European Asylum Support Office

EASO
Country of Origin
Information Report
Iraq
Targeting of Individuals

March 2019SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION

European Asylum Support Office

EASO
Country of Origin
Information Report
Iraq
Targeting ofIndividuals

March 2019

More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu).
ISBN 978-92-9476-053-1
doi: 10.2847/98611© European Asylum Support Office 2019
Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged, unless otherwise stated.
For third-party materials reproduced in this publication, reference is made to the copyrightstatements of the respective third parties.
Cover photo: © Joel Carillet, An Iraqi flag flies from the top of the heavily damaged Church of
St. Ephraim, a Syriac Orthodox church, in Mosul, Iraq, in the months after this part of Mosul
was taken from ISIS. The ISIS emblem was painted on the front of the building during the ISIS
occupation of Mosul.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS—3

Acknowledgements
This report was drafted by experts from the Belgian Office of the Commissioner General for
Refugees and Stateless persons, in the Documentation and Research Centre (CEDOCA).
Furthermore, the following national asylum and migration departments have contributed byreviewing this report together with EASO:The Netherlands, Office for Country Information and Language Analysis, Ministry ofJusticeDenmark, Danish Immigration Service
The review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts or organisations contributes
to the overall quality of the report, but does not necessarily imply their formal endorsementof the final report, which is the full responsibility of EASO.

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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

Contents
Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................................3
Contents .....................................................................................................................................4
Disclaimer ...................................................................................................................................8
Glossary and abbreviations ........................................................................................................9Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 11
Methodology ....................................................................................................................... 11
Structure and use of the report .......................................................................................... 12
Map.......................................................................................................................................... 13
Context .................................................................................................................................... 14
1. Targeting by state actors and affiliated armed groups ....................................................... 16
1.1 State actors and affiliated armed groups ...................................................................... 16
1.1.1 The Iraqi Security Forces ........................................................................................ 16
1.1.2 Popular Mobilization Units .................................................................................... 17
1.1.3 Kurdish Regional Government forces .................................................................... 22
1.2 Sunni perceived to be ISIL collaborators or sympathisers ............................................ 23
1.2.1 Prosecution of ISIL suspects................................................................................... 23
1.2.2 Retaliatory violence ............................................................................................... 26
1.2.3 Targeting by KRG Forces ........................................................................................ 34
1.3 Internally displaced persons ......................................................................................... 38
1.3.1 Denial of return...................................................................................................... 39
1.3.2 Eviction and forced return ..................................................................................... 40
1.3.3 Retaliatory violence ............................................................................................... 43
1.3.4 Targeting by KRG Forces ........................................................................................ 46
1.3.5 Kurds in Kirkuk after ISF take-over in October 2017 ............................................. 52
1.4 Family members of actual or perceived ISIL members, affiliates and supporters ........ 52
1.5 Members of tribes with (perceived) affiliation with ISIL .............................................. 57
1.6 Recruitment by PMUs and affiliated armed groups ..................................................... 59
1.6.1 Forced recruitment ................................................................................................ 61
1.7 Former Baath Party members ....................................................................................... 62
1.7.1 ISIL and former Baath Party members................................................................... 63
1.7.2 De-Baathification ................................................................................................... 65
1.8 Desertion ....................................................................................................................... 66

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS—5

1.8.1 Army desertion ...................................................................................................... 66
1.8.2 Absentee Internal Security Forces personnel ........................................................ 70
1.8.3 Desertion from Peshmerga forces ......................................................................... 72
1.9 (Perceived) collaborators of Western organisations/armed forces.............................. 73
1.10 Political opposition activists / protesters .................................................................... 74
1.10.1 Iraq ....................................................................................................................... 74
1.10.2 Kurdistan Region of Iraq ...................................................................................... 76
1.11 Human rights activists ................................................................................................. 78
1.11.1 Iraq ....................................................................................................................... 78
1.11.2 Kurdistan Region of Iraq ...................................................................................... 79
1.12 Journalists.................................................................................................................... 80
1.12.1 Iraq ....................................................................................................................... 80
1.12.2 Kurdistan Region of Iraq ...................................................................................... 82
1.13 Christians ..................................................................................................................... 84
1.14 Alcohol vendors........................................................................................................... 85
1.15 People with Sunni names ............................................................................................ 87
1.16 Humanitarian / medical workers ................................................................................ 88
1.17 Death penalty .............................................................................................................. 89
1.17.1 Iraq ....................................................................................................................... 89
1.17.2 Kurdistan Region of Iraq ...................................................................................... 90
1.18 Treatment of detainees............................................................................................... 91
1.18.1 Iraq ....................................................................................................................... 91
1.18.2 Kurdistan Region of Iraq ...................................................................................... 93
2. Targeting by ISIL .................................................................................................................. 95
2.1 Background, structure, modus operandi ...................................................................... 95
2.2 Targeting ethno-religious identity groups................................................................... 100
2.2.1 Targeting of Shi’a Muslims................................................................................... 100
2.2.2 Targeting of Sunni Muslims ................................................................................. 109
2.2.3 Targeting of Christians ......................................................................................... 111
2.2.4 Targeting of Yazidis .............................................................................................. 113
2.2.5 Targeting of Kaka’i ............................................................................................... 117
2.2.6 Targeting of Kurds................................................................................................ 118
2.3 Targeting of individuals perceived to oppose ISIL....................................................... 118
2.3.1 (Former) members of the Iraqi security forces, PMU, and Peshmerga............... 119
2.3.2 (Former) members of the local police forces and (former) members of the Sahwa
forces ............................................................................................................................ 121

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2.3.3 Tribal leaders known to support the government, or who supported thegovernment against AQ-I in the past ............................................................................ 123
2.3.4 Local and national politicians, candidates in local or regional elections, council
members who opposed to ISIL or AQ-I ......................................................................... 124
2.3.5 Other profiles targeted by ISIL ............................................................................. 125
3. Targeting by society........................................................................................................... 127
3.1 Key actors .................................................................................................................... 127
3.1.1 Society, family/community and tribes................................................................. 127
3.1.2 Criminals, traffickers, and unknown perpetrators .............................................. 128
3.2 Treatment of people perceived to transgress Islam ................................................... 130
3.2.1 Atheists ................................................................................................................ 130
3.2.2 Apostasy............................................................................................................... 132
3.3 Sexual orientation or gender identity ......................................................................... 133
3.4 Religious and ethnic minorities ................................................................................... 135
3.4.1 Turkmen ............................................................................................................... 138
3.4.2 Black Iraqis ........................................................................................................... 139
3.4.3 Yazidi .................................................................................................................... 140
3.4.4 Christians ............................................................................................................. 141
3.4.5 Assyrians .............................................................................................................. 143
3.4.6 Shabaks ................................................................................................................ 144
3.4.7 Kaka’i.................................................................................................................... 145
3.4.8 Sabean-Mandeans ............................................................................................... 145
3.4.9 Baha’i ................................................................................................................... 147
3.4.10 Zoroastrians ....................................................................................................... 148
3.4.11 Bidoon ................................................................................................................ 149
3.4.12 Fayli Kurds .......................................................................................................... 150
3.4.13 Roma .................................................................................................................. 151
3.4.14 Jews.................................................................................................................... 152
3.4.15 Palestinians ........................................................................................................ 153
3.5 Gender-based targeting .............................................................................................. 155
3.5.1 Domestic violence................................................................................................ 157
3.5.2 Forced and early marriage ................................................................................... 159
3.5.3 Honour-based violence ........................................................................................ 160
3.5.4 Female genital mutilation .................................................................................... 163
3.5.5 Single, divorced or widowed women .................................................................. 164
3.5.6 Sexual violence .................................................................................................... 166

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3.5.7 Women in public roles ......................................................................................... 167
3.5.8 Women’s shelters ................................................................................................ 168
3.6 Tribal conflict ............................................................................................................... 168
3.6.1 Blood feud............................................................................................................ 170
3.6.2 People transgressing tribal norms ....................................................................... 172
3.7 People with disabilities ............................................................................................... 173
3.7.1 Discrimination of people with disabilities ........................................................... 173
3.7.2 Health care for people with disabilities ............................................................... 174
3.7.3 Violence against persons with disabilities ........................................................... 176
3.8 Children ....................................................................................................................... 176
3.8.1 Child recruitment ................................................................................................. 177
3.8.2 Child labour .......................................................................................................... 179
3.8.3 Child marriage...................................................................................................... 179
3.8.4 Violence against children ..................................................................................... 179
3.8.5 Sexual exploitation of children ............................................................................ 180
3.8.6 Child education .................................................................................................... 181
3.8.7 Orphans ............................................................................................................... 182
3.9 People perceived as wealthy....................................................................................... 183
3.10 Inter-sect marriage between Sunni and Shia ............................................................ 184
3.11 Mixed Arab-Kurdish couples ..................................................................................... 186
3.12 People displaying westernised behaviour................................................................. 186
Annex I: Popular Mobilization Units – main militias and associated groups ........................ 189
Badr Organization ............................................................................................................. 189
Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) – The League of the Righteous .................................................... 190
Kataib Hezbollah (KH)........................................................................................................ 191
Saraya al-Salam (Peace Brigades) of Muqtada al Sadr...................................................... 192
Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) .............................................................................. 193
Tribal Mobilization Units or Hashd al Ashairi .................................................................... 194
Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba ............................................................................................ 195
Minority armed groups linked to PMUs............................................................................ 196
Annex II: Bibliography............................................................................................................ 198
Annex III: Terms of Reference ............................................................................................... 242

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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

Disclaimer
This report was written according to the EASO COI Report Methodology (2012).1 The report isbased on carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced.
The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed withutmost care. However, this document does not claim to be exhaustive. If a particular event,person or organisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has
not taken place or that the person or organisation does not exist.
Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particular
claim to refugee status or asylum. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative of aparticular legal position.
‘Refugee’, ‘risk’ and similar terminology are used as a generic terminology and not as legallydefined in the EU Asylum Acquis and the Geneva Convention.
Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which
may be made of the information contained in this report.
The drafting of this report was finalised in December 2018. Any event taking place after thisis not included in this report. More information on the reference period for this report can befound in the methodology section of the Introduction.

1 The EASO methodology is largely based on the Common EU Guidelines for processing Country of Origin

Information (COI), 2008, and can be downloaded from the EASO website: http://www.easo.europa.eu.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS—9Glossary and abbreviations
AAH

Asaib Ahl al‐Haq (The League of the Righteous)

Al-hashd al-Ashari

Sunni tribal militia units composed mainly of Sunni tribes; someaffiliated with the Popular Mobilization Units

Al-hashd al Shaabi

Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) or Popular Mobilization Forces
(PMF)

AQI

Al Qaeda in Iraq

AsayishIntelligence services of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

AI

Amnesty International

Badr Organization

Iranian-backed Shia militia that is part of the Popular Mobilization
Units.

Daesh

See ISIL

DFAT

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Australian
government

DIS

Danish Immigration Service

fasliya

A traditional practice whereby family members, including womenand children, are traded to settle tribal disputes.

fasl/Fasil

Often referred to as ‘blood money’ in English. In Iraq the Qur’anicterm diya is also used. It concerns the payment of financial
compensation to the injured party in order to resolve tribal
conflict.

FFM

Fact Finding Mission

FGM

Female Genital Mutilation

HRW

Human Rights Watch

IED

Improvised Explosive Device

IS

Islamic State. See ISIL

ISF

Iraqi Security Forces

ISI

Islamic State of Iraq. See ISILISIL

The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (the Levant).

ISIS

See ISIL

ISW

Institute for the Study of War

10 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALSIDPInternally Displaced Person

jizya

A tax to be paid by Abrahamic non-Muslims such as Christians andJews. Imposed by ISIL in areas it controlled.

KH

Kataib Hezbollah. Iranian-backed Shia militia that is part of the
Popular Mobilization Units.

KDP

Kurdistan Democratic Party

KRG

Kurdistan Regional Government

KRI

Kurdistan Region of Iraq – refers to Dohuk, Erbil, Sulaymaniyah
governorates

KSF

Kurdish Security Forces

MoI

Ministry of Interior

mukhtarLocal community leader

OSAC

Overseas Security Advisory Council

OHCHR

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

Peshmerga

Military forces of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq

PKK

Kurdistan Workers’ Party

PMF

Popular Mobilization Forces

PMU

Popular Mobilization Units

PUK

Patriotic Union of Kurdistan

Saraya al-Salam

Also known as the Peace Brigades. Shia militia linked to clericMuqtada al-Sadr.

takfir

An Arabic word meaning ‘unbeliever’; Extremist Islamist ideology
employed by ISIL to declare individuals as apostates or impure;used against those who do not pledge allegiance.

UNAMI

United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq

UNOCHA

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs

UNHCR

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

USAID

United States Agency for International Development

USDOS

United States Department of State

VBIED

Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device

WilayatTerm for ‘province’ used by ISILEASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 11Introduction
This report was drafted by Country of Origin Information (COI) specialists from Cedoca, theBelgian COI unit, as referred to in the Acknowledgments section. This report addresses topics
related to the individual targeting of individuals by armed actors and sectors of society. It is
written in conjunction with additional reports on Iraq on the topics of: Actors of Protection,
Key socio-economic indicators (Baghdad, Basrah, Erbil), Internal mobility, and Security
situation.
This report on targeting should be read in conjunction with the 2018 report titled EASO COI
Report – Iraq: Actors of Protection. The Actors of Protection report discusses inter alia theconfiguration, functioning and protection capabilities of government actors and affiliatedarmed groups. That report also describes the mandate/structure, capacity and integrity issuesof the Iraqi Security Forces (army/police), Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), Kurdistan
Regional Government forces (Peshmerga/Asayish), and the judiciary.

Methodology
Defining the terms of reference

The report aims to provide relevant information for the assessment of international
protection status determination (refugee status and subsidiary protection).
The terms of reference of this report were defined by EASO based on discussions held andinput received from COI experts and policy experts from EU+ countries2 within the frameworkof a Country Guidance Network exercise to develop a Country Guidance Note on Iraq on theapplication of Refugee Status and Subsidiary Protection, Article 15(a) and (b) of the
Qualification Directive. Terms of Reference for this report can be found in Annex III.
As a general indication, the time frame for the report was intended to provide an overview ofthe main issues giving context to the Iraqi situation since the ISIL crisis of 2014-2017. The
report focuses on recent trends, whilst also taking into account targeting taking place after
ISIL’s capture of Mosul and subsequent territorial conquests from June 2014 to 2017, with
updated information on 2018 where available. Where current information was lacking,relevant information on preceding targeting of individuals was included.
Collecting information

The information is a result of desk research of public, specialised paper-based and electronicsources until 30 November 2018. Additional research was carried out during the review andfinalisation phases through December 2018.


Quality control

To verify whether the writers respected the EASO COI Report Methodology, a peer review was
carried out by COI specialists from the departments listed as reviewers in the
Acknowledgements section. All comments made by the reviewers were taken into
consideration and most of them were implemented in the final draft of this report.

2 All EU Member States plus Norway and Switzerland

12 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALSStructure and use of the report
The report is organised in three chapters. In each chapter, the actor of targeting is presented,
followed by the profiles targeted. The first chapter covers targeting by state armed actors andaffiliated armed groups, including Iraqi and Kurdish state forces. Recalling that the main statearmed groups and security actors are already described in EASO COI Report – Iraq: Actors ofProtection, this targeting report includes greater detail on the structure/nature of Popular
Mobilization Units (PMU), given the complexity and importance of this actor in the Iraqi
context. Annex I provided in this report gives more detail about numerous different PMU
formations.
The second chapter focuses on ISIL and targeting perpetrated by this armed group. Its
introduction describes the origins and the functioning of ISIL and main profiles targeted bythis group.
The last chapter deals with society-based targeting often perpetrated by family/community,
tribal, criminal actors, often for a mixture of motives linked to issues such as transgression ofnorms, gender, criminal aims, or on the basis of particular identities.
It is important to note that a conceptual choice was made by the drafters to organise thecontent of different profiles under various targeting actors, however, this should not be taken
to discount the possibility that profiles may be targeted by multiple agents. Additionally,
reporting from Iraq does not always provide clear indications of perpetrators responsible;
sometimes violations are not reported and sometimes they are not clearly attributed to one
or another perpetrator. Furthermore, the reason for a person being targeted is not always
clear-cut and some profiles may be targeted by multiple actors for a range of motivations. Thisis particularly challenging given the Iraqi context, where diverse and overlapping identities
permeate society and institutions across a range of lines, such as tribal, religious/ethnoreligious, political, sometimes making distinct motivations and actors in targeting difficult todiscern in the sources. It was therefore challenging to arrange the content to reflect thesecomplexities.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

Map

Map: UN, Iraq 3

3 UN, Map No 3835 Rev. 6, July 2014, url.

— 13

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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

Context
In 2014, the Salafi jihadist group Islamic State of Iraq in Syria and Levant (ISIL) conquered one
third of Iraq’s territory and forced the sudden collapse of Iraq’s state security forces with theobjective to establish an Islamic caliphate.4 Between June 2014 and December 2017, in the
territories it attacked and controlled, ISIL applied a ‘sustained and deliberate policy of
executing civilians’ as a means of exerting control and instilling fear. The group committed
mass killings, targeted civilians, imposed strict codes of social behaviour, killing those not in
conformity with their Islamist Takfiri doctrines.5 The UN found that ISIL’s targeted violenceagainst civilians and minorities in particular may constitute war crimes, crimes against
humanity and possibly genocide.6 Although by the end of 2017, ISIL did not control any
territory in Iraq7, it continues to carry out targeted attacks against civilians8 and asymmetricattacks across Iraq.9
In reference to targeting in Iraq, numerous sources interviewed by the Danish Immigration
Service (DIS) and the Norwegian Landinfo in 2018 noted that ‘in general, it can be difficult to
set up specific profiles of targeted persons in Iraq’. The same source explained that thehistorical tensions between the Iraqi Sunni and Shia groups still exist, while ‘there is also
tension among other sectarian groups, such as the Arabs vs. Kurds, minorities vs. otherminorities etc.’10 The number of armed groups involved in security in Iraq since 2014 has
expanded, and includes tribal forces, militias, federal and local police, military forces, among
others.11 Al-Monitor reported in 2018 that the growth of ‘myriad armed groups’ are‘constantly emerging, merging, and dividing’.12
Additionally, the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPI)13 noted that ‘the plethora and fluidity ofarmed groups in Iraq frequently challenges definition.’ Furthermore, the distinction between
official state forces and non-state forces is not always clear. Especially since the incorporationof the PMU into the security apparatus in 2016, ‘the line between non-state armed groups

4 International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July

2018, url, p. 1; BBC News, What is ‘Islamic State’, 2 December 2015, url.
5 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on
her mission to Iraq, 14 to 23 November 2017 (A/HRC/38/44/Add.1), 5 June 2018, url, pp. 4-5.
6 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner on the human rights
situation in Iraq in light of abuses committed by the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and associatedgroups (A/HRC/28/18), 13 March 2015, url, p. 5.
7 UN Security Council, Seventh report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international
peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat[S/2018/770], 16 August 2018, url, p. 2.
8 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Iraq, 20 April 2018, url; UNAMI, Report on Human
Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, p. 1.
9 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2421 (2018) Report of the Secretary-General [S/2018/975], 31
October 2018, url, pp. 9-10; UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2367 (2017) – Report of theSecretary-General (S/2018/359), 17 April 2018, url, p. 4.
10 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 20.
11 Gharizi, O. and Al-Ibrahimi, H., Baghdad Must Seize the Change to Work with Iraq’s Tribes, 17 January 2018, url;
Global Public Policy Institute, Iraq After ISIL: Sub-State Actors, Local Forces, and the Micro-Politics of Control, 21
March 2018, url, p. 8.
12 Al-Monitor, Armed Kurdish groups want disputed territory back in Iraq, 11 January 2018, url.
13 GPPi is an independent think tank based in Germany that aims to ‘improve global governance through research,
policy advice and debate’, according to its website.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 15

and official forces has become even more attenuated.’14 GPPI also explained that the minority
militias’ complicate the picture though they have smaller numbers and a relatively peripheral
role in much of the fighting.15 Furthermore, criminality involves a range of armed groups,
tribes, and criminal gangs.16

14 Gaston, E. et.al., Literature review of local, regional or sub-state defense forces in Iraq, 6 August 2017, url, pp. 2-

3.
15 Gaston, E. et.al., Literature review of local, regional or sub-state defense forces in Iraq, 6 August 2017, url, p. 5.
16 DW, Killings of high-profile women in Iraq spark outrage, 2 October 2018, url.

16 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

1. Targeting by state actors and affiliatedarmed groups
1.1 State actors and affiliated armed groups
This chapter examines the Government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)
as potential actors of persecution or serious harm. This part provides information on examples
of profiles that have been targeted by state actors of the Iraqi and Kurdish governments, withinformation from 2017-2018, where possible. However, agents and motivations are notalways clear-cut in the sources and in the examples provided, given the changing security
context and cycles of violence in 2017 and 2018 which made patterns harder to discern during
drafting. The main actors of the state judiciary and government’s security forces’ mandate,structure, capacity, and integrity are provided in the 2018 EASO report on Iraq: Actors ofProtection. The main state actors referred to in this report include: Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)(Federal and local police), Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), KRG forces. Additional detail on
PMUs has been provided below, as it includes many different actors.

1.1.1 The Iraqi Security Forces
Profiles of persons targeted by the Iraqi Security Forces
Regarding the targeting of individuals in Iraq by state agents, the 2018 report of the
DIS/Landinfo joint fact-finding mission (FFM) to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) noted thatthe ‘primary profile that is targeted by all security actors is people, who are suspected to havesome kind of affiliation with ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant], who may face
impediments and limitations, such as arrests, abuses, refusals to return to the areas of origin,confiscation of documents, limitations of social services etc. There have been examples ofcollective punishments of larger groups of people who were accused of ISIS-affiliations.’17
According to the US Department of State’s (USDOS) 2018 country report (covering 2017),
although the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) carried out the majority of abuses thatyear, the government’s forces have been involved in unlawful killings, abuse and tortureduring arrest, pre-trial detention, and after conviction in a wide range of abuses including
extra-judicial killings.18 An Iraq analyst interviewed in 2018 by DIS/Landinfo indicated there
are fewer reports of human rights violations being committed by the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)in 2018.19 Regarding ISF’s capacity in the KRI the DIS/Landinfo 2018 FFM report noted that
Kurdish security forces have full control of the region and no ISF are operating inside the KRI.
The same report further stated that ‘it is not a priority for the ISF to target people in the
Kurdish areas.’20

17 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)

in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 20.
18 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Iraq, 20 April 2018, url.
19 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 24.
20 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 24.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 17

1.1.2 Popular Mobilization Units
Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) are also described in the EASO report, Iraq – Actors ofProtection. Additional descriptions on specific main elements of the Popular Mobilization
Units are provided in Annex I: Popular Mobilization Units – main militias and associatedgroups.

Modus operandi and structure
Rapidly expanded to halt the advance of ISIL in June 2014, the original objective of the PMU
in 2014 was to repel ISIL. Benefiting from the combat experience of existing Shia militias prior
to 2014, the PMU evolved into a military force that proved capable of bringing ISIL advances
to a standstill and reclaiming territory relinquished by the Iraqi army.21 The PMU filled the
security vacuum created after the collapse of the Iraqi armed forces and emerged as ‘both apivotal military and political actor’.22 Foreign Policy magazine noted in January 2018 that PMU
militias continue to provide support to the overstretched Iraqi Army, especially on the local
level.23
According to DIS/Landinfo’s 2018 FFM report, the present structure of the PMUs was formedin June 2014 to counter ISIL’s offensive. However, the PMUs consist of several different
militias and armed groups of which some were already established as early as 2003.24 PMUs
are recruited voluntarily and are very influential and popular among the majority of the
population in Iraq and enjoy strong links to the major political parties of Iraq.25
Immediately after the Iraq’s army collapse in June 2014, Prime Minister Maliki signed an
official decree to form the Popular Mobilisation Commission26 as the sole government body
responsible for the administration of the PMU27 and to give the PMU armed groups a sense oflegal justification and a degree of institutionalisation.28 In March 2018, Prime Minister Haider
al-Abadi issued a decree formalising the inclusion of the PMU into the country's security
forces. According to the decree, members of the PMU are granted many of the same rights asmembers of the military, such as equivalent salaries, access to military education and being
subject to military service law.29 However, Iraq expert Renad Mansour comments that the
PMU leadership has rejected Baghdad’s decrees, and aims to become as an ‘institutionalized
autonomous force’.30

21 Global Public Policy Institute, Iraq After ISIL: Sub-State Actors, Local Forces, and the Micro-Politics of Control, 21

March 2018, url, p. 6.
22 Frentzel, K., The future role of the Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq – Key influencers of Post- ISIS politics?, May 2017, url,p. 1.
23 Foreign Policy, Iraq’s militias set their sights on political power, 30 January 2018, url.
24 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 22.
25 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 23.
26 Mansour, R. and Jabar F. A., The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq’s future, 28 April 2017, url, p. 6.
27 AI, Iraq: turning a blind eye – the arming of the Popular Mobilization Forces, 5 January 2017, url, p. 9.
28 Mansour, R., More than militias: Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces are here to stay, 3 April 2018, url.
29 Middle East Eye, Iraq’s Abadi inducts Iran-linked militias into security forces, 8 March 2018, url.
30 Mansour, R., More than militias: Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces are here to stay, 3 April 2018, url

18 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

According to a 2017 report by Kari Frentzel, a guest researcher at the Syria/Iraq Office of theKonrad Adenauer Foundation31, the PMUs are officially under the control of the Iraqi statethrough the Popular Mobilisation Commission. Former Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, as
commander in chief, was the nominal head of this commission; however, government control
over the militias that constitute the PMUs is limited.32 The same source further explained that‘each militia has an autonomous command structure and thus, the militias are able to act withrelative autonomy from the government.’33 The PMUs ‘lack a single leadership structure anda unified ideological stance’ and they are ‘a myriad of competing organizations with very
different ideological viewpoints’.34 An informal chain of command responds by way of Iranianproxy militias to the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force and, thus to
Tehran. In 2017, Amnesty International (AI) observed that ‘in reality PMU militias often act
outside of the state’s command and control structures.’35
Official statistics on the number of militias within the PMU are not available.36 Sources reportthat PMUs range from 60 000 and 140 000 fighters37 registered in about 60-70 groups.38 The
DIS/Landinfo 2018 report explains:‘A low estimate of the total size of the PMUs is that they at least have 120,000
members. The PMUs consist of many different militias, out of which the majority are
Shia militias. There are Shia militias that are supported by Iran, whilst others have amore internal nationalist agenda. There are also Shia militias who have been driven
by the Syrian war and have been fighting in Syria. The ethnic and religious minorities
do also have their own PMUs, such as Turkmen, Christian, Yezidi and Shabak PMUs
etc. There are some Sunni PMUs that consist of 17,000-25,000 members. Most ofthem were established in late 2014 in alliance with the Iraqi government to fight ISIS.
The recruitment to the PMUs is entirely on a voluntary basis. Many join the PMUs for
economic reasons, because the salaries are attractive, compared to the rest of Iraq.
The PMUs are very influential and they are popular among the majority of the
population for their effort to defeat ISIS; they are active in promoting themselves
through PR campaigns and media coverage; and they are closely linked to the mostimportant political parties in Baghdad.’39
Iraq analysts Renad Mansour and Faleh A. Jabar stressed that the PMU do not form amonolithic Shia militia. Rather it is a complex umbrella organisation ‘consisting of fifty or sogroups varying in size from a few hundred to tens of thousands combatants each’.40 The major

31 KAS is a think tank and political foundation linked to Christian Democracy in Germany and is focused on

consolidating democracy and promoting civic education; the think tank produces analyses meant to ‘offer a basis
for possible political action’, according to its website.
32 Frentzel, K., The future role of the Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq – Key influencers of Post- ISIS politics?, May 2017, url,
p. 3.
33 Frentzel, K., The future role of the Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq – Key influencers of Post- ISIS politics?, May 2017, url,
p. 4.
34 Mansour, R., After Mosul, will Iraq’s paramilitaries set the state’s agenda?, 27 January 2017, url.
35 AI, Iraq: turning a blind eye – the arming of the Popular Mobilization Forces, 5 January 2017, url, p. 5.
36 AI, Iraq : turning a blind eye – the arming of the Popular Mobilization Forces , 5 January 2017, url, p. 9.
37 AP, Fears in Iraqi government, army over Shiite militias’ power, 21 march 2016, url; Mansour, R. and Jabar, F. A.,
The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq’s future, 28 April 2017, url, p. 27.
38 Schweitzer, M., The future for Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, 18 January 2017, url.
39 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 22.
40 Mansour, R. and Jabar, F. A., The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq’s future, 28 April 2017, url, p. 12.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 19

groups that compose the mainly Shia PMU fall into three distinct main clusters with varying
political agendas41:

pro-Khamenei (pro-Iranian);42
pro-Sadr43 PMUs, mainly the Saraya al Salam (Peace Brigades) which were organised
by Cleric Muqtada al-Sadr;44
pro-Sistani (referring to Iraq’s highest cleric) PMUs.45 The two central Shia religious
establishments in the holy cities of Karbala and Najaf raised their own militia units,
which remained directly subordinate to the Shia clerics and are loyal to Grand
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani.46

There are roughly 20 pro-Khameini groups, some of which tend to be those cited as the mostprominent and powerful of the PMUs. Among them, the key prominent groups are the Badr
Force, Asaib Ahl al‐Haq (AAH), Kata’eb Hezbollah (KH), Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, Kata’ib alTayyar al- Risali, Kata’ib al-Imam Ali and Jaysh al-Mukhtar militias allied to Iran.47 Iraqi media
source Niqash also names Badr Organisation, AAH, KH, as well as the Khorasani Brigades andthe Sayed al-Shuhada Brigades. These groups’ ‘military activities are supervised by Iranian
military leaders and they tend to be more heavily armed and more powerful than othermilitias.’48
Muqtada al Sadr’s militia, Saraya al-Salam, the Ashura Brigades and the Supporters of the Faith
Brigades are ‘associated with existing Shiite Muslim political parties and have their own party’s
agenda at heart’.49 Both Sadr’s and Sistani’s groups have complained of not being paid enoughby the Popular Mobilization Commission, which they accuse of favouring the pro-Khamenei
paramilitaries.50
The pro-Sistani militias were created following al Sistani’s 2014 fatwa and aim to protect Shia
shrines and include the Ali al-Akbar brigades, the Abbasiyah Shrine brigades, the Alawite
Shrine brigades and the Husayniyah Shrine brigades. They are at ‘the disposal of the Iraqi
government’ and are not as well-armed; they are also fewer in number than the pro-Khamenei
militias.51 According to administrators in al-Abbas, ‘the division includes 7 310 active-duty
members and a reserve contingent of between 35 000 and 40 000 members.’52 The Ali alAkbar Brigade counts 5 000 men, with more than 1 000 Sunni members.53
In government-controlled and in reconquered territory from ISIL, PMUs took up security
duties to ward off ISIL terror attacks. Iraq analyst Norman Cigar notes that the militias

41 Mansour, R. and Jabar, F. A., The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq’s future, 28 April 2017, url, pp. 12-15.
42 Mansour, R. and Jabar, F. A., The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq’s future, 28 April 2017, url, pp. 12-15.
43 Mansour, R. and Jabar, F. A., The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq’s future, 28 April 2017, url, pp. 12-15.
44 Cigar, N., Iraq’s shia warlords and their militias, June 2015, url, pp. 15- 17.
45 Mansour, R. and Jabar F. A., The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq’s future, 28 April 2017, url, pp. 12-15.
46 Cigar, N., Iraq’s shia warlords and their militias, June 2015, url, pp. 15-17.
47 Cigar, N., Iraq’s shia warlords and their militias, June 2015, url, pp. 15-17.
48 Niqash, Taming the beast: can Iraq ever control its controversial volunteer militias?, 4 August 2016, url.
49 Niqash, Taming the beast: can Iraq ever control its controversial volunteer militias?, 4 August 2016, url.
50 Mansour, R., After Mosul, will Iraq’s paramilitaries set the state’s agenda?, 27 January 2017, url, p. 5; Mansour,

R., Iraq after the fall of ISIS: the struggle for the state, July 2017, url, p. 15.
51 Niqash, Taming the beast: can Iraq ever control its controversial volunteer militias?, 4 August 2016,url.
52 Knights, M. and Malik, H., The al-Abbas combat division model: reducing Iranian influence in Iraq’s security
forces, 22 August 2017, url.
53 Slow Journalism Company (The), Brothers in arms, 25 March 2016, url.

20 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

provided a reserve element for the defence of Baghdad.54 In the southern provinces militias
relieved army and police by providing general security after the army deployed into combat.55
Amnesty International reports that, at checkpoints as well as on the battlefield, PMUs
operated both independently and alongside government forces. Militias also used army andsecurity forces’ bases and detention centres.56 An Iraqi politician, interviewed by Landinfo andLifos in March 2017, stated that PMUs can enter any private home, even the home of amember of Parliament. He further stated that PMUs have the ability to make arrests of theirown and operate their own prisons.57 The Geneva International Centre for Justice (GICJ)58 also
reported that militias detain suspects in ‘secret prisons’.59
In January 2017, Niqash noted that ‘most neighborhoods in Baghdad have a [PMU] base –usually an office – belonging to whichever militia is present in that part of the city’. In thesouthern provinces militias maintain a similar presence. Niqash further stated that militia attimes take over police duties, intervening, for instance, in disputes and engaging in conflict
resolution.60 The Economist reported in 2017 that militia members are ‘prone to patrolling
Baghdad’s streets as religious police’.61 In June 2016, the Washington Post reported thatmilitias enforce public morals, punishing, for example, persons who drink alcohol, gamble orhire prostitutes.62

Background on PMUs involvement in abuses
According to a May 2018 report published by Harvard University, Iranian ‘proxy’ PMUs (Kata’ib
Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), and the Badr Organization) are more sectarian and prone
to sectarian abuses, while PMUs that are loyal to Ayatollah Sistani are reportedly ‘generally
considered more moderate’ and ‘less prone’ to abuses on sectarian grounds. Sadrist PMUs
are ‘somewhere in between’.63 PMU leaders have acknowledged that abuses occur, but theystate that in their view these are acts committed by individuals and do not constitute a
policy.64
In October 2014, Amnesty International accused Shia militias of committing serious humanrights abuses, including war crimes, and abducting and killing Sunni civilian men in Baghdad
and around the country. Amnesty International documented dozens of cases of abductions
and unlawful killings by Shia militias in Baghdad, Samarra and Kirkuk and indicated that many
more such cases were reported all over the country in 2014.65 Most abuses in the 2014-2017
period were by ISIL, according to USDOS, though elements of the PMU were engaged in

54 Cigar, N., Iraq’s shia warlords and their militias, June 2015, url, p. 29.
55 Cigar, N., Iraq’s shia warlords and their militias, June 2015, url, pp. 27-34.
56 AI, Iraq: turning a blind eye – the arming of the Popular Mobilization Forces , 5 January 2017, url, p. 10.
57 Norway, Landinfo, Irak: Situasjonen for sunnimuslimer i Bagdad [Situation of Sunni Muslims in Baghdad], 23 June

2017, url, p. 10.
58 GICJ is a non-profit NGO committed to the ‘promotion and reinforcement of commitments to principles andnorms of human rights’ which prepares reports on human rights violations for submission to the United Nations
based on a coalition of NGO contacts, academics, and lawyers, according to its website.
59 GICJ, Militias in Iraq - The hidden face of terrorism, September 2016, url, p.19.
60 Niqash, Baghdad’s legal gangs? As Iraqi Police lose control of Baghdad’s streets, militias take over, 19 January
2017, url.
61 Economist (The), America and Iran are jostling over influence in Iraq, 12 April 2017, url.
62 Washington Post (The), Feared Shiite militias back in spotlight after three Americans vanish in Iraq, 21 January
2016, url.
63 Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018, url, p. 20.
64 Niqash, 'We Don't Deny Militias Have Committed Violations', 19 August 2015, url; Bloomberg, Why Iraq Doesn't
Punish its Militias' War Crimes, 9 February 2016, url.
65 AI, Absolute impunity: Militia rule in Iraq, 14 October 2014, url, pp. 4-5.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 21

unlawful killings, disappearances, kidnappings, extortion, and revenge attacks in the course of
the fighting against ISIL.66 In 2015, there were reports of instances of militia and armed groups
supporting the government being involved in, for example:

perpetrating ‘targeted killings, abducting civilians and committing other abuses’.
Especially in Diyala province there is a high number of abductions, purportedly carriedout by militias, also targeting Sunnis;67
forced evictions, abductions and summary executions;68
sporadic abductions of Sunni Arabs by the PMUs;69
carrying out targeted killings, abductions of civilians and destruction of property.70

During 2016, there were reports of PMUs killing, torturing, kidnapping and extorting civilians.
Some elements of Shia militias were involved in attacks on Sunni civilians, reportedly avenging
ISIL crimes.71 Civilians fleeing from conflict areas were subjected to threats, intimidation,
violence, and abductions by armed groups operating alongside the ISF.72 In June 2016, Human
Rights Watch reported abuses committed by government forces, including PMU, during theoffensive to retake Fallujah from ISIL. During the offensive, summary executions, beatings ofunarmed men, enforced disappearances and mutilation of corpses were reported, mainly
occurring on the outskirts of the city.73 In January 2017 and in April 2017, the UN Security
Council stated that UNAMI has received a ‘small number of reports of violations’ committed
by government and pro-government forces.74 In its 2017/2018 year report Amnesty
International noted that Iraqi forces, including the PMUs, arrested thousands of alleged
terrorism suspects without judicial warrant from their homes, checkpoints and camps forinternally displaced people.75

Profiles of persons targeted by the PMU
The DIS/Landinfo 2018 FFM report described the profiles of persons targeted by the PMUs as
follows:‘the PMUs are primarily targeting persons, who are suspected of being affiliated with
ISIS or family members to those. These are most often Sunni Arab young men, but, ingeneral, other Sunni Arabs and Sunni Turkmens also suffer from a form of collective
abuses, killings, discriminations etc. The PMU are often reacting in retaliation for ISISincidents. One source said that the PMUs have the capacity to target whom they want.

66 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2014 - Iraq, 25 June 2015, url; USDOS, Country Report on

Human Rights Practices 2016 - Iraq, 3 March 2017, url; USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 Iraq, 20 April 2018, url.
67 UN Security Council, Second report of the Secretary- General pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 2169 (2014),
2 February 2015, url, p. 12.
68 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Militias escalate abuses, possibly war crimes, 15 February 2015, url.
69 Human Rights Watch, Ethnic fighting endangers civilians, 13 January 2016, url.
70 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014 - 30 April
2015, 13 July 2015, url, pp. ii, 26, 27, 30.
71 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2016 - Iraq, 3 March 2017, url;
72 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, pp. i, ii, 19, 20.
73 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Fallujah abuses test control of militias, 9 June 2016, url.
74 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary- General pursuant to resolution 2299 (2016), 26 January 2017, url,
p. 11; UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary- General pursuant to resolution 2299 (2016), 25 April 2017, url,p. 6.
75 AI, Amnesty International Report 2017/18 - Iraq, 22 February 2018, url.

22 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

They have very good intelligence capabilities that reach out to most of the Iraqi
society. The PMUs can target political or economic opponents, regardless of theirreligious or ethnic background. After October 2017, there were reports on PMU
violations against the Kurdish population in Kirkuk and Tuz Khurmatu. The targeted
Kurds were mostly members of the political party KDP [Kurdish Democractic Party]
and the Asayish.’76
The DIS/Landinfo interviewed an Iraq expert source in 2018 who explained that there are 5
major profiles of those who are targeted by PMUs:






Political opponents, regardless of religious or ethnic background as militias arefighting for money, power, and influence attack rivals, including other Shia militias;
Retaliation attacks, especially after major terrorism incidents, as this can spark
retribution attacks, particularly targeting Sunni communities arbitrarily;
Targeting of Iraqi civil society activists and journalists, especially critical of the PMUs;
Targeting of people who deviate from morality mostly from Shia social norms, such as
LGBT people, Christians, alcohol sellers; sometimes with the support of the Shia
community;
PMUs also target business owners for the purpose of extortion.77

The DIS/Landinfo’s November 2018 FFM report further noted that ‘the PMUs are not targetingpeople in the KRI. It is considered unlikely that the PMUs conduct such actions as it is not apriority for them, and they do not have the capacity to operate in KRI.’78
In April 2018, Amnesty International reports that government forces, including PMUs, havebeen preventing families with perceived ties to ISIL from returning to their home or places oforigin. Iraqi forces, including the PMUs, have also regularly arrested and forcibly disappeared
men with perceived ISIL ties directly from IDP camps. Sexual exploitation of women in IDP
camps by members of the PMUs was also reported.79

1.1.3 Kurdish Regional Government forces
The security actors of the Kurdish government, the Peshmerga and the Asayish are describedin the EASO report, Iraq – Actors of Protection.
Regarding the profile of persons targeting by the Kurdish forces inside the KRI, the 2018
Landinfo/DIS report noted the following:‘The Kurdish security actors are targeting political and societal opposition in the KRI.
Human rights advocates, activists, journalists and protesting civil servants are being
targeted when they display criticism of the political leadership. The latest example ofthis was in March and April 2018 when public servants protested the lack of wages

76 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)

in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 20.
77 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 46.
78 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 23.
79 AI, The condemned- Women and children isolated, trapped and exploited in Iraq, 17 April 2018, url, pp. 17, 29,
34.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 23

and increasing poverty. The demonstrations were violently suppressed by armed
members of the political parties and the Asayish. Furthermore, more than fourjournalists have been killed in the region. The security forces in the KRI are also
targeting suspected ISIS affiliates who are often Sunni Arabs.’80
In November 2018, DIS/Landinfo reported that since October 2017, Kurdish forces withdrew
and are no longer in the disputed areas of Iraq, and that according to one source theyinterviewed for their 2018 FFM report, ‘no individuals are being targeted by the Kurdish forcesin the disputed areas or in the rest of Iraq anymore since October 2017.’81 Instances of prior
to that are explained below.

1.2 Sunni perceived to be ISIL collaborators or sympathisersThis section should be read in conjunction with Section 1.3 on treatment of IDPs.
Thousands of suspected ISIL fighters and affiliates have been detained by Iraqi government
forces and face criminal prosecution in the country’s counterterrorism courts. The
prosecutions of suspected ISIL fighters and affiliates present a number of shortcomings,
including wrongful arrests and mistreatment of suspects.82 Numerous death penalty
sentences have been issued.83 Earlier reporting makes note of retaliatory violence against
suspected ISIL collaborators and sympathisers, perpetrated by associated forces of the ISF,
including PMU and minority militias, as well as elements of the ISF.84 As the military battle
against ISIL wound down, there were fewer reports of such abuses85, despite the considerable
freedom of action militias maintain in Iraq.86

1.2.1 Prosecution of ISIL suspects
In an October 2018 report the United Nations Security Council writes that the United Nations
Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) continued its monitoring of trials in Iraq, including thoseof alleged ISIL members. It further notes its concern about the lack of consistent adherence
to the requirements of due process and a fair trial, in particular ‘the failure of the courts toinvestigate allegations by defendants that confessions were obtained through torture or other80 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)

in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 25.
81 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 25.
82 Human Rights Watch, Flawed Justice. Accountability for ISIS crimes in Iraq, December 2017, url, pp. 1-4.
83 Human Rights Watch, Flawed Justice. Accountability for ISIS crimes in Iraq, December 2017, url, pp. 52-54; UN
Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2421 (2018) Report of the Secretary-General [S/2018/975], 31
October 2018, url, p. 10; De Standaard, Dus u hoort niet bij IS? Toch geef ik u levenslang, 2 June 2018, url.
84 AI, Investigate Reports Iraqi Forces Tortured and Killed Villagers near Mosul in 'Cold Blood', 10 November 2016,
url; Human Rights Watch, Iraq: 37 Men Fleeing Fighting Detained, 10 November 2016, url; AP, Iraqis Dispense what
They Call Justice for Alleged Militants, 26 October 2016, url; AI, Displaced Iraqis Abused by Militias and Government
Forces, 18 October 2016, url; Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Ban Abusive Militias from Mosul Operation, 30 July 2016,
url; AI, Iraq: Authorities Must Rein in Forces amid Allegations of Torture and Deaths in Custody, 8 June 2016, url;
UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 May – 31 October 2015, 11
January 2016, url, p. 21; UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11
December 2014 - 30 April 2015, 13 July 2015, url, p. 25.
85 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary- General pursuant to resolution 2299 (2016), 26 January 2017, url,
p. 11; Economist (The), Fifteen years after America’s invasion, Iraq is getting back on its feet, 31 March 2018, url.
86 ISW, 11 July 2018, email to EASO; Dury-Agri, J.R. et.al., Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces:
orders of battle, December 2017, url, pp. 28-54; Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and thesituation for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 19.

24 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

forms of ill-treatment and the passive role played by defence counsel, thus undermining adefendant’s right to effective counsel’.87
Whilst pursuing their military campaign against ISIL, the Iraqi and KRG authorities havearrested large numbers of ISIL suspects under the provisions of the 2005 Anit-terrorism Law(Law 13/2005). This law covers a variety of crimes including membership and support for aterrorist organisation, but also crimes like possession or use of explosives, or kidnapping.88
This law, however, does not include rape, sexual slavery and other crimes that can be qualified
as war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide, as Human Rights Watch (HRW) points
out in its report on the accountability for ISIL crimes from December 2017.89
Sources interviewed during the DIS/Landinfo 2018 mission to KRI noted that due to ISIL beinga primarily Sunni organisation, the majority of the population considers Sunni Arabs
potentially affiliated with extremist groups.90 Belkis Wille, a senior researcher on Iraq with
Human Rights Watch, explained during an 2017 EASO cooperation meeting on Iraq that ‘every
person who has lived in a territory under the control of the IS in the past three years is apotential terrorist’ adding that persons perceived to be ISIL affiliates were detained by the
PMUs, usually without a warrant.91
Official numbers of persons arrested under the provisions of the 2005 Anti-terrorism Law are
not available. According to an analysis by Associated Press from March 2018, however, inJanuary 2018, at least 19 000 people were detained or imprisoned under accusation ofconnections to ISIL or other terror-related offenses. The same article further noted that morethan 3 000 of them were sentenced to death.92
Various sources reported that many of the arrests and also the subsequent detention forterror-related accusations do not comply with the criminal procedure rules: ISIL suspects arearrested without proper warrants issued by a judge; the duration of the period between being
taken into detention to a formal arrest is too long; the family of the suspect is not informed;
the suspect is not given have access to a lawyer during the interrogations.93 Another aspect
reported by Human Rights Watch are the frequent arrests based on the name of the suspect
on a wanted list, which results in numerous cases of people in detention only because theirname is similar to that of a terror suspect.94
The conditions in the pre-trial detention facilities are precarious, according to Human Rights
Watch.95 Visiting provisional detention facilities in Ninewa Governorate (Qayyarah andHammam al-Alil) Human Rights Watch observed extreme overcrowding, with at one instance114 detainees in one cell of about 4x6 meters. The prisoners were kept inside for four months,

87 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2421 (2018) Report of the Secretary-General [S/2018/975],

31 October 2018, url, pp. 10-11.
88 Iraq, Law Number (13) for the Year 2005, Anti-Terrorism Law, Article 2-3, 7 November 2005, url.
89 Human Rights Watch, Flawed Justice. Accountability for ISIS crimes in Iraq, December 2017, url, p. 29.
90 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 20.
91 Wille, B., cited in: EASO, Practical Cooperation Meeting on Iraq, 25-26 April 2017, url, p. 13.
92 AP, Iraq holding more than 19,000 because of IS, militant ties. 22 March 2018, url.
93 Human Rights Watch, Flawed Justice. Accountability for ISIS crimes in Iraq, December 2017, url, pp. 21, 25, 42;
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on
her mission to Iraq [A/HRC/38/44/Add.1], 20 June 2018, url, p. 12.
94 Human Rights Watch, Flawed Justice. Accountability for ISIS crimes in Iraq, December 2017, url, p. 21.
95 Human Rights Watch, Flawed Justice. Accountability for ISIS crimes in Iraq, December 2017, url, pp. 47-48;
Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Hundreds Detained in Degrading Conditions, 13 March 2017, url.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 25

with no regular access to the outdoors or showers, and with only one toilet inside the room.
The same source further stated that ‘the windows were bricked up, and the temperature andstench in the room were overpowering. At least four had died in cases that, according toprison staff, were linked to the lack of proper medical care and hygiene standards.’96
The authorities are relying almost exclusively on one provision of the counterterrorism law toprosecute the ISIL suspects: the membership of a terrorist organisation.97 Other crimes
punishable under the counterterrorism law or the criminal law are not charged separately,states Human Rights Watch. The counterterrorism act stipulates only two possible penalties,
death or life in prison, but according to Human Rights Watch, the Iraqi Chief Justice declaredthat judicial discretion would allow judges to hand down lower sentences, without specifying
what the possible margin could be.98
Human Rights Watch observed that there is an absence of a prioritisation towards the more
severe accusations, and notes that the authorities are targeting for prosecution even people
who only participated in providing basic services such as electricity or medical care under the
ISIL administration.99 These defendants risk the death penalty or lifelong prison like any other
ISIL member.100
The same source investigated allegations of torture and concluded that ill treatment ofsuspects during interrogation in order to extract confessions is widespread in Iraq. Moreover,it observed that ‘judges also frequently ignore allegations of torture and convict defendants
based on confessions that defendants credibly allege were coerced.’101 Also according to
Human Rights Watch, lawyers declared that, in terrorism cases, they were not allowed toattend interrogations of their clients.102
There are also reports that lawyers who come forward to represent ISIL suspects at the initialhearings are labelled ‘ISIL lawyers’ by the authorities, which can lead to their arrest or evenan indictment for terrorism charges, as pointed out in a Human Rights Watch report from
September 2018.103 All 17 lawyers interviewed by the source who were working forinternational and local organisations that provide legal assistance in and around Mosul
declared that since assisting so-called ‘ISIL-families’ that they have ‘witnessed or experienced
threats and other verbal harassment by National Security Service or Ministry of InteriorIntelligence and Counter Terrorism officers for providing legal representation to those viewed
by security forces as “ISIL” or “ISIL families”’.104 At least 15 private lawyers defending ISIL
suspects before Iraqi counterterrorism courts in Ninewa Governorate have been put underarrest between 24 July and 10 August 2017, as stated by Human Rights Watch. The warrants
were issued on charges of ISIL affiliation for their work in counterterrorism cases in the past.105
Lawyers have become very reluctant to defend ISIL suspects, unless they are assigned by the

96 Human Rights Watch, Flawed Justice. Accountability for ISIS crimes in Iraq, December 2017, url, pp. 47-48.
97 Human Rights Watch, Flawed Justice. Accountability for ISIS crimes in Iraq, December 2017, url, p. 27.
98 Human Rights Watch, Flawed Justice. Accountability for ISIS crimes in Iraq, December 2017, url, p. 30.
99 Human Rights Watch, Flawed Justice. Accountability for ISIS crimes in Iraq, December 2017, url, p. 30; Guardian(The), 'They deserve no mercy': Iraq deals briskly with accused 'women of Isis', 22 May 2018, url; New York Times(The), A 10-Minute Trial, a Death Sentence: Iraqi Justice for ISIS Suspects, 17 April 2018, url; New Arab (The), The
Iraq Report: Mass executions follow 'sham trials', 21 December 2017, url.
100 Human Rights Watch, Flawed Justice. Accountability for ISIS crimes in Iraq, December 2017, url, p. 30.
101 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Judges Disregard Torture Allegations. 31 July 2018, url.
102 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Judges Disregard Torture Allegations. 31 July 2018, url.
103 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Judges Disregard Torture Allegations, 31 July 2018, url.
104 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Officials Threatening, Arresting Lawyers, 12 September 2018, url.
105 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Lawyers Arrested for Work in ISIS Courts, 10 August 2017, url.

26 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

court. A senior judge told Human Rights Watch that ‘private lawyers had stopped taking on
ISIS suspects they believed were indeed affiliated with ISIS, only taking on cases of people they
thought were wrongly-charged with as ISIS suspects, usually for having similar names.’106
ISIL members convicted in courts of the government of Iraq were entitled to release under the
General Amnesty Law of August 2016 (No 27/2016), but as Human Rights Watch notes, thislaw is not applied in a consistent way by the Iraqi judges. The law offers amnesty to those who
can demonstrate they joined a terrorist group against their own will, and they did not commit
any serious offense before August 2016.107 However, after the law was criticised due toloopholes that allowed the release of ‘dangerous criminals’ through pardons and fines, andreports that convicted ISIL members were rampantly paying bribes to avoid prison, the Officeof the Prime Minister submitted amendments that ‘cancelled the provision that had allowed
amnesty for IS members who could prove that they joined against their will and had notcommitted any serious crimes associated with the group’ and these amendments were
ratified in November 2017.108
The trial of the suspected perpetrators of the Camp Speicher massacre (see section 2.2.1) was
the most renowned anti-terrorism case. It started in July 2015 and concluded in February
2016. It was reported that 36 of the 40 men accused of ISIL membership and participation in
the murdering of hundreds of Iraqi Air Force cadets were sentenced to death and executed
after the Federal Cassation Court confirmed the death sentences. In a second set of trials, theCentral Criminal Court sentenced another 27 men to death for their involvement in themassacre.109 The Report of the UN Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 2367 (2017) from
August 2017 mentions 25 death sentences and 25 acquittals.110 The defendants in the firsttrial had denied the charges and claimed that their confessions were made under tortureduring pre-trial detention. These confessions were the main evidence against the accused.
The court did not act on the allegations of torture and refused to allow new evidence that
could impact the charges.111

1.2.2 Retaliatory violence
According to the November 2018 report by DIS/Landinfo the primary profile that is targetedby all security actors present in Iraq is people suspected to have some kind of affiliation with
ISIL who as a result ‘may face impediments and limitations, such as arrests, abuses, refusals
to return to the areas of origin, confiscation of documents, limitations of social services
etc.’.112 The same source further observes that ‘people, who lived in areas under ISIS’ control,
seem to suffer more from discrimination and abuses than people who lived outside of ISIS’control.’113

106 Human Rights Watch, Flawed Justice. Accountability for ISIS crimes in Iraq, December 2017, url, p. 42.
107 Human Rights Watch, Flawed Justice. Accountability for ISIS crimes in Iraq, December 2017, url, pp. 4-5.
108 UNU-CPR and IFIT, The Limits of Punishment, May 2018, url, p. 21
109 Human Rights Watch, Flawed Justice. Accountability for ISIS crimes in Iraq, December 2017, url, p. 29; BBC News,

Iraq to hang 27 for IS Camp Speicher massacre, 8 August 2017, url.
110 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary- General pursuant to resolution 2367 (2017), 19 October 2017, url,
p. 10.
111 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Set Aside Verdict in Massacre of Cadets, 16 July 2015, url.
112 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 20.
113 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 20.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 27

The USDOS annual report on human rights practices in Iraq (covering 2017) noted that someelements of the PMUs engaged in unlawful killings, enforced disappearances, kidnapping andextortion. PMUs were also implicated in several attacks on Sunni civilians, reportedly avenging
ISIL crimes against the Shia community.114 Amnesty International stated that ‘PMU militias
have carried out a systematic pattern of violations, including enforced disappearance,
extrajudicial executions and other unlawful killings and torture of Sunni Arab men and boys,
seemingly in revenge for IS attacks.’115
Reporting on the protection of civilians in the context of the Ninewa operations and theretaking of Mosul in November 2017 UNAMI noted recorded instances of alleged violations
and abuses of human rights by ISF and associated forces.116 In January 2017 the UN Security
Council states that UNAMI has received ‘a small number of reports of violations committed
by government and pro-government forces’.117 In a January 2016 report UNAMI noted
allegations of unlawful killings committed by ISF and associated forces, including ‘attacks andreprisals against persons believed or perceived to support or to be associated with ISIS’.118
Acts of revenge in the form of interceptions, enforced disappearances and killings Sunnis
committed by ISF and affiliated forces were recorded during 2014-2017.119 Likewise, in a July
2015 report UNAMI made note of ‘continued reports of abuses and violations of human rights
and violations of international humanitarian law perpetrated by ISF and associated forces’.120
Human Rights Watch recorded 74 cases of men and four cases of boys who were detained by
Iraqi military and security forces between April 2014 and October 2017 and forcibly
disappeared because of their perceived sympathy for ISIL and Al Qaeda. 33 of the cases
involved Sunni men and boys from areas under ISIL control that were disappeared Iraqi
security forces at checkpoints.121
Examples of treatment of local population by government actors and affiliated armed groups
include the following lists of incidents below, however, it should be noted that perceived ISIL
affiliation is not necessarily explicitly cited as the reason for the abuses in the sources given.
Whilst the incidents happened in the context of the battle against ISIL, other factors may haveplayed a role. This list shows the majority of reported incidents occurred in the 2014-2016.122
In 2016, Ayatollah al-Sistani, in a reaction to allegations of abuse of civilians in Fallujah, in June
2016 cautioned that non-combatants should not be harmed, and Badr leader Hadi al-Ameri
vowed to hold those accountable for abuses.123 Sources report that there has been a reductionof the PMUs role in battles after the state security apparatus regrouped124, the gradual

114 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Iraq, 20 April 2018, url.
115 AI, Iraq: turning a blind eye – the arming of the Popular Mobilization Forces , 5 January 2017, url, p. 15.
116 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the context of the Ninewa Operations and the retakingof Mosul City, 17 October 2016 – 10 July 2017, 2 November 2017, url, pp. 3, 25.
117 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary- General pursuant to resolution 2299 (2016), 26 January 2017, url,
p. 11.
118 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 May – 31 October 2015,
11 January 2016, url, p. 21.
119 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions
on her mission to Iraq [A/HRC/38/44/Add.1], 20 June 2018, url, p. 8.
120 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014 - 30 April
2015, 13 July 2015, url, p. 25.
121 Human Rights Watch, “Life Without a Father is Meaningless”; Arbitrary Arrests and Enforced Disappearances in
Iraq 2014-2017, 27 September 2018, url, pp. 2, 25.
122 Comment made by the drafters of this report, Cedoca/Belgium
123 Human Rights Watch, Fallujah abuses test control of militias, 9 June 2016, url.
124 Mansour, R. and Jabar, F. A., The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq’s future, 28 April 2017, url, pp. 20-22.

28 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

improvement of the security situation125, the political ambitions of the PMU leadership126, as
well as an active effort to silence critics of the PMUs.127 Regarding abuses committed by ISF
an Iraq analyst informed the 2018 DIS/Landinfo FFM to KRI that ‘the ISF seriously tries to avoid
any violations’128 and the source noted in the 2018 report that ‘one would be hard pressed tofind examples of violations.’129
BaghdadShia militias were allegedly responsible for the ‘mass killing’ of 61 Sunni men between
1 June and 9 July 2014, and the killings of at least 48 Sunni men in March and April,2014 in villages and towns around Baghdad, an area known as the ‘Baghdad Belt’. In
many cases, witnesses identified the militia as Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq.130
During the period of 9-18 November 2014, around 25 individuals were reported tohave been abducted from Sha’ab (eastern Baghdad) by militias.131
Between May and October 2015, ‘members of the Sunni community from Anbar wereabducted, allegedly by militias operating under PMU, after passing to the Baghdad
side of Bzebiz Bridge. Some were reported to have been freed after payment of
ransoms, while others were allegedly killed.’132

Babil

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On 9 July 2014, police found 53 bodies in a ditch in an area north of Hilla (Babil
Governorate). Locals stated that Sunni men were targeted and spoke of involvementof AAH in the killings.133
On 6 January 2015, the remains of four men were found in Albu Bahani area, northern
Babil. The victims were inhabitants of Jurf al-Sakhr who had reportedly been abductedby militia members over a month earlier.134
On 4 January 2016, alleged militia members operating under PMU shot and killed themuezzin of the Abdallah Jubouri Mosque in Hasswa sub-district, in Iskandariya, Babilprovince.135

125 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary- General pursuant to resolution 2299 (2016), 26 January 2017, url,

p. 11; Economist (The), Fifteen years after America’s invasion, Iraq is getting back on its feet, 31 March 2018, url;
Sweden, Lifos, Thematic report: The security situation in Iraq: July 2016-November 2017, 18 December 2017, url,
pp. 11-35.
126 International Crisis Group, Iraq’s paramilitary groups, 30 July 2018, url, pp. 6-9.
127 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 47.
128 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 49.
129 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 49.
130 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: pro-government militias’ trail of death, attacks on sunnis in at least three provinces,
31 July 2014, url.
131 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 September – 10 December
2014, 23 February 2015, url, p. 20.
132 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 18.
133 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: pro-government militias’ trail of death, attacks on Sunnis in at least three provinces,
31 July 2014, url.
134 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014 - 30 April
2015, 13 July 2015, url, p. 27.
135 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 18.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

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On 28 March 2016, three days after an attack in a football stadium in al-Hasswa area,
Iskandariya sub-district militia members operating under PMU – attacked the Sunni
Mosque in Alexandria city centre, killing the son of the Muezzin. On the same day,
uniformed gunmen reportedly stormed a house in al-Hasswa area, Iskandariya subdistrict, wounding one civilian and abducting four others. All the victims of these
attacks were members of the Sunni community.136

Salah al-Din

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



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In September 2014, a number of people were executed and/or disappeared during
militia attacks in Tuz District, Salah al-Din province.137
On 25 March 2015, Shia militia members abducted 125 Sunni Arab residents of Naeband Tareq Douri villages in the Albo-Khadda and Jalam areas of al-Dour. Their
whereabouts are unknown.138
On 9 June 2015, a video appeared on social media showing men, wearing what
appeared to be police uniforms, burning a cadaver and shouting sectarian chants.
According to sources the corpse was found near al-Alam sub-district in Salah al-Din.139
On 18-19 October 2015, PMU destroyed and burned public and private properties in
Baiji, Salah al-Din Governorate. Houses of residents believed to be associated with ISIL
were burnt.140
On 22 October 2015, PMUs abducted at least 175 civilians from the Askari and Tin
areas of Tuz Khurmatu, Salah al-Din province. The victims were Sunni Arabs who had
been displaced to Tuz Khurmatu since June 2014. A day later the bodies of threeabductees were found.141
Between 1 and 5 March 2016, 500 to 550 Sunni males from the Khumrani and Juza
villages, in the Jazeera Tikrit area were taken away by Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq following asecurity operation carried out jointly by Federal police and militias. Residents
reported mistreatment during the incident or while being held.142
On 11 April 2016, the bodies of five civilians were found in Baiji district, north of Tikrit.
The victims were part of a group of Sunni men who were abducted some days before.
According to sources the perpetrators belonged to a militia group that operates under
the PMU.143
In September 2016, PMUs destroyed hundreds of homes in the village of al-Aithah,situated outside Tikrit, Salah al-Din province.144

136 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30

September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 18.
137 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 September – 10 December
2014, 23 February 2015, url, pp. 19-20.
138 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014 - 30 April
2015, 13 July 2015, url, p. 27.
139 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 May – 31 October 2015,
11 January 2016, url, p. 21.
140 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 May – 31 October 2015,
11 January 2016, url, pp. 26-27.
141 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 May – 31 October 2015,
11 January 2016, url, p. 22.
142 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 17.
143 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 17.
144 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Displacement, detention of suspected “ISIS families” – Troops force residents out,demolish homes, 5 November 2017, url.

30 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALSOn 22 September 2016, Sunni Mobilization Forces killed two alleged members of ISIL
in Etha village, northern Shirqat district (Salah al-Din province). The following day they
killed another alleged member of ISIL in Shukran village, also situated in Shirqat
District. On 26 September 2016 the same perpetrators killed two alleged ISIL
members in Jumela village, Shirqat district. On 30 September 2016 they killed anotheralleged ISIL member in Etha village.145
On 1 October 2016, Sunni Mobilization Forces, specifically the Shirqat Mobilisation,
together with PMUs destroyed about 52 residential houses in different villages of
Shirqat district. The houses allegedly belonged to well-known ISIL members.146
On 29 November 2016, Farsan al-Jubour, a militia made up of Sunni fighters,summarily executed at least four men they suspected of affiliation with ISIL. These
executions took place in Shayalat al-Imam village, situated 70 kilometres south of
Mosul in Salah al-Din Governorate. Army forces were present but did not intervene.147

BasrahIn the summer of 2014 at least 19 Sunni civilian men were killed and a further 19
injured in a spate of targeted killings and abductions in Basrah. Anonymous threats
were issued to several Sunni mosques and the houses of Sunni citizens in some areasof Abu Khaseeb district were marked with an ‘X’. Authorities listed the perpetratorsas ‘unidentified gunmen’. The local community expressed the view that the victims
were targeted for no other reason than their faith.148
On 8 October 2014 three members of the Sunni community were abducted in andaround Basrah in public places during daylight hours. Media and local sources allegedthat militias had carried out the abductions. UNAMI continued to receive reports from
Basrah of abductions believed to stem from the activities of militias active in thearea.149

Diyala

On 24-26 November 2014, militias destroyed at least four Sunni Mosques in Saadiya
and five in Jalawla (Diyala Governorate), according to unverified reports.150
On 3 December 2014, ISF assisted by members of a militia arrested a man alleged to
be an ISIL-leader in Saadiya (Diyala province). He was executed the following day.151
On 23 January 2015, four Sunni mosques were destroyed by Shia militia in
Muqdadiya. Homes were also destroyed.152

145 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2016, 30 August 2017, url, p. 13.
146 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2016, 30 August 2017, url, p. 14.
147 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: executions by government-backed militia – Government forces did not intervene,

respond, 18 December 2016, url; Human Rights Watch, Integrating Iraqi fighting forces is not enough, 6 January
2017, url.
148 UNAMI, SRGS Mladenov warns against increased targeting of Sunni minorities in Basra governorate, 20 August
2014, url.
149 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 September – 10 December
2014, 23 February 2015, url, p. 21.
150 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 September – 10 December
2014, 23 February 2015, url, p. 21.
151 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 September – 10 December
2014, 23 February 2015, url, p. 20.
152 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014 - 30 April
2015, 13 July 2015, url, p. 29.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

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— 31

On 26 January 2015, Shia militias and security forces killed at least 56 Sunni Muslims
in Barwana, situated in Diyala province. The killings were possibly revenge acts after
the killings of Shia militia men and government forces by ISIL in previous days.153
On 10 August 2015, a Sunni man went missing in Baquba after being stopped by PMU
militiamen. In retaliation for a bomb attack in a predominantly Shia area in Baqubathat day, some 30 Sunni men were rounded up.154
On 11 January 2016, attackers alleged by witnesses to be militia members operating
under PMU – detonated explosives against and set fire to at least six Sunni mosquesin Muqdadiya district, north-east of Baquba.155 Abductions and killings were also
reported.156
On 2 March 2016, gunmen allegedly belonging to the PMU stormed three houses in
al-Ahemar village, west of Muqdadiya. Three adult male civilians, belonging to theSunni Arab community, were killed.157
On 18 July 2016, in Diyala, gunmen, alleged by witnesses to be Shia militia members,
shot and killed one civilian near his home in eastern Kan’an sub-district, in Baquba
district. The victim was an employee of a health clinic in Kan’an, who was also a civilsociety activist from the Sunni Arab community.158
On 13 August 2016, PMU members conducted a raid in villages of Zaghniya Kabira andZaghniya Saghira, in Abbara sub-district, north-east of Baquba, abducting at least four
Sunni residents. The bodies of two abductees with gunshot wounds were later foundin a nearby farm.159

Anbar
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Since late 2014 members of KH have forcibly disappeared hundreds of men and boysat al-Razzaza checkpoint, which separates Anbar and Karbala governorates.160
In March 2016, a teacher who escaped from the district of al-Qaem went missing after
he was taken away for questioning by PMU militiamen at the Razzazza checkpoint, on
the road from Anbar Governorate to Baghdad.161
On 27 May 2016, during the military operation to retake Fallujah from ISIL, at least 80
men and boys were detained and abducted by members of armed groups operatingin support of ISF, after they fled al-Sejar, in the Abo Sdyrah area, Shyha.162
In June 2016 Iraqi forces, including PMUs, detained and disappeared at least 70 men
from Karma, a town north-east of Fallujah.163

153 AI, Iraq: Barwana massacre-Botched investigation, families waiting for justice, 10 June 2015, url; Human Rights

Watch, Iraq: Militias escalate abuses, possibly war crimes, 15 February 2015, url.
154 AI, Punished for Daesh’s crimes: Displaced Iraqis abused by militias and government forces, 18 October 2016,
url, p. 28.
155 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 20.
156 AI, Iraq: Militia war crimes in Muqdadiya highlights authorities’ persistent failures to hold them to account, 5February 2016, url.
157 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 18.
158 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2016, 30 August 2017, url, p. 14.
159 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2016, 30 August 2017, url, p. 14.
160 AI, Punished for Daesh’s crimes: Displaced Iraqis abused by militias and government forces, 18 October 2016,
url, pp. 8, 27, 28.
161 AI, Punished for Daesh’s crimes: Displaced Iraqis abused by militias and government forces, 18 October 2016,
url, p. 27.
162 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 19.
163 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Anbar displaced barred from going home, 2 November 2017, url.

32 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

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In July 2016 local media quoting the Chair of the Anbar Provincial Council reported
that PMUs had destroyed and burned down several mosques in Fallujah.164
During military operations to retake the town of Fallujah (Al-Anbar) and surrounding
areas from ISIL in May/June 2016. Hundreds of men and boys reportedly went missing
after having been taken into custody by forces affiliated with the PMUs.165
In October 2016, houses in Ramadi, Falujah, Heet and other areas of return in Anbar
were marked for eviction on accusation of affiliation with ISIL.166 As many police, ISF
and PMU units relocated towards Mosul, tribal fighters were the major players inthese returns area. According to estimates hundreds of families were evicted.167
In November 2016, authorities in Heet district (Anbar Governorate) published twolists, accusing 35 families of affiliation with ISIL. They were ordered to leave theirhomes, with threats to kill those who refused to leave.168
On 19 November 2016, ISF and PMUs from Karbala Governorate arrested 14 civilians
in al-Nukhayb (Anbar governorate). The following day six more civilians werearrested.169
On 11 November 2017, in al-Obeidi village of Qaim district, Anbar, a house belonging
to an alleged ISIL member was burnt.170

Ninewa

On 25 January 2015, members of a Yazidi militia attacked two Arab villages, Jiri and
Sibaya (Ninewa Governorate). It was reported that 21 residents were killed, forty
others were abducted, 17 of whom are still missing. Half of those killed were elderlyor disabled men and women and children. Houses were looted and burned.171
In November 2015, after the recapture of Sinjar by Peshmerga forces and associatedforces, Yazidi armed groups reportedly engaged in retaliatory attacks against Sunni
Arab civilians and property.172
On 14 November 2015, a Yazidi armed group entered the Sunni Arab villages N’eni’aand Golat, north-east of Sinjar in Ninewa Governorate, and looted and destroyed
property. The next day another Yazidi armed group shot and injured the village chiefand his brother in the Kurdish village Qabousiya, also situated in Ninewa
Governorate.173

164 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30

September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 21.
165 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Key Concerns for Impending Mosul Battle, 6 October 2016, url; AI, Punished for
Daesh’s crimes: Displaced Iraqis abused by militias and government forces, 18 October 2016, url; Human Rights
Watch, Iraq: Fallujah Abuses Inquiry Mired in Secrecy, 7 July 2016, url; UN News, Iraq: Security Reform, State
Control of Armed Groups Priorities at ‘Critical Junction,’ UN Envoy Says, 15 July 2016, url; UN Security Council, 4th
Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 7 of Resolution 2233 (2015), 5 July 2016, url, p. 8; UN
OHCHR, Zeid Condemns ISIL Atrocities in Iraq, Urges Release of Hundreds Abducted after Fleeing Fallujah, 5 July
2016, url; Reuters, Special Report: Massacre Reports Show U.S. Inability to Curb Iraq Militias, 23 August 2016, url;
Al Jazeera, Fallujah Civilians: 'Militias Take Turns to Torture Us', 16 June 2016, url.
166 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2016, 30 August 2017, url, pp. 4-5.
167 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2016, 30 August 2017, url, p. 5.
168 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2016, 30 August 2017, url, p. 5.
169 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2016, 30 August 2017, url, p. 14.
170 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, p. 3.
171 AI, Iraq: Revenge attacks in Sinjar – Arab civilians pay the price for IS crimes, 10 June 2015, url; AI, A deadly spiralof sectarian violence- a year on from IS onslaught on Iraq, 10 June 2015, url.
172 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 16.
173 UN Security Council, Second report of the Secretary- General pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 2233 (2015),
26 January 2016, url, pp. 10-11.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

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Around 21 October 2016, members of the Iraqi Federal Police were said to have killed
six men in the Shura sub-district of Mosul.174
In late October 2016, the Hashd al-Asha’iri Fares al-Sabawy militia detained and beatat least 22 men from two villages near Mosul.175 These events took place in the villageof al-Makuk, near Mosul.176
On 25 November 2016, a group of armed men allegedly wearing Iraqi Army uniforms
abducted an Imam in al-Qayyarah, south of Mosul. A day later his body was brought
to a local medical centre.177
On 21 January 2017, a video was posted on social media showing men in army andpolice uniforms killing three men in civilian clothing in Mosul city.178
In February 2017, home evictions and subsequent destructions of buildings werecommitted by PMUs in several villages situated south-west of Mosul.179
On 5 February 2017, a video emerged on social media showing men – some of whom
wearing what appear to be Iraqi Army uniforms – killing one individual in eastern
Mosul.180
On 6 February 2017, the commander of the Christian Mobilization Units, also known
as the Babylon Mobilization Unit, ordered Sunni Arabs to vacate Tilkef district, Ninewa
Governorate; 34 Sunni Arab community members fled to Mosul.181
On 28 April 2017, at least 170 men were abducted while they were fleeing from Hatra
district reportedly towards Hamam al-Alil district (Ninewa Governorate). One source
reported that they were taken away by PMUs. PMUs denied involvement.182
On 5 May 2017, the al- Sab’awi Tribal Committee, chaired by the leader of the alSab’awi Sunni Tribal Mobilization Unit, decided to evict ISIL members and theirfamilies from all the villages in Mosul district where the al-Sab’awi tribe are themajority. On 16 May 2017 the forced evictions process was halted, although by thattime some suspects had already been evicted.183
On 18 June 2017, a number of Ninewa policemen were arrested on charges of killing
two civilians on 14 May 2017, while searching for ISIL affiliated persons in the ISFcontrolled al-Intisar neighbourhood in Mosul.184
On 11 July 2017, a video posted online showed men in military uniform beating
several captives. One of them was dragged to the edge of a wall, then thrown off and

174 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2016, 30 August 2017, url, p. 13.
175 Human Rights Watch, Integrating Iraqi fighting forces is not enough, 6 January 2017, url.
176 AI, Iraq: Tribal militia tortured detainees in revenge attacks during Mosul offensive, 2 November 2016, url; AI,

Iraq: Nowhere to run, 22 December 2016, url.
177 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the context of the Ninewa Operations and the retakingof Mosul City, 17 October 2016 – 10 July 2017, 2 November 2017, url, p. 27.
178 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the context of the Ninewa Operations and the retakingof Mosul City, 17 October 2016 – 10 July 2017, 2 November 2017, url, p. 25.
179 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Looting, destruction by forces fighting ISIS- no apparent military necessity for homedemolitions, 16 February 2017, url.
180UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the context of the Ninewa Operations and the retakingof Mosul City, 17 October 2016 – 10 July 2017, 2 November 2017, url, p. 25.
181 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the context of the Ninewa Operations and the retakingof Mosul City, 17 October 2016 – 10 July 2017, 2 November 2017, url, p. 27.
182 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the context of the Ninewa Operations and the retakingof Mosul City, 17 October 2016 – 10 July 2017, 2 November 2017, url, p. 35.
183 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the context of the Ninewa Operations and the retakingof Mosul City, 17 October 2016 – 10 July 2017, 2 November 2017, url, p. 39.
184 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the context of the Ninewa Operations and the retakingof Mosul City, 17 October 2016 – 10 July 2017, 2 November 2017, url, p. 35.

34 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALSshot numerous times as he lay on the ground by a river. Another man, already lying
on the ground, is also shot numerous times by the uniformed men.185
On 22 July 2017, video footage online showed Iraqi police beating an alleged ISILmember earlier that month in western Mosul. Upon investigation, Iraq’s Minister ofInterior gave orders to jail the perpetrators, who had been identified as policemen.186

KirkukIn September 2017 units of the PMUs affiliated with the Badr Organization detained
and beat villagers during the battle to take the city of Hawija. Four men werereportedly taken away and killed.187

1.2.3 Targeting by KRG Forces
Kurdistan Region of Iraq
Sources interviewed by the DIS/Landinfo during a 2018 fact-finding mission to KRI noted that
‘Kurdish security forces have full control over the KRI and there are no Iraqi federal security
forces operating inside the KRI.’188 The report further assessed that ‘security forces in the KRI
are also targeting suspected ISIS affiliates who are often Sunni Arabs’ whereas the PMUs and
ISF don’t have the capacity to operate in Kurdish areas.189
In its World Report 2018, Human Rights Watch observes the battle against ISIL afforded KRG
forces the latitude to carry out serious abuses under the guise of fighting terrorism.190 Human
Rights Watch reported that ‘the judicial systems of both the federal Iraqi and the KRG
authorities are prosecuting thousands ISIL suspects under their respective counterterrorism
legislation, primarily for membership in or providing support to ISIS.’191 Human Rights Watch
added that ISIL suspects are being held in ‘overcrowded and in some cases inhumane
conditions’.192
In a December 2017 report Human Rights Watch expressed its concern about government
forces detaining suspects ‘with little real evidence or grounds’. Besides widespread arbitrary
detention of ISIL suspects, there are ‘numerous allegations of torture in the course of security
forces’ interrogations’.193 Human Rights Watch has documented allegations of torture by KRG
forces holding ISIL suspects. For instance, out of 19 child ISIL suspects held by the KRG andinterviewed by Human Rights Watch, seventeen said that Asayish forces tortured them inorder to extract confessions.194 Furthermore, Human Rights Watch described the prosecution

185UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the context of the Ninewa Operations and the retakingof Mosul City, 17 October 2016 – 10 July 2017, 2 November 2017, url, p. 36.
186 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, p. 7.
187 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Investigate abuses in Hawija operation, 28 September 2017, url.
188 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, pp. 23, 24.
189 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, pp. 24-25.
190 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2018 - Iraq, 18 January 2018, url.
191 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2018 - Iraq, 18 January 2018, url.
192 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2018 - Iraq, 18 January 2018, url.
193 Human Rights Watch, Flawed Justice. Accountability for ISIS crimes in Iraq, December 2017, url, p. 21.
194 Human Rights Watch, Flawed Justice. Accountability for ISIS crimes in Iraq, December 2017, url, p. 51.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 35

of ISIL suspects in Kurdish courts as flawed, relying exclusively on an expired counterterrorism
law and based on confessions and written witness testimony.195
During a fact-finding mission to the KRI in September and October 2015 Public Aid
Organization (PAO)/Kurdish Human Rights Watch (KHRW) informed the Danish Immigration
Service that the Kurdish authorities generally view Sunni Arabs as part of ISIL until the opposite
is proven. Even Sunni Arabs who have lived in KRI for a long period of time might experience
difficulties crossing border checkpoints or checkpoints inside KRI.196

Disputed territories under de facto Kurdish control (up until October 2017)
Areas of the disputed territories of Iraq, including Kirkuk, came under Kurdish Peshmerga
control during 2014 and up to October 2017, KRG ‘de facto’ controlled some of those areas.
However, as a consequence of a Kurdish referendum on independence on
25 September 2017, the ISF in cooperation with the PMUs took back control of most of the
disputed areas on 16 and 17 October 2017, which had previously been under control of theKurdish Peshmerga.197 Therefore, this section deals with examples from the areas prior to theloss of Kurdish control and regaining of ISF presence in the disputed territories.
Concerning the actions of KRG-government forces, the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,summary or arbitrary executions in Iraq mentions in a June 2018 report retaliatory attacks by
Kurdish security forces and associated Peshmerga and Yazidi armed groups, against Sunni
Arab civilians and property following the recapturing or territory from ISIL.198 In a December
2017 report Human Rights Watch noted that since 2014, units of the KRG have carried out
mass destruction of civilian property in areas recaptured from ISIL.199 In a November 2016
report Human Rights Watch reported on the demolition of buildings and homes by Kurdish
security forces in seventeen villages in Kirkuk and four in Ninewa between September 2014
and May 2016. In a further 62 villages satellite imagery provided evidence of destruction after
Kurdish security forces recaptured them. KRG President Massoud Barzani informed Human
Rights Watch in July 2016 ‘that the KRG would not allow Sunni Arabs to return to villages that
had been ”Arabized” by former President Saddam Hussein’ considering that they are rightfully
Kurdish lands.200 The Human Rights Watch report further remarked that ‘such territorial claims
lend credence to the belief of many Arabs that KRG security forces may have carried out
demolitions for the purpose of preventing or dissuading Arabs from returning there.’201
Human Rights Watch explained that in the 'disputed areas', and in several cases in KRI, there
are examples of Arabs arrested on suspicion of being ISIL members and deported.202 In 2015,
Human Rights Watch observed that in Kurdish areas there is ‘a steady stream of people beingarrested on the suspicion of being ISIS supporters’, despite a ‘striking absence of reports of

195 Human Rights Watch, Flawed Justice. Accountability for ISIS crimes in Iraq, December 2017, url, pp. 36-40.
196 Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI); fact finding mission, 26 September to 6 October 2015, 12 April

2016, url, p. 27
197 US, CRS, Iraq: Issues in the 115th Congress, 4 October 2018, url, pp. 1-2, 10-12.
198 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions
on her mission to Iraq [A/HRC/38/44/Add.1], 20 June 2018, url, p. 9.
199 Human Rights Watch, Flawed Justice. Accountability for ISIS crimes in Iraq, December 2017, url, p. 19.
200 Human Rights Watch, Marked with an ‘X’. Iraqi Kurdish forces’ destruction of villages, homes in conflict with
ISIS, November 2016, url, p. 3.
201 Human Rights Watch, Marked with an ‘X’. Iraqi Kurdish forces’ destruction of villages, homes in conflict with
ISIS, November 2016, url, p. 3.
202 Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI); fact finding mission, 26 September to 6 October 2015, 12 April
2016, url, p. 31.

36 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

suspected IS fighters in the prisons throughout KRI’.203 UNHCR informed the DIS that thepossibility to seek protection from the authorities in KRI and other Kurdish controlled areas incase of harassment based on religious and/or ethnic affiliation depends on the personalconnections of the person in question.204
In a November 2016 report Amnesty International reported that since mid-2014 hundreds ofthousands of IDPs have found shelter in Kirkuk, ‘raising fears among Kurdish leaders andresidents about the impact of the population movement on the demographic composition of
the governorate’.205 Following a surprise attack by ISIL on Kirkuk Governorate on
21 October 2016, Arab IDPs and Arab residents of the governorate suffered a backlash. The
authorities in Kirkuk demolished the homes of hundreds of Sunni Arab residents of Kirkuk andArab IDPs were displaced to camps or expelled from Kirkuk Governorate.206
Discussing the security situation in the disputed territories in 2016, UNHCR informed theDanish Immigration Service that, generally speaking, young single men faced higher
harassment rates based on their religious or ethnic affiliation than other profiles, stating that‘a Sunni Arab with no connections would potentially face a higher risk of harassment.’207
Human Rights Watch informed the Danish Immigration Service that the Asayish and thePeshmerga forces rounded up suspected ISIL supporters or members in Kirkuk, and there areconcerns about their due process rights and a general suspicion of Sunni Arab Iraqis. The
source further stated that ‘there are reports from 2014 that several dozens of Arab men havebeen assassinated around Kirkuk, allegedly by Kurdish forces or Shia militias.’208
The following are examples of treatment of local population by KRG forces in disputed
territories under de facto Kurdish control up to October 2017.209
Ninewa

Since regaining control of Zummar, west of Mosul, in late October 2014, Peshmerga
and associated forces conducted ‘retaliatory attacks’ against Sunni Arab civilians inthe sub-district after retaking control from ISIL and causing ‘scores’ of Sunni Arabfamilies to relocate to Mosul or Syria.210
On 22 April 2015, Peshmerga members expelled Sunni Arab residents from the village
of Sahl al-Malih, southern Zummar sub-district and set fire to their homes, accusing
them of supporting ISIL.211

203 Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI); fact finding mission, 26 September to 6 October 2015, 12 April

2016, url, p. 39.
204 Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI); fact finding mission, 26 September to 6 October 2015, 12 April
2016, url, p. 51.
205 AI, ‘Where are we supposed to go?’. Destruction and forced displacement in Kirkuk, 7 November 2016, url, p.
8.
206 AI, ‘Where are we supposed to go?’. Destruction and forced displacement in Kirkuk, 7 November 2016, url, p.
5.
207 Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI); fact finding mission, 26 September to 6 October 2015, 12 April
2016, url, p. 29.
208 Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI); fact finding mission, 26 September to 6 October 2015, 12 April
2016, url, pp. 33-34.
209 Perceived ISIL affiliation is not necessarily explicitly cited as the reason for the committed abuses in theexamples cited.
210 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014 - 30 April
2015, 13 July 2015, url, p. 27.
211 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014 - 30 April
2015, 13 July 2015, url, p. 30.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS











— 37

In mid-November 2015, at least 156 Sunni Arab families from three villages (al-Golat,
Aeiashat, and Neaineea'a) were displaced by military operations conducted by
Kurdish security forces to liberate Sinjar district. Whilst some of them were captured
by ISIL, others were stopped by Peshmerga forces as they attempted to access safe
areas. Between 5 and 16 February, Peshmerga prevented food items from reaching
the families, alleging that they were infiltrated by ISIL elements. A number of villagers
died.212
On 14 January 2016, Peshmerga forces destroyed more than 20 houses belonging toSunni Arab families in Der Um Toutha village, Wana sub-district, Tal Kaif. After thearea was retaken by Peshmerga in February 2015, villagers were forcibly displaced
and Sunni Arab families were barred from returning.213
On 17 April 2016, Asayish ordered 26 families (317 individuals), all Sunni Arabs from
Aski Mosul town, Huthema and Tal Thahab villages, to prepare to leave the areas thefollowing day for security reasons. On 18 April, they were relocated to the Garmawa
IDP camp (Dohuk Governorate). Leaving this camp was reportedly only allowed withwritten permission of Asayish.214
The KRG placed restrictions on the movement of goods into and out of the district ofSinjar, thus limiting the access to food, water, livelihoods, and other fundamental
rights of the local Yazidi population, Human Rights Watch reports in December
2016.215
Between 28 August and 3 September 2017, Asayish security forces allegedly carriedout mass executions of alleged ISIL fighters in their custody. Approximately 30 were
killed and buried in a mass grave in the village of Bardiya, Ninewa Governorate.216
Kurdish authorities denied the allegations.217

Kirkuk

On 8 February 2015, Peshmerga members allegedly destroyed a number of villages insouth-west Kirkuk to prevent ISIL from using them as a base from where to attack
Kirkuk.218
On 2 and 3 August 2015, Peshmerga forces allegedly destroyed civilian houses andgovernment buildings in Dibis district, Kirkuk. In Mullah-Abdullah sub-district, Kirkuk
similar destruction took place.219
On 9 October 2016, Kirkuk authorities (including Peshmerga, Asayish, and Police)
forcefully evicted between 3 000 and 4 000 residents of Qara Tapa village, Kirkuk
Governorate. Houses were reportedly burnt and destroyed.220

212 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30

September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 25.
213 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 21.
214 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 16.
215 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: KRG Restrictions Harm Yezidi Recovery - Disproportionate Limits on Goods Entering,
Leaving Sinjar, 4 December 2016, url.
216 Human Rights Watch, Kurdistan Regional Government: allegations of mass executions, 8 February 2018, url.
217 Human Rights Watch, KRG Response to war crimes Allegations in Iraq falls short, 5 April 2018, url.
218 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014 - 30 April
2015, 13 July 2015, url, p. 29.
219 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 May – 31 October 2015,
11 January 2016, url, p. 26.
220 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2016, 30 August 2017, url, p. 5.

38 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALSOn 21 October 2016, in Qutan Village in Pajwan sub-district of Kirkuk district,
Peshmerga forces evicted residents. KDP Asayish forces transported the detained
residents to Laylan camp a couple of days later and completely or partially demolished
all the houses in Qutan village, except for six belonging to Turkmen families.221
On 24 October 2016, KDP security forces evicted approximately 30 families of Qush
Qaya Village, in Pajwan sub-district of Kirkuk.222
In November 2016 Peshmerga destroyed houses, buildings and even entire villages inthe territories they recently conquered. Human Rights Watch mentions 17 villages in
Kirkuk and 4 in Ninewa governorates, specifically the sub-district of Zummar.223

Diyala

On 16 August 2015, Peshmerga forces demolished an unknown number of houses andstructures in Sunni-inhabited areas in Jalawla, Diyala Governorate.224

1.3 Internally displaced persons
In its October 2018 report the UN Security Council notes that more than 1.8 million people
remain displaced inside Iraq, many of whom express an unwillingness to return to their areasof origin because of ‘concerns regarding security and community reconciliation, thedestruction of property, insufficient services and livelihoods and the lack of progress inclearing explosive hazards’.225 As of 30 September 2018 the UN Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) reports that more than 4 million displaced people returned
home in Iraq. More than 1.9 million remain displaced, 50 % of whom have been displaced formore than three years.226 Some internally displaced persons face denial of return to theirregion of origin227, whilst others are forced to return.228 Denial of access to areas ofdisplacement was also reported229 as were abuses against IDPs committed by elements of the
ISF and associated forces, especially on account of their perceived support or collaboration
with ISIL.230

221 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2016, 30 August 2017, url, p. 5.
222 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2016, 30 August 2017, url,, p. 5.
223 Human Rights Watch, Iraqi Kurdish forces’ destruction of villages, homes in conflict with ISIS, 13 November

2016, url, p. 1.
224 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 May – 31 October 2015,
11 January 2016, url, p. 21.
225 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2421 (2018) Report of the Secretary-General [S/2018/975],
31 October 2018, url, p. 12.
226 UNOCHA, Iraq: Timeline of displacements and returns (as of 30 September 2018), 8 October 2018, url.
227 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, p. 6; IOM, Obstacles
to return in retaken areas of Iraq, 31 March 2017, url; AI, Punished for Daesh’s crimes: Displaced Iraqis abused bymilitias and government forces, 18 October 2016, url, p. 59.
228 NRC, The long road home: achieving durable solutions to displacement in Iraq, lessons from returns in Anbar,
27 February 2018, url, p. 4; Grisgraber, D., Too much too soon: Displaced Iraqis and the push to return home,
September 2017, url, p. 12.
229 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014 - 30 April
2015, 13 July 2015, url, p. 8.
230 AI, ‘Where are we supposed to go?’. Destruction and forced displacement in Kirkuk, 7 November 2016, url, p.
17; AI, Punished for Daesh’s crimes: Displaced Iraqis abused by militias and government forces, 18 October 2016,
url, p. 1.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 39

1.3.1 Denial of return
In September 2018 UNHCR reported that ‘tribal leaders, security actors and communities
continue to impede or deny permission to families with perceived links to extremists to returnto areas of origin in Anbar, Kirkuk and Ninewa’.231 Denied returns were reported in several
camps in Ninewa. Security actors forcibly relocated at least 22 families from villages near
Mosul to camps in Ninewa. It concerned female-headed households alleged to haveaffiliations with extremists.232 In Abbassi sub-district in Kirkuk Governorate governmentaffiliated armed groups instructed the Mukhtars to direct families perceived to haveaffiliations with extremists to leave the area for Kirkuk city or camps within one week. The
Mayor of Abbassi, however, referred the issue to the Governor of Kirkuk and the action was
suspended.233 In August 2018, 46 families from Kirkuk, Ninewa and Salah al-Din governorates
indicated to have been re-displaced to camps across Ninewa after being prevented or forced
to leave by armed actors in their area of origin.234
In a July 2018 report UNHCR noted ‘incidents of recruitment of returnees into governmentaffiliated armed groups continue to be reported in parts of Diyala and Ninewa. According tosome reports, groups who control the areas make returns conditional on the commitment offamilies to enlist one or more male family members.’235 In the same report UNHCR informedthat two groups of IDPs have been prevented from returning to Garma district in Anbar and
Al-Refeat in Balad district (Salah al-Din).236
UNHCR reported in May 2018 that 150 families were not allowed to return to the al-Rutba
district of Anbar, because of family ties with extremist groups. Earlier problems concerning
return to Falluja and other towns in Anbar were also reported.237 The Internet newspaper
Niqash noted the security vetting for a return to Anbar is very strict, and nobody is allowed toreturn without security clearance by several authorities. Niqash also stated that returnees still
get arrested as terrorism suspects, even though they are in possession of documents statingthat they do not pose any security risk.238
In April 2018 Amnesty International observed that government forces, including PMUs andTribal mobilisation militias, have been preventing families with perceived ties to ISIL fromreturning to their home or places of origin. Iraqi forces, including the PMUs, have also
regularly arrested and forcibly disappeared men with perceived ISIL ties directly from IDP
camps. Sexual exploitation of women in IDP camps by members of the PMUs was also
reported.239
In its report on human rights in Iraq in the July to December 2017 period, UNAMI notes its
concern about attempts to deny IDPs the right to return to their homes as well as attempts to

231 UNHCR, Iraq protection update-September 2018, 30 September 2018, url, p. 2.
232 UNHCR, Iraq protection update-September 2018, 30 September 2018, url, p. 2.
233 UNHCR, Iraq protection update-September 2018, 30 September 2018, url, p. 2.
234 UNHCR, Iraq Protection Update-August 2018, 31 August 2018, url, p. 3.
235 UNHCR, Iraq protection update-July 2018, 31 July 2018, url, p. 2.
236 UNHCR, Iraq protection update-July 2018, 31 July 2018, url, p. 2.
237 UNHCR, Iraq Situation: UNHCR Flash Update, 31 May 2018, url.
238 Niqash, Fact or Friction? Anbar Locals Worry As They See Extremist-Allied Neighbours Returning Home, 29March 2018, url.
239 AI, The condemned. Women and children isolated, trapped and exploited in Iraq, 17 April 2018, url, pp. 17, 29,
34, 36.

40 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

intimidate those who support their return.240 Reporting on human rights in Iraq in the July to
December 2016 period, UNAMI indicated there were ‘reports that IDPs attempting to returnto their places of origin faced hostility from local Government authorities, including threats offorced eviction, and at times destruction of property, harassment, threats, abductions, andkillings at the hands of armed groups operating in those areas.’241
In a March 2017, report IOM explained that ‘of those IDPs who tried to return, 23 % were notallowed to do so whether through intentional delays by local authorities in processing the
documentation required to organize the return, or blockages at checkpoints.’242
In October 2016 Amnesty International reported that Sunni IDPs have been prevented fromreturning home: ‘In parts of Diyala and Salah al-Din governorates, Sunni IDPs have been
prevented from returning to their towns and villages through a mix of complicatedbureaucratic procedures and requirements, and intimidatory tactics, including abductions,arbitrary detention and, in the case of Diyala, even extrajudicial executions.’243
UNAMI reported that all through 2016 the return of Sunni IDPs to Jurf al-Sakhr (Babil province)
was hindered by militias.244 Jurf al-Sakhr has been renamed Jurf al-Nasr, and residents werebarred from returning home. According to a Sunni MP ‘banning the people of Jurf al-Sakhar
from returning home is part of attempt to induce demographic change in this part of thecountry.’245

1.3.2 Eviction and forced return
In its protection update from August 2018, UNHCR stated that in the period from October
2017 up until August 2018, over 6 300 families in Salah al-Din, Anbar and Baghdad were
forcibly evicted from camps and informal settlements. In August 2018, evictions from Baghdad
were enforced by the Baghdad Operations Command (BOC). In Salah al-Din, local police forces
put pressure on IDPs in camps and informal settlements to return to their places of origin. 246
UNHCR further noted that ‘IDPs often leave Baghdad camps following eviction threats andsettle in nearby areas in the city in order to avoid being evicted despite not having security
clearance to live outside the camps. This makes them vulnerable to arrests or renewed
evictions’.247
UNHCR reported in July 2018, that a group which was forcibly returned from a camp in
Baghdad to return to Salah al-Din has been denied access to their place of origin by theauthorities in Balad district, Salah al-Din, and has been living in a train station in Balad since
early February 2018. The lack of coordination between the respective authorities led to thissituation and ‘despite extensive advocacy with local authorities, no solution has beenfound.’248

240 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, p. 6.
241 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2016, 30 August 2017, url, p. 3.
242 IOM, Obstacles to return in retaken areas of Iraq, 31 March 2017, url, Executive Summary
243 AI, Punished for Daesh’s crimes: Displaced Iraqis abused by militias and government forces, 18 October 2016,

url, p. 59.
244 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2016, 30 August 2017, url, p. 4.
245 Niqash, Security or demographics? Why Babel province has a ghost town, 30 August 2017, url.
246 UNHCR, Iraq Protection Update – August 2018, 31 August 2018, url, p. 4.
247 UNHCR, Iraq Protection Update – August 2018, 31 August 2018, url, p. 3.
248 UNHCR, Iraq Protection Update – July 2018, 31 July 2018, url.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 41

In its previous updates on the protection situation from June and July 2018, UNHCR mentions
various incidents where IDPs were forced or coerced to return to their places of origin or
relocate to other places in Anbar, Baghdad, Kirkuk, Salah al-Din and Ninewa. Different actors
like the BOC [Baghdad Operations Command], local authorities, Federal Police, Intelligence
Forces and local police were said to employ different methods to pressure IDPs to return:either notice was given that a camp or an informal settlement was about to be closed, or theidentity documents of IDPs were confiscated in order to force them to agree with a transfer.
UNHCR further reported threats to destroy personal belongings if the displaced persons did
not comply. Other cases involved letters issued by the governorate authorities to leave froma number of complexes within a given time frame.249
UNHCR asserted also, that in March 2018, at least 113 IDP families from Anbar were forced toleave the refugee camp al-Takiya in the al-Dora neighbourhood of Bagdad to regain theirresidences in Anbar. Most of these families were originating from al-Qa’im district at the
Syrian border. Families interviewed by UNHCR expressed concerns about the absence ofshelter and livelihood opportunities, and also about the security situation in and around alQa’im.250
Discussing returns to Anbar In a February 2018 report the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)
noted that ‘many of the returns taking place are premature and do not meet international
standards of safety, dignity, and voluntariness.’251 The report further mentioned that many
returns are unsustainable, as the security and habitability of some areas are not conducive toa permanent return for all people, leading to a situation where people are ‘pushed into
secondary displacement’.252
In a September 2017 report Refugees International informed that some IDPs are returning
because they are compelled to do so by the circumstances of their displacement, or becauseof the actions of local authorities. Although the government of Iraq recognizes that IDP returns
should not be forced, ‘there does appear to be not-so-subtle encouragement anddiscouragement by local officials to get people where they want them to go, and credible
accounts of activities that do appear to constitute forced return.’253
Baghdad

Late June 2018, Baghdad Operations Command informed camp management in a
number of camps in Baghdad that 45 families from Ninewa and 402 families from
Anbar would have to leave, in most cases to areas of origin.254
On 11 August 2018, residents of Al Jamea'a camp (45 families) in Karkh district,Baghdad were informed they would be evicted the following day. The following day
the majority of the families were transported to camps in Ninewa, and then continued
off on their own. Four families were transported to Anbar.255

249 UNHCR, Iraq Protection Update – July 2018, 31 July 2018, url; UNHCR, Iraq: Monthly Protection Update, 28 May- 1 July, 1 July 2018, url.
250 UNHCR, Anbar Protection Cluster, 31 March 2018, url.
251 NRC, The long road home: achieving durable solutions to displacement in Iraq, lessons from returns in Anbar,
27 February 2018, url, p. 4.
252 NRC, The long road home: achieving durable solutions to displacement in Iraq, lessons from returns in Anbar,
27 February 2018, url, p. 4.
253 Grisgraber, D., Too much too soon: Displaced Iraqis and the push to return home, September 2017, url, p. 12.
254 UNHCR, Iraq protection update - July 2018, 31 July 2018, url, p. 3.
255 UNHCR, Iraq Protection Update – August 2018, 31 August 2018, url, p. 3.

42 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALSSalah al-Din







On 2 July 2018, police confiscated identification documents (ID) of 370 IDP families
living in Shaqlawa complex in Tikrit. They were informed they would have to leave thesite. On 5 July 2018, nearly all families departed the complex.256
In July 2018, IDPs living in informal settlements in Qadissya neighbourhood in Tikrit
and in villages in Al Alam district were pressured to leave by the police.257
In the summer of 2018 a group of IDPs from Al-Refeat in Balad district (Salah al-Din)
was prevented from returning.258
On 1 August 2018, local police confiscated identification documents of 58 IDP families
living in Al Diom complex, Tikrit. They were informed they would need to leave thecomplex by the next morning. Although the evictions were not enforced, mostfamilies left the complex within the following week.259
On 7 September 2018, police visited Qadissiyah complex in Tikrit and instructed IDP
families from Baiji and Shirqat districts to leave within three days. On 10 and
11 September, the police entered Qadissiyah complex and began confiscating civil
documents and ordering IDPs to leave. By 16 September, more than 139 families had
left the complex – mostly returning to Baiji. The vast majority of these families
reported that they felt they had no choice except to leave following the document
confiscations. Most also reported that they were returning to severely damaged
houses.260

Kirkuk

Since late April 2018 forced relocation to camps in Kirkuk has been reported, affecting
at least 80 families (416 individuals). These relocations occurred mostly in May 2018
and were performed by security actors reportedly following an order of the acting
Governor of Kirkuk.261
In mid-July 2018, the Iraqi Intelligence and Federal Police forces evicted 14 families(77 individuals) originating from Hawija and Kirkuk districts from Kirkuk city centre tocamps due to their perceived affiliation with extremists.262

Anbar




On 22 September 2016, 12 persons from among recent returnees in Karma (Anbar
Governorate) were arrested by PMUs. Their whereabouts are unknown.263
In March 2017, PMU units arrived at the Amiriyat al-Fallujah and the Habbaniya
Tourist City IDP camps and confiscated the identity cards of at least 60 families, saying
they would get the cards back if they returned home.264
On 15 July 2018, approximately 84 families originating from Al Qa’im and Heet in
Anbar, living in AlKhalidiyah (AK) camps were instructed to return to their areas of

256 UNHCR, Iraq protection update - July 2018, 31 July 2018, url, p. 3.
257 UNHCR, Iraq protection update - July 2018, 31 July 2018, url, p. 3.
258 UNHCR, Iraq protection update - July 2018, 31 July 2018, url, p. 2.
259 UNHCR, Iraq Protection Update - August 2018, 31 August 2018, url, p. 4.
260 UNHCR, Iraq protection update - September 2018, 30 September 2018, url, p. 4.
261 UNHCR, Iraq protection update - July 2018, 31 July 2018, url, p. 3.
262 UNHCR, Iraq protection update - July 2018, 31 July 2018, url, p. 3.
263 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2016, 30 August 2017, url, p. 14.
264 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Anbar displaced barred from going home, 2 November 2017, url.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 43

origin through organised returns, although the majority of families wanted to remainin the camps due to concerns about security, and lack of services and shelter in areasof origin.265

1.3.3 Retaliatory violence
In a November 2016 report Amnesty International stated that ‘Sunni Arab IDPs in central Iraq
and the KR-I have frequently endured multiple abuses at the hands of different actors: whileliving in territories controlled by ISIL, in the course of their escape journeys, and in the very
places where they seek shelter and protection.’266 Reporting on human rights in Iraq in theJuly to December 2016 period UNAMI indicated there were ‘a number of reports that IDPs
faced hostility from local government authorities, including threats of forced eviction, and attimes destruction of property, harassment, threats, abductions, and killings at the hands ofarmed groups operating in those areas’.267 In December 2016 UNAMI reported that it
continued to receive ‘reports that in some areas, internally displaced persons were subjected
to harassment, threats, expulsions, destruction of property (including the deliberate
demolition of houses), and at times abductions and killings by armed groups operating in
support of ISF’.268
In October 2016 Amnesty International reported that since the emergence of ISIL, Al Qaeda,
and other armed groups, thousands of Sunni men and boys, including IDPs, have been
subjected to enforced disappearance by Iraqi security forces and militias. Some went missing
after having fled territories controlled by ISIL. Others were picked up from camps and othersettlements, checkpoints, homes, workplaces streets and other public places. Amnesty
International further notes that ‘all male IDPs considered of fighting age, roughly age 15-65,
who managed to flee territories under ISIL control are subject to opaque and flawed security
procedures.’269 In territories controlled by the Iraqi government these procedures are carriedout by ISF and PMU militias, as described by Amnesty International in 2016:‘Security screenings take place at temporary holding facilities or makeshift detention
centers. Typically, this involves checking names against computer databases and basic
questioning. While some detainees are released within days, others remain in limbo
for weeks or even months. Detainees are frequently held in inhuman and squalid
conditions, characterized by severe overcrowding, shortages of latrines and othersanitation facilities, and a lack of basic necessities including personal hygiene items.
Following initial screenings, detainees suspected of involvement with ISIL are
generally transferred into the custody of the Anti-Terrorism or Anti-Crime
Directorates of the Ministry of Interior in the cases of Anbar and Salah al-Din
governorates. (…) Little or no attempt is made to inform relatives of the whereaboutsof detainees or to provide detainees with means of communicating with the outside
world. There are severe delays in referring suspects to judicial authorities, denying
them the right to challenge the legality of their detention. In pre-arraignment
detention, which can last weeks or even months in contravention of Iraqi law and

265 UNHCR, Iraq protection update - July 2018, 31 July 2018, url, p. 3.
266 AI, ‘Where are we supposed to go?’. Destruction and forced displacement in Kirkuk, 7 November 2016, url, p.

17.
267 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2016, 30 August 2017, url, p. 3.
268 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, pp. ii, 24.
269 AI, Punished for Daesh’s crimes: Displaced Iraqis abused by militias and government forces, 18 October 2016,
url, p. 8.

44 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

Iraq’s international obligations, suspects are interrogated by members of security
forces without the presence of lawyers and are frequently denied family visits. In suchsituations, detainees are most vulnerable to torture and other ill-treatment, and may
be forced to sign or thumb-print statements.’270
In January 2016 UNAMI reported that many displaced persons are living in under-resourced
locations in poor conditions, and are subject to violence and abuse. According to UNAMI‘many IDPs have experienced threats, harassment and intimidation, including being rounded
up in police raids and arbitrarily arrested by security forces on mere suspicion of terrorism orother seemingly spurious pretext.’271
Examples of treatment of internally displaced persons by government forces and affiliatedarmed groups include the following. However it should be noted that the examples cited
pertain to incidents involving IDPs, without asserting the IDP’s status as a displaced person as
the sole reason for the treatment experienced.272
Baghdad

On 24 December 2014, two IDPs from Salah al-Din governorate were held captive
after being arrested by supposed PMU members on the road from Baghdad to
Samarra. One man was detained during 27 days and was subjected to torture. His
brother remains missing.273
On 29 April 2015 Iraqi police found the remains of two males: one in Amil, southwestern Baghdad, and another in Bayaa, eastern Baghdad. Reportedly the victims
were IDPs from Anbar, and their alleged killers belonged to a Shia militia. In Amil, Shia
militias threatened Anbar IDPs that they would be killed if they did not leave.274

Salah al-DinOn 13 October 2015, dozens of IDPs were rounded up from the Ishaqi IDP camp by
abductors believed to belong to the Saraya al-Salam militia. A number of theabductees disappeared.275
On 12 March 2016 unidentified gunmen, alleged to be militia members, abducted two
Sunni Arab IDPs in the Tin quarter of Tuz Khurmatu district.276
On 14 March 2016, members of a militia, allegedly AAH, used explosives to detonate
at least 20 houses belonging to Sunni Arab IDPs in the Aziz Balad area of Yathrib (Salah
al-Din Governorate).277

270 AI, Punished for Daesh’s crimes: Displaced Iraqis abused by militias and government forces, 18 October 2016,

url, p. 8.
271 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014 - 30 April
2015, 13 July 2015, url, p. 31.
272 Comment by the drafters of this report, Cedoca/Belgium
273 AI, Punished for Daesh’s crimes: Displaced Iraqis abused by militias and government forces, 18 October 2016,
url, p. 45.
274 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014 - 30 April
2015, 13 July 2015, url, p. 8.
275 AI, Punished for Daesh’s crimes: Displaced Iraqis abused by militias and government forces, 18 October 2016,
url,, p. 30.
276 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 25.
277 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 26.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS







— 45

In early 2016 there were several reports of disappearances of IDPs who had fled from
ISIL-controlled Hawija toward al-Alam (Salah al-Din province). Reportedly the malevictims disappeared during security screening by PMUs.278
On 25 June 2016, 12 family members were blindfolded and taken away by men
supposedly belonging to a PMU militia. They were interrogated and beaten severely.
Five days later they were dumped by the side of the road near the checkpoint near
the al-Baiji oil refinery where they had been seized.279
On 15 July 2016, IDPs passing through the Tuz Khurmatu checkpoint were severely
beaten by Turkmen fighters of the PMU.280
On 7 and 8 August 2016, military vehicles of the Samarra Operation Command drove
around the districts of Samarra, Dujail, Balad and the sub-districts of Dhuluya, Yathrib
and Ishaqi, using loudspeakers to warn the residents that they were not allowed toreceive any IDPs from north of Salah al-Din and south of Mosul areas, threatening thatthey would otherwise be expelled from their areas of residence.281

Kirkuk

On 14 April 2016, gunmen allegedly belonging to a militia operating under the PMU
killed an IDP from Ninewa in an industrial area south of Kirkuk city.282

Anbar






On 3 June 2016, members of PMUs intercepted thousands of IDPs fleeing an area in
the north of Fallujah and separated around 1 300 men and boys from the Al Mahamda
tribe.283 Over a period of several days, they were transferred by buses to unknown
locations. Of the 1 300, 605 were found to have been transferred to the custody of
local officials. An investigative committee set up by local authorities later confirmed
49 were dead and 643 remain missing to date.284
In late 2017 displaced people at camps in the town of Amriyat al-Fallujah (Anbar
Governorate) were forced to return home by security forces. Some camp residents
had to turn back because checkpoints manned by Shia militia were demanding bribesof up to USD 400 to let people through.285
Between 6 and 8 December 2017, three separate armed attacks against families who
had recently returned to their areas of origin in Ramadi and Garma district in Anbar
resulted in two men killed and eight persons injured. The families seem to have beentargeted because of alleged extremist links.286

278 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30

September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 26.
279 AI, Punished for Daesh’s crimes: Displaced Iraqis abused by militias and government forces, 18 October 2016,
url, pp. 44-45.
280 AI, Punished for Daesh’s crimes: Displaced Iraqis abused by militias and government forces, 18 October 2016,
url, p. 45.
281 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, pp. 26-27.
282 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 25.
283 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 19.
284 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions
on her mission to Iraq [A/HRC/38/44/Add.1], 20 June 2018, url, p. 8.
285 Reuters, Iraq returning displaced civilians from camps to unsafe areas, 7 January 2018, url.
286 UNHCR, Iraq: Bi-weekly Protection Update (8 - 24 December 2017), 24 December 2017, url.

46 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALSIn the summer of 2018, a group of IDPs was prevented from returning to Garma
district in Anbar.287
In July and August 2018, IDPs in AAF and Kilo 18 camps in Anbar faced freedom of
movement restrictions, including individuals seeking medical treatment.288

Ninewa and DiyalaIn 2018, IDPs in Ninewa reported incidents of harassment by armed actors, mostfrequently when passing through check points at the entrance and exit points of IDP
camps.289
In the summer of 2018 UNHCR documented ‘incidents of recruitment of returnees
into government-affiliated armed groups were reported in parts of Diyala andNinewa. According to some reports, groups who control the areas make returns
conditional on the commitment of families to enlist one or more male family
members.’290

1.3.4 Targeting by KRG Forces
Kurdistan Region of Iraq
In July 2018, IOM reported nearly 2 million people remain internally displaced in Iraq. Of
these, 349 782 reside in Dohuk, 217 506 in Erbil and 151 698 in Sulaimaniyah.291 A November
2018 report by DIS/Landinfo notes the situation regarding access to the KRI has improved.
However, legal norms, laws or formal policies are absent and procedures are subject tofrequent changes depending on security and political developments.292 With regard to thepossibility to gain residency in KRI, there are no legal norms and rules, but according to one
international source, the sponsorship requirement has been lifted for many cases. However,there are still groups that are required to have a sponsor to get residency in KRI. There are nopolicies, and procedures are subject to change. Conditions for residency among the three
governorates of Erbil, Dohuk and Sulaimaniyah vary considerably.293
Regarding the return of IDPs, the DIS/Landinfo report observes they must go through heavy
clearance procedures in order to reach their area of origin.294 Discussing the return of IDPs
from Kurdish territories to disputed areas the same source notes there are obstacles to returnand some groups are still not able to return at all. Security clearance by local security actors
is required, meaning the name of the IDP is checked through security databases. Those who
pass the clearance must register as returnee and are then allowed to return. However, there
have been reports of many cases of IDPs being disallowed to return, despite being allowed toleave the area of displacement. Local sheikhs and mukhtars play an important role in this287 UNHCR, Iraq protection update - July 2018, 31 July 2018, url, p. 2.
288 UNHCR, Iraq Protection Update – August 2018, 31 August 2018, url, p. 2.
289 UNHCR, Iraq Protection Update – August 2018, 31 August 2018, url, p. 1.
290 UNHCR, Iraq protection update - July 2018, 31 July 2018, url, p. 2.
291 IOM, Displacement tracking matrix – DTM Round 100, July 2018, url.
292 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)

in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 35.
293 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, pp. 36-38.
294 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 10.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 47

regard.295 Furthermore, the possibility of return depends largely on which militia controls thereturn area: ‘when IDPs return, they predominantly look at which militia or sectarian group
who controls the area. The communities look for protection by their own people, which meansthat Sunni Arabs want a Sunni militia; Christians want a Christian militia to protect themetc.’296 There have also been reports that a significant number of Sunni Arab IDPs, ‘originatingfrom villages in the disputed areas that the KRG do not want to populate with otherethnicities’, have not been allowed to return. Such has been the case with IDPs from thevillages Hasansham and Khazir.297
Concerning the actions of KRG- government forces the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,summary or arbitrary executions in Iraq points out in a June 2018 report that a number ofSunni IDPs faced arbitrary arrests by Kurdish security forces and in some cases were forcibly
disappeared.298 In its World Report 2018 Human Rights Watch observes ‘KRG forces arescreening people leaving ISIS-controlled areas in order to arrest ISIS suspects’. Furthermore,‘as part of this process, KRG forces have stopped hundreds of families fleeing ISIS-controlledareas, for weeks or even months at a time, citing security concerns about ISIS fighters present
among them or their affiliation with ISIS.’299
According to sources interviewed by the DIS/Landinfo during their 2018 mission to KRI ‘in
2017, 46 Arab IDPs, most of them from Anbar Governorate, were ordered to leave KRI by the
Asayish, because they were considered a security concern due to family relations to membersof ISIL. However, after intervention from humanitarian actors, they were allowed to return toSulaimania.’300 The tense security situation that followed the Kurdish independence
referendum of September 2017 also led to approximately 100 Sunni Arabs being forcefully
evicted under security pretexts from camps in Debaga to camps outside Makhmour within
Erbil Governorate.301
In a December 2017 and an October 2016 reports, Human Rights Watch reported that KRG
authorities ‘have not allowed IDPs to freely move in the KRI and the disputed territories,
requiring them to stay in camps with severe restrictions on their movement’.302 Human Rights
Watch also observed that ‘KRG forces have stopped hundreds of families fleeing ISILcontrolled areas including Hawija, 60 kilometers south of Mosul, and Tal Afar, 55 kilometers
west of Mosul, for weeks or even months at a time at checkpoints, including on the front lines,
citing security concerns about ISIL fighters present among them or their affiliation with ISIL, inmany cases preventing their access to humanitarian assistance.’303 In June 2017 Human Rights
Watch reported that Peshmerga forces were stopping thousands of civilians fleeing territory
held by ISIL, especially Hawija and Tal Afar, for up to three months at checkpoints, thus

295 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)

in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, pp. 26-27.
296 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 28.
297 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018 url, p. 32.
298 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions
on her mission to Iraq [A/HRC/38/44/Add.1], 20 June 2018, url, p. 9.
299 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2018 - Iraq, 18 January 2018, url.
300 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 34.
301 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, pp. 34, 52, 53.
302 Human Rights Watch, Flawed Justice. Accountability for ISIS crimes in Iraq, December 2017, url, p. 19; Human
Rights Watch, Iraq/KRG: Displaced People Can’t Move Freely, 21 October 2016, url.
303 Human Rights Watch, Flawed Justice. Accountability for ISIS crimes in Iraq, December 2017, url, p. 25.

48 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

preventing their access to humanitarian assistance.304 The same month, KRG authorities
detained men and boys fleeing Mosul on suspicion of affiliation with ISIL.305
In July 2017 Human Rights Watch reported that KRG forces expelled at least four Yazidi IDP
families and threatened others because of the participation of their relatives in Iraqi security
forces. The Asayish returned the displaced families to Sinjar where access to basic goods andservices was very limited.306 Citing figures from the Yazidi Documentation Organization USDOS
noted that as of August 2017 the Asayish expelled more than 200 Yazidi IDPs from camps.307
According to an October 2016 Amnesty International report all male IDPs considered offighting age, roughly 15-65, who managed to flee territories under ISIL control to safety are
subjected to opaque and flawed security procedures, applied by both the Iraqi and Kurdish
authorities. For entering the territories controlled by the KRG these procedures are carriedout by the Kurdish security service Asayish. Detainees suspected of involvement with ISIL aretransferred to detention facilities of the Asayish or, less frequently, of the Anti-Terrorism
Directorate. Amnesty International documented cases of torture and other ill treatment
perpetrated at some facilities controlled by the Asayish.308 Amnesty International indicatedthat some suspects are detained for months and even years without trial.309
An April 2016 report by the DIS quotes various sources describing the KRI infrastructure to beunsustainable compared to the number of IDPs in need of protection.310 The DIS noted that
IDPs face barriers for access to KRI and Kurdish controlled areas. According to UNHCR ‘accessto KRI may be very difficult for IDPs, unless they have some form of sponsorship or a certain
ethnic or religious profile and some sort of connection to government officials or people
employed with the security forces in the area.’311
The DIS reported that according to some sources indicate IDPs no longer need a sponsor togain entry. Obtaining a residence permit in KRI, according to various sources, requires asponsor; other sources indicated that the practice to obtain a residence permit in KRI is
inconsistent.312 The DIS was informed that the difficulties IDPs are meeting are linked to theirethnic profiles: ‘various sources mentioned Sunni Arabs, Arabs in general, Turkmen and tosome extent Shabaks as ethnicities that face denial of entry or varying degrees of difficulties
to enter KRI.’313 The Danish Immigration Service also learnt of IDPs in the KRI being forced torelocate to camps.314 According to an UNHCR source interviewed by DIS ‘collective

304 Human Rights Watch, Kurdistan Region of Iraq: Thousands Fleeing Kept Waiting Near Front Line, 21 June 2017,url.
305 Human Rights Watch: Kurdistan Region of Iraq: New Detentions of Fleeing Men, Boys, 3 June 2017, url.
306 Human Rights Watch, Kurdistan Region of Iraq: Yezidi Fighters’ Families Expelled, 9 July 2017, url.
307 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Iraq, 20 April 2018, url.
308 AI, Punished for Daesh’s crimes: Displaced Iraqis abused by militias and government forces, 18 October 2016,
url, p. 8.
309 AI, Punished for Daesh’s crimes: Displaced Iraqis abused by militias and government forces, 18 October 2016,
url, p. 42.
310 Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI); fact finding mission, 26 September to 6 October 2015, 12 April
2016, url, p. 11.
311 Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI); fact finding mission, 26 September to 6 October 2015, 12 April
2016, url, p. 14.
312 Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI); fact finding mission, 26 September to 6 October 2015, 12 April
2016, url, pp. 14-18.
313 Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI); fact finding mission, 26 September to 6 October 2015, 12 April
2016, url, p. 26.
314 Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI); fact finding mission, 26 September to 6 October 2015, 12 April
2016, url, p. 31.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 49

punishment of IDPs upon security incidents is common practice’. A lawyer working for aninternational NGO informed the Danish Immigration Service that ‘Sunni Arabs are sometimes
held responsible or being scapegoated as a community when security incidents happen.’315
IOM informed DIS that ‘the most vulnerable IDPs are those without financial resources, IDPs
living in various kinds of informal settlement like unfinished buildings, the sick and disabled,
female headed households and those without family or network, especially single women.’316

Disputed territories under de facto Kurdish control (up until October 2017)317
In 2014, the KRG took full control of Kirkuk City and the eastern part of the governorate inwake of the ISIL invasion.318 In October 2017, following the Kurdish independence
referendum, the Iraqi government forces and the PMUs took back control of Kirkuk generatinga new wave of displacement of about 150 000 – 200 000 people from the disputed areas.319
Further information is provided in section 1.3.5.
The information below refers to the situation in disputed areas under defector Kurdish control
prior to the ISF takeover in October 2017:
In May 2017 Human Rights Watch reported KRG authorities in Kirkuk forced Sunni Turkmen
IDPs to leave the city. The victims said Asayish security forces confiscated their identity cards
and harassed them. Displaced Turkmen in Kirkuk have faced arbitrary arrests, and in somecases mistreatment.320
Hundreds of thousands of IDPs that found shelter in Kirkuk since mid-2014 have raised ‘fears
among Kurdish leaders and residents about the impact of the population movement on the
demographic composition of the governorate’.321 IDP residents faced ‘increasingly stringent
restrictions on their freedom of movement and ability to secure residency in the city of
Kirkuk’.322 Following a surprise attack by ISIL on Kirkuk Governorate on 21 October 2016, Arab
IDPs and Arab residents of the governorate suffered a backlash. The then-Kurdish authorities
in Kirkuk demolished the homes of hundreds of Sunni Arab residents of Kirkuk and Arab IDPs
were displaced to camps or expelled from Kirkuk Governorate.323 Likewise, Human Rights
Watch notes in a November 2016 report that Kurdish authorities in Kirkuk have ejected Arab
residents and Arab IDPs in response to ISIL’s attack on the city on 21 October 2016.324

315 Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI); fact finding mission, 26 September to 6 October 2015, 12 April

2016, url, p. 46.
316 Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI); fact finding mission, 26 September to 6 October 2015, 12 April
2016, url, p. 61.
317 As a consequence of a Kurdish referendum on independence on 25 September 2017, the Iraqi Security Forces(ISF) in cooperation with the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) took control of most of the disputed areas on 16
and 17 October 2017.
318 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, pp. 14, 30.
319 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, pp. 14, 30.
320 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Kirkuk Security Forces Expel Displaced Turkmen, 7 May 2017, url.
321 AI, ‘Where are we supposed to go?’. Destruction and forced displacement in Kirkuk, 7 November 2016, url, p.
8.
322 AI, ‘Where are we supposed to go?’. Destruction and forced displacement in Kirkuk, 7 November 2016, url, p.
5.
323 AI, ‘Where are we supposed to go?’. Destruction and forced displacement in Kirkuk, 7 November 2016, url, p.
5.
324 Human Rights Watch, KRG: Kurdish Forces Ejecting Arabs In Kirkuk - Halt Displacements, Demolitions;Compensate Victims, 3 November 2016, url.

50 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALSIn an October 2016 report Amnesty International noted that in KRG-controlled areas security
screenings of IDPs carried out by the Asayish generally are performed in temporary holding
sites near IDP camps or at makeshift reception sites in areas where IDPs first come into contact
with the Peshmerga and other security forces. The living conditions in such temporary holding
sites are described as ‘substandard at best’.325 In October 2016 Human Rights Watch reported
that the freedom of movement of people in camps near Kirkuk is unlawfully restricted by KRG
security authorities. Displaced people in the Nazrawa and Laylan camps are required to havea sponsor who is a Kirkuk native to be allowed leave the camps. These policies hamper theiraccess to health care, separate the residents from their families and undermine their ability
to find employment.326
An April 2016 report by the DIS indicated that IDPs from Salah al-Din and Diyala face difficulties
to gain access to Kirkuk, especially Sunni Arabs and Turkmen. According to Qandil, a Swedish
non-profit, non-governmental humanitarian aid organization active in Iraq, Arabs need aresidence card to settle in Kirkuk, whilst ethnic Kurds and some ethnic groups who have lived
in Kirkuk for a longer period of time do not.327 The Danish Immigration service was also
informed IDPs in Kirkuk Governorate face pressure to move into camps and/or to return toDiyala or Salah al-Din.328 UNHCR informed the Danish Immigration Service of discriminatory
practices in terms of returning Arab IDPs to disputed areas. Whilst Kurdish IDPs are allowed
to return to their areas of origin, Arab IDPs who wish to return are subject to extensive andunclear clearance procedures. Various sources mentioned the destruction of houses by
Peshmerga troops in the disputed areas.329
In a January 2016 report Amnesty International noted that Peshmerga forces prevent
residents of Arab villages and Arab residents of mixed Arab-Kurdish towns in Northern Iraq
from returning to their homes, and in some cases they have destroyed or permitted thedestruction of their homes and property – seemingly as a way to prevent their return in the
future. Amnesty International further stated that these practices take place in territories
recaptured from ISIL by Kurdish forces in Ninewa, Kirkuk and Diyala Province, namely invillages east of Mount Sinjar (Ninewa), villages in the Kirkuk region and villages west of Jalawla
city (Diyala).330
Amnesty International observed that ‘in the KR-I and in the disputed areas currently under defacto KRG control [controlled up to October 2017], Sunni Arab IDPs are likewise being
subjected to arbitrary and discriminatory restrictions on their movements, which are notimposed on IDPs from other ethnic and religious communities.’331 Amnesty International
added that ‘Peshmerga forces are also preventing residents of Arab villages and Arab residents

325 AI, Punished for Daesh’s crimes: Displaced Iraqis abused by militias and government forces, 18 October 2016,

url, p. 35.
326 Human Rights Watch, Iraq/KRG: Displaced People Can’t Move Freely - Access to Health Care, Family, Work
Unlawfully Restricted, 21 October 2016, url.
327 Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI); fact finding mission, 26 September to 6 October 2015, 12 April
2016, url, pp. 24-25.
328 Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI); fact finding mission, 26 September to 6 October 2015, 12 April
2016, url, p. 32.
329 Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI); fact finding mission, 26 September to 6 October 2015, 12 April
2016, url, p. 30.
330 AI, Iraq: banished and dispossessed: forced displacement and deliberate destruction in Northern Iraq, 20
January 2016, url, pp. 5-33.
331 AI, Punished for Daesh’s crimes: Displaced Iraqis abused by militias and government forces, 18 October 2016,
url, p. 59.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 51

of mixed Arab-Kurdish towns from returning to their homes and, in some cases, havedestroyed or permitted the destruction of their homes and property – seemingly as a way toprevent their return in the future.’332 In February 2015 Human Rights Watch reported that
Kurdish forces confined thousands of Arabs in so-called security zones in areas of Northern
Iraq recaptured from ISIL since August 2014. Kurdish forces barred displaced Arabs fromreturning to their homes in portions of Ninewa and Erbil provinces. Kurds from these areas
were permitted to return to these areas and even to move into homes of Arabs who fled.
Human Rights Watch observed these discriminatory practices in the Ninewa Governorate subdistricts Sheikhan, Tilkaif and Zumar and in the Makhmur district of Erbil Governorate. In
Makhmur and in Zumar Arab homes were destroyed. Looting by Peshmerga forces wasreported in the Chaldo-Assyrian Christian town of Tal Usquf.333
Examples of incidents involving internally displaced persons by KRG forces in disputed
territories under Kurdish control prior to October 2017 include the following, however, it
should be noted that examples cited pertain to treatment of IDPs, without asserting that theperson’s IDP status is the sole reason for the treatment endured.334
Ninewa

Before the recapture of Sinjar from ISIL on 12 November 2015, approximately 163
Sunni Arab families fled from villages north-east of Sinjar to Ayadiya subdistrict, in Tal
Afar district, but were denied entry to territory controlled by the Peshmerga.
Stranded between Peshmerga and ISIL lines, their humanitarian situation wasreported to be critical.335
During the week from 21 to 27 October 2016, sixty Sunni Arab families attempting toreturn to retaken Misqlat village in the north-west of Tilkeif District, were prevented
by Peshmerga from returning home.336
At the end of October 2016, Asayish systematically and arbitrarily detained all males
older than 15 who fled Mosul and Hawija on a base near the refugee camp of Dabiga,
near the KRI border.337

KirkukIn mid-September 2016, mass arrests of IDPs were conducted by security forces in
Kirkuk city, who frequently cited lack of legal residency documents and/or suspicion
of involvement in terrorism. Asayish reportedly confiscated identification of IDPs then
immediately forced IDPs to sign a pledge to depart Kirkuk Governorate within one
week.338

332 AI, Punished for Daesh’s crimes: Displaced Iraqis abused by militias and government forces, 18 October 2016,

url, p. 9.
333 Human Rights Watch: Iraqi Kurdistan: Arabs Displaced, Cordoned Off, Detained, 26 February 2015, url.
334 Comment by the drafters of this report, Cedoca/Belgium.
335 UN Security Council, Second report of the Secretary- General pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 2233 (2015),
26 January 2016, url, p. 10.
336 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2016, 30 August 2017, url, p. 6.
337 Human Rights Watch, KRG: men, boys fleeing fighting arbitrarily detained, 27 October 2016, url.
338 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2016, 30 August 2017, url, p. 5.

52 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

1.3.5 Kurds in Kirkuk after ISF take-over in October 2017
In October 2017, following the Kurdish independence referendum, the Iraqi government
forces and the PMUs took back control of Kirkuk generating a new wave of displacement of
about 150 000 – 200 000 people from the disputed areas.339 Sources interviewed by
DIS/Landinfo in 2018 differed in their opinion on how many of the IDPs who fled Kirkuk during
the October 2017 Iraqi takeover of the region from Kurdish forces have returned. KRI-basedsources stated that a large majority of IDPs are restricted to return whereas other sources
assessed that the majority of IDPs have returned to Kirkuk.340 Among IDPs that have not
returned were people associated with the Kurdish rule in the disputed area, especially‘members and close associates of the Kurdish political party, Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)
and employees of the Kurdish security service, the Asayish’.341 According to sources, PMUs
have burned or destroyed houses of Kurds who lived in Arab neighbourhoods of Kirkuk city
and Tuz Khurmatu.342 There were also reports of Iraqi government forces issuing arrest
warrants for persons connected to KDP and enforcing stricter policies against KDP members
wishing to return.343
Also see section 2.2.6 on targeting of Kurds.

1.4 Family members of actual or perceived ISIL members,
affiliates and supporters
Although the government has not released statistics about ‘terrorism’ detainees, estimates
put the number of persons detained on suspicion of ties to the ISIL since 2017 at 13 000.344
According to sources cited by the New York Times, since the summer of 2017, more than
10 000 cases have been referred to the courts, and approximately 2 900 trials have been
completed, with a conviction rate of about 98 %.345 Human Rights Watch assessed in a January
2018 report (covering 2017) that ‘Iraqi authorities were detaining around 1 400 foreign
women and children who had been in Iraqi custody since they surrendered with ISIL fightersin late August.’346
A November 2018 DIS/Landinfo report observes that people with direct or indirect family
relation to an ISIL member may be targeted by security actors. Such discrimination and abuses‘primarily affect women and children, whose husbands, fathers or brothers were members of
ISIL and are either killed or detained. But also people whose name or the name of their moredistant family members is similar to that of an ISIL suspect can raise serious suspicion’.347
339 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)

in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, pp. 14, 30.
340 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 30
341 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, pp. 14-15.
342 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 15.
343 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 15.
344 New York Times (The), A 10-Minute Trial, a Death Sentence: Iraqi Justice for ISIS Suspects, 17 April 2018, url.
345 New York Times (The), A 10-Minute Trial, a Death Sentence: Iraqi Justice for ISIS Suspects, 17 April 2018, url.
346 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Events of 2017, January 2018, url, p. 4
347 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 20.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 53

UNOCHA, writing in September 2018, assessed that ‘women and children with perceived
affiliations to extremist groups have been identified as the most vulnerable category of those
who remain displaced. This population is discriminated against and segregated within IDP
camps, prevented from returning to their homes, denied humanitarian aid and subjected tosexual violence.’348 In a September 2018 report UNHCR stated that ‘tribal leaders, security
actors and communities continue to impede or deny permission to families with perceived
links to extremists to return to areas of origin in Anbar, Kirkuk and Ninewa.’349 Human Rights
Watch reported that local officials have ‘forcibly displaced hundreds of families of suspected
ISIS-members in Anbar, Babil, Diyala, Salah al-Din, and Ninewa governorates’.350
The DIS/Landinfo 2018 report noted the existence of designated camps for family membersof former ISIL members.351 Because of fear of retaliation from the victims of ISIL crimes, thelocations of these camps are often unknown. Wives and children of ISIL fighters are
stigmatised and isolated from the rest of the society. They are banned from returning to theirarea of origin; they are exposed to harassment, threats and abuses; they are unable to obtain
civil documents, and they are often disowned and/or treated as socially outcasts Femaleheaded households are met with the same treatment. They are also not allowed to re-enter
their home community. Many live in camps with significant limitation on their freedom of
movement. Often, they are not allowed to leave the camps. There are two such camps outside
Mosul, two or three more elsewhere in Ninewa Governorate, in addition to many more in
Syria.352
In April 2018 Amnesty International reported that government forces, including PMUs, havebeen preventing families with perceived ties to ISIL from returning to their home or places oforigin. Iraqi forces, including the PMUs, have also regularly arrested and forcibly disappeared
men with perceived ISIL ties directly from IDP camps. Women and children with perceived ties
to ISIL have been subjected to human rights violations and collective punishment. Sexual
exploitation of women in IDP camps by members of the PMUs was also reported. Upon
returning to their places of origin families with perceived ISIL ties have been subjected toforced displacement, evictions, arrests, looting of their homes, house demolitions, threats,sexual abuse, harassment and discrimination by, amongst others, PMU and local militias.353
Amnesty International describes a so-called ISIL family as follows:‘Perhaps the most determinative factor is if the family has a relative who was amember of IS. The perception of an affiliation to IS can exist even if the relative is adistant relative, with no relationship by blood. It may also exist in cases where therelative was not an IS fighter or commander, but worked in noncombat roles, such as
an administrative employee, driver or cook. Other determinative factors include: if
the family lived in an area that was a stronghold of support for IS; if the family lived in
an area that was controlled by IS and then fled that area at a late stage in the
hostilities; if the family belongs to a tribe of which the majority supported IS; or if one

348 UNOCHA, Iraq Humanitarian Snapshot (as of 30 September 2018), 30 September 2018, url.
349 UNHCR, Iraq protection update- September 2018, 30 September 2018, url, p. 2.
350 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Events of 2017, January 2018, url, p. 4.
351 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)

in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 10.
352 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 28.
AI, The condemned. Women and children isolated, trapped and exploited in Iraq, 17 April 2018, url, pp. 5, 17, 29,
34, 36.

54 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

or more male members of the family were arrested as they fled IS-held territory orafter they arrived at an IDP camp.’354
In a December 2017 report, Lifos, the Centre for Country of Origin Information and Analysisof the Swedish Migration Agency, also noted the situation of family members of ISIL affiliates
and supporters. An Iraqi parliamentarian whom Lifos/Landinfo spoke to in Baghdad statedthat ‘immediate family members’ of ISIL affiliates are considered to include father, son, or
husband. The same parliamentarian further stated that accusations of ISIL affiliation are often
unfounded, speculative, or arbitrary.355 Interviewed by Niqash, Hisham al-Hashimi, aresearcher into armed militias in Iraq who also advises the Iraqi government, considered thetreatment of ISIL families as a major challenge after the victories over ISIL. Hisham al-Hashimi
further remarked that ‘there are around 100,000 people in families with a connection to the
ISIL group and there is a likelihood that, if the harsh treatment continues, they will make up
the next generation of the ISIS group.’356
In its report on human rights in Iraq in the July to December 2017 period, UNAMI expressed
its concern about attacks on families of suspected ISIL members, seemingly intended to expel
them or prevent them from returning to their homes.357 UNAMI further stated that ‘attacks
targeting families of suspected ISIL members and their property continued, with the reported
objective to expel them, or prevent them from returning to their homes, particularly in Anbar
and Salah al-Din governorates.’358 Reporting on the Protection of Civilians in the context of
the Ninewa Operations and the retaking of Mosul City, in the 17 October 2016 – 10 July 2017
period, UNAMI makes note of threats to families alleged to have ISIL-affiliated members.
Evictions of such families were also reported. In some instances, unidentified groups madethe threats through so-called night letters. In other cases, local authorities were
responsible.359
Describing human rights situation in Iraq in the period from January to June 2017, UNAMI also
noted instances of threats to, and forced evictions of families alleged to have ISIL affiliatedmembers. UNAMI names local authorities and unidentified groups as those responsible.360 In
March 2017 Human Rights Watch documented instances of PMUs taking part in evictions andin the demolition of houses belonging to families said to have familial ties to affiliates of ISIL.361
In December 2016, UNAMI reported that some local government authorities issued orders toforcibly evict family members of people known to or perceived to have been supporters of
ISIL.362
The following are examples of treatment of family members of actual or perceived ISIL
affiliates or supporters.363

354 AI, The condemned. Women and children isolated, trapped and exploited in Iraq, 17 April 2018, url, p. 12.
355 Sweden, Lifos, Thematic report: The security situation in Iraq : July 2016- November 2017, 18 December 2017,

url, p. 43.
356 Niqash, Fuelling the fight, never-ending story of extremism in Iraq, 16 November 2017, url.
357 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, p. vi.
358 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, p. 3.
359 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the context of the Ninewa Operations and the retakingof Mosul City, 17 October 2016 – 10 July 2017, 2 November 2017, url, p. 3.
360 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – January to June 2017, 14 December 2017, url, p. 2.
361 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: displacement, detention of suspected “ISIS families”- Troops force residents out,demolish homes, 5 March 2017, url.
362 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. II.
363 The examples cited pertain to abuses committed against family members of actual or perceived ISIL affiliates orsupporters without asserting that such is the sole reason for the mistreatment endured.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 55

Ninewa

Between November 2015 and January 2016, at least 80 families were forcibly
relocated from Aski Mosul and Huteina villages of Wana sub-district of Tilkaif, toGarmawa IDP camp in Duhok Governorate. Some families claim they were ordered toleave their villages by the KR-I Asayish on account of being related to an ISIL
member.364
In January 2017, around 80 individuals alleged to have family members belonging to
ISIL were evicted from Hamam al-Alil subdistrict of Mosul district by a decision of a
local committee, led by tribal leaders and assisted by members of security forces.365
In June 2017, men of the al-Jabouri tribe announced a campaign to expel families
whose members are alleged of being linked to ISIL from al-Qayyarah. The next day, 90families who felt threatened fled the area.366
In April 2018, according to Human Rights Watch, local armed forces in the district ofal-Ba’aj, issued an order in February 2018 that relatives of male ISIL members could
not return to the area. It was estimated that out of the 12 000 residents of al-Ba’aj
who were still in camps about 20 % have an immediate relative who joined ISIL andtherefore will not be able to return.367
In September 2018 security actors forcibly relocated at least 22 families from villages
near Mosul to camps in Ninewa. It concerned female-headed households alleged tohave affiliations with extremists.368

Babil


In July 2016, the Babil provincial council ordered the demolition of the homes ofindividuals convicted of being members of ISIL and expelled their family members
from the governorate.369

Salah al-Din
 On 11 August 2016 at least 60 families in Dhuluiya (Salah al-Din) were notified bypolice that they must leave. According to sources the police stated families of ISIL
collaborators were expelled for seven years.370
 On 30 August 2016, the Salah al-Din Provincial Council decided to expel all the familiesof members of ISIL from the governorate for a period of 10 years. Those outside thegovernorate were barred from returning if a family member had ISIL involvement.371

364 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30

September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 24.
365 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the context of the Ninewa Operations and the retakingof Mosul City, 17 October 2016 – 10 July 2017, 2 November 2017, url, p. 27.
366 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the context of the Ninewa Operations and the retakingof Mosul City, 17 October 2016 – 10 July 2017, 2 November 2017, url, p. 40.
367 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Local Forces Banish ISIS Suspects’ Families, 26 April 2018, url.
368 UNHCR, Iraq protection update-September 2018, 30 September 2018, url, p. 2.
369 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 28.
370 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 27.
371 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 27.

56 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS









In September 2016, local PMU forces destroyed hundreds of homes in al-Aithah (Salah
al-Din Governorate). They targeted not only the families thought to be affiliated with
ISIL, but also families that had fled because of the fighting.372
According to Amnesty International in early 2017 ‘Sunni tribal militias within the PMU
known as the Hashad al-Ashari, alongside Iraqi government forces, forcibly displaced
at least 125 families from Salah al-Din Governorate perceived to be affiliated with IS,
following a decree issued by local authorities authorizing their displacement. The
families were then held against their will in an IDP camp functioning as a detention
centre near Tikrit.’373
In January 2017 PMU forces evicted a woman and her relatives from their home in alShakrah village (Salah al-Din Governorate) because her husband’s brother had joined
ISIL.374
In March 2017, Sunni tribal groups, within the PMUs, and Iraqi soldiers forcibly
displaced at least 125 families said to have familial ties to affiliates of ISIL. The families,
all from Salah al-Din province, were held in a camp near Tikrit. The PMUs also
destroyed some of the families’ homes.375
Between 8 and 20 November 2017, unknown perpetrators blew up at least 20
residential houses in three villages on the western side of Shirqat district, north of
Tikrit city in Tikrit, Salah al-Din Governorate. All of the houses belonged to families
perceived to have an affiliation with ISIL.376

Anbar


On 13 October 2017, the ISF notified families of suspected ISIL members to leave Heetcity, Anbar Governorate within 72 hours. On 26 October 2017, three houses wereattacked with explosives and two houses were burnt in Heet city. On
4 November 2017 two houses were burnt in separate incidents in the al-Khidir and alDawara areas of Heet city.377

Kirkuk

In early January 2018, Iraqi forces forcibly displaced at least 235 families of suspectedaffiliates of ISIL. All were from villages in the Hawija area, west of Kirkuk, and werebrought to Daquq by Iraqi forces because they allegedly had ISIL-affiliated relatives.
Human Rights Watch reported that groups within the PMUs, also known as the alHashd al-Sha'abi, destroyed some of their homes, forced some parents to leavechildren behind, stole some of the families’ livestock, and beat at least three of themen.378
In the fall of 2018 government-affiliated armed groups in Abbassi sub-district in Kirkuk
Governorate instructed the local Mukhtars to direct families perceived to haveaffiliations with extremists to leave the area for Kirkuk city or camps within one week.

372 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: displacement, detention of suspected “ISIS families”- Troops force residents out,demolish homes, 5 March 2017, url.
373 AI, Amnesty International Report 2017/18 - Iraq, 22 February 2018, url.
374 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: displacement, detention of suspected “ISIS families”- Troops force residents out,demolish homes, 5 March 2017, url.
375 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: displacement, detention of suspected “ISIS families”- Troops force residents out,demolish homes, 5 March 2017, url.
376 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, p. 3.
377 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, p. 3.
378 Human Rights Watch, Families with ISIS Relatives Forced into Camps, 4 February 2018, url.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 57

The Mayor of Abbassi, however, referred the issue to the Governor of Kirkuk and theaction was suspended.379
KRI

In 2017, 46 Arab IDPs, most of them from Anbar Governorate, were ordered to leave
KRI by the Asayish, due to family relations to members of ISIL. After intervention fromhumanitarian actors, they were allowed to return to Sulaimaniyah.380

1.5 Members of tribes with (perceived) affiliation with ISIL
A March 2016 report Renad Mansour notes that ‘ISIS inserted itself into tribal life, recruiting
members to its organization, committing atrocities, and causing pro– and anti–Islamic State
splits within tribal ranks.’381 Taking advantage of the Maliki government’s disregard for Sunnitribal concerns ISIL was able to infiltrate tribes by providing members with money, land, andweapons. As ISIL attracted tribesmen with better compensation, the tribal leaders wereunable to keep command of their tribes. Many tribes split into pro and anti-ISIL factions,exacerbating divisions among the Sunni population and leaving hardly any tribes without
members affiliated with or supportive of ISIL, Mansour observes.382
In a September 2015 report, anthropologist Hosham Dawod383 notes that ‘the return in force
of al-Qaeda that started in 2012 and transformed into ISIL profoundly divided the Sunnimajority tribes. Either they had to cooperate with federal security forces or else join the Sunni
insurgents.’384 According to Dawod, ‘barely any large tribes, either in central or western Iraq,
officially pledged allegiance to ISIL’. Rather, these often smaller tribes ‘sought to maintaintheir ties with the state, however weakened these had become after years of government
neglect’. Those tribes that joined with ISIL were those that since 2003 had ‘never truly
accepted Baghdad’s authority’. These tribes included ‘the Al-Jumaila, Al-Halabsa, Al-Bu ‘Issa,Azza, Al-Mishahda in the Anbar region, Al-Bu Ajil, Al-Bu Nasir and certain clans of the Al‑Juburand Ubaid tribal confederation in the region of Salah al-Din and Ninewa, etc.’.385
Examples of treatment of ISIL affiliated tribes, subdivisions or local divisions of these tribes by
ISF and affiliated armed groups are presented below. However, the motivation for thetreatment endured is not always clear in the source information and tribal affiliation to ISIL
shouldn’t be asserted as the sole reason, unless where it is clearly specified386.

379 UNHCR, Iraq protection update-September 2018, 30 September 2018, url, p. 2.
380 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)

in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 34.
381 Mansour, R., The Sunni predicament in Iraq, 3 March 2016, url.
382 Mansour, R., The Sunni predicament in Iraq, 3 March 2016, url.
383 Hosham Dawod is an anthropologist at the Centre national de la recherche scientifique and an associate of theNorwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF) which is a research network developed to ‘strengthen
peacebuilding policy and practice’. He has published research on tribes in Iraq and the Middle East.
384 Dawod, H., The Sunni tribes in Iraq, September 2015, url, p. 3.
385 Dawod, H., The Sunni tribes in Iraq, September 2015, url, pp. 2-3.
386 Comment by the drafters of this report, Cedoca/Belgium

58 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

DiyalaOn 22 August 2014 pro-government militias and security forces killed 34 people in an
attack on a Sunni mosque in the village of Imam Weiss, situated in Diyala province.
According to witnesses, all but one of the victims belonged to the Beni Weiss, a Sunnitribe in Diyala.387
On 26 January 2015, Shia militias and security forces killed at least 56 Sunni Muslims
in Barwana, situated in Diyala province. The killings were possibly revenge acts after
the killings of Shia militia men and government forces by ISIL in previous days. Mostof the victims were from families belonging to the Jburi tribe who lived in nearby
villages but were sheltering in Barwana.388
On 28 July 2015, armed militia members abducted three members of the Zuherat
tribe on the road between Abu Saida and Baquba (Diyala Governorate).389
On 31 July 2016, a leader of the Khazraj tribe was killed north-east of Baquba (Diyala
Governorate), allegedly by militia members operating under PMU.390

Salah al-Din






On 11 November 2014, 94 men of the Grathool tribe were abducted by PMUs in
Yathrib (Salah al-Din Governorate). Fourteen bodies were later discovered in a small
trench near the village, 46 persons were released, and 33 abductees went missing.391
After the liberation of Tikrit in April 2015, revenge acts were reported against
members of the Albu Ajil tribe and the Albu Nasr tribe. Tribal fighters and militia
members were responsible for disappearances and destruction of property andhouses.392 KH and AAH forces abducted more than 200 Sunni residents near al-Dur. At
least 160 abductees remained unaccounted for.393
On 16 July 2015, a group of AAH members abducted 12 civilians from the Khazraj tribe
in Jalludiyat village (Salah al-Din Governorate).394
On 27 September 2015, masked gunmen in uniform abducted at least 28 members of
the al- Jubour tribe in Hujjaj village (Salah al-Din Governorate). All abductees allegedly
had current or past affiliation with ISIL or family connections associated with ISIL.
According to sources the masked gunmen were militia.395

387 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Survivors describe mosque massacre, 2 November 2014, url.
388 AI, Iraq: Barwana massacre - Botched investigation, families waiting for justice, 10 June 2015, url; Human Rights

Watch, Iraq: Militias escalate abuses, possibly war crimes, 15 February 2015, url.
389 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 May – 31 October 2015,
11 January 2016, url, p. 22.
390 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 18.
391 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 September – 10 December
2014, 23 February 2015, url, p. 20.
392 Niqash, Family feuds that last, and last: as extremists withdraw in Salahaddin, Iraq’s tribes demand justice, 22
October 2015, url.
393 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Militia abuses mar fight against ISIS, 20 September 2015, url.
394 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 May – 31 October 2015,
11 January 2016, url, p. 22.
395 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 May – 31 October 2015,
11 January 2016, url, p. 22.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

— 59

Anbar






On 30 May 2016, members of the PMU and the federal police executed more than adozen civilians from the Jumaila tribe fleeing Sajar, a village north of Fallujah.396
Early June 2016, thousands of civilians, nearly all belonging to the Albo Akash clan of
the al Mahamda tribe, fled Saqlawiya (Anbar province). It was reported that 1 500
men and boys were taken away by an armed group using the banners of KH.
Reportedly, 643 men and boys went missing, and 49 others were believed to havebeen summarily killed or tortured to death while in custody of KH. Tribal leadersbelieved that 200 more men were unaccounted for.397
In November 2016, UNAMI received reports that in Albu Alwan area of Ramadi
district, a large number of returnee families were forcibly evicted from their houses
by members of the same tribe because of their alleged affiliation with ISIL.398
In June 2018, ISF troops at checkpoints in Anbar prevented a group of returnees toreach their places of origin in al-Baghdadi, Anbar. The group of families was from theSa’ada tribe, whose members have been accused of affiliation with ISIL. The families
were taken to IDP camps in Anbar, after their return was blocked in February andagain in June 2018. They had been displaced in 2014 and had expressed their will toreturn. The area was under control of the Iraqi government since February 2015.399
Earlier examples of members of the same tribe being blocked by members of the ISF
from returning, leading to secondary displacement, were also reported. A sheikh of
the Sa’ada tribe explained that, although the families had received clearance to returnto their former places of residence, forces of the Jazeera and Badia Operations
Command (JBOC) refused to recognize this permission.400 According to ISW the JBOC
has one of the largest geographic areas of responsibility including most of Anbar westof Ramadi, much of the Jazeera and Badia Deserts.401

NinewaIn June 2017, Yazidi fighters allegedly forcibly disappeared and killed 52 civilians fromthe Imteywit tribe. The victims were fleeing fighting between ISIL and PMUs west of
Mosul. Yazidi forces were also implicated in other incidents of enforced
disappearances of members of the Imteywit and Jahaysh tribes.402

1.6 Recruitment by PMUs and affiliated armed groups
The Institute for the Study of War noted in its December 2017 report which outlines the ISF
and PMU Orders of Battle in Iraq, stated that the recruitment process within the PMUs is
managed by the Popular Mobilisation Commission (PMC) in collaboration with the Ministry ofInterior. According to the same source ‘the Central Administrative Directorate manages a

396 AI, Punished for Daesh’s crimes: Displaced Iraqis abused by militias and government forces, 18 October 2016,

url, p. 20; Human Rights Watch, Fallujah abuses test control of militias, 9 June2016, url.
397 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 19.
398 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2016, 30 August 2017, url, p. 5.
399 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Displaced Families Blocked from Returning. 24 June 2018, url.
400 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Displaced Families Blocked from Returning. 24 June 2018, url.
401 Dury-Agri, J.R. et.al., Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: orders of battle, December 2017,
url, p. 18.
402 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Yezidi fighters allegedly execute civilians, 27 December 2017, url.

60 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

range of issues from the issuance and modification of recruitment forms, medical
examinations, and background and security checks, likely through the regional PMC
directorates and governorates.’403
According to an Iraq analyst interviewed during the DIS/Landinfo mission to KRI in 2018,
recruitment to the PMUs is on a voluntary basis, many joining for economic reasons such as
attractive salaries [up to USD 500/month] compared to rest of Iraq. The report notes that
there is no draft relating to the PMU.404
Discussing recruitment by PMUs at EASO’s practical cooperation meeting on Iraq in April 2017,
Joost Hiltermann, Program Director for Middle East & North Africa at the International Crisis
Group, noted that ‘militias have no trouble recruiting because they have money and pay well;there are economic incentives to join.’405 Mark Lattimer, Director of the Ceasefire Centre for
Civilian Rights, pointed out at the same meeting that ‘most of the members of the Shia militias
are Shiite but there are also Sunni, Christian or mixed militias. Service in militias is very
attractive for young men because of the possibility to earn a wage where there are few othereconomic options.’406 Gareth Stansfield, Professor of Middle East Politics and the Al-Qasimi
Chair of Arab Gulf Studies at the University of Exeter, remarked that ‘Asaib Ahl al-Haq and the
Badr Brigades have a good level of recruitment, including among the Shiite Turkmen of Tuz
Khormatu and Tal Afar.’407
Belkis Wille, senior Iraq researcher in the Middle East and North Africa division at Human
Rights Watch, stated at the same meeting that ‘the problem of recruitment that is “not totally
voluntary” concerns mainly the Sunni tribal militias. Young men, sometimes minors, arerecruited in camps for displaced persons through tribal leaders; they can also be strongly
encouraged by their brothers or their parents, or they may follow in a relatives’ footsteps, orgo along to accompany a father or brother to the fighting and become involved that way.
There was a wave of recruitment in the spring of 2016.’408
In an April 2017 report Renad Mansour and Faleh A. Jabar noted the popularity of the PMU
among the country’s Shia population, resulting in an overabundance of volunteers:‘A major reason why neither Abadi nor any other leader is able to challenge the PMF
groups is because of their broad popularity among Iraqi society. The paramilitary
outfits are particularly popular among the country’s Shia population. An August 2015poll claims that 99 percent of Shia respondents support the use of the PMF to fightthe Islamic State. Abadi’s chief intelligence officer has stated that up to 75 percent ofmen between eighteen and thirty years old living in Shia-majority provinces had
signed up to enlist in the PMF by the spring of 2016. Since there are more volunteers
than the state needs or can fund, most of these recruits remain inactive and not on
the official list of active fighters. As volunteers flocked from all of Iraq’s Shia provinces

403 Dury-Agri, J.R. et.al., Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: orders of battle, December 2017,

url, p. 34.
404 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, pp. 45, 48.
405 Hiltermann, J., EASO, Practical Cooperation Meeting on Iraq, 25-26 April 2017, url, p. 12.
406 Lattimer, M., cited in: EASO, Practical Cooperation Meeting on Iraq, 25-26 April 2017, url, p. 12.
407 Stansfield, G., cited in: EASO, Practical Cooperation Meeting on Iraq, 25-26 April 2017, url, p. 12.
408 Wille, B., cited in: EASO, Practical Cooperation Meeting on Iraq, 25-26 April 2017, url, pp. 14-15.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 61

to enlist, the PMF recruited roughly ten times more volunteers than the Iraqi
security forces.’409
International Crisis Group noted in an August 2016 report that Grand Ayatollah Sistani‘s June2014 fatwa resulted in a massive mobilisation of young volunteers:‘Iraq’s highest religious Shiite authority, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, issued a binding
religious edict (fatwa) on 13 June, calling on youths to volunteer in defense of thecountry. The call to sign up spread by word of mouth across the south and resulted ina massive mobilization of young volunteers (mutatawaeen) in what was later called“popular mobilization” (al-hashd al-shaabi). […] Joining the hashd was the only way
for many youths to earn a salary and benefits for their families if they died. Most who
enrolled had been working as day laborers or in the lower public sector ranks, with nopossibility of a decent living. Still, while income was an incentive, their motives cannot
be reduced to material interest. The hashd attracted many destitute youths in part
because recruitment targeted the most densely populated, poorest areas (like Sadr
City in Baghdad, Basrah, Diwaniya and Amara) or was done near the frontline (forexample, Shula and Hurriya neighborhoods in Baghdad and Karbala). Young men
continued to volunteer even when the government or militia defaulted on pay. In
2015, volunteers joined training sessions for reservists that offered no
remuneration.’410
In a March 2016 report Michael Knights, an expert on Iraq with the Washington Institute411,
discusses the appeal of the PMUs to Shia youth:‘Many Iraqis, particularly younger ones, want to try something new, and to reject old
institutions. The PMU also offered a military experience that appealed to many young
people. Pay and benefits (pension, disability allowances) are not as good as apermanent government job but service is flexible, with recruits able to come and go
as they please. Discipline is lax, which suits many young people. The command styleof PMU leaders, as previously discussed, is based on their personal characteristics andlevel of battle experience, which is again highly attractive to young people who arelooking for role models, not necessarily for leaders who must be obeyed whether you
like them or not. In many PMU units an emphasis on Shiism and the protection of Shia
shrines is another attractive feature.’412

1.6.1 Forced recruitment
At EASO’s practical cooperation meeting on Iraq in April 2017 Belkis Wille, senior Iraq
researcher in the Middle East and North Africa division at Human Rights Watch, noted that‘forced recruitment in Shiite militia remains very rare, perhaps three or four cases have beenreported. In some cases, young Sunni men enlisted in a Shiite militia (Kata’eb Hezbollah).’413
In January 2017 UNHCR mentioned allegations of forced recruitment of male residents,
including minors, in newly retaken areas of Mosul stating that ‘IDPs fleeing the eastern sideof Mosul are forced, also, by tribal militia to join the military offensive through preparing
409 Mansour, R. and Jabar, F. A., The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq’s future, 28 April 2017, url, pp. 10-11.
410 International Crisis Group, Fight or flight: the desperate plight of Iraq ‘s “Generation 2000”, 8 August 2016, url,

pp. 15-16.
411 A think tank committed to advancing US interests in the Middle East: url
412 Knights, M., The future of Iraq’s armed forces, March 2016, url, p. 30.
413 Wille, B., cited in: EASO, Practical Cooperation Meeting on Iraq, 25-26 April 2017, url, pp. 14-15.

62 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

meals, carrying weapons or taking up arms. IDPs are reported to be under the risk of being
accused or tainted of affiliation with armed groups should they refuse or show reluctance andthat one “volunteered” male per family reportedly absolves the family from allegations ofaffiliation with the armed group.’414
In a November 2016 report the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that forced
recruitment of fighters does not occur in the PMUs but men might face social pressure to joina militia.415 Despite the popularity of the PMUs and the availability of volunteers theInternational Crisis Group noted in August 2016 that armed groups (militias and ISIL alike)increasingly try to recruit young professionals whose skills they need. In particular doctors
face this type of recruitment:‘In areas the government controls, its fading ability to enforce the law in a militiadominated environment compels young professionals to ask militias for protection.
Armed groups (militias and IS alike) in need of their skills, in particular those of
doctors, increasingly try to recruit them, either forcibly or by creating professional
associations parallel to the state’s.’416
Describing the December 2014-April 2015 period UNAMI mentions reports of IDP families
being barred from entry to Baghdad, Karbala and Babil, except if the men joined the PMUs,
noting that ‘large numbers of IDPs made their way towards Baghdad, Karbala and Babilgovernorates, although many were denied entry unless they had a sponsor resident in those
governorates – and there were reports that some families were only being admitted if theadult men agreed to join the PMU.’417
Reporting on human rights practices in 2015, USDOS also mentioned reports of local councils
forcing displaced persons to enlist:‘On April 21 (2015), the Wasit Provincial Council issued a statement forcing displaced
persons between the ages of 18 and 50 to enlist. Shabak IDPs living in Wasit told
Masarat that local police confiscated their identity documents and told them they had
to enlist in security forces or leave the province. Ultimately, after intervention fromhuman rights activists, a member of parliament, religious authorities, and membersof the Wasit provincial council, the decision to forcibly enlist Shabak IDPs was revoked,
and local police returned their identity documents.’418

1.7 Former Baath Party members
From 1968 to 2003 the Arab Socialist Baath Party ruled Iraq. The Baathists had taken power
briefly in 1963 and regained it in 1968, after which the party’s power became concentrated
under Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein.419 The Party’s ideology was secular Arab nationalist, andthrough the Baath party, concentrated power over the country into the control of a ‘narrowelite united by family and tribal ties’ rather than ideological convictions. During the 1980s,

414 UNHCR, Mosul Weekly Protection Update 14-20 January 2017, 20 January 2017, url, p. 2.
415 Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Algemeen ambtsbericht Irak, 14 November 2016, url, p. 58.
416 International Crisis Group, Fight or flight: the desperate plight of Iraq ‘s “Generation 2000”, 8 August 2016, url,

p. 23.
417 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014 - 30 April
2015, 13 July 2015, url, p. 5.
418 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2015 - Iraq, 13 April 2016, url.
419 Encyclopaedia Britannica, Ba’th party, n.d., url.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 63

about 10 % of the Iraqi population were members of the party.420 The Baath party has been
described as a ‘brutal authoritarian regime’ which penetrated the government and military
institutions to retain power over the population.421 Saddam Hussein and the Baath party usedviolence, killing, torture, execution, and various forms of repression to control the population.
A particularly well-known incident was when the northern Kurdish village of Halabja wasgassed with poison in 1988 killing 5 000 and wounding 10 000 Iraqi Kurds suspected of
disloyalty to the regime.422
After the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003, the new constitution implemented in2005 effectively banned the Baath party.423 A Bill passed by the Iraqi Parliament in July 2016
formally banned the Arab Socialist Baath Party from ‘exercising any political or cultural or
intellectual or social activity under any name and by any means of communication ofmedia’.424

1.7.1 ISIL and former Baath Party members
Renad Mansour reported that, despite a constitutional ban425, remnants of the former Baath
Party were still active during the 2016 period during the ISIL conflict. He explained that ‘theparty is divided along two strands’ remarking that‘the first group includes supporters of Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, formerly vice chairmanof Saddam’s Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council, and the Naqshbandi order, a Sufi
sect of Sunni Islam prominent in northern Iraq. The second group is led byMohammed Younis al-Ahmed, who leads al-Awda, an underground Baath movement
inside Iraq. Both groups are wanted by the central government and as such operate
via clandestine networks. Both of these groups have shared relations with ISIL.’426
In April 2018, the Netherlands’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that the list of most wanted
ISIL members published by Iraqi authorities in February 2018 contains several high-ranking
former Baath party members.427 On 4 February 2018, Arab News, a Saudi Arabia English
language newspaper, similarly reported on the existence of a list of 60 ‘most wanted’ people
by the Iraqi security services for individuals involved in terrorism over the past 14 years, which
included some former Baathists.428 The article states that the ‘Iraqi list links the Ba’ath officials
to the Army of Muhammad, the Naqshbandi Army, the Army of Mujahideen, Al-Aussra Army,
Al-Qaeda and Daesh’ and that some of the names were already on a US wanted list for
Saddam-era officials and alleges involvement in militant groups since 2003. The list included
the name of Saddam Hussein’s eldest daughter, Raghad Saddam Hussein, his nephews, Omar
and Ayman Saba’awi, Ahmed Wattban Ibrahim Al-Hassan, as well as Saddam’s cousin, Rafei’a
Abdulatief Telfah.429

420 BBC News, The Iraqi Baath party, 25 March 2003, url.
421

Stanford News, Ba’ath Party archives at the Hoover Institution reveal brutality of Saddam Hussein’s
authoritarian regime, 29 March 2018, url.
422 New York Times (The), Saddam Hussein, Defiant Dictator Who Ruled Iraq With Violence and Fear, Dies, 30
December 2006, url.
423 Tahrawi, D., The future of the Iraqi Ba’ath Party, 3 March 2016, url.
424 GICJ, Iraq – New bill contradicts basic principles of human rights, 4 August 2016, url.
425 Tahrawi, D., The future of the Iraqi Ba’ath Party, 3 March 2016, url.
426 Mansour, R., The Sunni predicament in Iraq, 3 March 2016, url, pp. 15-16.
427 Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Algemeen Ambtsbericht Irak, 1 April 2018, url, p. 72.
428 Arab News, Iraq issues ‘most wanted’ terror list, 4 February 2018, url.
429 Arab News, Iraq issues ‘most wanted’ terror list, 4 February 2018, url.

64 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALSIn April 2018, the New Arab, a London-based pan-Arab media outlet, mentioned a survey
conducted by AFP, revealing that 14 former officials from the Saddam era are still in prison in
Iraq, 15 years after the ousting of the regime.430 In March 2018, Rudaw, a Kurdish media
network, reported that the Iraqi government ordered the seizure of assets which previously
belonged to Saddam Hussein and those belonging to more than 4 200 former Baathist
officials, including their spouses and relatives.431
In a December 2015 article Reuters reported that former Saddam-era officers have been apowerful factor in the rise of ISIL. According to multiple sources the Baathists strengthened
ISIL spy networks and battlefield tactics and were instrumental in the survival of its selfproclaimed caliphate. According to Hisham al-Hashimi, an Iraqi analyst who has worked with
the Iraqi government, of ISIL’s 23 portfolios – equivalent to ministries - former Saddam Regime
officers ran three of the most crucial: security, military and finance. The union of Baathists
and ISIL is a union of convenience, Reuters noted: ‘Former Baathists working with ISIS were
driven by self- preservation and a shared hatred of the Shia-led government in Iraq.’432 The
Washington Post reports that the recruitment of former Baathist officers was a deliberate
strategy installed under the watch of ISIL-leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.433 According to the
New York Times, the association with Baathists allowed ISIL to develop into a ‘hybrid ofterrorists and an army’.434
Other sources note the different agendas and tactics of ISIL and the Baathists. In April 2015,
Rudaw published an article reporting on the killing of hundreds of Saddam-era former militaryand police officers by ISIL:‘The Islamic State has reportedly killed hundreds of former military and police officers
who were part of Iraqi security forces during Saddam Hussein’s Baathist regime, theIraqi vice president announced. Vice President Osama Nujaifi, speaking in a press
conference Thursday held in Tal Afar, said “In the few past days, ISIS militias havekilled 300 former police and [army] officers in Mosul.” The Islamic State had earlier
demanded former Iraqi Army officers join the group’s fighters in Mosul, a source
inside the jihadist-held city told Rudaw on condition of anonymity.’435
Writing for the Intercept in 2015, journalist Malcolm W. Vance, reports that ex-Baathists hadconnections with ISIL, but also had their own political goals in mind and were aiming for theestablishment of a Sunni-dominated tribal nation from Damascus to Fallujah to Mosul, thus
covertly undermining ISIL’s caliphate.436 Former Regime loyalists working with ISIL were madeto swear loyalty to ISIL, according to the same source.437 In November 2014 Middle East Eyereports that ‘the initial hype about the return of the Baath party, and the Naqshbandi army,
has proven bogus’. Despite having a presence in Mosul, the Baath party is relatively
ineffective. ISIL fighters, supported by local, tribal groups, control the region. To tame any
opposition, ISIL arrested a number of local Baath party leaders. Middle East Eye further
stresses that not all Baath party members were enthusiastic about ISIL’s rise.438 In July 2014
430 New Arab (The), 14 Saddam-era officials remain jailed in Iraq: survey, 23 April 2018, url.
431 Rudaw, Iraq orders seizure of Baathist-remnant assets, 5 March 2018, url.
432 Reuters, The Baathists: how Saddam’s men help Islamic State rule, 11 December 2015, url.
433 Washington Post (The), The hidden hand behind the Islamic State militants? Saddam Hussein’s, 4 April 2015,

url.
434 New York Times (The), Military skill and terrorist technique fuel success of ISIS, 27 August 2014, url.
435 Rudaw, Iraqi VP: 300 ex-security officers executed in Mosul, 17 April 2015, url.
436 Intercept (The), ISIS forces that now control Ramadi are ex-Baathist Saddam loyalists, 3 June 2015, url.
437 Intercept (The), ISIS forces that now control Ramadi are ex-Baathist Saddam loyalists, 3 June 2015, url.
438 Middle East Eye, Analysis: Iraq’s Baath party: where are they now ?, 14 November 2014, url.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 65

Reuters reported ISIL rounded up between 25-60 ex-Baathists to eliminate potential rivals in
Mosul.439 Human Rights Watch noted that these arrests suggested fractures in the local
Baathist-ISIL alliance.440 In June 2014, a source inside Mosul contacted by Niqash noted that
ISIL most likely used their Baath party and tribal associations in Mosul to gain popular support
and be accepted by the people of the city. In Mosul, however, it was clear who was in charge,
and ISIL ordered posters of Saddam Hussein to be removed.441

1.7.2 De-Baathification
A March 2013 report by the International Center for Transitional Justice442 defines the deBaathification process in Iraq as a series of legal and administrative measures introduced
shortly after the fall of the Saddam regime in April 2003 with the objective of preventing the
Baath party from returning to power. It consisted of a broad policy aiming to eliminate senior
Baath party members from the civil service and disbanding the Iraqi armed forces and security
services. Whilst Shia political parties supported the process, Sunnis eventually considered deBaathification as ‘a sectarian instrument wielded to prevent Sunnis from participating in public
life’.443 As such, de-Baathification proved to be ‘a deeply flawed process’, polarising Iraqi
politics and contributing to ‘severe instability in the Iraqi military and government’.444 The
report noted that in May 2003, 400 000 military conscripts, officers and government officials
were made unemployed by the de-Baathification order of 2003.445 According to the GICJ, theeffect of de-Baathification was to legitimise sectarianism with a lasting negative impact on
Iraq.446 Human Rights Watch reported in 2015 that due to ‘historical animosities’ between
Shia and the Baath, ‘pro-government forces engaged in military operations against ISIS appear
to have conflated ISIS with the Baath party’, lumping together ISIL and those forces ‘loyal tothe disbanded Baath party and retired senior officers who served under Saddam Hussein’.447
Below are other examples of treatment mentioning former Baathists.448
In March 2015, militia fighters claimed that they burned and destroyed al-Dur village,
situated in Salah al-Din Governorate. According to militia members the residents ofthe village were Baathists and ISIL.449 Destruction of property and burning of buildings
by militias also took place in al-Alam village and Al-Bu Ajil village, reportedly due to439 Reuters, Islamic State rounds up ex-Baathists to eliminate potential rivals in Iraq’s Mosul, 8 July 2014, url.
440 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: ISIS Abducting, Killing, Expelling Minorities. Armed Group Targeting Christian Nuns,

Turkmen, Shabaks, Yazidis, 19 July 2014, url.
441 Niqash, Inside Mosul, ISIS bringing the Baath party back- or are they?, 13 June 2014, url.
442 The ICTJ is an international non-profit organisation that works with victims of human rights abuses, civil society,national and international organizations to ‘ensure redress for victims and help prevent atrocities from happening
again’ through research, analysis, and advisory activities, according to its website.
443 Sissons, M. and Al-Saiedi, A., A bitter legacy: Lessons of de-baathification in Iraq, March 2013, url, pp. 9-21.
444 Sissons, M. and Al-Saiedi, A., A bitter legacy: Lessons of de-baathification in Iraq, March 2013, url, p. 1.
445 Sissons, M. and Al-Saiedi, A., A bitter legacy: Lessons of de-baathification in Iraq, March 2013, url, p. 29.
446 GIJC, Iraq – New bill contradicts basic principles of human rights, 4 August 2016, url
447 Human Rights Watch, Ruinous aftermath: militia abuses following Iraq’s recapture of Tikrit, 20 September 2015,
url, p. 22
448 The examples cited pertain to acts committed against former Baath Party members without asserting that suchis the sole reason for the treatment endured.
449 Human Rights Watch, Ruinous aftermath: militia abuses following Iraq’s recapture of Tikrit, 20 September 2015,
url, p. 21.

66 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS








collaboration with ISIL.450 Enforced disappearances and killings by KH and AAH forceswere reported.451
In April 2015 members of militia groups allied to government forces looted civilian
homes in newly liberated areas of Tikrit. ‘A number of shops and homes were looted
and torched in Tikrit’s Zuhor quarter, Itibba’a street, Arbaeen street, Qadisiya quarter,
al-Asri quarter, and Shuhadaa quarter during the first 48 hours of the liberation of
Tikrit City. Between the afternoon of 3 April and the morning of 4 April, an additional
700 homes were reportedly looted and burned, and 200 more were allegedly
detonated – particularly those belonging to former officers of the Iraqi Army under
Saddam Hussein.’452
On 17 April 2015, in al-Sankar village of Abu al-Khaseeb district (Basrah Governorate),a Sunni sheikh from al-Ghanim tribe was shot dead in front of his house. The sheikh
had reportedly served in the intelligence services during the Saddam Hussein
regime.453
On 27 September 2015, a former member of the Baath party was shot and killed in
the al-Junaina area of central Basrah.454
On 29 April 2016, a high-ranking member of the Baath party was killed in Basrah byunidentified gunmen.455
According to the 2017 report on International Religious Freedom, ‘Sunnis said they
faced discrimination in public sector employment as a result of de-Baathification, aprocess originally intended to target loyalists of the former regime. According toSunnis and local NGOs, the government continued the selective use of thedeBaathification provisions of the law to render many Sunnis ineligible forgovernment employment, but did not do so to render former Shia Baathists
ineligible’.456

1.8 Desertion
1.8.1 Army desertion
The Military Penal Code No 19 of 2007, whichapplies to Iraqi military forces’ personnel inservice, cadets of military college and army schools or institutes, discusses desertion and arange of related punishments in Chapter 5. Article XXXV, First Article states that ‘whoever
escapes to join the enemy is punishable with a death sentence’. The Second Article states that‘[w]hosoever escapes to take enemy side during confirmations or during escape from a site
under siege, is punishable with imprisonment of 2-7 years’. Under the Fifth Article, a 5-year
imprisonment shall be imposed for any ‘[m]ilitary person escaping abroad during his military
service’. Article XXXVI notes that an army deserter who ‘surrenders himself repentantly is

450 Human Rights Watch, Ruinous aftermath: militia abuses following Iraq’s recapture of Tikrit, 20 September 2015,

url, pp. 31, 38, 40.
451 Human Rights Watch, Ruinous aftermath: militia abuses following Iraq’s recapture of Tikrit, 20 September 2015,
url, pp. 43-49.
452 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014 - 30 April
2015, 13 July 2015, url, p. 29.
453 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014 - 30 April
2015, 13 July 2015, url, p. 31.
454 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 30.
455 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 30.
456 USDOS, 2017 Report on International Religious Freedom - Iraq, 29 May 2018, url.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 67

deemed as [an] “Extenuating Circumstance”’.457 In an October 2014 report UNAMI notes thedeath penalty is provided for by the Military Penal Code of 2007:‘Offences carrying the death penalty are listed in Articles 27 and 28 – and include
offences relating to failure of personnel to perform their duty in the circumstancesleading to the surrender of themselves or other members of the armed forces andsurrender of military installations and military objects or territory; passing of secretdocumentation or information to hostile powers during peace or wartime; inciting
revolt, desertion, or defection of members of the armed forces to the enemy; inciting
insubordination or disobedience among other members of the armed forces;
disclosing military operations and military secrets to the enemy; spreading panic
within the armed forces through misinformation; and communicating secretly withenemy forces, etc.’.458
Absenteeism and absence are covered under Chapter IV, Article XXXIII of the same code,noting that, ‘Whosoever, is absent without proper legal justification from his unit or place of
duty or exceeds the duration of his leave at time of peace for more than (15) fifteen days forlower ranks and (10) ten days for officers, shall be punishable with imprisonment notexceeding (3) three years’.459 Perpetration of crimes of absenteeism (Article XXXIII) during
times of ‘mobilisation’ ‘shall be deemed as “Aggravating Circumstance”’ (Article XXXVI).460
In a June 2014 article, the New York Times noted that after ISIL captured Mosul that month,the Iraqi government ‘publicly invoked the law forbidding desertions, threatening harshpunishments, including the death penalty’.461 The same month, Public Radio International(PRI)462 reported Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki threatened deserters with apparent
execution in a televised address.463 An Iraqi military colonel, who asked to remain anonymous
because he was not authorised to speak to the press, however, said ‘the military does notconsider soldiers who fled after being abandoned by their superiors to be deserters.’ He statedthat soldiers had to flee as they had no orders to fight, their commanders left, and their lives
were in danger. The same source stated that ‘the mass desertions in Mosul are being treatedas a political issue, not a strategic or military problem.’464
In a July 2014 article the Washington Post reported the situation of an Iraqi soldier who
deserted the army the previous month. According to the source the young man ‘evaded
authorities, who are arresting deserters, by moving between the houses of friends and family
in his home city of Baghdad’.465 Michael Knights informed the Washington Post that nearly
one tenth of Iraq’s active soldiers deserted in the weeks following ISIL’s seizure of Mosul.
According to Iraqi officials, the number of deserters might have been as high as 90 000 at thattime.466

457 Iraq, Military Penal Code No. 19 of 2007, 2007, url.
458 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Death Penalty in Iraq, October 2014 url, p. 9.
459 Iraq, Military Penal Code No. 19 of 2007, 2007, url.
460 Iraq, Military Penal Code No. 19 of 2007, 2007, url.
461 New York Times (The), Exhausted and bereft, Iraqi soldiers quit fight, 10 June 2014, url.
462 PRI is a US-based global non-profit media company, according to its website.
463 PRI, Iraqi deserters say the army’s epic collapse isn’t their fault, 17 June 2014, url.
464 PRI, Iraqi deserters say the army’s epic collapse isn’t their fault, 17 June 2014, url.
465 Washington Post (The), Iraqi soldier tells of desertion as militants attacked refinery: ‘Our officers sold us out’,

11 July 2014, url.
466 Washington Post (The), Iraqi soldier tells of desertion as militants attacked refinery: ‘Our officers sold us out’,
11 July 2014, url.

68 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALSIn September 2014, the New York Times reported the Iraqi army tried to convince army
deserters to come back offering a de facto amnesty. An official at the re-enlistment centre in
Baghdad informed the New York Times that nobody is being asked to explain why heabandoned his unit.467 Niqash reported the Iraqi army suffers badly from the so-called
astronaut phenomenon, meaning soldiers who pay money to superior officers so they canleave the world of the military and stay out.468 The same article stated that many soldiers bribe
their way out of danger zones, ‘paying a hefty part or all of their salary to their superior officers
in return for the superior not reporting them absent’. Hence, an increase in the number of
Iraqi soldiers who were leaving areas where they could expect to see action, such as theprovinces Anbar, Salah al-Din and Diyala, it was reported in the July 2014 article.469 The article
further informed that corruption in Iraq’s army worsened since the new military penal code
was introduced in 2007 adding that ‘although the military law sets strict laws for soldiers who
are absent without leave, especially during times of war, it is barely ever enforced.’470 MP
Mathar al-Janabi, a member of the parliamentary committee on security and defence,
informed Niqash that ‘our security forces have a big problem when it comes to nonenforcement of military law (…) This makes members of the military unafraid of doing illegal
things – such as being absent without leave, illegal killing and otherwise not carrying out theirmilitary duties.’471
In April 2015 AFP reports Prime Minister al-Abadi offered an amnesty to security forces
members who deserted, provided they return to their units within 30 days.472 In May 2015,
Prime Minister al-Abadi announced ‘the halt of any legal action against the fugitives and theabsent during military service’. According to a statement from Abadi’s office ‘the Prime
Minister has decided to stop any legal action was taken against members of the Armed Forces
and internal security forces definitively, including the following offenses: escape,absenteeism, malingering and self-harm to get rid of service, as well as crimes against the
military regime and the affairs of the service.’473 In August 2016, Iraqi News reported that the
Iraqi Defense Ministry cancelled the contracts of 106 000 military officials who fled fromservice in June 2014 after ISIL’s entry into Mosul.474
In a December 2016 report, Landinfo makes note of a November 2016 meeting with a memberof an unnamed international organisation active in Iraq. According to this internationalorganisation, army deserters who have left the country could be arrested and may face
imprisonment upon return to Iraq. Those who have the right connections, however, may beallowed to return to their service without being punished. LandInfo noted that these claims
could not be confirmed by information from other sources.475 The director of UNAMI’s humanrights office in Baghdad also informed Landinfo that his services were not aware of any court
cases resulting in a death sentence on the basis of the military penal law. Besides that, UNAMI

467 New York Times (The), Iraq army woos deserters back to war on ISIS, 28 September 2014, url.
468 Niqash, The ‘Astronaut’ problem – Iraqi soldiers who pay money to officers so they don’t fight, 2 October 2014,

url.
469 Niqash, The ‘Astronaut’ problem – Iraqi soldiers who pay money to officers so they don’t fight, 2 October 2014,
url.
470 Niqash, The ‘Astronaut’ problem – Iraqi soldiers who pay money to officers so they don’t fight, 2 October 2014,
url.
471 Niqash, The ‘Astronaut’ problem – Iraqi soldiers who pay money to officers so they don’t fight, 2 October 2014,
url.
472 AFP, Iraq offers amnesty to security personnel who fled ISIS. Al Arabiya, 30 April 2015, url.
473 Iraqi News, Abadi pardons military deserters and others, 17 May 2015, url.
474 Iraqi News, Contracts of 106,000 deserters cancelled, says Obeidi, 1 August 2016, url.
475 Norway, Landinfo, Irak: Desertering fra den irakiske hæren [Desertion], 13 December 2016, url, p. 2.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 69

did not meet any army deserters in the prisons they visited.476 Landinfo stated that it cannot
exclude with certainty that military personnel have been arrested because of the massdesertions that took place upon ISIL’s offensive in June 2014. However, according to Landinfo,
the gathered information suggests that the military penal code is not strictly enforced to its
full extent.477
In a December 2016 article Al-Monitor reported the parliamentary Security and Defense
Committee announced that same month that ‘it would follow up on the implementation of
the law to repatriate those dismissed from the army, police and security institution, or others
who escaped or whose contracts had been terminated’.478 Political and humanitarian motives
are cited as the reason for implementing this so-called amnesty law. Parliamentarian Raad alDahlaki told Al-Monitor that ‘the decision gives the people who escaped a second chance, sothat they wouldn’t have to bear the burdens of a state that could not protect its citizens. They
should not be held accountable for the government’s bad management of security andpolitical affairs.’479 Saad al-Matlabi, a member of the Security and Defense Committee in
Baghdad’s Provincial Council, told Al-Monitor that ‘the decision to grant amnesty to security
officers and to halt their legal pursuit was part of the political settlement decisions that weretaken long before the Mosul operations. But they were only approved a few days ago.’480
In a January 2018 update report on desertion, Lifos refers to Niqash’s October 2014 article
discussing the so-called astronaut phenomenon, cited above. The report further notes little
to none concrete information is available about military personnel or police imprisoned on
account of desertion.481 Interviewed by ACCORD in May 2018, Joel Wing, a US-based Iraqi
expert and operator of the blog Musings on Iraq, stated that he was not aware of any
consequences for people who have deserted a unit of PMUs.482 According to an Iraq analyst
interviewed by DIS/Landinfo in 2018 during their mission to KRI desertion of low-level
members of the PMUs would have no consequence or retribution whereas for high-level
members there would be repercussions.483 This source further stated ‘that the Iraqi security
forces are voluntary forces and that there is no draft which also applies to the Peshmerga andthe PMUs. If a member of ISF deserts, the Iraqi state does not have the capacity to pursue
such a person; no one is coming after the deserter.’484 The source further remarks that formembers of the intelligence service in Iraq and KRI, it will not be easy to desert.485

476 Norway, Landinfo, Irak: Desertering fra den irakiske hæren [Desertion], 13 December 2016, url, pp. 2-3.
477 Norway, Landinfo, Irak: Desertering fra den irakiske hæren [Desertion], 13 December 2016, url, pp. 2-3.
478 Al-Monitor, Why does Iraq want to bring back dismissed security forces, 29 December 2016, url.
479 Al-Monitor, Why does Iraq want to bring back dismissed security forces, 29 December 2016, url.
480 Al-Monitor, Why does Iraq want to bring back dismissed security forces, 29 December 2016, url.
481 Sweden, Lifos, Lägesanalys: Irak – desertering [Desertion], 12 January 2018, url, p. 4.
482 ACCORD, Anfragebeantwortung zum Irak: Lage von Mitgliedern schiitischer Milizen, die sich als Deserteure vonihren Einheiten entfernt haben bzw. nicht wieder bei der Miliz gemeldet haben (Sanktionen, Behandlung durch
Milizen) [a-10558] [Query response on Iraq: Situation of deserters from Shia militias], 25 May 2018, url.
483 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 45.
484 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 48.
485 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 48.

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1.8.2 Absentee Internal Security Forces personnel
The Internal Security Forces Penal Code No 14 of the year 2008, which entered into effect inApril 2008486, applies to all officers and enlisted ranks of the Internal Security Forces who are
in service, students at facilities in training with ISF, and retirees or those out of ISF service who
committed applicable crimes while in service.487 The Internal Security Forces Criminal
Procedure Law 17 of 2008 details the rules of criminal procedure for the Internal Security
Forces. Article 28 of this law discusses the establishment of five Internal Security Forces Courts
based in Erbil, Mosul, Baghdad, Hilla and Basrah.488 A June 2010 Report to the U.S. Congress
notes Internal Security Forces Courts were formed in April 2008 and serve as the disciplinary
and criminal justice courts for the 500 000 MoI [Ministry of Interior] police. The Internal
Security Forces Court system consists of regional courts and the Internal Security Forces
Cassation (Appeals) Court, the highest court in the system. The same source noted that ‘from
January 2009 through February 2010, the Internal Security Forces Courts received 10,807
cases and issued 2,812 sentences to Iraqi police.’489
The Internal Security Forces Penal Code does not contain any provisions relating to desertion;
however, Articles 5-7 pertain to ‘the crime of absence’. Article 5 states absentee Internal
Security Forces personnel ‘shall be jailed for a period not exceeding six months. If the absence
is repeated a jail sentence not exceeding one year shall be imposed’. Article 6 states that
Internal Security Forces personnel ‘who are absent for more than ten days during disturbancesor states of emergency shall be jailed for at least one year’. Article 7 states that Policemen
who are absent for less than fifteen days during ordinary circumstances, may be punished by‘deducting his salary’. If such absence is repeated, the policeman faces imprisonment for a
maximum of thirty days.490
UNAMI observes that the Iraqi Internal Security Forces Penal Code of 2008 carries the death
penalty for some offences:‘Offences listed in articles 3 and 14, including causing public installations to be
surrendered to the enemy; disclosing official or State secrets related to the securityof the State; intentionally sabotaging or damaging public or military installations or
infrastructure; inciting anyone to join an armed gang or take up arms against theState; encouraging or inciting rebellion among the armed forces during disturbancesor emergencies; disclosing secrets to an armed gang; and the intentional destruction
or damage of communications, transport weapons or ammunition. Article 14 also
imposes the death penalty where a member of the armed forces assaults anothermember of the armed forces that results in the death of the victim.’491
However, UNAMI noted that the vast majority of death sentences carried out relate toconviction for crimes under the Anti-Terrorism Law of 2005.492

486 Perito, R. and Kristoff, M., Iraq’s Interior Ministry: The key to police reform, United States Institute for Peace,

July 2009, url, p. 5.
487 Iraq, Internal Security Forces Penal Code of 2008, 2008, url.
488 Iraq, Internal Security Forces Criminal Procedure Law No. 17 of 2008, 2008, url.
489 US, Ministry of Defense, Report to Congress - Measuring stability and security in Iraq, June 2010, url, p. 65.
490 Iraq, Internal Security Forces Penal Code of 2008, 2008, url.
491 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Death Penalty in Iraq, October 2014 url, pp. 9-10.
492 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Death Penalty in Iraq, October 2014 url, p. 20.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 71

In a May 2014 report, Lifos makes note of a general amnesty issued for members of theInternal Security Forces who had been absentee or left without permission:‘Civilians who leave their jobs without permission are deemed to having resigned after
10 days. Soldiers who do the same used to be taken to a military court, policemen toa police court (administered by MoI). According to the Internal Security Forces Penal
Code of 2008, they risk a salary deduction or maximum 6, or in exceptional cases, 12months jail. “The wages are good so why leave!?”, ponder our interlocutors from the
Shura council and continues with the following information. Policemen make 700 to
800 USD a month – minimum. Soldiers make more. If the governmental council
members let somebody off their job, it will be handled by the Shura Council.
From a police officer attending a EU JUSTLEX conference/seminar at hotel Rashid in
Baghdad we heard that policemen and military personnel used to risk up to six months
prison for leaving their work without notice. But an amnesty in August cleared them.
At first the amnesty was to last until October 15, but now it is indefinitely.
Maliki, (as commander in chief of the Armed Forces), beginning of August 2013, issued
a general amnesty for members of the ISF who had been absent or deserted fromtheir units. The amnesty came in the wake of the Abu Ghraib prison attack and istherefore likely intended to allow ISF members who defected the opportunity toreturn without enduring any punishment. The amnesty will also cover ISF members
who defected before 2007. It is very likely that the amnesty is designed to re-enlist
Sunni soldiers who may have deserted then and more recently. Its durability, andwhether it covers policemen in the Anbar province, seems questionable after media
reports about 1,200 policemen there dismissed by the Interior minister. The decision
is said to have been taken when they failed to report for duty in January 2014.
However, in line with the amnesty, they were not punished.’493
In July 2014 Iraqi News reported that ‘Iraq’s Interior Ministry announced punitive legal action
against a number of officers and associates in the Anbar police who had abandoned theirpositions in a number of police stations in Anbar province.’494
In April 2015, AFP reported that Prime Minister al-Abadi offered an amnesty to security forces
members who deserted, provided they return to their units within 30 days.495 In May 2015
Iraqi News reported that Prime Minister al-Abadi announced ‘the halt of any legal action
against the fugitives and the absent during military service’. According to a statement from
Abadi’s office, ‘The Prime Minister has decided to stop any legal action was taken against
members of the Armed Forces and internal security forces definitively, including the following
offenses: escape, absenteeism, malingering and self-harm to get rid of service, as well as
crimes against the military regime and the affairs of the service.’496
In a December 2016 article Al-Monitor reports the parliamentary Security and Defense
Committee announced that same month that ‘it would follow up on the implementation of
the law to repatriate those dismissed from the army, police and security institution, or others
who escaped or whose contracts had been terminated.’497 Political and humanitarian motives
493 Sweden, Lifos, Iraq: Rule of Law in the Security and Legal system, 8 May 2014, url, p. 17.
494 Iraqi News, Ministry of Interior to punish police who abandoned their post, 22 July 2014, url.
495 AFP, Iraq offers amnesty to security personnel who fled ISIS. Al Arabiya, 30 April 2015, url.
496 Iraqi News, Abadi pardons military deserters and others, 17 May 2015, url.
497 Al-Monitor, Why does Iraq want to bring back dismissed security forces?, 29 December 2016, url.

72 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

are cited as the reason for implementing this so-called amnesty law. Parliament member Raadal-Dahlaki told Al-Monitor that ‘the decision gives the people who escaped a second chance,
so that they wouldn’t have to bear the burdens of a state that could not protect its citizens.
They should not be held accountable for the government’s bad management of security andpolitical affairs.’ Saad al-Matlabi, a member of the Security and Defense Committee in
Baghdad’s Provincial Council, told Al-Monitor that ‘the decision to grant amnesty to security
officers and to halt their legal pursuit was part of the political settlement decisions that weretaken long before the Mosul operations. But they were only approved a few days ago.’498
In a January 2018 update report on desertion Lifos noted that little to none concrete
information is available about military personnel or police imprisoned on account ofdesertion.499

1.8.3 Desertion from Peshmerga forces
According the Iraqi Constitution, internal security forces for the region are stipulated; thePeshmerga are formalised as a state security force, however, they are not under the Iraqi
Ministry of Defence.500 Officially they are under the responsibility of the Peshmerga Ministryof the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).501 Brigades are politicised according to the main
political parties of the KRI, the KDP and the PUK.502
Several interviewed sources for the 2012 Finish and Swiss Immigration services fact-finding
mission to the KRI said that ‘desertion from the Peshmerga today is not a serious issue.’ Thesame source noted that ‘it can be more difficult for high-ranking Peshmerga to leave, andthere can be repercussions, but not for low-ranking Peshmerga. According to sourcesinterviewed by the fact-finding mission, being a Peshmerga was basically just a job.’503
In 2014, US media reported that many Kurds volunteered to join the ranks of the Peshmergain the fight against ISIL such that some had to be turned away.504 Sources indicate that joining
the Peshmerga is voluntary.505 In 2015 a spokesman for the Peshmerga, Jabbar Yawar, said
that recruits signs a contract voluntarily, but after the end of the contract, ‘they are free toleave.’ Yawar stated that some Peshmerga are leaving the forces and sometimes the country
though he attributed this to the ‘financial crisis’, and insisted that this situation would notaffect morale, since he said ‘there are always enough volunteers to fill the ranks.’506 A 2015
FFM to Erbil by the Danish Immigration Service and Danish Refugee Council interviewed the
NGO Public Aid Organisation/Kurdish Human Rights Watch (PAO/KHRW), who observed that‘the punishment for desertion, depending on the circumstances, goes from cancellation ofcontract and all the way up to death sentence’, no such cases had been brought before a court

498 Al-Monitor, Why does Iraq want to bring back dismissed security forces?, 29 December 2016, url.
499 Sweden, Lifos, Lägesanalys: Irak – desertering [Desertion], 12 January 2018, url, p. 4.
500 Clingendael, Fighting for Kurdistan?, March 2018, url, p. 15.
501 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Kurdistan’s Political Armies: The Challenge of Unifying thePeshmerga Forces, 16 December 2015, url.
502 Clingendael, Fighting for Kurdistan?, March 2018, url, p. 16.
503 Finland, Finnish Immigration Service/Switzerland, Federal Office for Migration, Report on Joint Finnish-Swiss
Fact Finding Mission to Amman and the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) Area, 1 February 2012, url, p. 27.
504 Fox News, Expendables: Kurdistan’s old soldiers flock to the battlefield to fight ISIS, 18 August 2014, url.
505 Finland, Finnish Immigration Service/Switzerland, Federal Office for Migration, Report on Joint Finnish-Swiss
Fact Finding Mission to Amman and the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) Area, 1 February 2012, url, p. 27;
Niqash, Leaving the good fight: Kurdish soldiers forced to buy own bullets, exit Iraq for good, 22 October 2015, url.
506 Niqash, Leaving the good fight: Kurdish soldiers forced to buy own bullets, exit Iraq for good, 22 October 2015,
url.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 73

of law before 2015.507 In 2016, the KRG’s Deputy Prime Minister stated that people wereleaving their posts in the Peshmerga and deserting due to unpaid wages.508
In November 2018, the DIS/Landinfo FFM report confirmed that the Peshmerga remains aforce were recruitment is based on voluntary applications and there is no draft.509 An Iraq
analyst informed the Danish Immigration Service in May 2018 that for members of theintelligence service in Iraq KRI, it will not be easy to desert.510

1.9 (Perceived) collaborators of Western organisations/armed
forcesIn a February 2017 article, the New York Times reported that interpreters who worked for theUnited States in Iraq between 2003 and 2011, following the fall of Saddam Hussein, often did
so at great risk to themselves and their families.511 An article by McClatchy DC Bureau, dated
March 2013, also noted that people who worked with Americans as interpreters, culturaladvisors, or support staff were viewed as ‘enemy collaborators’ and received death threats
from ‘Sunni and Shiite Muslim militants’.512 Al Jazeera reported in February 2017 that ‘tens of
thousands’ of Iraqis worked with the Americans as engineers, drivers or cultural consultants(as well as interpreters), for which they face ‘grave dangers’.513 A February 2017 article inForeign Policy noted on the experiences of an interpreter who said he had moved his familyin Baghdad at least four times for safety reasons since he stopped working for the US military
in 2011, claiming fear of both ISIL and militias.514
During the April 2017 EASO Practical Cooperation Meeting on Iraq Mark Lattimer, Director of
the Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights, noted that he had no information of recent cases of
US personnel being targeted and that working for the coalition was less sensitive than in thepast.515 In April 2016 Landinfo noted the following on the situation of people who worked forforeign companies in Iraq (as translated by the UK Home Office):‘One can not in general terms today say that the Shiite militias promotes threats orviolent [sic] to people who work for, or are/have been involved, foreign companies in
Iraq. This was a relevant issue in the period before the Americans pulled their troops
out of Iraq in December 2011, and especially in the most violent period between 2005
and 2008. According to the UNHCR occurred albeit [sic] still some attacks against
people who had worked for foreign forces or organizations in 2012.
Before the Americans pulled out of Iraq, were people who worked for the US-led
coalition subjected to abuse by militias, including the Shiite, who wanted to liberate
Iraq from occupation forces. This affected not only Iraqis who assisted the forces
directly, but also others who worked in the civil, such as in the oil sector.

507 Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI); fact finding mission, 26 September to 6 October 2015, 12 April

2016, url, p. 42.
508 DW, Unpaid Peshmerga are voting with their feet, 2 February 2016, url.
509 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 48.
510 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 48.
511 New York Times (The), Visa ban amended to allow Iraqi interpreters into U.S., 2 February 2017, url.
512 McClatchy DC Bureau, U.S. pledge to help Iraqis who aided occupation largely unfulfilled, 14 March 2013, url.
513 Al Jazeera, What happens to Iraqis who worked with the US military, 1 February 2017, url.
514 Foreign Policy, For Iraqi Military Interpreters, Trump Travel Ban Chaos is ‘Life and Death’, 6 February 2017, url.
515 Lattimer, M., cited in: EASO, Practical Cooperation Meeting on Iraq, 25-26 April 2017, url, p. 26.

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Today however, the situation is different. The Shiite militias are now, in spite ofinternal feuds and power struggles, mainly focused on combating the threat from theIslamic State (IS).
What may trigger these militias to again threaten foreign players in Iraq, and possibly
their local partners, (is) the return of foreign ground forces.’516

1.10 Political opposition activists / protesters
1.10.1 Iraq
Since August 2015, repeated civil protests have been taking place in Baghdad and several cities
in southern Iraq, protesting not only against infrastructure failures, but increasingly against
corruption within the public services. The authorities restrained mostly from intervening bymeans of the security forces, but there were also examples of violence between protesters
and police in southern Iraq and Baghdad. Examples of violent incidents were the protests
against the appointment of a new governor in Diwaniyah in 2015517, or the attacks against
headquarters of the Dawa party and the Badr Organisation (both essentially Shi’a) in different
cities in the south in June 2016.518
The protests became increasingly politicised: in February 2016, Moqtada al-Sadr, Head of the
Sadrist Movement, called for a protest against corruption in the government, and on
16 February 2016 he personally led a major demonstration on Tahrir Square in the capital.519
Sadr has also appealed to his supporters to increase pressure on the government, which in hisview was taking too long to implement reforms, by protesting closer to the international zone,
where – next to foreign embassies and international organisations – the Iraqi parliament andgovernment are located.520 His supporters followed this call, and since 18 March 2016 held
sit-ins at several entrances to the international zone. At the beginning of the sit-in, thedemonstrators gathered from Tahrir Square across the Jumhuriya bridge to the internationalzone.521 On 30 April 2016, the Sadrist protesters stormed the international zone, entered theCouncil of Representatives and vandalised the parliament and assaulted at least one memberof parliament who attempted to leave. They attempted to set up a ‘sit in’ in the Green Zone.522
Another demonstration by the Sadrist Movement on 20 May 2016 led to a second intrusionin the international zone, but this time, the police did use force against the protesters:
allegedly, four people were killed, and about 90 wounded.523 On 11 February 2017, a third raid
on the international zone, again by members of the Sadrist Movement, was pushed back by
police forces. The violence caused at least four deaths and 320 wounded.524

516 Norway, Landinfo, Irak: Situasjonen for personer som har jobbet for utenlandske selskaper [Situation of people

who worked for foreign companies], 7 April 2016, url. Extracts translated in English in: UK Home Office, Iraq,
Perceived collaborators, January 2018, url, p. 10.
517 Almirbad, Six people injured after clashes between supporters of the Virtue Party and Demonstrators in
Diwaniyah (Arabic), 09 October 2015, url.
518 Wing, J., Power Struggles Amongst Iraq’s Ruling Shiite Parties, Musings on Iraq [Blog], 21 June 2016, url.
519 ISW, Iraqi Updates (Sinan A.), Sadr Rejuvenates Demonstrations as PM Abadi Works to Implement Decisive
Reforms, 01 March 2016, url.
520 ISW, Iraqi Updates (Sinan A.), Sadr Rejuvenates Demonstrations as PM Abadi Works to Implement Decisive
Reforms, 01 March 2016, url.
521 Reuters, Shi'ite cleric's followers begin anti-corruption sit-in in Baghdad, 18 March 2016, url
522 ISW, Warning: Sadrists Storm the Green Zone. 30 April 2016, url; ISW, Sadr Attempts a De-facto Coup in Iraq, 1
May 2016, url.
523 Wing, J., Sadr Takes Over Protests In Iraq’s Capital But What’s Next?, Musings on Iraq [Blog], 30 May 2016, url.
524 ISW, Iraq Situation Report: February 11-16 2017, 16 February 2017, url.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 75

Between 8 and 17 July 2018, a series of protests in Basrah over water, jobs and electrical
power turned violent. The security forces, described by Human Rights Watch to belong mostly
to the Ministry of Interior, used force against the demonstrators, resulting in three protesters
being killed and at least 47 wounded.525 In six of the eight protests investigated by Human
Rights Watch, the security forces allegedly fired live ammunition, threw rocks and beat people
during or after their arrest. The source reported that ‘since July 14 [2018], the authorities haveseverely limited internet access across much of central and south Iraq.’526
The wave of protests rose again in September 2018 after a water crisis in Basrah described byJoel Wing on his blog Musings on Iraq:‘Basra’s water problems took off in August. That was when people started going to
the hospital after having drank contaminated water. By September 4 up to 22,000 had
been affected. The cause was growing salinity coming from the Persian Gulf up the
Shatt al-Arab, and the lack of water coming from the north due to a new dam in
Turkey. The Abadi government promised to truck in fresh water to deal with the crisis,
but Basra health officials have complained that the water delivered was not always
clean as some were filled up at desalination plants that were not checking the quality.
The government knew about both of these issues for years, and took little to noaction. That led to growing anger at the authorities, which revived the protest
movement.’527
In the course of this wave of protests the Iranian consulate in Basrah was stormed bydemonstrators, and an oil field in the region was overtaken where protester held workers
hostage. Protesters claimed that Iran-backed militias ‘run rampant in Basra, kidnapping andextorting money from their opponents and creating an atmosphere of fear’.528 Several sources
note that Shia militias backed by Iran played a major role in defeating ISIL and have sinceincreased their influence in Iraq.529 Government buildings were ransacked and burned down.
The demonstrations led to a temporarily shutdown of Iraq’s only major sea port at Umm Qasr,
60 km south of Basrah. Reuters reported that ‘residents say they have been driven to thestreets by corruption that allowed infrastructure to collapse, leaving no power or safe drinking
water in the heat of summer.’530 The same source counted 12 deaths among thedemonstrators in this wave of protest.531
On 8 September 2018, the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for
Iraq Ján Kubiš condemned the violent attacks on government and party offices, oil
installations, the airport and the Iranian consulate by the protesters.532 Citing figures thereleased by Iraqi High Commission for Human Rights (IHCHR), the October 2018 report of theSecretary-General of the UN Security Council noted that ‘casualties between 9 August and525 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Security Forces Fire on Protesters, 24 July 2018, url.
526 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Security Forces Fire on Protesters, 24 July 2018, url.
527 Wing, J., Basra Explodes In Rage and Riots Over Water Crisis, Musings on Iraq [Blog], 5 September 2018, url.
528 Washington Post (The), Chanting ‘Iran, out!’ Iraqi protesters torch Iranian Consulate in Basra, 7 September 2018,url.
529 RFE/RL, Iraqi PM Urged To Resign Over Basra Unrest, 8 September 2018, url; Fox News, Iran-backed militias
accused of reign of fear in Iraqi Basra, 23 September 2018, url.
530 Reuters, Unrest intensifies in Iraq as Iranian consulate and oil facility stormed. 7 September 2018, url.
531 Reuters, Unrest intensifies in Iraq as Iranian consulate and oil facility stormed. 7 September 2018, url.
532 UNAMI, UN Special Representative Kubiš condemns violence in Basra as harmful to people’s needs, urges thegovernment to take resolute action while respecting the right of people for peaceful demonstrations for theirlegitimate demands. 9 September 2018, url.

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3 October from the Basrah demonstrations reached 18 civilians killed (17 men and 1 woman),
155 civilians injured (all men) and 43 members of the security forces injured.’533 Reporting on
the protests in Basrah, Amnesty International noted in September 2018 that ‘up until
5 September [2018], at least seven protesters were reported to have been killed due toexcessive force, including by live ammunition. On 6 September, three more protesters werereported to have been killed as protesters took to burning government and political party
buildings.’534
The following incidents of violence against politicians, political opposition activists andprotesters, have been reported by UNAMI and other institutions monitoring the human rights
situation:










On 4 May 2017, an IED exploded outside the house of a parliamentarian of the Sadrist
bloc in Basrah, with material damages only.535 On the demonstrations by the Sadrist
movement in front of the international zone in 2016 (see above) UNAMI noted: ‘There
were also reports that individuals perceived to have significant leadership roles inorganizing such demonstrations were targeted for arrest or detention subsequent to
the demonstrations, or were reportedly threatened, intimidated, physically abusedand on occasion abducted or killed by unknown perpetrators.’536
On 8 May 2017, seven students, workers and civil activists were abducted from theirhome in Baghdad by unidentified gunmen and taken to an unknown destination,
where they were reportedly beaten before they were released the next day. Some of
the abductees were allegedly human rights activists who participated indemonstrations on Tahrir Square in Baghdad.537
On 8 September 2017, a well-known playwright received death threats on social
media following his expression of criticism at the presence of pictures of an Iranianreligious leader in Amarah city in Maysan Governorate. The day before, there were
gunshots in front of his house.538
On 6 February 2018, the Turkmen university teacher and spokesman for Kirkuk
University Ali Almas was shot by unidentified perpetrators in Kirkuk. He was a
candidate for the parliamentary election on the list led by former Prime Minister
Haider al-Abadi.539
Since 1 September 2018, 27 men have been arrested in Basrah for participating indemonstrations; 18 of them have been released, but the remaining 9 are being
detained under judicial orders.540

1.10.2 Kurdistan Region of Iraq
The November 2018 DIS/Landinfo report noted that Kurdish security actors are targeting
political and societal opposition in the KRI. Human rights advocates, activists, journalists andprotesting civil servants are being targeted when they display criticism of the political

533 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2421 (2018) Report of the Secretary-General [S/2018/975],

31 October 2018, url, p. 10.
534 AI, Iraq: Effective Investigations Needed Into Deaths of Protesters in Basra, 7 September 2018, url, p. 1
535 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – January to June 2016, 5 December 2016, url, p. 39.
536 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – January to June 2016, 5 December 2016, url, p. 20.
537 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – January to June 2017, 14 December 2017, url, p. 19.
538 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, p. 17.
539 iqNews, Candidate for Iraq’s Parliamentary Election Shot Dead in Kirkuk: Police. 6 February 2018, url.
540 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2421 (2018) Report of the Secretary-General [S/2018/975],
31 October 2018, url, p. 11.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 77

leadership.541 An international NGO working in Iraq that was interviewed by DIS/Landinfo
during their 2018 mission to KRI explained that ‘there are very small possibilities for thepolitical opposition in KRI. A small group of persons in top of the political parties, KDP and
PUK, can do anything they want without fearing sanctions etc. In general, the KDP and PUK
are in control. If a person has a conflict with a powerful figure from these two parties or the
Asayish, that person would be in trouble.’542 According to sources interviewed for the same
report ‘after October 2017, there were reports on PMU violations against the Kurdish
population in Kirkuk and Tuz Khurmatu. The targeted Kurds were mostly members of thepolitical party KDP and the Asayish.’543
In its Iraq 2018 Crime and Safety report the United States Overseas Security Advisory Council(OSAC) noted that civil unrest occasionally takes place in the KRI. Typically, protests arepeaceful, require a permit, and are heavily monitored by Kurdish police and security services.
However, violent protests occurred in late 2017 at the Kurdistan’s Parliament regarding the
Iraqi military intervention after the referendum vote.544 In its Iraq 2017 Crime and Safety
report OSAC reports demonstrations over lapses in civil servant pay and worsening economic
conditions were taking place in 2016, primarily in Sulaymaniyah.545
Incidents involving violence against protesters in the KRI include:







On 9 October 2015, a protest march near the KDP-headquarters in Qaladize(Sulaymaniyah Governorate) turned into riots, whereupon armed KDP-men took aim
at the protesters. Initially sources spoke of one person killed and 180 wounded.546
Later reports spoke about five fatalities.547
In December 2016 security forces in Sulaymaniyah started a crackdown on protestingteachers. Rallies were dispersed and some protesters were beaten or arrested.
Protest organizers and journalists are confronted with threats since then.548
At an unspecified date in the period July to December 2016 a number of teachers wasarrested and detained in Sulaymanyah and Halabja after striking over pay and working
conditions.549
In March 2017, Kurdish security services arrested 32 unarmed protesters in Erbil.
Most were released the same day, six remained in custody. The protesters
demonstrated against recent clashes in Sinjar.550
In 2017, Kurdish independent activists who oppose or criticize the referendum for
Kurdish independence have been threatened, arrested, and accused of treason.551

541 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)

in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 25.
542 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 43.
543 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 23.
544 OSAC, Iraq 2018 crime and safety report: Erbil, 3 June 2018, url.
545 OSAC, Iraq 2017 crime and safety report: Erbil, 13 February 2017, url.
546 Niqash, Dream of ‘Other Iraq’ crumbles: Whose political system is more stable - Iraqi Kurdistan’s or the real
Iraq’s?, 15 October 2015, url.
547 UN Security Council, Second report of the Secretary- General pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 2233 (2015),
26 January 2016, url, p. 3.
548 CPTI, Stand with civil society in Iraqi Kurdistan, 4 February 2017, url.
549 UK, FCO, Human Rights Priority Country update report: July to December 2016 – Iraq, 8 February 2017, url.
550 Human Rights Watch, Kurdistan region of Iraq: 32 arrested at peaceful protest, 16 March 2017, url.
551 Natali, D., Iraqi Kurds’ referendum for political relevance, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 7August 2017, url.

78 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALSOn 19 December 2017, an anti-government demonstration in Ranya district of
Sulaymaniyah Governorate turned violent. Two individuals were killed and 85 others,
including 40 security personnel, were wounded. Kurdistan Region Security Forces
arrested 200 individuals in various locations in the governorate, releasing themwithout charge by 31 December. In addition, the Kurdish Security Forces arrested
three other individuals.552
In late March 2018, KRG security forces detained at least 84 protesters during
demonstrations against unpaid wages which took place in the cities of Akre, Dohuk,
and Erbil.553

1.11 Human rights activists
1.11.1 Iraq
In a June 2018 report the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary
executions in Iraq stated that she ‘received information on incitement to hatred throughtraditional and social media, and attacks, including threats, physical assaults and killings, ofmen and boys on the basis of their actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity,
as well as of activists and organizations supporting the human rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender and intersex persons’.554
An Iraq analyst interviewed by the 2018 DIS/Landinfo FFM to KRI explained that although
there is very little reporting on this issue, the ‘PMUs are targeting Iraqi civilian society activists
and journalists’ who are critical of them.555 The source further noted that activists are often
kidnapped by Shia militia groups as a scare tactics, pointing out to an example from 2017 when
17 student activists from the communist party were kidnapped in Saadun in Baghdad, becauseof their activities, and subsequently released.556 Freedom House noted that in May 2017,seven student anticorruption activists affiliated with left-wing groups were abducted in
Baghdad and held for about three days by alleged members of a Shiite militia. They werereleased following negotiation with the interior minister.557
During the violent protests over unemployment, poor public services, and Iranian interference
that took place in September 2018 in Basrah dozens of activists were arrested, according to
the spokesman for the Iraqi High Commission for Human Rights in Baghdad.558 On
25 September 2018, Su’ad al-Ali, president of al-Weed al-Alaiami, an Iraqi human rights
organisation focused on the rights of women and children, was killed in central Basrah by anunidentified gunman. She had been involved in organising anti-government protests in
Basrah.559

552 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, p. 18.
553 Human Rights Watch, Kurdistan Region of Iraq: Protesters Beaten, Journalists Detained, 15 April 2018, url.
554 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions

on her mission to Iraq [A/HRC/38/44/Add.1], 20 June 2018, url, p. 3.
555 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 47.
556 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 47.
557 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2018 - Iraq, January 2018, url.
558 Al-Monitor, Dozens of Basra activists arrested, 5 September 2018, url.
559 AlAraby, The Iraq Report: Women's rights in danger after top activist and social media star assassinated, 28
September 2018, url; BBC News, Iraqi human rights activist shot dead in Basra, 25 September 2018, url.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 79

In an August 2018 report the Secretary-General of the UN General Assembly wrote on
allegations of acts of intimidation and reprisals, in the form of arbitrary arrest and illtreatment, against several human rights defenders for their work and cooperation with theUnited Nations in the field of human rights, especially on enforced disappearances in Iraq.560
According to the source, in March 2016 Imad Amara and Faisal al-Tamimi, of Al Wissam
Humanitarian Assembly - an NGO that documents cases of enforced disappearances in Iraq
and submits them to the United Nations human rights mechanism - were ‘severely beaten,
insulted and threatened while being interrogated about their work for around two hours,
before being released’.561 The same report further mentions allegations of death threats andattempted killing against human rights defenders for their work on enforced disappearancesin April 2018, highlighting the case of Faisal al-Tamimi who was injured in February 2018 in an
attempted assassination.562

1.11.2 Kurdistan Region of Iraq
Many opposition demonstrations and political activism occurring in KRI leads to frequentarrests of activists and journalists, especially Yazidi activists.563 According to Belkis Willie, asenior researcher on Iraq with Human Rights Watch, cases of torture have also beenreported.564 USDOS noted in its annual report on human rights (covering 2017) that activists
that were critical of the KRG were arrested and detained by police and internal security.565
Journalists and media outlets were prevented from reporting on several official events andcovering opposition protests.566 Reporting on events in 2017 by the UK Foreign Office
informed that it received reports of ‘detained journalists and temporary closures of thinktanks and NGOs, with those perceived as critical of the KRG banned from covering governmentand official events’.567
Amnesty International noted that online activists in the KRI ‘were subject to arbitrary arrest,
beatings, surveillance, death threats, and smear campaigns intended to damage theirreputations or the reputations of their family members’, especially in the run-up to the
September 2017 independence referendum.568 Amnesty International documented 12 casesof arbitrary arrests, beatings and intimidation of journalists and online activists between Juneand September 2017.569 According to Awat Ali, managing director of opposition TV
broadcaster NRT, who was closed by the Kurdish authorities during the December 2017
protests, fear of arrest has led dozens of politically engaged journalists, activists and humanrights defenders, to go into hiding.570

560 UN General Assembly, Cooperation with the United Nations, its representatives and mechanisms in the field of

human rights, Report of the Secretary-General, 13 August 2018, url, pp. 45-46.
561 UN General Assembly, Cooperation with the United Nations, its representatives and mechanisms in the field of
human rights, Report of the Secretary-General, 13 August 2018, url, pp. 45-46.
562 UN General Assembly, Cooperation with the United Nations, its representatives and mechanisms in the field of
human rights, Report of the Secretary-General, 13 August 2018, url, pp. 45-46.
563 Wille, B., cited in: EASO, Practical Cooperation Meeting on Iraq, 25-26 April 2017, url, p. 16.
564 Wille, B., cited in: EASO, Practical Cooperation Meeting on Iraq, 25-26 April 2017, url, p. 16.
565 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Iraq, 20 April 2018, url.
566 UK, FCO, Human Rights and Democracy: the 2017 Foreign and Commonwealth Office report, 16 July 2018, url;
RSF, Journalists arrested to prevent coverage of Iraqi Kurdistan protests, 28 December 2017, url.
567 UK, FCO: Human Rights and Democracy: the 2017 Foreign and Commonwealth Office report, 16 July 2018, url.
568 AI, Amnesty International Report 2017/18 - Iraq, 22 February 2018, url.
569 AI, Amnesty International Report 2017/18 - Iraq, 22 February 2018, url.
570 RSF, Journalists arrested to prevent coverage of Iraqi Kurdistan protests, 28 December 2017, url.

80 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

Amnesty International, in their 2016/17 report, noted that ‘media workers, activists andpoliticians critical of the ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) faced harassment andthreats and some were expelled from Erbil Governorate. No progress was made in conducting
investigations into the killings in previous years of journalists and other perceived critics andopponents of the Kurdish authorities.’571
The Gulf Center for Human Rights (GCHR)572, in an article dated December 2014, observed:‘Many see Iraqi Kurdistan, an autonomous region in Northern Iraq, as a safe haven, aplace of relative calm away from the terror and chaos that exists in much of the restof Iraq. This is not the position for independent journalists and human rights
defenders. The internal political tensions raging in the region have resulted in
impunity for attacks against them which include murder and arson. Human rights
defenders, working on such issues as women’s rights or conditions in detention, faceviolence from within the community. Many journalists say that they self-censor; theyknow where the “red lines” exist around issues such as religion, corruption and social
inequality, lines that must not be crossed.’573

1.12 Journalists
1.12.1 Iraq
According to Reporters Without Borders (Rapporteurs sans frontières, RSF) Iraq is one of theworld’s most dangerous countries for journalists: ‘They are often targeted by gunmen with
pro-government militias throughout the country as well as by militant opposition groups
including ISIL, which still poses a threat despite having been forced to retreat. The murders ofjournalists go unpunished, and even when investigations are opened they yield no result.’574
The November 2018 DIS/Landinfo report noted that ‘PMUs are targeting Iraqi civilian society
activists and journalists.’575 According to a source consulted for the same report ‘this has very
little coverage, but the attacks play an important role in silencing critics of the PMUs. Often,
the armed Shia militia groups are kidnapping the activists as a scare tactics. Journalists canalso be targeted, if their articles are both critical of the PMUs and gets a lot of publicity.’576
USDOS noted that in 2017, media workers feared reprisal by militias, criminal organisations,and private individuals, including political figures. Non-state actors, including militia groups,
reportedly threatened journalists with violence for reporting on sensitive subjects.577
According to Dlovan Barwari, from the independent Iraqi civil rights group Legal Defense for
Crimes Against Press Freedom, ‘militias don't hesitate to use all kinds of threats against

571 AI, Amnesty International Report 2016/2017 - Iraq, 22 February 2017, url.
572

A London-based independent non-profit organisation supporting Human Rights Defenders (HRDs) andpromoting human rights, freedom of expression, association, and peaceful assembly, according to its website.
573 GCHR, ‘Iraqi Kurdistan: No safe haven for human rights defenders and independent journalists’, 31 December
2014, url.
574 RSF, Iraq-assailed on all sides, n.d., url.
575 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 47.
576 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 47.
577 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Iraq, 20 April 2018, url.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 81

journalists, including killings.’578 A Baghdad-based journalist interviewed by Al Jazeera inNovember 2017 stated that criticising Shia militias, especially AAH or KH, is life-threatening.579
Reporting on human rights in Iraq in the period of January 2017 to June 2017, UNAMI notedsignificant challenges to freedom of opinion and expression. Journalists and media
professionals were intimidated, abducted and in some cases, killed while carrying out theirduties. UNAMI/OHCHR received reports that media professionals and protestors were
allegedly subjected to attacks by ISF, armed groups and unidentified perpetrators, whileworking or reporting on or participating in demonstrations.580 Freedom House reported in
April 2017 that ‘the Iraqi news media are diverse and collectively present a range of views,
but most outlets are owned by or affiliated with political parties and ethnic factions, often
leading to sharply partisan coverage.’581
Examples of treatment of journalists include:









In April 2015, Ned Parker, the Baghdad bureau chief for Reuters, was threatened on
Facebook and denounced by the satellite news channel of AAH in reaction to a Reutersreport that detailed lynching and looting in the city of Tikrit.582
In January 2016, unknown assailants shot and killed Al-Sharqiya TV correspondent Saif
Talal and his cameraman, Hassan al-Anbaki, in Diyala Province. Al-Sharqiya lateraccused local militias of responsibility for the killings.583
On 28 December 2016, gunmen reportedly kidnapped a prominent female Iraqi
journalist from her home in Baghdad after robbing the house; she was an ‘outspoken
critic’ of the government and corruption in several local media papers and outlets.584
On 24 January 2017, members of the Iraqi Army's 11th Division allegedly beat a female
reporter and a male photographer were allegedly to prevent them from reporting on
the bombing of central Baghdad’s al-Nhada Zone on the same day.585
On 30 April 2017, a journalist from Diwaniya was shot by unknown armed men at his
house. There was speculation that a previous posting on social media about armed
groups had incited public anger and protests.586
On 23 October 2017, a prominent Iraqi writer and journalist was abducted in Baghdad
by an unknown armed group. He had been critical of government operations in Kirkuk
and the Prime Minister in his articles. He was released on 12 December 2017.587
On 30 October 2017, photojournalist Arkan Sharif was killed in Daquq, south of
Kirkuk.588 KRG president Masoud Barzani held PMUs responsible.589
On 2 February 2018, Iraqi security forces arrested a freelance journalist at acheckpoint on the outskirts of Baghdad. He was taken to the intelligence headquarters

578 CPJ, Islamic State receded but threats to journalists in Iraq and Syria remain, 21 December 2017, url.
579 Al Jazeera, Is Iraq the most dangerous country for journalists?, 1 November 2017, url.
580 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: January to June 2017, 14 December 2017, url, p. 18.
581 Freedom House, Freedom of the Press 2017 - Iraq, 28 April 2017, url.
582 Reuters, Reuters Iraq bureau chief threatened, denounced over story, 11 April 2015, url.
583 Freedom House, Freedom of the Press 2017 - Iraq, 28 April 2017, url.
584 Middle East Eye, Prominent Iraqi journalist kidnapped by gunmen, 27 December 2016, url.
585 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: January to June 2017, 14 December 2017, url, p. 19.
586 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: January to June 2017, 14 December 2017, url, p. 21.
587 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, p. 17.
588 Iraqi News, Kurdistan TV photojournalist stabbed to death in southern Kirkuk, 30 October 2017, url.
589 Kurdistan 24, Barzani: Murder of journalist Arkan Sharif example of ‘chauvinist culture’ in Iraq, 1 November

2017, url.

82 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS








in Baghdad. In the weeks prior to his arrest he posted an article to his Facebook pagethat was critical of the Iraqi government.590
In June 2018, a reporter based in Najaf was issued an arrest warrant and had to pay alarge sum in bail to obtain his release on 6 June. The reporter had been harassed
before in connection with his coverage of an alleged corruption case involving the
Najaf provincial airport’s former governing board.591
On 9 June 2018, a reporter based in Fallujah was arrested at his home by policemen
who did not tell him what he was charged with. On 12 June 2018 he was released
without being charged.592
Between 14 July and 6 September 2018, at least seven Iraqi journalists were assaulted
or detained while covering protests over government corruption and the lack of basic
services in several cities across Iraq. The offices of two local media outlets were set
on fire.593
On 1 October 2018, Saif Hilal Al Azawi, journalist and editor of Adhamiya News, aFacebook page providing news about the Adhamiya neighbourhood in Baghdad, wasabducted by members of the Iraqi special forces and taken to an unknown location.594

1.12.2 Kurdistan Region of Iraq
In June 2018 the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions in
Iraq was informed of several attacks on journalists and media professionals in recent years,
including threats, intimidation, physical assaults and killings, in particular in the KRI. The
Rapporteur expressed her concern about the reported lack of effective investigations into thekillings of Kurdish journalists and media professionals, and little or no accountability. The same
report further stated that
‘his impunity has led to an overall mistrust in the criminal justice system and in turnincreased fear among the media community to continue their critical reporting. This
fear is heightened by their impression that the powerful figures who were the subjectof criticism by the deceased journalists might be behind their killings and may evenenjoy the protection of the justice system.’595
The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office noted that 46 cases of assaults and death threatsagainst journalists and media outlet closures were recorded during the December 2017
protests in Sulaimaniyah and Halabja.596
In December 2017 UNAMI/OHCHR points out that it‘continues to receive reports of intimidation of a number of media professionals andlimitations on the operation of media channels in the Kurdistan Region. Local
journalism advocacy organizations have reported significant spikes in violence andharassment against journalists and media organizations in 2017, in particular in the

590 CPJ, Iraqi authorities arrest Samir Obeid at Baghdad checkpoint, 6 February 2018, url.
591 RSF, Covering corruption exposes journalists to arrest in Iraq, 12 June 2018, url.
592 RSF, Covering corruption exposes journalists to arrest in Iraq, 12 June 2018, url.
593 CPJ, Iraqi authorities shut down internet, detain and assault journalists amid protests, 14 September 2018, url.
594 RSF, RSF concerned about Iraqi journalist abducted by security forces. 3 October 2018, url; Baghdad Post (The),

News editor in Baghdad arrested, taken to undisclosed location, 1 October 2018, url.
595 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions
on her mission to Iraq [A/HRC/38/44/Add.1], 20 June 2018, url, p. 9.
596 UK, FCO, Human Rights and Democracy: the 2017 Foreign and Commonwealth Office report, 16 July 2018, url.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 83

period leading up to the September 25 referendum, around the 16 Octoberrepositioning of forces in disputed areas, and in connection with protests in
December’.597
UNAMI/OHCHR further noted that‘the Kurdistan Journalists Syndicate reported 137 cases of violations against 230
journalists in 2017, compared to 45 cases against 80 journalists in 2016. The Metro
Center for Journalists Rights and Advocacy, an NGO, reported even greater numbers:
419 violations against 338 journalists in 2017 in the Kurdistan Region, including six
deaths, two of which were alleged assassinations, seven incidents of looting andburning media offices, and five times media offices were closed by officials or as aresult of violence.’598
In April 2017 Niqash reports there have been several cases of kidnapping and beating ofjournalists in KRG territory in recent years. Especially journalists who criticize the local
authorities are in danger.599
Examples of treatment of journalists in Kurdish territories include:







In February 2015, a journalist in the KRG was arrested and charged under the antiterrorism law for suggesting that a Kurdish military commander should be removed
from duty. He was later released, and the case was dropped.600
On 13 August 2016 a journalist working for TV, which is a channel sympathetic to the
PKK, was kidnapped and found murdered in Dohuk.601 Earlier he had been threatenedby Kurdish security forces over his reporting.602
On 10 July 2017 a group of men apparently associated with president Barzani
attacked and beat a journalist in Erbil. Earlier that year he had already been detainedand questioned by the Asayish.603
On 29 October 2017 several journalists who covered the resignation of Massoud
Barzani in Erbil were attacked by angry KDP-supporters. The offices of NRT TV in Erbiland Dohuk were ransacked. Some days later a cameraman of Kurdistan TV wasstabbed to death in Daquq, south of Kirkuk.604
On 19 December 2017 journalists of KNN TV and Xendan News Agency were physicallyattacked by security officers while reporters of NRT TV were threatened and beaten
by Asayish. Journalists of NRT TV and Roj News were detained. Sympathizers of theauthorities set fire to the offices of Raparin TV and the Mashxalan and Yekgrtw radio
stations in Ranya. There was also arson in the bureau of KNN TV in Koy Sanjaq, northwest of Suleymania.605

597 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, p. 18.
598 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, p. 18.
599 Niqash, Iraqi Kurdistan’s murdered journalists still wait for justice, 20 April 2017, url.
600 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2016 – Iraq, 27 January 2016, url.
601 Ekurd, Investigation continues into murder of Kurdish journalist Wedat Ali: Kurdistan Govt, 27 September 2016,

url.
602 Human Rights Watch, Iraqi Kurdistan: Kurdish journalist abducted, killed, 25 August 2016, url.
603 CPJ, Armed men beat Iraqi journalist in Erbil, 11 July 2017, url; Ekurd, Kurdish journalist attacked by ‘Barzani’
armed group in Iraqi Kurdistan, 11 July 2017, url.
604 RSF, Alarming violence against journalists in northern Iraq, 31 October 2017, url.
605 RSF, Journalists arrested to prevent coverage of Iraqi Kurdistan protests, 28 December 2017, url;
UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, p. 18.

84 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALSIn March 2018, several journalists were harassed and/or arrested whilst covering
protests against unpaid wages which took place in the cities of Akre, Dohuk, andErbil.606

1.13 Christians
The Christian population has declined over the past 15 years. Prior to the June 2014 ISIL
advance, the pre-2003 Christian population was estimated to be between 800 000 - 1.4 million
persons, which declined to around 300 000 Christians following the targeting of Christians by
ISIL. The majority of those left in Iraq are living in Baghdad, Mosul, the Ninewa Plain, Kirkuk,
Basra, and the KRI.607 Approximately 67 % of Christians are Chaldean Catholics (an Eastern riteof the Roman Catholic Church), and nearly 20 % are members of the Assyrian Church of theEast. The remainder are Syriac Orthodox, Syriac Catholic, Armenian Catholic, Armenian
Apostolic, and Anglican and other Protestants. There are approximately 3 000 evangelical
Christians in the KRI.608
The 2018 DIS/Landinfo report following a fact-finding mission to KRI noted that Christians that
displayed behaviour deviating from Muslim moral codes, such as Christian alcohol vendors,
are targeted by PMUs sometimes with the support of Shia society, although this occurs lessthan in the past.609 According to Minority Rights Group International (MRG)610, reporting inMay 2018, PMUs have sent threats to Christians living in Baghdad to deter them fromcelebrating Christmas and the New Year, and hung posters in their neighbourhoods calling on
Christian women to cover their hair.611 Christian leaders reported in 2017 that harassment
and abuse by the KRG Peshmerga and Asayish forces took place at checkpoints and impeded
movement in and around several Christian towns on the Ninewa Plain.612 According to theAustralian Government’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), writing in 2018,‘violence against Christians in the Kurdistan Region is less common, but Christians in theregion continue to face discrimination in the form of intimidation and denial of access toservices.’613
In 2017, criminal networks and some militia groups seized Christian properties with relative
impunity particularly in Baghdad, but also in areas of Anbar, Babil, Basrah, Diyala, and Wasit,
according to USDOS.614 Accusations of land appropriations against Christians, particularly
Assyrian Christians, have been reported in some parts of the KRI, such as rural areas of Dohuk
Governorate, Zhakho, and the Nahla Valley.615 In a June 2017 report Landinfo quoted an Iraqi
politician the mission met in Baghdad saying that Sunnis and Christians are still being forcedout of their homes in Baghdad. Christian property is confiscated by the militia and the owners

606 Human Rights Watch, Kurdistan Region of Iraq: Protesters Beaten, Journalists Detained, 15 April 2018, url.
607 MRG, Crossroads: The future of Iraq’s minorities after ISIS, 7 June 2017, url, p. 9.
608 USDOS, 2017 Report on International Religious Freedom - Iraq, 29 May 2018, url.
609 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)

in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 47.
610 MRG is a ‘leading international human rights organization’ that works to secure the rights of minorities throughresearch, advocacy, publications, and pursuing legal cases and projects to protect minority rights, according to its
website.
611 MRG, Iraq: Current issues, May 2018, url.
612 USDOS, 2017 Report on International Religious Freedom - Iraq, 29 May 2018, url.
613 Australia, DFAT Country Information Report Iraq, 9 October 2018, url, p. 15.
614 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Iraq, 20 April 2018, url.
615 USCIRF, Wilting in the Kurdish sun; the hopes and fears of religious minorities in Northern Iraq, May 2017, url,
p. 17.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 85

are not being allowed to return to their homes.616 Citing a Human Rights Watch seniorresearcher, the DIS noted in 2016 that there were reports on Peshmerga fighters looting
Christian homes in Ninewa.617
In October 2014 Amnesty International describes the attempted kidnapping of a Christian man
by three armed men, believed to belong to AAH. Amnesty International notes that the family
felt it would be neither useful nor safe to inform the police.618
For information on targeting of Christians under societal norms see section 3.4.4.

1.14 Alcohol vendors
The Associated Press (AP) reported in 2016 that the government of Iraq passed a law banningthe production, importation and sales of alcohol that was the result of a surpriseparliamentary initiative by Shiite Islamists.619
The ban is implemented in ‘many parts of the country’ according to USDOS and but Basrah,
Dhi Qar, Maysan, and Muthanna continued to prohibit the import, sale, or transport ofalcohol, ‘although southern Iraqis were still allowed to legally consume and own alcohol’.620
Al-Monitor reported in July 2018 that the governor of ISIL-liberated Salah al-Din decided toclose all alcohol stores in the governorate after he received requests from local councils in
Shirqat district, which was reportedly supported by the area’s tribe and conservative Sunni
clerics.621 The same source noted that the ban was supported by conservative elements ofsociety who perceive alcohol to be culturally unacceptable, related to social disintegration and‘excessive openness to Western customs and traditions’.622 The KRG stated the ban ‘would
not be applied or enforced’ within the KRI.623 The National reported in 2016 that Kurdish
officials vowed the ban on alcohol will not be enforced in Kurdish Territories. According to theregion’s culture minister the measure is an infringement on individual freedom.624 Niqash
reported in 2018 that alcohol sales go on in Kurdish Territories, although most liquor storesclose during Ramadan.625
At EASO’s practical cooperation meeting on Iraq in April 2017 Mark Lattimer observed thatselling of alcohol is heavily frowned upon in most areas of Iraq, including in KRI. Although quite
a lot of Iraqis do drink alcohol, the public practice of selling and buying it is widely seen as
immoral. Mark Lattimer further states:‘There are some communities associated with the practice – Christians and Ka’kai –which has been given as a reason for their persecution. So you see, the charge of being
an alcohol seller, attaches a stigma to someone, by reason even of ethnic or religious

616 Norway, Landinfo, Irak: Situasjonen for sunnimuslimer i Bagdad [Situation of Sunni Muslims in Baghdad], 23

June 2017, url, p. 16.
617 Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI); fact finding mission, 26 September to 6 October 2015, 12 April
2016, url, p. 127.
618 AI, Absolute impunity: militia rule in Iraq, October 2014, url, p. 9.
619 AP, Iraqi parliament passes bill banning alcohol, 23 October 2016, url.
620 USDOS, 2017 Report on International Religious Freedom - Iraq, 29 May 2018, url.
621 Al-Monitor, Iraq’s Salahuddin provinces launches war on alchol, 22 July 2018, url.
622 Al-Monitor, Iraq’s Salahuddin provinces launches war on alchol, 22 July 2018, url.
623 USDOS, 2017 Report on International Religious Freedom - Iraq, 29 May 2018, url.
624 National (The), In Iraqi Kurdistan, little regard for Baghdad alcohol ban, 27 October 2016, url.
625 Niqash, The Beer essentials: how to get an (illegal) drink during Ramadan in Northern Iraq, 31 May 2018, url.

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identity – there is also a pattern of those who do sell alcohol being targeted by Shia
militias in Basra and Baghdad – Asaib Ahl al-Haq has carried out assassinations, death
threats, forcing people out of the community, or sometimes just using it as anallegation to get someone to leave or get them to leave their property.’626
According to an Iraq analyst interviewed during the DIS/Landinfo 2018 mission to KRI PMUs
are targeting Christian liquor stores, although this happens less than in previous years.627 The
source further noted that ‘between Hilla and Basra there are no official liquor stores. Alcohol
is only sold clandestinely and it could get you killed. There are some liquor stores in Baghdad,
but they have iron doors (in Saadun area, North Karrada). Some of these have been attacked
by hand grenades. The motive behind such attacks can either be to kill or for the sake ofmoney.’628
USDOS noted in its annual report on religious freedom in Iraq (covering 2017) that ‘Yezidis
and Christians, the main importers and sellers of alcohol, continued to be subject toharassment or attacks and were often forced to pay “protection” money to local
authorities.’629 The source further reported that in July 2017 two Yazidis were killed byunidentified gunmen in their Baghdad alcohol shop.630 The report noted that the ban affects
religious minorities such as Christians and Sabaen-Mandaens, and Yazidis; groups who sell
alcohol.631 An article by AFP about liquor consumption in Mosul stated that shops were open
since liberation from ISIL but those that buy and consume alcohol do so in privacy and ‘takecertain precautions’. Additionally, licences to sell alcohol are not granted to Muslims andsome residents have demanded the stores shut down ‘for religious reasons or to protect
young people’.632
On 13 February 2017 Vice News reports on the impact of the October 2016 government banon the production, importation and sales of alcohol. The article notes that many liquor stores
have encountered violence from military personnel and militiamen. Other businesses survive
in ‘a web of constant and increasingly costly bribes’. A Christian shop owner from Abu Nuwas
street in Baghdad said that Shia militia raided his shop a month after the law was introduced,
setting fire to the shop and killing two employees. Due to lack of options, the man re-opened
his shop but was forced to pay heavy bribes to local police and militias.633
In the summer of 2016, there were reports of several IED attacks on cafes, restaurants andhouses where alcohol was sold in Basrah. The suspected culprits were religious extremists.634
In June 2016 the Washington Post also reported that militias enforce public morals, punishing,for example, persons who drink alcohol, gamble or hire prostitutes.635 DIS noted in a 2016
report that ‘there have been attacks against Christians in Zakho City near the Turkish border

626 Lattimer, M., cited in EASO, Practical Cooperation Meeting on Iraq, 25-26 April 2017, url, p. 23.
627 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)

in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 47.
628 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 47.
629 USDOS, 2017 Report on International Religious Freedom - Iraq, 29 May 2018, url.
630 USDOS, 2017 Report on International Religious Freedom - Iraq, 29 May 2018, url.
631 USDOS, 2017 Report on International Religious Freedom - Iraq, 29 May 2018, url.
632 AFP, With the jihadis gone, booze is back in Iraq’s Mosul, 4 December 2018, url.
633 Vice News, Iraq’s booze ban, 13 February 2017, url.
634 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2016, 30 August 2017, url, pp. 17-18.
635 Washington Post (The), Feared Shiite militias back in spotlight after three Americans vanish in Iraq, 21 January
2016, url.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 87

in Dohuk where radical Islamists attacked Christians and burned down their shops, because
they were selling alcohol.’636

1.15 People with Sunni names
Sources interviewed during the DIS/Landinfo 2018 mission to the KRI noted that Sunni males
trying to flee ISIL-controlled areas have to pass security screening at checkpoints where theirpotential affiliation with ISIL is assessed.637 The report further noted that ‘people whose nameor the name of their more distant family members is similar to that of an ISIS suspect can raise
serious suspicion’ and they could be subjected to abuses, detention or denied return.638
Many Iraqi citizens have identical names639 and as such many IDPs do not take the risk passing
the security check, fearing that their name is identical to a person on the wanted lists.640
According to Belkis Willie, a senior researcher on Iraq with Human Rights Watch, there was‘no transparent way of knowing how a person’s name ends up on the lists’ adding thatapproximately 90 000 were contained on them.641
Reporting on the situation of Sunni Muslims in Baghdad Landinfo noted in June 2017 that
persons passing checkpoints must prove their identity. Surnames and clan names can to someextent indicate which part of the population you belong to and where you come from. Sunnis
could arbitrarily be suspected of sympathy with ISIL and be subjected to abuse.642 Landinfo
further mentions that militia checkpoints in Baghdad are situated in the small streets of Shia
areas, the checkpoints located on the main roads through Baghdad are run by army andpolice.643
In December 2015 Niqash reported that some Sunni Arabs in Diyala Governorate have applied
to change their name to more neutral formulations, out of fear of Shia militias. A government
official speaks of 150-200 such demands in a two months period.644 In a June 2015 article
author and columnist Ali Hussein told Al-Monitor that the ‘name-changing phenomenon
spread widely following the occupation of the Sunni-majority city of Mosul’. Hussein also
asserted that ‘most of the names that are being changed refer to Sunni personages such as
Omar, Abu Bakr and Osman.’645 In an April 2015 article the Guardian stated that identifiable
Sunni names may arouse suspicion at checkpoints manned by Shia militiamen or Iraqi soldiers.
To avoid difficulties an unspecified number of people had their name changed. According to
an official most of these name changes involved Sunni men changing the Sunni name Omar to636 Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI); fact finding mission, 26 September to 6 October 2015, 12 April

2016, url, pp. 172-173.
637 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 28.
638 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 20.
639 Wille, B., cited in: EASO, Practical Cooperation Meeting on Iraq, 25-26 April 2017, url, p. 13.
640 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 28.
641 Wille, B., EASO, Practical Cooperation Meeting on Iraq, 25-26 April 2017, url, p. 13.
642 Norway, Landinfo, Irak: Situasjonen for sunnimuslimer i Bagdad [Situation of Sunni Muslims in Baghdad], url, p.
13.
643 Norway, Landinfo, Irak: Situasjonen for sunnimuslimer i Bagdad [Situation of Sunni Muslims in Baghdad], url,
pp. 8-9.
644 Niqash, What’s in a name? In Diyala, Iraqis change names to avoid being targeted by volunteer militias, 17
December 2015, url.
645 Al-Monitor, From Omar to Hussain: Why Iraqis are changing their names, 17 June 2015, url.

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Ammar. Others had their family name deleted from their citizenship card.646 In July 2014
Human Rights Watch reported how a Shia man was abused and mistreated by members of
AAH. Assuming he was a Sunni, his assailants accused the man of belonging to ‘Omar’s
army’.647

1.16 Humanitarian / medical workers
The International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO)648 reported that both official and semiofficial armed groups in Iraq represent a threat for humanitarian workers in various forms,
including access restrictions, detentions, targeted attacks against both humanitarian workers
and NGOs’ beneficiaries. According to INSO’s data, during the period between JanuaryOctober 2018, there were 66 reported incidents targeting NGOs in Iraq, the majority being
cases of assaults (40), followed by arrest and detention (9), direct fire (9), intimidation (4),robbery (3), IED ordinance (1). Two NGO workers died as a result of these incidents during thestated period.649
According to study by the Iraqi Ministry of Health and the local International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) cited by Rudaw in November 2018, 57 % of medical personnel in Iraq
have been exposed to forms of verbal, physical, or tribal violence.650 The ICRC noted that ‘In
Iraq, threats affecting health workers and services go beyond violence directly linked to armed
conflict. Other types of violence are prevalent, such as reprisals against health professionals
in the form of verbal or physical abuse, threats, kidnapping or even killing. Afraid for theirsafety, many of them have left the country.’651
A report published in May 2018 by the Safeguarding Health in Conflict Coalition652 notes that,throughout 2017, the health care sector was highly affected by the ISIL attacks and was also
subjected to ‘retaliatory or discriminatory practices’ acts by pro-government actors.653 At least
35 attacks were committed against health workers and facilities in 2017, ISIL being the main
perpetrator.654
The same report further stated that ‘medical staff also suffered from campaigns by Iraqi,
Kurdish, and allied groups to root out and punish ISIS members and anyone possibly
associated with them.’655 Two medical workers were subjected to administrative or judicial
punishment by Iraqi government officials for having worked under ISIL rule.656 In January 2018,
the Guardian reported the case of a young doctor who was denied permission by the Ministry
646 Guardian (The), Iraqi Sunnis forced to abandon homes and identity in battle for survival, 5 April 2015, url.
647 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Pro- government militias’ trail of death, 31 July 2014, url.
648 INSO is an NGO ‘dedicated to the safety of humanitarian aid workers’ which provides situational awareness,incident tracking, and analysis on operational and security contexts affecting aid workers, according to its website.
649 International NGO Safety Organisation, Iraq, NGO Incident rate, n.d., url.
650 Rudaw, Violence targets medical workers, patients preventing care in Iraq, 12 November 2018, url.
651 ICRC, Health Care in Danger campaign: Stop violence against medical personnel and facilities in Iraq, 6 November
2018, url.
652 The organisation is a coalition of NGOs who work to protect healthcare workers, services, and infrastructure by
documenting attacks and increasing accountability of those responsible, according to its website.
653 Safeguarding Health in Conflict Coalition, Violence on the Front Lines: Attacks on Health Care in 2017, 21 May
2018, url, p. 22-23.
654 Safeguarding Health in Conflict Coalition, Violence on the Front Lines: Attacks on Health Care in 2017, 21 May
2018, url, p. 22-23.
655 Safeguarding Health in Conflict Coalition, Violence on the Front Lines: Attacks on Health Care in 2017, 21 May
2018, url, p. 23.
656 Safeguarding Health in Conflict Coalition, Violence on the Front Lines: Attacks on Health Care in 2017, 21 May
2018, url, p. 22-23.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 89

of Health to write her board exam for medical school, hence to practice, because she had
worked in a Mosul hospital under ISIL rule.657 The Kurdish media network Rudaw reported inAugust 2017, without providing any detail, that in Baghdad there was an escalation of killings
targeting doctors and health workers by criminal groups.658

1.17 Death penalty
1.17.1 Iraq
Under the 2005 Constitution of Iraq, the President ratifies death sentences ‘issued by thecompetent courts’.659 The death penalty is prescribed under Article 86 of the Iraqi Penal CodeNo 11 of 1969.660 The Anti-Terrorism Law No 13 of 2005 calls for the death penalty for
terrorism offences under Article 4.661 Crimes that carry the death penalty include a variety ofoffences from crimes against internal/external security and state institutions, acts ofterrorism, kidnapping, rape, drug trafficking leading to death, prostitution, ‘aggravated’murder662, human trafficking leading to death.663 The UN states that the definition of‘terrorism’ crimes is ‘broad and susceptible to wide interpretation’ under the Anti-Terrorism
Law.664 The UN also reports that the death penalty is also provided for under the Military Penal
Code, Article 27 and 28, and under the Iraqi Internal Security Forces Penal Code of 2008 for arange of offences, for example, offences relating to failures to perform their duties orsurrendering military installations.665 For detailed information on treatment of deserters, seesections 1.8.1 and 1.8.2.
Death penalty is executed by hanging.666
Capital punishments are usually imposed under the Penal Code and Anti-Terrorism Law;though it can be imposed for a range of crimes, ‘not all of which satisfy the international
requirements that limit its application to premeditated murder only’.667 According to thegovernment, capital punishment is only carried out following strict legal checks, automatic
appeals, and that re-trial is necessary for cases where due process was not respected.668
UNAMI also states that death sentences under the Anti-Terrorism Law are sent for automatic
review by the Cassation Court.669

657 Guardian (The), How the people of Mosul subverted ISIS ‘apartheid’, 30 January 2018, url.
658 Rudaw, Alarming wave of assassinations hits Iraqi doctors, 8 August 2017, url.
659 Iraq, Constitution of the Republic of Iraq (15 October 2005), url, Article 73.
660 Iraq, Penal Code No. 111 of 1969, July 1969, url, Article 86.
661 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, p. 5.
662 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Death Penalty in Iraq, October 2014 url, p. 1.
663 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Death Penalty in Iraq, October 2014 url, p. 9; For a full compendium of all Iraqi

laws on the Death Penalty, refer to the Appendix One of the above report.
664 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Death Penalty in Iraq, October 2014 url, p. 2.
665 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Death Penalty in Iraq, October 2014 url, p. 9.
666 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions
on her mission to Iraq [A/HRC/38/44/Add.1], 20 June 2018, url, p. 13; UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Death Penalty
in Iraq, October 2014 url, p. 1.
667 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions
on her mission to Iraq [A/HRC/38/44/Add.1], 20 June 2018, url, pp. 13-14; UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Death
Penalty in Iraq, October 2014 url, p. 1.
668 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions
on her mission to Iraq [A/HRC/38/44/Add.1], 20 June 2018, url, p. 14.
669 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, 5.

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Iraq continues to carry out capital punishment670, being among the top three countries in the
Middle East that imposes and carries out executions according to Amnesty International’s
2017 report on death sentences and executions.671 UNAMI noted that ‘large scale executions’are frequently announced by the Ministry of Justice.672 The Ministry of Justice also reported
in 2017 that 3 to 4 executions occur per week in Baghdad and Nasiriya prisons, noting that 1520 % of the 6 000 prisoners in Nasiriya Central Prison have a death sentence.673
In Iraq, the death penalty was reportedly used to execute 250 convicted ISIL member since2014, with 100 of those executions occurring in 2017.674 Amnesty International recorded atleast 125 executions in 2017 for offences that included mostly terrorism-related acts, inaddition to others related to murder, kidnapping and drugs.675 For example, in 2017, UNAMI
reported that the Ministry of Justice stated it executed 42 people in September and another38 in December, for terrorism offences.676
Reporting in July 2018, the Supreme Judicial Council announced 41 death sentences forterrorism-linked crimes; 23 of the sentenced were foreign women.677 In April 2018, theMinistry of Justice announced 13 executions had been carried out during the year, 11 forterrorism.678 In October 2018 the UN Security Council noted that the total number of
executions publicly announced in 2018 by the Ministry of Justice was 32, although moredetails regarding the death sentences and executions had not been provided.679
ISIL’s ‘deputy leader’ was sentenced to death in September 2018.680 The death penalty has
popular support from the population, being considered to be appropriate and consistent with
Islamic law for certain crimes, especially for ‘large scale human rights violations’.681

1.17.2 Kurdistan Region of Iraq
The UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions in Iraq observes
in a June 2018 report that the KRG, whilst maintaining capital punishment, seemed to haveestablished a de facto moratorium on executions since 2008. However, it was breached on
two occasions in 2015 and 2016. Both the federal and regional governments cited popularpressure as a reason to continue to apply or resume the death penalty in particular in responseto crimes committed by ISIL.682

670 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions

on her mission to Iraq [A/HRC/38/44/Add.1], 20 June 2018, url, pp. 13-14.
671 AI, Death Sentences and Executions 2017, 2018, url, p. 30.
672 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, p. 5.
673 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, p. 5.
674 AP, Iraq holding more than 19,000 because of IS, militant ties, 22 March 2018, url.
675 AI, Death Sentences and Executions 2017, 2018, url, p. 32.
676 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, p. 5.
677 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2367 (2017) – Report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/677),
9 July 2018, url, p. 9.
678 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2367 (2017) – Report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/677),
9 July 2018, url, p. 9; New York Times (The), A 10-Minute Trial, a Death Sentence: Iraqi Justice for ISIS Suspects, 17
April 2018, url.
679 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2421 (2018) Report of the Secretary-General [S/2018/975],
31 October 2018, url, p. 10.
680 AFP, Iraq court condemns to death ‘deputy of IS leader’, 19 September 2018, url.
681 Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report – Iraq, 26 June 2017, p. 24.
682 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions
on her mission to Iraq [A/HRC/38/44/Add.1], 20 June 2018, url, p. 13.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 91

Execution cases in KRI in recent years include:

On 12 August 2015, the KRG executed three persons convicted in April 2014 of theabduction and murder of two girls. They were the first executions to have taken placein the KRI since the KRG introduced an informal moratorium on the implementationof the death penalty in 2008.683
On 10 December 2016, the authorities of Zarga Prison in Dohuk executed one convict
following ratification of a court’s sentence by the KRI President. The 22-year old
convict who was convicted of murdering an 18-month old girl was sentenced earlier
on 10 July 2016 by the Criminal Court in Dohuk for death pursuant to Article 406 of
the Iraqi Penal Code. On 19 October 2016, the Cassation Court endorsed thesentence. The KRI President approved the execution on 27 November 2016.684
In May 2017, UNAMI/OHCHR received information that President Barzani had signed
orders of execution for three of six men sentenced to death for a murder in 2015.685
UNAMI/OHCHR reported in December 2017 that it was not aware of any executions
taking place in the July to December 2017 period in the Kurdistan Region.686

1.18 Treatment of detainees
1.18.1 Iraq
The June 2018 report of the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary
executions in Iraq states that the Constitution of Iraq ‘guarantees the right to legal
representation to all arrested persons during phases of investigation and trial’ and theConstitution ‘prohibits all forms of psychological, physical torture and inhumane treatment,
and states that any confession made under duress may not be relied on in court’.687
Nevertheless, the UN Special Rapporteur describes several cases of Sunni Arab civilians killed
in detention during the military campaign against ISIL from 2014 until 2017. These incidents
occurred in Mosul, Tal Afar, Baquba, Muqdadiya and Fallujah. The perpetrators included
members of the Armed Forces, the Counterterrorism Service, the Police and also units of thePMU.688
Human Rights Watch denounced the precarious conditions in pre-trial detention, comprising
overcrowding, ill treatment and torture. Human Rights Watch investigated the conditions ofdetention and the accusations of torture in several detention localities in Iraq, and presented
witness accounts of former detainees and relatives of detainees in the Mosul area. It foundonly two detainees and one family member willing to testify, but claimed that the torture
methods described are consistent with those described by other former detainees andcaptured in photos and videos by a photojournalist in May 2017.689 The conditions for ISIL
suspects in the pre-trial detention facilities are described above in the section 1.2.1.

683 UN Security Council, First Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 2233 (2015),

26 October 2015, url, pp. 11-12.
684 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2016, 30 August 2017, url, p. 28.
685 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq January to June 2017, 14 December 2017, url, p. 10.
686 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, p. 11.
687 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions
on her mission to Iraq [A/HRC/38/44/Add.1], 20 June 2018, url, p. 6.
688 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions
on her mission to Iraq [A/HRC/38/44/Add.1], 20 June 2018, url, p. 8.
689 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Chilling Accounts of Torture, Deaths. 19 August 2017, url.

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Amnesty International corroborates the allegations of arbitrary arrests, prolonged detention
and widespread torture of terrorism suspects:‘Men and boys suspected of being members of IS were subjected to enforced
disappearance – cut off from their families and the outside world – in facilities
controlled by the Iraqi Ministries of the Interior and Defence, the KRG and in secretdetention centres. Detainees were interrogated by security officers without lawyers
present and were routinely tortured. Common forms of torture included beatings on
the head and body with metal rods and cables, suspension in stress positions by thearms or legs, electric shocks, and threats of rape of female relatives. Detainees faced
limited access to medical care, which led to deaths in custody and amputations. They
also endured harsh conditions, including severe overcrowding, poor ventilation andlack of access to showers or toilets.’690
Not only ISIL suspects, but also other detainees face ill treatment and torture, as pointed out
by other sources. In its 2017 periodical Human Rights report, UNAMI/OHCHR received anumber of complaints from detainees, prisoners and defendants that they had been subjected
to torture and ill treatment to extract confessions during police interrogations.691
UNAMI/OHCHR monitored places of detention run by the Ministry of Justice and found thatthe ‘physical conditions in many detention facilities and prisons remain poor.’692 Furthermore,
UNAMI/OHCHR noted that at the end of 2017, UNICEF reported that at least 1 036 children
up to the age of 18 (1 024 boys and 12 girls) remained in juvenile detention facilities on
charges related to national security, in most cases for alleged association with ISIL.693 Human
Rights Watch noted that children are not always separated from adult detainees.694 In 2015
the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child expressed serious concerns on the detention ofchildren under terrorism charges: the large number of children accused or convicted forterrorism-related charges, the way how they were held in detention, and the fact that childrelatives of terrorism suspects were ‘illegally arrested, held without charge or charged withcovering up terrorist acts’.695 Furthermore, the UN Committee for the Right of the Child
reported the following abuses:






Children detained on terrorism charges suffer ill treatment and acts amounting totorture while in detention.
The detention conditions are very poor, and that children are frequently detained
along with adults.
Those children are reportedly detained in extralegal facilities.
Children are transferred to death row upon reaching 18 years.
The families are not always informed that the child is being held in detention.696

690 AI, International Report 2017/2018, The State of the World’s Human Rights – Iraq, 2018, url.
691 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq January to June 2017, 14 December 2017, url, p. 6.
692 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, p. 8.
693 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, p. 8.
694 Human Rights Watch, Flawed Justice. Accountability for ISIS crimes in Iraq, December 2017, url, p. 2.
695 UN Committee for the Right of the Child, Concluding observations on the report submitted by Iraq under article

8, paragraph 1, of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children
in armed conflict, 5 March 2015, url, p. 6.
696 UN Committee for the Right of the Child, Concluding observations on the report submitted by Iraq under article
8, paragraph 1, of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children
in armed conflict, 5 March 2015, url, p. 6.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 93

1.18.2 Kurdistan Region of Iraq
The June 2018 report of the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary
executions in Iraq signalled worrisome detention, including juveniles, by the Kurdish
authorities under the counter-terrorism regime, which ‘due to a lack of procedural guarantees
places the detainees at risk of human rights violations. This risk is increased by the severely
limited access to detention facilities by local and international organizations, rendering
monitoring of the situation almost impossible.’697
According to a UN source interviewed during the 2018 DIS/Landinfo mission to KRI ‘conditions
in detention facilities for general criminality in the Kurdistan Region are generally acceptable,
but detention facilities holding terrorism suspects are overcrowded and services are strained,
which raises concerns about radicalization of detainees. The source was concerned bynumerous reports of torture or mistreatment at the time of arrest or interrogation. Terrorism
suspects are held in facilities run by Asayish intelligence services, along with suspects for othersecurity related crimes, drugs, and fraud. Access to assess conditions in some of these facilities
is restricted.’698
In its 2017 human rights report USDOS observed that ‘abusive interrogation, under certain
conditions, reportedly occurred in some detention facilities of the KRG’s internal security unit,
the Asayish, and the intelligence services of the major political parties, the Kurdistan
Democratic Party’s (KDP) Parastin and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan’s (PUK) Zanyari’.699 In
a December 2017 report Human Rights Watch also expressed concern that ISIL suspects arefacing torture and other forms of ill treatment in the KRG. Human Rights Watch has
documented allegations of torture by KRG forces holding ISIL suspects. Out of nineteen child
ISIL suspects held by the KRG and interviewed by Human Rights Watch, seventeen said thatAsayish forces tortured them in order to extract confessions. KRG authorities have not granted
researchers access to adult ISIL suspects yet.700
Reporting on events of 2017, UNAMI noted its concern regarding allegations that detainees
are subjected to torture and/or other ill treatment during the interrogation phase in order toforce them to make confessions. UNAMI has previously noted that detainees are reluctant toreport torture and/or other ill treatment for fear of reprisals or difficulties in the legal
procedures. It appears that there is no uniform and effective policy in place to deal withallegations of torture and other ill treatment raised by the defendants before the courts.701
Amnesty International wrote in an October 2016 report that former detainees report beatingsand other ill treatment in some facilities controlled by the Asayish, particularly in the initialperiod of their detention. It appears that detainees are subjected to such treatment to punish
them for crimes committed by ISIL or to extract information from them. A number of former
detainees interviewed by Amnesty International, currently living in territories controlled by
the KRG, also ‘appeared reluctant to complain about ill-treatment, telling the organization’s
researchers that they were just relieved to be at liberty and wished to move on with their

697 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions

on her mission to Iraq [A/HRC/38/44/Add.1], 20 June 2018, url, p. 9.
698 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 92.
699 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Iraq, 20 April 2018, url.
700 Human Rights Watch, Flawed Justice. Accountability for ISIS crimes in Iraq, December 2017, url, p. 51.
701 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – January to June 2017, url, p. 9; UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on
Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, p. 10.

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lives. Those who recounted their experiences only agreed to do so if their identities wereconcealed out of fear of reprisals.’702

702 AI, ‘Punished for Daesh’s Crimes’. Displaced Iraqi’s abused by militias and government forces, October 2016,

url, p. 47.

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2. Targeting by ISIL
2.1 Background, structure, modus operandi
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is a UNdesignated and internationally sanctioned organisation703 and is listed as a Proscribed
Terrorist Group by the United Kingdom.704
ISIL is the successor of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the Sunni resistance movement against USoccupation after 2003, led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian militant who left Afghanistan
for Iraq after the ousting of the Taliban.705 Contrary to Osama Bin Laden, al-Zarqawi
considered the ‘enemies within’ to be the worst enemies of Islam, and AQI targeted US andforeign occupation forces after the 2003 removal of Saddam Huseein, but also the local Shia
population, thus fuelling sectarian tension that culminated in a civil war in 2006-2007.706 It
was the successor of Al-Zarqawi, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, who declared the Islamic State of
Iraq (ISI) on 15 October 2006 in Western Iraq, under the name al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq,a merger of different Sunni insurgent groups with officers of the former Baathist regime andSunni tribal leaders. These different groups recognised Abu Omar al-Baghdadi as theirleader.707 In the years to follow, the group came under heavy pressure by the US Forces, andafter Abu Omar was killed in Spring of 2010, ISI was in retreat.708
The Syrian Civil War in 2011 created new opportunities for ISI, and the group became activeon the Syrian theatre. Under the new leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, ISI changed its nameon 9 April 2013 to ‘al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa-Sham–Da’aish’, The Islamic State of Iraq
and al-Sham (the Levant) (ISIS or ISIL), and Abu Bakr announced the merger with the Syrian
rebel group Jabhat al-Nusra, a Syrian Al-Qeada branch.709 Al-Nusra rejected the takeover, but
in the ensuing conflict most of its fighters, especially the foreign jihadists defected to ISIL,
which succeeded to become a major force in the Syrian War.710
In the period after the retreat of the US-troops in 2011, ISIL took advantage of the growing
sentiments of disenfranchisement within the Iraqi Sunni population caused by a government
policy that favoured the Shia majority in many aspects. Especially in Anbar, Salah al-Din andMosul, a part of the population showed their discontent during demonstrations in 2012-2013,
and in several cities, protest camps were set up. When the government ordered the Security
Forces to pull down the protest camps, this led to violence and numerous civilian casualties in
Hawija, Ramadi and Falluja.711 ISIL, present in the camps but not in a dominant way, capitalised

703 UN Security Council, Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) 1989 (2011) and 2253

(2015) concerning ISIL (Da'esh) Al-Qaida and associated individuals groups undertakings and entities, n.d. url.
704 UK, Home Office, Proscribed Terrorist Organisations, 22 December 2017, url.
705 International Crisis Group, Exploiting Disorder: al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, 14 March 2016, url, p. 16.
706 Hassan, H. The Sectarianism of the Islamic State. Ideological Roots and Political Context, June 2016, url, pp. 910.
707 Waziri, H., IS: from a jihadist ideology to a jihadist state, 23 February 2015, url; Soufan Group (The), TSG
IntelBrief: The Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria: A Primer, June 13, 2014, url, pp. 11-12.
708 Soufan Group (The), The Islamic State, November 2014, url, p. 12.
709 Waziri, H., IS: from a jihadist ideology to a jihadist state, 23 February 2015, url.
710 Waziri, H., IS: from a jihadist ideology to a jihadist state, 23 February 2015, url; Soufan Group (The), The IslamicState, November 2014, url, p. 12.
711 International Crisis Group, Iraq: Falluja’s Faustian Bargain, Middle East Report No. 150, 28 April 2014, url, pp. 56.

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upon the radicalisation of the opposition and the escalation of the conflict, especially in Anbar,
where a standoff between the Sunni leadership in Falluja and the government turned into an
outright siege of the city by the ISF. ISIL was in first instance rejected by the local authorities,
but by proving its military value, succeeded to gain control of the city.712
During the period from July 2012 to July 2013 ISIL conducted a major terror campaign all overthe country, under the name Breaking The Walls.713 This series of heavy attacks on a multitudeof targets aimed at a liberation of AQI prisoners, and at the domination of the territory that
previously controlled by AQI in 2006. Among the targets of the campaign that wereparticularly attacked by Vehicle Borne Explosive Devices (VBIED) were symbols of the Shia
government under Maliki, like the ISF, judges, other government officials, but also Shianeighbourhoods in Baghdad and other cities and towns.714 The end of the Breaking the Walls
campaign was marked by the prison break at Abu Ghraib on 21 July 2013, leading to theescape of 500 or more prisoners, most of them detained on terrorism charges.715
After Breaking the Walls, ISIL almost immediately announced a new campaign: Soldiers
harvest, another wave of heavy VBIED attacks, focused on Baghdad and southern Iraq. ISIL
aimed mainly on critical infrastructure like the port of Um Qasr in Basrah.716
According to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), the military strategy of ISIL is marked by
the concept of hybrid warfare it adopts to a high degree: Depending on the situation, it uses
either terrorist attacks, guerrilla tactics or conventional manoeuvre warfare. The terrorist
attacks are aimed to intimidate security forces and inspire fear and insecurity among thecivilian population. The guerrilla warfare tactics are used to attack enemy forces in an indirectway, to weaken and disrupt the adversary. The conventional warfare approach is adopted toattack enemy forces directly, destroy military targets and conquer terrain.717 In all three formsof warfare, the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) plays a great role. Either with orwithout the use of vehicles as a carrier, and with or without a suicide driver/carrier of the
explosives.718
The Sunni uprising against the Maliki-government was not solely led by ISIL, but also a numberof actors contributed to it, like part of the Sunni tribes, clerics, the Iraqi Islamic Party, former
Baathists etc. Every group had its own claims.719 However, after the capture of large parts ofcentral Iraq by ISIL in June 2014, these and other local insurgent groups fell in decline under
ISIL.720 As the example of Falluja showed, the opposition against the Shia-dominated central
government was heterogeneous and not exclusively supported by Sunni extremists. Becauseof the superior military capacity of ISIL after its successes in neighbouring Syria and theincreasing pressure by Baghdad, it was able to achieve a dominant position in the city, to thedetriment of the other groups participating in the insurgency.721

712 International Crisis Group, Iraq: Falluja’s Faustian Bargain, Middle East Report No. 150, 28 April 2014, url, p. 15.
713 Lewis, J.D., Al-Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent, The Breaking the Walls Campaign, Part I, September 2013, url.
714 Lewis, J.D., Al-Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent, The Breaking the Walls Campaign, Part I, September 2013, url, pp. 13-

20.
715 Lewis, J.D., Al-Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent, The Breaking the Walls Campaign, Part I, September 2013, url, p. 7.
716 Lewis, J.D., Al-Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent, The Breaking the Walls Campaign, Part I, September 2013, url., p. 21.
717 Lewis McFate. J. The ISIS Defense in Iraq and Syria: Countering an adaptive Enemy, May 2015, url, pp. 17-18.
718 Lewis McFate. J. The ISIS Defense in Iraq and Syria: Countering an adaptive Enemy, May 2015, url, pp. 19-20,
pp. 21-23.
719 International Crisis Group, Make or Break: Iraq’s Sunnis and the State, 14 August 2013, url, pp. 16-23;
International Crisis Group, Iraq: Falluja’s Faustian Bargain, 28 April 2014, url, p. 11.
720 Ohlers, C.A., What to Expect in Iraq After the Liberation of Mosul, 5 May 2017, url
721 International Crisis Group, Iraq: Falluja’s Faustian Bargain, 28 April 2014, url, pp. 14-16.

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ISIL is strongly rooted in a strictly conservative interpretation of Islam, with a literal reading of
the Quran, with the Sharia as penal system, and a complete rejection of any otherinterpretations of Islam, like Shia or Sufi. According to Hassan Hassan, an expert on Islamist
and Salafi groups and resident fellow at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, (a thinktank in Washington D.C.), the Islamic State has largely borrowed from Wahhabism, and pushes
the concept of wala wal bara (loyalty to Islam and rejection of anything that is perceived as
un-islamic) and tawhid (the oneness of God) further than other Salafist groups. In areas
conquered by the Islamic State, symbols of polytheistic practices (shirk) were systematicallydestroyed, like Sufi or Shia shrines.722 An important element of the ideology of ISIL is theconcept of takfir, the accusation of a Muslim by another Muslim that he/she is an unbeliever,and thus an apostate.723 Takfirism is heavily used by ISIL as an ideological justification of its
actions towards fellow Muslims.724
Although a militaristic organisation in the first place, ISIL took over the local administration in
territories where it exerted control over the territory and the population, and more
importantly, it introduced its own judicial system, based on a strict interpretation of the
Sharia. These ‘Sharia courts’ were – together with the law enforcement of the Sharia police an important instrument in pushing through the religious agenda of the organisation. As
pointed out by Richard Barrett of the Soufan Group in 2014, the enforcement of religious
observance is a symbol and also an instrument of the power of the Islamic State. The task of
the Sharia police force was the supervision of the Islamic conduct of the population in theareas under control by the Islamic State.725 The same source states that the Sharia courts dealt
with religious transgressions, but also with other civil affairs. Either the Sharia police or private
citizens had the right to bring forward accusations. In a country, where justice ‘has been
partial, sporadic, and subject to corruption’, the Sharia courts enjoyed some popularity,
because they were able to avoid those defects.726
According to UNAMI since 1 January 2014, an estimated 30 000 civilians have been killed andanother 55 000 injured in the conflict between the Iraqi authorities and ISIL.727 In November
2018 UNAMI released a report documenting 202 mass graves since June 2014, theoverwhelming majority of which reportedly contain victims killed by ISIL. Estimates provided
to UNAMI range from 6 000 to more than 12 000 victims buried in these sites, with the largest
number being located in the governorates of Ninewa (95), Kirkuk (37), Salah al-Din (36) and
Anbar (24).728 The report further stated that ‘victims include women, children, elderly andpersons with disabilities, members and former members of the Iraqi armed forces and police,
and some foreign workers.’729
ISF, with the support of the US-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, had reclaimed all of theterritory that ISIL had captured in 2014 and 2015, and by the end of 2017, ISIL did not hold722 Hassan, H. The Sectarianism of the Islamic State. Ideological Roots and Political Context, June 2016, url, p. 5.
723 Oxford University, Oxford Islamic Studies Online, Takfir, n.d., url.
724 Atlantic (The), What ISIS Really Wants, March 2015, url.
725 Soufan Group (The), The Islamic State, November 2014, url, p. 30.
726 Soufan Group (The), The Islamic State, November 2014, url, p. 30.
727 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions

on her mission to Iraq [A/HRC/38/44/Add.1], 20 June 2018, url, p. 3.
728 UNAMI/OHCHR, “Unearthing Atrocities: Mass Graves in territory formerly controlled by ISIL”, 6 November 2018,
url, pp. 1-2.
729 UNAMI/ OHCHR, “Unearthing Atrocities: Mass Graves in territory formerly controlled by ISIL”, 6 November
2018.

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territory under its control anymore.730 In its report from November 2018, DIS and Landinfo
note that the organisation changed back to be a more ordinary, traditional insurgent group,
concentrating in areas in the Hamreen Mountains, in Hawija, in Diyala and Ninewa provinces,
as well in the border areas towards Syria and Iran.731 The Institute for the Study of War (ISW)
noted in October 2018 that ISIL retains a small control zone north of Baiji, and support zones
in the areas of Daquq, Hawija, Riyadh and Rashad districts (Kirkuk Governorate), ‘as well as inrural areas around Lake Hamrin in the Diyala River Valley’.732
There are an estimated 15-17 000 ISIL fighters still active in Iraq as of August 2018.733
According to an UN report, the total number of current ISIL members across both Iraq and
Syria is estimated to be between 20 000 and 30 000 individuals, and among them there arestill many thousands of active foreign fighters.734 ISW stated in October 2018 that the activities
of ISIL in Iraq are limited to small arms attacks, targeted assassinations and suicide vest, butthat the group is scaling up the rate of its attacks to as many as four assassinations per week
across Northern and Central Iraq. ISIL hasn’t yet returned to the systematic use of VBIEDs
which were broadly deployed in 2011-2013.735
The situation remains unstable and ISIL continues to carry out targeted attacks against
civilians736 and asymmetric attacks across Iraq.737 A longer-term insurgency situation isdeveloping738, particularly intensely in Salah al-Din, and Diyala.739
Regarding ISIL’s capacity to commit violence, the DIS/Landinfo report notes that although ISIL
does not have control of any geographical area in Kirkuk Governorate, ‘there are pockets of
ISIS fighters around the governorate, especially in Hawija in Kirkuk Governorate and in the
Hamreen Mountains extending over Diyala, Kirkuk and Salah al-Din governorates and thegroup is relatively more active in the governorate compared to other parts of Iraq.’740 The
same source assessed that ISIL still has some presence in Ninewa Governorate, concentrated
in more remote areas close to the Iraq-Syria border and in the Badoush area between Mosul
and Tel Afar. ISIL cells ‘are active during the night carrying out explosions, killings,
assassinations and attacks on a regularly basis’, particularly in Mosul and surrounding

730 USDOS, Country Report on Terrorism 2017 - Chapter 1 - Iraq, 19 September 2018, url; UN Security Council,

Seventh report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security
and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat [S/2018/770], 16
August 2018, url, p. 2; Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internallydisplaced persons (IDPs) in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 20.
731 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 21.
732 ISW, ISIS's Second Resurgence, 2 October 2018, url.
733 US Lead Inspector General for Overseas and Contingency Operations, Operation Inherent Resolve and Operation
Pacific Eagle-Philippines – April 1 2018 – June 30 2018, August 2018, url, p. 3.
734 UN Security Council, Twenty-second report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted
pursuant to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, 27
July 2018, url, p. 5.
735 ISW, ISIS's Second Resurgence, 2 October 2018, url.
736 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Iraq, 20 April 2018, url; UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on
Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, p. 1.
737 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2367 (2017) – Report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/359),
17 April 2018, url, p. 4.
738 Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018, url, p. 2; ISW, ISIS's Second Resurgence, 2 October
2018, url.
739 Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018, url, p. 2.
740 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 15.

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villages.741 In Salah al-Din Governorate ISIL operational capabilities are limited by the presenceof the PMUs but pockets of fighters operating during the night have still been reported.742
In November 2018 the Center for Strategic and International Studies, referring to data fromthe Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), stated that ISIL attacks in the Kirkuk
Governorate were estimated to have doubled from 2017 to 2018. Data records on ISIL
orchestrated attacks in Kirkuk Governorate peaked in October 2018, and the number ofattacks had also increased in Salah al-Din and Ninewa governorates. The source explained that‘the lack of an official military presence throughout ungoverned space and disputed territories
in Kirkuk and Salah ad-Dine provinces have enabled Islamic State militants to operate
freely.’743
Numerous sources cited by the DIS/Landinfo 2018 FFM report state that ‘the primary targetsof ISIS are the security forces (ISF) and the PMU and to some extent government officials.’744
Other sources also state that ISIL continues to focus targeted attacks on members of the Iraqi
police, security forces and PMUs745, in Ninewa and Kirkuk in particular.746
DIS/Landinfo also noted that ‘for the purpose of creating chaos in the Iraqi society other actors
such as civilians or people collaborating with the security actors or the authorities can also betargets for ISIS.’747 The same source notes that ISIL ‘will use often use scare tactics where themembers drive into villages at night time to demonstrate the powerlessness of the authorities
and the ISF and to show that the group still exists’.748 Furthermore, they explain that ‘the levelof violence shows that ISIS still has the capacity to carry out attacks, but on a smaller scalecompared to when the group controlled vast territory in the northern Iraq. The authorities
often blame ISIS when attacks take place. And in some cases, ISIS does take the blame for theattacks. However, it is not always ISIS who is responsible for the violence.’749
ISIL has also been responsible for incidents where civilians have been ‘killed or kidnapped at
fake checkpoints’.750 ISIL also targeted its attacks against tribal leaders751 and local mayoral

741 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)

in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 17.
742 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, pp. 18-19.
743 Markusen, M. B., The Islamic State and the Persistent Threat of Extremism in Iraq, 30 November 2018, url.
744 Markusen, M. B., The Islamic State and the Persistent Threat of Extremism in Iraq, 30 November 2018, url.
745 UN Secretary-General, Implementation of resolution 2367 (2017) – Report of the Secretary-General(S/2018/359), 17 April 2018, url, p. 9; US Lead Inspector General for Overseas and Contingency Operations,Operation Inherent Resolve and Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines – April 1 2018 – June 30 2018, August 2018,
url, p. 20.
746 UN Secretary-General, Implementation of resolution 2367 (2017) – Report of the Secretary-General(S/2018/359), 17 April 2018, url, p. 9.
747 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 21.
748 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 21.
749 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 21.
750 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 21.
751 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 21.

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officials, such as in Kirkuk and Ninewa governorates in, whom they accused of providing
information on their movements to the government.752

2.2 Targeting ethno-religious identity groups
ISIL adopts an ‘extreme Salafist/takfir’ interpretation of Islam and diversion of their literalreading of the Quran and the Hadith is regarded as blasphemy and has to be eradicated. The
consequence of this view is that anything or anyone not conform to their own interpretation– Shi’ism, Sufism or any other theological concept must be destroyed.753 The concept of
takfirism – excommunication after a Muslim declares another an infidel or apostate (murtad)– has been used to the extreme by ISIL, its rigidity and refusal to recognize any other currentof Islam has created a culture of takfirism within takfirism.754
For religion outside Islam, ISIL follows a double path: Christians and Jews are regarded as nonbelievers, but the Quran instructs Muslims to fight the two other Abrahamic religions ‘until
they pay the jizya with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued’.755 However, thisprinciple was not respected by ISIL, as will be pointed out below.756 Yazidi however, areregarded as kufara (non-believers) by ISIL, to whom they only gave the ‘option’ of conversion
or death.757
UNAMI reported that ISIL deliberately targeted religious and culturally significant sites,churches, mosques, shrines, tombs, and graves that it considered to be ‘un-Islamic’ andgenerally looted these sites before destroying them758: UNAMI reported that the targeting of
religious leaders continued in the areas under ISIL control in the first half of 2017, without
specifying particular incidents.759

2.2.1 Targeting of Shi’a Muslims
Attacks by ISIL against civilians with explosives or firearms in areas not under ISIL
control
In its Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 6 July – 10
September 2014, UNAMI noted that the majority of the attacks by ISIL directly targeting
civilians and civilian objects appeared to be of a sectarian nature.760
Attacks which were explicitly (by an ISIL claim that it was against a Shi’a target) or obviously
targeting the Shi’a population (the attack was directed against a predominantly Shi’a

752 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2421 (2018) Report of the Secretary-General [S/2018/975],

31 October 2018, url, p. 10.
753 Soufan Group (The), The Islamic State, November 2014, url, p. 18.
754 See Section 2.1. Background, structure, modus operandi
755 Atlantic (The), What ISIS Really Wants, March 2015, url.
756 Comment by the drafters of this report, Cedoca/Belgium
757 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2016, 30 August 2017, url, p. 12; Human
Rights Watch, Iraq: ISIS Escapees Describe Systematic Rape. Yezidi Survivors in Need of Urgent Care, 14 April 2015,url.
758 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 May – 31 October 2015,
11 January 2016, url, p. 16.
759 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – January to June 2017, 14 December 2017, url, p. X.
760 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 6 July – 10 September 2014, 02
October 2014, url, p. 8.

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neighbourhood or town) are listed below from July 2014 until November 2018. The following
list is not exhaustive.761
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On 23 July 2014, ISIL claimed responsibility for an SVBIED [Suicide Vehicle Borne
Improvised Explosive Device] attack killing 28 civilians at a checkpoint north of
Kadhimiya (Baghdad) in a predominantly Shi’a area.762
On 25 August 2014 an ISIL suicide bomber blew himself up among worshippers infront of a Shi’a mosque in the blacksmith area of New Baghdad. Ten people were killed
and 24 wounded. ISIL claimed the responsibility on social media and websites.763
On 9 October 2014, a Shi’a village east of Baquba was attacked with a truck laden with
explosives, detonating in the village, killing ten civilians, and wounding six more.764
On 3 November 2014, ISIL carried out a suicide attack against Ashura pilgrims in Tunis,
northern Baghdad, a predominantly Shi’a area. Six civilians were killed and at least 13
wounded.765
In Muqdadiya (Diyala), a suicide bomber detonated his vest on 12 December 2014,
inside a Shi’a mosque, killing seven civilians.766
On 29 December 2014, an individual wearing an explosive vest inside a tent hosting
Shi’a pilgrims in al-Hamamiyat village in Baghdad killed 17 civilians and wounded atleast 24 more. The responsibility of this attack was claimed by ISIL on social media.767
On 30 January 2015, an attack comprising a SVBIED and an IED was conducted in a
crowded market in al-Bab al-Sharji, a Shi’a neighbourhood in central Baghdad. 62
civilians lost their lives, and 109 were wounded.768
On 9 February 2015, in Kadhimiya district, northern Baghdad, the detonation of asuicide vest in a restaurant claims the life of 21 civilians, and 49 other are wounded.769
On 28 February 2015, two vehicles packed with explosives were detonated at avegetable market in Baladruz, killing nine civilians and wounding 30 others. Womenand children were among the victims.770
On 6 April 2015, a VBIED was detonated on the parking of the Imam Abdullah Ibn Ali
Al-Hadi Shi’a shrine in the Bawiya area east of al-Abbara sub-district. At least four
civilians were killed in the blast.771

761 Comment the drafters of this report, Cedoca/Belgium
762 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 6 July – 10 September 2014, 02

October 2014, url, p. 9.
763 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 6 July – 10 September 2014, 02
October 2014, url, p. 9.
764 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 September – 10 December
2014, 23 February 2015, url, p. 15.
765 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 September – 10 December
2014, 23 February 2015, url, p. 12.
766 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014 - 30 April
2015, 13 July 2015, url, p. 32.
767 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014 - 30 April
2015, 13 July 2015, url, p. 21.
768 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014 - 30 April
2015, 13 July 2015, url, p. 32.
769 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014 - 30 April
2015, 13 July 2015, url, p. 32.
770 Balad Ruz has a Shi’a majority. Knights, M., Mello, A., Losing Mosul, Regenerating in Diyala: How the IslamicState Could Exploit Iraq’s Sectarian Tinderbox, October 2016, url, p. 2.
771 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014 - 30 April
2015, 13 July 2015, url, p. 32.

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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALSOn 22 April 2015, a bus returning Shi’a pilgrims from holy shrines in Samarra was
attacked by a suicide bomber. Eight people were killed and 15 others wounded. The
attack happened on the anniversary of death of Imam Ali al-Hadi.772
On 17 July 2015, as the celebrations of Eid al-Fitr marking the end of the Ramadan had
started, a SVBIED detonated in the main market of Khan Bani Saad, south of Baqubain Diyala Governorate. At least 108 people were killed, and 167 wounded. Almost all
victims were civilians. More than 50 shops and 70 cars were destroyed. ISIL claimed
responsibility for the attack, and declared on social media targeting the Shi’acommunity in retaliation for the killing of Sunnis in Hawija before.773
On 10 August 2015, a SVBIED attacked a crowded market in Hwaider, a village outsideof Baquba. The detonation killed at least 61 people, and wounded at least 88. A Diyala
branch of ISIL claimed responsibility on social media.774
On 13 August 2015, a VBIED detonated at the Jameela market in Shi’a majority Sadr
City (Baghdad). At least 45 people were killed and 72 wounded, ISIL claimed
responsibility.775
On 5 October 2015 a mini-bus with explosives detonated in a market in Khalis district,north-west of Baquba. At least 40 persons were killed and at least 60 wounded.
Between 10 and 20 people remained missing. The majority of the victims were
believed to be civilians, including a significant number of women and children. ISILassociated media outlets claimed ISIL responsibility for this attack.776
On 6 October 2015, a VBIED detonated in the al-Zubair district, west of Basrah city,
killing 10 civilians and injuring 25. ISIL claimed responsibility for the blast, stating thatis was part of a coordinated terror campaign around the country, aimed at killing andinjuring members of the Shi’a community.777
On 25 February 2016, two SVBIED detonated in a coordinated attack on Rasul al-Azam
Shi’a mosque in Shula (north-western Baghdad), eight worshippers were killed and 18
others wounded. ISIL claimed responsibility for the attack.778
On 28 February 2016, two attackers – one with a suicide vest, the other with amotorbike rigged with explosives – attacked a public market in Sadr City (eastern
Baghdad), killing 24 civilians and wounding 62 others. ISIL claimed responsibility forthe attack.779
On 29 February 2016, a SVEST (Suicide Vest) detonated at a Shi’a funeral ceremonyclose to al-Quds mosque, in the Asri quarter of Muqdadiya district, north-east of
Baquba. As a result, 19 civilians were killed, and 33 others wounded.780

772 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014 - 30 April

2015, 13 July 2015, url, p. 32.
773 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 May – 31 October 2015,
11 January 2016, url, pp. 14-15.
774 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 May – 31 October 2015,
11 January 2016, url, p. 15.
775 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 May – 31 October 2015,
11 January 2016, url, p. 15.
776 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 May – 31 October 2015,
11 January 2016, url, p. 15.
777 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 May – 31 October 2015,
11 January 2016, url, p. 15.
778 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 5.
779 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 5.
780 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 6.

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On 6 March 2016, a truck laden with explosives was detonated by the driver at themain checkpoint entering Hilla city in Babil. In the attack, 31 civilians and 10 police
members were killed, 70 civilians and 11 police members were wounded. ISIL claimed
responsibility for the attack.781
On 25 March 2016, a SVEST (Suicide Vest) attack in a football stadium in Iskandariya
sub-district in Babil killed at least 25 individuals and wounded at least 59 others. In
this attack, children were particularly targeted: 23 boys between 10 and 17 years oldattending the football game were killed, and 58 wounded. ISIL claimed responsibility
for this attack.782
On 22 April 2016, a suicide bomber detonated his explosive belt targeting the ImamAli Shi’a mosque in Radhwaniya (south-western Baghdad). At least three persons were
killed and 16 others wounded. A second suicide attacker was shot and killed before
he was able to detonate his explosives. ISIL claimed the attack.783
On 2 May 2016, an attack with a SVBIED against pilgrims in southern Baghdad killed
at least 10 individuals and wounded another 11. ISIL claimed responsibility for theattack.784
On 9 May 2016, a SVBIED detonated in a market and nearby a local restaurant in the
predominantly Shi’a Shafta area, in the centre of Baquba city. In the attack, 14 civilians
were killed and 38 others wounded. ISIL reportedly claimed the attack.785
On 11 May 2016, ISIL claimed responsibility for three massive attacks in different
areas of Baghdad. Two of the three were clearly aimed at the Shi’a population in thecapital: In the morning, a vehicle laden with explosives detonated in a market in Sadr
City, the biggest Shi’a neighbourhood, killing 28 individuals and wounding at least 74
others. In the afternoon, a SVBIED at a checkpoint in the Shi’a neighbourhood of
Kadhimiya claimed the lives of at least six individuals and wounded one police
officer.786
On the night of 12 May 2016, three attacks targeted civilians in a café in a
predominantly Shi’a area in Balad district south of Tikrit with hand grenades and smallarms fire. In the attack, 15 civilians were killed and 22 others wounded. The crowd
was watching a football game on television.787
On 17 May 2016, a combined attack involving a suicide vest and an IED targeted amarket in Shaab, killing at least 13 persons and wounding at least 37 others. On thesame day, a SVBIED detonated in a vegetable market in Sadr City, killing at least 11
individuals and wounding 30 others. ISIL claimed the responsibility for both attacks
online.788

781 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30

September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 6.
782 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 6.
783 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 5.
784 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 5.
785 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 6.
786 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 5.
787 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 6.
788 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 5.

104 —

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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

On 21 May 2016, a suicide attack with a motorcycle in the Shi’a Arab majority Dujail
district (Salah al-Din Governorate), killed at least 12 and wounded 33 others. ISIL
claimed responsibility for the attack online.789
On 7 June 2016, a SVBIED exploded in al-Mowadhafeen district in the predominantly
Shi’a Karbala province, killing eight civilians and wounding 18 others. ISIL claimed
responsibility for the attack online.790
On 7 July 2016, gunmen also wearing explosive vests attacked the Sayyid Mohammed
Shi’a shrine in Balad district, south of Tikrit. Attackers threw hand grenades at people
in the shrine area and engaged in gunfire with security forces. The attackers
detonated their explosive vests near the gate and in an area with shops close to theshrine wall. According to sources, 34 civilians and one member of the PMU were
killed, and more than 60 civilians were wounded. ISIL reportedly claimed
responsibility for the incident online.791
On 28 August 2016, five attackers with explosive vests, hand grenades and rifles
entered a wedding party at Hay al Hussein neighbourhood, in Ain Al-Tamr village(western Karbala). Hand grenades were launched, gunshots fired, and one assailant
blew himself up. The other four attackers were killed by ISF. At least 17 civilians were
killed and at least 25 wounded during this incident which was claimed by ISIL.792
On 24 November 2016, in Shomali, south of Hilla (Babil province), a truck rigged with
explosives detonated, killing at least 56 civilians and wounding at least 21 others. An
official source reported 74 persons killed and 24 more wounded. Among the victims
were dozens of local and foreign Shi’a pilgrims returning from Arbaeen
commemorations in Karbala. ISIL claimed responsibility for the attack online.793
On 2 January 2017 a pickup truck loaded with explosives detonated on a market in
Sadr City, Baghdad, killing at least 36 people, wounding another 52. ISIL claimed theattack online.794
On 16 February 2017 a VBIED detonated in the Shi’a area of Bayaa in southern
Baghdad. At least 48 people are killed and more than 50 wounded. ISIL claimed theattack, saying it targeted ‘a gathering of Shi’as’.795
On 20 May 2017, two VBIED were detonated in Basrah al-Remeila military checkpoint,
located on a highway near oilfields in Basrah. Eleven persons were killed, while 32
others were wounded. Later, Islamic State claimed responsibility for the Basrah car
bombing.796
On 30 May 2017, two explosions, one outside an ice cream shop in Karrada district,and the second outside an office in Baghdad, where people collect their government
pensions, killed 31 civilians and wounded 59. ISIL claimed this attack, saying its suicide
bombers had targeted gatherings of Shia Muslims.797

789 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30

September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 6.
790 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 7.
791 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 7.
792 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 7.
793 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2016, 30 August 2017, url, p. 6.
794 New York Times (The), Suicide Bombing in Baghdad Kills at Least 36, 2 January 2017, url; UNAMI, SRSG Kubiš
describes Baghdad bombings as “despicable”, 31 December 2016, url.
795 BBC News, Baghdad car bomb kills at least 48, 16 February 2017, url; CNN, ISIS claims responsibility for deadly
Baghdad blast, 16 February 2017, url.
796 Iraqi News, More than 80 killed, injured in several Baghdad, Basra blasts, 20 May 2017, url.
797 Guardian (The), Dozens of Iraqis killed as Isis targets Baghdad during Ramadan, 30 May 2017, url.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

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On 9 June 2017, a suicide bomber killed at least 31 people, and wounded another 35
in a market in the town of Musayab, 80 km south of Baghdad. ISIL claimed the attack.
On the same day, a second suicide bomber claimed the lives of three people (andwounding another 15) at the main bus station of the Shi’a holy city of Karbala.798
On 28 August 2017, 12 people were killed and 28 wounded as a car bomb explodedin the Jamila neighbourhood of Sadr City (Baghdad). A second blast in al-Yusufiya(south of Baghdad) claimed the lives of another four persons.799
On 14 September 2017, two gun-and-car bomb attacks near the city of Nasiriyah inthe southern province of Thi Qar killed at least 60 people and wounded dozens more.
The first attack was at a highway restaurant, the second at a checkpoint. ISIL claimed
the attack.800 Further reporting on the attacks mention that more than 80 persons
were confirmed dead in ‘an attack on a restaurant frequented by Shia Muslim pilgrims
in southern Iraq that was claimed by Islamic State’.801
On 27 November 2017, a combined gun-and-explosive vest attack in Nahrawan
district, 35 km east of the Iraqi capital claimed the lives of at least 11, and wounded
another 20. Two attackers opened fire on civilians, before one of them detonated his
vest. ISIL claimed responsibility for the attack, saying it targeted the Iran-backed Shi’amilitias known as PMU.802
On 15 January 2018, two suicide bombers killed at least 35 people and injured 90
more in an attack on Tayaran square in Baghdad where day labourers gather to lookfor work.803 The attack was later claimed by ISIL who mentioned that it aimed to target
Shia Muslims.804
On 23 May 2018, at least four persons were killed and 15 others wounded when a
SVEST (Suicide Vest) was detonated at the entrance of the Saqlawiyah public garden
in the predominantly Shi’a Shula district of north-west Baghdad. The explosion
occurred during the holy month of Ramadan, when a lot of people gather in cafes late
into the evening. ISIL claimed responsibility for the attack.805
On 7 June 2018, at least 20 people were killed and 110 wounded in an explosion neara Shi’a mosque in Sadr City when two bombs reportedly exploded near a weapons
cache.806
On 23 June 2018 ISIL fighters kidnapped six Shia men, showing them in a video andgiving the Iraqi government a three-day ultimatum to release Sunni women in Iraqi
prisons, or the men would be killed. After the government’s refusal to negotiate thebodies of the men were found once the deadline had expired, triggering outrage in
Shia areas.807

798 Reuters, Suicide bomber kills at least 31 in crowded Iraqi market, 9 June 2017, url.
799 Al Jazeera, 12 people dead as car bomb explodes in Baghdad, 28 August 2017, url; EPIC, ISHM, August 25-31, 31

August 2017, url; UNAMI, UNAMI condemns in the strongest terms the two terrorist bombings in Baghdad, 29
August 2017, url.
800 Al Jazeera, Deadly ISIL attacks hit southern Iraq's Thi Qar, 15 September 2017, url.
801 Guardian (The), Isis suicide attack: more than 80 killed in southern Iraq, 15 September 2017, url.
802 RFE/RL, Attack Kills At Least 11 Near Baghdad, IS Claims Responsibility, 27 November 2017, url.
803 BBC, Baghdad suicide bombers kill dozens in attack on labourers, 15 January 2018, url.
804 New York Times (The), ISIS Claims Responsibility for Baghdad Bombings, 17 January 2018, url.
805 Reuters, At least four killed, 15 wounded in Baghdad bomb blast, 24 May 2018, url; UNAMI, SRSG Kubiš
condemns suicide bomb attack in Baghdad, 24 May 2018, url.
806 Iraqi News, 130 people killed, wounded as dual bomb attack targets Shiite mosque in Baghdad. 7 June 2018,url.
807 Jamestown Foundation, Is Islamic State Making Plans for a Comeback in Iraq? Terrorism Monitor Volume: 16
Issue: 15, 28 July 2018, url.

106 —

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALSOn 30 October 2018 three Shi’ite Muslim pilgrims were killed by a roadside bomb near
the city of Khanaqin, Diyala Governorate. ISIL claimed responsibility for the attack,although the claim could not be verified.808
4 November 2018, three people were killed and five wounded in an explosion of an
IED in Sadr City (Baghdad). On the same day, three people were killed in an explosive
attack in the al-Shula district of north-west Baghdad.809

The number and impact of this kind of large-scale attacks has decreased considerably in late2017, according to Joel Wing (Musings on Iraq), who notes that ISIL reverted to insurgency
tactics because it was not able to take the losses induced to it conventional warfare against
ISF and Coalition airstrikes. ISIL apparently has entered a new phase of its rebuilding in
October 2018, with renewed efforts at mass casualty bombings.810

Targeting of the Shi’a Muslim civilian population in places under ISIL control
In areas under its control, ISIL committed widespread, systematic violations and abuses
against civilians. These acts include executions, targeted killings and enforced disappearancesof religious, community and political leaders.811
The attacks against the Shi’a population in places under ISIL control took place in the firstmonths of the offensive, essentially in summer and fall of 2014, as described in the cases
below.812


On 10 June 2014, ISIL stormed Badush prison in Mosul, Ninewa, and a high number of
Shi’a prisoners were executed. Concluding from statements by Iraqi officials andsurviving witnesses who were interviewed by UNAMI in Erbil where they had escapedfrom Mosul, the estimate of prisoners killed during this incident has to be put at above
400.813
On 17 September 2014, ISIL shelled three different areas in the predominantly Shi’aal-Khalis district of Diyala, and on 9 October it claimed responsibility for an attack on
Shafta village (a Shi’a village) east of Baquba (Diyala). On 16 November 2014,
approximately 35 bodies of men believed to have been Shi’a Arabs were found in Jurf
al-Sakhr (south of Baghdad, Babil Governorate), a town that had been under ISIL
control. On 3 December 2014, Peshmerga forces discovered two mass graves in
Jalawla sub-district (Diyala). It was however not clear whether all victims were Shi’a.814

The Shi’a Muslims in territories under ISIL control were not exclusively Arabs, but also
Turkmen and Shabak, who were also subjected to ISIL attacks.815
808 Reuters, Blast kills three Shi'ite Muslim pilgrims in Iraq: police, 30 October 2018, url.
809 Iraqi News, Eight people killed, wounded in second bomb blast, east of Baghdad, 04 November 2018, url; Iraqi

News, UN special envoy condemns heinous Baghdad bombings, 05 November 2018, url.
810 Wing, J., October 2018: Islamic State Expanding Operations In Iraq, Musings on Iraq [Blog], 2 November 2018,url.
811 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 September – 10 December
2014, 23 February 2015, url, p. 6; UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 6
July – 10 September 2014, 02 October 2014, url, pp. 5-6.
812 Comment by the drafters of this report, Cedoca/Belgium
813 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Non International Armed Conflict in Iraq: 5 June –5 July 2014, 18 July 2014, url, p. 10.
814 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 6 July – 10 September 2014, 02
October 2014, url, p. 15.
815 Comment by the drafters of this report, Cedoca/Belgium

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 107

The Turkmen are not exclusively Shi’a, the third biggest ethnic community of Iraq has
members who are part of both Sunni and Shia sects, they live in ‘an arc of towns and villages
stretching from Tal Afar, west of Mosul, through Mosul, Erbil, Altun Kopru, Kirkuk, Tuz
Khurmatu, Kifri and Khaniqin’.816 The Shi’a Turkmen reside mostly in the southern part of thissettlement area. About 60 % of the minority is Sunni, the remainder are Shi’a.817 During the
rapid ISIL advance in summer 2014, the Shi’a Turkmen fled together with other religious andethnic minorities like Christians and Shabaks, and in Sinjar district and parts of Tal Afar district
they were virtually surrounded by ISIL and associated armed groups. During August 2014, theShi’a Turkmen from this region fled towards Mount Sinjar, others fled to Dohuk in the KRI or
to other areas in Iraq.818
The members of the Shi’a Turkmen community came also under direct attack by ISIL, when
the organisation seized the area around the town of Amerli in Salah al-Din, placing its 13 000
inhabitants under siege. Amerli is in majority Shi’a Turkmen. The town was shelled on an
almost daily basis until the siege was broken by the ISF in combination with US air strikes on
31 August 2014. Due to ISIL cutting off the electricity supply to the town during the siege, theresidents (almost 10 000 of the 13 000 being women and children) were suffering from severe
shortages of food, medicines and drinking water. Some residents died from lack of access to
medical services, as was pointed out by UNAMI.819
UNAMI reported accounts by IDPs from two villages in Tal Afar district, that in mid-June 2014,‘ISIL killed and wounded civilians, destroyed religious buildings and houses, and looted
property. At least 38 civilians, all Turkmen Shi’a, were reportedly abducted.’820
UNAMI recorded more attacks on Turkmen during this period, like the abduction of 40 men
from the village of Rashidiya on 7 July 2014, and the killing of six civilians in Tuz district ofSalah al-Din Governorate during the week of 20-26 July 2014. Five of the victims of this attack
were Shi’a Turkmen, and the sixth was the Kurdish wife of one of the other victims. On 7
August, ‘about 100 Turkmen Shi’a men from Tal Afar, who had been displaced in Sinjar werereportedly executed by ISIL.’821
The Shabak minority is a smaller community located in the Ninewa plains and in some villages
east of Mosul, as well as in Mosul itself. Their community numbers approximately 250 000,
and about 70 % identify themselves as Shi’a, the rest as Sunni.822 The Shabak were also
targeted by ISIL: Their villages were attacked, members of the community abducted, and
UNAMI received reports that on 11 July 2014 during Friday prayers, an Imam in Mosul had
urged Sunnis to kill all Shabaks remaining in Mosul city.823

816 MRG, Iraq, Turkmen, November 2017, url.
817 MRG, Iraq, Turkmen, November 2017, url.
818 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 6 July – 10 September 2014, 02

October 2014, url, pp. 4, 15.
819 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 6 July – 10 September 2014, 02
October 2014, url, p. 16.
820 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 6 July – 10 September 2014, 02
October 2014, url, p. 16.
821 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 6 July – 10 September 2014, 02
October 2014, url, p. 16.
822 MRG, Iraq, Shabak, November 2017, url.
823 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 6 July – 10 September 2014, 02
October 2014, url, pp. 16-17.

108 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALSISIL continued the targeting of Shabak, and UNAMI received reports that houses of Shabak in
Mosul were destroyed by ISIL.824 The community reported they had been subjected toabductions and were mistreated during interrogations.825 On 13 March 2016, ISIL killed ninemen from the Shabak community in the village Bairbog in Bashiqa sub-district (east of Mosul).
They had been abducted months before and were executed after a verdict of an ISIL-court,
allegedly for cooperating with the Shi’a dominated Iraqi government.826
Many Shabak fled from ISIL territory, most to the KRI, others to the Shia dominated areas in
the south of Iraq like Karbala.827 The Guardian stated that Shabak and other Muslim minorities
had either fled or been killed, Human Rights Watch reported in July 2014 that ‘Virtually all
Turkmen and Shabaks have fled their communities near Mosul as a result of ISIL raids, in which
the fighters seize local men and pillage homes and places of worship, residents of thosevillages said.’828
More recently, more than 50 Shabak families who had returned to Mosul after the end of the
ISIL occupation of the city returned back to the KRI in July 2018, because of security
concerns.829

Targeting of Shi’a members of the Iraqi Security Forces
Members of ISF who were captured by ISIL, faced execution, unless they repented in public,
but as Human Rights Watch wrote already in July 2014, Shi’a soldiers were killed afterwards,
even when they had repented before. The same source stated that ISIL has summarily
executed Shi’a captives on several occasions in Iraq.830
The most prominent example of killing captured members of the ISF of the Shi’a sect is theCamp Speicher incident. In this incident, in June 2014, ISIL executed hundreds of Iraqi Shi’aarmy recruits from Camp Speicher near Tikrit. Several witnesses declared that ISIL separated
the Shi’a from the Sunni captives, and that the Sunni – both military and civilian – were
subsequently released, while the Shi’a were executed. UNAMI concluded in its report on themassacre issued on 13 July 2015 that almost all victims were Shi’a.831

Destruction of Shi’a mosques, shrines and other places of worship
ISIL attacked and destroyed places of religious significance ‘that did not conform to takfiri
doctrine’, and Shi’a mosques were particularly targeted. In areas under ISIL control, numerous
Shi’a mosques faced destruction, as the examples below show. But also outside ISIL territory,

824 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 May – 31 October 2015,

11 January 2016, url, p. 16.
825 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 September – 10 December
2014, 23 February 2015, url, p. 15.
826 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 15.
827 MRG, Between the Millstones: The State of Iraq’s Minorities Since the Fall of Mosul, 2015, url, p. 8.
828 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: ISIS Abducting, Killing, Expelling Minorities. Armed Group Targeting Christian Nuns,
Turkmen, Shabaks, Yazidis, 19 July 2014, url.
829 Rudaw, Mosul too insecure for Kurdish Shabak families, now settled in Duhok, 26 July 2018, url (video withtestimonies included).
830 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: ISIS Abducting, Killing, Expelling Minorities. Armed Group Targeting Christian Nuns,
Turkmen, Shabaks, Yazidis, 19 July 2014, url.
831 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 6 July – 10 September 2014, 02
October 2014, url, p. 9.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 109

Shi’a places of worship were regularly attacked, according to UNAMI’s reporting during
2014.832
UNAMI mentioned in its reporting the following incidents, this list is not exhaustive. Most
destructions of Shi’a mosques within ISIL territory happened in Mosul833:
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On 7 July 2014, the mosques of the villages of Shanaf (Nimrod district) and Staeh (alHadhar district) in Ninewa Governorate were blown up by ISIL.834
On 16 July 2014, ISIL blew up al-Sadraen Mosque in the Tamim area of Mosul and allHuseiniya in al-Sadaa village in Tal Kayf district.835
On 25 July 2014 several mosques in Kirkuk Governorate were targeted (outside ISIL
territory).836
An 3 August 2014, ISIL destroyed the Shi’a shrine of Sayida Zainab and the Shi’a shrineof Saiyed Zakariya, both in Sinjar.837
On 9 August 2014, the holy shrine of Imam Ridha (Shi’a Eighth Imam) in Tisikhrab in
Ninewa was blown up by an IED.838
On 23 October 2014 two Shi’a holy shrines in al-Dor district in Salah al-Din weredestroyed.839
On 19 March 2015, ISIL destroyed two Shi’a shrines belonging to the Shabak minority
in Hamdaniya, south of Mosul.840
On 13 July 2015, a Shi’a mosque/religious school was destroyed using an IED in Kirkuk
city (outside ISIL territory).841
UNAMI reported in 2016 that several Shi’a mosques in Mosul and Hamam al-Alil havebeen used as military operation centers.842

2.2.2 Targeting of Sunni Muslims
ISIL does not tolerate any deviant religious practices within its own fundamentalist takfiri
ideology. This was reflected by the destruction of numerous Sunni religious sites in the areas
controlled by ISIL. Any public worshipping outside the boundaries of the very narrowinterpretation of Islam was suppressed by ISIL. Other movements such as Shi’ism, Sufism, or

832 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 6 July – 10 September 2014, 02

October 2014, url, p. 9.
833 Comment by the drafters of this report, Cedoca/Belgium
834 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 6 July – 10 September 2014, 02
October 2014, url, p. 9
835 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 6 July – 10 September 2014, 02
October 2014, url, p. 9.
836 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 6 July – 10 September 2014, 02
October 2014, url, p. 9.
837 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 6 July – 10 September 2014, 02
October 2014, url, p. 9.
838 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 6 July – 10 September 2014, 02
October 2014, url, p. 9.
839 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 September – 10 December
2014, 23 February 2015, url, p. 12.
840 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014 - 30 April
2015, 13 July 2015, url, p. 19.
841 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 May – 31 October 2015,
11 January 2016, url, p. 16.
842 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2016, 30 August 2017, url, p. 11.

110 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

any others who is not in conformity with of ISIL’s ideological interpretation of Islam were
declared takfir and therefore had to be destroyed.843
In its periodic reports on human rights in Iraq, UNAMI cited a significant number of holy Sunni
shrines or other religious places that were destroyed, mainly in Ninewa Governorate,
including examples of Sunni sites targeted.844


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In July 2014 alone, ISIL destroyed nine different shrines in the Mosul area, and in
September of the same year five mosques, shrines and a cemetery, again in the wider
Mosul area. In the same period, ISIL destroyed also two Sufi shrines, one in Mosul, theother in Daquq district, south of Kirkuk.845
In October 2014, two Sunni and one Sufi shrine were destroyed in Salah al-Din
Governorate.846
In November 2014, the shrine of a Sunni Sheikh was obliterated in the Daquq area
(Kirkuk governorate).847
On 8 May 2015, ISIL looted and then destroyed the biggest Sunni mosque in Badoush
sub-district (Ninewa Governorate) because of the existence of a tomb inside themosque that ISIL objected to.848
Another example of the destruction of a mosque because it contained tombs andgraves venerated by the local population was the al-Farouq Sunni mosque in Ayathia
sub-district, Tal Afar district on 14 November 2015.849
On 21 June 2017, ISIL blew up the famous al-Nuri mosque and the al-Hadba minaret
in western Mosul.850

Sunni religious leaders (and others) who opposed ISIL faced severe repercussions. ISIL
required total loyalty from religious leaders, and those who refused to declare their allegianceto ISIL and the caliph risked being assassinated, or publicly tried and subsequently executed.851
Again UNAMI repeatedly reported on targeting of Sunni clerics, noting below a few examples:

On 22 July 2014, a Sunni Imam in eastern Baquba was killed by ISIL because he haddenounced the organisation. On 9 September 2014, reports alleged that another
Imam was executed in western Mosul for refusing to declare his allegiance to ISIL.852
On 14 June 2016, ISIL seized two Imams in central Mosul for violating instructions
regarding the conduct of prayers and Friday sermons.853

843 Soufan Group (The), The Islamic State, November 2014, url, p. 18.
844 Comment by the drafters of this report, Cedoca/Belgium
845 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 6 July – 10 September 2014, 02

October 2014, url, p. 10.
846 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 September – 10 December
2014, 23 February 2015, url, p. 12.
847 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 September – 10 December
2014, 23 February 2015, url, p. 12.
848 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 May – 31 October 2015,
11 January 2016, url, p. 16.
849 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 14.
850 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the context of the Ninewa Operations and the retakingof Mosul City, 17 October 2016 – 10 July 2017, 2 November 2017, url, p. 35.
851 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 6 July – 10 September 2014, 02
October 2014, url, p. 5.
852 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 6 July – 10 September 2014, 02
October 2014, url, p. 7.
853 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 6 July – 10 September 2014, 02
October 2014, url, p. 11.

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On 4 September 2014, ISIL reportedly forced Sunni Imams to pledge allegiance under
threat of death in villages south and west of Kirkuk. On 8 September ISIL released alist of 40 Sunni Imams who it has forbidden to perform their religious activities
because of their refusal to support ISIL.854
On 15 January 2016, ISIL abducted six Imams in Mosul, after they had been accusedof urging people not to join or support ISIL.855
On 23 January 2015, ISIL abducted six Imams in east Mosul for unknown reasons.856
On 10 February 2016, an Imam in Mosul was executed after a trial by an ISIL court,
reportedly for not cooperating with the group.857
On 29 February 2016, ISIL executed two Imams from different neighbourhoods in
Mosul. They had been tried by an ISIL court and accused of disobeying the group’s
instructions and of preventing young people from joining the group.858
On 22 April 2016, ISIL abducted three Imams from their homes in central Mosul. They
were taken to an unknown location, and their whereabouts and condition remained
unknown to UNAMI.859

UNAMI reported that the targeting of religious leaders continued in the areas under ISIL
control in the first half of 2017, without specifying particular incidents.860

2.2.3 Targeting of Christians
According to MRG, since 2003, over 1 100 Christians have been killed and 98 churches,monasteries and Christian shrines have been attacked, and such attacks continued in 2013
and 2014 in Christian areas, with reports of kidnappings, bombings, and attacks against
Christian areas, churches, and worshippers reported.861 In relation to ISIL’s targeting ofminorities, ethnic and religious minorities, such as Christians, Yazidis, and Shabaks, whoserights to practise their own religion are protected by the Iraqi Constitution, were targeted by
ISIL’s 2014 campaign to ‘purify’ its territory by eliminating influences that it considered to be
un-Islamic. In this respect, ‘Shiites were summarily executed [and] Christians’ homes weremarked and they were forced to pay jizya, in order to continue practising their own religion’for example.862 In a 2014 report on the situation of the different ethno-religious minorities in
Iraq, MRG wrote that most Christians in Iraq are of Chaldo-Assyrian or Armenian ethnicity,and that they adhere to several different denominations. Before the US-led invasion of 2003,
an estimate of up to 1.4 million Christians lived in the country. Following the eruption ofviolence in the years after the US invasion Christians were targeted for their religious

854 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 6 July – 10 September 2014, 02

October 2014, url, p. 11.
855 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 14.
856 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 14.
857 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 14.
858 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 14.
859 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 14.
860 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – January to June 2017, url, p. X.
861 MRG, From Crisis to Catastrophe: the situation of minorities in Iraq, 14 October 2014, url, pp. 8-9.
862 Kinyat Organisation for Documentation/FIDH, Sexual violence against Yazidis: ISIL foreign fighters should beprosecuted for genocide and crimes against humanity, 25 October 2018, url, p. 4.

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affiliation as well as for their perceived ties with the West.863 Subsequently, large numbers ofChristians fled the country, and in 2014, their number had declined to some 350 000.864
The population declined further since mid-2014 with the arrival of ISIL in areas with Christiantowns and villages, especially the Ninewa plains. When Mosul and the whole region fell to ISIL,
thousands of Christians fled, mostly to the KRI or abroad.865 Those who did not or could notflee faced various forms of targeting by ISIL: shortly after the taking of Mosul, ISIL released anorder on the Christians to either convert to Islam, pay a tax as non-Muslims (jizya), leave thecity by 19 July 2014, or face death by public execution or beheading.866 Human Rights Watch
pointed out that even before the decree on Christians, ISIL started to place marks on
minorities’ properties to designate them as either Christian (‘Nazarene’, ‘Nasrani’ or ‘N’867) or
belonging to one of the other minorities (Shi’a Shabak or Shi’a Turkmen), and asking a ‘jihadtax’ on the remaining Christian merchants. Some of the properties were seized, and somereligious buildings were destroyed. The few remaining Christian families chose to leave Mosul,
according to reports by Human Rights Watch and MRG from 2014.868 There were reports inJune 2014 of incidents where members of ISIL raped women and girls of families who did not
pay the tax in Mosul.869
In August 2014, ISIL took control of the Assyrian areas in the Ninewa plain, including the townsof Tel Isqof, Bartalla, Karamles, Natnaya, Tel Keyf and the largest Christian town in Iraq,
Qaraqosh. This caused approximately 200 000 people to flee towards the KRI.870
According to the NGO Shlomo Organization for Documentation, cited by USDOS:‘ISIS abducted 150 Christians from the Batnaya, Qaraqosh, and Tel Kayf areas in 2014;
their fate remained unclear at year’s end of the year. On 15 February, the NGO
reported the discovery of a mass grave west of Mosul containing 150 sets of humanremains, possibly of Christian civilians from the area. At year’s end it was unclear ifthey were the remains of the Christians abducted in 2014.’871
Burning of Christian houses by ISIL in the areas of the Ninewa Plain were also reported in 2014,
with some sources indicating that in some Christian towns 1 233 houses were destroyed,
3 520 houses burned, and 8 217 partially damaged.872

863 MRG, From Crisis to Catastrophe: the situation of minorities in Iraq, 14 October 2014, url, p. 5.
864 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues on her mission to Iraq, 9 January

2017, url, p. 10.
865 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues on her mission to Iraq, 9 January
2017, url, p. 10; MRG, From Crisis to Catastrophe: the situation of minorities in Iraq, 14 October 2014, url, p. 5.
866 France, OFPRA, The Security situation of religious and ethnic minorities, 14 November 2017, url, p. 4; UN Human
Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues on her mission to Iraq, 9 January 2017, url, p.
10.
867 MRG, From Crisis to Catastrophe: the situation of minorities in Iraq, 14 October 2014, url, p. 20
868 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: ISIS Abducting, Killing, Expelling Minorities. Armed Group Targeting Christian Nuns,
Turkmen, Shabaks, Yazidis, 19 July 2014, url; MRG, From Crisis to Catastrophe: the situation of minorities in Iraq,
14 October 2014, url, p. 9.
869 MRG, From Crisis to Catastrophe: the situation of minorities in Iraq, 14 October 2014, url, p. 9
870 MRG, From Crisis to Catastrophe: the situation of minorities in Iraq, 14 October 2014, url, p. 9.
871 USDOS, 2017 Report on International Religious Freedom - Iraq, 29 May 2018, url.
872 USDOS, 2017 Report on International Religious Freedom - Iraq, 29 May 2018, url.

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Members of the Christian community became victims of abductions, pillaging and arrests.873
Fleeing Christians and minorities were robbed by ISIL and their properties looted or stolen.874
Money, cars, mobile phones, jewellery and identification documents were confiscated, andthe deserted Christian property and homes in Mosul were ‘systematically looted’.875 MRG
reported that the Ninewa Plain was ‘practically emptied’ of the indigenous Christian
population that had lived there for thousands of years.876
ISIL took over abandoned houses belonging to Christians and religious buildings, and some ofthem were destroyed by using explosives or bulldozers.877 Property owned by Christians who
fled the city of Mosul in 2014 was sold in an ‘auction’ in western Mosul on 16 January 2016.
UNAMI reported in 2016 that 400 houses, 19 buildings and 167 shops were put up for sale,
together with other goods.878 The possibility to pay the jizya tax was not always granted.
UNAMI received reports that Christian families were expulsed when they refused to convert
to Islam.879
According to DFAT, writing in 2018, ‘ISIL subjected Christians to high levels of violence anddiscrimination in areas under its control. ISIL forced Christians to convert to Islam, pay jizya orface death or expulsion.’880 The 2017 USDOS noted numerous abuses by ISIL against religious
minorities, including Christians in ISIL-controlled areas, including kidnapping, rape,enslavement, forced marriage, and sexual violence.881
For information on targeting of Christians under societal norms see section 3.4.4.

2.2.4 Targeting of Yazidis
The Yazidis are one of the oldest ethno-religious minorities in Iraq, and their number isestimated to reach up to 700 000. They were mostly located in Northern Iraq, in the region
around Sinjar, and in areas south of and bordering the KRI, including the Ninewa plains. Since
2014, the minority has been severely targeted by ISIL, which justified the attacks against
Yazidis by labelling them as heretics and devil worshippers.882
In August 2014 ISIL overran the territories where the Yazidis settled, at that time held by the
Kurdish Peshmerga and the ISF. In the course of this military offensive, ISIL forces and othergroups allied to it systematically targeted the Yazidi community, killing and capturing
thousands from their villages in the Ninewa Governorate. Tens of thousands fled to Sinjar
Mountains, where they were surrounded by ISIL, and many others escaped towards the KRI.
In total, UNAMI and UNHCR reported that between 2 000 and 5 500 Yazidis were killed by the
873 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 6 July – 10 September 2014, 02

October 2014, url, pp. 11-12.
874 MRG, From Crisis to Catastrophe: the situation of minorities in Iraq, 14 October 2014, url, pp. 20-21.
875 MRG, From Crisis to Catastrophe: the situation of minorities in Iraq, 14 October 2014, url, pp. 20-21.
876 MRG, From Crisis to Catastrophe: the situation of minorities in Iraq, 14 October 2014, url, p. 9877 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 September – 10 December
2014, 23 February 2015, url, p. 12; UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq:
11 December 2014 - 30 April 2015, 13 July 2015, url, pp. 18-19; UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of
Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 May – 31 October 2015, 11 January 2016, url, p. 16 .
878 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 15.
879 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014 - 30 April
2015, 13 July 2015, url, p. 19.
880 Australia, DFAT Country Information Report Iraq, 9 October 2018, url, p. 15.
881 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Iraq, 20 April 2018, url.
882 France, OFPRA, The Security situation of religious and ethnic minorities, 14 November 2017, url.

114 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALSIslamic State. More than 6 000 were abducted in August 2014, including 3 500 women andgirls, who were subsequently sold or offered as sex slaves to ISIL members. The almost 3 000
men and boys in captivity were enrolled as fighters.883
In January 2018, UNAMI reported that 3 158 Yazidis (1 472 women and 1 686 men) were stillin ISIL captivity.884 The October 2018 UN Security Council report informed that ‘on 29 August,the Department of Yazidi Affairs in the Ministry of Awqaf and Religious Affairs in the KRG
reported that of the 6 417 Yazidis (3 548 women and 2 869 men) abducted by ISIL since August
2014, fewer than half have been freed or escaped. On the same day, the Department also
reported that 3 095 Yazidis (1 845 children and 1 250 women) remained in ISIL captivity or
were missing. No men remain in ISIL captivity. Those abducted have either escaped or been
freed, or have been executed by ISIL.’885
In her report on her mission to Iraq in 2016, the Special Rapporteur on minority issues of theUnited Nations considered the following, in view of a possible qualification of the crimes
committed by ISIL against the Yazidis as genocide:‘While further detailed investigation is required, information provided to the Special
Rapporteur, including public videos and statements by ISIL itself, strongly supports
allegations that the threshold required for a finding of genocide has been surpassedin the case of the Yazidis. The intention to destroy the Yazidi group in whole or in partcan be inferred from the deliberate and systematic targeting of members of that
community, including execution or forced conversion.’886
According to the UN’s Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic ISIL has committed the crime of genocide as well as multiple crimes against humanity
and war crimes against the Yazidis:‘ISIS has sought to destroy the Yazidis through killings; sexual slavery, enslavement,
torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and forcible transfer causing serious
bodily and mental harm; the infliction of conditions of life that bring about a slow
death; the imposition of measures to prevent Yazidi children from being born,
including forced conversion of adults, the separation of Yazidi men and women, andmental trauma; and the transfer of Yazidi children from their own families and placing
them with ISIS fighters, thereby cutting them off from beliefs and practices of theirown religious community, and erasing their identity as Yazidis.’887
The August 2016 UN report, A Call for Accountability and Protection: Yezidi Survivors ofAtrocities Committed by ISIL, based mainly on accounts obtained from survivors and witnessesof human rights abuses, collected accounts of the following types of human rights abuses
against Yazidis:

883

France, OFPRA, The Security situation of religious and ethnic minorities, 14 November 2017, url, p. 6;
UNAMI/OHCHR, A Call for Accountability and Protection: Yezidi Survivors of Atrocities Committed by ISIL, 12 August
2016, url, p. 4.
884 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, p. 15.
885 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2421 (2018) Report of the Secretary-General [S/2018/975],
31 October 2018, url, p. 10.
886 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues on her mission to Iraq, 9 January
2017, url, p. 16.
887 UN, Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, They came to destroy: ISIS
crimes against the Yazidis, 15 June 2016, url, p. 1.

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Forced displacements
Forced conversions
Abduction, deprivation of liberty,
Cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment
Systematic and widespread killing
Sexual violence/sexual slavery888

During the ISIL offensive against Sinjar, thousands of Yazidis were forced to flee, either to
Sinjar Mountain, to the Syrian border or towards the KRI. On Mount Sinjar, the population
was trapped on top of the mountain without sufficient supplies and under siege by ISIL. In areport from the Special Rapporteur for the United Nations on minority issues on her mission
to Iraq from 9 January 2017, community leaders estimated that about 400 000 Yazidis weredisplaced ‘trying to survive under the threat of extinction’.889
Those Yazidi who survived the initial onslaught, but were intercepted by ISIL, were told toconvert to Islam or be killed. Those who refused were killed, often in front of other captured
Yazidi. OHCHR and UNAMI jointly stated that ‘those who complied under this extreme duress
were nonetheless subjected to severe ill-treatment and sexual violence’ from ISIL.890
Those Yazidis who were captured were moved between different locations, subjected tosevere ill treatment and suffered a lack of basic supplies, including food and water. Children,
the elderly and people with disabilities had to endure the same treatment. Families wereseparated, young children taken away by force, and captives were forced to drink sewage
water. Many Yazidi reported being beaten frequently while in captivity. Those Yazidi who wereallowed to live outside captivity, had to perform forced work, and minor offences against therules imposed by ISIL were subject to corporal punishment like public flogging. Children above
the age of five were forcibly converted and had to learn the Quran. Boys above twelve years
old received weapons training by ISIL instructors.891
After the taking of Sinjar city and surrounding Yazidi villages, multiple witnesses reported to
OHCHR and UNAMI that ISIL killed scores of Yazidi civilians. Men, women, children and elderly
people were randomly killed, including mass executions of captives.892 The exact number of
Yazidis killed by ISIL is not known, but a retrospective household survey to estimate thenumber and demographic profile of Yazidis killed and kidnapped, conducted between 4
November and 25 December 2015 by four scientists of different domains revealed theestimated probabilities of killings and kidnappings of Yazidis by ISIL. Nearly 25 out of 1 000
people were either killed or kidnapped. The likelihood of being killed was 7.6 per 1 000, andthe likelihood of being kidnapped 17.0 per 1 000. Furthermore, this study estimated that,assuming a Yazidi population of 40 000 in Sinjar when ISIL attacked, the overall toll was 9 900
people. Around 3 100 Yazidis were killed (1 400 were executed, and 1 700 died on Mount

888 UNAMI/OHCHR, A Call for Accountability and Protection: Yezidi Survivors of Atrocities Committed by ISIL, 12

August 2016, url, p. 2.
889 UNAMI/OHCHR, A Call for Accountability and Protection: Yezidi Survivors of Atrocities Committed by ISIL, 12
August 2016, url, pp. 8-10; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues on her
mission to Iraq, 9 January 2017, url, pp. 12-13.
890 UNAMI/OHCHR, A Call for Accountability and Protection: Yezidi Survivors of Atrocities Committed by ISIL, 12
August 2016, url, p. 10.
891 UNAMI/OHCHR, A Call for Accountability and Protection: Yezidi Survivors of Atrocities Committed by ISIL, 12
August 2016, url, pp. 11-12.
892 UNAMI/OHCHR, A Call for Accountability and Protection: Yezidi Survivors of Atrocities Committed by ISIL, 12
August 2016, url, pp. 12-14.

116 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALSSinjar during the ISIL siege). The estimated number kidnapped was put on 6 800. At the timeof the survey in November and December 2015, an estimated 2 500 Yazidis were still
missing.893
After the capture of numerous Yazidi civilians, ISIL systematically separated the men from thewomen and children. Often ISIL took away the younger girls away from their families. Girlsabove a certain age (8 years, according to OHCHR/UNAMI) were taken, and women withyounger children or who were pregnant could not count on being spared from sexual
harassment or rape. ISIL regarded sexual slavery as acceptable regarding female captives, andreferred to them as ‘slaves’, or ‘spoils of war’. ISIL even issued a pamphlet allowing to havesexual intercourse with a girl who has not yet reached puberty, and stating that the slave isconsidered as a property of the owner.894
OHCHR/UNAMI listed numerous accounts of rape, sexual slavery and mistreatment of Yazidi
women and girls by members of ISIL895, and likewise did Human Rights Watch and Amnesty
International in similar reports.896
USDOS noted that ‘since 2014, ISIS militants have kidnapped and held captive thousands ofwomen and children from a wide range of ethnic and religious groups, especially Yazidis, andcontinue to sell them to ISIS fighters in Iraq and Syria, where they are subjected to forced
marriage, sexual slavery, rape, and domestic servitude.’897 Other sources explained that ISIL
trafficked Yazidi women and children ‘at slave markets or on specialized websites via
applications like Telegram and Signal. One online resale chat group, called “The Great Mall of
the Islamic State” had up to 754 members’ where ISIL member could buy women or
children.898
According to the findings of two missions conducted by the International Federation for
Human Rights (FIDH) to the KRI in February and August 2017, ‘Since August 2014 and over a
period of several years, ISIL systematically and on a horrifying scale committed SGBV [Sexualand Gender-Based Violence] amounting to genocide and crimes against humanity, as well asother acts amounting to crimes under international law, against the Yazidi population.’899
According to USDOS, 360 000 Yazidis displaced to Dohuk in KRI remained displaced due to the‘confused security situation’ in Sinjar.900
For further information on targeting of Yazidis under societal norms see section 3.4.3.

893 Cetorelli, V. et.al., Mortality and kidnapping estimates for the Yazidi population in the area of Mount Sinjar, Iraq,

in August 2014: A retrospective household survey. PLoS Med 14(5): e1002297, url.
894 UNAMI/OHCHR, A Call for Accountability and Protection: Yezidi Survivors of Atrocities Committed by ISIL, 12
August 2016, url, p. 14; Human Rights Watch, Slavery: The ISIS Rules, 5 September 2015, url.
895 UNAMI/OHCHR, A Call for Accountability and Protection: Yezidi Survivors of Atrocities Committed by ISIL, 12
August 2016, url, pp. 14-16;
896 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: ISIS Escapees Describe Systematic Rape. Yezidi Survivors in Need of Urgent Care, 14
April 2015, url; AI, Escape from hell Torture and sexual slavery in Islamic State captivity in Iraq, 23 December 2014,url.
897 USDOS, Trafficking in Persons Report 2018 - Country Narratives - Iraq, 28 June 2018, url.
898 Kinyat Organisation for Documentation/FIDH, Sexual violence against Yazidis: ISIL foreign fighters should beprosecuted for genocide and crimes against humanity, 25 October 2018, url, pp. 23-26.
899 Kinyat Organisation for Documentation/FIDH, Sexual violence against Yazidis: ISIL foreign fighters should beprosecuted for genocide and crimes against humanity, 25 October 2018, url, p. 49.
900 USDOS, 2015 Report on International Religious Freedom – Iraq, 10 August 2016, url.

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2.2.5 Targeting of Kaka’i
The Kaka’i religious minority, number between 110 000 and 200 000 in Iraq, and are locatedmainly south-east of Kirkuk and in the Ninewa plains near Daquq and Hamdaniya, but also inother places in Diyala and the KRI. The Kaka’i are followers of a syncretic religion whichcontains elements of Zoroastrianism and Shi’a Islam.901 Kaka’i activists estimate the number
to approximately 120 000-150 000 members.902
MRG described the situation of Kaka’i following the rise of ISIL in 2014 as follows:‘When ISIS began its advance in northern Iraq, most Kaka’i living in villages east of
Mosul fled to Erbil. ISIS reportedly released statements threatening Kaka’i with death
if they did not convert to Islam. Several villages were taken over by ISIS, and themilitant group also destroyed Kaka’i shrines in al-Hamdaniya district on the Ninewa
plains. In response, the Kaka’i formed their own armed forces, and one 600-member
contingent was incorporated into the Kurdish Peshmerga. In September 2016, ISIS
targeted a Kaka’i village in Tuz Kharmatu district with a car bomb attack, killing at least
six people.’903
According to the 2015 Report on International Religious Freedom of the USDOS, more than
2 500 Kaka’i families had fled to the KRI as a result of the ISIL incursion, and thousands
remained displaced.904 In 2018, Kaka’I community activists stated that only a limited numberof community members had returned to liberated Ninewa.905
In 2018, members of the Kaka’i community in Kirkuk Governorate (mainly in Daquq district,south of Kirkuk) continued to be displaced, because of security concerns. ISIL militants
regrouped in the disputed areas after the federal raid of 16 October 2017 to these areas.
Kaka’i villages have been targeted by ISIL, with several attacks having been reported. Some
villages have been deserted, others are defended by the local communities, but the local
populations expressed its concern that it would not be possible to secure their communities
without substantial outside help.906
In an article in CTC Sentinel issued in September 2018, the independent author, journalist andexpert on Iraqi security issues, Derek Henry Flood, wrote:‘This past summer, vulnerable populations faced regular attacks in Kirkuk
Governorate’s southern sub-districts. Religious minorities such as the Sufis andfollowers of the secretive syncretic Kakai faith along with local Sunni Arabs the IslamicState deems collaborators for cooperating with ISF continue to be at great risk fromattacks by jihadis based in the low-slung Hamrin Mountains and the Qori Chai rivervalley, which begins near the tiny villages of Dabaj and Qaryat Tamur to the north of
the Hamrin Mountains.’907

901 MRG, Kaka’i, November 2017, url.
902 USDOS, 2017 Report on International Religious Freedom - Iraq, 29 May 2018, url.
903 MRG, Kaka’I, November 2017, url.
904 USDOS, 2015 Report on International Religious Freedom – Iraq, 10 August 2016, url.
905 USDOS, 2017 Report on International Religious Freedom – Iraq, 29 May 2018, url.
906 Kirkuk Now, Kakaiyis look for safety - Tens of families fled Daquq to Qarahanjir, 13 August 2018, url; Voice ofAmerica, IS Attacks Drive Members of Iraqi Kakai Minority From Their Villages (video), 26 June 2018, url.
907 Flood, D.H., From Caliphate to Caves: The Islamic State’s Asymmetric War in Northern Iraq, September 2018,url.

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2.2.6 Targeting of Kurds
As explained in Section 1.3.5, after federal government of Iraq took over in disputed Kirkuk
from the Kurdish Peshmerga in October 2017, ISIL exploited the conflict between federal and
KRG forces to mount attacks on Kurdish villages (and those of other minorities) in Kirkuk
Governorate.908 On 18 October 2017, ISIL briefly captured three villages near Daquq in a nighttime assault.909 Attacks by ISIL against Kurdish villages surrounding Kirkuk continued into 2018,
and a former director of Kirkuk’s police identified in February 2018 Daquq and Tuz Khurmatu
as the primary targets of the ISIL militants. Another local security source warned that ISIL
fighters remained present in large numbers in Kirkuk governorate.910
Attacks continued to occur in the following months, and amidst security concerns related to
ISIL, Kurds abandoned their home villages in Daquq. Several attacks against Kurdish villages,
but also the ambushing and killing of policemen and members of the PMU in hit-and-run
operations contributed to the concerns of the civilian population, together with overt
appearances of ISIL fighters in villages.911
Between mid-October 2017, when Kurdish control of Kirkuk was turned over to the ISF and
the PMU, until the end of July 2018, a total of 30 villages in the region are reported to havebeen evacuated by the Kurdish population, but not only because of the threat by ISIL. Tensions
between Kurds and Shi’a Arabs living in the area also contributed to the population
movement.912
In July 2018, Kurdish residents of Mardan, a small village near Khanaqin in Diyala Governorate,evacuated their homes after a wave of ISIL killings. The departure of the Kurdish Peshmerga
forces from the disputed areas was exploited by ISIL remnants to reorganize in the Hamrin
Mountains, Salah al-Din, Diyala and Kirkuk governorates, was noted in an article by Rudaw
from July 2018.913
According to the DIS/Landinfo FFM to Kurdistan published in November 2018, ISIL was notpresent or carrying out insurgent activities in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq; however one
source reported that an attack on a government building in Erbil occurred In July 2018 thatwas suspected to have been carried out by ISIL.914

2.3 Targeting of individuals perceived to oppose ISIL
One of the main strategic elements of ISIL to gain control on cities and towns has been theelimination of opponents to weaken any opposition: key security personnel, politicians andgovernment figures opposing their agenda, tribal leaders who collaborated with the Baghdad

908 Comment by the drafters of this report, Cedoca/Belgium
909 Telegraph (The), Isil attacks villages south of Kirkuk as Iraqi and Kurdish forces are distracted fighting each other,

19 October 2017, url.
910 Rudaw, ISIS sleeper cells awaken in Kirkuk. 2 February 2018, url.
911 Rudaw, Fearing ISIS, Kurds abandon homes in southern Kirkuk, 26 March 2018, url.
912 NewsRep, A growing number of villages in Kirkuk, Iraq are being evacuated, 30 July 2018, url.
913 Rudaw, ISIS threats force Kurds to evacuate village near Khanaqin, 25 July 2018, url.
914 Denmark, DIS/Norway, Landinfo, Northern Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced
persons (IDPs) in the disputed areas, incl. possibility to enter and access the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KR-I), 5
November 2018, url, p. 22.

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government, they all risked to be assassinated or abducted by ISIL.915 Defectors or challengers
to ISIL central authority were eliminated, including local leaders, activists, and religious
scholars.916
When ISIL took over control of large parts of Iraq in 2014, it started immediately with thetargeting of a broad array of possible opponents to their new rule, accused of committing
gross human rights violations including crimes against humanity.917 ISIL attacks were carriedout to systematically target civilians and civilians’ infrastructure with the intention to kill andwound as many civilians as possible. Targeting campaigns included operations targeting Iraqi
security forces personnel and infrastructure. Additionally, civilian targets have included:‘markets, restaurants, shops, cafés, playgrounds, schools, places of worship and otherpublic spaces where civilians gather in large numbers. ISIL and associated armed
groups have also continued to target systematically civilians using a range ofimprovised explosive device (IEDs), and to perpetrate targeted assassinations(community, political, and religious leaders, government employees, education
professionals, health workers, etc.), sexual assault, rape and other forms of sexual
violence against women and girls, forced recruitment of children, kidnappings,
executions, robberies, attacks on installations with the potential of unleashing
dangerous forces, and the wanton destruction or plundering of places of worship orof cultural or historical significance.’918
Sources monitoring the human rights situation in Iraq (e.g. UNAMI, Human Rights Watch orAmnesty International, etc) have reported frequent examples of targeting the following
profiles listed in the headings below.

2.3.1 (Former) members of the Iraqi security forces, PMU, and Peshmerga
After taking control over a town or an area in, ISIL started with the targeting of members of
the ISF and police or those associating with them. Whoever did not ‘repent’ or swear
allegiance to ISIL and its Caliph, had to face judgment in a court and punishment (including a
possible execution). ISIL even issued ‘certificates of repentance’, and people associated withthe government were asked to show this proof when captured or at checkpoints. ISIL publicly
posted ‘wanted’ lists with the names of current and former ISF members or those associatedwith the government who refused to repent or recanted.919
The most widely known example of a mass execution is the Camp Speicher incident mentioned
in the section on religious targeting, but there were numerous other cases, when groups of
captured members of ISF, PMU or the Peshmerga were summarily executed. These mass
killings happened in 2014 and throughout the military campaign against ISIL in 2017. During
the campaign of the ISF to regain control over Mosul, numerous former members of ISF andthe police were abducted, tortured, held in captivity as hostages or out of fear of later

915 Lewis, J.D., Al-Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent, The Breaking the Walls Campaign, Part I, Middle East Security Report

14, September 2013, url, p. 21; Soufan Group (The), The Islamic State, November 2014, url, pp. 20, 31.
916 Soufan Group (The), The Islamic State, November 2014, url, p. 31.
917 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Non International Armed Conflict in Iraq: 5 June –5 July 2014, 18 July 2014, url, p. 9.
918 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Non International Armed Conflict in Iraq: 5 June –5 July 2014, 18 July 2014, url, p. 9.
919 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 6 July – 10 September 2014, 02
October 2014, url, p. 6.

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retaliation, or to punish or kill them for their former official functions with the ISF. These
abductions started on the first day of the offensive to retake Mosul (17 October 2016). UNAMI
received reports that many of these abducted former ISF and police members were
subsequently killed by ISIL.920
According to a July 2018 UN Security Council report ‘mass graves continued to be discoveredin areas previously under ISIL control. On 2 April 2018, a mass grave containing 51 bodies of
Iraqi security forces personnel was discovered in Mosul. On 6 April 2018, a mass grave
containing 22 bodies of former security personnel and Independent High Electoral
Commission employees was also discovered in Mosul. Both mass graves reportedly contain
ISIL victims.’921
After the collapse of the Islamic State as a territorial entity, ISIL continued to target membersof the ISF outside of combat situations. According to DIS/Landinfo, ‘for the purpose of creating
chaos in the Iraqi society other actors such as civilians or people collaborating with the security
actors or the authorities can also be targets for ISIS’ who are accidentally or deliberately
targeted as civilians, but ISIL ‘tries to disguise it as an attack against PMU members’.
DIS/Landinfo remarked that for ISIL, ‘the line between civilians and security actors is often
blurry’. The primary targets for ISIL are the security forces, the PMU and ‘to some extent,
government officials’.922 Examples of ISIL targeting of security personnel include:
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On 1 February 2018 ISIL assassinated a former ISF general south-west of Kirkuk.923
On 19 February 2018 ISIL militants ambushed a convoy of PMU fighters near Kirkuk,
killing at least 27 of them.924
On 4 March 2018, a police officer was assassinated in Tuz Khurmatu. The FirstLieutenant from the Rapid Response Force was shot by unknown gunmen.925
On 24 March 2018 ISIL killed eight security force members between Baghdad andKirkuk.926
On 9 April 2018 ISIL has claimed a ‘commando attack’ on Sunni militiamen in al-Anbar
that left two people killed and six injured.927
In April 2018 ISIL claimed responsibility for the bombing at Asdeira village in Shirqat
town, north of Tirkrit that killed 17 personnel of al-Hashd al-Shaabi (Popular
Mobilization Units) and injured 30 others.928
In May 2018, several policemen were kidnapped In Diyala Governorate by insurgentsbelieved to be members of ISIL.929
On 2 May 2018 ISIL claimed responsibility for a gun attack near the town of Tarmiya,
Salah al-Din Governorate, which killed eight unarmed civilians according to security

920 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the context of the Ninewa Operations and the retakingof Mosul City, 17 October 2016 – 10 July 2017, 2 November 2017, url, pp. 11-12.
921 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2367 (2017); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2018/677],
9 July 2018, url, p. 10.
922 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, pp. 21-22.
923 Iraqi News, Former Iraqi military general assassinated by Islamic State in Kirkuk, 1 February 2018, url.
924 Reuters, Islamic State kills 27 Iraqi militiamen near Kirkuk, 19 February 2018, url.
925 Iraqi News, Police officer assassinated by unknown gunmen in Iraq’s Tuz Khurmatu, 4 March 2018, url.
926 Iraqi News, Federal Police mourns eight personnel killed by Islamic State between Kirkuk, Baghdad, 24 March
2018, url.
927 BBC Monitoring, IS claims second 'commando' attack in western Iraq in 24 hours, 9 April 2018, url.
928 Iraqi News, Islamic State claims responsibility killing, injuring tens of people in blasts, north of Salahuddin, 13
April 2018, url.
929 Wing, J., Security In Iraq Largely Unchanged In May 2018, Musings on Iraq [Blog], 2 June 2018, url.

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sources. ISIL claimed that it killed 22 people, describing them all as members of theSunni Tribal Mobilization Forces.930
On 22 August 2018 a suicide attack in the village of Asdira, Salah al-Din Governorate,
killed six Sunni militiamen that were members of the Tribal Mobilization Forces.
Although no group claimed responsibility ISIL militants are known to operate in thearea.931
On 29 August 2018 a suicide car-bomb attack on a security checkpoint in Qaim
district, Al Anbar Governorate, which was jointly manned by the army and Shi’ite
militias killed five militiamen and three civilians and wounded 12 others. Islamic State
claimed responsibility for the attack and said it killed 28 people, contradicting theofficial death tolls.932
On 11 September 2018 ISIL claimed responsibility for a suicide attack outside a
hospital in the western Iraqi province of Anbar where it targeted a gathering Iraqi
soldiers and members of Sunni militias. One person was killed and four other were
injured.933
On 2 November 2018, two members of the Peshmerga were abducted in northwestern Kirkuk Governorate and found killed the following day.934
In the second week of November 2018, a major attack occurred in where ISIL gunmen
dressed in military uniforms entered the home of a local sheikh/tribal PMU leader
and executed 19 people.935

2.3.2 (Former) members of the local police forces and (former) members of the
Sahwa forces
UNAMI explained that the Sahwa refers to the National Council for the Salvation of Iraq, also
known as the Sunni Salvation movement, National Council for the Awakening of Iraq, theSunni Awakening movement, or the Sons of Iraq. These groups were coalitions of ‘tribal
leaders and Sheikhs that were founded in 2005 and united to maintain security of theircommunities from al-Qa’eda associated groups’.936 Sahwa forces linked to tribes in Anbar,
Ninewa, Salah al-Din and Diyala were supported and locally trained Sunni forces supported by
the US in their fight against Al Qaeda, and they were largely successful. However, they were
not subsequently integrated into the ISF under pro-Shia PM al Maliki, as had been hoped by
Sahwa leaders; Maliki stopped paying and appointing the Sahwa in favour of Shia for security
posts. According to GPPi, in the al-Maliki era prior to ISIL, Sunni tribal leaders who had beenpart of the Sahwa ‘were directly targeted by the remnants of al-Qaeda and the forerunners of
ISIL’. Later on in 2014 in the fight against ISIL, a US-backed tribal forces mobilization program(TMF) was created based on the Sunni ‘awakening’ (Sahwa) model, though it was only
authorised in Anbar and Ninewa, not Salah al-Din (those fighters mobilised under PMU orother tribal militia formations). TMF forces fell under the PMU officially as ‘Iraqi government
program’.937

930 Reuters, Islamic State claims responsibility for gun attack north of Baghdad, 2 May 2018, url.
931 Reuters, Suicide attack kills six Sunni fighters in northern Iraq: police, 22 August 2018, url.
932 Reuters, Eight killed in car-bomb attack at Iraqi checkpoint, 29 August 2018, url.
933 BBC Monitoring, IS claims suicide bombing outside hospital in western Iraq, 11 September 2018, url.
934 Bas News, Abducted Peshmerga Found Dead in Kirkuk, 3 November 2018, url.
935 Iraq Oil Report, Islamic State incursions highlight Iraq’s counter-insurgency challenges, 15 November 2018, url;Wing, J., Security In Iraq Nov 8-14, 2018, Musings on Iraq [Blog], 16 November 2018, url.
936 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014 - 30 April
2015, 13 July 2015, url, p. 11.
937 Gaston, E., Sunni Tribal Forces, GPPi, 30 August 2017, url.

122 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALSExamples of ISIL targeting of local police and Sahwa forces are provided below:
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












On 11 June 2014, 17 civilians who worked for the police were executed close to Mosul
airport.938
Also on 11 June 2014, ISIL executed 30 captured policemen in Tikrit, Salah al-Din, infront of civilians.939
On 25 July 2014, the bodies of 18 police officers were found in Abbasiyah, south of
Tikrit. They were reportedly executed after being forced to ‘repent’.940
The targeting by ISIL included also the relatives of police officers: On 12
September 2014, a police officer and ten of his relatives were killed by ISIL in alJumasah village in Shirqat district, Salah al-Din.941
On 11 November 2014, ISIL abducted a police officer in Falluja, and executed him twodays later. ISIL hung his body to a bridge.942
On 19 December 2014, ISIL blew up a house of a tribal leader, a former Sahwa
member in the al-Zab area in Kirkuk. During the same period, another home of a
Sahwa member was destroyed using explosives in Rashad district, Kirkuk
Governorate. On 29 April, a collective grave was found in al-Hajeer area of Jurf alSakhr (Jurf al-Nasr) district; it contained six Sahwa members killed by ISIL. Sahwa
members were also abducted in January 2015 in different places in Salah al-Din
Governorate.943
On 27 June 2015, ISIL executed 11 former police officers (all were members of the alJubur tribe) from a village in Hamam al-Aleel district, south of Mosul, Ninewa. They
had been abducted by ISIL in May 2015. The families received written notification of
the killings.944
On 4 October 2015, 70 members of the Albu Nimr tribe from the al-Tharthar area,
north of Ramadi, Anbar, were abducted and killed. According to a tribal leader, allthose killed were relatives of men that had joined ISF and Sahwa groups to fightagainst ISIL.945
On 23 October 2016, ISIL killed 50 former Iraqi police officers in Hamam al-Alil. The
victims had been abducted from other villages in the region.946
A policeman was killed and another injured in a suicide attack against a police stationin Amiryat al-Falluja on 27 July 2017.947
On 25 March 2018 ISIL ambushed and killed eight police officers on the BaghdadKirkuk highway.948

938 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Non International Armed Conflict in Iraq: 5 June –5 July 2014, 18 July 2014, url, p. 9.
939 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Non International Armed Conflict in Iraq: 5 June –5 July 2014, 18 July 2014, url, p. 10.
940 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 6 July – 10 September 2014, 2
October 2014, url, p. 6 .
941 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 September – 10 December
2014, 23 February 2015, url, p. 7.
942 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 September – 10 December
2014, 23 February 2015, url, p. 8.
943 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014 - 30 April
2015, 13 July 2015, url, pp. 11, 15, 17, 34.
944 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 May – 31 October 2015,
11 January 2016, url, p. 10.
945 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 May – 31 October 2015,
11 January 2016, url, p. 10.
946 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2016, 30 August 2017, url, p. 9.
947 Iraqi News, Policeman killed, police station chief injured in suicide attack south of Fallujah, 27 July 2017, url.
948 Albawaba News, ISIS Ambush Attack Kills 8 Police Officers in Iraq, 25 March 2018, url.

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On 21 May 2018, one policeman was killed and three were injured by an IED in AlQa’im district in western Anbar, near the Syrian border.949
On 30 June 2018, a policeman was killed by an ISIL sniper in the town of Abu Sayda,
Diyala Governorate.950

2.3.3 Tribal leaders known to support the government, or who supported thegovernment against AQ-I in the past
In a 2015 article for the Military Review, the Journal of the U.S. Army, Daveed GartensteinRoss and Sterling Jensen noted that many Sunni tribes in ISIL territory became internallydivided. While some members aligned with ISIL others remained neutral or allied with the
Iraqi government. ISIL sought to accentuate and capitalise on intra-tribal generational
conflicts by promising the tribes’ younger generations advancement in the tribal hierarchy.951
Reporting for the Carnegie Middle East Center in November 2014 Frederic Wehrey and Ala’
Alrababa’h note that ISIL ‘resorted to both carrots and sticks to ensure the tribal support itneeded to effectively control the areas it held’.952 For example, in several provinces (wilayat)
under ISIL control, the group appointed ‘tribal affairs’ officials who coordinated with local
leaders to collect taxes and ensure that people abide by its religious rules. Younger tribal
members were promised a greater share of power over the territories their tribes controlled.
Despite this soft-power approach ISIL also deployed intense violence to coerce and intimidate
the tribes.953
In a September 2015 report, anthropologist Hosham Dawod names a number of Sunni tribal
confederations opposing ISIL: ‘Al-Bu Nimr, Al-Bu Fahd, Al-Bu Alwan, Al-Bu Daraj, Jubur, ‘Ubaid,
etc.’; ISIL targeted hundreds of men from these tribes for beheading.954
Tribal leaders who refused to pledge allegiance to ISIL, were put on the kill-list of theorganisation. In summer 2014, ISIL had issued a statement listing 19 of those tribal leaders.955
Tribal leaders risked abduction or assassination if they opposed ISIL.956 Relatives of tribal
leaders were equally targeted.957 Tribal leaders who accused of being members in the alHashd al-Watani (National Gathering), a predominantly Sunni resistance movement against
ISIL, were also targeted: in February 2015, ISIL abducted 26 Sunni Arab tribal leaders fromdifferent places south of Mosul under accusation of membership of the Al-Hashd al-Watani.958

949 Iraqi News, Four Iraqi policemen killed, injured in bomb blast near Syrian borders, 21 May 2018, url.
950 Iraqi News, Policeman killed by Islamic State sniper in Diyala, 30 June 2018, url.
951 Garterstein-Ross, D. and Jensen, S., The role of Iraqi tribes after the Islamic State’s ascendance, July 2015, url,

pp. 107-108.
952 Wehrey, F. and Alrababa’h, A., An elusive courtship: The struggle for Iraq’s Sunni tribes, Carnegie Middle East
Center, 7 November 2014, url.
953 Wehrey, F. and Alrababa’h, A., An elusive courtship: The struggle for Iraq’s Sunni tribes, Carnegie Middle East
Center, 7 November 2014, url.
954 Dawod, H., The Sunni tribes in Iraq, September 2015, url, p. 4.
955 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 6 July – 10 September 2014, 02
October 2014, url, p. 8.
956 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 6 July – 10 September 2014, 02
October 2014, url, p. 8.
957 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 6 July – 10 September 2014, 02
October 2014, url, p. 9; UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the context of the Ninewa
Operations and the retaking of Mosul City, 17 October 2016 – 10 July 2017, 2 November 2017, url, p. 12.
958 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014 - 30 April
2015, 13 July 2015, url, p. 15.

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On 2 or 3 November 2016, ISIL allegedly abducted about 30 tribal leaders in Sinjar district, 18of them were executed at an unknown place. According to UNAMI ‘ISIL was reportedly warythat the victims would fight the group’ when ISF started operations to reclaim the territory.959
Tribal leaders who are opposed to ISIL continue to be targeted, as pointed out in a security
analysis of Ninewa by Julie Ahn, Maeve Campbell and Pete Knoetgen, commissioned for the
US Department of State, published in May 2018:‘The province has also begun to witness a rise in “quality attacks”—those which
accurately target ISF and anti-ISIS political leaders. In February and March 2018, ISIS
accelerated its attempts to assassinate and kidnap tribal sheikhs from the Jabour
tribe, one of the most prominent sources of local resistance to ISIS. An attack
conducted on March 12, during which ISIS militants stormed the home of a tribal
sheikh near Qayyara, killing him and six other guests, serves as a good example ofsuch incidents. These attacks are indicative of an insurgency increasingly capable ofconducting refined targeting and pattern of life analysis. Specifically targeted attacks,
rather than those that simply killed civilians, were the type of violence most
responsible for demoralizing the ISF and intimidating ISIS opposition during previous
insurgent periods.’960
Derek Henry Flood noted in his article in CTC Sentinel from September 2018 that ISIL regularly
attacked pro-Baghdad Sunni Arab tribal militias in Kirkuk, Diyala and Salah al-Din.961
A 2018 article by the Independent reported that members of the ‘pro-government Sunni tribe’
Albu Nimr in Hit (Anbar) claim that ISIL had killed 864 members of their tribe, and that there
remains significant intercommunal tensions and divisions regarding those families who did
and did not support ISIL there; some members of the Albu Nimr tribe said they were notworried about a renewed ISIL counteroffensive in Anbar, while others said that people with
ISIL members in their families were returning to the area and worries about local support for
ISIL returning.962 In the first half of 2018, ISIL reportedly killed an average of three and a half
mukhtars (village heads) each week, according to Michael Knights.963

2.3.4 Local and national politicians, candidates in local or regional elections, council
members who opposed to ISIL or AQ-I
Candidates for elections, parliamentarians, local council members and (former) employees of
the Independent Central Election Commission (IHEC) were ‘frequently targeted’ and became
victims of abduction, torture or execution by ISIL, most often in Ninewa.964 A few examples:

959 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the context of the Ninewa Operations and the retakingof Mosul City, 17 October 2016 – 10 July 2017, 2 November 2017, url, p. 12.
960 Ahn, J. et.al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa: Preventing an ISIS Resurgence in Northern Iraq. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard University, 7 May 2018, url, p. 3.
961 Flood, D.H., From Caliphate to Caves: The Islamic State’s Asymmetric War in Northern Iraq, September 2018,
url.
962 Independent (The), For this Iraqi tribe massacred by Isis, fear of the group's return is a constant reality, 4 July
2018, url.
963 Atlantic (The), ISIS Never Went Away in Iraq, 31 August 2018, url.
964 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 May – 31 October 2015,
11 January 2016, url, p. 32.

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On 4 September 2014, ISIL executed a general election candidate with his twobrothers. The public execution took place in a village about 40 km south of Mosul.965
On 23 November 2014 two former female parliamentary candidates were publicly
executed in Mosul following death sentences by an ISIL court. The women had
reportedly ‘repented’, but they were nevertheless killed.966
In the period from June to August 2015, ISIL executed nine former candidates forelections in the Mosul area in four separate incidents, and on 25 July 2015, 28 of 50
abducted employees and former employees of the Independent Election Commission(IHEC) were executed in a military base south of Mosul.967
On 8 August 2015, 300 civil servants employed by IHEC in Mosul were executed bygunfire at a military base in Mosul.968
And on 21 August 2015, 12 former IHEC employees who had been abducted three
weeks earlier were killed by ISIL.969
In May 2018, an election candidate was assassinated a few days ahead of the vote in
Qayyarah, 70 kilometres south from Mosul.970
Between 1 January and 18 August 2018, ISIL targeted local mayors, accusing them ofproviding information on their movements. Seven mayors were killed and two others
were wounded in Ninewa Governorate during this period. On 15 August, an armed
group shot and killed the mayor of the Tall al-Rumman neighbourhood in western
Mosul. Similarly, on 17 August, two masked gunmen on a motorbike shot and killed
the mayor of the Yarmuk neighbourhood in western Mosul.971

2.3.5 Other profiles targeted by ISIL
In the reports issued by UNAMI and OHCHR, among others, profiles targeted by ISIL haveincluded human rights activists, lawyers, teachers, doctors and other professionals targeted
for their activities, their connections with the Iraqi authorities, their perceived refusal to treat
wounded ISIL fighters or their opposition ISIL. Examples are given below:
Female doctors were considerably hindered in performing their duties by ISIL. Whensome female doctors went on strike in Mosul during the early period of ISIL
occupation, one of them was killed on 13 August 2014 for having participated or evenorganised the strike.972

965 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 6 July – 10 September 2014, 02

October 2014, url, p. 7.
966 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 September – 10 December
2014, 23 February 2015, url, p. 10.
967 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 May – 31 October 2015,
11 January 2016, url, p. 6.
968 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 May – 31 October 2015,
11 January 2016, url, p. 9.
969 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 May – 31 October 2015,
11 January 2016, url, p. 9.
970 National (The), ISIS claims assassination of Iraq election candidate, May 2018, url.
971 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2421 (2018) Report of the Secretary-General [S/2018/975],
31 October 2018, url, p. 10.
972 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 6 July – 10 September 2014, 02
October 2014, url, p. 10.

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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALSOn 22 September 2014, a well-known female lawyer and human rights activist was
publicly executed in Mosul. ISIL accused her of apostasy because she had denounced
the destruction of historical Muslim shrines on her Facebook-account.973
On 14 December 2014, ISIL killed a lawyer in Hawija who was also a candidate in the
April 2014 general election.974
On 29 December 2014, four doctors were executed in Mosul. According to local
media, two of them for refusing to treat wounded ISIL fighters.975
On 18 February 2015, a journalist who worked as a correspondent for Sama al-Mosul
TV channel owned by the Governor of Ninewa was executed in al-Ghizlani militarycamp in Mosul, after being sentenced to death by an ISIL court.976
UNAMI received a number of reports of teachers targeted by ISIL for refusing tosubmit to the rules on teaching or the curriculum imposed by ISIL. In January 2015,
four teachers were abducted in Mosul, and on 30 March 2015, a primary school
teacher was executed for being critical of the group in Tal Afar.977
On 26 April 2015, a journalist was killed in central Mosul. He was abducted three
weeks earlier for using his mobile phone.978
On 25 September 2015, ISIL executed two female lawyers in Mosul. The victims were
killed for violating the Sharia regulations by practicing law in the criminal court.979
On 15 January 2016, three female teachers were killed north of Mosul. They wereaccused of providing information to the ISF and were burnt to death.980

In its report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict for the period of 11 September– 10 December 2014, UNAMI expressed growing concern about a pattern of deliberate attacks
on doctors and other professionals who are seen by ISIL to be opposing their authority or
legitimacy.981
UNAMI noted that, as ISIL lost control of territory in Mosul and the surrounding parts ofNinewa, it shifted away from executing of persons suspected to oppose ISIL doctrines orcontrol towards the deliberate killing of civilians who were attempting to flee their remaining
areas.982

973 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 September – 10 December

2014, 23 February 2015, url, p. 10.
974 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014 - 30 April
2015, 13 July 2015, url, p. 11.
975 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014 - 30 April
2015, 13 July 2015, url, p. 11.
976 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014 - 30 April
2015, 13 July 2015, url, p. 13.
977 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014 - 30 April
2015, 13 July 2015, url, p. 24.
978 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014 - 30 April
2015, 13 July 2015, url, p. 11.
979 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 May – 31 October 2015,
11 January 2016, url, p. 10.
980 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 11.
981 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 September – 10 December
2014, 23 February 2015, url, p. 10.
982 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – January to June 2017, 14 December 2017, url, p. 2.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 127

3. Targeting by society
As previously noted, profiles included below may also be targeted by other actors or armed
groups described in other sections of this report for various motives. Information has been
included where possible.983

3.1 Key actors
3.1.1 Society, family/community and tribes
The majority of Iraqis identify by tribe and these identities play a strong social role in society
and as a safety net.984 Iraqi society is heavily influenced by tribal, family-based and clan-based
connections, most prominently in Sunni areas of Anbar, Salah al-Din, Kirkuk, and Ninewa, as
well as the south, in Basrah.985 Tribal culture and the lack of state capacity permitted tribal
customs to hold a strong role in dispute resolution in Iraq, as well as turning to militia andreligious authorities to carry out justice, whereby tribal justice for transgressing norms can beparticularly harsh for women.986 Tribes are often armed with heavy weapons and are often
involved in conflicts in Iraqi society relating to seeking retribution or compensation fortransgression of tribal codes, which can result in cycles of killings between tribes.987 Tribes
have also become entangled as actors in the ISIL conflict.988
In Iraqi society, customary and tribal laws and notions of ‘honour’ and the position of womenin Iraq as possessions of the family mean that women are unequal under the law and ‘under
the control of males in the household’.989 Transgressions of family honour linked to culturalbeliefs about women’s virginity or purity has caused families and tribe to carry out honourbased violence against family members, usually females.990 Perpetrators are frequently male
relatives or family members, who carry out honour killings for a range of ‘crimes’ from sexual
relations outside marriage, to inappropriate appearances or unacceptable contact with males
outside the family, among others.991 Domestic abuse, forced and underage marriages, socalled ‘honour’ crimes, and female genital mutilation (FGM) are forms of violence against
women that are primarily perpetrated by family members992 or due to tribal custom.993
Transgressing social norms has also led to killings of women with public profiles that have also
been carried out in 2018 by unknown armed actors.994

983 Comment by the drafters of this report, Cedoca/Belgium
984 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)

in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 48.
985 Gharizi, O. and Al-Ibrahimi, H., Baghdad Must Seize the Change to Work with Iraq’s Tribes, 17 January 2018, url.
986 Australia, DFAT Country Information Report Iraq, 9 October 2018, url, p. 28.
987 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)
in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 48.
988 AFP, Tribal Justice Awaits Returning Iraqis who Joined Daesh, 14 November 2017, url.
989 HuffPost, Kurdish Teenager’s “Honor Killing” Fades to Memory as Iraq Violence Swells, 6 December 2017, url.
990 MRG, The Lost Women of Iraq: Family-based violence during armed conflict, 15 November 2015, url, p. 26; NRT,
Brutal Murder in Najaf Highlights Endemic Violence Against Women in Iraq, 5 August 2018, url; Huffpost, Kurdish
Teenager’s “Honor Killing” Fades to Memory as Iraq Violence Swells, 6 December 2017, url; Denmark, DIS, Norway,
Landinfo, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Women and men in honour-related conflicts, 9 November 2018, url, p. 9.
991 Huffpost, Kurdish Teenager’s “Honor Killing” Fades to Memory as Iraq Violence Swells, 6 December 2017, url.
992 MRG, The Lost Women of Iraq: Family-based violence during armed conflict, 15 November 2015, url, p. 5.
993 MRG, The Lost Women of Iraq: Family-based violence during armed conflict, 15 November 2015, url, p. 20.
994 DW, Killings of high-profile women in Iraq spark outrage, 2 October 2018, url.

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Tribes have been involved in carrying out retribution against ISIL-suspected families outside
formal justice.995 The October 2017 UN Security Council reports on human rights abuses by
ISIL, abuses committed in the aftermath of the liberation of Mosul, cases of abductions ofdisplaced persons in Salah al-Din Governorate and tribal-based extrajudicial punitive
measures against families alleged to have relatives affiliated with or members of ISIL.996

3.1.2 Criminals, traffickers, and unknown perpetrators
A range of armed actors are involved in criminality in Iraq. ISIL has relied extensively on
criminality to fund its activities, and also recruited members of criminal groups to its ranks.
ISIL amassing of wealth from extortion and taxation, as well as looting, property confiscation,and petty criminality, smuggling, kidnapping, robbery, trafficking, levying fines, and selling oilon the black market, for example, allowed it to ‘become one of the wealthiest insurgent
groups in history’ at its height in 2015, and which could permit it to resurge.997 ISIL also forced
hundreds of women into marriages, sexual assaults, and slavery.998 With the military defeatof ISIL, organised and street-level crime ‘appears to have increased’ and ‘kidnapping forpolitical and monetary gain’ were common in Iraq, mainly by ISIL and Shia militias, according
to OSAC.999
Criminal networks and some militia groups, operated with ‘relative impunity’ according to the
USDOS.1000 Criminal networks were reportedly to be involved in sex trafficking of Iraqi womenand children, while criminal gangs have also exploited children for drug trafficking and dealing
purposes and migrants for forced labour.1001 Refugees and IDPs were also targeted bytraffickers.1002 Alleged official complicity occurred in recruitment of child soldiers and sex
trafficking, according to USDOS.1003 Corruption is also described as ‘rampant’1004, existing at
all levels with ‘organised corruption syndicates’ protected or involved with those in power1005
and government decisions strongly influenced by bribery, nepotism, tribal, political influence,family and religious considerations.1006 According to a source cited by the news agency AFP,‘”armed groups, tribes, criminal gangs ... all control positions” within the state and security
forces.’1007
PMUs were reportedly engaged in criminal activities and abuses against civilians.1008 Norman
Cigar notes that ‘in many areas the departure of army and police units to the front created asecurity vacuum that was exploited by criminal elements that engaged in kidnappings,
extortion and robberies. Often, the perpetrators claimed to belong to one of the militias.’
AAH’s leader, Qais al-Khazali, however, acknowledged that some criminals joined the militias

995 AFP, Tribal Justice Awaits Returning Iraqis who Joined Daesh, 14 November 2017, url.
996 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 2367 (2017), 19 October 2017, url,

pp. 9-11.
997 RAND, An Overview of Current Trends in Terrorism and Illicit Finance – Lessons from the Islamic State in Iraq
and Syria and Other Emerging Threats, 7 September 2018, url, pp. 1, 4, 5.
998 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2018 Country Report — Iraq, 2018, url, p. 13.
999 OSAC, Iraq 2018 Crime & Safety Report: Baghdad, 12 February 2018, url.
1000 USDOS, 2017 Report on International Religious Freedom - Iraq, 29 May 2018, url.
1001 USDOS, Trafficking in Persons Report 2018 - Country Narratives - Iraq, 28 June 2018, url
1002 USDOS, Trafficking in Persons Report 2018 - Country Narratives - Iraq, 28 June 2018, url
1003 USDOS, Trafficking in Persons Report 2018 - Country Narratives - Iraq, 28 June 2018, url
1004 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2018 Country Report — Iraq, 2018, url, pp. 12, 13, 24.
1005 Guardian (The), Post-war Iraq: Everybody is corrupt from top to bottom. Including me, 19 February 2016, url.
1006 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Iraq, 20 April 2018, url
1007 DW, Killings of high-profile women in Iraq spark outrage, 2 October 2018, url
1008 Australia, DFAT Country Information Report Iraq, 9 October 2018, url, p. 10.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 129

as a cover for their illegal activities.1009 In a 2016 report Michael Knights also indicated thatthe increase in criminal activity in Baghdad and the southern provinces was caused bycriminals claiming to be PMUs.1010 An Iraqi consultant Landinfo and Lifos met in Amman in
February 2017 indicated that militia were directly involved in the wave of criminally motivatedkidnappings1011, witnessed in Iraq since 2014.1012 This consultant further stated that militias in
Baghdad are ‘untouchable’ and collaborate with criminal elements.1013 According to the
Washington Post militias ‘operate as mafia-style organizations that engage in criminal
activities, extortion and human rights abuses’.1014
There can be intense rivalries between militias. In the past these differences often led toarmed clashes.1015 ‘The imminent threat ISIS posed induced cooperation among the Shia
militias’, Norman Cigar elaborates. For example, even Muqtada al-Sadr and Qais al-Khazaliannounced they would be cooperating, despite their past enmity, which had included armed
clashes between Sadr’s followers and AAH members as late as 2013. Nevertheless,‘competition remains just below the surface and small-scale incidents suggest ongoing
tensions.’1016 The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) of the Australian
government observes that violence between opposing Shia militias is more pronounced in
Shia areas (such as Baghdad and the south). These conflicts are sometimes linked to criminal
activities, including robberies and kidnappings.1017
Criminal gangs in Basrah have exploited the security gap and there has been a rise inrobberies, kidnapping, murder, and drug trafficking while the ISF struggles to keep security
among competing armed groups.1018 The United States Overseas Security Advisory Council
noted in its Iraq 2018 Crime and Safety report OSAC that ‘[k]idnapping is common throughout
the Basrah consular district and remains at significantly high levels. Kidnapping for ransom is
a common means of monetary gain. Kidnapping for intimidation (to include kidnapping
intended to send a "political" message) is also common in Basrah. RSO Basrah assesses thatmost kidnappings are criminal rather than political and reflect the deteriorating economic
situation.’1019
UNAMI has documented a large number of human rights abuses, violations and attacks
against civilians committed by unidentified perpetrators in reporting on the situation ofhuman rights in Iraq.1020 Many examples are provided in chapters Targeting by state actors
and affiliated armed groups and Targeting by ISIL.

1009 Cigar, N., Iraq’s shia warlords and their militias, June 2015, url, p. 34.
1010 Knights, M., The future of Iraq’s armed forces, March 2016, url, p. 32.
1011 Middle East Eye, Kidnappings greater threat to Baghdad than Islami State: top official, 2 December 2014 , url.
1012 Norway, Landinfo, Irak: Situasjonen for sunnimuslimer i Bagdad [Situation of Sunni Muslims in Baghdad], url,

p. 14.
1013 Norway, Landinfo, Irak: Militser i Bagdad [Militias in Baghdad], url, p. 2.
1014 Washington Post (The), What Iraq’s election means for its Shiite militias, 12 May 2018, url.
1015 Cigar, N., Iraq’s shia warlords and their militias, June 2015, url, p. 14.
1016 Cigar, N., Iraq’s shia warlords and their militias, June 2015, url, p. 64.
1017 Australia, DFAT Country Information Report Iraq, 9 October 2018, url, p. 16.
1018 OSAC, Iraq 2018 Crime & Safety Report: Basrah, 20 March 2018, url.
1019 OSAC, Iraq 2018 Crime & Safety Report: Basrah, 20 March 2018, url.
1020 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014 - 30 April
2015, 13 July 2015, url, pp. ii, 26, 27, 30; UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2016,
30 August 2017, url, pp. xviii, 3, 4, 16.

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3.2 Treatment of people perceived to transgress Islam
3.2.1 Atheists
The Constitution establishes Islam as the state religion and guarantees religious freedom forcertain groups, but does not explicitly protect atheists.1021 Under the Iraqi Penal Code of 1969,
Section Two deals with ‘Offences that violate religious sensibilities’. Article 372 of the Codestates that:‘The following persons are punishable by a period of detention not exceeding 3 years
or by a fine not exceeding 300 dinars:(1) Any person who attacks the creed of a religious minority or pours scorn on its
religious practices.
(2) Any person who willfully disrupts a religious ceremony, festival or meeting of areligious minority or who willfully prevents or obstructs the performance of suchritual.
(3) Any person who wrecks, destroys, defaces or desecrates a building set aside forthe ceremonies of a religious minority or symbol or anything that is sacred to it.
(4) Any person who prints or publishes a book sacred to a religious minority anddeliberately misspells the texts so that the meaning of the text is altered or who
makes light of its tenets or teachings.
(5) Any person who publicly insults a symbol or a person who constitutes an object ofsanctification, worship or reverence to a religious minority.
(6) Any person who publicly imitates a religious ceremony or celebration with intent
to deceive.’1022
Political and legal analyst Ali Jaber al-Tamimi informed Al-Monitor ‘there aren’t any articles in
the Iraqi Penal Code that provide for a direct punishment for atheism, nor are there any
special laws on punishments against atheists.’ However, ‘there are articles that punish thedesecration of religions.’1023 An article on growing atheism in the Muslim world, published by
the Washington Times in August 2017, noted that atheism is not illegal in Iraq; however state
actors equate atheism with blasphemy.1024
In a July 2018 article, the Atlantic noted the rise of secularism amongst Iraq’s youth.
Bookstores, cafés and Facebook provide fora where secular ideas are discussed. The article
makes note of Facebook groups numbering thousands of members.1025 An article by AlMonitor, dated 1 April 2018, stated that defining ‘atheism’ in Iraq is complex due tomisconceptions about the concept. Many clerics, close to Islamic political parties, often brandsecularism as atheism. Other religious figures call for resistance against liberal and communist
opinions, which are denounced as inherently anti-religious and denying the existence of god.
According to the same article, the ‘campaign against atheism has heavy political ties’ to Islamic

1021 USDOS, 2017 Report on International Religious Freedom - Iraq, 29 May 2018, url.
1022 Iraq, Penal Code No. 111 of 1969, July 1969: url
1023 Al-Monitor, Iraqi courts seeking out atheists for prosecution, 1 April 2018, url.
1024 Washington Times (The), Atheists in Muslim world: Silent, resentful and growing in number, 1 August 2017,url.
1025 Atlantic (The), The rise of Iraq’s young secularists, 5 July 2018, url.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 131

parties ruling Iraq since 2003.1026 An article published by PRI on 17 January 2018 informed
that, while atheism is rare in Iraq, the number of atheists is growing.1027
Another article by Al-Monitor, published in March 2014, mentions that while atheism has
deep historical roots in Iraq (dating to the 9th century), it a new in its ‘widespread andcomprehensive spread through all societal and age classes’. While it used to be an ‘elitist
phenomenon’ restricted to intellectuals and scholars, it is ‘all-encompassing’ and continues toincrease in scope. The article states that one of the possible reasons for this might be thereligious extremism and sectarianism that has dominated society for the past two decades in
the context of ongoing conflict.1028
In an EASO meeting report (25-26 April 2017) on Iraq, Mark Lattimer, director of the Ceasefire
Centre for Civilian Rights, stated that:‘Young people in Iraq are coming under many different influences and there are manyolder Iraqis who are not religious. I think as the country becomes more and moresectarian it is easy to assume everyone is becoming more religious, but this is notnecessarily the case. There is a strong strain of communism in Iraq associated with asecularist outlook and that is still quite strong among Iraqi civil society. You havevarying degrees of religious adherence, but that doesn’t mean it is easy to identify as
an atheist and it is rare that you would do that publicly. Sometimes people will say
they are Muslim but privately are atheist.’1029
According to an academic interviewed by the DIS/Landinfo during their 2018 mission to the
KRI persons who openly say they are not religious would risk arrest in Baghdad and the south
whereas in the KRI there would be more freedom of expression with regards to religious
beliefs.1030 In April 2018 Al-Monitor reports the Dhi Qar province's Garraf district judiciary
announced issuing arrest warrants for four Iraqis on atheism charges, leading to the arrest of
one of them.1031
An article by Al-Monitor from 23 June 2017 reported that atheists are viewed with disdain andface threats by military groups and political leaders. The article also mentions the case of an
atheist in Baghdad who was vocal about his views on social media and received death threats
from a Shia militia.1032 An aforementioned article in Al-Monitor stated: ‘There are many Iraqi
websites and blogs that cater to atheists, but they all keep their membership lists secret forfear of being persecuted or killed by extremist religious militias and groups, or even by
ordinary citizens on the street.’1033 In a February 2014 article by media platform Your Middle
East, a university student from Basrah stated that many atheists in Iraq could be at danger
from extremists and militias linked to religious groups, if they express their views too openly.
Another Iraqi atheist, who fled to the United States, received death threats from Al Qaeda
and Jaysh al-Mahdi. The article further states that religious militias often take matters into
their own hands.1034
1026 Al-Monitor, Iraqi courts seeking out atheists for prosecution, 1 April 2018, url.
1027 PRI, ISIS turned this young Iraqi Christian into an atheist, 17 January 2018, url.
1028 Al-Monitor, Iraqi atheists demand recognition, guarantee of their rights, 6 March 2014, url.
1029 Lattimer, M., EASO, Practical Cooperation Meeting on Iraq, 25-26 April 2017, url, p. 20.
1030 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Women and men in honour-related conflicts,

9 November 2018, url, p. 69.
1031 Al-Monitor, Iraqi courts seeking out atheists for prosecution, 1 April 2018, url.
1032 Al-Monitor, Islamic parties intimidate, fear atheists in Iraq, 23 June 2017, url.
1033 Al-Monitor, Iraqi atheists demand recognition, guarantee of their rights, 6 March 2014, url.
1034 Your Middle East, Without God in Baghdad, 4 February 2014, url.

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3.2.2 Apostasy
Islam is the official state religion of Iraq and no law may be enacted that contradicts theprovisions of Islam.1035 The Iraqi constitution also guarantees freedom of religious belief andpractices for Muslims, Christians, Yazidis, and Sabaen-Mandaens, but ‘not followers of otherreligious or atheists’. The Constitution guarantees freedom from religious coercion, and states
all citizens are equal before the law without regard to religion, sect, or belief.1036 The Personal
Status Law recognizes the following religious groups: Islam, Chaldean, Assyrian, Assyrian
Catholic, Syriac Orthodox, Syriac Catholic, Armenian Apostolic, Armenian Catholic, Roman
Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Latin-Dominican Rite, National Protestant, Anglican, EvangelicalProtestant Assyrian, Adventist, Coptic Orthodox, Yazidi, Sabean-Mandean, and Jewish.1037 The
same source further noted that ‘all recognized religious groups have their own personal status
courts responsible for handling marriage, divorce, and inheritance issues. According to the
Yazidi-affiliated NGO Yazda, however, there is no personal status court for Yazidis.’1038
Despite its acknowledgment of religious diversity, the Personal status laws and regulations
prohibit the conversion of Muslims to other religions. Whilst civil laws provide a simple
process for a non-Muslim to convert to Islam, conversion by a Muslim to another religion isforbidden by law.1039 Article 26 of the National Identity Card Law states the right of nonMuslims to convert to Islam but does not grant the same rights to Muslims to leave Islam andconvert to another faith. Children born to both Muslims and non-Muslims parents are legallydeemed Muslim.1040 If either parent converts to Islam or if one parent is a Muslim, the childborn is deemed Muslim, even as a result of rape.1041
According to an academic interviewed by the DIS/Landinfo during their 2018 mission to the
KRI ‘people who convert from Islam to Christianity are in risk of being killed’, noting thatpeople who converted from Islam to Christianity cannot declare their opinion publicly.1042 The
source further added that conversion from Christianity in KRI would cause more problems forthe person than being an atheist.1043 Discussing apostasy at EASO’s practical cooperation
meeting on Iraq in April 2017 Mark Lattimer observes that apostasy is uncommon in Iraq:‘generally speaking, you are considered to be born into a religion and you will die in that
religion – it is not just in Islam, but also in most other religions in Iraq, that apostasy is not justfrowned upon as an offence, but seen as unnatural.’1044 NGO representatives interviewed by
DIS during its 2015 mission to KRI noted that ‘there are cases of people being killed forconverting’ noting the case of Priest Abdullah who had sought asylum in Europe after threeattempted assassinations.1045

1035 USDOS, 2017 Report on International Religious Freedom - Iraq, 29 May 2018, url.
1036 USDOS, 2017 Report on International Religious Freedom - Iraq, 29 May 2018, url.
1037 USDOS, 2017 Report on International Religious Freedom - Iraq, 29 May 2018, url.
1038 USDOS, 2017 Report on International Religious Freedom - Iraq, 29 May 2018, url.
1039 USDOS, 2017 Report on International Religious Freedom - Iraq, 29 May 2018, url.
1040 MRG, Crossroads: The future of Iraq’s minorities after ISIS, 7 June 2017, url, p. 33.
1041 USDOS, 2017 Report on International Religious Freedom - Iraq, 29 May 2018, url.
1042 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Women and men in honour-related conflicts,

9 November 2018, url, p. 57.
1043 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Women and men in honour-related conflicts,
9 November 20188, url, p. 69.
1044 Lattimer, M., cited in: EASO, Practical Cooperation Meeting on Iraq, 25-26 April 2017, url, p. 23.
1045 Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI); fact finding mission, 26 September to 6 October 2015, 12 April
2016, url, p. 174.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 133

Converts from Islam to other religions cannot change their religious identification on theiridentity cards after conversion and must continue to be registered as Muslims.1046 The
Institute for International Law and Human Rights (IILHR), a human rights organisation basedin the United States and present in Iraq, notes the ongoing plight of minorities who were
obliged to convert to Islam under the Ba’ath regime:‘To date, members of the Kaka’i, Baha’i, Christian, Mandaean Sabean, and Yzidi faiths
report that, where families have been forced to adopt Islam for the purposes ofidentity documentation, they have been unable to change their religious designation
despite the legal right to practice their faiths.’1047‘Given Iraq’s history of discrimination against some groups (such as Baha’is), ongoing
forced conversion through threat or violence, and voluntary conversions often linked
to other factors (such as the inability of Muslim women to marry non-Muslim men),conversion to Islam for the purpose of official documents has been relatively
common. Among individuals who would like to be legally recognized as non-Muslim
after a voluntary or forced conversion to Islam however, Iraqi law prohibits suchchange. Even where laws requiring the forcible identification of some religious
minorities as Muslim have been reformed, Iraqi authorities have refused to issue new
identity documents because conversion away from Islam remains prohibited.’1048

3.3 Sexual orientation or gender identity
In an April 2018 report on Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) activism in the
Middle East and North Africa Human Rights Watch reported that Iraq has ‘no laws that
explicitly criminalize consensual same-sex conduct, and their governments have notsystematically interpreted other “morality” provisions to criminalize consensual same-sex
conduct’.1049 Authorities relied on public indecency or prostitution charges to prosecute samesex sexual activity.1050 Human Rights Watch notes a history of violence by pro-government
armed groups against LGBTI people in Iraq:‘In 2009, fighters suspected of affiliation with Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi army, anarmed group which publicly vilified gay and effeminate men as “the third sex”,
kidnapped, tortured and murdered as many as several hundred men in a matter ofmonths, most of them in Baghdad. The Mahdi army was allied with the government
at the time.1051 Another wave of killings, attributed in some media reports to anothergovernment-allied armed group, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (Leagues of the Righteous), took
place in 2012 after Iraq’s interior minister condemned as “Satanist” the “emo”

1046 USCIRF, United States Commission on International Religious Freedom 2018 Annual Report; Country Reports:

Tier 2 Countries: Iraq, April 2018, url; Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Women andmen in honour-related conflicts, 9 November 2018, url, p. 57.
1047 IILHR, Iraq’s Minorities and Other Vulnerable Groups: Legal Framework, Documentation and Human Rights,
May 2013, url, pp. 13-14.
1048 IILHR, Iraq’s Minorities and Other Vulnerable Groups: Legal Framework, Documentation and Human Rights,
May 2013, url, p. 57.
1049 Human Rights Watch: Audacity in Adversity - LGBT Activism in the Middle East and North Africa, 16 April 2018,
url, p. 8.
1050 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Iraq, 20 April 2018, url.
1051 Human Rights Watch describes this killing campaign in its August 2009 report “They want us exterminated” –Murder, torture, sexual orientation and gender in Iraq, 17 August 2009, url.

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subculture—a subculture related to a form of punk music and marked by a particularform of dress, including tight jeans and long or spiky hair for men. The government
failed to act against the killings, which targeted nonconformist young people,
including but not limited to people perceived to be LGBT. In 2014, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq
killed several men who were, or who were perceived to be, gay and put up “wanted”
posters for others. Killings of gay men attributed to Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq were reported
once again in 2017.’1052
The Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions noted in a 2018
report that she received ‘information on incitement to hatred through traditional and social
media, and attacks, including threats, physical assaults and killings, on men and boys on thebasis of their actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity as well as on activists
and organizations supporting the human rights of LGTBI persons.’1053 According to UNAMI,
reporting in 2018, ‘members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI)
community continue to face severe discrimination, threats, physical attacks, kidnappings, andin some cases, killings due to their actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender
identity.’1054 Sources interviewed by the DIS/Landinfo during their 2018 mission to KRI
assessed that ‘homosexuals risk harassment and/or violence from the public and police andfrom their own families.’1055
According to Iraqi NGO which monitors the situation of the ‘homosexual community in Iraq’,
the group estimates that ‘over 220 homosexuals were killed in Iraq in 2017, and approximately
96 % of Iraqi homosexuals were subjected to verbal or physical violence.’1056 Several sources
make note of the murder of a famous male Iraqi model in Baghdad who was reportedly killed
for his perceived sexual orientation.1057 From January to June 2017 UNAMI listed five murdersof people on account of their (perceived) sexual orientation which took place in Baghdad, in
Suq al-Shiyoukh district, 30 km south-east of Nasiriya, in Basrah and in Amara.1058
According to Human Rights Watch, writing in 2018, LGBT people are at risk of violence andthreats at the hands of their own family members and ‘face tremendous social pressures toremain in the closet, or not to reveal their sexual orientation or gender identity’.1059 In
addition, homosexuals are at risk of being disowned by their families, losing their jobs andbeing denied accommodation.1060
The 2017 Country report on Human Rights Practices in Iraq by the United States Departmentof State noted that ‘despite repeated threats and violence targeting LGBTI individuals, the1052 Human Rights Watch: Audacity in Adversity - LGBT Activism in the Middle East and North Africa, 16 April 2018,

url, pp. 17-18.
1053 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions
on her mission to Iraq [A/HRC/38/44/Add.1], 20 June 2018, url, p. 11.
1054 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, p. 16;1055 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Women and men in honour-related conflicts,
9 November 2018, url, p. 24.
1056 Iraqi Al-Amal Association; Al-Namaa Center for Human Rights (Author), published by CERD – UN Committee on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Civil Society Organizations' Report on Racial Discrimination in Iraq, October
2018, url, p. 3.
1057 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, p. 16; Independent(The), Iraqi male model brutally killed in Baghdad 'because of his good looks', 5 July 2017, url.
1058 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – January to June 2017, 14 December 2017, url, p. 17.
1059 Human Rights Watch: Audacity in Adversity - LGBT Activism in the Middle East and North Africa, 16 April 2018,
url, p. 21.
1060 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Women and men in honour-related conflicts,
9 November 2018, url, p. 24.

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government failed to identify, arrest, or prosecute attackers or to protect targetedindividuals.’1061 As in previous years ‘ISIS continued to publish videos depicting executions of
persons accused of homosexual activity that included stoning and being thrown frombuildings.’1062
A human rights activist interviewed by DIS/Landinfo during their 2018 mission to KRI statedthat the situation for homosexuals is relatively better in KRI than in the rest of the Iraq,
especially in urban areas compared to rural areas. The source however added thathomosexuality remains a taboo in KRI and ‘it is seen as shameful and stigmatising for thefamily if it becomes known to the public.’1063 Homosexuals will often be forced into marriages
in order to hide their sexuality and hide their sexuality to avoid conflict.1064
In an April 2018 article the online news organisation Middle East Eye noted ‘that the KRG, as
a whole, has generally been perceived as more secular and socially liberal than the Arabmajority regions of Iraq’ and the influence of socially conservative religious organisations andarmed groups is less pronounced.1065 An activist from Sulaymaniyah states: ‘if you compare
the situation of LGBTs themselves, it's better and safer in Kurdistan. So many people just run
away from the rest of the cities and they come to the north because it’s safer.’ ‘That doesn’tmean it’s safe. At all. But it’s safer’, he explains. ‘Compared to the rest of Iraq, they don’t get
their heads smashed in the street.’1066 The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote in2018 that according to a well-informed, confidential source multiple persons were detained
and convicted in KRG on account of homosexual activities. The Netherlands’ Ministry ofForeign Affairs also reported that Kurdish authorities allowed the activities of NGOs advancing
LGBTI rights. However the same source noted that there is discrimination against LGBT
persons in the KRI and in 2017 several persons have been ‘detained and convicted forhomosexual activities’.1067 Niqash reported in November 2017 that homosexuality remains amajor taboo in Iraqi Kurdistan, despite a minor shift in attitudes and some public debate on
the subject.1068

3.4 Religious and ethnic minorities
Iraq hosts a variety of religious, ethnic, cultural and linguistic minorities, especially in the northof the country. The USDOS annual report on religious freedom (covering 2017) provides an
overview of the religious demography in Iraq:‘According to 2010 government statistics, the most recent available, 97 percent of the
population is Muslim. Shia Muslims, predominantly Arabs but also including Turkmen,
Faili (Shia) Kurds, and others, constitute 55 to 60 percent of the population. Sunni
Muslims are approximately 40 percent of the population. Of Sunnis, Sunni Kurds
constitute 15 percent, Sunni Arabs 24 percent, and Sunni Turkmen the remaining 11061 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Iraq, 20 April 2018, url.
1062 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Iraq, 20 April 2018, url.
1063 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Women and men in honour-related conflicts,

9 November 2018, url, p. 23.
1064 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Women and men in honour-related conflicts,
9 November 2018, url, pp. 23-24.
1065 Middle East Eye, 'The world is changing': Iraqi LGBT group takes campaign to streets, 13 April 2018, url.
1066 Middle East Eye, 'The world is changing': Iraqi LGBT group takes campaign to streets, 13 April 2018, url.
1067 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Algemeen Ambtsbericht Irak, 1 April 2018, url, p. 62.
1068 Niqash, Coming out: The secret lives of Iraqi Kurdistan’s gay community slowly emerging, 9 November 2017,url.

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percent. Shia, although predominantly located in the south and east, are the majority
in Baghdad and have communities in most parts of the country. Sunnis form the
majority in the west, center, and north of the country.’1069
Reporting on the status of human rights in Iraq in the July to December 2017 period UNAMI
notes that ‘diverse ethnic and religious communities in Iraq continue to face substantial
challenges, which threaten their security and undermine their full enjoyment of political andsocial rights.’1070 In a January 2017 report the Special Rapporteur on minority issues to the UN
Human Rights Council remarks on Iraq’s historical prestige as ‘the cradle of civilization’:‘Iraq has been a country of great diversity and a unique and rich mosaic of ethnic,
religious, cultural and linguistic communities since ancient times. While the threelargest populations are Shia and Sunni Arabs and Kurds, smaller communities include
the Armenians, Baha’is, Chaldo-Assyrians, Circassians, Faili Kurds, Jews, Kaka’e,
Palestinians, Badawiyin (including the so-called Bidoon), Sabea Mandeans, Shabaks,
Turkmen, Yazidis, Zoroastrians and Roma. Some groups have historically lived
throughout Iraq, while minority groups, including Christians, Shabaks, Yazidis andTurkmen, live primarily in northern Iraq and areas south of and bordering theKurdistan region of Iraq, including the Ninewa plains region. Large Christiancommunities have historically also been found in Baghdad and Basra.’1071
The Special Rapporteur on minority issues to the UN Human Rights Council explained that‘many diverse ethnic and religious groups have suffered from decades of marginalization,
discrimination, lack of access to basic services and insecurity.’1072 The same report further
noted that ‘under the Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein, discrimination and a campaign ofpersecution of ethnic and religious groups, including the Kurds, was pursued.’1073 Following
the invasion of Iraq in 2003, ‘targeted attacks against ethnic and religious communities again
escalated and their position remained precarious, or even worsened, as sectarian violencedramatically increased. In 2006- 2007, the violence peaked, while many thousands fled thecountry.’1074 Regions with large or predominantly minority communities were heavily affectedby the insurgency of ISIL. While all communities suffered, ‘minorities have been particularly
targeted as a consequence of its [ISIL’s] extreme doctrine and interpretation of Islam and its
view of religious minorities as infidels or heretics.’1075 According to MRG deeply entrencheddiscrimination, long-standing marginalisation and mass violations against minorities in thecurrent conflict have led to a dramatic increase in emigration.1076
The 2015 National Identity Card Law requires children from mixed religion marriages to beregistered as Muslims and reinforces restrictions that Muslims cannot change their religious

1069 USDOS, 2017 Report on International Religious Freedom - Iraq, 29 May 2018, url.
1070 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, p. 14.
1071 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues on her mission to Iraq

[A/HRC/34/53/Add.1], 9 January 2017, url, p. 4.
1072 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues on her mission to Iraq
[A/HRC/34/53/Add.1], 9 January 2017, url, p. 4.
1073 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues on her mission to Iraq
[A/HRC/34/53/Add.1], 9 January 2017, url, p. 5.
1074 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues on her mission to Iraq
[A/HRC/34/53/Add.1], 9 January 2017, url, p. 6.
1075 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues on her mission to Iraq
[A/HRC/34/53/Add.1], 9 January 2017, url, p. 4.
1076 MRG, Crossroads: The future of Iraq’s minorities after ISIS, 7 June 2017, url, p. 32.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 137

identification on their identity cards after conversion to any other religion.1077 According to
USDOS ‘the only religions that may be listed on the national identity card are Christian,
Sabean-Mandean, Yazidi, and Muslim; there is no distinction between Shia and Sunni Muslim,
nor a designation of Christian denominations. Individuals practicing other faiths may only
receive identity cards if they self-identify as Muslim, Yzidi, Sabean-Mandean, or Christian.’1078
The same source further stated that ‘individuals practicing other faiths may only receive
identity cards if they self-identify as Muslim, Yezidi, Sabean-Mandean, or Christian. Without
an official identity card, non-Muslims and those who convert to faiths other than Islam may
not register their marriages, enrol their children in public school, acquire passports, or obtainsome government services.’1079
A 2018 DIS/Landinfo FFM to KRI noted that a new electronic and biometric ID card system isbeing introduced in Iraq where information about the person’s religion is stored on the chip
but does not appear on the ID card.1080
Regarding the position of religious minorities in the KRI the United States Commission on
International Religious Freedom notes that the region has been ‘a haven for minorities fleeing
the turmoil and sectarian violence in the south of Iraq’ but ‘troubling issues related todiscrimination and even violence targeting ethnic and religious minorities exist, exacerbatedby the KRI’s strained resources and security situation.’1081 The same source further reportsthat access to justice in the KRI varies depending on location, connections, ethnicity andreligion. Many minority leaders expressed scepticism about gaining a fair hearing in the courts,
especially if making a claim against a Sunni Kurd.1082 Furthermore, individuals from the Yazidi,
Shabak, Turkmen, and Christian communities told the researcher of The United States
Commission on International Religious Freedom that they do not believe the Peshmerga
forces prioritize protecting non-Kurds to the same degree as they do Kurds.1083
Authorities consulted by the Special Rapporteur on minority issues to the UN Human Rights
Council noted the generally good relations between different ethnic and religious
communities in the Kurdish region and that few tensions had historically existed between
communities. The report further stated that ‘members of those ethnic and religious
communities who were long-term residents of the region expressed satisfaction at minority
rights protection, including their right to use their mother-tongue languages in education anda degree of political representation.’1084 Whilst commending the KRG for supporting andproviding a safe haven for displaced communities, the Special Rapporteur on minority issues
also remarks that some communities, notably some Sunni Muslims, do not enjoy the same
freedoms of other groups. The KRG cites security grounds for limiting the movement of some1077 USCIRF, United States Commission on International Religious Freedom 2018 Annual Report; Country Reports:

Tier 2 Countries: Iraq, April 2018, url, pp. 4-5.
1078 USDOS, 2017 Report on International Religious Freedom - Iraq, 29 May 2018, url.
1079 USDOS, 2017 Report on International Religious Freedom - Iraq, 29 May 2018, url.
1080 Denmark, DIS (Danish Immigration Service)/Norway, Landinfo, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Report on
issuance of the new Iraqi ID card, 5 November 2018, url, pp. 5-7.
1081 USCIRF, Wilting in the Kurdish sun; the hopes and fears of religious minorities in Northern Iraq, May 2017, url,
p. 1.
1082 USCIRF, Wilting in the Kurdish sun; the hopes and fears of religious minorities in Northern Iraq, May 2017, url,
p. 9.
1083 USCIRF, Wilting in the Kurdish sun; the hopes and fears of religious minorities in Northern Iraq, May 2017, url,
p. 29.
1084 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues on her mission to Iraq
[A/HRC/34/53/Add.1], 9 January 2017, url, p. 8.

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groups who may be suspected of membership of ISIL.1085 Discussing the possibility to seek
protection from Kurdish authorities UNHCR informed the Danish Immigration Service that thepossibility to seek protection from the authorities in KRI and other Kurdish controlled areas incase of harassment based on religious and/or ethnic affiliation depends on the personalconnections of the person in question. Correspondingly, visiting Scholar Renad Mansour said
that the Kurdish forces would protect Kurds before other minorities.1086
The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom further noted that within
the disputed territories a policy of ‘Kurdification’ is pursued. It further explains that ‘there isextensive evidence that points toward a policy (implicit or otherwise) aimed at permanently
displacing certain non- Kurdish populations from some part of the disputed territories in the
Ninewa plains area, Kirkuk Governorate, and Sinjar.’1087
The Special Rapporteur on minority issues also reported that Shia and Sunni Arabs in somelocations also find themselves under threat, displaced, or facing violations of their humanrights.1088

3.4.1 Turkmen
Constituting the third-largest ethnic group in Iraq, after Arabs and Kurds, with community
representatives claiming a population of up to 2 million, the Turkmen are comprised of bothSunni and Shia communities. Historically they lived in the north of Iraq, including in Tal Afar,
Mosul, Erbil, Diyala and Kirkuk.1089 MRG adds that there are reportedly also some 30 000
Christian Turkmen as well.1090 The UN’s Special Rapporteur on minorities wrote in 2017 that
‘Turkmen claim to have historically faced violence and intimidation from all sides, including
the central Government, the Kurdistan Regional Government and Sunni and Shia militias.’1091
The UN wrote that Turkmen community leaders stated that ‘their areas were under threat
from ISIL and claim that they were not adequately protected by Iraqi or Kurdistan authorities.
Turkmen villages, including the Turkmen-majority area of Tal Afar in Ninewa Governorate,
were taken over by ISIL and tens of thousands Turkmen were forced to flee their areas’.
According to the Special Rapporteur on minority issues to the UN Human Rights Council ‘many
Shia Turkmen had fled to southern governorates, including Najaf and Karbala. Sunni Turkmen
were reportedly held at checkpoints as they sought safety in Erbil and other locations.’1092

1085 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues on her mission to Iraq

[A/HRC/34/53/Add.1], 9 January 2017, url, p. 8.
1086 Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI); fact finding mission, 26 September to 6 October 2015, 12 April
2016, url, p. 51.
1087 USCIRF, Wilting in the Kurdish sun; the hopes and fears of religious minorities in Northern Iraq, May 2017, url,
pp. 30-32.
1088 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues on her mission to Iraq
[A/HRC/34/53/Add.1], 9 January 2017, url, p. 6.
1089 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues on her mission to Iraq
[A/HRC/34/53/Add.1], 9 January 2017, url, p. 11.
1090 MRG, Crossroads: The future of Iraq’s minorities after ISIS, 7 June 2017, url, p. 10.
1091 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues on her mission to Iraq
[A/HRC/34/53/Add.1], 9 January 2017, url, p. 11.
1092 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues on her mission to Iraq
[A/HRC/34/53/Add.1], 9 January 2017, url, p. 12.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 139

USDOS noted in its human rights report on Iraq (covering 2017) that ‘there were reports of
KRG authorities discriminating against minorities, including Turkmen, Arabs, Yezidis, Shabaks,
and Christians, in the disputed territories.’1093
According the 2018 DIS/Landinfo FFM to KRI, Turkmens in Kirkuk, ‘for unknown reasons’ seemto be the most targeted group among all ethnic and religious groups living in the city.1094 Basedon suspicion of being affiliated with ISIL, Sunni Turkmens, along with Sunni Arabs, are targetedby the PMUs and subjected to discriminations, forms of collective abuses, killings.1095 There
have also been reports that Turkmen IDPs were prevented by the Peshmerga and PMUs fromreturning to their homes in areas liberated from ISIL.1096
Turkmen have clashed with Kurds politically and at times militarily over control of Kirkuk cityand governorate, and over Peshmerga control of areas such as Tuz Khurmatu.1097 In 2016,
violence erupted in Tuz Khurmatu between KRG Forces and Shia Turkmen paramilitaries,
leaving 69 dead.1098

3.4.2 Black Iraqis
According to community members the black Iraqi population may number up to 2 million andis located predominantly in southern Iraq, with the largest community residing in Basrah.1099
Black Iraqis are thought to have emigrated to Iraq around the 7th century, largely trafficked asslaves from east Africa.1100 Prejudice against Iraqis of African descent has made them subject
to social and cultural discrimination and political exclusion in Iraq.1101 They are considered tobe among the ‘poorest and most marginalized communities’ in Iraq.1102
Several sources noted that many Black Iraqis live in extreme poverty and with nearly 80 %illiteracy and reportedly over 80 % unemployment.1103 At EASO’s practical cooperation
meeting on Iraq in April 2017, Mark Lattimer (former director of MRG) observed thatsegments of the Black Iraqi community in the south constitute Iraq’s poorest community andthey are widely discriminated against in Iraqi society.1104 Many Black Iraqis live in informal
settlements lacking access to basic needs, such as clean water, proper sewage and1093 US DOS, 2017 Report on International Religious Freedom - Iraq, 29 May 2018, url.
1094 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons(IDPs) in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 16.
1095 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons(IDPs) in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 23.
1096 USDOS, 2017 Report on International Religious Freedom - Iraq, 29 May 2018, url.
1097 USCIRF, Wilting in the Kurdish sun; the hopes and fears of religious minorities in Northern Iraq, May 2017, url,
p. 37.
1098 USCIRF, Wilting in the Kurdish sun; the hopes and fears of religious minorities in Northern Iraq, May 2017, url,
p. 27.
1099 MRG, Black Iraqis, November 2017, url; IILHR, Iraq’s Minorities and Other Vulnerable Groups: Legal Framework,
Documentation and Human Rights, May 2013, url, p. 72.
1100 IILHR, Iraq’s Minorities and Other Vulnerable Groups: Legal Framework, Documentation and Human Rights,
May 2013, url, p. 73.
1101 IILHR, Iraq’s Minorities and Other Vulnerable Groups: Legal Framework, Documentation and Human Rights,
May 2013, url, pp. 72-76.
1102 Australia, DFAT Country Information Report Iraq, 9 October 2018, url, p. 13; MRG, Black Iraqis, November 2017,url.
1103 Australia, DFAT Country Information Report Iraq, 9 October 2018, url, p. 13; MRG, published by UN CERD – UN
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Alternative Report to the Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination (CERD); Review of the Periodic Report of Iraq, 2018, url, paragraph 28.
1104 Lattimer, M., EASO, cited in: Practical Cooperation Meeting on Iraq, 25-26 April 2017, url, p. 19.

140 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

electricity.1105 Poverty and the ongoing near-feudal structure of some community groups has
prevented some black Iraqis from obtaining identity documents, which hinders school
enrolment, employment, travel, and access to services.1106 The Special Rapporteur on minority
issues to the UN Human Rights Council notes a disturbing lack of information about thecircumstances of black Iraqis.1107

3.4.3 Yazidi
The Special Rapporteur on minority issues to the UN Human Rights Council notes that the
Yazidis constitute one of Iraq’s oldest minorities. They are thought to number about 700 000
people, the vast majority of which were concentrated in Northern Iraq around the town ofSinjar. Community leaders report that the Yazidis have suffered ‘a history of persecution
owing to perceptions of their faith, with numerous episodes of mass killing, including targeted
attacks during sectarian violence following the 2003 invasion. They suffered particularly when
their regions were overrun by ISIL beginning in August 2014.’1108 Dave van Zoonen and Khogir
Wirya, Iraq analysts with the Middle East Research Institute (MERI)1109 note in their 2017
report that ISIL’s attacks on the Yazidi community in and around Sinjar were ‘without mercy’and entailed mass killings, forced conversions, kidnapping young children and sexuallyenslaving thousands of women and girls.1110 MRG notes that even before ISIL’s offensive,
numerous incidents of arbitrary arrest, discrimination and other abuses against the Yazidi
community were reported. Prior to June 2014, the 2005 population of 700 000 had reportedly
fallen to approximately 500 000.1111
At EASO’s practical cooperation meeting on Iraq in April 2017 Mark Lattimer the Yazidis arewidely discriminated against in Iraqi society and they likely constitute ‘Iraq’s poorest
community’ (aside from Black Iraqis in the south). They were subjected ‘to a campaign ofextermination and enslavement’ by ISIL and he gave the view that the group remains ‘highly
vulnerable’ as they are in a precarious displacement situation and cut off from their traditionallands and livelihoods.1112
The 2015 National Identity Card Law prevented Yazidis from self-identifying with theirreligious and ethnic group and official government residence cards and driving licenses
required identifying as Kurdish or Muslim.1113 Kurdish officials frequently put pressure on
Yazidis to identify as Kurds and Muslims, and those who ‘dissent, or refuse to identify as Kurds

1105 MRG, published by UN CERD – UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Alternative Reportto the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD); Review of the Periodic Report of Iraq, 2018,
url, paragraph 28; MRG, Black Iraqis, November 2017, url; IILHR, Iraq’s Minorities and Other Vulnerable Groups:
Legal Framework, Documentation and Human Rights, May 2013, url, pp. 72-76.
1106 MRG, published by UN CERD – UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Alternative Reportto the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD); Review of the Periodic Report of Iraq, 2018,
url, paragraph 28; IILHR, Iraq’s Minorities and Other Vulnerable Groups: Legal Framework, Documentation and
Human Rights, May 2013, url, pp. 72-76.
1107 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues on her mission to Iraq
[A/HRC/34/53/Add.1], 9 January 2017, url, p. 13.
1108 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues on her mission to Iraq
[A/HRC/34/53/Add.1], 9 January 2017, url, p. 12.
1109 MERI is an Erbil-based independent research institute focused on policy issues and governance in the Middle
East, according to its website.
1110 van Zoonen, D. and Wirya, K., The Yazidis – Perceptions of reconciliation and conflict, Middle East ResearchInstitute, October 2017, url, p. 10.
1111 MRG, Crossroads: The future of Iraq’s minorities after ISIS, 7 June 2017, url, p. 10.
1112 Lattimer, M., cited in: EASO, Practical Cooperation Meeting on Iraq, 25-26 April 2017, url, pp. 19-20.
1113 USDOS, 2017 Report on International Religious Freedom - Iraq, 29 May 2018, url.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 141

risk harassment, detention, or deportation’ from KRI or blocked from entering.1114 According
to the USDOS, writing in 2018, ‘Yezidis in the IKR were discriminated against when theyrefused to self-identify as Kurdish and Muslim; only those Yezidis who considered themselves
Kurdish and Muslim could obtain senior positions in the IKR leadership.’1115
According to Dave van Zoonen and Khogir Wirya, the relationship between the KRG and the
Yazidis has been seriously damaged because of the controversial withdrawal of the Peshmerga
preceding ISIL’s attack of the Yazidi community.1116 Within KRG controlled areas, Yazidis who
dissent, or refuse to identify as Kurds, risk harassment, detention, or deportation, The UnitedStates Commission on International Religious Freedom reports. Yazidis in Kurdistan also
report facing hostility from the wider population.1117 On a number of occasions tensions
between Kurds and Yazidis have boiled over, resulting in violence.1118 A blockade put in placeby the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) forces controlling entry and exit from Sinjar cut
thousands of Yazidis off from their homelands.1119 The KDP is particularly concerned about thebase of support Turkish and Syrian Kurdish forces, such as Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS),
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and People’s Protection Units (YPG), have built in theregion.1120
In 2016 the KRG placed restriction on the movement of goods into and out of the district ofSinjar, thus limiting the access to food, water, livelihoods, and other fundamental rights.1121
Representatives of the Yazidi community indicated that many Yazidis are leaving Iraq, having
little hope for a return to normal life in the Ninewa plains and Sinjar.1122 In a November 2018
article the Norwegian Refugee Council notes close to 200 000 Yazidi remain displaced.1123
For further information on targeting of Yazidis by ISIL see section 2.2.4.

3.4.4 Christians
DFAT reported that the Iraqi government estimated the number of Christians living in Iraq tobe 1.4 million in 1987. Christian community leaders estimate this number has fallen to fewer
than 250 000, largely as a consequence of the high level of violence the community faced after
2003 and which exacerbated after the rise of ISIL since 2014.1124 Christian groups include
Chaldean Catholics (67 % of all Christians) and the Assyrian Church of the East (a further 20 %).

1114 USCIRF, Wilting in the Kurdish sun; the hopes and fears of religious minorities in Northern Iraq, May 2017, url,

p. 20
1115 USDOS, 2017 Report on International Religious Freedom - Iraq, 29 May 2018, url.
1116 van Zoonen, D. and Wirya, K., The Yazidis – Perceptions of reconciliation and conflict, Middle East ResearchInstitute, October 2017, url , p. 10.
1117 USCIRF, Wilting in the Kurdish sun; the hopes and fears of religious minorities in Northern Iraq, May 2017, url,
p. 22.
1118 USCIRF, Wilting in the Kurdish sun; the hopes and fears of religious minorities in Northern Iraq, May 2017, url,
p. 36.
1119 USCIRF, Wilting in the Kurdish sun; the hopes and fears of religious minorities in Northern Iraq, May 2017, url,
p. 22.
1120 USCIRF, Wilting in the Kurdish sun; the hopes and fears of religious minorities in Northern Iraq, May 2017, url,
p. 35.
1121 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: KRG Restrictions Harm Yezidi Recovery - Disproportionate Limits on Goods Entering,
Leaving Sinjar, 4 December 2016, url.
1122 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues on her mission to Iraq
[A/HRC/34/53/Add.1], 9 January 2017, url, pp. 12-13.
1123 NRC, Close to 200,000 Yazidis remain displaced, 13 November 2018, url.
1124 Australia, DFAT Country Information Report Iraq, 9 October 2018, url, p. 14.

142 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

Less numerous denominations include Syrian Orthodox, Syriac Catholic, Armenian Catholic,Armenian Orthodox, Anglican, Evangelical and other Protestants.1125
The Special Rapporteur on minority issues to the UN Human Rights Council also notes animportant decline in the size of the Christian population in Iraq, especially since 2003:‘Christian communities have historically been targeted because of their faith and theirperceived ties with the West. Following the 2003 invasion, attacks against Christiancommunities led to an exodus of Christians from the country. Christian representatives statedthat the population had declined dramatically, from up to 1.4 million people prior to 2003 to
only some 350 000 by 2014.’1126 The Special Rapporteur on minority issues to the UN Human
Rights Council concurs that the Christian population in Iraq declined further since mid-2014
with the rise of ISIL in areas of Christian populations, including the Ninewa plains:‘As places such as Mosul fell to ISIS, thousands of Christians fled. Those who remained
or were unable to flee faced demands for the payment of protection money whileothers faced forced conversion or execution if they failed to comply with demands.
Christian property was marked with an Arabic “N” (for Nusairi, the word used in the
Koran to refer to Christians) and was later seized, and Christians were given an
ultimatum to leave the city by 19 July 2014 or face execution.’1127
At EASO’s practical cooperation meeting on Iraq in April 2017 Mark Lattimer points out thatmost Christians in Iraq had already fled before the 2014 ISIL advance. The majority now live in
the KRG, particularly in a Christian district of Erbil called Ankawa. Many of the Christians in
Iraq ‘do not have hope of surviving beyond that enclave’.1128 Concerning the Christian
population in the KRI DFAT noted that violence against Christians in the Kurdistan Region isless common, but Christians in the region continue to face discrimination in the form of
intimidation and denial of access to services.1129 Christian NGOs have reported that someMuslims threaten and harass women and girls for refusing to wear the hijab or not adhering
to strict interpretations of Islamic norms regarding public behaviour.1130
The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom stated that the KRG makes
special efforts to provide for Christians, including Christian IDPs. However, Assyrian Christians
have complained of land appropriations by ethnic Kurds, which may have occurred with the‘blessing, or tacit consent’ of Kurdish officials.1131 Complaints about appropriation of Christianland by ethnic Kurds are long standing and originate mainly from Dohuk and Erbilgovernorates.1132 MERI noted that Law No 5 issued in 2015 by the Kurdistan parliamentaddresses the appropriation of Christian lands. However, the law is yet to be enforced.1133

1125 Australia, DFAT Country Information Report Iraq, 9 October 2018, url, p. 14.
1126 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues on her mission to Iraq

[A/HRC/34/53/Add.1], 9 January 2017, url, p. 10.
1127 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues on her mission to Iraq
[A/HRC/34/53/Add.1], 9 January 2017, url, p. 10.
1128 Lattimer, M., EASO, Practical Cooperation Meeting on Iraq, 25-26 April 2017, url, p. 20.
1129 Australia, DFAT Country Information Report Iraq, 9 October 2018, url, p. 15.
1130 USDOS, 2017 Report on International Religious Freedom - Iraq, 29 May 2018, url.
1131 USCIRF, Wilting in the Kurdish sun; the hopes and fears of religious minorities in Northern Iraq, May 2017, url,
p. 17.
1132 USCIRF, Wilting in the Kurdish sun; the hopes and fears of religious minorities in Northern Iraq, May 2017, url,
p. 38.
1133 Wirya, K. and Fawaz, L., The Christians – Perceptions of reconciliation and conflict, Middle East ResearchInstitute , September 2017, url, p. 11.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 143Religious minorities have stated that ‘forced conversion was the de facto outcome of thenational identity card law mandating children with only one Muslim parent, even children
born as a result of rape, be listed as Muslim.’1134 Christians have complained that in somecases ‘families that are formally registered as Muslim but practice Christianity have fled to
avoid registering their children as Muslims or to have their children remain undocumented,
affecting their eligibility for government benefits.’1135
For further information on targeting of Christians by state actors and affiliated groups see
section 1.13.
For further information of targeting of Christians by ISIL see section 2.2.3.

3.4.5 Assyrians
Assyrians comprise a distinct ethno-religious group in Iraq that is mainly concentrated in the
Ninevah plains in Northern Iraq.1136 Descendants of ancient Mesopotamian peoples, Assyrians
speak Aramaic and belong to one of four churches: the Chaldean (Uniate), Nestorian, Jacobite
or Syrian Orthodox, and the Syrian Catholic.1137 The population of Assyrians living in Iraq wasestimated at 300 000 before ISIL’s invasion.1138
Accusations of land appropriations against Christians, particularly Assyrian Christians, havebeen reported in some parts of the KRI, such as rural areas of Dohuk Governorate, Zhakho,
and the Nahla Valley.1139 According USCIRF, writing in 2017, 42 encroachments in Nahla Valley
villages have been alleged by Assyrian Christians in recent years.1140 Land appropriations are
attributed to long-standing disputes complicated by population displacements andresettlements, illegal construction by powerful local officials or businesses, and as a way tosuppress Assyrian political activities and force support of Kurdish parties.1141
According to MRG, writing in 2018, Chaldo-Assyrian Christians ‘face ongoing discrimination inaccess to jobs due to longstanding stereotypes about them, and the fact that they do notbelong to the major political blocs’.1142 Lack of economic opportunities, suppression ofpolitical activities and a perceived failure of the Iraqi authorities to provide protection, has led
to rising emigration among Assyrians since the start of the ISIL offensive.1143
The advance of ISIL in 2014 caused displacement of large numbers of Assyrians from Mosul
and Ninewa plains along with ‘destruction of their historical, cultural and religious

1134 USDOS, 2017 Report on International Religious Freedom - Iraq, 29 May 2018, url.
1135 USCIRF, United States Commission on International Religious Freedom 2018 Annual Report; Country Reports:

Tier 2 Countries: Iraq, April 2018, url, p. 5.
1136 World Watch Monitor, Iraq’s Assyrian Christians: persecution and resurgence, 8 April 2018, url.
1137 MRG, Assyrians, November 2017, url.
1138 World Watch Monitor, Iraq’s Assyrian Christians: persecution and resurgence, 8 April 2018, url.
1139 USCIRF, Wilting in the Kurdish sun; the hopes and fears of religious minorities in Northern Iraq, May 2017, url,
p. 17; UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, p. 15;1140 USCIRF, Wilting in the Kurdish sun; the hopes and fears of religious minorities in Northern Iraq, May 2017, url,
p. 38.
1141 MRG, Assyrians, November 2017, url; USCIRF, Wilting in the Kurdish sun; the hopes and fears of religious
minorities in Northern Iraq, May 2017, url, pp. 17, 18, 38.
1142 MRG, published by UN CERD – UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Alternative Reportto the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD); Review of the Periodic Report of Iraq, 2018,
url, paragraph 11.
1143 MRG, Assyrians, November 2017, url; USCIRF, Wilting in the Kurdish sun; the hopes and fears of religious
minorities in Northern Iraq, May 2017, url, p. 38.

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heritage’.1144 Under Saddam Hussein’s regime, Assyrian towns and villages were targeted
during the al-Anfal military campaign against Kurdistan in Northern Iraq between 1986 and1989, and again during the ethnic and sectarian civil war after the 2003 US invasion.1145 DFAT
noted that ‘many Assyrians claim that Kurds expropriated their land under the Ba’ath Party
between 1968 and 2003.’1146

3.4.6 Shabaks
Largely living in the Ninewa plains, the Shabak form a distinct ethnic group estimated tonumber between 200 000 and 500 000.1147 According to USCIRF, the Shabak are an ethnoreligious group consisting of three tribes: the Hariri, the Gergeri, and the Mawsili, the majorityof which are Shia.1148 According to MRG the Shabak ‘have been victims to some of the worst
instances of large-scale violence in recent years and an estimated 1 300 have been killed since2003’. There have been ‘major repeated attacks’ on Shabak villages and worshippers havebeen targeted during religious rituals. ISIL’s advance resulted in kidnappings, and executions
for those who refused to comply with ISIL orders, and Shabak properties were marked with‘R’ for Rafida, meaning Shia and other religions who rejected ISIL’s Islamic interpretations.
Besides facing violence by ISIL, they have been victims of efforts to forcibly alter thedemographic balance in their areas in favour of either Arabs or Kurds.1149 Representatives
consulted by the Special Rapporteur on minority issues to the UN Human Rights Council also
described the treatment of Shabak, most recently ISIL since 2014:‘Shabak properties in Mosul were marked with an Arabic “R” to signify “Rafida”, aterm ISIL used to designate Shia Muslims and others who have “rejected” itsinterpretation of Islam. Shabaks who refused to comply with ISIL orders werereportedly executed. By August 2014, an estimated 60 Shabak villages were under ISIL
control, with reports of massacres and kidnappings of Shabak civilians. Leaders statedthat 7,000 Shabak internally displaced families had fled Mosul following its fall.’1150
According to the USDOS, writing in 2018, the 2015 National Identity Card Law prevented
Shabaks from ‘self-identifying with their religious and ethnic group and from official
government recognition through official documentation’.1151
USCIRF noted that the Shabak community is located in an area that is disputed between Erbil
and Baghdad. The power struggles between the two governments have affected the Shabak
detrimentally and ‘the Shabak have faced enormous pressure (and even harassment) fromthe KRG to assimilate and declare themselves to be Kurds.’1152 Especially Shabaks who oppose

1144 MRG, Assyrians, November 2017, url.
1145 MRG, Assyrians, November 2017, url; World Watch Monitor, Iraq’s Assyrian Christians: persecution andresurgence, 8 April 2018, url.
Australia, DFAT Country Information Report Iraq, 9 October 2018, url, p. 15.
1147 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues on her mission to Iraq
[A/HRC/34/53/Add.1], 9 January 2017, url, p. 11.
1148 USCIRF, Wilting in the Kurdish sun; the hopes and fears of religious minorities in Northern Iraq, May 2017, url,
p. 24.
1149 MRG, From Crisis to Catastrophe: the situation of minorities in Iraq, October 2014, url, pp. 13-14.
1150 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues on her mission to Iraq
[A/HRC/34/53/Add.1], 9 January 2017, url, p. 11.
1151 USDOS, 2017 Report on International Religious Freedom - Iraq, 29 May 2018, url.
1152 USCIRF, Wilting in the Kurdish sun; the hopes and fears of religious minorities in Northern Iraq, May 2017, url,
p. 24.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 145

the KRG have been a target of political violence.1153 MERI noted that members of the Shabak
community have joined armed groups, with Sunni Shabaks joining the Peshmerga and Shias
joining PMU units. Although social relations between Sunni and Shia Shabaks have historically
been good, community members are wary of future conflicts, especially as tensions over the
disputed territories mount.1154

3.4.7 Kaka’i
According to the Special Rapporteur on minority issues to the UN Human Rights Council ‘theKaka’i are ethnically associated with the Kurds while maintaining a distinct religious
identity.’1155 Kak’ai are sometimes thought to be a branch of the Shia faith, though besides
Shia beliefs the religion also contains elements of Zoroastrianism.1156 According torepresentatives the Kaka’i numbered some 200 000 people scattered throughout different
regions, with most in Iraqi Kurdistan. Representatives further stated that the Kaka’i had
suffered historic persecution, including under the Saddam Hussein regime, with lands andvillages confiscated and given to the Arab populations. According to community
representatives some 300 Kaka’i had been killed by ISIL in Mosul and other areas because of
their religious identity, ISIL also took control of a large area normally occupied by Kaka’i.
Reportedly all Kaka’i who formerly lived in Mosul and in the Ninewa plains became internallydisplaced persons in Kurdistan.1157 Few have returned to the liberated Ninewa as of 2018.1158
USDOS reported that outside the KRI, the Kaka’i are an ‘unrecognised religious group’ notingthat the law does not prescribe penalties for practicing it, but that contracts signed byunrecognised religious groups are ‘not legal or permissible in as evidence court’.1159
For further information on targeting of Kaka’i by ISIL see section 2.2.5.

3.4.8 Sabean-Mandeans
Considered to be one of the smallest religious communities in Iraq, with estimated numbersof fewer than 5 000 members, and the UN writes that ‘their language, culture and religion arethought to be at risk of extinction in Iraq.’1160 According to DFAT, most Sabea-Mandaeans live
in southern Iraq, including Basrah and the southern governorates of Dhi Qar and Maysan, but
small numbers live in Baghdad and the Kurdistan Region.1161 According to the Special
Rapporteur on minority issues to the UN Human Rights Council they ‘have faced violence byboth Shia and Sunni Islamic groups and continue to be actively targeted. Numerous attacks
have taken place against community members, their property and places of worship, including

1153 USCIRF, Wilting in the Kurdish sun; the hopes and fears of religious minorities in Northern Iraq, May 2017, url,

pp. 41-42.
1154 van Zoonen, D. and Wirya, K., The Shabaks - Perceptions of reconciliation and conflict, Middle East ResearchInstitute, August 2017, url, p. 13.
1155 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues on her mission to Iraq
[A/HRC/34/53/Add.1], 9 January 2017, url, p. 10.
1156 MRG, Crossroads: The future of Iraq’s minorities after ISIS, 7 June 2017, url, p. 9.
1157 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues on her mission to Iraq
[A/HRC/34/53/Add.1], 9 January 2017, url, p. 10.
1158 USDOS, 2017 Report on International Religious Freedom – Iraq, 29 May 2018, url.
1159 USDOS, 2017 Report on International Religious Freedom – Iraq, 29 May 2018, url.
1160 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues on her mission to Iraq
[A/HRC/34/53/Add.1], 9 January 2017, url, p. 11.
1161 Australia, DFAT Country Information Report Iraq, 9 October 2018, url, p. 15.

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targeted killings of individuals.’1162 The UN writes that ‘Sabean-Mandeans have fled ISILcontrolled areas and have become internally displaced’ while many more are said to havedeparted the country.1163
In their July 2017 MERI report, Dave van Zoonen and Khogir Wirya noted that crimes against
Sabean-Mandaens have occurred ‘with impunity’ and that as the government lost its ability
to provide security, Sabean-Mandeans paid money to tribesmen and militias in order to obtainsome level of protection, noting this occurred in Missan, Baghdad, and Basrah. Nevertheless,they have been extorted and pressured to conform to Islamic principles by financially
supporting Shia ritual, parades and public events, especially during Islamic holidays. Not
participating in such societal displays risked Sabean-Mandaens becoming disenfranchisedfrom the local community, according to MERI.1164
Mark Lattimer explains at EASO’s practical cooperation meeting on Iraq in April 2017 SabeanMandeans were perceived as rich because they were associated with the jewellery trade.
Because of this, they became a target for extortion by extremist groups and criminal gangs.1165
Especially in Baghdad, members of the Sabean-Mandeans community are often associatedwith wealth since many of its member’s work within the jewellery and gold/silver smith
businesses. In addition, the Sabea-Mandaeans are prohibited to resort to arms, even in selfdefence. Thus, community members were especially exposed to face robberies of theirgoldsmith, silversmith and jewellery stores. In addition, community members faced killings,
abductions and torture.1166
According to MERI, Sabean-Mandeans whom they interviewed who fled to KRG indicated thatthe ‘distintegration of the rule of law in the rest of Iraq’ was the main reason they gave forattacks against them. Unlike in other parts of Iraq, in the KRI, they indicated they do not feel
under immediate threat from being targeted by religious extremist groups but face a range ofother challenges. Being Arabic speakers, MERI also found that two thirds of Sabaen-Mandaens
they interviewed faced a language barrier when interacting with the Kurdish majority,
experiencing racism and sometimes discrimination or verbal abuse on account of being
perceived as ‘Arabs from the south’. Being displaced into the KRI with a weak social network,
the community lacks access to employment and economic opportunities.1167
Sabean-Mandaeans experience discrimination and negative stereotyping in all aspects ofpublic life. For instance, some reports suggest that some Iraqis refuse to share food or to drink
from the same glass as a Sabean-Mandaean. These factors, combined with the effects of the
ISIL advance, continue to drive Sabean-Mandaeans to leave Iraq.1168 USDOS further reported
that some Sabean-Mandaeans, as well as Christians, claimed that they faced discrimination
limiting their economic opportunities. One example of such discrimination was the Iraqi

1162 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues on her mission to Iraq

[A/HRC/34/53/Add.1], 9 January 2017, url, p. 11.
1163 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues on her mission to Iraq
[A/HRC/34/53/Add.1], 9 January 2017, url, p. 11.
1164 van Zoonen, D. and Wirya, K., The Sabean-Manaeans – Perceptions of reconciliation and conflict, Middle East
Research Institute, July 2017, url, p. 8.
1165 Lattimer, M., cited in: EASO, Practical Cooperation Meeting on Iraq, 25-26 April 2017, url, p. 20.
1166 van Zoonen, D. and Wirya, K., The Sabean-Manaeans – Perceptions of reconciliation and conflict, Middle East
Research Institute, July 2017, url, pp. 5-8; MRG, Iraq: Current issues, May 2018, url;Lattimer, M., cited in: EASO, Practical Cooperation Meeting on Iraq, 25-26 April 2017, url, p. 20.
1167 van Zoonen, D. and Wirya, K., The Sabean-Manaeans – Perceptions of reconciliation and conflict, Middle East
Research Institute, July 2017, url, p. 10.
1168 MRG, Iraq: Sabian Mandaeans, url.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 147

government’s implementation of an alcohol ban in many parts of the country has affectedbusinesses run by these groups.1169 They continued to report threats, abuses, and robberiesin 2017.1170
John the Baptist is the central prophet of the Sabea-Mandean religion, and flowing water isessential for some religious rituals.1171 Despite a vulnerable security situation AP News
reported, in October 2018, that a group of Sabean-Mandaeans in Baghdad have a strip of the
Tigris River in Baghdad reserved where they celebrate a religious ceremony every Sunday
dressed in white clothing.1172

3.4.9 Baha’i
The number of Baha’i community members is unclear due to lack of information and fear of
revealing one’s faith due to ‘historic and widespread discrimination’. There are thought to beless than 2 000 members, according to the UN in 2017. Persons adhering to the Baha’i faithwere ‘particularly oppressed’ by the Baath party regime from the early 1970s. At that time,
the UN reported that the religion was banned, ‘Baha’i property was confiscated and membersof the community ultimately faced prison or execution.’1173 The UN also reported that
Regulation 358 of 1975 prohibited issuing national identity cards to Baha’i people, which
denied them access to birth and marriage registration, passports, employment, entry into
university, and the possibility to buy and sell housing and property. Although this regulation
was revoked in 2008, Baha’i is still report continuing difficulty with changing their ID cards tostate their religion and reportedly had to list ‘Muslim’ on identity documents.1174 According to
USDOS the Baha’i still cannot register their faith on their ID cards and Baha’i people are ‘atrisk of statelessness’.1175 MRG stated that Iraqi minorities, inter alia Baha’is, have been‘particularly targeted’ since Iraq’s internal conflict with ISIL started in 2014.1176
According to MRG,
‘Many Bahá’í still lack identity documentation or have identity cards stating that they
are Muslim. Without identity documentation, Bahá’í cannot access rights and services
related to citizenship such as education, property ownership and medical care. The
majority of Bahá’í marriages are not registered officially, so the children of suchmarriages cannot obtain identification. Bahá’í do not benefit from any recognition or
special measures under the Iraqi constitution, but they are recognized as a religious
minority by the Kurdistan Regional Government’s Ministry of Endowment andReligious Affairs.’1177

1169 USDOS, 2017 Report on International Religious Freedom - Iraq, 29 May 2018, url.
1170 USDOS, 2017 Report on International Religious Freedom - Iraq, 29 May 2018, url.
1171 MRG, Iraq: Sabian Mandaeans, url.
1172 AP, Water pollution in Iraq threatens Mandaean religious rites, 17 October 2018, url.
1173 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues on her mission to Iraq

[A/HRC/34/53/Add.1], 9 January 2017, url, p. 9.
1174 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues on her mission to Iraq
[A/HRC/34/53/Add.1], 9 January 2017, url, p. 9.
1175 USDOS, 2017 Report on International Religious Freedom - Iraq, 29 May 2018, url.
1176 MRG, Iraq: Current issues, May 2018, url.
1177 MRG (Minority Rights Group International), Baha’i, November 2017, url

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3.4.10 Zoroastrians
Zoroastrianism is one of the world’s oldest religions which disappeared from Iraq for
centuries.1178 There is no reliable data on the number of persons adhering to this community,
due to frequent registration as Muslims on Iraqi identity documents.1179 In an article from
December 2017, political representative of Kurdish Zoroastrians stated that ‘around 4 000
people in the Erbil province have filled out forms expressing desire to convert
to Zoroastrianism.’1180 In a report by Rudaw from 2015, it is stated that the movement claims
that it has 100 000 followers in Iraqi Kurdistan.1181 Zoroastrianism is recognised under Law
No 5 of Protecting Components of Iraqi Kurdistan of 2015, which allowed the official
establishment of the Zoroastrian Cultural and Heritage Center and an official representativewith the Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs in KRI.1182
Mainly found in Dohuk and in Sulaimaniyah, Zoroastrians enjoy more recognition in Kurdistan
than in other regions in Iraq. Zoroastrians claim increasing numbers of Kurdish Muslims areconverting to Zoroastrianism. According to some reports, these conversions have resulted inincitement of hatred and defamation by some Sunni clerics. Prominent followers of
Zoroastrianism reported threats and harassment from Islamic groups.1183 According to Niqash
the revival of Zoroastrianism in the semi-autonomous region of Iraqi Kurdistan is in part due
to its deep Kurdish roots – it was founded by Zoroaster, also known as Zarathustra, who wasborn in the Kurdish part of Iran. Niqash further notes that the number of converts is
unknown.1184
Prominent followers of Zoroastrianism reported threats and harassment from Islamicgroups.1185 In 2017, Rudaw reported that a Kurdish Islamic preacher in Erbil was alleged of
issuing a decree stating that all converts to the Zoroastrian faith must be killed which met
strong reactions by some members of the community that filed a legal complaint.1186
Furthermore, conversion from Islam to another religion is a criminal offence according to Iraqi
Personal Status Law.1187 In an interview with the New Arab, members of the religious
community described that they were not accepted by everyone in KRG, and a Zoroastrian
woman said that community members face discrimination and threats (including death
threats).1188 According to the spiritual leader of Iraq’s Zoroastrians, Peer Luqman Haji, who
administers ‘conversions from Islam’, conversion is ‘not an accurate term per se’, noting that
there were high rates of Kurds who were ‘returning to the religion’ of Zoroastrianism.1189

1178 Al-Monitor, Zoroastrianism in Iraq seeks official recognition, 17 February 2016, url.
1179 Al-Monitor, Zoroastrianism in Iraq seeks official recognition, 17 February 2016, url.
1180 Niqash, Cross-cultural love: what happens when a Christian falls in love with a Muslim, 14 December 2017, url.
1181 Rudaw, Zoroastrian faith returns to Kurdistan in response to ISIS violence, 2 June 2015, url.
1182 Al-Monitor, Zoroastrianism in Iraq seeks official recognition, 17 February 2016, url.
1183 USCIRF, Wilting in the Kurdish sun; the hopes and fears of religious minorities in Northern Iraq, May 2017, url,

p. 20.
1184 Niqash, The One, True Kurdish Prophet? Thanks To Extremism, Iraqis Revive Ancient Religion, 28 May 2015,
url.
1185 USCIRF, Wilting in the Kurdish sun; the hopes and fears of religious minorities in Northern Iraq, May 2017, url,
p. 20.
1186 Rudaw, Converts must die: Kurdistan’s Zoroastrians outraged by Islamic preacher, 5 February 2017, url.
1187 Al-Monitor, Zoroastrianism in Iraq seeks official recognition, 17 February 2016, url.
1188 New Arab (The), The quest for identity: How Kurds a rediscovering Zoroastrianism, 5 February 2018, url.
1189 Al-Monitor, Zoroastrianism in Iraq seeks official recognition, 17 February 2016, url.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 149

3.4.11 Bidoon
In its 2017 report on human rights practices USDOS describes Bidoon/Bidoun as descendants
of individuals who never received Iraqi citizenship upon the state’s founding, living as nomads
in the desert near or in the southern governorates of Basrah, Dhi Qar, and Qadisiyah. They
remain undocumented and stateless. In 2006 their number was estimated to be 54 500.1190
In a May 2013 report the IILHR noted that the Bedouin/Bidoon of Iraq consist of numerous
large and small tribes living a traditional nomadic life, although many have developed a more
settled life. An unreliable 1997 government census estimated their number at 100 000. The
Bidoon reportedly live throughout Iraq but are mainly concentrated along the west and southof the country, a large number of Bidoon is reported to live on the outskirts of Nassiriyah (ThiQar Governorate).1191
DFAT, writing in 2018, noted that stateless Bidoon ‘do not have access to many services andpublic sector job opportunities, nor can they register land in their own names, sign rental
contracts or inherit property’.1192 The births and deaths of stateless Bidoons aren’t usuallyregistered by the government.1193
The Bidoon community faces a high rate of poverty and a precarious living situation, limiting
access to education and services such as clean water, electricity, and adequate shelter.
Community members commonly earn money by selling garbage and tending other people’s
livestock. As many Iraqis view the Bidoon as travellers who do not need citizenship documents
or protections for other rights, the Bidoon have long been considered stateless. ‘However, thecommunity does not appear to face de jure barriers to accessing citizenship, identity, or otherdocumentation.’ Although UNHCR observed during a visit to members of the Bidoon
community in Thi Qar, that all interviewed families possessed nationality and identity
documents, little is known about the documentation situation of the Bidoon elsewhere in
Iraq.1194
Human Rights Watch noted that after the Iraq invasion of Kuwait many Bidoon fled from
Kuwait to Iraq and were later denied re-entry.1195 In a 2010 email addressed to the Refugee
Review Tribunal of the Australian Government, UNHCR reported that the Saddam Hussein
regime was relatively generous in granting them citizenship, considering those who had been
deported from Kuwait as supportive of the Iraqi regime. However, the majority of the Bidoons
were not granted Iraqi citizenship. The UNHCR reported that
‘Bidouns do not hold Iraqi ID cards, nationality certificates or PDS (Public Distribution
System) cards, their children are not registered and they do not have access to healthfacilities, they marry according to their tribal customs and do not register theirmarriages, they also solve their internal conflicts according to the same customs. They

1190 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Iraq, 20 April 2018, url.
1191 IILHR, Iraq’s Minorities and Other Vulnerable Groups: Legal Framework, Documentation and Human Rights,

May 2013, url, pp. 69-71.
1192 Australia, DFAT Country Information Report Iraq, 9 October 2018, url, p. 23.
1193 Australia, DFAT Country Information Report Iraq, 9 October 2018, url, p. 23.
1194 IILHR, Iraq’s Minorities and Other Vulnerable Groups: Legal Framework, Documentation and Human Rights,
May 2013, url, pp. 69-71.
1195 Human Rights Watch, Prisoners of the Past: Kuwaiti Bidun and the Burden of Statelessness, 13 June 2011, url,
p.14

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live in precarious conditions and have only tents as shelter. These Bidoons seem toignore the possibility for them to regularize their situation, while others have rejected
the Iraqi nationality and continue to claim their Kuwaiti origins and rights in
Kuwait.’1196
The IILHR1197 and the Special Rapporteur on minority issues to the UN Human Rights Council
noted a disturbing lack of information about the circumstances of the Bidoon community in
Iraq.1198

3.4.12 Fayli Kurds
MRG stated that around 1.5 million Fayli Kurds live in Iraq1199, whereas USCIRF estimates the
population of Fayli Kurds residing in Iraq at 2.5 million.1200
In a May 2013 report the IILHR stated that the Fayli Kurds are a Shia Muslim community living
mainly in Baghdad, Central Iraq, and the south, inhabiting the border areas between Iraq and
Iran on both sides of the Zagros mountains for centuries. An estimated one million Fayli Kurds
currently live in the greater Baghdad area. Under the former Ba’ath regime, the Fayli Kurds
faced ‘systematic marginalization’ and targeted discrimination from the state. Accused ofbeing agents of Iran, Fayli Kurds were stripped of their citizenship and 300 000 were expelled
to Iran. Sources report that the ‘persecution’ of Fayli Kurds under the Baath era largely
decreased since 2003, resulting in the return of many Fayli Kurds to Iraq. Although their rightto nationality was restored in 2006, the process to obtain nationality documentation andreclaim lost property is reportedly cumbersome.1201 DFAT similarly reported that legislation to
return citizenship is in place, however the process ‘can be administratively complex if an
individual lacks sufficient documentation to demonstrate Iraqi origin’.1202
The Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration claimed in 2013 that 97 % of the Fayli Kurds
had their nationality restored.1203 However, MRG noted that these figures have not been
demonstrated1204, and further referred to statistics from the Minister of Immigration showingthat between April 2003 and 2013 only 16 580 Fayli Kurds had their nationality reinstated, andonly 6 853 were in possession of national identification, in contrast to the estimatedpopulation of at least 150 000 Fayli Kurds that were denaturalised during the Ba’ath era.1205
The same source estimated in 2014 that it is likely that hundreds of families of Fayli Kurds
remain stateless.1206

1196 Australia, Refugee Review Tribunal, Country advice: Iraq – IRQ37184- Bidoons – UNHCR advice, 9 September

2010, url.
1197 IILHR, Iraq’s Minorities and Other Vulnerable Groups: Legal Framework, Documentation and Human Rights,
May 2013, url, p. 69.
1198 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues on her mission to Iraq
[A/HRC/34/53/Add.1], 9 January 2017, url, p. 13.
1199 MRG, Iraq. Faili Kurds, November 2017, url.
1200 USCIRF, Wilting in the Kurdish Sun. The Hopes and Fears of Religious Minorities in Northern Iraq, May 2017,
available at: url, p. 27.
1201 IILHR, Iraq's Minorities and Other Vulnerable Groups: Legal Framework, Documentation and Human Rights,
May 2013, url, pp. 89-95; MRG, Iraq. Faili Kurds, November 2017, url.
1202 Australia, DFAT Country Information Report Iraq, 9 October 2018, url, pp. 12-13.
1203 Ekurd, The displacement ministry restores the nationality to 97% of Faili Kurds, 4 February 2013, url.
1204 MRG, Iraq. Faili Kurds, November 2017, url.
1205 MRG, Iraq. Faili Kurds, November 2017, url.
1206 MRG, From Crisis to Catastrophe: the situation of minorities in Iraq, October 2014, url, p. 24.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 151

DFAT, referring to ‘local sources’, noted that societal discrimination against Fayli Kurds occurs,
and communities that are dominated by other ethnic or religious groups tend to not welcome
Fayli Kurds, as well as other religious and ethnic minorities.1207 According to The Al-Khoei
Foundation, a Shia non-governmental organisation, the ‘Fayli Kurds have been constantly
persecuted by ISIL, including the destruction of their places of worship.’ Thousands have been
displaced and have sought refuge in Dohuk, Arbil, Najaf and Karbala.1208 According to the
Kurdish news website Rudaw harassment of Fayli Kurds in Baghdad intensified after the
Kurdistan Region set a date for its independence referendum. As a consequence, a number ofthem moved to Kurdistan.1209
Rudaw stated that an estimated 10 000 Fayli Kurds live in Kurdistan.1210 In 2017, Rudaw
reported that harassment of Fayli Kurds in Baghdad intensified after the KRI set a date for its
independence referendum. As a consequence, a number of them moved to Kurdistan.1211 In
May 2018, a Kurdish family (the man was Fayli Kurd), was murdered in a neighbourhood in
Baghdad. No motives for the murder was identified in the article. However, the same article
referred to a statement of a Kurdish member of the Iraqi Parliament who in 2017 had claimed
that Fayli Kurds in southern Iraq were ‘increasingly facing threats at both the governmental
and local levels, where they are asked to reject their ethnicity’.1212
The Danish Immigration Service noted in 2016 that some Fayli Kurds joined a Shia militia thatis often in conflict with the Peshmerga forces. As a consequence, the Peshmerga fail to protect
Fayli Kurds.1213

3.4.13 Roma1214
IILHR stated that Roma are ‘among the most vulnerable, disfavoured and at-risk of all the
marginalized groups in Iraq’. Also known under the highly derogatory term Kawliyah, there
are no accurate demographic data on the Roma community in Iraq, with estimates ranging
between 50 000 and 200 000.1215 According to 2017 estimates, the Roma population isapproximately 100 000, the majority living in Diwanieh City, Al Zuhour Village (Al-Qadisiyah
Governorate).1216 They are also reported to be living in isolated villages and neighbourhoods
around major cities, including Baghdad, Mosul, Basrah, and elsewhere in southern Iraq.1217

1207 Australia, DFAT Country Information Report Iraq, 9 October 2018, url, pp. 12-13.
1208 Imam Al-Khoei Foundation, Written statement submitted by the Al-Khoei Foundation, a non-governmentalorganization in general consultative status; Persecuted Minorities and IDPs in Iraq [25 May 2015][A/HRC/29/NGO/95], 10 June 2015, url, pp. 3-4.
1209 Rudaw, Baghdad’s Faili Kurds threatened, forced out over referendum, 13 August 2017, url.
1210 Rudaw, In no man’s land; Faili Kurds rally for recognition in Erbil, 16 February 2016, url.
1211 Rudaw, Baghdad’s Faili Kurds threatened, forced out over referendum, 13 August 2017, url.
1212 Kurdistan24, Kurdish family found dead under mysterious circumstances in Baghdad, 6 May 2018, url.
1213 Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI); fact finding mission, 26 September to 6 October 2015, 12 April
2016, url, p. 43.
1214 Also referred to as Dom, or Gypsies. IILHR, Iraq's Minorities and Other Vulnerable Groups: Legal Framework,
Documentation and Human Rights, May 2013, url, pp. 126-133; Iraqi Al-Amal Association; Al-Namaa Center for
Human Rights (Author), published by CERD – UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Civil
Society Organizations' Report on Racial Discrimination in Iraq, October 2018, url, p. 5.
1215 IILHR, Iraq's Minorities and Other Vulnerable Groups: Legal Framework, Documentation and Human Rights,
May 2013, url, pp. 126-133.
1216 Iraqi Al-Amal Association; Al-Namaa Center for Human Rights (Author), published by CERD – UN Committee on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Civil Society Organizations' Report on Racial Discrimination in Iraq,
October 2018, url, p. 5
1217 IILHR, Iraq's Minorities and Other Vulnerable Groups: Legal Framework, Documentation and Human Rights,
May 2013, url, pp. 126-133.

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In a 2018 article Reuters reports the Roma in Iraq live a ‘precarious existence’, are ‘scornedby many Muslims’ and ‘barely tolerated by the rest of society’. The same source further notesthat ‘lacking education or skills, they form one of the lower rungs of Iraq’s social system, andare not granted Iraqi citizenship.’1218 Roma who lack Iraqi nationality cannot hold any politicalposts.1219 USDOS lists Roma as a community vulnerable to statelessness in Iraq.1220
Iraqi NGOs reported to the UNCERD in 2018 that Roma ‘suffer from discrimination andexclusion by the public authorities, including denial of services and employment. A large
percentage of gypsy Iraqis live in disastrous conditions, lacking basic needs such as water,electricity, health care and sufficient nutrition. There are also high rates of illiteracy within the
gypsy community.’1221
According to the IILHR, the group faces ‘extreme poverty, lack of education and access to basic
services, eviction, and exploitation’.1222 Increasing Islamist fundamentalism and Islamist
militant groups since 2003 have exacerbated the ‘humanitarian and security crisis within thecommunity’; they have experienced targeted violence, harassment, assault and exploitation
forced from Islamist groups and tribal groups, forcing many Roma to leave their places origin.
The same source notes that ‘many Roma remain internally displaced and live on squatted land
without access to clean water, electricity, adequate shelter, healthcare, adequate food,education and other basic services.’ Roma women face a high risk of sexual assault, few Romachildren are enrolled in school.1223 MRG notes that under the Saddam Hussein regime Roma
were forced to work as entertainers and in prostitution. Because of this, they have come undertargeted attack by Islamic militias since 2003.1224
The Special Rapporteur on minority issues to the UN Human Rights Council notes a disturbing
lack of information about the circumstances of the Roma community in Iraq.1225

3.4.14 Jews
Reuters reported in April 2018 that the numbers of Iraq’s Jewish community have dwindled
to single numbers. In 1947, a year before Israel’s birth, Iraq’s Jewish community numberedaround 150 000.1226 According to USDOS, the number of Jewish citizens living in Baghdad is‘very small’, and unofficial statistics from the KRG Ministry of Endowments and Religious
Affairs estimated that there were approximately 430 Jewish families residing in IKR.1227

1218 Reuters, Children of Iraq’s Kawliya return to school after 14 year break, 17 April 2018, url.
1219 Iraqi Al-Amal Association; Al-Namaa Center for Human Rights (Author), published by CERD – UN Committee on

the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Civil Society Organizations' Report on Racial Discrimination in Iraq,
October 2018, url, p. 5.
1220 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Iraq, 20 April 2018, url.
1221 Iraqi Al-Amal Association/Al-Namaa Center for Human Rights, published by CERD – UN Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Civil Society Organizations' Report on Racial Discrimination in Iraq, October
2018, url, p. 2.
1222 IILHR, Iraq's Minorities and Other Vulnerable Groups: Legal Framework, Documentation and Human Rights,
May 2013, url, pp. 126-133.
1223 IILHR, Iraq's Minorities and Other Vulnerable Groups: Legal Framework, Documentation and Human Rights,
May 2013, url, pp. 126-133.
1224 MRG, Iraq’s Minorities: Participation in Public Life, 28 November 2011, url, p. 9.
1225 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues on her mission to Iraq
[A/HRC/34/53/Add.1], 9 January 2017, url, p. 13.
1226 Reuters, With Jews largely gone in Iraq, memories survive in Israel, 18 April 2018, url.
1227 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Iraq, 20 April 2018, url.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 153

The New York Times reports the Jewish community in Baghdad, once the community’s heart,cannot muster even a minyan, the ten Jewish men required to perform some of the mostimportant rituals of their faith. The community is scared even to publicize their exact number,which was estimated at seven by the Jewish Agency for Israel, and at eight by one Christiancleric.1228
In January 2018, ABC News published a reportage on the remaining Jews in Baghdad. The last
synagogue of Baghdad was described as possibly ‘the most secret location in all of Baghdad’,
and most of the population in the neighbourhood of its location are unaware of thesynagogue’s existence. According to the author, no one visits the synagogue since it would be
too dangerous for the community to gather in one place. Furthermore, the reportage statedthat most of the remaining Jews in Baghdad live ‘Anne Frank-style’, i.e. in hiding.1229
In an article by Rudaw a Kurdish Jewish man attending an art exhibition in Erbil wasinterviewed. According to the man called David approximately 700 Jewish families remain in
the Kurdistan Region. On general attitudes the interviewee stated: ‘They call us “Ben Jews” or“Sons of Jews” because we are mixed Jews, Kurds, or other ethnicities.’ He further claimed
that Jews in Kurdistan keep their Jewish identity hidden due to fear of persecution. Religious
holy days are celebrated in private home, and they meet for Shabbat at different homes every
week. The cultural event the interviewee was attending was organised by many of the Jewish
community, however ‘they didn't want to give their name or picture because of the dangerous
situation’ according to him.1230 David stated that he did not feel threatened in Erbil, but that
he had faced problems in the past when a journalist wrote about him and posted his photo
online. ‘When the article was translated into Arabic, they saw my article in Baghdad […] When
Baghdad knew there were Jews living here, they accused me of working with Mossad, Israeli
intelligence, and issued an arrest warrant against me. […] Orders came from Baghdad that if
they catch me, they will cut off my hands and behead me.’1231
The territory of Iraq entails many important Jewish sites, and some of the persons that were
evicted from the country, and their descendants, show an interest in returning to Iraq.1232 In
Al-Monitor and Al Arbaiya reported on a number of Iraqi Jews in exile organised to officiallydemand a restoration of their Iraqi citizenship.1233 Haaretz reported on Iraqi Jews applying for
Iraqi passports in London and Israel in 2017.1234 On 2 June 2018, the Shiite leader Muqtada alSadr spoke out on social media favouring the return of the Jews that were evicted from Iraq.
As a response to a question on whether Jews have the right to return to Iraq, published on
one of his social media platforms the Shiite leader stated: ‘If their loyalty was to Iraq, they arewelcome.’1235

3.4.15 Palestinians
The Palestinian population in Iraq is estimated between 10 000 to 15 000 with the majority
residing in the districts of al-Baladiyat and Zafarania in Baghdad, and smaller numbers located1228 New York Times (The), Baghdad Jews have become a fearful few, 1 June 2008, url.
1229 ABC News, Vanishing History Baghdad’s Last 21 Jews, 30 January 2018, url.
1230 Rudaw, Kurdistan’s Jewish community still fears persecution, , 30 November 2018, url.
1231 Rudaw, Kurdistan’s Jewish community still fears persecution, , 30 November 2018, url.
1232 The Arab Weekly, ‘Remember Baghdad’ Tells the story of Iraqi Jews, 8 July 2018, url.
1233 Al-Monitor, Iraqi Jews organizing to regain citizenship, 31 August 2018, url: Al Arabiya, Back to the roots: Iraqi

Jews want their citizenship reinstated, 3 September 2018, url.
1234 Haaretz, Decades After Fleeing, Iraqi Jews Plan to Return to Their Homeland, , 17 December 2017, url.
1235 Al-Monitor, Sadr welcomes return of Iraqi Jews, 11 June 2018, url.

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near Mosul, Basrah and Sulaimaniyah.1236 According to DFAT, writing in 2018, ‘the Iraqi
Government does not recognize Palestinians as refugees, although legislation does provide
protections for Palestinians including the right to access the same services as other refugeecommunities.’1237
After the fall of the government of Saddam Hussein in April 2003 the Palestinians became thetarget of hostility and harassment, particularly by armed militia, ‘on account of their perceived
association with and preferential treatment by the former regime, as well as their perceived
support for Sunni militant groups’1238 which led to thousands of Palestinians fleeing Iraq,
mainly to Syria and Jordan.1239 The situation of Palestinians reportedly improved between
2008 and 2012 but the escalation of violence since 2014 as a result of ISIL advances and therise of Shia militias has brought a deterioration of the security and human rights situation for
Palestinians.1240
In correspondence with EASO on 6 December 2017, the UNHCR stated the following:‘Pursuant to Decree 202 of 2001, Palestinians who arrived in Iraq in 1948 were to be“treated as Iraqi citizens in rights and duties”, with the exception of the right to obtain
Iraqi nationality. Palestinians nevertheless enjoyed an otherwise broad range of rights
in Iraq, including the right to work, own property, obtain travel documents and accesspublic health care and education. Palestinians who arrived in Iraq in 1967 and later do
not have the same rights; however, they have access to public services and work in
private sector. Following the fall of former President Saddam Hussein in 2003, theabovementioned legislation remained in force. Despite the legal rights outlined,
however, in practice Palestinians have since often been prevented from accessing or
enjoying these rights. Since 2003, many Palestinians have been dismissed from theirjobs both in public and the private sector and faced widespread discrimination
regarding access to the job market.’1241
A COI report by UNHCR noted in 2018 that due to their nationality and perceived support of
ISIL and other Sunni armed groups, Palestinians in Baghdad are subjected to illegal detention,
kidnapping, killings, disappearances, ill treatment and threats.1242 At EASO’s practicalcooperation meeting on Iraq in April 2017 Joost Hiltermann, Program Director, Middle East &North Africa, at the International Crisis Group, noted without giving detailed information that
‘Palestinians in Baghdad were targeted as allies of Saddam Hussein, and now as allies of theIS.’1243 In 2017 Palestinians living in Iraq expressed fears of reprisals as a number of social
media activists revived accusations that ‘Palestinians have joined the Islamic State (IS) and arecarrying out suicide attacks.’1244
In March 2018 UNHCR recorded 69 cases of Palestinians being detained, many on suspicionof terrorist activities, mostly without formal charges.1245 As of March 2017 UNHCR had
recorded 47 Palestinians known to be in detention or missing, with the majority being
1236 Norway, Landinfo/Sweden, Lifos, Palestinians in Iraq, Palestinians in Iraq, 7 March 2014, url, p. 6.
1237 Australia, DFAT Country Information Report Iraq, 9 October 2018, url, p. 13
1238 UNHCR, Relevant COI on the Situation of Palestinian Refugees in Baghdad, 30 March 2017, url, p. 1.
1239 UNHCR, Relevant COI on the Situation of Palestinian Refugees in Baghdad, 30 March 2017, url, p. 1.
1240 UNHCR, Relevant COI on the Situation of Palestinian Refugees in Baghdad, 30 March 2017, url, pp. 1-2
1241 EASO COI Query Response, Iraq: Palestinians in Iraq, 4 January 2018, url.
1242 UNHCR, Relevant COI on the Situation of Palestinian Refugees in Baghdad, 30 March 2017, url, p. 2.
1243 Hiltermann, J., EASO, Practical Cooperation Meeting on Iraq, 25-26 April 2017, url, p. 12.
1244 Al-Monitor, Old fears rise again about Palestinians in Iraq, 29 August 2017, url.
1245 UNHCR, UNHCR-Kurzinformation zur Situation von PalästinenserInnen im Irak, 27 April 2018, url, p. 4.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 155

detained by the ISF on suspicion of terrorist activities.1246 Noting that most cases go
unreported, UNHCR further documented 74 security incidents involving Palestinian refugees
between January 2014 and February 2017, that included ‘26 detentions, three
disappearances, three abductions, five killings, two attempted murders, two cases of physicalabuse, three cases of SGBV and 30 cases of threats to life’.1247
According to DFAT, writing in 2018, Palestinians ‘face similar issues to other refugee and IDP
communities in Iraq, such as being targeted by armed groups and livelihood challenges suchas excessive rental costs. Palestinians have reported mistreatment at the hands of theauthorities, although the number and severity of such allegations have markedly decreased
since 2006.’1248 Abuses by militias and other non-state actors such as confiscation of property
or evictions were also reported. Because of the risk of arbitrary arrests at checkpoints, many
Palestinians remain in Al-Baladiyat, hampering their access to education and the labour
market.1249 USDOS noted that denominational groups, extremists, criminals and, in somealleged but unverified cases, government forces have attacked and detained refugees,
including Palestinians.1250 The 2016 country report of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign
Affairs notes that Palestinians face militia violence, including abductions and forced
confessions after arrest.1251

3.5 Gender-based targeting
According to the Bertelsmann Stiftung1252 report BTI 2018 - Iraq, ‘conservative patriarchalsocial norms and the domination of religious values across communities in Iraq pose obstacles
to women’s effective participation in various aspects of social life.’1253 In a November 2015
report MRG notes that against a backdrop of armed conflict and spiralling sectarian violence,‘the family remains the number one perpetrator of violence against women in Iraq.’1254 In a
March 2014 report the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Womennotes its concern about ‘the persistence of deep-rooted patriarchal attitudes and stereotypes
in respect of women’s roles and responsibilities which discriminate against women andperpetuate their subordination within the family and society and have been exacerbated by
the sectarian and religious divisions’.1255
Human rights violations against women in Iraq include rape, domestic violence, female genital
mutilation/cutting, honour killings, temporary marriages, sexual abuse and discrimination.1256
Reporting on the status of human rights in Iraq in the July to December 2017 period UNAMI
noted that ‘women in Iraq continue to face many challenges including discrimination, which
adversely impacts on their ability to fully and equally participate in the political, social and1246 UNHCR, Relevant COI on the Situation of Palestinian Refugees in Baghdad, 30 March 2017, url, p. 3.
1247 UNHCR, Relevant COI on the Situation of Palestinian Refugees in Baghdad, 30 March 2017, url, p. 2. (footnote

9)1248 Australia, DFAT Country Information Report Iraq, 9 October 2018, url, p. 13.
1249 UNHCR, UNHCR-Kurzinformation zur Situation von PalästinenserInnen im Irak, 27 April 2018, url, p. 4.
1250 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Iraq, 20 April 2018, url.
1251 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Algemeen ambtsbericht Irak, 14 November 2016, url, pp. 81-82.
1252 An independent foundation that funds projects aimed at social reform of value to the public, as explained on

their website.
1253 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2016; Iraq Country Report, 2016, url, p. 22.
1254 MRG, The Lost Women of Iraq: Family-based violence during armed conflict, 4 November 2015, url, p. 4.
1255 CEDAW, Concluding observations on the combined fourth to sixth periodic reports of Iraq
[CEDAW/C/IRQ/CO/4-6], 10 March 2014, url, p. 7.
1256 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Iraq, 20 April 2018, url.

156 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

economic life of the country.’1257 The same source also mentioned continued reports ofwomen and girls being murdered in so-called ‘honour crimes’.1258 In a previous report UNAMI
noted that women ‘continue to be subjected to violence of all forms, including in particularsexual and gender-based violence. There are currently no effective legal or policy frameworks
which prevent sexual and gender-based violence or protect the survivors of violence, or lawsthat ensure accountability for the perpetrators of violence.’1259
A November 2018 DIS/Landinfo report notes the prevalence of domestic violence and honour
conflicts has increased in the KRI. The economic crisis due to the conflict with ISIL was cited as
one of the reasons for this increase.1260 Victims of honour crimes and domestic violence areoften reluctant to approach the authorities.1261
When seeking protection, the DIS/Landinfo report notes women in KRI are met with different
types of reactions from the authorities:‘In some cases, the police will send the woman back to her family, or they will tell herthat this is a family issue, or try to calm the woman down and ask her to talk to herfamily. Or, the police may blame the woman for the harassment or violence herself.
Furthermore, women risk being harassed by some staff at the police stations and her
intentions will be questioned. Moreover, a husband may threaten to take the children
if the wife reports a violent act.’1262
The Iraqi High Commission for Human Rights noted in a 2018 report that ‘the Iraqi reality still
discriminates against minority women due to the social environment, weak or lack of cultureof rejection of hatred, extremism and racism, and lack of public awareness of gender issues
and women's participation where the taken measures to monitor, prevent and combat all
forms of discrimination against women belonging to minority groups remain weak and do notrise to the scale of the problem.’1263
Mark Lattimer explained at EASO’s practical cooperation meeting on Iraq in April 2017 that‘women are generally expected to be deferential to men’, and they shouldn’t travel without
being accompanied by a male relative or act independently. Some of the violence during theconflict has been specifically aimed at women due to their conduct being considered politicallyor morally illicit. For instance, militia have killed women at venues claimed to be brothels or
because they wore ‘the wrong clothes’. Lattimer estimates that any woman living outside ofa family community in Iraqi society is at risk of violence.1264
Findings from a 2016 United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) assessment across eight
governorates in Iraq revealed that ‘gender-based violence is pervasive in IDP and refugeecommunities across all governorates and disproportionately affects women and girls. Violence

1257 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, pp. 12-13.
1258 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, pp. 12-13.
1259 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – January to June 2017, 14 December 2017, url, p. 11.
1260 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Women and men in honour-related conflicts,

9 November 2018, url, p. 7.
1261 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Women and men in honour-related conflicts,
9 November 2018, url, p. 18.
1262 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Women and men in honour-related conflicts,
9 November 2018, url, p. 18.
1263 Iraq, IHCHR, Report on Iraq's Compliance with the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, 2018, url, p. 18.
1264 Lattimer, M., EASO, Practical Cooperation Meeting on Iraq, 25-26 April 2017, url, pp. 21-22.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 157

directed at women and girls within family is normalized and legitimized by survivors,
perpetrators and communities through reference to cultural and religious norms.’1265
MRG notes that victims seeking redress often encounter disinterest from police and judicial
authorities when seeking assistance from authorities:‘Attempts to seek redress in cases of violence against women are undermined by aweak and ineffective judicial system and outdated laws that excuse or legitimize
attacks against women. When such cases are brought before the court, perpetrators
are often acquitted or given very mild sentences for grievous crimes against women,even in the face of clear evidence. However, the large majority of cases never make it
before the judicial system. In Iraq, violence against women in the home is considereda private matter and strong cultural taboos prevent victims from speaking out. Police
responsible for receiving reports of violence against women often sympathize withmale family members and are unable or unwilling to protect female victims fromfurther attacks. These factors combine to act as a strong deterrent for women toreport incidents of violence.’1266
In July 2015 the UN Human Rights Council reported that ‘in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, thefull realization of women’s rights continues to be hindered by a number of factors, including
deep-rooted patriarchal norms, legislative gaps and a culture of silence.’1267

3.5.1 Domestic violence
In its 2018 World Report Human Rights Watch notes that women’s rights organisations
continue to report a high rate of domestic violence in Iraq. Although Iraq’s criminal code
includes provisions criminalising physical assault, explicit mention of domestic violence islacking. As such, women have few legal protections to shield them from domestic violence.1268
According to USDOS, writing in 2018, in Iraq there is no law prohibiting domestic violence
which remained a pervasive problem. Legal personnel who sought to pursue domestic
violence cases under laws criminalising assault was subjected to harassment.1269
Domestic violence receives widespread societal acceptance in Iraq and Article 41 of the Penal
Code reinforces such cultural attitudes by allowing a husband to resort to physical violenceagainst his wife within certain limits prescribed by law or by custom.1270 Mark Lattimer
explained at EASO’s practical cooperation meeting on Iraq in April 2017 that:‘Under the legislative environment, there are provisions under the penal code, code
11, which dates to 1969, which engrains the position of women in Iraqi society as
being the property of their men. Article 41 gives husbands a legal right to punish theirwives, leading to the phenomena of domestic violence across Iraq, which is extreme,

1265 UNPF, A report on the GBV assessment in conflict affected governorates in Iraq, November 2016, url, p. 7.
1266 MRG, The Lost Women of Iraq: Family-based violence during armed conflict, 4 November 2015, url, pp. 4- 5.
1267 UN Human Rights Council, Technical assistance provided to assist in the promotion and protection of humanrights in Iraq; Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights [A/HRC/30/66], 27 July 2015, url,
p. 7.
1268 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2018 - Iraq, 18 January 2018, url.
1269 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Iraq, 20 April 2018, url.
1270 International Women's Human Rights Clinic at the City University of New York School of Law, et. al, Women's
Human Rights Violations in Iraq, 31 August 2015, url, p. 12; MRG, The Lost Women of Iraq: Family-based violence
during armed conflict, 4 November 2015, url, p. 7.

158 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

and across the country. In terms of the bodies of women arriving in morgues andmedico-legal institutes, we think that approximately 1,000 women are killed or more
every year in Iraq due to domestic violence.’1271
In 2011, the Kurdish parliament passed a law against domestic violence, considered as asignificant advancement for women’s rights in the region and providing a legal basis for a wide
variety of violent acts to be prosecuted as criminal offences.1272 USDOS noted that ‘KRG law
criminalizes domestic violence, including physical and psychological abuse, threats ofviolence, and spousal rape’ and has implemented the provisions of the law, such as creatinga special police force for investigating cases and shelters for victims.1273 NGOs pointed out thatthe measures were not effective at combating gender-based violence.1274
Sources interviewed by the DIS/Landinfo during their 2018 fact-finding mission to the KRI
explained that barriers for the implementation of the KRI law on domestic violence are ‘thepatriarchal mentality of the society as well as the discriminatory mind-set of the judges
towards women’ but also the fact that men hold key posts ‘in politics, in the judiciary as wellas in the police’.1275 The report further noted that the rate of domestic violence has increasedin the KRI due to ‘abuse of mass communication, the financial crisis and the fact that womenare not familiar with their basic rights yet’.1276 In tribal areas in the KRI such as Ranya, Qaladze,
Peshdar, Chamchamal and Erbil women are considered to be more under control anddomestic violence is also common.1277
Reporting on the status of human rights in Iraq in the July to December 2017 period, UNAMI
noted in there were approximately 3 400 domestic violence cases reported to the police in2017 and 3 200 in 2016.1278 Minority Rights Group points out women’s lack of awareness of
their legal rights still leaves many cases unreported. Furthermore, ‘when women do filecomplaints or bring cases to court, endemic problems in the police and justice system often
lead to outcomes in favor of men.’ ‘Moreover, the justice process is prone to manipulation by
powerful husbands and their families. With no victim or witness protection programs in place,
women are often harassed and threatened not to give evidence in the run-up to court
procedures.’1279
MRG further notes that the overall climate of violence, deteriorating economic circumstances,
the resurgence of tribalism and the militarisation of society have translated into high levels ofviolence perpetrated within the home.1280 Often, but not exclusively, such violence isperpetrated by the husband. Research shows it may consist of verbal or emotional abuse,physical violence, sexual abuse, economic deprivation, control over a woman’s movements,
preventing the woman or girl from completing her education or from working and/or other1271 Lattimer, M., cited in: EASO, Practical Cooperation Meeting on Iraq, 25-26 April 2017, url, pp. 21-22.
1272 MRG, The Lost Women of Iraq: Family-based violence during armed conflict, 4 November 2015, url, p. 9.
1273 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Iraq, 20 April 2018, url.
1274 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Iraq, 20 April 2018, url.
1275 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Women and men in honour-related conflicts,

9 November 2018, url, p. 15.
1276 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Women and men in honour-related conflicts,
9 November 2018, url, p. 48.
1277 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Women and men in honour-related conflicts,
9 November 2018, url, p. 42.
1278 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, p. 12.
1279 MRG, The Lost Women of Iraq: Family-based violence during armed conflict, 4 November 2015, url, p. 19.
1280 MRG, The Lost Women of Iraq: Family-based violence during armed conflict, 4 November 2015, url, p. 11.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 159

forms of abuse.1281 MRG further adds: ‘Despite the widespread prevalence of domestic
violence, most victims do not report their experience to any authority. The dominant culture
in Iraq views domestic violence as a private matter within the family, and even a legitimate
part of married life.’1282
Regarding the possibility of redress for the victims of domestic violence MRG notes:‘Strong social taboos and family pressures prevent victims from speaking about abusein the home and from reporting such instances to the authorities. Moreover, given
the overall weakness of the judicial authorities and their low regard for female victims,
women are unlikely to receive a helpful response even if they do report domestic
violence.’1283

3.5.2 Forced and early marriage
USDOS reports that ‘the legal minimum age of marriage is 15 with parental permission and 18
without’ and although the government tried to enforce the law, traditional forced marriagesof girls occurred throughout the country.1284 According to UNICEF data for 2011-2016
approximately 5 % of children were married by the age of 15 and 24 % before the age of 18.1285
Mark Lattimer explained at EASO’s practical cooperation meeting on Iraq in April 2017 that:‘Early marriage is another concern that is rising in Iraq. Different Iraqi officials
estimate that the number of girls that are married at age 15 or below is around 10 %in areas outside Kurdistan. This is a significant rate of child marriage in Iraq. Certainly,
at the age of 18 or so, about 50 % or so are likely married. There is a growing trend of
marrying younger women as a measure of family security.’1286
According to sources interviewed during 2018 DIS/Landinfo fact-finding mission to the KRI,
the average age of marriage in rural areas is 19 for men and 17 for women while in urban
areas men will marry in their late twenties and women will marry around the age of 24-28
years.1287 The same source noted that forced marriages usually take place before the age of
25 years, although in rare cases unmarried women older than 25 could also be in risk of amarriage if they have a relationship their father doesn’t approve.1288 Women cannot choose
whom to marry and usually will have to agree to marry a man chosen by their family. In somecases forced marriages consist of a ‘trade’ in which two brothers marry two sisters or
exchange marriage where ‘a female is married of exchange of a bride for a male in her
family.’1289 In some case forced marriages result in the woman committing suicide.1290

1281 MRG, The Lost Women of Iraq: Family-based violence during armed conflict, 4 November 2015, url, p. 11.
1282 MRG, The Lost Women of Iraq: Family-based violence during armed conflict, 4 November 2015, url, p. 13.
1283 MRG, The Lost Women of Iraq: Family-based violence during armed conflict, 4 November 2015, url, p. 16.
1284 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Iraq, 20 April 2018, url.
1285 UNICEF, The State of World’s Children 2017, December 2017, url, p. 191.
1286 Lattimer, M., cited in: EASO, Practical Cooperation Meeting on Iraq, 25-26 April 2017, url, p. 22.
1287 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Women and men in honour-related conflicts,

9 November 2018, url, p. 35.
1288 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Women and men in honour-related conflicts,
9 November 2018, url, p. 35.
1289 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Women and men in honour-related conflicts,
9 November 2018, url, p. 35.
1290 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Women and men in honour-related conflicts,
9 November 2018, url, p. 35.

160 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALSThe DIS/Landinfo report further noted that in the KRI forced marriage is widespread in areas
like Germian, Ranya, Dohuk, Erbil and rural area around Sulaimaniyah.1291 Child marriage isencountered among Kurdish and Arab IDPs, as fathers usually marry off daughters for
economic reasons and to maintain the family’s honour.1292
Especially in rural areas, forced and early marriages continue to take place in Kurdistan in large
numbers as well. According to MRG ‘the practice finds sanction in tribal traditions, such as the
tradition of “jin be jin” (a woman for a woman), in which brides are exchanged between tribes
in order to avoid the payment of dowries.’1293 The tradition of forced marriage as a method ofresolving tribal disputes is also practiced. Although illegal according to the Domestic Violence
Act, these practices continue to take place because the contracts are concluded without the
involvement of the courts and the justice system.1294 The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign
Affairs reports widowed women may be taken in by their own family or by their in-laws.1295
Musawah, a global movement for equality and justice in the Muslim family launched in
February 2009, noted in a March 2014 report that rates of marriages involving minor girls haveincreased dramatically in Iraq since 2003, due to the deteriorating economic and security
conditions, and the increase of poverty and illiteracy. The same source further stated that ‘Aswith many countries that have set the minimum age of marriage at 18, Iraq also provides foran exception to that minimum age upon parental consent or court’s authorization. This has
led to the continuing practice of child marriage.’1296 MRG also notes an increase in rates offorced and early marriages. Although both are illegal in Iraq, ‘forced marriages and earlymarriages take place at alarmingly high rates because they are performed by clerics outside
the jurisdiction of the courts’. As such, girls who find themselves in such marriages face thelegal disadvantages which result from unregistered marriages.1297
MRG goes on to note that the phenomenon of early marriages is most pronounced in thepoorer governorates of South and Central Iraq.1298 Furthermore, ‘once an early and forced
marriage has been consummated, it is no longer legally void’, and victims can only leave suchmarriages by pursuing legal measures. Since doing so could open them to retribution fromtheir families and the law does not provide any protection for victims following a complaint,
this is an option few women choose.1299

3.5.3 Honour-based violence
In her June 2018 report of an official visit to Iraq (14-23 November 2017) the Special
Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions defines honour killing as the‘arbitrary deprivation of life of women and girls (but possibly also men and boys) by (male)family members or tribal members, because they are deemed to have brought shame or

1291 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Women and men in honour-related conflicts,

9 November 2018, url, p. 35.
1292 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Women and men in honour-related conflicts,
9 November 2018, url, p. 38.
1293 MRG, The Lost Women of Iraq: Family-based violence during armed conflict, 4 November 2015, url, p. 25.
1294 MRG, The Lost Women of Iraq: Family-based violence during armed conflict, 4 November 2015, url, p. 25.
1295 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Algemeen ambtsbericht Irak, 14 November 2016, url, p. 78.
1296 Musawah, Musawah Thematic Report on Article 16: Iraq, February 2014, url, p. 7.
1297 MRG, The Lost Women of Iraq: Family-based violence during armed conflict, 4 November 2015, url, p. 23.
1298 MRG, The Lost Women of Iraq: Family-based violence during armed conflict, 4 November 2015, url, pp. 20-24.
1299 MRG, The Lost Women of Iraq: Family-based violence during armed conflict, 4 November 2015, url, p. 24.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 161“dishonor” on the family or tribe’.1300 Although the scale of honour killings in Iraq is unknown
due to severe underreporting, the estimates that several hundreds of girls and women
become victims of honour killings in Iraq each year. The Special Rapporteur was informed that
‘this issue affects all parts of the country, cutting through religious and ethnic divides, with astrong tribal element and linked with the strong patriarchal society.’1301 UNAMI also reported
in 2018 that ‘the killing of women and girls to protect the “honour” of the family continued,
as does the fact the police appear to be reluctant to meaningfully investigate such
incidents.’1302
Grounded in the cultural belief that women’s bodies are the site of honour and that theirsexuality and movement must be strictly controlled in order to avoid bringing dishonour upon
the entire family, honour crimes are acts of violence perpetrated by family members against
a relative who is perceived to have brought shame upon the family or tribe.1303 MRG reports
in 2015 that women are the main victims of such crimes, which are overwhelmingly
perpetrated by male family members, although occasionally males are also the victims of such
violence.1304
Honour crimes are most often perpetrated after a woman has committed or is suspected ofcommitting any of the following transgressions: ‘engaging in friendships or pre-marital
relationships with a member of the opposite sex; refusing to marry a man chosen by thefamily; marrying against the family’s wishes; committing adultery; or being a victim of rape or
kidnapping’.1305 In Iraq, honour crimes often take the form of murder, although they also canencompass other forms of violence. Sometimes families will compel a female member
accused of wrongdoing to kill herself as an alternative to carrying out the killing themselves(hence, the large numbers of female suicides, especially by self-immolation in Iraq).1306
Honour crimes take place in all areas of Iraq and cut across ethnic and religious lines. Because
many honour crimes are unreported or disguised by the family as accidents or suicides, it isdifficult to assess the true scale of their incidence.1307 Minority Rights Group adds that ‘as ageneral rule, crimes go unreported and unprosecuted and are seen by the police and the
judicial authorities as falling within the responsibility and discretion of male family
members.’1308 If prosecution does take place, the Iraqi Penal Code allows mitigated sentences
for perpetrators of crimes against women in which ‘honour’ was a motive.1309
A November 2018 DIS/Landinfo report notes that honour crimes are underreported in KRI andacademic studies on the extent of the practice are lacking.1310 Several sources explained that
‘honour crimes, including honour killings are more frequent in smaller towns and rural areas

1300 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions

on her mission to Iraq [A/HRC/38/44/Add.1], 20 June 2018, url, p. 10.
1301 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions
on her mission to Iraq [A/HRC/38/44/Add.1], 20 June 2018, url, p. 10 .
1302 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, p. vii.
1303 MRG, The Lost Women of Iraq: Family-based violence during armed conflict, 4 November 2015, url, pp. 26-27.
1304 MRG, The Lost Women of Iraq: Family-based violence during armed conflict, 4 November 2015, url, pp. 26-27.
1305 MRG, The Lost Women of Iraq: Family-based violence during armed conflict, 4 November 2015, url, p. 26.
1306 MRG, The Lost Women of Iraq: Family-based violence during armed conflict, 4 November 2015, url, pp. 26-27.
1307 MRG, The Lost Women of Iraq: Family-based violence during armed conflict, 4 November 2015, url, pp. 26-27.
1308 MRG, The Lost Women of Iraq: Family-based violence during armed conflict, 4 November 2015, url, pp. 26-27.
1309 MRG, The Lost Women of Iraq: Family-based violence during armed conflict, 4 November 2015, url, pp. 26-27.
1310 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Women and men in honour-related conflicts,
9 November 2018, url, p. 10.

162 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALSof KRI than in the urban areas.’1311 However, it was also stated that people in the bigger cities
Dohuk and Erbil are known to have conservative gender role attitudes, and that honour killings
and other honour related crimes happen also there. In the city of Sulaymaniya honour crimes
are said to be less common.1312
The DIS/Landinfo report further observes extramarital relationships (including premarital
relationship and adultery) are unacceptable in KRI, and people are aware that it requires
discretion. In general, unmarried couples, including young people know that they take a highrisk by having a premarital relationship.1313 ‘Women who have had a premarital affair known
to their families, or who get married without the acceptance of their families, are at risk ofbeing killed’, the report further notes - adding that the risk is enhanced if the relationship isrevealed to a wider circle of people outside the family.1314 In case of adultery, ‘the leastconsequence for a woman will be a divorce, in the worst case she will get killed.’1315
Regarding men who engage in an extramarital relationship the DIS/Landinfo report notes suchcases are not perceived as staining the family honour and a man in this situation can often
easily escape the conflict. However, the report added that ‘men are still under pressure to getmarried and there are cases of killings. When a man is killed in an honour conflict, it has to dowith revenge or a consequence of a blood feud rather than the honour of the family. Normallyin these cases, both families agree to the killing. The sources did not know of any cases where
only the man in such a couple got killed and not the woman.’1316
The DIS/Landinfo 2018 report states that honour killings are covered by the Iraqi Penal CodeNo 111 of the year 1969. The articles in the penal code, providing for mitigated sentences inrelation to honour crimes, were suspended in KRI in 2000. However, implementation of thelaws regulating honour crimes in KRI are impeded by the patriarchal mentality of the society
as well as the discriminatory mindset of the judiciary towards women. Furthermore, the lower
ranks of police officers do not take women seriously when they report family conflicts andviolence, and the police investigations of honour crimes are generally not taken seriously.1317
The prosecution of the perpetrators is further undermined by the KRI’s main ruling parties,
who will not only protect their own members but also influential people and people who areaffiliated with the party. People with money and party connections may also be able toinfluence the judge through political pressure, by paying bribes or providing a false alibi.1318
Although the principle of honour as a mitigating factor has been removed from the legal
system in Kurdistan, ‘the persistent power of tribal justice means that ”honor” killings often

1311 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Women and men in honour-related conflicts,

9 November 2018, url, p. 12.
1312 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Women and men in honour-related conflicts,
9 November 2018, url, p. 12.
1313 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Women and men in honour-related conflicts,
9 November 2018, url, p. 12.
1314 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Women and men in honour-related conflicts,
9 November 2018, url, p. 14.
1315 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Women and men in honour-related conflicts,
9 November 2018, url, p. 14.
1316 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Women and men in honour-related conflicts,
9 November 2018, url, pp. 22-23.
1317 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Women and men in honour-related conflicts,
9 November 2018, url, p. 15.
1318 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Women and men in honour-related conflicts,
9 November 2018, url, pp. 15-16.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 163

continue to go unpunished’, MRG observes.1319 Particularly in rural areas, ‘honor killings
continue to take place in high numbers beyond the purview of the law.’1320 A representativeof the Kurdish NGO WADI, a German NGO with operations in Iraqi Kurdistan that works tocombat violence against women and improve their social and economic status, states that thelaw against honour killing in Kurdistan is not implemented and that the police ‘will notinvestigate because honor crimes are regarded as family matters’. Corresponding with the
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada in January 2016 the representative of WADI said:‘No person who has committed honour-based violence “has ever had to serve a prison
term longer than two years - provided he is sentenced to prison at all”. The same
source stated that in order to grant early release from prison, the judge “expects
negotiations” and when they are carried out, ‘they are easy because both sides arefamily. They agree, and the perpetrator is released”.’1321
The same source continued that the ‘prevalence and social attitudes do not differ between
rural and urban areas because only a short time ago, all city dwellers used to live in the
countryside.’1322
Addressing the resolution of tribal disputes in the south of Iraq in a 2015 paper, Haider Ala
Hamoudi, Wasfi H. Al-Sharaa and Aqeel Al-Dahhan1323 discuss honour crimes resulting fromsituations where a young male from one tribe seeks a relationship with a woman from another
tribe without obtaining permission from their respective male kin. The authors point out thatin such situations tribal leaders usually encourage and facilitate a fast marriage, in order toavoid any reputational repercussions by hiding the past relationship. The paper further adds
that
‘If however, despite the urging of tribal leaders, immediate male family members ofeither of the two parties (usually, the father) object to the marriage strenuously, as
does occur from time to time, only one solution is possible under the tribal law. Bothof the romantically involved parties are killed, and the father or nearest male relativeof the woman has a right to compensation from the father of the young man on the
belief, we presume, that it is the young woman who was seduced and therefore her
death was the responsibility of her paramour.’1324

3.5.4 Female genital mutilation
According to the World Health Organization, female genital mutilation (FGM) comprises ‘allprocedures that involve partial or total removal of the external female genitalia, or otherinjury to the female genital organs for non-medical reasons’.1325

1319 MRG, The Lost Women of Iraq: Family-based violence during armed conflict, 4 November 2015, url, pp. 27-29.
1320 MRG, The Lost Women of Iraq: Family-based violence during armed conflict, 4 November 2015, url, pp. 27-29.
1321 Canada, IRB, Iraq: Honour-based violence in the Kurdistan region; state protection and support services

available to victims [IRQ105424.E], 15 February 2016, url.
1322 Canada, IRB, Iraq: Honour-based violence in the Kurdistan region; state protection and support services
available to victims [IRQ105424.E], 15 February 2016, url.
1323 Three professors of law at the University of Pittsburgh and the University of Basra; published in Helfand, M.,
Negotiating State and Non-State Law – The Challenge of Global and Local Legal Pluralism, Cambridge University
Press, June 2015.
1324 Hamoudi, H. A. et.al., The Resolution of Disputes in State and Tribal Law in the South of Iraq: Toward a
Cooperative Model of Pluralism, 30 March 2015, url, p. 240.
1325 WHO, Female Genital Mutilation, 31 January 2018, url.

164 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

After studies revealed startlingly high rates of FGM in Kurdistan1326, public debate ensued andefforts of activists culminated in the criminalising of FGM in 2011. However, theimplementation of this legislation remains a major challenge, meaning that FGM continues tobe practiced on substantial numbers of girls and women. Outside the Kurdish region theextent of the practice remains unclear. Recent studies carried out by local rights group pointout that it takes place in other governorates as well, despite the official stance that thepractice is limited to the Kurdish region.1327 In its 2016 human rights report USDOS refers to
NGO data indicating 25 % of women in the central and southern parts of the country had been
subjected to FGM/C.1328 MRG reported that up until 2015 modest progress was made in raisingawareness of the health and legal consequences of FGM, reducing the prevalence of thepractice in some communities. However, ‘due to the fact that FGM is now illegal and bears
criminal consequences, activists say that the practice has now gone underground.
Communities continue to practice it, but deny it when asked about it by activists.’1329
Sources interviewed by the DIS/Landinfo during their 2018 fact-finding mission to KRI notedthat ‘the main areas where FGM still prevails are villages in northern Sulaimania, the Germian
district and in villages in Erbil. Rania is one of the places where FGM still takes place.’1330
Women, mostly midwives and elderly women, are the ones who carry out FGM and in somecases the circumcision takes places at birth.1331
During a fact-finding mission to the KRI in September and October 2015 The Danish
Immigration Service was informed by Human Rights Watch that female genital mutilation(FGM) is particularly found in the part of KRI bordering Iran but is practiced across KRI. In someareas, however, the number has gone down after FGM was outlawed in 2011.1332 In a July
2013 report UNICEF estimates 3.8 million women and girls have undergone FGM in Iraq.1333
UNICEF further reports that available data ‘show that FGM/C is only practiced in a few
northern regions, including Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, where the majority of girls and women
have undergone the procedure; it is practically non-existent in other areas of the country.’1334

3.5.5 Single, divorced or widowed women
In a May 2018 report the Finnish Immigration Service made the observation that
‘The community-based culture in Iraq has a major influence on the situation of
women. As men have the main responsibility for their families and family honour,
most women are dependent on men for cultural reasons. Despite some change in1326 A 2010 Study by the German-Iraqi NGO WADI based on research conducted between 2007 and 2008 in morethan 700 villages as well as urban centers in Erbil, Sulaymaniyah and Germian/ Kirkuk, revealed an overall FGM
rate of 72 %. MRG, The Lost Women of Iraq: Family-based violence during armed conflict, 4 November 2015, url,
p. 32.
1327 MRG, The Lost Women of Iraq: Family-based violence during armed conflict, 4 November 2015, url, p. 31.
1328 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2016 - Iraq, 3 March 2017, url.
1329 MRG, The Lost Women of Iraq: Family-based violence during armed conflict, 4 November 2015, url, p. 33.
1330 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Women and men in honour-related conflicts,
9 November 2018, url, p. 36.
1331 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Women and men in honour-related conflicts,
9 November 2018, url, p. 36.
1332 Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI); fact finding mission, 26 September to 6 October 2015, 12 April
2016, url, p. 62.
1333 UNICEF, Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: A statistical overview and exploration of the dynamics of change,
July 2013, url, p. 2.
1334 UNICEF, Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: A statistical overview and exploration of the dynamics of change,
July 2013, url, p. 30.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 165

attitudes, women’s lives are restricted by these cultural norms. Women who violatethem can become victims of so-called honour violence. Living alone as a woman is not
generally accepted in Iraq because it is considered inappropriate behaviour. Women
can also face other legal infringements. Women also face discrimination in the labour
market and education. In practice, a single woman has very poor chances of making aliving independently.’1335
In a September 2016 article the Economist also takes note of the trend, reporting that
‘between 2004 and 2014 there was one divorce for every five Iraqi marriages.’1336 The
DIS/Landinfo November 2018 notes the number of divorces in KRI has increased. However,‘to be a divorced woman in the Kurdish society is still considered to be tough andstigmatizing.’1337 Whilst a well-educated woman with her own income and who lives in thecity is able to live on her own as long as she does not have an honour conflict with her family,
the deteriorating financial situation along with the societal restrictions that women are facing
in Iraq, have reduced a women’s ability to live on their own. Besides that, ‘Erbil and Dohuk areboth known as conservative regions with strict control of women.’1338 The same report further
adds that a divorced woman who lives outside the cities will not be able to live on her own.
On the other hand, for widows this is accepted.1339
According to DFAT, writing in 2018 in the KRI ‘single people, especially women, are unable forcultural reasons to rent properties on their own.’1340 The USDOS annual human rights report(covering 2017) states that single women and widows often had problems registering theirchildren’s births, leading to problems accessing public services like food, healthcare andeducation.1341
In a November 2016 report the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs makes note of the
difficult position of single, divorced or widowed women. The report states that it is customary
for divorced women to return to the care their families, widowed women may be taken in by
their own family or by their in-laws. In those circumstances, male relatives will act as theircustodian. Women who have been repudiated by their family and lack a social support
network are considerably worse off. The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs further notesthat the position of single women who are self-sufficient because they have a job differs fromthe position of unemployed and/or uneducated women.1342
MRG notes in a report on violence against women in Iraq that divorce does not bring an end
to the women’s problems with their former husband: ‘In a large number of cases, women
were intimidated by their husbands into giving up their legal rights, such as support paymentsor child custody, in order to finalize the divorce.’ Furthermore, divorced women who return
to live with their families may be subject to abuse and stigma due to their status as divorced

1335

Finland, Finnish Immigration Service, Report on the situation of women living without a safety net provided
by family or marriage (status of women; legislation; infringements against women; women as heads of households;
documents, housing and shelters; protection), 22 May 2018, url, p. 1.
1336 Economist (The), Divorce in Iraq – Breaking up in Baghdad, 17 September 2016, url.
1337 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Women and men in honour-related conflicts,
9 November 2018, url, p. 13.
1338 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Women and men in honour-related conflicts,
9 November 2018, url, p. 13.
1339 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Women and men in honour-related conflicts,
9 November 2018, url, p. 13.
1340 Australia, DFAT Country Information Report Iraq, 9 October 2018, url, p. 29.
1341 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Iraq, 20 April 2018, url.
1342 Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Algemeen ambtsbericht Irak, 14 November 2016, url, p. 78.

166 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

women.1343 As married women often rely on their husbands as the sole breadwinner, divorce
places women in an economically vulnerable situation. Given the lack of employment
opportunities for women, it is difficult for them to find a job. Besides that, negative social
perceptions of divorced women can leave them vulnerable to sexual harassment, Minority
Right Group International adds.1344
A factsheet published in March 2013 by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq
(UNAMI), in a section headed Female-Headed Households (FHHs), states:‘In Iraq, due to years of war and political instability, 10 % of households are headed
by females who are widowed, divorced, separated, or caring for sick spouses. They
represent one of the most vulnerable segments of the population and are more
exposed to poverty and food insecurity as a result of lower overall income levels.
More than half of Female Heads of Households (FHoH) are between the ages of 35
and 54. This segment of the population is particularly disadvantaged in terms ofeducation and access to employment and adequate shelter.’1345

3.5.6 Sexual violence
According to a July 2018 UN Security Council report ‘information on sexual violence remains
difficult to obtain as a result of stigma against the victims and fear of reprisals.’1346 A March2018 Report of the Secretary-General on conflict-related sexual violence notes that Sunni
women and girls living under ISIL occupation endured forced and coerced marriages, in whichrape was used as a weapon of punishment for disobeying ISIL rules.1347 Thousands of Iraqi
Yazidi women and girls, captured since August 2014, were trafficked into and across the Syrian
Arab Republic, where they have been used as sex slaves.1348 In an August 2017 report UNAMI
also notes large numbers of women and girls (but also some men and boys), mainly from Iraq’s
ethnic and religious communities, have been subjected to conflict-related sexual violence by
ISIL.1349
According to an Amnesty International 2018 report ‘women with perceived ties to IS in IDP
camps, among other women from female-headed households, have been subjected to sexual
violence, including rape and sexual exploitation. The primary perpetrators of these violations
are armed actors working in and nearby the camps, such as security guards, military and militia
personnel, who use their positions of authority to take advantage of these women’s poverty
and isolation.’1350
In its most recent report on human rights practices USDOS observes women and girls in Iraq
were at times sexually exploited through so-called temporary marriages, under which a man
gives the family of the girl or woman dowry money in exchange for permission to ‘marry’ her

1343 MRG, The Lost Women of Iraq: Family-based violence during armed conflict, 4 November 2015, url, p. 15.
1344 MRG, The Lost Women of Iraq: Family-based violence during armed conflict, 4 November 2015, url, p. 15.
1345 UNAMI, Women in Iraq Factsheet, 12 March 2013, url, p. 2.
1346 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2367 (2017); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2018/677],

9 July 2018, url, p. 10.
1347 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on conflict-related sexual violence, 23 March 2018, url,
p. 13.
1348 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on conflict-related sexual violence, 23 March 2018, url,
p. 24.
1349 UNAMI/OHCHR, Promotion and protection of rights of victims of sexual violence captured by ISIL/ or in areas
controlled by ISIL in Iraq, 22 August 2017, url, p. 1.
1350 AI, The condemned. Women and children isolated, trapped and exploited in Iraq, 17 April 2018, url, p. 27.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 167

for a specified period.1351 ‘The traditional practice of “fasliya” -- whereby family members,
including women and children, are traded to settle tribal disputes -- remained a problem,
particularly in southern governorates.’1352 According to KRI statistics there were 135 cases ofsexual violence were reported in 2017.1353
See Section 3.5.3 for information on transgressions against family honour and consequences
for women.

3.5.7 Women in public roles
Large differences persist in participation in the labour market between Iraqi women and men,
UNAMI reported in 2013: ‘only 14 % of women are working or actively seeking work compared
to 73 % of men; 21 % of active females are unemployed compared to 11 % of active males.
The percentage increases to 27 % for young women and is significantly higher in urban areas
than in rural areas where women are mainly employed in the agricultural sector.’1354
According to data from the International Labour Organization (ILO)(2010), published by theWorld Bank, Iraq was among the top five countries in the world with the lowest women’s
employment participation rates: Iraq (15 %), Yemen (21 %), Syria (22 %), Saudi Arabia (22 %),Pakistan (22 %).1355
The UN Security Council noted in a July 2018 report that ‘according to the Independent HighElectoral Commission, 2 009 female candidates participated in the parliamentary elections.
During the campaign period, posters of female candidates were vandalised and photographs
allegedly showing candidates wearing revealing clothing were posted online. Some female
candidates withdrew following threats and intimidation.’1356
In August – September 2018 a number of prominent women was murdered in Iraq. One victim
was a former beauty queen popular on social media (killed in Baghdad), another victim was a
women’s rights activist (killed in Basrah). Two other victims worked in beauty parlours.
According to the Guardian all four victims ‘had a public presence and a voice that had
unsettled elements of Iraqi society, which has retained rigid views on how women should
behave’.1357 The head of the Iraqi Women Journalists Forum informed the New York Times thetargeting of well-known women in Iraq had ‘greatly increased’.1358
In a December 2017 article Al-Monitor reports that for many people in Iraq the only
acceptable jobs for women are in certain home-related sectors or government departments.
Women and girls who work in shops, cafes, entertainment, nursing or the transportation
sector (taxi/truck drivers) are frowned upon.1359 In a June 2017 article Niqash reports theprovincial council in Wasit decided that women should not be allowed to work in cafes at night
because of ‘long standing and deep cultural traditions’. The head of the council stated Wasit
was a conservative place and that new practices, such as employing females, cannot be1351 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Iraq, 20 April 2018, url.
1352 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Iraq, 20 April 2018, url.
1353 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, p. 13.
1354 UNAMI, Women in Iraq Factsheet, 12 March 2013, url, p. 2.
1355 World Bank (The), World development report 2012. Gender equality and development, 2012, url, p. 199.
1356 UN Security Council: Implementation of resolution 2367 (2017); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2018/677],

9 July 2018, url, p. 10.
1357 Guardian (The), Deaths of high-profile Iraqi women sparks fear of conservative backlash, 2 October 2018, url.
1358 New York Times (The), A social media star is killed in Baghdad. Iraqis fear a trend, 29 September 2018, url.
1359 Al-Monitor, Nightclubs, cafes still risky business for Iraqi women, 5 December 2017, url.

168 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

tolerated by locals.1360 A human rights lawyer based in Kut (Wasit) informed Niqash women in
the region don’t get the same employment opportunities as men. The source noted that ‘even
if they get a job in a government department they are often harassed, just for working’, thelawyer states.1361

3.5.8 Women’s shelters
In its most recent report on human rights USDOS observes that in most areas in Iraq there
were few or no publicly provided women’s shelters. In the absence of shelters, authorities
often detained or imprisoned sexual harassment victims for their own protection. Some
women, without alternatives, became homeless.1362 According to UNAMI, resources topublicly fund shelters for women across Iraq remain limited. In October 2017, a women’s
shelter in Baghdad was attacked by an armed group comprising of about 50 persons, allegedly
including some from the ISF.1363
The DIS/Landinfo 2018 report noted there is a shelter for women in each of the bigger cities
in KRI: Erbil, Sulaimaniyah and Dohuk. These shelters are run by the KRG authority the
Directorate of Combating Violence Against Women (DCVAW). The capacity for each centre isapproximately 20 to 40 women. According to DCVAW access to their centres normally requires
a court order. However, in urgent cases a woman can access the shelter directly with a court
order being filed subsequently. The women in the shelters are not allowed to leave the shelter
without a court order. Whilst shelters run by NGOs in KRI have experienced attacks fromvictims’ families, ‘shelters run by the state are less inclined to be attacked, because the stateis seen as a stronger protector than the private actors.’1364 The same source further remarks
many women are reluctant to go to a shelter, because women in the shelters are seen as
outcasts.1365

3.6 Tribal conflict
In a 2007 article Hussein D. Hassan, an information research specialist for the US
Congressional Research Service (CRS), states that Iraq is home to approximately 150 tribesthat are composed of about 2 000 smaller clans, with varying sizes and influence. While thelargest tribe numbers more than one million people; the smallest number a few thousand. 75% of the total Iraqi population are members of a tribe or have kinship to one.1366 In a 2015
paper Haider Ala Hamoudi, Wasfi H. Al-Sharaa and Aqeel Al-Dahhan note that Iraq’s 150
existing tribes continue to provide an important source of order throughout much of Iraq.
According to the authors, tribal authority increases when the state is weak. They describe how
tribal resolution procedures are applied to prevent interpersonal disputes from escalating into

1360 Niqash, An immoral trade: Wasit council bans women from working in cafés, 8 June 2017, url.
1361 Niqash, An immoral trade: Wasit council bans women from working in cafés, 8 June 2017, url.
1362 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Iraq, 20 April 2018, url.
1363 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, pp. 12-13.
1364 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Women and men in honour-related conflicts,

9 November 2018, url, p. 18.
1365 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Women and men in honour-related conflicts,
9 November 2018, url, p. 19.
1366 US, CRS, Iraq: Tribal Structure, Social, and Political Activities, 7 April 2008, url, p. 1.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 169

intertribal conflict.1367 The study also remarks that urban elites often dismiss their tribal
affiliation as irrelevant, whilst among rural populations it bears particular importance.1368
According to an Iraq analyst interviewed by the DIS/Landinfo 2018 mission to KRI more than
70 % of Iraqis identify themselves as members of a tribe, which is traceable by the person’s
last name.1369 The same source further stated that ‘in a tribal conflict, religion and ethnic
issues do not matter as much as it is a question of honour.’1370
An October 2018 DFAT report notes that particularly in the poorer areas of the south andwest, tribal culture continues to play an important role in dispute resolution. Some Iraqi
citizens turn to tribal groups to dispense justice rather than seeking redress through official
judicial bodies.1371 USDOS noted that kidnappings and the practice of fasliya - whereby family
members, including women and children, are traded to settle tribal disputes - occurred during
2017 in tribal conflicts, particularly in southern governorates.1372 The same source further
mentioned four tribal dispute-linked kidnappings during the year that took place in Basrah.1373
In 2018 Foreign Policy reported on a particularly unstable situation in Basrah where tribal
disputes spill over into violent clashes. Neighbourhoods are turned into conflict zones andlocal security forces rarely intervene. The government has resorted to short-term military
actions to stabilise the situation temporarily.1374 AFP also reported on the situation anddescribed a ‘never-ending cycle of revenge attacks’ in Basrah where tribal feuds flared into
battles with the usage of heavy arms that kill bystanders.1375
In December 2016, UNAMI noted an increase in the number of tribal clashes in southern Iraq.
Such clashes may result in armed confrontations, which in turn can result in deaths andinjuries, including of innocent bystanders. UNAMI further explained that ‘tribes frequently
come into conflict with one another over issues such as land use and ownership, inter-and
intra-family disputes and historic inter-tribal animosities.’1376
In a 2011 article published in The Middle East Journal Katherine Blue Carroll, an AssistantProfessor of Political Science at Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tennessee and a former
member of a Human Terrain Team supporting the U.S. Military in Iraq, notes that given the
weakness of the new Iraqi state, and in particular its legal system, tribal law surged in to fill
the gap. She observes many of Iraq’s tribes have printed their legal codes in formal documentsthat may be voted into effect by the tribe’s senior members. According to Katherine Blue
Carroll there is ‘relatively little variation in the structure, specifics, or processes of law fromtribe to tribe, and this facilitates the settlement of disputes between them’.1377 The article
1367 Hamoudi, H. A. et.al., The Resolution of Disputes in State and Tribal Law in the South of Iraq: Toward a

Cooperative Model of Pluralism, 30 March 2015, url, pp. 228-240.
1368 Hamoudi, H. A. et.al., The Resolution of Disputes in State and Tribal Law in the South of Iraq: Toward a
Cooperative Model of Pluralism, 30 March 2015, url, p. 229.
1369 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons(IDPs) in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 47.
1370 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons(IDPs) in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 48.
1371 Australia, DFAT Country Information Report Iraq, 9 October 2018, url, pp. 26-27.
1372 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Iraq, 20 April 2018, url.
1373 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Iraq, 20 April 2018, url.
1374 Foreign Policy, Northern Iraq May Be Free, but the South Is Seething, 9 November 2018, url.
1375 AFP, Tribal feuds spread fear in Iraqs Basra, 1 January 2018, url.
1376 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, p. 32.
1377 Carroll, K. B., Tribal Law and Reconciliation in the New Iraq, Winter 2011, url, p. 12.

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goes on to explain that reconciliation processes centre on ‘shayks working with the parties
involved:
1) to determine the facts of the case2) with reference to tribal legal codes, to set out the amount of money that theperpetrator’s tribe or family must pay to the victim’s to avoid retribution (often
referred to as “blood money” in English but called either fasel or the Qur’anic term
diya in Iraq)
3) to enact communal rituals of reconciliation. The Arabic term for this entire process
is sulha, or settlement, but Iraqis often use the term fasel to refer not only to the“blood money” paid but also to the process for determining its amount.’1378
Katherine Blue Carroll further explains that the ultimate goal of tribal mediation is to restore
peace through restoring honour, thus avoiding feuds.1379
In a May 2011 article Niqash observes that ‘in modern Iraq, many legal and religious
authorities are generally happy to accept resolutions made by tribal law because of the way
it is able to solve social problems holistically and consensually as well as come up with quick
solutions that don’t require government involvement or bureaucracy.’1380 The article further
notes that tribal law is not written down anywhere, ‘although research indicates that mosttribes appear to use similar code’.1381

3.6.1 Blood feudAccording to the Iraq analyst interviewed by the DIS/Landinfo 2018 mission to KRI, tribes canbe heavily armed and tribal violence is often the grassroots reason to the outburst of conflictin the Iraqi society.1382 Tribal conflicts can be triggered by a number of reasons. The Iraq
analyst stated that inter-tribal killings (killing members of another tribe) will put a target on
the perpetrators, as well as his tribe.1383 Niqash reported that the current political instability
has increased the onset of tribal conflicts, and in Basrah tribal conflicts could erupt over lesssevere situations than murders and honour related questions, such as business disputes, state
construction contracts, or even football matches.1384
Tribal conflict is often settled by paying compensation in the form of ‘blood money’ in order
to avoid ‘endless killing among tribes’, although it’s considered to be more difficult to resolve
conflict between different ethnic or religious tribes, such as a Shia tribe and a Sunni tribe.1385
Other sources noted that women sometimes are awarded as compensation in tribal disputes,

1378 Carroll, K. B., Tribal Law and Reconciliation in the New Iraq, Winter 2011, url, p. 12.
1379 Carroll, K. B., Tribal Law and Reconciliation in the New Iraq, Winter 2011, url, p. 13.
1380 Niqash, Justice served, tribal law trumping civil in modern Iraq, 12 May 2011, url.
1381 Niqash, Justice served, tribal law trumping civil in modern Iraq, 12 May 2011, url.
1382 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons(IDPs) in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 48.
1383 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons(IDPs) in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 48.
1384 Niqash, In Basra, ‘Terrorism By Tradition’ Causes Fear And Waste, 22 March 2017, url; Niqash, Iraqi Tribes Take
Law Into Own Hands, Make Facebook Trolls Pay, 13 July 2017, url; AlAraby, Tribal feuds spread fear in Iraq's Basraprovince, 15 January 2018, url; Reuters, Tribal clashes, political void threaten oil installations in Iraq's south, 11September 2017, url; Daily Mail, Tribal feuds spread fear in Iraq's Basra, 19 January 2018, url.
1385 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons(IDPs) in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 48.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 171

called fasliya marriage.1386 According to an article from Al-Monitor, women who enter fasliya
marriages are stripped from all of their rights, even the right to divorce or separate from theirhusband.1387
Concerning persons who do not comply with the will of their tribe, an Iraq analyst interviewed
in 2018 by the DIS/Landinfo FFM indicated that they are either being ‘shot, ostracised or
disowned and expelled’ from the tribe and be forbidden to reside in specific areas.1388 The
same source noted that persons fleeing from tribal violence in Basrah could be safe in
Baghdad, Anbar and the KRI, whereas in the southern regions there would not be any
possibility to seek protection by the authorities.1389
The Iraq analyst further stated that sometimes a minor act, such as criticising a tribe member
on Facebook can get a person expelled from the tribal community.1390 An article on Niqash
confirmed that Facebook activity has caused ‘real-life’ violence in Iraq. It reported thatsouthern tribes were sending out fines to persons posting inappropriate comments. In one
case a man from Wasit was reportedly forced to pay 10 million IQD (around USD 8 400) after
his son posted a ‘social unacceptable’ statement about a girl he intended to propose to, using
the wording ‘remembering good old days’ which her parents interpreted as an insult and an
allegation that their daughter had had many lovers.1391 In 2016 Iraqi News reported that 500
refugee families feared returning to Diyala over an unresolved tribal blood feud dating backto 2006.1392
International corporations, corrupt officials and tribal leaders collude in Basrah over money
and power. The tribal conflicts are affecting the economy of southern Iraq economy as someforeign companies and oil refineries have suspended their operations in the area, and workers
refused to work due to security concerns.1393 The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) writes
that Basrah tribes are known to be well-armed and clashes are the main source of violence inthe area.1394 Arab News reported in April 2018 on corruption and extortion in the Iraqi oil
sector noting that ‘Basra’s prominent clans have been paid more than $105 million as part ofa racketeering scheme disguised as state-backed compensation.’1395 During the July 2018
demonstrations against foreign and local oil companies in Basrah protesters ‘were targeting
operations at key energy-sector facilities demanding jobs and improved services’.1396
According to a Middle East Eye article ‘the protests in Basra are part of a conflict between the
periphery and capital, between the government and oil companies on one hand, and the Basraregion, on the other. Dhurgham Al-Maliki, sheikh of the Bani Malik tribe, and Muzahim al-1386 Australia, DFAT Country Information Report Iraq, 9 October 2018, url, pp. 26-27; Al-Monitor, Blood money

marriage makes comeback in Iraq , 18 June 2015, url.
1387 Al-Monitor, Blood money marriage makes comeback in Iraq, 18 June 2015, url.
1388 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons(IDPs) in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 48.
1389 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons(IDPs) in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 48.
1390 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons(IDPs) in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 48.
1391 Niqash, Social Media Justice: Iraqi Tribes Take Law Into Own Hands, Make Facebook Trolls Pay, 13 July 2017,url.
1392 Iraqi News, 500 refugee families fear return to Diyala over blood feud, 4 December 2016, url.
1393 Reuters, Tribal clashes, political void threaten oil installations in Iraq's south, 11 September 2017, url; Daily
Mail, Tribal feuds spread fear in Iraq's Basra, 19 January 2018, url.
1394 NRC, Basra Fact Finding Mission Report #1, 9 September 2018, url, p. 4.
1395 Arab News, Oil firms' multimillion-dollar bribery racket bringing death to the streets of Iraq's Basra, April 4 ,2018, url.
1396 Washington Post (The), Protests are mounting in Iraq. Why?, 21 July 2018, url.

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Tamimi, sheikh of the Bani Tamim, two of Basra's largest tribes, have emerged as therepresentatives of the protesters.’1397
After police opened fire against the protesters in July 2018 and one man was killed, more than
13 tribes were backing the request of the victim’s tribe for punishment against theperpetrators. This led to tribes blocking roads to restrict the movement of the workers in theoil and gas sector and evacuation of staff from the area by oil companies.1398 Other sources
reported on the killing of an employee in the oil sector near his home in Basrah by gunmen in
January 2018 and an incident in 2017 in which a minibus with employees of an oil company
travelling to Basra was attacked by armed men in a pickup truck.1399 In 2017 tribal fighting wasreported between rival Shia tribes over ‘farmland, state construction contracts and landownership’ which threatened security at oil installations in the south.1400

3.6.2 People transgressing tribal norms
An October 2018 DFAT report notes that women who transgress tribal customs face harshpunishment.1401 In a July 2017 article Niqash reports that socially unacceptable activities on
Facebook, including clicking on the like button of an objectionable Facebook post, may resultin tribal sanction, involving hefty financial compensation. The article mentions a tribal
agreement amongst various tribes in southern Iraq on the subject.1402
In 2016 tribal agreements were reported to have been reached by representatives of tribes ina number of governorates, which included a provision for families connected to ISIL to be
subjected to forced eviction and confiscation of their property.1403 Distribution of night letterswarning families of affiliated ISIL members to leave or face forced expulsion have beenreported in Salahadin and Ninewa governorates and Mosul city.1404 An Iraq analyst
interviewed during the 2018 DIS/Landinfo FFM to KRI explained that revenge attacks against
tribes perceived to have been collaborated with ISIL were a ‘consequence of tribal conflicts
between Sunni and Shia tribes or as a consequence of that ISIS successfully has split Sunnitribes’.1405
In a November 2017 article AFP notes that defeated members of ISIL in Anbar province facetribal justice. Local tribes have agreed ‘to treat with utmost severity those members who
became militants’.1406 In contrast, sheikhs and tribes in and around Hawija (Kirkuk
Governorate) pledged to forego traditional justice in dealing with ISIL fighters and agreed tomake use of Iraq’s formal legal system, Fred Strasser reports in a June 2017 report publishedby the United States Institute of Peace.1407 Reporting on the situation of family members of1397 Middle East Eye, What's behind Iraq's Basra protests?, 7 September 2018, url.
1398 Arab News, Iraqi tribes put more pressure on oil companies in Basra, 12 Juley 2018, url.
1399 Arab News, Oil firms' multimillion-dollar bribery racket bringing death to the streets of Iraq's Basra, April 4 ,2018, url.
1400 Reuters, Tribal clashes, political void threaten oil installations in Iraq’s south, 11 September 2017, url.
1401 Australia, DFAT Country Information Report Iraq, 9 October 2018, url, p. 28.
1402 Niqash, Social media justice: Iraqi tribes take law into own hands, make Facebook trolls pay, 13 July 2017, url.
1403 UNAMI/OHCHR, Promotion and Protection of Rights of Victims of Sexual Violence Captured by ISIL/or in Areas
Controlled by ISIL in Iraq, 22 August 2017, url, pp. 7-8.
1404 UN OHCHR, OHCHR Briefing Note on Iraq, 30 June 2017, url.
1405 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons(IDPs) in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 48.
1406 AFP, Tribal justice awaits returning Iraqis who joined ISIS, 14 November 2017, url.
1407 Strasser, F., Iraqi tribes sharpen legal tools to root out ISIS, 22 June 2017, url.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 173

ISIL fighters Human Rights Watch notes in January 2017 that tribal leaders in Anbar areblocking their return home.1408
For more information on tribal dispute resolution see EASO COI Report, Iraq: Actors ofProtection.

3.7 People with disabilities
In a December 2016 report on the rights of persons with disabilities UNAMI notes a lack ofreliable statistics, benchmarks and data collection systems, making it difficult to obtain a clear
picture of the community of persons with disabilities in Iraq.1409 In a 2011 report the World
Health Organization estimates that 0.9 % of Iraq’s population is affected by disabilities1410 or
about 4 million people.1411 UNAMI further notes that the figure of people with disabilities has
been constantly increasing, mainly due to ongoing violence, conflict and acts of terrorism.1412

3.7.1 Discrimination of people with disabilities
Reporting on the status of human rights in Iraq in the July to December 2017 period UNAMI
notes that persons with disabilities continue to face significant challenges in Iraq, ‘including
social, economic, and political discrimination, all of which are detrimental to the fullenjoyment of their rights as Iraqi citizens’.1413 UNAMI further reports that, in addition tolacking adequate opportunities and protection, persons with disabilities face a wide array ofsocietal discrimination. The prevailing perception among the public is to treat persons withdisabilities as charity. This often leads to isolation of persons with disabilities and exacerbates
negative psychological effects.1414
USDOS noted that were reports that persons with disabilities experienced discrimination due
to social stigma and ‘many children with disabilities dropped out of public school due toinsufficient physical access to school buildings, a lack of appropriate learning materials inschools, and a shortage of teachers qualified to work with children with developmental or
intellectual disabilities.’1415 According to UNAMI persons with disabilities ‘face common
experiences of often multiple, intersecting and aggravated forms of discrimination whichhinder, prevent or impair their full enjoyment of their rights and their full and equal
participation in all aspects of society’.1416 In a December 2016 report for MRG Ahmed Hassin
and Mays Al-Juboori note that people with disabilities face discrimination in accessing services
and facilities to address medical or rehabilitative needs. People with disabilities who areinternally displaced face multiple discrimination.1417
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) noted in a March 2014
report that people with disabilities in Iraq face social, economic, and political marginalisation.

1408 Human Rights Watch, The plight of those related to ISIS fighters, 11 January 2017, url.
1409 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Iraq, December 2016, url, p. 2.
1410 WHO, World report on disability, 2011, url, p. 273.
1411 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Iraq, December 2016, url, p. 3.
1412 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Iraq, December 2016, url, pp. 3- 4.
1413 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, p. 16.
1414 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, p. 16.
1415 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Iraq, 20 April 2018, url.
1416 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Iraq, December 2016, url, p. 3.
1417 MRG/Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights, Humanitarian challenges in Iraq’s displacement crisis, 22 December

2016, url, pp. 25-26.

174 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALSThe same source mentions that ‘the disabled are often kept hidden away in their homes withlittle exposure to the rest of society. Most Iraqis with disabilities are socially and economically
excluded because of the lack of infrastructure, medical care, prosthetic equipment, and socialand rehabilitation services. While not all Iraqis with disabilities are marginalized, the majorityof them are.’1418 Furthermore, the chances of employment are rare for people with disabilities.
If employed, they are often relegated to low-skilled, low- paid job.1419 According to USAID, ‘thevast majority (estimated at 90 %) of Iraqis with disabilities live in poverty.’ Most often his/herfamily is the only support that a person with disability will have. As such, all respondents
contacted by USAID perceive the family as the core contributor – either benefiting or limitingto their health, safety and enjoyment of life. USAID further notes that families function within
a wider social context that discriminates against people with disabilities and frames theirfamilies’ treatment of them:‘Tribal masculine culture alongside religious conservatism dominates Iraqi society.
Rigorous gender roles, separation of men and women (especially in public places),
cultural norms that confine women to the private sphere and expectations ofheightened masculinity all have a direct impact on Iraqis. These dovetail withdiscriminating social attitudes towards people with disabilities to exacerbate thedifficulties they face living in Iraq.’1420
Discussing civil society support for people with disabilities, USAID reports such groups in Iraq
‘suffer from lack of or irregular funding’ but noted that civil society has a longer history in the
KRI, so civil society support for people with disabilities is ‘more established’ in the region thanin other areas of Iraq. The same source remarked that in the KRI ‘only 2 % of people withdisabilities do not receive the social security salary. Although the legislation is equal for men
and women, the implementation of the law takes discriminative forms.’1421

3.7.2 Health care for people with disabilities
A December 2017 report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace noted that Iraq’s
already compromised public health system is struggling to provide adequate support to thegrowing number of people with disabilities and chronic diseases. At 3 % of GDP, the share of
Iraq’s budget allocated to the health sector is low compared to other Middle East and North
African countries. Government-run facilities that treat long-term disabilities struggle toprovide cost-free treatments.1422
Discussing the possibility to live independently and to be included in the community, UNAMI
remarks that the Iraqi health care system appears overstretched and suffers from lack ofinfrastructure, equipment and capacity.1423 The same source further states that ‘the psychosocial health sector in particular is perceived to lack specialized and trained staff and is underresourced.’ Such is the result of increased poverty, due to the conflict, the internationalsanctions regime during the 1990s, as well as the targeting of medical and paramedical
professionals during 2003-2008, which led to a ‘brain-drain’ of specialised healthprofessionals.1424 Some of the NGOs interviewed by UNAMI also note the limited help families

1418 USAID, Iraq access to justice program, March 2014, url, p. 11.
1419 USAID, Iraq access to justice program, March 2014, url, p. 23.
1420 USAID, Iraq access to justice program, March 2014, url, p. 21.
1421 USAID, Iraq access to justice program, March 2014, url, p. 26.
1422 Boskovitch, A., A struggle to care for Iraq’s disabled, 20 December 2017, url.
1423 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Iraq, December 2016, url, pp. 11-14.
1424 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Iraq, December 2016, url, p. 11.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 175

of persons with disabilities receive from the State to support them. Civil society organisations
working on disability rights reported to UNAMI that they received limited or no state financial
support. Respondents to the questionnaire UNAMI sent out acknowledged that some healthcare facilities were available for persons with disabilities. However, these services seemed to
be decreasing, were mostly available in larger urban centres, and tended to focus on persons
with physical disabilities.1425 USAID notes the limited number of doctors available in Iraq
stating that ‘In the Muslim world, Iraq’s doctor-patient ratio was higher only than Afghanistan,
Djibouti, Morocco, Somalia and Yemen.’1426
Persons with disabilities can get an allocation of USD 35 per month. If the impairment isacquired as a result of previous or current conflicts, the disability pension ranges from
USD 250 to USD 750 per month. Persons who acquired their disability as a result of terrorist
attacks are eligible to receive a lump-sum payment of USD 3 500, in addition to a USD 350
monthly payment. UNAMI, however, remarks that challenges in claiming these benefits are
numerous.1427 In an August 2015 article Al-Monitor reports that disabled people face neglect
and isolation in Iraq and dire poverty leads some of them to street begging.1428 Ahmed Hassin
and Mays Al-Juboori noted that disabled women and girls are not entitled to social security
payments if they are married or if their father is alive.1429
USAID notes that persons with disabilities encountered obstacles to obtaining cash transfer
benefits. These obstacles include difficulties obtaining the required documentation (including
a medical assessment report) and the accessibility and the bureaucratic processes ofgovernment offices and services. The social security pension can be inadequate as a soleincome and as a consequence many people with disabilities do not see the point inapplying.1430 USAID further notes that specialised institutions for children with disabilities exist
in the KRI’s major cities (e.g. Dahuk, Erbil, Sulaymaniyah), but such facilities are missing fromrural areas. Such is also the case in Iraq’s central and southern regions. Although,approximately 25 % of government schools have special needs classes, schools are generally
unequipped for the needs of children with disabilities.1431
In a March 2014 article Al-Monitor discusses the limited capabilities of the Iraqi health caresystem when it comes to diagnosing autism or treating it properly.1432
In a March 2013 article the medical journal The Lancet notes the significance of mental healthproblems among the many adult survivors of trauma in both Iraqi Kurdistan and southern Iraq.
In both regions most participants described substantial symptoms of depression, anxiety, andpost-traumatic stress. The Lancet reports that the Iraq mental health system is unable to meetthese needs:‘The system is hospital-based and relies on psychiatrists providing inpatient andoutpatient services even though there is only one long-term care hospital in the
country—the Al Rashid Hospital in Baghdad. Previous reports have estimated that1425 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Iraq, December 2016, url, pp. 11-14.
1426 USAID, Iraq access to justice program, March 2014, url, p. 10.
1427 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Iraq, December 2016, url, pp. 17-18.
1428 Al-Monitor, Iraq’s disabled lack basic help, 11 August 2015, url.
1429 MRG/Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights, Humanitarian challenges in Iraq’s displacement crisis, 22 December

2016, url, p. 25.
1430 USAID, Iraq access to justice program, March 2014, url, pp. 15-19.
1431 USAID, Iraq access to justice program, March 2014, url, p. 22.
1432 Al-Monitor, Iraq government fails to address rise in autism, 4 March 2014, url.

176 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

there are fewer than 100 psychiatrists in all of Iraq and most of them have little formal
training in child and adolescent mental health. Other mental health professionals,
such as clinical psychologists or social workers, do not exist at levels of any significancein the mental health care system. Psychiatrists in both regions report that treatment
is limited almost exclusively to drugs, partly because of drug-focused training andpartly because other therapies are too time consuming.’1433

3.7.3 Violence against persons with disabilities
In a 2012 report the World Health Organization (WHO) noted that, although robust studies
are absent for most regions of the world, adults with disabilities are at a higher risk of violence
than are non-disabled adults, and those with mental illnesses could be particularly
vulnerable.1434 A July 2012 WHO study found that overall children with disabilities are almost
four times more likely to experience violence than non-disabled children. Children withmental or intellectual impairments appear to be among the most vulnerable.1435
All respondents contacted by USAID in 2014 perceived the family as the core contributor –either benefiting or limiting- to their health, safety and enjoyment of life.1436 One of UNAMI’s
interviewees mentioned cases of persons with disabilities exposed to domestic violence.1437
In a March 2014 article an administrative assistant for the Iraqi Institute for Autism, acommunity centre that was established to treat autistic children, informed Al-Monitor thatthe majority of the centre’s clients have been victims of domestic violence.1438
In February 2015, an expert of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child informed Reutersthat ISIL used children who are mentally disabled to commit suicide bombings.1439

3.8 Children
Reporting on the status of human rights in Iraq in the July to December 2017 period UNAMI
notes armed conflict and violence continued to impact the lives of children, especially in
Ninewa Governorate. Children were exposed to the use of IEDs, including suicide bombers,
recruitment by non-state actors (including ISIL), attacks on schools, abduction and sexual
violence.1440 DFAT noted that violence in Iraq continues to affect children, stating that
‘Children have been killed or injured in attacks specifically targeting schools andplaygrounds. Violence has weakened institutions and systems of physically, social andlegal protection in most parts of the country. The loss of parents and caregivers due
to conflict has made children vulnerable to harassment, exploitation and abuse.
Children in areas controlled by ISIL have been traumatized and recruited.’ 1441

1433 Bolton, P., Mental health in Iraq: issues and challenges, The Lancet, Volume 3181, Issue 9870, 16 March 2013,url.
1434 WHO, Prevalence and risk of violence against adults with disabilities, 28 February 2012, url, p. 2.
1435 WHO, Violence against adults and children with disabilities, 2012, url.
1436 USAID, Iraq access to justice program , March 2014, url, p. 20.
1437 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Iraq, December 2016, url, p. 7.
1438 Al-Monitor, Iraq government fails to address rise in autism, 4 March 2014, url.
1439 Reuters, Islamic State selling, crucifying, burying children alive in Iraq – UN, 4 February 2015, url; Independent(The), Isis militants are using mentally challenged children as suicide bombers and crucifying others, says UN body,
5 February 2015, url.
1440 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, p. 2.
1441 Australia, DFAT Country Information Report Iraq, 26 June 2017, p. 22.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 177

The report further states child labour and child marriage remain significant problems.1442 In a
June 2017 report, Save the Children, a humanitarian organisation advocating children’s rights,
reported on what it called a mental health crisis among conflict-affected children in Iraq.1443
Children who endured the reign of ISIL for several years display multitudinous psychosocial
issues, according to the same source.1444

3.8.1 Child recruitment
In a May 2018 report on the impact of armed conflict on children the UN Secretary-General
makes note of 523 cases of child recruitment by parties to conflict in Iraq in 2017. The same
source further stated that ‘cases of recruitment involving 59 children, including 8 girls, were
attributed to ISIL. Children were used as suicide bombers and combatants, for logistics andmanufacturing explosive devices, and as wives for fighters.’1445 A total of 35 boys wererecruited by unidentified armed groups, 9 by the People’s Defense Forces — the armed wingof the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), 4 by the Sinjar Resistance Units, 1 by Protection Force of
Ezidkhan and 1 by Zeravani forces, part of the Peshmerga.1446 The UN Secretary-General alsomentions credible reports from the south of Iraq, specifically Najaf and Diwaniyah, in whichgroups under the umbrella of PMU organised military training for boys aged 15 and above.1447
Reporting on events in 2016 the UN Secretary-General stated that at least 168 boys werereportedly recruited and used by parties to the conflict, including ISIL, the People’s Defense
Forces of the Kurdish Workers Party and the PMUs. Furthermore, 40 verified cases were
attributed to ISIL. Children were also allegedly used as human shields by ISIL.1448 The reportfurther writes that ‘a total of 57 children were recruited and used by groups operating under
the umbrella of the Popular Mobilization Forces, most of whom received military training andwere deployed for combat, while 12 children were recruited by tribal mobilization groups,
including from internally displaced persons camps.’1449
A February 2018 study published by the United Nations University reports that ISIL heavily
recruited children whom it calls Cubs of the Caliphate. The Monitoring and Reporting
Mechanism (MRM) established by the United Nations documented ISIL’s recruitment ofchildren as young as seven for combat roles. 1450 The same source further noted that ‘ingeneral, ISIS uses a biological rather than a numerical definition of adulthood that is based on
perceptions of an individual’s strength and physical maturity.’ Interviewees from IS-controlledareas report that children who wish to enlist are inspected for signs of puberty, and ‘if they
have armpit hair and are able to carry a weapon, they are considered old enough to fight.’1451
In a June 2017 article, the Economist reports ISIL recruited thousands of children in Iraq and1442 Australia, DFAT Country Information Report Iraq, 26 June 2017, p. 22.
1443 Save The Children, An Unbearable Reality: The impact of war and displacement on children's mental health inIraq, 15 June 2017, url, p. 37.
1444 Save The Children, An Unbearable Reality: The impact of war and displacement on children's mental health inIraq, 15 June 2017, url, pp. 7-11.
1445 UN General Assembly, Children and armed conflict [A/72/865-S/2018/465], 16 May 2018, url, p. 12.
1446 UN General Assembly, Children and armed conflict [A/72/865-S/2018/465], 16 May 2018, url, p. 12.
1447 UN General Assembly, Children and armed conflict [A/72/865-S/2018/465], 16 May 2018, url, p. 13.
1448 UN General Assembly, Children and armed conflict [A/72/361–S/2017/821], 24 August 2017, url, p. 12.
1449 UN General Assembly, Children and armed conflict [A/72/361–S/2017/821], 24 August 2017, url, p. 12.
1450 O'Neil, S. and van Broeckhoven, K., Cradled by conflict – Child involvement with armed groups in contemporary
conflict, February 2018, url, pp. 109-110.
1451 O'Neil, S. and van Broeckhoven, K., Cradled by conflict – Child involvement with armed groups in contemporary
conflict, February 2018, url, pp. 109-110.

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Syria. Whilst many have been dispatched to the front, others work as spies, bomb-makers,
cooks or prison guards. In extreme cases, children have executed prisoners. The Economist
adds that ‘thousands more have been exposed to the group’s warped ideology at ISISsponsored schools.’1452
The aforementioned February 2018 study published by the United Nations University
indicates that the PMUs recruit few children. The Sinjar Resistance Units, a Yazidi militia
associated with PKK Peshmerga recruit some children, albeit not on the scale that ISIL has.1453
USDOS, writing in 2018, noted that ‘children remain highly vulnerable to forcible recruitment
and use by multiple armed groups operating in Iraq, including—but not limited to—ISIS, thePMF, tribal forces, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and Iran-backed militias.’1454 There
have been reports that PMUs units recruited and used children in militia activities andmanning checkpoints or providing support at checkpoints.1455
The USDOS country report on Human Rights practices in 2017 specifies that some armed
militia groups, under the banner of the PMU, provided weapons training and military-stylephysical fitness conditioning to children under the age 18. Although the government and Shia
religious leaders expressly forbid children under age 18 from serving in combat, there wasevidence on social media of children serving in combat positions.1456 In October 2017, the UN
Security Council states that cases of recruitment and use of children, reportedly by those
operating under the PMUs, have been reported in the south of Kirkuk.1457 In a September 2017
report the US Department of Labor notes: ‘Sunni tribal forces and other armed groups,
including the Iran backed militias, the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ), the Sinjar Resistance
Units (YBS), People’s Defense Forces (HPG), and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) acceptedchild volunteers into their ranks.’1458
The USDOS country report on Human Rights practices in Iraq in 2016 notes that ‘children
continued to be associated with the PMF and militias in conflict areas.’1459 On social media
there was evidence of children serving in combat positions. For example, the official‘Ideological Guidance’ page of the PMU website lauded a 14-year-old volunteer from Basrah
for fighting alongside his father in Fallujah. The head of a Basrah NGO visited PMU units inSalah al-Din, where she encountered teenage volunteers serving on the front lines. The United
Nations verified 12 reported cases of recruitment of children by militias affiliated with the
PMU, all of whom had been killed in combat.1460
In November 2016, Human Rights Watch reported that the Sunni tribal militia Farsan al-Jubour
recruited at least ten children in Debaga camp (Erbil governorate).1461 In October 2015, Human
Rights Watch reports that Shia militia within the PMU send children into combat. AAH and

1452 Economist (The), What to do with Islamic State’s child soldiers, 17 June 2017, url.
1453 O'Neil, S. and van Broeckhoven, K., Cradled by conflict – Child involvement with armed groups in contemporary

conflict, February 2018, url, p. 114.
1454 USDOS, Trafficking in Persons Report 2018 - Country Narratives - Iraq, 28 June 2018, url.
1455 US Department of Labor, 2017 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor - Iraq, 20 September 2018, url, p. 2.
1456 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Iraq, 20 April 2018, url.
1457 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 2367 (2017), 19 October 2017, url,
p. 9.
1458 US Department of Labor, 2016 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor - Iraq, 30 September 2017, url, p. 2.
1459 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2016 - Iraq, 3 March 2017, url.
1460 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2016 - Iraq, 3 March 2017, url.
1461 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Militias held, beat villagers- Recruited children as fighters from camp for displaced
people, 20 November 2016, url.

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Badr Organization are cited as militia using child soldiers.1462 Reporting on Human Rights
practices in Iraq in 2015 USDOS mentions reports of dozens of camps around the country withhundreds of students training to join the PMU. A spokesperson of the Prime Minister’s Officenoted isolated incidents of underage fighters joining combat on their own but indicated thatthe government does not condone this. According to observers there was no official
encouragement for children to join militias, child recruitment occurred infrequently and was
generally due to family or peer encouragement.1463 In August 2014 UNAMI also noted therecruitment of children:‘Children have also increasingly been recruited and used by other armed groups,
including “pro-Government” groups, in many conflict-affected areas, as well as in
Shi’a-dominated areas of Baghdad. Similar reports have also been received from
Basra. Witnesses, including United Nations staff, have seen children staffing illegal
checkpoints, armed and wearing military uniforms.’1464

3.8.2 Child labour
In a September 2018 report the US Department of Labor reported that ‘children in Iraq engage
in the worst forms of child labour, including in armed conflict and commercial sexual
exploitation, each sometimes as a result of human trafficking.’1465 According to data from 2011
cited by the same report, 75 % of Iraqi children between 5 and 14 years of age attend school,
4.2 % combine work and school, whilst 5.3 % work without attending school.1466 UNICEF statedthat more than half a million Iraqi children are estimated to be at work rather than at school,
Reuters reports in July 2016.1467 In a March 2016 report MRG notes that child labour especiallyaffects IDP children.1468
According to an August 2016 article in Rudaw, the number of underage workers has increasedin Kurdistan‘s larger cities, partly due to the influx of displaced families from Iraq and Syria.
The Kurdistan Region’s Ministry of Social Affairs announced legal action to curb this trend.1469

3.8.3 Child marriage
See section 3.5.2.

3.8.4 Violence against children
In a May 2018 report on the impact of armed conflict on children the UN Secretary-Generalpoints out killing and maiming remain the most prevalent violations against children
witnessed in Iraq. In 2017 717 child casualties were verified, resulting in 279 children being
killed (143 boys, 84 girls, 52 sex unknown) and 438 children being maimed (270 boys, 143 girls,
25 sex unknown). Of the total number of verified cases of killing and maiming, 424 were
attributed to ISIL, 109 to ISF and the international counter-ISIL coalition, 34 to Peshmerga and1462 Human Rights Watch, No child’s play: kids fighting one another in Iraq conflict, 30 October 2015, url.
1463 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2015 - Iraq, 13 April 2016, url.
1464 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: January – June 2014, August 2014, url, p. 18.
1465 US Department of Labor, 2017 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor - Iraq, 20 September 2018, url, p. 1.
1466 US Department of Labor, 2017 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor - Iraq, 20 September 2018, url, p. 1.
1467 Reuters, Child labour doubles in Iraq as violence, displacement hit incomes, 10 July 2016, url.
1468 MRG; Ceasefire Centre for Civilan Rights, Iraq’s displacement crisis: security and protection, March 2016, url,

p. 5.
1469 Rudaw, Kurdistan: New laws in the works to curb ‘forced’ child labor in Kurdistan, 24 August 2016, url.

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150 to unknown parties to the conflict.1470 The same report further states that ‘over half of allincidents were the result of air strikes, shelling, sniper fire and rockets, resulting in 390 childcasualties. Improvised explosive devices were the second leading cause (24 %), followed bytargeted attacks on children (10 %), including three boys who were killed and two who were
injured by unidentified parties for their alleged association with ISIL.’1471
Reporting on events taking place in 2016 the UN Secretary-General recorded 257 incidents,
resulting in 834 child casualties of which 138 were verified, resulting in the killing of 229
children (145 boys, 58 girls, 26 sex unknown) and injuries to 181 children (129 boys, 44 girls,
8 sex unknown). ISIL was responsible for at least 13 incidents of targeted attacks againstchildren, including torture. A total of 66 verified incidents resulted from the use of improvised
explosive devices, particularly by ISIL, while public areas, security forces and Shia ceremonies
were also targeted: 32 incidents of killing and maiming of children were attributed to ISF andthe international counter-ISIL coalition (30), the Peshmerga (1) and the PMUs (1), resulting
from mortars and rocket attacks, air strikes and artillery shelling.1472
In June 2016 UNICEF assessed that one in every five children in Iraq is at serious risk of death,injury, sexual violence and recruitment into armed groups.1473 UNICEF further noted that it
has documented 838 child deaths since 2014, and 794 injuries, but it says the true number isprobably much higher. It has also verified the abduction of 1 496 children – on average 50
every month – since the beginning of 2014.1474

3.8.5 Sexual exploitation of children
A March 2018 Report of the Secretary-General on conflict-related sexual violence notes that
Sunni women and girls living under ISIL occupation endured forced and coerced marriages, inwhich rape was used as a weapon of punishment for disobeying ISIL rules.1475 Thousands of
Iraqi Yazidi women and girls, captured since August 2014, were trafficked into and across the
Syrian Arab Republic, where they have been used as sex slaves. Reports have indicated thatthat additional women and girls from the Yazidi community, and other targeted minority
groups, have been forcibly transferred to the Syrian Arab Republic, following military
operations in 2017 to liberate areas of Iraq controlled by ISIL.1476
In a September 2018 report the US Department of Labor noted that ‘throughout the country,
some girls were subjected to commercial sexual exploitation through temporary marriages.
This practice involves a dowry paid to the girl’s family and an agreement to dissolve themarriage after a predetermined length of time.’1477 The same source also mentions that ‘childlabourers were also exposed to sexual violence and abuse.’1478
In its most recent report on human rights USDOS notes that during 2017 ISIL members forced
girls into marriage with ISIL fighters. ISIL’s sexual exploitation of Yazidi children was
1470 UN General Assembly, Children and armed conflict [A/72/865-S/2018/465], 16 May 2018, url, p. 12.
1471 UN General Assembly, Children and armed conflict [A/72/865-S/2018/465], 16 May 2018, url, p. 12.
1472 UN General Assembly, Children and armed conflict [A/72/361–S/2017/821], 24 August 2017, url, p. 12.
1473 UNICEF, A Heavy Price for Children: Violence Destroys Childhoods in Iraq, 01 June 2016, url, p. 5.
1474 UNICEF, A Heavy Price for Children: Violence Destroys Childhoods in Iraq, 01 June 2016, url, p. 5.
1475 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on conflict-related sexual violence, 23 March 2018, url,

p. 13.
1476 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on conflict-related sexual violence, 23 March 2018, url,
p. 24.
1477 US Department of Labor, 2017 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor - Iraq, 20 September 2018, url, p. 2.
1478 US Department of Labor, 2017 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor - Iraq, 20 September 2018, url, p. 2.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 181

widespread throughout the year in areas under the group’s control; this abuse included rapeand sexual slavery.1479 Child prostitution occurs in Iraq. Authorities often treat sexually
exploited children as criminals instead of victims.1480
In June 2016 UNICEF noted that ‘the use of sexual violence and the brutalisation of womenand girls has been well documented, with many abducted on a mass scale, held captive formonths, sold into sexual slavery and subjected to rape, torture and abuse.’1481

3.8.6 Child education
In a May 2017 report UNICEF notes education in Iraq progressed remarkably over the last
decade, with enrolment in primary education increasing at about 4.1 % per year. The reportfurther stated that ‘As of 2015-2016, 9.2 million students are enrolled across all educationlevels in Iraq. The total enrolment in primary education almost doubled to six million children
in 2012 from 3.6 million in 2000.’1482 In spite of this progress, as of 2013, 13.5 % of schoolaged Iraqi children (1.2 million children) did not have access to basic education (involving six
years of education in primary school, which is compulsory, plus three years of education inlower secondary school). Although girls’ enrolment grew at all levels, UNICEF still notes a large
gender gap in Central Iraq. In primary education the out-of-school rate of girls is 11.4 %, morethan double the rate of boys at 5.4 %. In secondary education in central Iraq, there are 142
and 121 boys for every 100 girls at lower secondary level and upper secondary level
respectively in 2015-2016. Around 355 000 internally displaced children remain out of schoolin Iraq, representing 48.3 % of the total internally displaced school-age children. In conflictaffected governorates such as Salah al-Din and Diyala more than 90 % of school-age children
are left out of the education system.1483
As of 2015-2016, Iraq spent only 5.7 % of its government expenditure on education, whichputs the country on the bottom rank of Middle East countries in any given year. These limited
public education resources result in decreasing quality of education and learning outcomes
and dropping teacher retention rates.1484
USDOS noted in a 2018 report that children encountered a range of barriers to education
access, such as ‘attacks on schools and specific targeting of teachers and school personnel.
Other barriers included the lack of schools nearby, the use of schools as shelters by internallydisplaced persons (IDPs) and as detention centers by ISIS, costs of transportation and schoolsupplies, lack of sufficient educational facilities, and IDPs’ and refugees’ lack of identification
documents.’1485 This was also the case in previous years’ reporting.1486 USDOL remarked thatwhile many schools have re-opened, approximately 1.2 million children throughout Iraq
remained out of school as of October 2017.1487

1479 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Iraq, 20 April 2018, url.
1480 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Iraq, 20 April 2018, url.
1481 UNICEF, A Heavy Price for Children: Violence Destroys Childhoods in Iraq, 01 June 2016, url, p. 5.
1482 UNICEF, The Cost and Benefits of Education in Iraq, 21 May 2017, url, pp. i-1.
1483 UNICEF, The Cost and Benefits of Education in Iraq, 21 May 2017, url, pp. i-1.
1484 UNICEF, The Cost and Benefits of Education in Iraq:, 21 May 2017, url, pp. i-1.
1485 US Department of Labor, 2017 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor - Iraq, 20 September 2018, url, p. 2.
1486 US Department of Labor, 2016 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor - Iraq, 30 September 2017, url, p. 2.
1487 US Department of Labor, 2017 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor - Iraq, 20 September 2018, url, p. 2.

182 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALSIn September 2016 UNICEF noted that one in five schools in Iraq was out of use due to
conflict.1488 UNICEF reported that in 2013, some 777 000 5-year-olds who should be in preprimary were out of school (76 %), along with nearly 485 000 primary school aged children (8%) and over 651 000 lower secondary school aged children (26 %), remarking that theycounted an additional 500 000 children out of school IDPs since the 2014 armed conflict with
ISIL.1489 UNICEF remarked that children most at risk of being excluded from school were girls,
poor children, children with uneducated mothers, and children with disabilities.1490
Discussing how ISIL describes its government structure the Atlantic Council, an American thinktank in the field of international affairs, reported that the organisation set up several
government bodies in the territories it controlled, so-called Diwan. According to ISIL the
Diwan of Education regulates curriculums and courses for schools as well as locates therequired personnel.1491 Numerous sources note the brutality of ISIL’s school curriculum, andthe risk of indoctrination school children faced.1492 In an October 2017 article Foreign Affairs,
however, discusses the disparity between ISIL’s propaganda about their educational systemand the reality on the ground. Through interviews conducted with over two dozen civilian
teachers and parents who had fled to southern Turkey from ISIL-held territory in Syria, Foreign
Affairs concludes that ISIL’s school system is in truth deeply dysfunctional and, in some ISILcontrolled areas, nearly non-existent.1493
Education was a low priority for ISIL. Despite ISIL’s distribution of educational materials in its
online propaganda, teachers reported ISIL’s online textbooks were rarely distributed. Schools
were underfunded and understaffed, and school attendance was not monitored. ISIL’s true
recruitment interest was not its school system but the Diwan (‘Department’) of Dawah and
Masajid (outreach and mosques), ‘which ran sharia training centers, mosques, Friday
sermons, and so-called media points, or propaganda centers with large screens that played
footage of battles; beheadings; sermons of ISIL’ leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi; and Islamicchants and songs’.1494

3.8.7 Orphans
The New York Times reports in 2018 that no Iraqi government agency or international
humanitarian group has comprehensive statistics on the number of children orphaned in the
2014-2017 period. The Iraqi state has few resources for these children, and the country’s
communities are too overwhelmed to handle the orphans’ needs. Most of these children havebeen placed in the care of their extended families, the New York Times observes.1495
Al-Monitor reports in August 2016 that a recent survey by the Ministry of Planning andDevelopment indicated the number of orphans aged 17 at most and registered at the Ministryof Planning and Development reached 600 000. The survey, however, did not include Ninewa

1488 UNICEF, UNICEF Iraq briefing note – education, 30 September 2016, url, p. 2.
1489 UNICEF, OOSCI-MENA, Iraq-Overview, last updated May 2017, url.
1490 UNICEF, OOSCI-MENA, Iraq-Overview, last updated May 2017, url.
1491 Atlantic Council, How ISIS describes its government structure, 28 July 2016, url.
1492 Niqash, How to be a good little jihadi: extremists release new school textbooks, curriculum in Mosul, 29

October 2015, url; Guardian (The), How Islamic State is training child killers in doctrine of hate, 5 March 2016, url;
UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2016, 30 August 2017, url, p. xviii.
1493 Foreign Affairs, Inside ISIS’ dysfunctional schools, 13 October 2017, url.
1494 Foreign Affairs, Inside ISIS’ dysfunctional schools, 13 October 2017, url.
1495 New York Times (The), Iraq’s forgotten casualties: children orphaned in battle with ISIS, 31 August 2018, url.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 183

and Anbar governorates. A member of the Child and Family Committee in the Iraqi parliament
informed Al-Monitor that government programs for the care of these orphans are limited.1496
In a June 2016 article Al Jazeera reports Iraq lacks enough orphanages to host the large
number of children who have lost both parents. In October 2014, the Iraqi Ministry of Labour
and Social Affairs announced that it runs 22 orphanages across the country, Al Jazeera
notes.1497

3.9 People perceived as wealthy
In a May 2018 article the Washington Post reported that Shia militias ‘operate as mafia-styleorganizations that engage in criminal activities, extortion and human rights abuses’.1498 In a
February 2018 report Red24, a global security specialist consultancy based in South Africa,
indicated ‘the kidnapping threat will remain high in conflict and previously conflict affectedareas of Iraq in 2018, in particular in the central and northern Sunni governorates. In addition
to the kidnapping threat posed by Islamist militant groups, such as the Islamic State (ISIL), in
the abovementioned regions, the upsurge in kidnappings by a myriad of criminal and militia
groups which we have witnessed over the past 18 months is expected to continue, andpossibly increase, in 2018.’1499 Locals are cited as primary targets. The report further notes the
kidnapping threat is expected to remain lower in the Kurdish north and Shia south.1500 In its
2017 Country Report on Terrorism, USDOS notes all through 2017 kidnapping-for-ransom
remained a source of funding for ISIL.1501
In a September 2018 article the New York Times noted that organised crime groups arerampant in Basrah. The leaders of these criminal organisations are said to be linked to
powerful Shia militias.1502 In a September 2017 article Iraqi News reports a surge in ransom
kidnappings of the relatives of well-off residents and merchants in Mosul. A source within
Mosul’s police, who asked not to be named, indicated that many of the armed groups andmobilisation troops do not receive salaries from the Iraqi government, which prompts
undisciplined elements to carry out kidnappings and armed robberies.1503 In a January 2017
article Al-Monitor reports on the rise kidnappings for ransom in Baghdad. According to AlMonitor some criminal gangs employ a person called Al-Allas, which means a bounty hunter.
This person’s mission is to provide the names and details of wealthy individuals or families togang members. A deputy head of the Security Committee of the Baghdad Provincial Council
stated influential political or armed group are behind the kidnappings to secure funds throughransoms.1504 An Iraqi consultant Landinfo and Lifos met in Amman in February 2017 indicatedthat militia were directly involved in the wave of criminally motivated kidnappings witnessedin Iraq since 2014.1505
Mark Lattimer explains at EASO’s practical cooperation meeting on Iraq in April 2017 SabeaMandeans are perceived as rich because they were associated with the jewellery trade.

1496 Al-Monitor, Amid war on ISIS, Iraq’s widows and orphans face neglect, 14 August 2016, url.
1497 Al Jazeera, Iraq’s child soldiers: ‘What happened to our boys?’, 8 June 2016, url.
1498 Washington Post (The), What Iraq’s election means for its Shiite militias, 12 May 2018, url.
1499 Red24, Special Risks - Global kidnapping hotspots 2018, 1 February 2018, url.
1500 Red24, Special Risks - Global kidnapping hotspots 2018, 1 February 2018, url.
1501 USDOS, Country Report on Terrorism 2017 - Chapter 5 - Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 19 September

2018, url.
1502 New York Times (The), In strategic Iraqi city, a week of deadly turmoil, 8 September 2018, url.
1503 Iraqi News, Mosul ISIS: Mosul sees surge in ransom kidnappings of its rich: newspaper, 18 September 2018, url.
1504 Al-Monitor, Why are kidnappings on the rise in Baghdad?, 27 January 2017, url.
1505 Middle East Eye, Kidnappings greater threat to Baghdad than Islamic State: top official, 2 December 2014, url.

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Because of this, they became a target for extortion by extremist groups and criminal gangs.1506
In a January 2017 article Middle East Eye reports numerous kidnappings - politically andcriminally related - take place almost daily in Baghdad. Former Iraqi Interior minister
Mohammed al-Ghabban informed Middle East Eye the criminal kidnappings aim to blackmailpeople to get money, and the terrorist, political type aims to impose the gang's influence andblackmail people at the same time. A senior Iraqi security official who declined to be named
indicated some of the abductors ‘are either supported by big Shia armed factions or takeadvantage of contacts with the security forces’.1507 Several key security officials told Middle
East Eye that the abductees and their abductors were mainly Shia. According to Middle East
Eye the criminal gangs responsible for the kidnappings aim to extort ransoms ranging from
USD 10 000 to USD 100 000, depending on the financial situation of a victim's family.1508
In a March 2016 report Michael Knights noted the increase in criminal activity observed in
Baghdad and the southern provinces was caused by criminals claiming to be PMU.1509 In a June2015 report Norman Cigar notes that after June 2014 ‘in many areas the departure of army
and police units to the front created a security vacuum that was exploited by criminal
elements that engaged in kidnappings, extortion and robberies. Often, the perpetrators
claimed to belong to one of the militias’. AAH’s leader Qais al-Khazali acknowledged that somecriminals joined the militias as a cover for their illegal activities.1510
In a December 2014 article Middle East Eye reports dozens of kidnappings take place every
week in Baghdad. Some abductions are a direct result of the sectarian tension that has grownsince ISIL took over part of Iraq; others are the work of extortion gangs that have prosperedin the confusion. Victims or their families report that the kidnappers often use text messages
to make their demands, and that the amount asked is usually subject to negotiation. The
agreed ransom is usually between USD 20 000 and UD 30 000.1511
For further information on criminal gangs see section 3.1.2.

3.10 Inter-sect marriage between Sunni and Shia
Discussing mixed marriages in Iraq at EASO’s practical cooperation meeting on Iraq in April
2017 Mark Lattimer observes that mixed marriages between Sunni and Shia Muslims are quite
common in Iraq. He further states that ‘there was a huge preponderance of mixed marriages
over many decades and there still are many mixed families and mixed communities in Iraq.’1512
BBC News reports Sunni-Shia marriages are common in countries with large Shia populations
like Iraq and Lebanon. BBC Monitoring journalist Mina al-Lami, who was born in Iraq into aSunni-Shia inter-marriage, adds that ‘having a parent from each sect was and continues to becommon in Iraq, especially in mixed areas like the capital Baghdad.’1513
According to a Senior Iraq researcher at Human Rights Watch, contacted in January 2018 by
the Research Directorate of the IRB, ‘there is plenty of anecdotal evidence that intermarriage
has decreased around the years of peak Sunni-Shia violence in 2006-2007’. Exceptional cases

1506 Lattimer, M., cited in: EASO, Practical Cooperation Meeting on Iraq, 25-26 April 2017, url, p. 20.
1507 Middle East Eye, Criminal kidnappings are big business in Baghdad, 1 January 2017, url.
1508 Middle East Eye, Criminal kidnappings are big business in Baghdad, 1 January 2017, url.
1509 Knights, M., The future of Iraq’s armed forces, March 2016, url, p. 32.
1510 Cigar, N., Iraq’s shia warlords and their militias, June 2015, url, p. 34.
1511 Middle East Eye, Kidnappings greater threat to Baghdad than Islamic State: top official, 2 December 2014, url.
1512 Lattimer, M., cited in: EASO, Practical Cooperation Meeting on Iraq, 25-26 April 2017, url, p. 19.
1513 BBC News, ‘Sushi’ children defy Sunni-Shia divide, 18 June 2016, url.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 185

notwithstanding, however, ‘inter-sect marriage is not controversial in Iraq.’1514 Contacted in
January 2018 by IRB, the representative of the Middle East and North Africa Programmes at
the Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights states that inter-sect marriages ‘have become lesssocially acceptable in some quarters due to the politicization of sectarian differences’ since2006. He further explains ‘this varies greatly from family to family and from place toplace.’1515 Likewise, BBC Monitoring journalist Mina al-Lami explains sectarian tensions in Iraq
after 2003 have led to a drop in Sunni-Shia marriages. However, ‘they are still not unusual.’1516
The representative of the Middle East and North Africa Programs at the Ceasefire Centre for
Civilian Rights explained its network of local researchers documented 1 249 cases of familybased violence between February 2014 and May 2015. In 11 of those cases inter-sect marriage
was mentioned as a factor of violence or abuse. The same source indicated the organisation
documented a number of cases in which Sunni-Shia couples were forced to divorce after therise in sectarian tensions due to pressure from the family/community. In other cases, womenin inter-sect marriages, particularly if living with the husband’s family, were exposed todomestic abuse and violence, due to the mother’s sectarian difference. In cases of divorce,
women were sometimes prevented from seeing their children because of their religiondiffered from their former husband’s.1517
Asked if mixed couples can become targets of persecution at EASO’s practical cooperation
meeting on Iraq in April 2017 Mark Lattimer responded that this may occur. However ‘they
are not persecuted indiscriminately; there has been a long history of mixed marriages in
Iraq.’1518 Discussing honour killings in the Kurdistan region, the same source added women are
more affected by honour violence than men, for example, in the case of ‘a problematic mixed
marriage’.1519
In a 2011 report IOM Iraq notes divorce and separation have been most common amongmixed religion marriages. According to IOM these marriages fall apart because of ‘familypressure and threats from militia groups’.1520 In a 2010 article published by the Institute for
War and Peace Reporting, a not-for profit organisation that works with media and civil society
to promote change in conflict zones, a Shia woman married to a Sunni man describes how she
received death threats living in a Sunni quarter in Baghdad at the height of the sectarian
conflict in 2006.1521 In 2007, the Washington Post reported mixed couples in Iraq faced
violence and threats. Militias or insurgents forced them to leave their homes because one
partner is from the wrong sect.1522

1514 Canada, IRB, Iraq: Inter-sect marriage between Sunni and Shia Muslims, including prevalence; treatment ofinter-sect spouses and their children by society and authorities, including in Baghdad; state protection available(2016-January 2018) [IRQ106049.E], 29 January 2018, url.
1515 Canada, IRB, Iraq: Inter-sect marriage between Sunni and Shia Muslims, including prevalence; treatment ofinter-sect spouses and their children by society and authorities, including in Baghdad; state protection available(2016-January 2018) [IRQ106049.E], 29 January 2018, url.
1516 BBC News, ‘Sushi’ children defy Sunni-Shia divide, 18 June 2016, url.
1517 Canada, IRB,, Iraq: Inter-sect marriage between Sunni and Shia Muslims, including prevalence; treatment ofinter-sect spouses and their children by society and authorities, including in Baghdad; state protection available(2016-January 2018) [IRQ106049.E], 29 January 2018, url.
1518 Lattimer, M., cited in: EASO, Practical Cooperation Meeting on Iraq, 25-26 April 2017, url, p. 24.
1519 Lattimer, M., cited in: EASO, Practical Cooperation Meeting on Iraq, 25-26 April 2017, url, p. 24.
1520 IOM, IOM Iraq: Special Focus Report on Female Headed Households, 12 October 2011, url, p. 4.
1521 IWPR, Fighting for love across Iraq’s sectarian frontline, 16 April 2010, url.
1522 Washington Post (The), Marriages between sects come under siege in Iraq, 4 March 2007, url.

186 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

3.11 Mixed Arab-Kurdish couples
A human rights activist interviewed by the DIS/Landinfo during their 2018 fact-finding mission
to KRI informed that marriages between Arabs and Kurds are very rare, especially in Northern
Iraq, where sectarian and ethnic tensions are high. Another source said that mixed ArabKurdish couples may be stigmatised both by other Arabs and Kurds.1523 In a 2017 article Niqash
however noted that due to displacement in the context of the ISIL crisis ‘more Kurdish andArab families are intermarrying in northern Iraq’. The article went on to explained that sincemarriage in Iraq and KRI is a ‘conservative tradition’ through arranged marriage by family and‘matchmakers’, ‘men have far more choice than women, it seems that it is usually Kurdish
men marrying Arab women.’1524
At EASO’s practical cooperation meeting on Iraq in April 2017 Mark Lattimer noted that in the
KRI both men and women, though particularly women, may be victims of honour killings, forexample, in the case of ‘a problematic mixed marriage’, such as a relationship between a Sunni
and a Shia who ‘want to marry but the families do not approve’.1525 The EASO report indicatesthat various experts and organisations noted the following concerning the Kurdistan region:‘[I]t is possible for a clan or a tribe to punish a member (especially a woman) for committinga misguided act, such as a mixed marriage.’1526

3.12 People displaying westernised behaviour
An Iraq analyst interviewed during the 2018 DIS/Landinfo fact-finding mission to KRI statedthat ‘the PMUs are targeting people that show signs of deviating morality. This is mostly whenpeople stand out the Shia social norms. The victims are from the LGBT [Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual
and Transgender] community or among creative people who, for instance, dress
differently.’1527 Freedom House explains that ‘both men and women face pressure to conformto conservative standards on personal appearance.’1528
The USDOS 2017 report on international religious freedom mentions that according torepresentatives of Christian NGOs, ‘some Muslims continued to threaten women and girls,
regardless of their religious affiliation, for refusing to wear the hijab, for dressing in Westernstyle clothing, or for not adhering to strict interpretations of Islamic norms governing public
behavior.’1529 The report further states Shia militias that mobilised to fight ISIL ‘have long usedtheir weapons and power to crack down on activities they deem “un-Islamic”’.1530 In a June2017 e-mail quoted in a COI report posted on the website the Austrian Supreme
Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht), Mark Lattimer explained that the style ofclothing expected of women in Iraq has become more conservative over the last decades.
Whilst there is a strict dress code for women in territories controlled by ISIL, in Baghdad andBasrah Shia militias also seek to enforce strict dress codes and are responsible for violent
attacks on women whose dress styles are considered inappropriate. He further pointed out
1523 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons(IDPs) in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 37.
1524 Niqash, In Northern Iraq, Some Kurdish Men Prefer Their Brides Budget, 9 March 2017, url.
1525 Lattimer, M., cited in: EASO, Practical Cooperation Meeting on Iraq, 25-26 April 2017, url, p. 24.
1526 Lattimer, M., cited in: EASO, Practical Cooperation Meeting on Iraq, 25-26 April 2017, url, p. 24.
1527 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons(IDPs) in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 47.
1528 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2018 - Iraq, January 2018, url.
1529 USDOS, 2017 Report on International Religious Freedom - Iraq, 29 May 2018, url.
1530 USDOS, 2017 Report on International Religious Freedom - Iraq, 29 May 2018, url.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 187

that in 2006-2007, militias in Basrah and Diyala killed hundreds of women for failing to comply
with the dress code.1531
In September 2018, Tara Fares, a 22-year-old model and social media celebrity was shot deadon the streets of Baghdad. This killing followed a series of violent attacks targeting prominent
women considered to be ‘outspoken or bucking the norms of conservative society’. Following
Fares’ killing, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi ordered an investigation to examine
whether this attack was linked to other recent murders and kidnappings in Baghdad andBasrah.1532 A few days before Faras’ murder, a well-known female human rights activist andhead of a local NGO was killed in Basrah. She was an active supporter of the series of antigovernment protests taking place in Basrah at the time she was killed.1533 In the previous
months, at least two female beauticians died in their home ‘in mysterious circumstances’,
raising concerns about a systematic targeting of women owner of beauty centres.1534 In
October 2018, a former Miss Iraq reported to have received death threats.1535
At EASO’s practical cooperation meeting on Iraq in April 2017 Mark Lattimer mentioned
women in Iraq have been targeted for assassination because of commission of moral crimes.
In Baghdad, Asaib Ahl al-Haq has committed mass killings of women found in alleged brothels.
Also, ‘there have been dozens of cases of women turning up in Basra with notes saying they
were found wearing the wrong clothes or in comprising positions and have been killed bymilitias.’1536 Reporting on human rights in Iraq in the July to December 2016 period UNAMI
mentions several cases that involved the targeting of premises that were purportedly selling
alcohol or drugs or connected to prostitution. The same source further states that ‘cafes,
restaurants and houses were attacked with IEDs, usually during the night, by actors seeking
to impose their own form of behavior upon those that they suspected of not adhering to theirmoral code.’1537
The Washington Post explains in 2016 Iraq was once proudly secular, ‘but religious parties
have dominated the political landscape since the United States toppled Saddam Hussein’s
regime in 2003’. Religious hard-liners were further empowered by the sectarian civil war
between Sunnis and Shiites. The Shia militias that mobilised to fight ISIL ‘have long used their
weapons and power to crack down on activities they deem un-Islamic’.1538 In 2015,
participants and organizers of the ‘Baghdad Festival for Youth’, an event inspired by the Indian‘Holi’ festival (known for the coloured powder participants throw on one another), werecriticised and threatened after photos of the festival circulated on social media. A prominent
leader of Asaib Ahl al-Haq accused them of moral turpitude.1539 A January 2014 report the AlMassalla Organization for Human Resources Development/ NPA- Norwegian People’s Aid
describes how an Iraqi rap artist received direct threats from Asaib Ahl al-Haq. They deemed
rap music a religiously forbidden (Haram) and as an intrusive Western art form.1540 In 2013

1531 Austria, BVwG (Bundesverwaltungsgericht) [Supreme Administrative Court], Entscheidungstext L512 1417529-

1/33E [Decision/case number L512 1417529-1/33E], 8 November 2017, 8 November 2017, url.
1532 New York Times (The), A social media star is shot dead in Baghdad. Iraqis fear a trend, 28 September 2018, url.
1533 BBC News, Iraqi human rights activist shot dead in Basra, 25 September 2018, url.
1534 Al Arabiya, After death of Iraq’s ‘Barbie’, beautician dies in mysterious circumstances, 24 August 2018, url.
1535 BBC News, Former Miss Iraq ‘threatened’ after fellow Instagram star’s murder, 1 October, url.
1536 Lattimer, M., EASO, Practical Cooperation Meeting on Iraq, 25-26 April 2017, url, p. 22.
1537 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July to December 2016, 30 August 2017, url, p. 17.
1538 Washington Post (The), Feared Shiite militias back in spotlight after three Americans vanish in Iraq, 21 June
2016, url.
1539 Middle East Eye, The death of fun in Baghdad?, 28 July 2015, url.
1540 Al-Masalla Organization for Human Resources Development/Norwegian People’s Aid, The Situation of Personal
Freedoms of Iraqi Youths, January 201, url.

188 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

the Guardian reported on the rising popularity of tattoos in Baghdad, including amongst
women. According to the newspaper, ‘having a tattoo in Baghdad remains a complex social
negotiation’. Facing discrimination when seeking employment as public servants, police
officers or soldiers, many hide their tattoos under the T-shirt line. One interviewee says hekeeps his tattoo out of sight because ‘terrorists have killed people for having tattoos.’1541

1541 Guardian (The), Mum, imam and Saddam: what daring young Iraqis are saying with tattoos, 22 March 2013,

url.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 189

Annex I: Popular Mobilization Units –main militias and associated groups
Badr Organization
Formed in the 1980s in Iran1542, the Badr Organization emerged as the most powerful Shia
militia within the PMU1543 and reportedly has influence over elements of Iraq’s security
forces.1544 In a December 2015 report Kenneth Katzman and Carla E. Humud state that the
Badr Organization might have as many as 30 000 militia fighters.1545 According to a reportpublished in August 2017 by the GPPi, the Badr Organization was about 20 000 men strong in
February 2016.1546 An Iran-backed militia, the Badr Organization’s primary concern was
securing and pacifying the strategically important province of Diyala.1547 Increasingly theprovince became a Badr principality, partially outside state control.1548 In eastern Diyala
province the Fifth Iraqi Army division is considered to be under the command of the Badr
Organization.1549
In a July 2017 report for the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, anorganisation that advises political decision-makers on international politics and foreign andsecurity policy, Guido Steinberg notes that Badr also controls part of Salah al-Din province. He
notes that ‘this dominion over Diyala and Salah al-Din is part of the Iranian project to createan (Islamic) state within a state in Iraq, modelled on Hezbollah in Lebanon.’1550 Members of
the Badr Organization have repeatedly been accused of committing atrocities against civilians
in contested and reconquered territory1551, especially in Diyala province.1552 In the May 2018
election Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri headed the Fateh alliance, a political bloc thatgained 47 seats, finishing second after Muqtada al-Sadr’s Saairun coalition.1553

1542 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons(IDPs) in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 44.
1543 Counter Extremism Project, Badr Organization, last updated November 2017, url; Reuters, Special report: How
Iran’s military chiefs operate in Iraq, 24 February 2015, url.
1544 Washington Post (The), Appointment of Iraq’s new interior minister opens door to militia and Iranian influence,
18 October 2014, url.
1545 US, CRS, Iraq: politics and governance, 31 December 2015, url, p. 17.
1546 Gaston, E. et.al., Literature review of local, regional or sub-state defense forces in Iraq, 6 August 2017, url, p.
27.
1547 Foreign Policy, Iran’s Shiite militias are running amok in Iraq, 19 February 2015, url.
1548 Knights, M., Iraq’s popular demobilization, 26 February 2016, url.
1549 Dury-Agri, J.R. et.al., Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: orders of battle, December 2017,
url, p. 17; Reuters, Exclusive: U.S. falters in campaign to revive Iraqi army, experts say, 3 June 2016, url.
1550 Steinberg, G., The Badr Organization, Iran’s most important instrument in Iraq, July 2017, url, pp. 1-3.
1551 Human Rights Watch, Iraq, Investigate abuses in Hawija operation, 28 September 2017, url; Human Rights
Watch, Fallujah abuses test control of militias, 9 June 2016, url; Reuters, Attacks on Iraq’s Sunnis could constitutewar crimes: rights group, 31 January 2016, url.
1552 Reuters, Iraqi commander denies paramilitary groups involved in killings, 9 February 2015, url.
1553 Mansour, R., van den Toorn, C., The 2018 Iraqi federal elections – A population in transition, July 2018, url, pp.
7-8.

190 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALSAsaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) – The League of the Righteous
Asaib Ahl al‐Haq (AAH) (The League of the Righteous) broke away from the Mahdi Army (JAM),
the militia run by influential Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, in 2006.1554 In September 2014 The
New York Times designates AAH as ‘the largest and most formidable of the Iranian-backed
Shiite militias dominating Baghdad’.1555 According to a report published in August 2017 by the
GPPi, AAH was about 5 000 – 10 000 men strong as of March 2015.1556 AAH’s leader, Qais alKhazali, headed the Mahdi Army ‘special groups’ during 2006-2007. AAH was formed whilst
Qais al-Khazali was incarcerated by U.S. forces for his alleged role in a 2005 raid that killed five
American soldiers.1557 AAH fell out with Sadrists because Muqtada al-Sadr became increasingly
critical of Iranian influence in Iraq1558 and the group has ideological links to Iran's supremeleader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and a close connection to Lebanon's Hezbollah.1559
Virulently anti- American, after its creation in 2006, Asaib Ahl al-Haq conducted thousands ofattacks against U.S. and Iraqi forces, targeted kidnappings of Westerners, the murder ofAmerican soldiers and the assassination of Iraqi officials.1560 In a June 2013 report Jessica
Lewis, Ahmed Ali, and Kimberly Kagan report that AAH re-mobilizes, establishing checkpoints
in Baghdad and conducting extra-judicial killing against Sunnis.1561 Asaib Ahl al-Haq came tobe known as the armed support for Mr Maliki’s Shiite political faction.1562
AAH formed a political bloc of its own, al-Sadiqun (the Honest Ones), and ran under al-Maliki’s
State of Law bloc in the April 2014 Iraqi national elections, winning one seat.1563 In this July
2014 report Human Rights Watch accuses government-backed militias, notably AAH, ofinvolvement in kidnappings and killings of Sunni civilians throughout Baghdad, Diyala and
Hilla; they also allegedly killed 48 Sunni men around towns/villages in the ‘Baghdad belts’according to witnesses.1564
During the fight against ISIL AAH continued to expand its influence in Iraq1565, despite further
allegations of human rights violations.1566 Fighters of AAH have been actively fighting in
Syria.1567 Sources interviewed by DIS/Landinfo during their 2018 FFM to KRI stated that AAH

1554 Cochrane, M., Iraq report 12: The fragmentation of the Sadrist movement, January 2009, url, p. 17; Cochrane,

M., Asaib Ahl al‐Haq and the Khazali Special Groups Network, 13 January 2008, url.
1555 New York Times (The), Shiite militias pose challenge for U.S. in Iraq, 16 September 2014, url.
1556 Gaston, E. et.al., Literature review of local, regional or sub-state defense forces in Iraq, 6 August 2017, url, p.
27.
1557 US, CRS, Iraq: politics and governance, , 9 March 2016, url, p. 18.
1558 Mansour, R. and Jabar, F. A., The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq’s future, 28 April 2017, url, p. 14.
1559 Guardian (The), Controlled by Iran, the deadly militia recruiting Iraq’s men to die in Syria, 12 March 2014, url.
1560 Wyer, S., The resurgence of Asaib Ahl al-Haq, December 2012, url, p. 6; Cochrane, M., Iraq report 12: Thefragmentation of the Sadrist movement, January 2009, url, p. 27.
1561 Lewis, J. et.al., Iraq’s sectarian crisis reignites as shi’a militias execute civilians and remobilize, 1 July 2013, url,
p. 4.
1562 New York Times (The), Shiite militias pose challenge for U.S. in Iraq, 16 September 2014, url.
1563 Heras, N.A., Iraqi Shi’a militia Asa’ib Ahl al- Haq expands operations to Syria, 15 May 2014, url.
1564 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: pro-government militias’ trail of death, attacks on Sunnis in at least three provinces,
31 July 2014, url.
1565 Counter Extremism Project, Asaib Ahl al‐Haq, last update April 2017, url.
1566 Human Rights Watch, Militias escalate abuses, possibly war crimes, 15 February 2015, url; Human Rights
Watch, Pro-government militias’ trail of death, 31 July 2014, url.
1567 Guardian (The), Controlled by Iran, the deadly militia recruiting Iraq’s men to die in Syria, 12 March 2014, url;
Smyth, P., The Shiite Jihad in Syria and its regional effects, February 2015, url, p. 23.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 191

is feared for its targeting of civilians, being considered responsible for murders and torture ofSunni Arabs and the Kurds, mostly in Mosul and Sinjar, but also in other contested areas.1568
In the May 2018 election AAH was part of the Fateh alliance, a political bloc that gained 47
seats, finishing second after Muqtada al-Sadr’s Saairun coalition1569 and taking more than adozen seats in Parliament.1570

Kataib Hezbollah (KH)
Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) is an Iranian-sponsored, anti-American Shiite militia, led by Abu Mahdi
al-Muhandis, also known as Jamal al- Ibrahimi1571, a former Badr commander.1572 According toMichael Knights it was formed in early 2007 as ‘a vehicle through which Iran’s IRGC Qods Forcecould deploy its most experienced operators and its most sensitive equipment in Iraq’.1573 KH
was responsible for some of the most lethal attacks against U.S. and coalition forces and was
designated as a terrorist organisation by the U.S. Treasury in 2009.1574 Violence and abuses
against civilians, including ‘summary killings, enforced disappearances, torture, and thedestruction of homes’1575 have also been reported.1576 Government sources contacted byReuters in 2016 indicate that military operations command of Salah al-Din province, north of
Baghdad, is dominated by Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.1577 Consistent with its secret and elite
profile KH is a smaller force than other Iranian proxy militias. Saraya al-Difaa al-Shaabi is alesser wing of KH, which likely formed to absorb an overflow of recruits without diluting themost capable combat units.1578
According to a November 2010 report by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy KH
developed as a compact movement of less than 400 personnel.1579 KH’s estimated strength isabout 20 000 men strong as of February 2016.1580 Other sources cited in 2018 estimate theirstrength at around 3-5 0001581 or between 1 000 and 30 000 fighters.1582

1568 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons(IDPs) in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, pp. 44, 95.
1569 Mansour, R., van den Toorn, C., The 2018 Iraqi federal elections – A population in transition, July 2018, url, pp.
7-8.
1570 Smyth, P., Iranian militias in Iraq’s parliament: political outcomes and U.S. response, 11 June 2018, url.
1571 Counter Extremism Project, Kata’ib Hezbollah, last update December 2017, url.
1572 Steinberg, G., The Badr Organization, Iran’s most important instrument in Iraq, July 2017, url.
1573 Knights, M., The evolution of Iran’s special groups in Iraq, November 2010, url, p. 12.
1574 Foreign Policy, Iran’s Shiite militias are running amok in Iraq, 19 February 2015, url.
1575 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: ban abusive militias from Mosul operation – Unpunished killings- torture puts
civilians in harm’s way, 31 July 2016, url.
1576 Reuters, U.N. warns of renewed cycle of sectarian strife in Iraq, urges prevention, 5 July 2016, url; Human
Rights Watch, Ruinous aftermath: militia abuses following Iraq’s recapture of Tikrit, 20 September 2015, url, pp. 19; AI, Absolute impunity: militia rule in Iraq, October 2014, url, pp 4-17.
1577 Reuters, Exclusive: U.S. falters in campaign to revive Iraqi army, experts say, 3 June 2016, url.
1578 Dury-Agri, J.R. et.al., Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: orders of battle, December 2017,
url, pp. 40-41.
1579 Knights, M., The evolution of Iran’s special groups in Iraq, November 2010, url.
1580 Gaston, E. et.al., Literature review of local, regional or sub-state defense forces in Iraq, 6 August 2017, url, p.
28.
1581 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons(IDPs) in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 45.
1582 USDOS, Country Report on Terrorism 2017 – Chapter 5 – Kata’ib Hizzballah, 19 September 2018, url.

192 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALSIt operates in Diyala and in southern Iraq, including Basrah, but not openly.1583 Philip Smythnotes that KH has created its own Imam al-Hussein Scouts, which has supplied fighters for its
operations.1584 In June 2016, in the course of fighting against ISIL in Anbar, PMUs, according
to witnesses using the banners of KH, illegally detained 1 500 men and teenage boys from
Saqlawiya, Anbar Governorate and 643 men and boys went missing; 49 are believed to havebeen summarily killed or tortured to death while in custody.1585 According to USDOS, ‘In 2016,
KH continued to fight ISIS alongside the Iraqi Army and participated in the operation toliberate Mosul, though they were only active outside the city. In 2017, the group threatened
to fight “American occupiers” in Iraq, in an article published on the group’s official
website.’1586

Saraya al-Salam (Peace Brigades) of Muqtada al Sadr
Saraya al-Salam, also known as the Peace Brigades, was formed in June 2014 by Shia clericMuqtada al-Sadr, of the Sadrist Movement, in response to the Islamic State’s territorial gains
in Iraq.1587 In June 2003 Muqtada al-Sadr established the Mehdi Army, also known as Jaysh alMahdi (JAM). In 2004 fighting broke out between the Mehdi army and US- led coalition
forces.1588 According to a January 2009 report by Marisa Cochrane Muqtada al Sadr turned
successfully to politics in 2005, joining a coalition of Shi’a parties led by the Supreme Council
for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and including Dawa. During the 2006-2007 civil war
the Mehdi army ‘positioned itself as a security guarantor for the Shia population’. The
organisation also spawned death squads responsible for sectarian cleansing1589, evolving into‘a gang-style militia even Sadr could not control’.1590 After the fall of Mosul in June 2014, Sadr
reformed the Mahdi Army under a new name, the Peace Brigades.1591 Claiming their main role
was to protect Iraq’s shrines The Peace Brigades played a less prominent role than other Shiite
militias in the fight against ISIL, although they took part in major operations, including thecapture of Jurf al-Sakhr1592 and the defence of Samarra.1593
Reports of atrocities by Shiite militia groups in February 2015 led Muqtada al-Sadr totemporarily withdraw The Peace Brigades from the battle against ISIL.1594 Taking a strongly
nationalistic stance Muqtada al-Sadr opposes Iranian influence in Iraqi politics1595 and later

1583 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons(IDPs) in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 45.
1584 Smyth, P., The Shiite Jihad in Syria and its regional effects, February 2015, url, p. 26.
1585 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30
September 2016, 30 December 2016, url, pp. i, ii, 19, 20.
1586 USDOS, Country Report on Terrorism 2017 – Chapter 5 – Kata’ib Hizzballah, 19 September 2018, url.
1587 Washington Post (The), Shiite ‘peace brigades’ send signal of aggression with major rally in Baghdad, 21 June
2014, url).
1588 BBC News, Profile: Moqtada Sadr, 19 January 2012, url.
1589 Cochrane, M., Iraq report 12: The fragmentation of the Sadrist movement, January 2009, url, p. 21.
1590 International Crisis Group, Fight or flight: the desperate plight of Iraq ‘s “Generation 2000”, 8 August 2016, url,
p. 5.
1591 Washington Post (The), Shiite ‘peace brigades’ send signal of aggression with major rally in Baghdad, 21 June
2014, url.
1592 Washington Post (The), Iraqi Shiite cleric recalls militiamen from fight against Islamic State, 17 February 2015,
url.
1593 Reuters, Iraq’s Sadr readies militia to fight for Samarra, 11 December 2014, url.
1594 Washington Post (The), Iraqi Shiite cleric recalls militiamen from fight against Islamic State, 17 February 2015,url.
1595 Gaston, E. et.al., Literature review of local, regional or sub-state defense forces in Iraq, 6 August 2017, url, p.
29.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 193

distanced himself from acts of sectarian violence.1596 He has also criticised Iraqi Shia militias
for their involvement in Syria.1597 A large Sadrist-led protest, demanding electoral reforms,
tried to move into the Green Zone on 11 February 2017 but security forces repelled theprotesters with force, resulting in casualties.1598
In December 2017 Muqtada al-Sadr stated that the Peace Brigades would be transformed into
a civil organisation, liberated areas were to be handed over to Iraqi security forces.1599 In
February 2018 Muqtada al-Sadr formed a new political party called Istiqama, surprisingly
allying with Iraq’s Communist party and other secular and civil society groups.1600 According
to a report published in August 2017 by the Global Public Policy Institute Saraya al-Salam was
14 000 men strong as of July 2016, of which only 3 000 are registered under PMU salary.1601
Renad Mansour and Faleh A. Jabar note that Saraya-al Salam has the virtual capacity to build
a 100 000-strong army. However, ‘their actual capacity is restrained by a lack of resources,
not by the number of volunteers.’1602 In the May 2018 election Muqtada al-Sadr’s Saairun
coalition (an alliance between Sadr’s followers and the Iraqi Communist Party) gained 54
seats, winning the most seats in Parliament. Especially in Baghdad province the Saairun
coalition proved to be more popular than Hadi al-Amiri’s Fateh alliance.1603

Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI)In the early 1980s Iraqi Shiite exiles in Iran formed under Teheran’s tutelage the Supreme
Council for the Islamic revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). Its military branch was called the Badr Corps,
also known as Faylaq Badr.1604 SCIRI was the largest political party in the aftermath of the 2003
invasion.1605 SCIRI’s Badr Corps remained active after 2003.1606 During Iraq’s sectarian war the
Badr Corps became infamous for its brutal tactics.1607 The organisation ran notorious Shiite
death squads, after infiltrating the Ministry of Interior.1608 In part to distance itself from IranSCIRI changed its name to Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) in 2007.1609 Leader Ammar alHakim, who succeeded his father in 2009, distanced the group from Iranian influence andcaused the Badr Corps to split off and reform themselves as the Badr Organization.1610 In 2014ISCI formed its own militia, Saraya Ashura, also known as the Ashura companies.1611 Renad

1596 Al Jazeera, Iraq: the re-invention of Muqtada al- Sadr, 9 March 2016, url.
1597 Mansour, R. and Jabar, F. A., The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq’s future, 28 April 2017, url, p. 17.
1598 Anagnostos, E., Iraq Situation Report: February 11-16, 2017, 16 February 2017, url.
1599 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 2367 (2017), 17 January 2018, url,

p. 2.
1600 Niqash, Change we can believe in? Major religious group allies with Iraq’s communists, for election shake-up,
8 February 2018, url.
1601 Gaston, E. et.al., Literature review of local, regional or sub-state defense forces in Iraq, 6 August 2017, url, p.
29.
1602 Mansour, R. and Jabar, F. A., The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq’s future, 28 April 2017, url, p. 14.
1603 Mansour, R., van den Toorn, C., The 2018 Iraqi federal elections – A population in transition, July 2018, url, pp.
7-12.
1604 Smyth, P., Should Iraq’s ISCI Forces really be considered ‘Good Militias’?, 17 August 2016, url.
1605 Mansour, R., Iraq after the fall of ISIS: the struggle for the state, July 2017, url), p. 11; BBC News, Guide to Iraqi
political parties, 20 January 2006, url.
1606 Beehner, L., Iraq’s militia groups, 26 October 2006, url.
1607 Foreign Policy, Breaking Badr, 6 November 2014, url.
1608 Washington Post (The), Appointment of Iraq’s new interior minister opens door to militia and Iranian influence,
18 October 2014, url.
1609 Smyth, P., Should Iraq’s ISCI Forces really be considered ‘Good Militias’?, 17 August 2016, url; International
Crisis Group, Shiite politics in Iraq: the role of the Supreme Council, 15 November 2007, url, pp. 15-17.
1610 Smyth, P., Should Iraq’s ISCI Forces really be considered ‘Good Militias’?, 17 August 2016, url.
1611 Smyth, P., Should Iraq’s ISCI Forces really be considered ‘Good Militias’?, 17 August 2016, url.

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Mansour notes that Saraya Ashura isn’t ISCI’s sole militia. ‘Saraya el-Jihad and Saraya el-Aqida
were also created by ISCI, as were other paramilitary groups.’1612 Zana K. Gulmohamad also
cites Liwa al-Muntathar as an ISCI militia.1613
According to Niqash ISCI militias are dependent on the Iraqi government for funding andweapons and abide by the central government's decisions; ‘they also often accompany official
army units and have been known to use some of the Iraqi army's equipment.’1614 ISW reportthat ISCI militias ‘exhibit close ties with Iranian proxy leaders and are interoperable with
Iranian proxy militias’1615 while others note that ISCI ‘maintains deep links with Iranian- backed
groups, despite tensions with other Iranian proxy groups’.1616 According to a May 2017 reportby Kari Frentzel ISCI militias count about 3 000 fighters.1617
In the May 2018 election Ammar Al-Hakkim took part as the leader of the National Wisdom
Movement, gaining 19 seats.1618 Philip Smyth notes Ammar al-Hakim formed this movement
just before the elections, to detach itself from ICSI’s pro-Iranian, Badr-friendly old guard.
Hakim’s faction has since aligned itself with Sadr’s camp.1619

Tribal Mobilization Units or Hashd al Ashairi
In a January 2017 report Amnesty International states that ‘Tribal Mobilization (TM or Hashd
al-Asha’iri) militias, composed of fighters from Sunni tribes and generally active locally in theirown places of origin, have played an increasing role in the fight against ISIS and in securing
their areas once they have been recaptured.’1620 Amnesty International also reports that Tribal
Mobilisation Militias remain much less powerful than the PMUs, although some tribes within
the TM have received support from government authorities, including salaries andweapons.1621
A GPPi report indicates that it is not always clear to what extent Sunni Forces are associatedwith or incorporated into the PMUs. The report notes that with the formalisation of the PMU
as part of the legal security forces in November 2016 Sunni forces that remained somewhat
independent from the leadership of the PMU were ‘formally swept under the larger PMF
umbrella’.1622 Nonetheless, locals still tend to make a distinction between the larger Hashd alSha’abi forces and the Sunni tribal forces, the so- called Hashd al-Asha’iri. These tribal forces
tend to be locally mobilised and operate locally. Often they are identified with their particularSunni leader or with the larger forces they associate with. While some take orders directlyfrom Iraqi forces and local authorities, others strongly affiliate with and respond to orders
from larger PMU militia. However, this can vary on a per unit basis, making it difficult to create

1612 Mansour, R., After Mosul, will Iraq’s paramilitaries set the state’s agenda?, 27 January 2017, url, p. 7.
1613 Gulmohamad, Z.K., Iraq’s shia militias: helping or hindering the fight against the Islamic State, 29 April 2016,url.
1614 Niqash, Divided loyalties: Iraq’s controversial Shiite militias fight amongst themselves, 18 June 2015, url.
1615 Dury-Agri, J.R. et.al., Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: orders of battle, December 2017,

url, p. 50.
1616 Smyth, P., Should Iraq’s ISCI Forces really be considered ‘Good Militias’?, 17 August 2016, url.
1617 Frentzel, K., The future role of the Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq – Key influencers of Post- ISIS politics?, May 2017,
url, p. 5.
1618 Mansour, R., van den Toorn, C., The 2018 Iraqi federal elections – A population in transition, July 2018, url, pp.
7-8.
1619 Smyth, P., Iranian militias in Iraq’s parliament: political outcomes and U.S. response, 11 June 2018, url.
1620 AI, Iraq: turning a blind eye – the arming of the Popular Mobilization Forces , 5 January 2017, url, p. 19.
1621 AI, Iraq: turning a blind eye – the arming of the Popular Mobilization Forces , 5 January 2017, url, p. 19.
1622 Derzsi-Horvath, A. et.al., Who’s who : Quick facts about local and Sub-State forces, 16 August 2017, url.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 195

large categorisations of the nature of these forces.1623 In another report Global Public Policy
Institute (GPPI) estimates Hashd al-Asha’iri forces to number 16 000 in Anbar province, 18 000
in Ninewa province and 2 000 – 3 000 in Salah al-Din province (although real fighting forces
numbers may be much lower).1624 The UN Security Council notes that the Government of Iraq
steadily gained the support of tribal fighters to join military operations in areas under ISIL
control in Anbar, Ninewa, Diyala, Kirkuk and Salah al-Din governorates as early as late 2014.1625

Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba
The DIS/Landinfo 2018 FFM to KRI stated that ‘the Nujaba Movement, is an Iraqi Shia group,that has presence in Iraq, but it is mostly active in Syria.’1626 The group fights under theumbrella of the PMU and has a force of around 10 000 fighters.1627 Though the group is madeup of Iraqis, it is loyal to Iran and according to some sources ‘is helping Tehran create a supply
route through Iraq to Damascus’, and alongside other Iranian-backed militias ‘are pushing into
southeast Syria near the border with Iraq, where U.S. forces are based’.1628
The militia was established in 2013 assisting state security forces during the U.S.
occupation.1629 Other sources note that the Harakat al-Nujaba militia was established for
operations in Syria.1630 According to the International Crisis Group writing in 2018 ‘Nujaba arefighting in Syria in support of the Bashar al-Assad regime; one of its leaders said that his
group’s top priorities were to block the U.S. in Iraq and Syria and, next, to prevent ISIL fromspreading.’1631 According to the Nujaba’s spokesman around 500 Nujaba fighters have been
killed in combat between Syria and Iraq.1632
USCIRF, writing in 2018, stated that ‘as in Syria, As-Saib Ahl Al-Haq and Harakat Hizballah AlNujaba, two militia groups controlled by Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
Commander Qassem Soleimani, were identified as having committed sectarian crimes,
including raping, attacking, and abducting Sunni Muslims in Iraq. They fought in battles torecapture territories from ISIS on behalf of the Iranian-backed PMF.’1633
In a 2018 report Renad Mansour makes note that ‘in Ninewah, PMF groups such as al-Nujaba
and Badr seek – either directly or through allies, such as the Sunni hashd – to gain control ofthe provincial council, local police, local state courts, and other provincial state institutions’

1623 Derzsi-Horvath, A. et.al., Who’s who : Quick facts about local and Sub-State forces, 16 August 2017, url.
1624 Gaston, E. et.al., Literature review of local, regional or sub-state defense forces in Iraq, 6 August 2017, url, p.

30.
1625 UN Security Council, Second report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 2169 (2014),

2 February 2015, url, p. 2.
1626 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons(IDPs) in the disputed areas, 5 November 2018, url, p. 45.
1627 Reuters, Special Report: The Iraqi militia helping Iran carve a road to Damascus, 22 September 2017, url.
1628 Mansour, R., The Popular Mobilisation Forces and the Balancing of Formal and Informal Power, 15 March 2018,
url; Reuters, Special Report: The Iraqi militia helping Iran carve a road to Damascus, 22 September 2017, url.
1629 International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 20 July
2018, url, p. 5.
1630 Ohlers, C.A., The uncertain future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, in: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 16 Issue:
3, 8 February 2018, url.
1631 International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 20 July
2018, url, p. 5.
1632 Reuters, Special Report: The Iraqi militia helping Iran carve a road to Damascus, 22 September 2017, url.
1633 USCIRF, United States Commission on International Religious Freedom 2018 Annual Report; Country Reports:
Tier 2 Countries: Iraq, April 2018, url, p. 4.

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and that ‘al-Nujaba has taken over several informal and smuggling markets in north-western
Iraq.’1634
In 2018 proposals to impose sanctions on Iran aligned Iraqi groups, including Harakat
Hezbollah al Nujaba were considered by the US Congress.1635 According to the Washington
Institute Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba has been threatening U.S. assets in Iraq in 2013 and ‘inMarch 2017, the group created the Golan Liberation Army to advance the goals of returning
the Golan Heights to Syria and destroying Israel.’1636
In January 2018, al-Nujaba and a number of other PMU groups, including the Badr
Organization and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq announced a political coalition called Fatah Alliance.1637

Minority armed groups linked to PMUs
In addition to the militias that are majority Shia such as those above, ‘there are also a numberof Sunni, Christian, Yezidi and other minority militias that consider themselves as part of thelarger Popular Mobilization Units structure.’1638 According to an August 2017 Global Public
Policy Institute (GPPI) report the presence and power of minority militias in Iraq has increased
since the rise of ISIL in June 2014, explaining that ‘persecution and violence under ISIL andduring the anti-ISIL campaign has led many of the communities to mobilize their own forces
since 2014, including tribal Sunni Arab, Yezidi, Turkmen, Shabak and Christian forces.’1639
PMUs, as well as the Peshmerga, ‘seek to affiliate with these groups to take advantage of theirlocal ties or knowledge, or to improve local legitimacy’.1640 According to ISW, Iranian proxymilitias have tried to co-opt militias from minority populations in Iraq, including ‘Sunni tribal
fighter formations, Christian self-defense militias, and Yezidi militias linked to the Kurdistan
Workers’ Party (PKK)’.1641 Doing so, the PMU cultivates an image of inclusivity and nationalism
in order to enhance its legitimacy and shroud Iranian influence.1642
In a June 2017 report Minority Rights International indicated that militias representing ethnic
and religious factions of Iraq operate outside of PMU parameters but are to a large extent
united with other armed groups, such as the PMU, in their efforts against ISIL;1643 however,other sources note that the link to the PMU is not always clear cut or standard and can beloosely based on financial, legal, of political incentives.1644
Minority militias linked to PMUs which are of note are also:
1634 Mansour, R., The Popular Mobilisation Forces and the Balancing of Formal and Informal Power, 15 March 2018,url.
1635 US, CRS, Iraq: Issues in the 115th Congress, 4 October 2018, url, p. 21.
1636 Knights, M. et.al., The Smart Way to Sanction Iranian-Backed Militias in Iraq, 17 September 2018, url.
1637 Mansour, R., The Popular Mobilisation Forces and the Balancing of Formal and Informal Power, 15 March 2018,url.
1638 Frentzel, K., The future role of the Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq – Key influencers of Post- ISIS politics?, May 2017,

url, p. 3.
1639 Gaston, E. et.al., Literature review of local, regional or sub-state defense forces in Iraq, 6 August 2017, url, p.
11.
1640 Gaston, E. et.al., Literature review of local, regional or sub-state defense forces in Iraq, 6 August 2017, url, p.
11.
1641 Dury-Agri, J.R. et.al., Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: orders of battle, December 2017,url), p. 45.
1642 Dury-Agri, J.R. et.al., Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: orders of battle, December 2017,
url, p. 45.
1643 MRG, Crossroads: The future of Iraq’s minorities after ISIS, 7 June 2017, url, pp. 42-43.
1644 Al Jazeera, Iraq’s second army: who are they and what do they want, 31 October 2017, url.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS








— 197

Yazidi militias: In a 2017 KAS noted that as of 2014 the Yazidi community in Iraq set
up militia groups to protect its community against ISIL’s onslaught. The largest ofthese militias, the Protection Force of Êzîdxan and the Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS),
are associated with the PKK. The Yazidis also act as allies of the PMU.1645 They count
2 500 fighters and frequently change alliances.1646
Christian militias: Christian militias include the Ninewa Plains Protection Units (NPUs)
and are financed by the Iraqi and the American government. Founded in 2015 The
Babylon Brigade forms part of the PMU.1647 Kata’ib Babiliun are a Chaldean Christian
militia operating as the 50th PMU Brigade and active in Ninewa province.1648
Turkmen brigades: Turkmen Brigades 16 and 52 are a minority militia within the PMU
formed in 2014 and counting over 3 000 fighters. Whilst Brigade 16 is linked to various
Shia militia, Brigade 52 reports exclusively to the Badr Organization.1649
Shabak forces: This minority militia was formed in November 2014 and consists mostlyof Shia Shabak from the Ninewa plains area and Shia Arabs. They are about 1 000 men
strong and are linked to the Badr Organization. They operate across the Ninewa plains
and in Mosul, including controlling many checkpoints and areas from Bartella leading
into Mosul.1650 The integration of The Shabak forces in the PMU has helped promote
them as potential stakeholders in the Ninewa plains region, resulting in tensions
between Shabak and Christian militias and deterring the return of the Christiancommunity to Qaraqosh and nearby Christian areas.1651

1645 Oehring, O., Christians and Yazidis in Iraq : current situation and prospects, 2017, url, pp. 40-43.
1646 Derzsi-Horvath, A. et.al., Who’s who: Quick facts about local and Sub-State forces, 16 August 2017, url.
1647 Oehring, O., Christians and Yazidis in Iraq : current situation and prospects, 2017, url, pp. 37-39.
1648 Dury-Agri, J.R. et.al., Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: orders of battle, December 2017,

url, pp. 45-46.
1649 Derzsi-Horvath, A. et.al., Who’s who: Quick facts about local and Sub-State forces, 16 August 2017, url.
1650 Derzsi-Horvath, A. et.al., Who’s who: Quick facts about local and Sub-State forces, 16 August 2017, url.
1651 Gaston, E., Report: Qaraqosh, Hamdaniya District, The Global Public Policy Institute, 5 August 2017, url.

198 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

Annex II: Bibliography
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210 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALSGuardian (The), Isis suicide attack: more than 80 killed in southern Iraq, 15 September 2017,https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/14/isis-kills-at-least-50-in-southern-iraqattacks, accessed 23 August 2018
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9 May 2018

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 211

Human Rights Watch, Families with ISIS Relatives Forced into Camps, 4 February 2018,https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/04/families-isis-relatives-forced-camps, accessed 22
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2018
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Human Rights Watch, Iraq: ban abusive militias from Mosul operation – Unpunished killingstortureputs
civilians
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way,
31
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19 October 2018
Human Rights Watch, Iraq: displacement, detention of suspected “ISIS families”- Troops force
residents out, demolish homes, 5 March 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/03/05/iraqdisplacement-detention-suspected-isis-families, accessed 17 July 2018
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Human Rights Watch, Iraq: ISIS Abducting, Killing, Expelling Minorities. Armed Group
Targeting
ChristianNuns,
Turkmen,Shabaks,
Yazidis,
19
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19 October 2018
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https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/10/06/iraq-key-concerns-impending-mosul-battle,
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Human Rights Watch, Iraq: KRG Restrictions Harm Yezidi Recovery - Disproportionate Limitson
GoodsEntering,
LeavingSinjar,4
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2016,
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Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Security Forces Fire on Protesters, 24 July 2018,https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/07/24/iraq-security-forces-fire-protesters, accessed 19
October 2018

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 213

Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Set Aside Verdict in Massacre of Cadets, 16 July 2015,
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Human Rights Watch, KRG: Kurdish Forces Ejecting Arabs In Kirkuk - Halt Displacements,
Demolitions;Compensate
Victims,3
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2016,
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2018,
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Human Rights Watch, Kurdistan Region of Iraq: Thousands Fleeing Kept Waiting Near Front
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conflictwith
ISIS,
November
2016,

214 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

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Annex III: Terms of Reference
The report should aim to cover the situation of targeted individuals in Iraq as well as thefollowing research topics:
1. Briefly describe main actors involved in targeting of individuals, including state, nonstate, and armed groups
a. Who are the main actors and what is their modus operandi/targeting
rationaleb. Main presence/strength and structure
c. Main activities
2. Targeting of individuals and treatment by main actors
a. Who is targeted, by which actor, how, what is their treatment, why doestargeting occur, when has targeting happenedb. Possibility access redress and protection and/or avoid or escape targeting
Research should aim to consider the main profiles: Individuals originating from ISIS-held territories who fled due to fear of ISIS Individuals accused of being ISIS members, or perceived to be
sympathetic/collaborators with ISIS, including their family members
 Members of main ethno-religious groups and minorities
 Women and girls in situations of gender-based violence Individuals who are perceived to have transgressed honour, moral and social codes Individuals who are (former) Baathists
 Individuals who work(ed) for international organisations, military forces, or US forces Individuals involved in tribal disputes or blood feuds; outcasts from the tribe
 Situation of forced recruitment into armed groups and treatment ofdefectors/deserters
 Situation of individuals perceived to be collaborators of the Iraqi government or who
work for the government
 Individuals detained, accused and/or prosecuted for ordinary crimes
 Politicians and political activists
 Human rights activists
 Journalists and media workers
 Children in certain situations (domestic violence, sexual violence, unaccompanied
children, child labour) Individuals who are stateless with a former habitual residence in Iraq (e.g.
Palestinians) Individuals perceived as ‘wealthy’EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT IRAQ: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS— 243

doi: 10.2847/98611