European Asylum Support OfficeAfghanistan
State Structure andSecurity Forces
Country of Origin Information ReportAugust 2020
SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION

European Asylum Support OfficeAfghanistan
State Structure andSecurity Forces
Country of Origin Information ReportAugust 2020

More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu).

ISBN: 978-92-9485-650-0
doi: 10.2847/115002
BZ-02-20-565-EN-N© European Asylum Support Office (EASO) 2020
Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged, unless otherwise stated.
For third-party materials reproduced in this publication, reference is made to the copyrights
statements of the respective third parties.

Cover photo: © Al Jazeera English, Helmand, Afghanistan 3 November 2012, url CC BY-SA 2.0
Taliban On the Doorstep: Afghan soldiers from 215 Corps take aim at Taliban insurgents.

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AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT

Acknowledgements
This report was drafted by the European Asylum Support Office COI Sector.
The following national asylum and migration department contributed by reviewing this report:

The Netherlands, Office for Country Information and Language Analysis, Ministry of Justice

It must be noted that the review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts or organisations
contributes to the overall quality of the report, it but does not necessarily imply their formal
endorsement of the final report, which is the full responsibility of EASO.

AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 5

Contents
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................... 4Contents ............................................................................................................................................ 5
Disclaimer .......................................................................................................................................... 7
Glossary and abbreviations ............................................................................................................... 8
Introduction..................................................................................................................................... 11
Terms of Reference ..................................................................................................................... 11
Methodology............................................................................................................................... 11
Structure and use of the report .................................................................................................. 11
Map ................................................................................................................................................. 12
1. State structure and governance .................................................................................................. 13
1.1 Historical overview of the Afghan state................................................................................ 13
1.2 Overview of the state structure and governance ................................................................. 14
1.3 Executive branch ................................................................................................................... 15
1.4 Legislative branch ................................................................................................................. 16
1.5 Judicial branch....................................................................................................................... 17
1.6 Elections ................................................................................................................................ 18
1.7 Political developments .......................................................................................................... 19
1.8 Corruption ............................................................................................................................. 22
1.8.1 Anti-corruption efforts and mechanisms ....................................................................... 22
2. Security institutions ..................................................................................................................... 26
2.1 Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) ............................................................................... 26
2.1.1 Afghan National Army (ANA) ......................................................................................... 27
2.1.2 Afghan National Police (ANP)......................................................................................... 30
2.1.3 Afghan Local Police (ALP) ............................................................................................... 33
2.1.4 National Directorate of Security (NDS) .......................................................................... 35
3. State judiciary .............................................................................................................................. 39
3.1 Structure ............................................................................................................................... 39
3.2 Capacity ................................................................................................................................. 40
3.3 Access and effectiveness....................................................................................................... 41
3.3.1 Women ........................................................................................................................... 44
3.4 Integrity ................................................................................................................................. 45
3.5 Military justice....................................................................................................................... 45
3.6 Prison conditions................................................................................................................... 46
Annex I: Bibliography ...................................................................................................................... 48 doi:

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AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT

Annex II: Terms of Reference .......................................................................................................... 63

AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 7

Disclaimer
This report was written according to the EASO COI Report Methodology (2019).1 The report is basedon carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced.
The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed with utmost
care. However, this document does not claim to be exhaustive. If a particular event, person ororganisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has not taken place orthat the person or organisation does not exist.
Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particular application
for international protection. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative of a particular legal
position.
‘Refugee’, ‘risk’ and similar terminology are used as generic terminology and not in the legal sense as
applied in the EU Asylum Acquis, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the
Status of Refugees.
Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may bemade of the information contained in this report.
The drafting of this report was finalised on 30 June 2020. Any event taking place after this date is notincluded in this report. More information on the reference period for this report can be found in themethodology section of the Introduction.

1 The EASO methodology is largely based on the Common EU Guidelines for processing Country of Origin Information (COI),

2008, and can be downloaded from the EASO website: http://www.easo.europa.eu.

8—

AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORTGlossary and abbreviations
AAN

Afghanistan Analysts Network

AGEs

Anti-Government Elements are individuals and armed groups
involved in armed conflict with, or armed opposition against, thegovernment of Afghanistan and/or international military forces.
Examples of such groups include the Taliban, the Haqqani Network,
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Islamic Jihad Union, Lashkari
Tayyiba, Jaysh Muhammed and groups identifying themselves as
Islamic State/‘Daesh’.2

AIHRC

Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission

ANASOC

Afghan National Army Special Operations Command

ANSF/ANDSF

Afghan National Security Forces/Afghan National Defense And
Security Forces, an umbrella term which includes:3

ABF
ALP
ANA
AAF
ANP
ANCOF
ASF
ANA TFNDS

Afghan Border Force
Afghan Local Police
Afghan National Army
Afghan Air Force
Afghan National Police
Afghan National Civil Order Force
Afghan Special Forces
Afghan National Army Territorial ForceNational Directorate of Security

ArbakiTribal police; Afghan Local Police

Attrition

Attrition is unplanned and planned total losses, including Dropped
from Rolls, Killed in Action, Separation, and Other losses[disappearance/captured, disability, death (not in action),retirement, exempted (i.e. AWOL or permanent medical), or transfer
to the ANA/ANP]4

bacha bazi

A practice whereby boys are exploited by wealthy or powerful men
for entertainment, particularly for dancing and sexual activities5

CSIS

The Center for Strategic and International Studies

Civilian

UNAMA refers to international law for a definition of ‘civilians’:
persons who are not members of military/paramilitary forces ormembers of organised armed groups with continuous combat

2 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, pp. 59, 61
3 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 61
4 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2019, 23 January 2020, url, p. 35, footnote 24
5 UNAMA, Afghanistan protection of civilians in armed conflict 2019, 22 February 2020, url, p. 88

AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 9

function and are protected against direct attacks unless and for suchtime as they directly participate in hostilities.6
Ground engagements

Ground engagements include kinetic ground operations, stand-off
attacks, crossfire and armed clashes between parties to the conflict.
Ground engagements include attacks or operations in which smallarms, heavy weapons and/or area weapons systems, i.e. mortars androckets are fired.7

HIG

Hezb-e Islami/Gulbuddin Hekmatyar

Huquq/ Huqooq
Department

A department within the Justice Ministry dedicated to resolve family
issues or civil cases through mediation under the Civil Procedure
Code prior to referral to court; provincial departments/offices exist
in all 34 provinces8

IEC

Independent Election Commission

IECC

Independent Elections Complaints Commission

IED

Improvised Explosive Device. A bomb constructed and deployed inways other than in conventional military action. IEDs can broadly be
divided into four categories:
Command-Operated IEDs – Radio or remote controlled IEDs
operated from a distance that can enable operators to detonate apre-placed device at the precise time a target moves into the target
area. Magnetic IEDs are IEDs attached by a magnetic or other device
and are a sub-category of command-operated IEDs.
Victim-Operated IEDs – These detonate when a person or vehicle
triggers the initiator or switch which could be a pressure plate (PPIED) or pressure release mechanism, trip wire or another device,
resulting in an explosion.
Other IEDs – This category includes command-wired IEDs and timedIEDs and IEDs where the trigger/switch type for detonation could not
be determined.
Suicide IEDs – Separately from data on IEDs, UNAMA documents
civilian casualties resulting from complex and suicide attacks. Suicide
IEDs are generally either Body-Borne IEDs (BB-IEDs) or Suicide
Vehicle-Borne IEDs (SVB-IEDs). Body-Borne IEDs refer to situations
where a suicide bomber wears an explosive vest or belt while Suicide
Vehicle-Borne IEDs is defined as the detonation of a vehicle riggedwith explosives by a driver or passenger inside the vehicle, or thedetonation of a BB-IED by the driver or a passenger while inside thevehicle.9

IS, ISKP

Islamic State, also called ISIS, ISIL or Daesh. Islamic State inAfghanistan is referred to as Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP).

6 UNAMA, Protection of civilians in armed conflict, 2019, 22 February 2020, url, p. 88
7 UNAMA, Protection of civilians in armed conflict, 2019, 22 February 2020, url, p. 89

8Afghanistan, MoJ, General directorate of huqoq, n.d., url

9 UNAMA, Afghanistan, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Special Report - Increasing Harm to Afghan Civilians fromthe Deliberate and Indiscriminate Use of Improvised Explosive Devices, October 2018, url, p. 10

10 —AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORTIslamic Emirate of
Afghanistan

The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan was the state in Afghanistan from1996 to 2001 under the Taliban regime. The Taliban still uses this
name.

Jirga

A council or assembly of tribal elders held for dispute resolution;
jirgamar refers to elders whose profession is dispute settlement.

Loya Jirga

Grand assembly

Khost Protection ForceA ‘campaign force’ that was established after 2001 underinternational (CIA/US special forces) control. There are long-standing
allegations against the Khost Protection Force of extrajudicial
killings, torture, beating and unlawful detentions.10

Kuchi

Nomadic Pashtuns

Lewat

SodomyMoD

Ministry of Defense

MoI

Ministry of InteriorNGO

Non-Governmental Organisation

NUG

National Unity Government

OFS

Operation Freedom’s Sentinel

PDPA

People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan

PGF

Pro-Government Forces. Afghan National Security Forces and otherforces and groups that act in military or paramilitary counterinsurgency operations and are directly or indirectly under the controlof the government of Afghanistan.11

Red Unit/Red Brigade

In 2015, the Taliban established a ‘special forces’ unit named Red
Unit or Red Brigade (‘sra qet’a’ in Pashto). They are better equipped
and trained and are generally used as a ‘rapid reaction force’.12

RFE/RL

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

RS

Resolute Support

shariaThe religious law of Islam; Islamic canonical law

SIGAR

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

UNAMA

United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan

USDOD

United States Department of Defense

USDoS

United States Department of State

Wolesi Jirga

Lower house of the Afghan Parliament

Meshrano Jirga

Upper house of the Afghan Parliament

10 Clark, K., Khost Protection Force Accused of Fresh Killings: Six men shot dead in Zurmat, AAN, 21 January 2019, url
11 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of civilians in armed conflict Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 64
12 Times (The), Helmand teeters after Taliban storm in with British tactics, 21 August 2016, url

AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 11

Introduction
The purpose of this report is to provide relevant information for the assessment of international
protection status determination, including refugee status and subsidiary protection, and in particularfor use in EASO’s country guidance development on Afghanistan.
The report provides an overview of the state structure, security institutions and state judiciary in
Afghanistan. It is meant to be read in conjunction with other 2020 EASO COI reports on Afghanistan,which provide relevant information regarding topics such as customary law and informal dispute
resolution, the main insurgent groups, targeted violence, security situation and armed conflict
developments, and key socioeconomic indicators.

Terms of Reference
The terms of reference (ToR) of this report were defined by EASO based on discussions held and input
received from COI experts in the EASO COI specialist network on Afghanistan and from policy experts
in EU+ countries13 within the framework of a Country Guidance development on Afghanistan. Termsof reference for this report can be found in Annex II.

Methodology
This report is produced in line with the EASO COI Report Methodology (2019)14 and the EASO COI
Writing and Referencing Style Guide (2019).15
The information gathered is a result of research using public, specialised paper-based and electronicsources until 30 June 2020. Some additional information was added during the finalisation of thisreport in response to feedback received during the quality control process, until 10 July 2020. Sources
in Pashto and Dari used in this report were duly assessed and informally translated by EASO.

Structure and use of the report
The report is divided into three parts. The first part focuses on presenting an overview of the state
structure in Afghanistan, including governance, corruption, and the latest developments on the 2019
elections. The second part focuses on the state security institutions, their mandate and structure,
integrity, and the main reported cases of violations perpetrated by these security forces. The third partof the report provides a general overview of the state judiciary, focusing on its capacity, integrity,
effectiveness in prosecution, as well as prison conditions.

13 EU Member States plus Norway and Switzerland
14 EASO, EASO Country of Origin Information (COI) Report Methodology, June 2019, url
15 EASO, Writing and Referencing Guide for EASO Country of Origin Information (COI) Reports, June 2019, url12 —AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT

Map

Map 1: Afghanistan - administrative divisions, source: UNOCHA16

16 UNOCHA, Afghanistan - administrative divisions, January 2014, url

AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 13

1. State structure and governance
1.1 Historical overview of the Afghan state
In 1747, the first Afghan state was established based on the Afghan traditional institution of the Loya
Jirga (grand assembly in Pashto language), where tribal leaders from different Afghan ethnic groups
gathered and elected Ahmad Shah Durrani as the King of Afghanistan and Kandahar as the capital of
the country.17 In 1838, the British army invaded Afghanistan, which led to three Anglo-Afghan wars.18
In 1919, King Amanullah Khan declared a war of independence, starting the so-called Third AngloAfghan War, which ended the same year with the Treaty of Rawalpindi, recognising Afghanistan as asovereign state.19 In 1923, King Amanullah promulgated the first Afghan Constitution20, which
established the structure of the government and gave the Amir (‘commander’, ‘ruler') executive andlegal authority,21 aimed at limiting the powers of tribal leaders.22
In 1923, Zahir Shah became the king of Afghanistan and the monarchy lasted for four decades. In 1973,
Mohammad Daud took the power in a coup and established the first Republic. On 27 April 1978, Daudwas ousted and killed in a pro-Soviet coup. The so-called Saur Revolution brought the People
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), the Afghan communists, to power.23 In 1979, the governmentof the former Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to support the communist Afghan government headed
by Babrak Karmal, which faced opposition by armed groups, often referred to as the ‘Mujahidin’. The
invasion was followed by a decade of armed conflict between the Afghan government, supported by
Soviet troops, and US-backed Mujahidin groups. These groups were divided into several different
factions, but they all participated in a nationwide armed uprising that lasted until the government
finally collapsed in 1992, following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989.24
A period generally referred to as ‘Civil War’ followed, which saw different Mujahidin groups who had
formed new alliances and fronts fighting for control of Afghanistan.25 In 1994, a group called the
Taliban emerged, bringing stability in areas under their control, which won them support fromsegments of the population.26 The Taliban gradually gained more control and conquered Kabul in 1996.
By 2001, the Taliban controlled most of the Afghan territory. But by the end of the year, as aconsequence of the 11 September attacks in the US, they were ousted by a US-led military operation.27

17 The Cairo Review of Global Affairs, Afghanistan since 1700, 2014, url; RFERL, Loya Jirga – Afghan tradition explained, 20

November 2013, url; Etilaatroz, ‫[ به تاج و تخت رسیدن احمدشاه ابدایل؛ میان افسانه و واقعیت‬informal translation: ‘reaching the crown
and the throne by Ahmad Shah Abdali, between legends and realities’], 19 February 2020, url; Barfield, T., A Cultural andPolitical History, 2010, pp. 99-103
18 BBC, Afghanistan profile – Timeline, 9 September 2019, url
19 Barfield, T., A Cultural and Political History, 2010, p. 181; Foschini F., The 1919 War of Independence (or third Anglo-Afghan
War): a conflict the Afghans started (and ended), AAN, 21 September 2019, url
20 Maine Law, the path of law in Afghanistan: from custom to code, 9 May 2019, url
21 Barfield, T., A Cultural and Political History, 2010, p. 182
22 The Cairo Review of Global Affairs, Afghanistan since 1700, 2014, url
23 Clark, K., An April Day that Changed Afghanistan 2: Afghans remember the ‘Saur Revolution’, AAN, 27 April 2018, url; BBC,Afghanistan profile – Timeline, 9 September 2019, url
24 Barfield, T., A Cultural and Political History, 2010, p. 234; BBC News, Afghanistan profile – Timeline, updated on: 31 January
2018, url; Ipsos/ICRC, Our world. Views from the field. Summary report: Afghanistan, Colombia, Democratic Republic ofCongo, Georgia, Haiti, Lebanon, Liberia and the Philippines. Opinion Survey, June 2009, url, p. 10; Oxfam International, The
Cost of War, Afghan Experiences of Conflict, 1978-2009, November 2009, url, pp. 7-9.
25 BBC News, Afghanistan profile – Timeline, updated on: 9 September 2019, url; HRW, Afghanistan: Crisis of Impunity, July
2001, url, pp. 13-17; International Crisis Group, The Insurgency in Afghanistan’s Heartland, 17 June 2011, url, p. 3
26 Giustozzi, A. and Ibrahimi, N., Thirty Years of Conflict: Drivers of anti-Government Mobilisation in Afghanistan, 1978-2011,
January 2012, url, p. 22
27 CFR, The Taliban in Afghanistan, 4 July 2014, url14 —AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORTThe US gave its support to the Mujahidin front opposing the Taliban, at that time known as Northern
Alliance or Northern coalition.28
On 22 December 2001, based on the Bonn Agreement, an Afghan interim government was formed,
led by Hamid Karzai,29 a Pashtun, who also won the first presidential elections in October 2004.30 In2014 and 2019, presidential elections were held during which Mohammad Ashraf Ghani was electedpresident. For more information see Section 1.6 Elections.
The Afghan government continues to be involved in ‘multiple and overlapping non-internationalarmed conflicts’ between government forces and Anti-Government Elements (AGEs), mainly against
the Taliban and Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), among others.31 On 29 February 2020, after
more than 18 years of conflict, the US and the Taliban signed32 the ‘Agreement for Bringing Peace toAfghanistan’.33 However, the Afghan government was not involved in the deal.34 Simultaneously with
the Doha Agreement, the US signed a ‘Joint Declaration’35 with the Government of Afghanistan, as an
attempt to involve the Afghan government in the discussions, enabling political settlement and apermanent ceasefire, while also affirming continued support to the Afghan security forces andrefraining from intervention in domestic affairs.36

1.2 Overview of the state structure and governanceAccording to Article 1 of the 2004 Constitution, Afghanistan is an Islamic Republic37, and the state iscomprised of three branches: Executive, Legislative and Judiciary. The president is the head of stateand exercises his authority in all three branches in line with the Constitution. The president is electedwith more than 50 % of ballots through direct universal suffrage. The president serves a five-year term
and can serve a maximum of two terms.38 Article 60 of the Afghanistan Constitution states that ‘thePresident shall have two Vice-Presidents, first and second.’39
The Constitution stipulates that ‘the Loya Jirga is the highest manifestation of the will of the people ofAfghanistan and consist of members of the National Assembly, presidents of the provincial as well as
district assemblies. Ministers, Chief Justice and members of the Supreme Court as well as the attorney
general shall participate in the Loya Jirga sessions without voting rights.’40 The political system is
28 International Crisis Group, The Insurgency in Afghanistan’s Heartland, 17 June 2011, url, p. 5
29 Oxfam International, The Cost of War, Afghan Experiences of Conflict, 1978-2009, November 2009, url, p. 13; UNAMA,

Eighth Anniversary Today of 2001 Afghan Interim Authority, 22 December 2009, url
30 Guardian (The), The Afghan interim government: who's who, 6 December 2001, url; New York Times (The), Election of
Karzai Is Declared Official, 4 November 2004, url; The Cairo Review of Global Affairs, Afghanistan since 1700, 2014, url
31 RULAC, Non-international armed conflicts in Afghanistan, Last updated 30 April 2019, url
32 BBC News, Afghan conflict: US and Taliban sign deal to end 18-year war, 29 February 2020, url; Ruttig, T., From Doha to
Peace? Obstacles rising in the way of intra-Afghan talks, 3 March 2020, url; Zeino E., Peace versus Democracy? Afghanistan
between Government Crisis and a U.S. Peace Deal with the Taliban, Pajhow, 6 April 2020, url
33 The full text in English of the US-Taliban agreement, refered in this report as the ‘Doha agreement’ is available at: AAN,
Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognized by theUnited States as a state and is known as the Taliban and the United States of America, 29 February 2019, url; For a detailed
explanation of the Doha Agreement and stipulations, see UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions
Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501 (2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url
34 Ruttig, T., From Doha to Peace? Obstacles rising in the way of intra-Afghan talks, 3 March 2020, url; Zeino E., Peace versus
Democracy? Afghanistan between Government Crisis and a U.S. Peace Deal with the Taliban, Pajhwok, 6 April 2020, url
35 The full text (in English, Dari, Pashtu) of the Joint Declaration between the US and the Afghanistan government is available
at: AAN, Joint Declaration between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States of America for Bringing Peaceto Afghanistan, 29 February 2020 url
36 Ruttig, T., From Doha to Peace? Obstacles rising in the way of intra-Afghan talks, 3 March 2020, url
37 Afghanistan, MoJ, Enforced Constitution of Afghanistan, 30 July 2004, url, Article 1
38 Pajhwok, Government structure, 27 April 2013, url
39 Afghanistan, MoJ, Enforced Constitution of Afghanistan, 30 July 2004, url, Article 60
40 Afghanistan, MoJ, Enforced Constitution of Afghanistan, 30 July 2004, url, Article 110

AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 15

centralised; the president appoints all ministers, provincial and district governors and mayors. Budget
decisions are made in the capital, Kabul.41 In practice, since 2014 executive power has been shared
between a ‘President and a Chief Executive Officer (CEO), a quasi-head of government not provided
for in the constitution. This power triangle between the President, the CEO and the parliament has
been marked by hostilities and destructive blockade policies’.42 See Section 1.1 Executive Branch.
According to the Asian Institute of Research, as of November 2019, Afghanistan could not achieve theminimum standards for a good governance, mainly due to the corruption within the government,
insecurity, unemployment, violation of human rights, lack of rule of law, illiteracy and lack of capacity
into administrative reforms.43 The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) concluded that
Afghanistan has a ‘failed governance as well as failed politics’, with corruption as a key challenge anda central government that still cannot function without foreign aid.44 SIGAR reported that, as of 31
March 2020, the US supported governance and economic development in Afghanistan with around35.06 billion dollars.45
In an article analysing the political developments following the 2019 post electoral standoff, Dr Ellinor
Zeino, Country director for Afghanistan at the political foundation Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS),
stated that government and the political system in Afghanistan continue to be weak and in parts
dysfunctional:‘Executive and legislative powers have been, at times, overstretched or misused against eachother. At times, the government sidelined the parliament or simply ignored legislativedecisions. But also parliament members did not hesitate to misuse their legislative oversight
powers such as no-confidence votes or the right to impeach government ministers for theirown retaliatory or individual purposes.[…]’.46

1.3 Executive branch
The 2004 Afghanistan Constitution stipulates that ‘the Government shall be comprised of Ministers
who work under the chairmanship of the President. The number of Ministers as well as their duties
shall be regulated by law’ (Article 71).47 The Afghan Government is comprised of 24 ministries.48 It has
the following duties:‘Execute the provisions of this Constitution, other laws, as well as the final decisions of thecourts, preserve the independence, defend the territorial integrity and safeguard the interestsand prestige of Afghanistan in the international community, maintain public law and order andeliminate every kind of administrative corruption, prepare the budget, regulate financial
conditions of the state as well as protect public wealth, devise and implement social, cultural,
economic and technological development programs, report to the National Assembly, at theend of the fiscal year, about the tasks achieved as well as important programs for the new

41 Diplomat (The), Political reform urgently needed in Afghanistan, 22 February 2020, url
42 Zeino E., Peace versus Democracy? Afghanistan between Government Crisis and a U.S. Peace Deal with the Taliban,

Pajhwok, 6 April 2020, url
43 Asian Institute of Research, The main challenges of public management in Afghanistan and the possible solution, 7
November 2019, url, pp. 142-143
44 CSIS, Afghanistan: The prospects for a real peace, 7 July 2020 url, pp. 88-95
45 SIGAR, Quarterly report to the United States Congress, 30 April 2020, url, p. 98
46 Zeino E., Peace versus Democracy? Afghanistan between Government Crisis and a U.S. Peace Deal with the Taliban,
Pajhwok, 6 April 2020, url
47 Afghanistan, MoJ, Enforced Constitution of Afghanistan, 30 July 2004, url, Article 71
48 IRA, The Cabinet members, n.d., url16 —AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT

fiscal year, perform other duties that, in accordance with this Constitution and other laws, fallwithin the Government responsibilities.’49
According to Article 64(11) of the Constitution, the president has the authority to appoint ministers.50
However, regardless of the provisions contained in the Constitution, the executive power has been
split since 2014 between President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Abdullah Abdullah.51
The disputed 2014 presidential election resulted in a political compromise which led to theestablishment of the National Unity Government (NUG), under the Presidency of Ghani and Chief
Executive Abdullah. Divisions within the government, particularly between Ghani and Abdullah andtheir camps, severely compromised the NUG’s effectiveness.52 According to the Afghanistan Analysts
Network’s (AAN), in January 2017, ‘its complex power-sharing arrangements [have] paralysed
governance in Afghanistan’.53
Followed the 2019 disputed election result, President Ghani and his main contender Abdullah
Abdullah, signed a power-sharing agreement on 17 May 2020,54 (See Section 1.6 Elections) which gave
Abdullah the lead of the High Council of National Reconciliation with executive authorities, as well as
the right to appoint 50 % of the cabinet,55 including for some key ministries, while provincial governors
will be appointed based on ‘a rule agreed upon by the two sides’.56 However, as of 13 June 2020, AAN’s
researcher Ali Yawar Adili and co-director Thomas Ruttig observed that it was not clear yet whether
such a rule had been put in place, noting that a cabinet had yet to be fully formed.57

1.4 Legislative branch
The Afghan legislative branch is called the National Assembly and is a bi-cameral parliament. The
National Assembly is comprised of two houses: the Wolesi Jirga (lower house) and Meshrano Jirga(Upper House).58 According to the 2004 Constitution, ‘the National Assembly of the Islamic Republicof Afghanistan, as the highest legislative organ, shall manifest the will of its people as well as represent
the entire nation. The National Assembly consists of two houses: House of People and House of
Elders.’59 Article 83 of the Constitution stipulates that ‘members of the House of People shall beelected by the people through free, general, secret, and direct balloting.’60 Members of the Wolesi
Jirga (lower house) are elected from the 34 provinces ‘according to proportional representation’ for
250 seats. The Sikh and Hindu communities have the right to one seat, and the nomadic Kuchi peoples
to ten seats. A total of 68 seats are reserved for female representatives, two from each of Afghanistan's
34 provinces.61

49 Afghanistan, MoJ, Enforced Constitution of Afghanistan, 30 July 2004, url, Article 75
50 Afghanistan, MoJ, Enforced Constitution of Afghanistan, 30 July 2004, url, Article 64/11
51 Zeino E., Peace versus Democracy? Afghanistan between Government Crisis and a U.S. Peace Deal with the Taliban, Pajhow,

6 April 2020, url
52 Foreign Policy, NUG One Year On: Struggling to Govern, 29 September 2015, url
53 AAN, What to Watch? Key issues to follow in Afghanistan in 2017, 27 January 2017, last updated 9 March 2020, url
54 AP, Afghanistan President and rival announce power-sharing agreement, 17 May 2020, url; Tolonews, Ghani and Abdullah
sign an agreement to break political deadlock, 17 May 2020, url
55 Adili A. Y., End of post-election impasse? Ghani and Abdullah’s new power-sharing formula, AAN 20 May 2020, url;
Tolonews, Ghani and Abdullah Sign Agreement to Break Political Deadloc, 17 May 2020, url
56 Adili A. Y., Ruttig T., Between Professionalism and Accommodation: The slow progress on the new cabinet, AAN, 13 June
2020, url
57 Adili A. Y., Ruttig T., Between Professionalism and Accommodation: The slow progress on the new cabinet, AAN, 13 June
2020, url
58 Pajhwok, Government structure, 27 April 2013, url
59 Afghanistan, MoJ, Enforced Constitution of Afghanistan, 30 July 2004, url, Articles 81-82
60 Afghanistan, MoJ, Enforced Constitution of Afghanistan, 30 July 2004, url, Article 83
61 Al Jazeera, Understanding Afghanistan’s elections 2018, 20 October 2018, url

AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 17

On 20 October 2018, the third parliamentary elections in Afghanistan were held. The elections resulted
in five major political parties within the lower house: Jamiat-e Islami (23 seats), People’s Islamic Unity
Party (11 seats), Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami (7 seats), Hezb-e Jamhoori Afghanistan (9 seats), and Junbishe Mili Islami Afghanistan (10 seats). Members of the Meshrano Jirga (upper house) have 102 seats
reserved for 68 members elected by the provincial and district councils and 34 members are appointed
by the president.62
Article 35 of the Afghanistan Constitution stipulates that ‘the people of Afghanistan shall have theright, in accordance with provisions of the law, to form political parties.’63 According to the Ministry ofJustice of Afghanistan, as of 2016, there were 70 political parties officially registered in Afghanistan.64
Transparency International observed that in Afghanistan, political parties do not represent ‘coherent
policy platforms’ as they are formed on specific ethnic or personalities. The majority of the candidates
run their campaign independently and shift alliance based on local and regional ‘patronage
networks’.65
Free and Fair Election Forum of Afghanistan (FEFA) published a survey in November 2019 among themembers of Wolesi Jirga stating that during the survey 76.6 % of the MPs stated that they did notbelong to any political parties and 23.4 % indicated that they belonged to a political party (7.6 % to
Jamiat-e Islami, 3.4 % to Junbesh-e Mili, 2.5 % to Hezb-e Harakat, 2.9 % to Wahdat-e Islami, 2.1 % toHezb-e Islami and the remaining 4.9 % to other parties). The source also stated that during thelegislative elections, only 8.5 % of the candidates responded that they belonged to a political party(3.4 % to Junbesh-e Mili Islami, 3.4 % to Jamiat-e Islami, 2.7 % to Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami Mardom-eAfghanistan, 1.8 % to Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami, 0.9 % to Hezb-e Islami and 0.9 % to Hezb-e HarakatIslami) while 91.5 % were independent candidates. According to the same source 28 % of the Membersof Wolesi Jirga expressed their link to the President’s team, 13 % to the Chief Executive Office’s team,
3 % to the former President’s team and 56 % to none of the sides in the Afghan Unity Government.66
According to the Asia Foundation, around 70 % of the newly elected MPs are relatively young and new
to the political scene. The presence of young MPs in parliament generated a lot of faith and higher
expectation amongst the ordinary Afghans. However, the newly constituted lower house Wolesi Jirga
experienced tensions on the new leadership during the first session, which questioned the capacity of
the legislature amongst the political elites and international observers.67

1.5 Judicial branch
Article 116 of the Constitution of Afghanistan provides that the judiciary shall be an independent organof the country. According to the same article, ‘the judiciary shall be comprised of one Supreme Court,
Courts of Appeal as well as Primary Courts whose organization and authority shall be regulated by law.
The Supreme Court shall be the highest judicial organ, heading the judicial power of the Islamic
Republic of Afghanistan.’68 The justice system comprises the judiciary, which is independent from the62 Al Jazeera, Understanding Afghanistan’s elections 2018, 20 October 2018, url
63 Afghanistan, MoJ, Enforced Constitution of Afghanistan, 30 July 2004, url, Article 35
64 Afghanistan, MoJ, Registered political parties, 16 August 2016, url
65 Transparency International, Anti-Corruption Resource Center, Corruption in Afghanistan and the role of development

assistance, 29 April 2019, url, pp. 6-8
66 FEFA, ‫ دور هفدهم‬- ‫[ شناسنامه مجلس نمایندگان‬informal translation: ‘information about the members of the House of Common –seventeenth term of office’], 5 November 2019, url, pp. 4-5
67 The Asia Foundation, A survey of the Afghan people, Afghanistan in 2019, 2 December 2019, url, p. 135
68 Afghanistan, MoJ, Enforced Constitution of Afghanistan, 30 July 2004, url, Article 116

18 —AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT

executive branch, the Ministry of Justice, the Attorney General’s Office (AGO), and the Ministry ofInterior.69 For more in-depth information on the State judiciary, see 3. State judiciary.

1.6 Elections
The Independent Elections Commission (IEC) has the mandate and is the only institution in charge ofadministrating and supervising elections including presidential elections, Wolesi Jirga elections,provincial council elections, district council elections, village council elections, municipal council
elections, elections for Mayor’s office and Referenda.70 Article 156 of the Constitution of Afghanistan
stipulates that ‘the Independent Elections Commission shall be established to administer andsupervise every kind of elections as well as refer to general public opinion of the people in accordancewith the provisions of the law’ and Article 157 of the said Constitution stipulates that ‘the Independent
Commission for supervision of the implementation of the Constitution shall be established inaccordance with the provisions of the law. Members of this Commission shall be appointed by the
President with the endorsement of the House of People.’71
In December 2018, the IEC announced a three-month delay for the presidential election which was
originally scheduled for 20 April 2019.72 In March 2019, the elections were postponed again, due to‘problems with the voting process’.73 Presidential candidates included incumbent Ashraf Ghani, Chief
Executive Abdullah Abdullah, former national security adviser, Muhammad Hanif Atmar and also
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.74 Interior Minister Amrullah Saleh, once a devoted critic of the president
stepped down from his position to join Ghani's team as a candidate for the post of vice president.75
Appointing Saleh was an effort from the ethnic Pashtun Ghani to neutralise a political opponent andto get the support of the Tajiks, among whom Saleh has a strong backing.76
On 28 September 2019, the presidential elections were finally held, with the lowest election turnout
recorded since the Taliban were ousted in 2001. In the immediate aftermath of the elections, both
frontrunners, incumbent Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah, declared victory;77
which resulted in the following five months of political impasse.78 After almost three months since theelections, and with delays due to allegations of fraud, irregularities, attacks and technical problems
with biometric devices used for voting,79 on 22 December 2019, the IEC announced the preliminary
results showing 50.64 % of the votes (923 868) in favour of Ghani and 39.52 % of the votes (720 990)
in favour of Abdullah Abdullah.80 This latter rejected the preliminary results, stating they were based

69 SIGAR, Rule of Law in Afghanistan: US Agencies Lack a Strategy and Cannot Fully Determine the Effectiveness of Programs

Costing more than $Billion, July 2015, url
70 IEC, Vision and Mission, 1 January 2019, url
71 Afghanistan, MoJ, Enforced Constitution of Afghanistan, 30 July 2004, url
72 France24, Afghan presidential election delayed until July 20, 30 December 2018, url
73 Reuters, Afghanistan presidential election postponed to September, 20 March 2019, url
74 Adili, A.Y., Afghanistan’s 2019 elections (2): Who is running to become the next president?, AAN, 11 February 2019, url
75 New York Times (The), Afghan Presidential Race Takes Shape as Ghani’s Challengers Emerge, 18 January 2019, url
76 Reuters, Afghanistan's Ghani launches bid for second presidential term, 20 January 2019, url
77 BBC, Afghanistan presidential election: Rivals declare victory after record low turnout, 30 September 2019, url
78 Adili A. Y., End of post-election impasse? Ghani and Abdullah’s new power-sharing formula, AAN 20 May 2020, url
79 Reuters, Afghan election runoff likely amid thousands of complaints: officials, 23 December 2019, url; France24, Over
16,000 complaints filed in Afghan presidential polls, 26 December 2019, url
80 BBC, Afghanistan presidential election: Ghani set for second term after initial results, 22 December 2019, url; TKG, Thepreliminary results of the Afghanistan presidential elections announced, 22 December 2019, url

AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 19

on fraud.81 The election turnover was estimated to be over 1.8 million,82 of which 31.5 % wascomposed of women.83
After three days since the announcement of the preliminary results, the Independent Elections
Complaints Commission (IECC) said to have registered around 16 500 complaints, with about 8 000
submitted by the Stability and Integration team of Abdullah Abdullah; around 4 400 by Peace andIslamic Justice led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar; over 3 000 complaints lodged by the Stable Builder teamled by President Ashraf Ghani and 15 by the Security and Justice team led by Rahmatullah Nabil.84
The final results were announced in February 2020, confirming almost exactly the preliminary
outcome.85 Incumbent Muhammad Ashraf Ghani was declared the winner, with 50.64 % of votes. His
rival Abdullah Abdullah, who was second with 39.52 % of votes,86 rejected the results, declaring himself
the winner;87 he announced his intention to form an alternative, ‘inclusive’ government, and in thefollowing weeks started appointing some provincial governors.88 On 9 March 2020, both Ghani and
Abdullah held separate inauguration ceremonies taking the oath of office as the president of
Afghanistan.89
After months of tension, on 17 May 2020, President Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, finally signed a
power-sharing agreement,90 which recognised Ghani as the President and Abdullah as the leader ofthe High Council of National Reconciliation with executive authorities; in addition giving to the latterthe right to appoint 50 % of the cabinet.91

1.7 Political developments
The five-year power-sharing NUG had been run with continued tensions between Ghani and Abdullah
Abdullah.92 The disputed 2019 election outcome resulted in an intensified polarisation between Ghani
supporters and opponents, primarily his main rival Abdullah,93 plunging the country into a standoff
and political crisis risking to jeopardise the peace talks.94 The US expressed their disappointment on
the failure of the Afghan leaders to reach a compromise, threatening to cut USD 1 billion aid to

81 Reuters, Afghanistan's Ghani claims narrow win in preliminary presidential vote results, 22 December 2019, url
82 Reuters, Afghan election runoff likely amid thousands of complaints: officials, 23 December 2019, url
83 UN Security Council, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security A/74/753–

S/2020/210, 17 March 2020, url, p. 2
84 Adili A. Y., Afghanistan’s 2019 Election (28): ECC starts final, decisive phase of complaints procedure, AAN, 20 January 2020,
url
85 Ruttig T., Afghanistan’s 2019 Elections (30): Final results… and parallel governments?, AAN, 19 February 2020, url
86 IEC, Afghanistan 2019, Presidential election, n.d., url
87 Ruttig T., Afghanistan’s 2019 Elections (30): Final results… and parallel governments?, AAN, 19 February 2020, url; Reuters,
Ghani named winner of disputed Afghan poll, rival also claims victory, 18 February 2020, url
88 UN Security Council, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security A/74/753–
S/2020/210, 17 March 2020, url, p. 3; Tolonews, Abdullah-Loyal governor installed in Sar-e-Pul, 22 February 2020, url
89 New York Times (The), Ghani Takes the Oath of Afghan President. His Rival Does, Too, 9 March 2020, url
90 Adili A. Y., End of post-election impasse? Ghani and Abdullah’s new power-sharing formula, AAN, 20 May 2020, url
91 Adili A. Y., End of post-election impasse? Ghani and Abdullah’s new power-sharing formula, AAN, 20 May 2020, url;
Tolonews, Ghani and Abdullah Sign Agreement to Break Political Deadloc, 17 May 2020, url
92 NYT, Ghani named Afghan election winner, his opponent claims victory, too, 18 February 2020, url
93 Zeino E., Peace versus Democracy? Afghanistan between Government Crisis and a U.S. Peace Deal with the Taliban, Pajhow,
6 April 2020, url
94 Adili A. Y., From parallel governments to a new form of power-sharing? Afghanistan’s ongoing post-elections crisis, AAN, 7
May 2020, url; Al Jazeera, Afghanistan’s peace process is in danger of unravelling, 31 March 2020, url; Reuters, Afghanistan's'Game of Thrones' jeopardizes peace process, 9 March 2020, url20 —AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT

Afghanistan in 2020 and potentially another USD 1 billion in 2021, in a bid to get the two contenders
reach a ‘political settlement’.95
According to AAN’s analyst Ali Yawar Adili for the second consecutive time, the presidential election
resulted in a political dispute, and in order to resolve it, an ‘extra-Constitutional arrangement’ had to
be made, (see Section 1.6 Elections). The source also indicated that Abdullah Abdullah and otherAfghan political actors, with whom Abdullah tried to create an alliance, issued a joint statement
indicating that ‘the national crisis emerging out of election fraud has affected the national peace
process and might render the situation even more critical.’96
In February 202097, President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani, who has been elected for the second term ofoffice, announced that he maintained the previous cabinet members for two weeks before selecting
new members.98 On 31 March 2020, President Ghani appointed Arghandiwal as the acting financeminister and according to the presidential advisor, the process of appointing new cabinet members
was going to continue, and would be followed by a vote of confidence from the Parliament before the
newly appointed ministers take office.99 On 4 April 2020, the President appointed Haneef Atmar as theacting minister of foreign affairs.100 On 11 March 2020, President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani issued adecree that dissolved the Office of Chief Executive101, which was formed under the National Unit
Government following the disputed elections in 2014.102
As of mid-June, a cabinet had yet to be fully formed. Only nine ministers and the governor of thecentral bank were nominated, along with two state ministers; all candidates were exclusively from
Ghani’s own side. The appointment process was being delayed by ‘intra-factional consultation withinboth Ghani’s and Abdullah’s electoral teams’, and by the ‘need to accommodate other political forces’.
Some of the nominees from Ghani’ side were reportedly being made with the aim to award hiselectoral allies and loyalists as well as to accommodate political factions, mostly Pashtuns, who
opposed him during the election. The AAN’s analysts explained that Ghani was trying to accommodatein particular a ‘group of influential politicians who gathered around former president Karzai’. This
group had tried to push for President Ghani’s removal during the latest post-electoral political impasseand place themselves as an ‘unofficial third force’ between Ghani and Abdullah’s camps within thecontext of the US-Taleban negotiations. On Abdullah’s side, no nominees had yet been proposed as of
mid-June; which, according to AAN, reflected the difficulty to accommodate his heterogeneouspolitical camp, ‘supported by various, often conflicting, factions of his own Tajik-dominated politicalparty, Jamiat-e Islami, but also by forces from the Hazara and Uzbek communities.’103
Next to fair and transparent elections, peace negotiations with the Taliban aimed at establishing acease-fire continued to be a high priority for Afghans, and according to a survey conducted by the Asia
Foundation, two thirds of the interviewed Afghans (88.7 %) expressed their strong support for thepeace talks.104 A consultative Loya Jirga – a gathering of Afghan politicians and tribal, ethnic andreligious leaders - was initially planned in Kabul in March 2019 with the goal of creating a framework
95 USDOS, On the Political Impasse in Afghanistan. Press Statement, Michael R. Pompeo, Secretaty of State, 23 March 2020,

url; Adili A. Y., From parallel governments to a new form of power-sharing? Afghanistan’s ongoing post-elections crisis, AAN,
7 May 2020, url
96 Adili A. Y., From parallel governments to a new form of power-sharing? Afghanistan’s ongoing post-elections crisis, AAN, 7
May 2020, url
97 Reuters, Ghani named winner of disputed Afghan poll, rival also claims victory, 18 February 2020, url
98 Reuters, Afghanistan's 'Game of Thrones' jeopardizes peace process, 9 March 2020, url
99 Tolonews, Ghani appoints Arghandiwal as acting finance minister, 31 March 2020, url
100 Khaama Press, Ghani appoints Atmar as acting minister of foreign affairs, 4 April 2020, url
101 Khaama Press, Ghani dissolves the office of the Chief Executive, 11 March 2020, url; Tolonews, Ghani, by Decree,“abolishes” Chief Executive Office, 11 March 2020, url; TKG, Afghan President Ghani terminates the office of Chief Executive,
12 March 2020, url
102 Foreign Policy, NUG One Year On: Struggling to Govern, 29 September 2015, url
103 Adili A. Y., Ruttig T., Between Professionalism and Accommodation: The slow progress on the new cabinet, AAN, 13 June
2020, url
104 The Asia Foundation, A survey of the Afghan people, Afghanistan in 2019, 2 December 2019, url, p. 135

AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 21

for the Afghan government to engage in peace negotiations with the Taliban. The Loya Jirga waseventually postponed.105 On September 2019, US President Donald Trump declared the US-Taleban
negotiations ‘dead’,106 after the Taliban had killed a US soldier; however, the discussions between thetwo sides resumed within weeks behind the scenes.107
On 29 February 2020, the US and the Taliban signed the Doha agreement. The main points outlined in
the agreement include guarantees by the Taleban on not providing protection to groups, such as Al
Qaeda, that pose a threat to the US and its allies; guarantees by the US and their NATO allies towithdraw from Afghanistan; the question of ceasefire and the intra-Afghan negotiations.108 However,the Afghan government was not involved in the deal, with the Taliban later refusing to engage with
their negotiating team, leading to questions about the viability of the agreement, which is described
as a ‘negotiated political settlement’ rather than a comprehensive peace deal.109 The Doha agreement
also stipulates that the modalities for a permanent ceasefire are to be negotiated in intra-Afghan
negotiations, with a mutual release of prisoners as a measure for confidence-building.110
At the time of drafting this report, there was little clarity as to the scope of the intra-Afghan
negotiations. Five political groups put forward proposals, with the main themes being: ‘structural
framework, phases of the negotiation process and institutional arrangements.’111 In mid-June 2020,
the Taliban and the Afghan government finally agreed on Doha as the venue for their first session ofhigh-level ‘intra-Afghan dialogue’, but held off confirmation pending disagreements over prisoner
releases.112 At the beginning of July 2020, Abdullah Abdullah announced an official visit to Pakistan aspart of the efforts to initiate the intra-Afghan talks, described as ‘imminent’.113
Dr Ellinor Zeino observed that the political crisis derived by the 2019 post-electoral result, coinciding
with the the US-Taliban deal, and the intra-Afghan talks in the making, have plunged Afghanistan intoa ‘defining turning point’. She concluded:‘With a US-Taliban peace agreement signed and NATO troops about to leave, Afghanistan isagain at a decisive moment where its political and social order and its role as a Western partner
are renegotiated. The Taliban leadership seems ready to move from combat to politics. The
current government crisis and hardened intra-Afghan conflicts put the pluralist-democraticachievements of the past twenty years at risk when going to the negotiation table with the
Taliban. If the inner political struggles remain unsolved, Afghans risk losing all, its hard-won
democracy and prospects for peace.’114

105 RFE/RL, Afghan Loya Jirga Aimed At Discussing Peace Talks Delayed, 3 March 2019, url
106 Ruttig T., US-Taleban Agreement Still in the Air: Disputes about a ‘ceasefire’ versus ‘reduction of violence’, AAN, 30 January

2020, last updated 9 April 2020, url
107 BBC News, Afghan conflict: US and Taliban sign deal to end 18-year war, 29 February 2020, url
108 BBC News, Afghan conflict: US and Taliban sign deal to end 18-year war, 29 February 2020, url; Ruttig, T., From Doha to
Peace? Obstacles rising in the way of intra-Afghan talks, 3 March 2020, url; Zeino E., Peace versus Democracy? Afghanistan
between Government Crisis and a U.S. Peace Deal with the Taliban, Pajhow, 6 April 2020, url
109 US, CRS, Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief, 1 May 2020, url, pp. 3-4; see also for further details on thedeal’s provisions: Ruttig, T., From Doha to Peace? Obstacles rising in the way of intra-Afghan talks, 3 March 2020, url
110 Afghanistan Times, More violence feared as freed Taliban inmates may return to the battlefield, 14 June 2020, url
111 Adili A. Y., Hossaini K., Looking ahead to Intra-Afghan Negotiations: A scrutiny of different political groups’ plans for peace,
AAN, 30 April 2020, url
112 Reuters, Afghan government, Taliban agree to Doha as venue for first peace talks, 15 June 2020, url; VOA, Prisoner Release
Delays May Jeopardize Start of Intra-Afghan Negotiations, 6 July 2020, url
113 Tribune, Afghanistan's Abdullah Abdullah to visit Pakistan soon, 5 July 2020, url
114 Zeino E., Peace versus Democracy? Afghanistan between Government Crisis and a U.S. Peace Deal with the Taliban,
Pajhow, 6 April 2020, url22 —AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT

1.8 Corruption
UNAMA (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) defines corruption as follows:‘Corruption in its most general definition is the misuse of public trust for private gain and inthat regard, it cannot exist without institutions designed to meet public or common
interests.’115
According to Article 75(3) of the Constitution of Afghanistan, the Government has the duty to‘maintain public law and order and eliminate every kind of administrative corruption’.116 On
20 February 2004, Afghanistan signed the 2003 UNCAC (United Nations Convention Against
Corruption) and ratified it on 25 August 2008 to prevent and prosecute corruption.117 The September
2018 Afghan anti-corruption law deals with corruption in Afghanistan.118
According to Transparency International:‘In 2018, an estimated 4.6 million Afghan adults paid a bribe in order to access services suchas applying for jobs, interacting with provincial governor’s offices, meeting security services(e.g. border guards or the police), using healthcare facilities or to be admitted into schools anduniversities […]The bulk of bribes in Afghanistan are demanded by the authorities.’119
In 2019, Afghanistan was ranked 173 out 180 by Transparency International.120 According to a survey
conducted by the Asia Foundation, in 2019 majority of Afghans (81.5 %) perceived corruption a major
problem in their daily life in Afghanistan. The level of perception of corruption was the same as lastyear. According to the same source, the perception of corruption by province during the same period
was as follows:‘Respondents in Panjshir (96.8 %), Helmand (95.0 %), Nangarhar (93.1 %), and Kabul (92.9 %) are
the most likely to say corruption is a major problem in Afghanistan, while respondents in Paktia(50.0 %), Sar-e-Pul (56.3 %), Ghor (57.0 %), and Paktika (57.1 %) are least likely. Urban respondents
are more likely to say corruption is a major problem in Afghanistan (88.7 %) than rural respondents(79.0 %).’121

1.8.1 Anti-corruption efforts and mechanisms
According to UNAMA, the Afghanistan Anti-Corruption law, which was adopted on 5 September 2018,provides a solid legal basis for the Anti-Corruption and Justice Centre (ACJC) and creates an AntiCorruption Commission. The source also indicated that the adoption of September 2017 Government’s
Anti-Corruption Strategy and the adoption of the new Penal Code of March 2017, which was enforced
in February 2018, are the key developments made by the Afghanistan Unity Government, including
the codification of all mandatory corruption offences in line with the United Nation’s Convention
against Corruption (UNCAC) in the new Penal Code.122
The US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) observed a progress by theAfghan Government to meet its Anti-Corruption Strategy Benchmarks since May 2018 despite ‘serious

115 UNAMA, Afghanistan’s fight against corruption, groundwork for Peace and Prosperity, 20 May 2019, url, p. 6
116 Afghanistan, MoJ, Enforced Constitution of Afghanistan, 30 July 2004, url
117 UNODC, Signature and ratification status, n.d., url
118 ACKU, Gazette, ‫[ قانون مبارزه با فساد اداری‬informal translation: ‘law on combating corruption’], 5 September 2018, url
119 Transparency International, Anti-Corruption Resource Center, Corruption in Afghanistan and the role of development

assistance, 29 April 2019, url, pp. 6-8
120 TI, Afghanistan, corruption perception index 2019, url
121 The Asia Foundation, A survey of the Afghan people, Afghanistan in 2019, 2 December 2019, url, p. 142
122 UNAMA, Afghanistan’s fight against corruption, from strategies to implementation, 14 May 2018, url, p. 3

AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 23

challenges’ which still remain including ‘resource shortfalls at anticorruption institutions, the seeming
impunity of powerful individuals, and declining activity at the corruption courts’.123
However, the UN General Assembly and Security Council indicated that Afghanistan’s ‘Anti-Corruption
Strategy expired on 31 December 2019 without a successor document, leaving Afghanistan without aframework document for addressing corruption.’124
According to Afghanistan Public Policy Research Organization (APPRO), the Anti-Corruption
Commission has the whole responsibility to monitor the implementation of National Strategy for
Combating Corruption (NSCC), which was expected to be established in 2019.125 The source indicatedshortfalls during the development of NSCC such as the lack of consultation with the Parliament, local
government authorities, and civil society. Additionally, as a Dari and Pashto version of the strategic
document (which was only in English) was only available after adoption, consultation from the public
had not been sought, according to the source.126
In March 2020, Freedom House observed that in Afghanistan corruption remained a widespreadchallenge, noting that ‘Law enforcement agencies and the judiciary are themselves compromised bygraft and political pressure, and the most powerful officials and politicians effectively enjoy impunity’.
The source also mentioned that allegation of financial corruption and political influence questioned
the legitimacy of the new elected Afghan Parliament. There is a lack of transparency within thegovernment operations and widespread corruption in the ‘management of public-sector
contracting.’127
Anti-Corruption Justice Centre (ACJC) and Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF)
In 2016, the High Council for Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption (High Council), which was established tocoordinate Afghanistan’s anti-corruption efforts. It is Afghanistan’s highest level anti-corruption organ.
The High Council is chaired by President Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, and other high-ranking
politicians and civil servants are members.128
During the same period, the Afghanistan National Unity Government established the ACJC to address
corruption in the country including cases of corruption that involve high ranking officials, such as
Deputy Ministers and Governors, or those exceeding 500 000 AFN (about USD 7 500). ‘The Center
employs specialized police, prosecutors and courts that are independent from political and otherpressures in order to impartially detect, investigate, prosecute and adjudicate corruption cases.’129
On 1 November 2019, SIGAR noted that the Afghan Government continued to face important
challenges including resource shortfalls in its key anti-corruption institutions. While the Afghan
Government increased the number of prosecutors at the ACJC, in other cases resource shortfalls
remained, such as the Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) which had an insufficient number of vehicles
for the MCTF.130
Despite lack of sufficient progress to improve cooperation between the law enforcement authorities
in corruption-related prosecutions, a number of cases were prosecuted by the ACJC.131 For instance,
during the period between July - September 2019, ACJC convicted three members of the Paktika
provincial council, found guilty of using false documents; they were sentenced to 14 months’
123 SIGAR, Quarterly report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2020, url, p. 18
124 UN Security Council, General Assembly, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace andsecurity, Report of the Secretary-General [A/74/753–S/2020/210], 17 March 2020, url, p. 11
125 APPRO, National Strategy for Combating Corruption in Afghanistan: a critical assessment, 7 October 2019, url, p. 12
126 APPRO, Afghanistan’s National Strategy for Combating Corruption: an assessment, 10 October 2019, url
127 Freedom House, Freedom in the world 2020, Afghanistan, 6 March 2020, url
128 Transparency International, Corruption in Afghanistan and the role of development assistance, 29 April 2019, url, p. 10
129 UNODC, Training for Anti-Corruption Justice Center (ACJC) officials, n.d., url
130 SIGAR, Afghanistan’s Anti-Corruption efforts: The Afghan Government made progress in meeting its anti-corruption
strategy benchmarks, but serious challenges remain to fighting corruption, 1 November 2019, url, p. 3
131 Transparency International, Corruption in Afghanistan and the role of development assistance, 29 April 2019, url, p. 10

24 —AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT

imprisonment and fined a sum equivalent between 23 800 and 29 400 USD. The former chairs of the
IEC and ECC, together with eight election commissioners, were convicted for manipulating therecorded vote count during the October 2018 parliamentary election. The court sentenced all of themto five years’ imprisonment. During the same period, six employees of the Ministry of Refugees andRepatriation were convicted to two years in jail for crimes linked to procurements.132
During the period of 1 December 2019 to 16 February 2020, ACJC’s primary court ruled on three cases
and its appeal court ruled on seven cases. For instance, in February 2020, the ACJC appellate court
sentenced a former Logar Province’s district administrator to 10 and a half years in prison for bribes
over settling a land dispute. The UN noted that, however, the output of the ACJC ‘remained low’. Since
its establishment in 2016, and as of February 2020, the ACJC has adjudicated a total of 68 cases at the
primary court, with 260 defendants resulting in 208 convictions and 50 acquittals; while the appeal
court has adjudicated 59 cases with 193 defendants, convicting 174 and acquitting 19 others.133
In order to better execute the outstanding arrest warrants, on 24 December 2019, the OAG and theMinistry of Interior (MoI) created the Arrest Warrants Joint Committee. However, the MCTF134 reform
was not finalised to have an active police component, as a result there is limited cooperation with law
enforcement bodies, which has negatively affected the ACJC’s work.135 However, according toTransparency International the ‘MCTF itself is not always free of corruption, and leaders have in thepast resigned from the MCTF on corruption charges.’136 In December 2019, UNAMA stated that ‘while
the ACJC has been adjudicating corruption cases, the United Nations notes that the Centre has yet toserve as an effective deterrent to high-level corruption’, also the UN acknowledged the impact that
corruption has on the lives of ordinary Afghan citizens on a daily basis.137
Reporting corruption and misconduct by officials and police
Journalists avoid reporting on administrative corruption due to the fear of violent reprisal by provincial
police officials and powerful families.138 On 11 March 2020, the Afghanistan Attorney General’s Office(AGO) published its annual report of the year 1398 (21 March 2019 to 11 March 2020), indicating that
AGO registered, investigated and referred to relevant courts 1 685 cases of corruption (governmentrelated) across Afghanistan including 506 cases in the provinces of Afghanistan via AGO’s provincial
assistants.139
The MoI reported that in 2019, 725 MoI officials were arrested on corruption-related cases and theirfiles were sent to the competent authorities for prosecution.140 The Supreme Court of Afghanistan
reported, via its monthly Bulletin, on the corruption-related cases, which were prosecuted by the
primary anti-corruption court of Kabul Province between 23 November and 21 December 2019. The
source noted that 28 persons were arrested and accused of misuse of power, bribes, harassment,

132 SIGAR, Quarterly report to the United States Congress, 30 October 2019, url, p. 125
133 UN Security Council, General Assembly, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace andsecurity, Report of the Secretary-General [A/74/753–S/2020/210], 17 March 2020, url, p. 11
134 Transparency International indicated that ‘the Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) is the institution mandated withinvestigating claims of corruption alongside the attorney general, both of which investigate and prosecute smaller cases ofcorruption’, Transparency International, Corruption in Afghanistan and the role of development assistance, 29 April 2019,url, pp. 10-11
135 UN Security Council, General Assembly, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace andsecurity, Report of the Secretary-General [A/74/753–S/2020/210], 17 March 2020, url, p. 11
136 Transparency International, Corruption in Afghanistan and the role of development assistance, 29 April 2019, url, p. 10
137 UNAMA, On international anti-corruption day, UN acknowledges achievements and urges further progress in Afghanistan,
9 December 2019, url
138 USDOS, Afghanistan 2019 Human Rights report, 11 March 2020, url, p. 21‫ی‬
139 AGO, ‫ رسیدگ کرده است‬،‫ خورشیدی‬۱۳۹۸ ‫ در سال‬،‫ قضیۀ را در بخش مبارزه علیه فساد اداری‬۱۶۸۳ ‫[ لوی څارنوایل‬informal translation:’Attorney General Office prosecuted 1 683 cases of corruption during the period of 2019-2020’], 11 March 2020, urlٔ
140 Afghanistan, MoI, ‫نامە میل حسابدیه حکومت به ملت‬‫ بر‬1398 ‫[ وزارت امورداخله گزارش سال‬informal translation: ‘Ministry of Interior
affairs, annual report 2018 – 2019, State’s accountability programme for the Nation], 2 August 2019, url, p. 6

AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 25

embezzlement, robbery and possession of illegal weapons. Those who were found guilty weresentenced as follows:‘Three persons were sentenced between one month to one year of imprisonment, five persons
were sentenced between one to five years of imprisonment and fifteen persons weresentenced between five to fifteen years of imprisonment.’141
For instance, on 15 December 2019, President Ashraf Ghani ordered the arrest of a former commanderof the Afghan Public Protection Forces, Zemarai Paikan on charges of corruption.142 According to
SIGAR, Zemarai Paikan was convicted in December 2017 for murder in absence and abuse of power,and during the reporting period, it could not be determined whether he was arrested despite Ghani’sorder.143 In March 2019, Haseebullah Qureshi, a former Public Order Police commander, was sentence
by a primary military court to 10 years’ imprisonment and fined with 8.6 million Afghani overcorruption charges.144

141 Supreme Court, Special Bulletin of the Supreme Court, 8 March 2020, url, pp. 34-35
142 Tolonews, Ghani gives anti-corruption speech, orders arrest, 15 December 2019, url
143 SIGAR, Report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2020, url, p. 113
144 Pajwhok Afghan News, Ex-police commander gets 10 years in jail for graft, 17 March 2019, url26 —AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT

2. Security institutions
The Afghanistan Constitutions delegates to the state the fundamental duty of providing security andthe defence of the country and designates the President as the Commander in Chief of the Armed
Forces of Afghanistan.145 The President leads the National Security Council (NSC), which is the‘supreme institution with the authority of making decisions regarding national security, national
interests, territorial integrity and national sovereignty’. Members of the NSC are from amongst the‘high-ranking government, civilian, military and security officials’.146

2.1 Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)
The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) or Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF)
are comprised of the Afghan National Army (including the Afghan Border Force, Afghan Air Force
Afghan Territorial Army, Afghan National Civil Order Force), Afghan National Police (including Afghan
Local Police), and the National Directorate of Security (including the Afghan Special Force).147
According to the USDOD, ‘the current ANDSF authorised force level remains at 382 000. The MoD[Ministry of Defence] is authorised 227 103 personnel and the MoI [Ministry of Interior] is authorised
154 626 personnel’ including the authorisation for 30 000 ALP (Afghan Local Police) personnel.148
As of October 2019, the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), quoted in a
SIGAR report, indicated that 272 807 ANDSF personnel (176 019 Ministry of Defence and 96 788
Ministry of Interior) were biometrically enrolled, which does not include civilians or roughly 19 000
Afghan Local Police (ALP).149
Since the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the United States’ top priority was to build up new security forces
but low morale, corruption and desertion have plagued this process.150 In 2017, the Afghan
government started implementing a four-year ‘Road Map’ to streamline and bolster the ANSF. The aimof the plan is to ensure the government’s control over population centres by tackling leadership issues,
resource management and rampant corruption, and by doubling the size and combat power of theSpecial Forces, strengthening the air component, and moving the police away from a combat missions
to civil policing.151 Under the US-Afghan ‘Joint Declaration’ signed in February 2020 in parallel with the
US-Taliban agreement,152 the ‘US reaffirmed its existing commitment to seek funds on a yearly basis
to support training, equipping, advising, and sustaining Afghan security forces, so that Afghanistan can
independently secure and defend itself against internal and external threats’.153
In January 2019, President Ashraf Ghani said that more than 45 000 members of the Afghan security
forces have been killed since he became leader in 2014.154
In its report for the year 2019, UNAMA stated it ‘remains concerned about the disproportionate rateof civilian deaths versus injuries in the context of search operations by Afghan national security forces,

145 Afghanistan, MoJ, Enforced Constitution of Afghanistan, 30 July 2004, url, Articles 5, 64/3
146 NSC, Office of the National Security Council, n.d., url
147 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Annual Report 2018, 24 February 2019, url, p. 62
148 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2019, url, p. 27
149 SIGAR, Quarterly report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2020, url, p. 73
150 DW, Afghanistan security forces suffer steep decline in numbers, says SIGAR, 1 May 2018, url
151 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the US Congress, 30 July 2017,

url, p. 94; USDOD; Enhancing Security and Stability in
Afghanistan, June 2017, url, pp. 2-3; Marty, F. J., Expanding Afghanistan’s Special Operations Forces: Doubling their successor further diluting their mission?, AAN, 2 October 2017, url
152 Ruttig, T., From Doha to Peace? Obstacles rising in the way of intra-Afghan talks, 3 March 2020, url
153 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the US Congress, 30 April 2020, url, p. 105
154 BBC, Afghanistan's Ghani says 45,000 security personnel killed since 2014, 25 January 2019, url

AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 27

primarily resulting from incidents attributed to NDS Special Forces’.155 In 2019, a number of incidents
were documented by UNAMA, in which family members of Taliban fighters were intentionally killed
by ANSF, in retaliation for Taliban attacks against them.156 Despite progress made, child recruitment
by ANFS continued to be a ‘concern’ during 2019157 (see Sections 2.1.2 Afghan National Police and2.1.3 Afghan Local Police). Moreover, UNAMA received reports of sexual abuse and exploitation ofboys, including the practice of bacha bazi perpetrated by the ANSF, despite the criminalisation of thepractice in the revised Penal Code.158

2.1.1 Afghan National Army (ANA)The Afghan National Army (ANA) operates under the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence (MoD)
and is part of the Armed Forces of Afghanistan.159 In April 2018, President Ghani announced theestablishment of the Afghan National Army Territorial Force (ANA TF).160 The goal was to create a local
security force that is more effective, professional, sustainable and led by MoD. Contrary to the ALP,the MoD will command and control locally recruited, but nationally trained ANA TF personnel.161 Eachcompany (tolai) recruits soldiers from a particular district but is led by officers from outside that
district, already serving in the regular ANA or being in the ANA reserves. The aim was for the ANA TF
to be 36 000 strong.162 The Afghan Air Force (AAF) is ‘the primary air enabler for the ANA ground forces
by providing aerial fires and lift support to ground forces across Afghanistan’ with their headquarters
in Kabul. As USDOD noted, human capital limitations are one of the largest challenges that AAF has toface with only a limited number of Afghans meeting the needed qualifications.163 According to AAN,
the ANA-TF is set to reach 10,000 men and be mobilised across districts in 32 of Afghanistan’s 34
provinces in 2020.164
Mandate and structure
ANA is [informal translation] the ‘guardian of the national sovereignty, territorial integrity andindependence of Afghanistan’.165 According to the USDOD, ‘the ANA General Staff commands andcontrols all of Afghanistan’s ground and air forces, including the ANA conventional forces, the Afghan
Air Force (AAF), the Special Mission Wing (SMW), the Afghan National Army Special Operations
Command (ANASOC), the Afghan National Civil Order Force (ANCOF) and the Afghan Border Force(ABF).’166
According to USDOD,‘ANA elements are comprised of six regional corps. Each corps is composed of a headquarter
Kandak, three/four infantry brigades, and different specialty Kandaks. The 201st Corps, 203rd
Corps, 205th Corps, 207th Corps, 209th Corps, 215th Corps, and 217th Corps are responsible
for their geographic regions that follow the provincial boundaries. The ANDSF divided the

155 UNAMA, Afghanistan protection of civilians in armed conflict 2019, 22 February 2020, url, p. 54
156 UNAMA, Afghanistan protection of civilians in armed conflict 2019, 22 February 2020, url, p. 66
157 UNAMA, Afghanistan protection of civilians in armed conflict 2019, 22 February 2020, url, p. 24
158 UNAMA, Afghanistan protection of civilians in armed conflict 2019, 22 February 2020, url, p. 9
159 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2019, url, p. 43; UNAMA, Protection of civilians inarmed conflict, 2019, 22 February 2020, url, p.87; The Washington Post, Unguarded nation, Afghan security forces, despite
years of training, were dogged by incompetence and corruption, 9 December 2019, url
160 Clark, K., The Afghan Territorial Force: Learning from the lessons of the past?, AAN, 15 January 2019, url
161 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2018, url, p. 39
162 Clark, K., The Afghan Territorial Force: Learning from the lessons of the past?, AAN, 15 January 2019, url
163 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2018, url, p. 72; USDOD, Enhancing Security andStability in Afghanistan, December 2019, url, p. 51
164 Clark K., Gaston E., et al., Ghosts of the Past: Lessons from Local Force Mobilisation in Afghanistan and Prospects for the
Future, (AAN), 1 July 2020, url, pp. 2-3
165 Afghanistan, MoD, ‫[ وضعیت فعیل اردوی میل‬informal translation: ‘The current National Army status’], 26 June 2016, url
166 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2019, 23 January 2020, url, p. 49

28 —AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT

209th’s previous sector to incorporate the 217th Corps. The 111th Capital Division is
independent from any corps and is responsible for security in Kabul.’167
A corps is comprised of six brigades and 24 000 soldiers.168 Soldiers for ANA are recruited on a
voluntary basis for an initial period of three years and shall be aged between 18 and 35 years old.169
Article 3 of the Afghan Law on the prohibition of child recruitment in the military institutions prohibits
child recruitment in the military units and Article 4 of the said Law punishes the perpetrators from 6
months to one year imprisonment.170
Capacity and effectivenessAccording to UNAMA, the security situation in Afghanistan during the third quarter of 2019, wasextremely volatile.171 The Taliban continued their attacks against the ANDSF (over 76 attacks in 24
provinces within a week). The deadliest attack on ANA soldiers was carried out in Kunduz Province by
the Taliban Red Unit, killing 15 soldiers due to the lack of proper trenches.172 During the period of 17– 23 April 2020, 119 pro-government forces were killed, in particular 17 members of the Afghan
Territorial Army, by the Taliban Red Unit in Takhar Province.173
The NATO-led RS (Resolute Support) mission provides ANA with training, advice and assistanceincluding capacity building.174 According to The Washington Post, as of December 2019, the ANA
counted about 162 000 troops175, while SIGAR reported that as of 26 January 2020, the number of ANA
personnel was 182 173, including 1 735 female personnel.176 The authorised strength of ANA in 2019
remained 227 103, according to USDOD.177
The MoD reportedly indicated that the Afghan army strength should be 234 000 personnel, butcurrently it is believed to be around 200 000 active soldiers. The increasing number of losses amongst
the Afghan forces is one of the reasons why ANA cannot reach the expected recruitment of more
personnel. According to a former ANA officer who survived a battle, ANA suffer from serious challenges
in the battlefield including lack of enough troops.178
In December 2019, it was reported that the number of soldiers who were absent without leaveremained a major problem for ANA.179 During the reporting period, the MoD had the logistic capacity
to supply ANA, however, it did not have accurate information on its stocks and it was challenged to
distribute materials to ANA, partly due to insurgent activity around the supplying routes, in particular
the route that leads to the southern provinces.180
In rural areas, Afghan security forces remained in a defensive position and could not hold territories
that were recaptured. For instance, according to the head of a district council in Badghis Province,
government security suffered continued attacks and killings by the Taliban due to their lack of capacity

167 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2019, 23 January 2020, url, p. 50
168 Tolonews, New corps established to improve Northeast security, 11 April 2019, url
169 Afghanistan, MoD, ‫[ فهرست پالییس و طرزالعمل شمولیت اردوی میل‬informal translation: ‘National army recruitment procedure andpolicy’], url, p. 26
170 ACKU , ‫ قانون منع استخدام اطفال در قطعات نظایم‬،‫[ رسم جریده‬informal translation ‘Official Gazette, Law on prohibition of child‫ي‬recruitment in military barracks’], 17 February 2015, url
171 UNAMA, Protection of civilians in armed conflict, 2019, 22 February 2020, url, p. 16
172 NYT, Taliban ramp up attacks on Afghans after Trump says “no violence”, 6 March 2020, url
173 NYT, Afghan War Casualty Report: April 2020, 30 April 2020, url
174 OFS, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, 1 October – 31 December 2019, 5 February 2020, url,
p. 17
175 The Washington Post, Unguarded nation, Afghan security forces, despite years of training, were dogged by incompetence
and corruption, 9 December 2019, url
176 SIGAR, Quarterly report to the United States Congress, 30 April 2020, url, pp. 74 and 82
177 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2019, 23 January 2020, url, p. 49
178 Tolonews, ANA not meeting target enlistment numbers: MoD, 27 December 2019, url
179 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2019, 23 January 2020, url, pp. 45 and 49
180 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2019, 23 January 2020, url, pp. 33, 45

AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 29

to conduct offensive operations. It is believed that ground operations are conducted by the Americanbacked Afghan Special Forces.181
Integrity
In October 2019, SIGAR reported that the ‘Afghan personnel and payroll systems in place created
opportunities for corruption—including the creation of and payment to ghost soldiers—in early 2016.’
The source also stated that as of October 2019, ‘SIGAR investigation directorate found that
Government officials within the MOD and MOI, and at various provincial police headquarters
throughout Afghanistan, fraudulently created payroll records to receive payments to non-existent
ANDSF personnel.’182 Following the SIGAR report, the Afghan Ministry of Defence rejected theexistence of ‘ghost soldiers’.183 However, according to a national corruption survey carried out by
Transparency International, the Afghan army was perceived as a trusted organ in Afghanistan with
74 % of the respondents believing that ANA worked for the well-being of the people.184
Violations
The Constitution of Afghanistan stipulates in its Article 29 that the ‘persecution of human beings shallbe forbidden. No one shall be allowed to or order torture, even for discovering the truth from anotherindividual who is under investigation, arrest, detention or has been convicted to be punished.
Punishment contrary to human dignity shall be prohibited.’185
According to UNAMA, in 2019, ANA caused 1 088 civilian casualties including 381 deaths and 707
injured including 113 deaths and 118 injured by Afghan Air Force.186 On 21 March 2020, Afghan Air
Force carried out an airstrike against Taliban in Imam Sahib District of Kunduz Province in which 11
civilians were killed, including seven children and three women, and injured a woman and a girl.187
ANA caused several civilian casualties while firing mortars on residential houses during the battle with
the Taliban. For instance, on 6 March 2019, during a ground engagement against the Taliban, the ANA
fired a mortar on a residential house where Taliban were hiding in Chemtal District, Balkh province
killing three civilians including one boy aged 6 years old and injured three other children. In a separate
incident, on 13 November 2019, a woman was killed, and a boy was injured by a mortar shrapnel firedby ANA on a residential home in Seori District of Zabul Province.188 On 22 November 2019, threecivilians were killed, including two women, and two others were wounded after a mortar fired by theAfghan soldiers on Taliban’s strongholds in the village of Dand-e Ghori in Pul-e Khumri City accidently
hit a house.189
USDOS also reported on the causes of extra-judiciary killings, forced disappearance, arbitrary
detention and torture by the Afghan security forces without specifically mentioning the ANA.190
In April 2019, UNAMA published a report on the treatment of conflict related detainees in Afghanistan
stating that:‘Between of 1 January 2017 and 31 December 2018, UNAMA interviewed 33 detainees who
had been held by the Afghan National Army (ANA) before being transferred to ANP or NDS.
Twelve of them (36.4 per cent) gave credible and reliable reports of having been subjected totorture or other forms of ill-treatment whilst in detention, indicating severe beatings as main
181 NYT, As USU.S. nears a pull out a deal, Afghan army is on the defensive, 12 August 2019, url
182 SIGAR, Quarterly report to the United States Congress, 30 October 2019, url, p. 83
183 Tolonews, MoD rejects existence of ‘ghost soldiers’ in Afghan army, 3 August 2019, url
184 Transparency International, Afghanistan in corruption and the role of development assistance, 29 April 2019, url, p. 8
185 Afghanistan, MoJ, Enforced Constitution of Afghanistan, 30 July 2004, url
186 UNAMA, Protection of civilians in armed conflict, 2019, 22 February 2020, url, pp. 12, 51, 54
187 UNAMA, Protection of civilians in armed conflict, First quarter report: 1 January – 31 March 2020, url, p. 6
188 UNAMA, Protection of civilians in armed conflict, 2019, 22 February 2020, url, pp. 51, 54
189 NYT, Afghan War Casualty Report: November 2019, 2 December 2019, url
190 USDOS, Afghanistan 2019 Human Rights report, 11 March 2020, url, p. 1

30 —AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT

technique. These incidents took place in nine provinces: Balkh, Herat, Helmand, Kabul,
Kandahar, Kunduz, Laghman, Logar and Nangarhar.’191
According to USDOS, in some instances, ANA officials reportedly used promises of food and money toentice boys into bacha bazi.192 In its report for the year 2019, UNAMA noted that, despite the fact thatthe practice of bacha bazi has been criminalised in the new Penal Code, there are reports that suchcrime continues to exist and is mainly perpetrated by the Afghan national security forces. There wasonly one case, to UNAMA’s knowledge, in which such a crime was successfully prosecuted under theprovisions of the revised Penal Code.193 For more child specific issues in the context of the conflict ofAfghanistan, such as the harmful practice of bacha bazi and the recruitment of children by the armed
actors in the conflict, please refer to the EASO Country of Origin Information Report Afghanistan:
Individuals targeted under societal and legal norms (2017) and the EASO Country of Origin Information
Report Afghanistan: Recruitment by armed groups (2016).

2.1.2 Afghan National Police (ANP)The ANP operates under the responsibility of the MoI and is the primary law enforcement agency in
Afghanistan.194
Mandate and structure
The ANP is mandated ‘to maintain civil order; reduce corruption; prevent the cultivation, production,and smuggling of illegal narcotics; provide security for individuals and the community; and safeguard
legal rights and freedoms’.195 According to USDOD the ANP consist of four pillars: AUP (Afghan Uniform
Police), PSP (Public Security Police), ABP (Afghan Border Police), and AACP (Afghan Anti-Crime Police)
and three sub-pillars ALP (Afghan Local Police), APPF (Afghan Public Protection Force), and CNPA(Counter Narcotic Police of Afghanistan). The GCPSU (General Command of Police Special Units) is the
MoI’s component of the ASSF (Afghan Special Security Forces).196
Capacity and effectivenessAccording to the Washington Post, as of December 2019, the ANP counted about 91 000 personnel197
while SIGAR reported that as of 30 April 2020, ANP personnel was 99 375, including 3 535 female
officers.198 In December 2019, USDOD reported that the number of ANP authorised personnel
remained at 124 626.199 In November 2019, Salaam Times reported on the importance of women
within the police for Afghanistan. For instance, Kunduz police is recruiting more female police officers
in addition to the current 80 female police officers that serve across the districts of Kunduz Province.
According to the source, the presence of women within the police helped decrease security issues that
affected women. In addition, female police officers were used to search women during house search
operations in Kunduz in line with the Islamic tradition.200
191 UNAMA, Treatment of conflict related detainees in Afghanistan: preventing torture and ill-treatment under the Anti-

Torture Law, 17 Avril 2019, url, p. 19
192 USDOS, Afghanistan 2019 Human Rights report, 11 March 2020, url, p. 16
193 UNAMA, Afghanistan protection of civilians in armed conflict 2019, 22 February 2020, url, p. 9
194 UNAMA, Protection of civilians in armed conflict, 2019, 22 February 2020, url, p. 83; The Washington Post, Unguarded
nation, Afghan security forces, despite years of training, were dogged by incompetence and corruption, 9 December 2019,url
195 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2019, 23 January 2020, url, p. 76
196 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2019, 23 January 2020, url, p. 76
197 The Washington Post, Unguarded nation, Afghan security forces, despite years of training, were dogged by incompetence
and corruption, 9 December 2019, url
198 SIGAR, Quarterly report to the United States Congress, 30 April 2020, url, p. 82
199 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2019, 23 January 2020, url, p. 76
200 Salaam Times, Kunduz police seek women recruits amid growing female security role, 14 November 2019, url

AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 31

Attrition remains a major problem within ANP. A large part of the attrition within ANP is due to ‘thecombination of frequent and lengthy deployments to remote checkpoints with minimal provisions andequipment, difficult living conditions, and the near-constant prospect of attacks contribute to the high
ANP attrition’.201 An important part of the ANP and ANA personnel is dispersed in small numbers instatic checkpoints across the country, which makes them vulnerable to attacks and reduces theircapacity to deploy staff for other operations.202 As of July 2019, 6 452 police outposts and checkpoints
all over the country were assessed to be closed, in order to reduce losses and desertion among police
officers. Over 210 police outposts and checkpoints, often in remote areas, had been closed in 17
provinces and another 200 had been identified for closure. several checkpoints along the highway
between Kabul and Kandahar had been removed as the police extorted money from truck drivers.203
In 1398 (Afghan calendar corresponding to 2018–2019), the MoI reported that during the joint
operations with other ANSF personnel, ANP have retaken the control of nine Districts, killing 9 396
AGEs (Anti-Government Elements) including key members: shadow provincial and district governors,
and military commanders across the country. The source also indicates that 2 983 AGEs were injured
and 1 934 others were arrested, who were suspected of organising terrorist attacks.204
According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS):‘The Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan Local Police (ALP) – which are critical to securing
the countryside and the population – receive only very limited outside support, are again in aside of turbulence because of ongoing problems and attempts at reform, lack the paramilitarycapabilities they need, fail to properly support governance at the District and local levels andthe rule of law, and present more serious problems in terms of corruption and extortion, anddivided loyalties to powerbrokers, warlords, narcotraffickers as well as willingness to reachsome accommodation with the Taliban.’205
According to USDOD, majority of the ANP personnel are stationed in the headquarters and there areless ANP personnel in the operation units.206
Integrity
According to Freedom House, the police force is heavily militarised and primarily focused on its role asa first line of defence against insurgents in administrative centres. The police are highly implicated incorruption and organised crime, in particular near key smuggling routes.207 Another source also
indicated that the police is perceived to be highly corrupt.208 Reuters quotes Khoshal, the new police
commander stating that there was corruption within the MoI such as receiving money from contracts,
food, fuel or taking money from hotels, shops, highways.209
In December 2019, Stars and Stripes reported that the Afghan population perceive police as ‘predatory
bandits’ and call them as ‘the most hated institution’ in the country. Around 30 percent of the recruitedpolice have deserted with their issued weapons to ‘set up their own private checkpoints’ and extort
money from travellers.210 Numerous truck drivers allegedly accuse border police personnel of forcing
201 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2019, 23 January 2020, url, p. 76
202 OFS, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, 1 October – 31 December 2019, 5 February 2020, url,

p. 5
203 Reuters, Afghan police pull back from isolated outposts as losses mount, 24 July 2019, urlٔ
204 Afghanistan, MoI, ‫نامە میل حسابدیه حکومت به ملت‬‫ بر‬1398 ‫[ وزارت امورداخله گزارش سال‬informal translation: ‘Ministry of Interior
affairs, annual report 2018 – 2019, National Government accountability programme to the Nation], 2 August 2019, url, p. 3
205 CSIS, Military developments in the Afghan war, 10 September 2019, url, p. 9
206 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2019, 23 January 2020, url, p. 72
207 Freedom House, Freedom in the world 2020, Afghanistan, 6 March 2020, url
208 Transparency International, Anti-Corruption Resource Center, Corruption in Afghanistan and the role of development
assistance, 29 April 2019, url, pp. 6-8
209 Reuters, New commander takes on corruption ‘mess’ in Afghanistan police, 4 June 2019, url
210 Stars and Stripes, In documents, US military trainers describe Afghan security forces as incompetent, unmotivated and rifewith deserters, 9 December 2019, url32 —AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT

to stop their vehicles and pay bribes. Similar incidents have reportedly occurred in Torkham town in
Nangarhar province,211 along the main border crossing between Afghanistan and Pakistan;212 also in
Herat province, where, on 27 January 2019, about 3 000 cargo truck drivers protested against allegedly
police extortion on the Herat-Farah highway.213
Violations
According to UNAMA, in 2019, ANP have caused 90 civilian casualties including 23 deaths and 67
injured. During the same period, UNAMA reportedly ‘verified nine incidents of abduction of children
involving 14 boys, seven of which were attributed to the Taliban, one to Afghan National Police andone to a pro-Government armed group’.214
In 2019, UNAMA documented several intentional killings and summary executions that caused civilians
casualties, including six killed and five injured by the ANP. The same source also indicated that ‘aprovincial ANP confirmed the prosecution of one of its officers who shot and killed a man after adispute on 28 September, in Arghandab district, Kandahar province’. In a separate incident, on
30 October 2019, in Qalat District of Zabul Province, two ANP officers, based at a checkpoint,
reportedly shot and killed a truck driver who refused to pay the money they were demanding.215
According to Human Rights Watch, the Kandahar police was allegedly responsible for human rights
violations such as torture, forced disappearance, and extrajudicial executions.216
Even though to a lesser extent than the ALP, the ANP continued to use children in combat and insupport role at checkpoints during 2019.217
Kabul City ANP
The ANP strength within Kabul City, which is divided into 22 police districts218, is about 15 000
personnel. The majority amongst them are based in checkpoints and guarding buildings, but only 1 200of them are assigned to criminal investigations, which is roughly one police officer per 5 800 Kabul
residents for a population of about 6 million people. Police offices remain primary targets for carbombs.219 Kabul City Commandment started to install GPS (Global Positioning System) in police
vehicles to counter corruption and misuse of police vehicles.220
Herat City ANP
During the reporting period, the number of ANP in Herat City could not be retrieved. According to
Pajhwok, residents of Herat City complained on the rise of insecurity in the city and the deficiency inthe number and capacity of the police to provide security for the population.221 Another source quoted
the commander of Herat police stating that there is a shortage in the number of police in Heratprovince and only in Herat city there is a need for 12 000 ANP in order to tackle insecurity.222

211 Pajhwok, Corruption redux: Truckers forced to pay bribes in Torkham, 24 January 2019, url
212 RFE/RL, Truckers Cite Corruption, Distress At Pakistan-Afghanistan Border 7 July 2020, url
213 Pajhwok, Truck drivers protest in Herat against police extortion, 27 January 2019, url
214 UNAMA, Afghanistan protection of civilians in armed conflict 2019, 22 February 2020, url, pp. 23 and 54
215 UNAMA, Afghanistan protection of civilians in armed conflict 2019, 22 February 2020, url, pp. 66, 67, 120
216 HRW, ‘The have shot many like this’, Abusive night raids by CIA-backed Afghan strike forces, 31 October 2019, url, p. 30
217 UNAMA, Afghanistan protection of civilians in armed conflict 2019, 22 February 2020, url, p. 24
218 AAN, Kabul unpacked, a geographical guide to a metropolis in the making, 19 March 2019, url
219 NYT, They fight suicide bombers. But can Afghan police fight crime?, 8 February 2020, url
220 Khaama Press, GPS system to be used to control, counter corruption and misuse of Kabul police vehicles, 23 February

2020, url
221 Pajhwok, Worsening insecurity worries Herat residents, 19 December 2019, url
222 Radio Azadi, ‫ اگر نیوهای پولیس افزایش نیابد اقتصاد هرات فلج یمشود‬:‫[ فرمانده پولیس هرات‬informal translation: ‘Herat Police
commander: if the number of police personnel does not increase, economy of Herat will be impacted’], 17 December 2019,url

AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 33

Another source reported that the chief of Police District 10 (PD 10) of Herat City has been removed
from the office due to negligence after unknown gunmen attacked the PD 10 and killed three police
officers.223
ANA reportedly shot and killed ‘accidently’ the commander of ANP operations’ unit in the western partof Herat city.224 More information on security incidents is communicated by the Herat ANP press office
via social media channels including Telegram.225
Mazar-e Sharif ANP
During the reporting period, the exact number of ANP in Mazar-e Sharif could not be found, however,the Governor of Balkh indicated that the number of ANP for the Balkh province should increase by
3 275. He further suggested to add six more Police Districts to the current 12 ones in Mazar-e Sharif.226
Residents of Mazar-e Sharif reportedly expressed their concern on the increasing number of armed
robberies in the city and the lack of capacity within the Mazar-e Sharif ANP to provide security.227
A local source reported that due to the lack of security forces on the road connecting Balkh District toMazar-e Sharif, the Taliban established a checkpoint in the Chawk-e Daisoor, (Daisoor intersection)
where they killed two persons during vehicles search operation.228

2.1.3 Afghan Local Police (ALP)In August 2010, the ALP was created as a security initiative led by the MoI and funded by the US
Government.229 Officially, the ALP reports to the MoI at national level but, in practice, since June 2015,it has been subordinated to the AUP230, however it is not counted as part of the ANSF’s authorised
strength.231 Since 2001, the Afghan state and international military have tried to develop a ‘local force
model’ in order to fill security gaps and defend the territory from Anti-Government Elements (AGEs).
According to an analysis by AAN, although this model has worked in some cases, in others has notproved to be successful mainly due to the fact that ‘local forces have been co-opted by ethnic, factionalor criminal interests and abused the local population’. These factors have contributed to decision todissolve the ALP, which has been the main local force for the last ten years. According to AAN, the ALP
was due to be dissolved by September 2020, although the ‘exact means of dissolution, disbandment
or transition’ was not clear yet at the time of finalising this report.232‫ی‬
223 Pajhwok, ‫امنیت پولیس هرات به دلیل غفلت وظیفوی برکنار شد‬‫[ آمر حوزه دهم‬informal translation: ‘chief of Police District 10 of Herat
has been removed from office due to negligence’], 17 December 2019, url
224 Tolonews, Police commander killed by ANA at checkpoint “accidently”, 8 February 2020, url
225 Press Office, Herat Police, n.d., url
226 AVA, ‫[ ورود دو قطعه ویژه وزارت داخله و امنیت میل؛ تشکیل پولیس بلخ افزایش پیدا یمکند‬informal translation ‘arrival of two MoI and NDS
special units; Balkh police strength increases’]11 February 2020, url‫[ نگر یان باشندهگان مز ر‬informal translation: ‘Mazar-e-Sharif’s population express
227 Tolonews, ‫ارشیف از افزایش دزدیهای مسلحانه‬concerns on rising armed robberies’], 29 March 2020, url‫[ احداث چک پاینت طالبان در مسی ولسوایل بلخ ـ مز ر‬informal translation: ‘Taliban establishing checkpoint on the way
228 AVA, ‫ارشیف‬between Balkh District-Mazar-e-Sharif’], 31 December 2019, url
229 Los Angeles Times, Afghanistan tries to clean up its militias, 31 October 2016, url
230 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the US Congress, 30 April 2016, url, p. 107
231 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the US Congress, 30 July 2017, url, p. 104; Clark, K., Update on the Afghan Local Police, AAN, 5
July 2017, url
232 Clark K., Gaston E., et al., Ghosts of the Past: Lessons from Local Force Mobilisation in Afghanistan and Prospects for the
Future, (AAN), 1 July 2020, url, pp. 2; 9; 75

34 —AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT

Mandate and structure
The ALP personnel have the responsibility to provide security within villages and rural areas to protect
the population from insurgent attacks and to protect facilities. ALP personnel are not included in theoverall ANDSF authorisation and the US funds the salaries for the ALP.233
In a case study of ALP in Takhar Province by AAN, it is reported that, based on the rules and procedures,
ALP personnel should be appointed by the Government. They should be loyal to the District Chief of
Police. On the contrary, mostly, ALP belong to the members of Parliament, former commanders of
Mujahidin factions, drug dealers and are appointed based on the family ties with Police or NDS
commanders.234 According to the same source, residents of Shajoy District of Zabul Province statedthat ‘in the various districts of Afghanistan where the ALP operates, people’s experience of it has been
mixed: in some places, it protects people, contributing to stability; in others, it behaves as a predatory
militia, with locals powerless to protect themselves or get abusive commanders removed.’235
Capacity and effectivenessAccording to USDOD, the total MoI-authorised ANP personnel of 154 626 includes 30 000 ALP
personnel. When the ALP was formalised in 2010, in the counter-Taleban military strategy, as a way ofmobilising local communities against the Taleban and improving gaps in state services by enrolling
communities into local community defensive forces (eventually in 31 of 34 provinces). However, the
ALP was controversial from the start.236
According to an investigation by the Washington Post237, some US officials held in contempt the ALP,
which the source said to be known for their ‘brutality’.238 USDOS noted that, since most of the ALP
personnel are illiterate and lack training, they are largely unaware of their responsibilities anddefendants’ rights under the law.239 On 9 April 2020, Salaam Times reported that local police in Kunduz
received literacy training to improve their professionalism and to build people’s trust towards thepolice.240
Integrity
The Washington Post indicated that according to a former analyst at the US Institute of Peace, theAfghan Local Police was ‘dysfunctional – in many areas it was a corrupt force, run by warlords’.241
According to Ufuq news, residents of Samarqandian Char Sang in Balkh District of Balkh Province
complained about commander Karim (known as Karim-Broot) ALP chief in the region, on cases ofbeatings of people, money extortion and harassment of people.242 There were also reports of ALP
involved in drug trade, imposing illegal taxes, and shooting a farmer who refused to pay.243

233 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2019, 23 January 2020, url, p. 77
234 AAN, A maelstrom of militias: Takhar, a case study of strongmen co-opting the ALP, 14 November 2019, url
235 AAN, How to replace a bad ALP commander: in Shajoy success and now calamity, 21 September 2016, url
236 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2019, 23 January 2020, url, pp. 27 and 38
237 In December 2019, the Washington Post released the ‘The Afghanistan Papers’, an investigation made of hundreds ofinterviews collected during the years by SIGAR with US officials and never made public before. See, Washington Post, The
Afghanistan Papers, 9 December 2020, url
238 The Washington Post, Unguarded nation, Afghan security forces, despite years of training, were dogged by incompetence
and corruption, 9 December 2019, url
239 USDOS, Afghanistan 2019 Human Rights report, 11 March 2020, url, p. 6
240 Salaam Times, Kunduz literacy training programme helps local police built citizen’s trust, 9 April 2020, url
241 The Washington Post, Unguarded nation, Afghan security forces, despite years of training, were dogged by incompetence
and corruption, 9 December 2019, url‫ی‬
242 Ufuq news, ‫قانونشکت پولیس محیل در بلخ؛ «کریم بروت» بهزور تفنگ باج یمگید‬[informal translation: ‘breaching of law by Balkh local
police; ‘Karim-e-Broot’ extort money with the power of gun’], 5 November 2019, url
243 Clark, K., A Maelstrom of Militias: Takhar, a case study of strongmen co-opting the ALP14 November 2019, url

AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 35

Violations
AAN concluded that ‘ALP forces were prone to abuse and political capture, and frequently exacerbatedcommunity divisions and conflict’.244 In February 2020, UNAMA indicated that in 2019, ALP was
responsible for the death of nine civilians and 27 injured. The source also stated that amongst the deadand injured civilians, four were killed and six were injured in intentional killings and summary
executions by ALP.245
According to UNAMA, there were numerous incidents in which family members of Taliban wereintentionally killed by ANSF. For example, on 25 November 2019 in Pul-e Khumri district, Baghlan
province, two Taliban fighters killed an ALP commander. ‘In retaliation, Afghan Local Police went to
the house of one of the Taliban fighters and shot and injured his brother - a healthcare worker. Duringthat incident, Afghan Local Police opened fire on villagers and wounded two more civilians.’246
UNAMA received credible and reliable accounts from nine detainees interviewed between
1 January 2017 and 31 December 2018, which showed that six out of the nine (66 %) detainees
experienced torture or other forms of ill-treatment, including severe beatings as the main techniqueused by ALP. The incidents reportedly occurred in Badakhshan, Balkh, Faryab, Kandahar, Jawzjan and
Parwan provinces.247
The source also indicated that the detainees were reportedly held by ALP for a period of between one
and six days while ALP are required to hand over any suspected insurgents to ANP or NDS immediately.
UNAMA expressed its concern over the high percentage of detainees held by ALP who provided
credible and reliable accounts of torture or ill treatment.248
Voice of Jihad, Taliban’s news media, claimed on 20 April 2020 that Arbakis (local police) have beaten
and detained eight villagers in Badghis Province, Sang-e Atash District, in Jafaryan area.249
According to USDOS, ‘accountability of ALP officials for torture and abuse was weak, not transparent,
and rarely enforced’. The source also indicated that ‘independent judicial or external oversight of ALP
in the investigation and prosecution of crimes or misconduct, including torture and abuse, was limited
or non-existent.’250
The use of children by the ALP, including in combat and in support role at checkpoints, remained aconcerned in 2019, according to UNAMA, despite the progress made by the ANSF in preventing childrecruitment.251 USDOS observed that Afghan security forces, in particular ALP, reportedly recruited
boys specifically to use them for bacha bazi (sexual exploitation of children) in every province of thecountry.252

2.1.4 National Directorate of Security (NDS)
NDS (National Directorate of Security) is the State intelligence and security service of Afghanistan.253
The command structure of the NDS is independent and the head of NDS reports directly to the
244 Clark, K., Gaston E., et al., Ghosts of the Past: Lessons from Local Force Mobilisation in Afghanistan and Prospects for the

Future, (AAN), 1 July 2020, url, p. 3
245 UNAMA, Afghanistan protection of civilians in armed conflict, 2019, 22 February 2020, url, p. 54, 66
246 UNAMA, Afghanistan protection of civilians in armed conflict 2019, 22 February 2020, url, p. 66, 67
247 UNAMA, Treatment of conflict-related detainees in Afghan custody, 17 April 2020, url, pp. 18-19
248 UNAMA, Treatment of conflict-related detainees in Afghan custody, 17 April 2020, url, pp. 18-19
249 Voice of Jihad, ‫ تنه کلیوال له وهلو ډبولو وروسته بندیان کړي‬۸ ‫ سنګ آتش گ ګوډاګ اربکیانو‬:‫[ بادغیس‬informal translation: ‘Badghis: Local‫ي‬‫ې‬
police detained 8 villagers after beating them’], 20 April 2020, url
250 USDOS, Afghanistan 2019 Human Rights report, 11 March 2020, url, p. 6
251 UNAMA, Afghanistan protection of civilians in armed conflict 2019, 22 February 2020, url, p. 24
252 USDOS, Afghanistan 2019 Human Rights report, 11 March 2020, url, p. 16
253 AIHRC & OSF, Torture, transfers, and Denial of due process: the treatment of conflict-related detainees in Afghanistan, 17
March 2012, url, p. 9; UNAMA, Protection of civilians in armed conflict, 2019, 22 February 2020, url, p. 91

36 —AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT

President. The agency was established in 2002 with the support of CIA to collect intelligence in ruraland urban areas related to the Taliban.254
Mandate and structure
The NDS is in charge of investigating national security-related criminal cases.255 Its primary
responsibility is to manage national security cases including conflict-related detainees.256 It shares
responsibility for law enforcement and maintenance of order in the country with the MoI and theMoD.257 The agency is organised by departments and units, which are designated by numbers. For
instance, the counter-terrorism department is number 241 and the internal surveillance department
is number 34.258
The Special Forces of the Afghan intelligence agency is one of the units of NDS, which is divided into
four main units, each has a regional area of operation. For instance, NDS-01259 operates in the central
region (Kabul, Parwan, Wardak, Logar and possibly other bordering provinces), NDS-02 in the easternregion (Nangahar and possibly in bordering regions), NDS-03 in the southern region (Kandahar), and
NDS-04 in the north-eastern regions (Nuristan, Kunar and other neighbouring regions).260
The investigative branch of the agency is located in Kabul, where it holds national security prisoners
before their trail for prosecution.261
Capacity and effectivenessThe estimated number reported for NDS agents varies between 15 000, 20 000 and 30 000, according
to sources from 2011 and 2014 cited in a 2018 OFPRA report. The status of these agents is regulatedby the military code of discipline for breaching the NDS laws.262 The agency recruits, trains and uses a
pro-government militia group called Sangorian who conducts offensive operations against the Taliban.
The group is made up of around 500 to 1 000 fighters.263
In April 2020, NDS Afghan Special Forces arrested the ISKP (Islamic State of Khorasan Province) leader
in Afghanistan named Abdullah Orakizai and known as Aslam Farooqi, including his top 19
commanders.264 The Afghan Special Forces are considered to be Afghanistan’s toughest and the best
troops.265 During the operations, NDS Special Forces units often receive airstrike support from the US
and Afghan Forces.266 According to SIGAR, ‘Afghan special forces conducted fewer ground operationsin the fourth quarter of 2019, lower than any other quarter in 2019, and only 31% of their operations
were conducted without US or Coalition assistance.’267 Another source observed in 2018 that due to254 SWJ, Strengthening Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security: is it equipped to counter “emerging” threats?, 2 March

2018, url
255 USDOS, Afghanistan 2019 Human Rights report, 11 March 2020, url, p. 1
256 AIHRC & OSF, Torture, transfers, and Denial of due process: the treatment of conflict-related detainees in Afghanistan, 17
March 2012, url, p. 9257 USDOS, Afghanistan 2019 Human Rights report, 11 March 2020, url
258 OFPRA, la National Directorate of Security (NDS), organisation centrale et présence à Kandahar [informal translation : ‘The
National Directorate of Security, central organisation and presence in Kandahar’], 1 November 2018, url
259 NDS 01 unit uses a Twitter account and constantly post their operations in the field, n.d., url
260 Watson Institute, The CIA’s ‘army’: a threat to human rights and an obstacle to peace in Afghanistan, 21 August 2019, url,
p. 5; HRW, ‘They have shot many like this’, abusive night raids by CIA-backed Afghan strike forces, 31 October 2019, url, p. 19
261 USDOS, Afghanistan 2019 Human Rights report, 11 March 2020, url, p. 1
262 OFPRA, la National Directorate of Security (NDS), organisation centrale et présence à Kandahar [informal translation : ‘The
National Directorate of Security, central organisation and presence in Kandahar’], 1 November 2018, url
263 The Jamestown Foundation, The Sangorian: weakening the Taliban from within, 11 January 2019, url
264 Khaama Press, ISIS Khurasan leader and many other top ISIS commanders arrested in Afghanistan, 4 April 2020, url
265 CBSNews, CBS News gets rare access to Afghanistan’s forces hunting ISIS suspects, 11 September 2019, url
266 TRT World, Clandestine operations and CIA-backed forces endangered peace in Afghanistan, 8 May 2019, url
267 SIGAR, Quarterly report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2020, url, p. 65

AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 37

the deployment of under-trained and inexperienced intelligence officers, the Afghan intelligenceagencies failed to collect high-valuable information to help improve the Afghan state security.268
Integrity
During the reporting period, no recent information could be found regarding the integrity of the NDS
among public sources consulted. Between 2016 and 2017, sources believed that, although the NDS
has a reputation for being less corruptible than other security institutions, it has reportedly been
involved in abuses and using torture.269 See the below section on Violations.
Violations
For the year 2019, UNAMA has documented high levels of civilian harm from the use of force during
search operations (‘night raids’) by NDS Special Forces, including the intentional killing of civilians,
some of which amount to summary executions, in the context of these search operations.270 Special
forces units belonging to the NDS were also reportedly accused of summary execution of civilians
during night raids.271 During the same period, NDS (including Special Forces) have caused 179 civilian
deaths and 52 injured.272
UNAMA reported that in 2019, there was intentional killing of civilians by Afghan national security
forces including NDS, particularly during ‘search operations when civilians suspected of involvementwith AGEs could have been safely detained by or handed over to law enforcement authorities’.273 The
source indicated that:‘For example, in the night of 4 September in Jalalabad city, Nangarhar province, NDS Special
Forces (NDS02) conducted a search operation against suspected ISIL-KP supporters in a
residential compound that contained 39 people at the time (11 men, 10 women and 18
children). NDS02 relocated the women and children to a neighbouring compound anddetained the men, handcuffing them and interrogating them separately in various locations in
the compound. Another man who was passing through the area was arrested by NDS02. Fourmen, who were brothers, were summarily executed. They were brought inside the house andwere shot at close range in three separate rooms.’274
Several other sources reported on the same aforementioned incident.275 In a separate incident,
UNAMA reported that on the night of 8 to 9 July 2019, NDS Special Forces shot and killed an adult malecaregiver in Daimardan District of Wardak province during an operation on a health clinic supportedby the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan. During this operation, two other men, a guard and a lab
technician, were found dead outside the building following their earlier arrest by the latter forces.276

268 SWJ, Strengthening Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security: is it equipped to counter “emerging” threats?, 2 March

2018, url
269 Western official, Skype interview, 7 February 2017, in EASO COI report EASO COI report Afghanistan Key socio-economic
indicators, state protection, and mobility in Kabul City, Mazar-e Sharif, and Herat City, August 2017, url, pp. 75-76; AIHRC,
Torture in detention in Afghanistan 1394, 8 May 2016, url, pp. 29-30
270 UNAMA, Protection of civilians in armed conflict, 2019, 22 February 2020, url, pp. 54, 92‫ی‬
271 Freedom House, Freedom in the world 2020, Afghanistan, 6 March 2020, url; AIHRC, ‫قربان شدن افراد ملیک در عملیات‬‫در باره‬‫[ ی‬unofficial translation: ‘concerning civilian casualties in joint national and international‫خارج در والیت کاپیسا‬‫مشیک نیوهای داخیل و ی‬forces’ operation in Kapisa province’], 29 December 2019, url; The Heart of Asia Post, Six civilians killed in Kapisa operations:
AIHRC, 30 December 2019, url
272 UNAMA, Protection of civilians in armed conflict, 2019, 22 February 2020, url, pp. 54, 92
273 UNAMA, Protection of civilians in armed conflict, 2019, 22 February 2020, url, p. 37
274 UNAMA, Protection of civilians in armed conflict, 2019, 22 February 2020, url, p. 66
275 Tolonews, Four members of one family killed in Nangarhar operation, 5 September 2019, url; NYT, Afghan War Casualty
Report: September 2019, 26 September 2019, url; Khaama Press, Four brothers lost their lives in security forces operation in
Jalalabad City, 5 September 2019, url; Al Jazeera, Afghans seek justice for men killed ‘in cold blood’ by spy agency, 6
September 2019, url
276 UNAMA, Protection of civilians in armed conflict, 2019, 22 February 2020, url, p. 30

38 —AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORTOn 11 August 2019, Human Rights Watch released a report exposing ‘grave abuses’ committed bythese CIA-backed units, including ‘extrajudicial executions and enforced disappearances,indiscriminate airstrikes, attacks on medical facilities, and other violations of international
humanitarian law, or the laws of war’. For instance, NDS strike forces backed by the US forces carriedout night raids in Kulalgo village. In the first house that they have raided, according to a witness, thegroup shot four men in front of their family members. In a separate attack on a house, NDS strike force
shot and killed three shopkeepers and one of their customer. Additionally, the group killed a religious
teacher and two construction workers.277 On 29 December 2019, the Afghanistan Independent Human
Rights Commission (AIHRC) indicated that [unofficial translation] ‘Afghan special forces backed by theInternational troops killed six civilians and wounded four others on 23 December 2019 in ground andair operations in Afghania, Bahramkhel, Ahangaran, Pashai, Hesar, Suratkhel, Mahtano, Lokakhel and
Sahibzadah villages of Nijrab district of Kapisa Province to target AGEs’. The same source noted that
their findings are based on the confirmation by the local security authorities of Kapisa province.278 On
30 December 2019, another source reported on the same incident by quoting the AIHRC.279
According to Human Rights Watch, Afghan paramilitary forces, which belong to the NDS but do not fallunder its chain of command, were largely recruited, trained, equipped and overseen by the CIA andcarried out ‘kill or capture’ operations in Afghan villages alongside the US special forces against
insurgents. There was a significant surge in these operations, which often caused civilian casualties.280
Human Rights Watch reported on summary execution and forced disappearance in Kandahar Province
by NDS. For instance, on 21 March 2019, alleged NDS03 strike force raided a village in Panjwai in
Kandahar, taking two men with them, from which only one returned.281
UNAMA reported on unlawful and arbitrary detention by NDS Special Forces during search
operations.282 In April 2019, UNAMA indicated that 128 detainees, including 22 minors, havereportedly been tortured or ill-treated in NDS custody. The detainees have reportedly been severely
beaten. These incidents took place in NDS provincial facilities in Faryab, Helmand, Herat, Kabul(including NDS 241 and 501), Khost, Kunar, Kunduz, Laghman, Nangarhar, Parwan, Samangan and Sare Pul. Similarly, amongst the detainees that UNAMA interviewed within the NDS custody at DFiP (TheAfghan National Detention Facility in Parwan), it found out, based on credible and reliable information,that one detainee has experienced torture or ill treatment by NDS 241, and two other detainees havereportedly been threatened by NDS 501 to admit alleged guilt.283

277 HRW, ‘They have shot many like this’, abusive night raids by CIA-backed Afghan strike forces, 31 October 2019, url‫ی‬‫قربان شدن افراد ملیک در عملیات ی‬
278 AIHRC, ‫خارج در والیت کاپیسا‬‫مشیک نیوهای داخیل و ی‬‫[ در باره‬unofficial translation: ‘concerning civilian
casualties in joint national and international forces’ operation in Kapisa province’], 29 December 2019, url
279 The Heart of Asia Post, Six civilians killed in Kapisa operations: AIHRC, 30 December 2019, url
280 HRW, ‘They have shot many like this’, abusive night raids by CIA-backed Afghan strike forces, 31 October 2019, url
281 HRW, ‘The have shot many like this’, Abusive night raids by CIA-backed Afghan strike forces, 31 October 2019, url
282 UNAMA, Protection of civilians in armed conflict, 2019, 22 February 2020, url, pp. 64-65
283 UNAMA, Treatment of conflict related detainees in Afghanistan: preventing torture and ill-treatment under the AntiTorture Law, 17 April 2019, url, p. 20

AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 39

3. State judiciary
In Afghanistan, there are two dominant systems used to obtain justice: through the state, and throughnon-state mechanisms.284 Afghanistan has a pluralistic legal system whereby multiple sources of law
interact with one another;285 justice is administered on the basis of a mixture of overlapping andsometimes contradictory legal codes.286 Many disputes, ranging from disagreements over land tocriminal acts, are settled outside of the formal court system, in informal institution such as local jirgas
and shuras.287 The USDOS noted that, throughout 2019, traditional justice mechanisms remained themain recourse for many, especially in rural areas.288 According to the 2019 Survey by the Asia
Foundation289, more than 46 % of Afghans have applied to shuras or jirgas to solve their disputes,
41.5 % to state courts, and around 25 % to the Huqooq department. The preference revealed urbanrural divide: rural inhabitants appealed more to shuras/jirgas (48 %), while urban residents preferredappealing to state courts and the Huquq department (around 52 % and 30 % respectively).290 The
survey further found that the vast majority of Afghans believed that local shuras and jirgas are fair andtrusted (81.2 %), that they follow local norms and values (74.4 %), that such institutions are effectiveat delivering justice (74.2 %), and that they resolve cases quickly and efficiently (73.2 %).291
Information on non-state justice systems, including Taliban’s parallel justice systems, informal
customary blood feud resolution and prosecution by the state; as well as on the pluralistic socio-legal
framework for punishment of crime, including Islamic principles and the Penal Code can be found in
EASO COI report Afghanistan Criminal law, customary justice and informal dispute resolution, July
2020.

3.1 Structure
According to the Constitution of Afghanistan, the Judiciary is independent and is comprised of primary
courts, appeal courts and a supreme court as the highest judicial organ.292 See also Section 1.5 Judicial
Branch. Article 120 of the Constitution stipulates that:‘The authority of the judicial organ shall include consideration of all cases filed by real orincorporeal persons, including the state, as plaintiffs or defendants, before the court inaccordance with the provisions of the law.’293
284 Nojumi, N., The merits of non-state justice: An effective mechanism for a stable Afghanistan, 5 November 2014, url; SinghD., The management of legal pluralism and human rights in decentralized Afghanistan, in: The Journal of Legal Pluralism andUnofficial Law, 3 September 2019, Vol. 51, Issue 3, pp. 350-380, Full article available under request at url
285 ALEP, Stanford Law School, An introduction to the Law of Afghanistan, 2017, url, p. 43
286 Rahbari S., From Normative Pluralism to a Unified Legal System in Afghanistan? Cambridge University Press, 2 October
2018, url; ALEP, Stanford Law School, An introduction to the Law of Afghanistan, 2017, url, p. 43
287 ALEP, Stanford Law School, Introduction to the Criminal Law of Afghanistan, 2012, url, p. 3
288 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2019 – Afghanistan, 11 March 2020, url, pp. 9-11
289 Asia Foundation (The), Afghanistan in 2019: A Survey of the Afghan People is The Asia Foundation’s fifteenth annual public
opinion survey in Afghanistan. The Asia Foundation describes the Survey as ‘the longest-running barometer of public opinion
in Afghanistan’. Since 2004, the Survey has gathered the views of more than 129,800 Afghans on topics such as security,elections, governance, the economy, essential services, corruption, youth issues, reconciliation with the Taliban, access tomedia, migration, the role of women, and political participation. For the purpose of the 2019 Survey, the Asia Foundation
conducted face-to-face interviews with a national sample of 17,812 Afghan respondents aged 18 years and above, across all
34 provinces from July 11 to 7 August 2019. For more information on the methodology used for the Survey, please see Asia
Foundation (The), Afghanistan in 2019: A Survey of the Afghan People, 2 December 2019, Appendix 1: Methodology, url, p.
257
290 Asia Foundation (The), Afghanistan in 2019: A Survey of the Afghan People, url, pp. 23, 144
291 Asia Foundation (The), Afghanistan in 2019: A Survey of the Afghan People, 2 December 2019, url, p. 23
292 Afghanistan, MoJ, Enforced Constitution of Afghanistan, 30 July 2004, url, Article 116
293 Afghanistan, MoJ, Enforced Constitution of Afghanistan, 30 July 2004, url, Article 120

40 —AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT

Experts on the Afghan Legal System, Omar Sial and Ahmadullah Masoud, explained in a paper updated
in 2018 that:‘Cases are resolved in courts taking into consideration the quality and nature of the case in
two stages: primary and appeal. The Supreme Court deals with the referred cases of Courts ofAppeal only in terms of accurate application of law (to see if any provision of law is breachedor accurately applied).
Cases in court are handled as follows:
At the primary stage, with participation of three judges, except less than three judges may
decide a case when they are not available.
At the appeal stage, three judges shall decide any case.
At the cessation stage, shall take place by two or more persons.
The courts are required to resolve cases in accordance with the Constitution and other laws of
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. If there is no clear legal provision for the case, the court
shall, in pursuance of the Hanafi jurisprudence, and, within the limits set by this Constitution,
rule in a way that attains justice in the best manner (Article 133, Afghan Constitution, 2004).
Trials in the Afghanistan courts happen in open procedure in which everybody may attend,
subject to law. The court may convene the trials in a close procedure only if they are legallyrequired or that it is deemed necessary. Making notice of the final decision shall always be
open to public (Article 128, Afghan Constitution, 2004).’294
The Huquq department attempts to resolve family issues through mediation. If this fails, the case will
be referred to court.295 According to the Asia Foundation 2019 survey, amongst those Afghans who
used ‘dispute resolution services’, 25.2 % of them used Huquq department.296
Other primary institutions of the justice sector are the Ministry of Justice, which drafts and reviews
proposed laws in line with the Constitution, and provides legal counsel; as well as the Attorney
General’s Office (AGO), which investigates and prosecutes crime, including corruption.297 The AGO has
offices in Kabul, in all 34 provinces, and in 365 prosecutorial districts.298

3.2 Capacity
In 2005, the US established the Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP), the largest rule-of-law
programme in Afghanistan to provide the Afghan judiciary with technical assistance including:‘Building the capacity of justice institutions to be professional, transparent, and accountable;(2) assisting the development of statutes that are clearly drafted, Constitutional, and the
product of effective, consultative drafting processes; and (3) supporting the CMS [CaseManagement System] so that Afghan justice institutions work in a harmonized and interlinked
manner and resolve cases in a transparent and legally sufficient manner’.299
294 Sial O., Masoud A., Update: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Legal System and Research, Hauser Global Law School Program,

New York University School of Law, last updated November/December 2018, url
295 APPRO, Afghanistan Rights Monitor: Baseline Report, April 2016 url, p. 52; Afghanistan, MoJ, General directorate of huqoq,
n.d., url
296 The Asia Foundation, A survey of the Afghan people, Afghanistan in 2019, 2 December 2019, url, p 23
297 SIGAR, Rule of Law in Afghanistan: US Agencies Lack a Strategy and Cannot Fully Determine the Effectiveness of Programs
Costing more than $1Billion, July 2015 url, p. 3
298 IDLO, Women’s Professional Participation in Afghanistan’s Justice Sector, 6 June 2014, url, p. 23
299 SIGAR, Afghanistan’s justice sector case management system: seized or forfeited assets were not tracked and nationwide
implementation is not complete, 13 January 2020, url, p. 1

AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 41

According to SIGAR, as of 31 March 2020, the JSSP contract currently in place began has an estimatedcost of USD 34 million, while the previous JSSP contract started in 2010 and costed USD 280 million.300
Ali Wardak, professor of Criminology at the University of South Wales, explained that, following thefall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the US spent more than a billion dollars to restore and reformthe judiciary. However, he noted, ‘the failure to engage with the Afghanistan’s own tradition ofrestorative justice and to understand its multiplicity of justice providers has undermined true reform.’
This failure resulted in deficiency in the capacity of the justice system ‘to address the complex needsof all Afghan people and allowed others, including the Taliban judiciary – who have a select and narrowinterpretation of Sharia – to step into the vacuum. This can lead to situations where people’s rights –especially women – are unprotected or infringed.’301
According to the Supreme Court of Afghanistan, there are appeal courts in each provincial capital andprimary courts in each provincial and district capital.302 UNAMA noted that, as of May 2019, in
Afghanistan, there were a total of 2 083 judges working across the country. Courts are functioning onlyin 232 districts out of the overall 378 Afghan districts. For 24 districts, the primary courts operate in
the neighbouring districts and 116 primary courts operate in the provincial capitals. In the remaining
146 districts there are no courts due to insecurity and logistical facilities.303
This information is confirmed in several media reports. For example, the Head of the Provincial Councilof Balkh declared in January 2019 that there were ‘no judges or prosecutors in a number of Balkh
districts’;304 a prominent tribal chief stated in 2020 that there were ‘no judges, prosecutors, district
chiefs in almost all of Uruzgan’;305 in Andar district, Ghazni province, there were only Taliban judges
and the prosecutors office was not functional;306 and according to Obaid Ali from AAN, in February
2019, the justice system in Kunduz province was paralysed and only operated remotely from Kunduzcity.307

3.3 Access and effectivenessBased on the 2004 Afghanistan Constitution, the judiciary is an independent body308, however, USDOS
observed that the judiciary in Afghanistan continued to be ‘underfunded, understaffed, inadequately
trained, largely ineffective, and subject to threats, bias, political influence, and pervasive
corruption’.309 Freedom House reported that ‘prosecutions and trials suffer from a number of
weaknesses, including lack of proper representation, excessive reliance on uncorroborated witness
testimony, lack of reliable forensic evidence, arbitrary decision-making, and failure to publish court
decisions.’310 In its report released in June 2020, the USDOS stated that Afghanistan was downgradedto Tier 3 since it does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and it isalso not making significant efforts to do so.311

300 SIGAR, Quarterly report to the United States Congress, 30 April 2020, url, p. 106
301 Wardak A., Afghanistan: how to widen access to justice, The Conversation, 15 July 2019, url
302 Afghanistan, The Supreme Court, History of Supreme Court, n.d., url
303 UNAMA, Afghanistan’s fight against corruption, ground work for peace and prosperity, 20 May 2019, url, p. 37; The Asia

Foundation, A survey of the Afghan people, Afghanistan in 2019, 2 December 2019, url, p. 147
304 Pajhwok, Key govt positions sold in Balkh, claims Hadid, 13 January 2019, url
305 Arab News, Afghans turn to Taliban in forgotten province, 9 February 2020, url
306 Muzhary, F. R., One Land, Two Rules (7): Delivering public services in insurgency-affected Andar district in Ghazni province,
AAN, 13 June 2019, url
307 Obaid A. One Land, Two Rules (3): Delivering public services in insurgency-affected Dasht-e Archi district in Kunduz
province, AAN, 26 February 2019, last updated 9 March 2020, url
308 Afghanistan, MoJ, Enforced Constitution of Afghanistan, 30 July 2004, url, Article 116309 USDOS, Afghanistan 2019 Human Rights report, 11 March 2020, url, p. 9
310 Freedom House, Freedom in the world 2020, Afghanistan, 6 March 2020, url
311 USDOS, Trafficking in Persons Report - Afghanistan, 25 June 2020, url, p. 64

42 —AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORTAs of May 2019, general insecurity, threats and targeted attacks, protection of judges, prosecutors,
judicial staff and premises across the country were the main challenges to provide justice services.
Between March 2018 and April 2019, five judges, seven prosecutors and nine judicial staff were killed
across the country. For instance, insecurity and direct threats to judges have dissuaded female judges
to work in remote areas.312 Judges and lawyers frequently receive threats and bribes from local leaders
or armed groups.313 Some reported cases of targeted attacks against judges in 2019 and 2020 include:
on 7 November 2019, the Taliban killed in an ambush four judges when they were traveling from Paktia
to Kabul, in Mohammad Agha District of Logar Province.314 Another source reported that three judges
were killed in the incident;315 on February 2020, Taliban militants were believed responsible forshooting to death of Abdul Rahim, a primary court judge in Herat’s Injil district in a recent trend oftargeted killings of judges by the group;316 Abdul Rahim, the only court judge in Injil District, was shotand killed by unknown gunmen on motorcycles while he was returning home from prayer;317 five
employees of a state-owned bank were abducted and shot by Taliban militants in Herat on 10 April
2020.318 (For more information on targeting attacks by AGEs against judges and other government
officials, see EASO COI report Afghanistan Anti-Government Elements (AGEs), August 2020).
Throughout 2019, traditional justice mechanisms remained the main recourse for many, especially inrural areas. In major cities, criminal cases were decided by state courts, most of which administeredjustice unevenly, adopting a mixture of codified law, sharia, and local customary norms. To resolve
civil cases, authorities frequently resorted to the informal system, the government mediation
mechanism through the Ministry of Justice Huquq (civil rights) office, or, in some cases, throughnegotiations between the parties facilitated by judicial personnel or private lawyers.319
In addition, in territories under their control, in 2020 the Taliban continued to operate a parallel judicial
system based on a strict interpretation of sharia.320 The Taliban courts have become significantly
widespread and they are also reported to reach far beyond Taliban-held areas.321 An increasing
number of Afghans across the country were reported to seek justice in Taliban courts due to feeling
frustrated322 with the state’s bureaucracy, corruption, and lengthy processing times.323 Various sources
reported that Taliban courts were a preferable alternative324, and that they were perceived asaccessible, fast, and less corrupt325 than the government-established courts.326

312 UNAMA, Afghanistan’s fight against corruption, ground work for peace and prosperity, 20 May 2019, url, pp. 36-37
313 Freedom House, Freedom in the world 2020, Afghanistan, 6 March 2020, url
314 Tolonews, Four judges killed in an ambush in Logar: Police, 7 November 2019, url
315 Reuters, Three judges killed at the Taliban checkpoint in Afghanistan, official say, 7 November 2019, url
316 Kazemi, R., Herat City’s Reported Spike in Insecurity: What a sober reading of events reveals, 21 April 2020, url; Xinhua,

Militants kill judge in E. Afghanistan, 18 February 2020, url; New York Times (The), Afghan War Casualty Report: February
2020, 27 February 2020, url
317 New York Times (The), Afghan War Casualty Report: February 2020, 27 February 2020, url
318 RFE/RL/Gandhara, Taliban Kills Five Bank Employees in Western Afghan Province, 10 April 2020, url
319 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2019 – Afghanistan, 11 March 2020, url, pp. 9-11
320 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2019 – Afghanistan, 11 March 2020, url, pp. 10-11; Bleuer C., Sadat S.
A., Ali O., One Land, Two Rules (8): Delivering public services in insurgency-affected insurgent-controlled Zurmat district, AAN,
4 September 2019, last updated 9 March 2020, url
321 Jackson, A., Weigand, F., Rebel rule of law - Taliban courts in the west and north-west of Afghanistan, ODI/HPG/NRC, May
2020, url, p. 1; Jackson, A., Amiri R., Insurgent Bureaucracy: How the Taliban Makes Policy, USIP, Peaceworks No. 153,
November 2019, url, p. 10; Baqakhil A. Q., Rahimi W., et al., Assessment Report- Health and Integrated Protection Needs in
Ghazni Province, Agency for Assistance and Development of Afghanistan (AADA); The Johanniter International Assistance,
December 2019, url, p. 53
322 Arab News, Afghans turn to Taliban in forgotten province, 9 February 2020, url
323 National (The), Afghans flock to Taliban courts seeking swift justice, 20 May 2019, url
324 Smith S.S., Service Delivery in Taliban Influenced Areas of Afghanistan, USIP, April 2020 url, p. 6
325 Semple, M., Afghanistan’s Islamic Emirate Returns: Life under a Resurgent Taliban, WPR, 18 September 2018, url; Jackson,
A., Weigand, F., Rebel rule of law - Taliban courts in the west and north-west of Afghanistan, ODI/HPG/NRC, May 2020, url,
p. 1; Obaid A. One Land, Two Rules (3): Delivering public services in insurgency-affected Dasht-e Archi district in Kunduz
province, AAN, 26 February 2019, last updated 9 March 2020, url
326 Jackson, A., Weigand, F., The Taliban’s war for legitimacy in Afghanistan, Current History 118 (807), 2019, url, p. 145

AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 43

Freedom House stated that ‘informal justice systems, employing variants of both customary law andSharia (Islamic law), are widely used to arbitrate disputes, especially in rural areas.’327 In May 2020, it
was reported that half of the 37 million Afghans sought informal justice and referred either to Taliban’s‘desert courts’ or jirgas (traditional conflict resolution meetings), in particular in rural areas. For
instance, in Herat Province, Gulran District, a victim of kidnapping had to seek Taliban’s justice torecover his money from the kidnappers and have them arrested after being allegedly refused by thecompetent ANSF authorities.328 Similarly, in Uruzgan Province, people reportedly used Taliban’s court
as a lack of state courts within the entire Uruzgan Districts.329 Transparency International also notedthat in rural areas of Afghanistan, people use customary justice to resolve community-based disputes
due to corruption within the state courts.330
Despite capacity, security and other issues (see sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4), courts in Afghanistan also
effectively delivered decisions and sentences in a variety of cases or crimes331 for, e.g.: clashing withor violence against ANSF;332 killings or murder;333 abduction;334 sexual crimes;335 robbery;336 drug tradeor smuggling;337 blowing up pylons;338 election fraud;339 and misuse of authority.340
The above-mentioned cases included sentences issued by the following courts: Kabul primary andappeal courts;341 Nimroz appeal court;342 Herat court;343 Kandahar court;344 Gardez appeal court(Paktya);345 Nangarhar appeal court;346 Mazar-e Sharif appeal court (Balkh);347 Maimana primary court

327 Freedom House, Freedom in the world 2020, Afghanistan, 6 March 2020, url
328 The National, Afghans flock to Taliban courts seeking swift justice, 20 May 2019, url
329 Arabnews, Afghans turn to Taliban in forgotten province, 24 April 2020, url
330 Transparency International, Anti-Corruption Resource Center, Corruption in Afghanistan and the role of development

assistance, 29 April 2019, url, pp. 6-8; AI, Afghanistan 2019, 30 January 2020, url
331 Pajhwok, Nangarhar appellant court, 16 May 2019, url
332 Pajhwok, Ex-defence minister’s son sentenced to 22 years in jail, 3 February 2020, url;
333 Pajhwok, 3 child killers sentenced to death by appellant court, 19 January 2020, url; Pajhwok, Nimroz court sentences 2
security men to death, 19 March 2020, url; Pajhwok, court session, 8 March 2020, url; Pajhwok, AGO says Arghand’s killers
sentenced to death, 16 April 2019, url; Pajhwok, Balkh applellate court, 25 June 2019, url; Pajhwok, Baghlan Appellant court,
27 August 2019, url; Pajhwok, Policeman gets 25 years in jail over killing 2 colleagues, 12 December 2019, url; Pajhwok, Sari-Pul death row prisoner seeks right to re-appeal, 23 December 2019, url
334 Pajhwok, Herat court punishes 9 kidnappers: AGO, 14 February 2020, url; Pajhwok, Woman among 3 jailed for up-to 18
years in Balkh, 28 December 2019, url
335 Pajhwok, Woman among 3 jailed for up-to 18 years in Balkh, 28 December 2019, url
336 Pajhwok, 3 men sentenced in bank vehicle robbery case, 10 March 2019, url; Pajhwok, Balkh applellate court, 25 June
2019, url
337 Pajhwok, Prison official sentenced to 20 years in jail on drug charges, 28 January 2020, url; Pajhwok, Notorious drug
smuggler, 3 cops sentenced, 17 November 2019, url; Pajhwok, 30 drug smugglers sentenced up to 16 years in jail, 18 June
2019, url
338 Pajhwok, Mamati sentenced to 16-year in jail over blowing up pylons, 28 April 2020, url
339 Pajhwok, Several ex-election commissioners jailed for 2.5 years each, 15 January 2020, url; Pajhwok, 3 IEC workers
sentenced to jail in Paktia trial, 24 April 2019, url
340 Pajhwok, Kohistan education observer gets 18 months in jail, 26 November 2019, url
341 Pajhwok, Ex-defence minister’s son sentenced to 22 years in jail, 3 February 2020, url; Pajhwok, 3 child killers sentenced
to death by appellant court, 19 January 2020, url; Pajhwok, Prison official sentenced to 20 years in jail on drug charges, 28
January 2020, url; Pajhwok, Mamati sentenced to 16-year in jail over blowing up pylons, 28 April 2020, url; Pajhwok, Several
ex-election commissioners jailed for 2.5 years each, 15 January 2020, url; Pajhwok, AGO says Arghand’s killers sentenced todeath, 16 April 2019, url; Pajhwok, Notorious drug smuggler, 3 cops sentenced, 17 November 2019, url; Pajhwok, 30 drug
smugglers sentenced up to 16 years in jail, 18 June 2019, url
342 Pajhwok, Nimroz court sentences 2 security men to death, 19 March 2020, url
343 Pajhwok, Herat court punishes 9 kidnappers: AGO, 14 February 2020, url; Pajhwok, 3 men sentenced in bank vehicle
robbery case, 10 March 2019, url
344 Pajhwok, court session, 8 March 2020, url
345 Pajhwok, 3 IEC workers sentenced to jail in Paktia trial, 24 April 2019, url
346 Pajhwok, Nangarhar appellant court, 16 May 2019, url
347 Pajhwok, Balkh applellate court, 25 June 2019, url; Pajhwok, Woman among 3 jailed for up-to 18 years in Balkh, 28
December 2019, url44 —AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT(Faryab);348 Tirinkot primary court (Uruzgan);349 Sar-e Pul primary and appeal court;350 and Pul-e
Khumri appeal court (Baghlan).351
On 5 March 2020, the International Criminal Court (ICC) authorised the Prosecutor to start aninvestigation for crimes against humanity and war crimes allegedly committed in Afghanistan during
the ongoing conflict, since 2003, by the Taliban, ANSF and US forces.352

3.3.1 Women
Due to corruption and limited capacity in the justice system, citizens have restrictive access to reportcases of human rights abuses. Some female victims were demanded for sexual favours by thegovernment officials in exchange of service, when they tried to report their cases to the government
institutions. Additionally, the justice system did not sufficiently address domestic violence partly due
to corruption. Female victims of domestic violence and sexual abuse did not seek legal assistanceeither due to lack of awareness about their rights or due to the fear of being returned to their families
or perpetrators.353
Delbar Nazari, the Afghan Minister for Women Affairs, stated:‘The prevailing war in the country, the lack of rule of law, and our inability to preventstrongmen from interfering in criminal cases are some of the contributing factor to the highlevels of violence against women, the lack of women’s access to justice, particularly in theregions controlled by the insurgents, and the injustice meted to them by irregular courts [andjirgas] also contributes to the violence against women.’354
In 2019, ‘UNAMA documented four cases of human rights violations in which the Taliban exacted
punishments against women according to their own justice system for committing adultery or having
an “immoral relationship”. In three of these cases the women were lashed and, in one case, the woman
was executed, accused of eloping.’ The same source also indicated that from 1 January to
31 December 2019, 345 women were killed and 857 others were injured by different actors in theconflict, marking a 4 % increase compared the same period in 2018.355 According to Amnesty
International, women and girls continue to suffer from gender-based violence across Afghanistan
particularly in the areas under Taliban control, where women and girls are stoned to death or shotdead. Additionally, there has been a significant number of unreported cases of violent incidents against
women, and the few reported ones were not investigated, or women had to withdraw their complaints
due to pressure. Often mediation was used instead of a legal framework to resolve the complaints.
Offenders of attacks against women including ‘beatings and killings, torture or other ill-treatment,
corporal punishments against women for having sex outside marriage, continued to enjoy impunity’.
The source also stated that the government is failing to establish Elimination of Violence Against
Women courts and prosecution units in all 34 provinces.356

348 Pajhwok, Kohistan education observer gets 18 months in jail, 26 November 2019, url
349 Pajhwok, Policeman gets 25 years in jail over killing 2 colleagues, 12 December 2019, url
350 Pajhwok, Sar-i-Pul death row prisoner seeks right to re-appeal, 23 December 2019, url
351 Pajhwok, Baghlan Appellant court, 27 August 2019, url
352 ICC, The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, requests judicial authorisation to commence aninvestigation into the situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 20 November 2017, url; ICC, Situation in the Islamic
Republic of Afghanistan, 5 March 2020, url
353 USDOS, Afghanistan 2019 Human Rights report, 11 March 2020, url, pp. 12 and 32
354 RFERL, Afghanistan: Nearly 6,500 Incidents Of violence against women recorded in past year, 25 November 2019, url
355 UNAMA, Afghanistan protection of civilians in armed conflict 2019, 22 February 2020, url, pp. 18 and 19
356 AI, Human Rights in Asia-Pacific: review of 2019, 29 January 2020, url, p. 8

AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 45

3.4 Integrity
There is widespread corruption across the justice system in Afghanistan.357 According to a survey
conducted by the Asia Foundation in 2019, 45.2 % of respondents indicated that they haveencountered corruption within the judiciary/courts.358 According to Transparency International, thejudiciary in Afghanistan is perceived to be the most corrupt institution.359
According to USDOS, in 2019, there were multiple reports that prisoners were not released although
they had served their sentences unless the judges received payment from family members. Prisoners
and NGOs reported that judges receive bribes to arrange the release of prisoners prosecuted for
criminal cases. In addition, officials reportedly received unlawful payments in order to reduce prison
sentences, to halt investigations, or outright dismissing charges.360

3.5 Military justiceThe 2004 Constitution removes the military courts from the Afghan civil judicial system,361 stating that
‘The organization and authority of these courts shall be regulated by law.362 The ANA military justicecodes are not contained in one document but in several codes, which include Afghan National Army
Law of Military Courts, Military Criminal Procedure Code and Military Crimes Code.363 The MilitaryAppeal Court considers cases which were first adjudicated by primary military courts, and it iscomprised of two divisions: the division for the crimes of officers, sergeants and saatenmans (‘noncommissioned police officer'364); and the division for the crimes of soldiers.365
A 2010 papers by the National Defence University (NDU) of Washington DC reported that military
judicial system in Afghanistan comprised of ‘functioning courts, judges, prosecutors, defense counsel,
and appellate review’. According to this source:‘The ANA military justice system has many of the advantages that the civilian justice system
lacks—chiefly, the leadership and strategic planning support provided by the Combined
Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC–A). In addition to the ANA prosecutors,
defense attorneys, and judges who exist in every ANA corps headquarters compound,courthouses built on secure ANA installations provide justice officials with a level of protection
from attack that is lacking in most civilian courts. This security allows prosecutors and military
judges to function with less concern for acts of retribution. Most important, the military legal
system benefits from focused, well-resourced international advisors under an organized andunified command and control scheme. […] In addition to the Afghan army courts, othersaligned with the security sector are more or less functioning under a heavy cloak of

357 USDOS, Afghanistan 2019 Human Rights report, 11 March 2020, url, p. 28; Freedom House, Freedom in the world 2020,

Afghanistan, 6 March 2020, url
358 The Asia Foundation, A survey of the Afghan people, Afghanistan in 2019, 2 December 2019, url, p. 22
359 Transparency International, Anti-Corruption Resource Center, Corruption in Afghanistan and the role of development
assistance, 29 April 2019, url, pp. 6-8
360 USDOS, Afghanistan 2019 Human Rights report, 11 March 2020, url, p. 28; Tolonews, Prison situation “terrible”: MP report,
22 April 2020, url
361 Bogar T. J., Rule of Law Operations in the Combat Environment: A Judge Advocate's Perspective as a Legal Mentor, in
Brooklyn Journal of International Law, Vol. 38 Issue 1, 2012, url, p. 247
362 Afghanistan, MoJ, Enforced Constitution of Afghanistan, 30 July 2004, url, Article 122
363 Bogar T. J., Rule of Law Operations in the Combat Environment: A Judge Advocate's Perspective as a Legal Mentor, in
Brooklyn Journal of International Law, Vol. 38 Issue 1, 2012, url, p. 247
364 Afghanistan, MoJ, Police Law, 22 September 2005, url, Art. 2
365 Sial O., Masoud A., Update: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Legal System and Research, Hauser Global Law School Program,
New York University School of Law, last updated November/December 2018, url

46 —AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT

mentorship. They include courts such as the Counter Narcotics Court and the Anti-Corruption
Tribunal.’366
In March 2019, Haseebullah Qureshi, a former Public Order Police commander, was sentence by aprimary military court to 10 years’ imprisonment and fined with 8.6 million afghanis over corruption
charges.367 On 5 January 2020, two ANP officers involved in the shooting and killing of a truck driver
who had refused to pay bribes (see 2.1.2 Afghan National Police) in Qalat district of Zabul province,
were sentenced to 25 years imprisonment by the primary military court of Zabul province.368

3.6 Prison conditions
The Afghanistan Law on prisons and detention centres provides safeguards for the rights of prisoners
and detainees.369 Based on Article 2(1) of the Afghan law on prisons and detention centres, ‘thefreedom of an accused in a detention center can only be taken away in accordance with the concerned
attorney’s arrest warrant and the court order in conformity with the provisions of the law.’370
Prisons and detention centres fall under the authority of the MoI, MoD, MoJ, and NDS, and according
to a new presidential decree, the mentioned authority will be transferred to an independent civilian
institution.371
According to AIHRC, in Afghanistan in 1398 (2019), the number of individuals imprisoned and detained
increased by 9.23 % compared to 1397 (2018). The new figures indicated that there were 37 529
individuals imprisoned and detained. It included 28 885 imprisoned (28 310 men and 575 women) anda total of 8 644 individuals detained (including 8 456 men and 188 women).372 While another source
believes that the total number of prisoners and detainees across Afghanistan is 40 000.373 The Afghan
government reportedly held 10 000 Taliban prisoners374, amongst whom 300 were released between
8 and 12 April 2020.375
AIHRC reported on a confrontation between detainees and guards in Parwan prison on 28 March 2020,
which caused two deaths and 60 injured amongst the prisoners and 12 injured amongst the guards.376
On 28 March 2020, the Taliban published a statement indicating two alleged attacks by the guards
against the prisoners in Bagram prison.377 The group previously published another statement accusing
the Afghan soldiers of using corporal punishment against the prisoners in Bagram prison. The groupposted alleged photos of the victims.378 However, no other sources could be found to corroborate suchclaims.

366 Hagerott, Mark R., et al., A Patchwork Strategy of Consensus: Establishing Rule of Law in Afghanistan, NDU, Washington

DC, 2010, url, p. 143
367 Pajhwok, Ex-police commander gets 10 years in jail for graft, 17 March 2019, url
368 UNAMA, Protection of civilians in armed conflict, 2019, 22 February 2020, url, pp. 67, 117
369 AIHRC,‫قوانی‬‫ی‬‫مجموعه‬، ‫[ قانون محابس و توقیف خانه ها‬informal translation: ‘Compilation of laws, law on prisons and detention
centres’], 9 March 2020, url, pp. 110-129; UNODC, Unofficial translation, Law on prisons and detention centres, n.d., url
370 AIHRC,‫قوانی‬‫ی‬‫مجموعه‬، ‫[ قانون محابس و توقیف خانه ها‬informal translation: ‘Compilation of laws, law on prisons and detention
centres’], 9 March 2020, url, pp. 110-129; UNODC, Unofficial translation, Law on prisons and detention centres, n.d., url, p. 1
371 BBC, ‫[ مدیریت تمام زندانهای افغانستان به یک اداره مستقل غینظایم سیده یمشود‬informal translation: ‘administration of all prisons in‫ر‬Afghanistan will be transferred to an independent non-military institution’], 24 January 2020, url
372 AIHRC, Summary report on human rights situation in detention centres, 2018 – 2019, 24 March 2020, url
373 Khaama Press, Corona virus threatening 40,000 prisoners in Afghanistan, warns Taliban, 16 March 2020, url
374 RFERL, Stumbling block or bargaining chip? The faith of 5,000 prisoners in Afghanistan, 27 February 2020, url
375 RFERL, Afghan Government releases 100 more Taliban prisoners, 12 April 2020, url
376 AIHRC, Statement on Parwan detention facility, 3 April 2020, url
377 Voice of Jihad, Statement by prisoners commission affair regarding brutal treatment of inmates in Bagram, 28 March 2020,
url
378 Voice of Jihad, ‫[ په بګرام گ د بندیانو په وړاندې د تاوتریخوایل په اړه د اسالیم امارت د بندیانو چارو کمیسیون اعالمیه‬informal translation: ‘Islamic
‫ي‬
‫ي‬
‫ې‬
Emirate’s prisoners commission’s statement on violence against prisoners in Bagram’], 3 February 2020, url

AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 47

In March 2020, Human Rights Watch indicated that many people were imprisoned by the Afghan
Government based on terrorism laws, and individuals were detained with no definite detention period.
The detainees included fighters (captured during the battle), alleged recruiters of suicide bombers,
arbitrarily arrested individuals during night raids, and others allegedly having links with the Taliban.
Detainees have been reportedly tortured to confess.379 In a separate report, UNAMA stated that 36
juveniles out of 82 held in ANDSF custody reported on torture or ill-treatment practices they sufferedin custody.380 The source also reported on the ‘poor’ living conditions in the Parwan Detention Facility,
which is run by ANA.381
Another source stated that in April 2020, three Afghan parliamentarians conducted a visit to Pul-e
Charkhi prison in Kabul and found the prisons in a ‘terrible’ condition, where drug trafficking was alsopresent. The conditions of the prison primarily affected women and children prisoners.382 In April 2020,
local media website Etilaatroz reported that female personnel within the Afghan prisons are victim ofsexual harassment by male personnel.383

379 HRW, Afghanistan’s prisoner’s dilemma, 20 March 2020, url
380 UNAMA, Treatment of conflict related detainees in Afghanistan: preventing torture and ill-treatment under the Anti-

Torture Law, 17 April 2019, url, p. 20
381 UNAMA, Treatment of conflict related detainees in Afghanistan: preventing torture and ill-treatment under the AntiTorture Law, 17 April 2019, url, p. iv
382 Tolonews, Prison situation “terrible” : MP report, 22 April 2020, url
383 Etilaatroz, ‫[ کارمندان زن در زندانهای افغانستان از سوی کارمندان مرد مورد آزار جنیس قرار یمگین‬informal translation: ‘Female prison
personnel suffer from sexual harassment by male personnel in Afghanistan’s prisons’], 21 April 2020, url

48 —AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT

Annex I: Bibliography
Public sources
1TV news, Over 16,000 complaints lodged following Afghan preliminary election results, 26
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accountability programme to the Nation], 2 August 2019,

AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 49

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54 —

AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT

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AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 55

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AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 57

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Voice of Jihad, ‫ تنه کلیوال له وهلو ډبولو وروسته بندیان کړي‬۸ ‫ګوډاګ اربکیانو‬‫ سنګ آتش ېگ‬:‫[ بادغیس‬informal‫ي‬translation: ‘Badghis: Local police detained 8 villagers after beating them’], 20 April 2020,
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Voice of Jihad, ‫اسالیم امارت د بندیانو چارو کمیسیون اعالمیه‬‫تاوتریخوایل په اړه د‬‫په بګرام ېگ د بندیانو په وړاندې د‬‫ي‬‫ي‬[informal translation: ‘Islamic Emirate’s prisoners commission’s statement on violence against
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AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 63

Annex II: Terms of Reference
1.

State structure and governance






2.

Executive branch
Legislative branch
Judicial branchElections and political developments following the result
Corruption: anti-corruption efforts and mechanisms; reporting corruption and misconduct byofficials and police

Security institutions






Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)
Afghan National Army (ANA): mandate and structure, capacity and effectiveness; integrity,
violations (including torture and illegal detention; extrajudicial killings; practices of corporaland capital punishment)
Afghan National Police (ANP): mandate and structure, capacity and effectiveness; integrity,
violations (including torture and illegal detention; extrajudicial killings; practices of corporaland capital punishment)
National Directorate of Security (NDS): mandate and structure, capacity and effectiveness;
integrity, violations (including torture and illegal detention; extrajudicial killings; practices ofcorporal and capital punishment)
Afghan Local Police (ALP): mandate and structure, capacity and effectiveness; integrity,
violations (including torture and illegal detention; extrajudicial killings; practices of corporaland capital punishment)

3. State judiciary: general overview on structure, capacity, access and effectiveness, integrity, prison
conditions, including information on access to justice for women and LGTBI

AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 5

doi: 10.2847/115002