Key socio-economic indicators in Afghanistan
and in Kabul city
Country of Origin Information ReportAugust 2022

Manuscript completed in August 2022
Neither the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) nor any person acting on behalf of the
EUAA is responsible for the use that might be made of the information contained within thispublication.
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2022
PDF

ISBN 978-92-9400-450-5doi: 10.2847/566373

BZ-09-22-396-EN-N© European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), 2022
Cover photo, ‘Daily Life in Afghanistan's Capital’, Milad Hamadi for the Tasnim News Agency,
19 September 2021, © Wikimedia Commons, Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0), url
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. For any use or reproductionof photos or other material that is not under the EUAA copyright, permission must be sought
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KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN KABUL CITY

Acknowledgements
The EUAA acknowledges as the drafter of this report:•

Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation(ACCORD)The following departments and organisations have reviewed the report:••

Greece, Asylum Processes and Training Department, Greek Asylum Service, Ministryof Migration and Asylum
Sweden, Unit for Migration Analysis, the Swedish Migration Agency

It must be noted that the review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts ororganisations contributes to the overall quality of the report, but does not necessarily imply
their formal endorsement of the final report, which is the full responsibility of the EUAA.

3

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMContents
Acknowledgements........................................................................................................................ 3Contents .......................................................................................................................................... 4
Disclaimer ........................................................................................................................................ 7
Glossary and abbreviations ........................................................................................................... 8
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 9
Methodology ......................................................................................................................................... 9
Defining the terms of reference ................................................................................... 9
Collecting information ..................................................................................................... 9
Quality control ................................................................................................................... 9
Sources ................................................................................................................................................... 9
Structure and use of the report ...................................................................................................... 10
Terminology ..................................................................................................................... 10
Research limitations ........................................................................................................................... 11
Map .................................................................................................................................................12
1.

Background........................................................................................................................ 13
1.1 Developments and major events impacting socio-economic situation since the
Taliban takeover .................................................................................................................................13
1.2

Demographic figures ............................................................................................................... 16

1.3 COVID-19 situation .................................................................................................................... 18
2.

Economy.............................................................................................................................19
2.1 National economic and financial situation .......................................................................... 19
2.2 Poverty rates.............................................................................................................................. 21
2.3 Female-headed households ................................................................................................. 21
2.4 IDPs ............................................................................................................................................. 22
2.5 Returnees .................................................................................................................................. 22

3.

Basic subsistence and employment ............................................................................... 23
3.1 Countrywide trends ................................................................................................................. 23
3.2 Female-headed households ................................................................................................ 26
3.3 IDPs ...............................................................................................................................................27
3.4 Returnees .................................................................................................................................. 28
3.5 Situation in Kabul ...................................................................................................................... 29

4

KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN KABUL CITY

4.

Food security .................................................................................................................... 30
4.1 Countrywide trends ................................................................................................................. 30
4.2 Female-headed households ..................................................................................................34
4.3 IDPs ............................................................................................................................................. 35
4.4 Returnees .................................................................................................................................. 36
4.5 Situation in Kabul ....................................................................................................................... 37

5.

Housing and living conditions ........................................................................................ 39
5.1 Countrywide trends ................................................................................................................. 39
5.2 Female-headed households ...................................................................................................41
5.4 Returnees ....................................................................................................................................41
5.3 IDPs ............................................................................................................................................. 42
5.5 Situation in Kabul......................................................................................................................43

6.

Healthcare ......................................................................................................................... 46
6.1 State of the national health system after the Taliban takeover ................................... 46
6.1.1

WASH and Energy ............................................................................................. 47

6.2 Access to basic health care, treatment and medication ............................................... 47
6.3 Access to healthcare for women, maternal healthcare, and child healthcare ........ 49
6.4 Access to healthcare for IDPs .............................................................................................. 50
6.5 Access to healthcare for returnees ..................................................................................... 51
6.6 Situation in Kabul..................................................................................................................... 52
7.

Education .......................................................................................................................... 53
7.1 State of the national education system after the Taliban takeover ............................ 53
7.2 Access to basic education, secondary education, and higher education ................ 54
7.3 Access to education for IDPs ................................................................................................ 56
7.4 Access for returnees ............................................................................................................... 56
7.5 Situation in Kabul......................................................................................................................57

8.

Child-specific living conditions ....................................................................................... 59
8.1 Child marriage ........................................................................................................................... 59
8.2 Child recruitment ..................................................................................................................... 60
8.3 Child labour ................................................................................................................................ 61
8.4 Trafficking of children ............................................................................................................ 62

9.

Network of support .......................................................................................................... 64
9.1

Network through family and community ........................................................................... 64

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

9.2 Women without a support network .................................................................................... 65
9.3 Orphans and children without a support network........................................................... 66
9.4 IDPs and returnees ................................................................................................................. 66
10.

Mobility and travel............................................................................................................ 68
10.1 Travel requirements and restrictions ................................................................................. 68
10.2 Access to airports in Kabul City, Mazar-e Sharif and Herat ..........................................70
10.3 Operability of international and domestic flights .............................................................. 71

Annex 1: Bibliography .................................................................................................................. 72
Oral sources, including anonymous sources .............................................................................72
Public sources.....................................................................................................................................72
Annex 2: Terms of Reference ...................................................................................................... 99

6

KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN KABUL CITY

Disclaimer
This report was written according to the EUAA COI Report Methodology (2019)1. The report isbased on carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced.
The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed withutmost care. However, this document does not claim to be exhaustive. If a particular event,person or organisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has
not taken place or that the person or organisation does not exist.
Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particularapplication for international protection. Terminology used should not be regarded asindicative of a particular legal position.
‘Refugee’, ‘risk’ and similar terminology are used as generic terminology and not in the legal
sense as applied in the EU Asylum Acquis, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.
Neither the EUAA, nor any person acting on its behalf, may be held responsible for the use
which may be made of the information contained in this report.
On 19 January 2022 the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) became the European Union
Agency for Asylum (EUAA). All references to EASO, EASO products and bodies should beunderstood as references to the EUAA.
The drafting of this report was finalised on 29 July 2022. Any event taking place after this dateis not included in this report. More information on the reference period for this report can befound in the methodology section of the Introduction.

1

EASO, EASO Country of Origin Information (COI) Report Methodology, June 2019, url

7

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMGlossary and abbreviations
Term

Definition

ANSF

Afghan National Security Forces

AWMS

Afghanistan Welfare Monitoring Survey

GDP

Gross Domestic ProducthawalaInformal money transfer system

HFA

Humanitarian Food Assistancehijab

A Muslim head covering

IDP

Internally Displaced Person

IEA

Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan

IED

Improvised explosive device

IPC

Integrated Food Security Phase Classification

ISKP

Islamic State Khorasan Province

MPVPVMinistry for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice

NSIA

Afghanistan’s National Statistics and Information Authority

8

KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN KABUL CITY

Introduction
The purpose of this report is to provide relevant information for the assessment ofinternational protection status determination, including refugee status and subsidiary
protection. In particular, it is intended to inform the update of the Country Guidance on
Afghanistan April 2022. The terms of reference can be found in Annex 2.

Methodology
This report was drafted by Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research andDocumentation (ACCORD) as mentioned in the Acknowledgements section. This report is
produced in line with the EASO COI Report Methodology (2019)2 and the EASO COI Writing
and Referencing Style Guide (2019).3

Defining the terms of reference
The terms of reference were defined by EUAA and were based on inputs on informationneeds from country of origin information (COI) and policy experts in EU+ countries within theframework of a Country Guidance development on Afghanistan. The terms of reference areavailable in Annex 2: Terms of Reference.

Collecting information
In accordance with the EASO COI Report Methodology, the information gathered is a result ofresearch using public, specialised paper-based and electronic sources. The reference period
is from 1 December 2021 until 30 June 2022. Some additional information was added during
the finalisation of this report in response to feedback received during the quality control
process, until 4 August 2022.

Quality control
To ensure that the drafters respected the EASO COI Report Methodology, a review was
carried out by COI specialists from the countries and organisations listed as reviewers in the
Acknowledgements section. All comments made by the reviewers were taken into
consideration and most of them were implemented in the final draft of this report.

Sources
In accordance with the EASO COI Report Methodology the content of this report relies on a
range of different open-source material. Amongst others, the report draws from the
2
3

EASO, EASO Country of Origin Information (COI) Report Methodology, June 2019, url
EASO, Writing and Referencing Guide for EASO Country of Origin Information (COI) Reports, June 2019, url

9EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Humanitarian Needs Overview Afghanistan published by UNOCHA4, a study published by
Silvia Mila Arlini and Melissa Burgess written for Save the Children5, an UNHCR multi sectoral
rapid assessment covering household in all 34 provinces6, and several publications from theWorld Food Programme7.
The local Afghan media outlet Hasht-e Subh is used as a source in the report, although a shift
in the reporting tone was noted during the drafting exercise which became more critical of the
Taliban, especially on events taking place in Panjsher Province. Due to difficulties assessing
the reliability of this source, case-by-case assessments have been made on the inclusion ofreports from Hasht-e Subh. Particular care has been taken on topics related to resistancegroups involving Panjsher Province, and the Taliban’s interactions with the local population ofthis area as well as with Tajiks in general. Reporting from Hasht-e Subh was often
uncorroborated. Efforts to corroborate the information have been made but were not always
possible.
All sources are outlined in Annex 1: Bibliography.

Structure and use of the report
The report is structured in line with the Terms of Reference. The first chapter provides
background information on Afghanistan; chapters two to seven provide an overview of key
socio-economic indicators for Afghanistan and Kabul City, chapter eight covers child specificissues, chapter nine provides information on networks of support and chapter ten deals withmobility and travel in the country. In addition, most chapters also include subsections on thesituation of women-headed households, as well as on the situation of IDPs and returnees.

Terminology
In this report the Afghan authorities operating under the Taliban (since August 2021) aredescribed as the de facto authorities, as the announced state or interim government have notbeen internationally recognised. For readability, specific ministries or ministers operating
under the Taliban are referred to as, for example, the ‘Taliban Ministry of Interior’ or the‘Taliban Minister of Foreign Affairs’. Persons working within lower-level authorities, who havebeen appointed by the Taliban or have returned to work since the takeover are not routinely
referred to de facto state employees or Taliban officials, but efforts had been made to give
clear context in which capacity these persons are working.
The administration of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, that collapsed amid the Taliban
takeover on 15 August 2021, is either referred to by its official name or as ‘the previous

UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Afghanistan 2022, 7 January 2022, url
Arlini, S. M. and Burgess, M., Afghanistan Multi-sectoral Needs Assessment – 2021/2022, Save the Children,
March 2022, url
6
UNHCR, Afghanistan 2021 Multi Sectoral Rapid Assessments Analysis, 21 April 2022, url
7
WFP publications are available via the following website: url
4

5

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KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN KABUL CITY

government’. In cases where the reports refer to the previous government of the Taliban of
the 1990s, this is indicated in the text.
Footnoted citations for documents published by Afghan authorities (typically previously citedas ‘Afghanistan’) are aligned with this terminology. This is to ensure a clear distinction
between publications made by the previous elected Afghan government and publications
published under the current de facto authorities.

Research limitations
Due to the Taliban takeover in August 2021, research limitations during the drafting of thisreport were observed. These challenges included: reduced and restricted media coverage,
closing of local media outlets and fleeing of journalists, censorship, political interference fromthe Taliban in the work of journalists, threats and violence toward media workers and outlets,and difficulties verifying source/information reliability and corroborating information, especiallyfrom social media sources.8 Efforts have been made to locate reliable and corroborated
information where possible given the limits.
Regarding population figures, there is a ‘lack of reliable current disaggregated population data
at provincial and district level’.9 The last national census was conducted in 1979. The numbers
published by the de facto Taliban authorities in 2022 are based on the household listing of
the years 2003-2005.10

RSF, RSF seeks UN Security Council meeting on plight of journalists in Afghanistan, 18 August 2021, url; CNN, The
media spotlight in Afghanistan is about to dim as journalists evacuate, 20 August 2021, url; Denmark, DIS,
Afghanistan, Taliban’s impact on the population, June 2022, url, p. 8; HRW, Afghanistan: Taliban Threatening
Provincial Media, 7 March 2022, url
9
IPC, Afghanistan: IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis (September 2021 – March 2022), October 2021, url, p. 13
10
Taliban de facto authorities of Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated Population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022,
url, p. III
8

11

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Map

Map 1. Afghanistan11

11

UN, Afghanistan, Map No. 3958 Rev. 7, June 2011, url

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KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN KABUL CITY

1.
1.1

Background
Developments and major events impacting socioeconomic situation since the Taliban takeover

When US and international forces withdrew from Afghanistan in 2021, and following a largescale Taliban offensive in the midst of the withdrawal with a consequent rise in insecurity, theTaliban swiftly took control of large parts of Afghanistan, including major Afghan cities,12 andeventually Kabul on 15 August 2021.13 The previous elected government of Ashraf Ghani
collapsed and the Taliban became the de facto authorities throughout Afghanistan.14 On
7 September 2021 the Taliban announced the formation of an interim or ‘caretaker’
government and declared the re-establishment of the country as Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan (IEA)15.
In late September 2021, the caretaker government was expanded, and included someindividuals of non-Pashtun ethnic backgrounds.16 Although the new composition was reported
to be a ‘small gesture toward including ethnic minorities’17, the cabinet still consisted of malemembers only, of predominantly ethnic Pashtuns, primarily from southern Afghanistan, andalmost exclusively of former Taliban officials or long-time loyalists18.
As to how these caretaker positions differ from permanent ones, or by whom and when themembers of this cabinet might be replaced in the future remained unclear.19 Moreover, theTaliban leadership remained vague concerning their plans on how to govern and structure thestate and the ‘movement’ itself seemed to internally hold ‘diverse views about the forms thatan Islamic order might take’.20 After 100 days of the new de facto Taliban authorities taking
control, the economic policy of the Taliban was still unclear, as well as how they intended toaddress issues such as poverty and unemployment.21 Taliban officials reportedly lacked
experience in banking or financial issues.22 An Afghan human rights expert, interviewed by theEuropean Asylum Support Office (EASO) on 11 November 2021, also stated that the Taliban did

UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/328–
S/2021/759, 2 September 2021, url, para. 16, 23
13
US, CSR, U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions, 17
September 2021, url, p. 10
14International Crisis Group, With the Taliban Back in Kabul, Regional Powers Watch and Wait, 26 August 2021, url
15
US, CSR, U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions, 17
September 2021, url, p. 14; BBC News, Hardliners get key posts in new Taliban government, 7 September 2021, url
16International Crisis Group, Afghanistan’s Taliban Expand Their Interim Government, 28 September 2021, url
17International Crisis Group, Afghanistan’s Taliban Expand Their Interim Government, 28 September 2021, url
18
US, CSR, Taliban Government in Afghanistan: Background and Issues for Congress, 2 November 2021, url, p. 10
19International Crisis Group, Who Will Run the Taliban Government, 9 September 2021, url
20
Lombardi, C.B and March, A.F., Afghan Taliban Views on Legitimate Islamic Governance, USIP, February 2022,
url, p. 2
21
Al Jazeera, 100 days of the Taliban, 23 November 2021, url
22
AP, The economy on the brink, Taliban rely on former technocrats, 19 October 2021, url
12

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

not realise the urgency of the situation and the need to conform with some demands to reachinternational assistance.23.
Since the Taliban’s seizure of power, they have issued instructions impacting, inter alia,
media24, girl’s and women’s rights25 and the general population as regards observing Islamiclaw (sharia) in their daily lives26. For more information on such restrictions, see EUAA COI
report on Afghanistan: Targeting of individuals published in August 2022.
After the Taliban’s seizure of power in August 2021 the international community froze
Afghanistan’s foreign assets and halted most economic aid;27 only some aid continued to flow
mainly through ‘NGOs and multilateral bodies like the UN’28. Since September 2021, as
reported by various sources, Afghanistan’s aid-dependent economy has been in free fall,29
with public services30 and the banking system collapsing31.
The UN Security Council adopted Resolution No. 2615 in December 2021, exempting
humanitarian assistance, as well as financial transactions and the delivery of goods andservices necessary to deliver such assistance, from Taliban-related sanctions.32 In January2022, the UN launched the largest single country aid appeal in history, exceeding five billion
USD,33 and 308 million USD of humanitarian assistance were announced by the US, raising thetotal US humanitarian aid to Afghanistan since October 2021 to 782 million USD34. In February2022, the US administration announced that half of the seven billion USD Afghan foreign
reserves held in the US would be restored to Afghanistan, while the future of the other halfremained to be resolved in litigation over the claims by relatives of 9/11 victims.35 Thisapproach was criticised by some advocacy groups and analysts.36 Moreover, also in February2022, the US administration had eased sanctions that had ‘contributed to the collapse of

Afghan human rights expert, online interview, 11 November 2021. This source left Afghanistan as the Taliban took
power but remains in communication with sources on the ground. The source monitor developments within thehuman rights field through local sources in the country. The source wishes to be anonymous.
24
HRW, Afghanistan: Taliban Severely Restrict Media, 1 October 2021, url
25
Chatham House, Women’s rights under threat in Taliban-run Afghanistan, 10 June 2022, url
26
Samim, S., Policing Public Morality, AAN, 15 June 2022, url
27
AAN, Afghanistan’s looming economic catastrophe: What next for the Taleban and the donors?, 6 September
2021, url; US, SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 October 2021, url, pp. 119-120; Al Jazeera,
UN chief warns millions of Afghans are on ‘verge of death’, 13 January 2022, url
28
BBC News, Afghanistan: What humanitarian aid is getting in?, 14 February 2022, url
29
USIP, The State of Afghanistan’s Economy and Private Sector, 13 April 2022, url; HRW, Afghanistan: Taliban
Blocking Female Aid Workers, 4 November 2021, url; Barr, H., From Taliban to Taliban: Cycle of Hope, Despair on
Women’s Rights [Opinion], IPS, 29 October 2021, url; AAN, Afghanistan’s looming economic catastrophe: What next
for the Taleban and the donors?, 6 September 2021, url
30
WHO, Afghanistan’s health system is on the brink of collapse: urgent action is needed, 24 January 2022, url; IRC,
2022 Emergency Watchlist – System Failure, 14 December 2021, url, p. 24
31
Reuters, Paralysed banking system pushing Afghanistan towards collapse -Red Cross, 25 February 2022, url
32
UN Security Council, Resolution S/RES/2615 (2021), 22 December 2021, url
33
UN News, Afghanistan: UN launches largest single country aid appeal ever, 11 January 2022, url
34
CNN, US providing $308 million in humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, 11 January 2022, url
35
USIP, Afghanistan’s Frozen Foreign Exchange Reserves: What Happened, What’s Next, 1 March 2022, url; FP,
Biden Hands the Taliban a Propaganda Victory, 17 February 2022, url; Reuters, Afghan central bank says U.S. planfor frozen funds an 'injustice', 14 February 2022, url
36
Drezner, D.W., The United States is stealing Afghanistan’s money, The Washington Post [Perspective], 14
February 2022, url; VOA, Biden Keeping Half of Afghanistan’s $7B in Assets for 9/11 Victims, 11 February 2022, url;
Al Jazeera, ‘Theft’: Advocates decry US decision to withhold Afghan funds, 11 February 2022, url
23

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KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN KABUL CITY

Afghanistan’s economy since the Taliban takeover in August’.37 In March 2022, the Afghan
central bank reportedly received 32 million USD in cash assistance.38 On 22 June 2022,
Paktika and Khost provinces were hit by a ‘devastating’39 earthquake, causing the deaths ofmore than 1 000 individuals and injuring over 6 000 with the Taliban launching appeals forinternational assistance.40
As of June 2022, the Taliban de facto authorities had not yet been formally recognised by any
foreign government.41
After August 2021, many countries halted or significantly reduced their financial assistance to
the Afghan budget.42 Some sources claim this has impeded efforts to address humanitarian
issues in Afghanistan.43 In October 2021, the International Crisis Group reported thathumanitarian aid was still reaching Afghanistan, whereas non-humanitarian assistance, which
had previously supported development programs, the payment of civil servants, and theprovision of public services, was suspended.44 According to an article by The Diplomat, ‘thelimited aid being distributed in Afghanistan’ reached the country mainly ‘through establishedchannels’, including cooperation with the World Health Organization (WHO) and the World
Food Program (WFP), and centred on medical and basic food assistance. Various other aid
organisations like Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), the International Rescue Committee (IRC),
and the International Red Cross continued to work after the Taliban took power, with whomthey ‘had already established working relationships.’45 In a January 2022 report, theNorwegian Refugee Council (NRC) stated that humanitarian organisations faced difficulties intransferring funds to and within Afghanistan due to a ‘complex set of international anddomestic factors’ - including the enormous shortage of cash inside Afghanistan, blockades byWestern governments and financial institutions and ‘banking rejections, linked to theincreased compliance burden and financial sector over-compliance’.46
In November 2021, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) stated that Afghanistan washeading for one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world, due to, among other things, a
sharp decrease in international aid and the Taliban’s inability to deliver basic services.47
According to the UNOCHA’s January 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview, it was estimatedthat in 2022, 24.4 million people will be in need in Afghanistan.48 For the second half of March
New York Times (The), U.S. Eases Sanctions to Allow Routine Transactions With Afghan Government, 25
February 2022, url
38
Hasht-e Subh, The Central Bank of Afghanistan Receives Another $32 Million Cash in Assistance, 6 March 2022,
url
39
UN News, From the Field: Afghan earthquake survivors look to rebuild their lives, 18 July 2022, url
40
IOM, Rising from the Rubble: Earthquake Victims in Afghanistan Rebuild After Disaster, 12 July 2022, url;France24, Taliban appeal for help as rescuers scramble to reach Afghan quake survivors, 23 June 2022, url
41
VOA, Taliban Say US Is ‘Biggest Hurdle’ to Diplomatic Recognition, 18 June 2022, url; Al Jazeera, Taliban
supreme leader urges world to recognise ‘Islamic Emirate’, 29 April 2022, url
42
BBC News, Afghanistan earthquake: What foreign aid is getting in?, 8 July 2022, url
43
VOA, Afghan Taliban's Quest for International Recognition Stuck in Neutral, 15 February 2022, url; ACCORD,
Afghanistan: Aktuelle Lage & Überblick über relevante Akteure; Situation gefährdeter Gruppen [Current situation &overview of relevant actors; situation of vulnerable groups] [source: Mielke, K.], March 2022, url, pp. 9-10
44International Crisis Group, Thinking Through the Dilemmas of Aid to Afghanistan, 7 October 2021, url, p. 1
45
Diplomat (The), Can the World Get Aid to Afghanistan?, 24 September 2021, url
46
NRC, Life and Death: NGO access to financial services in Afghanistan, January 2022, 27 January 2022, url, p. 7,
1247
USIP, Winter is coming in Afghanistan. Are the Taliban ready?, 11 November 2021, url
48
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Afghanistan 2022, 7 January 2022, url, p. 4
37

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

2022, the WHO reported a still increasing number of people in need of humanitarianassistance in Afghanistan.49 As noted by UNOCHA, ‘[t]he humanitarian conditions created by
Afghanistan’s multi-dimensional crisis continue to impact all parts of the country and affectevery aspect of Afghan life.’ It was estimated that 24.5 million people, or 55% of the Afghan
population, would require humanitarian assistance in 2022, with 9.3 million of them estimatedto be in extreme need.50
In September 2021, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) warned of a drastic
increase in poverty among the Afghan population.51 In addition, WFP reported the Afghan
health care system to be on the brink of failure.52 As of 20 May 2022, by referring to the multipartner initiative Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), the WFP estimated thatabout 19.7 million people, nearly half of Afghanistan’s population, were facing acute foodinsecurity,53 not only because of the collapsing Afghan economy but also due to a severe
drought plaguing the country.54
For detailed information on these critical aspects of Afghanistan’s humanitarian and socioeconomic situation, please see section 2. Economy, section 3. Basic subsistence andemployment, section 4. Food security, section 6. Healthcare and section 8. Child-specificliving conditions.

1.2

Demographic figures

This section will provide general demographic figures about the situation of internallydisplaced persons (IDPs), returnees, and female-headed households, and regarding the
population of Kabul city.
As of 1 December 2021, UNHCR estimated that 3.5 million people in Afghanistan wereinternally displaced by conflict.55 Conflict-induced displacement has decreased significantly
since the Taliban takeover. According to UNOCHA, 7 420 persons were displaced due to
conflict between 2 December 2021 and 30 June 2022, the majority of displacement took
place from Sar-e Pul to Bamyan and within Baghlan province.56 According to IOM, 1 327 474
persons were displaced in 2021 due to conflict and natural disasters. This number included
988 817 persons who were displaced after the political changes in August 2021 and remainedin displacement by the end of 2021. Of the total number of 5 832 454 IDPs residing in hostcommunities by the end of 2021, Herat province was hosting 17 % of all IDPs and thus theWHO, Afghanistan Emergency Situation Report No. 15, Reporting Period: 15—31 March 2022, 13 April 2022, url,
p. 1
50
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Afghanistan 2022, 7 January 2022, url, p. 48
51
UNDP, Economic Instability and Uncertainty in Afghanistan after August 15, 9 September 2021, url, p.1
52
WHO, Afghanistan’s health system is on the brink of collapse: urgent action is needed, 24 January 2022, url
53
WFP, Afghanistan: Situation Report 20 May 2022, 23 May 2022, url, p. 1
54
UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Humanitarian Bulletin (January – March 2022), 18 April 2022, url, p. 6; Al Jazeera, Nearly
10 million children going hungry in Afghanistan, says NGO, 10 May 2022, url; Al Jazeera, Climate now a worse crisis
than war for Afghanistan’s farmers, 26 October 2021, url
55
UNHCR Regional Bureau for Asia and Pacific, Flash External Update: Afghanistan Situation #16 as of 15 April
2022, 26 April 2022, url, p. 1
56
UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Conflict Induced Displacements, last updated 24 July 2022, url
49

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KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN KABUL CITY

largest IDP population countrywide.57 Hundreds of Hazara Shia families had reportedly been
forcibly evicted from their homes and land by the Taliban.58 Local media reported on similarevictions in Jowzjan province, with more than 1 000 members of ethnic Uzbeks and Turkmen
communities being expelled by Taliban fighters.59
According to IOM data, 575 818 people, including documented and undocumented persons,returned to Afghanistan in 2021 after having lived abroad – mostly in Iran and Pakistan - for atleast six months.60 For 2022, IOM estimated over 785 000 returns to Afghanistan.61
As of 2020, an estimated 1.6 % or 69 000 households were headed by women, and 306 000
people were living in female-headed households, according to the Income and Expenditure &Labor Force survey by the Afghan National Statistics and Information Authority (NSIA).62 The
majority of female household leaders were widowed women (77.08 %), while 19.22 % were
married, and less than 2 % were either divorced (1.27%) or had never married nor were they
engaged (1.88 %).63 According to UNHCR’s 2021 Multi Sectoral Rapid Assessments Analysis –an analysis based on assessments of 142 182 households in the period October to December
2021, mainly among IDPs and IDP returnees64 -, 43 % of female-headed IDP households were
headed by widows. Among IDP returnees alone, the share of widows among female-headedhouseholds was even higher with 56 %.65
As of 2022, the population of Kabul province was estimated66 to be 5 572 630, including
4 801 200 persons living in urban areas and 771 430 persons living in rural areas, according to
the Afghan National Statistics and Information Authority (NSIA).67 This estimation is the resultof calculations based on the 2003-2005 census.68 According to IOM, 93 631 IDPs weredisplaced to or arrived in Kabul province since August 2021, making Kabul district69 the district
where the largest numbers of IDPs had arrived.70 In the same period, Kabul was also the
district to which most migrants from abroad – 4 166 individuals - returned.71

IOM, DTM Afghanistan, Baseline Mobility Assessment Summary Results Round 14 November-December 2021, 2
March 2022, url, p. 5
58
HRW, Afghanistan: Taliban Forcibly Evict Minority Shia, 22 October 2021, url
59
Gandhara, Taliban Accused Of Forcibly Evicting Ethnic Uzbeks, Turkmen In Northern Afghanistan, 9 December
2021, url
60
IOM, DTM Afghanistan, Baseline Mobility Assessment Summary Results Round 14, November-December 2021, 2
March 2022, url, p. 961
IOM, Afghanistan Crisis Response Plan 2022, 22 March 2022, url, p. 3
62
Afghanistan, NSIA, Income and Expenditure & Labour Force survey 2020, April 2021, url, p. 23
63
IPC-IG, Afghanistan: Needs Assessment, 2022, 10 March 2022, url, p. 24
64
According to UNHCR, the term ‘IDP returnee’ refers to internally displaced persons who have returned to theirplace of origin. UNHCR, Assessment of livelihood opportunities for returnees/internally displaced persons and hostcommunities in Afghanistan, 2013, url, p.13
65
UNHCR, Afghanistan 2021 Multi Sectoral Rapid Assessments Analysis, 21 April 2022, url, p. 5
66
Regarding population figures, only estimates are available, and the official figures appear to be understated. IPC,
Afghanistan IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis September 2021 - March 2022, October 2021, url, p. 13
67
De facto authority of Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated Population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022, url, p. 13
68
De facto authority of Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated Population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022, url, p. 42
69
IOM, DTM Afghanistan Emergency Event Tracking Kabul Province, EET Round 3 (1-19 December 2021), 2 February2022, url, p. 1
70IOM, DTM Afghanistan Emergency Event Tracking, EET Round 3 (1-19 December 2021), 21 December 2021, url, p. 1
71
IOM, DTM Afghanistan Emergency Event Tracking Kabul Province, EET Round 3 (1-19 December 2021), 2 February2022, url, p. 3
57

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

1.3

COVID-19 situation

According to UNOCHA, writing in January 2022, COVID-19 was a ‘serious threat’ inAfghanistan after the country was rocked by several waves of the pandemic with newly
emerging variants and inadequate prevention measures.72 As of 7 July 2022, 182 873 COVID19 infections and 7 725 COVID-19-related deaths were confirmed across Afghanistan. At thesame time, the vaccination coverage rate of the population reportedly lied at approximately
8.5 %.73
Measures to combat the COVID-19 pandemic reportedly ‘deteriorated dramatically’ after
15 August 2021, as the suspension of funding74 and lack of doctors and medicines led to theclosure of the majority of COVID-19 treatment centres75 and the de facto authorities did not
clearly position themselves regarding the resumption of COVID-19 vaccination76. Non-paymentof salaries and other disrupted support including fuel for the generators and food reportedlyleft the remaining COVID-19 treatment centres in a state of limited functioning.77 In addition,the ‘closure of most commercial land and air routes’ prompted by the events of August 2021
caused disruptions to scheduled imports of essential medical supplies.78 For detailed
information on this subject, please see section 6. Healthcare .
In its 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview, UNOCHA reported that ‘[t]he COVID-19 pandemic
continues to be felt across the country as it affects livelihoods and undermines coping
capacity of an already vulnerable nation.’ According to the same source, for the majority of the
Afghan households the pandemic resulted in ‘diminished or lost income’, 79 lost or limitedaccess to clean water and sanitation, limited access to food, or in the form of illness or deathof household members, among others.80 For detailed information on these aspects, pleasesee section 3. Basic subsistence and employment, section 4. Food security and section
6. Healthcare .

UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Afghanistan 2022, 7 January 2022, url, p. 22
Reuters, COVID-19 Tracker: Afghanistan, updated 7 July 2022, 6:08 AM, url
74
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Afghanistan 2022, 7 January 2022, url, pp. 41, 23
75
Diplomat (The), New COVID-19 Wave Batters Afghanistan’s Crumbling Health Care, 9 February 2022, url
76
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Afghanistan 2022, 7 January 2022, url, p. 41
77
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Afghanistan 2022, 7 January 2022, url, p. 23; Diplomat (The), New
COVID-19 Wave Batters Afghanistan’s Crumbling Health Care, 9 February 2022, url; HealthNet TPO, Urgent
Funding Needed for Covid-19 Hospital in Kabul, 13 October 2021, url
78
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Afghanistan 2022, 7 January 2022, url, p. 23
79
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Afghanistan 2022, 7 January 2022, url, pp. 22, 41
80
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Afghanistan 2022, 7 January 2022, url, p. 41
72
73

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KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN KABUL CITY

2.

Economy2.1 National economic and financial situation
Afghanistan’s public spending depended on foreign assistance for 75 % of its support (in theform of grants)81 until August 2021. After the Taliban’s takeover on 15 August 2021, however,donors and international financial institutions suspended all payments, leading to a liquidity
crisis in the country, a near-collapse of the banking system, depreciation of the national
currency, increasing prices and the loss of hundreds of thousands of jobs.82
In the absence of official Gross Domestic Product (GDP) statistics by the de facto authorities of
Afghanistan, the World Bank estimated the country’s economic output to decline by between
20-30 % in the period August 2021 to August 2022.83 According to a World Bank survey in
October-November 2021 among 100 private businesses,84 82 % reported a decline in demand
for their products and one third of the interviewed businesses had temporarily stopped
operating since the Taliban takeover in August 2021. Small and women-owned businesses
disproportionally indicated that they had faced a drop in demand, and two-fifths of them
reported to have temporarily closed since August 2021.85 The World Bank expected per capita
incomes to be one-third lower at the end of 2022 than they were at the end of 2020,86 andUNDP analysis similarly indicated a possible per capita income decline from USD 500 [EUR
475.4]87 in 2020 to about USD 350 [EUR 332.8] by 2022, in case the resident population
continued to increase by 2.5 % per year.88
Afghanistan’s Central Bank, facing a shortage of banknotes in both US dollars and Afghanis(Afghan currency), limited the transfer of banknotes to private banks as well as the amount ofmoney that could be withdrawn from one’s account. Due to these restrictions and the lack ofphysical money, private banks were no longer able to cover withdrawals, including forhumanitarian aid, nor to pay out funds that were transferred electronically to the bank. For thesame reason, banks were no longer able to grant credit to customers. Moreover, after the
Taliban took control of the country in August 2021, the US and other governments and theWorld Bank decided to revoke the credentials of the Afghan Central Bank to interact with theinternational banking system, with international financial institutions and with many othernational banking systems. This decision prevented the Afghan Central Bank from receiving
USIP, Afghanistan Study Group Final Report, February 2021, url, p. 26; World Bank (The), Afghanistan: Public
Expenditure Update, 28 July 2019, url, p. 6
82
WFP, Afghanistan Annual Country Report 2021, 2022, url, p. 7
83
World Bank (The), Macro Poverty Outlook for Afghanistan: April 2022, 21 April 2022, url, p. 1
84
The cited survey was sent to about 350 firms of which 100 eventually participated. The World Bank noted in its
key findings that the low return rate might indicate that a considerable number of firms already had stopped
operating. See url, pp. v, 27
85World Bank (The), Afghanistan Private Sector Rapid Survey, A Snapshot of the Business Environment — Round 1,
March 2022, 7 April 2022, url, pp. 5-6
86World Bank (The), Towards Economic Stabilization and Recovery, Afghanistan Development Update April 2022,
13 April 2022, url, p. iii
87
Exchange rates in this paragraph from European Commission, Exchange rate (InforEuro), n.d., url, accessed on 14
July 2022
88
UNDP, Afghanistan: Socio-Economic Outlook 2021-2022, 1 December 2021, url, p. 981

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

any World Bank funds. It also blocked the bank from accessing its foreign currency reserves(approximatively USD 9 billion [EUR 8.5 billion]89), which could have been used otherwise tobridge liquidity problems and stabilise the national banking system.90 The liquidity crisis andsevered access to the international banking system prevented firms from making or receiving
payments for their import/export businesses or accessing their working capital, international
humanitarian organisations and NGOs from paying salaries and contractors in the country as
well as private households from gaining access to remittances or their savings.91 In November
2021, the de facto authorities of Afghanistan prohibited the use of foreign currency in the
country, requiring the population to use only Afghanis for their financial transactions.92
In this report, NRC analysed available payment channels for NGOs to transfer humanitarianfunds into Afghanistan and observed that some humanitarian organisations began to use
informal money transfer systems (hawala) for the transfer of humanitarian funds into
Afghanistan. Previously, humanitarian organisations had reportedly used hawala
predominantly to transfer money within the country.93 According to a non-exhaustive poll by
an NGO working group quoted in the report, USD 3.7 million [EUR 3.5 million]94 have been
sent into the country by NGOs using hawala between mid-August and mid-December 2021.95
In view of the situation, UN agencies reportedly resorted to bringing physical cash to Kabul topay for salaries and other costs. In this way, up to USD 150 million [EUR 142 million] were flown
into Afghanistan every month as of April 2022.96
According to an April 2022 report by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM),
individual account holders were able to withdraw funds up to USD 400 or AFN 30 000[EUR 367.31]97 per week. However, only the Afghanistan International Bank (AIB) in Kabul wasable to actually pay out this amount. In the provinces, some banks were only able to pay anequivalent of USD 100-200 [EUR 91.83–183.66] per week, depending on the funds available tothem. Business clients’ withdrawals were limited to either five percent of their balance or up to
USD 25 000 [EUR 22 957], whichever sum was lower. In-country transfers were possible,
while international transfers depended on the Afghan Central Bank’s prior approval and wasrestricted to the purchase of certain goods, including food, medicine and hygiene items, fuel,gas and electricity, and others. However, in case transfers reached a limit of 25 % of the total
account balance of each vendor, no further withdrawals were allowed.98 Nevertheless, bothindividuals and businesses reported that in practice the amounts of funds they were able to

Exchange rates in this paragraph from European Commission, Exchange rate (InforEuro), n.d., url, accessed on 14
July 2022
90
HRW, Afghanistan: Economic Roots of the Humanitarian Crisis, 1 March 2022, url
91World Bank (The), Towards Economic Stabilization and Recovery, Afghanistan Development Update April 2022,
13 April 2022, url, p. 5
92
Al Jazeera, Taliban bans the use of foreign currency across Afghanistan, 2 November 2021, url
93
NRC, Life and Death: NGO access to financial services in Afghanistan, January 2022, 27 January 2022, url, p. 8
94
Exchange rates in this paragraph from European Commission, Exchange rate (InforEuro), n.d., url, accessed on 14
July 2022
95
NRC, Life and Death: NGO access to financial services in Afghanistan, January 2022, 27 January 2022, url, pp.
27-28
96World Bank (The), Towards Economic Stabilization and Recovery, Afghanistan Development Update April 2022,
13 April 2022, url, p. 8
97
Exchange rates in this paragraph are as indicated in the source: url
98
IOM, Information on the socio-economic situation in Afghanistan requested by the Austrian Federal Office for
Immigration and Asylum, 12 April 2022, url, p. 4
89

20

KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN KABUL CITY

withdraw in the first three months of 2022, were – considerably for firms- below the regulated
limits.99
As of March 2022, the World Bank noted that ongoing humanitarian support contributed tosome economic stabilisation, with a slightly improved exchange rate, more stable inflation, anda slight increase in labour demand, and in nominal and real wages.100 Nevertheless, the WorldBank (WB) estimated that even under a best-case scenario it would take until 2031 for
Afghanistan’s GDP per capita to return close to the level of 2020. According to the WB, this,however, would require international support, the easing of restrictions on the financial sector,
increased political confidence, which in turn would increase private investment in the country,
more possibilities for women to participate in the economy, and a stable security situation. 101
Headline year-on-year inflation was 12.7 % in December 2021, due to an increase ininternational prices, import restrictions caused by disruptions to international transactions, andcurrency devaluation. In the period between the end of July 2021 to mid-February 2022, thenational currency Afghani lost 14 % of its value against the US-Dollar, 10 % against the Euroand 4 % against the Pakistani Rupee.102

2.2 Poverty rates
Due to the economic crisis, the humanitarian situation – already affected by decades ofconflict, severe droughts, and the COVID-19 pandemic – further deteriorated.103
According to a statement by the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs andEmergency Relief Coordinator, as of June 2022, 25 million Afghans were living in poverty,
noting that this was more than double compared with 2011.104
More current data on poverty rates in Afghanistan could not be found within the time
constraints of this report.

2.3 Female-headed households
The labour force participation rate for women in Afghanistan is low and those who do workoutside the home tend to have more education. UNDP expressed concern that Taliban
restrictions on female employment ‘affect both the economic and society’ noting that while itremains unclear to what extent the Taliban will enforce restrictions, incomes of householdswith working females will be reduced depending on the scope and severity that apply. UNDPWorld Bank (The), Afghanistan Economic Monitor, 18 April 2022, url, p. 1
World Bank (The), Afghanistan Economic Monitor, 18 April 2022, url, pp. 5-6
101
World Bank (The), Towards Economic Stabilization and Recovery, Afghanistan Development Update April 2022,
13 April 2022, url, pp. 23-24
102
World Bank (The), Macro Poverty Outlook for Afghanistan: April 2022, 21 April 2022, url, p. 1
103
WFP, Afghanistan Annual Country Report 2021, 2022, url, p. 7
104
UN, Amid Plummeting Humanitarian Conditions in Afghanistan, Women, Girls ‘Are Being Written Out of Society’by De Facto Authorities, Briefers Warn Security Council, 23 June 2022, url
99

100

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

remarked that Taliban’s approach to female employment has not been consistent or
uniform.105

2.4 IDPs
UNOCHA noted in its 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview and with reference to unpublisheddata of a nationwide survey among roughly 9 880 households in the period August to
October 2021 (the Whole of Afghanistan (WoA) Assessment), that active conflict (73 %) andpoverty (47 %) were the main drivers for forced internal displacement.106 A recent Mid-Year
WoA Assessment, however, indicates that unemployment and poverty had become thegreatest drivers of internal displacement by May 2022.107

2.5 Returnees
The main push factors causing recent returnees to come back to Afghanistan were being
forced to leave their host country (40 %) followed by unemployment and poverty (26 %),according to findings of the nationwide WoA Assessment survey of August–September 2021.
Moreover, their socio-economic situation was difficult due to a general lack of income
opportunities as well as their specific shelter, food and health expenses. For these reasons,returnees faced significant obstacles related to sustainable integration including ‘limited
absorption capacity of basic services and infrastructure, slow progress on land allocation andlack of economic opportunities coupled with uncertain political prospect in Afghanistan.’108

UNDP, Afghanistan: Socio-Economic Outlook 2021-2022, 1 December 2021, url, pp. 1, 17
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Afghanistan 2022, 7 January 2022, url, p. 17
107
IRC, From Humanitarian Response to Economic Recovery: recommendations for addressing acute needs and theroot causes of the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, May 2022, 11 May 2022, url, p. 1
108
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Afghanistan 2022, 7 January 2022, url, p. 33, 35
105

106

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KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN KABUL CITY

3.

Basic subsistence and employment

3.1 Countrywide trends
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) estimated that in the context of the Taliban
takeover of control in mid-August 2021, more than half a million workers lost their job in thethird quarter of 2021, compared to a hypothetical scenario with no change in administration.
Estimated losses were attributed to the Taliban takeover and related economic crisis as wellas to restrictions on the employment of women. ILO estimated a further increase inemployment losses up to 700 000 or – in case of a significant deterioration of the labour
market situation of women and intensified emigration – up to 900 000 workers by the second
quarter of 2022.109
According to the World Bank’s Afghanistan Welfare Monitoring Survey (AWMS) among 4 937
households across the country in the period October to December 2021, employment
decreased in both, public and private sectors compared to data from the same period 2019.
The decrease was, however, considerably higher in the public sector – from 12 % ofhousehold heads employed in that sector in the last quarter of 2019 to 8 % in the same period
in 2021. This decline was mostly due to a decline in employment in the security sector including police, armed forces, and security services, the share household heads employed inthese sectors fell from over 3 % in 2019 to 1 % in December 2021. Similarly, employment rates
in public administration fell from 2.8 % to 0.9 %. The decline in paid employment wascomparatively moderate in the private sector, from 9 % in 2019 to 8 % in 2021. Selfemployment, including casual work, increased in both urban and rural areas.110
According to a World Bank survey of November 2021 among 100 private businesses, some
80 % of the country’s 700 000 private businesses (90 % of which were micro, small andmedium enterprises) were in the informal sector. The survey found that one third of allinterviewed businesses temporarily ceased operations since August 2021, and businesses ofall sizes and sectors reported to have dismissed over half of their staff, on average, withbusiness in the agricultural sector dismissing fewer employees than other sectors.111
According to the same World Bank survey, 75 % of all female workers have been dismissed
since August 2021. Some companies reportedly arranged for female workers to continue
working from home. About one third of female-owned businesses – predominantly small
businesses in the manufacturing sector, producing handicraft, jewellery and traditional
clothing – resorted to this strategy, in comparison with 4 % of companies owned by men.112
Security concerns were considerably higher among women-owned firms – 66 % of women felt

ILO, Employment prospects in Afghanistan: A rapid impact assessment, ILO Brief, January 2022, 19 January2022, url, pp. 2-3
110World Bank (The), Afghanistan Welfare Monitoring Survey Round 1, March 2022, 15 March 2022, url, pp. 7-8
111World Bank (The), Afghanistan Private Sector Rapid Survey, A Snapshot of the Business Environment — Round 1,
March 2022, 7 April 2022, url, pp. 2, 6, 8
112
World Bank (The), Afghanistan Private Sector Rapid Survey, A Snapshot of the Business Environment — Round 1,
March 2022, 7 April 2022, url, p. 9
109

23

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMthat the security situation had deteriorated following the Taliban takeover, while 61 % of menowned firms said it had improved – and might be a key factor in the higher rate of closure offemale-owned businesses.113 More than a quarter of female-owned firms (26 %) listed
insecurity and restrictions on women among their top three business constraints, in contrast to
only one percent of male-owned businesses.114
According to the World Bank’s AWM survey, 79 % of household heads were employed in the
period October to December 2021, showing an increase of 6 % compared with data from thesame period 2019. The World Bank pointed at differing developments regarding urban andrural employment between 2019 and 2021: while in urban areas, the employment rate ofhousehold heads dropped from 75 % to 73 %, it increased from 73 % to 81 % in rural areas. The
World Bank suggested that this increase of employment in rural areas might be linked to an
improved security situation and to the return of some households to farm or non-farmactivities. At the same time, the World Bank noted an increase in unemployment compared to2019, mainly because the number of economically inactive persons (that is, persons nothaving a paid job and not looking for one) decreased and a larger part of the population
actively began to look for work. The increase in household heads searching for work rosefrom 8 % to 21 % in urban areas and from 12 % to 15 % in rural areas in the period October toDecember 2021 compared with the same period 2019, presumably – as the World Bank noted– due to decreased earnings, a decline in remittances and the ongoing drought, which made itnecessary to find additional sources of income.115
In April 2022, WFP noted that casual labour wage and the number of days of work available inthe country’s main markets was below average and ‘gradually decreasing’ due to thedeteriorating economy. By the end of that month, the daily wage rate for unskilled labour was
AFN 287 [EUR 3.05]116 and for skilled labour AFN 577 [EUR 6.15], which constituted a 5 % and
11 % decrease, respectively, compared to the rates of June 2021, before the establishment of
the de facto authorities of Afghanistan in mid-August 2021.117 By July 2022, wages had slightly
increased to AFN 297 [EUR 3.16] and AFN 610 [EUR 6.5], respectively.118
WFP indicated that 81 % of interviewed households faced a decrease in their income inJanuary 2022. In Kabul that number was even higher with 88 % of households. 18 % ofhouseholds reportedly had no earnings at all in that month.119 Among the 1 409 households120
interviewed at the end of 2021 by Save the Children, 82 % of households reported loss ofWorld Bank (The), Afghanistan Private Sector Rapid Survey, A Snapshot of the Business Environment — Round 1,
March 2022, 7 April 2022, url, p. 15
114
World Bank (The), Afghanistan Private Sector Rapid Survey, A Snapshot of the Business Environment — Round 1,
March 2022, 7 April 2022, url, p. 20
115
World Bank (The), Afghanistan Welfare Monitoring Survey Round 1, March 2022, 15 March 2022, url, pp. 6-7
116
Exchange rates in this paragraph from European Commission, Exchange rate (InforEuro), n.d., url, accessed on 14
July 2022
117
WFP, Afghanistan Countrywide Weekly Market Price Bulletin, Issue 101 (covering 4 th week of April 2022), 1 May
2022, url, p. 1
118
WFP, Afghanistan Countrywide Weekly Market Price Bulletin, Issue 110 (covering the first week of July 2022), 8
July 2022, url, p. 1
119
WFP, Afghanistan Food Security Update: Round Five January 2022, 16 February 2022, url, p. 1
120
The surveyed households were ‘current Save the Children programme participants in seven provinces where
Save the Children Afghanistan has an operational presence – Balkh, Faryab, Jawzjan, Kabul, Kandahar, Nangarhar
and Sar-e Pul’. Arlini, S. M. and Burgess, M., Afghanistan Multi-sectoral Needs Assessment – 2021/2022, Save theChildren, March 2022, url, p. 16
113

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KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN KABUL CITY

income since mid-August 2021, with a third of families (34.8 %) having lost their entire
household income and a quarter (26.6 %) of families having lost more than half of theirhousehold income since then.121 Similarly, almost 90 % of household heads interviewed by theWorld Bank for its AWM survey had experienced a decline in their labour earnings in the 30days prior to the interview.122 In autumn 2021, the average household debt was reportedly
more than six times the average monthly income, and loss of livelihood and employment,
rising food prices and currency devaluation led to an increase in negative coping mechanisms
such as increase in debts, the sale of assets, marrying off girls or the sale or exchange ofchildren.123
The World Bank noted that according to official statistics, the net inflow of remittances fell by
47.8 % in the third quarter of 2021 (compared to the same period in 2020)124, mainly becauseof restrictions on international financial transactions.125 In December 2021, five percent ofrespondents of the World Bank’s AWM survey said they were receiving private remittances,
only half as many as in December 2019, when ten percent of households reportedly received
remittances.126 As of January 2022, most households (95 %) interviewed by WFP did notreceive any remittances. In case remittances were received, they were mostly spent on
food.127
In a survey conducted by the World Bank in the period November to December 2021 among
4 937 households from all Afghanistan’s provinces and 321 out of 401 districts (called theAfghanistan Welfare Monitoring Survey (AWMS)), 70 % of households reported that they were
not able to cover basic food and non-food needs, that is, the double percentage compared to
May 2021 (35 %). Of these, 37 % of households could not cover food expenses, while 33 %said that ‘they were unable to cover both food and non-food needs’, compared to 16 % and
18% respectively in May 2021. Moreover, 85 % of households reportedly resorted to buying
lower-quality or less expensive food, and 46 % reduced the number of daily meals.128
An increasing number of Afghans reportedly resorted to selling one of their kidneys to be able
to feed their families, while the practice has been common for several years already.129
Moreover, the poverty crisis has led to an increase in ‘suicide cases’, according to Hasht-e
Subh.130

Arlini, S. M. and Burgess, M., Afghanistan Multi-sectoral Needs Assessment – 2021/2022, Save the Children,
March 2022, url, p. 58
122
World Bank (The), Afghanistan Welfare Monitoring Survey Round 1, March 2022, 15 March 2022, url, p. 8123
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Afghanistan 2022, 7 January 2022, url, p. 42; VOA, Afghanistan
Poverty Bears More Child Brides, 4 May 2022, url
124
Exchange rates in this paragraph from European Commission, Exchange rate (InforEuro), n.d., url, accessed on 14
July 2022
125
World Bank (The), Towards Economic Stabilization and Recovery, Afghanistan Development Update April 2022,
13 April 2022, url, p. 16
126
World Bank (The), Afghanistan Welfare Monitoring Survey Round 1, March 2022, 15 March 2022, url, p. 11
127
WFP, Afghanistan Food Security Update: Round Five January 2022, 16 February 2022, url, p. 2
128World Bank (The), Afghanistan Welfare Monitoring Survey Round 1, March 2022, 15 March 2022, url, pp. 4-5, 9-10129
Al Jazeera, Desperate Afghans sell kidneys amid poverty, starvation, 28 February 2022, url; New York Times(The), In Afghanistan, a Booming Kidney Trade Preys on the Poor, 15 February 2021, url; Pajhwok Afghan News,
Trafficking in Persons for the purpose of organ removal, 19 April 2017, url
130
Hasht-e Subh, Poverty, Father Burns Himself in Front of His Child, 18 April 2022, url
121

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Save the Children noted in a survey among 1 409 households of Save the Children
programme participants across seven provinces of Afghanistan that 82% of respondents had
lost income since the Taliban took control in mid-August 2021. 18 % said they had no choice
but to send their children to work. Based on this data, Save the Children estimated thatcountrywide over one million children were engaged in child labour.131 For more information on
the situation of children, please see section 8. Child-specific living conditions.

3.2 Female-headed households
According to ILO estimates, women constituted 17 % of the total labour force and 10 % in urban
settings in 2020, with most of them employed in agriculture, manufacturing of textiles andclothes, and in public administration and social services. As these sectors had been badly hit
by the economic crisis and furthermore women’s economic participation had been ‘limited by
newly imposed restrictions’, women’s employment was estimated to have decreased by 16 %in the third quarter of 2021. Moreover, ILO expected that women’s employment might
decrease by 21 % in the second quarter of 2022.132 In addition, the lack of any civil identity
documentation – the Tazkira – made it more difficult for women to seek employment oraccess services. According to findings of the 2021 WoA Assessment, 28 % of women did nothave a Tazkira.133
Women and female-headed households were particularly affected by the Taliban’s policies ofbanning women from returning to their jobs or using public transport alone, requiring them tobe accompanied by a close male relative when leaving the house, and observing a strict dress
code. These policies did not only limit women’s freedoms, but also affected their ability towork and make a living and thus were driving them further into poverty, as a group of UN
experts noted in January 2022.134 Human Rights Watch reported in January 2022 on theconditions for women in Ghazni province since the Taliban took control of the province.
Several of the women interviewed for the report stated that they had not been able to return
to work and had not received salaries for several months or were living of their savings,
despite being the breadwinners of their families. A former government worker noted thatwidows and women who had been the sole providers of their families were facing great
difficulties due to the constantly rising prices and turned to begging with their children. 135
For more information on the situation of female-headed households, please see section
4.Female-headed households on Food security. In addition, for further information on
women’s access to employment after the Taliban take-over, see EUAA COI report on
Afghanistan: Targeting of individuals, 5.2 Situation of women and girls under Taliban rule,5.2.2 Access to employment.

Save the Children, Afghanistan: A Fifth of Starving Families Sending Children to Work as Incomes Plummet in
Past Six Months, 14 February 2022, url
132
ILO, Employment prospects in Afghanistan: A rapid impact assessment, ILO Brief, January 2022, 19 January2022, url, p. 4
133
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Afghanistan 2022, 7 January 2022, url, pp. 24-25
134
UN, Afghanistan: Taliban attempting to steadily erase women and girls from public life – UN experts, 17 January2022, url
135
HRW, Afghanistan: Taliban Deprive Women of Livelihoods, Identity, 18 January 2022, url
131

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KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN KABUL CITY

3.3 IDPs
According to UNHCR’s 2021 Multi Sectoral Rapid Assessment Analysis, 63 % of IDP and IDP
returnee households said that they were not able to work and cover they daily expenses in
the period following the establishment of the Taliban de facto government. UNHCR suggested
a strong correlation between this fact and an increase in negative coping mechanisms among
respondents such as reducing meals or the size of meals, buying less food or borrowing food,accruing debt, delaying medical treatment, or sending children to work. Nevertheless, UNHCR
noted gender-based differences: among female-headed households, 81 % of IDP and 76 % of
IDP returnee households indicated their inability to work and cover daily expenses, while theshares were lower among male-headed IDP and IDP returnee households, with 72 % and
68 %, respectively. All groups named food as their top priority need, while other needs –prioritised differently among female and male-headed IDP and IDP returnee households included fuel, rent, non-food items and health care.136
More than half of displaced households (51 %) fell in the emergency category of the Livelihood
Coping Strategy (LCS) Index,137 meaning they had to apply non-sustainable livelihood coping
strategies that affected their future productivity and were more difficult to reverse, such as
selling house or land, selling their last female animals, and begging as a response to a lack offood or of money to buy food.138
UNOCHA noted that most people fleeing conflict in 2021 were displaced to provincial or urban
areas. As most of the IDPs lacked urban labour skills, while their livelihood assets had beenlooted, sold at very low prices or, in the case of livestock, lost, IDPs were left with very few
livelihood options in their new environment. In cases of return to their places of origin, IDP
returnees had to cope with reduced remittances, the loss of livelihood opportunities at theirplace of origin and the loss of family support networks according to UNHCR. 139 For moredetailed information on networks of support of IDPs, please see section 9 Networks of supportof this report.
The US Department of State (USDOS) noted in its 2021 Country Report on Human Rights, thatmany IDPs lacked identity documents (61.4 % of IDPs, according to a report by the Protection
Cluster of March 2022)140, and that especially female-led IDP households had difficulties
obtaining basic services as they lacked identity documents. In urban areas, many IDPs
reportedly faced discrimination, lacked access to basic services and faced a permanent risk ofbeing evicted from illegally occupied displacement sites. Lack of livelihood opportunities often
led to secondary displacement,141 while media also reported on IDPs begging to pay for shelter

UNHCR, Afghanistan 2021 Multi Sectoral Rapid Assessments Analysis, 21 April 2022, url, pp. 6, 9-10
REACH Initiative, Whole of Afghanistan Assessment (WoAA) Key Sectoral Findings, October 2021, 23 December
2021, url, p. 3
138
For the definition of ‘emergency’ and other LCS categories and what coping strategies they include, see WFP, A
Guide to Standardized Collection, Processing and Visualization of Cadre Harmonisé Food Security Indicators,
Chapter 7 Livelihood Coping Strategies, 22 September 2021, url; FAO, Livelihood-based Coping Strategy Index,
2021, url
139
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Afghanistan 2022, 7 January 2022, url, p. 30, 31
140
Protection Cluster Afghanistan, Afghanistan Protection Analysis Update – Q 4, 28 February 2022, url, p. 12
141
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 – Afghanistan, 12 April 2022, url, p. 35
136
137

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

and food142 or turning to extreme negative coping mechanisms such as child-selling or organselling.143

3.4 Returnees
In April 2022, IOM published the results of the third round of its returnee longitudinal survey –a long-term study that was designed to gain better understanding of the living conditions andreintegration processes of return migrants in Afghanistan. To this aim, several hundred
returnees from Turkey or the EU were interviewed on a regular basis over the course of
several years. According to the latest survey, half of the respondents (51 %), who had returned
to Afghanistan between January 2018 and July 2021, were unemployed by the end of 2021
and 29 % were working for daily wages. 12 % of respondents said they were self-employed.
41 % of respondents said they had been without work in the six months prior to the interview(in December 2021) and 10 % said they had lost their job in the previous six months and not
got a new one since then. Around two thirds (64 %) of those who lost their job in the last six
months said this was because their employer stopped activities and about a quarter (24 %)said it was because they closed their own business.144
In the same study, 95 % of respondents stated that their personal economic situation had
worsened in the last six months. While the rate of respondents earning a monthly income from
USD 1 [EUR 0.9]145 to USD 44 [EUR 41.8] increased from 16 % to 42 % between the second andthe third round of the survey146, the share of those earning between USD 45 [EUR 42.8] andUSD 89 [EUR 84.6] dropped from 23 % to 8 %. Almost half of respondents in both rounds
reported no income at all, with the share of those decreased in the third round. Nine in ten
respondents said they had to borrow money to cover monthly expenses and 77 % stated that
their monthly income was not enough to cover their family’s basic needs. Almost all
respondents (98 %) were facing periods of food insecurity and had to resort to measures suchas reducing the quantity (7 % very often, 53 % often) or quality (9 % very often, 53 % often) offood, skipping meals (1 % very often, 19 % often, 56 % sometimes) and borrowing food (14 %very often, 38 % often) to cope with food insecurity and scarcity. 27% of respondents indicatedtheir intention to migrate from Afghanistan in the next six months, 80 % of them named thelack of jobs in Afghanistan as their primary reason.147

142

openDemocracy, While displaced Afghans starve, international help is nowhere to be found, 31 January 2022,

url
Guardian (The), ‘I’ve already sold my daughters; now, my kidney’: winter in Afghanistan’s slums, 23 January2022, url
144
IOM, DTM Afghanistan, Returnee Longitudinal Survey (RLS), Round 3 – December 2021, 21 April 2022, url, p. 1
145
Exchange rates in this paragraph from European Commission, Exchange rate (InforEuro), n.d., url, accessed on 14
July 2022
146
Interviews for the second round were conducted in the period September-October 2021, and for the third roundin the period 4 December 2021 to 1 January 2022. IOM, DTM Afghanistan, Returnee Longitudinal Survey (RLS),
Round 3 – December 2021, 21 April 2022, url, p. 1
147
IOM, DTM Afghanistan, Returnee Longitudinal Survey (RLS), Round 3 – December 2021, 21 April 2022, url, pp. 24
143

28

KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN KABUL CITY

3.5 Situation in Kabul
In a survey by Save the Children conducted in the period November to December 2021, morethan 82 % of households148 reported that they had lost household income since the Taliban
takeover in mid-August 2021. Among those losing their entire income, 42.3 % lived in an urban
setting and 31.2 % in a rural setting. In Kabul, about 50 % of respondents said they had lost all
their income.149
According to a survey among 100 household respondents aged 16 to 35 years in Kabul city
published by the Austrian BFA Staatendokumentation (Country of Origin Information Unit of
the Austrian Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum) in January 2022, more men than
women reported having full-time jobs. 85.7 % of people surveyed in Kabul had a ‘low’ level ofincome (defined as less than 10 000 AFN, or about 100 USD month) and 14.3 % had a mid-level
income (defined as 100-200 USD per month). In comparison, Balkh had 96% at low level and
4 % at mid-level. Herat had 87.2 % at low level and 7.7% at mid-level. 85.7 % of people
surveyed in Kabul had a ‘low’ level of income (defined as less than 10 000 AFN, or about 100
USD month) and 14.3 % had a mid-level income (defined as 100-200 USD per month). In
comparison, Balkh had 96% at low level and 4 % at mid-level. Herat had 87.2 % at low leveland 7.7% at mid-level.150 and noted that they had difficulties in providing sufficient food andbasic goods for their families.151
More specific information on the situation in Kabul could not be found within the time
constraints of this report.

TTThe surveyed households were ‘current Save the Children programme participants in seven provinces where
Save the Children Afghanistan has an operational presence – Balkh, Faryab, Jawzjan, Kabul, Kandahar, Nangarhar
and Sar-e Pul’. Arlini, S. M. and Burgess, M., Afghanistan Multi-sectoral Needs Assessment – 2021/2022, Save theChildren, March 2022, url, p. 16
149
Arlini, S. M. and Burgess, M., Afghanistan Multi-sectoral Needs Assessment – 2021/2022, Save the Children,
March 2022, url, p. 58
150
Exchange rates in this paragraph from European Commission, Exchange rate (InforEuro), n.d., url, accessed on 14
July 2022
151
Austria, BFA Staatendokumentation, Dossier Afghanistan Socio-Economic Survey 2021, 12 January 2022, url, pp.
26-28
148

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

4.

Food security

4.1 Countrywide trends
As of March 2022, Afghanistan was reported to be facing ‘one of the world’s largest foodsecurity crises’152 and a ‘malnutrition crisis of unparalleled proportions’153 with a sharp surge in
the acute hunger-affected population from 14 million in July 2021 to around 23 million in March
2022.154 By comparison, the UN reported nearly 17 million food insecure people in March
2021.155 In the first quarter of 2022, the acute hunger-affected population reportedly
experienced great difficulty satisfying their day-to-day food needs and ensuring theirhousehold’s food security.156 The high prevalence of food insecurity stemmed from multiple
factors, most notably a series of severe droughts and the economic meltdown that followed
the Taliban’s seizure of power.157 Rising food prices were cited in connection with thesefactors, and the Ukraine conflict was identified as also adding to food insecurity in
Afghanistan.158
In May 2022, the multi-partner initiative, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification(IPC), reported that an estimated 19.7 million people were deprived of sufficient food in the
period between March and May 2022, which is classified as ‘lean’ season, i.e., the period
between harvests, with an estimated 13 million people in a ‘crisis situation’ (IPC Phase 3), 6.6
million in an ‘emergency situation’ (IPC Phase 4), and 20 000 people in ‘catastrophic
conditions’ (IPC Phase 5).159 Compared to IPC’s previous reporting period, from November
2021 to March 2022, food insecurity has been alleviated for the most affected households
through intensively scaled-up humanitarian food assistance (HFA). This is mainly due tohumanitarian actors being better able to reach beneficiaries in vulnerable rural areas thanduring the peak of the winter season.160 Yet according to IPC, the number of people
experiencing acute food insecurity at high and critical levels decreased only marginally.161 The
World Food Programme (WFP) reported in its monthly Food Security Updates that the

FAO, FAO Afghanistan Newsletter: 1st Quarter 2022 – Issue #27, 2022, url, p. 2
UN Afghanistan, Statement by Dr Ramiz Alakbarov, Deputy Special Representative for the Secretary General,
Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator, on the Continued Food Insecurity and Malnutrition Crisis
Facing People in Afghanistan, 15 March 2022, url
154
UN Afghanistan, Statement by Dr Ramiz Alakbarov, Deputy Special Representative for the Secretary General,
Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator, on the Continued Food Insecurity and Malnutrition Crisis
Facing People in Afghanistan, 15 March 2022, url
155
UN News, ‘If you don’t feed people, you feed conflict’, UN chief tells Security Council, 11 March 2021, url
156
FAO, FAO Afghanistan Newsletter: 1st Quarter 2022 – Issue #27, 2022, url, p. 2
157
FAO, FAO Afghanistan Newsletter: 1st Quarter 2022 – Issue #27, 2022, url, p. 2; IPC, Afghanistan: IPC Acute
Food Insecurity Analysis (March – November 2022), May 2022, url, p. 1; FEWS NET, Afghanistan Remote Monitoring
Update: Despite seasonal progress, poor macroeconomy and drought will drive high assistance needs, April 2022,
url, p. 1; AAN, A Pledging Conference for Afghanistan… But what about beyond the humanitarian?, 31 March 2022,
url
158
IPC, Afghanistan: IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis (March – November 2022), May 2022, url, p. 1
159
IPC, Afghanistan: IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis (March – November 2022), May 2022, url, pp. 1-2
160
IPC, Afghanistan: IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis (March – November 2022), May 2022, url, pp. 1-2; see also
WFP, Afghanistan Food Security Update: Round Seven March 2022, 19 April 2022 url, p. 1
161
IPC, Afghanistan: IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis (March – November 2022), May 2022, url, pp. 1-2
152
153

30

KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN KABUL CITY

percentage of people in Afghanistan facing insufficient food consumption162 declined from98 % in December 2021,163 to 95 % in January and February,164 93 % in March 2022165 and
92 % in April and May 2022166.
Since August 2021, food security has reportedly declined in all regions of Afghanistan167 andacute hunger was ‘not limited to remote parts of the country’ according to WFP Regional
Deputy Director Anthea Webb.168 Regional variations in the prevalence of food insecurity,
which also evolved differently during the referencing period of this report, are depicted in
Figure 1. For detailed information on the development in Kabul, please see section 4.5
Situation in Kabul.

Proportion of people with insufficient food consumption
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
North

Northeast

East

Southeast

pre 15 Aug 21

January 22

CentralHighlands
March 22

South

West

Herat

May 22

Figure 1: Proportion of people with inadequate nutrition per region, comparison between pre-August 2021 (i.e.,Round 1 of the WFP Afghanistan Food Security Update covering 19 July – 15 August 2021)169, January 2022, March
2022, and May 2022 based on WFP data170

For May 2022, WFP reported, that ‘hunger continues cutting across urban-rural divides’ as
92 % of urban families were found to be facing insufficient food consumption as well as 92 %of rural ones.171 According to WFP, Afghans have had to adopt ‘crisis-coping’ strategies to deal
with insufficient food consumption. These numbers rose from 11 % in pre-August 15 time
period, to 43 % in October 2021, 55 % in November, to 66% in January 2022, to 71 % in

According to WFP “insufficient food consumption" is composed of the Food Consumption Score (FCS) of “poorfood consumption” and the FCS of “borderline food consumption”. For further information on the Food
Consumption Scores, please see WFP, Meta Data for the Food Consumption Score (FCS) Indicator, 3 February
2015, url
163
WFP, Afghanistan Food Security Update: 8 December 2021, 10 December 2021, url, p. 1
164
WFP, Afghanistan Food Security Update: Round Five January 2022, 16 February 2022, url, p. 1; WFP, Afghanistan
Food Security Update: Round Six February 2022, 23 March 2022, url, p. 1
165
WFP, Afghanistan Food Security Update: Round Seven March 2022, 19 April 2022, url, p. 1
166
WFP, Afghanistan Food Security Update: Round Eight April 2022, 13 June 2022, url, p. 1; WFP, Afghanistan Food
Security Update: Round Nine May 2022, 27 June 2022, url, p. 1
167
WFP, Afghanistan Food Security Update: 7 January 2022, 13 January 2022, url, p. 1
168
VOA, Humanitarians Fear Afghan Hunger Crisis Could Kill More Than War, 14 February 2022, url
169
Pre-August data slightly differs between WFP Round 5, Round 7 and Round 9. The drafters relied on the more
recent figures for the period before August (Round 9, published in June 2022).
170
WFP, Afghanistan Food Security Update: Round Five January 2022 [Map], 16 February 2022, url, p. 3; WFP,
Afghanistan Food Security Update: Round Seven March 2022 [Map], 19 April 2022 url, p. 3; WFP, Afghanistan Food
Security Update: Round Nine May 2022 [Map], 27 June 2022, url, p. 3
171
WFP, Afghanistan Food Security Update: Round Nine May 2022, 27 June 2022, url, p. 2
162

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

February 2022, and back down to 63% in March,172 59 % in April and 57 % in May.173 These
measures, which may include skipping meals or incurring debt to ensure that food is madeavailable ‘reduced the quality, quantity, and diversity of food available, led to high levels of
wasting174 in children, and other harmful impacts on the physical and mental wellbeing of
women, men, and children.’175 UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Afghanistan,
Ramiz Alakbarov, was moreover quoted in an February 2022 news article as saying, ‘People
are selling their organs. People are selling their children. They are desperate. They are
hungry. And the situation is very, very dire.”176
With below-average harvest prospects in most parts of the country for the period between
June and November 2022, various factors at the socioeconomic and developmental levels but
also the sanctions against the de facto authorities were ‘further expected to hamper theforeseeable seasonal improvement’. At the household level, the situation was reportedly
expected to be exacerbated by the anticipated reduction in humanitarian food assistance due
to a lack of funds.177
As of 29 March 2022, the Joint Market Monitoring Initiative (JMMI)178 reported that both foodand non-food items were generally available at Afghan markets, but that consumers struggled
to purchase them as they were too expensive.179 For January 2022, WFP reported of 72 % ofinterviewed families not having enough to eat at least once during the previous 14 days andmost of them (92 %) indicated that this was due to a lack of money to buy food.180 Similarly,
Save the Children’s Afghanistan Country Director noted that there was no shortage of food,but that ‘children are starving to death’ as their parents did not have the money to pay for it.181
Numbers remained similarly high in March 2022, with WFP estimating that 93 % of people in
Afghanistan reportedly did not have enough to eat, and that 63 % resorted to crisis coping
strategies.182
USAID-funded Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) indicated that many rural
households in lower-lying areas saw improved access to food and income, and poor urbanhouseholds also witnessed seasonal improvements regarding income opportunities in April

WFP, Afghanistan Food Security Update: Round Seven March 2022, 19 April 2022 url, p. 2
WFP, Afghanistan Food Security Update: Round Nine May 2022, 27 June 2022, url, p. 1
174
‘Child wasting refers to a child who is too thin for his or her height and is the result of recent rapid weight loss or
the failure to gain weight. A child who is moderately or severely wasted has an increased risk of death, but
treatment is possible.’ WHO, Wasting among children under 5 years of age (JME), n.d., url
175
UN Afghanistan, Statement by Dr Ramiz Alakbarov, Deputy Special Representative for the Secretary General,
Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator, on the Continued Food Insecurity and Malnutrition Crisis
Facing People in Afghanistan, 15 March 2022, url
176
VOA, Humanitarians Fear Afghan Hunger Crisis Could Kill More Than War, 14 February 2022, url
177
IPC, Afghanistan: IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis (March – November 2022), May 2022, url, p. 1
178
The Afghanistan Joint Market Monitoring Initiative (JMMI) was launched by the Afghanistan Cash and Voucher
Working Group (CVWG) and partners in March 2020, in collaboration with REACH Initiative (REACH).
179
JMMI, Market Trends – March 2022, 29 March 2022, url, pp. 5, 8, 11
180
WFP, Afghanistan Food Security Update: 7 January 2022, 13 January 2022, url, p. 1
181
Save the Children, Afghanistan: A Fifth of Starving Families Sending Children to Work as Incomes Plummet in
Past Six Months, 14 February 2022, url
182
WFP, Afghanistan Food Security Update: Round Seven March 2022, 19 April 2022, url, p. 1
172
173

32

KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN KABUL CITY

2022.183 According to a May 2022 IPC report, particularly non-farming households were
expected to face major difficulties affording food.184
Food prices were at historically high levels and expected to rise further or stabilize at a highlevel.185 As of February 2022, the cost of a regular food basket was reported to exceed 82 %of an average family’s income.186 JMMI reported a 23 % increase in average median cost of thefood basket between March 2021 and March 2022 and a 37 % increase between July 2021
and December 2021, the month were the food basket price peaked.187 In March 2022, themedian cost of a minimum expenditure basket (MEB)188 was AFN 20 211 [EUR 215.48189].190 In
the same month, the daily wage of an unskilled worker amounted to AFN 283.2 [EUR 3.02]
and of a skilled worker to AFN 573.2 [EUR 6.11].191.In the early months of 2022, ‘prices of key
staple food commodities continued to increase’;;;192 between April and May 2022, staple
wheat and wheat flour prices reportedly rose by 3% despite the harvest season, ‘reachinglevels similar to the record-high prices recorded in January 2022’.193 The general increase in
prices was primarily caused by the depreciation of the Afghan currency, but the ongoing crisisin Ukraine and Russia was expected to significantly affect the supply and prices of food andfertilizers as well. Citing monthly WFP data, IPC reported that wheat prices had increased
45 %, wheat flour 49 %, rice 20 %, cooking oil 32 %, pulses 23 %, and sugar 25 % between
June 2021 and April 2022.194 Figure 2 shows the price development of the above-mentioned
basic commodities across Afghan markets between December 2021 and June 2022. Figure 3
depicts the ratio of basic commodities per daily non-qualified labour wage.

FEWS NET, Afghanistan Remote Monitoring Update: Despite seasonal progress, poor macroeconomy anddrought will drive high assistance needs, April 2022, url, pp. 1, 4
184
IPC, Afghanistan: IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis (March – November 2022), May 2022, url, p. 6
185
IPC, Afghanistan: IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis (March – November 2022), May 2022, url, p. 6
186
UNHCR, Afghanistan: Operational update (February 2022), 16 March 2022, url, p. 5
187
JMMI, Market Trends – March 2022, 29 March 2022, url, p. 5
188
Defined as representing the minimum culturally adjusted group of items required to support a seven-person
Afghan household for one month. See REACH Initiative, Afghanistan Joint Market Monitoring Initiative (JMMI), 7-17
March 2022, 19 April 2022, url, p. 6
189
Exchange rates in this paragraph from European Commission, Exchange rate (InforEuro), n.d., url, accessed on 14
July 2022
190
REACH Initiative, Afghanistan Joint Market Monitoring Initiative (JMMI), 7-17 March 2022, 19 April 2022, url, p. 1
191
WFP, Afghanistan Countrywide Monthly Market Price Bulletin Issue 22 (covering March 2022), 12 April 2022, url,p. 1
192
FEWS NET, Afghanistan Remote Monitoring Update: Despite seasonal progress, poor macroeconomy anddrought will drive high assistance needs, April 2022, url, p. 3
193
FEWS NET, Afghanistan Remote Monitoring Update: In rural areas, food security outcomes improve only
temporarily given poor crop production, June 2022, url, pp. 2-3
194
IPC, Afghanistan: IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis (March – November 2022), May 2022, url, pp. 2, 6
183

33

Price in AFG/KG

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Food price trend: basic commodities at national average,
Dec 2021 - Jun 2022

210
190
170
150
130
110
90
70
50
30

Dec 21

Jan 22

Cooking Oil

Feb 22

PulsesMar 22

Apr 22

Rice (low quality)

May 22Sugar

Jun 22Wheat flour (low quality)

Figure 2: Development of prices of basic commodities at various markets across Afghanistan between December
2021 and June 2022, based on WFP data195

Basic commodities (in kg) per daily wage (non-qualified
labour): national average
9.5

5.0
3.2
2.2

5.1
4.2

2.6
1.6

1.5

Jul 21

Dec 21
Cooking Oil

Pulses

6.5

6.4

6.4

5.9 5.9

5.4
4.3
2.6

2.4

1.6

Feb 22
Rice (low quality)

5.2

4.6

4.5

2.5
1.4

Apr 22Sugar

5.8

Jun 22Wheat flour (low quality)

Figure 3: Ratio of basic commodities (in kg) per daily wage (non-qualified, non-agricultural labour) at various
markets across Afghanistan between December 2021 and June 2022 and in comparison to July 2021 prior to the
Taliban takeover (highlighted in different colours), based on WFP data196

4.2 Female-headed households
According to a WFP update published in April 2022, female-headed households werereported197 to be ‘struggling the most’ with 97 % experiencing insufficient food consumption.198
This share was previously estimated by UN sources to be ‘almost 100 %’ as of February and
ACCORD, chart based on WFP, Afghanistan – Food Prices, last updated 10 July 2022, url
ACCORD, chart based on WFP, Afghanistan – Food Prices, last updated 10 July 2022, url
197
WFP’s findings on female-headed households were described as ‘indicative’ due to a small sample size. WFP,
Afghanistan Food Security Update: Round Seven March 2022, 19 April 2022 url, p. 2
198
WFP, Afghanistan Food Security Update: Round Seven March 2022, 19 April 2022 url, p. 2
195

196

34

KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN KABUL CITY

mid-March 2022.199 These households reportedly resorted to ‘crisis-coping’ strategies more
often (87%) than male-headed households (56%).200 Based on a multi-sectorial rapid
assessment201 between October and December 2021, UNHCR found that post-August 2021
around 4 % of households turned to the negative coping strategy of child selling and 2 % toearly marriage. When comparing male-headed and female-headed households, the findings
are ‘mostly similar although the situation is marginally worse for female headedhouseholds’.202
In Afghan culture, women reportedly ‘bear the brunt of the effects of food insecurity’ and often
tend to feed their families first and themselves second.203 In a March 2022 news article Orzala
Ashraf Nemat, the exiled head of the independent think tank Afghanistan Research and
Evaluation Unit (AREU), indicated that for female-households it is more challenging to accessaid ‘in the deeply conservative and patriarchal country’, as it is, for example, quite difficult for
women to access food distribution centers when they are already overcrowded with men. The
same article moreover reported on the struggle female-headed households had to faced
amidst the humanitarian crisis, including skipping and drastically reducing meals.204

4.3 IDPs
Recently displaced households experienced worse food security scores than any otherpopulation group in Afghanistan.205 46 % of displaced households had a poor Food
Consumption Score (FCS) (measuring the frequency of consumption of different food groups
consumed by a household in the 7 days prior to data collection),206 compared to 36 % of theresident population.207 According to the above-mentioned UNHCR multi-sectorial rapid
assessment between October and December 2021, food was the main priority in terms ofassistance needs of male- as well as female-headed IDP and IDP returnee households.
However, only 5 % of households had reportedly received assistance.208 An article publishedby the independent media platform openDemocracy in January 2022 also stated that

WFP, WFP Data Shows Almost 100% of Households Headed by Women in Afghanistan Not Getting EnoughFood, 28 February 2022, url; UN Afghanistan, Statement by Dr Ramiz Alakbarov, Deputy Special Representative for
the Secretary General, Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator, on the Continued Food Insecurity andMalnutrition Crisis Facing People in Afghanistan, 15 March 2022, url
200
WFP, Afghanistan Food Security Update: Round Seven March 2022, 19 April 2022 url, p. 2
201
TTThis survey is not representative for the whole Afghan population and mainly provides findings ‘on thechallenges IDPs and IDP returnees, in particular, face in Afghanistan’. UNHCR, Afghanistan 2021 Multi Sectoral
Rapid Assessments Analysis, 21 April 2022, url, p. 2
202
UNHCR, Afghanistan 2021 Multi Sectoral Rapid Assessments Analysis, 21 April 2022, url, p. 9
203
FAO, FAO Afghanistan Newsletter: 1st Quarter 2022 – Issue #27, 2022, url, p. 2
204
Gandhara, Afghan Widows Struggle To Survive Amid Humanitarian Disaster, 25 March 2022, url
205
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Afghanistan 2022, 7 January 2022, url, p. 30
206
For the definition of ‘emergency’ and other CLS categories, see WFP, A Guide to Standardized Collection,
Processing and Visualization of Cadre Harmonisé Food Security Indicators, Chapter 7 Livelihood Coping Strategies,
22 September 2021, url
207
REACH Initiative, Whole of Afghanistan Assessment (WoAA) Key Sectoral Findings, October 2021, 23 December
2021, url, pp. 2-3
208
UNHCR, Afghanistan 2021 Multi Sectoral Rapid Assessments Analysis [Chart], 21 April 2022, url, p. 6
199

35

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

residents of an IDP camp in the north-western outskirts of Kabul received little to no support
from NGOs or the new Taliban de facto authorities.209
IDPs largely had to rely on begging and garbage selling, and meals were reportedly covered
almost exclusively by (stale) bread or potatoes.210 According to UNOCHA's Humanitarian
Needs Overview, 54 % of recently displaced IDP households reported facing a reduced
access to food, and 13 % reported taking ‘high-risk activities to obtain food’ in the past 30
days.211 Regarding negative coping strategies, UNHCR found that these strategies were moreprevalent among IDP returnee households headed by women than by other household
types.212 Tens of thousands of IDPs who have returned to Afghanistan’s ‘former battleground
districts’ faced significant struggles to feed their families. After borrowing money to buy foodor repair their homes, many IDP returnees were reported to be severely indebted.213

4.4 Returnees
In its Humanitarian Needs Overview published in January 2022, UNOCHA stated that 88 % ofcross-border returnee households mentioned food as a ‘priority need’, while 57 % reported
having difficulties obtaining or affording it.214 At the end of 2021, a survey by Save the Children
among 1 409 households of Save the Children programme participants in the provinces ofBalkh, Faryab, Jawzjan, Kabul, Kandahar, Nangarhar and Sar-e Pul similarly noted that 93.1 %of surveyed returnee households were in need of food assistance.215 Concerning negative
coping strategies employed to obtain food or money to buy food, 67 % of cross-borderreturnee households reportedly used savings, 42 % sold household assets, 34 % reduced
health and education expenditures, 24 % reported that they sent their children to work, 19
percent reported taking ‘high-risk activities’. 216
According to the WFP’s Annual Country Report on Afghanistan, four out of five households ofreturnees from Pakistan and Iran who were living in Kabul and received cash-based
humanitarian assistance, indicated poor food consumption, the remaining ones indicatedborderline food consumption. Most households had experienced sickness or loss of
employment and wages and had used negative coping mechanisms such as borrowing
money to pay for food, shelter or healthcare, according to WFP’s Annual Country Report
2021.217

209

openDemocracy, While displaced Afghans starve, international help is nowhere to be found, 31 January 2022,

url
DRC, Hunger eats away at Afghans' ability to dignified self-preservation, 24 March 2022, url; openDemocracy,
While displaced Afghans starve, international help is nowhere to be found, 31 January 2022, url
211
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Afghanistan 2022, 7 January 2022, url, p. 32
212
UNHCR, Afghanistan 2021 Multi Sectoral Rapid Assessments Analysis, 21 April 2022, url, p. 9
213
UNHCR, Displaced Afghan families return to destruction and hunger in Helmand, 10 January 2022, url
214
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Afghanistan 2022, 7 January 2022, url, p. 33
215
Arlini, S. M. and Burgess, M., Afghanistan Multi-sectoral Needs Assessment – 2021/2022, Save the Children,
March 2022, url, p. 30
216
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Afghanistan 2022, 7 January 2022, url, p. 35
217
WFP, Afghanistan Annual Country Report 2021, 2022, url, p. 16
210

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KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN KABUL CITY

4.5 Situation in Kabul
Since August 2021, humanitarian food assistance operations in Kabul City suffered repeateddisruptions.218 Most recently, WFP operations were suspended between 20 March and 4 April
2022 due to security concerns but resumed in early April.219 According to IPC, in the period
between March and May 2022, 30 % of the analysed urban population in Kabul experienced
stress in regard to their food security (IPC Phase 2), 35 % were found to be in state of crisis(IPC Phase 3) and 15 % in an emergency situation (IPC Phase 4), while only 20 % wereclassified as food secure.220
As depicted in Figure 4 below, the proportion of people in Kabul with malnutrition increased
after the events of 15 August 2021 and declined again slightly between January 2022 andMarch 2022.

Proportion of people with insufficient food consumption

Kabul

0%

20%

40%
pre 15 Aug 21

60%

January 22

March 2280%
May 22

Figure 4: Proportion of people with inadequate nutrition per region, comparison between pre-August 2021 (i.e.,Round 1 of the WFP Afghanistan Food Security Update covering 19 July – 15 August 2021)221, January 2022, andMarch 2022, based on WFP data222

According to UNICEF, in Kabul wheat flour prices in early February 2022 were 81 % above thefive-year average.223 According to a local media report of April 2022 quoting a resident of thecity, a bag of flour was sold for AFN 2 450 [EUR 26.12]224, while people earned AFN 100 [[EUR
1.06] per day.225 Figure 5 shows the price development of basic commodities at markets in
Kabul City. Figure 6 displays the relation between these commodities and non-qualified, nonagricultural daily wage.

IPC, Afghanistan: IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis (March – November 2022), May 2022, url, p. 10
WFP, Afghanistan Situation Report: 8 April 2022, 12 April 2022, url, p. 1
220
IPC, Afghanistan: IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis (March – November 2022), May 2022, url, p. 10
221Pre-August data differs between WFP Round 5 and Round 7. The drafters relied on the more recent figures forthe period before August (Round 7, published in April 2022).
222
ACCORD graphic based on WFP, Afghanistan Food Security Update: Round Five January 2022 [Map], 16
February 2022, url, p. 3; WFP, Afghanistan Food Security Update: Round Seven March 2022 [Map], 19 April 2022
url, p. 3; WFP, Afghanistan Food Security Update: Round Nine May 2022 [Map], 27 June 2022, url, p. 3
223
UNICEF, Afghanistan, Humanitarian Situation Report #3, 1-28 February 2022, url, p. 2
224
Exchange rates in this paragraph from European Commission, Exchange rate (InforEuro), n.d., url, accessed on
14 July 2022
225
Kabul Times (The), Prices still high; even on the rise despite officials’ efforts, Kabul citizens, 7 April 2022, url
218

219

37

100%

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Price in AFG/KG

Food price trend: basic commodities in Kabul City,
Dec 2021 - Jun 2022
210
190
170
150
130
110
90
70
50
30
Dec 21

Jan 22

Cooking Oil

Feb 22

PulsesMar 22

Apr 22

Rice (low quality)

May 22Sugar

Jun 22Wheat flour (low quality)

Figure 5: Development of prices of basic commodities in Kabul between December 2021 and June 2022, based on
WFP data226

Basic commodities (in kg) per daily wage (non-qualified
labour) in Kabul City
10.3
8.8

7.9

7.5

7.0

3.4

3.4

2.1

1.9

Jul 21
Cooking Oil

Dec 21
Pulses

6.6

5.9

5.4

2.9

2.8

1.9

Feb 22
Rice (low quality)

8.8

7.4

5.5

5.1
2.3

8.8

8.1

8.0

2.8
1.6

Apr 22Sugar

Jun 22Wheat flour (low quality)

Figure 6: Ratio of basic commodities (in kg) per daily wage (non-qualified, non-agricultural labour) in Kabul between
December 2021 and June 2022 and in comparison to July 2021 prior to the Taliban takeover (highlighted indifferent colours), based on WFP data227

226
227

ACCORD, chart based on WFP, Afghanistan – Food Prices, last updated 10 July 2022, url
ACCORD, chart based on WFP, Afghanistan – Food Prices, last updated 10 July 2022, url

38

KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN KABUL CITY

5.

Housing and living conditions

5.1 Countrywide trends
According to a report on NRC’s operations in Afghanistan of November 2021, more than 6.8
million individuals (of an estimated population of 34 262 840)228 lived in inadequate housing
conditions, such as overcrowding, rooms with low ceilings that did not allow standing up,
windows without glass and limited privacy. Women, elderly people and persons withdisabilities were the most affected by these adverse living conditions as they often spent moretime inside the house than other population groups, as NRC noted.229 According to the Wholeof Afghanistan Assessment (WoA), a nationwide survey among roughly 9 880 households(including IDPs, cross-border returnees and host communities) in the period August to
October 2021,230 slightly more than 70 % of responding households reportedly lived in partiallyor significantly damaged or fully destroyed shelters. In provinces that were most affected by
the conflict such as Farah, Helmand and Kandahar, more than 20 % of households reportedly
lived in significantly damaged shelters.231 Overall, the 2021 WoA indicated that 31 % ofhouseholds affected by conflict have lost their shelters or had them seriously damaged.
UNOCHA estimated that in 2022, nearly 11 million persons would be in need of adequate
shelters, heating items, blankets and adequate clothing for the winter.232
In a survey by Save the Children among 1 409 households of Save the Children programmeparticipants in the provinces of Balkh, Faryab, Jawzjan, Kabul, Kandahar, Nangarhar and Sar-e
Pul, the majority of respondents lived in a permanent house that they either owned (71.5 %) or
rented (18.2 %). 9.8 % lived in a shelter, temporary settlement or unfinished or abandonedbuilding. Most of the shelters were reportedly made of relatively low-quality material such as
mud (76.3 %) while 14.8 % were made of better or stronger material such as bricks.
Respondents to Save the Children’s survey indicated that more than half of the shelters (59 %)had no separate provisions for women and men and 20.9 % of shelters had only partial
separate provisions. The largest share of respondents living in shelters or temporary
settlements were households of IDPs (18.1 %), undocumented returnees (11.9 %) or households
headed by someone with a disability (9.9 %).233 More than half of the interviewed households
reportedly used grass, animal waste and branches as an energy source for heating (50.5 %)and about two in five households (42.3 %) for cooking. The majority of respondents using thissource of energy were IDP households, poor and urban households.234 Other reports

Taliban de facto authorities of Afghanistan, NSIA, Estimated Population of Afghanistan 2022-2023, April 2022,
url, p. 3
229
NRC, NRC’s operations in Afghanistan, Fact Sheet November 2021, November 2021, url, p. 4
230
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview January 2022, 7 January 2022, url, p. 74;
231
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview January 2022, 7 January 2022, url, p. 40, REACH Initiative, Whole ofAfghanistan 2021, August-September 2021, Final Dataset Household-Level Analysis, n.d., url
232
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview January 2022, 7 January 2022, url, p. 39
233
Arlini, S. M. and Burgess, M., Afghanistan Multi-sectoral Needs Assessment – 2021/2022, Save the Children,
March 2022, url, p. 28
234
Arlini, S. M. and Burgess, M., Afghanistan Multi-sectoral Needs Assessment – 2021/2022, Save the Children,
March 2022, url, pp. 29-30
228

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

mentioned families heating their homes with used coal chips, wood scraps, cardboard andburnable garbage collected from the streets as they could not afford wood or heating fuel.235
NRC noted that the number of people in need of support with regard to water, sanitation andhygiene has nearly doubled in 2021, due to drought, conflict and the COVID-19 pandemic,
which has limited the population’s access to these materials. Moreover, the population
suffered from water scarcity, poorly managed and underfunded water facilities, and lack offinancial means to pay for basic hygiene materials.236 According to a report by UNICEF of
March 2022, 80 % of Afghanistan’s population consumed unsafe water, and while prior to theeconomic crisis, about 30 % of Afghans used to buy drinking water from private vendors, thisrate was steadily decreasing as people could no longer afford to do so. Moreover, half of the
population lacked access to at least basic sanitation facilities and 60 % had no access to basic
hygiene facilities. Nearly 30 % of households had no toilet that hygienically separated wastefrom human contact and nearly 11 % of the population continued to practice open defecation,
as UNICEF noted.237 Most people with disabilities faced barriers in accessing WASH facilities,
according to UNOCHA, as water points and latrines were either too far away or access wasdifficult due to slippery ramps or a lack of handrails, easy-to-use water taps or because access
was not suitable to wheelchair users.238
A media report noted that the decision by the Taliban to prohibit women in Balkh and Heratprovinces access to public bathhouses (hammams) sparked outrage, as many households
lacked the facilities and capacity to heat large quantities of water for washing and bathing at
home. In Herat city, according to the media report, only 39 % of neighbourhoods had
adequate access to water and sanitation.239
For information on water, sanitation, and hygiene standards at Afghan schools, please see
section 7.1 .
When asked about land-related issues, respondents of a household survey240 conducted bysix humanitarian organisations in the 4th quarter of 2021 and analysed by the Protection
Cluster, named rental disputes as their most pressing concern. 16 % of respondents pointed atland-related issues in their communities. Other issues like inheritance disputes and accessand use issues were also mentioned. Households in Helmand, Zabul, Nangarhar, Kabul andGhor provinces were reportedly most affected. Key informants interviewed in the same period,
noted that such disputes often arose when households were not able to pay their rent on timeand subsequently were facing harassment and eviction, or abusive practices (such as a

Washington Post (The), As Afghanistan’s harsh winter sets in, many are forced to choose between food andwarmth, 7 January 2022, url; UNHCR, Displaced Families in Kabul caught in downward spiral, 16 December 2021,
url
236
NRC, NRC’s operations in Afghanistan, Fact Sheet November 2021, November 2021, url, p. 4
237
UNICEF, Afghanistan WASH on the Brink, 2022, 30 March 2022, url, pp. 2-4
238
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview January 2022, 7 January 2022, url, p. 39
239
Guardian (The), Taliban stop Afghan women from using bathhouses in northern provinces, 7 January 2022, url
240
The report used data collected in 12 722 household-level interviews, 589 Focus Group Discussions and 2 177
Key Informant Interviews by DRC, INTERSOS, IOM, IRC, NRC and UNHCR. Protection Cluster Afghanistan,
Afghanistan Protection Analysis Update – Q4, 28 February 2022, url, p. 4
235

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KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN KABUL CITY

sudden increase of rent or asking for rent during the month) by their landlords. As mosthouseholds had no rental agreements, tenants were vulnerable to such practices.241

5.2 Female-headed households
UNOCHA noted in its 2022 report that women required both a Tazkira (identity document)
and a marriage certificate to secure housing, land and property (HLP) rights and that women
had a greater risk of inheritance problems if they lacked proper documentation. At the sametime, according to the 2021 WoA Assessment, 31 % of households reported that no female
household member had a Tazkira, and according to estimates, less than 5 % of land andhousing tenure and ownership documents included the name of a female family member. As aresult – and since a woman’s ownership of land was mainly manifested through her
relationship with a male owner – women often lacked independent access to land andhousing rights.242
Inheritance issues were also often mentioned in key informant interviews analysed by theProtection Cluster, noting that women were particularly affected because communities andfamilies discriminated against their inheritance rights, while informal justice systems would bediscriminatory when applying related legal frameworks. Consequently, affected households
were living in permanently instable situations, which made them ‘especially vulnerable toabuse and exploitation’. Such households, the Protection Cluster noted, were in need offurther HLP assistance and cash for rent in case they were at risk of eviction.243 The threat ofeviction was the second most urgent concern for female-headed households, according tofindings of UNHCR, while it was the primary concern for IDP households, both male andfemale-headed.244

5.4 Returnees
In January 2022, UNOCHA noted that cross-border returnees faced significant humanitarianneeds and often struggled to access basic services due to their socio-economic situation, lackof civil documentation and a shelter situation. Findings of the 2021 WoA Assessment indicatedthat almost two-thirds of returnees (62 %) lived in non-permanent, non-robust shelters, withhalf of returnee households lacking insulation and 39 % reporting leaks during heavy rain.
Moreover, 48 % relied on wood and bushes and 12 % on animal dung and waste as heating
sources. 63 % of cross-border returnees reported a lack of adequate heating sources andnone reportedly had access to electricity. The difficult socio-economic and shelter situation
also increased the risk of gender-based violence (GBV), as UNOCHA noted, with 43 % of
returnee households reporting at least one place in their settlement being unsafe for girls andwomen.245

Protection Cluster Afghanistan, Afghanistan Protection Analysis Update – Q4, 28 February 2022, url, p. 13
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview January 2022, 7 January 2022, url, pp. 13-14
243
Protection Cluster Afghanistan, Afghanistan Protection Analysis Update – Q4, 28 February 2022, url, p. 14
244
UNHCR, Afghanistan 2021 Multi Sectoral Rapid Assessments Analysis, 21 April 2022, url, p. 7
245
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Afghanistan 2022, 7 January 2022, url, pp. 33-34
241

242

41

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

In a survey by Save the Children among 1 409 households246, 61 % of undocumented
returnees and 38 % of documented returnees reported a need for shelter.247

5.3 IDPs
UNOCHA noted in January 2022 that according to findings of the WoA assessment, a large
number of newly displaced IDPs were living in urban areas and residing in poorly constructedhouses. For more than half of IDP households (53 %), shelter was reportedly one of the top
three priority needs, compared with 39 % of cross-border returnees and 26 % of hostcommunities. 85 % of IDPs reported at least one shelter issue, such as leaks during heavy rain,lack of insulation, and others.248
Save the Children noted in a survey among 1 409 households249 by the end of 2021 that39.2 % of IDP households stated to be in need of shelter.250
According to data collected by IOM across the country in the period November to December
2021 from 13 187 settlements, almost two-thirds of all IDPs who were displaced in the period
2012 to 2021, were living in a house they either owned (30 %) or rented (32 %). More than athird (37 %) of IDPs lived with a host family, 1 % lived in a tent and less than 1 % in open air. The
largest number of IDPs living in informal settlements (166 857 individuals) was living in Khost
province. Overall, about 9 % of IDPs across the country lived in informal settlements, andalmost two-thirds of all IDPs remained within their province of origin, according to IOM.251
According to findings of UNHCR’s 2021 Rapid Assessment Analysis, 84 % of IDPs indicatedthat they were renting shelters. UNHCR pointed to the fact that the presence of IDPs who
were renting shelters led to an increase in rental prices and contributed to community
tensions, noting that also 20 % of host community members said they were living in rented
shelters. In this context, the primary concern named by IDP households was the threat ofbeing evicted in case of inability to pay rent.252 Concerns with regard to eviction were alsomentioned in several other reports, linked to the fact that many displaced households were
living in insecure accommodation arrangements such as having only verbal or no rental

Please note that the surveyed households were ‘current Save the Children programme participants in sevenprovinces where Save the Children Afghanistan has an operational presence – Balkh, Faryab, Jawzjan, Kabul,
Kandahar, Nangarhar and Sar-e Pul’. Arlini, S. M. and Burgess, M., Afghanistan Multi-sectoral Needs Assessment –2021/2022, Save the Children, March 2022, url, p. 16
247
Arlini, S. M. and Burgess, M., Afghanistan Multi-sectoral Needs Assessment – 2021/2022, Save the Children,
March 2022, url, p. 32
248
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Afghanistan 2022, 7 January 2022, url, p. 31
249
The surveyed households were ‘current Save the Children programme participants in seven provinces where
Save the Children Afghanistan has an operational presence – Balkh, Faryab, Jawzjan, Kabul, Kandahar, Nangarhar
and Sar-e Pul’. Arlini, S. M. and Burgess, M., Afghanistan Multi-sectoral Needs Assessment – 2021/2022, Save theChildren, March 2022, url, p. 16
250
Arlini, S. M. and Burgess, M., Afghanistan Multi-sectoral Needs Assessment – 2021/2022, Save the Children,
March 2022, url, p. 32
251
IOM, DTM Afghanistan, Baseline Mobility Assessment Summary Results Round 14 November-December 2021, 2
March 2022, url, pp. 1, 5-6
252
UNHCR, Afghanistan 2021 Multi Sectoral Rapid Assessments Analysis, 21 April 2022, url, p. 7
246

42

KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN KABUL CITY

agreements,253 living in ‘illegally occupied displacement sites’,254 or informal sites andsettlements255.
Another shelter-related issue mentioned by UNHCR’s 2021 Rapid Assessment Analysis was
overcrowding (see also above, section 5.1 ), which affected IDP and host communities
likewise. 70 % of all households assessed had between 1 and 10 persons in their household,while 27 % had between 11 and 20 household members and 3 % of households included 21 ormore persons. Moreover, 49 % of IDP households indicated that they lived in ‘shelters inremote locations with no access to basic services’ and 34 % reportedly had no water source inless than 500 metres distance.256 UNOCHA equally noted that IDP households weredisproportionally in need of water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) facilities. 79 % of newly
displaced households reported limited access to water, which would cover only the needs fordrinking, washing and handwashing.257 IDP households were slightly more in need of accessto sufficient handwashing facilities (including soap and sufficient water) than non-displacedhouseholds (with 34 % of IDP and 32 % of non-displaced households being in ‘critical’ need).
Similarly, 26 % of IDP households (compared with 19 % of non-displaced ones) were in criticalneed of access to functional and improved (e.g., including flush or covered pit latrines)
sanitation facilities.258

5.5 Situation in Kabul
A survey conducted for the Austrian BFA Staatendokumentation of January 2022 indicatedthat brick-and-mortar houses or mudbrick houses were the most common dwellings in Kabul
city with only a small number of the population living in an apartment, tent or shack. Renting or
leasing accommodation was found to be more common than owning one’s home and formany households the monthly costs for accommodation were in the range of AFN 5 000 [EUR
53.30]259 to AFN 10 000 [EUR 106.62], or less than AFN 5 000 [EUR 53.30], while only a few
paid between AFN 10 000 [EUR 106.62] and AFN 20 000 [EUR 213.23].260.
According to a brief report by IOM of April 2022, based on information from local real estateagents and house owners, the average monthly rent for a three-bedroom apartment in Kabul
city was USD 120 to USD 150 (EUR 110.19 to EUR 137.74)261, which represented a decrease in
price (USD 250 to USD 300 and EUR 229.57–EUR 275.48, respectively) compared to the past.
Monthly rent for a simple house with three bedrooms in the suburbs of Kabul was about
Protection Cluster Afghanistan, Afghanistan Protection Analysis Update – Q4, 28 February 2022, url, pp. 13-14;
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Afghanistan 2022, 7 January 2022, url, p. 14
254
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 – Afghanistan, 12 April 2022, url, p. 35
255
CCCM and Protection Clusters Afghanistan, Joint-Advocacy Briefing Note From The Shelter/NFI, CCCM And
Protection Clusters Afghanistan Pledging Conference, 31 March 2022, url
256
UNHCR, Afghanistan 2021 Multi Sectoral Rapid Assessments Analysis, 21 April 2022, url, p. 7
257
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Afghanistan 2022, 7 January 2022, url, p. 31
258
REACH Initiative, Whole of Afghanistan Assessment (WoAA) Key Sectoral Findings, October 2021, 23 December
2021, url, p. 8
259
Exchange rates in this paragraph from European Commission, Exchange rate (InforEuro), n.d., url, accessed on
14 July 2022
260
Austria, BFA Staatendokumentation, Dossier Afghanistan Socio-Economic Survey 2021, 12 January 2022, url, p.
9261
Exchange rates in this paragraph are as indicated in the source.
25343

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

USD 100 [EUR 91.83].262 Similarly, local media quoted property dealers in Kabul saying thathouse rents, prices and mortgages had fallen by more than 50 % since the Taliban takeover ofcontrol in mid-August 2021. Even with lower prices, however, people were reluctant to invest
money in a house or could not afford it, and some real estate agents were expressing fears
that they might have to close their business. Some residents, however, were reportedly happy
about the decline in prices and rents.263
Rukhshana Media, an Afghan online news agency focusing on women’s issues, reported thatfemale students in Kabul faced problems with finding rooms and apartments, as landlords
were reluctant to rent them out to women for fear of being punished by the Taliban.264
UNOCHA noted that since the Taliban takeover of Kabul in mid-August 2021, the quality andquantity of drinking water supply had considerably deteriorated in cities across the country. In
several cities across the country, including Kabul, less than 20 % of the urban population had
access to piped water, after the Afghan Urban Water Supply and Sewerage State Owned
Corporation (UWASS SoC) slowed down or ceased water supply due to financial andbureaucratic troubles.265 A survey conducted for the Austrian BFA Staatendokumentation ofJanuary 2022 indicated that there were households which always had access to clean
drinking water, from a variety of sources, including piped water, piped on premise, public tap,
tube well or borewell, dug well, water tanker, and bottled water. A small number ofhouseholds had never access to clean drinking water, while some households hardly ever oronly sometimes had access to it.266
In Kabul province, 20.8 % of respondents in a survey conducted by Save the Children at theend of 2021 among 1 409 households267 indicated that they did not have access to sufficientdrinking water (with no mention of possible sources), while 27.2 % reportedly had no access toa stable supply of water for domestic use. Almost three-quarters of respondents (72.3 %) in
Kabul province noted that water availability in 2021 was worse than the previous year.268 With
regard to sanitation facilities, 4.5 % reported that they did not have a functional latrine in thehouse.269
UWASS SoC estimated that due to the poor state of urban water networks and the basic
equipment in the water pumping stations and storage systems, system water loss amounted
to about 50-60 %. In addition, according to UNOCHA, aquifers in central Afghanistan were
IOM, Information on the socio-economic situation in Afghanistan requested by the Austrian Federal Office for
Immigration and Asylum, 12 April 2022, url, p. 7
263
Pajhwok Afghan News, Rents, prices of residential buildings drop by 50pc in Kabul, 20 January 2022, url
264
Rukshshana Media, Landlords refuse to rent apartments to female university students in Kabul, 19 March 2022,
url
265
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Afghanistan 2022, 7 January 2022, url, p. 38
266
Austria, BFA Staatendokumentation, Dossier Afghanistan Socio-Economic Survey 2021, 12 January 2022, url, p.
34
267
Please note that the surveyed households were ‘current Save the Children programme participants in sevenprovinces where Save the Children Afghanistan has an operational presence – Balkh, Faryab, Jawzjan, Kabul,
Kandahar, Nangarhar and Sar-e Pul’. Arlini, S. M. and Burgess, M., Afghanistan Multi-sectoral Needs Assessment –2021/2022, Save the Children, March 2022, url, p. 16
268
Arlini, S. M. and Burgess, M., Afghanistan Multi-sectoral Needs Assessment – 2021/2022, Save the Children,
March 2022, url, pp. 34-35
269
Arlini, S. M. and Burgess, M., Afghanistan Multi-sectoral Needs Assessment – 2021/2022, Save the Children,
March 2022, url, p. 37
262

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KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN KABUL CITY

severely affected by the drought and subsequent water scarcity crisis and 45 % of
respondents in a June 2021 UNICEF monitoring analysis reported an increase in turbidity andsalinity in drinking water in Kabul province. Groundwater levels had reportedly lowered
continually from 8 to 45 metres since 2003, with the quality and quantity of water used for
drinking and domestic use deteriorating to the extent that first cases of cholera were reported
since 2016.270
A survey by the Austrian BFA Staatendokumentation indicated that there were households in
Kabul city with uninterrupted access to electricity and others with interrupted access. Few, ifany, households never had access to electricity.271 In Kabul province, according to a survey
conducted by Save the Children at the end of 2021 among 1 409 households272, 19.3 % ofhouseholds were reportedly using grass, animals waste and branches as heating energy, andalmost one third (31.2 %) used these materials also for heating.273 In January 2022, local media
reported on a blackout in Kabul due to a decrease in imports of energy from Uzbekistan,allegedly due to technical problems,274 while in April 2022, the bombing of two pylons in
Parwan province reportedly caused blackouts in 11 provinces, including Kabul.275

270
271

UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Afghanistan 2022, 7 January 2022, url, p. 38
Austria, BFA Staatendokumentation, Dossier Afghanistan Socio-Economic Survey 2021, 12 January 2022, url, p.

9Please note that the surveyed households were ‘current Save the Children programme participants in sevenprovinces where Save the Children Afghanistan has an operational presence – Balkh, Faryab, Jawzjan, Kabul,
Kandahar, Nangarhar and Sar-e Pul’. Arlini, S. M. and Burgess, M., Afghanistan Multi-sectoral Needs Assessment –2021/2022, Save the Children, March 2022, url, p. 16
273
Arlini, S. M. and Burgess, M., Afghanistan Multi-sectoral Needs Assessment – 2021/2022, Save the Children,
March 2022, url, p. 29
274
Khaama Press, Kabul in Blackout, Uzbekistan’s electricity to Afghanistan decreased by 60 %, 13 January 2022,
url
275
New Arab (The), Millions in Afghanistan will face power cuts ahead of Eid al-Fitr, following tower explosions, 30
April 2022, url
272

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

6.

Healthcare

6.1 State of the national health system after the Taliban
takeoverHealth care services in the country were severely disrupted after mid-August 2021 by thefreezing of World Bank funding for the so-called Sehatmandi Project. The project provided
support for quality health care, nutrition and family planning services across the country and,according to the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), involved more than 20 000
health workers in 2 309 health facilities.276 Eventually, WHO and UNICEF continued to support
the project with funding from the UN Central Emergency Response Fund277 and – for theperiod from February to June 2022 – from the World Bank-led Afghanistan Reconstruction
Trust Fund.278
The health system continued to face shortages of supplies, fuel, and money to pay healthworkers’ salaries. WHO noted that over 1 200 health facilities and more than 11 000 healthworkers were not covered through current support. 279 Similarly, field reports indicated that
health facilities were lacking medical supplies and equipment, while needs were high, as the
WHO-led Health Cluster Afghanistan noted in April 2022.280 Media and internationalorganisations such as Human Rights Watch and the ICRC reported on a lack of adequate
medicines and funds to pay for salaries,281 as well as a lack of food supplies for patients andmoney to buy fuel for generators.282
Moreover, the country is dealing with several disease outbreaks, including COVID-19, measles,
acute watery diarrhoea (AWD), dengue fever, malaria,283 leishmaniasis,284 and cholera. AWD
was the second biggest cause of death in the country overall, as IFRC noted in June 2022.285
As of March 2022, more than 5 000 cases of AWD had been registered in five provinces
including Kabul and neighbouring areas, where the outbreak started in summer 2021. 286 As of
April 2022, there have been 178 154 confirmed cases of COVID-19 (overall positivity of 31.3 %)and 7 676 associated deaths (case fatality ratio of 4.30 %) since February 2020, according to

IFRC, Operation Update Report Afghanistan: Humanitarian Crises, 3 June 2022, url, p. 2
For the period November 2021 to January 2022.
278
WHO, Afghanistan Emergency Situation Report No. 14, Reporting period: 1-15 March 2022, 21 March 2022, url, p.
3
279
WHO, Afghanistan Emergency Situation Report No. 14, Reporting period: 1-15 March 2022, 21 March 2022, url, p.
2
280
WHO, Health Cluster Afghanistan, Health Cluster Bulletin April 2022, 22 May 2022, url, p. 2
281
HRW, Afghans Dying from Lack of Medicine, 9 May 2022, url; ICRC, Afghanistan, ICRC scales up support toprevent the collapse of health care, 21 February 2022,url; DW, Afghan health faces collapse amid economic crisis,
24 December 2021, url
282
ICRC, Afghanistan, ICRC scales up support to prevent the collapse of health care, 21 February 2022, url
283
WHO, Afghanistan Emergency Situation Report No. 14, Reporting period: 1-15 March 2022, 21 March 2022, url, p.
2
284
US, CDC, FAQs for Health Care Providers Leishmaniasis in Afghan Evacuees, n.d., url, p. 1
285
IFRC, Operation Update Report Afghanistan: Humanitarian Crises, 3 June 2022, url, pp. 2-3
286
UNICEF, Afghanistan WASH on the Brink, 2022, 30 March 2022, url, p. 4
276
277

46

KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN KABUL CITY

WHO,287 although numbers were likely higher.288 At the same time, about 4.6 million people
have been fully vaccinated and about 1.3 million people partially vaccinated. WHO’s support ofhealth facilities in the country included nine COVID-19 hospitals in eight provinces across thecountry.289 For more information on the COVID-19 situation in Afghanistan, please see section
1.3 of this report.
In February 2022, gunmen reportedly killed seven members of polio vaccination teams inthree separate incidents in Kunduz and Takhar province, leading the UN to suspend thevaccination campaign in these provinces.290

6.1.1 WASH and Energy
UNICEF noted in March 2022, that around 35 % of healthcare facilities lacked access to basic
water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) facilities. Since the country’s health system was at thesame time dealing with outbreaks of acute watery diarrhoea, malnutrition and COVID-19, thelack of sufficient basic WASH facilities posed the risk that health facilities were becoming
points of infection and reinfection. Moreover, one third of health facilities lack access to atleast basic drinking water supply.291 According to a WHO report on the operational status ofhealth facilities across Afghanistan published in March 2022, water was available at 79 % of
health facilities, with the main sources being protected dug wells, tube wells or boreholes,
piped supply networks or surface water. 74 % of health institutions had sanitation facilities withor without water, such as pit latrines. More than 8 in 10 health facilities (85%) had electricity
available.292 According to a media report from February 2022, hospitals in northern
Afghanistan were affected by power cuts reportedly due to technical problems inneighbouring Uzbekistan - one of the country’s electricity suppliers -, leaving patients in thecold and forcing doctors to manage work with a fuel-run generator.293

6.2 Access to basic health care, treatment andmedication
IOM Germany noted in a 2021 report that public health insurance in Afghanistan did not exist,
while private insurance companies charged comparatively high fees, which a large majority ofthe population could not afford. Patients will usually be advised to buy medicines privately,
except in case of emergencies.294

287

WHO, Afghanistan Emergency Situation Report No. 16, Reporting period: March-April 2022, 15 May 2022, url, p.

8
CSIS, A Conversation with Paul Spiegel on the Afghan Healthcare System, 3 January 2022, urlWHO, Afghanistan Emergency Situation Report No. 16, Reporting period: March-April 2022, 15 May 2022, url, p.
2, 8290
Insecurity Insight, Attacks on Health Care, Bi-Monthly News Brief, 23 February – 8 March 2022, 22 March 2022,
url, p. 2
291
UNICEF, Afghanistan WASH on the Brink, 2022, 30 March 2022, url, p. 2, 4
292
WHO, HeRAMS Afghanistan Baseline Report 2022. Operational Status of the health system: A comprehensive
mapping of the operational status of health facilities, March 2022, 29 March 2022, url, pp. 20, 22, 23, 25, 37, 39
293
National (The), Afghanistan's power dependency takes its toll on hospitals, 1 February 2022, url
294
IOM Germany, Afghanistan Country Fact Sheet 2021, 2021, url, pp. 4-5
288

289

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

About 81 % of households interviewed for the World Bank’s Afghanistan Welfare Monitoring
Survey (AWMS) in the period October to December 2021 reported having at least one
household member who needed medical help in the last 30 days. Of these, more than 90 %were able to obtain it either from a public or a private provider, regardless of whether they
were men or women or living in a rural or urban setting, although public providers – e.g.,
public hospitals, basic or community health clinics - were slightly more often attended in rural
areas.295 According to the 2021 WoA Assessment, more than eight in ten households (81 %)reported access to an active health care centre in or close to their village in the three months
prior to data collection and only 19 % responded that they did not have access. However, 23 %noted that specific treatments or medication was not available and 18 % could not afford
treatment.296 Similarly, the ICRC noted that sometimes, families of a patient could not afford
the accommodation or medicine that was not provided for free by the hospital, and sometimes
patients were discharged without treatment.297 In a survey conducted by Save the Children
among 1 409 households298 at the end of 2021, the main reason given for not being able toreceive medical help was the respondents’ inability to pay the costs (58.1 %). Other reasons
included the health facility being too far away (45 %), security issues (35.1 %) andtransportation costs (21.5 %).299
19 % of respondents to the 2021 WoA Assessment reported that there was no functional
health facility near their home. Slightly over a quarter (26 %) of households noted thatemergency care was not available within 24 hours of serious injuries like, for example, abroken bone or loss of limb. On settlement level (and based on key informant interviews),
36 % of settlements assessed reported no access to a health care facility in the three months
prior to data collection. The provinces with the highest number of settlements reporting noaccess to a health care facility were Nuristan (84 %)300, Badghis (70 %) and Samangan (60 %)provinces. Slightly more than half of settlements assessed (51 %) reported that their closest
health facility could be reached within an hour by the majority of the population and by regularmode of transport. 32 % of settlements reported that it would take between one and threehours to reach the closest health facility and 17 % would need more than 3 hours.301
More than half (53.9 %) of respondents to Save the Children’s survey302 reported that theyneeded 30 minutes or more to reach the nearest health facility, while 32.7 % reportedly
World Bank (The), Afghanistan Welfare Monitoring Survey Round 1, March 2022, 15 March 2022, url, pp. 13-14
REACH Initiative, Whole of Afghanistan Assessment (WoAA) Key Sectoral Findings, October 2021, 23 December
2021, url, p. 5
297
ICRC, Afghanistan, ICRC scales up support to prevent the collapse of health care, 21 February 2022, url
298
The surveyed households were ‘current Save the Children programme participants in seven provinces where
Save the Children Afghanistan has an operational presence – Balkh, Faryab, Jawzjan, Kabul, Kandahar, Nangarhar
and Sar-e Pul’. Arlini, S. M. and Burgess, M., Afghanistan Multi-sectoral Needs Assessment – 2021/2022, Save theChildren, March 2022, url, p. 16
299
Arlini, S. M. and Burgess, M., Afghanistan Multi-sectoral Needs Assessment – 2021/2022, Save the Children,
March 2022, url, p. 45
300
AAN described Nuristan in 2018 as ‘one of the most remote, under-served and unknown provinces’ where‘services and social infrastructure are ‘patchy and low-level’. AAN, The 2018 Election Observed (5) in Nuristan:
Disfranchisement and lack of data, 17 November 2018, url
301
REACH Initiative, Whole of Afghanistan Assessment (WoAA) Key Sectoral Findings, October 2021, 23 December
2021, url, pp. 4-5
302
The surveyed households were ‘current Save the Children programme participants in seven provinces where
Save the Children Afghanistan has an operational presence – Balkh, Faryab, Jawzjan, Kabul, Kandahar, Nangarhar
295

296

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KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN KABUL CITY

needed 30 to 60 minutes and 21.2 % more than an hour. 23.6 % of respondents noted thatbasic health services were not available at health facilities. Of those services that wereavailable, the ones most frequently mentioned were routine immunisation (EPI) services(mentioned by 60.7 % of respondents), child health services (55.9 %), treatment of malnutrition(40.2 %). More than half (56.9 %) of respondents noted the availability of a female doctor or
midwife. About one third (36.5 %) reported that some medication was available free of charge,
and only 10.9 % reported the availability of mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS)
services.303 The Health Cluster indicated that several areas in the country were underserved
and in need of Primary Health Care (PHC) services and health cluster partners had reportedly
been urged to sustain critical life-saving health services in these areas and remote locations. A
UNICEF assessment in the context of a countrywide measles outbreak reportedly indicatedthat adequate stocks of medicines for treatment were available, however, provincial hospitals
were lacking beds and space for the clinical management of cases.304

6.3 Access to healthcare for women, maternal
healthcare, and child healthcare
As of April 2022, the infant mortality rate was 46.5 per 1 000 live births (by comparison, theinfant mortality rate in the EU was 3.4 deaths per 1 000 live births in 2019)305, and projectedmaternal mortality rate was 638 deaths per 100 000 births, according to the Health Cluster
Afghanistan. Pregnant women were in need of antenatal and postnatal care as well as
services of access to trained birth attendants. The Health Cluster Afghanistan estimated in
April 2022 that about 20% of deliveries and 20% of new-born children would require lifesaving emergency interventions.306 The United Nation’s Population Fund noted in March
2022, that ‘every two hours an Afghan woman dies from childbirth or pregnancy
complications’.307
Women with more complex health needs, such as pregnant women, have reportedly been
facing major issues with regard to access to health care, including fear and insecurity, mobility
restrictions due to the need to be accompanied in public by a mahram308 or the need to travel
long distances to reach health services. Moreover, women lacked sufficient means of safe
transportation and there was a shortage of trained female personnel, as UN Women noted in
December 2021.309 Similarly, USDOS stated in its 2021 Country Report on Human Rights thatand Sar-e Pul’. Arlini, S. M. and Burgess, M., Afghanistan Multi-sectoral Needs Assessment – 2021/2022, Save theChildren, March 2022, url, p. 16
303
Arlini, S. M. and Burgess, M., Afghanistan Multi-sectoral Needs Assessment – 2021/2022, Save the Children,
March 2022, url, pp. 42-43
304
WHO, Health Cluster Afghanistan, Health Cluster Bulletin April 2022, 22 May 2022, url, pp. 2, 8
305
EU, Eurostat, Infant mortality sharply declined over the past decades, 4 June 2021, url
306
WHO, Health Cluster Afghanistan, Health Cluster Bulletin April 2022, 22 May 2022, url, p. 2
307
UNFPA, Midwives ensure life-saving reproductive health care for women returning to Afghanistan, 31 March
2022, url
308
Defined as a ‘close male relative: either a husband, or a male relative’ whom a woman ‘cannot marry, such as abrother, father, son or uncle’. AAN, “We need to breathe too”: Women across Afghanistan navigate the Taleban’s
hijab ruling, 1 June 2022, url
309
UN Women, Gender Alert No. 1, Women’s Rights in Afghanistan: Where are we now?, December 2021, 7
December 2021, url, p. 6

49

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

some social norms and traditions such as home births or the need for women to have malecompany if they want to leave the house, had a negative impact on women’s reproductive
health, including insufficient care before and after giving birth as well as emergency obstetriccare. Moreover, access to maternal health care services was restricted by a limited number offemale health workers, including trained birth attendants. Their number further decreased
after the Taliban takeover, since many women were afraid to return to work, although the
Taliban had allowed female medical personnel to continue working.310 WHO noted in March
2022, that for a considerable part of the vulnerable population maternal and child healthservices were not easily accessible, including because of the country’s weak referral systemand the record level of malnutrition, which made the population more susceptible to illness
and diseases such as measles.311
MSF has been operating a specialised maternity hospital in Khost since 2012, with an almost
entirely female medical staff, noting this was important to ensure separation of the sexes andto make patients and their families feel at ease.312 Similarly, the Guardian reported in May
2022 on several hospitals in Kabul with an exclusively female staff.313 An article for the Fuller
Project quoted health workers from Ghazni district describing an incident where two
unaccompanied women were reportedly forced out of a clinic by the Taliban. In anotherincident, a midwife was reportedly detained, and medical staff of the clinic was facing
prosecution for having attended a single woman giving birth. Taliban reportedly denied such
incidents did happen.314 In May 2022, local media quoted a de facto deputy minister of the defacto Ministry of Public Health that more than 38 000 midwives were working in the country’s
health institutions. He reportedly acknowledged a shortage of midwives and the necessity ofhigher education in the field of midwifery.315

6.4 Access to healthcare for IDPs
According to a report by the Protection Cluster of March 2022, based on an analysis ofhousehold surveys, 65 % of IDPs indicated that they were not able to access services upon
arrival at their displacement location, specifically health and livelihood services. The main
reasons for this inability were reportedly a lack of information on available services and thenecessary documentation to get access to services. 9 % of IDPs planned to integrate into theexisting community in order to have access to services and infrastructure.316 UNOCHA noted
in its 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview that IDPs and returnees were particularly affectedby their lack of official identity documentation (Tazkira), as it prevented them from getting
access to the few existing de facto government services,317 and USDOS indicated that
especially female-headed IDP households were facing difficulties obtaining basic services for
310
311

USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 – Afghanistan, 12 April 2022, url, p. 49
WHO, Afghanistan Emergency Situation Report No. 14, Reporting period: 1-15 March 2022, 21 March 2022, url, p.

2
MSF, A ‘hospital of women, for women’, 16 December 2021, url; MSF, Expanding access to urgently neededmaternal health care in Afghanistan, 16 December 2021, url
313
Guardian (The), ‘The Taliban know they need us’: the Afghan hospitals run by women, 9 May 2022, url
314
Nader, Z. and Amini, N., The Taliban are harming Afghan women’s health, The Fuller Project, 2 March 2022, url
315
TOLOnews, Health Ministry pledges to hire more midwives, 16 May 2022, url
316
Protection Cluster Afghanistan, Afghanistan Protection Analysis Update – Q4, 28 February 2022, url, p. 15
317
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Afghanistan 2022, 7 January 2022, url, p. 13
312

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KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN KABUL CITY

this reason.318 According to 2021 WoA Assessment data, 63 % of displaced households
reported that some of their members did not have a Tazkira, while 2 % of households reported
that none of their members had such official identity documentation.319 UNHCR’s 2021 Rapid
Assessment Analysis noted that both, IDPs and IDP returnees, named costs of medicines,
care, and treatment as well as costs of transport as the main obstacles for accessing healthcare. Lack of health care facilities or long travel times to reach such facilities were also –
although significantly less frequently – mentioned.320

6.5 Access to healthcare for returnees
UNOCHA noted that based on findings of the 2021 WoA Assessment a substantial number ofcross-border returnees might have ‘greater health-related needs’ than other populationgroups. Almost two thirds (63 %) of interviewed cross-border households reportedly indicatedhealth care was among their top three priority needs, in comparison to 48 % of IDP
households and 54 % of host community households. At the same time, cross-border returnee
households reportedly spent considerably more money on health care than either IDP or hosthouseholds. Moreover, cross-border returnees faced difficulties in accessing health andnutrition services, with 78 % stating that they did not have access to nutrition services in thethree months prior to the assessment mainly because such services were not available.
UNOCHA noted that in addition to food needs – which were reported by 88 % of cross-borderreturnees -, undocumented returnees and deportees faced additional protection andassistance needs, as well as critical health needs, including for injuries sustained when trying
to cross the border and deprivation of basic services, violence and coercion such as forced
recruitment – factors which were increasing mental health needs.321 However, while in thecontext of the 2021 WoA Assessment 72 % of cross-border returnee households reported a
behavioural change in at least one household member in the year prior to data collection (theshare was even higher among IDPs and host communities, with 75 % and 74 %,respectively),322 82 % of cross-border returnee households were not aware of any ‘mental
health and psychological support services (MHPSS) in or near their community’.323
IOM Germany noted in a 2021 report that for access to medical facilities, returnees needed topresent their national identity documentation (Tazkira) to a hospital, where they would ‘getregistered and referred to the respective doctor’. The fee for a doctor’s visit was AFN 20 [EUR0.2]324 in public and AFN 100 [EUR 1.06] to 1 500 [EUR 16] in private hospitals; fees for
hospitalisation amounted to AFN 1 000 [EUR 10.66] to 1 500 [EUR 16] per night.325

USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 – Afghanistan, 12 April 2022, url, p. 35
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Afghanistan 2022, 7 January 2022, url, p. 13
320
UNHCR, Afghanistan 2021 Multi Sectoral Rapid Assessments Analysis, 21 April 2022, url, p. 7
321
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Afghanistan 2022, 7 January 2022, url, pp. 33-34
322
REACH Initiative, Whole of Afghanistan Assessment (WoAA) Key Sectoral Findings, October 2021, 23 December
2021, url, p. 5
323
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Afghanistan 2022, 7 January 2022, url, p. 34
324
Exchange rates in this paragraph from European Commission, Exchange rate (InforEuro), n.d., url, accessed on 4
July 2022
325
IOM Germany, Afghanistan Country Fact Sheet 2021, 2021, url, pp. 4-5
318

319

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

6.6 Situation in Kabul
AP reported in February 2022 that the Afghan Japan Communicable Disease Hospital in
Kabul is the only hospital offering COVID-19 treatment. The hospital’s director was quoted
saying that the hospital lacked everything from oxygen to medicine supplies.326 Al Jazeera
quoted the hospital’s logistics manager that as of December 2021 the hospital’s oxygen
production plant had not been working for several months as the hospital lacked the fuel forthe generators.327 AP quoted the head of the intensive care unit saying that they needed more
ventilators as well as staff trained to use them. Most of the staff reportedly continued to work
despite not having received salaries for several months. Since the establishment of the defacto authorities, hospital staff had reportedly received their salaries just once.328 WHO
reported in April 2022 that funding had been granted to another COVID-19 hospital in Kabul,that hadn’t been fully operational following the Taliban takeover.329 In some hospitals,
including in hospitals in Kabul, Taliban mullahs (Islamic religious leader or teacher)330 havereportedly taken the place of health officials to manage the facilities,331 and in some cases,
there were reportedly issues about their conduct, as medical staff was threatened andassaulted.332
WHO reported in April 2022 that Kabul was among the five provinces most affected by arecent measles outbreak. Similarly, in relation to an outbreak of acute watery diarrhoea (AWD),
Kabul city and Sorobi district were the most affected areas compared to other affected
provinces.333 WHO was also supporting the National Infectious Disease Hospital in Kabul by
providing food for patients, heating system, maintenance of ambulances, waste management,
as well as essential drugs and supplies.334
More specific information on the situation in Kabul could not be found within the time
constraints of this report.

AP, New COVID surge batters Afghanistan’s crumbling health care, 9 February 2022, url
Al Jazeera, Afghanistan healthcare ‘on brink of collapse’ amid Omicron scare, 16 December 2021, url
328
AP, New COVID surge batters Afghanistan’s crumbling health care, 9 February 2022, url
329
WHO, Afghanistan Emergency Situation Report No. 15, Reporting period: 15-31 March 2022, 13 April 2022, url, p.
7
330
Cambridge Dictionary, Definition: Mullah, 2014, url
331
CSIS, A Conversation with Paul Spiegel on the Afghan Healthcare System, 3 January 2022, url; Economist (The),On life support; Afghanistan’s health-care system is crumbling, 19 December 2021, url
332
CSIS, A Conversation with Paul Spiegel on the Afghan Healthcare System, 3 January 2022, url
333
WHO, Afghanistan Emergency Situation Report No. 16, Reporting period: March-April 2022, 15 May 2022, url,
pp. 6-7
334
WHO, Afghanistan Emergency Situation Report No. 15, Reporting period: 15-31 March 2022, 13 April 2022, url, p.
5
326
327

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KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN KABUL CITY

7.

Education

7.1 State of the national education system after the
Taliban takeover
Until mid-August 2021, 49 % of Afghanistan’s education expenses were financed throughexternal aid, which was largely suspended after the Taliban’s take of control, as theAfghanistan Education Cluster noted in February 2022. Girls enrolled in secondary schools
and female teachers had been requested by the Taliban to stay at home until a decision had
been made on how the girls’ education could be continued in accordance with the de facto
leadership’s norms and values. Moreover, the higher education system required
reorganisation at universities due to the newly introduced gender segregation. Salaries ofprofessors had been cut by 40 % on average without benefits due to the economic crisis,335
and a significant number of university staff including highly qualified professors had left or fledfrom the country following the Taliban’s return to power.336 Local media reported on the
shortage of teachers and textbooks in several provinces.337 The de facto Ministry of Education
announced in April 2022 that it would hire 70 000 teachers in the next one or two years, butthat in the meantime part-time teachers would be hired temporarily.338 UNICEF announced in
February 2022 that it would pay an EU-funded monthly emergency stipend of USD 100 [EUR95]339 for the months of January and February 2022 to about 194 000 primary and secondary
school teachers, who had not received salaries for several months.340 The Afghan de facto
Ministry of Education declared that for teachers with a salary over USD 100 [EUR 95], the defacto ministry would cover the remaining costs.341 In April 2022, UNICEF noted that it paid asecond round of monthly cash support of USD 100 [EUR 95] to teachers who had problems toaccess their bank account or did not have an account. UNICEF expected that round to becompleted in May 2022.342
In an interview with Pajhwok Afghan News, an independent Afghan news agency, in February2022, the director of the Afghan Private Schools Union (APSU) noted that 200 of the overall
3 000 private schools across the country had closed since the Taliban takeover in mid-August2021 for economic reasons. The number of students in the same period had declined by 30 %,Afghanistan Education Cluster, Afghanistan Education Sector Transitional Framework, 28 February 2022, 12 May
2022, url, pp. 12-13
336
Afghanistan Education Cluster, Afghanistan Education Sector Transitional Framework, 28 February 2022, 12 May
2022, url, p. 13; Pajhwok Afghan News, Herat University students concerned as teachers flee abroad, 9 March
2022, url
337
TOLOnews, Schools Faces Shortage of Teachers, Textbooks, Uniforms, 5 June 2022, url; Pajhwok AfghanNews, More than 800 teachers being recruited in Logar, 30 May 2022, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Maidan Wardak
needs 1144 more teachers: Education director, 12 April 2022, url; Pajhwok Afghan News, Kapisa school need 1,338
more teachers, 23 March 2022, url
338
Pajhwok Afghan News, About 70,000 more teachers need to be hired: MoE, 17 April 2022, url
339
Exchange rates in this paragraph from European Commission, Exchange rate (InforEuro), n.d., url, accessed on 4
July 2022
340
UNICEF, UNICEF provides support to all public school teachers in Afghanistan for 2 months, 20 February 2022,
url
341
TOLOnews, MoE: UNICEF to Pay Salaries of Nearly 200,000 Teachers, 20 February 2022, url
342
UNICEF, Afghanistan Humanitarian Situation Report # 5, 1-30 April 2022, 26 May 2022, url, p. 3335

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

particularly after the Taliban’s decision to keep girls’ schools closed. According to the director,
most of the private schools had separate branches for boys and for girls. Overall, 750 000
students were enrolled in private schools and about 70 000 to 80 000 teachers were
employed, with 50 000 among them women. He reportedly also noted that the de facto
government charged tax on private schools and that the private sector paid more than USD
100 million [EUR 95 million]343 in taxes to the de facto government.344
According to local media reports from Daikundi and Maidan Wardak provinces, a considerable
part of the provinces’ schools was without buildings, forcing students to have classes in open
air,345 or in a tent346. UNICEF noted in a report of March 2022, that more than 9 out of 10
schools (94 %) did not have at least basic handwashing facilities,347 nearly 40 % had no accessto drinking water and the other 60 % had only access to bacteriologically contaminated water.
A quarter of schools had no access to basic sanitation facilities and over 90 % had not accessto basic hygiene facilities, according to UNICEF. The organisation noted that lack of access tosuch facilities disrupted children’s education, in particular that of girls. Almost one third of girls
reportedly did not come to class during menstruation because their schools lacked menstrual
hygiene facilities.348

7.2 Access to basic education, secondary education,and higher education
Secondary education for girls was de facto banned after the Taliban announced in September
2021 that all male pupils and schoolteachers had to be present at schools but did not mention
girls and female teachers. This de facto ban was, however, not applied to the same extent
everywhere in the country and many secondary schools for girls were allowed to keep
operating due to the support of local Taliban leaders or pressure by parents or teachers, as
researcher Ashley Jackson noted in a report for the Afghan Analysts Network in March 2022.
Furthermore, the general opening of secondary schools for girls at the beginning of the newschool year on 23 March 2022, that had been widely expected, was cancelled by the Talibanon the day itself, citing lack of teachers, inappropriate school uniforms and, eventually, theneed for a plan for girls’ higher education ‘in accordance with sharia and Afghan culture’.
According to Jackson, the decision and surrounding circumstances indicated internal
disagreements among the Taliban on the matter.349 According to a joint report by UNICEF,
Save the Children and the Education Cluster, the ban affected 1.1 million girls at the secondary
school level.350 However, in nine provinces across the country, some schools were open forgirls at secondary level, reportedly due to pressure from local communities, as UNICEF notedin April 2022. According to estimates, as of April 2022, about 70 % of all children were back in
Exchange rate from European Commission, Exchange rate (InforEuro), n.d., url, accessed on 4 July 2022.
Pajhwok Afghan News, Number of private schools’ students declines by 30pc, 7 April 2022, url
345
Pajhwok Afghan News, Half of Daikundi schools without buildings, 14 April 2022, url
346
Pajhwok Afghan News, Maidan Wardak needs 1144 more teachers: Education director, 12 April 2022, url
347
UNICEF, Afghanistan WASH on the Brink, 2022, 30 March 2022, url, p. 2
348
UNICEF, Afghanistan WASH on the Brink, 2022, 30 March 2022, url, p. 5
349
Jackson, A., The Ban on Older Girls’ Education: Taleban conservatives ascendant and a leadership in disarray,
AAN, 29 March 2022, url
350
UNICEF et al., Afghanistan: Back to School. Situation Update, April 2022, 21 April 2022, url, p. 2
343

344

54

KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN KABUL CITY

primary school and about 80 % of the boys in secondary education. In general, UNICEF noted,
the key factor for children leaving school before they finished their education was poverty.351
More than one in five households (22.3 %) interviewed for Save the Children’s survey among
1 409 households352 at the end of 2021 indicated that they had decreased expenditures on
education and health to cope with the difficult economic situation. 12.8 % reported that they
had taken their children out of school for this reason.353 With regard to girls, security concerns
were named by more than half of interviewed households (50.5 %, compared to 44.6 % withboys), security concerns were the main reason for not sending girls to school, compared to44.6 % with regard to boys. High school costs were an issue for 37.3 % of households withregard to girls, and for 40.3 % of households with regard to boys. Expensive transportation toschool was also named by 15.3 % (girls) and 17.1 % (boys) of households respectively. Other
reasons indicated by households why they would not send girls to school were a lack of(female) teachers (39.4 %) and family restrictions or cultural barriers (32.2%). These two issues
were significantly less important in the case of boys (14.3 % and 14.1 % respectively). A larger
share of households said they would not send boys to school as they needed to work or help
at home (30.5 %), or because no importance was given to education (24.7 %); with regard togirls, these reasons were mentioned less frequently (20.8 % and 20.5 %, respectively).354
Human Rights Watch quoted a teacher from a school in Balkh province – one of the few
provinces where girls’ secondary schools have continued to operate even after the Taliban
takeover – that dress codes for women were getting increasingly harsh and teachers or
students not complying with the regulations were dismissed or expelled immediately.355
Moreover, the need to buy new uniforms reportedly put additional financial strain on families
already struggling with the difficult economic situation. Nevertheless, hundreds of families
have reportedly moved to Balkh and other provinces, or to neighbouring Iran, so that theirdaughters could continue their education.356 Local and international media reported on a‘mobile school and mobile library’ project by an Afghan NGO in Kandahar province, whereboys and girls would be instructed separately in locally set up classrooms.357
Al Jazeera reported that the country’s main universities reopened in February 2022 withgender-segregated classes and a strict dress-code for women, pressing them to wear a black
abaya358 to cover their bodies and a hijab (a Muslim head covering)359 on their heads. Only
UNICEF, Afghanistan Humanitarian Situation Report #5, 1-30 April 2022, 26 May 2022, url, p. 1
Please note that the surveyed households were ‘current Save the Children programme participants in sevenprovinces where Save the Children Afghanistan has an operational presence – Balkh, Faryab, Jawzjan, Kabul,
Kandahar, Nangarhar and Sar-e Pul’. Arlini, S. M. and Burgess, M., Afghanistan Multi-sectoral Needs Assessment –2021/2022, Save the Children, March 2022, url, p. 16
353
Arlini, S. M. and Burgess, M., Afghanistan Multi-sectoral Needs Assessment – 2021/2022, Save the Children,
March 2022, url, p. 59
354
Arlini, S. M. and Burgess, M., Afghanistan Multi-sectoral Needs Assessment – 2021/2022, Save the Children,
March 2022, url, pp. 62-63
355
HRW, Dress Restrictions Tighten for Afghanistan Girls’ Schools, 27 April 2022, url
356
MEE, Afghan girls move to Iran to defy Taliban’s education ban, 14 May 2022, url
357
Hasht-e Sub, Mobile School: Pen Path Takes School to the Door Steps in Kandahar Province, 17 May 2022, url,
Kabul Times (The), Pen Path setting up schools, libraries to support education in Afghanistan, 19 May 2022, url,
openDemocracy, The volunteers risking their lives to secretly educate Afghanistan’s girls, 3 June 2022, url
358“A long piece of clothing that reaches to the ground, covering the whole of the body except the head, feet, andhands, worn by some Muslim women”, Cambridge Dictionary, Definition: Abaya, 2014, url359
Cambridge Dictionary, Definition: Hijab, 2014, url
351

352

55

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

few students, however, reportedly did return to university, while also a shortage of female
lecturers was noted.360 Similar conditions had already been imposed on private universities
and colleges in September 2021.361

7.3 Access to education for IDPs
According to a survey by Save the Children among 1 409 households362 at the end of 2021,
56.3 % of girls were not attending school, compared to 27.7 % of boys. The situation was
worse for girls living in IDP households with 62.7 % not attending classes, although they were
often enrolled in school.363 22 % of IDP households interviewed for the 2021 WoA Assessment
noted that they had at least one child in their household that did not feel safe travelling to or
being at school, compared to 16 % of host communities’ households.364 Overall, 47 % of boys
and 39 % of girls at school age from IDP households were reportedly enrolled in school, whilealmost half of IDP households said they had none of their school-aged children (6 to 17 years)
enrolled in school.365

7.4 Access for returnees
In 2022, UNHCR expected 225 276 returnee children to face needs with regard to theireducation. Findings of the 2021 WoA Assessment indicated that boys and girls from families ofreturnees and deportees faced different kinds of barriers to access education depending on
their gender. Families reported that 13 % of boys were taken out of school to earn money,
compared to 2 % of girls, while conversely, 13 % of girls did not attend school for cultural
reasons, compared to 2 % of boys, and another 2% of girls did not attend because they were
given in marriage. School closure due to the COVID-19 pandemic and schools being too far
were other reasons indicated by families for children not going to school.366
UNHCR noted in April 2022, that some 40 Afghan refugee returnee students – half of them
women - started courses in February at universities across Kabul with UNHCR’s support andunder the DAFI (Albert Einstein German Academic Refugee Initiative) Scholarship367 scheme.
UNHCR expected the programme to be established in other areas as well, including Jalalabad
Al Jazeera, Afghan public universities reopen with gender segregated classes, 26 February 2022, url. In May
2022, the Taliban noted publicly that ‘the best hijab’ was the burqa and that women (unless they were ‘too old or
young’) had to cover their face except for the eyes. Guardian (The), Taliban order all Afghan women to cover theirfaces in public, 7 May 2022, url
361
Gandhara, Taliban Imposes New Dress Code, Segregation Of Women At Afghan Universities, 6 September 2021,
url
362
Please note that the surveyed households were ‘current Save the Children programme participants in sevenprovinces where Save the Children Afghanistan has an operational presence – Balkh, Faryab, Jawzjan, Kabul,
Kandahar, Nangarhar and Sar-e Pul’. Arlini, S. M. and Burgess, M., Afghanistan Multi-sectoral Needs Assessment –2021/2022, Save the Children, March 2022, url, p. 16
363
Arlini, S. M. and Burgess, M., Afghanistan Multi-sectoral Needs Assessment – 2021/2022, Save the Children,
March 2022, url, p. 67
364
REACH Initiative, Whole of Afghanistan Assessment (WoAA) Key Sectoral Findings, October 2021, 23 December
2021, url, p. 15
365
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Afghanistan 2022, 7 January 2022, url, p. 31
366
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Afghanistan 2022, 7 January 2022, url, p. 35
367
UNHCR, DAFI Tertiary Scholarship Programme, n.d., url
360

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KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN KABUL CITY

(Nangarhar Province) and Mazar-e Sharif (Balkh Province) for an additional 20 students.
Moreover, UNHCR reported that it would construct new schools in 55 Priority Areas of Returnand Reintegration (PARRs) in 2022 and would also provide support for the upgrading ofexisting educational facilities.368
USAID reported in May 2022 on funding programmes designed to reintegrate refugees and toincrease opportunities for vulnerable host community populations, including literacy courses,
courses to increase business knowledge, and skills development. Support was also provided
to give returning refugee children access to learning spaces and accelerated learning
programmes to help these children prepare for enrolment in formal schools.369

7.5 Situation in Kabul
According to Save the Children’s survey370 at the end of 2021, in Kabul, 38.3 % of childreninterviewed371 for the report responded that they were not attending school. 22.9 % among
them were not enrolled at school either, while the remaining 15.4 % were enrolled but did notattend classes.372 In 17.9 % of households, children were attending programmes such ascommunity-based education, accelerated learning or early childcare and development
programmes – the majority of them (60.5 %) in Kabul province.373
Local media reported that of the overall 3 000 private schools operating in Afghanistan, 1 200
were located in Kabul. The owner of a private school in Kabul confirmed that the number ofstudents had decreased by 40 % since the Taliban’s return to power in mid-August 2021 andnoted that the difficult economic situation made it hard for parents to pay for school fees.
Equally, the fact that girls beyond 6th grade were not allowed to continue their education
contributed to the decrease in the number of students. Of 137 private schools in the 12th police
district of Kabul, 45 had been closed, according to the interviewed private school owner.374
According to the Afghanistan Education Cluster, disability inclusion in Afghanistan’s schools
had been limited due to fluctuations in donor and government interest and support. Someagencies had developed sign language and Braille translated curricula and teacher training
materials and in Kabul there was a small number of special education schools, however, not

UNHCR, Afghanistan Operational Update April 2022, 8 June 2022, url, pp. 3, 4
USAID, Afghanistan – Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #7, Fiscal Year (FY) 2022, 27 May 2022, url, p. 4
370
Please note that the surveyed households were ‘current Save the Children programme participants in sevenprovinces where Save the Children Afghanistan has an operational presence – Balkh, Faryab, Jawzjan, Kabul,
Kandahar, Nangarhar and Sar-e Pul’.
371
Data for the survey was collected from 1 409 adults living in a household with children and from 1 408 children
aged 11 to 17 years living in the household of an adult interviewed for the survey. Arlini, S. M. and Burgess, M.,
Afghanistan Multi-sectoral Needs Assessment – 2021/2022, Save the Children, March 2022, url, p. 24
372
Arlini, S. M. and Burgess, M., Afghanistan Multi-sectoral Needs Assessment – 2021/2022, Save the Children,
March 2022, url, pp. 66-67
373
Arlini, S. M. and Burgess, M., Afghanistan Multi-sectoral Needs Assessment – 2021/2022, Save the Children,
March 2022, url, p. 61
374
Pajhwok Afghan News, Number of private schools’ students declines by 30pc, 7 April 2022, url
368

369

57

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

yet in the country’s rural areas.375 According to a 2019 study by the Asia Foundation, 17.3 % ofchildren in Afghanistan had some form of disability.376

Afghanistan Education Cluster, Afghanistan Education Sector Transitional Framework, 28 February 2022, 12 May
2022, url, p. 52
376
Asia Foundation (The), Model Disability Survey of Afghanistan 2019, 13 May 2020, url, p. 19375

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KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN KABUL CITY

8.

Child-specific living conditions

The economic deterioration and resulting increase in poverty in the country following August
2021,377 as well as reoccurring ‘shocks and disruptions’ causing the population’s resilience todiminish,378 have led the Afghan population to increasingly resort to negative coping
strategies, which can generally be understood as ‘a set of responses to difficulties that may
provide a temporary means of survival.’379 Examples include the case of child marriage, thesale of children or child recruitment .380

8.1 Child marriage
There has been a slow but steady decline in child marriages over the past years.381 However,according to UN entities, aid organisations and local officials, since the Taliban takeover, therisk of child marriages is increasing in Afghanistan,382 with UNICEF remarking in November
2021 that they had received credible reports of families offering baby girls as young as 20days old up for marriage.383 The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic has already raised
concerns that the situation has worsened in terms of the prevalence of forced marriages.384 In
addition, the ongoing food crisis and the onset of winter further worsened the circumstancesof Afghan families.385 Based on a multi-sectorial rapid assessment386 between October andDecember 2021, UNHCR found that post-August 2021 around 4 % of households turned to thenegative coping strategy of child selling and 2 % to early marriage.387

UN Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in Afghanistan, and technical assistance achievements inthe field of human rights, A/HRC/49/90, 12 January 2022, url, para. 29
378
CCCM and Protection Clusters Afghanistan, Joint-Advocacy Briefing Note from the Shelter/NFI, CCCM andProtection Clusters Afghanistan Pledging Conference, 31 March 2022, url
379
TNH, Pakistan’s IDPs find it can get worse, 5 August 2013, url
380
CCCM and Protection Clusters Afghanistan, Joint-Advocacy Briefing Note from the Shelter/NFI, CCCM andProtection Clusters Afghanistan Pledging Conference, 31 March 2022, url; UN Human Rights Council, Situation ofhuman rights in Afghanistan, and technical assistance achievements in the field of human rights, A/HRC/49/90, 12
January 2022, url, para. 29; Washington Post (The), Through child marriage or paid adoption, Afghan girls bearbrunt of crisis, 14 April 2022, url
381
UNICEF, Child marriage is declining in Afghanistan – yet, more is needed to end the practice, 29 July 2018, url
382
OHCHR, Afghanistan: Taliban attempting to steadily erase women and girls from public life – UN experts, 17
January 2022, url; UNICEF, Girls increasingly at risk of child marriage in Afghanistan - Statement by UNICEF
Executive Director Henrietta Fore, 12 November 2021, url; Washington Post (The), Through child marriage or paid
adoption, Afghan girls bear brunt of crisis, 14 April 2022, url; CNN, The rescue of Parwana: 9-year-old child bride istaken to safety in Afghanistan, 3 December 2021, url
383
UNICEF, Girls increasingly at risk of child marriage in Afghanistan - Statement by UNICEF Executive Director
Henrietta Fore, 12 November 2021, url
384
Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, Atlas der Versklavung [Atlas of slavery], November 2021, url, p. 45; Penn Today, Spikein child marriages may be ‘the most disturbing fallout of the Taliban takeover’, 3 December 2021, url
385
UNICEF, Girls increasingly at risk of child marriage in Afghanistan - Statement by UNICEF Executive Director
Henrietta Fore, 12 November 2021, url
386This survey is not representative for the whole Afghan population and mainly provides findings ‘on thechallenges IDPs and IDP returnees, in particular, face in Afghanistan’. UNHCR, Afghanistan 2021 Multi Sectoral
Rapid Assessments Analysis, 21 April 2022, url, p. 2
387
UNHCR, Afghanistan 2021 Multi Sectoral Rapid Assessments Analysis, 21 April 2022, url, p. 9377

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

In its November 2021 publication, the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation referred to estimatesindicating a prevalence of child or forced marriages of 60-80 % in Afghanistan. Reasons forthe high prevalence reportedly include practices such as marriage to pay off debts or toresolve conflicts (bad), and bride-swapping to avoid paying the bride’s dowry (badal). Children
and young women married off through forced or child marriage usually live in complete
dependence on the husband’s family.388
In December 2021, the Taliban issued a decree banning forced marriages, stating that womenshould not be considered property and needed to consent to marriage.389 Even before the
Taliban came to power, the country’s judicial system was lacking strength and options to
respond to cases of forced marriages. As a result, many girls and women find little supportand help, especially if their families insisted on their marriages.390 Almost all shelters that had
previously offered young women and girls protection from forced marriage have reportedly
been closed by the Taliban throughout the country.391
Since the Taliban took power in August 2021, the dire economic conditions have forced more
and more families to resort to the negative coping strategy of marrying off daughters.392
Afghan women’s rights activist Mahbouba Seraj was cited by CNN in December 2021 assaying that ‘[A]fghan young girls (are) becoming the price of food; [b]ecause otherwise theirfamily will starve.’393 Moreover, restrictions imposed by the Taliban on girls’ access to
education increase the risk of child marriage further.394 According to a November 2021
statement by UNICEF Executive Director Henrietta Fore, girls who marry before the age of 18
are also at higher risk of domestic violence, discrimination, abuse, and poor mental health.395

8.2 Child recruitment
In an October 2021 report, UNHCR referred to information obtained from interlocutors in thefield, according to which both the Taliban/the de facto authorities as well as the ISKP ’recruit
widely and use children in their ranks.’396 USDOS indicated in its report on the human rights
situation in Afghanistan in 2021, that armed groups, particularly the Taliban and ISKP, were
responsible for most child recruitments and were also deploying children under the age of
12.397

Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, Atlas der Versklavung [Atlas of slavery], November 2021, url, p. 44
Al Jazeera, Taliban bans forced marriage of women in Afghanistan, 3 December 2021, url
390
Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, Atlas der Versklavung [Atlas of slavery], November 2021, url, p. 45
391
TNH, Protections for women facing violence have vanished under the Taliban, 20 April 2022, url
392
UNICEF, Girls increasingly at risk of child marriage in Afghanistan - Statement by UNICEF Executive Director
Henrietta Fore, 12 November 2021, url; VOA, Afghanistan Poverty Bears More Child Brides, 4 May 2022, url
393
CNN, The rescue of Parwana: 9-year-old child bride is taken to safety in Afghanistan, 3 December 2021, url
394
UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/862S/2022/485, 15 June 2022, url, para. 38; UNICEF, Girls increasingly at risk of child marriage in Afghanistan Statement by UNICEF Executive Director Henrietta Fore, 12 November 2021, url
395
UNICEF, Girls increasingly at risk of child marriage in Afghanistan - Statement by UNICEF Executive Director
Henrietta Fore, 12 November 2021, url
396
Protection Cluster Afghanistan, Afghanistan Protection Analysis Update – October 2021, October 2021, url, p. 8
397
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Afghanistan, 12 April 2022, url, p. 4
388

389

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KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN KABUL CITY

According to a January 2022 report by the UN Human Rights Council, there were at least 47
verified cases of child recruitment in 2021, including 24 by the Taliban, 16 by pro-government
militias and 7 by the Afghan National Police. However, the same report emphasised that‘recruitment and use of children remains under verified’ due to sensitivity and protection
issues. The vast majority of these recruitments reportedly took place before 15 August 2021.
‘At the same time, children in the ranks of Taliban have become more visible since its
takeover, leading to perceptions that the recruitment of children has increased, despite muchof the recruitment likely having occurred previously.’398
In more than 20 years of armed conflict, the Taliban have reportedly used children as fighters,
to plant and detonate IEDs, and as suicide bombers. HRW reported in July 2022 that there arethousands of children in their ranks, often trained in madrassas and recruited through force
and threats, deception, promises of money or other incentives. ‘The Taliban have denied thatthey use children in “jihadic operations” and their code of conduct states that “boys without
beards” are not allowed in military centers.’ Moreover, in more recent years, the Taliban
reportedly ‘expressed some sensitivity’ to the problematic issue of child recruitment.
Nevertheless, hundreds of individual cases of child recruitment by Taliban forces have been
documented, with a significant increase in 2020.399
According to a January 2022 report by the UN Human Rights Council, the increasing poverty‘served as a driving factor for the recruitment and use of children by armed groups.’400 In its
Humanitarian Needs Overview, UNOCHA emphasised the harmful impact of this practice on
the safety, well-being, and development of children.401

8.3 Child labour
Although the previous Afghan government enacted regulations against child labour, the legal
framework does not adequately safeguard children against the worst forms of child labour,which include debt bondage and commercial sexual exploitation.402 As reported by USDOS in
April 2022, the Taliban have not expressed any intention to change existing labour laws andhave not yet commented on child labour.403 In its April 2022 country report, USDOS
mentioned children forced to work under threat of physical violence from their families, boys
sent to work in neighbouring Iran, or children living in orphanages reportedly forced to.404 For
more information in this regard, please see section 9.3
Orphans and children without asupport network.

UN Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in Afghanistan, and technical assistance achievements inthe field of human rights, A/HRC/49/90, 12 January 2022, url, para. 24
399
HRW, This is our opportunity to end the Taliban's use of child soldiers, 20 September 2021, url
400
UN Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in Afghanistan, and technical assistance achievements inthe field of human rights, A/HRC/49/90, 12 January 2022, url, para. 29
401
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Afghanistan 2022, 7 January 2022, url, p. 37
402
USDOL, Country Report on Child Labor and Forced Labor – Afghanistan, 29 September 2021, url
403
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Afghanistan, 12 April 2022, url, p. 63
404
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Afghanistan, 12 April 2022, url, p. 63
398

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Poverty is reported to be a driving factor for child labour,405 causing the current economiccrisis to further increase the risk of child labour.406 In March 2022, the UN Human Rights
Council referred to UNICEF, which had reportedly identified an uptick in child labour in
Afghanistan.407 In a January 2022 article, the Afghan online news portal Hasht-e Subh also
reported that child labour has increased sharply since the Taliban came to power and poverty
levels soared. According to the same article, in Charikar city, the capital city of Parwan
province alone, more than 1 700 children were employed in hard labour and more than 100 ofthem were homeless.408 Based on a multi-sectorial rapid assessment between October andDecember 2021, UNHCR found that post-August 64 % of households confirmed that children
were required to work.409 According to a February 2022 article published by the Save theChildren, up to 20 % of Afghan families ‘have been forced to send their children out to work as
incomes have plummeted in the past six months with an estimated one million children now
engaged in child labour’.410
According to a January 2022 International Labour Organization (ILO) Rapid Impact
Assessment, boys and children living in rural areas are generally more likely to be affected bychild labour than girls and children living in urban areas.411 In February 2022, the news website
Equal Times, which focuses on ‘social justice’ issues, referred to data by the Afghan National
Statistics and Information Authority (NSIA), according to which ‘twice as many boys as girls areengaged in work outside the home, while girls are mostly confined to work in their homes,
rendering them invisible and thus more difficult to assess’. The article further stated, thatalongside poverty, the issue of child labour is exacerbated by limited access to education in‘remote and conservative’ areas of the country.412

8.4 Trafficking of children
In January 2022, the UN Human Rights Council found that the deterioration of the economic
situation after August 2021 was a contributing factor to the sale of children.413 In addition, UN
experts stated that restrictions imposed by the Taliban against women and girls increased the
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Afghanistan, 12 April 2022, url, p. 63; Equal
Times, Afghanistan’s dire political and economic situation is undermining its fight against child labour, 4 February2022, url
406
ILO, Employment prospects in Afghanistan: A rapid impact assessment, ILO Brief, January 2022, 19 January2022, url, p. 5; UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security,
A/76/667-S/2022/64, 28 January 2022, url, para. 65; BBC News, Afghanistan: What's life like for children in the
country?, 17 January 2022, url
407
UN Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in Afghanistan: Report of the United Nations HighCommissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/49/24, 4 March 2022, url, para. 12; UN News, Afghanistan: Humanitariancrisis threatens basic human rights, 14 December 2021, url
408
Hasht-e Subh, Child Labor in Afghanistan’s Parwan Province Increases Since Taliban Takeover, 21 January2022, url
409
UNHCR, Afghanistan 2021 Multi Sectoral Rapid Assessments Analysis, 21 April 2022, url, p. 9
410
Save the Children, Afghanistan: A Fifth of Starving Families Sending Children to Work as Incomes Plummet in
Past Six Months, 14 February 2022, url
411
ILO, Employment prospects in Afghanistan: A rapid impact assessment, ILO Brief, January 2022, 19 January2022, url, p. 5
412
Equal Times, Afghanistan’s dire political and economic situation is undermining its fight against child labour, 4February 2022, url
413
UN Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in Afghanistan, and technical assistance achievements inthe field of human rights, A/HRC/49/90, 12 January 2022, url, para. 29
405

62KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN KABUL CITY

‘risk of exploitation of women and girls including of trafficking for the purposes of child andforced marriage as well as sexual exploitation and forced labor’.414
According to a June 2022 news report, the illegal trafficking of Afghan children increased
since the Taliban takeover.415
In January 2022 the All Survivors Project, an independent research project and charitablefoundation, pointed out that the Taliban takeover caused conflict-related sexual violence risk
factors to ‘increase significantly,’ while ‘exponentially decreas[ing]’ the scope to respond. In
this context, the source referred to ‘multiple recent reports of boys being smuggled across the
Iranian and Pakistan borders (where prospects for employment and security are consideredbetter than in Afghanistan), and of incidents of sexual violence against them committed bypaid ‘“guides”.’416
In its country report on child labour in Afghanistan published in September 2021, the US
Department of Labor (USDOL) mentioned, that children are subjected to human trafficking
both domestically and internationally and that boys migrating unaccompanied are ‘particularly
vulnerable to human trafficking,’ including for agricultural and construction work.417 There werereportedly cases of children being trafficked as a means of paying off their families’ debts.418
In September 2021, the USDOL noted that some victims of child trafficking (especially thoseengaged in bacha bazi419 or armed conflict) were treated as criminals by the former Afghan
government and subjected to abuse.420 In April 2022, the USDOS wrote that ‘the pre-August
15 government protected trafficking victims from prosecution for crimes committed because ofbeing subjected to trafficking’.421

OHCHR, Afghanistan: Taliban attempting to steadily erase women and girls from public life – UN experts, 17
January 2022, url
415
WION, Taliban regime accountable for rise in illegal trafficking of children in Afghanistan, 8 June 2022, url
416
All Survivors Project, Conflict-related sexual violence: New dangers facing men and boys in Afghanistan, January2022, url, pp. 1-3
417
USDOL, Country Report on Child Labor and Forced Labor – Afghanistan, 29 September 2021, url
418
Save the Children, Afghanistan: Desperate Mother Agreed to Sell her Unborn Baby as Debt-Ridden Families Are
Pushed to Crisis Point, 17 March 2022, url; USDOL, Country Report on Child Labor and Forced Labor – Afghanistan,
29 September 2021, url
419
Bacha Bazi can be roughly translated as ‘boy play’ and is ‘the sexual and commercial exploitation of boys,
especially by men in positions of power’. There were numerous reports that members of the former Afghan security
forces were ‘among the most prevalent perpetrators of bacha bazi’. USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices for 2021 - Afghanistan, 12 April 2022, url, p. 8; Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, What About theBoys: A Gendered Analysis of the U.S. Withdrawal and Bacha Bazi in Afghanistan, 24 June 2021, url
420
USDOL, Country Report on Child Labor and Forced Labor – Afghanistan, 29 September 2021, url
421
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Afghanistan, 12 April 2022, url, p. 23
414

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

9.
9.1

Network of support
Network through family and community

Sources report that in the absence of a functioning state, government, or market, in Afghan
villages, autonomous local institutions such as social networks, exist and play a pivotal role inregard to resources.422 According to rural development researcher Adam Pain, ‘[i]nAfghanistan, rural households have not been able to obtain reliable economic security fromeither the state or the market and as a result, the community and family play a central role inmeeting that deficit of provision.’423 In this context, so-called qawm424, families or joint
households,425 and at a higher level, villages, are described as vital social institutions thatprovide Afghan communities with the resilience needed to be able to withstand both internaland external shocks while also hampering 40 years of efforts to modernise governance of thecountry.426
Joint households are usually composed of several generations and several nuclear families
living under one roof and can include 20 or more members. Such households form acooperative community within which collaboration ensures survival.427 Villages are describedas networks ‘that govern […] social, political, and economic life’428, provide ‘the key public
good of security’ and are ‘central to household economic life and a wider “distributional
economy” of sharing’429. According to Pain, in a distributional economy, individuals who do nothave enough land, sufficient employment or decent work can claim access to the resources ofothers in order to survive. To make such claims, it is essential to invest in and maintain social
relationships on which (material) assistance and support might depend in times of need. 430
Pain stated that ‘the quality of the social relationships that a household can establish is central
to its security.’ He states that the ‘robustness of household economies’ affects their ability toreciprocate that support to other households and that when they are in decline, this limits

Noori, H., Social capital and structural disadvantages: A case of Community-Driven Development program in
Afghanistan, 2022, url, p. 72; Pain, A., Living With Radical Uncertainty in Rural Afghanistan: The work of survival,
AAN, 21 February 2022, url
423
Pain, A., Living With Radical Uncertainty in Rural Afghanistan: The work of survival, AAN, 21 February 2022, url
424
Qawm can be described as ‘a social structure which is based on kinship, residence, and occupation’, that used
to be translated ‘as a tribe or ethnicity in Afghanistan’, although it may refer to ‘cross tribal and ethnicity
boundaries’ as well, according to Hadi Noori. According to Barnett R. Rubin, qawm refers to ‘any form of solidarity’and ‘may denote various forms of identity: any level of tribal organization; an area of residence such as a village,
valley, or town; a linguistically based ethnic group or “nationality”; or an occupational group similar to a caste’.
Noori, H., Social capital and structural disadvantages: A case of Community-Driven Development program in
Afghanistan, 2022, url, p. 72; Rubin, B.R., The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, 2002, p. 25.
425
Pain, A., Living With Radical Uncertainty in Rural Afghanistan: The work of survival, AAN, 21 February 2022, url
426
Noori, H., Social capital and structural disadvantages: A case of Community-Driven Development program in
Afghanistan, 2022, url, p. 72; Pain, A., Living With Radical Uncertainty in Rural Afghanistan: The work of survival,
AAN, 21 February 2022, url
427
Pain, A., Living With Radical Uncertainty in Rural Afghanistan: The work of survival, AAN, 21 February 2022, url
428
Noori, H., Social capital and structural disadvantages: A case of Community-Driven Development program in
Afghanistan, 2022, url, p. 73
429
Pain, A., Living With Radical Uncertainty in Rural Afghanistan: The work of survival, AAN, 21 February 2022, url
430
Pain, A., Living With Radical Uncertainty in Rural Afghanistan: The work of survival, AAN, 21 February 2022, url
422

64KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN KABUL CITY

what they can provide to others, and may cause them to lose access to support networks. 431 In
June 2021, Friederike Stahlmann, researcher at the Max Planck Institute for EthnologicalResearch, stressed that social networks have long been unable to cope with temporary crises,
which in turn leads to long-term impoverishment.432
For detailed information on the economic situation, access to basic subsistence, employment
and food security of Afghan households, please see sections 2. Economy, 3. Basic
subsistence and employment and 4. Food security.

9.2 Women without a support network
After their seizure of power in August 2021, the Taliban restricted women’s freedom of
movement, requiring them to travel with a close male relative, a mahram433, when traveling
longer distances, accessing health facilities, or using taxis.434 The Taliban-imposed restrictions
on movement also affected women’s access to food and related services and their ability towork.435 Due to the potential need to have a mahram, unmarried women reportedly felt evenmore compelled to marry.436
Single mothers and single female breadwinners were hit particularly hard by the Taliban’s ban
on women working.437 In August and September 2021, the British newspaper The Guardian
reported that single mothers, whose lives in Afghanistan had always been marked by stigma,
poverty and exclusion, and divorced women, who were often disowned by their families andhad to fight hard for their basic rights, found themselves in an even more difficult anddesperate situation.438
For detailed information on the economic and labour market situation of female-headedhouseholds, please see section 2.3 and section 3.2 of this report.

Pain, A., Living With Radical Uncertainty in Rural Afghanistan: The work of survival, AAN, 21 February 2022, url
Stahlmann, F., Erfahrungen und Perspektiven abgeschobener Afghanen [Experiences and Perspectives ofDeported Afghans], June 2021, url, p. 41
433
Mahram can be defined as ‘a close male relative: either a husband, or a male relative whom she cannot marry’.
AAN, “We need to breathe too”: Women across Afghanistan navigate the Taleban’s hijab ruling, 1 June 2022, url
434
Al Jazeera, Shrinking public space for Afghan women as Taliban expands curbs, 6 April 2022, url
435
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Afghanistan 2022, 7 January 2022, url, pp. 24, 38
436
HRW, Afghanistan: Taliban Deprive Women of Livelihoods, Identity, 18 January 2022, url; Die Zeit, "Sollen wir
Frauen uns in Luft auflösen?" ["Should we women vanish into thin air?"], 9 June 2022, url
437
DW, A brief history of Afghan women's rights, 23 January 2022, url
438
Guardian (The), ‘They came for my daughter’: Afghan single mothers face losing children under Taliban, 8September 2021, url; Guardian (The), ‘Nowhere to go’: divorced Afghan women in peril as the Taliban close in, 13
August 2021, url
431

432

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9.3 Orphans and children without a support network
Media articles published in January and February 2022 indicated that the number of orphans
and unsupervised children was on the rise in Afghanistan.439 In war-torn Afghanistan, many
children have lost their parents in the conflict, making orphanages in Afghanistan important
institutions.440 However, at the same time orphanages were seriously struggling to provide
care and food for the children due to the country’s economic crisis and lack of external andinternal funding.441
In its 2021 report on the human rights situation in Afghanistan, USDOS noted that living
conditions in orphanages were poor with no ‘regular access to running water, heating in
winter, indoor plumbing, health-care services, recreational facilities, or education’. Children
were reportedly subjected to psychological, physical, and sexual abuse or forced labour, andat times became the victims of human trafficking (for more information in this regard, pleasesee section 8.4).442 As of February 2022, of the 68 public orphanages in Afghanistan, only 9were reportedly still open, while 36 private orphanages were also still operating.443 Only a few
weeks after the Taliban takeover in August 2021, the situation for children was described as
particularly dire.444 In October 2021, RFE/RL’s Gandhara reported the starvation deaths of eight
unattended orphan boys in Kabul’s District 13.445

9.4 IDPs and returnees
For returnees from European countries, research studies published in 2020 and 2021 foundthat they often did not have access to support from their previous social networks and local
communities.446 The resources needed for reintegration were not available to these
returnees447 as their networks had changed in the meantime448 or they had been deliberately
excluded from their networks due to the disappointment associated with their return or

TOLOnews, Most Public Orphanages in Afghanistan Now Closed: Ministry, 1 February 2022, url; ITV News,
Afghanistan orphanage forced to turn away children from desperate parents, 19 January 2022, url
440
Conversation (The), With catastrophe looming, the world cannot turn its back on Afghanistan’s children, 2November 2021, url
441
ITV News, Afghanistan orphanage forced to turn away children from desperate parents, 19 January 2022, url;
AA, Economic crisis hits Afghanistan orphanages hard, 4 December 2021, url; Conversation (The), With catastrophelooming, the world cannot turn its back on Afghanistan’s children, 2 November 2021, url
442
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Afghanistan, 12 April 2022, url, p. 58, 63
443
TOLOnews, Most Public Orphanages in Afghanistan Now Closed: Ministry, 1 February 2022, url
444
Conversation (The), With catastrophe looming, the world cannot turn its back on Afghanistan’s children, 2November 2021, url
445
Gandhara, Eight Orphan Children Found Dead From Starvation In Kabul, 24 October 2021, url
446
Majidi, N., Assuming Reintegration, Experiencing Dislocation – Returns from Europe to Afghanistan, 6 November
2020, url, p. 186; Stahlmann, F., Erfahrungen und Perspektiven abgeschobener Afghanen [Experiences andPerspectives of Deported Afghans], June 2021, url, pp. 16, 41; Ahmad, A., From Austria to Afghanistan: Forced
return and a new migration cycle, VIDC, January 2021, url, p. 5
447
Majidi, N., Assuming Reintegration, Experiencing Dislocation – Returns from Europe to Afghanistan, 6 November
2020, url, p. 186
448
Ahmad, A., From Austria to Afghanistan: Forced return and a new migration cycle, VIDC, January 2021, url, p. 5
439

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stigmatization as ‘westernized’ or ‘criminal’449. In her June 2021 study, Friederike Stahlmann
further expressed that those returnees who do not have support networks in Afghanistan are
particularly vulnerable.450 More recent information covering the period between the end of2021 and June 2022 could not be found within the time constraints of this report.
With regard to IDPs, a January 2022 research study conducted in Kandahar indicated that
relations between locals and IDPs were found to be hard to improve, as IDPs were primarily
perceived as ‘security threats, economic competitors in a tight labor market, and a strain on
resources such as schools and housing’.451
More recent and further relevant information on the situation of IDPs and returnees in regard
to their networks of support could not be found within the time constraints of this report.

Stahlmann, F., Erfahrungen und Perspektiven abgeschobener Afghanen [Experiences and Perspectives ofDeported Afghans], June 2021, url, pp. 16, 41; Ahmad, A., From Austria to Afghanistan: Forced return and a new
migration cycle, VIDC, January 2021, url, p. 5
450
Stahlmann, F., Erfahrungen und Perspektiven abgeschobener Afghanen [Experiences and Perspectives ofDeported Afghans], June 2021, url, p. 16
451
Zhou, Y.-Y. and Lyall, J., Prolonged Contact Does Not Reshape Locals’ Attitudes toward Migrants in Wartime
Settings: Experimental Evidence from Afghanistan, 31 January 2022, url, pp. 5-6
449

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10.

Mobility and travel

10.1 Travel requirements and restrictions
Freedom House reported that the de facto Taliban authorities had few ‘direct restrictions’ on
movement but that it can be hazardous due to ‘intrusive checkpoints, designed to ensnare
suspected opponents and enforce Taliban codes’.452 In a May 2022 publication by the UN
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) the United Nations Special
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan noted that the decline in armed
conflict in the country has led to better accessibility within the country for Afghans andhumanitarian actors alike and increased ‘predictability’, particularly in rural communities.453
According to the USDOS, ‘intercity travel’ was largely unimpeded after the Taliban takeover.454
According to June 2022 media reports, the Taliban limited access to areas where conflict wasconcentrated.455
As reported by USDOS, local and international media in March and April 2022, Taliban leaders
claimed that while they do not want citizens to leave Afghanistan, those who have foreign
travel authorisation and necessary papers will be permitted to go abroad.456 According to
USDOS, ‘[c]itizens with passports and visas for third countries were generally permitted todepart the country, and Pakistan was allowing pedestrians from Kandahar province to crossinto Pakistan and back for trade and day labor using only identity cards.’ (Further informationon the situation at the Afghan-Pakistani border can be found in the EUAA COI Report: Pakistan– Situation of Afghan refugees (May 2022).) However, the Taliban reportedly barred specificpolitical figures affiliated with the former government from leaving the country over concerns
about ‘possible political activities abroad’.457
Women’s freedom of movement was, however, ‘restricted.’458 This was by orders imposed by
the Taliban’s Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (MPVPV) limiting
how far women were allowed to travel on their own. Moreover, women who do not dress inaccordance with the ministry’s guidelines risked being denied access to vehicles.459

Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2022 – Afghanistan, 28 February 2022, url
OHCHR, Statement by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights, Richard Bennett,
following his visit to Afghanistan from May 15-26, 2022, 26 May 2022, url, p. 1
454
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Afghanistan, 12 April 2022, url, p. 33
455
Washington Post (The), Inside the Taliban’s secret war in the Panjshir Valley, 8 June 2022, url; Hasht-e Subh,
Taliban Closes Access Routes to Balkhab District, Sar-e Pol, 17 June 2022, url
456
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Afghanistan, 12 April 2022, url, pp. 33-34;
Khaama Press, Mujahid claims to be misconstrued about travel restrictions on people, 1 March 2022, url; Ariana
News, Afghans with legal documents, invitations can travel: Mujahid, 1 March 2022, url; AFP, Taliban Rows Back
Comments Saying Afghans Barred From Leaving, 1 March 2022; Al Jazeera, Afghans with correct legal documents
may travel abroad: Taliban, 2 March 2022, url
457
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Afghanistan, 12 April 2022, url, p. 34
458
OHCHR, Statement by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights, Richard Bennett,
following his visit to Afghanistan from May 15-26, 2022, 26 May 2022, url, p. 1; Freedom House, Freedom in theWorld 2022 – Afghanistan, 28 February 2022, url
459
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2022 – Afghanistan, 28 February 2022, url
452
453

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Shortly after returning to power in August 2021, the Taliban stopped the issuance ofpassports.460 In October, the Kabul passport office reopened, but stopped operating just a few
days later as biometric equipment broke down due to the large number of applications.461 In
December 2021, passport offices in 25 provinces462 reportedly reopened.463 According to an
April 2022 report by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the de facto Taliban
authorities have halted issuing new passports in Bamyan, Daykundi and Kandahar as well.464
In February 2022, the renewed closure of passport offices was mentioned,465 which, reopened
again in Kabul in early April466 and were announced to reopen in the provinces in May 2022.467
Further information on the operations of passport offices as of July 2022 could not be found.
In its April 2022 report on the human rights situation in Afghanistan, the USDOS referred to‘anecdotal reports’ that passport issuance was not always conducted impartially but tended tobe reserved for individuals deemed ‘unproblematic’ by the Taliban or individuals who wereable to pay much higher prices for it. Some individuals linked to the former government were
allegedly detained and beaten after visiting passport offices.468 According to IOM, under the
new de facto government, passport issuance takes much longer and can require up to amonth and a half.469 In a February 2022 webinar on the situation in Afghanistan, Emran Feroz,
a journalist and book author well versed in Afghanistan, reported of cases where individuals
were waiting already for six months to receive their passports. In addition, the cost ofobtaining a passport reached an extremely high level. Even before the Taliban took power, it
was reportedly very difficult to obtain a passport from the Kabul passport office, which used tocost between USD 70 and USD 100 per person. According to Emran Feroz’s research,however, bribes had increased immensely, with a single passport sometimes reaching a pricebetween USD 600 and USD 1 000.470
According to the above-cited April 2022 report by IOM, the de facto authority responsible forthe issuance of national ID-cards (Tazkira), the National Statistics and Information Authorities
Guardian (The), Hundreds queue for passports in bid to leave Afghanistan, 19 December 2021, url; Daily Sabah,
Suicide attack at Afghan passport office injures several in Kabul, 23 December 2021, url; IOM, Information on thesocio-economic situation in Afghanistan requested by the Austrian Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum, 12
April 2022, url, p. 2; USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Afghanistan, 12 April 2022, url,
p. 34
461
Daily Sabah, Suicide attack at Afghan passport office injures several in Kabul, 23 December 2021, url; Guardian(The), Hundreds queue for passports in bid to leave Afghanistan, 19 December 2021, url
462
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Afghanistan, 12 April 2022, url, p. 34
463
Guardian (The), Hundreds queue for passports in bid to leave Afghanistan, 19 December 2021, url; Daily Sabah,
Suicide attack at Afghan passport office injures several in Kabul, 23 December 2021, url; USDOS, Country Reports
on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Afghanistan, 12 April 2022, url, p. 34
464
IOM, Information on the socio-economic situation in Afghanistan requested by the Austrian Federal Office for
Immigration and Asylum, 12 April 2022, url, p. 2
465
ACCORD, Afghanistan: Aktuelle Lage & Überblick über relevante Akteure; Situation gefährdeter Gruppen[Current situation & overview of relevant actors; situation of vulnerable groups] [source: Feroz, E.], March 2022, url,
p. 33
466
TOLOnews, Passport Processing Resumes in Kabul, 9 April 2022, url; UNHCR, Afghanistan situation: Emergency
preparedness and response in Iran (30 April 2022), 9 May 2022, url, p. 2
467
TOLOnews, Passport Processing Resumes in Kabul, 9 April 2022, url
468
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Afghanistan, 12 April 2022, url, p. 34
469
IOM, Information on the socio-economic situation in Afghanistan requested by the Austrian Federal Office for
Immigration and Asylum, 12 April 2022, url, p. 3
470
ACCORD, Afghanistan: Aktuelle Lage & Überblick über relevante Akteure; Situation gefährdeter Gruppen[Current situation & overview of relevant actors; situation of vulnerable groups] [source: Feroz, E.], March 2022, url,
p. 33
460

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM(NSIA) resumed their activities in 104 centres across the country, including 25 centres in Kabul
Province two months after the collapse of the previous government.471
In March 2022, Amnesty International (AI) reported that the Taliban-imposed limitations on
departures, including ‘insurmountable difficulties’ in acquiring passports and visas,
compromised the ability of Afghans, including those at fear of retaliation, to seek asylum inthird countries. Concerns were raised that border restrictions by neighbouring countries would
force Afghans to travel irregularly and smuggler smugglers, making them even more
vulnerable to human rights abuses.472 In June 2022, RFE/RL's Gandhara reported on theincrease in smuggling of Afghans without documents into neighboring Iran and Pakistan.
Although the Taliban have banned the cross-border movement of undocumented migrants,
smugglers reportedly circumvent the ban by ‘bribing corrupt Taliban border guards’.473
In December 2021, VOA reported on Taliban checkpoints ‘in and around Afghan cities andtowns’,474 while the Wall Street Journal mentioned in January 2022 that Taliban checkpoints
far from the cities have become ‘increasingly rare’475. In July 2022, Hasht-e Subh reported on
an increase in Taliban checkpoints in Panjshir province476 as well as on Taliban checkpoints
set up at the Afghanistan-Iran border in order to identify former soldiers and NRF affiliates,
after clashes reportedly intensifies in Afghanistan’s north477. According to a former Afghan
military commander quoted in a March 2022 Human Rights Watch article, Taliban forces
check the names and faces of individuals at checkpoints based on ‘lists of names andphotographs of former army and police’ personnel.478

10.2 Access to airports in Kabul City, Mazar-e Sharif and
Herat
A June 2022 NPR report described the drive from Kabul airport to Kabul and noted that armed
Taliban manned checkpoints and patrolled the roads.479 In March 2022, the Taliban reportedly
notified airlines in Afghanistan that women, including dual nationals, were not allowed toboard domestic or international flights without being accompanied by a male.480 However,these regulations were not always implemented, according to a June 2022 interview with
Afghan women rights activist Mahbouba Seraj.481 More recent and further relevant information

IOM, Information on the socio-economic situation in Afghanistan requested by the Austrian Federal Office for
Immigration and Asylum, 12 April 2022, url, p. 3
472
AI, Amnesty International Report 2021/22 – The state of the world’s human rights, 29 March 2022, url, p. 65
473
Gandhara, Gandhara Briefing: Taliban Rift, Afghan Musicians, People Smuggling, 3 June 2022, url
474
VOA, Taliban Fighters Now Manning Checkpoints in Afghan Cities, 8 December 2021, url
475
WSJ, A Journey Along Afghanistan’s Main Highway Leads Through a Country in Transition, 22 January 2022, url
476
Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Increases Checkpoints in Panjshir Province, 12 July 2022, url
477
Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Establishes Check Points Across Afghanistan-Iran Border to Identify Ex-Government NRF
Affiliates, 24 July 2022, url
478
HRW, New Evidence that Biometric Data Systems Imperil Afghans, 30 March 2022 url
479
NPR, NPR travels to Afghanistan for the 1st time since the Taliban took over, 9 June 2022, url
480
Reuters, 27 March 2022, url; AP, Officials: Taliban blocked unaccompanied women from flights, 26 March 2022,
url
481
Die Zeit, "Sollen wir Frauen uns in Luft auflösen?" ["Should we women vanish into thin air?"], 9 June 2022, url
471

70KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN KABUL CITY

on access to the airports in Kabul City, Mazar-e Sharif and Herat could not be found within thetime constraints of this report.

10.3 Operability of international and domestic flights
After the Taliban took power, air traffic declined significantly due to the lack of capacity andfunctionality of the country’s airports.482 Already in September 2021, the Afghan police,
together with Taliban security forces, had reportedly resumed their work at Kabul Airport.483
As of December 2021, it was reported that no commercial flights were operating into or out of
the country,484 which resumed to a limited extent in the course of the first half of 2022485.
According to a January 2022 SIGAR report, Qatari engineers were able to restore limited
daytime airport operations in Kabul in September, and enabled domestic flights to Herat,
Mazar-e Sharif, and Kandahar.486 In April 2022, the Special inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction (SIGAR) reported that ‘[c]onditions on the ground at Kabul International Airport(KBL) remain[ed] essentially unchanged’ with Kabul airport only operating when weather andlight conditions ‘allow pilots to navigate visually’, as the airport lacked trained personnel andthe necessary equipment for poor-weather conditions.487 In a January 2022 article by theAfghan news outlet TOLOnews, the spokesman of the de facto Taliban Ministry of Transportand Civil Aviation was quoted as saying that flights from Afghanistan’s airports were
proceeding as normal, international and domestic flights were taking place, and parts of Kabul
Airport served for military, logistical, and other flights.488 An April 2022 TOLOnews article
referred to numbers of the respective Taliban ministry stating that more than 20 domestic andinternational flights were departing and arriving from/at Kabul Airport each day,489 while SIGAR
reported also in April 2022 on eight domestic and international flights leaving Kabul airport
per day on average, including to the United Arabic Emirates, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran,
Turkey, Uzbekistan, and Qatar490.
According to a June 2022 report by the UN Secretary General, in May 2022 the de facto
authorities signed a contract with a company based in the United Arab Emirates, ‘for groundhandling and related services at Afghan international airports’. On ‘more comprehensive
services’, negotiations with Qatar and Turkey were reportedly ongoing.491

USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Afghanistan, 12 April 2022, url, p. 34
AFP, Afghan police return to work alongside Taliban at airport, 12 September 2021
484
Washington Post (The), As evacuations from Afghanistan slow to a trickle, some ‘at risk’ allies may face long roadto the United States, 12 December 2021, url
485
US, SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 April 2022, url, pp. 117-118; TOLOnews, Weekly
Kabul-Moscow Flights to Begin, 27 April 2022, url; TOLOnews, Afghan Civilian and Military Airports Resume
Activities, 29 January 2022, url
486
US, SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2022, url, p. 108
487
US, SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 April 2022, url, pp. 117-118
488
TOLOnews, Afghan Civilian and Military Airports Resume Activities, 29 January 2022, url
489
TOLOnews, Weekly Kabul-Moscow Flights to Begin, 27 April 2022, url
490
US, SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 April 2022, url, pp. 117-118
491
UNSG, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/76/862S/2022/485, 15 June 2022, url, para. 32
482
483

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Annex 1: Bibliography
Oral sources, including anonymous sources
Afghan human rights expert, online interview, 11 November 2021. This interview was
conducted by EASO in the course of EASO’s COI report: Afghanistan – Country Focus(January 2022). This source left Afghanistan as the Taliban took power but remains incommunication with sources on the ground. The source monitors developments within thehuman rights field through local sources in the country. The source wishes to be anonymousfor security reasons.

Public sources
AA (Anadolu Agency), Economic crisis hits Afghanistan orphanages hard, 4 December 2021,
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/economic-crisis-hits-afghanistan-orphanageshard/2438406, accessed 23 June 2022
AAN (Afghanistan Analysts Network), “We need to breathe too”: Women across Afghanistan
navigate the Taleban’s hijab ruling, 1 June 2022, https://www.afghanistananalysts.org/en/reports/rights-freedom/we-need-to-breathe-too-women-across-afghanistannavigate-the-talebans-hijab-ruling%EF%BF%BC/, accessed 27 July 2022
AAN (Afghanistan Analysts Network), A Pledging Conference for Afghanistan… But what about
beyond the humanitarian?, 31 March 2022, https://www.afghanistananalysts.org/en/reports/international-engagement/a-pledging-conference-for-afghanistan-butwhat-about-beyond-the-humanitarian/, accessed 23 June 2022
AAN (Afghanistan Analysts Network), Afghanistan’s looming economic catastrophe: What next
for the Taleban and the donors?, 6 September 2021, https://www.afghanistananalysts.org/en/reports/economy-development-environment/afghanistans-looming-economiccatastrophe-what-next-for-the-taleban-and-the-donors/, accessed 23 June 2022
AAN (Afghanistan Analysts Network), The 2018 Election Observed (5) in Nuristan:
Disfranchisement and lack of data, 17 November 2018, https://www.afghanistananalysts.org/en/reports/political-landscape/the-2018-election-observed-4-in-nuristandisfranchisement-and-lack-of-data/, accessed 14 July 2022
ACAPS, Afghanistan: Information and analysis ecosystem, 21 March 2022,
https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20220321_acaps_thematic_report_afgh
anistan_information_and_analysis_ecosystem.pdf, accessed 23 June 2022
ACAPS, In Short, n.d., https://www.acaps.org/who-we-are/in-short, accessed 27 July 2022

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ACCORD (Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation),
Afghanistan: Aktuelle Lage & Überblick über relevante Akteure; Situation gefährdeter
Gruppen [Current situation & overview of relevant actors; situation of vulnerable groups],
March 2022, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2070441/2022-03_ACCORD_COIWebinar_Afghanistan_Februar_2022.pdf, accessed 23 June 2022
Afghanistan Education Cluster, Afghanistan Education Sector Transitional Framework, 28
February 2022, 12 May 2022,
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/
files/afghanistan_education_sector_transitional_framework_3_mar_2022.pdf, accessed 14
July 2022
AFP (Agence France-Presse), Afghan police return to work alongside Taliban at airport, 12
September 2021, available by subscription at: https://www.dowjones.com/professional/factiva/,
accessed 13 July 2022
AFP (Agence France-Presse), Taliban Rows Back Comments Saying Afghans Barred From
Leaving, 1 March 2022, available by subscription at:https://www.dowjones.com/professional/factiva/, accessed 13 July 2022
Ahmad, A., From Austria to Afghanistan: Forced return and a new migration cycle, VIDC
(Vienna Institute for International Dialogue and Cooperation), January 2021,
https://www.vidc.org/fileadmin/michael/studien/fromaustria_web.pdf, accessed 23 June 2022
AI (Amnesty International), Amnesty International Report 2021/22 – The state of the world’s
human rights, 29 March 2022, https://www.amnesty.org/en/wpcontent/uploads/2022/03/WEBPOL1048702022ENGLISH.pdf, accessed 13 July 2022
Al Jazeera, ‘Theft’: Advocates decry US decision to withhold Afghan funds, 11 February 2022,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/11/theft-afghan-americans-decry-decision-to,accessed 23 June 2022
Al Jazeera, 100 days of the Taliban, 23 November 2021,
https://www.aljazeera.com/program/start-here/2021/11/23/100-days-of-the-taliban-starthere?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter, accessed 27 July 2022
Al Jazeera, Afghan public universities reopen with gender segregated classes, 26 February2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/26/afghan-main-universities-reopen-but-fewwomen-return, accessed 14 July 2022
Al Jazeera, Afghanistan healthcare ‘on brink of collapse’ amid Omicron scare, 16 December
2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/16/afghanistan-healthcare-omicron-covidchildren-hospital, accessed 14 July 2022
Al Jazeera, Afghans with correct legal documents may travel abroad: Taliban, 2 March 2022,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/2/afghans-with-correct-legal-documents-may-travelabroad-taliban, accessed 13 July 2022

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Al Jazeera, Climate now a worse crisis than war for Afghanistan’s farmers, 26 October 2021,
https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2021/10/26/photos-afghanistan-climate-change-farmerscop26-agriculture, accessed 23 June 2022
Al Jazeera, Desperate Afghans sell kidneys amid poverty, starvation, 28 February 2022,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/28/desperate-afghans-resort-to-selling-kidneys-tofeed-families, accessed 14 July 2022
Al Jazeera, Nearly 10 million children going hungry in Afghanistan, says NGO, 10 May 2022,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/10/nearly-10-million-children-go-hungry-inafghanistan-says-ngo, accessed 23 June 2022
Al Jazeera, Shrinking public space for Afghan women as Taliban expands curbs, 6 April 2022,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/6/are-the-taliban-returning-to-their-harshest-ruling,
accessed 23 June 2022
Al Jazeera, Taliban bans forced marriage of women in Afghanistan, 3 December 2021,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/3/taliban-bans-forced-marriage-calls-for-equal-rightsfor-women, accessed 13 July 2022
Al Jazeera, Taliban bans forced marriage of women in Afghanistan, 3 December 2021,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/3/taliban-bans-forced-marriage-calls-for-equal-rightsfor-women, accessed 13 July 2022
Al Jazeera, Taliban bans the use of foreign currency across Afghanistan, 2 November 2021,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/2/taliban-bans-use-of-foreign-currency-acrossafghanistan, accessed 27 July 2022
Al Jazeera, Taliban supreme leader urges world to recognise ‘Islamic Emirate’, 29 April 2022,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/29/taliban-supreme-leader-urges-world-to-recogniseislamic, accessed 23 June 2022
Al Jazeera, UN chief warns millions of Afghans are on ‘verge of death’, 13 January 2022,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/13/un-chief-warns-millions-of-afghans-are-on-vergeof-death, accessed 23 June 2022
All Survivors Project, Conflict-related sexual violence: New dangers facing men and boys in
Afghanistan, January 2022, https://allsurvivorsproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/02/Conflict-related-Sexual-Violence-New-Dangers-facing-Men-andBoys-in-Afghanistan.pdf, accessed 13 July 2022
AP (Associated Press), New COVID surge batters Afghanistan’s crumbling health care, 9February 2022, https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-coronavirus-pandemic-businesshealth-kabul-9e983468daac7ef86367b6b9f76a704f, accessed 14 July 2022
AP (Associated Press), Officials: Taliban blocked unaccompanied women from flights, 26
March 2022, https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-travel-business-pakistan-lifestylefebfbef58116fd063e1a5ef780762e56, accessed 13 July 2022

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KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN KABUL CITY

AP (Associated Press), Taliban vow to respect women, despite history of oppression, 18
August 2021, https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-taliban-kabul1d4b052ccef113adc8dc94f965ff23c7, accessed 23 June 2022
AP (Associated Press), The economy on the brink, Taliban rely on former technocrats, 19
October 2021, https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-business-united-nations-economykabul-08db064b2e1d8986b3f731ae7f6589f4, accessed 27 July 2022
Ariana News, Afghans with legal documents, invitations can travel: Mujahid, 1 March 2022,
https://www.ariananews.af/afghans-with-legal-documents-invitations-can-travel-mujahid/,
accessed 13 July 2022
Arlini, S. M. and Burgess, M., Afghanistan Multi-sectoral Needs Assessment – 2021/2022, Save
the Children, March 2022, https://resource-centreuploads.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/Afghanistan-MSNA-Full-Report-March2022.pdf,
accessed 23 June 2022
Asia Foundation (The), Model Disability Survey of Afghanistan 2019, 13 May 2020, available at:https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/model-disability-survey-afghanistan-2019, accessed 14
July 2022
Austria, BFA Staatendokumentation, Dossier Afghanistan Socio-Economic Survey 2021, 12
January 2022, available at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2066706/AFGHANISTAN++Socio-Economic+Survey+2021.pdf, accessed 14 July 2022
Barr, H., From Taliban to Taliban: Cycle of Hope, Despair on Women’s Rights [Opinion], IPS(Inter Press Service), 29 October 2021, https://www.ipsnews.net/2021/10/taliban-taliban-cyclehope-despair-womens-rights/, accessed 23 June 2022
BBC News, Afghanistan earthquake: What foreign aid is getting in?, 8 July 2022,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-59518628, accessed 27 July 2022
BBC News, Afghanistan: What humanitarian aid is getting in?, 14 February 2022,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-59518628, accessed 23 June 2022
BBC News, Afghanistan: What's life like for children in the country?, 17 January 2022,
https://www.bbc.co.uk/newsround/59881582, accessed 13 July 2022
BBC News, Hardliners get key posts in new Taliban government, 7 September 2021,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58479750, accessed 23 June 2022
Byline Times, The Taliban Protection Racket, 10 January 2022,
https://bylinetimes.com/2022/01/10/the-taliban-protection-racket/, accessed 13 July 2022
Cambridge Dictionary, Definition: abaya, Cambridge University Press, 2014,
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/de/worterbuch/englisch/abaya, accessed 27 July 2022
Cambridge Dictionary, Definition: hijab, Cambridge University Press, 2014,
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/de/worterbuch/englisch/hijab, accessed 27 July 2022

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Cambridge Dictionary, Definition: mullah, Cambridge University Press, 2014,
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/de/worterbuch/englisch/mullah, accessed 27 July 2022
CCCM (Global Camp Coordination and Camp Management Cluster) and Protection Clusters
Afghanistan, Joint-Advocacy Briefing Note from the Shelter/NFI, CCCM and Protection
Clusters Afghanistan Pledging Conference, 31 March 2022, https://cccmcluster.org/news/jointadvocacy-briefing-note-shelternfi-cccm-and-protection-clusters-afghanistan-pledging,accessed 13 July 2022
Chatham House, Women’s rights under threat in Taliban-run Afghanistan, 10 June 2022,
https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/06/womens-rights-under-threat-taliban-run-afghanistan,accessed 27 July 2022
CNN (Cable News Network), The media spotlight in Afghanistan is about to dim as journalists
evacuate, 20 August 2021, https://edition.cnn.com/2021/08/20/media/journalists-leaveafghanistan-reliable-sources/index.html, accessed 23 June 2022
CNN (Cable News Network), The rescue of Parwana: 9-year-old child bride is taken to safety in
Afghanistan, 3 December 2021, https://edition.cnn.com/2021/12/02/asia/afghanistan-parwanagirls-marriage-intl-hnk-dst/index.html, accessed 13 July 2022
Conversation (The), With catastrophe looming, the world cannot turn its back on Afghanistan’schildren, 2 November 2021, https://theconversation.com/with-catastrophe-looming-the-worldcannot-turn-its-back-on-afghanistans-children-168377, accessed 23 June 2022
CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies), A Conversation with Paul Spiegel on the
Afghan Healthcare System, 3 January 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/conversation-paulspiegel-afghan-healthcare-system, accessed 14 July 2022
Daily Sabah, Suicide attack at Afghan passport office injures several in Kabul, 23 December
2021, https://www.dailysabah.com/world/asia-pacific/suicide-attack-at-afghan-passport-officeinjures-several-in-kabul, accessed 13 July 2022
Denmark, DIS, Afghanistan, Taliban’s impact on the population, June 2022, Afghanistan Taliban’s impact on the population (us.dk), accessed 5 August 2022
Die Zeit, "Sollen wir Frauen uns in Luft auflösen?" ["Should we women vanish into thin air?"], 9June 2022, https://www.zeit.de/zett/politik/2022-06/mahbouba-seraj-afghanistan-frauenrechte-taliban, accessed 23 June 2022
Diplomat (The), Can the World Get Aid to Afghanistan?, 24 September 2021,
https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/can-the-world-get-aid-to-afghanistan/, accessed 23 June
2022
Diplomat (The), New COVID-19 Wave Batters Afghanistan’s Crumbling Health Care, 9 February2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/02/new-covid-19-wave-batters-afghanistans-crumblinghealth-care/, accessed 23 June 2022

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KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN KABUL CITY

DRC (Danish Refugee Council), Hunger eats away at Afghans' ability to dignified selfpreservation, 24 March 2022, https://drc.ngo/it-matters/current-affairs/2022/3/hunger-eatsaway-at-afghans-ability-to-dignified-self-preservation/, accessed 23 June 2022
Drezner, D.W., The United States is stealing Afghanistan’s money, The Washington Post
[Perspective], 14 February 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/02/14/unitedstates-is-stealing-afghanistans-money/, accessed 23 June 2022
DW (Deutsche Welle), A brief history of Afghan women's rights, 23 January 2022,
https://www.dw.com/en/a-brief-history-of-afghan-womens-rights/a-60449450, accessed 23
June 2022
DW (Deutsche Welle), Afghan health faces collapse amid economic crisis, 24 December 2021,
https://www.dw.com/en/afghan-health-care-faces-collapse-amid-economic-crisis/a-60252184,
accessed 14 July 2022
EASO (European Asylum Support Office), EASO Country of Origin Information (COI) Report
Methodology, June 2019,https://coi.euaa.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2019_EASO_COI_Report_Methodology.p
df, accessed 23 June 2022
EASO (European Asylum Support Office), Writing and Referencing Guide for EASO Country of
Origin Information (COI) Reports, June 2019,https://coi.easo.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2019_EASO_COI_Writing_and_Referenci
ng_Guide.pdf, accessed 23 June 2022
Economist (The), On life support; Afghanistan’s health-care system is crumbling, 19 December
2021, https://www.economist.com/asia/2021/12/19/afghanistans-health-care-system-iscrumbling, accessed 14 July 2022
Equal Times, Afghanistan’s dire political and economic situation is undermining its fightagainst child labour, 4 February 2022, https://www.equaltimes.org/afghanistan-s-dire-politicaland?lang=en, accessed 13 July 2022
EU, Eurostat, Infant mortality sharply declined over the past decades, 4 June 2021,
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/ddn-20210604-1, accessed 27
July 2022
European Commission, Exchange rate (InforEuro), n.d., https://ec.europa.eu/info/fundingtenders/procedures-guidelines-tenders/information-contractors-and-beneficiaries/exchangerate-inforeuro_de, accessed 13 July 2022
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization), FAO Afghanistan Newsletter: 1st Quarter 2022 –Issue #27, 2022, https://www.fao.org/3/cb9485en/cb9485en.pdf, accessed 23 June 2022
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization), Livelihood-based Coping Strategy Index, 2021,
https://data-in-emergencies.fao.org/pages/afg_r3_storymap_lcs, accessed 27 July 2022

77

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMFEWS NET (Famine Early Warning Systems Network), Afghanistan Remote Monitoring Update:Despite seasonal progress, poor macroeconomy and drought will drive high assistance needs,
April 2022,
https://fews.net/sites/default/files/documents/reports/AFGHANISTAN_RMU_April%202022_FI
NAL.pdf, accessed 23 June 2022
FEWS NET (Famine Early Warning Systems Network), Afghanistan Remote Monitoring Update:In rural areas, food security outcomes improve only temporarily given poor crop production,
June 2022,
https://fews.net/sites/default/files/documents/reports/AFGHANISTAN_RMU_June%202022_FI
NAL.pdf, accessed 14 July 2022
FP (Foreign Policy), Biden Hands the Taliban a Propaganda Victory, 17 February 2022,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/17/afghanistan-biden-central-bank-assets-talibanpropaganda-victory/, accessed 23 June 2022
France24, Taliban appeal for help as rescuers scramble to reach Afghan quake survivors, 23
June 2022, https://www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20220623-taliban-appeal-for-help-afterafghanistan-quake-kills-more-than-1-000, accessed 3 August 2022
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2022 – Afghanistan, 28 February 2022,
https://freedomhouse.org/country/afghanistan/freedom-world/2022, accessed 13 July 2022
Frontier Post (The), Afghan children crossing border by hiding under and over moving trucks
to sell things in Pakistan, June 2022, https://thefrontierpost.com/afghan-children-crossingborder-by-hiding-under-and-over-moving-trucks-to-sell-things-in-pakistan/, accessed 13 July
2022
Gandhara, Afghan Widows Struggle To Survive Amid Humanitarian Disaster, 25 March 2022,
https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/afghan-widows-struggle-to-survive/31768872.html, accessed 23
June 2022
Gandhara, Eight Orphan Children Found Dead From Starvation In Kabul, 24 October 2021,
https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/kabul-orphan-children-starvation/31526972.html, accessed 23
June 2022
Gandhara, Gandhara Briefing: Taliban Rift, Afghan Musicians, People Smuggling, 3 June 2022,
https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/taliban-rift-afghan-musicians-people-smuggling/31882115.html,
accessed 13 July 2022
Gandhara, Leader Of Taliban's New Afghan Regime Says Shari'a Law Will Govern All Aspects
Of Life, 7 September 2021, https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/taliban-names-afghangovernment/31448288.html, accessed 23 June 2022
Gandhara, Taliban Accused Of Forcibly Evicting Ethnic Uzbeks, Turkmen In Northern
Afghanistan, 9 December 2021, https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/taliban-evictions-uzbeksturkmen/31601904.html, accessed 14 July 2022

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Gandhara, Taliban Imposes New Dress Code, Segregation Of Women At Afghan Universities,
6 September 2021, https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/taliban-dress-code-segregationwomen/31446726.html, accessed 14 July 2022
Guardian (The), ‘I’ve already sold my daughters; now, my kidney’: winter in Afghanistan’sslums, 23 January 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/jan/23/ivealready-sold-my-daughters-now-my-kidney-winter-in-afghanistans-slums, accessed 14 July
2022
Guardian (The), ‘Nowhere to go’: divorced Afghan women in peril as the Taliban close in, 13
August 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/aug/13/nowhere-to-godivorced-afghan-women-in-peril-as-the-taliban-close-in, accessed 23 June 2022
Guardian (The), ‘The Taliban know they need us’: the Afghan hospitals run by women, 9 May
2022, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/may/09/taliban-afghanistanhospitals-run-by-women-doctors, accessed 14 July 2022
Guardian (The), ‘They came for my daughter’: Afghan single mothers face losing children
under Taliban, 8 September 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/globaldevelopment/2021/sep/08/they-came-for-my-daughter-afghan-single-mothers-face-losingchildren-under-taliban, accessed 23 June 2022
Guardian (The), Hundreds queue for passports in bid to leave Afghanistan, 19 December 2021,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/19/hundreds-queue-for-passports-in-bid-toleave-afghanistan, accessed 13 July 2022
Guardian (The), Taliban order all Afghan women to cover their faces in public, 7 May 2022,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/07/taliban-order-all-afghan-women-to-wearburqa, accessed 14 July 2022
Guardian (The), Taliban stop Afghan women from using bathhouses in northern provinces, 7January 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/jan/07/taliban-stopafghan-women-using-bathhouses-in-northern-provinces, accessed 14 July 2022
Hasht-e Sub, Mobile School: Pen Path Takes School to the Door Steps in Kandahar Province,
17 May 2022, https://8am.af/eng/pen-path-campaigners-take-school-to-the-door-steps-inkandahar-province/, accessed 14 July 2022
Hasht-e Subh, Child Labor in Afghanistan’s Parwan Province Increases Since Taliban
Takeover, 21 January 2022, https://8am.af/eng/child-labor-in-afghanistans-parwan-provinceincreases-since-taliban-takeover/, accessed 14 July 2022
Hasht-e Subh, Child Labor in Afghanistan’s Parwan Province Increases Since Taliban
Takeover, 21 January 2022, https://8am.af/eng/child-labor-in-afghanistans-parwan-provinceincreases-since-taliban-takeover/, accessed 13 July 2022
Hasht-e Subh, Poverty, Father Burns Himself in Front of His Child, 18 April 2022,
https://8am.af/eng/poverty-a-father-burns-himself-in-front-of-his-child/, accessed 14 July 2022

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Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Closes Access Routes to Balkhab District, Sar-e Pol, 17 June 2022,
https://8am.af/eng/taliban-closes-access-routes-to-balkhab-district-sar-e-pol/, accessed 27
July 2022
Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Establishes Check Points Across Afghanistan-Iran Border to Identify ExGovernment NRF Affiliates, 24 July 2022, https://8am.af/eng/taliban-establishes-check-pointsacross-afghanistan-iran-border-to-identify-ex-government-nrf-affiliates/, accessed 27 July
2022
Hasht-e Subh, Taliban Increases Checkpoints in Panjshir Province, 12 July 2022,
https://8am.af/eng/taliban-increases-checkpoints-in-panjshir-province/, accessed 27 July 2022
Hasht-e Subh, The Central Bank of Afghanistan Receives Another $32 Million Cash in
Assistance, 6 March 2022, https://8am.af/eng/the-central-bank-of-afghanistan-receivesanother-32-million-cash-in-assistance/, accessed 27 July 2022
HealthNet TPO, Urgent Funding Needed for Covid-19 Hospital in Kabul, 13 October 2021,
https://www.healthnettpo.org/en/news/urgent-funding-needed-covid-19-hospital-kabul,
accessed 23 June 2022
HRW (Human Rights Watch), Afghanistan: Economic Roots of the Humanitarian Crisis, 1 March
2022, https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/01/afghanistan-economic-roots-humanitarian-crisis,
accessed 14 July 2022
HRW (Human Rights Watch), Afghanistan: Taliban Blocking Female Aid Workers, 4 November
2021, https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/11/04/afghanistan-taliban-blocking-female-aid-workers,
accessed 23 June 2022
HRW (Human Rights Watch), Afghanistan: Taliban Deprive Women of Livelihoods, Identity, 18
January 2022, https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/01/18/afghanistan-taliban-deprive-womenlivelihoods-identity, accessed 23 June 2022
HRW (Human Rights Watch), Afghanistan: Taliban Forcibly Evict Minority Shia, 22 October
2021, https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/10/22/afghanistan-taliban-forcibly-evict-minority-shia,
accessed 14 July 2022
HRW (Human Rights Watch), Afghanistan: Taliban Severely Restrict Media, 1 October 2021,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/10/01/afghanistan-taliban-severely-restrict-media, accessed 27
July 2022
HRW (Human Rights Watch), Afghanistan: Taliban Threatening Provincial Media, 7 March
2022, https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/07/afghanistan-taliban-threatening-provincialmedia, accessed 23 June 2022
HRW (Human Rights Watch), Afghans Dying from Lack of Medicine, 9 May 2022,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/05/09/afghans-dying-lack-medicine, accessed 14 July 2022

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KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN KABUL CITY

HRW (Human Rights Watch), Dress Restrictions Tighten for Afghanistan Girls’ Schools, 27 April
2022, https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/27/dress-restrictions-tighten-afghanistan-girlsschools, accessed 14 July 2022
HRW (Human Rights Watch), New Evidence that Biometric Data Systems Imperil Afghans, 30
March 2022 https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/30/new-evidence-biometric-data-systemsimperil-afghans, accessed 13 July 2022
HRW (Human Rights Watch), This is our opportunity to end the Taliban's use of child soldiers,
20 September 2021, https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/09/20/our-opportunity-end-talibans-usechild-soldiers, accessed 13 July 2022
ICRC (International of the Red Cross), Afghanistan, ICRC scales up support to prevent thecollapse of health care, 21 February 2022, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/icrc-scalessupport-health-care, accessed 14 July 2022
IFRC (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies), Operation Update
Report Afghanistan: Humanitarian Crises, 3 June 2022,
https://adore.ifrc.org/Download.aspx?FileId=535606, accessed 14 July 2022
ILO (International Labour Organization), Employment prospects in Afghanistan: A rapid impact
assessment, ILO Brief, January 2022, 19 January 2022,
https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---robangkok/documents/briefingnote/wcms_834525.pdf, accessed 13 July 2022
Insecurity Insight, Attacks on Health Care, Bi-Monthly News Brief, 23 February – 8 March
2022, 22 March 2022, https://insecurityinsight.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/23-February09-March-2022-Attacks-on-Health-Care-Bi-Monthly-News-Brief.pdf, accessed 14 July 2022
International Crisis Group, Afghanistan’s Taliban Expand Their Interim Government, 28
September 2021, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/afghanistans-talibanexpand-their-interim-government, accessed 23 June 2022
International Crisis Group, Thinking Through the Dilemmas of Aid to Afghanistan, 7 October
2021, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/afghanistan.pdf, accessed 23 June 2022
International Crisis Group, Who Will Run the Taliban Government, 9 September 2021,
https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/who-will-run-taliban-government,
accessed 23 June 2022
International Crisis Group, With the Taliban Back in Kabul, Regional Powers Watch and Wait,
26 August 2021, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/Afghanistan%20.pdf, accessed 23
June 2022
IOM (International Organisation for Migration) Germany, Afghanistan Country Fact Sheet 2021,
2021,
https://milo.bamf.de/OTCS/cs.exe/fetch/2000/702450/698578/704870/698612/18363835//Afghanistan_-81

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM_Country_Fact_Sheet_2021%2C_englisch.pdf?nodeid=23268588&amp;vernum=-2, accessed
14 July 2022
IOM (International Organisation for Migration), Afghanistan Crisis Response Plan 2022, 22
March 2022,
https://crisisresponse.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1481/files/appeal/pdf/2022_Afghanistan_Crisis_Response_Plan_2022.pdf, accessed 14 July 2022
IOM (International Organisation for Migration), DTM Afghanistan Emergency Event Tracking
Kabul Province, EET Round 3 (1-19 December 2021), 2 February 2022,
http://displacement.iom.int/sites/default/files/public/reports/IOM%20AFG_EET%20Round%203_Kabul%20Province_1-19Dec2021.pdf, accessed 14 July 2022
IOM (International Organisation for Migration), DTM Afghanistan Emergency Event Tracking,
EET Round 3 (1-19 December 2021), 21 December 2021,
https://displacement.iom.int/sites/default/files/public/reports/IOM%20AFG_EET%20Round%20
3_1-19Dec2021%20%281%29.pdf, accessed 14 July 2022
IOM (International Organisation for Migration), DTM Afghanistan, Returnee Longitudinal Survey(RLS), Round 3 – December 2021, 21 April 2022,
https://displacement.iom.int/sites/default/files/public/reports/AFG_RLS_Snapshot_Round3.pdf,
accessed 14 July 2022
IOM (International Organisation for Migration), DTM Afghanistan, Baseline Mobility Assessment
Summary Results Round 14 November-December 2021, 2 March 2022,
https://displacement.iom.int/sites/default/files/public/reports/IOM-AFGDTM%20BMA_Round14_3.pdfhttps://displacement.iom.int/reports/afghanistan-baselinemobility-assessment-summary-results-november-december-2021?close=true, accessed 14 July2022
IOM (International Organization for Migration), Information on the socio-economic situation in
Afghanistan requested by the Austrian Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum, 12 April
2022, available by subscription at:https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2071112/Information%3B+the+socioeconomic+situation+in+Afghanistan.pdf, accessed 13 July 2022
IOM (International Organization for Migration), Rising from the Rubble: Earthquake Victims in
Afghanistan Rebuild After Disaster, 12 July 2022, https://storyteller.iom.int/stories/risingrubble-earthquake-victims-afghanistan-rebuild-after-disaster, accessed 27 July 2022
IPC (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification ), Afghanistan: IPC Acute Food Insecurity
Analysis (March – November 2022), May 2022,
https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Afghanistan_AcuteFoodInsec_2022Mar_2022Nov_report.pdf, accessed 23 June 2022
IPC (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification), Integrated Food Security Phase
Classification Technical Manual Version 3.1. Evidence and Standards for Better Food Security
and Nutrition Decisions, August 2021,

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https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/manual/IPC_Technical_Manual_3_Final.
pdf, accessed 14 July 2022
IPC, Afghanistan: IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis (September 2021 – March 2022),
October 2021,
https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Afghanistan_AcuteFoodInsec_2021Oct2022Mar_report.pdf, accessed 27 July 2022
IPC-IG (International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth), Afghanistan: Needs Assessment,
2022, 10 March 2022,
https://ipcig.org/sites/default/files/pub/en/RR66_Afghanistan_Needs_assessment.pdf,
accessed 14 July 2022
IRC (International Rescue Committee), 2022 Emergency Watchlist – System Failure, 14
December 2021,
https://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/document/6423/cs2201watchlistreportfinal.pdf,
accessed 27 July 2022
IRC (International Rescue Committee), From Humanitarian Response to Economic Recovery:
recommendations for addressing acute needs and the root causes of the humanitarian crisis
in Afghanistan, May 2022, 11 May 2022,
https://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/document/6764/afghanistanpolicybriefmay2022final.
pdf, accessed 14 July 2022
ITV News, Afghanistan orphanage forced to turn away children from desperate parents, 19
January 2022, https://www.itv.com/news/2022-01-19/inside-the-struggling-afghan-orphanageforced-to-turn-away-desperate-parents, accessed 23 June 2022
Jackson, A., The Ban on Older Girls’ Education: Taleban conservatives ascendant and aleadership in disarray, AAN (Afghanistan Analysts Network), 29 March 2022,
https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/rights-freedom/the-ban-on-older-girlseducation-taleban-conservatives-ascendant-and-a-leadership-in-disarray/, accessed 14 July
2022
JMMI (Joint Market Monitoring Initiative), Market Trends – 7–17 May 2022, 14 June 2022,
https://www.impactrepository.org/document/reach/3b856587/REACH_AFG_CVWG_JMMI_May2022.pdf,
accessed 14 July 2022
JMMI (Joint Market Monitoring Initiative), Market Trends – March 2022, 29 March 2022,
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/
files/market_trends_in_afghanistan_jmmi_reach_cvwg_29.03.22.pdf, accessed 23 June 2022
Kabul Times (The), Pen Path setting up schools, libraries to support education in Afghanistan,
19 May 2022, https://thekabultimes.gov.af/pen-path-setting-up-schools-libraries-to-supporteducation-in-afghanistan/, accessed 27 July 2022

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Kabul Times (The), Prices still high; even on the rise despite officials’ efforts, Kabul citizens, 7April 2022, https://thekabultimes.gov.af/prices-still-high-even-on-the-rise-despite-officialsefforts-kabul-citizens/, accessed 14 July 2022
Khaama Press, Kabul in Blackout, Uzbekistan’s electricity to Afghanistan decreased by 60 %,13 January 2022, https://www.khaama.com/kabul-in-a-blackout-uzbekistans-electricity-toafghanistan-decreased-by-60-8768586/, accessed 14 July 2022
Khaama Press, Mujahid claims to be misconstrued about travel restrictions on people, 1 March
2022, https://www.khaama.com/mujahid-claims-to-be-misconstrued-about-travel-restrictionson-people-7658687/, accessed 13 July 2022
Lombardi, C.B and March, A.F., Afghan Taliban Views on Legitimate Islamic Governance, USIP
(United States Institute of Peace), February 2022,
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/pw_183afghan_taliban_views_on_legitimate_islamic_governance.pdf, accessed 23 June 2022
Majidi, N., Assuming Reintegration, Experiencing Dislocation – Returns from Europe to
Afghanistan, in: International Migration, Vol. 59, Issue 2, 6 November 2020,
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/imig.12786, pp. 186-201, accessed 23 June 2022
MEE (Middle East Eye), Afghan girls move to Iran to defy Taliban’s education ban, 14 May
2022, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/afghanistan-taliban-iran-girls-move-defyeducation-ban, accessed 14 July 2022
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KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN KABUL CITY

New York Times (The), U.S. Eases Sanctions to Allow Routine Transactions With Afghan
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Taliban attempting to steadily erase women and girls from public life – UN experts, 17 January2022, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/01/afghanistan-taliban-attemptingsteadily-erase-women-and-girls-public-life-un?LangID=E&NewsID=28029, accessed 13 July
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KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN KABUL CITY

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87

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMRSF (Reporters Without Borders), RSF seeks UN Security Council meeting on plight ofjournalists in Afghanistan, 18 August 2021, https://rsf.org/en/rsf-seeks-un-security-councilmeeting-plight-journalists-afghanistan, accessed 23 June 2022
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Save the Children, Afghanistan: A Fifth of Starving Families Sending Children to Work as
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KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN KABUL CITY

TOLOnews, Health Ministry pledges to hire more midwives, 16 May 2022,
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90

KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN KABUL CITYUNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Afghanistan situation: Emergency
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KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN KABUL CITY

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93EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMUSIP (United States Institute of Peace), Winter is coming in Afghanistan. Are the Taliban
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Annex 2: Terms of Reference
The reference period should be 1 December 2021 – 30 June 2022. The Background should
also cover events from 15 August – 30 November 2022.
The report should cover the general humanitarian situation in Afghanistan, including
information on the following topics. Information on the situation in the capital Kabul should be
included, and in cases where provinces or areas experience a notably different situation thisshould be indicated.
1. Backgrounda. Developments and major events since the Taliban takeoverb. Humanitarian situation/issues since Taliban takeoverc. COVID-19 situation
2. Economy
a. National economic and financial situationb. Poverty ratesc. Situation in Kabul
d. Female-headed households
e. IDPs
3. Basic subsistence and employmenta. Countrywide trends
b. Situation in Kabul
c. Female-headed households
d. IDPs
4. Food security
a. Countrywide trends
b. Situation in Kabul
c. Female-headed households
d. IDPs
5. Housing/shelter and living conditions, including water, hygiene, and sanitationa. Countrywide trends
b. Situation in Kabul
c. Female-headed households
d. IDPs
6. Healthcare situationa. Situation of the national health system since Taliban takeoverb. Access to basic health care treatment and medicationc. Access to healthcare for women/maternal and child healthcared. Access to healthcare for IDPse. Situation in Kabul
7. Educationa. Situation of the national education system since Taliban takeoverb. Access to basic education, secondary, and higher educationc. Access for IDPs
d. Situation in Kabul

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8. Child specific living conditions
a. Child marriage
b. Child recruitment
c. Child labourd. Trafficking of children
9. Networks of support
a. Network through family and community
b. Women without a support networkc. Orphans and children without a support network
d. IDPs and returnees from abroad
10. Mobility and travel
a. Requirements to travel from/to/within Afghanistan (including any legal
requirements, travel restrictions, documents, etc).
b. Situation of and access to airports in Kabul city, Mazar-e Sharif, Heratc. Operability of international and domestic flights

100