European Asylum Support Office

Syria
Security situation

Country of Origin Information Report

November 2019SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION

European Asylum Support Office

Syria
Security situation

Country of Origin Information Report

November 2019

More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu).

ISBN: 978-92-9485-069-0
doi: 10.2847/267982© European Asylum Support Office (EASO) 2019
Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged, unless otherwise stated.
For third-party materials reproduced in this publication, reference is made to the copyrights
statements of the respective third parties.

Cover photo: © Jorge Villalba. The aftermath of the war in Aleppo Syria. url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION — 3

Acknowledgements
EASO would like to acknowledge the Norwegian Country of Origin Information Centre, Landinfo,
as the drafter of this report.
Due to significant developments to the security situation taking place during the finalisation of thereport (October 2019), EASO drafted Chapter 6 of the report documenting these changes. Chapter
6 has not been reviewed by the departments and organisations acknowledged below.

The following departments and organisations have reviewed the report together with EASO:
Denmark, Danish Immigration Service (DIS)ACCORD, the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research andDocumentation

It must be noted that the review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts ororganisations contributes to the overall quality of the report, but does not necessarily imply theirformal endorsement of the final report, which is the full responsibility of EASO.

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Contents
Acknowledgements........................................................................................................................... 3Contents ............................................................................................................................................ 4
Disclaimer.......................................................................................................................................... 6
Glossary and Abbreviations .............................................................................................................. 7
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 8
Methodology ................................................................................................................................ 8
Sources ......................................................................................................................................... 8
Quality control .............................................................................................................................. 8
Structure and use of the report .................................................................................................... 9
Map .................................................................................................................................................10
1. Background .................................................................................................................................11
1.1 Syria before the civil war ......................................................................................................11
1.2 The civil war: background and development .......................................................................11
2. Territorial control ........................................................................................................................14
2.1 Areas controlled by the government....................................................................................15
2.1.1 Actors that maintain security and control on behalf of the government .....................15
2.1.2 Recaptured areas and reconciliation agreements ........................................................16
2.1.3 Conflicts between pro-government militias..................................................................16
2.2 The north-east – Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) ................................................................17
2.3 Turkish-occupied areas .........................................................................................................19
2.4 Idlib .......................................................................................................................................19
2.5 Tanf .......................................................................................................................................21
2.6 Islamic State..........................................................................................................................22
3. Intensity and distribution of violence .........................................................................................24
3.1 Number of violent incidents .................................................................................................24
3.2 Number of conflict-related deaths .......................................................................................25
3.3 Which areas were most affected by violence in 2018 and 2019? ........................................27
4. How does the conflict affect the civilian population? ................................................................31
4.1 Sieges, air strikes and artillery fire........................................................................................31
4.2 Terrorist attacks and bombings ............................................................................................32
4.3 Arrests, detentions and abductions .....................................................................................33
4.4 Landmines and explosive remnants of war ..........................................................................34

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4.5 Humanitarian conditions ...................................................................................................... 34
4.6 Refugees and internally displaced persons .......................................................................... 35
5. Concluding remarks on the security situation ............................................................................ 36
5.1 Ongoing warfare in Idlib ....................................................................................................... 36
5.2 Decrease in violent incidents in government-controlled areas ........................................... 36
5.3 Internal violent conflicts in the Turkish-occupied zone ....................................................... 37
5.4 Attacks in SDF-held areas in the north-east ......................................................................... 37
6. New developments to the security situation (October 2019) .................................................... 39
6.1 Turkish offensive in north-east Syria .................................................................................... 39
6.2 Syrian government gains ...................................................................................................... 41
6.3 US withdrawal ...................................................................................................................... 42
6.4 Impact of the offensive on IS ................................................................................................ 43
Bibliography .................................................................................................................................... 44
Terms of Reference......................................................................................................................... 52

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Disclaimer
This report was written according to the EASO COI Report Methodology (2019). The report is basedon carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced.
The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed withutmost care within a limited timeframe. However, this document does not claim to be exhaustive.
If a particular event, person or organisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not meanthat the event has not taken place or that the person or organisation does not exist. Any event
taking place after the finalisation of this report is not included. More information on the reference
period for this report can be found in the introduction.
Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particularapplication for international protection. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative ofa particular legal position.
‘Refugee’, ‘risk’ and similar terminology are used as generic terminology and not in the legal sense
as applied in the EU Asylum Acquis, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating
to the Status of Refugees.
Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may
be made of the information contained in this report.

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Glossary and Abbreviations
ACLED

Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project

HTS

Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham

INSO

International NGO Safety OrganizationIS

The Islamic State (IS); also known as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant(ISIL), Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), or Daesh.

ISW

Institute for the Study of War

NDF

National Defence Forces

UNOCHA

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

PKK

Kurdistan Workers’ Party

PYD

Democratic Union Party (Kurdish)

SDF

Syrian Democratic Forces

SCSR

Syrian Center for Statistics and Research

SNHR

Syrian Network for Human Rights

SOHR

Syrian Observatory of Human Rights

UNICEF

United Nations Children’s Fund

VDC

Violations Documentation Center in Syria

YPG

Kurdish People’s Protection Units

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Introduction
This report was drafted by Country of Origin Information (COI) specialists from the NorwegianCountry of Origin Information Centre, Landinfo, as listed under the Acknowledgements section.
This report is produced in line with the EASO COI Report Methodology (2019)1 and the EASO COI
Writing and Referencing Style Guide (2019).2

Methodology
This report analyses the security situation in Syria, focusing in particular on the situation for thecivilian population. The reference period is 2018 and the first half of 2019. Some additional
information was added during the finalisation of this report in response to feedback received
during the quality control process until 18 September 2019.
After finalisation of the content of the report by Landinfo, during the editing phase, significant
developments to the security situation occured, which did not follow recent trends in the conflict.
Because of the significant nature of these developments, having an impact on the content of thisreport, EASO agreed with Landinfo to include a separate chapter (Chapter 6, New developments),
with a short overview of information up until 23 October 2019. Because of the early stage andvolatile nature of such developments in the conflict, information on this will have to be updatedon short notice. EASO plans such update by spring 2020.

Sources
The report is based on information from UN reports, reports from human rights organisations,academic publications and news articles, that in different ways describe the security situation in
Syria.
This COI report also draws heavily on the December 2018 report by Syria analyst, Aron Lund, titledSyria´s Civil War: Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, published by the Swedish Defence
Research Agency. Mr. Lund is a researcher focusing on Middle Eastern and North African politics
and a fellow with The Century Foundation of New York, and with the Centre for Syrian Studies of
St. Andrew’s University. He has published widely on Syria, including three books, and is a frequentcolumnist on the country’s developments. He has written two Swedish-language books on Syrian
politics, Drömmen om Damaskus (Stockholm, 2010) and Syrien brinner (Stockholm, 2014), as wellas the book Divided They Stand (Brussels, 2012), in English.
In addition, statistics on the number of violent incidents and conflict-related deaths are used,
despite variations in these figures (this is elaborated in Chapter 3), as an indication of the security
situation in different parts of the country at different times. The different organisations’ datacollection methods are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.

Quality control
In order to ensure that the report respects the EASO COI Report Methodology, a review was
carried out by COI specialists from the countries and organisations listed as reviewers in the
Acknowledgements section. Chapter 6 was developed after this quality control phase. Because of

1 EASO, EASO Country of Origin Information (COI) Report Methodology, June 2019, url
2 EASO, Writing and Referencing Guide for EASO Country of Origin Information (COI) Reports, June 2019, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION — 9

the occurrence of these developments after finalisation and shortly before publication of thisreport, the added information in chapter 6 was not reviewed by the departments andorganisations mentioned in the Acknowledgements section but was internally reviewed by EASO.

Structure and use of the report
The report starts with a brief introduction to the background to the civil war, the belligerents inthe conflict and who controls which parts of the country. It goes on to describe the security
situation in different parts of Syria. To illustrate this, the report presents estimates of the numberof people killed and the number of conflict-related violent incidents. A description is also providedof how the war has been fought, what types of weapons and war tactics the warring parties haveused, and how this has affected the civilian population. The report does not address how thegovernment or other belligerents treat specific ethnic, political or social groups.
Following significant changes to the security situation occurring during the quality control phaseof the report (beginning of October 2019) it has been decided to include a limited chapter
documenting the new developments. These developments are discussed in Chapter 6. A full
update of the information will be published in first quarter of 2020.
In this report, the term security is used to mean freedom from violence. Violence is the intentionaluse of, or threat of, physical force against another person. The term civilian is used in contrast to
military and refers to persons who are neither members of armed groups nor participate incombat.

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Map

Map 1: Syrian Arab Republic, United Nations3

3 Syria, Map No. 4204 Rev. 3, April 2012, United Nations, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION — 11

1. Background
1.1 Syria before the civil war
Syria is a republic in which all real power rests with President Bashar al-Assad. He took over thepresidency in 2000 after his father Hafez al-Assad, who came to power in 1970. Assad is the leaderof the ruling Baath Party and commander-in-chief of the Syrian Armed Forces. The president iselected for a seven-year term, in tightly controlled elections without any genuine opposing
candidates. A set of formal state institutions, such as the parliament and government, exist under
the president, but, according to Syria analyst Aron Lund, in practice, they lack independent power
and are overshadowed by an informal network closely linked to the president, consisting of theheads of the various security services and a small group of politicians and wealthy businessmen.4
Central parts of the country consist of sparsely populated desert areas. Most of the population
live along a north-south axis in the western part of the country, where cities like Damascus andAleppo are located. The Euphrates Valley and the north-eastern corner of the country are home
to some of Syria’s most fertile agricultural land. Almost 90 % of the population are Arabs, while
about 10 % are Kurds. The majority are Sunni Muslims (approximately 70–80 %). The rest are
Christians belonging to different denominations, as well as Alawites, Druze and Shia Muslims(Ismailis and Twelvers).5
The president’s family and large parts of the informal power structure around him are Alawites.
Formally, the government has promoted secularism, and discussions of sectarian problems havebeen banned. However, sectarianism has been a major structural feature of the current conflict.6
Before the uprising and the ensuing civil war in 2011, the Syrian government controlled all Syrian
territory, except the Golan Heights, which were occupied by Israel in 1967. In general, there waslittle violent crime such as robberies, kidnappings and murders, largely due to a strongly repressive
state with an omnipresent security service. An Islamic uprising centred in Hama was brutally
crushed in 1982. After that, anti-government groups were marginalised, and there was no armed
insurrection in the country between 1982 and 2011.7

1.2 The civil war: background and development
A series of protests against the government began in March 2011, inspired by the Arab Spring
protests. The government tried to stop the protests, partly by introducing reforms intended toconcede the protesters’ demands and partly through the use of force.8 Their attempts to stop theuprising failed, and a general breakdown in state control was felt in some rural regions and dense
outer-city slums. The main thrust of the uprising came from within the Sunni Muslim majority

4 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War. Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, December 2018,

url, p. 40
5 Based on the Landinfo readings of the following maps: Izady, M., Syria: Ethnic composition in 2010. Atlas of the Islamic
wold and vicinity, Colombia University, 2010, url; Izady, M., Syria: Population density and demography, in 2012. Atlas of
the Islamic world and vicinity, Colombia University, 2012, url; Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War. Government Victory or Frozen
Conflict?, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, December 2018, url, p. 15
6 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War. Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, December 2018,
url, pp. 41-43
7 Lund, A., Syrien brinner. Hur revolutionen mot Assad blev ett inbördeskrig, SILC Förlag, 2014; Seale, P. , Asad. The
struggle for the Middle East, University of California Press, 1989; Wieland C., Syria. A decade of lost chances. Repression
and revolution from Damascus spring to Arab spring, Cune, 2012
8 US, CRS, Issues for the 112th Congress and Background on U.S. Sanctions, 28 April 2011, url, pp. 4-5

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population, with a rural and religiously conservative bent. A fragmented set of armed rebel groups
gradually emerged in the same areas, confronting the Army and the security forces.9
The groups consisted almost exclusively of Sunni Muslims, thereby also adding a sectarian
dimension to the conflict. Foreign states meddled in the conflict at an early stage, forming alliancesthat largely coincided with the sectarian divisions in Syria. Sunni majority states such as Turkey,
Qatar and Saudi Arabia started arming the Sunni-dominated rebels, while Shia forces in Iran, Iraq
and Lebanon supported the Syrian government. In line with Cold War dividing lines, the US, UK
and France sided with and assisted the rebels, while Russia and China backed the Syrian
government. Israel has bombed military installations in Syria on several occasions, allegedly todamage the military capacity of Hezbollah.10
Since then, the civil war has gone through several phases:-

During 2012, rebel groups took control of large rural areas, several suburbs of Damascus
and the eastern half of Aleppo. In 2013, the rebels captured the city of Raqqa, but the
government remained in control of the other provincial capitals and the supply lines
between most of the cities.11-

In mid-2012, the Syrian Army withdrew from the Kurd-dominated areas in the north of thecountry, leaving control to the Kurdish Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)-affiliated Democratic
Union Party/Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat (hereinafter referred to as PYD) and its armed wing
the People’s Protection Units/Yekineyen Parastina Gel (hereinafter referred to as YPG). The
PYD was neither allied with the rebels nor with the Syrian government, and it has beenworking towards Kurdish autonomy in the areas under its control. Since 2015, the YPG
militia has been part of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) coalition together with local
Arab and Assyrian militias, receiving military support from the US as part of the efforts to
defeat the Islamic State, also called ISIL or Daesh (hereinafter IS).12-

In January 2014, a new line of conflict arose between IS, on the one hand, and other rebel
groups on the other. During 2014, IS succeeded in gaining full control of large areas in theeastern part of the country along the Euphrates Valley and further into Iraq, while the otherrebel groups kept control of parts of Idlib and Aleppo provinces in the north-east, some rural
areas in the south-west and several suburbs around Damascus.13-

The Syrian Army gradually lost further terrain, and, in March 2015, a coalition of rebel
groups led by the al-Qaeda-allied group, al-Nusra Front, took control of Idlib.14-

In September 2015, Russia’s military intervention in the war began, at the request of theauthorities in Damascus. Russia began a sustained campaign of air strikes in support of the

9 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War. Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, December 2018,

url, p. 17
10 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War. Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, December 2018,
url, pp. 17–18, 22
11 Al Jazeera, Syria rebels capture northern Raqqa city, 5 March 2013, url; Holliday J., Syria’s maturing insurgency,
Institute for the Study of War, June 2012, url; Holliday J., The Assad regime. From counterinsurgency to civil war,
Institute for the Study of War, March 2013, url ; Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War. Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?,
Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, December 2018, url, p. 18
12 Casagrande, G., The road to ar-Raqqah: Background on the Syrian Democratic Forces, Institute for the Study of War,
22 November 2016, url, p. 1; Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War. Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Totalförsvarets
forskningsinstitut, December 2018, url, pp. 18, 20, 59-60
13 Lister, C., The Syrian Jihad. Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and the evolution of an insurgency, Hurst & Company, 2015,
pp. 185-186, 221-222
14 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War. Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, December 2018,
url, p. 20; Washington Post (The), Syrian rebels take strategic town of Idlib, 28 March 2015, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION — 13

Syrian government forces, which thereby gradually managed to reclaim areas from the rebel
groups, including the eastern districts of Aleppo in December 2016.15-

Government forces backed by Russia and the SDF coalition, backed by US special forces,
gradually succeeded in defeating IS. Some areas in the northern part of Aleppo provincethat had previously been under IS control were occupied by Turkish troops and Syrian rebel
militias allied with Turkey.16-

In April 2018, following a massive military operation, the government regained control ofEastern Ghouta outside Damascus. The rebel stronghold in Homs fell shortly afterwards
through a negotiated surrender. In June and July 2018, southern areas in Daraa andQunaitra held by rebel forces were subsequently surrendered through a series of local
agreements.17-

In spring 2018, Afrin, the Kurdish enclave under PYD control, was occupied by Turkey.18-

In April 2019, the Syrian Army started a new offensive against Idlib, with military support
from Russia. The offensive continued through the summer of 2019, but did not result in any
material changes in territorial control until August, when the army seized the city of Khan
Shaykhun, among others.19

15 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War. Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, December 2018,

url, pp. 21-22
16 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War. Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, December 2018,
url, pp. 21-22
17 International Crisis Group, Lessons from the Syrian State’s Return to the South, Middle East Report N°196, 25 February
2019, url, p. 1; Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War. Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut,
December 2018, url, p. 22
18 International Crisis Group, Squaring the Circles in Syria’s North East, Report 204 / Middle East & North Africa, 31 July
2019, url, p. 7; Lund, A. , Syria’s Civil War. Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut,
December 2018, url, p. 22
19 Syria Direct, Khan Sheikhoun exposes the limitations of the Turkish guarantor role, 21 August 2019, url

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2. Territorial control
As reported in July 2019, the government appeared to have largely consolidated its control of large
parts of the country, retaining a relatively secure hold on power. The rebels have been defeatedin most places, but still controlled Idlib province and neighbouring areas in the provinces of Aleppoand Hama. An area to the north-west along the Turkish border, from Afrin to Jarabulus, was under
military control by Syrian rebel groups allied with Turkey. The Kurdish-dominated SDF coalition
controlled the north-eastern parts of the country, while US forces and an allied local rebel militia
controlled an area around Tanf, in the western part of the desert bordering Iraq, Jordan and Syria.
The rest of the country was under the control of the Syrian government and allied militias as ofJuly 2019.20
Territorial control in Syria as of 31 July 2019

Map 2: Territorial control in Syria as of 31 July 201921

For updated information on territorial control developments as of 21 October 2019, see theadditional Chapter 6.
The principal belligerents are described below, with emphasis on how they exercise control in therespective areas. A brief description of IS is also provided, even though the organisation no longer
has territorial control of populated areas of Syria, as described in Section 2.6.

20 Summary by drafter of the report, NO-Landinfo. See Liveuamap, Syria, 31 July 2019, url

For an overview of the military control situation in Syria over time, see Liveuamap: https://syria.liveuamap.com/.
21 Edmaps.com 2019, url

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2.1 Areas controlled by the government
As of August 2019, the government controlled most of the country, including the cities ofDamascus, Aleppo, Homs and Hama, and nearly all the provincial capitals. The government also
regained control of the entire border with Lebanon, restored limited land access to Iraq, gained
control of the southern provinces and reopened a border crossing to Jordan for commercial trafficin October 2018.22
For updated information on areas controlled by the Syrian government as of 21 October 2019, see
Chapter 6.
As a result of the war, the regular economy collapsed, and a ‘violence-related’ economy has risen
instead. According to the Syrian Center for Policy Research, 50 % of economic activity was related
to smuggling, kidnapping, and arms sales; 12 million Syrians were without an income, and 90 %lived in poverty in 2018.23 Aron Lund reported in December 2018 that important central
government functions and services had nonetheless been maintained to a certain degree. Publicschools and hospitals were operating, albeit with strongly reduced capacity. Other services andfunctions, such as the civil registry and salary payments to state employees, continued to operate
in government-controlled areas, and partly also in SDF-held areas in the north-east.24

2.1.1 Actors that maintain security and control on behalf of the government
Security and control are maintained by the police, the intelligence organisations, the Army andpro-government militias:-

The police are responsible for law enforcement together with the courts.

-

The intelligence services concentrate on monitoring for opposition against the government.
The intelligence apparatus in Syria consists of four main intelligence organisations withoverlapping areas of responsibility, all reporting directly to President Assad. Each organisation
is subdivided into a number of regional specialised branches and departments, which, among
other things, run their own detention centres and prison units.25-

The Syrian Army is comprised of professional officers and conscripts. Almost all Syrian males,with some exceptions, have to undergo 18 months of military service. The service period
significantly increased during the course of the civil war.26-

After the outbreak of the civil war in 2011, a number of pro-government militias were
established. These militias perform security enforcement services in areas loyal to thegovernment and take part in the fighting against anti-government groups near the front lines.
Governments of states allied with Assad contributed to the establishment of these militias.
Officers from the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) trained local militias,
especially those affiliated to the National Defence Forces (NDF), an umbrella made up ofvarious pro-government militias, and also helped staff Shia militias with foreign personnel,
including from Iraq and Afghanistan. Members of the Lebanese Shia militia, Hezbollah, also
participated in the war in support of the government and also trained soldiers from other

22 Liveuamap, Map of Syrian civil war, 31 July 2019, url; Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War. Government Victory or Frozen

Conflict?, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, December 2018, url, p. 39
23 Australian National University, The socio-economic impact of the crisis in Syria, 14 June 2018, url
24 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War. Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, December 2018,
url, p. 39
25 EIP, Refugee return in Syria: Dangers, security risks and information scarcity, July 2019, url, pp. 7–8; Lund, A., Syria’s
Civil War. Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, December 2018, url, pp. 43–45;
Sweden, LIFOS , Syriens säkerhetsapparat, 10 November 2016, url, pp. 7-8, 17-18
26 Norway, Landinfo, Syria: Militærtjeneste – innrullering, utsettelse og fritak, 14 November 2017, url, p. 7

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militias. After Russia joined the war in 2015, it took the initiative to reorganise many of themilitias under what is known as the 5th Corps, which was formally a branch of the Syrian Army,
but included many civilians and former militia members.27

2.1.2 Recaptured areas and reconciliation agreements
The government’s recapturing of areas held by anti-government groups largely took place throughlocal agreements between the warring parties. These agreements meant that the rebels, theirfamilies and others who had worked for the opposition were given an opportunity to evacuate to
Idlib. Siege Watch referred to this process as a forced transfer, as these agreements were forcedon the communities, giving rebels little choice but to evacuate.28 Civilians were allowed to stay orwere forcibly moved to dedicated collection centres established by the government on
government-controlled territory. Some members of the rebel militias were also given the choiceof staying. They had to undergo a clearance process known colloquially as taswiat al-wad’a (tolegalise one’s status). They then had to agree to enlisting in the Army or a pro-government
militia.29
In practice, the government’s victories on the battlefield and control of the suburbs of Damascus,
Homs and southern provinces in spring and summer 2018 led to a considerable reduction in
warfare and violence in government-controlled parts of the country by autumn 2018.30 Data fromorganisations that count the number of conflict-related incidents and fatalities also confirm thereduction in violence from autumn 2018 (see Chapter 3–5).

2.1.3 Conflicts between pro-government militias
Many Syria observers reported that pro-government militias are a potentially destabilisingelement that could undermine security and government control. The militia leaders have become
powerful figures in the political landscape, and cannot just be removed.31 Many of the militias
have been deeply involved in criminal activity, including kidnapping for ransom, looting andinformal taxation of trade by demanding ‘protection money’ at checkpoints.32
There were also armed clashes between militia groups fighting for control over this lucrative
business. For example, the militias prevented the stabilisation of Aleppo after the government
recaptured parts of the city held by the opposition in December 2016. In the ensuing period, local
pro-government militias were involved in kidnappings and street fighting among themselves. The

27 Khaddour, K., Strength in Weakness: The Syrian army’s accidental resilience, Carnegie Middle East Center, 16 March

2016, url, p. 6; Khaddour, K. , Syria’s Troublesome Militias, Carnegie Middle East Center, 5 November 2018, url; Norway,
Landinfo, Syria: Regimelojale militser, 2 November 2017, url; Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War. Government Victory or Frozen
Conflict?, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, December 2018, url, pp. 47-49; Al-Masri, A., Analysis: The fifth Corps andthe state of the Syrian Army, Syria Deeply, 11 January 2017, url
28 Siege Watch, Final Report. Out of Sight, Out of Mind: The Aftermath of Syria’s Sieges, May 2018, url , p. 20
29 Adleh, F. and Favier, A., ”Local reconciliation agreements” in Syria: A non-starter for peacebuilding, European
University Institute, 1 June 2017, url, pp. 1–6; Daily Beast (The), Syria’s cruel ‘reconciliations’, 9 December 2017, url ; AlJabassini, A., From Insurgents to Soldiers: The Fifth Assault Corps in Daraa, Southern Syria, Middle East Directions,
European University Institute, 14 May 2019, url, pp. 11–13; International Crisis Group, Lessons from the Syrian State’s
Return to the South, Middle East Report N°196, 25 February 2019, url, pp. 10–11
30 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, 31 January 2019, url, para. 4
31 Jenkins, B. M., (2014), The dynamics of Syria’s civil war, Rand Corporation, 2014, url, p. 6; Khaddour, K., Syria’s
Troublesome Militias, Carnegie Middle East Center, 5 November 2018, url; Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War. Government
Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, December 2018, url, p. 49
32 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War. Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, December 2018,
url, pp. 49-50

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION — 17

president eventually sent the head of one of the intelligence services to Aleppo to resolve thesituation, which reduced the problem without making it disappear completely.33
Militias in the city are still accused of informal ‘taxation’ of trade and industry according to an
August 2019 article from the Syria Observer.34 Similarly, desert areas further east that the
government recaptured from IS in 2017 were plagued by checkpoint extortion and clashes
between militias.35 In some places in Homs, Hama and Aleppo provinces, clashes between militias
escalated into exchanges of machine gun fire and the use of RPG rocket launchers, resulting incivilian casualties.36
Moreover, the fact that the closest allies of the government, Russia and Iran, have conflicting
agendas and interests in Syria, had a destabilising effect on the situation. Iran exerted great
influence on some of the militias, especially those affiliated to the National Defence Forces (NDF)
and was working to ensure that these militias remained relatively independent of the government
and tied to Iran. Russia, however, is primarily interested in stability and ensuring that the
government has a monopoly of violence, and made efforts to incorporate the militia groups informal branches of the Syrian Army. This rivalry led on several occasions to armed confrontations
between army branches and militias loyal to Iran and Russia, respectively.37
The government’s preferred strategy has been to attempt to absorb militia groups into the Army,
while also keeping control by pitting different militia leaders against each other.38 The government
made active efforts to keep the militias under control and keep them dependent on the Army’s
central command and supply lines. According to Syria analyst Aron Lund:‘As effective as they may be on the battlefield, they depend on the official militaryand other institutions, or on figures in Assad’s entourage, for access to salaries,
ammunition, security clearances, air support, heavy weapons, hospital care,veterans’ benefits, etcetera; in addition, their civilian lives and families remain
embedded in the prevailing order.’39

2.2 The north-east – Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
Since 2012, the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its armed wing the People’s Protection
Units (YPG) were in control of several areas in the north of Syria, along the Turkish border. PYD
and YPG were closely affiliated with the Turkish-Kurdish PKK guerrillas, and pursue a socialist,
secularist and feminist agenda based on the ideas of PKK founder Abdullah Öcalan, who was inprison in Turkey. PYD’s system of governance was described by Syria analyst Aron Lund as
authoritarian, and public criticism was suppressed. PYD did not seek secession from Syria but
worked toward self-rule and federalism.40

33 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War. Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, December 2018,

url, pp. 49-50
34 Syrian Observer (The), Aleppo: Tension between Russia and Iran escalates in the markets, 7 August 2019, url
35 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War. Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, December 2018,
url, p. 50
36 Denmark, DIS, DRC, Syria. Security Situation in Damascus. Province and Issues Regarding Return to Syria, February
2019, url, p. 10
37 Al-Jabassini, A., From Insurgents to Soldiers: The Fifth Assault Corps in Daraa, Southern Syria, Middle East Directions,
European University Institute, 14 May 2019, url, p. 7
38 Khaddour, K., Syria’s Troublesome Militias, Carnegie Middle East Center, 5 November 2018, url
39 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War. Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, December 2018,
url, p. 50
40 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War. Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, December 2018,
url, pp. 59-60

18 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

Since 2015, the YPG militia was reported to be part of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) together
with local Arab and Assyrian militia groups. SDF was dominated by PYD and YPG. SDF was neither
in alliance with the Syrian opposition nor the government, but it was nevertheless largely
dependent on the Syrian government, which funded certain state institutions in the area and paidsalaries to state employees. The government also maintained control over parts of the city of
Qamishli in the north-east, including the airport outside the city, and a limited security presencein the city of Hasaka.41 According to reports from September 2018, the airport had regular flights
to and from Damascus.42
PYD originally had control over three different enclaves with a Kurdish majority population: Afrinin the north-west, and Kobane and Jazira (Hasakah province) in the north-east.43 Between 2014
and 2017, IS took control of large parts of these areas, but was eventually pushed out by SDF,
helped by the US-led Global Coalition Against Daesh. The coalition contributed in the form of aerial
support, in addition to deploying US soldiers to the area.44 As of 31 July 2019, SDF controlled nearly
all territory north-east of the Euphrates River, including Hasakah province and parts of the Deirez-Zor, Raqqa and Aleppo governorates, as well as the areas around Manbij and Tabqa south-westof the Euphrates.45
The SDF previously also controlled Afrin in the north-west, but almost all of this area was occupied
by Turkey and allied Syrian militias in March 2018 (see section 3.3). The US backing of SDF was adifficult political balancing act, as Turkey, a NATO ally, regarded SDF as the extended arm of its
arch enemy, the PKK.46 Turkey wanted to remove SDF from its southern border and repeatedly
threatened to intervene in north-east Syria. On several occasions, Turkey also launched missiles
across the border and bombed targets in SDF-held areas. The US opposed a Turkish intervention
but was brokering a ‘security zone’ along the border with Turkey at that time. Moreover, President
Trump has repeatedly announced that US forces will withdraw from SDF-held areas.47 On thispoint, for information on US withdrawal developments regarding the ‘security zone’ on the borderthat occurred in October 2019, see Chapter 6.
Parts of SDF-held areas, especially the southern part along the Euphrates, are predominantly
inhabited by Arab tribes, and support for the Kurdish PYD has not traditionally been widespreadthere. SDF attempted to rule with support from local tribal leaders, but problems have still
occurred. Many people in the tribal areas held SDF responsible for the lack of services andreconstruction, and for arbitrary arrests in connection with the fight against IS. The conflict caused
some tribal leaders to seek alternative alliances with the government or even IS. IS carried out anumber of attacks in the area with the help of underground cells, including two relatively large

41 International Crisis Group, Squaring the Circles in Syria’s North East, Report 204 / Middle East & North Africa, 31 July

2019, url, pp. 1, 13-14; Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War. Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Totalförsvarets
forskningsinstitut, December 2018, url, pp. 59-60
42 SANA, Awda tashghil ar-rahalat al-jawiya bayn matari Dimashq wal-qamishli bad inhisar al-asifa al-ghbariya [Flights
between Damascus and Qamishli resumed after the passing of the sand storm], 14 September 2018, url
43 HRW, Under Kurdish rule. Abuses in PYD-run enclaves of Syria, June 2014, url, p. 1. The YPG militia is also present in
Shaykh Maqsud suburb in Aleppo city, where the majority population is Kurdish. It also holds the area around Tel Rifaat
north-west of the city. In both places, security is coordinated with the Syrian Army. Tel Rifaat was the only part of the
YPG’s autonomous Afrin canton that was not occupied by the Turkish-allied militias in 2018. See: International Crisis
Group, Squaring the Circles in Syria’s North East, Report 204 / Middle East & North Africa, 31 July 2019, url, p. 14;
Reuters, Aleppo district shows Assad’s delicate dance with Kurds, 27 July 2017, url
44 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War. Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, December 2018,
url, p. 59
45 NO-Landinfo reading of Liveuamap, Map of Syrian civil war, 31 July 2019, url
46 International Crisis Group, Squaring the Circles in Syria’s North East, Report 204 / Middle East & North Africa, 31 July
2019, url, p. 3; Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War. Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut,
December 2018, url, pp. 59-60
47 International Crisis Group, Squaring the Circles in Syria’s North East, Report 204 / Middle East & North Africa, 31 July
2019, url, pp. 2, 4–11

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION — 19

attacks in Manbij in January 2019. The two latter attacks, a bomb explosion and an armed attack,killed several dozen people, including SDF soldiers and four US servicemen (see also section 6.3).48
For updated information on the security situation and territorial control in Kurdish controlled
north-east Syria as of 23 October 2019, see Chapter 6.

2.3 Turkish-occupied areas
Local Syrian militia groups allied with Turkey were reported to control an area in the north of Syria
on the Turkish border between the cities of Al-Bab, Jarabulus and Azaz. Turkey intervened in Syria
in 2016 in an operation called ‘Euphrates Shield’, occupying previously IS-held areas, incooperation with rebel militias that had controlled the area around Azaz north of Aleppo for a
prolonged period. In March 2018, Turkey and the local militias attacked Afrin, west of theEuphrates Shield area. Up until then, Afrin had been held by PYD. Around half the population,
primarily Kurds, fled to areas controlled by SDF or the government.49 Tens of thousands arereported to have returned, but many of them found that their homes had either been looted or
taken over by Syrian rebel militias and their families.50 SDF’s leadership vowed to reclaim areas
and launched an armed revolt in Afrin after the Turkish occupation.51
Turkey appeared to be planning a permanent occupation of the area. Turkish authorities helped
local Syrian partners to set up local councils affiliated to the Syrian Interim Government, based in
Gaziantep, in Turkey. Salaries for rebel soldiers, local police forces and public servants were
funded by Turkey. In the Euphrates Shield area, Turkish was taught in schools and new ID cards
were linked to Turkey’s population registry. The ID cards were in both Turkish and Arabic.52
The local Syrian militias were in opposition to both the government in Damascus and to SDF but
are banned by Turkey from attacking targets outside the Turkish-occupied zone. The militias aredescribed as problematic allies for Turkey, as they demonstrated poor discipline and are
constantly clashing with each other.53 Arbitrary arrests, kidnapping for ransom and pillaging werereported to be widespread. The lack of a centralised judicial system made it difficult for the civilian
population to address conflicts that arose. Local armed militias fought amongst themselves forcontrol, and the area saw a series of car bombings. The agricultural land in Afrin was littered withlandmines and explosive remnants.54

2.4 Idlib
Idlib is described by sources as the last rebel stronghold in Syria.55 In this report, the area isreferred to as Idlib for the sake of simplicity, but it also includes neighbouring areas in the

48 International Crisis Group, Squaring the Circles in Syria’s North East, Report 204 / Middle East & North Africa, 31 July

2019, url, pp. 16–20
49 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War. Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, December 2018,
url, p. 53
50 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, 31 January 2019, url, para. 89
51 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War. Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, December 2018,
url, p. 53
52 Norway, Landinfo, Syria: Sivilregistrering i Idlib, 22 February 2019, url, pp. 8, 11; Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War. Government
Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, December 2018, url, pp. 53-54
53 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War. Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, December 2018,
url, pp. 53-54
54 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, 31 January 2019, url, paragraphs 7, 35
55 International Crisis Group, The Best Bad Options for Syria’s Idlib, Middle East Report N°197, 14 March 2019, url, p. 1;
Hinnebusch, R. and Imady, O., Syria’s Reconciliation Agreements, University of St Andrews, 2017, url, p. 9

20 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

provinces of Aleppo, Hama and Latakia. Idlib borders on Turkey and Turkish-occupied Afrin in thenorth and is otherwise surrounded by areas controlled by the government.56
The area has an estimated population of 2.5 million people.57 As of March 2019, more than 1.1
million were internally displaced persons (IDPs).58 For years, Idlib has been a refuge for Syrians
fleeing the government. From and including 2014, the other rebel-held areas surrendered one
after another. Rebel soldiers who refused to accept the government, or who were considered
unacceptable for reconciliation by the Syrian security services, were shipped by bus to Idlib
together with their spouses and children.59 The UN described Idlib as ‘extremely vulnerable’, with
two-thirds of the population in need of humanitarian assistance.60
Acoording to Lund’s report from December 2018, Idlib was controlled by a number of different
militias, but the dominant group was the jihadist organisation, Hay’a Tahrir al-Sham (HTS),
formerly known as the al-Nusra Front. The al-Nusra Front was part of the international al-Qaeda
network. HTS officially denied being part of al-Qaeda but was nonetheless classified as a terrorist
organisation by the UN, the US, EU and Turkey, among others. HTS controlled strategicallyimportant areas such as the city of Idlib and the Bab al-Hawa border crossing to Turkey, the mostimportant supply line into the area.61
The other militias in Idlib can be categorised in two groups. One group consists of militias alliedwith Turkey, grouped together in the National Liberation Front. The other consists of jihadist
organisations, including Hurras ad-Din, which pledged loyalty to al-Qaeda, and Ansar at-Tawhid,
which has allegedly tried to recruit IS members from areas formerly held by IS.62
HTS refused to cooperate with the civilian Syrian opposition, in other words the Turkish-backed
Syrian Interim Government, and has instead set up its own administration called the Syrian
Salvation Government. Turkey has continued to push for the dissolution of HTS, arguing that it is
the only way to avoid an attack by the government, but HTS has resisted so far. At the same time,
HTS has established a pragmatic relationship with Turkey, hoping that limited Turkish influence
over Idlib will help to prevent attacks by the government and its allies, Russia and Iran.63
After a series of trilateral meetings between Russia, Turkey and Iran in Astana, the capital of
Kazakhstan, Idlib was declared a ‘de-escalation zone’ in May 2017. Between October 2017 andMay 2018, Turkey established twelve military observation posts along the front line between Idlib
and the government-controlled areas. This was part of the de-escalation agreement and inagreement with HTS. In September 2018, the ‘Astana countries’ agreed on a demilitarised bufferzone around Idlib, to be patrolled by Turkish soldiers on the Idlib side and Russian soldiers on thegovernment side. The agreement was backed by the Syrian government and Iran. Turkish-allied

56 Liveuamap, Map of Syrian civil war, 31 July 2019, url; Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War. Government Victory or Frozen

Conflict?, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, December 2018, url, p. 54
57 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War. Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, December 2018,
url, p. 52
58 UNOCHA, 2019 Humanitarian Needs Overview. Syrian Arab Republic, March 2019, url, p. 31
59 International Crisis Group, The Best Bad Options for Syria’s Idlib, Middle East Report N°197, 14 March 2019, url, p. 1;
Hinnebusch, R. and Imady, O., Syria’s Reconciliation Agreements, University of St Andrews, 2017, url, p. 9; Lund, A.,
Syria’s Civil War. Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, December 2018, url, pp.
54-55
60 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War. Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, December 2018,
url, pp. 54-55
61 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War. Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, December 2018,
url, pp. 55-56
62 International Crisis Group, The Best Bad Options for Syria’s Idlib, Middle East Report N°197, 14 March 2019, url, p. 21;
Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War. Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, December 2018,
url, pp. 55-56
63 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War. Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, December 2018,
url, pp. 56-58

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION — 21

militias in Idlib also backed the agreement, while HTS maintained an ambivalent position. It was
unwilling to officially endorse the agreement, but did not oppose the Turkish military deployment
either.64
The Sochi agreement of September 2018 calmed the situation along the front line with thegovernment-controlled areas for a period. The situation in the border areas between Idlib and thegovernment-controlled areas was nonetheless unstable throughout the winter of 2018/2019, withseveral clashes in the buffer zone and air raids carried out by the government on civilian areas in
Idlib.65
In early May 2019, the government launched a large-scale attack against the southern parts of
Idlib and northern Hama. Intensive fighting, including artillery fire and air strikes by Syrian andRussian fighter planes, persisted throughout the summer, but did not result in any materialchanges in territorial control until August, when the government seized the city of Khan Shaykhun,
among others.66 By mid-July, approximately 450 000 people had fled the affected areas andheaded north as a result of the warfare, and at least 450 civilians had been reported killed as of
26 July 2019.67

2.5 Tanf
The Tanf border crossing is in the desert in the eastern part of Syria, on the main road between
Damascus and Baghdad, close to the tri-border area between Syria, Iraq and Jordan. US and allied
forces from the Global Coalition Against Daesh have controlled the area since 2016.68
As of December 2018 the coalition reportedly patrolled a 55-km-wide buffer zone around theborder station together with the rebel militia Maghawir al-Thawra. Sporadic attacks by progovernment forces have been repelled by coalition air strikes and artillery fire. For the US, theoccupation of Tanf was originally part of the war against IS. However, the government forces andtheir allies gradually started to take control of the remaining parts of the desert and the inhabitedareas further north along the Euphrates River. Tanf and the buffer zone thus became surroundedby government forces and thereby lost their importance in the fight against IS. US officials
described the occupation of the area as a way of preventing the reopening of the BaghdadDamascus road, in order to thwart Iranian access to Syria and Lebanon.69
The Tanf border crossing and the surrounding areas are in a desolate desert area and contain no
ordinary settlements except the nearby Rukban refugee camp. The camp houses internallydisplaced Syrians who have been denied entry to Jordan. Rukban is on the border between Syria
and Jordan within the 55-km-wide buffer zone, but the coalition forces have steered clear of the

64 International Crisis Group, The Best Bad Options for Syria’s Idlib, Middle East Report N°197, 14 March 2019, url, pp.

4-5; Al-Monitor, Turkish army's Idlib action 'riskiest cross-border operation' to date, 22 May 2018, url
65 International Crisis Group, The Best Bad Options for Syria’s Idlib, Middle East Report N°197, 14 March 2019, url, pp.
4-5; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, 31 January 2019, url, paragraphs 24-29; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 15 August 2019, url, paragraphs 39-42
66 Syria Direct, Khan Sheikhoun exposes the limitations of the Turkish guarantor role, 21 August 2019, url
67 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic. Recent developments in Northwestern Syria. Situation Report no. 8 – as of 26 July
2019, 2019, url, pp. 1-2
68 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War. Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, December 2018,
url, p. 51
69 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War. Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, December 2018,
url, pp. 51-52

22 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

camp, which is dominated by rebel militias, including Mughawir al-Thawra, and armed clans. As of
April 2018, between 30 000 and 50 000 people were confined in the camp.70
Sources reported that the delivery of humanitarian supplies to the camp has been difficult attimes, and a lack of food and fuel supplies has been reported.71 In spring 2019, Russia establishedhumanitarian corridors that enabled some of the camp’s residents to be evacuated togovernment-controlled areas.72 According to UN reporting from 21 July 2019, more than 17 000
people had left Rukban.73

2.6 Islamic StateIn 2017 and 2018, IS lost almost all its territory in Iraq and Syria, but maintained control over asmall area called Baghuz near Albu Kamal in the eastern part of Deir ez-Zor province.74 In April
2019, SDF managed to seize this last IS stronghold. Fighting in the months leading up to thetakeover meant that several tens of thousands of people were displaced and confined in makeshift
camps without sufficient access to health services, food and clean water.75 Moreover, air strikes
by the US-led coalition to support SDF forces on the ground reportedly led to an increase in thenumber of civilian casualties in the same period (winter 2018/19).76
IS has subsequently carried out several ‘hit-and-run’ attacks and bombings from a network ofunderground cells in SDF-held areas in Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa and Manbij (Aleppo governorate) during
the first months of 2019.77 In addition, IS carried out a string of coordinated attacks on several
Druze villages in Sweida in southern Syria on 25 July 2018. IS members went door to door, killing
civilian men, women and children; then they went to the city of Sweida and carried out a suicide
attack that killed at least 200 civilians. In the aftermath, the government launched a counteroffensive to drive IS out of the al-Safa plateau in the eastern Badia desert. The offensive officiallyended on 19 November 2018.78 However, locals claim that the Islamic State has returned to thearea. Local Druze factions in eastern Sweida encountered Islamic State fighters while scouting thearea in March 2019.79
Although IS has lost all its territories in Syria, the organisation is still considered a threat becauseof its extensive experience as an underground movement and its capacity to continue launchingattacks. Moreover, political instability in both Syria and Iraq can provide fertile ground for a newflourishing of the terrorist organisation.80

70 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War. Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, December 2018,

url, p. 52
71 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, 31 January 2019, url, paragraphs 84-86
72 Syria Direct, Hundreds of Rukban camp residents leaving US-administered desert zone board Syrian government
buses, 10 April 2019, url
73 UNOCHA, Humanitarian update, Syrian Arab Republic, Issue 04, 25 July 2019, url, p. 4
74 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War. Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, December 2018,
url, pp. 60-61
75 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, 15 August 2019, url, paragraph 13
76 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, 31 January 2019, url, paragraph 46
77 International Crisis Group, Squaring the Circles in Syria’s North East, Report 204 / Middle East & North Africa, 31 July
2019, url, pp. 16–17
78 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, 31 January 2019, url, paragraphs 38-43
79 Hunaidi, S., ISIS has not been defeated. It’s alive and well in Southern Syria, Foreign Policy, 3 April 2019, url
80 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War. Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, December 2018,
url, p. 61; Heller, S., A glimpse into the Islamic State’s external operations, post-caliphate, War on the Rocks, 29 May

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION — 23

In Deir ez-Zor the majority of the population are organised in tribes and SDF has entered into
reconciliation agreements with tribes allowing imprisoned former IS members to be granted
amnesty and released. However, some tribes have felt threatened by IS to strike deals allowing IS
to operate more or less freely in their tribal area in exchange for a guarantee that tribe members
will not be attacked.81
Updated information on ISIL activity following the October 2019 Turkish offensive into north-east
Syria is available in Chapter 6.

2019, url; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, 31 January 2019, url, paragraph 36
81 International Crisis Group, Squaring the Circles in Syria’s North East, Report 204 / Middle East & North Africa, 31 July
2019, url, p. 20

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3. Intensity and distribution of violenceThis chapter presents data from organisations that endeavour to document and quantify violent
incidents of different types and the number of casualties as a result of conflict-related violence inSyria. The number of violent incidents and casualties are deemed to be important indicators of
the intensity of the violence.
No complete overview is available of the number of violent incidents or conflict-related deaths,
but several local organisations and some international academic institutions are endeavouring toregister and count the number of incidents. The figures presented by the different organisations
vary due to a range of factors. Mainly, this is related to the fact that they use slightly different
methods and because the organisations’ presence and access to information in different parts of
Syria vary. It can also be difficult to distinguish civilian casualties from military ones or to know
exactly who is responsible for the different violent incidents.82
Landinfo’s review of the findings from the different organisations nonetheless shows that thefigures are relatively consistent in the sense that they show the same geographical differences andthe same tendencies over time. Despite shortcomings in the data, they nevertheless give a good
indication of the security situation in different parts of the country and how it has changed overtime.
The figures presented show two main trends. Firstly, they show a downward trend in the level ofviolence in the country as a whole. The number of violent incidents and conflict-related deaths
was far lower in 2018 than earlier in the conflict. The downward trend continued in 2019.
Secondly, the data show great variation between different areas. There were relatively few actsof violence in parts of the government-controlled areas, including the capital of Damascus, thesouthern provinces and the coastal areas north of Lebanon, in the first half of 2019, and a marked
decrease from the year before. This can largely be explained by the government recapturing areas
around Damascus and in the south, thereby ending the military campaign in this part of thecountry.
In other parts of the country, the situation is the opposite. Areas near the active front lines around
Idlib saw many violent incidents and ongoing warfare in 2019. The number of violent incidents
were also high internally in Idlib, in Turkish-occupied areas and in SDF-held areas, relative tocentral areas controlled by the government.

3.1 Number of violent incidents
Landinfo assessed that available statistics show a steady decrease in the number of violent
incidents per month for the country seen as a whole.83 Figures from the International NGO Safety
Organisation (INSO), an organisation dedicated to maintaining the safety of aid workers in conflictareas, show, for example, a marked decrease in violent incidents in 2018. The total number of
security incidents registered by INSO in 2018 was 31 579.84 Graphing incidents across the year

82 Slemrod, A., Counting under fire: the untold story of Syria’s casualty data, New Humanitarian (the), 27 October 2015,url
83 NO-Landinfo drafter assessment
84 INSO’s definition of security incidents includes both crime-related and conflict-related incidents. INSO registers bothmajor incidents, such as bomb explosions, and less serious incidents, such as demonstrations. INSO, Syrian Arab
Republic. Context Analysis, n.d., url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION — 25

2018 started with around 4 000 incidents per month in January, February and March, after which
the figure gradually decreased to around 1 500 incidents from August to December.85
The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) collects data on violent incidents in
Syria, coding each incident with the time and place, type of violent incident, the parties involved
and the number of fatalities. The information is collected in a database that is openly accessible,
searchable and kept continuously up to date. ACLED has data on Syria going back to 1 January
2017. The data primarily come from secondary sources such as media reports. In addition, sinceApril 2019, ACLED has incorporated data from the Syrian Network for Human Rights, Airwars andan additional undisclosed local partner.86
Figures from ACLED show a reduction in the number of violent incidents through 2018, followedby an increase in summer 2019. ACLED classifies violent incidents in the following categories(‘event types’):







battlesviolence against civilians
explosions/remote violenceriots
protests
strategic developments87

When comparing available data on the ACLED dashboard for Syria, it appears that
‘explosions/remote violence,’ which includes artillery fire and air strikes, is the category with thehighest number of individual incidents by far. The figure varied from month to month, but
remained relatively high through 2017, with two peaks of 1 800 individual incidents in January
2017 and almost 1 900 in January 2018. The figure gradually decreased to 450 in October 2018
and then increased again to between 1 250 and 1 350 per month in the period May–July 2019.
Almost all the incidents in May and July 2019 took place in Hama and Idlib provinces and canthereby be linked to the ongoing government offensive in the area (see Section 3.3).
‘Battles (armed clashes)’ is the category with the second most registered incidents. Here, thefigure decreased from 900 in January 2017 to fewer than 200 in August 2018. The monthly figure
has since fluctuated between 100 and 400.88

3.2 Number of conflict-related deaths
Looking at the number of conflict-related deaths, Landinfo assessed that the situation is largely
the same as with violent incidents. Available statistics show a steady decrease in the number offatalities per month for the country as a whole.89
Many international monitoring groups have given up on providing detailed estimates of thenumber of fatalities because of the complexity of the situation and lack of access to first-handinformation.90 The UN stopped publishing statistics on conflict-related deaths in 2014, stating that
it was no longer possible to arrive at accurate figures. The final estimate from 2016, partly basedon UN’s own statistics from 2014, was 400 000. Today, most international experts state that the

85 INSO, Syrian Arab Republic. Context Analysis, n.d., url
86 ACLED, Methodology overview, 10 April 2019, url; ACLED, Press Release: ACLED integrates new partner data on the

war in Syria, 5 April 2019, url
87 ACLED, ACLED Event Definitions, October 2017, url
88 Based on information available from ACLED, Dashboard, nd, url
89 NO-Landinfo assessment
90 New York Times (The), How Syria’s death toll is lost in the fog of war, 13 April 2018, url

26 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

number of fatalities in Syria since the war broke out in 2011 until the present is somewhere around
500 000 or higher, but indicate that these are very rough estimates.91
There are several Syrian organisations that still attempt to keep count, however, the figures vary
between organisations. As mentioned above, this is related to the fact that these organisations
have varying methods, ground presence, and access to information.92
One of the organisations still attempting to document and count the number of conflict-related
deaths is the Violations Documentation Center in Syria (VDC). The VDC was started by Syrian
human rights activists in 2011, shortly after the insurgency broke out.93 The centre’s figures arepresented here because Landinfo considers them to be relatively reliable due to their rigorous
methodology, and because their numbers are conservative compared with other organisations.94
Another reason for using VDC is that their database contains a lot of information about eachdeceased person, including where and when they died, status as a civilian or non-civilian, cause ofdeath and alleged responsible party. The VDC’s data are available online in a searchable format.
This makes it possible to extract data for specific provinces and periods of time. At the time ofwriting, the database contains data up until 31 May 2019.95
The VDC has registered approximately 166 000 fatalities from the time the conflict started in 2011
until May 2019. As mentioned, these are deaths that the VDC has been able to document with afair amount of certainty. The actual figure is far higher, as mentioned. Of 166 000 registeredfatalities, approximately 118 000 of the victims were defined as civilians and 48 000 as military
combatants. The number of deaths increased from just under 5 000 in 2011 to 38 500 in 2012,
peaking at more than 40 000 in 2013. The number has subsequently decreased year by year, with
27 000 fatalities in 2014, 18 000 in 2015, 17 500 in 2016, 11 000 in 2017 and 7 500 in 2018. For
the first five months of 2019, the registered number of fatalities was 1 030. Examining civilian
casualties in isolation, the number peaked already in 2012, at 30 000. The number has
subsequently decreased year by year.96
ACLED has registered approximately 80 000 conflict-related deaths in Syria between January 2017
and February 2019, 26 000 of whom were civilians. The number of fatalities was almost halved
from 2017 to 2018 and continued to decrease in the first two months of 2019.97 ACLED notes thatits data only ‘includes civilians killed as a result of direct civilian targeting’ and ‘does not include
collateral civilian fatalties,’ representing an ‘underestimate’.98 Also, ACLED’s methodology
attributes a count of ‘10’ deaths to events where a report states that ‘several’, ‘many’, ‘few’, plural,or an unknown number of deaths are reported.99

91 SOHR, More than 570 thousand people were killed on the Syrian territory within 8 years of revolution demanding

freedom, democracy, justice, and equality, 15 March 2019, url; New York Times (The), How Syria’s death toll is lost in
the fog of war, 13 April 2018, url
92 New Humanitarian (The), Counting under fire: the untold story of Syria’s casualty data, 27 October 2015, url
93 New Humanitarian (The), Counting under fire: the untold story of Syria’s casualty data, 27 October 2015, url; VDC,
Our methodology, n.d., url
94 The VDC has recruited a network of human rights activists and media activists who collect information about conflictrelated deaths. It also collects information from hospitals, funeral homes, the victims’ families and some local media
institutions. The data are then compared with and cross-checked against available video recordings and images fromconflict events before being entered in the VDC database. The data are verified further and updated as new information
becomes available. VDC, Our methodology, n.d., url
95 VDC, Killed, n.d, url
96 VDC, Killed, n.d, url
97 ACLED, Press release: Even as overall violence drops, civilians face record threats in Syria, 22 March 2019, url
98 ACLED, Press release: Even as overall violence drops, civilians face record threats in Syria, 22 March 2019, url
99 ACLED’s methodology states that ‘If source reports differ or a vague estimate is provided, the lowest number offatalities is reported unless a more reliable or corroborated estimate has become available. If reports mention “several”,“many”, “few” or plural fatalities, yet the exact number is unknown, “10” is recorded as the total. If a report mentions“dozens”, this is recorded as “12” fatalities. If a report mentions “hundreds”, this is recorded as “100” fatalities. If a note

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION — 27

Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) at Uppsala University has registered 347 000 conflictrelated deaths in Syria since the conflict started in 2011. The peak years were 2013 and 2014, withmore than 70 000 fatalities per year, followed by a gradual decrease to under 20 000 fatalities in2018. The UCDP collects data on conflict events resulting in deaths through automatic searches ina variety of news media.100
The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reports a total of 570 000 fatalities since theconflict started but does not present statistics that allow figures for individual months or years to
be extracted. According to SOHR, the total figure includes 112 000 civilians, of whom 21 000 werechildren, 64 000 were members of anti-government and Kurdish militias, 65 000 were government
soldiers and members of pro-government militias, and 65 000 were members of Islamist militias.
SOHR states that 88 000 people have been killed in the government’s prisons and other places ofdetention. They also estimate a further 100 000 casualties that they have been unable todocument.101
The Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) has registered a total of 223 000 civilian fatalities up
until March 2019. The highest number was registered in 2012, with more than 60 000 civilian
deaths, followed by a gradual decrease to 30 000 in 2014 and less than 10 000 in 2018. Most were
killed by Syrian government forces.102
The Syrian Center for Statistics and Research (SCSR) has registered a total of 169 000 fatalities, ofwhom 166 000 were civilians. SCSR registered the highest number in August 2012, with just under
5 000 fatalities in one month, followed by a gradual reduction. For the first five months of 2019,the average number of registered fatalities was about 300 per month. Landinfo assesses that theirdata collection method is not well explained, however, and information is lacking about where in
Syria each person was killed.103

3.3 Which areas were most affected by violence in 2018 and 2019?
Landinfo assessed that the figures presented under Section 3.2 give the impression that the
security situation has improved, given that the number of violent incidents and conflict-related
deaths has decreased considerably. However, this conceals the fact that there are great variations
between different parts of the country.104
In the VDC database, it is possible to search for deaths in specific provinces. The searches done byLandinfo for this report reveal great variations between the provinces. The highest number ofconflict-related deaths in 2018 was registered in Rif Dimashq province, with a total of more than
2 800 fatalities. Rif Dimashq completely surrounds the city of Damascus, which is a separate
province.105
Landinfo assessed that the high numbers in Rif Dimashq can be explained by the fact that, in spring
2018, the government launched the offensive that led to the recapture of the suburbs east ofDamascus, in Rif Dimashq. In June 2018, the government had regained control and the fighting

mentions “massacres”, a default number of 100 fatalities is recorded. If there is no reference made to fatalities in thereport, or if it is unclear whether fatalities occurred at all (for example, when “casualties” are mentioned, which, bydefinition, means ‘injuries and/or fatalities’), “0” fatalities are recorded.’ For more information on the fatalities
methodology used by ACLED, see: ACLED, ACLED Codebook (2019), 10 April 2019, url, p. 31
100 UCDP, Syria, Uppsala University, n.d., url
101 SOHR, More than 570 thousand people were killed on the Syrian territory within 8 years of revolution demanding
freedom, democracy, justice, and equality, 15 March 2019, url
102 SNHR, Toll of civilian victims killed in Syria from March 2011 to January 2019, n.d., url
103 SCSR, Syria – Since march 2011, n.d., url
104 NO-Landinfo drafter assessment
105 English-language sources often refer to Rif Dimashq as Damascus suburbs. VDC, Killed, n.d, url

28 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

ceased. This is reflected in the VDC statistics.106 For example, of the 2 800 fatalities registered in
Rif Dimashq in 2018, almost all died in the first six months of the year. Only 174 deaths wereregistered in the province in the second half of the year.107 INSO also links the marked fall in thenumber of conflict events in 2018 to the government regaining control of the entire Damascus
area and the southern provinces.108
According to VDC, Idlib had the second highest figure in 2018, with more than 1 000 fatalities. Idlib
province has also seen ongoing warfare, including Syrian and Russian air raids in 2018. Of the 1 057
registered fatalities in Idlib in 2018, the cause of death was registered as ‘warplane shelling’ for as
many as 466. The rebel-held areas in Idlib also include parts of Hama, Aleppo and Latakia
provinces. In these provinces, 429 (Hama), 723 (Aleppo) and 54 (Latakia) conflict-related deaths
were registered in 2018.109 Landinfo assessed that based on this information, at least some of thedeaths registered in these provinces were individuals who were in rebel-held areas or near thefront lines.110
For this report, Landinfo looked at the figures for the first five months of 2019, finding great
variations between the provinces; however Idlib now comes out on top, while the figures for Rif
Dimashq are far lower than the year before.111 The VDC only registered 14 conflict-related deathsin Rif Dimashq and 13 in the city of Damascus between 1 January and 31 May 2019. There wereno registered conflict-related deaths in Tartus or Sweida in the same period, only three in
Quneitra, three in Latakia and 18 in Daraa.112 By then, the government had regained control of thesuburbs around Damascus and the southern parts of the country, and the fighting had ceased.
Tartus has been controlled by the government throughout the civil war and has been spared fromdirect warfare in recent years.113 Only 61 conflict-related deaths in total were registered by VDC
in the province during the period 2015–2018.114
In the period January–May 2019, 209 deaths were registered in Idlib, 111 in Aleppo and 248 inHama.115 This must be seen in conjunction with the unrest along the front lines with the rebel-heldarea in Idlib and neighbouring areas in Hama.116 In Deir ez-Zor, 140 deaths were registered in thesame period.117 This area had active IS cells that were responsible for several attacks on
government forces.118
The figures presented by ACLED show a corresponding trend.119 In Rif Dimashq, the number ofregistered violent incidents decreased from more than 500 in February 2018 to 67 in May 2018.
Again, the government’s offensive against the suburbs of Damascus can explain the dramatic
decrease. The southern provinces show the same decreasing trend in the number of violent
incidents after the government regained control of these provinces in spring and summer 2018.
Daraa had 450 registered incidents in June 2018, while the figure from September 2018 to April
2019 has been between 10 and 30 per month. A corresponding trend and strong reduction are
also found in Quneitra, the city of Damascus and Homs after the spring of 2018.120
106 NO-Landinfo drafter assessment
107 VDC, Killed, n.d, url
108 INSO, Syrian Arab Republic. Context Analysis, n.d., url
109 VDC, Killed, n.d, url
110 NO-Landinfo drafter assessment
111 NO-Landinfo drafter assessment
112 VDC, Killed, n.d, url
113 NO-Landinfo drafter assessment
114 VDC, Killed, n.d, url
115 VDC, Killed, n.d, url
116 NO-Landinfo drafter assessment
117 VDC, Killed, n.d, url
118 Carter Center (The), Weekly conflict summary. 15 – 21 July 2019, 2019, url, pp. 5-6
119 NO-Landinfo drafter assessment
120 NO-Landinfo drafter assessment based on ACLED, Dashboard, n.d., url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION — 29

ACLED also produces maps of Syria that show territorial control. The most recent map reflects thesituation during the period April–June 2019.121 The maps are based on data collected by ACLED on
violent incidents broken down by sub-districts.122 On the maps, each sub-district has been assigned
a colour code to show which party is in control.123 Some sub-districts are coded as disputed(coloured black). These are areas in which none of the belligerents has full control.124

Map 3: 2nd Quarter of 2019 (April-June) control map of Syria, © ACLED125

For each group, the colour codes also indicate whether the sub-district is coded as ‘active’ (morethan ten violent incidents registered in the past six months) or inactive (fewer than ten violent

121 The map can be retrieved here url
122 For administrative purposes, Syria is divided into fourteen provinces or governorates (muhafaza, pl. muhafazat),

sixty districts (mintaqa, pl. manatiq) and more than two hundred sub-districts (nahiya, pl. nawahi).
123 A specific group is deemed to have territorial control in a specific sub-district if 1) collected data on violent incidents
show that it has taken control of most of the populated areas in the sub-district, 2) if it is the dominant group in the subdistrict based on its activities (registered violent incidents), or 3) if a specific group has had military control of the subdistrict for a prolonged period and has not been actively challenged. ACLED, Mapping Territorial Control, Contestation,
and Activity in Syria, March 2019, url
124 In contested sub-districts, none of the three criteria for classifying a sub-province as being under the control of a
specific group are met. ACLED, Mapping Territorial Control, Contestation, and Activity in Syria, March 2019, url
125 Muaz, A. and Grinstead, N., The State of Syria April June 2019, ACLED, © 2019 ACLED All rights reserved. Used withpermission from ACLED, n.d., url30 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

incidents registered in the past six months).126 This means that the maps also gives an indicationof which areas are suffering most violence.127
On ACLED’s map for the period April–June 2019, most of the sub-districts in the governmentcontrolled parts of Syria are classified as ‘inactive,’ meaning that fewer than ten violent incidents
have been registered in the past six months. This includes the southern provinces Daraa and
Sweida, Damascus and the surrounding areas (Rif Dimashq), most of Hama and Homs and thecoastal areas north of Lebanon.128
Active sub-districts in government-controlled parts of the country are found in the desert areas in
the east (Homs province) and along the Euphrates Valley (Deir ez-Zor province).129 There wereactive IS cells in this area that were responsible for several attacks on government forces.130 The
sub-districts along the front lines near Idlib are also marked as ‘active’. This is because the areas
have been bombarded by artillery and missiles from rebel-held parts of Idlib in response to thegovernment’s offensive. Moreover, some sub-districts in Daraa in the south changed status from‘inactive’ in March 2019 to ‘active’ in the period April–June 2019. This can be explained by anincreasing number of bombing raids and attacks targeting members of the Syrian Army and the
security forces.131
Large parts of Idlib and the Turkish-occupied areas in the north are classified as either contested
or active. Large parts of the Kurdish-controlled areas in the north-east and the governmentcontrolled areas in Deir ez-Zor province are also classified as active.132
In summary, Landinfo assesses that the figures show great variation and thus indicate considerable
differences in the security situation in different parts of the country. Government-controlled areas
in and around Damascus, southern Syria and the coastal areas north of Lebanon had relatively few
conflict events and conflict-related deaths since summer of 2018 and up to present. At the sametime as the areas in and around Idlib were dominated by armed conflict and saw relatively manyfatalities in the same period.133

126 ACLED, Mapping Territorial Control, Contestation, and Activity in Syria, March 2019, url , p. 7
127 NO-drafter assessment
128 ACLED, The State of Syria. April-June 2019, 12 July 2019, url
129 ACLED, The State of Syria. April-June 2019, 12 July 2019, url
130 Carter Center (The), Weekly conflict summary. 15-21 July 2019, 2019, url, p. 4
131 ACLED, The state of Syria. March 2019, 8 April 2019, url; ACLED, The State of Syria. April-June 2019, 12 July 2019, url
132 ACLED, The state of Syria. March 2019, 8 April 2019, url ; ACLED, The State of Syria. April-June 2019, 12 July 2019, url
133 NO-drafter assessment

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION — 31

4. How does the conflict affect the civilian
population?
This chapter describes how the war has been fought, the type of weapons that have been mostused and the belligerents’ war tactics. The purpose is to explain how the warfare and violence
affect the security of the civilian population.

4.1 Sieges, air strikes and artillery fire
As mentioned above, different armed rebel groups started taking control of parts of the rural areasand some suburbs in 2012. Many of these areas gradually became the scene of intense combat.
The government adopted a ‘kneel and starve’ strategy whereby it besieged rebel-held areas andthen launched a campaign of air strikes from planes and helicopters.134
A large number of neighbourhoods controlled by armed rebel groups were besieged. This meantthat access to workplaces, money, food, water, health services, electricity and gas was restricted
or cut off completely. In several places, the siege tactics led to food shortages and starvation, but
no overview is available of how many people died as a result. The besieged areas were thenbombed in order to force the population to surrender.135
The government was responsible for most of the sieges and was the only side to impose sieges ina widespread, systematic manner across the country.136 However, the tactic was also used by antigovernment militias. IS, for example, besieged government-controlled parts of the city of Deir-ezZor between 2014 and 2017.137 Government-controlled Shia Muslim villages in Idlib were also
besieged by rebel groups for extended periods.138 In spring 2018, the last sieges came to an end
as the government took control of all rebel-held neighbourhoods and villages in Damascus andsouthern Syria. As of May 2018, no areas in Syria was under siege any more.139
The bombings have destroyed civilian buildings and infrastructure and, in some cases, notdistinguished between combatants and civilians. The result has been extensive destruction ofbuildings and entire neighbourhoods, resulting in high civilian losses. In autumn 2018 alone,
before the last offensive against Idlib was launched, dozens of civilians were killed in air raids ontowns and villages in the rebel-held Idlib enclave. According to the UN’s Independent International
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, the Syrian government forces launched dozens
of air raids on civilian areas on at least three occasions in autumn 2018, without specific military
targets, which is tantamount to a war crime.140
The government has also been accused of deliberately attacking hospitals and field clinics in rebelheld areas. The organisation Physicians for Human Rights documented 583 separate bomb attacks

134 Global Rights Compliance, World Peace Foundation, Accountability for Starvation Crimes: Syria, June 2019, url, p. 2;

Holliday, J., Syria’s maturing insurgency, Institute for the Study of War, June 2012, url, pp. 7-8; Holliday, J., The Assadregime. From counterinsurgency to civil war, Institute for the Study of War, March 2013, url, p. 19; Lund, A., Syria’s Civil
War. Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, December 2018, url, p. 18
135 Global Rights Compliance, World Peace Foundation, Accountability for Starvation Crimes: Syria, June 2019, url, pp.
1-4; Siege Watch, Final Report. Out of Sight, Out of Mind: The Aftermath of Syria’s Sieges, May 2018, url, pp. 9–12
136 Siege Watch, Final Report. Out of Sight, Out of Mind: The Aftermath of Syria’s Sieges, May 2018, url, p. 11
137 Global Rights Compliance, World Peace Foundation, Accountability for Starvation Crimes: Syria, June 2019, url, p. 7
138 Al Jazeera, Syria: Buses arrive to evacuate two rebel-besieged Shia towns, 18 July 2018, url
139 Siege Watch, Final Report. Out of Sight, Out of Mind: The Aftermath of Syria’s Sieges, May 2018, url, p. 8
140 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, 31 January 2019, url, paragraph 30

32 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

on 350 different hospitals and health clinics between March 2011 and June 2019, in which 912
healthcare workers were killed. According to the organisation, 90 % of these attacks can be traced
back to the Syrian government and its Russian allies.141
Amnesty International and the UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria have also documented air raids
on health facilities in rebel-held parts of Syria. The frequency of these attacks is said to havemarkedly increased from October 2015, after Russia became involved in the war and began an air
campaign in support of the Syrian government. This led to clinics in rebel-held areas being
established in basements and caves to escape the bombings. UN’s Commission of Inquiry has also
documented air attacks on schools and markets in densely populated neighbourhoods in rebelheld areas.142
In spring and summer 2019, it was primarily the southern part of Idlib and the northern part ofHama that experienced air raids and artillery fire as a result of the government’s ongoing offensive.
As mentioned above, by mid-July, approximately 450 000 people had fled the affected areas andgone north as a result of this warfare, and at least 450 civilians had been killed by 26 July 2019.143

4.2 Terrorist attacks and bombings
The Global Terrorism Index defines terrorism as ‘[…] the threatened or actual use of illegal force
and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal throughfear, coercion, or intimidation’.144 Violence committed by a state actor falls outside the definition.
This means that attacks carried out by the Syrian government are not included in the GTI
statistics.145
Bombings and other forms of terrorist attacks have occurred frequently during the conflict, but
the number has decreased in the last few years.146 The Global Terrorism Index, which analyses
trends in terrorist attacks around the world, registered a total of 2 110 fatalities from terrorist
attacks in Syria in 2016, and 1 096 in 2017, which is a reduction of almost 50 %. The figures do not
distinguish between military and civilian victims.147
In 2017, Syria was ranked fifth in the world in terms of deaths resulting from terrorist attacks, after
Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria and Somalia.148 Figures for 2018 have not yet been published. IS was
responsible for 63 % of the registered deaths from terrorist attacks in Syria in 2017. Approximately
three-quarters of all attacks that year took place in four provinces: Aleppo, Damascus, Deir ez-Zor
and Homs.149

141 PHR, Physicians for Human Rights’ findings of attacks on health care in Syria, 2019, url
142 AI, Syrian and Russian forces targeting hospitals as a strategy of war, 3 March 2016, url; UN Human Rights Council,

Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 1 February 2018, url,paragraphs 72-76; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the
Syrian Arab Republic, 31 January 2019, url, paragraph 23
143 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic. Recent developments in Northwestern Syria. Situation Report no. 8 – as of 26 July
2019, 2019, url, pp. 1-2
144 IEP, Global Terrorism Index 2018. Measuring the impact of terrorism, November 2018, url, p. 6
145 IEP states that: ‘In order to be included as an incident in the GTD, the act has to be ‘an intentional act of violence orthreat of violence by a non-state actor.’ This means an incident has to meet three criteria in order for it to be counted
as a terrorist act: 1. The incident must be intentional - the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator;
2. The incident must entail some level of violence or threat of violence - including property damage as well as violenceagainst people; 3. The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors. This database does not include acts ofstate terrorism. IEP, Global Terrorism Index 2018. Measuring the impact of terrorism, November 2018, url, p. 6
146 NO-drafter assessment
147 IEP, Global Terrorism Index 2018. Measuring the impact of terrorism, November 2018, url, pp. 12, 22
148 IEP, Global Terrorism Index 2018. Measuring the impact of terrorism, November 2018, url, p. 12
149 IEP, Global Terrorism Index 2018. Measuring the impact of terrorism, November 2018, url, p. 22

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION — 33

As mentioned earlier, the number of conflict-related deaths decreased dramatically after thegovernment regained control of former rebel-held areas, including around Damascus and in thesouth.150 Attacks of different kinds have nonetheless been carried out in the area also after thechange of control. For example, the Carter Center states that six bombings and attacks using
explosives were carried out south of Damascus and in the southern provinces between 15 and 21
July 2019. The attacks targeted members of the government’s armed forces. No information has
been provided about possible civilian victims. In total, the Carter Center has registered more than
30 bomb attacks in the three southernmost provinces Daraa, Quneitra and Sweida from August
2018 to July 2019.151
IS cells were reportedly active in the desert east of Homs province and along the Euphrates Riverin the provinces of Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa. In total, IS carried out more than one hundred attacks
in these areas in the first half of 2019. The number of attacks increased up until April 2019,
followed by a decrease. IS has also attacked SDF personnel in SDF-held areas in the north-east,
with 36 attacks in July alone. The city of Hasakah has been especially hard-hit, with more than 40
bombings from July 2018 to July 2019, mostly in the southern part of the city.152
In Turkish-occupied areas in the north of Syria, the conflict between the many Turkish-allied armed
rebel groups has led to frequent confrontations, armed clashes and bombings, including the useof car bombs. Most of the attacks have taken place in the densely populated areas around thecities of Afrin and Azaz. Dozens of civilians are reported to have been killed or injured in suchattacks in the second half of 2018.153

4.3 Arrests, detentions and abductions
The government’s security forces, the police, the Army, pro-government militias and the different
branches of the intelligence service carried out extensive arrest campaigns during the first yearsof the civil war. Already in 2012, it was estimated that tens of thousands of people had beenarrested on the grounds of alleged affiliation to or support for anti-government groups. Those who
were arrested were subjected to systematic torture in one of the intelligence services’ many
detention centres. They were detained for days or months, often without being brought before ajudge and without being told what they were accused of. In most cases, the detainees’ families
were not informed of their whereabouts. Detainees were held in crowded cells and without
sufficient food.154
Many are assumed to have died while in detention as a result of torture, starvation or lack ofadequate medical assistance. In January 2014, more than 50 000 photos of dead people were
smuggled out of Syria by a person using the code name ‘Caesar,’ who claimed to be a forensic
photographer for the military police. Among other things, the photos showed between six andseven thousand individuals said to have died in the government’s custody. It has subsequently
been verified that some of the victims were persons detained by the government’s security
forces.155 In the first half of 2018, information about tens of thousands of people who had died in
150 ACLED, Dashboard, n.d., url; VDC, Killed, n.d, url
151 The Carter Center also has a dedicated team that has been collecting data on conflict events in Syria since 2012. The

organisation publishes weekly updates on security incidents in the country. Carter Center (the), Weekly conflictsummary. 15-21 July 2019, 2019, url, pp. 4-6
152 Carter Center (The), Weekly conflict summary. 15-21 July 2019, 2019, url, pp. 4-6
153 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, 31 January 2019, url, para. 35
154 EIP, Refugee return in Syria: Dangers, security risks and information scarcity, July 2019, url, pp. 10–11; HRW, Torturearchipelago. Arbitrary arrests, torture, and enforced disappearances in Syria’s underground prisons since March 2011,
July 2012, url, pp. 12–14
155 EIP, Refugee return in Syria: Dangers, security risks and information scarcity, July 2019, url, pp. 14-15; HRW, If thedead could speak. Mass deaths and torture in Syria’s detention facilities, December 2015, url, pp. 1–7

34 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

detention was communicated to the civil registries, which subsequently registered them as
deceased and informed their families.156
According to reports in 2019, the government has continued its practice of arresting alleged
members and supporters of anti-government groups until the present, including in areas that the
government has reclaimed from rebel groups. Activists, persons who have recently returned fromrebel-held areas, and deserters, among others, have been arrested by the government.157
According to UN reporting from January 2019, a large number of armed rebel groups and criminal
networks have reportedly been responsible for abductions and deprivation of liberty. In Idlib,
police forces working under Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s ‘Salvation Government’ arrested many
civilians critical of the organisation or who break with its narrow interpretation of Islamic law(sharia). Those arrested were reported to be subjected to torture and abuse in detention as amatter of routine. The UN reported that courts organised under the Salvation Government did notoperate in accordance with international standards of law. Moreover, in both Idlib and theTurkish-occupied Afrin, there were many examples of civilians being abducted by armed groups
demanding a ransom from the victims’ families.158

4.4 Landmines and explosive remnants of war
Landmines, roadside bombs (or IEDs/improvised explosive devices) and explosive remnants of war
are widespread in Syria. According to the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), thefollowing groups are particularly vulnerable to the threat of such explosives: children who pick up
dangerous items from the ground, agricultural workers who plough the land and internallydisplaced persons who may enter areas without knowing the local risks. In the provinces of Aleppo,
Daraa, Rif Dimashq (Rural Damascus), Idlib, Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor, landmines, explosives and IEDs
have caused injuries and deaths. According to UNMAS, more than ten million Syrians live incommunities reporting either landmines, explosive remnants or IEDs. In the city of Raqqa alone,several hundred people were killed by explosives shortly after returning to the city in 2018.159
The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) has stated that children were as much at risk in Syria
in 2018 as earlier in the conflict. In 2018, 1 106 children were killed as a result of the armed conflict.
That is the highest number of conflict-related child deaths in one year since the conflict started.
Landmines, IEDs and explosive remnants were the number one cause by far of conflict-relatedchild deaths. They are reported to have killed 434 children in total in 2018.160

4.5 Humanitarian conditions
The armed conflict has led to extensive, complex humanitarian challenges. According to the UN’s
estimates, 11.7 million people, more than half the population of Syria, are in need of one or more
forms of humanitarian aid. This is a reduction since the peak year 2017, when the number was
estimated to be 13.5 million. People in this category lack basic necessities such as health services,shelter, food, education or water and sanitary services. In 2015, it was estimated that 83 % of the

156 EIP, Refugee return in Syria: Dangers, security risks and information scarcity, July 2019, url, pp. 14–15, 23; UN Human

Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 31 January
2019, url, para. 75
157 EIP, Refugee return in Syria: Dangers, security risks and information scarcity, July 2019, url , pp. 14–15, 23; UN Human
Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 31 January
2019, url , para. 73
158 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, 31 January 2019, url , paragraphs 51, 64-66
159 UNMAS, Syria. Explosive Hazard Contamination, March 2019, url
160 UNICEF, 2018 deadliest year yet for children in Syria as war enters 9th year, 10 March 2019, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION — 35

population lived in poverty, and the situation is reported to have further deteriorated in recent
years. According to the UN’s 2019 humanitarian needs overview, one-third of the population are
estimated to experience food insecurity, and in some areas, there are local communities where
people suffer from acute malnutrition. Almost half the country’s health facilities have been either
partly or completely destroyed. More than one in three schools are damaged or destroyed.161

4.6 Refugees and internally displaced persons
The conflict has also triggered a large-scale refugee crisis. While about 5.6 million have fled toneighbouring countries, most of them between 2013 and 2016; 6.2 million people are internallydisplaced, some more than once, according to 2019 sources. In 2018 alone, 1.6 million people
were displaced, most of them during the first six months of the year as a result of increasing
violence in Idlib and northern parts of Hama as well as in Eastern Ghouta outside Damascus. Far
fewer fled in the second half of 2018, despite fighting in the southern provinces. A total of 1.4
million internally displaced persons returned to their homes in 2018.162
Intense fighting in southern Idlib and northern Hama since April 2019 gave rise to new large waves
of displacement. The UN stated that more than 450 000 people were displaced from the area
between mid-May and mid-July 2019 as a result of the conflict. Most moved further north in Idlib
and to Turkish-occupied areas.163

161 UNOCHA, 2019 Humanitarian Needs Overview. Syrian Arab Republic, March 2019, url, pp. 5-12
162 NRC, 8 facts after 8 years of conflict in Syria, 15 March 2019, url; UN OCHA, 2019 Humanitarian Needs Overview.

Syrian Arab Republic, March 2019, url, pp. 5, 14; UNHCR, Syria Regional Refugee Response, Syria Regional Refugee
Response, url
163 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic. Recent developments in Northwestern Syria. Situation Report no. 8 – as of 26 July
2019, 2019, url, pp. 1-2

36 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

5. Concluding remarks on the security
situation
5.1 Ongoing warfare in Idlib
The southern parts of Idlib province and northern parts of Hama were most severely affected byviolence in summer 2019. The government’s offensive against rebel groups in this area consisted,among other things, of a prolonged air campaign that also impacted the civilian population andinfrastructure. Some of the deadliest bombings occurred on 16 July 2019, when a market in Maar
Shurin in Idlib was bombed, killing 12 people, and on 22 July, when a market in Maarat an-Numan
in Idlib was bombed, killing 39 people, including eight women and five children. In total, 59 civilians
are reported to have been killed that day, and more than 100 injured. The Office of the UN HighCommissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has, as of 26 July, registered at least 450 deaths as aresult of the offensive that started in May.164
The VDC documented a total of 1 032 conflict-related deaths in Syria in the first five months of
2019. Of these deaths, nearly half occurred in the provinces of Idlib (209, of whom 189 were
civilians) and Hama (248, of whom 169 were civilians). Most of those who died were killed by the
Syrian Army and the cause of death registered as ‘shelling’, ‘explosion’ or ‘shooting’.165
The government-controlled side of the front line in Idlib and Hama was also affected by attacks
with missiles and artillery grenades fired by anti-government militias. Dozens of attacks arereported to have taken place in the second quarter of 2019.166

5.2 Decrease in violent incidents in government-controlled areas
Large parts of the government-controlled areas saw relatively few violent incidents in the first halfof 2019. In the city of Damascus and Rif Dimashq (Damascus suburbs), the VDC registered 13 (ofwhom 11 civilians) and 14 (of whom 10 civilians) conflict-related deaths in the first five months of
2019. As mentioned, this is a marked decrease from the year before.167 Violent incidents still occur
in Damascus, however. On 22 July 2019, for example, explosives were attached to a car that
subsequently exploded in the Qadam district in the southern part of Damascus. A local leader ofa pro-government militia and his driver were allegedly killed. IS has claimed responsibility, but it
is still uncertain who was actually behind the attack. It was the eighth IED attack in the capital so
far in 2019. This type of activity has increased since April 2019.168
The number of fatalities was also low in other government-controlled provinces in the first half of
2019: 0 in Tartus, 3 in Latakia, 0 in Sweida and 3 in Quneitra.169 ACLED’s conflict map for the period
April–June 2019 also shows that nearly all the sub-districts in these government-controlled
provinces were coded as ‘inactive,’ with fewer than ten conflict events per month.170

164 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic. Recent developments in Northwestern Syria. Situation Report no. 8 – as of 26 July

2019, 2019, url, p. 2
165 VDC, Killed, n.d, url
166 ACLED, The State of Syria. April-June 2019, 12 July 2019, url
167 VDC, Killed, n.d, url
168 Carter Center (The), Weekly conflict summary. 22 – 28 July 2019, 2019, url, p. 4; ISW, Syria situation report: July 10– 23, 2019, 25 July 2019, url
169 VDC, Killed, n.d, url
170 ACLED, The State of Syria. April-June 2019, 12 July 2019, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION — 37

Three separate areas within the government-controlled area had sub-districts classified as ‘active’
on ACLED’s conflict map from July 2019. Firstly, the sub-districts near the front lines in Idlib wereclassified as ‘active’ as a result of rebel groups from Idlib bombarding the area with missiles andartillery in response to the government offensive. Secondly, several sub-districts in the desert
areas in the eastern part of Homs and neighbouring areas in the southern part of Deir ez-Zor wereclassified as ‘active’.171 There were active IS cells in this area that were responsible for several
attacks on government forces.172 The VDC registered 91 conflict-related deaths in Homs in the first
five months of 2019, 65 of whom were civilians; and 140 in Deir ez-Zor, 96 of whom were
civilians.173 It is impossible to say for certain where in the provinces these deaths occurred,however.174
Thirdly, several sub-districts in Daraa and one in Sweida were classified as ‘active’ on ACLED’s map
for the period April–June 2019. This represents a change from the first quarter of 2019, whenthese areas were classified as inactive. The change in status is due to IED attacks and assassinationsof members of the Syrian Army and pro-government militias.175 In July 2019, a total of 38 attacks
were documented in southern Syria in July 2019, killing 16 and injuring 11, an increase fromprevious months.176 The VDC registered 18 conflict-related deaths in Daraa in the first half of 2019and none in Sweida.177

5.3 Internal violent conflicts in the Turkish-occupied zone
Local armed militias allied with Turkey have fought among themselves for control, and the area
has seen a series of bombings in the past year. On average, ten different IED attacks have takenplace per month in the first six months of 2019. Extrajudicial arrests, kidnapping for ransom,
pillaging and confiscation of property are also widespread, according to two sources from 2019.
The lack of a centralised judicial system made it difficult for the civilian population to address
conflicts that arose. The agricultural land in Afrin was reported to be littered with landmines andexplosive remnants that have caused civilian casualties.178

5.4 Attacks in SDF-held areas in the north-east
Since IS lost the last of its territory in March 2019, the organisation changed its strategy andbecome more active as an underground movement. The number of IS attacks on SDF personnel
increased in the first half of 2019.179 Between 10 and 25 IED attacks targeting SDF personnel werecarried out per month between January and June 2019, increasing to more than 40 attacks in
July.180 IS carried out two relatively large attacks in Manbij in January 2019, a bomb explosion andan armed attack, killing several dozens, including SDF soldiers and four US servicemen.181

171 ACLED, The State of Syria. April-June 2019, 12 July 2019, url
172 Carter Center (The), Weekly conflict summary. 15 – 21 July 2019, 2019, url, p. 4
173 VDC, Killed, n.d, url
174 NO-drafter assessment
175 ACLED, The State of Syria. April-June 2019, 12 July 2019, url; Carter Center (The), Weekly conflict summary. 22 – 28

July 2019, 2019, url, pp. 3-4
176 Haid, H., Syria war: Who is behind the anti-regime attacks in Daraa?. Middle East Eye, 5 August 2019, url
177 VDC, Killed, n.d, url
178 Carter Center (The), Weekly conflict summary. 22 – 28 July 2019, 2019, url, p. 3; UN Human Rights Council, Report of
the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 31 January 2019, url, paragraphs 6,35
179 International Crisis Group, Squaring the Circles in Syria’s North East, Report 204 / Middle East & North Africa, 31 July
2019, url, p. 16
180 Carter Center (The), Weekly conflict summary. 22 – 28 July 2019, 2019, url, p. 5
181 International Crisis Group, Squaring the Circles in Syria’s North East, Report 204 / Middle East & North Africa, 31 July
2019, url, pp. 16-20

38 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATIONAs of August 2019 SDF controlled the city of Hasakah and parts of Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa and Aleppo
provinces. In Hasakah, the VDC registered 78 conflict-related deaths in the first five months of
2019, 16 of whom were civilians. In the other provinces, 140 deaths were registered in Deir ez-Zor(96 civilians), 43 in Raqqa (34 civilians) and 111 in Aleppo (95 civilians), but it is not possible toascertain whether or not these deaths occurred in SDF-held areas.182 ACLED’s conflict map for theperiod April–June 2019 showed that about one third of the administrative sub-districts in the SDFheld areas were ‘active’ at that time, with more than ten security incidents registered in each ofthese sub-districts in the past six months. This was also the case for the north-eastern parts of Deirez-Zor province and the south-western parts of Hasakah, as well as the sub-district of Raqqa, which
includes the city of Raqqa.183
For more information on security developments in SDF-held areas see Chapter 6.

182 VDC, Killed, n.d, url
183 ACLED, The State of Syria. April-June 2019, 12 July 2019, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION — 39

6. New developments to the security
situation (October 2019)
6.1 Turkish offensive in north-east Syria
In the beginning of October 2019, after a phonecall between US President Donald Trump andTurkish President Tayyip Erdogan, US troops began to withdraw from Syria’s northern border withTurkey, giving way to an announced Turkish military offensive into northern Syria against theKurdish-controlled SDF.184 Official representatives of the US announced the development, statingthat ‘the United States Armed Forces will not support or be involved in the [Turkish] operation,and United States forces, having defeated the Isis territorial “Caliphate”', will no longer be in theimmediate area’.185
On 9 October 2019, Turkey together with affiliated armed groups, launched a military offensive
into Kurdish-held territory in northeastern Syria following the withdrawal of US troops from theregion.186 The stated objective of the Turkish offensive was to remove Kurdish-led forces fromalong the border area and establish a ‘safe zone’ 32-kilometre wide and 480-kilometre long in
northern Syria, where Turkey intends to relocate up to two million Syrian refugees currently
residing in Turkey.187
In the first week of the offensive, Turkish and affiliated forces captured the towns of Tell Abiad in
Raqqa and Ras al-Ain in Hasaka governorates, as well as part of the M4 international highway
linking the Kurdish troops between the two governorates.188 In mid-October 2019, Kurdish-led SDF
forces, who were in control of northeast Syria, announced an agreement with the Syrian
government forces, who entered the region to deter Turkey from attacking.189
On 17 October 2019, a five-day ceasefire was reached following negotiations between Turkish
President Erdogan and US Vice President Mike Pence. Turkey agreed to pause its offensive to allow
Kurdish forces to pull 30 kilometres back from the Turkey-Syria border where Turkey aims toestablish the ‘safe zone’.190 Accusations of violating the ceasefire were voiced by both sides andfighting continued to be reported including in the towns of Lazqa, Marikiz, Bab al-Khair and Qabr
Sheikh Hussein in Ras Al Ain, according to sources reporting in late October 2019.191
On 20 October 2019, a senior official of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) announced
the withdrawal of Kurdish forces and evacuation of civilians from the besieged border town of Ras
al-Ain. The forces were reportedly expected to initially move back 30 kilometres from the borderwith a subsequent retreat from a 120km area between the towns of Ras al-Ain and Tal Abyad to
184 Washington Post (The), Trump administration pulls troops from northern Syria as Turkey readies offensive, 07

October 2019, url
185 BBC, Trump makes way for Turkey operation against Kurds in Syria, 7 October 2019, url
186 Al Jazeera, Turkey's military operation in Syria: All the latest updates, 11 October 2019, url
187 International Crisis Group, Averting an ISIS Resurgence in Iraq and Syria, 11 October 2019, url, p. 22; BBC, TurkeySyria offensive: Kurds reach deal with Syrian army, 14 October 2019, url; HRW, Turkey’s ‘Safe Zone’ Would Be Anything
But, 11 October 2019, url
188 ACLED, Regional Overview – Middle East (6-12 October 2019), 15 October 2019, url
189 Al Jazeera, Syria's army to deploy along Turkey border as Kurds strike deal, 14 October 2019, url; New York Times(The), Abandoned by U.S. in Syria, Kurds Find New Ally in American Foe, 14 October 2019, url
190 Al Jazeera, US, Turkey agree on Turkish ceasefire with Syrian Kurds, 17 October 2019, url; Guardian (The), Erdogan
says Turkey to resume Syria offensive if truce deal falters, 19 Octoeber 2019, url
191 UNOCHA, Syria ǀ Flash Update #7, Humanitarian impact of the military operation in northeastern Syria, 16-18 October
2019, 18 October 2019, url, p. 2; Al Jazeera, Turkey, Kurds trade accusations as Syria truce largely holds, 19 October
2019, url40 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

follow.192 On 21 October 2019 SDF announced that all of the Kurdish fighters belonging to thegroup evacuated the town of Ras al-Ain.193

Map 4, Situation in Northeast Syria: 21 October 2019, ©ISW

On 23 October 2019, Turkey and Russia signed an agreement to remove YPG fighters from theenvisaged Turkish ‘safe zone’. The removal of YPG forces was reportedly to be overseen by Russianand Syrian government forces after which Russian and Turkish forces would run joint patrols
around the area.194 According to the deal, Turkey ‘will control a 32km-wide (20 miles) area
between the towns of Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ain, which covers 120km (75 miles) of the TurkishSyrian border’. The area around the predominantly Kurdish city of Qamishli is not included in thedeal and no further details were given.195 According to the Center for Operational Analysis andResearch (COAR), an independent social enterprise, ‘the YPG will also be forced to withdraw fromTel Rifaat and Menbij, which will presumably come under Government of Syria control’.196
Following the agreement, Turkey announced that it would not resume its offensive.197 Further
details on the developments of this agreement could not be found within the time constraints.
As of 20 October 2019, at least 176 400 people, including an estimated 74 000 children have been
displaced from Aleppo, Hasaka and Raqqa governorates following the offensive. 18 500 people
were reported to have returned, primarly to Tel Abiad in Raqqa governorate and Qamishli in
Hasaka governorate according to a UNOCHA update from 20 October 2019.198

192 Al Jazeera, Kurdish forces agree to withdraw from Turkey-Syria border, 20 October 2019, url
193 CNN, US troops leave Syria and cross into Iraq where some will stay, 21 October 2019, url
194 Al Jazeera, Turkey, Russia reach deal for YPG move out of Syria border area, 23 October 2019, url
195 BBC, Turkey Syria offensive: Erdogan and Putin strike deal over Kurds, 23 October 2019, url
196 COAR, Syria Update: 16-22 October 2019, 23 October 2019, url , p. 4
197 New York Times (The), Turkey Halts Syrian Incursion, Hours After Deal with Russia, 23 October 2019, url
198 UNOCHA, Syria ǀ Flash Update #7, Humanitarian impact of the military operation in northeastern Syria, 19-20 October

2019, url, p. 1

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION — 41

According to the SOHR, as of 19 October 2019, there were 86 civilian fatalities recorded, including
21 children, while Kurdish authorities claimed that 218 civilians, including 18 children, were killedduring the first week of the offensive.199

6.2 Syrian government gains
Following the start of Turkey’s offensive against the Kurdish controlled northeast Syria in the
beginning of October 2019, the Syrian government and the Kurdish-controlled SDF announced anagreement to allow the Syrian government’s troops to be deployed along the border with Turkey
to assist Kurdish forces in repelling the Turkish offensive. The agreement also envisaged that
Turkish occupied areas in Syria such as Afrin are to be reconquered.200
At the end of September 2019, the Syrian army and affiliated armed groups were reported to havetaken positions on the eastern bank of the Euphrates River near the towns of Salihiyah, Hatlah,
Husseiniyah and Tabiyah, located close to Deir Ez Zor city.201 As of 14 October 2019, the Syrian
government’s forces were reported to be deployed to Ain Issa, Raqqa governorate in northern
Syria.202 On 15 October, the Syrian government forces were also reported to have entered thepreviously Kurdish-controlled city of Manbij, in northern Aleppo governorate. Russian state media
quoted the Russian Defence Ministry claim that the Syrian government forces had ‘full control’ of
the city.203 On 16 October, Syrian government forces entered the city of Kobane, Aleppo
governorate, which has been a stronghold of the SDF.204 Russian troops reportedly accompanied
the Syrian government forces in regaining control of the Kurdish-controlled territories.205

199 SOHR, 10 days of Operation “Peace Spring”: Turkey controls an area equivalent to a quarter of the size of Lebanon.

Turkish-backed factions continue its violations and breach the “ceasefire”, and the death toll among the “SDF”, theregime, Turkish forces and factions loyal to it rises to 449, 19 October 2019, url; Reuters, Kurdish-led health authority innortheast Syria says 218 civilians killed in Turkish offensive, 17 October 2019, url
200 Al Jazeera, Syria's army to deploy along Turkey border as Kurds strike deal, 14 October 2019, url; New York Times(The), Abandoned by U.S. in Syria, Kurds Find New Ally in American Foe, 14 October 2019, url
201 ISW, Syria Situation Report: September 25 – October 10 2019, 11 October 2019, url
202 Al Jazeera, Turkey's military operation in Syria: All the latest updates, 14 October 2019, url; Reuters, Syrian
Observatory: government forces deploy to Ain Issa in northern Syria, 14 October 2019, url
203 DW, Russia-backed Syrian forces enter key city Manbij in northern Syria, 15 October 2019, url
204 Defense Post (The), Syrian army troops enter symbolic Kurdish city of Kobani, 16 October 2019, url
205 New Yorker (The), Turkey, Syria, the Kurds, and Trump’s Abandonment of Foreign Policy, 20 October 2019, url;
Defense Post (The), Syrian army troops enter symbolic Kurdish city of Kobani, 16 October 2019, url42 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

Map 5: Control of Terrain in Syria: 21 October 2019, ©ISW

6.3 US withdrawal
After the launch of the Turkish offensive on Kurdish controlled areas in north east Syria at the
beginning of October 2019, the US took the decision to withdraw almost 1 000 troops from
northern Syria, although no information on the timeframe for the withdrawal or where the troops
will be redeployed was given.206 On 20 October 2019, the New York Times, citing a senior US
official, reported that President Trump is leaning towards keeping a contingent of about 200
troops in eastern Syria to fight ISIL and block the Syrian government’s forces and Russian allies
from taking the region’s oil fields.207 As of 21 October 2019, US officials announced that American
troops from north east Syria will be redeployed in western Iraq leaving behing a small force toprotect the oil fields in the region from ISIL attacks.208 As of 22 October 2019, the forces of the USled coalition had reportedly whitdrawn from ‘nearly all of its bases in Raqqa and Aleppo
provinces’.209

206 BBC, Turkey-Syria offensive: US to evacuate 1,000 troops as Turkey advances, 13 October 2019, url
207 New York Times (The), Trump Said to Favor Leaving a Few Hundred Troops in Eastern Syria, 20 October 2019, url
208 CNN, US troops leave Syria and cross into Iraq where some will stay, 21 October 2019, url
209 ISW, Syria Situation Report: October 10 – 22 2019, 24 October 2019, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION — 43

6.4 Impact of the offensive on IS
Prior to the Turkish offensive into northern Syria SDF leaders stated that their first priority will be
to defend their territories rather than securing IS prisoners held in the region.210 Following thestart of Turkey’s offensive into Kurdish-controlled areas in northeast Syria in October 2019, there
have been reports of detainees affiliated with IS escaping from displacement camps. An estimated
750 to 850 women and children linked to IS were reported to having escaped from the Ain Issa
camp, in Raqqa governorate following Turkish bombardments in the area. There were also reportsof IS cells carrying out attacks from within the camp and riots prior to the escape.211 According to
Kurdish forces’ information cited in the Guardian in mid-October 2019, ISIL sleeper cells andsuicide bombers were reported to be active in the region, attempting to liberate its former fightersfrom the prisons.212

210 International Crisis Group, Averting an ISIS Resurgence in Iraq and Syria, 11 October 2019, url; Guardian (The), Kurdish

forces in Syria will no longer prioritise guarding Isis prisons, 12 October 2019, url
211 Guardian (The), At least 750 Isis affiliates escape Syria camp after Turkish shelling, 13 October 2019, url; Defense Post
(The), ISIS families escape Ain Issa camp in northeast Syria after Turkish bombardment, 13 October 2019, url
212 Guardian (The), Kurdish forces in Syria will no longer prioritise guarding Isis prisons, 12 October 2019, url44 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

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Terms of Reference

Who are in control over the different parts of the country?

What groups provide security in government controlled areas, i.e. army, police,
security services, militias?

In which parts of the country are there ongoing military clashes?

In what areas are civilians killed or injured due to violence, and how has thischanged over time?

What kinds of security threats are civilians faced with, i.e. bombings, sieges,
IEDs/terror attacks, unexploded ordinance, arrest/kidnappings, foodinsecurity/lack of medical treatment/other humanitarian issues?

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doi: 10.2847/267982