European Asylum Support Office

EASO
Country of Origin
Information Report
Iraq
Actors of Protection

November 2018SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION

European Asylum Support Office

EASO
Country of Origin
Information Report
Iraq
Actors of Protection

November 2018

Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which
may be made of the information contained herein.
More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu).
PDF: ISBN: 978-92-9476-088-3

doi: 10.2847/683642

BZ0119054ENN© European Asylum Support Office (EASO) 2018
Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged, unless otherwise stated.
For third-party materials reproduced in this publication, reference is made to the copyrights
statements of the respective third parties.
Cover photo: US Department of Defense, Iraqi Federal Police training as part of Operation
Inherent Resolve in February 2018, public domain, (url)EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT – IRAQ : ACTORS OF PROTECTION— 3

Acknowledgements
This report was co-drafted by the EASO COI sector with research contributions from the COI unit of
the Romanian General Inspectorate for Immigration, Ministry of Internal Affairs.
Furthermore, the following national asylum and migration departments have contributed byreviewing this report together with EASO:
Estonia, Estonian Police and Border Guard Board
Slovakia, Migration Office, Department of Documentation and Foreign Cooperation.
Additionally, the following individual expert reviewed this report:
Dr. Geraldine Chatelard, Contemporary Historian and Social Anthropologist. Dr. Chatelard isan independent consultant and social scientist currently associated with the Iraq (Erbil) branchof the Institut français du Proche-Orient (French Institute in the Near East). For the past 15
years, she has conducted research and written on migration and displacement issues in theregion, including the socioeconomic and humanitarian situation in Iraq. Since 2014, shespends on average one third of her time conducting field research in various regions of Iraq
(Kurdistan, Baghdad, Najaf, Karbala, Basra and other southern governorates, and more
recently Mosul) including on forced displacement, the return and reintegration of migrants
and refugees, and the politics of religious identities.
The review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts or organisations contributes to theoverall quality of the report, but does not necessarily imply their formal endorsement of the final
report, which is the full responsibility of EASO.

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Contents
Acknowledgements................................................................................................................................. 3Contents .................................................................................................................................................. 4
Disclaimer................................................................................................................................................ 7
Glossary and abbreviations ..................................................................................................................... 8
Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 10
Methodology and sources ................................................................................................................ 10
Structure and use of the report ........................................................................................................ 10
Map ....................................................................................................................................................... 11
1. Basic data .......................................................................................................................................... 12
2. Context .............................................................................................................................................. 13
3. State structure and governance........................................................................................................ 15
3.1 Executive branch......................................................................................................................... 15
3.2 Legislative branch ....................................................................................................................... 16
3.3 Judicial branch ............................................................................................................................ 16
3.4 Federal system and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq ...................................................................... 16
3.4.1 Provincial councils ............................................................................................................... 17
3.4.2 Kurdistan Region of Iraq ...................................................................................................... 17
3.4.3 Disputed territories ............................................................................................................. 18
3.5 Elections, political parties, lists and coalitions ........................................................................... 18
3.6 National elections in May 2018 .................................................................................................. 19
3.7 New 2018 Iraqi government ....................................................................................................... 21
3.8 Corruption .................................................................................................................................. 22
3.8.1 Efforts to fight corruption ................................................................................................... 23
3.8.2 2018 protests ...................................................................................................................... 24
4. Legal framework ............................................................................................................................... 24
4.1 Constitution and fundamental rights overview.......................................................................... 25
4.2 Criminal law and anti-terrorism laws ......................................................................................... 26
4.3 Arrest and detention procedures ........................................................................................... 27
4.4 Authority to arrest and detain ............................................................................................... 28
5. Security institutions .......................................................................................................................... 29
5.1 ISF command and structure........................................................................................................ 29
5.2 Ministry of Defence and Iraqi Army ........................................................................................... 31

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5.2.1 Mandate and structure ....................................................................................................... 31
5.2.2 Capacity and effectiveness .................................................................................................. 32
5.2.3 Integrity ............................................................................................................................... 33
5.3 Ministry of Interior and police .................................................................................................... 34
5.3.1 Mandate, structure, capacity .............................................................................................. 34
5.3.2 Effectiveness ....................................................................................................................... 37
5.3.3 Integrity ............................................................................................................................... 38
5.3.4 Emergency Response Division (furqa ar-red as-suriya) ...................................................... 40
5.3.5 Provincial Emergency Police Battalions .............................................................................. 40
5.3.6 Border Guards (haras hadud al-Iraq), Facilities Protections Service, and Oil Police .......... 41
5.4 Popular Mobilisation Units or Forces (al-hashd al-sha’abi) ....................................................... 41
5.4.1 Mandate and structure ....................................................................................................... 41
5.4.2 Capacity ............................................................................................................................... 44
5.4.3 Effectiveness ....................................................................................................................... 45
5.4.4 Integrity ............................................................................................................................... 45
5.5 Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) (jihaz mukafahat al-irhab)...................................................... 47
5.5.1 Mandate and structure ....................................................................................................... 47
5.5.2 Capacity ............................................................................................................................... 48
5.5.3 Effectiveness ....................................................................................................................... 48
5.5.4 Integrity ............................................................................................................................... 49
5.6 National Security Service (NSS) (jihaz al-amn al-watni) ............................................................. 49
5.7 Professional conduct .................................................................................................................. 50
5.7.1 Code of conduct .................................................................................................................. 50
5.7.2 Arbitrary arrest, detention, torture, disappearances, and extrajudicial killings ................. 50
6. Judiciary and legal system................................................................................................................. 54
6.1 Court structure ........................................................................................................................... 54
6.2 Criminal trial procedures ............................................................................................................ 56
6.3 Capacity ...................................................................................................................................... 57
6.4 Effectiveness ............................................................................................................................... 58
6.5 Integrity ...................................................................................................................................... 59
6.5.1 Public trust .......................................................................................................................... 59
6.5.2 Independence, corruption, threats ..................................................................................... 59
6.5.3 Arbitrary arrest, detention and access to legal assistance ................................................. 60
6.5.4 Treatment in detention ....................................................................................................... 61
6.5.5 Fair trial ............................................................................................................................... 62
6.6 Tribal interactions with state justice .......................................................................................... 65

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7. Oversight mechanisms and complaints ............................................................................................ 67
7.1 Offices of Inspectors General (OIG) ............................................................................................ 67
7.2 Commission of Integrity (CoI) ..................................................................................................... 68
7.3 Iraqi High Commission for Human Rights (IHCHR) ..................................................................... 70
7.4 Investigations into state forces abuses ...................................................................................... 70
7.5 Investigations of ISIL war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide ...................................... 71
7.6 Redress through courts and reparations .................................................................................... 72
8. Kurdistan Region of Iraq ................................................................................................................... 73
8.1 Security institutions - General .................................................................................................... 73
8.1.1 Procedures .......................................................................................................................... 73
8.1.2 Peshmerga - Mandate and structure .................................................................................. 73
8.1.3 Ministry of Interior and Police - Mandate and structure .................................................... 74
8.1.4 Asayish - Mandate and structure ........................................................................................ 75
8.2 Capacity and effectiveness ......................................................................................................... 75
8.3 Integrity ...................................................................................................................................... 77
8.4 Judiciary ...................................................................................................................................... 79
8.4.1 Structure and capacity ........................................................................................................ 79
8.4.2 Effectiveness ....................................................................................................................... 80
8.4.3 Integrity ............................................................................................................................... 80
8.5 Oversight mechanisms and complaints ...................................................................................... 81
8.5.1 Commission of Integrity ...................................................................................................... 81
8.5.2 High Committee to Evaluate and Respond to International Reports ................................. 81
8.5.3 Independent Commission for Human Rights of the Kurdistan Region ............................... 81
8.5.4 Oversight and investigations into abuses by KRG forces .................................................... 82
9. Specific groups .................................................................................................................................. 84
9.1 Women and children .................................................................................................................. 84
9.2 Ethno-religious minorities .......................................................................................................... 86
9.3 People with disabilities ............................................................................................................... 87
9.4 LGBT minorities........................................................................................................................... 87
Bibliography .......................................................................................................................................... 89
Terms of Reference ............................................................................................................................. 106

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT – IRAQ : ACTORS OF PROTECTION— 7

Disclaimer
This report was written according to the EASO COI Report Methodology (2012) ( 1). The report is basedon carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced.
The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed with utmost
care. However, this document does not claim to be exhaustive. If a particular event, person ororganisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has not taken place orthat the person or organisation does not exist. Any event taking place after the finalisation of thisreport is not included.
Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particularapplication for international protection. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative of aparticular legal position.
‘Refugee’, ‘risk’ and similar terminology are used as generic terminology and not in the legal sense as
applied in the EU Asylum Acquis, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the
Status of Refugees.
Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may bemade of the information contained in this report.
The drafting of this report was finalised in November 2018. Any event taking place after this date is
not included in this report. More information on the reference period for this report can be found in
the methodology section of the Introduction.

(1) The EASO methodology is largely based on the Common EU Guidelines for processing Country of Origin Information(COI), 2008, and can be downloaded from the EASO website: http://www.easo.europa.eu.

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Glossary and abbreviations
AAH

Asaib ahl al-Haq, also called League of the Righteous or the Khazali
network; Shia-PMU militia formerly part of the Mahdi army. Led by Qais
al-Khazalial-hashd al-ashari

Sunni tribal militia units composed mainly of Sunni tribes; someaffiliated with the PMUs

Al-hashd al Shaabi

Popular Mobilisation Units (PMU) or Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF)

Al Quds Force

Also spelled Al Qods; Extra-territorial contingent of the IRGC special
forces run by Qassem Suleimani, involved in supporting Iran-backed
PMUs in Iraq and Syria

AsayishIntelligence services of the Kurdistan Regional Government; also has
divisions along party lines between PUK and KDP

Baath party

Political party of Saddam Hussein

Badr Organisation

Political organisation with associated Badr Popular Mobilisation Unit(also called Badr Brigades, Badr Corps, or Munathamat Badr). Led by
Hadi al Amiri

COI

Commission of Integrity

CoR

Council of Representatives

CTS

Counter-Terrorism Service; also called ISOF (Iraqi Special Operations
Forces); elite-trained special forces

Daesh

Arabic abbreviation for ISIL, ad-Dawlah al-Islamiyah fi ‘I-‘Iraq wa-shSham

Diya

Blood money; compensation paid in tribal justice dispute resolution

ERD

Emergency Response Division

Fasliya marriage

Marriages taking place to settle tribal disputes

fatwa

Religious edict issued by Islamic clerics

Fateh Alliance

Conquest Alliance; political bloc formed by Hadi al Ameri associatedwith Iranian-linked PMUs; came second in May 2018 elections

FEDPOL or FP

Federal Police

GBV

Gender-based violenceIA

Iraqi Army

IHCHR

Iraqi High Commission for Human Rights

IDP

Internally Displaced Persons

ISF

Iraqi Security Forces

ISW

Institute for the Study of War

ISIL

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant; also known as Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria (ISIS), the Islamic State (IS), or Daesh

JOC

Joint Operations Command

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT – IRAQ : ACTORS OF PROTECTION

KDP

Kurdish Democratic Party

KH

Kataib Hezbollah

KRG

Kurdistan Regional Government

KRI

Kurdistan Region of Iraq

MoD

Ministry of Defence

MoI

Ministry of Interior

Muhasasa system

An ethno-sectarian quota system to distribute cabinet and political
positionsmukhtar

A local official at the lowest level of local administration

NSS

National Security Service

OIG

Office of the Inspector General; oversight mechanism within ministries
that is supposed to provide independent internal control

Peshmerga

Military forces of the Kurdistan region; divided in loyalty between KDP
and PUK

PM

Prime Minister

PMF or PMU

Popular Mobilisation Forces or Popular Mobilisation Units, also called
Hashd al Shaabi in Arabic

PUK

Patriotic Union of Kurdistan

Sairoon Alliance

Toward Reform; Shia-led political bloc formed by populist Shia cleric
Moqtada al Sadr; came first in May 2018 elections

Takfiri or Takfir

An Arabic word meaning ‘unbeliever’; Extremist Islamist ideology
employed by ISIL to declare individuals as apostates or impure; usedagainst those who do not pledge allegiance

SCIRI

Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq; a post-2003 Shiite political party with amilitant wing from which Badr split

TI

Transparency International

UNAMI

United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq

‘Urf

Tribal customary law; also known as aadat or al-qada al-asha’iri

Victory Alliance

Prime Minister Haider al Abadi’s list for the May 2018 elections; came inthird in the May 2018 elections leading to the end of Abadi’s tenure

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Introduction
The purpose of this report is to provide an overview of the structure, functions, and effectiveness ofthe justice and security sectors of the government of Iraq, in their role as state actors of protection.
The primary focus of the report is on the state’s functioning in guaranteeing the protection of its
citizens in the context of civilian security and justice. The central institutions that fulfil critical functions
such as the Ministries of Interior and Defence, as well as the judiciary are examined in terms of
capacity, mandate, effectiveness and integrity. Further institutions, such as the Iraqi High Commissionfor Human Rights are also examined. Given the distinct governance of Kurdistan, institutions in that
region were also included as part of this report. Given the large-scale broad proliferation of statealigned militias, non-aligned groups and other security actors in Iraq post-ISIL, this report is limited toan overview of the main actors of the state.

Methodology and sources
The terms of reference of this report were defined by EASO based on discussions held and input
received from policy experts in EU+ countries within the framework of a Country Guidance Network
exercise on Iraq. This report was drafted for the purpose of developing a chapter on actors ofprotection.
Terms of Reference for this report can be found in the annex of this report.
Research was carried out for this report in accordance with the EASO COI Research Methodology. The
information gathered is a result of research using public, specialised paper-based and electronicsources. EASO contacted expert sources which are listed in the bibliography to supplement
information found in public sources. Research was conducted between July 2018 and October 2018with some additional information added prior to finalisation on 17 November 2018.
In line with the EASO COI Report Methodology, a peer review was performed by COI researchers fromthe departments listed as reviewers in the Acknowledgements section; an external review was also
carried out.
All comments made by the reviewers were taken into consideration and most of them were
implemented in the final draft of this report.

Structure and use of the report
The report aims to provide relevant information for the assessment of international protection statusdetermination, including refugee status and subsidiary protection, as well as for use in thedevelopment of EASO’s country guidance exercise on Iraq.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT – IRAQ : ACTORS OF PROTECTION

Map

Map: UN, Iraq - Map No 3835 Rev. 6, July 2014, (url).

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1. Basic data
Iraq is a federal republic ( 2) with a population of 38 375 000 people as of 2017, according to the UN( 3). The population density is 88.1 ( 4).
The country is administratively divided into 18 governorates, with the Kurdish Region of Iraq (Dohuk,
Sulaymaniyah, Erbil) governed as an autonomous region by the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG)( 5).
The capital, Baghdad, has roughly 6.6 million people ( 6), with other major cities being Mosul(1.5 million), Basra (1.2 million), Kirkuk (981 000), Erbil (821 000), and Najaf (820 000) ( 7). The
population is mainly concentrated in the north, centre, and eastern parts of the country with large
urban areas being located along the Tigris and Euphrates. The western and southern areas are lesspopulated or uninhabited ( 8). The urbanised population is estimated to be about 69.5 ( 9) to 70.5 %( 10).
The country is estimated to be 75-80 % Arab, 15-20 % Kurdish, and 5 % made up of groups including
Turkmen, Yazidi, Shabak, Kaka’i, Bedouin, Romani, Assyrian, Circassian, Sabaean-Mandaen, andPersian. Islam is the country’s official religion, with 95-98 % of the population being Muslim (roughly
64-69 % Shia and 29-34 % Sunni). Christians make up between 1 % and 5 % ( 11).
Shia communities are mainly concentrated in the south and east of Iraq, while Sunnis are mostly
located in the west, north, and central parts of the country ( 12). Under the Constitution, Arabic andKurdish are the two official languages of Iraq, and Turkmen, Syriac, and Armenian languages areguaranteed to be provided in government and private educational institutions ( 13).
The economy has been undermined by decades of conflict and remains heavily oil-dependent ( 14).

(2) US, CIA World Factbook – Iraq, n.d. (url).
(3) UNSD, UNdata, Country Profile – Iraq, n.d. (url).
(4) UNSD, UNdata, Country Profile – Iraq, n.d. (url).
(5) US, CIA World Factbook – Iraq, n.d. (url).
(6) US, CIA World Factbook – Iraq, n.d. (url); UNSD, UNdata, Country Profile – Iraq, n.d. (url).
(7) US, CIA World Factbook – Iraq, n.d. (url).
(8) US, CIA World Factbook – Iraq, n.d. (url).
(9) UNSD, UNdata, Country Profile – Iraq, n.d. (url).
(10) US, CIA World Factbook – Iraq, n.d. (url).
(11) US, CIA World Factbook – Iraq, n.d. (url).
(12) Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report – Iraq [updated 9 October 2018], 9 October 2018 (url), p. 7.
(13) Iraq, Constitution of the Republic of Iraq (15 October 2005), (url).
(14) US, CIA World Factbook – Iraq, n.d. (url).

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT – IRAQ : ACTORS OF PROTECTION— 13

2. Context
Iraq is a deeply complex and diverse society with a range of intersecting identities across ethnic, tribal,
religious configurations ( 15). The past 15 years of Iraq’s recent history since the fall of Saddam Hussein
have been characterised by a series of conflicts unfolding with political and sectarian dimensions, andinvolving domestic and foreign entities, the impacts of which still resound ( 16).
Sectarianism rapidly increased in violent waves after the 2003 US invasion, mainly between Sunni andShia; this was stoked by historical favouritism of Sunni under Saddam Hussein, then PM Maliki’s Shia
preference ( 17), as well as the new post-2003 US-implemented governance system put in place thatfavoured Shia ( 18); creating significant mistrust and societal division ( 19). Thousands of Iraqis have been
killed in suicide attacks since 2003 ( 20). Sectarian appointments and policies under Shia PM Nuri alMaliki eroded public confidence in the security forces in the years after 2010, causing significant
friction among the ISF and population, particularly for Sunnis ( 21).
In 2014, the Salafi jihadist group Islamic State of Iraq in Syria and Levant (ISIL) conquered one third of
Iraq’s territory and forced the sudden collapse of Iraq’s state security forces ( 22). Between June 2014and December 2017, in the territories it attacked and controlled, ISIL applied a ‘sustained anddeliberate policy of executing civilians’ as a means of exerting control and instilling fear. The group
committed mass killings, targeted civilians, imposed strict codes of social behaviour, killing those notin conformity with their Islamic Takfiri doctrines ( 23). The UN found that ISIL’s targeted violence against
civilians and minorities in particular may constitute war crimes, crimes against humanity and possibly
genocide ( 24). The conflict and military interventions sparked an internal displacement crisis in Iraq,
and opened deep further distrust in the population ( 25).
Following Iraqi military forces’ collapse and failure to protect the population, Iraq slowly began torebuild its security forces with Western support ( 26). A 73-nation Global Coalition to Defeat ISIL, led by
the US, supported the Iraqi efforts against ISIL ( 27). After three years of military campaigns, in
December 2017, PM al-Abadi declared that ISIL was declared defeated ( 28) and Iraqi territory wasliberated from them, though the situation remains unstable and they continue to carry out targeted(15) UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her
mission to Iraq, 14 to 23 November 2017 (A/HRC/38/44/Add.1), 5 June 2018 (url), pp. 3-4.
(16) UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her
mission to Iraq, 14 to 23 November 2017 (A/HRC/38/44/Add.1), 5 June 2018 (url), pp. 3-4.
(17) US, USCIRF, Annual Report 2018 – Iraq, April 2018 (url).
(18) Chatelard, G., Comment made during the review of this report, 30 October 2018.
(19) US, USCIRF, Annual Report 2018 – Iraq, April 2018 (url).
(20) UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner on the human rights situationin Iraq in light of abuses committed by the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and associated groups(A/HRC/28/18), 13 March 2015 (url), p. 5.
(21) Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018 (url), p. 31.
(22) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), p. 1.
(23) UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her
mission to Iraq, 14 to 23 November 2017 (A/HRC/38/44/Add.1), 5 June 2018 (url), pp. 4-5.
(24) UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner on the human rights situationin Iraq in light of abuses committed by the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and associated groups(A/HRC/28/18), 13 March 2015 (url), p. 5.
(25) MRG (Minority Rights Group International), Iraq, May 2018 (url).
(26) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), p. 16.
(27) US, USCIRF, Annual Report 2018 – Iraq, April 2018 (url).
(28) UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her
mission to Iraq, 14 to 23 November 2017 (A/HRC/38/44/Add.1), 5 June 2018 (url), pp. 3-4; US, USCIRF, Annual Report 2018
– Iraq, April 2018 (url).

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attacks against civilians ( 29) and asymmetric attacks across Iraq ( 30). A longer-term insurgency situation
is developing ( 31), particularly intensely in Salah al-Din, and Diyala ( 32). There are an estimated
15-17 000 ISIL fighters still active in Iraq as of August 2018 ( 33). ISIL also continues to focus targeted
attacks on members of the Iraqi police, security forces and PMUs ( 34), in Ninewa and Kirkuk inparticular ( 35). Civilians continue to be subjected to conflict-related violence, with 8 079 casualties in
2017, totalling 85 123 since June 2014 to the end of 2017 ( 36).
The presence and influence of foreign armed forces active in Iraqi territory continue to complicate thesecurity landscape, with Turkish, Iranian, and US-backed international forces present ( 37). Stabilisation
efforts for the local population post-ISIL have been slow due to the immense infrastructure damageand explosive hazards left behind following years of conflict with ISIL. Although ISIL’s territorial control
and capabilities have been reduced, it continues to operate ( 38).
The fight against ISIL allowed a range of paramilitary groups (Hashd al Shaabi, or Popular Mobilisation
Units) to operate ‘autonomously from state security forces’ ( 39) while the Kurdish forces also gained(in the wake of ISIL in 2014) and lost territory in the disputed areas (October 2017) ( 40). Having now
been praised for their role in the defeat of ISIL, these groups have a partially legalised role in ensuring
security in Iraq and are moving into political and economic aspects of the country’s governancestructures ( 41). In the fight against ISIL, a range of security actors have developed and proliferated ( 42).
For example, forces operating in Ninewa province as of 2018 include at least 10 formal security
services and numerous government-aligned, non-aligned, and foreign forces with a plethora ofloyalties ( 43). Although ISIL carried out the majority of abuses, the government’s forces have been
involved in abuse and torture during arrest, pre-trial detention, and after conviction in a wide rangeof abuses including extra-judicial killings ( 44). Following the territorial liberation of ISIL areas, Iraq isfacing a ‘complex and fragile’ transition phase with new dynamics emerging across sensitive politicaland conflict fault lines ( 45).

(29) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 1; UNAMI, Report on Human
Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018 (url), p. 1.
(30) UN Secretary-General, Implementation of resolution 2367 (2017) – Report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/359), 17
April 2018 (url), para. 18.
(31) Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018 (url), p. 2; ISW, ISIS’s Second Resurgence, 2 October 2018(url).
(32) Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018 (url), p. 2.
(33) US, Lead Inspector General for Overseas and Contingency Operations, Operation Inherent Resolve and Operation
Pacific Eagle-Philippines – April 1 2018-June 30 2018, August 2018 (url).
(34) UN Secretary-General, Implementation of resolution 2367 (2017) – Report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/359), 17
April 2018 (url), para. 44; US, Lead Inspector General for Overseas and Contingency Operations, Operation Inherent
Resolve and Operation Pacific Eagle-Philippines – April 1 2018-June 30 2018, August 2018 (url), p. 20.
(35) UN Secretary-General, Implementation of resolution 2367 (2017) – Report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/359), 17
April 2018 (url), para. 44.
(36) UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018 (url), p. vi.
(37) Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018 (url), pp. 23-24.
(38) US, Leading Inspector General Special Report: Observations from Travel to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Qatar, March 2018(url), pp. 3-4.
(39) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), p. 1; Mansour, R., More than Militias: Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces are Here to Stay, 3 April 2018 (url).
(40) US, CRS, Iraq: Issues in the 115th Congress, 4 October 2018 (url), pp. 1, 10-11.
(41) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), p. 1; Mansour, R., More than Militias: Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces are Here to Stay, 3 April 2018 (url).
(42) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), p. 1; Mansour, R., More than Militias: Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces are Here to Stay, 3 April 2018 (url).
(43) Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018 (url), pp. 13-14.
(44) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 6.
(45) UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her
mission to Iraq, 14 to 23 November 2017 (A/HRC/38/44/Add.1), 5 June 2018 (url), pp. 3-(4).

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT – IRAQ : ACTORS OF PROTECTION— 15

3. State structure and governance
The Republic of Iraq is a constitutional, federal, parliamentary republic ( 46). The Constitution of Iraq
was established in 2005, two years after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the Baath Party ( 47).
According to Article 1 of the Constitution, ‘the Republic of Iraq is a single federal, independent andfully sovereign state in which the system of government is republican, representative, parliamentary,and democratic, and this Constitution is a guarantor of the unity of Iraq’ ( 48).
Iraq is a multi-party state with a prime minister as the head of government and a president, which
both have executive power ( 49). The three branches of the Iraqi federal government are designed tocreate a system of ‘checks and balances’ through the executive, legislative, and judicial branches ( 50).
However, in practice, the boundaries between the branches are ‘blurred’ ( 51).

3.1 Executive branch
The executive branch is composed of:• the Presidency Council (president and maximum of three vice-presidents);• the Council of Ministers (the PM, three deputy PMs, and 30 ministers) ( 52).
The president appoints the prime minister ( 53). In practice, the prime minister’s position is more
influential while the president is a more representative or ceremonial post ( 54). The prime minister
appoints the council of ministers who must be approved by Parliament. The council of ministers ismade up of the ministers for each department within the Council. Parliamentary committees oversee
ministers and the ministries within the council of ministries ( 55).
Since 2003, unofficial agreements between sectarian and ethnic groups have meant that Iraq’s
presidency is traditionally held by a Kurd; the parliamentary speaker is a Sunni, and the prime minister
is a Shia/Shiite ( 56); these two latter positions are held by Sunni and Shia Arabs ( 57). Political positionsin the cabinet are distributed through ‘ethnosectarian quotas’ called the Muhasasa system ( 58) which
rely on ‘back room deals’ between different identity groups over allocation of ministries on the basisof ethno-sectarian lines ( 59).

(46) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 1; Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI
2018 Country Report — Iraq, 2018 (url), p. 13.
(47) Ali, A., Mapping the Major Political Organizations and Actors in Iraq since 2003, 2 May 2018 (url), p. 4.
(48) Iraq, Constitution of the Republic of Iraq (15 October 2005), (url).
(49) EPIC, ISHM Reference Guide (Updated April 2018), n.d. (url).
(50) Ali, A., Mapping the Major Political Organizations and Actors in Iraq since 2003, 2 May 2018 (url), pp. 2-3.
(51) Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2018 Country Report — Iraq, 2018 (url), p. 13.
(52) EPIC, ISHM Reference Guide (Updated April 2018), n.d. (url).
(53) EPIC, ISHM Reference Guide (Updated April 2018), n.d. (url).
(54) AP, Iraq Has a New, Moderate President and Shiite Prime Minister, 3 October 2018 (url); Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI
2018 Country Report — Iraq, 2018 (url), p. 13.
(55) EPIC, ISHM Reference Guide (Updated April 2018), n.d. (url).
(56) AP, Iraq Has a New, Moderate President and Shiite Prime Minister, 3 October 2018 (url); New York Times (The), Iraq’s
New Leaders Seen as Technocrats, in a Break From Sectarian Politics, 2 October 2018 (url).
(57) Chatelard, G., Comment made during the review of this report, 30 October 2018.
(58) Atlantic Council, What ‘Inclusivity’ Means in Iraq, 28 March 2016 (url); Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2018 Country Report— Iraq, 2018 (url), pp. 12-13.
(59) Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2018 Country Report — Iraq, 2018 (url), pp. 12-13.

16 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT - IRAQ: ACTORS OF PROTECTION

3.2 Legislative branch
Legislative power is through the elected parliamentary Council of Representatives (CoR) and theFederation Council ( 60). As a unicameral system, it is composed of Members of Parliament elected tofour year terms ( 61). The Council of Representatives is Iraq’s 329-seat Parliament, requires a 165-seatmajority in elections to govern by majority ( 62). The CoR has allocated representation for minority
groups (5 seats for Christians and one each for Yazidi, Sabean Mandaen, Shabaks, Feyli Kurds) andallocates 25 % of seats to women ( 63). The CoR is responsible for passing federal laws, overseeing theexecutive, and nominating and approving officials for certain posts. The CoR is also responsible forelecting the President of the Republic, who in turn, appoints the Prime Minister from among the‘majority coalition of Parliament’ ( 64).
Apart from the CoR, the Iraqi administration has to establish, further to the new constitutional
demands, an upper house called the Federal (or Federation) Council, but it has not organised elections
for it yet ( 65).

3.3 Judicial branch
Under the Constitution of Iraq, the judiciary is ‘independent and no power is above the judiciary
except the law’ ( 66). The judiciary is made up of the Higher Judicial Council, Federal Supreme Court(nine judges), Court of Cassation, Public Prosecution Department, Judicial Oversight Committee andfederal courts ( 67).
The Federal Court is responsible for federalism and constitutionality issues and the Higher Judicial
Council is mandated to manage and oversee the federal Iraqi court system and ‘disciplinary matters’( 68). This includes authority over federal court staff, judges of the Court of Cassation, appellate judges,
trial judges, investigative judges and prosecutors of federal courts ( 69).
In 2013, Parliament passed legislation to prevent the chief of the Federal Supreme Court from also
being head of the Higher Judicial Council, which oversees the legal system ( 70). However, USDOS statedin 2017 that one person heads both the Federal Supreme Court and the Higher Judicial Council, leading
to accusations of lack of independence and politicisation of the judiciary ( 71).

3.4 Federal system and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq
Article 116 states that Iraq is a federal republic, consisting of ‘a decentralized capital, regions, andgovernorates, as well as local adminstrations’ ( 72). The Iraqi Constitution allows for the creation of(60) EPIC, ISHM Reference Guide (Updated April 2018), n.d. (url).
(61) EPIC, ISHM Reference Guide (Updated April 2018), n.d. (url).
(62) ISW, Breaking Down Iraq’s Election Results, 24 May 2018 (url).
(63) Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2018 – Iraq, (url); UN Secretary-General, Implementation of resolution 2367
(2017) – Report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/677), 9 July 2018 (url), para. 6.
(64) EPIC, ISHM Reference Guide (Updated April 2018), n.d. (url).
(65) US, CIA World Factbook – Iraq, n.d. (url).
(66) Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2018 Country Report — Iraq, 2018 (url), p. 12; Iraq, Constitution of the Republic of Iraq (15October 2005), Unofficial English version available at: (url), Article 19 (1).
(67) EPIC, ISHM Reference Guide (Updated April 2018), n.d. (url).
(68) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 15.
(69) GJPI, Judicial Independence, n.d. (url).
(70) Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2018 Country Report — Iraq, 2018 (url), p.8.
(71) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 15.
(72) Iraq, Constitution of the Republic of Iraq (15 October 2005), 2005, (url).

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT – IRAQ : ACTORS OF PROTECTION— 17

new regions by referendum; however, KRI is the only constitutionally recognised autonomous region
under Article 117 ( 73). Under Article 121, the Constitution permits regional powers to have their own
executive, legislative and judicial powers, aside from those exclusive to the federal government. They
are allocated an equitable share of national revenues, and are permitted to establish and organise
their own internal security forces, such as police ( 74).

3.4.1 Provincial councils
Iraq has 18 governorates, each of which is governed by an elected Provincial Council and headed by agovernor. The governor is determined by the party with the majority of seats in provincial level
elections ( 75). Provinces or governorates and districts are administrative units of the central
government which regulates their affairs under federal law ( 76). Provincial councils have the right toissue legislation in accordance with decentralisation principles that do not violate the Constitution andfederal law. The Governor directs and manages provincial affairs, including legal and security affairs,with ‘direct authority over local security agencies and investigative services’. He has the authority torequest additional resources from MoI if the province is unable to maintain security and order ( 77).
Provincial councils still remain under the authority of the CoR, and have complained of limited
freedom in recent years, keeping provincial powers dependent on central budgets. Corruption of local
officials is also reportedly the cause of accusations of ineffectiveness at that level ( 78).

3.4.2 Kurdistan Region of Iraq
The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) is governed by the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government(KRG) under the Iraqi Constitution, and responsible for the governorates of Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, andDohuk. The KRI is dominated by the split between two main rival political parties and their associatedfounding families, the Barzanis (KDP) and the Talabanis (PUK). Each party respectively governs Dohuk
and Erbil (KDP), and Sulaymaniyah (PUK) ( 79). The KDP-PUK division of the region based on clientalistic
networks is associated with high levels of corruption, personalism and nepotism ( 80) as both sides put
their extended families in senior government posts ( 81).
KRG’s regional legislative assembly is made up of 111 seats, ten of which are reserved for minorities(5 for Christian, 5 for Turkmen), and 30% of which are for women ( 82). Under the Constitution, the KRG
has considerable powers to legislate a range of areas including health services, education, policing andsecurity, environment and natural resources, housing, trade, industry, social services, transportation
and roads. The Kurdish Parliament may also amend the application of Iraq-wide legislation fallingoutside of exclusive federal powers ( 83). Article 141 states that legislation, decisions, court decisions
and contracts enacted in the region of Kurdistan shall remain in force, and decisions issued by thegovernment of the region of Kurdistan ‘shall be considered valid unless they are amended or annulledpursuant to the laws of the region of Kurdistan by the competent entity in the region, provided that(73) Iraq, Constitution of the Republic of Iraq (15 October 2005), 2005, (url).
(74) Iraq, Constitution of the Republic of Iraq (15 October 2005), 2005, (url).
(75) Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report – Iraq, 26 June 2017 [available on request], p. 7.
(76) Cravens, L., & Brinkerhoff, D. W. Provincial governance in Iraq: Councils, contestation, and capacity building, 2013 (url),
p. 4.
(77) Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018 (url), p. 25.
(78) Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018 (url), p. 26.
(79) Denmark, DIS, Northern Iraq – Security Situation and the Situation for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the
Disputed Areas, Including the Possibility to Enter and Access the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), November 2018 (url), p. 12.
(80) Al Jazeera, Is Iraqi Kurdistan on the verge of another civil war? 30 September 2018 (url); Carnegie MEC, Kurdistan’s
Politicized Society Confronts a Sultanistic System, 18 August 2015 (url).
(81) Al Jazeera, Is Iraqi Kurdistan on the verge of another civil war? 30 September 2018 (url); Carnegie MEC, Kurdistan’s
Politicized Society Confronts a Sultanistic System, 18 August 2015 (url).
(82) Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report – Iraq [updated 9 October 2018], 9 October 2018 (url), p. 9.
(83) Iraq, Kurdistan Region, The Kurdistan Parliament, n.d. (url).

18 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT - IRAQ: ACTORS OF PROTECTION

they do not contradict with the Constitution’ ( 84). A number of parliamentary committees also support
the government in areas such as health, housing, human rights, civil affairs, women’s rights,
education, integrity and labour rights ( 85).
The KRG held legislative elections on 30 September 2018 ( 86). The regional election commission
reported that Kurdistan’s two main parties, the KDP and the PUK dominated the election results ( 87).
The KDP won 45 of 111 seats, and the PUK won 21 seats, while the Gorran Movement came third with
12 seats. However, opposition parties of Gorran, Kurdistan Islamic Union, and Kurdistan Islamic Groupaccused both the KDP and PUK of electoral fraud and ballot stuffing ( 88). The PUK and KDP also accusedeach another of election fraud, with the PUK claiming it would not accept the results ( 89).

3.4.3 Disputed territories
The disputed territories of Iraq are located in parts of Erbil, within KRI, and across parts of Kirkuk,
Diyala, Salah al-Din, and Ninewa governorates. These areas have been the subject of contested control
between KRG and Iraqi central government when Kurds took control of these areas lying outside the
KRI border, after the fall of Saddam Hussein. The question of their control was addressed in the 2005
Constitution under Article 40, but this has never been resolved ( 90).
In 2014, in the context with the war with ISIL, KRG forces of the Peshmerga moved into some areas ofthe disputed areas and took over control there, including Kirkuk ( 91), oil-rich areas adjacent to it, andparts of Ninewa populated by ethnic and religious minorities ( 92). In September 2017, the KRG held anon-binding referendum on KRI independence which was well-supported by the population, but was
opposed by the federal government. The government issued demands that the KRG nullify the results,
and in support of this, Iraqi government forces retook parts of the disputed territories taken by the
Kurds, sparking the displacement of thousands of Kurds ( 93). According to the Danish Immigration
Service, following the takeover of the governorate of Kirkuk, 148 000 to 200 000 mostly ethnic Kurds
from Kirkuk and Tuz Khurmatu fled and sources were unclear on how many have returned; there werereports of Kurds in Arab areas of Kirkuk city and Tuz forced to leave or having shops and houses burned( 94).

3.5 Elections, political parties, lists and coalitions
The Council of Representatives is elected from an open-list proportional representation system ( 95).
Political parties and coalitions in Iraq are largely organised along ethno-religious lines ( 96), but driversof political behaviour are complex, and sectarian lines may be crossed to obtain political gains orfurther interests ( 97). Sources report that some political parties have sought to transcend sectarian(84) Iraq, Constitution of the Republic of Iraq (15 October 2005), 2005, (url).
(85) Iraq, Kurdistan Region, The Kurdistan Parliament, n.d. (url).
(86) US, CRS, Iraq: Issues in the 115th Congress, 4 October 2018 (url), p. 11.
(87) Al Monitor, Iraqi Kurds vote to elect new Parliament, 1 October 2018 (url).
(88) Al Jazeera, Opposition parties reject vote results in Iraq’s Kurdish region, 21 October 2018 (url).
(89) VOA, Both Major Parties Cry Fraud in Iraqi Kurdish Election, 30 September 2018 (url).
(90) US, CRS, Iraq: Issues in the 115th Congress, 4 October 2018 (url), p. 11.
(91) Chatelard, G., Comment made during the review of this report, 30 October 2018.
(92) US, CRS, Iraq: Issues in the 115th Congress, 4 October 2018 (url), p. 11.
(93) MRG (Minority Rights Group International), Iraq, May 2018 (url); ISW, Iraq and Iran compel Kurdish withdrawal from
Kirkuk, 19 October 2017 (url).
(94) Denmark, DIS, Northern Iraq – Security Situation and the Situation for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the
Disputed Areas, Including the Possibility to Enter and Access the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), November 2018 (url), p. 14.
(95) IFES, Elections in Iraq – 2018 Council of Representatives Election, 7 May 2018 (url ), p. 1.
(96) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 1, 34(97) Ali, A., Mapping the Major Political Organizations and Actors in Iraq since 2003, 2 May 2018 (url), p. 23.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT – IRAQ : ACTORS OF PROTECTION— 19

divisions ( 98), though the cross-sectarian political landscape remains underdeveloped ( 99). About 80
political parties have emerged with broadly stable leadership and resources to participate in Iraqi
elections since 2003 ( 100). Since 2003, mainly Shia-led governments have been in control, having tomanage high levels of insecurity and sectarian violence ( 101).
Under the Constitution, Iraqi armed forces and their personnel are barred from participating inelections ( 102). Security forces and political activities are blurred in Iraq, with Shiites having PMU
militias, Sunnis having tribal militias, Kurds having the Peshmerga/Asayish, and minorities setting up
their own protection forces ( 103). Numerous major political parties and coalitions have associatedmilitias or armed wings, including the main political entities elected in national elections in May 2018
( 104). Fatah Alliance was created by members of the PMUs as the political arm of the Badr Organisation,
running in the 2018 elections; Moqtada al-Sadr, whose militia, the Peace Brigades, is part of the PMU,
created the Sairoon list to run ( 105). Paramilitaries have participated in elections as political entities in
the past, with Badr and AAH also electing officials to office in 2014 ( 106). Many of these groups havebeen accused of being involved in sectarian abuses historically and since the ISIL crisis ( 107).

3.6 National elections in May 2018
Parliamentary elections in 2014 allowed for a peaceful transition of power from former Prime Minister
Nuri al Maliki to Prime Minister Haider al Abadi ( 108). National parliamentary elections were held for
the Council of Representatives 12 May 2018 ( 109). The elections were reportedly competitive andlargely peaceful ( 110). However, voter turnout was reportedly low ( 111) and after the results werereleased there were allegations of electoral fraud and contestation by a number of groups ( 112);
election-related violence, and protests calling for a recount of the votes occurred in the months
following the election ( 113).
In the May 2018 national elections, none of the winning electoral lists won a majority (165 seats)
enough to form government, creating the need to form a coalition government: the Shia political bloc
(98) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 1, 34; Ali, A., Mapping the
Major Political Organizations and Actors in Iraq since 2003, 2 May 2018 (url), p. 2.
(99) Ali, A., Mapping the Major Political Organizations and Actors in Iraq since 2003, 2 May 2018 (url), p. 23.
(100) Ali, A., Mapping the Major Political Organizations and Actors in Iraq since 2003, 2 May 2018 (url), pp. 2-3.
(101) BBC News, Iraq country profile, 3 October 2018 (url).
(102) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), p. 7.
(103) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), p. 23(104) Ali, A., Mapping the Major Political Organizations and Actors in Iraq since 2003, 2 May 2018 (url); International Crisis
Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018 (url), p. 5.
(105) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), p. 7.
(106) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), p. 7.
(107) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 6.
(108) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), pp. 1, 34(109) International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch Database – Iraq, June 2018 (url); Hasan, H., Beyond Security: Stabilization,
Governance, and Socioeconomic Challenges in Iraq, July 2018 (url), p.1.
(110) Hasan, H., The Truth About Iraq’s Democracy, 29 May 2018 (url).
(111) ISW, Breaking Down Iraq’s Election Results, 24 May 2018 (url); Hasan, H., Beyond Security: Stabilization, Governance,
and Socioeconomic Challenges in Iraq, July 2018 (url), p.1.
(112) ISW, Breaking Down Iraq’s Election Results, 24 May 2018 (url); International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch Database – Iraq,
June 2018 (url); UN Secretary-General, Implementation of resolution 2367 (2017) – Report of the Secretary-General(S/2018/677), 9 July 2018 (url), pp. 2-3.
(113) International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch Database – Iraq, June 2018 (url).

20 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT - IRAQ: ACTORS OF PROTECTION

formed by Moqtada al Sadr, Sairoon Alliance (Toward Reform) which is made up of Sadrists and the
Iraqi Communist Party, came first in the elections, with 54 seats ( 114). Fatah Alliance (or Conquest
Alliance), the electoral list led by the Iranian-backed Badr Organisation (led by Hadi al Ameri) came
second, winning 47 seats ( 115). Prime Minister Abadi’s list, the Victory Alliance, placed third, with 42seats ( 116).
In terms of ethno-religious and party list representation, the configuration of seats by electoral
alliance indicates that the majority of seats in the CoR are held by Shia, followed by Kurds:

Table 1: Iraq’s Council of Representatives in May 2018 ( 117).

(114) Musings on Iraq, Sadr-Communist Alliance and Iraq’s 2018 Elections Interview with Benedict Robin, 22 May 2018 (url);
ISW, Breaking Down Iraq’s Election Results, 24 May 2018 (url).
(115) ISW, Breaking Down Iraq’s Election Results, 24 May 2018 (url).
(116) ISW, Breaking Down Iraq’s Election Results, 24 May 2018 (url).
(117) ISW, Breaking Down Iraq’s Election Results, 24 May 2018 (url).

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT – IRAQ : ACTORS OF PROTECTION— 21

Minority components’ reserved seats were allocated as per constitutional requirements. Women
candidates gained 84 seats in the 2018 parliament, meeting the constitutional requirement at 25.5 %( 118). Over 2 000 female candidates ran in the 2018 election, though some withdrew due to threats
and intimidation ( 119).
Iraq analyst Harith Hasan ( 120), in a report on stabilisation post-ISIL, gave the view that the al Sadr
alliance’s 2018 election victory was based on a populist discourse pushing for the need to tackle
corruption and address poverty ( 121). Similarly, in a July 2018 research paper on the elections by Renad
Mansour and Christine Van den Toorn, the authors found that lower voter turnout was a sign ofrejection of the political class that has governed Iraq since 2003, as voters perceived the problems ofcorruption and lack of services had not been addressed, allowing perceived ‘outsiders’ such as
Moqtada al Sadr (Sairoon Alliance) and Hadi Al Ameri (Fateh Alliance) to make large electoral gains.
The authors also note that most voters continued to vote along sectarian lines; however, the politicalcoalitions formed in the May 2018 elections were ‘more cross-sectarian’ than in the past ( 122). In KRI
also, low voter turnout was noted likely due to disillusionment with political elites, loss of territory indisputed areas, corruption and mismanagement of the KRI economy, similarly reflecting an electorate
in transition, discontented with old parties but not willing to fully support new ones ( 123).

3.7 New 2018 Iraqi government
Without a clear winner with enough seats to form a government right after the May 2018 elections,parties/list winners were required to negotiate the formation of a coalition government; for thisreason, Sadr entered negotiations to partner with Hadi Al Ameri’s Fatah Alliance, and with PM Abadi’s
political bloc to create the foundation for a new coalition government with either one or the other( 124). However, this move created discontent among Sadr supporters, who perceived it as acompromise to the established political elite; subsequently Sadr’s offices were attacked in Babil during
July 2018 protests in the south ( 125). Subsequently, two Shiite-led political blocs have emerged as of
October 2018, each claiming to have the most seats and the right to govern: Haider al Abadi’s bloc,
which includes supporters of Muqtada al Sadr (largest winning list in Parliament), and the bloc alignedwith the Fatah (second largest winning list), the Iranian-backed PMUs and former PM Nuri al-Maliki( 126).

(118) UN Secretary-General, Implementation of resolution 2367 (2017) – Report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/677), 9
July 2018 (url), para. 6.
(119) UN Secretary-General, Implementation of resolution 2367 (2017) – Report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/677), 9
July 2018 (url), para. 47.
(120) Hasan Harith is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Middle East Center; was a Senior Research Fellow at theCentral European University and Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the Atlantic Council, leading the US-based think tank’s Iraq
initiative. Carnegie-MEC, Harith Hasan, n.d. (url).
(121) Hasan, H., Beyond Security: Stabilization, Governance, and Socioeconomic Challenges in Iraq, Atlantic Council, July
2018 (url), p. 4.
(122) Mansour, R. and van den Toorn, C., The 2018 Iraqi Federal Elections, July 2018 (url), p. 6.
(123) Mansour, R. and van den Toorn, C., The 2018 Iraqi Federal Elections, July 2018 (url), p. 17.
(124) International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch Database – Iraq, June 2018 (url); ISW, Breaking Down Iraq’s Election Results, 24
May 2018 (url).
(125) Mansour, R. and van den Toorn, C., The 2018 Iraqi Federal Elections, July 2018 (url), p. 14.
(126) AP, Iraq Has a New, Moderate President and Shiite Prime Minister, 3 October 2018 (url).

22 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT - IRAQ: ACTORS OF PROTECTION

In mid-September 2018, Iraq’s CoR elected the Speaker of the Iraqi Parliament, Muhammad alHalbusi, a Sunni politician backed by the pro-Iranian bloc of Hadi Al Ameri ( 127). He had 90 days fromselection to form government ( 128).
In October 2018, however, Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi (Shiite) was selected as Prime Ministerof Iraq, to replace PM al-Abadi who has been in office since 2014 ( 129). BBC states that he wasnominated by the Shia majority in Parliament and previously was a leading figure in the Shia Islamic
Supreme Council of Iraq (SCIRI) after 2003 with a pro-Iranian view ( 130). He is described by the New
York Times as a consensus candidate unaffiliated with any party, and with a ‘reputation for secularism’( 131). Mahdi was previously in ‘various governments’ as a vice-president and minister of oil and finance( 132). Within 30 days of selection, he was supposed to form Iraq’s Cabinet ( 133) and 14 Cabinet posts
were successfully filled but key Ministries of Defence, Justice and Interior have remained unfilled asof October 2018 ( 134).
Parliament selected Barham Salih, a Kurd, as President in a Parliamentary vote in October 2018 andhe then appointed Shia PM Abdul-Mahdi to his post ( 135). Salih, a former Prime Minister of Kurdistan
Region, had his candidacy contested between the main Kurdish parties, the PUK and the KDP, whonormally agree on the Kurdish candidate put forward for Iraqi President ( 136). In the aftermath of theOctober 2017 Kurdish independence referendum, Salih is seen as a ‘conciliatory’ President, having
sworn to protect Iraqi unity ( 137).

3.8 Corruption
Iraq is among the countries with the highest corruption rates in the world, according to Transparency
International (TI), who ranked Iraq as 169th out of 175 countries in its 2017 Corruption Perceptions
Index, having a corruption level of 18 out of 100 (0 is highly corrupt; 100 is very clean) ( 138). According
to Bertelsmann Stiftung, the government under PM al Abadi behaves with more professionalism andresponsibility than the previous government under PM al Maliki ( 139), however, the governanceinstitutions of Iraq are still described as ‘largely dysfunctional’ ( 140) and governance failures are due toproblems of corruption and economic mismanagement, according to Iraq expert, Renad Mansour ( 141).
Ahmed Ali, a political analyst and expert on Iraq, stated that all the branches of government are
criticised by the population and obstructed in their ‘performance and independence’ in practice ( 142).
In the Iraqi political system, there is a division of power-sharing that allocates ministries and public(127) RFE/RL, Iraq Elects Pro-Iran Sunni As Parliament Speaker, 16 September 2018 (url).
(128) RFE/RL, Iraq Elects Pro-Iran Sunni As Parliament Speaker, 16 September 2018 (url).
(129) AP, Iraq Has a New, Moderate President and Shiite Prime Minister, 3 October 2018 (url).
(130) BBC News, Iraq country profile, 3 October 2018 (url).
(131) New York Times (The), Iraq’s New Leaders Seen as Technocrats, in a Break From Sectarian Politics, 2 October 2018(url).
(132) BBC News, Iraq country profile, 3 October 2018 (url).
(133) AP, Iraq Has a New, Moderate President and Shiite Prime Minister, 3 October 2018 (url).
(134) Al Monitor, Iraqi prime minister faces pressure in forming his cabinet, 30 October 2018 (url); AP, Iraq lawmakers
confirm new government but key posts are left empty, 25 October 2018 (url).
(135) AP, Iraq Has a New, Moderate President and Shiite Prime Minister, 3 October 2018 (url).
(136) New York Times (The), Iraq’s New Leaders Seen as Technocrats, in a Break From Sectarian Politics, 2 October 2018(url).
(137) New York Times (The), Iraq’s New Leaders Seen as Technocrats, in a Break From Sectarian Politics, 2 October 2018(url).
(138) TI, Iraq, n.d. (url); TI, Corruption Perceptions Index 2017, 21 February 2018 (url).
(139) Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2018 Country Report — Iraq, 2018 (url), p. 14.
(140) Hasan, H., Beyond Security: Stabilization, Governance, and Socioeconomic Challenges in Iraq, July 2018 (url), pp. 2, 1213.
(141) Mansour, R., Rebuilding the Iraqi State: Stabilisation, Governance, and Reconciliation, February 2018 (url), p.12
(142) Ali, A., Mapping the Major Political Organizations and Actors in Iraq since 2003, 2 May 2018 (url), pp. 2-3.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT – IRAQ : ACTORS OF PROTECTION— 23

institutions among parties which ‘facilitates the evolution of fiefdoms within the state structure’; as aresult, parties, and those with their own militia wing, use this patronage and clientalism as a tool for
power and economic opportunities in different sectors ( 143). Political party patronage in the federal
government and in Kurdistan is reportedly a major issue as nepotism and clientalism are the meansby which appointments are made ( 144). Corruption is described as ‘rampant’ ( 145); existing at all levels
with ‘organised corruption syndicates’ protected or involved with those in power ( 146) and government
decisions strongly influenced by bribery, nepotism, tribal, political influence, family and religious
considerations ( 147).

3.8.1 Efforts to fight corruption
Efforts to fight corruption have been officially undertaken by successive Iraqi governments since 2006
( 148) and also made by Prime Minister Abadi in recent years to respond to the public’s demands andmass protests ( 149). In 2015, the Iraqi parliament unanimously passed a reform package to address
corruption following mass public protests to do so, which led to the creation of an anti-corruption
commission. As part of the package, several high level ministers were fired and senior posts were
eliminated ( 150). Aimed at reducing high level corruption, 11 Cabinet posts were eliminated, including
the ministries of Human Rights, Women’s Affair’s, and Provincial and Parliamentary Affairs ( 151).
However, BTI notes ‘that there has been no holistic anti-corruption approach at all administrative andpolitical levels, nor in the business sector. In the absence of systematic prosecution of office abuse,
officials have no real incentive to give up the prospect of personal gains. Some isolated anti-corruption
actions against influential political actors were either used to convince the public of the government’s
commitment to fight corruption or to target opponents’ ( 152). According to an Iraq analyst, Kirk Sowell,
Abadi’s Shia political rivals also sought to undermine his anti-corruption efforts because theyattempted ‘to establish an alternative political platform that could marginalize militia parties’;
however, he also states that Abadi’s failure to enact effective implementation was because of thecampaign’s focus on symbolic moves, the lack of political support from major Shia and Sunni blocs,
and the failure to prosecute corruption of previous officials, which did not respond to public demands
for change ( 153). The government’s overall capacity to implement and convict officials with criminal
penalties against corruption was limited ( 154). According to BTI, deeply rooted patronage networks
incorporate ‘political clientalism, nepotism, and tribal and family ties’ ( 155).

(143) Hasan, H., Beyond Security: Stabilization, Governance, and Socioeconomic Challenges in Iraq, July 2018 (url), pp. 2, 1213.
(144) Hasan, H., Beyond Security: Stabilization, Governance, and Socioeconomic Challenges in Iraq, Atlantic Council, July
2018 (url), p. 3.
(145) Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2018 Country Report — Iraq, 2018 (url), pp. 12-13, 24.
(146) Guardian (The), Post-war Iraq: Everybody is corrupt from top to bottom. Including me, 19 February 2016 (url).
(147) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), pp. 35-26.
(148) Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2018 Country Report — Iraq, 2018 (url), pp. 12-13.
(149) Hasan, H., Beyond Security: Stabilization, Governance, and Socioeconomic Challenges in Iraq, Atlantic Council, July
2018 (url), pp. 12-13; EU, EEAS, Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy 2017 – Iraq, 28 May 2018 (url), p. 157(150) BBC News, Iraq reforms: Parliament backs PM Haider al-Abadi’s plan, 11 August 2015 (url).
(151) RFE/RL, Iraqi PM Scraps 11 Cabinet Posts in Reform Drive, 16 August 2015 (url).
(152) Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2018 Country Report — Iraq, 2018 (url), pp. 12-13.
(153) Sowell, K. Abadi’s Failed Reforms, 17 November 2015 (url), accessed 23 July 2018.
(154) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), pp. 35-36.
(155) Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2018 Country Report — Iraq, 2018 (url), p. 15.

24 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT - IRAQ: ACTORS OF PROTECTION

3.8.2 2018 protests
Protests against corruption and the lack of basic services in the country have been organised
nationwide in the past several years ( 156) and are common in Iraq as well as the Kurdish region ( 157). In
July 2018, in southern Iraq, large-scale demonstrations were launched against corruption, and the lackof consistent electricity, clean water and public services ( 158). Protesters stormed governmentbuildings in Basra, Najaf, Karbala and a number of other cities in the south. The government security
response resulted in injured protesters ( 159), and arrests 160, and lead to deaths in the midst of theprotests ( 161), rising to at least 10 by September 2018 due to excessive force by authorities ( 162).
Protesters reportedly stormed Najaf airport for a day and also blocked routes to local oil refineries in
Basra ( 163) and border crossings to Kuwait ( 164). In Basra, a group calling itself the Coordination Board
for Peaceful Protests and Demonstrations in Basra announced in July 2018 a list of 14 demands for
improved basic public services, education, health, unemployment, water, electricity, as well as issuesof corruption and oil wealth distribution ( 165). South of the city, residents blocked the road to the Umm
Qasr port near Basra, causing the government to dispatch Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS) troops to
Basra to protect oil fields ( 166) and ‘protect demonstrators from harm’ ( 167). The government ordereda ministerial committee to examine the demands of protesters in response to the demonstrations( 168). In mid-July 2018, the PM then issued 7 governmental resolutions to allocate funding to Basra,address service gaps in water, electricity and health sectors, accelerate investment in housing,education and public services, address unemployment in a ‘fair system’ that avoids nepotism, prevent
water flow problems to the south including by intervention from security leaders, and dissolve the
Najaf Airport Board of Directors ( 169). Protests continued through September and October 2018 ( 170).

4. Legal framework
The Republic of Iraq has a mixed legal system of both civil and Islamic law ( 171). Under the 2005
Constitution, ‘Islam is the official religion of the State and is a foundation source of legislation’, stating(156) Hasan, H., Beyond Security: Stabilization, Governance, and Socioeconomic Challenges in Iraq, Atlantic Council, July
2018 (url), p.3; Mansour, R., Rebuilding the Iraqi State: Stabilisation, Governance, and Reconciliation, February 2018 (url),
p. 20.
(157) Hasan, H., Beyond Security: Stabilization, Governance, and Socioeconomic Challenges in Iraq, Atlantic Council, July
2018 (url), p. 4; Mansour, R. and van den Toorn, C., The 2018 Iraqi Federal Elections, LSE Middle East Centre Report, July
2018 (url), p. 14; Carnegie MEC, Kurdistan’s Politicized Society Confronts a Sultanistic System, 18 August 2015 (url).
(158) EPIC, ISHM: July 13-19 2018, 19 July 2018 (url); Al Monitor, Iraqi protests escalate with no new government in sight, 16
July 2018 (url); Rudaw, Basra protest leaders issue 14 demands, condemn rioting, 16 July 2018 (url); Al Arabiya andReuters, Iraqi protesters withdraw from Najaf airport, air traffic resumes, 13 July 2018 (url).
(159) Reuters, Iraqi protesters storm local government building amid anger over graft, 14 July 2018 (url); HRW, Iraq: Security
Forces Fire on Protesters, 24 July 2018 (url); RFE/RL, Iraqi PM Urged To Resign Over Basra Unrest, 8 September 2018 (url).
(160) HRW, Iraq: Security Forces Fire on Protesters, 24 July 2018 (url).
(161) Al Monitor, Iraqi protests escalate with no new government in sight, 16 July 2018 (url); EPIC, ISHM: July 13-19 2018, 19
July 2018 (url); Reuters, Two protesters killed in clashes with Iraqi police as unrest spreads in south, 15 July 2018 (url).
(162) AI, Iraq: Effective investigations needed into deaths of protesters in Basra, 7 September 2018 (url).
(163) Al Monitor, Oil installations hit by protests in Southern Iraq, 13 July 2018 (url).
(164) Al Arabiya and Reuters, Iraqi protesters withdraw from Najaf airport, air traffic resumes, 13 July 2018 (url).
(165) Rudaw, Basra protest leaders issue 14 demands, condemn rioting, 16 July 2018 (url).
(166) Reuters, Iraqi protesters storm local government building amid anger over graft, 14 July 2018 (url); Reuters, Iraq
protests spread to Najaf in fifth day of unrest over services, corruption, 13 July 2018 (url).
(167) EPIC, ISHM: July 13-19 2018, 19 July 2018 (url).
(168) EPIC, ISHM: July 13-19 2018, 19 July 2018 (url).
(169) EPIC, ISHM: July 13-19 2018, 19 July 2018 (url).
(170) Reuters, Protesters torch political party offices in Basra's fourth night of violence, 6 September 2018 (url); Al Jazeera,
Basra unrest tops new Iraqi government agenda, 10 October 2018 (url).
(171) US, CIA World Factbook – Iraq, n.d. (url).

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT – IRAQ : ACTORS OF PROTECTION— 25

that no law may contradict the established provisions of Islam, the principles of democracy, or therights and freedoms stipulated in the Constitution ( 172).
Iraq is a signatory to numerous international treaties and initiatives to protect the rule of law,
including eight of the nine core international human rights laws: International Covenant on Civil andPolitical Rights (ICCPR), Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),
Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), Convention on Protection of Persons from Enforced
Disappearances (ICPPED) and the UN Convention Against Torture (CAT) ( 173).

4.1 Constitution and fundamental rights overview
The Iraqi Constitution provides guarantees for fundamental rights, rule of law, equal treatment before
the law, equal participation, and judicial independence, as well as prohibition of discrimination onvarious grounds ( 174). It also provides for‘treatment with justice in judicial proceedings (Article 19(6)); participation in publicaffairs (Article 20); right to work (Article 22); and the preservation of the family, theprotection of motherhood, childhood and old age, and the prohibition of child laborand violence in the family (Article 29). The Constitution also guarantees to all Iraqis,“especially women and children,” “social and health security,” “basic requirements
for living a free and decent life,” and income and housing (Article 30), as well as healthcare (Article 31), care for the persons with disabilities (Article 32), and education(Article 34)’ ( 175).
The Constitution also provides for freedom of expression, assembly and peaceful demonstration inaccordance with the law (Article 38); freedom of association (Article 39), freedom of expression,
freedom of personal status according to their religion (Article 41), and freedom of thought, conscienceand belief (Article 42) ( 176).
The Constitution prohibits all forms of violence and abuse in the family, however only KRI has a law
against domestic violence ( 177). In Iraq, the national draft ‘Family Protection Law’ which provides
protections for gender and sexual-based violence, has not been passed and remains unimplemented( 178).
The Constitution of Iraq makes Islam the official religion of the country, but guarantees freedom ofbelieve and practice for all individuals, including such as Christians, Yezidis, and Mandaen Sabeans( 179). According to the Iraqi Hammurabi Human Rights Organisation, the Constitution has createdcontradictory situations in the application of personal status laws that impact non-Muslims ( 180).
Regulations based on Sharia prevent conversion from Islam, and under Personal Status Laws, if a childhas one Muslim parent, the child is considered Muslim ( 181).

(172) Iraq, Constitution of the Republic of Iraq (15 October 2005), (url).
(173) UNAMI/OHCHR, Promotion and Protection of Rights of Victims of Sexual Violence Captured by ISIL/or in Areas
Controlled by ISIL in Iraq, 22 August 2017 (url), p. 4; UN OHCHR, View ratification status by country or by treaty – Iraq, n.d.
(url).
(174) Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report – Iraq [updated 9 October 2018], 9 October 2018 (url), p. 9.
(175) UNAMI/OHCHR, Promotion and Protection of Rights of Victims of Sexual Violence Captured by ISIL/or in Areas
Controlled by ISIL in Iraq, 22 August 2017 (url), p. 5.
(176) Iraq, Constitution of the Republic of Iraq (15 October 2005), (url).
(177) HRW, Iraq: Strengthen Domestic Violence Bill, 19 March 2017 (url).
(178) UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018 (url), p. vii, para. 5.2; HRW, World
Report 2018 – Iraq, 9 January 2018 (url).
(179) Iraq, Constitution of the Republic of Iraq (15 October 2005), Unofficial English version available at: (url), Article 2 (2).
(180) HHRO, Annual Report 2017 – On the situation of Human Rights in Iraq, May 2018 (url), p. 13.
(181) Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report – Iraq [updated 9 October 2018], 9 October 2018 (url), p. 14.

26 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT - IRAQ: ACTORS OF PROTECTION

The KRI has adopted a 2015 law ensuring protection of ethnic and religious groups, however it does
not criminalise hate crimes, or establish a formal body to monitor implementation ( 182). The UN
commented that these ‘laws are often not supported by implementation mechanisms’ or face severe
constraints due to lack of resources for implementation due to economic strain ( 183).

4.2 Criminal law and anti-terrorism laws
Article 19 of the Iraqi Constitution provides guarantees that crime and punishment shall be treatedunder the law, and that ‘punishment shall only be for an act that the laws considers a crime whenperpetrated’ ( 184). Article 19 also provides the right to legal defence in all phases of investigation andtrial, the right to fair and just trial proceedings under the presumption of innocence, as well as theguarantee of a court-appointed defence lawyer for legal aid purposes ( 185). The same Article statesthat ‘unlawful detention shall be prohibited’ as well as ‘imprisonment and detention shall be
prohibited in places not designed for these purposes’ ( 186). Preliminary investigation documentationmust be provided to a competent judge no more than 24 hours after the time of arrest, which can
only be extended once ( 187). The Constitution also prohibits torture, inhumane treatment, and coerced
confessions under Article 37 ( 188).
National Iraqi courts are responsible for applying the Iraqi Penal Code No 111 of 1969 and the Iraqi
Criminal Procedures Code No 23 of 1971 in line with general constitutional guarantees relating to thepunishment of crime ( 189). Iraqi criminal law contains ‘some provisions ensuring due process and fairtrial’ ( 190). The Criminal Procedure Code allows for legal procedural guarantees such as the right tolegal counsel prior to questioning and the prohibition of mistreatment to extract confessions ( 191). In
2014, PM Abadi issued an Executive Order that prohibits the arrest and detention of persons except
on the order of a competent judge or court in line with the Criminal Procedure Code and only by legallycompetent authorities, requiring registration of the individual with the Ministry of Justice within 24
hours while giving relevant information about the detainee and reasons for detention ( 192).
The Anti-Terrorism Law No. 13 of 2005 provides a broad definition of terrorism ( 193). Under the AntiTerrorism Law of 2005, the death penalty is mandatory for those convicted of committing,threatening, inciting, planning, aiding/abetting, or financing terrorism as principles or accomplices( 194). The UN states the law is ‘vague in its application’ and ‘does not include process and fair trial
guarantees’ ( 195). Article 4 of the Anti-Terrorism law, which permits the death penalty, has reportedly
been used by former PM Maliki to target political leaders in the past; human rights groups have been(182) UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: January to June 2017, 14 December 2017 (url), p. 16.
(183) UNAMI/OHCHR, Promotion and Protection of Rights of Victims of Sexual Violence Captured by ISIL/or in Areas
Controlled by ISIL in Iraq, 22 August 2017 (url), pp. 6-7.
(184) Iraq, Constitution of the Republic of Iraq (15 October 2005), (url).
(185) Iraq, Constitution of the Republic of Iraq (15 October 2005), (url).
(186) Iraq, Constitution of the Republic of Iraq (15 October 2005), (url).
(187) Iraq, Constitution of the Republic of Iraq (15 October 2005), (url).
(188) Iraq, Constitution of the Republic of Iraq (15 October 2005), (url).
(189) Iraq, Consideration of reported submitted by States parties under article 40 of the Covenant: Fifth periodic reports ofStates parties due in 2000 (CCPR/C/IRQ/5), 12 December 2013 (url), para. 52.
(190) UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: January to June 2017, 14 December 2017 (url), pp. 3-4.
(191) UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her
mission to Iraq, 14 to 23 November 2017 (A/HRC/38/44/Add.1), 5 June 2018 (url), para. 61.
(192) Iraq, Prime Minister Dr. Haider Al-Abadi Issues Executive Order No. 57, 2 December 2014 (url); USDOS, Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 9;(193) UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: January to June 2017, 14 December 2017 (url), pp. 3-4.
(194) UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Death Penalty in Iraq, October 2014 (url), p. 9.
(195) UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: January to June 2017, 14 December 2017 (url), pp. 3-4.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT – IRAQ : ACTORS OF PROTECTION— 27

critical of the handling of ISIL suspects under this law, which they claim has created large-scale due
process violations ( 196).
In the KRI, the Iraqi Penal Code and Penal Procedure Code apply ( 197). Terrorism is prosecuted in KRI
under the Anti-Terrorism Law (No. 3 of 2006), which expired in July 2016 ( 198), and was later renewed
in July 2018 ( 199). The Kurdistan anti-terrorism law also permits the death penalty ( 200). In December
2017, KRG ratified the General Amnesty Law No. 4 of 2017, which allows for reduction of sentences
for some offences that occurred prior to the enactment, and the conversion of death sentences to 15
years in prison where reconciliation before a committee occurs with the victims and where the victims
are in agreement with the reduction ( 201).
The UN has expressed concern that the anti-terrorism laws in Iraq and KRI are not in conformity withinternational human rights standards ( 202).
Iraq also has an anti-trafficking law which,however, does not apply in the KRI ( 203). The law’s prescribedpenalties were ‘sufficiently stringent’ according to USDOS: up to 15 years imprisonment and fines of
USD 8 580 for trafficking adult male victims and up to life imprisonment and fines of USD 12 86021 440 for trafficking female of child victims ( 204). However, government capacity to provide resourcesin Iraq and KRI to fight trafficking was limited due to lack of resources, conflict, and reconstructionneeds ( 205).

4.3 Arrest and detention procedures
The UK Embassy in Baghdad states that what ‘should occur’ in arrest procedures is that an
investigative judge issues a warrant, and the target of the warrant has to appear before a judge within
24 hours to hear the allegations. The arrested person should be advised that they have the right toremain silent and to an attorney, during a process called the ‘initial hearing or notification of
investigation’ ( 206). Arrested persons may be held up to 72 hours, unless it is an offence punishable bydeath, in which case, authorities can detain a person for the length of the judicial process ( 207). The UK
Embassy also explains that a person can be held on criminal charges for up to 24 hours, and up to 72
hours prior to being formally indicted and presented to court ( 208). The UK Embassy writes thatarrested people ‘should be transferred’ to the Ministry of Justice detention facilities ( 209). However,
UNAMI writes that after arrest, the person is held at facilities administered by the detaining authority(196) Mansour, R., Rebuilding the Iraqi State: Stabilisation, Governance, and Reconciliation, February 2018 (url, p. 24.
(197) UK, British Consulate-General Erbil, Information Pack for British Prisoners in Kurdistan Region of Iraq, July 2018 (url),
pp. 9-10.
(198) UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her
mission to Iraq, 14 to 23 November 2017 (A/HRC/38/44/Add.1), 5 June 2018 (url), para. 21.
(199) Al Monitor, Renewal of anti-terror law threatens human rights in Kurdistan, 19 July 2018 (url);(200) UN Human Rights Council, Technical assistance provided to assist in the promotion and protection of human rights in
Iraq (A/HRC/30/66), 27 July 2015 (url), para. 80.
(201) UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018 (url), p. 4.7.1(202) UN Human Rights Council, Technical assistance provided to assist in the promotion and protection of human rights in
Iraq (A/HRC/30/66), 27 July 2015 (url), paras. 78-80.
(203) USDOS, Trafficking in Persons Report 2018 – Iraq, 28 June 2018 (url), p. 231.
(204) USDOS, Trafficking in Persons Report 2018 – Iraq, 28 June 2018 (url), p. 231.
(205) USDOS, Trafficking in Persons Report 2018 – Iraq, 28 June 2018 (url), p. 233.
(206) UK, Embassy in Baghdad, Information Pack for British Prisoners in Iraq (not including Kurdistan), September 2017 (url),
p. 9.
(207) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 12.
(208) UK, Embassy in Baghdad, Information Pack for British Prisoners in Iraq (not including Kurdistan), September 2017 (url),
p. 9.
(209) UK, Embassy in Baghdad, Information Pack for British Prisoners in Iraq (not including Kurdistan), September 2017 (url),
p. 9.

28 —

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT - IRAQ: ACTORS OF PROTECTION( 210). The UK Baghdad Embassy writes that ‘investigating prosecutors and judges can order thedetention of suspects for six months, renewable almost indefinitely’ ( 211).
Under Iraqi Criminal Procedure Law No. 23 of 1971, which applies in both Iraq and KRI, a person who
is arrested has the right to remain silent prior to questioning, and has the right to an attorney. The UK
Consulate-General in Erbil states that detainees are supposed to be questioned within 24 hours ofarrest and do not have the right to detain and hold arrestees without initiating an investigation ( 212).
KRG states that under the Kurdistan Counter-Terrorism Act No. 3 of 2006 and the Iraqi Penal Code,the arrest procedure is ‘subject to judicial jurisprudence and not arbitrary’:‘There is a clearly defined arrest procedure by which individuals are brought into
custody. This arrest procedure is initiated through intelligence and information
gathered by or relayed to the Asayish regarding an individual who poses a security
threat. The information is subsequently relayed to a judge who chooses whether or
not to issue an arrest warrant for that designated individual or individuals. If the court
decides to issue an arrest warrant, the Asayish security forces are then permitted to
conduct the arrest’ ( 213).
Upon arrival at the police station, a person is asked to give a statement to authorities through a firstround of questioning by a police officer. A second round of questioning will occur; this is done by the
Criminal Investigator, who will also ask questions, possibly the same ones. The notes are taken by thepolice officer and the investigator and given to the Criminal Court judge who reviews the notes. Basedon the judge’s review of the case, he/she will decide whether to remand the suspect in custody or
release them. In many cases, the criminal court judge will not release a person unless they provide amonetary bail guarantee or a ‘sponsor’ in Kurdistan who will assure the court that the suspect will not
flee. The same source notes that a judge ‘has the power and discretion to decide that there is noevidence’ and to drop the case ( 214). Individuals are remanded in custody until investigation iscomplete and ‘[t]here is no fixed time limit; the Judge is free to exercise his discretion’ ( 215).

4.4 Authority to arrest and detain
Numerous security, law enforcement, intelligence agencies and regular armed forces units are
responsible for maintaining order in Iraq ( 216) and have overlapping responsibilities that include
counter-terrorism, frontline fighting, and law enforcement ( 217). Legal responsibility and powers ofarrest and detention are split across different security forces and their respective ministries ofdefence, interior, counter-terrorism, or the Prime Minister’s Office ( 218). Kurdish forces arrest anddetain suspects in KRG-controlled areas; in disputed areas, it is jurisdictionally unclear, a situation
exacerbated by ISIL’s control in some areas during 2017 ( 219).

(210) UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Death Penalty in Iraq, October 2014 (url), p. 12(211) UK, Embassy in Baghdad, Information Pack for British Prisoners in Iraq (not including Kurdistan), September 2017 (url),
p. 9.
(212) UK, British Consulate-General Erbil, Information Pack for British Prisoners in Kurdistan Region of Iraq, July 2018 (url),
pp. 9-10.
(213) Iraq, KRG, Clarification on Human Rights Watch (HRW) Report, 4 March 2018 (url).
(214) UK, British Consulate-General Erbil, Information Pack for British Prisoners in Kurdistan Region of Iraq, July 2018 (url),
pp. 6-7.
(215) UK, British Consulate-General Erbil, Information Pack for British Prisoners in Kurdistan Region of Iraq, July 2018 (url),
pp. 9-10.
(216) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 10; USDOS, Country Reports
on Terrorism 2017 – Iraq, 6 September 2018 (url).
(217) USDOS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2017 – Iraq, 6 September 2018 (url).
(218) UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Death Penalty in Iraq, October 2014 (url), p. 11(219) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 12.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT – IRAQ : ACTORS OF PROTECTION— 29

Human Rights Watch notes that while arrest and detention procedures fall under the Iraqi Penal Codeand Criminal Procedures Code, they allow for police and ‘crime scene officers’ to detain andinterrogate suspects with a warrant ( 220). Specifically, the law ‘defines crime scene officers broadly,
making it impossible to ascertain which forces are included’ ( 221). The Australian Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFAT) states that the security forces had ‘broad discretion’ over powers of arrest
during times of emergency declared by the government ( 222). Due to the conflict with ISIL, units of the
security forces moved beyond their original roles and in practice, ‘almost all units’ contributed to daily
counterterrorism operations ( 223). Multiple agencies such as MoI, MoD, the Ministry of National
Security Affairs and the Iraqi National Intelligence Service also develop terrorism intelligence andcompile target lists ( 224).
After arrest, the person is held at facilities administered by the detaining authority ( 225). The Ministriesof Justice, Defence, Interior, Labour and Social Affairs are all authorised to hold pre-trial detainees in
Iraq ( 226). Intelligence services also operated detention facilities and claimed authority to arrest, detain
and interrogate suspects, though Human Rights Watch stated there was an unclear legal mandate to
do so ( 227). Make shift detention also occurred in ISIL-liberated areas ( 228).
The Iraqi Correctional Service has the legal authority to hold persons after conviction ( 229).

5. Security institutions
5.1 ISF command and structure
The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) refers to the formal military and security forces reporting to the Ministryof Defence (MoD), Ministry of Interior (MoI), through the Council of Ministers ( 230). The Prime Minister
is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces ( 231). PM Abadi abolished the Maliki-era Office of the
Commander-in-Chief and replaced it with the Joint Operations Command (JOC) ( 232). The Joint
Operations Command is the highest headquarters of the ISF leadership with oversight over all
operations commands and sometimes taking direct command of subordinate units ( 233). The JOC is
mandated to coordinate the Ministry of Defence, Counter Terrorism Service (CTS), Prime Minister’sSpecial Forces Division, Presidential Brigades, the Ministry of Interior, and the Popular Mobilisation
Committee (PMC) ( 234).

(220) HRW, Iraq: Intelligence Agency Admits Holding Hundred Despite Previous Denials, 22 July 2018 (url).
(221) HRW, Iraq: Intelligence Agency Admits Holding Hundred Despite Previous Denials, 22 July 2018 (url).
(222) Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report – Iraq [updated 9 October 2018], 9 October 2018 (url), p. 25.
(223) Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018 (url), p. 42.
(224) Witty, D., The Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service, Brookings Institution, 16 March 2015 (url), p. 15.
(225) UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Death Penalty in Iraq, October 2014 (url), p. 12(226) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 13.
(227) HRW, Iraq: Intelligence Agency Admits Holding Hundred Despite Previous Denials, 22 July 2018 (url).
(228) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 43.
(229) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p.7.
(230) ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Population Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017 (url), p. 10(231) ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Population Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017 (url), p. 10(232) See the chain of command diagram on page 60 available in: ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Population Mobilization
Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017 (url), p. 60.
(233) ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Population Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017 (url), p. 12.
(234) See the chain of command diagram on page 60 available in: ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Population Mobilization
Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017 (url), p. 60.

30 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT - IRAQ: ACTORS OF PROTECTION

The Iraqi Constitution sets out that there should be no military militias; however, both the CTS and
the PMUs are outside the authority of the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defence ( 235) andreport to the Prime Minister ( 236). Under the Constitution, KRI has the right to its own forces, financially
supported by the Iraqi government but operationally controlled by KRG ( 237). Human Rights Watch
described them as formally part of the Iraqi security forces, but independent ( 238). Kurdish forces are
discussed in Section 8.
ISF units are mobile, rather than being permanently deployed to any regional operations command.
ISF divisions maintain headquarters all over Iraq and are often ‘forward deployed’ far from their usual
headquarters. Regional operations commands are ‘standing operational-level headquarters’
responsible for supervision of all ISF units in their geographic boundaries ( 239). The ISF has twelve
operational commands across Iraq, each of them having respective geographic areas of responsibility( 240).
Despite merging forces under the ISF to fight against ISIL, inter-institutional rivalry and competition
causes a ‘fraught relationship’ between Iraqi security forces, PMUs, Peshmerga, Sunni PMUs and local
tribal forces ( 241). Forces located in areas recently liberated from ISIL also try to influence local police
and security institutions ( 242). Iraq’s security agencies, institutions and ministries are described as‘competing fiefdoms in a struggle for resources, power, and influence’ ( 243). For example, there havebeen reports of ISF forces commonly turning their weapons on each other during the battle for Mosul,
and allegations that inter-service disputes have led to assassinations and kidnappings by PMUs ( 244).
Iraqi security forces maintain a significant presence in most major urban centres to limit ‘terrorist,
insurgent, and militia activity’ ( 245). However, due to the fight against ISIL in the rest of Iraq, security
voids have been left, for example, southern Iraqi law enforcement and security forces departed Basrah
which has resulted in a dramatic rise in robbery, murder, drug trafficking and kidnapping, as well as
rising PMU militia power in 2017-2018 ( 246).
Governorate-level authorities held little influence over the security forces operating in their territory
with most operational decisions being made in Baghdad ( 247). Furthermore, sources state thatdecisions about recruitment, deployment, and senior command appointments are most often madeby the central government without governorate input ( 248).
The government has made reform efforts such as adopting a National Security Strategy for Iraq,
promulgating laws on the Ministry of Interior and the CTS in 2016, and developing roadmaps forreform and civilian policing in liberated areas, as well as joint work with UNDP on security sector(235) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), p. 22.
(236) Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report – Iraq [updated 9 October 2018], 9 October 2018 (url), p. 26.
(237) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 11.
(238) Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Access, Possibility of Protection, Security and Humanitarian
Situation, April 2016 (url), p. 40.
(239) ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Population Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017 (url), p. 12.
(240) See chart on page 57 available in: ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Population Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle,
December 2017 (url).
(241) Mansour, R., Rebuilding the Iraqi State: Stabilisation, Governance, and Reconciliation, February 2018 (url, p. 7.
(242) Mansour, R., Rebuilding the Iraqi State: Stabilisation, Governance, and Reconciliation, February 2018 (url, p. 7.
(243) Witty, D. The Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service: From the War on ISIS to the Future, 23 January 2018 (url).
(244) Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018 (url), p. 43.
(245) OSAC, Iraq 2018 Crime & Safety Report: Basrah, 20 March 2018 (url); OSAC, Iraq 2018 Crime & Safety Report:
Baghdad, 12 February 2018 (url).
(246) OSAC, Iraq 2018 Crime & Safety Report: Basrah, 20 March 2018 (url).
(247) Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018 (url), pp. 29, 32-33.
(248) Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018 (url), p. 29.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT – IRAQ : ACTORS OF PROTECTION— 31

reform ( 249). As part of its EU Strategy on Iraq, the EU provides support to the Office of the National
Security Advisor and MoI in support of implementing the civilian aspects of National Security Strategy( 250).

5.2 Ministry of Defence and Iraqi Army
5.2.1 Mandate and structure
The Ministry of Defence is responsible for conventional military forces involved in national defence,but also carrying out anti-terrorism and ‘internal security operations’ in conjunction with the Ministryof Interior ( 251). In areas where ISIL has been fought, the Iraqi Army has taken on law enforcementtasks, for example, in Ninewa, where much of the provincial police responsibilities and ‘security void’
post-ISIL was filled by the IA ( 252). Some divisions are also co-deployed with Federal Police as part ofISF Regional Operational Commands. Regional Operations Commands of the ISF are structured withthe following IA units, according to ISW’s 2017 report on IA and PMU Orders of Battle:
•
•
•
•
•

•

•
•
•
•

Anbar Operations Command (AOC): Responsible for Ramadi and Fallujah and surrounding
desert areas; 1st, 2nd, 3rd Brigades, along with several unattributed brigades; this brigade is‘always Sunni’;
Babil Operations Command (BabOC): Responsible for Babil and southern Baghdad belts
including Jurf al Sakhr which has been ‘intentionally depopulated’;
Baghdad Operations Command (BOC): Responsible for security in Baghdad and most of theBaghdad belts; described as the ‘best-resourced of the ISF commands’; composed of the 6th
Army Division in Karkh and 9th Army Division in Rusafah, 1st Federal Police Division ( 253);
Basra Operations Command (BasOC): Holds de jure responsibility for Basra province; unable
to secure presence due to lack of manpower and strength of PMU militias; 14th Army Division,
made up on five army brigades; the only one present is 64th brigade;
Dijla Operations Command (DOC): 5th Army Division; responsible for all of Diyala, eastern
Salahaddin, Tuz Khurmutu, Alas and Ajil oil fields and Hamrin Mountains; these are areas ofpriority to Iran and Badr Organisation, and according to ISW, the army command is responsive
to Badr;Jazeera and Badia Operations Command (JBOC): Responsibility for one of the largest
geographic commands covering most of Anbar west of Ramadi, Rutba district, and Jazeera
and Badia deserts; it consists of the understaffed divisions of the 7th Infantry Division, which
relies heavily on tribal fighters, operating alongside PMUs and Border Guards brigades ( 254);
Mid-Euphrates Operations Command (MEOC): MEOC is responsible for the cities of Najaf and
Karbala, desert sectors around the cities, and southern Anbar’s district of Nukhaib; Composedof the 8th and 17th Army Divisions, with many Shia militias supplementing security;
Ninewa Operations Command (NOC): 15th Army Division, 16th Army Division, 3rd Federal
Police Division; responsible for all operations to recapture Ninewa from ISIL control;
Salah al-din Operations Command (SDOC): Responsible for the northern half of Salah al-Din,
including cities of Tikrit, Baiji, Shirwat; proposed to be covered by 20th Division;
Samarra Operations Command (SOC): Responsible for Samarra, Jazeera desert west of
Samarra, and southern Salah al-Din; 15th IA from NOC operates here, as does the 5th Division(249) ANCSS, Public Safety and Security Perception Survey in Iraq 2017, 22 January 2018 (url), p. 50.
(250) EU, EEAS, The EU and Iraq, 9 January 2018 (url); EU, EEAS, EU Advisory Mission in Support of Security Sector Reform in
Iraq (EUAM Iraq), November 2017 (url).
(251) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 11.
(252) Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018 (url), pp. iii-iv.
(253) ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Population Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017 (url), pp. 14-15.
(254) ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Population Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017 (url), pp. 16-18.

32 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT - IRAQ: ACTORS OF PROTECTION•of the FP; Shia militias reportedly ‘proliferate’ in the area and have ‘freedom of movement
and action’;Rafidain Operations Command: 10th Army Division and 11th Army Division have responsibility
for Muthanna, Dhi War, Maysan, Qadisiyah and Wasit provinces with most ISF being forward
deployed to combat ISIL or protect Baghdad. ISW deems their security capacity vulnerable
due to ROC’s overstretched resources across the region ( 255).

5.2.2 Capacity and effectiveness
The Iraqi Army collapsed in June 2014 in the face of the fight against ISIL ( 256). After the fall of Mosul
to ISIL, the ISF’s capacity was very poor, with tens of thousands of desertions, lack of training,equipment, and competent leadership. Out of Iraq’s 243 combat battalions, 60 were gone, and 5 ofIraq’s 14 Army divisions were ineffective or disappeared ( 257). Between May 2014 and January 2015,
the Iraqi Army dropped from 55 brigades (110 000 strength) to 36 brigades (54 000 strength) ( 258). In
the midst of security void created by the collapse of the Iraqi army and police, Shia-based militias suchas Badr Organisation, Asaib al ahl Haq and Kataib Hezbollah mobilised and a large number ofvolunteers joined the ranks ( 259). The legalisation of the PMUs as an official part of the Iraqi security
apparatus in 2016 has reportedly undermined the restructuring of the security forces ( 260).
In January 2016, frontline strength of the Iraqi Army was estimated to be 81 000 ( 261). As part of efforts
to strengthen Iraqi forces against ISIL, between September 2015 and 2017, international coalition
forces trained more than 100 000 ISF members, including 43 000 members of the Iraqi army to rebuild
its forces ( 262).
On 9 December 2017, PM al Abadi formally declared that ISIL had been militarily defeated after
conflicts which began in June 2014 ( 263). UNAMI states that the government and ISF have regained
control over Syrian-Iraqi border areas and western Anbar and Ninewa, and ISIL’s territorial control
decreased between July-December 2017, though the group continued to intentionally target civilians( 264). Security forces also continue to be targeted by ISIL, particularly in Ninewa province ( 265). The
military campaign to eliminate ISIL control over territory has significantly reduced its capabilities;
however, the group continues to operate ( 266). In March 2018, the US Department of Defence reported
that with the help of international forces, Iraq’s urban centres have been taken back from ISIL control( 267). US authorities stated in April-June 2018 that the US’s military campaign against ISIL had driven
down the group’s capability such that Iraqi forces ‘should be’ able to maintain security with limited(255) ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Population Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017 (url), pp. 19-23.
(256) EU, EASO, EASO COI Meeting Report – Iraq: Practical Cooperation Meeting 25-26 April 2017 (Source: Joost
Hiltermann), July 2017 (url), p. 11; International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a
Functioning State, 30 July 2018 (url), p. 1.
(257) Witty, D., The Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service, Brookings Institution, 16 March 2015 (url), p. 35.
(258) Knights, M., The Future of Iraq’s Armed Forces, March 2016 (url), p. 23.
(259) EU, EASO, EASO COI Meeting Report – Iraq: Practical Cooperation Meeting 25-26 April 2017 (Source: Joost
Hiltermann), July 2017 (url), p. 11; International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a
Functioning State, 30 July 2018 (url), p. 1.
(260) Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2018 Country Report — Iraq, 2018 (url), p. 29(261) Knights, M., The Future of Iraq’s Armed Forces, March 2016 (url), p. 23.
(262) US, Lead Inspector General for Overseas and Contingency Operations, Operation Inherent Resolve: Report to theUnited States Congress – July 1 2017-September 30 2017, November 2017 (url), p. 16.
(263) UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018 (url), p. 1; UN Human Rights Council,
Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her mission to Iraq, 14 to 23
November 2017 (A/HRC/38/44/Add.1), 5 June 2018 (url), para. 29.
(264) UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018 (url), p. 1.
(265) Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018 (url), pp. 2-4.
(266) US, Leading Inspector General Special Report: Observations from Travel to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Qatar, March 2018(url), p. 3.
(267) US, Leading Inspector General Special Report: Observations from Travel to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Qatar, March 2018(url), p. 3.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT – IRAQ : ACTORS OF PROTECTION— 33

international support ( 268). However, security analysts interviewed in media stated that Iraqi forceswere rebuilt to take cities from ISIL, but have not acquired sufficient skills to defeat ISIL in the form ofa lengthy counter-insurgency ( 269), and are ‘unprepared’ for the underground insurgency against ISIL,
lacking skills, training, as well as local knowledge and trust in areas where ISIL is re-emerging ( 270).
Much of the government’s budget is reportedly allocated to defence ahead of other sectors which
remain underfunded ( 271). The legalisation of the PMUs as another security actor under the umbrellaof the state has added to the state’s financial burden as these forces’ salaries and equipment are paid
from central budgets ( 272). The Ministry of Defence reportedly struggles to pay salaries and attract
recruits in comparison with the PMUs ( 273).
In 2014, Prime Minister al-Abadi launched anti-corruption efforts in the security sector, leading to thedismissal of a number of senior army and police commanders as well as [50,000] “ghost soldiers” andpolice ( 274). According to Bertelsmann Stiftung, Abadi’s efforts to reform the security sector are‘considered by al-Abadi’s critics to be necessary but insufficient’. The source gave the view that todate, ‘al-Abadi has not made substantive progress in regards to this phenomenon’ ( 275).
The EU External Action Service stated in its 2017 report that Iraqi ‘government forces have been
seriously stretched and depleted, particularly senior and elite ranks’ ( 276). Since 2014, the central
government has largely been dependent on militias (PMUs) to fight back against ISIL and to regain andhold territory taken from ISIL ( 277). In July 2018, International Crisis Group also stated that, except for
the KRI, the central government lacked the capacity to patrol the entire country, causing them to be
dependent on the PMU/Hashd capabilities in holding against ISIL during continued ‘mop-up
operations’ ( 278).

5.2.3 Integrity
DFAT assessed that the central government had limited ability to exert ‘centralised control’ over the
ISF forces deployed to the field ( 279). According to ISW, the PMU and Badr Organisation in particular
has to some extent infiltrated and exerted control over some elements of the Iraqi military forces
under the MoD ( 280).
The Iraqi Army had a contentious relationship with the Sunni population in Nineveh prior to ISIS andwas known for commonly being involved in ‘checkpoint abuses’, though it has improved its image witha reduced role in Ninewa’s cities post-ISIL. The Sunni population in Ninewa reportedly prefers‘institutional security forces’ such as IA over the PMF units ( 281). The IA forces are also perceived as(268) US, Lead Inspector General for Overseas and Contingency Operations, Operation Inherent Resolve and Operation
Pacific Eagle-Philippines – April 1 2018-June 30 2018, August 2018 (url), pp. 19, 38-39; ISW, ISIS’s Second Resurgence, 2October 2018 (url).
(269) Intercept (The), The Underground Caliphate, 16 September 2018 (url).
(270) Intercept (The), The Underground Caliphate, 16 September 2018 (url).
(271) Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2018 Country Report — Iraq, 2018 (url), p. 27.
(272) Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2018 Country Report — Iraq, 2018 (url), p. 30(273) Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Access, Possibility of Protection, Security and Humanitarian
Situation, April 2016 (url), p. 199.
(274) Reuters, Iraq says it found 50,000 ‘ghost soldiers’ on the payroll, 1 December 2014 (url); Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI
2018 Country Report — Iraq, 2018 (url), pp. 28, 31.
(275) Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2018 Country Report — Iraq, 2018 (url), pp. 28, 31.
(276) EU, EEAS, Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy 2017 – Iraq, 28 May 2018 (url), p. 156(277) Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2018 Country Report — Iraq, 2018 (url), pp. 3, 14(278) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), p. 17.
(279) Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report – Iraq [updated 9 October 2018], 9 October 2018 (url), p. 27.
(280) ISW, 11 July 2018, email to EASO.
(281) Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018 (url), p. 16.

34 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT - IRAQ: ACTORS OF PROTECTION

less sectarian and corrupt than the Federal Police ( 282). Since the defeat of ISIL, the Iraqi Army’s
reputation and popularity have rebounded following their collapse in 2014 ( 283). However, many
Sunnis, though they are grateful for freedom from ISIS ‘remain deeply suspicious of the Iraqi state andits security forces (…) whom they accuse of arbitrary arrests, looting and forced evictions.’ 284
The primary target of the ISF is individuals suspected of ISIL affiliation, who are often Sunni Arab males
in their twenties, according to the Danish and Norwegian fact-finding mission of November 2018 ( 285).
The Danish Immigration Services (DIS) noted in November 2018 that an Iraq analyst interviewed in
May 2018 stated that there were fewer reports of human rights violations committed by the ISF andthat both the army and police were working to rebuild their image ( 286). Ministry of Defence forceswere reported to be involved in torturing and killing detainees and committing extra-judicial killings,
and summary executions according to USDOS in 2017 ( 287).

5.3 Ministry of Interior and police
5.3.1 Mandate, structure, capacity
As of October 2018, the Prime Minister of Iraq is acting as the Minister of Interior ( 288). Previously,
Ministers of Interior have had close ties with Badr Organisation: The Minister of the Interior was Qasim
al-Araji [until October 2018]. Like his predecessor, Mohhamed al-Ghabban, al-Araji is a senior memberof the Badr Organisation ( 289) and has close ties with Iran ( 290). Minister Al-Araji was previously arrested
by US forces during the period following the 2003 US invasion of Iraq for alleged involvement interrorist attacks against coalition forces but was never convicted ( 291). He entered politics and waselected as a Member of Parliament in 2014 ( 292).
Routine policing 293, law enforcement and domestic order are the responsibility of the Ministry ofInterior 294. MoI oversees the governorate level local police (sometimes referred to as the Iraqi Police
Service, IPS) and the Iraqi Federal Police (formerly called the Iraqi National Police). 295 The work of thepolice is governed by the Penal (or Criminal) Procedure Law. 296 However, police are also engaged incounterterrorism with their functions being overshadowed by militias during the fight against ISIL. 297
Ministry of Interior forces were reported to have an authorised strength of 531 000 in 2013, acrossthe Iraqi Police Service, Iraqi Federal Police, border enforcement, facilities protection police and theoil police ( 298). Due to ‘ghost soldiering’ actual figures of police personnel have been difficult to(282) Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018 (url), p. 93.
(283) Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018 (url), p. 16.
(284) Intercept (The), Justice for the Enemy, 17 June 2018 (url).
(285) Denmark, DIS, Northern Iraq – Security Situation and the Situation for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the
Disputed Areas, Including the Possibility to Enter and Access the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), November 2018 (url), p. 24.
(286) Denmark, DIS, Northern Iraq – Security Situation and the Situation for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the
Disputed Areas, Including the Possibility to Enter and Access the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), November 2018 (url), p. 24.
(287) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 3.
(288) Al Monitor, Iraqi prime minister faces pressure in forming his cabinet, 30 October 2018 (url);(289) EPIC, ISHM Reference Guide (Updated April 2018), n.d. (url); ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Population Mobilization
Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017 (url), p.24.
(290) Al Monitor, Iraqi police who fought for tribal PMUs won’t return to force, 11 April 2018 (url).
(291) EPIC, ISHM Reference Guide (Updated April 2018), n.d. (url).
(292) EPIC, ISHM Reference Guide (Updated April 2018), n.d. (url).
(293) OSAC, Iraq 2018 Crime & Safety Report: Baghdad, 12 February 2018 (url).
(294) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 11.
(295) Mockaitis, T. (Ed.), The Iraq War Encyclopedia, 15 August 2013, pp. 214-216.
(296) Sweden, Lifos, Iraq: Rule of Law in the Security and Legal System, 8 May 2014 (url), p.8.
(297) Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report – Iraq [updated 9 October 2018], 9 October 2018 (url), p. 28.
(298) CSIS, Iraqi in Crisis, May 2014 (url), p. 258

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT – IRAQ : ACTORS OF PROTECTION— 35

estimate ( 299). Sources report high attrition rates among police were a problem with only 40-70% of
trained police recruits staying in the force in 2013 ( 300).
The MoI has a larger operating budget allocation than other state security agencies and is heavily
relied upon by the government for offensive and holding operations against ISIL ( 301). According to
BTI, law enforcement was limited by the lack of capacity as well as ‘rampant corruption’ ( 302).

5.3.1.1 Federal Police (FEDPOL or FP, shurta itihadiya or Raed Shakir Jawdat)
The Iraqi Federal Police are focused more on counter-terrorism than ordinary policing and areorganised into military-style units ( 303); particularly in recent years fighting ISIL, they have transformed
themselves into a paramilitary force rather than focusing on law enforcement ( 304). Sources report its
membership to be between 37 000 ( 305), 42 000 ( 306) or up to 44 000 ( 307).
The force is structured across six territorial Divisions, including mechanised brigades, maintaining apresence in:
•
•
•
•
•
•

1st Federal Police Division, under Baghdad Operations Command with MoD;
2nd FP Division, deployed to secure Baghdad and Baghdad belts for counterterrorism, securing
pilgrimage routes, and law enforcement;
3rd FP Division, under Ninewa Operations Command with MoD;
4th FP Division, responsible for southern Baghdad, areas south of the city, parts of Salah alDin, Basra, Karbala and Wasit;
5th FP division, provides security in south and east Salah al Din, the Jazeera desert west of
Samarra, and participated in Mosul operations;
6th FP Division, operating in Ninewa, Fallujah, Anbar ( 308).

ISW describes it as a ‘deployable gendarmerie’ with capabilities ranging between those of the Iraqi
Army and the local police ( 309). The FP is reportedly deployed alongside PMUs ‘during every major
PMF-led operation’ ( 310). They are heavily armed with armoured and mechanised units and heavy
weapons ( 311). The Federal Police is dominated by Shia and ( 312) and recruited and deployed nationally( 313).

5.3.1.2 Local police
The Iraqi Police Service is responsible for local and governorate level law enforcement ( 314) and is the‘civilian policing component’ operating in the governorates ( 315). The local police forces in eachgovernorate are responsible for day-to-day security and are the primary first responders generally(299) Mockaitis, T. (Ed.), The Iraq War Encyclopedia, 15 August 2013, pp. 214-216.
(300) Mockaitis, T. (Ed.), The Iraq War Encyclopedia, 15 August 2013, pp. 214-216.
(301) Rise Foundation, Mosul and Tal Afar: Context Analysis, December 2017 (url), p. 10.
(302) Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2018 Country Report — Iraq, 2018 (url), p. 8.
(303) Mockaitis, T. (Ed.), The Iraq War Encyclopedia, 15 August 2013, pp. 214-216.
(304) OSAC, Iraq 2018 Crime & Safety Report: Baghdad, 12 February 2018 (url).
(305) Rise Foundation, Mosul and Tal Afar: Context Analysis, December 2017 (url), p. 10.
(306) Mockaitis, T. (Ed.), The Iraq War Encyclopedia, 15 August 2013, pp. 214-216.
(307) CSIS, Iraqi in Crisis, May 2014 (url), p. 258(308) ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Population Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017 (url), p. 24-26.
(309) ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Population Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017 (url), p. 24.
(310) ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Population Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017 (url), p. 24.
(311) Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018 (url), p. 17.
(312) CSIS, Iraqi in Crisis, May 2014 (url), p. 261.
(313) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 11.
(314) Mockaitis, T. (Ed.), The Iraq War Encyclopedia, 15 August 2013, pp. 214-216.
(315) Rise Foundation, Mosul and Tal Afar: Context Analysis, December 2017 (url), p. 11.

36 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT - IRAQ: ACTORS OF PROTECTION

serving as the first line of defence against terrorism and crime ( 316). Sources dated prior to ISIL reportprovincial police numbers to be between 230 000 ( 317) to 302 000 personnel ( 318). However, according
to DFAT reporting in 2018, the combined strength of the federal and local police is about 300 000 ( 319).
The Iraqi police are locally recruited, unlike the Federal Police and Iraq Army which are recruitednationally and have large Shia contingents from the south ( 320). Many officers of the local police weretargeted, imprisoned, arrested, and executed under ISIL occupation ( 321). Compared to the Federal
Police, local Iraqi police services lack firepower, patrolling in soft-shell vehicles and carrying pistols( 322).
A 2016 survey on public perceptions about safety and security in Iraq which compared Baghdad, Erbil,
Anbar, Diyala, Karbala, and Salah al-Din found that respondents’ sense of security was linked to theabsence of ISIL and irregular armed groups, and that the limited presence of local police contributed
to the population feeling unsafe ( 323). The same study found that respondents felt the government
should improve local police services as the primary way to improve security ( 324). In Ninewa, theprovincial police force had 30 000 officers prior to ISIS, which dropped to 13-15 000 in 2018 ( 325). Iraqi
security officials believe that post-ISIL, Ninewa province requires an additional 10,000 to 17,000 police
officers ( 326). Many local police in Ninewa remain out of work ( 327). Al Monitor interviewed a numberof local police forces in Anbar province who had left their positions to join local tribal PMUs to fight
ISIL; in 2018, the fighters stated that they had no intention of returning to their police role as the PMU
positions are ‘more coveted’ ( 328).
Lifos wrote in 2014 that Iraqi Police Service recruits receive eight weeks of training ( 329). Tens of
thousands of Iraqi police have received training from NATO, international and US forces under security
programs to reconstitute the force post-2003 ( 330) and providing for ‘wide and comprehensive training( 331). Iraq has three police academies and six regional training centres, with over half of the force
estimated to have been trained by the US ( 332).
MoI also has a community policing program supported by the International Organization for Migration(IOM) which is aimed at building local trust and mediating between officials and community members
in areas liberated from ISIL ( 333). The program has created 49 Community Policing Forums andconducted trainings reaching over 1 000 police, law enforcement, civil society, judiciary officials andcommunity members ( 334). Through the Rule of Law Programme, the UNDP partners with Iraqi security
and justice partners to provide comprehensive security sector reform and capacity building in its(316) Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018 (url), p. 17.
(317) Mockaitis, T. (Ed.), The Iraq War Encyclopedia, 15 August 2013, pp. 214-216.
(318) CSIS, Iraqi in Crisis, May 2014 (url), p. 258(319) Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report – Iraq [updated 9 October 2018], 9 October 2018 (url), p. 28.
(320) Rise Foundation, Mosul and Tal Afar: Context Analysis, December 2017 (url), p. 11.
(321) Rise Foundation, Mosul and Tal Afar: Context Analysis, December 2017 (url), p. 11.
(322) Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018 (url), p. 17.
(323) ANCSS, Public Safety and Security Perception Survey in Iraq 2017, 22 January 2018 (url), pp. 50-51.
(324) ANCSS, Public Safety and Security Perception Survey in Iraq 2017, 22 January 2018 (url), p. 52.
(325) Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018 (url), p. iii; Rise Foundation, Mosul and Tal Afar: Context
Analysis, December 2017 (url), p. 11.
(326) Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018 (url), p. 83.
(327) Rise Foundation, Mosul and Tal Afar: Context Analysis, December 2017 (url), p. 10.
(328) Al Monitor, Iraqi police who fought for tribal PMUs won’t return to force, 11 April 2018 (url).
(329) Sweden, Lifos, Iraq: Rule of Law in the Security and Legal System, 8 May 2014 (url), p. 9.
(330) Mockaitis, T. (Ed.), The Iraq War Encyclopedia, 15 August 2013, pp. 214-216.
(331) Sweden, Lifos, Iraq: Rule of Law in the Security and Legal System, 8 May 2014 (url), p. 9.
(332) Mockaitis, T. (Ed.), The Iraq War Encyclopedia, 15 August 2013, pp. 214-216.
(333) IOM, UN Migration Agency, Iraq Ministry of the Interior Affirm Cooperation in Community Policing Programme, 5
February 2017 (url).
(334) IOM, UN Migration Agency, Iraq Ministry of the Interior Affirm Cooperation in Community Policing Programme, 5
February 2017 (url).

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT – IRAQ : ACTORS OF PROTECTION— 37

efforts to transform policing from a fighting force against ISIL into a civilian-oriented police service( 335).
Police lacked sufficient capacity to respond to violence against women and children via its 16 family
protection units ( 336). According to the UN Human Rights Council, the police’s family protection units
are understaffed and ‘remain inaccessible to most victims’ of domestic violence ( 337). A 2016 survey
on public perceptions about security found there was low public support for increasing female
participation in the security sector, except among respondents who were female and in urban areas( 338).
MoI has reportedly trained personnel to identify trafficking victims but deficiencies in identification of
victims prevented victims from receiving care and they remained ‘highly vulnerable to punishment for
crimes committed as a direct result of being subjected to trafficking’ ( 339).

5.3.2 Effectiveness5.3.2.1 Reporting a crime or calling for assistance
Reporting a crime to police can be done by going to the police station or to an investigative judge,
who may also be present at the police station. Police may also bring the civilian to a court where suchthe investigating judge may proceed with a case ( 340). For information on procedures, see Section 4.3.

5.3.1.2 Police response
The Federal Police, along with the army, rapidly retreated and collapsed in the face of ISIL’s territorial
gains in 2014 ( 341). In 2018, police and military units in Baghdad are described by the Overseas Security
Advisory Committee (OSAC) as having the ability to respond to ‘security incidents, terrorist attacks
and criminal activities’ although response and capabilities of responding authorities ‘vary
considerably’ ( 342). Lifos stated in its 2014 report that policing effectiveness in response to reporting acrime can differ from place to place. Sources reported to Lifos that in some areas, police work may be
performed well, while others stated that the police are not efficient in responding to crime. Crime
reports are ‘sent to unknown higher officials’ and police are ‘generally tied to one group or another’( 343). According to the UN, Iraqi police and law enforcement officials lack ‘resources, training, andforensic capacity to gather impartial and reliable evidence of sufficient standard to identify alleged
perpetrators, warrant charges, or secure convictions before the courts’ ( 344).
Despite the lack of statistics, OSAC reported that organised crime has increased in 2017 and remained
a serious threat in Baghdad ( 345). Baghdad’s criminal court also reported to Al Monitor that in 2017
there had been a dramatic increase in kidnapping, theft and robbery by organised gangs. However, amember of Baghdad’s provincial council stated that although they have no statistics on abductions,he attributed the rise to the inability of the government to find and hold criminals accountable due tothe collapse of the security situation and the rise in ‘influential political or armed groups’ who kidnap(335) UNDP, UNDP trains mid-ranking police officers to improve the effectiveness of Local Police, 3 September 2018 (url).
(336) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 11.
(337) UN Human Rights Council, Technical assistance provided to assist in the promotion and protection of human rights in
Iraq (A/HRC/30/66), 27 July 2015 (url), para. 29.
(338) ANCSS, Public Safety and Security Perception Survey in Iraq 2017, 22 January 2018 (url), para. 2.6.
(339) USDOS, Trafficking in Persons Report 2017 – Iraq, 28 June 2018 (url), p. 232.
(340) Sweden, Lifos, Iraq: Rule of Law in the Security and Legal System, 8 May 2014 (url), p. 10.
(341) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), p. 1.
(342) OSAC, Iraq 2018 Crime & Safety Report: Baghdad, 12 February 2018 (url).
(343) Sweden, Lifos, Iraq: Rule of Law in the Security and Legal System, 8 May 2014 (url), p. 9.
(344) UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Death Penalty in Iraq, October 2014 (url), p. 2(345) OSAC, Iraq 2018 Crime & Safety Report: Baghdad, 12 February 2018 (url).

38 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT - IRAQ: ACTORS OF PROTECTION

to secure funds ( 346). Media stated that there were 745 kidnappings registered with MoI in Baghdadin the first nine months of 2016, but the government denied the claim ( 347).
Societal and family violence
The police reportedly made ‘limited efforts to prevent or respond to societal violence’ ( 348). UNAMI
similarly observed that during 2017, despite an increase in violence against women, police were notwilling to ‘meaningfully investigate’ killings of women and girls for honour ( 349). The Ministry of Interior
has specialised police units called ‘Family and Child Protection Units’ ( 350). According to UNAMI, theseunits have improved women’s access to justice; however, they are limited to provincial capitals andmajor cities and lack suitable facilities and female personnel ( 351). According to sources interviewed
by Lifos/Landinfo, women victims of sexual violence rarely report it to police and the crime ‘often goes
unpunished’ as perpetrators can pay to escape punishment ( 352). Shelters in Iraq were significantly
lacking and run by volunteers ( 353). The NGO Iraqi Al-Amal Association reports on its website that itruns five family guidance centres for victims of domestic, sexual and gender-based violence in
Baghdad, Najaf, Basra, Kirkuk, and Nasiriyah ( 354). UNAMI similarly reports that there were ‘someshelters’ in Kirkuk for women, and one in Basra for victims of sex trafficking ( 355). A women’s shelterin Baghdad run by an NGO was reportedly stormed by an armed group in October 2017, whodemanded that a female resident who escaped domestic violence be released to them in exchange
for a staff member they abducted. The woman’s father was reportedly with the group ( 356).

5.3.1.3 Crime rates and arrest statistics
According to OSAC, ‘crime statistics in Iraq and reporting mechanisms are incomplete and inconsistent
within Iraqi law enforcement and security forces’ ( 357). Organised crime continues to be a significant
problem ( 358). Individuals, militias, and criminal groups were involved in abductions and kidnappingsfor extortion or political purposes ( 359).
The police and the army frequently arrested and detained individuals without judicial authority
however there are no reliable statistics available on how many people this impacted ( 360). Thousands
are reportedly detained under anti-terrorism laws ( 361).

5.3.3 Integrity
Independence
As stated earlier, the head of the Federal Police under the MoI, Qasim –Araji [head until October 2018]
was a Badr Organisation member and, according to the Institute for the Study of War, ‘FP commanders
who are not sympathetic to the PMF are likely intimidated into cooperating with PMF or ordered to(346) Al Monitor, Why are kidnappings on the rise in Baghdad? 27 January 2017 (url).
(347) MEE, Criminal kidnappings are big business in Baghdad, 1 January 2017 (url).
(348) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 11.
(349) UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018 (url), p. vii.
(350) UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018 (url), para. 5.2.
(351) UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: January – June 2014, August 2014 (url), pp. 13-14.
(352) Sweden, Lifos, 8 May 2014, Iraq: Rule of Law in the Security and Legal System (url), p. 18.
(353) UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her
mission to Iraq, 14 to 23 November 2017 (A/HRC/38/44/Add.1), 5 June 2018 (url), paras. 40-44.
(354) Iraqi Al-Amal Association, ‫ﻣﺮا�ﺰ اﻷﻣﻞ ﻟﻸرﺷﺎد اﻷ�ي‬. [Hope Centres for Family Guidance], n.d. (url).
(355) UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018 (url), para. 5. 3.
(356) UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018 (url), para. 5. 3.
(357) OSAC, Iraq 2018 Crime & Safety Report: Baghdad, 12 February 2018 (url).
(358) OSAC, Iraq 2018 Crime & Safety Report: Baghdad, 12 February 2018 (url).
(359) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 5.
(360) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 13.
(361) AP, Iraq holding more than 19,000 because of IS, militant ties, 22 March 2018 (url); New York Times (The), A 10Minute Trial, a Death Sentence: Iraqi Justice for ISIS Suspects, 17 April 2018 (url).

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT – IRAQ : ACTORS OF PROTECTION— 39

do so by the sympathetic FP senior leadership’ ( 362). Sources stated that PMU and Badr Organisationin particular ‘holds considerable influence over the Iraqi Ministry of Interior’ ( 363), that Badr dominates
the Federal Police and MoI ( 364), particularly in Diyala ( 365). ISW assesses that multiple divisions of theFederal Police have close ties with Iran and overlapping responsibilities with militias of the PMU. The
6th FP is described as being led by a Badr commander and ‘effectively an extension of the Badr
Organization’; the 5th Division also operates closely with the 6th Division and coordinate operations
with the Sadrist peace brigades around Samarra; and units of the 4th FP Division have close ties and‘overlapping responsibility’ with Kataib al-Imam Ali militias ( 366).
Public trust and corruption
A 2016 survey on public perceptions about safety and security in Iraq which compared Baghdad, Erbil,
Anbar, Diyala, Karbala, and Salah al-Din found that public trust in different security services varied
dramatically between governorates and security providers. More than half of the total respondents
considered the local civilian police to be more trustworthy than the army. In Karbala, Erbil, and Salahal Din, the civilian/local police were the most trusted actor; while in Diyala and Anbar, the Army wasseen as the most trustworthy. More than half of Baghdad respondents did not trust any actors; though
local police were highest. Irregular armed groups were seen as least trusted by the population in allareas surveyed ( 367). Women and people in rural areas had the lowest rates of trust in any of the
security forces ( 368).
The MoI and its history of human rights violations prior to ISIL has contributed to the perception that
it is sectarian and corrupt, and although its popularity has risen in the wake of ISIL, failed reforms
mean it is not fully trusted by Iraqis ( 369).
Corruption was reportedly a persistent problem in the police forces ( 370), occurred at many levels andinvolved paying bribes to reduce or drop charges ( 371). Lifos interviewed sources in 2014 who statedthat people would prefer to use their clan relations to resolve issues rather than go through the local
police ( 372). There were reports from local residents in Mosul, for example that people referred alleged
ISIL suspects to security officials in order to settle personal disputes knowing the person would end
up in lengthy pre-trial detention without due process ( 373).
Abuses
Police were involved in forcing confessions and using abusive methods to torture detainees,
particularly in pre-trial detention ( 374). Federal Police force has been seen as being used against Sunnis
in the past ( 375). MoI units are seen as ‘highly sectarian, corrupt, and Badr influenced’ ( 376) with Badr
members reportedly being embedded in the Federal police ( 377). There were complaints from local(362) ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Population Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017 (url), p. 24.
(363) ISW, 11 July 2018, email to EASO.
(364) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), p. 18.
(365) Mansour, R., Rebuilding the Iraqi State: Stabilisation, Governance, and Reconciliation, February 2018 (url, p. 19.
(366) ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Population Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017 (url), pp. 25-26.
(367) ANCSS, Public Safety and Security Perception Survey in Iraq 2017, 22 January 2018 (url), para. 2.4.
(368) ANCSS, Public Safety and Security Perception Survey in Iraq 2017, 22 January 2018 (url), pp. 50-51.
(369) Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018 (url), p. 93.
(370) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 11; Australia, DFAT, Country
Information Report – Iraq [updated 9 October 2018], 9 October 2018 (url), p. 28.
371 Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report – Iraq [updated 9 October 2018], 9 October 2018 (url), p. 28.
(372) Sweden, Lifos, Iraq: Rule of Law in the Security and Legal System, 8 May 2014 (url), p. 9.
(373) Rise Foundation, Mosul and Tal Afar: Context Analysis, December 2017 (url), p. 26.
(374) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), pp. 5, 11.
(375) Mockaitis, T. (Ed.), The Iraq War Encyclopedia, 15 August 2013, pp. 214-216; CSIS, Iraqi in Crisis, May 2014 (url), p. 258.
(376) Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018 (url), p. 93(377) Rise Foundation, Mosul and Tal Afar: Context Analysis, December 2017 (url), p. 10.

40 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT - IRAQ: ACTORS OF PROTECTION

communities that because the federal police and army recruit and deploy forces nationally, thatmembers were abusive on the basis of ethnosectarian differences ( 378).

5.3.4 Emergency Response Division (furqa ar-red as-suriya)
The Emergency Response Division is a specialised counterterrorism unit within the MoI ( 379) or MoI’s‘commando unit’ ( 380). ERD played a large role in liberating Ninewa and Mosul in particular ( 381). The
ERD has been characterised by the US advisors as a ‘very effective fighting force’ against ISIL and it
has received US training and support in the past ( 382). Detracting from the anti-ISIL focus, in July 2018,
ERD was re-deployed by the Prime Minister out of the disputed territories into the south to deal withgrowing unrest and protests there ( 383).
The ERD and its commander are described by ISW as having ‘close ties’ with the Badr Organisation( 384). ISW observes that the ERD is ‘less disciplined’ than other special forces (ISOF) organisations and‘likely more compromised’ due to the leadership and operational closeness it has to the Iran-backed
PMUs ( 385).
In 2015, images and videos appeared online of ERD members with photos of severed heads anddragging corpses behind vehicles during anti-ISIL operations. ( 386). A documentary investigating
abuses by ERD was smuggled out of Iraq in 2015 also showing ERD involvement in torture, abuses ofdetainees and field executions of ISIL suspects and civilians ( 387). After initial denial and then an
investigation by the PMO in 2017, members of the ERD were found to have committed torture andabuses; they were said to face prosecution, but no public findings were released ( 388). Some ERD
officers have been relieved of field duty ( 389).
The ERD is blacklisted by the US military for committing gross violations of human rights and no longer
receives US equipment of support as of March 2015; however, they continue to coordinate on fighting
ISIL ( 390).

5.3.5 Provincial Emergency Police Battalions
Emergency Police Battalions are local combat formations attached to the local police under provincial
commands, but under the leadership of the Federal Police. They are mainly stationary where they areformed and not commonly forward deployed, although they are used to guard pilgrimage routes orsites in southern Iraq ( 391). They have limited capacity and are used to hold territory, not to clear it( 392).

(378) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 11.
(379) Witty, D., The Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service, Brookings Institution, 16 March 2015 (url), p. 29.
(380) Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018 (url), pp. 17, 94.
(381) Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018 (url), pp. 17, 94.
(382) ABC News, Iraqi troops torture and execute civilians in secret videos,(383) ISW, ISIS’s Second Resurgence, 2 October 2018 (url).
(384) ISW, 11 July 2018, email to EASO; ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Population Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle,
December 2017 (url), pp. 26-27.
(385) ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Population Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017 (url), pp. 26-27.
(386) ABC News, ‘Dirty Brigades’: US-Trained Iraqi Forces Investigated for War Crimes, 11 March 2015 (url).
(387) ABC News, US Ignores evidence of atrocities by blacklisted Iraqi military unit, 31 May 2017 (url); ABC News, Iraqi
troops torture and execute civilians in secret videos, 26 May 2017 (url).
(388) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 4; Reuters, Iraq
acknowledges abuses committed against civilians in Mosul campaign, 17 August 2017 (url).
(389) ABC News, Watchdogs: Iraqi troops beat and execute Mosul prisoners in new videos, 14 July 2017 (url).
(390) ABC News, US Ignores evidence of atrocities by blacklisted Iraqi military unit, 31 May 2017 (url).
(391) ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Population Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017 (url), p. 28.
(392) ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Population Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017 (url), p. 28.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT – IRAQ : ACTORS OF PROTECTION— 41

5.3.6 Border Guards (haras hadud al-Iraq), Facilities Protections Service, and Oil Police
Iraq’s Border Guards are a motorised brigade attached to MoI and responsible for overseeing ports
and borders ( 393), as well as having a role in counterterrorism ( 394). The Guards are structured underfive distinct Regional commands ( 395). With assistance from PMF in the region, they are primarily
operating on the Syrian border, especially in Rabia, and are responsible for preventing retreating
Syrian ISIL fighters from coming across into Iraq ( 396).
Border Guards in the Kurdish region are ‘responsive to the KRG, not the MoI’ ( 397). The force hadroughly 39 330 personnel in 2013 ( 398) and this decreased to an estimated 13 500 in 2016 ( 399). It was
described in a CSIS briefing from 2014 as ‘increasingly politicized’ with corruption and the sale ofpositions as a problem, in addition to having a lack of mobility, intelligence support and firepower toadequately secure Iraq’s borders ( 400).
MoI’s Facilities Protection Police are responsible for protecting critical infrastructure and are more
responsive to the ministries whose infrastructure they protect than the MoI. The Oil Police are under
the Ministry of Oil and serve to guard Iraq’s oil fields mainly in Basra and southern Iraq. Those forcesin KRI are more responsive to KRG than the Ministry of Oil and MoI ( 401).

5.4 Popular Mobilisation Units or Forces (al-hashd al-sha’abi)
5.4.1 Mandate and structure
Since 2016, under the Popular Mobilisation Law PMUs are formally and legally part of the state’ssecurity apparatus, however they are defined as an ‘independent military formation’ not part of the
MoD or the MoI ( 402). It is not subordinate to the ISF ( 403). The PMF received USD 1.63 billion in 2017,about 6 % of the Iraqi security budget, compared to USD 683 million, allotted to CTS ( 404).
The PMUs nominally report to the Prime Minister as the Commander in Chief through the civilianbody, the PMF Commission and then the National Security Council ( 405). However, in practice, thePMUs retain a formal and informal command structure ( 406). Although they are legally a state
institution, the PMUs retain autonomous control and influence ( 407). Leaders of the PMUs participate
in the political sphere, are elected politicians, and some are seen as proxies of the Iranian government(AAH, KH, Badr mainly) ( 408), and are responsive to Iran’s Quds force ( 409). The PMUs are purported to
be run through the government’s Popular Mobilisation Commission (PMC), which is run in practice by(393) ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Population Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017 (url), p. 27.
(394) CSIS, Iraqi in Crisis, May 2014 (url), p. 263(395) ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Population Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017 (url), p. 27.
(396) Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018 (url), p. 17.
(397) ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Population Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017 (url), p. 27.
(398) CSIS, Iraqi in Crisis, May 2014 (url), p. 263.
(399) Knights, M., The Future of Iraq’s Armed Forces, March 2016 (url), p. 23.
(400) CSIS, Iraqi in Crisis, May 2014 (url), p. 263.
(401) ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Population Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017 (url), p. 28.
(402) Mansour, R., More than Militias: Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces are Here to Stay, 3 April 2018 (url).
(403) ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Population Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017 (url), p. 33.
(404) ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Population Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017 (url), p. 29.
(405) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), pp. i-ii; Mansour, R., More than Militias: Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces are Here to Stay, 3 April 2018 (url).
(406) ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Population Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017 (url), pp. 29-32.
(407) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), p. 5.
(408) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), pp. i-ii.
(409) ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Population Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017 (url), p. 28.

42 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT - IRAQ: ACTORS OF PROTECTION

deputy PMC Chairman, Abu Mahdi al Muhandis, an officer of the Quds force with close ties to Iran
( 410). Muhandis is a US-designated terrorist ( 411).
The PMUs are an umbrella group of roughly 50 militias with a decentralised mixture of Shiite
ideological allegiances, largely falling into three groups: those aligned with Supreme Leader Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei of Iran (having strong links with the Iranian Quds force and Quds commander Qasim
Soleimani), those with Najaf-based Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani (Iraq’s supreme Shia cleric), andthose allegiant to populist Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr ( 412). The main Iranian-tied groups and the mostpowerful PMUs are Badr Organisation, Asaib ahl al-Haq, Kataib Hezbollah, Kataib Sayed al-Shuhada,
and Harakat Hizbollah al-Nujaba ( 413). Badr Organisation is among the most powerful ( 414), Kataib alImam Ali, and Kataib Jund al-Imam ( 415). Kataib Hizbollah is a US designated terrorist group ( 416).
Politically, these groups and their political arms have created tensions and conflicts with PM Abadi,
who is simultaneously confronted and undermined at times, while at others, cooperative ( 417). They
are closely aligned with the ‘right wing’ Shia political camp and work closely with Abu Mahdi alMuhandis ( 418) and are operationally directed by Muhandis and Badr Organisation’s Hadi Al Ameri( 419). Militias within the PMU have been historically involved in human rights violations and terrorism,
as well as death squads targeting Sunnis during the 2005-2006 sectarian violence ( 420). They gained
further power and flourished under PM Nuri Al Maliki in 2010-2014 ( 421).
The PMUs have played a vital role, along with the ISF, in carrying out the military defeat of ISIL ( 422).
The PMUs existed prior to 2014 in different forms, but emerged on an important scale in 2014 to
supplement the ISF’s capacity, with large scale increase in membership in 2014 when thousands ofyoung men joined new and old militias under forces affiliated with the government to fight against
ISIL ( 423). International Crisis Group describes them as ‘quite unlike the state’s traditional security
agencies’ as they are a political institution with politicians and ministers in their leadership ( 424). Overthe past four years, the PMUs have reportedly penetrated state institutions and entered ‘all ministries’at ‘all levels’, according to a senior Fatah leader ( 425). Badr is described as having capitalised on thecollapse of the ISF in 2014 in order to capture military power, political roles and cabinet positions ( 426).

(410) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), p. 3.
(411) ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Population Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017 (url), p. 33.
(412) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), p. 3.
(413) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), p. 3.
(414) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), p. 14.
(415) Mansour, R., Rebuilding the Iraqi State: Stabilisation, Governance, and Reconciliation, February 2018 (url, p. 22.
(416) USDOS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2017 – Iraq, 6 September 2018 (url).
(417) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), pp. 13-14.
(418) Mansour, R., Rebuilding the Iraqi State: Stabilisation, Governance, and Reconciliation, February 2018 (url, p. 22.
(419) ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Population Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017 (url), p. 28.
(420) GICJ, Militias in Iraq: The hidden face of terrorism, September 2016 (url), pp. 4-5.
(421) GICJ, Militias in Iraq: The hidden face of terrorism, September 2016 (url), pp. 8-9.
(422) UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her
mission to Iraq, 14 to 23 November 2017 (A/HRC/38/44/Add.1), 5 June 2018 (url), para. 29.
(423) UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her
mission to Iraq, 14 to 23 November 2017 (A/HRC/38/44/Add.1), 5 June 2018 (url), para. 29.
(424) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), p. 5.
(425) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), p. 9.
(426) Sowell, K., Badr at the Forefront of Iraq’s Shia Militias, 13 August 2015 (url).

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT – IRAQ : ACTORS OF PROTECTION— 43

PMU salaries are paid from the central budget and match those of the ISF under the 2018 budget (427).
The PMUs were originally intended as an ‘organic hold force’ to be used in local areas; however withthe fight against ISIL, the force became a deployable asset, being sent much further across the country
away from their natural support bases ( 428). The PMUs were credited and thanked by the Prime
Minister of Iraq for their role in defeating ISIL at the end of 2017 ( 429).
Structure and presence
Administratively, the PMC has numerous directorates to plan and manage PMU military operations
and handle matters of administration, finance, intelligence, logistics, media, medical support,
engineering, forward operations, planning and training, among others ( 430). PMC Regional Committees
are local level components present in Anbar, Babil, Basra, Dhi Qar, Diwaniyah, Diyala, Karbala, Kirkuk,
Maysan, Muthanna, Salah al Din, Najaf, Ninew, Wasit ( 431). The ISW provides a graphic showing thevarious PMUs (politically-linked PMUs, PMUs linked to Ayatollah al-Sistani, Iranian-linked PMUs) areaffiliated with different ISF commands across the governorates of Iraq ( 432). ISW remarked in July 2018
that
‘The PMF wield influence or retain freedom of action in the areas of responsibility ofseveral Iraqi Army Divisions / Operations Commands in Diyala, Salah al-Din, and Kirkuk
Province. The Dijla Operations Command – which covers all of Diyala Province,
Eastern Salah ad-Din Province, and the Hamrin Mountains – is connected to Badr
Organization Chairman Hadi al-Ameri. The Badr Organization exerts strong influence
over the Iraqi Army 5th Division operating under Dijla Operations Command. The PMF
also operates freely in Salah ad-Din Operations Command – which covers Northern
Salah ad-Din Province including Tikrit, Shirqat, and Tuz Khurmatu – as well as Samarra/ Al-Askari Shrine in Southern Salah ad-Din Province (nominally under Samarra
Operations Command)’ ( 433).
Sources reported to a 2016 Danish fact-finding mission that the PMUs are not present in KRI; however,they are present in areas that are contested between authorities of Iraq and KRG ( 434).
According to the International Crisis Group, the PMU projects an image of being cross-sectarian, but
this is misleading ( 435). The PMUs are broadly popular in Iraq, especially among the Shia. They mainly
draw from Shia for their composition ( 436). They tend to recruit locally ( 437). There are also militias from
Sunni Arab and minority groups attached to the PMUs ( 438). These minority militias formed under thePMUs, which include Christians, Turkmen, Sunnis, Yezidis, Shabaks, and others are reportedly‘separate homogenous fighting units’ under tight overall control of the Iranian-backed PMUs ( 439).

(427) ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Population Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017 (url), p. 29.
(428) Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018 (url), p. 42.
(429) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), p. i.
(430) ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Population Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017 (url), p. 35.
(431) ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Population Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017 (url), p. 36.
(432) ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Population Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017 (url), p. 58.
(433) ISW, 11 July 2018, email to EASO.
(434) Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Access, Possibility of Protection, Security and Humanitarian
Situation, April 2016 (url), p. 198.
(435) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), p. 20.
(436) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), p. 1
(437) Mansour, R., More than Militias: Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces are Here to Stay, 3 April 2018 (url).
(438) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), p. 1
(439) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), p. 20.

44 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT - IRAQ: ACTORS OF PROTECTION

5.4.2 Capacity
The PMUs are an umbrella organisation of approximately 50 paramilitary groups with varying
alignments, composed of approximately 42 000 to 142 000 personnel. Massively popular volunteer
recruitment occurred in 2014 in the recruitment drives held by the PMUs in the wake of Grand
Ayatollah’s religious fatwas calling on Iraqis to serve due to the security vacuum created after ISIL
began to take large territory. The PMC reportedly controls salary payment and favours paying Iranbacked militias, which has been a complaint of Sadrists, who complain of unfair salary distribution tofighters ( 440).
Most of the Iranian-backed PMUs are led by commanders who have not been part of Iraq’s formal
security apparatus and rarely received training in military colleges ( 441). They are described as being‘driven fighters’ better deployed outside of cities and not trained for ‘inner-city combat’ ( 442). ISW
notes that the PMU use a ‘numerical ranking system’ similar to the IA in order to ‘increase the veneer
of professionalism and integration’ they have with the IA ( 443). PMC has a training directorate, andmay run some standard training elements; however, militias ‘usually operate their own training
camps’ ( 444).
Attrition / desertion
In terms of desertion, ISW commented in July 2018 that there is no clear information on desertion
from PMUs or official and unofficial punishments for it in practice; noting that:‘No clear information although we expect desertions are limited at best. Both ISF and
PMF are motivated by the desire to earn a salary as well as special benefits (such as
medical care) to support their families amidst a widespread lack of job opportunities
for young men, particularly across Central and Southern Iraq. These social pressuresfueled the initial groundswell of support for the PMF after the fatwa released by
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani in 2014’ ( 445).
Public trust
The PMUs, along with the CTS are seen as the most ‘respected’ units of the ISF by the Iraqi public in
the fight against ISIL ( 446), though their appeal is not universal and they are mainly popular withpredominantly Shia areas from where PMU forces mainly originate ( 447).
A 2016 survey on public perceptions about safety and security in Iraq which compared Baghdad, Erbil,
Anbar, Diyala, Karbala, and Salah al-Din found that PMUs and irregular armed groups were seen as
least trusted by the population in all areas surveyed compared to police and the Iraqi army ( 448). In
2018, International Crisis Group stated that PMUs are beginning to suffer reputational damage inareas retaken from ISIL as well as in Baghdad, locals have complained about PMU lawlessness,
including looting and extortion, and setting up illicit checkpoints ( 449).

(440) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), p. 4;(441) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), p. 18.
(442) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), p. 20.
(443) ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Population Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017 (url), p. 33.
(444) ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Population Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017 (url), p. 35.
(445) ISW, 11 July 2018, email to EASO.
(446) Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018 (url), p. 18; Knights, M. and Mello A., The Best Thing
American Built in Iraq, 19 July 2017 (url).
(447) Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018 (url), p. 18(448) ANCSS, Public Safety and Security Perception Survey in Iraq 2017, 22 January 2018 (url), para. 2.4.
(449) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), p. 19.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT – IRAQ : ACTORS OF PROTECTION— 45

5.4.3 EffectivenessIranian-proxy militias are described by ISW as the most capable of the militias active inside of Iraq
( 450). The PMUs recruitment and activity moved rapidly in to fight against ISIL when Iraqi Army andFederal Police forces collapsed in 2014 and have been instrumental in ISIL’s defeat; they were the firstforces to move to defend Baghdad ( 451), and critical to holding territory ( 452). The PMUs continue toplay a significant role in Iraq’s ability to continue fighting the remaining elements of ISIL in the country( 453). Four years after ISIL’s appearance, Iraqi security forces ‘lack the capacity to patrol the entire
country (apart from the Kurdish region…), obliging them to rely on the Hashd for help’ ( 454). Neither
would the Iraqi government have been able to retake the disputed territories and Kirkuk in October
2017 without the support of the PMUs ( 455).
The PMUs have also filled a vacuum left by the state by setting up parallel institutions involved inreconstruction, rebuilding critical infrastructure, and public services in areas where they have support,
as well as in areas destroyed by ISIL ( 456). The PMUs remain dominant in taking a security lead and in
local politics and governance in the areas where they have control and influence ( 457). DIS noted thatsources described relations between ISF and PMUs as ‘generally good’ in disputed and liberated areas,
though the government prefers that ISF serve as guarantor of security and not PMUs, until regular law
enforcement and civil authority is re-established ( 458). However, other sources report that the PMUs
frequently ‘clash’ in conflicts with other security institutions like the Iraqi Army which turn violent( 459). Competition between PMU units is also ‘rife’ creating tensions between these groups ( 460).

5.4.4 Integrity
According to the Government of Iraq, the PMU is ‘fully integrated with State forces and responds to asingle chain of command’ though the UN states that there is a widespread perception that fighters
respond to their own commanders primarily ( 461). Other sources also indicate that the Shia militias arebeyond the formal control of the authorities and that government control is nominal, rather than real
( 462). The government’s ability to retain command and control over PMUs was inconsistent ( 463),
particularly those aligned with Iran ( 464). PMUs are described as the structurally opposite to theapolitical CTS, being ‘organically formed units more comfortable expressing and relying upon their(450) ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Population Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017 (url), p. 36.
(451) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), p. 1.
(452) Mansour, R., More than Militias: Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces are Here to Stay, 3 April 2018 (url).
(453) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), p. 2.
(454) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), p. 16.
(455) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), p. 16.
(456) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), pp. 11-12.
(457) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), p. 17.
458 Denmark, DIS, Northern Iraq – Security Situation and the Situation for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the
Disputed Areas, Including the Possibility to Enter and Access the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), November 2018 (url), p. 19.
(459) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), p. 20.
(460) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), p. 20.
(461) UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her
mission to Iraq, 14 to 23 November 2017 (A/HRC/38/44/Add.1), 5 June 2018 (url), para. 29.
(462) EU, EASO, EASO COI Meeting Report – Iraq: Practical Cooperation Meeting 25-26 April 2017 (Source: Joost
Hiltermann), July 2017 (url), p. 12.
(463) EU, EEAS, Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy 2017 – Iraq, 28 May 2018 (url), p. 156(464) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 1.

46 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT - IRAQ: ACTORS OF PROTECTION

ethnic or religious beliefs as the motivating cause for their activities’ which has made Shia units acontroversial and divisive force, particularly for Sunni Arab, Turkmen and Kurdish Iraqis ( 465). The
PMUs pose a challenge to the state’s ability to monopolise the legitimate use of violence ( 466).
Although they report to the Prime Minister, he has a limited ability to curtail their role, given theirinfluence and broad popularity with the Shia population ( 467). Iranian proxy militias not only operate
a separate chain of command, they also are able to command ISF units and direct use of force; with‘near wholesale control of components of the ISF’ ( 468).
There are also numerous ‘fake hashd’ militias especially in Ninewa, who take advantage of theambiguity surrounding which groups are acting for legitimate authorities; these criminal organisations
exploit this making crimes by PMUs even more difficult to identify ( 469).
Abuses and sectarianism
Human rights organisations claim that PMU paramilitaries have been involved in widespread mass
kidnapping, extortion, murder, torture, and destruction of property ( 470). PMUs that are loyal to
Ayatollah Sistani are reportedly ‘generally considered more moderate and less prone to sectarianabuses’ while the Iranian proxy PMUs (KH, AAH, Badr) are on the other end of the spectrum. Sadrist
PMUs are ‘somewhere in between’ ( 471). In June 2016, for example, 643 men intercepted at PMU
screening sites after the liberation of Fallujah disappeared and are feared dead ( 472). However, theseabuses have gone unpunished by the judiciary ( 473) and occurred with impunity ( 474). PMUs abusedprisoners and detainees ( 475) and targeted Sunnis in particular ( 476). DIS noted in its 2018 report that
PMUs have the upper hand in ISIL-liberated and disputed territories and ‘can commit violations
without consequences’ ( 477).
Regarding the ability of the state to protect an individual fearing the PMUs, in email correspondence
for this report, the ISW commented that:‘[t]he state retains limited ability to protect minorities and others (including Sunnis
and Kurds) in areas where it relies upon the PMF as the main force to establish
security on behalf of the Government of Iraq. These regions include Diyala and Salah
ad-Din Provinces, which have witnessed repeated accusations of human rights abuses
leveled against the PMF. Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi has not taken major
punitive actions to address these incidents despite publically stressing theunacceptability of these abuses. Abadi may attempt to reassign other state forces tosecure a given area prone to abuses, but he remains constrained by both politicalconcerns as well as the overstretched nature of the Iraqi Army’ ( 478).

(465) Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018 (url), p. 18.
(466) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), p. 1.
(467) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), p. 13.
(468) ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Population Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017 (url), p. 31.
(469) Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018 (url), p. 23.
(470) GICJ, Militias in Iraq: The hidden face of terrorism, September 2016 (url); Mansour, R., Rebuilding the Iraqi State:
Stabilisation, Governance, and Reconciliation, February 2018 (url, p. 24.
(471) Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018 (url), p. 20.
(472) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 4.
(473) Mansour, R., Rebuilding the Iraqi State: Stabilisation, Governance, and Reconciliation, February 2018 (url, p. 24.
(474) AI, Absolute Impunity: Militia Rule in Iraq, 2014 (url), p. 5.
(475) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 20.
(476) AI, Absolute Impunity: Militia Rule in Iraq, 2014 (url), p. 5.
477 Denmark, DIS, Northern Iraq – Security Situation and the Situation for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the
Disputed Areas, Including the Possibility to Enter and Access the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), November 2018 (url), p. 19.
(478) ISW, 11 July 2018, email to EASO.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT – IRAQ : ACTORS OF PROTECTION— 47

The government has announced its intention to disband the PMUs with a decree issued in March 2018,
aiming to integrate them into the Ministries of Defence and Interior, but this has been resisted by proIranian elements of the PMU, who wish to retain their autonomous functioning ( 479); the government
does not have a practical plan to deal with integration of PMUs ( 480).
There were reports that some groups of the PMUs gave weapons and training to children ( 481),
particularly the AAH and KH militias ( 482). Recruiting youths under 18 was banned by Shia authorities
and clerics but media reported images of minors serving in PMU combat positions in 2017 ( 483).

5.5 Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) (jihaz mukafahat al-irhab)
5.5.1 Mandate and structure
The CTS is an elite counterterrorism force established by US forces after 2003 ( 484). The CTS was
originally under the MoD’s authority but this authority was removed by former PM Nuri al-Maliki in
2007, making it report directly to him, bringing criticism of Maliki’s concentration of power ( 485).
According to ISW, after Maliki, PM Abadi changed this structure by dissolving the Office of the
Commander in Chief of the PM, and instead putting the CTS and special forces ‘nominally under the
day-to-day control of the JOC/MoD although they still report to the Prime Minister ( 486). Formally, theCTS reports directly to the Prime Minister via the Council of Ministers and coordinates its activity with
the Joint Operations Command (JOC) under the Ministry of Defence ( 487). However, the CTS Law,passed in 2016, grants the CTS the status of a Ministry, but ambiguously, operating outside of theestablished security institutions of MoI and MoD ( 488). Under the CTS Law of 2016, it is mandated tocoordinate and lead all counterterrorism efforts ( 489). However, numerous units in MoI and MoD also
conduct counterterrorism operations ( 490). CTS is supposed to carry out targeted warrant-based
counterterrorism missions but in 2018 continued to engage in missions and tasks outside this, such as
securing infrastructure, maintaining order in cities, and quelling sectarian tensions ( 491).
The CTS is structured with a CTS headquarters (for strategy, policy, coordination), Counter-Terrorism
Command (operational level command), and below that, three Iraqi Special Operations Brigades(ISOF) (headquarters which control ISOF battalions of 440-600 personnel each( 492). ISOF 1st Brigage
also has additional battalions in Baghdad: 1st Battalion (36th Commando Brigade), 2nd Battalion (also(479) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), pp. 4, 18, 19; Mansour, R., More than Militias: Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces are Here to Stay, 3 April 2018 (url).
(480) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), pp. 4, 18, 19.
(481) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 12.
(482) USDOS, 2018 Trafficking in Persons Report – Iraq, June 2018 (url).
(483) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 12.
(484) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), p. 18.
(485) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), pp. 18-19.
(486) ISW, 11 July 2018, email to EASO.
(487) ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Population Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017 (url), pp. 10, 60.
(488) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), p. 19; Witty, D., The Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service, Brookings Institution, 16 March 2015 (url), p. 5; Witty, D. The
Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service: From the War on ISIS to the Future, 23 January 2018 (url).
(489) Witty, D. The Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service: From the War on ISIS to the Future, 23 January 2018 (url).
(490) Witty, D., The Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service, Brookings Institution, 16 March 2015 (url), p. 29.
(491) US, Lead Inspector General for Overseas and Contingency Operations, Operation Inherent Resolve and Operation
Pacific Eagle-Philippines – April 1 2018-June 30 2018, August 2018 (url), p. 40.
(492) Witty, D., The Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service, Brookings Institution, 16 March 2015 (url), p. 5. For a diagram, see page
32 of this source.

48 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT - IRAQ: ACTORS OF PROTECTION

called Iraqi Counter Terrorism Force, ICTF), and Special Tactics Unit (STU), all three of which operate
country-wide ( 493).

5.5.2 Capacity
The CTS is modelled on US counterterrorism forces, and originally were recruited, trained, equipped
and advised, and led by US Special Forces ( 494); in 2008, US and Iraqi forces transitioned to jointcommand ( 495). Originally, it recruited volunteer candidates who were selected from across Iraq’s
ethno-religious groups; the ‘central identity’ of CTS is as a non-sectarian organisation ( 496). CTS
personnel are paid approximately twice as much as MoD personnel ( 497). Training has expanded since
the war with ISIL and it now requires 8-12 months to complete; it is conducted jointly by CTS and US
advisors ( 498).
In 2013, the organisation had approximately 10 000 to 13 000 personnel ( 499). The service took heavy
losses in fighting ISIL, particularly 1st ISOF fighting ISIS, depleting the most effective and experienced
officers and soldiers from the ranks ( 500). The CTS took an estimated 4 000 casualties with 400 deadfrom 2014 to the battle for Fallujah in June 2016; it is estimated that a large number of the 1 200 –
1 500 Iraqi forces killed in the battle for Mosul in 2017 were likely CTS as the spearheading force ( 501).
Iraq security expert, Michael Knights, who tracks the unit, made the assessment in 2017 that the CTS
is only 54 % manned and 34 % manned in combat divisions after several years of anti-ISIL operations( 502).
Due to its training arm, it has reportedly retained strength levels in the force with low attrition rates
reported in 2017 among new recruits, and the US estimating that 2 000 new recruits graduate per
year under the new training program ( 503).

5.5.3 Effectiveness
The CTS is described as one of the most effective forces in the government’s fight against ISIL ( 504).
The CTS ISOF first Golden Division is the most capable unit of the ISF, according to ISW ( 505). The force
was ‘pivotal’ in the ability of the ISF to defeat ISIL’s ability to hold cities and large areas of territory( 506). However, with the advance of ISIS, it began carrying out operations for which it was not trainedor equipped such as clearing operations and battalion level operations coordination, artillery and air
support, and coordination with ISF units ( 507). Prior to ISIL, CTS carried out ‘highly refined targeting’with checks and balances on targets to prevent political or sectarian involvement ( 508). However, after
ISIL’s rise, CTS was forced to become a conventional combat force used for urban clearance operations(493) Witty, D. The Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service: From the War on ISIS to the Future, 23 January 2018 (url).
(494) Witty, D., The Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service, Brookings Institution, 16 March 2015 (url), p. 7.
(495) Witty, D., The Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service, Brookings Institution, 16 March 2015 (url), p. 9.
(496) Witty, D., The Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service, Brookings Institution, 16 March 2015 (url), pp. 6, 8, 16.
(497) Witty, D., The Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service, Brookings Institution, 16 March 2015 (url), p. 13.
(498) Witty, D. The Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service: From the War on ISIS to the Future, 23 January 2018 (url).
(499) Witty, D. The Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service: From the War on ISIS to the Future, 23 January 2018 (url).
(500) Witty, D., The Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service, Brookings Institution, 16 March 2015 (url), p. 33.
(501) Witty, D. The Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service: From the War on ISIS to the Future, 23 January 2018 (url).
(502) Knights, M. and Mello A., The Best Thing American Built in Iraq, 19 July 2017 (url).
(503) Witty, D. The Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service: From the War on ISIS to the Future, 23 January 2018 (url).
(504) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), p. 19; Witty, D., The Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service, Brookings Institution, 16 March 2015 (url), p. 33; Ahn, J. et al.,The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018 (url), p. 15; ISW, ISIS’s Second Resurgence, 2 October 2018 (url).
(505) ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Population Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017 (url), p. 11.
(506) Witty, D. The Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service: From the War on ISIS to the Future, 23 January 2018 (url).
(507) Witty, D., The Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service, Brookings Institution, 16 March 2015 (url), p. 33; Witty, D. The Iraqi
Counter Terrorism Service: From the War on ISIS to the Future, 23 January 2018 (url).
(508) Witty, D. The Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service: From the War on ISIS to the Future, 23 January 2018 (url).

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT – IRAQ : ACTORS OF PROTECTION— 49

in which it had no experience ( 509). In the fight against ISIL, CTS appears to have ‘spearheaded all major
combat operations’ although it was mainly being employed as a conventional force rather than its
intended focus on targeted counterterrorism missions ( 510). In July 2018, the force was deployed in
the south to protect government installations in the south during violent protests there ( 511).

5.5.4 Integrity
Under PM Maliki, the CTS was seen as the ‘private army’ of the Prime Minister, accountable only tohim, and there were accusations he used it to intimidate Sunnis. The force was implicated in cases of‘political and sectarian targeting’ in 2008-2010. It was also accused of sometimes conducting ‘mass
and arbitrary arrests’ ( 512). It has had problems of being perceived as partially politicised, and lacking
legitimacy due to its US backing, as well as facing lack of resources. Training standards reportedly
deteriorated after the US withdrew and missions began to creep in scope beyond the original intentionof the CTS ( 513). It was, prior to ISIL, ‘one of the most feared and disliked organizations’ ( 514). However,following the successes against ISIL, CTS has become extremely popular with the Iraqi population ( 515).
It has a reputation as a ‘capable and disciplined force’ that recruits across sectarian lines, carries out
strict vetting, does not engage in political activity and has ‘widespread acceptance’ in Iraq ( 516).
However, ISW notes that the CTS has had problems with politicisation and militia-ties, though it islargely responsive and uncompromised ( 517). It has had far less problems with corruption and militiapenetration and higher levels of professionalism and discipline ( 518). It has a ‘better human rights
record’ than other forces involved in Mosul operations, for example ( 519).
In 2018, Human Rights Watch released a report on 78 cases of enforced disappearances in 2014-2017
which alleges the involvement of CTS forces in several cases ( 520).

5.6 National Security Service (NSS) (jihaz al-amn al-watni)
The NSS reports to the Prime Minister ( 521) and according to the Constitution, is under civilian control,
subject to legislative oversight and should operate in accordance with principles of human rights ( 522).
The NSS is ‘ostensibly focus[ed] on intelligence collection’ with as role similar to the traditional
mukhabarat. The NSS reportedly clash with other security forces due to lack of coordination in ‘battle
space’ between units responsible for a given territory. In Ninewa, NSS are often present at checkpoints
to identify individuals of interest ( 523). The NSS also administers PMU units that are recruited fromlocal Sunni militias known as Tribal Mobilisation Units (TMUs) or local Sunni al-hashd al-ashari, whichmainly come from Shamar and Jabour tribes and are US-funded and equipped ( 524). At their peak,(509) Witty, D. The Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service: From the War on ISIS to the Future, 23 January 2018 (url).
(510) Witty, D., The Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service, Brookings Institution, 16 March 2015 (url), p. 36.
(511) ISW, ISIS’s Second Resurgence, 2 October 2018 (url).
(512) Witty, D., The Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service, Brookings Institution, 16 March 2015 (url), p. 17.
(513) Witty, D., The Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service, Brookings Institution, 16 March 2015 (url), p. 33.
(514) Witty, D. The Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service: From the War on ISIS to the Future, 23 January 2018 (url).
(515) Witty, D. The Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service: From the War on ISIS to the Future, 23 January 2018 (url).
(516) Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018 (url), p. 15.
(517) ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Population Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017 (url), p. 11.
(518) Knights, M. and Mello A., The Best Thing American Built in Iraq, 19 July 2017 (url).
(519) AP, Baghdad’s Finest: A look at Iraq’s vaunted special forces, 20 October 2016 (url).
(520) HRW, “Life Without a Father is Meaningless” Arbitrary Arrests and Enforced Disappearances in Iraq 2014-2017, 27
September 2018 (url).
(521) HRW (Human Rights Watch), Iraq: Intelligence Agency Admits Holding Hundred Despite Previous Denials, 22 July 2018(url).
(522) Iraq, Constitution of the Republic of Iraq (15 October 2005), (url), Article 9 (D).
(523) Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018 (url), p. 17.
(524) Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018 (url), p. 19.

50 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT - IRAQ: ACTORS OF PROTECTION

these forces in Iraq numbered 12 000, however due to attrition and lack of political support thesenumbers dropped under Maliki, and as of May 2018 reporting, their numbers are ‘disappearing’ ( 525).
Human Rights Watch reported in July 2018 that NSS admitted it was detaining more than 400 ISIL
suspects in Mosul, after previously denying it had any detention facilities ( 526). NSS told Human Rights
Watch that all detainees appear before a judge within 24 hours and detention ‘may be extended by acompetent judge’. They stated that it was impossible for NSS to provide a fixed number of detainees( 527). However, the same report states that a witness spoke to detainees who had been held fornumerous months and years and experienced torture. NSS admitted that there have also been casesof deaths in detention which they claimed were ‘very limited’ and ‘judicially documented’ ( 528).
In September 2018, Human Rights Watch released a report on 78 cases of enforced disappearancesin 2014-2017 which alleges the involvement of NSS in several cases ( 529).

5.7 Professional conduct
5.7.1 Code of conduct
According to the EU External Action Service, the Iraqi government has ‘strongly supported theprotection of civilians in the military campaign to retake areas from Da’aesh’ ( 530). The Government
has reportedly issued instructions to all ISF personnel that they should ‘protect civilians’ as well as
public and private property ( 531). Grand Ayatollah Sistani has also issued a similar statement (fatwa)
calling for such behaviour ( 532). In February 2018, the Iraqi Commission of Integrity released a code of
conduct for the security forces titled, Code of Conduct Military Personnel and Internal Security ForcesNo. (1) Of (2018). The code applies to personnel of the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior,Counter Terrorism Service, Popular Mobilisation Units, and any other security force covered by thelaws of military or internal security services. Article 1 states that ‘This Code aims to root ethical norms
for the personnel of the military and security institutions to ensure proper, honorable and soundperformance, to respe[c]t military duties, secure public organization and protect the homeland andcitizens’ ( 533).

5.7.2 Arbitrary arrest, detention, torture, disappearances, and extrajudicial killings
According to multiple sources interviewed by DIS in 2018, the primary profile of individuals targetedby security actors are those suspected of affiliation with ISIL ( 534).

(525) Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018 (url), p. 49.
(526) HRW (Human Rights Watch), Iraq: Intelligence Agency Admits Holding Hundred Despite Previous Denials, 22 July 2018(url).
(527) HRW, Response to Human Rights Watch from the National Security Service on July 12, 2018, 12 July 2018 (url).
(528) HRW (Human Rights Watch), Iraq: Intelligence Agency Admits Holding Hundred Despite Previous Denials, 22 July 2018(url).
(529) HRW, “Life Without a Father is Meaningless” Arbitrary Arrests and Enforced Disappearances in Iraq 2014-2017, 27
September 2018 (url).
(530) EU, EEAS, Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy 2017 – Iraq, 28 May 2018 (url), p. 157(531) UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her
mission to Iraq, 14 to 23 November 2017 (A/HRC/38/44/Add.1), 5 June 2018 (url), para. 30.
(532) UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her
mission to Iraq, 14 to 23 November 2017 (A/HRC/38/44/Add.1), 5 June 2018 (url), para. 30.
(533) Iraq, CoI, CoI Activities for the First Quarter of 2018, 2018 url, p. 30.
(534) Denmark, DIS, Northern Iraq – Security Situation and the Situation for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the
Disputed Areas, Including the Possibility to Enter and Access the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), November 2018 (url), p. 20.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT – IRAQ : ACTORS OF PROTECTION— 51

Despite the legal provisions to safeguard against it, security forces reportedly engaged in arrests
without warrants, detention for long periods before seeing a judge, and detained people in secret
locations ( 535). Secret informants were frequently used as evidence for arresting people under the
Anti-Terrorism Law ( 536). ISF and its affiliated carried out extrajudicial killings, torture, andindiscriminate attacks during fighting with ISIL ( 537). Torture and battlefield executions reportedly
occurred with impunity during anti-ISIL operations in Mosul in 2017, for example ( 538). In 2015, the UN
reports that ISF and affiliated militias ‘may have committed some war crimes’ ( 539).
The state did not have comprehensive statistics tracking the number of disappeared persons orenforced disappearances ( 540). The UN estimated in August 2014 (prior to ISIL), that there were 16,408
outstanding cases of such disappearances ( 541).
Torture and ill treatment in detention to obtain confessions or during investigations continued toremain a serious issue in 2017, according to UNAMI ( 542) and were reportedly practiced often ( 543).
Reports gathered by the UN indicate a routine and widespread use of torture and ill treatment inpolice custody, and pre-trial detention facilities of the MoI and the MoD ( 544). Reports of civilian
accusations of abuse by PMUs and associated forces were reportedly common ( 545) as are accusations
by locals that security forces unfairly accuse them of ISIL association ( 546).
Numerous videos of ISF forces, including US-trained Iraqi federal police and members of the military,
appeared online in 2015 showing instances of possible beheadings, and shootings of detainees during
clearance operations ( 547). Multiple videos also appeared in 2017 that showed abuse, ill treatment andarbitrary executions taking place by federal police and soldiers ( 548). For example, in one such video
Iraqi police reportedly abused a Sudanese man accused of being an ISIL member on 22 July 2017 ( 549).
In another, a man in uniform beats one of a dozen detainees, then throwing one off the edge of a highwall shooting him on the ground ( 550).

(535) UN Human Rights Committee, ICCPR Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of Iraq (CCPR/C/IRQ/CO/5), 3
December 2015 (url), para. 33; UN Committee on Enforced Disappearances, Concluding observations on the reportsubmitted by Iraq under article 29 (1) of the Convention (CED/C/IRQ/CO/1), 13 October 2015 (url), para. 28.
(536) Rise Foundation, Mosul and Tal Afar: Context Analysis, December 2017 (url), p. 27.
(537) UN Human Rights Committee, ICCPR Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of Iraq (CCPR/C/IRQ/CO/5), 3
December 2015 (url), para. 19.
(538) HRW, World Report 2018 – Iraq, 9 January 2018 (url).
(539) UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner on the human rights
situation in Iraq in light of abuses committed by the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and associated groups(A/HRC/28/18), 13 March 2015 (url), p. 17.
(540) UN Committee on Enforced Disappearances, Concluding observations on the report submitted by Iraq under article 29(1) of the Convention (CED/C/IRQ/CO/1), 13 October 2015 (url), para. 11.
(541) UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Voluntary Disappearances (A/HRC/27/49), 4
August 2014 (url), p. 12.
(542) UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018 (url), para. 4.2.
(543) UN Human Rights Committee, ICCPR Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of Iraq (CCPR/C/IRQ/CO/5), 3
December 2015 (url), para. 29.
(544) UN Committee Against Torture, Concluding observations on the initial report of Iraq (CAT/C/IRQ/CO/1), 7 September
2015 (url), para. 15.
(545) Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018 (url), p. 45.
(546) Intercept (The), The Underground Caliphate, 16 September 2018 (url).
(547) ABC News, ‘Dirty Brigades’: US-Trained Iraqi Forces Investigated for War Crimes, 11 March 2015 (url).
(548) UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018 (url), para. 4.2.
(549) IraqiNews, Sudan summons Iraqi envoy after citizen cruelly assaulted by Iraqi police, 25 July 2017 (url); UNAMI, Reporton Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018 (url), para. 4.2.
(550) UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018 (url), para. 4.2.

52 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT - IRAQ: ACTORS OF PROTECTION

Unlawful and extrajudicial killings by some members of the ISF, and elements of the PMU in particular,
disappearances, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, and life-threatening prison conditions wereamong the most significant abuses of human rights in 2017, according to USDOS ( 551).
The UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, and arbitrary executions stated in her June2018 report that she received documentation that between 2014-2017 up to the end of the battle of
Mosul, ISF and affiliated forces were responsible for human rights violations, mainly connected torevenge, disappearances, and killings of Sunni civilians, including IDPs, detainees, children, andsuspected ISIL fighters hors de combat ( 552). According to a September 2018 study by Human Rights
Watch, the group documented 78 cases of enforced disappearances of men and boys in 2014-2017 in
Iraq. Most of those cases documented were Sunni Arab men in their thirties arrested mainly by the
PMUs but also other forces, in the context of anti-ISIL operations ( 553). There were 36 disappearances
attributed to PMUs, however, other forces of the ISF were also implicated: Anbar Operations
Command, Federal Police, MoI’s Intelligence and Counter-terrorism Office, NSS, special weapons andtactics forces (SWAT), and the Prime Minister’s Special Forces, as well as KRG’s Asayish ( 554).
During the battle for Mosul in 2016-2017, there were reports of arbitrary arrest and some cases offorcible disappearances by the Kurdish security forces, as well as retaliatory attacks against Sunni
Arabs and property in the course of operations to recapture ISIL territory ( 555).
Sexual violence has also reportedly been used by the Iraqi army and militias, with apparent impunity( 556).
Corruption and abuses by ISF in summer 2018 also included forcing family members to pay bribes torecover bodies, as well as alleged involvement in kidnappings, assassinations, robbery and criminal
activity ( 557).
USDOS reported that government forces, including ISF, PMU and Kurdish forces detained and arrested
individuals on suspicion of supporting ISIL, including IDPs, and ‘routinely’ doing so with Sunni males,
particularly following liberation of ISIL-held areas ( 558). DFAT similarly states that in practice,throughout Iraq and KRI, security forces arrested and detained Sunni males in particular, without
access to counsel ( 559). Family members were also detained in order to compel ISIL suspects tosurrender ( 560) of forcibly removed by security forces ( 561). Iraqi Security Forces have reportedly been
involved in forced expulsions of families with alleged links to ISIL ( 562) and forcing Sunnis in particular(551) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 1.
(552) UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her
mission to Iraq, 14 to 23 November 2017 (A/HRC/38/44/Add.1), 5 June 2018 (url), paras. 30-32.
(553) HRW, “Life Without a Father is Meaningless” Arbitrary Arrests and Enforced Disappearances in Iraq 2014-2017, 27
September 2018 (url).
(554) HRW, “Life Without a Father is Meaningless” Arbitrary Arrests and Enforced Disappearances in Iraq 2014-2017, 27
September 2018 (url).
(555) UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her
mission to Iraq, 14 to 23 November 2017 (A/HRC/38/44/Add.1), 5 June 2018 (url), para. 36.
(556) UN Committee Against Torture, Concluding observations on the initial report of Iraq (CAT/C/IRQ/CO/1), 7 September
2015 (url), para. 13.
(557) US, Lead Inspector General for Overseas and Contingency Operations, Operation Inherent Resolve and Operation
Pacific Eagle-Philippines – April 1 2018-June 30 2018, August 2018 (url), pp. 21-22.
(558) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 13.
(559) Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report – Iraq [updated 9 October 2018], 9 October 2018 (url), p. 25.
(560) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 14.
(561) Rise Foundation, Mosul and Tal Afar: Context Analysis, December 2017 (url), p. 28.
(562) UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018 (url), p. 6.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT – IRAQ : ACTORS OF PROTECTION— 53

into ISIL camps ( 563). Sunni Arabs were subjected to ‘systematic and egregious violations’ including
killings, torture, and disappearance due to perceived ISIL affiliation, carried out by militias withgovernment insignia, and in particular Iranian controlled militia groups, according to USCIRF ( 564).
Displaced Iraqis, and their family members suspected of supporting ISIL were ‘vulnerable to revenge
attacks or retribution killings’, denied access to services, and were often denied return or unwilling toreturn to their area of origin ( 565). DFAT stated in its October 2018 report that the government claimed
it made efforts to reduce risks of abuses while also effectively screening of IDPs for ISIL suspects, but
DFAT gave no further detail ( 566).
The lack of unified command across units of the security forces has led to an inability to hold force
commanders accountable for abuses committed by their units ( 567).

(563) US, USCIRF, Annual Report 2018 – Iraq, April 2018 (url).
(564) US, USCIRF, Annual Report 2018 – Iraq, April 2018 (url).
(565) USDOS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2017 – Iraq, 6 September 2018 (url).
(566) Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report – Iraq [updated 9 October 2018], 9 October 2018 (url), p. 26.
(567) Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018 (url), p. 45.

54 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT - IRAQ: ACTORS OF PROTECTION

6. Judiciary and legal system
6.1 Court structure
The court system in Iraq ‘lacks a single comprehensive law regulating organization and administration,
thus making it difficult to ascertain the exact institutional hierarchy of the courts ( 568). The two highest
courts are the Federal Supreme Court and the Court of Cassation (Appeal) ( 569). The Federal Supreme
Court rules on federalism and constitutionality issues ( 570). The Court of Cassation is the last appeal
court for all cases, except security-related cases, and adjudicates cases involving state officials or incase of conflicts of lower court jurisdiction ( 571).
According to Lifos, the regular criminal justice system ‘consists of courts of investigation, first
instance courts (including misdemeanor courts), courts of appeal and a Court of Cassation (and the
Public Prosecution Department)’ ( 572). Other lower courts include the Court of Appeal, Court of First
Instance, Courts of Personal Status, Labour, Criminal, Juvenile and Religious Matters ( 573).
Juvenile justice courts are specialised to handle matters concerning crimes by people aged 9 to 17;
these are handled by a single investigative judge, who then may refer the matter to juvenile court for
sanctioning; decisions are reviewed by the Federal Court of Cassation ( 574).
First Instance Courts are set up in the center of each province to hear civil lawsuits ( 575). For criminal
matters, regular provincial criminal courts have an Investigative court and a Felony (trial) court ( 576).
Investigating Courts are mandated to ‘investigate all crimes’ and are located in each area where there
is a First Instance court ( 577). Appeal courts are located in sixteen judicial areas of the governorates of
Iraq (not including Kurdistan), two of which are in Baghdad (Rusafa and Kharkh) ( 578).
There are also specialised courts for ‘integrity cases’ linked to the CoI ( 579). Special counterterrorism
courts that handle cases related to ISIL in both Iraq and the Kurdish region ( 580). The Central Criminal
Court of Iraq in Baghdad is a specialised court dealing with complicated major crimes ( 581). This courthas ‘sweeping, nation-wide jurisdiction’ with a specific mandate to focus on ‘terrorism, organized(568) ILEI, Constitutional Law of Iraq, 2013 (url), p. 24.
(569) Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report – Iraq [updated 9 October 2018], 9 October 2018 (url), p. 28.
(570) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 15.
(571) Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report – Iraq [updated 9 October 2018], 9 October 2018 (url), p. 28.
(572) Sweden, Lifos, 8 May 2014, Iraq: Rule of Law in the Security and Legal System (url), pp. 11-12.
(573) Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report – Iraq [updated 9 October 2018], 9 October 2018 (url), p. 28.
(574) Christova, A., Seven Years of EUJUST LEX: The Challenge of Rule of Law in Iraq, 2013, Journal of Contemporary
European Research (url), p. 428.
(575) Al-Mahmood, M., The Judiciary in Iraq, 2014, pp. 85-92.
(576) Warnock, D., The Iraqi Criminal Justice System, An Introduction, Denver Journal of International Law and Practice,
Volume 39, No. 1, Winter 2011 (url), p. 3.
(577) Al-Mahmood, M., The Judiciary in Iraq, 2014, pp. 85-92.
(578) Al-Mahmood, M., The Judiciary in Iraq, 2014, pp. 85-92.
(579) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), pp. 35-36.
(580) HRW, Flawed Justice, December 2017 (url), p. 21(581) Al-Mahmood, M., The Judiciary in Iraq, 2014, pp. 85-92.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT – IRAQ : ACTORS OF PROTECTION— 55

crime, corruption, and other serious cases’ ( 582). Appeals are sent directly to the national Court ofCassation ( 583). The Criminal Procedure Code applies in this court in the same way as other courts ( 584).
Specialised courts for trafficking cases were established in 2016; however, in 2017, the Higher Judicial
Council repealed the directive, and no specialised courts of judges heard those cases ( 585).
The Iraqi High Tribunal is a special tribunal that tries defendants from the Saddam Husseingovernment for abuses committed up to 2003 ( 586). It reportedly stopped functioning in 2015 and did
not provide information about the number of perpetrators convicted, investigations ongoing,
reparations, or sentences imposed ( 587).
Internal disciplinary courts exist within the Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Defence for theirown criminal justice system with both a trial and cassation level. According to the GJPI, ‘[t]he Ministryof Interior Courts have jurisdiction over crimes stipulated in the Internal Security forces Penal Law No.
14 of 2008, the Penal Code No. 111 of 1969 or other penal laws if a policeman commits the crime
provided that the victim is not a civilian’ ( 588).
Courts in the Kurdish region are managed and supervised under the Kurdish Judicial Council ( 589). The
Kurdish court structure and judicial system is closely reflective of the federal judiciary ( 590).
National Iraqi courts are responsible for applying the Iraqi Penal Code no. 111 of 1969 and the Iraqi
Criminal Procedures Code No. 23 of 1971 in line with general constitutional guarantees relating to thepunishment of crime ( 591).
Iraqi courts do not have jurisdiction over international crimes occurring in Iraq as they are notprovided for in the Penal Code of 1969 ( 592), nor do they have the capacity to investigate or prosecute
crimes occurring in relation to armed conflict and violations of international humanitarian law,according to UNAMI ( 593). The UN established an investigative team under UNSC Resolution 2379
(2017) to support Iraq’s government in investigating war crimes and crimes against humanity by ISIL
( 594).

(582) Warnock, D., The Iraqi Criminal Justice System, An Introduction, Denver Journal of International Law and Practice,
Volume 39, No. 1, Winter 2011 (url), p. 2.
(583) Warnock, D., The Iraqi Criminal Justice System, An Introduction, Denver Journal of International Law and Practice,
Volume 39, No. 1, Winter 2011 (url), p. 3.
(584) Warnock, D., The Iraqi Criminal Justice System, An Introduction, Denver Journal of International Law and Practice,
Volume 39, No. 1, Winter 2011 (url), p. 3.
(585) USDOS, Trafficking in Persons Report 2017 – Iraq, 28 June 2018 (url), p. 232.
(586) HRW, Flawed Justice, December 2017 (url), p. 12; Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2018 Country Report — Iraq, 2018 (url), p.
33(587) UN Human Rights Committee, ICCPR Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of Iraq (CCPR/C/IRQ/CO/5), 3
December 2015 (url), para. 17.
(588) GJPI, Special Courts and Tribunals, 29 November 2009 (url).
(589) HRW, Flawed Justice, December 2017 (url), p. 21(590) GJPI, The Judiciary and the Law in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, 14 August 2009 (url).
(591) Iraq, Consideration of reported submitted by States parties under article 40 of the Covenant: Fifth periodic reports ofStates parties due in 2000 (CCPR/C/IRQ/5), 12 December 2013 (url), para. 52.
(592) UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her
mission to Iraq, 14 to 23 November 2017 (A/HRC/38/44/Add.1), 5 June 2018 (url), paras. 19, 49; UNAMI, Report on Human
Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018 (url), para. 4.3.
(593) UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018 (url), para. 4.3.
(594) UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her
mission to Iraq, 14 to 23 November 2017 (A/HRC/38/44/Add.1), 5 June 2018 (url), paras. 19, 51-53.

56 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT - IRAQ: ACTORS OF PROTECTION

6.2 Criminal trial procedures
According to the UK Consulate in Erbil, the Iraqi legal system is a civil law system which means that:‘the primary source of law is not past court room decisions, or Judge-made law, but rather, a
set of written laws, contained in “codes”- for example, the Iraqi Civil Code, or the Iraqi
Commercial Code. In the Iraqi system there are Judges, but those Judges are instructed tobase their decisions not on past decisions, but on the code which applies to the case at hand.
For example, in a criminal case being tried in Kurdistan Iraq, the Criminal Court Judge mustbase his decision on the articles which are contained in the Iraqi Penal Code. The Judge is notsupposed to refer to or make reference to past legal decisions; rather, he is supposed to follow
the Penal Code’ ( 595).
In Iraq’s civil-law criminal justice system, Iraqi judges (firstly investigative judges, then trial judges) are
the central figures who run the criminal investigation process; they ‘issue arrest warrants, interview
witnesses, determine appropriate charges, weight the evidence, issue findings, and pass sentences’.
Unlike a US-style system that separates pre-trial investigations from the trial procedure, ‘Iraqi courts
consider fact-gathering to be an integral part of the judicial purview’ and it is the first step in theformal trial process. While some fact-gathering occurs before the criminal proceedings, the criminal
justice process ‘calls for the investigative judge (…) to repeat or confirm all critical facts of the case’.
In Iraq’s criminal justice system, Iraqi judges ‘spend their time determining what if anything happened’
and after ascertaining the facts, formally charge the accused ( 596). The accused may be aware of theoffense being investigated by the investigating judge, but not the specific crime he is to be charged
with; in Iraqi courts, after the trial judge assesses the evidence and determines if a crime has beencommitted, the charge is formalised ( 597).
The UK Baghdad Embassy explains that at criminal trials in Iraq, ‘a panel of one or three trial chamber
judges hears the case in public. After trial, the trial chamber reaches a judgement of either guilty or
not guilty. If not guilty, the accused is released. If guilty, sentencing takes place’ with set penalties foreach crime. Appeals can be made to the appellate chamber ( 598).
The UK Consulate in Erbil writes that during the trial in KRI criminal cases, there is ‘no trial by jury’ but
the person appears in the relevant Criminal Court, which is open to the public, and stands before the
Criminal Court Judge who directs the case and asks questions, with your lawyer present. An accuser
may also be present in the court room – ‘an individual who says that they were the victim’. The
proceedings are reportedly overseen by an Attorney General, who ensures the law is followed, andhas the power to launch an official investigation ‘if legal or procedural abuses are taking place’ ( 599).
There is no discretion by the judge to grant clemency or bail; appeals can be launched within 30 daysor the right is lost; and sentences are guided by the Iraqi Penal Code ( 600).

(595) UK, British Consulate-General Erbil, Information Pack for British Prisoners in Kurdistan Region of Iraq, July 2018 (url),
pp. 9-10.
(596) Warnock, D., The Iraqi Criminal Justice System, An Introduction, Denver Journal of International Law and Practice,
Volume 39, No. 1, Winter 2011 (url), p. 5.
(597) Warnock, D., The Iraqi Criminal Justice System, An Introduction, Denver Journal of International Law and Practice,
Volume 39, No. 1, Winter 2011 (url), pp. 47-48.
(598) UK, Embassy in Baghdad, Information Pack for British Prisoners in Iraq (not including Kurdistan), September 2017 (url),
p. 10.
(599) UK, British Consulate-General Erbil, Information Pack for British Prisoners in Kurdistan Region of Iraq, July 2018 (url), p.
10.
(600) UK, British Consulate-General Erbil, Information Pack for British Prisoners in Kurdistan Region of Iraq, July 2018 (url), p.
11.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT – IRAQ : ACTORS OF PROTECTION— 57

6.3 Capacity
Judges play the primary role in investigation of cases in Iraq. Prosecutors in Iraq have the role to review
case files, provide recommendations to judges, try the case and deliberate findings; they may attend
the trial and accompany judges in deliberations, however, their role is largely administrative incomparison to judges ( 601).
Investigating judges have six months of training and prosecutors have two years of training beyond
their Bachelor of Laws, according to Lifos ( 602). The Iraqi judiciary requires professional training for allprosecutors and judges involved in investigating and prosecuting crime be graduates of the Iraqi
Judicial Institute which is a two year course given to qualified lawyers who hold a four year law degree( 603). The judiciary reportedly still follows professional standards and practices of the Baathist period( 604). Defence lawyers do not require special training beyond a law degree ( 605).
There was a lack of information about the impact of human rights training for police, prison staff andjudicial officers ( 606). With the support of UNDP, since 2015, the government has made efforts toreform the security and justice sectors. Efforts have included creating Parliamentary committees toimplement civilian oversight of security sector reform and a Criminal Justice Working Group to meet
regularly and identify reform priorities, and training officials in security sector reform ( 607).
The judiciary is described as understaffed ( 608). A 2013 report submitted by Iraq to the UN stated that
there were 1,327 judges in the Department of Public Prosecutions ( 609). According to Lifos sources in
2014, there were an estimated 1 700 judges in Iraq ( 610). Women were not well-represented in highlevels of government and the judiciary ( 611). Iraq reported in 2013 having 27 female judges ( 612). Witha shortage of judges in Iraq, one judge may have the responsibility for areas covering a million people,
leaving judges overwhelmed with work and only enough time to read summaries of preliminary
investigation reports, if at all ( 613).
The lack of capacity in the judiciary to deal with cases was also due to vast numbers of detainees,
detentions without documentation, slow legal processing times, lack of use of bail provisions, and lackof information sharing ( 614).

(601) Warnock, D., The Iraqi Criminal Justice System, An Introduction, Denver Journal of International Law and Practice,
Volume 39, No. 1, Winter 2011 (url), p. 5.
(602) Sweden, Lifos, Iraq: Rule of Law in the Security and Legal System, 8 May 2014 (url), p. 10.
(603) Warnock, D., The Iraqi Criminal Justice System, An Introduction, Denver Journal of International Law and Practice,
Volume 39, No. 1, Winter 2011 (url), pp. 6-7.
(604) Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2018 Country Report — Iraq, 2018 (url), p. 12.
(605) Warnock, D., The Iraqi Criminal Justice System, An Introduction, Denver Journal of International Law and Practice,
Volume 39, No. 1, Winter 2011 (url), pp. 6-7.
(606) UN Committee Against Torture, Concluding observations on the initial report of Iraq (CAT/C/IRQ/CO/1), 7 September
2015 (url), para. 30.
(607) UNDP Iraq, Rule of Law Programme, n.d. (url).
(608) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 17; Sweden, Lifos, 8 May
2014, Iraq: Rule of Law in the Security and Legal System (url), pp. 11-12.
(609) Iraq, Consideration of reported submitted by States parties under article 40 of the Covenant: Fifth periodic reports ofStates parties due in 2000 (CCPR/C/IRQ/5), 12 December 2013 (url, p. 69.
(610) Sweden, Lifos, 8 May 2014, Iraq: Rule of Law in the Security and Legal System (url), pp. 11-12.
(611) UN Human Rights Committee, ICCPR Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of Iraq (CCPR/C/IRQ/CO/5), 3
December 2015 (url), para. 13.
(612) Iraq, Consideration of reported submitted by States parties under article 40 of the Covenant: Fifth periodic reports ofStates parties due in 2000 (CCPR/C/IRQ/5), 12 December 2013 (url, p. 69.
(613) Sweden, Lifos, 8 May 2014, Iraq: Rule of Law in the Security and Legal System (url), pp. 11-12.
(614) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 14.

58 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT - IRAQ: ACTORS OF PROTECTION

6.4 Effectiveness
The UN describes the criminal justice system in Iraq as ‘weak’ ( 615). Sources state that courts lackresources and have ‘limited forensic capabilities’ ( 616) and that lack of ‘remuneration, security,
technical, and human resources’ hindered the judiciary from carrying out its duties ( 617). The UK
Embassy in Baghdad notes that lack of resources in the judiciary caused ‘lengthy delays before andduring trials’ ( 618).
According to a 2010 paper about the Iraqi criminal justice system ( 619), in Iraq, case verdicts and judicial
explanations of them are not formally recorded for future use in similar cases ( 620). In terms ofmonitoring judicial performance, if judges act inappropriately, they can be reported to the Public
Prosecutor ( 621). The work of investigative and trial judges is reviewed by appellate court presidents
and Ministry of Justice, who have disciplinary authority of them ( 622).
Abuses by paramilitary groups have gone on with impunity and without being addressed by the judicial
system ( 623).
In 2017, there were 272 honour crimes reported to police and sent to court; up from 224 in 2016.
There were also 3 400 domestic violence cases reported, up from 3 600 in 2016 ( 624). Domestic
violence and honour killings are rarely punished and spousal rape is not criminalised ( 625).
The government made efforts to enforce its 2012 anti-trafficking law that applies to Iraq (except KRI),
but failed to prosecute or convict officials involved in human and sex trafficking and child soldiering( 626). MoI claimed to have prosecuted 22 human traffickers in 2017, but provided no details ( 627).
Iraq continues to allow for the death penalty, hand down sentences to death, and carry out capital
punishment ( 628), being among the top three countries in the Middle East that imposes and carries out
state executions according to Amnesty International’s 2017 report on death sentences and executions( 629).

(615) UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Death Penalty in Iraq, October 2014 (url), p. 2(616) Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report – Iraq [updated 9 October 2018], 9 October 2018 (url), p. 28.
(617) Al-Khatteeb, L. and Al Sadoon O., Iraq’s Rule of Law [Brookings Institution Oped], 26 July 2015 (url).
(618) UK, Embassy in Baghdad, Information Pack for British Prisoners in Iraq (not including Kurdistan), September 2017 (url),
p. 9(619) Written by Dan Warnock, a US Airforce attorney who was based in Baghdad and observed the criminal justice system
in practice during 2010.
(620) Warnock, D., The Iraqi Criminal Justice System, An Introduction, Denver Journal of International Law and Practice,
Volume 39, No. 1, Winter 2011 (url), p. 4.
(621) Warnock, D., The Iraqi Criminal Justice System, An Introduction, Denver Journal of International Law and Practice,
Volume 39, No. 1, Winter 2011 (url), p. 4.
(622) Warnock, D., The Iraqi Criminal Justice System, An Introduction, Denver Journal of International Law and Practice,
Volume 39, No. 1, Winter 2011 (url), p. 4.
(623) Mansour, R., Rebuilding the Iraqi State: Stabilisation, Governance, and Reconciliation, February 2018 (url, p. 24.
(624) UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018 (url), para. 5.2.
(625) Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2018 – Iraq, (url),(626) USDOS, 2018 Trafficking in Persons Report – Iraq, June 2018 (url).
(627) USDOS, 2018 Trafficking in Persons Report – Iraq, June 2018 (url).
(628) UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her
mission to Iraq, 14 to 23 November 2017 (A/HRC/38/44/Add.1), 5 June 2018 (url), paras. 59-68.
(629) AI, Death Sentences and Executions 2017, 2018 (url), p. 32.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT – IRAQ : ACTORS OF PROTECTION— 59

6.5 Integrity
6.5.1 Public trust
Iraqi often avoid Iraqi civil and criminal courts and instead rely on tribal and religious disputesettlement of private issues ( 630), even those involving major crimes ( 631). This was largely due to lackof access to justice, lack of trust in the judiciary ( 632) or because of lack of social status and financial
resources for some parts of the population ( 633). Some citizens turned to religious and militia groups
instead of the official system, mainly in poor areas of the south and west, according to DFAT ( 634).

6.5.2 Independence, corruption, threats
The Iraqi judiciary is described as having restricted independence and impartiality with a weak anddependent nature due to the unstable security situation and historical political conflict ( 635).
Judges, lawyers, and family members faced threats ( 636). The independence of the judiciary was
undermined by threats and killings by sectarian, tribal, criminal and extremist elements ( 637), politicalparties and paramilitary groups ( 638). Judicial officials face ‘significant pressure’, intimidation, andviolence, particularly for cases of organised crime, corruption or related to militias ( 639). According tosources, the judiciary became especially politicised under former PM Maliki who appointed politicalloyalists to the Supreme Judicial Council and Federal Supreme Court ( 640). Over the past few years, theIranian-backed PMUs made particular effort to create strong bonds with the judiciary, with Fateh’s alAmeri and PMU administrator Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis offering the block 2015 judicial reforms
proposed by PM Abadi ( 641). The judiciary is described by the same source as ‘friendly’ toward the
PMUs ( 642).
Corruption and intimidation impacted judges in criminal cases, at the trial level, and on appeal ( 643).

(630) Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2018 Country Report — Iraq, 2018 (url), p. 8; Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2018 –Iraq, (url).
(631) Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2018 – Iraq, (url).
(632) Revkin, M., The Limits of Punishments: Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism – Iraq Case Study, May 2018 (url), p.
24; Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2018 – Iraq, (url).
(633) Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2018 Country Report — Iraq, 2018 (url), p. 8(634) Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report – Iraq [updated 9 October 2018], 9 October 2018 (url), p. 28.
(635) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 15.
(636) UN Human Rights Committee, ICCPR Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of Iraq (CCPR/C/IRQ/CO/5), 3
December 2015 (url), para. 35; USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p.
15.
(637) UN Human Rights Committee, ICCPR Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of Iraq (CCPR/C/IRQ/CO/5), 3
December 2015 (url), para. 35; USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p.
15; Sweden, Lifos, 8 May 2014, Iraq: Rule of Law in the Security and Legal System (url), p. 13.
(638) Hasan, H., Beyond Security: Stabilization, Governance, and Socioeconomic Challenges in Iraq, Atlantic Council, July
2018 (url), pp. 12-13; TI, Iraq: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption, 20 March 2015 (url).
(639) Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report – Iraq [updated 9 October 2018], 9 October 2018 (url), p. 28.
(640) Sweden, Lifos, Iraq: Rule of Law in the Security and Legal System, 8 May 2014 (url), p. 10; International Crisis Group,
Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018 (url), p. 9.
(641) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), p. 9.
(642) International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018(url), p. 10.
(643) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 15.

60 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT - IRAQ: ACTORS OF PROTECTION

According to sources, the Iraqi judiciary is susceptible to corruption and bribery ( 644) and politicalinterference, and pressure from religious and tribal forces ( 645). Appointments and court decisions are
influenced by political and sectarian identity, according to DFAT ( 646).
Human Rights Watch documented instances in 2018 where defence lawyers who were providing
assistance to perceived ISIL suspects and family members accused of terrorism charges or missing civil
documentation were threatened by security officials from the NSS, MoI, and CTS ( 647).

6.5.3 Arbitrary arrest, detention and access to legal assistance
UK Embassy in Baghdad states that ‘there are no procedures which are strictly followed on arrest’ in
Iraq ( 648). Despite constitutional protections against unlawful detention and the requirement thatarresting bodies provide documentation to a judge within 24 hours of arrest, arbitrary arrest anddetention continued to be frequently reported in Iraq ( 649). Suspects were arrested without warrants,
under anti-terrorism laws in particular ( 650) in processes described by human rights experts, lawyers,
judges and prosecutors as ‘rife with abuses’ ( 651). KRG and ISF forces reportedly screened individuals
from ISIL-controlled areas against official lists based on being identified by community members ( 652).
There were numerous reports that the ISF, including PMF and Peshmerga arrested and temporarily
detained Sunni Arab IDPs predominantly ( 653). Under the Anti-Terrorism Law, law enforcement
officials detained terrorism suspects without charge of trial for extended periods ( 654).
Pre-trial detention after arrest was often lengthy; such detentions without judicial process were
described as ‘systematic’ by the US Department of State ( 655). The UN reports that there are a ‘large
number of persons’ who have been held in pre-trial detention beyond the period mandated under thelaw ( 656). The lack of judicial review was due to large numbers of detainees, delays in processing
criminal investigations, an ‘insufficient number of judges and trained judicial personnel’, as well as
issues of bribery, corruption, and failure to use legal mechanisms such as bail or conditional release( 657).

(644) Hasan, H., Beyond Security: Stabilization, Governance, and Socioeconomic Challenges in Iraq, Atlantic Council, July
2018 (url), pp. 12-13; TI, Iraq: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption, 20 March 2015 (url).
(645) CSIS, Iraqi in Crisis, May 2014 (url), p. 270.
(646) Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report – Iraq [updated 9 October 2018], 9 October 2018 (url), p. 28.
(647) HRW, Iraq: Officials Threatening, Arresting Lawyers, 12 September 2018 (url).
(648) UK, Embassy in Baghdad, Information Pack for British Prisoners in Iraq (not including Kurdistan), September 2017 (url),
p. 7.
(649) HRW, Flawed Justice, December 2017 (url), p. 12; USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq,
20 April 2018 (url), p. 9, 12, 3, 14; UN Human Rights Committee, ICCPR Concluding observations on the fifth periodic reportof Iraq (CCPR/C/IRQ/CO/5), 3 December 2015 (url), para. 33.
(650) UN Human Rights Committee, ICCPR Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of Iraq (CCPR/C/IRQ/CO/5), 3
December 2015 (url), para. 33; USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p.
12.
(651) Intercept (The), Justice for the Enemy, 17 June 2018 (url).
(652) HRW, World Report 2018: Iraq, 18 January 2018 (url).
(653) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 9.
(654) UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Death Penalty in Iraq, October 2014 (url), p. 2; Intercept (The), Justice for the Enemy,
17 June 2018 (url).
(655) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), pp. 13, 14.
(656) UN Human Rights Committee, ICCPR Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of Iraq (CCPR/C/IRQ/CO/5), 3
December 2015 (url), para. 33.
(657) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), pp. 13, 14.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT – IRAQ : ACTORS OF PROTECTION— 61

Legal counsel is provided for under the Constitution for those who cannot afford a lawyer ( 658);
however, lawyers complained about lack of access to clients ( 659).

6.5.4 Treatment in detention
Prison population
Lengthy detention without action by the court and due process was a ‘systemic problem’ ( 660). Press
reports investigating the issue in 2018 estimate 19 000 ( 661) to 20 000 people ( 662) are in detention on
accusations of ISIL connections and terrorism offences ( 663). UNAMI reported that at the end of 2017,
more than 1 000 children, mostly boys, were in juvenile detention due to national security charges
related to alleged ISIL affiliation ( 664).
An estimated 10,000 foreign fighters are in the custody of the Government of Iraq as of August 2018
( 665). Among the general prison population in Iraq, there are reportedly 1 350 foreign women and 580
children, most of whom had surrendered to ISF during operations in Tal Afar in 2017 ( 666).
As of 2017, UNAMI reported that Kurdistan Region authorities reportedly held 5 898 prisoners, which
included 2 630 detainees and 3 268 convicts, mostly men (3 023) with 95 women and 150 juveniles( 667).
Prison conditions and treatment
According to the UK Embassy in Baghdad, there are ‘considerable differences’ in detention conditions
among various authorities with the Ministry of Justice prisons having the highest standards, comparedto Ministries of Interior and Defence ( 668). Ministry of Justice detention facilities have been describedby UNAMI as seriously overcrowded with poor infrastructure, including those facilities for juveniles( 669). Other sources state that overcrowding was a common problem, with poor physical and sanitation
conditions ( 670) and sometimes lacking access to food water and medical services ( 671). Human Rights
Watch also reported that Iraqi prison conditions were ‘deplorable’, noting in its reporting on 1 200
detained ISIL suspects, exposure to extreme overcrowding, lack of ventilation, overheating, lack of
medical support contributing to deaths in detention and amputations for treatable wounds, andlimited access to sanitation facilities ( 672).

(658) Iraq, Constitution of the Republic of Iraq (15 October 2005), Unofficial English version available at: (url), Article 19 (11).
(659) UNDP, UNDP trains mid-ranking police officers to improve the effectiveness of Local Police, 3 September 2018 (url), p.
11.
(660) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url),(661) AP, Iraq holding more than 19,000 because of IS, militant ties, 22 March 2018 (url).
(662) New York Times (The), A 10-Minute Trial, a Death Sentence: Iraqi Justice for ISIS Suspects, 17 April 2018 (url).
(663) AP, Iraq holding more than 19,000 because of IS, militant ties, 22 March 2018 (url); New York Times (The), A 10Minute Trial, a Death Sentence: Iraqi Justice for ISIS Suspects, 17 April 2018 (url).
(664) UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018 (url), p. 8.
(665) UN Secretary General, Seventh report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international
peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat(S/2018/770), 16 August 2018 (url), para. 10.
(666) New York Times (The), A 10-Minute Trial, a Death Sentence: Iraqi Justice for ISIS Suspects, 17 April 2018 (url), p. 13.
(667) UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018 (url), p. 11.
(668) UK, Embassy in Baghdad, Information Pack for British Prisoners in Iraq (not including Kurdistan), September 2017 (url),
p. 7.
(669) UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018 (url), p. vii.
(670) UK, Embassy in Baghdad, Information Pack for British Prisoners in Iraq (not including Kurdistan), September 2017 (url),
p. 7.
(671) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 7.
(672) HRW, Iraq: Hundreds Detained in Degrading Conditions, 13 March 2017 (url).

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Women prisoners, particularly those detained on terrorism charges, have been subjected to rape andsexual assault ( 673). Sexual violence, rape and torture occur against women in detention, mainly
against Sunni women accused of covering for their male relatives ( 674). Children were held in poor,
overcrowded conditions and exposed to physical and sexual abuse in detention ( 675).
Torture remained a widespread practice in police detention, interrogation cells, and in prisons ( 676).
Detained suspects are subject to treatment such as electrocution, solitary confinement, and beatings
by investigators, according to a report on treatment of ISIL suspects by The Intercept in 2018 ( 677).
There were reports of deaths in custody following torture or other ill treatment ( 678). Sources indicatethat international human rights groups documented a wide range of torture and abuses in detention
facilities run by MoI and to a lesser degree, in MoD facilities and in KRG ( 679). Detainees on terrorism
charges were more likely to stay in detention for longer periods in MoI and MoD facilities ( 680).
KRG facilities in major cities were described as ‘well maintained’ compared to poorer conditions insmaller KRG MoI facilities; some Asayish jails held minors together with adults ( 681).

6.5.5 Fair trial
The law requires that confessional statements must be corroborated with other evidence or be
rejected if coercion is substantiated, however this did not always occur in court ( 682). Forced
confessions frequently remained a common source of evidence in trials ( 683), often obtained by torture( 684). Secret informant evidence is also frequently relied upon ( 685). Courts did not investigate detainee
claims that they had been tortured while detained ( 686). A 2016 law allowed for retrials of detainees
based on forced confession or secret informants; the Ministry of Justice claimed that 4 500 detainees
were released as a result of the law between 2016 and 31 May 2017 ( 687). Sources describe trial
procedures in Iraq as ‘deeply flawed’ ( 688) and did not meet international standards despite the effortsof judges to investigate, trial, and appellate courts to provide for the right to fair trial ( 689).

(673) UN Human Rights Committee, ICCPR Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of Iraq (CCPR/C/IRQ/CO/5), 3
December 2015 (url), para. 29.
(674) UN Committee Against Torture, Concluding observations on the initial report of Iraq (CAT/C/IRQ/CO/1), 7 September
2015 (url), para. 15.
(675) UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations on the combined second to fourth periodic reportsof Iraq (CRC/C/IRQ/CO/2-4), 3 March 2015 (url), para. 86.
(676) EU, EEAS, Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy 2017 – Iraq, 28 May 2018 (url), p. 156(677) Intercept (The), Justice for the Enemy, 17 June 2018 (url).
(678) UN Human Rights Committee, ICCPR Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of Iraq (CCPR/C/IRQ/CO/5), 3
December 2015 (url), para. 29.
(679) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 6.
(680) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 6.
(681) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 8.
(682) UK, Embassy in Baghdad, Information Pack for British Prisoners in Iraq (not including Kurdistan), September 2017 (url),
p. 9.
(683) UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018 (url), para. 4.2; USDOS, Country Reports
on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 16.
(684) UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018 (url), para. 4.2; Freedom House,
Freedom in the World 2018 – Iraq, (url).
(685) Rise Foundation, Mosul and Tal Afar: Context Analysis, December 2017 (url), p. 27.
(686) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), pp. 13, 14; HRW, Iraq: Judges
Disregard Torture Allegations, 31 July 2018 (url).
(687) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 9.
(688) Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2018 – Iraq, (url); HRW (Human Rights Watch), Flawed Justice, December 2017(url).
(689) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 16.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT – IRAQ : ACTORS OF PROTECTION— 63

Detainees were not given sufficient access to government-appointed legal counsel or representation,
despite provisions for it under the law ( 690). The lawyers subsequently stopped taking ISIL-relatedcases, leaving suspects to be defended by state-appointed lawyers, whom Human Rights Watch stated
did not ‘provide a robust defense of these clients’ ( 691). Human Rights Watch documented theissuance of arrest warrants against 15 private lawyers who were representing ISIL suspects in Ninewa’s
counterterrorism court in 2017 ( 692).
Both UNAMI and the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions
described large scale problems of the lack of due process, fair trial rights and violation of the right tolife, especially in relation to the application of the death penalty ( 693). The Special Rapporteur
concluded in 2018 that ‘existing procedural guarantees to ensure fair trials are either not
implemented in practice or proven insufficient against abuses of due process rights, resulting insystematic violations of the right to life’ ( 694). Children may also be sentenced to death and the age ofcriminal responsibility is nine. ( 695).
Anti-terrorism trials were particularly flawed ( 696). Under Iraqi law, the death penalty can be imposed
under the Iraqi Penal Code (IPC) No. 111 of 1969 or the Anti-Terrorism Law No. 13 of 2005. Terrorism
crimes are prosecuted in KRI under the Anti-Terrorism Law (No. 3 of 2006), which expired in July 2016
( 697) and was later renewed in July 2018 ( 698). The KRG appears to have a ‘defacto moratorium’ on
executions as of 2008 ( 699), though it executed three individuals in 2015 and another three in 2016
( 700).
Most ISIL suspects being tried by the central government are in proceedings in the Ninewa
governorate counter-terrorism court, though they also occur in the Baghdad counterterrorism
chamber of the Central Criminal Court ( 701). According to Human Rights Watch, individuals suspectedof ISIL membership are charged under counterterrorism laws, not the penal code or in ordinarycriminal courts, meaning a wide range of crimes can be tried from general support or membership ofa terrorist group to specific crimes of torture, kidnapping or killing in affiliation with terrorist groups.
Human Rights Watch states that investigations and trials for thousands of ISIL suspects are expedient,describing them as ‘too rushed to guarantee due process’, based primarily on confessions potentially(690) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 12; Intercept (The), Justice for
the Enemy, 17 June 2018 (url).
(691) HRW, Iraq: Lawyers Arrested for Work in ISIS Courts, 10 August 2017 (url).
(692) HRW, Iraq: Lawyers Arrested for Work in ISIS Courts, 10 August 2017 (url).
(693) UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018 (url), para. 4; UN Human Rights Council,
Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her mission to Iraq, 14 to 23 November
2017 (A/HRC/38/44/Add.1), 5 June 2018 (url), paras. 67-68.
(694) UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her
mission to Iraq, 14 to 23 November 2017 (A/HRC/38/44/Add.1), 5 June 2018 (url), paras. 67-68.
(695) UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations on the combined second to fourth periodic reportsof Iraq (CRC/C/IRQ/CO/2-4), 3 March 2015 (url), para. 86.
(696) UN Human Rights Committee, ICCPR Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of Iraq (CCPR/C/IRQ/CO/5), 3
December 2015 (url), para. 35; Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2018 – Iraq, (url), accessed 25 July 2018; Revkin, M.,
The Limits of Punishments: Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism – Iraq Case Study, May 2018 (url); New York Times(The), A 10-Minute Trial, a Death Sentence: Iraqi Justice for ISIS Suspects, 17 April 2018 (url).
(697) UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her
mission to Iraq, 14 to 23 November 2017 (A/HRC/38/44/Add.1), 5 June 2018 (url), para. 21.
(698) Al Monitor, Renewal of anti-terror law threatens human rights in Kurdistan, 19 July 2018 (url);(699) HRW, World Report 2018 – Iraq, 9 January 2018 (url).
(700) UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her
mission to Iraq, 14 to 23 November 2017 (A/HRC/38/44/Add.1), 5 June 2018 (url), para. 59.
(701) HRW, Flawed Justice, December 2017 (url), p. 28

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obtained under duress, and offering ‘no meaningful opportunity to challenge evidence’ ( 702);
sometimes trials last no more than 30 minutes ( 703).
The New York Times reported in April 2018 that 10 000 cases have been referred to counterterrorism
courts, and 2 900 trials were completed, having a ‘98 percent conviction rate’ ( 704). The trials
commonly end in the death penalty which is stipulated under Provision 4 of the Anti-Terrorism
Law ( 705), and AP reported that more than 3 000 people have been sentenced to death ( 706), although
the UN reports that number was 1 724 as of 2014, according to officials, though it is likely higher ( 707).
The UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions, who visited Iraq in
November 2017, stated that there has been no information made public since 2015 on the numberof charged, tried, death-sentenced, or executed persons, noting with concern the ‘mass executions’that occurred in 2016 in ISIL/terrorism cases ( 708). UNAMI reports on multiple government
announcements of confirmed death penalty convictions and executions in 2017, including theexecution of 42 people in September 2017 for terrorism and 38 people in December 2017 ( 709). On
28 June 2018, 13 convicts were executed for terrorism and the Prime Minister reportedly ordered theexecution of another 300 men and women ( 710). The Minister of Justice stated in a press conferencein 2017 that on average, there are three to four executions per week in Baghdad and Nassiriya prisons( 711).
The Iraqi government has an amnesty law for those who demonstrate that they joined ISIL against
their will and did not commit anti-terrorism crimes; this has been used to release nearly 10,000
suspects, according to the Chief Justice, as reported by HRW in December 2017 ( 712). In August 2017,
the Amnesty Amendment Law No. 80 of 2017 entered into force, which renders individuals convictedof various offences under the Anti-Terrorism Law ineligible for amnesty where the crime occurred
after 10 June 2014 ( 713). UNAMI expressed concern in 2018 that this development ‘appears to exclude
the possibility that amnesty could be used as a tool for reconciliation and reintegration of persons
convicted of being members of ISIL and denying convicted persons the right to seek a pardon’ or tocommute their sentence as required under the ICCPR ( 714). Appeals against the death penalty are
rarely successful and clemency is prohibited for terrorism crimes under the Constitution of Iraq,
Article 75 ( 715); however it was reported that it can be granted under Article 5 of the Anti-Terrorism
Law ( 716).

(702) HRW, Flawed Justice, December 2017 (url), p. 21(703) AP, Iraq holding more than 19,000 because of IS, militant ties, 22 March 2018 (url); see also: New York Times (The), A
10-Minute Trial, a Death Sentence: Iraqi Justice for ISIS Suspects, 17 April 2018 (url).
704 New York Times (The), A 10-Minute Trial, a Death Sentence: Iraqi Justice for ISIS Suspects, 17 April 2018 (url).
(705) HRW, Flawed Justice, December 2017 (url), p. 21, 29(706) AP, Iraq holding more than 19,000 because of IS, militant ties, 22 March 2018 (url).
(707) UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her
mission to Iraq, 14 to 23 November 2017 (A/HRC/38/44/Add.1), 5 June 2018 (url), paras. 67-68.
(708) UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her
mission to Iraq, 14 to 23 November 2017 (A/HRC/38/44/Add.1), 5 June 2018 (url), paras. 64-66.
(709) UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018 (url), para. 4(710) RFI, Irak: exécution de treize «terroristes» condamnés à mort, 29 June 2018 (url).
(711) UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018 (url), para. 4.
(712) HRW, Flawed Justice, December 2017 (url), p. 33(713) UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018 (url), para. 4.1(714) UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018 (url), para. 4.1(715) UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on the Death Penalty in Iraq, October 2014 (url), p. 2(716) Al-Khatteeb, L. and Al Sadoon O., Iraq’s Rule of Law [Brookings Institution Oped], 26 July 2015 (url).

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT – IRAQ : ACTORS OF PROTECTION— 65

According to a report on the situation in Ninewa in December 2017 by Rise Foundation, in the
judiciary, Sunni terrorism suspects are almost ‘exclusively tried under this [Anti-Terrorism] law’ andthat ‘Shia offenders are tried for similarly violent crimes under the penal code’ ( 717).

6.6 Tribal interactions with state justice
Roughly 75 % of Iraq’s population is either a member or an associate of one of the 150 main tribes in
Iraq. These family-based clans and networks, which are most prominent in Sunni areas (Anbar, Salahal Din, Kirkuk and Ninewa) and in the southern areas (mainly Basra), help their tribesmen to obtain
employment, government services, and protection from threats ( 718). Tribes have been engaged toprovide security and tribal law is described by a tribal leader as ‘fill[ing] gaps not addressed by thestate’ where state institutions are weak ( 719). Tribal dispute resolution is particularly important inpoorer areas in southern and western Iraq ( 720).
Tribal customary law (‘urf) is a longstanding and important mechanisms for dispute resolution andpreservation of order in Iraq ( 721). It is based on a system of collective honour and responsibility,
whereby disputes are resolved through restoration of equilibrium by reciprocity and compensation( 722). Tribal justice in Iraq remains common ( 723) and has reportedly become increasingly popular andpreferred to courts and police, particularly in central and southern Iraq ( 724). This was compounded
post-ISIS, in Anbar, for example, where locals prefer to go to their local leaders rather than trust thestate rule of law institutions ( 725) and as tribes have become fragmented ( 726). Tribal authorities areseen as more expedient for settling disputes than state justice institutions, or, used where theauthorities fail to resolve the dispute ( 727), or where complainants need to pay bribes to state judicial
officials ( 728). Dr. Chatelard observed that the tribal justice system is an auxiliary, rather than acompetitor with the state judicial system; tribal structures are sanctioned in practice by the state, but
do not have an official status and enforcement officials may also encourage conflicting parties to use
the tribal justice system, while state courts sometimes also refer cases for tribal settlement ( 729).
Since 2003, tribal justice has been increasingly relied upon due to weak state capacity in the justicesystem, for issues ranging from murder, assault, armed conflict, theft ( 730), to commercial and criminal
matters, to settlement through paying compensation (blood money or diya) or exchanging
women/girls ( 731), vengeance, or marriage ( 732). Article 45 (2) of the Iraqi Constitution protects theadvancement of tribes in Iraq, but prohibits tribal traditions that contradict human rights ( 733).
(717) Rise Foundation, Mosul and Tal Afar: Context Analysis, December 2017 (url), p. 27.
(718) Gharizi, O. and Al-Ibrahimi, H., Baghdad Must Seize the Change to Work with Iraq’s Tribes, 17 January 2018 (url).
(719) Gharizi, O. and Al-Ibrahimi, H., Baghdad Must Seize the Change to Work with Iraq’s Tribes, 17 January 2018 (url).
(720) Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report – Iraq [updated 9 October 2018], 9 October 2018 (url), p. 28.
(721) Asfura-Heim, P. Chapter 6: Tribal Customary Law and Legal Pluralism in al Anbar, Iraq, in: Customary Justice and theRule of Law in War-torn Societies, 2011, p. 239.
(722) Asfura-Heim, P. Chapter 6: Tribal Customary Law and Legal Pluralism in al Anbar, Iraq, in: Customary Justice and theRule of Law in War-torn Societies, 2011, p. 239.
(723) Niqash, As Extremists Withdraw in Salahaddin, Iraq’s Tribes Demand Justice, 22 October 2015 (url).
(724) Al Monitor, When conflict arises, these Iraqis go to the madeef, 30 October 2015 (url).
(725) National (The), In post-ISIS Iraq, tribal justice grows in the shadow of Baghdad mistrust (url).
(726) Gharizi, O. and Al-Ibrahimi, H., Baghdad Must Seize the Change to Work with Iraq’s Tribes, 17 January 2018 (url).
(727) Al Monitor, When conflict arises, these Iraqis go to the madeef, 30 October 2015 (url).
(728) Asharq Al-Awsat, In Iraq, Tribes are Stronger than Judiciary, 14 September 2016 (url).
(729) Chatelard, G. Comment made during the review of this report, 30 October 2018.
(730) Al Monitor, When conflict arises, these Iraqis go to the madeef, 30 October 2015 (url); Raseef22, South Iraq’s Armed
Clans Outmuscling the State, 22 February 2018 (url).
(731) AW, Iraqi tribes take law and justice into their own hands, 22 January 2016 (url); IraqiNews, Armed tribal clash northof Basra leaves 5 casualties, 12 April 2017 (url); Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report – Iraq [updated 9 October
2018], 9 October 2018 (url), p. 28.
(732) Al Monitor, Will Iraq’s new ‘tribal court’ undermine the rule of law? 12 April 2018 (url).
(733) Al Monitor, Will Iraq’s new ‘tribal court’ undermine the rule of law? 12 April 2018 (url).

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However, tribal dispute mechanisms can involve violations of human rights such as giving away female
relatives as compensation ( 734) or honour killing; it may also include retributive killing/death orbanishment ( 735). Women are ‘particularly vulnerable’ regarding tribal justice and can encounter harshtreatment for transgression of tribal customs ( 736). Tribal Fasliya marriages, or exchange marriages forcompensation, have reportedly grown in recent years due to weak rule of law ( 737). In 2015 forexample, one tribal dispute was resolved by giving away 50 women in compensation ( 738).
Due to the societal importance of tribal custom, powerful tribal affiliation can interfere with the police
in upholding respect for the law ( 739). Tribal disputes are described as ‘widespread’ ( 740), especially inthe south, with many tribes being well-armed ( 741) and challenging state security and control ( 742).
Judicial authorities do not follow up on tribal incidents and judges must seek tribal protection
themselves in case of threats against them ( 743). In southern Iraq, tribal clashes have also beenreported in 2017 with clashes over oil, land, and construction contracts and social conflicts ( 744) as wellas water scarcity ( 745). According to information provided to UNHCR, judicial officials and law
enforcement ‘take sides’ in tribal disputes, along their own tribal affiliations ( 746). Tribes are also given
privileges by government parties and politicians who seek tribal assistance and tribes also haveconnections within the security forces ( 747). Tribal members also escape punishment due to suchconnections ( 748). In 2015, a local NGO noted that tribal rulings also occurred in Baghdad, noting 800
such rulings there, 1 200 in Najaf, and 2 450 in Basra ( 749).
In ISIL-affected areas, Niqash reports that tribes seen as ISIL-affiliated such as Ajili and Albu Nasr have
led to members or whole areas being targeted by security forces ( 750). Tribes have also enacted
informal justice, revenge, assassinations, and disappearances in tribal justice against ISIL suspects ( 751).
Tribal conflict resolution and customary law may also be used to prevent feuds from escalating
through arbitration and mediation ( 752) and formal linkages with the state system have been created( 753). In 2017, USIP reported on the unusual step taken by over 100 tribal sheikhs in Hawija who agreed
to make a formal agreement to cooperate with the state justice system and ban ‘collective
punishment’, instead of using tribal justice to handle ISIL ‘fighters and supporters’ ( 754). In August 2018,
tribal and community leaders and the local government in Ninewa and Tal Afar signed a mutual(734) AW, Iraqi tribes take law and justice into their own hands, 22 January 2016 (url);(735) Asfura-Heim, P. Chapter 6: Tribal Customary Law and Legal Pluralism in al Anbar, Iraq, in: Customary Justice and theRule of Law in War-torn Societies, 2011, p. 256.
(736) Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report – Iraq [updated 9 October 2018], 9 October 2018 (url), p. 28.
(737) ICSSI, No to Harrassment, No to Tribal Fasliya! Iraqi Women Want Their Rights and Freedom! July 2015 (url); Al
Monitor, Blood money marriage makes a comeback in Iraq, 18 June 2015 (url).
(738) ICSSI, No to Harrassment, No to Tribal Fasliya! Iraqi Women Want Their Rights and Freedom! July 2015 (url).
(739) AFP, Tribes, and tradition stand in way of Iraq police, 23 September 2017 (url).
(740) Al Monitor, Can Iraq curb tribal disputes? 20 January 2016 (url).
(741) Al Monitor, Can Iraq curb tribal disputes? 20 January 2016 (url); Raseef22, South Iraq’s Armed Clans Outmuscling theState, 22 February 2018 (url).
(742) Raseef22, South Iraq’s Armed Clans Outmuscling the State, 22 February 2018 (url).
(743) AW, Iraqi tribes take law and justice into their own hands, 22 January 2016 (url).
(744) Reuters, Tribal clashes, political void threaten oil installations in Iraq’s south, 11 September 2017 (url); IraqiNews,
Armed tribal clash north of Basra leaves 5 casualties, 12 April 2017 (url).
(745) Al Monitor, Tribal disputes flare in southern Iraq over water scarcity, 15 February 2018 (url).
(746) UNHCR, Tribal Conflict Resolution, January 2018 (url), p. 4.
(747) AW, Iraqi tribes take law and justice into their own hands, 22 January 2016 (url).
(748) Niqash, As Extremists Withdraw in Salahaddin, Iraq’s Tribes Demand Justice, 22 October 2015 (url).
(749) AW, Iraqi tribes take law and justice into their own hands, 22 January 2016 (url).
(750) Niqash, As Extremists Withdraw in Salahaddin, Iraq’s Tribes Demand Justice, 22 October 2015 (url).
(751) USIP, Special Report 389: Justice and Security Needs in Iraq after ISIL, August 2016 (url), pp. 7-8.
(752) CNA, “No Security Without Us”: Tribes and Tribalism in Al Anbar Province, Iraq, June 2014 (url), pp. 12-13; Gharizi, O.
and Al-Ibrahimi, H., Baghdad Must Seize the Change to Work with Iraq’s Tribes, 17 January 2018 (url).
(753) Chatelard, G., Comment made during the review of this report, 30 October 2018.
(754) USIP, Iraqi Tribes Sharpen Legal Tools to Root Out ISIS, 22 June 2017 (url).

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT – IRAQ : ACTORS OF PROTECTION— 67

agreement to facilitate the return of 40 000 IDPs to Ayadiyah, with tribal authorities agreeing tocooperate with state forces and the rule of law in pursuing justice and ISIS members and suspects ( 755).
In 2018, the Ministry of Justice announced a new ‘arbitration initiative’ to create a team of 47 Sheikhs
who will work voluntarily as tribal arbitrators to resolve tribal disputes, in direct affiliation with the
Ministry of Justice, to attempt prevention of escalation; though the initiative has been criticised bycivil society for undermining state institutions, creating a parallel justice structure, and undermining
human rights ( 756).

7. Oversight mechanisms and complaints
7.1 Offices of Inspectors General (OIG)
Following the removal of Saddam Hussein, Iraq attempted to restore public confidence and reduce
corruption by establishing an Inspector General Office as ‘independent, internal control unit[s]’ within
numerous Iraqi ministries and public institutions ( 757). There are reportedly 36 such offices, some ofwhich have regional branches ( 758). The IGs are appointed by the Prime Minister and confirmed by the
CoR, and report directly to the respective Minister concerned ( 759).
Within the OIGs of ministries, there are Directorates of Human Rights, to which complaints of tortureby law enforcement or investigating officers can be reported ( 760).
OIGs are responsible for tasks including:
•
•
•
•
•
•

investigating integrity and transparency of ministry operations;
reporting violations and cases of criminal behaviour to law enforcement officials;
coordinating with relevant bodies such as the Integrity Commission;
receiving and following up on complaints from citizens playing a similar role to an
Ombudsman;verifying performance and efficiency of the ministry’s operations; implementing corrective
action;preventing fraud, waste and abuse and promote integrity and accountability ( 761).

Such bodies are available to receive complaints within Ministries of Justice, Interior, Defence, Labour
and Social Affairs, the CoI, and the Department of Public Prosecutions ( 762). The Ministry of Interior
has an Office of the Inspector General which is responsible for ‘observation and enforcement of
human rights’ in the Ministry and for those in MoI detention facilities ( 763). In 2018, the EU announced
that its Advisory Mission in support of Security Sector Reform in Iraq (EUAM Iraq) would provide(755) Sanad, Press Release: Announcement of Peaceful Coexistence Pact of honor for the Tribes in Al-Ayadiyah Sub-district,
10 August 2018 (url).
(756) Al Monitor, Will Iraq’s new ‘tribal court’ undermine the rule of law? 12 April 2018 (url).
(757) UNDP-Iraq, Technical Assistance to the Offices of Inspectors General in Iraq, January 2014 (url), p. 44.
(758) UNDP-Iraq, Technical Assistance to the Offices of Inspectors General in Iraq, January 2014 (url), p. 44.
(759) UNDP-Iraq, Technical Assistance to the Offices of Inspectors General in Iraq, January 2014 (url), p. 46.
(760) Iraq, Consideration of reported submitted by States parties under article 40 of the Covenant: Fifth periodic reports ofStates parties due in 2000 (CCPR/C/IRQ/5), 12 December 2013 (url), para. 90.
(761) UNDP-Iraq, Technical Assistance to the Offices of Inspectors General in Iraq, January 2014 (url), pp. 44-45.
(762) Iraq, Consideration of reported submitted by States parties under article 40 of the Covenant: Fifth periodic reports ofStates parties due in 2000 (CCPR/C/IRQ/5), 12 December 2013 (url), para. 90.
(763) EU, EEAS, EUAM: Providing strategic advice on Gender and Human Rights in Iraq, 27 March 2018 (url).

68 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT - IRAQ: ACTORS OF PROTECTION

advice to the Inspector General of MoI on issues of gender and human rights ( 764) and established ajoint coordination centre in June 2018 ( 765).
OIGs within government ministries are vague in terms of referring matters to courts, while the OIGs
‘personnel are subject to intimidation and political influence’ ( 766). The institutions are described as
weak, uncoordinated, lacking capacity ( 767), and ‘deeply influenced’ by political circumstances andrespective ministers who have the power to fire OIGs ( 768). In 2018, UNAMI recommended that the
Iraqi government establish an independent oversight body such as an ombudsman or ‘police
disciplinary tribunal’ to independently investigate cases of alleged abuses of authority anddisappearances ( 769). Sources describe an environment characterised by corruption and where
impunity is prevalent ( 770) and complaints of torture and ill-treatment are rarely investigated orprosecuted ( 771).

7.2 Commission of Integrity (CoI)The Iraqi Commission of Integrity (CoI) is an anti-corruption body responsible for investigating andprosecuting corruption ( 772) as an ‘independent political body supervised by the parliament’ ( 773);
however, the Commission falls under direct control of Cabinet, as a result of ‘controversial court
rulings’ ( 774). The Commission’s mandate ‘ensures that elected representatives disclose their financial
records to guarantee transparency’ in an effort to re-establish public trust in government ( 775). It isalso tasked with :
•
•
•
•
•
•

investigating corruption under supervision of a competent judge in compliance with criminal
legal procedures;
following cases of corruption that are outside COI’s scope through legal representatives;
fostering accountability, integrity, transparency and public ethics;
drafting and submitting legislation on combating corruption for submission to the Prime
Minister, President, or parliamentary committees;
issuing organisational instructions on conflicts of interest and financial disclosure;issuing codes of conduct for use of public assets ( 776).

The Commission’s website provides several phone numbers and an email address through which
corruption can be reported ( 777). Under the law, any person or legal body can submit corruption
complaints to the pertinent ministry’s Inspector General, or to the Commission of Integrity’s
Department of Complaints and Reports ( 778).

(764) EU, EEAS, EUAM: Providing strategic advice on Gender and Human Rights in Iraq, 27 March 2018 (url).
(765) EU, EEAS, The Ministry of Interior and EUAM Agree to Establish Joint Coordination Center, 7 June 2018 (url).
(766) Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2018 Country Report — Iraq, 2018 (url), p. 31.
(767) International Crisis Group, Failing Oversight: Iraq’s Unchecked Government, 26 September 2011 (url), pp. 11, 14-16.
(768) Younis, N. and Mahdy, S., The Next War in Iraq Needs to be on Corruption, 16 December 2016 (url).
(769) UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018 (url), p. iii.
(770) EU, EEAS, Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy 2017 – Iraq, 28 May 2018 (url), p. 156; UN Committee
Against Torture, Concluding observations on the initial report of Iraq (CAT/C/IRQ/CO/1), 7 September 2015 (url), para. 21.
(771) UN Committee Against Torture, Concluding observations on the initial report of Iraq (CAT/C/IRQ/CO/1), 7 September
2015 (url), para. 21.
(772) Iraq, COI, About COI, 16 September 2009 (url); Sowell, K. Abadi’s Failed Reforms, 17 November 2015 (url)(773) Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2018 Country Report — Iraq, 2018 (url), p. 31.
(774) Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2018 Country Report — Iraq, 2018 (url), pp. 12-13.
(775) Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2018 Country Report — Iraq, 2018 (url), p. 31.
(776) UNDP-Iraq, Technical Assistance to the Offices of Inspectors General in Iraq, January 2014 (url), pp. 35-36.
(777) Iraq, COI (Commission of Integrity), About COI, 16 September 2009 (url), accessed 25 July 2018.
(778) USDOS, Investment Climate Statements 2018 – Iraq, 19 July 2018 (url).

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT – IRAQ : ACTORS OF PROTECTION— 69

The Director General of COI can permit the opening of investigations in regions where there is noregional office ( 779). The complaint referral procedure relies on the Offices of the Inspectors Generalexisting in Iraq’s public administration ‘as internal, independent control unit[s]’. The referral
procedure goes from the Office of the Inspector General to the COI. Cases that are investigated by COI
may be referred to courts, who decide whether to proceed with prosecution, and if so, the matter isreferred to the Ministry of Interior for the issuance of arrest warrants ( 780).
In July 2016, the CoI demanded that 2 000 people be arrested on charges of corruption and bribery
and six MPs were given travel bans ( 781). In the first half of 2017, CoI filed more than 4 000 corruption
cases, issued 880 arrest warrants, referred 1 249 officials’ cases to court for corruption, and secured
convictions for 285 corruption cases, including several ministers ( 782). A CoI quarterly report on
activities in the first quarter of 2018 reported that since 2017, the CoI has been working on 6 219
criminal cases, of which 37.88 % (2 356) were ‘completed’ (closed or referred to other courts) andmost (62 %) were still under investigation ‘supervised by the judiciary’ ( 783). According to sources ‘thelack of good relations between the Commission and law enforcement agencies impedes theimplementation of follow-up efforts’ ( 784) and the CoI had limited capacity to investigate ( 785). In 2014,
the now former chief of the Integrity Commission tried to call for an investigation into former Prime
Minister Nuri al Maliki for corruption and abuse of office, however, no further actions were taken ( 786).
Abadi attempted to reform the government in 2016 by dissolving 11 cabinet positions, but protests
by Moqtada al-Sadr forced him to change all cabinet ministers except the Minister of Interior andDefence ( 787). According to Iraq analyst Harith Hassan, ‘substantial results’ have not yet beendelivered in the fight against corruption due to the sensitivities of going after people in senior political
positions and due to politically motivated anti-corruption pursuits ( 788). Similarly, in a 2016 interview
with the Guardian newspaper, the head of the Iraqi anti-corruption commission stated that he had
accepted bribes himself and that due to the seniority of those involved in corruption, efforts toaddress it have been undermined ( 789). Cases that are compiled rarely end up in convictions due topoliticisation in the courts ( 790). Also, investigations by the CoI against some judges have also beenreportedly politically motivated ( 791).
According to Bertelsmann Stiftung, writing in 2018, ‘Iraq’s legal framework is not sufficient to fightcorruption effectively; the country also shows a lack of will to engage, and a lack of human andfinancial resources’ while personnel involved in anti-corruption activities including the CoI are
subjected to threats and political influence ( 792). Several directors have previously been forced fromtheir position and complained of threats of violence ( 793).

(779) UNDP-Iraq, Technical Assistance to the Offices of Inspectors General in Iraq, January 2014 (url), pp. 35-36.
(780) UNDP-Iraq, Technical Assistance to the Offices of Inspectors General in Iraq, January 2014 (url), pp. 35-36.
(781) Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2018 Country Report — Iraq, 2018 (url), pp. 12-13.
(782) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), pp. 35-36.
(783) Iraq, CoI (Commission of Integrity), CoI Activities for the First Quarter of 2018, 2018 url, pp .4-5.
(784) Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2018 Country Report — Iraq, 2018 (url), p. 31.
(785) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), pp 35-36.
(786) Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2018 Country Report — Iraq, 2018 (url), pp. 12-13.
(787) Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2018 Country Report — Iraq, 2018 (url), p. 31.
(788) Hasan, H., Beyond Security: Stabilization, Governance, and Socioeconomic Challenges in Iraq, Atlantic Council, July
2018 (url), pp. 12-13; USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 15.
(789) Guardian (The), Post-war Iraq: Everybody is corrupt from top to bottom. Including me, 19 February 2016 (url).
(790) Younis, N. and Mahdy, S., The Next War in Iraq Needs to be on Corruption, 16 December 2016 (url).
(791) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 15.
(792) Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2018 Country Report — Iraq, 2018 (url), p. 31.
793 Younis, N. and Mahdy, S., The Next War in Iraq Needs to be on Corruption, 16 December 2016 (url).

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7.3 Iraqi High Commission for Human Rights (IHCHR)
The Ministry of Human Rights was abolished by Prime Minister al-Abadi in August 2015 during a seriesof reforms ( 794) aimed at reducing corruption and mismanagement ( 795). Ministry staff weretransferred to the IHCHR ( 796). The IHCHR was established by law in 2008 and created in 2012 as Iraq’s
national human rights body which has a mandate to accept individual complaints, investigate them,and provide education and information on human rights. It also carries our monitoring activities andsubmits an annual report to Parliament ( 797).
The Iraqi Parliament votes on and selects the 13 board members of the IHCHR. The IHCHR Board has
11 of the 13 Board seats distributed across main party blocs (5 seats to Shiite National Alliance, 3 toUnion of Sunni Forces, 2 to Kurdistan Alliance and 1 for Assyrian Movement) ( 798). It is also supposed
to include a representative of civil society and a representative of UNAMI, who also reportedly raised
concerns about party quotas relating to board selection in 2017 ( 799). A new board, president, anddeputy were eventually elected in December 2017 ( 800). NGOs complained that the selection process
was politicised ( 801).
However, there were complaints that the system did not allow for effective monitoring human rights
by the IHCHR ( 802), that its effectiveness was unclear and that it lacked capacity ( 803). The UN Human
Rights Committee noted that the Commission lacked adequate resources to effectively dischargesome of its activities, such as visiting detention facilities ( 804).
Any citizen can file a complaint with the commission ( 805). The website of the commission allows forcomplaints to be filed electronically online ( 806).

7.4 Investigations into state forces abuses
MoI and MoD have internal courts ( 807). In June 2017, the government also created an investigative
committee to review abuse allegations ( 808) committed under the MoI ( 809). The government also
reportedly set up a new directorate of discipline for the security forces in 2017 and an associateddetention centre ( 810).
In summer 2017, the government announced it would investigate abuses that occurred in Mosul
during liberation operations and in August 2017, that ‘perpetrators had been referred to the judiciary’(794) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 – Iraq, 3 March 2017 (url), p. 48(795) RFE/RL, Iraqi PM Scraps 11 Cabinet Posts in Reform Drive, 16 August 2015 (url).
(796) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 – Iraq, 3 March 2017 (url), p. 48(797) Iraq, IHCHR, Mandate and Functions, 5 April 2015 (url); Sweden, Lifos, Iraq: Rule of Law in the Security and Legal
System, 8 May 2014 (url), p. 19(798) ICSSI, The New Iraqi High Commission for Human Rights Faces Serious Objections from Civil Society, 29 July 2017 (url).
(799) ICSSI, The New Iraqi High Commission for Human Rights Faces Serious Objections from Civil Society, 29 July 2017 (url).
(800) EU, EEAS, Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy 2017 – Iraq, 28 May 2018 (url), p. 156(801) Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report – Iraq [updated 9 October 2018], 9 October 2018 (url), p. 10.
(802) ICSSI, The New Iraqi High Commission for Human Rights Faces Serious Objections from Civil Society, 29 July 2017 (url);
EU, EEAS, Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy 2017 – Iraq, 28 May 2018 (url), p. 156(803) Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report – Iraq [updated 9 October 2018], 9 October 2018 (url), p. 9.
(804) UN Human Rights Committee, ICCPR Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of Iraq (CCPR/C/IRQ/CO/5), 3
December 2015 (url), para. 7.
(805) Sweden, Lifos, 8 May 2014, Iraq: Rule of Law in the Security and Legal System (url), p. 19.
(806) Iraq, IHCHR, Submit a Complaint, n.d. (url).
(807) GJPI, Special Courts and Tribunals, 29 November 2009 (url).
(808) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p.4;(809) ABC News, Watchdogs: Iraqi troops beat and execute Mosul prisoners in new videos, 14 July 2017 (url).
(810) UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her
mission to Iraq, 14 to 23 November 2017 (A/HRC/38/44/Add.1), 5 June 2018 (url), paras. 57-58.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT – IRAQ : ACTORS OF PROTECTION— 71( 811). UN sources in 2018 state that authorities have admitted that violations of rights and law havebeen carried out by the ISF and its associated forces and announced investigations into these crimes( 812).
Public statements by PM al Abadi in 2017 maintained these were ‘individual’ acts, not systematic, andthat perpetrators would be punished ( 813). The government took ‘credible steps’ to examine abuse
allegations in government facilities, but the extent of the impact was unknown ( 814) and such efforts
remained ‘ad hoc’ and only temporarily or locally effective ( 815). The UN also stated in June 2018, ‘it isunclear how effective these accountability mechanisms and the investigations conducted to date are,as it appears no legal proceedings have been opened’ in relation to alleged ISF violations, specificallythose that occurred in 2014 (Bani Wais village), in June 2016 (north of Fallujah, deaths of 49 people
and disappearance of 643 men and boys), and in the battle for Mosul ( 816).
USDOS states that such human rights abuses by ISF and Peshmerga occur with impunity ( 817).

7.5 Investigations of ISIL war crimes, crimes against humanity,
genocide
During the ISIL conflict, it is reported that thousands of people have been forcibly disappeared, mostof whom are not accounted for; the Yezidi community for instance, has reported 6 450 people missing,most of whom are feared dead and in mass graves ( 818). It is estimated that a million persons areburied in mass graves across Iraq due to mass killings under Saddam Hussein, sectarian violence, anddue to ISIL ( 819). Mass graves continue to be uncovered, most of the victims from ISIL killings ( 820). As
of October 2018, UNAMI/OHCHR documented 202 mass grave sites, mainly located in Ninewa (95),
Kirkuk (37), Salah al-Din (26) and Anbar (24), with the number of buried victims estimated to be
between 6 000 to over 12 000, including women, children, elderly people, disabled people, Iraqi
security force members and police, and some foreign workers ( 821). A mass grave found near Mosul
reportedly contained 4 000 bodies, mainly of Yazidis ( 822). In April 2018, mass graves were found in(811) UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her
mission to Iraq, 14 to 23 November 2017 (A/HRC/38/44/Add.1), 5 June 2018 (url), paras. 57-58.
(812) UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018 (url), para. 4.2; UN Human Rights
Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her mission to Iraq, 14 to 23
November 2017 (A/HRC/38/44/Add.1), 5 June 2018 (url), paras. 57-58; ABC News, Watchdogs: Iraqi troops beat andexecute Mosul prisoners in new videos, 14 July 2017 (url).
(813) UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018 (url), para. 4.2.
(814) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 8.
(815) US, Lead Inspector General for Overseas and Contingency Operations, Operation Inherent Resolve and Operation
Pacific Eagle-Philippines – April 1 2018-June 30 2018 (url), p. 35.
(816) UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her
mission to Iraq, 14 to 23 November 2017 (A/HRC/38/44/Add.1), 5 June 2018 (url), paras. 57-58./(817) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 2.
(818) UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her
mission to Iraq, 14 to 23 November 2017 (A/HRC/38/44/Add.1), 5 June 2018 (url), para. 73.
(819) UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her
mission to Iraq, 14 to 23 November 2017 (A/HRC/38/44/Add.1), 5 June 2018 (url), para. 77.
(820) UN Secretary-General, Implementation of resolution 2367 (2017) – Report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/677), 9
July 2018 (url), para. 43; UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018 (url), pp. vi, 3.
(821) UNAMI/OHCHR, “Unearthing Atrocities: Mass Graves in territory formerly controlled by ISIL”, 6 November 2018 (url),
p. 1; UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018 (url), pp. vi, 3;(822) US, USCIRF, Annual Report 2018 – Iraq, April 2018 (url).

72 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT - IRAQ: ACTORS OF PROTECTION

Mosul with the bodies of 51 security forces members and another with 22 bodies of electoralcommission employees ( 823).
The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2379 in September 2017, creating an independent
investigating body to support Iraq-led investigations into ISIL war crimes, crimes against humanity andgenocide. The action promotes accountability and support for Iraq’s capacity to carry out evidencegathering ( 824). Iraq’s Mass Graves Directorate is tasked with opening, investigating and identifying
mortal remains in mass graves; the Directorate has 43 staff, including 11 administrative staff, atechnical team of crime and forensic experts, an archaeologist, photographer and IT expert. The
Directorate noted that it has insufficient resources, space, and equipment to deal with the scale ofneeds for site investigation and gathering of evidence related to crimes committed ( 825).
Iraqi courts ‘do not have jurisdiction over international crimes committed in Iraq’ and UNAMI noted
in its July 2018 human rights report on the second half of 2017 that the ‘capacity to investigate andtry perpetrators of such crimes remains extremely weak’ ( 826). UNAMI has advocated for a draft law
and a specialised court for this purpose and that will replace the death penalty with a life sentence forconcerned crimes ( 827).

7.6 Redress through courts and reparations
Although civil and administrative remedies exist for human rights violations through the courts, they
were not effectively implemented due to the lack of judicial independence and security-oriented
interest of the executive branch ( 828). Legal mechanisms to protect human rights and institutions toguarantee constitutional rights encounter capacity problems ( 829). The government did not provide
the UN with information about actual reparation and compensation ordered by the courts to beprovided to torture victims ( 830).
Acts No. 3 and No. 4 of 2006 and No. 20 of 2009 provide for financial reparations for victims of pasthuman rights violations; however, domestic law ‘does not contain a comprehensive reparation forwhich the State is responsible’ ( 831). Trafficking victims and survivors of ISIL sexual violence crimes
were reportedly provided with services and compensation by the government of Iraq; the state
reported that it allocated USD 857 630 for Yezidi victims in 2017, though hundreds reportedly did notreceive the compensation ( 832).

(823) UN Secretary-General, Implementation of resolution 2367 (2017) – Report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/677), 9
July 2018 (url), para. 43(824) EU, EEAS, Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy 2017 – Iraq, 28 May 2018 (url), p. 156.
(825) UNAMI/OHCHR, “Unearthing Atrocities: Mass Graves in territory formerly controlled by ISIL”, 6 November 2018 (url),
p. 12.
(826) UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018 (url), p. 7.
(827) UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018 (url), p. 8.
(828) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 17.
(829) Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report – Iraq, 26 June 2017 [available upon request], p. 8.
(830) UN Committee Against Torture, Concluding observations on the initial report of Iraq (CAT/C/IRQ/CO/1), 7 September
2015 (url), para. 31.
(831) UN Committee on Enforced Disappearances, Concluding observations on the report submitted by Iraq under article 29(1) of the Convention (CED/C/IRQ/CO/1), 13 October 2015 (url), para. 31.
(832) USDOS, Trafficking in Persons Report 2017 – Iraq, 28 June 2018 (url), p. 232.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT – IRAQ : ACTORS OF PROTECTION— 73

8. Kurdistan Region of Iraq
8.1 Security institutions - General
The Kurdistan Regional Security Council (KRSC) oversees and coordinates the ‘intelligence and security
community’ in KRI, reporting to the President through its Chancellor. ( 833). The KRSC also has an elite
counter-terrorism force which works jointly with international coalition forces ( 834).

8.1.1 Procedures
For information on arrest and detention procedures see Section 4.3 of this report.
KRG security forces detained suspects in areas where the KRG is in control, however, disputed regions
created confusion over jurisdiction for courts and arresting authorities ( 835).
DIS reports that the Peshmerga do not have the legal authority to keep prisoners, however it detained
combatants and ISIL suspects ( 836). KRG has also transferred ISIL suspects to the federal authorities( 837). Human Rights Watch reports that it is a general practice for the Peshmerga to transfer detained
individuals to the Asayish ( 838).
Asayish forces reportedly run informal detention facilities ( 839). Detention conditions in KRG’s new
facilities in major cities were reportedly well-maintained compared to smaller ones operated by the
MoI. Facilities of the Asayish reportedly held some minors with adults ( 840).

8.1.2 Peshmerga - Mandate and structure
In the Kurdistan region, the Peshmerga and ‘militias of the KDP and PUK’ are responsible formaintaining order in KRI, according to USDOS ( 841). The KRG Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs oversees
the Peshmerga ( 842). The KDP’s Zerevani and the PUK’s Emergency Force are both de facto part of thePeshmerga although they report to the Ministry of Interior ( 843), thereby having both a civilian policing
and military function ( 844). They are described as a ‘military police force’ with functions that switch
between police work and soldiering ( 845). Both of these groups were involved in frontline anti-ISIL
operations largely being active in their respective traditional zones of political influence ( 846).

(833) Iraq, Kurdistan Region, Kurdistan Regional Security Council – People and Organization, n.d., (url).
(834) Iraq, Kurdistan Region, Kurdistan Regional Security Council – People and Organization, n.d., (url).
(835) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 12.
(836) Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Access, Possibility of Protection, Security and Humanitarian
Situation, April 2016 (url), p. 39.
(837) Iraq, Kurdistan Region, Clarification on Human Rights Watch (HRW) Report, 4 March 2018 (url); Iraq, Kurdistan Region,
International Reports Committee: Statement on Human Rights Watch Report, 11 January 2018 (url).
(838) HRW, “Life Without a Father is Meaningless” Arbitrary Arrests and Enforced Disappearances in Iraq 2014-2017, 27
September 2018 (url).
(839) HRW, Kurdistan Region of Iraq: 350 Prisoners ‘Disappeared’, 21 December 2017 (url).
(840) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 8.
(841) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 10.
(842) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 10.
(843) Van Wilgenburg, W. and Fumerton, M., Kurdistan’s Political Armies: The Challenge of Unifying the Peshmerga Forces,
16 December 2015 (url), p. 2.
(844) Warisboring.com, Mosul Needs 35,000 Cops, 27 March 2017 (url).
(845) Warisboring.com, Mosul Needs 35,000 Cops, 27 March 2017 (url).
(846) Van Wilgenburg, W. and Fumerton, M., Kurdistan’s Political Armies: The Challenge of Unifying the Peshmerga Forces,
16 December 2015 (url), p. 3.

74 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT - IRAQ: ACTORS OF PROTECTION

The Peshmerga is part of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), but falls under the jurisdiction of KRG but also
has to follow certain Iraqi laws ( 847). Under the 2009 Law No. 5 on the Peshmerga, the Peshmerga is aregular united military force and it is prohibited that political parties maintain militias or private armed
groups ( 848). Since 2010, fourteen regional brigades (about 40 000 personnel) have been integrated
under the Ministry of Peshmerga, however, outside these brigades, there are an estimated 120 000
Peshmerga, mainly divided between the PUK’s 70 Unit and the KDP’s 80 Unit, who are ‘directly
controlled’ by their Political Bureaus, not the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs ( 849). In July 2014, theKurdish Parliament instructed the KRG to unify the command of the Peshmerga within six months;
however, it still remains divided on partisan lines ( 850). The Peshmerga are a predominantly Kurdish
force and recruitment is patronage-based ( 851).
The Peshmerga initially abandoned positions in non-Kurdish areas of Ninewa province in the face of
ISIL’s advance in 2014 ( 852). Their collapse was so severe in those areas that US and Iranian forcesintervened on their behalf; with their support, Kurdish forces halted the advance and retook ISIL
territory with the support of US airstrikes and counterattacks ( 853). Since then, the Peshmerga andother Kurdish forces were ‘among the most successful ground forces’ fighting ISIL ( 854). Also, after the
rollback of ISIL, KRGs were ‘dramatically expanding its control over the Ninewa plans andnorthwestern portion of the province’ ( 855). This territory was then rapidly lost against in October 2017
when PMU and ISF forces rolled back Kurdish forces from the disputed territories in the wake of theKurdish independence referendum that was opposed by Baghdad ( 856).

8.1.3 Ministry of Interior and Police - Mandate and structure
Municipal police are responsible for traditional civil and traffic enforcement, environmental policing,
immigration enforcement, and facilities protection roles ( 857). Municipal police forces are responsible
for routine policing, patrols, first response and investigation to minor felonies although they have arange of administrative functions. Emergency police handle major felonies ( 858).
According to a research paper on the KRG security forces published in 2009, the municipal police
remain politically divided along party lines ( 859). Police forces in the Dohuk and Erbil governorates
which are KDP dominated, report to the Ministry of Interior, and have a General Directorate in chargeof each governorate, with district and sub-districts police stations. Police in the PUK area around
Sulaymaniyah have stations distributed throughout the governorate ( 860).

(847) Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Access, Possibility of Protection, Security and Humanitarian
Situation, April 2016 (url), p. 40.
(848) Van Wilgenburg, W. and Fumerton, M., Kurdistan’s Political Armies: The Challenge of Unifying the Peshmerga Forces,
16 December 2015 (url), p. 2.
(849) Van Wilgenburg, W. and Fumerton, M., Kurdistan’s Political Armies: The Challenge of Unifying the Peshmerga Forces,
16 December 2015 (url), p. 3.
(850) Van Wilgenburg, W. and Fumerton, M., Kurdistan’s Political Armies: The Challenge of Unifying the Peshmerga Forces,
16 December 2015 (url), p. 1.
(851) Van Wilgenburg, W. and Fumerton, M., Kurdistan’s Political Armies: The Challenge of Unifying the Peshmerga Forces,
16 December 2015 (url), p. 5.
(852) Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018 (url), p. 37.
(853) Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018 (url), p. 37; Van Wilgenburg, W. and Fumerton, M.,
Kurdistan’s Political Armies: The Challenge of Unifying the Peshmerga Forces, 16 December 2015 (url), p. 6.
(854) Van Wilgenburg, W. and Fumerton, M., Kurdistan’s Political Armies: The Challenge of Unifying the Peshmerga Forces,
16 December 2015 (url), p. 6.
(855) Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018 (url), p. 37.
(856) Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa, 7 May 2018 (url), p. 37.
(857) Chapman, D., Security Forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government, 26 February 2009 (url), p. 195.
(858) Chapman, D., Security Forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government, 26 February 2009 (url), p. 198.
(859) Chapman, D., Security Forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government, 26 February 2009 (url), p. 196.
(860) Chapman, D., Security Forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government, 26 February 2009 (url), p. 198.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT – IRAQ : ACTORS OF PROTECTION— 75

8.1.4 Asayish - Mandate and structure
The Asayish is the intelligence agency of the Kurdish Regional Government responsible for ‘domestic
security throughout the region’ working in cooperation with the MoI and Ministry of Justice ( 861). The
Asayish is regulated by law for responsibilities over counter-terrorism, counter-trafficking of humanbeings, drug and weapons and matters of national security ( 862). The website of the General Security
Department states that the Asayish is overseen by Parliament and the KRG Council of Ministers ( 863).
According to HRW, the legally authorised law enforcement powers of KRI intelligence services are‘unclear’ ( 864). Asayish has provincial, district and sub-district offices ( 865).
Within Asayish, there are political allegiances between the KDP and PUK and parties also had theirown intelligence services: the KDP’s intelligence service, Parastin, and the PUK’s Zanyari ( 866), with PUK
essentially controlling Sulaymaniyah Asayish and KDP controlling the Erbil office of Asayish ( 867). These
two intelligence agencies were unified under the law in 2011; however, they continue to work closelywith the official branch of Asayish on intelligence gathering operations ( 868).

8.2 Capacity and effectivenessAccording to OSAC, command and control over KRI police and military units is sufficient to respond tosecurity, criminal and terrorist incidents; and forces are directed where required and they havesufficient training and modern equipment ( 869). A 2016 FFM report by the Danish Immigration Service(DIS) states that in areas controlled by the KRG, their forces have the potential to provide very
effective security. Law enforcement in KRI was described as more effective than in the south/central
areas of Iraq, however, other sources commented that there are areas outside of KRI control where
there are pockets that lack law enforcement, such as west of KRI. Another source interviewed by DIS
stated that the possibility of protection can depend on ‘who the persecutor is’ and those in conflictwith politicians would not be protected by authorities ( 870). Human Rights Watch stated to DIS that
Kurdish forces have been able to pursue targets in KRI and in KRI-controlled areas with the support ofinternational forces and provide support against ISIL, but also gave the view that there is ‘no effective
protection of human rights in KRI’ ( 871).
According to OSAC, crime reporting and statistics for KRI are unreliable, though in 2018, crime
reportedly increased due to poor economic conditions and much of the crime reported is non-violent( 872). DFAT states that KRI experienced lower levels of insecurity than other areas or Iraq, but that IDP
increases have strained the ability of the KRI to guarantee safety to those fleeing into the area ( 873).

(861) Iraq, Kurdistan Region, Kurdistan Regional Security Council – General Security (Asayish), n.d. (url).
(862) Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Access, Possibility of Protection, Security and Humanitarian
Situation, April 2016 (url), p. 40.
(863) Iraq, Kurdistan Region, Kurdistan Regional Security Council – General Security (Asayish), n.d. (url).
(864) Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Access, Possibility of Protection, Security and Humanitarian
Situation, April 2016 (url), p. 40.
(865) Iraq, Kurdistan Region, Kurdistan Regional Security Council – General Security (Asayish), n.d. (url).
(866) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), pp. 11-12.
(867) Stratfor, An Uncertain Future for Iraq’s Intelligence Services, 11 January 2012 (url).
(868) Iraq, Kurdistan Region, Kurdistan Regional Security Council – Parastin and Zanyari, n.d. (url); Stratfor, An Uncertain
Future for Iraq’s Intelligence Services, 11 January 2012 (url).
(869) OSAC, Iraq 2018 Crime & Safety Report: Erbil, 3 July 2018 (url).
(870) Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Access, Possibility of Protection, Security and Humanitarian
Situation, April 2016 (url), p. 45.
(871) Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Access, Possibility of Protection, Security and Humanitarian
Situation, April 2016 (url), p. 38.
(872) OSAC, Iraq 2018 Crime & Safety Report: Erbil, 3 July 2018 (url).
(873) Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report – Iraq [updated 9 October 2018], 9 October 2018 (url), p. 10.

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Sources told DIS that despite the existence of legislation and institutions to deal with honour violenceagainst women, such crimes still occurred, most commonly in rural areas, and people often turned to
traditional justice instead of state mechanisms ( 874). Women have somewhat better legal protections
in Kurdistan ( 875) but restrictive societal norms limit women’s participation in public life throughout
Iraq ( 876). In Kurdistan, there were 9 693 cases of violence against women recorded in 2017, anincrease from 7 123 in 2016, though UNAMI cannot determine if this was due to an increase inreporting. There were 658 cases submitted to a ‘reconciliation committee’, 171 reconciled, 456 notreconciled, and 31 referred to the courts ( 877). In the Kurdistan region, UNAMI reports that between
January and October 2017, there were 662 women who entered shelters in KRI, of which 276
remained housed, while 421 left shelters because a ‘guardian guaranteed their safety or theirproblems were considered resolved’ ( 878). Shelters in KRI raised concerns about adequate funding
from the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA) and about the fact that shelters in Dohuk andErbil do not have doctors for their medical units ( 879), and lack basic utilities ( 880). Admission to shelters
in KRI requires a judicial order, which is reportedly a deterrent for women to use them, and many
hotels in KRI refuse to permit single women to stay alone ( 881). The UN stated that there remained‘insufficient legal protection from domestic violence for women and children’ in the KRI, despite Act
No. 8, and that fear of family shame, risk of reprisals and harassment and abuse from security forces
prevented reporting of such violence ( 882). Similarly, Minority Rights Group International (MRG) statedthat implementation has been criticised as ‘ineffective and incomplete’, while reforms have not been
implemented and increased pressure on the state due to the 2014 influx of IDPs has also weakened
the government’s ability to respond to GBV ( 883).
For protection of individuals from targeting by armed groups such as ISIL in KRI or Kurdish controlledareas, sources interviewed by DIS stated that authorities have the capacity to protect from conflict,but it can be impacted by the person’s profile; some armed groups are aligned with either the KDP
and PUK which impacts their willingness to intervene, depending on whether the person belongs to agroup the Peshmerga would protect. The UNHCR stated in 2016 that‘in the disputed areas, the possibility to seek protection from the authorities in caseof conflict with armed groups depends on whether or not a person belongs to thegroups that the Peshmerga would protect. According to UNHCR, groups that areprotected by the Peshmerga include Kurds and ethnic or religious minorities. In linewith this, an international humanitarian organisation said that private individuals'
possibility to seek protection from the Kurdish authorities if they have conflicts witharmed groups in KRI and other Kurdish controlled areas depends on who they are.
According to the international humanitarian organisation, generally, Sunni Arabs
would be unlikely to receive support from the authorities, especially if conflicts are(874) Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Access, Possibility of Protection, Security and Humanitarian
Situation, April 2016 (url), p. 46.
(875) Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report – Iraq [updated 9 October 2018], 9 October 2018 (url), p. 28; Kaya, Z.,
Gender equality in Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan, 5 January 2018 (url).
(876) Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report – Iraq [updated 9 October 2018], 9 October 2018 (url), p. 28(877) UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018 (url), para. 14.
(878) UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018 (url), para. 5.4.3.
(879) UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018 (url), para. 5.4.3.
(880) MRG, Broken Lives: Violence against Syrian refugee women and girls in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, March 2018 (url),
p. 16.
(881) MRG, Broken Lives: Violence against Syrian refugee women and girls in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, March 2018 (url),
p. 16.
(882) UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations on the combined second to fourth periodic reportsof Iraq (CRC/C/IRQ/CO/2-4), 3 March 2015 (url), para. 40.
(883) MRG, Broken Lives: Violence against Syrian refugee women and girls in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, March 2018 (url),
p. 16.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT – IRAQ : ACTORS OF PROTECTION— 77

with non-Sunni Arabs. The international humanitarian organisation added that if aSunni Arab has a conflict with Islamic State, there is nothing that the authorities cando’ ( 884).

8.3 Integrity
As a result of different political factions, Peshmerga groups’ operating procedures are not standard or
uniform ( 885) and they frequently do not coordinate with each faction taking orders from their politicalcommand ( 886). Sources indicated that the Peshmerga factions are politically divided, with one source
stating that they act on instructions from politicians ( 887). In 2018, there were clashes reported locallybetween Peshmerga and Iraqi Army units in areas of Ninewa where KRG disputes Iraqi government
control ( 888). Peshmerga groups are described as ‘deeply partisan’ and an instrument of political
patronage for the PUK and KDP’s respective political bureaus ( 889).
Partisanship in the KRG security forces has enabled both KDP and PUK to use armed wings to suppress
political dissent ( 890). An atmosphere of mistrust between the main political parties in Kurdistan has
been created, with each perceiving their own factions of the security forces as a line of defence against
political rivals ( 891). The KDP’s intelligence service (Parastin) is reportedly more powerful and feared
than the PUK service ( 892).
The population of KRI reportedly ‘does not make use of the police or the courts’ according to a UNHCR
interview in 2016 with DIS ( 893). The same report notes that IDPs ‘generally mistrust’ the KRG forcesand do not approach police either ( 894). Two sources said to DIS that ordinary citizens in KRI report oneach other with accusations of terrorism, for example ( 895).
AbusesA Western diplomat stated that Arab IDPs generally do not trust the KRG or seek police protection,
though the police were trying to improve the situation. He had not heard of ‘systematic mistreatment’of IDPs by the police or courts on account of their status or belonging in the north. Human Rights
Watch gave the view that Arabs and Kurds were both at ‘arbitrary risk of detention and torture’ from
Asayish. The UNHCR remarked to DIS that ‘collective punishment of IDPs upon security incidents is
common’ and a lawyer stated that ‘scapegoating’ sometimes occurred ( 896). The UN Special(884) Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Access, Possibility of Protection, Security and Humanitarian
Situation, April 2016 (url), p. 50.
(885) Van Wilgenburg, W. and Fumerton, M., Kurdistan’s Political Armies: The Challenge of Unifying the Peshmerga Forces,
16 December 2015 (url), p. 3.
(886) Helfont, S., Getting Peshmerga Reform Right, May 2017 (url), p. 3.
(887) Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Access, Possibility of Protection, Security and Humanitarian
Situation, April 2016 (url), p. 41.
(888) OSAC, Iraq 2018 Crime & Safety Report: Erbil, 3 July 2018 (url).
(889) Van Wilgenburg, W. and Fumerton, M., Kurdistan’s Political Armies: The Challenge of Unifying the Peshmerga Forces,
16 December 2015 (url), p. 1.
(890) Van Wilgenburg, W. and Fumerton, M., Kurdistan’s Political Armies: The Challenge of Unifying the Peshmerga Forces,
16 December 2015 (url), p. 3.
(891) Van Wilgenburg, W. and Fumerton, M., Kurdistan’s Political Armies: The Challenge of Unifying the Peshmerga Forces,
16 December 2015 (url), p. 6.
(892) Stratfor, An Uncertain Future for Iraq’s Intelligence Services, 11 January 2012 (url).
(893) Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Access, Possibility of Protection, Security and Humanitarian
Situation, April 2016 (url), p. 45.
(894) Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Access, Possibility of Protection, Security and Humanitarian
Situation, April 2016 (url), p. 45.
(895) Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Access, Possibility of Protection, Security and Humanitarian
Situation, April 2016 (url), p. 38.
(896) Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Access, Possibility of Protection, Security and Humanitarian
Situation, April 2016 (url), p. 46.

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Rapporteur on extra-judicial, summary, and arbitrary executions stated in her June 2018 report that
KRI, host to a large IDP population, separated out civilians from combatants at checkpoints and men
and boys were under particular scrutiny; they were reported to face arbitrary arrest and ‘in somecases were forcibly disappeared’ and Kurdish forces, Peshmerga, and affiliated Yezidi forces were also
alleged to have carried out retaliatory attacks on Sunni Arab civilians during territorial recapture ( 897).
There were reports in 2017 of killings and sectarian violence in the KRI and minorities reported
targeted threats and attacks in areas outside KRI under KRG control ( 898).
In 2018, Human Rights Watch accused the Peshmerga of detaining suspects and transferring them to
Asayish whom they allege carried out mass executions of ‘scores of even hundreds’ of ISIL suspects intheir custody between 28 August and 3 September 2017, in Bardiya, Ninewa ( 899). The KRG denied theaccusations and stated that a joint military and security investigation committee organised by the
Ministry of Pesherga was investigating the allegations ( 900).
Human Rights Watch accused the Asayish security forces of forcibly disappearing 350 ISIL suspect
detained in the city of Kirkuk after federal authorities retook the city in October 2017 ( 901). The KRG’s
International Reports Committee denied the accusation, stating that they had surrenderedthemselves to security forces, admitted to being in ISIL, and were later transferred to a camp underfederal jurisdiction ( 902).
A western diplomat interviewed by DIS in 2016 remarked that the Peshmergas are generally wellrespected by the population, though there have been reports of ‘bad actors’ in the Peshmerga
victimising individuals in areas retaken from ISIL or who cross into KRI from ISIL territory ( 903). Sources
told DIS in 2016 that the Peshmerga detained armed opponents and prisoners of war or suspected
ISIL militants, who sources said were often ‘young Sunni Arab IDPs’ or ‘male Sunni Arabs’ ( 904).
Sources reported in 2016 that the Peshmerga has been allegedly involved in demolitions of houses inthe disputed areas of Kirkuk ( 905). One Human Rights Watch report alleged that there was a patternof such demolitions by the Peshmerga in Kirkuk and Ninewa between September 2014 and May 2016,
sometimes of whole villages destroyed across 17 towns and villages recaptured from ISIL ( 906). An
Amnesty International report from 2016 also documented instances of intentional damage to Arabhomes across 13 villages recaptured by Peshmergas in October 2014-November 2015 ( 907). The
Ninewa provincial council refuted the allegations as baseless ( 908). KRG stated such acts are reportedlyfor ‘security reasons’ but UNHCR commented it was for political claims to the disputed areas ( 909).

(897) UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her
mission to Iraq, 14 to 23 November 2017 (A/HRC/38/44/Add.1), 5 June 2018 (url), para. 36.
(898) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 4.
(899) HRW, Kurdistan Regional Government: Allegations of Mass Executions, 8 February 2018 (url).
(900) Iraq, Kurdistan Region, Clarification on Human Rights Watch (HRW) Report, 4 March 2018 (url), p. 3.
(901) HRW, Kurdistan Region of Iraq: 350 Prisoners ‘Disappeared’, 21 December 2017 (url).
(902) Iraq, Kurdistan Region, International Reports Committee: Statement on Human Rights Watch Report, 11 January 2018(url).
(903) Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Access, Possibility of Protection, Security and Humanitarian
Situation, April 2016 (url), pp. 36-37.
(904) Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Access, Possibility of Protection, Security and Humanitarian
Situation, April 2016 (url), p. 39.
(905) Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Access, Possibility of Protection, Security and Humanitarian
Situation, April 2016 (url), p. 30.
(906) HRW, Marked with an “X”: Iraqi Kurdish Forces’ Destruction of Villages, 13 November 2016 (url).
(907) AI, Banished and Dispossessed, 20 July 2016 (url), pp. 5-6.
(908) Kurdistan24, ‘Amnesty should apologize to Peshmerga, Kurdistan’, 24 January 2016 (url).
(909) Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Access, Possibility of Protection, Security and Humanitarian
Situation, April 2016 (url), p. 30.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT – IRAQ : ACTORS OF PROTECTION— 79

There were reports that PMU and KRG forces reportedly detained children accused of terrorism, andabused and beat them ( 910). HRW reported in 2017 that more than 150 boys were detained on suchcharges, held for weeks and months in detention, and were subjected to mistreatment ( 911).
In 2018, Human Rights Watch released a report on 78 cases of enforced disappearances in 2014-2017
which alleges the involvement of Asayish forces in several cases at checkpoints in Ninewa and thedisputed territories ( 912).
As of November 2018, DIS remarked that Kurdish security forces are ‘no longer in the disputed areasor the rest of Iraq’ ( 913).
‘Abusive interrogations’ reportedly occurred in Asayish and intelligence services (Parastin and Zanyari)facilities ( 914).
Despite legal protections under the ‘press law’ No 35. Of 2007, which prohibits imprisonment,harassment, or physical abuse of reporters, journalists state that it is used arbitrarily by the ‘ruling
elite to stifle dissent’ ( 915) and security forces harassed news outlets critical of the KRG leadership ( 916).
DIS reported in 2016 that Kurdish authorities have detained political opponents and have shot at andbeaten political demonstrators and journalists ( 917). In November 2018, DIS reported that sources
noted the violent suppression of demonstrations in KRG by armed political party members and the
Asayish and the killing of four journalists ( 918).

8.4 Judiciary
8.4.1 Structure and capacity
According to a report on the security institutions of the KRG published in 2009, ‘the judiciary in the
Kurdistan Region consists of primary courts (courts of original jurisdiction), secondary courts (courtsof appellate jurisdiction), the Court of Cassation (court of last resort), and the Kurdistan High Judicial
Council which oversees the Judiciary. Each governorate has its own Appellate Court and array ofprimary courts’ ( 919). KRG has numerous types of courts for felony (major crimes), misdemeanours(minor crimes), which apply the Iraqi Penal Code, as well as investigative courts for crime, personal
status courts that deal with family law related to Muslims, civil status courts, which apply to nonMuslims, Courts of First Instance for civil matters not related to personal status, and labour courts.
Courts of appeal exist in all governorates. The Court of Cassation of the Kurdistan region is the final
court of last resort, having chambers for different jurisdictions ( 920).
For criminal cases, like in the rest of Iraq, KRI operates an inquisitorial model with an active role in
conducting the trial and interviewing witnesses. Criminal investigations begin with a police or Asayish(910) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 6.
(911) HRW, Why Children Are Stuck in Prison in Erbil Without Trial, 27 March 2017 (url).
(912) HRW, “Life Without a Father is Meaningless” Arbitrary Arrests and Enforced Disappearances in Iraq 2014-2017, 27
September 2018 (url).
(913) Denmark, DIS, Northern Iraq – Security Situation and the Situation for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the
Disputed Areas, Including the Possibility to Enter and Access the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), November 2018 (url), p. 24.
(914) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 6.
(915) CPJ, Mountain of impunity looms over Kurdistan journalists, 22 April 2014 (url).
(916) Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2018 Country Report — Iraq, 2018 (url); Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2018 – Iraq,(url);(917) Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Access, Possibility of Protection, Security and Humanitarian
Situation, April 2016 (url), pp. 39-40(918) Denmark, DIS, Northern Iraq – Security Situation and the Situation for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the
Disputed Areas, Including the Possibility to Enter and Access the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), November 2018 (url), p. 25.
(919) Chapman, D., Security Forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government, 26 February 2009 (url), p. 209.
(920) Chapman, D., Security Forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government, 26 February 2009 (url), p. 210.

80 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT - IRAQ: ACTORS OF PROTECTION

response, who investigate and may refer the case to an investigative judge, who may continue toinvestigate, completes the inquiry and may issue a charge and refer the case to Felony or
Misdemeanour courts ( 921).

8.4.2 EffectivenessAccording to Lifos, the legal system ‘works better in the KRI’ than in the other parts of Iraq, as judges
are not under threat ( 922). Transparency International also writes that corruption in KRI is lower thanin Iraq, but still relatively high for the region and few are convicted for corruption ( 923).
The KRI reported that there were 5,898 people in detention as of December 2017, with 2 652 people
arrested on ISIL-related charges, 1 110 found guilty of terrorism, and 870 released ( 924).

8.4.3 Integrity
In the Kurdistan region, the Kurdistan Judicial Council is independent of the KRG Ministry of Justice,
however the executive branch reportedly ‘influenced politically influenced sensitive cases’ ( 925).
Judges are frequently appointed based on partisanship rather than merit or independence ( 926).
Despite the existence of numerous laws with provisions related to human rights and positive
developments toward the promotion of the rule of law in KRI, ‘laws are not often supported by
implementation mechanisms, and economic conditions have severely restricted the availability ofresources for implementation ( 927). Sources interviewed by DIS stated that the Kurdish court system
was politically influenced and not responsive despite the availability of Kurdish laws that meetinternational standards ( 928). According to the UN, there is an ‘overall mistrust in the criminal justicesystem’ in Kurdistan with respect to the lack of effective investigations and atmosphere of impunity,
particularly regarding attacks on media professionals ( 929). A 2015 field research paper on the impact
of corruption on returnees to Kurdistan noted that several interviewees perceived governing elites tobe above the law, and that the legal system was weak, politicised, and dependent on one’s
connections ( 930). The UNHCR made a similar observation to the DIS in 2016 that ‘access to the rule oflaw [in KRI] is dependent on ethnic and religious affiliation, tribe, connections, family and relatives,and it is very difficult, if not impossible, for an individual to stand up for his rights by himself’ ( 931).
In Kurdistan region, UNAMI reported that it remained concerned about lengthy delays in bringing
detainees before judges, denial of access to counsel and prolonged periods of detention without trial.
The justice system in KRI also largely relies on confessional evidence ( 932). Detainees made allegationsof torture and harm for extraction of confessions and feared reporting it due to retribution inproceedings ( 933). USDOS states that in general, the KRG allowed access to prisoners and pre-trial
detainees for monitoring, but delayed access to some cases, usually for terrorism. UN and ICRC were(921) Chapman, D., Security Forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government, 26 February 2009 (url), p. 212.
(922) Sweden, Lifos, 8 May 2014, Iraq: Rule of Law in the Security and Legal System (url), p.13.
(923) TI, Kurdistan Region of Iraq: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption, 24 March 2015 (url), p. 1.
(924) UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018 (url), para. 4.7.2(925) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 16.
(926) Carnegie MEC, Kurdistan’s Politicized Society Confronts a Sultanistic System, 18 August 2015 (url).
(927) UNAMI/OHCHR, Promotion and Protection of Rights of Victims of Sexual Violence Captured by ISIL/or in Areas
Controlled by ISIL in Iraq, 22 August 2017 (url), p. 7.
(928) Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Access, Possibility of Protection, Security and Humanitarian
Situation, April 2016 (url), p. 45.
(929) UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her
mission to Iraq, 14 to 23 November 2017 (A/HRC/38/44/Add.1), 5 June 2018 (url), para. 39.
(930) Paasche, E., PRIO, The role of corruption in reintegration: experiences of Iraqi Kurds upon return from Europe, Journalof Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 42, No. 7 (url), p. 1084(931) Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Access, Possibility of Protection, Security and Humanitarian
Situation, April 2016 (url), p. 45.
(932) UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018 (url), para. 4.7.2(933) UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018 (url), para. 4.7.2

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT – IRAQ : ACTORS OF PROTECTION— 81

able to monitor detention facilities, but the Human Rights Commission of Kurdistan had difficulty
accessing Asayish facilities ( 934).
Defence lawyers and prosecutors reportedly experienced ‘unnecessary administrative delays’ incarrying out their work ( 935).

8.5 Oversight mechanisms and complaints
8.5.1 Commission of Integrity
The Kurdish Parliament created the Kurdistan Region Commission of Integrity in 2011 under CoI
Law 3/2011, and the Chairman reportedly has greater independence and impartiality than the Federal
body though it is not mentioned that the CoI is independent ( 936). The CoI has functions including
receiving complaints, investigating and referring corruption cases to competent courts ( 937). According
to Dr. Chatelard, who reviewed this report, KRG oversight bodies and accountability mechanisms are
subjected to political pressures and are not more effective at fighting corruption than those operating
at the federal level ( 938). KRG faces similar problems to the rest of Iraq regarding fighting corruption
due to the strong role of main political parties and nepotism with a fraction of cases of corruption
ending up in court ( 939).
The Commission accepts complaints by email and phone ( 940).
Media reported that in 2017 ‘39 verdicts were reached out of 123 corruption cases’ and that two men
were convicted and sentenced to seven years in prison for embezzlement and fined USD 1.67 million( 941). The Commission of Integrity told media that it had received more than 100 case referrals in 2018
and that 59 had been ‘sent to court’ ( 942).

8.5.2 High Committee to Evaluate and Respond to International Reports
Kurdistan’s High Committee to Evaluate and Respond to International Reports is responsible forfollowing up in response to allegations made about human rights violations ( 943). The body reviewed
reports of abuses by Peshmerga and made public reports and commentaries to exculpate them ( 944).

8.5.3 Independent Commission for Human Rights of the Kurdistan Region
The Human Rights Commission of Kurdistan issued periodic reports and stated that KRG police andsecurity forces were ‘receptive to human rights training and responsive to rights violations’ ( 945). In its
2017 report, the Australian DFAT states that although progress has been made in the creation of theKurdish Human Rights Commission, ‘there is a lack of legal or practical mechanisms to implement a(934) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 9.
(935) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 16.
(936) UNDP Iraq, Workshop on the Law to Establish a Commission of Integrity in the Kurdistan Region, 29-31 January 2013(url), p. 4.
(937) UNDP, Analytical Study: The Law of the Public Authority of Integrity (Kurdistan Region–Iraq) No. (3) Of 2011, (url), pp.
14-18.
(938) Chatelard, G. Comment made during the review of this report, 30 October 2018.
(939) Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2018 – Iraq, (url); TI, Kurdistan Region of Iraq: Overview of Corruption andAnti-Corruption, 24 March 2015 (url).
(940) Iraq, Kurdistan Region, Commission of Integrity in Kurdistan Region – Hotline, n.d. (url).
(941) Kurdistan24, Kurdistan’s Integrity Commission fines two with over 1.67M over corruption, fraud, 29 May 2018 (url).
(942) Kurdistan24, Kurdistan Integrity Commission: 125 corruption cases so far in 2018, 31 July 2018 (url).
(943) Iraq, Kurdistan Region, KRG Response to HRW Findings and Questions on the Treatment of Child Terrorism Suspects,
10 January 2017 (url),(944) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 1; Iraq, Kurdistan Region,
Clarification on Human Rights Watch (HRW) Report, 4 March 2018 (url); Iraq, Kurdistan Region, International Reports
Committee: Statement on Human Rights Watch Report, 11 January 2018 (url).
(945) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 39.

82 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT - IRAQ: ACTORS OF PROTECTION

functioning framework for the protection of human rights’ ( 946). The KRI Commission regularly
informed the Kurdistan MoI about credible reports of police violations of human rights ( 947).
In 2017, the deputy head of the Dohuk human rights office was convicted for interfering in a police
investigation; his 6-month sentence was suspended ( 948).

8.5.4 Oversight and investigations into abuses by KRG forces
Renad Mansour noted that the Peshmerga is overseen by the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs, theNational Security Council and down through to the ‘polit bureaus’ of the main parties ( 949). DIS wastold by several sources that the Asayish is directly linked to the President of the KRG, and one NGO
source stated that it is the only institution in KRI that is not monitored, noting that even Parliament
lacks information on their working methods ( 950).
The KRG reportedly had no uniform policy for dealing with allegations of abuse and mistreatment indetention by the KRG’s Ministry of Interior or the Asayish ( 951). The KRG stated in a letter to Human
Rights Watch that all forms of torture are prohibited and there are investigation committees in the
MoI to examine allegations of mistreatment by prisoners. KRG explained that the Asayish will collectstatements and evidence of the mistreatment, and then send an independent investigative
representative of the judge to investigate, with the Asayish ( 952). The Kurdish Human Rights
Commission had difficulty accessing Asayish facilities for monitoring purposes ( 953).
According to the USDOS, credible steps were taken by the KRG to address allegations of mistreatment
within central facilities, though the impacts were unknown. The Higher Judicial Council stated that
abuse allegations were handled promptly ( 954). However, UNHCR commented to DIS in 2016 that there
has been no prosecution of members of the Asayish or the Peshmerga for violations of human rights
by these forces ( 955). In 2017, 5 KRG MoI officials were sentenced to 3-5 years in prison for abuses intheir facilities ( 956).
Compensation by the government was available under the law for those subjected to unlawful arrestand detention ( 957), or those who experienced forced confessions of torture ( 958). The KRG reported
that 5 000 cases had been approved for compensation in the form of land, salaries, or college tuition;
however, payment could not be made due to budget constraints. The KRG reported that 13 000 cases
were pending ( 959).

(946) Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report – Iraq, 26 June 2017 [available on request], p. 8.
(947) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 12.
(948) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 39.
(949) Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Access, Possibility of Protection, Security and Humanitarian
Situation, April 2016 (url), pp. 41-42.
(950) Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Access, Possibility of Protection, Security and Humanitarian
Situation, April 2016 (url), p. 42.
(951) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p.8.
(952) Iraq, Kurdistan Region, KRG Response to HRW Findings and Questions on the Treatment of Child Terrorism Suspects,
10 January 2017 (url),(953) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p.8.
(954) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p.8.
(955) Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Access, Possibility of Protection, Security and Humanitarian
Situation, April 2016 (url), p. 39.
(956) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p.8.
(957) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 17.
(958) Iraq, Kurdistan Region, KRG Response to HRW Findings and Questions on the Treatment of Child Terrorism Suspects,
10 January 2017 (url) p. 5.
(959) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 17.

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9. Specific groups
9.1 Women and children
Violence against women in Iraq is a serious ( 960) and common problem that remains ‘undercover’ ( 961).
In Iraq, on average, one in five women (21.2%) is subjected to physical violence ( 962). According to the
MoI, cases of domestic violence increased steadily between 2010-2016 ( 963). Several hundred womenand girls are killed every year in honour crimes in Iraq and such crimes are underreported to theauthorities ( 964).
Women face particular difficulties accessing justice due to the discriminatory attitudes of police andgovernment officials towards women, and a lack of awareness of their rights ( 965). Women face broad
discriminatory treatment in society and under the law ( 966); marriage and divorce law tend to favourmen ( 967). The Iraqi Penal Code treats gender-based and sexual violence in a discriminatory manner( 968). Iraq lacks comprehensive legislation to protect and punish violence against women; it allows forhonour as a mitigating circumstance, and although it criminalises sexual assault, it also allows charges
to be dropped if sexual assault perpetrators marry the victims ( 969). The Iraqi Penal Code of 1969
states, under Article 409, ‘[a]ny person who surprises his wife in the act of adultery or finds his
girlfriend in bed with her lover and kills them immediately or one of them or assaults one of them sothat he or she dies or is left permanently disabled is punishable by a period of detention not exceeding
3 years. It is not permissible to exercise the right of legal defense against any person who uses thisexcuse nor do the rules of aggravating circumstance apply against him’ ( 970).
UNAMI writes that due to the ‘honour’ mitigation, fighting crime against women and children ‘remains
problematic’ ( 971). The Global Justice Center (GJC) ( 972) provides a legal analysis that found that gaps
and gender inequalities in the domestic Iraqi legal framework also prevent women and girls victimisedby ISIL to obtain ‘meaningful justice’ ( 973). The UN writes that the existing legal and policy frameworks
in Iraq for criminal justice ‘largely fail’ to protect women and children who have been subjected to(960) HRW, Domestic Violence in Iraq: Commentary on the Draft Anti-Domestic Violence Law in
Iraq, March 2017 (url), p.1.
(961) PAX, Interview: Amal’s fight against sexual and gender-based violence in Iraq, 8 December 2017 (url).
(962) Iraq and WHO, Iraq Family Health Survey Report 2006/7, 2008 (url), p. 25(963) AW, Domestic violence in Iraq on the rise in the absence of protective laws, 16 July 2017 (url).
(964) UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her
mission to Iraq, 14 to 23 November 2017 (A/HRC/38/44/Add.1), 5 June 2018 (url), paras. 40.
(965) KAS, Women’s Access to Justice in Iraq, 27 November 2016 (url).
966 Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report – Iraq [updated 9 October 2018], 9 October 2018 (url), p. 20; Freedom
House, Freedom in the World 2018 – Iraq, (url).
(967) Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2018 – Iraq, (url).
(968) GJC, Iraq’s Criminal Laws Preclude Justice for Women and Girls, March 2018 (url), pp. 3-8.
(969) UN Human Rights Committee, ICCPR Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of Iraq (CCPR/C/IRQ/CO/5), 3
December 2015 (url), para. 25; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or
arbitrary executions on her mission to Iraq, 14 to 23 November 2017 (A/HRC/38/44/Add.1), 5 June 2018 (url), paras. 40-44;
UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018 (url), para. 5; HRW, World Report 2018 –Iraq, 9 January 2018 (url).
(970) Iraq, Penal Code No. 111 of 1969 [unofficial translation], July 1969, available at: (url).
(971) UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018 (url), para. 5.1.
(972) GJC is a non-profit human rights organisation that develops legal strategies to protect and ‘seek justice for victims ofconflict, discrimination, torture, and abuse’: GJC, Our Work, n.d. (url).
(973) GJC, Iraq’s Criminal Laws Preclude Justice for Women and Girls, March 2018 (url), pp. 3-8.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT – IRAQ : ACTORS OF PROTECTION— 85

sexual violence ( 974). Due to a reliance on traditional non-state justice mechanisms in areas of Iraq thatare less developed, ‘justice systems can lead to poor outcomes for women’ ( 975).
Domestic violence and honour killings are rarely punished and spousal rape is not criminalised ( 976).
ISIL subjected women and girls and men and boys, to a range of conflict-related sexual violence
including rape, sexual slavery, violence and trafficking, which impacted women and girls in particular( 977). The state reportedly failed to act with due diligence in providing prevention, investigation,
sanctions and reparations to affected women and girls victimised by conflict-related sexual violence( 978). Shelters in Iraq were significantly lacking and were run by volunteers ( 979).
Unlike the rest of Iraq, in KRI, domestic violence is criminalised ( 980). The Kurdistan Region has
domestic violence legislation under the Kurdistan Region Act (Act No. 8) of 2011 on domestic violence( 981). KRI also has several government bodies and a High Council for Women’s Affairs that promotewomen’s rights ( 982). The KRI Ministry of Interior’s General Directorate to Combat Violence Against
Women, which has directorates in each governorate and receives complaints, collects data, and runs
hotlines ( 983). KRI has three domestic violence shelters, including one for trafficking victims ( 984). It has
a number of government entities that ‘have competence to promote the respect and protection of
women’s rights and to address the needs of women’ abused by ISIL ( 985). FGM is prohibited in
Kurdistan but not the rest of Iraq ( 986). The UN stated that ‘insufficient measures’ were in place tocombat the practice despite its prohibition in KRI ( 987).
The UN 2015 concluding observations on the rights of the child in Iraq reported the conflict with ISILand armed groups, sectarian divisions, extremism and instability led to ‘severe violations of children’s
rights’, including for example, targeted killings, abductions and mass executions of minorities and boys
( 988). Iraq has also been unable to sufficiently integrate the rights of the child into domestic legislation,(974) UNAMI/OHCHR, Promotion and Protection of Rights of Victims of Sexual Violence Captured by ISIL/or in Areas
Controlled by ISIL in Iraq, 22 August 2017 (url), p. 10.
(975) Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report – Iraq [updated 9 October 2018], 9 October 2018 (url),(976) Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2018 – Iraq, (url),(977) UNAMI/OHCHR, Promotion and Protection of Rights of Victims of Sexual Violence Captured by ISIL/or in Areas
Controlled by ISIL in Iraq, 22 August 2017 (url), p. 1.
(978) UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her
mission to Iraq, 14 to 23 November 2017 (A/HRC/38/44/Add.1), 5 June 2018 (url), paras. 40-44.
(979) UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her
mission to Iraq, 14 to 23 November 2017 (A/HRC/38/44/Add.1), 5 June 2018 (url), paras. 40-44.
(980) MRG, Broken Lives: Violence against Syrian refugee women and girls in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, March 2018, (url),
p. 16.
(981) UN Human Rights Committee, ICCPR Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of Iraq (CCPR/C/IRQ/CO/5), 3
December 2015 (url), para. 25; EU, EASO, EASO COI Meeting Report – Iraq: Practical Cooperation Meeting 25-26 April 2017
(Source: Mark Lattimer), July 2017 (url), p. 21; Iraq (Kurdistan), Act of Combatting Domestic Violence in the Kurdistan
Region of Iraq (Law No. 8 of 2011),(982) KRG, The By-Law of High Committee of Combating Violence Against Women and Family in Kurdistan Region
Governorates of Iraq, 2014 (url); MRG, Broken Lives: Violence against Syrian refugee women and girls in the Kurdistan
Region of Iraq, March 2018, (url), p. 16.
(983) UN Human Rights Committee, ICCPR Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of Iraq (CCPR/C/IRQ/CO/5), 3
December 2015 (url), para. 25; EU, EASO, EASO COI Meeting Report – Iraq: Practical Cooperation Meeting 25-26 April 2017
(Source: Mark Lattimer), July 2017 (url), p. 21; Iraq (Kurdistan), Act of Combatting Domestic Violence in the Kurdistan
Region of Iraq (Law No. 8 of 2011),(984) USDOS, Trafficking in Persons Report 2017 – Iraq, 28 June 2018 (url),(985) UNAMI/OHCHR, Promotion and Protection of Rights of Victims of Sexual Violence Captured by ISIL/or in Areas
Controlled by ISIL in Iraq, 22 August 2017 (url), pp. 6-7.
(986) UN Human Rights Committee, ICCPR Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of Iraq (CCPR/C/IRQ/CO/5), 3
December 2015 (url), para. 15.
(987) UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations on the combined second to fourth periodic reportsof Iraq (CRC/C/IRQ/CO/2-4), 3 March 2015 (url), para. 46.
(988) UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations on the combined second to fourth periodic reportsof Iraq (CRC/C/IRQ/CO/2-4), 3 March 2015 (url), para 6.

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and public officials lacked necessary training on the issue ( 989). Iraq did create a national interministerial committee on children in armed conflict, including child soldiering; however, it did notpunish militias, including PMUs for allegedly using child soldiers ( 990).
In the administration of justice, the Juvenile Welfare Act allowed for alternatives to detention,
however, they were not frequently used. Children were reportedly subjected to torture and cruelpunishment by police in detention and there were reports of children being held in pre-trial detention
for long periods ( 991). Children in detention were subjected to poor conditions, overcrowding, physicaland sexual abuse ( 992).
Legal protections for children and women against domestic violence in Iraq and KRI were described as‘insufficient’ by the UN, violence in the family was underreported due to fear of shame,family/community reprisals, or harassment and abuse from police and security forces ( 993). Sexualenslavement of children by ISIL and sexual exploitation and abuse of children were reportedly
prevalent according to the UN’s 2015 report ( 994). Iraq failed to prosecute or convict officials involved
in sex trafficking and child soldiering and victims remained vulnerable to arrest, imprisonment orprosecution ( 995). The MoI prosecuted 68 people on trafficking charges in 2017 and convicted 22, but
provided no further details ( 996).

9.2 Ethno-religious minorities
Australia’s DFAT gave the assessment that Iraq has strong constitutional and legislative guarantees toprotect ethnic minority groups, who also participate in political and public life and have language
rights, but that the state’s legal guarantees were ‘rarely and unevenly enforced’ and that minorities
face ‘widespread societal discrimination’ ( 997). The USCIRF states that the government of Iraq engages
in or tolerates religious freedom violations that are ‘systematic, ongoing, egregious’ ( 998). Minority
Rights Group International (MRG) states that since 2014 ISIL has committed serious human rights
abuses against Iraq’s minorities, who have been particularly targeted in the conflict, including Yezidis,
Christians, Bahai, Kakai, Sabean Mandeans, and Turkmen ( 999).
Sunnis do not trust the majority Shia government to ‘protect its community’ and religious minoritiesare ‘skeptical of the Iraqi government’s willingness and capability to protect them’ from both Shia andSunni armed groups, including against ISIL and the PMUs ( 1000). The UN noted that attacks on minority
groups occurred with impunity and that the state enforcement authorities were reluctant to holdperpetrators to account, causing a lack of confidence in officials ( 1001).

(989) UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations on the combined second to fourth periodic reportsof Iraq (CRC/C/IRQ/CO/2-4), 3 March 2015 (url), para 21.
(990) USDOS, Trafficking in Persons Report 2017 – Iraq, 28 June 2018 (url), pp. 231.
(991) UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations on the combined second to fourth periodic reportsof Iraq (CRC/C/IRQ/CO/2-4), 3 March 2015 (url), paras. 36 and 86.
(992) UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations on the combined second to fourth periodic reportsof Iraq (CRC/C/IRQ/CO/2-4), 3 March 2015 (url), paras. 36 and 86.
(993) UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations on the combined second to fourth periodic reportsof Iraq (CRC/C/IRQ/CO/2-4), 3 March 2015 (url), para. 40.
(994) UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations on the combined second to fourth periodic reportsof Iraq (CRC/C/IRQ/CO/2-4), 3 March 2015 (url), paras. 42-44.
(995) USDOS, Trafficking in Persons Report 2017 – Iraq, 28 June 2018 (url), p. 232.
(996) USDOS, Trafficking in Persons Report 2017 – Iraq, 28 June 2018 (url), p. 232.
(997) Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report – Iraq [updated 9 October 2018], 9 October 2018 (url), p. 10.
(998) US, USCIRF, Annual Report 2018 – Iraq, April 2018 (url).
(999) MRG, Iraq, May 2018 (url).
(1000) US, USCIRF, Annual Report 2018 – Iraq, April 2018 (url).
(1001) UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations on the combined second to fourth periodic reportsof Iraq (CRC/C/IRQ/CO/2-4), 3 March 2015 (url), paras. 78.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT – IRAQ : ACTORS OF PROTECTION— 87

Sources interviewed by the DIS in 2016 stated that the KRG makes efforts to prevent ethnic disputes
and discrimination in its territory and to show that it protects minorities. Human Rights Watch statedthat the ‘level of harassment is very low and the government is good at controlling it’. However, the
UNHCR stated in the same report that the possibility to seek protection in KRI against ethnic/religious
harassment ‘depends on the connections of the person in question’. Renad Mansour stated that Kurds
would likely be protected by Kurdish forces ahead of other minorities, while a civil society source
indicated that in private conflicts, ethnicity would not impact protection offered ( 1002).
KRI is home to a numerous ethno-religious minority groups and has seen a large influx of IDPs andSunni Arabs from neighbouring governorates fleeing into the territory seeking safety ( 1003). According
to a Kurdish NGO, since 2014, 360 000 Yezidi people fled into KRG controlled territory seeking safety
from ISIL ( 1004). The Kurdish government’s Office of Yezidi Rescues reported rescuing thousands ofwomen, men and children from ISIL kidnappers; while 3 319 Yezidis are still missing ( 1005). The KRG
also paid ransom to IS to secure the release and safe passage over 3 000 Yezidis into KRI in May 2017
( 1006). Many thousands of Yazidis were taken by ISIL as sexual slaves remain in captivity ( 1007).

9.3 People with disabilities
The Government of Iraq has ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities andhas adopted the Law No. 38 on the Care of Persons with Disabilities and Special Needs, including theestablishment of a Commission for the promotion of respect and protection of the rights of people
living with disabilities. According to UNAMI, however, the state has not implemented appropriate
measures to guarantee the protection of such rights, or to address discrimination and other barriers
to well-being ( 1008). People with disabilities face broad societal discrimination ( 1009) and are among the‘most vulnerable’ communities and often neglected in public discourse, according to the UN ( 1010).

9.4 LGBT minorities
According to the International Gay Lesbian and Intersex Association (ILGA), the Iraqi Penal Code of1969 does not explicitly prohibit same-sex relations ( 1011). OurRight Action International ( 1012) collected
dozens of unverified reports by the Islamic State in 2014-2016 wherein they reported on their Shariaimposed executions of people accused of sodomy or morality crimes, in particular, men accused ofsodomy who were thrown from buildings ( 1013). ILGA states that both police and militias forces werereported to kidnap, threaten, and kill LGBT people ‘frequently’ ( 1014). The UN Special Rapporteur on
extrajudicial executions reported that she received information on her 2018 mission that men andboys were subjected to, ‘on the basis of their actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender’,(1002) Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Access, Possibility of Protection, Security and Humanitarian
Situation, April 2016 (url), p. 51.
(1003) UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: January to June 2017, 14 December 2017 (url), p. 16.
(1004) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 19.
(1005) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 19.
(1006) USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018 (url), p. 19.
(1007) US, USCIRF, Annual Report 2018 – Iraq, April 2018 (url).
(1008) UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018 (url), para. 7.
(1009) UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018 (url), para. 45.
(1010) UN Human Rights Council, Technical assistance provided to assist in the promotion and protection of human rights in
Iraq (A/HRC/30/66), 27 July 2015 (url), para. 53.
(1011) ILGA, State-Sponsored Homophobia 2017 – Iraq, May 2017 (url), pp. 128-129.
(1012) OutRight Action International is a US-based non-profit organisation advocating for human rights concerns for LGBTIQ
people and holding consultative status with the UN. OutRight Action International, About Us, n.d. (url).
(1013) OutRight Action International, Timeline of Publicized Executions for ‘”Indecent Behavior” by IS Militias, 2 April 2016(url).
(1014) ILGA, State-Sponsored Homophobia 2017 – Iraq, May 2017 (url), pp. 128-129.

88 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT - IRAQ: ACTORS OF PROTECTION

threats, assault and killings, and to incitement of hatred from the media, as was the situation for LGBT
activists and organisations incitement to hatred from the media, as well as threats, assault and killings,
as were LGBT activists and organisations ( 1015). In 2017, an LGBT model and actor, Mr. Karar Nusbi,
was killed in Baghdad ( 1016). In response, the Government that is would establish a Committee
committed to the issue though the UN stated that it was unclear whether any results were
forthcoming ( 1017).

(1015) UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her
mission to Iraq, 14 to 23 November 2017 (A/HRC/38/44/Add.1), 5 June 2018 (url), p. 11.
(1016) UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her
mission to Iraq, 14 to 23 November 2017 (A/HRC/38/44/Add.1), 5 June 2018 (url), p. 11.
(1017) UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her
mission to Iraq, 14 to 23 November 2017 (A/HRC/38/44/Add.1), 5 June 2018 (url), p.11.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT – IRAQ : ACTORS OF PROTECTION— 89

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Terms of Reference
COI on state actors of protection should aim to consider the following topics:
 Main institutions of the state law enforcement system and the main institutions of theprosecution and judicial system, covering Structure / mandate / geographical reach Effectiveness Accessibility
 Integrity
 Are there main human rights bodies, complaint mechanisms or oversight bodies that aperson can make a complaint to? Are they effective?
 Are there any other parties or organisations controlling significant part of the territory?
 Do they ensure effective law enforcement?
 Do they ensure effective prosecution and adjudication?
The report should aim to consider the main actors of protection under the federal/central governmentof Iraq and in the Kurdish Region of Iraq.

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doi: 10.2847/683642