Asan Report

South Korean Public Opinion on
ROK-U.S. Bilateral Ties
J. James Kim, Kang Chungku, Ham Geon Hee
May 2022

AboutThe Asan Institute for Policy Studies is an independent, non-partisan think tank withthe mandate to undertake policy-relevant research to foster domestic, regional, andinternational environments conducive to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula,
East Asia, and the world-at-large.
The Public Opinion Studies Program at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies conducts
some of the most widely cited public surveys in international relations and politicalscience. Its regular polls produce reliable data for political leaders and the general public,
creating more informed policy debates and decisions. The Program also publishes survey
reports dealing with both international and domestic issues in Korea.

Disclaimer
The views expressed herein are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect
those of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies.

Authors
J. James Kim
Dr. J. James KIM is the director of Center for Regional Studies at the Asan Institutefor Policy Studies (Seoul). He is also a lecturer in the Executive Master of Public
Administration program at Columbia University. Previously, Dr. Kim was an assistantprofessor of political science at the California State Polytechnic University (Pomona).
He also served as a summer research associate at the RAND Corporation and as astatistical consultant for the Institute for Social and Economic Research and Planningat the School of International and Public Affairs in Columbia University. His primaryresearch interests include political economy, energy, security, public opinion, andmethodology. Dr. Kim received a B.S. and M.S. in industrial and labor relations from
Cornell University and an M.Phil. and Ph.D. in political science from Columbia
University.
Kang Chungku
Mr. Kang Chungku is a principal associate at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies.
Prior to joining the Asan Institute, he was a research assistant at the Korea Dialogue
Academy in Seoul. His research interests include quantitative research methods, survey
design, and statistical data analysis. Mr. Kang received his B.A. in English and M.A. in
Sociology at Korea University.
Ham Geon Hee
Mr. Ham Geon Hee is a senior research associate at the Asan Institute for Policy
Studies. Prior to joining the Asan Institute, he worked at the Korea Institute for
Defense Analyses (KIDA) and the Research Institute of Applied Statistics at
Sungkyunkwan University. He received a B.S. in Information and Mathematics from
Korea University and a M.S. in Statistics from Sungkyunkwan University. He iscurrently pursuing his Ph.D. in Statistics at Sungkyunkwan University. His researchinterests include mixture models, incomplete data analysis, and methodology.

Table of Contents
Executive Summary06

1. Introduction

09

2. Image, History, and Favorability of the United States

10

2.1. Image

2.2. History

2.3. Favorability
3. ROK-U.S. Alliance3.1. Purpose and Functionality

3.2. Necessity of the ROK-U.S. Alliance3.3. USFK

3.4. Nuclear Options
4. The Future of ROK-U.S. Relations

4.1. Agenda Priorities for ROK-U.S.

4.2. Outstanding Issues in ROK-U.S. Alliance4.3. Outlook on ROK-U.S. Relations

10
11
14
18
18
23
24
28
33
33
35
39

5. Conclusion

42

Survey Methodology

45

Appendix I: 2022 Asan Poll Questionnaire (March 2022(a))

49

Appendix II: 2022 Asan Poll Questionnaire (March 2022(b))

56List of Figures
Figure 1.

Image of the U.S.

11

Figure 3.

Favorability of Country and Leader

15

Figure 2.
Figure 4.
Figure 5.
Figure 6.
Figure 7.
Figure 8.
Figure 9.

Important Events in ROK-U.S. Relations
Role of the ROK-U.S. AllianceNorth Korean Military Provocations, 2010~2022

Necessity of the ROK-U.S. Alliance: Future vs. Post-Unification
Necessity of USFK: Future vs. Post-Unification
Level of USFK Presence in the Future

Attitudes on Indigenous Nuclear Weapons Development

Figure 10. Attitudes on Reintroducing Tactical Nuclear Weapons
Figure 11. Important Issues for Current ROK-U.S. Relations
Figure 12. Attitudes on ROK-U.S. Military Exercise

Figure 13. Attitudes on Issues in ROK-U.S. Relations
Figure 14. Outlook on ROK-U.S. Relations

12
19
20
23
25
27
29
31
34
36
37
39

List of Tables
Table 1.

Favorability Toward the U.S. and Biden by Demographics

16

Table 3.

Expectations about the U.S. Response to a War

22

Table 2.

Table 4.
Table 5.
Table 6.

Role of the ROK-U.S. Alliance by Demographics, 2020~2022
on the Korean Peninsula

Necessity of USFK by Demographics: Future vs. Post-Unification
Attitudes on Indigenous Nuclear Weapons Development by
Demographics: With(out) Hypothetical Sanctions

Outlook on ROK-U.S. Relations by Demographics

21

26
30
40

6

Executive Summary
May 2022 holds a special meaning for ROK-U.S. relations because it marks a critical
turning point in the South Korean political landscape as Seoul ushers in a newadministration. From a historical standpoint, the month also marks the 140th anniversaryof signing the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between Korea (also known as Joseon)
and the United States. Test of time has shown that the bilateral ties have managed topersevere through thick and thin, if not strengthen. The question for the investigatorsof this report is how South Koreans view the past, present, and future trajectory of thisrelationship. Given that President Yoon Suk-yeol has already expressed his commitment
to the ROK-U.S. alliance, this report serves as a timely review of the South Korean
public view of the ROK-U.S. bilateral relationship.
This report utilizes a combination of data drawn from past studies and the survey
conducted during March 10~13 and 17~18, 2022. The data was collected through arandom digit dialing method with weighted sampling referenced according to thelatest South Korean census.
The following are the key findings from this report.
•	When asked what the first thing that comes to mind is when they see “the UnitedStates,” 37.3% of respondents chose “strong military.” In 2015, the percentage ofanswers mentioning “capitalist economy” and “strong military” were similar at 28.6%
and 26.7%, respectively.
•	When asked about important events in the history of ROK-U.S. relations, morethan half answered security-related issues (Korean War 35.8%, formation of the
ROK-U.S. alliance 23.3%).
•	South Koreans showed high affinity for the United States and President Biden.
The favorability of the U.S. remained above 5 (neutral) and reached a maximumof 6.85 in March 2022. President Biden’s favorability remained at 5.89, which wassignificantly higher than that of President Xi Jinping (1.99).
•	60.2% of South Koreans supported the idea of developing the ROK-U.S. alliance to7include fundamental values, such as democracy and human rights.
•	South Korean public’s confidence in the U.S. security guarantee was high. When
asked if the U.S. would intervene in the event of a military conflict on the Korean
Peninsula, 88.9% answered affirmatively.
•	Support for the ROK-U.S. alliance was high. Since 2012, the response that the
ROK-U.S. alliance is necessary never fell below 91.9%. South Korean public felt thatthe alliance was still necessary after unification (minimum 80%, maximum 86.3%).
•	Support for USFK was 82.1%. 62.3% of respondents stated that the USFK was stillnecessary after unification. The support for USFK seems higher than in the past due
to a rise in North Korean provocation.
•	70.2% of South Koreans supported developing indigenous nuclear weapons. This
was the highest support for proliferation since 2010. 63.6% favored independent
nuclear armament even if South Korea was sanctioned for violating the NPT.
•	59% of South Koreans supported the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons
in South Korea. 38.3% opposed.
•	South Koreans appeared to place a high premium on the security and economic
dimensions of ROK-U.S. relations. When asked about the most important issue
South Korea and the U.S. should jointly manage, 37.1% named cooperation in
dealing with a nuclear North Korea. 16.1% mentioned economic revitalization
through trade, 14.3% picked resumption of dialogues with North Korea, 12.6%
mentioned China, and about 10% named OPCON transfer, joint exercises, andother alliance related issues.
•	The survey explored what South Koreans thought about the joint military exercises.
Even since the Moon administration began active engagement with North Korea,
ROK-U.S. joint military exercises have been scaled down to win Pyongyang’s trust.
However, the survey data indicated that nearly half of all South Koreans (46.4%)
wanted the military exercises to be scaled up to the level before the dialogues. 35.8%
wanted to maintain the reduced or suspended status.

8•	86.1% supported South Korea’s participation in the QUAD.
•	83% of respondents supported ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral cooperation.
•	71.7% of South Koreans supported South Korea’s participation in the U.S.-ledballistic missile defense (BMD) system (22.8% opposed).
•	57.7% of South Koreans supported the deployment of additional THAAD batteries.
38.9% were opposed to this idea.
•	Nearly 9 out of 10 people (88.3%) were optimistic about ROK-U.S. relations. South
Koreans believed that the relationship between the two countries would improvebased on trust in the alliance.

9

1. Introduction
May 2022 holds a special meaning for ROK-U.S. relations because it marks a critical
turning point in the South Korean political landscape as Seoul ushers in a newadministration. From a historical standpoint, the month also marks the 140th anniversaryof signing the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between Korea (also known as Joseon
at the time) and the United States. Test of time has shown that the bilateral ties havemanaged to persevere through thick and thin, if not strengthen. The question for theinvestigators of this report is how South Koreans view the past, present, and future
trajectory of this relationship. Given that President Yoon Suk-yeol has already expressed
his commitment to the ROK-U.S. alliance, this report serves as a timely review of theSouth Korean public view of the ROK-U.S. bilateral relationship.
This report utilizes a combination of data drawn from past studies as well as the survey
conducted during March 10~13 and 17~18, 2022. The data was collected through arandom digit dialing method with weighted sampling referenced according to thelatest South Korean census.

10

2.Image, History, and Favorabilityof the United States
History suggests that South Korean public sentiment about the United States has
had good and bad moments. Periodic flair-ups of anti-American sentiments were
often coupled with incidents such as homicides involving U.S. soldiers in the 1990s,
formaldehyde dumping in 2000, auto accident involving U.S. armored vehicles andSouth Korean minors in 2002, and protest against U.S. imported beef in 2008.
However, the overall South Korean public opinion on the United States, at least as far
as the data would allow us to see, has generally been quite favorable. In fact, the Asan
Institute for Policy Studies has continuously gauged country favorability for the UnitedStates, China, Japan, North Korea, and Russia since 2010. This data shows consistent
support for the United States and its leader, which far surpassed that of other countries
in the region regardless of the domestic political circumstance in the United States orSouth Korea.

2.1. Image
To get a sense of the South Korean public perception of the United States, we asked
the survey respondents what image came to mind when they read “the United States.”
Of the choices they were given, 68.7% of the answers referred to hard power, suchas “strong military” and “capitalist economy.” Determinants of soft power, such as“democratic system of government” (17.2%), “innovative companies” (7.5%), “popular
culture” (2.6%), and “famous people and places” (2.4%) accounted for 29.7% of all
answers.1
An interesting trend observed in the longitudinal data is that between “strong military”
and “capitalist economy,” there has been relatively little change in the association
between the U.S. and capitalist economy since 2015; however, the association with“strong military” increased by a sizable margin from 26.7% in 2015 to 37.3% (+10.6%p)

1. There were no statistically significant demographic differences.

11

in 2022. This result may be attributed to the recently increased attention given to security
matters as U.S.-China competition begins to heat up and the Ukrainian crisis worsens.
The fact that the U.S. fancies a large defense budget is also a contributing factor. Global
Firepower’s military strength ranking suggests, for instance, that the U.S. has continued
to maintain the world’s strongest military through its defense spending.2 In short, theSouth Korean perception is shaped by structural realities of the U.S. military capability
and the emerging security challenges.
Figure 1. Image of the U.S.3 (%)
Strong Military
Democratic System of Government
Popular Culture

37.3

2022

Capitalist Economy
Innovative Companies
Famous People & Places

31.4

17.2

7.5
2.6
2.4

26.7

2015

0

28.6

20

40

20.6

60

5.7 5.2 5.1

80

100

2.2. History
Next, the survey questions explored further what historical event(s) came to mind forthe respondent when considering ROK-U.S. relations. The respondents were asked
to select the top two choices among the list that included “the Korean independence
in 1945,” “the division of the Korean Peninsula,” “the Korean War,” “the formation of
the ROK-U.S. alliance,” “the signing of the KORUS FTA,” and “the protest against
imported U.S. beef in 2008.”

2. Source: Military Strength Ranking 2005~2022, Global Firepower (GFP). https://www.globalfire
power.com/global-ranks-previous.php.
3. Source: Asan Poll (March 2022(a)).

12

The majority of respondents converged on security-related matters, such as the Korean
War (35.8%) and the formation of the ROK-U.S. alliance (23.3%). Part of the reason
may be linked to the fact that security cooperation was the foundation of bilateralrelations immediately after the Korean War. The priority on security cooperation scoredeven higher when we broadened the selection to the top two choices, with 56.6%
choosing “the Korean War” and 47.3% opting for “the formation of the ROK-U.S.
alliance.” “The KORUS FTA” (31.2%) was followed by “the division of the Korean
Peninsula” (26.5%) and “the Korean independence” (23.3%). “The protest against
imported U.S. beef ” recorded the lowest percentage at 8.4%.
Figure 2. Important Events in ROK-U.S. Relations4 (%)
First

Second

75

60

56.6

45

21.8

47.3

25.3

31.2

30

15

19.6

35.8
23.3

12.6
0

Korean War(1950~1953)

Formation of
ROK-U.S. Alliance(1953)

KORUS FTA

(2007)

26.5
13.6
13.6

23.3
13.9
10.1

KoreanDivision of
the Korean Peninsula Idenpendence(1945)(1945)

8.4
5.1
3.6
Protest against
Imported U.S. Beef
(2008)

Interpretive meaning can be assigned to the results from this data through simple
sentiment analysis. For instance, the data suggests that the respondents focused on
historical events that can be categorized as more “positive” than “negative.” Looking
only at the first choice, for instance, the respondents tended to favor “the formationof the ROK-U.S. alliance” (23.3%), “the KORUS FTA” (12.6%), and “the Korean
independence” (10.1%) over “the division of the Korean Peninsula” (13.6%) and “the4. Source: Asan Poll (March 2022(a)). Top line numbers represent the result of multiple response
analysis.

13

protest against imported U.S. beef ” (3.6%). This relative ordering remained consistenteven when broadened out to the top two choices.
What we mean by “positive” and “negative” events is based on a crude modal subjective
assessment about how ordinary Koreans can see these events from a historical perspective
and whether the net impact of a given event can be assigned some meaning on aspectrum between positive and negative.5 For instance, events such as alliance formation,
FTA, and independence can be interpreted as positive outcomes of the bilateralrelationship between Korea and the U.S. On the other hand, division of the Korean
Peninsula and South Korean protest against imported U.S. beef in 2008 could beinterpreted as a negative outcome.
Excluded from this analysis was “the Korean War,” even though it scored highest among
all choices. The reason for not assigning any value to this choice was because the U.S. rolein the Korean War can have both positive and negative interpretations.6 This is supportedby the fact that the respondent’s ideological disposition did not appear to correlate with“the Korean War.” Both conservatives (33.3%) and progressives (32.5%), for instance,
had an equally high tendency to link “the Korean War” with the United States.
For other historical events, the respondent’s modal choice tended to correlate with
their ideological disposition. For instance, conservatives tended to emphasize theimportance of “the formation of the ROK-U.S. alliance” (28.2%), while progressives
tended to emphasize “the division of the Korean Peninsula” (22.7%). When looking at
5. Michael Gref, Nike Matthiesen, Sreenivasa Hikkal Venugopala, Shalaka Satheesh, Aswinkumar
Vijayananth, Duc Bac Ha, Sven Behnke, and Joachim Kohler. 2022. “A Study on the Ambiguity in
Human Annotation of German Oral History Interviews for Perceived Emotion Recognition andSentiment Analysis.” arXiv:2201.06868. Retrieved from chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpca
jpcglclefindmkaj/https://arxiv.org/pdf/2201.06868.pdf; A.B. Pawar, M.A. Jawale, and D. N.
Kyatanavar. 2016. “Fundamentals of Sentiment Analysis: Concepts and Methodology.” Sentiment
Analysis and Ontology Engineering. pp.25-48.
6. Although the start of the Korean War is attributed to the North Korean invasion, there arecompeting historical explanations about “the cause” of the war. See Bruce Cummings. 1990. The
Origins of the Korean War Volume II. Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ; Youngho Kim.
1999. “The origins of the Korean War: Civil War or Stalin’s Rollback?” Diplomacy and Statecraft.
10(1): 186-214.

14

the top two choices, conservatives focused on “the formation of the ROK-U.S. alliance”(57.8%) followed by “the Korean independence” (27.4%) and “the KORUS FTA”
(25.4%). Progressives, on the other hand, converged on “the division of the Korean
Peninsula” (38%) followed by “the KORUS FTA” (37.3%) and “the formation of the
ROK-U.S. alliance” (35.1%).7
Since past findings suggest a correlation between age and ideological disposition of theSouth Korean public, we also see some relationship between age and choice of the modal
historical event the people often associate with the ROK-U.S. relations. Looking at the
top two choices, for instance, 65.3% of those 60-and-over chose the Korean War as theevent that comes to mind when thinking of the bilateral relationship. The formation of the
ROK-U.S. alliance was most important for those in their 20s (53.5%). While individuals
in their 30s and 40s also tended to name the Korean War and the formation of the ROKU.S. alliance most often, their mentioning of the KORUS FTA (30s: 38%; 40s: 39.5%)
was higher than any other age categories. Similarly, the same can be said about thedivision of the Korean Peninsula, for which individuals in their 40s and 50s were more
likely to mention than individuals in other age categories (40s: 29.7%; 50s: 32.9%).

2.3. Favorability8
Data indicates that South Koreans appear to favor the presidency of Joe Biden and theUnited States. For example, the favorability (0=least favorable to 10=most favorable)of the United States was above five (5=neutral) during the Trump years, except for July
2020. If we leave out July 2020, South Koreans’ favorability for the United States was
at a minimum of 5.45 in August 2019 and at a maximum of 6.85 in March 2022.
Furthermore, the favorability rating for the United States improved significantly after
Joe Biden won the 2020 presidential election. In December 2020, the favorability of
the United States was 5.99, and in March 2022, it increased to 6.85.
7. Relative frequency of the moderates for the top two choices are as follows: Korean War (60%),
formation of the ROK-U.S. alliance (47%), KORUS FTA (34.3%), division of the Korean Peninsula(24%), Korean independence (21.7%).
8. The Asan Institute for Policy Studies has continued to measure South Korean favorability for
the U.S., China, Japan, North Korea, and Russia. This report excludes data for Japan, North
Korea, and Russia, given that it is primarily focused on the U.S. China was included as a reference
point for comparison.

15

We also found a significant gap in the relative favorability of the United States andChina. For the period examined above, China’s favorability was at a minimum of 2.4
in July 2020 and at a maximum of 4.16 in June 2018. China’s favorability increased
significantly in December 2020 to 3.25, but it declined to 2.71 by March 2022. Thisdecline can be explained by the ongoing domestic debate over the origins of COVID-19
and “cultural (mis)appropriation.”9 Leadership favorability was significantly lower thanthe country favorability, which suggests that the South Koreans blame the Chinese
leadership for COVID-19 and cultural (mis)appropriation. Xi Jinping’s favorability
was at a minimum of 1.63 in July 2020 and at a maximum of 3.89 in June 2018.
Figure 3. Favorability of Country and Leader10 (0~10 Point)
U.S.

Donald Trump

Joe Biden

Jan

Jul

China

Xi Jinping

8

6

4

2

0

Mar

Jun
2018

Mar
2019

Aug

Dec

Jul
2020

Mar
2022

9. Cultural appropriation refers to incidents when the Chinese government or people incorrectly
lay claim to distinctly unique Korean culture as their own. An example was the appearance ofan individual wearing a Korean traditional garment called hanbok as a representative of Chinese
ethnic group during the opening ceremony of the Beijing Winter Olympics in 2022. President Xi
Jinping also claimed during his meeting with Donald Trump in 2017 that Korea was once a partof China.
10. Source: Asan Poll (March 2022(a)). Figures 3 and 4 include data taken from J. James Kim,
Chungku Kang. “South Korean Outlook on the United States and ROK-U.S. Relations in the
Biden Era.” Issue Brief. The Asan Institute for Policy Studies. February 2021.

16

The above findings are hardly surprising given that South Korean favorability of leadersand country are generally correlated. One exception to this rule was Donald J. Trump.
While the overall favorability of the United States was within the range of 4 to 5,
President Trump’s favorability had a wider range spanning 2.26 to 5.16. However, as
shown in Figure 3, favorability for Xi Jinping and China was highly correlated (r=0.99).
A similar observation can be made concerning President Biden after his inauguration.
One interesting result was that the relationship between favorability for President Biden
and the United States varied according to the age and ideology of the respondent. For
instance, the data indicates that country-leader favorability correlation is higher amongolder or ideologically more conservative respondents. The variance in favorability was
more pronounced across ideology than age, however. Progressives and moderates rated
the U.S. and President Biden around points 5~6, while conservatives ranked the U.S.
and President Biden to be between points 6~8.
Table 1. Favorability Toward the U.S. and Biden by Demographics11 (0~10 Point)
U.S. (a)Joe Biden (b)Gap (a-b)

6.85

5.89

0.96

20s

6.35

5.05

1.30

30s

6.73

5.46

1.27

40s

6.63

5.44

1.19

50s

6.80

6.04

0.76

60+

7.34

6.76

0.58

F=5.467, df=4, p<.001

F=17.479, df=4, p<.001

Conservative

7.83

6.63

1.20

Moderate

6.31

5.38

0.93

Progressive

5.81

5.26

0.55

F=75.032, df=2, p<.001

F=34.365, df=2, p<.001

Total

Age

Test Statistics

Ideology

Test Statistics

11. Source: Asan Poll (March 2022(a)).

17

Since Joe Biden took office in 2020, South Korean favorability of the U.S. has stayed
above 6, and Biden’s favorability remained well above 5. These results are meaningful
because the South Korean public mood appears set for building a stronger bilateralrelationship with the United States, which is also high on the priority list for the Yoon
administration in Seoul.

18

3. ROK-U.S. Alliance
The ROK-U.S. alliance helped keep the peace on the Korean Peninsula after the Korean
War and contributed to South Korea’s economic development. But there are different
interpretations of the alliance. For instance, some observers may say that South Korea
was the poster child of democracy and capitalism for much of the Cold War era. These
people also claim the alliance was a beacon for the free world in Asia. Through thickand thin, the relationship has continued to grow and blossom in promoting a stableenvironment in and around the Korean Peninsula and contributed to shaping theregional order. On the other hand, of course, the detractors may question whether the
U.S. played any constructive role in the region. Some people argue that the U.S. was atleast partly responsible for the division of the Korean Peninsula and the Korean War.12
In light of these different interpretations, it may be worth exploring the South Korean
public’s attitudes about the ROK-U.S. alliance and its future outlook.

3.1. Purpose and Functionality
As stated in Article III of the Mutual Defense Treaty, both South Korea and the U.S.
acknowledge that “an armed attack in the Pacific area on either [party] … would be
dangerous to [the other’s] peace and safety and declare that [they] would act to meetthe common danger in accordance with [their] constitutional processes.” While the treaty
alludes to the security obligations of each party, subsequent documents and interactions
have signaled concern for a broader set of challenges. The Joint Vision Statement of2009, for instance, states that South Korea and the United States agree to expand theareas of bilateral cooperation to include space, energy, public health, economic inequality,
human rights, democracy, and climate change, among others. These ideas were revisited
during the ROK-U.S. summit in 2021, where South Korea and the United Statesagreed more specifically to expand cooperation on global health, supply chain, space,and emerging technology.
How do South Koreans view the role of the ROK-U.S. alliance within the context of
the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia? First, we explore South Korean attitudes

12. See Cummings (1990).

19

about the functional role of the ROK-U.S. alliance. Do South Koreans see the role of
the ROK-U.S. alliance to be restricted to addressing the North Korean threat as security
cooperation or recognize the need to broaden the alliance to include fundamental
values such as human rights and democracy?
Figure 4. Role of the ROK-U.S. Alliance13 (%)
Should be limited to respond to the North Korean security threats
Should be built on principles such as democratic ideals, human rights and universal values

38.8

2022

60.2

28.8

2020

66.3

42.4

2016

0

20

51.2

40

60

80

100

When we considered this very question in the past (2016 and 2020), where more thanhalf of the respondents expressed the desire to broaden the alliance initiative to include
fundamental values such as human rights and democracy. This year was no exception,with 60.2% of respondents stating that they would like the ROK-U.S. alliance todevelop into a broad value-based one. The notable difference is that the percentage ofindividuals not having any opinion on this matter declined significantly between 2016
and 2020, which suggests that individuals are increasingly more likely to form a clear
view on this issue over time.
Secondly, individuals supporting a broader role for the alliance was peaked in 2020
at 66.3% but pulled back to a little over 60%, yet still significantly higher than 51.2%
in 2016. Part of the explanation for this trend is the rising security risk posed by an

13. Source: Asan Poll (November 2016, December 2020, March 2022(a)). “Don’t Know/Refused toAnswer” declined from 6.4% in 2016 to 4.9% in 2020.

20

increased number of North Korean provocations since the failure of nuclear diplomacy
in Hanoi. As shown in Figure 5, the number of provocations has continued to growsince 2020. This trend is likely to continue given the series of public statements releasedby North Korea in recent months. In short, the increasing security risk perception has
contributed to the view that the alliance should be valued for its contribution to thedefense needs of South Korea. What is notable is the relatively higher percentage ofSouth Koreans seeing the need for a broadened value-based perspective of the alliancedespite rising security risks associated with North Korea.
Figure 5. North Korean Military Provocations, 2010~202214 (No. of Incidence)
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

There were some notable differences in opinion across age groups. Except for those aged
60 and over, every age category agreed in 2020 and 2022 that the alliance should bevalue-based. However, the older respondents favored a more restrictive security-based
view of the alliance, perhaps due to their concerns over the security risks associatedwith North Korea. For instance, individuals in their 50s wanting the alliance to be morevalue-encompassing declined from 74.7% to 62.2%. For 60-and-over, the percentage
fell from 60% to 48.3%. These declines were offset by individuals preferring a moresecurity-focused alliance, which grew from 22.7% to 36.2% for the 50s and 34.4% to
14. Source: CSIS Missile defense project (https://missilethreat.csis.org/north-korea-missile-launches1984-present/). Each unit of analysis is incidence of provocation not the number of missiles or
tests conducted. Data in Figure 5 was extracted in March 2022.

21

50.7% for 60-and-over during the same period. While we see a similar trend amongindividuals in their 30s, the magnitude of swings for 50-and-over is significantly higher.
Table 2. Role of the ROK-U.S. Alliance by Demographics, 2020~202215 (%)
2020
Security

ValuesSecurity

Values

29.0

66.1

38.7

60.1

20s

30.0

64.7

32.3

65.9

30s

25.5

68.2

36.7

62.7

40s

29.3

66.0

29.3

69.7

50s

22.7

74.7

36.2

62.2

60+

34.4

60.0

50.7

48.3

Total

Age

x2=13.611, df=8, p<.10x2=29.942, df=8, p<.001

29.3

66.9

38.4

60.5

Conservative

33.1

65.1

41.9

57.0

Moderate

28.8

63.9

38.2

60.4

Progressive

25.7

71.6

33.8

65.2

Test Statistics
Total

Ideology

2022

Test Statistics

x2=18.956, df=4, p<.05

n.s.

Interestingly, the respondent’s ideology also mattered less in 2022 than in 2020. In
2020, for instance, the progressives tended to prefer a value-based alliance more thanthe conservatives but this difference became statistically non-significant in 2022.
This suggests that the ideological disposition has no decisive impact on determining
whether an individual will support broadening out the alliance functionality to defend
fundamental values such as human rights and democracy today. In short, the supportersof the value-based view of the alliance may not see a trade-off between security andvalues and that the two can go hand-in-hand.

15. Source: Asan Poll (December 2020, March 2022(a)). Table 2 excludes “Don’t Know/Refused toAnswer.”22

Table 3. Expectations about the U.S. Response to a War on the Korean Peninsula16 (%)

Asan
Institutefor Policy
Studies

SNU
Institute for
Peace andUnification
Studies

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Will
Intervene

92.6

91.3

91.6

90.0

88.0

84.7

86.6

88.9

Won’t
Intervene

7.4

8.7

8.4

10.0

12.0

15.3

13.4

10.7

Help
South
Korea

74.0

70.5

74.1

67.8

66.1

71.7

64.7

70.7

Help
North
Korea

1.8

4.9

2.4

3.4

2.4

3.2

1.1

2.3

Follow Its
Interests

22.6

22.6

22.1

26.2

29.7

23.2

32.0

25.4

RemainNeutral

1.6

2.0

1.4

2.7

1.7

1.8

2.2

1.6

Another dimension of the functionality perception is the level of trust that South
Koreans may have about the U.S. security guarantees often tied to the ROK-U.S.
alliance. If trust is high, South Korean public perception of the overall robustness of thealliance is also high. When the respondents were asked whether they thought the U.S.
would intervene in the event of a war on the Korean Peninsula, nearly 90% (88.9%)
answered in the affirmative. This percentage had never declined below 84.7% since2014, when the question was first asked in previous surveys. It shows that the South
Koreans maintain a high level of confidence in the U.S. security guarantee. This wastrue even during the Trump years when Washington was demanding more from South
16. Source: Asan Annual Survey (2014~2020). Asan Poll (March 2022). March 2022(a) poll changed
the wording of the question from “If there is a war on the Korean Peninsula…” to “If North
Korea attacks South Korea…” Although there is qualitative difference in the wording, thequestion of interest was what the respondent thought about the likelihood of U.S. intervention
on South Korea’s behalf in the event of a military conflict.
Source: SNU Institute for Peace and Unification Studies (Attitudes on Unification, 2014~2021).
Retrieved from https://ipus.snu.ac.kr/blog/archives/publishing/4767 {Question: “How do you
think the neighboring countries (the U.S., Japan, China, and Russia) would respond in the eventof a war on the Korean Peninsula?”}.

23

Korea in terms of its ability to shoulder a more significant cost burden on maintaining
the alliance.
This finding is consistent with data reported by Institute for Peace and Unification
Studies at Seoul National University, which showed that every year since 2010, themajority of South Koreans continued to believe that the U.S. would intervene to help
South Korea in the event of a war on the Korean Peninsula. This was true even during
the term of the Trump presidency, when 32% of the Korean public believed that the
U.S. would pursue its national interest.

3.2. Necessity of the ROK-U.S. Alliance
Trust in U.S. security guarantees can be linked to the perception of the necessity of
the alliance. We can explore this idea more directly by checking the survey for what
the respondent thinks about the “necessity” of the alliance in the future and perhaps
even after unification. This question was asked every year since 2012, and the answer in
the affirmative has never been below 91.9% (max: 96.4%). The interesting finding wasthat there was little to no variation in the general attitude about the necessity of thealliance. In short, the security environment did not matter much for the South Koreans.
Figure 6. Necessity of the ROK-U.S. Alliance: Future vs. Post-Unification17 (%)
Future (a)
100

94.0
84.0

80

96.0
83.3

95.0
81.1

Post-Unification (b)

94.9
81.8

94.1
81.8

95.6
80.0

Gap (a-b)

94.1
85.2

91.9
80.4

95.9
86.3

96.4
82.9

60

40

20

0

10.0

2012

12.7

13.9

13.1

12.3

2013

2014

2015

2016

15.6

2017

8.9
2018

11.5

9.6

2019

2020

13.5

2022

24

When asked if the alliance was necessary post-unification, the percentage dipped toa minimum of 80% (2017) and a maximum of 86.3% (2020). In short, the difference
between pre and post-unification can be seen as North Korea’s effect on the general
South Korean thinking about the alliance. This difference never broke 16%p since thesequestions were first posed in 2012. This finding suggests that the South Koreans see thevalue of the alliance not only for its role in addressing the North Korea challenge but
also for a whole host of other functions it serves, as discussed above.

3.3. USFKThe centerpiece of the ROK-U.S. alliance is the 28,500 Americans serving in the USFK.
While the USFK can be the center of controversy and criticism as it may have in thepast when it comes to negotiations for the Special Measures Agreement (SMA), it
can also be the bedrock for a stable security environment in the Korean Peninsula. But
exactly how do South Koreans see the USFK? Do they know the presence of USFK
as a benefit or hindrance to South Korea’s interest?
The survey posed two questions to gauge public attitudes about the USFK. One waswhether the respondent thought it was necessary to have the USFK continually present
into the foreseeable future. The second question asked whether the respondent thought
it was essential to have the USFK after unification. Concerning the former, 82.1%
answered that it is necessary to have the USFK in South Korea for the foreseeable
future. Since this question was first posed in 2012, the lowest percentage supporting
USFK’s presence in South Korea was 67.8%. Support for USFK was at a high in 2016
and 2017 when tensions ran high, and North Korea has conducted multiple tests.
However, it declined significantly during 2018~2020 when diplomatic engagements
between the two Koreas and the United States suggested a possible breakthrough inNorth Korea’s denuclearization. However, this changed when the talks broke down,
and North Korea resumed testing missiles.

17. Source: Asan Annual Survey (2012~2020), Asan Poll (March 2022(a)). Figure 6 includes datafrom Annual Survey between 2012~2020. March 2022 data is from the Asan Poll (March
2022(a)). Data before 2020 was taken from Figure 8 of the Asan Report on “The Fundamentals
of South Korean Public Opinion on Foreign Policy and National Security.”

25

Figure 7. Necessity of USFK: Future vs. Post-Unification18 (%)
Future (a)

100
80.1

80

80.3

Post-Unification (b)

78.7

82.1

80.6

Gap (a-b)

76.3

82.1
74.7

67.8

72.0
62.3

60
44.2
40

36.1

39.5
39.2

42.4
39.7

45.5

26.8

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

44.1

46.3

35.1

20

0

49.5

2017

2018

30.6

2019

25.7

2020

19.8

2022

Therefore, it is not surprising to find that the support for USFK’s continued presenceon the Korean Peninsula declines significantly when North Korea is taken out of theequation. When asked whether the survey respondent would support the continued
presence of USFK post-unification, the affirmative answer drops to 62.3%. Before 2022,
the percentage ranged from 35.1% to 49.5%. This suggests that the North Korean
threat is a significant factor when considering the necessity of the USFK. However,there is also a substantial change in this view starting in 2022. This may be due to thechanging regional security environment, which now includes challenges other thanNorth Korea. Increasing great power competition and concern about the potential
threat posed by a neighboring great power from having watched the Russo-Ukrainian
conflict seems to have contributed to the South Korean public thinking about thestrategic value of the USFK for South Korea.
There were statistically significant differences in the need for USFK by age and ideology.
For instance, respondents aged 60-and-over were most supportive when it came to thepresence of the USFK before and after unification at 90.4% and 70.3%, respectively.
For all other age categories above 30, the percentage breakdown was approximately

18. Source: Asan Annual Survey (2012~2020). Asan Poll (March 2022(a)).

26

Table 4. Necessity of USFK by Demographics: Future vs. Post-Unification19 (%)
FutureNecessary

Unnecessary

Necessary

Unnecessary

82.4

17.6

63.1

36.9

20s

84.0

16.0

60.5

39.5

30s

77.3

22.7

64.4

35.6

40s

80.3

19.7

61.5

38.5

50s

74.5

25.5

54.6

45.4

60+

90.4

9.6

70.3

29.7

Total

Age

x2=25.107, df=4, p<.05

x2=13.285, df=4, p<.05

82.2

17.8

63.2

36.8

Conservative

90.3

9.7

75.4

24.6

Moderate

79.0

21.0

60.9

39.1

Progressive

74.1

25.9

49.1

50.9

Test Statistics
Total

Ideology

Post-Unification

Test Statistics

x2=32.086, df=2, p<.05

x2=49.624, df=2, p<.05

10~20%p lower. However, for those in their 20s, the support for USFK was relatively
high at 84%. This suggests that the individuals in their 20s though slightly less supportive
had very similar views as respondents aged 60-and-over regarding attitudes about the
USFK. Post-unification, however, the respondents in their 20s saw less need for USFK
than individuals aged 60-and-over. What this suggests is that the individuals in their
20s tend to restrict their association of the need for USFK with North Korea.

19. Source: Asan Poll (March 2022(a)). The number of “Don’t Know/Refused to Answer” was excluded
because it was negligible. To compare the “future” with “post-unification,” “Don’t Know/Refused
to Answer” was excluded from the analysis. The sample size for “future” by age was n=998;“future” by ideology was n=958; “post-unification” by age was n=988; “post-unification” byideology was n=952.

27

Not surprisingly, ideological conservatives were more supportive of the USFK than themoderates or progressives. This carried over into the post-unification scenario as well.
However, the more interesting finding was that as many as 3 in 4 progressives (73.8%)
even saw a strong argument for why the USFK should remain in South Korea for theforeseeable future.
Figure 8. Level of USFK Presence in the Future20 (%)
Maintain current level of troops

Reduce level of troops

Increase level of troops

15.5

69.8

2022

26.7

63.1

2019

0

20

10.4

23.8

60.0

2020

40

12.3

60

80

7.8

100

Among those who answered that the USFK should remain for the foreseeable future(n=821), the survey asked whether the size of the USFK should stay at the current levelor change. 69.8% answered that the USFK should remain at the current level. This issignificantly higher than in 2019 and 2020. During 2019 and 2020, when the Trumpadministration demanded more contribution from South Korea for troop basing, moreindividuals opted for a reduction in the size of USFK (2019: 26.7%; 2020: 23.8%). On
the other hand, individuals wanting to increase the size of the USFK grew from 7.8%
in 2019 to 10.4% in 2020 and 12.3% in 2022.

20. Source: Asan Annual Survey (2020), Asan Poll (2019, March 2022(a)).

28

3.4. Nuclear Options
Northeast Asia is becoming an increasingly dangerous place with the emergence of anassertive and bolder China and a menacing de facto nuclear North Korea. With eachpassing day, these threats continue to grow, not lessen. How should South Korea addressthese threats? Recent chatters in Washington and Seoul suggest that there is a growing
call for potential indigenous nuclear development or reintroduction of U.S. tactical
nuclear weapons.21 Others recommend that South Korea should continue to rely on thetried-and-true U.S. extended deterrence.22 However, signs of shifting winds within the
United States indicate the possibility that the future staying power of U.S. security
commitment is less reliable than once thought.23
One recent study of the South Korean public suggests that support for nuclear weapons
is “robust,” with 71% in favor of indigenous nuclear weapons development and 56%
supporting the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea.24 This finding
is consistent with other research which also shows similar results. The Asan Institutefor Policy Studies, for instance, has conducted a similar survey every year since 2010
(except for 2021), and the support for indigenous nuclear development ranged from
54.8% (2018) to 70.2% (2022). Trends show growing support for indigenous nuclear
program since 2019. There are several factors that may explain this trend: 1) the failureof nuclear negotiations with North Korea as of 2019; 2) the increased incidence of
provocation and testing by North Korea; 3) the continued refinement and developmentof North Korean defense capability, including nuclear ones; 4) the growing concern
about the longevity of U.S. security commitment to South Korea.

21. Jennifer Lind and Daryl G. Press. “Should South Korea build its own nuclear bomb?” The
Washington Post. October 7, 2021; Toby Dalton, Karl Friedhoff, and Lami Kim. “Thinking Nuclear:
South Korean Attitudes on Nuclear Weapons.” The Chicago Council on Global Affairs. February2022.
22. Shane Smith. “Renewing U.S. Extended Deterrence Commitments Against North Korea.” 38North.
May 13, 2020; Toby Dalton. “How Washington and Seoul Can Get on the Same Page to Deter
North Korea.” War On the Rocks. April 4, 2022.
23. Carol Leonnig and Philip Rucker. 2022. I Alone Can Fix It: Donald J. Trump’s Catastrophic Final
Year. Penguin Random House.
24. Dalton et. al.

29

Figure 9. Attitudes on Indigenous Nuclear Weapons Development 25 (%)
Support (a)100Oppose (b)Gap (a-b)

80
55.6

62.6

66.0

62.9

61.3

62.3

37.4

34.0

37.1

38.7

37.7

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

59.9

64.1

54.8

67.1
69.3

70.2

32.9

30.7

28.2

2019

2020

2022

60

40

20

0

44.5

2010

40.1

2016

35.9

45.3

2017

2018

What these studies fail to show, however, is the South Korean public thinkings about“going nuclear” after accounting for the potential costs of embarking on this path.
Indigenous nuclear weapon development would require that South Korea exit the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and risk the possibility of diplomatic isolationand economic sanctions. For an economy heavily dependent on trade, this would likely
be an unacceptable outcome. Would the South Korean public still support pursuing an
indigenous nuclear capability despite economic sanctions? If reframed in this way, theresult may be different.
The survey questionnaire was designed so that the respondents were asked to answer
both questions. First, they were presented with a question about their support for
indigenous nuclear weapon development. Then they were cued with the informationthat indigenous nuclear weapon development can lead to international sanctions. The
study aims to see if there are any noticeable changes in the respondent’s answers after
25. Source: Asan Annual Survey (2010~2020), Asan Poll (March 2022(a)). The Asan Institute for
Policy Studies has followed South Korean public opinion on indigenous nuclear weapons
development and reintroduction of tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea. Figure 9 and 10
are adapted from the “Fundamentals of South Korean Public Opinion on Foreign Policy andnational Security” (2021).

30

accounting for the costs of proliferation.
If we exclude respondents who did not respond or did not have an opinion, the support
for going nuclear declined from 71.3% to 65%, a 6.3%p decline. We can derive twological conclusions from these results. One is that there was a decline in Korean public
support for going nuclear when the cost of doing so was made clear. The decline wasalso felt very broadly throughout all age categories and ideologies. In general, moreconservative and older respondents (50-and-over) supported going nuclear than more
Table 5. Attitudes on Indigenous Nuclear Weapons Development by Demographics:
With(out) Hypothetical Sanctions26 (%)
Without Sanctions
Support

OpposeSupport

Oppose

71.3

28.7

65.0

35.0

20s

59.3

40.7

50.9

49.1

30s

58.4

41.6

51.7

48.3

40s

62.0

38.0

55.9

44.1

50s

77.1

22.9

71.0

29.0

60+

86.4

13.6

81.2

18.8

Total

Age

x2=67.606, df=4, p<.001

x2=13.285, df=4, p<.05

70.6

29.4

64.5

35.5

Conservative

79.4

20.6

72.8

27.2

Moderate

70.6

29.4

63.8

36.2

Progressive

58.4

41.6

53.8

46.2

Test Statistics
Total

Ideology

With Sanctions

Test Statistics

x2=34.355, df=2, p<.001

x2=25.717, df=2, p<.001

26. Source: Asan Poll (March 2022(a)). Table 5 excludes “Don’t Know/Refused to Answer.” Sample
size for without sanctions by age was n=985; without sanctions by ideology was n=946; withsanctions by age was n=980; with sanctions by ideology was n=944.

31

moderate or progressive and younger respondents. The second finding is that a small
percentage of respondents were discouraged from going nuclear when they were
informed about the sanctions risk.
Together, these findings suggest that simply mentioning “the possibility of sanctions” isnot enough to alter the South Korean public’s views about proliferation. The data does
show, however, that the Korean public can change its mind if the cost of proliferation iscommunicated more clearly. For instance, policymakers can more clearly communicate
the seriousness of sanctions and their spillover effects. They can also point out that
South Korea will need reprocessing facilities for spent fuel. The public may need to be
informed that South Korea will also lack access to fresh nuclear fuel from the Nuclear
Supplier Group (NSG), which would subsequently impact South Korea’s nuclear
security and safety, and energy supply.
Some people have argued that South Korea can better address its security threat
and avoid international scrutiny by convincing the United States to redeploy its
tactical nuclear weapons onto the Korean Peninsula. The proponents see the value of
Figure 10. Attitudes on Reintroducing Tactical Nuclear Weapons27 (%)
Support (a)100Oppose (b)Gap (a-b)

80
60

67.0

61.8

46.0

59.0
61.3

40
20
0

47.9
28.8

38.2

2013

2017

2019

25.0

38.3

2020

2022

-20

27. Source: Asan Annual Survey (2013, 2017, 2020), Asan Poll (2019, March 2022(a)).

32strengthening deterrence posture and its effect in pressuring other countries like China
to be stricter with North Korea since an arms race in Northeast Asia can go against
China’s national interest. The opponents have argued that tactical nuclear weapons
would not credibly deter North Korea. On the contrary, it would only encourage
proliferation, which would create a more destabilizing regional security environment.
What do South Koreans think about this matter?
When asked about the reintroduction of tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea,
59% of respondents supported this idea. This was a marginal decline from 61.3% in2020 but still consistent with other results obtained in 2013 and 2017. The support
for tactical nuclear weapons dropped momentarily in 2019 when nuclear diplomacy
suggested a possible denuclearization deal that fell apart in Hanoi earlier that year.
If we exclude 2019, approximately 60% of South Koreans appear to support tactical
nuclear weapons. This figure is significantly lower than support for the indigenous
nuclear weapons development. There may be several reasons for this, but the mostconvincing one is that tactical nuclear weapons are ultimately American (not South
Korean) assets. A previous study on this issue suggests that one of the main reasons
South Koreans support going nuclear is the national prestige associated with being a
nuclear state. This condition would certainly not hold in the case of tactical nuclear
weapons.28

28. Dalton et. al.

33

4. The Future of ROK-U.S. Relations
Northeast Asia is undergoing a geopolitical tectonic shift as the United States declared
the start of a new era by releasing the National Security Strategy Report in 2017 andthe National Defense Strategy Report in 2018. South Korea is among the countries
being asked to either take part or opt out of the U.S.-China competition. The riseof different mini-lateral cooperative arrangements, such as the Quadrilateral Security
Dialogue (QUAD) or AUKUS, signals a possible expansion of security cooperation
with other countries like South Korea and Japan. What would these changes mean forSouth Korea’s relations with China and North Korea? What are the implications for
the ROK-U.S. alliance and USFK?

4.1. Agenda Priorities for ROK-U.S.
To get a pulse on where the South Korean public stands regarding the above changes,
the survey asked the respondents to name the most important national security issue
that South Korea and the United States must manage together. The choices included
addressing the North Korean nuclear threat, economic revitalization and trade, coordination
on ROK-DPRK and U.S.-DPRK dialogue, China challenge, alliance maintenance,
pandemics and infectious diseases, climate change, and other global issues.
For most South Koreans, the North Korean nuclear issue loomed large as 37.1%
named “addressing North Korean nuclear threat” the most important problem South
Korea and the United States must jointly manage. When we looked deeper into the
respondents who chose this answer, threat perception seemed to be an important
determinant. For instance, of the individuals that named the North Korean nuclear
threat as the most important issue, 44.5% rated the probability of military conflict on
the Korean Peninsula to be high, 30.6% thought the likelihood of military conflict waslow, and 40.5% estimated the likelihood of military conflict to be moderate.
In contrast, 16.1% named “economic revitalization and trade,” 14.3% stated “cooperating
to restart dialogues with North Korea,” 12.6% answered “the China challenge,” and
10% answered “OPCON transfer, joint exercises, and alliance maintenance.” Emerging
security issues such as global health and climate change, among other global issues
were below 5%.

34

Figure 11. Important Issues for Current ROK-U.S. Relations29 (%)
0.2
Addressing North Korean Nuclear Threat
4.9

4.8

Economic Revitalization and Trade

10.0
37.1

Cooperating to Restart Dialogues
with North Korea
China Challenge

12.6

OPCON Transfer, Joint Exercises,
Alliance Maintenance
Global Public Health
Climate Change

14.3
16.1

Don’t Know/Refused

There are two important lessons to be drawn from this data. One is that South Koreansseem to take a more immediate and narrow view of the most pressing security challenge.
The second is that the priorities for South Korea may not align with those of theUnited States. According to the 2020 Chicago Council Survey of American Public
Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy, Americans rank the top seven critical threats to U.S.
vital interests as 1) COVID-19 pandemic; 2) domestic violent extremism; 3) China; 4)
global economic downturn; 5) political polarization; 6) international terrorism; and 7)
foreign interference in U.S. elections.30 Bilateral cooperation would be difficult if there
is no convergence on agenda priority.
There were some differences across ideologies. Conservatives, for instance, cared more
about the North Korean nuclear threat (49.5%) compared to moderates (31.8%) andprogressives (24.2%), while progressives (22.8%) tended to prioritize dialogue with
North Korea more so than moderates (13%) and conservatives (9.8%). Both moderates(19%) and progressives (20.7%) tended to care more about trade and economy than the
29. Source: Asan Poll (March 2022(a)).
30. Dina Smeltz, Ivo Daalder, Karl Friedhoff, Craig Kafura, and Brendan Helm. “Divided We Stand:
Democrats and Republicans Diverge on U.S. Foreign Policy.” 2020 Chicago Council Survey of
American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy. September 2020.

35

conservatives (11.1%).

4.2. Outstanding Issues in ROK-U.S. Alliance
Aside from broad issue areas that both South Korea and the United States can workon, there are several outstanding issues that the two countries must address when it
comes to the alliance. These include ROK-U.S. joint exercises, mini-lateral regional
cooperation, U.S.-led ballistic missile defense (U.S. BMD) participation, and THAAD.

Joint Exercises
For much of the Moon administration’s term, ROK-U.S. joint military exercise has
been in a lull. This is mainly due to Seoul’s priority on engagement with North Korea
and the Trump administration’s desire to lower perceived expenses related to these
activities. COVID-19 was another contributing factor during much of 2020 and 2021
or 2022. Given the rotational nature of the USFK deployment and North Korea’s
stated intent to continually develop its capabilities, it would be a gross understatement
to suggest that long gaps between exercises have not impacted the readiness of combinedforces. In speaking to the Senate Armed Service Committee in September 2018, thecommander of USFK General Robert B. Abrams stated that an “atmosphere of détente”
on the Korean Peninsula has led to the suspension of the joint exercise and that “there
was certainly degradation to the readiness of the force.”
What does the South Korean public think about this development? 46.4% of respondents
stated that the joint exercises should be conducted at full-scale. 13.1% advocated for an
increase in the scale of original joint military exercises. 35.8% supported the continuationof currently reduced or suspended exercises. While a majority favors either return to theoriginal scale or expansion of joint military training, a sizable number of respondents
cared to disagree with this position, reflecting a split in South Korean public opinion.
Not surprisingly, there were individual differences across ideologies. 54.9% ofconservatives and 48.9% of moderates stated that the joint exercises should returnto the original scale, while only 35% of progressives agreed with this view. 51.7% ofprogressives argued for the continuation of reduced or suspended exercises. Only 22.1%
of conservatives and 37% of moderates agreed. 20.2% of conservatives supported
expanding the scale of joint exercises, while only 5.7% of progressives supported the same.

36

Figure 12. Attitudes on ROK-U.S. Military Exercise31 (%)
1.1

13.1

3.6
Should eliminate

35.8

Should maintain it at current
scaled-down level
Should revert back to normal level
before scaling down
Should expand

46.4

Don’t know/Refused

The QUAD
One issue gaining momentum in the Korean media over the past two years has been
whether South Korea will take part in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue as partof the QUAD+ initiative. The Moon administration has been less than forthcoming
about taking part in this kind of mini-lateral cooperation framework and instead
elected to maintain a policy of strategic ambiguity. There are at least two arguments forwhy the Moon administration has refrained from participating in the QUAD. One isthat participating in the QUAD would lower the strategic value of South Korea. The
second is that South Korea is vulnerable to economic retaliation from China if it sides
with the U.S. Our survey, however, suggests that most South Koreans beg to differ.
As shown in Figure 13, 86.1% of the South Korean public supports South Korea’s
QUAD participation. Opposition to QUAD participation was a meager 10.1%. While
there were some differences across ideology, an overwhelming share of conservatives(93.3%), moderates (87.4%), and progressives (77.1%) support the QUAD.

31. Source: Asan Poll (March 2022(a)).

37

ROK-U.S.-Japan Trilateral Cooperation
A similar trend can also be observed in the issue of Japan. Looking at the data on basic
attitudes about trilateral cooperation between South Korea, the U.S., and Japan, 83%
have expressed approval. Only 15.9% disapproved. Support also seemed very broad
across age and ideological spectrum. Most support came from individuals in their 20s(88.4%) and 60-and-over (90.7%) as well as conservatives (90.2%).
Figure 13. Attitudes on Issues in ROK-U.S. Relations32 (%)
Support (Positive)

Oppose (Negative)

57.7

THAAD

MissileDefense

38.9

71.7

ROK-U.S.Japan
Cooperation

22.8

83.0

15.9

86.1

QUAD

0

20

40

10.1
60

80

100

One explanation for the broad approval is the heightened awareness of the security
challenges associated with North Korea and China. However, this issue also gainedsome attention when President Yoon Suk-yeol also stated that he looked to improvebilateral ties with Japan. Surprisingly, the South Korean public attitudes about Japan
have shifted so quickly over the past two years. In 2020, over 70% of South Koreans
were reported to have participated in boycotting Japanese products after the twocountries engaged in a bitter dispute over the forced labor issue and trade.33

32. Source: Asan Poll (March 2022(a)).
33. Source: “Over 70 pct of S. Koreans joined boycott of Japanese goods: survey.” Yonhap News.
December 22, 2020. (Retrieved from https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20201222007600315)

38

THAAD
Another major national security issue that gained quite a bit of attention in recent
months was the debate surrounding the deployment of additional batteries for theTerminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea. On morethan one occasion, President Yoon proposed to work with the U.S. to deploy additional
THAAD batteries in South Korea to deter North Korea. However, Yoon’s idea drewsome controversy because detractors questioned its feasibility and practicality. Currently,
there is one THAAD battery in South Korea, which is based in Seongju County. But
the residents of this town have opposed its basing and clashed with authorities every
time the government brought construction equipment and other items onto the base.
Perhaps it is not surprising that the South Korean public appears somewhat split overthis matter. According to our survey, 57.7% supported additional THAAD deployment.
38.9% opposed. There were meaningful differences across different demographic andattitudinal categories. For instance, 77.9% of conservatives and 33.8% of progressives
were supportive. Those who supported a more security-focused view (65.9%) of thealliance tended to support additional THAAD deployment than those who did not(52.4%). Those who saw the possibility of military conflict on the Korean Peninsulain the next ten years to be moderate (69.5%) to high (66%) were more supportive of
THAAD than those who did not (47.3%).

U.S. BMD
Although the South Korean public appears split over the issue of THAAD, the datasuggests that the attitude about participating in the U.S.-led ballistic missile defense(U.S. BMD) system was different. When asked what the respondent thought about
South Korea’s participation in U.S. BMD, 71.7% supported it. 22.8% opposed (5.5%
did not know or refused to answer). The response also differed according to ideology.
84.7% of conservatives, 70.1% of moderates, and 56.2% of progressives supported U.S.
BMD. 38.5% of progressives, 24% of moderates, and 12% of conservatives opposed.
Attitudinal disposition about national security also seemed to matter. More people who
saw the ROK-U.S. alliance as a security alliance supported the U.S. BMD (75.7%) thanthose who did not (69.6%). Those who thought the likelihood of military confrontationon the Korean Peninsula in the next 10 years is high (78.6%) or moderate (79.6%) were39

more supportive of U.S. BMD than those who did not (64%).
This finding suggests that the South Korean public associates South Korea’s participationin the U.S. BMD is a more effective way of addressing the ballistic missile threats fromadversaries in and around the Korean Peninsula. It also suggests that the South Korean
public has a view that is different than the Moon administration, which has elected todeclare the Three No policy: 1) no additional THAAD battery; 2) no participation in
U.S. BMD; and 3) no ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral security cooperation.

4.3. Outlook on ROK-U.S. Relations
Finally, we sought to explore South Korean attitudes about the future of ROK-U.S.
relations by asking whether the survey respondents expected the ROK-U.S. ties tobe better, worse, or the same. 88.3% stated that they expected ROK-U.S. relations tobe better in the future than in the past. This was a sizable increase from 2020, when
74.7% of respondents thought that ROK-U.S. relations would improve after Joe
Biden’s presidential election victory. This is comparable, if not better, to when President
Obama was beginning his second term in 2013, when 75.1% of respondents thought
Figure 14. Outlook on ROK-U.S. Relations34 (%)
Improve

Stay the Same

Biden
Administration(2022)

Worsen3.5 6.9

88.3

After Bidenbeing elected(2020)

3.6

74.7

After Trump
being elected(2016)

12.4

19.1

Obama
Administration(2013)
0

64.0

8.8

75.1
20

18.3

40

60

9.5

80

34. Source: Asan Poll (October 2013, December 2016, December 2020, March 2022(b)).

100

40

that the bilateral relations would improve. It is most certainly a big turnaround from2016, when Donald Trump was elected to be the next president. On the other hand,
64% thought that ROK-U.S. relations would worsen.
There were some notable differences according to ideology. That is, conservatives(94.1%) tended to be more optimistic than moderates (86.8%) or progressives (84.6%)
about the prospect of ROK-U.S. relations. Interestingly, this difference was not as
noticeable in 2020. In 2020, age was more of an important factor where individuals in
Table 6. Outlook on ROK-U.S. Relations by Demographics35 (%)
2020
Improve

WorsenImprove

Worsen

77.3

19.0

89.5

6.9

20s

72.3

23.5

89.4

8.8

30s

64.1

32.0

91.8

6.8

40s

75.4

22.3

85.6

9.0

50s

82.6

14.9

88.1

6.7

60+

85.1

9.8

91.9

4.7

Total

Age

Test Statistics
Total

Ideology2022

x2=40.656, df=8, p<.001

n.s.

76.9

19.5

89.5

7.0

Conservative

75.8

20.9

94.1

4.2

Moderate

78.0

18.0

86.8

8.4

Progressive

76.9

19.6

84.6

10.3

Test Statistics

n.s.

x2=18.999, df=6, p<.05

35. Source: Asan Poll (December 2020, March 2022(a)) “Don’t Know/Refused to answer” wasexcluded from this analysis. Sample sizes were as follows: 2020 by age was n=968; 2020 byideology was n=942; 2022 by age was n=985; 2022 by ideology was n=987.

41

their 50s (82.6%) and 60-and-over (85.1%) were more optimistic than others. Age was
not shown to be an important factor in 2022. This suggests that even though age andideological leanings are often correlated on issues related to foreign policy and national
security, there are unique differences across sampled groupings that require separate
consideration.

42

5. Conclusion
This year is significant from the standpoint of ROK-U.S. relations. It marks the 140th
anniversary of bilateral ties, and we have a new administration in Seoul that prioritizes
strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance. Although the relationship has had its ups anddowns in the past, the survey presented in this report suggests that the South Korean
public feels very strongly about the bond with the United States and believes that thealliance is critical to keeping peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula. Key findings
from this report can be described as follows.
First, South Koreans were generally very optimistic about the United States and its
leadership. In particular, the South Koreans continue to see the U.S. as a strong military
and the history of the alliance relationship as one built on common security challenges
and interests. South Koreans also tend to make positive linkages between the U.S. andcritical historical events such as the signing of the KORUS FTA and the liberationof South Korea from Japanese occupation. While the Korean War still loomed large
for most South Koreans when it comes to relations with the United States, the datasuggests that this is colored by different historical interpretations of the role of theUnited States before, during, and after the Korean War.
Second, the data clearly shows that the South Korean view of the United States since2010 is very favorable. This was true even during the problematic Trump-Moon era
when relations between Washington and Seoul were not always that easy. However,there are promising signs that the bilateral relationship is on an upswing with theinauguration of a new administration in Seoul, ushering in a new Biden-Yoon era.
Third, South Koreans tended to see the role of the ROK-U.S. alliance differently
depending on the geopolitical context of Northeast Asia. For instance, while more thanhalf of South Koreans wanted the ROK-U.S. alliance to develop into one based on abroad set of values encompassing democracy and human rights, this view was temperedby the context that favored closer bilateral relations and modest threat perception.
When perceived security risk was more significant, individuals tended to emphasize thesecurity dimension of the alliance. For instance, South Koreans were more concerned
about U.S. security guarantees when the occurrence of North Korean provocation was
high. This suggests that it would be impossible to ignore North Korea when thinking

43

about pushing the boundaries of alliance function to address new frontier challenges.
Therefore, South Koreans will need greater reassurance if policymakers wish to seek
their support in expanding the areas of cooperation within the alliance framework.
Fourth, South Koreans continued to maintain a high level of trust in U.S. security
guarantees. Although some critics lamented the decline of trust in U.S. extended
deterrence during President Trump’s term, many South Koreans believed strongly
that the U.S. would intervene on their behalf if North Korea invaded South Korea.
This view also spilled over into South Korean views about the ROK-U.S. allianceand the USFK. A large cross-section of South Koreans continued to believe that the
ROK-U.S. alliance should continue even after unification. A significant share also
thought that the USFK should continue to remain on the Korean Peninsula even after
unification. While North Korea is still a major security threat to South Koreans, thesefindings show that South Koreans also see other regional threats related to great powercompetition between the U.S. and China.
Fifth, South Koreans supported indigenous nuclear development and redeploymentof tactical nuclear weapons regardless of the U.S. security guarantees. Rising security
risks coupled with potential U.S. withdrawal would necessitate an insurance policyin the form of a nuclear deterrent. However, it was surprising that the support for
proliferation was relatively high even when South Koreans were made aware of its
potential cost. There was, nonetheless, a marginal decline in the desire to pursue nuclear
development when the cost was factored in. This suggests that the view on proliferation
largely hinges on the perceived costs and benefits of going nuclear.
Sixth, South Koreans seemed to be driven by practical concerns when considering
the ROK-U.S. relations. For them, the overriding security concern was North Korea
and denuclearization. South Koreans are more willing to consider the possibility ofmultilateral security cooperation and cooperation on missile defense with the UnitedStates. Although there was less interest in introducing additional THAAD batteries inSouth Korea, a majority still supported this idea.
Together, the findings suggest that the current and future state of ROK-U.S. relations
are on firm grounds concerning the South Korean public. South Koreans believe that
there is a solid foundation for strengthening and broadening this relationship to include
matters beyond the Korean Peninsula, provided that there is an adequate assurance of

44effectively deterring a de facto nuclear North Korea. With the new administration in
Seoul favoring a strengthened alliance, South Korea is likely to take a more proactive
stance on matters related to China and Japan. Signs of shifting tide look promising forthe time being. South Korea and the U.S. should seize this moment to accomplish as
much as they can.

45

Survey Methodology
Asan Poll
2013
Sample size: 1,000 respondents over the age of 19
Margin of error: ±3.1%p at the 95% confidence level
Survey method: Computer Assisted Telephone Interview (CATI) with Random
Digit Dialing (RDD) for mobile and landline phones
Period: May 23~25, October 10~12, 2013
Organization: Research & Research
2014
Sample size: 1,000 respondents over the age of 19
Margin of error: ±3.1%p at the 95% confidence level
Survey method: Computer Assisted Telephone Interview (CATI) with RDD
for mobile and landline phones
Period: March 13~15, July 11~13, 2014 (Nuclear Armament)
Organization: Research & Research2015
Sample size: 1,000 respondents over the age of 19
Margin of error: ±3.1%p at the 95% confidence level
Survey method: Computer Assisted Telephone Interview (CATI) with RDD
for mobile and landline phones
Period: March 11~13, 2015
Organization: Research & Research
2016
Sample size: 1,000 respondents over the age of 19
Margin of error: ±3.1%p at the 95% confidence level
Survey method: Computer Assisted Telephone Interview (CATI) with RDD
for mobile and landline phones
Period: October 10~12, November 22~24, 2016
Organization: Research & Research

46

2019
Sample size: 1,000 respondents over the age of 19
Margin of error: ±3.1%p at the 95% confidence level
Survey method: Computer Assisted Telephone Interview (CATI) with RDD
for mobile and landline phones
Period: January 7~9 (USFK), August 19~21, 2016
Organization: Research & Research
2020
Sample size: 1,000 respondents over the age of 19
Margin of error: ±3.1%p at the 95% confidence level
Survey method: Computer Assisted Telephone Interview (CATI) with RDD
for mobile and landline phones
Period: December 28~29, 2020
Organization: Research & Research2022
Sample size: 1,000 respondents over the age of 19
Margin of error: ±3.1%p at the 95% confidence level
Survey method: Computer Assisted Telephone Interview (CATI) with RDD
for mobile and landline phones
Period: March 10~12 (a) 17~18 (b), 2022
Organization: Research & Research
Asan Annual Survey
2010
Sample size: 2,000 respondents over the age of 19
Margin of error: ±2.2%p at the 95% confidence level
Survey method: Personal Interview Survey (Face-to-face Method)
Period: August 16~September 17, 2010
Organization: Media Research
2011
Sample size: 2,000 respondents over the age of 19
Margin of error: ±2.2%p at the 95% confidence level

47

Survey method: Mixed-Mode Online Survey employing RDD for mobile andlandline telephones
Period: August 26~October 4, 2011
Organization: EmBrain
2012
Sample size: 1,500 respondents over the age of 19
Margin of error: ±2.5%p at the 95% confidence level
Survey method: RDD for mobile and landline telephones and online survey
Period: September 24~November 1, 2014
Organization: Media Research
2013
Sample size: 1,500 respondents over the age of 19
Margin of error: ±2.5%p at the 95% confidence level
Survey method: RDD for mobile and landline telephones and online survey
Period: September 4~27, 2013
Organization: Media Research
2014
Sample size: 1,500 respondents over the age of 19
Margin of error: ±2.5%p at the 95% confidence level
Survey method: RDD for mobile and landline telephones and online survey
Period: September 1~17, 2014
Organization: Media Research2015
Sample size: 1,500 respondents over the age of 19
Margin of error: ±2.5%p at the 95% confidence level
Survey method: RDD for mobile and landline telephones and online survey
Period: September 2~30, 2015
Organization: Media Research
2016
Sample size: 1,500 respondents over the age of 19
Margin of error: ±2.5%p at the 95% confidence level

48

Survey method: RDD for mobile and landline telephones and online survey
Period: September 9~October 14, 2016
Organization: Media Research2017
Sample size: 1,200 respondents over the age of 19
Margin of error: ±2.8%p at the 95% confidence level
Survey method: RDD for mobile and landline telephones and online survey
Period: October 19~November 14, 2017
Organization: Kantar Public
2018
Sample size: 1,200 respondents over the age of 19
Margin of error: ±2.8%p at the 95% confidence level
Survey method: RDD for mobile and landline telephones and online survey
Period: November 8~December 5, 2018
Organization: K-Stat Research2019
Sample size: 1,500 respondents over the age of 19
Margin of error: ±2.5%p at the 95% confidence level
Survey method: RDD for mobile and landline telephones and online survey
Period: December 5~24, 2019
Organization: K-Stat Research
2020
Sample size: 1,500 respondents over the age of 19
Margin of error: ±2.5%p at the 95% confidence level
Survey method: RDD for mobile and landline telephones and online survey
Period: December 3~17, 2020
Organization: EmBrain Public

49

Appendix I: 2022 Asan Poll Questionnaire(March 2022(a))
Q01. What is the first thing that comes to your mind when you think of the U.S.?
Response Options

Percentages (%)

Strong Military

37.3

Capitalist Economy

31.4

Democratic System of Government

17.2

Innovative Companies

7.5

Popular Culture

2.6

Famous People & Places

2.4

Others/Don’t Know/Refused

1.7

Q02. What is the most important event in 140 years of ROK-U.S. relations? Pleasepick two things in the order of importance. (%)
Response Options

First

SecondKorean War (1950~1953)

35.8

21.8

Formation of ROK-U.S. Alliance (1953)

23.3

25.3

Division of Korean Peninsula (1945)

13.6

13.6

KORUS FTA (2007)

12.6

19.6

Korean Independence (1945)

10.1

13.9

Protest against Imported U.S. Beef (2008)

3.6

5.1

Others/Don’t Know/Refused

1.0

0.7

50

Q03. Which one of the following statements about the ROK-U.S. alliance do you
agree with?
Response Options

Percentages (%)

Should be built on principles such as democratic ideals, human rights
and universal values

60.2

Should be limited to respond to the North Korean security threats

38.8

Don’t Know/Refused

1.1

Q04. What is the most important issue for current ROK-U.S. Relations?
Response Options

Percentages (%)

Addressing North Korean Nuclear Threat

37.1

Economic Revitalization and Trade

16.1

Cooperating to Restart Dialogues with North Korea

14.3

China Challenge

12.6

OPCON Transfer, Joint Exercises, Alliance Maintenance

10.0

Global Public Health

4.9

Climate Change

4.8

Don’t Know/Refused

0.3

Q05. If North Korea attacks South Korea, do you think the U.S. will intervene?
Response Options

Percentages (%)

Very Likely

53.4

Likely on the Whole

35.5

Not Likely

8.6

Not Likely at All

2.0

Don’t Know/Refused

0.5

51

Q06. Do you think the ROK-U.S. alliance will continue to be necessary in the future?
Q07. Do you think the ROK-U.S. alliance will continue to be necessary after the two
Koreas reunify? (%)
Response Options

FuturePost-Unification

Not Necessary at All

1.2

4.5

Not Necessary

2.2

11.7

Necessary

33.9

45.6

Very Necessary

62.5

37.3

Don’t Know/Refused

0.1

1.0

Q08. What is your opinion toward the U.S. military stationing in South Korea in the
future?
Q09. What is your opinion toward the U.S. military stationing in South Korea after
unification? (%)
Response Options

FuturePost-Unification

Very Necessary

42.3

23.2

Necessary

39.9

39.1

Not Necessary

13.4

23.8

Not Necessary at All

4.0

12.7

Don’t Know/Refused

0.4

1.3

52

Q10. Currently, the U.S. has some 28,500 troops in South Korea. Do you think thesize of U.S. military should be reduced, maintained, or increased in the future?
(n= 821)
Response Options

Percentages (%)

Should be reduced

15.5

Should be maintained

69.8

Should be increased

12.3

Don’t Know/Refused

2.4

Q11. Do you think the ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation is necessary for
responding to North Korean nuclear threats and the rise of China?
Response Options

Percentages (%)

Very Positive

38.5

Positive on the Whole

44.5

Negative on the Whole

10.5

Very Negative

5.4

Don’t Know/Refused

1.0

Q12. Do you think that South Korea should develop its own nuclear weapons tocounter North Korea’s nuclear weapon development?
Response Options

Percentages (%)

Strongly Support

32.0

Support38.2

Oppose18.4

Strongly Oppose

9.8

Don’t Know/Refused

1.5

53

Q13. If there are international sanctions on a country developing its own nuclear
weapon, do you think that South Korea should still develop nuclear weapons?
Response Options

Percentages (%)

Strongly Support

21.3

Support42.3

Oppose22.1

Strongly Oppose

12.2

Don’t Know/Refused

2.1

Q14. Do you think that tactical nuclear weapons should be deployed to South Korea?
Response Options

Percentages (%)

Strongly Support

20.5

Support38.5

Oppose23.8

Strongly Oppose

14.5

Don’t Know/Refused

2.6

Q15. What is your opinion on the ROK-U.S. military exercise?
Response Options

Percentages (%)

Should eliminate

3.6

Should maintain it at current reduced level

35.8

Should revert back to normal level before scaling down

46.4

Should expand

13.1

Don’t Know/Refused

1.0

54

Q16. What do you think about South Korea joining the QUAD?
Response Options

Percentages (%)

Very Positive

35.5

Positive on the Whole

50.6

Negative on the Whole

7.0

Very Negative

3.1

Don’t Know/Refused

3.8

Q17. What do you think about South Korea deploying additional THAAD system?
Response Options

Percentages (%)

Strongly Support

25.6

Support32.1

Oppose21.2

Strongly Oppose

17.6

Don’t Know/Refused

3.4

Q18. What do you think about South Korea joining the U.S. Missile Defense?
Response Options

Percentages (%)

Strongly Support

21.6

Support50.1

Oppose16.8

Strongly Oppose

6.0

Don’t Know/Refused

5.4

55

Q19. How do you rate the likelihood of military conflict on Korean Peninsula within nextten years? Please rate your view on a scale of zero to ten, respectively, representing“Not Likely at all” and “Very Likely” with five being “Normal.”Response Options

Percentages (%)

Not Likely

48.4

Normal25.7

Likely23.3

Don’t Know/Refused

2.5

56

Appendix II: 2022 Asan Poll Questionnaire(March 2022(b))
Q1~2. How do you rate the favorability of [the U.S. and China]? Please rate yourview on a scale of zero to ten, respectively, representing “Not favorable at all”
and “Very favorable” with five being “Neutral.”Q5~6. How do you rate the favorability of [President Joe Biden and President Xi
Jinping]? Please rate your view on a scale of zero to ten, respectively, representing“Not favorable at all” and “Very favorable” with five being “Neutral.” (0~10 point)
Response Options

Average

The U.S.

6.85

China

2.71

Joe Biden

5.89

Xi Jinping

1.99

Q13~17. Do you think the relationship between South Korea and [the U.S., Japan,
China, North Korea, and Russia] will improve or worsen in the future? (%)
Response Options

U.S.

Japan

China

North Korea Russia

Improve

88.3

62.2

37.9

24.6

23.4

Stay the Same

3.5

5.1

3.4

4.1

3.8

Worsen

6.9

31.6

56.8

68.5

68.9

Don’t Know/Refused

1.3

1.1

1.9

2.8

3.9

South Korean Public Opinion on
ROK-U.S. Bilateral Ties
J. James Kim, Kang Chungku, Ham Geon Hee
First edition May 2022
Published by The Asan Institute for Policy Studies
Registration number 300-2010-122
Registration date September 27, 2010
Address 11, Gyeonghuigung 1ga-gil, Jongno-gu, Seoul 03176, Korea
Telephone +82-2-730-5842
Fax +82-2-730-5876
Website www.asaninst.org
E-mail info@asaninst.org
Book design EGISHOLDINGSISBN 979-11-5570-243-7 95340 (PDF)
Copyright ⓒ 2022 by The Asan Institute for Policy Studies
All Rights reserved, including the rights of reproduction in whole or in part in any form.
Printed in the Republic of Korea