, url
188
UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, paras. 7-8; International
Crisis Group, Leaders Under Fire, 6 October 2020, url, p. 11; See also: HRW, Left Undefended, 10 February 2021, url,
pp. 68-122

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EUAA COI REPORT - COLOMBIA: COUNTRY FOCUS

Caquetá, Cauca, Chocó, Nariño, Norte de Santander, Putumayo, and Valle del Cauca.189 The
lack of state presence has also left human rights defenders, social leaders, ex-FARC-EP
combatants and others exposed to targeted attacks and killings.190 In areas where the state isless present and there are higher concentrations of violence, the provision of basic services
such as education, health, and justice are also lacking. 191
From 2012, when peace negotiations between the government of Colombia and FARC -EP
commenced, to 2016 when the peace agreement was signed, there was a drop in the overallnational homicide rate from 35.95 to 23.66/100 000 inhabitants) and a drop in the homicide
rate in the 281 municipalities most affected by the conflict (and most at-risk of post-conflictviolence).192 In 2016-2017, the national homicide rate remained similar at 23.66 (2016) and23.07 (2017), but in those 281 municipalities most impacted by the conflict, the violence began
to increase, marked by significant clashes between competing groups in the aftermath of
FARC-EP’s demobilisation.193 This was followed by an additional spike in violence and therising the homicide rate in 2018-2020 (during the Duque administration) in the most affectedmunicipalities. This was due to outbreaks of violence between ELN against EPL, AGC, andFARC dissidents, respectively; as well as violence between AGC and other paramilitary andcriminal armed groups.194 Multiple NGOs blamed the increase in violence and expansion ofarmed groups during 2018-2022 on Duque’s policies of refusal to engage in peace talks with
ELN, failure to confront paramilitarism and to dismantle the AGC, and generating theconditions for impunity.195 Colombia’s Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) war crimes tribunal
determined that 2021 was the most violent year since the government and FARC-EP signed
the accord, with the highest number of massacres, massive forced displacements, armed
clashes between security forces and armed groups, harassment of security forces and childrecruitment.196 Similarly, FIP indicated that 2021 was the year where armed actions have had
the greatest humanitarian impact on the population since 2015, mainly in the form ofconfinement and displacement.197Children have been displaced, confined, recruited, subjected
to abuses and sexual violence during the conflict also. This declined after 2016, but since thearmed groups have attempted to take over former FARC territory since 2016, conflict levels
increased in 2020-2021, causing an increase in conflict-affected youth.198

189

UN OHCHR, Situation of human rights in Colombia [Year 2021] (A/HRC/49/19), 17 May 2022, url, para. 32
Front Line Defenders, Global Analysis 2021, 23 February 2022, url, p. 31; Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against
Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021, url, p. 321
191
OAS, IACHR, Annual Report 2021 – Chapter 5: Colombia, 2022, url, para. 3
192
Pares, Plomo es lo que hay: Violencia y seguridad en tiempos de Duque, 7 April 2022, url, pp. 5-6
193
Pares, Plomo es lo que hay: Violencia y seguridad en tiempos de Duque, 7 April 2022, url, pp. 5-6
194
Pares, Plomo es lo que hay: Violencia y seguridad en tiempos de Duque, 7 April 2022, url, pp. 5-6
195
Colombia Reports, Duque obstructed peace in Colombia ‘deliberately’, 16 June 2022, url; El Espectador,“Gobierno actuó para hacer trizas la paz”: El balance de organizaciones sociales, 14 July 202 2, url; Infobae, “El
gobierno actual actuó de manera deliberada, para hacer trizas el Acuerdo de Paz”, informe de organizaciones
sociales, 14 June 2022, url; See the full report: PCDHDD, CCEEU, Alianza, hambre y guerra: El legado del aprendiz:
Balance del último año del gobierno de Iván Duque Márquez, June 2022, url
196
Colombia Reports, Armed conflict resurged throughout Colombia: war crimes tribunal, 19 February 2022, url; Seealso: Pares, Plomo es lo que hay: Violencia y seguridad en tiempos de Duque, 7 April 2022, url, pp. 9-11
197
FIP, Ni paz ni guerra, May 2022, url, p. 31
198
ACAPS, Colombia – Impact of the armed conflict on children and youth, 31 March 2022, url, p. 1; Colombia,
CNMH, Un 30% de las víctimas de violencia sexual en el conflicto armado son niñas o adolescentes, 19 June 2021,
url
190

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4.2.

Dynamics in 2022

Sources indicate that conflict patterns have remained largely the same since 2016 when there
was an initial drop in violence, followed by a reconfiguration of armed groups and growth ofcriminal groups disputing former FARC-EP territory and filling vacuums left by the FARC-EP’s
withdrawal.199 Violence is especially concentrated in the Pacific region largely inhabited byindigenous and Afro-Colombians, and the Department of Antioquia.200 The main departments
affected by armed conflict and homicides in 2021-2022 are: Antioquia, Arauca, Bolívar, Cauca,
Córdoba, Chocó, Norte de Santander [especially Catatumbo on the border with Venezuela 201],
Nariño, Valle de Cauca, as well as departments with lower population density like Caquetá,
Putumayo, and Guaviare.202 According to Indepaz, in relation to the impact of armed
confrontations and groups on the civilian population, communities and social leaders, themost affected territories number 250 municipalities, however, due to the interconnectednessof mafia groups, cartels, and economic and social power, the conflict ‘touches the whole ofsociety and most of the national territory’.203 The UN OHCHR produced a map and an index of
the municipalities most affected by violence and human rights violations during 2021. The map
uses five variables: number of verified homicides of human rights defenders, number ofverified massacres, rate of displaced people per 100 000 of the population, rate ofconfinement per 100 000 inhabitants, and assassinations of ex-FARC-EP combatants.
Municipalities were coded as level ‘critical’ (red), ‘very high’ (orange), or ‘high’ (red) for impactsof violence:204

199

Political Analyst, 2 September 2022, Interview with EUAAOAS, IACHR, Annual Report 2021 – Chapter 5: Colombia, 2022, url, para. 14
201
Colombia Reports, Catatumbo, 20 July 2019, url; HRW, The War in Catatumbo, 8 August 2019, url
202
ICRC, Colombia: Retos humanitarios 2022, 28 March 2022, url, p. 3; HRW, World Report 2022 – Colombia, 16
December 2021, url; OAS, IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders and Social Leaders in
Colombia, 6 December 2019, url, p. 30; Insight Crime, Colombia's Election Year Begins with Alarmi ng Escalation inViolence, 8 March 2022, url
203
Indepaz, Desafío a la paz total. Lo que recibió el gobierno de Gustavo Petro. Informe sobre presencia de grupos
armados en Colombia 2021 – 2022, 28 November 2022, url, p. 9204
See map in: UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, p. 6
200

40

EUAA COI REPORT - COLOMBIA: COUNTRY FOCUS

Figure 2: Index of the impact of violence based on variables of homicides of social leaders,massacres, assassinations of ex-FARC combatants, rates of confinement and rates ofdisplacement, June 2022205

205

UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, p. 46

41

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMThe Duque government of 2018-2022, like past governments under Uribe, denied that there
was any armed conflict in Colombia, contravening the position of the International Committeeof the Red Cross (ICRC).206 According to ICRC, as of March 2022 reporting, there were six noninternational armed conflicts on-going in Colombia in 2022:
1. The Colombian state versus the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)
2. The Colombian state versus the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC)
3. The Colombian state versus FARC-EP dissident groups [former FARC-EP who do not
accept the 2016 Peace Agreement]
4. The ELN versus the AGC
5. FARC-EP dissident groups versus Segunda Marquetalia [itself a FARC-EP dissidentgroup207]
6. FARC-EP dissident groups versus Comandos de la Frontera-Ejército-Bolivariano (CDFEB) [itself a sub-group of Segunda Marquetalia208]209
The UN reported that violence by armed groups in some areas of the country has increased in
2022.210 The UN described the security situation as being of ‘continued concern’ in areas witha historical pattern of conflict211 In the wake of the 2016 demobilisation of the FARC-EP and therelinquishing of their territory, rival armed groups have emerged and compete to control
illicit/criminal economies and territory.212 International Crisis Group explained that ‘hostilities
between the military and armed groups is no longer at the heart of the conflict in Colombia’
but rather the competition between armed groups for territory [and illicit economies] while
trying to avoid direct engagement with the armed forces.213 ICG described it as a low intensity
conflict with ‘extremely high impact’.214
Illegal armed groups impose social control over populations in areas they control or seek tocontrol.215 Social control in this context is defined by the UN as intimidation strategies,
harassment, pressure, extortion, and other actions by non-state armed groups and criminalorganisations with the objective to control the population and territories.216 Armed groups
retain the capacity to control large swathes of territory through demonstrated military capacity,communications, and financial capabilities as demonstrated by the AGC’s ‘armed strike’ inspring 2022 that saw the group threaten 11 departments of Colombia. A Political Analyst based
206

PCDHDD, CCEEU, Alianza, hambre y guerra: El legado del aprendiz: Balance del último año del gobierno de
Iván Duque Márquez, June 2022, url, p. 14
207
Indepaz, Cifras de la violencia en las regiones 2021, 2022, url, p. 21
208
Indepaz, Cifras de la violencia en las regiones 2021, 2022, url, p. 21
209
ICRC, Colombia: Retos humanitarios 2022, 28 March 2022, url, p. 3
210
UN OHCHR, Situation of human rights in Colombia [Year 2021] (A/HRC/49/19), 17 May 2 022, url, para. 2; UN
OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, para. 14
211
UNVMC/UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General (S/2022/513), 27 June 2022, url, para. 10
212
OAS, IACHR, Annual Report 2021 – Chapter 5: Colombia, 2022, url, para. 14; OCCO, A Criminal Peace. Mapping
the Murders of Ex-FARC Combatants, November 2020, url, pp. 16, 33; InSight Crime, 1 st Front (Ex-FARC Mafia), 13
July 2019, url
213International Crisis Group, Trapped in Conflict: Reforming Military Strategy to Save Lives in Colombia, 27
September 2022, url, p. 7
214International Crisis Group, Trapped in Conflict: Reforming Military Strategy to Save Lives in Colombia, 27
September 2022, url, p. 1
215
UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url; International Crisis Group,
Calming the Restless Pacific, 8 August 2019, url, pp. 9, 11
216
UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url; International Crisis Group,
Calming the Restless Pacific, 8 August 2019, url, pp. 9, 11

42

EUAA COI REPORT - COLOMBIA: COUNTRY FOCUS

in Colombia who monitors security, political, and economic developments and risks in
Colombia who was interviewed for this report stated that while they do not appear to pose athreat to the stability of the state at the current time, armed groups have sufficient power andinfluence to become a strong threat, especially in Catatumbo (Norte de Santander), Cauca,
Valle del Cauca, the Pacific coastal region, Tumaco, and the borders with Ecuador and
Venezuela.217 Jeremy McDermott remarked during his review of this report that while AGC
itself has little presence in the border areas of Ecuador and Venezuela, the threat from allarmed groups is in all departments along the coast, including Nariño.218
Violence and killings are often concentrated in areas where there is a limited state presence
in rural areas,219 concentrated in former FARC-held areas, and where these illegal armed
groups are competing with one another for control over illicit economies [such as cocaine
production, drug trafficking, illegal mining, land grabbing, etc]. 220 This dynamic has FARC
dissidents and other criminal groups willing to forge alliances to achieve their aims.’221 Other
factors contributing to the rise in violence include the slow stabilisation of areas formerly
occupied by the FARC-EP and proliferation of armed groups in their wake, expansion of illicit
crops and ‘diversification of organised-crime interests.’222 According to the OHCHR, weak ruleof law and lack of development alternatives in conflict-affected by violence has also
exacerbated the situation.223 Violence particularly and disproportionately affects social andcommunity leaders from the indigenous, Afro-Colombian, peasant and female population inrural areas.224 The distribution of violence is also closely aligned with the 170 municipalities
designated in the peace agreement for post-conflict Territorially Focused Development
Programs (Programas de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial, PDET 225).226 Threats made to217

Political Analyst, 2 September 2022, Interview with EUAA
McDermott, J., Comment made during the review of this report, 14 November 2022
219
OAS, IACHR, Annual Report 2021 – Chapter 5: Colombia, 2022, url, para. 14; OCCO, A Criminal Peace. Mapping
the Murders of Ex-FARC Combatants, November 2020, url, p. 16; HRW, World Report 2022 – Colombia, 16
December 2021, url; Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in
Colombia, July 2021, url, p. 333
220
OAS, IACHR, Annual Report 2021 – Chapter 5: Colombia, 2022, url, para. 14; OCCO, A Criminal Peace. Mapping
the Murders of Ex-FARC Combatants, November 2020, url, p. 16; HRW, World Report 2022 – Colombia, 16
December 2021, url; Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in
Colombia, July 2021, url, p. 333
221
InSight Crime, 1 st Front (Ex-FARC Mafia), 13 July 2019, url
222
OAS, IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders and Social Leaders in Colombia, 6 December
2019, url, p. 31
223
UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, paras. 7-8
224
UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, para. 14
225
PDET are municipalities identified for Development Plans with a Territorial Focus and are the main tool throughwhich the Colombian state conducts post-conflict development projects as part of the Peace Agreement. They areintended t increase state presence in areas in historically weak areas and support the participation andreintegration of demobilised Colombians. USAID/IOM, Toward an Integral Approach of the PDET, September 2019,url
226
International Crisis Group, Leaders Under Fire, 6 October 2020, url, pp. 6-7; WOLA, A Long Way to Go:
Implementing Colombia’s peace accord after five years, 23 November 2021, url; For a map of PDET zones andassociated physical violence, see: Colombia, Triage poblacional – subregiones y Municipios PDET Colombia 2021,
p. 6
218

43

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

female leaders who are outspoken make them ‘particularly vulnerable’ to killing and sexual
violence; they also report threats against their children and their extended family members.227
A 2018 report on urban security by the International Institute for Strategic Studies remarked
that cities are not unconnected from post-conflict security and that the absence of the FARCEP has created shifts in crime and illicit economies inside cities, and that cities are ‘at thecentre of new security dynamics’ as insecurity fragments urban territory with some areas
disproportionately affected by extortion, violence, and forced displacement. 228 Jeremy
McDermott commented that it is true that in rural areas violence and killings are often
concentrated in areas with limited state presence and disputes over illicit economies.
However he remarked that if there is one group with control in an area, homicides tend to belower because the armed group has hegemony and may not need to terrorise the local
population to keep them in line or control territory. In urban context, there are now few big
confrontations between large gangs for territorial control. There are neighbourhoods withhigher rates of homicide, but high urban homicide rates do not necessarily reflect the extent ofpolitical violence or organised crime inside cities– as opposed to reflecting regular street
violence. The state is more present in big cities and police have organized themselves by
districts / Centros de Attencion Inmediata (CAI) (street posts). However, they are less present
in slum neighbourhoods.229 Indepaz asserted that presence of the armed conflict in urban
areas is not new. In 2021-2022, it acquired greater relevance due to the strengthening of thelinkages between armed structures with national scope to local gangs/combos, throughrelationships of outsourcing.230
For more information on urban areas, see Homicides and displacement, as well as sections on
armed groups.

4.3.

Total Peace plan

Shortly after the Paz Total (Total Peace) announcement was made by the Petro government,
sources report that there was an immediate spike in violence through summer 2022 as armed
groups sought to extend and consolidate their territories as much as possible prior to any
negotiations.231 According to a Conflict Analyst based in Colombia who specialises in tracking
conflict and political developments in the country, in September 2022, homicides decreasedin the wake of the Total Peace plan announcement, but other forms of social control by armed
groups such as curfews and demands on local elected authorities increased, as these groups
sought to consolidate their local social structures of governance and demonstrate territorial
control. 232 A researcher for the human rights monitoring NGO, Fundación Ideas para la Paz

227

International Crisis Group, Tackling Colombia’s Next Generation in Arms, 27 January 2022, url; OAS, IACHR,
Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders and Social Leaders in Colombia, 6 December 2019, url, pp. 3738
228
IIS, Peace and Security in Bogotá, 2018, url, p. 6229
McDermott, J., Comment made during the review of this report, 14 November 2022
230
Indepaz, Desafío a la paz total. Lo que recibió el gobierno de Gustavo Petro. Informe sobre presencia de grupos
armados en Colombia 2021 – 2022, 28 November 2022, url, p. 9
231
Conflict Analyst, 4 November 2022, Correspondence with EUAA; FIP, 3 November 2022, Interview with EUAA
232
Conflict Analyst, 4 November 2022, Correspondence with EUAA

44

EUAA COI REPORT - COLOMBIA: COUNTRY FOCUS(FIP) also stated that following the summer peak there was a reduction over the following
couple of months, but that disputes and clashes between groups have been continuing. 233
The Political Analyst remarked that Petro’s ‘Total Peace’ concept is coming into the context ofa serious deterioration of security conditions exacerbated by the post-2016 vacuum left by
FARC-EP’s demobilisation, inability of the state to fill those spaces across Colombia’s territory,
and post-COVID economic decline.234 The Conflict Analyst remarked that at the moment, thePetro government is essentially seeking to reduce impacts of the violence on civilians (whoare largely located in the most conflict-affected areas / constituencies that elected him), but
not necessarily to change the fundamental dynamics of the conflict through a politicalnegotiation or disarmament.235 The Political Analyst also remarked that although Petro is trying
to change the narrative of the conflict, the ability of the Petro adminis tration to implement
security policy in the historically affected areas that severely limited by the state’s historicinability to exercise the rule of law and the varying control of the state in these areas. 236
Civilians continue to be affected by violence.237 In the last week of September, Centro de
Recursos para el Análisis de Conflictos (CERAC), which is monitoring the groups that havepublicly agreed to the ceasefire reported violations of ceasefires through incidents by ELN,FARC dissident groups, AGC, and by unidentified armed actors.238 WOLA also provided a listof security incidents and human rights abuses that have occurred in the transitional period
between the Duque and Petro governments. 239

233

FIP, 3 November 2022, Correspondence with EUAA
Political Analyst, 2 September 2022, Interview with EUAA
235
Conflict Analyst, 4 November 2022, Interview with EUAA
236
Political Analyst, 2 September 2022, Interview with EUAA
237
FIP, 3 November 2022, Interview with EUAA238
CERAC, Monitor del cese el fuego de grupos armados (Reporte semanal número 1 – período de monitoreo: del21 al 30 septiembre), 30 September 2022, url
239
WOLA, As Colombia Transitions, Abuses Continue, 2 September 2 022, url
234

45EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

5. Illegal armed groups
As mentioned in the introduction, the following section provides a brief overview of the main
illegal armed structures and criminal groups involved in conflict in Colombia and generaltrends in their behaviour. Not all gangs and smaller groups can be covered by this report andthe sources footnoted provide more detailed coverage. Sources provide a snapshot in time;groups are present in different strength/presence in different regions, with significant variation
by region/department, and dynamics are frequently fluctuating in very localis ed conditions
which cannot be captured by this report. 240 The presence of many irregular and criminal
armed groups in different regions constantly changes 241 There is also a high level of
uncertainty as several of these groups frequently change their names. 242
This report organises the groupings of illegal armed groups in Colombia under four main
structures: the AGC, ELN, FARC dissident groups (in particular the factions of First Front and
Segunda Marquetalia, and other urban gangs/criminal structures. 243 These structures havecommon characteristics making them difficult to eradicate: reliance on increased recruitmentof young untrained youth to their ranks; decentralised operations that allow ‘substantial
leeway’ to field commanders although they remain under apparent national hierarchies; asharp decline in the importance of ideology and a strong interest in exerting political control
over local communities, land, commerce, dispute mediation and punishment of detractors toensure territorial dominance.244
According to Indepaz, in 2021 and the first half of 2022, armed group configurations evolved
showing the AGC reaffirming itself as the main paramilitary successor group; the post-FARC
dissident groups have moved from atomization to convergence under several umbrella
structures with varying degrees of coordination, and the ELN has maintained itself as aguerrilla group. The main actions by these groups that have become prominent in 2021-2022
are the conducting of military operations using small armed groupings and the outsourcing of
criminal actions subcontracted to local ‘oficinas’, gangs, combos/bandas criminales, in bothurban and rural areas.245 These themes are further elaborated in the sections below.

240

EUAA observation on research challenges.
Norway, Landinfo, Temanotot – Colombia: Vaepnede grupper etter fredsavtalen, 6 April 2022, url, p. 6; Political
Analyst, 2 September 2022, Correspondence with EUAA
242
Norway, Landinfo, Temanotot – Colombia: Vaepnede grupper etter fredsavtalen, 6 April 2022, url, p. 6; Political
Analyst, 2 September 2022, Correspondence with EUAA
243
Pares, Plomo es lo que hay: Violencia y seguridad en tiempos de Duque, 7 April 2022, url, p. 8, 10; International
Crisis Group, Trapped in Conflict: Reforming Military Strategy to Save Lives in Colombia, 27 September 2022, url,
pp. 4-5244International Crisis Group, Trapped in Conflict: Reforming Military Strategy to Save Lives in Colombia, 27
September 2022, url, p. 5
245
Indepaz, Desafío a la paz total. Lo que recibió el gobierno de Gustavo Petro. Informe sobre presencia de grupos
armados en Colombia 2021 – 2022, 28 November 2022, url, p. 9
241

46

EUAA COI REPORT - COLOMBIA: COUNTRY FOCUS

5.1.

Presence

Illegal armed groups and criminal organisations continue to operate in Colombia, despite thepeace agreement with the FARC-EP. These groups are responsible for human rights abuses
and violence such as killings, sexual violence, executions, use of antipersonnel mines,
confinement and forced displacement, extortion, kidnapping, torture, massacres, humantrafficking, drug trafficking and illegal exploitation of natural resources. 246 Since the signing of
the peace agreement, the government has not fully responded to the territorial challenge ofproviding a comprehensive state presence and has pursued military solutions that have been
insufficient to curb the progressive increase in presence of armed groups.247 At the time that
the Peace Agreement was signed in 2016, the FARC-EP, guerrilla, and paramilitary groups
were mostly active in approximately 300 out of Colombia’s 1 123 municipalities. As of August
2022, the Office of the Ombudsperson classified 290 municipalities of being at ‘extreme risk’of abuses by illegal armed groups due to territorial disputes. The United States Institute for
Peace (USIP) observed that both the AGC and the ELN have more than doubled their territorialpresence since FARC-EP demobilised.248 In April 2022, Pares reported that 420 municipalities
are now reporting the presence of armed groups, touching 37 % of Colombian national
territory.249
Armed groups also ‘exercise territorial control in some areas of the cities’ such as Medellín
and Bogotá, exercising their presence through illegal economies and social control. 250
Violence is often concentrated in regions of the country where there is a limited state
presence.251 However, Jeremy McDermott remarked that this is not the case in the urban
context where there is a state presence, nor in areas such as Urabá, home region of the AGC,
where there is a significant state and security force presence, but the group still operates
there.252 Targeted killings tend to be higher in areas with the presence of multiple armed
groups and where there is rivalry between them. 253 Additionally, with Colombia having thehighest cocaine production in the world, the coca-growing and drug trafficking industry fuelthe armed conflict and its myriad criminal actors in competition with one another, often wherecoca is grown in Norte de Santander, Nariño, Putumayo, Cauca, and Antioquia. Armed groups
are also concentrated in areas where legal an illegal mining is occurring, 254 as well as areas ofstrategic importance such as ports, access corridors through the territory], coasts andborders.255

246

Pares, Plomo es lo que hay: Violencia y seguridad en tiempos de Duque, 7 April 2022, url; Freedom House,
Colombia 2022, February 2022, url; USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in 2021 – Colombia, 12April 2022, url; UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url
247
Pares, Plomo es lo que hay: Violencia y seguridad en tiempos de Duque, 7 April 2022, url, p. 58
248
USIP, Colombia’s New Administration Raises Hopes for ‘Total Peace’, 12 July 2022, url
249
Pares, Plomo es lo que hay: Violencia y seguridad en tiempos de Duque, 7 April 2022, url, p. 10
250
DRC, Colombia: Quarterly Report-Protection Monitoring (October-December 2020), December 2020, url, p. 22
251
OAS, IACHR, Annual Report 2021 – Chapter 5: Colombia, 2022, url, para. 3
252
McDermott, J., Comment made during the review of this report, 14 November 2022.
253
OCCO, A Criminal Peace. Mapping the Murders of Ex-FARC Combatants, November 2020, url, p. 22
254
Pares, Plomo es lo que hay, April 2022, url, p. 46-50
255
Political Analyst, 2 September 2022, Correspondence with EUAA

47

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

The presence of these groups also overlaps, as shown in this 2018 map by the European
Parliamentary Research Service.256

Figure 3: 2018 Map of Illegal Armed Groups Presence in Colombia 257

256

EU, EPRS, Peace and Security in 2019 – Evaluating the EU’s efforts to support peace in Colombia, May 2019, url,
p. 46
257
EU, EPRS, Peace and Security in 2019 – Evaluating the EU’s efforts to support peace in Colombia, May 2019, url,
p. 46

48

EUAA COI REPORT - COLOMBIA: COUNTRY FOCUS

Indepaz also produced maps of the various armed groups’ presence in Colombia in 2020 258
and in 2021, as in the graphical representation below: 259

Figure 4: Presence of Main Armed Groups in Colombia, 2021 260

258

Indepaz/Colombia Reports, Colombia’s illegal armed groups (maps) (2020), url
Indepaz, Cifras de la violencia en las regiones 2021, 2022, url, p. 21
260
Indepaz, Cifras de la violencia en las regiones, 2021, January 2022, url, p. 21
259

49

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

5.2.

Motivations and strategy for exerting control
and targeting civilians

All criminal and armed groups in Colombia are interested in exerting control overcommunities, land, commerce, and securing territorial control via coercion and control of local
populations.261 Violence by armed groups is very much over economic and military strategicinterests and clashes are used to maintain or dispute power and control. 262 In some areas,illegal armed groups behave as a traditional actor of the armed conflict, for example
exercising total social control of a territory, while in other areas, they may behave like criminal
bandits. For example, AGC behaves like a traditional actor in Urabá, one of its mainstrongholds. The ELN also behaves this way along the Venezuelan border where they havepolitical and physical control, but in Chocó, for example, they engage in more criminal
behaviour. FARC dissidents also do this in the Pacific department of Nariño. 263
Furthermore, the distinction between criminal and political violence is not always clear
because most armed groups are not ideologically driven anymore and they no longer
distinguish between enemies and allies on this basis, but rather, who aligns with their militaryor economic interests in that local area at any given moment. This has changed the relations
between different groups. Armed and criminal groups establish alliances of convenience, 264
for tactical and strategic reasons.265 AGC allies itself with ELN or with FARC dissidents,
depending on the area and the interests at stake, while they may clash with them in other
territories.266 Configurations can be the domination of territory, for co-existence, or tochallenge each other’s territory – but there is no longer a single organisational logic to theconflict – it has become fragmented.267 Former paramilitaries, FARC dissidents, criminal gangs
and drug traffickers are operating through networks of opportunism. 268
The influence of political ideology has declined as a motivating factor, in favour of pursuingillicit markets and territory.269 Sources indicated that the ELN is the group most likely tocontinue targeting on the basis of its leftist ideology,270 though local fronts vary in their261

International Crisis Group, Trapped in Conflict: Reforming Military Strategy to Save Lives in Colombia, 27
September 2022, url, pp. 5-6; FIP, 3 November 2022, Interview with EUAA
262
FIP, 3 November 2022, Interview with EUAA
263
FIP, 3 November 2022, Interview with EUAA
264
FIP, 3 November 2022, Interview with EUAA; Gil Ramírez, M., Interview with EUAA, 21 November 2022
265
Somos Defensores, 12 January 2022, Correspondence on file with EUAA
266
Somos Defensores, 12 January 2022, Correspondence on file with EUAA; FIP, 3 November 2022, Interview with
EUAA
267
FIP, 3 November 2022, Interview with EUAA; Gil Ramírez, M., Interview with EUAA, 21 November 2022
268
CODHES, 14 January 2022, Correspondence on file with EUAA
269
International Crisis Group, Trapped in Conflict: Reforming Military Strategy to Save Lives in Colombia, 27
September 2022, url, p. 6; International Crisis Group, Tackling Colombia’s Next Generation in Arms, 27 January2022, url; FIP, 3 November 2022, Interview with EUAA
270
International Crisis Group, Trapped in Conflict: Reforming Military Strategy to Save Lives in Colombia, 27
September 2022, url, p. 6; International Crisis Group, Tackling Colombia’s Next Generation in Arms, 27 January2022, url; Political Analyst, 2 September 2022, Correspondence with EUAA

50

EUAA COI REPORT - COLOMBIA: COUNTRY FOCUS

adherence.271 The Political Analyst noted however that even targets with the ideologicalalignment to the ELN will be targeted if they become a threat to ELN’s objectives. 272
Armed groups ‘try to avoid direct confrontation with the military’ and instead achieve control
and expansion of space through intimidation and co-opting of the local population througheconomic means such as paid recruitment of youth in remote areas, or co-opting farmers
seeking to substitute illicit crops. Additionally ‘coercive measures’ include intimidating local
community bodies such as the Communal Action Councils (JAC, Juntas de Acción
Comunal).273 In urban areas, organised crime groups also exert social control throughextortion, recruitment of children, sexual violence, and confrontations between groups. 274
Sources indicate that generally criminal groups target those that they see as an annoyance o r
an obstacle to their economic objectives in the area, or who infringe on the group’s
interests.275 Civilians who are deemed to be an obstacle to the control of illicit economies andterritory are forced out of their homes and those who oppose or resist the control or
expansion of these groups, such as social leaders or demobilised FARC-EP combatants aretargeted.276 Targets may include a whole community in a strategic area, or specific profiles
such as social leaders and human rights defenders, demobilised FARC-EP fighters, indigenous
communities, children and youth, journalists, state officials and security force members. 277 The
UN similarly reported that one of the most significant patterns in homicides human rights
defenders by non-state groups in rural areas consists of assassinating community leaders inorder to gain control of illicit economics, appropriate profitable illegal economic activities andcontrol drug trafficking routes and extractive projects. 278 The killings of social leaders andhuman rights defenders poses a threat to the peace process as communities lose expertise,relationships, and peace promoters, and others are discouraged from taking up the function orcooperating with authorities.279
All main armed groups retain a capacity to engage in sub-contracting to smaller local groups,
depending on the region and the interests at stake, in order to expand their influence. 280
According to Indepaz, in 2021-2022, outsourcing as a strategy for territorial control has
continued. Local armed structures, generally in urban areas, have been threatened due toleveraging outsourcing of criminal activities by criminal groups with national reach. 281

271International Crisis Group, Trapped in Conflict: Reforming Military Strategy to Save Lives in Colombia, 27
September 2022, url, p. 6; International Crisis Group, Tackling Colombia’s Next Generation in Arms, 27 January2022, url
272
Political Analyst, 2 September 2022, Correspondence with EUAA
273
International Crisis Group, Trapped in Conflict: Reforming Military Strategy to Save Lives in Colombia, 27
September 2022, url, pp. 6-7
274
Gil Ramírez, M., Interview with EUAA, 21 November 2022
275
A Professor and International Crisis Group Senior Analyst cited in Canada, IRB, Colombia: Targets of criminalgroups (2019-June 2021) [COL200703.E], 13 August 2021, url
276
OCCO, A Criminal Peace. Mapping the Murders of Ex-FARC Combatants, November 2020, url, p. 33
277
Canada, IRB, Colombia: Targets of criminal groups (COL200703.E), 13 August 2021, url
278
UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, para. 35
279
Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021, url,
p. 321
280
FIP, 3 November 2022, Interview with EUAA; Political Analyst, 2 September 2022, Interview with EUAA
281
Indepaz, Desafío a la paz total. Lo que recibió el gobierno de Gustavo Petro. Informe sobre presencia de grupos
armados en Colombia 2021 – 2022, 28 November 2022, url, p. 11

51

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

5.3.
5.3.1.

Main structures and activities
Paramilitary successor groups, including the Autodefensas
Gaitanistas de Colombia

Paramilitary successor groups are illegal armed groups also called narco-paramilitaries,
bacrim (bandas criminales, criminal bands) that have been made up of recycled groups
through difference generations and cycles of violence in Colombia. 282 They originate fromright-wing paramilitary organisations that participated in a flawed demobilisation process in
2003-2006. 283 In 2003, then-President Uribe had made an agreement with the AUC
paramilitary group to demobilise 30 000 paramilitary fighters, some of whom thenregrouped284 splintered, re-organised, and continued activity by reconfiguring into newgroups.285 Indepaz reported that there were 22 such groups across 27 departments and 291
municipalities in 2020,286 while Pares reported that AGC was present in 241 municipalities .287
In 2022, the government stated that they are present in 253 municipalities.288 By contrast,
Indepaz reported an increase to 345 municipalities in 27 departments during 2021-2022.289
Human Rights Watch reported that paramilitary successor groups commit war crimes andserious human rights violations, including killings, disappearances, and rapes.290 They are
frequently in conflict with other illegal armed groups, as well as with each other. 291 Paramilitary
successor groups also offer private security and engage in counterinsurgency; capture state
institutions, exercise private justice, forcibly appropriate assets, resources and income; andpractice systematic corruption through their businesses and business allies; as well as
attempting to promote and establish linkages with politicians. 292
Today, the Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas deColombia, AGC) [also called Clan del Golfo,293 Urabeños,294 Clan Úsuga295] is the largest narco-

282

FIP 3 November 2022, Interview with EUAA
HRW, World Report 2022 – Colombia, 16 December 2021, url
284
Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021, url,
p. 323285
HRW, World Report 2022 – Colombia, 16 December 2021, url
286
Indepaz, Los focos del conflicto en Colombia, September 2021, url, p. 6; See also: Pares, Plomo es lo que hay:
Violencia y seguridad en tiempos de Duque, 7 April 2022, url, pp. 40-42; FIP, Ni paz ni guerra, May 2022, url, pp.
25-29
287
Pares, Plomo es lo que hay, April 2022, url, p. 41
288
UNHCR, Colombia: Monitoreo de protección (enero- junio 2022), June 2022, url
289
Indepaz, Desafío a la paz total. Lo que recibió el gobierno de Gustavo Petro. Informe sobre presencia de grupos
armados en Colombia 2021 – 2022, 28 November 2022, url, p. 6 [Tabla 1]
290
HRW, World Report 2022 – Colombia, 16 December 2021, url
291
Indepaz, Los focos del conflicto en Colombia, September 2021, url, p. 43
292
Indepaz, Desafío a la paz total. Lo que recibió el gobierno de Gustavo Petro. Informe sobre presencia degrupos armados en Colombia 2021 – 2022, 28 November 2022, url, p. 9
293
UNVMC/UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General (S/2022/513), 27 June 2022, url, 11294
OCCO, A Criminal Peace. Mapping the Murders of Ex-FARC Combatants, November 2020, url, p. 6295
Colombia Reports, Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AGC) / Gulf Clan, 25 October, 2021, url; Indepaz,
Los focos del conflicto en Colombia, September 2021, url, p. 49; InSightCrime, Urabeños – Gulf Clan, 24 October
2021, url
283

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paramilitary successor group,296 though membership estimates vary from 1 700 297 to 3 260
combatants.298 Other successor groups, some of which are AGC associates, are Los Rastrojos,
Los Pachencas, EPL [also called Los Pelusos 299], Los Caparrapos, Los Puntilleros, Los
Contadores, and La Constru, among others.300 The AGC is responsible for committing 80 % ofrecorded narcoparamilitary activities and affected 25 departments and 237 municipalities in
2020.301 Indepaz reported the following table of paramilitary successor group activity per
department/municipality over the period of 2016-2022: 302
Year
Departments
Municipalities

2016
31
351

2017
30
310

2018
27
274

2019
27
258

2020
25
292

2021
27
332

2022
27
345

Indepaz provided a table of the number of departments and municpalities affected byparamilitary successor groups in 2021-2022:303
Group

Number of
departments in
2021

Number ofmunicipalities in
2021

Number of
departments in
2022 (first half)

Number ofmunicipalities in
2022 (first half)

AGC
EPL
La Oficina
Los Pachencas
Los Puntilleros
Los Rastrojos
Los Caparrapos
Los Consteños
Los Pachelly
La Constru
Los Contadores
Los Shotas
Los Espartanos

25
4
5
4
3
5
2
1
1
1
1
2
1

279
26
19
17
14
15
11
9
9
6
3
3
2

25
3
5
4
2
4
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

326
9
16
11
6
7
2
7
4
1
1
2
2

Of note, the ‘Aguilas Negras’ (Black Eagles) was an old group previously linked to the AUC,
but after demobilisation in 2006 the name began to be used as a brand by criminalorganisations under which to issue death threats, though it does not currently appear tooperate as a group as such; however, it was reported that threats continue to be issued under
296

HRW, World Report 2022 – Colombia, 16 December 2021, url; Indepaz, Los focos del conflicto en Colombia,
September 2021, url, p. 43
297
Indepaz, Los focos del conflicto en Colombia, September 2021, url, p. 43
298
Pares, Plomo es lo que hay, April 2022, url, p. 41
299
OCCO, A Criminal Peace. Mapping the Murders of Ex-FARC Combatants, November 2020, url, p. 6
300
Indepaz, Cifras de la violencia en las regiones 2021, 2022, url, p. 21, 43; See also for a full list of other smaller
narcoparamilitaries: Indepaz, Los focos del conflicto en Colombia, September 2021, url, p. 56
301
Indepaz, Los focos del conflicto en Colombia, September 2021, url, p. 43
302
For a detailed listing of the affected areas, see the full report, including annees. Indepaz, Desafío a la paz total.
Lo que recibió el gobierno de Gustavo Petro. Informe sobre presencia de grupos armados en Colombia 2021 –
2022, 28 November 2022, url, p. 10
303
Indepaz, Desafío a la paz total. Lo que recibió el gobierno de Gustavo Petro. Informe sobre presencia de grupos
armados en Colombia 2021 – 2022, 28 November 2022, url, p. 11

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the name in 20 of Colombia’s 32 departments.304 Professor Gil Ramírez stated that the name isalso used by some members of the security forces to launch threats against political andsocial targets, including sex workers, and for ‘social cleansing’ against people considered
immoral. No logistical centre has ever been found, but pamphlets continue to appear issuingthreats.305
AGC, as the largest paramilitary successor group, operates characteristically by subcontracting out to smaller groups.306 It operates as a criminal network with some of its cells
under direct control and others operating as semi-autonomous members of the ‘franchise’,307
or with a high degree of autonomy.308 The group has a strong nucleus in Urabá which extends
to other areas of the country through subcontracting out to local criminal structures who use
the brand and anchor control of activities such as drug trafficking and contract killing. 309 The
AGC grew in size after FARC-EP’s demobilisation, and is now present in much of Colombia’s
north from Chocó to the Catatumbo region.310
AGC clashes with ELN, FARC dissidents, and other paramilitary successor groups. 311 AGC has
a stronghold in Urabá,312 and its activities are concentrated in the Caribbean and Pacificcoastal departments, Córdoba, Sucre, Bolívar, Atlántico, Magdalena, San Andrés, Chocó, andAntioquia.313 The AGC continues to maintain the capacity to regulate daily life in communities
where it has strength or military strongholds (such as Urabá, Chocó, or southern Córdoba),
imposing parallel justice and settling disputes. 314 The extent of their ‘entrenched power’ andactivities runs deeply in society, including money-laundering via financing political campaigns,
establishing front businesses (e.g. petrol stations to construction firms), financing football
players/events and having links to some municipal mayors’ offices in the Urabá region. They
also regulate farming activity, offer loans to farmers and peasants, financing local businesses
and infrastructure, as well as causing forced displacement to control land.315 They engage intransnational drug trafficking, illegal mining, and extortion. 316 The AGC’s criminal network

304

Colombia.com, Las Águilas Negras: ¿Qué se sabe de este temido grupo criminal?, 27 January 2022, url;
Indepaz, Desafío a la paz total. Lo que recibió el gobierno de Gustavo Petro. Informe sobre presencia de grupos
armados en Colombia 2021 – 2022, 28 November 2022, url, p. 14; See also: Insightcrime, Águilas Negras, 3September 2017, url; For specific information on the Black Eagles (Águilas Negras) and the use of the Black Eagles
brand by paramilitary successor groups and other criminal actors, see: Canada, IRB, Colombia: The Black Eagles(COL201106.E), 13 July 2022, url
305
Gil Ramírez, M., Interview with EUAA, 21 November 2022
306
FIP, 3 November 2022, Interview with EUAA
307
InSightCrime, Urabeños – Gulf Clan, 24 October 2021, url
308
FIP, Ni paz ni guerra, May 2022, url, pp. 25-29
309
FIP, Ni paz ni guerra, May 2022, url, pp. 25-29; Pares, Plomo es lo que hay, April 2022, url, p. 41
310
International Crisis Group, Trapped in Conflict: Reforming Military Strategy to Save Lives in Colombia, 27
September 2022, url, p. 4
311
Insight Crime, United They Stand, Divided They Fall – Urbanos Losign Grip in Colombia, 27 April 2022, url
312
Canada, IRB, Whether armed groups such as the National Liberation Army (Ejército de liberación nacional, ELN)
or the Gulf Clan (Clan del Golfo) [also known as the Gaitanista Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas
Gaitanistas de Colombia, AGC), Los Urabeños and Clan Úsuga] use non-members to carry out bombings or recruit
minors on their behalf (2018–May 2022) (COL201062.E), 16 June 2022, url
313
Indepaz, Los focos del conflicto en Colombia, September 2021, url, p. 49
314
FIP, Ni paz ni guerra, May 2022, url, pp. 25-29; See also: Insight Crime, United They Stand, Divided They Fall Urabeños Losing Grip in Colombia, 27 April 2022, url
315
Indepaz, Los focos del conflicto en Colombia, September 2021, url, p. 50
316
Insight Crime, Urabeños – Gulf Clan, 24 October 2021, url

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extends to countries including links with Mexican and European drug cartels. 317 The AGC has
been the group most affected by state operations and military campaigns that have weakened
its command over 2020-2021 with capture and killings of some of its leaders, but the grouphas recomposed itself.318
The group’s leader, Dairo Antonio Úsuga (alias ‘Otoñiel’), was captured in 2021.319 In May
2022, the government decided to extradite Otoñiel, to the United States. In retaliation, AGC
carried out a five-day armed strike, ‘with reports of widespread violence affecting 178
municipalities in 11 of Colombia’s 32 departments. According to the Investigation andAccusation Unit of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, there were over 300 acts of violenceagainst civilians, including the killing of 24 persons, and 22 attacks against public security
forces, killing two of their members.’320 The armed strike was also enforced by associate
gangs within Medellín. The armed strike involved assassinations, assassination attempts, roadblocks, disconnection of services, media shutdowns, threats, attacks on police stations. 321 The
strike mostly affected northern departments, especially Antioquia, Bolívar, Córdoba,
Magdalena, and Sucre.322 Analysts remarked that the armed strike by AGC was more violent
and widespread than those seen in the past and by other armed groups such as ELN. 323
Collaboration between illegal armed groups and security forces has declined however there
are still reports by rights organisations that officials tolerate paramilitary successor groups insome areas.324 Peace talks with the AGC were pursued in 2017 during the government ofSantos; however they were broken off under President Duque following a major offensive by
the AGC to expand territory.325 For information on recent developments see the sections on
Total Peace. Indepaz provides a map of the intensity of paramilitary successor group activity in
2021:

317

Reuters, Colombia’s Clan del Golfo gang network extends to 28 countries, November 2021, url; La Prensa,
Honduras, entre los 28 países donde el Clan del Golfo envía 20 toneladas de cocaína mensuales, 3 November
2021, url
318
FIP, Ni paz ni guerra, May 2022, url, pp. 25-29
319
InSight Crime, What does Otoniel’s arrest really mean for Colombia, 25 October 2021, url; BBC, Colombia’s mostwanted drug lord Otoniel captured, 24 October 2021, url
320
UNVMC/UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General (S/2022/513), 27 June 2022, url, para. 12
321
Colombia Reports, AGC kill 26 during 4-day terror campaign in northern Colombia, 9 May 2022, url; Wradio, JEP
advierte que la totalidad del Chocó y La Guajira fueron afectados por el paro armado, 9 May 2022, url
322
France24, Colombia: Violence continues even after cartel’s ‘armed strike’ ends, 20 May 2022, url
323
France24, Colombia: Violence continues even after cartel’s ‘ar med strike’ ends, 20 May 2022, url
324
Freedom House, Colombia – 2022, February 2022, url
325
Colombia Reports, Peace talks with Colombia’s ELN guerrillas ‘about to be resumed’: Petro, 8 August 2022, url

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Figure 5: Map of intensity of activities by paramilitary successor groups, 2016-2021326

326

Indepaz, Desafío a la paz total. Lo que recibió el gobierno de Gustavo Petro. Informe sobre presencia de grupos
armados en Colombia 2021 – 2022, 28 November 2022, url, p. 51

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EUAA COI REPORT - COLOMBIA: COUNTRY FOCUS

Pares produced a map of the presence of the AGC/Clan del Golfo as of March 2022:

Figure 6: Presence of AGC [Clan del Golfo], March 2022327

327

Pares, Plomo es lo que hay: Violencia y seguridad en tiempos de Duque, 7 April 2022, url, p. 40

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Indepaz also produced a map of municipalities affected by AGC activity in 2022:

Figure 7: Municipalities affected by AGC, 2022328

328

Indepaz, Desafío a la paz total. Lo que recibió el gobierno de Gustavo Petro. Informe sobre presencia degrupos armados en Colombia 2021 – 2022, 28 November 2022, url, p. 57

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5.3.2.

Ejército de Liberación Nacional

With the demobilisation of the FARC-EP, the National Liberation Army (ELN, Ejército de
Liberación Nacional) is Colombia’s last remaining active guerrilla group. 329 The ELN is a
designated terrorist group under EU law.330 It is a Marxist-Leninist guerrilla group that began in
the 1960s but is currently more focused on illicit activities including drug trafficking, extortion,
kidnapping, and controlling coca and cocaine production. 331 It also attacks infrastructure whichis in keeping with its Marxist ideology and insurgency, undermining foreign capitalism. 332
Insight Crime states that ELN is currently ‘the most powerful criminal group in Colombia and
Venezuela’ having rapidly expanded after the FARC-EP demobilised.333 It is the only remaining
group that explicitly fights against the Colombian state. 334
The ELN has a ‘Central Command’ (Comando Central, COCE) and operates eight335 active ‘war
fronts’ or fighting divisions across Colombia (with further local subdivisions) which have a highdegree of autonomy.336 ELN is described as ‘very decentralized,’ 337 ‘radical and not centrallycontrolled’ with much of the leadership being of an older generation living in Cuba with limited
influence over local units operating in rural Colombia. 338 The ELN has between 2 400 to 4 000
combatants and militia networks.339 ELN has expanded its presence and location inmunicipalities over the past several years following the FARC peace accord. 340 Sourcesindicate ELN operates in 16 out of 32 departments in Colombia, including major cities, as wellas the border with Venezuela, especially in its Pacific Coast strongholds of Chocó, Cauca,
Valle del Cauca, and Nariño,341 Norte de Santander (especially Catatumbo and Cúcuta),
Arauca, and Vichada, among others.342 Pares similarly reported in 2020 that they operated in
329

Axios, Colombia to restart peace talks with last remaining major rebel group, 11 October 2022, url; International
Crisis Group, Trapped in Conflict: Reforming Military Strategy to Save Lives in Colombia, 27 September 2022, url, p.
4
330
EU,Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/138, 5 February 2021, url
331
Insight Crime, ELN, 11 January 2022, url; Insight Crime, ELN show of force confirms its unmatched criminal
presence in Colombia, 2 March 2022, url
332
McDermott, J., Comment made during the review of this report, 14 November 2022
333
Insight Crime, ELN, 11 January 2022, url; Insight Crime, ELN show of force confirms its unmatched criminal
presence in Colombia, 2 March 2022, url
334International Crisis Group, Trapped in Conflict: Reforming Military Strategy to Save Lives in Colombia, 27
September 2022, url, p. 8
335
Indepaz, Los focos del conflicto en Colombia, September 2021, url, p. 6; Indepaz provides a detailed breakdownof the military structure of the ELN’s multiple ‘Frentes de guerra’ and sub-structures, including the departments inwhich they operate. Indepaz, Desafío a la paz total. Lo que recibió el gobierno de Gustavo Petro. Informe sobre
presencia de grupos armados en Colombia 2021 – 2022, 28 November 2022, url, p. 95
336
Insight Crime, ELN, 11 January 2022, url; Indepaz, Balance sobre las dinámicas del Ejército de Liberación
Nacional -ELN- en Colombia 2018-2020, January 2021, url, p. 2, 6-7; Pares, Seguridad en tiempos de pandemia, 14
September 2020, url, p. 22; For more information on ELN’s background see: NACLA, Colombia’s Longest
Insurgency and the Last Chance for Peace? 23 December 2019, url; SWP, Colombia’s Path to “Total Peace”,
September 2022, url; Pares, Plomo es lo que hay, 7 April 2022, url, p. 43
337
SWP, Colombia’s Path to “Total Peace”, September 2022, url, p. 2
338
Reuters, Colombia advances towards restarting peace talks with EL N, 12 August 2022, url339
Estimates vary: Reuters, Colombia advances towards restarting peace talks with ELN, 12 August 2022, url; Al
Jazeera, Colombia and ELN rebels agree to restart peace talks, 4 October 2022, url; Pares, Plomo es lo que hay:
Violencia y seguridad en tiempos de Duque, 7 April 2022, url, p. 43
340
Indepaz, Balance sobre las dinámicas del Ejército de Liberación Nacional -ELN- en Colombia 2018-2020,
January 2021, url, p. 2, 6-7; Insight Crime, ELN show of force confirms its unmatched criminal presence in Colombia,
2 March 2022, url
341
Insight Crime, ELN, 11 January 2020, url
342
Pares, Plomo es lo que hay: Violencia y seguridad en tiempos de Duque, 7 April 2022, url, p. 44

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17 departments, across 167 municipalities,343 and by 2021, in 183 municipalities.344 The
government of Colombia issued an Early Alert (004) stating that they were present in 189
municipalities in 2022.345 Indepaz reported that in early 2022, they were in 19 departments
and 162 municipalities.346 Also, in Venezuela, ELN is sheltered and entrenched ‘ostensibly as
an ally of the Venezuelan government’.347 ELN has a rapidly expanded presence in borderareas of Colombia and within Venezuela, especially in the states of Zulia, Táchira, Apure, andAnzoátegui.348
The group has been involved in drug trafficking, illegal mining, kidnapping, 349 human rights
violations, war crimes and serious abuses against civilians such as killings, forced
displacement.350 It has been conducting attacks on civilians, assassinating social leaders,engaging in forced recruitment, and enforcing social control. 351 It has also been engaging inarmed violence against other illegal armed groups 352 and the armed forces.353 ELN makes
armed and political attempts to recruit others to the group’s ideology.354 Violent confrontations
with other armed actors have occurred against AGC, FARC dissidents, EPL, 355 and in particularagainst the AGC in Bolívar, Chocó, Norte de Santander, and Antioquia. 356 In 2018-2021, there
was a sustained reduction in ELN violence during July 2018 to May 2021 and then an uptick
during the last five months of 2021; however the annual number of clashes (42 in 2021) was
still the lowest since March 2018.357 In 2021-2022, ‘offensive armed actions’ andclashes/fighting by ELN increased in the period around ELN’s February 2022’s armed strike. 358
Examples of recent ELN armed acts and attacks include:•

In January 2022, an ELN bombing in Cali injured 13 police officers 359 and a threesimultaneous ELN attacks on military bases that wounded 20;360

343

Pares, Seguridad en tiempos de pandemia, 14 September 2020, url, pp. 24-25
Pares, Plomo es lo que hay: Violencia y seguridad en tiempos de Duque, 7 April 2022, url, p. 43
345
UNHCR, Colombia: Monitoreo de protección (enero- junio 2022), June 2022, url, p.10
346
Indepaz, Desafío a la paz total. Lo que recibió el gobierno de Gustavo Petro. Informe sobre presencia de grupos
armados en Colombia 2021 – 2022, 28 November 2022, url, pp. 14; 90-99
347
Insight Crime, ELN show of force confirms its unmatched criminal presence in Colombia, 2 March 2022, url
348
Insight Crime, ELN, 11 January 2022, url
349
Indepaz, Balance sobre las dinámicas del Ejército de Liberación Nacional -ELN- en Colombia 2018-2020,
January 2021, url; Reuters, Colombia advances towards restarting peace talks with ELN, 12 August 2022, url; Insight
Crime, ELN, 11 January 2022, url
350
HRW, World Report 2022, 13 January 2022, url351
Pares, Seguridad en tiempos de pandemia, url, pp. 24-26
352
Pares, Seguridad en tiempos de pandemia, url, pp. 24-26; For information on ELN’s rivalry with factions of FARCEP dissidents see: Ex-FARC Mafia vs. ELN: a fight too far at Colombia-Venezuela border? 11 January 2022, url;
CERAC, Reporte del conflicto con ELN (Reporte mensual número 19 – Período de monitoreo: del 1 al 30 noviembre
2021, 3 January 2022, url
353
CERAC, Reporte del conflicto con ELN (Reporte mensual número 19 – Período de monitoreo: del 1 al 30
noviembre 2021, 3 January 2022, url
354
Indepaz, Balance sobre las dinámicas del Ejército de Liberación Nacional -ELN- en Colombia 2018-2020,
January 2021, url, p. 8
355
Pares, Plomo es lo que hay: Violencia y seguridad en tiempos de Duque, 7 April 2022, url, pp. 44-46; See forexample: Insight Crime, ELN and Urabeños War Again in Northern Colombia, 16 August 2022, url
356
Insight Crime, ELN and Urabeños War Again in Northern Colombia, 16 August 2022
357
CERAC, Reporte del conflicto con ELN (Reporte mensual número 19 – Período de monitoreo: del 1 al 30
noviembre 2021, 3 January 2022, url; See also the trends graph in the same source.
358
CERAC, Acciones ofensivas atribuidas al ELN y combates con participación de esa guerrilla 2021-2022(mensual) [Graph], 30 September 2022, url
359
Reuters, Colombia’s leftist ELN rebels claim responsibility for bombing, 8 January 2022, url
360
AA, Soldier killed, more than 20 wounded in attacks on Colombian military bases, 27 January 2022, url
344

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EUAA COI REPORT - COLOMBIA: COUNTRY FOCUS•••

In January 2022, fighting between ELN and FARC dissidents left at least 23 people
dead and dozens more displaced in Arauca, along the border areas with Venezuela; 361
February 2022 a three-day long ‘armed strike’ including attacks on infrastructure,
movement restrictions, setting cars on fire, and setting off bombs that injured 8 people,
in protest against the government’s social and economic policies. 362 65 separate
incidents were registered across Colombia, with the majority concentrated in Norte deSantander, Cauca, and Nariño.363
In August 2022, renewed fighting between ELN and the AGC in Bolívar displaced 600
families.364

Regarding peace talks, these had been broken off several years ago by the Duqueadministration following the ELN’s 2019 Bogotá bomb attack that killed 22 police cadets. 365
Subsequently with the change of government in August 2022, ELN leadership in Cuba met
with the new Petro government representatives to restart peace talks. 366 CERAC reported thatthe overall trend has been that armed clashes by ELN dropped in September. 367 However,despite promises by the group to engage in peace talks beginning in November 2022, ELN
has continued to fight against FARC dissidents in Arauca (a key stronghold) as of October
2022.368 Maps by Pares and Indepaz indicate the presence and municipalities most affectedby ELN activities in 2022.

361

Al Jazeera, At least 23 dead in clashes between armed rebel groups, urlReuters, ELN rebels blow up bridge, injure eight in attacks across Colombia, 23 February 2022, url
363
Insight Crime, ELN show of force confirms its unmatched criminal presence in Colombia, 2 March 2022, url;
Indepaz, Acciones de ELN durante el paro armado febrero 2022, url
364
Insight Crime, ELN and Urabeños War Again in Northern Colombia, 16 August 2022, url
365
Reuters, Colombia advances towards restarting peace talks with ELN, 12 August 2022, url
366
Reuters, Colombia advances towards restarting peace talks with ELN, 12 August 2022, url
367
CERAC, Reporte del conflicto con El ELN, 4 October 2022, url;
368
Insight Crime, ELN keeps fighting in key state despite peace talk plans with Colombia government, 14 October
2022, url
362

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Figure 8: Presence of ELN, 2022369

369

Pares, Plomo es lo que hay: Violencia y seguridad en tiempos de Duque, 7 April 2022, url, p. 43

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Figure 9: Municipalities most affected by ELN activities, 2022370

370

Indepaz, Desafío a la paz total. Lo que recibió el gobierno de Gustavo Petro. Informe sobre presencia degrupos armados en Colombia 2021 – 2022, 28 November 2022, url, p. 99

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5.3.3.

FARC dissident groups

FARC dissident groups [also referred to as Ex-FARC Mafia or post-FARC-EP groups] are armed
groups whose leaders rejected the 2016 peace agreement and continue fighting thegovernment and other illegal armed groups,371 particularly against ELN, AGC, and amongst
themselves.372 Formed and led mainly by former mid-level commanders, they are mostly
concerned with taking over illicit activities and businesses. 373 There are at least two dozen
FARC dissident groups operating across Colombia, although these groups have ‘limited
ideological coherence and volatile connections to one another’ and are made u p mainly of
newly recruited members.374 Estimates of their presence in municipalities ranges from 132(2020),375 to 161376 and 164 (2022).377 However, a 2022 Early Alert (004) issued by the Office of
the Ombudsperson stated such groups have a presence in 230 municipalities.378 The overall
trend has been increasing since the peace agreement. 379 Total membership estimates byPares in 2022 were 2764 combatants and 1887 collaborators (4 651 total members) while
Colombian intelligence estimated 4 284 in total.380
Between 2021-2022, multiple key leaders of FARC dissident groups have been killed. This has
led to concerns about the increased fragmentation of FARC-dissident groups.381 However,Indepaz reported that in 2021-2022, FARC dissident groups have reconfigured from atomised
groupings into converging main structures: Segunda Marquetalia, Bloque Suroriental (Eastern
Command) and Comando Coordinador de Occidente (Western Coordinating Command).382
Other sources describe that many of the estimated two dozen FARC dissident structures areorganised under two main structures in competition with one another: the Segunda
Marquetalia and the First Front group led by Iván Mordisco.383 Another category of FARC
dissidents, in addition to the First Front and Segunda Marquetalia structures, are what Jeremy
McDermott refers to ‘FARCRIM’384 groups – those who are purely criminal groups withroots/links to FARC dissidents.385 Pares also mentions ‘dispersed’ FARC dissidents mainly
371

InSight Crime, 1 st Front (Ex-FARC Mafia), 13 July 2019, url. For a full explanation of the Post-FARC dissidentgroups, see pages 58-103 in Indepaz, Los focos del conflicto en Colombia, September 2021, url and also Pares,
Grupos Armados PosFarc: Un nueva espiral de violencia en Colombia, August 2021, url
372
InSight Crime, Urabeños – Gulf Clan, 24 October 2021, url
373International Crisis Group, Trapped in Conflict: Reforming Military Strategy to Save Lives in Colombia, 27
September 2022, url, p. 4374
International Crisis Group, Leaders Under Fire, 6 October 2020, url, p. 11375International Crisis Group, Leaders Under Fire, 6 October 2020, url, p. 11
376
Indepaz, Desafío a la paz total. Lo que recibió el gobierno de Gustavo Petro. Informe sobre presencia de grupos
armados en Colombia 2021 – 2022, 28 November 2022, url, p. 12
377
Pares, Plomo es lo que hay: Violencia y seguridad en tiempos de Duque, 7 April 2022, url, p. 35
378
UNHCR, Colombia: Monitoreo de protección (enero- junio 2022), June 2022, url
379
Indepaz, Desafío a la paz total. Lo que recibió el gobierno de Gustavo Petro. Informe sobre presencia de grupos
armados en Colombia 2021 – 2022, 28 November 2022, url, p. 12
380
Pares, Plomo es lo que hay: Violencia y seguridad en tiempos de Duque, 7 April 2022, url, p. 35
381
Insight Crime, Decimation of Ex-FARC Mafia Leadership May Continue with Death of Ivan Marquez, 5 July 2022,
url
382
Indepaz, Desafío a la paz total. Lo que recibió el gobierno de Gustavo Petro. Informe sobre presencia degrupos armados en Colombia 2021 – 2022, 28 November 2022, url, p. 9383
International Crisis Group, Trapped in Conflict: Reforming Military Strategy to Save Lives in Colombia, 27
September 2022, url, p. 4; Pares, Plomo es lo que hay: Violencia y seguridad en tiempos de Duque, 7 April 2022,
url, p. 35
384
Insight Crime, Ex-FARC Mafia: The New Player in Colombian Organized Crime, 9 March 2018, url
385
McDermott, J., Comment made during the review of this report, 14 November 2022

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located in the south Pacific region.386 Indepaz similarly mentions the existence of roughly fivedissident groups characterised as ‘independent’. 387 FARC-dissident structures clash with eachother, especially in the regions of Caquetá and Meta, claiming that they are the legitimate
owners of FARC-EP’s former assets, 388 in Cauca and along the Pacific Coast,389 in Nariño,
Putumayo, Antioquia, Arauca, and Catatumbo,390 and Norte de Santander.391 Activities of the
post-FARC-EP groups include assassinations, kidnappings, threats, forced disappearances,392
cocaine production and drug trafficking, attacking and killing social leaders, 393 causing forced
displacement,394 targeting former FARC-EP members.395(a)First Front / Bloque Oriental / Comando Coordinador de Occidente

Indepaz indentified that Bloque Oriental had at least 7 sub-structures and Comando
Coordinador de Occidente had 10 sub-structures.396 Néstor Gregorio Vera Fernández (alias
Ivan Mordisco) is one of the foremost FARC dissident leaders397 and is in charge of First Front.
First Front is one of the largest and ‘arguably the strongest’ of the FARC dissident groups
having emerged in 2016 with 400 members 398 and in 2022 is the ‘fastest growing’ faction withconsolidation of smaller factions and a permanent presence in Vaupés, Vichada, Caquetá and
Putumayo forming a strategic corridor to the south-west departments of Nariño and Cauca. It
also has a significant presence in the northeast. 399 First Front is in open conflict with Segunda
Marquetalia ex-FARC faction.400 It was believed that Mordisco had been killed in an operationin summer 2022, however he re-appeared in October 2022, and stated that he was interested
in participating in President Petro’s Total Peace plan. 401 His re-appearance presents a
386

Pares, Grupos Armados PosFarc: Un nueva espiral de violencia en Colombia, August 2021, url, p. 4
Indepaz mentions Frente 33, Frente 36, Frente Oliver Sinisterra (FOS), Guerrillas Unidas del Pacífico (GUP),
Frente 4. Indepaz, Desafío a la paz total. Lo que recibió el gobierno de Gustavo Petro. Informe sobre presencia degrupos armados en Colombia 2021 – 2022, 28 November 2022, url, p. 13
388
InSight Crime, FARC Dissidents Want Old Land Back in Colombia’s Caquetá and Meta, 23 July 2021, url
389
International Crisis Group, A Fight by Other Means, 30 November 2021, url, p.28
390
WOLA, FARC Dissident Groups, 24 April 2020, url
391
Insight Crime, FARC dissidents patrol streets in broad daylight on Colombia-Venezuela border, 21 July 2022, url
392
Pares, Seguridad en tiempos de pandemia, 14 September 2020, url, p. 35
393
HRW, Left Undefended, 10 February 2021, url394
Pares, Grupos Armados PosFarc: Un nueva espiral de violencia en Colombia, August 2021, url, p. 20
395
WOLA, FARC Dissident Groups, 24 April 2020, url
396
Bloque Suroriental: Frente 62 Miller Perdomo, Frente Carolina Ramírez, Unidad Jhon Linares, Frente
Comandante Jorge Suárez Briceño, Frente Madre (agrupa frentes 1,7,16 y 40), Frente 28, Frente 10, Frente Edison
Cinco Mil y Frente 45; Comando Coordinador de Occidente: Compañía Adán Izquierdo, la Columna Móvil
Dagoberto Ramos, el Frente Ismael Ruiz, el Frente Carlos Patiño, la Columna Móvil Franco Benavides, la Columna
Móvil Urías Rondón, la Columna Móvil Jaime Martínez, el Frente Rafael Aguilera, la Column a Móvil Jhonier Toro
Arenas y la Compañía Alan Rodríguez, located in Cauca, Huila, Nariño, Putumayo, Tolima y Valle del Cauca. which
are located in the departments of Cauca, Huila, Nariño, Putumayo, Tolima and Valle del Cauca. Both the Columna
Móvil Jhonier Toro Arenas and la Compañía Alan Rodríguez appeared in 2022, the first through pamphlets thatwere distributed among the township of Jardines de Sucumbíos in Ipiales (Nariño), Piamonte (Cauca) andVillagarzón, Puerto Caicedo and Orito ( Putumayo). la Compañía Alan Rodríguez, has influence in Roberto Payán
and Olaya Herrera in Nariño. Indepaz, Desafío a la paz total. Lo que recibió el gobierno de Gustavo Petro. Informe
sobre presencia de grupos armados en Colombia 2021 – 2022, 28 November 2022, url, p. 13
397
Insight Crime, Iván Mordisco's Reappearance Brings New Challenges to 'Total Peace' in Colombia, 18 October
2022, url
398
InSight Crime, 1 st Front (Ex-FARC Mafia), 13 July 2019, url399
Pares, Plomo es lo que hay: Violencia y seguridad en tiempos de Duque, 7 April 2022, url, p. 35
400
Insight Crime, Néstor Gregorio Vera Fernández, alias ‘Iván Mordisco’, 17 October 2022, url
401
Insight Crime, Iván Mordisco’s Reappearance Brings New Challenges to ‘Total Peace’ in Colombia, 18 October
2022, url
387

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challenge to Petro’s ‘Total Peace’ given the influence that Mordisco has over whether thedissident groups under his control will participate or not. 402(b)

Segunda Marquetalia

Segunda Marquetalia was founded by Luciano Marín Arango (alias Iván Márquez),403 theformer lead negotiator for FARC-EP.404 He left the peace process in 2019 when he was linked
to drug trafficking by the United States.405 Márquez was seriously injured in an attack inside
Venezuela July 2022 and was reportedly recovering in a Caracas hos pital under protection by
Venezuela.406 Segunda Marquetalia expanded during Duque’s presidency from 2018 to 2022
into 61 municipalities.407
Indepaz indicated that the group has at least 11 sub-structures.408 The group’s firm base is in
Apure (Venezuela) with their troops controlling much of the drug trafficking along theColombian-Venezuelan border, specifically in Arauca and Apure. Much of its leadership has
been killed in operations in Venezuela, including its top three commanders, leaving
uncertainty around how the group will control territory and weakening the group significantly
though it still controls important drug trafficking routes. 409 The group has sub-groups andfactions such as Comandos de la Frontera-Ejército-Bolivariano410 The group frequently clashes
with FARC dissidents First Front, and Colombian and Venezuelan forces. 411 In other places, it
forms alliances, such as in Nariño, where Segunda Marquetalia has allied with ELN andparamiltary successors to create alliances to dominate territory. 412 Insight Crime indicated that‘broader political achievements’ are ‘unlikely’ for this group despite being weakened. 413

402

Insight Crime, Iván Mordisco's Reappearance Brings New Challenges to 'Total Peace' in Colombia, 18 October
2022, url
403
Insight Crime, Luciano Marín Arango, alias ‘Iván Márquez’, 29 September 2022, url
404International Crisis Group, Trapped in Conflict: Reforming Military Strategy to Save Lives in Colombia, 27
September 2022, url, p. 4405
McDermott, J., Comment made during the review of this report, 14 November 2022
406
El Colombiano, El dosier de armas y comandos de la “Segunda Marquetalia” de Márquez, 18 July 2022, url
407
Pares, Plomo es lo que hay: Violencia y seguridad en tiempos de Duque, 7 April 2022, url, p. 9408
Sub-groups listed were: Compañía Fernando Díaz, Columna Móvil Teófilo Forero/Unidad Oscar Mondragón, Frente
Acacio Medina, Bloque Occidental Alfonso Cano, Frente Alfonso Cano, Frente Diomer Cortés, Frente 18, Fre nte 41 CaciqueUpar, Comando Danilo García, Columna Móvil Cristian Pérez, Comandos Bolivarianos de la Frontera y Frente 37. Indepaz,
Desafío a la paz total. Lo que recibió el gobierno de Gustavo Petro. Informe sobre presencia de grupos armados en
Colombia 2021 – 2022, 28 November 2022, url, p. 13
409
Insight Crime, Luciano Marín Arango, alias ‘Iván Márquez’, 29 September 2022, url
410
McDermott, J., Comment made during the review of this report, 14 November 2022
411
Insight Crime, Luciano Marín Arango, alias ‘Iván Márquez’, 29 September 2022, url
412
Infobae, Macabre alliance between the Second Marquetalia, ELN and paramilitaries in Nariño, 11 April 2022, url
413
Insight Crime, Luciano Marín Arango, alias ‘Iván Márquez’, 29 September 2022, url

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Pares published a map of the presence of FARC-dissident groups as of 2022 [NB Gentil
Duarte is referred to as First Front in this report]:

Figure 10: Presence of Post-FARC/FARC dissident groups, 2022414

414

Pares, Plomo es lo que hay: Violencia y seguridad en tiempos de Duque, 7 April 2022, url, p. 34

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Indepaz also produced a map of municipalities most affected by activities of post-FARC
dissident groups in 2022:

Figure 11: Municipalities most affected by Post-FARC dissident groups, 2022415

415

Indepaz, Desafío a la paz total. Lo que recibió el gobierno de Gustavo Petro. Informe sobre presencia de grupos
armados en Colombia 2021 – 2022, 28 November 2022, url, p. 71; see also Indepaz annexes for full listing ofmunicipal presence.

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5.3.4.

Other criminal groups, organised crime and urban street gangs

In major urban areas organised crime groups exert control through extortion, forced
displacement, child recruitment, sexual exploitation, and armed confrontations between
groups. Some urban criminal gang structures have long histories, especially in Medellín and toa lesser extent, Cali.416 In the 1980s, Pablo Escobar set up the first ‘oficina de cobro’ criminal
debt collection agency in the municipality of Envigado, in Medellín.417 Dynamics are very
different between Medellín, Cali, Bogota – there is no one size fits all approach to how armed
and criminal groups operate locally in these cities. Medellín is traditionally divided up bydifferent groups with longer histories like Oficina de Envigado and La Terraza. Cali has similar
tradition but is less organised, and while Bogota does not have that tradition, some suburban
areas like Ciudad Bolivar – do not have strong state presence.418
Urban criminal street gangs now account for an increasing proportion of the violence inColombia. These groups are also frequently contracted out by larger groups such as AGC andELN to operate their ‘urban trafficking routes.’ 419 AGC is particularly distinguishable for using
franchise groups which are often smaller, localised gangs across Colombia who operate underthe banner of the larger group 420 and with a large degree of autonomy as as ‘outsourced’
gangs.421 According to Indepaz, local gangs/combos/bandas criminales serve the otherumbrella structures of paramilitary successor groups (such as AGC, as well as lesser groups
such as EPL, Los Rastrojos, etc.), as well as guerrilla structures and Post-FARC dissidentgroups which are dedicated to drug trafficking and money laundering. These local groups andare strengthened by outsourcing processes from larger structures. Their territorialreconfiguration has mainly occurred around income seeking.422 Gangs active in cities havefurther grown as a result of social unrest due to protests and lack of economic opportunities in
the wake of the pandemic.423
In Medellín, estimates range from 93 to 350 active gangs [including 15 ‘super gangs’ which
coordinate loose federations of street gangs 424 ].425 According to a recent study virtually every
low and middle-income neighbourhood of Medellín has a neighbourhood gang (‘combo’),416

McDermott, J., Comment made during the review of this report, 14 November 2022
Insight Crime, Oficina de Envigado, 28 October 2020, url
418
McDermott, J., Comment made during the review of this report, 14 November 2022
419
International Crisis Group, Trapped in Conflict: Reforming Military Strategy to Save Lives in Colombia, 27
September 2022, url, p. 5
420
Insight Crime, United they stand, divided they call – Urabeños losing grip in Colombia, 27 April 2022, url; For
specific information on the Black Eagles (Águilas Negras) and the use of the Black Eagles brand by paramilitary
successor groups and other criminal actors, see: Canada, IRB, Colombia: The Black Eagles (COL201106.E), 13 July
2022, url
421
Colombiano (El), Así se juega el ajedrez del crimen organizado en el Valle de Aburrá, 1 November 2021, url
422
Indepaz, Desafío a la paz total. Lo que recibió el gobierno de Gustavo Petro. Informe sobre presencia degrupos armados en Colombia 2021 – 2022, 28 November 2022, url, p. 40
423
WSJ, In Colombian city, gangs thrive amid protests and anarchy, 9 June 2021, url; Colombia Reports, Medellin
gangs gave as many members as the ELN in all Colombia, 6 July 2021, url; See also: Guardian (The), Colombia’s‘capital of horror’ despairs amid new wave of gang violence, 23 February 2021, url
424
Blattman, C., The terrible trade-off: Why less violent cities often means more powerful and organized crime, 11
May 2022, url
425
Colombia Reports, Medellin gangs gave as many members as the ELN in all Colombia, 6 July 2021, url
417

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estimating 400 combos (8-12 000 men) in total, which are organized into higher level‘razones’ (250-500 men) and hierarchical alliances that coordinate illicit activity. 426
Criminal groups are responsible for majority of urban homicides and engage in youth
recruitment,427 especially among Venezuelan migrants, extortion, money laundering, and drug
dealing,428 as well as being used by landlords to enforce evictions and engage in forced urban
displacement.429 A study of these gangs in Medellín found they are embedded in the local
economy and in extracting various kinds of ‘rents’ from the territory where they operate: drug
retailing, protection and extortion of local retailers and bus lines, loan sharking, contract killing,debt collection, robbery, and being involved as intermediaries in the sale of consumer
goods.430 Furthermore, the same study found that in many neighbourhoods, the combos are
the local authority in low and middle income areas and provide services and exercise statefunctions. The strength of criminal governance is correlated with high rates of extortion and‘gota a gota’ loans suggesting that rent extraction is one of the primary motivations for gangs
to rule territory.431 The AGC is also active in Medellín and has allied with local gangs 432 andassociates located in northern and western peripheral areas of Medellín. 433 La Oficina deEnvigado, which evolved from Escobar’s first criminal debt collection agency, is the mostinfluential mafia gang in Medellín.434 It is described as the ‘mafia federation that regulates
almost all criminal activity in Medellín.’435 Jeremy McDermott commented that ‘La Oficina deEnvigado’ is a useful label for the mafia in Medellín, that it has appeared under different
names (recently as Cuerpo Colegiado La Oficina), and that it but functions rather more like anumbrella of independent mafias that provide crime services. 436 Crime services include
extortion, local drug sales, robberies, sex trafficking, contraband, and gota-a-gota loan
sharking.437 Murder services are offered by most ‘oficinas’ in Medellín.438 In Medellín
metropolitan area, AGC and La Oficina share control of most of the 350 combos in the area;
though there are also some gangs who declare themselves independent. 439 Other majorgroups include La Terraza, Los Chatas, and La Sierra, the latter of which is also an outsourced
gang associated with the AGC.440 In Medellín, there is a presence of criminal gangs (bandas
criminales), ELN and AGC groups. Most active gangs in Medellín are controlled by the Oficina

426

Blattman, et. al, Understanding criminal organisations: the Gangs of Medellin, Colombia, May 2022, url
Gil Ramírez, M., Interview with EUAA, 21 November 2022
428
Colombia Reports, Medellin gangs gave as many members as the ELN in all Colombia, 6 July 2021, url
429
Colombia Reports, Medellin landlords and gangs skyrocket displacement, 15 April 2021, url
430
Blattman, et. al, Understanding criminal organisations: the Gangs of Medellin, Colombia, May 2022, url
431
Blattman, et. al, Gobierno criminal en Medellín: Panorama general del fenómeno y evidencia empírica sobre
cómo enfrentarlo, October 2020, url, pp. 2-3, 6, 11
432
Colombia Reports, Crime and security in Medellin, 9 August 2022, url
433
Colombia Reports, AGC kill 26 during 4-day terror campaign in northern Colombia, 9 May 2022, url
434
El Colombiano, Así se juega el ajedrez del crimen organizado en el Valle de Aburrá, 1 November 2021, url
435
Insight Crime, Oficina de Envigado, 28 October 2020, url
436
McDermott, J., Comment made during the review of this report, 14 November 2022
437
Insight Crime, For Medellín's Oficina Capos, the Shuffle is Part of the Game, 24 May 2019, url
438
McDermott, J., Comment made during the review of this report, 14 November 2022
439
El Colombiano, Así se juega el ajedrez del crimen organizado en el Valle de Aburrá, 1 November 2021, url
440
El Colombiano, Así se juega el ajedrez del crimen organizado en el Valle de Aburrá, 1 November 2021, url
427

70EUAA COI REPORT - COLOMBIA: COUNTRY FOCUS

de Envigado and the remaining groups are under the control of 10 smaller syndicates, 441 suchas Los Triana and La Terraza.442
In Bogotá, the Tren de Aragua and Los Maracuchos are two gangs formed in Venezuela
responsible for a series of violent murders and dispute with other criminal groups for controlof illicit revenues in the city.443 Tren de Aragua originated in Aragua (Venezuela), its powerbase, and conducts kidnapping, extortion, homicide, and robbery,444 weapons offences, drugtrafficking,445 and human trafficking of Venezuelan migrants. 446 International Crisis Group
noted that according to multiple sources, Tren de Aragua has some operations in Colombia,
on the border with Venezuela, in Norte de Santander, and in Bogotá although ‘Tren deAragua’s presence in the capital and other major cities goes no further than small cells
working alongside local illegal outfits’; there are indications that it collaborates with the AGC in
Norte de Santander.447

5.3.5.

Mexican cartels

Mexican cartels work with Colombian armed groups in drugs trafficking and production in the
territory,448 since 2010, and this intensified after the peace negotiations and the 2016 peaceagreement.449 The Sinaloa Cartel and the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación were reported by
the Brookings Institute to be involved in making alliances with illegal armed groups in
Colombia.450 In 2020-2021, Mexican drug cartels increasingly shipped high powered guns andweapons to armed groups in Colombia in exchange for cocaine, giving armed groups a
firepower advantage over law enforcement. 451 They are mainly concentrated in areas ofstrategic interest for drug trafficking such as the Pacific coastal areas of Nariño, Norte deSantander (Catatumbo), Magdalena452 and in southern Cordoba and parts of Antioquia. 453

5.3.6.

Venezuelan armed actors

Venezuela has been a safe haven for Colombia’s guerrilla groups at least since 1998. 454 In
border areas between Colombia and Venezuela, multiple armed groups operate openly,455

441

Colombia Reports, Crime and security in Medellin, 9 August 2022, urlColombia Reports, Medellin’s violent crime statistics drop significantly, 17 August 2022, url
443
CBS News, “Packaged” corpses sow terror in Colombian capital, 17 September 2022, url; OCCRP, Colombia
Dismantles the Los Maracuchos Gang, 15 September 2022, url
444
Insight Crime, Venezuela's Tren de Aragua Gang Muscling into Col ombia Border Area, 10 July 2019, url; El
Espectador, Presuntos cabecillas del Tren de Aragua en Bogotá, a esperar el juicio en prisión, 20 October 2022,
url
445
El Colombiano, Otro golpe al Tren de Aragua: 19 integrantes fueron capturados, 14 October 2022, url
446International Crisis Group, Hard Times in a Safe Haven: Protecting Venezuelan Migrants in Colombia, 9 August
2022, url, p. 16
447International Crisis Group, Hard Times in a Safe Haven: Protecting Venezuelan Migrants in Colombia, 9 August
2022, url, p. 16
448
GITOC, Organized Crime Index – Colombia 2021, url, p. 4
449
Brookings Institute, The Foreign Policies of the Sinaloa Cartel and CJNG, 22 July 2022, url
450
Brookings Institute, The Foreign Policies of the Sinaloa Cartel and CJNG, 22 July 2022, url
451
Reuters, Mexican cartels swap arms for cocaine, fueling Colombia violence, 13 April 2022, url
452
Pares, Radiografía de la ominosa presencia de los carteles mexicanos, 10 June 2020, url, p. 4453
McDermott, J., Comment made during the review of this report, 14 November 2022
454
Insight Crime, Rebels and Paramilitaries: Colombia’s Guerrillas in Venezuela, 3 October 2022, url
455
HRW, Venezuela: Security Force Abuses at Colombia Border, 26 April 2021, url
442

71EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMsuch as FARC dissidents as well as the ELN. 456 Colombian intelligence reported in February
2022 that as many as 1 600 ELN and FARC dissidents are involved in conflicts along theborder.457 The Venezuelan security forces have been complicit with some Colombian illegal
armed groups on border areas and have carried out joint operations with the ELN and been
implicated in ‘systematic’ human rights violations against civilians and causing displacement
between the two countries.458 Venezuelan forces have also fought against other Colombianfactions who have become ‘unwelcome’ in the region. ELN and FARC dissidents who operate
in Venezuelan territory are ‘subject to a sustained Venezuelan security force offensive.’ In
areas of Venezuela where there is conflict between Venezuelan forces and Colombian
guerrillas, there are ‘airstrikes, gunfights, assassinations, landmines, kidnappings,
disappearances, arbitrary detentions, torture, and abuse’. 459 In border areas where ELN and
FARC dissidents have become entrenched they are the de facto authorities, imposing social
norms and rules, regulating the local economy and running parallel justice mechanisms.
Insight Crime provides a map of the Colombian guerrilla presence in Colombia and Venezuela
border regions in 2022.460 Venezuelan crime syndicate (megabanda) Tren de Aragua hassome operations in Colombia.461

5.4.

Interaction dynamics between armed groups

As described in the chapter on conflict dynamics, in several regions, ‘despite the growing
presence of the security forces’ illegal armed groups and criminal organisations continued to‘multiply, expand, and use violence’ which has led to displacement in places due to clashes. 462
In addition to the state’s armed conflict against illegal armed groups mentioned in Chapter 5,
the ICRC lists three on-going internal armed conflicts between ELN, AGC, and different FARC EP dissident groups.463 These groups seek to avoid direct confrontation with the state, but are‘apt to engage in firefights’ with one another during competition for control over illicit
activities, land, and drug trafficking routes, which often leads to confinement or displacementof civilians.464 Often these groups fight with each other and do not necessarily have aligned
strategies and no one group has been able to establish hegemony in the way that the FARC EP previously did.465 Traditionally territorially based criminal groups have evolved into flexible
networks with branches reaching across jurisdictions and in some cases, internationally.466

456

Insight Crime, Rebels and Paramilitaries: Colombia’s Guerrillas in Venezuela, 3 October 2022, url
ACLED, Regional Overview - South America (12-18 February 2022), 24 February 2022, url, pp. 2-3; El Nacional,
Más de 1.600 integrantes de las disidencias y el ELN están en Venezuela, 13 January 2022, url
458
HRW, Colombia/Venezuela: Border Area Abuses by Armed Groups, 28 March 2022, url; HRW, Venezuela:
Security Force Abuses at Colombia Border, 26 April 2021, url
459
Insight Crime, Rebels and Paramilitaries: Colombia’s Guerrillas in Venezuela, 3 October 2022, url
460
Insight Crime, Rebels and Paramilitaries: Colombia’s Guerrillas in Venezuela, 3 October 2022, url
461International Crisis Group, Hard Times in a Safe Haven: Protecting Venezuelan Migrants in Colombia, 9 August
2022, url, p. 16
462
UN OHCHR, Situation of human rights in Colombia [Year 2021] (A/HRC/49/19), 17 May 2022, url, para. 32
463
ICRC, Colombia: Retos humanitarios 2022, 28 March 2022, url, p. 3
464
International Crisis Group, Trapped in Conflict: Reforming Military Strategy to Save Lives in Colombia, 27
September 2022, url, p. 8, 9
465
EU, EPRS, Peace and Security in 2019 – Evaluating the EU’s efforts to support peace in Colombia, May 2019, url,
p. 47
466
EU, EPRS, Peace and Security in 2019 – Evaluating the EU’s efforts to support peace in Colombia, May 2019, url,
p. 47
457

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Pares stated that interactions between armed groups are fragmented and mixed, occurring
between the same actors across different territories and configurations. Without providing an
exhaustive geographic list, sources outline different modes for how illegal armed groupsinteract, establish alliances or clash in the territories where they are present, which are notexclusive and which sometimes occur simultaneously: 467
The map below by FIP shows the areas of the country where there are focal points ofinteraction between illegal armed groups in 2018 and 2022:

Figure 12: Interaction focal points between armed groups 468
The zones of dominance, co-existence, and dispute are described below headings
derived from the analysis of interactions between armed groups by FIP. 469

467

FIP, Ni paz ni guerra, May 2022, url, pp. 16-17; See also: Colombia, Comisión de Seguimiento y Monitoreo a la
Implementación de la Ley 1448 de 2011, “Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de Tierras”, Noveno informe de seguimiento
al Congreso De La República 2021-2022, 22 August 2022, url, pp. 90-93
468
FIP, Ni paz ni guerra, May 2022, url, pp. 16-17
469
FIP, Ni paz ni guerra, May 2022, url, pp. 16-17

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Zones of dominance
•
•

•
•

North of Cauca: FARC dissidents are in constant conflict with the security forces;
Catatumbo (Norte de Santander): ELN dominates in this territory and exists in a
dynamic of confrontation with FARC dissident Front 33; however the groups co-exist
for the purpose of fighting against the security forces;
Norte de Santander (Southern Tibu): ELN disputes AGC for control of the border andaccess to Cúcuta municipality;
South-eastern departments of Meta, Guaviare, Caquetá, Guainía, Vaupés, Amazonas:
FARC dissidents established control of territory and strategic corridors and are thedominant regional actor causing low intensity conflict and significant control of daily
community life.470
Zones of co-existence•••South of Bolívar: ELN and AGC co-exist but there are also signs of clashes, as well aswith FARC dissident structures;North of Caquetá and southern Meta: Factions of Segunda Marquetalia and First Front
co-exist;
Northeastern departments and Bajo Cauca: ELN and AGC co-exist with someincursions by FARC dissident groups. These are areas of strategic military importancebecause they serve as geographic links to other strategic areas. 471
Zones of dispute

•

•
•
•

Antioquia: Especially on the border with Córdoba [Ituango, which connects Córdoba
and Chocó/sea access] violent disputes between AGC, FARC dissidents and Los
Caparrapos;472
Southcentral Cauca and pacific Cauca: ELN disputes with AGC and residual dissidentsof FARC-EP;473
Chocó: ELN territorial disputes AGC, especially in the south pacific and San Juanareas;474
Norte de Santander: ELN disputes with EPL; and on the border with Venezuela, violent
disputes between ELN, AGC, and Los Rastrojos; 475

470

FIP, Ni paz ni guerra, May 2022, url, pp. 16-17
FIP, Ni paz ni guerra, May 2022, url, pp. 16-17
472
Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021, url,
p. 32; Atalayar, Armed groups displace 3,700 farmers in Colombia, 29 July 2021, url; FIP, Ni paz ni guerra, May
2022, url, pp. 16-17
473
Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021, url,
p. 322; FIP, Ni paz ni guerra, May 2022, url, pp. 16-17
474
Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021, url,
p. 322; FIP, Ni paz ni guerra, May 2022, url, pp. 16-17
475
Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021, url,
p. 322
471

74

EUAA COI REPORT - COLOMBIA: COUNTRY FOCUS

•
•

•

•

Caquetá: FARC dissidents fighting against the Sinaloa/La Mafia [not the Mexican
Cartel; this is a local Colombian criminal group that adopted the name 476];477
Putumayo: FARC dissidents factions and allies of Segunda Marquetalia in dispute
against factions and allies of FARC dissidents First Front.478 Violence has intensified
since the growing presence of armed groups in 2018, increasing civilian fatalities; 479
Nariño: ELN against the AGC 480 and ELN against rival FARC dissidents.481 The pacificregion of Nariño is ‘the most volatile region of the country’ with constantreconfigurations of groups. After intense periods of disputes between armed groups,
rearrangement, and security forces intervention, there has been a reduction in
confrontations by armed groups. Disputes between factions of FARC dissidents
persist;482
Arauca: ELN against FARC dissidents.483 ELN and FARC dissidents had co-existed until
2021 but in early 2022 their non-aggression pact broke down, leading to combat andmurders. Confrontations are concentrated in Venezuelan territory with repercussions
for the Colombian side.484 Clashes have caused large scale displacement and civilian
casualties.485

5.5.

Engagement with security forces

The Global Index on Organized Crime stated that Colombia has taken a hard line onorganised crime and drug trafficking and has successfully scaled back the power of organised
criminal groups; however ‘significant work remains to be done’. 486 State efforts to deal withillegal armed groups are predominantly military responses that have not been able to preventthe expansion of these groups and the violence generated. 487 State actions up to now havenot modified the underlying conditions that have allowed illegal armed groups and criminalorganisations to expand and continue their activities including: sources of funding and money
laundering, corruption, arms trafficking, child and youth recruitment, lack of development
alternatives to prevent youth from joining these groups, among others. 488 They have
476

McDermott, J., Comment made during the review of this report, 14 Novembe 2022
Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021, url,
p. 322
478
FIP, Ni paz ni guerra, May 2022, url, pp. 16-17; ACAPS , Colombia Risk Report - Escalation in violence between
non-state armed groups in Putumayo significantly increases displacement, confinement, and protection needs, 31
March 2022, url, pp. 2-3
479
ACAPS , Colombia Risk Report - Escalation in violence between non-state armed groups in Putumayo
significantly increases displacement, confinement, and protection needs, 31 March 2022, url, pp. 2-3
480
Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021, url,
p. 322481
International Crisis Group, Trapped in Conflict: Reforming Military Strategy to Save Lives in Colombia, 27
September 2022, url, p. 8; Pares, Plomo es lo que hay, April 2022, url, p. 41
482
FIP, Ni paz ni guerra, May 2022, url, pp. 16-17
483
Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021, url,
p. 322
484
FIP, Ni paz ni guerra, May 2022, url, pp. 16-17; Insight Crime, The Battle for Apure: Chavismo and the exFARC, 13
October 2021, url
485
ACAPS, Violence in Arauca Department, 31 January 2022, url, pp. 1-2
486
GITOC, Organized Crime Index – Colombia 2021, url, p. 4487
UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, paras. 7-8; International
Crisis Group, Leaders Under Fire, 6 October 2020, url, p. 14
488
UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, paras. 79-80
477

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

conducted operations against armed groups, detained many, and captured and killed
members of the leadership of these groups, however crime levels have not decreased. 489
Despite having a large military of 300 000 personnel, Colombia’s military faces organisational
challenges that undermine its ability to dismantle armed groups, including reliance on
conscription, budget constraints, corruption, human rights abuses, and perceived lack ofeffectiveness and legitimacy in the eyes of the public. 490 Colombia is geographically vast withlarge remote spaces, leaving the civilian population ‘to the mercy’ of armed groups. 491 Militaryand police forces are frequently absent in conflict-affected areas except within urban centres,
and local populations frequently reject military tactics that include periodic patrols, capture-orkill operations, and targeting of the local economy. 492 The state has carried out numerous
actions with important results against all types of illegal and criminal armed groups. However,the UN reported that communities have expressed concerns that there is a lack of timely
action by security forces, and that these groups are able to pass through security checkpoints
and control posts, as well as allowing the passage of heavy machines for illegal mining andinputs for drug/crop processing. This lack of actions makes it easier for these groups tomaintain presence and exercise control of territory. 493
There are zones experiencing open confrontation between illegal armed groups and public
security forces, including in the subregions of Valle de Aburrá, Bajo Cauca, North, Northeast
and West of Antioquia, Alto Sinú and San Jorge of Córdoba, and Alto, Bajo and Medio Atrato
in Chocó.494
While the ELN remains the only group explicitly fighting the state, generally armed groups
avoid direct confrontation with the military in favour of a now common tactic of targeting
security forces on a smaller scale through opportunistic and asymmetric attacks such as
assaulting police stations and military outposts using firearms and explosives. 495 In someareas, asymmetric attacks have become common enough to prevent the capacity of themilitary to patrol and conduct offensive operations, meaning a reduction in visible state forces
presence and effectiveness in municipalities. 496 The year 2021 has been described as thedeadliest year for security forces since the 2016 peace deal due to increased attacks andassassinations of police officers, murdered by illegal armed groups, mainly the AGC, followedby FARC-dissidents, ELN, and unknown perpetrators. In 2021, 148 members of the

489

FIP, 3 November 2022, Interview with EUAAInternational Crisis Group, Trapped in Conflict: Reforming Military Strategy to Save Lives in Colombia, 2 7
September 2022, url, p. 19
491International Crisis Group, Trapped in Conflict: Reforming Military Strategy to Save Lives in Colombia , 27
September 2022, url, p. 25
492International Crisis Group, Trapped in Conflict: Reforming Military Strategy to Save Lives in Colombia, 27
September 2022, url, p. 25
493
UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, p. 38
494
Colombia, Comisión de Seguimiento y Monitoreo a la Implementación de la Ley 1448 de 2011, “Ley de Víctimas yRestitución de Tierras”, Noveno informe de seguimiento al Congreso de la República 2021 -2022, 22 August 2022,
url, p. 90
495International Crisis Group, Trapped in Conflict: Reforming Military Strategy to Save Lives in Colombia, 27
September 2022, url, p. 8496International Crisis Group, Trapped in Conflict: Reforming Military Strategy to Save Lives in Colombia, 27
September 2022, url, p. 8; see also: UNHCR, Colombia: Monitoreo de protección (enero- junio 2022), June 2022,
url
490

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EUAA COI REPORT - COLOMBIA: COUNTRY FOCUS

police/armed forces were killed by attacks by armed groups, a 57 % increase of 2020, 497 andthe most violence year since 2016.498 As of July 2022, 61 police force members have been
killed, 34 in the line of duty, including in a July killing spree by the AGC killing 6 police bysnipers and motorised hitmen.499 The Ministry of Defense stated that between January andJune 2022, 77 murders of security force members have occurred. 500
AGC offered reward money for killing police officers, and prior to Petro’s election, had
stepped up their offensives against police in July 2022. Other reasons for the violence havebeen described as revenge for police action against organized crime, a signal of strength byparamilitary groups, territorial expansion by armed groups, as well as failures of security andpeace policies of the Duque administration,501 and exertion of pressure on authorities ahead of
possible peace talks.502

5.6.

Collusion between state forces and illegal andcriminal armed groups

Acts of collusion between authorities and illegal and criminal armed groups have beenreported.503 Armed groups have ‘grown adept at penetrating the military to gather intelligence’and by offering high payments to lower-level members of the security forces. The ELN, AGC,
and FARC dissidents have been able to co-opt some military elements into providing
information about operations or ignoring illicit activity in their sector. 504 There have also beenreports of acts of collusion between corporations and armed groups, particularly regarding
opposition to development or extractive projects by local activists. 505
FIP explained that collusion has evolved over the years with the conflict. During the years ofconflict prior to the peace accord, collusion involved high level relationships between the
AUC/Paramilitary groups and the government. However, now collusion happens informallyand locally, depending on the corruption and interests of the local security forces. The
collusion relationships happen on two levels:
1) Low level corruption of military ranks:506 The most common types of infiltration of themilitary involves low-level corruption where an armed group pay soldiers for theirservices such as providing intelligence, re-directing patrols, or ignoring trafficking
activities. Armed groups also try to recruit former members of the military who
497

Reuters, Mexican cartels swap arms for cocaine, fueling Colombia violence, 13 April 2022, urlInternational Crisis Group, Trapped in Conflict: Reforming Military Strategy to Save Lives in Colombia, 27
September 2022, url, p. 8499
City Paper (The), Colombia’s National Police face killing spree by Gulf Clan, 28 July 2022, url
500
UNHCR, Colombia: Monitoreo de protección (enero- junio 2022), June 2022, url
501
Colombia Reports, Colombia’s paramilitaries put target on police, 36 killed so far this year, 28 July 2022, url
502International Crisis Group, Trapped in Conflict: Reforming Military Strategy to Save Lives in Colombia, 27
September 2022, url, p. 8503
UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, paras. 7-8, 109-116;
Colombia Reports, Colombia accuses former army captain of drug trafficking, 19 October 2022, url
504International Crisis Group, Trapped in Conflict: Reforming Military Strategy to Save Lives in Colombia, 27
September 2022, url, p. 8505
Al Jazeera, Colombian environmental activists deluged by threats, 9 May 2022, url
506
FIP, 3 November 2022, Interview with EUAA
498

77

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

understand military networks and can penetrate them. 507 An example is a 2022 case of
several army soldiers and a General who was reportedly part of La Cordillera, acriminal group linked to the AGC, which recruited active and retired military members
to participate in illicit activities.508 In 2019, this General was reportedly the Director of
the Action Plan for the Prevention and Protection of Human Rights Defenders andJournalists (PAO), and a preliminary investigation has been opened by the Attorney
General’s Office.509
2) Cooperation based on relationships of convenience, for example, AGC and the
security forces working together against the ELN. 510 For example, in February 2022,
multiple officers, including a high-ranking army Colonel, were being investigated andheld for having collaborated with AGC in Nariño in order to pushback the ELN, andfacilitate coca and drug production in the department. 511
FIP explained that there are also cases of collusion where there is no explicit relationship, but
the armed groups instrumentalise the security forces for their own purposes. For example,
they kill a social leader in an area belonging to another group to get the attention of the
security forces and instigate an operation in the area to push out the other rival group. 512
Collusion between the security forces and armed groups also impacts the population bycreating mistrust in the security forces.513

5.7.

Civilians caught up in the middle

As explained in the chapter on illegal armed groups, armed groups may also form alliances of
convenience to further their illicit objectives and then break those alliances leading to armed
clashes, causing civilian impacts in the process, 514 such as killings, disappearances, and forced
recruitment.515 It is also common for armed groups to kill civilians they perceive or accuse of
supporting the other side,516 including community social leaders, in order to set an example toremind the population who is in control and ensure their compliance. 517 This is made more
complex when the military intervenes in confrontations between armed groups, sometimes
507

International Crisis Group, Trapped in Conflict, 27 September 2022, url, p. 22
El Espectador, Excomandante de las Fuerzas Militares sería parte de tentáculo del Clan del golfo, 15 February2022, url; UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, para. 115;
Colombia Reports, Colombia accuses former army captain of drug trafficking, 19 October 2022, url
509
UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, para. 115
510
FIP, 3 November 2022, Interview with EUAA
511
Infobae, A la cárcel oficial del Ejército relacionado con el clan del Golfo, 15 February 2022, url
512
FIP, 3 November 2022, Interview with EUAA
513
FIP, 3 November 2022, Interview with EUAA
514
HRW, Colombia/Venezuela: Border Area Abuses by Armed Groups, 28 March 2022, url; InSight Crime, ELN and
Urabeños War Again in Northern Colombia, 16 August 2022, url; International Crisis Group, Leaders Under Fire, 6
October 2020, url, p. 12515
HRW, Colombia/Venezuela: Border Area Abuses by Armed Groups, 28 March 2022, url; HRW, “The Guerrillas
Are the Police,” 22 January 2020, url
516
HRW, Colombia/Venezuela: Border Area Abuses by Armed Groups, 28 March 2022, url; Wesche, P. Post-war
Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021, url, p. 322; International
Crisis Group, Trapped in Conflict: Reforming Military Strategy to Save Lives in Colombia, 27 September 2022, url, p.
8
517
Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021, url,
p. 322508

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EUAA COI REPORT - COLOMBIA: COUNTRY FOCUS

using intervention as an excuse to further intensify their own campaigns. 518 However the
depletion of one group by the military may create perceptions by armed groups that local rural
population is colluding with the military.519 In areas where there are clashes between the state
and armed groups, there is ‘a risk of stigmatization’ of the civilian population accused ofcollaborating with armed groups. People who provide information to the state have been
subjected to reprisals from armed groups, including killings. 520 Also after security operations
there are often reprisals against the community who are perceived to be informants. There
have been cases where social leaders have been prevented from leaving their territory
because armed groups think they will pass information to the security forces, so they impose
confinements.521
For example:•••

In January 2022, along the Colombia-Venezuela border, clashes broke out between
the ELN and the First Front, over control of territory and illegal activities in Arauca
department (Colombia) and Apure state (Venezuela). Guerrillas from both sides,
previously allies, and also members of the Venezuela armed forces (supporting ELN),
have committed ‘brutal abuses’ in border areas. The groups reportedly killed ‘dozens
of people’ and the clashes caused nearly 4 000 people in Colombia to be displaced
and more than 3 300 in Venezuela.522
In March 2022, the military carried out an operation in Putumayo to capture a leader of
the Comandos de la Frontera while a civilian bazaar with 30-50 people and children
was taking place nearby. The operation resulted in 11 people being killed and 4 injured,
mostly civilians.523
In Bolívar, a ‘highly coveted region for criminal groups’ due to mineral wealth and drugtrafficking routes, relative calm between ELN and AGC, two major armed groups, wasdisrupted in August 2022. The ELN and AGC have been involved in hostilities in a
number of departments such as Chocó, Norte de Santander, and Antioquia. In Bolívar,after the FARC-EP demobilisation, the AGC moved into the traditionally ELN-dominatedregion and fought for three years until they ended fighting by forming an alliance tokeep other legal and illegal actors out of the area and continue their illicit activity. Afterseveral years, in August 2022, armed confrontations sparked up again between thegroups, causing displacement of 600 families, despite public promises by the group to
participate in peace processes under the new President Petro. 524

The Colombian military has a historical legacy of ‘atrocities,’ abuses and excessive use offorce against rural communities, often without punishment, leading to distrust by the local
population. Reforms made later under the peace agreement now allow for abuses by the
military during the pre-2016 era such as ‘false positive’ cases to be tried in the transitional
518

International Crisis Group, Trapped in Conflict: Reforming Mil itary Strategy to Save Lives in Colombia, 27
September 2022, url, p. 9519
International Crisis Group, Trapped in Conflict: Reforming Military Strategy to Save Lives in Colombia, 27
September 2022, url, p. 9520
UN OHCHR, Situation of human rights in Colombia [Year 2021] (A/HRC/49/19), 17 May 2022, url, para. 33
521
FIP, 3 November 2022, Interview with EUAA
522
HRW, Colombia/Venezuela: Border Area Abuses by Armed Groups, 28 March 2022, url
523
UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaci ones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, p. 36
524
InSight Crime, ELN and Urabeños War Again in Northern Colombia, 16 August 2022, url; see also: El Tiempo,
Más de 600 familias desplazadas dejan comates entre ilegales en sur de Bolívar, 10 August 2022, url

79EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

justice system, while abuses now carried out under during operations are handled by the
Attorney General’s Office rather than the internal military system. 525 During 2021, the UN
received allegations of ‘arbitrary deprivation of life’ by public security forces in conflictaffected areas, including at least 6 out of 27 verified cases where deaths occurred during
operations against these groups. In 2022, 45 allegations were received and are being
processed.526 There have also been local reports of the Venezuelan military logistically aiding
ELN and Segunda Marquetalia to fight the FARC dissident factions aligned with First Front. 527

5.8.

Capacity and willingness of illegal armed
groups to track and trace targets

Sources indicate that illegal armed groups expand their presence and influence through subcontracting to smaller groups and criminal outfits,528 as well as operating internationally due toparticipation in international criminal networks. 529 Sources consulted by the Immigration andRefugee Board of Canada (IRB) stated that ‘criminal groups are “definitely” able to tracktargeted individuals’. The sources indicated this mainly happens through word-of-mouth andcountry-wide networks of ‘urban collaborators’ or hiring local urban contacts.530 Regardingwhether there was variation in the capacity of various armed actors to conduct such tracking,such as larger versus smaller groups, two sources gave similar views that while almost allarmed groups and dissident groups can [track and trace targets], generally, the more national
the group, the more likely it is for them to trace someone. Hence a FARC dissident faction, theELN, or the AGC would be better able to do so than a local delinquent organisation. It does
however not rule out that a small group could track someone, particularly because many ofthese smaller gangs are contracted by larger organisations and hence have access to theextended national networks.531 Similarly, the Political Analyst remarked that the AGC or ELN
are more likely to be able to carry out coordinated actions, while smaller groups in remotecommunities would have a more limited scope. However, the source stated that if a group has
identified a specific individual as a target, they have the capacity within their criminal networks
to effectively carry out a threat. The source stated that ‘it is very difficult to know the extent towhich armed groups are capable of scaling up their targeting capacity from a local area to an
urban centre.’532
The Conflict Analyst interviewed by IRB remarked that such groups would more easily rely on
tracking people through family ties or asking within communities rather than trying to access
525

International Crisis Group, Trapped in Conflict: Reforming Military Strategy to Save Lives in Colombia, 27
September 2022, url, p. 22-23
526
UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, p. 36
527
ACLED, Regional Overview: South America 12-18 February 2022, 24 February 2022, url, p. 3
528
Political Analyst, 2 September 2022, Interview with EUAA; FIP, 3 November 2022, Interview with EUAA; Gil
Ramírez, M., Interview with EUAA, 21 November 2022
529
Political Analyst, 2 September 2022, Interview with EUAA
530
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Colombia: Targets of criminal groups, 13 August 2021, url;
McDermott, J., Comments made during the review of this report, 14 November 2022
531
Conflict Analyst, 25 February 2022, Correspondence with EUAA; Gil Ramírez, M., Interview with EUAA, 21
November 2022
532
Political Analyst, 2 September 2022, Correspondence with EUAA

80

EUAA COI REPORT - COLOMBIA: COUNTRY FOCUS

governmental information for such purposes.533 A professor interviewed by the IRB in 2021
indicated that in addition to using criminal networks across the country, criminal groups ‘track
their victims through informants, contacts in intelligence agencies and the army’. 534 In partial
corroboration to this, the Conflict Analyst interviewed by EUAA remarked that ‘penetration of
local institutions does happen’ and although the analyst did not know of specific cases,
indicated that this is a possible strategy that armed groups could use. 535
On the issue of factors that influence whether an armed group tracks or traces a person
across different regions, the Political Analyst remarked that ‘it is very difficult to generalise.’ 536
Professor Gil Ramírez remarked similarly that a there is no generalised logic to locate/target
someone; the criminal world does not follow established patterns of violence, and a person
threatened by a local gang in one place may be attacked again, while another person may
move away from an AGC threat without problems. It is highly dependent on local factors, andthe effectiveness of protection and ability to relocate depend to a large extent on the natureof the group issuing threats, and the motivations for doing so. 537 The analyst stated that it isnecessary to analyse the specific profile of the targeted person’s local and political situation,
threats faced, cases they’ve been involved in or reported on, potential linkages to criminal,
armed groups, or the state itself, as well as whether the person comes from an at-risk
geographic area, and the local dynamics of the area where they experienced threats. 538 The
Conflict Analyst stated similarly that a criminal or armed group may or may not necessarily
track an individual target if ‘the annoyance is removed’. 539 Jeremy McDermott commented thateach targeting situation can be different, depending on the group, the location, the profile,including in relation to large cities such as Medellín, Cali, and Bogota, where the dynamics ofarmed structures are each distinct.540
Sources cited by IRB report that illegal armed groups are more likely to track down individuals
with a high profile, or who continue advocacy work for their communities after being
displaced, or those who are capable of encroaching on territory or limiting the group’s
operations.541 The Political Analyst stated that factors influencing the tracking of a target stemfrom the person’s material or operational impediment to the group’s ability to carry out its
intended objectives. For example, someone who could provide information to the authorities
that would make the group’s operations less effective.542 Similarly, the Conflict Analyst statedthat,‘Usually the more serious the threat [to the person] locally, the more likely the person is
to be pursued in other cities. Some frequent examples of “serious” offenses, according
to an armed group, would be if a leader or threatened person is accused of being an
533

Conflict Analyst, 25 February 2022, Correspondence with EUAA
Conflict Analyst, 25 February 2022, Correspondence with EUAA
535
Conflict Analyst, 4 November 2022, Correspondence with EUAA
536
Political Analyst, 2 September 2022, Correspondence with EUAA
537
Gil Ramírez, M., Interview with EUAA, 21 November 2022
538
Political Analyst, 2 September 2022, Correspondence with EUAA
539
Canada, IRB, Colombia: Targets of criminal groups (2019 -June 2021) [COL200703.E], 13 August 2021, url
540
McDermott, J., Comments made during the review of this report, 14 November 2022
541
Canada, IRB, Colombia: Targets of criminal groups (2019 -June 2021) [COL200703.E], 13 August 2021, url
542
Political Analyst, 2 September 2022, Correspondence with EUAA
534

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

informant (either to the military or to another armed group), trying to avoid recruitment
into a group (for example a child or youth and his or her family), or someone perceived
to have a debt with an armed group. […] economic elites sometimes threaten people, or
have [sic] powerful political and military contacts, who would have even more means tofollow someone’.543
Similarly, Jeremy McDermott remarked that:‘Regarding reaching a person who is considered by an armed group as high value orhigh profile, if a hit is out on that individual, there are local ‘oficinas’ in most cities, so if
there is enough interest or money to pay for it, the group can find someone almost
anywhere; but they must want to kill them. In most cases, the group just want the
problematic person out of their business. If the target is sitting on strategic or tacticalintelligence about a group, they might be prepared to shell out a lot of money to havethem murdered. They can often find people by tracking their social media andpressuring friends and family in the area in order to find someone they wish totarget.’544
On the issue of whether targets have been pursued to other locations, the Conflict Analyst
stated that their organisation was ‘aware of numerous cases of human rights defenders who
were displaced from rural areas to Bogotá and have subsequently been approached by thesame group in the city with threats, photos of their activities, and clear evidence that they arebeing watched once again. They do this through their networks of fighters or paid agentsthroughout the country.’545 The Conflict Analyst observed that ‘the efficiency of successfully
tracking a person depends on the group, who the targeted person is, how badly the groupwants to find him or her, and whether that person´s family members are willing to (orpressured to) share information about their whereabouts’. 546 Similarly, Dejusticia remarked thatthe effectiveness of relocation for a social leader will depend on their profile, noting that insome cases, criminal organisations do follow them even in large cities, giving the example of apeasant leader who relocated to Bogotá in 2022 and still received threats while staying at a
hotel there. 547
Sources stated that it is much more difficult to relocate from a threat for people in rural areas
compared to those in urban areas, where the state is more accessible; 548 however, thePolitical Analyst remarked that state capacity in urban areas is still lacking and the ability to
relocate to an urban area is ‘case by case’. 549 Dejusticia, a Colombia-based research andadvocacy organisation dedicated to the strengthening of the rule of law, social/environmental
justice and human rights that monitors judicial effectiveness, commented in an interview withEUAA for this report that, ‘when a social leader has a wide range of work around the country
543

Conflict Analyst, 25 February 2022, Correspondence with EUAA
McDermott, J., Comments made during the review of this report, 14 November 2022
545
Conflict Analyst, 25 February 2022, Correspondence with EUAA
546
Conflict Analyst, 25 February 2022, Correspondence with EUAA
547
Dejusticia, 2 September 2022, Correspondence with EUAA
548
CONPA, 17 January 2022, Correspondence on file with EUAA; Political Analyst, 2 September 2022, Interview
with EUAA
549
Political Analyst, 2 September 2022, Interview with EUAA
544

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EUAA COI REPORT - COLOMBIA: COUNTRY FOCUS

or at least in several departments, it is more likely that they are attacked again or constantly
threatened, regardless of their location.’ Relocation does occur too, however social leadersusually do not have enough money to live in a large city and would lose their connections to
the local communities where they work. For this reason, they frequently return to the places
where they were attacked after short periods of time and find the loss of connections withfamily deepen psychological difficulties. 550 Regarding the situation of re-victimisation,
Professor Ramírez stated that in the case of victims of intra-urban displacement, they are notseen as ‘victims’ by the Victims Unit, and despite a Constitutional Court decision (T 268 of
2003551), applications from intra-urban victims of displacement were being rejected and due tothe lack of official assistance, victims have to rebuild their lives without state support andrelying on self-protection measures. It is also common for someone to relocate and enter new
dynamics with new or different armed actors or groups. 552 Similarly, the Conflict Analyst
remarked that ‘it is very difficult to have intra-urban displacement recognised by any
authorities.’ Without providing specific information about the Victims Unit, the Analyst statedthat ‘it is so common and widespread that it is rarely taken seriously by the authorities.’553
Dejusticia stated that relocation as a security measure depends on several factors, such as theavailability of a possible replacement for work (in order to obtain a livelihood), the possibility ofliving with relatives, and the sustained conditions of security.554

550

Dejusticia, 2 September 2022, Correspondence with EUAA
Colombia, Corte Constitucional, Sentencia T-268/03, 2003, url
552
Gil Ramírez, M., Interview with EUAA, 21 November 2022
553
Conflict Analyst, Correspondence with the EUAA, 4 November 2022
554
Dejusticia, 2 September 2022, Correspondence with EUAA
551

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6. Impact on civilians
ICRC reported that the civilian population in 2021-2022 is under ‘increasing pressure’ from thereconfiguration of armed groups, their increased armed confrontations, social control anddisputes over territory.555 Sources indicate the following are the main types of violence
encountered by civilian populations and those refraining from participation in hostilities:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Social control by armed groups 556 or ‘social cleansing’ through imposed ‘moral’
regulations;557
Threats 558 [usually in the form of pamphlets, phone calls, text messages, social
networks or through intermediary persons 559];
Homicides 560 and femicides;561
Massacres;
Targeted assassinations of social leaders/HRDs/peace agreement signatories;
Aggression by security forces during social disturbances/protests;
clashes with illegal armed groups and with security forces; 562
Arbitrary deprivation of liberty: kidnapping, hostage-taking, disappearances;
Movement restrictions and confinement;
Forced displacement including large scale and individual/familial displacement;
Forced recruitment;
Sexual violence;
Impacts from explosive artifacts such as land mines; 563
Being perceived to be cooperating with either the state or with armed groups. 564

Violence and violations of rights particularly impact those who have been historically affectedby the patterns of violence in Colombia, such as indigenous and Afro-Colombian people,
peasants/campesinos, women, and children/youth.565

555

ICRC, Colombia: Retos humanitarios 2022, 28 March 2022, url, p. 3
HRW, “The Guerrillas Are the Police,” 22 January 2022, url; ICRC, Colombia: Retos humanitarios 2022, 28
March 2022, url, p. 3
557
International Crisis Group, Leaders Under Fire, 6 October 2020, url, p. 19
558
ICRC, Colombia: Retos humanitarios 2022, 28 March 2022, url, p. 3; Indepaz, Cifras de la violencia en las
regiones 2021, 2022, url, p. 20; OAS, IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders and Social
Leaders in Colombia, 6 December 2019, url, p. 55
559
UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, para. 39; see also:
Canada, IRB, Colombia: Pamphlets produced by criminal groups declaring a person to be a “military target”(COL200906.E), 9 February 2022, url
560
ICRC, Colombia: Retos humanitarios 2022, 28 March 2022, url, p. 3; Indepaz, Cifras de la violencia en las
regiones 2021, 2022, url, p. 20
561
New Humanitarian (The), A Colombian town’s spike in femicides is linked to armed groups, 12 April 2022, url
562
Indepaz, Cifras de la violencia en las regiones 2021, 2022, url, p. 20
563
ICRC, Colombia: Retos humanitarios 2022, 28 March 2022, url, p. 3; Indepaz, Cifras de la violencia en las
regiones 2021, 2022, url, p. 20
564
Wesche, P., Post-war Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021,
url, p. 333
565
OAS, IACHR, Annual Report 2021 – Chapter 5: Colombia, 2022, url, para. 3; UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial:
Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url
556

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6.1.

Homicides

People who were killed during the armed conflict are counted as homicides in Colombia by
the Truth Commission.566 The Truth Commission found that around 450 666 homicides
committed between 1985 and 2018 were related to the armed conflict. This figure on
homicides includes both civilians and combatants, including those killed in clashes, as it was
not possible to disaggregate this variable from some databases. 567
Colombia’s National Institute for Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences (Instituto Nacional de
Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses, INMLCF) is attached to the FGN and also tracks
homicides in Colombia. Regarding the tracking of homicides, it observes that homicide isdefined as the death caused to one person by another, which is an expression of violence thathas marked the history of Colombia for decades. The INMLCF does not classify the reasonsfor homicides, which is the role of the FGN. 568 There are numerous contexts in whichhomicides occur, and for 2020 the most frequent were: 1) interpersonal violence, which
involves settling scores, legal intervention and fights, and 2) socio-political violence. However,
the most frequent forms of conflict in the Colombian territory come from illegal armed groups
and from military actions.569
The INMLCF documented a decrease in the homicide rate between 2011 to 2016, followed byan increase in 2018 and slight decrease in 2019-2020 due to pandemic related restrictions. 570
The Ministry of Defense’s statistics reported an increase in 2021: there were 13 362 nonuniformed civilians killed in homicides, the highest number since 2014; and there were 11 021
killed by homicide in 2022 as of October.571 INMLCF reported that most homicide victims weremale (especially indigenous and Afro-descendants), and most were caused by shootings (over75 %) and stabbings (15 %).572 The homicide rate was highest in 2020 in Archipelago of San
Andrés , Providencia and Santa Catalina, Cauca and Valle del Cauca. Likewise, themunicipalities with the highest homicide rates were Puerto Santander (Norte de Santander),Algeria (Cauca) and Cairo (Valle del Cauca). 573 Insight Crime’s map below shows homicide
rates based on DANE data which indicates Cauca, Valle del Cauca, Arauca, and Caquetá had
the highest homicide rates as of March 2022: 574 FIP also reported on homicides, noting that2020 was an atypical year due to pandemic-related restrictions; however 2021 indicated washighest since 2016. PDET and PNIS areas generally had higher homicide rates than thenational average, as indicated by the graph provided below from FIP based on police
statistics:575

566

Colombia, CEV, Hasta la guerra tiene límites, August 2022, url, p. 49
Colombia, CEV, Hasta la guerra tiene límites, August 2022, url, p. 49
568
Colombia, INMLCF, Forensis: Datos Para La Vida 2020, April 2022, url, p. 85
569
Colombia, INMLCF, Forensis: Datos Para La Vida 2020, April 2022, url, p. 85
570
Colombia, IFMLCF, Forensis: Datos Para La Vida 2020, April 2022, url, p. 85
571
Colombia, Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Logros de la política de defensa y seguridad, [Last updated October2022], url, p. 9572
Colombia, INMLCF, Forensis: Datos Para La Vida 2020, April 2022, url, p. 99
573
Colombia, INMLCF, Forensis: Datos Para La Vida 2020, April 2022, url, p. 83
574
Insight Crime, Homicide Rate in Colombia, March 2022, information provided to EUAA
575
FIP, Ni Paz Ni Guerra, May 2022, url, p. 33
567

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Figure 13: Homicide rates from 2010-2021, including in PDET and PNIS areas 576

Insight Crime provided EUAA with a map of homicide rates as of 2022:

Figure 14: Homicide rate in Colombia based on DANE statistics, March 2022 577

576
577

FIP, Ni Paz Ni Guerra, May 2022, url, p. 33
Insight Crime, Homicide Rate in Colombia, March 2022, information provided to EUAA

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EUAA COI REPORT - COLOMBIA: COUNTRY FOCUS

Futuros Urbanos, a Colombian thinktank focused on analysing urban issues, conducted a
2022 report on contracted homicides by hitmen (sicariato) in major cities, and reported that
according to police data, contract-killings are the most important type of homicide affecting
the security of Colombia’s main cities. The report stated that this type of killing has registered‘constant growth’ since 2017.578 Cities in the Caribbean region showed a ‘considerable
increase’ in contracted homicides and indicates an upward trend. 579 Principal causes include
drug trafficking, struggles to control territory, control of drug sales, and settling accounts
between criminal organisations. Contract-killing is multi-causal, originating from multiple
factors such as those above, as well as family problems, revenge, profit, personal problems,
settling accounts, among others.580 Between 2017-2021, recorded homicide cases done bysicarios [‘hitmen’] doubled from 4 080 to 8 161 cases.581 In 2021, more than 1 000 of thoseassassinations were in Colombia’s five largest cities. 582 So far in 2022, 61 % of the total
homicides registered were carried out by contract-killing, mainly using firearms. Sicariato
homicides were concentrated in five main cities by level of impact: Cali, Bogotá, Cartagena,
Medellín, Barranquilla.583 The main profile of victims are young males (94 %). 584
In relation to homicide rates in urban centres, Jeremy McDermott observed that where there is
one group that has total hegemony, the murder rates tend to be low because the group does notneed to kill people because they are dominant, do not have as many disputes, works in tandem withlocal authorities, and do not want to attract attention. If they are powerful in the area, then no othergroups can operate and they are more entrenched in the local economy; people are not inclined todisrupt their hegemony. 585 Similarly, Professor Gil Ramírez and a report by the Medellín mayor’s
office also stated that in neighbourhoods where an armed actor has established hegemonic
power and control, homicides and the excessive use of violence tend to decrease, and groups
instead use displacement to avoid raising the attention of civil authorities or security forces. 586

6.1.1.

Armed attacks, military operations, and civilian deaths

This section should be read in conjunction with sections on dynamics of the conflict, andchapters on interaction dynamics, as well as homicides, particularly definitions of how civilian
deaths related to armed conflict are tracked in Colombia. According to the Conflict Analyst
interviewed for this report, ‘there is no official way of counting civilian deaths and there aredifferences between the military, the police, civil society, international organisations. Evenamong state institutions, the official counts may differ.’ 587
Confrontations between armed groups are at the highest level since the peace deal was
signed in 2016, with 2021 the most violent year since the signing of the accords, according to578

Futuros Urbanos, Panorama Del Sicariato En Las Principales Ciudades Del Pa ís, August 2022, url, p. 3, 4
Futuros Urbanos, Panorama Del Sicariato En Las Principales Ciudades Del Pa ís, August 2022, url, p. 8
580
Futuros Urbanos, Panorama Del Sicariato En Las Principales Ciudades Del Pa ís, August 2022, url, p. 3
581
Futuros Urbanos, Panorama Del Sicariato En Las Principales Ciudades Del Pa ís, August 2022, url, p. 3
582
Colombia Reports, Assassinations driving increase in Colombia’s homicides: report, 29 August 2022, url
583
Colombia Reports, Assassinations driving increase in Colombia’s homicides: report, 29 August 2022, url
584
Futuros Urbanos, Panorama Del Sicariato En Las Principales Ciudades Del País, August 2022, url, p. 3
585
McDermott, J., Comment made during the review of this report, 14 November 2022
586
Medellín, El desplazamiento forzado intraurbano en Medellín: Categorización de un fenómeno complejo, 2019,url, pp. 69, 70; Gil-Ramírez, M., Interview with EUAA, 21 November 2022
587
Conflict Analyst, Correspondence with EUAA, 4 November 2022
579

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

ICRC,588 Colombia’s Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) war crimes tribunal determined that2021 was the most violent year since the government and FARC-EP signed the accord, withthe highest number of massacres, massive forced displacements, armed clashes between
security forces and armed groups, harassment of security forces and child recruitment.589
State forces’ operations intended to fight against armed groups can have ‘blowback’ oncivilians with captures of armed group members often causing waves of retaliatory violenceand displacement. Also when successful operations occur, armed groups retaliate against
civilians, accusing locals of collaboration with the military. The military frequently also has
difficulty discerning collaborators or combatants from actual civilians. 590 Throughout thereference period, there were reports of civilians killed during military operations and due toattacks by illegal armed groups in 2022, such as:••

In March 2022, 11 people were killed in a Putumayo operation which the government
claimed was against armed groups; however, local communities and civil society
groups later reported that civilians and social leaders were those killed. 591
In May 2022, AGC carried out a 4-day ‘armed strike’ to protest the extradition of theirformer leader, Otoniel (Dairo Antonio Úsaga592) who was extradited to the US for
federal prosecution.593 The armed strike mainly affected Antioquia, Bolívar, Córdoba,
and Sucre departments.594 It caused ‘widespread violence’ according to the UN,
impacting 178 communities in 11 departments; there were over 300 acts of violenceagainst civilians including the killing of 24 people, and 22 attacks against security
forces, causing 2 deaths.595

6.2.

Massacres

Massacres continue to be documented after the peace accord, including in Indigenous andAfro-Colombian communities and as a form of extreme violence are used to intimidate local
populations.596 Used to ‘keep entire towns in line’, massacres are also used by illegal armed
groups to retaliate and punish people perceived to be working or have the appearance of588

New York Times (The), Deep in Colombia, Rebels and Soldiers Fight for the Same Prize: Drugs, 20 April 2022,
url; New Humanitarian (The), Why Colombia’s next president will have to hit the humanitarian ground running, 15June 2022, url; ICRC, Colombia, Living in the shadow of armed conflict, 23 March 2022, url
589
Colombia Reports, Armed conflict resurged throughout Colombia: war crimes tribunal, 19 February 2022, url;
See also: Pares, Plomo es lo que hay: Violencia y seguridad en tiempos de Duque, 7 April 2022, url, pp. 9-11
590
International Crisis Group, Trapped in Conflict: Reforming Mil itary Strategy to Save Lives in Colombia, 27
September 2022, url, p. 27; Al Jazeera, ‘A massacre’: Deadly Colombia military operation sparks outrage, 7 April
2022, url
591
UNVMC/UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General (S/2022/513), url, para. 10; New York Times (The), Deep inColombia, Rebels and Soldiers Fight for the Same Prize: Drugs, 20 April 2022, url
592
Otoniel formerly controlled large areas of Colombia’s coastline and led the Clan del Golfo’s global cocaine
distribution chain; there were 500 open legal cases against him in Colombia for crimes committed 2007 -2021,
including a 40-year sentence for a massacre of 30 civilians by paramilitaries in 1997. InSight Crime, Otoniel’s
Extradition Heralds End for a Generation of Colombian Traffickers, 5 May 2022, url
593
Reuters, Colombia’s Clan del Golfo attacks vehicles to protest Otoniel extradition, 2 May 2022, url;
UNVMC/UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General (S/2022/513), url, para. 12; France24, Colombia: Violence continues
even after cartel’s ‘armed strike’ ends, 20 May 2022, url
594
Reuters, Colombia’s Clan del Golfo attacks vehicles to protest Otoniel extradition, 2 May 2022, url
595
UNVMC/UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General (S/2022/513), 27 June 2022, url, para. 12
596
UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, pp. 17-18; New YorkTimes (The), Colombia Sees Surge in Mass Killings Despite Historic Peace Deal, 13 September 2020, url

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EUAA COI REPORT - COLOMBIA: COUNTRY FOCUS

collaborating with a rival.597 The Ministry of Defence statistics on ‘collective homicide’ noted an
upward trend since 2016598 and the UN reported that the official number of massacres
increased by 200 % between 2016-2021.599 Indepaz documented 91 massacres in 2020,
affecting 381 victims; 96 massacres in 2021 killing 338 people, and 87 massacres with 274
victims [up to 31 October 2022].600 Departments especially affected have been Antioquia,
Cauca, Valle del Cauca, Nariño, Norte de Santander, and Putumayo. 601

6.3.

Kidnapping

Kidnapping was intensely problematic during the height of the Colombian conflict from thelate 1990s,602 and especially 2003-2012, in both urban and rural areas and financed FARC’s
expansion in the 1990s, however, since 2012 the practice has declined and did so even further
after the 2016 demobilisation.603 ELN still continues to use kidnapping but not to the same
extent as in the 1990s; rates have declined sharply since 2002. In more than 75 % of
kidnapping cases, no perpetrator is ever determined. 604 There were 207 reported kidnappingsin 2016, 195 in 2017, 176 in 2018, 163 in 2019, 192 in 2020, 160 in 2021, and 154 in 2022, as of
October 2022.605 Armed groups such as ELN and FARC dissidents still engage in kidnapping
civilians, including subjecting them to forced labour or as punishment for violation of grouprules.606 Kidnappings for the purpose of extortion in cities were also reported. 607

6.4.

Enforced disappearances

Enforced disappearances are used by all armed groups to instil fear in the population andensure social control.608 A new disappearance case was reported every second day in
Colombia in 2021, totalling 168 cases throughout the year (145 civilians and 23 members ofstate forces or armed groups).609 From 2016 to 2019, disappearances increased nationally and597

New York Times (The), Deep in Colombia, Rebels and Soldiers Fight for the Same Prize: Drugs, 20 April 2022,

url
598

Colombia, Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Logros de la política de defensa y seguridad, [Last udated October2022], url, pp. 10-11
599
UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, pp. 17-18
600
Indepaz, Masacres en Colombia durante el 2020, 2021, y 2022, [Last updated: 31 October 2022], url; For
example, see: Telesur, Colombia: Indepaz Denounces New Massacre in Cauca, 2 August 2022, url; Telesur, 83rd
Massacre in Colombia’s Cali, 4 October 2022, url
601
Indepaz, Masacres en Colombia durante el 2020, 2021, y 2022, [Last updated: 31 October 2022 ], url; UN
OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, pp. 17-18
602
McDermott, J., Comment made during the review of this report, 14 November 2022
603
Colombia Reports, Kidnapping and extortion, 8 June 2022, url; See also: Colombia, Ministerio de Defensa
Nacional, Logros de la política de defensa y seguridad, [Last updated October 2022], url, p. 13
604
Colombia Reports, Kidnapping and extortion, 8 June 2022, url;
605
Colombia, Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Logros de la política de defensa y seguridad, [Last updated October2022], url, p. 13
606
HRW, “The Guerrillas Are the Police”, 22 January 2020, url
607
Futuros Urbanos, Comportamiento Del Delito Extorsivo En Las 10 Principales Ciudades Del Pais, October 2022,
url, p. 3-4
608
UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, paras. 45-46; ICRC,
Colombia: Retos humanitarios 2022, 28 March 2022, url, p. 6
609
ICRC, Colombia: Retos humanitarios 2022, 28 March 2022, url, p. 6

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in conflict-affected areas, dropping in 2020 and 2021. 610Areas with the highest numbers offorced disappearances in 2016-2021 were Nariño, Antioquia, Cauca, Norte de Santander, andPutumayo.611 In departments with international borders, the permeability of those border sincreases the risk of disputes between armed groups and associated disappearances. The
state has a legal framework and robust institutional mechanisms to protect people against
disappearances, however important challenges undermine their effectiveness, including
issues of access to justice and delays in initiating searches. 612

6.5.

Forced recruitment, including of children/youth

In a 2022 study on recruitment of children/youth to armed groups, the Colombian Observatory
on Organised Crime (OCCO, Observatorio Colombiano de Crimen Organizado), an academic
think thank focused on criminality in Colombia, used the concept of ‘illicit recruitment’ whendescribing the phenomenon, meaning being incorporated into the ranks of armed groups tofulfill different functions and thus satisfy the organisation’s needs, whether this is ascombatants, cooks, nurses, or other functions, such as gathering information, extortion
collection, or selling drugs.613 According to International Crisis Group, ‘forced recruitment ofboth Colombian nationals and Venezuelan migrants has been on the increase since 2017 androse notably after the COVID-19 pandemic started’. Forced recruitment into armed groups andstreet gangs often targets Venezuelan migrants, who rely on informal labour and have few
resources and who are enticed with payment, food and shelter. It occurs both in border areas
and throughout the country.614 OCCO also reported that recruitment of youth occurred in bothrural and urban contexts, especially in poor and marginalised neighbourhoods. 615
Forced recruitment of minors continues to be reported in Colombia and since the 2016 peaceagreement has increased as illegal armed groups seek to boost their ranks in the absence of
the FARC-EP and in the midst of competition for territory.616 According to the UN, children andyouth are disproportionately affected by the armed conflict and suffer lack of education
prospects, food security, or means of livelihoods making them vulnerable to recruitment toarmed groups.617

610

Pares, Plomo es lo que hay, 22 April 2022, url, p. 17
For a trend graph and map see Pares, Plomo es lo que hay, 22 April 2022, url, pp. 17-19
612
UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, paras. 45-46
613
OCCO, La niñez reclutada. La participación de niños, niñas y adolescentes en el crimen or ganizado y conflicto
después del Acuerdo de Paz, 2022, url, pp. 5-6
614
International Crisis Group, Hard Times in a Safe Haven, 9 August 2022, url, p. 12
615
OCCO, La niñez reclutada. La participación de niños, niñas y adolescentes en el crimen organizado y conflicto
después del Acuerdo de Paz, 2022, url, pp. 5-6
616
OCCO, La niñez reclutada. La participación de niños, niñas y adolescentes en el crimen organizado y conflicto
después del Acuerdo de Paz, 2022, url, pp., 5-6; Insight Crime, How Colombia's Lockdown Created Ideal
Conditions for Child Recruitment, 28 August 2020, url; Insight Crime, Despite Peace Agreement, Child Recruitment
Plagues Colombia, 22 February 2022, url
617
UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, pp. 54-57; See also:
OCCO, La niñez reclutada. La participación de niños, niñas y adolescentes en el crimen organizado y conflicto
después del Acuerdo de Paz, 2022, url, p. 10; Insight Crime, Despite Peace Agreement, Child Recruitment Plagues
Colombia, 22 February 2022, url
611

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EUAA COI REPORT - COLOMBIA: COUNTRY FOCUS

Armed groups perpetrated recruitment of children, including FARC -dissident groups who wereamong the top perpetrators, and the ELN.618 The FARC-EP was the main child recruiter from1960 to 2016, however after the peace agreement, the ELN has been a main recruiter. 619 The
threat of recruitment to urban gangs and criminal combos is also a cause of intra-urban
displacement.620 Children are recruited to armed groups with offers of money, telephones, andare also intimidated and threatened to join. 621 Armed groups expose children and youth totrafficking, exploitation, and sexual slavery. 622 Threats of child recruitment forced families to
move, most commonly in Arauca and in Meta.623
Cases of recruitment of children are underreported. 624 Most reported cases occurred in
Antioquia, Arauca, Caquetá, Chocó, Córdoba, Guaviare, Nariño, Norte de Santander,
Tolima,625 and Putumayo.626 A study on child recruitment by the Colombian Observatory on
Organized Crime (Observatorio Colombiano de Crimen Organizado, OCCO), found that armed
groups concentrated on recruiting boys aged 12-15 and recruited over 1 000 youth during thefour year study (2017-2020), with Indigenous and Afro-Colombians being most at risk.
Seventeen departments represent 96 % of all cases, with a significant proportion (56 %)occurring in PDET municipalities.627 Reported cases of recruitment of children and youth
increased in 2021.628 In 2021, the OHCHR received 51 alleged cases of recruitment anddocumented 8 killings and 3 sexual violence cases against children and youth. For the same
year the government reported receiving 98 reported cases of children and youth involved
being in activities of armed groups, and 94 cases of children and youth who said they wererecruited by illegal armed groups.629 Between 2019-2021, more than 270 children from the
Nasa tribe in the north of Cauca were victims of recruitment by illegal armed groups.630 In
March 2022, indigenous authorities reported that more than 30 indigenous children and youth
had committed suicide in Chocó, Antioquia, Nariño, and Cauca, to avoid being recruited by
FARC dissidents, ELN, and the AGC.631 A 2022 study on the participation of youth in organised
crime since the peace accords found that both rural and urban populations are at risk, with
Montería and Medellín among the top 10 municipalities with the highest number of cases. 632
618

UNSC, Children and armed conflict in Colombia - Report of the Secretary-General (S/2021/1022), 8 December
2021, url
619
ACAPS, Colombia – Impact of the armed conflict on children and youth, 31 March 2022, url, p. 3
620
McDermott, J., Comment made during the review of this report, 14 November 2022
621
UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, pp. 54-57; Guardian(The), Armed groups target Colombia's children as reform process slows, 9 November 2020, url
622
UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, pp. 54-57
623
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in 2021 – Colombia, 12 April 2022, url, p. 27
624
OCCO, La niñez reclutada. La participación de niños, niñas y adolescentes en el crimen organizado y conflicto
después del Acuerdo de Paz, 2022, url, pp. 5-6
625
UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, pp. 54-57. For a moredetailed regional analysis, see also: OCCO, La niñez reclutada. La participación de niños, niñas y adolescentes en
el crimen organizado y conflicto después del Acuerdo de Paz, 2022, url
626
Insight Crime, How Colombia's Lockdown Created Ideal Conditions for Child Recruitment, 28 August 2020, url
627
OCCO, La niñez reclutada. La participación de niños, niñas y adolescentes en el crimen organizado y conflicto
después del Acuerdo de Paz, 2022, url, pp. 5-6
628
UNOCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview 2022 – Colombia, url
629
UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, pp. 54-57
630
UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, p. 23
631
Infobae, At least 30 indigenous children in Chocó have committed suicide to avoid being recruited by armed
groups, 19 March 2022, url
632
OCCO, La niñez reclutada. La participación de niños, niñas y adolescentes en el crimen organizado y conflicto
después del Acuerdo de Paz, 2022, url, pp. 5-6

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Armed groups exploited the COVID-19 pandemic to escalate control and increase childrecruitment with the closure of schools and worsened living conditions. 633 As of August 2022,
the government’s early warning system (Sistema de Alertas Tempranas, SAT) that warns ofhuman rights violations, has issued 15 Alerts relating to forced recruitment of children. 634

6.6.

Sexual and gender-based violence

Forms of sexual violence used during the conflict include rape, sexual slavery, early marriage,
forced pregnancy, as a means of population control, to extract information, for punishment in
the context of recruitment to armed groups of girls and youth, as well as for the purpose of
trafficking and sexual labour.635 Between 1959-2020, 31% of those affected by sexual violencein the armed conflict were underage girls.636 Sexual violence against women and girls in thecontext of the conflict in Colombia has been documented as a widespread, invisible andsystemic practice,637 that remains underreported.638 Boys are also abused and hindered from
reporting.639 Though less well-documented, sexual violence against men and boys is evenmore silenced in Colombia than against women and girls due to societal and family shame,fear of reprisals and lack of protection from authorities. 640 In areas where armed groups arepresent, victims experience increased barriers to institutional routes for care due to fear of
reprisals, stigmatisation, distrust in authorities, revictimisation, lack of confidentiality andprejudice based on race, social background, gender, and age.641

6.7.

Anti-personnel mines, explosive remnants ofwar, and unexploded ordnanceDue to more than five decades of conflict, Colombia is the country with among the highest
number of victims of anti-personnel mines in the world. Between 1999 and 2019, Afghanistan
and Colombia alternated placement as the top country having the highest number of mine

633

Guardian (The), Armed groups target Colombia's children as reform process slows, 9 November 2020, url;
Insight Crime, How Colombia's Lockdown Created Ideal Conditions for Child Recruitment, 28 August 2020, url;
New Humanitarian, How Colombia’s armed groups are exploiting COVID -19 to recruit children, 10 September 2020,
url; OCCO, La niñez reclutada. La participación de niños, niñas y adolescentes en el crimen organizado y conflicto
después del Acuerdo de Paz, 2022, url
634
Colombia, CERD – Informes periódicos 20° y 21° combinados que la Colombia debía presentar en 2022 en
virtud del artículo 9 de la Convención (CERD/C/COL/20-21), 6 October 2022, url, para. 71
635

UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, paras. 51-53

636

ACAPS, Colombia – Impact of the armed conflict on children and youth, 31 March 2022, url, p. 3
ASP et al., Laying Down Arms Reclaiming Souls: Sexual violence against men and boys in the armed conflict inColombia, 19 June 2022, url, pp. 9, 12
637

638

UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, paras. 51-53

639

ACAPS, Colombia – Impact of the armed conflict on children and youth, 31 March 2022, url, p. 3
ASP et al., Laying Down Arms Reclaiming Souls: Sexual violence against men and boys in the armed conflict inColombia, 19 June 2022, url, pp. 3, 9-11
641
UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, paras. 51-53; See also,
ASP et al., Laying Down Arms Reclaiming Souls: Sexual violence against men and boys in the armed conflict inColombia, 19 June 2022, url, p. 24
640

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casualties.642 From 2012 to 2016 there was a decline in ERW events and casualties. 643
Although the number of APM and ERW events dropped, and the number of victims dropped in
2016-2017, casualties per event have been increasing since then. 644 Despite the peaceagreement, improvised antipersonnel devices and mines are still used by armed groups andcriminal groups involved in drug trafficking and illegal mineral extraction. 645 Armed groups use
explosive artifacts and improved devices to impede enemy advancement into specificareas.646 There were reportedly 15 631 ‘events’ related to these devices between 2012-2022,
leading to 1525 incidents causing injury or death, and a total of 2 341 killed or injured. 647
According to UNMAS, since 2017, the number has increased from 58 victims to 179 (2018), 115(2019), 174 (2020) and 151 (2021).648 For landmines specifically, the government of Colombia
recorded 157 victims in 2021, and 89 to date in 2022. 649 ICRC recorded 486 victims of
explosive devices in 2021, which it deemed the highest number of the past five years,
registering victims in 21 departments and 131 municipalities during that time.650 The UN Mine
Action Service (UNMAS) reported that most victims are adult (83.4 %) civilians (60.9 %) anddisproportionately affected Afro-Colombian and Indigenous (28.5 %).651 Colombia isconsidered to have ‘medium’ level of landmine contamination as of 2021, on par with Somalia
and South Sudan.652 There are an estimated 260 municipalities with known or suspectedcontamination, including 138 that are considered inaccessible or partly inaccessible. 653
Contamination causes limitations on mobility, livelihoods, health, education, and causes
confinement and displacement.654 The areas most affected are Nariño, Norte de Santander,
and Antioquia,655 as well as Cauca, and Valle del Cauca.656

6.8.

Attacks on health infrastructure

ICRC reported that Colombia has become increasingly dangerous place to deliver health care,due to attacks on health workers, health facilities and vehicles, which have ‘increased
considerably’ over the past three years. There were 218 cases of aggression against health642

ICBL-CMC, Land Mine Monitor 2021, 10 November 2021, url, p. 42
ACAPS, Colombia – Antipersonnel mines and explosive remnants of war, 2 June 2022, url, p. 9644
Pares, Plomo es lo que hay: Violencia y seguridad en tiempos de Duque, 7 April 2022, url, p. 21
645
ICBL-CMC, Land Mine Monitor 2021, 10 November 2021, url, p. 12; ACAPS, Colombia – Antipersonnel mines andexplosive remnants of war, 2 June 2022, url
646
Pares, Plomo es lo que hay: Violencia y seguridad en tiempos de Duque, 7 April 2022, url, p. 21
647
Colombia, Comisión de Seguimiento y Monitoreo a la Implementación de la Ley 1448 de 2011, “Ley de Víctimas yRestitución de Tierras”, Noveno informe de seguimiento al Congreso de la República 2021 -2022, 22 August 2022,
url, p. 88
648
UNMAS, Boletín de Noticias, February 2022, url
649
Colombia, Estadísticas de asistencia integral a las víctimas de MAP y MUSE, 30 September 2022, url. See also:
Colombia, Comisión de Seguimiento y Monitoreo a la Implementación de la Ley 1448 de 2011, “Ley de Víctimas yRestitución de Tierras”, Noveno informe de seguimiento al Congreso de la República 2021 -2022, 22 August 2022,
url, p. 88
650
UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, paras. 58-59
651
UNMAS, Boletín de noticias, February 2022, url
652
ICBL-CMC, Land Mine Monitor 2021, 10 November 2021, url, p. 31
653
ICBL-CMC, Land Mine Monitor 2021, 10 November 2021, url, p. 32
654
ACAPS, Colombia – Antipersonnel mines and explosive remnants of war, 2 June 2022, url
655
Pares, Plomo es lo que hay: Violencia y seguridad en tiempos de Duque, 7 April 2022, url, p. 21; UNMAS, Boletínde noticias, February 2022, url
656
UNMAS, Boletín de noticias, February 2022, url
643

93EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

workers and facilities 657 in 2020 and 553 attacks and incidents recorded in 2021, a 70 %increase from 2020.658 Health workers have been attacked by civilians such as members of
the community, patients and relatives (66 %) and ‘weapon-bearers’ such as non-state armed
groups (17 %). The most severe incidents were homicides, deprivation of liberty, assaults andthreats, including extortion. Most incidents occurred in Valle del Cauca, Norte de Santander,
Huila, Nariño, and Chocó.659

6.9.

Displacement

Colombia’s conflict situation of more than 5 decades has led to a long term situation of
protracted displacement, with secondary displacement also being common.660 Over 9.3 million
Colombians have been recognised by the government Victims Unit as having been victims offorced displaced due to the conflict in the period from 1985 to the pres ent.661 UNHCR reported
that in 2021 the number of currently internally displaced people in Colombia was 6.8 million, 662
second only to Syria (6.9 million).663 There are an estimated 2.5 million Venezuela migrants
and refugees living in Colombia.664
Displacement of large groups in affected communities, families, and individual-level
displacements continue to occur in Colombia due to armed conflict. 665 Most of thedisplacement from rural to urban areas happened in late 1990s/early 2000s and since then,displacement has fallen; it usually happens now on individual/family level in both rural andurban areas.666 Intra-urban displacement is difficult to quantify given the different variables
that are present in this phenomenon and because victims do not always file complaints in thisregard.667 IACHR noted its concern about the scale of individual/family displacements, and civilsociety organisations report that individual and family level displacements due to threats from

657

ICRC, Health care under threat in Colombia 2020, 3 March 2020, url
ICRC, Colombia: Health care in danger, 23 March 2022, url
659
ICRC, Colombia: Health care in danger, 23 March 2022, url
660
UNOCHA, Breaking the Impasse: Reducing Protracted Internal Displacement as a Collective Outcome, 22 June
2017, url, pp. 92-93
661
Colombia, Unidad Para Las Víctimas, [Last checked on 21 November 2022] url
662‘The National Victims Registry of Colombia (Victims Unit) contains the historical accumulated figure of thenumber of victims of displacement, which continues to increase given that victims continue to be registered in the
country. Thus, the total number of people recognized [by Colombia’s Victims Unit] as victims of displacement (...),
includes the number of IDPs who are subject to attention and/or reparation, i.e. those who meet the requirements
to access the measures of attention and reparation established in Colombian Law 1448 (6.8 million). The number ofvictims of displacement who are deceased, or IDPs who were victims of homicide or forced disappearance, andother victims who, for various reasons, cannot effectively access these measures, are identified as not being
subject to attention or reparation and therefore not included in the figure of 6.8 million. The figure is constantly
updated, considering that by legal definition, victims have up to two years to make their declaration and be
included in the registry system.’ UNCHR, Global Trends Report 2021, url, p. 25
663
UNCHR, Global Trends Report 2021, url, p. 26
664
International Crisis Group, Hard Times in a Safe Haven: Protecting Venezuelan Migrants in Colombia, 9 August
2022, url
665
ICRC, Colombia: Retos humanitarios 2022, 28 March 2022, url, p. 3; Indepaz, Cifras de la violencia en las
regiones 2021, 2022, url, p. 20; UNHCR, Internal Displacement/Colombia: Large-Group Internal Displacement for
January to December 2021 [Infographic], 25 February 2022, url
666
McDermott, J., Comment made during the review of this report, 14 November 2022
667
Medellín, El desplazamiento forzado intraurbano en Medellín: Categorización de un fenómeno complejo, 2019,url, pp. 56-57; Verdad Abierta, El desplazamiento forzado, un crimen irreparable, 3 June 2021, url
658

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armed groups affect a greater number of people than most displacement, but due to its nature
is more difficult to record.668
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) reported that the root causes ofinternal displacement remain linked to the limited progress on the implementation of thepeace agreement, particularly relating to the substitution of illicit crops and economic
development aimed at mitigating the underlying causes of violence. Other causes include theexpansion of non-state armed groups, threats to local populations to push them out of theirterritories, cuts to state response budgets, and the absence of victim assistance initiatives or
weaknesses in their response causing people to return to areas without having risks assessed
and guarantees for safe return in place. Civil society groups report that despite the state’smajor efforts, the response to displacement has fallen short and it does not guarantee
protection for the rights of displaced persons. 669 Threats, harassment, extortion, homicides,
and killings by armed groups were listed as principle causes of mass forced displacement inrisk areas identified by the Office of the Ombudsperson. 670 OHCHR reported that some social
leaders shared with the organisation that the objective for armed groups is to push them off
their land permanently, and that they would rather die that be forced into displacement or tolose their ancestral territories.671
IDPs face human rights violations such as right to adequate living standards, freedom of
movement, residence, housing, health, education, employment and family life, and may
become new targets for armed groups or for forced recruitment. 672 Displaced women are
particularly at risk of violence, sexual exploitation, labour exploitation, risks of forced
recruitment of their children, and obstacles to owning or protecting assets. 673
Forced displacement increased in 2021 to the highest number since 2016 674 with Internal
Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) reporting over 100 000 forced displacements and 32
000 disaster related displacements in 2021. 675 According to UNHCR, during 2021, 62 273
individuals (21 201 families) were displaced due to 145 large-scale group displacements,
representing a 151 % increase compared to 2020, with a continued increasing trend since2017. Most of these large-group displacements were mainly caused by armed confrontations
with armed groups (64 %), followed by threats (16 %), combat (9 %), APM/UXO (4 %), homicides(3 %), presence of illegal armed groups (3 %), massacres and recruitment (<1 %). Those mainly
affected were Afro-Colombian populations (60 %), small-scale farmers [campesinos] (27 %),668

OAS, IACHR, IACHR Expresses Concern Over the Notable Increase in Forced Internal Displacement in
Colombia, 30 September 2021, url
669
OAS, IACHR, IACHR Expresses Concern Over the Notable Increase in Forced Internal Displacement in
Colombia, 30 September 2021, url; OAS, IACHR, Annual Report 2021 – Chapter 5: Colombia, 2022, url, paras. 152153
670
Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Boletín de Movilidad Humana Forzada #2 31 de Enero-28 de Febrero, url, p. 1
671
UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, para. 50
672
OAS, IACHR, IACHR Expresses Concern Over the Notable Increase in Forced Internal Displacement in
Colombia, 30 September 2021, url
673
OAS, IACHR, IACHR Expresses Concern Over the Notable Increase in Forced Internal Displacement in
Colombia, 30 September 2021, url; UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July
2022, url, para. 48
674
Citing OCHA, UNCHR, and Colombia, in OAS, IACHR, IACHR Expresses Concern Over the Notable Increase in
Forced Internal Displacement in Colombia, 30 September 2021, url; CODHES, 2021, el año con mayor número devíctimas de desplazamiento en 5 años, 22 December 2021, url
675
IDMC, Country Profile – Colombia, 19 May 2022, url

95EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

indigenous communities (13 %), and Venezuelan migrants (<1 %). The main areas wheredisplacement was registered were Nariño (39 %), Valle del Cauca (19 %), Cauca (16 %),Antioquia (11 %), Chocó (9 %), Córdoba (3 %), Norte de Santander (2 %), as well as Putumayo
and Arauca.676 Similar trends were reported by UNOCHA (reporting 72 000) 677 and theColombian Ombudsman,678 as well as the displacement monitoring NGO, CODHES679.680 IDMC
reported similarly that Colombia’s Pacific departments account for most of the displacement
due to conflict and in some cases, displacement is highly concentrated in several
municipalities, for instance Buenaventura, a major transit point for narcotics where violence isconcentrated between competing armed groups. 681
Between January and June 2022, there were 79 large scale displacements, affectin g 30 866
people (11 735 families). These large scale displacements were caused by conflict or threats
and affected mainly Nariño, Putumayo, Cauca, Valle del Cauca, Chocó, Córdona, Bolívar,Magdalena, Norte de Santander, Arauca, as well as Antioquia and Ris aralda.682

6.9.1.

Intra-urban displacement

Intra-urban displacement refers to displacement to a different area within the same city. 683
Intra-urban displacement in Colombia is a complex phenomenon that often intersects
economic development projects, dynamics of the armed conflict, and local criminal
activities.684 Intra-urban displacement can take place due to armed confrontations among
armed actors, usually criminal gangs, to dispute territory or preserve autonomy from othercriminal actors.685 It also takes place as a tactic by criminal actors or powerful economic
interests to gain territorial control over neighbourhoods and control licit and illicit economies,
the administration of justice, and social relationships and identities. 686 Violence in informal
settlements is caused mainly by armed groups and criminal gangs, which can trigger intraurban displacement between urban areas. 687 According to IDMC, ‘illegal armed groups exert
social and territorial control over many urban areas in Colombia, and their activities force

676

UNHCR, Internal Displacement/Colombia: Large-Group Internal Displacement for January to December 2021, 25
February 2022, url; See also: UNHCR, Colombia: Impacto y tendencias humanitarias entre enero y agosto de 2021,
22 September 2021, url
677
UNOCHA, Más de 72 mil personas sufrieron desplazamiento forzado en Colombia, 6 January 2022, url
678
OAS, IACHR, IACHR Expresses Concern Over the Notable Increase in Forced Internal Displacement in
Colombia, 30 September 2021, url; see also: UNHCR, Colombia: Impacto y tendencias humanitar ias entre enero yagosto de 2021, 22 September 2021, url
679
Consultoría para los derechos humanos y el desplazamiento (CODHES) was created in 1992 to carry out
research and advocacy contributing to the promotion and protection of human rights, in particular of the internallydisplaced population in Colombia.
680
CODHES, 2021, el año con mayor número de víctimas de desplazamiento en 5 años, 22 December 2021, url
681
IDMC, Global Report on Internal Displacement 2022, April 2022, url, p. 78
682
UNHCR, Colombia: Monitoreo de protección (enero - junio 2022), June 2022, url
683
Insight Crime, The Nomad Victims: Intra-urban Displacement in Medellin, 10 July 2013, url
684
Medellín, El desplazamiento forzado intraurbano en Medellín: Categorización de un fenómeno complejo, 2019,url, pp. 25, 67
685
Medellín, El desplazamiento forzado intraurbano en Medellín: Categorización de un fenómeno complejo, 2019,url, p. 70; Gil-Ramírez, M., Interview with EUAA, 21 November 2022
686
Medellín, El desplazamiento forzado intraurbano en Medellín: Categorización de un fenómeno complejo, 2019,url, pp. 60, 67; Gil-Ramírez, M., Interview with EUAA, 21 November 2022
687
IDMC, Addressing Urban Displacement in Colombia’s Informal Settlements, 2020, url, p. 5

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people, including those already displaced at least once, to flee from one neighbourhood toanother.’ 688
Of Colombia’s historically displaced population, 89 % has been displacement from rural tourban areas. In urban informal settlements, the population is densely populated with highlevels of poverty, inequality, poor housing and few services. 689 In Medellín, neighbourhoods of
expulsion and destination in intra-urban displacement are mostly located in the peripheral
areas 690 due to the presence of armed actors that seek control of corridors to and from thecity for the transportation of drugs and weapons. 691 According to a report on intra-urban
displacement in Medellín produced by the Mayor’s office, areas such as northeastern andcentral eastern parts of Medellín, that tend also to receive IDPs, revictimisation may be apossibility,692 with persons being displaced on several occasions to flee threats and physicalviolence.693 Armed actors tend to remain for long periods of time in neighbourhoods, whichfacilitates revictimisation of returnees who were displaced in the past. 694 Oral sourcesindicated that intra-urban displacement victims are not recognised 695 or and that the issue isnot ‘taken seriously’ by authorities.696
Forced urban displacement by gangs also involves death threats, forcing residents to leave sothat gangs can gain access to profits [e.g. extortion] in certain territories. 697 In Medellín, todisplace persons out of neighbourhoods, armed actors use homicides, establishment ofinvisible frontiers, extortion, ‘penalty fees’ for violating imposed social behaviours, childrecruitment, open armed confrontations, harassment, social control, 698 requiring the local
population to use goods and services offered by armed actors, and forced evictions for illicit
purposes.699 Professor Gil-Ramírez stated that intra-urban displacement is caused ‘illegal
territorial control practices’ by organised crime groups. 700 The municipal Ombudsperson ofMedellín indicated that, in 2021, that office registered 1,940 intra-urban displacements in thecity, an increase from 1,694 in 2020.701 The same source indicated that most displacements
took place in Comunas 1, 3, 7, 8, 13, and 16, and in the jurisdictions of San Antonio de Prado
688

IDMC, Addressing Urban Displacement in Colombia’s Informal Settlements, 2020, url, p. 5
IDMC, Addressing Urban Displacement in Colombia’s Informal Settlements, 2020, url, p. 5
690
Medellín, El desplazamiento forzado intraurbano en Medellín: Categorización de un fenómeno complejo, 2019,url, p. 59; Medellín, Desplazamiento forzado intraurbano Medellín, 14 Nov. 2022, url; Colombia, Personería deMedellín, El desplazamiento forzado intraurbano en Medellín aumentó alrededor del 15% en 2021 con respecto al
2020, 3 June 2022, url
691
Medellín, El desplazamiento forzado intraurbano en Medellín: Categorización de un fenómeno complejo, 2019,url, p. 59
692
Medellín, El desplazamiento forzado intraurbano en Medellín: Categorización de un fenómeno complejo, 2019,url, pp. 56-58
693
Verdad Abierta, El desplazamiento forzado, un crimen irreparable, 3 June 2021, url
694
Medellín, El desplazamiento forzado intraurbano en Medellín: Categorización de un fenómeno complejo, 2019,url, p. 132
695
Gil-Ramírez, M., Interview with EUAA, 21 November 2022
696
Conflict Analyst, Correspondence with the EUAA, 4 November 2022
697
Doyle, C., Perceptions and Realities of Violence in Medellin, Colombia, June 2019, url, p. 157
698
Medellín, El desplazamiento forzado intraurbano en Medellín: Categorización de un fenómeno complejo, 2019,url, pp. 71, 73; Colombia, Personería de Medellín, El desplazamiento forzado intraurbano en Medellín aumentó
alrededor del 15% en 2021 con respecto al 2020, 3 June 2022, url
699
Medellín, El desplazamiento forzado intraurbano en Medellín: Categorización de un fenómeno complejo, 2019,url, pp. 71, 73
700
Gil-Ramírez, M., Interview with EUAA, 21 November 2022
701
Colombia, Personería de Medellín, El desplazamiento forzado intraurbano en Medellín aumentó alrededor del
15% en 2021 con respecto al 2020, 3 June 2022, url
689

97EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

and San Cristóbal, and that most of the victims were between 21 and 49 years of age, mostly
women.702 New Humanitarian interviewed several women who had fled Cúcuta and Tibú in
Catatumbo and moved to Medellín and Bogotá. The article states that the women felt ‘is olated
and abandoned by the state’, had to move to shelters where they experienced abuse, andhad difficulty earning a living. ‘Economic precarity’ in large cities often forced women to returnto their hometown in Catatumbo despite threats of being killed. 703
In 2021, the Attorney General reported on several cases where alleged members of different
criminal groups were prosecuted for incidents of forced displacements, including members of
La Oficina de Envigado, Los Sureños, and the ELN, and Los Chuma. 704 Further information on
the results could not be found within time constraints.

6.10. Confinement
Confinement in Colombia is a complex term. Resolution No. 0171 of 2016 under Colombian law
defines confinement as ‘a situation of violation of fundamental rights, in which communities,
despite remaining in a part of their territory, lose mobility as a result of the presence andactions of illegal armed groups. This restriction implies the impossibility of accessing goods
indispensable for survival derived from the military, economic, political, cultural, and social
control exercised by illegal armed groups in the framework of the internal armed conflict.’ 705
However, UNOCHA defines confinement without limiting it to being imposed only by armed
groups: ‘forced confinement is understood as the limitation of the mobility of the populationand their access to at least three basic services or goods (such as food, education, health,water and sanitation, and livelihoods) for at least one week. Restrictions that last for less th an
one week are considered a restriction on mobility. 706
Colombia continues to report a high number of confinement situations and mobility restriction
incidents.707 Since 2016, a significant increase in confinements has been registered due toactions and threats by non-state armed groups marking a shift in dynamics.708 UNOCHA
reported an increase in the number of people confined by the armed conflict by 593 % from2016 to 2021.709 Confinements may arise from direct imposition by armed actors to facilitate
illegal activities, from the community itself, or indirectly due to conflict, such as due to use ofmines, UXO, or explosive devices, due to armed clashes between groups or with the state

702

Colombia, Personería de Medellín, El desplazamiento forzado intraurbano en Medellín aumentó alrededor del
15% en 2021 con respecto al 2020, 3 June 2022, url703
New Humanitarian, A Colombian town’s spike in femicides is linked to armed groups, 12 April 2022, url
704
OAS, IACHR, Annual Report 2021 – Chapter 5: Colombia, 2022, url, paras. 172-175
705
Article 1 in, Colombia, Resolución 00171 del 24 de febrero de 2016, 24 February 2016, url
706
ACAPS, Colombia Confinements, 18 February 2022, url, p. 3
707
OAS, IACHR, Annual Report 2021 – Chapter 5: Colombia, 2022, url, para. 154; ACAPS, Colombia Confinements,
18 February 2022, url, p. 1
708
UNHCR, Colombia: Impacto y tendencias humanitarias entre enero y agosto de 2021, 22 September 2021, url;
ACAPS, Colombia Confinements, 18 February 2022, url, p. 1; New Humanitarian (The), Five years after ‘peace’ theColombian communities living in forced confinement, 25 November 2021, url
709
ACAPS, Colombia Confinements, 18 February 2022, url, p. 9

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forces.710 Confinement creates a situation of high risk for displacement, 711 and is used as a formof social control by armed groups.712 Confinement imposed mobility restrictions and thepresence of armed groups impact the population’s ability to access protection, food, health,
livelihoods, and access to water and hygiene, and adequate housing/shelter as well as
humanitarian assistance.713
During 2020, 70 000 known cases of confinement were reported, exacerbated by the COVID19 pandemic and multiplication of armed groups. During 2021, UN sources reported 57 464
people (15 152 families) 714 to 65 236 people were confined mainly due to confrontations witharmed groups.715 Departments and municipalities of the Pacific region were reported to be themost affected.716 In 2021, these confinements occurred mainly in the department of Chocó (73%), as well as Nariño (14 %), Antioquia (7 %), Valle del Cauca (3 %), and Cauca, Putumayo,
Arauca, and Risaralda.717 OCHA also reported the increasing trend, with the highest numbers
during 2016-2021 also affecting Chocó, Nariño, Antioquia, Norte de Santander, Cauca, andValle del Cauca.718 Between January and June 2022, UNHCR recorded 26 mass confinement
events that affected 43 059 people (10 488 families), meaning a 22 % increase compared to
the number of people confined in 2021. The most affected areas were Chocó (77 %), Valle delCauca (9 %), and Arauca (9 %).719 ACAPS provides a local analysis of the conflict dynamics
leading to confinements within those 5 most affected departments.720
UNHCR stated that the most affected groups in 2021 were Indigenous (62 %), Afro-Colombian(37 %), and small-scale farmers (1 %).721 UNOCHA and ACAPC corroborate that the majority of
those affected by confinement are indigenous or Afro-Colombian, often who have been
revictimized or previously displaced,722 and who live in areas of strategic interest to armed
groups.723 The same trends were reported in 2022, with most confinement-affected
populations being indigenous and Afro-Colombian, and mainly having been caused byclashes, mobility restrictions, threats, fighting, mine and UXO contamination.724 UNOCHA and
UNHCR provide maps indicating the relationship between areas where there are attacks and710

ACAPS, Colombia Confinements, 18 February 2022, url, p. 3; UNHCR, Colombia: Impacto y tendencias
humanitarias entre enero y agosto de 2021, 22 September 2021, url
711
UNHCR, Colombia: Confinements (Jan to March 2022), 3 May 2022, url; ACAPS, Colombia Confinements, 18
February 2022, url, p. 1
712
New Humanitarian (The), Five years after ‘peace’ the Colombian communities living in forced confinement, 25
November 2021, url; International Crisis Group, A Fight by Other Means: Keeping the Peace with Colombia’s FARC,
30 November 2021, url, p. 30; UNHCR, Colombia: Impacto y tendencias humanitarias entre enero y agosto de 2021,
22 September 2021, url
713
ACAPS, Colombia Confinements, 18 February 2022, url, pp. 5-8; UNHCR, Colombia: Monitoreo de protección(enero - junio 2022), June 2022, url
714
UNHCR, Colombia: Confinements (January to December 2021), 2 March 2022, url
715
ACAPS, Colombia Confinements, 18 February 2022, url, p. 1
716
UNHCR, Colombia: Impacto y tendencias humanitarias entre enero y agosto de 2021, 22 September 2021, url, p.
3; ACAPS, Colombia Confinements, 18 February 2022, url, pp. 10-14
717
UNHCR, Colombia: Confinements (January to December 2021), 2 March 20 22, url
718
ACAPS, Colombia Confinements, 18 February 2022, url, pp. 1, 9719
For additional information on trends, see also: UNHCR, Colombia: Confinements (January 2022 to March 2022),
3 May 2022, url
720
ACAPS, Colombia Confinements, 18 February 2022, url
721
UNHCR, Colombia: Confinements (January to December 2021), 2 March 2022, url
722
UNHCR, Colombia: Impacto y tendencias humanitarias entre enero y agosto de 2021, 22 September 2021, url, p.
1
723
ACAPS, Colombia Confinements, 18 February 2022, url, p. 1
724
UNHCR, Colombia: Monitoreo de protección (enero - junio 2022), June 2022, url

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armed actions by illegal armed groups and areas where there have been incidents ofdisplacement, confinement, and mobility restrictions. 725
Confinement is frequently ‘invisible’ statistically due to the lack of communication withgovernment or aid organisations by affected communities.726 Underreporting of confinement
situations occurs due to threats, lack of communication, or being perceived as a normal
condition of life; hence it is likely that the number of people affected is higher than reported.727

725

UNHCR, Colombia: Impacto y tendencias humanitarias entre enero y agosto de 2021, 22 September 2021, url, p.
2; UNHCR, Colombia: Confinements (January to December 2021), 2 March 2022, url
726
New Humanitarian (The), Five years after ‘peace’ the Colombian communities living in forced confinement, 25
November 2021, url
727
ACAPS, Colombia Confinements, 18 February 2022, url, p. 5

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7. Profiles
7.1.

Social leaders and human rights defenders

In the sources consulted, EUAA observed variances in use of the term ‘social leaders,’ which
are closely linked with the definition of ‘human rights defenders,’ and frequently used together
or interchangeably in source material due to functional overlaps in the Colombian context.
There is no ‘agreed upon’ definition of ‘social leaders’ and varying definitions within thegovernment of Colombia itself and among civil society which increases the numbers of thoseeligible for protection and generates variations in tracking statistics for violence against
leaders.728 The Attorney-General’s Office prefers a narrower definition of social leaders toinclude only human rights defenders, while the Ombudsperson’s Office uses broader
definitions. 729 The IACHR recognizes that ‘the concept of human rights defender is broad andflexible in nature,’ and that in the Colombian context, there are those ‘who are defending
human rights by being leaders in their communities’. 730 Colombian civil society definitions tend
to ‘rely on community recognition to decide who is a leader and based on alternative
definitions violence against leaders is ‘more widespread than official statistics indicate’. 731
CERAC explained that human rights defenders are part of a larger category of ‘social leaders’
used when sources are referring to murders and human rights abuses and that ‘social leaders’have different roles related to cultural, language, or heritage; while human rights defenders
are focused on human rights violations.732 Community Action Councils (JAC, Juntas de Acción
Comunal) are the main political participation body at the local level; they are composed of
local residents who organise the community and serve as intermediaries with the state andsome also promote human rights and development initiatives outside the Councils. 733 The
IACHR has stated that JAC leaders are human rights defenders. 734 Members of JAC make up alarge percentage of the most severely affected profiles. 735
Sources indicate that the sectors with the most frequently targeted social leaders and humanrights defenders were those working in:•indigenous issues/rights;736728International Crisis Group, Leaders Under Fire, 6 October 2020, url, p. 4; For a list of profiles designated associal leaders by the Colombian Ombudperson’s Office, see: HRW, Left Undefended, 10 February 2021, url, p. 15
729
International Crisis Group, Leaders Under Fire, 6 October 2020, url, p. 4
730
OAS, IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders and Social Leaders in Colombia, 6 December
2019, url, p. 23
731
International Crisis Group, Leaders Under Fire, 6 October 2020, url, p. 4
732
Norway, Landinfo, Temanotot – Colombia: Vaepnede grupper etter fredsavtalen, 6 April 2022, url, p. 14
733
Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021, url,
p. 320; HRW, Left Undefended, 10 February 2021, url, p. 3
734
OAS, IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders and Social Leaders in Colombia, 6 December
2019, url, p. 23
735
International Crisis Group, Leaders Under Fire, 6 October 2020, url, pp. 13-14
736
Indepaz, Cifras de la violencia en las regiones 2021, 2022, url, p. 11; Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against
Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021, url, p. 320

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•

•
•

civic and communal leaders 737 such as members of JAC;738
peasant (campesino) rights;739
afro-descendants rights;740
union/labour leaders;741
environmental rights;742
questioning the use of power and violence to solve political differences; 743
participating in illicit crop substitution and opposition to illegal economies on the
territory744 such as drug trafficking;745
defence of land and territorial land rights,746 including opposition to large agro-industrial
projects, mineral extraction, and unsustainable infrastructure projects, 747 or working toreclaim territories belonging to displaced families and communities; 748
defence of the Peace Agreement and the rights of victims of the conflict, 749 including
programs such as crop substitution programs (Programa Nacional Integral de Sustituciónde Cultivos Ilícitos, PNIS) 750 and development program (Programas de Desarrollo con
Enfoque Territorial PDET);751
Women’s rights defenders;752 andLGBTI human rights defenders.753

737

Indepaz, Cifras de la violencia en las regiones 2021, 2022, url, p. 112020 information from the Colombian Attorney General’s Office cited in: Wesche, P., Post-war Violence Against
Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021, url, p. 320; International Crisis Group,
Leaders Under Fire, 6 October 2020, url, p. 13
739
Indepaz, Cifras de la violencia en las regiones 2021, 2022, url, p. 11; Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against
Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021, url, p. 320; OAS, IACHR, Report on the
Situation of Human Rights Defenders and Social Leaders in Colombia, 6 December 2019, url, pp. 32-33
740
Indepaz, Cifras de la violencia en las regiones 2021, 2022, url, p. 11; Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against
Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021, url, p. 320; OAS, IACHR, Report on the
Situation of Human Rights Defenders and Social Leaders in Colombia, 6 December 2019, url, p. 34
741
Indepaz, Cifras de la violencia en las regiones 2021, 2022, url, p. 11; OAS, IACHR, Report on the Situation of
Human Rights Defenders and Social Leaders in Colombia, 6 December 2019, url, p. 43
742
UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, para. 34; Wesche, P.
Post-war Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021, url
743
CODHES, Manual de Autoprotección para personas defensoras de derechos humanos, líderes y lideresassociales y sus colectivos, March 2021, url, p. 6744
CODHES, Manual de Autoprotección para personas defensoras de derechos humanos, líderes y lideresassociales y sus colectivos, March 2021, url, p. 6; Al Jazeera, Colombians call for end to impunity as activist kill ings
continue, 16 July 2022, url
745International Crisis Group, Leaders Under Fire, 6 October 2020, url, p. 18
746
CODHES, Manual de Autoprotección para personas defensoras de derechos huma nos, líderes y lideresassociales y sus colectivos, March 2021, url, p. 6
747
CODHES, Manual de Autoprotección para personas defensoras de derechos humanos, líderes y lideresassociales y sus colectivos, March 2021, url, p. 6
748
OAS, IACHR, IACHR Expresses Concern Over the Notable Increase in Forced Internal Displacement in
Colombia, 30 September 2021, url; Al Jazeera, Colombians call for end to impunity as activist killings continue, 16
July 2022, url
749
CODHES, Manual de Autoprotección para personas defensoras de derechos humanos, líderes y lideresassociales y sus colectivos, March 2021, url, p. 6; OAS, IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders
and Social Leaders in Colombia, 6 December 2019, url, pp. 41-42
750
UNVMC/UNSC, Report of the Secretary General (S/2021/1090), 27 December 2021, url, para. 17
751
UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, para. 34, p. 35; OAS,
IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders and Social Leaders in Colombia, 6 December 2019, url,
p. 51-52
752
OAS, IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders and Social Leaders in Colombia, 6 December
2019, url, p. 31
753
OAS, IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders and Social Leaders in Colombia, 6 December
2019, url, p. 31
738

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In 2021 specifically, the Office of the Ombudsperson similarly indicated that the following werethe main vulnerable sectors in order of precedence: Community, indigenous, communal,
public officials, human rights activists, victims of the conflict, agrarians or peasants, AfroColombians, women, environmental, labour unions, students/academics, peace processcoordinators, LGBTIQ, children/youth, and cultural/sport. 754 Leaders in rural areas receive themost threats, are most attacked and are the most displaced. 755
Colombia is described as one of the most dangerous countries in the world for human rights
defenders.756 Attacks against environmental activists in Colombia during 2021 were also
described as ‘persistent’.757 Peasant leaders and those involved in making land restitution
claims, particularly in PDET zones, experienced poor security conditions and have been
subjected to threats, disappearances, and homicides. 758 Social leaders and human rights
defenders experience threats, attacks, harassment, and killings by illegal armed groups andcriminal organisations.759 In addition they encounter stigmatisation and criminalisation by state
actors. Their family members are also attacked, harassed, and intimidated.760
The Colombian government, international organisations, and civil society all report that there
has been an ‘alarming increase’ in targeted homicides, although no exact figure is agreed
upon.761 The Office of the Ombudsperson identified the intensification of this violence since2016 has persisted and issued three national level risk warnings which led to 25 early
warnings (Alertas Tempranas) being issued. However, human rights violations against these
profiles continued to be recorded.762
The Office of the Ombudsperson reported 2 829 threats against these profiles between
January 2016 and June 2020,763 while the UN recorded 1 911 threats and attacks against
human rights defenders in 2020-2021 alone.764 In 2021, the Office of the Ombudsperson
registered 779 incidents in 263 municipalities in 28 departments and indicated that the mostcommon types of conduct registered have been threats, homicides, attempted homicide,forced displacement, extortion, disappearance, stigmatisation, abduction. However, they754

Colombia, Comisión de Seguimiento y Monitoreo a la Implementación de la Ley 1448 de 2011, “Ley de Víctimas yRestitución de Tierras”, Noveno informe de seguimiento al Congreso de la República 2021 -2022, 22 August 2022,
url, p. 97
755
Political Analyst, 2 September 2022, Interview with EUAA
756
Front Line Defenders, Global Analysis 2021, 23 February 2022, p. 30, url; HRW, World Report 2022 – Colombia,
16 December 2021, url
757
Front Line Defenders, Global Analysis 2021, 23 February 2022, p. 29, url
758
UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, p. 35
759
Colombia, Comisión de Seguimiento y Monitoreo a la Implementación de la Ley 1448 de 2011, “Ley de Víctimas yRestitución de Tierras”, Noveno informe de seguimiento al Congreso de la República 2021 -2022, 22 August 2022,
url, p. 97; UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, p. 35
760
OAS, IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders and Social Leaders in Colombia, 6 December
2019, url, Chapter 4. See also: HRW, Left Undefended, 10 February 2021, url
761
OAS, IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders and Social Leaders in Colombia, 6 December
2019, url, pp. 29-30; 47-48; See also: HRW, Left Undefended, 10 February 2021, url, p. 18762
Colombia, Comisión de Seguimiento y Monitoreo a la Implementación de la Ley 1448 de 2011, “Ley de Víctimas yRestitución de Tierras”, Noveno informe de seguimiento al Congreso de la República 2021 -2022, 22 August 2022,
url, p. 94
763
HRW, Left Undefended, 10 February 2021, url, p. 18764
UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, para. 40

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noted that the drop in incidents was due to lack of reporting and registration problems due to
COVID-19.765
Since the peace agreement was signed in 2016, the UN has verified 562 cases of homicidesof human rights defenders (including 64 women). The number has increased since then. 766
The Office of the Ombudsperson reported 883 killings of social leaders between January
2016 and December 2021.767 NGO Indepaz has tallied between 1 309768 to 1 328 social leaderskilled since 2016.769
The UN OHCHR documented 58 killings of human rights defenders in 2021 and is verifying 34
other cases.770 According to Frontline Defenders, there were 138 Colombian human rights
defenders and social leaders killed in Colombia in 2021, or 38% of the 358 killed during theyear, making Colombia ‘the deadliest country in the world’ for defenders. 771 There were fewer
HRDs and social leaders killed in 2021 than in 2020, however, Front Line Defenders statesthat this was because in 2020, social leaders were more easily targeted as they wereconfined to their homes due to COVID-19 restrictions; in 2021, these restrictions were lifted. 772
Data on assassinations of social leaders and human rights defenders by Indepaz shows there
were 279 killings in 2019, 310 in 2020, and 171 killings in 2021. 773
Indepaz keeps a real time list updated of social leaders, human rights defenders, and Peace
Agreement signatories assassinated in 2022. As of 11 November 2022, there were 162 social
leaders and human rights defenders killed and 36 peace signatories/former FARC members
assassinated according to the Indepaz monitors.774 The Attorney General stated that between
1 January and 31 July 2022, 122 social leaders and human rights activists were assassinated,marking an increase in comparison to previous years. 775 From January to June 2022, the
UNOHCR verified 22 killings of HRDs, put 64 under investigation and recorded 108
allegations.776

7.1.1.

Nature of the targeting

The Duque administration perceived targeting of social leaders as a criminal matter resulting
from ‘unscrupulous criminal competition and the climate of violence’ promoted by crime.

765

Colombia, Comisión de Seguimiento y Monitoreo a la Implementación de la Ley 1448 de 2011, “Ley de Víctimas yRestitución de Tierras”, Noveno informe de seguimiento al Congreso de la República 2021 -2022, 22 August 2022,
url, p. 9766
UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, para. 36
767
Defensoría del Pueblo, Reporte de homicidios y conductas vulneratorias a líderes sociales y defensores dederechos humanos: 1 de enero a 30 de noviembre, 9 December 2021, url
768
Citing Indepaz [source not accessible], Norway, Landinfo, Temanotot – Colombia: Vaepnede grupper etter
fredsavtalen, 6 April 2022, url, p. 14769
Al Jazeera, Colombians call for end to impunity as activist killings continue, 16 July 2022, url
770
HRW, World Report 2022 – Colombia, 16 December 2021, url
771
Front Line Defenders, Global Analysis 2021, 23 February 2022, p. 30, url
772
Front Line Defenders, Global Analysis 2021, 23 February 2022, p. 30, url
773
Indepaz, Cifras de la violencia en las regiones 2021, 2022, url, pp.4-5774
Indepaz, Líderes sociales, defensores de DD.HH y firmantes de acuerdo asesinados en 2022, [ Last updated: 11
November 2022], url
775
Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Entre enero y julio de este año han sido asesinados 122 líderes sociales ypersonas defensoras de DD. HH., 19 August 2022, url
776
UNHCR, Colombia: Monitoreo de protección (enero- junio 2022), June 2022, url

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However, civil society groups and political opponents in Colombia perceive the killings asintended as a political message: social leaders are associated with the fulfilment of the peaceagreement, land rights, and the fulfilment of ethnic and indigenous rights which are ‘politicallyinconvenient’ and threatening to the economic and security interests of armed groups. 777 The
targeting pattern involves ‘increased risks’ to social and community leaders who are caught up
between the interests of competing groups seeking to exercise control over the territory andpopulation. The Public Prosecutor’s Office explained: when armed groups arrive in a territory,
the first people they approach are the community’s leaders, and they give them three options:‘work with them, to close their eyes and shut up, or to leave’.778 Many social leaders are killed
because of their influence in the community and to weaken the resolve of the community,
allowing illegal armed groups to obtain access to their territories. 779 During territorial disputes,
various armed groups may force the community’s leaders to cooperate, collect extortion on
behalf of the group, or co-opt and divert production of coca by the community for their own
purposes. This situation ‘draws the leaders into conflict between the competing groups – when
they support one group, they almost inevitably become the military target for the other’. 780
Threats are sent through different means. 781 In 2020, 604 acts of threat against social leaders
were registered by Somos Defensores, a human rights monitoring NGO, and most of thesethreats occurred in the form of pamphlets, harassment, phone calls to landlines and cell phones,
text messages, unidentified threats, emails, social media, use of explosives, and murder ofrelatives.782 Pamphlets with threatening messages are most frequently used to intimidate targets
such as human rights defenders.783 Elements related to death were often used in threats, suchas sending to the target: wreaths of flowers, candles, sympathy cards, mutilated dolls or animal
corpses.784 Often those social leaders and human rights defenders who are threatened or
attacked are forced to lower their profile, end their activism, abandon their communities,
relinquish their community or leadership responsibilities, or leave the country. 785

7.1.2.

Geographical distribution

Most killings and areas with the highest rates of violence against s ocial leaders and humanrights defenders are those where there has been competition by armed groups for control ofterritory, drug trafficking routes, conflict over natural resources, areas with historically highlevels of conflict and where the FARC-EP was previously present,786 as well as areas with high
777

International Crisis Group, Leaders Under Fire, 6 October 2020, url, p. 13
Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021, url,
p. 322779
CODHES, 14 January 2022, Correspondence on file with EUAA
780
Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021, url,
p. 322781
Mercy Corps, A Clash of Contagions, June 2021, url, p. 89
782
Somos Defensores, Informe anual 2020, 20 May 2021, url, pp. 102-103
783
Somos Defensores, Informe anual 2020, 20 May 2021, url, p. 103
784
Somos Defensores, Informe anual 2020, 20 May 2021, url, p. 103
785
UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, paras. 39-40
786
International Crisis Group, Leaders Under Fire, 6 October 2020, url, pp. 5-6; Wesche, P. Post-war Violence
Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 202 1, url, p. 320; OAS, IACHR, Report on
the Situation of Human Rights Defenders and Social Leaders in Colombia, 6 December 2019, url, p. 30; HRW, Left
Undefended, 10 February 2021, url, p. 26
778

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

levels of poverty.787 Killings are particularly high in PDET municipalities as well as areas where
there is the national crop substitution program outlined in the peace agreement. 788 According
to a research paper by Philipp Wesche, an International Professional Officer working ontransitional justice in Colombia, which included field interviews with government officials andcivil society, post-war violence in Colombia targeting social leaders is ‘largely (64.4 %) a rural
phenomenon related to the presence of armed groups that primarily affects community
leaders at the local level’.789 The violence is concentrated in areas where there is little state
presence and limited access to basic services like health, education, and justice.790 Howeverin addition, International Crisis Group states that community activists denounce armed groups
and experience threats ‘in remote areas with little state presence as well as in cityneighbourhoods where armed actors prey on the vulnerable to extort, traffic goods and recruit
youth. Bogotá’s southern suburb of Soacha, home to sprawling informal settlements and asignificant population of internally displaced conflict victims and migrants, is one such area.
The largest number of threats to social leaders have come as a result of their denouncing
drug trafficking in the neighbourhood ollas (selling points) that fuel consumption of basuco(local crack cocaine) and marijuana, the latter being used to recruit youth and children’.’ 791
Attacks against HRDs and social leaders have been mainly concentrated in Cauca, Antioquia,
Norte de Santander, Chocó, Nariño, and Putumayo, where the highest homicide rates arefound,792 as well as Urabá, Valle del Cauca, Córdoba, Meta, Caquetá, Risalda, and Arauca.793

787

HRW, Left Undefended, 10 February 2021, url, p. 26
FIP, Ni paz ni guerra, url, May 2022, pp. 32-33
789
Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021, url,
p. 320790
OAS, IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders and Social Leaders in Colombia, 6 December
2019, url, p. 30
791
International Crisis Group, Leaders Under Fire, 6 October 2020, url, pp. 17
792
OAS, IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders and Social Leaders in Colombia, 6 December
2019, url, p. 30
793
OAS, IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders and Social Leaders in Colombia, 6 December
2019, url, p. 50
788

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Figure 15: Assassinations of social leaders 2016-2020794

7.1.3.

Main perpetrators

The strategic and tactical ‘alliances’ made between illegal armed groups for illicit purposes
makes the conflict much more complex and it becomes more difficult to identify the true
responsible aggressors [command], versus the actual perpetrator of violence toward social
leaders.795 In many cases of targeted killings, authorities have been unable to identify those
responsible at all.796 In the absence of the state and fragmentation of armed groups that havegrown in the shadow of FARC-EP’s demobilisation, a wide range of armed and criminal groups
are reportedly involved.797 International Crisis Group compiled data from the Attorney
General’s Office that indicated that about 59 % of perpetrators were linked ot armed groups
and 39 % were individuals without affiliation or belonging to unknown groups, and 2 % were
military personnel.798 According to State prosecutors, most of the killings are perpetrated by
FARC dissidents and ‘local bands without nationwide reach’. 799 ICG provides a graphic of

794

International Crisis Group, Leaders Under Fire, 6 October 2020, url, p. 6
Somos Defensores, 12 January 2022, Correspondence on file with EUAA
796
HRW, Left Undefended, 10 February 2021, url, p. 27; OAS, IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights
Defenders and Social Leaders in Colombia, 6 December 2019, url, p. 49
797
Al Jazeera, Colombians call for end to impunity as activist killings continue, 16 July 2022, url; OAS, IACHR,
Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders and Social Leaders in Colombia, 6 December 2019, url, p. 49;
OAS, IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders and Social Leaders in Col ombia, 6 December
2019, url, p. 49
798
International Crisis Group, Leaders Under Fire, 6 October 2020, url, p. 12799International Crisis Group, Leaders Under Fire, 6 October 2020, url, pp. 11-12; See also: HRW, Left Undefended,
10 February 2021, url, p. 27
795

107

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM‘Assumed Perpetrators in Cases with Advanced Investigations’ from its 2020 report on thetargeting of social leaders:

Figure 16: Assumed perpetrators of killings of social leaders in cases with advanced
investigations 800

7.1.4.

State treatment

Sources report that HRDs and social leaders have ‘suffered reprisals’ from the state for theirwork defending human rights, including arbitrary detention, long criminal processes withirregularities, non-compliance with due process and detention with lack of evidence. 801 HRDs
and social leaders have been stigmatised and sometimes their actions are criminalised by thestate,802 paramilitary successor groups,803 which have attempted to associate them withguerrilla groups, which World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) has indicated raises the‘risk of being attacked’. 804 Prior to the 2016 accord, there were three sides to the conflict(paramilitaries, guerrillas, and the public security forces); after the agreement was signed,social leaders could no longer be accused of helping the FARC-EP, so threats shifted toleaders claiming environmental rights ,protection of natural resources, and rights of ethnic
groups.805 For example, Milena Quiroz Jiménez is a human rights defender and social leader
who was arrested and charged in 2017 by the city of Cartagena for crimes of ‘rebellion,’‘conspiracy to commit a crime’ and ‘financing terrorist groups,’ due to demonstrations sheorganised in her community. She was released due to lack of evidence but it was ruled she
could not remain in her community and was forced to relocate to avoid her having influence inher municipality. On 10 occasions she was stigmatised by the Prosecutor’s Office whichattempted to link her to guerrilla groups. Such stigma ‘raises the risk of her being attacked’.
800

International Crisis Group, Leaders Under Fire, 6 October 2020, url, pp. 11-12; See also: HRW, Left Undefended,
10 February 2021, url, p. 27
801
OMCT, Colombia: Over 2,000 days of criminalisation against human rights defender Milena Quiroz Jiménez, 28
July 2022, url
802
OAS, IACHR, Annual Report 2021 – Chapter 5: Colombia, 2022, url, para. 93; CODHES, 14 January 2022,
Correspondence on file with EUAA
803
CODHES, 14 January 2022, Correspondence on file with EUAA804
OMCT, Colombia: Over 2,000 days of criminalisation against human rights defender Milena Quiroz Jiménez, 28
July 2022, url
805
CONPA, 17 January 2022, Correspondence on file with EUAA

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She survived a 2019 assassination attempt which occurred despite having government
protection measures in place to protect her. 806

7.2.

Former members of FARC-EP

The targeted killing of former combatants of the FARC-EP is not a new phenomenon and has
occurred in previous periods of Colombian history around demobilisation and ceasefire
periods in the 1980s, 1990s,807 and during the 2003-2006 AUC demobilisation.808
Municipalities identified as priority areas for 2016 peace-building investments are in territories
where guerrillas formerly exercised ‘control and influence’ and are affected by conflict
between rival armed groups battling for control over land and illicit economies. Targetedmurders occur in former FARC-held areas where the group’s demobilisation has left a power
vacuum.809 With FARC-EP’s demobilisation in 2016, male and female former combatants wholaid down their weapons continue to face ‘persistent violence’ such as threats from armed
groups, security threats and attacks, and other problems such as co-opting of economic
projects and sabotaging of their political and social initiatives.810 The UN reported in July
2022, that since the signing of the Peace Agreement in 2016, a total of 327 homicides offormer combatants have been documented by the UN Verification Mission in Colombia. 811
During 2022, Indepaz reported that as of 11 November 2022, 36 ex-combatants have beenassassinated,812 while the UN reported as of July 2022, that 22 ex-FARC combatants had been
killed during the year to date.813 A 2020 study mapping the targeting of ex-FARC-EP
combatants found that the majority of victims were male and most were of low rank and lessthan 10 % being commanders.814 Many of those murdered had been released from prison orwere active in local politics promoting re-integration of former combatants.815 Former FARC-EP
members who declined to re-take up arms have been killed and displaced often by FARC
dissident groups.816 It has been difficult to assess who is responsible for the killings with some
attributed to ELN and others to other dissident and criminal structures,817 while the JEP statedthat paramilitary successor groups have been largely responsible. 818 Together illegal armed
groups and criminal groups perpetrate 78 % of attacks on former combatants. 819 Sourcesindicate the highest numbers of ex-FARC-EP killings occurred in Cauca, Caquetá, Nariño,
806

OMCT, Colombia: Over 2,000 days of criminalisation against human rights defender Milena Quiroz Jiménez, 28
July 2022, url
807
OCCO, A Criminal Peace. Mapping the Murders of Ex-FARC Combatants, November 2020, url, p. 8808
McDermott, J., Comment made during the review of this report, 14 November 2022
809
OCCO, A Criminal Peace. Mapping the Murders of Ex-FARC Combatants, November 2020, url, p. 16
810
UNVMC/UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General (S/2020/1301), 29 December 2020, url, paras. 10-12; International
Crisis Group, A Fight by Other Means, 30 November 2021, url, pp. 11-12
811
UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, para. 42
812
Indepaz, Líderes sociales, defensores de DD. HH y firmantes de acuerdo asesinados en 2022, [11 November2022], url
813
UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, para. 42
814
OCCO, A Criminal Peace. Mapping the Murders of Ex-FARC Combatants, November 2020, url, p. 14. This source
also provides a map of the 2020 killings of ex-FARC combatants by department.
815
OCCO, A Criminal Peace. Mapping the Murders of Ex-FARC Combatants, November 2020, url, p. 15
816International Crisis Group, A Fight by Other Means, 30 November 2021 , url, pp. 11-12
817
Al Jazeera, Killings of Colombia ex-FARC fighters persist amid peace process, 18 January 2021, url
818
Justice for Colombia, JEP court orders government to take steps to improve security for former FARC
combatants, 7 March 2022, url
819
UNVMC/UNSC, Report of the Secretary General (S/2021/1090), 27 December 2021, url, para. 58

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Antioquia, and Meta,820 as well as Valle del Cauca.821 Most killings occur in areas that havebeen identified as priorities for peace-building initiatives following the peace agreement.822
Recent examples include:••

In 2021, a man who was in the process of reincorporation into civilian life was killed
while serving as president of the JAC within a local community of Tuluá in Valle delCauca. He was an activist for the Comunes party and former election candidate. 823
In July 2022, a former FARC member, who was also a member of the Comunes
political party and coordinator for reintegration efforts, was killed by a sniper at his
farm in Huila department.824

Several times during 2021 the JEP ordered institutions of the government to implement
precautionary protection measures for former combatants including ordering the UNP toprovide protection to unaddressed requests. 825 By the end of 2021, the government’s National
Protection Unit (UNP, Unidad Nacional de Protección) had provided 690 ex-FARC-EP
beneficiaries with protection and implemented 377 protection schemes. 826 However, inJanuary 2022, the Colombian Constitutional Court again ordered the government and the
UNP to provide protection to disarmed former FARC-EP combatants as stipulated in the peaceaccord, due to the low level of implementation of security guarantees for these individuals.827
Following that ruling, in March 2022, the JEP directed the National Commission for Security
Guarantees, a special body created by the peace agreement to support dismantling armed
groups, to activate its strategy to combat these groups which are largely responsible for killingex-FARC-EP combatants and social leaders.828
In January 2022, both the Constitutional Court of Colombia and the Special Jurisdiction for
Peace stated that the security of former combatants was an ‘unconstitutional state ofaffairs’.829 According to the UN Verification Mission in Colombia, the state-provided security
measures have been strengthened since 2017 however due to the lack of a comprehensive
security strategy in conflict-affected areas, the ‘collective security of former combatants isbeing increasingly threatened by the actions of illegal armed groups.’ 830 As of June 2022, the820

Indepaz, Cifras de la violencia en las regiones 2021, 2022, url, p. 15; OCCO, A Criminal Peace. Mapping the
Murders of Ex-FARC Combatants, November 2020, url, p. 13
821
OCCO, A Criminal Peace. Mapping the Murders of Ex-FARC Combatants, November 2020, url, p. 13
822
OCCO, A Criminal Peace. Mapping the Murders of Ex-FARC Combatants, November 2020, url, p. 16
823
Indepaz, Cifras de la violencia en las regiones 2021, 2022, url, p. 18
824
Colombia Reports, FARC reintegration chief assassinated in south Colombia, 5 July 2022, url
825
Colombia, JEP, JEP ordena al gobierno medidas de protección para excombatientes y sus familias, 18
November 2021, url; Colombia, JEP, JEP imparte nuevas órdenes a la Consería para la Estabilización y a la UNP
para la protección de firmantes de paz, 19 November 2021, url; Infobae, JEP ordena nuevas medidas para laprotección de los firmantes del Acuerdo de Paz, 21 September 2021, url; Pressenza, Colombia: JEP orders
protection for peace signatories, 25 November 2021, url; HRW, World Report 2022 – Colombia, 13 January 2022,
url
826
Colombia, UNP, Informe de rendición de cuentas: Construcción de paz (enero – diciembre de 2021), 2021, url,
pp. 5-6
827
AFP, Colombia’s top court orders government to protect ex-FARC rebels, 28 January 2022, url
828
Justice for Colombia, JEP court orders government to take steps to improve security for former FARC
combatants, 7 March 2022, url; Colombia Reports, Colombia’s war crimes tribunal orders government to implement
peace policies, 2 March 2022, url
829
UNVMC/UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General (S/2022/513), 27 June 2022, url, para. 59
830
UNVMC/UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General (S/2022/513), 27 June 2022, url, para. 58

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Special Investigation Unit of the Office of the Attorney General has had 379 investigations
against former combatants, with a total of 55 convictions, of which only 4 are against those
who have ordered the attacks. The Unit reported that 80 % of those crimes were committed
by illegal armed groups and criminal organisations such as AGC, FARC dissidents, and theELN.831
For more information, see the section on state protection.

7.3.

Victims of extortion

Prior to the 2016 peace agreement, FARC-controlled extortion mechanisms within its territory,
but these have since increased due to the recycling and creation of new actors.832 Extortion ispervasive in Colombia,833 due to reliance on the informal economy, and problems of
involvement of criminal groups in regulating circulation of drugs, money, and financial
resources.834 Futuros Urbanos reported that there is a high likelihood of high underreportingof extortion as victims due to fear for themselves or reprisals against family members. 835 The
Ministry of Defense statistics from 2012 to September 2022 indicate an increase in extortion
crime since the peace agreement with 4 903 cases reports in 2016, 8 362 in 2019, 8 342 in
2021, and 7 277 as of October 2022.836 Illegal armed groups and criminal organisations in
Colombia frequently use extortion as a major revenue stream through licit and illicit economic
activity occurring in their territory.837 Thriving illicit businesses, which includes coca production,illegal mining, extortion, and contraband, are embedded in the ‘rudimentary, authoritarian’form of local governance imposed by armed groups. 838 In the context of Colombia’s history of
conflict, extortion is used as a form of social control 839 by illegal armed groups and criminalorganisations to exert pressure on the population in territories where they have an active
presence, and can include direct coercion or threats to the population to ensure control andprevent risks to their activities.840 ‘Vacunas’ or ‘taxes’ are revenues collected by armed
groups, organised crime groups and urban gangs, particularly in areas where police areunable to guarantee security. 841 The practice occurs frequently in coastal areas, border areas,
831

UNVMC/UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General (S/2022/513), 27 June 2022, url, para. 64
CONPA, 17 January 2022, Correspondence on file with EUAA
833
AP, Boom in Colombian extortion rings undermines security gains, 4 February 2015, url; CODHES, 14 January2022, Correspondence on file with EUAA
834
CODHES, 14 January 2022, Correspondence on file with EUAA
835
Futuros Urbanos, Comportamiento Del Delito Extorsivo En Las 10 Principales Ciudades Del Pais, October 2022,
url, p. 3-4
836
Colombia, Ministerio de Defensa, Logros de la politica de defensa y seguridad, url, October 2022, p. 30; seealso: Colombia Reports, Kidnapping and extortion, 8 June 2022, url;
837
International Crisis Group, Calming the Restless Pacific, 8 August 2019, url, pp. 9, 11; International Crisis Group,
Tackling Colombia’s Next Generation in Arms, 27 January 2022, url; Political Analyst, 2 September 2022,
Correspondence with EUAA
838
International Crisis Group, Colombia’s Armed Groups Battle for Spoils of Peace, 19 October 2017, url, p. i
839
Social control in this context is defined by the UN as intimidation strategies, harassment, pressure, extortion, andother actions by non-state armed groups and criminal organisations with the objective to control the population andterritories. UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url; International
Crisis Group, Calming the Restless Pacific, 8 August 2019, url, pp. 9, 11
840
UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url; Freedom House,
Colombia 2021, February 2021, url; HRW, “The Guerrillas Are the Police,” 22 January 2020, url
841
Colombia Reports, Kidnapping and extortion, 8 June 2022, url
832

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

and where the state is less present, as well as in departmental capital cities, such as Medellín,
Barranquilla, Cali, and Bogotá,842 as well as cities on the Caribbean coast, Cartagena, Cucuta,
Santa Marta, Bucaramanga, Ibague and Villavicencio. 843 For example, gangs in Medellín use
extortion (vacunas) as a control mechanism over the local population and resistance topayments can lead to threats of violence or killings. 844 Extortion is common in the city’s lower
and middle class areas because police are either absent or paid by local crime lords.
Protection rackets (vacunas) are especially targeted at small business owners and transport
sector workers who have to pay gangs for permission to work in their territories.845
Victims of extortion include merchants,846 miners,847 businesses, farmers,848 bus operators,849
builders/engineers/carpenters,850 and beneficiaries of coca substitution programs.851 Extortion
practices and protection rackets are also ‘rife’ in rural areas, especially where there is a lack ofaccess to the formal financial system and property/land rights for the local population, 852 andextractive sectors and their workers are targeted such as in oil, gas, mining, pipeline, andinfrastructure companies.853 Examples of extortion used include:•••

Charging local miners fees or demanding extortion payments from those using
backhoes to search for gold854
When an armed group moves into a territory in dispute, groups may force local
leaders to cooperate and such as collecting extortion on behalf of the group, or
requiring that coca and coca leaves produced by the community to be exclusively
sold to the armed group;855
In Buenaventura, local gangs have a monopoly on supplies into the city, including
food, and suppliers pay the group based on how much is permitted into the city. If
new suppliers try to move in, the group impounds the product, issues a threat, andprevents the new operator market access, allowing authorised providers to inflate
local prices;856

842

Caracol, El infierno de la extorsión en Colombia, 7 February 2022, url
Futuros Urbanos, Comportamiento Del Delito Extorsivo En Las 10 Principales Ciudades Del Pais, October 2022,
url, p. 3-4
844
Doyle, C., Perceptions and Realities of Violence in Medellin, Colombia, June 2019, url, p. 157
845
Colombia Reports, Crime and security in Medellin, 9 August 2022, url; see also: Colombia Reports, Medellin’s
violent crime statistics drop significantly, 17 August 2022, url
846International Crisis Group, Tackling Colombia’s Next Generation in Arms, 27 January 2022, url; El Tiempo, En elÁrea Metropolitana de Barranquilla siguen desbordadas las denuncias de extorsiones, 2 September 2022, url
847
HRW, Left Undefended, 10 February 2021, url; International Crisis Group, Colombia’s Armed Groups Battle for
Spoils of Peace, 19 October 2017, url, p. 10
848
HRW, “The Guerrillas Are the Police,” 22 January 2020, url; International Crisis Group, Colombia’s Armed
Groups Battle for Spoils of Peace, 19 October 2017, url, p. 10
849International Crisis Group, Colombia’s Armed Groups Battle for Spoils of Peace, 19 October 2017, url, p. 10
850
Semana, “Falso servicio”: denuncian modalidad de secuestro y extorsión en Santander, 24 June 2022, url
851
HRW, Left Undefended, 10 February 2021, url
852
GITOC, Organized Crime Index – Colombia 2021, url, p. 5
853
Political Analyst, 2 September 2022, Correspondence with the EUAA
854
International Crisis Group, Colombia’s Armed Groups Battle for Spoils of Peace, 19 October 2017, url, p. 10855
Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021, url,
p. 322; International Crisis Group, Leaders Under Fire, 6 October 2020 , url, p. 16
856International Crisis Group, Calming the Restless Pacific, 8 August 2019, url, pp. 11-12
843

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•

•

•

Armed groups offer false services (secuestro con falso servicio) to lure clients who
are then kidnapped and extorted,857 a rising trend, especially in Valle del Cauca,
Antioquia, and Cauca;858
Armed groups or gangs staking out territory in a neighbourhood and charging local
people protection fees so the locals can informally work there in menial jobs likewashing or parking cars and defending the area from encroachment by othergroups;859
Control over bus routes, for example in Barranquilla, whereby bus drivers are
extorted to be able to drive through certain areas and killed if they fail to pay; 860

Victims of extortion receive threats (house visits, letters, phone calls, social networks, visits tohome or work), or may be kidnapped for the purpose of extortion.861 Failure to pay extortion
can result in death.862 Few victims are willing to report extortion to authorities 863 reportedly
due to lack of trust in authorities or fear of being killed. 864 Reporting to police can make thesituation worse if extortionists find out.865 The Political Analyst observed that extortion
practices that lead to violence often thrive in environments where the state is absent and thegovernment fails to regulate the informal sector. 866 Jeremy McDermott stated that‘the patterns around intra-urban displacement today tend to be linked aroundextortion. Another issue is recruitment of neighbourhood kids, usually done by very
local groups, such as combos in Medellín. This is a very localised threat. Again, if aperson upsets the combo enough for them to want to kill that person, moving from oneneighbourhood to another is not going to be sufficient. However, if a person has notbeen paying their protection/extortion fees, and have been pushed out of theirneighbourhood, the group may not pursue them unless the target still has family in thearea whom they can pressure. This tends to happen in neighbourhoods where there
are more recent arrivals of people displaced from the rural areas and where the state
has not caught up in providing services, paved roads, electricity, decen t sewage – andwhere there is little permanent police presence.’ 867
According to a representative of CONPA (El Consejo Nacional de Paz Afrocolombiano (TheNational Afro-Colombian Peace Council) 868 if a person cannot pay their extortion fees, they
have three options: negotiate the payment, leave or move away, or be killed. This happens
857
858

Semana, “Falso servicio”: denuncian modalidad de secuestro y extorsión en Santander, 24 June 2022, url
Infobae, “Express kidnapping” is on the rise in Colombia, according to the Ombudsman's Office, 29 March 2022,

url
859

Political Analyst, 2 September 2022, Correspondence with the EUAA
Political Analyst, 2 September 2022, Correspondence with the EUAA
861
Futuros Urbanos, Comportamiento Del Delito Extorsivo En Las 10 Principales Ciudades Del Pais, October 2022,
url, p. 3-4
862
HRW, Left Undefended, 10 February 2021, url
863
HRW, “The Guerrillas Are the Police,” 22 January 2020, url; Caracol, El infierno de la extorsión en Colombia, 7February 2022, url
864
Caracol, El infierno de la extorsión en Colombia, 7 February 2022, url
865
CONPA, 17 January 2022, Correspondence on file with EUAA
866
Political Analyst, 2 September 2022, Correspondence with the EUAA
867
McDermott, J., Comment made during the review of this report, 14 November 2022
868
CONPA is a council based on an agreement between organisations of the black, Afro-Colombian, Raizal andPalenquero people, to advocate for the defense and promotion of r ights for these groups.
860

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first by receiving a note or phone call, or having their house shot with fire arms. Most people
try to find the money and pay.869
For more information on urban displacement, see the chapter on Displacement.

7.3.1.

Gota a gota loans

Urban extortion frequently occurs in the form of loansharking. 870 Drop-by-drop (prestamos
gota a gota or prestadiario) loans are microcredit informal loans or rapid financing fromloansharks at exorbitantly high interest rates ranging from 10 % to 30 % 871 or 40 % permonth.872 They are frequently used by people who lack access to formal credit, 873 often usedby taxi drivers, street vendors, mechanics, service employees, businessmen, merchants,
housewives, among others. 874 Gota a gota criminal enterprises are managed by criminal
networks 875 and have links to armed groups and gangs.876 The groups also use mobile apps tohide transfers, charge customers, and issue threats. 877 The money loaned out in gota a gota
schemes facilitates money laundering and is used to move money from drug trafficking andextortion rackets through commercial facades 878 and to exert control over territory, co-opt
local residents, or draw them into surveillance on the groups’ behalf. 879 The situation occurs
throughout Colombia, but especially in departmental capitals and main cities in lessdeveloped regions, particularly in the Caribbean regions, 880 Atlántico, Córdoba, Cesar, Sucre,
Valle, Cauca, Antioquia, and Tolima.881 Colombian criminal groups such as AGC, La Oficina deEnvigado and La Terraza also run loan operations in other Latin American countries. 882 AGC
reportedly controls 50 gota-a-gota networks in Urabá (Antioquia).883
The gota a gota operation structure functions through various roles:•

volanteros (flyers): who are in charge of distributing advertisement for the loans
especially in commercial areas and middle and lower class neighbourhoods to obtainneedy clients;

869

CONPA, 17 January 2022, Correspondence on file with EUAA
Political Analyst, 2 September 2022, Correspondence with the EUAA
871
BBC Mundo, Qué son los préstamos "gota a gota" que grupos criminales de Colombia exportan al resto deAmérica Latina, 21 October 2016, url
872
Forbes, El drama del ‘gota a gota’: un arma de doble filo, 9 June 2022, url
873
BBC Mundo, Qué son los préstamos "gota a gota" que grupos criminales de Colombia exportan al resto deAmérica Latina, 21 October 2016, url; Forbes, El drama del ‘gota a gota’: un arma de doble filo, 9 June 2022, url
874
Forbes, Microcrédito para todos: ¿El fin del ‘gota a gota’?, 7 July 2022, url; Vanguardia, Comerciantes informales
siguen acudiendo a préstamos ‘gota a gota’, 8 June 2022, url
875
BBC Mundo, Qué son los préstamos "gota a gota" que grupos criminales de Colombia exportan al resto deAmérica Latina, 21 October 2016, url; Forbes, El drama del ‘gota a gota’: un arma de doble filo, 9 June 2022, url
876
Connectas, La expansión del ‘gota a gota’ - Colombia: Un problema de salud pública, n.d., url
877
Insight Crime, In Colombia, Loan Sharking is Now Just a Click Away , 27 May 2019, url;
878
Insight Crime, In Colombia, Loan Sharking is Now Just a Click Away , 27 May 2019, url; Connectas, La expansiondel ‘gota a gota’ - Colombia: Un problema de salud pública, n.d., url
879
El Quindiano, Préstamos “gota a gota” y “cadenas de ahorro”, modalidades de alto riesgo para la comunidad, 15
September 2020, url
880
Forbes, Microcrédito para todos: ¿El fin del ‘gota a gota’?, 7 July 2022, url
881
Connectas, La expansión del ‘gota a gota’ - Colombia: Un problema de salud pública, n.d., url
882
BBC Mundo, Qué son los préstamos "gota a gota" que grupos criminales de Colombia exportan al resto deAmérica Latina, 21 October 2016, url; Insight Crime, Colombia’s ‘Gota a Gota’ Loan Sharks Exploit Chile Market, 2September 2019, url
883
Connectas, La expansión del ‘gota a gota’ - Colombia: Un problema de salud pública, n.d., url
870

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administrador (administrator): The person who receives and verifies calls and who
personally goes to deliver the amount requested which can be via blank checks;
cobradores (collectors): The collectors, who drive motorcycles, collect payment thecapital amount and interest accrued on the deadline;
Jefes de seguridad (security chiefs): Specialists in threats and armed violence; when aclient is late, security chiefs are sent to press for payment.884

Forms of collection can start with phone calls and can lead to threats and violence. 885
According to the Prosecutor’s office, those who do not repay promptly are subjected tothreats to themselves and their families, dispossession of their property or identity documents,
and become victims of extortion, theft, displacement, injury and homicide. 886 Consequences of
non-payment may also include blackmail, losing one’s job, intimidation, death threats, andphysical danger to themselves or their family.887 In Medellín, for example, most individual
cases of forced intra-urban displacement are related to gota a gota victimsation, such ascollection of extortion fees, regulation of neighbourhood problems, and personal/family
problems related to armed groups; such cases are not reported to the authorities. 888 There
have been reports of suicide by non-payers or being forced to work for the armed grouptransporting drugs.889 Victims rarely approach authorities for assistance. 890 The Attorney
General’s Office reported that between 2021 and 2022, 4790 charges were laid and 4 779
indictments were registered for extortion and fraud related to gota a gota.891 Further
information on prosecution of these crimes could not be found within time constraints.

7.4.

People involved in crop substitution

UNODC reported that coca cultivation reach a historically high level in 2021 following an
upward trend since 2014, and up by 43 % since 2020, with 62 % of cultivation concentrated in
Narino, Norte de Santander, and Putumayo.892 The National Comprehensive Programme for
the Substitution of Illicit Crops (Programa Nacional Integral de Sustitución de Cultivos Ilícitos,
PNIS), is a voluntary eradication program established under the peace agreement to provide
coca893 cultivators with alternatives, and short-term payments and assistance to transition tolegal crops.894 PNIS has provided legal income-generation opportunities to over 14,000
families transitioning away from illicit crop growing.895 The government made agreements withalmost 100 000 growers and pickers in 56 municipalities and voluntarily eradicated nearly 4 5
884

Cundinamarca, Informe especial: Prestamos Gota a Gota, n.d., url, p. 6; Forbes, El drama del ‘gota a gota’: unarma de doble filo, 9 June 2022, url
885
El Colombiano, Los gota a gota ahora ‘secuestran’ su tarjeta débito, 19 September 2022, url
886
Forbes, El drama del ‘gota a gota’: un arma de doble filo, 9 June 2022, url
887
BBC Mundo, El suicidio por causa de un préstamo "gota a gota" que conmociona a Colombia, 7 February 2019,url
888
Medellín, El desplazamiento forzado intraurbano en Medellín: Categorización de un fenómeno complejo, 2019,url, pp. 56
889
Connectas, La expansión del ‘gota a gota’ - Colombia: Un problema de salud pública, n.d., url
890
El Colombiano, Los gota a gota ahora ‘secuestran’ su tarj eta débito, 19 September 2022, url; Insight Crime,
Colombia’s ‘Gota a Gota’ Loan Sharks Exploit Chile Market, 2 September 2019, url
891
Forbes, Microcrédito para todos: ¿El fin del ‘gota a gota’?, 7 July 2022, url
892
UNODC, Survey of territories affected by coca cultivation, 2021, 19 October 2022, url
893
For maps of coca cultivation areas, see UNODC, Informe de monitoreo de territorios afectados por cultivos
ilícitos 2021, October 2022, url, p. 28, 37
894
WOLA, A Long Way to Go: Implementing Colombia’s peace accord after five years, 23 November 2021, url
895
UNVMC/UNSC, Report of the Secretary General (S/2021/1090), 27 December 2021, url, para. 17

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000 hectares of illicit crops.896 Illegal armed groups oppose drug cultivation substitution
programme.897 Furthermore, under President Duque, whose party was critical of the accords,
the government stopped signing new agreements and delivery on the program andassistance was slow and has fallen short of assistance promised. 898 Coercive methods such as
forced eradication increased, leaving producers caught between state eradication or threats
from armed groups.899 Furthermore, the program has led to complaints from peasants of foodinsecurity, with UNODC finding that 91 % of participant households had some degree of foodinsecurity despite the programs primary component, food assistance. 900
Forced eradication of illicit crops has caused conflicts between coca cultivators and security
forces to become more frequent, causing blockades, confrontations, and deaths. 901 According
to military statistics, in 2021, there were over 1 000 blockades or clashes between public
security forces and communities opposed to forced eradication programs, or calling for the
expansion of the PNIS program under the peace accord; these have lead to a ‘significant
number of injured peasants’. Some communities received pressure from armed groups toparticipate in blockades.902 According to Somos Defensors, between 2016-2020, 75 people
working on PNIS programs have been murdered, mostly by unknown perpetrators andparamilitary groups and mainly in Antioquia, Cauca, Norte de Santander, Putumayo, andNariño.903 PNIS municipalities also experience higher than average homicide rates, which
increased since 2017.904

7.5.

Journalists

Colombia is described as one of the western hemisphere’s most dangerous countries forjournalists.905 Journalists continue to experience threats, murder attempts, targeted killings,
harassment, assaults, and attacks.906 Human Rights Watch described the death threats andviolence faced by journalists, HRDs, social leaders and activists as ‘pervasive’. 907 Coverages ofsubjects such as the 2021 national protests, 908 gender-based violence, drug-trafficking, armed

896

WOLA, A Long Way to Go: Implementing Colombia’s peace accord after five years, 23 November 2021, url
Nilsson, M., Colombia’s Program to Substitute Crops Used for Illegal Purposes: Its Impact on Security andDevelopment, 17 May 2021, url
898
WOLA, A Long Way to Go: Implementing Colombia’s peace accord after five years, 23 November 2021, url;France 24, “Un total incumplimiento”: La desesperanza de los campesinos excocaleros colombianos, 21 November
2022, url899
New Internationalist, An Uneasy Peace for Colombia’s Coca Farmers, 13 October 2021, url; France 24, “Un total
incumplimiento”: La desesperanza de los campesinos excocaleros colombianos, 21 November 2022, url
900
El Espectador, Entre el hambre y la coca: el fracaso del plan de substitución en el Guaviare, 1 August 2022, url
901
New Internationalist, An Uneasy Peace for Colombia’s Coca Farmers, 13 October 2021, url; WOLA, A Long Way
to Go: Implementing Colombia’s peace accord after five year s, 23 November 2021, url; Nilsson, M., Colombia’s
Program to Substitute Crops Used for Illegal Purposes: Its Impact on Security and Development, 17 May 2021, url
902
UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, pp. 37-38
903
Justice for Colombia, 75 coordinators of crop substitution murdered from 2016 to 2020, 26 March 2021, url;
Somos Defensores, La substicion voluntaria siembra paz, url, 2021, pp. 56-58
904
El Espectador, Sustitución de coca: las propuestas a Gobierno Petro para reformular el PNIS, 10 August 2022,
url
905
RSF, Colombia, n.d., url
906
OAS, IACHR, Annual Report 2021 – Chapter 5: Colombia, 2022, url, p. 957-964; EU Election Observation
Mission, Colombia 2022 – Final Report, url, p. 29; RSF, RSF calls for thorough investigation into journalist’s murderin western Colombia, 22 September 2022, url
907
HRW, World Report 2022 – Colombia, 13 January 2022, url
908
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in 2021 – Colombia, 12 April 2022, url, p. 17; OAS, IACHR,
Annual Report 2021 – Chapter 5: Colombia, 2022, url, para. 291
897

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groups, 909 the environment, armed conflict, corruption or collusion of authorities and armed
groups cause ‘systemic harassment, intimidation, and violence.’ 910 Slander and libel laws also
caused self-censorship911 and the Ministry of Defence implemented a policy to monitor social
media.912 In 2021, Fundación Para La Libertad de Prensa (FLIP) recorded 117 journalists
affected by threats, and 158 journalists affected by incidents of violence and harassment. 913
For 2022, the FLIP recorded 365 violations of freedom of the press and 417 victims as of 28
September 2022.914 Three journalists have been killed so far in 2022. 915
Colombian military and intelligence allegedly spied illegally on journalists in the past. 916
Journalist Ricardo Calderón, director of the investigative team for the national newspaper
Semana, who investigated corruption in the security forces, was targeted and shot six times
but survived.917 He and other journalists working at the publication experienced threats,
harassment, and surveillance while working at the publication. 918 The IACHR then ordered in
2021 that the government of Colombia to protect him from ‘grave threats’ noting that theauthorities had failed to bring those responsible to justice.919 The UNP provided protection to
187 journalists in 2021, however, delays and improper measures caused concerns about
perceived protection shortcomings ‘such as delays in granting protection and theappropriateness of measures for addressing specific threats.’920 There were 49 complaints ofdeath threats and assaults against journalists benefitting from the state’s protection in 2021. 921
There were allegations that a journalist protected by the UNP was being monitoring by GPS
tracking without her consent. 922 One of the 3 journalists killed in 2022 had been given a panic
button, bodyguard, and bulletproof vest by the national protection unit but requested
additional reinforcement; the UNP was still considering his request when he was killed. 923 The
IACHR stated that while the state has made institutional efforts to investigate and punish thosetargeting journalists, that there are still major challenges in obtaining justice and that impunity
rate in killings of journalists is 78 % and this rises to 98 % when considering other crimes suchas threats,924 as convictions remain rare.925

909

OAS, IACHR, Annual Report 2021 – Chapter 5: Colombia, 2022, url, para. 274, 280
RSF, Colombia, n.d., url
911
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in 2021 – Colombia, 12 April 2022, url, p. 18
912
FLIP, Preserving Democracy Begins with Protecting Journalisms, 8 March 2022, url
913
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in 2021 – Colombia, 12 April 2022, url, p. 17
914
FLIP, Mapa de violaciones a la libertad de prensa [28 September 2022], n.d., url
915
RSF, Journalist receiving state protection gunned down in Colombia, 19 October 2022, url
916
CPJ, Colombian magazine Semana alleges military spied on journalists, 13 January 2020, url; Semana, Chuzadas
sin cuartel: la persecución a SEMANA, 12 January 2020, url
917
El País, ‘Ricardo Calderón: el reportero invisible’, 26 April 2022, url
918
CPJ, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights orders Colombia to protect journalist Ricardo Calderon, 20
January 2021, url;
919
HRW, World Report 2022 – Colombia, 13 January 2022, url; CIDH, Resolucion 6/2021 – Medidas cautelares No.
207-20, url
920
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in 2021 – Colombia, 12 April 2022, url, p. 17
921
OAS, IACHR, Annual Report 2021 – Chapter 5: Colombia, 2022, url, para. 279
922
OAS, IACHR, Annual Report 2021 – Chapter 5: Colombia, 2022, url, para. 287
923
RSF, Journalist receiving state protection gunned down in Colombia, 19 October 2022, url
924
OAS, IACHR, Annual Report 2021 – Chapter 5: Colombia, 2022, url, para. 303
925
Freedom House, Colombia – 2022, February 2022, url
910

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

7.6.

Ethnic groups

Colombian minority groups include indigenous communities, Afro-descendants, and a small
population of several thousand Roma people.926 The IACHR has expressed concern at thepersistence of violence against indigenous and Afro-descendant communities, who
experience situations of harassment, intimidation, homicides and threats to their social andcommunity leaders.927 The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD)
has likewise expressed concern that violence persists following the peace agreement and that
this poses a ‘serious threat’ to indigenous and Afro-descendant communities.928 Social andcommunity leaders from both communities are frequently assassinated by armed groups as a
strategy to erode the capacity of these groups to assert their rights. 929 Additionally,
generalised homicides are concentrated in Cauca, Chocó, Nariño, Valle del Cauca, Antioquia,
and Norte de Santander, known for the lack of state presence and impacts of the armed
conflict and violence disproportionately affected indigenous and Afro-descendentcommunities, peasants, and community leaders.930 The Colombian government’s Victims Unit,
which monitors implementation of the Victims Law 1448 of 2011 stated that ethnic and rural
populations endured marked conditions of vulnerability and lack of protection as well as
limited or non-existent access to goods and services, access to justice, conflict resolution andpermanent security, allowing armed groups to establish de factor footholds in the territory. 931
In 2021, the SAT issued 21 Alerts warning of risks so the indigenous population and 12 Alerts
warning of risks to the Afro-Colombian communities.932

7.6.1.

Indigenous communities

Colombia’s indigenous population makes up roughly 3-5% of the population [with 112
Indigenous People groups 933] who live on approximately 34 million hectares of land grantedby the government [28 % of the country’s territory 934 ]. Indigenous lands are frequently rich inresources, located in strategic areas, and ‘highly contested by armed groups’ causing them tobe targeted by all sides in the conflict,935 and experiencing violence and human rights
abuses.936 Under Decree 4633 of 2011, the government provides for assistance, reparations,and territorial rights to indigenous victims of the armed conflict. 937 However, there were delays

926

WOLA, A Long Way to Go: Implementing Colombia’s peace accord after five years, 23 November 2021, url
OAS, IACHR, Annual Report 2021 – Chapter 5: Colombia, 2022, url, para. 34-38
928
UN, CERD, Concluding observations on the combined seventeenth to nineteenth periodic reports on Colombia,
22 January 2020, url, para. 12
929
UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, p. 15
930
OAS, IACHR, Annual Report 2021 – Chapter 5: Colombia, 2022, url, para. 34-38
931
Colombia, Comisión de Seguimiento y Monitoreo a la Implementación de la Ley 1448 de 2011, “Ley de Víctimas yRestitución de Tierras”, Octavo informe de seguimiento al Congreso de la República 2020 -2021, 18 August 2021,
url, p. 38-39
932
Colombia, CERD – Informes periódicos 20° y 21° combinados que la Colombia debía presentar en 2022 en
virtud del artículo 9 de la Convención (CERD/C/COL/2 0-21), 6 October 2022, url, para. 70
933
IWGIA, Indigenous Peoples at risk of extinction in Colombia, 27 June 2022, url
934
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in 2021 – Colombia, 12 April 2022, url, pp. 30
935
Freedom House, Colombia – 2022, February 2022, url; ONIC, 30 September 2021, p. 69
936
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in 2021 – Colombia, 12 April 2022, url, pp. 1, 2, 29-31;
ONIC, Informe de afectaciones a los derechos humanos y territoriales en los pueblos indígenas de Colombia, 30
September 2021, url
937
Colombia, Decreto Ley 4633 de 2011, 9 December 2011, url
927

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in effectiveness due to poor progress formalizing land claims, the presence of third parties
interested in exploiting natural resources, and the impact of the armed conflict on indigenous
peoples.938 The lack of implementation of the security guarantees in the peace agreement
was also cited as a cause for continued violence against indigenous people in the armed
conflict. 939 The National Indigenous Organisation of Colombia (ONIC, Organización Nacional
Indígena de Colombia), an organisation that works to represent the indigenous people ofColombia, documents violations against their community and reported that the top violent acts
in 2021 and 2022 against indigenous people have been confinement, mass forced
displacement, intimidation and threats, forced recruitment, violations of rights, attempted
homicides, homicides, among others.940
ONIC reported that the departments most affected by violent acts against indigenous people
were concentrated in southern and coastal departments and north-eastern regions:941 Chocó(11 736), Antioquia (1 008), Valle del Cauca (757), Córdoba (434), Tolima (128), Cauca (103),
Nariño (33), and Putumayo (14).942 According to the Comisión Nacional de Territorios Indígenas(CNTI), an advisory and consultative body for indigenous communities to engage with thegovernment, there have been 431 homicides of indigenous people since the 2016 peaceagreement with a growth rate of 200 % from 10 killings in 2016 up to 114 in 2021 (17 % women
victims), with most of them happening in Cauca, Nariño, and coastal departments. 943 Most of
the victims have been community members (78 %) as well as people with community
leadership roles (local authorities, local indigenous guards, leaders, traditional
doctors/healers).944 ONIC reported that 24 different indigenous groups had people victimised
during 2021, mainly among Awá, Emberá Dóbida, Emberá Katío, Emberá Eyábida, Emberá,
Sikuani, and Nasa peoples.945 CNTI reported that Awá and Nasa peoples were the mostaffected specifically by homicides and massacres and most were committed by unknown
perpetrators.946 The UN CERD stated that there has been a lack of progress in investigating,prosecuting, punishing human rights violations against indigenous and Afro-descendant
Colombians, as well as delays in paying reparations related to the armed conflict. 947

938

CNTI, Balance de la implementación – Decreto Ley 4633 – durante el 2021, July 2022, url, p. 10
CNTI, El eterno retorno de la violencia política contra los pueblos indígenas en Colombia: Un balance del año
2021, October 2022, url, p. 30
940
Informe de afectaciones a los derechos humanos y territoriales en los pueblos indígenas de Colombia, 30
September 2021, url, p. 37; ONIC, Afectaciones a los derechos humanos en los pueblos indígenas de Colombia,
October 2022, url, p. 6
941
ONIC, Afectaciones a los derechos humanos en los pueblos indígenas de Colombia, October 2022, url, p. 7
942
Informe de afectaciones a los derechos humanos y territoriales en los pueblos indígenas de Colombia, 30
September 2021, url, p. 51
943
CNTI, El eterno retorno de la violencia política contra los pueblos indígenas en Colombia: Un balance del año
2021, October 2022, url, p. 15; See also, p. 22 of the same source for a map of the homicides of indigenous
peoples in 2021
944
CNTI, El eterno retorno de la violencia política contra los pueblos indígenas en Colombia: Un balance del año
2021, October 2022, url, p. 23; see also: Al Jazeera, Indigenous activists’ deaths highlight surging Colombia
conflict, 4 February 2022, url
945
ONIC, Afectaciones a los derechos humanos en los pueblos indígenas de Colombia, October 2022, url, p. 21
946
CNTI, El eterno retorno de la violencia política contra l os pueblos indígenas en Colombia: Un balance del año
2021, October 2022, url, p. 23, 26
947
UN, CERD, Concluding observations on the combined seventeenth to nineteenth periodic reports on Colombia,
22 January 2020, url, para. 14
939

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Indigenous people have special legal protections and specialised government assistance, but
still experienced discrimination and high levels of poverty and child mortality. 948Under the law,indigenous people have recognition and perpetual rights to their lands; however this is often
disputed by land owners and even the government. 949 The constitution provides for a priorconsultation mechanism regarding decisions affecting their land but the indigenous groups
continued to assert a lack of participation.950 Land restitution claims under the Victims Law
1448 also remain limited in their progress, falling short in providing protection and titling tovictims of the armed conflict.951
The armed conflict has posed ‘existential threats’ to indigenous communities and in 2004, theColombian Constitutional Court issued Ruling T-025 which declared the forced displacement
and risk of extinction for 35 Indigenous Peoples to be unconstitutional. 952 The UN Committee
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (UN CERD) remarked that there has been a lack ofsignificant progress on the application of Constitutional Court decisions relating to theprotection of indigenous groups at risk of extinction, in particular the Awa and Uitoto
people.953

7.6.2.

Afro-descendant communities

Afro-Colombians make up 4.6 million people, or 9.4 % of the national total population ofColombia,954 a population which has declined by almost 31 % since 2005. 955 It is the second
largest such population in the Americas, after Brazil, and includes Palenqueros and Raizales
people.956 Afro-descendant Colombians reside mainly in the Pacific and Caribbean areas ofColombia.957 The majority (85 %) reside in urban areas and are the majority in towns of theNorth West as well as having significant numbers in low-income settlements in major cities.958
They have been victims of harassment, intimidation, killings, violence, and displacement
related to the drug trade and post-conflict insecurity which has pushed them of theircommunal lands.959 They also are disproportionately affected by illicit economic activities in

948

USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in 2021 – Colombia, 12 April 2022, url, p. 30; UN, CERD,
Concluding observations on the combined seventeenth to nineteenth periodic reports on Colombia, 22 January
2020, url, para. 16
949
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in 2021 – Colombia, 12 April 2022, url, p. 30; UN, CERD,
Concluding observations on the combined seventeenth to nineteenth periodic reports on Colombia, 22 January
2020, url, para. 18
950
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in 2021 – Colombia, 12 April 2022, url, p. 30
951
UN, CERD, Concluding observations on the combined seventeenth to nineteenth periodic reports on Colombia,
22 January 2020, url, para. 20
952
IWGIA, Indigenous Peoples at risk of extinction in Colombia, 27 June 2022, url
953
UN, CERD, Concluding observations on the combined seventeenth to nineteenth periodic reports on Colombia,
22 January 2020, url, para. 22
954
Colombia, CERD – Informes periódicos 20° y 21° combinados que la Colombia debía presentar en 2022 en
virtud del artículo 9 de la Convención (CERD/C/COL/20-21), 6 October 2022, url, para. 8
955
UN, CERD, Concluding observations on the combined seventeenth to nineteenth periodic reports on Colombia,
22 January 2020, url, para. 4956
MRG, World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples - Colombia, June 2020, url957
Canada, IRB, Situation of Afro-Colombians (2017- May 2020) (COL200219.E), 6 May 2020, url
958
MRG, World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples - Colombia, June 2020, url
959
UN, CERD, Concluding observations on the combined seventeenth to nineteenth periodic reports on Colombia,
22 January 2020, url; MRG, World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples - Colombia, June 2020, url; seealso: Canada, IRB, Situation of Afro-Colombians (2017- May 2020) (COL200219.E), 6 May 2020, url

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their rural lands and lack sufficient state support and presence.960 Displacement particularly
affected Afro-descendants and they constitute about 14 percent of IDPs registered with thegovernment.961
Afro-Colombians are entitled to all constitutional and legal rights and protections however,these communities continue to experience discrimination, high levels of poverty andunemployment, and social exclusion from services such as health care, when compared to therest of the population. 962 Approximately 32 percent of Afro-Colombians live below the poverty
line and in Chocó department, 79 percent are below the poverty line. 963
The UN CERD stated that there has been a lack of progress in investigating, prosecuting,punishing human rights violations against indigenous and Afro-descendant Colombians, aswell as delays in paying reparations related to the armed conflict.964 Land restitution claims
under the Victims Law 1448 also remain limited in their progress providing protection andtitling to victims of the armed conflict.965 There were about 1.2 million people who identified
themselves as Afro Colombian registered as victims of the armed conflict in the Victims Unit
database.966 There was a 2020 Constitutional Court ruling (T-469) which indicated Afrodescendants in Colombia are a ‘vulnerable group’.

7.7.

People involved in the justice system, including
officials and crime witnesses

Intimidation of judges, prosecutors and witnesses hindered judicial functioning. 967 Violenceagainst justice sector workers, crime witnesses, victims of violence crimes being prosecuted in
the justice system and public servants has not decreased with the peace accords and it
continues to the ongoing presence of criminal organisations and armed groups. 968 There is alack of effective witness protection in Colombia. 969 Lawyers who work on issues of humanrights in particular, or who represent victims of state atrocities, land rights issues, and sensitive
cases relating to the conflict, harassment, threats, and efforts to disrupt their professional

960

USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in 2021 – Colombia, 12 April 2022, url, p. 29
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in 2021 – Colombia, 12 April 2022, url, p. 22
962
UN, CERD, Concluding observations on the combined seventeenth to nineteenth periodic reports on Colombia,
22 January 2020, url, para. 14; MRG, World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples - Colombia, June 2020,
url; USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in 2021 – Colombia, 12 April 2022, url, p. 29
963
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in 2021 – Colombia, 12 April 2022, url, p. 29
964
UN, CERD, Concluding observations on the combined seventeenth to nineteenth periodic reports on Colombia,
22 January 2020, url, para. 14
965
UN, CERD, Concluding observations on the combined seventeenth to nineteenth periodic reports on Colombia,
22 January 2020, url, para. 20
966
Colombia, Registro Único de Víctimas RUV, url
967
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in 2021 – Colombia, 12 April 2022, url, p. 11
968
Dejusticia, Correspondence with the EUAA, 2 September 2022
969
GITOC, Organized Crime Index – Colombia 2021, url, p. 5; Canada, IRB, Colombia: State protection programs forvictims and witnesses of crimes; requirements to access the programs; statistics on the number of applications forrelocation that are granted and refused; duration and effectiveness of these programs (2012 -March 2016)(COL105470.E), url; USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in 2021 – Colombia, 12 April 2022, url, p. 7
961

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

functioning.970 There have been NGO reports of state spying on lawyers. 971 Protection
measures for lawyers are described as insufficient due to the lack of holding perpetrators toaccount.972 More than 700 lawyers have been killed between 1991 to 2013; between 20172019, at least 3 were killed and several others faced attempts on their lives. In 2019, twolawyers were killed, and many others threatened. 973 Judges are subjected to harassment,
threats, and intimidation especially in rural areas where there is a presence of illegal armed
groups and a weak state presence.974 Public officials involved in administering justice andjudicial personnel are subjected to threats, and attacks relating in sensitive political or
economic cases, corruption cases, or organised criminal groups. 975 Land claims cases
especially judicial workers to be threatened by armed groups or powerful economic
interests.976 Between January 2019 and April 2021, there were 6 judicial employees murdered,
26 received threats, 12 were attacked, 3 were prosecuted and 6 were forcibly disappeared. 977
Dejusticia reported that there were 1145 victims of attacks against judicial workers between
2019-2022, mostly in Cundinamarca.978 There have also been smear campaigns against
members of the Supreme Court who have pursued Alvaro Uribe for his involvement in forming
paramilitary groups.979

7.8.

Women

Women and girls ‘continue to be the victims of violence and suffer gender inequality’ anddiscrimination.980 In the armed conflict in Colombia, women are particularly vulnerable toconflict-related and sexual violence.981 Sexual violence and rape has been used as a tool in
the war and is linked to control of territory. Women are disproportionately affected by the
conflict. 4.6 million women were registered as victims affected by the armed conflict. 982
Aggression, intimidation, and threats of violence instil fear and dissuade reporting of crimes
against women.983 Women from indigenous and African descent faced disproportionately

970

Lawyers for Lawyers, Colombia – Submission on the List of Issues by the Lawyers for Lawyers Foundation(Human Rights Committee Consideration of the Eighth Periodic Report on Colombia), 2 May 2022, url; SLAW,
Escalating Threats to Colombian Human Rights Advocates, 11 January 2022, url
971
Lawyers for Lawyers, Colombia – Submission on the List of Issues by the Lawyers for Lawyers Foundation(Human Rights Committee Consideration of the Eithh Periodic Report on Colombia), 2 May 2022, url; SLAW,
Escalating Threats to Colombian Human Rights Advocates, 11 January 2022, url
972
Lawyers for Lawyers, Colombia – Submission on the List of Issues by the Lawyers for Lawyers Foundation(Human Rights Committee Consideration of the Eithh Periodic Report on Colombia), 2 May 2022, url
973
PBI, PBI-Colombia amplifies article about women lawyers subjected to threats, attacks and intimidation, 19
September 2022, url
974
CCEEU et al, Independencia judicial en Colombia: En riesgo por un régimen autoritario, June 2021, url, p. 15, 22
975
CCEEU et al, Independencia judicial en Colombia: En riesgo por un régimen autoritario, June 2021, url, p. 8, 70,
22-24
976
CCEEU et al, Independencia judicial en Colombia: En riesgo por un régimen autoritario, June 2021, url, p. 22
977
CCEEU et al, Independencia judicial en Colombia: En riesgo por un régimen autoritario, June 2021, url, p. 26
978
Dejusticia, 2 September 2022, Correspondence with EUAA
979
CCEEU et al, Independencia judicial en Colombia: En riesgo por un régimen autoritario, June 2021, url, p. 26
980
UN OHCHR, Situation of human rights in Colombia [Year 2021] (A/HRC/49/19), 17 May 2022, url, para. 10
981
ODI, Women’s participation and influence in transitions from conflict: The case of Colombia, April 2022, url, p. 12
982
Insight Crime, How Colombia's Conflict Intensified Violence Against Women and the LGBTQI+ Community, 4August 2022, url
983
ODI, Women’s participation and influence in transitions from conflict: The case of Colombia, April 2022, url, p. 12

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higher rates of sexual violence in particular in relation to the conflict, and lacked assistance,
protection and justice for crimes against them. 984
Women human rights defenders and social leaders live ‘in a particular situation of risk’ in thecontext of increases in recent years of murder, torture, and sexual violence against HRDs. 985
They are more likely to receive threats of sexual violence or to have their family members andchildren harassed.986 The author of the Truth Commission’s chapter on women stated thatthreats to women has been used an effective means of clearing territory due to the ripple
effects on the family and community as women tend to be displaced with their families. 987
Violence against women and impunity for perpetrators continues to be a serious problem in
Colombia.988 The main forms of violence against women are domestic and family violence,
sexual violence, and femicides.989 Women and girls suffer inequality and gender-based
discrimination, as well as barriers to accessing health, justice, and protection for victims ofviolence.990 Crimes against women and girls increased during the pandemic due toconfinement, while underreporting also remains a problem. 991
Sexual violence can range from verbal harassment to rape. 992 Despite being prohibited by thelaw, rape of both women and men, including spousal rape, remains a serious problem.993 The
Attorney General’s office received 43 394 complaints of sexual violence in 2021, 86 % ofwhich had female victims. 994 In the same year, it also received 114 727 complaints of domestic
violence, with 77 % being from female victims.995 Prosecution rates were low and impunity wasa problem in gender-based violence cases.996
Femicide [intentional killing of women because they are female] numbers were reported by
the Colombian Observatory on Women as 57 in 2016, 208 in 2017, 228 in 2018, and 226 in
2019, with the highest 2019 numbers in Antioquia and Norte de Santander. 997 In 2021, there

984

UN, CERD, Concluding observations on the combined seventeenth to nineteenth periodic reports on Colombia,
22 January 2020, url, para. 24
985
OMCT, Colombia: Over 2,000 days of criminalisation against human rights defender Milena Quiroz Jiménez, 28
July 2022, url
986International Crisis Group, Leaders Under Fire, 6 October 2020, url
987
Insight Crime, How Colombia's Conflict Intensified Violence Against Women and the LGBTQI+ Community, 4August 2022, url
988
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in 2021 – Colombia, 12 April 2022, url, p. 27-28; Pares,
Vivir sin miedo: Balance de violencias basadas en género durante 2021 y el primer cuatrimestre de 2022, June
2022, url, pp. 3-5
989
Pares, Vivir sin miedo: Balance de violencias basadas en género durante 2021 y el primer cuatrimestre de 2022,
June 2022, url, pp. 3-5
990
UN OHCHR, Situation of human rights in Colombia [Year 2021] (A/HRC/49/19), 17 May 2022, url, para. 10
991
Pares, Vivir sin miedo: Balance de violencias basadas en género durante 2021 y el primer cuatrimestre de 2022,
June 2022, url, pp. 3-5
992
Pares, Vivir sin miedo: Balance de violencias basadas en género durante 2021 y el primer cuatrimestre de 2022,
June 2022, url, pp. 3-5
993
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in 2021 – Colombia, 12 April 2022, url, p. 27
994
UN OHCHR, Situation of human rights in Colombia [Year 2021] (A/HRC/49/19), 17 May 2022, url, para. 10
995
UN OHCHR, Situation of human rights in Colombia [Year 2021] (A/HRC/49/19), 17 May 2022, url, para. 10
996
Bogota Post, Impunity for femicide in Colombia is still above 90 %, 27 September 2021, url
997
Colombia, Consejería Presidencial para la Equidad de la Mujer, Observatorio Colombiano de la Mujeres:
Violencia, 2019, url

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were 183 reports of killings of women on account of their gender. 998 In femicide cases, there isa 93 % impunity rate.999
The government has a number of pieces of legislation on the prevention of gender based
violations.1000 There is also a national policy for gender equity and an Office of the Advisor on
Equality of Women which deals with combating discrimination, however, it persists despite
women having the same legal rights as men,1001 as did gender-based violence.1002 Gender
discrimination within the justice system is reported, both in terms of the representation of
women in the judiciary and in decisions made which exclude women in certain areas of law
and high courts.1003 Women of indigenous and African descent experienced multiple forms of
discrimination in accessing work, health, and education services. 1004

7.9.

Children and youth

According to Colombia’s Victim’s Unit, between 1985 to 2021, the armed conflict affected
more than 2 million children through displacement, confinement, recruitment, abuses, andsexual violence. The source stated that there was a decline between 2016 and 2019 due tothe peace agreement, but increased again 2021-2021 due to increased conflict intensity,
causing an 88 % increase in conflict-affected youth (from 12 481 to 23 465 cases). After 2016,
most children affected were in Chocó, Antioquia, Nariño, Norte de Santander, Valle del Cauca,
Cauca, Córdoba, and Bolívar.1005 The UN reported a decrease in ‘grave violations’ againstchildren since the 2016 peace agreement, however noted that children continue to suffer fromthe impact of hostilities, most prominently through the recruitment of children by armed
groups, and the threat of recruitment causing displacement.1006 Armed groups forcibly recruitand use children as combatants, informants, porters and traffickers, and sometimes girls areused for sex.1007 Child rape and abuse by armed groups continued to be a serious problem. 1008
Grave violations against children such as rape and sexual violence are underreported due to998

UN OHCHR, Situation of human rights in Colombia [Year 2021] (A/HRC/49/19), 17 May 2022, url, para. 10
Bogota Post, Impunity for femicide in Colombia is still above 90 %, 27 September 2021, url
1000
Pares, Vivir sin miedo: Balance de violencias basadas en género durante 2021 y el primer cuatrimestre de2022, June 2022, url, pp. 3-5
1001
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in 2021 – Colombia, 12 April 2022, url, p. 29
1002
Pares, Vivir sin miedo: Balance de violencias basadas en género durante 2021 y el primer cuatrimestre de2022, June 2022, url, pp. 3-5
1003
CCEEU et al, Independencia judicial en Colombia: En riesgo por un régimen autoritario, June 2021, url, pp. 7476
1004
UN, CERD, Concluding observations on the combined seventeenth to nineteenth periodic reports on Colombia,
22 January 2020, url, para. 24
1005
ACAPS, Colombia – Impact of the armed conflict on children and youth, 31 March 2022, url, p. 1; Colombia,
CNMH, Un 30% de las víctimas de violencia sexual en el conflicto armado son niñas o adolescentes, 19 June 2021,
url
1006
UNSC, Children and armed conflict in Colombia - Report of the Secretary-General (S/2021/1022), 8 December
2021, url
1007
ACAPS, Colombia – Impact of the armed conflict on children and youth, 31 March 2022, url, p. 3
1008
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in 2021 – Colombia, 12 April 2022, url, p. 27
999

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fear of stigma and reprisal.1009 Groups convince children to join in poorer areas with offers offood and money.1010
The impacts of the conflict, displacement and confinement on children include a ‘total
disruption to their lives’ including risks of family separation, mental health, education, andaccess to food and water.1011 Children were also killed and maimed during the conflict. The UN
reported 118 verified cases during June 2019-July 2021 (78 killed, 48 maimed) who werevictims of gunshots, anti-personnel mines, unexploded ordnance, and aerial attacks. 1012

7.10. LGBTIQ
In the armed conflict, the Truth Commission found LGBTIQ people to have been targeted due
to both prejudice and social complicity,1013 disproportionately.1014 All armed actors in the conflicthave violated the rights of LGBTI people in varying degrees. 1015 The armed conflictexacerbated violence against LGBTI people and the Victims Registry (RUV, Registro Único de
Víctimas RUV has registered 4 971 self-identified LGBTI people as victims, mainly indepartments of Antioquia, Nariño, Bolívar, Valle del Cauca, and Chocó. 1016
There were no reports of official discrimination based on sexual orientation when accessing
housing, employment, or education, however there were reports with regard to health careaccess.1017 The Constitutional Court ruled in favour of tasking medical insurance companies
with covering costs of gender reassignment surgery.1018
Societal discrimination and abuses were reported. 1019 The primary forms of abuse against
LGBTIQ people were physical, sexual, and psychological aggression, particularly against
transgender men with reports of sexual abuse and corrective rape. There were allegations ofpolice violence based on sexual orientation, 1020 and discrimination.1021 The UN reported that
the Ombudsperson’s office handled 72 cases of gender-based violence against LGBTQI
persons in 2021.1022 USDOS between 2008-July 2021, there were 185 LGBTIQ people killed,
1009

UNSC, Children and armed conflict in Colombia - Report of the Secretary-General (S/2021/1022), 8 December
2021, url
1010
ACAPS, Colombia – Impact of the armed conflict on children and youth, 31 March 2022, url, p. 3
1011
ACAPS, Colombia – Impact of the armed conflict on children and youth, 31 March 2022, url, p. 3
1012
UNSC, Children and armed conflict in Colombia - Report of the Secretary-General (S/2021/1022), 8 December
2021, url
1013
Insight Crime, How Colombia's Conflict Intensified Violence Against Women and the LGBTQI+ Community, 4August 2022, url
1014
Insight Crime, How Colombia's Conflict Intensified Viol ence Against Women and the LGBTQI+ Community, 4August 2022, url
1015
Colombia Diversa, Who is Going to Tell Us? Report for the Truth Commission on the Experiences of Gay,
Bisexual, and Trans People in the Colombian Armed Conflict, September 2020, url, p. 44
1016
Colombia, La Unidad reafirma su compromiso con las víctimas del conflicto armado con orientaciones sexuales
e identidades de género diversas, 16 May 2020, url
1017
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in 2021 – Colombia, 12 April 2022, url, p. 34
1018
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in 2021 – Colombia, 12 April 2022, url, p. 34
1019
Freedom House, Colombia 2022, February 2022, url; WOLA, LGBT+ Rights and Peace in Colombia: The
Paradox Between Law and Practice, 3 July 2020, url
1020
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in 2021 – Colombia, 12 April 2022, url, p. 34
1021
UN OHCHR, Situation of human rights in Colombia [Year 2021] (A/HRC/49/19), 17 May 2022, url, para. 11
1022
UN OHCHR, Situation of human rights in Colombia [Year 2021] (A/HRC/49/19), 17 May 2022, url, para. 11

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mostly transgender women. In 2021, there were 39 homicides of LGBTI people reported by
the NGO Diversa, including 26 transgender people. 1023 However the Office of the
Ombudsperson reported in 2021, 27 killings of transgender persons, 111 complaints of violenceagainst transgender people, and 9 threats against rights defenders. 1024 The Colombian NGO
Temblores reported in a 2019 report that according to information from the Colombian legal
medicine department, between 2009-2018 there were 1 944 acts of violence against LGBT
people recorded, 19.8 % homicides, 10 % acts of sexual violence, and 70.2 % interpersonal
violence. Abuses were underreported. Most of the registered violence cases had ‘no
information’ or unknown perpetrators.1025
On paper, Colombia has one of the ‘strongest legal frameworks in Latin America’ fordefending the rights of LGBTIQ people, however in practice protections are ‘rarely
enforced’.1026 The JEP has opened two cases relating to the violence perpetrated by the
FARC-EP and paramilitaries against LGBTIQ people in the armed conflict. 1027 The governmentof Colombia has a public policy and action plan on guaranteeing the rights of people from the
LGBTI sector, including coordination with multiple national institutions. However, NGOs
reported concerns about the absence of nationwide measures to implement them. 1028 There
are high levels of impunity for crimes against LGBTI people. 1029 The UN remarked that the FGN
did not have a clear approach to conducting investigations with an LGBTI dimension making it
difficult to determine whether attacks were related to sexual orientation of gender identity ofthe victim.1030 The Prosecutor General continues to prioritise investigating cases with highconcentrations of incidents in main cities such as Cali, Medellín, Bogotá, as well as providing
training to investigators on LGBTIQ perspectives.1031

1023

USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in 2021 – Colombia, 12 April 2022, url, p. 34
OAS, IACHR, Annual Report 2021 – Chapter 5: Colombia, 2022, url, pp. 965-966
1025
Temblores, Qué maricada con nuestros derechos, 2019, url, p. 27
1026
WOLA, LGBT+ Rights and Peace in Colombia: The Paradox Between Law and Practice, 3 July 2020, url
1027
WOLA, LGBT+ Rights and Peace in Colombia: The Paradox Between Law and Practice, 3 July 2020, url
1028
OAS, IACHR, Annual Report 2021 – Chapter 5: Colombia, 2022, url, pp. 965-966; UN OHCHR, Situation ofhuman rights in Colombia [Year 2021] (A/HRC/49/19), 17 May 2022, url, para. 121029
Freedom House, Colombia 2022, February 2022, url; UN OHCHR, Situation of human rights in Colombia [Year2021] (A/HRC/49/19), 17 May 2022, url, para. 11-12
1030
UN OHCHR, Situation of human rights in Colombia [Year 2021] (A/HRC/49/19), 17 May 2022, url, para. 11
1031
OAS, IACHR, Annual Report 2021 – Chapter 5: Colombia, 2022, url, pp. 965-966; USDOS, Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices in 2021 – Colombia, 12 April 2022, url, p. 34-35
1024

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8. State protection
8.1.

Justice system

According to Transparency International (TI), corruption in Colombia ranks 87th out of 180
countries in TI’s Corruption Perceptions Index for 2021, compared to Venezuela (177 th) andChile (27th),1032 making it in line with regional averages.1033 However, corruption in Colombia isalso described as ‘endemic in all state branches and levels of government,’ including
politicians forming alliances with criminal groups in exchange for election support, bribery ofjudges and attorneys including in high courts, and corruption of officials in the police, military,and prison system.1034 The justice system has a lack of resources and there are high levels ofcorruption and high levels of impunity.1035 Widespread corruption is ‘one of the greatest
obstacles to effective law enforcement;’ and killings and impunity have led to calls for police
reform.1036 According to the NGO Colectivo de Abogados, an NGO that works on judicial
issues with consultative status with the UN, the four most important problems of judicial
independence in Colombia are underfunding and initiatives to limit judicial autonomy,
harassment, attacks and targeting of judicial officers, politicised appointments to the judiciary,and failure to comply with judicial decisions that check executive authority. The justicesystem’s lack of effectiveness causes distrust from citizens to deal with rights violations by thestate and armed groups.1037
The justice system is compromised by corruption and extortion, with allegations also touching
the Constitutional and Supreme Courts, though they remain independent from theexecutive.1038 Colombia’s justice system is described as having numerous independent
mechanisms to regulate it; however it is affected by a lack of resources, high levels ofcorruption and characterised by ‘exceedingly high impunity rates’. 1039 The prosecution service
is described as ‘relatively professional’ though there have been allegations of reduced
independence under Duque.1040 Despite reforms made in 2021 to accelerate legal procedures,
due process ‘remains weak, and trial processes move very slowly’. 1041

1032

TI, Corruption Perceptions Index 2021, 2022, url
WJP, Rule of Law Index 2022 - Colombia, 2022, url
1034
GITOC, Organized Crime Index – Colombia 2021, url, p. 41035
GITOC, Organized Crime Index – Colombia 2021, url, p. 5; Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against Human Rights
Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021, url, p.329
1036
GITOC, Organized Crime Index – Colombia 2021, url, p. 5
1037
CCEEU et al., Por la defensa de la independencia de la justicia en Colombia, June 2021, url
1038
Freedom House, Colombia 2022, February 2022, url
1039
GITOC, Organized Crime Index – Colombia 2021, url, p. 5; See also: Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against
Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021, url, pp. 329-330
1040
Freedom House, Colombia 2022, February 2022, url
1041
Freedom House, Colombia 2022, February 2022, url
1033

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8.2.

Reporting crime

Communities are often unwilling to report crimes by armed groups or participate incooperation with authorities for fear of retaliation and lack of protection.1042 Some communities
are not willing to cooperate with state authorities because illegal mining or coca growing aretheir only source of income, while others have been victims of forced eradication,
disappearances, extrajudicial killings, or human rights violations by public security forces. 1043 In
some areas, armed groups have corrupted local state institutions, including law enforcement,
local mayors and civil servants, making it ‘high risk’ for crime witnesses to cooperate andcausing distrust in the state due to lack of protection. 1044

8.3.

Mechanisms for state efforts to protect
individuals

Colombia has been regarded as a pioneer in protecting human rights defenders due to thecreation of the physical protection programme dating back to 1997. It has more than 14
relevant laws and decrees and 18 institutional bodies involved in protecting human rights
defenders. The government’s strategy has focused mainly in physical security of at-risk
individuals, but has evolved to take greater account of prevention and accountability. 1045
Despite the extensive protection framework for defenders and efforts to strengthen protection
under the peace agreement, this has not restrained the increase in post-war violence against
HRDs since 2016, ‘partly because they are relatively recent, with many newer instruments
lacking full implementation’.1046 In August 2022, the newly elected Petro government launched
the first Unified Command Post for Life (PMU), located in Caldono in Cauca department. The
PMU is an initiative that is part of a protection plan covering 65 municipalities in which thestate plans to provide ‘accompaniment and maintain a permanent presence’ including in 10
municipalities where social leaders have been systematically assassinated. 1047 Further
information on implementation could not be found. Colombia’s Truth Commission released its
final report in June 2022, and called on the government to provide increased state protection
to social leaders and to address violence against them and negligence by the state. 1048
The Colombian government’s approach to protection focuses on providing security toindividuals and attacking armed groups, both of which are described by the International

1042

Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021,
url, p. 330
1043
Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021,
url, pp. 330-331
1044
Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021,
url, p. 331
1045
Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021,
url, p. 324
1046
Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021,
url, p. 327
1047
People’s Dispatch, Colombian government launches iniative for protection of social leaders, 23 August 2022,
url
1048
Al Jazeera, Colombians call for end to impunity as activist killings continue, 16 July 2022, url

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Crisis Group as temporary interventions. The individual protection schemes have saved lives
but been unable to stop the groups issuing threats to life; the military operations to stop
armed groups have not resolved the environment and underlying causes of violence. 1049
Human Rights Watch reported that protection measures such as bullet proof vests do notaddress the underlying factors that ‘foster violence against social leaders’ such as drugtrafficking, state absence, and slow judicial processes, 1050 weak implementation of the peaceagreement or institutional weaknesses.1051 Nor do measures provide for broader planning toaccount for collective risks faced by communities that may oppose an armed group or large
scale development/energy project.1052 Civil society organisations described the state’s
response to threats as ‘reactive’ and militarized, rather than preventive, as the majority ofincidents of threats, harassment, and murder go unpunished. 1053 The government ofColombia’s efforts to deal with the underlying causes of violence and the conditions thatfacilitate the activity and expansion of armed groups and criminal organisations is describedby sources as limited in preventing and diminishing violence. 1054 Protection through reactive
physical measures is insufficient to mitigate risks in the context of ‘widespread and systematic
violence’ particularly in rural and remote areas with little infrastructure, nor does the state haveresources to afford protection for all defenders at risk. 1055 The UN concluded in July 2022 in its
recommendations to the incoming Petro government that the state’s response to violence has
been insufficient in reducing violence, preventing abuses by illegal armed groups and criminalorganisations, and adequately protecting communities and their territory. 1056
Under the 2016 peace agreement, social leaders and human rights defenders are explicitly
identified as being in need of protection and guarantees are to be provided to them throughstate mechanisms such as an Elite Corps within the National Police for rapid response tothreats, a special investigative unit within the General Attorney’s Office to investigate andprosecute crimes against ex-FARC-EP and social leaders, and strengthened capacity for the
Early Warning System, and the Office of the Ombudsperson and the UNP. 1057 The National
Commission on Security Guarantees was also intended to play a key role in dismantling armed
criminals, paramilitarism, and protecting vulnerable groups, however it remains lacking in
implementation.1058 It is a high level commission that includes the President of Colombia, key
cabinet ministers, the human rights ombudsperson, the attorney-general, the inspector
1049

International Crisis Group, Leaders Under Fire, 6 October 2020, url, p. 29; See also: Al Jazeera, Colombians callfor end to impunity as activist killings continue, 16 July 2022, url; Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against Human
Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021, url, pp. 334-335
1050
Al Jazeera, Colombians call for end to impunity as activist killings continue, 16 July 2022, url
1051
AI, ¿Por qué nos quieren matar?, 8 October 2020, url, p. 43
1052
AI, ¿Por qué nos quieren matar?, 8 October 2020, url, p. 43
1053
OAS, IACHR, Annual Report 2021 – Chapter 5: Colombia, 2022, url, para. 93; GITOC, Organized Crime Index –Colombia 2021, url, p. 5
1054
UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, paras. 79-80; HRW, Left
Undefended, February 2021, url, p. 70
1055
Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021,
url, pp. 328-329
1056
UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, p. 40
1057
WOLA, A Long Way to Go: Implementing Colombia’s peace accord after five years, 23 November 2021, url;
Colombia, Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace, 24 November 2016,
url, p. 8; UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, para. 75
1058
WOLA, A Long Way to Go: Implementing Colombia’s peace accord after five years, 23 November 2021, url;
Colombia, Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace, 24 November 2016,
url, p. 8, 69

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general, military and police commanders, and representatives of civil society and internationalorganisations.1059 Under Colombian law, the Commission is mandated under the 2016 Peace
Accord to design and implement a policy to dismantle armed groups that attack social
leaders/human rights defenders, but has yielded limited results. 1060 Since its creation in
November 2016, they have met only 22 times and have yet to function properly. 1061 There isalso the Timely Action Plan on the Prevention and Protection of Human Rights Defenders,
Social Leaders, Community Leaders and Journalists, a 2018 strategy to articulate protection
programs and resources to safeguard these groups. 1062 Additional protection measures are
required to be provided by governors and mayors at the local level, as local authorities are‘legally the first responders’ to threatened social leaders. 1063
The Colombia government has two long-standing systems that have been important inprotecting against human rights violations and targeted persons, ‘though both suffer frominsufficient funding and other constraints’: The Early Warning System (Sistema de Alertas
Tempranas) through the Office of the Ombudsperson and the National Protection Unit (UNP).
A number of other mechanisms have developed since the peace agreement, but these have
only been ‘superficially promoted’ and most remain ‘barely functional’. 1064 Furthermore, while
the Office of the Ombudsperson has achieved a wider territorial presence and community
trust, in many territories, its presence continues to be weak and it encounters a large numberof demands from communities under daily pressure and threats. 1065

8.3.1.

Early Warning System (SAT, Sistema de Alertas Tempranas)

Under Colombian law, the Office of the Ombudsperson is responsible for an alert systemcalled the Early Warning System (Sistema de Alertas Tempranas, SAT), which collects andanalyses information on risk to civilians and their human rights due to the armed conflict, andwhich issues alerts to inform competent authorities of the need for a timely response,
including recommendations to take steps to prevent and mitigate risks. 1066 The SAT Office of
the Ombudsperson has a presence in multiple regions where there are ‘few other state
actors’.1067 When an alert is issued by the system, municipal, departmental, and national
authorities are required to trigger a ‘rapid response’ to prevent abuses from occurring, whichis coordinated by the Ministry of Interior.1068 Between 2016 and December 2020, 278 warnings
were issued (including 50 in 2019 and 49 in 2020), in which risks were flagged in 549 ofColombia’s 1 123 municipalities; however defenders were killed in over 30% of these cases
1059

HRW, Left Undefended, 10 February 2021, url, p. 91
HRW, Left Undefended, 10 February 2021, url, pp. 91, 93
1061
UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, para. 77
1062
Colombia, Plan de Acción Oportuna de prevención y protección para los defensores de derechos humanos,líderes sociales, comunales y periodistas (PAO), 19 November 2018, url
1063
International Crisis Group, Leaders Under Fire, 6 October 2020, url, p. 29; See Decree 2252 de 2017 regarding
individual and collective protection for human rights defenders provided by governors and mayors: Colombia,
Decreto 2252 de 2017, url
1064
HRW, Left Undefended, 10 February 2021, url, p. 4-5
1065
UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, paras. 74, 86, 87
1066
OAS, IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders and Social Leaders in Colombia, 6 December
2019, url, p. 106; Perry, J., SAIS Review of International Affairs, Can the Government Police Itself? Colombia’s False
Positives Scandal and its Lessons for Atrocity Prevention, 5 August 2022, url; HRW, Left Undefended, 10 February
2021, url, p. 82
1067
HRW, Left Undefended, 10 February 2021, url, p. 5
1068
HRW, Left Undefended, 10 February 2021, url, p. 82
1060

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after an alert had been issued.1069 In 2019 alone, 56 Alerts were issued warning of risks in 32
departments and 418 municipalities, 1 of which was national in scope. In 2021, the system
issued 21 Alerts of risks to Indigenous communities and 12 to Afro-Colombian communities.1070
The system has reportedly prevented some human rights violations against ‘marginalized
communities.’1071 However, sources indicate that there is a lack of response and coordinatedlocal action by authorities to the issued alerts 1072 Despite their legal obligation to respond,
national, state, and local authorities reportedly fail to respond to the ‘scores’ of early warning
alerts issued by the system identifying risks to human rights defenders in hundreds ofmunicipalities.1073 Between 2016-2020, 30 % of HRD killings in these cases occurred after analert had been issued to warn of the risks. 1074 The government was ‘systematically ignoring’alerts and failed to provide adequate protection funding according to a top official of the
Office of the Ombudsperson.1075 The Victims Unit also reported in 2022 that although alerts
are being issues, there is a low level of compliance with the recommendations of the SAT bynational and territorial entities. 1076
Furthermore, the state-run and designed SAT system is not designed to issue alerts forgovernmental abuses by security forces such as situations of ‘false positives’ [falsos positivos]
and have ‘little ability to monitor or prevent state abuses’. 1077
The Office of the Ombudsperson publishes a listing on its website of issued Alertas
Tempranas, including an interactive map of those that have been issued. 1078

8.3.2.

National Protection Unit (UNP, Unidad Nacional de Protección)

The National Protection Unit (UNP, Unidad Nacional de Protección), [under the Ministry ofInterior 1079 which is the primary government entity responsible for protection policy 1080] is
responsible for the protection program for victims of threats to their life, liberty, integrity or
security due to their political, public, social, or humanitarian activities.1081 The UNP has a

1069

HRW, Left Undefended, 10 February 2021, url, pp. 82-83
Colombia, CERD – Informes periódicos 20° y 21° combinados que la Colombia debía presentar en 2022 en
virtud del artículo 9 de la Convención (CERD/C/COL/20-21), 6 October 2022, url, para. 69-70
1071
Perry, J., Can the Government Police Itself? Colombia’s False Positives Scandal, 5 August 2022, url
1072
OAS, IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders and Social Leaders in Colombia, 6 December
2019, url, p. 106; HRW, Left Undefended, 10 February 2021, url, p. 5; Colombia Reports, Government systematicallyignoring alert system put in place to prevent killing of social leaders, 6 May 2019, url; HRW, The War in Catatumbo,
8 August 2019, url
1073
HRW, Left Undefended, 10 February 2021, url, p. 5
1074
HRW, Left Undefended, 10 February 2021, url, pp. 82-83
1075
Colombia Reports, Government systematically ignoring alert system put in place to prevent killing of social
leaders, 6 May 2019, url
1076
Colombia, Comisión de Seguimiento y Monitoreo a la Implementación de la Ley 1448 de 2011, “Ley de Víctimasy Restitución de Tierras”, Noveno informe de seguimiento al Congreso de la República 2021 -2022, 22 August
2022, url, p. 104
1077
Perry, J., Can the Government Police Itself? Colombia’s False Positives Scandal, 5 August 2022, url
1078
Colombia, Alertas Tempranas [interactive map], n.d., url
1079
ISHR, Defenders Toolbox – Colombia: National Protection, n.d., url
1080
Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021,
url, p. 324
1081
Colombia, UNP, ABC para acceder a las rutas de protección individual y colectiva, May 2020, url, p. 2; Wesche,
P. Post-war Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021, url, p. 324
1070

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budget of approximately 260 000 000 EUR [$1 338 615 611 624 Colombian Pesos] as ofJanuary 2022.1082 The UNP faced ‘significant budgetary constraints’ as well as understaffing
according to HRW.1083
Protection measures through the UNP can only be applied for by individuals where there is a
nexus between the threat and their political, public, social, humanitarian activities. Individuals
who are victims of threats or extortion that are not directly related these activities cannot
obtain protection measures from the UNP, or if they have an ‘ordinary’ risk level [seebelow].1084 UNP provides two types of protection measures: individual protection, and‘collective protection’ from a threat to a community, ethnic group, or collective of people. 1085
UNP requires that those wishing to request protection file a criminal complaint with the
Attorney General’s office.1086 In areas where there is no UNP office, applicants can obtainassistance to apply at the local Office of the Ombudsperson or the Municipal Ombudsperson(Personería), municipal mayor’s office, or by calling UNP’s hotline. 1087 Police, local authorities,
the Office of the Ombudsperson, and the UN can also recommend cases. 1088
Applications are received by a committee and assessed for the level of risk and those that are
accepted are sent to the UNP Director for the implementation of measures. 1089 Under
Colombian law, the processing time should be 30 days.1090 There are three levels of risk:
ordinary, extraordinary, and extreme. Ordinary risk can ‘occur to any person or community
independent of their activities’ and does not oblige the state to provide protection measure s.
Extraordinary risk is one arising as a direct consequence of one’s political, social,humanitarian, or public activities or functions. This level of risk will trigger protection measures
where the threat affects the individual, family members, or community; has occurred recently,
is clear, concrete, disproportionate and is not based on suspicion, and threatens rights to life,
liberty integrity or security. Extreme risk is for threat situations that are above extraordinary,
where immediate attention is required because the possibility of occurrence is very high andsevere.1091
Since its creation in 2011, UNP has provided protection schemes to thousands of individuals
and prevented attempted murders,1092 and since 2016, has increased the number of protection
schemes granted to those it considers human rights defenders. 1093 The UNP reported that in2020, it received 51 097 applications and of that, 4 795 were accepted (17.5 %). In 2021, it
received 28 467 applications to the Risk Assessment Sub-directorate; of which 5 746 (20 %)1082

Colombia, UNP, Resolución 0003, 3 January 2022, url, p. 6
HRW, Left Undefended, 10 February 2021, url, p. 72, 76
1084
Colombia, UNP, ABC para acceder a las rutas de protección individual y colectiva, May 2020, url, p. 61085
Colombia, UNP, ABC para acceder a las rutas de protección individual y colectiva, May 2020, url, p. 2
1086
HRW, Left Undefended, 10 February 2021, url, p. 73
1087
Colombia, UNP, ABC para acceder a las rutas de protección individual y colectiva, May 2020, url, p. 7
1088
International Crisis Group, Leaders Under Fire, 6 October 2020, url, p. 31
1089
Colombia, UNP, ABC para acceder a las rutas de protección individual y colectiva, May 2020, url, p. 10
1090
HRW, Left Undefended, 10 February 2021, url, p. 77
1091
Colombia, UNP, ABC para acceder a las rutas de protección individual y colectiva, May 2020, url, p. 7
1092
OAS, IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders and Social Leaders in Colombia, 6 December
2019, url, p. 106-107
1093
HRW, Left Undefended, 10 February 2021, url, p. 72
1083

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were deemed eligible for protection.1094 As of July 2021, more than 8 000 individuals werereceiving UNP protection, of which 4 000 were human rights defenders and social leaders,
187 journalists, 255 mayors, 16 governors and 435 departmental deputies, councillors, judges,
local ombudsmen.1095
Thousands of protection measures have been deployed to protect the rising number of thosein need of it.1096 The government reported that between 2019-July 2022 more than 66 000‘protection measures’ had been given to human rights leaders, particularly leaders inindigenous and afro-Colombian communities, as well as 185 relocation assistancemeasures.1097 Provision of body guards, armoured cars, cell phones, panic buttons, directcommunications with police, and temporary relocation have been the ‘centre of theColombian protection regime’.1098 Variation in terms of protection measures provided is‘enormous’ and may range from mobile phones, panic buttons, self-protection courses, bulletproof jackets, armoured cars, to bodyguards; those more at risk may be relocated to anotherarea in their region and be given bodyguards, while those ‘most imperilled’ are moved into
town with armoured cards and given a basic income and fuel.1099 The most common measures
given are bulletproof vests and cell phones. 1100
Collective protection
During the Peace process, the government adopted additional instruments to regulate‘collective protection’ by the UNP,1101 and the UNP made efforts to provide collective protection
to ethnic groups, trade unions, women’s rights and human rights organisations. 1102 Heavy
backlogs processing collective protection requests caused delays with 915 requests being
made from 2016-2020 and only 16 % being granted measures.1103 HRW mentioned that UNP’scollective protection programs have encountered significant constraints such as budget
problems meaning communities had difficulties obtaining protection. 1104 Community protection
schemes largely mirrored individual protection measures such as self-protection training and1094

Colombia, UNP, Informe evaluación rendición de cuentas 2021, 25 August 2022, url, p. 10
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in 2021 – Colombia, 12 April 2022, url, p. 17, 25, 27
1096International Crisis Group, Leaders Under Fire, 6 October 2020, url, p. 31; OAS, IACHR, Report on the Situationof Human Rights Defenders and Social Leaders in Colombia, 6 December 2019, url, p. 106
1097
Colombia, CERD – Informes periódicos 20° y 21° combinados que la Colombia debía presentar en 2022 en
virtud del artículo 9 de la Convención (CERD/C/COL/20-21), 6 October 2022, url, para. 196
1098
Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021,
url, p. 327-328
1099
International Crisis Group, Leaders Under Fire, 6 October 2020, url, p. 31; See for example the listed measuresin 2021: OAS, IACHR, Annual Report 2021 – Chapter 5: Colombia, 2022, url, para. 88
1100
Political Analyst, 2 September 2022, Interview with EUAA
1101
Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021,
url,p.324
1102
UN OHCHR, Situation of human rights in Colombia [Year 2021] (A/HRC/49/19), 17 May 2022, url, para. 49; HRW,
Left Undefended, 10 February 2021, url, p. 78
1103
UN OHCHR, Situation of human rights in Colombia [Year 2021] (A/HRC/49/19), 17 May 2022, url, para. 48
1104
HRW, Left Undefended, 10 February 2021, url, pp. 78-79
1095

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armoured cars.1105 Community groups not registered with the government reported problems
obtaining protection from UNP.1106
Effectiveness of UNP
Thousands of protection measures have been deployed to protect the rising number of thosein need of it.1107 The government reported that between 2019-July 2022 more than 66 000‘protection measures’ had been given to human rights leaders, particularly leaders inindigenous and afro-Colombian communities, as well as 185 relocation assistancemeasures.1108 Provision of body guards, armoured cars, cell phones, panic buttons, directcommunications with police, and temporary relocation have been the ‘centre of theColombian protection regime’.1109 Variation in terms of protection measures provided is‘enormous’ and may range from mobile phones, panic buttons, self-protection courses, bulletproof jackets, armoured cars, to bodyguards; those more at risk may be relocated to anotherarea in their region and be given bodyguards, while those ‘most imperilled’ are moved into
town with armoured cards and given a basic income and fuel. 1110 The most common measures
given are bulletproof vests and cell phones. 1111
According to the International Crisis Group, the UNP scheme’s infrastructure ‘works in manysettings, particularly in urban areas, though it may create some new risks and is far from fool
proof.’1112 There is little evidence of an articulated and effective response by the competentauthorities to prevent risk situations or rapidly advance protection measures of the UNP andinvestigations by the Attorney General’s Office. 1113 Despite efforts made by the state toprioritise protecting social leaders, strengthen the prosecution of these crimes and provide
additional protections, violence levels have not been reduced. 1114 During the year, the UN
received information on operational deficiencies in individual protection measures,
dismantling of protection schemes ‘without objective justification’ and the inadequacy ofprotection measures in the context and work of human rights defenders.1115 Similarly, IACHR
reported on limitations to protection schemes, associated in many cases with difficulties
guaranteeing victims’ mobility, lack of resources to mobilize bodyguards, and the1105

AI, ¿Por qué nos quieren matar?, 8 October 2020, url, p. 42; International Crisis International Crisis Group,
Leaders Under Fire, 6 October 2020, url, p. 31
1106
Compromiso, Amenazas e incidentes de seguridad y violencia basada en género que se han presentado en el
departamento de Santander (enero a marzo 2022), March 2022, url, p. 13; International International Crisis Group,
Leaders Under Fire, 6 October 2020, url, p. 31
1107
International Crisis Group, Leaders Under Fire, 6 October 2020, url, p. 31; OAS, IACHR, Report on the Situationof Human Rights Defenders and Social Leaders in Colombia, 6 December 2019, url, p. 106
1108
Colombia, CERD – Informes periódicos 20° y 21° combinados que la Colombia debía presentar en 2022 en
virtud del artículo 9 de la Convención (CERD/C/COL/20-21), 6 October 2022, url, para. 196
1109
Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021, url,
p. 327-328
1110
International Crisis Group, Leaders Under Fire, 6 October 2020, url, p. 31; See for example the listed measures in
2021: OAS, IACHR, Annual Report 2021 – Chapter 5: Colombia, 2022, url, para. 88
1111
Political Analyst, 2 September 2022, Interview with EUAA
1112
International Crisis Group, Leaders Under Fire, 6 October 2020, Leaders under Fire, url, p. 31
1113
This statement was in reference to the situation in Santander in 202 2: Compromiso, Amenazas e incidentes deseguridad y violencia basada en género que se han presentado en el departamento de Santander (enero a marzo2022), March 2022, url, p. 13
1114
AP, Colombia struggles to keep social leaders safe, 13 January 2021, url
1115
UN OHCHR, Situation of human rights in Colombia [Year 2021] (A/HRC/49/19), 17 May 2022, url, para. 47

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characteristics of protection provided.1116 In its 2022 report to Congress, the Victims Unit statedthat there is a lack of coordination between civil authorities and security officials in addressing
risk to victims, there is a lack of monitoring and contingency planning, and that despite
protection measures being in place for some, there have still been attacks, killings anddisplacements of those under protection.1117
The UNP faced ‘significant budgetary constraints’ as well as understaffing according to
HRW.1118
UNP requires that those requesting protection file a criminal complaint with the Attorney
General’s office, however, they often face significant obstacles doing so due to lack of accessin their municipalities, or lack of coordination when threats are reported to local authorities orhuman rights Ombudsperson offices.1119 Underreporting was a problem; to avoid having toabandon their home or community, some social leaders did not request protection measuresor rely on their own informal warnings.1120 Cooperation with authorities puts social leaders andhuman rights defenders at ‘major risk’ of becoming victims of post-war crime and violence forreporting actions of armed groups to police in areas where there are armed groups present,
as well as in the absence of territorial disputes. Doing so may result in the person being
declared a ‘military target’ or a ‘sapo’ (informant).1121 In some areas, some protectees prefer not
to use their protection scheme for fear it will increase their visibility and chances of being
targeted.1122 Other sources reported similarly protected leaders have said that the measures
sometimes increase their vulnerability because they are made more visible by having
protection.1123 De justicia explained that armoured vehicles can be more easily seen andtargeted by assailants from illegal armed groups.1124
Committees to assess risk deal with approximately 350 cases a week. 1125 Measures aredelayed and often take months,1126 typically three to five months.1127 NGOs complained thattime delays left those in need of protection at risk. 1128 In September 2021, reform processes
1116

OAS, IACHR, Annual Report 2021 – Chapter 5: Colombia, 2022, url, para. 87
Colombia, Comisión de Seguimiento y Monitoreo a la Implementación de la Ley 1448 de 2011, “Ley de Víctimas yRestitución de Tierras”, Noveno informe de seguimiento al Congreso de la República 2021-2022, 22 August 2022,
url, p. 103
1118
HRW, Left Undefended, 10 February 2021, url, p. 72, 76
1119
HRW, Left Undefended, 10 February 2021, url, pp. 73-74
1120
HRW, World Report 2022 – Colombia, 16 December 2021, url; International Crisis Group, Leaders Under Fire, 6
October 2020, Leaders under Fire, url, p. 31
1121
Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021, url,
p. 322; see also: International Crisis Group, Leaders Under Fire, 6 October 2020, Leaders under Fire, url, p. 31;
HRW, Left Undefended, 10 February 2021, url, p. 72-73
1122
Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021,
url,p.328; HRW, Left Undefended, 10 February 2021, url, p. 75
1123
FIP, 3 November 2022, Interview with EUAA; Dejusticia, 2 September 2022, Correspondence with EUAA
1124
Dejusticia, 2 September 2022, Correspondence with EUAA
1125
International Crisis Group, Leaders Under Fire, 6 October 2020, Leaders under Fire, url, p. 31
1126
International Crisis Group, Leaders Under Fire, 6 October 2020, Leaders under Fire, url, p. 31; AI, ¿Por qué nosquieren matar?, 8 October 2020, url, p. 42; USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in 2021 –Colombia, 12 April 2022, url, p. 17
1127
UN OHCHR, Situation of human rights in Colombia [Year 2021] (A/HRC/49/19), 17 May 2022, url, para. 47; Seealso: HRW, Left Undefended, 10 February 2021, url, p. 77
1128
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in 2021 – Colombia, 12 April 2022, url, p. 38; OAS, IACHR,
Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders and Social Leaders in Colombia, 6 December 2019, url, p. 107;
HRW, Left Undefended, 10 February 2021, url, p. 77
1117

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were adopted to reduce wait times; however these ‘may prove inefficient’ without acomprehensive institutional response.1129 According to the Victims Unit, the UNP’s average
number of days to process an evaluation improved from 140 days (2019) to 157 days (2020) to
77 days (first quarter of 2022) which they attributed to Decree 1139 aimed at speeding up theevaluation and granting of measures.1130
Measures offered often do not correspond with the level of risk and risk factors to social
leaders.1131 Risk assessments and protection fail to take into account differentiating factors
contributing to increased risk, such as gender, age, local context. 1132 Protection schemes do
not extend to family members of the targeted person. 1133 This was a particular issue for femalesocial leaders, as aggressions against them frequently include threats to their children andfamily.1134
The government has deployed thousands of protection measures as the number of figuresneeding protection has risen, and the government has been unable to investigate themquickly enough.1135 NGOs stated that UNP monitoring has not granted sufficient measures toeffectively counteract threats to all those at risk and protection was described as weak 1136 andinadequate in many cases.1137
Measures sometimes do not consider geographic circumstances and life in rural areas andremote areas, such as lack of road access, or providing home-protection at rural defenders.1138
The FIP researcher remarked that killings of social leaders and other profiles have ‘different
logics’ that vary from region to region, and leaders often adopt self-protection measures suchas asking neighbours to watch out for them, due to lack of state assistance. 1139
Other reported problems include delivering armoured vehicles without providing sufficientgas; providing cell phones without credit or giving phones to protectees living in areas withpoor cell phone reception.1140 Protection by bodyguards, armoured cars, and bulletproof vests
is ‘very limited’ in areas controlled by armed groups where law enforcement may only enter if
1129

UN OHCHR, Situation of human rights in Colombia [Year 2021] (A/HRC/49/19), 17 May 2022, url, para. 47
Colombia, Comisión de Seguimiento y Monitoreo a l a Implementación de la Ley 1448 de 2011, “Ley de Víctimasy Restitución de Tierras”, Noveno informe de seguimiento al Congreso de la República 2021 -2022, 22 August
2022, url, p. 98
1131
Dejusticia, 2 September 2022, Correspondence with EUAA
1132
AI, ¿Por qué nos quieren matar?, 8 October 2020, url, p. 42; UN OHCHR, Situation of human rights in Colombia[Year 2021] (A/HRC/49/19), 17 May 2022, url, para. 47; OAS, IACHR, Annual Report 2021 – Chapter 5: Colombia,
2022, url, paras. 84, 90; OAS, IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders and Social Leaders in
Colombia, 6 December 2019, url, p. 109; HRW, Left Undefended, 10 February 2021, url, p. 74
1133
Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021, url,
p. 328; Conflict Analyst, 4 November 2022, Correspondence with the EUAA; FIP, 3 November 2022, Interview with
the EUAA
1134
FIP, 3 November 2022, Interview with EUAA
1135
International Crisis Group, Leaders Under Fi re, 6 October 2020, Leaders under Fire, url, p. 31
1136
AI, ¿Por qué nos quieren matar?, 8 October 2020, url, p. 42
1137
Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021,
url,p.328; FIP, 3 November 2022, Interview with EUAA; Political Analyst, 2 September 2022, Interview with EUAA;
Dejusticia, 2 September 2022, Correspondence with EUAA
1138
Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021,
url,p.328; OAS, IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders and Social Leaders in Colombia, 6December 2019, url, p. 109
1139
FIP, 3 November 2022, Interview with EUAA
1140
AI, ¿Por qué nos quieren matar?, 8 October 2020, url, p. 42
1130

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accompanied by military force.1141 The FIP researcher similarly indicated that protected social
leaders have reported that protection measures like bodyguards, vehicles, vests, and others
have been ‘largely useless’ because these leaders live in areas where armed groups
presence is so strong the state is not effective there. 1142 Difficult terrain and small rural roads
are often not accessible to large armoured SUVs. 1143
Although the state may be more present in urban areas, their response does not necessarily
indicate that the complaints or concerns in urban areas will be dealt with in sufficient time topreserve the person’s safety and integrity. The source was aware of individuals who have avery high security risk and live in urban areas where the state has not responded to their caseto provide sufficient protection. 1144
The majority of social leaders assassinated since 2016 had no protection measures. 1145 There
have been cases of HRDs and social leaders who have been placed under UNP protection
measures and still been subjected to assassination attempts or attacks while underprotection,1146 have been killed despite being given protection measures, 1147 been killed while
waiting for protection measures to be initiated, or been killed after protection measures weredismantled.1148 The Victims Unit reported that from 2016 to the first quarter of 2022, there were
59 attacks against people under protection schemes (including social leaders, people
reintegrating into civilian life, ethnic minorities, human rights defenders and NGO
representatives). These attacks resulted in 31 fatalities and 17 injuries, despite having UNP
protection.1149 In 2021, the UN reported 6 cases of human rights defenders who were killed
and one disappeared while under UNP protection. 1150
In 2022, one journalist withdrew from her UNP protection measures over concerns that her
armoured car was being tracked by GPS without her consent and because she alleged thather data was accessible by at least one member of the former Security Administration
Department (Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad, DAS). DAS was eliminated in 2011 fortargeting journalists and replaced with the UNP. 1151 Another journalist under UNP protection in
2022 also made allegations in 2022 of UNP connections to DAS, and involvement in alleged

1141

Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021,
url,p.328
1142
FIP, 3 November 2022, Interview with EUAA
1143
Dejusticia, 2 September 2022, Correspondence with EUAA
1144
Dejusticia, 2 September 2022, Correspondence with EUAA
1145
HRW, Left Undefended, 10 February 2021, url, p. 73
1146
OMCT, Colombia: Over 2,000 days of criminalisation against human rights defender Milena Quiroz Jiménez, 28
July 2022, url; see also: CPJ, Armed men attack car, bodyguard of Colombian journalist Julian Martínez, 28
February 2022, url; Martínez, J./La Nueva Prensa, Mi carta desde el exilio a la UNP, 19 July 2022, url
1147
HRW, Left Undefended, 10 February 2021, url, p. 27; Political Analyst, 2 September 2022, Interview with EUAA;
FIP, 3 November 2022, Interview with EUAA
1148
FIP, 3 November 2022, Interview with EUAA
1149
Colombia, Comisión de Seguimiento y Monitoreo a la Implementación de la Ley 1448 de 2011, “Ley de Víctimasy Restitución de Tierras”, Noveno informe de seguimiento al Congreso de la República 2021 -2022, 22 August
2022, url, p. 99
1150
UN OHCHR, Situation of human rights in Colombia [Year 2021] (A/HRC/49/19), 17 May 2022, url, para. 47
1151
LatAm Journalism Review, ‘This is a forced resignation in the face of a very serious situation’: Colombianjournalist Claudia Duque after returning her protection scheme, 30 March 2022, url; FLIP, Alerta por recolección
masiva de datos de la periodista Claudia Duque, 27 October 2021, url

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crimes,1152 as well as spying on those they are assigned to protect. 1153 Information corroboratingthese allegations could not be found among the sources consulted.

8.4.

Police and Attorney-General’s Office (Fiscalía
General de la Nación, FGN)

According to the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index 2022, Colombia’s criminal justicesystem is ranked below the regional and global averages at 119 th out of 140 countries, scoring
below average on the criminal justice system's effectiveness in criminal investigations, timely
and effective adjudication, reduction of criminal behaviour, impartiality, freedom from
corruption, improper government influence, and due process. 1154 According to FIP, although
the Peace agreement strengthened protection, capacity, and provided training to the FGN,
this has not translated into better investigations and prosecutions of crimes committed byarmed groups.1155 The state and law-enforcement lacks a consistent presence in areas of thecountry affected by armed violence, particularly in rural areas where impunity especially fortargeted killings remains a problem1156 at nearly 90 % or more in Colombia.1157 Areas with highrates of current and historic violence coincide with areas that have low rates of democratic
governance and weak local institutions, few resources, and overburdened municipal
representatives who also face personal risk. 1158 In the regions most severely affected byconflict, the criminal justice system is described as ‘dysfunctional’ with a ‘precarious’ law
enforcement presence, with few and poorly equipped agents in areas controlled by armed
groups. As a result of the lack of resources and high security risks, police often fail to attend tocrime scenes or implement arrest warrants in cases of targeted killings by armed groups. 1159
The criminal justice system is described as having a ‘limited reach’ in its capacity to dismantle
organisations responsible for attacks against HRDs given the context of widespread poverty
and rights violations.1160 Impunity for human rights abuses and targeted killings is an ongoing
concern.1161 Local prosecutors frequently do not advance cases against armed groups, but
focus on crimes such as theft or family violence. 1162

1152

Martínez, J./La Nueva Prensa, Mi carta desde el exilio a la UNP, 19 July 2022, url
AP, High-risk Colombians say GPS devices only add to dangers, 1 August 2022, url
1154
WJP, Rule of Law Index 2022 – Colombia – Criminal Justice, 2022, url
1155
FIP, 3 November 2022, Interview with EUAA
1156
Al Jazeera, Colombians call for end to impunity as activist killings continue, 16 July 2022, url; GITOC, Organized
Crime Index – Colombia 2021, url, p. 5; Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State
Protection in Colombia, July 2021, url,p. 331; Dejusticia, 2 September 2022, Correspondence with EUAA
1157
Dejusticia, 2 September 2022, Correspondence with EUAA
1158
UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, paras. 83-84
1159
Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021,
url,p. 330
1160
Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021, url,
p. 3331161
Wesche, P., Post-war Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021, url,
p. 334; HRW, World Report 2022 – Colombia, 16 December 2021, url; International Crisis Group, Leaders Under
Fire, 6 October 2020, url, p. 13
1162
Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021,
url,p. 330
1153

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Colombia’s National Police also have an Elite Team specialised in the task of dealing withhomicides of social leaders; however, they lack personnel and budget. 1163 The FGN has taken
steps to increase the effectiveness of investigations of crimes against HRDs s uch as a new
system of investigations that prioritizes cases against armed and criminal groups and inlocating the principal perpetrators who ordered the crimes and focusing on command andcontrol of these groups, as well as patterns between cases. 1164 Within the FGN, there is a
specialised investigation unit for dismantling criminal groups responsible for attacking andkilling social leaders.1165 The Special Investigation Unit of the Attorney General’s Office has
captured a significant number of members of armed and criminal groups, for instance 570
members of the AGC; however, even with the capture of members and leadership cadres, thishas not prevented or reduced the violence and failed to stop the expansion of armed
groups.1166
Sources explained that one of the key problems with the criminal justice system is the lack ofeffective investigations of crimes.1167 The FGN is ‘weak in clarifying threats’ and in obtaining
sentences resulting from issuing threats; described as a ‘major gap in the Colombian
protection regime’.1168 IACHR indicated that there was a failure to investigate crimes against
targeted profiles in Colombia.1169 FIP stated that the FGN often cannot access crime scenes
because they are in areas where even the security forces cann ot enter, and it is thecommunities themselves that have to deal with collecting evidence and corpses. 1170
Figures of cases ‘clarified’ for investigation by the state and those tracked by civil society
differed. The Colombian government claims a solve-rate of 50 %, while civil society groups
state that only 8.5 % of cases they track resulted in convictions. 1171 Efforts to bring perpetrators
to justice in the cases of targeted killings of human rights defenders has been ‘moremeaningful’ and produced ‘significant progress’ compared to other periods of Colombian
history.1172 However, investigations and prosecutions have encountered significant challenges
including finding the ‘intellectual authors’ behind targeted killings, providing too few
prosecutors, judges, and investigators in regions most affected by killings, limited capacity ofthe special bodies created under the peace accord, such as the Special Investigation Unit andElite Police team, such as lack of staff and budget funding; limited and delayed attendance tocrime scenes by military and police.1173

1163

HRW, Left Undefended, 10 February 2021, url, p. 9
Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021, url,
p. 3331165
HRW, Left Undefended, 10 February 2021, url, p. 6; OAS, IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights
Defenders and Social Leaders in Colombia, 6 December 2019, url
1166
UN OHCHR, Violencia territorial: Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022, url, para. 79; FIP, 3
November 2022, Interview with EUAA
1167
FIP, 3 November 2022, Interview with EUAA; Dejusticia, 2 September 2022, Correspondence with EUAA
1168
Wesche, P. Post-war Violence Against Human Rights Defenders and State Protection in Colombia, July 2021, url,
p. 333
1169
OAS, IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders and Social Leaders in Colombia, 6 December
2019, url, p. 65 (Section F)
1170
FIP, 3 November 2022, Interview with EUAA
1171
OAS, IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders and Social Leaders in Colombia, 6 December
2019, url, p. 65; Dejusticia, 2 September 2022, Correspondence with EUAA
1172
HRW, Left Undefended, 10 February 2021, url, p. 6
1173
HRW, Left Undefended, 10 February 2021, url, p. 6
1164

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Annex 1: Bibliography
Oral sources, including anonymous sources
CODHES, 14 January 2022, Correspondence on file with EUAA. Consultoría para los derechos
humanos y el desplazamiento (CODHES) was created in 1992 to carry out research andadvocacy contributing to the promotion and protection of human rights, in particular of theinternally displaced population in Colombia.
Conflict Analyst, 25 February 2022 and 4 November 2022, Correspondence with EUAA. The
Conflict Analyst is based in Colombia and monitors and reports on conflict and politicaldevelopments including the peace process, armed groups, security policy, and criminality.
CONPA, 17 January 2022, Correspondence on file with EUAA. CONPA, El Consejo Nacionalde Paz Afrocolombiano (The National Afro-Colombian Peace Council), is a council based on anagreement between organisations of the black, Afro-Colombian, Raizal and Palenquero
people, to advocate for the defense and promotion of rights for these groups.
Dejusticia, 2 September 2022, Correspondence with EUAA. Dejusticia is a Colombia-based
research and advocacy organisation dedicated to the strengthening of the rule of law,social/environmental justice and human rights.
FIP, 3 November 2022, Interview with EUAA. Fundación Ideas para la Paz ( FIP) is anindependent think tank based in Colombia created in 1999. It is one of the principle civilsociety organisations in Colombia working on issues of peace and security and is among themost influential think tanks in the region. EUAA interviewed a research analyst who studies
and monitors the dynamics of the conflict, armed groups and organised crime and humanrights issues.
Gil Ramírez, M.Y., 21 November 2022, Interview with EUAA. Dr. Max Yuri Gil Ramírez is a
professor at the Institute of Political Studies of the University of Antioquia, specializing incitizenship, immigration, human rights and armed conflict. He is a sociologist, with a master's
degree in political science and a doctorate in human and social sciences. He worked as an
official in the Permanent Human Rights Unit of the municipal Ombudsperson’s Office(Personería) of Medellín and was also the coordinator of the Antioquia Eje Cafetero region 1174
of the Truth Commission.
McDermott, J., 14 November 2022, Comments made during his expert review of this report.
Mr. McDermott is the co-director and co-founder of Insight Crime. Mr. McDermott has over two
decades of experience reporting from around Latin America. He is a retired military officer
who then became a war correspondent working in the Balkans, the Middle East, and thenColombia. Mr. McDermott has worked for the UK’s most prestigious media outlets including
the BBC, the Daily Telegragh, and The Economist. He specializes in drug trafficking, organised
crime and the Colombian civil conflict. His organisation, Insight Crime, is a think thank thatseeks to deepen and inform the debate about organised crime and citizen security in the1174

This territory covers municipalities in the departments of Antioquia, Caldas, Quindío, Risaralda and some in thesouth of Córdoba and in the north of Valle del Cauca. Colombia, CEV, En los territorios, n.d., url

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Americas through reporting, analysis, investigations, and policy suggestions on challenges in
the region.
Political Analyst, 2 September 2022, Interview with EUAA. The Political Analyst is based in
Colombia and monitors and publishes on issues of security, political, and economic
developments and risks in Colombia.
Somos Defensores, 12 January 2022, Correspondence on file with EUAA. Somos Defensores
is a non-governmental organisation involved in protection of human rights defenders throughdirect programs, training, advocacy, and human rights monitoring of attacks against humanrights defenders.

Public sources
All internet sources were accessed between 1 August 2022 and 21 November 2022.
AA (Anadolu Agency), Soldier killed, more than 20 wounded in attacks on Colombian militarybases, 27 January 2022, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/soldier-killed-more-than-20wounded-in-attacks-on-colombian-military-bases/2487450
ABColombia, COVID 19 pandemic exacerbates poverty and inequality in Colombia, 20
October 2021, https://www.abcolombia.org.uk/covid-19-pandemic-exacerbates-poverty-andinequality-in-colombia/
ABColombia, Truth Commission of Colombia: Executive Summary,https://www.abcolombia.org.uk/truth-commission-of-colombia-executive-summary/
ACAPS , Colombia Risk Report - Escalation in violence between non-state armed groups in
Putumayo significantly increases displacement, confinement, and protection needs, 31 March2022,
https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20220331_acaps_mire_risk_report_colombia_putumayo_0.pdf
ACAPS, Colombia – Antipersonnel mines and explosive remnants of war, 2 June 2022,
https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20220602_acaps_mire_thematic_report_colombia_antipersonnel_mines_1.pdf
ACAPS, Colombia – Impact of the armed conflict on children and youth, 31 March 2022,
https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20220331_acaps_mire_thematic_report_colombia_impact_on_children_and_youth.pdf
ACAPS, Colombia Confinements, 18 February 2022,
https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20220218_acaps_mire_thematic_report_colombia_confinements_0.pdf
ACAPS, Colombia Risk Update, 8 March 2022,
https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20220308_acaps_mire_colombia_them
atic_risk_report_update_0.pdf
141EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMACAPS, Humanitarian Access Overview, July 2022,
https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/acaps_humanitarian_access_overview_j
uly_2022_0.pdf
ACAPS, Violence in Arauca Department, 31 January 2022,
https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20220131_acaps_briefing_note_colomb
ia_arauca.pdf
ACLED (Armed Conflict Location and Event Data), Colombia: Legislative Elections, 25 March
2022, https://acleddata.com/2022/03/25/colombia-legislative-elections/
ACLED (Armed Conflict Location and Event Data), Regional Overview - South America (12-18
February 2022), 24 February 2022, https://reliefweb.int/report/brazil/acled-regional-overviewsouth-america-12-18-february-2022
ACLED (Armed Conflict Location and Event Data), Understanding the Killing of Social Leadersin Colombia During COVID-19, 5 October 2020,
https://acleddata.com/2020/10/05/understanding-the-killing-of-social-leaders-in-colombiaduring-covid-19/
AFP (Agence-France Press), Colombia’s top court orders government to protect ex-FARC
rebels, 28 January 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/28/colombia-top-courtorders-govt-to-protect-ex-farc-rebels
AI (Amnesty International), ¿Por qué nos quieren matar?, 8 October 2020,
https://www.es.amnesty.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Informe_defensores_Colombia.pdf
AI (Amnesty International), Colombia: The Victims and Land Restitution Law, April 2012,https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4f99029f2.pdf
Al Jazeera, ‘A massacre’: Deadly Colombia military operation sparks outrage, 7 April 2022,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/7/a-massacre-deadly-colombia-military-operationsparks-outrage
Al Jazeera, At least 23 dead in clashes between armed rebel groups,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/3/colombia-at-least-16-dead-in-clashes-betweenarmed-rebel-groups
Al Jazeera, Colombia and ELN rebels agree to restart peace talks, 4 October 2022,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/4/colombia-and-eln-rebels-agree-to-restart-peacetalks-next-month
Al Jazeera, Colombian environmental activists deluged by threats, 9 May 2022,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/9/colombian-environmental-activists-deluged-bythreats

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Al Jazeera, Colombians call for end to impunity as activist killings continue, 16 July 2022,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/7/16/colombians-call-for-end-to-impunity-as-activistkillings-continue
Al Jazeera, Indigenous activists’ deaths highlight surging Colombia conflict, 4 February 2022,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/4/colombia-indigenous-land-defender-killings-spurcalls-to-action
Al Jazeera, Killings of Colombia ex-FARC fighters persist amid peace process, 18 January
2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/18/killings-of-colombia-ex-farc-fighters-persistamid-peace-process
AP (Associated Press), Boom in Colombian extortion rings undermines security gains, 4February 2015, https://apnews.com/article/f4f5822a4ba24fb4892cd5dd8e1046ce
AP (Associated Press), Colombia struggles to keep social leaders safe, 13 January 2021,
https://apnews.com/article/bogota-colombia-7bf26433022d0376ed1e7728487c8794
AP (Associated Press), High-risk Colombians say GPS devices only add to dangers, 1 August
2022, https://apnews.com/article/technology-colombia-journalism-government-and-politics052267bdc0d65942344fa1cb8fa424f6
ASP (All Survivors Project) et al., Laying Down Arms Reclaiming Souls: Sexual violence against
men and boys in the armed conflict in Colombia, 19 June 2022,
https://allsurvivorsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Public-report-SV-men-boysarmed-conflict-Colombia-19-june-2022.pdf
Atalayar, Armed groups displace 3,700 farmers in Colombia, 29 July 2021, Armed groups
displace 3,700 farmers in Colombia | Atalayar - Las claves del mundo en tus manos
Axios, Colombia to restart peace talks with last remaining major rebel group, 11 October 2022,
https://www.axios.com/2022/10/11/colombia-rebels-farc-eln-petro
BBC Mundo, El suicidio por causa de un préstamo "gota a gota" que conmociona a Colombia,
7 February 2019, https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-47157801
BBC Mundo, Qué son los préstamos "gota a gota" que grupos criminales de Colombia
exportan al resto de América Latina, 21 October 2016, https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticiasamerica-latina-37708989
BBC News, Colombia profile – timeline, 8 August 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latinamerica-19390164
BBC News, Colombia’s most wanted drug lord Otoniel captured, 24 October 2021,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-59026214
BBC News, Country Profile – Colombia, 8 August 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latinamerica-19390026

143

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMBBC News, Profile: Alvaro Uribe Velez, 28 July 2010, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latinamerica-10788697
BBC News, Who are the Farc? 24 November 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latinamerica-36605769
Blattman, C. et. al, Gobierno criminal en Medellín: Panorama general del fenómeno yevidencia empírica sobre cómo enfrentarlo, October 2020,
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Juan-MesaMejia/publication/345699236_Gobierno_criminal_en_Medellin_panorama_general_del_feno
meno_y_evidencia_empirica_sobre_como_enfrentarlo/links/5fab135f299bf18c5b64b112/Gobi
erno-criminal-en-Medellin-panorama-general-del-fenomeno-y-evidencia-empirica-sobre-comoenfrentarlo.pdf
Blattman, C. et. al, Understanding criminal organisations: the Gangs of Medellin, Colombia,
May 2022, https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/Events/PDF/Slides/devconfmay2022santiago-tobon.pdf
Brookings Institute, The Foreign Policies of the Sinaloa Cartel and CJNG – Part I: In theAmericas, 22 July 2022, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-foreign-policies-of-thesinaloa-cartel-and-cjng-part-i-in-the-americas/
BTI, Colombia’s Partial Peace and Its Discontents, 14 December 2021, https://blog.btiproject.org/2021/12/14/colombias-partial-peace-and-its-discontents/
Cambio, “Esta es la puta guerra”: General reconoce alianza con narcotraficantes para
enfrentar disidencias de las Farc, 11 February 2022,
https://cambiocolombia.com/articulo/conflicto/esta-es-la-puta-guerra-general-reconocealianza-con-narcotraficantes-para
Canada, IRB (Immigration and Refugee Board), Colombia: Pamphlets produced by criminalgroups declaring a person to be a “military target” (COL200906.E), 9 February 2022,
https://irb.gc.ca/en/country-information/rir/Pages/index.aspx?doc=458533&pls=1
Canada, IRB (Immigration and Refugee Board), Colombia: State protection programs forvictims and witnesses of crimes; duration and effectiveness of these programs (2012-March
2016) (COL105470.E), https://www.refworld.org/docid/5729a24a4.html
Canada, IRB (Immigration and Refugee Board), Colombia: Targets of criminal groups, 13
August 2021, https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/countryinformation/rir/Pages/index.aspx?doc=458405&pls=1
Canada, IRB (Immigration and Refugee Board), Colombia: Targets of criminal groups (2019June 2021) [COL200703.E], 13 August 2021, https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/countryinformation/rir/Pages/index.aspx?doc=458405&pls=1
Canada, IRB (Immigration and Refugee Board), Colombia: The Black Eagles (COL201106.E), 13
July 2022, https://irb.gc.ca/en/country-information/rir/Pages/index.aspx?doc=458665&pls=1

144

EUAA COI REPORT - COLOMBIA: COUNTRY FOCUS

Canada, IRB (Immigration and Refugee Board), Situation of Afro-Colombians (2017- May 2020)(COL200219.E), 6 May 2020, https://irb.gc.ca/en/countryinformation/rir/Pages/index.aspx?doc=458098&pls=1
Canada, IRB (Immigration and Refugee Board), Whether armed groups such as the National
Liberation Army (Ejército de liberación nacional, ELN) or the Gulf Clan (Clan del Golfo) [alsoknown as the Gaitanista Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas deColombia, AGC), Los Urabeños and Clan Úsuga] use non-members to carry out bombings or
recruit minors on their behalf (2018–May 2022) (COL201062.E), 16 June 2022,
https://irb.gc.ca/en/country-information/rir/Pages/index.aspx?doc=458661&pls=1
Caracol Radio, Cada dos días hay una víctima de violencia electoral en Colombia: Pares, 13
March 2022, https://caracol.com.co/2022/10/21/gobernacion-tiene-maquinaria-botada-en-viasy-el-jardin-botanico-alcalde-socota/
Caracol, El infierno de la extorsión en Colombia, 7 February 2022,
https://noticias.caracoltv.com/colombia/el-infierno-de-la-extorsion-en-colombia-incluso-cobranvacuna-a-quien-tenga-arena-para-construir
CBS News, “Packaged” corpses sow terror in Colombian capital, 17 September 2022,
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/packaged-corpses-sow-terror-in-bogota-colombia/
CCEEU (Coordinación Colombia Europa Estados Unidos) et al, Independencia judicial en
Colombia: En riesgo por un régimen autoritario, June 2021, https://coeuropa.org.co/laindependencia-judicial-en-colombia-en-riesgo-por-un-regimen-autoritario/
CCEEU (Coordinación Colombia Europa Estados Unidos) et al., Por la defensa de la
independencia de la justicia en Colombia, June 2021,
https://www.colectivodeabogados.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Executive-Summary.pdf
CERAC (Centro de Recursos para la Análisis de Conflictos), Acciones ofensivas atribuidas al
ELN y combates con participación de esa guerrilla 2021-2022 (mensual) [Graph], 30
September 2022, https://www.blog.cerac.org.co/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/AO-y-CL-delELN-2018-2022-mensual-041022-p%C3%BAblico.png
CERAC (Centro de Recursos para la Análisis de Conflictos), Monitor del cese el fuego degrupos armados (Reporte semanal número 1 – período de monitoreo: del 21 al 30 septiembre),
30 September 2022, https://www.blog.cerac.org.co/monitor-del-cese-el-fuego-de-gruposarmados
CERAC (Centro de Recursos para la Análisis de Conflictos), Reporte del conflicto con El ELN, 4
October 2022, https://www.blog.cerac.org.co/wp-content/plugins/downloadattachments/includes/download.php?id=8548
City Paper (The), Colombia’s National Police face killing spree by Gulf Clan, 28 July 2022,
https://thecitypaperbogota.com/news/colombias-national-police-face-killing-spree-by-gulfclan/

145

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

CNTI (Comisión Nacional de Territorios Indígenas), Balance de la implementación – Decreto
Ley 4633 – durante el 2021, July 2022,
https://cntindigena.org/documents/Informes/Informe_Decreto_4633_2011_2022_julio.pdf
CNTI (Comisión Nacional de Territorios Indígenas), El eterno retorno de la violencia política
contra los pueblos indígenas en Colombia: Un balance del año 2021, October 2022,
https://cntindigena.org/documents/Informes/ODTPI_informe_violenciapol%C3%ADtica_2021.p
df
CODHES (Consultoria para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento), 2021, el año con
mayor número de víctimas de desplazamiento en 5 años, 22 December 2021,
https://codhes.wordpress.com/2021/12/22/2021-el-ano-con-mayor-numero-de-victimas-dedesplazamiento-en-5-anos/
CODHES (Consultoria para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento), Manual de
Autoprotección para personas defensoras de derechos humanos, líderes y lideresas sociales
y sus colectivos, March 2021, https://codhes.files.wordpress.com/2021/07/manual-deautoproteccion.pdf
Colombia Diversa, Who is Going to Tell Us? Report for the Truth Commission on theExperiences of Gay, Bisexual, and Trans People in the Colombian Armed Conflict, September
2020, https://colombiadiversa.org/c-diversa/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Who-is-going-totell-us.pdf
Colombia Reports, AGC kill 26 during 4-day terror campaign in northern Colombia, 9 May
2022, https://colombiareports.com/agc-kill-26-during-4-day-terror-campaign-in-northerncolombia/
Colombia Reports, Armed conflict resurged throughout Colombia: war crimes tribunal, 19
February 2022, https://colombiareports.com/armed-conflict-resurged-throughout-colombiawar-crimes-tribunal/
Colombia Reports, Assassinations driving increase in Colombia’s homicides: report, 29 August
2022, Assassinations driving increase in Colombia's homicides: report (colombiareports.com)
Colombia Reports, Catatumbo, 20 July 2019, https://colombiareports.com/catatumbo/
Colombia Reports, Colombia accuses former army captain of drug trafficking, 19 October
2022, https://colombiareports.com/colombia-accuses-former-army-captain-of-drug-trafficking/Colombia Reports, Colombia needs $68B before 2031 for war victims to rebuild lives, 23
August 2022, https://colombiareports.com/colombias-needs-68b-before-2031-to-help-warvictims-rebuild-lives/
Colombia Reports, Colombia’s congress gives green light to Petro’s “Total Peace” policy, 27
October 2022, https://colombiareports.com/colombias-congress-gives-green-light-to-petrostotal-peace-policy/

146

EUAA COI REPORT - COLOMBIA: COUNTRY FOCUS

Colombia Reports, Colombia’s paramilitaries put target on police, 36 killed so far this year, 28
July 2022, https://colombiareports.com/colombias-paramilitaries-put-target-on-police-36killed-so-far-this-year/
Colombia Reports, Colombia’s poverty rate down to 39.3% as economy recovers frompandemic, 27 April 2022, https://colombiareports.com/colombias-poverty-rate-down-to-39-3as-economy-recovers-from-pandemic/
Colombia Reports, Colombia’s war crimes tribunal orders government to implement peace
policies, 2 March 2022, https://colombiareports.com/colombias-war-crimes-tribunal-ordersgovernment-to-implement-peace-policies/
Colombia Reports, Crime and security in Medellín, 9 August 2022,
https://colombiareports.com/medellin-crime-security-statistics/
Colombia Reports, Duque obstructed peace in Colombia ‘deliberately’, 16 June 2022,
https://colombiareports.com/duque-obstructed-peace-in-colombia-deliberately/
Colombia Reports, FARC reintegration chief assassinated in south Colombia, 5 July 2022,
https://colombiareports.com/farc-reintegration-chief-assassinated-in-south-colombia/
Colombia Reports, Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AGC) / Gulf Clan, 25 October,
2021, https://colombiareports.com/agc-gulf-clan/
Colombia Reports, Government systematically ignoring alert system put in place to prevent
killing of social leaders, 6 May 2019, https://colombiareports.com/government-systematicallyignoring-alert-system-put-in-place-to-prevent-killing-of-social-leaders/
Colombia Reports, Kidnapping and extortion, 8 June 2022,
https://colombiareports.com/colombia-kidnapping-and-extortion-statistics/
Colombia Reports, Medellín gangs gave as many members as the ELN in all Colombia, 6 July
2021, https://colombiareports.com/medellin-gangs-have-more-members-than-eln-in-allcolombia/
Colombia Reports, Medellín landlords and gangs skyrocket displacement, 15 April 2021,
https://colombiareports.com/medellin-landlords-and-gangs-skyrocket-forced-displacement/
Colombia Reports, Medellín sees murders rise after years of declining violence, 4 February
2019, https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/organized-crime-medellin-murders/
Colombia Reports, Medellín’s violent crime statistics drop significantly, 17 August 2022,
https://colombiareports.com/medellin-violent-crime-rates-drop-significantly/
Colombia Reports, Peace talks with Colombia’s ELN guerrillas ‘about to be resumed’: Petro, 8
August 2022, https://colombiareports.com/peace-talks-with-colombias-eln-guerrillas-about-tobe-resumed-petro/amp/

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Colombia Reports, Petro proposes multilateral ceasefire with Colombia’s illegal armed groups,
28 August 2022, https://colombiareports.com/petro-proposes-bilateral-ceasefire-withcolombias-illegal-armed-groups/
Colombia, Alertas Tempranas [interactive map], n.d.,
https://alertastempranas.defensoria.gov.co/Content/Mapa.html
Colombia, Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, Bases de datos, n.d.
https://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/micrositios/informeGeneral/basesDatos.html
Colombia, CERD – Informes periódicos 20° y 21° combinados que la Colombia debía presentar
en 2022 en virtud del artículo 9 de la Convención (CERD/C/COL/20-21), 6 October 2022,
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%
2fC%2fCOL%2f20-21&Lang=en
Colombia, CEV (Comisión de la Verdad), Hallazgos y recomendaciones para la no repetición,
August 2022, https://www.comisiondelaverdad.co/sites/default/files/descargables/202208/FINAL%20CEV_HALLAZGOS_DIGITAL_2022.pdf
Colombia, CEV (Comisión de la Verdad), Hasta la guerra tiene límites, August 2022,
https://www.comisiondelaverdad.co/hasta-la-guerra-tiene-limites9
Colombia, CEV (Comisión de la Verdad), Hay futuro si hay verdad, August 2022,
https://www.comisiondelaverdad.co/sites/default/files/descargables/202208/FINAL%20CEV_HALLAZGOS_DIGITAL_2022.pdf
Colombia, CEV (Comisión de la Verdad), Truth Commission of Colombia – Executive Summary,July 2022, https://www.abcolombia.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/ENV1.pdf
Colombia, CNMH (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica), Un 30% de las víctimas de violencia
sexual en el conflicto armado son niñas o adolescentes, 19 June 2021,
https://centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/un-30-de-las-victimas-de-violencia-sexual-en-elconflicto-armado-son-ninas-o-adolescentes/ :~:text=Los%20datos%20del%20OMC%20muestran,%2C6%20%25%20del%20total
Colombia, Comisión de Seguimiento y Monitoreo a la Implementación de la Ley 1448 de 2011,“Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de Tierras”, Noveno informe de seguimiento al Congreso de la
República 2021-2022, 22 August 2022, https://www.camara.gov.co/sites/default/files/202208/Informe%20-%20Victimas.pdf
Colombia, Consejería Presidencial para la Equidad de la Mujer, Observatorio Colombiano dela Mujeres: Violencia, 2019, https://observatoriomujeres.gov.co/es/Violence
Colombia, Corte Constitucional, Sentencia T-268/03, 2003,
https://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2003/t-268-03.htm

148

EUAA COI REPORT - COLOMBIA: COUNTRY FOCUS

Colombia, DANE, Departamentos y municipios de Colombia, 15 July 2022,
https://www.datos.gov.co/Mapas-Nacionales/Departamentos-y-municipios-de-Colombia/xdk5pm3f
Colombia, Decreto 2252 de 2017,https://www.funcionpublica.gov.co/eva/gestornormativo/norma_pdf.php?i=85059
Colombia, Decreto Ley 4633 de 2011, 9 December 2011,https://funcionpublica.gov.co/eva/gestornormativo/norma_pdf.php?i=44966
Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Entre enero y julio de este año han sido asesinados 122
líderes sociales y personas defensoras de DD. HH., 19 August 2022,
https://www.defensoria.gov.co/web/guest/-/entre-enero-y-julio-de-este-a%C3%B1o-han-sidoasesinados-122-l%C3%ADderes-sociales-y-personas-defensoras-de-dd.hh.?redirect=/web/guest/inicio
Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Reporte de homicidios y conductas vulneratorias a líderes
sociales y defensores de derechos humanos: 1 de enero a 30 de noviembre, 9 December
2021, https://www.defensoria.gov.co/es/nube/comunicados/10607/En-lo-corrido-de-2021fueron-asesinados-130-l%C3%ADderes-sociales-y-defensores-de-derechos-humanosl%C3%ADderes-sociales-asesinatos-balance-Defensor%C3%ADa.htm
Colombia, Estadísticas de asistencia integral a las víctimas de MAP y MUSE, 30 September
2022, http://www.accioncontraminas.gov.co/Estadisticas/estadisticas-de-victimas
Colombia, Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace,
24 November 2016, https://unmc.unmissions.org/en/file/2961/download?token=0BXJsEJJ
Colombia, IFNLCF (Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses), Forensis: Datos
Para La Vida 2020, April 2022,
https://www.medicinalegal.gov.co/documents/20143/787115/Forensis_2020.pdf
Colombia, JEP (Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz), JEP imparte nuevas órdenes a la Conseríapara la Estabilización y a la UNP para la protección de firmantes de paz, 19 November 2021,
https://www.jep.gov.co/Sala-de-Prensa/Paginas/JEP-imparte-nuevas-%C3%B3rdenes-a-laConsejer%C3%ADa-para-la-Estabilizaci%C3%B3n-y-a-la-UNP-para-la-protecci%C3%B3n-defirmantes-de-Paz.aspx
Colombia, JEP (Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz), JEP ordena al gobierno medidas deprotección para excombatientes y sus familias, 18 November 2021,
https://www.jep.gov.co/Sala-de-Prensa/Paginas/JEP-ordena-nuevas-medidas-para-proteger-alos-firmantes-del-Acuerdo-de-Paz-y-sus-familias.aspx
Colombia, JEP (Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz), Los grandes casos, n.d.,
https://www.jep.gov.co/especiales1/macrocasos/01.html
Colombia, La Unidad reafirma su compromiso con las víctimas del conflicto armado con
orientaciones sexuales e identidades de género diversas, 16 May 2020,149EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

https://www.unidadvictimas.gov.co/es/enfoques-diferenciales/la-unidad-reafirma-sucompromiso-con-las-victimas-del-conflicto-armadocon#:~:text=La%20Unidad%20ha%20venido%20trabajando,con%20ocasi%C3%B3n%20del%2
0conflicto%20colombiano
Colombia, Las cifras que presenta el Informe Global sobre Desplazamiento 2022, 19 May
2022, https://www.unidadvictimas.gov.co/es/registro-y-gestion-de-informacion/las-cifras-quepresenta-el-informe-global-sobre-desplazamiento
Colombia, Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Logros de la política de defensa y seguridad, [Lastupdated October 2022 – NB, link is replaced monthly with updated figures],https://www.mindefensa.gov.co/irj/go/km/docs/Mindefensa/Documentos/descargas/estudios_
sectoriales/info_estadistica/Logros_Sector_Defensa.pdf
Colombia, Plan de Acción Oportuna de prevención y protección para los defensores dederechos humanos, líderes sociales, comunales y periodistas (PAO), 19 November 2018,https://pruebaw.mininterior.gov.co/sites/default/files/noticias/19.11.2018_pao_final.pdf
Colombia, Resolución 00171 del 24 de febrero de 2016, 24 February 2016,
https://www.unidadvictimas.gov.co/sites/default/files/documentosbiblioteca/resolucion00171de
24febrero2016.pdf
Colombia, RUV (Registro Único de Víctimas), RUV, https://cifras.unidadvictimas.gov.co/Cifras/ !/infografia
Colombia, SIVJRNR (Sistema Integral de Verdad, Justicia, Reparación y garantías de No
Repetición), 2019, https://www.jep.gov.co/SiteAssets/Paginas/JEP/Sistema-Integral-de-VerdadJusticia-Reparacion-y-NoRepeticion/SIVJRNR_EN%20.pdf
Colombia, Unidad para las Víctimas (Unidad Nacional de Protección), n.d.,
https://www.unidadvictimas.gov.co/es/registro-unico-de-victimas-ruv/37394
Colombia, UNP (Unidad Nacional de Protección), ABC para acceder a las rutas de protección
individual y colectiva, May 2020,
Colombia, UNP (Unidad Nacional de Protección), Informe de rendición de cuentas:
Construcción de paz (enero – diciembre de 2021), 2021, https://www.unp.gov.co/wpcontent/uploads/2022/03/informe-rendicion-de-cuentas-para-la-paz-2021.pdf
Colombia, UNP (Unidad Nacional de Protección), Informe evaluación rendición de cuentas
2021, 25 August 2022, https://www.unp.gov.co/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/EVALUACIONAUDIENCIA-RENDICION-CUENTAS-2021-OK.pdf
Colombia, UNP (Unidad Nacional de Protección), Resolución 0003, 3 January 2022,
https://www.unp.gov.co/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/res-0003-desagregacion-presupuestalunp-2022.pdf

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Colombia.com, Las Águilas Negras: ¿Qué se sabe de este temido grupo criminal?, 27 January2022, https://www.colombia.com/actualidad/nacionales/que-se-sabe-de-las-aguilas-negrasen-colombia-335803
Compromiso, Amenazas e incidentes de seguridad y violencia basada en género que se han
presentado en el departamento de Santander (enero a marzo 2022), March 2022,
https://corporacioncompromiso.org/apc-aafiles/6a67676b753637373837753635793679/boletin-de-derechos-humanos-enero-marzo2022.pdf3
Connectas, La expansión del ‘gota a gota’ - Colombia: Un problema de salud pública, n.d.,
https://www.connectas.org/especiales/gota-gota-america-latina/index.html@p=2804.html
CPJ (Committee to Protect Journalists), Armed men attack car, bodyguard of Colombianjournalist Julian Martínez, 28 February 2022, https://cpj.org/2022/02/armed-men-attack-carbodyguard-of-colombian-journalist-julian-martinez/
CPJ (Committee to Protect Journalists), Colombian magazine Semana alleges military spied onjournalists, 13 January 2020, https://cpj.org/2020/01/colombian-magazine-semana-allegesmilitary-spied-o/
CPJ (Committee to Protect Journalists), Inter-American Commission on Human Rights orders
Colombia to protect journalist Ricardo Calderon, 20 January 2021,
https://cpj.org/2021/01/inter-american-commission-on-human-rights-orders-colombia-toprotect-journalist-ricardo-calderon/
Cundinamarca, Informe especial: Prestamos Gota a Gota, n.d., https://5622af83-8af5-4b269f44-08b0b4991842.filesusr.com/ugd/9dfd70_d9944cd3070345f8934b0c292c5617b5.pdf
Doyle, C., Perceptions and Realities of Violence in Medellín, Colombia, June 2019, View ofPerceptions and Realities of Violence in Medellín, Colombia (crimejusticejournal.com)
DRC (Danish Refugee Council), Colombia: Quarterly Report-Protection Monitoring (OctoberDecember 2020), December 2020,
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Protection Monitoring Report Oct - Dec
2020 DRC Colombia.pdf
DRC (Danish Refugee Council), Factsheet – DRC Colombia, 2022,
https://drc.ngo/media/qfzht3jq/factsheet-col-2022.pdf
e7c20b_476fc49ae03d4dbdbf5e6698ad7e9b98.pdf (usrfiles.com)
El Colombiano, Así se juega el ajedrez del crimen organizado en el Valle de Aburrá, 1
November 2021, https://www.elcolombiano.com/antioquia/el-ajedrez-del-crimen-organizadoen-el-aburra-HL15966076

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMEl Colombiano, Así se juega el ajedrez del crimen organizado en el Valle de Aburrá, 1
November 2021, https://www.elcolombiano.com/antioquia/el-ajedrez-del-crimen-organizadoen-el-aburra-HL15966076
El Colombiano, El dosier de armas y comandos de la “Segunda Marquetalia” de Márquez, 18
July 2022, https://www.elcolombiano.com/colombia/ivan-marquez-armas-y-hombres-de-lasegunda-marquetalia-que-se-esconde-en-venezuela-EB18084189
El Colombiano, Los gota a gota ahora ‘secuestran’ su tarjeta débito, 19 September 2022,
https://www.elcolombiano.com/antioquia/los-pagadiarios-tienen-azotados-a-las-comunas-demedellin-OK18653951
El Colombiano, Otro golpe al Tren de Aragua: 19 integrantes fueron capturados, 14 October
2022, https://www.elcolombiano.com/colombia/la-fiscalia-y-la-policia-logro-la-captura-de-19integrantes-del-tren-de-aragua-AH18861643
El Espectador, “Gobierno actuó para hacer trizas la paz”: El balance de organizaciones
sociales, 14 July 2022, https://www.elespectador.com/colombia-20/conflicto/gobierno-duquey-el-acuerdo-de-paz-el-balance-de-las-organizaciones-sociales/
El Espectador, Entre el hambre y la coca: el fracaso del plan de substitución en el Guaviare, 1
August 2022, https://www.elespectador.com/colombia-20/conflicto/campesinos-quesustituyeron-coca-en-guaviare-pasan-hambre-por-fallas-en-el-plan-de-sustitucion/
El Espectador, Excomandante de las Fuerzas Militares sería parte de tentáculo del Clan delgolfo, 15 February 2022, https://www.elespectador.com/judicial/excomandante-de-las-fuerzasmilitares-seria-parte-de-tentaculo-del-clan-del-golfo/
El Espectador, Las pruebas que salpican a cinco oficiales del Ejército en escándalo decorrupción en la Cuarta Brigada, 9 January 2022, https://www.elespectador.com/judicial/laspruebas-que-salpican-a-cinco-oficiales-del-ejercito-en-escandalo-de-corrupcion-en-la-cuartabrigada/
El Espectador, Las sombras de la mafia que persiguen al general (r) Barrero Gordillo, 20
February 2022, https://www.elespectador.com/judicial/las-sombras-que-persiguen-al-generalr-barrero-gordillo-y-sus-nexos-con-la-mafia/
El Espectador, Presuntos cabecillas del Tren de Aragua en Bogotá, a esperar el juicio en
prisión, 20 October 2022, https://www.elespectador.com/bogota/presuntos-cabecillas-deltren-de-aragua-en-bogota-a-esperar-el-juicio-en-prision/
El Espectador, Sustitución de coca: las propuestas a Gobierno Petro para reformular el PNIS,
10 August 2022, https://www.elespectador.com/colombia-20/paz-y-memoria/gobierno-petrocultivos-de-coca-las-propuestas-para-avanzar-en-el-programa-de-sustitucion-pnis/
El Nacional, Más de 1.600 integrantes de las disidencias y el ELN están en Venezuela, 14
February 2022, https://www.elnacional.com/venezuela/mas-de-1-600-integrantes-de-lasdisidencias-y-del-eln-estan-en-venezuela/

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El País, ‘Ricardo Calderón: el reportero invisible’, 26 April 2022,
https://elpais.com/internacional/2022-04-27/ricardo-calderon-el-reportero-invisible.html
El País, Las cinco claves de la ley de la paz total de Gustavo Petro, https://elpais.com/americacolombia/2022-10-26/las-claves-de-la-ley-de-la-paz-total.html
El Quindiano, Préstamos “gota a gota” y “cadenas de ahorro”, modalidades de alto riesgo
para la comunidad, 15 September 2020,
https://www.elquindiano.com/noticia/21299/prestamos-gota-a-gota-y-cadenas-de-ahorromodalidades-de-alto-riesgo-para-lacomunidad#:~:text=El%20pr%C3%A9stamo%20de%20usura%2C%20conocido%20como%20%E2%80%9Cgota%20a,social%20de%20los%20territorios%20importantes%20para%20su%2
0accionar
El Tiempo, En el Área Metropolitana de Barranquilla siguen desbordadas las denuncias deextorsiones, 2 September 2022, https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/barranquilla/extorsionesen-el-area-metropolitana-de-barranquilla-699318
El Tiempo, Más de 600 familias desplazadas dejan comates entre ilegales en sur de Bolívar,10 August 2022, https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/familias-desplazadasdejan-combates-entre-ilegales-en-sur-de-bolivar-693801
EU (European Union), Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/138, 5 February 2021,
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L:2021:043:FULL&from=en
EU (European Union), EPRS (European Parliamentary Research Service), 2018 elections in
Colombia: A test for peace?, May 2018,https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/621899/EPRS_BRI(2018)621899_
EN.pdf
EU (European Union), EPRS (European Parliamentary Research Service), Peace and Security in2019 – Evaluating the EU’s efforts to support peace in Colombia, May 2019,https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333657855_Peace_and_Security_in_2019_Evaluati
ng_EU_efforts_to_support_peace_in_Colombia/download
EU (European Union), EU Election Observation Mission, Colombia 2022 – Final Report,
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2079269/Final+Report+EU+EOM+Colombia+2022.pdf9
FIP (Fundación Ideas para la Paz), Ni paz ni guerra Escenarios híbridos de inseguridad y
violencia en el gobierno de Iván Duque, May 2022,
https://storage.ideaspaz.org/documents/FIP_Infome_NiPazNiGuerra.pdf
FIU (Florida International University), Colombia, n.d., https://caj.fiu.edu/national-cjsystems/south-america/colombia/
FLIP (Fundación para la Libertad de Prensa), Alerta por recolección masiva de datos de laperiodista Claudia Duque, 27 October 2021,

153

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMFLIP (Fundación para la Libertad de Prensa), Mapa de violaciones a la libertad de prensa [28September 2022], n.d., https://www.flip.org.co/index.php/es/atencion-a-periodistas/mapa-deagresiones
FLIP (Fundación para la Libertad de Prensa), Preserving Democracy Begins with Protecting
Journalists, 8 March 2022, https://flip.org.co/index.php/en/public-statements
Forbes, El drama del ‘gota a gota’: un arma de doble filo, 9 June 2022,
https://forbes.co/2022/06/09/editors-picks/el-drama-del-gota-a-gota-un-arma-de-doble-filo
Forbes, Microcrédito para todos: ¿El fin del ‘gota a gota’?, 7 July 2022,
https://forbes.co/2022/07/07/editors-picks/microcredito-para-todos-el-fin-del-gota-a-gota/
Foundation Hirondelle, First rift between Colombia’s peace tribunal and the victims, 14 March
2022, https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/88737-first-rift-between-colombia-peace-tribunalvictims.html
FP (Foreign Policy), Can Colombia’s President Achieve “Total Peace?,”https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/08/colombia-total-peace-gustavo-petro-eln-farc-guerrillasconflict/
France 24, “Un total incumplimiento”: La desesperanza de los campesinos excocaleroscolombianos, 21 November 2022, https://www.france24.com/es/am%C3%A9ricalatina/20211121-colombia-conflicto-plantaciones-coca-paz
France24, Colombia: Violence continues even after cartel’s ‘armed strike’ ends, 20 May 2022,
https://observers.france24.com/en/americas/20220520-colombia-spike-in-violence-continueseven-after-cartel-s-armed-strike-ends
Freedom House, Colombia – 2022, February 2022,
https://freedomhouse.org/country/colombia/freedom-world/2022
Freedom House, Colombia 2021, February 2021,
https://freedomhouse.org/country/colombia/freedom-world/2021
Front Line Defenders, Global Analysis 2021, 23 February 2022,
https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/sites/default/files/2021_global_analysis_-_final.pdf
Futuros Urbanos, Comportamiento Del Delito Extorsivo En Las 10 Principales Ciudades Del
Pais, October 2022, https://futurosurbanos.com/wpcontent/uploads/2022/10/informe_comportamiento1.pdf
Futuros Urbanos, Panorama Del Sicariato En Las Principales Ciudades Del País, August 2022,
https://futurosurbanos.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/4.-Informe-Sicariato.pdf
GITOC (Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime), Colombia’s National Strike,
July 2021, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/GITOC-Colombia-NationalStrike-When-Social-Demonstrations-Fuels-Criminal-Interest.pdf

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GITOC (Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime), Organized Crime Index –Colombia 2021, https://ocindex.net/assets/downloads/english/ocindex_profile_colombia.pdf
GIWPS (Georgetown Institute of Women Peace and Security), Violence Targeting Women in
Politics: 10 Countries to Watch in 2022, 28 January 2022,
https://giwps.georgetown.edu/violence-targeting-women-in-politics-10-countries-to-watch-in2022/
Globalex, Introduction to Colombian Governmental Institutions and Primary Legal Sources,
May 2007, https://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Colombia.html
Guardian (The), Armed groups target Colombia's children as reform process slows, 9November 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/nov/09/armedgroups-target-colombias-children-as-reform-process-slows
Guardian (The), Colombia says 10 armed groups including FARC dissidents agree to ceasefire,
28 September 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/28/colombia-governmentfarc-rebels-armed-groups-ceasefire
Guardian (The), Colombia’s ‘capital of horror’ despairs amid new wave of gang violence, 23
February 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/feb/23/colombiascapital-of-horror-despairs-amid-renewed-gang-violence-buenaventura
Harvard Law School Library, Colombian Legal Research, 12 October 2022,
https://guides.library.harvard.edu/colombia
Harvard Law School Library, Rama Judicial del Poder Público, 12 October 2022,
https://guides.library.harvard.edu/ld.php?content_id=68877593
HRW (Human Rights Watch), “The Guerrillas Are the Police,” 22 January 2020,
https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/01/22/guerrillas-are-police/social-control-and-abuses-armedgroups-colombias-arauca
HRW (Human Rights Watch), Colombia/Venezuela: Border Area Abuses by Armed Groups, 28
March 2022, https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/28/colombia/venezuela-border-area-abusesarmed-groups
HRW (Human Rights Watch), Colombia: Egregious Police Abuses Against Protesters, 9 June
2021, https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/06/09/colombia-egregious-police-abuses-againstprotesters
HRW (Human Rights Watch), Left Undefended: Killings of Rights Defenders in Colombia’s
Remote Communities, 10 February 2021, https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/02/10/leftundefended/killings-rights-defenders-colombias-remote-communities
HRW (Human Rights Watch), The War in Catatumbo, 8 August 2019,https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/08/08/war-catatumbo/abuses-armed-groups-againstcivilians-including-venezuelan-exiles

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HRW (Human Rights Watch), Venezuela: Security Force Abuses at Colombia Border, 26 April
2021, https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/04/26/venezuela-security-force-abuses-colombiaborder
HRW (Human Rights Watch), World Report 2022 – Colombia, 13 January 2022,
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/colombia
HRW (Human Rights Watch), World Report 2022 – Colombia, 16 December 2021,
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/colombia
ICBL-CMC (International Campaign to Ban Landmines), Land Mine Monitor 2021, 10 November
2021, http://www.the-monitor.org/media/3318354/Landmine-Monitor-2021-Web.pdf
ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross), Colombia: Health care in danger, 23 March
2022, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/colombia-health-care-danger
ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross), Colombia: Retos humanitarios 2022, 28
March 2022,
https://www.icrc.org/es/download/file/239431/retos_humanitarios_cicr_colombia_2022.pdf
ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross), Health care under threat in Colombia 2020,
3 March 2020, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/health-care-under-threat-colombia
IDMC (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre), Addressing Urban Displacement in
Colombia’s Informal Settlements, 2020, https://www.internaldisplacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/Urban%20displacement%20colu
mbia_EN_26-11.pdf
IDMC (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre), Country Profile – Colombia, 19 May 2022,
https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/colombia
IDMC (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre), Global Report on Internal Displacement
2022, April 2022, https://www.internaldisplacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/IDMC_GRID_2022_LR.pdf page=41
IIS (International Institute for Strategic Studies), Peace and Security in Bogotá: Transformations
and Perspectives After the Armed Conflict, 2018, https://www.iiss.org//media/images/comment/analysis/2018/july/documents/peace-and-security-inbogota.pdf?la=en&hash=BF07FE2A173029535D31449EB01CD857A4BB8108
Indepaz, Acciones de ELN durante el paro armado febrero 2022,
https://indepaz.org.co/acciones-del-eln-durante-el-paro-armado-febrero-2022/
Indepaz, Balance sobre las dinámicas del Ejército de Liberación Nacional -ELN- en Colombia
2018-2020, January 2021, https://www.indepaz.org.co/wpcontent/uploads/2021/02/INFORME-ELN-2020-corregido-L-cgp.pdf

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Indepaz, Cifras de la violencia en las regiones 2021, 2022, https://indepaz.org.co/cifras-de-laviolencia-en-las-regiones-2021/
Indepaz, Desafío a la paz total. Lo que recibió el gobierno de Gustavo Petro. Informe sobre
presencia de grupos armados en Colombia 2021 – 2022, 28 November 2022,
https://indepaz.org.co/informe-sobre-presencia-de-grupos-armados-en-colombia-2021-20221/,
Indepaz, Líderes sociales, defensores de DD. HH y firmantes de acuerdo asesinados en 2022,[Last updated 11 November 2022], https://indepaz.org.co/lideres-sociales-defensores-de-ddhh-y-firmantes-de-acuerdo-asesinados-en-2022/
Indepaz, Los focos del conflicto en Colombia, September 2021, http://www.indepaz.org.co/wpcontent/uploads/2021/10/INFORME-DE-GRUPOS-2021.pdf
Indepaz, Masacres en Colombia durante el 2020, 2021, y 2022, [Last updated 31 October2022], https://indepaz.org.co/informe-de-masacres-en-colombia-durante-el-2020-2021/
Indepaz/Colombia Reports, Colombia’s illegal armed groups (maps) (2020),
https://colombiareports.com/amp/colombia-illegal-armed-groups-maps/
Infobae, “El gobierno actual actuó de manera deliberada, para hacer trizas el Acuerdo dePaz”, informe de organizaciones sociales, 14 June 2022, “El gobierno actual actuó de manera
deliberada para hacer trizas el Acuerdo de Paz”, informe de organizaciones sociales - Infobae
Infobae, “Express kidnapping” is on the rise in Colombia, according to the Ombudsman's
Office, 29 March 2022, https://www.infobae.com/en/2022/03/29/express-kidnapping-is-onthe-rise-in-colombia-according-to-the-ombudsmans-office/Infobae, A la cárcel oficial del Ejército relacionado con el clan del Golfo, 15 February 2022,
https://www.infobae.com/america/colombia/2022/02/15/a-la-carcel-oficial-del-ejercitorelacionado-con-el-clan-del-golfo/
Infobae, At least 30 indigenous children in Chocó have committed suicide to avoid being
recruited by armed groups, 19 March 2022, https://www.infobae.com/en/2022/03/19/at-least30-indigenous-children-in-choco-have-committed-suicide-to-avoid-being-recruited-by-armedgroups/
Infobae, JEP ordena nuevas medidas para la protección de los firmantes del Acuerdo de Paz,
21 September 2021, https://www.infobae.com/america/colombia/2021/09/21/jep-ordenanuevas-medidas-para-la-proteccion-de-los-firmantes-del-acuerdo-de-paz/Infobae, Macabre alliance between the Second Marquetalia, ELN and paramilitaries in Nariño,
11 April 2022, https://www.infobae.com/en/2022/04/11/macabre-alliance-between-the-secondmarquetalia-eln-and-paramilitaries-in-narino/
Infobae, Partido de ex-FARC denuncia ataques con dos muertos previo a comicios en
Colombia, 25 February 2022,

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https://www.infobae.com/america/agencias/2022/02/25/partido-de-ex-farc-denuncia-ataquescon-dos-muertos-previo-a-comicios-en-colombia/
inseguridad y violencia en el gobierno de Iván Duque, May 2022,
https://storage.ideaspaz.org/documents/FIP_Infome_NiPazNiGuerra.pdf
Insight Crime, 1 Front (Ex-FARC Mafia), 13 July 2019, https://insightcrime.org/colombiaorganized-crime-news/first-front-dissidence/
Insight Crime, Águilas Negras, 9 March 2017, https://insightcrime.org/colombia-organizedcrime-news/aguilas-negras/
Insight Crime, Colombia Profile, 21 January 2021, Colombia Profile (insightcrime.org)
Insight Crime, Colombia’s ‘Gota a Gota’ Loan Sharks Exploit Chile Market, 2 September 2019,https://insightcrime.org/news/brief/colombias-gota-a-gota-loansharks-exploit-chile-market/
Insight Crime, Colombia’s Truth Commission Signposts Road to Peace for President-Elect toFollow, 12 July 2022, https://insightcrime.org/news/questions-unanswered-truth-commissionreport-colombia/
Insight Crime, Colombia's Election Year Begins with Alarming Escalation in Violence, 8 March
2022, https://insightcrime.org/noticias/colombias-election-year-begins-with-alarmingescalation-in-violence/
Insight Crime, Decimation of Ex-FARC Mafia Leadership May Continue with Death of Ivan
Marquez, 5 July 2022, Decimation of Ex-FARC Mafia Leadership May Continue with Death of
Iván Márquez (insightcrime.org)
Insight Crime, Despite Peace Agreement, Child Recruitment Plagues Colombia, 22 February2022, https://insightcrime.org/news/despite-peace-agreement-child-recruitment-plaguescolombia/
InSight Crime, ELN and Urabeños War Again in Northern Colombia, 16 August 2022,
https://insightcrime.org/news/eln-and-Urabeños-reignite-war-over-key-drug-trafficking-regionof-colombia/
Insight Crime, ELN keeps fighting in key state despite peace talk plans with Colombia
government, 14 October 2022, https://insightcrime.org/news/eln-actions-eastern-colombiacould-prove-obstacle-road-peace/
Insight Crime, ELN show of force confirms its unmatched criminal presence in Colombia, 2March 2022, https://insightcrime.org/news/eln-show-of-force-confirms-its-unmatched-criminalpresence-in-colombia/
Insight Crime, ELN, 11 January 2020, https://insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crimenews/eln-profile/

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InSight Crime, Ex-FARC Mafia vs. ELN: a fight too far at Colombia-Venezuela border? 11
January 2022, https://insightcrime.org/news/is-the-ex-farc-mafia-betting-all-its-chips-on-thecolombian-venezuelan-border/
Insight Crime, Ex-FARC Mafia: The New Player in Colombian Organized Crime, 9 March 2018,https://insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/ex-farc-mafia-new-player-colombianorganized-crime/
Insight Crime, FARC dissidents patrol streets in broad daylight on Colombia-Venezuela
border, 21 July 2022, https://insightcrime.org/news/tibu-colombia-farc-dissidents-patrolstreets-broad-daylight/
InSight Crime, FARC Dissidents Want Old Land Back in Colombia’s Caquetá and Meta, 23 July
2021, https://insightcrime.org/noticias/farc-assets-center-of-dissident-disputes-colombia/
Insight Crime, For Medellín's Oficina Capos, the Shuffle is Part of the Game, 24 May 2019,https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/medellin-oficina-envigado-capos-shuffle-game/
Insight Crime, Homicide Rate in Colombia, March 2022, information provided to EUAA at the
EUAA COI Network Meeting on Colombia, March 2022.
Insight Crime, How Colombia's Conflict Intensified Violence Against Women and the LGBTQI+
Community, 4 August 2022, https://insightcrime.org/news/colombia-conflict-violence-womenlgtbiq/
Insight Crime, How Colombia's Lockdown Created Ideal Conditions for Child Recruitment, 28
August 2020,
Insight Crime, In Colombia, Loan Sharking is Now Just a Click Away , 27 May 2019,https://insightcrime.org/news/brief/colombia-gota-a-gota-extortion-a-click-away/;
Insight Crime, Iván Mordisco’s Reappearance Brings New Challenges to ‘Total Peace’ in
Colombia, 18 October 2022, https://insightcrime.org/news/ivan-mordiscos-reappearancebrings-new-challenges-to-total-peace-in-colombia/
Insight Crime, Luciano Marín Arango, alias ‘Iván Márquez’, 29 September 2022,
https://insightcrime.org/luciano-marin-ivan-marquez/
Insight Crime, Néstor Gregorio Vera Fernandez, alias ‘Iván Mordisco’, 17 October 2022, Néstor
Gregorio Vera Fernández, alias 'Iván Mordisco' (insightcrime.org)
Insight Crime, Oficina de Envigado, 28 October 2020, https://insightcrime.org/colombiaorganized-crime-news/oficina-de-envigado-profile/
InSight Crime, Otoniel’s Extradition Heralds End for a Generation of Colombian Traffickers, 5
May 2022, https://insightcrime.org/news/otoniels-extradition-heralds-end-for-a-generation-ofcolombian-traffickers/

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Insight Crime, Rebels and Paramilitaries: Colombia’s Guerrillas in Venezuela, 3 October 2022,
https://insightcrime.org/investigations/rebels-paramilitaries-colombia-guerrillas-venezuela/
Insight Crime, The Battle for Apure: Chavismo and the exFARC, 13 October 2021,
https://insightcrime.org/investigations/battle-apure-chavismo-ex-farc/
Insight Crime, The Nomad Victims: Intra-urban Displacement in Medellín, 10 July 2013,https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/the-nomad-victims-intra-urban-displacement-inmedellin/
Insight Crime, United they stand, divided they call – Urabeños losing grip in Colombia, 27 April
2022, https://insightcrime.org/news/united-stand-divided-fall-Urabeños-losing-grip-colombia/
Insight Crime, Urabeños – Gulf Clan, 24 October 2021, https://insightcrime.org/colombiaorganized-crime-news/Urabeños-profile/
Insight Crime, Venezuela's Tren de Aragua Gang Muscling into Colombia Border Area, 10 July
2019, https://insightcrime.org/news/brief/venezuela-tren-de-aragua-gang-colombia-borderarea/
InSight Crime, What does Otoniel’s arrest really mean for Colombia, 25 October 2021,
https://insightcrime.org/news/otoniel-arrest-really-mean-for-colombia/
InSightCrime, Urabeños – Gulf Clan, 24 October 2021, https://insightcrime.org/colombiaorganized-crime-news/urabenos-profile/
International Crisis Group, A Fight by Other Means: Keeping the Peace with Colombia’s FARC,
30 November 2021, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/092-a-fight-by-othermeans%20(2).pdf
International Crisis Group, Calming the Restless Pacific, 8 August 2019, https://icgprod.s3.amazonaws.com/076-calming-the-restless-pacific_0.pdf
International Crisis Group, Colombia’s Armed Groups Battle for Spoils of Peace, 19 October
2017, https://icg-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/063-colombias-armed-groups-battle-for-the-spoilsof-peace_0.pdf
International Crisis Group, Hard Times in a Safe Haven: Protecting Venezuelan Migrants in
Colombia, 9 August 2022, https://icg-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/094-protecting-venezuelans-incolombia_0.pdf
International Crisis Group, Leaders Under Fire, 6 October 2020,
https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/andes/colombia/82-leaders-under-firedefending-colombias-front-line-peaceInternational Crisis Group, Risky Business: The Duque Government’s Approach to Peace inColombia, 21 June 2018, https://icg-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/067-risky-business-the-duquegovernments-approach_0.pdf, p. 1

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International Crisis Group, Tackling Colombia’s Next Generation in Arms, 27 January 2022,
https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/andes/colombia/tackling-colombias-nextgeneration-arms
International Crisis Group, Trapped in Conflict: Reforming Military Strategy to Save Lives inColombia, 27 September 2022, https://www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/202209/095%20Colombia%20-%20New%20Military%20Strategy.pdf
Isacson, A., Razon Pública, ¿Cómo pasar del gasto en defensa a la seguridad para loscolombianos?, 18 September 2022, https://razonpublica.com/pasar-del-gasto-defensa-laseguridad-los-colombianos/
ISHR, Defenders Toolbox – Colombia: National Protection, n.d., https://ishr.ch/defenderstoolbox/national-protection/colombia/
IWGIA, Indigenous Peoples at risk of extinction in Colombia, 27 June 2022,
https://www.iwgia.org/en/colombia/4844-indigenous-peoples-at-risk-of-extinction-incolombia.html
Justice for Colombia, 75 coordinators of crop substitution murdered from 2016 to 2020, 26
March 2021, https://justiceforcolombia.org/news/75-coordinators-of-crop-substitutionprogrammes-murdered-from-late-2016-to-mid-2020/
Justice for Colombia, Colombia extends Victims Law until 2031, 19 November 2020,
https://justiceforcolombia.org/news/colombia-extends-victims-law-until-2031/
Justice for Colombia, JEP court orders government to take steps to improve security forformer FARC combatants, 7 March 2022, https://justiceforcolombia.org/news/jep-court-ordersgovernment-to-take-steps-to-improve-security-for-former-farc-combatants/
KROC Institute, Five Years After the Signing of the Colombian Final Agreement: Reflections
from Implementation Monitoring, 2 June 2022,
https://curate.nd.edu/downloads/und:41687h17b57
KROC Institution, Colombia Data Visualizations, n.d.,
https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/barometer/visualizations
La Prensa, Honduras, entre los 28 países donde el Clan del Golfo envía 20 toneladas decocaína mensuales, 3 November 2021, https://www.laprensa.hn/mundo/honduras-entre-los28-paises-donde-el-clan-del-golfo-envia-20-toneladas-de-cocaina-mensuales-YM3385265
La Silla Vacia, El cese al fuego de los grupos ni es verificable ni tiene a salvo a poblaciones, 10
October 2022, https://www.lasillavacia.com/historias/silla-nacional/el-cese-al-fuego-de-losgrupos-ni-es-verificable-ni-tiene-a-salvo-a-poblaciones/, accessed 14 November 2022
LatAm Journalism Review, ‘This is a forced resignation in the face of a very serious situation’:
Colombian journalist Claudia Duque after returning her protection scheme, 30 March 2022,

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https://latamjournalismreview.org/articles/this-is-a-forced-resignation-in-the-face-of-a-veryserious-situation-colombian-journalist-claudia-duque-after-returning-her-protection-scheme/
Lawyers for Lawyers, Colombia – Submission on the List of Issues by the Lawyers for Lawyers
Foundation (Human Rights Committee Consideration of the Eighth Periodic Report on
Colombia), 2 May 2022, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CCPR/Shared
Documents/COL/INT_CCPR_ICO_COL_48543_E.pdf
Martínez, J./La Nueva Prensa, Mi carta desde el exilio a la UNP, 19 July 2022,
https://www.lanuevaprensa.com.co/component/k2/mi-carta-desde-el-exilio-a-la-unp
Medellín, Datos generales de la ciudad, https://www.medellin.gov.co/es/conoce-algunosdatos-generales-de-la-ciudad/
Medellín, El desplazamiento forzado intraurbano en Medellín: Categorización de un fenómeno
complejo, 2019, https://www.medellin.gov.co/es/wpcontent/uploads/2021/09/Desplazamiento-forzado-en-Medellin.-Caracterizacion-de-unfenomeno-complejo_compressed.pdf
MRG (Minority Rights Group International), World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous
Peoples - Colombia, June 2020, https://minorityrights.org/country/colombia/
NACLA, Colombia’s Longest Insurgency and the Last Chance for Peace? 23 December 2019,https://nacla.org/news/2019/12/23/colombia-longest-insurgency-ELN-peace
New Humanitarian (The), A Colombian town’s spike in femicides is linked to armed groups, 12April 2022, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2022/04/12/Colombia-armedgroups-femicide-Cucuta
New Humanitarian (The), Five years after ‘peace’ the Colombian communities living in forced
confinement, 25 November 2021, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/newsfeature/2021/11/25/five-years-after-peace-Colombian-communities-confinement
New Humanitarian (The), Why Colombia’s next president will have to hit the humanitarian
ground running, 15 June 2022,
https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/Analysis/2022/06/15/Why-Colombia-next-president-willhave-to-hit-the-humanitarian-ground-running
New Humanitarian, A Colombian town’s spike in femicides is linked to armed groups, 12 April
2022, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2022/04/12/Colombia-armedgroups-femicide-Cucuta
New Humanitarian, How Colombia’s armed groups are exploiting COVID-19 to recruit children,
10 September 2020, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/newsfeature/2020/09/10/Colombia-conflict-armed-groups-child-recruitment
New Internationalist, An Uneasy Peace for Colombia’s Coca Farmers, 13 October 2021, An
uneasy peace for Colombia’s coca farmers | New Internationalist

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New York Times (The), Colombia Sees Surge in Mass Killings Despite Historic Peace Deal, 13
September 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/13/world/americas/colombia-massacresprotests.html
New York Times (The), Deep in Colombia, Rebels and Soldiers Fight for the Same Prize:
Drugs, 20 April 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/20/world/americas/colombiacomandos-armed-groups.html
Nilsson, M., Colombia’s Program to Substitute Crops Used for Illegal Purposes: Its Impact on
Security and Development, 17 May 2021,
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17502977.2021.1921546
Norway, Landinfo, Temanotot – Colombia: Vaepnede grupper etter fredsavtalen, 6 April 2022,
https://landinfo.no/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Colombia-temanotat-Vaepnede-grupperetter-fredsavtalen-06042022.pdf
NPR (National Public Radio), Colombia’s tribunal exposes how troops kidnapped and killedthousands of civilians, 28 June 2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/06/28/1103324447/colombiawar-crimes-tribunal
OAS (Organisation of American States), IACHR (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights),
Annual Report 2021 – Chapter 5: Colombia, 2022,
OAS (Organisation of American States), IACHR (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights),
IACHR Expresses Concern Over the Notable Increase in Forced Internal Displacement in
Colombia, 30 September 2021,
OAS (Organisation of American States), IACHR (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights),
IACHR Expresses Concern Over the Notable Increase in Forced Internal Displacement in
Colombia, 30 September 2021,
https://oas.org/fr/CIDH/jsForm/?File=/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2021/258.asp
OAS (Organisation of American States), IACHR (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights),
Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders and Social Leaders in Colombia, 6December 2019, https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/colombiadefenders.pdf
OAS (Organization of American States), CIDH (Comisión Interamericana De Derechos
Humanos), Resolución 6/2021 – Medidas cautelares No. 207-20,
http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/decisiones/pdf/2021/Res_6-2021_MC-207-20_CO.pdf
OCCO (Colombian Organized Crime Laboratory), A Criminal Peace. Mapping the Murders of
Ex-FARC Combatants, November 2020, https://www.urosario.edu.co/Documentos/Facultadde-Ciencia-Politica-Gobierno-y-Relacione/Observatorios/Crimenorganizado/DOCUMENTOS_OCCO_2_A_Criminal_Peace-18-nov-min.pdf
OCCO (Colombian Organized Crime Laboratory), La niñez reclutada. La participación de niños,
niñas y adolescentes en el crimen organizado y conflicto después del Acuerdo de Paz, 2022,

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https://www.urosario.edu.co/Documentos/Facultad-de-Estudios-Internacionales-Politicos-yU/OCCO/DOCUMENTOS_OCCO_4_La_ninez_reclutada.pdf
OCCRP (Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project), Colombia Dismantles the Los
Maracuchos Gang, 15 September 2022, https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/16768-colombiadismantles-the-los-maracuchos-gang
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), Colombia, February 2019,https://www.sng-wofi.org/country-profiles/Fiche%20COLOMBIA.pdf
OMCT (World Organisation Against Torture), Colombia: Over 2,000 days of criminalisation
against human rights defender Milena Quiroz Jiménez, 28 July 2022,
https://www.omct.org/en/resources/statements/colombia-m%C3%A1s-de-2000-d%C3%ADasde-criminalizaci%C3%B3n-y-persecuci%C3%B3n-en-contra-de-la-defensora-de-derechoshumanos-milena-quiroz
ONIC, Afectaciones a los derechos humanos en los pueblos indígenas de Colombia, October
2022, https://www.onic.org.co/images/noticias/2022/CO-RE-20221019-ESTercer_informe_afectaciones_DDHH-ONIC-V2.pdf
ONIC, Informe de afectaciones a los derechos humanos y territoriales en los pueblos
indígenas de Colombia, 30 September 2021,
https://www.onic.org.co/images/pdf/Informe_Consejeri%CC%81a_de_Derechos_Humanos_se
gundo_trimestre_y_tercer_trimestre_de_2021.pdf
Pares, Grupos Armados PosFarc: Un nueva espiral de violencia en Colombia, August 2021,
https://e7c20b27-21c2-4f2b-9c38a1a16422794e.usrfiles.com/ugd/e7c20b_d33aea1ed5b7406b95c1031d9ed79f5a.pdf
Pares, Grupos Armados PosFarc: Un nueva espiral de violencia en Colombia, August 2021,
https://e7c20b27-21c2-4f2b-9c38a1a16422794e.usrfiles.com/ugd/e7c20b_d33aea1ed5b7406b95c1031d9ed79f5a.pdf
Pares, Plomo es lo que hay: Violencia y seguridad en tiempos de Duque, 7 April 2022,
https://e7c20b27-21c2-4f2b-9c38a1a16422794e.usrfiles.com/ugd/e7c20b_476fc49ae03d4dbdbf5e6698ad7e9b98.pdf
Pares, Radiografía de la ominosa presencia de los carteles mexicanos, 10 June 2020,
https://e7c20b27-21c2-4f2b-9c38a1a16422794e.usrfiles.com/ugd/e7c20b_1249ee35717d47deac2f228fa2cd961c.pdf
Pares, Seguridad en tiempos de pandemia, 14 September 2020, https://e7c20b27-21c2-4f2b9c38-a1a16422794e.usrfiles.com/ugd/e7c20b_50832f60bc1e49b4a938c5e4ab7c7acc.pdf
Pares, Vivir sin miedo: Balance de violencias basadas en género durante 2021 y el primer
cuatrimestre de 2022, June 2022, https://e7c20b27-21c2-4f2b-9c38a1a16422794e.usrfiles.com/ugd/e7c20b_7ef1b9570dc84d29974d67717b3288b9.pdf

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PBI (Peace Brigades International), PBI-Colombia amplifies article about women lawyers
subjected to threats, attacks and intimidation, 19 September 2022,
https://pbicanada.org/2022/09/19/pbi-colombia-amplifies-la-abogacia-espanola-article-aboutwomen-lawyers-subjected-to-threats-attack-andintimidation/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=pbi-colombia-amplifies-laabogacia-espanola-article-about-women-lawyers-subjected-to-threats-attack-and-intimidation
PCDHDD (Plataforma Colombiana de Derechos Humanos, Democracia y Desarrollo), Alianza,
hambre y guerra: El legado del aprendiz: Balance del último año del gobierno de Iván Duque
Márquez, June 2022, https://coeuropa.org.co/wp-content/uploads/El-legado-del-aprendizweb.pdf
PCDHDD (Plataforma Colombiana de Derechos Humanos, Democracia y Desarrollo), Alianza,
hambre y guerra: El legado del aprendiz: Balance del último año del gobierno de Iván Duque
Márquez, June 2022, https://coeuropa.org.co/wp-content/uploads/El-legado-del-aprendizweb.pdf
People’s Dispatch, Colombian government launches iniative for protection of social leaders,
23 August 2022, https://peoplesdispatch.org/2022/08/23/colombian-government-launchesinitiative-for-protection-of-social-leaders/
Perry, J., SAIS Review of International Affairs, Can the Government Police Itself? Colombia’sFalse Positives Scandal and its Lessons for Atrocity Prevention, 5 August 2022,
https://saisreview.sais.jhu.edu/colombia-false-positives-scandal-atrocity-prevention/
Pressenza, Colombia: JEP orders protection for peace signatories, 25 November 2021,
https://www.pressenza.com/2021/11/colombia-jep-orders-protection-for-peace-signatories/
Reuters, Colombia advances towards restarting peace talks with ELN, 12 August 2022,
https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/colombia-peace-commissioner-cuba-meet-elnrebels-2022-08-11/
Reuters, Colombia advances towards restarting peace talks with ELN, 12 August 2022,
https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/colombia-peace-commissioner-cuba-meet-elnrebels-2022-08-11/
Reuters, Colombia illegal armed groups propose ceasefire with incoming government, 21 July
2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/colombian-illegal-armed-groups-proposeceasefire-with-incoming-government-2022-07-21/
Reuters, Colombia poverty declined in 2021, but still above pre-pandemic levels, 26 April
2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/colombia-poverty-declined-2021-still-abovepre-pandemic-levels-2022-04-26/
Reuters, Colombia poverty declined in 2021, but still above pre-pandemic levels, 26 April
2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/colombia-poverty-declined-2021-still-abovepre-pandemic-levels-2022-04-26/

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Reuters, Colombia’s Clan del Golfo attacks vehicles to protest Otoniel extradition, 2 May
2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/colombias-clan-del-golfo-attacks-vehiclesprotest-otoniel-extradition-government-2022-05-07/
Reuters, Colombia’s Clan del Golfo gang network extends to 28 countries, November 2021,
https://www.reuters.com/world/colombias-clan-del-golfo-gang-network-extends-28-countriespolice-2021-11-03/
Reuters, Colombia’s leftist ELN rebels claim responsibility for bombing, 8 January 2022,
https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/colombias-leftist-eln-rebels-claim-responsibilitybombing-2022-01-08/
Reuters, ELN rebels blow up bridge, injure eight in attacks across Colombia, 23 February2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/eln-rebels-blow-up-bridge-injure-eight-attacksacross-colombia-government-2022-02-23/
Reuters, Families of protesters killed in Colombia face long wait for justice, 13 September
2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/families-protesters-killed-colombia-face-longwait-justice-2021-09-10/
Reuters, Former rebel Petro takes office in Colombia promising peace and equality, 7 August
2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/leftist-petro-takes-office-colombia-amideconomic-social-challenges-2022-08-07/
Reuters, Mexican cartels swap arms for cocaine, fueling Colombia violence, 13 April 2022,
https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/mexican-cartels-swap-arms-cocaine-fuelingcolombia-violence-2022-04-12/
Reuters, New Colombia government to propose incentives to crime gang members who
disarm, 3 August 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/new-colombia-governmentpropose-incentives-crime-gang-members-who-disarm-2022-08-03/
RSF (Reporters Without Borders), Colombia, n.d., https://rsf.org/en/country/colombia
RSF (Reporters Without Borders), Journalist receiving state protection gunned down in
Colombia, 19 October 2022, https://rsf.org/en/journalist-receiving-state-protection-gunneddown-colombia
RSF (Reporters Without Borders), RSF calls for thorough investigation into journalist’s murderin western Colombia, 22 September 2022, https://rsf.org/en/rsf-calls-thorough-investigationjournalist-s-murder-western-colombia
Semana, “Falso servicio”: denuncian modalidad de secuestro y extorsión en Santander, 24
June 2022, https://www.semana.com/nacion/bucaramanga/articulo/falso-servicio-denuncianmodalidad-de-secuestro-y-extorsion-en-santander/202212/

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Semana, Chuzadas sin cuartel: la persecución a SEMANA, 12 January 2020,
https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/persecucion-espionaje-y-amenazas-a-periodistas-dela-revista-semana/647890/
SLAW, Escalating Threats to Colombian Human Rights Advocates, 11 January 2022,
http://www.slaw.ca/2022/01/11/escalating-threats-to-colombian-human-rights-advocates-theday-of-the-endangered-lawyer-24-january-2022/
Somos Defensores, La sustitución voluntaria siembra paz, 2021,
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1GiYkYUsiEyAJ9lH_fneN9Ozh2XLg1f5L/view
SWP (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik), Colombia’s Path to “Total Peace”, September 2022,
https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/comments/2022C54_ColombiasPath.pdf
SWP (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik), Colombia’s Path to “Total Peace”, September 2022,
https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/comments/2022C54_ColombiasPath.pdf
Telesur, 83rd Massacre in Colombia’s Cali, 4 October 2022,
https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/83rd-Massacre-in-Colombias-Cali-At-Least-5-Dead20221004-0017.html
Telesur, Colombia: 2022 is the Most Violent Pre-electoral Period on Record, 14 May 2022,
https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/Colombia-2022--Is-Most-Violent-Pre-electoral-Period-onRecord-20220514-0002.html
Telesur, Colombia: Indepaz Denounces New Massacre in Cauca, 2 August 2022,
https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/Colombia-Indepaz-Denounces-New-Massacre-in-Cauca20220802-0011.html
Transparencia por Colombia, Así se mueve la corrupción 2016-2020, November 2021,
https://transparenciacolombia.org.co/wp-content/uploads/radiografia-2016-2021-02-11-21.pdf
Transparency International (TI), Corruption Perceptions Index 2021, 2022,
https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021
UN OHCHR (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights), Situation of human rights in
Colombia [Year 2021] (A/HRC/49/19), 17 May 2022,
https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc4919-situation-human-rightscolombia-report-united-nations-high
UN OHCHR (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights), Violencia territorial:
Recomendaciones para el Gobierno, 2 July 2022,
https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2022-07/reporta-Informe-Violencia-Territorial-enColombia-Recomendaciones-para-el-Nuevo-Gobierno-Oficina-ONU-Derechos-Humanos.pdf
UN, CERD (Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination), Concluding observations
on the combined seventeenth to nineteenth periodic reports on Colombia, 22 January 2020,167

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https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%
2fC%2fCOL%2fCO%2f17-19&Lang=en
UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees), Colombia: Confinements (January 2022 toMarch 2022), 3 May 2022, https://reliefweb.int/report/colombia/colombia-confinementsjanuary-march-2022
UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees), Colombia: Confinements (January to
December 2021), 2 March 2022, https://reliefweb.int/report/colombia/colombia-confinementsjanuary-december-2021
UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees), Colombia: Impacto y tendencias humanitarias
entre enero y agosto de 2021, 22 September 2021,
https://reliefweb.int/report/colombia/colombia-impacto-y-tendencias-humanitarias-entreenero-y-agosto-de-2021-22-de
UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees), Colombia: Monitoreo de protección (enero junio 2022), June 2022, https://data.unhcr.org/es/documents/details/96350
UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees), Internal Displacement/Colombia: Large-GroupInternal Displacement for January to December 2021 [Infographic], 25 February 2022,
https://reliefweb.int/report/colombia/colombia-large-group-internal-displacement-januarydecember-2021
United They Stand, Divided They Fall - Urabeños Losing Grip in Colombia (insightcrime.org)
UNMAS (UN Mine Action Service), Boletín de noticias, February 2022,
https://mcusercontent.com/309bf5c4d180b5fadfd9c7050/files/357291fb-7a7e-0d10-d2e351519273e077/UNMAS_Boletin_Febrero_2022.pdf
UNOCHA (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), Breaking the Impasse:
Reducing Protracted Internal Displacement as a Collective Outcome, 22 June 2017,https://reliefweb.int/report/world/breaking-impasse-reducing-protracted-internal-displacementcollective-outcome-enruuk
UNOCHA (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), Global Humanitarian
Overview 2022 – Colombia, https://gho.unocha.org/colombia
UNOCHA (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), Más de 72 mil personas
sufrieron desplazamiento forzado en Colombia, 6 January 2022, https://www.prensalatina.cu/2022/01/06/mas-de-72-mil-personas-sufrieron-desplazamiento-forzado-en-colombia
UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime), Informe de monitoreo de territorios
afectados por cultivos ilícitos 2021, October 2022,
https://www.unodc.org/documents/colombia/2022/Octubre/Otros/Informe_de_Monitoreo_de_Territorios_Afectados_por_Cultivos_Ilicitos_2021.pdf

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UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime), Survey of territories affected by cocacultivation - 2021, 19 October 2022, https://www.unodc.org/documents/cropmonitoring/Colombia/EXECUTIVE_SUMMARY_19102022.pdf
UNSC (United Nations Security Council), Children and armed conflict in Colombia - Report of
the Secretary-General (S/2021/1022), 8 December 2021, available at:https://reliefweb.int/report/colombia/children-and-armed-conflict-colombia-report-secretarygeneral-s20211022
UNVMC (Verification Mission in Colombia)/UNSC (UN Security Council), Report of theSecretary-General (S/2022/513),
https://colombia.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/n2238676.pdf
UNVMC (Verification Mission in Colombia)/UNSC (UN Security Council), Report of theSecretary-General (S/2020/1301), 29 December 2020,
https://colombia.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/en_n2037701.pdf
UNVMC (Verification Mission in Colombia)/UNSC (UN Security Council), Report of theSecretary-General (S/2022/1090), 27 December 2021,
https://colombia.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/informe_en_n2139924.pdf
UNVMC (Verification Mission in Colombia)/UNSC (UN Security Council), Report of theSecretary-General (S/2022/715), 27 September 2022,
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2079425/N2260312.pdf
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2022, 24 June 2022,
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11955/2#:~:text=On%20June%2019%2C%202
022%2C%20Colombian,magnate%20and%20one%2Dterm%20mayor
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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMUSIP (United States Institute for Peace), Colombia’s New Administration Raises Hopes for‘Total Peace’, 12 July 2022, https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/07/colombias-newadministration-raises-hopes-total-peace
USIP (United States Institute for Peace), Colombia’s New Administration Raises Hopes for‘Total Peace’, 12 July 2022, https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/07/colombias-newadministration-raises-hopes-total-peace
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WOLA (Washington Office on Latin America), What Macro-Cases has Colombia’s Special
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Annex 2: Terms of Reference
Reference period: 1 January 2021 – 7 November 2022
The reference period encompasses 2021-2022 in order to capture most recent annual
data/trends at the end of President Duque’s administration. It covers up to November 2022 tocapture the first several months of President Petro’s administration following his August
inauguration.
Country overview/background•

Overview of basic information such as geography, demographics, state structure,
background to the conflict 1964-2016

Recent developments••

Recent developments in the conflict/major events/trends in 2021-2022/since 2016
peace agreement, such as COVID-19 situation/impact on security/targeting/state
capacity, election of Petro in 2022
Other relevant developments for international protection caseload

Security overview/trends•••

Main security/criminal/conflict dynamics and drivers
Recent developments in the conflict/major events/trends since 2016 peace agreement
Geographic overview/armed groups presence: main areas of conflict, trends/patterns
in security incidents/confrontations

Main actors in the conflict (capacity, areas of operation, alliances, motives/activities)••

Non-state armed actors/illegal armed groups – overview of criminal/conflict dynamics(Post-paramilitary groups/AGC, etc, ELN, FARC dissidents, Criminal gangs – structure,dynamics, presence)
Government of Colombia: Security forces capacity/response to conflict and integrity
issues Integrity issues (corruption, abuses, collusion between state and non -statearmed actors, etc.)

Impact on civilian population (Rights violations, fatalities/homicide rates/killings, confinementand displacement, humanitarian situation)
Individual profiles••

Information on targeting dynamics, perpetrators, threats, and types of targeting,regional dynamics/specificities (e.g. threat, disappearance, killing, etc)
Main targets: E.g. information on profiles such as: social leaders/HRDs (Indigenous,
Afro-Colombian, peace process, etc); Former members of the FARC; Individuals
involved in the administration of justice (attorneys, judges, lawyers, crime witnesses);
Journalists; Local politicians and election-related targeting (as relevant); Members of
the Juntas de Acción Communal (Neighbourhood associations); Children recruited to172

EUAA COI REPORT - COLOMBIA: COUNTRY FOCUS•

armed groups; Extortion a victims and loansharking practices and targets; LGBT; Other
profiles as relevant (research dependent)
Capacity of armed groups to track/trace targets/relocation

State response and protection – what state protection measures are available to victims andwitnesses (and family members) and what is their presence, capacity and effectiveness?
•••

Judiciary system, including filing complaints to police or the Fiscalía, prosecutions,judicial remedies
National Protection Unit (Unidad Nacional de Protección, UNP)
Office of the Ombudsperson (Defensoría del Pueblo)

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