Country of Origin Information
February 2023

Somalia:

Defection, desertion anddisengagement from Al-Shabaab

Manuscript completed in February 2023
Neither the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) nor any person acting on behalf of the
EUAA is responsible for the use that might be made of the information contained within thispublication.
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2023
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ISBN 978-92-9400-797-1 doi: 10.2847/821510 BZ-03-22-161-EN-N© European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), 2023
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Aerial view of a typical homestead on the outskirts of the southern Somali port city of Kismayo,
04 October 2012
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SOMALIA: DEFECTION, DESERTION AND DISENGAGEMENT FROM AL-SHABAAB

Acknowledgements
This report was written by the COI Sector of the EUAA. The following departments andorganisations have reviewed the report, together with EUAA:•••

Germany, Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), Country Analysis
Belgium, Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons,
CEDOCA – Documentation and Research Center
Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation(ACCORD)

It must be noted that the review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts ororganisations contributes to the overall quality of the report but does not necessarily imply
their formal endorsement of the final report, which is the full responsibility of EUAA.

3

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMContents
Acknowledgements............................................................................................................ 3Contents ............................................................................................................................ 4
Disclaimer .......................................................................................................................... 6
Glossary and abbreviations ................................................................................................ 7
Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 9
Methodology................................................................................................................................................ 9
Defining the terms of reference....................................................................................... 9
Terminology............................................................................................................................. 9
Collecting information........................................................................................................ 10
Research challenges .......................................................................................................... 10
Quality control ........................................................................................................................11
Sources ..........................................................................................................................................................11
Structure and use of the report.............................................................................................................11
Map................................................................................................................................... 12
1.

Overview and State policy...................................................................................... 13
1.1. Formal and informal pathways to disengage from Al-Shabaab ......................................13
1.2. Government policy/programmes and amnesty proclamations .......................................15
1.2.1. Current policy and amnesty proclamations ....................................................15
1.2.2. National Programme for the Treatment and the Handling ofDisengaged Combatants and the Defector Rehabilitation Programme,
including screening procedures .....................................................................................16
1.2.3. Registration and screening of high and low-risk profiles........................... 17
1.2.4. The Defectors’ Rehabilitation Programme.....................................................22
1.2.5. Overview of rehabilitation centres and capacity..........................................23

2.

Profiles and sub-profiles........................................................................................ 30
2.1. Men...................................................................................................................................................... 30
2.1.1. Disengagement factors and consequences................................................. 30
2.1.2. Informal pathways and consequences, including Al-Shabaab targeting33
2.1.3. Formal pathways and consequences for disengagement from AlShabaab ..................................................................................................................................35
2.1.4. Consequences for defectors/deserters’ family members .........................41

SOMALIA: DEFECTION, DESERTION AND DISENGAGEMENT FROM AL-SHABAAB

2.2. Women................................................................................................................................................422.2.1. Options for leaving..................................................................................................422.2.2. Informal pathways and consequences for disengaging ...........................44
2.2.3. Formal pathways and consequences ............................................................. 50
2.2.4. Consequences for women’s family members...............................................52
2.3. Children ..............................................................................................................................................52
2.3.1. Disengagement options........................................................................................53
2.3.2. Informal pathways and consequences, including Al-Shabaab targeting………………………………………………………………………………………..........................53
2.3.3. Formal pathways and consequences, including Al-Shabaab targeting ...
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..54
2.3.4. Consequences for deserters/defectors’ family members ........................59
Annex I: Bibliography ....................................................................................................... 60
Oral sources, including anonymous sources ................................................................................ 60
Public sources .......................................................................................................................................... 60
Annex II: Terms of Reference ........................................................................................... 64

5

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Disclaimer
This report was written according to the EUAA COI Report Methodology (2019). The report isbased on carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced.
The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed withutmost care. However, this document does not claim to be exhaustive. If a particular event,person or organisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has
not taken place or that the person or organisation does not exist.
Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particularapplication for international protection. Terminology used should not be regarded asindicative of a particular legal position.
‘Refugee’, ‘risk’ and similar terminology are used as generic terminology and not in the legal
sense as applied in the EU Asylum Acquis, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.
Neither the EUAA, nor any person acting on its behalf, may be held responsible for the use
which may be made of the information contained in this report.
The drafting of this report was finalised on 9 December 2022. More information on thereference period for this report can be found in the methodology section of the Introduction.

SOMALIA: DEFECTION, DESERTION AND DISENGAGEMENT FROM AL-SHABAAB

Glossary and abbreviations
Term

Definition

AMISOM

African Union Mission in Somalia

ATMIS

African Transition Mission in Somalia

CAAFAGChildren Associated with Armed Forces and Groups

CID

Criminal Investigation Department

CRD

Centre for Research and Dialogue

CSO

Civil Society Organisation

DDR

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration. The process
through which members of armed forces and groups aresupported to lay down their weapons and return to civilian life

DDRR

Disengagement, Disassociation, Reintegration and Reconciliation

DRP

Defectors’ Rehabilitation Programme

FCA

Finn Church Aid

JISA

Juba Intelligence and State Agency

NISA

National Security Intelligence Agency

SNA

Somali National Army

SOP

Standard Operating Procedure

UNHCR

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF

United Nations International Children's Emergency FundUNSOM

United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia

7

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

TermDefinition

USAID

United States Agency for International Development

Zakat

An obligatory tax, one of the five Pillars of Islam. Muslims are
required to give 2.5% of their qualifying wealth each year to help
the needy.

SOMALIA: DEFECTION, DESERTION AND DISENGAGEMENT FROM AL-SHABAAB

Introduction
The purpose of this report is to provide relevant context information in view of the assessmentof applications for international protection, including refugee status and subsidiary protection.
The report provides background information and whenever available data about desertingand defecting pathways out of Al-Shabaab militant group. After distinguishing between theformal and the informal options, the report engages with the main challenges andconsequences associated with them. Men, women, and children’s profiles, as well as forms ofengagement with the group, are discussed as key determinants of potentially available
pathways. Complementing this overview, which is based on research findings limited in scopeand representativeness, the report relies on a pool of expert interviews which help shed somelight on the unreported and underreported aspects of the issues at stake.

Methodology
The reference period is from 1 July 2021 to 30 November 2022. The information gathered is a
result of desk research and oral source interviews and input until 18 November 2022. Somelimited additional information was added during the finalisation of this report in response to
feedback received during the quality control process, until 9 December 2022.
This report is produced in line with the EASO COI Report Methodology (2019) 1 and the EASO
COI Writing and Referencing Style Guide (2019). 2

Defining the terms of reference
The terms of reference of this report are based on the information needs identified by EUAA’s
target users, and build on internal and external consultations with experts, with EUAA COI
Specialist Network members, and the relevant most recent literature on the topic. Terms ofreference for this report can be found in Annex II.

Terminology
In the Somali context, the relevant literature and sources make use of various (technical) terms
when describing the issues/phenomena that fall within the scope of this study. The following
meanings have been used by EUAA in this report, and take into account commonalities acrossthe relevant sources:-

1
2

Deserting: usually men voluntarily leaving Al-Shabaab without reporting to the Somali
authorities;
Defecting: usually men voluntarily leaving Al-Shabaab and then reporting to the Somali
authorities;

EASO, EASO Country of Origin Information (COI) Report Methodology, June 2019, url
EASO, Writing and Referencing Guide for EASO Country of Origin Information (COI) Reports, June 2019, url
9EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM--Disengaging: to stop being actively involved in Al-Shabaab. The term is in use for men,but also for women and children associated with Al-Shabaab;
Leaving: the act of leaving the group or Al-Shabaab’s territory without implying
previous active involvement;
Formal pathways: the formal pathway to exit Al-Shabaab and to reintegrate entails
contact with the Somali authorities at one stage or another and implies going throughgovernment-held processes (including rehabilitation);
Informal pathways: the informal pathway to exit Al-Shabaab and to reintegrate takes
place without the involvement of Somali government authorities and without theirknowledge.

Collecting information
The information gathered results from two main sets of sources: extensive desk researchusing predominantly public, specialised paper-based, and electronic sources until 18
November 2022; interviews with oral sources conducted by EUAA for the purposes of thereport between August and November 2022.
All sources used are referenced in the Bibliography. Wherever information could not be foundwithin the timeframes for drafting this report after carefully consulting a range of sources, thisis stated in the report.

Research challenges
The present study has encountered a number of research challenges, including: the sensitivityof the issues at stake, scarce information and reporting on the topics addressed by the termsof reference, and difficulty to extend research findings of the quoted studies beyond thescope of their respective samples. Finally, the report often lacks concrete data and information
on reported incidents and events affecting the various profiles (men, women, and children).
This is due to the sensitivity of the topic and the lack of reporting presence in the country,
especially about events taking place in remote areas. This impacts in particular some of thesections illustrating the consequences of disengaging from Al-Shabaab.
Regarding sensitivity, the report has been affected in various ways. It has been extremely
challenging to engage with oral sources and have them collaborate on the project. Those whoin the end agreed and were willing to do so preferred to remain anonymous for security
reasons.
In terms of available studies, most research on this topic focuses on the main
towns/rehabilitation centres in Mogadishu, Baidoa, and Kismayo. Statistical information or
clear representative samples available for the rest of Somalia and based on which possible
country-wide findings can be drawn are not existent. Additionally, the available studies only
partially address the formal pathways (see Terminology and the remainder of this report).
Information on informal pathways is scarce. As a result, fragments of information had to becollected across various sources, including oral ones, in order to be able to piece together aclearer and more complete picture. For this same reason corroboration of information has
been provided to the extent possible and reflects these research limitations.

SOMALIA: DEFECTION, DESERTION AND DISENGAGEMENT FROM AL-SHABAAB

Moreover, due to the nature of the conflict, and the fact that Al-Shabaab controls large
swathes of territory in most of South-Central Somalia, reporting of incidents affecting civilians
disengaging or who have disengaged from the group is very scarce and at times anecdotal.
This can be because in those areas free media reporting is severely impaired or limited.

Quality control
To ensure that the authors respected the EASO COI Report Methodology and the Terms ofReference were comprehensively addressed, a review was carried out by COI specialists fromthe countries and organisations listed as reviewers in the Acknowledgements section. Allcomments made by the reviewers were taken into consideration and almost all of them were
implemented in the final draft of this report, which was finalised on 9 December 2022. EUAA
also performed the final quality review and editing of the text.

Sources
In accordance with EASO COI methodology, a range of different published documentarysources have been consulted on relevant topics for this report. These include: academic
publications, think tank reports, and specialised sources covering Somalia; COI reports bygovernments; information from civil society and NGOs; reports produced by various bodies of
the United Nations; and Somali and regionally-based media.
In addition to using publicly available documentary sources, seven oral sources (experts andofficials) were contacted for this report. Oral sources were selected based on theirdemonstrated expertise in Somalia, publications, and relevant field research/presence. Thoseinterviewed are described in detail in the text and the bibliography in Annex I.

Structure and use of the report
The report is divided into a general introductory part, which approaches disengagement from
Al-Shabaab distinguishing between formal and the informal pathways, and three chapters
dealing with profiles (men, women, and children) and respective sub-profiles.
In the general introduction, the report provides an overview of disengagement pathways, andaddresses the current legal and policy framework in force for Al-Shabaab deserters anddefectors. It then goes on to describe the National Programme for the Treatment and theHandling of Disengaged Combatants, as well as, within it, the Defector Rehabilitation
Programme. Finally, it provides on overview of the rehabilitation centres currently in use inSomalia.
The three chapters that follow focus on the situation of men, women, and children formerly
associated with Al-Shabaab, on disengagement options (formal or informal), and theconsequences associated with them, including treatment by state authorities, family/clan
networks, and Al-Shabaab.

11EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Map

Map 1. Somalia - Approximate Territorial Control, 30 November 2022, Political Geography Now. 3
Please note: The depictions on this map do not imply any opinion whatsoever on the part of EUAA concerning
legal status or effective control over any country, territory, city, or area. Every effort is made to ensure this map isfree of errors, but there is no guarantee that the map or its features are either spatially or temporally accurate or fit
for a particular use. This map is provided without any warranty of any kind whatsoever, either expressed or implied.
3

Polgeonow, Somalia Approximate Territorial Control, as of 30 November 2022, n.a., non-public source

SOMALIA: DEFECTION, DESERTION AND DISENGAGEMENT FROM AL-SHABAAB

1.

Overview and State policy

1.1.

Formal and informal pathways to disengage from
Al-Shabaab

Sources indicate that it is difficult to know how many Somalis have left or been formerly
associated with Al Shabaab due to underreporting, and difficulties researching anddocumenting the issue. 4
Sources indicate that Somalis ‘disengage’ from Al Shabaab through both formal pathways andthrough informal pathways. 5 A Somalia expert on persons formerly associated with AlShabaab indicated that the process of disengaging or just leaving the Al-Shabaab group cango the formal or the informal pathway depending on what is available to the people
concerned. The formal pathway entails contact with the Somali authorities at one stage oranother and implies going through government-held processes. The informal pathway takes
place without the involvement of Somali government authorities and without their knowledge.
The same expert explained that it would not be possible to attribute numbers or just order ofmagnitude to those going through the informal process. 6
Another Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, also interviewed for this report,
stated that the number of those going through the formal pathway is very small compared tothe potential number of people formerly associated with Al-Shabaab, about which any
indication is lacking. 7 Very little is known about this given the strong limitations that curtail fieldresearch in Somalia, as the Somali expert on persons formerly associated with Al-Shabaab put
it, including the impossibility to venture outside major government-controlled towns. 8 As aresult, very limited qualitative – as opposed to quantitative - research is available, and it
focuses only on the formal pathways in these three locations: Kismayo, Baidoa andMogadishu. 9 These locations are the sole formal venues available for rehabilitation for men
and women. 10 Apart from that, there are no figures, statistics, or clear representative samples
available for the rest of Somalia and based on which possible country-wide findings can be
drawn. 11
Along similar lines, an international organisation official based in Somalia maintained that‘quite a number of people’ decide to desert from Al-Shabaab informally, without reporting to
the local authorities. However, the expert added, it would be extremely hard to ascertain theSomalia expert on rehabilitation and reintegration, interview, 10 November 2022; Somalia expert on persons
formerly associated with Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 28 September 2022; International organisation official
based in Somalia (I), Online interview, 12 September 2022
5
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022; Somalia expert on
persons formerly associated with Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 28 September 2022
6
Somalia expert on persons formerly associated with Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 28 September 2022
7
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
8
Somalia expert on persons formerly associated with Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 28 September 2022
9
Somalia expert on persons formerly associated with Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 28 September 2022
10
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
11
Somalia expert on persons formerly associated with Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 28 September 2022
413

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

size of this group, given the fact that it is highly ‘localised’ and scattered throughout the
territory. In particular, the expert indicated, many Al-Shabaab fighters simply do not know
about the amnesty proclamations or the rehabilitation centres, or just ‘fear of being in thehands of the government’. 12 Stern and Peterson, in a research article published in 2022,
corroborated this point when indicating that ‘not everyone who leaves al-Shabaab announces
themselves to the government and goes through a formal process’, many reintegrate
informally, ‘under the radar’, by ‘slipping back’ to their own communities and without
benefitting from the ‘National Programme for the Treatment and the Handling of Disengaged
Combatants’ (for further details see section 1.2.2 National Programme for the Treatment andthe Handling of Disengaged Combatants and the Defector Rehabilitation Programme,
including screening procedures). 13
Still on this point, another Somalia expert, on rehabilitation and reintegration, confirmed theabsolute lack of robust data on informal disengagement. The expert reported anecdotally thaton the backdrop of the autumn-2022 anti-Al-Shabaab offensive in Hiraan, Galgaduud, andMiddle Shabelle, only four official defections had been recorded. However, the expert
believed that ‘group defection’ might be taking place with numbers of ex Al-Shabaab fighters
joining local militias or the Somali National Army (SNA). In general, however, the expert
explained that leaving Al-Shabaab is extremely dangerous and difficult, and that while informal
defection does exist it is often overinflated in the debate. 14
The UN Panel of Experts on Somalia, in their report from October 2022, have recorded
reports from media affiliated with the Federal Government of Somalia and the Somali security
forces, indicating that in the period October 2021 – 28 August 2022 ‘more than 600 AlShabaab operatives have been neutralised or defected’, 15 with only 29 actual defections,
including one leader defection. 16
Against this backdrop, the Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab indicated thatfor every defecting man there are also potentially 3-4 wives leaving Al-Shabaab territory.17
As to children, a child protection consultant based in Somalia, indicated that while authorities
in collaboration with protection partners try to ensure that children go through a formal
reintegration process, there are also cases of informal or self-reintegration. 18
Deserting, defecting, or disengaging
The Somali expert on persons formerly associated with Al-Shabaab explained that thedistinction between ‘desertion’ and ‘defection’ is not useful in the Somali context. ‘Defection’as a term used to describe men voluntarily leaving the group and then reporting to theauthorities does not adequately describe situations for women’s and children’s
International organisation official based in Somalia (I), Online interview, 12 September 2022
Stern, O. M. and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach toprogramming, Adam Smith International, 2022, p. 24
14
Somalia expert on rehabilitation and reintegration, Telephone interview, 10 November 2022
15
UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, S/2022/754, 10 October 2022, url, para. 90
16
UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, S/2022/754, 10 October 2022, url, Annex 10, pp.
56-58
17
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 23 September 2022
18
Child protection consultant based in Somalia, Online interview, 3 October 2022
12
13

SOMALIA: DEFECTION, DESERTION AND DISENGAGEMENT FROM AL-SHABAAB

disengagement, or just leaving, or disassociating from the group.19 The Somalia expert on
disengagement from Al-Shabaab is of the same opinion when stating that women do not really‘desert’ the group, as if they were active combatants, ‘they just leave’. 20 For further details on
this point see 2 Profiles and sub-profiles. Regarding men, Taylor et al. (2019), provided thisdefinition of (men) ‘defection’: ‘the individual must have left Al-Shabaab on their own accord tojoin a rival group or seek government protection, and willingly share information or
experience’. 21
For an overview of the different options and pathways men, women, and children associatedwith Al-Shabaab might take, see following sections.

1.2.

Government policy/programmes and amnesty
proclamations

1.2.1.

Current policy and amnesty proclamations

Various past Somali governments have offered amnesty to Al-Shabaab members defectingfrom the group. 22
In Somalia, an amnesty policy was issued for the first time during the last period of Hassan
Sheikh Mohamud’s first presidency (2012-2017). However, it lacked clarity for potential
defectors or deserters in terms of how to defect or surrender and with what consequences. 23
Similarly, Human Rights Watch reported that this policy (from June 2016) was vague, and that it
failed to clarify its linkage with the disengaged combatants programme as well as the scope of
application of the amnesty with regards to potential reasons for exclusion from the amnesty.
The policy indicated that war crimes, crimes against humanity, crimes of genocide, crimes ofsexual violence, and gross violations of human rights and humanitarian law as crimes were not
to be included in the scope of application of the amnesty, but it failed to define these crimes,
and to expressly indicate that responsibility for these crimes as a criteria for exclusion from theamnesty. 24 The Somalia expert on rehabilitation and reintegration stated that an amnesty
policy document, in its draft form, still lies with the government as of 10 November 2022. 25
Felbab-Brown (2018), an American scholar and Somalia specialist, corroborated this point
when stating that ‘Somalia has not clarified the laws surrounding the use of amnesty
declarations and defectors programs’ and that an amnesty law remains unfinished. 26

Somalia expert on persons formerly associated with Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 28 September 2022
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 202221
Taylor, C. et al., The Cost of Defection: The Consequences of Quitting Al-Shabaab, 2019, url, p. 3
22HRW, “It’s like we are always in a prison” - Abuses Against Boys Accused of National Security Offenses inSomalia, February 2018, url, p. 18
23
Toros, H. and Harley, S., Negotiations with Al-Shabaab - Lessons learned and future prospects, 2018, p. 441
24HRW, “It’s like we are always in a prison” - Abuses Against Boys Accused of National Security Offenses inSomalia, February 2018, url, pp. 18-19, footnote no. 36
25
Somalia expert on rehabilitation and reintegration, Telephone interview, 10 November 2022
26
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, IFIT,
May 2018, url, p. 11
19

20

15

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM‘In the absence of an amnesty law, ad hoc presidential declarations have become the main
tool for granting amnesty’, a practice that started with president Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed in theearly 2000s and continued with following Somali presidents: 27•

In August 2011, by President Sharif Sheikh Ahmad; 28•

In September 2014, 45-day amnesty window offered by President Hassan Sheikh
Mohamud, followed by new amnesty offers in January and September 2015; 29•

In April 2017, 60-day amnesty window offered by President Mohamed Abdullahi
Farmaajo. 30•

After Farmaajo in 2017, there have not been other amnesty declarations. The current
Somali President, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has called for a ‘total war’ on Al-Shabaab. 31

Khalil et al. commented that ‘such declarations are unclear in terms of scope’, that they are
only verbally communicated by the Office of the President, and fail to be ‘precisely definedwithin Somali policy and legal frameworks’. Moreover, their informal character is ‘problematic’,because they lack details about eligibility criteria and entitlements associated with thedefector programme, raising false expectations in the beneficiaries, such as continued
education and post-rehabilitation employment. 32 Furthermore, Felbab-Brown also noted thatentering a Defector Rehabilitation Programme for ‘low-risk defectors’ is not limited toresponding (in time) to an amnesty window. 33 For details about the Defectors’ Rehabilitation
Programme see section 1.2.4 below.

1.2.2.

National Programme for the Treatment and the Handling ofDisengaged Combatants and the Defector Rehabilitation
Programme, including screening procedures

The Federal Government of Somalia developed the National Programme for the Treatment
and Handling of Disengaged Combatants in Somalia in 2012, 34 which then was ‘endorsed’ in
2013. 35 Felbab-Brown referred to this programme in more comprehensive terms as the‘National Program for the Handling and Treatment of Ex-Combatants and Youth at Risk’, whichis meant to handle low-risk and high-risk defectors and detainees. The author reported thatbasically defectors are sorted out into two programmes:

Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 11
28
Reuters, Somalia offers rebels amnesty, 9 August 2011, url
29
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 1230
NPR, Somali president offered jihadi group amnesty option for 60 days, 9 April 2017, url; see also Toros, H. andHarley, S., Negotiations with Al-Shabaab - Lessons learned and future prospects, 2018, p. 441
31
Somalia expert on rehabilitation and reintegration, Telephone interview, 10 November 2022
32
Khalil, J. et al., Deradicalisation and Disengagement in Somalia, January 2019, url, p. 17
33
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 13
34
UNSOM, Voices of Al-Shabaab, Understanding former combatants from the Baidoa Reintegration Center, 2016,
url, p. 4
35
HRW, “It’s like we are always in a prison” - Abuses Against Boys Accused of National Security Offenses inSomalia, February 2018, url, p. 19
27

SOMALIA: DEFECTION, DESERTION AND DISENGAGEMENT FROM AL-SHABAAB•

one for high-value defectors ‘who individually negotiate their leniency terms with theSomalia government, a form of co-optation deal’; 36 for more details see section 2.1.3(a)High-value defectors;•

one for low-value individuals, which further sorts them into: high-risk defectors andlow-risk defectors.37 For more details see section 1.2.3 Registration and screening ofhigh and low-risk profiles.

A Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, who was interviewed for the purposesof this report, confirmed that the programme still runs this way. 38
As of 2015, three male rehabilitation centres had already been established, 39 while, at the endof 2017, no rehabilitation facility for low-risk women defectors existed. The female
rehabilitation programme was piloted in 2019-2020, 40 and rehabilitation centres for women
were set up in the course of 2020. 41 The inaugural women’s section of the Baidoa
rehabilitation centre had been already closed earlier. 42 Regarding children, as of March 2017
there were six UNICEF-supported child rehabilitation centres run by NGOs across Somalia. 43
For details on centres and facilities as of November 2022 see section 1.2.3 Overview ofrehabilitation centres and capacity.

1.2.3.

Registration and screening of high and low-risk profiles

Upon defection or leaving of the group, disengaged combatants, children, as well as women
formerly associated with Al-Shabaab, who opt for the formal pathway, are received by theauthorities, either at the outpost or in the city centres. Upon reception people are also
registered. Their screening takes place after this first step. 44
There are different standard operating procedures (SOP), for men, women, and children,
based on which the screening is carried out. 45 The de facto main objective of SOPs for men
and women is to assess defectors’ and women’s past role within Al-Shabaab. With regard tochildren, the main goal is to assess their level of radicalisation. 46 SOPs set a 72-hour time limit
for the assessment of defectors.47
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 15
37
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 15
38
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
39
UNSOM, Voices of Al-Shabaab, Understanding former combatants from the Baidoa Reintegration Center, 2016,
url, p. 440
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
41
Stern, O. M. and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach toprogramming, Adam Smith International, 2022, p. 19
42
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 22
43
HRW, “It’s like we are always in a prison” - Abuses Against Boys Accused of National Security Offenses inSomalia, February 2018, url, p. 25
44
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
45
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
46
Child protection consultant based in Somalia, Online interview, 3 October 2022
47
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022; Felbab-Brown, V.,
The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May 2018, url, p. 16
36

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Screening of men
Stern, a South African researcher specialised in women’s role in Al-Shabaab, indicated that
defection trajectories might differ: defectors might hand themselves in directly to the National
Security Intelligence Agency (NISA), and could be ‘be facilitated in this by family members’, orpresent themselves to the Somali National Army (SNA), Somalia Police Force (SPF) or African
Union’s AMISOM troops [now ATMIS], and then be transferred to NISA. 48 The author reported
that defectors are either way transferred to NISA: ‘NISA go on to screen defectors as either“high risk” or “low risk”, using a screening tool designed for purpose’. 49 After screening, ‘thoseclassified as “low risk” can receive amnesty from prosecution and be sent to rehabilitation
facilities, while those deemed “high risk” are referred for prosecution by military courts andpossible imprisonment’. 50
As Felbab-Brown put it:•

high-risk defectors ‘face military courts where there is a high chance they will be
issued the death penalty’. 51 High-risk profiles are generally considered ‘those believed
to be amirs (i.e., commanders of some sort), who had engaged in the making of
explosives, or who had killed someone’. 52 Additionally the author indicated that ‘those
who had fundraised, preached jihad, or provided logistical support could be classified
as either low-risk or high-risk’. 53 For more details see section 2.1.3(b);•low-risk defectors are those who are sent to ‘DDR-like [Disarmament, Demobilization,
and Reintegration] facilities’. 54 The Defectors’ Rehabilitation Programme for low-risk
defectors is a component of the overall National Programme for the Handling andTreatment of Ex-Combatants. 55 In a BBC article on former Al Shabaab fighters, Somalia
specialist Mary Harper listed the following profiles as low-risk: ‘foot soldiers, porters,
mechanics and the like’. 56 For more details see section 2.1.3(c) Low-risk defectors.

In May 2018 Felbab-Brown stated that ‘while there has been some nominal formalisation of thesorting criteria for distinguishing high- and low-risk defectors in recent years, the process isstill handled exclusively by Somali federal and state intelligence authorities, or sometimes
Stern, O. M., The Invisible Women of Al-Shabaab, Adam Smith International, September 2019, p. 9. Dr Orly Maya
Stern is a researcher, consultant and human rights lawyer from South Africa. She is an expert on international law,gender, human rights and security, particularly in countries affected by conflict and instability. Recently she has
conducted various research projects with focus on women’s role in Al-Shabaab.
49
Stern, O. M., The Invisible Women of Al-Shabaab, Adam Smith International, September 2019, p. 950
Stern, O. M., The Invisible Women of Al-Shabaab, Adam Smith International, September 2019, p. 9; see also
Felbab-Brown, Vanda, The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study,
May 2018, url, pp. 4, 17, 19
51
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 13
52
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 15
53
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 19
54
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 13
55
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 15
56
Harper, M., Life after al-Shabab: Driving a school bus instead of an armed pickup truck, BBC News, 23 November
2020, url
48

SOMALIA: DEFECTION, DESERTION AND DISENGAGEMENT FROM AL-SHABAAB

AMISOM [today ATMIS]’. The author indicated that either NISA or subordinate state versions ofit, such as Juba Intelligence and State Agency (JISA), ‘decide, who is high-risk and who is lowrisk through interrogation of captured or defecting al Shabaab affiliates’. 57
According to the same author, new SOPs for the assessment of men’s risk profile wereadopted – although still in draft form – in July 2017. Their stated goal was to evaluate ‘thelikelihood that disengaged al Shabab combatants will engage in any of the following activities:(a) direct participation in violent extremist activity; (b) training and/or recruitment of civilians; (c)the provision of operational, organisational, or logistical support to al Shabaab; (d) and theradicalisation of civilians’. In practice, however, according to Felbab-Brown SOP questions ‘areheavily based on past behaviour and activities with al Shabaab’. The author reported that the‘SOP assess 19 risk factors [including] individual’s personal history, […] motivations andcontext, […] previous engagement with Al-Shabaab, […] training and capacity’, and individual’scurrent views, including on religion and democracy. ‘Other information gained during theinterviews is included in the overall judgements’. 58
The Somalia expert on rehabilitation and reintegration interviewed for this report maintainedthat still in November 2022 the screening criteria, which remain unclear, focus more on
defectors’ past role rather than prospective behaviour. At the same time, the expert
suggested that the screening process still lacks transparency, is often highly politicised, andleads to questionable outcomes. 59
Felbab-Brown stated that before 2017 [and the adoption of the new – back then – SOP] ‘thecriteria for being considered low-risk versus high-risk lacked consistency and explicit
definitions’, and that this often resulted in arbitrary decisions. Basically low-risk versus highrisk assessments ‘were mostly based on the individual’s role in Al-Shabaab’. 60
Screening of women
Women defecting from Al-Shabaab and following a more formal pathway are ‘“received”’ ininconsistent ways ‘across cases and locations’. As Stern and Peterson noted (2022) ‘thereception phase pertains to the moment defectors hand themselves over, or are “received”,
by one of the “receiving forces”, including the SNA, NISA, the police or AMISOM’. 61 They
describe the situation at the beginning of 2022 as follows:‘Different processes are evident in different areas. Sometimes, when women
first leave al-Shabaab and arrive in a new location, they make contact or arereferred to either the SNA, police or NISA, who register them and collect basic
information from them. Sometimes, women go straight into the communities,
and community elders or clan leaders contact the DRP, police or NISA, toFelbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 15
58
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 16
59
Somalia expert on rehabilitation and reintegration, Telephone interview, 10 November 2022
60
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 15
61
Stern, O. and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach toprogramming, 2022, p. 17
57

19

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

inform them that these women are living there. In other places, regardless ofthe point of initial contact, women are first registered with the CID [Criminal
Investigation Department], before being handed over to NISA for registrationand screening. In Kismayo, when a woman arrives in the community, her
relatives contact the local district commissioners to inform them of her arrival,
before she is transferred to security actors. In Baidoa, many former al-Shabaab
women move to IDP camps. […] In Adado (Galmudug), CSOs working in thecamps refer women to the FMS-level Ministry of Women. […] in Galmudug once
registered, women are returned to the community with a guarantor’. 62
Reportedly all women coming from Al-Shabaab controlled territory and reporting to theauthorities are ‘registered’. Based on this first registration it is decided who will be screened –for some type of association with the group – and who will just be registered because of‘merely living in al-Shabaab territory’. 63 In most places, during screening, women stay with
their communities after having been signed over to ‘guarantors’. In other places, such as
Baidoa and Kismayo women are reportedly ‘held in NISA “safehouses” while being
screened’. 64
The Somalia expert on persons formerly associated with Al-Shabaab said that the programme
for women is not a ‘defectors’ programme, but rather a programme meant to assist vulnerable
women, including victims of rape by Al-Shabaab members. 65
The government and NISA developed a screening tool and SOP for women in the period
following the start of the women’s rehabilitation programme in spring 2020 (see section 1.2.4
The Defectors’ Rehabilitation Programme for further details). To this end NISA screeners weretrained on how to screen women, and female screeners were also onboarded to the project(although they are not always available in all locations). 66
In their study on assistance to women formerly associated with Al-Shabaab, Stern andPeterson reported that NISA officers stated that only women actively engaged with AlShabaab are screened, while ‘wives and other non-participant women are not screened’. 67
The Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab indicated that women’s SOPs arevery similar to men’s SOPs, with some differences such as questions about women’s marital
status, and type of role played within the group (among others as wife, cook, cleaner). 68 Stern

Stern, O. and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach toprogramming, 2022, p. 17
63
Stern, O. and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach toprogramming, 2022, p. 18
64
Stern, O. M. and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach toprogramming, Adam Smith International, 2022, p. 18
65
Somalia expert on persons formerly associated with Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 28 September 2022
66
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
67
Stern, O. M. and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach toprogramming, Adam Smith International, 2022, p. 18
68
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
62

SOMALIA: DEFECTION, DESERTION AND DISENGAGEMENT FROM AL-SHABAAB

and Peterson also indicated that up until early 2022, ‘no women have been screened as“high-risk”’, as reported by NISA. 69
Once women have been screened, they are referred to rehabilitation centres. At this stage avulnerability assessment is carried out to determine women’s priority in accessing the
programme upon availability of places. 70 In practice, not all registered and screened women
go through rehabilitation unless they have additional vulnerabilities, as per an expert interview
conducted for the purposes of this report. 71 Corroborating this, Sarfati and Donnelly, two
researchers working at the International Peace Institute (IPI), reported in 2022 that whenrehabilitation in women’s facilities is not available, NISA ‘may make alternative arrangementswith a guarantor’, ‘typically a relative or clan elder’. 72
Before the development of the women’s programme in 2020, the screening tool used for
women was the same as for men. 73 Stern indicated that during that time, the screening of
women was ‘more inconsistent, with less of a clear established pathway’. The expert reported
that while some women were screened by NISA, most of them were just sent back to theircommunities to reintegrate. 74 Corroborating this point, Felbab-Brown indicated that at thattime, if deemed to be low-risk by NISA, or by AMISOM, women were released to theircommunities, if nearby, or to areas where they were encountered. As a result, they tended to
re-join their communities or become internally displaced. 75
Screening of childrenChildren also go through screening, which is carried out by NISA. 76 Reportedly this task, is
performed ‘in a softer form [compared to adult screening] not to make children afraid’. 77
The screening aims to establish whether the child under scrutiny has ‘effectively disengaged’
from Al-Shabaab: this is done to prevent other children who are not formerly associated with
Al-Shabaab, from taking advantage of the programme and its services. Additionally, by way of
asking basic questions, the screening is meant to differentiate between children with different
levels of indoctrination and active participation in the group. Children may be screened aseither ‘low-risk’ or ‘high-risk’:•Children who could be deemed as ‘low-risk’ by NISA: children who disapprove of AlShabaab activities and ideology;•

Children who could be deemed as ‘high-risk’ by NISA: children who still believe that siding
with Al-Shabaab means siding ‘with the right side’, or whose parents are still with theStern, O. M. and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach toprogramming, Adam Smith International, 2022, p. 18
70Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
71
Somalia expert on persons formerly associated with Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 28 September 202272
Sarfati A. and Donnelly P., Protection Dilemmas Arising from the Reintegration of Former Combatants and the
Impact of the Terrorist Designation, IPI, January 2022, url, p. 7
73
Stern, O. M., The Invisible Women of Al-Shabaab, Adam Smith International, September 2019, p. 34
74
Stern, O. M., The Invisible Women of Al-Shabaab, Adam Smith International, September 2019, p. 33
75
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 22
76International child protection specialist based in Somalia, Online interview, 5 October 2022
77
Child protection consultant based in Somalia, Online interview, 3 October 2022
69

21

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

group, or who could potentially engage in some sort of terrorist activity (such as spying,suicide bombing), or who could harm the local community, or even go back to AlShabaab. 78
The child protection consultant underlined that the government’s classification of ‘low-risk’and ‘high-risk’ children in the screening process is not an official one. The same source
remarked that classifications are not to be seen as endorsed by any protection partner.79
An international child protection specialist based in Somalia, interviewed for the purposes ofthis report, maintained that NISA’s screening process assesses the extent of theirembeddedness in the radical ideology of the group. In general terms, the international
specialist reported that younger children are more often assessed as ‘low-risk’ than older
ones. The screening is conducted in the presence of a trained government social worker.80For
more details see section 2.3.3 Formal pathways and consequences, including Al-Shabaabtargeting.

1.2.4.

The Defectors’ Rehabilitation Programme

According to UNSOM, the purpose of the Defectors’ Rehabilitation Programme (DRP) is ‘toprovide support to Low Risk Al-Shabaab disengaged combatants attempting to reintegrateback into the community’. 81 Stern indicated that the ‘defector’s programme has been createdas a means with which to entice al-Shabaab members out of the group, in the hopes ofultimately degrading the group, as a way to promote peace’. 82
As reported by Human Rights Watch in 2018, although ‘the national programme stipulates thatformer combatants who are captured or detained also qualify for the program, the working
consensus is that only former combatants who surrender to the government qualify and enter
the screening process’. 83
Low-risk male defectors access the DRP as an alternative to going to court. As Felbab-Brown
put it, ‘since in the judicial process, al Shabaab affiliates incur a very substantial risk of being
sentenced to death, most low-risk defectors choose to go to the DDR-like centres’. The source
indicated that due to this situation, the degree to which their decision to enter rehabilitation
centres is voluntary is open to question. However, the author added, while they join the DRP‘with the implicit understanding that they will not be prosecuted after completing the programfor past association with al Shabaab’ they do not seem ‘to receive explicit and legally-binding
guarantees against future prosecution’. 84

Child protection consultant based in Somalia, Online interview, 3 October 2022
Child protection consultant based in Somalia, Online interview, 3 October 2022
80
International child protection specialist based in Somalia, Online interview, 5 October 2022
81
UNSOM, Voices of Al-Shabaab, Understanding former combatants from the Baidoa Reintegration Center, 2016,
url, p. 4
82
Stern, O. M., The Invisible Women of Al-Shabaab, Adam Smith International, September 2019, p. 9
83
HRW, “It’s like we are always in a prison” - Abuses Against Boys Accused of National Security Offenses inSomalia, February 2018, url, p. 19
84
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 18
78

79

SOMALIA: DEFECTION, DESERTION AND DISENGAGEMENT FROM AL-SHABAAB

The DRP programme consists of five phases: outreach, reception, screening, rehabilitation,and reintegration. 85

1.2.5.

Overview of rehabilitation centres and capacity

In the period May 2021 – 23 August 2022, the UN Special Representative of the Secretary
General, in his reports on the situation in Somalia, referred to five operational rehabilitation
centres for low-risk former Al-Shabaab fighters (male and female), 86 located in Mogadishu,
Kismayo, and Baidoa. 87 Three centres are for men (Mogadishu, Baidoa, Kismayo), while twocentres are for women (Baidoa and Kismayo), 88 all of them currently run by IOM as animplementing partner. 89
According to Hansen et al. (2019), the original proposal was to set up four centres, one in
Baidoa, one in Mogadishu, one in Beled Weyne and one in Kismayo. 90 The centre in Beled
Weyne (Hiil Walaal), was apparently operational in 2016, 91 and still in 2017 92 and 2019, 93 but
this is no longer the case due to lack of funds. 94
The Somali expert on persons formerly associated with Al-Shabaab maintained that thesecentres are extremely costly, posing serious sustainability problems, while at the same time
there is little evidence that they are effective at degrading Al-Shabaab. Discussions are ongoing about a possible revised approach.95 The programme is currently funded by United
Kingdom, Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands, among other minor international donors.96
Based on the latest UN Special Representative of the Secretary General reports, in the period
8 May 2021 – 23 August 2022, the five operational rehabilitation centres for low-risk former
Al-Shabaab fighters hosted in average more than 500 people, with the following breakdown
per period:

Stern, O. M. and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach toprogramming, Adam Smith International, 2022, pp. 15-21; Khalil, J. et al., Deradicalisation and Disengagement in
Somalia, January 2019, url, p. 2; Gjelsvik, I. M., Should I stay or should I go?: Security considerations for members
leaving al-Shabaab in Somalia, NUPI, 2019, url, p. 2; Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional
Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May 2018, url, p. 18
86
UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2021/723, 10 August 2021, url, para. 66; UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2021/944, 11
November 2021, url, para. 66; UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2022/101, 8 February 2022, url, para. 69; UNSG,
Situation in Somalia, S/2022/392, 13 May 2022, url, para. 75; UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2022/665, 1 September
2022, url, para. 70
87
UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2022/101, 8 February 2022, url, para. 69
88
UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2022/665, 1 September 2022, url, para. 70
89
International organisation official based in Somalia (I), Online interview, 12 September 2022
90
Hansen, S. J. et al., Countering violent extremism in Somalia and Kenya: Actors and approaches, April 2019, url,p. 26
91
UNSOM, Voices of Al-Shabaab, Understanding former combatants from the Baidoa Reintegration Center, 2016,
url, p. 4
92
Taylor, C. et al., The Cost of Defection: The Consequences of Quitting Al-Shabaab, 2019, url, p. 2
93
Hansen, S. J. et al., Countering violent extremism in Somalia and Kenya: Actors and approaches, April 2019, url,p. 26
94International organisation official based in Somalia (II), Online interview, 31 August 2022
95
Somalia expert on persons formerly associated with Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 28 September 2022
96
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
85

23

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM•As of 24 June (reporting period 8 May – 31 July 2021): 355 male and 170 female
beneficiaries, while 157 men and 102 women had graduated from the centres in 2021;97•

By the end of October 2021 (reporting period 1 August – 4 November 2021): 317 male and
223 female beneficiaries; 98•

As of 2 December 2021 (reporting period 6 November 2021 – 31 January 2022): a total of
337 men and 223 women beneficiaries were enrolled in the centres in Mogadishu, Baidoa
and Kismayo; 99•

As of 14 April 2022 (reporting period 1 February – 6 May 2022): a total of 296 male and219 female beneficiaries; 100•

As of 28 July 2022 (reporting period 7 May – 23 August 2022), there were 304 men in
Mogadishu, Baidoa and Kismayo and 184 women in Kismayo and Baidoa attending thecentres. 101

In the period 2012 - December 2017, according to Somali government officials quoted by
Felbab-Brown in 2018, ‘some 2 000 Al-Shabaab combatants and people associated with AlShabaab had gone through various DDR programmes for low-risk defectors’. 102 According toanother UN DDR expert quoted in a 2022 International Peace Institute report, until July 2021
around 3 000 people were estimated to have gone through the programmes, including 600
women. 103 Based on UNSG’s latest report, in in the period 1 January - 28 July 2022, ‘187 men
and 186 women have been rehabilitated and reintegrated within host communities’.104
Belowis an overview of the main characteristics and details available on rehabilitation centres
in Somalia (for men, women, and children), as of November 2022:(a)

The Serendi Rehabilitation Centre (Mogadishu)•

Facility-type: residential; 105 ‘the Serendi centre […] is a closed, full-board facility for former
associates of Al-Shabaab deemed “low risk” by national security forces’. 106•

Capacity: about 200 107•

Average length of stay: on average between 6 and 9 months, up to a maximum of 12months according to an expert interview; 108 as per an IOM report (2021) ‘participants residein the centre for approximately one year before re-entering the community’ 109, in line with

UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2021/723, 10 August 2021, url, para. 66
UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2021/944, 11 November 2021, url, para. 66
99
UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2022/101, 8 February 2022, url, para. 69
100
UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2022/392, 13 May 2022, url, para. 75
101
UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2022/665, 1 September 2022, url, para. 70
102
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 14, and footnote no. 34, p. 38
103
Sarfati A. and Donnelly P., Protection Dilemmas Arising from the Reintegration of Former Combatants and the
Impact of the Terrorist Designation, IPI, January 2022, url, p. 6
104
UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 1 September 2022, url, para. 70
105
Somalia expert on rehabilitation and reintegration, Telephone interview, 10 November 2022
106
IOM, Disengagement, Disassociation, Reintegration and Reconciliation: Transitional Rehabilitation, December
2021, url, p. 19
107
International organisation official based in Somalia (I), Online interview, 12 September 2022
108
Somalia expert on rehabilitation and reintegration, Telephone interview, 10 November 2022
109
IOM, Disengagement, Disassociation, Reintegration and Reconciliation, Transitional Rehabilitation, December
2021, url, p. 19
97

98

SOMALIA: DEFECTION, DESERTION AND DISENGAGEMENT FROM AL-SHABAAB

what was indicated by Felbab-Brown already in 2018. 110 The same author also reported
that ‘exit is tailored toward release after six months, since the education package isdesigned around a six-month program. However, beneficiaries can submit an exit
application at any time, with an expected minimum stay of between three and fourmonths.’ An exit committee – consisting of NISA intelligence officials, officials of the
Defectors’ Rehabilitation Program, and Serendi Centre Management representatives - istasked with assessing the application. ‘The approval of exit is based on several conditions,
including medical approval and NISA certification that the reinsertion area is safe’. 111•

Implementing partner (non-state organisations that runs the centre): IOM as of July 2022 (itwas Adam Smith International until then); 112•

Access for NISA and other Somali security officials: unlimited; 113

In 2022, based on an expert interview, the Serendi rehabilitation centre is largely hosting,along with various other clan affiliates, Digil clan members, with an uptick of Marehan clan
members towards the end of the year. 114(b)

The Baidoa Rehabilitation Centre•

Facility-type: non-residential; 115 ‘the centre in Baidoa, Somalia, is semi-open and provides
participants with passes, subject to government approval, to spend evenings andweekends with their families. This format encourages a gradual transition fromrehabilitation to reintegration’. 116•

Capacity: about 150; 117•

Average length of stay: 3 months, according to Felbab-Brown (2018); 118 an exit committee,
comprising representatives of the rehabilitation centre, the Somali government, and theimplementing partners is tasked with processing beneficiaries’ exit from the programme; 119•

Implementing partner: IOM; 120•

Access for NISA and other Somali security officials: limited; 121

Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 21
111
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 21
112
International organisation official based in Somalia (I), Online interview, 12 September 2022
113
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, pp. 20-21
114
Somalia expert on rehabilitation and reintegration, Telephone interview, 10 November 2022
115
Somalia expert on rehabilitation and reintegration, Telephone interview, 10 November 2022
116
IOM, Disengagement, Disassociation, Reintegration and Reconciliation, Transitional Rehabilitation, December
2021, url, p. 23
117
International organisation official based in Somalia (I), Online interview, 12 September 2022
118
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 20
119
Sarfati A. and Donnelly P., Protection Dilemmas Arising from the Reintegration of Former Combatants and the
Impact of the Terrorist Designation, IPI, January 2022, url, pp. 6-7
120International organisation official based in Somalia (I), Online interview, 12 September 2022
121
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 20
110

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

In terms of clan composition, in 2019, Taylor et al. reported that according to the Baidoa DRR
center, about 90 percent of the low-level Al-Shabaab members residing there were from theBay, Bakool, and Lower Juba regions and were ‘predominantly Maay Maay speakers from theRahanweyn’, a marginalised clan compared to other noble clans. 122 According to an expert
interviewed for this report, in 2022, the Baidoa rehabilitation centre was largely hosting Mirifle
and notably Hadama clan members, along with various other clan affiliates. 123 For further
details see the EUAA report on Targeted profiles 2021, 4. Minorities and non-minority clans. 124(c)

The Kismayo Rehabilitation Centre•

Facility-type: non-residential; 125•

Capacity: about 150; 126•

Average length of stay: 3 months, according to Felbab-Brown (2018); 127 an exit committee,
comprising representatives of the rehabilitation centre, the Somali government, and theimplementing partners is tasked with processing beneficiaries’ exit from the programme;128•

Implementing partner: IOM; 129•

Access for NISA and other Somali security officials: limited; 130(d)‘Reception centres’ in Galmudug

While there are no rehabilitation centres in Galmudug, men who have been screened can stayin dedicated ‘reception centres’ while they await transfer to rehabilitation. 131(e)Female community-based rehabilitation in Mogadishu 132•

Opening: the programme was piloted in 2019 and 2020; it targeted 50 beneficiaries in2019 and 40 in 2020; 133•

Facility-type: non-residential; 134•

Capacity: currently closed due to lack of funding; as of 2022 information from aninterviewed source, women formerly associated with Al-Shabaab residing in Mogadishu do
not have access to any form of rehabilitation programme; 135

Taylor, C. et al., The Cost of Defection: The Consequences of Quitting Al-Shabaab, 2019, url, pp. 9-10
Somalia expert on rehabilitation and reintegration, Telephone interview, 10 November 2022
124
EUAA, Somalia – Targeted profiles, Country of Origin Information Report, September 2021, url
125
Somalia expert on rehabilitation and reintegration, Telephone interview, 10 November 2022
126
International organisation official based in Somalia (I), Online interview, 12 September 2022
127
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 20
128
Sarfati A. and Donnelly P., Protection Dilemmas Arising from the Reintegration of Former Combatants and the
Impact of the Terrorist Designation, IPI, January 2022, url, pp. 6-7
129International organisation official based in Somalia (I), Online interview, 12 September 2022
130
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 20
131
Stern, O. M. and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach toprogramming, Adam Smith International, 2022, p. 17
132
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
133
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
134
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
135
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 23 September 2022
122
123

SOMALIA: DEFECTION, DESERTION AND DISENGAGEMENT FROM AL-SHABAAB•

Average length of stay: n.a.;•

Implementing partner: n.a;•

Access for NISA and other Somali security officials: n.a;(f)

The Female Rehabilitation Centre in Baidoa•

Opening: March 2020; 136•

Regime: non-residential (day centre), three days a week, 137 although a few residential
rooms are available for ‘protection cases’ [women who are in need of shelter or additional
protection]. 138 Most women keep living in their communities where they take care of theirnumerous dependants (between 6 and 8 in average). The centre also offers a day care forchildren under five. 139 IOM reported that many disengaged women were heads ofhousehold and hence the centre adopted a daily schedule which enabled women to takepart in the rehabilitation program while still taking care of families. The centre provided‘child-friendly amenities, including a playground’, and ‘offer[ed] supervised care forchildren under five’. 140•

Capacity: the Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab states that the capacityof the centre is 100 places; 141 IOM indicated that ‘the centre can attend 100 women in
daytime programmes and provides residential accommodation for up to 25 women andchildren for those who cannot safely reside elsewhere’. 142•

Average length of stay: it varies, from approximately six months to one year, 143 as also
reported by the Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, who added that ‘most
women leave within 6-8 months’; 144•

Implementing partner: IOM; 145•

Allowances (career-focused component of the programme): beneficiaries are given an
initial allowance of 100 USD (during their first two weeks in the programme), and a final
750 USD grant as start-up for their businesses (once they have completed theStern, O. M. and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach toprogramming, Adam Smith International, 2022, p. 19
137
Sarfati A. and Donnelly P., Protection Dilemmas Arising from the Reintegration of Former Combatants and the
Impact of the Terrorist Designation, IPI, January 2022, url, p. 7; Stern, O. M. and Peterson, C., Assisting women
formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach to programming, Adam Smith International, 2022, pp.
19-20
138
Stern, O. M. and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach toprogramming, Adam Smith International, 2022, p. 19
139
Stern, O. M. and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach toprogramming, Adam Smith International, 2022, p. 19
140
IOM, Disengagement, Disassociation, Reintegration and Reconciliation, Transitional Rehabilitation, December
2021, url, p. 4; Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
141
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 23 September 2022
142
IOM, Disengagement, Disassociation, Reintegration and Reconciliation, Transitional Rehabilitation, December
2021, url, p. 4
143
Stern, O. M. and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach toprogramming, Adam Smith International, 2022, p. 20
144
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
145
Stern, O. M. and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach toprogramming, Adam Smith International, 2022, p. 19
136

27

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

programme); 146 additionally they are given a 90 USD transport allowance (tied to classattendance); 147•

Access for NISA and other Somali security officials: no information found.

(g)

The Female Rehabilitation Centre in Kismayo•

Opening: June 2020; 148•

Facility-type: non-residential (day centre), three days a week, 149 although a few residential
rooms are available for protection cases; 150 most women keep living in their communities
where they take care of their numerous dependants (between 6 and 8 in average); thecentre also offers a day care for children under five; 151 corroborating this IOM reported thatmany disengaged women were heads of household and hence the centre adopted a dailyschedule which enabled women to take part in the rehabilitation program while still taking
care of families. The centre provided ‘child-friendly amenities, including a playground’, and‘offer[ed] supervised care for children under five’. 152•

Capacity: the Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab states that the capacityof the centre is of 100 places; 153 Stern and Paterson report that around 120 beneficiaries
were enrolled in this centre at the time of their research (beginning of 2022);154•

Average length of stay: it varies, from approximately six months to one year, 155 as also
reported by the Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, who added that ‘most
women leave within 6-8 months’; 156•

Implementing partner: IOM; 157•

Allowances (career-focused component of the programme): beneficiaries are given an
initial allowance of 100 USD (during their first two weeks in the programme), and a final

Stern, O. M. and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach toprogramming, Adam Smith International, 2022, p. 19; Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online
interview, 29 September 2022
147
Stern, O. M. and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach toprogramming, Adam Smith International, 2022, p. 20; Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online
interview, 29 September 2022
148
Stern, O. M. and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach toprogramming, Adam Smith International, 2022, p. 19
149
Sarfati A. and Donnelly P., Protection Dilemmas Arising from the Reintegration of Former Combatants and the
Impact of the Terrorist Designation, IPI, January 2022, url, p. 7; Stern, O. M. and Peterson, C., Assisting women
formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach to programming, Adam Smith International, 2022, pp.
19-20
150
Stern, O. M. and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach toprogramming, Adam Smith International, 2022, p. 19
151
Stern, O. M. and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach toprogramming, Adam Smith International, 2022, p. 19
152
IOM, Disengagement, Disassociation, Reintegration and Reconciliation, Transitional Rehabilitation, December
2021, url, p. 4; Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
153
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 23 September 2022
154
Stern, O. M. and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach toprogramming, Adam Smith International, 2022, p. 19
155
Stern, O. M. and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach toprogramming, Adam Smith International, 2022, p. 20
156
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
157
Stern, O. M. and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach toprogramming, Adam Smith International, 2022, p. 19
146

SOMALIA: DEFECTION, DESERTION AND DISENGAGEMENT FROM AL-SHABAAB

750 USD grant as start-up for their businesses (once they have completed theprogramme); 158 additionally they are given a 90 USD transport allowance (tied to classattendance); 159•

Access for NISA and other Somali security officials: no information found;(h)Female reintegration in other regions

In other parts of Somalia, where no rehabilitation facilities for women are available, there
might be different scenarios following their registration or screening:•

In Galmudug: ‘women are sent to their communities, using relatives as guarantors’.
Guarantors are male family members or clan elders. Women share their mobile phone
number with NISA, on which they can always be reached, and must report whenrequested. 160•

In Hirshabelle: based on an expert interview, as of November 2022 no structured support
existed in this area for women formerly associated with Al-Shabaab. 161(i)

Reintegration centres for children

Throughout the country there are several centres, but they do not solely address children
formerly associated with Al-Shabaab. 162 A child protection consultant based in Somalia, reportsthat there are at least 6 reintegration centres distributed across the country. 163 Some of thedisengaged children referred to the Somali authorities in Southwest region can be brought toMogadishu to benefit from reintegration services. 164
The international child protection specialist based in Somalia indicated that these centres canprovide services on average for about 100-150 children at the same time, while those in
Mogadishu can cater for 200 children. In November 2022 they hosted about 100 children
each centre, on average. The child protection consultant based in Somalia stated that no
precise indication of the reception capacity of these centres nor of the enrolment rate of theirrespective programmes are available, but that they can vary depending on needs and local
demand. 165
Local reintegration centres and programmes are run by both local NGOs and government
entities in different locations of the country. 166

Stern, O. M. and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach toprogramming, Adam Smith International, 2022, p. 19; Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online
interview, 29 September 2022
159
Stern, O. M. and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach toprogramming, Adam Smith International, 2022, p. 20; Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online
interview, 29 September 2022
160
Stern, O. M. and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach toprogramming, Adam Smith International, 2022, p. 20
161
Somalia expert on rehabilitation and reintegration, Telephone interview, 10 November 2022
162
International organisation official based in Somalia (II), Online interview, 31 August 2022
163
Child protection consultant based in Somalia, Online interview, 3 October 2022
164
International child protection specialist based in Somalia, Online interview, 5 October 2022
165
Child protection consultant based in Somalia, Online interview, 3 October 2022
166
International child protection specialist based in Somalia, Online interview, 5 October 2022
158

29

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

2.

Profiles and sub-profiles

2.1.

Men

2.1.1.

Disengagement factors and consequences

Pondering disengagement and its consequences
Various sources report that leaving Al-Shabaab is difficult and dangerous. Al-Shabaab
members can take months or even years to disengage from the group, also for fear of being
punished by death if they decide to do so. 167
In a research report from November 2022, which focuses on the experiences of former AlShabaab members, 168 lead author Heide-Ottosen, Director of Research, Analysis and Learningfor USAID’s Transition Initiatives for Stabilization-Saddex in Somalia, together with her
research team, indicated that for ‘many of [their] respondents [it] took months or even years toleave al-Shabaab, with such exits potentially punishable by death’. 169 One of their main
research findings was that ‘while al-Shabaab severely punishes most of those who attempt toescape, certain individuals are allowed to leave freely’, 170 with this last comment referring tomembers allegedly less deeply involved ‘who were permitted to leave the group on medical
and compassionate grounds’. 171
Bacon, the director of the Policy Anti-Terrorism Hub at American University, in a 2022 report,
indicated that ‘it is difficult to leave al-Shabaab and extremely dangerous to try to defect’.
Hence some members ‘stay in the organisation because of the costs and risks associated withseeking to leave’. The same author also noted that ‘numbers quitting the organisation are
currently low’. 172 Furthermore, the author reported that members of the organisation ‘fear thewrath of the organisation’, especially the Amniyat (the intelligence unit), which is charged with,among others, eliminating defectors. 173
In line with Heide-Ottosen’s and Bacon’s findings mentioned above, Khalil et al., in their reporton Deradicalisation and Disengagement in Somalia (2019), indicated that for many of their
Heide-Ottosen, S. et al., Journeys Through Extremism: The Experiences of Former Members of Al-Shabaab,
Resolve Network, 2022, url, p. 3; Bacon, T., Inside the minds of Somalia’s ascendant insurgents: an identity, mind,
emotions and perceptions analysis of al-Shabaab, March 2022, url, pp. 80, 94; Khalil, J. et al., Deradicalisation andDisengagement in Somalia, January 2019, url, p. 17
168
The report applied the Attitudes-Behaviors Corrective (ABC) Model of Violent Extremism to map personal
journeys in and out of al-Shabaab
169
Heide-Ottosen, S. et al., Journeys Through Extremism: The Experiences of Former Members of Al-Shabaab,
Resolve Network, 2022, url, p. 3
170
Heide-Ottosen, S. et al., Journeys Through Extremism: The Experiences of Former Members of Al-Shabaab,
Resolve Network, 2022, url, p. 2
171
Heide-Ottosen, S. et al., Journeys Through Extremism: The Experiences of Former Members of Al-Shabaab,
Resolve Network, 2022, url, p. 3
172
Bacon, T., Inside the minds of Somalia’s ascendant insurgents: an identity, mind, emotions and perceptions
analysis of al-Shabaab, March 2022, url, p. 94
173
Bacon, T., Inside the minds of Somalia’s ascendant insurgents: an identity, mind, emotions and perceptions
analysis of al-Shabaab, March 2022, url, p. 80
167

SOMALIA: DEFECTION, DESERTION AND DISENGAGEMENT FROM AL-SHABAAB

interviewees it took ‘many months or even years to find an opportunity to disengage’, for fearof retaliation, given the fact that disengagement is potentially punishable by death. 174 In asimilar study on the consequences of quitting Al-Shabaab (2019), which is based on 32
interviews conducted with disengaged Al-Shabaab combatants from the Baidoa rehabilitation
centre, Taylor et al. indicated that ‘the average amount of time spent considering defection
was 6.3 months with the longest being 48 months and the shortest an impromptu decision
with no time allotted for consideration’. 175 In the same study the authors indicated that ‘theaverage duration of membership of Al-Shabaab was 4.83 years (range one month to ten
years)’. 176
Still Taylor et al. (2019) found that defection is an ‘unsafe option for Al-Shabaab combatants’and that ‘the lack of security has made them fearful for their lives and is possibly discouraging
more defectors’. Additionally, in the case of intrastate defection, such as in the case of low-risk
Al-Shabaab ex-combatants, the authors indicate that changing identity would be extremely
challenging given the interconnected clan-based society of Somalia. 177
Richard Barret conducted another similar study in 2018, based on over 130 interviews with, exAl-Shabaab combatants at various locations and rehabilitation centres. 178 The 2018 study
included current and former leaders as well as foot soldiers. 179 About foot soldiers, the author
reported that the ‘process of leaving is often drawn out, both in terms of making the final
decision to leave and in finding the opportunity and summoning the courage to do so.’ 180
Gjelsvik (2019) was of the same opinion when stating that ‘people thinking of disengaging
from such groups must give careful consideration to whether it feels safe to do so’. 181
Territorial control
For information on Al-Shabaab territorial control and the contested areas with the governmentof Somalia see Map. 1 Somalia Approximate Territorial Control of this report, the EUAA
Somalia Security Situation Report - September 2021, and the EUAA Somalia Security Situation
Report – February 2023.
According to Heide-Ottosen et al. (2022), while territorial control is a ‘key determinant ofsympathy for and participation in al-Shabaab’, it is as well for exiting from the group. 182 Khalil etal. also make the same point in a previous study (2019) when they indicate that the level ofinfluence and control of a certain area impacts directly on disengagement options. 183 Still on
Khalil, J. et al., Deradicalisation and Disengagement in Somalia, January 2019, url, p. 17
Taylor, C. et al., The Cost of Defection: The Consequences of Quitting Al-Shabaab, 2019, url, pp. 7-8
176
Taylor, C. et al., The Cost of Defection: The Consequences of Quitting Al-Shabaab, 2019, url, p. 8
177
Taylor, C. et al., The Cost of Defection: The Consequences of Quitting Al-Shabaab, 2019, url, p. 9
178
Barret, R., Why They Fight and Why They Quit: An Analysis of Interviews with Current and Former Al-ShabaabFighters, 2018, p. 320
179
Barret, R., Why They Fight and Why They Quit: An Analysis of Interviews with Current and Former Al-ShabaabFighters, 2018, pp. 319-327
180
Barret, R., Why They Fight and Why They Quit: An Analysis of Interviews with Current and Former Al-ShabaabFighters, 2018, p. 324
181
Gjelsvik, I. M., Should I stay or should I go?: Security considerations for members leaving al-Shabaab in Somalia,
2019, url, p. 2
182
Heide-Ottosen, S., et al., Journeys Through Extremism: The Experiences of Former Members of Al-Shabaab,
2022, url, pp. 2, 29
183
Khalil, J. et al., Deradicalisation and Disengagement in Somalia, January 2019, url, pp. 17-18
174

175

31

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

this point, various interviewed sources indicate that newly liberated territories open up
disengagement opportunities. 184
Perceptions of authorities’ treatment
Harper, in a BBC News article published in 2020, reported about the fear not just of being
targeted by Al-Shabaab, but also of the treatment defectors might expect from the Somali
authorities, ‘as senior militants tell recruits that defectors will be tortured with electric shocks
by the Somali security services’. 185 An international organisation official interviewed for thisreport, as already mentioned, also touched upon the ‘fear of being in the hands of thegovernment’. 186 Similarly, UNSOM’s research respondents, in a report published in 2016,
reported about their fear of being traced and then killed by government forces upon releasefrom the rehabilitation centres. 187 Hansen et al. (2018) reported about an ex-Al-Shabaab
member who ‘hesitated to surrender for a long period because he feared that he would be
tortured or shot depending on who, at what point in time, got a hold of him’. 188
Within this context Felbab-Brown reported about the challenges posed by the lack ofpredictability of the screening process ‘for low-level al Shabaab affiliates considering
defection’. Uncertainty about their eligibility for amnesty and the outcome of the screening
process exposes them to the risk of being deemed as high-risk, hence impacting on theirdecisions. 189
For further details on the screening process see section 1.2.3 Registration and screening ofhigh and low-risk profiles.
Knowledge of the Defectors’ Programme
The international organisation official based in Somalia stated that many Al-Shabaab members
do not know about the amnesty proclamations or the rehabilitation centres. 190 Harper reported
that ‘most do not know there are government amnesty or rehabilitation centres where they willbe "re-educated" and integrated back into society’. 191 In contrast, Khalil et al., drawing frominterviews with Serendi residents (2015 and 2017), 192 found that ‘more than two-thirds of
respondents claimed that amnesty proclamations by successive Somali presidents
substantially motivated their decision to exit’. 193 In particular, they found that most of theirInternational child protection specialist based in Somalia, Online interview, 5 October 2022; Somalia expert on
persons formerly associated with Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 28 September 2022; Somalia expert on
disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
185
Harper, M., Life after al-Shabab: Driving a school bus instead of an armed pickup truck, BBC News, 23 November
2020, url
186
International organisation official based in Somalia (I), Online interview, 12 September 2022
187
UNSOM, Voices of Al-Shabaab, Understanding former combatants from the Baidoa Reintegration Center, 2016,
url, p. 13
188
Hansen, S. J. and Gelot, L., Anatomy of Counter-Jihad: Community Perspectives on Rehabilitation andReconciliation, 2018, p. 384
189
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 16
190International organisation official based in Somalia (I), Online interview, 12 September 2022
191
Harper, M., Life after al-Shabab: Driving a school bus instead of an armed pickup truck, BBC News, 23 November
2020, url
192
Khalil, J. et al., Deradicalisation and Disengagement in Somalia, January 2019, url, p. 13
193
Khalil, J. et al., Deradicalisation and Disengagement in Somalia, January 2019, url, p. 17
184

SOMALIA: DEFECTION, DESERTION AND DISENGAGEMENT FROM AL-SHABAAB

respondents agreed that radio and mobile phones were their main source of information, andthat through these channels they were driven out of the organisation, either after ‘having beenencouraged by their families’, or after having heard of amnesty proclamations. However, notone of them, reportedly, had been induced to disengage from the group thanks to a leaflet
campaign. 194
Other factors influencing defection
Heide-Ottosen’s November 2022 research report on former Al-Shabaab members found thatfamily, clan, and other social networks play a crucial role in exiting from Al-Shabaab. 195 The
thirteen respondents 196 of the study were at times encouraged or pressured by their family todisengage, while on several occasions their family or clan members secured their safe
passage with the security forces. 197 It is reportedly because of this that Al-Shabaab tries tohinder exits from the group ‘by transferring members between locations, resulting in themlacking the necessary social networks and knowledge of the terrain to escape’. 198 In anotherreport from March 2022, Bacon indicated that clan elders have also been a means fordefection and that ‘indeed defection through one’s clan is more prevalent than defection
through the Somali government’. 199
Khalil et al. (2019) discussed the main enabling factors for defection uncovered by theirstudy. 200 Based on the interviews conducted with two samples of Serendi residents (27 and 38
respondents respectively), 201 they reported the following key determinants of disengagement
were found: (a) the level of control or influence exercised by Al-Shabaab over specificterritories and whether potential defectors’ community of belonging or home location falls
under it or not (Territorial control already mentioned above); (b) the role defectors’ family
members might play to ease the process; (c) the role played by media and communication to
enable dissemination of information about rehabilitation centres or amnesty proclamations.202

2.1.2.
(a)

Informal pathways and consequences, including Al-ShabaabtargetingLeaving Al-Shabaab territory, relocation and self-integration

Sources indicate that Al-Shabaab’s extent of territorial control in combination with a person’splaces of origin are crucial aspects affecting disengagement: Stern noted that ‘while some
Khalil, J. et al., Deradicalisation and Disengagement in Somalia, January 2019, url, p. 18
Heide-Ottosen, S. et al., Journeys Through Extremism: The Experiences of Former Members of Al-Shabaab,
Resolve Network, 2022, url, p. 2
196
Heide-Ottosen, S. et al., Journeys Through Extremism: The Experiences of Former Members of Al-Shabaab,
Resolve Network, 2022, url, p. 11
197
Heide-Ottosen, S. et al., Journeys Through Extremism: The Experiences of Former Members of Al-Shabaab,
Resolve Network, 2022, url, p. 2
198
Heide-Ottosen, S. et al., Journeys Through Extremism: The Experiences of Former Members of Al-Shabaab,
Resolve Network, 2022, url, pp. 27-28
199
Bacon, T., Inside the minds of Somalia’s ascendant insurgents: an identity, mind, emotions and perceptions
analysis of al-Shabaab, March 2022, url, p. 94
200
Khalil, J. et al., Deradicalisation and Disengagement in Somalia, January 2019, url, pp. 17-18
201
Khalil, J. et al., Deradicalisation and Disengagement in Somalia, January 2019, url, p. 13
202
Khalil, J. et al., Deradicalisation and Disengagement in Somalia, January 2019, url, pp. 17-18
194

195

33

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

men are able to serve al-Shabaab in their home towns, most men serve the group fromlocations away from home’. 203 Bacon noted that ‘the group does not allow people living in its
territory to readily leave’. 204 Similarly, the Somalia expert on rehabilitation and reintegration
stated that leaving the group is ‘extremely dangerous’. 205
Against this backdrop, Harper reports that ‘first there was the escape, then the long, lonely
march out of al-Shabab territory’. The author reported about one of her interviewees statingthat ‘he will never return to his home village - he will spend the rest of life trying to melt into
the big city of Mogadishu. Otherwise al-Shabab will find and execute him.’ 206 Gjelsvik reported
in 2019 that ‘some of those who decide to leave al-Shabaab do so quietly, without entering a
programme, simply trying to settle into a new environment anonymously.’ 207
For further details on territoriality and other factors affecting disengagement see section 2.1.1
Disengagement factors and consequences.
(b)

Family/clan-based re-integration

Felbab-Brown reported that reintegration processes also take place through customary justiceand xeer councils independently of the formal processes. Sometimes these processes arealso part of the ‘reinsertion/reintegration phase of the formal low-risk defectors program, suchas in the Baidoa centre programming’. 208
However, the same author reported that ‘customary xeer system comes with several
difficulties for men accused of association with al Shabaab’. Stronger and resourceful clans
are the dominant or the only clans represented in the councils of elders, and they often
discriminate against other clans and sub-clans. Moreover, the determinations of the xeer
councils ‘cannot be appealed or challenged’.’ 209
Regarding community reintegration, Sarfati and Donnelly reported in 2022 that this also
depends on past connection with Al-Shabaab: ‘while some community members were their
victims, others were their supporters’. At times Al-Shabaab had managed to create links withcertain communities. As a result, this can reduce the stigma faced by former combatants. 210

Stern, O. M., Married in the Shadows: The Wives of Al-Shabaab, Adam Smith International, June 2020, p. 25
Bacon, T., Inside the minds of Somalia’s ascendant insurgents: an identity, mind, emotions and perceptions
analysis of al-Shabaab, March 2022, url, p. 94
205
Somalia expert on rehabilitation and reintegration, Telephone interview, 10 November 2022
206
Harper, M., Life after al-Shabab: Driving a school bus instead of an armed pickup truck, BBC News, 23
November 2020, url
207
Gjelsvik, I. M., Should I stay or should I go?: Security considerations for members leaving al-Shabaab in Somalia,
2019, url, p. 3
208
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 23
209
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 23
210
Sarfati A. and Donnelly P., Protection Dilemmas Arising from the Reintegration of Former Combatants and the
Impact of the Terrorist Designation, IPI, January 2022, url, p. 10
203

204

SOMALIA: DEFECTION, DESERTION AND DISENGAGEMENT FROM AL-SHABAAB

Further details and publicly available reporting on specific cases of Al-Shabaab targeting
could not be found within time constraints. For more information see section on Researchchallenges.

2.1.3.

Formal pathways and consequences for disengagement from
Al-Shabaab

An overview of the formal pathways has been discussed in section 1.2.2, with focus on the
National Programme for the Handling and the Treatment of Disengaged Combatants. Moredetails about this formal pathway and consequences for disengagement are provided below
per profile and sub-profile (2.1.3, 2.2, 2.3).
(a)High-value defectors

Felbab-Brown reported that the high-value defectors programme was introduced in Somalia in2015 by Somalia’s national security advisor and the director general of the National
Intelligence and Security Agency. The programme fails to establish a systematic way ofassessing which persons qualify as high-value defectors. According to the same author thecommon understanding and practice is that these are Al-Shabaab commanders, or at times
clan elders and warlords, that have associated themselves with the group, and who can makemany of their followers (in the tens) also leave. 211 The Somalia expert on disengagement from
Al-Shabaab reported that the high-value defector programme is still running as of September
2022. 212
As put by Felbab-Brown ‘potential high-value defectors negotiate their co-optation deals withthe government prior to defection on an individual basis’. The terms of these deals are notpublic, and it is difficult to ascertain what kind of guarantees are offered against the possibilityof future prosecution.213 The Somalia expert on rehabilitation and reintegration reports thatthese deals are very ad-hoc and fully controlled by the government.214
Reportedly, in the period 2015 to 2017, some 20 individuals have struck such deals with theSomali authorities. 215 Notable cases where those of:•

Muktar Robow (at least initially, before being put under house arrest), former
spokesman of Al-Shabaab and the group’s deputy leader; 216

Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 13
212
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
213
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 13
214
Somalia expert on rehabilitation and reintegration, Telephone interview, 10 November 2022
215
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, pp. 13-14
216
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 14
211

35

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM•

Ahmed Madobe, 217 the current president of Jubbaland federal member state ofSomalia; 218

The Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab stated that ‘many Somalis resent
these types of deals which contribute to perpetuate impunity in the country, and ‘reward’ exAl-Shabaab members’. 219(b)High-risk defectors

After screening - see section 1.2.3 – those deemed as high-risk defectors by the government
are sent to prison and then to military courts. According to the Somalia expert on
disengagement from Al-Shabaab, this path lacks transparency and it is secretly managed bygovernment authorities and NISA officials. 220 On this same point Felbab-Brown reported thatmilitary courts pathways and outcomes have little visibility and transparency. Their practiceand ‘laws are widely seen as not providing basic rights to the accused, although these areenshrined in international human rights law and the Somali Provisional Constitution’. 221
Government officials interviewed by Felbab-Brown (2018) ‘maintain that regular civilian courts
do not have the capacity to prosecute al Shabaab detainees and high-risk defectors becauseof a lack of laws on terrorism, a lack of secure facilities, and because civilian judges are afraidof al Shabaab retaliation’. 222
In general, Felbab-Brown indicated that high-risk defectors face a high likelihood of being
sentenced to death and executed, being rehabilitation not an option for them. 223 According to
the Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, chances to face death, harsh, andless harsh sentences (in terms of length), including the possibility to bypass them altogether,would depend on clan affiliation and belonging. Those belonging to clans with higher
influence might be able to serve shorter sentences or escape the system all-together. 224 On
this same point Felbab-Brown indicated that it is not apparent ‘whether some high-risk
individuals are held in detention for a long time without trial or after trial, or whether they are
released through bribery or informal means […]. Nevertheless, corruption is widelysuspected.’ 225 The Somalia expert on rehabilitation and reintegration corroborated this point
when stating that high-risk defectors’ treatment may also depend on their capacity toFelbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 15
218
Horn Diplomat, Somalia: Jubaland state parliament extends president Madobe’s mandate from 4 to 5 years, 21
August 2022, url
219
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
220
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
221
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 17
222
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 17
223
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 17
224
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
225
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 17
217

SOMALIA: DEFECTION, DESERTION AND DISENGAGEMENT FROM AL-SHABAAB‘negotiate’ with the authorities, which is in turn determined by the level and strength of clan
protection they can mobilise. 226
The Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab stated that, occasionally, government
authorities make public announcements about sentenced defectors and then hold public
executions, but ‘most of the times nobody gets to know who these high-risk defectors are,how they are treated, and how they end up’. The expert believed that at times they are
executed without public knowledge. 227 According to another expert interview, government’s
treatment towards high-risk defectors – as well as towards captured Al-Shabaab militants – isincreasingly harsh, with more frequent public executions.228
While most high-risk defectors are reportedly sentenced to death, the Baidoa prison/military
court had adopted a different approach, according to Felbab-Brown’s research from 2018.
This court sentenced a number of Al-Shabaab members to prison. Stern corroborated thispoint when stating that high-risk former al-Shabaab were serving, in 2019, sentences in a
prison facility in Baidoa and were also ‘taking part in a rehabilitation programme run by Finn
Church Aid (FCA) and CRD (Centre for Research and Dialogue)’. 229 Such an approach has
been fostered by the international community. At the end of the prison sentence, ‘when thehigh-risk prisoners are about to be released, it is expected that the family will collect them atthe prison and that they will be monitored for at least six months.’ 230
Towards expanding civilian courts capacity, UN and other international partners have built a
special secure court and prison complex in Mogadishu. 231 However, the same source reported
about ‘al Shabaab holding a court within the central prison in Mogadishu and executing aprisoner’. 232
Further details and publicly available reporting on specific cases of death sentences andexecutions carried out by state or non-state actors could not be found within time constraints.
For more information see section on Research challenges.
For more details about prison facilities and prison conditions in Somalia see the EUAA Somalia
report on Actors, section 2.4.5.
(c)

Low-risk defectors

If defectors are classified as low-risk, they can volunteer to be placed in one of three smallscale DDR-like facilities for adults [five, including women’s facilities, see for details section 1.2.3
Overview of rehabilitation centres and capacity], or special facilities for children (see also

Somalia expert on rehabilitation and reintegration, Telephone interview, 10 November 2022
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
228
Somalia expert on rehabilitation and reintegration, Telephone interview, 10 November 2022
229
Stern, O. M., The Invisible Women of Al-Shabaab, Adam Smith International, September 2019, p. 7
230
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 17
231
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 18
232
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 17
226
227

37

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

section 2.3 Children), which constitute an alternative to going to court. 233 For average lengthof stay in the rehabilitation facilities as of November 2022, see section 1.2.5 Overview ofrehabilitation centres and capacity.
Taylor et al. (2019) found that ’70 percent of the disengaged combatants [had] received death
threats from Al-Shabaab, and many described themselves as “hunted”’. 234 Some of theirinterviewees reported also about their fear to be killed upon exiting the rehabilitation centre
and knowing about spies waiting for them to leave the centre. 235
Against this backdrop, as Gjelsvick put it, given the fact that the rehabilitation programme ismeant to weaken Al-Shabaab, ‘the rehabilitation centres are potential targets, at risk of being
attacked’. 236 Harper indicated that the threats against inmates of the rehabilitation centres are‘so serious’, that when she visited the Serendi rehabilitation centre, ‘there were 80 guards for
84 defectors’. 237 At the same time, an international organisation official based in Somalia,
reported that the level of security and surveillance in the rehabilitation centres is quite highand that in the prior 12 months (at the time of the interview, September 2022) there have beenno cases of attacks against the centres claimed by Al-Shabaab. The same expert also
maintained that the group does not seem to overly focus on low level ex-combatants. 238
Another major challenge faced by the rehabilitation centres is infiltration by al-Shabaab. In
2019, Gjelsvick stated that ‘there have been incidents where active al-Shabaab fightersentered the programme, pretending to want to disengage. In some cases, it is challenging todetermine who is a potential infiltrator and who is genuinely seeking exit from the group’. 239
NISA officers interviewed by Felbab-Brown ‘stress that their screening process does notguarantee the weeding out of al Shabaab infiltrators’ from the rehabilitation centres. 240 Harper
reported in 2020 about ‘active members of al-Shabab [who] slip through the net and send
messages to the group from within the [Serendi] camp’. 241
After rehabilitation
After going through the different stages/pillars of the rehabilitation programme beneficiaries
often end up working for the security sector or join militias, reported Felbab-Brown in 2018. 242

Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 18
234
Taylor, C. et al., The Cost of Defection: The Consequences of Quitting Al-Shabaab, 2019, url, p. 9
235
Taylor, C. et al., The Cost of Defection: The Consequences of Quitting Al-Shabaab, 2019, url, p. 9236
Gjelsvik, I. M., Should I stay or should I go?: Security considerations for members leaving al-Shabaab in Somalia,
2019, url, p. 2
237
Harper, M., Life after al-Shabab: Driving a school bus instead of an armed pickup truck, BBC News, 23
November 2020, url
238International organisation official based in Somalia (I), Online interview, 12 September 2022
239
Gjelsvik, I. M., Should I stay or should I go?: Security considerations for members leaving al-Shabaab in Somalia,
2019, url, p. 2
240
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 20
241
Harper, M., Life after al-Shabab: Driving a school bus instead of an armed pickup truck, BBC News, 23 November
2020, url
242
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 19
233

SOMALIA: DEFECTION, DESERTION AND DISENGAGEMENT FROM AL-SHABAAB

On this point a Somali security expert reported on social media in November 2022 that thispractice is still pervasive in Mogadishu while it poses serious security issues. 243
On a different note, Gjelsvick reported that ‘careful consideration must be given to whether
participants will be secure living with family, relatives or others in their networks’. Some lowrisk ex-combatants may have family members or friends who are still engaged with or
supportive of al-Shabaab. In certain cases, ‘the best solution is to relocate individuals to adifferent area than the community of origin’. 244 For instance, at the Serendi rehabilitation
facility, ‘if, after 12 months, an individual does not have a family and community to go to, or thearea to which he would return is insecure, he can apply for a longer stay at the facility’. 245
Community-based reintegration
Sarfati and Donnelly reported that ‘when possible’ low-risk beneficiaries are ‘referred to local
civil society organisations for community-based reintegration support’. 246 Felbab-Brown
reported that ‘Somali NGOs play an important role in facilitating the formal program for lowlevel defectors as well as informal defection’. ‘More fundamentally’, these NGOs ease‘community reconciliation’, which is crucial to enabling ‘acceptance and effectiveness ofamnesty and defectors programs’. The author noted for instance that the implementing
partner at the Baidoa rehabilitation centre had hired the NGO Soyden on various occasions tofacilitate the reinsertion of low-level defectors. Pursuing such goals, Soyden organises various
activities ‘by engaging elders, women’s groups, and business representatives to mediate
conflict and reconciliation with clans, such as over resources or grievances, and to accept
back defectors’. 247
However, as reported by Sarfati and Donnelly, community reintegration is often challenged by‘social divisions and socioeconomic hardships’ that can in turn ‘be exacerbated by thereintegration process’. The author maintained that it would be essential to ensure that
communities also benefit from the reintegration of disengaged combatants and that impunity,in the eyes of the local people, does not seem to be rewarded. 248
StigmaDiscussing protection dilemmas in various contexts, including in Somalia, Sarfati and Donnelly
found in 2022 that ‘men and boys tend to be immediately viewed as security threats when

M.Mubarak, [Twitter], posted on 17 November 2022(a), url; M.Mubarak, [Twitter], posted on 17 November
2022(b), url. Mohamed Mubarak is a political and security analyst based in Mogadishu. He is the founder of anticorruption NGO Marqaati (Marqaati.org) and previously of the Hiraal Institute.
244
Gjelsvik, I. M., Should I stay or should I go?: Security considerations for members leaving al-Shabaab in Somalia,
2019, url, p. 3
245
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 21
246
Sarfati A. and Donnelly P., Protection Dilemmas Arising from the Reintegration of Former Combatants and the
Impact of the Terrorist Designation, IPI, January 2022, url, p. 7
247
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 24
248
Sarfati A. and Donnelly P., Protection Dilemmas Arising from the Reintegration of Former Combatants and the
Impact of the Terrorist Designation, IPI, January 2022, url, p. 11
243

39

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

they are associated with “terrorists”’. 249 Harper reported in 2020 about defectors that havebeen rejected by family members or the community of belonging. 250
Within this context, Nagai, an international expert on de-radicalization, rehabilitation, andreintegration, reported in 2021 about perception gaps between disengaged combatants andcommunity members in Somalia. 251 The author conducted interviews in 2016 and 2019 with,among others, disengaged combatants from Baidoa and Mogadishu rehabilitation
programmes as well as community members. 252 The author registered that most excombatants interviewees ‘had enormous confidence and an expectation that they would be
accepted’ by their respective communities. 253 Community members instead associated AlShabaab ex-combatants to negative sentiments, such as ‘“trouble” and ‘“fear”’, 254 as well as
feelings of opposition and wariness of them. 255 When discussing potential successful
reintegration, interviewees essentially regarded disengaged combatants ‘as risks’, forpotentially re-joining Al-Shabaab or for potentially inviting attacks from Al-Shabaab. 256
At the same time the author registered that many interviewees ‘felt able to accept excombatants if they met certain conditions’. These conditions ranged from ‘the acquisition ofskills to the making of a guarantee to their families that they would behave normally’. 257
Reportedly, ex-combatants trustworthiness depended on various criteria such as ‘thepresence or absence of skills, voluntarism, physical appearance, employment, participation inand contribution to the community, and a minimum time from disengagement, such as five
years’. 258
According to the same author sustainable employment and income were other issues
undermining effective reintegration in Somalia. 259

249
Sarfati A. and Donnelly P., Protection Dilemmas Arising from the Reintegration of Former Combatants and the
Impact of the Terrorist Designation, IPI, January 2022, url, p. 12
250
Harper, M., Life after al-Shabab: Driving a school bus instead of an armed pickup truck, BBC News, 23
November 2020, url
251
Nagai, Y., Reintegration of Al-Shabaab’s Defectors in Somalia: An Examination of Conditions for Successful
Reintegration, 2021, url, pp. 19-24
252
Nagai, Y., Reintegration of Al-Shabaab’s Defectors in Somalia: An Examination of Conditions for Successful
Reintegration, 2021, url, p. 7
253
Nagai, Y., Reintegration of Al-Shabaab’s Defectors in Somalia: An Examination of Conditions for Successful
Reintegration, 2021, url, p. 13
254
Nagai, Y., Reintegration of Al-Shabaab’s Defectors in Somalia: An Examination of Conditions for Successful
Reintegration, 2021, url, p. 15
255
Nagai, Y., Reintegration of Al-Shabaab’s Defectors in Somalia: An Examination of Conditions for Successful
Reintegration, 2021, url, p. 16
256
Nagai, Y., Reintegration of Al-Shabaab’s Defectors in Somalia: An Examination of Conditions for Successful
Reintegration, 2021, url, p. 19
257
Nagai, Y., Reintegration of Al-Shabaab’s Defectors in Somalia: An Examination of Conditions for Successful
Reintegration, 2021, url, p. 16
258
Nagai, Y., Reintegration of Al-Shabaab’s Defectors in Somalia: An Examination of Conditions for Successful
Reintegration, 2021, url, p. 17
259
Nagai, Y., Reintegration of Al-Shabaab’s Defectors in Somalia: An Examination of Conditions for Successful
Reintegration, 2021, url, p. 24

SOMALIA: DEFECTION, DESERTION AND DISENGAGEMENT FROM AL-SHABAAB

2.1.4.

Consequences for defectors/deserters’ family members

Bacon stated that, based on her interviews with experts, practitioners, and officials, individuals
attempting to leave al-Shabaab also put their family members at risk. 260 In a 2020 reportbased on several interviews conducted with key informants - 23 Al-Shabaab defectors, focus
group discussions with wives of former Al-Shabaab militants and low risk al-Shabaab
defectors, as well as 12 one-to-one interviews with Al-Shabaab wives 261 - Stern noted that
defection is not only dangerous for defectors themselves but also for their family members,
notably their wives. 262
The author reported about cases of wives being executed or held back by Al-Shabaab when
their husbands defected from the group. Furthermore, the author elaborated on the ‘wives ofdefectors’ deciding to leave Al-Shabaab territory in order to feel more secure and then facing
the risks usually associated with (urban) displacement. 263 While feeling fearful of retribution
after their men defected, women may also receive threats from or can be regularly questionedby the group. 264
Against this backdrop, the Somalia expert on rehabilitation and reintegration indicated that
defectors’ wives and family members, notably parents, are subject to retaliation by the group.
The expert reported that in cases where defectors have left the group with military equipment,
family members are also asked to compensate in kind, often with livestock. Towards
mitigating these risks, family members of defectors who are residing at the Serendi
Rehabilitation Centre are often also relocated to Mogadishu.265
Stern reported also about ‘wife inheritance’ in case of death or defection. 266 While the practiceof Somali wife inheritance foresees that a widow can be married to her husband’s male
relative, for Al-Shabaab any man in the group can inherit the wife of a killed member. The
same author added that ‘in a further distortion of this practice’, wives are also inherited when
their husband defects from the group. 267

260
Bacon, T., Inside the minds of Somalia’s ascendant insurgents: an identity, mind, emotions and perceptions
analysis of al-Shabaab, March 2022, url, p. 94
261
Stern, O. M., Married in the Shadows: The Wives of Al-Shabaab, Adam Smith International, June 2020, p. 6;
Stern, O. M., The Invisible Women of Al-Shabaab, Adam Smith International, September 2019, p. 7
262
Stern, O. M., Married in the Shadows: The Wives of Al-Shabaab, Adam Smith International, June 2020, p. 31
263
Stern, O. M., Married in the Shadows: The Wives of Al-Shabaab, Adam Smith International, June 2020, p. 31
264
Stern, O. M., Married in the Shadows: The Wives of Al-Shabaab, Adam Smith International, June 2020, pp. 31-32
265
Somalia expert on rehabilitation and reintegration, Telephone interview, 10 November 2022
266
Stern, O. M., Married in the Shadows: The Wives of Al-Shabaab, Adam Smith International, June 2020, p. 35
267
Stern, O. M., Married in the Shadows: The Wives of Al-Shabaab, Adam Smith International, June 2020, p. 19;
Stern, O. M., The Invisible Women of Al-Shabaab, Adam Smith International, September 2019, p. 24

41

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

2.2.

Women

2.2.1.

Options for leaving(a)Members, wives, supporters, or victims

The UN Panel of Experts on Somalia, in its report from October 2022, indicated thatinterviewed female defectors from Bay and Bakool region maintain that ‘women are generally
relegated to support roles’ and ‘contribute to Al-Shabaab’s governance system by serving aszakat collectors, madrasa teachers and preachers, and security guards in prisons’.
Additionally, women may also support the group’s activities ‘by serving as cooks and cleaners
for Al-Shabaab fighters, storing weapons and operating as spies.’ 268
According to Stern and Peterson, women formerly associated with Al-Shabaab can begrouped as follows:•

Members. There are women ‘actively involved with the group’ as ‘spies, recruiters,
fundraisers and trainers’. They are rarely active as combatants, but are sometimes
engaged ‘as suicide bombers and assassins.’ The majority are married to al-Shabaab men,and many of these women are ‘ideologically supportive of al-Shabaab, its goals and its
methods’.

•

Wives. The majority of women formerly associated with al-Shabaab are ‘linked to thegroup through marriage’. These women married Al-Shabaab members or their respective
husbands joined the group after their marriage. Some of these women are ‘supportive of
their husband’s involvement and of the group’s ideology’, while others are ‘against it’. 269

An expert interviewed for this report stated that most women formerly associated with AlShabaab regard themselves as just wives, and among these only very few reported having
been active within the group. Girls instead state more often to have been actively involved in
the group’s activities. 270
In a previous study from 2019, Stern also engaged in a discussion about women’s role in the
militant group. Within this context the author distinguished between:•••

Members: women who are actually recruits or combatants, or who actively support thegroup –militarily or otherwise;
Associated women: women who are in other ways associated with the group, as wives,abducted women or those coerced into involvement;
Women living in Al-Shabaab-, who have lived in Al-Shabaab-occupied territory – andpossibly (but not necessarily) have exhibited some level of support or acceptance ofthe group. 271

UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, S/2022/754, 10 October 2022, url, para. 29
Stern, O. M. and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach toprogramming, Adam Smith International, 2022, p. 12;
270
Somalia expert on persons formerly associated with Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 28 September 2022
271
Stern, O. M., The Invisible Women of Al-Shabaab, Adam Smith International, September 2019, p. 6
268

269

SOMALIA: DEFECTION, DESERTION AND DISENGAGEMENT FROM AL-SHABAAB

However, Stern indicated that the level of support and membership of women varies ‘along acontinuum’ from non-participation ‘with a complete disapproval of the group on the one end,
full membership and participation on the other, and gradations of support in between’. 272
Within this context, according to questioned former al-Shabaab members, it remains
debatable what full ‘membership’ entails and how it is distinct from mere assistance to thegroup. 273 The Somali expert on persons formerly associated with Al-Shabaab corroborates thispoint in two interviews conducted for the purpose of this report, when stating that such
distinctions are extremely hard to make and to disentangle, being the various profiles andcases extremely interwoven. 274
Still on the distinction between wives and members, Stern’s previous research from 2020
revealed as well that ‘while most female members seem to be married to al-Shabaab men, it
appears that most wives do not actively participate in the group – over and above being
supportive wives to their husbands’.275 Furthermore, Stern’s study from 2019 showed thatamong the women actively participating in the group most did so ‘from their homes – from
cities, towns and villages, in both al-Shabaab-occupied and unoccupied territory’. 276 They tend
to keep ‘their support quiet, making it hard to know which women [are] involved’, 277 either
because, as stated elsewhere, operating from home or because hidden by full face veils. 278 In
contrast to men members of the group, women generally do not move away from their families
and communities. 279(b)Territorial control and ‘leaving’ options

The Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab explained that a crucial variable
determining women’s leaving options is whether the area where they live has been reclaimed
by government forces or not (see more details below). 280 Another expert corroborates thispoint when stating that disengagement options actually available to women depend on theirlocation and the actor controlling or contesting the given area: ‘territorial control creates theoptions available to you’. 281
Leaving or disengaging from Al-Shabaab is also difficult to ascertain and categorise, while
viable options differ according to local or personal circumstances.282 Based on Stern’s
research from 2019, leaving Al-Shabaab meant for the interviewees at times ‘stopping carryingout tasks in support of the group’, 283 at times leaving al-Shabaab territory, or leaving their al-

Stern, O. M., Married in the Shadows: The Wives of Al-Shabaab, Adam Smith International, June 2020, pp. 28-29
Stern, O. M., The Invisible Women of Al-Shabaab, Adam Smith International, September 2019, p. 15
274
Somalia expert on persons formerly associated with Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 13 September and 28
September 2022
275
Stern, O. M., Married in the Shadows: The Wives of Al-Shabaab, Adam Smith International, June 2020, p. 29; seealso Stern, O. M., The Invisible Women of Al-Shabaab, Adam Smith International, September 2019, pp. 6, 25
276
Stern, O. M., The Invisible Women of Al-Shabaab, Adam Smith International, September 2019, p. 17277
Stern, O. M., The Invisible Women of Al-Shabaab, Adam Smith International, September 2019, p. 15
278
Stern, O. M., The Invisible Women of Al-Shabaab, Adam Smith International, September 2019, p. 12, 37
279
Stern, O. M., The Invisible Women of Al-Shabaab, Adam Smith International, September 2019, pp. 15, 21
280
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
281
Somalia expert on persons formerly associated with Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 28 September 2022
282
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022; Somalia expert on
persons formerly associated with Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 28 September 2022
283
Stern, O. M., The Invisible Women of Al-Shabaab, Adam Smith International, September 2019, p. 31
272
273

43

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Shabaab husbands. 284 Sometimes it meant leaving Al-Shabaab in groups – as part of groupdeals or as part of clan defections. 285 Elsewhere in the same study the author spoke about
women who stop their support and continue to lead the life they have always apparently
led, 286 or who move from one place to another. 287
The Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab noted that, in general, once they
have left the group, going back to Al-Shabaab territory is not an option for women, who would‘most probably face execution as traitors’. 288

2.2.2.

Informal pathways and consequences for disengaging

Stern and Peterson, in a 2022 report on women formerly associated with Al-Shabaab,
indicated that not everybody who leaves Al-Shabaab, including women, announces it to thegovernment forces and goes through a formal process. Those women opting for an informal
pathway might do so in different ways: they might return and live amongst their clan, theymight move to IDP camps in new cities, or in some cases, marry government officials or
soldiers. 289
Women who are not brought to or do not report themselves to the authorities, and hence do
not go through formal rehabilitation programmes, do not have access to the same services
and assistance as their counterparts in the formal pathway. Moreover, they are not formally
cleared by the government, and, consequently, are at risk of being arrested. For further details
about women’s clearance see section below 2.2.3 Formal pathways and consequences.290(a)Remaining ‘home’

The Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab maintained that women formerly
associated with Al-Shabaab can remain ‘home’ after disengaging, or just ‘leaving’ the group,
where their home area now falls under the government control area or has been reclaimed
back. 291 Similarly, women not playing any particular role within Al-Shabaab might be able toleave the group and remain where they are ‘as long as they can stand the danger’. 292
Stern’s 2020 research on the wives of Al-Shabaab indicated that in general ‘the ways
communities treat al-Shabaab wives depends largely on how those communities feel about alShabaab’. The author also observed that ‘attitudes to al-Shabaab wives differ in al-Shabaab

Stern, O. M., The Invisible Women of Al-Shabaab, Adam Smith International, September 2019, p. 30
Stern, O. M., The Invisible Women of Al-Shabaab, Adam Smith International, September 2019, p. 33
286
Stern, O. M., The Invisible Women of Al-Shabaab, Adam Smith International, September 2019, p. 31
287
Stern, O. M., The Invisible Women of Al-Shabaab, Adam Smith International, September 2019, p. 32
288
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
289
Stern, O. M. and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach toprogramming, Adam Smith International, 2022, p. 24
290
Stern, O. M. and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach toprogramming, Adam Smith International, 2022, p. 24
291
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
292
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
284

285

SOMALIA: DEFECTION, DESERTION AND DISENGAGEMENT FROM AL-SHABAAB

and government-held areas, with wives enjoying better treatment – and even some status – inal-Shabaab territory.’ 293
Furthermore, as already mentioned above, Stern noted in 2019 that among the womenactively supporting Al-Shabaab, many did so ‘secretly’ from their homes, without theknowledge of their communities and neighbours. For this reason, women leaving Al-Shabaab
were able to reintegrate back into their communities more easily than men.294(b)Leaving Al-Shabaab territory, going back to local communities, or relocating

The UN Panel of Experts on Somalia, in its report from October 2022, indicated that women
formerly associated with Al-Shabaab mentioned ‘the protection of their children fromrecruitment’ and ‘the fact that they had lost their husbands in Al-Shabaab operations’ as key
factors motivating their defection. 295 In her report on the Wives of Al-Shabaab (2020) Stern
reported that women leaving their husbands and Al-Shabaab territory may do so for a numberof different reasons, such as ideology, needs for services, safety, husbands’ defection ordeath, or separation. 296
Stern and Peterson (2022) noted that upon leaving Al-Shabaab territory, women with different
type of association to the group are perceived to pose different level of ‘risk’ for society andare in turn exposed to different levels of ‘risk’, such as security and vulnerability issues or lackof support. 297 The Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab explained that theconsequences associated with leaving Al-Shabaab (territory) depend on women’s role orsituation within the group prior to that. 298 For instance:•

Al-Shabaab wives. Al-Shabaab wives who want to disengage or just leave the group needto leave Al-Shabaab territory while their respective husbands want them back or try tochase them down. 299•

Mothers of ‘Al-Shabaab’ children. Al-Shabaab wives who want to disengage or just leave
the group need to leave Al-Shabaab territory while they take their children with them.
Taking children out of the group has serious security implications because Al-Shabaabwants these children back as an important source for recruitment: 300 ‘This is when‘threatening comes’. 301•

Al-Shabaab widows. Al-Shabaab wives can remain under Al-Shabaab if they want to, evenafter their husband’s death. But if they want to avoid wife inheritance and refuse to get

Stern, O. M., Married in the Shadows: The Wives of Al-Shabaab, Adam Smith International, June 2020, p. 29
Stern, O. M., The Invisible Women of Al-Shabaab, Adam Smith International, September 2019, p. 8295
UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, S/2022/754, 10 October 2022, url, para. 30
296
Stern, O. M., Married in the Shadows: The Wives of Al-Shabaab, Adam Smith International, June 2020, pp. 32-37
297
Stern, O. M. and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach toprogramming, Adam Smith International, 2022, pp. 12, 14
298
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
299
Somalia expert on persons formerly associated with Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 28 September 2022; Somalia
expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
300
Somalia expert on persons formerly associated with Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 28 September 2022; Somalia
expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
301
Somalia expert on persons formerly associated with Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 28 September 2022
293

294

45

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

married again (and again) ‘they put themselves in a life/death situation’. Hence, ‘they needto leave Al-Shabaab territory to save their life’. 302•

Al-Shabaab defectors’ wives. They might decide to leave Al-Shabaab territory in order tofeel more secure and avoid retribution from the group. See on this section 2.1.4.
Consequences for defectors/deserters’ family members. 303•

Business women. They often work in money-laundering activities for Al-Shabaab. If theyrefuse to collaborate or to further work for them, they also ‘put themselves in a life/deathsituation and they must leave in order to save their life’. 304•

Teachers, fundraisers, recruiters. The moment they refuse to play the same role theymust leave Al-Shabaab territory. 305•

Women whose family members have joined security forces. Family members of women
living in Al-Shabaab controlled area might put them in a dangerous situation if they joinsecurity forces or armed militias opposing Al-Shabaab. 306

In the cases described above, where women decide to leave the group, they are exposed toretaliation and threatening from the group in reason of the role/function they used toplay/have within the group. 307
However, as mentioned in section 1.2.1 Current policy and amnesty proclamations, Bacon(2022) noted that ‘the group does not allow people living in its territory to readily leave.’ 308
Stern (2019) reported that if women are to leave Al-Shabaab territory or move from one place
to another in order to disengage from the group, their pathways can differ greatly dependingon the destination of their relocation. Reportedly, in big cities like Mogadishu they could
relocate ‘basically unnoticed,’ while in smaller cities such as Baidoa this was less the case. 309
The IOM-funded project on women’s formal rehabilitation - see section below 2.2.3 for further
details - included a very first estimation, carried out by local women’s organisations, ofpotential beneficiaries across three locations (Kismayo, Baidoa and Mogadishu). 310 Based onthese estimates, women who were potentially eligible for rehabilitation were estimated at thetime between 2 000 and 2 500 people. 311 On this same point, IOM reported that ‘as a result ofa [2019] household survey administered by women’s organizations, the project identified over
2,600 women living in Baidoa, Kismayo and Mogadishu, who had escaped, defected or been
rescued from Al-Shabaab’. 312

Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
304
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
305
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
306
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
307
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
308
Bacon, T., Inside the minds of Somalia’s ascendant insurgents: an identity, mind, emotions and perceptions
analysis of al-Shabaab, March 2022, url, p. 94
309
Stern, O. M., The Invisible Women of Al-Shabaab, Adam Smith International, September 2019, p. 32
310
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
311
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
312
IOM, Disengagement, Disassociation, Reintegration and Reconciliation, Transitional Rehabilitation, December
2021, url, p. 4
302
303

SOMALIA: DEFECTION, DESERTION AND DISENGAGEMENT FROM AL-SHABAAB

The Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab maintained that most women
disengaging informally from the militant group find their way to these three cities. However,the same expert added that ever since the project has been formalised, in 2021, no statistics
have been collected. 313 Moreover, as the Somali expert on persons formerly associated with
Al-Shabaab stressed, many of these women do not know about the rehabilitation programme,with the exception of some in Kismayo and Baidoa areas. 314
Treatment after leaving
In their 2022 study Stern and Paterson discussed women’s need after leaving al-Shabaabterritory. They indicated that many women head to cities and towns in government-held areas
and many of them do not reveal their past association with Al-Shabaab as this might cause‘mistrust, stigma or even arrest’. 315 In a previous report from 2020, Stern indicated that, apartfrom the difficulties of the journey, the ease of integration depends very much on the places
women move to, and the level of family or clan connection/support they can rely upon. 316
Again the author noted that in their new location women face a number of challenges, suchas: poverty, stigma and mistrust from within the hosting community (including IDP camps) or
the family circle, sexual exploitation, and fear of Al-Shabaab (also within IDP camps). 317
In the same study from 2022 Stern and Peterson quoted a research conducted by Albany
Associates (2021) on communities’ perceptions about women formerly associated with AlShabaab. This study found that communities in Jubbaland, South-West State, and Hirshabelle‘would be open to female defectors returning to their communities, as they viewed them as
being vulnerable’ and not actively involved in Al-Shabaab activities. The same study also
found a view held by Hirshabelle and South-West communities that ‘only “their own” womenshould be welcomed’. 318 Elaborating on this point, the Somalia expert on disengagement from
Al-Shabaab explains that women’s clan status, and hence the level of protection they canaccess, depends on their own clan affiliation (the clan from which they originally come from)and that of their husband’s. Children always belong to their father’s clan. Women who seek
protection after having left Al-Shabaab and who have children are usually welcomed by theirhusbands’ clan, or at least their children are so. 319
In terms of housing and securing livelihoods, Stern and Paterson (2022) noted that while some
women can live with family or clan members, most need to find other housing solutions, withmany ‘moving into rooms’, often in IDPs camps. Sometimes they are excluded from receiving
assistance there, due to discrimination or the fact that they separated from their own

Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 23 September 2022
Somalia expert on persons formerly associated with Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 28 September 2022
315
Stern, O. M. and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach toprogramming, Adam Smith International, 2022, p. 13
316
Stern, O. M., Married in the Shadows: The Wives of Al-Shabaab, Adam Smith International, June 2020, pp. 32-37
317
Stern, O. M., Married in the Shadows: The Wives of Al-Shabaab, Adam Smith International, June 2020, pp. 38-39
318
Stern, O. M. and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach toprogramming, Adam Smith International, 2022, p. 22
319
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
313

314

47

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

communities. 320 Already in 2019 Stern noted that some of the women ‘leaving’ Al-Shabaab,alone or with their children, struggle to find housing or to secure livelihoods. 321
Stern and Paterson (2022) noted that some women face specific security problems from AlShabaab husbands, from whom they have escaped with their children, or from other membersof the group. ‘This is particularly the case when women flee with children, whom the groupwishes to recruit’, 322 as also the Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaabcorroborated. 323 Stern noted already in 2019 that some women risk being targeted by thegroup. 324
StigmaRegarding stigma, Stern and Peterson (2022) noted that in many communities women
formerly associated with Al-Shabaab actually face significant stigma: 325 ‘where women’sbackgrounds are known, some are stigmatised and discriminated against – with some evenrejected by their families due to their affiliation with the group’. 326 This is particularly the casewhen women have left their husbands in the group, and they are believed to be spying or
carrying out activities on behalf of the group. Community attitudes towards these women
would be particularly negative when they have married al-Shabaab fighters outside of theirown clans, and they have had children with them. 327 However, according to the Somalia expert
on disengagement from Al-Shabaab the level of stigma rarely reaches the point of outright
expulsion. 328 Women might be looked at very suspiciously, and community members mightrefuse to engage with them, but usually this is not enough to ‘kick you out’. 329
In a previous report (2019) Stern noted that women might also be welcomed back by theirrespective communities, depending on the women’s own attitude, the place at hand, and thewomen’s relationship with Al-Shabaab. 330 Women whose participation in the group remained
concealed would not experience stigma. The same would apply to women relocating to cities
or other places, provided that their past role with the group remains unknown. 331
This notwithstanding, Felbab-Brown (2018) reported about ‘several instances of community
retaliation against women considered to be “al Shabaab wives”’ in various parts of Somalia,

Stern, O. M. and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach toprogramming, Adam Smith International, 2022, p. 13
321
Stern, O. M., The Invisible Women of Al-Shabaab, Adam Smith International, September 2019, p. 36
322
Stern, O. M. and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach toprogramming, Adam Smith International, 2022, p. 14323
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
324
Stern, O. M., The Invisible Women of Al-Shabaab, Adam Smith International, September 2019, p. 36
325
Stern, O. M. and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach toprogramming, Adam Smith International, 2022, p. 22326
Stern, O. M. and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach toprogramming, Adam Smith International, 2022, p. 13
327
Stern, O. M. and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach toprogramming, Adam Smith International, 2022, p. 20
328
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
329
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
330
Stern, O. M., The Invisible Women of Al-Shabaab, Adam Smith International, September 2019, p. 36
331
Stern, O. M., The Invisible Women of Al-Shabaab, Adam Smith International, September 2019, pp. 36-37
320

SOMALIA: DEFECTION, DESERTION AND DISENGAGEMENT FROM AL-SHABAAB

including in Kismayo and Baidoa. 332 Local authorities and community members wanted to
expel them or stigmatised them out of fear and suspiciousness (for them being spies). 333
Felbab-Brown noted that women labelled as wives of Al-Shabaab fighters are seen by theirfamilies and communities as disgraced, and unable to be married off again. 334 The sameauthor added that ‘women are highly vulnerable to community ostracism, retaliation, andexpulsion, which can have severe implications for their safety and security and that of theirchildren.’ This is particularly true for ‘those from minority clans or who are internallydisplaced’. 335
Women from minority clans
Felbab-Brown (2018) further elaborated on women and children from minority clans/groups
and formerly associated with Al-Shabaab. First the author indicated that the ‘xeer system
under-privileges women’ in general and then went on elaborating on women coming from ‘asubordinate minority clan, such as the Bantu’ [actually a minority group, see EUAA Somalia
Report on Targeted Profiles 2021] or who are displaced and do not have access to clan
protection. The author stated that these women are ‘unlikely to receive any justice or to beable to (re)integrate into the local community’. She added that ‘such women can easily end up
without any protection and resources’. 336 As also stated above by the Somalia expert on
disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Somali women have a dual clan status. 337 Because of thisthey can face discrimination as women and as members of a minority clan, ‘even only bymarriage’. ‘Since many minority clans ally with al Shabaab precisely because of theirsubjugated status, women who have a connection to those clans are highly vulnerable’. 338
Political scientists Besteman and Van Lehman (2018), focussed on the situation of the Somali
Bantu of the Juba River Valley (Jubbaland). Their research showed that ‘Al-Shabaabdifferentiates in its application and enforcement of religious, governance and economic rules
between Somali Bantus and Somalis from the major clans by extorting a greater percentage of
harvests, remittances and “religious-adherence” fines from Somali Bantus than from other
Somalis.’ 339 Within this context, 97.5 % of respondents of their face-to-face survey (41respondents in total), reported that in their villages Al-Shabaab members ‘commit rape
through the forced “marriage” of Somali Bantu girls’ and that the average age at which thishappen ranges from ‘9 to 17 years old, with a mean age of 13 years’. 340 Against this backdrop,
all respondents reported that ‘Somali Bantus cannot “move freely between Al-Shabaab-held
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 22
333
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 22334
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 11335
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 23
336
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 24
337
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022; Felbab-Brown, V.,
The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May 2018, url, p. 24
338
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 24
339
Besteman, C. and Van Lehman, D., Somalia’s Southern War, The Fight Over Land and Labour, 2018, p. 300
340
Besteman, C. and Van Lehman, D., Somalia’s Southern War, The Fight Over Land and Labour, 2018, p. 305
332

49

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

areas and government-controlled areas”’ while 90% reported that despite their wish to leave
the Jubba Valley, ‘they are too afraid to do so’. 341 Leaving the territory and then being caught
returning to Al-Shabaab controlled areas could be highly costly. According to the respondents,
Somali Bantu may face execution (39%), imprisonment and interrogation (41%), and removal tounknown or fighting area (20%). 342(c)Marrying government soldiers

Stern and Peterson reported that some women, who desert and integrate informally, marry
government soldiers or officials. 343 In a different study, Stern further stated that women who
divorce Al-Shabaab men have to marry for safety, and this can happen with government
soldiers. 344
No further information regarding this sub-topic could be found within the time limits of theresearch. For more details see section on Research challenges.

2.2.3.

Formal pathways and consequences

The UN Panel of Experts on Somalia, in its report from October 2022, indicated that thepresence of rehabilitation programmes for (female) defectors and the support of families orrelatives in government-controlled territories were important pull factors determining
defection. 345
Stern and Paterson (2022) reported that women’s formal rehabilitation was piloted in 2019 and2020 in three locations in Somalia (Kismayo, Baidoa and Mogadishu) where IOM-funded
projects were implemented by local partners. The pilot project was addressed to 50
beneficiaries in each location. 346 Following this pilot phase two centres for the rehabilitation of
women formerly associated with Al-Shabaab were opened in 2020, one in Kismayo and one
in Baidoa, with IOM as the key implementing partner. 347 For more details see section 1.2.5
Overview of rehabilitation centres and capacity.
Most beneficiaries of these rehabilitation programmes in Baidoa and Kismayo reside in theircommunity and they travel to the centre during the day, three days a week. 348 The authors
also added that ‘the need for the programme is higher’ than the actual reception capacity ‘withmore women arriving in these towns each day who need assistance’. 349 They also indicatedBesteman, C. and Van Lehman, D., Somalia’s Southern War, The Fight Over Land and Labour, 2018, p. 306
Besteman, C. and Van Lehman, D., Somalia’s Southern War, The Fight Over Land and Labour, 2018, p. 306
343
Stern, O. M. and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach toprogramming, Adam Smith International, 2022, p. 24
344
Stern, O. M., The Invisible Women of Al-Shabaab, Adam Smith International, September 2019, p. 32
345
UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, S/2022/754, 10 October 2022, url, para. 30
346
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
347
Stern, O. M. and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach toprogramming, Adam Smith International, 2022, p. 24
348
Stern, O. M. and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach toprogramming, Adam Smith International, 2022, pp. 19-20
349
Stern, O. M. and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach toprogramming, Adam Smith International, 2022, p. 19
341

342

SOMALIA: DEFECTION, DESERTION AND DISENGAGEMENT FROM AL-SHABAAB

that centre staff reported ‘not having heard of any cases of women returning to al-Shabaab’among those who have accessed the rehabilitation programmes. 350
Following the screening, in Kismayo (Jubbaland) and Baidoa (South-West) the NISA ‘sends alist of beneficiaries to the centres’. There are waiting lists, and if no places are available,
thenwomen are registered and live in the community while waiting for their turn. They are not‘cleared’ by the government until they have completed the rehabilitation programme. 351
After participating in the women’s programme, women receive a ‘non-criminal certificate fromthe CID [Criminal Investigation Department], with which they can obtain other documents’. 352
However, the possession of the CID clearance does not prevent women from being ‘raided’ attimes by government security forces, because there is no national database for women having
gone through rehabilitation. 353 In such instances, women might need the intervention of clanelders or other members, or of the rehabilitation programme officers in order to bereleased. 354
Prior to the setting up of the rehabilitation centres in Kismayo and Baidoa, based on an IOM
scoping study mentioned by Stern (2019), Baidoa was the sole place where ‘a process
seemed to be in place for female defectors’. This process followed the same procedure as formen: first the women reached out to their family members or clan elders in order to negotiate
their return. Then they were taken to the local police station, then CID and then NISA for thescreening. Once interviewed, they were released into the custody of a guarantor, while NISA
monitored them and required them to report regularly. 355
Treatment while in rehabilitation or by the hosting community
Stern and Peterson (2022) reported that ‘there is evidence to suggest that women who
participate in rehabilitation programming are better received [by communities] than those who
defect informally’. 356 CSOs, both in Baidoa and Kismayo, through events and initiatives havealso promoted the relationship between formerly associated Al-Shabaab women and the local
communities to ease their welcoming and make women feel more comfortable. 357
Women who go through rehabilitation are still potentially exposed to Al-Shabaab threats andretribution, depending on their past role and their personal circumstances (see sections 2.2.2
Informal pathways and consequences for disengaging, including AS targeting (a), (b), and (c)above). The Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab mentioned various grounds:
because these women have left the group with their children, or ran away from their
Stern, O. M. and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach toprogramming, Adam Smith International, 2022, p. 20
351
Stern, O. M. and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach toprogramming, Adam Smith International, 2022, pp. 19-20
352
Stern, O. M. and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach toprogramming, Adam Smith International, 2022, p. 14353
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
354
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
355
Stern, O. M., The Invisible Women of Al-Shabaab, Adam Smith International, September 2019, p. 32
356
Stern, O. M. and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach toprogramming, Adam Smith International, 2022, p. 23357
Stern, O. M. and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed approach toprogramming, Adam Smith International, 2022, p. 23
350

51

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

husbands, or because of their previous role or level of strategic information they had accessto. This level of risk ‘tends to diminish over time’ from the moment they had left the group. 358
The Somali expert on persons formerly associated with Al-Shabaab stated that ‘we hear lessabout women’s targeting because they are less involved in the activities of the group’. 359

2.2.4.

Consequences for women’s family members

According to the Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab women often leave thegroup because of their children, in order to secure them a better life. These children are often
claimed back by the group who wants to recruit them. In such circumstances, other family
members might face retaliation or threatening from the group, and be asked to join the groupin the place of these women. Family members may still pretend not to know where theirrelative is or try to engage clan mechanisms in order to resolve the dispute with AlShabaab. 360

2.3.

Children

The UN Panel of Experts on Somalia, in its report from October 2022, indicated that in the
period January to March 2022, Al-Shabaab remained the main perpetrator of child recruitment
incidents (177 cases, 78.9 %) and child abduction incidents (192 cases out of 194 verified),
which are closely associated with recruitment. 361
The international child protection specialist based in Somalia indicated that as per the UN
Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on Children in Armed Conflict, about 1 000 children are
recruited yearly by armed forces or groups in Somalia. Of these about 70-80 % are recruited
by Al-Shabaab. Children associated with Al-Shabaab may play different roles: there are those
actively engaged in combat roles, and those used as helpers, spies, cooks, washers, logistics
assistants, among other roles. 362
A child protection consultant based in Somalia, indicated that, according to estimates available
to the source, the number of children (below the age of 18) associated with Al-Shabaab ranges
between 1 500 and 2 000 yearly. The same expert stated that children are lured into thegroup in many ways, especially through indoctrination and the prospects of benefits. Thoseliving under Al-Shabaab controlled areas are more easily recruited into the group, when they
are not forced to be part of it. Often clan structures and elders are charged with recruitment
on behalf of Al-Shabaab. The group also carries out recruitment activities outside its control
areas, by reaching out to children and trying to have them join the group through deceit andmisinformation. 363

Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
Somalia expert on persons formerly associated with Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 28 September 2022
360
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 29 September 2022
361
UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, S/2022/754, 10 October 2022, url, para. 127
362
Child protection consultant based in Somalia, Online interview, 3 October 2022
363
Child protection consultant based in Somalia, Online interview, 3 October 2022
358

359

SOMALIA: DEFECTION, DESERTION AND DISENGAGEMENT FROM AL-SHABAAB

2.3.1.

Disengagement options

Children may disengage or just leave Al-Shabaab through the formal or the informal pathways.
According to the child protection consultant based in Somalia, most children who are
identified either by government or by child protection actors opt for or are channelled throughthe formal pathways. 364 According to the international child protection specialist based inSomalia the number of those referred to the authorities are a ‘tiny drop in the ocean’. 365

2.3.2.
(a)

Informal pathways and consequences, including Al-ShabaabtargetingLeaving territory and/or going back ‘home’

According to the international child protection specialist based in Somalia many children
disengage from Al-Shabaab informally. Little is known about informal pathways in government
control areas, while basically nothing is known about areas that fall under Al-Shabaab control
and influence: ‘entire areas of the country are no-go zones’. Many of these children, when
they do not manage to reunite with their family or community of belonging, may end up being
street children. 366 Children going the informal pathway do not have access to the services
offered by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and other protection partners.367
Other times, despite having been identified by protection partners, children go back to theirparents and stay with them without taking part in any formal reintegration process. 368 In manyof these cases, children who have already re-joined their families ‘do not necessarily want totake part in the programme’ as the international child protection specialist put it. 369 In suchcases children remain vulnerable to Al-Shabaab appeals, calls and threats. And the group isable to trace them and track them down. 370
Children wishing to disengage from the group might decide to escape whenever they arepresented a good opportunity: at night for instance, whenever the level of control from thegroup lessens, or in case of newly liberated areas, whenever it is easier to seek refuge andreach security or government forces. 371
In some cases, disengaged children tend to return to their family and community of belonging,but this option is not always viable. Al-Shabaab tends to break the link between a child and its
family or community. Recruited children are usually taken away from their place of origin,maybe to a training camp or facility in another region, some hundred kilometres away. Thisposes serious challenges to the possibility of being reunified with their family. With
reintegration outside of the clan of belonging rarely viable, many of these children end up in
IDP camps or as street children. Other times children themselves prefer not to re-join theirChild protection consultant based in Somalia, Online interview, 3 October 2022
International child protection specialist based in Somalia, Online interview, 5 October 2022
366
International child protection specialist based in Somalia, Online interview, 5 October 2022
367
Child protection consultant based in Somalia, Online interview, 3 October 2022
368
Child protection consultant based in Somalia, Online interview, 3 October 2022
369
International child protection specialist based in Somalia, Online interview, 5 October 2022
370
Child protection consultant based in Somalia, Online interview, 3 October 2022
371
Child protection consultant based in Somalia, Online interview, 3 October 2022
364

365

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

family for various reasons: they might be ashamed about their past participation in the AlShabaab group, they might fear their family’s reaction, or they might come from areas that are
still under Al-Shabaab control. 372 See section 2.3.3(b) for further details.

2.3.3.

Formal pathways and consequences, including Al-Shabaabtargeting

The international child protection specialist indicated that in the first 9 months of 2022, among
those disengaging from the group (formally and informally), about 220 children werechannelled through the formal referral mechanism. 373
According to the National Programme for the Treatment and Handling of Disengaged
Combatants in Somalia, children in government’s custody should be transferred over to
UNICEF within 72 hours, 374 irrespective of whether they have ‘escaped, been captured, or
having been otherwise separated from armed groups, or [are] in government custody’ as per
the ‘“SOPs on reception and handover”’. 375
The child protection consultant based in Somalia, reported that children can disengage from
Al-Shabaab or just leave the group in different ways while reporting or being referred to theSomali authorities. Without providing details on the prevalence of each, the source mentioned:•

Disengagement via community mechanisms triggered and enacted by child protection
actors (local and international NGOs). Practitioners liaise with community members/elders
and through them reach out to children currently enrolled in madrasas, or training camps,
or already fighting and actively contributing to the group. Where children are far away, in
Al-Shabaab controlled areas, a viable strategy is to wait for them to be back with theircommunity or family of belonging during breaks, and then take initiative during suchopportunity windows.

•

Children may voluntarily report themselves to the Somali authorities, such as NISA, Police,
and SNA. This may happen when: (a) children walk away from the group while taking
serious risks until they reach a security outpost or Somali authorities; (b) newly liberated
territory creates the opportunity for escape; (c) they manage to reach out to Somali
security forces and are eased in the process. In all three cases UNICEF or other protection
partners should be informed immediately in order to ensure the hand-over process tocivilian actors.

•

Other times children are captured during raids and fights and then referred to the Somali
authorities. UNICEF or other protection partners should be informed immediately in orderto ensure the hand-over process to civilian actors. 376

International child protection specialist based in Somalia, Online interview, 5 October 2022
International child protection specialist based in Somalia, Online interview, 5 October 2022
374
HRW, “It’s like we are always in a prison” - Abuses Against Boys Accused of National Security Offenses inSomalia, February 2018, url, p. 19
375
HRW, “It’s like we are always in a prison” - Abuses Against Boys Accused of National Security Offenses inSomalia, February 2018, url, p. 20
376Child protection consultant based in Somalia, Online interview, 3 October 2022
372
373

SOMALIA: DEFECTION, DESERTION AND DISENGAGEMENT FROM AL-SHABAAB

The international child protection specialist based in Somalia refers to the redirecting
procedure above as a formal referral mechanism that channels disengaged children from stateand non-state actors to protection actors, in line with the SOPs for the reception and handover of children separated from armed groups, signed by the Government in 2014. 377 Thereare child protection focal points at the level of the Ministry of Defence, SNA (including focal
points distributed across the army’s outposts) and NISA. After identification, children arescreened by NISA and then referred to protection partners. 378
Human Rights Watch reported in 2018 that ‘in south-central Somalia NISA is clearly in chargeof screening and interrogations of children’, however ‘the implementation of the SOPs is
inconsistent’, with key actors at times unwilling to implement them. As a result, children are
sometimes left in limbo in intelligence facilities, prison or in adult rehabilitation camps for long
periods. 379(a)Reintegration programme

After screening, the formal pathway out of the group is called ‘reintegration’ rather than‘rehabilitation,’ and this is ‘also to avoid stigma’, as the child protection consultant based inSomalia put it. 380 The reintegration programme at the various centres (see section 1.2.3(g) for
further details) has following features:•

The reintegration programme comprises education and vocational training. 381 It is an 8–9month skills programme that ends with a graduation ceremony. There are also a numberof activities that are open to other children in general. 382•

Both boys and girls can access the programme, ideally in equal numbers. Most girls, who
often have experienced forced marriage or sexual violence while with Al-Shabaab, areoften not identified after separation or sent directly to reunite with their families. 383 Overall,
girls currently make up between 20 and 30 % of children benefitting from reintegration
programmes. 384•

Reintegration programs aim to cater to the needs of Children Associated with Armed
Forces and Groups (CAAFAG) as well as other vulnerable children. On average, about
70 % of the children benefitting from the reintegration programme are CAAFAG. Most ofthem are associated with Al-Shabaab, while there are also children formerly associatedwith national or regional security forces, and clan militias. The rest are other vulnerable
children, including those who are likely to be recruited or radicalised. Their participation in
the programme is meant so to prevent such occurrences. 385

International child protection specialist based in Somalia, Online interview, 5 October 2022; HRW, “It’s like weare always in a prison” - Abuses Against Boys Accused of National Security Offenses in Somalia, February 2018, url,
p. 20
378
International child protection specialist based in Somalia, Online interview, 5 October 2022
379
HRW, “It’s like we are always in a prison” - Abuses Against Boys Accused of National Security Offenses inSomalia, February 2018, url, p. 21
380
Child protection consultant based in Somalia, Online interview, 3 October 2022
381
Child protection consultant based in Somalia, Online interview, 3 October 2022
382
International child protection specialist based in Somalia, Online interview, 5 October 2022
383
International child protection specialist based in Somalia, Online interview, 5 October 2022
384
International child protection specialist based in Somalia, Online interview, 5 October 2022
385
Child protection consultant based in Somalia, Online interview, 3 October 2022
377

55

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM•

The reintegration package aims to provide the same services to all children, including
counselling and psycho-social support and socio-economic reintegration activities.
However, based on the assessments made by NISA and qualified social workers fromreintegration partners, children may need different levels of support. 386 Regarding children
formerly associated with Al-Shabaab, the child protection consultant further explained:
a. Children deemed as ‘low-risk’ by NISA (and other vulnerable children at risk ofrecruitment): ideally, these children would attend the programme from theirparents, or guarantor’s place, or from their foster care; however, depending on thesituation and assessments made, those children may go through an interim care
centre at the beginning;b. Children deemed as ‘higher-risk’ by NISA: these children are hosted in a
residential facility (interim care centre) where they can stay three, six, or even ninemonths depending on assessments made by social workers. During this period,
and as long as in need of an emergency response, they receive counselling andpsycho-social support, and they also participate in the CAAFAG reintegration
programme. Afterwards they are reintegrated back into the community: they canstay with their parents, relatives or in foster care, while they keep attending
education and vocational training. 387

The international child protection specialist indicated that interim care centres usually cater amaximum of 20-30 children at one time. 388
Upon completion of the reintegration/re-education process children are granted a start-up
allowance. 389
Felbab-Brown indicated in 2018 that children reintegration facilities were established andmanaged by Somali NGOs, while they were funded by UNICEF. 390 The author described thework of these NGOs back then in these terms:‘At the rehabilitation facilities, the Somali implementing partners provide
medical and psychosocial support, as well as literacy, life skills, and vocational
training (e.g. repairing cell phones, masonry or electrical work). Children are
released to their families after a stay in the facility, if security conditions allow.
Since many children come from al Shabaab controlled areas where theirextended families still reside, a large number are not able to return home.’ 391
About these centres, Felbab-Brown also mentioned the following issues:•

Somali authorities’ willingness to apply international human rights standards (including
the definition of child), which has improved over the years;

International child protection specialist based in Somalia, Online interview, 5 October 2022
Child protection consultant based in Somalia, Online interview, 3 October 2022
388
International child protection specialist based in Somalia, Online interview, 5 October 2022
389
Child protection consultant based in Somalia, Online interview, 3 October 2022
390
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 26
391
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, pp. 21-22
386
387

SOMALIA: DEFECTION, DESERTION AND DISENGAGEMENT FROM AL-SHABAAB•

controversy with sub-federal state authorities about age considerations anddetermination for children (under 18 or 15);•

‘difficulties with the transfer of minors associated with militancy’ to UNICEF; 392

Treatment during and after ‘reintegration’
The child protection consultant based in Somalia reported that during the initial phase, rightafter disengagement, children are subject to forms of intimidation by Al-Shabaab. 393
According to the international child protection specialist there have been few monitored casesof children being ‘chased’ or ‘targeted’ by Al-Shabaab after having left the group. However,
the expert added that ‘known cases are just a few’ and that the risk of reprisals – if thechildren are identified by Al-Shabaab – remains very high. Detention also remains a risk formany of them. 394 See section below 2.3.3.(b) Detention and sentencing.
The child protection consultant based in Somalia indicated that over time such instances targeting, chasing, reprisals - tend to fade away and stated that such instances would be ‘very
unlikely after one year away from the group’. 395 The same expert also indicated that the‘government does not go after’ the children formerly associated with Al-Shabaab who havegone through reintegration. 396
The hosting community usually ‘does not show outright resentment or poses any particularrisk for these children’, but in some cases it might be more difficult for them to findemployment. 397 Protection partners work with community as a whole to facilitate socioeconomic integration of children and sometimes with the assistance of ‘guarantors’ to facilitate
access to employment. 398(b)

Detention and sentencing by state forces

At times children who have reported to an army base, or who have been captured on
occasion of military operations against Al-Shabaab, or who are handed over to the police inother contexts, are put in detention because they are considered being a ‘threat’ by the
security forces: either because they are associated with the militant group, or the security
forces are just ‘suspicious’ about them. This was the case for instance with 195 children in
2021, mentioned as an example by the international child protection specialist. 399 Anotherexample is provided in the report of the UNSG on Children and Armed Conflict in Somalia,
which covers the period 1 October 2019 – 30 September 2021, which stated that about 415
children (411 boys, 4 girls), ‘aged between 11 and 17 years, were detained by federal andFelbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 22
393
Child protection consultant based in Somalia, Online interview, 3 October 2022
394
International child protection specialist based in Somalia, Online interview, 5 October 2022
395
Child protection consultant based in Somalia, Online interview, 3 October 2022
396
Child protection consultant based in Somalia, Online interview, 3 October 2022
397
Child protection consultant based in Somalia, Online interview, 3 October 2022
398
International child protection specialist based in Somalia, Online interview, 5 October 2022
399
International child protection specialist based in Somalia, Online interview, 5 October 2022
392

57

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

regional government security forces for their alleged association with armed groups’ ingeneral. 400
Human Rights Watch reported already in 2018 that in south-central Somalia, above all in
Mogadishu, and in Puntland, the arrest and detention of children allegedly associated with AlShabaab by the authorities is a recurring measure, while their process is at times abusive. 401‘Children are on occasion mistreated by authorities upon apprehension’, 402 and once ingovernment custody, they are screened, including for age, and interrogated ‘within
intelligence facilities’. 403 Within this context, coercive treatment and occasional use of torture
has been documented by Human Rights Watch as well as UN bodies. 404 In 2018, Human
Rights Watch found that in Mogadishu and in Puntland ‘children have been held with adults forprolonged periods in pre-charge detention in intelligence facilities’, at times for months, whileinternational standards set a 24 hours limit within which children should be brought before acompetent authority. 405 In the same report, Human Rights Watch registered that the practice ofholding children for lengthy periods was justified by the need to ‘“extract information”’. 406
Within this context the use of children as informants by NISA has reportedly stopped in 2014
but similar allegations also refer to later periods (2016). 407 Human Rights Watch reported in2018 that across Somalia, notably Mogadishu and Puntland, ‘intelligence officials and militaryprosecutors prosecute children for Al-Shabab-related crimes in military courts, typically as
adults’, with sentences ranging from some years to life imprisonment. 408
Regarding the situation in Puntland, the international child protection specialist based inSomalia reports that there are still a number of children kept in detention in Puntland, on
grounds of their association with Al-Shabaab, while some of them have been sentenced todeath or to life sentences through military prosecution and courts. 409 This is to be attributed tothe existent anti-terrorist legislation in Puntland which defines children as those under
fifteen. 410 Felbab-Brown reported in 2018 about 96 children that in March 2016 ‘were accusedof participating in an al Shabaab terrorist attack’, and who were arrested and placed in adultprisons. After UN mediation, those under 15 years of age were handed over to UNICEF, while
those over 15 remained in prison and ‘were sentenced to very heavy penalties of

UNSG, Children and armed conflict in Somalia, S/2022/397, 16 May 2022, url, para. 35
HRW, “It’s like we are always in a prison” - Abuses Against Boys Accused of National Security Offenses inSomalia, February 2018, url, p. 22
402
HRW, “It’s like we are always in a prison” - Abuses Against Boys Accused of National Security Offenses inSomalia, February 2018, url, p. 23
403
HRW, “It’s like we are always in a prison” - Abuses Against Boys Accused of National Security Offenses inSomalia, February 2018, url, p. 25
404
HRW, “It’s like we are always in a prison” - Abuses Against Boys Accused of National Security Offenses inSomalia, February 2018, url, pp. 26-27, 28-29
405
HRW, “It’s like we are always in a prison” - Abuses Against Boys Accused of National Security Offenses inSomalia, February 2018, url, p. 29
406
HRW, “It’s like we are always in a prison” - Abuses Against Boys Accused of National Security Offenses inSomalia, February 2018, url, p. 30
407
HRW, “It’s like we are always in a prison” - Abuses Against Boys Accused of National Security Offenses inSomalia, February 2018, url, pp. 33-35
408
HRW, “It’s like we are always in a prison” - Abuses Against Boys Accused of National Security Offenses inSomalia, February 2018, url, pp. 36-37
409
International child protection specialist based in Somalia, Online interview, 5 October 2022
410
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 22
400
401

SOMALIA: DEFECTION, DESERTION AND DISENGAGEMENT FROM AL-SHABAAB

imprisonment for 20 years and in some cases the death penalty’. 411 Further information on
implementation of these sentences could not be found among the sources consulted withintime constraints.

2.3.4.

Consequences for deserters/defectors’ family members

According to the child protection consultant based in Somalia, parents of children who haveformally disengaged from the group might be questioned or threatened by Al-Shabaab in an
attempt to get the children back. 412
No further information regarding this sub-topic could be found within the time limits of theresearch. For more details see section on Research challenges.

Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Somali Case Study, May
2018, url, p. 22
412
Child protection consultant based in Somalia, Online interview, 3 October 2022
411

59

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Annex I: Bibliography
Oral sources, including anonymous sourcesChild protection consultant based in Somalia, Online interview, 3 October 2022
International child protection specialist based in Somalia, Online interview, 5 October 2022
International organisation official based in Somalia (I), Online interview, 12 September 2022
International organisation official based in Somalia (II), Online interview, 31 August 2022
Somalia expert on disengagement from Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 23 and 29 September
2022
Somalia expert on persons formerly associated with Al-Shabaab, Online interview, 13 and 28
September 2022
Somalia expert on rehabilitation and reintegration, Telephone interview, 10 November 2022

Public sources
Bacon, T., Inside the minds of Somalia’s ascendant insurgents: an identity, mind, emotions andperceptions analysis of al-Shabaab, Program on Extremism at George Washington University,
March 2022,
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2
ahUKEwj3qNbA2qj6AhXshv0HHQElCc0QFnoECBQQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fextremism.gw
u.edu%2Fsites%2Fg%2Ffiles%2Fzaxdzs2191%2Ff%2FAl-Shabaab-IMEP_Bacon_March2022.pdf&usg=AOvVaw0Z7MuqJ2aTjEXedonnXipG, accessed 4 November 2022
Barret, Richard, Why They Fight and Why They Quit: An Analysis of Interviews with Current
and Former Al-Shabaab Fighters, in: Keating M., and Matt W., War and Peace in Somalia:
National Grievances, Local Conflict and Al-Shabaab, Oxford University Press, 2018, pp. 319327
Besteman, C., and Van Lehman, D., Somalia’s Southern War, The Fight Over Land and Labour,
in: Keating M., and Matt W., War and Peace in Somalia: National Grievances, Local Conflict andAl-Shabaab, Oxford University Press, 2018, pp. 209-308
EUAA (European Union Agency for Asylum), Somalia – Targeted profiles, Country of Origin
Information Report, September 2021,
https://coi.euaa.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2021_09_EASO_COI_Report_Somalia_T
argeted_profiles.pdf, accessed 4 November 2022
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism,
Somali Case Study, United Nations University and Institute for Integrated Transitions, May
2018, https://i.unu.edu/media/cpr.unu.edu/attachment/2770/4-LoP-Somalia-Case-Study.pdf,
accessed 4 November 2022
Gjelsvik, I. M., Should I stay or should I go?: Security considerations for members leaving alShabaab in Somalia, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2019,https://nupi.brage.unit.no/nupi-

SOMALIA: DEFECTION, DESERTION AND DISENGAGEMENT FROM AL-SHABAAB

xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/2599517/NUPI_Policy_Brief_4_2019_Gjelsvik_.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y, accessed 4 November 2022
Hansen, S. J., and Gelot, L., Anatomy of Counter-Jihad: Community Perspectives on
Rehabilitation and Reconciliation, in: Keating M., and Matt W., War and Peace in Somalia:
National Grievances, Local Conflict and Al-Shabaab, Oxford University Press, 2018, pp. 379388
Hansen, S. J., Stian L., S., and Omondi Okwany, C., Countering violent extremism in Somalia
and Kenya: Actors and approaches, Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research,
NIBR Working Paper 2019: 106, April 2019, https://www.cvekenya.org/media/library/oslomet.pdf, accessed 4 November 2022
Harper, M., Life after al-Shabab: Driving a school bus instead of an armed pickup truck, 23
November 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/stories-55016792, accessed 4 November 2022
Heide-Ottosen, S., et al., Journeys Through Extremism: The Experiences of Former Membersof Al-Shabaab, Resolve Network, 2022, https://www.resolvenet.org/system/files/202210/SOMALIA_WEB.pdf, accessed 4 November 2022
Heide-Ottosen, S., et al., Journeys Through Extremism: The Experiences of Former Membersof Al-Shabaab, Resolve Network, 2022, https://www.resolvenet.org/system/files/202210/SOMALIA_WEB.pdf, accessed 4 November 2022
Horn Diplomat, Somalia: Jubaland state parliament extends president Madobe’s mandate from4 to 5 years, 21 August 2022, https://www.horndiplomat.com/2022/08/21/somalia-jubalandstate-parliament-extends-president-madobes-mandate-from-4-to-5-years/, accessed 4
November 2022
Human Rights Watch, “It’s like we are always in a prison” - Abuses Against Boys Accused of
National Security Offenses in Somalia, February 2018,https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/somalia0218_web.pdf, accessed 4
November 2022
IOM (International Organisation for Migration), Disengagement, Disassociation, Reintegration
and Reconciliation, Transitional Rehabilitation, December 2021,
https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/DDRR-Transitional-Rehabilitation.pdf, accessed 4
November 2022
Khalil, J. Brown, R., Chant, C., Olowo, P., Wood, N., Deradicalisation and Disengagement in
Somalia – Evidence from a Rehabilitation Programme for Former Members of Al Shabaab,Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI), January 2019,https://static.rusi.org/20190104_whr_418_deradicalisation_and_disengagement_in_somalia_web.pdf, accessed 4 November 2022
M. Mubarak, [Twitter], posted on 17 November 2022,
https://twitter.com/somalianalyst/status/1593207904286695424, accessed 18 November
2022
M.Mubarak, [Twitter], posted on 17 November 2022,
https://twitter.com/somalianalyst/status/1593208134507827201, accessed 18 November 2022
Nagai, Y., Reintegration of Al-Shabaab’s Defectors in Somalia: An Examination of Conditionsfor Successful Reintegration, in Peace and Conflict Studies: Vol. 27, No. 3 , Article 5, 2021,
https://www.cve-kenya.org/media/library/Reintegration_of_AlShabaab_s_Defectors_in_Somalia__An_Examinatio_SECURITY_POLICY.pdf, accessed 7
December 2022

61

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMNPR (National Public Radio), Somali president offered jihadi group amnesty option for 60 days,
9 April 2017, https://www.npr.org/2017/04/09/523203718/somali-president-offers-jihadi-groupamnesty-option-for-60-days, accessed 4 November 2022
Polgeonow (Political Geography Now), Somalia Approximate Territorial Control, as of June
2021, n.d., non-public source
Reuters, Somalia offers rebels amnesty, 9 August 2011, https://www.reuters.com/article/ussomalia-conflict/somalia-offers-rebels-amnesty-idUSTRE7783D820110809, accessed 4
November 2022
Sarfati A. and Donnelly P., Protection Dilemmas Arising from the Reintegration of Former
Combatants and the Impact of the Terrorist Designation, International Peace Institute (IPI),
January 2022, https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/2201_ProtectionDilemmas.pdf, accessed 7 December 2022
Stern, O. M., Married in the Shadows: The Wives of Al-Shabaab, June 2020. A copy of thisreport was shared with the EUAA by the author
Stern, O. M., The Invisible Women of Al-Shabaab, September 2019. A copy of this report wasshared with the EUAA by the author
Stern, O., and Peterson, C., Assisting women formerly associated with al-Shabaab: A proposed
approach to programming, 2022. A copy of this report was shared with the EUAA by theauthorTaylor, C. et al., The Cost of Defection: The Consequences of Quitting Al-Shabaab,International Journal of Conflict and Violence, Volume 13/1, 2019,https://www.ijcv.org/index.php/ijcv/article/view/3122/pdf, accessed 4 November 2022
Toros, H. and Harley, S., Negotiations with Al-Shabaab - Lessons learned and future
prospects, in: Keating M., and Matt W., War and Peace in Somalia: National Grievances, Local
Conflict and Al-Shabaab, Oxford University Press, 2018, pp. 437-447
United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia (S/2022/754), 10
October 2022, https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N22/638/44/PDF/N2263844.pdf?OpenElement, accessed 17
November 2022
UNSG (United Nations Secretary-General), Children and armed conflict in Somalia,(S/2022/397), 16 May 2022, https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N22/352/04/PDF/N2235204.pdf?OpenElement, accessed 4
November 2022
UNSG (United Nations Secretary-General), Situation in Somalia (S/2021/723), 10 August 2021,
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2021_723.pdf, accessed 4 November 2022
UNSG (United Nations Secretary-General), Situation in Somalia (S/2021/944), 11 November
2021, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_2021_944_E.pdf, accessed 4 November 2022
UNSG (United Nations Secretary-General), Situation in Somalia (S/2022/101), 8 February 2022,
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2022_101.pdf, accessed 4 November 2022
UNSG (United Nations Secretary-General), Situation in Somalia (S/2022/665), 1 September
2022, https://documents-dds-

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ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N22/579/41/PDF/N2257941.pdf?OpenElement, accessed 4
November 2022
UNSG (United Nations Secretary-General), Situation in Somalia (S/2022/392), 13 May 2022,
https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N22/336/63/PDF/N2233663.pdf?OpenElement, accessed 4
November 2022
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former combatants from the Baidoa Reintegration Center, 2016,
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accessed 4 November 2022

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Annex II: Terms of Reference
1.

General description of the profile(s) and latest trends/data on deserting and defecting
1.1. Deserting or defecting from Al-Shabaab, differences and options
1.2. Government policy/programmes and amnesty proclamations
1.2.1. Current policy and amnesty proclamations
1.2.2. Overview of the National Programme for the Treatment and the Handling ofDisengaged Combatants, and the Defector Rehabilitation Programme
1.2.3. Overview of rehabilitation centres and capacity

2. Profiles and sub-profiles
2.1. Men
2.1.1. Deserting or defecting options
2.1.2. Informal pathways and consequences, including AS targeting
2.1.2.1. Family/clan-based re-integration
2.1.2.2.
Relocation and self-integration
2.1.3. Formal pathways and consequences, including AS targeting
2.1.3.1. High-value defectors
2.1.3.2.
High-risk defectors
2.1.3.3.
Low-risk defectors
2.1.4. Associated consequences for deserters/defectors’ family members
2.2. Women
2.2.1. Deserting or defecting options
2.2.2. Informal pathways and consequences, including AS targeting
2.2.2.1.
Remaining ‘home’ and consequences/treatment
2.2.2.2.
Leaving territory, going back to local communities, relocating andconsequences/treatment
2.2.2.3.
Marrying government soldiers2.2.3. Formal pathways and consequences, including AS targeting
2.2.3.1.
Defecting, NISA screening, rehabilitation centres
2.2.4. Consequences for deserters/defectors’ family members
2.3. Children
2.3.1. Deserting or defecting options
2.3.2. Informal pathways and consequences, including AS targeting
2.3.2.1.
Remaining ‘home’ and consequences/treatment
2.3.2.2.
Leaving territory and consequences/treatment
2.3.3. Formal pathways and consequences, including AS targeting
2.3.3.1.
Rehabilitation
2.3.3.2.
Detention
2.3.4. Consequences for deserters/defectors’ family members

SOMALIA: DEFECTION, DESERTION AND DISENGAGEMENT FROM AL-SHABAAB

65