EASO
Syria
Military service
Country of Origin Information
ReportApril 2021

More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu)

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ISBN: 978-92-9465-046-7

doi: 10.2847/461371

BZ--08-21-055-EN-N© European Asylum Support Office, 2021
Cover photo: © Goran Safarek via iStock by Getty Images, 1278365191, 11 October 2020, url.
Syrian army soldier with an assault rifle.
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Country of origin information report | Syria: Military service

Acknowledgements
This report was drafted by the European Asylum Support Office COI Sector.

The following departments and organisations have reviewed the report:
Belgium, Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons (CGRS),
Centre for Documentation and Research (Cedoca)
Denmark, Danish Immigration Service (DIS)The Netherlands, Office for Country Information and Language Analysis, Ministry of Justice(OCILA)It must be noted that the review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts or organisations
contributes to the overall quality of the report, but does not necessarily imply their formal
endorsement of the final report, which is the full responsibility of EASO.

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Military service

Contents

Acknowledgements................................................................................................................................. 3Contents .................................................................................................................................................. 4
Disclaimer................................................................................................................................................ 6
Glossary and abbreviations ..................................................................................................................... 7
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 9
Methodology ...................................................................................................................................... 9
Quality control .................................................................................................................................... 9
Sources ............................................................................................................................................... 9
Structure and use of the report ........................................................................................................ 10
Map ....................................................................................................................................................... 11
1. Background ....................................................................................................................................... 12
2. Military service and official conscription .......................................................................................... 13
2.1 Military and reserve service ....................................................................................................... 13
2.2 Conscientious objectors ............................................................................................................. 14
2.3 Recruitment practices of conscripts and reservists to the SAA during the reporting period .... 15
2.3.1 Recruitment in SAA-affiliated forces ................................................................................... 16
2.3.2 Conscription of Druze .......................................................................................................... 17
2.3.3 Prevalence of SAA conscription in SDF-controlled areas .................................................... 18
2.3.4 Prevalence of recruitment of males under 18 and over 42 years ....................................... 19
2.4 Methods of recruiting of conscripts and reservists to the SAA .................................................. 20
2.5 Deployment of conscripts and reservists to the front................................................................ 23
2.5.1 Deployment of conscripts ................................................................................................... 23
2.5.2 Deployment of reservists .................................................................................................... 25
2.6 Discharge of conscripts and reservists serving in the SAA ......................................................... 26
3. Deferrals and exemptions from military service............................................................................... 28
3.1 Only sons .................................................................................................................................... 28
3.2 Medical exemptions ................................................................................................................... 29
3.3 Students ...................................................................................................................................... 29
3.4 Exemption fee ............................................................................................................................. 30
3.4.1 Exemption fee for males residing in Syria ........................................................................... 32

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Military service

4. Consequences of draft evasion, military desertion and defection ................................................... 33
4.1 Draft evaders .............................................................................................................................. 33
4.1.1 Amendment to Article 97 of the Military Service Law ........................................................ 34
4.1.2 Potential consequences for family members...................................................................... 34
4.2 Military deserters and defectors ................................................................................................ 35
4.2.1 Potential consequences for family members...................................................................... 38
4.3 Amnesties regarding draft evaders and military deserters and their implementation in practice.......................................................................................................................................................... 38
Annex I: Bibliography ............................................................................................................................ 41
Annex II: Terms of Reference ................................................................................................................ 53

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Military service

Disclaimer
This report was written according to the EASO COI Report Methodology (2019).1 The report is basedon carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced.
The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed with utmost
care. However, this document does not claim to be exhaustive. If a particular event, person ororganisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has not taken place orthat the person or organisation does not exist.
Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particularapplication for international protection. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative of aparticular legal position.
‘Refugee’, ‘risk’ and similar terminology are used as generic terminology and not in the legal sense as
applied in the EU Asylum Acquis, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the
Status of Refugees.
Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may bemade of the information contained in this report.
The drafting of this report was finalised on 22 March 2021. Any event taking place after this date is
not included in this report. More information on the reference period for this report can be found in
the methodology section of the Introduction.

1

The 2019 EASO COI Report Methodology can be downloaded from thehttps://coi.easo.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2019_EASO_COI_Report_Methodology.pdf

EASO

COI

Portal6

Country of origin information report | Syria: Military service

Glossary and abbreviations
Abbrev.

Explanation

COAR

Center for Operational Analysis and Research

CoI

Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic

DIS

Danish Immigration Service

FIS

Finnish Immigration Service

GoS

Government of Syria

ISIL

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant; also known as Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria (ISIS), the Islamic State (IS), or Daesh

NDF

National Defence Forces

OHCHR

Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights

SAA

Syrian Arab Army

SDF

Syrian Democratic Forces

SNHR

Syrian Network for Human Rights

SOHR

Syrian Observatory of Human Rights

SACD

Syrian Association for Citizens Dignity

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Military service

Military service

Military service2 is used broadly to cover both military service andreserve service in the SAA.

Conscientious objection

Conscientious objection to military service is an objection to suchservice which ‘derives from principles and reasons of conscience,
including profound convictions, arising from religious, moral,
ethical, humanitarian or similar motives’.3

Conscript

A conscript is a Syrian male, above the age of 18, currently serving
his military service in the SAA.4

Reservist

A reservist5 is a Syrian soldier currently serving his reserve duty in
the SAA. Reservists have previously completed their mandatory
military service in Syria, but have been called up for reserve service
in the SAA.6

Draft evader

A draft evader7 is a Syrian male, above the age of 18, who has
avoided being drafted into the SAA either by hiding form the Syrian
authorities or by fleeing Syria.8

DeserterA deserter9 is a former SAA soldier (e.g. a conscript, a noncommissioned officer (corporal or sergeant) or an officer) who has
left his post or unit in the SAA and is thus no longer in active military
service.10

Defector

A defector is a former SAA soldier who has left the SAA anddefected to an armed opposition group in Syria.11

2

See UNHCR’s definition of military service here: UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No. 10: Claims to Refugee
Status related to Military Service within the context of Article 1A (2) of the 1951 Convention and/or the 1967 Protocol relating
to the Status of Refugees, 3 December 2013, url, p. 2
3
UN Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 1998/77, “Conscientious Objection to Military Service”, E/CN.4/RES/1998/77,
22 April 1998, url
4
TIMEP, TIMEP Brief: Conscription Law, 22 August 2019, url; Syria Report, Syria’s security sector: A legal handbook”, February
2019, url, p. 138
5
See UNHCR’s definition of reservist here: UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No. 10: Claims to Refugee Status
related to Military Service within the context of Article 1A (2) of the 1951 Convention and/or the 1967 Protocol relating to
the Status of Refugees, 3 December 2013, url, p. 2
6
TIMEP, TIMEP Brief: Conscription Law, 22 August 2019, url; Syria Report, Syria’s security sector: A legal handbook”, February
2019, url, p. 138
7
See UNHCR’s definition of draft evasion here: UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No. 10: Claims to Refugee
Status related to Military Service within the context of Article 1A (2) of the 1951 Convention and/or the 1967 Protocol relating
to the Status of Refugees, 3 December 2013, url, p. 1
8
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 7
9
See UNHCR’s definition of desertion here: UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No. 10: Claims to Refugee Status
related to Military Service within the context of Article 1A (2) of the 1951 Convention and/or the 1967 Protocol relating to
the Status of Refugees, 3 December 2013, url, p. 1
10
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 7
11
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 7

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Military service

Introduction
The purpose of this report is to provide relevant information regarding the military service in the
Syrian Arab Army - the formal land forces of the national Syrian Armed forces - for international
protection status determination, including refugee status and subsidiary protection, and in particularfor use in updating EASO’s country guidance development on Syria.
This report is produced in line with the EASO COI Report Methodology (2019)12 and the EASO COI
Writing and Referencing Style Guide (2019).13

Methodology
The report contains information on the topic of military service in the Syrian Arab Army focusing
primarily on recent trends, with updated information on 2020 and 2021 where available. The
information gathered is a result of research using public, specialised paper-based and electronicsources until 5 March 2021. Some additional information was added during the finalisation of thisreport in response to feedback received during the quality control process, until 22 March 2021.
The terms of reference (ToR) of this report were defined by EASO based on discussions held and input
received from COI experts in the EASO COI specialist network on Syria and from policy experts in EU+
countries14 within the framework of a Country Guidance development on Syria. This report wasdrafted for the purpose of developing analysis of particular profiles with regard to qualification forrefugee status.
ToR for this report can be found in Annex II of this report.

Quality control
In line with the EASO COI Report Methodology, a peer review was performed by COI researchers fromthe departments listed as reviewers in the Acknowledgements section.

SourcesThis report is based on desk research of public, specialised paper-based and electronic sources. In
addition to the paper-based and electronic sources that were consulted, EASO researchers conducted
extensive interviews with the following sources:
•

•
•

12

Suhail Al-Ghazi, Syrian researcher and activist from Damascus. In addition to being the nonresident fellow at Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, he is also a member of Verify-Syria
fact checking platform. His research focuses on the military and security situation of Syria as
well as the socioeconomic situation in government-held areas.
Sara Kayyali, Syria researcher, Human Rights Watch. Sara Kayyali is a Syria researcher in the
Middle East and North Africa Division at Human Rights Watch, where she researches humanrights and international humanitarian law violations in Syria.
An international humanitarian organisation working in Syria. The source preferred anonymity
for the sake of discretion and their personal and organisational safety.

EASO, EASO Country of Origin Information (COI) Report Methodology, June 2019, url
EASO, Writing and Referencing Guide for EASO Country of Origin Information (COI) Reports, June 2019, url
14
All EU Member States plus Norway and Switzerland
13

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Military service

The report also draws from the Danish Immigration Service COI report on military service in the Syrian
Arab Army (May 2020)15, based on interviews with sources in Istanbul and Beirut, as well as additional
consulted sources via Skype in the USA, Germany, England, France and Turkey.

Structure and use of the report
The report is structured in line with the Terms of Reference. The first chapter provides a shortbackground into the topic of military service during the current conflict in Syria. The second chapter
provides an overview of the provisions of the military service law and its implementation in practice,
looking specifically at the Syrian Arab Army’s current recruitment practices, methods of recruitment,
factors influencing deployment of conscripts and reservists, and demobilisation. The third chapter
covers the legal exemptions and deferrals from military service and their enforcement in practice. The
final chapter addresses the legal and practical implications of draft evasion, desertion and defection.

15

Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Military service

Map

Map 1: Syrian Arab Republic, © United Nations16

16

Syrian Arab Republic, Map No. 4204 Rev. 3, April 2012, United Nations, url

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Military service

1. Background
When the Syrian civil war began in 2011, one of the Government of Syria’s (GoS) main issues was toprovide manpower in order to face armed rebel groups.17 During the conflict, the Syrian Arab Army
(SAA) lost many soldiers to casualties, draft evading, desertion and defection.18
Some men have fled the country because they do not want to perform military service for fear thatthey will be killed in combat, while others have defected from the army or avoided military service
out of political conviction and in opposition to the GoS.19 Throughout the conflict, sources reported
that the GoS viewed the activities of wide categories of individuals as political dissent, including draft
evaders20 and defectors.21
The evasion of conscription has been reported as one of the main reasons for young men over the ageof 18 having fled Syria. Furthermore, ‘it is also one of the primary reasons why they cannot return’,according to a Forced Migration Review report.22 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees(UNHCR) found that 75 % of Syrians hope to return one day, but the military conscription that they‘cannot avoid’ makes them reluctant to do so.23 A 2020 research by the Syrian Association for Citizens
Dignity (SACD)24 based on a survey of 1 100 Syrians inside and outside the country, found that 84 % of
respondents who wish to return want to see compulsory military recruitment either cancelled orsuspended for at least five years, while 58 % of respondents flagged cancelling compulsory
recruitment as a necessary condition for return.25

17

Quartz, Syria’s young men face an impossible choice, 14 December 2016, url
Finland, FIS, Fact-Finding Mission Report, Syria: Military service, national defence forces, armed groups supporting Syrian
regime and armed opposition, Helsinki, 23 August 2016, url, p. 5
19
TIMEP, Brief: Legislative Decree No.18 – Military Service Amnesty, 6 December 2018, url
20
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/40/70], 31 January 2019, url, p. 15; See UNHCR interviews with several sources between May and October 2017:
UNHCR, International Protection Considerations with Regard to People Fleeing the Syrian Arab Republic; Update V, 3
November 2017, url, pp. 39-40, footnote 224; Al Jazeera, Why is the world afraid of young refugee men?, 20 June 2016, url
21
AI, Between Prison and the Grave: Enforced Disappearances in Syria, November 2015, url, p. 7; UN Human Rights Council,
Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/19/69], 22 February
2012, url, p. 13
22
The authors of the report had the position of Humanitarian Field Coordinator in Syria (Ahmad Araman) and Program
Officer at the US Institute of Peace in Iraq (Shaza Loutfi), respectively. Araman, A. and Loutfi, S., Return to Syria after evading
conscription, Forced Migration Review, October 2019, url, p. 52; see also Denmark, DIS/DRC, Syria: Security Situation in
Damascus Province and Issues Regarding Return to Syria, 21 February 2019, url, p. 21
23
UNHCR, Fifth Regional Survey on Syrian Refugees, Perceptions and Intentions on Return to Syria, March 2019, url, p. 2
24
SACD is a civil-rights movement aimed at promoting and protecting the rights of Syrian refugees and internally displaced
persons. For more information see url
25
SACD, We are Syria, July 2020, url, pp. 4, 35
18

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Military service

2. Military service and official conscription
2.1 Military and reserve service
Male citizens between the ages of 18 and 42 are required by law to perform their military service.26
According to Law No 35/2011, which amended the military conscription Law No 30 of 2007, military
service lasts between 18 and 21 months.27 Women may perform military service voluntarily.28
Palestinians with permanent residency in Syria are also subject to conscription and usually serve inthe ranks of the SAA-affiliated Palestine Liberation Army (PLA).29 Internally displaced persons (IDPs)
are also subjected to military service and recruited like other Syrians.30
Those who have completed the compulsory military service and have not exceeded the maximum
draft age remain reservists and can be called for reserve duty up to the age of 42.31 Career soldiers
can be called to service up to the age bracket of 48 to 62, depending on the rank.32
Interviewees from a Basmeh & Zeitooneh33 February 2021 report stated that since the start of theconflict conscripts who have finished their military service, as well as career soldiers have been called
to re-enlist as reservists.34 According to independent Syria researcher Suhail Al-Ghazi, reservists arecalled to active service when the army has a shortage of manpower, but also as a method of controlling
the population. Certain qualifications of the reservist such as being a tank operator, mechanic or
previous deployment following military training influence whether the SAA will call a reservist into
active service.35 Christopher Kozak of the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) stated in a 2017
interview with UNHCR that the age limit for reserve service can be increased if the person possesses
specific qualifications such as for example doctors, tank drivers, air force personnel, artillery specialists
and combat equipment engineers.36

26

International Crisis Group, Lessons from the Syrian State’s Return to the South, 25 February 2019, url, p. 10
Syrian Arab Republic, Parliament of Syria (The), al-Marsoum at-Tashre’ee 35 li-am 2011 [Legislative Decree 35 for the year2011], 1 June 2011, url
28
TIMEP, TIMEP Brief: Conscription Law, 22 August 2019, url
29
Finland, FIS, Fact-Finding Mission to Beirut and Damascus, 14 December 2018, 14 December 2018, url, p. 6; Atlantic (The),
Assad is desperate for soldiers, 14 May 2018, url
30
Finland, FIS, Fact-Finding Mission to Beirut and Damascus, 14 December 2018, 14 December 2018, url, p. 26
31
TIMEP, TIMEP Brief: Conscription Law, 22 August 2019, url
32
Syria Report, Syria’s security sector: “A legal handbook”, February 2019, url, p. 110
33
Basmeh & Zeitooneh is a Lebanon-based NGO established in 2012 specialised in providing assistance to Syrian refugees.
For more information see url.
34
Basmeh & Zeitooneh interviewed a sample of 12 men who served in the SAA, 13 men of military age who did not serve in
the SAA and 8 women whose direct family members were affected by military conscription. Respondents were residing in
Lebanon, Syria, Turkey and the Netherlands. Basmeh & Zeitooneh, A Sword of Damocles. Compulsory Military Service inSyria and its Consequences on the Lives of Syrians, February 2021, url, p. 935
Al-Ghazi, S., Microsoft Teams interview, 3 February 2021
36
Christopher Kozak, ISW, 15 February 2017 interview with UNHCR, UNHCR, Relevant Country of Origin Information to Assist
with the Application of UNHCR's Country Guidance on Syria; "Illegal Exit" from Syria and Related Issues for Determining theInternational Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Syria, February 2017, url, p. 22 footnote 11827

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Military service

2.2 Conscientious objectors
According to Article 46 of the Constitution of the Syrian Arab Republic, ‘compulsory military service
shall be a sacred duty and is regulated by a law for all men over the age of 18 years.’37
Syria does not legally recognise the right to conscientious objection neither does it provide for
substitute or alternative service.38 The US Department of State (USDOS) reported in its 2020 annual
report on religious freedom in Syria that exemption from military service based on conscientious
objection is granted to Christian and Muslim religious leaders, although Muslim religious leaders are
required to pay an exemption fee.39 Suhail Al-Ghazi stated that the GoS does not recognise the rightto conscientious objection. Currently, those wishing to evade military service will either try to get an
exemption, go to areas outside the GoS control or leave the country.40
Suhail Al-Ghazi assessed that the GoS views the act of conscientious objection as high treason. The
source assessed that conscientious objectors would face imprisonment or the death penalty. He gave
the opinion that their family members would also ‘be at risk of being detained or killed’.41
Draft evaders and deserters interviewed by Basmeh & Zeitooneh for a February 2021 report motivatedtheir decision to evade the military service or desert by not wanting to take part in what they
considered ‘has increasingly become a “cleansing” of opposition views by the GoS, with the SAA as its
main apparatus for doing so’.42
In the first years of the conflict, there were reports of arbitrary arrests43, enforced disappearances44,
torture and extra-judicial executions of soldiers who refused orders from superiors, such as to shootat protesters.45 The Daraa Martyrs Documentation Office - a pro-opposition NGO that compiles
statistics on victims of the Syria civil war from Dar’a governorate - claimed, without providing details,
that reconciled46 fighters from Dar’a which took part in the GoS offensive on Idlib in the beginning of
2020, were executed by field commanders for refusing to take part in the battle.47 In an interview with
the Danish Immigration Service (DIS) in February 2020, Mohammed Sarmini of the think-tank Jusoor
for Studies48 assessed that SAA conscripts or reservists who refuse to participate in the fighting in Idlib
are pressured and threatened and those who continue to refuse ‘may be imprisoned’.49

37

UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/34/64], 2 February 2017, url, p. 34
38
UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: Syrian Arab Republic, 9 August 2005, url, p. 4
39
USDOS, 2019 Report on International Religious Freedom: Syria, 10 June 2020, url, p. 1140
Al-Ghazi, S., Microsoft Teams interview, 27 January 2021
41
Al-Ghazi, S., Microsoft Teams interview, 27 January 2021
42
Basmeh & Zeitooneh, A Sword of Damocles. Compulsory Military Service in Syria and its Consequences on the Lives of
Syrians, February 2021, url, p. 11
43
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
16 August 2012, A/HRC/21/50, url, p. 14
44
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
12 February 2014, url, p. 38
45
HRW, “By All Means Necessary!” Individual and Command Responsibility for Crimes Against Humanity in Syria, 15
December 2011, url, pp. 67-68; Guardian (The), Syrian soldiers shot for refusing to fire on protesters, 12 April 2011, url
46
Detailed information on the so-called reconciliation agreements and impact on the population is available in the EASO COI
Report: Syria - Exercise of authority in recaptured areas (January 2020)
47
Al Monitor, Some Syrian regime fighters defecting when forced to front lines, 11 March 2020, url
48
Mohammed Sarmini was also a former political advisor of the president of Syrian Interim Government, the opposition’s
political body. See url
49
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 69

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2.3 Recruitment practices of conscripts and reservists to the SAA
during the reporting period
Following the outbreak of COVID-19 and the cessation of major military operations in Syria in early
2020, military recruitment drives by the SAA reportedly slowed down.50 An international humanitarianorganisation working in Syria, who was interviewed by EASO in 2021 for this report, stated however,that the SAA is regularly calling on new conscripts and reservists.51 As a result of the COVID-19
outbreak, in March 2020 the GoS suspended the conscription for eligible men for one month until
22 April 2020.52
In an interview with EASO in February 2021, an international humanitarian organisation working in
Syria assessed that conscription drives are taking place across the entire GoS-held territory.53 Other
sources stated that SAA recruitment focuses on Alawites and areas loyal to the GoS.54 According to a
research published in August 2020 by the Arab Reform Initiative55, between 65 % and 75 % of Alawites
aged 18 to 30 and between 35 % and 40 % of Alawites aged 30 to 40 are serving in the SAA as
conscripts, reserves or volunteers. The same source reported that some Alawites served in the SAA
for more than seven years.56
Two experts interviewed by DIS in January and February 2020 assessed however, that there is lesspressure and less conscription of Alawites from Latakia, Tartous, Hama and Homs governorates into
the SAA as compared to previous years.57 Syria researcher Gregory Waters58 assumed that the GoS
focused more on recruiting soldiers from reconciled areas than Alawites.59 Tawazun60 stated that the
SAA also ‘draws on select Sunni clans in the north and east to form ad hoc units’.61
Suhail Al-Ghazi indicated in January 2021 that the SAA concentrated its recruiting on young men
between 18 and 30 years old and those with specific qualifications which are needed, such as tanks
mechanics or engineers.62 Other sources explained that the GoS mainly recruits men up to 27 yearsof age, while older people are more likely to invoke exceptions.63
On 10 January 2021, the GoS issued a circular ordering the reduction of the SAA’s combat readinessand overall mobilisation to pre-2012 levels. The order provides for combat unit readiness to be
reduced from 100 to 80 % within ground and naval units, 66 to 33 % in administrative units and from80 to 50 % in their affiliated military units. The circular also provided for a decrease in ration

50

COAR, Syria in 2021. Forecast for a Protracted Crisis, 28 January 2021, url
An international humanitarian organisation working in Syria, Microsoft Teams interview, 18 February 2021
52
Syrian Observer (The), Syrian Government Delays Sending Conscripts to Military Service, 19 March 2020, url
53
An international humanitarian organisation working in Syria, Microsoft Teams interview, 18 February 2021
54
Al-Ghazi, S., Microsoft Teams interview, 27 January 2021; Tawazun, Syria Country Profile, 2020, url
55
The Arab Reform Initiative is an independent Arab think tank working with expert partners in the Middle East and North
Africa. See url
56
Lazkani, A., No Homeland, No Future: Alawite Youth As the Backbone of the Assad Regime, Arab Reform Initiative, 4 August
2020, url
57
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, pp. 48, 57
58
Gregory Waters is a researcher focusing on Syrian security forces, primarily using open-source research. For more
information, see url
59
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 48
60
Tawazun is an independent platform which analyses defence sectors in Arab countries. For more information, see url
61
Tawazun, Syria Country Profile, 2020, url
62
Al-Ghazi, S., Microsoft Teams interview, 27 January 2021
63
Finland, FIS, Fact-Finding Mission to Beirut and Damascus, 14 December 2018, url, p. 7; Austria, BFA
Staatendokumentation [Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum – COI Unit], Country Report on Syria [Updated February2021], p. 43, Available from BFA Staatendokumentation
51

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allocations to military units.64 In practice, the scaling down would be achieved by providing more leavedays for soldiers.65 The measure was interpreted by sources as a means by which the GoS aims to cut
down costs in a period when major military operations have been frozen and the economic situation
has deteriorated.66 Suhail Al-Ghazi assumed that soldiers will still have to get permission from theircommanding officer for leave which generally entails paying a bribe.67 Information on theimplementation in practice of the circular could not be found.
For information on conscription practices of the SAA prior to 2020, see Chapter 2 of the EASO COI
Report: Syria – Targeting of Individuals (March 2020)

2.3.1 Recruitment in SAA-affiliated forces
According to the Center for Operational Analysis and Research (COAR)68, reporting in September 2020,
military recruitment was being carried out also by pro-GoS militias or Iranian and Russian-backed
factions formally under the command of the SAA. In Dar’a governorate, the Russian-backed 5th Corps
and the Iranian-backed 4th Division of the SAA were reported to be the main units conducting military
recruitment, particularly attracting military defectors, deserters and former opposition fighters fromreconciled areas who fear arrest, detention, or forced military conscription in the SAA.69 These units
reportedly provide better incentives for conscripts such as higher salaries than in the SAA70, as well as
issuing of documents that remove restrictions on movement and provide protection against criminal
charges or outstanding security threats by the GoS.71
March 2020 estimates from a research published by the European University Institute put the numberof recruits from eastern Dar’a in the 8th Brigade of the 5th Corps at around 1 600, including 900 former
rebels.72 By June 2020, at least 7 000 military defectors, deserters, and draft evaders from Dar’aregistered their names at the headquarters of the 8th Brigade.73 In July 2020, the Iranian-backed 4th
Division of the SAA opened several recruitment centres in the towns of Mzeireb and Zayzun, western
Dar’a governorate attracting the enrolment of around 2 700 recruits, mostly deserters from the SAA
and former rebels, according to COAR reporting.74 Research from 2020 conducted by the European

64

Enab Baladi, Syrian regime lowers army readiness to pre-2012 levels, 18 January 2021, url
Enab Baladi, Syrian regime lowers army readiness to pre-2012 levels, 18 January 2021, url; COAR, Syria Update, 25 January
2021, url
66
COAR, Syria Update, 25 January 2021, url; Enab Baladi, What pressed Syrian regime into scaling down combat readiness?,
20 January 2021, url
67
Al-Ghazi, S., Microsoft Teams interview, 27 January 2021, 3 February 2021
68
COAR is a social enterprise that provides research and analysis related to the conflict in Syria as part of an EU-funded
project. For more information see url
69
COAR, The Syrian economy at war. Armed group mobilization as livelihood and protection strategy, September 2020, url,
pp. 8-970
Al-Jabassini, A., Festering Grievances and the Return to Arms in Southern Syria, European University Institute, 7 April 2020,
url, p. 18; COAR, The Syrian economy at war. Armed group mobilization as livelihood and protection strategy, September
2020, url, pp. 8-9
71
COAR, The Syrian economy at war. Armed group mobilization as livelihood and protection strategy, September 2020, url,
pp. 8-9; Enab Baladi, Syria’s Daraa.. attempts to abort role of central committee militarily and socially, 17 June 2020, url
72
Al-Jabassini, A., Festering Grievances and the Return to Arms in Southern Syria, European University Institute, 7 April 2020,
url, p. 18
73
Al-Jabassini, A., Is Ahmad al-Oda winning the “hearts and minds” of Daraa’s people?, MEI, 22 June 2020, url
74
COAR, The Syrian economy at war. Armed group mobilization as livelihood and protection strategy, September 2020, url,
p. 9
65

16

Country of origin information report | Syria: Military service

University Institute indicated that the Lebanese Hezbollah has also recruited around 300 former rebels
from Dara’s into its ranks.75
Recruitment in other pro-government militias such as the National Defense Forces (NDF) was reported
to take place in Sweida governorate in 2020.76 Fabrice Balanche77 assessed in a February 2020
interview with DIS, that recruitment in the NDF is done on a voluntary basis and is often motivated byeconomic reasons.78 Other sources interviewed by the Finnish Immigration Service (FIS) during a 2018
fact-finding mission to Beirut and Damascus similarly assessed that recruitment in the NDF is generally
voluntary.79
While those serving in pro-government forces have reportedly been promised that they would be
exempted from compulsory military service, there have been reports of cases where former
reconciled fighters serving in the 5th Corps in Dar’a governorate were included on the lists of men
wanted for military service by GoS.80

2.3.2 Conscription of Druze
Throughout the conflict, the Druze of Sweida governorate largely managed to resist compulsory andreserve conscription in the SAA.81 The neutrality of the Druze at the start of the conflict contributed
to the cessation of compulsory and reserve recruitment by the GoS forces.82 Amnesty International(AI) stated that inside Sweida, the Druze are ‘protected through an agreement with the government
from forced conscription’.83 Instead, the Druze have maintained well-organised neighbourhood
militias84 and NDF units.85
Since mid-2018, the GoS and its allies were increasingly pressuring Sweida to resolve the issue of the
Druze youths absconding from their military service.86 According to an estimation made by a humanrights activist from Sweida who was interviewed in May 2019 for a European University Instituteresearch, around 50 000 individuals were reportedly wanted for military service and a large numberof them joined local militias and gangs in order to ensure salaries, power and protection.87 The

75

Al-Jabassini, A., Festering Grievances and the Return to Arms in Southern Syria, European University Institute, 7 April 2020,
url, p. 18
76
COAR, The Syrian economy at war. Armed group mobilization as livelihood and protection strategy, September 2020, url,
pp. 7-8
77
Dr. Fabrice Balanche is an associate professor and research director at the University of Lyon 2, is an adjunct fellow at The
Washington Institute specialising in Lebanon and Syria since the 1990s. His expertise on Syria focuses on political geography,
conflict and sectarian issues. For more information see url
78
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 58
79
Finland, FIS, Fact-Finding Mission to Beirut and Damascus, 14 December 2018, url, pp. 16-1780
COAR, Syria Update: June 20 – June 26 2019, 26 June 2019, url
81
COAR, The Syrian economy at war. Armed group mobilization as livelihood and protection strategy, September 2020, url,
pp. 7-8; al-Lababidi, M., The Druze of Sweida: the Return of the Regime Hinges on Regional and Local Conflicts, 28 August
2019, url, pp. 2, 9; Syria Untold, Men evading military service in southern Syria’s Suwayda feel ‘trapped’, 9 January 2020, url
82
Al-Lababidi, M., The Druze of Sweida: the Return of the Regime Hinges on Regional and Local Conflicts, 28 August 2019,url, p. 2
83
AI, Syria: Peaceful protesters detained in Sweida must be released immediately, 24 June 2020, url
84
Arab Weekly, Rising discontent in Syria’s Daraa, Sweida reflects simmering woes, 16 February 2020, url
85
COAR, The Syrian economy at war. Armed group mobilization as livelihood and protection strategy, September 2020, url,
pp. 7-886
Al-Lababidi, M., The Druze of Sweida: the Return of the Regime Hinges on Regional and Local Conflicts, 28 August 2019,url, p. 2
87
Al-Lababidi, M., The Druze of Sweida: the Return of the Regime Hinges on Regional and Local Conflicts, 28 August 2019,url, p. 917

Country of origin information report | Syria: Military service

independent online media platform Syria Untold also advanced the figure of 50 000 men wanted formilitary service in Sweida in a January 2020 article.88
Reporting from 2020 indicated that Druze were increasingly joining Iranian-backed NDF units. In the
town of Qarraya, south-western Sweida, the NDF recruited 450 primarily Druze fighters as a response
to local tensions between the Druze and the Russian-backed 5th Corps. In late 2019, Russia successfully
recruited Druze fighters to serve as mercenaries in Libya, mainly due to the high salaries offered(ranging from USD 800 to USD 1 500 per month). By September 2020, the Druze leadership opposed
the recruitment drives and largely managed to prevent further recruits departing to Libya.89 In a 2021
interview with EASO, Sara Kayyali of Human Rights Watch stated that there are attempts by the SAA
to recruit in Sweida governorate, but these are often resisted by the local community.90
In June 2020, AI noted that Druze are only protected from conscription by the SAA inside Sweida andmany do not leave the province out of fear of being forcibly conscripted.91 According to a source fromthe Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR)92 interviewed by DIS in February-March 2020, Druze
conscripts in the SAA serve only in Sweida and will not be required to take part in active fighting.93

2.3.3 Prevalence of SAA conscription in SDF-controlled areas
In SDF-controlled areas, the SAA has a presence in Hasaka, Qamishli, Manbij and Tal Tamr.94 The US
Defense Intelligence Agency estimated in a November 2020 report, that the SAA had between 4 000
and 10 000 troops deployed in north-east Syria, between the cities of Manbij (Aleppo governorate)and Tal Tamr (Hasaka governorate).95
The GoS has not yet reintroduced compulsory military service in the SDF-controlled areas in northeast Syria due to a lack of administrative authority, according to several sources interviewed by DIS
between January and February 2020.96 According to an international humanitarian organisation
working in Syria interviewed by EASO in January 2021, the SAA does not carry out conscription
campaigns in SDF-controlled areas.97
Suhail Al-Ghazi assessed in January 2021 that in SDF-controlled areas recruitment to the SAA is doneon a voluntary basis. The SAA does not carry out conscription campaigns in the SDF-controlled areas
and those who do not want to be recruited are able to avoid it by staying and moving outside theareas that the SAA controls.98 Other sources interviewed by DIS in 2020 stated that recruitment to the
SAA did take place in SDF-controlled areas but on a voluntary basis.99
The US Defense Intelligence Agency assessed in a US Department of Defense report covering theperiod between July and September 2020 that the GoS ‘has increased its local recruitment efforts to88

Syria Untold, Men evading military service in southern Syria’s Suwayda feel ‘trapped’, 9 January 2020, url
COAR, The Syrian economy at war. Armed group mobilization as livelihood and protection strategy, September 2020, url,
pp. 7-8
90
Kayyali, S., Microsoft Teams interview, 18 February 2021
91
AI, Syria: Peaceful protesters detained in Sweida must be released immediately, 24 June 2020, url
92
The SNHR is, according to its website, ‘an independent, non-profit and non-governmental organization’. It documents
human rights violations in Syria. For more information, see SNHR, About us, n.d., url
93
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 88
94
Al-Ghazi, S., Microsoft Teams interview, 27 January 2021
95
USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve. Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, July 1, 2020‒September 30, 2020,
3 November 2020, url, p. 63
96
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 10
97
An international humanitarian organisation working in Syria, Microsoft Teams interview, 26 January 2021
98
Al-Ghazi, S., Microsoft Teams interview, 27 January 2021
99
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, pp. 10-1189

18

Country of origin information report | Syria: Military service

supplement existing units in north-eastern Syria’, without providing further details on the nature of
recruitment.100
In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the majority of World Health Organisation (WHO) medical
shipments delivered in April 2020 to north-east Syria were destined for use in the Qamishli National
Hospital which is under GoS control.101 According to Syria researchers Elizabeth Tsurkov102 and Qussai
Jukhadar103, this measure will deter many individuals, including those wanted for military service, toseek medical care out of fear of arrest and forced conscription.104
According to a source interviewed by EASO in January 2021, the SAA does not conscript stateless Kurds(Ajanibs and Maktumeen). Those who are granted Syrian citizenship and are born after 1992, areeligible for conscription in the SAA.105
For information on conscription to the SAA in SDF-controlled areas prior to 2020, see Chapter 2 of the
EASO COI Report: Syria – Targeting of Individuals (March 2020)

2.3.4 Prevalence of recruitment of males under 18 and over 42 years
Sources interviewed by EASO for this report in February 2021 stated that they are not aware of any
current cases of recruitment of males under 18 or over 42 years old in the SAA.106
In previous years, sources reported that men in their late 40s and early 50s were being forced to join
the SAA.107 Several sources interviewed by DIS in January and February 2020 reported that they had
not received information of any cases of recruitment of people over 42 years of age, while some statedthat they did not have knowledge of such cases of recruitment that took place after 2016108 and2017109, respectively. According to Gregory Waters however, he had heard unconfirmed accounts ofconscription of over-42-year-old returnees from Lebanon and Jordan as reservists.110 SNHR mentioneda case of a person from northern Homs governorate who was forcibly conscripted in early 2019 as areservist after reaching the age of 42. The person was later killed in battle in Hama governorate inJanuary 2020.111

100

USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve. Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, July 1, 2020‒September 30,
2020, 3 November 2020, url, p. 63
101
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: COVID-19 Humanitarian Update No. 06, 17 April 2020, url, p. 6
102
Elizabeth Tsurkov is a researcher who focuses on Syria and Iraq. She is a Research Fellow at the Forum for Regional
Thinking and a doctoral student at Princeton University's politics department. For more information see: url
103
Qussai Jukhadar is a Syrian researcher based in Turkey and guest contributor at Middle East Institute. For more
information see: url
104
Tsurkov, E. and Jukhadar, Q., Ravaged by war, Syria’s health care system is utterly unprepared for a pandemic, Middle
East Institute, 23 April 2020, url
105
An international humanitarian organisation working in Syria, Microsoft Teams interview, 26 January 2021
106
Kayyali, S., Microsoft Teams interview, 18 February 2021; An international humanitarian organisation working in Syria,
Microsoft Teams interview, 18 February 2021
107
Finland, FIS, Fact-Finding Mission to Beirut and Damascus, 14 December 2018, url, p. 6; Denmark, DIS/DRC, Syria:
Recruitment Practices in Government-controlled Areas and in Areas under Opposition Control, Involvement of PublicServants and Civilians in the Armed Conflict and Issues Related to Exiting Syria, August 2017, url, p. 12
108
DIS interview with Mohammad Sarmini, Jusoor for Studies, 18 February 2020, see Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service,
May 2020, url, p. 69
109
DIS interview with Navvar Shaban, Omran Center for Strategic Studies, 18 February 2020. See Denmark, DIS, Syria MilitaryService, May 2020, url, p. 72
110
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 48
111
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 19

19

Country of origin information report | Syria: Military service

All sources interviewed by DIS in January and February 2020 stated that they have not received
information that the SAA had been recruiting men under the age of 18.112 Other sources, however,reported child recruitment and use in GoS forces and affiliated militias during the reporting period. Ininterviews carried out with DIS between January and March 2020, Fabrice Balanche and SNHR statedthat the NDF recruits and uses men under the age of 18.113 Reporting on the period between April
2019 and March 2020, USDOS stated that the ‘government and pro-Syrian regime-affiliated militias
continued to forcibly recruit and use child soldiers’, specifically identifying the Lebanese Hezbollah
and the NDF as forcibly recruiting children.114 The UN Commission of Inquiry in the Syrian Arab
Republic (CoI) stated in a January 2020 report that it received reports of young boys assessed to be noolder than 13 years who were manning GoS and affiliated militias checkpoints in Hama governorate.115
An administrative order issued on 6 February 2019 ended the retention and recall for reserve military
service for men born in or before 1981, specifically the following categories: non-commissioned
officers, draftees who were not discharged after serving their conscription period and enrolled civil
reservists.116 While some sources stated that men born in or before 1981 were not called for reserve
service duty following the entry into force of the administrative order117, several other sources
documented cases where reservists up to or above the age of 40 were either called up for reserve
duty or were still serving as reservists.118 Information on how prevalent the call for reserve service of
those up to or above 40 years could not be found.
For information on the prevalence of recruitment of males under 18 and over 42 years to the SAA
prior to 2020, see Chapter 2 of the EASO COI Report: Syria – Targeting of Individuals (March 2020)

2.4 Methods of recruiting of conscripts and reservists to the SAA
When new recruits are called up, the GoS sends out military service notifications the houses of men
who have reached the age of military service, asking them to register for military service. The namesof the men called up for military service are recorded in a central database which is accessed by
officers at checkpoints and at the border.119
During 2020, sources noted that men of military age deliberately avoided leaving their houses120,
passing through checkpoints121 or interacting with state institutions122, out of fear of being forcibly
conscripted.
Those passing through checkpoints may be arrested for not having completed their military service.123
Suhail Al-Ghazi assessed in a January 2021 interview with EASO that checkpoints are usually connected112

Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 18
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, pp. 58, 89
114
USDOS, 2020 Trafficking in Persons Report: Syria, 25 June 2020, url
115
UN Human Rights Council, “They have erased the dreams of my children”: children’s rights in the Syrian Arab Republic;
Conference Room Paper of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/43/CRP.6], 13 January 2020, url, p. 11 para. 35
116
‫رن‬
‫رن‬
SANA, ‫ وما قبل من دعوات االحتياط‬1981 ‫الملتحقي( من مواليد‬‫)غي‬‫[ القيادة العامة للجيش تستبعد‬The General Army‫االحتياطيي المدعوين ر‬
Command excludes called up reservists born in 1981 and earlier], 6 February 2019, url
117
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 19; EASO interview with an international humanitarian organisation
working in Syria, 18 February 2021
118
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, pp. 19-20
119
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 11
120
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/43/57], 28 January 2020, url, p. 17
121
PHR, Obstruction and Denial: Health System Disparities and COVID-19 in Daraa, Syria, December 2020, url, p. 26
122
TNH, No papers, no rights: Understanding Syria’s civil documentation crisis, 30 July 2020, url
123
PHR, Obstruction and Denial: Health System Disparities and COVID-19 in Daraa, Syria, December 2020, url, p. 25
113

20

Country of origin information report | Syria: Military service

to the wanted lists. Draft evaders screened at checkpoints would be arrested and transferred to themilitary police. Some might be able to bribe the military police and evade being conscripted.124
Corruption at checkpoints is widespread and sometimes those passing through are pressured to pay
bribes to not be forcibly recruited.125 In Quneitra governorate, over 60 incidents of extortion at
checkpoints were documented by Syrians for Truth & Justice126 in the period between August 2019and March 2020, including of men of military age which evaded mandatory or reserve military
service.127 In Deir Ez Zor governorate, pro-GoS militias were reported to extort young men at
checkpoints on the threat of military conscription.128 In northern rural Homs, the military police sets
up random and unpredictable road checks, including for catching draft evaders.129
Several sources indicated that men of military age who have not completed their compulsory military
service or reserve duty restrict their freedom of movement out of fear of forced conscription.130 For
the period between July 2019 and January 2020, the CoI noted that men eligible for conscription inretaken areas such as Eastern Ghouta (Rural Damascus) were not leaving their homes or travelling out
of fear of being conscripted in the SAA.131 A January 2021 joint NGO research report132 cited a
confidential assessment carried out in Douma, Eastern Ghouta which ‘observed that a disproportional
number of women, children and elderly men were moving around the city, suggesting men of
conscription age were either conscripted, displaced, or in hiding’.133
Conscription took place also when men wanted for military service interacted with state institutions134
such as registering a marriage, renewing documents135, or seeking treatment at hospitals.136 Those
who do not have proof of military service can be arrested for evading conscription.137 Cases of arrests
in 2019 and 2020 were reported at Dar’a National Hospital138 and at hospitals in Damascus.139
Interviewees from Dar’a for a European University Institute research stated that the threat of military

124

Al-Ghazi, S., Microsoft Teams interview, 27 January 2021
An international humanitarian organisation, Microsoft Teams interview, 18 February 2021
126
Syrians for Truth & Justice is an NGO documenting human rights violations in Syria. See url
127
STJ, Populace Enraged over Blackmail at Syrian Checkpoints in Quneitra, 31 March 2020, url
128Interviews conducted in January 2019. International Crisis Group, Easing Syrian Refugees’ Plight in Lebanon, 13 February
2020, url, p. 20
129
Enab Baladi, Fear of forced military conscription looms over northern rural Homs again, 6 March 2020, url
130
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/43/57], 28 January 2020, url, p. 17; NGO Joint Research Report; Syria Solutions Analysis: An Assessment of Durable
Solutions Conditions at the Whole of Syria Level, January 2021, pp. 18-19; private document held on file; Daher, J., State
Institutions and Regime Networks as Service Providers in Syria, European University Institute, June 2020, url, p. 7
131
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/43/57], 28 January 2020, url, p. 17
132
The report represents the joint work of different organizations, including international NGOs, Syrian NGOs and humanrights organisations. It draws on existing publicly available as well as limited distribution data and research reports, including
previously unpublished data held by organisations, shared and cross-analysed for the first time. It was complemented by key
informant interviews. NGO Joint Research Report; Syria Solutions Analysis: An Assessment of Durable Solutions Conditions
at the Whole of Syria Level; January 2021; private document held on file133
NGO Joint Research Report; Syria Solutions Analysis: An Assessment of Durable Solutions Conditions at the Whole of Syria
Level; January 2021, p. 23; private document held on file134
TNH, No papers, no rights: Understanding Syria’s civil documentation crisis, 30 July 2020, url;
135
Al-Ghazi, S., Microsoft Teams interview, 27 January 2021
136
Tsurkov, E. and Jukhadar, Q., Ravaged by war, Syria’s health care system is utterly unprepared for a pandemic, Middle
East Institute, 23 April 2020, url
137
PHR, Obstruction and Denial: Health System Disparities and COVID-19 in Daraa, Syria, December 2020, url, p. 26
138
PHR, Obstruction and Denial: Health System Disparities and COVID-19 in Daraa, Syria, December 2020, url, p. 26
139
Sawt Al-Aasima, ‫والمشاف مصيدة الشبان‬،‫ خدمات طبية خجولة‬:‫[ دوما‬Douma: Medical services are shy, and hospitals trap young‫ي‬men], 8 July 2019, url
125

21

Country of origin information report | Syria: Military service

conscription at checkpoints keeps them staying at home and seeking informal jobs.140 In January 2021,
a Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) researcher assessed that those who are wanted for mandatory
military service ‘may be hesitant to visit public health centers’ to access the vaccine for COVID-19 forfear of being conscripted.141
Two sources interviewed by DIS in early 2020 noted that the SAA carried out recruitment in camps forinternally displaced persons (IDPs).142 After the GoS recaptured Eastern Ghouta in Rural Damascus in
May 2018, men of military service age were put in displacement camps and conscripted to the SAA
directly from these detention centres. Around 7 000 IDPs who were wanted for mandatory or reserve
military service were either conscripted in the SAA or joined affiliated forces such as the 5th Corps andthe Lebanese Hezbollah.143
In an interview conducted with EASO in January 2021, Suhail Al-Ghazi stated that the SAA does not
currently carry out house raids to arrest draft evaders.144 On the other hand, an international
humanitarian organisation working in Syria mentioned that had received information from residentsof Dar’a who claimed that authorities conduct house raids and pressure families to recruit men
wanted for compulsory military service.145
While some oral sources interviewed by DIS between January and March 2020 assumed that,
especially in former opposition-held areas (e.g. Rural Damascus, Aleppo, Dar’a and Homs),
recruitment by means of house raids is still taking place, others reported that the GoS was largely
refraining from doing so in order to avoid renewed uprisings.146
During the reference period, publicly available sources have reported on cases of recruitment throughhouse raids. In December 2019, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR)147 reported on raids
carried out by the intelligence services in Douma city which led to the arrest of about 10 young men
wanted for military service.148 House raids carried out by the military police to arrest evaders ofmilitary service were reported to have taken place in January 2020 in northern rural Homs.149 House
raids carried out by security forces were reported in Eastern Ghouta in March 2020, reportedly toarrest those wanted for reserve military service and security issues.150 In August 2020, SOHR reported
that GoS forces were carrying out campaigns of arrests of men wanted for military conscriptions in
Deir Ez Zor city, Aleppo, Hama, Rural Damascus governorates and Dar’a countryside.151
In February 2021, the pro-opposition website Sowt Al-Asima reported that patrols belonging to themilitary police and the Military Security intelligence branch screened and arrested young men wanted
for compulsory and reserve military service while they were queuing to buy bread in Eastern Ghouta.
The source also mentioned that in 2020 it documented 39 security campaigns in Damascus and Rural

140

Daher, J., State Institutions and Regime Networks as Service Providers in Syria, European University Institute, June 2020,
url, p. 7
141
Syria Direct, Syria’s COVID-19 vaccine is expected by April, but fair access is not guaranteed, 14 January 2021, url
142
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, pp. 51, 54
143
MEI/Etana, Forgotten Lives: Life unde regime rule in former opposition-held East Ghouta, May 2019, url, pp. 1, 7-9
144
Al-Ghazi, S., Microsoft Teams interview, 27 January 2021
145
An international humanitarian organisation working in Syria, Microsoft Teams interview, 18 February 2021
146
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 12
147
The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) is a UK-based independent network that reports on human rights
violations in Syria. For more information see url
148
SOHR, For the purpose of conscription, the regime’s security services carry out a new campaign of raids and arrests inthe Eastern Ghouta of Damascus, 14 December 2019, url
149
Enab Baladi, Fear of forced military conscription looms over northern rural Homs again, 6 March 2020, url
150
Enab Baladi, After two years of settlement agreement in Eastern Ghouta… home raids and arrests despite Coronavirus
lockdowns, 24 March 2020, url
151
SOHR, Military conscription | Regime forces step up arrests of young recruits, 6 August 2020, url

22

Country of origin information report | Syria: Military service

Damascus which led to at least 694 men being forcibly conscripted in the SAA.152 SOHR also reported
in February 2021 on the arrest of 57 men wanted for military service by the military police at breadbakeries queues in Eastern Ghouta, Rural Damascus.153

2.5 Deployment of conscripts and reservists to the front
2.5.1 Deployment of conscripts
Several sources interviewed by DIS between January and March 2020, stated that the deployment of
SAA soldiers to the front is being done indiscriminately, independent of their qualifications, ethnoreligious background, area of origin or combat experience.154 In an interview with EASO conducted in
January 2021, Suhail Al-Ghazi assessed however, that SAA deployment to the frontlines is dependent
on the soldier’s warfare experience and the army’s need for manpower. He further stated that the
SAA uses in active fighting the most experienced soldiers which were conscripted in the first years of
the conflict and relies on experienced units such as the Russian-backed 25th Division (Tiger Forces),the 4th Division, the Republican Guard, Special Forces and 2nd Division for offensive operations. If the
SAA’s need for manpower increases, conscripts serving in the pro-GoS militias and those coming fromformer opposition-held areas will also be sent to the frontlines to participate in active fighting. 155
According to a Human Rights Watch report which documented the GoS offensive on Idlib from April
2019 to March 2020, the main GoS units involved in the offensive included the 4th and 5th Corps, the25th Division (Tiger Forces), the Palestinian militia Liwa al-Quds and the NDF.156
A source interviewed by EASO assumed that due to the concentration of military activity in north-west
Syria, the likelihood of conscripts being sent to the Idlib front is high. The source had anecdoticalinformation on reconciled fighters who participated in active fighting on the Idlib front.157 Sara Kayyali
of Human Rights Watch stated that draft evaders from former opposition-held areas were deployed
to frontlines to fight ISIL in 2020.158 During the military operations carried out by GoS in 2019 and early
2020, fresh recruits including draft evaders and persons from former opposition-held areas
participated in active fighting in parts of Idlib, Hama and Deir Ez-Zor.159
While Suhail Al-Ghazi stated in January 2021 that recruits undergo a period of six months of training
before they are deployed160, reporting from March 2020 indicated that draft evaders from former
opposition-held areas in Dar’a and Rural Damascus were sent to the frontlines either directly161 orwithin two months after their conscription, with minimal or no combat training.162 Six of 12 former
SAA soldiers interviewed for a February 2021 research assessed that the military training received
prior to being deployed to the frontlines was not adequate, pointing to the short duration of the

152

Syrian Observer (The), Regime Intelligence Target Eastern Ghouta Bakery Queues, 15 February 2021, url
SOHR, While waiting outside bread bakeries | Regime security services arrest 57 young men in eastern Ghouta for
mandatory conscription, 20 February 2021, url
154
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 13
155
Al-Ghazi, S., Microsoft Teams interview, 27 January 2021
156
HRW, “Targeting Life in Idlib”; Syrian and Russian Strikes on Civilian Infrastructure, October 2020, url, p. 136
157
An international humanitarian organisation working in Syria, Microsoft Teams interview, 18 February 2021
158
Kayyali, S., Microsoft Teams interview, 18 February 2021
159
Kayyali, S., Microsoft Teams interview, 18 February 2021; SACD, Vengeance, Repression and Fear: Reality Behind Assad’s
Promises to Displaced Syrians, October 2019, url, p. 3
160
Al-Ghazi, S., Microsoft Teams interview, 27 January 2021
161
Syria Direct, As losses mount in Idlib, Damascus sends conscripts from “reconciled” areas to the front, 4 March 2020, url
162
Al Monitor, Some Syrian regime fighters defecting when forced to front lines, 11 March 2020, url
153

23

Country of origin information report | Syria: Military service

training and lack of specialisation.163 An analysis by ISW dating March 2021, stated that GoS forces
fighting ISIL cells in the Central Syrian Desert are made up of ‘ill-trained hired or conscripted troops’.164
In an interview with UNHCR conducted in March 2020, Sara Kayyali of Human Rights Watch assessedthat conscripts originating from former opposition-held areas were likely to be viewed by the GoS as
holding anti-government opinion. Professor Dr Ugur Umit Üngör165 similarly assessed incorrespondence with UNHCR dating April 2020 that Sunnis originating from former opposition-heldareas such as Eastern Ghouta are perceived as disloyal to the army. The source further stated thatthey would receive a harsher treatment once recruited such as being sent the frontlines with minimal
training as a form of punishment, being subjected to physical training that would amount to tortureand in some cases being executed.166
In early 2020, conscripts and reservists from the so-called reconciled areas of Rural Damascus (Doumacity) were reportedly sent to the frontlines in Idlib once the SAA’s need for manpower grew. Those
who evaded conscription and were arrested at checkpoints, were reportedly sent directly to thefrontlines.167
In March 2020, Al Monitor reported on the desertion of recent conscripts and soldiers in the SAA
originally from Dar’a, Quneitra and Rural Damascus governorates for fear of being sent to thefrontlines and the reportedly large number of casualties among new conscripts serving in the SAA.
Some reconciled fighters interviewed by Al Monitor claimed that hundreds of those originating from
Dar’a were being sent to the frontlines in Idlib, in some cases two months after their conscription andwithout receiving any combat training.168
In March 2020, Turkey’s military operation against GoS forces in Idlib dubbed Operation Spring Shieldreportedly led to hundreds of GoS soldiers being killed, who were reportedly replaced by the SAA‘dispatching policeman and underage conscripts’.169
A July 2020 research published by SACD stated that men from Dar’a perceived as being anti-GoS arereportedly forcibly recruited and sent to the frontlines.170 The source further stated that ‘forced
recruits from Daraa were far more likely to die at the front than other recruits in regime’s army, as
they were pushed to the fiercest front lines against battle-hardened opponents. There were also
reports that they were executed.’171 Interviewees from a February 2021 report claimed that reconciled
fighters conscripted in the SAA were ‘disproportionately sent to the frontlines after being conscriptedin the SAA, as a form of punishment for their anti-regime activities.172 Horan Free League, an
opposition-affiliated media organisation, stated that 76 conscripts from Dar’a governorate were killedin 2020 in military operations which took place in different governorates.173

163

Basmeh & Zeitooneh, A Sword of Damocles. Compulsory Military Service in Syria and its Consequences on the Lives of
Syrians, February 2021, url, p. 12
164
Kahan, E., ISIS Poised for a Ramadan Surge in Syria, ISW, 9 March 2021, url
165
Ugur Umit Üngör is professor of Holocaust and Genocide Studies at the NIOD Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide
Studies, the Netherlands. See url
166
UNHCR, Relevant Country of Origin Information to Assist with the Application of UNHCR’s Country Guidance on Syria, 7
May 2020, url, p. 9, footnotes 33 and 36
167
Syria Direct, As losses mount in Idlib, Damascus sends conscripts from “reconciled” areas to the front, 4 March 2020, url
168
Al Monitor, Some Syrian regime fighters defecting when forced to front lines, 11 March 2020, url
169
Lister, C., The puzzling outcome of the Moscow Summit, MEI, 16 March 2020, url
170
SACD, “Reconciliation agreement” in Daraa: Insecurity, continued repression and collective punishment, 10 July 2020, url
171
SACD, “Reconciliation agreement” in Daraa: Insecurity, continued repression and collective punishment, 10 July 2020, url
172
Basmeh & Zeitooneh, A Sword of Damocles. Compulsory Military Service in Syria and its Consequences on the Lives of
Syrians, February 2021, url, p. 20
173
Horan Free League, Human Rights Report: Death Reap in Daraa 2020, 8 January 2021, url, p. 11

24

Country of origin information report | Syria: Military service

A research conducted on pro-GoS Facebook pages which document deaths among the SAA and allied
forces in 2020174 revealed that around half of all fatalities incurred by GoS forces in January andFebruary 2020 were of men originating in the core loyalist governorates of Latakia, Tartous, Hama,
and Homs, particularly from areas with a high concentration of Alawites. The source noted however,that deaths of reconciled fighters serving in the GoS forces are rarely if at all acknowledged in the‘martyrdom reporting’.175 The Alawite community is reported to have lost one third of their men of
military age in the current conflict.176
For the year 2020, over 60 % of all GoS forces fatalities were recorded on the north-west front (Latakia,
west Aleppo, Idlib, north Hama governorates). Around 30 % of all GoS fatalities recorded in 2020 camefrom majority Alawite and Ismaili communities in the loyalist areas of Latakia, Tartous, and Hama.
From July to December 2020, the central Syria front against ISIL (Deir Ez Zor, east Homs, south Raqqa,
south Aleppo governorates) became the deadliest front for GoS forces. Fatalities among GoS forces
originated mainly from Homs governorate (14 % of all GoS casualties in 2020). For around 20 % of GoS
fatalities recorded in 2020 the governorate of origin of the soldiers killed was not indicated, but the
researchers assessed that almost half of them came from Deir Ez Zor, Raqqa and Homs
governorates.177

2.5.2 Deployment of reservists
Several sources interviewed by DIS between January and March 2020, stated that reservists are also
deployed to the frontlines, although in considerably lower numbers compared to conscripts.178
Basmeh & Zeitooneh assessed in a February 2021 report that because of GoS’ need for manpower,
enlisting as a reservist ‘equates to actively serving’.179 In January 2021, Suhail Al-Ghazi noted however,that deployment of reservists is influenced by the army’s need for manpower, if they possess certain
qualifications needed by the SAA and if they are considered loyal by the GoS. The source further statedthat in the conflict hotspots in north-west Syria and those against ISIL, the SAA does not rely on
reservists.180
Among the GoS casualties recorded in January 2020, research indicated that there were young andold soldiers, inexperienced and experienced alike. The research also mentioned the deaths of a 37year-old reservist and an 18-year-old serving in the ranks of Lebanese Hezbollah.181

174

The source monitored casualties reported by SAA on various social media platforms. The findings provide only a partial
picture of the military operations and associated casualties. It does not provide a comprehensive number of Syrians killed incombat. Schoenborn, T. and Waters, G., Tracking the Military Losses of the Syrian Civil War: January 2020, International
Review, 5 February 2020, url
175
Schoenborn, T. and Waters, G., Tracking the Military Losses of the Syrian Civil War: January 2020, International Review,
5 February 2020, url; Schoenborn, T. and Waters, G., Tracking the Military Losses of the Syrian Civil War: February 2020,
International Review, 12 March 2020, url
176
Mohamad, N., As Discontent Grows in Syria, Assad Struggles to Retain Support of Alawites, New Lines Institute, 21
December 2020, url
177
Schoenborn, T. and Waters, G., The Military Casualties of the Syrian Civil War in 2020, International Review, 18 January
2021, url178
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 14
179
Basmeh & Zeitooneh, A Sword of Damocles. Compulsory Military Service in Syria and its Consequences on the Lives of
Syrians, February 2021, url, p. 9
180
Al-Ghazi, S., Microsoft Teams interview, 27 January 2021
181
Schoenborn, T. and Waters, G., Tracking the Military Losses of the Syrian Civil War: January 2020, International Review,
5 February 2020, url

25

Country of origin information report | Syria: Military service

Bribery of high-ranking SAA officers for avoiding deployment to frontlines or military service
altogether is reportedly common.182 Reservists also pay bribes to avoid being sent to the frontlines.183

2.6 Discharge of conscripts and reservists serving in the SAA
Since the outbreak of the conflict, most conscripts have not been discharged even after their
compulsory military service had been fulfilled, and had to continue their service.184 Until January 2018,
only a few serving in the military since 2011 were demobilised.185 Many men continue to perform theirmilitary service beyond the compulsory period.186 Two sources interviewed by DIS in early 2020 notedthat by paying a bribe some men, while officially still enrolled as conscripts in the SAA, are allowed inpractice to stay at home and avoid military service.187
In 2018, the GoS began to discharge the oldest classes of recruits who have been in service since2010.188 According to a humanitarian organisation working in Syria which was interviewed by DIS in
February 2020, Palestinian units within the SAA have been discharging conscripts who have served fora period of four to five years.189
Suhail Al-Ghazi stated that in 2020, the SAA discharged those who have served in the army for overseven years, those who reached a specific age (38) or military rank. There have not been majordemobilisation orders for conscripts who joined the SAA after 2013.190
According to Suhail Al-Ghazi reporting in January 2021, reservists have been gradually demobilised in
the last two years. The discharge focused on reservists who served for more than five years.191 The
same source noted in an interview with DIS in 2020 that while reservists serving in infantry andlogistics units have been discharged on a regular basis since 2012, those serving in armoured divisions
were kept in service for one or two years. Most reservists originating from former opposition-heldareas were discharged after a couple of months.192
On 29 March 2020, two administrative orders were issued, ending the retention and recall of reserve
officers who have completed three years or more of actual backup service until the date of
1 April 2020. It also discharged non-commissioned officers, as well as military personnel who
completed reserve service of seven years or more. The implementation date of the order was
7 April 2020.193 A June 2020 research noted that soldiers demobilised in March 2020 after completingnine years of service have not been begun receiving the monthly retirement stipend (SYP 35 000 orjust over USD 14) entitled to them for one year.194
On 18 November 2020, two administrative decrees were issued that ended military service for thefollowing class of reservists: officers who will have served as reservists for two or more years by
182

Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 14; Finland, FIS, Fact-Finding Mission to Beirut and Damascus, 14
December 2018, url, p. 11
183
Al-Ghazi, S., Microsoft Teams interview, 27 January 2021
184
International Crisis Group, Easing Syrian Refugees’ Plight in Lebanon, 13 February 2020, url, p. 20; Atlantic (The), Assad isdesperate for soldiers, 14 May 2018, url
185
Norway, Landinfo, Syria: Reactions against deserters and draft evaders, 3 January 2018, url, p. 5
186
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 16
187
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 16
188
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 16
189
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 86
190
Al-Ghazi, S., Microsoft Teams interview, 27 January 2021
191
Al-Ghazi, S., Microsoft Teams interview, 27 January 2021
192
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 17
193
Enab Baladi, Syrian soldiers desperate for demobilization after retention in regime’s armed forces, 14 April 2020, url
194
Tsurkov, E., Syria’s Economic Meltdown, Center for Global Policy, June 2020, url, p. 8

26

Country of origin information report | Syria: Military service

January 2021; non-commissioned officers who have served as reservists for more than seven and ahalf years; non-commissioned officers born in 1982 and who served as reservists for more than two
years. The implementation date of the decrees was 1 February 2021.195
Information on how the circulars on discharge have been implemented in 2020-2021 could not befound among the sources consulted with in the time constraints of this report.
In January 2021, the Syrian Ministry of Administrative Development announced that 10 076
demobilised soldiers and reservists had passed exams to enter top tier public service jobs. In February
2021, an additional 18 000 demobilised soldiers and reservists passed the exams for lower tier public
service jobs. Most of the successful applicant originated or resided in Tartous and Latakia
governorates, traditionally pro-GoS areas. Applicants from former opposition held areas (Dar’a, Rural
Damascus, Raqqa, Deir Ez Zor, Quneitra) accounted for 10 % of all jobs for demobilised soldiers andreservists.196 No information on when the soldiers and reservists who took part in the employment
exams for public service were demobilised could be found.

‫رن‬
COAR, Syria Update, 24 November 2020, url; SANA, ‫إداريي بإنهاء االحتفاظ واالستدعاء للضباط‬‫القيادة العامة للجيش تصدر أمرين‬‫رن‬‫االحتياطيي وصف الضباط‬[The Army General Command issues two administrative orders to end the retention and summoningof reserve officers, non-commissioned officers, and reserve personnel], 18 November 2020, url
196
COAR, Syria Update State Steps up as Soldiers Enter Public Service in Droves, 15 February 2021, url
195

27

Country of origin information report | Syria: Military service

3. Deferrals and exemptions from military
service
The law permits exemptions from military service for certain categories of individuals (described
below). However, the process for obtaining an exemption was assessed by sources interviewed FIS
during a 2018 fact-finding mission to Beirut and Damascus ‘to include more limitations and morevariation on case-by-case basis’.197 Suhail Al-Ghazi noted that exemptions to the military service are
generally implemented in practice. The source had however, knowledge of cases where individuals
were extorted at checkpoints on the basis of threats of recruitment by members of the security forces
despite having exemptions.198

3.1 Only sonsThe Syrian Military Service Law provides that the only male child to his parents, or single parent canbe exempted from military service. The exemption is also applicable if the parents of the only son are
divorced, or if one or both parents are deceased.199 DIS noted that ‘in addition, an only son will be
exempted if he has half-brothers or has become an only male child as a result of the death of one ormore of his brothers.’200
President Assad issued on 6 August 2014 Legislative Decree No 33, which amends a number of articlesof Legislative Decree No 30 of 2007 on the mandatory military service law. The amendments also
altered the number of sons per family who may postpone military service, with the numbers becoming
as follows: ‘1 may postpone if 2-4 brothers were performing mandatory, voluntary, or reserve military
service, 2 if there were 5-8 brothers in the service, and 3 if there were 9 or more brothers in theservice. Before the amendments, only one son could postpone.’201
According to an expert interviewed by FIS, a family’s only son can still benefit from the exemption
regulation, but the GoS has been tightening controls on this. Instead of renewing the exemption every
two years, the person concerned is obliged to renew it every single year. From there, the only son isrequired to renew his exemption until his mother reaches the age when she is not expected to be able
to give birth to another child (approximately by the age of 50, according to the source).202
According to several sources interviewed by DIS between January and March 2020, the GoS has
implemented in practice the provision of exempting only sons from military service. A Western
diplomat interviewed by DIS in February 2020 noted that while he has not heard of cases ofconscription of only sons, some of his sources did not rule out the possibility that this exemption is
not respected in former opposition-held areas.203

197

Finland, FIS, Fact-Finding Mission to Beirut and Damascus, 14 December 2018, url, pp. 6-7
Al-Ghazi, S., Microsoft Teams interview, 27 January 2021
199
Syrian Arab Republic, Ministry of Defense, Only male child, n.d., url
200
Denmark, DIS, Issues Regarding Military Service, October 2019, url, p. 5
201
SANA, President al-Assad issues legislative decree amending mandatory military service law, 6 August 2014, url
202
Finland, FIS, Fact-Finding Mission to Beirut and Damascus, 14 December 2018, url, p. 8
203
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, pp. 20, 83
198

28

Country of origin information report | Syria: Military service

3.2 Medical exemptions
Several sources noted that medical committees in the SAA conduct assessments of persons with a
medical condition and ultimately decide if they are to be exempted.204 The criteria used by the medical
committees for the assessments are not clear, making it difficult to know how it is implemented inpractice.205
Sources interviewed by DIS between January and February 2020 indicated that those suffering fromserious mental illness, those that had a disability or became disabled while serving in the army, suchas losing an eye or limb, were either exempted from military service or assigned to an administrative
position where they were not required to carry a weapon. Some sources noted however, that soldierswith mental disorders, such as those suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder or depression, as
well as those who shot themselves in the arm or leg, were still serving in the army.206
Two sources interviewed by FIS in 2018 stated that exemptions were still granted on the basis of
medical reasons. Other experts cited estimated that in the case of military conscription the
recruitment criteria in general have loosened. Accordingly, even old and obese men, who in the pastwould have been exempted relatively easily, were conscripted if required by the authorities.
According to one source, it is probable that a person will not be given an exemption unless his medical
condition is very clearly visible. The source also points out that in some cases it was possible for anindividual to get an exemption based on medical grounds if a bribe was paid.207

3.3 Students
Students at universities may under certain conditions be exempted from military service though a2017 change in law has made it more difficult for university students to continue deferring theirconscription.208 DIS noted that amendments made to the Military Service Law in July 2019 byLegislative Decree No. 12 introduced more restrictions on the age limits allowed to start different
levels of education and the number of study years during which students are permitted to request
exemption from military service.209
A 2018 FIS fact-finding mission report noted that students applying for a deferral from military service
were put under more scrutiny than before. Students without proper documentation were conscripted
immediately. Older students were more likely to be recruited, however. Persons who have reached
the age of 27 were usually not given deferrals by the military police. According to an anonymous
source quoted in the report, there were ‘quite a few cases where people have student exemptions
but were called anyway to join the army’.210 Furthermore, the treatment of students was said todepend on the military police unit responsible, for example, for a particular checkpoint, since thepolice themselves might serve in their posts involuntarily: ‘Sometimes these guys [the military police]204

Norway, Landinfo, Syria: Militærtjeneste – innrullering, utsettelse og fritak, 14 November 2017, url, pp. 22- 23; Sweden,
Lifos Migrationsverket, Reguljär och irreguljär syrisk militärtjänst (version 3.0), 30 May 2017, url, p. 39; Denmark, DIS, Syria
Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 75
205
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, pp. 61, 83
206
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 21
207
Finland, FIS, Fact-Finding Mission to Beirut and Damascus, 14 December 2018, url, p. 8
208
Norway, Landinfo, Syria: Reactions against deserters and draft evaders, 3 January 2018, url, pp. 6, 8
209‫الرئيس األسد يصدر مرسوما ر‬
Denmark, DIS, Issues Regarding Military Service, October 2019, url, p. 5; SANA, ‫تشيعيا بتعديل مواد من‬‫[ قانون خدمة العلم‬President Assad issues a Legislative Decree [no.12] amending articles of the Military Service Law], 14 July
2019, url
210
Finland, FIS, Fact-Finding Mission to Beirut and Damascus, 14 December 2018, url, p. 7

29

Country of origin information report | Syria: Military service

have been recruited forcefully and they are not very sympathetic to people who have been able tododge the draft.’211
According to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) information on Dar’agovernorate from May 2019, students who have suspended their education since the beginning of thecivil unrest in 2011 were pardoned by the GoS and allowed to return to college. Those who returned
were granted a deferment of their military service. Those who were over 25 years old – the age limit
for which the Syrian law states that students can remain at university – were drafted in the army andother affiliated security bodies.212
Syria expert Fabrice Balanche assessed in an interview with DIS in February 2020 that university
students are still benefiting from military service deferral while they are studying. The source noted
however that Syrian men who lived in former opposition-held areas are not permitted by the Syrian
Ministry of Education to postpone their military service by attending university.213
The CoI reported on a case recorded in October 2019 of a group of students from Douma travelling to
the university to sit for exams. Fifteen students were arrested at a General Security Directorate
operated checkpoint as their exemption from military service was viewed as invalid.214
Further cases and examples from 2020-2021 could not be found.

3.4 Exemption fee
The Syrian Military Service Law allows Syrian men of military service age (18-42), including registered
Palestinians from Syria, to pay a fee (‘Badal al-Naqdi’) to get an exemption from compulsory military
service and not be called up again. However, this option only applies for people residing abroad.215
Reservists are not eligible to pay the exemption fee.216
Before November 2020, the exemption fees applied to a male living abroad for no less than four
consecutive years, who could pay a fee of USD 5 000 before the war and USD 8 000 after to be
exempted from military service.217 According to a November 2020 amendment made to the law,
Syrians who reside abroad for one year, two years, three years or four years can now pay USD 10 000,
9 000, 8 000 or 7 000 respectively to acquire exemptions. The number of years of residence arecalculated for the period either before or after the person reached the age of military recruitment.218
Those whose residence periods have exceeded five years after reaching the military age, have to pay
a fine of USD 200 per each year in addition to the exemption fee (i.e. for five year it is equivalent to
USD 7 200; for six year it is equivalent to USD 7 400, etc.).219
According to the chief of Syria’s Immigration and Passports Department interviewed by DIS in
November 2018, both persons who left the country legally and those who left illegally can be

211

Finland, FIS, Fact-Finding Mission to Beirut and Damascus, 14 December 2018, url, p. 7
OHCHR, Human Rights Digest Syria, The “unreconciled” concerns of civilians in Dar’a Governorate, May 2019, url, p. 6
213
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 58
214
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/43/57], 28 January 2020, url, p. 13
215
Denmark, DIS/DRC, Syria, Syria: Security Situation in Damascus Province and Issues Regarding Return to Syria, February
2019, url, pp. 27-28
216
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 23
217
Enab Baladi, Military Service Exemption Fee: Expensive Return Ticket To Homeland, 2 September 2019, url
218
Legislative Decree 31, President Bashar Al-Assad issues the LD # 31/2020, amending some articles of the LD# 30 date
03/05/2007, as amended, which contains the Military Service Law, url, p. 1
219
Legislative Decree 31, President Bashar Al-Assad issues the LD # 31/2020, amending some articles of the LD# 30 date
03/05/2007, as amended, which contains the Military Service Law, url, p. 2
21230

Country of origin information report | Syria: Military service

exempted from their military service obligations.220 A male of military service born outside Syria andresiding continuously there until he reaches 18 years can pay USD 3 000, while one who was born
abroad and lived there for at least 10 years before reaching the military age can pay USD 6 500.221
Those exceeding 25 years will have to pay USD 8 000.222
Referring to the website of the Syrian embassy in Stockholm, among other sources, DIS reported thatthose who have left Syria illegally during the conflict will have to first undergo the procedure of ‘sortingout one’s affairs’/status settlement [taswiyat wada͛]223 before they can pay the exemption fee.224 Thismeans that they will have to go through a security check and resolve any outstanding issues theymight have with the GoS.225 While the German Federal Foreign Office reported in 2018 that it is notknown whether this regulation also applies to Syrian men who have left Syria illegally since thebeginning of the conflict226, other sources reported in 2020 that even those who left Syria illegally can
pay the exemption fee for military service after undergoing status settlement.227
Several sources interviewed by DIS between January and February 2020 assessed that the exemption
fee system was being implemented in practice by the GoS authorities.228 Fabrice Balanche noted
however, that border guards could demand bribes from returnees despite having paid an exemption
fee. Syrian journalist and researcher Asaad Hanna229 had knowledge of two cases of men who returned
from Lebanon and were arrested and conscripted, despite having paid the exemption fee.230 An
October 2020 research based on interviews with Syrians in Lebanon, Homs and Rural Damascus notedthat several interviewees stated that many returnees who paid the exemption fee and additional fines
were arrested for their previous political activities and some were conscripted.231
In previous years, the exemption fee has been linked with corruption232, bribery233, and discretionary
application.234

220

Denmark, DIS/DRC, Syria Syria: Security Situation in Damascus Province and Issues Regarding Return to Syria, February
2019, url, p. 29
221
Legislative Decree 31, President Bashar Al-Assad issues the LD # 31/2020, amending some articles of the LD# 30 date
03/05/2007, as amended, which contains the Military Service Law, url, p. 1
222
Syrian Arab Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, ‫[ البدل النقـدي‬Exemption Fee] n.d., url
223
Sorting out of affairs (also called status settlement) is ‘a process through which a person who is wanted by the GoS applies
to settle his/her issues with the GoS. If the GoS agrees to settle the person’s outstanding issues, the person’s name will bedeleted from wanted lists and he/she will not be wanted anymore’. See Denmark, DIS, Syria; Security clearance and status
settlement for returnees, December 2020, url, p. 3; EASO, COI Report: Syria - Exercise of authority in recaptured areas,
January 2020, url, pp. 16-17
224
Denmark, DIS, Syria; Security clearance and status settlement for returnees, December 2020, url, p. 7
225
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 26
226
Austria, BFA Staatendokumentation [Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum – COI Unit], Country Report on Syria[Updated February 2021], p. 46, Available from BFA Staatendokumentation
227
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, pp. 26, 67, 62; Denmark, DIS, Syria; Security clearance and status
settlement for returnees, December 2020, url, p. 11
228
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 28229
Asaad Hanna is a Syrian journalist and researcher who has been associated with the armed opposition, White Helmets.
See url
230
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, pp. 59, 76
231
Refugee Protection Watch, Trapped in Between Lebanon and Syria. The Absence of Durable Solutions for Syria’s Refugees,
October 2020, url, p. 6
232
Omran Center for Strategic Studies, Transformations of the Syrian Military: The Challenge of Change and Restructuring,
31 December 2018, url, pp. 174-175
233
Syria Direct, Damascus student to pay 8 months of salary in bribe to avoid military service, 20 April 2017, url
234
TIMEP, TIMEP Brief: Conscription Law, 22 August 2019, url

31

Country of origin information report | Syria: Military service

3.4.1 Exemption fee for males residing in Syria
In November 2020, the Syrian authorities announced a new decree allowing Syrians residing in the
country to pay a waiver in lieu of military conscription. Only those deemed unfit for field operations
and determined to serve in non-field service [khadamat thabiteh] would be eligible to apply.235 Basedon the decree, those with medical excuses can pay USD 3 000 or the equivalent in the SYP at the rate
determined by the Central Bank and they will be assigned solely to administrative services.236 Those
who make use of the waiver will ‘be ineligible for governmental housing and cooperatives and are
barred from drafting loans from Syrian public banks for five years’.237 Information on the medical
criteria for being deemed unfit for military service and on the implementation in practice of thisamendment by the Syrian government could not be found.

235

Legislative Decree 31, President Bashar Al-Assad issues the LD # 31/2020, amending some articles of the LD# 30 date
03/05/2007, as amended, which contains the Military Service Law, url, p. 1
236
Jusoor for Studies, Notes on Legislative Decree No. 31 to Amend the Mandatory Military Service Law, 9 November 2020,
url
237
COAR, Syria Update, 24 November 2020, url

32

Country of origin information report | Syria: Military service

4. Consequences of draft evasion, militarydesertion and defection
4.1 Draft evaders
The punishment for evading conscription is defined in the Military Penal Code, but its application
remains arbitrary.238 According to the Syrian Military Penal Code (Articles 98, 99), draft evaders arepunished with one to six months imprisonment in peacetime, after which they have to complete theirmilitary service in full. In wartime, draft evasion is a criminal offense punishable by up to five years inprison.239
Sources interviewed by DIS between January and February 2020 differ on the consequences of draft
evasion. Some stated that draft evaders would likely not face imprisonment and are sent directly to
military training or military service240, a practice that is attributed to GoS’ need for manpower. Other
sources mentioned that draft evaders would be detained or imprisoned before they are sent to themilitary service.241 An October 2020 research based on interviews with Syrians in Lebanon and in Homs
and Rural Damascus noted that interviewees who have evaded the military service or deserted
reported that they would be ‘at high risk of detention or immediate conscription in Syria’.242 In a
January 2021 interview with EASO, Suhail Al-Ghazi stated that draft evaders can face imprisonment of
up to three months followed by military service.243
Some sources interviewed by DIS in early 2020 assessed that draft evaders who were also wanted forother offences would be more likely to face imprisonment.244 Reporting on the period between July
2019 and January 2020, the CoI noted that a large number of men wanted for conscription have beendetained in Dar’a and Rural Damascus governorates.245
According to Sara Kayyali’s information from interviews with draft evaders and military deserters
outside of Syria, they have been in most cases detained once caught at checkpoints. Subsequently,
some of them were sent to the frontlines.246 Several sources interviewed by the DIS also stated thatafter being caught, draft evaders would be sent to the frontlines or to fight against ISIL-cells in eastern
Syria.247 An October 2020 research by Refugee Protection Watch248 stated that draft evaders have238

Swiss Refugee Council, Syrien: Aufschub des Militärdienstes für Studenten [Postponement of military service forstudents], 11 June 2019, url, p. 6
239
Syrian Arab Republic, Legislative Decree No. 61/1950, Military Penal Code, url; Syrian Arab Republic, Law No. 61 of 1950,
as amended (Military Penal Code) [unofficial translation], 16 February 2017, url, p. 1
240
Norway, Landinfo, Syria: Reactions against deserters and draft evaders, 3 January 2018, url, p. 8; Denmark, DIS, Syria
Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 31
241
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 31
242
Refugee Protection Watch, Trapped in Between Lebanon and Syria. The Absence of Durable Solutions for Syria’s Refugees,
October 2020, url, p. 6
243
Al-Ghazi, S., Microsoft Teams interview, 27 January 2021
244
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 31
245
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/43/57], 28 January 2020, url, p. 13
246
Kayyali, S., Microsoft Teams interview, 18 February 2021
247
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 32
248
The Refugee Protection Watch (RPW) is a coalition formed in 2019 that bring together Lebanese, Syrian and European
organisations working in the human rights, peacebuilding, development and humanitarian fields. See url

33

Country of origin information report | Syria: Military service

minimal training before being sent to participate in active fighting.249 Some draft evaders managed to
avoid being sent to frontlines by using connections and paying bribes to relevant authorities.250 For
more information on the factors influencing deployment to frontlines and participating in active
fighting see Section 2.5.
Older information pointed to cases where draft evaders were subjected to violence from military
superiors, torture and enforced disappearances.251

4.1.1 Amendment to Article 97 of the Military Service Law
In December 2019, an amendment to Article 97 of the Military Service Law was announced by the GoS
which applies to men who have reached the age of 43, evaded compulsory military service and havenot paid the exemption fee. The amendment entails for the ‘executive seizure of financial assets [ofsuch a person] without warning when he reaches 43 years of age, as well as the provisional seizure ofcapital held by his wife, or wives, and children, until it can be proven that these did not come from[the person in question], in cases where his capital was insufficient’.252
The law previously allowed for the conditional seizure of assets of those who failed to pay the
exemption fee, pending court judgement. In February 2021 however, Syria’s Ministry for Media andInformation posted a video in which Colonel Elias al-Bitar, head of the army’s Exemptions andReserves Branch, announced the immediate confiscation of assets, without previous notice, for Syrian
men who did not pay the required exemption fee within a period of three months from the day theyturned 43.253 In case the assets of the draft evader are insufficient, the assets of his wife/wives andchildren can also be confiscated until the source of the funds was verified. Human Rights Watch statedthat the amendment gives the authorities the power to ‘immediately confiscate and sell an individual’s
property without providing notice or giving the individual an opportunity to challenge the decision’.254
Judges and lawyers interviewed on the matter remarked that the GoS does not have legal ground forthe seizure of the assets of the draft evader’s relatives.255 Information on the implementation inpractice of this provision could not be found.

4.1.2 Potential consequences for family members
Regarding the treatment of family members, sources differ in their assessment. While several sources
stated that family members of draft evaders would not face any consequences256, other sourcesindicated that they would face house searches257, pressure and harassment from military police or
intelligence services to reveal the whereabouts of male relatives wanted for military service.258 In

249

Refugee Protection Watch, Trapped in Between Lebanon and Syria. The Absence of Durable Solutions for Syria’s Refugees,
October 2020, url, p. 31
250
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 32
251
Norway, Landinfo, Syria: Reactions against deserters and draft evaders, 3 January 2018, url, p. 8
252
Al-Mustafa, M., Drain Society, Feed the Military, Carnegie Middle East Center, 20 February 2020, url
253
HRW, Syrian ‘Military Evaders’ Face Unlawful Seizure of Property, Assets, 9 February 2021, url; Middle East Eye, Damascus
threatens to seize property from displaced Syrians over conscription fees, 12 February 2021, url
254
HRW, Syrian ‘Military Evaders’ Face Unlawful Seizure of Property, Assets, 9 February 2021, url
255
Verify Syria, Specialists answered ... Does the Syrian regime have the right to enforce seizure of the funds of the familiesof those who have failed to "serve in the education"?, 7 February 2021, url; Enab Baladi, Seizing assets of military evaders’relatives: Legal grounds, 11 February 2021, url
256
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 36
257
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 37
258
Al-Ghazi, S., Microsoft Teams interview, 27 January 2021; Kayyali, S., Microsoft Teams interview, 18 February 2021

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Military service

some cases, family members have been arrested or required to report to an intelligence service
branch for questioning.259
In a February 2021 interview with EASO, an international humanitarian organization working in Syria
mentioned a case in which the authorities conditioned the granting of security clearance required forrenewing a lease agreement by requiring the applicant to provide information on the whereabouts ofmale relatives wanted for military service.260 Suhail Al-Ghazi assessed that family members of draft
evaders from areas loyal to the GoS won’t face the same kind of harassment as those originating informer opposition-held areas.261

4.2 Military deserters and defectors
According to the Military Penal Code (Articles 100, 101), desertion is punishable by one to five years
imprisonment in peacetime and can result in a prison sentence up to twice as long in wartime. Those
who have left the country following desertion can be punished with a penalty of up to 15 years
imprisonment in wartime. Desertion to the enemy is punishable by life imprisonment or the death
penalty.262
In the early years of the conflict, desertion from the SAA occurred frequently with some sources
estimating that by mid-2014 between 20 000 and 100 000 thousand conscripts and officers
deserted.263 Since then, desertions have become a relatively rare occurrence.264
According to a Syria Justice and Accountability Centre (SJAC) report which analysed classified
documents of the Syrian security services265, the General Command of the Armed Forces provided
information concerning deserters and defectors to the Military Intelligence Directorate branch of the
security services. The General Command of the Armed Forces then issues orders based on the
instructions of the Military Intelligence Directorate. In practice, detention orders were often issued
directly by the Military Intelligence Directorate instead of the General Command of the Armed
Forces.266
In previous years, defectors were often punished in the same way as those who actively joined the
opposition. In targeted campaigns, the government systematically arrested defectors and military
personnel suspected of sympathising with the opposition.267 Reporting for the period between mid-259

Al-Ghazi, S., Microsoft Teams interview, 27 January 2021; Kayyali, S., Microsoft Teams interview, 18 February 2021
An international humanitarian organisation working in Syria, Microsoft Teams interview, 18 February 2021
261
Al-Ghazi, S., Microsoft Teams interview, 27 January 2021
262
Syrian Arab Republic, Legislative Decree No. 61/1950, Military Penal Code, url
263
Washington Post (The), Talking to Assad’s Military Deserters, 17 December 2015, url; Gaub, F., Syria’s Military: Last Man
Standing?, 29 July 2014, url
264
Denmark, DIS/DRC, Syria: Recruitment Practices in Government-controlled Areas and in Areas under Opposition Control,
Involvement of Public Servants and Civilians in the Armed Conflict and Issues Related to Exiting Syria, August 2017, url, p. 33;
Albrecht, H. and, Koehler, K., Going on the Run: What Drives Military Insubordination in Violent Domestic Conflict?, American
University in Cairo, 2 March 2016, url, p. 16
265
Syria Justice and Accountability Centre (SJAC) is a US based non-profit organisation which provide insights and analysis
on human rights violations in Syria. The analysis is based on a sample of 5 003 documents drawn from about 483 000 papers
retrieved from Syria during the civil war from government facilities. SJAC, Walls Have Ears: An Analysis of Classified Syrian
Security Sector Documents, April 2019, url, p. 4
266
SJAC, Walls Have Ears: An Analysis of Classified Syrian Security Sector Documents, April 2019, url, p. 10
267
UN Human Rights Council, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Deaths in Detention in the Syrian Arab Republic, 3 February 2016,
url, p. 4
260

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Military service

July 2018 and mid-January 2019, the CoI assessed that conscript deserters were among the groups
most likely to be detained arbitrarily by the GoS forces.268
Several sources interviewed by DIS between January and March 2020 noted that deserters are
imprisoned.269 Fabrice Balanche stated that the deserter would be tried by the military court and givena short prison sentence, due to the army’s need for manpower on the frontlines.270 According to Suhail
Al-Ghazi, deserters are placed on wanted lists and if caught will be arrested. They can then face
imprisonment up to six months after which they are sent back to the army.271 If the deserter has abackground of anti-GoS activity he could face longer imprisonment272 or execution.273 SNHR statedthat deserters are usually detained by branches of the Syrian intelligence services, which may expose
them to the risk of torture and enforced disappearances.274 A Western diplomat interviewed by DIS
indicated that the GoS would not only punish deserters according to the provisions of the law but
would also make use of the provisions of the anti-terrorism law of 2012 (Decree No. 19/2012).275
Some sources interviewed by DIS pointed to the possibility of avoiding punishment for desertion if thedeserter would undergo the process of status settlement and re-join the army. However, the status
settlement would not cover crimes committed by the deserter such as killings or rape, for which hewould still face trial in court.276
A number of sources interviewed by DIS indicated that the GoS has changed its practice and would nolonger kill or execute deserters as in the previous years of the war. However, some sources assessedthat deserters would still risk being killed or executed by the GoS authorities, giving the examples ofmen who were executed in 2020 while trying to desert during the Idlib offensive277 or the case of
Safwan Bakour who was executed in 2019 for treason despite having sorted out his affairs.278
Suhail Al-Ghazi assessed in January 2021 that the treatment of defectors may include arrest,
prolonged detention, torture, death in detention and execution. Some defectors, depending on theirbackground and influence in reconciled areas, would not be subjected to this type of treatment.279
Daraa Martyrs Documentation Office estimated that around 92 former opposition fighters anddefectors from the SAA were forcibly disappeared in southern Syria since the area has undergone thereconciliation process in 2018. Death notifications for 31 of them were received by their families.280
In November 2020, the Turkish state-run Anadolu Agency, citing local sources from Syria, reported
that 98 persons, including 40 military defectors from Dar’a were tortured by the GoS authorities since
the signing of the reconciliation agreement in 2018.281

268

UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/40/70], 31 January 2019, url, p. 15
269
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 33
270
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 59
271
Al-Ghazi, S., Microsoft Teams interview, 27 January 2021
272
Al-Ghazi, S., Microsoft Teams interview, 27 January 2021
273
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 33
274
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 90
275
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 84
276
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, pp. 33-34
277
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, pp. 34
278
Syrian Observer (The), Hezbollah Arrests Them, and the Regime Executes Them, 2 August 2019, url based theirinformation on reporting done by the Lebanese news site Al-Modon
279
Al-Ghazi, S., Microsoft Teams interview, 27 January 2021
280
Syria Direct, Reconciliation without forgiveness: Defectors and former opposition members face 'deferred execution', 9February 2021, url
281
AA, Syrian regime killed 98 people in Daraa: Sources, 22 November 2020, url

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Military service

Reconciled military defectors were arrested despite the amnesties brought forward by legislative
decrees No. 18 and No. 20. Between July 2018 and mid-March 2020, Horan Free League recorded thearrest of 140 military defectors across Dar’a governorate. Some of them were released and joined the
SAA while a small number were reported to have died in prison.282
In 2020, several sources reported on military defectors from Dar’a governorate who were arrested283
despite having settled their affairs with GoS and who subsequently died in prison, in some cases
reportedly under torture. Their families received death notifications from the authorities, sometimes
two years after the defector’s arrest.284 In June 2020, a group of eight reconciled opposition fightersserving for the SAA in Rural Damascus defected for unknown reasons.285 All defectors were reportedly
killed following clashes with the SAA forces.286
For the reporting period between January and July 2020, the CoI verified 34 cases where men havebeen forcibly disappeared in in Dar’a, Homs, Quneitra, Rural Damascus and Sweida provinces. The
cases included military defectors who were subjected to enforced disappearances following arrestand detention, including those who had undergone a reconciliation process in Dar’a governorate.287
In January 2021, SOHR reported on the death of a defector with the rank of colonel from Dar’agovernorate who reportedly died under torture after more than two years in GoS detention.288
In January 2021, COAR, citing the Syrian Center for Safety and Defection289, reported that 40 SAA
soldiers defected and relocated to Idlib governorate. A further 10 soldiers originating from Dar’a,
Aleppo, Idlib, Homs, Damascus and Rural Damascus governorates were reported to have defected in
mid-January 2021.290
COAR noted that the of number desertions and defections has increased in since early 2020, recording
a total of 132 desertions and defections from the GoS forces between January 2020 and January 2021.
The data was collected from open sources and validated by local researchers. COAR assessed thatmany deserters and defectors were originally from governorates that have undergone
reconciliation.291

282

Al-Jabassini, A., Festering Grievances and the Return to Arms in Southern Syria, European University Institute, 7 April
2020, url, p. 13283
SNHR, At Least 1,882 Cases of Arbitrary Arrest/ Detention Documented in Syria in 2020, 149 of Them in December:
Detainees Include 52 Children and 39 Women, 2 January 2021, url, p. 16; SHRC, Arrest and kidnapping in October 2020, 8
November 2020, url
284
SOHR, Arrested two years ago | Army defector dies under torture in regime security prisons, 8 December 2020, url; SNHR,
Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 1,734 Civilians in Syria in 2020, Including 99 in December; Killings of IDPs and Deathsby Mines and Remote Bombings Stood Out Among Killings in Syria in 2020, 1 January 2021, url, p. 18; SHRC, Arrest andkidnapping in October 2020, 8 November 2020, url; SNHR, Daraa soldier who defected from Syrian regime dies due to torturein the regime’s detention center, Nov 9, 11 November 2020, url
285
Syria Call, Aircraft participated in it ... Clashes between the Assad regime and young men who had defected from it in the
countryside of, 13 June 2020, url; Sawt Al-Aasima, Using its planes and tanks ... Violent battles in the city of Conscience, andthe regime is committing a massacre on its outskirts, 13 June 2020, url
286
Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary, 8 -14 June 2020, url, p. 4
287
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/45/31], 14 August 2020, url, p. 6
288
SOHR, Arrested over 25 months ago | Defector colonel from Daraa countryside dies under torture in regime prisons, 16
January 2021, url
289
The Syrian Center for Safety and Defection is reportedly made up of activists with ties to the anti-GoS opposition whichaims to document and support defectors from the SAA. See Syrian Observer (The), Activists Launch Center to Secure Army
Defectors, 14 February 2020, url
290
COAR, Syria Update, 8 February 2021, url
291
COAR, Syria Update, 8 February 2021, url

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Military service

4.2.1 Potential consequences for family members
Several sources interviewed by DIS between January and March 2020 stated that family members ofdeserters and defectors would not face problems with the GoS. Other sources however, assessed thatfamily members may still face house visits, harassment, threats, arrest, interrogation, torture,
confiscation of property and pressure from authorities.292 DIS interviewed three sources who
respectively stated that either immediate293 and extended family members294 may face consequences
due to desertion/defection of a family member, though it could be hard to distinguish whether thiswas for actual desertion or joining the opposition.295 In January 2021, Suhail Al-Ghazi assessed thatfamily members of defectors may also be subjected to arrest, prolonged detention, torture, death indetention and execution.296
The extent to which family members may face consequences is influenced by factors such as the rankof the deserter/defector, the family’s place of residence and religious background and the secretservice and officer in charge of the area.297 For example, family members of high-ranking
deserters/defectors or those from opposition-held areas would be more likely to face consequences
than those with a low rank in the army or who originate from GoS-held areas.298
The actions of the deserter/defector, such as killing soldiers or officers or joining opposition groups
and participating in armed actions against the SAA, would be further influencing factors on thetreatment of their family members.299

4.3 Amnesties regarding draft evaders and military deserters andtheir implementation in practiceAmnesty laws have been issued on several occasions since Syria's crisis began in March 2011 to grantdraft evaders or deserters amnesty from prosecution.300 Some organisations stated that thesemeasures have not necessarily resulted in the return of refugees or draft evaders, because suchindividuals would still be required to complete their military service after turning themselves in.301
Legislative Decree No. 18 issued in October 2018, granted a general amnesty to certain individuals in
Syria or abroad, accused of deserting or avoiding military service. However, the decree did not exempt
the person to whom amnesty was granted from military service.302 The amnesty had to be taken up
within four months for those residing within the country, or six months for those living abroad. 303

292

Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 37
DIS interviews with Elizabeth Tsurkov, researcher on Syria and fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. Denmark,
DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 56
294
DIS interviews with a Western diplomat and with Suhail Al-Ghazi in February 2020. Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service,
May 2020, url, pp. 81, 84
295
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 38
296
Al-Ghazi, S., Microsoft Teams interview, 27 January 2021
297
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 37
298
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, pp. 37-38
299
Norway, Landinfo, Syria: Reactions against deserters and draft evaders, 3 January 2018, url, p. 11
300
TIMEP, TIMEP Brief: Conscription Law, 22 August 2019, url
301
TIMEP, Legislative Decree No.18 – Military Service Amnesty, 6 December 2018, url
302
Reuters, Syria’s offers amnesty to deserters and draft dodgers, 9 October 2018, url; Washington Post (The), Syria offers
amnesty to deserters and draft dodgers, 9 October 2018, url
303
EIP, Refugee return in Syria: Dangers, security risks and information scarcity, July 2019, url, p. 10
293

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Military service

Those who fought on the side of the armed opposition or dissented against GoS were excluded fromthe amnesty.304
On 28 October 2018, the Ministry of Defence issued a circular that provided for the implementationof the amnesty law. The circular forbade the arrest of reservists who had evaded military service andstates that the names of reservists who were wanted for active service would be removed from thelist. Those reservists could still be called up again in the event of war or a state of emergency, however.
According to some estimates, this decree could have affected 800 000 people who have left thecountry or gone into hiding.305
According to the Atlantic Council, despite the October 2018 amnesty law, the GoS issued new lists ofpersons called for emergency military service, which contained 400 000 names, including a large
number of youths whose names had just been removed from the list by virtue of the amnesty
measure.306 Syria Direct307 reported in March 2019 on a case of a defector who returned to Syria
following the amnesty and was reportedly taken by the authorities upon his return. His whereabouts
were unknown.308
Representatives of COAR interviewed by DIS in November 2018 assessed that very few individuals
would be interested in using the amnesty law, the main reasons being that it does not pardon themfor fulfilling the military service. Other interviewed sources mentioned that GoS has not respectedprior amnesties and reconciliation agreements, fuelling distrust among Syrians. A Syrian official statedhowever, that following the amnesty ‘a crucial number of both deserters and draft evaders had
handed themselves in to the authorities.’309
In September 2019, the GoS issued Decree No 20/2019 which among other provisions, granted
amnesty for deserters and draft evaders under the condition that they would re-enlist for military
service within three months for those residing in Syria and six months for those residing abroad. 310
Those who were labelled as ‘terrorists’ and those who were part of the armed opposition to the GoS
were excluded from the amnesty.311
Some sources reporting in 2019 and 2020 stated that the GoS authorities were not respecting theamnesty agreements by continuing to arrest civilians and former affiliates of armed opposition
factions in areas that previously signed settlement agreements with the GoS.312 In 2019, OHCHR also
stated that it received information that returnees having been detained following their return to Syria
in response to the amnesty decree issued in September 2019.313
On 22 March 2020, the GoS issued Legislative Decree No 6 which provided for a limited amnesty for
military deserters. In order to benefit from the amnesty military deserters had to turn themselves inwithin period of three months for those inside the country, and six months for those who are currently

304

TIMEP, Legislative Decree No. 18 of 2018 (Military Service Amnesty), 20 August 2019, url, pp. 1-2
National (The), Syrian military clears men wanted for extra military service, 31 October 2018, url
306
Atlantic Council, Forced conscription continues despite amnesty by Syrian Government, 13 February 2019, url
307
Syria Direct is ‘an independent journalism organization focused on Syria’, founded in 2013. For more information see url
308
Syria Direct, ‘Is it safe to go home?’ Amid promises of amnesty in Syria, defectors abroad weigh their options, 18 March
2019, url309
Denmark, DIS/DRC, Syria: Security Situation in Damascus Province and Issues Regarding Return to Syria, February 2019,url, pp. 30-31
310
RFI, Syria president decrees amnesty, reduces sentences, 15 September 2019, url
311
Reuters, Syria's Assad issues amnesty reducing punishment for crimes, 15 September 2019, url
312
USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2019 - Syria, 11 March 2020, url, p. 19; Al Monitor, Syrian opposition
skeptical of Assad’s amnesty decision, 4 October 2019, url
313
OHCHR, Regular press briefing by the Information Service: Syria, 8 November 2019, url
305

39Country of origin information report | Syria: Military service

abroad.314 Sources reported that the amnesty was only partially implemented in relation to otheroffences it covered.315
The sources interviewed by EASO for this report stated that little to no information was available on
the implementation and scope of the general amnesties issued by the GoS for draft evaders anddeserters.316 Some sources mentioned that generally, Syrians did not make use of the amnesties
because they did not trust the GoS to respect the provisions317 and because the amnesties did notremove the duty to perform military service.318 Sources interviewed by DIS between January andMarch 2020 reported that GoS detained or disappeared military deserters and defectors from former
opposition-held areas who were granted amnesty as part of the reconciliation agreements. Others
noted however, that they knew of cases where deserters covered by amnesty were imprisoned for a
few months and then sent to perform the military service or draft evaders who were sent directly to
military service.319 Syrian refugees, returnees and IDPs interviewed for a June 2020 joint NGO reportstated that the GoS authorities arrested and detained Syrians despite the amnesties.320

314

COAR, Syria Update, 30 March 2020, url; AP News, Syrian president issues amnesty, reduces sentences, 22 March 2020,

url
315

HRW, World Report 2021 - Syria, 13 January 2021, url; SNHR, Two Months Since Issuing Amnesty Decree, the Syrian
Regime Released Only 96 of Nearly 130,000 Detainees and Arrested 113 More, 15 May 2020, url, p. 5
316
Kayyali, S., Microsoft Teams interview, 18 February 2021; An international humanitarian organisation working in Syria,
Microsoft Teams interview, 18 February 2021
317
Kayyali, S., Microsoft Teams interview, 18 February 2021; An international humanitarian organisation working in Syria,
Microsoft Teams interview, 18 February 2021
318
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 35
319
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, pp. 35-36
320
DRC, Into the Unknown: Listening to Syria’s Displaced In the Search for Durable Solutions, June 2020, url, p. 16

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Military service

Annex I: Bibliography
Oral sources, including anonymous sources•••

Al-Ghazi, S., Microsoft Teams interview, 27 January 2021 & 3 February 2021. Suhail Al-Ghazi
is a Syrian researcher and activist from Damascus. In addition to being the non-resident fellow
at Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, he is also a member of Verify-Syria fact checking
platform. His research focuses on the military and security situation of Syria as well as thesocioeconomic situation in government-held areas.
An international humanitarian organisation working in Syria, Microsoft Teams interview, 26
January 2021 & 18 February 2021
Kayyali, S., Microsoft Teams interview, 18 February 2021. Sara Kayyali is a Syria researcher inthe Middle East and North Africa Division at Human Rights Watch, where she researches
human rights and international humanitarian law violations in Syria

Public sources
AA (Anadolu Agency), Syrian regime killed 98 people in Daraa: Sources, 22 November 2020,
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/syrian-regime-killed-98-people-in-daraa-sources-/2052398,
accessed 20 February 2021
AI (Amnesty International), Between Prison and the Grave: Enforced Disappearances in Syria,
November 2015, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/MDE2425792015ENGLISH.PDF,
accessed 12 February 2021
AI (Amnesty International), Syria: Peaceful protesters detained in Sweida must be released
immediately, 24 June 2020, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/06/syria-peacefulprotesters-detained-in-sweida-must-be-released-immediately/, accessed 12 February 2021
Al Jazeera, Why is the world afraid of young refugee men?, 20 June 2016,
https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2016/6/20/why-is-the-world-afraid-of-young-refugee-men,
accessed 12 February 2021
Al Monitor, Some Syrian regime fighters defecting when forced to front lines, 11 March 2020,
https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/03/daraa-battles-reconciliation-agreementsyrian-army-fighters.html, accessed 5 February 2021
Al Monitor, Syrian opposition skeptical of Assad’s amnesty decision, 4 October 2019, https://www.almonitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/10/amnesty-decision-syrian-regime-political-detainees.html,
accessed 2 March 2021
Albrecht, H. and, Koehler, K., Going on the Run: What Drives Military Insubordination in Violent
Domestic
Conflict?,
American
University
inCairo,
2
March
2016,
https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/Albrecht_Koehler Desertion Syria
MEI2016.pdf , accessed 16 January 2021
Al-Jabassini, A., Festering Grievances and the Return to Arms in Southern Syria, European University
Institute, 7 April 2020, url, https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/66786/Festering
Grievances and the Return to Arms in Southern Syria-final.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, accessed 16
January 2021
Al-Jabassini, A., Is Ahmad al-Oda winning the “hearts and minds” of Daraa’s people?, MEI, 22 June
2020, https://www.mei.edu/publications/ahmad-al-oda-winning-hearts-and-minds-daraas-people,
accessed 16 January 2021

41

Country of origin information report | Syria: Military service

Al-Lababidi, M., The Druze of Sweida: the Return of the Regime Hinges on Regional and Local Conflicts,
European
University
Institute,
28
August2019,https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/63924/MED_2019_12.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, accessed 16 January 2021
Al-Mustafa, M., Drain Society, Feed the Military, Carnegie Middle East Center, 20 February 2020,
https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/81107, accessed 7 January 2021
AP News (Associated Press News), Syrian president issues amnesty, reduces sentences, 22 March
2020, https://apnews.com/article/52402b39db2cdc39366418acf9cbf6d0, accessed 12 January 2021
Arab Weekly, Rising discontent in Syria’s Daraa, Sweida reflects simmering woes, 16 February 2020,
https://thearabweekly.com/rising-discontent-syrias-daraa-sweida-reflects-simmering-woes,
accessed 12 January 2021
Araman, A. and Loutfi, S., Return to Syria after evading conscription, Forced Migration Review,
October 2019, https://www.fmreview.org/sites/fmr/files/FMRdownloads/en/return/return.pdf,
accessed 9 January 2021
Atlantic (The), Assad is desperate for soldiers, 14 May 2018, urlAtlantic Council, Forced conscription continues despite amnesty by Syrian Government, 13 February
2019,
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/forced-conscription-continues-despiteamnesty-by-syrian-government, accessed 10 January 2021
Austria, BFA Staatendokumentation [Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum – COI Unit], Country
Report on Syria [Updated December 2020], Available from BFA Staatendokumentation
Basmeh & Zeitooneh, A Sword of Damocles. Compulsory Military Service in Syria and its Consequenceson the Lives of Syrians, February 2021, https://www.basmeh-zeitooneh.org/getpdf/cms_report.pdf,
accessed 15 February 2021
CarterCenter(The),
WeeklyConflict
Summary,
8-14
June
2020,
https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/conflict_resolution/syria-conflict/weeklyconflict-summary-8june-14june2020.pdf, accessed 14 January 2021
COAR (Center for Operational Analysis and Research), Syria in 2021. Forecast for a Protracted Crisis,
28 January 2021, https://coar-global.org/2021/01/28/syria-in-2021/, accessed 4 February 2021
COAR (Center for Operational Analysis and Research), Syria Update, 24 November 2020, https://coarglobal.org/2020/11/24/changes-to-military-service-reflect-damascuss-unrealistic-aims-growingsocio-economic-divide/, accessed 6 January 2021
COAR (Center for Operational Analysis and Research), Syria Update, 25 January 2021, https://coarglobal.org/2021/01/25/damascus-flails-as-syrians-abroad-queue-for-covid-19-vaccine/, accessed 5
February 2021
COAR (Center for Operational Analysis and Research), Syria Update, 30 March 2020, https://coarglobal.org/2020/03/30/beyond-the-health-sector-covid-19s-impact-on-syrias-economy-anddetainees/, accessed 18 January 2021
COAR (Center for Operational Analysis and Research), Syria Update, 8 February 2021, https://coarglobal.org/syria-updates-sweeping-real-estate-sales-tax-reform-discussed/, accessed 15 February
2021
COAR (Center for Operational Analysis and Research), Syria Update: June 20 – June 26 2019, 26 June2019,
https://coar-global.org/2019/06/26/syria-update-between-20-june-to-26-june-2019/,
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42

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Annex II: Terms of Reference
The report should focus on military service in the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) in 2020 and first quarter of2021, looking specifically at the provisions and implementation of the military service law, current
patterns of recruitment (prevalence, methods, deployment and discharge), implementation of rules
regarding exemption from military service and the consequences of draft evasion, desertion anddefection.
❑ Military service and official conscription▪

Military service law provisions▪

Conscientious objection▪

Current recruitment practices of conscripts and reservists to the SAA▪

Methods of conscription▪

Duties and tasks of recruited conscripts and reservists, including deployments andparticipation in active fighting▪

Discharge of conscripts and reservists serving in the SAA❑ Exemptions and deferrals from military service▪

Overview of legal exemptions and implementation in practice❑ Consequences of draft evasion, desertion and defection

53▪

Treatment of draft evaders, military deserters and defectors▪

Treatment of family members of draft evaders, military deserters and defectors▪

Amnesties regarding draft evaders and military deserters and their implementationin practiceCountry of origin information report | Syria: Military service

doi: 10.2847/461371

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