Iraq - Targeting ofIndividuals
Country of Origin Information Report
January 2022

Manuscript completed in January 2022
Neither the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) nor any person acting on behalf of the
EUAA is responsible for the use that might be made of the information contained within thispublication.
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2022
PDF

ISBN 978-92-9465-666-7 doi: 10.2847/40146

BZ-01-22-022-EN-N© European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), 2022
Cover Photo: 846014608, © iStock (photographer: Joel Carillet), 12 September 2017, url: Sharya,
Iraq - May 28, 2017: A young Yazidi woman sits with her three children inside a tent in Sharya IDP
camp in northern Iraq. They and their families fled the 2014 ISIS advance in which many Yazidis
were killed and others, especially women and children, captured and trafficked by ISIS.
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. For any use or reproduction ofphotos or other material that is not under the EUAA copyright, permission must be sought directlyfrom the copyright holders.
2

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Acknowledgements
EUAA would like to acknowledge the following national asylum department and external
expert as co-drafters of this report, together with EUAA:
Romania, International Protection Unit, Asylum and Integration Directorate of theGeneral Inspectorate for Immigration.
Ms. Stephanie Huber, Country of Origin Information (COI) expert
The following departments and organisations have reviewed parts of the report:
France, Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA),
Information, Documentation and Research Division
Norway, Landinfo – Norwegian Country of Origin Information Centre
All parts of this report have been reviewed by at least one reviewer.
It must be noted that the review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts ororganisations contributes to the overall quality of the report, but does not necessarily imply
their formal endorsement of the final report, which is the full responsibility of EUAA.

3IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMContents
Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................................... 3Contents ..........................................................................................................................................4
Disclaimer ....................................................................................................................................... 7
Glossary and Abbreviations ..........................................................................................................8
Introduction ....................................................................................................................................9
Methodology ....................................................................................................................................... 9
Defining the terms of reference ..................................................................................................... 9
Sources ................................................................................................................................................ 10
Structure and use of the report ..................................................................................................... 10
Map of Iraq ..................................................................................................................................... 11
1. Persons with perceived affiliation to ISIL ............................................................................... 12
1.1 Prosecutions of suspected ISIL involvement and people convicted of terrorism
offences ............................................................................................................................................... 12
1.1.1 Children suspected of ISIL involvement .......................................................... 13
1.1.2 Former ISIL suspects ............................................................................................ 15
1.2 Iraqis detained or in camps in Syria and returning to Iraq from Al Hol camp............. 15
1.2.1 Repatriations from Syria to Iraq ........................................................................ 16
1.3 Family members with perceived ISIL affiliation................................................................... 17
1.3.1 IDPs and perceived ISIL affiliation ................................................................... 18
1.3.2 Women ................................................................................................................... 23
1.3.3 Children.................................................................................................................. 24
2. Sunni Arabs ............................................................................................................................. 25
2.1 General situation of Sunni Arabs in Iraq .............................................................................. 25
2.2 Treatment of Sunni Arabs ....................................................................................................... 26
3. Political opposition activists and protesters ........................................................................ 30
3.1 Political opposition and protests in Iraq............................................................................... 30
3.1.1 Recent developments in protests .................................................................... 30
3.1.2 Government response to protests ................................................................. 32
3.1.3 Examples of targeting of protesters/activists.............................................. 34
3.1.4 Targeting of online activists ............................................................................. 37
3.2 Political opposition and protests in the KRI ....................................................................... 38
3.2.1 Recent developments in protests................................................................... 38
3.2.2 KRG response to protests................................................................................ 39

4

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

3.2.3 Examples of targeting of protesters/activists............................................. 40
3.2.4 Targeting of online activists ............................................................................ 40
4. Religious and ethnic minorities, and stateless persons...................................................... 42
4.1 Christians ...................................................................................................................................... 42
4.1.1 General situation of Christians in Iraq and the KRI .................................... 42
4.1.2 Instances of targeting of Christians in Iraq and the KRI........................... 44
4.1.3 Situation of Christian converts in Iraq and the KRI .................................... 47
4.2 Turkmen....................................................................................................................................... 48
4.2.1 General situation of Turkmen in Iraq and the KRI ..................................... 48
4.2.2 Treatment of Sunni and Shia Turkmen......................................................... 51
4.2.3 Instances of targeting of Turkmen ................................................................ 52
4.3 Yazidis .......................................................................................................................................... 53
4.3.1 General situation of Yazidis in Iraq and the KRI......................................... 54
4.3.2 Treatment of Yazidis in Iraq and in the KRI ................................................ 56
4.3.3 Situation of Yazidi women and children ...................................................... 58
4.4 Palestinians ................................................................................................................................. 62
5. Journalists, media workers and human rights activists...................................................... 63
5.1 General situation of journalists and other media workers in Iraq and the KRI .......... 63
5.1.1 Situation of journalists and media workers in Iraq ..................................... 64
5.1.2 Situation of journalists and media workers in the KRI.............................. 64
5.2 Incidents of targeting journalists in Iraq and the KRI ...................................................... 65
5.2.1 Incidents of targeting journalists and media workers in Iraq ................. 65
5.2.2 Incidents of targeting of journalists and media workers in the KRI ..... 67
5.3 General situation of human rights activists in Iraq and the KRI .................................... 68
5.3.1 The situation of human rights activists in Iraq ............................................ 68
5.3.2 The situation of human rights activists in the KRI ..................................... 69
5.4 Incidents of targeting human rights activists in Iraq and the KRI ................................. 70
5.4.1 Incidents of targeting human rights activists in Iraq ................................. 70
5.4.2 Instances of targeting human rights defenders in the KRI ..................... 72
6. Individuals perceived to transgress moral codes .................................................................73
6.1 Perception and treatment of individuals perceived as westernised in the Iraqi
society ................................................................................................................................................. 73
6.2 Instances of targeting of individuals perceived as westernised in Iraq and the KRI............................................................................................................................................................... 76
7. Women ...................................................................................................................................... 77
7.1 General situation of women in Iraq and the KRI .................................................................77
5

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

7.2 Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in Iraq and the KRI ................................... 78
7.2.1. Rape....................................................................................................................... 79
7.2.2 Domestic violence ............................................................................................. 79
7.2.3 Child forced-marriage and trafficking .......................................................... 80
7.2.4 Conflict-related sexual violence..................................................................... 80
7.2.5 Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) .................................................................... 81
7.3 Treatment of single/divorced/widowed women in Iraq and the KRI ............................ 81
7.4 Treatment of women perceived to transgress moral codes in Iraq and the KRI ..... 82
8. Persons involved in and affected by blood/land feuds in the context of tribal conflict .. 85
8.1 Context of tribalism in Iraq....................................................................................................... 85
8.2 Interaction between the formal and tribal legal systems ............................................... 86
8.3 Conflict resolution practices in customary law ................................................................. 88
8.4 Blood and land feuds ............................................................................................................... 89
8.5 The role of tribes in areas formerly captured by ISIL ....................................................... 91
8.6 The role of tribes in southern Iraq ........................................................................................ 92
9. (Perceived) collaborators with western forces .................................................................... 95
9.1 General situation of persons collaborating (or perceived to be collaborating) withwestern forces .................................................................................................................................. 95
9.2 Instances of targeting of persons belonging to this profile .......................................... 98
10. Atheists, converts and individuals considered to have committed apostasy ................ 100
10.1 Prevalence in KRI / Iraq ......................................................................................................... 100
10.2 Treatment of atheists, converts and perceived apostates ......................................... 101
10.3 Treatment of atheists, converts and perceived apostates by state authorities ... 102
10.4 Treatment of atheists, converts and apostates by non-state actors ....................... 105
Annex 1: Bibliography ................................................................................................................ 106
Annex 2: Terms of Reference ................................................................................................... 144

6

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Disclaimer
This report was written according to the EASO COI Report Methodology (2019) 1. The report isbased on carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced.
The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed withutmost care. However, this document does not claim to be exhaustive. If a particular event,person or organisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has
not taken place or that the person or organisation does not exist.
Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particularapplication for international protection. Terminology used should not be regarded asindicative of a particular legal position.
‘Refugee’, ‘risk’ and similar terminology are used as generic terminology and not in the legal
sense as applied in the EU Asylum Acquis, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.
Neither EUAA nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which
may be made of the information contained in this report.
The drafting of this report was finalised on 30 November 2021. Any event taking place after
this date is not included in this report. More information on the reference period for this report
can be found in the Methodology section of the Introduction.

The 2019 EASO COI Report Methodology can be downloaded from the EASO COI Portal
https://coi.easo.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2019_EASO_COI_Report_Methodology.pdf
17

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMGlossary and Abbreviations
AAH
Al-hashd al Shaabi
AsayishAwa’il Dawa’ish
Badr Organization
fasliyaFasl/Fasil

FGM
Hisba
IDP
IED
Ikhbar
ISF
ISIL
Kafir
KH
KDP
KRG
KRI
KSF
MoI
Mukhtar
OHCHR
Peshmerga
PKK
PMF
PMU
PUK
Saraya al-Salam
Tabrea’a/Tabriya

Asaib Ahl al‐Haq (The League of the Righteous)
Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) or Popular Mobilization Forces(PMF)
Intelligence services of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.
ISIL-associated family members
Iranian-backed Shia militia that is part of the Popular Mobilization
Units.
A traditional practice whereby family members, including womenand children, are traded to settle tribal disputes.
Often referred to as ‘blood money’ in English. In Iraq the Qur’anicterm diya is also used. It concerns the payment of financial
compensation to the injured party in order to resolve tribal
conflict.
Female Genital Mutilation
ISIL morality police
Internally Displaced Person
Improvised Explosive Device
Denunciation
Iraqi Security Forces
The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (the Levant). Also known as
Daesh, IS, and ISIS
Unbeliever (plural: Kafirs or Kuffar)
Kataib Hezbollah. Iranian-backed Shia militia that is part of the
Popular Mobilization Units.
Kurdistan Democratic Party
Kurdistan Regional Government
Kurdistan Region of Iraq – refers to Dohuk, Erbil, andSulaymaniyah governorates
Kurdish Security Forces
Ministry of Interior
Local community leader
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
Military forces of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq
Kurdistan Workers’ Party
Popular Mobilization Forces
Popular Mobilization Units
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
Also known as the Peace Brigades. Shia militia linked to clericMuqtada al-Sadr
Disavowal

8

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Introduction
The purpose of this report is to provide relevant context information in view of theassessment of international protection status determination, including refugee status andsubsidiary protection. and in particular for use in EUAA’s country guidance development on
Iraq (2022).
This report is an update of the EASO COI Report – Iraq: Targeting of Individuals, published in
March 2019, as well as the two EASO COI reports, Treatment of Iraqis with perceived
affiliation to ISIL and the Protest movement and treatment of protesters and activists, bothpublished in October 2020. This report addresses topics related to the targeting ofindividuals by armed actors and sectors of society. It is written in conjunction with additional
reports on Iraq on the topics of Key socio-economic indicators (Baghdad, Basrah andSulaymaniyah), and Security situation (which will be published at a later stage).

Methodology
This report is produced in line with the EASO COI Report Methodology (2019) 2 and the EASO
COI Writing and Referencing Style Guide (2019). 3
The reference period for the different profiles varies depending on when they were last
updated in an EASO COI report. Therefore, the reference period covering the time period
between 1 August 2020 and 30 October 2021 was observed for the profiles (perceived) ISIL
affiliates, Sunni Arabs, political opposition activists and protesters, religious and ethnic
minorities and stateless persons. The reference period covering the time period between 1
January 2020 and 31 October 2021 was observed for the profiles: journalists, media workers
and human rights activists, individuals perceived to transgress moral codes, women, persons
involved in and affected by blood/land feuds, (perceived) collaborators with western forces,
and atheists, converts and individuals considered to have committed apostasy.
Some additional information was added during the finalisation of this report in response to
feedback received during the quality control process which happened until 30 November
2021. In this quality review process, a review was carried out by COI specialists from Franceand Norway, as stated in the Acknowledgments section of this report, and internally by EUAA.
All comments made by reviewers were taken into consideration and most of them were
implemented in the final draft of this report.

Defining the terms of reference
The terms of reference (ToR) of this report focus on criteria for the assessment of the applicationof articles 15(a) and 15(b) of the Qualification Directive on actors of persecution or serious harm.
The ToR were defined by EUAA based on discussions held and input received from COI experts
in the EUAA COI specialist network on Iraq and from policy experts in EU+ countries 4 within the

EUAA, EASO Country of Origin Information (COI) Report Methodology, June 2019, url
EUAA, Writing and Referencing Guide for EASO Country of Origin Information (COI) Reports, June 2019, url
4
EU Member States plus Norway and Switzerland.
2
3

9IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

framework of a Country Guidance development on Iraq. The ToR can be found in Annex 2:
Terms of Reference of this report.

Sources
In accordance with the EASO COI methodology, a range of different published documentarysources have been consulted on relevant topics for this report. These include: COI reports bygovernments; information from civil society, advocacy groups, humanitarian organisations,and NGOs; international and NGO human rights reports; reports produced by various bodiesof the United Nations; Iraqi and regionally-based media and social media; academic
publications and think tank reports and specialised sources covering Iraq.
In addition to desk-based research, oral sources were also consulted in order to fill in gaps ofinformation identified by the drafters. To this end, a Middle East researcher with significant
experience researching legal issues and human rights in Iraq, including field work, and a PhD
researcher based in the region and with significant experience researching Iraqi tribal
dynamics were interviewed through video-chat and by phone. The two oral sources, who
preferred to stay anonymous, provided information pertinent to the following profiles: Persons
with perceived affiliation to ISIL, Persons perceived to transgress moral codes, and Persons
involved in and affected by blood/land feuds in the context of tribal conflict.

Structure and use of the report
The report comprises ten chapters, each covering one group of individuals who fall under one
profile. The profiles tackled in this report are: (perceived) ISIL affiliates; Sunni Arabs, political
opposition activists and protesters; religious and ethnic minorities, and stateless persons(Christians, Turkmen, Yazidis, and Palestinians); journalists, media workers and human rights
activists; individuals perceived to transgress moral codes; women; persons involved in andaffected by blood/land feuds in the context of tribal conflict; (perceived) collaborators withwestern forces; and atheists, converts and individuals considered to have committed
apostasy.
Each chapter provides a contextual overview of the situation of persons belonging to the
profile in Iraq, the treatment of such persons by the Iraqi society and/or the different actors,
and instances of targeting of individuals perceived to belong to the profile in question. Where
there are differences of treatment in federal Iraq and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI),
separate sub-sections are dedicated to highlighting such differences.
It is important to note that while certain actors are explicitly mentioned as targeting actors
across the report, this should not be taken to discount the possibility that profiles may betargeted by multiple agents. Additionally, reporting from Iraq does not always provide clear
indications of responsible perpetrators; sometimes violations are not reported and sometimes
they are not clearly attributed to one or another perpetrator. Furthermore, the reason for a
person being targeted is not always clear-cut and some profiles may be targeted by multiple
actors for a range of motivations. This is particularly challenging given the Iraqi context, where
diverse and overlapping identities permeate society and institutions across a range of lines,
such as tribal, religious/ethno-religious, political, sometimes making distinct motivations andactors in targeting difficult to discern in the sources.

10

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Map of Iraq

Map: UN, Iraq. 5

5UN, Iraq - Map No. 3835 Rev.6, July 2014, url

11

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

1. Persons with perceived affiliation to ISIL
For detailed information on the situation of persons with perceived affiliation to ISIL, please
see EASO COI Report: Iraq – Treatment of Iraqis with perceived affiliation to ISIL, published in
October 2020.

1.1 Prosecutions of suspected ISIL involvement andpeople convicted of terrorism offences
ISIL continues to be the subject of international investigations by the United Nations inrelation to the group’s acts amounting to war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. 6
In Iraq, there is no national legislation for the prosecution of international crimes. 7 Iraq
charges and tries ISIL suspects under the Iraqi Anti-Terrorism Law No. 13 of 2005. 8 The
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) also does so under the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)
counter-terrorism law. 9
The UN has criticised the anti-terrorism law as ‘ambiguous’ and overly broad in its definition ofterrorism. The law can lead to ‘arbitrary’ trials on terrorism charges and death sentences,including for ‘non-violent crime committed without the intent to terrorize the population’. 10
Suspects were reportedly arbitrarily arrested and detained for months and sometimes years,
often without a court order or arrest warrant. 11 In relation to criminal trials of ISIL suspects by
Iraqi authorities, since the end of anti-ISIL military operations in 2018 that retook the areas
previously under their control, courts in Iraq have sentenced and tried ‘scores’ of Iraqis
suspected of being affiliated with ISIL. 12 The UN and Amnesty International have criticised theterrorism trials as ‘unfair’ and based on extracted confessions allegedly obtained by torture,
leading to convictions for terrorism crimes that can carry the death penalty. 13
Kurdish media outlet Rudaw reported in January 2021 that it had obtained a document fromthe Iraqi Ministry of Justice indicating that there were 22 380 people detained in Iraqi prisonsconvicted of terrorism-related offences, including 950 women. 14 The UN stated in November
2020 that there were 4 000 prisoners on death row, most of whom convicted of terrorism
charges. 15 Sources report that Iraq executed 21 death row prisoners in October 2020 16 andanother 21 in November 2020. 17 Among the sources reporting on executions in 2021: The
Arab Weekly reported in February 2021 that there were 8 people executed on terrorism
UNITAD, Sixth report of the Special Adviser and Head of the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for
Crimes Committed by Da’esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (S/2021/419), 3 May 2021, url, para. 2; UN, ISIL/Daesh
Committed Genocide of Yazidi, War Crimes against Unarmed Cadets, Military Personnel in Iraq, Investigative Team Head Tells
Security Council, 10 May 2021, url
7
Rudaw, Iraq needs to pass law to prosecute ISIS genocide: UNITAD, 4 August 2021, url
8
UN OHCHR, Iraq: Wave of mass executions must stop, trials are unfair - UN experts, 20 November 2020, url
9HRW, Iraq/Kurdistan Region: Former ISIS suspects stuck in limbo, 28 October 2021, url
10
UN OHCHR, Iraq: Wave of mass executions must stop, trials are unfair - UN experts, 20 November 2020, url; see also: HRW,World Report 2021 – Iraq: Events of 2020, 23 January 2021, url
11
HRW, World Report 2021 – Iraq: Events of 2020, 23 January 2021, url
12
AI, Iraq: Mass execution of 21 individuals is an outrage, 17 November 2020, url
13
UN OHCHR, Iraq: Wave of mass executions must stop, trials are unfair - UN experts, 20 November 2020, url; AI, Iraq: Mass
execution of 21 individuals is an outrage, 17 November 2020, url
14
Rudaw, 22,380 terror convicts imprisoned in Iraq: Ministry of Justice, 7 January 2021, url
15
UN OHCHR, Iraq: Wave of mass executions must stop, trials are unfair - UN experts, 20 November 2020, url
16
UN OHCHR, Iraq: Wave of mass executions must stop, trials are unfair - UN experts, 20 November 2020, url
17
AI, Iraq: Mass execution of 21 individuals is an outrage, 17 November 2020, url; UN OHCHR, Iraq: Wave of mass executions
must stop, trials are unfair - UN experts, 20 November 2020, url
612

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

convictions during January and February 2021. 18 In June 2021, 9 men were sentenced todeath for their participation in the Camp Speicher massacre. 19
In April 2021, the Kurdish parliament proposed legislation to create a special court to try
suspected Islamic State fighters. However, in June 2021, Iraq’s highest judicial authorities
rejected the request by the KRG to create such a special tribunal. 20
Lawyers who have provided legal services to individuals and families with perceived ISIL
affiliation have also reported being threatened by security forces for providing thoseservices. 21
An anonymous source interviewed for this report who is a researcher on the Middle East,
including Iraq, stated that there have not been major significant changes since August 2020
regarding prosecution and treatment of ISIL affiliates, aside from the increased use of
Tabrea’a (also spelled Tabriya) 22, described in the relevant section below.

1.1.1 Children suspected of ISIL involvement
With regards to children, Iraqi ‘authorities can prosecute child suspects as young as 9 withalleged ISIS affiliation in Baghdad-controlled areas and 11 in the KRI.’ 23 According toobservations by Human Rights Watch, children have joined ISIL for various reasons, including:peer pressure, financial reasons, family pressure or because they were forced to join thegroup. 24 The same source further states that ‘security forces often apprehend children basedon “wanted lists” of names collected from villagers or from other suspects throughinterrogation and torture.’ 25 Contact to family members for detained children is often ‘little’and when they are released from detention, they are often perceived as ISIL affiliates. 26
In December 2020, Human Rights Watch reported that children were forced to confessalleged affiliations to ISIL: ‘thousands of children suspected of ISIS [also referred to as ISIL]
membership have been arrested by Iraqi and [KRG] authorities. Hundreds have been
convicted of terrorism. The prosecutions are often based on forced confessions obtained
through torture.’ 27 Human Rights Watch further reports that:‘a special committee of judges to adjudicate cases of children in detention in Iraq for alleged
links to the Islamic State (ISIS) during the first half of 2020 appeared to comply withinternational human rights standards better than other Iraqi courts […] [the committee] […]reviewed individual cases and ordered the release of 75 alleged child offenders for reasons
including lack of evidence and preventing double jeopardy.’ 28

Arab Weekly (The), Iraq executes five men convicted of terrorism, 10 February 2021, url
National News (The), Iraq sentences 9 men to death over links to Camp Speicher massacre, 28 June 2021, url; on 12 June 2014,
ISIL militants ‘captured and murdered at least 1,500 Iraqi Shi’a Air Force cadets outside Tikrit Air Academy (formerly known asCamp Speicher)’. UNITAD, Five year anniversary of Camp Speicher massacre on 12th June, 12 June 2021, url
20
AA, Iraq rejects request for ‘special court’ for Daesh trials, 28 June 2021, url; Rudaw, PM Barzani, new UNITAD head discuss
trying ISIS members, 3 November 2021, url
21
Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report, August 2021, url, p. 39
22
Middle East Researcher, Interview with EUAA, 3 November 2021
23
Rudaw, 22,380 terror convicts imprisoned in Iraq: Ministry of Justice, 7 January 2021, url
24
HRW, Iraq: Step Toward Justice for ISIS Child Suspects, 13 December 2020, url
25
HRW, Iraq: Step Toward Justice for ISIS Child Suspects, 13 December 2020, url
26
HRW, Iraq: Step Toward Justice for ISIS Child Suspects, 13 December 2020, url
27
HRW, Iraq: Step Toward Justice for ISIS Child Suspects, 13 December 2020, url
28
HRW, Iraq: Step Toward Justice for ISIS Child Suspects, 13 December 2020, url
18

19

13

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Human Rights Watch assesses that ‘the work of this committee suggests that some Iraqi
judges understand how to apply international human rights principles and are doing so even
if the rest of the system ignores them.’ 29 The committee, working on child terrorism cases,
was disbanded in June 2020. Previously, the committee had released and dropped charges
against suspects, as defendants were under the age of 15 and unaware of the impact of their
participation in ISIL training courses, due to a lack of evidence, because the defendant had
already served a sentence for the same crime, or because the committee found that ‘merely
taking a [ISIL-led] course without carrying out any terrorist activity cannot be consideredaffiliation [with ISIL].’ 30
In addition, Human Rights Watch reported that:‘documented cases in which child suspects were tried on terrorism charges in the Kurdistan
Region and then put on trial again in Baghdad-controlled territory, regardless of whether they
had been acquitted or convicted and served a sentence in the Kurdistan Region […] the
defendant had confessed to participating in ISIS [also referred to as ISIL] training for between
7 and 30 days before turning 18, but there was no evidence that they engaged in other ISIS
activities.’ 31
While Iraqi law stipulates that minors who committed a crime should go to a ‘youth
rehabilitation school’ aiming at reintegration, Human Rights Watch believes that Tal Kayf
prison holds child suspects in the same way it holds adult suspects. 32
Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict 33 noted that in some cases the Iraqi and Kurdish
authorities did not detain children associated with armed forces and armed groups(CAAFAGs) and allowed them to return to their areas of origin, while in other cases CAAFAGs
and children with perceived affiliation with ISIL were detained by Iraqi and Kurdish authorities
without evidence of a committed crime. The same source added that ‘some children’s
association with ISIL is perceived as voluntary, despite, in some cases, living in a climate ofextreme fear where they may have felt compelled to comply with the group’s norms.’ 34 In
January 2021, an estimated 2 294 children remained in detention in Bagdad due to their(perceived) ISIL affiliation with sentences averaging between 5 to 15 years. Iraqi’s juvenile
penal justice system is overwhelmed and overcrowded according to Watchlist. 35
In KRI, most children associated with armed groups left prisons, but reintegration services
remain limited for them and returning children ‘have faced many challenges reintegrating into
their communities.’ 36 Non-Iraqi children with ISIL affiliations were likewise held in ‘high-levelsecurity detention facilities in Iraq’, while some countries have returned them to their country

HRW, Iraq: Step Toward Justice for ISIS Child Suspects, 13 December 2020, url
HRW, Iraq: Step Toward Justice for ISIS Child Suspects, 13 December 2020, url
31
HRW, Iraq: Step Toward Justice for ISIS Child Suspects, 13 December 2020, url
32
HRW, Iraq: Step Toward Justice for ISIS Child Suspects, 13 December 2020, url
33
Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict is an organisation that ‘strives to end violations against children in armed conflicts
and to guarantee their rights’ and partners with other (I)NGOs, disseminates information on children. It ‘is a fiscally sponsoredprogram of United Charitable, a not-for-profit organization. Moreover, it conducts desk-based literature reviews and interviews
with local and international actors in the field of children human rights. Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, About, n. d., url
34
Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, Bridging the Gap: Bringing the Response to Children Formerly Associated with ISIL
in Iraq in Line with International Child Protection Standards, March 2021, available at url, p.2
35
HRW, Iraq: Step Toward Justice for ISIS Child Suspects, 13 December 2020, url
36
Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, Bridging the Gap: Bringing the Response to Children Formerly Associated with ISIL
in Iraq in Line with International Child Protection Standards, March 2021, available at url, p.2
29
30

14

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

of nationality. 37 According to Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, as of March 2021, theIraqi government did not have a ‘national strategy or legal framework guiding theGovernment’s response to children associated with armed forces and armed groups […] to theextent that reintegration support is provided, it is primarily led by humanitarian and protection
actors, often on a limited and short-term basis.’ 38

1.1.2 Former ISIL suspects
The UN reported in 2020 that those who had served their sentences in the KRI were ‘at riskof being arrested and tried twice for the same [terrorism] crime’ upon their return to theirareas of origin in other parts of Iraq as the two systems exist in parallel and lackcoordination. 39 Similarly, Human Rights Watch wrote in October 2021 that ‘dozens of Sunni
Arab men’ in the KRI who had served prison time or been acquitted of having ISIL
connections were examples of those at ‘risk of rearrest or retaliation if they try to reunite with
their families in areas controlled by Baghdad’. Human Rights Watch reported that they werebeing held at a KRI camp where security forces would allow them to leave to Baghdad
controlled areas but they prevented them from leaving to settle elsewhere in the KRI. The
source gave the view that they were at risk of being arbitrarily detained or killed by armed
groups due to their suspected ISIL affiliation with ‘near impunity’. 40
The Middle East researcher interviewed for this report stated that on the issue of being
prosecuted a second time (‘double jeopardy’), ‘the fact that someone was previously detainedmeans in the eyes of the community that they are linked to ISIS, even if found not guilty’. 41

1.2 Iraqis detained or in camps in Syria and returning to
Iraq from Al Hol camp
There are thousands of Iraqis detained in prisons and camps in Syria on ISIL suspicion. 42
Among those foreigners detained in Syria for ISIL links, there are about 31 000 Iraqis: family
members of ISIL suspects, who are mostly women and children. 43 The living conditions in the
Syrian camps are described as lacking adequate shelter, food, sanitation, education,
healthcare, and judicial processes, as well as encountering ‘insecurity and violence’, all ofwhich is exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. 44 Children are described by charity groups
as living in ‘unbearable’ 45 or inhumane conditions in Al Hol. 46 Since the beginning of 2021, 70

Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, Bridging the Gap: Bringing the Response to Children Formerly Associated with ISIL
in Iraq in Line with International Child Protection Standards, March 2021, available at url, p.2
38
Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, Bridging the Gap: Bringing the Response to Children Formerly Associated with ISIL
in Iraq in Line with International Child Protection Standards, March 2021, url, p. 2
39
UN OHCHR, End of Mission Statement by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced
persons, 23 February 2020, url
40
HRW, Iraq/Kurdistan Region: Former ISIS Suspects Stuck in Limbo, 28 October 2021, url
41
Middle East Researcher, video-chat Interview with EUAA, 3 November 2021
42
HRW, Thousands of Foreigners Unlawfully Held in NE Syria, 23 March 2021, url; Al Jazeera, Return of Iraqis seen by US as
easing threat from Syria camp, 22 May 2021, url
43
HRW, Thousands of Foreigners Unlawfully Held in NE Syria, 23 March 2021, url; Similar figures are reported in Al Jazeera
indicate 70 000 are located in Al Hol camp, about half of whom are Iraqis, mostly women and children: in Al Jazeera, Return of
Iraqis seen by US as easing threat from Syria camp, 22 May 2021, url; also 32 000 reported by CIVIC: CIVIC, Ignoring Iraq’s Most
Vulnerable: The Plight of Displaced People, April 2021, url, p. 12
44
UN News, UN launches initiative to support returnees trapped in Syria camps, 29 September 2021, url
45
Rudaw, Al-Hol’s 27,000 children in unbearable conditions: charities, 3 December 2021, url
46
AI, Syria: Repatriate at least 27,999 children held in dire conditions in north-east Syria, 30 November 2021, url
37

15

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

people have been killed in Al Hol camp, 47 with responsibility being attributed to hard-line
female supporters of ISIL 48 or members of the Hisba ISIL female religious police 49 within thecamp, who punish perceived enemies of ISIL or violators of ISIL policies. 50

1.2.1 Repatriations from Syria to Iraq
Beginning in May 2021, Iraq repatriated some Iraqis from Al Hol, and UN information from
December 2021 regarding their situation stated:‘while official communication from the GoI [Government of Iraq] on the exact timing of
the return of all Iraqi citizens from Syria has not yet been received, the GoI has
decided to initially repatriate some 500 families, with Jada’ah 1 camp in Ninewa
serving as a transition point, where the families would be hosted until arrangements
could be made for their return to areas of origin or integration elsewhere in Iraq. As of
September 30, 2021, 203 Iraqi households (866 individuals) arrived (in two waves) 51
from Al-Hol camp in northeast Syria to Jada’ah 1 camp in Ninewa governorate. The
Government of Iraq announced to resume the camp closures process in Federal Iraq
specially to close Jada’ah 5 camp in Ninewa governorate. Few voluntary and dignified
departures are happening in few formal camps in Federal Iraq. At the same time,
returns of families back to formal camp settings continue, due to various factors
including persistent conflict in the areas of return, perceived affiliation with the IslamicState of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and security, safety and/or political issues. Some
IDP households that had returned to their areas of origin have come back to formal
camps in Ninewa and Duhok governorates.’ 52
Voice of America (VOA) reported in September 2021 on the same first two waves of Iraqi
returnees from Al Hol; they interviewed a senior analyst from the Newlines Institute, whostated that the procedure for the Iraqi returnees was handled with thorough vetting, notingthat ‘the Iraqi government is suspicious of anybody tainted with the stigma of being
connected by family to IS.’ 53 The returns are described as a ‘test case’ by the New
Humanitarian, to see whether further repatriations of the 30 000 Iraqis in Al Hol could occur.
The New Humanitarian described the transfer process as ‘fraught with problems and lack oftransparency’. In May 2021, the Iraqi arrivals from Al Hol were reportedly cleared for return to
Iraq and were taken to Jeddah 1 camp having been set up in tents where they were expected
to be housed at least for several months prior to being able to return to their homes in Iraq. 54
However, the same source reported that there was ‘heavy resistance’ from local government

VOA, Hundreds of Iraqi Nationals Leave al-Hol Refugee Camp in Syria, 30 September 2021, url; Washington Post (The), Syrian
detention camp rocked by dozens of killings blamed on Islamic State women, 19 September 2021, url
48
Washington Post (The), Syrian detention camp rocked by dozens of killings blamed on Islamic State women, 19 September
2021, url
49
VOA, Reporter’s Notebook: Islamic State Murders in Syria’s al-Hol Camp, 25 November 2021, url; Hisba (more commonly
known as morality police) ‘focused on strictly enforcing Sharia Law in ISIS conquered territories and recruiting more individuals tojoin ISIS’s ranks’. Georgetown Security Studies Review, ISIS’s Female Morality Police, 13 May 2021, url
50
Washington Post (The), Syrian detention camp rocked by dozens of killings blamed on Islamic State women, 19 September
2021, url; VOA, Reporter’s Notebook: Islamic State Murders in Syria’s al-Hol Camp, 25 November 2021, url
51
Voice of America (VOA) reported similar figures in two waves (868 individuals) of returnees from Al Hol: VOA, Hundreds of Iraqi
Nationals Leave al-Hol Refugee Camp in Syria, 30 September 2021, url
52
UN Partner Portal, General Food Assistance IDPs and Refugees in Camps 2022/Iraq Call for Expression of Interest, url
53
VOA, Hundreds of Iraqi Nationals Leave al-Hol Refugee Camp in Syria, 30 September 2021, url
54
New Humanitarian (The), Inside the troubled repatriation of Iraqis from Syria’s al-Hol camp, 7 June 2021, url
47

16

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

and the civilian population in the area, 55 as well protests and delays due to security
concerns. 56
Apart from Jeddah 1, and according to the New Humanitarian, there are two otherdisplacement camps that remain open in Iraq outside of KRI. Jeddah 5 contains 1 200 – 1 500
displaced families. 57 However, the Iraqi Government stated on 19 April 2021 that only two IDP
camps, located in Ninewa and Anbar governorates, remained open in federal Iraq. 58 The Iraqi
camps were reported to be ill-equipped to receive people, 59 with a lack of electricity andadequate food. 60 The same source noted that aid groups expressed concern that the
government claims the camps are temporary but without plans to move them out andstigmatisation, integration into the local community is challenging. 61 The government provided
New Humanitarian with no information on deradicalisation programmes, reintegration, or
steps to release the returnees back into society. 62
According to the Middle East researcher interviewed in November 2021, since August 2020
the number of camps stands at three: Amiriyat Al-Fallujah camp in Anbar, and Jeddah 1 andJeddah 5 camps in Ninewa. While Jeddah 1 is completely closed, as it is housing returnees
from al-Hol, the other camps are open for some camp residents. The source explained thatthe two open camps have less movement restrictions. Some families might be able to leave
during the day by leaving their ID cards at the camp entrance while other families might not
be able to leave at all. Whether families are allowed to leave during daytime or not depends
on their profile and how the security forces view them. 63

1.3 Family members with perceived ISIL affiliation
The term for ISIL-associated family members (awa’il Dawa’ish) is explained by sources as
being understood to have a broad definition. 64
According to a report published by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade(DFAT) in August 2021, the UN uses the term ‘families with perceived affiliations’ in referenceto ‘a group that does not include people accused or suspected of extremism or committing aterrorism offence, but who are nevertheless stigmatised due to a tribal or family connection toa Da’esh supporter.’ This, according to the source, could affect relatives from a first degree toa sixth degree. 65
The Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC) stated that the term ‘ISIS families’ is used to‘describe families in which one member, normally a son or husband, joined or collaborated
with ISIS’. The degree of affiliation varies depending on the role the family member played
New Humanitarian (The), Inside the troubled repatriation of Iraqis from Syria’s al-Hol camp, 7 June 2021, url
AP, 100 Iraqi families from IS-linked camp in Syria repatriated, 25 May 2021, url
57
New Humanitarian (The), Inside the troubled repatriation of Iraqis from Syria’s al-Hol camp, 7 June 2021, url
58
Iraq, Government of Iraq, Iraqi government continues to support voluntary return of IDPs as it oversees closure of remaining
displacement camps, 19 April 2021, url
59
New Humanitarian (The), Inside the troubled repatriation of Iraqis from Syria’s al-Hol camp, 7 June 2021, url; AP, 100 Iraqi
families from IS-linked camp in Syria repatriated, 25 May 2021, url
60
New Humanitarian (The), Inside the troubled repatriation of Iraqis from Syria’s al-Hol camp, 7 June 2021, url
61
New Humanitarian (The), Inside the troubled repatriation of Iraqis from Syria’s al-Hol camp, 7 June 2021, url
62
New Humanitarian (The), Inside the troubled repatriation of Iraqis from Syria’s al-Hol camp, 7 June 2021, url
63
Middle East Researcher, video-chat Interview with EUAA, 3 November 2021
64
CIVIC, Ignoring Iraq’s Most Vulnerable: The Plight of Displaced People, April 2021, url, p. 12; Australia, DFAT, Country
Information Report, August 2021, url, p. 38; International Crisis Group, Exiles in Their Own Country: Dealing with Displacement in
Post-ISIS Iraq, 19 October 2020, url, p. 3
65
Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report, August 2021, url, p. 38
55

56

17

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

within ISIL, and ‘some government employees who continued to work under ISIS rule havealso been accused of ISIS affiliation’. 66
IOM remarked that the meaning of affiliation varies depending on location. Thus,‘in some settings, it refers only to those whose immediate relatives (such as the headof household) committed crimes during the ISIL insurgency and occupation, whereas
in others, communities may perceive IDPs who lived in ISIL-controlled areas or those
who only displaced when the military operation was underway as affiliated with thegroup.’ 67
Moreover, other factors could lead to a perception of affiliation, and those include ‘the timingof a decision to leave or remain in an area held by Da’esh, or the stage of the conflict whenan IDP arrived in a particular camp’. 68 Displaced people with perceived ISIL affiliation were‘typically part of the last wave [of displacement]’ following military campaigns against ISIL,
according to International Crisis Group. 69
DFAT observed that ‘some families have reportedly been falsely accused of being affiliatedas a way of settling unrelated disputes between tribes.’ 70 CIVIC stated that ISIL families ‘arestigmatized and collectively punished for crimes committed by their relatives’, and that thisstigmatisation could extend to ‘second- and third- degree relatives, including cousins, uncles,
and brothers living in different households. 71

1.3.1 IDPs and perceived ISIL affiliation
Iraq has over 1.2 million displaced people, many of whom are perceived to have affiliation to
ISIL 72 and are Sunni Arabs. 73 CIVIC reported in April 2021, that official Iraqi estimates showedthat 300 000 people with family connections to ISIL suspects were living in informal camps
and settlements across Iraq. 74 However, International Crisis Group considers that due to thevague definition of who is perceived as an ‘ISIS family’, it is ‘impossible to count’ the numbers
and hard to determine whether a given family counts as such. 75
The Iraqi government initiated a campaign to close IDP camps in mid-2019. 76 Sudden IDP
camp closures began in mid-October 2020 77 and by January 2021, Iraq had closed 26 camps,
many of which were headed by females displaced in the fight against ISIL during previous
years, and whose families have been ‘labelled as ISIS-affiliated’. 78 The closures of camps
forced thousands of people out of the camps and many have been denied security
CIVIC, Ignoring Iraq’s Most Vulnerable: The Plight of Displaced People, April 2021, url, p. 12
IOM, Protracted Displacement in Iraq: Revisiting Categories of Return Barriers - January 2021, 25 January 2021, url, p. 31
68
Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report, August 2021, url, p. 38
69
International Crisis Group, Exiles in Their Own Country: Dealing with Displacement in Post-ISIS Iraq, 19 October 2020, url, p. 2
70
Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report, August 2021, url, p. 38
71
CIVIC, Ignoring Iraq’s Most Vulnerable: The Plight of Displaced People, April 2021, url, p. 12
72
UNDP, Reaching the unreachable: The return and reintegration of families perceived as affiliated with ISIL in Iraq, 1 August
2021, url; Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report, August 2021, url, p. 38
73
Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report, August 2021, url, p. 38; Washington Post, Iraq wants thousands displaced by the
ISIS war to go home. They may be killed if they do, 22 December 2020, url
74
CIVIC, Ignoring Iraq’s Most Vulnerable: The Plight of Displaced People, April 2021, url, p. 1275International Crisis Group, Exiles in Their Own Country: Dealing with Displacement in Post-ISIS Iraq, 19 October 2020, url, p. 3
76
Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report, August 2021, url, p. 38
77
BBC News, Iraq camp closures ‘could leave 100,000 displaced people homeless’, 9 November 2020, url; HRW, Iraq: Camp
expulsions leave families homeless, 2 December 2020, url; UNHCR, UNHCR ramps up support to Iraqi returnees amid largescale closure of IDP camps, 13 November 2020, url
78
HRW, Iraq: Inadequate plans for camp closures, 3 June 2021, url
66
67

18

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

clearances and other civil documentation due to their perceived ISIL affiliation, ‘usually due totheir family name, tribal affiliation, or area of origin.’ 79
IOM reported that IDPs in Iraq originate mostly from Ninewa, Salah al-Din, Anbar, Kirkuk, andDiyala. 80 The same source also reported in January 2021 that most IDPs were living in ‘out-ofcamp’ situations (61 %), while 39 % were living in camps. 81 Following Iraq’s official efforts toclose camps beginning in the second half of 2019, many IDPs were unable to return to areasof origin 82 due to barriers such as:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Housing destruction 83 or property restitution claims that are complex; 84
Lack of livelihoods and basic services; 85
Security concerns 86 or risks of violence; 87
Social/community tensions in home areas; 88
Inability to access civil documentation or to access locations where their civil
documents are registered; 89
Re-displacement 90 or protracted displacement;
Explosive hazards or UXO/IED contamination.91

Families with perceived ISIL affiliations encounter many of the same obstacles as other IDPs,
however they also face stigmatisation. 92 Such families living in IDP camps lack basic services
and encounter sexual exploitation and violence. 93
There were reports that despite efforts by the Iraqi government and humanitarian actors tofacilitate returns of displaced people to areas formerly held by ISIL, individuals and families
with perceived ISIL affiliation have been prevented or encountered barriers due to:••Local decrees and ‘other preventive measures’ stopping their return 94 such as‘communal rejection’; 95
Denial of humanitarian assistance by community leaders; 96

HRW, Iraq: Inadequate plans for camp closures, 3 June 2021, url
IOM, Protracted Displacement in Iraq: Revisiting Categories of Return Barriers - January 2021, 25 January 2021, url, p. 13
81
IOM, Protracted Displacement in Iraq: Revisiting Categories of Return Barriers - January 2021, 25 January 2021, url, p. 13
82
Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report, August 2021, url, p. 11; IOM, Protracted Displacement in Iraq: Revisiting Categories
of Return Barriers - January 2021, 25 January 2021, url, p. 23 [graphic]
83
Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report, August 2021, url, p. 39; IOM, Home Again? Categorising Obstacles to Returnee
Reintegration in Iraq, 28 February 2021, url, p. 4
84
IOM, Home Again? Categorising Obstacles to Returnee Reintegration in Iraq, 28 February 2021, url, pp. 4, 30-31
85
Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report, August 2021, url, p. 39; IOM, Home Again? Categorising Obstacles to Returnee
Reintegration in Iraq, 28 February 2021, url, pp. 4, 19, 23, 27-28
86
Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report, August 2021, url, p. 39
87
IOM, Home Again? Categorising Obstacles to Returnee Reintegration in Iraq, 28 February 2021, url, pp. 4, 13-14; International
Crisis Group, Exiles in Their Own Country: Dealing with Displacement in Post-ISIS Iraq, 19 October 2020, url, p. 7
88
Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report, August 2021, url, p. 39
89
Protection Cluster Iraq, Protection Analysis Report: Right to identity and civil documentation, October 2021, url, p. 9; IOM,Home Again? Categorising Obstacles to Returnee Reintegration in Iraq, 28 February 2021, url, pp. 4, 34-35
90
IOM, Home Again? Categorising Obstacles to Returnee Reintegration in Iraq, 28 February 2021, url, p. 10
91
IOM, Home Again? Categorising Obstacles to Returnee Reintegration in Iraq, 28 February 2021, url, p. 21
92
Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report, August 2021, url, pp. 38-39; IOM, Protracted Displacement in Iraq: Revisiting
Categories of Return Barriers - January 2021, 25 January 2021, url, p. 31
93
Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report, August 2021, url, p. 39; UN OHCHR, End of Mission Statement by the United
Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons, 23 February 2020, url
94
Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report, August 2021, url, p. 39
95
International Crisis Group, Exiles in Their Own Country: Dealing with Displacement in Post-ISIS Iraq, 19 October 2020, url, p. 6
96
Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report, August 2021, url, p. 39
79

80

19

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

•
•
•
•
•

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Threats, harassment, physical violence 97 and attacks on families attempting toreturn; 98
Destruction or confiscation of family land and property; 99
Threats of eviction; 100
Refusal to allow returns unless the family or relative denounce or disavow ISIL
affiliated relatives; 101
Inability to obtain security clearances and civil documentation. 102

UNHCR has provided detailed information on access and residency restrictions applicable to
Iraqis originating from areas formerly held by ISIL who are seeking to return from abroad or toother areas of Iraq other than their area of origin. 103 Access and residency requirements are‘not always clearly defined and/or implementation can vary or be subject to changes
depending mostly on the security situation. Sponsorship and other clearance requirements
are generally not grounded in law nor are they officially announced.’ 104

Security clearances
Security clearances are required for families to relocate or return to areas of their origin from
IDP camps. 105 CIVIC described the process in April 2021 as follows: security clearance
involves security screening by security services to obtain a document stating that the name is
not in security databases. Security clearances are issued by the local authorities in the IDP’s
area of origin through the district civil authorities, security/intelligence services, and in
consultation with the mukhtar (local community leader). According to CIVIC, if a person’sname appears in the database as a suspected ISIL affiliate, this person will be detained andquestioned; if the person is a relative of a suspected ISIL affiliate, the household will bedenied a security clearance. The security screening process is ‘not standardized across thecountry’ and there are differing rules, appeals, and processes which are ‘cumbersome’ andleave ‘individuals vulnerable to exploitation,’ while those that are issued to people leaving IDP
camps are not always recognised by other security actors, meaning those returning or
resettling are subjected to additional checks even as a security clearance holder. 106 Similarly,
International Crisis Group reported that the security clearance process typically relies on themukhtar, the local community leader in the IDP’s hometown area. The process requires him tovouch for the returnee as not ISIL-affiliated. 107
For more information on security clearance requirement for returnees, please refer to section
3.3.3 of the EASO Iraq Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, andSulaymaniyah published in November 2021.
CIVIC, Ignoring Iraq’s Most Vulnerable: The Plight of Displaced People, April 2021, url, p. 12
Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report, August 2021, url, p. 39
99
CIVIC, Ignoring Iraq’s Most Vulnerable: The Plight of Displaced People, April 2021, url, p. 12
100
Protection Cluster Iraq, Protection Analysis Report: Right to identity and civil documentation, October 2021, url, p. 8; HRW, Iraq:
Apparent Familial Feud Drives Illegal Evictions, 21 August 2021, url
101
Protection Cluster Iraq, Protection Analysis Report: Right to identity and civil documentation, October 2021, url, p. 8
102
Protection Cluster Iraq, Protection Analysis Report: Right to identity and civil documentation, October 2021, url, p. 9; Australia,
DFAT, Country Information Report, August 2021, url, p. 38-39; CIVIC, Ignoring Iraq’s Most Vulnerable: The Plight of Displaced
People, April 2021, url, p. 13
103
See for detailed regional information: UNHCR, Relevant Country of Origin Information to Assist with the Application of
UNHCR’s Country Guidance on Iraq, January 2021, url
104
UNHCR, Relevant Country of Origin Information to Assist with the Application of UNHCR’s Country Guidance on Iraq, January
2021, url, p.2
105
UN OHCHR, End of Mission Statement by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced
persons, 23 February 2020, url; HRW, World Report 2021 – Iraq: Events of 2020, 23 January 2021, url
106
CIVIC, Ignoring Iraq’s Most Vulnerable: The Plight of Displaced People, April 2021, url, p. 14
107International Crisis Group, Exiles in Their Own Country: Dealing with Displacement in Post-ISIS Iraq, 19 October 2020, url, p. 5
97

98

20

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMDisavowal processes
Persons with perceived ISIL affiliation or family ties are required to obtain security clearancesin order to obtain civil documentation, 108 and to return to their areas of origin when departingfrom an IDP settlement.109 There have been reports that families have been compelled bycivilian authorities, security/armed actors of community/tribal groups to renounce ties to thoseaffiliated with ISIL as a prerequisite to obtain a security clearance. 110 There are two
mechanisms used:••

Tabrea’a (disavowal): a tribal mechanism (with no basis in Iraqi law) to disavow an
incriminated relative and cut all ties with the person; 111
Ikhbar (denunciation): a ‘notification of offence’ where a person reports his/her relativewith alleged extremist ties to an investigative judge usually entailing a complaint
under Article 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Law of 2005 amounting to ‘an accusation andlegal complaint’. 112

According to the Protection Cluster Iraq, both processes have the same societal implications
and are used ‘in parallel or interchangeably’. 113 CIVIC remarked that there is no legal basis
under Iraqi law that security clearances or civil documentation should be conditional on theact of ikhbar or tabrea’a. 114
The Middle East researcher interviewed by EUAA stated that the Tabrea’a process is not new
but since mid-2020 it has become extremely widely practiced. The practice enabled some
women to eventually apply for civil documentation. The same source explained that Tabrea’aallows women with a first-degree relative perceived to be affiliated with ISIL, to go to court
and open a criminal complaint against her husband, father, or son. The court then provides
them with a document attesting the fact that they opened a criminal complaint against awanted person. With this piece of paper from the court, the woman can then obtain security
clearance. Security clearance in turn, allows her to apply for civil documentation. 115 According
to the same source, the number of people without civil documentation has decreased in thereporting period, since August 2020, as many Iraqis were able to get their documents
because of the Tabrea’a procedures. The source pointed out that the process is not without
negative repercussions. If a woman reports her husband, father or son to a court and opens acriminal complaint about him, the women might face to be detained if the husband, son orfather added to the ‘wanted list’ is still alive and finds out that she reported him.’ 116
Corroborating information could not be found in the time constraints of this report.
Protection Cluster Iraq, Protection Analysis Report: Right to identity and civil documentation, October 2021, url, p. 8; HRW,World Report 2021 – Iraq: Events of 2020, 23 January 2021, url
109
CIVIC, Ignoring Iraq’s Most Vulnerable: The Plight of Displaced People, April 2021, url, p. 13
110
Protection Cluster Iraq, Protection Analysis Report: Right to identity and civil documentation, October 2021, url, p. 8; CIVIC,
Ignoring Iraq’s Most Vulnerable: The Plight of Displaced People, April 2021, url, p. 13; UN OHCHR, End of Mission Statement by
the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons, 23 February 2020, url; HRW, World
Report 2021 – Iraq: Events of 2020, 23 January 2021, url; UNOCHA, Situation and Needs Monitoring – Report #1: Iraq InterCluster Coordination Group January-May 2021, May 2021, url, p. 13; International Crisis Group, Exiles in Their Own Country:
Dealing with Displacement in Post-ISIS Iraq, 19 October 2020, url, pp. 5-6
111
Protection Cluster Iraq, Protection Analysis Report: Right to identity and civil documentation, October 2021, url, p. 8; CIVIC,
Ignoring Iraq’s Most Vulnerable: The Plight of Displaced People, April 2021, url, p. 14
112
Protection Cluster Iraq, Protection Analysis Report: Right to identity and civil documentation, October 2021, url, p. 8; see also:
CIVIC, Ignoring Iraq’s Most Vulnerable: The Plight of Displaced People, April 2021, url, p. 14
113
Protection Cluster Iraq, Protection Analysis Report: Right to identity and civil documentation, October 2021, url, p. 8
114
CIVIC, Ignoring Iraq’s Most Vulnerable: The Plight of Displaced People, April 2021, url, p. 14
115
Middle East Researcher, video-chat Interview with EUAA, 3 November 2021.
116
Middle East Researcher, video-chat Interview with EUAA, 3 November 2021.
108

21

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMInternational Crisis Group wrote that displaced people who denounce their family members
are treated as ‘presumptively guilty by association’ and those who refuse to denounce theirrelatives are ‘effectively sentenced to open-ended stays in provisional camps’ which Crisis
Group said, ‘amounts to extra-legal punishment.’ 117

Denial of security clearances and civil documentation
Sources report that individuals and family members with perceived ISIL affiliations have beendenied security clearances by authorities due to their perceived affiliation. 118 Denial of security
clearance impacts the ability to meet requirements for issuance of National ID cards and othercivil documentation, 119 by ‘deliberately targeting people with perceived affiliation to armed
groups’ through the denunciation processes described above. 120 The deprivation of security
clearances and civil documentation has life-impacts which are described by the Protection
Cluster for Iraq as ‘multi-dimensional’121 and include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Physical safety at checkpoints armed by security actors leading to an increased ‘riskof arbitrary arrest and detention’; 122
Freedom of movement 123 and to choose one’s residence; 124
Ability to access education rights, 125 school enrolment; 126
Access to healthcare, or health facilities which may require ID, such as for hospital
admission; 127
Renting housing; 128
Rights to work and apply for welfare benefits 129 such as the Public Distribution System
food rations; 130
Inheritance of property and remarriage; 131International Crisis Group, Exiles in Their Own Country: Dealing with Displacement in Post-ISIS Iraq, 19 October 2020, url, p. 12
Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report, August 2021, url, p. 39; Protection Cluster Iraq, Protection Analysis Report: Right
to identity and civil documentation, October 2021, url, pp. 3, 9; UN OHCHR, End of Mission Statement by the United Nations
Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons, 23 February 2020, url; International Crisis Group, Exiles
in Their Own Country: Dealing with Displacement in Post-ISIS Iraq, 19 October 2020, url, pp. 5-6
119
Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report, August 2021, url, p. 39; Protection Cluster Iraq, Protection Analysis Report: Right
to identity and civil documentation, October 2021, url, p. 7
120
Protection Cluster Iraq, Protection Analysis Report: Right to identity and civil documentation, October 2021, url, p. 9
121
Protection Cluster Iraq, Protection Analysis Report: Right to identity and civil documentation, October 2021, url, p. 9
122
Protection Cluster Iraq, Protection Analysis Report: Right to identity and civil documentation, October 2021, url, p. 11
123
Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report, August 2021, url, p. 39; Protection Cluster Iraq, Protection Analysis Report: Right
to identity and civil documentation, October 2021, url, p. 3; CIVIC, Ignoring Iraq’s Most Vulnerable: The Plight of Displaced
People, April 2021, url, p. 12
124
Protection Cluster Iraq, Protection Analysis Report: Right to identity and civil documentation, October 2021, url, p. 8125Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report, August 2021, url, p. 39; Protection Cluster Iraq, Protection Analysis Report: Right
to identity and civil documentation, October 2021, url, p. 12; CIVIC, Ignoring Iraq’s Most Vulnerable: The Plight of Displaced
People, April 2021, url, p. 13
126
Protection Cluster Iraq, Protection Analysis Report: Right to identity and civil documentation, October 2021, url, p. 12; UN
OHCHR, End of Mission Statement by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons,
23 February 2020, url
127
Protection Cluster Iraq, Protection Analysis Report: Right to identity and civil documentation, October 2021, url, p. 12; UN
OHCHR, End of Mission Statement by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons,
23 February 2020, url
128
CIVIC, Ignoring Iraq’s Most Vulnerable: The Plight of Displaced People, April 2021, url, p. 13
129
Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report, August 2021, url, p. 39; CIVIC, Ignoring Iraq’s Most Vulnerable: The Plight of
Displaced People, April 2021, url, p. 13
130
Protection Cluster Iraq, Protection Analysis Report: Right to identity and civil documentation, October 2021, url, p. 13; CIVIC,
Ignoring Iraq’s Most Vulnerable: The Plight of Displaced People, April 2021, url, p. 13
131
Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report, August 2021, url, p. 39
117

118

22

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM•••

Ability to make claims for government compensation to Iraqis impacted by terrorism,
military operations and errors; 132
To make court cases, challenge damages or seizures of property 133 and pursue legal
remedies for rights violations; 134
Ability to prove one’s Iraqi nationality. 135

Human Rights Watch reported that in late 2020, in the context of the Iraqi authorities efforts
to close all IDP camps, they ‘granted many more people security clearance and issued themnew civil documentation.’ 136 International Crisis Group wrote in October 2020 that the national
government ‘has produced no comprehensive program to facilitate the return of thedisplaced,’ though there have been more targeted directives such as those aimed at allowing
children without civil documents to attend school, even if these are ‘implemented
incompletely by local authorities or not at all’. 137 According to the Middle East researcher, in
2021, ‘more people were allowed to return to their places of origin even if they were(allegedly) connected to ISIL, but some communities in southern Nineveh refused to takeback families.’ In November 2021, the source’s understanding was that new return initiatives
were on pause due the elections. 138

1.3.2 Women
Female-headed households with perceived ISIL affiliation encounter particular difficulties, 139
and the challenges are described as ‘worse’ due to the legal status and social position of
women, which are interconnected with husbands and families. 140 If the father is dead ordisappeared, obtaining a birth certificate for one’s child usually requires obtaining a deathcertificate for the father, which is also difficult,141 as women cannot obtain birth certificates fortheir children without the father’s presence. 142 Women cannot pass their nationality on to theirchildren under Iraqi law for children with absent fathers, 143 nor can children inherit property of
their fathers, 144 or women obtain basic papers for their children. 145 Women whose husbands
are missing or dead also face ‘additional obstacles’ to obtain humanitarian and government
assistance. 146 Furthermore, CIVIC reported that female IDPs and heads of household ‘may be
exposed to additional threats’ when trying to access civil documentation or when undergoing
Ikhbar due to harassment and sexual exploitation by officers. 147 Similarly, International Crisis
Group reported that these women’s ‘main avenue for pursuing legal autonomy is tabria –disavowal – but this procedure is freighted with additional burdens and perils’ including
Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report, August 2021, url, p. 39
Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report, August 2021, url, p. 39; Protection Cluster Iraq, Protection Analysis Report: Right
to identity and civil documentation, October 2021, url, p. 13
134
Protection Cluster Iraq, Protection Analysis Report: Right to identity and civil documentation, October 2021, url, p. 12
135
Protection Cluster Iraq, Protection Analysis Report: Right to identity and civil documentation, October 2021, url, p. 12
136
HRW, World Report 2021 – Iraq: Events of 2020, 23 January 2021, url
137International Crisis Group, Exiles in Their Own Country: Dealing with Displacement in Post-ISIS Iraq, 19 October 2020, url, p. 4
138
Middle East Researcher, video-chat Interview with EUAA, 3 November 2021
139
International Crisis Group, Exiles in Their Own Country: Dealing with Displacement in Post-ISIS Iraq, 19 October 2020, url, p. 9;
CIVIC, Ignoring Iraq’s Most Vulnerable: The Plight of Displaced People, April 2021, url, p. 15; Protection Cluster Iraq, Protection
Analysis Report: Right to identity and civil documentation, October 2021, url, p. 12140International Crisis Group, Exiles in Their Own Country: Dealing with Displacement in Post-ISIS Iraq, 19 October 2020, url, p. 9
141
CIVIC, Ignoring Iraq’s Most Vulnerable: The Plight of Displaced People, April 2021, url, p. 15; Protection Cluster Iraq, Protection
Analysis Report: Right to identity and civil documentation, October 2021, url, p. 12
142
CIVIC, Ignoring Iraq’s Most Vulnerable: The Plight of Displaced People, April 2021, url, p. 16; International Crisis Group, Exiles in
Their Own Country: Dealing with Displacement in Post-ISIS Iraq, 19 October 2020, url, p. 9
143
Protection Cluster Iraq, Protection Analysis Report: Right to identity and civil documentation, October 2021, url, p. 12
144
CIVIC, Ignoring Iraq’s Most Vulnerable: The Plight of Displaced People, April 2021, url, p. 15
145International Crisis Group, Exiles in Their Own Country: Dealing with Displacement in Post-ISIS Iraq, 19 October 2020, url, p. 9
146
CIVIC, Ignoring Iraq’s Most Vulnerable: The Plight of Displaced People, April 2021, url, p. 15
147
CIVIC, Ignoring Iraq’s Most Vulnerable: The Plight of Displaced People, April 2021, url, p. 16
132
133

23

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

putting her detained or missing husband ‘at risk’ by testifying that he is connected to ISIL; it
can compromise access to inheritance and other entitlements, and ‘risk’ in-law alienation, lossof support networks, or threats of reprisal or removal of her children by angry in-laws.
Additionally, the process is administratively difficult, costly, and surrounded by corruption. 148
The same source noted that these women also face limited ability to participate in tribal
mechanisms to facilitate return, obtain a security clearance, or obtain paid work, and may end
up rejected by their communities of return. 149

1.3.3 Children
Many children of families perceived to have ISIL affiliation lack civil documentation. 150 Children
who lack at least one piece of identity and nationality documentation such as the birthcertificate, Civil Status ID Card, Iraqi nationality certificate or Unified ID Card, number morethan 450 000 in Iraq. Families lacking any of these may be blocked from obtaining birthcertificates, required to obtain subsequent IDs. This also affects children born to Iraqi womenof foreign men, often by forced marriage or rape; those whose marriage certificates were
issued by ISIL and are not recognised, and children from former ISIL areas whose parents
cannot be found or identified. 151 Without these documents children’s rights to access to
education and healthcare are affected.152

International Crisis Group, Exiles in Their Own Country: Dealing with Displacement in Post-ISIS Iraq, 19 October 2020, url, p. 10
International Crisis Group, Exiles in Their Own Country: Dealing with Displacement in Post-ISIS Iraq, 19 October 2020, url, p. 9
150
CIVIC, Ignoring Iraq’s Most Vulnerable: The Plight of Displaced People, April 2021, url, p. 15
151
Protection Cluster Iraq, Protection Analysis Report: Right to identity and civil documentation, October 2021, url, p. 12
152
CIVIC, Ignoring Iraq’s Most Vulnerable: The Plight of Displaced People, April 2021, url, p. 15; UN OHCHR, End of Mission
Statement by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons, 23 February 2020, url
148

149

24

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

2. Sunni Arabs
2.1 General situation of Sunni Arabs in Iraq
Population statistics, in as far as they are available, show that Iraq is majority Arab (75-80 %)with Kurds forming a significant minority (15-20 %); and Muslim (97 %), with Shia Muslims in the
majority (64-69 %) and Sunni Muslims forming a significant minority (29-34 % or 40 %depending on the source). 153 The majority of Sunni Muslims are Arabs, with Kurds forming asignificant minority. Statistics cited by the US Department of State (USDOS) estimate Sunni
Arabs to be 24 % of the population. Shia Muslims, although predominantly located in thesouth and east, are the majority population in Baghdad and have communities in most partsof the country. Sunnis form the majority in the west, centre, and north of the country. 154
Increased sectarian tension and focus on communal identity since 2003 led to a reduction in‘mixed’ districts in Baghdad. 155
According to analysis from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), sectarianand ethnic divisions between Arab Sunnis and Shia, and Iraqi Arabs and Kurds are rooted in
Iraq’s founding after World War I. An Iraqi monarchy with Arab Sunni leadership wasestablished by the British and eventually replaced by the Ba’ath Party and Saddam Hussein
after the fall of the monarchy in 1958, consolidating a Sunni-Arab dominated base of power. 156
With the US invasion of 2003, and the toppling of Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath Party,
power was handed over to Shia Arabs and a process of ‘De-Ba’athification’ purges took place
within the government and military. 157 According to the United States Institute of Peace (USIP),
these events were pivotal in Iraq’s recent history. In the following years ‘Iraq suffered througha civil war, political turmoil, widespread corruption, sectarian tensions and an extremist
insurgency that seized a third of the country’. 158
The Middle East Research Institute (MERI) reported that in 2005 the new Constitution of Iraq
established a system where public sector roles were allocated based on sect and ethnicity, aprinciple that has eventually permeated all of Iraq’s institutions 159 and has become a ‘powerfuldriver of conflict’.160 The distribution of power along sectarian lines, known as Muhasasa 161 in
Arabic, led to a ‘confessional democracy’ in which power is apportioned to ethnic groups
according to population size. Groups with the largest population size reportedly dominate thelegislative, executive, and judicial branches of governance ‘which they lead with an overt
sectarian approach’, according to MERI. 162 According to a paper from the Brookings Doha
Center, Arab Sunni representatives ‘proclaimed the marginalisation of Sunnis’ from the outset
following the new Constitution, to mobilise the Sunni population and win popular support.

CSIS, Strategic Dialogue: Shaping a U.S. Strategy for the “Ghosts” of Iraq, 26 May 2020, url, pp. 10-12; US DOS, 2020 Reporton International Religious Freedom: Iraq, 12 May 2021, url, p. 3
154
USDOS, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Iraq, 12 May 2021, url, p. 3
155
Australia, DFAT, DFAT Country Information Report: Iraq, 17 August 2020, url, p. 11
156
CSIS, Strategic Dialogue: Shaping a U.S. Strategy for the “Ghosts” of Iraq, 26 May 2020, url, pp. 10-12
157
CSIS, Strategic Dialogue: Shaping a U.S. Strategy for the “Ghosts” of Iraq, 26 May 2020, url, pp. 10-12
158
USIP, Iraq Timeline: Since the 2003 War, 29 May 2020, url
159
MERI, State-Building in Iraq, July 2021, url, 3.2., pp. 9-11
160
MERI, Sectarianism and Sectarianisation in Iraq, 25 May 2021, url, p. 1
161
‘Since 2004, muhasasa has stood for an unwritten social contract in Iraq that distributes positions and power according to an
ethno-confessional key’. IPS, In Iraq, you can't vote out the ‘muhasasa’, 8 October 2021, url
162
MERI, Sectarianism and Sectarianisation in Iraq, 25 May 2021, url, pp. 1-4; CRS, Iraq: Issues in the 116th Congress, 17 July 2020,
url
153

25

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMThis messaging reportedly ‘intensified ethno-sectarian fissures’. 163 According to analyses fromthe London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) Conflict Research Programme,‘Sunni marginalisation continues to be the principle narrative of Iraq experts and policy
analysts when commenting on the status of Iraq’s Sunni Arabs’. 164 For example, in 2021, the
US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) reported that the ‘deBa’athification’ process ‘continued to provide a basis for discrimination against Sunni
Muslims’. 165
Sources reported that the systematic disenfranchisement of the Sunnis and the shifting of
power between communities at national, provincial and local levels 166 ‘provided fodder for
non-state actors and extremist groups to exploit grievances to gain community support along
ethno-sectarian lines’ 167. According to the USIP, ‘Sunni extremist groups, first al-Qaida then
ISIL, preyed on these feelings by drumming up cause to protest against the new politicalorder’. 168 Research published by the New Century Foundation in November 2019 found thattensions and deep divisions persisted between and within Sunni tribes, relating back to the‘varying levels of support of or opposition to the Islamic State’ of different clans and individual
tribesmen. 169 In 2020 the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) gave the following view: ‘The
legacies of Ba’ath Party rule under Saddam Hussein, the sectarian civil war from 2006-2009,
and the brutal reign of ISIS still fuel distrust within the Sunni population and between Iraq’s
Sunnis and other ethno-sectarian groups. This distrust weakens the national influence ofSunni elites and fuels intra-Sunni conflict in ISIS-ravaged parts of Iraq’. 170

2.2 Treatment of Sunni Arabs
In 2020 sources reported that more than 1 000 000 mostly Sunni civilians remained internallydisplaced in Iraq and that communities they come from remain divided more than three years
after ISIL was ousted from its territory in Iraq. 171
With the Iraqi government announcement in October 2020 of the intention to close allremaining IDP camps, media and UN sources reported that internal refugees fear retribution if
they return home. 172 According to humanitarian aid groups ‘tens of thousands of people, mostof them women and children risk homelessness or violent reprisals from Shiite militiamen andeven from their own tribes and kin over perceived affiliation with the Islamic State or simply
because they share its Sunni Muslim faith’. 173 According to the International Crisis Group,
reasons for people remaining in displacement camps are complex and include the destructionof their homes and livelihoods and lack of reconstruction in their home areas; ongoing
Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper, Sectarianism, Governance, and Iraq's Future, November 2018, url
LSE, Conflict Research Programme, The King of Salah al-Din: The Power of Iraq’s Sunni Elites, 2021, url, p. 4
165
USCIRF, Annual Report 2021, Iraq, May 2021, url
166
BBC News, How US military pullback in Iraq could benefit Iran, 26 July 2021, url; LSE, Conflict Research Programme, The Kingof Salah al-Din: The Power of Iraq’s Sunni Elites, 2021, url, p. 5
167
USIP, Four Years After ISIS, Iraq’s Tal Afar Remains Riven by Communal Divisions, 2 August 2021, url
168
USIP, Four Years After ISIS, Iraq’s Tal Afar Remains Riven by Communal Divisions, 2 August 2021, url
169
Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, 7 November 2019, url, p. 13
170
ISW, Iraq is Fragile, not Hopeless: How Iraq’s Fragility Undermines Regional Stability, December 2020, url, p.17
171
Washington Post, Iraq wants thousands displaced by the ISIS war to go home. They may be killed if they do, 22 December
2020, url; International Crisis Group, Exiles in Their Own Country: Dealing with Displacement in Post-ISIS Iraq, 19 October 2020,
url, pp. 1-2; UN OCHA, Iraq: Humanitarian Bulletin October 2020, 30 November 2020, url
172
Washington Post, Iraq wants thousands displaced by the ISIS war to go home. They may be killed if they do, 22 December
2020, url; UN OCHA, Iraq: Humanitarian Bulletin October 2020, 30 November 2020, url
173
Washington Post, Iraq wants thousands displaced by the ISIS war to go home. They may be killed if they do, 22 December
2020, url; International Crisis Group, Exiles in Their Own Country: Dealing with Displacement in Post-ISIS Iraq, 19 October 2020,
url; pp. 1-2; UN OCHA, Iraq: Humanitarian Bulletin October 2020, 30 November 2020, url
163

164

26

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

security risks in their home area – from ISIL, state security forces or the Popular Mobilisation
Forces (PMF); as well as fear of reprisal attacks in their home areas due to perceived familyties with ISIL. 174 Similarly, UNOCHA reported that barriers preventing IDPs from returninghome include ‘lack of civil documentation required to travel domestically or use public
services; lack of housing and services due to destruction and other causes; the presence of
explosive remnants of war in home areas; and threats to their safety and security, including
due to perceived affiliation to ISIL’. 175
The International Crisis Group observed that, although many displaced people remaining incamps and elsewhere in the country may have no actual or perceived ISIL affiliation, there areno accurate estimates of numbers, or fixed and agreed definitions of who are ‘ISIS families’.
Given the stigma resulting from affiliation with ISIL, this source suggests that families areunlikely to identify themselves as such and that multiple lists maintained by security services
are not considered reliable. According to the same source, returnees may face retribution in
their home area if they share a name with someone on a list or if anyone in their extended
family is thought to be implicated in ISIL actions. 176
Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch reported that Sunni Arab IDPs have been
prevented by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) from returning to their homes in
disputed territories and areas that KRG forces had taken from ISIL, while Kurdish villagers
were allowed to return. 177 According to Human Rights Watch ‘The Kurdistan Regional
Government is preventing about 1 200 Arab families from returning home to 5 villages morethan 6 years after the area was retaken from the Islamic State’. 178 The USDOS reported that in2020 entry limitations for IDPs and refugees attempting to return to their home areas
depended on their ethno-sectarian background and the area to which they intended toreturn. The source also indicated that entry to the KRG was more difficult for Arab men
travelling without family. 179 Similarly, in January 2021, IOM reported that some Sunni Arab IDPs
from certain governorates could not go back home because militias explicitly barred themfrom returning ‘under the pretext that they co-operated with ISIL during the period of conflict’,
while others feared revenge attacks by militias for ‘non-ISIL-related reasons’. 180 In June 2021,
UNOCHA reported that an evaluation of the consequences of the government policy to close
IDP camps from November 2020 had revealed ‘increased exposure to protection risks forcommunities who left camps unexpectedly; increased difficulty accessing some services;limited livelihood opportunities in the new areas of displacement or return; and different
shelter/NFI needs, with a slight increase in the number of people living in critical shelters’. 181
USDOS reported that in 2020 there were numerous cases of arbitrary arrests and detentionsof Sunni Arabs by government forces and that Sunni Arabs were abused and tortured during
arrest and pretrial detention. 182 Spouses and family members of Sunni Arabs who were
wanted on terrorism charges were reportedly detained to compel their surrender. 183
International Crisis Group, Exiles in Their Own Country: Dealing with Displacement in Post-ISIS Iraq, 19 October 2020, url, p. 3
UN OCHA, Iraq: Humanitarian Bulletin October 2020, 30 November 2020, url
176International Crisis Group, Exiles in Their Own Country: Dealing with Displacement in Post-ISIS Iraq, 19 October 2020, url, pp.
3-4
177
AI, The State of the World's Human Rights; Iraq 2020, url, p. 198; HRW, World Report 2021 – Iraq, Events of 2020, January
2021, url, pp. 349-50; US DOS, 2020 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Iraq, 30 March 2021, url, 2d, p. 27
178
HRW, Kurdistan Region of Iraq: Arabs Blocked From Returning, 19 July 2020, url
179
US DOS, 2020 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Iraq, 30 March 2021, url, 2d, pp. 27-29
180
IOM, Protracted Displacement in Iraq: Revisiting Categories of Return Barriers, January 2021, url, p. 34, footnote 152
181
UN OCHA, Iraq: Humanitarian Bulletin, June 2021, 19 July 2021, url
182
USDOS, 2020 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Iraq, 30 March 2021, url, 2d, pp. 27-29; Australia, DFAT, DFATCountry Information Report: Iraq, 17 August 2020, url, pp. 53-54
183
USDOS, 2020 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Iraq, 30 March 2021, url, 1c-d, g, pp. 5-19
174

175

27

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

According to sources cited by USDOS, in 2020 ‘the government continued to use theantiterrorism law as a pretext for detaining individuals without due process’. 184 Sunni leadersreported that authorities cited this law when detaining young Sunni men on suspicion of
having links with ISIL. A Sunni parliamentarian and member of the Security and Defense
Committee described ‘random arrests of Sunnis in areas north of Baghdad’ and alleged thatthe security forces were ‘arresting innocent people […] in a humiliating manner and with false
accusations’. 185
In parts of the country where they form the minority, Sunnis ‘continued to face verbal
harassment and restrictions from authorities’ during 2020, according to USDOS. The same
source reported that Shia militias and the Shia Endowment confiscated properties owned by
the Sunni Endowments in Diyala and Ninewa Provinces, leading to sectarian tensions in those
provinces. 186 In January 2021, an analyst for the LSE’s Conflict Research Programme reported
that Shia militias present across Salah Al-Din Province were ‘applying security pressure’ on
the Sunni Arabs. According to this source, ‘They stop, harass, and arrest Sunnis based on
their perceived ties to extremist groups like IS’. He reported that the militias have beenaccused of ‘extreme human rights abuses including unlawful killings of Sunni citizens’, as wellas land grabs and economic extortions that have damaged the ‘private and general economic
interests’ of Sunnis in the province. 187 In 2020, according to a Sunni Muslim parliamentarian
from Diyala Province, ‘government-affiliated Shia militia continued to forcibly displace Sunnis
in his province, leading to widespread demographic change along the Iraq-Iran border’. 188
Similarly, according to a former Sunni parliamentarian from Baghdad, government-affiliatedShia militia groups forcibly displaced Sunni residents in Al-Madain District on the outskirts of
Baghdad in an attempt to alter the district’s demography. 189
ISW reported that in 2020 and 2021, ISIL and Shia-led militias operating as part of the PMF
carried out attacks in the areas surrounding the capital (known as the ‘Baghdad Belts’) withthe aim of perpetuating ethnic conflict and displacement, igniting tension between the local
Sunnis and Shia communities and, in the case of ISIL, increasing ‘Sunni disillusion with andisolation from the Iraqi state’. According to ISW, in some instances PMF militias falsely
attributed attacks on civilians to ISIL, and in other cases, ISIL carried out attacks under theguise of PMF militias, the net effect of which has been to create a situation of impunity. 190 The
same source suggested that the inability of Iraqi security forces to confront PMF militias andto protect local populations from attacks ‘deepens mistrust between Sunnis and the Iraqi
government and risks radicalization of the Sunni population’. Sunnis, and other non-Shia
populations in Diyala province, reportedly complained that PMF militias failed to protect them,enabling further displacement of their communities, including through relocation to‘overcrowded camps in the Kurdistan region’. According to ISW, ‘Iranian-backed militias arelikely to continue aiding, perpetuating, and taking advantage of ISIS-initiated ethnic
population displacement in order to gain a demographic and electoral advantage, as they did
in 2016’. 191

USDOS, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Iraq, 12 May 2021, url, pp. 8-9
USDOS, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Iraq, 12 May 2021, url, p. 9
186
USDOS, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Iraq, 12 May 2021, url, p. 14
187
LSE, Conflict Research Programme, The King of Salah al-Din: The Power of Iraq’s Sunni Elites, 2021, url, p. 16
188
USDOS, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Iraq, 12 May 2021, url, p. 1, 9
189
USDOS, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Iraq, 12 May 2021, url, p. 1, 10
190
ISW, ISIS and Iranian-backed Militias Compete to Control Baghdad Region, 19 May 2021, url; The New Arab, The Iraq Report:
Sectarian killings revive fears of strife under an 'unsustainable' system, 23 October 2020, url
191
ISW, ISIS and Iranian-backed Militias Compete to Control Baghdad Region, 19 May 2021, url
184

185

28

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMExamples where Sunni persons were involved as victims of attacks include the following,
although sources were unclear on whether they were targeted specifically due to their Sunni
ethnicity:• 26 October 2021: residents of the majority Shia village of Al-Rashad in the eastern
Diyala province killed 11 people in the predominantly Sunni neighbouring hamlet of
Nahr Al-Imam, having claimed they were responsible for an attack on Al-Rashad the
day before in which 15 people were killed. 192• 19 July 2021: a suicide attack on the Shia-dominated Sadr City district of Baghdad led
some pro-Iran militias to demand vengeance against Sunnis near Baghdad following
speculation that the attack had arisen in a Sunni-majority town north of the capital. 193• 8 July 2021: four fishermen were killed and five others injured in an attack by ISIL near
the Haditha Dam, a Sunni-majority area in Iraq's western province of Anbar. 194• 11 March 2021: six members of a family were killed in three separate, targeted attacks
in a Sunni-majority village in the south of Salah Al-Din province, for which ISIL claimed
responsibility, although the perpetrators had reportedly entered the village in militaryuniform. 195• 17 October 2020: twelve Sunni men believed to be relatives from the same tribe wereabducted in Salah Al-Din Province, eight of whom, including children, were later foundexecuted. 196 Locals accused PMF militias operating in the area of being behind theattack. 197

The New Arab, Iraqis kill 11 after Islamic State terror attack, blaming neighbouring village, 28 October 2021, url
Al-Monitor, Militias call for revenge against Sunni town over suicide attacks in Baghdad, 27 July 2021, url
194
Al-Monitor, Islamic State uses hit-and-run tactics in Iraq, 11 July 2021, url
195
Al-Monitor, Flurry of Sunni Triangle ops sparks questions over Islamic State, 15 March 2021, url; ISW, ISIS and Iranian-backed
Militias Compete to Control Baghdad Region, 19 May 2021, url
196
ISW, ISIS and Iranian-backed Militias Compete to Control Baghdad Region, 19 May 2021, url; Al-Monitor, Killing of Sunni youths
prompts calls for end to impunity in Iraq, 19 October 2020, url; The New Arab, The Iraq Report: Sectarian killings revive fears of
strife under an 'unsustainable' system, 23 October 2020, url
197
Al-Monitor, Killing of Sunni youths prompts calls for end to impunity in Iraq, 19 October 2020, url
192
193

29

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

3. Political opposition activists andprotesters
3.1 Political opposition and protests in Iraq
For more information on the protest movement and the treatment of protesters and activists,
please see EASO COI Report: Iraq – The protest movement and treatment of protesters andactivists, published in October 2020.

3.1.1 Recent developments in protests
From October 2019, protests demanding more job opportunities and an end to corruption as
well as against pro-Iranian militias’ influence have shaken Iraq. The largest protests havetaken place in Baghdad. With an interruption due to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic
in 2020, 198 demonstrations continued into 2021. 199
According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), the targeting ofpolitical activists, possibly perpetrated by pro-Iranian militias, has been a fundamental issue
ever since the 2019 protest movement and constituted the reason for protests of Iraqis asking
for accountability and protection. 200
In its Annual Report, ACLED highlighted that during 2020 violence against civilians in Iraq
increased significantly, due to rise in attacks against activists that participated in the 2019
protests. 201
Brookings stated in June 2021 that, after the end of the October 2019 protests, violenceagainst activists shifted from ‘indiscriminate killings to targeted assassinations’. One of themain, and unmet, demands of the protesters was justice and accountability for the protesters
and activists that were killed. 202
The UN Security Council reported on May 2021 that activists, anti-government protesters andpersons openly criticising non-state armed groups were still facing violence, being intimidated
and harassed. 203 On February 2021 it stated that violence and targeting of protesters
continued taking place without arrests or prosecution of suspects. 204 According to the UN
Secretary General ‘Ongoing impunity, most notably with regard to the abduction, torture andtargeted killing of protesters and activists, remains a concern.’ 205 Similarly, in November

Hasan, S., A Perfect Storm has Hit Iraq’s Economy, LSE [Blog], 22 October 2020, url
NPR, In Iraq's 'Dire' Economy, Poverty Is Rising — And So Are Fears Of Instability, 3 February 2021, url; Tung, N., A Fragile
Inheritance: An Iraqi Youth Uprising against a Dire Economy and Foreign Intervention, 21 September 2020, url, p. 56
200
ACLED, Regional Overview: Middle East 10-16 July 2021, 21 July 2021, url
201
ACLED, ACLED 2020: The year in review, March 2021, url, p. 13
202
Brookings, Iraq’s upcoming elections: Voters and likely winners, 24 June 2021, url
203
UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2021/426, 4 May 2021, url,
p. 10, para. 48
204
UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2021/120, 8 February
2021, url, p. 10, para 46
205
UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2021/120, 8 February
2021, url, p. 16, para. 80
198

199

30

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

2020, the UN Security Council noted the targeting of protesters, resulting in fatalities, was stilltaking place. 206
In August 2020 protests continued taking place in Iraq’s central and southern governorates.
The protesters’ demands included extensive reform, accountability of those targeting
protesters, work opportunities and the improvement of public services. 207 The protests
escalated in August 2020 in Basrah and Thi-Qar, due to instances of violence against
activists, including what was described as ‘targeted killings’. 208
In early November 2020, anti-government protests took place in relation to the clashes in
Basrah on 31 October, where security forces used force to disperse crowds. 209 The samemonth, protests broke out across the country due to the delay in the payment of monthly
wages; there was a significant presence of government employees. 210 Small-scale and mostly
peaceful protests continued taking place in late November 2020 in southern and central
governorates. 211
From 22 to 27 February 2021, demonstrations took place in Nasiriyah, in Thi-Qar Governorate,during which clashes occurred between protesters and security forces. The protesters wereasking for the resignation of Governor Nadhim al-Waeli. 212 During the protests, the security
forces used live ammunition against protesters, which resulted in the deaths of six protesters,
including a 16-year-old boy, and in injuries to over 130 other protesters. 213 Following these
protests, the governor resigned and the Prime Minister announced the implementation of
measures, including the establishment of a committee that would investigate recent violence.
According to the UN Security Council report, protesters in Nasiriyyah ‘announced asuspension of demonstrations to allow time for the Government to implement theirdemands’. 214
Protests took place in Karbala from 9 to 11 May 2021, following the killing of the activist Ehab
Al-Wazni on 9 May. 215 Al-Wazni’s killing triggered riots, with the protesters clashing withsecurity forces across several areas in Iraq, including in Basrah, Nasiriyah and Baghdad, andburning tires in front of the Iranian consulate. 216
On 25 May 2021 protests took place in the Tahrir Square and elsewhere in Baghdad, withthousands of Iraqis protesting, asking for justice for the victims of the attacks against
activists. 217
UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2020/1099, 10 November
2020, url, p. 10, para. 56
207
UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2020/1099, 10 November
2020, url, p. 3, para. 13
208
UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2020/1099, 10 November
2020, url, p. 3, para. 13
209
ACLED, Regional Overview: Middle East 1-7 November 2020, url
210
ACLED, Regional Overview: Middle East 8-14 November 2020, url
211
UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2021/120, 8 February 2021,
url, p. 3, para. 12
212
UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2021/426, 4 May 2021, url,
p. 3, para. 9
213
UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2021/426, 4 May 2021, url,
p. 10, para. 47
214
UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2021/426, 4 May 2021, url,
p. 3, para. 9215
UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2576 (2021), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2021/700, 3 August 2021,
url, p. 2, para. 5
216
Rudaw, Assassination of activist in Karbala sparks rage, 9 May 2021, url
217
UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2576 (2021), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2021/700, 3 August 2021,
url, p. 2, para. 6
206

31

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Al Jazeera reported on 18 July 2021 that hundreds of Iraqis protested in central Baghdad
demanding that the authorities held accountable those responsible for the killing of numerous
activists involved in the protest movement. 218
The USA Congressional Research Service (CRS) stated that protests in Iraq decreased in early2020 in relation to the COVID-19 mitigation measures. They were reignited and intensified in
May 2021, with protesters demanding accountability and prosecution of those involved in thekillings and abductions since 2020 of protesters, activists and other individuals. 219 ACLED
stated that Iraq had one of the largest increases in demonstration activities in late 2020;
protests took place due to the unemployment and delays in the payment of salaries, becauseof the pandemic, as well as due to the electricity crisis. 220
On 1 October 2021, approximately 1 000 protesters marched to Tahrir square in Baghdad, tocommemorate those killed by the security forces during the protests that started in October
2019. Protesters in favour of in depth change to the current political system were calling for aboycott of the upcoming elections. 221
In October 2021, following the results of the parliamentary elections in Iraq, many supportersof Shia parties protested in provinces throughout the country against the election results thatwere announced on 16 October 2021. The protesters were reportedly from different parties,
such as the Wisdom Movement, led by Ammar al-Hakim. 222 In addition, following theelections, protests took place in Baghdad. After the results of the October 2021 elections,protesters close to Al-Fatah Alliance 223 were demanding a recount of votes in Baghdad; someattempted to forcibly enter the Green Zone where many government offices and embassies
are located. 224 In addition, supporters of Hashd Al-Shaabi (PMF) protested following theelection results, claiming that the results were manipulated. 225 According to an Al Jazeera
report dated 5 November 2021, protests in Baghdad ‘turned violent’ as supporters of proIranian militias threw stones at security forces who ‘fired tear gas and shot in the air todisperse the crowd’. The source added that two protesters were reportedly killed and dozens
injured on both sides. 226

3.1.2 Government response to protests
In the period between October 2019 to April 2020, the United Nations Assistance Mission for
Iraq (UNAMI) documented 487 fatalities and more than 7 715 injuries that took place atdemonstration sites across Iraq. Most of these incidents were attributed to state security
forces. Simultaneously, armed militias, usually anonymous and aiming to suppress
demonstrations, attacked protesters and activists at protest sites and elsewhere, in occasionof what was described by UNAMI as ‘limited intervention by security forces’. 227 In the period
Al Jazeera, Iraq protesters demand accountability after killings of activists, 18 July 2021, url
USA, CRS, Iraq and U.S. Policy, 4 June 2021, url, p. 1
220
ACLED, ACLED 2020: The year in review, March 2021, url, pp. 22-23
221
Al Jazeera, Iraqis march in Baghdad to mark protests anniversary, 1 October 2021, url
222
BasNews, Iraqi Elections: Supporters of Shia Parties Protest Final Results, 17 October 2021, url
223
Fatah (Conquest) Alliance, ‘the political arm of the multi-party Hashed’ or PMF. France 24, Pro-Iran Hashed punished in Iraq
vote, 18 October 2021, url
224
Al Jazeera, Iraq election body soon to announce final results after recount, 27 October 2021, url
225
Al Jazeera, Iraqi protesters demand election recount in Baghdad, 19 October 2021, url
226
Al Jazeera, Protests against Iraq election results turn violent, 5 November 2021, url
227
UNAMI, Update on Demonstrations in Iraq: Accountability for Human Rights Violations and Abuses by Unidentified Armed
Elements, May 2021, url, pp. 6 - 7
218

219

32

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

from 1 October 2019 to 15 May 2021, UNAMI reported 48 incidents of attempted or successful
targeted killings of protestors and critics, mostly by ‘unidentified armed elements’. These
resulted in at least 32 fatalities and 21 injuries. 228 As of May 2021, 20 protesters who had
disappeared remained missing. 229
In its annual report covering 2020, Amnesty International (AI) stated that Iraqi security forces‘continued to use excessive and unlawful force against largely peaceful protests that had
started in 2019’. The security forces used live ammunition and military-grade tear gas
grenades, which resulted in the death of many protesters in Baghdad, Basrah, Karbala, Diyala,
Najaf and Nasiriyah.230 Similarly, Human Rights Watch, in its annual report covering 2020,stated that ‘arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, and extrajudicial killings ofdemonstrators by Iraqi security forces’ continued in 2020. In addition, in the period from
October 2019 until the end of 2020, clashes between protesters and security forces,
including the PMF, resulted in the death of at least 560 protesters and security forces in
Baghdad and other southern cities. 231 Iraqi authorities arbitrarily detained protesters andreleased them later, some within hours or days and others within weeks, without charge. 232
In early November 2020, protests took place in relation to the clashes in Basrah on 31
October. Security forces used force to disperse crowds resulting in the death of one protester
and at least 10 injuries. Security forces arrested more than 100 protesters across thegovernorate. 233 Moreover, in late November - early December 2020, during the antigovernment protests in Basrah, clashes took place between the Iraqi Security Forces andrioters gathered near the main square in the city. There were reported injuries on bothsides. 234
On 10 January 2021, in the third day of protests in Nasiriyah, a policeman was killed while
security forces were trying to dispel protests. The military reported that during these incidents
33 other policemen were injured, while medical sources reported that protesters were
injured. 235 On 26 February 2021, at least five protesters were killed - most due to bullet
wounds - and approximately 120 protesters were injured, in clashes between protesters andsecurity forces in Nasiriya city in Thi-Qar governorate. 236 Between 22 and 27 February 2021,
the Iraqi security forces used live ammunition against protesters in Nasiriyah, which resulted
in the deaths of six protesters, including a 16-year-old boy, and injuries to over 130
protesters. 237
During the protests that took place on 25 May 2021 in Baghdad, two protesters were killedfrom bullet wounds and injuries among protesters and security forces were reported. The

UNAMI, Update on Demonstrations in Iraq: Accountability for Human Rights Violations and Abuses by Unidentified Armed
Elements, May 2021, url, p. 4
229
UNAMI, Update on Demonstrations in Iraq: Accountability for Human Rights Violations and Abuses by Unidentified Armed
Elements, May 2021, url, pp. 4 - 5
230
AI (Amnesty International), Amnesty International Report 2020/21, 2021, url, p. 196
231
HRW, World Report 2021, Iraq, 13 January 2021, url, p. 345
232
HRW, World Report 2021, Iraq, 13 January 2021, url, p. 347
233
ACLED, Regional Overview: Middle East 1-7 November 2020, url
234
ACLED, Regional Overview: Middle East 29 November-5 December 2020, url
235
MEA, Iraqi policeman shot dead, dozens wounded in Nasiriyah protests, 10 January 2021, url
236
Reuters, Five protesters die, dozens injured in clashes in Iraqi city, 26 February 2021, url
237
UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2021/426, 4 May 2021, url,
p. 10, para. 47
228

33

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

following day, the Iraqi Government ordered an investigation and reiterated the Prime
Minister’s support for peaceful protests as well as for the protection of protesters. 238

3.1.3 Examples of targeting of protesters/activists
Amnesty International (AI), in its annual report for 2020, reported that dissent in Iraq
continued being forcefully supressed. Protesters were faced with excessive force, arbitraryarrests, torture, other forms of ill-treatment, killings, disappearances and attacks against the
freedom of expression. 239
Washington Post reported in May 2021 on an increase across Baghdad and southern Iraq of
attacks against activists and journalists, which was causing alarm to those involved in theprotest movement. Prominent figures in the protest movement were being targeted while
walking or driving to their house. These killings appeared to be perpetrated by Iraq’s militia
network and their aim was to ‘underscore the reach of Iraq’s militia network — to punish
citizens who dare to criticize it and control a political system meant to hold it accountable’
according to the source. Friends and associates of anti-government activists were also being
threatened. According to a Human Rights Watch senior researcher cited by Washington Post,‘Those who are carrying out these assassinations are very powerful armed actors who arebeyond the control of the government’. The researcher also noted that ‘The human rights
situation in Iraq has really become dire when it comes to the safety and security of individuals
who are openly critical.’ 240
In a June 2021 article in the New York Times, it was stated that, according to both protesters
and Iraqi officials (the latter unofficially) Iran-backed militias were responsible for the killings
and targeting of the protest movement, further noting that ‘In a country where militias —nominally a part of the security apparatus — operate with impunity, the killers have gone
unpunished’. 241
Belkis Wille, Senior Researcher in Human Rights Watch, stated in May 2021 that, for theprevious one and a half years, the targeting and killings of critics of the government, including
journalists and activists, were still taking place. She further reported that, due to the targetingtaking place, many Iraqis who had a prominent role during the protests and who were willingto play a key part in a new political movement in Iraq, either left their homes because of fearor stopped protesting. 242 According to an October 2021 report by the Enabling Peace in Iraq
Center (EPIC), there was a very high number of assassinations, kidnappings and other formsof violence targeting well known activists and government critics through the second half of2020 and through 2021. 243
The France 24 Observers 244 reported in December 2020 that in the previous months there
was a ‘wave of kidnappings, torture and killings of high-profile anti-government activists in
UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2576 (2021), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2021/700, 3 August 2021,
url , p. 2, para. 6
239
AI, Amnesty International Report 2020/21, 2021, url, p. 195
240
Washington Post (the), In Iraq, powerful militias assassinate protesters with impunity, 12 May 2021, url
241
Arraf, J., Iraqi Activism Fights for Survival Amid Murders and Threats, New York Times (the), updated 2 June 2021, url
242
Wille, B., Impunity for Killings Will Cast a Pall Over Iraq's Elections, HRW, 20 May 2021, url
243
EPIC, The Long Game: Iraq’s “Tishreen” Movement and the Struggle for Reform, October 2021, url, p. 62
244
According to their website, the Observers is a collaborative site who cover international current affairs by using first- hand
information, including photos and videos, which they ‘verify and contextualize’. After the journalists in the FRANCE 24 Observers
fact-check the authenticity of the information they proceed to publish their findings. Source: FRANCE 24 Observers, Who are
we?, n.d., url
23834

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Iraq’. The source noted that both protesters and experts were accusing the pro-Iran militias
within the PMF as the perpetrators. The source documented at least seven activists who
closely managed to survive or escape assassination attempts since the 20th of November. 245
The UN Security Council reported on February 2021 that, up to that point, there was not any
significant criminal accountability for violations and abuses against protesters since October
2019; these violations included targeted killings, kidnappings and torture of protesters andactivists. 246
Incidents of targeting of activists and protesters in the period August 2020 until October
2021 (non-exhaustive list)
On 14 and 19 August respectively, unidentified gunmen tried to kill two activists in Nasiriyahcity. In addition, unidentified gunmen tried to kill two activists, in two separate incidents, in
Baghdad on 19 August and three activists in Babil on 20 August. On 21 August, 11 protesters
were injured when an improvised explosive device (IED) detonated in Al-Haboubi Square in
Nasiriyah city. 247
On 19 August 2020, prominent female activist and doctor Reham Yacoub was shot and killed
by unidentified gunmen in Basrah when she was in a car. Other passengers were injured andone more passenger later died. Two more incidents of gunmen targeting anti-government
political activists took place on that same week, resulting in one activist’s death. 248
Human Rights Watch reported on 26 August 2020 that, since 14 August 2020, unidentified
gunmen killed two protesters and wounded four others in Basrah, all with ties to a youth
protest group with political ambitions. 249
On 19 September 2020, according to a testimony of a friend of Sajjad Satar Shanan, an antigovernment protester in Nasiriyah, two vehicles stopped their car, eight armed men got out,
ordered Shanan out of the car and kidnapped him. 250
On 19 September, in Nasiriyah city, unidentified gunmen attacked a vehicle with activists; one
was seriously injured and another, who had previously received threats, was kidnapped. 251
On 25 November, unidentified gunmen opened fire at a vehicle with two protesters, resulting
in the injury of one of them. 252
On 27 and 28 November 2020, in Haboubi Square in Nasiriyah, armed men killed fiveprotesters, injured 90 and damaged property. 253 Another source reported that followers of

FRANCE 24 Observers, Iraqi activists go underground after wave of attacks by pro-Iran militias, 2 December 2020, url
UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2021/120, 8 February
2021, url, p. 9, para. 44
247
UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2020/1099, 10 November
2020, url, p. 10, para. 56
248
Al Jazeera, Iraq: Prominent female activist killed by unknown gunmen in Basra, 20 August 2020, url
249
HRW, Iraq: Basra Political Group Targeted, 26 August 2020, url
250
HRW, Iraq: No Justice for Enforced Disappearances, 16 November 2020, url
251
UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2020/1099, 10 November
2020, url, p. 10, para. 56
252
UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2021/120, 8 February
2021, url, p. 10, para 46
253
UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2021/120, 8 February
2021, url, p. 10, para 46
245

246

35

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

the Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr attacked a tent camp of anti-government protesters in
Haboubi Square. The attack resulted in the death of six people and in numerous injuries. 254
On 4 December 2020, unidentified gunmen opened fire in Baghdad at a vehicle with four
protesters from Tahrir Square, injuring two. 255
On 11 December 2020, protesters near Tahrir Square were attacked by a group of masked
individuals; one protester was stabbed in the back repeatedly. 256
On 15 December 2020, a prominent Iraqi protester and activist, Salah Al-Iraqi, was shot andkilled by unidentified gunmen in Baghdad’s Al-Jadida district. 257
In the period between 28 November 2020 to 2 January 2021, eight separate attacks against
protesters and activists in southern Iraq were documented by UNAMI. The attackers used
IEDs and targeted activists’ homes in Nasiriyah and Basrah, causing material damage. 258
The UN Security Council reported on February 2021 the ongoing violence and targeting ofprotesters, including disappearances, abductions and torture, without arrests or prosecutionof suspects. 259
On 9 May 2021, activist Ihab Jawad Al-Wazni was killed in Karbala near his home by unknown
gunmen. Al-Wazni was a prominent figure in protests against the government in Karbala. At
the time, no group claimed responsibility. 260 According to Washington Post, one week before
his death, Al-Wazni, who had already survived one assassination attempt, reached out to a
local police chief, reminding him that he had been receiving death threats and stating that hehad already shared the names of those who were threatening him with the police. 261
On 23 May 2021, a protester was injured after an IED detonated on his vehicle, in Nasiriyah,
Thi Qar Governorate. This constituted the fifteenth similar attack targeting protesters in Thi
Qar in the past few months. 262
During the protests that took place on 25 May 2021 in Tahrir Square and elsewhere in
Baghdad, two protesters were killed from bullet wounds and protesters and members of the
security forces were injured. 263

MEA, Attack on protest camp leaves six dead, dozens wounded in Iraq's south, 27 November 2020, url
UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2021/120, 8 February
2021, url, p. 10, para 46
256
UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2021/120, 8 February
2021, url, p. 10, para 46
257
Al Jazeera, Prominent Iraqi activist shot dead in Baghdad: Reports, 15 December 2020, url; UN Security Council,
Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2021/120, 8 February 2021, url, p. 10, para 46
258
UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2021/120, 8 February
2021, url, p. 10, para 46
259
UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2021/120, 8 February
2021, url, p. 10, para 46
260
Al Jazeera, Activist’s killing triggers protests in Iraq’s Karbala, 9 May 2021, url
261
Washington Post (the), In Iraq, powerful militias assassinate protesters with impunity, 12 May 2021, url
262
UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2576 (2021), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2021/700, 3 August 2021,
url, p. 10, para. 60
263
UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2576 (2021), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2021/700, 3 August 2021,
url, p. 2, para. 6
254

255

36

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

On 9 July 2021, members of an unknown militia kidnapped and killed an activist who
participated in what was described as the ‘October Revolution’ in Al-Rashid area of
Baghdad. 264

3.1.4 Targeting of online activists
Freedom House, in its report on Freedom on the Net 2021, noted that internet freedom in Iraq
was limited and that ‘Government authorities, armed groups, and individuals have all carriedout physical attacks on internet users for their online activities.’ Online activists were among
the categories being targeted due to their online activity, suffering both physical attacks andharassment. In Iraq, intimidation, arrests and killings of online activists were a relatively
regular occurrence. Reprisals against online activists could be triggered on occasion by asimple post on Facebook. As a result, online activists refrained from posting content thatcriticised or expressed their opposition to the government and party policies online. 265
The France 24 Observers reported in December 2020 that, according to a testimony, online
activity could also prove risky since so-called trolls on social media linked to pro-Iranian
militias were attacking protesters online. 266
According to an October 2021 report by the EPIC, social media platforms were no longer safefor the majority of activists in Iraq since they were being monitored by so-called electronicarmies and militias, in order to target activists and expose their physical location. Activists andformer protesters were still using social media to discuss and be critical of the state, however
they had to censure themselves and be cautious, because of the targeting. 267
While there were cases where courts in Iraq ruled against attempts to penalize activists forthe content they posted online, Freedom House reported that those who targeted them werevery rarely punished. The source further noted that online activists were regularly detained
and arrested in Iraq although long sentences for online content were not frequent. 268
MENA Rights Group reported that the Iraqi Parliament revised and reintroduced in November
2020 a ‘new draft Law on Combating Cybercrimes [which] still contains problematic
provisions restricting fundamental freedoms’. According to the source, the draft law contains
provisions that criminalise ‘vague and imprecise acts’ which are ‘subject to broadinterpretation by the judge’, such as Article 8(4) which stipulates that the use of the internet or
a computer device ‘with the intention of violating religious, family or social principles andvalues shall be punished with imprisonment for a period of no less than seven years and notexceeding ten years, and a fine of not less than 10 million Iraqi dinars (approx. 8 380 USD)
and not exceeding 15 million Iraqi dinars (approx. 12 570 USD)’. 269 Iraqi civilians and activists
objected the new bill and labelled it ‘as repressive of freedoms and rights guaranteed in the
Iraqi Constitution’. 270

ACLED, Regional Overview: Middle East 10-16 July 2021, 21 July 2021, urlFreedom House, Freedom on the Net 2021, 21 September 2021, url
266
FRANCE 24 Observers, Iraqi activists go underground after wave of attacks by pro-Iran militias, 2 December 2020, url
267
EPIC, The Long Game: Iraq’s “Tishreen” Movement and the Struggle for Reform, October 2021, url, p. 106
268
Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2021, 21 September 2021, url
269
MENA Rights Group, Iraq’s new draft Law on Combating Cybercrimes still contains problematic provisions restricting
fundamental freedoms, 1 December 2020, url
270
Al-Monitor, Activists fear Iraqi cybercrime law could limit press freedoms, 2 December 2020, url
264

265

37

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

3.2 Political opposition and protests in the KRI
3.2.1 Recent developments in protests
Amnesty International (AI) in its annual report for 2020, reported that protests took placethroughout 2020 in the KRI due to civil servants’ unpaid or delayed salaries. 271 According to
TRT news agency, while protests had taken place in KRI since 2015, the December 2020
ones were ‘more intense’. 272 ACLED noted that in 2020 the number of protests in the KRI rosesignificantly. 273
In August 2020, protests took place in Sulaymaniyah where protesters demanded thedissolution of the government, the appointment of an interim authority and early elections. 274
Other demands included an end to corruption, the payment of salaries of employees andretirees, and an investigation into the wealth of members of the two main parties in theregion, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan party(PUK). 275 The protests took place in the governorates of Sulaymaniyah and Halabja 276 and in
the cities of Rania, Darbandikhan and Chamchamal, 277 and the headquarters of the Halabjahmunicipality was set on fire during the protests. 278
In August 2020, truck drivers in Duhok protested against a government decision to allow
Turkish truck drivers to continue to operate across the Turkish-Iraqi border. 279
On 27 September 2020, protests took place in Sulaymaniyah asking for civil servants’ salaries
to be paid. 280
In December 2020, protests took place in Sulaymaniyah and in other areas of the KRI, in
relation to unpaid wages and corruption. 281 In the period between 2 to 12 December 2020,
protesters in Sulaymaniyah Governorate demanded the payment of public sector salaries,
complained for the lack of government transparency and accountability, and asked for basic
services and work opportunities. 282 At the beginning, the protesters were teachers
demanding unpaid salaries. They were later joined by other civil servants and unemployedyoung people. 283 The protesters were forcibly dispersed by security forces, who were firing
AI, Amnesty International Report 2020/21, 2021, url, p. 196
TRT World, Why protests are raging across Iraq's Kurdish region, 14 December 2020, url
273
ACLED, ACLED 2020: The year in review, March 2021, url, p. 25
274
UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2020/1099, 10 November
2020, url, p. 3, para. 16
275
Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor, Cracking down on protesters in Iraqi Kurdistan legitimizes corruption, 25 August 2020, url
276
Halabja (Halabcha), located in the south-east of the governorate, was acknowledged as a separate governorate by the Iraqi
government in December 2013 (see Rudaw, Years on, Halabja still waiting for full province status, 26 June 2017, url) and by the
KRG in March 2014 (see Iraq, KRG, Kurdistan Region Presidency, Kurdistan Region President Signs Halabja Province Directive, 16
March 2014, url). However, on a map published by UNOCHA and iMMAP in May 2020, is still depicted as a district of
Sulaymaniyah governorate (see UNOCHA and iMMAP, Iraq: Al-Sulaymaniyah Governorate Reference Map 2020, 5 May 2020,
url)
277
Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor, Cracking down on protesters in Iraqi Kurdistan legitimizes corruption, 25 August 2020, url
278
UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2020/1099, 10 November
2020, url, p. 3, para. 16
279
Al Jazeera, It is time for a system overhaul in Iraq’s Kurdish region, 30 December 2020, url; UNAMI and OHCHR, Freedom ofExpression in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, May 2021, url, p. 9
280
UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2020/1099, 10 November
2020, url, p. 3, para. 16
281
AI, Amnesty International Report 2020/21, 2021, url, p. 197
282
UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2021/120, 8 February
2021, url, pp. 3 – 4, para. 14
283
EPIC, The Long Game: Iraq’s “Tishreen” Movement and the Struggle for Reform, October 2021, url, p. 60
271

272

38

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

live ammunition and tear gas. 284 Following that, the protests spread throughout the
governorate and became violent; the protesters set fire to political parties’ offices andgovernment buildings. 285 In reaction, security forces used live ammunition. UNAMI
documented nine fatalities and 85 injuries during these protests. 286
On 29 September 2021, residents in Erbil’s Taajili Nwe neighbourhood protested against the
subpar public services. This protest followed previous ones in the area due to thegovernment not providing basic infrastructure. 287

3.2.2 KRG response to protests
During the December 2020 protests in Sulaymaniyah and in other areas of the KRI, the KRI
authorities used excessive force against protesters, which resulted in tens of fatalities,
including of underage protesters. In addition, the authorities arrested and released activists
and also limited internet access and banned press coverage of the protests. 288 Al Jazeera
reported that the crackdown on the protests resulted in the death of at least seven people including a 13 year-old boy - and many injuries as well as the arrest of hundreds. 289 According
to ACLED, during the protests in the week 25 November to 5 December in Sulaymaniyah,
protesters were hit with tear gas and 23 among them were arrested. 290
In the August 2020 truck drivers’ protests, AI Jazeera reported that security forces were‘deployed immediately to forcefully disperse the crowd and prevent any media coverage ofit’. Following the protests, approximately 100 people, mostly activists and journalists, weredetained. Campaigns aiming to intimidate political opposition-oriented activists continued
taking place in the rest of 2020 in KDP and PUK-controlled areas. 291
Anadolu Agency reported that, according to local media, security forces opened fire at theprotesters who attacked the KDP building in Chamchamal on 7 December 2020, protestingover the worsening economic conditions. 292
Amnesty International reported that in 2020 in the KRI, the authorities targeted activists andprotesters taking part in protests. Some of those detained by the authorities were released
but several remained detained. 293
According to Human Rights Watch, during the civil servants’ August 2020 protests in the KRI
related to payment of unpaid wages, the KRG security forces hit and arbitrarily detained
protesters and journalists. 294

UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2021/120, 8 February
2021, url, pp. 3 – 4, para. 14; EPIC, The Long Game: Iraq’s “Tishreen” Movement and the Struggle for Reform, October 2021, url, p.
60
285
UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2021/120, 8 February
2021, url, pp. 3 – 4, para. 14
286
UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020), Report of the Secretary-General, S/2021/120, 8 February
2021, url, p. 10, para. 25
287
NRT, Protest in Erbil’s Taajili Nwe neighborhood over poor public services, 29 September 2021 url
288
AI, Amnesty International Report 2020/21, 2021, url, p. 197
289
Al Jazeera, It is time for a system overhaul in Iraq’s Kurdish region, 30 December 2020, url
290
ACLED, Regional Overview: Middle East 29 November – 5 December 2020, url
291
Al Jazeera, It is time for a system overhaul in Iraq’s Kurdish region, 30 December 2020, url
292
Anadolu Agency, Iraq: Teenager killed in Sulaymaniyah protests, 7 December 2020, url
293
AI, Iraq: End impunity for murders, release all kidnapped and detained peaceful activists, 9 December 2020, url
294
HRW, World Report 2021, Iraq, 13 January 2021, url, p. 346
284

39IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Freedom House reported that in 2020 the KRI authorities arrested protesters, amongst
others, for criticising COVID-19 lockdown measures, corruption and unpaid salaries. 295
Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor reported that, after 13 of August 2020, 26 activists andmembers of trade unions involved in protests, remained detained in an Internal Security
Forces (Asayish) prison in Erbil. According to the source, they were arrested by ‘militantsbelonging to the Kurdistan Democratic Party (Hadak) and forces affiliated with the region'sPrime Minister, Masrour Barzani’. 296

3.2.3 Examples of targeting of protesters/activists
UNAMI noted in May 2021 that, over the previous year, individuals such as protesters who
had questioned or criticised the actions of the KRI, were intimidated, harassed, threatenedand subjected to arbitrary arrests and detentions. 297
Amnesty International, based on interviews it conducted in 2021, documented 14 cases ofindividuals from Badinan (three journalists and 11 civil society and political activists) who were
all arrested in the period August - October 2020. According to its findings, in all cases,
Asayish and Parastin forces had arbitrarily arrested, detained, and in six cases, forcibly madeto disappear individuals, in relation to their participation in protests, criticism of local
authorities or to their journalistic work. 298
On 7 December 2020, a protester was shot and killed in the KRI during protests demanding
the payment of salaries and criticizing Kurdish political parties. The protester was shot byarmed men guarding the headquarters of the KDP in the town of Chamchamal, west of
Sulaimaniya. 299 Anadolu Agency reported that the protester was 16 years old and that twoother people were injured during these protests. 300

3.2.4 Targeting of online activists
Freedom House reported in 2021 that internet freedom in Iraqi Kurdistan was limited. 301 While
the KRI was for many years a safer place for online activists and journalists, that was no longer
the case due to crackdowns on journalists and media in September 2020. 302
The same source described Iraq, including KRI, as one of the most dangerous places globallyfor online journalists, activists, bloggers, and social media users. Journalists and activists wereregularly targeted and being harassed and intimidated online. There were also cases where
they were physically hurt, even killed, by state and non-state actors because of content theywould post online. Online journalists and activists were regularly detained and arrested in the
KRI; however, long prison sentences for online content were infrequent. 303

Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2021, 3 March 2021, url
Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor, Protesters unlawfully detained and tortured in Iraqi Kurdistan, 8 February 2021, url
297
UNAMI and OHCHR, Freedom of Expression in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, May 2021, url, p. 4
298
AI, Kurdistan Region of Iraq: Authorities must end protests-related repression, 15 June 2021, url, p. 1
299
Al Jazeera, Protester killed in Iraq's Kurdistan region after days of unrest, 7 December 2020, url
300
Anadolu Agency, Iraq: Teenager killed in Sulaymaniyah protests, 7 December 2020, url
301
Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2021, 21 September 2021, url
302
Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2021, 21 September 2021, url; Al Jazeera, Iraq’s Kurdish region is not a model for freespeech, 25 September 2020, url
303
Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2021, 21 September 2021, url
295

296

40

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

While there were cases where courts in the KRI ruled against attempts to penalise activists forthe content they posted online, Freedom House reported that those who targeted them werevery rarely punished. 304 In another report, Freedom House noted that, in December 2020,
the KRI authorities arrested many young men because they were calling for protests in posts
on social media. 305

304
305

Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2021, 21 September 2021, urlFreedom House, Freedom in the World 2021, 3 March 2021, url

41

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

4. Religious and ethnic minorities, andstateless persons
4.1 Christians
4.1.1 General situation of Christians in Iraq and the KRI
Iraqi Christians counted roughly 1 500 000 under the Saddam Hussein regime, most of themenjoying ’protection and near-equal rights with the Iraq’s Muslim majority’. 306 After the US-led
military intervention in 2003, the Iraqi Christian community has been suffering frompersecution and discrimination 307 and the number declined to just a few hundred thousand,as most of the Iraqi Christians fled to the west or to the neighbouring countries. 308 Hammurabi
Human Rights organisation in its Annual Report on the Human Rights Situations in Iraq for2020 assessed that more than 1 100 Christians have been victims of terrorism and sectarian
violence since 2003. 309 The ISIL occupation of the Ninewa Plain in 2014 led to a massive
exodus which almost emptied this region of Christians. 310 After the military defeat of the ISIL
Caliphate in Iraq in 2017, Christians have gradually begun to return, but at a low rate mainly
due to fear induced by local and Shiite militias that control the territory and over which thegovernment has little control. 311
On 22 September 2021, the CIA indicated that Christians are estimated to make 1% of thetotal population of Iraq. 312 The Christian community in Iraq comprises 14 officially recognised
sects 313, the most prominent of which are the following:••

Chaldeans are the most numerous Christian group in Iraq. Referring to Chaldeans ofany denomination, a 2021 media article estimated that they represent 80% of the Iraqi
Christian population. According to USDOS, 67% of the Christian population in Iraq are
Chaldean Catholic. 314
Assyrians are linked by their common goal of living in the historical regions of the
Ninewa Plain and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Being predominantly Christian, they
have founded five Eastern Churches during their long history: the Ancient Church of
the East, the Assyrian Church of the East, the Chaldean Catholic Church, the Syriac
Catholic Church, and the Syriac Orthodox Church. 315 According to USDOS they make

Associated Press, A timeline of disaster and displacement for Iraqi Christians, 5 March 2021, url
National Interest (The), The Pope Visited Iraqi Christians, Victims of U.S. Foreign Policy, 8 March 2021, url
308
Associated Press, A timeline of disaster and displacement for Iraqi Christians, 5 March 2021, url
309
Hammurabi Human Rights Organization, Annual Report 2020 on the Human Rights Situations in Iraq, 04 April 2021, url
310
Middle East Institute, Waiting for a miracle in Iraq, 26 February 2021, url
311
Atlantic Council, Three years after the Caliphate, Iraq’s Christians find little incentive to return, 04 August 2020, url; TheJamestown Foundation, Iran’s Man in Nineveh: Waad Qado and the PMF’s 30th Brigade, 4 June 2021, url
312
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The World Factbook – Iraq, 22 September 2021, url
313
Reuters, Factbox: Iraq's Christian denominations, 1 March 2021, url
314
USDOS, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Iraq, 12 May 2021, url; Reuters, Factbox: Iraq's Christiandenominations, 1 March 2021, url
315
Assyrian Policy Institute (API), Contested control: the future of security in Iraq’s Nineveh Plain, 1 June 2020, url, p. 2
306
307

42

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

20% of the Iraqi Christians, while the Iraqi Christian Foundation attributes them only
5%. 316
Syriacs ‘belong to either the Syriac Catholic Church or the Syriac Orthodox Church’ and speak
a dialect of Aramaic known as Syriac. Historically, in Iraq, they inhabited Baghdad, Mosul andother smaller towns located in the Ninewa Plains such as Bartella and Qaraqosh, the latter ofwhich had a population of 50 000 Christians before the ISIL invasion in 2014. Syriacs
represent 10% of the Iraqi Christians. 317
Armenians, both Catholic and Orthodox , arrived in Iraq mainly ‘after the Armenian genocide
in 1915-1923 by the Ottoman Empire’. They constitute approximate 3% of the Iraqi Christian
population. 318
For more information about the situation of Christians in Iraq between 2019 and 2020, as wellas the various denominations, see EASO’s 2020 query on Christians.
In Iraq, minorities occupy 9 out of 329 parliamentary seats in the Council of Representatives.
Five seats are allocated to Christian candidates and one each for Fayli Kurds, Yazidis, Sabean
Mandaeans, and Shabaks. 319 In June 2020, a Christian woman, member of the Chaldean
Church, was appointed as minister of migration and displacement. 320 Allocation for ethnic andethno-religious minorities is similar in the Kurdish parliament where out of 111 seats, five areallocated to Christians, five to Turkmen and one to Armenians. 321 For other ethnic and ethnoreligious minorities that the KRG recognizes as ethnically Kurdish or Arab, such as Yazidis,
Shabak, Sabean-Mandaeans, Kaka’i, and Fayli Kurds, there are no seats allocated. 322
On 16 December 2020, Christmas became an annual national holiday after the Iraqi
Parliament’s unanimous vote. December 25 was already recognised as a Christian holiday but
not a national public holiday. 323
The return of Christian population to Iraq was encouraged in 2021 by visits and statements ofhigh state officials and even a four-day trip of Pope Francis to Iraq which included a meetingwith Grand Ayatollah Al-Sistani. 324 Pope Francis made an appeal to peace and unity between
Muslims and Christians as he addressed people in the cities of Baghdad, Najaf, Ur, Mosul,
Qaraqosh and Erbil. 325
On 3 June 2021, during an official meeting, the Iraqi President, Barham Salih, stated that ‘Iraqi
social cohesion must be protected, and Christian displaced persons must be allowed toreturn home, in Nineveh Plains, Mosul and other Iraqi cities‘. He also emphasised that efforts
should be made in order to provide Christians with the right to ‘fully participate in the political,
social and cultural life of the country, in a way that ensures their voice could be heard by the

USDOS, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Iraq, 12 May 2021, url, 12 May 2021, url; Iraqi Christian Foundation,
Who are the Iraqi Christians?, last update 20 April 2021, url
317
Iraqi Christian Foundation, Who are the Iraqi Christians?, last update 20 April 2021, url
318
Reuters, Factbox: Iraq's Christian denominations, 1 March 2021, url
319
Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2021 - Iraq, 3 March 2021, url
320
USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq, 30 March 2021, url
321
Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2021 - Iraq, 3 March 2021, url; USDOS, Iraq 2020 – Country Report on Human Rights
Practices, 30 March 2021, url
322
USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq, 30 March 2021, url
323
Crux Now, Iraqi parliament formally declares Christmas a national holiday, 18 December 2020, url
324
Al Jazeera, Pope Francis’s visit to Iraq: Beyond the symbolism, 9 March 2021, url
325
France24 Pope visits Iraqi Christians, leads prayer for 'victims of war' in Mosul, 7 March, 2021, url
316

43IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

government and Iraqi parliament as well‘. 326 Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi also
encourged Christian IDPs to return home ‘stressing that full support will be provided tofacilitate this return and stability‘. 327
In 2020, after more than five years of displacement, security forces ensured the return of 50
Christian families to their homes in Mosul City, according to a Ninewa police statement
released on 9 October. 328 In November, another 200 displaced Christian families returned in
Mosul and in other cities and villages of the Ninewa Plain. 329
In the KRI, Christianity is one of the eight faiths that are recognised by the KRG and one of thethree which also receive payments for clergy salaries and infrastructure expenditures. 330
Along with other minorities, Christians benefitted from the passing of the Law of Protecting
the Rights of Components in Kurdistan-Iraq as this law ‘guarantees efficient and full equality
to all ethnic and religious minorities living in the Muslim-Kurdish dominated Kurdistan
Region.‘ 331
In terms of access to education, the KRG operates 49 schools in which Syriac (the dialect
spoken by most Christians) is the used language and the public education system provides
Christian education for children. 332 The government also approved private initiatives like the2021 opening of a high school in Erbil through the efforts of the Archdiocese of Erbil and a
US-based Schools Network. 333 The KRG supported the health and education of Christians byfunding the construction of churches, hospitals and schools, especially in Erbil (Ankawa
neighbourhood). 334

4.1.2 Instances of targeting of Christians in Iraq and the KRI
Under the previous regime of Saddam Hussein, Iraqi Christians were generally tolerated,enjoying almost the same rights as the Muslim majority. 335 Following the US-led invasion in
March 2003, the Christian population in Iraq has declined from approximately 1 500 000 toless than 250 000. 336 Amid the sectarian violence that prevailed for years, Christians wereforced to flee the traditionally Christian regions in Northern Iraq seeking protection mostly in
the KRI or abroad. In 2014, after ISIL fighters took control of the Christian territories inNorthern Iraq, more people were forced to flee as ISIL militants killed thousands of civilians
and destroyed religious sites 337 in their attempt of ‘religious cleansing of the population andpublic spaces‘. 338
Since the liberation of Mosul and the rest of Ninewa Province in 2017, paramilitary groups
which joined the state security forces during the assault against ISIL, known as the Popular

Iraqi Presidency, President Salih Meets with Deputy Yonadam Kanna, 03 June, 2021, url
Rudaw, PM Kadhimi calls on Christians to return to Iraq, 14 August 2021, url
328
EPIC, ISHM: October 7 – October 14, 2021, 14 October 2021, url
329
Agenzoa Fides, Another 200 families of Christian displaced persons return to Mosul and the Nineveh Plaines, 12 November
2020, url
330
USDOS, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Iraq, 12 May 2021, url
331
United States Institute of Peace (USIP), The Pope's Visit to Iraq and the Future of the Country’s Christians, March 3, 2021, url
332
USDOS, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Iraq, 12 May 2021, url
333
Catholic News, New high school in Iraq with emphasis on classical education has U.S. ties, 4 June 2021, url
334
USDOS, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Iraq, 12 May 2021, url
335
Associated Press, A timeline of disaster and displacement for Iraqi Christians, 5 March 2021, url
336
BBC News, Iraq's Christians 'close to extinction', 23 May, 2019, url
337
Associated Press, A timeline of disaster and displacement for Iraqi Christians, 5 March 2021, url
338
Al Jazeera, Pope Francis’s visit to Iraq: Beyond the symbolism, 9 March 2021, url
326
327

44

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Mobilisation Forces (PMF), have emerged as new stakeholders in the region. 339 In theaftermath of the war against ISIL, these Shiite militias advanced in the Disputed Areas andhelped the Iraqi forces to overcome the Kurdish Peshmerga after the referendum of
independence conducted by the KRG. 340 Partially converging with government institutions oreven replacing them ‘de facto‘, the PMF prevented the return of many displaced Christians aspart of their attempt to induce demographic changes and secure illegal economic benefits. In
the outskirts of Mosul and the Ninewa Plains, Christians have been confronted withdiscrimination as the Shiite militia groups seized large areas of residential, business andagricultural lands in the traditionally Christian regions with the help of local officials. 341
It is estimated that less than half of the population of displaced Christians has returned since
ISIL was defeated. 342 Between December 2019 and December 2020, 122 820 people
returned to the Ninewa Governorate, representing 52 % of all Iraqi returnees for this period. 343
Local militias discouraged the returning of Christian IDPs as they limited their movement by
setting up checkpoints 344, imposed illegal taxes for business owners and refused to return theproperties that were occupied during the war. 345
The most prominent PMF militias present in the Christian regions are the 50th Brigade(Babylon Brigades) and the 30th Brigade (Liwa Al-Shabak), as well as the Yazidi 36th Brigade(Lalish Regiment). 346 The 36th Brigade is a Yazidi regiment of the PMF involved in ‘violations
against both Muslims and Christians in Mount Sinjar and al-Qayrwan‘. 347
According to USDOS, the PMF 50th Brigade is the main reason why Christians IDPs from the
Assyrian town of Tal Kayf refuse to return home. Tal Kayf is under the control of the 50th
Brigade and is hosting a detention center and a court. 348 Even though it imposed itself as a
Christian militia, the 50th Brigade is composed of fighters foreign to the Ninewa Plains, mainly
Shia Arabs and Shabaks. 349 In the cities of Batnaya and Tal Kayf the 50th Brigade puts
Christians at a disadvantage when it comes to buying property by imposing illegal approvals
and bribes. 350
Reported harassment and intimidation against Christians continued to be committed in 2020
by the Shabak-dominated 30th Brigade in the Ninewa Plains 351, particularly in the cities of

Newlines Institute for Startegy and Policy, Intelligence Briefing: A Thousand Hezbollahs: Iraq’s Emerging Militia State, May
2021, url340
Al Jazeera, Iran-backed PMFs are destabilising Iraq’s disputed regions, 8 May 2021, url
341
Newlines Institute for Startegy and Policy, Intelligence Briefing: A Thousand Hezbollahs: Iraq’s Emerging Militia State, May
2021, p. 4, 7, 19, 39 url
342
United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), Annual Report 2021, April 2021, url
343
IOM, Returns in Iraq: 2020 Overview December 2019 (Round 7) – December 2020 (Round 11), July 2021, url
344
Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ – CRU Report, May 2021, url
345
Newlines Institute for Startegy and Policy, Intelligence Briefing: A Thousand Hezbollahs: Iraq’s Emerging Militia State, May
2021, url
346
The Jamestown Foundation, Iran’s Man in Nineveh: Waad Qado and the PMF’s 30th Brigade, 4 June 2021, url; USDOS, 2020
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq, 30 March 2021, url; Newlines Institute for Startegy and Policy, Intelligence
Briefing: A Thousand Hezbollahs: Iraq’s Emerging Militia State, May 2021, p. 20, 24, url
347
Newlines Institute forstartegy and policy, Intelligence Briefing: A Thousand Hezbollahs: Iraq’s Emerging Militia State, May
2021, url
348
USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq, 30 March 2021, url; 1001 Iraqi Thoughts, Security in the
Nineveh Plains: What it means for Assyrians, 19 January 2021, url
349
1001 Iraqi Thoughts, Security in the Nineveh Plains: What it means for Assyrians, 19 January 2021, url
350
USDOS, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Iraq, 12 May 2021, url
351
Aid to the Church in Need (ACN), Iraq’s Christians remain at risk of eradication, 8 July 2020, url; Jamestown Foundation (The),
Iran’s Man in Nineveh: Waad Qado and the PMF’s 30th Brigade, 4 June 2021, url; USDOS, Iraq 2020 – Country Report on
Human Rights Practices, 30 March 2021, url
339

45IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Bartella, Bazwiya and Bashiqa.352 It was reported that they imposed traffic restrictions in andbetween Christian-populated towns in the Ninewa Plains. In July 2020, at Bartella main
checkpoint, 30th PMF Brigade members assaulted two Christians by forcing them out of their
car and beating them. Reportedly, Shabak members used social media to threaten Christian
priests that talked against them. 353 Also, according to USDOS Annual Report 2020 on the
Human Rights Situations in Iraq, the 30th Brigade detained 1 000 persons in secret facilities
located in Ninewa Province on false religious motives and along with the 50th PMF Brigades
was involved ‘in extortion, illegal arrests, kidnappings, and detention of individuals without
warrants‘. 354
According to Father Behnam Benoka of the Syriac Catholic Church in the Bartella Subdistrict,in February 2020, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), a US-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization,used false pretext to harass Christian families in Bartella by running investigations againstthem and trying to convince them to leave the city. 355
Several media outlets reported that more than 14 Christian and Yezidi-owned liquor stores
were attacked in Baghdad, in 2020. Some Iraqi Christian business owners claimed that Shiite
Iran-backed militia members bombed their stores in an attempt to intimidate them. 356
In November 2020, Christians from the town of Tal Kayf have complained about the Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF) intimidating them by running searches, imposing movement restrictions
and using some of their houses without offering compensations. According to the mayor of
Tal Kayf, Christians were also worried about the use of a youth centre as a jail for ISIL
members due to concern that ISIL fighters could try to attack the facility in order to set freetheir imprisoned members. 357
Although one of the representatives of Christians in the Iraqi parliament, Yonadam Kanna,signalled an improvement of the situation of Christians in 2020, the Christian community
complained about the general treatment by Shiite militias that disadvantaged them in terms ofreal estate purchases, trade opportunities and free movement. While ISIL is considered to be
defeated in Iraq, Yonadam Kanna stated in November 2020 that ‘threats, kidnappings,
extortion and deaths still persist‘. 358 According to Open Doors, a Christian advocacy
organisation, the presence of Islamist extremists is reflected in the increased level of violence
committed against Christians in 2020 who continued to be targeted by attacks andkidnappings. 359 On 17 August 2020, unknown gunmen opened fire on a car carrying a 27year-old Christian activist in southern region of Basrah, injuring her leg. 360 In November 2020,a lawyer working with the Chaldean Catholic Church in Baghdad was attacked by unidentified
gunmen. 361

Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ – CRU Report, May 2021, url
USDOS, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Iraq, 12 May 2021, url
354
USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq, 30 March 2021, url
355
USDOS, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Iraq, 12 May 2021, url
356
Middle East Monitor Middle East Monitor, 3 explosions target liquor stores in Iraq's Baghdad, 16 December 2020, url; Arab
Weekly (The), Baghdad liquor stores live in ‘constant fear’ of firebombings, 16 December 2020, url; Al Monitor, Armed groups
target liquor shops in Iraq, 15 December 2020, url
357
USDOS, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Iraq, 12 May 2021, url
358
France24, Nightmare over but Iraqi Christians still dream of leaving, 22 November 2020, url
359
Open Doors, Country Report – Iraq, 13 January 2021, url
360
Hammurabi Human Rights Organization, Annual Report 2020 on the Human Rights Situations in Iraq, 04 April 2021, p. 70, url
361
USDOS, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Iraq, 12 May 2021, url
352
353

46

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

In an interview with Agence France-Presse (AFP), the head of the Chaldean Catholic Church
stated that while Christians are not subject to ‘direct pressure‘ from the society in the present,
they face ‘day-to-day discrimination‘ as they remain outside state institutions. He added that
this is mainly due to corruption and is one of the reasons why Christians continue toemigrate. 362 Christians have been reported to be socially pressured to withhold fromcelebrating religious feasts overlapping with the Islamic holidays like Ramadan or Ashura.
Also, Christian women have been reported to be harassed for not following the Islamic
practice of wearing the hijab. 363
According to local media, only one church remains open in Kirkuk out of a total of 12, seven ofwhich were destroyed in car bomb attacks after 2003. 364 In northern Iraq several churches
have been closed as a result of attacks by Turkish military forces. 365
In the KRI, the Christian villages near the Turkey border were under threat as the conflict
between Turkey and Iraqi Kurds persisted and also as the tensions between the Kurdish
political groups continued. 366 Even though Christians in Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR) havebetter living opportunities, they still face discrimination in terms of land disputes and property
issues as they were subjected to expropriations for different reasons. 367

4.1.3 Situation of Christian converts in Iraq and the KRI
Iraqi personal status law and regulations ‘prohibit the conversion of Muslims to otherreligions. 368 Even though religious freedom is guaranteed by the Iraqi constitution, nationallaws continue to violate the rights of non-Muslim minorities, including Christians. 369 Children
with one of the parents converted to Islam or if one of the parents is considered Muslim areautomatically designated as Muslim, ‘even if the child is a product of rape’. 370 Furthermore,families who practice Christianity in private have to register their children as Muslim in order
to be eligible for government benefits such as access to education and allocation of basic
food items. 371
According to Open Doors, Muslims who have converted to Christianity may facediscrimination from society, religious leaders, and extended family members. The source
added that ‘Christian converts risk losing inheritance rights or the right to marry—and they are
not allowed to marry Christians, as the law still considers them Muslim’. 372
Iraqi laws do not allow the conversion from Islam to another religion, however facilitate thereverse process of converting to Islam. 373 Legal provisions establish the rules of marriage

France24, Nightmare over but Iraqi Christians still dream of leaving, 22 November 2020, url
Middle East Institute, Waiting for a miracle in Iraq, 26 February 2021, url
364
Kirkuk Now, Christians in Kirkuk feel marginalized, 02 Novermber 2021, url
365Open Doors, Country Report – Iraq, 13 January 2021, url; The Jerusalem Post, Turkey bombs Christian villages in Iraq’s
Kurdish region – analysis, 26 May 2021, url; see also: Rudaw, Turkish bombardment damages church in Duhok village, terrifying
villagers, 25 May 2021, url; Rudaw, Christian villagers under fire in Turkey-PKK clashes, 17 June 2021, url
366
Modern Diplomacy, Iraq’s Nineveh Plains Christians Need the Pope’s Support, 11 March 2021, url
367
IRB – Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada: Iraq: Situation and treatment of Christians, particularly in the north, theKurdistan region, and Baghdad; government protection and support programs (2017–September 2020, 9. October 2020, url
368
USDOS, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Iraq, 12 May 2021, url
369
Hammurabi Human Rights Organization, Annual Report 2020 on the Human Rights Situations in Iraq, 04 April 2021, url
370
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2021 - Iraq, 3 March 2021, url
371
USDOS, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Iraq, 12 May 2021, url
372
Open Doors, Country Report – Iraq, 13 January 2021, url
373
USDOS, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Iraq, 12 May 2021, url
362
363

47

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

between women and men according to their confession. Thus, a Muslim man can marry awoman of another religion, but a Muslim woman cannot marry a non-Muslim man. 374

4.2 Turkmen
4.2.1 General situation of Turkmen in Iraq and the KRI
Turkmen are the third-largest ethnic group in Iraq, behind Arabs and Kurds. As noted by UN
Rapporteur on minority issues in 2017, community representatives claimed that the Turkmen
population was reaching up to two million; 375 before 2003, the number of Turkmen in Iraq wasin a range between 600 000 and two million.376 Turkmen are the second largest group in the
Kurdistan region. 377 Turkmen inhabit largely the areas stretching from Tal Afar (Telafar) to
Mosul, Erbil, Altun Kopru (Altun Kupri), Kirkuk, Tuz Khurmatu, Kifri, and Khanaqin, 378 whichconstitute the largest part of the so-called ‘disputed territories.’ 379 In Tel Afar city, Turkmen—
consisting of both Sunni and Shia religious denomination 380—constitute the majority of the
population. 381
Sunni Turkmen constitute approximately 50 %382 – 60 % 383 of the Turkmen population of Iraq
and one percent of all Sunni Muslims in the country. 384 The other part of the Turkmen
community is comprised of Shia. 385 The number of Christian Turkmen was estimated ataround 30 000. 386
According to the Iraqi constitution, the Turkmen language is an official language in theadministrative units in which Turkmen ‘constitute density of population’. 387 In its reportcovering 2020, USDOS noted on the existence of 18 schools operating in Turkmen in the
KRI. 388
In Iraq’s parliamentary elections of May 2018, Turkmen political parties won eight seats out of
329: the Turkmen bloc got five seats and the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF) three. 389 In the KRI,
Turkmen representatives were allocated five seats out of 11 seats reserved for minorities in
the 111-seat Kurdistan Parliament. 390 Since 2020, Kirkuk became divided into three electoral
districts, allocated to Kurds, Turkmen, and Arabs. Turkmen fractions were given three seats
US Embassy and Consulates in Iraq, Marriage in Iraq, n. d., url
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues on her mission to Iraq [A/HRC/34/53/Add.1], 9January 2017, url, para 40
376
MRG, Still Targeted: Continued Persecution of Iraq’s Minorities, June 2010, url, p. 7;
377
Al-Hamoud, A. H., Iraqi Turkmen: Controversy of Identity and Affiliation, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, August 2021, url, p. 17
378
MRG, Still Targeted: Continued Persecution of Iraq’s Minorities, June 2010, url, p. 7; Australia, DFAT, DFAT Country Information
Report – Iraq, 17 August 2020, url, p. 25
379
US Congregational Research Service, Iraq: Issues in the 116th Congress, updated 17 July 2020, url, p. 26; Mako, Sh.,
Negotiating Peace in Iraq’s Disputed Territories: Modifying the Sinjar Agreement, Lawfare, 17 January 2021, url
380
REACH Initiative, Telafar City, Area-Based Assessment, August-September 2020, n.d., url, pp. 3, 11381
Sanbar, S., Barries to Post-ISIS Reconciliation in Iraq, Case Study of Tel Afar, Ninewa, Sciences Po Kuwait Program, 30 April
2020, url, p. 6; USIP, Four Years After ISIS, Iraq’s Tal Afar Remains Riven by Communal Divisions, 2 August 2021, url
382
Kirkuk Now, Turkmen & Arabs: We Don’t want the Peshmerga in Kirkuk, 26 May 2021, url
383
Australia, DFAT, DFAT Country Information Report – Iraq, 17 August 2020, url, p. 25
384
USDOS, Iraq 2020 International Religious Freedom Report, url, 12 May 2021, p. 3385
Australia, DFAT, DFAT Country Information Report – Iraq, 17 August 2020, url, p. 25
386
MRG, Crossroads: The future of Iraq’s minorities after ISIS, 7 June 2017, url, p. 10
387
USDOS, Iraq 2020 International Religious Freedom Report, url, 12 May 2021, p. 7
388
USDOS, Iraq 2020 International Religious Freedom Report, url, 12 May 2021, p. 7
389
Kirkuk Now, Turkmen & Arabs: We Don’t want the Peshmerga in Kirkuk, 26 May 2021, url
390
USDOS, Iraq 2020 Human Rights Report, 30 March 2021, url, p. 37
374

375

48

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

reserved for Kirkuk governorate in Iraq’s parliament. 391 In the elections of 10 October 2021,
Turkmen representatives won two seats in Kirkuk. 392
Khanaqin, Kirkuk, the Ninewa Plains, Tal Afar, Mandali, Tuz Khurmatu, as well as Sinjar,
constitute the so-called ‘disputed territories.’ 393 According to a study published in August
2021, Turkmen argued that the areas of their residence, ‘including Kirkuk and many cities andvillages,’ were historically Turkmen areas, and refused to name them ‘disputed.’ 394
Shia Turkmen were recruited to the Popular Mobilisation Forces’ (PMF, also known as AlHashd al-Shabi or Popular Mobilisation Units, PMU 395) 53rd Brigade in Ninewa Governorate
and the 16th Brigade in Taza district in Kirkuk Governorate; they were also recruited in the 52nd
Brigade. 396 Turkmen-led PMF were reported to be a dominant element in organisation of
security in Tal Afar, and especially in its Zummar sub-district. 397 In Kirkuk city, Shia Turkmen,
most of whom are affiliated with the Badr Organisation, were reported to belong to the key
military and political leadership of the PMF active in the city. 398 The relations of PMF ‘with thecivilian population and other military units’ was reported as ‘tense.’ 399
As noted by USDOS, a member of the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF) in Tal Afar district reported inAugust 2020 that 400 Turkmen from Tal Afar—described by him as poor, unemployed young
men mostly from Shia Turkmen community, but also some Sunni Turkmen—joined theKurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in 2020. Many of the new recruits were reportedly ‘sent to
PKK camps for trainings and indoctrination,’ while PKK was offering them ‘monthly salaries,’
aiming at the increase of PMF influence in the areas inhabited by Turkmen. According to an
ITF parliamentarian, PKK and PMF were sharing ‘common interests’ in Iraq. 400
The UN Special Rapporteur on minority issues noted in 2017 that ‘Turkmen claim to havehistorically faced violence and intimidation from all sides, including the central Government,
the Kurdistan Regional Government and Sunni and Shia militias.’ 401 After the Iraqi central
government restored its control over Kirkuk governorate in October 2017, 402 Turkmen, as wellas other ethnoreligious minorities, were reported to have faced ‘discrimination, displacement,
and in some cases, violence from government forces, particularly Iran-aligned PMF groups.’
PMF were also reported to have conducted arbitrary and unlawful detainment of Kurds andTurkmen in Kirkuk, while incidents of violence were reported in Kirkuk and Khanaqin. 403
According to an international NGO working in Iraq interviewed in 2018 by DIS and Landinfo,

Amwaj Media, Turkey on the back foot as Kurds, PMU aim high in Kirkuk elections, 23 September 2021, url
Kirkuk Now, PUK pushes for Kirkuk Governor position, 3 November 2021, url
393
US Congregational Research Service, Iraq: Issues in the 116th Congress, updated 17 July 2020, url, p. 26; Mako, Sh.,
Negotiating Peace in Iraq’s Disputed Territories: Modifying the Sinjar Agreement, Lawfare, 17 January 2021, url
394
Al-Hamoud, A. H., Iraqi Turkmen: Controversy of Identity and Affiliation, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, August 2021, url, p. 18. This
study is based on 20 interviews with activists, academics, media figures, and members of political parties residing in thegovernorates of Baghdad, Saladin, Diyala, Mosul, Kirkuk, and Erbil, which were conducted in April 2021, see p. 8395
Al-Monitor, Turkish-Iranian rivalry heats up over Mosul, 25 February 2021, url
396
Palani, K., Iran-backed PMFs are destabilising Iraq’s disputed regions, Al Jazeera, 8 May 2021, url; see also: Knights, M., et all,Honored, not Contained: The future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, March 2020, url
397
USIP, Four Years After ISIS, Iraq’s Tal Afar is Riven by Communal Divisions, 2 August 2021, url
398
Bakr, M. J., Kirkuk in Iraq’s Upcoming Elections, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, September 2021, url, p. 7
399
ICG, Iraq: Fixing Security in Kirkuk, Middle East Report N° 215, 15 June 2020, url, p. 13
400
USDOS, Iraq 2020 International Religious Freedom Report, 12 May 2021, url, p. 21
401
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues on her mission to Iraq [A/HRC/34/53/Add.1], 9January 2017, url, p. 11402
ICG, Iraq: Fixing Security in Kirkuk, 15 June 2020, url
403
USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices, 2018 – Iraq, url
391

392

49

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Turkmen in Kirkuk, seemed to be ‘for unknown reasons’ more targeted than other groups
inhabiting the city. 404
The capture of the Ninewa Plains by ISIS in 2014 brought destruction of non-Sunni minorities,
with Yazidis, Christians, and Turkmen being particularly affected. 405 As noted by the UN
Special Rapporteur on minority issues, many Shia Turkmen fled from their villages in Ninewa
governorate ‘to southern governorates, including Najaf and Karbala.’ 406 For Tal Afar city, it
was reported that while its Shia population fled, 407 many Sunni residents stayed in the city. 408
Turkmen civil society NGOs estimated that 1 300 Turkmen from Tal Afar were abducted by
ISIS, including 470 women and 130 children. 409 According to a representative of the ITF, as
noted by USDOS in its 2020 report, the number of the abducted Turkmen was estimated at
1 200, including around 450 women; 800 of those who were abducted were believed to havebeen killed. 410 As reported by USDOS, Ninewa Governorate’s Advisor for Women’s Affairs
estimated that 900 Shia and Sunni Turkmen remained missing at the end of 2020. 411
The largest number of Turkmen women captured by ISIS were reportedly Shia Turkmen,
abducted after they fled from Tal Afar to Sinjar. As reported by the Middle East Eye (MEE) in
February 2021, 131 women out of 600 were freed, mostly with families ‘paying ransoms tomilitants who they reached through mediators working to liberate Yazidi women held by IS in
Syria.’ MEE reported that most of abducted Turkmen women were not registered as missingand ‘there were no real official or non-governmental campaign efforts to find them and tobring them home’ from camps in Syria due to the ‘state of denial’ by their families and ‘theacquiescence of influential government institutions and Shia political and religious forces.’ 412
Only a small number of abducted Turkmen women reportedly returned to their community; it
was also reported that the stigma around sexual violence could lead to honour killings. 413
After the seizure of Tal Afar by ISIL in 2014, many Turkmen of the area joined the Shia militias
to fight ISIL and returned to the area victorious in summer 2017. As noted by Fabrice
Balanche in May 2021, since the return of Shia Turkmen to Tal Afar, ‘no ethnic cleansing hastaken place so far against the Sunni population.’ 414
Based on IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) of October 2020, the REACH Initiative
noted on the return of the majority of the Tal Afar’s pre-war inhabitants. Households which
remained in the city during the ISIL occupation became reportedly displaced to escape thefighting in 2017 or out of fear of persecution due to perceived affiliation with ISIS. 415 The main
obstacles behind unwillingness of former residents to return were reportedly lack ofDenmark, DIS, and Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in thedisputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 16
405
Ezzeddine, N., Pietrantonio Pellise, A. di, Trapped into a vicious cycle, Factors of instability in the Ninevah Plains, Clingendael(Netherlands Institute of International Relations), May 2021, url, p. 3
406
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues on her mission to Iraq [A/HRC/34/53/Add.1], 9January 2017, url, p. 12
407
Balanche, F., From the Iranian Corridor to the Shia Crescent, A Hoover Institution Essay, 21 May 2021, url, p. 4408
Australia, DFAT, DFAT Country Information Report – Iraq, 17 August 2020, url, p. 26
409
Kirkuk Now, Turkmen women call to uncover fate of 1300 missing Turkmen abducted by ISIS, 4 February 2021, url
410
USDOS, Iraq 2020 Human Rights Report, 30 March 2021, url, p. 18
411
USDOS, Iraq 2020 International Religious Freedom Report, 12 May 2021, url, p. 13
412
MEE, The untold tragedy of Shia Turkmen women abducted by Islamic State, 18 February 2021, url
413
McKay, H., The ISIS War Crime Iraqi Turkmen Won’t Talk About, New Lines Magazine, 5 March 2021, url
414
Balanche, F., From the Iranian Corridor to the Shia Crescent, A Hoover Institution Essay, 21 May 2021, url, p. 4
415
REACH Initiative, Telafar City Area-Based Assessment, August-September 2020, 14 April 2021, url, pp. 3, 11. In Tal Afar city, an
Area-Based Assessment (ABA) by REACH Initiative was conducted between 24 August and 10 September 2020 and covered 55
key informant interviews with 23 community leaders and 23 subject-matter experts, as well as 707 household-level surveys.
404

50

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

economic opportunities, destroyed homes and fear of perceived ISIS affiliation. 416 According
to data collected by the US Institute of Peace (USIP), there was ‘a positive trend with regard tosecurity’ in Hamdaniya, Tal Afar, and Sinjar districts of Ninewa Governorate; Turkmen
residents in Tal Afar were found to ‘feel the security actors have too much influence over
governance in their districts.’ 417

4.2.2 Treatment of Sunni and Shia Turkmen
As noted by the Yazidi NGO Yazda, quoted by USDOS in its report covering 2020, Turkmen
were among the ethnoreligious minorities discriminated by the KRG authorities in thedisputed territories. 418 According to DFAT, Turkmen faced discrimination particularly in issues
related to land and property disputes. 419 According to ‘a media director of Diaya Governorate,’
Turkmen in the KRI-controlled locations of Kifri, Jalawla, Mandali, Qazaniyah, and Hamrin werefeeling ‘harmed, marginalized, and mistreated’ in matters related to ‘administrative issues,
financial allocations, government appointments, and the distribution of positions.’ 420
In June 2020, the International Crisis Group reported that the Sunni population of Kirkuk citywas ‘suspicious’ of such structures as federal police and PMF, composed largely of Shia
members. 421 PMF were reported to have committed violence against ethnoreligious minorities
in the Ninewa Plains and Sinjar. 422 According to the International Crisis group reporting, PMF
were also engaged in illegal income-generating activities, such as collecting duties frompetrol stations and truck drivers; illegal checkpoints were reportedly established in Daquq
and Hawija. 423 According to the Enabling Peace in Iraq Center (EPIC), ‘dozens of inhabitants of
the Ninewa Plains’—Arabs, Kurds, Shabaks, Yazidis, Christians, and Turkmen, many of whomwere IDPs—participated in a protest in the beginning of February 2020 against the presenceof PMF and affiliated militias, accusing them of causing displacements of IDPs and ‘imposing
illegal taxation on road traffic through the plains.’ 424
Tensions between ethnoreligious communities in Ninewa and Kirkuk governorates werereported to have increased with the entrance of Shia Turkmen into PMF. In Kirkuk city, thePMF backing was reported to have made Shia Turkmen ‘more politically assertive,’ despite
being a minority in the city, compared to Sunni Turkmen. A similar situation among Shia-Sunni
Turkmen was reported in Tal Afar district. 425 As reported by Al-Monitor, based on ‘a Turkmen
source from Mosul’, Mosul, Shia Turkmen, as well as Yazidis and other minorities ‘value[d] therole of the PMU’ in the area. 426
Sources interviewed by the Danish Immigration Service (DIS) and Landinfo in 2018 noted that
the PMF were targeting Sunni Arabs and Sunni Turkmen, seeking revenge for ISIL-committed
incidents. 427
REACH Initiative, Telafar City Area-Based Assessment, August-September 2020, 14 April 2021 (seems to be this but not
September 2020), 14 April 2021, url, pp. 3-4.
417
USIP, Unemployment Replaces ISIS as Top Security Concern for Minorities in Iraq, 22 June 2021, url
418
USDOS, Iraq 2020 International Religious Freedom Report, 12 May 2021, url, p. 17
419
Australia, DFAT, DFAT Country Information Report – Iraq, 17 August 2020, url, p. 28
420
Al-Hamoud, A. H., Iraqi Turkmen: Controversy of Identity and Affiliation, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, August 2021, url, p. 14421International Crisis Group, Iraq: Fixing Security in Kirkuk, Middle East Report N° 215, 15 June 2020, url, pp. 12-13
422
USCIRF, Annual Report 2021 – Iraq, url, p. 1
423
ICG, Iraq: Fixing Security in Kirkuk, Middle East Report N° 215, 15 June 2020, url, p. 14
424
EPIC, ISHM (Iraq Security and Humanitarian Monitor): January 30 – February 6, 2020, 6 February 2020, url
425
Palani, K., Iran-backed PMFs are destabilising Iraq’s disputed regions, Al Jazeera, 8 May 2021, url
426
Al-Monitor, Turkish-Iranian rivalry heats up over Mosul, 25 February 2021, url
427
Denmark, DIS, and Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in thedisputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 23
416

51

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMSecurity forces were reportedly treating relatives of the Tal Afar inhabitants who had joined
ISIL as ISIL-supporters. 428 As found by USIP, particularly in Al-Ayadhiya sub-district, Turkmen(as well as Arabs) were reported to have expressed their concerns of ‘being collectively
blamed or accused of a crime;’ they also indicated ‘higher levels of restriction on movement
than other groups.’ 429 According to REACH initiative, 99 % of households in Tal Afar city
reported they were not facing stigmatisation or discrimination; however, 10 % of households
indicated they were not feeling ‘safe from harm.’ 430
For more information on the treatment of (perceived) ISIL affiliates, see Chapter 1 of thisreport; for more information on the treatment of Sunni Arabs, see Chapter 2 of this report.

4.2.3 Instances of targeting of Turkmen
In the reporting period, ISIL was reported to have conducted attacks in the governorates ofKirkuk, Salah Al-Din, and Diyala, which have a significant Turkmen population. 431 On 3 May
2021, one Turkmen security officer was killed, and three other persons were injured when ISIL
conducted an attack in the surroundings of Turkmen-inhabited Beshir village, Kirkuk
province. 432
On 9 November 2020, a military convoy in the village of Palkana, Tuz Khurmatu district, Salah
Al-Din governorate, was targeted by an IED. In the incident, two members of the Oil
Protection Force (OPF) were killed and seven persons, including Turkmen PMF, were injured.
No group claimed responsibility for the attack. 433
In 2020, the PKK was reported to be active in the areas with Turkmen populations, andparticularly in Kirkuk. 434 In June 2020, locals reported on an attack by PKK on a Turkmen
martyrs’ cemetery in Kirkuk city. According to a media report, Turkmen flags were removed insome locations in Kirkuk city. 435
On 20 October 2020, the office of the ITF in the area of Altun Kupri in Kirkuk city was
attacked, the perpetrators of the attack were reported as unidentified. 436

Çalışkan S. and Zineelabdin, A., 2020 Irak Değerlendirmesi: Türkmenlerin Durumu ve 2021’den Beklentiler [informaltranslation: Iraq Assessment 2020: The Situation of Turkmen and the Expectations for 2021], ORSAM, Febryary 2021, url, p. 13
429
USIP, Four Years After ISIS, Iraq’s Tal Afar is Riven by Communal Divisions, 2 August 2021, url
430
REACH Initiative, Telafar City Area-Based Assessment, August-September 2020, 14 April 2021, url, p. 30
431Çalışkan S. and Zineelabdin, A., 2020 Irak Değerlendirmesi: Türkmenlerin Durumu ve 2021’den Beklentiler [informaltranslation: Iraq Assessment 2020: The Situation of Turkmen and the Expectations for 2021], ORSAM (Ortadoğu Araştırmaları
Merkezi), Febryary 2021, url, p. 5; AA, Iraq hunts down Daesh/ISIS terrorists in Nineveh, 17 October 2021, url
432
QHA, Kerkük’te DEAŞ saldırısı: 1 Türkmen şehit oldu [Daesh attak in Kirkuk: One Turkmen martyred], 4 May 2021, url
433
Garda World, Iraq: IED targets military convoy in Tuz Khurmatu (Salah-al-Din province) November 9, 10 November 2020, url
434Çalışkan S. and Zineelabdin, A., 2020 Irak Değerlendirmesi: Türkmenlerin Durumu ve 2021’den Beklentiler [informaltranslation: Iraq Assessment 2020: The Situation of Turkmen and the Expectations for 2021], ORSAM, Febryary 2021, url, p. 5
435
Cengiz, S., Iraq, Syria’s Turkmen communities a useful tool for Turkey, Arab News, 7 August 2020, url
436
AA, Kerkük’te Irak Türkmen Cephesi bürosuna saldırı [informal translation: Attack on the Kirkuk office of the Iraq Turkmen
Front], 20 October 2020, url
428

52IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

4.3 Yazidis
The Yazidis 437 are ‘a heterodox ethnoreligious group’ 438 that represents a minority in Iraq. 439
According to Eva Savelsberg, Siamend Hajo and Irene Dulz, who wrote the article ‘Yezidis in
the Collective Towns of Sheikhan and Sinjar’ for OpenEdition, a platform dedicated toacademic information in social sciences,‘the majority of Yezidis in Sinjar speak Arabic today, with Kurdish more or lessrelegated to the status of a domestic language. Numerous Arabic words are used inplace of Kurdish terms; as a written language, Arabic takes preference over Kurdish.
The private as well as the official language in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, in contrast,
is Kurdish.’ 440
Although most Yazidis see themselves as Kurdish, ‘the relationship between Yazidis andMuslim Kurds is complicated. 441 In confidential conversations with the source, Yazidis statedthat Muslim Kurds discriminate them in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). 442
Yazidis lived in the plains of Ninewa in north-western Iraq. 443 Sinjar444, one of the eight
districts of Ninewa, was predominantly populated by Yazidis. 445 The Public Library of Science(PLOS), a non-profit open-access science publisher, wrote that according to UN and Kurdish
officials, prior to the presence of ISIL 446 in 2014, ‘the largest Yazidi community - approximately
400,000 people - resided in the area of Mount Sinjar’ in Ninewa. 447
Estimates on the Yazidi population differ significantly. Pew Research Center noted in 2014
that there is little reliable information on the size of the Yazidi community. According to thesource, ‘published estimates of the size of the Yazidi population vary […] from fewer than
300,000 in the entire world to about 700,000 in northern Iraq alone.’448 While in 2013, theInstitute for International Law and Human Rights, wrote that ‘USCIRF reports that the Yezidi
population has fallen from around 700,000 in 2005, to approximately 500,000 [in 2013].’ 449
IOM wrote in 2019, that estimates on the number of Yazidis ‘in northern Iraq hover between
400 000 and 500 000.’ 450
Yazidis identify themselves first by religion and then by ethnicity. 451 Under the Islamic belief,
Yazidis are not considered to be ‘People of the Book’. This distinction excludes the Yazidis

Yazidis are sometimes also referred to as Yezidis or Êzîdî. Allison, C., The Yazidis, n.d., url, p. 2
DW, Yazidi children abused by 'IS' urgently need help, 3 August 2020, url
439
Savelsberg, E. et al, Effectively Urbanized, Yezidis in the Collective Towns of Sheikhan and Sinjar, 29 March 2010, url, p. 1
440Savelsberg, E. et al, Effectively Urbanized, Yezidis in the Collective Towns of Sheikhan and Sinjar, 29 March 2010, url, p. 10441Savelsberg, E. et al, Effectively Urbanized, Yezidis in the Collective Towns of Sheikhan and Sinjar, 29 March 2010, url, p. 2
442
Savelsberg, E. et al, Effectively Urbanized, Yezidis in the Collective Towns of Sheikhan and Sinjar, 29 March 2010, url, p. 10443
IOM, Iraq, Rural areas in Ninewa - Legacies of conflict on rural economies and communities in Sinjar and Ninewa Plains, 28
November 2019, url, p. 8
444
Also known as ‘Shingal’ in Kurdish. Kurdish Project (The), Sinjar (Shingal), n.d., url
445
IOM, Iraq, Rural areas in Ninewa - Legacies of conflict on rural economies and communities in Sinjar and Ninewa Plains, 28
November 2019, url, p. 8
446
ISIL is also referred to as ISIS, IS or Da’esh. BBC, Isis, Isil, IS or Daesh? One group, many names, 2 December 2015, url
447
PLOS, Mortality and kidnapping estimates for the Yazidi population in the area of Mount Sinjar, Iraq, 9 May 2017, url, p. 3
448
Pew Research Center, Iraqi Yazidis: Hazy population numbers and a history of persecution, 12 August 2014, url
449
Institute for International Law and Human Rights, Iraq’s Minorities and Other Vulnerable Groups, Legal Framework,
Documentation and Human Rights, May 2013, url, p. 148
450
IOM Iraq, Rural areas in Ninewa - Legacies of conflict on rural economies and communities in Sinjar and Ninewa Plains, 28
November 2019, url, p. 14451
IOM, Understanding ethno-religious groups in Iraq: Displacement and Return, February 2019, url, p. 26
437

438

53

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

from ‘the protection of religious edicts that exhort Muslim believers not to kill “people of thebook.”’ 452
The Iraqi constitution under Article 2, identifies Islam as the nation’s official religion andstipulates that ‘no law may be enacted that contradicts the established provisions of Islam,’
while furthermore mentioning that the ‘constitution guarantees the Islamic identity of the
majority of the Iraqi people and guarantees the full religious rights to freedom of religious
belief and practice of all individuals such as […] Yazidis.’ 453
For more background information on Yazidis in Iraq see EASO’s COI Query - Iraq - What is the
security context and treatment of Yazidis in Iraq.

4.3.1 General situation of Yazidis in Iraq and the KRI
Situation of Yazidi IDPs
According to the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and Al-Monitor, in 2021 around
200 000 Yazidis remained displaced. 454 The Iraqi writer Hamad Shehab Ahmad, writing for
the Tehran Times in August 2021, said that ‘more than 70 % of the Yazidis are still displaced
and living in camps in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq’ and they are unable to return to Iraq’s
Sinjar district due to lack of services, security issues and bureaucratic hurdles. 455 The
Newlines Institute described the economic and security situation in Ninewa as ‘very bad’ andadded that ‘economic offices are involved in selling land belonging to the families of those
involved with ISIS and the land and farms of […] Yazidis who left Iraq.’ 456
As regards the situation in IDP camps, the Washington Institute wrote in March 2021, that‘most internally displaced Yazidis feel that living conditions in the camps are difficult and thatthe deteriorating economic situation in the Kurdistan region has significantly affected theirlives, exacerbating poverty in the camps that has in turn led to higher incidences of suicide,domestic violence, and abandonment of children.’ 457
The USDOS stated that many of the women and children formerly held in ISIS captivity, were‘pregnant as a result of rape, forced marriage, and sex trafficking; these women and girls,
including IDPs among this population, remain highly vulnerable to various forms of
exploitation, including re-trafficking’. The source added that ‘some Yezidi women and girls
reportedly reside in Iraqi IDP camps or Al-Hawl camp in Syria where they continue to live with
Sunni families that formerly exploited them under ISIS rule.’ 458
USDOS in its 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom for Iraq, wrote that ‘the KRG
continued to actively support and fund the rescue of captured Yezidis and provide
psychosocial support services at a center in Dohuk Province [in the KRI].’ 459

Yale MacMillan Canter - Genocide Studies Program, Before it’s too late, June 2019, url, p. 5
Iraq, Constitution of the Republic of Iraq of the year 2005, 15 October 2005, Translated by: the National Authorities, url
454
IOM, Six years after the Yazidi genocide, investment in services is crucial for returning Yazidi families, 16 July 2020, url; AlMonitor, Iraq passes law addressing women survivors of Yazidi genocide, 1 March 2021, url
455
Tehran Times (The), More than 70% of the Yazidis are still displaced: Iraqi writer, 11 August 2021, url
456
Newlines Institute, A Thousand Hezbollah’s, May 2021, url, p. 39
457
The Washington Institute, Tensions in Sinjar Continue to Threaten Yazidis’ Return, 2 March 2021, url
458
USDOS, 2021 Trafficking in Persons Report: Iraq, 2021, url
459
USDOS, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Iraq, 12 May 2021, url, p. 13
452
453

54

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Although the Iraqi government vowed to help Yazidi survivors, Jane Arraf, an NPR
correspondent, reported that ‘little concrete help’ has been provided to Yazidi returnees. 460
Another source, the Yazidi activist Shahab Ahmed, ‘emphasize[d] on the Yazidi
disappointment towards the lack of the Iraqi governmental efforts to facilitate the Yazidi IDPs
return to Sinjar’; he stated that most Yazidis are unable to return and that the Iraqi
government ‘did not even cover the transportation costs for the returning families.’ 461
Security situation in Sinjar
The Washington Institute wrote that ‘tensions continue to simmer in Sinjar’ region. 462 The
Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) noted that the security situation around Sinjar ‘remains
complex and menacing.’ 463 The area is of strategical interest; it has been disputed between
the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and the Iraqi central government. 464 Al-Monitor alsoclassified the security situation as fragile and informed that armed extremists’ groups remainin Sinjar’s mountain region. 465
On 1 March 2021, Al-Monitor stated that the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), who settled in
Sinjar’s region to fight ISIL, has been attacked by Turkey. 466 In a report published on 10 March
2021, IAI observed that both the PKK and spill overs from the war in Syria worsened the
security situation around Sinjar. The same source further reported, that ‘Sinjar district has
been witnessing airstrikes by the US-led anti-IS international coalition forces, intra-Kurdish
clashes, military confrontations between Iran-backed Iraqi militias and Kurdish armed forces,
the return of the Iraqi army and federal police and, last but not least, intensified Turkish
bombardment of PKK positions.’ 467
Kirkuk Now reported in February 2021, that ‘three more brigades of pro-Shiite Popular
Mobilization Forces PMF have been deployed in Shingal, west of Mosul […] to confront any
sudden offensive by Turkey in Iraq.’ Kirkuk Now reported that in Sinjar five different security
forces are present: ‘the PMF, pro-PKK Shingal Protection Units (YBS), local Police, Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF), and KRG's Yazidkhan Peshmerga.’ 468
In October 2020, Al-Monitor reported that the YBS was ‘targeted by Turkish forces in Iraq for
its connection with the Kurdistan Workers Party [PKK].’ 469 According to Al-Monitor, the YBS,
‘an officially recognized forced by the Iraqi government and registered as part of the Popular
Mobilization Units (PMU)’, continued to be shelled by Turkey. The source explained that ‘YBS
members are Iraqi Yazidis from Sinjar.’ 470 Jamil Mohsen Barakat, a researcher on Yazidi affairs
stated that ‘the actual influence of the PKK within the Yazidi community and on the YBS in
particular needs further analysis’ - the YBS has a religious base while the PPK does not havea religious base. 471

NPR, A Yazidi Survivor’s Struggle Shows The Pain Endures After ISIS Attack, 8 August 2020, url
IRAM, Iraq’s Yazidi Existential Crisis Amidst Sinjar’s Hyper-militarization, 24 March 2021, url
462
Washington Institute (The), Tensions in Sinjar Continue to Threaten Yazidis’ Return, 2 March 2021, url
463
IAI, Iraq’s Yazidis: Among the World’s Most Threatened Minorities, 10 March 2021, url, p. 3
464
IAI, Iraq’s Yazidis: Among the World’s Most Threatened Minorities, 10 March 2021, url, p. 3
465
Al-Monitor, Iraq passes law addressing women survivors of Yazidi genocide, 1 March 2021, url
466
Al-Monitor, Iraq passes law addressing women survivors of Yazidi genocide, 1 March 2021, url
467
IAI, Iraq’s Yazidis: Among the World’s Most Threatened Minorities, 10 March 2021, url, p. 3
468
Kirkuk Now, PMF doubles troops in Shingal to face probable Turkey Offensive, 12 February 2021, url
469
Al-Monitor, Turkey targets Yazidi militia in Iraq over PKK links, 6 October 2020, url
470
Al-Monitor, Turkey targets Yazidi militia in Iraq over PKK links, 6 October 2020, url
471
Al-Monitor, Turkey targets Yazidi militia in Iraq over PKK links, 6 October 2020, url
460
461

55

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

The PKK, making use of a power vacuum, increased its influence along the Iraqi-Syrian
border. Additionally, the PPK’s ‘ideological and organizational ties with local groups, such as
the People Protection Units (YPG) in Syria and Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS) in Iraq, enabled it
to exert security and political influence.’ 472 According to the Carnegie Middle East Center,
since 2010, Al-Faw, an Iraqi-Syrian border crossing, was used as an entry point ‘between
northern and southern Sinjar on the Iraqi side […] and al-Hawl subdistrict’ in Syria. According
to the same source, ‘PKK-affiliated elements used it to secure a safe corridor to Syria for tensof thousands of Yazidis who fled the Islamic State’s onslaught on Sinjar, allowing the refugees
to travel to Duhok.’ This led to a boosted presence of both, the PKK and the YBS near AlFaw. 473
In October 2019, Iraq’s central government and the KRI reached common ground, resulting ina security agreement - the Sinjar agreement 474 - with the aim to expel the PKK from Sinjar
district and surrounding areas. 475 The agreement would allow for ‘a safe return of thousandsof Yazidi refugees’, however the PKK, ‘a number of pro-PKK Yazidi militias’ and the Iraqi
Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) rejected the Sinjar agreement. 476 The Center for IranianStudies in Ankara (IRAM) noted that Sinjar area continued to experience ‘geopoliticalescalations.’ When Yazidi families considered returning, the situation re-escalated and Sinjar
area witnessed the ‘deployment of many Iran-backed groups from the PMU - a move that
undermines the most recent Sinjar Agreement.’ 477 DW wrote in an article published in August
2020, that‘IS fighters are still hiding in the region, Kurdish and Shi'ite militias are fighting there,
and the Turkish military has come into play. In late June [2020], [… Turkey] attacked
militias there with fighter planes. One hundred and fifty families had just then decided
to leave the camps and return to their villages. One day later everything had been
turned to rubble.’ 478
In addition to the complex security and political situation, the Yazidi community is also
geographically scattered and internally divided. Not all Yazidis are in favour of Mir Hazim
Tahsin Beg, who in 2020, became ‘the religious-political leader of the Yazidi community’ thus
undermining his leadership. Yazidis in Sinjar proclaimed another leader. These divisions are‘weakening traditional leadership and the Yazidi community’s social and spiritual ties.’ 479

4.3.2 Treatment of Yazidis in Iraq and in the KRIWith regards to Yazidi’s political representation, DFAT noted that Iraq’s legislative branch of
the government ‘consists of an elected Council of Representatives.’ 480 Out of the total 329
seats, 9 seats were designated to minorities, out of which one seat was designated to theCarnegie Middle East Center, The Making of the Kurdish Frontier: Power, Conflict, and Governance in the Iraqi-Syrian
Borderlands, March 2021, url, p. 1
473
Carnegie Middle East Center, The Making of the Kurdish Frontier: Power, Conflict, and Governance in the Iraqi-Syrian
Borderlands, March 2021, url, pp. 8, 11474
Daily Sabah, Sinjar agreement not implemented yet, KRG PM Barzani says, 10 February 2021, url
475
Kirkuknow, Content of the Baghdad-Erbil Agreement on Shingal, 10 October 2020, url
476
IAI, Iraq’s Yazidis: Among the World’s Most Threatened Minorities, 10 March 2021, url, p. 3
477
IRAM, Iraq’s Yazidi Existential Crisis Amidst Sinjar’s Hyper-militarization, 24 March 2021, url
478
DW, Yazidi children abused by 'IS' urgently need help, 3 August 2020, url
479
IAI, Iraq’s Yazidis: Among the World’s Most Threatened Minorities, 10 March 2021, url, p. 4
480
Australia, DFAT, DFAT Country Information Report Iraq, 17 August 2020, url, p. 17
472

56

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Yazidi community. 481 DFAT further noted, that ‘Yazidi advocates, considering the number of
their community, pressed the Federal Supreme Court in 2018 to hold a ruling, resulting in theSupreme Courts’ decision, that ‘the Yazidi should have additional parliamentary
representation.’ As of 2020 no consensus regarding Yazidis’ parliamentary representation
was reached within the Parliament. 482
In May 2021, the UN investigation team concluded that the crimes committed by ISIL during
its rule against the Yazidi community constituted a genocide, as the UN established that ‘clear
and convincing evidence’ was available to support their finding. 483 In March 2021, Al-Monitor
reported that ‘in total, at least 10,000 Yazidis were killed or abducted by the Islamic State’(IS). 484 The Irish Times and DW stated that 10 000 Yazidis were killed. 485 Moreover,approximately 7 000 Yazidi women and girls were abducted according to DW, Reuters and
The Irish Times. 486 The New York Times mentioned a slightly lower number of abducted
Yazidis as the source wrote that ISIL captured 6 000 women and girls. 487 Reuters and the
New York Times mentioned that 3 000 Yazidis were killed.488 With reference to targeting by
ISIL, The Irish Times summarised that‘nearly 2,000 Yazidi children suffered indoctrination, rape, torture, starvation, andslavery at the hands of the terror group. Boys were forced to serve as child soldiersand girls to “marry” Islamic State fighters. Children were denied schooling andcompelled to abandon their Yazidi faith by adopting Islam.’ 489
Both DW and The Irish Times noted the discovery of ‘more than 70 mass graves.’ 490 In
October 2020, the UN reported that the Iraqi government ‘resumed the exhumations of mass
graves’ in Ninewa Governorate, while the government ‘plans to open all mass graves.’ 491 The
USDOS reported in October 2021 that ‘the number of [Yazidi] people […] [ISIL] killed remains
unknown, and discoveries of mass graves continue.’ 492 In March 2021, IAI claimed that ‘almost
none of the Islamic State perpetrators of the Yazidi genocide have been brought to justice.’ 493
The USDOS reported that Yazidis in the KRI faced discrimination if they did not identify as
Kurdish, as ‘only those Yezidis who identified publicly as Kurdish could obtain senior positionsin the IKR [KRI] leadership.‘ 494 DFAT noted, that ‘a number of religious minority communities[including the Yazidis] have reported cases of discrimination from KRG authorities in territories
Australia, DFAT, DFAT Country Information Report Iraq, 17 August 2020, url, p. 17; ORSAM, Early Parliamentary elections in Iraq
and Nineveh, September 2021, url
482
Australia, DFAT, DFAT Country Information Report Iraq, 17 August 2020, url, p. 17
483
UN, ISIL crimes against Yazidis constitute genocide, UN investigation team finds, 10 May 2021, url
484
Al-Monitor, Iraq passes law addressing women survivors of Yazidi genocide, 1 March 2021, url
485
Irish Times (The), Yazidi children still traumatised by ordeal at hands of Isis, 4 August 2020, url; DW, Yazidi children abused by'IS' urgently need help, 3 August 2020, url
486
DW, Yazidi children abused by 'IS' urgently need help, 3 August 2020, url; Irish Times (The), Yazidi children still traumatised byordeal at hands of Isis, 4 August 2020, url; Reuters, Seven years on, Yazidi survivor buries father slain by Islamic State, 8
February 2021, url
487
New York Times (The), 3 000 Yazidis Are Still Missing. Their Families Know Where Some of Them Are, 3 October 2021,
available by subscription at url
488
Reuters, Seven years on, Yazidi survivor buries father slain by Islamic State, 8 February 2021, url; New York Times (The), 3
000 Yazidis Are Still Missing. Their Families Know Where Some of Them Are, 3 October 2021, available by subscription at url
489
Irish Times (The), Yazidi children still traumatised by ordeal at hands of Isis, 4 August 2020, url
490
Irish Times (The), Yazidi children still traumatised by ordeal at hands of Isis, 4 August 2020, url; DW, Yazidi children abused by'IS' urgently need help, 3 August 2020, url
491
UN News, Government of Iraq Resumes Exhumation Activities; Opens Two New Yazidi Mass Graves from ISIL, 28 October
2020, url
492
USDOS, Statement on Missing Yezidi Women and Children, 18 October 2021, url
493
IAI, Iraq’s Yazidis: Among the World’s Most Threatened Minorities, 10 March 2021, url, p.2
494
USDOS, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Iraq, 12 May 2021, url, p. 13
481

57

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

claimed by both the central government and KRG, particularly in relation to land andproperty disputes.’ 495
The USDOS stated in May 2021 that ‘the Yezidi community in Sinjar District reported […] that
the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) had kidnapped hundreds of Yezidi children with the aim of
recruiting them in the years since ISIS was defeated in Sinjar in 2015 and that 70 children
were still missing.’ 496 According to the USODS, by 2020, ‘authorities in the KRG’s Yezidi
Rescue Coordinating Office reported 2,874 Yezidis, mainly women and children, were still
missing both inside and outside the country, compared with up to 3,000 reported missing in
2019.’ 497 Forbes reported in September 2021 that in total ‘2,763 Yazidi women and children’
remain missing in while it is unclear how many of them are still alive. 498 In Sinjar district, on 9
November 2020 anti-PPK demonstrations by Yazidis who ‘demanded the release of theirkidnapped children’ reportedly took place. 499
Human rights observers cited in DFAT report, noted that the YBS and the People’s Defence
Forces (HPG), militias operating in Sinjar and the KRI, recruited children. 500
UNOCHA pointed out that missing, destroyed and damaged identification documents as well
as a ‘legacy of discriminatory policies’ towards the Yazidi community, often makes it hard for
Yazidis to prove land ownership or to occupy land rights. 501 In 2020, USCIRF reported that‘the Yazidi community continued to face severe challenges to reclaiming its homeland alongwith its religious and ethnic identity.’ 502
In April 2021, the Daily Sabah reported that Yazidis were prevented from returning home to
Sinjar region by the PKK. The source wrote that ‘Yazidi people living in the camps in Duhok
widely believe that the Sinjar district is still not a safe place to return due to the PKK'spresence in the region.’ The same source reported on an incident in which Yazidis who wereabducted by the PKK were later tortured by members of the PKK.’ 503 According to anothersource, Yazidis faced challenges by the PMF upon their return. The Newlines Institute wrotethat ‘even though some […] Yazidis returned after the liberation operations, PMF forcesrefused to give up the farms on the pretext of using them to combat ISIS cells.’ 504

4.3.3 Situation of Yazidi women and children
Amnesty International wrote that ISIL separated married and unmarried women, as well as
girls aged 9 and older and boys aged 12 and older from their mothers. 505 Yazidi women andgirls aged nine years and older, were considered to be ISIL’s property. 506 According to Samar
El-Masri, researcher on ethnic conflict resolution and women’s rights, Yazidi women and girls
Australia, DFAT, DFAT Country information report Iraq, 17 August 2020, url, p. 28
USDOS, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Iraq, 12 May 2021, url
497
USDOS, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Iraq, 12 May 2021, url, p. 13
498
Forbes, The Missing Yazidis Women And Children Must Be Located And Rescued, 25 September 2021, url
499
Daily Sabah, Yazidi families stage anti-PKK protests, demand return of their children in Iraq's Sinjar, 9 November 2020, url
500
Australia, DFAT, DFAT Country Information Report Iraq, 17 August 2020, url, p. 47
501
UNOCHA Iraq, Humanitarian Bulletin, April 2021, available at url, pp. 1-2
502
USCIRF, Iraq Annual Report, 2021, url, p. 75
503
Daily Sabah, PKK presence prevents Yazidis' return to Sinjar: Turkish envoy , 2 April 2021, url
504
Newlines Institute, A Thousand Hezbollah’s, May 2021, url, p. 39
505
AI, Iraq: Legacy of Terror: The Plight of Yezidi Child Survivors of ISIS, 29 July 2020, url, pp. 13-14
506
UN News, Remarks of Under-Secretary-General Pramila Patten at the Free Yezidi Foundation Panel on Genocide andRecovery for the Commemoration of the Sinjar Massacre of 3 August 2014, 3 August 2020, url; UN Commission of Inquiry on
Syria, They came to destroy, 15 June 2016, url, para. 54; AI, Iraq: Legacy of Terror: The Plight of Yezidi Child Survivors of IS, 29
July 2020, url, p. 14
495

496

58

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

were sold as sexual slaves by ISIL. ISIS considered them ‘commodities that were in need ofregulation and oversight.’ El-Masri stated that ‘sexual slavery against Yazidi women and girls
was extreme because it was organized, deeply institutionalised, legalized, and legitimized in
ISIS-controlled territory’. 507
After becoming ISIL’s property, Yazidi women and girls faced different acts of sexual violence,
including rape and torture, they lacked adequate food and were ‘used’ as domestic servants,
while ‘in some rare cases Yezidi women and older girls were forced to marry IS members.’ 508
Many children witnessed violence and abuse against their mothers. Younger boys, aged
seven to twelve, were separated from their mothers and transferred to military camps where
they faced indoctrination by ISIL, beating and torture. Young boys received military training,served as human shields and had to fight at the frontline. 509 Additionally, Amnesty
International noted that Yazidi children under ISIL captivity ‘were also forced to turn theirbacks on their native language, religion, and identity [… and] propaganda videos to which they
were regularly exposed contained specific instructions on how to kill kuffar, or infidels, suchas the Yezidis.’ 510
On 1 March 2021, the Iraqi parliament passed a new law, the ‘Yazidi [Female] Survivors Bill(the Bill)’ with the goal to assist survivors of the Daesh 511 atrocities. 512 Al-Monitor, citing the
Yazidi Nobel laureate Nadia Murad, stated that the Yazidi Survivors Bill was a landmark bill as
it formally recognised the sexual abuse ‘and the trauma of sexual violence’ that Yazidi women
had faced and provided for compensation and rehabilitation for survivors. 513 The Yazidi
Survivors Bill created ‘a new directorate for survivor’s affairs and a civil court’ in Ninewa andoutlined the ‘punishment for people involved in abduction and sexual crimes.’ 514 The UN
observed that‘after the enactment of the Yazidi Female Survivors Law on 1 March, the Council of
Ministers established a General Directorate of Yazidi Survivors Affairs under theFederal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs in May and appointed a Yazidi female
lawyer as Director General […] in accordance with article 11 of the Law, the General
Secretariat of the Council of Ministers, supported by the International Organization for
Migration, initiated the development of by-laws to facilitate its implementation,
including by ensuring that the law prioritizes the needs of survivors.’ 515
For the first time, the bill established a framework for reparations in various forms for ISIL
survivors. 516 With regards to compensation, the bill ‘provides for, among other assistance, amonthly salary, a plot of land or housing unit, support to re-enter school, and access to

El-Masri, S., The Failure of National Prosecution to Bring Justice to Yazidi Victims of Sexual Slavery, 29 April 2021, url
AI, Iraq: Legacy of Terror: The Plight of Yezidi Child Survivors of ISIS, 29 July 2020, url, p. 14
509
AI, Iraq: Legacy of Terror: The Plight of Yezidi Child Survivors of ISIS, 29 July 2020, url, pp. 13-15
510
AI, Iraq: Legacy of Terror: The Plight of Yezidi Child Survivors of ISIS, 29 July 2020, url, p. 32
511
IS/ISIL is also referred to as Daesh. ‘In 2014, Daesh, a terror organization, unleashed genocidal atrocities against religious
minorities: Yazidis, Christians and others.’ Forbes, Iraq Adopts New Law To Assist Survivors Of The Daesh Genocide, 4 March
2021, url; DW, Iraq's Yazidis warn of ongoing threats from extremists, 26 March 2021, url
512
Al Jazeera, We do not accept those children’: Yazidis forbid ISIL offspring, 24 March 2021, url; UN News, New Iraqi law ‘major
step’ in assisting ISIL’s female victims but more must be done, 21 April 2021, url
513
Al-Monitor, Iraq passes law addressing women survivors of Yazidi genocide, 1 March 2021, url
514
Al-Monitor, Iraq passes law addressing women survivors of Yazidi genocide, 1 March 2021, url
515
UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2576 (2021), 3 August 2021, url, para. 63
516
UN News, Iraq: ‘Moral obligation’ to ensure justice for Yazidi and other survivors of ISIL crimes, 30 September 2021, url;
Reuters, Six years on: Yazidi survivors see 'only empty promises' in aftermath of massacre, 4 August 2020, url; Al Jazeera, Iraq’s
reparations law for Yezidi survivors is a positive step, 28 June 2021, Al Jazeera, Iraq’s reparations law for Yezidi survivors is apositive step, 28 June 2021, url
507

508

59

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

psychosocial and other health services.’ 517 While Al Jazeera noted that although the ‘Yazidi(Female) Survivors Law […] formally recognised the Yazidi genocide, […] called forcompensation, rehabilitation, and education […] it does not address the fate of the children
born to ISIL fathers.’ 518 Al-Monitor also mentioned this shortcoming and wrote that the bill was
limited to women and should have included boys and men. 519 According to Al-Monitor,
members of the Yazidi community recognised the importance of the bill, yet they underlined
the continued needs for support and indicated that the bill would not solve all their problems
and the implementation of the law remains a challenge due to lack of public services, security
and infrastructure in Sinjar. 520
Many Yazidis escaped captivity through the help of smugglers by paying ransom to ISIL or asmuggler or the family capturing them, or to all of them. With ransoms paid, this left many
Yazidi families indebted. Although the KRG established a fund to reimburse these families,
reimbursement payments have been delayed or not made at all. 521
According to NPR, within the Yazidi community, societal attitudes and traditions persis; ‘theclosed Yazidi community doesn't accept children fathered by ISIS […] Under Yazidi religious
law, only a child born to two members of the faith can be considered Yazidi.’ A mother, freed
from ISIL in Syria, who returned to the KRI, told NPR that her child was called a daughter of
ISIS and people threatened to kill either her child or both of them. Moreover, despite the factthat Yazidi religious leaders announced that ISIL-abducted survivors are to be respected, inpractice, this was not always the case. A formerly ISIL-captured women explained that upon
return to her family in Iraq, she was insulted by her brother ‘for having been held as aslave.’ 522 Yazidi women who had children with ISIS fighters, were, according to The Guardianin 2020, forced to leave their children behind in Syria upon return to Iraq as‘their communities in Iraq have demanded they leave their children in Syria before
they are accepted home. The forced separations have led to dozens of women being
estranged from their children, some of whom they were told to hand over as soon as
they gave birth. Nearly two years after the collapse of Isis, what to do with the children
born to extremists, and how to reunite families created and broken in suchcircumstances, remains far from being resolved among Yazidi communities and Iraqi
officials.’ 523
DFAT also stated that Yazidi women were forced to leave children behind and noted that ‘theYazidi community frequently forced Yazidi women to give up to orphanages babies andchildren fathered by Da’esh fighters (through rape) […] as a result, such children are withoutparents, identification, clear country of birth or settled nationality.’ 524 The same source
indicated that according to one Yazidi elder, children could even risk being killed if theirmothers brought them back to their community. 525 Approximately 30 children remain inorphanages in northeastern Syria as their mothers either gave them up or were too afraid to
ask about them. 526
Al Jazeera, Iraq’s reparations law for Yezidi survivors is a positive step, 28 June 2021, url
Al Jazeera, We do not accept those children’: Yazidis forbid ISIL offspring, 24 March 2021, url
519
Al-Monitor, Iraq passes law addressing women survivors of Yazidi genocide, 1 March 2021, url
520
Al-Monitor, Iraq passes law addressing women survivors of Yazidi genocide, 1 March 2021, url
521
AI, Legacy of Terror, The Plight of Yezidi Child Survivors of ISIS, 29 July 2020, url, pp. 16-17
522
NPR, A Yazidi Survivor’s Struggle Shows The Pain That Endures After ISIS Attack, 8 August 2020, url
523
Guardian (The), After Isis, Yazidi women forced to leave their children behind, 16 October 2020, url
524
Australia, DFAT, DFAT Country Information Report Iraq, 17 August 2020, url, p. 12525
New York Times (The), ISIS Forced Them Into Sexual Slavery, 12 March 2021, available by subscription at url
526
New York Times (The), ISIS Forced Them Into Sexual Slavery, 12 March 2021, available by subscription at url
517

518

60

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

DW wrote in August 2020 that although some Yazidi children were liberated from ISIL
captivity and sent to their families, they remained traumatised as they have been abused,
tortured, forced into armed combat, humiliated, exploited, indoctrinated, kidnapped, andenslaved by ISIL. 527 Amnesty International outlined that trauma affected both girls and boys.
Boys commonly forcibly became child soldiers; one former child solider reported to Amnesty
International that ‘he was beaten continually with cables and plastic pipes, he was starved
and forced to fight.’528
Children fathered by ISIS fighters and born to Yazidi women who were forced to give themup, are without identification documents. 529 Caregivers of children born in captivity as a resultof sexual violence and rape may face numerous challenges in obtaining documentation.
Children born out of sexual violence were born in IS-controlled areas and therefore ‘lack
officially-recognised civil documents.’ Under Iraqi law, proof of paternity is required forchildren born outside of marriages. However, this often represents a challenge, as according
to UNICEF and UNAMI, ‘for children born of rape and sexual slavery, where proof of paternity
may be impossible, the Iraqi law [as of 2020] does not have any provisions […] which meansthat it can be extremely difficult or even impossible to register them.’ 530
According to outcomes from Amnesty International interviews, civil documentation was notexistent when families were forced to flee, or it got lost when families fled their homes
forcefully, or was absent because children were born in captivity. 531 Caregivers and NGO
workers indicated that obtaining civil documentation can be costly, unsafe (as travel to certain
unsafe areas may be required) and slow, while one female interviewee indicated that she wasscared that ISIL would recognise her or her children, and one male interviewee indicated that
he had spent 3 000 US Dollars 532 to obtain documents for his son. 533
Yazidi mothers often faced challenges in registering their children in the ‘absence of afather.’ 534 Under Iraqi law, children born with unregistered fathers or Muslim fathers, areregistered as Muslim; further hindering the documentation process of these children. Yazidi
tradition only allows Yazidis to marry Yazidis. 535 If they are registered as Muslim children, theywould not qualify to be Yazidi children, which in turn could expel them from the Yazidi
community and further ostracize them from their roots. 536
The lack of civil documentation can result in a lack of access to education and school
attendance, denied freedom of movement, inability to collect government food ration and thedenial of other basic rights. While children without civil documentation are at risk of becoming
stateless. There are several reasons why children might have to either get new
documentation or replace or update existing civil documentation after they were freed from
ISIS. 537 The UN and local and international NGOs are offering services to support the
documentation for Yazidi children. While these services have brought progress, Amnesty
DW, Yazidi children abused by 'IS' urgently need help, 3 August 2020, url
DW, Yazidi children abused by 'IS' urgently need help, 3 August 2020, url
529
Australia, DFAT, DFAT Country Information Report Iraq, 17 August 2020, url, p. 12
530
AI, Iraq: Legacy of Terror: The Plight of Yezidi Child Survivors of ISIS, 29 July 2020k, url, pp. 33-35
531
AI, Iraq: Legacy of Terror: The Plight of Yezidi Child Survivors of ISIS, 29 July 2020, url, pp. 33-35
532
2574,22 EUR according to the European Commission, InforEuro, 1 October 2021, url
533
AI, Iraq: Legacy of Terror: The Plight of Yezidi Child Survivors of ISIS, 29 July 2020, url, pp. 33-35
534
UN News, New Iraqi law ‘major step’ in assisting ISIL’s female victims but more must be done, 21 April 2021, url
535
DW, Who are the Yazidis?, 10 April 2018, url
536
AI, Iraq: Legacy of Terror: The Plight of Yezidi Child Survivors of ISIS, 29 July 2020k, url, pp. 33-35
537
AI, Iraq: Legacy of Terror: The Plight of Yezidi Child Survivors of ISIS, 29 July 2020, url, pp. 33-35
527

528

61

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMInternational still heard of several children without documentation for whom these services
were not reachable or inadequate or they were not aware of their existence at all. 538 For more
information on the situation of children born in territories under ISIL control and who lack civil
documentation, see section 1.3.3 of this report.
According to the UN Protection cluster, lack of access to education and child labour
represented some of the main threats affecting children in Iraq. 539 Amnesty International
indicated that many Yazidi families who had to pay ransoms, on average between 5 000 - 20000 540 USD 541 to release abducted family members, struggle to send their children to school
and afford school-related costs. Many children previously held captive are missing several
years of school. The UN, in cooperation with KRG’s Ministry of Education and the Iraqi
government are working on reintegrating these children into the education system. Whileefforts are in place to provide special programmes, barriers remain, such as access, languageof instruction, bureaucratic hurdles, and transportation costs. Education provided is limited toprimary level schooling. Additionally, former child soldiers often face difficulties attending
school institutions due to experiences with ISIL ‘institutions’, which may have included beating
and other physical and psychological harm. 542
Amnesty International noted that Yazidi former child soldiers, indoctrinated by ISIL, continued
to ‘endure an isolated existence’ even after return to their families as families struggle torecognise or acknowledge their experiences in captivity. 543 The language barrier presented
one major obstacle to successful reintegration of child survivors of ISIL captivity. Children
freed from ISIL’s captivity and who returned to their family often were unable to speak or
understand (Kurmanji) Kurdish, the language spoken by their families, as they spoke Arabic.
Some Yazidi children abducted by foreign families spoke Turkish and English only. An
exception to this situation were children who were only held captive for a short time or
together with family members. According to Amnesty International, neither Amnesty
International nor its interviewees were aware of any governmental or non-governmental
support to deal with freed ISIS children’s language barrier to reintegration. 544

4.4 Palestinians
For information regarding the situation and targeting of Palestinians in Iraq, see the EASO
query on Palestinians in Iraq published on 5 August 2021.

AI, Iraq: Legacy of Terror: The Plight of Yezidi Child Survivors of ISIS, 29 July 2020, url, pp. 33-35
Protection Cluster Iraq, Protection Monitoring System Report 1, February 2021, url, p. 9
540
According to Al Jazeera one woman reported the ransom pay of 20 000 US. Al Jazeera, Sold, whipped and raped: A Yazidi
woman remembers ISIL captivity, 16 October 2020, url
541
4290.37 EUR to 17161.48 EUR according to the European Commission, InforEuro, 1 October 2021, url
542
AI, Legacy of Terror, The Plight of Yezidi Child Survivors of ISIS, 29 July 2020, url, pp. 29-31
543
AI, Legacy of Terror, The Plight of Yezidi Child Survivors of ISIS, 29 July 2020, url, p. 32
544
AI, Legacy of Terror, The Plight of Yezidi Child Survivors of ISIS, 29 July 2020, url, p. 28
538

539

62

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

5. Journalists, media workers and humanrights activists
On several occasions, sources consulted during the drafting of this profile did not make clear
distinction between journalists, media workers and human rights activists. Moreover, many of
the incidents in which journalists, media workers and human rights activists were targeted
were directly linked to protests and political activism. For information related to the targetingof protesters and political activists, please see Chapter 3 of this report.

5.1 General situation of journalists and other media
workers in Iraq and the KRI
The World Press Freedom Index for 2021 by Reporters Without Borders (Rapporteurs sansfrontières, RSF) ranked Iraq 163rd out of 180 countries, which is one point down from 2020 andthe lowest ranking since 2013, when Iraq held 150th place. 545 The Iraqi Constitution of 2005
guarantees ‘freedom of the press, printing, advertisement, media and publication’ if such
‘does not violate public order and morality’ (Art. 38). 546 As noted by RSF, reporting on ‘politicalor religious figures still regarded as untouchable could lead to prosecution or to media bansfor disrespecting “national or religious symbols.”’ 547 For the reporting period between January
2020 and October 2021, the sources noted that both the Government of Iraq and the KRG
used their security forces to restrict broadcasting, shut television and radio channels, andthreaten or target journalists. 548
In 2020, the Press Freedom Advocacy Association in Iraq (PFAAI), as reported by local media,
documented 305 cases of targeting of media workers in the country, including ‘assassination,
arrest, detention, beating, obstruction of coverage, confiscation of photographic equipment,
as well as attacks on or closure of media institutions.’ 549 Most of these incidents reportedly
occurred during protests and demonstrations. 550 According to the number of the cases
documented by PFAAI, the highest number of incidents was registered in Baghdad andKirkuk provinces, with 61 and 58 incidents respectively; in total, the violations were
documented in 17 provinces. 551 In the period between 5 March 2020 and 2 May 2021, the
PFAAI recorded 268 incidents of violence against journalists in 16 governorates, including theKRI, with 77 incidents registered in Baghdad, 36 in Kirkuk, and 29 in Basrah. 552 Despite thedecrease in the number of protests, the PFAAI documented 141 incidents of prevention of

RSF, Iraq, accessed 26 October 2021, url
Constitute, Iraq’s Constitution of 2005, n.d., url
547
RSF, Iraq, accessed 26 October 2021, url
548
HRW, “We Might Call You in at Any Time,” Free Speech Under Threat in Iraq, 15 June 2020, url; USDOS, Iraq 2020 Human
Rights Report, 30 March 2021, url, p. 21; Cornish, C., Iraqi dreams of democracy fade with arrests of journalists, FT, 24 March
2021, url
549
K24, Press freedom groups document over 300 violations in Iraq during 2020, 1 May 2021, url
550
IWPR, Iraq: Radio Stations Fear for Future, 1 May 2021, url
551
Kirkuk Now, 2020 was abysmal for press freedom in Iraq, 1 April 2021, url; K24, Press freedom groups document over 300
violations in Iraq during 2020, 1 May 2021, url
552
PFAAI, Media Observatory Report on the violations against Iraqi Journalists, n.d., url, p. 9
545

546

63

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

coverage, including with the use of physical force, 63 incidents of arbitrary arrests anddetentions, and ten armed attacks; 11 journalists were injured and two received threats. 553
As underlined by RSF, killings of journalists remained frequently unpunished due to a lack ofproper investigation or absence of investigation. 554 In its annual Global Impunity Index, theCommittee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) ranked Iraq as the third highest country as regards
impunity level with 21 unsolved murders of journalists between 1 September 2010 and 31
August 2020. 555

5.1.1 Situation of journalists and media workers in Iraq
The situation of journalists and media workers was reported to have deteriorated since theeruption of anti-government protests in October 2019. 556 In September 2021, the Gulf Centre
for Human Rights (GCHR) 557 reported that many Iraqi journalists feared for their safety
because of ‘an increase in targeted violence’ against journalists ‘during the past two years,’
while the authorities ‘failed to implement measure to support journalists and protect the rights
to freedom of expression both online and offline.’ 558 Besides being subjected to censorship,journalists and media workers risked arbitrary arrests 559 and detention, 560 intimidation andattacks, 561 and abductions. 562 RSF reported that three journalists were killed in 2020 by agunshot to the head by unidentified gunmen while covering the protests. 563 Relatives ofjournalists were reportedly targeted as well. 564
As noted by USDOS in its Human Rights Report for 2020, journalists who covered sensitive
topics, were threatened by various ‘nongovernmental and quasi-governmental actors,
including militias outside of state control, terrorist groups, and criminal organizations.’ 565

5.1.2 Situation of journalists and media workers in the KRI
According to a joint report by UNAMI and UNOHCHR, published in May 2021, journalists andactivists who worked in the KRI, faced threats and arbitrary arrests by the authorities. Most of
the incidents were related to the attempts by the authorities to prevent media coverage of theprotests and were recorded between March and August 2020. 566

PFAAI, Baghdad; The Most Dangerous Area For Journalists, n.d., url; PFAAI, Media Observatory Report on the violations
against Iraqi Journalists, n.d., url, pp. 5-7
554
RSF, Iraq, accessed 26 October 2021, url
555
CPJ, Getting Away with Murder, 28 October 2020, url
556
HRW, “We Might Call You in at Any Time,” Free Speech Under Threat in Iraq, 15 June 2020, url; IWPR, Iraq: Radio Stations
Fear for Future, 1 May 2021, url; RSF, Iraq, accessed 26 October 2021, url
557
The GCHR is a Lebanon-based NGO, which documents the situation of human rights defenders in the Gulf region andneighbouring countries since 2011, see GCHR, webpage, url
558
GCHR, Iraq: GCHR’s 18th Periodic Report on Human Rights Violations in Iraq, 19 September 2021, url.
559
USDOS, Iraq 2020 Human Rights Report, 30 March 2021, url, p. 2
560
Cornish, C., Iraqi dreams of democracy fade with arrests of journalists, FT, 24 March 2021, url
USDOS, Iraq 2020 Human Rights Report, 30 March 2021, url, p. 2
561
USDOS, Iraq 2020 Human Rights Report, 30 March 2021, url, p. 22; RSF, Iraq, accessed 26 October 2021, url
562
RSF, Iraq, n.d., 2021, url; Cornish, C., Iraqi dreams of democracy fade with arrests of journalists, FT, 24 March 2021, url
563
RSF, RSF’s 2020 Round-up: 50 journalists killed, two-thirds in countries “at peace,” updated 29 December 2020, url
564
OMCT, Systematic Targeting of Human Rights Defenders, 26 May 2021, url
565
USDOS, Iraq 2020 Human Rights Report, 30 March 2021, url, p. 24
566
UNAMI and OHCHR, Freedom of Expression in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, May 2021, url, p. 9. The report is based on 361
confidential interviews with ‘journalists, protesters, activists, arrested and detained individuals, family members of activists,
lawyers, civil society organizations, KRG representatives and security officials, and other relevant sources with direct involvement
or knowledge of the issues covered’ in the report; the interviews were conducted between 1 March 2020 and 30 April 2021, see
p. 5.
553

64

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

In August 2020, the offices of the Kurdish Nalia Radio and Television (NRT) were closed downin Erbil and Dohuk, allegedly because the station was covering protests. 567 Both offices werereportedly raided by the Asayish forces, without any court documentation being presented,
and remained closed for over a month. 568 According to a commentary made on 9 September
2020 by Dindar Zebari, KRG coordinator for international advocacy, ‘NRT violated the Article
2 of Law 12 of 2010, which bars encouraging a public disturbance or harming social harmonyin accordance with IKR [KRI] law.’ 569 In July 2021, PUK-affiliated security forces raided theheadquarters of PUK co-president-owned iPlus TV channel in Sulaymaniyah, 570 which, asreported by Al-Monitor, reflected the Talabani family ‘power struggle’ over the leadership in
PUK. 571 iPlus reported on the raid through its Facebook page, mentioning that the raid
involved about 50 armed men, who kept the employees under arrest for about an hour,
injuring some of them. 572
RSF reported that in 2020 a journalist was killed in the KRI, while trying to escape clashes
between protesters and the security forces. 573
As reported by UNAMI and UNOHCHR, several cases of criminal proceedings were initiatedin the KRI from March 2020 to 30 April 2021 against journalists and social media activists,
who either covered the protests or wrote critical opinions about the KRI authorities. 574
According to the same report, ‘basic rights and procedural safeguards’ were either
disrespected or limitedly respected during respective court trials. 575 In the overview for 2021,
RFS noted that journalists were detained ‘on charges of spying or endangering state security’after their confession was ‘extracted under torture or by means of threats.’ 576

5.2 Incidents of targeting journalists in Iraq and the KRI
5.2.1 Incidents of targeting journalists and media workers in Iraq
In January 2020, three journalists were killed while covering protests in Baghdad andBasrah. 577 On 10 January 2020, a correspondent of Dijlah TV, Ahmed Abdul Samad, and acameraman of the same TV station, Safaa Ghali, were shot dead by unknown gunmen when
they were driving in their car in Basrah after finishing reporting of a protest. 578 Four persons
suspected in conducting the attack were reportedly arrested and detained on 13 February
2021. 579 On 20 January 2020, Yusuf Sattar, a photojournalist, was fatally shot in central
Baghdad after the Iraqi security forces used tear gas and live bullets to disperse a protest. 580
USDOS, Iraq 2020 Human Rights Report, 30 March 2021, url, p. 22
HRW, Kurdish Region of Iraq: Media Offices Shut Down, 6 October 2020, url
569
USDOS, Iraq 2020 Human Rights Report, 30 March 2021, url, p. 22
570
RSF, Authorities close RT bureau in Baghdad, new TV station in Sulaymaniyah, 15 July 2021, url
571
Al-Monitor, Talabani family feud at center of power struggle in Iraqi Kurdistan Party, 14 July 2021, url
572
iPlus, Facebook, 13 July 2021, url
573
RSF, RSF’s 2020 Round-up: 50 journalists killed, two-thirds in countries “at peace,” updated 29 December 2020, url
574
UNAMI and OHCHR, Freedom of Expression in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, May 2021, url, p. 10
575
UNAMI and OHCHR, Freedom of Expression in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, May 2021, url, p. 4
576
RFS, Iraq, n.d., url
577
RSF, Iraq: Three journalists killed in January, murder attempt on fourth, 3 February 2020, url
578
CPJ, Gunmen open fire on car, kill 2 Dijlah TV journalists at Iraq protest, 10 January 2020, url; GCHR, Iraq: Prominent journalist
Ahmed Abdul Samad and cameraman Safaa Ghali assassinated, 11 January 2020, url
579
UNAMI, Update on Demonstrations in Iraq: Accountability for Human Rights Violations and Abuses by Unidentified Armed
Elements, May 2021, url, p. 13580
Al Jazeera, ‘Here to stay’, vow Iraqi protesters as deadly violence surges, 20 January 2020, url; ANHRI, Iraq: Iraqi security
forces open fire on journalists… Photojournalist Youssef Sattar shot dead, 22 January 2020, url
567

568

65

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Targeted killings of journalists and media workers and assassination attempts were reported
in 2020 and 2021. On 29 January 2020, Mohammed Hussein al-Quraishy, a professor ofjournalism at Al-Mustansiriyah University and a member of the Iraqi Journalists Syndicate, wasfatally shot by unknown gunmen in Bagdad’s Banook neighbourhood. 581 On 11 February 2020,
Nizar Thanoun, a journalist and chief executive officer of Al-Rasheed Satellite TV, was shotdead by unknown men on a motorcycle in front of his home on Al-Jamaa neighbourhood ofwestern Baghdad. 582 On 6 July 2020, Hisham Al-Hashimi, a security analyst and researcher
on armed groups in Iraq, who frequently appeared on Iraqi television, was shot dead near hishome in the Zeyouneh area in Baghdad. 583 According to an Iraqi official, the person who killed
Al-Hashimi was ‘a police first lieutenant who occasionally worked for the Hashd al-Shaabi
paramilitary’s 47th Brigade’ and was a Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) member. 584 On 10 May 2021,
Ahmed Hassan, a reporter of Al-Forat TV was critically injured after being shot twice in frontof his home in Al-Diwaniya city. 585
Journalists and bloggers were reported to have been threatened and slandered via the use ofsocial networks; in some cases, the threats were followed by attacks. 586 As reported by
USDOS, a reporter for Al-Sumaria satellite TV, Istiaq Adel, said she survived an attack after
receiving several threatening text messages. 587
On 4 September 2021, Ali Fadel, who has worked as a journalist for 20 years andcollaborated with various local and foreign agencies, reported that his home in Shafta village
in the Baqubah district in Diyala Governorate was targeted by a sound bomb, placed byunidentified gunmen in front of the house. 588 According to PFAAI, a probable reason for theattack was Fadel’s reports in which he criticised the situation and the local government inDiyala. 589 GCHR reported that Fadel was using ‘his Facebook page to post his personal
opinions and comment on public issues that concern citizens.’ 590
Journalists were reported to have frequently faced abductions. 591 On 19 February 2020,
journalist Raed Salam Dahham was reportedly abducted by unidentified armed men. 592 On 9
March 2020, journalist Tawfiq Al-Tamimi who worked for Al-Sabah, a newspaper issued by
the Public Authority for Information and Communication was reportedly abducted byunknown armed men, who intercepted his car after he left his home in Ur neighborhoud in
Baghdad. 593 On 2 May 2021, journalist, poet, and civil society activist, Abbas Al-Rafi’i, whocovered protests, was abducted by ‘unidentified armed elements’ in Karbala and released on
6 May 2021. 594 On 9 July 2021, freelance reporter and activist Ali Al-Mikdam was abducted
after accepting an invitation to meet someone at a coffee shop in Karrada district, downtown
Baghdad. The next evening, Al-Mikdam was found injured in Dora district in southern
Iraq News Gazette, Baghdad journalism professor shot dead by unknown gunmen, 29 January 2020, url
CPJ, Al-Rasheed TV CEO Nizar Thanoun shot and killed in Baghdad, 12 February 2020, url
583
Al Jazeera, Iraq armed groups expert Hisham al-Hashemi shot dead in Baghdad, 6 July 2020, url
584
MEE, Hisham al-Hashimi: Iraq’s PM says analyst’s killers arrested, 16 July 2021, url
585
CPJ, Iraqi journalist Ahmed Hassan shot, critically wounded, 10 May 2021, url
586
OMCT, Systematic Targeting of Human Rights Defenders, 26 May 2021, url
587
USDOS, Iraq 2020 Human Rights Report, 30 March 2021, url, p. 22
588
GCHR, Iraq: GCHR’s 18th Periodic Report on Human Rights Violations in Iraq, 14 September 2021, url
589
PFAAI, Diyala Journalist Targeted by Sound Bomb, 4 September 2021, url
590
GCHR, Iraq: GCHR’s 18th Periodic Report on Human Rights Violations in Iraq, 14 September 2021, url
591
MEE, Iraq: Journalist Ali Abdel Zahra recounts abduction days before elections, 13 October 2021, url
592
GCHR, Iraq: Sixth periodic report on violations during popular demonstrations, 3 July 2020, url
593
GCHR, Iraq: Fifth periodic report on violations during popular demonstrations, 15 May 2020, url; GCHR, Iraq: Sixth periodic
report on violations during popular demonstrations, 3 July 2020, url
594
UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders, Iraq: Killing and kidnapping of Human Rights Defenders engaged in
popular protest (joint communication), 11 October 2021, url
581

582

66

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Baghdad. 595 In October 2021, journalist Ali Abdel Zahra was abducted in Sadr City district in
Baghdad and was reportedly interrogated for two days about ‘his work on the elections andwhy, as a journalist, he seemed to “target certain candidates”’. Allegedly, he was also
accused of ‘working against the country.’ 596
As reported by USDOS in its report covering 2020, ‘militias and government officials usedarrest warrants in defamation cases to intimidate, silence, and in some instances apparently“flush out” activists and journalists from hiding.’ 597 Under the Iraqi legislation, defamation canbe punishable by imprisonment and/or financial compensation. 598 In October 2020, a
defamation complaint by Harakat Al-Nujaba, an Iran-backed militia, against Suadad al-Salihi, aMiddle East Eye (MEE) correspondent who reported on their activities, led to an arrest warrant
against the journalist issued by Baghdad’s Karrada Investigative Court. 599 In March 2021, on
the charges of defamation of public authorities 600, the Supreme Judicial Council in Baghdad
issued an arrest warrant for political analyst, lawyer, and journalist Ibrahim al-Sumaidaie 601 andpolitical analyst Yahya al-Kubaisi. 602

5.2.2 Incidents of targeting of journalists and media workers in the KRI
RSF reported that a journalist was killed in the KRI, while trying to escape clashes between
protesters and the security forces. 603
Reporting on the situation in the KRI, UNAMI and UNOHCHR reported on ‘a pattern’, in whichjournalists, human rights defenders, and other civil society activists were arrested by the KRG
following their publications or online posts as well as after attending or covering protests. 604
As noted by Amnesty International (AI), a wave of arrests of ‘tens of protesters, activists,
journalists, and individuals who may have been bystanders during a protest’, took place inJanuary 2020 in Duhok Governorate. Thus, a journalist and two online activists were arrestedby the Asayish in the area of Baadre in Duhok Governorate, while they allegedly were
heading to join a demonstration. 605 Journalists who were covering the protests, were arrested
in the towns of Zakho, Duhok, 606 Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, and Baziyan. 607 For instance, on 19
August 2020, a reporter was arbitrarily arrested while covering a truck drivers’ protest at aborder crossing point in Duhok. Reportedly, he was detained by the KRI security forces for tendays ‘without being brought before an investigating judge’ while he was also refusedcommunication with his lawyer and family, before being released on 30 August 2020. 608
In August 2020, the journalist Omed Baroshki was arrested after criticising the KRI authorities
on social media 609 and sentenced to one year in prison in June 2021. 610 In September 2021,
CPJ, Iraqi freelance journalist Ali al-Mikdam abducted, found beaten, 13 July 2021, url
MEE, Iraq: Journalist Ali Abdel Zahra recounts abduction days before elections, 13 October 2021, url
597
USDOS, Iraq 2020 Human Rights Report, 30 March 2021, url, p. 24
598
Rudaw, Media coalition demands Iraq retract arrest warrant of journalist Suadad al-Salhy, 26 October 2020, url
599
USDOS, Iraq 2020 Human Rights Report, 30 March 2021, url, p. 24
600
Cornish, C., Iraqi dreams of democracy fade with arrests of journalists, FT, 24 March 2021, url
601
Shafaq News, The Political Analyst Ibrahim Al-Sumaidaie to be released on Monday, 30 March 2021, url
602
CNN, Arrest warrants for two Iraqi government critics spark outrage, 22 March 2021, url
603
RSF, RSF’s 2020 Round-up: 50 journalists killed, two-thirds in countries “at peace,” 29 December 2020, url
604
UNAMI and OHCHR, Freedom of Expression in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, May 2021, url, p. 9605
AI, Iraq/Kurdistan Region-Iraq: Journalists must be released immediately, 26 February 2021, url, p. 2
606
USDOS, Iraq 2020 Human Rights Report, 30 March 2021, url, p. 9
607
Kirkuk Now, 2020 was abysmal for press freedom in Iraq, 1 April 2021, url
608
UNAMI and UN OHCHR, Freedom of Expression in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, May 2021, url, p. 9
609
RSF, Three jailed reporters charged with “undermining national security”, 16 February 2021, url
610
CPJ, Iraqi Kurdish Court Extends Journalist Omed Baroshky’s Prison Sentence by 1 Year, 23 September 2021, url
595

596

67

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Baroshki was ‘found guilty on two counts of defamation, one for comments about Duhok’s
provincial government and the other about the Duhok Police’, for which he was additionallysentenced to six months in prison on each charge. 611
On 22 September 2020, the journalist Bahroz Jaafar was detained for defamation charges in
Sulaymaniyah, after writing an editorial in which he criticized Iraq’s President Bahram Saleh. 612
In October 2020, the Asayish arrested Sherwan Ameen Sherwani, a freelancer journalist, in
Erbil and Kohidar Mohammed Zebari, a journalist working for Wllat News in KRI, 613 in Akre.
After being transferred to a prison in Erbil, both journalists, according to their lawyers, were
allegedly subjected to acts of ill-treatment and intimidation and were denied access to theirlawyers during the interrogations. 614 In February 2021, the Erbil Criminal Court, in a joint trial,
found Sherwani, Zebari and the journalist and activist Ayaz Karam Bruji, as well as two otheractivists, guilty of ‘undermining national security’, and sentenced them in a joint trial to six
years in prison. 615
In January 2021, a reporter of Roj News, Qahraman Shukri, was arrested after criticising the
KRI authorities in social media posts and ‘sentenced to seven years in prison in June without
any specific charge being brought against him.’ 616 In June 2021, a court in Halabja city
sentenced journalist and civil society activist Naseh Abdulrahim Rashid to six months in prisonon the charges of ‘the misuse of social media and in accordance with Article (182) of the Codeof Criminal Procedure’; as reported by GCHR, Rashid was writing on matters of corruption in
the healcare sector in Halabja Governorate. 617

5.3 General situation of human rights activists in Iraq and
the KRI
Based on information by government officials, representatives of NGOs, and media reports,
USDOS noted that both the Iraqi central government and the KRG were arresting activists
who expressed their critique of the authorities. 618 In December 2020, eight human rights
organisations, including AI, FIDH, GCHR, and HRW, signed a petition, in which they called on
the Iraqi authorities to investigate cases of detention, forcible disappearance, and killing ‘ofdozens of Iraqi activists, journalists, lawyers, and other civil society members,’ which took
place after October 2019, as well as to release the individuals arbitrary detained and ‘to bringto justice all those responsible for these acts.’ 619

5.3.1 The situation of human rights activists in Iraq
Human rights defenders were reported to have been targeted with assassination attempts,
attacks, abductions, and arbitrary arrests and detentions. 620 According to the World
Organisation Against Torture (OMCT), the targeting of human rights defenders in Iraq was
NRT, Imprisoned Journalist Omed Baroshki Sentenced to Additional Year in Prison, 23 September 2021, url
RSF, Iraqi Kurdish journalist jailed for defaming Iraq’s president, 25 September 2020, url
613
Cornish, C., Iraqi dreams of democracy fade with arrests of journalists, FT, 24 March 2021, url
614
OMCT, Iraq: Sentencing of journalists Sherwan Sherwani, Ayaz Karam Bruji and Kohdar Mohammed Amin Zebari, 26 February
2021, url
615
RSF, Three jailed reporters charged with “undermining national security”, 16 February 2021, url
616
RSF, Call for release of five journalists held in Iraqi Kurdistan, 29 September 2021, 1 October 2021, url
617
GCHR, General: Iraqi Kurdistan: GCHR’s periodic report on human rights violations in the Kurdistan Region, 23 August 2021, url
618
USDOS, Iraq 2020 Human Rights Report, 30 March 2021, url, p. 21
619
HRW, Iraq: End Impunity for Murders, Release All Kidnapped and Detained Peaceful Activists, 9 December 2021, url
620
FIDH, Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan: Systematic targeting of human rights defenders, 26 May 2021, url
611

612

68

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

related to protests that started across Iraq in October 2019 and involved incidents of attacks,
killings, assaults, and threats by unidentified armed groups. 621 As noted by UNAMI and
UNOHCHR in the report for October 2019 – April 2020, the targeting of protestors andpolitical, civil, and/or human rights activists, comprising the incidents of targeted killings,
abductions, and enforced disappearances, increased in October and November 2019. 622 The
report further noted on a ‘pattern’ between killings by unidentified armed actors and aperson’s belonging to one of the abovementioned profiles. 623
In the period between 1 October 2019 and 21 March 2020, UNAMI reported on receiving 154‘allegations of missing protestors and human rights activists who were presumed to havebeen abducted or detained,’. Among these, it verified 99 incidents in which 123 missing
persons were involved. UNAMI was able to confirm the whereabouts of 98 persons out of
123: ‘at least 28 individuals’ were reportedly abducted by militias, 33 were detained by the
Iraqi Security Forces, and 37 persons did not provide UNAMI with details ‘mainly due tosecurity concerns, including the risk of reprisal.’ 624 In the update of the report and for theperiod between October 2019 and May 2021, UNAMI reported on having documented‘premeditated killings and abductions targeting prominent protestors, activists, and otherpersons’ , including ’48 incidents of attempted or completed targeted killings,’ which largely
consisted of attacks by unidentified gunmen and caused 32 deaths. 625
According to ‘a legal advisor at an Iraqi human rights NGO,’ interviewed by USDOS, at least
75 human rights and political activists were abducted from protest squares and ‘held byunknown parties presumed to be Iranian-backed militias’ in 2020. 626 In its report for 2020, AI
noted that at least 30 activists were killed by unidentified gunmen and PMU members in
Baghdad, Nasiriyah, and Basrah while more than 30 others were injured. 627 As reported by Ali
Al-Bayati, a member of the Iraqi High Commission of Human Rights, quoted by Rudaw in July
2021, there were 81 attempted killings of activists since the start of the anti-government
protests in October 2019; 34 activists were killed. 628
In July 2021, Amwaj Media quoted a Germany-based Iraqi activist who stated that the threats
Iraqi activists were receiving were ‘continuous and announced publicly through media
channels on Telegram or through various other social media platforms,’ with the names ofactivists being ‘explicitly mentioned.’ 629

5.3.2 The situation of human rights activists in the KRI
In the KRI, the targeting of civil society activists has been reported to intensify since August2020. 630 As noted by AI in June 2021, the ‘crackdown’ on activists, as well as journalists andprotesters, in the KRI included arbitrary arrests, lack of fair trial, and ill-treatment in
OMCT, Iraq: Systematic targeting of human rights defenders, 21 May 2021, url
UNAMI and OHCHR, Human Rights Violations and Abuses in the Context of Demonstrations in Iraq, October 2019 to April
2020, August 2020, url, p . 13
623
UNAMI and OHCHR, Human Rights Violations and Abuses in the Context of Demonstrations in Iraq, October 2019 to April
2020, August 2020, url, p . 33
624
UNAMI, Human Rights Special Report – Demonstrations in Iraq: 3rd update, Abductions, torture and enforced disappearancesin the context of ongoing demonstrations in Iraq, 23 May 2020, url, p. 2
625
UNAMI, Update on Demonstrations in Iraq: Accountability for Human Rights Violations and Abuses by Unidentified Armed
Elements, May 2021, url, p. 8
626
USDOS, Iraq 2020 Human Rights Report, 30 March 2021, url, p. 15
627
AI, Amnesty International Report 2020/21, url, p. 197
628
Rudaw, One year since Hashimi assassination, impunity remains rife in Iraq, 6 July 2021, url
629
Amwaj Media, Activists launch campaign to ‘end impunity in Iraq,’ 17 July 2021, url
630
HRW, Iraq: End Impunity for Murders, Release All Kidnapped and Detained Peaceful Activists, 9 December 2020, url
621

622

69

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

detention. 631 As reported by Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor in October 2021, 55 out of 81
activists arrested by the KRI authorities in the period between August and October 2020
remained in detention, with only five activists being brought to trial. As noted by the source,
most activists were arrested under the charges of ‘undermining the security and stability of
the region, which is punishable by life imprisonment under Article 1 of Law No. 21 of 2003.’ 632

5.4 Incidents of targeting human rights activists in Iraq
and the KRI
5.4.1 Incidents of targeting human rights activists in Iraq
Human rights defenders/activists who were taking part in the protests were targeted byunidentified armed actors. 633 On 10 March 2020, Abdulqudus Qasim, a human rights defenderand a theatre and television producer and actor, and Karar Adel, a human rights lawyer at the
Maysan Federal Appeal Court, were fatally shot by masked gunmen who stopped their car in
the centre of Al-Amarah city. 634 On 5 April 2020, a woman human rights defender, Anwar
Jassem Mhawwas, known as ‘Umm Abbas‘ and described as ‘one of the most prominent field
activists and organizers of the Thi Qar Governorate demonstrations’ who worked to provide
protestors with food, was killed by unknown gunmen; two of her sons were reported to havebeen injured. 635 On 9 May 2020, a human rights defender, Azhar Al-Shammari, whoparticipated in the protests at Al-Habboubi Square in Nasiriyah since their start, was targetedby inidentified gunmen near his house in the Sumer neighborhood of the city and died in a
hospital the next day. 636 On 17 August 2020, several unidentified men in a car shot andinjured human rights defender Lodya Remon Albarty when she was leaving her home in
Basrah; two colleagues of Albarty, who were waiting for her in her car, were also targeted. As
reported by Frontline Defenders, no security measures were implemented to prevent futureattacks against the human rights defender; at the same time, she reportedly became targetedwith a defamation campaign on social media.637
On 10 March 2021, Jaseb Hattab Al-Heliji—a father of Ali Jaseb Hattab Al-Heliji, a humanrights lawyer who was abducted in Amarah city in October 2019 by the PMU members— 638
was fatally shot dead in Amarah. In a video, which he reportedly had shared on social media,
Jaseb Hattab Al-Heliji claimed that the Ansar Allah Al-Awfiya militia was behind the abductionof his son. 639 On 15 April 2021, a civil society activist Hassan Ashour was killed in front of hishome in Thi Qar Governorate, after reportedly receiving threats by armed groups. 640 On 8
May 2021, Ihab Jawad Al-Wazni, a human rights defender and the head of the Karbala

AI, Kurdistan Region of Iraq: Arbitrary arrests and enforced disappearance of activists and journalists, 15 June 2021, url
Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor, Iraqi Kurdistan’s authorities must release Badinan detainees, 31 October 2021, url
633
GCHR, Iraq: Fifth periodic report on violations during popular demonstrations, 15 May 2020, url; Civicus, Popular Protests:
Demonstrators, Journalists and Human Rights Defenders Killed, Attacked & Silenced, 7 August 2020, url
634
Civicus, Popular Protests: Demonstrators, Journalists and Human Rights Defenders Killed, Attacked & Silenced, 7 August
2020, url
635
WHRDMENA, Alert: WHRD Anwar Jassem Mhawwas assassinated in Iraq, 6 April 2020, url
636
GCHR, Iraq: Fifth periodic report on violations during popular demonstrations, 15 May 2020, url
637
Front Line Defenders, Iraq: Assassination attempt against woman human rights defender Lodya Remon Albarty, 19 August
2020, url
638
AI, Amnesty International Report 2020/21, url, p. 197
639
MENA Rights Group, Human rights lawyer Ali Jaseb Hattab Al Heliji disappeared since arrest in Amarah on October 8, 2019,
updated 22 April 2021, url
640
OMCT, Iraq: Systematic targeting of human rights defenders, 21 May 2021, url
631

632

70

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Coordination for the Civil Movement 641 and an anti-corruption campaigner, 642 was fatally shotby unknown gunmen on a motorbike in front of his home in the centre of Karbala. 643
Previously, in December 2019, Al-Wazni was seriously injured, when two gunmen attacked
him and his colleague Fahim Al-Tai, who was fatally shot in that incident. 644
On 28 August 2021, Hamdiya Al-Saadi, a civil society activist was targeted with a soundbomb, placed in front of her house in Sumer neighbourhood in the centre of Nasiriyah, thecapital of Thi Qar Governorate, by unknown persons. 645
Human rights defenders and activists were reported to have been abducted by armed groups
from the city streets, protest squares, and their homes. 646 For instance, in May 2020, several
civil society activists, including a woman, were reportedly kidnapped in Al-Hillah city, thecapital of Babel Governorate, in the proximity to the protest square. 647 On 1 April 2021, a civilsociety activist Haider Al-Khashan was abducted in front of his home in Samawah city 648, thecapital of Al-Muthanna Governorate, by four masked people in a car649 and released several
hours later. He was also reported to have received death threats by unknown persons. 650
On 25 July 2021, in Basrah, Ali Karim, the 26-year-old son of human rights activist Fatima AlBahadly, was found fatally shot after he was abducted by unidentified actors a day before. As
reported by the media sources, based on AFP reporting, Fatima Al-Bahady was a founder ofthe Al-Firdaws Society, which ‘focuses on the protection and education of women andcampaigns against the recruitment of young people into armed groups’ and reportedly was atarget of threats and pressure before. 651
Due to their involvement in the protests, human rights defenders and civil society activists
were reported to have faced arrests. 652 In April 2020, human rights defender Ayham AlNuaimi was arrested in Al-Muthanna Governorate; as reported by GCHR, he had also received
death threats from a militia. 653 The same month, human rights defender Mortada Naim wasarrested by the National Security Agency in Al-Diwaniyah city. Both were reportedly releasedon bail. 654 As was the case with journalists, human rights defenders and activists were also
reported to have been tried on charges of defamation. 655 For example, on 25 April 2021,
Hassan Maharj Al-Toufan, a human rights lawyer, was sentenced by the Babylon Governorate
Criminal Court to two years in prison on charges of ‘insulting the states and the courts.’ 656

GCHR, Iraq: GCJR’s 14th periodic report on human rights violations during popular protests, 9 May 2021, urlFrance24, Iraqi reporter shot a day after activist’s killing sparks protests, 10 May 2021, url
643
GCHR, Iraq: GCJR’s 14th periodic report on human rights violations during popular protests, 9 May 2021, url; OMCT, Iraq:
Systematic targeting of human rights defenders, 21 May 2021, url
644
GCHR, Iraq: Photojournalists and civil society activists among victims in targeted attacks by militants, 13 December 2019, url
645
GCHR, Iraq: GCHR’s 18th Periodic Report on Human Rights Violations in Iraq, 14 September 2021, url
646
GCHR, Iraq: Fifth periodic report on violations during popular demonstrations, 15 May 2020, url
647
FIDH, Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan: Systematic targeting of human rights defenders, 26 May 2021, url
648
FIDH, Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan: Systematic targeting of human rights defenders, 26 May 2021, url
649
Rudaw, Calls for protests in southern Iraqi city of Samawah after activist kidnap, 1 April 2021, url
650
FIDH, Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan: Systematic targeting of human rights defenders, 26 May 2021, url
651
MEE, Iraq: Son of prominent women’s rights activist found dead near Basra, 25 July 2021, url; Al-Arabiya News, Iraqi activist’s
son found shot dead in Basra, url
652
Civicus, Popular Protests: Demonstrators, Journalists and Human Rights Defenders Killed, Attacked & Silenced, 7 August
2020, url
653
GCHR, Iraq: Fifth periodic report on violations during popular demonstrations, 15 May 2020, url
654
GCHR, Iraq: Fifth periodic report on violations during popular demonstrations, 15 May 2020, url
655
HRW, “We Might Call You in at Any Time,” Free Speech Under Threat in Iraq, 15 June 2020, url; OHCHR, Freedom of
expression increasingly curtailed in Kurdistan Region of Iraq – UN report, 12 May 2021, url
656
FIDH, Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan: Systematic targeting of human rights defenders, 26 May 2021, url
641

642

71

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

5.4.2 Instances of targeting human rights defenders in the KRI
Like journalists, human rights defenders were reported to have faced arrests by the KRI
authorities. 657 In the period between 24 March and 28 April 2020, an Erbil-based humanrights defender Hemin Mamand, who, as reported by Front Line Defenders, worked with
‘Azhan newspaper and Mewda press, focusing on the issue of corruption in the Kurdish
government,’ was arrested and detained at Erbil Central Prison several times. According to
Front Line Defenders, the arrests of Mamand likely took place in the wake of a post on social
media, in which he ‘criticised the economic measures taken by the Kurdish government inresponse to the COVID-19 outbreak as violating the economic rights of the Kurdish people.’ 658
In February 2021, the court in Erbil sentenced activists Shivan Saed Omar Brushki andHarwian Issa Ahmed, who were frequently criticising the authorities, to six years in prison in ajoint trial with Sherwan Ameen Sherwani and two other journalists. 659

UNAMI and OHCHR, Freedom of Expression in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, May 2021, url, p. 9
Front Line Defenders, Arbitrary Detention of Human Rights Defender Hemin Mamand, 28 April 2020, url
659
HRW, Kurdish Region of Iraq: Flawed Trial of Journalists, Activists, 22 April 2021, url
657

658

72

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

6. Individuals perceived to transgress moral
codes
6.1 Perception and treatment of individuals perceived as
westernised in the Iraqi society
A specific definition for what constitutes westernisation in the context of Iraq could not befound in the limits of the research conducted for this chapter. The information available in
English on this topic was limited.
A Middle East researcher, who has significant experience researching legal issues and humanrights in Iraq, including field work, was consulted in order to understand what can constitutewesternised behaviour in Iraq and this chapter was structured also based on the informationthat was provided. According to the expert, the concept of westernization in Iraq can be
described as an umbrella term. Groups that can be perceived as transgressing moral codes
and that therefore may be perceived as westernised in Iraq include:- members of the LGBTIQ community;- atheists;- individuals perceived as ‘amoral’; 660- individuals running liquor shops. 661
As regards members of the LGBTIQ community, USDOD stated that Iraq’s Penal Code‘criminalizes consensual same-sex conduct if those engaging in the conduct are younger thanage 18, while it does not criminalize any same-sex activities among adults.’ 662 Human Rights
Watch noted that, according to Article 394 of Iraq’s penal code, it is illegal to engage in extramarital sex, which heavily affects individuals of the LGBTIQ community. 663 Article 401 of Iraq’s
Penal Code, states ‘Any person who commits an immodest act in public is punishable by aperiod of detention not exceeding 6 months plus a fine not exceeding 50 dinars or by one ofthose penalties.’ 664, which according to Human Rights Watch can be used to target sexual andgender minorities. 665 On 15 February 2021, Omar Gulpi, member of the Kurdistan Parliament,
filed a lawsuit against Rasan Organization, a non-profit advocating for LGBT+ rights in theregion of Kurdistan, claiming that homosexuality is a ‘“violation” of public rights and morals’. 666
On 1 April 2021, Kurdish security forces in Sulaymaniyah arrested several members of the
LGBTIQ community. The purpose of that operation was, according to the operation’s
supervisor to ‘arrest people they suspected of being LGBTQ+ and for immorality.’ 667
According to the Middle East expert interviewed, members of the LGBTIQ community, or
individuals perceived as such, are mostly harassed online. For instance, there have been

Middle East Researcher, video-chat Interview with EUAA, 3 November 2021
Al Monitor, Armed groups target liquor shops in Iraq, 15 December 2020, url
662
USDOS, Iraq 2020 Human Rights Report, 30 March 2021, url, p. 53
663
It also significantly impacts women, since pregnancy can be considered evidence of violation of the above article. Source:
USDOS, Iraq 2020 Human Rights Report, 30 March 2021, url, p. 53
664
Iraq, Iraqi Penal Code (Law No. 111 of 1969), 1969, url, p. 73
665
HRW, World Report 2021, Iraq, 13 January 2021, url, p. 350
666
Rudaw, LGBT+ activists slam ‘immoral’ lawsuit against Sulaimani organization, 22 February 2021, url
667
MEE, Iraq: Arrests among LGBTQ+ community in Kurdish city sparks fierce debate, 7 April 2021, url
660
661

73

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

attempts of using gay dating websites to try and trap members of this community. Although
there have been cases where individuals perceived as members of the LGBTIQ community
have been harassed physically, mostly harassment and targeting took place online. 668 For
more information on the Situation of LGBTIQ persons in Iraq, see EASO COI Query Response- Iraq - Situation of LGBT.
Another category that can fall under the westernized profile are individuals who areperceived as ‘amoral’, i.e., the general perception that an individual is leading an ‘amoral’
lifestyle in the way they behave. This perception is mainly based on the individual’s presence
on social media. Examples of this include perceived provocative clothing, showing sexuality,
flirting with men, being unmarried and flirting, engaging in sexual acts before marriage. 669
According to Freedom House, ‘both men and women face pressure to conform toconservative standards on personal appearance’. 670
Based on this perception, women involved in the public life can also be targeted and can facebacklash and harassment. 671 Individuals perceived as leading an ‘amoral’ lifestyle and women
involved in the public sphere face harassment, particularly online through social media.
Online harassment can be aggressive, and according to the expert interviewed, womenactivists are harassed to a much higher degree and their photos and addresses could beshared online alongside messages calling for their rape or assassination. 672
Reuters noted in 2021 that, for female politicians, ‘elections can be an excruciating
experience’. One of the female candidates who participated in the 2021 elections reported
being targeted and harassed: many of her banners were destroyed or disappeared. 673
Similarly, International Crisis Group noted that, in early 2020 during the Tishreen protests,
campaigns painting female activists as promiscuous were discouraging families from allowing
their daughters to join the protests. A female arts student at the Diwaniya encampment
reported that she had to be escorted by her mother daily in order to prevent rumours being
spread about her. The source further reported that parties against the protests ran campaigns
on social media claiming that activists were committing ‘immoral acts’ such as drug abuse,homosexual acts or premarital sex. 674
The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy reported in 2021 that women’s character andmorality were being targeted on social media through the distortion of hashtags. For instance,
militia affiliates distorted the hashtag #‫( ﺑﻨﺎﺗﻚ_ﯾﺎ_وطﻦ‬which translates to ‘the homeland’sdaughters’) to #‫( ﻋﺎھﺮاﺗﻚ_ﯾﺎ_وطﻦ‬which translates to ‘the homeland’s whores’). They also createdonline accusations of promiscuity during protests and at tents. The source stressed that‘sexual defamation has dangerous consequences, especially for women and girls who are at
risk of “honor killings.”’ 675
In November 2020, Iraq’s parliament finished the second reading of a new draft bill against
cyber-crime. 676 This bill’s aim was to promote ‘public order and morals’. According to the US
Middle East Researcher, video-chat Interview with EUAA, 3 November 2021
Middle East Researcher, video-chat Interview with EUAA, 3 November 2021
670
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2021, 3 March 2021, url
671
Middle East Researcher, video-chat Interview with EUAA, 3 November 2021
672
Middle East Researcher, video-chat Interview with EUAA, 3 November 2021
673
Reuters, Braving intimidation, hundreds of Iraqi women run for parliament, 16 September 2021, url
674International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Tishreen Uprising: From Barricades to Ballot Box, 26 July 2021, url, pp. 9 - 10
675
TIMEP, Hate Speech, Social Media and Political Violence in Iraq: Virtual Civil Society and Upheaval, 2 November 2021, url
676
MENA Rights Group, Iraq’s new draft Law on Combating Cybercrimes still contains problematic provisions restricting
fundamental freedoms, 1 December 2020, url
668

669

74

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Library of Congress, it included provisions to punish any individual who used a computer or
any information system to create, manage or assist the creation of a website that promotes or
encourages immorality, or programs, information, images, or videos perceived to not respectpublic decency and morals. 677 Human Rights Watch reported in May 2021 that, in February
2021, Iraq’s Parliament stated that they would stop promoting this bill and would amend it, inorder to ensure that the bill promoted and not limited freedom of speech. 678
According to the expert interviewed, atheists can fall under the profile of individuals
perceived to transgress moral codes in Iraq, and this stems from the broader concept that if
an individual is not leading what is perceived as a ‘good’ Muslim lifestyle, they can be
exposed to harassment or threats. 679 For more information on the treatment of atheists, see
Chapter 10: Atheists, converts and individuals considered to have committed apostasy.
Freedom House reported that restaurants serving alcohol and liquor stores have faced
harassment and attacks, further limiting religious freedom in the country. 680 ACLED noted in
2021 that the issue of alcohol sales in Iraq was framed in terms of morality and religion. 681 In
2016, the Parliament in Iraq voted a ban for the sale, import and production of alcohol, withthe supporters of this ban claiming that alcohol’s availability ‘contradicts Islam’. 682 Different
sources reported incidents of systematic targeting of places such as liquor stores and a
massage parlour 683 in an attempt to restrict personal freedoms in Iraq. 684 According to
ACLED, since late 2020, Kataib Hezbollah (KH) – an Iran-backed militia – started ‘patrolling
Islamic morality’. 685 According to Al-Monitor, seven attacks against liquor stores had takenplace in the period between 24 November to 14 December 2020. 686 A group called ‘Peopleof the Good’, an unknown group likely affiliated with Iran-backed Kataib Hezbollah, warned
Iraqi security forces - which had increased their presence in order to protect liquor stores thatwere being attacked - to stop protecting these shops because the group would continue
targeting them in order to clean Baghdad from their ‘filth’. On 26 November 2020, armed
group Rab’Allah (God’s Fellows), with links to Iran, attacked a massage parlour in Baghdad,
hitting two female workers and destroying equipment. 687 Following this attack, accounts
supporting Rab’ Allah stated that ‘To all the centers of disobedience and prostitution in Iraq,
we are on the lookout and the worst is yet to come.’ 688 According to news website
Diyaruna 689, this attack was part of the campaign led by pro-Iranian militias including Rab’
Allah with the aim to ‘fight immorality’, which is the alleged reasoning behind the attacks onliquor stores, massage parlours and nightclubs. 690
USA, LOC, Iraq: Parliament Considers New Anti-cybercrimes Bill, 14 January 2021, url
HRW, Iraq Parliament Suspends Draconian Cybercrimes Bill, 7 May 2021, url
679
Middle East Researcher, video-chat Interview with EUAA, 3 November 2021
680
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2021, 3 March 2021, url
681
ACLED, Religious repression and disorder: Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, and Yemen, 4 June 2021, url
682
BBC, Iraq alcohol: Parliament imposes ban in a surprise move, 23 October 2016, url
683
Al Monitor, Armed groups target liquor shops in Iraq, 15 December 2020, url; MEMO, Iraq: Liquor store explodes in Baghdad,
27 November 2020, url; MEMO, Street sweeper killed in latest attack on liquor stores in Iraq, 22 December 2020, url; Gulf News,
Bomb hits Baghdad liquor store, 12 January 2021, url; MEMO, 3 blasts target liquor stores in Iraq's Baghdad, 25 February 2021,
url; MEMO, 3 explosions target liquor stores in Iraq's Baghdad, 16 December 2020, url; Kurdistan24, Militia group attacks spa
center, migrant workers in Baghdad, 27 November 2020, url
684
Al Monitor, Armed groups target liquor shops in Iraq, 15 December 2020, url
685
ACLED, Religious repression and disorder: Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, and Yemen, 4 June 2021, url
686
Al Monitor, Armed groups target liquor shops in Iraq, 15 December 2020, url
687
Kurdistan24, Militia group attacks spa center, migrant workers in Baghdad, 27 November 2020, url
688
Al Monitor, Armed groups target liquor shops in Iraq, 15 December 2020, url; It was not possible to check the original source
since the hyperlink provided by Al-Monitor leads to an unavailable YouTube video689
In its website, Diyaruna states that it is sponsored by the USCENTCOM, the United States Central Command ‘to highlightmovement toward greater regional stability through bilateral and multilateral cooperative arrangements.’. Source: Diyaruna,
About us, n.d., url
690
Diyaruna, Rubu Allah is an instrument of Kataib Hizbullah, 17 December 2020, url
677

678

75

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

6.2 Instances of targeting of individuals perceived as
westernised in Iraq and the KRI
Below follows some non-exhaustive instances of targeting of individuals who were perceived
as westernized.
In the period between the end of 2020 and early 2021, a young male student at the medical
school in Baghdad was targeted in relation to a Facebook group for atheists that he wasrunning. His fellow students found out, started harassing him and informed a professor. The
professor in turn informed other professors who also harassed the young man; the latter was
eventually expelled from medical school. 691
USDOS noted that, in 2020, according to representatives of Christian NGOs, there werecases of Muslims continuing to harass and threaten women and girls – irrespective if theirreligious affiliation – because they were not wearing the hijab, for dressing in Western-style
clothing or for not following strict interpretations of Islamic norms related to public
behaviour. 692
USDOS reported that, in September 2020, two young women were found killed near the
town of Chamechamal, in Sulaymaniyah. Allegedly they were killed by their father because he
did not approve of them dating outside of marriage. 693

Middle East Researcher, video-chat Interview with EUAA, 3 November 2021
USDOS (United States Department of State), Iraq 2020 International Religious Freedom Report, 12 May 2021, url, p. 23
693
USDOS, Iraq 2020 Human Rights Report, 30 March 2021, url, p. 44
691

692

76

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

7. Women
7.1 General situation of women in Iraq and the KRI
Women in Iraq continue to face violence, 694 socio-economic restrictions and discriminatory
practices, as a result of traditional stereotypes, 695 patriarchal norms, discriminatory laws aswell as weakness of state institutions. 696
Iraqi laws regulating personal status, family, religion, labour, inheritance and criminal
procedure discriminate against women and their rights are not the same as for men. Women
face discrimination in areas such as employment, education, housing, judicial procedure,
marriage, divorce, child custody, owning and managing properties or businesses. 697 Genderequality in the KRI is described as ‘relatively higher’ compared to the rest of the country,
especially in legal terms. 698 However, despite the additional legal protections for women in
the KRI and despite the establishment of a High Council of Women’s Affairs and a Women’s
Rights Monitoring Board, ‘such protections were applied inconsistently’ during 2020, andwomen were subject to discrimination 699 and violence. 700
The right to freedom of movement is legally restricted for women in Iraq, since they needconsent of a male relative to obtain a passport and the Civil Status Identification Document,
which is required to access education, employment, 701 healthcare, housing and foodassistance. 702
Although women have legally the same rights as men in owning land and other properties, inpractice property rights of women are hindered by cultural and religious norms, particularly inrural areas. 703
Significant barriers, such as traditional gender roles and norms, family levels of education,
poverty, perceived protection concerns, continue to limit girls’ access to education, especiallyin territories formerly under ISIS’ control. There are accounts collected by UNAMI/ OHCHR
about girls not allowed to attend school by their families in some rural areas. 704
There is no law prohibiting the participation of women in the political process, and women doparticipate. 705 Both the national Council of Representatives (CoR) and the Kurdish parliament

Abed A., Violence Against Women in Iraq: Between Practice and Legislation, LSE’s Middle East Centre Blog, 8 July 2020, url;
USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq, 30 March 2021, url; UNAMI, Opposing Violence Against Women- Remarks by SRSG Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert Baghdad - 11 September 2021, url
695
UNAMI/ OHCHR, The Right to Education in Iraq, Part Two: Obstacles to Girls’ Education after ISIL, 24 January 2021, url p. 5
696
Alkhudary T., Iraqi Women are Engaged in a Struggle for their Rights, LSE’s Middle East Centre Blog, 15 June 2020, url
697
USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq, 30 March 2021, url
698
Kaya, Z. N., Gender equality in Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan, LSE’s Middle East Centre Blog, 5 January 2018, url
699
USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq, 30 March 2021, url
700
Inside Arabia, ‘Alarming Increase in “Honor Killing” of Kurdish and Iraqi Women’, 1 January 2021, url
701
USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq, 30 March 2021, url; Freedom House, Freedom in the world
2021 – Iraq, 3 March 2021, url
702
USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq, 30 March 2021, url
703
USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq, 30 March 2021, url
704
UNAMI/ OHCHR, The Right to Education in Iraq, Part Two: Obstacles to Girls’ Education after ISIL, 24 January 2021, url pp. 3, 7
705
USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq, 30 March 2021, url
694

77IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

foresee 25 % and 30 % of seats for women respectively. 706 However women are often
marginalised in political discussions 707 and excluded from leadership positions. 708 Moreover,the participation of women in the political and electoral processes has been impeded byvarious factors, including harassment, intimidation, 709 physical, sexual and psychologicalviolence, gender-biased scrutiny by the public and the media. 710
Women played an important role in the anti-government demonstrations 711 that took place in
Iraq during 2019712 and 2020, 713 taking to the streets to demand for equal rights as well as forbroader social, political, and economic change. 714

7.2 Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in Iraq and
the KRI
Iraq ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women(CEDAW) in 1986. 715 However, many Iraqi laws do not comply with the CEDAW and those inline with the Convention are not properly implemented. 716 Further, there is lack ofinvestigation of and accountability for violence against women in Iraq. 717
Official national statistics on different forms of violence against women are not available, 718
and in general, there is lack in systematic collection of data on SGBV in Iraq. 719 The major
forms of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) across the country are sexual violence,
domestic violence, so-called honour crimes, child marriage, trafficking in women and girls,
Female Genital Mutilation (FGM). 720
SGBV has been historically rooted within the Iraqi society prior to the US-led invasion in
2003. Since 2003, however, recurring armed conflicts have exacerbated the use of violenceagainst women, further undermining the already inadequate mechanisms in place to protect
women. A mapping report on SGBV in Iraq between 2003 and 2018 found an increase in thenumber of honour killings. The study also revealed cases of human trafficking, incest andrape never reported, cases of sexual violence committed by security forces and other state
entities as well as non-state armed groups, cases of female genital mutilation, virginity testing,rape, murder, and child marriage. 721 A 2021 study conducted by Oxfam on the community
perception of SGBV specifically in Diyala and Anbar governorates found that SGBV isFreedom House, Freedom in the world 2021 – Iraq, 3 March 2021, url; USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices: Iraq, 30 March 2021, url
707
USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq, 30 March 2021, url
708
Freedom House, Freedom in the world 2021 – Iraq, 3 March 2021, url
709
UNAMI/ESCWA, Women Running for Elected Office in Iraq: Needs and Challenges, 1 November 2020, url, p. 7
710
UNAMI, Opposing Violence Against Women - Remarks by SRSG Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert Baghdad - 11 September 2021, url
711
Al-Mayali I., Iraqi Women Will Not Be Silenced, 9 February 2021, in IWPR, available at: url
712
Independent, Women in Iraq defiantly take to the streets despite fears they ‘could die at any moment’, 23 November 2019, url
713
France 24, Hundreds of Iraqi women defy cleric to protest authorities, 13 February 2020, url714
Alkhudary T., Iraqi Women are Engaged in a Struggle for their Rights, LSE’s Middle East Centre Blog, 15 June 2020, url
715
UN Treaty Collection, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, New York, 18 December
1979, Iraq 13 August 1986, url
716
Alkhudary T., Iraqi Women are Engaged in a Struggle for their Rights, LSE’s Middle East Centre Blog, 15 June 2020, url
717
USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq, 30 March 2021, url
718
UN Women, Iraq: Prevalence Data on Different Forms of Violence against Women, n.d., url
719
Impunity Watch, Iraqi Al-Amal Association, PAX, Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Iraq 2003-2018, 20 July 2020, url, p. 13
720
Abed A., Violence Against Women in Iraq: Between Practice and Legislation, LSE’s Middle East Centre Blog, 8 July 2020, url
721
Iraqi Al-Amal Association, Impunity Watch, PAX, Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Iraq 2003-2018, 20 July 2020 url, pp. 7,
18-19
706

78

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

widespread in both governorates and that is still justified within the communities. In bothgovernorates, there is either lack of services for SGBV survivors or lack of accessibility to thelimited services provided, mainly due to societal barriers and lack of awareness on their
existence. 722
During the COVID-19 pandemic, there was an increase in SGBV cases in Iraq, including
spousal abuse, 723 and the use of harmful coping mechanisms, such as child marriage, 724‘immolation and self-immolation, self-inflicted injuries due to spousal abuse, sexual
harassment of minors, and suicide’. 725 Likewise, the KRI saw an increase in sexual anddomestic violence, honour crimes, child marriages, trafficking and FGM. A rising number ofKurdish women have reportedly committed suicide. 726

7.2.1. Rape
Iraqi law criminalises rape and sexual assault of women, men, and children but information on
the effectiveness of government enforcement of the law was lacking. 727 In the provisions
related to rape, there is no clear definition of ‘consent’, leaving the interpretation up to thejudges. Moreover, authorities are required to drop a rape case if the perpetrator marries thevictim, and sometimes families of the victims agree with such arrangement to avoid social
stigma associated with rape. 728 This is a practice that is often encouraged by government
authorities. There is no specialised care provided by the Iraqi government for rape victims. 729

7.2.2 Domestic violence
Article 29 of the Iraqi constitution prohibits ‘all forms of violence and abuse in the family’. 730
However, the Iraqi federal government has not yet adopted a law combatting domestic
violence, 731 and there is no law specifically criminalising spousal rape. 732 Article 41 of the Penal
Code (No.111 of 1969) 733 grants husbands the right to discipline their wives. Within such apatriarchal legal framework, domestic violence is described as normalised. 734 During 2020,
domestic violence, including the killings of women by their families and husbands, continued
to remain ‘endemic’. 735
Although the government stated to have set up family protection units at police stations
across the country, these units prioritise family reconciliation over protection of the victims
and most of them do not serve as shelters. 736 Provision of shelters remains lacking in the
country, with the exception of the KRI. 737 The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) adopted
Oxfam, Community perceptions of sexual and gender based violence, July 2021, url, pp. 4, 5
UN Women, UN in Iraq raises the alarm: Time to endorse the anti-domestic violence law, 17 April 2020, url; Al Jazeera, Iraqi
women struggle to escape abuse as domestic violence rises, 12 February 2021, url
724
UNSC, Conflict-related sexual violence, S/2021/312, 30 March 2021, url, p. 13725
UN Iraq, UN in Iraq raises the alarm: Time to endorse the anti-domestic violence law, 16 April 2020, url
726
Al Jazeera, ‘As if she had never existed’: The graveyards for murdered women, 8 March 2021, url
727
USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq, 30 March 2021, url
728
USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq, 30 March 2021, url
729
USDOS, 2021 Trafficking in Persons Report – Iraq, (covering April 2020 to March 2021), 1 July 2021, url
730
Iraq, Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, Art. 29, 15 October 2005, url
731
World Bank (The), Iraq Economic Monitor: Seizing the Opportunity for Reforms and Managing Volatility, 27 May 2021, url, p. 26;
HRW, Iraq: Urgent Need for Domestic Violence Law, 22 April 2020, url
732
USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq, 30 March 2021, url
733
Iraq, Penal Code, No. 111 of 1969, July 1969, Art. 41 (1), available at: url
734
Abed A., Violence against women in Iraq: between practice and legislation, LSE’s Middle East Centre Blog, 8 July 2020, url
735
HRW, World report 2021 - Events of 2020, 13 January 2021, url, p. 350
736
USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq, 30 March 2021, url
737
Abed A., Violence against women in Iraq: between practice and legislation, LSE’s Middle East Centre Blog, 8 July 2020, url
722
723

79

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

the Law N. 8 Against Domestic Violence in 2011, 738 which criminalises physical andpsychological abuse, threats of violence and spousal rape. A special police force has been
set up in the KRI to implement the law and investigate cases of gender-based violence, whilea family reconciliation committee has been established within the judicial system.
Nonetheless, these measures 739 as well as efforts by civil society organisations were noteffective and domestic violence still occurs in the KRI. 740 The frequent practice by theauthorities is to mediate between the women and their families, so that women return to theirhome. There are four government shelters and two private shelters, which provided some
protection to women victims of SGBV in the KRI; while there are NGOs providing key support
with legal and psychological aid, which is not provided by the authorities. 741
For more detailed information on domestic violence in Iraq and the KRI, including availability
and access to shelters, it is possible to consult the EASO COI Query Response on Domestic
violence in Iraq and the KRI, 14 October 2021.

7.2.3 Child forced-marriage and trafficking
Although Iraq’s Personal Status Law sets the legal age for marriage at 18, the law also allows
a judge to permit girls as young as 15 to be married in ‘urgent’ cases. 742 According to thelatest available UNICEF data on child marriage, as of 2018, 24.3 % of women were firstmarried or in union before the age of 18. 743 During 2020, traditional early, so-called temporary
marriage and forced marriages of women occurred throughout the country. 744 In a June 2021
report, Save the Children noted that due to loopholes in laws, children in Iraq are exposed toa wide range of protection risks, including the exploitation of girls through temporary
marriages. 745 Under the so-called temporary or pleasure marriages, a man can marry a girl fora limited period of time in exchange for dowry money to her family. The traditional practicesof nahwas and fasliya, 746 whereby women are traded to settle tribal disputes, continued tooccur especially in areas where tribes have more influence than state institutions. 747

7.2.4 Conflict-related sexual violence
Conflict-related sexual violence continued to be underreported in Iraq, due to ‘lack of trust in
the justice system, a fear of reprisals, pressure from family members, and stigma codified in
the law, which allows perpetrators to quash a criminal case by marrying their victims.’ The UN
reported cases of sexual abuse by members of Iraqi security forces against women in camps,
such as in Ninawa. 748 For information on conflict-related sexual violence targeting specificallyYazidi women, see section 4.3.3.

Iraq/KRG, Act No. 8 from 2011, The Act from combating domestic violence in Kurdistan Region, Iraq, 21 June 2011, url; Abed A.,
Violence against women in Iraq: between practice and legislation, LSE’s Middle East Centre Blog, 8 July 2020, url
739
USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq, 30 March 2021, url
740
Abed A., Violence against women in Iraq: between practice and legislation, 8 July 2020, url
741
USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq, 30 March 2021, url
742
HRW, Iraq: Parliament Rejects Marriage for 8-Year-Old Girls, 17 December 2017, url; Tahirih Justice Center, Forced Marriage
Overseas: Iraq, n.d., url
743
UNICEF, Data Warehouse, 2018, url
744
USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq, 30 March 2021, url
745
Save the Children, Married by exception: Child marriage policies in the Middle East and North Africa, 25 June 2021, url
746
Nahwah is described as ‘obstruction of marriage by a cousin suitor’, while fasliya as ‘forced marriage by immediate family
member’. See Iraqi Women Network, Iraqi Women challenges of Security, Peace and Justice, Shadow Report to the CEDAWCommittee, 2019, url, p. 15
747
USDOS, 2021 Trafficking in Persons Report – Iraq, (covering April 2020 to March 2021), 1 July 2021, url
748
UNSC, Conflict-related sexual violence, S/2021/312, 30 March 2021, url, p. 13
738

80

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

7.2.5 Female Genital Mutilation (FGM)
Despite advocacy efforts to eradicate the practice, FGM continues to occur in some parts of
Iraq, mainly in rural areas of the KRI. 749 According to the latest available data based on the2018 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) conducted by the Iraqi Central Statisticalorganisation (CSO), the Kurdistan Regional Statistics Office (KRSO), UNICEF and the Iraqi
Ministry of Health, 7.4 % of women aged between 15 and 49 underwent FGM in Iraq. The
majority of FGM procedure occurred in Kurdistan region (37.5 %), compared with 0.4 % in
central and southern Iraq. 750 Updated information regarding FGM in Iraq within the reference
period of this report was scarce. For previous information on prevalence and practice of FGM
in Iraq and the KRI, please see an EASO COI Query Response, published on 15 March 2019,
and the EASO 2019 report, Iraq: Targeting of Individuals.
For information regarding the so-called honour killings, see section 7.4 Treatment of women
perceived to transgress moral codes in Iraq and the KRI.

7.3 Treatment of single/divorced/widowed women in Iraq
and the KRI
According to the Article 37 of the Iraqi Personal Status Law No. 188/1959 (IPSL), only thehusband has the right to unilateral divorce by ‘pronouncing three repudiations.’ 751 Iraqi
women have the right to initiate divorce, 752 under both the aforementioned IPSL 753 and theKurdistan Personal Status Law, Act No. 15/2008. 754 However, there are reports of breaches ofthe law, due to tribal and religious norms, and weakness in law enforcement. 755 The law
however does not foresee any financial assistance for a divorced woman, other than childsupport or in some cases two years’ financial support. There are cases when divorced womenmust return their dowry or a sum of money to their husband. Although the father is theguardian of the children under Iraqi law, a divorced woman may obtain custody of herchildren until they reach age 10, and up to age 15 upon a court decision. Although the
Ministries of Health and Interior provide birth certificates upon registration of birth, single
women and widows face problem in registering their children, and the registration process
may be lengthy and complicated. 756 Obtaining identity cards and access to services continued
to be a problem for women with children conceived as a result of rape, and the lack ofidentity documents could lead to statelessness. 757
Citing a local judiciary source, the news agency Anadolu reported in 2018 that divorce rate in
Iraq has risen noticeably in recent years. 758 In 2019, a local media source, referring to official

UNFPA Iraq, FGM: an infringement on morals and rights, 22 July 2021, url
CSO, KRSO, UNICEF, Iraqi Ministry of Health, Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS), 2018, url, p. 19
751
Oxfam, Community perceptions of Sexual and Gender Based Violence, July 2021, url, p. 14
752
USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq, 30 March 2021, url; Musawah, Thematic report on article 16,
Muslim family law and Muslim women’s rights in Iraq, 74th CEDAW Session Geneva, Switzerland November 2019 url, p. 2753
Iraq, Personal Status Law No. 188/1959, Art. 40-41, url754
Iraq/KRG, Personal Status Law, Act No. 15/2008, url
755
Musawah, Thematic report on article 16, Muslim family law and Muslim women’s rights in Iraq, 74th CEDAW Session Geneva,
Switzerland November 2019, url, p. 2
756
USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq, 30 March 2021, url
757
UNSC, Conflict-related sexual violence, S/2021/312, 30 March 2021, url, p. 6
758
AA, Iraq's divorce rate steadily mounting: Judicial source, 31 January 2018, url
749

750

81

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

statistics, reported that there has been an increase in divorce also in the KRI. 759 However,official statistics on divorce rate across the country could not be verified. Interviewed by local
news website Basnews, women’s rights activist Fatima Al-Assadi noted that there might beseveral reasons for such an increase in divorce cases, including ‘the opening of society’. 760
Despite the reported increase in divorce rate, divorced women in Iraq still facediscrimination 761 and stigma 762 whereby a ‘divorced woman who lives outside the cities will
not be able to live on her own’, while this is more accepted for widows. 763
According to human rights organisations interviewed by the Danish Immigration Service (DIS)
during their fact-finding mission in 2018, the situation for single women may vary dependingon their level of education, on whether they live in cities or not, and on their financial
independence. Although it is possible for an educated woman with an income to live in a city
on her own, ‘as long as she does not have an honour conflict with her family’, in practice thepossibility for single women to live on their own has been reduced due to deteriorating
societal restrictions and financial situation in the country. 764 A study conducted by Oxfam in
the governorates of Kirkuk and Diyala between November 2020 and January 2021 found thatwidows and divorced women face particular challenges, and that women who ask for divorce
are particularly stigmatised for stepping outside of their traditional roles as wives andmothers. 765
In various IDP camps, women heads of household had issues obtaining permission to moveand were subject to various forms of abuse, including rape, sexual assault, and exploitation by
government forces and camp residents. There were reports of several cases of women who
became widows after being forced to marry ISIS fighters. These widows did not havemarriage certificates or birth certificates of their children and were therefore unable to obtainlegal documentation for their children. In addition, these women were particularly stigmatised
due to their association with ISIS and were subject to higher risk of sexual exploitation,
retaliation, and suicide. 766 For more information on women with perceived affiliation to ISIL,
see section 1.3.2 of this report.

7.4 Treatment of women perceived to transgress moral
codes in Iraq and the KRI
Article 409 of the Iraqi Penal Code permits ‘honour’ as mitigation for crimes of violenceagainst family members. 767 According to Iraqi law, a sentence for murder is limited to a
maximum of three years in prison for men accused of killing their wives or a female
dependent if the victim had committed adultery or engaged in sex outside of marriage. 768
Asharq Al-Awsat, Official Data: Divorce Rates Soar in Kurdistan, 1 March 2019, url
Basnews, One Divorce Every Four Minutes in Iraq, 5 September 2021, url
761
USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq, 30 March 2021, url
762
OECD/SIGI Iraq, 2019, url. P. 3
763
Denmark: DIS, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Women and men in honour-related conflicts, 9 November 2018 available at: url,
p. 13
764
Denmark: DIS, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Women and men in honour-related conflicts, 9 November 2018 available at: url,
p. 13
765
Oxfam, Social Norms Structuring Masculinities, Gender Roles, and Stereotypes: Iraqi men and boys’ common misconceptions
about women and girls’ participation and empowerment, 31 August 2021, url, pp. 19-20
766
USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq, 30 March 2021, url
767
UNSC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her mission to Iraq, 5 June 2018,
A/HRC/38/44/Add.1, url, p. 10
768
USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq, 30 March 2021, url
759

760

82

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Traditionally, the so-called honour killing refers to the murder of a woman by a male memberof her family in order to clean the family’s or tribe’s honour from the ‘shameful’ act the woman
committed by losing her virginity, having an extramarital relationship, but also refusing an
arranged marriage, seeking divorce, expressing her sexual orientation or gender identity, andfor being a victim of rape.769
Since there are not accurate statistics on the prevalence of so-called honour killings in Iraq, 770
and since the phenomenon is severely underreported, its scale is unknown. 771 USDOS statedthat honour killings against women continue to represent ‘a serious problem throughout thecountry’, and citing UNAMI, added that several hundred women in Iraq are killed for ‘honour’each year. In some cases, families reportedly arrange honour killings to appear as suicides. 772
Generally, the practice is prevalent throughout the country, though its frequency hasreportedly decreased in some geographical areas such as cities, while it is more widespreadin more conservative areas, 773 such as the southern part of the country. 774
In the KRI, there were reports of a rise in number of women being killed for ‘honour’. 775 In
several cemeteries in the Kurdish region of northern Iraq, women victims of honour killings
are buried with no names on their graves to signal the shame they were perceived to havebrought to their families. 776 Similarly, there are reports of women victims of honour killings
secretly buried in some archaeological sites, in southern Iraq. 777
In September 2020, two young sisters were killed by their father for ‘honour’ in the town of
Chamchamal, west of Sulaimaniyah. 778 In November 2020, a woman was killed by her threebrothers for allegedly attempting to divorce her husband in the district of Kalar, in Garmiyanadministration. 779
The KRG Ministry of Interior’s Directorate General of Combating Violence against Women
confirmed that, as of September 2020, three women were victims of honour crimes out of the
26 female homicide victims in the KRI. However, a UN source noted that the actual number
was likely much higher. 780
Quoting Iraqi journalist Diyar Raad, a 2021 article by Deutsche Welle (DW) noted that while
the concept of breaching honour code has traditionally been related to losing virginity or
having a relation outside marriage, today it has widened to include posting pictures or ‘bold
things’ on social media platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and even opening an
account using their real names. Journalist Diyar Raad further mentioned two cases of womenfrom Nasiriyah, in southern Iraq, who were allegedly killed by their respective families forposting pictures on Instagram, an act they considered immoral. Raad added that there are

KCCRC, Honor killing in Iraq, 14 August 2021, url
KCCRC, Honor killing in Iraq, 14 August 2021, url
771
Rudaw, To kill your daughter in the name of honour, 11 December 2020, url
772
USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq, 30 March 2021, url
773
KCCRC, Honor killing in Iraq, 14 August 2021, url
774
Washington Post (The), Furtive love, forbidden grief, 28 February 2020, url
775
Inside Arabia, ‘Alarming Increase in “Honor Killing” of Kurdish and Iraqi Women’, 1 January 2021, url
776
Al Jazeera, ‘As if she had never existed’: The graveyards for murdered women, 8 March 2021, url; Rudaw, Kurdistan’s
forgotten victims: the women killed for ‘honour’, 25 April 2019, url
777
Al Jazeera, The hills of sinners. The story of the secret burials of women in southern Iraqurl 26 June 2020, url
778
Kirkuknow, Two sisters found dead in Chamchamal: father wanted by police, 10 September 2020, url
779
Rudaw, Three men in Kalar arrested for hanging their sister to death: police, 23 November 2020, url
780
USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq, 30 March 2021, url
769
770

83

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

many cases like these in Iraq, however it is difficult to prove them. 781 Similarly, according to
Aisha K. Gill, 782 a professor of criminology at the University of Roehampton in the UK, andcited in the same DW article, her research has found that the concept of honour code is being
used to control women’s online activities. 783
Women involved in feminist groups, such as the Sofia Society, a women’s rights grouppresent in some cities across the Kurdish region, reported fear of repercussions for theiractivities. 784
Hundreds of women participated in the anti-government demonstrations that erupted in Iraq
during 2019785 and 2020. 786 Some analysts noted that women’s participation in the protests
has been perceived by Iraqi society as a subversion of their gender roles, 787 which are deeply
rooted in traditional and religious norms. Being perceived as having broken taboos, these
women were reportedly accused of infidelity, of ‘dishonouring’ their family names, and they
were referred to as prostitutes or ‘whores of the nation’. 788 As many as 600 protestors were
killed by Iraqi security forces in Baghdad and cities in Southern Iraq during thedemonstrations, 789 including women protestors. 790 In August 2020, activist and doctor Reham
Yacoub was killed by unidentified gunmen in Basrah. She was the leader of several women’s
marches in local protest movement since 2018. 791 Some women protestors were abducted,
threatened, 792 and in some cases allegedly forced into exile, although these cases were
underreported. 793

DW, Middle East: Murdered because of Snapchat?, 29 January 2021, url
Aisha K. Gill, Personal Profile, University of Roehampton, UK, n.d., url
783
DW, Middle East: Murdered because of Snapchat? 29 January 2021, url
784
Al Jazeera, ‘As if she had never existed’: The graveyards for murdered women, 8 March 2021, url
785
Independent, Women in Iraq defiantly take to the streets despite fears they ‘could die at any moment’, 23 November 2019, url
786
France 24, Hundreds of Iraqi women defy cleric to protest authorities, 13 February 2020, url
787
Alkhudary T., Iraqi Women are Engaged in a Struggle for their Rights, LSE’s Middle East Centre Blog, 15 June 2020, url
788
Abdelhameed H., The Pink and Purple Protest: Iraqi Women Invert the Gender Game, Australian Institute of International
Affairs, 1 April 2020, url
789
AI, Iraq: Protest death toll surges as security forces resume brutal repression, 23 January 2020, url
790
Washington Post (The), Furtive love, forbidden grief, 28 February 2020, url
791
BBC, Female Iraqi activist killed in Basra as gunmen target protesters, 20 August 2020, url
792
HRW, Iraq: Abductions Linked to Baghdad Protests, 2 December 2019, url; Rudaw, Iraqi women continue protests despite fearof abduction, assassination, 22 December 2019, url
793
Al-Mayali I., Iraqi Women Will Not Be Silenced, 9 February 2021, in IWPR, available at: url
781

782

84

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

8. Persons involved in and affected byblood/land feuds in the context of tribal
conflict
8.1 Context of tribalism in Iraq
According to Hussein D. Hassan, an information research specialist writing for theCongressional Research Service (CRS) in 2008, 75% of the total Iraqi population belong to atribe or ‘have kinship to one’. 794 The same source stated that there are around 150 tribes in
Iraq composed of thousands of smaller clans of varying size and influence. These tribalgroups range from ‘extended family clans that may number just several hundred people tobroad confederations of clans that claim the loyalty of a million or more’. 795 Tribes andtribalism are reported to be ‘ubiquitous throughout Iraq’, but prominent in Sunni areas ofAnbar, Salah Al-Din, Kirkuk, Ninewa; and in the southern, mainly Shia, province of Basrah, 796
as well as in the KRI. 797
Haley Bobseine, in research published by the Century Foundation, described tribalism as ‘adefining characteristic of modern Iraqi society, but one that is constantly adapting to changing
times’. 798 An article published by The Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS) notesthat tribes are ‘so flexible in form and function that they defy any meaningful attempt at
definition’. 799 Bobseine observed that, although the Iraqi state holds jurisdiction over tribal
lands, the tribe survives ‘as a cultural and social reality’ and traditional tribal customs continue
to influence day-to-day life. 800 She noted that many Iraqis may turn to their tribe for their
physical or economic security or for dispute mediation. 801
According to analysis from the Center for Security Studies (CSS), the tribal system in Iraq
represents a ‘crucial social system’, and ‘previous attempts at dismantling the tribal networks
gravely destabilized the country and increased chances of armed conflict’. 802 This source
reported that the Iraqi government has ‘continuously’ attempted to ‘ensure that tribal loyalties,
allegiances, and their affairs are taken into consideration to maintain social
stability’. 803According to Article 45 of the 2005 Iraqi Constitution, the State is required to‘seek the advancement of the Iraqi clans and tribes’, and should ‘attend to their affairs in amanner that is consistent with religion and the law’. 804 The State is also required to uphold theHassan, H.D., Iraq: Tribal Structure, Social, and Political Activities, CRS, 7 April 2008, url, p.1
Hassan, H.D., Iraq: Tribal Structure, Social, and Political Activities, CRS, 7 April 2008, url, p. 1
796
Gharizi, O. and Al-Ibrahimi, H., Baghdad Must Seize the Change to Work with Iraq’s Tribes, 17 January 2018, url
797
DIS, Honour Crimes against Men in Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and the Availability of Protection, 6 to 20 January 2010, url;
Denmark, DIS, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), Women and men in honour-related conflicts, Report based on interviews in Erbiland Sulaimania, KRI, November 2018, url
798
Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, 7 November 2019, url, p. 1
799
Parry, J., Legal Pluralism and Justice in Iraq after ISIL, POMEPS, September 2018, url, p. 24
800
Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, 7 November 2019, url, p. 2
801
Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, 7 November 2019, url, p. 2
802
CSS, The Persisting Past of Iraq, September 2021, url, p. 3
803
CSS, The Persisting Past of Iraq, September 2021, url, p. 3
804
Anonymous, Iraq's Constitution of 2005, Constitute project, PDF generated: 26 Aug 2021, url, p. 16
794

795

85

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM‘noble human values’ of tribes in a way that ‘contributes to the development of society’, but to‘prohibit tribal traditions that are in contradiction with human rights’. 805

8.2 Interaction between the formal and tribal legal
systems
Experts Gharizi and Al-Ibrahimi 806 wrote that, since the founding of Iraq, when the state is
weak the power of sheikhs and tribal practices around issues of justice, security, identity, and‘mobilisation of armed men’ is strengthened. 807 Similarly, according to an analyst fromPOMEPS, tribal law exists alongside state law, though its influence depends on the social andcultural character of a particular area, and on the relative strength of the state over time. The
same source explained that when the state has been weak in terms of administering security
and justice, tribal leaders and processes ‘have stepped in to fill the gap’. 808 According to atribal leader from Tikrit cited by Gharizi and Al-Ibrahimi, ‘Tribal law is not meant to competewith the state’s laws. Rather it is meant to fill gaps not addressed by the state’. 809 Bobseine
gave the opinion that Iraqis use, and abuse, both formal and informal justice systems to ‘seek
justice, revenge or absolution from guilt’. 810 A decision to turn to one system or the other may
rest on factors such as ‘the relevance of the tribal system in a particular area, the strength ofone’s tribe or sheikhs as opposed to the opposing party’s tribal affiliations, or whether there isaccess to the formal legal system’. 811
According to Bobseine ‘The informal tribal justice and formal justice systems frequently
overlap and even coordinate with each other, and at other times challenge each other’. 812
Sheikhs may communicate with judges regarding private disputes resolved by tribal
mechanisms, which may lead the judge to consider closing the case or adjusting thesentence considering informal agreements reached. Tribal leaders may also coordinate withsecurity forces deployed in their area over criminal cases, and refer cases directly to the state,particularly in terrorism cases involving Islamic State suspects or sensitive security cases. 813
UNHCR reported that prosecution of an offender in the formal judicial system might not end
or avoid tribal conflict and, in some cases, law enforcement officials and courts refer cases tothe tribal system for settlement. 814 In a paper for the LSE Middle East Centre, Al-Jaffal and
Khalaf reported that in Basrah Governorate, the executive and legislative institutions ‘usuallyresort to the authority of their tribes to resolve their issues, obtain protection, and pressure
higher powers’, due to disagreements that prevail between them. 815 According to officials
interviewed by these authors, ‘resorting to the authority of tribes, although it weakens the law,is actually a way to enforce the law’, although the authors noted that this gives power to thetribes ‘to impose their rules on the city’. They further observed that this power is mostly
Anonymous, Iraq's Constitution of 2005, Constitute project, PDF generated: 26 Aug 2021, url, p. 16
Osama Gharizi is regional program manager for the Middle East at USIP, and based in Iraq. Haider Al-Ibrahimi is executive
director of Sanad for Peacebuilding Organization, a leading Iraqi non-governmental organization, url
807
Gharizi, O. and Al-Ibrahimi, H., Baghdad Must Seize the Change to Work with Iraq’s Tribes, 17 January 2018, url. See also
Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, 7 November 2019, url, p. 3
808
POMEPS, Legal Pluralism and Justice in Iraq after ISIL, September 2018, url, pp. 24-25
809
Gharizi, O. and Al-Ibrahimi, H., Baghdad Must Seize the Change to Work with Iraq’s Tribes, 17 January 2018, url
810
Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, 7 November 2019, url, p. 7
811
Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, 7 November 2019, url, p. 5
812
Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, 7 November 2019, url, p. 5
813
Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, 7 November 2019, url, p. 8
814
UNHCR, Tribal Conflict Resolution in Iraq, 15 January 2018, url
815
Al-Jaffal, O., and Khalaf, S., Basra Governorate, A locality in Crisis, Local Government Crisis and Conflict with Federal
Government, LSE Middle East Centre Paper Series 49, May 2021, url, p. 18
805

806

86

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

exemplified through use of ‘light to medium weapons, but sometimes heavy weaponry anddrones’. 816
Bobseine observed that ‘Sometimes the line between the state and tribe is blurred’ given that‘Tribal sheikhs, their relatives, and other tribesmen may staff security, judicial, police, andother Iraqi government bodies’. 817 Reportedly, they may feel pressure to use their official
position to take sides in tribal disputes according to their tribal affiliation. Alternatively, law
enforcement personnel may be reluctant to get involved in tribal conflict, for fear of escalating
the dispute. 818
Tribal sheikhs interviewed by Bobseine argued that they do more than fill the ‘justice gap’
where the state is absent, but also offer a superior form of justice in some respects, providing
quick decisions, without the endemic corruption of state justice systems. 819 Some state
officials in turn criticised the tribal justice system as ‘backward’ and ‘encouraging revenge’,
and also ‘plagued’ with corruption. 820 Despite the importance of tribal justice in Iraq, sourcesinterviewed by Bobseine warned of the risk of empowering tribes to take the place of thestate and undercutting state judicial authority, and of the absence of formal safeguards intribal decision making to protect weaker parties and ensure impartial justice. 821 When the
Ministry of Justice established a ‘tribal arbitration committee’ in 2018 to resolve tribal conflicts,
Al-Monitor reported fears that this would ‘further undermine the formal justice system’. 822 As
further reported by Al-Monitor, the Ministry of Justice said the team of 47 tribal leaders would
be a ‘safety valve’ for the community and would strengthen security and establish peace
across the country. The initiative reportedly came at a time when there had been a ‘dramatic
escalation of conflict between tribes’, especially in southern provinces. 823 Al-Monitor notedthe concerns of civil society actors that the tribal arbitration committee would ‘abolish the ruleof law little by little’ and potentially violate human rights principles embodied in theConstitution, which prohibits tribal traditions that contravene human rights. 824
In October 2021 Sanad for Peacebuilding (Sanad), an Iraqi non‐government organisation
established with support from USIP, reported that a covenant had been signed by ‘more than
40 confederate tribal leaders and 40 tribal leaders from all over Iraq’. 825 This followed a joint
initiative between the USIP and Sanad to ‘promote peace and non-violence in Iraq’. 826 The
covenant ‘aims to confirm support for the state of law and stability in Iraq and to harmonize
tribal customs and practices with Iraqi law and human rights’ and highlights the role of Iraqi
tribal leaders in ‘enhancing stability and the rule of law and maintaining human rights in
Iraq’. 827 The covenant is reported to include ‘important amendments to tribal customary law,

Al-Jaffal, O., and Khalaf, S., Basra Governorate, A locality in Crisis, Local Government Crisis and Conflict with Federal
Government, LSE Middle East Centre Paper Series 49, May 2021, url, p. 19
817
Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, 7 November 2019, url, p. 8
818
Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, 7 November 2019, url, pp. 7, 8, 10, 14
819
Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, 7 November 2019, url, p. 9
820
Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, 7 November 2019, url, p. 9
821
Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, 7 November 2019, url, p. 9822
Al Monitor, Will Iraq’s new ‘tribal court’ undermine the rule of law? 12 April 2018, url
823
Al Monitor, Will Iraq’s new ‘tribal court’ undermine the rule of law? 12 April 2018, url
824
Al Monitor, Will Iraq’s new ‘tribal court’ undermine the rule of law? 12 April 2018, url
825
Sanad for Peacebuilding, Announcing the Tribal covenant to support the rule of law and the preservation of human rights for
Iraq's confederate tribal leaders, 5 October 2021, url
826
Sanad for Peacebuilding, Announcing the Tribal covenant to support the rule of law and the preservation of human rights for
Iraq's confederate tribal leaders, 5 October 2021, url
827
Sanad for Peacebuilding, Announcing the Tribal covenant to support the rule of law and the preservation of human rights for
Iraq's confederate tribal leaders, 5 October 2021, url
816

87IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMsuch as ending revenge killings and retaliations and enhancing women's protection and rights
in tribal practices’. 828

8.3 Conflict resolution practices in customary law
Administering justice is a key role for tribes and tribal law ‘provides remedies for all types ofdisputes involving harm to person, property or reputation, whether intentional or accidental’
through a system of reciprocity and compensation. 829 The goal of the tribal justice system, inwhich the individual is subordinate to the group, is to provide stability and maintain collective
honour, while preventing revenge killings and the escalation of conflict. 830 The underlying
principle of tribal legal processes is that if one member of the group (khamsa, meaning ‘five’in Arabic), which includes as a core unit all males descended from a common ancestor for fivegenerations, is the victim of a crime, serious insult or honour related issue, the honour of theentire group is violated. This group is entitled to respond ‘with equal violence’ to restore thehonour of the group. 831 To prevent the incidence of violence, tribal law offers the opportunity
to the khamsa to restore honour through negotiated settlement and payment ofcompensation.832 Tribal sheikhs mediate disputes over ‘civil’ and ‘criminal’ matters within or
between tribes, ranging from land and property, water rights and commercial matters, toinheritance, ‘honor crimes’, car accidents, drug offenses, theft, fraud, and murder. 833
Disputes are generally mediated where the issue occurred, at the ‘house’ or ‘clan’ level where
possible, though complex cases may be referred for adjudication by ‘high-ranking sheikhs at
the level of the tribe’. The tribal negotiation process (sulha) involves a series of sessions
during which the parties to the dispute, their respective sheikhs, and other mediators, as well
as experts and, potentially, a tribal jurist, discuss the matter. Once a solution is reached (fas’l),both parties sign an agreement, and the dispute is ended, with most agreements reportedly
upheld. 834 A range of solutions may be involved, but in the case of death, destruction ofproperty or accidents, diya (known as ‘blood money’) is the financial payment made to theextended family of the injured party, who then forfeit the right to revenge or retribution. 835
Other solutions reportedly include the dishonouring of a perpetrator and their family by theperpetrator’s tribe, as well as temporary or permanent expulsion from their tribe (jalwa). 836
Those found to have committed an ‘honor crime’ may be subject to capital punishment. 837
Tribal conflicts may also be resolved by ‘forcing women to marry members of another tribe’(fasliyah), although this practice contravenes state law. 838 According to multiple sources citedby UNHCR, the use of women and girls as compensation for injury or death (fasliyah) has
seen a resurgence since 2014, particularly in southern Iraq and among poorer families unable

Sanad for Peacebuilding, Announcing the Tribal covenant to support the rule of law and the preservation of human rights for
Iraq's confederate tribal leaders, 5 October 2021, url
829
POMEPS, Legal Pluralism and Justice in Iraq after ISIL, September 2018, url, p. 24
830
Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, 7 November 2019, url, p. 5
831
POMEPS, Legal Pluralism and Justice in Iraq after ISIL, September 2018, url, pp. 24-25
832
POMEPS, Legal Pluralism and Justice in Iraq after ISIL, September 2018, url, pp. 24-25
833
Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, 7 November 2019, url, pp. 5
834
Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, 7 November 2019, url, pp. 5, 6
835
Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, 7 November 2019, url, p. 6
836
UNU-CPR, The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Iraq Case Study, May 2018, url, p. 25;
Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, 7 November 2019, url, p. 7
837
Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, 7 November 2019, url, p. 6
838
UNU-CPR, The Limits of Punishment, Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Iraq Case Study, May 2018, url, p. 24,
828

88

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

to raise ‘blood money’. 839 Similarly, according to human rights observers cited by Australia’s
DFAT, ‘the traditional practice of fasliya, whereby family members (including women andchildren) are traded to settle tribal disputes, remains a problem, particularly in southerngovernorates’. 840 In this type of marriage, the woman has no right to divorce, is required to cut
off relations with her birth family, and ‘may be mistreated by the family in reprisal for the initialcrime against their kinsman, and live as a virtual slave with none of the status or recourses of
an official wife’. 841
Although tribal customs vary, there is reportedly ‘significant overlap and little variation among
Sunni and Shia Arab tribal customs and “urf” (tribal law)’. 842 According to Arab tribal jurists
interviewed by Bobseine, ‘more than 80% of tribal structures, customs and processes
between Arab tribes are the same, facilitating the resolution of intertribal disputes’; the main
variations concern the prices set for compensation payments. 843 Differences in custom andlaw between tribes are reported to be greater among other ethnic and religious
groups. 844Tribal law or urf is described by Bobseine as ‘a dynamic amalgamation of tribal
customs, precedents from prior tribal resolutions, and, to a certain extent, interpretations ofsharia law’, although she notes that not all tribal rulings are strictly in line with Islamic law. 845
She further notes that urf ‘shapes the entire tribal justice process’ and ‘may evolve throughiteration and according to prevailing circumstances’. 846
Tribal conflict resolution ‘does not happen in a vacuum’ and negotiations are reportedly
influenced by many factors, including ‘the social status and political connections of the tribes
involved, the sheikhs’ level of influence and connections, the gender and social status of theperpetrator and the victim, and any history of feuding’. Since there is no standardisation ofruling, the system is reportedly open to manipulation. Bobseine states: ‘Tribal laws andcustoms are sometimes used as a tool merely to extract resources and revenge. Some tribal
negotiation processes are not intended to equitably resolve disputes to begin with.
Extortionary demands are sometimes presented in the guise of fasl, which weaker parties
may simply decide to pay in order to avoid further disputes’. 847

8.4 Blood and land feuds
Blood feuds arise when tribes fail to resolve disputes by peaceful means and may result inarmed confrontations and cycles of retaliatory violence and revenge. 848 Reportedly, diya issometimes paid to end blood feuds within or between tribes. 849 According to a PhD
researcher based in the region and interviewed for this report 850, land feuds may escalate toblood feuds either when things can’t be resolved using tribal reconciliation mechanisms, Iraqi
state law, or when there is a lack of accountability and redress, people may attempt to take
UNHCR, Tribal Conflict Resolution in Iraq, 15 January 2018, url, p. 4
Australia, DFAT, DFAT Country Information Report: Iraq, 17 August 2020, url, 3.131, pp. 45-46
841
UNHCR, Tribal Conflict Resolution in Iraq, 15 January 2018, url; Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, 7 November 2019,url, p. 12
842
Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, 7 November 2019, url, p. 3
843
Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, 7 November 2019, url, pp. 5, 6
844
Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, 7 November 2019, url, p. 3
845
Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, 7 November 2019, url, p. 5
846
Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, 7 November 2019, url, p. 5
847
Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, 7 November 2019, url, p. 7
848
Foreign Policy, Northern Iraq May Be Free, but the South Is Seething, 9 November 2018, url
849
Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, 7 November 2019, url, p. 6
850
PhD Researcher, telephone interview with EUAA, 24 November 2021
839

840

89

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

land (or take back land) by force. In this situation individuals who own the land or are currently
in possession of the land could be targeted, but also those living and working on the land
who are not involved in the dispute might be threatened or caught up in the violence andforced to migrate to another area to seek safety. The same source stated that when blood
feuds occur those involved might request mediation from their tribe, which may result inpayment of compensation to end the blood feud, paid either on their own or with financial
support from their tribe. On the other hand, the tribe may refuse to get involved if powerfulactors in the area are involved as they may fear a confrontation with powerful actors if they
are involved in the case. Depending on the nature of the dispute and the area, the blood feud
may involve the individual and their immediate family members only (Khamsa 851), or may more
broadly affect members of the tribe. 852
Shafaq News reported in March 2021 that a tribal dispute in the area around Basrah escalated
to an armed clash lasting several days, resulting in civilian casualties. The cause of the
dispute was not reported. 853 According to the head of the Clan Dispute Resolution Committeein Basrah, as reported by The New Arab in September 2021, 280 armed disputes took placein Basrah in the previous two years, with 35 killed and 74 injured. The same source reported
that 15 armed disputes occurred in the first three months of 2021, killing 11 people. Around
85% of clan conflicts reportedly occurred in the Basrah districts of Al Hartha, Al-Qurna and AlMidaina, close to the oil fields. 854 An Iraqi media source reported in September 2021 that tribal
conflicts break out on a weekly basis in the southern province of Thi-Qar. According to local
sources ‘there are between five and ten armed fights between members of different tribes
each month’ which are often deadly and have resulted in women and children being killed. 855
The same source described a fight between three tribes in the Ur District of Thi-Qar, based onan earlier dispute, that involved heavy weapons and rocket launchers, and lasted for several
days. Similar conflicts also reportedly took place in Nasiriyah. Sources in the security forces
reported to Al-Menasa that tribal conflicts in the region are increasing and are more deadly,
due to the quantity of heavy weapons that have been smuggled into the region after thefighting with ISIL, and the weakness of the state in resolving conflicts. 856 Meanwhile,according to BasNews, armed confrontation between two major tribes took place in Baghdadin September 2021, killing or wounding at least three people. The source reported that thisincident came ‘as Iraq has so far failed to disarm the tribes and other militia groups,
particularly in areas of central and south of the country where such confrontations are often
reported’. 857
France 24 reported in June 2021 that in Missan governorate in the south of Iraq a child was
killed, and four adults wounded in gun fighting between two tribes over a disputed loan of 1
000 dinar (less than a dollar) between two children. In the same location three were killed andtwo seriously wounded in a sword fight that arose over an alleged insult to a religious figure.
In the city of Kut, in Wasit province, a dispute between two women over a duck escalated to atribal dispute and fighting that involved guns and grenades, during which a young man was
killed. The same source reported that in the village of Bani Hashem in eastern Iraq, a football
According to the PhD researcher interviewed for this report: ‘Under tribal custom, male members of an extended family unit, or“khamsa,” are obligated to avenge the injury or death of another family member, whether through tit-for-tat killing (“dam butlobdam”), or through a negotiated solution’852
PhD Researcher, telephone interview with EUAA, 24 November 2021
853
Shafaq News, Tribal Conflict kills a man and wounded four others in Basra, 23 March 2021, url
854
The New Arab, Clan violence in Iraq: Oil companies targeted as poverty reigns, 13 September 2021, url
855
Al-Menasa, Arms Race: Iraqi tribes using heavy weapons in local conflicts, 7 September 2021, url; BasNews, Dhi Qar: One
Killed, Three Wounded in Tribal Fight, 21 April 2021, url
856
Al-Menasa, Arms Race: Iraqi tribes using heavy weapons in local conflicts, 7 September 2021, url
857
BasNews, Three People Killed, Injured in Tribal Fight in Iraq, 19 September 2021, url
851

90IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

match between two tribes ended with one person killed and five wounded after two players
quarrelled. According to a police source, a tribal council met and ordered USD 13 000 (11 528
EUR) 858 in ‘blood money’ be paid to the family of the dead man. 859

8.5 The role of tribes in areas formerly captured by ISIL
In many areas of Iraq, the actions of individual members of a tribe or their families during theperiod of ISIL control and the subsequent fight to expel them, led to the whole tribe being
accused of complicity with ISIL’s crimes. 860 Sources reported that local tribal agreements in
Anbar, Salah Al-Din, Kirkuk, and Ninewa - the result of extended dialogue and negotiation
between some tribal leaders - addressed the issue of perceived collective punishment ofSunni communities, as well as the demand from compensation from victims of ISIL’s crimes. 861
Sources stated that these agreements were an attempt to resist the customary practice of
payment of ‘blood money’ to the family of victims of ISIL’s crimes, prevent violent retribution
permitted under tribal law, and to provide guidance on which IDPs should be allowed toreturn. 862 The tribal leaders negotiated for payments to be made from a formal government
compensation fund 863 and agreed to a national vetting system to identify those linked with
ISIL 864. These tribal leaders reportedly entered into local negotiated agreements ‘in hope of
restoring tribal cohesion and repairing their relationship with the state’ 865 and to preserve
their roles as ‘agents of reconciliation’. 866 According to an analyst with the research network
POMEPS, they were willing to recognise ISIL crimes as a matter for the state and not tribal law
due to the scale and severity of atrocities that went beyond the scope of traditional
mechanisms. 867
Despite these negotiated agreements in some areas, Bobseine reported that confiscation ofproperty and land from those perceived to be affiliated with ISIL and redistribution to others
had been used as a mechanism for settling tribal disputes, and in some instances ‘merely to
extract resources and revenge’. 868 The number of cases in need of tribal resolution reportedly
spiked following the end of ‘major fighting’ with ISIL and ‘Sheikhs’ resources were reportedly
overwhelmed as they attempted to mediate disputes among survivors’. 869 Some fearedrepercussions from ‘powerful actors’ in areas liberated from ISIL if they were perceived to be
too lenient on those accused of affiliation with ISIL and, in areas with limited state security,
Sheikhs have been targeted for their role in mediating disputes involving family members of
ISIL fighters or those accused of supporting ISIL. 870

European Commission, Exchange rate (InforEuro), n. d., urlFrance 24, Tribal Iraq: where petty squabbles turn lethal, 27 June, 2021, url
860
Gharizi, O. and Al-Ibrahimi, H., Baghdad Must Seize the Change to Work with Iraq’s Tribes, 17 January 2018, url
861
Gharizi, O. and Al-Ibrahimi, H., Baghdad Must Seize the Change to Work with Iraq’s Tribes, 17 January 2018, url; POMEPS,
Legal Pluralism and Justice in Iraq after ISIL, September 2018, url, pp. 24-25; Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, 7November 2019, url, p. 17
862
Gharizi, O. and Al-Ibrahimi, H., Baghdad Must Seize the Change to Work with Iraq’s Tribes, 17 January 2018, url; POMEPS,
Legal Pluralism and Justice in Iraq after ISIL, September 2018, url, pp. 24-25; Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, 7November 2019, url, p. 17
863
Gharizi, O. and Al-Ibrahimi, H., Baghdad Must Seize the Change to Work with Iraq’s Tribes, 17 January 2018, url
864
POMEPS, Legal Pluralism and Justice in Iraq after ISIL, September 2018, url, pp. 24-25
865
Gharizi, O. and Al-Ibrahimi, H., Baghdad Must Seize the Change to Work with Iraq’s Tribes, 17 January 2018, url
866
POMEPS, Legal Pluralism and Justice in Iraq after ISIL, September 2018, url, pp. 24-25
867
POMEPS, Legal Pluralism and Justice in Iraq after ISIL, September 2018, url, pp. 24-25
868
Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, 7 November 2019, url, pp. 6, 7, 16, 18
869
Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, 7 November 2019, url, p. 8
870
Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, 7 November 2019, url, p. 8
858

859

91

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Civilians in Conflict reported that in Salah al-Din province, even where negotiation andreconciliation processes have led to victims of ISIL accepting government compensation
instead of ‘blood money’, displaced families who have no criminal charges or judicial
decisions against them, have still been obliged to make payments of 500 000 Iraqi dinars(equivalent to 295 EUR 871), ‘which is an economic burden to most’. 872 IOM found that in ruralcommunities in Anbar province, displaced people seeking to return faced difficulties withtribal mediation if they were accused of committing acts against members of their own clan. In
this situation they lost the protection of their clan against retaliatory attacks and had to raise
the full price of compensation (‘blood money’), which in other circumstances would be sharedwith the tribe. 873

8.6 The role of tribes in southern Iraq
In the context of mass demonstrations that erupted in October 2019 in Baghdad and southern
Iraq as ‘citizens protested widespread corruption, unemployment and poor public services’,
confrontations between protesters and security forces in the south drew in the involvement oftribes. 874 According to the International Crisis Group, activists in southern provinces targeted
local officials, parliamentarians, and armed groups, and in response they were bothindividually targeted for intimidation and subject to mass arrests. The International Crisis
Group reported that the ‘extraction of blood money pursuant to unwritten tribal codes held
the authorities back from using lethal violence’ in some cases. 875 In particularly violent clashes
in Nasiriyah, when ‘dozens of protesters were killed in clashes with the army’ and ‘over 100
were wounded, including members of the security forces’, tribesmen reportedly blocked thearrival of military reinforcements’. 876 Tribal leaders spoke out demanding justice for the deathof their ‘slain sons’, while activists and observers expressed concern that tribes would pursue
vengeance rather than wait for anyone to be held accountable through legal processes. 877
According to The Guardian ‘What has been unleashed in the south in particular is a blood
feud’ against militias backed by Iran. 878 UNAMI received reports from judicial sources, lawyers
and victims, that at least three families of those killed had been pressured to ‘waive cases’ inreturn for ‘blood money’ or were threatened to withdraw cases against ‘certain armed
actors’. 879 Victims interviewed by UNAMI ‘frequently expressed a lack of trust in the formal
justice system’ and those who attempted to obtain criminal accountability reported threats
and intimidation and so resorted to the use of ‘informal tribal customary mechanisms’.
Activists from ‘prominent families or tribes’ reportedly received more protection than those

European Commission, Exchange rate (InforEuro), accessed 24 November 2021, url
Centre for Civilians in Conflict, Ignoring Iraq’s Most Vulnerable: The Plight of the Displaced, 1 April 2021, url, p. 19
873
IOM, Al-Anbar Province: Report on the return of IDPs with perceived affiliation with IS, 26 March 2020, url, p. 9874
International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Tishreen Uprising: From Barricades to Ballot Box, Middle East Report N°223, 26 July 2021, url,
pp. 16-17
875International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Tishreen Uprising: From Barricades to Ballot Box, Middle East Report N°223, 26 July 2021, url,
pp. 16-17
876International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Tishreen Uprising: From Barricades to Ballot Box, Middle East Report N°223, 26 July 2021, url,
pp. 16-17
877International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Tishreen Uprising: From Barricades to Ballot Box, Middle East Report N°223, 26 July 2021, url,
pp. 16-17
878
Guardian (The), Iraq risks breakup as tribes take on Iran’s militias in ‘blood feud’, 30 November 2019, url
879
UNAMI, Update on Demonstrations in Iraq: Accountability for Human Rights Violations and Abuses by Unidentified Armed
Elements, 30 May 2021, url, pp. 14-15
871

872

92

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

from poorer families, or from ethno-religious minorities ‘without ties to parties or tribes’, orwith weak tribal networks. 880
France 24 reported that tribes are ‘powerful actors in Iraq’, especially in the south, ‘where
they have their own moral and judicial codes, as well as huge caches of arms’. 881 According tothis source, tribal elders meet to settle disputes when fights break out and their verdicts
reportedly override state law. 882 France 24 reported that tribal clashes regularly involve theuse of rockets, heavy machine guns and armoured vehicles, 883although since a judicial rulingin 2018 such armed confrontations or ‘tribal warnings’ have been designated acts ofterrorism that carry the death penalty’ under article (2) of the Anti-Terrorism Act No. (13) of
2005. 884
Media sources also reported in 2020 and 2021 that tribes and armed militias in Iraq are
making demands for compensation payments related to alleged loss of tribal lands and for
employment opportunities from foreign companies and investors, leading many to withdraw
from projects due to fear of violent reprisals if they don’t comply. 885 In October 2020 the
Malaysian Petronas company threatened to leave the Garraf oil field in Thi-Qar province
because of ‘tensions stemming from the behaviour or tribal members living near the field’. 886
In the same month unknown forces reportedly raided a residential investment complex inSalah Al-Din province and ‘detained workers for more than three hours and threatened to killthem if they resumed work’. 887 According to sources cited by Al-Monitor, extortion attempts
by both militias and tribes are increasing, with some tribes claiming compensation paymentsfrom oil or investment companies for land they allege belonged to their parents or ancestors.
Although the state had reportedly already paid financial compensation, it was not reported
whether this was considered to be fair compensation or had reached those affected. 888
The New Arab, in an analysis piece focused on clan violence in Iraq, stated that ‘Heavily
armed Iraqi tribes are blackmailing oil companies who make lucrative profits from investmentson seized land, as the Iraqi state stands by powerless to intervene.’ 889 The same source
reported that local people in the oil rich Basrah governate suffer high levels of poverty andunemployment and are vulnerable to violent disputes between armed tribes in a context
where ‘state and security forces are almost absent’. 890 The main driver of clan conflict isreported to be access to employment in oil companies or compensation when oil is
discovered on tribal lands, as well as the general deterioration in living conditions in thegovernate. According to UNOHCHR, cited by The New Arab, ‘poor economic conditions haveexacerbated the poverty rate in the governorate and the area's natural resources are bringing

International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Tishreen Uprising: From Barricades to Ballot Box, Middle East Report N°223, 26 July 2021,
url, pp. 16-17
881
France 24, Tribal Iraq: where petty squabbles turn lethal, 27 June, 2021, url
882
France 24, Tribal Iraq: where petty squabbles turn lethal, 27 June, 2021, url
883
France 24, Tribal Iraq: where petty squabbles turn lethal, 27 June, 2021, url
884
France 24, Tribal Iraq: where petty squabbles turn lethal, 27 June, 2021, url; Republic of Iraq Supreme Judicial Council, The
judiciary writes the end chapter (Tribal attack) as a terrorist, 23 December 2018, url; AFP, In Iraq, bloody tribal custom nowclassed as 'terrorism', 15 November 2018, url
885
Al-Monitor, Demands for payment from tribes, militias stalling investment in Iraq, 28 October 2020, url; New Arab (The), Clanviolence in Iraq: Oil companies targeted as poverty reigns, 13 September 2021, url
886
Al-Monitor, Demands for payment from tribes, militias stalling investment in Iraq, 28 October 2020, url; New Arab (The), Clanviolence in Iraq: Oil companies targeted as poverty reigns, 13 September 2021, url
887
Al-Monitor, Demands for payment from tribes, militias stalling investment in Iraq, 28 October 2020, url
888
Al-Monitor, Demands for payment from tribes, militias stalling investment in Iraq, 28 October 2020, url; New Arab (The), Clanviolence in Iraq: Oil companies targeted as poverty reigns, 13 September 2021, url
889
New Arab (The), Clan violence in Iraq: Oil companies targeted as poverty reigns, 13 September 2021, url
890
New Arab (The), Clan violence in Iraq: Oil companies targeted as poverty reigns, 13 September 2021, url
880

93IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

nothing to the residents except disease, unemployment and the seizure of their farmland’. 891
A source in the Iraqi High Commission for Human Rights said to The New Arab that ‘many fallvictim to clashes they have no connection to’ and gave an example of a family forced to leave
their home in northern Basrah due to ‘ongoing clan disputes’. 892 The head of the Basrah
police force confirmed that 13 families had left their homes in Basrah for the same reason,
while the Chair of the Reconciliation and Clans Committee in the Iraqi Parliament, said ‘that
this type of displacement is spiralling out of control due to the proliferation of weapons within
the tribes and the weakness of the security apparatus’. 893 According to local sources ‘some of
the clans own a much more formidable arsenal than that of the security forces’. 894
In the same New Arab analysis piece, the Interior Ministry is reported to have made someefforts through its Tribal Affairs Directorate to de-escalate clan conflict in the south, byestablishing committees who intervene as arbitrators to resolve disputes between tribes.
According to a government spokesperson cited by The New Arab, ‘50 people accused ofstarting clan conflicts were arrested in the first quarter of 2021 and 5,000 firearms in Basraand Nasiriyah were confiscated during search operations in 2019 and 2020’. 895 However, one
source was reportedly sceptical about whether these measures will be effective: ‘The
situation is out of control. We would not have reached this stage if it had not been for thestate’s weakness and inability to apply the law’. 896 Political actors reportedly ‘exploit the tribal
element in regional disputes to mobilise support and win clan loyalty’ or back local sheikhs inreturn for their allegiance. 897

New Arab (The), Clan violence in Iraq: Oil companies targeted as poverty reigns, 13 September 2021, url
New Arab (The), Clan violence in Iraq: Oil companies targeted as poverty reigns, 13 September 2021, url
893
New Arab (The), Clan violence in Iraq: Oil companies targeted as poverty reigns, 13 September 2021, url
894
New Arab (The), Clan violence in Iraq: Oil companies targeted as poverty reigns, 13 September 2021, url
895
New Arab (The), Clan violence in Iraq: Oil companies targeted as poverty reigns, 13 September 2021, url
896
New Arab (The), Clan violence in Iraq: Oil companies targeted as poverty reigns, 13 September 2021, url
897
New Arab (The), Clan violence in Iraq: Oil companies targeted as poverty reigns, 13 September 2021, url
891

892

94

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

9. (Perceived) collaborators with westernforces
9.1 General situation of persons collaborating (orperceived to be collaborating) with western forces
Following the assassination of Iranian’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Forcecommander, Qasem Soleimani, and his ally, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, Deputy Chief of the
PMF 898, in January 2020, multiple attacks by militias using hand-thrown grenades, missiles,
gunfire or IEDs against Iraqi-operated logistics convoys contracted by the US-led Coalition
began and have continued up until the end of October 2021; the reporting period for thisreport. 899 According to the ISW, these attacks have ‘escalated’ in late 2020 and into 2021. 900
In the first half of 2020, 51 such attacks were counted 901, whilst ‘at least 30’ rocket or IED
attacks were reported between summer and November 2020 902. The UN Security Council
counted 18 attacks between early December 2020 and early February 2021 903, ‘more than’ 30
attacks between 17 February and 21 March 2021 904, and ‘more than’ 29 attacks between 11
May and 30 June 2021905. Figures drawn from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy
counted 5 attacks between 11 July and 31 July 2020, 12 attacks in August 2020, 33 in
September 2020, and by the end of September 2021, 317 ‘reported convoy attacks in Iraq’. 906
According to The Washington Institute for Near East Policy ‘In the first quarter of 2021, there
was a weekly average of seven reported convoy attacks and in the second quarter [of 2021] amonthly average of six. Multiple interviewees suggested that the number of actual provenanti-coalition convoy attacks each week was two or fewer’. 907
Southern and central Iraq, particularly Anbar, Babil, Baghdad, Basrah, Thi-Qar, Muthanna,
Qadisiyah and Salah ad-Din Governorates, were specifically mentioned as places were

BBC News, Qasem Soleimani: US kills top Iranian general in Baghdad air strike, 3 January 2020, url
Knights, M., Reacting Smartly to Harassing tactics by Iraqi Militias, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 29 July 2020,
url; Kohlmann, E., Profile and Exclusive Interview with Iraqi Shiite Insurgents Ashab al-Kahf, Flashpoint, 20 August 2020, url; BBC
News, Iraqi interpreters ‘stalked by death squads’ for helping the British, 30 December 2020, url; UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs
Overview Iraq, February 2021, url, p. 17; Smith, C. et al., Team of Legal Gladiators? Iraqi Militias’ Tortured Relationship with Law, 12
April 2021, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, url; Kahan E. and Lawlor, K., ISIS and Iranian-backed Militias Compete toControl Baghdad Region, ISW, 19 May 2021, url; Knights, M. et al., Discordance in the Iran Threat Network in Iraq: Militia
Competition and Rivalry, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 2021, url, p. 1
900
Kahan E. and Lawlor, K., ISIS and Iranian-backed Militias Compete to Control Baghdad Region, ISW, 19 May 2021, url. See also
Loveluck, L. et al, They served alongside U.S. soldiers. Now they fear that Iran’s allies in Iraq will strike back, 12 November 2020,
The Washington Post,
url; Knights, M. et al., Discordance in the Iran Threat Network in Iraq: Militia Competition and Rivalry, The Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, October 2021, url, p. 3901
Knights, M., Reacting Smartly to Harassing tactics by Iraqi Militias, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 29 July 2020,
url
902
Loveluck, L. et al, They served alongside U.S. soldiers. Now they fear that Iran’s allies in Iraq will strike back, 12 November
2020, The Washington Post, url
903
UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020), Report of the Secretary-General, 8 February 2021, url, p. 5
904
UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020), Report of the Secretary-General, 4 May 2021, url, pp. 4, 5
905
UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020), Report of the Secretary-General, 3 August 2021, url, p. 4906
Knights, M. et al., Discordance in the Iran Threat Network in Iraq: Militia Competition and Rivalry, The Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, October 2021, url, footnote a, p. 1
907
Knights, M. et al., Discordance in the Iran Threat Network in Iraq: Militia Competition and Rivalry, The Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, October 2021, url, p. 7
898

899

95

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

attacks occurred. 908 These attacks have mainly damaged the trucks and transported materieland supplies, but in some instances have also wounded or killed the Iraqi contractors (seesection 9.2) who are primarily responsible for driving these trucks or escorting the convoys. 909
Explanations put forward for these attacks were to weaken or end the coalition’s presence in
Iraq 910 and intimidate Iraqi businesses cooperating with the United States 911, with a US official
reportingly stating that these attacks ‘now focused on Iraqi who work for the coalition, rather
than the coalition forces itself’.912
Convoy attacks have been attributed to Kataib Hezbollah (KH) 913, members from PMF units 914,
and other Iranian-backed militias, ‘self-styled as al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya (“the Islamic
Resistence”)’ 915, including the ‘façade groups’ Qasem al-Jabbarin 916, Ashab al-Kahf 917, Saraya
Awliya al-Dam918, Saraya Tawrat al-Ashreen Al-Thaniya (STAT), and Usbat al-Thairen (UaT). 919
According to interviews conducted by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy ‘façadegroup brands’ are used to ‘threaten and coerce contract workers on military bases andembassies’ 920, have posted warnings ‘advising drivers and other civilians to steer clear of U.S.
military supply convoys […] has even named the companies behind contractor convoys it iseyeing’ 921, and have stated that these Iraqis working for the Coalition forces have become

Kohlmann, E., Profile and Exclusive Interview with Iraqi Shiite Insurgents Ashab al-Kahf, Flashpoint, 20 August 2020, url; UN
Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020), Report of the Secretary-General, 10 November 2020, url p. 5; UN
Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020), Report of the Secretary-General, 8 February 2021, url, p. 5; UN
Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020), Report of the Secretary-General, 4 May 2021, url, pp. 4, 5; Kahan E.
and Lawlor, K., ISIS and Iranian-backed Militias Compete to Control Baghdad Region, ISW, 19 May 2021, url; UN Security Council,
Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020), Report of the Secretary-General, 3 August 2021, url, p. 4909
Knights, M., Reacting Smartly to Harassing tactics by Iraqi Militias, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 29 July 2020,
url; Institute for the Study of War, Iraq Situation Report: August 19 – 25, 2020, 28 August 2020, url; UN Security Council,
Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020), Report of the Secretary-General, 10 November 2020, url p. 5; Loveluck, L. et al, They
served alongside U.S. soldiers. Now they fear that Iran’s allies in Iraq will strike back, 12 November 2020, The Washington Post,
url; Smith, C. et al., Team of Legal Gladiators? Iraqi Militias’ Tortured Relationship with Law, 12 April 2021, The Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, url
910
Kohlmann, E., Profile and Exclusive Interview with Iraqi Shiite Insurgents Ashab al-Kahf, Flashpoint, 20 August 2020, url;Institute for the Study of War, Iraq Situation Report: August 12 – 18, 2020, 21 August 2020, url; UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs
Overview Iraq, February 2021,
url, p. 17
911
Institute for the Study of War, Iraq Situation Report: August 12 – 18, 2020, 21 August 2020, url; Kahan E. and Lawlor, K., ISISand Iranian-backed Militias Compete to Control Baghdad Region, ISW, 19 May 2021, url
912
BBC News, Iraqi interpreters 'stalked by death squads' for helping the British, 30 December 2020, url
913
For more information on this non-state armed group see Knights M. et al., Profile: Kataib Hezbollah, The Washington Institutefor Near East Policy, 1 April 2021, url
914
Knights, M. et al., Discordance in the Iran Threat Network in Iraq: Militia Competition and Rivalry, The Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, October 2021, url, p. 7
915
For more information on this terminology see Smith, C. et al., Team of Legal Gladiators? Iraqi Militias’ Tortured Relationshipwith Law, 12 April 2021, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, url
916
For more information on this non-state armed group see Smith, C. et al., Profile: Qasem al-Jabbarin, 1 April 2021, The
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, url
917
For more information on this non-state armed group see Kohlmann, E. (Flashpoint), Profile and Exclusive Interview with Iraqi
Shiite Insurgents Ashab al-Kahf, 20 August 2020, url
918
For more information on this non-state armed group see Smith, C. et al., Profile: Saraya Awliya al-Dam, 29 March 2021, The
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, url919
Institute for the Study of War, Iraq Situation Report: July 8-14, 2020, 17 July 2020, url; Institute for the Study of War, Iraq
Situation Report: July 29 – August 05, 2020, 7 August 2020, url; Kohlmann, E., Profile and Exclusive Interview with Iraqi Shiite
Insurgents Ashab al-Kahf, Flashpoint, 20 August 2020, url; Smith, C. et al., Team of Legal Gladiators? Iraqi Militias’ Tortured
Relationship with Law, 12 April 2021, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, url; Knights, M. et al., Discordance in the Iran
Threat Network in Iraq: Militia Competition and Rivalry, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 2021, url, pp. 3, 7
920
Knights, M. et al., Discordance in the Iran Threat Network in Iraq: Militia Competition and Rivalry, October 2021, The
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, url, p. 11. See also Kohlmann, E., Profile and Exclusive Interview with Iraqi Shiite
Insurgents Ashab al-Kahf, Flashpoint, 20 August 2020, url
921
Kohlmann, E., Profile and Exclusive Interview with Iraqi Shiite Insurgents Ashab al-Kahf, Flashpoint, 20 August 2020, url. See
also NPR, Laid Off By U.S. Contractor, Iraqi Interpreters Fear ISIS Retaliation, 12 June 2020, url
908

96IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

kafirs (“Unbelievers”) 922. In early 2020 Shia militia leaders threatened to target and kill those
who continued to work with western forces, specifying that they included those working forthe ‘Iraqi transportation and security companies, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of
Defense, and the Iraqi Counterterrorism Service’, 923 ‘describing them as enemies who will be“eliminated”’ 924. In October 2020, the militia Ashab al-Kahf published a statement ‘suggestingthat the group would be willing to “forgive” and even provide a salary to those who identified
themselves as working on a U.S. military installation’ 925 and also raised a ‘veiled threat againstinterpreters working with British forces specifically’. 926 In June 2020 a list containing personal
identifying information about Iraqis working for western forces had been obtained by Iranianbacked militias 927 and reportedly Sabereen/Sabreen News (the media network used by ‘allresistance factions in Iraq’ 928), has ‘leaked documents purporting to show government
databases containing details of Iraqi citizens’ since October 2020. 929
Between June 2020 and May 2021 a number of news articles were published which included
interviews with Iraqis who had worked for the British or U.S. military or the U.S-led Coalition asinterpreters or contractors and who feared being targeted by non-government armed groups,
some of whom received threatening messages or felt observed. 930 It was specifically reported
that Iraqi interpreters working for the U.S. military or the U.S.-led Coalition, amongst others at
training centres for Iraqi Kurdish and Arab forces, feared targeted attacks from ISIL and Iranbacked militias who view them as kafir [unbeliever]. 931 An Iraqi interpreter working for the
British Army told the BBC News that ever since the killing in January 2020 of the Iranian
military commander, Qasem Soleimani, and his Iraqi counter-part, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis,
deputy chief of the PMF, he felt that ‘some of the Iraqi forces that were being trained by thecoalition started to treat us like an enemy’. 932 According to one source two Iraqi translators
saw militiamen stationed near an Iraqi military checkpoint ‘check a list containing personal
information that had been acquired from a military coordination center run by the Iraqi
security forces’. 933 Other Iraqi interpreters told NPR that they are ‘easily’ identifiable and‘hunted down’, posing a threat to themselves and their families. 934 According to eighttranslators who worked for the British military and are now in hiding, one of them received‘three AK-47 bullets, representing each member of his family’ with a message ‘threatening
NPR, Laid Off By U.S. Contractor, Iraqi Interpreters Fear ISIS Retaliation, 12 June 2020, url; BBC News, Iraqi interpreters‘stalked by death squads’ for helping the British, 30 December 2020, url
923
ISW, Iraq Situation Report: February 26 – March 3, 2020, 6 March 2020, url
924
Australia, DFAT, DFAT Country Information Report Iraq, 17 August 2020, url, p. 34
925
Loveluck, L. et al, They served alongside U.S. soldiers. Now they fear that Iran’s allies in Iraq will strike back, 12 November
2020, The Washington Post, url. See also BBC News, Iraqi interpreters 'stalked by death squads' for helping the British, 30
December 2020, url
926
The Independent, They helped British soldiers in Iraq. Now they’ve been left behind to die, 11 May 2021, url
927
Loveluck, L. et al, They served alongside U.S. soldiers. Now they fear that Iran’s allies in Iraq will strike back, 12 November
2020, The Washington Post, url; BBC News, Iraqi interpreters 'stalked by death squads' for helping the British, 30 December
2020, url
928
Malik, H. et al, Profile: Sabereen News, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 9 April 2021, url
929
The Independent, They helped British soldiers in Iraq. Now they’ve been left behind to die, 11 May 2021, url
930
NPR, Laid Off By U.S. Contractor, Iraqi Interpreters Fear ISIS Retaliation, 12 June 2020, url; Loveluck, L. et al, They served
alongside U.S. soldiers. Now they fear that Iran’s allies in Iraq will strike back, 12 November 2020, The Washington Post, url; BBC
News, Iraqi interpreters ‘stalked by death squads’ for helping the British, 30 December 2020, url; Chloe Cornish, Iraqi translators
live in terror as the west withdraws, Financial Times, 1 December 2020, url; The Times, Iraqi interpreters ask Britain for sanctuary
after death threats, 26 February 2021, url; The Independent, They helped British soldiers in Iraq. Now they’ve been left behind todie, 11 May 2021, url
931
NPR, Laid Off By U.S. Contractor, Iraqi Interpreters Fear ISIS Retaliation, 12 June 2020, url. See also Loveluck, L. et al, They
served alongside U.S. soldiers. Now they fear that Iran’s allies in Iraq will strike back, 12 November 2020, The Washington Post,
url
932
BBC News, Iraqi interpreters ‘stalked by death squads’ for helping the British, 30 December 2020, url
933
Loveluck, L. et al, They served alongside U.S. soldiers. Now they fear that Iran’s allies in Iraq will strike back, 12 November
2020, The Washington Post, url
934
NPR, Laid Off By U.S. Contractor, Iraqi Interpreters Fear ISIS Retaliation, 12 June 2020, url
922

97IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

punishment’, whilst another felt watched by a group of ‘strange men’ in a ‘white SUV,
interrogating his neighbours about his work’. 935
According to reporting by the Australian DFAT, Iraqi translators and ‘others working with theinternational community’ continued to experience ‘strong societal hostility, particularly in Shi’aareas’. 936 The same source further noted that ‘in-country sources’ had reported that Iraqis
working for the international communities, in particular western militaries and embassies ‘take
substantial measures to mitigate the risks they face’ including hiding their employer fromfamilies and communities, avoiding speaking foreign languages in particular English,‘changing clothing at work, avoiding appearing in work-related photographs, not travellingwith documentation that would identify their international connections, and deleting contact
information from phones’. 937 The UN Security Council noted that between January and June
2020 ISIL targeted ‘members of its own community who are deemed to be collaborators’. 938

9.2 Instances of targeting of persons belonging to thisprofileReporting on specific instances focused primarily on the targeting of logistics convoys
contracted by the US-led Coalition, but where Iraqi contractors are mainly employed. A
number of these sources have documented the wounding and killing of individual Iraqis in2020 due to these attacks. 939 The following are illustrative, but not exhaustive, incidents ofattacks on convoys that resulted in injuries or killings of Iraqi contractors:••••

Between 11 August and 2 October 2020: 17 IED-led convey attacks in Babil, Baghdad,
Thi-Qar, Qadisiyah and Salah al-Din governorates were reported resulting in the deathof two Iraqis and seven wounded. 940
21 January 2021: an IED detonated near a convoy on the highway near Abu Ghraib,injuring one security guard. 941
5 February 2021: ‘An Iran aligned militia targeted Coalition forces in Erbil, killing one
civilian contractor [a Filipino national] and wounding nine other people’. 942
15 February 2021: an IED targeted a contractor convoy for the International Coalition in
the Rashid district of Yusufiya, south of Baghdad, injuring an Iraqi lieutenant ‘providing
security for the convoy’. 943

The Independent, They helped British soldiers in Iraq. Now they’ve been left behind to die, 11 May 2021, url
Australia, DFAT, DFAT Country Information Report Iraq, 17 August 2020, url, p. 34
937
Australia, DFAT, DFAT Country Information Report Iraq, 17 August 2020, url, p. 34
938
UN Security Council, Letter dated 16 July 2020 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267
(1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals,
groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council, 23 July 2020, url, p. 6939
Knights, M., Reacting Smartly to Harassing tactics by Iraqi Militias, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 29 July 2020,
url; Institute for the Study of War, Iraq Situation Report: August 19 – 25, 2020, 28 August 2020, url; UN Security Council,
Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020), Report of the Secretary-General, 10 November 2020, url p. 5; Loveluck, L. et al, They
served alongside U.S. soldiers. Now they fear that Iran’s allies in Iraq will strike back, 12 November 2020, The Washington Post,
url
940
UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020), Report of the Secretary-General, 10 November 2020, url, p. 5.
See also ISW, Iraq Situation Report: August 19-25, 2020, url
941
Epic, ISHM: January 14 – January 21, 2021, 21 January 2021, url
942
U.S. Lead Inspector General, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress,
January 1, 2021-March 31, 2021, 14 May 2021, url, p. 2 and 15
943
Epic, ISHM: February 11 – February 25, 2021, 25 February 2021, url
935

936

98

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

•
•
•
•

•
•

18 February 2021: an IED targeted a contractor convoy working for the International
Coalition on the main highway in Diwaniyah province, injuring one contractor. 944
29 March 2021: an IED targeted a contractor convoy for the International Coalition on
the highway outside Hilla in Babylon province, injuring an Iraqi driver’. 945
7 April 2021: an IED exploded on a contractor convoy in Balad district, causing
casualties without providing further details. 946
22 April 2021: an IED exploded near an International Coalition contractor convoy
travelling on the international highway in Babylon province, injuring an Iraqi
contractor. Spokesman for the U.S. Joint Task Force was reported as stating that theattacks are not targeting American forces, but rather, innocent ‘Iraqi civilians who aretrying to make a living and support their families’. 947
23 May 2021: an IED attack on a supply convoy in Anbar province injured an Iraqi
contractor. 948
13 June 2021:a roadside IED targeting a logistical supply convoy on the Nassriya
highway in Thi-Qar Governorate injured ‘three members of the team in charge ofprotecting the convoy, two Iraqis and a foreign man’. 949

Epic, ISHM: February 11 – February 25, 2021, 25 February 2021, url
Epic, ISHM: March 25 – April 1, 2021, 1 April 2021, url
946
Epic, ISHM: April 1 – April 8, 2021, 8 April 2021, url
947
Epic, ISHM: April 15 – April 22, 2021, 22 April 2021, url
948
Epic, ISHM: May 20 – May 27, 2021, 27 May 2021, url
949
Shafaq, Six injured in an explosion that targeted a Logistics Convoy of the Global Coalition south Iraq, 13 June 2021, url. See
also ACLED, Regional Overview: Middle East 12-18 June 2021, 23 June 2021, url; Epic, ISHM: June 10 – June 17, 2021, 17 June
2021, url
944

945

99

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

10. Atheists, converts and individuals
considered to have committed apostasy
10.1 Prevalence in KRI / Iraq
According to the CIA World Factbook, as of 20 October 2021, between 95 and 98 % of the
population of Iraq were Muslim. 950 It has been noted that it is impossible to identify the size ofthe non-religious population in Iraq 951 nor the number of Christian converts in the KRI. 952 An
August 2020 DFAT report estimated that there are around 1 000 Baha’is living in Iraq andsome Muslim leaders consider Baha’is to be apostates from Islam. 953 A Reuters article notedin September 2020 that the Zoroastrianism Yasna association in Kurdistan has around 15 000
people registered with the organisation, most of whom were Kurds converting from Islam. 954
Sources pointed to a rise in recent years of secularism 955 and atheism 956 in Iraq and thenumbers of Muslims converting to Zoroastrianism in the KRI 957. A September 2020 article by
Al Monitor noted that this rising trend is supported by increased activism amongst young
secularists as well as decreased mosque attendance, with the number of Iraqis who say theyattend Friday prayers falling from 60 % to 33 % over a five year period. 958 According to a poll
conducted by Arab Barometer in Iraq, Jordan, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt and Libya, thepercentage of Arabs who describe themselves as ‘not religious’ in 2018 was 13 %, a rise from
8 % in 2013. 959 An article published in the Review of Nationalities in May 2021 noted that the
KRI had the largest number of atheism supporters in Iraq, based on interviews and reports. 960
In considering the development and causes of atheism in Iraq, the same article argued thatthe historical brutality of ISIL, Al-Qaeda and Ansar al Islam, and the advent of Islamic radicals
created increasing rebellion against the presence of religion in social and political life in
Iraq. 961

CIA World Factbook, Iraq, 20 October 2021, url
UK All-Party Parliamentary Group for International Freedom of Religion or Belief, Commentary on the Current State ofInternational Freedom of Religion or Belief (2020), February 2021, url, p. 32
952
US Department of State, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Iraq, 12 May 2021, url, Section I. Religious
Demography; Canada, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Iraq: Situation and treatment of Christians, particularly in thenorth, the Kurdistan region, and Baghdad; government protection and support programs (2017–September 2020) [IRQ200350.E],
9 October 2020, url; Australia, DFAT, DFAT Country Information Report on Iraq, 17 August 2020, url, para. 3.46
953
Australia, DFAT, DFAT Country Information Report on Iraq, 17 August 2020, url, para. 3.67
954
Reuters, Zoroastrians make a comeback in northern Iraq, but still face stigma, 30 September 2020, url; Ekurd Daily,
Zoroastrians make a comeback in Iraqi Kurdistan, but still face stigma, 2 October 2020, url
955
Deutsche Welle, Middle East: Are people losing their religion?, 4 February 2021, url; Al Monitor, Are Iraqi youths losing theirreligion?, 11 September 2020, url; Graczyk, A., Atheism and the changing image of Islam in Iraq, Review of Nationalities No.10(2020), 18 May 2021, url, pp. 5-6
956
Humanists International, Iraq, 28 October; 2020, url; Graczyk, A., Atheism and the changing image of Islam in Iraq, Review of
Nationalities No.10 (2020), 18 May 2021, url, pp. 5-6; Germany, FFO and BMZ, The Federal Government’s Second Report on the
Global Status of Freedom of Religion: Reporting period 2018 – 2019, 28 October 2020
url, p. 191; CIRSD, Battle for the Soul of Islam, Winter 2021, url
957
Australia, DFAT, DFAT Country Information Report on Iraq, 17 August 2020, url, para. 3.43
958
Al Monitor, Are Iraqi youths losing their religion?, 11 September 2020, url
959
Al Monitor, Are Iraqi youths losing their religion?, 11 September 2020, url
960
Graczyk, A., Atheism and the changing image of Islam in Iraq, Review of Nationalities No.10 (2020), 18 May 2021, url, p. 8
961
Graczyk, A., Atheism and the changing image of Islam in Iraq, Review of Nationalities No.10 (2020), 18 May 2021, url, pp. 4-5
950
951

100

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

An August 2020 DFAT report noted that it is reportedly easier to convert from Islam in the
KRI. At a national level, those disillusioned with their faith more commonly become
nonreligious rather than undergo conversion. 962

10.2 Treatment of atheists, converts and perceived
apostates
There is low social tolerance of atheism in Iraq 963 and non-religious people reportedly facesignificant social marginalisation and stigma, while open conversions are reportedly rare
because of ostracism. 964 In the first half of 2020, Humanists International 965 received over 45
requests for assistance internationally, 7 % of which came from Iraq, reporting abuse,ostracism or difficulty finding employment. 966
In May 2020, the Wilson Center reported that conservative Sunni clerics cited conspiracy
theories that blamed atheists for triggering the Covid-19 pandemic with some clerics statingthat the pandemic was divine punishment against non- believers. 967 According to a May 2021
report published in the Review of Nationalities, politicians and the clergy publicly labelledatheists as enemies of the state and traitors to God who threaten to destroy tradition anddestabilise society, calling for their punishment. 968 There are many websites and online
forums catering to atheists in Iraq 969 but membership lists are hidden. Groups that meetvirtually or in person do so in secret for fear of surveillance. 970
International Christian Concern noted in March 2020 that the risk of being targeted by theirfamilies left many converts homeless, jobless, and with nowhere to go. 971 Owing to thesocietal pressure and threats facing them from extended family members, clan leaders or
wider society, Christian converts often keep their faith a secret. 972 The Voice of the Martyrs 973
noted on its website that those who convert from Islam to Christianity can be rejected andabused by their families and may be killed or persecuted by clan or tribe members, stateauthorities or extremist groups. 974

Australia, DFAT, DFAT Country Information Report on Iraq, 17 August 2020, url, para. 3.43
Humanists International, Iraq, 28 October 2020, url964
Humanists International, Iraq, 28 October 2020, url
965
Humanists International are an international NGO that seeks to represent the global humanist movement. The organisation
supports humanists who are at direct threat for and/or unable to live in accordance with their humanist values. See url
966
Humanists International, Humanists at Risk: Action Report 2020, 25 June 2020, url, p. 10967
Wilson Centre, What Islamists Are Doing and Saying on COVID-19 Crisis, 14 May 2020, url
968
Graczyk, A., Atheism and the changing image of Islam in Iraq, Review of Nationalities No.10 (2020), 18 May 2021, url, p. 7
969
Examples of social media groups include: Iraqi Atheists; Irreligious Society; Iraqi Atheist Youth; and Atheists are unique.
Graczyk, A., Atheism and the changing image of Islam in Iraq, Review of Nationalities No.10 (2020), 18 May 2021, url, pp. 5-6
970
Graczyk, A., Atheism and the changing image of Islam in Iraq, Review of Nationalities No.10 (2020), 18 May 2021, url, pp. 5-6.
Examples of social media groups include: Iraqi Atheists; Irreligious Society; Iraqi Atheist Youth; and Atheists are unique. Graczyk,
A., Atheism and the changing image of Islam in Iraq, Review of Nationalities No.10 (2020), 18 May 2021, url, pp. 5-6
971
International Christian Concern, Iraqis’ Faith Grows as Churches Close, 30 March 2020, url
972
Open Doors, World Watch List 2021: Iraq, January 2021, url
973
The Voice of the Martyrs is a non-profit, interdenominational missions organisation that aims to ‘serve persecuted Christians
around the world’. See url
974
The Voice of the Martyrs, Global Prayer Guide: Iraq, n.d., url
962
963

101

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

10.3 Treatment of atheists, converts and perceived
apostates by state authorities
The Iraqi Constitution of 2005 established Islam as the official religion and no law may beenacted that contradicts the ‘established provisions of Islam’. While the Constitution provides
for freedom of religious belief, it does not explicitly mention followers of other religions andatheists. 975 Article 2 of the Constitution states that:‘First: Islam is the official religion of the State and is a foundation source of legislation:
A. No law may be enacted that contradicts the established provisions of Islam.
B. No law may be enacted that contradicts the principles of democracy.
C. No law may be enacted that contradicts the rights and basic freedoms stipulated inthis Constitution.
Second: This Constitution guarantees the Islamic identity of the majority of the Iraqi
people and guarantees the full religious rights to freedom of religious belief andpractice of all individuals such as Christians, Yazidis, and Mandean Sabaeans.’ 976
Section Two of the Iraqi Penal Code of 1969 contains provisions relating to ‘Offences that
violate religious sensibilities’. Article 372 of the Code states that:‘The following persons are punishable by a period of detention not exceeding 3 years
or by a fine not exceeding 300 dinars:(1) Any person who attacks the creed of a religious minority or pours scorn on its
religious practices.
(2) Any person who wilfully disrupts a religious ceremony, festival or meeting of areligious minority or who wilfully prevents or obstructs the performance of such ritual.
(3) Any person who wrecks, destroys, defaces or desecrates a building set aside forthe ceremonies of a religious minority or symbol or anything that is sacred to it.
(4) Any person who prints or publishes a book sacred to a religious minority anddeliberately misspells the texts so that the meaning of the text is altered or who
makes light of its tenets or teachings.
(5) Any person who publicly insults a symbol or a person who constitutes an object ofsanctification, worship or reverence to a religious minority.
(6) Any person who publicly imitates a religious ceremony or celebration with intent todeceive’. 977
Whilst atheism is not prohibited by law, Humanists International noted that atheists have beenprosecuted for blasphemy and other related charges. 978 An article published in the Review of
Nationalities stated that non-believers can fall into the category of Article 372 because of thelack of precise legal provisions and the freedom of interpretation amongst the judiciary. 979
Freedom House noted in their annual report for 2020 that although blasphemy laws are
rarely enforced, the judiciary is influenced by corruption, political pressure, tribal forces, andreligious interests. 980

US Department of State, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Iraq, 12 May 2021, url, Executive Summary
Iraq, Iraqi Constitution, 2005, available url
977
Government of Iraq, Iraq Penal Code, July 1969, url
978
Humanists International, Iraq, 28 October 2020, url
979
Graczyk, A., Atheism and the changing image of Islam in Iraq, Review of Nationalities No.10 (2020), 18 May 2021, url, p. 6-7
980
Freedom House, Annual report on political rights and civil liberties in 2020, 3 March 2021, url
975

976

102

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

According to a February 2021 report by the UK All-Party Parliamentary Group for International
Freedom of Religion or Belief, humanists, atheists and secularists are considered apostasisers
and blasphemers and, as a result, face repression across Iraq, in a climate of impunity or
collusion in violence by state actors. 981
According to Humanists International, a fifteen year old boy from Erbil was imprisoned andtortured in 2014 after his father reported him to the police following a disclosure of nonbelief. 982 No recent examples of prosecution of atheists in the KRI have been found. In March
2018, four men received arrest warrants in Thi-Qar in Iraq on charges of atheism. 983 In May
2020, a doctor was sentenced to two years imprisonment for promoting atheism and insulting
the prophet of Islam in Al-Qadissiyah province. 984 The court found that his actions online
offended the position of the Prophet and the religious feelings of Muslims around the world,
thereon sentencing him according to provisions Articles 372/1 and 5 of the Penal Code. 985
In October 2021, the Supreme Judicial Council issued a statement noting that a judicial order
had been issued in order to enable the monitoring of social media sites so as to ensure
adherence to the Penal Code and the Iraqi Constitution. This included monitoring social
media sites promoting atheism, deemed to threaten national values and contradict the
principles of Islam (notably preserving Islamic identity), as stipulated in the Constitution of the
Republic of Iraq of 2005. 986
An article published in the Review of Nationalities in May 2021 noted that there are ‘special
institutions looking for and arresting people who do not agree with the line of the state’. The
article further noted that whilst civil law does not impose penalties on atheists, Islamic law
states that apostasy is punishable by death, and ‘in the public awareness, denial of God
should be punished, and therefore, lynch law often applies’. Owing to this fear atheists keep
their view secret and can fast alongside believers during fasting, while women may wear ahijab in public places against their will. 987
The Personal Status Law recognises the following religious groups: Muslims, Chaldeans,
Assyrians, Assyrian Catholics, Syriac Orthodox, Syriac Catholics, Armenian Apostolic,Armenian Catholics, Roman Catholics, National Protestants, Anglicans, Evangelical Protestant
Assyrians, Seventh-day Adventists, Coptic Orthodox, Yazidis, Sabean-Mandeans, and Jews. 988
The formal recognition of nontheist groups and other religious minority groups, such as
humanists, Kaka’is, Baha’is and Jehovah witnesses is denied. 989 The US Department of State
noted in May 2021 that recognised religious groups are able to appoint legal practitioners andperform legal transactions. These groups, with the exception of the Yazidis, have their own
personal status courts, which handle marriage, divorce, and inheritance issues. 990 The law
UK All-Party Parliamentary Group for International Freedom of Religion or Belief, Commentary on the Current State ofInternational Freedom of Religion or Belief (2020), February 2021, url, p.33
982
Humanists International, Iraq, 28 October 2020, url
983
Graczyk, A., Atheism and the changing image of Islam in Iraq, Review of Nationalities No.10 (2020), 18 May 2021, url, p.8
984
Graczyk, A., Atheism and the changing image of Islam in Iraq, Review of Nationalities No.10 (2020), 18 May 2021, url, p.8
985
Republic of Iraq Supreme Judicial Council/ High Judicial Court, Imprisonment for two years for a convict insulting theposition of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) through social media pages, 13 May 2020, url
986
Republic of Iraq Supreme Judicial Council/ High Judicial Court, Clarification, 4 October 2021, url
987
Graczyk, A., Atheism and the changing image of Islam in Iraq, Review of Nationalities No.10 (2020), 18 May 2021, url, pp. 6-7
988
US Department of State, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Iraq, 12 May 2021, url, Section II. Status ofGovernment Respect for Religious Freedom
989
United States Commission on International Religious Freedom 2021 Annual Report; USCIRF – Recommended for Special
Watchlist: Iraq, April 2021, url, p. 75
990
US Department of State, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Iraq, 12 May 2021, url, Section II. Status ofGovernment Respect for Religious Freedom
981

103

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

does not contain provisions for penalties for the practice of unrecognised religious groups,
except for the Baha’is. However, legal contracts signed by ‘institutions of unrecognised
religious groups are not legal or permissible as evidence in court’. 991
According to the US Department of State’s annual report covering 2020, in the KRI thepersonal status laws forbidding Muslims to convert to another religion was rarely enforced. 992
Outside the KRI, the law does not provide a mechanism for a new religious group to obtainlegal recognition. In the KRI, religious groups are able to obtain official recognition byregistering with the KRG’s Ministry of Endowment and Religious Affairs. 993 DFAT’s August2020 report noted that it is reportedly easier to convert from Islam in the KRI with a growing
trend of Muslim Kurds converting to Zoroastrianism. 994 The KRG officially recognised
Zoroastrianism in 2015 but the federal Iraqi government still registers converts from Islam as
Muslims. 995
Whilst civil laws provide a simple process for non-Muslims to convert to Islam, the personal
status laws prohibit the conversion of Muslims to other religions. If a child has one Muslim
parent or if one parent has converted to Islam, the child is designated Muslim, even if thechild is a product of rape. 996
Article 26 of the Nationality Identity Card Law sets the religious affiliation of minor children on
ID cards as Muslim if one parent is Muslim or has converted to Islam. Law No. 3 of 2016
concerning the National Identity Card does not contain provisions for Muslims to convert but
Article 26 notes that the children of converts to Islam become Muslim automatically 997 The UK
All-Party Parliamentary Group for International Freedom of Religion or Belief noted in
February 2021 that atheists, agnostics and humanists are unable to record their faith identity
on national ID cards.998
According to Christian leaders, Christian families who are registered as Muslim but practice
Christianity or another faith in private are forced to either register their children as Muslims or
have their children undocumented by federal authorities. If undocumented without a national
identity card, families are ineligible for government benefits and children cannot enrol inschool enrolment. 999 Undocumented people without national identity cards are unable toaccess other rights and services, including healthcare and the property ownership. 1000 For
more information about Christian converts, see 4.1.3 Situation of Christian converts in Iraq
and the KRI.

US Department of State, Iraq 2019 International Religious Freedom Report: Iraq, 11 June 2020, url, Section II. Status ofGovernment Respect for Religious Freedom
992
US Department of State, Annual report on human rights in 2020, 30 March 2021, url, Section 6. Discrimination, Societal
Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons
993
US Department of State, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Iraq, 12 May 2021, url, Section II. Status ofGovernment Respect for Religious Freedom
994
Australia, DFAT, DFAT Country Information Report on Iraq, 17 August 2020, url, para. 3.43
995
Reuters, Zoroastrians make a comeback in northern Iraq, but still face stigma, 30 September 2020, url; Ekurd Daily,
Zoroastrians make a comeback in Iraqi Kurdistan, but still face stigma, 2 October 2020, url
996
US Department of State, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Iraq, 12 May 2021, url, Section II. Status ofGovernment Respect for Religious Freedom; Australia, DFAT, DFAT Country Information Report on Iraq, 17 August 2020, url,para. 3.43
997
Graczyk, A., Atheism and the changing image of Islam in Iraq, Review of Nationalities No.10 (2020), 18 May 2021, url, p. 4998
UK All-Party Parliamentary Group for International Freedom of Religion or Belief, Commentary on the Current State ofInternational Freedom of Religion or Belief (2020), February 2021, url, p. 33
999
US Department of State, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Iraq, 12 May 2021, url, Section II. Status ofGovernment Respect for Religious Freedom
1000
Minority Rights Group, Iraq: Bahá’í, n.d., url
991

104

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

10.4 Treatment of atheists, converts and apostates by
non-state actors
During the rise of ISIL, Christians were forcibly converted to Islam, abducted, raped and/or
killed, 1001 with some 140 000 Christians fleeing their homes in mid-2014; 1002 Kaka’is were
threatened with death if they did not convert to Islam; 1003 Sabean-Mandaeans fled ISIL
controlled areas to avoid forced conversions or death; 1004 and Yazidis suffered a range ofatrocities, including forced conversions. 1005 In August 2014, thousands of Yazidi women andgirls were captured by ISIS militants who imposed conversion to Islam. If women refused, they
were killed. 1006 Further information about religious and ethnic minorities is provided in Chapter
4. Freedom House noted in a March 2021 open letter that the risk of ISIL remains as extremist
clerics across Iraq continue to promulgate hate speech against religious minorities. 1007 Within
the research timeframe for this report no additional information was located amongst thesources consulted on the treatment of atheists, converts and apostates by non-state actors.

Australia, DFAT, DFAT Country Information Report on Iraq, 17 August 2020, url, paras. 3.50 and 3.64; Minority Rights Group,
Iraq: Assyrians, n.d., url
1002
Los Angeles Times, Pope Francis arrives in Iraq, where beleaguered Christians are struggling to hold on, 5 March 2021, url
1003
Australia, DFAT, DFAT Country Information Report on Iraq, 17 August 2020, url, paras. 3.50 and 3.64;
Minority Rights Group, Iraq: Kaka’i’, n.d., ,url
1004
Minority Rights Group, Iraq: Sabean-Mandaeans, n.d.,url1005
Minority Rights Group, Iraq: Current Issues, n.d., url; US Department of State, 2020 Report on International Religious
Freedom: Iraq, 12 May 2021, url, Section II. Status of Government Respect for Religious Freedom
1006
Global Network of Peacebuilders, Seeking Accountability and Preventing Reoccurrence: Addressing Conflict-Related Sexual
Slavery through them Women, Peace and Security Agenda, Case Study: Conflict-Related Sexual Slavery and the Yazidi
Genocide, Iraq, December 2020, url, p. 4
1007
Freedom House, Open Letter to the Holy See on Pope Francis' Visit to Iraq, 4 March 2021, url
1001

105

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Annex 1: Bibliography
Oral sources, including anonymous sources
The following source wished to remain anonymous and be quoted only by their profession orby the area of expertise and work experience due to security reasons.
Middle East Researcher, video-chat Interview with EUAA, 3 November 2021. The researcher
has worked in the field for several years and has extensive knowledge on several Middle
Eastern countries including Iraq. The researcher has insight to the situation and treatment of
persons (perceived to be) ISIL affiliates and issues of westernization.
PhD Researcher, telephone interview with EUAA, 24 November 2021. The researcher isbased in the Middle East and has significant experience researching Iraqi tribal dynamics.
Public sources
1001 Iraqi Thoughts, Security in the Nineveh Plains: What it means for Assyrians, 19 January
2021, https://1001iraqithoughts.com/2021/01/19/security-in-the-nineveh-plains-what-it-meansfor-assyrians/, accessed 23 October 2021
AA (Anadolu Agency), Iraq hunts down Daesh/ISIS terrorists in Nineveh, 17 October 2021,
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/iraq-hunts-down-daesh-isis-terrorists-innineveh/2394827, accessed 23 October 2021
AA (Anadolu Agency), Iraq: Teenager killed in Sulaymaniyah protests, 7 December 2020,
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/iraq-teenager-killed-in-sulaymaniyah-protests/2068492,
accessed 1 November 2021
AA (Anadolu Agency), Iraq's divorce rate steadily mounting: Judicial source, 31 January 2018https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/iraqs-divorce-rate-steadily-mounting-judicialsource/1048625, accessed 13 October 2021
AA (Anadolu Agency), Kerkük’te Irak Türkmen Cephesi bürosuna saldırı [informal translation:
Attack on the Kirkuk office of the Iraq Turkmen Front], 20 October 2020,
https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/kerkukte-irak-turkmen-cephesi-burosuna-saldiri/2012619,
accessed 18 October 2021
AA (Anadolu Agency), Iraq rejects request for ‘special court’ for Daesh trials, 28 June 2021,
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/iraq-rejects-request-for-special-court-for-daeshtrials/2287259, accessed 16 December 2021
Abdelhameed H., The Pink and Purple Protest: Iraqi Women Invert the Gender Game,
Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1 April 2020,
https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/the-pink-and-purple-protest-iraqiwomen-invert-the-gender-game/, accessed 3 November 2021
Abed A., Violence against women in Iraq: between practice and legislation, LSE’s Middle East
Centre Blog, 8 July 2020, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2020/07/08/violence-against-womenin-iraq-between-practice-and-legislation/, accessed 7 October 2021
106

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

ACCORD (Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation),
Query response on Iraq: Salah ad Din Governorate, esp. Samarra: Situation upon return, 10
September 2021, https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/2060263.html, accessed 13 October
2021
ACLED (The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project), ACLED 2020: The year in review,
March 2021, https://acleddata.com/acleddatanew/wpcontent/uploads/2021/03/ACLED_AnnualReport2020_WebMar2021_PubUpd.pdf, accessed 1
November 2021
ACLED (The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project), Regional Overview: Middle East
10-16 July 2021, 21 July 2021, https://acleddata.com/2021/07/21/regional-overview-middleeast10-16-july-2021/, accessed 2 November 2021
ACLED (The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project), Regional Overview: Middle East
8-14 November 2020, https://acleddata.com/2020/11/18/regional-overview-middle-east8-14november-2020/, accessed 1 November 2021
ACLED (The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project), Regional Overview: Middle East
1-7 November 2020, https://acleddata.com/2020/11/11/regional-overview-middle-east1-7november-2020/, accessed 1 November 2021
ACLED (The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project), Regional Overview: Middle East
29 November-5 December 2020, https://acleddata.com/2020/12/09/regional-overviewmiddle-east29-november-5-december-2020/, accessed 3 November 2021
ACLED (The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project), Regional Overview: Middle East
12-18 June 2021, 23 June 2021, https://acleddata.com/2021/06/23/regional-overview-middleeast12-18-june-2021/, accessed 13 October 2021
AFP (Agence France Press), In Iraq, bloody tribal custom now classed as 'terrorism', 15November 2018, https://www.france24.com/en/20181118-iraq-bloody-tribal-custom-nowclassed-terrorism, accessed 1 November 2021
Agenzoa Fides, Another 200 families of Christian displaced persons return to Mosul and the
Nineveh Plaines, 12 November 2020, http://www.fides.org/en/news/69012, accessed 1
November 2021
AI (Amnesty International) Amnesty International Report 2020/21; The State of the World's
Human Rights; Iraq 2020, https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/middle-east-and-northafrica/iraq/report-iraq/, accessed 5 November 2021
AI (Amnesty International), Iraq/Kurdistan Region-Iraq: Journalists must be released
immediately, 26 February 2021, https://www.amnesty.org/en/wpcontent/uploads/2021/05/MDE1437542021ENGLISH.pdf, accessed 5 October 2021
AI (Amnesty International), Iraq: End impunity for murders, release all kidnapped and detained
peaceful activists, 9 December 2020, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/pressrelease/2020/12/iraq-end-impunity-for-murders-release-peaceful-activists/, accessed 1
November 2021
107

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

AI (Amnesty International), Iraq: Legacy of Terror: The Plight of Yezidi Child Survivors of ISIS,
29 July 2020, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde14/2759/2020/en/, accessed 1
November 2021
AI (Amnesty International), Iraq: Mass execution of 21 individuals is an outrage, 17 November
2020, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/11/iraq-mass-execution-of-21-individualsis-an-outrage/, accessed 14-16 December 2021
AI (Amnesty International), Iraq: Protest death toll surges as security forces resume brutal
repression, 23 January 2020, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/01/iraq-protestdeath-toll-surges-as-security-forces-resume-brutal-repression/, accessed 13 October 2021
AI (Amnesty International), Kurdistan Region of Iraq: Arbitrary arrests and enforced
disappearance of activists and journalists, 15 June 2021,
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2021/06/kurdistan-region-of-iraq-arbitraryarrests-and-enforced-disappearance-of-activists-and-journalists/, accessed 5 October 2021
AI (Amnesty International), Kurdistan Region of Iraq: Authorities must end protests-related
repression, 15 June 2021, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde14/4233/2021/en/,
accessed 1 November 2021
AI (Amnesty International), Marked for Life: Displaced Iraqis in Cycle of Abuse andStigmatization, November 2020,
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2041230/MDE1433182020ENGLISH.pdf, accessed 14
December 2021
AI (Amnesty International), Syria: Repatriate at least 27,999 children held in dire conditions innorth-east Syria, 30 November 2021, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/11/syriarepatriate-at-least-27000-children-held-in-dire-conditions-in-north-east-syria/, accessed 14-16
December 2021
AI (Amnesty International), Iraq: Legacy of Terror: The Plight of Yezidi Child Survivors of IS, 29
July 2020, https://www.amnesty.org/en/wpcontent/uploads/2021/05/MDE1427592020ENGLISH.pdf, accessed 1 November 2021
Aid to the Church in Need (ACN), Iraq’s Christians remain at risk of eradication, 8 July 2020,
https://acninternational.org/iraqs-christians-remain-at-risk-of-eradication/, accessed 1
November 2021
Aisha K. Gill, Personal Profile, University of Roehampton, UK, n.d.,
https://pure.roehampton.ac.uk/portal/en/persons/aisha-k-gill-ph-d-cbe, accessed 13 October
2021
Al Jazeera, ‘As if she had never existed’: The graveyards for murdered women, 8 March 2021,
https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2021/3/8/as-if-she-had-never-existed-the-graveyards-formurdered-women, accessed 18 October 2021
Al Jazeera, ‘Here to stay’, vow Iraqi protesters as deadly violence surges, 20 January 2020,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/1/20/here-to-stay-vow-iraqi-protesters-as-deadlyviolence-surges, accessed 9 October 2021
108

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Al Jazeera, Activist’s killing triggers protests in Iraq’s Karbala, 9 May 2021,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/9/activists-killing-triggers-protests-in-iraqs-karbala,accessed 1 November 2021
Al Jazeera, Iran-backed PMFs are destabilising Iraq’s disputed regions, 8 May 2021,
https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/5/8/iran-backed-pmfs-are-destabilising-iraqsdisputed-regions, accessed 1 November 2021
Al Jazeera, Iraq armed groups expert Hisham al-Hashemi shot dead in Baghdad, 6 July 2020,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/7/6/iraq-armed-groups-expert-hisham-al-hashemi-shotdead-in-baghdad, accessed 9 October 2021
Al Jazeera, Iraq election body soon to announce final results after recount, 27 October 2021,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/27/independent-body-to-give-verdict-on-iraqelection, accessed 4 November 2021
Al Jazeera, Iraq protesters demand accountability after killings of activists, 18 July 2021,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/18/iraqis-protest-against-unpunished-killings-ofactivists, accessed 1 November 2021
Al Jazeera, Iraq: Prominent female activist killed by unknown gunmen in Basra, 20 August
2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/8/20/iraq-prominent-female-activist-killed-byunknown-gunmen-in-basra, accessed 2 November 2021
Al Jazeera, Iraq’s Kurdish region is not a model for free speech, 25 September 2020,
https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/9/25/iraqs-kurdish-region-is-not-a-model-for-freespeech, accessed 1 November 2021
Al Jazeera, Iraq’s reparations law for Yezidi survivors is a positive step, 28 June 2021,
https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/6/28/iraqs-reparations-law-for-yezidi-survivors-is-apositive-step, accessed 1 November 2021
Al Jazeera, Iraqi protesters demand election recount in Baghdad, 19 October 2021,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/19/protesters-call-for-parliamentary-electionrecount-in-baghdad, accessed 4 November 2021
Al Jazeera, Iraqi women struggle to escape abuse as domestic violence rises, 12 February
2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2021/2/12/iraqi-women-struggle-to-escape-abuseas-domestic-violence-rises, accessed 18 October 2021
Al Jazeera, Iraqis march in Baghdad to mark protests anniversary, 1 October 2021,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/1/iraqis-march-in-baghdad-to-mark-protestsanniversary, accessed 29 October 2021
Al Jazeera, It is time for a system overhaul in Iraq’s Kurdish region, 30 December 2020,
https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/12/30/it-is-time-for-an-overhaul-of-the-system-iniraqs-kurdish-region, accessed 4 November 2021

109

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Al Jazeera, Pope Francis’s visit to Iraq: Beyond the symbolism, 9 March 2021,
https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/3/9/pope-franciss-visit-to-iraq-beyond-thesymbolism, accessed 1 November 2021
Al Jazeera, Prominent Iraqi activist shot dead in Baghdad: Reports, 15 December 2020,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/12/15/prominent-iraqi-activist-shot-dead-in-baghdad,
accessed 2 November 2021
Al Jazeera, Protester killed in Iraq's Kurdistan region after days of unrest, 7 December 2020,
https://www.reuters.com/article/iraq-protests-kurds-idUSKBN28H21L, accessed 1 November
2021
Al Jazeera, Protests against Iraq election results turn violent, 5 November 2021, Protests
against Iraq election results turn violent | News | Al Jazeera, accessed 10 November 2021
Al Jazeera, Return of Iraqis seen by US as easing threat from Syria camp, 22 May 2021,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/22/return-of-iraqis-seen-as-easing-threat-from-syriacamp, accessed 16 December 2021
Al Jazeera, Sold, whipped and raped: A Yazidi woman remembers ISIL captivity, 16 October
2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2020/10/16/separation-from-my-children-was-morepainful-than, accessed 1 November 2021
Al Jazeera, The hills of sinners. The story of the secret burials of women in southern Iraq, 26
June 2020,
https://www.aljazeera.net/news/women/2020/6/26/%D8%AA%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B5%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9, accessed 5 October 2021
Al Jazeera, We do not accept those children’: Yazidis forbid ISIL offspring, 24 March 2021,
https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2021/3/24/wrenching-choice-yazidi-mothers-to-choosechildren-or-community, accessed 1 November 2021
Al-Arabiya News, Iraq arrests suspected killer of activist’s son: Interior ministry, 27 July 2021,
https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2021/07/27/Iraq-arrests-suspected-killer-ofactivist-s-son-Interior-ministry, accessed 23 November 2021
Al-Arabiya News, Iraqi activist’s son found shot dead in Basra,
https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2021/07/26/Iraqi-activist-s-son-found-shotdead-in-Basra, accessed 23 November 2021
Al-Hamoud, A. H., Iraqi Turkmen: Controversy of Identity and Affiliation, Friedrich Ebert
Stiftung, August 2021, http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/amman/18225.pdf, accessed 18
October 2021
Al-Jaffal, O., and Khalaf, S., Basra Governorate, A locality in Crisis, Local Government Crisisand Conflict with Federal Government, LSE Middle East Centre Paper Series 49, May 2021,
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/110478/2/Al_Jaffal_basra_locality_in_crisis_published_english.pdf,
accessed 1 November 2021

110

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Alkhudary T., Iraqi Women are Engaged in a Struggle for their Rights, LSE’s Middle East
Centre Blog, 15 June 2020, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2020/06/15/iraqi-women-areengaged-in-a-struggle-for-their-rights/, accessed 6 October 2021
Allison, C., The Yazidis, n.d.,
https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/repository/bitstream/handle/10871/36072/ALLISONThe%20YazidisOxf
ordResearchEncyclopaediaofReli-gion%C2%A0.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y, accessed 1
November 2021
All-Party Parliamentary Group for International Freedom of Religion or Belief, Commentary on
the Current State of International Freedom of Religion or Belief (2020), February 2021,
https://appgfreedomofreligionorbelief.org/media/2020-APPG-commentary-final.pdf, accessed
1 November 2021
Al-Mayali I., Iraqi Women Will Not Be Silenced, 9 February 2021, in IWPR, available at:https://www.gendersecurityproject.com/post/iraqi-women-will-not-be-silenced, accessed 19
October 2021
Al-Menasa, Arms Race: Iraqi tribes using heavy weapons in local conflicts, 7 September 2021,
https://www.al-menasa.net/en/2021/09/07/arms-race-iraqi-tribes-using-heavy-weapons-inlocal-conflicts/, accessed 1 November 2021
Al-Monitor, Are Iraqi youths losing their religion?, 11 September 2020, https://www.almonitor.com/originals/2020/09/irreligionism-religion-atheism-iraqsecularism.html#ixzz7APLns000, accessed 1 November 2021
Al-Monitor, Armed groups target liquor shops in Iraq, 15 December 2020, https://www.almonitor.com/originals/2020/12/liqour-baghdad-iraq-freedom.html#ixzz7CHSzlSGQ, accessed
30 November 2021
Al-Monitor, Demands for payment fro
m tribes, militias stalling investment in Iraq, 28 October 2020, https://www.almonitor.com/originals/2020/10/iraq-investors-militias-blackmail.html, accessed 1 November
2021
Al-Monitor, Flurry of Sunni Triangle ops sparks questions over Islamic State, 15 March 2021,
https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/03/iraq-sunni-triangle-security-islamic-state.html,
accessed 13 November 2021
Al-Monitor, Iraq passes law addressing women survivors of Yazidi genocide, 1 March 2021,
https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/03/iraq-baghdad-yazidi-sinjar-islamic-stategenocide.html, accessed 10 November 2021
Al-Monitor, Islamic State uses hit-and-run tactics in Iraq, 11 July 2021, https://www.almonitor.com/originals/2021/07/islamic-state-uses-hit-and-run-tactics-iraq, accessed 1
November 2021
Al-Monitor, Killing of Sunni youths prompts calls for end to impunity in Iraq, 19 October 2020,
https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2020/10/iraq-salahuddin-sunni-pmu.html, accessed 1
November 2021

111

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Al-Monitor, Militias call for revenge against Sunni town over suicide attacks in Baghdad, 27
July 2021, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/07/militias-call-revenge-against-sunnitown-over-suicide-attacks-baghdad, accessed 1 November 2021
Al-Monitor, Talabani family feud at center of power struggle in Iraqi Kurdistan Party, 14 July
2021, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/07/talabani-family-feud-center-powerstruggle-iraqi-kurdistan-party, accessed 9 October 2021
Al-Monitor, Turkey targets Yazidi militia in Iraq over PKK links, 6 October 2020,
https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2020/10/sinjar-resistance-units-ybs-iraq-yazidis-pkkturkey.html, accessed 1 November 2021
Al-Monitor, Turkish-Iranian rivalry heats up over Mosul, 25 February 2021, https://www.almonitor.com/originals/2021/02/turkey-iran-iraq-sinjar-heats-up-turkish-iranian-rivalry.html,
accessed 12 October 2021
Al-Monitor, Will Iraq’s new ‘tribal court’ undermine the rule of law? 12 April 2018,https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2018/04/iraq-tribalism-sheikhs-justice-law.html,
accessed 1 November 2021
Amwaj Media, Activists launch campaign to ‘end impunity in Iraq,’ 17 July 2021,
https://amwaj.media/article/iraqis-launch-campaign-to-end-impunity-and-boost-it-withmarches-around-the-world, accessed 9 October 2021
Amwaj Media, Turkey on the back foot as Kurds, PMU aim high in Kirkuk elections, 23
September 2021, https://amwaj.media/article/kirkuk-city-of-black-gold-a-national-andregional-conflict-rages-on-its-deput, accessed 18 October 2021
ANHRI (The Arabic Network for Human Rights Information), Iraq: Iraqi security forces open fireon journalists… Photojournalist Youssef Sattar shot dead, 22 January 2020,
https://www.anhri.info/?p=14098&lang=en, accessed 17 October 2021
AP (Associated Press), 100 Iraqi families from IS-linked camp in Syria repatriated, 25 May
2021, https://apnews.com/article/islamic-state-group-syria-middle-east-iraq-lifestyle6e8f37749435cef4bf7d85965b7b22f6, accessed 16 December 2021
AP (Associated Press), A timeline of disaster and displacement for Iraqi Christians, 5 March
2021, https://apnews.com/article/middle-east-islamic-state-group-saddam-hussein-baghdadiraq-296b5588995cf7be62b49619bf1a7bb6, accessed 1 November 2021
API (Assyrian Policy Institute), Contested control: the future of security in Iraq’s Nineveh Plain,
1 June 2020, http://www.aina.org/reports/cctfositnp.pdf, accessed 1 November 2021
Arab Weekly (The), Baghdad liquor stores live in ‘constant fear’ of firebombings, 16 December
2020, https://thearabweekly.com/baghdad-liquour-stores-live-constant-fear-firebombings,
accessed 1 November 2021
Arab Weekly (The), Iraq executes five men convicted of terrorism, 10 February 2021,
https://thearabweekly.com/iraq-executes-five-men-convicted-terrorism, accessed 16
December 2021

112

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Arraf, J., Iraqi Activism Fights for Survival Amid Murders and Threats, New York Times (the),updated 2 June 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/25/world/middleeast/iraq-protestmurder-iran.html, accessed 1 November 2021
Asharq Al-Awsat, Official Data: Divorce Rates Soar in Kurdistan, 1 March 2019,https://english.aawsat.com//home/article/1613306/official-data-divorce-rates-soar-kurdistan,accessed 18 October 2021
Atlantic Council, Three years after the Caliphate, Iraq’s Christians find little incentive to return,
04 August 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/three-years-after-thecaliphate-iraqs-christians-find-little-incentive-to-return/, accessed 1 November 2021
Australia, DFAT (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade), DFAT Country Information Report– Iraq, 17 August 2020, https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/country-information-reportiraq.pdf, accessed 5 October 2021
Bakr, M. J., Kirkuk in Iraq’s Upcoming Elections, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, September 2021,
https://www.kas.de/documents/266761/0/Mera+Jasm+Bakr++Federal+Elections+in+Kirkuk.pdf/7b04c96d-0647-6102-2df835cfe744bc7e?version=1.0&t=1631717791191, accessed 12 October 2021
Balanche, F., From the Iranian Corridor to the Shia Crescent, A Hoover Institution Essay, 21
May 2021, https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs03175780/file/From_the_Iranian_Corridor_to_the_Shia_Cr.pdf, accessed 18 October 2021
BasNews, Dhi Qar: One Killed, Three Wounded in Tribal Fight, 21 April 2021,
https://www.basnews.com/en/babat/683585, accessed 1 November 2021
BasNews, Iraqi Elections: Supporters of Shia Parties Protest Final Results, 17 October 2021,
https://www.basnews.com/en/babat/718442?__cf_chl_jschl_tk__=heifMzn6N4Sh7n3ZxHApg
hrV0.GeHFoRQgXEeEYolcQ-1636051320-0-gaNycGzNCT0, accessed 1 November 2021
BasNews, IS Kills Tribal Chief and Four Family Members in Diyala, 28 October 2020,
https://www.basnews.com/en/babat/644692, accessed 1 November 2021
BasNews, IS Kills Tribal Chief in Diyala, 27 April 2021,
https://www.basnews.com/en/babat/684915, accessed 1 November 2021
BasNews, IS Militants Kidnap Tribal Leader in Kirkuk: Police, 19 April 2021,
https://www.basnews.com/en/babat/683195?__cf_chl_jschl_tk__=2bipWWrN89v1PqX1QhRn4
sm3Kq7tDvB9YE9oET_s7Z0-1635960931-0-gaNycGzNCOU, accessed 1 November 2021
BasNews, IS Militants Kill Iraqi Tribal Leader in Planned Attack, 22 May 2021,
https://www.basnews.com/en/babat/690127?__cf_chl_jschl_tk__=G93F06UvZkM3y2zI6gN5E
BPqzlwXaJW0IIOOhDWu2Co-1635960516-0-gaNycGzNCP0, accessed 1 November 2021
Basnews, One Divorce Every Four Minutes in Iraq, 5 September 2021
https://www.basnews.com/en/babat/710899?__cf_chl_jschl_tk__=pmd_95tc9LiqLCwRv6Op0
sUttq1LRV5ikepHjAXXVSaamxI-1634912954-0-gqNtZGzNAhCjcnBszQil, accessed 14 October
2021

113

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

BasNews, Three People Killed, Injured in Tribal Fight in Iraq, 19 September 2021,
https://www.basnews.com/en/babat/713312?__cf_chl_jschl_tk__=2BkQunl1vsfvMs5wOwM2D
XjUlarR5gj8AaMgM8gfuks-1635959749-0-gaNycGzNCCU, accessed 1 November 2021
BBC News, How US military pullback in Iraq could benefit Iran, 26 July 2021,
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-57976007, accessed 1 November 2021
BBC News, Iraq camp closures ‘could leave 100,000 displaced people homeless’, 9November 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-54873830, accessed 16
December 2021
BBC News, Iraqi interpreters 'stalked by death squads' for helping the British, 30 December
2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-55481651, accessed 1 November 2021
BBC News, Iraq's Christians 'close to extinction', 23 May, 2019,https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-48333923, accessed 1 November 2021
BBC News, Qasem Soleimani: US kills top Iranian general in Baghdad air strike, 3 January
2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50979463, accessed 1 November 2021
BBC, Female Iraqi activist killed in Basra as gunmen target protesters, 20 August 2020,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-53847648, accessed 15 October 2021
BBC, Isis, Isil, IS or Daesh? One group, many names, 2 December 2015,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27994277, accessed 1 November 2021
Bobseine, H., Tribal Justice in a Fragile Iraq, The Century Foundation, 7 November 2019,https://production-tcf.imgix.net/app/uploads/2019/11/08121945/tribal-justice_bobseinePDF.pdf,
accessed 12 November 2021
Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper, Sectarianism, Governance, and Iraq's Future, Number
24, November 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Sectarianismgovernance-and-Iraqs-future_English.pdf, accessed 10 November 2021
Brookings, Iraq’s upcoming elections: Voters and likely winners, 24 June 2021,
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/06/24/iraqs-upcoming-electionsvoters-and-likely-winners/, accessed 1 November 2021Çalışkan S. and Zineelabdin, A., 2020 Irak Değerlendirmesi: Türkmenlerin Durumu ve
2021’den Beklentiler [informal translation: Iraq Assessment 2020: The Situation of Turkmen
and the Expectations for 2021], ORSAM (Ortadoğu Araştırmaları Merkezi), Febryary 2021,
https://orsam.org.tr/d_hbanaliz/2020-irak-degerlendirmesi-turkmenlerin-durumu-ve-2021denbeklentiler-.pdf, accessed 5 October 2021
Carnegie Middle East Center, The Making of the Kurdish Frontier: Power, Conflict, andGovernance in the Iraqi-Syrian Borderlands, March 2021,
https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Hasan_Khaddour_XBORDER_Kurdish_Frontier.pdf,
accessed 11 November 2021

114

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Catholic News, New high school in Iraq with emphasis on classical education has U.S. ties, 4June 2021, https://www.catholicnews.com/new-high-school-in-iraq-with-emphasis-onclassical-education-has-u-s-ties/, accessed 1 November 2021
Cengiz, S., Iraq, Syria’s Turkmen communities a useful tool for Turkey, Arab News, 7 August
2020, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1716151, accessed 5 October 2021
Center for International Relations and Sustainable Development (CIRSD), Battle for the Soul ofIslam, Winter 2021, https://www.cirsd.org/en/horizons/horizons-winter-2021-issue-no-18/battlefor-the-soul-ofislam?__cf_chl_jschl_tk__=8QyZ8PSx191j3vXI41QG4xo78tEPNL9eEhMmTWQcq841636044517-0-gaNycGzNCKU, accessed 1 November 2021
Centre for Civilians in Conflict, Ignoring Iraq’s Most Vulnerable: The Plight of the Displaced, 1April 2021, https://civiliansinconflict.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/04/CIVIC_Iraq_Report_Final-Web.pdf, accessed 21 November 2021
CIVIC, Ignoring Iraq’s Most Vulnerable: The Plight of Displaced People, April 2021,
https://civiliansinconflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/CIVIC_Iraq_Report_Final-Web.pdf,
accessed 13 December 2021
Civicus, Popular Protests: Demonstrators, Journalists and Human Rights Defenders Killed,
Attacked & Silenced, 7 August 2020,
https://monitor.civicus.org/updates/2020/08/07/popular-protests-iraq-demonstratorsjournalists-and-human-rights-defenders-killed-attacked-and/, accessed 23 November 2021
CNN, Arrest warrants for two Iraqi government critics spark outrage, 22 March 2021,
https://edition.cnn.com/2021/03/21/world/iraq-arrest-ibrahim-al-sumaidaie-yahya-al-kubaisiintl-latam/index.html, accessed 17 October 2021
Cornish, C., Iraqi dreams of democracy fade with arrests of journalists, FT (Financial Times), 24
March 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/d673b1c2-926c-4927-9657-a1221e02d84f, accessed
9 October 2021
Cornish, C., Iraqi translators live in terror as the west withdraws, Financial Times, 1 December
2020, https://www.ft.com/content/9f3a283f-78bd-48b7-8fab-1a7b1d3ee7fc, accessed 29
November 2021
CPJ (Committee to Protect Journalists), Al-Rasheed TV CEO Nizar Thanoun shot and killed in
Baghdad, 12 February 2020, https://cpj.org/2020/02/al-rasheed-tv-ceo-nizar-thanoun-shotand-killed-in/, accessed 9 October 2021
CPJ (Committee to Protect Journalists), At least 6 Iraq-based journalists with Dijlah TV resign,
go into hiding following threats, 10 September 2020, https://cpj.org/2020/09/at-least-6-iraqbased-journalists-with-dijlah-tv-resign-go-into-hiding-following-threats/, accessed 9 October
2021
CPJ (Committee to Protect Journalists), Getting Away with Murder, 28 October 2020,
https://cpj.org/reports/2020/10/global-impunity-index-journalist-murders/#index, accessed 12
October 2021

115

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

CPJ (Committee to Protect Journalists), Gunmen open fire on car, kill 2 Dijlah TV journalists at
Iraq protest, 10 January 2020, https://cpj.org/2020/01/dijlah-tv-journalists-killed-protest-basra/,
accessed 12 October 2021
CPJ (Committee to Protect Journalists), Iraqi frelance journalist Ali al-Mikdam abducted, foundbeaten, 13 July 2021, https://cpj.org/2021/07/iraqi-freelance-journalist-ali-al-mikdam-abductedfound-beaten/, accessed 9 October 2021
CPJ (Committee to Protect Journalists), Iraqi journalist Ahmed Hassan shot, criticallywounded, 10 May 2021, https://cpj.org/2021/05/iraqi-journalist-ahmed-hassan-shot-criticallywounded/, accessed 17 October 2021
CPJ (Committee to Protect Journalists), Iraqi Kurdish Court Extends Journalist Omed
Baroshky’s Prison Sentence by 1 Year, 23 September 2021, https://cpj.org/2021/09/iraqikurdish-court-extends-journalist-omed-baroshkys-prison-sentence-by-1-year/, accessed 18
October 2021
CRS (Congregational Research Service), Iraq: Issues in the 116th Congress, updated 17 July
2020, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45633, accessed 7 October 2021
CRS (Congressional Research Service), Iraq and U.S. Policy, 4 June 2021,
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/IF10404.pdf, accessed 1 November 2021
Crux Now, Iraqi parliament formally declares Christmas a national holiday, 18 December 2020,
https://cruxnow.com/church-in-the-middle-east/2020/12/iraqi-parliament-formally-declareschristmas-a-national-holiday/, accessed 1 November 2021
CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies), Strategic Dialogue: Shaping a U.S.
Strategy for the “Ghosts” of Iraq, 26 May 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/strategicdialogue-shaping-us-strategy-ghosts-iraq, accessed 1 November 2021
CSO (Iraqi Central Statistical organisation), KRSO (Kurdistan Regional Statistics Office),
UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund), Iraqi Ministry of Health, Multiple Indicator Cluster
Survey (MICS), 2018,https://mics.unicef.org/files?job=W1siZiIsIjIwMTkvMDMvMDEvMTkvMjMvMTgvNTg5L0VuZ2xp
c2gucGRmIl1d&sha=aea1de7cc6f6ec09, accessed 14 October 2021
CSS (Center for Security Studies), The Persisting Past of Iraq, CSS Analyses in Security Policy,
September 2021, https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-forsecurities-studies/pdfs/CSSAnalyse289-EN.pdf, accessed 1 November 2021
Daily Sabah, PKK presence prevents Yazidis' return to Sinjar: Turkish envoy , 2 April 2021,
https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/war-on-terror/pkk-presence-prevents-yazidis-return-tosinjar-turkish-envoy, accessed 1 November 2021
Daily Sabah, Sinjar agreement not implemented yet, KRG PM Barzani says, 10 February 2021,
https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/war-on-terror/sinjar-agreement-not-implemented-yet-krgpm-barzani-says, accessed 9 November 2021
Daily Sabah, Yazidi families stage anti-PKK protests, demand return of their children in Iraq's
Sinjar, 9 November 2020, https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/war-on-terror/yazidi-families116

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

stage-anti-pkk-protests-demand-return-of-their-children-in-iraqs-sinjar, accessed 11 November
2021
Denmark, DIS (Danish Immigration Service), Honour Crimes against Men in Kurdistan Regionof Iraq (KRI) and the Availability of Protection, Report from Danish Immigration Service’s factfinding mission to Erbil, Sulemaniyah and Dahuk, KRI, 6 to 20 January 2010,https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4bd95eae2.pdf, accessed 1 November 2021
Denmark, DIS, and Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internallydisplaced persons (IDPs) in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018,https://www.nyidanmark.dk//media/Files/US/Landerapporter/iraq_report_security_IDPs_and_access_nov2018.pdf?la=da&
hash=F20C250A8F2946B52667C1C78AEC7E356A5D715F, accessed 7 October 2021
Denmark: DIS (Danish Immigration Service), Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Women and men inhonour-related conflicts, 9 November 2018 available at:https://www.refworld.org/docid/5beacadd4.html, accessed 3 November 2021
DW (Deutsche Welle), Middle East: Are people losing their religion?, 4 February 2021,
https://www.dw.com/en/middle-east-are-people-losing-their-religion/a-56442163, accessed 1
November 2021
DW (Deutsche Welle), Middle East: Murdered because of Snapchat? 29 January 2021,
https://www.dw.com/en/social-media-uptick-in-honor-crime-in-middle-east/a-56370773,
accessed 5 October 2021
DW (Deutsche Welle), Iraq's Yazidis warn of ongoing threats from extremists, 26 March 2021,
https://www.dw.com/en/iraq-yazidi-law-warning/a-56993162, accessed 29 November 2021
DW (Deutsche Welle), Who are the Yazidis?, 10 April 2018, https://www.dw.com/en/who-arethe-yazidis/a-43324003, accessed 1 November 2021
DW (Deutsche Welle) , Yazidi children abused by 'IS' urgently need help, 3 August 2020,
https://www.dw.com/en/yazidi-children/a-54417617, accessed 3 November 2021
Ekurd Daily, Zoroastrians make a comeback in Iraqi Kurdistan, but still face stigma, 2 October
2020, https://ekurd.net/zoroastrians-comeback-kurdistan-2020-10-02, accessed 3 November
2021
El-Masri, S., The Failure of National Prosecution to Bring Justice to Yazidi Victims of Sexual
Slavery, 29 April 2021, https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/29/04/2021/failure-nationalprosecution-bring-justice-yazidi-victims-sexual-slavery, accessed 3 November 2021
EPIC (Enabling Peace in Iraq Center), ISHM (Iraq Security and Humanitarian Monitor): January
30 – February 6, 2020, 6 February 2020, https://enablingpeace.org/ishm240/, accessed 12
October 2021
EPIC (Enabling Peace in Iraq Center), ISHM: April 1 – April 8, 2021, 8 April 2021,
https://enablingpeace.org/ishm298/, accessed 30 November 2021

117

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMEPIC (Enabling Peace in Iraq Center), ISHM: April 15 – April 22, 2021, 22 April 2021,
https://enablingpeace.org/ishm300/, accessed 30 November 2021
EPIC (Enabling Peace in Iraq Center), ISHM: February 11 – February 25, 2021, 25 February
2021, https://enablingpeace.org/ishm292/, accessed 30 November 2021
EPIC (Enabling Peace in Iraq Center), ISHM: January 14 – January 21, 2021, 21 January 2021,
https://enablingpeace.org/ishm288/, accessed 30 November 2021
EPIC (Enabling Peace in Iraq Center), ISHM: June 10 – June 17, 2021, 17 June 2021,
https://enablingpeace.org/ishm308/ , accessed 30 November 2021
EPIC (Enabling Peace in Iraq Center), ISHM: March 25 – April 1, 2021, 1 April 2021,
https://enablingpeace.org/ishm297/, accessed 30 November 2021
EPIC (Enabling Peace in Iraq Center), ISHM: May 20 – May 27, 2021, 27 May 2021,
https://enablingpeace.org/ishm305/, accessed 30 November 2021
EPIC (Enabling Peace in Iraq Center), The Long Game: Iraq’s “Tishreen” Movement and theStruggle for Reform, October 2021, https://enablingpeace.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/09/Tishreen_Report_October_2021.pdf, accessed 1 November 2021
EPIC (Enabling Peace in Iraq), Iraq Security and Humanitarian Monitoring, Monitoring the
Crisis, 5 August 2021, https://enablingpeace.org/ishm314/, accessed 30 November 2021
Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor, Cracking down on protesters in Iraqi Kurdistan legitimizes
corruption, 25 August 2020, https://euromedmonitor.org/en/article/3751, accessed 5
November 2021
Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor, Iraqi Kurdistan’s authorities must release Badinandetainees, 31 October 2021, https://euromedmonitor.org/en/article/4706/IraqiKurdistan%E2%80%99s-authorities-must-release-Badinan-detainees, accessed 23 November
2021
Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor, Protesters unlawfully detained and tortured in Iraqi
Kurdistan, 8 February 2021, https://euromedmonitor.org/en/article/4168/Protesters-unlawfullydetained-and-tortured-in-Iraqi-Kurdistan, accessed 1 November 2021
European Commission, Exchange rate (InforEuro), accessed 24 November 2021,
https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/procedures-guidelines-tenders/informationcontractors-and-beneficiaries/exchange-rate-inforeuro_en, accessed 30 November 2021
Ezzeddine, N., Pietrantonio Pellise, A. di, Trapped into a vicious cycle, Factors of instability in
the Ninevah Plains, Clingendael (Netherlands Institute of International Relations), May 2021,
https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2021-05/factors-of-instability-in-the-ninevehplains.pdf, accessed 18 October 2021
FIDH (International Federation for Human Rights), Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan: Systematictargeting of human rights defenders, 26 May 2021, https://www.fidh.org/en/region/northafrica-middle-east/iraq/iraq-and-iraqi-kurdistan-systematic-targeting-of-human-rights,
accessed 18 October 2021
118

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Forbes, Iraq Adopts New Law To Assist Survivors Of The Daesh Genocide, 4 March 2021,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ewelinaochab/2021/03/04/iraq-adopts-new-law-to-assistsurvivors-of-the-daesh-genocide/?sh=5381d8b156ce, accessed 30 November 2021
Forbes, The Missing Yazidis Women And Children Must Be Located And Rescued, 25
September 2021, https://www.forbes.com/sites/ewelinaochab/2021/09/25/the-missingyazidis-women-and-children-must-be-located-and-rescued/?sh=7ac759d41697, accessed 30
November 2021
Foreign Policy, Northern Iraq May Be Free, but the South Is Seething, 9 November 2018,https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/09/northern-iraq-may-be-free-but-the-south-is-seethingbasra-isis-sistani-pmf-shiites-oil-poverty/, accessed 3 November 2021
FRANCE 24 Observers, Iraqi activists go underground after wave of attacks by pro-Iranmilitias, 2 December 2020, https://observers.france24.com/en/moyen-orient/20201204video-irak-assassinat-contestation-iran-milices, accessed 4 November 2021
FRANCE 24 Observers, Who are we?, n.d., https://observers.france24.com/en/who-are-we,accessed 4 November 2021
France 24, Hundreds of Iraqi women defy cleric to protest authorities, 13 February 2020,
https://www.france24.com/en/20200213-hundreds-of-iraqi-women-defy-cleric-to-protestauthorities, accessed 3 November 2021
France 24, Iraqi reporter shot a day after activist’s killing sparks protests, 10 May 2021,
https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20210510-iraqi-reporter-shot-a-day-after-activist-skilling-sparks-protests, accessed 24 October 2021
France 24, Nightmare over but Iraqi Christians still dream of leaving, 22 November 2020,
https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20201122-nightmare-over-but-iraqi-christians-stilldream-of-leaving, accessed 30 November 2021
France 24, Pope visits Iraqi Christians, leads prayer for 'victims of war' in Mosul, 7 March,
2021, https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20210307-pope-francis-visits-iraqi-christiansset-to-lead-prayer-for-victims-of-war, accessed 30 November 2021
France 24, Tribal Iraq: where petty squabbles turn lethal, 27 June, 2021,
https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210627-tribal-iraq-where-petty-squabbles-turnlethal, accessed 30 November 2021
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2021, 3 March 2021,
https://freedomhouse.org/country/iraq/freedom-world/2021, accessed 1 November 2021
Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2021, 21 September 2021,
https://freedomhouse.org/country/iraq/freedom-net/2021, accessed 1 November 2021
Freedom House, Open Letter to the Holy See on Pope Francis' Visit to Iraq, 4 March 2021,
https://freedomhouse.org/article/open-letter-holy-see-pope-francis-visit-iraq, accessed 30
November 2021

119

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Front Line Defenders, Arbitrary Detention of Human Rights Defender Hemin Mamand, 28
April 2020, https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/case/arbitrary-detention-human-rightsdefender-hemin-mamand, accessed 23 November 2021
Front Line Defenders, Iraq: Assassination attempt against woman human rights defender
Lodya Remon Albarty, 19 August 2020,
https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/sites/default/files/iraq_-_ua_-_lodya_remon_albarty__19_aug_2020.pdf, accessed 24 October 2021
Garda World, Iraq: IED targets military convoy in Tuz Khurmatu (Salah-al-Din province)
November 9, 10 November 2020, https://www.garda.com/crisis24/news-alerts/398121/iraqied-targets-military-convoy-in-tuz-khurmatu-salah-al-din-province-november-9, accessed 12
October 2021
GCHR (Gulf Centre for Human Rights), General: Iraqi Kurdistan: GCHR’s periodic report on
human rights violations in the Kurdistan Region, 23 August 2021,
https://www.gc4hr.org/news/view/2821, accessed 23 November 2021
GCHR (Gulf Centre for Human Rights), Iraq: Fifth periodic report on violations during populardemonstrations, 15 May 2020, https://www.gc4hr.org/news/view/2388, accessed 23
November 2021
GCHR (The Gulf Centre for Human Rights), Iraq: GCJR’s 14th periodic report on human rights
violations during popular protests, 9 May 2021, https://www.gc4hr.org/news/view/2713,
accessed 24 October 2021
GCHR (The Gulf Centre for Human Rights), Iraq: Photojournalists and civil society activists
among victims in targeted attacks by militants, 13 December 2019,https://www.gc4hr.org/news/view/2273, accessed 24 October 2021
GCHR (The Gulf Centre for Human Rights), Iraq: Prominent journalist Ahmed Abdul Samadand cameraman Safaa Ghali assassinated, 11 January 2020,
https://www.gc4hr.org/news/view/2305, accessed 24 October 2021
GCHR (The Gulf Centre for Human Rights), Iraq: Sixth periodic report on violations during
popular demonstrations, 3 July 2020, https://www.gc4hr.org/news/view/2420, accessed 30
November 2021
GCHR (The Gulf Centre for Human Rights), Iraq: GCHR’s 18th Periodic Report on Human
Rights Violations in Iraq, 19 September 2021, https://www.gc4hr.org/news/view/2831,
accessed 24 October 2021
Georgetown Security Studies Review, ISIS’s Female Morality Police, 13 May 2021, ISIS’s
Female Morality Police – Georgetown Security Studies Review, accessed 30 November 2021
Gharizi, O. and Al-Ibrahimi, H., Baghdad Must Seize the Change to Work with Iraq’s Tribes, 17
January 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/baghdad-must-seize-chance-work-iraqstribes/, accessed 30 November 2021
Global Network of Peacebuilders, Seeking Accountability and Preventing Reoccurrence:
Addressing Conflict-Related Sexual Slavery through them Women, Peace and Security
120

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Agenda, Case Study: Conflict-Related Sexual Slavery and the Yazidi Genocide, Iraq,
December 2020, https://gnwp.org/wp-content/uploads/Iraq_GNWP-Conflict-Related-SexualSlavery-Research_Dec-2020.pdf, accessed 9 November 2021
Graczyk, A., Atheism and the changing image of Islam in Iraq, Review of Nationalities No.10(2020), 18 May 2021, http://reviewofnationalities.com/index.php/RON/article/view/192/210,
accessed 30 November 2021
Guardian (The), After Isis, Yazidi women forced to leave their children behind, 16 October
2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/16/after-isis-yazidi-women-forced-toleave-their-children-behind, accessed 30 November 2021
Guardian (The), Iraq risks breakup as tribes take on Iran’s militias in ‘blood feud’, 30
November 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/30/iraq-risks-breakup-bloodfued-protests-iran-influence, accessed 30 November 2021
Gulf News, Bomb hits Baghdad liquor store, 12 January 2021,
https://gulfnews.com/world/mena/bomb-hits-baghdad-liquor-store-1.76431771, accessed 30
November 2021
Hammurabi Human Rights Organization, Annual Report 2020 on the Human Rights Situations
in Iraq, 04 April 2021, http://www.hhro.org/uploads/files/55353/hhro-2020-eng_2.pdf,
accessed 30 November 2021
Hasan, S., A Perfect Storm has Hit Iraq’s Economy, LSE [Blog], 22 October 2020,
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2020/10/22/a-perfect-storm-has-hit-iraqs-economy/, accessed 30
November 2021
Hassan, Hussein, D., Iraq: Tribal Structure, Social, and Political Activities, CRS (Congressional
Research Service), CRS report for Congress, 7 April 2008,https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/RS22626.pdf, accessed 30 November 2021
HRW (Human Rights Watch), “We Might Call You in at Any Time,” Free Speech Under Threat
in Iraq, 15 June 2020, https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/06/15/we-might-call-you-anytime/free-speech-under-threat-iraq, accessed 24 October 2021
HRW (Human Rights Watch), Iraq/Kurdistan Region: Former ISIS suspects stuck in limbo, 28
October 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-54873830, accessed 16
December 2021
HRW (Human Rights Watch), Iraq: Abductions Linked to Baghdad Protests, 2 December 2019,https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/12/02/iraq-abductions-linked-baghdad-protests, accessed 3
November 2021
HRW (Human Rights Watch), Iraq: Apparent Familial Feud Drives Illegal Evictions, 21 August
2021, https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/08/11/iraq-apparent-familial-feud-drives-illegal-evictions,accessed 16 December 2021
HRW (Human Rights Watch), Iraq: Basra Political Group Targeted, 26 August 2020,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/08/26/iraq-basra-political-group-targeted#, accessed 2
November 2021
121

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

HRW (Human Rights Watch), Iraq: Camp expulsions leave families homeless, 2 December
2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/12/02/iraq-camp-expulsions-leave-families-homelessvulnerable, accessed 14-16 December 2021
HRW (Human Rights Watch), Iraq: End Impunity for Murders, Release All Kidnapped andDetained Peaceful Activists, 9 December 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/12/09/iraqend-impunity-murders, accessed 24 October 2021
HRW (Human Rights Watch), Iraq: Inadequate plans for camp closures, 3 June 2021,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/06/03/iraq-inadequate-plans-camp-closures, accessed 16
December 2021
HRW (Human Rights Watch), Iraq: No Justice for Enforced Disappearances, 16 November
2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/11/16/iraq-no-justice-enforced-disappearances,
accessed 3 November 2021
HRW (Human Rights Watch), Iraq: Parliament Rejects Marriage for 8-Year-Old Girlshttps://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/17/iraq-parliament-rejects-marriage-8-year-old-girls,
accessed 14 October 2021
HRW (Human Rights Watch), Iraq: Step Toward Justice for ISIS Child Suspects, 13 December
2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/12/13/iraq-step-toward-justice-isis-child-suspects,
accessed 16 December 2021
HRW (Human Rights Watch), Iraq: Urgent Need for Domestic Violence Law, 22 April 2020,
uhttps://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/22/iraq-urgent-need-domestic-violence-law, accessed
19 October 2021
HRW (Human Rights Watch), Kurdish Region of Iraq: Flawed Trial of Journalists, Activists, 22
April 2021, https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/04/22/kurdistan-region-iraq-flawed-trialjournalists-activists, accessed 26 October 2021
HRW (Human Rights Watch), Kurdish Region of Iraq: Media Offices Shut Down, 6 October
2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/10/06/kurdistan-region-iraq-media-offices-shut-down,
accessed 24 October 2021
HRW (Human Rights Watch), Kurdistan Region of Iraq: Arabs Blocked From Returning, 19 July
2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/07/19/kurdistan-region-iraq-arabs-blocked-returning,accessed 30 November 2021
HRW (Human Rights Watch), Thousands of Foreigners Unlawfully Held in NE Syria, 23 March
2021, https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/23/thousands-foreigners-unlawfully-held-ne-syria,
accessed 16 December 2021
HRW (Human Rights Watch), World report 2021 - Events of 2020, 13 January 2021,
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2021/01/2021_hrw_world_report.pdf, accessed
5 October 2021
Humanists International, Humanists at Risk: Action Report 2020, 25 June 2020,
https://humanists.international/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/3098_Humanists122

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMInternational_Humanists-at-Risk-Action-Report_Amends-V2_LR.pdf, accessed 30 November
2021
Humanists International, Iraq, 28 October 2020,
https://fot.humanists.international/countries/asia-western-asia/iraq/, accessed 30 November
2021
IAI (Istituto Affari Internazionali), Iraq’s Yazidis: Among the World’s Most Threatened
Minorities, 10 March 2021, https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaicom2110.pdf, accessed 30
November 2021
Impunity Watch, Iraqi Al-Amal Association, PAX, Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Iraq
2003-2018, 20 July 2020
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ResearchReport_Mapping_SGBV_Iraq_
2020_English.pd f, accessed 14 October 2021
Independent (The), They helped British soldiers in Iraq. Now they’ve been left behind to die, 11
May 2021, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/iraq-translators-uk-armyb1841803.html#comments-area, accessed 30 November 2021
Independent, Women in Iraq defiantly take to the streets despite fears they ‘could die at any
moment’, 23 November 2019, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/iraqprotests-women-streets-death-torture-revolution-tahir-square-a9213976.html, accessed 4
October 2021
Inside Arabia, ‘Alarming Increase in “Honor Killing” of Kurdish and Iraqi Women’, 1 January
2021, https://insidearabia.com/alarming-increase-in-honor-killing-of-kurdish-and-iraqi-women,
accessed 11 October 2021
Institute for International Law and Human Rights, Iraq’s Minorities and Other Vulnerable
Groups, Legal Framework, Documentation and Human Rights, May 2013, http://ezidis.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/03/MinorityHB_EN.pdf, accessed 30 November 2021
International Christian Concern, Iraqis’ Faith Grows as Churches Close, 30 March 2020,
https://www.persecution.org/2020/03/30/iraqis-faith-grows-churches-close/, accessed 5
November 2021
International Crisis Group, Exiles in Their Own Country: Dealing with Displacement in PostISIS Iraq, 19 October 2020, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/b079-post-isis-iraq_0.pdf,
accessed 13 December 2021
International Crisis Group, Iraq: Fixing Security in Kirkuk, Middle East Report N° 215, 15 June
2020, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/215-iraq-fixing-security-in-kirkuk.pdf, accessed 12
October 2021
International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Tishreen Uprising: From Barricades to Ballot Box, Middle East
Report N°223, 26 July 2021, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/223-iraq-tishreen.pdf,
accessed 30 November 2021
IOM (International Organisation for Migration), Al-Anbar Province: Report on the return of IDPs
with perceived affiliation with IS, 26 March 2020, https://iraq.iom.int/publications/managing123

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

return-anbar-community-responses-return-idps-perceived-affiliation, accessed 30 November
2021
IOM (International Organization for Migration), Home Again? Categorising Obstacles toReturnee Reintegration in Iraq, 28 February 2021, https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/06/03/iraqinadequate-plans-camp-closures, accessed 20 December 2021
IOM (International Organization for Migration), Iraq, Rural areas in Ninewa - Legacies ofconflict on rural economies and communities in Sinjar and Ninewa Plains, 28 November 2019,https://iraq.iom.int/publications/rural-areas-ninewa-legacies-conflict-rural-economies-andcommunities-sinjar-and-ninewa, accessed 30 November 2021
IOM (International Organization for Migration), Protracted Displacement in Iraq: Revisiting
Categories of Return Barriers - January 2021, 25 January 2021,
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/IOM%20Iraq%20Protracted%20Displace
ment%20in%20Iraq-%20Revisiting%20Categories%20of%20Return%20Barriers.pdf, accessed
14 December 2021
IOM (International Organization for Migration), Six years after the Yazidi genocide, investment
in services is crucial for returning Yazidi families, 16 July 2020, https://iraq.iom.int/node/1507,
accessed 30 November 2021
IOM International Organization for Migration), Understanding ethno-religious groups in Iraq:
Displacement and Return, February 2019, https://publications.iom.int/books/understandingethnoreligious-groups-iraq-displacement-and-return-february-2019, accessed 30 November
2021
IOM, (International Organisation for Migration), Protracted Displacement in Iraq: Revisiting
Categories of Return Barriers, January 2021, p34, footnote 152,https://iraq.iom.int/publications/protracted-displacement-iraq-revisiting-categories-returnbarriers, accessed 30 November 2021
IOM (International Organisation for Migration), Returns in Iraq: 2020 Overview December
2019 (Round 7) – December 2020 (Round 11), July 2021,
http://iraqdtm.iom.int/images/ReturnIndex/20217151345870_IOM_dtm_Returns_in_iraq_2020_overview.pdf, accessed 13 October 2021
iPlus, Facebook, 13 July 2021, https://www.facebook.com/iplus.kurdii/posts/164991212364277,
accessed 8 October 2021
IRAM, Iraq’s Yazidi Existential Crisis Amidst Sinjar’s Hyper-militarization, 24 March 2021,
https://iramcenter.org/en/iraqs-yazidi-existential-crisis-amidst-sinjars-hyper-militarization/,
accessed 13 October 2021
Iraq News Gazette, Baghdad journalism professor shot dead by unknown gunmen, 29
January 2020, https://www.iraqnewsgazette.com/baghdad-journalism-professor-shot-deadby-unknown-gunmen/, accessed 12 October 2021
Iraq Security and Humanitarian Monitor, Monitoring the Crisis, 14 October 2021,
https://enablingpeace.org/ishm324/, accessed 28 October 2021

124

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Iraq, Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, 15 October 2005, available athttps://www.refworld.org/docid/454f50804.html, accessed 11 October 2021
Iraq, Government of Iraq, Law No. (188) of the Year 1959 Personal Status Law andamendments, 1959, http://gjpi.org/wpcontent/uploads/2009/01/iraq_personal_status_law_1959_english_translation.pdf, accessed
13 October 2021
Iraq, Government of Iraq, Iraqi government continues to support voluntary return of IDPs as it
oversees closure of remaining displacement camps, 19 April 2021, Iraqi government continues
to support voluntary return of IDPs as it oversees closure of remaining displacement camps Government of Iraq (gds.gov.iq), accessed 19 January 2022
Iraq, Iraqi Penal Code (Law No. 111 of 1969), 1969,https://www.refworld.org/docid/452524304.html, accessed 6 November 2021
Iraq, KRG, Kurdistan Region Presidency, Kurdistan Region President Signs Halabja Province
Directive, 16 March 2014, http://www.krp.org/english/articledisplay.aspx?id=JDcr+40ccEs=,
accessed 13 December 2021
Iraq, Supreme Judicial Council, The judiciary writes the end chapter (Tribal attack) as aterrorist, 23 December 2018, https://www.hjc.iq/view-en.4951/, accessed 28 November 2021
Iraq, Supreme Judicial Council/ High Judicial Court, Imprisonment for two years for aconvict insulting the position of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) through social media
pages, 13 May 2020, https://www.hjc.iq/view.67293/, accessed 28 November 2021
Iraq, Supreme Judicial Council/ High Judicial Court, Clarification, 4 October 2021,
https://www.hjc.iq/view-en.68916/, accessed 28 November 2021
Iraq/KRG, Act No. 8 from 2011, The Act from combating domestic violence in Kurdistan
Region, Iraq, 21 June 2011,
http://www.ekrg.org/files/pdf/combat_domestic_violence_english.pdf, accessed 14 October
2021
Iraq/KRG, Personal Status Law, Act No. 15/2008, available at
http://www.ekrg.org/files/pdf/personal_status_law.pdf, accessed 14 October 2021
Iraqi Al-Amal Association, Impunity Watch, PAX, Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Iraq
2003-2018, 20 July 2020
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ResearchReport_Mapping_SGBV_Iraq_
2020_English.pdf, accessed 13 October 2021
Iraqi Christian Foundation, Who are the Iraqi Christians?, last update 20 April 2021,
https://iraqichristianfoundation.org/who-are-the-iraqi-christians/, accessed 3 November 2021
Iraqi Presidency, President Salih Meets with Deputy Yonadam Kanna, 03 June, 2021,
https://presidency.iq/EN/Details.aspx?id=3330&__cf_chl_jschl_tk__=pmd_V0rKvzmTvFlQxLs
Ye7YHrAnxDMrjYjA_bEZjJbbwltM-1633501264-0-gqNtZGzNAeWjcnBszQi9, accessed 28
November 2021

125

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Iraqi Women Network, Iraqi Women challenges of Security, Peace and Justice, Shadow
Report to the CEDAW Committee, 2019 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared
Documents/IRQ/INT_CEDAW_CSS_IRQ_37264_E.docx, accessed 13 October 2021
IRB (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada), Iraq: Situation and treatment of Christians,
particularly in the north, the Kurdistan region, and Baghdad; government protection andsupport programs (2017–September 2020, 9. October 2020, https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/countryinformation/rir/Pages/index.aspx?doc=458197&pls=1, accessed 28 November 2021
Irish Times (The), Yazidi children still traumatised by ordeal at hands of Isis, 4 August 2020,
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/middle-east/yazidi-children-still-traumatised-byordeal-at-hands-of-isis-1.4321984, accessed 28 November 2021
ISW (Institute for the Study of War), Iraq is Fragile, not Hopeless: How Iraq’s Fragility
Undermines Regional Stability, December 2020,
https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Iraq%20is%20Fragile,%20Not%20Hopel
ess.pdf, accessed 28 November 2021
ISW (Institute for the Study of War), Iraq Situation Report: August 12 – 18, 2020, 21 August
2020,
https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Iraq%20Situation%20Report%20Aug%20
12%20-%2018,%202020.pdf, accessed 28 November 2021
ISW (Institute for the Study of War), Iraq Situation Report: August 19 – 25, 2020, 28 August
2020, https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iraq-situation-report-august-19-252020
ISW (Institute for the Study of War), Iraq Situation Report: February 26 – March 3, 2020, 6
March 2020, https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/26%20FEB%20%2003%20MAR%202020%20-%20Iraq%20SITREP%20Map.pdf, accessed 28 November2021
ISW (Institute for the Study of War), Iraq Situation Report: July 29 – August 05, 2020, 7 August
2020,
https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Iraq%20Situation%20Report%20Aug%20
12%20-%2018%2C%202020.pdf, accessed 28 November 2021
ISW (Institute for the Study of War), Iraq Situation Report: July 8-14, 2020, 17 July 2020,
https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Iraq%20Situation%20Report%20July%20
08-14%202020.pdf, accessed 28 November 2021
ISW (Institute for the Study of War), ISIS and Iranian-backed Militias Compete to Control
Baghdad Region, 19 May 2021, http://www.iswresearch.org/search/label/Iraq?updatedmax=2021-08-10T17:19:00-04:00&max-results=20&start=3&by-date=false, accessed 28
November 2021
IWPR (Institute For War & Peace Reporting), Iraq: Radio Stations Fear for Future, 1 May 2021,
https://iwpr.net/impact/iraq-radio-stations-fear-future, accessed 26 October 2021

126

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Izady, M., Iraq’s Religious Composition in 2015 [map], The Gulf/2000 Project, University ofColombia, n.d., https://gulf2000.columbia.edu/images/maps/Iraq_Religions_lg.png, accessed
28 November 2021
Jamestown Foundation (The), Iran’s Man in Nineveh: Waad Qado and the PMF’s 30th Brigade,
4 June 2021, https://jamestown.org/brief/irans-man-in-nineveh-waad-qado-and-the-pmfs-30thbrigade/, accessed 8 November 2021
Jerusalem Post (The), Turkey bombs Christian villages in Iraq’s Kurdish region – analysis, 26
May 2021, https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/turkey-bombs-christian-villages-in-iraqs-kurdishregion-analysis-669214, accessed 28 November 2021
K24 (Kurdistan 24), Press freedom groups document over 300 violations in Iraq during 2020,
1 May 2021, https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/story/23730-Press-freedom-groups-documentover-300-violations-in-Iraq-during-2020, accessed 26 October 2021
Kahan E. and Lawlor, K., ISIS and Iranian-backed Militias Compete to Control Baghdad Region,
ISW, 19 May 2021, http://www.iswresearch.org/2021/05/isis-and-iranian-backed-militias.html,
accessed 28 November 2021
Kaya, Z. N., Gender equality in Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan, LSE’s Middle East Centre Blog, 5January 2018, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2018/01/05/gender-equality-in-iraq-and-iraqikurdistan/, accessed 14 October 2021
KCCRC (Kurdistan Conflict and Crisis Research Center), Honor killing in Iraq, 14 August 2021,
https://www.kurdistanc.com/en/details.aspx?jimare=1126, accessed 13 October 2021
Kirkuk Now, 2020 was abysmal for press freedom in Iraq, 1 April 2021,
https://kirkuknow.com/en/news/64504, accessed 26 October 2021
Kirkuk Now, Christians in Kirkuk feel marginalized, 02 Novermber 2021,
https://kirkuknow.com/en/news/63865, accessed 5 November 2021
Kirkuk Now, PUK pushes for Kirkuk Governor position, 3 November 2021,
https://kirkuknow.com/en/news/66803, accessed 23 November 2021
Kirkuk Now, Turkmen & Arabs: We Don’t want the Peshmerga in Kirkuk, 26 May 2021,
https://www.kirkuknow.com/en/news/65639, accessed 5 October 2021
Kirkuk Now, Turkmen women call to uncover fate of 1300 missing Turkmen abducted by ISIS,
4 February 2021, https://kirkuknow.com/en/news/64788, accessed 5 October 2021
Kirkuk Now, Two sisters found dead in Chamchamal: father wanted by police, 10 September
2020, https://kirkuknow.com/en/news/63309, accessed 3 November 2021
Kirkuk Now, Content of the Baghdad-Erbil Agreement on Shingal, 10 October 2020,
https://kirkuknow.com/en/news/63613, accessed 3 November 2021
Kirkuk Now, PMF doubles troops in Shingal to face probable Turkey Offensive, 12 February
2021, https://kirkuknow.com/en/news/64862, accessed 3 November 2021

127

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Knights M. et al., Profile: Kataib Hezbollah, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1
April 2021, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-kataib-hezbollah,
accessed 3 November 2021
Knights, M. et al., Discordance in the Iran Threat Network in Iraq: Militia Competition andRivalry, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 2021,
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/4924, accessed 3 November 2021
Knights, M., et al., Honored, not Contained: The future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces,
March 2020, 4125 (washingtoninstitute.org), accessed 3 November 2021
Knights, M., Reacting Smartly to Harassing tactics by Iraqi Militias, The Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, 29 July 2020, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/reactingsmartly-harassing-tactics-iraqi-militias, accessed 3 November 2021
Kohlmann, E. (Flashpoint), Profile and Exclusive Interview with Iraqi Shiite Insurgents Ashab alKahf, 20 August 2020, https://www.flashpoint-intel.com/blog/profile-and-exclusive-interviewwith-iraqi-shiite-insurgents-ashab-al-kahf/, accessed 3 November 2021
Kurdish Project (The), Sinjar (Shingal), n.d., https://thekurdishproject.org/kurdistan-map/iraqikurdistan/sinjar-shingal/, accessed 30 November 2021
Kurdistan24, Militia group attacks spa center, migrant workers in Baghdad, 27 November
2020, https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/story/23566-Militia-group-attacks-spa-center,-migrantworkers-in-Baghdad-, accessed 30 November 2021
Los Angeles Times, Pope Francis arrives in Iraq, where beleaguered Christians are struggling
to hold on, 5 March 2021, https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2021-03-05/popefrancis-iraq-visit-battered-christian-community, accessed 3 November 2021
Loveluck, L. et al, They served alongside U.S. soldiers. Now they fear that Iran’s allies in Iraq
will strike back, 12 November 2020, The Washington Post,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iraq-militias-contractorstranslators/2020/11/12/2f2296e0-07d4-11eb-8719-0df159d14794_story.html, accessed 3
November 2021
LSE (London School of Economics), Conflict Research Programme, The King of Salah al-Din:
The Power of Iraq’s Sunni Elites, 2021,
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/108541/1/Ali_Saleem_the_king_of_salah_al_din_published.pdf,
accessed 25 November 2021
Mako, S., Negotiating Peace in Iraq’s Disputed Territories: Modifying the Sinjar Agreement,
Lawfare, 17 January 2021, https://www.lawfareblog.com/negotiating-peace-iraqs-disputedterritories-modifying-sinjar-agreement, accessed 12 October 2021
Malik, H. et al, Profile: Sabereen News, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 9 April
2021, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-sabereen-news, accessed 3
November 2021

128

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMMcKay, H., The ISIS War Crime Iraqi Turkmen Won’t Talk About, New Lines Magazine, 5
March 2021, https://newlinesmag.com/essays/the-isis-war-crime-iraqi-turkmen-wont-talkabout/, accessed 12 October 2021
MEE (Middle East Eye), Attack on protest camp leaves six dead, dozens wounded in Iraq's
south, 27 November 2020, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iraq-sadr-protesters-clashnasiriyah, accessed 3 November 2021
MEE (Middle East Eye), Hisham al-Hashimi: Iraq’s PM says analyst’s killers arrested, 16 July
2021, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iraq-hisham-hashimi-prime-minister-says-killersarrested, accessed 26 October 2021
MEE (Middle East Eye), Iraq: Journalist Ali Abdel Zahra recounts abduction days before
elections, 13 October 2021, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iraq-elections-journalist-aliabdel-zahra-recounts-abduction, accessed 26 October 2021
MEE (Middle East Eye), Iraq: Son of prominent women’s rights activist found dead near Basra,
25 July 2021, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iraq-son-prominent-iraqi-rights-activistshot-dead-near-basra, accessed 23 November 2021
MEE (Middle East Eye), Iraqi policeman shot dead, dozens wounded in Nasiriyah protests, 10
January 2021, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iraqi-policeman-shot-dead-dozenswounded-nasiriyah-protests, accessed 3 November 2021
MEE (Middle East Eye), The untold tragedy of Shia Turkmen women abducted by IslamicState, 18 February 2021, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iraq-islamic-state-turkmenwomen-enslaved-tragedy, accessed 12 October 2021
MEI (Middle East Institute), Waiting for a miracle in Iraq, 26 February 2021,
https://www.mei.edu/publications/waiting-miracle-iraq, accessed 3 November 2021
MEMO (Middle East Monitor), 3 blasts target liquor stores in Iraq's Baghdad, 25 February
2021, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20210225-3-blasts-target-liquor-stores-in-iraqsbaghdad/, accessed 30 November 2021
MEMO (Middle East Monitor), 3 explosions target liquor stores in Iraq's Baghdad, 16
December 2020, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20201216-3-explosions-target-liquorstores-in-iraqs-baghdad/, accessed 30 November 2021
MEMO (Middle East Monitor), Iraq: Liquor store explodes in Baghdad, 27 November 2020,
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20201127-iraq-liquor-store-explodes-in-baghdad/,
accessed 30 November 2021
MEMO (Middle East Monitor), Street sweeper killed in latest attack on liquor stores in Iraq, 22
December 2020, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20201222-street-sweeper-killed-inlatest-attack-on-liquor-stores-in-iraq/, accessed 30 November 2021
MENA Rights Group, Human rights lawyer Ali Jaseb Hattab Al Heliji disappeared since arrestin Amarah on October 8, 2019, updated 22 April 2021,
https://menarights.org/en/caseprofile/human-rights-lawyer-ali-jasib-hattab-al-helijidisappeared-arrest-amarah-october-8-2019, accessed 24 October 2021
129

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMMENA Rights Group, Iraq’s new draft Law on Combating Cybercrimes still contains
problematic provisions restricting fundamental freedoms, 1 December 2020, Iraq’s new draft
Law on Combating Cybercrimes still contains problematic provisions restricting fundamental
freedoms | MENA Rights Group, accessed 30 November 2021
MERI (Middle East Research Institute), Sectarianism and Sectarianisation in Iraq:
Ambassadorial Appointments as an Exemplar, 25 May 2021, http://www.merik.org/publication/sectarianism-and-sectarianisation-in-iraq-ambassadorial-appointments-asan-exemplar/, accessed 3 November 2021
MERI (Middle East Research Institute), State-Building in Iraq: Addressing the Structural andFunctional Gaps in the Governing System, With Reference to the Constitution, July 2021,
http://www.meri-k.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/State-Building-in-Iraq.pdf, accessed 3
November 2021
Modern Diplomacy, Iraq’s Nineveh Plains Christians Need the Pope’s Support, 11 March 2021,
https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2021/03/11/iraqs-nineveh-plains-christians-need-the-popessupport/, accessed 3 November 2021
MRG (Minority Rights Group), Crossroads: The future of Iraq’s minorities after ISIS, 7 June
2017, https://minorityrights.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/06/MRG_Rep_Iraq_ENG_May17_FINAL2.pdf, accessed 5 October 2021
MRG (Minority Rights Group), Iraq: Assyrians, n.d.,
https://minorityrights.org/minorities/assyrians-2/, accessed 15 November 2021
MRG (Minority Rights Group), Iraq: Current Issues, n.d., https://minorityrights.org/country/iraq/,
accessed 3 November 2021
MRG (Minority Rights Group), Iraq: Kaka’i’, n.d., https://minorityrights.org/minorities/kakai/,
accessed 15 November 2021
MRG (Minority Rights Group), Iraq: Sabean-Mandaeans, n.d.,
https://minorityrights.org/minorities/sabian-mandaeans/, accessed 15 November 2021
MRG (Minority Rights Group), Still Targeted: Continued Persecution of Iraq’s Minorities, June
2010, https://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/old-site-downloads/download-942Download-this-report-in-ENGLISH.pdf, accessed 7 October 2021
Musawah, Thematic report on article 16, Muslim family law and Muslim women’s rights in Iraq,
74th CEDAW Session Geneva, Switzerland November 2019 https://www.musawah.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/10/Iraq-Musawah-Thematic-Report-CEDAW74-2019.pdf, accessed 11
October 2021
National (The), Mother of murdered Iraqi activist calls for justice in Karbala, 22 June 2021,
https://www.thenationalnews.com/mena/mother-of-murdered-iraqi-activist-calls-for-justice-inkarbala-1.1246035, accessed 26 October 2021

130

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMNational Interest (The), The Pope Visited Iraqi Christians, Victims of U.S. Foreign Policy, 8
March 2021, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/pope-visited-iraqi-christians-victims-usforeign-policy-179672, accessed 3 November 2021
National News (The), Iraq sentences 9 men to death over links to Camp Speicher massacre,
28 June 2021, https://www.thenationalnews.com/mena/iraq-sentences-9-men-to-death-overlinks-to-camp-speicher-massacre-1.1250568, accessed 16 December 2021
Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ – CRU Report, May 2021,
https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2021-05/factors-of-instability-in-the-ninevehplains.pdf, accessed 30 November 2021
New Arab (The), The Iraq Report: Sectarian killings revive fears of strife under an'unsustainable' system, 23 October 2020, https://english.alaraby.co.uk/analysis/iraq-reportsectarian-killings-revive-fears-strife, accessed 3 November 2021
New Arab (The), Clan violence in Iraq: Oil companies targeted as poverty reigns, 13
September 2021, https://english.alaraby.co.uk/analysis/iraqs-clans-extort-oil-companiespoverty-reigns, accessed 3 November 2021
New Arab (The), Iraqis kill 11 after Islamic State terror attack, blaming neighbouring village, 28
October 2021, https://english.alaraby.co.uk/news/iraqis-kill-11-blaming-neighbouring-villageattack, accessed 3 November 2021
New Humanitarian (The), Inside the troubled repatriation of Iraqis from Syria’s al-Hol camp, 7June 2021, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2021/6/7/Iraqi-repatriationsSyria-al-Hol-camp-fear, accessed 14-16 December 2021
New York Times (The), 3 000 Yazidis Are Still Missing. Their Families Know Where Some ofThem Are, 3 October 2021, available by subscription athttps://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/03/world/middleeast/yazidis-missing-isis.html, accessed 3
December 2021
New York Times (The), ISIS Forced Them Into Sexual Slavery, 12 March 2021, available bysubscription at: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/12/world/middleeast/yazidi-isis-slaveschildren.html, accessed 3 December 2021
Newlines Institute for Startegy and Policy, Intelligence Briefing: A Thousand Hezbollahs: Iraq’s
Emerging Militia State, May 2021, https://newlinesinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/ShiaMilitia-Briefing-Newlines-Institute-1.pdf, accessed 3 November 2021
NPR, A Yazidi Survivor’s Struggle Shows The Pain Endures After ISIS Attack, 8 August 2020,
https://www.npr.org/2020/08/08/898972162/a-yazidi-survivors-struggle-shows-the-pain-thatendures-after-isis-attack, accessed 3 November 2021
NPR, In Iraq's 'Dire' Economy, Poverty Is Rising — And So Are Fears Of Instability, 3 February
2021, https://www.npr.org/2021/02/03/961149079/in-iraqs-dire-economy-poverty-is-rising-andso-are-fears-of-instability?t=1631273292568, accessed 13 November 2021

131

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

NPR, Laid Off By U.S. Contractor, Iraqi Interpreters Fear ISIS Retaliation, 12 June 2020,
https://www.wvtf.org/2020-06-12/laid-off-by-u-s-contractor-iraqi-interpreters-fear-isisretaliation#stream/0, accessed 3 November 2021
NRT, Imprisoned Journalist Omed Baroshki Sentenced to Additional Year in Prison, 23
September 2021, https://www.nrttv.com/En/detail6/1008, accessed 18 October 2021
NRT, Protest in Erbil’s Taajili Nwe neighborhood over poor public services, 29 September
2021 https://nrttv.com/En/detail6/1074, accessed 5 November 2021
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development)/SIGI (Social Institute &Gender Index), Iraq, 2019 https://www.genderindex.org/wpcontent/uploads/files/datasheets/2019/IQ.pdf, accessed 11 October 2021
OMCT (World Organisation Against Torture), Iraq: Sentencing of journalists Sherwan
Sherwani, Ayaz Karam Bruji and Kohdar Mohammed Amin Zebari, 26 February 2021,
https://www.omct.org/en/resources/urgent-interventions/iraq-sentencing-of-journalistssherwan-sherwani-ayaz-karam-bruji-and-kohdar-mohammed-amin-zebari, accessed 28
October 2021
OMCT (World Organisation Against Torture), Systematic Targeting of Human Rights
Defenders, 26 May 2021, https://www.omct.org/en/resources/statements/iraq-systematictargeting-of-human-rights-defenders, accessed 26 October 2021
Open Doors, Country Report – Iraq, 13 January 2021, https://www.opendoorsusa.org/christianpersecution/world-watch-list/iraq/, accessed 26 October 2021
Open Doors, World Watch List 2021: Iraq, January 2021,
https://www.opendoorsuk.org/persecution/world-watch-list/iraq/, accessed 26 October 2021
ORSAM, Early Parliamentary elections in Iraq and Nineveh, September 2021,
https://www.orsam.org.tr/en/early-parliamentary-elections-in-iraq-and-nineveh/, accessed 3
November 2021
Oxfam, Community perceptions of sexual and gender based violence, July 2021,
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/rr-community-perceptions-sgbv-iraqnaseej-290721-en.pdf, accessed 6 October 2021
Oxfam, Social Norms Structuring Masculinities, Gender Roles, and Stereotypes: Iraqi men andboys’ common misconceptions about women and girls’ participation and empowerment, 31
August 2021, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/rr-masculinitiesmisconceptions-women-girls-empowerment-310821-en.pdf pp. 19-20, accessed 5 October
2021
Palani, K., Iran-backed PMFs are destabilising Iraq’s disputed regions, Al Jazeera, 8 May 2021,
https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/5/8/iran-backed-pmfs-are-destabilising-iraqsdisputed-regions, accessed 12 October 2021
Parry, J., Institute for Regional and International Studies, American University of Iraqi
Sulaimani, Legal Pluralism and Justice in Iraq after ISIL, POMEPS (Project on Middle East
Political Science), POMEPS Studies 30, The Politics of Post-Conflict Reconstruction,132

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

September 2018, https://pomeps.org/legal-pluralism-and-justice-in-iraq-after-isil, accessed 30
November 2021
Pew Research Center, Iraqi Yazidis: Hazy population numbers and a history of persecution, 12
August 2014, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/08/12/iraqi-yazidis-hazypopulation-numbers-and-a-history-of-persecution/, accessed 30 November 2021
PFAAI (Press Freedom Advocacy Association in Iraq), Baghdad; The Most Dangerous Area
For Journalists, n.d., https://pfaa-iq.com/?p=5015, accessed 26 October 2021
PFAAI (Press Freedom Advocacy Association in Iraq), Diyala Journalist Targeted by Sound
Bomb, 4 September 2021, https://pfaa-iq.com/?p=5428, accessed 26 October 2021
PFAAI (Press Freedom Advocacy Association in Iraq), Media Observatory Report on theviolations against Iraqi Journalists, n.d., https://pfaa-iq.com/wp-content/uploads/Baghdad-themost-dangerous-area-for-Journalists.pdf, accessed 23 November 2021
PLOS, Mortality and kidnapping estimates for the Yazidi population in the area of Mount
Sinjar, Iraq, 9 May 2017,https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5423550/pdf/pmed.1002297.pdf, accessed 30
November 2021
Protection Cluster Iraq, Protection Analysis Report: Right to identity and civil documentation,
October 2021,
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/protection_cluster_analysis_-_right_to_identity_and_civil_documentation.pdf, accessed
14-16 December 2021
Protection Cluster Iraq, Protection Monitoring System Report 1, February 2021,
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/protection_monitoring_report__february_2021.pdf, accessed 12 October 2021
QHA (Kırım Haber Ajansı, Crimea News Agency), Kerkük’te DEAŞ saldırısı: 1 Türkmen şehit
oldu [Daesh attak in Kirkuk: One Turkmen martyred], 4 May 2021,
https://qha.com.tr/haberler/guncel/kerkuk-te-deas-saldirisi-1-turkmen-sehit-oldu/319942/,
accessed 7 October 2021
REACH Initiative, Telafar City, Area-Based Assessment, August-September 2020, 14 April
2021, https://www.impactrepository.org/document/reach/42913889/REACH_IRQ_AreaProfile_ABATelafar_Sept2020.p
df, accessed 12 October 2021
Reuters, Braving intimidation, hundreds of Iraqi women run for parliament, 16 September
2021, Braving intimidation, hundreds of Iraqi women run for parliament | Reuters, accessed 30
November 2021
Reuters, Factbox: Iraq's Christian denominations, 1 March 2021,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pope-iraq-christians-sects-factbox-idUSKCN2AT1UZ,
accessed 3 November 2021

133

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Reuters, Five protesters die, dozens injured in clashes in Iraqi city, 26 February 2021,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-security-protest-nassiriya-idUSKBN2AQ2TX, accessed
4 November 2021
Reuters, Seven years on, Yazidi survivor buries father slain by Islamic State, 8 February 2021,
https://www.reuters.com/article/iraq-security-yazidi-survivor-int-idUSKBN2A81GE, accessed
30 November 2021
Reuters, Six years on: Yazidi survivors see 'only empty promises' in aftermath of massacre, 4August 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/iraq-war-yazidis-idUSL8N2DW0XI, accessed 3
December 2021
Reuters, Zoroastrians make a comeback in northern Iraq, but still face stigma, 30 September
2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-iraq-religion-zoroastrianism-idUKKBN26L32S,
accessed 3 November 2021
RSF (Reporters Without Borders), Call for release of five journalists held in Iraqi Kurdistan, 29
September 2021, updated 1 October 2021, https://rsf.org/en/news/call-release-five-journalistsheld-iraqi-kurdistan, accessed 18 October 2021
RSF (Reporters Without Borders), Iraq, https://rsf.org/en/iraq, accessed 17 October 2021
RSF (Reporters Without Borders), Iraq: Three journalists killed in January, murder attempt on
fourth, 3 February 2020, https://rsf.org/en/news/iraq-three-journalists-killed-january-murderattempt-fourth, accessed 18 October 2021
RSF (Reporters Without Borders), Iraqi Kurdish journalist jailed for defaming Iraq’s president,
25 September 2020, https://rsf.org/en/news/iraqi-kurdish-journalist-jailed-defaming-iraqspresident, accessed 17 October 2021
RSF (Reporters Without Borders), RSF’s 2020 Round-up: 50 journalists killed, two-thirds incountries “at peace,” updated 29 December 2020, https://rsf.org/en/news/rsfs-2020-round50-journalists-killed-two-thirds-countries-peace, accessed 18 October 2021
RSF (Reporters Without Borders), Three jailed reporters charged with “undermining national
security”, 15 February 2021, updated 16 February 2021, https://rsf.org/en/news/three-jailedreporters-charged-undermining-national-security, accessed 17 October 2021
RSF (Reporters Without Borders), Round-up 2020, Journalists Killed, n.d.,
https://rsf.org/sites/default/files/bilan_2020_en-tues_.pdf, accessed 18 October 2021
Rudaw, 22,380 terror convicts imprisoned in Iraq: Ministry of Justice, 7 January 2021,
https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/070120211, accessed 14-16 December 2021
Rudaw, Al-Hol’s 27,000 children in unbearable conditions: charities, 3 December 2021,
https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/03122021, accessed 14-16 December 2021
Rudaw, Assassination of activist in Karbala sparks rage, 9 May 2021,
https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/090520212, accessed 1 November 2021

134

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Rudaw, Calls for protests in southern Iraqi city of Samawah after activist kidnap, 1 April 2021,
https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/010420212, accessed 28 October 2021
Rudaw, Iraq needs to pass law to prosecute ISIS genocide: UNITAD, 4 August 2021,
https://www.rudaw.net/english/interview/04082021, accessed 14-16 December 2021
Rudaw, Iraqi women continue protests despite fear of abduction, assassination, 22 December
2019, https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/221220191, accessed 13 October 2021
Rudaw, Kurdistan’s forgotten victims: the women killed for ‘honour’, 25 April 2019,https://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/250420195?fbclid=IwAR3_kaeId3-M9R73P0wp5urSHfEghQ1-8_kBZcU28OuEbpPOA5jlxuak1s, accessed 13 October 2021
Rudaw, Media coalition demands Iraq retract arrest warrant of journalist Suadad al-Salhy, 26
October 2020, https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/261020201, accessed 28
October 2021
Rudaw, One year since Hashimi assassination, impunity remains rife in Iraq, 6 July 2021,
https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/060720213, accessed 27 October 2021
Rudaw, PM Barzani, new UNITAD head discuss trying ISIS members, 3 November 2021,
https://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/031120211, accessed 14-16 December 2021
Rudaw, PM Kadhimi calls on Christians to return to Iraq, 14 August 2021,
https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/140820212, accessed 26 October 2021
Rudaw, Three men in Kalar arrested for hanging their sister to death: police, 23 November
2020, https://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/23112020, accessed 13 October 2021
Rudaw, To kill your daughter in the name of honour, 11 December 2020,
https://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/111220201, accessed 13 October 2021
Rudaw, Years on, Halabja still waiting for full province status, 26 June 2017,https://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/260620174, accessed 26 October 2021
Rudaw, Turkish bombardment damages church in Duhok village, terrifying villagers, 25 May
2021, Turkish bombardment damages church in Duhok... | Rudaw.net, accessed 19 January
2022
Rudaw, Christian villagers under fire in Turkey-PKK clashes, 17 June 2021, Christian villagers
under fire in Turkey-PKK... | Rudaw.net, accessed 19 January 2022
Sanad for Peacebuilding, Announcing the Tribal covenant to support the rule of law and thepreservation of human rights for Iraq's confederate tribal leaders, 5 October 2021,
https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/announcing-tribal-covenant-support-rule-law-and-preservationhuman-rights-iraqs, accessed 3 December 2021
Sanbar, S., Barries to Post-ISIS Reconciliation in Iraq, Case Study of Tel Afar, Ninewa,
Sciences Po Kuwait Program, Spring 2020, https://www.sciencespo.fr/kuwait-program/wpcontent/uploads/2021/02/Sarah-Sanbar-Post-ISIS-Reconciliation-in-Iraq.pdf, accessed 7
October 2021
135

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Save the Children, Married by exception: Child marriage policies in the Middle East and North
Africa, 25 June 2021 https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/married-exception-child-marriagepolicies-middle-east-and-north-africa, accessed 5 October 2021
Savelsberg, E. et al, Effectively Urbanized, Yezidis in the Collective Towns of Sheikhan and
Sinjar, 29 March 2010, https://journals.openedition.org/etudesrurales/9253, accessed 26
October 2021
Shafaq News, The Political Analyst Ibrahim Al-Sumaidaie to be released on Monday, 30 March
2021, https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq-News/the-political-analyst-Ibrahim-Al-Sumaidaie-to-bereleased-on-Monday, accessed 18 October 2021
Shafaq News, Tribal Conflict kills a man and wounded four others in Basra, 23 March 2021,
https://shafaq.com/ar/Iraq-News/Tribal-conflict-kills-a-man-and-wounded-four-others-in-Basra,
accessed 3 November 2021
Shafaq News, Six injured in an explosion that targeted a Logistics Convoy of the Global
Coalition south Iraq, 13 June 2021, https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq-News/Six-injured-in-anexplosion-that-targeted-a-Logistics-Convoy-of-the-Global-Coalition-south-Iraq, accessed 3
November 2021
Smith, C. et al., Profile: Qasem al-Jabbarin, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1
April 2021, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-qasem-al-jabbarin,
accessed 8 November 2021
Smith, C. et al., Profile: Saraya Awliya al-Dam, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
29 March 2021, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-saraya-awliya-aldam, accessed 8 November 2021
Smith, C. et al., Team of Legal Gladiators? Iraqi Militias’ Tortured Relationship with Law, The
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 12 April 2021,
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/team-legal-gladiators-iraqi-militiastortured-relationship-law, accessed 8 November 2021
Tahirih Justice Center, Forced Marriage Overseas: Iraq, n.d.,
https://preventforcedmarriage.org/forced-marriage-overseas-iraq/, accessed 11 October 2021
Tehran Times (The), More than 70% of the Yazidis are still displaced: Iraqi writer, 11 August
2021, https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/463994/More-than-70-of-the-Yazidis-are-stilldisplaced-Iraqi-writer, accessed 8 November 2021
TRT World, Why protests are raging across Iraq's Kurdish region, 14 December 2020,
https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/why-protests-are-raging-across-iraq-s-kurdish-region42357, accessed 5 November 2021
Tung, N., A Fragile Inheritance: An Iraqi Youth Uprising against a Dire Economy and Foreign
Intervention, 21 September 2020, https://muse.jhu.edu/article/765300/pdf, accessed 8
December 2021

136

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

UN (United Nations) Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on minority
issues on her mission to Iraq [A/HRC/34/53/Add.1], 9 January 2017,https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/a_hrc_34_53_add_1.pdf, accessed 5 October 2021
UN (United Nations) Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders, Iraq: Killing andkidnapping of Human Rights Defenders engaged in popular protest (joint communication), 11
October 2021, https://srdefenders.org/iraq-killing-and-kidnapping-of-human-rights-defendersengaged-in-popular-protest-joint-communication/, accessed 17 October 2021
UN (United Nations), ISIL crimes against Yazidis constitute genocide, UN investigation teamfinds, 10 May 2021, https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/05/1091662, accessed 18 November
2021
UN (United Nations), ISIL/Daesh Committed Genocide of Yazidi, War Crims against Unarmed
Cadets, Military Personnel in Iraw, Ivestigative Team Head Tells Security Council, 10 May
2021, https://www.un.org/press/en/2021/sc14514.doc.htm, accessed 8 December 2021
UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria, They came to destroy, 15 June 2016,
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/A_HRC_32_CRP.2_en.pdf,
accessed 9 November 2021
UN Iraq, UN in Iraq raises the alarm: Time to endorse the anti-domestic violence law, 16 April
2020, https://iraq.un.org/index.php/en/126347-un-iraq-raises-alarm-time-endorse-antidomestic-violence-law, accessed 12 October 2021
UN News, Government of Iraq Resumes Exhumation Activities; Opens Two New Yazidi Mass
Graves from ISIL, 28 October 2020, https://www.unitad.un.org/news/government-iraqresumes-exhumation-activities-opens-two-new-yazidi-mass-graves-isil, accessed 8 December
2021
UN News, Iraq: ‘Moral obligation’ to ensure justice for Yazidi and other survivors of ISIL
crimes, 30 September 2021, https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/09/1101852, accessed 8
December 2021
UN News, New Iraqi law ‘major step’ in assisting ISIL’s female victims but more must be done,
21 April 2021, https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/04/1090322, accessed 8 December 2021
UN News, Remarks of Under-Secretary-General Pramila Patten at the Free Yezidi Foundation
Panel on Genocide and Recovery for the Commemoration of the Sinjar Massacre of 3 August
2014, 3 August 2020, https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/statement/remarks-ofunder-secretary-general-pramila-patten-free-yazidi-foundation-panel-on-genocide-andrecovery-for-the-commemoration-of-the-sinjar-massacre-of-3-august-2014/, accessed 8
December 2021
UN News, UN launches initiative to support returnees trapped in Syria camps, 29 September
2021, https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/09/1101652, accessed 14-16 December 2021
UN OHCHR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights), Freedom of
expression increasingly curtailed in Kurdistan Region of Iraq – UN report, 12 May 2021,

137

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=27086&LangID=E,
accessed 28 October 2021
UN OHCHR (United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights), End of
Mission Statement by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internallydisplaced persons, 23 February 2020,
https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25608&LangID=E,
accessed 20 December 2021
UN OHCHR (United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights), Iraq: Wave of
mass executions must stop, trials are unfair - UN experts, 20 November 2020,
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26526&LangID=E&
fbclid=IwAR3bXRCtoTJYTZp2Z7GuUBztACOqT_9Bj8crlD_zE_78nzhVLNe54k0Rzj4,
accessed 14-16 December 2021
UN Partner Portal, General Food Assistance IDPs and Refugees in Camps 2022/Iraq Call for
Expression of Interest, December 2021,
https://www.unpartnerportal.org/api/public/export/projects/5622/, accessed 14-16 December
2021 [link no longer accessible]
UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020), Report of the SecretaryGeneral, S/2021/426, 4 May 2021, https://undocs.org/S/2021/426, accessed 1 November 2021
UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020), Report of the SecretaryGeneral, S/2021/120, 8 February 2021, https://undocs.org/en/S/2021/120, accessed 1
November 2021
UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020), Report of the SecretaryGeneral, S/2020/1099, 10 November 2020, https://undocs.org/en/S/2020/1099, accessed 1
November 2021
UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2576 (2021), Report of the SecretaryGeneral, S/2021/700, 3 August 2021, https://undocs.org/S/2021/700, accessed 1 November
2021
UN Security Council, Letter dated 16 July 2020 from the Chair of the Security Council
Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups,
undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council, 23 July 2020,
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2036549/S_2020_717_E.pdf, accessed 8 December 2021
UN Security Council, Conflict-related sexual violence, S/2021/312, 30 March 2021,
https://undocs.org/S/2021/312, accessed 5 October 2021
UN Security Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary
executions on her mission to Iraq, 5 June 2018, A/HRC/38/44/Add.1,
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/a_hrc_38_44_add_1.pdf, accessed 13 October 2021
UN Treaty Collection, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women, New York, 18 December 1979, Iraq 13 August 1986,
138

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4,
accessed 5 October 2021
UN Women, Iraq: Prevalence Data on Different Forms of Violence against Women, n.d.,
https://evaw-global-database.unwomen.org/en/countries/asia/iraq, accessed 6 October 2021
UN Women, UN in Iraq raises the alarm: Time to endorse the anti-domestic violence law, 17
April 2020, https://arabstates.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2020/04/un-in-iraq-raises-thealarm-to-endorse-the-anti-domestic-violence-law, accessed 5 October 2021
UNAMI (United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq) and OHCHR (Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights), Freedom of Expression in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq,
May 2021, https://iraq.un.org/sites/default/files/2021-05/F_of_Ex_in_K_Rn_%20%281%29.pdf,
accessed 1 November 2021
UNAMI (United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq) and OHCHR (Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights), Human Rights Violations and Abuses in the Context ofDemonstrations in Iraq, October 2019 to April 2020, August 2020,
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/Demonstrations-Iraq-UNAMI-OHCHRreport.pdf, accessed 23 November 2021
UNAMI (United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq), Opposing Violence Against Women Remarks by SRSG Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert Baghdad, 11 September 2021,
https://iraq.un.org/index.php/en/144068-opposing-violence-against-women-remarks-srsgjeanine-hennis-plasschaert-baghdad-11-september, accessed 11 October 2021
UNAMI (United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq), Update on Demonstrations in Iraq:
Accountability for Human Rights Violations and Abuses by Unidentified Armed Elements, May
2021,
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_Report_Accountability_for_Human_
Rights_Violations_and_Abuses_ENG.pdf, accessed 1 November 2021
UNAMI (United Nations Assisted Mission for Iraq), Human Rights Special Report –Demonstrations in Iraq: 3rd update, Abductions, torture and enforced disappearances in thecontext of ongoing demonstrations in Iraq, 23 May 2020,
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/3pdatemayen_1.pdf, accessed 26 October
2021
UNAMI/ OHCHR (United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq/Office of the United Nations HighCommissioner for Human Rights), The Right to Education in Iraq, Part Two: Obstacles to Girls’
Education after ISIL, 24 January 2021,
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/GirlsRightEducation_EN.pdf, accessed 8
December 2021
UNAMI/ESCWA (United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq/ Economic and Social Commission
for Western Asia), Women Running for Elected Office in Iraq: Needs and Challenges, 1
November 2020, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/20-00382_WomenPolitical-Participation-Iraq-Executive-Summary-En-Web-Full.pdf, accessed 11 October 2021
UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), Reaching the unreachable: The return andreintegration of families perceived as affiliated with ISIL in Iraq, 1 August 2021,
139

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

https://www.arabstates.undp.org/content/rbas/en/home/stories/reaching-the-unreachable-the-return-and-reintegration-of-famili.html, accessed 16 December 2021
UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund) Iraq, FGM: an infringement on morals and rights, 22
July 2021 https://iraq.unfpa.org/en/news/fgm-infringement-morals-and-rights-0, accessed 11
October 2021
UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Relevant Country of Origin
Information to Assist with the Application of UNHCR’s Country Guidance on Iraq, January
2021, available at https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2043432/5ffc243b4.pdf, accessed 20
December 2021
UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Tribal Conflict Resolution in Iraq,
15 January 2018, https://www.refworld.org/docid/5a66f84f4.html, accessed 8 December 2021
UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), UNHCR ramps up support to Iraqi
returnees amid large-scale closure of IDP camps, 13 November 2020,
https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2020/11/5fae43084/unhcr-ramps-support-iraqireturnees-amid-large-scale-closure-idp-camps.html, accessed 16 December 2021
UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund), 3. State Party Reports - Iraq, n.d.,
https://www.unicef-irc.org/portfolios/documents/396_iraq.htm, accessed 20 December 2021
UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund), Data Warehouse, 2018https://data.unicef.org/resources/data_explorer/unicef_f/?ag=UNICEF&df=GLOBAL_DATAFLO
W&ver=1.0&dq=.PT_F_20-24_MRD_U15+PT_M_20-24_MRD_U18+PT_F_2024_MRD_U18+PT_M_15-19_MRD+PT_F_15-19_MRD..&startPeriod=2016&endPeriod=2021,
accessed 12 October 2021
UNITAD (United Nations Investigative Team for Accountability of Da'esh/ISIL), Five year
anniversary of Camp Speicher massacre on 12th June, 12 June 2021, Five year anniversary ofCamp Speicher massacre on 12th June | Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for
Crimes Committed by Da'esh/ISIL (UNITAD), accessed 3 January 2022
UNITAD (United Nations Investigative Team for Accountability of Da'esh/ISIL), Sixth report of
the Special Adviser and Head of the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote
Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant(S/2021/419), 3 May 2021,
https://www.unitad.un.org/sites/www.unitad.un.org/files/general/s.2021.419__sixth_unitad_report_en.pdf, accessed 16 December 2021
UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), Situation and
Needs Monitoring – Report #1: Iraq Inter-Cluster Coordination Group January-May 2021, May
2021, available athttps://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2055675/202105_iccg_situation_and_needs_monitoring_r
eport_1_-_final.pdf, accessed 16 December 2021
UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), Iraq:
Humanitarian Bulletin, June 2021, 19 July 2021, https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/iraqhumanitarian-bulletin-june-2021, accessed 6 December 2021

140

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), Iraq:
Humanitarian Bulletin October 2020, 30 November 2020,
https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/iraq-humanitarian-bulletin-october-2020, accessed 16
December 2021
UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), Humanitarian
Needs Overview Iraq, February 2021,
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2046959/iraq_hno_2021_humanitarian_needs_overview__feb_2021.pdf, accessed 3 December 2021
UNOCHA and iMMAP, Iraq: Al-Sulaymaniyah Governorate Reference Map 2020, 5 May 2020,
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/irq06_al-sulaymaniyah_reference_map_a0_20200501.pdf, accessed 16 December
2021
UNOCHA Iraq, Humanitarian Bulletin, April 2021, available athttps://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2052044/april_2021_humanitarian_bulletin.pdf, accessed
16 December 2021
UNU-CPR (United Nations University, Centre for Policy Research), The Limits of Punishment,
Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism, Iraq Case Study, May 2018,https://i.unu.edu/media/cpr.unu.edu/attachment/3127/2-LoP-Iraq-final.pdf, accessed 16
December 2021
US Embassy and Consulates in Iraq, Marriage in Iraq, n. d., Marriage in Iraq - U.S. Embassy &Consulates in Iraq (usembassy.gov), accessed 16 November 2021
US, CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), The World Factbook – Iraq, 22 September 2021,
https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/iraq/#people-and-society, accessed 16
December 2021
US, CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), World Factbook, Iraq, 20 October 2021,
https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/iraq/#people-and-society, accessed 16
December 2021
USCIRF (US Commission for International Religious Freedom), Annual Report 2021, Iraq, May
2021, https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/2021-05/Iraq%20Chapter%20AR2021.pdf,
accessed 28 October 2021
USDOD (United States Department of Defense), Lead Inspector General, Operation Inherent
Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, January 1, 2021-March
31, 2021, 14 May 2021, https://media.defense.gov/2021/May/11/2002638870/-1/1/1/LEAD%20INSPECTOR%20GENERAL%20FOR%20OPERATION%20INHERENT%20RESOLV
E%20QUARTERLY%20REPORT%20TO%20THE%20UNITED%20STATES%20CONGRESS%20%20JANUARY%201,%202021%20%E2%80%93%20MARCH%2031,%202021.PDF, accessed
28 October 2021
USDOS (United States Department of State), 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices: Iraq, 30 March 2021 https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-humanrights-practices/iraq/, accessed 6 October 2021

141

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMUSDOS (United States Department of State), 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom:Iraq, 12 May 2021, https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-report-on-international-religiousfreedom/iraq/, accessed 28 October 2021
USDOS (United States Department of State), 2021 Trafficking in Persons Report – Iraq,(covering April 2020 to March 2021), 1 July 2021, https://www.state.gov/reports/2021trafficking-in-persons-report/iraq/, accessed 5 October 2021
USDOS (United States Department of State), Country Report on Human Rights Practices, 2018
– Iraq, https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/2004254.html, accessed 18 October 2021
USDOS (US Department of State), Statement on Missing Yezidi Women and Children, 18
October 2021, https://www.state.gov/statement-on-missing-yezidi-women-and-children/,accessed 28 October 2021
USIP (United States Institute for Peace), Four Years After ISIS, Iraq’s Tal Afar Remains Riven
by Communal Divisions, 2 August 2021, https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/08/four-yearsafter-isis-iraqs-tal-afar-remains-riven-communal-divisions, accessed 28 November 2021
USIP (United States Institute for Peace), Iraq Timeline: Since the 2003 War, 29 May 2020,
https://www.usip.org/iraq-timeline-2003-war, accessed 21 October 2021
USIP (United States Institute of Peace), The Pope's Visit to Iraq and the Future of theCountry’s Christians, March 3, 2021, https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/03/popes-visitiraq-and-future-countrys-christians, accessed 20 November 2021
USIP (United States Institute of Peace), Unemployment Replaces ISIS as Top Security Concern
for Minorities in Iraq, 22 June 2021,
https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/06/unemployment-replaces-isis-top-security-concernminorities-iraq, accessed 7 October 2021
VOA (Voice of America), Hundreds of Iraqi Nationals Leave al-Hol Refugee Camp in Syria, 30
September 2021, https://www.voanews.com/a/hundreds-of-iraqi-nationals-leave-al-holrefugee-camp-in-syria-/6252265.html, accessed 16 December 2021
VOA (Voice of America), Reporter’s Notebook: Islamic State Murders in Syria’s al-Hol Camp,
25 November 2021, https://www.voanews.com/a/reporter-s-notebook-islamic-state-murdersin-syria-s-al-hol-camp/6327980.html, accessed 16 December 2021
Voice of the Martyrs (The), Global Prayer Guide: Iraq, n.d.,
https://www.persecution.com/globalprayerguide/iraq/?_source_code=WHPB20C, accessed
20 November 2021
Washington Institute (The), Tensions in Sinjar Continue to Threaten Yazidis’ Return, 2 March
2021, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/tensions-sinjar-continue-threatenyazidis-return, accessed 20 November 2021
Washington Post (The), Furtive love, forbidden grief, 28 February 2020,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/02/28/when-iraqi-men-perish-ramparts-protestwomen-they-secretly-loved-must-hide-away-their-grief/?arc404=true, accessed 3 November
2021
142

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Washington Post (the), In Iraq, powerful militias assassinate protesters with impunity, 12 May
2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/iraq-militia-assassinationsfear/2021/05/12/501474c0-b1cc-11eb-bc96-fdf55de43bef_story.html, accessed 1 November
2021
Washington Post (The), Syrian detention camp rocked by dozens of killings blamed on IslamicState women, 19 September 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/09/19/syriaisis-al-hol-camp/, accessed 14-16 December 2021
Washington Post (The), Iraq wants thousands displaced by the ISIS war to go home. They may
be killed if they do, 22 December 2020,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iraq-refugees-displacedcamps/2020/12/21/9a2b6188-3af6-11eb-aad9-8959227280c4_story.html, accessed 20
November 2021
Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, Bridging the Gap: Bringing the Response toChildren Formerly Associated with ISIL in Iraq in Line with International Child Protection
Standards, March 2021, available athttps://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/watchlist-policy-brief-iraq-mar2021final.pdf, accessed 16 December 2021
WHRDMENA, Alert: WHRD Anwar Jassem Mhawwas assassinated in Iraq, 6 April 2020,
https://whrdmena.org/2020/04/06/alert-whrd-anwar-jassem-mehwes-assassinated-iniraq/?lang=en, accessed 23 November 2021
Wille, B., Impunity for Killings Will Cast a Pall Over Iraq's Elections, HRW (Human Rights
Watch), 20 May 2021, https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/05/20/impunity-killings-will-cast-pallover-iraqs-elections, accessed 1 November 2021
Wilson Centre, What Islamists Are Doing and Saying on COVID-19 Crisis, 14 May 2020,
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/what-islamists-are-doing-and-saying-covid-19-crisis,
accessed 20 November 2021
World Bank (The), Iraq Economic Monitor: Seizing the Opportunity for Reforms and Managing
Volatility, 27 May 2021,
https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/552761621369308685/pdf/Iraq-EconomicMonitor-Seizing-the-Opportunity-for-Reforms-and-Managing-Volatility.pdf, accessed 6
October 2021
Yale MacMillan Canter - Genocide Studies Program, Before it’s too late, June 2019,https://gsp.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/Before%20Its%20Too%20Late%20Report.pdf,
accessed 20 November 2021

143

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Annex 2: Terms of ReferenceThis report should aim to provide the necessary COI to respond to questions relevant for thedevelopment of country guidance on actors of persecution or serious harm, refugee status, aswell as subsidiary protection under Article 15(a) and (b) QD: “a) the death penalty or execution;or (b) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of an applicant in the countryof origin”. The reference period is generally 1 January 2020 – 31 October 2021, while forsome profiles focus is on more recent information, in particular since August 2020.
Research should cover the following profiles:
1. (Perceived) ISIL affiliates [focus on new developments since August 2020]• Persons perceived to be associated with ISIL
 Factors which make it likely for a person to be suspected of ISIL
affiliation
 Treatment of Iraqis with perceived ISIL affiliation during the period(examples)• Treatment of family members
 Women with family links to suspected ISIL members
 Children of suspected ISIL members• Situation in ISIL camps• Situation of children born in territories under ISIL control and who lack civil
documentation
2. Sunni Arabs• General situation of Sunni Arabs in Iraq
• Instances of targeting Sunni Arabs during the period (with a focus on Baghdad
and Mosul)
3. Political opposition activists and protesters [focus on new developments sinceAugust 2020]• Iraq: Recent developments in protests (including the elections issues
developing) Government response during protests, arrests and treatment indetention
 Examples of targeting of protesters/activists (here the drafter shouldelaborate on general treatment versus particular targeting of certain
people, for example, organisers, vocal critics, etc, and by whom – e.g.,
PMUs, unknown perpetrators, etc.)
 Ability of the authorities to monitor online activism and targeting ofindividuals for such online activism• KRI:
 Recent developments in protests
 KRG response during protests, arrests and treatment in detention
 Examples of targeting of protesters/activists (here the drafter shouldelaborate on general treatment versus particular targeting of certain
people, for example, organisers, vocal critics, etc., and by whom) Ability of the authorities to monitor online activism and targeting ofindividuals for such online activism

144

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

4. Religious and ethnic minorities, and stateless persons [focus on developments
since August 2020 – for all profiles: difference of treatment between Iraq and the
KRI should be highlighted]• Christians
 General situation of Christians in Iraq and the KRI
 Instances of targeting of Christians during the period The situation of Christian converts (with reference to the chapter onatheists, converts, and apostates)• Turkmen General situation of Turkmen
 Differences in treatment between Sunni and Shia Turkmen (regions ofpresence, affiliation, etc.)
 Instances of targeting of Turkmen during the period (specify for
different relevant actors: Iraqi Federal Government, PMUs, KRG, PKK,
ISIL, etc.)• Yazidis
 General situation of Yazidis in Iraq
 Treatment of Yazidis
 Instances of targeting of Yazidis during the period
 Situation of Yazidi women victims of gender-based violence and theirchildren• Palestinians
 Background information including population figures/locations
 Legal position and rights
 Treatment of Palestinians and instances of targeting during the period
5. Journalists, media workers and human rights activists [reference period January
2020 – October 2021]• General situation of journalists and other media workers• Incidents targeting journalists
 Iraq KRI• General situation of human rights activists• Incidents targeting human rights activists
 Iraq KRI
6. Individuals perceived to transgress moral codes [reference period January 2020 –October 2021]• Perception of Westernisation in Iraqi society• treatment of individuals who display such behaviours/appearances in Iraq and
KRI (e.g., tattoos, women clothing, striking men’s hairstyles, alcohol
consumption)• Instances of targeting of individuals perceived as westernised (by armed
groups, by tribes, by family members)
7. Women [reference period January 2020 – October 2021]• General situation of women in both Iraq and the KRI• The situation as regards gender based violence in Iraq and the KRI• Treatment of single/divorced/widowed women (including single women headof households) in both Iraq and the KRI• Treatment of women perceived to transgress moral codes in Iraq and the KRI
8. Persons involved in and affected by blood/land feuds in the context of tribal
conflict [reference period January 2020 – October 2021]
145

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM• Background of tribal feuds• Land feuds resolution and escalation to blood feuds• Targeting of individuals in the context of blood feuds
9. (Perceived) collaborators with western forces [reference period January 2020 –October 2021]• General situation of persons collaborating (or perceived to be collaborating)with western forces• Instances of targeting of persons belonging to this profile (by armed actors or
by society)
10. Atheists, converts and individuals considered to have committed apostasy[reference period January 2020 – October 2021]• Prevalence in KRI / Iraq (and who are we talking about)• Treatment of atheists, converts and perceived apostates bysociety/family/community• Treatment of atheists, converts and perceived apostates by state authorities(laws/arrests/prosecution/punishments/implementation)• Treatment of atheists, converts and apostates by ISIL (or other non-state
entities

146

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

147

IRAQ – TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS 2022

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

doi: 10.2847/40146

doi: 10.2847/851217

148