Iraq
Key Socio-economic
Indicators
for Baghdad, Basrah, andSulaymaniyahCountry of Origin
Information Report
November 2021

More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu)
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doi: 10.2847/7919

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Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

Acknowledgements
EASO acknowledges as the drafter of this report:
Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation (ACCORD)
The following departments and organisations have reviewed the report:
The Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of Origin (COI) unit
It must be noted that the review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts ororganisations contributes to the overall quality of the report, but does not necessarily imply theirformal endorsement of the final report, which is the full responsibility of EASO.

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Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and SulaymaniyahContents
Acknowledgements................................................................................................................................. 3Contents .................................................................................................................................................. 4
Disclaimer................................................................................................................................................ 7
Glossary and Abbreviations .................................................................................................................... 8
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 9
Methodology ...................................................................................................................................... 9
Defining the terms of reference ..................................................................................................... 9
Sources ............................................................................................................................................. 10
Structure and use of the report ........................................................................................................ 10
Map ....................................................................................................................................................... 11
1. Access and residency requirements for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah ................................ 12
1.1 General information on access and residency requirements .................................................... 12
1.2 Legal and administrative requirements to enter the respective city ......................................... 14
1.2.1 Baghdad............................................................................................................................... 14
1.2.2 Basrah .................................................................................................................................. 14
1.2.3 Sulaymaniyah ...................................................................................................................... 15
1.3 Legal and administrative requirements to settle in the respective city ..................................... 16
1.3.1 Baghdad............................................................................................................................... 16
1.3.2 Basrah .................................................................................................................................. 17
1.3.3 Sulaymaniyah ...................................................................................................................... 17
2. Key Socio-economic indicators in Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah .......................................... 20
2.1 Economy ..................................................................................................................................... 20
2.1.1 Baghdad............................................................................................................................... 20
2.1.2 Basrah .................................................................................................................................. 22
2.1.3 Sulaymaniyah ...................................................................................................................... 23
2.2 Employment ............................................................................................................................... 24
2.2.1 Baghdad............................................................................................................................... 24
2.2.2 Basrah .................................................................................................................................. 26
2.2.3 Sulaymaniyah ...................................................................................................................... 27
2.3 Poverty........................................................................................................................................ 27
2.3.1 Baghdad............................................................................................................................... 28
2.3.2 Basrah .................................................................................................................................. 29
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Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

2.3.3 Sulaymaniyah ...................................................................................................................... 30
2.4 Food Security .............................................................................................................................. 30
2.4.1 Baghdad............................................................................................................................... 30
2.4.2 Basrah .................................................................................................................................. 32
2.4.3 Sulaymaniyah ...................................................................................................................... 33
2.5 Healthcare .................................................................................................................................. 35
2.5.1 Baghdad............................................................................................................................... 35
2.5.2 Basrah .................................................................................................................................. 37
2.5.3 Sulaymaniyah ...................................................................................................................... 38
2.6 Education .................................................................................................................................... 39
2.6.1 Baghdad............................................................................................................................... 39
2.6.2 Basrah .................................................................................................................................. 41
2.6.3 Sulaymaniyah ...................................................................................................................... 42
2.7 Housing and Living Conditions.................................................................................................... 43
2.7.1 Baghdad............................................................................................................................... 43
2.7.2 Basrah .................................................................................................................................. 45
2.7.3 Sulaymaniyah ...................................................................................................................... 47
3. Overview of the situation as regards ID documents, security clearances, and COVID-19 ............... 49
3.1 Requirements to obtain ID documents ...................................................................................... 49
3.1.1 Unified national card ........................................................................................................... 50
3.1.2 Civil status ID ....................................................................................................................... 52
3.1.3 Birth certificate.................................................................................................................... 53
3.1.4 Nationality certificate .......................................................................................................... 54
3.1.5 Residency card..................................................................................................................... 54
3.1.6 Public Distribution System (PDS) card................................................................................. 55
3.2 ID documents and access to services ......................................................................................... 56
3.2.1 Education............................................................................................................................. 58
3.2.2 Health-Care ......................................................................................................................... 58
3.2.3 Housing, Land and Property (HLP) ...................................................................................... 59
3.2.4 Social Welfare...................................................................................................................... 59
3.3 IDPs and returnees ..................................................................................................................... 60
3.3.1 Obtaining lost ID documents ............................................................................................... 61
3.3.2 Requirements of ID documents for family members .......................................................... 64
3.3.3 Security clearance requirement for returnees.................................................................... 65
3.3.4 Possible risks considering travel to/through formerly ISIL-controlled areas without
personal ID documents ................................................................................................................ 69
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3.4 Impact of COVID-19 at a national level ...................................................................................... 69
3.4.1 Measures to curb the spreading of COVID-19 .................................................................... 70
3.4.2 Impact on economy and vulnerable groups........................................................................ 71
3.4.3 Vaccination programme ...................................................................................................... 71
3.4.4 Measures in relation to the elections ................................................................................. 72
Annex 1: Bibliography ........................................................................................................................... 73
Annex 2: Terms of Reference ................................................................................................................ 96

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Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

Disclaimer
This report was written according to the EASO COI Report Methodology (2019) 1. The report is basedon carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced.
The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed with utmost
care. However, this document does not claim to be exhaustive. If a particular event, person ororganisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has not taken placeor that the person or organisation does not exist.
Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particularapplication for international protection. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative of aparticular legal position.
‘Refugee’, ‘risk’ and similar terminology are used as generic terminology and not in the legal sense as
applied in the EU Asylum Acquis, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the
Status of Refugees.
Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may bemade of the information contained in this report.
The drafting of this report was finalised on 31 October 2021. Any event taking place after this date is
not included in this report. More information on the reference period for this report can be found in
the methodology section of the Introduction.

1 The 2019 EASO COI Report Methodology can be downloaded from the EASO COI Portal

https://coi.easo.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2019_EASO_COI_Report_Methodology.pdf

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Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

Glossary and Abbreviations
AsayishIntelligence services of the KRG

CAD

Civil Affairs Directorate

CWTU

Compact water treatment unit

HLP

Housing, Land and Property

ID

Identification documentation

IDP

Internally displaced persons

IDH

Internally displaced household

IQD

Iraqi Dinar

ISIL

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, also known as the IslamicState of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Islamic State, or Daesh

ISX

Iraq Stock Exchange

JCCC

Joint Crisis Coordination Cell

KRG

Kurdish Regional Government

KRI

Kurdistan Region of Iraq

LSG

Living standards gap

MoDM

Ministry of Displacement and Migration

MoE

Ministry of Education

MoLSA

Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs

MoT

Ministry of Trade

MP

Multidimensional poverty

mukhtarLocal community leader

MSNI

Multi-Sectoral Needs Index

MVI

Multidimensional Vulnerability Index

PDS

Public Distribution System

PMU

Popular Mobilisation Units, also known as Hashd Al-Sha‘bi

WASH

Water, sanitation and hygiene

8Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

Introduction
This report is an update to the EASO COI Report: Iraq Key Socio-economic Indicators, published in
September 2020.
The purpose of this report is to provide relevant information for the assessment of international
protection status determination, including refugee status and subsidiary protection. In particular, it
is intended to inform the update of the chapter on Internal Protection Alternative (IPA) within the
EASO Country Guidance on Iraq 2021 update. This report provides information on key socioeconomic indicators in Iraq, focusing on the cities of Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah andhighlights aspects of the legal and administrative requirements for Iraqis to enter and settle in therespective city, ID documents and access to basic services, the situation of IDPs and returnees, andthe impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Methodology
This report is produced in line with the EASO COI report methodology (2019) 2 and the EASO COI
Writing and Referencing Guide (2019) 3.
The reference period for this report covers the time period between 1 August 2020 and 15 October
2021.
Some additional information was added during the finalisation of this report in response to feedback
received during the quality control process, until 31 October 2021. In this quality review process, areview was carried out by a COI specialist from the Netherlands as stated in the Acknowledgments
section of this report, and internally by EASO. All comments made by reviewers were taken into
consideration and most of them were implemented in the final draft of this report. Furthermore,
and since this report is an update to the previous Iraq Key Socio-economic Indicators reportpublished in September 2020, reference to that report was included for background information andwhere no new information was available. In those sections where no specific information was foundon the respective city, information on the governorate was included. Where possible, the distinction
is made in the report.

Defining the terms of reference
The terms of reference of this report are based on the input received from policy experts from EU+
countries 4 within the context of an EASO country guidance development on Iraq.
It was determined that the report will concentrate information on the main urban areas of Baghdad,
Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah, within the relevant national context. Members of the EASO COI Specialist
Network on Iraq and EASO Country Guidance Network were consulted and gave input on the ToR
prior to its finalisation.
After consultation with stakeholders, it was determined that information on the situation in
Sulaymaniyah would also be beneficial to decision makers. For this reason, it was covered in thisreport in lieu of Erbil as a representative city for northern Iraq for this update. This by no means2

The 2019 EASO COI Report Methodology can be downloaded from the EASO COI Portal
https://coi.easo.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2019_EASO_COI_Report_Methodology.pdf
3
The 2019 EASO Writing and Referencing Guide can be downloaded from the EASO COI Portal
https://coi.easo.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2019_EASO_COI_Writing_and_Referencing_Guide.pdf
4
EU Member States, Norway and Switzerland.

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Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

implies an IPA assessment of the two cities or indicates that Sulaymaniyah is safer than Erbil. The
TOR for this report can be found in the Annex 2: Terms of Reference.

Sources
In accordance with EASO COI methodology, a range of different published documentary sources havebeen consulted on relevant topics for this report. These include: COI reports by governments;
information from civil society, advocacy groups, humanitarian organisations, and NGOs; internationaland NGO human rights reports; reports produced by various bodies of the United Nations; Iraqi andregionally-based media and social media; academic publications and think tank reports andspecialised sources covering Iraq.
Additionally, at the request of the drafters, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees(UNHCR) provided information regarding access to residency in Sulaymaniyah through writtencorrespondence.

Structure and use of the report
The report is divided into three main parts: Part 1 deals with access and residency requirements for
Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah, including legal and administrative requirements for Iraqis toenter and settle in those cities. Part 2 covers key socio-economic indicators in the three cities,
including the economy, employment, poverty, food security, healthcare, education and housing andliving conditions. Part 3 provides information on requirements to obtain ID documents, including for
IDPs, ID documents and related access to services, and the impact of COVID-19 pandemic at anational level.

10Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

Map

Map 1: UN, Iraq - Map No. 3835 Rev.6, July 2014 5

5UN, Iraq - Map No. 3835 Rev.6, July 2014, url

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1. Access and residency requirements for
Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah
1.1 General information on access and residency requirements
In Article 44 (1), the Constitution of Iraq grants that ‘each Iraqi has freedom of movement, travel,
and residence inside and outside Iraq’ while, in Article 44 (2), it stipulates that ‘no Iraqi may be
exiled, displaced, or deprived from returning to the homeland.’ 6
Iraq also has a National Policy on Displacement, dating from July 2008, which provides for a broad
range of IDP rights including non-discrimination and freedom of movement. 7 Under the provisions
on the Right to Freedom of Movement, Section 6.9 states that:‘The competent authorities have the responsibility to ensure that the IDPs enjoy the right tomove freely and choose their place of residence. It also includes the right to return andrehabilitate themselves in their places of origin or habitual residence, local integration or
resettlement in other places in Iraq. [...] The Government ensures that a person’s freedomof movement and choice of place of residence will not be subject to any restrictions savethose maintained by the law as they are deemed necessary for reasons pertaining tonational security, public order or health, morals or other people’s rights and freedoms. The
governorates and local authorities shall not prevent IDPs from residing in their areas, andthey shall not create obstacles to that effect. The Government of Iraq realizes theconsequences that resulted regionally from imposing internal obstacles on those who havebeen seeking safety.’ 8
According to information from October 2018, the Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MoDM),
created after 2003, was the federal body entrusted with addressing IDP and returnee issues under
the National Policy on Displacement, and reportedly maintained offices in all governorates. 9
When the 2014 ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) crisis began and with the 2008 National
Policy on Displacement proving to be inadequate to tackle the challenges arising from new mass
displacement, Iraq established an additional body 10 called the Supreme Committee for the Relief
and Shelter of Families Displaced by Terrorist Operations (renamed in 2019 into Higher Committee
for the Relief and Support of the Displaced) 11 to coordinate the intersectoral response. 12

6 Iraq, Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, 15 October 2005, url, Article 44 (1), (2)7 Iraq, National Policy on Displacement, July 2008, url, section 6

8 Iraq, National Policy on Displacement, July 2008, url, section 6.9

9 Chatelard, G., Comment made during the review of EASO Report on Internal Mobility, 10 October 2018, cited from EASO,COI Report: Iraq – Internal Mobility, February 2019, url, p. 15, footnote 28; see also Costantini, I. and Palani, K.,
Displacement-Emigration-Return: Understanding Uncertainty in the Context of Iraq, MERI, January 2018, url, p. 37
10 Costantini, I. and Palani, K., Displacement-Emigration-Return: Understanding Uncertainty in the Context of Iraq, MERI,
January 2018, url, p. 38
11 Iraq, Government of Iraq, Cabinet approves measures to strengthen support for people displaced by terrorist operations,
25 December 2019, url
12 Costantini, I. and Palani, K., Displacement-Emigration-Return: Understanding Uncertainty in the Context of Iraq, MERI,
January 2018, url, p. 38

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While the KRI, unlike Baghdad-administered Iraq, does not have a ministry dedicated to the issue ofdisplacement, 13 the Joint Crisis Coordination Cell (JCCC) was formed in 2015 as a body within the
Kurdish Ministry of Interior to coordinate responses to the displacement crisis. 14
Iraq’s security forces are authorised to restrict movement within the country 15 and, in recent years,
local authorities in many areas have put in place requirements relating to access and residency. 16
According to UNHCR, these ‘access and residency requirements are not always officially announced
and/or clearly defined, and/or implementation can vary or be subject to changes depending on
political or security dynamics’. 17 They have also been enforced selectively on ethno-sectarian
grounds. 18
In the face of mass displacement prompted by the expansion of ISIL and the ensuing military conflict
between 2014 and 2017, authorities have imposed restrictions on entry and residency in numerous
localities, including sponsorship requirements. In some places, they have imposed near-total entrybans for people originating from conflict areas, especially Sunni Arabs. While access bans and entry
restrictions had been lifted in most places by early 2020, sponsorship and other clearance
requirements still existed in several governorates as of January 2021 with regard to residency for
persons from areas formerly held by ISIL or affected by conflict. 19
Two of the main obstacles to freedom of movement and residency for IDPs and returnees areproving one’s identity and obtaining security clearance. 20
Missing civil documents (as a result of documents being lost or left behind while fleeing, confiscationof documents or destruction of civil registries during conflict 21) have been reported as a major
concern for 43 % of IDP households living outside camps, 55 % of camp-based IDP households and
57 % of returnee households across the country. 22 For more information regarding lost civil
documentation, as well as the requirements for obtaining ID documents, please see section 3.1
Requirements to obtain ID documents.
Security clearance for persons with alleged affiliation with ISIL involves a review by security services.
Moreover, the process ‘relies centrally on the mukhtar, the local headman in the displaced person’s
hometown or city neighbourhood’, who acts in coordination with the security forces 23 and canprovide a signed letter attesting that a person suspected of ISIL affiliation has not actuallycommitted any crime. 24 For more information relating to security clearance requirements for

13 Khedir, H. H., IDPs in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Intractable Return and Absence of Social Integration Policy, 2021,
url, p. 154
14 Costantini, I. and Palani, K., Displacement-Emigration-Return: Understanding Uncertainty in the Context of Iraq, MERI,
January 2018, url, p. 38
15 USDOS, Country reports on human rights practices for 2020 - Iraq, 30 March 2021, url, p. 28
16 UNHCR, Relevant Country of Origin Information to Assist with the Application of UNHCR’s Country Guidance on Iraq:
Ability of Persons Originating from Formerly ISIS-Held or Conflict-Affected Areas to Legally Access and Remain in Proposed
Areas of Internal Relocation, 11 January 2021, url, p. 2
17 UNHCR, Access to and Residency in Sulaymaniyah – Response to ACCORD, 25 October 2021, p. 1
18 USDOS, Country reports on human rights practices for 2020 - Iraq, 30 March 2021, url, p. 28
19 UNHCR, Relevant Country of Origin Information to Assist with the Application of UNHCR’s Country Guidance on Iraq:
Ability of Persons Originating from Formerly ISIS-Held or Conflict-Affected Areas to Legally Access and Remain in Proposed
Areas of Internal Relocation, 11 January 2021, url, p. 2
20 GPC, Protection Monitoring System, Report 1, February 2021, url, p. 6; see also UNHCR, Iraq: IDPs - Civil & Identity
Documentation (May 2021), 27 June 2021, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Iraq: 2021 Humanitarian Needs Overview, 7 February 2021,
url, pp. 37, 39
21 NRC, Broken Home: Women’s housing, land and property rights in post-conflict Iraq, 11 May 2020, url, p. 10
22 UNOCHA, Iraq: 2021 Humanitarian Needs Overview, 7 February 2021, url, p. 39
23 International Crisis Group, Exiles in Their Own Country: Dealing with Displacement in Post-ISIS Iraq, 19 October 2020, url,
p. 5
24 IOM, Protracted Displacement in Iraq: Revisiting Categories of Return Barriers, 24 January 2021, url, p. 32

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persons with alleged ISIL affiliation, please see section 3.3.3 Security clearance requirement for
returnees.
Individuals alleged to be affiliated with ISIL appear to have limited prospects for settling outside of IDP
camps 25 as they are subjected to denial of security clearance by security forces 26 or are compelled toundergo procedures that involve reporting relatives with alleged ISIL ties to the authorities ordisavowing these relatives 27 in order to obtain civil documents. 28 What is meant by ISIL affiliation,
however, varies by location. In some places ISIL affiliation is attributed to persons who lived in ISILheld areas or those who did not flee until the military offensive was underway. In other places, it may
only refer to those who have close family members directly involved in crimes committed by thegroup. 29

1.2 Legal and administrative requirements to enter the respectivecity
1.2.1 Baghdad
Baghdad City has a mixed resident population that includes ‘Sunni and Shia Arabs with smaller pockets
of Christians, Sunni and Shia Kurds, and Sunni and Shia Turkmen’. The city’s displaced population iscomposed mainly by Sunni Arab. 30
A person is required to hold a valid identity document (e.g., Civil Status ID card, Iraqi Nationality
Certificate, or passport) 31 in order to be allowed to pass checkpoints and be admitted into Baghdad. 32
As of January 2021, individuals originating from areas formerly held by ISIL or affected by conflict(including returnees from a third country) do not need a sponsor to enter Baghdad governorate. 33

1.2.2 Basrah
The majority of Basrah City’s population is Shia, 34 while it also includes a minority of Sunnis, 35 a small
Christian community 36 and other groups including Sabean Mandeans. 37

25 IOM, Cities as Home: Understanding Belonging and Acceptance Among IDPs and Host Communities in Iraq, 19 October

2020, url, p. 29

26 UNOCHA, Iraq: 2021 Humanitarian Needs Overview, 7 February 2021, url, p. 74

27 IOM, Protracted Displacement in Iraq: Revisiting Categories of Return Barriers, 24 January 2021, url, pp. 31-32
28 UNOCHA, Iraq: 2021 Humanitarian Needs Overview, 7 February 2021, url, p. 74

29 IOM, Protracted Displacement in Iraq: Revisiting Categories of Return Barriers, 24 January 2021, url, p. 31
30 IOM, Cities as Home: Location Factsheets and Case Studies of Local Integration, 6 January 2021, url, p. 39

31 Since 2018/19, the Civil Status ID Card and Iraqi Nationality Certificate have been progressively replaced by the Unified ID
Card, a biometric document that functions both as nationality and ID certificate. However, as UNHCR notes, the roll-out of
the Unified ID Card has been ‘inconsistent due to administrative and logistical challenges and remains uneven across thecountry’. UNHCR, Access to and Residency in Sulaymaniyah – Response to ACCORD, 25 October 2021, p. 1, footnote 1
32 UNHCR, Relevant Country of Origin Information to Assist with the Application of UNHCR’s Country Guidance on Iraq:
Ability of Persons Originating from Formerly ISIS-Held or Conflict-Affected Areas to Legally Access and Remain in Proposed
Areas of Internal Relocation, 11 January 2021, url, p. 2; Regarding the requirements for obtaining ID documents, please see
3.1 Requirements to obtain ID documents.
33 UNHCR, Relevant Country of Origin Information to Assist with the Application of UNHCR’s Country Guidance on Iraq:
Ability of Persons Originating from Formerly ISIS-Held or Conflict-Affected Areas to Legally Access and Remain in Proposed
Areas of Internal Relocation, 11 January 2021, url, p. 2
34 France 24, Iraqi protesters set fire to Iran consulate in southern city of Basra, 7 September 2018, url
35 Skelton, M. and Saleem, Z. A., Living Among the Hashd: Relations Between Citizens and Security Actors in Five Iraqi
Provinces, IRIS, July 2021, url, p. 18
36 Al-Monitor, Basra church restored, but few Christians left to worship there, 7 August 2019, url
37 Al-Menasa, Basra’s Sabean-Mandeans Keeping Golden Traditions Alive, 16 October 2019, url

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A person is required to hold a valid identity document (e.g., Civil Status ID card, Iraqi Nationality
Certificate, or passport) in order to be able to pass checkpoints and be admitted into Basrah. 38
As of January 2021, individuals originating from areas formerly held by ISIL or affected by conflict(including returnees from a third country) do not need a sponsor to enter Basrah governorate. 39

1.2.3 Sulaymaniyah
Sulaymaniyah City has a predominantly Sunni Kurdish resident population, with smaller numbers of
Shia Kurds, Sunni and Shia Arabs, Christians and other minorities. Since 2014, the city ‘has hosted
primarily Sunni Arab IDPs from across conflict-affected governorates’. 40
A person is required to hold a valid identity document (e.g., Civil Status ID card, Iraqi Nationality
Certificate, or passport) in order to be able to pass checkpoints and be admitted into Sulaymaniyah
governorate. 41
IDPs, including ethnic Arabs and Turkmen not originating from the KRI, such as those stemming fromareas formerly held by ISIL or affected by conflict, do not need a sponsor to enter Sulaymaniyah
governorate. 42 However, IDPs need to undergo a security screening and clearance process (for which
holding ID documentation is a prerequisite) before they are allowed to enter Sulaymaniyah
governorate. 43
Regarding Iraqi Arabs whose Civil Status ID Card or Unified ID Card has been issued in a governorate
outside the KRI and who also do not have a residency permit from any KRI governorate, UNHCR
states that ‘upon entry to Sulaymaniyah governorate at an internal border checkpoint and following
security screening, the Asayish 44 generally provides such persons with a temporary entry
authorization (Tourist Visitor Card) valid for 30 days’. This authorisation is granted for short-term
visits (for business, shopping, medical care, or similar purposes) and ‘enables the holder to enter andremain in Sulaymaniyah governorate within the validity period of the authorization’. It does not
authorise the holder to rent a house or obtain regular employment (they are however able to rent
accommodation in a hotel). No fees are charged in Sulaymaniyah governorate for the issuance oftemporary entry authorisation (Tourist Visitor Card). Persons who enter the governorate throughSulaymaniyah airport do not obtain this document 45 (see 3.1 Requirements to obtain ID documents).
According to UNHCR, the below procedures apply for Iraqi Arabs ‘from the KRI’, i.e., 1) those whose
Civil Status ID Card or Unified ID Card has been issued in one of the governorates that are part to the
KRI (i.e., Sulaymaniyah, Erbil, Dohuk or Halabja governorates) and 2) Iraqi Arabs who hold a

38 UNHCR, Relevant Country of Origin Information to Assist with the Application of UNHCR’s Country Guidance on Iraq:
Ability of Persons Originating from Formerly ISIS-Held or Conflict-Affected Areas to Legally Access and Remain in Proposed
Areas of Internal Relocation, 11 January 2021, url, p. 2; Regarding the requirements for obtaining ID documents, please see
3.1 Requirements to obtain ID documents.
39 UNHCR, Relevant Country of Origin Information to Assist with the Application of UNHCR’s Country Guidance on Iraq:
Ability of Persons Originating from Formerly ISIS-Held or Conflict-Affected Areas to Legally Access and Remain in Proposed
Areas of Internal Relocation, 11 January 2021, url, p. 2
40 IOM, Cities as Home: Location Factsheets and Case Studies of Local Integration, 6 January 2021, url, p. 18
41 UNHCR, Relevant Country of Origin Information to Assist with the Application of UNHCR’s Country Guidance on Iraq:
Ability of Persons Originating from Formerly ISIS-Held or Conflict-Affected Areas to Legally Access and Remain in Proposed
Areas of Internal Relocation, 11 January 2021, url, p. 2; Regarding the requirements for obtaining ID documents, please see
3.1 Requirements to obtain ID documents.
42 UNHCR, Relevant Country of Origin Information to Assist with the Application of UNHCR’s Country Guidance on Iraq:
Ability of Persons Originating from Formerly ISIS-Held or Conflict-Affected Areas to Legally Access and Remain in Proposed
Areas of Internal Relocation, 11 January 2021, url, p. 2
43 IOM, Cities as Home: Location Factsheets and Case Studies of Local Integration, 6 January 2021, url, p. 20
44 Intelligence services of the KRG
45 UNHCR, Access to and Residency in Sulaymaniyah – Response to ACCORD, 25 October 2021, pp. 1-2

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residency permit issued by any of the four KRI governorates, but whose civil documentation has
been issued in a governorate outside the KRI.
Iraqi Arabs whose Civil Status ID Card or Unified ID Card has been issued in one of the governorates
that are part to the KRI are generally able to enter Sulaymaniyah governorate without restrictions bypresenting such documents. Iraqi Arabs who hold a residency permit issued by any of the four KRI
governorates, but whose civil documentation has been issued in a governorate outside the KRI, areable to enter Sulaymaniyah governorate by showing their ‘residency permit’. 46 For further
information on this permit, please see section 1.3.3 Sulaymaniyah on legal and administrativerequirements to settle in the respective city.
The same source indicates that the following requirements apply for Iraqi Kurds or Yazidis ‘fromoutside the KRI’, i.e., those whose Civil Status ID Card or Unified ID Card has been issued in agovernorate falling under the administration of the Iraqi federal government: Iraqi Kurds can enter
Sulaymaniyah governorate by ‘presenting their Civil Status ID Cards or Unified ID Cards, regardless ofthe governorate in which their documents have been issued’. Iraqi Yazidis are, in practice, treatedsimilarly to Iraqi Kurds and ‘can enter Sulaymaniyah governorate by showing their Civil Status ID
Card or Unified ID Card, regardless of where these have been issued’. 47

1.3 Legal and administrative requirements to settle in therespective city
1.3.1 Baghdad
IDPs seeking to stay in Baghdad are required to hold identity documentation in order to be able toobtain security clearance from the local security forces. This security clearance relating to theconflict with ISIL is the prerequisite for obtaining residency. Once clearance has been obtained, theindividual can apply for residency documentation. 48
UNHCR reported that, as of January 2021, all individuals, including those originating from areas
formerly held by ISIL or affected by conflict (as well as returnees from a third country), are requested
to have a letter of support from the mukhtar of the neighbourhood where they intend to reside, in
addition to two sponsors from the same neighbourhood. 49 Meanwhile, IOM noted that IDPs needeither a support letter from the mukhtar or sponsorship from two residents of the relevantneighbourhood. 50
Meanwhile, former Baghdad residents who have a Housing Card (‘Information Card’) issued in
Baghdad and intend to take up residency again in the same neighbourhood do not need sponsors or
a support letter from the mukhtar. The housing card indicates the address at which the household
head owns or rents a house or flat and is issued by the General Directorate for Nationality within the
Ministry of the Interior. 51

46 UNHCR, Access to and Residency in Sulaymaniyah – Response to ACCORD, 25 October 2021, p. 1

47 UNHCR, Access to and Residency in Sulaymaniyah – Response to ACCORD, 25 October 2021, p. 3

48 IOM, Cities as Home: Understanding Belonging and Acceptance Among IDPs and Host Communities in Iraq, 19 October

2020, url, p. 29; see also IOM, Cities as Home: Location Factsheets and Case Studies of Local Integration, 6 January 2021,
url, p. 41
49 UNHCR, Relevant Country of Origin Information to Assist with the Application of UNHCR’s Country Guidance on Iraq:
Ability of Persons Originating from Formerly ISIS-Held or Conflict-Affected Areas to Legally Access and Remain in Proposed
Areas of Internal Relocation, 11 January 2021, url, p. 3
50 IOM, Cities as Home: Location Factsheets and Case Studies of Local Integration, 6 January 2021, url, p. 41
51 UNHCR, Relevant Country of Origin Information to Assist with the Application of UNHCR’s Country Guidance on Iraq:
Ability of Persons Originating from Formerly ISIS-Held or Conflict-Affected Areas to Legally Access and Remain in Proposed
Areas of Internal Relocation, 11 January 2021, url, p. 3, footnote 816Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

It has also been noted that movement restrictions do not apply for IDPs who are in possession ofrequired residency documentation and that ‘no extra security measures are reportedly taken in IDP
populated areas’ in Baghdad. 52
Once an IDP has residency documentation, he or she is considered a ‘resident’ and can seek housing
and move around within Baghdad.’ 53 However, IDPs are not allowed to purchase or own property inthe city. 54

1.3.2 Basrah
Individuals from areas formerly held by ISIL or affected by conflict ‘require a local sponsor as well asa support letter from the local mukhtar’ in order to legally take up residence in Basrah governorate.
Moreover, the relevant Operations Command at the Governorate level must grant additional
security clearance to the security clearance given by local security actors. 55

1.3.3 Sulaymaniyah
According to IOM, IDPs displaced within the KRI originate either from outside the region or from theterritories disputed between the KRI and the Federal Government of Iraq. As for IDPs from the KRI
who have been displaced to other regions, authorities in the region’s major cities, including
Sulaymaniyah, have ‘no instructions, regulations, or laws’ with regard to their returns. As a result,
those IDPs who have returned have reportedly done so either spontaneously or under the Federal
Government of Iraq regulations that have been applied to all IDPs in the country. 56
As of January 2021, ethnic Arabs and Turkmen originating from outside the KRI, including those fromareas formerly held by ISIL or affected by conflict, are not required to have a sponsor but ‘must
approach the local Asayish in the neighbourhood in which they seek to reside in order to obtain aresidency permit issued by Asayish’. 57 In order to obtain residency permission, they need security
clearance. 58 While this permit, which is issued in the form of an ID card proving legal registration
with the Asayish, 59 is commonly called ‘residency permit’, it is in fact a security clearance permit thatis issued by the Asayish. 60

52 IOM, Cities as Home: Location Factsheets and Case Studies of Local Integration, 6 January 2021, url, p. 41

53 IOM, Cities as Home: Understanding Belonging and Acceptance Among IDPs and Host Communities in Iraq, 19 October

2020, url, p. 30

54 IOM, Cities as Home: Location Factsheets and Case Studies of Local Integration, 6 January 2021, url, p. 41

55 UNHCR, Relevant Country of Origin Information to Assist with the Application of UNHCR’s Country Guidance on Iraq:

Ability of Persons Originating from Formerly ISIS-Held or Conflict-Affected Areas to Legally Access and Remain in Proposed
Areas of Internal Relocation, 11 January 2021, url, p. 3
56 IOM, Cities as Home: Understanding Belonging and Acceptance Among IDPs and Host Communities in Iraq, 19 October
2020, url, p. 29
57 UNHCR, Relevant Country of Origin Information to Assist with the Application of UNHCR’s Country Guidance on Iraq:
Ability of Persons Originating from Formerly ISIS-Held or Conflict-Affected Areas to Legally Access and Remain in Proposed
Areas of Internal Relocation, 11 January 2021, url, p. 4; see also MEI, The War at Home: The Need for Internal Security
Sector Reform in Iraqi Kurdistan, July 2021, url, p. 15; USDOS, Country reports on human rights practices for 2020 - Iraq, 30
March 2021, url, p. 28
58 IOM, Cities as Home: Location Factsheets and Case Studies of Local Integration, 6 January 2021, url, p. 20
59 Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report – Iraq, 17 August 2020, url, p. 65
60 UNHCR, Access to and Residency in Sulaymaniyah – Response to ACCORD, 25 October 2021, p. 1, footnote 2

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Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

According to IOM, these protocols apply for any person from outside the KRI 61 seeking to residethere, regardless of their displacement status’. 62 The residency permits are normally valid for ayear 63 and can generally be renewed 64 reportedly at any Asayish office. 65
However, it has been reported that single Arab and Turkmen men are generally only issued a onemonth renewable residency permit by the Asayish. Although ‘single Arab and Turkmen men who
have proof of regular employment and a support letter from their employer can apply for a one-year
Asayish-issued residency permit’, only few of those who apply are granted one. 66
IDPs, including Arabs, who have residency in Sulaymaniyah are allowed to buy property in the cityand have it registered under their own names. This new regulation applies to any person not
originating from the KRI, whether or not they have been displaced. 67
According to UNHCR, the following requirements apply for Iraqi Arabs ‘from the KRI’, i.e., 1) those
whose Civil Status ID Card or Unified ID Card has been issued in one of the KRI’s other governorates
and 2) those whose Civil Status ID Card or Unified ID Card has been issued outside the KRI but who
hold a residency permit granted by one of the other governorates of the KRI.
Iraqi Arabs whose Civil Status ID Card or Unified ID Card has been issued in one of the KRI’s othergovernorates are required to request a new Asayish code 68 as well as the transfer of their Housing
Card (‘Information Card’) 69 to Sulaymaniyah in order to be able to settle in Sulaymaniyah
governorate, according to UNHCR. The process of obtaining a new Asayish code involves that,
initially, the local Asayish in the neighbourhood in which the person seeks to settle will refer him or
her to the General Asayish Directorate of Sulaymaniyah. There, the person will be interviewed andgiven a new Asayish code that confirms that the person/family is known to the General Asayish
Directorate of Sulaymaniyah. The person will subsequently have to approach the local mukhtar of
the area where s/he seeks to settle and inform him about his/her arrival presenting him the Asayish
code. In order to transfer the Housing Card, the person requires a support letter from the local
mukhtar to be approved by the local Asayish. This letter then needs to be presented to the local
police station for additional endorsement, followed by endorsement by the local mayor’s office.
Once these steps have been completed, the Sulaymaniyah Information Office can transfer the
person’s Housing Card to Sulaymaniyah. As the same source notes, an individual can already initiate
the process of renting a house based on the Asayish code but will need to transfer the Housing Card
before being allowed to sign the rental contract. Meanwhile, a Housing Card issued in Sulaymaniyah
is necessary to obtain regular employment. 70

61 IOM, Cities as Home: Location Factsheets and Case Studies of Local Integration, 6 January 2021, url, p. 20

62 IOM, Cities as Home: Understanding Belonging and Acceptance Among IDPs and Host Communities in Iraq, 19 October

2020, url, p. 30

63 UNHCR, Relevant Country of Origin Information to Assist with the Application of UNHCR’s Country Guidance on Iraq:

Ability of Persons Originating from Formerly ISIS-Held or Conflict-Affected Areas to Legally Access and Remain in Proposed
Areas of Internal Relocation, 11 January 2021, url, p. 4
64 USDOS, Country reports on human rights practices for 2020 - Iraq, 30 March 2021, url, p. 28
65 Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report – Iraq, 17 August 2020, url, p. 65
66 UNHCR, Relevant Country of Origin Information to Assist with the Application of UNHCR’s Country Guidance on Iraq:
Ability of Persons Originating from Formerly ISIS-Held or Conflict-Affected Areas to Legally Access and Remain in Proposed
Areas of Internal Relocation, 11 January 2021, url, p. 4
67 IOM, Cities as Home: Location Factsheets and Case Studies of Local Integration, 6 January 2021, url, p. 20
68 ‘The Asayish code is provided to every individual above 18 years old. Due to prevailing political, security andadministrative divisions, the Asayish codes vary in each KR-I governorate. Therefore, individuals from Erbil, Dohuk or
Halabja seeking to settle in Sulaymaniyah governorate will require a new Asayish code.’ UNHCR, Access to and Residency in
Sulaymaniyah – Response to ACCORD, 25 October 2021, p. 2, footnote 3
69 ‘The Housing Card is a document showing the address where the head of household rents or owns a residence. The
General Directorate for Nationality of the Ministry of the Interior is responsible for the issuance of the Housing Card. It is
used in both Federal Iraq and in the KR-I.’ UNHCR, Access to and Residency in Sulaymaniyah – Response to ACCORD, 25
October 2021, p. 2, footnote 470 UNHCR, Access to and Residency in Sulaymaniyah – Response to ACCORD, 25 October 2021, p. 2

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Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

On the other hand, Iraqi Arabs whose Civil Status ID Card or Unified ID Card has been issued outside
the KRI but who hold a residency permit granted by one of the other governorates of the KRI, arerequired to request a new Asayish code as well as the transfer of their residency permit and their
Housing Card to Sulaymaniyah in order to be able to settle in Sulaymaniyah governorate, according
to UNHCR. The process of transferring the residency permit involves that initially, the local Asayish in
the neighbourhood where the person seeks to settle will refer him or her to the Sulaymaniyah’s
General Asayish Directorate. There, the person will be interviewed and issued a new Asayish code toconfirm that the person/family is known by the General Asayish in Sulaymaniyah. The General
Asayish in Sulaymaniyah will then process the transfer of the residency permit. This involves
reaching out to the Asayish in the governorate in which the residency permit was issued andinforming them of the person’s move to Sulaymaniyah. After a security screening, the individual will
be given the new Asayish code in Sulaymaniyah. Once the person has obtained the new code, s/hecan proceed to requesting the transfer of the Housing Card. This process is the same as for Iraqi
Arabs whose Civil Status ID Card or Unified ID Card has been issued in one of the KRI’s othergovernorates (an Asayish-approved letter from the local mukhtar that has been further endorsed by
the local police and mayor’s office). As the same source notes, an individual can already initiate theprocess of renting a house based on the Asayish code but will need to transfer both the residency
permit and the Housing Card before being allowed to sign the rental contract. Meanwhile, a person
has to hold both a residency permit and a Housing Card issued in Sulaymaniyah to obtain regular
employment. 71
The processes described above normally require no longer than one week, ‘unless any complications
affect the process, including for instance, an arrest warrant against the individual or any of thefamily members.’ Also, single men may face additional scrutiny and thus their process may takelonger. Having issued/transferred the residency permit to Sulaymaniyah requires payment of a feeof 10 000 Iraqi Dinars (EUR 5,88 72) (8 000 card fees and 2 000 administrative fees). Likewise, theissuance/transfer of the Housing Card to Sulaymaniyah entails fees totalling 10 000 Iraqi dinars (EUR
5,88 73) (8 000 card fees and 2 000 administrative fees). 74 The residency permit and the Housing Cardare both issued per household. 75
The same source indicates that the below requirements apply for Iraqi Kurds or Yazidis ‘from outside
the KRI’, i.e., those whose Civil Status ID Card or Unified ID Card has been issued in a governorate
falling under the administration of the Iraqi federal government. Individuals of Kurdish or Yazidi
background, regardless of where their ID documents have been issued, do not need a residency
permit to settle in Sulaymaniyah governorate. Kurds and Yazidis who have obtained their Civil Status
ID Card or Unified ID Card in any governorate outside the KRI need to request an Asayish code andthe transfer of their Housing Card through the local Asayish office in the neighbourhood in which
they want to settle in Sulaymaniyah. This process includes the following steps: the local Asayish in
the neighbourhood in which the person intends to settle will refer him/her to the General Asayish
Directorate of Sulaymaniyah. S/he will be issued an Asayish code confirming that theindividual/family is known by the General Asayish. The person will then need to approach the local
mukhtar of the area to inform him about his/her arrival by showing the Asayish code. To transfer the
Housing Card, the person needs to get a support letter from the local mukhtar to be approved by the
local Asayish. S/he then needs to present this letter to the local police station for additional
endorsement, followed by endorsement by the local mayor’s office. After this process has been
completed, the Sulaymaniyah Information Office can proceed to transfer the person’s Housing Card.
A person can already initiate the process of renting a house once s/he has the Asayish code;
71 UNHCR, Access to and Residency in Sulaymaniyah – Response to ACCORD, 25 October 2021, pp. 2-3

72 Exchange rates from European Commission, Wechselkurs (InforEuro), n.d., url, accessed on 29 October 2021
73 Exchange rates from European Commission, Wechselkurs (InforEuro), n.d., url, accessed on 29 October 2021
74 UNHCR, Access to and Residency in Sulaymaniyah – Response to ACCORD, 25 October 2021, p. 3

75 UNHCR, Access to and Residency in Sulaymaniyah – Response to ACCORD, 25 October 2021, p. 3, footnote 5

19Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

however, s/he will need to transfer the Housing Card before being allowed to sign the rental
contract. Access to regular employment requires a Housing Card issued in Sulaymaniyah 76
The processes also take no longer than one week, ‘unless any complications affect the process,including, for instance, an arrest warrant against the individual or any of the family members.’ Also,
single men may face additional scrutiny and thus their process may take longer. Same as above,
issuance/transfer of the Housing Card to Sulaymaniyah entails fees totalling 10 000 Iraqi dinars (EUR
5,88 77) (8 000 card fees and 2,000 administrative fees). 78
Kurds and Yazidis arriving from areas that are disputed between the Kurdish Regional Government(KRG) and the Federal Government of Iraq (i.e., ‘disputed areas’ in parts of Diyala, Erbil, Kirkuk,
Ninewa and Salah Al-Din Governorates) are also permitted to move their Housing Card to
Sulaymaniyah as explained in this section. However, they cannot obtain civil documentation issued
in Sulaymaniyah and are not allowed to request a transfer of their food ration card via the Public
Distribution System (PDS). 79

2. Key Socio-economic indicators in Baghdad,
Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah
2.1 Economy
For general information on the economy in Iraq, please see section 2.1.1 Country overview of EASO’s
COI report Iraq: Key socio-economic indicators - For Baghdad, Basra and Erbil from September 2020.

2.1.1 Baghdad
Baghdad encompasses a population of seven million and is the fourth biggest city in the Middle East
after Cairo, Tehran and Istanbul. As the capital city, ‘it represents one of the wealthiest and mosteconomically diverse areas of the country.’ Baghdad’s development has been linked to the growth ofthe oil industry. Oil refining is the ‘principal economic activity’. 80 The city’s location is ‘crucial’ for the
petroleum industry, since it is well connected to other parts of Iraq by both road and rail with theoil-rich areas of Southern Iraq. 81
During the 1970s, Baghdad experienced a rapid economic growth, which reportedly stagnated as oil
prices fell in 2020 82. Other local economic sectors are the production of textiles, cement, tobacco
products, leather and carpets. The city is therefore the manufacturing hub of Iraq. 83 Baghdad is also
the ‘center for commerce, banking and the financial sector’. 84 Iraq’s three largest financial banks and
76 UNHCR, Access to and Residency in Sulaymaniyah – Response to ACCORD, 25 October 2021, p. 4

77 Exchange rates from European Commission, Wechselkurs (InforEuro), n.d., url, accessed on 29 October 2021
78 UNHCR, Access to and Residency in Sulaymaniyah – Response to ACCORD, 25 October 2021, p. 4
79 UNHCR, Access to and Residency in Sulaymaniyah – Response to ACCORD, 25 October 2021, p. 4

80 Jiyad, S. et al., Economic Drivers of Youth Political Discontent in Iraq: The Voice of Young People in Kurdistan, Baghdad,
Basra and Thi-Qar, February 2021, url, p.26; see also, NCCI, Baghdad Governorate Profile, updated December 2015, url, p. 2
81 Jiyad, S. et al., Economic Drivers of Youth Political Discontent in Iraq: The Voice of Young People in Kurdistan, Baghdad,
Basra and Thi-Qar, February 2021, url, p.26
82 World Bank (The), COVID-19 and Low Oil Prices Push Millions of Iraqis into Poverty, 11 November 2020, url; NPR, In
Iraq's 'Dire' Economy, Poverty Is Rising — And So Are Fears Of Instability, 3 February 2021, url
83 Jiyad, S. et al., Economic Drivers of Youth Political Discontent in Iraq: The Voice of Young People in Kurdistan, Baghdad,
Basra and Thi-Qar, February 2021, url, p. 26; Rawabet Center for Research and Strategic Studies, Economy of the largest
cities of Iraq “Baghdad”, 4 October 2018, url
84 NCCI, Baghdad Governorate Profile, updated December 2015, url, p. 2

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Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

three largest insurance companies are headquartered there. 85 Also, the Iraq Stock Exchange (ISX),
which was formed in 2004, has its headquarters in Baghdad. 86 The ISX stresses that it is ‘financiallyand administratively independent from the Iraqi government including the Ministry of Finance.’ 87
With its international airport, Baghdad serves as an important trading centre in the region.
Furthermore, the city attracts more than one million tourists each year. 88 Also to be mentioned are
the various military industries located there. 89
Construction work has increased since 2003 due to destructions in the course of military conflicts
and terrorist operations. At the same time, the risk for companies and workers involved has
increased, particularly at sites near military bases or territories where military operations are
conducted. 90
In December 2020, the government devalued the Iraqi dinar against the dollar by about 20 %,causing food prices to increase, especially in Baghdad 91. Shopkeepers near the Khadimiya shrine, amajor religious site in Baghdad, 92 moreover complained in early 2021 that ‘no one has been buying
much’ since. 93
The Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) wield influence both at economic and political levels. As a
resident told Chatham House in February 2021, ‘in most cases working closely with PMU parties,
companies, economic committees or leaders meant that “loans can be obtained” and “projects will
not be obstructed or rejected”’. 94
A female shopkeeper, who owns a shop on public land in Baghdad, reported that bureaucrats
contracted out rent collection to the parastatal armed group Asaʾib Ahl Al-Haq and that themunicipal authorities sent members of them to collect the rent from her. 95
From October 2019, protests demanding more job opportunities and an end to corruption as well as
against pro-Iranian militias’ influence have shaken Iraq. The largest protests have taken place in
Baghdad. With an interruption due to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, 96
demonstrations continued into 2021. In February 2021, forceful crackdowns were reported, but
growing poverty was one factor that kept them going. 97 However, small businesses had to deal withlosses and suffered from the ‘halt in commerce and outright destruction of property’ in the context
of the protests. 98
The COVID-19 lockdowns initiated in Baghdad on 17 March 2020, including curfews and restrictionsof movement, impacted opening hours and business activities as well as limited foot traffic,

85 Rawabet Center for Research and Strategic Studies, Economy of the largest cities of Iraq “Baghdad”, 4 October 2018, url

86 Chambers, R. L. et al., Iraq, n.d., last updated 3 September 2021, url; ISX, About us, n.d., url; AFCM, Iraq Stock Exchange(ISX), n.d., url
87 ISX, About us, n.d., url
88 Rawabet Center for Research and Strategic Studies, Economy of the largest cities of Iraq “Baghdad”, 4 October 2018, url
89 Jiyad, S. et al., Economic Drivers of Youth Political Discontent in Iraq: The Voice of Young People in Kurdistan, Baghdad,
Basra and Thi-Qar, February 2021, url, p.26
90 Schreiber, A. et al., Study of the impact of military factors and security threats on construction projects in Baghdad, 20
May 2021, url, pp. 1, 5-6
91 WFP, Iraqi Dinar Devaluation and the Price of the Food Basket, 3 March 2021, url, p. 5
92 Iraq Heritage, Al Kathimayn Shrine, Baghdad, n.d., url
93 NPR, In Iraq's 'Dire' Economy, Poverty Is Rising — And So Are Fears Of Instability, 3 February 2021, url
94 Chatham House, Networks of power – The Popular Mobilization Forces and the state in Iraq, February 2021, url, p. 15
95 Sirri, O., Destructive Creations: Social-Spatial Transformations in Contemporary Baghdad, 23 April 2021, url, p. 24
96 Hasan, S., A Perfect Storm has Hit Iraq’s Economy, LSE [Blog], 22 October 2020, url
97 NPR, In Iraq's 'Dire' Economy, Poverty Is Rising — And So Are Fears Of Instability, 3 February 2021, url; Tung, N., A Fragile
Inheritance: An Iraqi Youth Uprising against a Dire Economy and Foreign Intervention, 21 September 2020, url, p. 56
98 Al Jazeera, Ruined: Baghdad small businesses ravaged by months of protests, 14 February 2021, url; see also, New YorkTimes (The), Iraq, Struggling to Pay Debts and Salaries, Plunges Into Economic Crisis, 4 January 2021, url

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Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

consumption and earning opportunities. In June 2021, night curfews still applied between 9 pm and5 am. 992.1.2 Basrah
The city of Basrah encompasses a population of between around 1 380 000 100 and 1 500 000. 101 The
city’s main economic sectors are the oil and petrochemical industries, since Basrah governorate has
the largest oil reserves in the country. 102 After the mid-1970s, the government shifted its economic
focus toward heavy industrialisation and import substitution. This led to the rapid development of
the manufacturing sector. A great expansion of petrochemical production and oil refining in Basrah
was propelled by the construction of petrochemical, iron and steel plants at Khawr al-Zubayr. 103
Exploration, drilling, and refining was boosted by foreign investment. But instead of creating local
job opportunities and a rise in wages, foreign oil companies caused anger and frustration by theirhiring practices, culminating in protests against patronage and corruption within the oil industry in2018 and 2019 (for more information on the protests in Basrah, see section 2.3.2 Basrah in thisreport). 104 Basrah is a wealthy province due to its large volume of oil exports which secure 80 % of
Iraq’s oil budget. However, Basrah’s citizens ‘do not benefit from services in line with the value of its
exploited resources.’ 105 Corruption and nepotism reportedly occurred ‘widespread’ in the form of‘failed contracts’ between local authorities and companies, which resulted in non-executed or
incomplete projects funded by the Iraqi federal government. Furthermore, powerful militias areheavily involved in the smuggling of oil and drugs. 106 Basrah’s governor, Asa‘ad Al-Eidani, distributed
financial and natural resources and projects among factions of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Units(PMU), on the one hand, in order to limit their political influence, and on the other, to secure theirsupport. 107
With all six of Iraq’s ports and an international airport located in Basrah, major industries in shipping,logistics and transport have developed in the city. 108 Meanwhile, in October 2020, UN-Habitat
identified the following main economic issues: a damaged industrial sector in need of financial
resources and investment plans; the fact that only two of the six ports (Khor Al-Zubair and Umm
Qasr) were operational; damaged infrastructure, ships and bridges preventing access, heavy
siltation, lack of security as well as decreasing water levels of the inland waterways hindering
movement of freight from the Shatt Al-Arab and Shatt Al-Basrah. 109
As of August 2020, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, income stability decreased, particularly affecting
taxi drivers, whose income decreased by 90 % due to the curfew. The income of crop production
farmers was affected by a decrease of 25 % and that of animal husbandry farmers by 15 % in the

99 World Bank (The), Iraq High Frequency Phone Survey (IHFPS) - To Assess the Impact of COVID-19 on Firms, June 2021, url,

pp. 8-9100 US, CIA, The World Factbook, Iraq, last updated 20 October 2021, url
101 UN-Habitat, Basra Urban Profile, October 2020, url, p. 24
102 Jiyad, S. et al, Economic Drivers of Youth Political Discontent in Iraq: The Voice of Young People in Kurdistan, Baghdad,
Basra and Thi-Qar, February 2021, url, p.26
103 Chambers, R. L. et al., Iraq, n.d., last updated 3 September 2021, url
104 Jiyad, S. et al, Economic Drivers of Youth Political Discontent in Iraq: The Voice of Young People in Kurdistan, Baghdad,
Basra and Thi-Qar, February 2021, url, p. 26
105 Al-Jaffal, O. and Khalaf, S., Basra Governorate: A Locality in Crisis – Local Government Crisis and Conflict with the Federal
Government, 18 May 2021, url, p. 7
106 Al-Jaffal, O. and Khalaf, S., Basra Governorate: A Locality in Crisis – Local Government Crisis and Conflict with the Federal
Government, 18 May 2021, url, pp. 12, 19
107 Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, A Thousand Hezbollahs: Iraq’s Emerging Militia State, 4 May 2021, url, p. 43
108 Jiyad, S. et al, Economic Drivers of Youth Political Discontent in Iraq: The Voice of Young People in Kurdistan, Baghdad,
Basra and Thi-Qar, February 2021, url, p. 26
109 UN-Habitat, Basra Urban Profile, October 2020, url, p. 20

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Basrah governorate. 110 The nationwide lockdown, including closed borders, travel restrictions andcurfews, had ‘a significant negative impact on non-oil activity’. In 2020, oil prices declined. This
resulted ‘in a sharp fall in oil revenues’. 111 Already in the months before the COVID-19 pandemic, an
oil crisis as well as a decline in global demand and oil prices had been affecting the economy. In April
2020, prices of Basrah oil reached their lowest level. 112

2.1.3 Sulaymaniyah
For 2021, the Iraqi CSO (Central Statistical Organization) estimated the governorate’s population at
2 336 191 with around 450 295 people living in rural and around 1 276 114 in urban areas. 113
In Sulaymaniyah, natural water reserves, favourable climatic conditions and a rather calm security
situation bring potential advantages to the economy. However, infrastructural and bureaucratic
barriers impede the development of the private sector. 114 The city is an important point of trade for
local farm products and maintains active trade links between Baghdad and Tabriz in Iran. 115
Moreover, several news reports mentioned smuggling to be an issue in Sulaymaniyah, including
illegal trade of livestock, drugs and organs. 116
On 6 April 2021, KRG Deputy Prime Minister Talabani established the parliamentarian AntiCorruption and Integrity Committee, under decree 3662, its function being the investigation ofcorruption cases and irresponsible spending within the jurisdiction of the municipality of
Sulaymaniyah. Moreover, the committee aims to increase accountability and integrity in the public
sector. 117 However, as the chairwoman of the Kurdistan Region parliament’s integrity committee
told Rudaw in September 2021, ‘as long as the political parties are powerful in the Kurdistan Region,
the role of parliament will be weak. That’s why the committees haven’t garnered results for things
that are their responsibility.’ 118 Levels of corruption are high in the entire KRI and undermine
economic reform. 119
A study published in August 2021 found that, from a sample of 30 entrepreneurs, men in
Sulaymaniyah city had more entrepreneurial opportunities than women, and that, therefore, thenumber of male entrepreneurs (67.3 %) was significantly higher than that of women (36.7 %). The
age group of 18- to 24-year-olds was most active in the entrepreneurial field. 40 % of theentrepreneurs draw income from financial support by their families. Management of taxes, businessregistration, as well as dealing with government procedures was mentioned as particularly
challenging for entrepreneurs. 120
In Sulaymaniyah, a part of agricultural production is rainfed. Insufficient rainfall in November 2020,
March and early April 2021 impacted winter cereal production. In May 2021, extremely high110 UNSDG, Iraq Socio-Economic Response Plan, 31 August 2020, url, p. 49
111 IMF, Policy Responses to COVID-19 – Iraq, last updated 2 July 2021, url

112 WFP, Regional Market Analysis: Economic Trends across RBC Region, End 2020 Update, 15 February 2021, url, p. 22
113 Iraq, CSO, 2021 ‫واﻟﺒيﺌﺔ واﻟﺠنﺲ ﻟﺴﻨﺔ‬‫[ ﺗﻘﺪﻳﺮات ﺳكﺎن اﻟﻌﺮاق ﺣﺴﺐ اﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺎت‬Demographic and population indicators, Estimates
for the population of Iraq by governorate, environment and gender for the year 2021] (table), n.d., url
114 IAU, Sulaymaniyah Governorate Profile, November 2010, url
115 Encyclopædia Britannica, Al-Sulaymāniyyah, n.d., url
116 INA, KRG Takes New Decision to Confront Smuggling Via Borders, 8 August 2021, url; Financial Tribune, Rise in Livestock
Smuggling Into Iraqi Kurdistan, 6 July 2020, url; Rudaw, Sulaimani Asayish arrest drug dealer with 106 kg of heroin, 5 July
2021, url; Bas News, Police Arrests Eight Organ Traffickers in Sulaymaniyah, 16 July 2020, url
117 Iraq, KRG, Deputy PM Qubad Talabani meets with the Anti-Corruption and Integrity Committee in Sulaymaniyah, 8 June
2021, url
118 Rudaw, Chair of Kurdistan Region parliament’s integrity committee resigns, 7 September 2021, url
119 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2020 Country Report: Iraq, url, p. 4
120 Salem, R., Challenges Facing Entrepreneurs in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq: Sulaymaniyah, 5 August 2021, url, pp. 40, 42,
47

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Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

temperatures brought droughts. 121 Therefore, winter cereal production ‘is expected to significantly
decline compared to the previous year’. 122
A survey undertaken in June 2020 in Sulaymaniyah and other northern and Kurdish governorates
showed that firms significantly reduced opening hours and 15 % closed altogether until further
notice due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Reduction of revenues were reported by 75 % of thesurveyed firms, many of which responded by reducing their wage bill, laying off their workers or
stopping to pay social security and health insurance for their workers. 123 Enterprises suffered fromreduced production activity and worsened economic status. 124
The pandemic and related response measures impacted household incomes, but coping mechanisms
were limited, as a June 2020 survey showed. 84 % of households in the Kurdistan region of Iraq (KRI)
and the northern governorates did not have any savings. They rather relied on loans from theirfamilies or friends (70 %) and/or took on debts from a shop owner nearby (66 %). The majority
neither received cash nor in-kind assistance. 125

2.2 Employment
For general information on employment in Iraq, please see section 2.2.1 Country overview of EASO’s
COI report Iraq: Key socio-economic indicators - For Baghdad, Basra and Erbil from September 2020.

2.2.1 Baghdad
The state both stimulates and monopolises most economic activities, and functions as the city’s
principal employer. Public sector employment includes the civil service, government-run educational
institutions as well as government-owned industrial and commercial enterprises. 126 University
graduates suffer from lack of jobs and employment opportunities. Therefore, the announcement ofan employment stop and a delay in payment of public sector salaries shocked and frustrated people
in Baghdad and beyond, particularly the youth, who took to the streets protesting. 127
After protests for better employment had started in Basrah, they spread to Baghdad in October
2019 and continued into 2021 with some interruptions due to the COVID-19 pandemic (see section
2.1 Economy above). 128 In early 2021, protests against the government's employment policy for
2021 took place in central Baghdad. Protesters rejected the government’s decision to suspend newjobs in the public sector for the year 2021 and demanded an amendment of this policy. 129 The
121 FAO, GIEWS Update – The Republic of Iraq: Drought in northern parts of the country, 11 June 2021, url, pp. 1-2; FAO,

GIEWS Country Brief – The Republic of Iraq, 11 June 2021, url, p. 1; see also, MEE, Iraq's Kurdish farmers in anguish as
drought kills harvest season, 24 April 2021, url
122 FAO, GIEWS Update – The Republic of Iraq: Drought in northern parts of the country, 11 June 2021, url, p. 3
123 World Bank (The), Iraq High Frequency Phone Survey (IHFPS) - To Assess the Impact of COVID-19 on Firms, June 2021,
url, p. 10
124 ILO and Fafo, Rapid Assessment of the Impact of COVID-19 on Vulnerable Populations and Small-Scale Enterprises in
Iraq, 16 July 2020, url, p. 30
125 ILO and Fafo, Rapid Assessment of the Impact of COVID-19 on Vulnerable Populations and Small-Scale Enterprises in
Iraq, 16 July 2020, url, pp. 18-19
126 Marr, Ph. A. and Bahry, L., Baghdad: Economy, n.d., url
127 MEMO, Thousands of Iraqis protest government employment policy, 1 February 2021, url; Jiyad, S. et al, Economic
Drivers of Youth Political Discontent in Iraq: The Voice of Young People in Kurdistan, Baghdad, Basra and Thi-Qar, February
2021, url, p. 56; Arab Weekly (The), Iraqi university graduates take to the streets again, 10 August 2020, url; AP, Bloatedpublic salaries at heart of Iraq’s economic woes, 23 October 2020, url; Al Arabiya, Oil-dependent Iraq must ‘diversify
rapidly’ as challenges stifle young population, 8 November 2020, url
128 AI, Amnesty International Report 2020/21: The State of the World’s Human Rights, 7 April 2021, url, p. 196; Chatham
House, Networks of power: The Popular Mobilization Forces and the State in Iraq, February 2021, url, p.14
129 MEMO, Thousands of Iraqis protest government employment policy, 1 February 2021, url; Peoples Dispatch, Iraqis
protest government’s 2021 employment policy, demand public sector jobs, 4 February 2021, url

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Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

economic and unemployment crisis was severe. 130 According to information published in July 2021
by the National Committee for Sustainable Development of the Ministry of Planning (MoP), theunemployment rate in Baghdad governorate was 9.3 % and the youth unemployment rate 15 %. 131
The World Bank published a report in spring 2021, stating that in Baghdad over two thirds of female
and male employees in the private and public sector had difficulties finding a job because of thelimited job opportunities. The World Bank linked these challenges to the economically hampering
effects of the 2003-2011 and 2014-2017 Iraq wars as well as to the high dependency on oil, whichhinders employment potential in productive sectors. 132 In 2019, oil accounted for 43 % of the GDP in
Iraq 133 and the budget revenues stemming from the oil exports are used, among others, to pay
salaries and benefits to state employees 134.
The above-mentioned World Bank report showed a clear difference in preferences of men andwomen in Baghdad and other regions regarding employment in the private or public sector: men
mostly preferred to work in the private sector, whereas most women preferred the public sector
due to prevailing gender norms and perceived benefits, such as a secure income and fewer working
hours. For self-employed people a lack of financial support or capital was the main challenge forstarting their self-employment activities. 135
Usually, foreign oil companies are obliged to recruit 85 % of their employees from Iraq’s labour
market. However, as an assessment conducted in Baghdad, Basrah and Erbil showed, this rule iswidely thought to be ignored in practice, and, in general, recruitment is instrumentalised ‘as ameans for patronage and appeasement of different tribes and loyalties.’ To see the central
government profit from a flourishing oil industry, yet locals not benefitting much, caused highfrustration among the population. 136
A survey on the labour market in Al-Mahmoudiya district, located close to the governorate’s capital,
Baghdad, suggested a preference of jobseekers for entrepreneurship. The given reason preventing
the opening of an own business was lack of financing. For not accessing the desired job, the reasons
were lack of jobs, lack of connections, lack of resources, lack of skills and lack of equipment. Key
informants to the survey named construction, retail in malls, retail in groceries, agriculture andrestaurants as the sectors employing most people. 137
The employment of IDPs in Baghdad in the public and private sector is not restricted, however, as allother citizens of Baghdad, IDPs face problems in finding jobs because of the difficult economic
conditions. The local authorities also noted that ‘some IDPs with reasonable financial capacity havebeen able to open businesses without any restrictions’. 138
No additional information could be found on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on employment
in Baghdad.

130 Peoples Dispatch, Iraqis protest government’s 2021 employment policy, demand public sector jobs, 4 February 2021,

url; see also GardaWorld, Iraq: Security forces kill at least one protester and wound 11 others in clashes with antigovernment protesters in Baghdad May 25 /update 1, 25 May 2021, url
131 Iraq, MoP, The Second National Voluntary Review Report on the Achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals,
July 2021, url, p. 96
132 World Bank (The), Iraq Economic Monitor: Seizing the Opportunity for Reforms and Managing Volatility, Spring 2021,
url, p. 23
133 UNOCHA, Iraq: 2021 Humanitarian Needs Overview, 7 February 2021, url, p. 18
134 US, CRS, Iraq and U.S. Policy, last updated 4 June 2021, url, p. 1
135 World Bank (The), Iraq Economic Monitor: Seizing the Opportunity for Reforms and Managing Volatility, Spring 2021,
url, pp. 25-27
136 Jiyad, S. et al, Economic Drivers of Youth Political Discontent in Iraq: The Voice of Young People in Kurdistan, Baghdad,
Basra and Thi-Qar, February 2021, url, p. 26
137 IOM, Labour Market Assessment: Covid-19 and Labour Markets - Al-Musayyab Babylon Governorate [sic], September
2021, url, pp. 6-8
138 IOM, Cities as Home: Location Factsheets and Case Studies of Local Integration, 6 January 2021, url, p. 41

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Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

2.2.2 Basrah
As mentioned above (in section 2.2.1 Baghdad), among the local population there is high frustration
about politicised employment practices in the oil industry and lack of benefit from its profits andemployment potential. 139 In Basrah, similarly to Baghdad, lack of jobs and employment
opportunities highly affect university graduates. Even engineering graduates suffer fromunemployment after graduation despite Basrah’s oil wealth. 140 Protests for better employment
opportunities and public services erupted in Basrah in July 2018. 141 Nationwide protests followed in
October 2019 and continued into the first months of 2020 until the COVID-19 pandemic caused
them to stop, but they resumed on a smaller scale in May 2020. 142 According to information
published in July 2021 by the National Committee for Sustainable Development of the MoP, theunemployment rate in Basrah governorate was 7.6 % and the youth unemployment rate (age 15-29)
was 16.5 %. 143
The influx of populations from neighbouring provinces since 2010 was another factor that reduced
the number of available jobs for local citizens. 144
As of May 2020, the sectors employing the highest numbers of people in Basrah city were drinking
water bottling plants, water desalinisation, construction, carpentry, manufacturing, restaurants,
cafes, malls, medical centres, banks, services in general, as well as oil and gas. The average salary
was 460 US dollars for skilled workers and 322 US dollars for unskilled workers. A perspective on
female employment showed that generally, women owned businesses related to tailoring, nursing
care and health care, food processing, agriculture and livestock (particularly calves raising and fish),or worked in beauty, administration, medical labs, education, kindergartens and fitness centres. The
average salary for women was 220 US dollars per month. However, IOM stated that only 31 % of
women contributed to household income. 145 In interviews, women mentioned restrictions by
patriarchal structures in society as obstacles to women’s employment. 146
Similarly to Baghdad, in Basrah over two thirds of female and male employees in the private andpublic sector experienced challenges finding their current job because of the limited job
opportunities. Men preferred employment in the private sector, women in the public sector. 147 In a
2021 interview study on young Iraqis’ economic situation, a 22-year-old woman in Basrah wasquoted stating that there were generally too few job opportunities, that women in particular had a
hard time finding employment in the private sector, and that social constraints on working women

139 Jiyad, S. et al, Economic Drivers of Youth Political Discontent in Iraq: The Voice of Young People in Kurdistan, Baghdad,

Basra and Thi-Qar, February 2021, url, p. 26

140 MEMO, Having unemployed oil engineers in oil-rich Iraq is unacceptable, 23 December 2020, url
141 AP, Soaring unemployment fuels protests in southern Iraq, 26 July 2018, url

142 AI, Amnesty International Report 2020/21: The State of the World’s Human Rights, 7 April 2021, url, p. 196; Chatham

House, Networks of power; The Popular Mobilization Forces and the State in Iraq, February 2021, url, p.14; Arab Weekly(The), Iraqi university graduates take to the streets again, 10 August 2020, url
143 Iraq, MoP, The Second National Voluntary Review Report on the Achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals,
July 2021, url, p. 105
144 Skelton, M. and Saleem, Z. A., Living Among the Hashd: Relations Between Citizens and Security Actors in Five Iraqi
Provinces, IRIS, July 2021, url, p. 18
145 IOM, Labour Market Opportunities and Challenges: Basra District, Basra Governorate, May 2020, url, pp. 4, 8
146 Jiyad, S. et al, Economic Drivers of Youth Political Discontent in Iraq: The Voice of Young People in Kurdistan, Baghdad,
Basra and Thi-Qar, February 2021, url, pp. 32-33
147 World Bank (The), Iraq Economic Monitor: Seizing the Opportunity for Reforms and Managing Volatility, Spring 2021,
url, pp. 23, 26-27

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Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

prevailed. 148 For the self-employed, lack of financial support or capital challenges the initial start oftheir businesses. 149
As reported in August 2020, lockdowns and curfews, which had started in March 2020, 150 had anegative impact on the employability of daily casual labour and low-income workers. Basrah wasamong the most affected regions regarding unemployment as a result of COVID-19-related
movement restrictions. 151

2.2.3 Sulaymaniyah
According to information published in July 2021 by the National Committee for Sustainable
Development of the MoP, the economic activity rate of people between the age of 15 and 29 was
44.7 % in Sulaymaniyah governorate (above the national average of 36.8 %), however theunemployment rate in this group was high at 27.7 %. 152 Compared to the rest of Iraq,
unemployment among women (28 %) and youth (42 %) was particularly high in the KRI alreadybefore the COVID-19 pandemic. The construction sector and the service sector were the strongest
sectors for employment in the KRI before March 2020. 153
A survey published in May 2020 showed that 77 % of jobseekers interviewed preferred to own theirbusiness. In Sulaymaniyah’s Khabat community, where many IDPs and their host families reside,
many young people found job opportunities in one of three sweets factories; young men worked
with government police units, Peshmerga departments, or in the private trade and service sectors.
Female business owners and employees were engaged in breadmaking, hairdressing or tailoring.
Trade was mentioned as the sector with most opportunities for employment, hiring the largest
number of people in the city, along with the service sector. Respondents particularly mentioned
marketing, working with larger companies, tourism services and supermarkets. IOM provided
different amounts for the average salary. For unskilled workers it was 265 US dollars, for skilledworkers 429 US dollars. Among the businesses in and around Khabat, average monthly wages forskilled and unskilled workers reached up to 900 US dollars. Consumers’ monthly incomes were
362 US dollars, and, according to job-seekers, women-owned businesses earned on average
296 US dollars per month. 154
In December 2020, mass protests erupted against the delay in payment of public sector employees’salaries by the Kurdish regional government. 155

2.3 Poverty
The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (UNOCHA) Humanitarianneeds overview for 2020 stated that the poverty rate in Iraq was expected to possibly double and
148 Jiyad, S. et al, Economic Drivers of Youth Political Discontent in Iraq: The Voice of Young People in Kurdistan, Baghdad,

Basra and Thi-Qar, February 2021, url, p. 57
149 World Bank (The), Iraq Economic Monitor: Seizing the Opportunity for Reforms and Managing Volatility, Spring 2021,
url, p. 25
150 IMF, Policy Responses to COVID-19 – Iraq, last updated 2 July 2021, url
151 UNSDG, Iraq Socio-Economic Response Plan, 31 August 2020, url, p. 47
152 Iraq, MoP, The Second National Voluntary Review Report on the Achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals,
July 2021, url, p. 99
153 ILO and Fafo, Rapid Assessment of the Impact of COVID-19 on Vulnerable Populations and Small-Scale Enterprises in
Iraq, 16 July 2020, url
154 IOM, Labour Market Opportunities and Challenges: Sulaymaniyah District, Sulaymaniyah Governorate, May 2020, url,
pp. 5, 7
155 EPC, Sulaymaniyah-Erbil Disagreement: Scenarios of Division in Iraqi Kurdistan, 21 March 2021, url; MRG, Minority andIndigenous Trends 2021 – Focus on Covid-19, 30 June 2021, url, p. 154; AI, Amnesty International Report 2020/21: The
State of the World’s Human Rights, 7 April 2021, url, p. 197

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Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

increase by up to 14 % leading to possibly 12.4 million Iraqis living in poverty in 2021 (adding 5.5
million newly poor to the 6.9 million already considered poor). 156
For more general information on poverty in Iraq, please see section 2.3.1 Country overview of
EASO’s COI report Iraq: Key socio-economic indicators - For Baghdad, Basra and Erbil from
September 2020.

2.3.1 Baghdad
A report by Mac Skelton and Zmkan Ali Saleem from the Institute of Regional and International
Studies (IRIS) categorised Baghdad’s districts Sadr City, Al-Shu‘ala, Al-Hurriya and Al-Za‘faraniya as‘poorer’ Shia neighbourhoods 157 and identified a ‘concentration of economically disadvantaged Shia
population in eastern and southern Baghdad’ 158.
Since PMU contacts often function as middlemen with government or private entities, particularly
people in poorer areas in eastern and southern Baghdad and among the youth resort to relying on
or joining PMU groups – the dominant factions there being Saraya Al-Salam (SS) and the Asa‘ib Ahl
Al-Haq (AAH). Poverty and structural inequality limit the agency of residents of Baghdad’s poorer
neighbourhoods and create dependence upon SS and AAH for jobs, access to public and/or private
services as well as bureaucratic approval. 159
In April 2020, the World Bank published figures on poverty in Baghdad governorate. The
multidimensional poverty (MP) headcount ratio 160 in the governorate regarding the entire
population was 3.2 %. The multidimensional poverty (MP) headcount ratio of internally displacedhouseholds (IDH) was 9.8 %. The MP headcount ratio of non-IDHs was 2.7 %. 161
In Baghdad’s Adhamiya neighbourhood, people told Reuters in May 2020 that the COVID-19
pandemic ‘[had] driven their families into the worst poverty they [could] remember’. 162
In July 2020, UNICEF, The World Bank and Iraq’s Ministry of Planning (MOP) presented figures onvulnerability in Iraq 163, stating that in Baghdad governorate 20-40 % 164 of the population or

156 UNOCHA, Iraq: 2021 Humanitarian Needs Overview, 7 February 2021, url, p. 19

157 Skelton, M. and Saleem, Z. A., Living Among the Hashd: Relations Between Citizens and Security Actors in Five Iraqi

Provinces, IRIS, July 2021, url, p. 11
158 Skelton, M. and Saleem, Z. A., Living Among the Hashd: Relations Between Citizens and Security Actors in Five Iraqi
Provinces, IRIS, July 2021, url, p. 14
159 Skelton, M. and Saleem, Z. A., Living Among the Hashd: Relations Between Citizens and Security Actors in Five Iraqi
Provinces, IRIS, July 2021, url, pp. 5, 8, 11, 32-33; Chatham House, Networks of power – The Popular Mobilization Forces
and the state in Iraq, February 2021, url, p. 15
160 The multidimensional headcount ratio is the share of individuals experiencing multidimensional deprivation over the
total population. A household is considered MPI poor if the total of its weighted deprivations is 33 percent or more of all
possible deprivations. (World Bank (The), Multidimensional Poverty Assessment of Internally Displaced Persons in Iraq,
April 2020, url, pp. 7-8)
161 World Bank (The), Multidimensional Poverty Assessment of Internally Displaced Persons in Iraq, April 2020, url, pp. 3637, 42
162 Reuters, Pandemic pushes some Iraqis, broken by conflict, into poverty, 6 May 2020, url
163 Figures are based on the Multidimensional Vulnerability Index (MVI), which is defined as: ‘a multidimensional index
tailored to measure social deprivation in dimensions affected by the crisis. The index includes four dimensions measured athousehold level, namely education and health dimensions capturing access to services, and living conditions and financial
security dimensions capturing household living standards and resilience to cope with shocks. The index is calculated as the
product of the percentage of the population that is vulnerable and the average intensity of deprivations among vulnerable
people. The Household is considered vulnerable if they are deprived in more than a quarter of the weighted indicators.’(UNICEF et al., Assessment of COVID-19 Impact on Poverty and Vulnerability in Iraq, July 2020, url, p. 2)
164 The percentages of 0.2-0.4 % given in the source on p. 17 are obviously a mistake, see p. 22. 20-40 % are more realistic
assuming a total population size of estimated 8-9 million people in Baghdad governorate (Iraq, CSO, (2019) ‫ﺗﻘﺪﻳﺮات ﺳكﺎن‬‫[ اﻟﻌﺮاق‬Iraq population estimates (2019)], November 2019, url, p. 9)28

Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

2.5-3 million people were vulnerable. Baghdad housed 17.6 %. of Iraq’s (monetarily) poor
population. 165
The highest rate of increase in poverty in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic was 14.5 % in thecentral governorates, which include Baghdad. 166
In parts of Baghdad, the severity of livelihood conditions and basic services was rated ‘medium’
between July and October 2020. 167 By November 2020, more than 1.8 million people in need were
living in districts in Baghdad and other governorates that were affected by moderate to high accessconstraints for humanitarian actors due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 168
The UNOCHA Humanitarian needs overview for 2020 stated that in Baghdad governorate, out of
31 000 IDPs living in out-of-camp settings in Baghdad governorate, 20 000 were in need and 8 000
out-of-camp-IDPs were in acute need. According to the same source, all of the documented in-campIDPs in Baghdad governorate were in need (1 000 IDPs) or in acute need (300 IDPs). Additionally,
more than 50 000 returnees were in need. 169

2.3.2 Basrah
In Basrah, more than 30 % of the population live in poverty despite the city’s rich resources.
Therefore, poverty and inequality are ‘defining issues in the city and province’. 170 According to
REACH, 60-80 % of households in Basrah were in severe or extreme need (MSNI 171 score 3-4) in
September 2020. 172
According to the World Bank report from April 2020, in Basrah governorate, the MP headcount ratioof IDHs was 3.2 %, despite hosting high numbers of IDPs. The MP headcount ratio of non-IDHs was
8.0 %. 173
The Multidimensional Vulnerability Index (MVI) assessment from July 2020 showed that in Basrah
governorate, the share of Iraq’s (monetarily) poor was 5.9 %. In the southern governorates, among
them Basrah, the COVID-19 pandemic-related increase of poverty was 8.5 %. 174
As stated in an academic publication from May 2021, Basrah ‘witnessed no stimulus of the economy
nor a decrease in poverty’. 175
In 2020, out of 6 000 documented out-of-camp IDPs, 2 000 were in need and 458 in acute need in
Basrah governorate. 176

165 UNICEF et al., Assessment of COVID-19 Impact on Poverty and Vulnerability in Iraq, July 2020, url, pp. 17, 20
166 UNICEF et al., Assessment of COVID-19 Impact on Poverty and Vulnerability in Iraq, July 2020, url, pp. 9, 22
167 UNOCHA, Iraq: 2021 Humanitarian Needs Overview, 7 February 2021, url, pp. 22, 24, 106 footnote 72
168 UNOCHA, Iraq: 2021 Humanitarian Needs Overview, 7 February 2021, url, p. 30

169 UNOCHA, Iraq: 2021 Humanitarian Needs Overview, 7 February 2021, url, pp. 46-47

170 Skelton, M. and Saleem, Z. A., Living Among the Hashd: Relations Between Citizens and Security Actors in Five Iraqi

Provinces, IRIS, July 2021, url, p. 18

171 ‘“Severity” signifies the “intensity” of needs, using a scale that ranges from 1 (minimal/none) to 4 (extreme). Sixty

percent (for severe or extreme needs) and twenty-five percent (for extreme needs) were the minimum percentages found.
(REACH, Iraq: Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment - Key Findings for Iraq, September 2020, 2 June 2021, url, p. 2, footnote 1;
see also p. 14)
172 REACH, Iraq: Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment - Key Findings for Iraq, September 2020, 2 June 2021, url, p. 2
173 World Bank (The), Multidimensional Poverty Assessment of Internally Displaced Persons in Iraq, April 2020, url, pp. 3537
174 UNICEF et al., Assessment of COVID-19 Impact on Poverty and Vulnerability in Iraq, July 2020, url, pp. 9, 20, 22
175 Al-Jaffal, O. and Khalaf, S., Basra Governorate: A Locality in Crisis – Local Government Crisis and Conflict with theFederal Government, 18 May 2021, url, p. 8
176 UNOCHA, Iraq: 2021 Humanitarian Needs Overview, 7 February 2021, url, p. 46

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Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

2.3.3 Sulaymaniyah
In April 2020, with 0.8 %, the World Bank published the second lowest MP headcount ratio for IDHs,
even though Sulaymaniyah was the IDPs primary governorate of residence. The MP headcount ratio
for non-IDHs was 2.2 %. 177
A May 2020 IOM study focussing on Sulaymaniyah’s Khabat district found that many of theapproximately 350 IDP families and 2 700 host community individuals were estimated to be living
below the poverty line. Yet, people were generally better off than in Iraq’s southern governorates. 178
The MVI assessment from July 2020 showed that in Sulaymaniyah governorate, the share of Iraq’s(monetarily) poor was 3.8 %. In the Kurdistan region, including Sulaymaniyah governorate, theincrease in poverty induced by the COVID-19 pandemic was 6.4 %. 179
According to REACH, in Sulaymaniyah governorate 80.1-90 % of households were in severe or
extreme need (MSNI 180 score 3-4) in September 2020. 181
By November 2020, more than 1.8 million people in need were living in districts in Sulaymaniyah andother governorates that were affected by moderate to high access constraints for humanitarian
actors due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 182
UNOCHA’s humanitarian needs overview for 2020 stated that, out of 119 000 IDPs living in out-ofcamp settings in Sulaymaniyah governorate, 92 000 were in need and 49 000 out-of-camp-IDPs werein acute need. According to the same source, all of the documented in-camp-IDPs in the governorate
were in need (11 000 IDPs) or in acute need (6 000 IDPs).

2.4 Food Security
For general information on food security in Iraq, please see section 2.4.1 Country overview of EASO’s
COI report Iraq: Key socio-economic indicators - For Baghdad, Basra and Erbil from September 2020.

2.4.1 Baghdad
Food production
Although vegetable production increased near urban centres, the country was highly dependent onfood imports. 183 Tomatoes and potatoes were the most important crop for domestic agriculture.
Reportedly, in the area north-west of Baghdad there was potential for vegetable production, since it
had formerly been an important region for potato production. 184 Fishing in Baghdad governorate

177 World Bank (The), Multidimensional Poverty Assessment of Internally Displaced Persons in Iraq, April 2020, url, pp. 35-37

178 IOM, Labour Market Opportunities and Challenges: Sulaymaniyah District, Sulaymaniyah Governorate, May 2020, url,

pp. 5, 10
179 UNICEF et al., Assessment of COVID-19 Impact on Poverty and Vulnerability in Iraq, July 2020, url, pp. 9, 20, 22
180 ‘“Severity” signifies the “intensity” of needs, using a scale that ranges from 1 (minimal/none) to 4 (extreme). Sixty
percent (for severe or extreme needs) and twenty-five percent (for extreme needs) were the minimum percentages found.
(REACH, Iraq: Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment - Key Findings for Iraq, September 2020, 2 June 2021, url, p. 2 footnote 1;
see also p. 14)
181 REACH, Iraq: Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment - Key Findings for Iraq, September 2020, 2 June 2021, url, p. 2
182 UNOCHA, Iraq: 2021 Humanitarian Needs Overview, 7 February 2021, url, p. 30
183 World Bank (The), Iraq Economic Monitor - Turning the Corner: Sustaining Growth and Creating Opportunities for Iraq’s
Youth, With a Special Focus on Transforming Agriculture for Economic Diversification and Job Creation, Fall 2019, url, p. 22
184 World Bank (The), Iraq Economic Monitor - Turning the Corner: Sustaining Growth and Creating Opportunities for Iraq’s
Youth, With a Special Focus on Transforming Agriculture for Economic Diversification and Job Creation, Fall 2019, url, pp.
21-22

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Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

was prohibited in rivers, marshes and lakes during breeding season usually extending from early
March to early May. 185
Explosive hazards as a consequence of past conflicts constrained agriculture in Baghdad
governorate, where in a few areas between 2.5 % and 12 % of surface areas had been classified ashazardous. 186
Food prices
In the first half of 2020, prices for vegetables ‘fluctuated wildly’. 187 During August 2020, tomato
prices increased by 50 % in Baghdad from 500 to 750 Iraqi dinar per kilogramme (EUR 0.29-0.44 188).
An increase in price from 400 to 750 Iraqi dinar (EUR 0.23-0.44 189) was recorded regarding
potatoes. 190
Due to the devaluation of the Iraqi dinar in December 2020, prices for some imported essential
foods rose. 191 In Baghdad, the price of the food basket 192 increased by 36 % in late December
2020. 193 It was also Baghdad where the highest variation in price was observed between January and
April 2021. 194 This negatively affected food security at the household level. Loss of employment andincome because of the COVID-19 pandemic challenged the situation additionally. 195 Between theend of December 2020 and the beginning of January 2021, prices for milk powder increased in
Baghdad by 75 % from 4 000 to 7 000 Iraqi dinar (EUR 2.35-4.11 196) per kilo. 197 In mid-February 2021,
the price for vegetable oil increased in Baghdad by 38 % (from 2 000 to 2 750 Iraqi dinar per
kilogramme [EUR 1.18-1.62 198]). 199
Food support
As reported in January 2020, Tamwini, an online application of the Public Distribution System (PDS),
was rolled out in a first pilot phase in Baghdad and the second pilot phase was in preparation. 200 The
smartphone app was launched on 8 July 2020 as a pilot project in Baghdad. It was supposed toenable households to remotely update family information using their smartphone. 201 As of April
2021, the second phase of expanded pilots had not started yet. The delay was explained by the
COVID-19 pandemic. 202 For more information on the PDS, please see section 3.1.6 Public Distribution
System (PDS) card.

185 FAO et al., Iraq Covid-19 Food Security Monitor – Bi-weekly Update, Issue 28, 16 February 2021, url, p. 1
186 WFP, Iraq Socio-Economic Atlas 2019, 30 March 2020, url, p. 19

187 FAO et al., Food Security in Iraq – Impact of COVID-19: With a Special Feature on Digital Innovation, June-August 2020,

23 September 2020, url, p. 2

188 Exchange rates from European Commission, Wechselkurs (InforEuro), n.d., url, accessed on 14 October 2021
189 Exchange rates from European Commission, Wechselkurs (InforEuro), n.d., url, accessed on 14 October 2021
190 FAO et al., Iraq Covid-19 Food Security Monitor – Bi-weekly Update, Issue 16, 25 August 2020, url, pp. 1-2

191 WFP, Iraq Annual Country Report 2020: Country Strategic Plan 2020-2024, 20 April 2021, url, p. 7; FAO et al., Food

Security in Iraq: Impact of COVID-19, with a Special Section on Water Shortages and Adaptation, 3 October 2021, url, p. 28
192 More information on the (composition of the) Food Basket can be found here: WFP, Iraqi Dinar Devaluation and thePrice of the Food Basket, 3 March 2021, url, p. 3
193 FAO et al., Iraq Covid-19 Food Security Monitor - Bi-weekly Update, Issue 25, 5 January 2021, url, p. 2
194 FAO et al., Food Security in Iraq: Impact of COVID-19, with a Special Section on Water Shortages and Adaptation, 3October 2021, url, p. 28
195 WFP, Iraq Annual Country Report 2020: Country Strategic Plan 2020-2024, 20 April 2021, url, p. 7
196 Exchange rates from European Commission, Wechselkurs (InforEuro), n.d., url, accessed on 14 October
197 FAO et al., Iraq Covid-19 Food Security Monitor - Bi-weekly Update, Issue 25, 5 January 2021, url, p. 2
198 Exchange rates from European Commission, Wechselkurs (InforEuro), n.d., url, accessed on 14 October
199 FAO et al., Iraq Covid-19 Food Security Monitor – Bi-weekly Update, Issue 28, 16 February 2021, url, p. 2
200 SIPRI and WFP, The World Food Programme’s Contribution to Improving the Prospects for Peace in Iraq, Working Paper,
January 2020, url, p. 10; WFP, With Continued Support From the United States, WFP Assists Thousands of Vulnerable
Families in Iraq, 30 November 2020, url
201 CaLP, Humanitarian Cash and Social Protection in Iraq, 28 January 2021, url, p. 13
202 WFP, Iraq Annual Country Report 2020: Country Strategic Plan 2020-2024, 20 April 2021, url, p. 20

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Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

In some parts of Baghdad city, sugar commodity was distributed via the PDS in early 2021. 203 As of 2
March 2021, 7 602 tons of sugar were distributed in Baghdad. 204
Returnees, IDPs and hosts living in out-of-camp settings were reached through emergency foodbaskets as well as agriculture inputs, animal feed and health inputs in January 2021. 205
In September 2021, the Barzani Charity Foundation (BCF) launched a campaign to distribute an
estimated total of 1 000 food parcels to low-income families in Baghdad. The first parcels were
distributed to poor families in the Jamila area in Rusafa, additional ones were planned to be
distributed to the poor on the Al-Karkh side of Baghdad and in the Al-Fadhl area. 206
Insufficient food consumption
In September 2020, 0.1-5 % of IDP households in Baghdad’s Al-Khadhimiyah, Al-Risafa, and Al-Karkh
districts had a food security LSG (living standards gap) 207. In Al-Mahmoudiya district, 5.1-10 % of IDP
households had a food security LSG, and in Al-Adhamiya a number of 10.1-15 % of IDP households
had a food security LSG. 208
Data collected on 15 November 2020 showed that 10 % of people in Baghdad governorate hadinsufficient food consumption. 209 In comparison, between 2016 and 2018, 99 % of households in
Baghdad governorate had an acceptable level of food consumption, the remaining 1 % had aborderline level of food consumption. 53 % of the households were food secure, 46 % were
marginally food secure and 1 % was food insecure. 210

2.4.2 Basrah
Hardly any information on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on food security in Basrah could befound.
Food production
In July 2021, an economist told France 24 that cultivating land no longer created sufficient income,which is why many farmers near Basrah have sold their plots. Linked to urban population growth,
agricultural land was increasingly turned into residential areas. 211
The reduced flow of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers was one reason for increasing salt water
intrusion from the gulf. This caused problems for farmers in Basrah and destroyed thousands ofhectares of farmland. One of the farmers said that everything they planted died, including thoseplants that normally tolerated salt water. 212
Increasingly frequent and intense droughts in central and southern Iraq were an additional threat toagricultural production and contributed to the problem of water scarcity. Poor water governance,out-dated infrastructure and poorly maintained irrigations systems also worsened Iraq’s situation of

203 FAO et al., Iraq Covid-19 Food Security Monitor – Bi-weekly Update, Issue 28, 16 February 2021, url, p. 1
204 FAO et al., Iraq Covid-19 Food Security Monitor - Bi-weekly Update, Issue 29, 25 February 2021, url, p. 2
205 FAO et al., Iraq Covid-19 Food Security Monitor – Bi-weekly Update, Issue 25, 5 January 2021, url, p. 2

206 Kurdistan 24, Barzani Charity Foundation hands out 1,000 food baskets to needy Baghdad families, 18 September 2021,

url

207 ‘The food security LSG composite indicator consists of the following indicators: % of households with a ‘borderline’ or‘poor’ Food Consumption Score; % of households spending more than 65% of their total expenditure on food, and % ofhouseholds with a ‘moderate’ to ‘severe’ (2-6) Household Hunger Scale.’ (REACH, Iraq: Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment Key Findings for Iraq, September 2020, 2 June 2021, url, p. 5)
208 REACH, Iraq: Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment - Key Findings for Iraq, September 2020, 2 June 2021, url, p. 5
209 FAO et al., Iraq Covid-19 Food Security Monitor – Bi-weekly Update, Issue 22, 16 November 2020, url, p. 1
210 WFP, Iraq Socio-Economic Atlas 2019, 30 March 2020, url, p. 101
211 France 24, For war-scarred Iraq, climate crisis the next great threat, 8 July 2021, url
212 France 24, For war-scarred Iraq, climate crisis the next great threat, 8 July 2021, url

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Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

water scarcity. Irrigators mainly use flood irrigation methods. However, this consumes more water
than modern methods and increases soil salinity. Alarmingly low water levels and high salinity on the
Shatt Al-Arab in Basrah governorate have rendered its waters unsuitable for human consumption or
agriculture. 213 In summer 2021, shrunken Tigris tributaries, which had cut-off or decreased riverflows, caused a major water crisis and losses for farmers in Basrah and other central and southern
regions. A serious impact on food security and access to drinking water was apprehended. 214 For
more information on the water crisis in Basrah, please see section 2.7.2 Basrah.
Food production in Basrah included fishing which was prohibited in rivers, marshes and lakes during
breeding season usually extending from mid-February to mid-April. 215
Food retailers in Basrah reported a decrease in sales between June and August 2020 due to the
COVID-19 pandemic, more specifically mostly because of the movement restrictions. 216
Food support
In some parts of Basrah city, sugar commodity was distributed via the PDS in early 2021. 217 As of
March 2021, 2 569 tons of sugar were distributed in Basrah. 218
In Basrah, among other regions, humanitarian organisations reached returnees, IDPs and hosts living
in out-of-camp settings through emergency food baskets as well as agriculture inputs, animal feed
and health inputs in January 2021. 219
Food security
The Shatt Al-Arab River water supplied most households in Basrah governorate with drinking water.
Almost half of the governorate’s inhabitants informed UN-Habitat that the availability of drinking
water was bad or very bad and less than half of the people with access to the public water network
had water available for the full day. Environmental problems threatened Basrah’s fresh water supply
and limited the availability of drinking water. Due to its low quality and high salinity, drinking waterrequires treatment, provided by treatment plants, compact units or desalination units before
consumption. 220
In September 2020, none of the IDP households in Basrah had a food security LSG. 221

2.4.3 Sulaymaniyah
Food production
WFP warned in September 2021 that barley and wheat crops could be negatively impacted by below
average rainfall, particularly in the KRI. 222 In October 2021, ‘sporadic and insufficient precipitation
during the cropping season (2020-21)’ in portions of Sulaymaniyah were ‘expected to affect rainfed
winter cereal production significantly compared to [2020]’. 223

213 FDI, Iraqi Food Security at Risk in a Year of Mounting Disasters, 13 August 2020, url, p. 3
214 IFRC, Emergency Plan of Action (EPoA), Iraq: Droughts, 2 September 2021, url, pp. 1-2

215 FAO et al., Iraq Covid-19 Food Security Monitor – Bi-weekly Update, Issue 28, 16 February 2021, url, p. 1

216 FAO et al., Food Security in Iraq – Impact of COVID-19: With a Special Feature on Digital Innovation, June-August 2020,

23 September 2020, url, p. 16

217 FAO et al., Iraq Covid-19 Food Security Monitor – Bi-weekly Update, Issue 28, 16 February 2021, url, p. 1
218 FAO et al., Iraq Covid-19 Food Security Monitor - Bi-weekly Update, Issue 29, 25 February 2021, url, p. 2
219 FAO et al., Iraq Covid-19 Food Security Monitor – Bi-weekly Update, Issue 25, 5 January 2021, url, p. 2
220 UN-Habitat, Basra Urban Profile, October 2020, url, pp. 36, 38

221 REACH, Iraq: Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment - Key Findings for Iraq, September 2020, 2 June 2021, url, p. 5
222 WFP, WFP resilience projects respond to water shortages in Iraq, 6 September 2021, url, p. 1

223 FAO et al., Food Security in Iraq: Impact of COVID-19, with a Special Section on Water Shortages and Adaptation, 3October 2021, url, p. 21; see also p. 31

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Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

Water shortages caused losses in irrigated barley production and will potentially cause a 50 %reduction in irrigated wheat production in the KRI in 2021, where also grazing areas and rangelands
were ‘greatly reduced’ and prices of animal fodder increased. Irrigated areas of Sulaymaniyah havebeen impacted. 224
Explosive hazards as a consequence of conflict constrained agriculture in Sulaymaniyah governorate,
where, in a few areas, between 2.5 % and 12 % of surface areas had been classified as hazardous. 225
Food prices
In a nationwide comparison, the Sulaymaniyah food market was the least impacted by thedevaluation of the Iraqi dinar. 226
Food support
According to a study published in December 2019, the KRI’s consumption of rationed items was thelowest in Iraq. 227
In January 2021, humanitarian partners distributed food baskets to IDPs in Sulaymaniyah. 228 In April
2021, during Ramadan, BCF delivered 1 500 food parcels to Sulaymaniyah. 229 In May 2021, the WFPassisted families whose relatives contracted COVID-19 and were held in isolation in IDP camps withready-to-eat food packages. 230 In July 2021, following a fire in the Ashty IDP camp in Sulaymaniyah,
the WFP provided ready-to-eat food packages to the four families affected. 231
In summer 2020, the KRG distributed a one-time-disbursement of 100 000 Iraqi dinar (EUR 58.77 232)
to vulnerable households in Sulaymaniyah on occasion of the Eid Al-Adha. 233
Food security
In Sulaymaniyah, 22 % of respondents to a survey by Oxfam from June 2020 did not have access tonutritious food. 50 % of them were women. 44 % indicated that their access to nutritious food hadchanged since the outbreak of COVID-19. Influencing factors for that change were high prices,limited incomes, closure of markets, the suspension of mobile shops. 234
Food retailers in Sulaymaniyah reported a decrease in sales between June and August 2020 due tothe COVID-19 pandemic, particularly because of the movement restrictions. 235
In September 2020, 5.1-10 % of IDP households in Sulaymaniyah had a food security LSG. 236

224 FAO et al., Food Security in Iraq: Impact of COVID-19, with a Special Section on Water Shortages and Adaptation, 3October 2021, url, p. 33

225 WFP, Iraq Socio-Economic Atlas 2019, 30 March 2020, url, p. 19

226 FAO et al., Food Security in Iraq: Impact of COVID-19, with a Special Section on Water Shortages and Adaptation, 3October 2021, url, p. 28

227 Krishnan, N. et al., Estimating the Welfare Costs of Reforming the Iraq Public Distribution System: A Mixed Demand

Approach, 6 December 2019, url, p. 97
228 FAO et al., Iraq Covid-19 Food Security Monitor - Bi-weekly Update, Issue 25, 5 January 2021, url, p. 2
229 Barzani Charity Foundation [Twitter], posted on: 29 April 2021, url
230 WFP, WFP Iraq Country Brief, May 2021, 31 May 2021, url, p. 1
231 WFP, WFP Iraq Country Brief, July 2021, 31 July 2021, url, p. 1
232 Exchange rates from European Commission, Wechselkurs (InforEuro), n.d., url, accessed on 14 October
233 FAO et al., Food Security in Iraq – Impact of COVID-19: With a Special Feature on Digital Innovation, June-August 2020,
23 September 2020, url, p. 11
234 Oxfam, Gender Analysis of the COVID-19 Pandemic in Iraq: Conducted in Kirkuk, Diyala and Sulaimaniyah Governorates,
June 2020, 22 June 2020, url, p. 23
235 FAO et al., Food Security in Iraq – Impact of COVID-19: With a Special Feature on Digital Innovation, June-August 2020,
23 September 2020, url, p. 16
236 REACH, Iraq: Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment - Key Findings for Iraq, September 2020, 2 June 2021, url, p. 5

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Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

2.5 Healthcare
2.5.1 Baghdad
According to the Ministry of Health’s 2020 Annual Statistical Report, Baghdad governorate had 260
primary health care centres (PHCs), including 213 main health care centres and 47 health subcentres. Almost 90 % of all PHCs (in exact numbers: 232), were administered by a physician, while
28 PHCs were administered by other health professionals. On average, each PHC served a populationof about 33 000. Moreover, Baghdad had 51 specialised health centres, including 20 dental centres,
3 specialised centres for respiratory diseases, 2 centres for asthma and allergies and 26 otherspecialised health centres. Nine medical institutions were operating as training health centres. 237 On
secondary and tertiary-care level, Baghdad had 105 hospitals and other inpatient specialised healthcentres; 52 of them were public and 53 private clinics. Of the total number of 52 public hospitals, 18
were teaching and 34 non-teaching facilities. 19 were general hospitals, 28 specialised hospitals and
5 provided tertiary-level health care. Statistically, the number of public hospitals on secondary andtertiary-care level available per population of 100 000 was 0.6. 238
A World Bank report published in May 2021 and based on data from the Ministry of Health notedthat some private hospitals also provided publicly financed medical services, such as a clinic in
Baghdad offering dialysis care. 239
According to the Health Ministry’s 2020 Statistical Report, Baghdad disposed of the nationwide
highest bed availability in public hospitals – 1.6 beds per 1 000 people -, with a total number of
13 628 beds, among them 10 729 general hospital beds and the remainder being labelled as‘emergency beds’. Baghdad’s private hospitals offered an additional 2 342 general hospital beds.
Numbers concerning the availability of ‘emergency beds’ in private medical facilities were notincluded in the report. 240
With regard to other health-related institutions, there were 1 008 private laboratories, 1 561
pharmacies, 977 pharmaceutical offices and 304 drugstores located in Baghdad in 2020. 241
In 2020, 9 622 physicians were working in Baghdad, that is, statistically, 11.24 physicians per 10 000
people. Other health personnel included 4 466 dentists (5.21 per 10 000 people), 5 353 pharmacists(6.3 per 10 000 people), 12 334 nursing staff (a ratio of 14.4, making Baghdad the second-last in Iraq
with regard to nursing staff available per 10 000 people), 22 437 paramedical staff (26.2 per 10 000)
and 1 479 midwives. 242 Regarding maternity health, maternal mortality was 42.2 per 100 000 births,
while perinatal mortality was 20.4 per 1 000 births, according to the Health Ministry’s 2020
Statistical Report. 243 A report by the UK Home Office on medical and healthcare provision in Iraq,
published in January 2021, listed some examples found on the MedCOI website of hospitals/clinics
that treated diseases such as cancer, heart conditions, mental health issues and diabetes as well as
pharmacies/clinics that provided appropriate medication. 244
Dr. Abdulameer al-Shammary, the former head of the Iraqi Medical Association, noted in aninterview with Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) in April 2021 that in Iraq the numbers of healthprofessionals and centres were very low and did not match the population growth. He stated that
237 Iraq, Ministry of Health and Environment, Annual Statistical Report 2020, 2021, url, pp. 100, 102
238 Iraq, Ministry of Health and Environment, Annual Statistical Report 2020, 2021, url, pp. 138-139

239 World Bank (The), Addressing the human capital crisis. A Public Expenditure Review for Human Development Sectors in

Iraq, 31 May 2021, url, p. 52
240 Iraq, Ministry of Health and Environment, Annual Statistical Report 2020, 2021, url, pp. 141, 143
241 Iraq, Ministry of Health and Environment, Annual Statistical Report 2020, 2021, url, p. 210
242 Iraq, Ministry of Health and Environment, Annual Statistical Report 2020, 2021, url, pp. 215, 233, 236, 240, 243, 244
243 Iraq, Ministry of Health and Environment, Annual Statistical Report 2020, 2021, url, pp. 72, 95
244 UK Home Office, Country Policy and Information Note Iraq: Medical and healthcare provision, January 2021, url

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Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah‘there is a lack of medical supplies and mismanagement of human resources. The waiting list in
public hospitals is very long. Patients prefer to go to the private sector. There are no guidelines fortreatment or proper sanitation or disposal of waste’. 245
A nurse in Baghdad noted in June 2021 that patients had to pay 2 000 IQD (EUR 1.18 246) for a ticket
at a public primary health care centre. This included a medical consultation and, if necessary, basic
medication or other basic medical supplies (e.g., dressing material). In case of a referral to a
specialised hospital, patients had to buy another ticket for a similar price. If a certain drug or othermaterial was not available, patients had to acquire it in a private pharmacy at their own account.
According to the nurse, those patients who could afford it would prefer going to private specialists.
Costs for an appointment were between 15 and 25 US-dollars, but additional examinations had to be
paid for separately. Costs for private surgery ranged from several hundred to thousands of USdollars. 247
The COVID-19 pandemic only aggravated the existing situation. One medical doctor in Baghdad told
PHR in a phone interview that during the peak of infections, he often had to examine more than 100
patients per day, which made it ‘impossible to give enough time to each patient’, leaving ‘doctors so
exhausted and the patient frustrated’. 248 Another doctor who worked on a COVID-19 ward in
Baghdad told AFP, as quoted in AsiaNews, they were ‘collapsing’, after working a 48-hour shift. 249
The relative of a COVID-19 patient in Baghdad’s al-Kindi hospital told PHR that the ‘service and thetreatment were very bad.’ 250
In April 2021, 82 people died in a fire in the COVID-19 intensive care unit of Ibn al-Khatib Hospitalwhen an oxygen tank exploded. According to the deputy director of the hospital, the number ofpatients being treated at the intensive care unit at the time of the explosion was about four time its
capacity and reportedly there was also an unspecified number of relatives staying with them. 251 Poor
construction of medical facilities and negligence of safety measures made doctors worry aboutfurther incidents. 252
The ongoing healthcare crisis resulted in an increased number of attacks on doctors by the familiesof patients who died of COVID-19, according to a UNDP report of June 2021, 253 and in September
2020, doctors publicly protested in Baghdad for better protection of medical professionals. 254
Medical college graduates and other health workers joined the protests to demand employment as
many had been unable to find a job due to the government’s lack of funds for the health sector. 255
Moreover, in some areas people reportedly prohibited their family members from going to thehospital, as they believed that being taken into quarantine meant being taken into detention. 256
Women, in addition, feared stigmatisation if they had to stay alone at a hospital without family

245 PHR, Challenges Faced by the Iraqi Health Sector in Responding to COVID-19, April 2021, url, p. 1

246 Exchange rates from European Commission, Wechselkurs (InforEuro), n.d., url, accessed on 14 October 2021

247 ACCORD, Anfragebeantwortung zum Irak: Medizinische Behandlung von Fettgewebsnekrose; Zugang zu und Kosten vonbestimmten Medikamenten [a-11610-1] [Query response on Iraq: Medical treatment of fat necrosis, access to and cost ofcertain medicines [a-11610-1]] [source: nurse in Baghdad], 30 June 2021, url
248 PHR, Challenges Faced by the Iraqi Health Sector in Responding to COVID-19, April 2021, url, p. 3
249 AsiaNews, COVID-19: Iraqi doctors near collapse; for Fr Paul, the situation is 'critical', 30 June 2020, url
250 PHR, Challenges Faced by the Iraqi Health Sector in Responding to COVID-19, April 2021, url, p. 3
251 TNH, What was really behind Baghdad’s hospital fire?, 26 April 2021, url
252 Arab Weekly (The), Doctors beg for donations as Iraq loses battle against pandemic, 16 July 2021, url
253 UNDP, Iraq, Sustainable recovery from COVID-19 in Iraq: Key findings, June 2021, url, p. 13
254 Reuters, Violence mounts against Iraqi doctors as COVID cases spike, 23 September 2020, url; PHR, Challenges Faced by
the Iraqi Health Sector in Responding to COVID-19, April 2021, url, p. 4
255 Hasan, S., A Perfect Storm has Hit Iraq’s Economy, LSE [Blog], 22 October 2020, url
256 UNDP, Iraq, Sustainable recovery from COVID-19 in Iraq: Key findings, June 2021, url, p. 13

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Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

guardians 257 and in many conservative families women were thus reluctant to seek medical help ortheir families would not let them go to hospital even if they had COVID-19 symptoms. 258
Most IDP camps in Baghdad had no health centre or medical teams to take care of emergencies, andpeople lacked the money to pay for private doctors. 259

2.5.2 Basrah
In 2020, Basrah governorate counted 135 PHCs, including 49 main health care centres and 86 healthsub-centres, each serving approximately 22 700 people. 49 of the PHCs were administered by aphysician (that is, 36.6 % of the total number), while the remaining 86 were administered by other
health professionals. The governorate’s 18 specialised health centres included 2 dental centres, 1
centre each for respiratory diseases and for asthma and allergies and 14 other specialised healthcentres. Moreover, Basrah had 2 training health centres. 260
Basrah had 21 hospitals and specialised centres, 14 of them were public and 7 private. Among
Basrah’s 14 public hospitals and inpatient health centres, 11 were general hospitals and 3 specialised
institutions, one of them offering tertiary-level health care. The ratio of public hospitals per 100 000
people was 0.5. The total number of 4 227 available beds in public hospitals, including 3 323 generaland 904 ‘emergency beds’, signified a ratio of 1.4 beds per 1 000 people. Basrah’s 7 private hospitals
offered an additional 282 general beds. The report included no data on the availability of‘emergency beds’ in private hospitals. 261
According to the Ministry’s 2020 Statistical report, other health-related facilities included 94 private
laboratories, 729 pharmacies and 19 pharmaceutical offices as well as 42 drugstores. 262
The number of physicians working in Basrah in 2020 was 2 513, which meant that statistically
8.2 physicians were available per population of 10 000. Moreover, there were 525 dentists (1.71 per
10 000), 718 pharmacists (2.3 per 10 000), 4 063 nurses (13.3 per 10 000), 5 084 paramedics (16.6
per 10 000) and 321 midwifes working in Basrah’s health sector. 263As regards maternity, health,maternal mortality was 54.0 per 100 000 births – the second-highest number nationwide -, while
perinatal mortality was highest in Basrah with 25.8 per 1 000 births, according to the Health
Ministry’s 2020 Statistical Report. 264
According to UN-Habitat’s October 2020 urban profile of Basrah, 98.4 % of the population was able
to reach the closest health centre in less than one hour. The main obstacles with regard to access topublic hospitals were linked to the unavailability of doctors in general, of female doctors or nurses
and of medical equipment. The report noted that 23.3 % of the population assessed the health careservices in Basrah as ‘bad’, while 47.2 % said they were ‘neither bad nor good’. The Governorate ofBasrah named ‘shortage in financial resources and lack of authority granted to health services’,
shortage in specialised medical devices and insufficiently trained technical personnel and ‘poor andinadequate control over medicines and private pharmacies’ among their main concerns with regard
to the health sector. 265

257 New York Times (The), Stigma Hampers Iraqi Efforts to Fight the Coronavirus, 14 April 2020, url; UNDP, Iraq, Pathways

to reintegration: Iraq. Families formerly associated with ISIL, February 2021, url, p. 14
258 PHR, In Iraq, Those Infected with Coronavirus Face Shame and Stigmatization, 23 April 2020, url
259 Euro-Med Monitor, Exiled At Home: Internal displacement resulted from the armed conflict in Iraq and its humanitarianconsequences, June 2021, url, pp. 29, 34-35
260 Iraq, Ministry of Health and Environment, Annual Statistical Report 2020, 2021, url, pp. 100, 102
261 Iraq, Ministry of Health and Environment, Annual Statistical Report 2020, 2021, url, pp. 138, 139, 141, 143
262 Iraq, Ministry of Health and Environment, Annual Statistical Report 2020, 2021, url, p. 210
263 Iraq, Ministry of Health and Environment, Annual Statistical Report 2020, 2021, url, pp. 215, 233, 236, 240, 243, 244
264 Iraq, Ministry of Health and Environment, Annual Statistical Report 2020, 2021, url, pp. 72, 95
265 UN-Habitat, Basra Urban Profile, October 2020, url, p. 40

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Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

Basrah has been one of the hotspots of social protests that erupted in 2018, continued into autumn
2019 and 2020 and flared up again in the summer of 2021 266, with demands for better public
services, employment opportunities and combating local mismanagement and corruption. 267 Better
healthcare services such as better access to cancer treatment featured prominently among thedemands, as Reuters reported in March 2020. The report described the situation in the city’schildren cancer hospital: lack of beds, doctors and nursing staff, technical equipment and of cancer
drugs, which had to be acquired through the Ministry of Health that often was experiencing
shortages itself. 268
Medical personnel - in particular in Basrah, Baghdad and Thi Qar - has come under increasing attackby relatives of patients who have died during the COVID-19 pandemic, blaming the doctors for thedeath of their family members. Moreover, in some areas people reportedly prohibited their family
members from going to the hospital, as they believed that being taken into quarantine meant being
taken into detention. 269

2.5.3 Sulaymaniyah
According to the Ministry of Health’s 2020 Annual Statistical Report, Sulaymaniyah governorate had
492 PHCs, including 115 main health care centres and 377 health sub-centres. With statistically 21.6
health centres per population of 100 000, the governorate had the nationwide highest density ofprimary health facilities. 13.2 % of all PHCs were administered by a physician, while the vast majority– 86.8 % - was administered by other health personnel. In addition, the governorate had
30 specialised health centres, including 5 dental centres, 1 for respiratory diseases and 24 with otherspecialisations. 270 Sulaymaniyah had 63 hospitals, 38 of them public (including 1 offering tertiary
health care) and 25 private hospitals. The total bed availability in public hospitals was 3 519(including 3 080 general beds), the total general bed availability was 3 847 (3 080 public beds plus
767 beds in private hospitals). No data were given regarding the availability of ‘emergency beds’ inprivate hospitals. 271 With regard to other health-related infrastructure, the report mentioned 356
pharmacies and 40 pharmaceutical offices and drugstores. No data were available for private
laboratories. 272
In 2020, Sulaymaniyah’s medical and health workforce included 2 676 physicians (11.75 per 10 000
people), 294 dentists (1.29 per 10 000), 375 pharmacists (1.65 per 10 000), 4 054 nursing staff (17.8
per 10 000) and 5 785 paramedical staff (25.39 per population of 10 000) as well as 395 midwives. 273
With regard to maternal health, in 2020, no woman was reported to have died giving birth, while
perinatal mortality was 0.1 per 1 000 births. 274
Data from the Kurdistan Region Statistic’s Office of the KRI’s Ministry of Planning differed slightly or
was not directly comparable due to a different mode of presentation. 275
Both the Ministry of Health’s report and the KRI Statistics Office website offered data only withregard to governorates, not specific cities. A document published by UNCHR on health information
for refugees and internally displaced persons listed the 15 main hospitals of Sulaymaniyah
266 Al Jazeera, Basra protests erupt as power cuts hit scorching Iraq, 8 July 2021, url

267 Jiyad, S. et al, Economic Drivers of Youth Political Discontent in Iraq: The Voice of Young People in Kurdistan, Baghdad,

Basra and Thi-Qar, February 2021, url, pp. 9-10
268 Reuters, The medical crisis that’s aggravating Iraq’s unrest, 2 March 2020, url
269 UNDP, Iraq, Sustainable recovery from COVID-19 in Iraq: Key findings, June 2021, url, p. 13
270 Iraq, Ministry of Health and Environment, Annual Statistical Report 2020, 2021, url, pp. 100, 102
271 Iraq, Ministry of Health and Environment, Annual Statistical Report 2020, 2021, url, pp. 138,139, 141, 143
272 Iraq, Ministry of Health and Environment, Annual Statistical Report 2020, 2021, url, p. 210
273 Iraq, Ministry of Health and Environment, Annual Statistical Report 2020, 2021, url, pp. 215, 233, 236, 240, 243, 244
274 Iraq, Ministry of Health and Environment, Annual Statistical Report 2020, 2021, url, pp. 72, 95
275 Iraq, KRG, Kurdistan Region Statistics Office, Indicators: Health and Education, n.d., url

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Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

governorate, with 14 of them located in Sulaymaniyah city and one psychiatric hospital located in
Raparin district. 276 The NGO Emergency has been running a centre for physiotherapy and prosthetic
treatment for landmine victims in Sulaymaniyah since 1998 and had also patients from other regions
referred to its facilities. 277 A report by the UK Home Office on medical and healthcare provision in
Iraq, published in January 2021, included data on several health facilities in Sulaymaniyah city thatoffered dental treatment, treatment for heart and eye conditions, tuberculosis and otherdiseases. 278 A report by the Swiss Refugee Council on psychiatric care in Sulaymaniyah of May 2020
included information on available outpatient and inpatient psychiatric care in public hospitals andwith private providers. 279

2.6 Education
For general information on education in Iraq, please see section 2.6.1 Country overview of EASO’s
COI report Iraq: Key socio-economic indicators - For Baghdad, Basra and Erbil from September 2020.

2.6.1 Baghdad
On the primary school level, the gross enrolment rate for the school year 2019/2020 in Baghdad
governorate was 100 % for girls and 104 % 280 for boys. The net enrolment rate was 92 % for girls and
94 % for boys. 281 On the secondary school level, the gross enrolment rate for the school year
2019/2020 was 81 % for girls and 82 % for boys. The net enrolment rate was 70 % for girls and 62 %for boys. 282 School completion rates in Baghdad governorate were 73 % for primary school, 44 % forlower secondary school and 32 % for upper secondary school. Out of school rates were 8 % on the
primary, 20 % on the lower secondary and 46 % on the upper secondary level. 283
The latest United Nations human development report from 2014 stated that the rate of illiterate
youth in Baghdad was 9.6 % (11.5 % females, 8.2 % males). 284 The fact that students were not able
to attend literacy centres during the COVID-19 pandemic probably worsened the state ofilliteracy. 285
According to the NGO Coordination Committee for Iraq (NCCI), Baghdad hosted ‘a large number’ ofprimary and secondary schools. 286 With 48 % of the country’s universities or colleges and 53 % ofscientific departments, Baghdad hosts the highest share of tertiary educational institutions among
all governorates. 287

276 UNHCR, Iraq, Health Information for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), [2017], url

277 Emergency UK, Sulaymaniyah Rehabilitation and Social Reintegration Centre, December 2020, url

278 UK Home Office, Country Policy and Information Note Iraq: Medical and healthcare provision, January 2021, url

279 Swiss Refugee Council, Irak: Psychiatrische Versorgung in Sulaimaniyya [Psychiatric care in Sulaymaniyah], 13 May 2020,url

280 ‘A high [gross enrolment rate (GER)] generally indicates a high degree of participation, whether the pupils belong to theofficial age group or not. A GER value approaching or exceeding 100% indicates that a country is, in principle, able toaccommodate all of its school-age population, but it does not indicate the proportion already enrolled. […] GER can exceed
100% due to the inclusion of over-aged and under-aged students because of early or late entrants, and grade repetition.’
UIS, Glossary: Gross enrolment ration, n.d., url
281 Iraq, CSO, The net and gross enrollment rate at the primary level, including (governmental, private, religious) bygovernorate and gender for the academic year 2019/2020, n.d., url
282 Iraq, CSO, The net and gross enrollment rate at the secondary school stage (governmental, private and religious) by sex
and governorate year 2019/2020, n.d., url
283 UNICEF, Iraq Education Fact Sheet 2020 – Analyses for learning and equity using MICS data, 2020, url, pp. 9, 15
284UNDP, Iraq Human Development Report 2014: Iraqi Youth – Challenges and Opportunities, 20 July 2016, url, p. 157‫ ت‬..‫ﻣﻼﻳن ّأ� ف� اﻟﻌﺮاق‬‫ف‬
285 Rudaw, ‫واﻟ���ﺔ ﺗﻌﺰو ارﺗﻔﺎع اﻟنﺴبﺔ ﻟﻌﺪة ﻋﻮاﻣﻞ‬‫[ ﺧﻤﺴﺔ‬Five million illiterate people in Iraq.. Education attributes‫ي ي ي‬the high rate to several factors], 3 October 2020, url
286 NCCI, Baghdad Governorate Profile, updated December 2015, url, p. 2
287 Iraq, MoP, National Development Plan 2018-2022, June 2018, url, p. 197

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Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

Six years of schooling between ages six and twelve are compulsory for children in Baghdad, as in therest of Baghdad-governed Iraq. 288
In Baghdad, it is not uncommon that public schools operate in shifts, since different schools andschool types share a building. Numbers of children in class range around 50. 289 There is,furthermore, a lack of qualified teachers. The quality of education in the public system but also inmany private schools does not meet international standards. Education standards and enrolment
costs in private schools vary greatly. 290
Schools in Baghdad closed due to COVID-19-restrictions in late February 2020 and partly reopened
on 29 November 2020, with fewer days of attendance per week. 291 Schools reportedly opened forsix instead of five days to make up for lost time and maintain physical distancing. 292 Different days ofattendance were allocated to the different levels. Online teaching remained an alternative option,
for which the Ministry of Education (MoE) had launched applications for online classes and a TV
channel. According to a local school teacher ‘private schools and some public ones in central
Baghdad are well equipped for the new situation, but those in poor or rural areas such as Yousifiyah
struggle to cope.’ He teaches in a school in Yousifiyah operating out of caravans because of lack ofpublic funding. He said, furthermore, that most families that opted for online learning for theirchildren cannot afford smartphones or computers for the study online. Additionally, poor electricity
supply and internet made online learning hard. 293 The WFP supported reopening schools throughtheir Urban Livelihoods activities in Baghdad and other cities in 2020. 294
Further disruption in secondary school and university classes was caused by students’ participationin protests in late 2019 and through 2020. 295
During April 2020, 64 % of children aged 5-17 in four IDP camps in Baghdad governorate surveyed byMercy Hands for Humanitarian Aid reportedly did not receive any kind of schooling. 296 This pointed
to ‘significant shortcoming[s] in the initial shift to remote learning’. 297 Their illiteracy rate wasreported as 12 %. 298
A survey published in March 2021 showed that for 38 % of IDPs in Baghdad, functioning schools
were the best aspect of living in the current location compared to their area of origin. 299 In
September 2020, in Baghdad’s Al-Adhamiya, Al-Khadhmiyah, Al-Risafa, Al-Karkh and Al-Mahmoudiya

288 IRFAD, Iraq Education, n.d., url

289 Al-Monitor, Decline in education threatens future Iraqi generations, 15 April 2016, url
290 IRFAD, Iraq Education, n.d., url

291 Al Jazeera, COVID-19: 10 million Iraqi children back to school, 29 November 2020, url; see also HRW, World Report 2021

- Iraq, 13 January 2021, url; National (The), Coronavirus: Iraqi children resume education despite difficulties, 7 December
2020, url
292 Al Jazeera, COVID-19: 10 million Iraqi children back to school, 29 November 2020, url; National (The), Coronavirus: Iraqi
children resume education despite difficulties, 7 December 2020, url
293 National (The), Coronavirus: Iraqi children resume education despite difficulties, 7 December 2020, url
294 WFP, Iraq Annual Country Report 2020: Country Strategic Plan 2020-2024, 20 April 2021, url, p. 17
295 ACAPS, Education in Iraq: Impact of COVID-19, protests, and pre-existing crises on needs, 9 November 2020, url, p. 5;
see also National (The), Coronavirus: Iraqi children resume education despite difficulties, 7 December 2020, url
296 Mercy Hands for Humanitarian Aid, Health and Educational Status of Iraqi Children in IDP Camps During COVID-19: An
Assessment of Children in IDP Camps in Salah Al Din, Anbar, Ninewa, and Baghdad Governorates of Iraq, May 2020, url, pp.
3-4, 9297 ACAPS, Education in Iraq: Impact of COVID-19, protests, and pre-existing crises on needs, 9 November 2020, url, p. 8
298 Mercy Hands for Humanitarian Aid, Health and Educational Status of Iraqi Children in IDP Camps During COVID-19: An
Assessment of Children in IDP Camps in Salah Al Din, Anbar, Ninewa, and Baghdad Governorates of Iraq, May 2020, url, p. 4299 IOM, An Analysis of Urban Displacement in Iraq, 14 March 2021, url, p. 14

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Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

districts, the education living standards gap (LSG) severity score 300 among IDPs was between 10.1
and 25 %. 301

2.6.2 Basrah
On the primary school level, the gross enrolment rate for the school year 2019/2020 in Basrah
governorate was 102 % for girls and 104 % for boys. The net enrolment rate was 91 % both for girls
and boys. 302 On the secondary school level, the gross enrolment rate for the school year 2019/2020
was 77 % for girls and 84 % for boys. The net enrolment rate was 52 % for girls and 46 % for boys. 303
School completion rates in Basrah governorate were 72 % for primary school, 42 % for lower
secondary school and 24 % for upper secondary school. Out of school rates were 6 % on the primary,
24 % on the lower secondary and 52 % on the upper secondary levels. 304 In the southern provincesof Iraq, including Basrah, a much higher percentage of children were out of school than in thenorth. 305
The latest United Nations human development report from 2014 stated that the rate of illiterate
youth in Basrah governorate was 14.9 % (16.7 % females, 13.4 % males). 306 The overall literacy ratein Basrah governorate was 81.9 % in 2015. 307 In September 2020, the education LSG score among
IDPs in Basrah city was between 1 and 10 %. 308
Six years of schooling between ages six and twelve are compulsory for children in Basrah, as in therest of Baghdad-governed Iraq. In primary school, classes can be mixed or separated by sexes. On
the secondary level sexes are separated. The public education system is centralised and statefunded including tertiary education. 309
In Basrah, it is not uncommon that public schools have up to three class shifts as different schools
and educational levels share the same building. 310 There is a ‘severe shortage in the number ofschool buildings throughout the governorate due to the lack of land allocated for construction and inplaces that suffer from overcrowding such as the centre of the province and its urban areas’. 311
Numbers of children in class range around 50. 312 Lack of electricity in schools bring hardship on hot
summer or cold winter days. 313 In 2018, of the 1 068 primary schools in Basra, only 682 (64 %) had

300 The education LSG score considers the ‘% of households reporting barriers to education related to a lack of household

resources; % of households with at least one child not attending formal or informal education regularly (at least 4 days aweek) prior to the COVID-19 outbreak; % of households with no child attending formal or informal education regularly (atleast 4 days a week) prior to the COVID-19 outbreak, and % of households without a functioning primary or secondary
school within 2km of their dwellings.’ REACH, Iraq: Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment - Key Findings for Iraq, September
2020, 2 June 2021, url, p. 9
301 REACH, Iraq: Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment - Key Findings for Iraq, September 2020, 2 June 2021, url, p. 9302 Iraq, CSO, The net and gross enrollment rate at the primary level, including (governmental, private, religious) bygovernorate and gender for the academic year 2019/2020, n.d., url
303 Iraq, CSO, The net and gross enrollment rate at the secondary school stage (governmental, private and religious) by sex
and governorate year 2019/2020, n.d., url
304 UNICEF, Iraq Education Fact Sheet 2020 – Analyses for learning and equity using MICS data, 2020, url, pp. 9, 15
305 UNICEF, Iraq Education Fact Sheet 2020 – Analyses for learning and equity using MICS data, 2020, url, p. 13
306 UNDP, Iraq Human Development Report 2014: Iraqi Youth – Challenges and Opportunities, 20 July 2016, url, p. 157
307 NCCI, Basrah Governorate Profile, updated December 2015, url, p. 5
308 REACH, Iraq: Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment - Key Findings for Iraq, September 2020, 2 June 2021, url, p. 9309 IRFAD, Iraq Education, n.d., url
310 RFE/RL, Iraq's Basra Province Struggles To Meet Demand For Schools, 13 April 2011, url; Altai Consulting et al.,Economic Relief, Recovery, and Resilience Assessment for Southern Iraq: Final Report, May 2021, url, pp. 25-26
311 UN-Habitat, Basra Urban Profile, October 2020, url, p. 40
312 Al-Monitor, Decline in education threatens future Iraqi generations, 15 April 2016, url
313 IRFAD, Iraq Education, n.d., url

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Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

water, sanitation and hygiene facilities. Out of these, 494 (72 %) were served by the public sewage
network and 396 (58 %) had access to public water, ‘which is mostly not drinkable’. 314
There is, furthermore, a lack of qualified teachers. The quality of education in the public system but
also in many private schools does not meet international standards. Education standards andenrolment costs in private schools vary greatly. 315
Schools in Basrah closed due to COVID-19-restrictions in late February 2020 and partly reopened in
November 2020 with fewer days of attendance per week. 316 Schools reportedly opened for six
instead of five days to make up for lost time and maintain physical distancing. 317 Different days ofattendance were allocated to the different levels. Online teaching remained an alternative option,
for which the MoE had launched applications for online classes and a TV channel. However, poor
electricity supply and internet made online learning hard. 318 Further disruption in secondary school
and university classes was caused by students’ participation in protests in 2019 and 2020. 319
The WFP supported reopening schools through their Urban Livelihoods activities in Basrah in
2020. 320 Together with the Basrah Directorate of Education and UNICEF, it developed a new pilot
project in 2021 supporting 2 500 girls transition from primary to intermediate education throughfinancial support for the girls’ families during the academic year. 321
UNESCO provided technical and vocational education and training courses in construction to 50
young people in Basrah Governorate. They also supported the enrolment of students in catch-up
classes, provided transportation support, psychological support as well as case management for
students between February and early May 2021. 322
People with disabilities in Basrah governorate face difficulties in accessing education due toinadequate and far-away schools and too few institutions catering for their specific disability. 323
Partly, since it is almost impossible for persons with disabilities to secure employment after
completing their education, parents are little aware of the importance of education for children withdisabilities, especially females. 324

2.6.3 Sulaymaniyah
School completion rates in Sulaymaniyah governorate were 91 % for primary school, 72 % for lower
secondary school and 45 % for upper secondary school. Out of school rates were 2 % on the primary,
9 % on the lower secondary and 20 % on the upper secondary levels. 325 Thus, in the Kurdish north, amuch lower percentage of children were out of school than in the southern provinces of Iraq. 326

314 UNDP, United Nations Joint Programme Document: Response to Basra water crisis-Iraq, 4 November 2020 url, p. 6
315 IRFAD, Iraq Education, n.d., url; UN-Habitat, Basra Urban Profile, October 2020, url, pp. 40-41
316 Al Jazeera, COVID-19: 10 million Iraqi children back to school, 29 November 2020, url

317 Al Jazeera, COVID-19: 10 million Iraqi children back to school, 29 November 2020, url; National (The), Coronavirus: Iraqi

children resume education despite difficulties, 7 December 2020, url
318 National (The), Coronavirus: Iraqi children resume education despite difficulties, 7 December 2020, url
319 ACAPS, Education in Iraq: Impact of COVID-19, protests, and pre-existing crises on needs, 9 November 2020, url, p. 5;
National (The), Coronavirus: Iraqi children resume education despite difficulties, 7 December 2020, url
320 WFP, Iraq Annual Country Report 2020: Country Strategic Plan 2020-2024, 20 April 2021, url, p. 17
321 WFP, Iraq Annual Country Report 2020: Country Strategic Plan 2020-2024, 20 April 2021, url, p. 19
322 UNSG, Implementation of resolution 2522 (2020), S/2021/426, 4 May 2021, url, para. 65
323 ACAPS, Education in Iraq: Impact of COVID-19, protests, and pre-existing crises on needs, 9 November 2020, url, p. 15
324 Optimum Analysis and Handicap International, Barriers to Accessing Services for Persons with Disabilities in Basra
Governorate Iraq - July 2020, 2020, url, pp. 4, 24, 50
325 UNICEF, Iraq Education Fact Sheet 2020 – Analyses for learning and equity using MICS data, 2020, url, pp. 9, 15
326 UNICEF, Iraq Education Fact Sheet 2020 – Analyses for learning and equity using MICS data, 2020, url, p. 13

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Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

The latest United Nations human development report from 2014 stated that the rate of illiterate
youth in Sulaymaniyah was 5.4 % (6.1 % females, 4.7 % males). 327 According to information
published in July 2021 by the National Committee for Sustainable Development of the MoP, theilliteracy rate in Sulaymaniyah governorate was 24 %. 328 In September 2020, the education LSG scoreamong IDPs in Sulaymaniyah was between 25.1 and 35 %. 329 Access to schooling for children is only
possible with the required ID documents (please see also section 3.2 ID documents and access toservices). 330
In the KRI, primary education for the first six years of schooling and until age 15 is compulsory andfree of cost to citizens. 331
Schools in Sulaymaniyah closed due to COVID-19-restrictions in late February 2020. 332 Primary andsecondary schools reopened temporarily in October 2020, while university teaching remained
online. 333 The Education and Health Ministries in the KRG issued a mask mandate for all students
and reduced the number of students in classrooms and school buses, amongst others. 334 Schools
were constantly closed and reopened again into the year 2021. 335
A teacher reported that lack of internet access was ‘a driving factor for why students could notattend school virtually’. For the small number of students with access to internet and a computer,
power outages that constantly interrupted connectivity were a problem hindering their study. 336

2.7 Housing and Living Conditions
For general information on housing and living conditions in Iraq, please see section 2.7.1 Country
overview of EASO’s COI report Iraq: Key socio-economic indicators - For Baghdad, Basra and Erbilfrom September 2020.

2.7.1 Baghdad
A population boom in Baghdad 337 put pressure on utilities and housing. As reported in February
2021, 18 % of the population were affected by water service interruptions. Lack of housing led to a
growing number of informal settlements. 338 As reported in February 2020, the 1 022 informal
settlements in Baghdad represented around 26 % of the total housing sector. An estimated 3.3
million inhabitants (12.9 % of the local population) lived in informal settlements. 339
Housing prices

327UNDP, Iraq Human Development Report 2014: Iraqi Youth – Challenges and Opportunities, 20 July 2016, url, p. 157

328 Iraq, MoP, The Second National Voluntary Review Report on the Achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals,

July 2021, url, p. 99
329 REACH, Iraq: Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment - Key Findings for Iraq, September 2020, 2 June 2021, url, p. 9
330NRC, Desperate Measures: Syrians fleeing Turkey’s military operation, 17 December 2019, url, p. 5
331 USDOS, Country reports on human rights practices for 2020 - Iraq, 30 March 2021, url, p. 47
332 Al Jazeera, COVID-19: 10 million Iraqi children back to school, 29 November 2020, url
333 Asharq Al-Awsat, Schools Reopen in Iraqi Kurdistan Region Despite COVID-19 Outbreak, 15 October 2020, url
334 Epic, ISHM: February 4 - February 11, 2021, 11, February 2021, url
335 Epic, ISHM: March 25 - April 1, 2021, 1 April 2021, url; Atlantic Council, An “illiterate generation”—one of Iraq’s untold
pandemic stories, 26 July 2021, url
336 Atlantic Council, An “illiterate generation”—one of Iraq’s untold pandemic stories, 26 July 2021, url
337 According to a February 2021 report, Baghdad’s population was estimated to be around 7 million people. Jiyad, S. et al.,Economic Drivers of Youth Political Discontent in Iraq: The Voice of Young People in Kurdistan, Baghdad, Basra and Thi-Qar,
February 2021, url, p.26
338 Jiyad, S. et al., Economic Drivers of Youth Political Discontent in Iraq: The Voice of Young People in Kurdistan, Baghdad,
Basra and Thi-Qar, February 2021, url, p.26
339 UN-Habitat and IsDB, Informal Settlements in the Arab Region: “Towards Arab Cities without Informal Areas” - Analysis
and Prospects, February 2020, url, p. 36

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Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

According to IOM, current rental costs have slightly decreased due to COVID-19-related restriction ofwork and income generating activities. In the first quarter of 2021, the rent for a house with two
bedrooms, one bathroom, one toilet, kitchen and living room close to the city centre of Baghdad
cost around 500-800 US dollars. Housing locations further away from the city centre had cheaper
rents, with costs around 300-600 US dollars, depending on the location and services available within
the area. Utilities - depending on the lifestyle and needs- were about 100-150 US dollars per monthfor electricity, power generators, water, and internet. 340
According to a real estate agent in Al-Mansour, a traditionally wealthy district in the west of the city,
a house with a floor area of 100 square metres and three floors, including four bedrooms, cost 1 000
US dollars per month as of January 2021. A house with a floor area of 300 square metres and two
floors cost between 1 700 and 1 800 dollars rent per month. The real estate agency charged an
additional monthly rent for the brokerage. There was no deposit, but it was likely that landlords
would insist on receiving several months of rent in advance. The potential tenant had to show his or
her identity and residency card. In Al-Ghadeer, a middle-class neighbourhood east of the city, anolder house for a family of eight cost one million Iraqi dinars (EUR 587.72 341) per month. In the lessaffluent suburban neighbourhood of Sadr City in Baghdad’s east, a house of 144 square metres andtwo floors cost 400-500 US dollars per month. In the new urban project of Bismaya, 10 kilometres
southeast of Baghdad, a 140 square metre flat with four bedrooms for rent cost 600 US dollars permonth. 342
Water and sanitation
In Baghdad, high concentrations of cadmium were found in drinking water in 2018 and 2019, which
can cause kidney failure and cancer diseases among other health problems. Highest concentrationsof cadmium were found in water from the Tigris River and water wells, but also bottled water was
polluted. 343
The sewer system in Baghdad serves between 75.9 and 90 % of the city’s households but it is oldand, therefore, inefficient. 344 The city’s electricity supply from the grid is insufficient to power the
sewage treatment plant. Therefore, the levels of water pollution continue to be dangerous. 345
Electricity
According to BBC’s Middle East analyst Alan Johnston, ‘Iraq’s power network has been in a dire statefor years, largely on account of bad management and corruption.’ Repeated power cuts in Baghdad
affect peoples’ lives and living conditions especially in summer, when temperatures rise above 50
degrees Celsius. 346 In July 2021, private generators served as a solution alternative to the public

340 IOM, ZIRF Counselling: Wohnsituation, 1. Quartal 2021 [Housing situation, 1st quarter 2021], n.d., url

341 Exchange rates from European Commission, Wechselkurs (InforEuro), n.d., url, accessed on 14 October

342 ACCORD, Anfragebeantwortung zum Irak: Versorgungslage Bagdad (Lebensmittel, Wasser, Strom), Wohnungsmarkt,

Schulbesuch [Query Response on Somalia: General Information on Sufism in Somalia; Information on the treatment of Sufi
members in Mogadishu by society and al-Shabaab, political representation of Sufis], [a-11469-2], 20 January 2021, url
343 Abdul Jabar, M. A. B. and Thabit, J. A., Chemical Pollution Risks for Many Drinking Water Sources in Baghdad City, Iraq,
28 September 2020, url, pp. 1205, 1207‫ئ‬
344 Iraq, MoP, National Development Plan 2018-2022, June 2018, url, pp. 38, 163; Iraq, CSO, 2018 ‫اﻻﺣﺼﺎئ بﻐﺪاد‬‫اﻟﻤﻮﺟﺰ‬‫ي‬[Statistical Summary Baghdad 2018], n.d., url
345 Chatham House, Same Old Politics Will Not Solve Iraq Water Crisis, 15 April 2020, url
346 BBC News, Iraq power cuts stir protests as summer temperatures scorch country, 2 July 2021, url

44Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

power network, but ‘these often overheat or run out of fuel.’ 347 Power cuts in times of extreme heatin July 2021 led to protests in Baghdad and Iraq’s southern regions. 348
IDPs
As of July 2021, there were 26 856 IPDs or 4 476 IDP households in Baghdad governorate. The
highest number of IDPs lived in Mahmoudiyah (7 236 individuals in 1 206 households), followed by
Abu Ghraib (5 316 individuals in 886 households) and Karkh (5 088 individuals in 848 households).
Fewest IDPs lived in Thawra 1 district (six individuals in one household). 349 Data collected between
March and December 2020 showed that Baghdad and Abu Ghraib hosted 19 506 IDPs or 3 251 IDP
households in 365 neighbourhoods. The IDP to host population ratio was 0.29. The displacement
situation in Baghdad was the most dynamic compared to other urban centres in Iraq. IDPs
mentioned as the best aspects of living in Baghdad and Abu Ghraib proximity to relatives and friends
that can offer support (27 %) and affordable cost of living (24 %). The latter probably related to thehigh proportion of heads of household that were working (87 %). 2 % of IDPs lived in a house theyowned, although 36 % of IDPs still owned a property in their area of origin. 350
In October 2020, three IDP camps closed in Baghdad governorate 351 leaving some IDP households
unable to return ‘displaced in random areas suffering from difficult humanitarian conditions.’ 352
Subsequently, the number of IDPs in slum areas and on Baghdad’s outskirts and governorate’sborders reached 13 477. 353 The camp closures followed a government’s policy aiming at closing all
IDP camps in the Baghdad-controlled regions by December 2020. 354 UNOCHA reported that ‘largescale closures of IDP camps and informal sites in Baghdad’ and other regions continued in December
2020, which resulted in ‘not well-coordinated’ movements and protection issues. 355
10.1-25 % of IDP households in Baghdad governorate’s Al-Khadhmiyah and Al-Mahmoudiya districts
suffered from a water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) living standards gap (LSG) 356. In Al-Adhamiya
and Al-Karkh 0.1-10 % suffered from a WASH LSG. In Al-Rusafa district 0 % suffered from a WASH
LSG. 357

2.7.2 Basrah
Basrah city’s Hay Al-Jaza’ir, Breeha, Manawi Basha and Al-Baradhiyah are middle- and upper-classneighbourhoods. 358 Since 2010, the expansion of the oil sector attracted an influx of populations
from neighbouring provinces. As a result, Basrah city’s ‘already dilapidated infrastructure’ was
347 BBC News, Iraq power cuts stir protests as summer temperatures scorch country, 2 July 2021, url

348 BBC News, Iraq power cuts stir protests as summer temperatures scorch country, 2 July 2021, url; AP, Power outages hit

Iraq amid scorching temperatures, 2 July 2021, url; DW, How to solve Iraq's hellishly hot power crisis, 8 July 2021, url;
Reuters, Iraqis protest over power, water cuts amid heat wave, 2 July 2021, url
349 IOM, DTM: IDP Master List 31-07-2021, 31 July 2021, url
350 IOM, Urban Displacement in Federal Iraq, 14 March 2021, url, p. 6
351 Euro-Med Monitor, Exiled AT Home: Internal displacement resulted from the armed conflict in Iraq and its humanitarianconsequences, June 2021, url, p. 20
352 Euro-Med Monitor, Exiled AT Home: Internal displacement resulted from the armed conflict in Iraq and its humanitarianconsequences, June 2021, url, p. 14353 Euro-Med Monitor, Exiled AT Home: Internal displacement resulted from the armed conflict in Iraq and its humanitarianconsequences, June 2021, url, pp. 20-21
354 HRW, Iraq: Camp Expulsions Leave Families Homeless, Vulnerable, 2 December 2020, url
355 UNOCHA, Iraq: 2021 Humanitarian Needs Overview, 7 February 2021, url, p. 25
356 ‘The WASH LSG indicator consists of the following indicators: % of households without access to an improved water
source; % of households without access to a sufficient quantity of water for drinking and domestic purposes; % ofhouseholds without access to improved functional sanitation facilities, and % of households treating their water prior todrinking.’ (REACH, Iraq: Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment - Key Findings for Iraq, September 2020, 2 June 2021, url, p. 6)
357 REACH, Iraq: Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment - Key Findings for Iraq, September 2020, 2 June 2021, url, p. 6
358 Skelton, M. and Saleem, Z. A., Living Among the Hashd: Relations Between Citizens and Security Actors in Five Iraqi
Provinces, IRIS, July 2021, url, p. 19

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Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

further challenged by the rapid expansion of illegal settlements. 359 As reported in February 2020,
Basrah had 667 informal settlements. 360 Particularly, the middle-class population in the city centre
perceived themselves as deprived due to the increased competition over jobs and oil revenues. 361 As
of 31 July 2021, Basrah city housed 2 376 IPDs or 396 IDP households. 362
Housing prices
In September 2021, monthly rent for a three-bedroom apartment in Basrah ranged between
200 000-600 000 Iraqi dinars (EUR 117.54-352.63 363), depending on the neighbourhood. 364 In
September and August 2021, a house for rent was available from 400 000 Iraqi dinars (EUR
235.09 365) per month. 366
Water and sanitation
In Basrah, water and sanitation are provided as a public service, but are supplemented by private
providers where the public provision is deficient. There exists only one wastewater treatment
facility. The city’s sewage system is obsolete and sewerage services are deteriorating. Officially,
93.6 % of the residents have access to improved sanitation. However, only 24.8 % are served by
piped systems, while 37.8% use a covered external canal. 60 % of Basrah’s inhabitants are served bya sewerage network, 35 % rely on septic tanks and 5 % are not served at all. A lack of specialised
equipment and technical staff, the increasing demand of urban growth and the growing number ofslums without adequate connection to the drainage network, intensify the problematic situation. 367
Protests in Basrah continued in July 2021 demanding from the local government to address chronic
electricity cuts and poor public services. 368 Already in 2018, failings in water management were at
the heart of massive protests that erupted in Basrah city as residents demanded improvements inpublic services. The increased use of polluted water from the Shatt Al-Arab triggered an outbreak ofwater related illnesses. Public water infrastructure had deteriorated due to decades of armed
conflict and tap water has been undrinkable since the 1990s. Therefore, most households had topurchase water privately from mobile tankers or in bottles. In 2020, one ton of water, covering theneeds of an Iraqi family for about seven days, costed about 8 000-10 000 Iraqi dinars (US 5.50–6.80
US dollars). Low-income households had to rely on tap water. 369
Compact water treatment units (CWTUs), dominantly used for purification, supplied 83 or 85 % oftreatment capacity across Basrah Governorate and 92 or 95 % in Basrah city. However, the efficiency
of CWTUs supplying Basrah city was negatively affected by irregular flows from the Bada‘a Canal to359 Skelton, M. and Saleem, Z. A., Living Among the Hashd: Relations Between Citizens and Security Actors in Five Iraqi

Provinces, IRIS, July 2021, url, p. 18; see also Al-Jaffal, O. and Khalaf, S., Basra Governorate: A Locality in Crisis – Local
Government Crisis and Conflict with the Federal Government, 18 May 2021, url, p. 8
360 UN-Habitat and IsDB, Informal Settlements in the Arab Region: “Towards Arab Cities without Informal Areas” - Analysis
and Prospects, February 2020, url, p. 36
361 Skelton, M. and Saleem, Z. A., Living Among the Hashd: Relations Between Citizens and Security Actors in Five Iraqi
Provinces, IRIS, July 2021, url, p. 18
362 IOM, DTM: IDP Master List 31-07-2021, 31 July 2021, url
363 Exchange rates from European Commission, Wechselkurs (InforEuro), n.d., url, accessed on 14 October
364 OpenSooq, ‫[ ﻣﺸﺘﻤﻞ ﻟﻸ�ﺠﺎر‬Semi-detached house for rent], 26 September 2021, url; OpenSooq, ‫[ ﺷﻘﻖ ﻟﻼ�ﺠﺎر‬Apartments
for rent], 17 September 2021, url; OpenSooq, ‫ [ ﺷﻘﻪ ﻟﻼ�ﺠﺎر ف ي� اﻟﻤﻮﻓﻘ�ﻪ ﻧﻈ�ﻔﻪ‬Clean apartment for rent in Al-Muwafiqiya], 17
September 2021, url; OpenSooq, ‫ﺷﻘﻖ ﻟﻸﺟﺎر ف ي� ﻣﻨﺎوي ﻟﺤﻢ‬, [Apartments for rent in Manawi Lajim], 14 September 2021, url;
OpenSooq, ‫[ ﺑ�ﺖ اﻹ�ﺠﺎر بﻞ ﺣ�ﺎﻧ�ﻪ ﺷﻮف اﻟﻮﺻﻒ‬House for rent in Hianiya, see description], 6 September 2021, url; OpenSooq,‫[ ﻣﺸﺘﻤﻞ ﺗﺠﺎوز ﻟﻠ�ﺠﺎر‬Illegal small house to rent] 3 September 2021, url
365 Exchange rates from European Commission, Wechselkurs (InforEuro), n.d., url, accessed on 14 October
366 OpenSooq, ‫[ ﺑ�ﺖ اﻹ�ﺠﺎر‬House for rent], 4 September 2021, url; OpenSooq, ‫[ ﺑ�ﺖ ﻟﻼ�ﺠﺎر ف� اﻟﻤﻮﻓﻘ�ﻪ‬House for rent in Al‫ي‬
Muwafiqiya], 30 August 2021, url
367 UN-Habitat, Basra Urban Profile, October 2020, url, p. 38
368 Al Jazeera, Basra protests erupt as power cuts hit scorching Iraq, 8 July 2021, url
369 Al-Rubaie, A. et al., Failing Flows: Water Management in Southern Iraq, July 2021, url, pp. 6, 20 footnote 28; Al-Fanar
Media, Study Blames Mismanagement for Water Crisis in Southern Iraq, 8 September 2021, url; see also BBC News, Howwater shortages are brewing wars, 17 August 2021, url

46

Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

the main water treatment plant as well as limited operational capacity due to underinvestment intheir maintenance. 370 Water from the public water network was non-potable and not suitable forwashing dishes and showering. 371
Iraq obtains nearly all its water from the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. The summer of 2021 was‘intolerably harsh’ and, together with historically low water levels due to a lack of winter rainfall in
the region as well as snowmelt in the mountains of southern Turkey, has created major water
shortages in Basrah, Diyala and Ninewa governorates. Access to drinking water was jeopardized. 372
In the course of the COVID-19 pandemic ‘the need for clean water has become even more urgent forresidents’. 373
Electricity
According to BBC’s Middle East analyst Alan Johnston, ‘Iraq’s power network has been in a dire statefor years, largely on account of bad management and corruption.’ Repeated power cuts affectpeoples’ lives and living conditions in southern Iraq especially in summer, when temperatures rise
above 50 degrees Celsius. 374 In July 2021, private generators served as an alternative to the public
power network, but ‘these often overheat or run out of fuel.’ 375 Power cuts in times of extreme heatin July 2021 led to protests in Basrah and other southern regions. 376

2.7.3 Sulaymaniyah
In Sulaymaniyah, the demand for housing was growing. People moved from the villages to the city,
attracted by employment opportunities.377 It was reported that there are non-financial barriers forcertain groups when it comes to accessing certain types of housing. According to UNHCR, ‘single
men and women face restrictions on areas and types of rental accommodation. For instance, they
are not permitted to rent apartments in Sulaymaniyah city centre, unless the apartment is part of anapartment complex.’ 378
Housing prices
A one-bedroom apartment in a guarded compound in Sulaymaniyah cost 350 000 Iraqi dinars (EUR
205.70 379) rent per month. 380 A three-bedroom apartment for sale in Sulaymaniyah’s industrial area
was available at 123 750 000 Iraqi dinars (EUR 72 730.63 381). 382 A house with three bedrooms near
the airport was available for sale at 9 250 000 Iraqi dinars (EUR 5 436.43 383). 384 A house with three
bedrooms near universities and malls was available at 195 000 000 Iraqi dinars (EUR
370 Al-Rubaie, A. et al., Failing Flows: Water Management in Southern Iraq, July 2021, url, pp. 6, 11;371 Al-Fanar Media, Study Blames Mismanagement for Water Crisis in Southern Iraq, 8 September 2021, url
372 IFRC, Emergency Plan of Action (EPoA) Iraq: Droughts, 2 September 2021, url, pp. 1-2

373 UNICEF, Up to 960,000 people in Basra to have access to safe drinking water thanks to the Netherlands’ support to

UNICEF and UNDP, 21 December 2020, url
374 BBC News, Iraq power cuts stir protests as summer temperatures scorch country, 2 July 2021, url
375 BBC News, Iraq power cuts stir protests as summer temperatures scorch country, 2 July 2021, url
376 BBC News, Iraq power cuts stir protests as summer temperatures scorch country, 2 July 2021, url; AP, Power outages hit
Iraq amid scorching temperatures, 2 July 2021, url; DW, How to solve Iraq's hellishly hot power crisis, 8 July 2021, url; VOA,
Iraqis Protest Electricity Cuts as Temperatures Top 50 C, 1 July 2021, url; Al Jazeera, Basra protests erupt as power cuts hit
scorching Iraq, 8 July 2021, url
377 Jamal Ali, B. et al., Factors Shaping Customer Satisfaction with Residential Flats: Evidence from Sulaymaniyah City, 10
May 2021, url, pp. 1-2
378 UNHCR, Access to and Residency in Sulaymaniyah – Response to ACCORD, 25 October 2021, p. 3
379 Exchange rates from European Commission, Wechselkurs (InforEuro), n.d., url, accessed on 14 October
380 Offers of real estate rentals in Sulaymaniyah [‫[] ﻋﺮوض ا�ﺠﺎرات ﻋﻘﺎرات ض� اﻟﺴﻠ�ﻤﺎﻧ�ﺔ‬Facebook], ‫[ ﺷﻘﺔ ﺷﺎري ﻧﻤﻮﻧﺔي‬Apartment in‫يي‬‫ي‬Nemonahi City], 2 October 2021, url
381 Exchange rates from European Commission, Wechselkurs (InforEuro), n.d., url, accessed on 14 October‫ف‬‫ت‬
382 OpenSooq, ‫ﺳئ‬‫[ ﺷﻘﺔ ﻟﻠﺒﻴﻊ ي� ﻣﺠﻤﻊ ﺻﺎﺋﺐ ي‬Apartment for sale in Sa’ib City complex], 17 August 2021, url
383 Exchange rates from European Commission, Wechselkurs (InforEuro), n.d., url, accessed on 14 October‫[ ف ف‬House for sale in Sulaymaniyah], 12 September 2021, url
384 OpenSooq, ‫ﻣ�ل ﻟﻠﺒﻴﻊ ف� اﻟﺴﻠ�ﻤﺎﻧ�ﺔ‬‫ي‬

47

Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

114 605.84 385). 386 IOM assessed average monthly expenses for rent in Sulaymaniyah’s Khabat district
to be 195 US dollars per month. In Khabat, rent was reportedly less than in other districts of thegovernorate. 387
Water and sanitation
In June 2021, drought impacted Sulaymaniyah city, and in the whole governorate contaminatedwater caused a rise in diseases due to the consumption of non-potable water. The drought-related
decline of publicly provided potable water forced people to buy it from private tankers. 388 In August
2021, protests erupted in Tangro, 30 kilometres east of Sulaymaniyah, because of water shortages in
the past five years. According to one protester, people had to pay for potable water from private
tankers, one tanker costing 20 000 Iraqi dinars (EUR 11.75 389). 390
Electricity
In contrast to other regions in Iraq, which can only provide a few hours of electricity a day,Sulaymaniyah governorate provides on average 12 hours of electricity a day. 391
IDPs
ISIL-related conflict between 2014 and 2017 caused ‘systematic and widespread destruction, looting,and confiscation of housing’, which contributed to the displacement of people in Iraq’s northern andwestern regions. Their houses having been ruined or being occupied or disputed, limited ability toaccess compensation for damage as well as lack of security were barriers for IDPs to return to theirplaces of origin. 392 Particularly in Duhok, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah a large percentage of IDPs from thefirst waves of displacement in 2014 and 2015 was still present. IDPs in Sulaymaniyah and otherregions in KRI lived in camps and in out-of-camp settings. 393
According to UNOCHA, Sulaymaniyah, with 123 000, had the third largest overall number of out-ofcamp IDPs in KRI in January 2021. 90 % of them lived in private, rented housing and about 500 IDPs
lived in critical shelter in Sulaymaniyah and Erbil. 394
IOM reported that Sulaymaniyah city hosted 90 075 IDPs living in 15 364 households as of 31 July
2021. The largest camp is the Ashti IDP camp holding 9 100 individuals or 1 820 households. 395 No
camps for IDPs were closed, and no closures are planned. 396 The camps are equipped with six ampsof electricity for each caravan, which can generate electricity around the clock. 397 In Sulaymaniyah
district, 0.1-10 % of IDP households suffered from a WASH LSG. 398
Hardly any information on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on housing and living conditions in
Sulaymaniyah could be found.

385 Exchange rates from European Commission, Wechselkurs (InforEuro), n.d., url, accessed on 14 October
386 OpenSooq, ‫بەﮐﺮەﺟﯚی ﺗﺎزەدا‬‫ت‬‫ﻟەبﺎﺷ��ﻦ ﺷ��ین‬(10 * 10) ‫ ﻣەﺗﺮی ﭼﻮارﮔﯚﺷە‬100 ‫ﺧﺎﻧﻮو�� ڕوﮐﻦ‬, [100 square metres house in the best

part of ‘new Bakraj’],19 August 2021, url

387 IOM, Labour Market Opportunities and Challenges: Sulaymaniyah District, Sulaymaniyah Governorate, May 2020, url, p.

5

388 Kurdistan 24, Sulaimani warns of surge in waterborne illness as region feels drought effects, 10 June 2021, url
389 Exchange rates from European Commission, Wechselkurs (InforEuro), n.d., url, accessed on 14 October390 Shafaq News, Demonstrators in al-Sulaymaniyah block roads to protest potable water shortage, 15 August 2021, url
391 AA, Oil-rich Iraq grapples with power outages for 30 years, 8 July 2021, url

392 IOM, Protracted Displacement in Iraq: Revisiting Categories of Return Barriers, 24 January 2021, url, p. 23
393 UNOCHA, Iraq: 2021 Humanitarian Needs Overview, 7 February 2021, url, p. 48

394 UNOCHA, Iraq: 2021 Humanitarian Needs Overview, 7 February 2021, url, pp. 48-49, 105 endnote 24
395 IOM, DTM: IDP Master List 31-07-2021, 31 July 2021, url,

396 Although a committee formed by the Iraqi Prime Minister aimed at closing all IDP camps in the KRI by 2021 (HRW, Iraq:

Camp Expulsions Leave Families Homeless, Vulnerable, 2 December 2020, url).
397 Euro-Med Monitor, Exiled At Home: Internal displacement resulted from the armed conflict in Iraq and its humanitarianconsequences, June 2021, url, pp. 22, 30
398 REACH, Iraq: Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment - Key Findings for Iraq, September 2020, 2 June 2021, url, p. 6

48

Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

3. Overview of the situation as regards ID
documents, security clearances, and COVID19
3.1 Requirements to obtain ID documents
There are four documents in Iraq which were often required to update one another: the civil status
ID 399 [also called national ID 400, hawwiyat al-ahwal al-madaniya 401, bitaqa shakhsiya402, bitaqa
hawwiya 403], the nationality certificate 404 [also called nationality card 405, shahadat al-jinsiya (al‘iraqiya) 406, shahadat jinsiya 407], the Public Distribution System (PDS) card 408 [also called ration
card 409, al-bitaqa al-tamwiniya 410] and the residency card 411 [also called housing card 412, housing
information card 413, residence card414, bitaqat al-sakan 415]. Furthermore, a combination of thosefour documents was required to access a number of services. Civil documentation processes areinterlinked: in order to get a birth certificate for a child or a civil status ID for example, individuals
had to present other documents such as official marriage certificates, birth certificates or deathcertificates. Since Iraq does not have a centralised, digitised civil registry, the relevant directorates
often still relied on paper documents. Hence, a loss of those documents significantly complicatedthe procedure. 416 In the governorates Anbar, Ninawa and Salah Al-Din, which were all affected by

399 NRC et al., Paperless People Of Post-Conflict Iraq, Denied rights, barred from basic services and excluded fromreconstruction efforts, 16 September 2019, url, p. 8
400 Signpost Project, Iraqi Official Identification Documents: What are they and how do I get them?, July 2021, url
401 Iraq, Directorate of National Card Affairs, Home, n.d., url‫ف‬
402 Signpost Project, ‫�ﻤﻜﻨئ اﻟﺤﺼﻮل ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ؟‬‫� وﻛ�ﻒ‬‫ي‬‫ ﻣﺎ ي‬:‫[ اﻟﻮﺛﺎﺋﻖ واﻟﻤﺴﺘﻤﺴكﺎت اﻟﺮﺳﻤ�ﺔ اﻟﻌﺮاﻗ�ﺔ‬Iraqi Official Identification Documents:
What are they and how do I get them?], July 2021, url
403 Norway, Landinfo, Irak: Reisedokumenter og andre ID-dokumenter [Iraq: Travel documents and other ID documents],
11 April 2018, url, p. 23
404 NRC et al., Paperless People Of Post-Conflict Iraq, Denied rights, barred from basic services and excluded fromreconstruction efforts, 16 September 2019, url, p. 8
405 NRC, Barriers from birth: Undocumented children in Iraq sentenced to a life on the margins, April 2019, url, p. 11‫ف‬406 Signpost Project, ‫�ﻤﻜﻨئ اﻟﺤﺼﻮل ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ؟‬‫� وﻛ�ﻒ‬‫ي‬‫ ﻣﺎ ي‬:‫[ اﻟﻮﺛﺎﺋﻖ واﻟﻤﺴﺘﻤﺴكﺎت اﻟﺮﺳﻤ�ﺔ اﻟﻌﺮاﻗ�ﺔ‬Iraqi Official Identification Documents:
What are they and how do I get them?], July 2021, url
407 Norway, Landinfo, Irak: Reisedokumenter og andre ID-dokumenter [Iraq: Travel documents and other ID documents],
11 April 2018, url, p. 23
408 CaLP, Humanitarian Cash and Social Protection in Iraq, 28 January 2021, url, p. 12
409 NRC et al., Paperless People Of Post-Conflict Iraq, Denied rights, barred from basic services and excluded fromreconstruction efforts, 16 September 2019, url, p. 15‫ف‬
410 Signpost Project, ‫�ﻤﻜﻨئ اﻟﺤﺼﻮل ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ؟‬‫� وﻛ�ﻒ‬‫ي‬‫ ﻣﺎ ي‬:‫[ اﻟﻮﺛﺎﺋﻖ واﻟﻤﺴﺘﻤﺴكﺎت اﻟﺮﺳﻤ�ﺔ اﻟﻌﺮاﻗ�ﺔ‬Iraqi Official Identification Documents:
What are they and how do I get them?], July 2021, url
411 NRC et al., Paperless People Of Post-Conflict Iraq, Denied rights, barred from basic services and excluded fromreconstruction efforts, 16 September 2019, url, p. 8
412 NRC, Barriers from birth: Undocumented children in Iraq sentenced to a life on the margins, April 2019, url, p. 17
413 NRC et al., Paperless People Of Post-Conflict Iraq, Denied rights, barred from basic services and excluded fromreconstruction efforts, 16 September 2019, url, p. 8
414 Canada, IRB, Iraq: Nationality Certificate, including purpose and validity; requirements and procedures for the issuance,
renewal and replacement; frequency of fraudulent certificates (2011-November 2013), 25 November 2013, url‫ف‬
415 Signpost Project, ‫�ﻤﻜﻨئ اﻟﺤﺼﻮل ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ؟‬‫� وﻛ�ﻒ‬‫ي‬‫ ﻣﺎ ي‬:‫[ اﻟﻮﺛﺎﺋﻖ واﻟﻤﺴﺘﻤﺴكﺎت اﻟﺮﺳﻤ�ﺔ اﻟﻌﺮاﻗ�ﺔ‬Iraqi Official Identification Documents:
What are they and how do I get them?], July 2021, url
416 NRC, Barriers from birth: Undocumented children in Iraq sentenced to a life on the margins, April 2019, url, p. 17

49

Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

ISIL and the military operations against ISIL 417, reportedly challenges related to civil documentation
access were most frequent. 418
In September 2015, the issuance of new electronic and biometric unified national cards 419 [alsocalled new national card 420, new ID card 421, al-bitaqa al-wataniya al-muwahhada 422, al-bitaqa alwataniya al-jadida 423] started in Iraq. The unified national card is supposed to replace the civil status
ID and make the nationality certificate and ultimately the residency card obsolete, so that Iraqis will
eventually have only one official ID document, while it was uncertain when the residency card will
also be included. 424 By obtaining a unified national card Iraqi citizens will be given a personal
registration number. 425 As of 2018, the civil status ID was still being issued in Civil Affairs
Directorates (CAD) lacking the necessary equipment for the unified national card. Reportedly, someoffices that had the equipment to issue unified national cards were also issuing civil status IDs as atemporary solution because of the long waiting time for the unified national card. 426 As of
September 2021, both identification systems reportedly existed in Iraq. 427

3.1.1 Unified national card
According to a diplomatic source in Amman interviewed by Landinfo, both the unified national cardand the civil status ID were issued at the local offices of the Directorate of National Card Affairs,
situated all over the country 428 and were referred to as Civil Affairs Directorate (CAD) offices. 429 This
directorate is part of the Directorate of Civil Status, Passports and Residencies of the General
Directorate of Nationality which belongs to the Ministry of Interior. 430 The offices can be found in
most cities and in the provincial capitals. Both types of ID cards could only be issued in the district
where the family was registered, which made it difficult for IDPs to obtain new documents as theyoften needed help if they lived in a province other than where they were registered. 431
Individuals applying for the unified national card had to book an appointment with the local office
via the website of the Directorate of National Card Affairs and download an application form, which
had to be completed and taken to the appointment. In addition, they had to submit their civil status
ID and their nationality certificate. The website of the Directorate of National Card Affairs also
requested applicants to submit their residency card with the application and it stated that the

417 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan Iraq, February 2021, url, p. 9418 GPC, Protection Monitoring System, Report 1, February 2021, url, p. 7

419 Signpost Project, Iraqi Official Identification Documents: What are they and how do I get them?, July 2021, url
420 Signpost Project, Iraqi Official Identification Documents: What are they and how do I get them?, July 2021, url

421 Norway, Landinfo and Denmark, DIS, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Report on issuance of the new Iraqi ID card,

November 2018, url, p. 3
‫ف‬
422 Signpost Project, ‫�ﻤﻜﻨئ اﻟﺤﺼﻮل ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ؟‬‫� وﻛ�ﻒ‬‫ي‬‫ ﻣﺎ ي‬:‫[ اﻟﻮﺛﺎﺋﻖ واﻟﻤﺴﺘﻤﺴكﺎت اﻟﺮﺳﻤ�ﺔ اﻟﻌﺮاﻗ�ﺔ‬Iraqi Official Identification Documents:
What are they and how do I get them?], July 2021, url‫ف‬
423 Signpost Project, ‫�ﻤﻜﻨئ اﻟﺤﺼﻮل ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ؟‬‫� وﻛ�ﻒ‬‫ي‬‫ ﻣﺎ ي‬:‫[ اﻟﻮﺛﺎﺋﻖ واﻟﻤﺴﺘﻤﺴكﺎت اﻟﺮﺳﻤ�ﺔ اﻟﻌﺮاﻗ�ﺔ‬Iraqi Official Identification Documents:
What are they and how do I get them?], July 2021, url
424 Norway, Landinfo, Irak: Reisedokumenter og andre ID-dokumenter [Iraq: Travel documents and other ID documents][sources:Norwegian embassy in Amman; Iraqi embassy in Norway], 11 April 2018, url, p. 18
425 Norway, Landinfo and Denmark, DIS, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Report on issuance of the new Iraqi ID card [source:
Director General Sami Jalal Hussein, Ministry of Interior, KRG], November 2018, url, p. 6
426 Norway, Landinfo, Irak: Reisedokumenter og andre ID-dokumenter [Iraq: Travel documents and other ID documents][source: diplomatic source in Amman], 11 April 2018, url, p. 22
427 Signpost Project, Iraqi Official Identification Documents: What are they and how do I get them?, July 2021, url; see also:
Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report – Iraq, 17 August 2020, url, p. 65
428 Norway, Landinfo, Irak: Reisedokumenter og andre ID-dokumenter [Iraq: Travel documents and other ID documents],[source: diplomatic source in Amman], 11 April 2018, url, p. 19
429 UNHCR, Iraq: IDPs – Civil identity and documentation (June - July 2021), 9 September 2021, url, pp. 1, 2
430 Iraq, Directorate of National Card Affairs, Home, n.d., url
431 Norway, Landinfo, Irak: Reisedokumenter og andre ID-dokumenter [Iraq: Travel documents and other ID documents][source: diplomatic source in Amman], 11 April 2018, url, p. 19

50

Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

original documents needed to be presented. 432 Referring to information of 2016, Landinfo notedthat the PDS card had to be handed in as well and that all of the aforementioned documents would
be considered invalid upon issuance of the unified nationality card and would be retained. 433
It is mandatory for applicants to appear in person to submit their application, because a photo, aniris scan and fingerprints will be taken. Subsequently, the application is sent to a central office in
Baghdad together with the biometrics, where the information is checked. 434 It costs 5 000 Iraqi
dinars (IQD) (EUR 2.90 435) to get the unified national card issued, both at the first issuance and uponrenewal after the expiration of the validity period. Should the card be damaged or get lost, theissuance of a new card costs 10 000 IQD (EUR 5.80 436) and 25 000 IQD (EUR 14.51 437), respectively. 438
In accordance with the Act on National ID Cards of 2016 a new unified national card has to be issued
in the event of loss or damage to the card. 439 All newborns will be given the unified national card
provided that they are registered in an area where the population registration office has thenecessary equipment. 440 No information was found regarding the requirement for children in Iraq togive biometric data, such as an iris scan and fingerprints, for the application. In the KRI, however,children below the age of 12 were reportedly not required to give biometry to get a unified nationalcard. 441
With a few deviations, the aforementioned procedure applies for the KRI. According to Abdulrahman
Ismael Azaz, Director of the Directorate of Nationality and Civil Status in Erbil, which belongs to the
Ministry of the Interior of the KRG, interviewed in 2018 by Landinfo and DIS, in Erbil, people did notneed to make an appointment via the website, because many people did not have internet access.
Applicants needed to present their civil status ID, their nationality certificate and their residencycard with the application. The documents handed in were first checked at the Directorate of
Nationality and Civil Status and only after the document check was finished, they were sent to themain servers in Baghdad, where the personal identification number was produced. According to
Director Azaz, the applicants’ fingerprints of all ten fingers had to be taken as well. 442
The card was valid for ten years but, when the civil status changed, e.g., through marriage or
divorce, a renewal was required by submitting a new application for the issuance of a new unified
national card. 443
In the KRI, only a picture was required when applying for the unified national card for children under
the age of 12. Furthermore, the parents needed to present a court document attesting the marriage

432 Iraq, Directorate of National Card Affairs, Home, n.d., url

433 Norway, Landinfo, Irak: Innføring av nytt nasjonalt ID-kort og digitalisering av folkeregisteret [Iraq: Introduction of a

new national ID card and digitization of the population register] [source: Norwegian embassy in Amman], 16 February
2017, url, p. 3
434 Norway, Landinfo, Irak: Innføring av nytt nasjonalt ID-kort og digitalisering av folkeregisteret [Iraq: Introduction of a
new national ID card and digitization of the population register] [source: Norwegian embassy in Amman], 16 February
2017, url, p. 3; Norway, Landinfo, Irak: Reisedokumenter og andre ID-dokumenter [Iraq: Travel documents and other ID
documents] [source: Norwegian embassy in Amman], 11 April 2018, url, p. 24;
435 Exchange rates from European Commission, Wechselkurs (InforEuro), n.d., url, accessed on 7 October 2021
436 Exchange rates from European Commission, Wechselkurs (InforEuro), n.d., url, accessed on 7 October 2021
437 Exchange rates from European Commission, Wechselkurs (InforEuro), n.d., url, accessed on 7 October 2021
438 Iraq, Act on National ID Cards, 1 February 2016, url, Art. 37 (1-3)
439 Iraq, Act on National ID Cards, 1 February 2016, url, Art. 34
440 Norway, Landinfo, Irak: Reisedokumenter og andre ID-dokumenter [Iraq: Travel documents and other ID documents],
11 April 2018, url, p. 21
441 Norway, Landinfo and Denmark, DIS, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Report on issuance of the new Iraqi ID card,
November 2018, url, p. 6
442 Norway, Landinfo and Denmark, DIS, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Report on issuance of the new Iraqi ID card [source:
Director Abdulrahman Ismael Azaz, Directorate of Nationality and Civil Status, Erbil, Ministry of the Interior, KRG],
November 2018, url, pp. 6-7
443 Norway, Landinfo and Denmark, DIS, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Report on issuance of the new Iraqi ID card [source:
Directorate of Nationality and Civil Status], November 2018, url, p. 6

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Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

as well as two witnesses. When the child reached the age of 12, it had to give full biometry to get a
unified national card. 444
Iraqi women with either deceased or missing husbands, who needed to have civil documentation
issued, had to undergo a lengthier and more complex process of proving the circumstances of theirhusband’s death and providing a marriage certificate, which were necessary to obtain birthcertificates, nationality certificates or civil IDs for their children. 445
The unified national card was reportedly criticised by human rights monitoring bodies for being
discriminatory, limited in regard to freedom of religion and lacking equal status for men and women.
The registration of a child’s name for example was reportedly only allowed under the father’s name,because only he can establish affiliation, while a mother did not have the right to request an ID cardfor her child. This situation led back to Article 19(2) of the National Identity Card Law of 2016.
Moreover, according to Article 20(2) of the same law, foundlings were considered to be Muslim andIraqi, which was discriminatory in regard to other religions and denied individuals the right to choose
their own religion. Similarly, Article 26 allowed non-Muslims to change their religion, but it did notrefer to a possible change of religions of Muslims. 446

3.1.2 Civil status ID
While the civil status IDs were being phased out, they were still issued where the correct equipment
was not available for the issuance of the unified national card. 447 As of 2018, in the KRI, the unified
national cards were being issued in the bigger cities, while outside them, the civil status ID was still
being issued. 448
According to information obtained in a meeting with the General Directorate of Nationality in
Bagdad in 2012 by Landinfo, it was necessary to fill out an application form, which had to be signedby the head of the household, the guardian or lawyer, and to attach two passport photos, when
applying for an old type of ID card. In addition, the applicant’s identity had to be documented bypresenting a birth certificate at the first issue and an ID card from a close relative such as a father or
grandfather. The fee for getting civil status ID is 1 000 IQD (EUR 0.58 449) 450. A webpage of theinformation service Signpost Project, dealing with civil documentation in Iraq, stated that a
residence card as well as a ‘residence support letter’ were also required for the application and thatwas possible to process the application in one day in case no information or document was
missing. 451 Children below the age of two years were not required to hand in a photo and photos ofwomen in hijab were accepted. Authorities in the Kurdistan region required four photographs. 452
A husband or father can apply for the civil status ID for his wife or children, unless the civil status ID
gets lost, in case of which the applicants have to appear in person. This does not apply to children
under the age of twelve. It is possible to authorize another person to apply for the civil status ID and
444 Norway, Landinfo and Denmark, DIS, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Report on issuance of the new Iraqi ID card [source:

Directorate of Nationality and Civil Status], November 2018, url, p. 6

445 NRC, Barriers from birth: Undocumented children in Iraq sentenced to a life on the margins, April 2019, url, p. 3

446 Yassen, A. O., Report on Citizenship law: Iraq, European University Institute, May 2021, url, p 18; see also: Iraq, National

Card Law No (3) of the year 2016 [٢٠١٦ ‫( ﻟﺴﻨﺔ‬٣) ‫]ﻗﺎﻧﻮن اﻟبﻄﺎﻗﺔ اﻟﻮﻃﻨ�ﺔ رﻗﻢ‬, 2016, url, pp. 15, 18
447 Norway, Landinfo, Irak: Reisedokumenter og andre ID-dokumenter [Iraq: Travel documents and other ID documents],
11 April 2018, url, p. 22
448 Norway, Landinfo and Denmark, DIS, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Report on issuance of the new Iraqi ID card [source:
Director General Sami Jalal Hussein, Ministry of Interior, KRG], November 2018, url, p. 6
449 Exchange rates from European Commission, Wechselkurs (InforEuro), n.d., url, accessed on 7 October 2021
450 Norway, Landinfo, Irak: Reisedokumenter og andre ID-dokumenter [Iraq: Travel documents and other ID documents][source: General Directorate of Nationality], 11 April 2018, url, p. 23
451 Signpost Project, Iraqi Official Identification Documents: What are they and how do I get them, July 2021, url
452 Norway, Landinfo, Irak: Reisedokumenter og andre ID-dokumenter [Iraq: Travel documents and other ID documents],
11 April 2018, url, p. 23

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Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

it is common to ask a relative for help. The identity of both the applicant and the person authorized
has to be documented. In the KRI, it has also been possible to issue civil status IDs via a proxy. 453

3.1.3 Birth certificate
Parents must obtain a birth certificate from the hospital where the child was born in order toregister a new-born child in Iraq. In case the child is born outside of health facilities, the certificate
can be obtained from the obstetrician or a licensed nurse or midwife. 454 According to the results of ahousehold survey published in 2018, 16,4 % of children in Iraq were born at home. 455 DRC, IRC, and
NRC reported that the civil IDs of both the child’s father and mother as well as a state-issued
marriage certificate, in case the IDs were not updated in that regard yet, were cited by members offocus group discussions 456 as a general requirement across the three governorates Anbar, Ninawa
and Salah Al-Din previously held by ISIL for giving birth in a hospital. 457
UNICEF and UNAMI reported that a distinction had to be made between children born in areas
under the control of ISIL. On the one hand, there were cases in which both parents were Iraqi
nationals and were married before ISIL gained control of the provinces they lived in. On the other
hand, there were couples who got officially married under ISIL control but were not affiliated with
ISIL. In the first case, both parents had to go to the Personal Status Court which issued proof ofpaternity and a birth certificate for the child. If one of the parents was deceased or unknown, thedeath certificate for the deceased spouse had to be presented. In case the unknown parent was thefather, the child was termed a foundling under Iraqi Law. In order for the mother to keep the child,
she had to prove that she was the biological mother by undergoing a DNA test. 458
For married couples who got married under ISIL control slight variations to the beforehand
described general procedure applied. The marriage was treated as a marriage conducted outside thecourt and had to be registered again. 459 Marriages in Iraq have to be registered in a Personal Status
Court, which issues the marriage certificates. 460 This court had to decide regarding proof of paternity
and registration of the birth certificate for the child and had to inform the relevant Directorate of
Civil Status, which then issued the birth certificate. 461
Once the marriage was registered in a state court, the couple was able to update their marital status
in their ID cards, which was ‘a complicated and lengthy process’. 462 In case both partners still
possessed their ID cards, it was possible to retroactively register the marriage in a Personal Status
Court by bringing along two witnesses. With the thereupon obtained marriage certificate, they wereable to update their marital status on their ID cards and subsequently get a birth certificate for theirchild. 463

453 Norway, Landinfo, Irak: Reisedokumenter og andre ID-dokumenter [Iraq: Travel documents and other ID documents],

11 April 2018, url, p. 24

454 UNHCR, Birth registration, n.d., url

455 Moazzem Hossain, S. M. et al., Maternal and Neonatal Health in Select Districts of Iraq: Findings from a Recent

Household Survey, 2018, url, pp. 5, 7

456 Research was conducted in Anbar, Ninewa, and Salah Al-Din governorates. Six focus group discussions in eachgovernorate and a total of 18 across all three governorates were conducted.

457 NRC et al., Paperless People Of Post-Conflict Iraq, Denied rights, barred from basic services and excluded fromreconstruction efforts, 16 September 2019, url, p. 13

458 UNICEF and UNAMI, Analysis of the legal framework governing civil documentation in Iraq, 2019, url, p. 3

459 UNICEF and UNAMI, Analysis of the legal framework governing civil documentation in Iraq, 2019, url, pp. 3-4

460 Norway, Landinfo, Irak: Muslimsk ekteskapsinngåelse og skilsmisse [Iraq: Muslim marriage and divorce], 12 September

2014, url, p. 7
461 UNICEF and UNAMI, Analysis of the legal framework governing civil documentation in Iraq, 2019, url, pp. 3-4
462 NRC, Barriers from birth: Undocumented children in Iraq sentenced to a life on the margins, April 2019, url, p. 17
463 NRC, Barriers from birth: Undocumented children in Iraq sentenced to a life on the margins, April 2019, url, p. 17

53

Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and SulaymaniyahSome judges from Mosul region were reported to demand an approval of the Public Prosecutor’s
Office before issuing a proof of paternity certificate though this practice was not backed by the law
and was thought to be based on a legal misinterpretation. According to UNICEF and UNAMI ‘it isviewed by many as adding another layer of complication, causing further delays and acting as anadditional obstacle to obtaining birth registration and civil documentation for children.’ 464 Hospitals
reportedly refused to register a birth in the absence of the ID cards of the parents or – in case thefather was deceased – the absence of a death certificate. 465 According to a source of April 2019‘without the marriage certificate and both civil IDs, registering a birth is either delayed until these
documents or suitable alternatives are obtained, or not possible at all.’ 466
The birth certificate then needed to be presented to the Directorate of Health in order to bevalidated and recorded in the Birth and Deceased logs. In the central and southern governorates, acopy of the endorsed birth certificate needed to be delivered by one of the parents to the CAD forthe family record. 467

3.1.4 Nationality certificate
A nationality certificate is issued to all Iraqi nationals upon application. Children normally obtainthem around the age of 12. 468 In practice, both the ID card and nationality certificate were required
to obtain certain services such as health services or education access. 469
Referring to information obtained in 2013 from IOM, the Canadian immigration authorities reported
that Iraqis living in Iraq needed to present a nationality certificate from the father or a brother, theirown ID card, their own or their father’s residency card, their own or their father’s PDS card and four
passport photos against a white background in order to be issued a nationality certificate. 470

3.1.5 Residency card
The residency card is a ‘proof of an individual’s place of residence and must be routinely presented
as part of the application procedure for other identity cards and for access to a range of services.’ It
is issued by the Ministry of Interior to the head of the household. 471 Information on requirements toobtain the residency card in Iraq is scarce. The Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada stated in2013 with reference to an IOM representative in Iraq that for the issuance, renewal andreplacement of the residency card applicants needed to present an original and a copy of thenationality certificate for the applicant and the applicant's wife and children, an original and copy ofthe civil status ID for the applicant and the applicant's wife and children, the original and a copy of
the residency card of the applicant's father, the original and a copy of the PDS card of the applicant
or his father, the original and a copy of the marriage certificate and a support of residence from the

464 UNICEF and UNAMI, Analysis of the legal framework governing civil documentation in Iraq, 2019, url, pp. 3-4

465 NRC et al., Paperless People Of Post-Conflict Iraq, Denied rights, barred from basic services and excluded fromreconstruction efforts, 16 September 2019, url, p. 14
466 NRC, Barriers from birth: Undocumented children in Iraq sentenced to a life on the margins, April 2019, url, p. 17
467 UNHCR, Birth registration, n.d., url
468 Norway, Landinfo, Travel documents and other identity documents,16 December 2015 [source: General Directorate of
Nationality], url, pp. 23-24.
469 Chatelard, G., Comment made during the review of EASO Report on Internal Mobility, 10 October 2018, cited from
EASO, COI Report: Iraq – Internal Mobility, February 2019, url, p. 20, footnote 84
470 Canada, IRB, Iraq: Nationality Certificate, including purpose and validity; requirements and procedures for the issuance,
renewal and replacement; frequency of fraudulent certificates (2011-November 2013), 25 November 2013, url
471 NRC et al., Paperless People Of Post-Conflict Iraq, Denied rights, barred from basic services and excluded fromreconstruction efforts, 16 September 2019, url, p. 854

Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

Municipal Council as well as four photos with a white background. 472 UNHCR explained thatfurthermore, ‘in order to obtain a housing card, the head of household is required to present an
official housing deed or rental contract with his/her name on it’. 473
The aforementioned residency card is not to be confused with the residency permit issued in the
KRI, which was sometimes also referred to as residence card, but was basically a security clearance
permit issued by the Asayish to individuals who did not originate from the KRI and wished to stay in
the KRI longer than a month, such as Iraqi Arabs or Turkmen, individuals from previously ISIL-heldareas or areas affected by the conflict. Those individuals had to register at the Asayish office close to
their envisaged place of residency. 474 They then received what was called an ID card 475, a residency
permit 476 or a residence card 477. In Dohuk governorate, if they wished to stay longer than a month, asponsor was further required for the application and the issued residency permit was reportedly
valid for up to six months, while for Sulaymaniyah and Erbil, it was stated that the permit was‘usually valid for a year’. However, single Arab and Turkmen men only received a renewable
residency permit for one month in Sulaymaniyah and Erbil. Though it was possible to apply for a
one-year permit, it required a proof of regular employment and a support letter from the employee
and was reportedly seldomly issued. 478

3.1.6 Public Distribution System (PDS) card
Holders of the PDS card were provided a monthly food ration via the Public Distribution System of
the government, managed by the Ministry of Trade (MoT). The card was issued to the head ofhousehold, and contained a list of the names of all household members. 479

472 Canada, IRB, Iraq: Residence Card and Public Distribution System (PDS) ration card, including purpose and validity;

requirements and procedures for the issuance, renewal and replacement of the cards; frequency of fraudulent cards;
whether a person can live in the country without these cards (1991-November 2013), 25 November 2013, url
473 UNHCR, UNHCR eligibility guidelines for assessing the international protection needs of asylum-seekers from Iraq,
31 May 2012, url, p. 207, footnote 1342
474 UNHCR, Relevant Country of Origin Information to Assist with the Application of UNHCR’s Country Guidance on Iraq:
Ability of Persons Originating from Formerly ISIS-Held or Conflict-Affected Areas to Legally Access and Remain in Proposed
Areas of Internal Relocation, 11 January 2021, url, p. 4; p. 4, footnote 9475 Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report – Iraq, 17 August 2020, url, p. 65
476 UNHCR, Relevant Country of Origin Information to Assist with the Application of UNHCR’s Country Guidance on Iraq:
Ability of Persons Originating from Formerly ISIS-Held or Conflict-Affected Areas to Legally Access and Remain in Proposed
Areas of Internal Relocation, 11 January 2021, url, p. 4
477 Canada, IRB, Iraq: The Foreigner's Residence Card issued in the Kurdistan region, including purpose and validity; status
afforded by the card, including access to employment and services and the ability to return and reside in Iraq;
requirements and procedures for the issuance and renewal of cards; information included on the card (2015-October
2017), 30 October 2017, url
478 UNHCR, Relevant Country of Origin Information to Assist with the Application of UNHCR’s Country Guidance on Iraq:
Ability of Persons Originating from Formerly ISIS-Held or Conflict-Affected Areas to Legally Access and Remain in Proposed
Areas of Internal Relocation, 11 January 2021, url, p. 4; see also Canada, IRB, Iraq: The Foreigner's Residence Card issued in
the Kurdistan region, including purpose and validity; status afforded by the card, including access to employment andservices and the ability to return and reside in Iraq; requirements and procedures for the issuance and renewal of cards;
information included on the card (2015-October 2017), 30 October 2017, url
479 NRC et al., Paperless People Of Post-Conflict Iraq, Denied rights, barred from basic services and excluded fromreconstruction efforts, 16 September 2019, url, p. 855

Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

Several sources indicated that the PDS card was one of the key civil documents in Iraq 480 whichsometimes also served as an identity document. 481 Humanitarian and UN agencies used the card toverify family units that were out to receive assistance. 482
In order to get a PDS card, it is necessary to present a civil ID and a residency card. Should the family
composition change in any way, the PDS card had to be updated by handing in a marriage, birth ordeath certificate respectively. 483
In cooperation with the World Food Programme (WFP), as of summer 2020, the Government of Iraq
was working on the digitalisation of the PDS System in a pilot study via the MoT. The smartphone
app Tamwini (‘My Food Ration’ 484), which was launched on 8 July 2020 as a pilot project in
Baghdad 485, was supposed to enable households to remotely update family information using theirsmartphone. 486

3.2 ID documents and access to services
The ID card and other state-issued civil documents 487, i.e., the PDS card, the nationality certificate,
the residency card, 488 the passport, and certificates of birth, death, and marriage, 489 are required toaccess the rights stipulated by the law, e.g., healthcare, education, and freedom of movement within
the country, the state justice system, and social welfare. 490 In addition, possession of a legal identity
enables access to humanitarian assistance for displaced persons. 491
The ID card is used in all contact with public authorities. It is necessary to access health services,
social welfare services, schools and for buying and selling a home and a car. In addition, it must bepresented when applying for other official documents, such as passports. 492 Stateless persons who
were not able to register for ID cards were reported to be unable to register marriages and to gain
access to some government services without ID cards. 493
According to a 2015 report, a nationality certificate was required when applying for work in the
public sector, educational contexts and other public services. Furthermore, ‘the nationality
certificate is a required breeder document when applying for a passport, birth certificates for own
children, a marriage certificate and death certificate’ 494. In practice, both the ID card and nationality

480 CaLP, Humanitarian Cash and Social Protection in Iraq, 28 January 2021, url, p. 12; REACH, Iraq: Multi-Cluster Needs

Assessment - Key Findings for Iraq, September 2020, 2 June 2021, url, p. 12, footnote 3; Yassen, A. O., Report on
Citizenship law: Iraq, European University Institute, May 2021, url, pp. 8-9
481 NRC et al., Paperless People Of Post-Conflict Iraq, Denied rights, barred from basic services and excluded fromreconstruction efforts, 16 September 2019, url, p. 15
482 CaLP, Humanitarian Cash and Social Protection in Iraq, 28 January 2021, url, p. 12, footnote 10
483 NRC et al., Paperless People Of Post-Conflict Iraq, Denied rights, barred from basic services and excluded fromreconstruction efforts, 16 September 2019, url, p. 15
484WFP, Iraq Country Brief, June 2020, 27 July 2020, url, p. 2
485 CaLP, Humanitarian Cash and Social Protection in Iraq, 28 January 2021, url, p. 13
486WFP, Iraq Country Brief, June 2020, 27 July 2020, url, p. 2
487 NRC, Barriers from birth: Undocumented children in Iraq sentenced to a life on the margins, 30 April 2019, url, p. 11
488 NRC et al., Paperless People Of Post-Conflict Iraq, Denied rights, barred from basic services and excluded fromreconstruction efforts, 16 September 2019, url, p. 11
489 AI, Legacy of Terror: The Plight of Yezidi Child Survivors of ISIS, 30 July 2020, url, p. 51
490 NRC et al., Paperless People Of Post-Conflict Iraq, Denied rights, barred from basic services and excluded fromreconstruction efforts, 16 September 2019, url, pp. 11; 5-6; UNHCR, Iraq – UNHCR Civil Documentation for IDPs, December
2019, url, p. 1; see also AI, Legacy of Terror: The Plight of Yezidi Child Survivors of ISIS, 30 July 2020, url, p. 51; UNOCHA,
Humanitarian Needs Overview – Iraq, February 2021, url, p. 20
491 AI, Legacy of Terror: The Plight of Yezidi Child Survivors of ISIS, 30 July 2020, url, p. 51
492 Norway, Landinfo, Irak: Reisedokumenter og andre ID-dokumenter [Iraq: Travel documents and other ID documents],
11 April 2018, url, p. 18
493 USDOS, Country reports on human rights practices for 2020 - Iraq, 30 March 2021, url, p. 57
494 Norway, Landinfo, Travel documents and other identity documents, 16 December 2015, url, p. 24

56

Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyahcertificate were required to obtain services such as health, social welfare, education access, andwhen buying and selling property such as houses or vehicles, and could also be requested frompeople crossing check points. 495 As mentioned in section 3.1.4 Nationality certificate, holders of theunified national card do not need to present their nationality certificate because it is alreadyencompassed in the unified national card.
Paperless Iraqi families in urban areas formerly under ISIL control were not only limited in essential
services but also in ‘their ability to recover and rebuild their lives’ after the war due to their lack ofnecessary documents. In addition to the above-mentioned restrictions, they had limited access toformal employment, government compensation schemes for damaged housing, and opportunities toown or rent property. People without civil documents were barred from accessing a significant
portion of Iraq's recovery and reconstruction efforts. 496
Moreover, people without documents also faced a considerably higher risk of arbitrary detention
and arrest. Reasons for individuals lacking documents could be manifold: some lost their documents
when fleeing their homes; for others, they were confiscated by various factions in the conflict; andstill others received ISIL documents that were of no value anymore. 497 Especially, IDPs and returnees
were reported to be severely impacted by a lack of documentation. 498 Marginalised groups such as
Faili Kurds, Bidoons, the Dom (Roma) and Palestinian refugees also had been barred access to civil
documents, such as the ID card or the nationality certificate, or have faced difficulties in accessing
them. 499
In April 2019, it was reported that 45 000 children displaced in camps had not received Iraqi-stateissued birth certificates or other documents providing their legal identity. Children without legal
documents faced a high risk of being condemned to spend their lives on the margins of society. They
were not able to travel within the country, attend formal schools or obtain educational certificatesand had no access to health-care or state social-welfare programs. If this issue is not resolved before
they reach adulthood, these children are at risk of not having their marriages state-recognized, notbeing able to own or rent property, and lacking a fair chance at formal employment. Moreover, notowning civil documents puts children at increased risk of statelessness. 500
Difficulties in obtaining a death or missing person certificate furthermore affected women’s accessto services in cases where relevant documents were issued in the names of their husbands orfathers. NRC stated that this included claiming unpaid salaries of spouses. 501 Furthermore, to acquirean ID card, women reportedly needed the consent of a male relative. 502

495 Chatelard, G., Comment made during the review of EASO Report on Internal Mobility, 10 October 2018, cited from

EASO, COI Report: Iraq – Internal Mobility, February 2019, url, p. 20, footnote 84
496 NRC et al., Paperless People Of Post-Conflict Iraq, Denied rights, barred from basic services and excluded fromreconstruction efforts, 16 September 2019, url, p. 6
497 NRC et al., Paperless People Of Post-Conflict Iraq, Denied rights, barred from basic services and excluded fromreconstruction efforts, 16 September 2019, url, pp. 5-6
498 UNHCR, Over 29,500 internally displaced persons in camps in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq receive civil identification
documents [Press release], 6 July2021, url, p. 1
499 Yassen, A. O., Report on Citizenship Law: Iraq, European University Institute, May 2021, url, pp. 8-9
500 NRC, Barriers from birth: Undocumented children in Iraq sentenced to a life on the margins, April 2019, url, pp. 3, 7
501 NRC et al., Paperless People Of Post-Conflict Iraq, Denied rights, barred from basic services and excluded fromreconstruction efforts, 16 September 2019, url, p. 21
502 USDOS, Country reports on human rights practices for 2020 - Iraq, 30 March 2021, url, p. 27

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Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

3.2.1 Education
The directives of the MoE stipulate that several types of civil documentation, including the PDS
card 503 and the ID cards of the students and their parents, are required for school enrolment. 504
Children from previously ISIL-held areas were reported to face difficulties in school enrolment due tomissing required civil documentation and experienced problems obtaining it from the authorities. 505
This situation was reported to persist despite the issuance of a ministerial directive in 2018 506 thatallows undocumented children to attend school, as a number of education officials interviewed by
DRC, IRC, and NRC were unaware of the directive. Furthermore, there was diverging information
circulating about what types of civil documents were required to attend school. While some thoughtthat the student’s ID card was required, others assumed that the ID card of the father and themother were also required, and that, in case the father was deceased, his death certificate had to besubmitted. The issuance of a death certificate was reported to depict an extremely protracted,
expensive, and difficult procedure. In addition, among officials who were aware of a directive, there
were discrepancies regarding its content as well. 507
In a September 2019 published survey, more than half the respondents in Anbar, Ninewa, and Salah
Al-Din stated that a woman could not enrol their children in school by using only her papers. Almost
half of the respondents indicated that the father’s ID card or, if deceased, the father’s deathcertificate was also necessary for this purpose. 508 The same survey found that 18 % of respondents
who said their children lacked civil documentation reported that their children were denied accessto education due to this reason. 509

3.2.2 Health-Care
Basically, all citizens of Iraq have access to the health system, since a health insurance system does
not exist in Iraq. Public hospitals can be consulted in order to get checked by a physician for
relatively low charges and medicine can be acquired for lower prices than in the private sector. 510
While a 2019 IOM report indicated that a valid ID card must be presented to register for treatment
at a health care facility, 511 a 2019 NRC report stated that, for routine consultations, civil documents
were not required. However, for inpatient stays, surgeries, and other major procedures, an ID card
was required. Reportedly, ID requirements varied at health care facilities across the country. 512
In practice, the documentation requirements for accessing hospitals or medical facilities reportedly
varied a lot in Iraq. NRC reported the case of a pregnant woman with a missing husband from Mosul.
Because she was not in possession of a valid ID card or a marriage certificate, she was turned down
503 IOM, Country Fact Sheet Iraq, 2019, url, p. 9

504 UNAMI and OHCHR, The Right to Education in Iraq, Part One: The legacy of ISIL territorial control and access to

education, February 2020, url, p. 11, see also IOM, Country Fact Sheet Iraq, 2019, url, p. 9505 HRW, Iraq: School Doors Barred to Many Children, 28 August 2019, url; UN Human Right Council, Visit to Iraq, Report of
the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons [A/HRC/44/41/Add.1], 13 May 2020, url, para.
44
506 UNICEF, Iraq: Humanitarian Situation Report, December 2018 url, p. 4
507 NRC et al., Paperless People Of Post-Conflict Iraq, Denied rights, barred from basic services and excluded fromreconstruction efforts, 16 September 2019, url, p. 11
508 NRC et al., Paperless People Of Post-Conflict Iraq, Denied rights, barred from basic services and excluded fromreconstruction efforts, 16 September 2019, url, p. 12509 NRC et al., Paperless People Of Post-Conflict Iraq, Denied rights, barred from basic services and excluded fromreconstruction efforts, 16 September 2019, url, p. 26
510 IOM, Country Fact Sheet Iraq, 2019, url, p. 4
511 IOM, Country Fact Sheet Iraq, 2019, url, p. 4
512 NRC et al., Paperless People Of Post-Conflict Iraq, Denied rights, barred from basic services and excluded fromreconstruction efforts, 16 September 2019, url, p. 13; see also DSP, Far from Home: Future Prospects for Syrian Refugees in
Iraq, January 2019, url, p. 24

58

Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyahby two different hospitals and eventually gave birth at home. For the Hawija area in Kirkuk, it wasreported that women without documentation were allowed to give birth in hospitals, however thesechildren were not issued birth certificates by the hospitals. Without a birth certificate, new-borns
would not receive vaccinations, which has led to the emergence of children’s diseases which were
not present in the area before ISIL. 513

3.2.3 Housing, Land and Property (HLP)
According to a survey published in September 2019, individuals without ID cards were less likely tobe the owners of the properties they lived in or to have rental contracts for rented properties,
therefore facing an increased risk of eviction. Various types of documents were reported to berequired for renting a home, such as the head of household’s ID card, nationality certificate,residency card and PDS card. As far as housing, land and property rights were concerned, the local
tribal official (mukhtar) played the role of an important interlocutor. In some cities, such as Mosul,
Tikrit, or Ramadi, the approval from the mukhtar had to be obtained first. For Mosul city, it wasreported that without a valid ID card, a mukhtar would not agree to a tenancy or validate a contract.
Furthermore, he needed to be presented the aforementioned documents which he would thensubmit to the local intelligence office for a final approval. Reportedly, all of these documents, as well
as a household-level security clearance, were also necessary in order to file a housing or property
dispute in court. 514
Members of the Yazidi community were reported to have only limited chances to restore HLP rights
as many had lost civil and property documents during the forced displacement. 515 A study publishedin May 2020 found that especially in the districts of Sinjar, Tal Afar, and Tal Keif IDPs mentioned thelack of HLP documentation as one of the main barriers to return. 516
Households headed by paperless women were reported to encounter additional hurdles when it
comes to claiming housing, land or property rights. This was due to the fact that their names were
often not mentioned in property deeds, which could be challenging when a woman’s husband waseither missing or deceased, and the woman wasn’t able to acquire a death certificate, or
substantiate her rights. 517

3.2.4 Social Welfare
Iraq’s Public Distribution System provides for monthly food distributions, including flour, rice, sugar,
beans and cooking oil, for every Iraqi who earns less than 1 million IQD (EUR 580.40 518) per monthand is not employed by the government. However, paperless people cannot benefit from the PDS, asa PDS card from the area of origin of the head of the household is needed, for the issuance of whichan ID card and a residency card are required. In case the family composition changed in some way,
the PDS card has to be updated by presenting a marriage, birth or death certificate, respectively. 519

513 NRC, Barriers from birth: Undocumented children in Iraq sentenced to a life on the margins, April 2019, url, p. 13
514 NRC et al., Paperless People Of Post-Conflict Iraq, Denied rights, barred from basic services and excluded fromreconstruction efforts, 16 September 2019, url, p. 14
515 Salih, S.Y and Qadr, K.M., How the Deprivation of Land Ownership Makes Minority Groups more Vulnerable: An
Examination of the Case of Yazidis in Iraq, 2019, url, p. 116
516 USIP and MERI, Ninewa Plains and Western Ninewa, Barriers to Return and Community Resilience, A Meta-analysis of
Existing Studies and Literature, 7 May 2020, url, pp. 31, 33, 36
517 NRC et al., Paperless People Of Post-Conflict Iraq, Denied rights, barred from basic services and excluded fromreconstruction efforts, 16 September 2019, url, pp. 14-15
518 Exchange rates from European Commission, Wechselkurs (InforEuro), n.d., url, accessed on 7 October 2021
519 NRC et al., Paperless People Of Post-Conflict Iraq, Denied rights, barred from basic services and excluded fromreconstruction efforts, 16 September 2019, url, p. 15

59

Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

In order to receive additional welfare services provided by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs(MoLSA), such as unemployment assistance or a disability allowance, applicants had to provide theID cards and nationality certificates for all household members, as well as a residency card. 520
According to another source, to receive social assistance, the Iraqi ID card and a PDS card wererequired for registration, but the MoLSA could ask for additional documents based on the individual
case as well. 521 As of September 2019, it was reported that the registration for MoLSA cash
assistance had been closed in June 2016. 522 In September 2021, the Iraqi government announced thelaunch of a social protection reform in collaboration with UNICEF, the WFP and the International
Labour Organization (ILO) and the support of the European Union aiming at establishing a‘sustainable and more inclusive system for those in need’. It is supposed to prioritize children, youth,
women, the elderly, people with disabilities, displaced persons and workers in the informal sector.
Reportedly, the PDS card (in digitized form) will continue to play a central role even under the newarrangement. 523

3.3 IDPs and returnees
An IOM study which carried out a survey between March and December 2020 found that 8 % of IDPs
in Tuz Khurmatu 524, 6 % in Baquba 525, 3 % in Mosul 526, 2 % in Bagdad and Abu Ghraib 527 and 1 % in
Tikrit 528 reported having issues regarding access to documents and security clearance. 529 Findings of
the National Protection Cluster of Iraq monitoring the protection situation between July and August2021 show that 49 % of 2 097 interviewed key informants (among them 698 IDPs and returnees)
across 18 governorates said that ‘some or most people are facing issues to obtain or renew their civil
documentation’, while access to civil documentation was reported to be most hindered in Dohuk,
Anbar and Ninawa. 530
The Civil Status Law requires applicants to renew their identification documents in their place oforigin. Hence, IDPs needed to travel back to their hometown for the relevant application process.
However, the return of IDPs to areas previously held by ISIL was described as problematic due to‘local “decrees” and threats of violence’. 531 Some IDPs were reportedly blocked from returning totheir areas of origin because of the alleged ISIL affiliation of a family member and were therefore,among others, facing difficulties in obtaining civil documents. 532 However, UNHCR was implementing
mobile missions in order to make it easier for IDPs to access civil documentation. 533 For further
information on the mobile missions, please refer to section 3.3.1 Obtaining lost ID documents.
Meanwhile, the top three reported barriers to accessing civil documentation, according to the
520 NRC et al., Paperless People Of Post-Conflict Iraq, Denied rights, barred from basic services and excluded fromreconstruction efforts, 16 September 2019, url, p. 15
521 IOM, Country Fact Sheet Iraq, 2019, url, p. 7
522 NRC et al., Paperless People Of Post-Conflict Iraq, Denied rights, barred from basic services and excluded fromreconstruction efforts, 16 September 2019, url, p. 15
523 WFP, The Government of Iraq, UNICEF, WFP and ILO partner to reform social protection with support from theEuropean Union, 21 September 2021, url
524 IOM, Urban Displacement in Federal Iraq, 14 March 2021, url, p. 33
525 IOM, Urban Displacement in Federal Iraq, 14 March 2021, url, p. 13
526 IOM, Urban Displacement in Federal Iraq, 14 March 2021, url, p. 23
527 IOM, Urban Displacement in Federal Iraq, 14 March 2021, url, p. 8
528 IOM, Urban Displacement in Federal Iraq, 14 March 2021, url, p. 28
529 The study focuses on ten urban centres in Iraq, namely the cities of Baghdad/Abu Ghraib, Baquba, Dohuk, Erbil, Kirkuk,
Mosul, Sulaymaniyah, Tikrit, Tuz Khurmatu and Zakho, where data were collected at household-level between March andDecember 2020.
530 Protection Cluster Iraq, Protection Monitoring System/Community Level: Third Round, n.d., url
531 UNAMI and OHCHR, The Right to Education in Iraq: Part One: the legacy of ISIL territorial control on access to education,
February 2020, url, p. 12
532 CIVIC, Ignoring Iraq’s most vulnerable: The plight of displaced persons, April 2021, url, pp. 1, 12
533 UNHCR, Iraq: UNHCR civil documentation for IDPs, November 2019, url, p. 2

60

Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

aforementioned National Protection Cluster findings, were the ‘complexity, cost and length of theadministrative process’; the inaccessibility of CADs or courts ‘due to distance and/or cost oftransportation’; and ‘the inability to provide the required documentation for applications’. 534 In
addition, according to an interview with a staff member from an NGO working in Mosul, ‘frequentharassment’ of displaced women may prevent them from consulting civil authority offices. 535
Regarding the cost for the renewal of lost documents, respondents flagged widespread corruption,bribery, and the need to use interpersonal connections (wasta), especially in Mosul. Several
respondents indicated that they needed to pay 50 000 IQD (EUR 29.39) 536] for a blood test required
to formalize marriages in Tikrit, while the blood test had reportedly been free of charge before
2014. 537 Moreover, a ‘serious backlog’ in providing civil documentation to people living in former
ISIL-held areas was reported in 2019. This was due to ‘the sheer number of people who lost
documents over the last four years’ as well as the effects of the conflict on administrative
institutions and services, which led to the disappearance of some services in these areas. 538 Overcrowdedness of the civil directorates (most serious in Anbar, Salah Al-Din and Ninawa) overstrained
courts and bureaucracy made it difficult for Iraqis to obtain documents. In Mosul, IDPs and returnees
signaled significant delays in the process of document renewal. 539

3.3.1 Obtaining lost ID documents
The first step in the process for obtaining new civil registration documents in Iraq was to apply forsecurity clearance by submitting one’s name to the intelligence forces in the applicant’s area.
Security clearances were required for residents of areas formerly under ISIL control. The names werechecked against a database of ISIL affiliates, and the application was denied if a relative’s nameappeared in the database. Otherwise, the IDP was handed out a document confirming clearance. 540
However, perceived ISIL affiliation often led to the denial of security clearances by officials andhence, to problems for displaced households in obtaining civil documentation. 541
For detailed information about security clearance and the steps returnees need to take in case they
are suspected of ISIL affiliation, please see section 3.3.3 Security clearance requirement for
returnees.
Persons with a missing or deceased relative were not able to obtain documents until thegovernment located the body of the relative. Due to the difficulty in proving death in Mosul, therelatives were required to declare the person missing in a police station with the testimony of two
men or four women. The Criminal Investigation Court then opened a case and the relatives wererequired to publish a public notice in the newspaper. After two years without any news from themissing persons, the relatives could request that the person be declared dead by the Personal Status
Court, although this could take up to four years according to the source. 542 According to a 2018534 Protection Cluster Iraq, Protection Monitoring System/Civil Status and Documentation: Third Round, n.d., url
535 CIVIC, Ignoring Iraq’s most vulnerable: The plight of displaced persons, April 2021, url, p. 16

536 Exchange rates from European Commission, Wechselkurs (InforEuro), n.d., url, accessed on 6 October 2021

537 NRC et al., Paperless People Of Post-Conflict Iraq, Denied rights, barred from basic services and excluded fromreconstruction efforts, 16 September 2019, url, p. 19
538 NRC, Barriers from birth: Undocumented children in Iraq sentenced to a life on the margins, April 2019, url, p. 19
539 NRC et al., Paperless People Of Post-Conflict Iraq, Denied rights, barred from basic services and excluded fromreconstruction efforts, 16 September 2019, url, p. 20
540 CIVIC, Ignoring Iraq’s most vulnerable: The plight of displaced persons, April 2021, url, p. 13; HRW, Iraq: Inadequate
Plans for Camp Closures, 3 June 2021 url; UNHCR, Relevant Country of Origin Information to Assist with the Application of
UNHCR’s Country Guidance on Iraq: Ability of Persons Originating from Formerly ISIS-Held or Conflict-Affected Areas toLegally Access and Remain in Proposed Areas of Internal Relocation, 11 January 2021, url, pp. 2-3; UNAMI and OHCHR, The
Right to Education in Iraq: Part One: the legacy of ISIL territorial control on access to education, February 2020, url, p. 12541 USDOS, Country reports on human rights practices for 2020 - Iraq, 30 March 2021, url, p. 31
542 NRC et al., Paperless People Of Post-Conflict Iraq, Denied rights, barred from basic services and excluded fromreconstruction efforts, 16 September 2019, url, p. 21

61

Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyahreport citing government sources, Iraqi law provides for something that could be considered as‘certificate of absence’ issued by a judge and valid for three years. According to the report, ‘thesecertificates may be withheld from families of disappeared suspected ISIL members, including thosethat went missing after surrendering to ISF [Iraqi Security Forces] or affiliated forces.’ 543
As outlined in section 3.1 Requirements to obtain ID documents, in order to obtain new
documentation, individuals have to present several civil documents that may be missing as well. ISIL
‘routinely confiscated and destroyed civil and other state-issued documents, instead issuing theirown documentation that is not recognized by the Iraqi state’, such as marriage certificates.
Therefore, the larger part of the families who lived under ISIL rule between 2014 and 2017 misscertain civil documents. Other reasons for missing civil documentation are the loss of documents
during the fighting or having them confiscated by security actors. 544
Since April 2019, UNHCR has implemented mobile missions in collaboration with the Ministry ofInterior through which government officials were sent to IDPs in camps and out-of-camp locations to
issue civil documentation. 545 This enabled IDPs to have access to civil documentation without theneed to travel to their area of origin. 546 IDPs and returnees were furthermore helped to get access tolegal advice and representation. 547 As of July 2021, UNHCR was still supporting the mobile missions
and was helping IDPs and returnees to get access to legal advice and representation in collaboration
with legal assistance partners. 548 25 048 individuals made use of legal assistance and 37 255 civil
documents were issued with the support of this programme between January to July 2021. 549
While courts and civil affairs offices were reported to have worked at full capacity during the firstquarter of 2021, some COVID-19 restrictions were imposed by the end of March. 550 However, someof the restrictions were lifted between June and July 2021 and previously halted applications for theunified national card were processed again, while courts and CADs were said to have beenfunctioning ‘at near full capacities (generally up to 80%) in most locations’ 551. Civil documentation
for IDPs who live in the KRI were being issued again after a break due to COVID-19 restrictions. By
July 2021, 29 593 applications had been processed during 5 missions to 12 IDP camps in Dohuk. 552
The first national identification card centre was inaugurated in Ninawa at the end of 2019 by the
Ninawa Directorate of Civil Affairs, Passports and Residencies. 553In January 2021, two CADs wereopened in Rabia and Zummar in Ninawa governorate. 554 As of May 2021, 11 CAD offices in Mosul
were rehabilitated, 5 of which were functional, while the rest of the offices ‘rehabilitated andfurnished between the end of 2020 and 2021 in Ayadiyah, Haman Al-Alil, Qayarah, Tal Abta,
Shimal/Sinuni, and Qahtaniya are yet to be officially opened and also await the recruitment ofadditional staffing by the authorities in order to become fully functional’ 555. Furthermore, another
CAD rehabilitation project was still running in Hawija in Kirkuk and one was being planned in Shirqat
in Salah al-Din. 556
543 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her

mission to Iraq, 5 June 2018, url, para. 75-76

544 CIVIC, Ignoring Iraq’s most vulnerable: The plight of displaced persons, April 2021, url, p. 14
545 UNHCR, Iraq: UNHCR civil documentation for IDPs, November 2019, url, p. 2

546 UNHCR, Iraq: IDPs – Civil identity and documentation (June - July 2021), 9 September 2021, url, p. 2
547 UNHCR, Iraq: UNHCR civil documentation for IDPs, November 2019, url, p. 1

548 UNHCR, Iraq: IDPs – Civil identity and documentation (June - July 2021), 9 September 2021, url, p. 2
549 UNHCR, Iraq: IDPs – Civil identity and documentation (June - July 2021), 9 September 2021, url, p. 1
550 UNHCR, Iraq: IDPs - Civil & Identity Documentation (JAN-MAR 2021), 11 May 2021, url, p. 1

551 UNHCR, Iraq: IDPs – Civil identity and documentation (June - July 2021), 9 September 2021, url, p. 1

552 UNHCR, Over 29,500 internally displaced persons in camps in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq receive civil identification

documents, 6 July 2021, url, p. 1
553 UNHCR, Iraq: UNHCR civil documentation for IDPs, November 2019, url, p. 1
554 UNHCR, Iraq: IDPs - Civil & Identity Documentation (JAN-MAR 2021), 11 May 2021, url. 2
555 UNHCR, Iraq: IDPs - Civil & Identity Documentation (May 2021), 27 June 2021, url, p. 2
556 UNHCR, Iraq: IDPs - Civil & Identity Documentation (May 2021), 27 June 2021, url, p. 2

62

Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

In the first half of 2021, the Personal Status Courts in Sulaymaniyah and Erbil, in collaboration with
UNHCR and partners, were working on facilitating the process for IDPs to obtain birth and marriage
certificates without the need to appear in person in the CAD of their areas of origin. 557
Regarding the issuance of civil status IDs for Iraqi citizens living abroad, the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign
Affairs stated that ‘[t]he Consular Section organizes the papers to obtain the Civil Status Card andsend them to the General Directorate of Travel and Nationality / Directorate of Civil Status’.
According to the Ministry, the applicant had to submit a form ‘used to obtain the Civil Status Cardfor the first time or to renew it or to get damaged or lost alternate form and stamp with the circular
stamp of the consulate.’ The form had to be filled in by the head of the family, the ‘family
housewife’, the owner of the record, the guardian, or the legal agent. The applicant had to sign andwrite his full name and address in the cell provided and then the form had to be stamped by the
consul.’ Moreover, an amount of 750 IQD (EUR 0.44 558) had to be paid and two 3 x 3 cm photos had
to be attached to the form. If the card got lost and the applicant applied for a replacement, theconsul had to write down a statement of the applicant on the back of the form stating when, where
and how the applicant thought the original ID card was lost. Additionally, a copy of the applicant’s
lost ID card and a copy of the applicant’s father’s, brother’s or unmarried sister’s ID card had to be
attached to the form. The copies had to be certified by the consul. In case the ID card got damaged
and needed to be replaced, in addition to the applicant’s statement, the damaged ID card had to be
attached to the form as well as a recent photograph of the applicant and a personal document ‘tosupport the identity of the applicant’. According to the source, the applicant 'can authorize one of
the citizens inside Iraq [...] to come to the Civil Affairs Department for the purpose of following-up.'Once issued, the Department of Nationality and Civil Status would send the card to the Ministry ofForeign Affairs which in turn would send it to the embassy concerned. 559 The same information was
found on the websites of the Iraqi embassies in Brussels 560, Berlin 561, Vienna 562, and Bern 563 among
others. None of the sources gave information on or referred to modalities of issuance of the unified
national card.
Regarding the issuance of a nationality certificate for Iraqi citizens living abroad, the Iraqi Ministry ofForeign Affairs stated that to obtain one, the applicant needed to fill in an application for anationality certificate to which two photographs of the applicant needed to be attached. One of thephotographs had to be stamped by the consulate. In addition, the applicant’s left thumbprint was
required in the form and the consul had to validate the information in the form, sign it by providing
his full name and stamp it with the consular stamp. Furthermore, the applicant had to attach acoloured copy of the Iraqi nationality certificate of the applicant’s father or mother and a coloured
copy of the civil ID card of the applicant and his or her father’s or mother’s ID card. Adult applicantsneeded to further give testimony. In case the applicant was a minor, a declaration from the father of
the applicant was necessary. 564
In case the nationality certificate was damaged or got lost, the applicant had to fill in the relevant
form. Furthermore, the applicant’s thumbprint as well as a photograph stamped by the consulate inaddition to one more photograph were required. In case of damage, the original Iraqi nationality
certificate had to be attached and in case of loss, a copy of the lost certificate was needed for theapplication. Also, applicants had to attach a coloured copy of their ID card and pay a fee of 1 250 IQD

557 UNHCR, Iraq: IDPs – Civil identity and documentation (June - July 2021), 9 September 2021, url, p. 1; UNHCR, Iraq: IDPs -Civil & Identity Documentation (JAN-MAR 2021), 11 May 2021, url, p. 2
558 Exchange rates from European Commission, Wechselkurs (InforEuro), n.d., url, accessed on 7 October 2021
559 Iraq, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Civil Status ID, n.d., url
560 Iraq, Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Brussels, The Civil Status ID, n.d., url
561 Iraq, Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Berlin, The Civil Status ID, n.d., url
562 Iraq, Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Vienna, The Civil Status ID, n.d., url
563 Iraq, Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Bern, The Civil Status ID, n.d., url
564 Iraq, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nationality Cert, n.d., url

63Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah(EUR 0.73 565). For the completion of the legal procedures in Iraq, applicants needed to authorise
relatives residing in Iraq who had to go to the Directorate of Citizenship and the Civil Affairs
Directorate to follow up with the procedures. 566 The same information was found on the websites of
the Iraqi embassies in Brussels 567, Berlin 568, Vienna 569, and Bern 570 among others.

3.3.2 Requirements of ID documents for family members
Regarding the issuance of a birth certificate for Iraqi children born outside of Iraq, the Iraqi Ministryof Foreign Affairs stated that the family had to present a birth certificate, issued by the relevant
authorities of the child’s birthplace, and the father’s ID card to the consular section of the embassy.
This had to happen within two months from the date of birth. Otherwise, a fine of 10 000 IQD(EUR 5.57 571) had to be paid. To make sure the new-born’s father had Iraqi citizenship, either thefather himself had to go the consular section of the embassy or a marriage certificate had to bepresented to prove paternity of the child and to make sure the father agreed with registering thechild under his own name. After having verified that the child’s father was Iraqi, the consular sectionof the foreign ministry ‘according to Article V of the Law on registration of births and deaths No.
(148) of 1971, registers the birth and issues a birth certificate’. The same procedure applied to theissuance of a death certificate. 572
The source also mentioned a ‘document of birth’ which was issued by Iraqi Personal Status Courts to‘children or people who did not get a certificate from an authorized official during birth because
they were not born at an empowered hand to organize birth certificate (for example, inside thehospital or [with the help of an] authorised midwife) or other reasons. However, this document
could only be issued by Personal Status Courts and the consul needed authorisation from a personal
status judge in order to issue this document. 573 This document was also needed for children borninside Iraq whose parents were ‘married outside the court’ 574 or were late in applying for theissuance of a birth certificate. For this ‘document of birth’ 575 or ‘proof of birth’ 576, the parents
needed to fill out an application form, which was available at the relevant Personal Status Court.
Furthermore, the ID cards of the child’s father and mother were required in original and in copy aswell as a marriage certificate, the residency card and the presence of two witnesses. Moreover, thechild’s age needed to get estimated by a medical committee and a legal fee of 6 000 IQD (EUR
3.53 577) had to be paid, before the document for proof of birth was eventually signed by a judge. 578
For married couples residing in Iraq who did not possess a (valid) marriage certificate, it was possible
to retroactively register the marriage, as outlined in section 3.1.3 Birth certificate, to get a marriage
certificate, update the marital status on the ID card and get a birth certificate for their child. 579
Please refer to the same section for information on the requirements and procedures for obtaining abirth certificate for children born inside Iraq.

565 Exchange rates from European Commission, Wechselkurs (InforEuro), n.d., url, accessed on 7 October 2021
566 Iraq, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nationality Cert, n.d., url

567 Iraq, Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Brussels, Nationality Cert, n.d., url
568 Iraq, Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Berlin, Nationality Cert, n.d., url

569 Iraq, Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Vienna, Nationality Cert, n.d., url
570 Iraq, Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Bern, Nationality Cert, n.d., url

571 Exchange rates from European Commission, Wechselkurs (InforEuro), n.d., url, accessed on 7 October 2021
572 Iraq, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Birth certificate, n.d., url
573 Iraq, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Birth certificate, n.d., url

574 Signpost Project, How to obtain a birth certificate, July 2021, url
575 Iraq, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Birth certificate, n.d., url

576 Signpost Project, How to obtain a birth certificate, July 2021, url

577 Exchange rates from European Commission, Wechselkurs (InforEuro), n.d., url, accessed on 7 October 2021
578 Signpost Project, How to obtain a birth certificate, July 2021, url

579 NRC, Barriers from birth: Undocumented children in Iraq sentenced to a life on the margins, April 2019, url, p. 1764

Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

Since administrative requirements for the issuance of civil identification documents were reported
to ‘heavily rely on existence of documentation possessed by the father’ 580, it was often not possible
for mothers to obtain civil documentation for their children, such as a birth certificate or a ID card, incase the father of the children was ‘missing, imprisoned or dead’ and no proof of the event wasissued to her by the government. 581 This also applied if she was in possession of a marriage
certificate issued by the state. For women in possession of a marriage certificate issued under ISIL
rule, it was very difficult to transform the document into a state-approved one, if the father of thechild got killed or was missing with no proof confirming this fact. 582 If a woman wanted to legalisesuch a marriage certificate, she needed a death certificate to prove her husband’s death. In case she
did not have a death certificate, she ‘will have to get her husband’s family to file a claim on hisbehalf.’ 583
Regarding the issuance of ID cards for children of Iraqi citizens living abroad, the Iraqi Ministry ofForeign Affairs stated that to obtain one, a prove of marriage and the birth certificate of the newborn were required. The two documents had to undergo a verification procedure before the citizen
was able to apply for an ID card for his child at the embassy. 584 For details on the requirements forthe application, please see section 3.3.1 Obtaining lost ID documents and for the issue of the civil
status card or the unified national card for individuals living in Iraq, please refer to section 3.1.1
Unified national card and 3.1.2 Civil status ID, respectively.
As for the issuance of nationality certificates for Iraqi citizens living abroad, please refer to section
3.3.1 Obtaining lost ID documents and for the issuance of nationality certificates for Iraqi citizens
living in Iraq, please refer to section 3.1.4 Nationality certificate.

3.3.3 Security clearance requirement for returnees
Security clearance procedures were required for residents of areas with former ISIL presence andobtained through the relevant security forces in the respective area. 585 While UNHCR spoke of sucha form of clearance needed generally everywhere for the purpose of taking up residence 586, Human
Rights Watch mentioned such a system in place in many areas with former ISIL presence. 587 It wasreported in December 2019 that the Iraqi National Security Council had decided to stop the security
clearance procedures in the governorates liberated from ISIL but exempted IDPs residing in camps
from that order. 588
Based on information by key informants gathered across 18 governorates from October 2020 toJanuary 2021, Global Protection Cluster reported that the need to obtain security clearance was

580 NRC, Barriers from birth: Undocumented children in Iraq sentenced to a life on the margins, April 2019, url, p. 24
581 NRC, Barriers from birth: Undocumented children in Iraq sentenced to a life on the margins, April 2019, url, p. 18
582 NRC, Barriers from birth: Undocumented children in Iraq sentenced to a life on the margins, April 2019, url, p. 18

583 NRC, Barriers from birth: Undocumented children in Iraq sentenced to a life on the margins, April 2019, url, p. 32,

endnote 24
584 Iraq, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Civil Status ID, n.d., url
585 HRW, Iraq: Inadequate Plans for Camp Closures, 3 June 2021, url; UNHCR, Relevant Country of Origin Information toAssist with the Application of UNHCR’s Country Guidance on Iraq: Ability of Persons Originating from Formerly ISIS-Held or
Conflict-Affected Areas to Legally Access and Remain in Proposed Areas of Internal Relocation, 11 January 2021, url, pp. 2-3
586 UNHCR, Relevant Country of Origin Information to Assist with the Application of UNHCR’s Country Guidance on Iraq:
Ability of Persons Originating from Formerly ISIS-Held or Conflict-Affected Areas to Legally Access and Remain in Proposed
Areas of Internal Relocation, 11 January 2021, url, p. 3587 HRW, Iraq: Inadequate Plans for Camp Closures, 3 June 2021, url‫ف‬‫ف‬
588 Al-Sumaria TV: ‫اﻻﻣي ف� اﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺎت اﻟﻤﺤﺮرة‬‫اﻟﻮﻃي �ﻘﺮر اﻟﻐﺎء اﻟﺘﺪﻗﻴﻖ‬‫[ ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻻﻣﻦ‬National Security Council decides to cancel
‫ي ي‬
‫ي‬
security clearance for liberated governorates], 26 December 2019, url

65Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

mentioned as the second main barrier to freedom of movement specifically in areas of return 589, but
only mentioned by 1 % of the informants overall as being among the main impediments. 590
During the reference period, instances of security clearances being carried out were reported in
Mosul in Ninawa governorate 591, Jurf Al-Sakhr in Babil governorate 592, Kirkuk governorate 593 andMuqdadiya district in Diyala governorate 594. IDPs returning from Baghdad to Al-Anbar province inNovember 2020 reportedly had to go through four separate security screenings carried out bydifferent military forces, despite carrying security clearance papers issued by the army command in
Baghdad. 595
As of October 2020, families of alleged ISIL members needed to pass security clearance both forbeing able to return and in order to apply for civil documentation. 596 Furthermore, a woman from
Mosul who had lost her husband to ISIL shelling, told local media in December 2020 that she neededa security clearance in order to apply for reparation payments given out to victims of terrorism. She
declared that the procedure had been put on hold for more than one year, pending security
clearance and it was further mentioned that there were thousands of applicants like her who werestill waiting to get clearance in order for the procedure to be completed. 597 In September 2021
another source still referred to thousands of procedures for reparation halted in Mosul because ofoutstanding security clearances. 598
There was no legal basis for security clearance procedures, nor were they officially announced. 599 A
broad interpretation of Iraqi counter-terrorism laws was often used by authorities in order to justify
security clearance measures and subsequent denial to issue civil documentation. 600
A security clearance was described by Human Rights Watch as a stamp obtained from local security
forces. 601 IDPs living in camps needed to make a request for voluntary return to the camp
management in order to initiate the return process. Part of this request meant providing a security
clearance from the relevant security and intelligence authorities in the IDPs’ area of former
residence, upon which camp management would issue an exit document which would in turnfacilitate passing through checkpoints. 602 In order to obtain security clearance documentation,

589 GPC, Protection Monitoring System, Report 1, February 2021, url, p. 6

590 GPC, Protection Monitoring System, Report 1, February 2021, url, p. 15, endnote 28‫[ اﻧتﺸﺎر ف‬Sudden intensive deployment of security forces in
591 Shafaq News, ‫"ﻣﻔﺎ�" وﻣﺤﺎﻓﻆ ﻧيﻨﻮى �ﻌﻠﻖ‬‫ب ئ‬‫أﻣئ ﻣﻜﺜﻒ ف� اﻟﻤﻮﺻﻞ �ﺸكﻞ‬‫ي‬‫ي‬Mosul and the governor of Ninawa comments], 28 January 2021, url‫ف‬‫ف‬
592 Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, ‫اﻗﻴن‬‫اﻟﻨﺎزﺣن اﻟﻌﺮ ي ن‬‫ين‬‫أﻣي �ﺴﺒﻖ ﻋﻮدة‬‫ ﺗﺪﻗﻴﻖ ي‬:‫[ اﻧﻔﺮاﺟﺔ ي� ﻣﻠﻒ ﺟﺮف اﻟﺼﺨﺮ‬A breakthrough in the Jurf al-Sakhr file:security check ahead of the return of displaced Iraqis], 4 August 2021, url
593 Baghdad Today, ‫ ﻋﺎﺋﻠﺔ ﻧﺎزﺣﺔ ا� ﻣﻨﺎﻃﻘﻬﻢ ف� ﻛﺮﻛﻮك‬17 ‫[ ﻋﻮدة‬return of 17 IDP families to their areas in Kirkuk], 17 September‫ي‬2021, url� ‫[ ﻋﻮدة‬return of more than 300 displaced families to security risk
594 Shafaq News: �‫ ا�ة ﻧﺎزﺣﺔ ا� ﻣﻨﺎﻃﻖ "ﺳﺎﺧﻨﺔ" ف� د�ﺎ‬300 ‫ا�� ﻣﻦ‬‫ي‬areas in Diyala], 15 February 2021, url
595 CIVIC, Ignoring Iraq’s Most Vulnerable: The Plight of Displaced Persons, April 2021, url, p. 7
596 International Crisis Group, Exiles in Their Own Country: Dealing with Displacement in Post-ISIS Iraq, 19 October 2020,
url, p. 5‫ت‬597 Al-Quds Al-Arabi: ‫ آﻻف ﻣﻌﺎﻣﻠﺔ ﻣﻌﻄﻠﺔ‬7‫ اﻟﺘﺼﺎر� ــﺢ اﻷﻣﻨ�ﺔ كﺎﺑﻮس �ﻄﺎرد أﻫﺎ� اﻟﻤﻮﺻﻞ و‬:�‫ا‬‫ي‬‫[ ﻣﻮﻗﻊ ﻋﺮ ي‬Iraqi site: security clearances are anightmare chasing the people of Mosul and 7,000 procedures have been put on hold], 8 December 2020, url
598 Yaqin News, ‫[ ﻣﺮاﺟﻌﻮ داﺋﺮة ﺗﻌ��ﻀﺎت اﻟﻤﻮﺻﻞ �ﺸﻜﻮن ﺗﻮﻗﻒ إ�ﻤﺎل ﻣﻌﺎﻣﻼﺗﻬﻢ �ﺴبﺐ ﻗﺮار اﻟﻤﺴﺎءﻟﺔ واﻟﻌﺪاﻟﺔ‬Persons consulting thedepartment for reparation in Mosul complain that their transactions have been suspended due to decree on“accountability and justice”], 4 September 2021, url
599 UNHCR, Relevant Country of Origin Information to Assist with the Application of UNHCR’s Country Guidance on Iraq:
Ability of Persons Originating from Formerly ISIS-Held or Conflict-Affected Areas to Legally Access and Remain in Proposed
Areas of Internal Relocation, 11 January 2021, url, p. 2
600 NRC, Barriers from birth: Undocumented children in Iraq sentenced to a life on the margins, April 2019, url, p.23
601 HRW, Iraq: Inadequate Plans for Camp Closures, 3 June 2021, url
602 AI, Marked for Life - Displaced Iraqis in Cycle of Abuse and Stigmatization, November 2020, url, p. 33

66

Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyahdisplaced individuals were reviewed by several security services. The National Security Service (NSS)
was mentioned as also being involved in security clearance procedures needed for return. 603
The process usually also involved the mukhtar, the local community leader in the returnee’s place oforiginal residence. 604 The mukhtar consulting with local residents would be asked by the security
services to vouch that the returnee had no affiliation with ISIL. 605 Once the screening process wascompleted, the returnee was issued a document confirming that a clearance procedure had been
undertaken and that the name of the returnee did not match with any names in any security
databases. The security clearance documents were issued by the local authorities in the returnee’s
area of origin. 606 Only with such clearance documents IDPs were able to return to their former areaof residence. 607
If during the security screening the returnee’s name appeared in any of the government databases
containing the names of persons with suspected ISIL affiliation, the returnee would be detained andquestioned. 608 If the returnee was found to have a family member who was suspected of ISIL
affiliation, security clearance was denied. The source, however, does not mention cases ofdetention. 609 In the eastern and western peripheries of Anbar governorate for example, security
clearances for returning IDPs could easily be denied by either the PMU or local tribal entities. 610
Government officials reportedly frequently denied security clearances for displaced families withsuspected ties to ISIL, effectively restricting their freedom of movement. 611 It was considered
impossible to appeal such a denial. 612 Not being granted security clearance also meant not being
able to access many public services such as public health-care and a school education for thechildren. 613 Undocumented families had no access to food rations distributed through PDS andencountered difficulties when trying to find formal employment, rented housing or applying forcompensation or government benefits. 614 For further information on ID documents needed foraccessing services, please refer to section 3.2 ID documents and access to services.
In case security clearance was denied, returnees felt pressured to undergo either or both of thefollowing two processes called tabriya (tabreea/tabrea) and ikhbar as an alternative way to obtainclearance. 615
The tabriya (disavowal) process involved denouncing the relative with suspected ties to ISIL as wellas the crimes this relative was accused of. 616 It meant declaring to sever all ties with this family

603 USDOS, Country reports on human rights practices for 2020 - Iraq, 30 March 2021, url, p. 17; Iraqi News Agency, ‫اﻟﺪﻓﺎع‬‫ اﻷﻣﻦ اﻟﻮﻃين ي �ﻤﺘﻠﻚ ﻗﺎﻋﺪة ﺑ�ﺎﻧﺎت ﻟﺠﻤﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﺎﺋﻼت اﻟﻌﺎﺋﺪة ﻣﻦ ﻣﺨ�ﻢ اﻟﻬﻮل‬:‫[ اﻟﻨ�ﺎﺑ�ﺔ‬Parliamentary defence committee is in possession of adatabase containing all families returning from Al-Hol camp ], 26 June 2021, url
604 CIVIC, Ignoring Iraq’s Most Vulnerable: The Plight of Displaced Persons, April 2021, url, p. 13; International Crisis Group,
Exiles in Their Own Country: Dealing with Displacement in Post-ISIS Iraq, 19 October 2020, url, p. 5
605 International Crisis Group, Exiles in Their Own Country: Dealing with Displacement in Post-ISIS Iraq, 19 October 2020,
url, p. 5
606 CIVIC, Ignoring Iraq’s Most Vulnerable: The Plight of Displaced Persons, April 2021, url, p. 13
607 International Crisis Group, Exiles in Their Own Country: Dealing with Displacement in Post-ISIS Iraq, 19 October 2020,
url, p. 5
608 CIVIC, Ignoring Iraq’s Most Vulnerable: The Plight of Displaced Persons, April 2021, url, p. 13609 HRW, Iraq: Inadequate Plans for Camp Closures, 3 June 2021, url;
610 Skelton, M. and Saleem, Z. A., Displacement and Iraq’s Political Marketplace: Addressing Political Barriers to IDO Return,
IRIS, February 2021, url, p. 16
611 USDOS, Country reports on human rights practices for 2020 - Iraq, 30 March 2021, url, p. 31
612 HRW, Iraq: Inadequate Plans for Camp Closures, 3 June 2021, url; Just Security, Ignoring Iraq’s Most Vulnerable
Displaced Families Undermines US Stabilization Agenda in Iraq, 18 August 2020, url
613 International Crisis Group, Exiles in Their Own Country: Dealing with Displacement in Post-ISIS Iraq, 19 October 2020,
url, p. 5; CIVIC, Ignoring Iraq’s Most Vulnerable: The Plight of Displaced Persons, April 2021, url, p. 13
614 CIVIC, Ignoring Iraq’s Most Vulnerable: The Plight of Displaced Persons, April 2021, url, p. 13
615 CIVIC, Ignoring Iraq’s Most Vulnerable: The Plight of Displaced Persons, April 2021, url, p. 1; see also IOM, Protracted
Displacement in Iraq: Revisiting Categories of Return Barriers, 24 January 2021, url, pp. 31-32
616 NRC, Broken Home: Women's housing, land and property rights in post-conflict Iraq, 11 May 2020, url, p. 11

67

Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

member who had been incriminated and expelled from the tribe. 617 Tabriya was described as aconcept rooted in tribal justice 618 and was not considered to be an official legal procedure. 619
However, an Iraqi news source reported that in Mosul specifically, residents were asked to undergo
tabriya on account of their incarcerated relatives and the clearance papers were then issued by local
courts resorting not to statutory but to customary law. 620 A woman in Mosul for example explained
how she denounced her brother - who as an ISIL member was killed in battle - disavowing all ties tohim and to ISIL, whereupon she was issued a tabriya document indicating that the family had beencleared. 621 IDPs residing in camps were reported to undergo tabriya before being able to return totheir homes in Ninawa governorate. A local tribal sheikh in southern Ninawa reportedly asked
families to disavow their imprisoned relatives affiliated with ISIL or alternatively to pay blood money
to compensate for the tribal members killed at the hands of ISIL. 622 A completion of the tabriya did
not guarantee the right to return home or being issued identification documents. 623 Some IDPs
having undertaken tabriya were still reported to be living in camps at the end of 2020. 624 Moreover,the person undergoing a tabriya process risked social rejection and potential violent repercussions
from relatives of the accused. 625
Ikhbar (denunciation) is a legal complaint made in form of a denunciation in court. 626 It involved
reporting a relative with suspected ISIL affiliation to an investigative judge. 627 Ikhbar was describedas ‘well established in the Iraqi legal system’ 628 and as being based on Iraqi anti-terrorism law. 629
According to IOM, IDPs were requested by security actors in many areas to undertake this process inorder to receive permission to return home and IDPs in camps had to do ikhbar before journeying totheir areas of origin. 630 Families faced the dilemma of either undertaking ikhbar and risking that theirdenunciation might be used in a court procedure against the suspected relative or not undertaking
this process and thereby not being able to obtain civil documentation needed to access basic
services. 631
IOM mentioned a third possibility of being allowed to return to the former community, namely
through tribal sponsorship (kafala). In this process, community leaders such as tribal sheikhs
sponsored the return of IDPs by officially attesting to security forces involved in return proceduresthat the returnee in question had not committed an offense despite having suspected ISIL membersin the family. 632

617 CIVIC, Ignoring Iraq’s Most Vulnerable: The Plight of Displaced Persons, April 2021, url, p. 14

618 IOM, Protracted Displacement in Iraq: Revisiting Categories of Return Barriers, 24 January 2021, url, pp. 31-32; CIVIC,

Ignoring Iraq’s Most Vulnerable: The Plight of Displaced Persons, April 2021, url, p. 14
619 NRC, Broken Home: Women's housing, land and property rights in post-conflict Iraq, 11 May 2020, url, p. 11; NIRIJ,‫ف‬‫ ﻋﺎﺋﻼت داﻋﺶ ﻣﻤﻨﻮﻋﻮن ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﻮدة ﻟﻤﻨﺎﻃﻘﻬﻢ ف ي� ﻧيﻨﻮى‬..‫ﺗﻜ� ﻹﻋﺎدة اﻧﺪﻣﺎﺟﻬﺎ‬‫[ ب‬Tabriya alone is not enough for reintegration …
‫اﻟﺘ�ﺋﺔ وﺣﺪﻫﺎ ﻻ ي‬
ISIL families are not permitted to return to their areas in Ninawa], 28 November 2020, url‫ت‬‫ف‬
620 Yaqin News, ‫اﻟﻨﺎزﺣن اﻟﻌﺎﺋﺪﻳﻦ إ� ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﻧيﻨﻮى‬‫يف‬‫ﺗﻌﺴ� بﺤﻖ‬‫[ ﻣﺮﻛﺰ‬Human rights centre: undertaking tabriya‫اﻟﺘ�ﺋﺔ إﺟﺮاء‬‫ ﻛﺘﺎب ب‬:�‫ﺣﻘﻮ‬‫ي‬‫ي‬is an arbitrary process that IDPs returning to Ninawa go through], 20 January 2021, url‫يف‬
621 France 24, ‫اﻟﺠﻬﺎدﻳن" ﻏﻄﺎء أﺣ�ﺎﻧﺎ ﻟﺘﺼﻔ�ﺔ ﻧﺰاﻋﺎت ﻗﺪ�ﻤﺔ ف� اﻟﻌﺮاق‬�‫[ ﺗﻬﻤﺔ "اﻻﻧﺘﻤﺎء ا‬The accusation of belonging to jihadists is‫ي‬sometimes used as an excuse to settle old scores in Iraq], 8 January 2021, url‫ت‬‫ف‬
622 Yaqin News, ‫اﻟﻨﺎزﺣن اﻟﻌﺎﺋﺪﻳﻦ إ� ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﻧيﻨﻮى‬‫يف‬‫ﺗﻌﺴ� بﺤﻖ‬‫[ ﻣﺮﻛﺰ‬Human rights centre: undertaking tabriya‫اﻟﺘ�ﺋﺔ إﺟﺮاء‬‫ ﻛﺘﺎب ب‬:�‫ﺣﻘﻮ‬‫ي‬‫ي‬is an arbitrary process that IDPs returning to Ninawa go through], 20 January 2021, url
623 Just Security, Ignoring Iraq’s Most Vulnerable Displaced Families Undermines US Stabilization Agenda in Iraq, 18 August
2020, url‫ف‬
624 NIRIJ, ‫ ﻋﺎﺋﻼت داﻋﺶ ﻣﻤﻨﻮﻋﻮن ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﻮدة ﻟﻤﻨﺎﻃﻘﻬﻢ ف� ﻧيﻨﻮى‬..‫ﺗﻜ� ﻹﻋﺎدة اﻧﺪﻣﺎﺟﻬﺎ‬‫[ ب‬Tabriya alone is not enough for‫ي‬‫اﻟﺘ�ﺋﺔ وﺣﺪﻫﺎ ﻻ ي‬
reintegration … ISIL families are not permitted to return to their areas in Ninawa], 28 November 2020, url
625 NRC, Broken Home: Women's housing, land and property rights in post-conflict Iraq, 11 May 2020, url, p. 11
626 CIVIC, Ignoring Iraq’s Most Vulnerable: The Plight of Displaced Persons, April 2021, url, p. 14
627 IOM, Protracted Displacement in Iraq: Revisiting Categories of Return Barriers, 24 January 2021, url, p. 31
628 CIVIC, Ignoring Iraq’s Most Vulnerable: The Plight of Displaced Persons, April 2021, url, p. 14
629 IOM, Protracted Displacement in Iraq: Revisiting Categories of Return Barriers, 24 January 2021, url, p. 31
630 IOM, Protracted Displacement in Iraq: Revisiting Categories of Return Barriers, 24 January 2021, url, p. 31
631 CIVIC, Ignoring Iraq’s Most Vulnerable: The Plight of Displaced Persons, April 2021, url, p. 1
632 IOM, Protracted Displacement in Iraq: Revisiting Categories of Return Barriers, 24 January 2021, url, p. 32

68

Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

At the beginning of 2021, there were still about 2 000 displaced families residing in camps in thegovernorates Diyala, Kirkuk, Salah Al-Din and Anbar for whom a safe return to their homes was
impossible due to tribal disputes, societal rejection and outstanding security approvals. 633

3.3.4 Possible risks considering travel to/through formerly ISIL-controlledareas without personal ID documents
In order to pass through checkpoints across Iraq, people usually needed to show civil identificationsuch as an ID card, a passport or a nationality certificate. 634 IDPs leaving the camps were often
stopped at checkpoints and prevented by security actors from travelling to their area of originalresidence. 635 According to a woman displaced to Kirkuk, her family was not able to return to theirvillage in Salah Al-Din because they did not possess valid civil documentation in order to passthrough checkpoints. 636 IDPs without proper documentation risked harassment and arrests atcheckpoints when travelling. 637 Based on interviews carried out with IDPs during fieldwork between
November 2018 and October 2020, Amnesty International (AI) reports on cases in which persons
were arrested in Ninawa governorate at checkpoints run by Iraqi army, military intelligence, police,
Asayish or PMU for not carrying identification documents. Interview partners explained that militaryand security forces would assume that men and boys leaving ISIL-held areas without documentationmust be affiliated with ISIL and were therefore trying to conceal their identity. 638 AI does notdisclose when exactly these arrests took place but mentions that thousands of men havedisappeared after having been arrested. 639 An IDP residing in the KRI reported Asayish forces
confiscating his civil documents and not returning them afterwards. He told AI that he was unable totravel to Mosul to get new identification documents because he feared being arrested by Iraqi forcesat a checkpoint if found to be undocumented. 640 A 2019 report similarly noted that displaced people
and returnees in Mosul feared arrest or detention when passing through a checkpoint without
identification documents. 641

3.4 Impact of COVID-19 at a national level
The World Health Organisation (WHO) stated that as of 27 September 2021, Iraq has conducted
15 154 796 tests and confirmed 1 996 214 cases of COVID-19, with 22 142 deaths. 1.9 % of all
confirmed cases of COVID-19 have been health care workers (37 859 cases) and 323 health carepersonnel have died of the disease until 27 September 2021. 642 According to the Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG), as of 27 September 2021, there have been 328 118 confirmed cases of COVID-19
in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), with 5 819 confirmed deaths. 643 UNHCR reported that as of‫ث‬‫ف‬
633 Al Jazeera, ‫اﻟﻨﺎزﺣن ف� اﻟﻌﺮاق بﻌﺪ ﻗﺮار إﻏﻼق اﻟﻤﺨ�ﻤﺎت‬‫ ﺛﻼﺛ�ﺔ ﺗﻄﺎرد‬..‫واﻟت��ﺪ‬‫[ اﻟﺨﻮف واﻟﺠ�ع‬Fear and hunger and displacement –‫ي ي‬
three problems chasing Iraqi IDPs following the decision to close the camps], 30 January 2021, url
634 UNHCR, Relevant Country of Origin Information to Assist with the Application of UNHCR’s Country Guidance on Iraq:
Ability of Persons Originating from Formerly ISIS-Held or Conflict-Affected Areas to Legally Access and Remain in Proposed
Areas of Internal Relocation, 11 January 2021, url, p. 2; see also HRW, Iraq: Inadequate Plans for Camp Closures, 3 June
2021, url
635 CIVIC, Ignoring Iraq’s Most Vulnerable: The Plight of Displaced Persons, April 2021, url, p. 7636 HRW, Iraq: Inadequate Plans for Camp Closures, 3 June 2021, url
637 AI, Marked for Life - Displaced Iraqis in Cycle of Abuse and Stigmatization, November 2020, url, p. 27
638 AI, Marked for Life - Displaced Iraqis in Cycle of Abuse and Stigmatization, November 2020, url, p. 23
639 AI, Marked for Life - Displaced Iraqis in Cycle of Abuse and Stigmatization, November 2020, url, p. 6
640 AI, Marked for Life - Displaced Iraqis in Cycle of Abuse and Stigmatization, November 2020, url, p. 31
641 NRC et al., Paperless People Of Post-Conflict Iraq, Denied rights, barred from basic services and excluded fromreconstruction efforts, 16 September 2019, url, p 17
642 WHO, Iraq, COVID-19 Dynamic Infographic Dashboard Iraq 2020-2021, Situation for 27 September 2021, 28 September
2021, url, pp. 2, 18
643 Iraq, KRG, Coronavirus (COVID-19) Dashboard, as of 27 September 2021, url

69Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

15 September 2021 the number of confirmed cases of COVID-19 among IDPs and refugees
amounted to 2 188, including 103 deaths. 644

3.4.1 Measures to curb the spreading of COVID-19
According to an IOM report on COVID-19 restrictions and public health measures during the period
March to May 2021, the government made the use of masks in public spaces and government
offices mandatory as of 29 March 2021. Malls and markets in federal Iraq and KRI were closed; cafes,
restaurants and clubs were only allowed to provide outdoor services. Social gatherings such as
funerals were prohibited in homes or small spaces such as alleys and travels between KRI and othergovernorates were restricted to four days per week. During the period of Ramadan from 12 April to
12 May 2021, the government introduced further restrictions such as a total lockdown on Fridays
and Saturdays and a nightly curfew during the business week. Schools had to resume online
teaching. 645 A 10-day full lockdown during the Eid al-Fitr festival beginning with 12 May 2021 wasannounced but later changed to a partial curfew. 646
IOM noted that as of 31 May 2021, only four points of entry into Iraq were fully open. A further
12 points of entry remained partially closed and 11 were open for commercial transit only. 647 In
March 2021, authorities lifted a previous partial ban on international travel. Travellers were required
to present a negative COVID-19 test not older than 72 hours and to self-isolate at home for sevendays unless they provided evidence that they had been fully vaccinated against COVID-19. 648
According to the KRG, as of 31 August 2021, all travellers entering KRI have to either be fully
vaccinated or tested negative within 48 hours prior to departure. 649
On 9 June 2021, the Iraqi government decided on new requirements for attending sessions andcourses as of 1 September 2021. All students over the age of 18 years, teaching staff and employeesof private and public schools, universities and other institutes had to provide evidence that they
were either vaccinated or had recovered from a COVID-19 infection within the previous 90 days orpresent a weekly negative PCR test. The same requirements were extended to employees atministries, departments and institutions of the public and private sector as well as to visitors atgovernment departments. Anyone failing to comply with these requirements would be consideredabsent from work or would not be received as a visitor at government departments until providing
the necessary evidence. Moreover, the government decided to make the vaccination of all staff
working at companies and institutions that were subject to health checks a prerequisite for the
granting or renewal of health licenses. Non-compliance would result in closure of these enterprises
on 1 September 2021. With regard to international travel, the government decided that startingfrom 1st October 2021, all Iraqi nationals travelling abroad would be required to present aninternational COVID-19 vaccine certificate prior to departure. 650 Authorities advised fully vaccinatedpersons to have their national vaccination certificates translated and certified at vaccination centres
until international documents would be provided through the Ministry of Health. 651 In September
2021, the government announced that they would allow 40 000 foreigners, including 30 000 from

644 UNHCR, Iraq, Fact Sheet September 2021, September 2021, url, p. 3

645 IOM, Iraq, COVID-19 Mobility Restrictions and Public Health Measures. 1 March to 31 May 2021, June 2021, url, p. 2

646 UNSG, Implementation of resolution 2576 (2021), S/2021/700, 3 August 2021, url, para 8; Iraq, Government of Iraq, The

Cabinet imposes a complete curfew for 10 days, and takes several measures regarding Iraqis in India, 5 May 2021, url
647 IOM, Iraq, COVID-19 Mobility Restrictions and Public Health Measures. 1 March to 31 May 2021, June 2021, url, p. 6
648 IOM, Iraq, COVID-19 Mobility Restrictions and Public Health Measures. 1 March to 31 May 2021, June 2021, url, p. 2
649 Iraq, KRG, Situation update, n.d., url
650 Iraq, Government of Iraq, The Government will continue to require the vaccination of employees, workers, students andteaching staff, 9 June 2021, url
651 Health Cluster Iraq, Health Cluster Bulletin No. 8, August 2021, 19 September 2021, url, p. 2

70

Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

Iran, to attend the Arbaeen pilgrimage, an important Shia religious event, in the city of Karbala. In
comparison, in 2019, about 14 million foreigners had participated in the pilgrimage. 652

3.4.2 Impact on economy and vulnerable groups
In June 2021, UNDP, in partnership with UN-Habitat and IOM, published a study on the effects of
COVID-19 and COVID-19-related restrictions on the livelihoods and socioeconomic situation ofvulnerable groups. Loss of income was the ’most ubiquitously reported change’ among all vulnerable
groups nationwide, although the study noted differences between federal Iraq and KRI. Whilehouseholds in Federal Iraq suffered from reduced non-employment income, households in the
Kurdistan Region of Iraq experienced greater losses with regard to employment income. The study
noted also differences between different population groups such as women and men or IDPs andthe local population. Other impacts included rising food costs, an increase in community insecurity
and gender-based violence, payment delays, loss of employment opportunities and reduced accessto education and health care services, especially for the youth and disabled persons, as well as
reduced access to aid for displaced persons due to office closures. 653

3.4.3 Vaccination programme
Vaccination in Iraq started in the first days of March 2021. 654 WHO stated in its weekly COVID-19
situation report covering the period 23 to 29 August 2021 that, as of calendar week 34, a total of
4 043 632 vaccine doses have been administered in the country. This number indicated that 11.4 %of the target population have received at least one dose of the vaccine. Reportedly, 2 628 559
people have received their first dose while 1 414 676 have been fully vaccinated. WHO based its
information on statistics from Iraq’s Ministry of Health that were compiled with numbers the
Ministry received every day from the Directorates of Health in all governorates. 655 Specifically withregard to KRI, the KRG spokesperson informed in a message on social media that 581 056 vaccines
have been administrated until 25 August 2021 in KRI, including 395 427 first doses and 184 629
second doses. 656 With regard to IDPs and refugees, UNHCR stated that both groups have been
included in the national vaccination plan and can register for a COVID-19 vaccine through the official
online registration platform. According to UNHCR, as of September 2021, more than 13 675 IDPs andrefugees have been vaccinated this way. 657
Since the beginning of the vaccination programme in March 2021, WHO has periodically noted agender discrepancy in the number of women and men receiving the vaccine and has cited women’shousehold and family requirements and rumours over side effects – such as infertility, blood clots,
birth defects and miscarriage 658 - as reasons for this difference. 659 Other factors that were found tocontribute to a general vaccine hesitancy among the population were fears over side effects such as
fever, allergic reactions and death, fears that the vaccine was not safe or counterfeit, lack of accessto information or misinformation about the vaccine and the vaccination process and mistrust in the
652 France24, Iraq caps Arbaeen foreign pilgrim numbers at 40,000, 5 September 2021, url

653 UNDP et al., Iraq, Impact of COVID-19 on Iraq’s vulnerable populations, May 2021, url, pp. 6-7

654 WHO, Iraq, CoronaVirus Disease (COVID-19), Weekly Situation Report (Week 12), 21 March to 28 March 2021, n.d., url,

pp. 2-3655 WHO, Iraq, Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Situation Report, Week 34, 23-29 Aug 2021, n.d., url, p. 3
656 KGRSpokesperson [Twitter], posted on: 25 August 2021, url
657 UNCHR, Iraq, Fact Sheet September 2021, September 2021, url, p. 3; UNHCR, Iraq, How to register for the COVID-19
vaccine, n.d., url
658 Health Cluster Iraq, Health Cluster Bulletin No. 8, August 2021, 19 September 2021, url, p. 3
659 See, for example: WHO, Iraq, Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Situation Report, Week 34, 23-29 Aug 2021, n.d., url, p. 3;
WHO, Iraq, CoronaVirus Disease (COVID-19), Weekly Situation Report (Week 16) 19 to 25 April 2021, n.d., url, p. 3; WHO,Iraq, Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Situation Report, Week 20, 17-23 May 2021, 24 May 2021, url, p. 5; WHO, Iraq,
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19), Situation Report, Week 27, 05-11 July 2021, 11 July 2021, url, p. 6

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Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

government. 660 The Iraqi Judiciary addressed the issue of misinformation on social media in astatement reportedly published in August 2021, announcing that anyone spreading misinformation
on COVID-19 or the vaccine would be detained and prosecuted. 661
According to WHO’s situation report covering the week 23 to 29 August 2021, the Iraqi Ministry of
Health has decided to extend the period between the administering of the first and second dose of
the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine to at least eight weeks (56 days) in order to ensure that a greaternumber of people could receive their first dose at an earlier date. In the same week, the Ministry has
issued a recommendation for the use of an mRNA COVID-19 vaccine (Pfizer-BioNTech) for pregnant
women in or beyond week 16 of their pregnancy. 662

3.4.4 Measures in relation to the elections
In the context of preparations for elections on 10 October 2021, UNAMI noted that authorities were
procuring COVID-19 protective equipment such as masks, gloves and disinfectants to be distributed
to all polling stations across the country for election workers and voters. 663

660 CARE, COVID-19 Vaccination Uptake. A study of Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices of Marginalized Communities in

Iraq, August 2021, url, pp. 5-6; PHR, Latest COVID-19 Surge Pushes More Iraqis to Get Vaccinated, But Hesitancy Still
Remains, 12 August 2021, url
661 WHO, Iraq, Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19), Situation Report, Week 33, 16-22 Aug 2021, n.d., url, p. 9662 WHO, Iraq, Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19), Situation Report, Week 34, 23-29 Aug 2021, n.d., url, p. 1
663 UNAMI, Iraq’s Electoral Preparations and Processes - Report No. 11, 9 September 2021, url, p. 4; UNAMI, Elections for
Iraq’s Council of Representatives, Fact Sheet #4 COVID-19, 11 August 2021, url

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Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

Annex 1: Bibliography
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73

Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

Al Jazeera, Basra protests erupt as power cuts hit scorching Iraq, 8 July 2021,
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‫ث‬‫يف‬
Al Jazeera, ‫اﻟﻨﺎزﺣن ف ي� اﻟﻌﺮاق بﻌﺪ ﻗﺮار إﻏﻼق اﻟﻤﺨ�ﻤﺎت‬‫ ﺛﻼﺛ�ﺔ ﺗﻄﺎرد‬..‫واﻟت��ﺪ‬‫[ اﻟﺨﻮف واﻟﺠ�ع‬Fear and hunger anddisplacement – three problems chasing Iraqi IDPs following the decision to close the camps], 30January 2021,
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‫ف‬‫ف‬‫اﻟﻨﺎزﺣن اﻟﻌﺮ ي ف‬‫يف‬
Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, ‫اﻗﻴن‬‫أﻣي �ﺴﺒﻖ ﻋﻮدة‬‫ ﺗﺪﻗﻴﻖ ي‬:‫[ اﻧﻔﺮاﺟﺔ ي� ﻣﻠﻒ ﺟﺮف اﻟﺼﺨﺮ‬A breakthrough in the
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‫ت‬
Al-Quds Al-Arabi: ‫ آﻻف ﻣﻌﺎﻣﻠﺔ ﻣﻌﻄﻠﺔ‬7‫أﻫﺎ� اﻟﻤﻮﺻﻞ و‬‫ اﻟﺘﺼﺎر� ــﺢ اﻷﻣﻨ�ﺔ كﺎﺑﻮس �ﻄﺎرد ي‬:�‫ا‬‫[ ﻣﻮﻗﻊ ﻋﺮ ي‬Iraqi site:
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‫ف‬
‫ب ئ‬
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‫ت‬
‫ف‬
‫يف‬
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Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

Annex 2: Terms of Reference
1. Access and residency requirements for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah (per city)••

Legal and administrative requirements to enter the respective city and their application inpractice (including specific rules for different categories of individuals)
Legal and administrative requirements to settle in the respective city and their application inpractice (including specific rules for different categories of individuals)

2. Key Socio-economic indicators in Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

economyemployment
povertyfood security
healthcare
education
housing and living conditions (including water and sanitation)

3. Overview of the situation as regards ID documents, security clearances, and COVID-19
•
•
•

•

Requirements to obtain ID documents
ID documents and access to services
IDPs/returneeso Obtaining lost ID documentso Requirements of ID documents for family members
o Security clearance requirement for returneeso Possible risks considering travel to/through formerly ISIS-controlled areas without
personal ID documents
Impact of COVID-19 at a national level96

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97Country of origin information report | Iraq: Key Socio-economic Indicators for Baghdad, Basrah, and Sulaymaniyah

doi: 10.2847/7919

98