エネルギーの今 ― CSIS より

U.S. policymaking in the era of“energy dominance” —— cause forcelebration or concern?
―― トランプ政権によるエネルギー戦略「エネルギー支配（energy dominance）」をどう捉えるべきか ――

Jane Nakano
Senior Fellow, Energy and National Security Program, CSIS
米国戦略国際問題研究所（CSIS）エネルギー・国家安全保障部シニアフェロー Jane Nakano 氏による連載第 5回のテーマは、トランプ政権によるエネルギー戦略「エネルギー支配（energy dominance）」。トランプ政権が「エネルギー自立（energy independence）」に替わり掲げる「エネルギー支配（energy dominance）」の意味するところや各国での捉えられ方、政策の実現性などについて、米国のエネルギー情勢を踏まえつつ、考察する。

As the Trump Administration’s energy team takes
charge, the notion of “energy dominance” hasbecome the self-prescribed overarching terminologyof their energy policy agenda moving forward. Thebuzzword raises a few important questions. What
does the term mean? How viable is it? And what are
the implications of U.S. policymaking under themantra of energy dominance?
According to Energy Secretary Perry, Interior Secretary
Zinke and EPA Administrator Pruitt:“An energy-dominant America means a selfreliant and secure nation, free from thegeopolitical turmoil of other nations that seek touse energy as an economic weapon… An
energy-dominant America will export to markets
around the world, increasing our global
leadership and influence.” (Washington Times,June 26, 2017)W

hile the statement signifies a healthy
recognition on the part of policymakers thatthe nation’s energy security footing has transformed
since the onset of unconventional oil and gas boom,
the term at the same time has caused confusion andsome consternation abroad. These concerns fromoverseas stem from the presupposition that the notionof “dominance” involves at least two parties: one to32

2017.9dominate and the other to be dominated. Such anotion has caused concern for countries which aredependent on energy imports from the United States,
as to whether the United States would use its energy
wealth as a diplomatic weapon to impose its will uponthem.
Becoming sensitive to such a concern, theAdministration adopted softer tone in the President’s
July speech in Poland, a country which received its
first cargo of U.S. gas in June: “The United States
will never use energy to coerce your nations, and wecannot allow others to do so.” In Europe, liquefied
natural gas (LNG) from the United States can help
achieve diversification in supply and reduce highlevels of dependency on Russian gas. In August,
Lithuania also received its first U.S. LNG. The
optionality of U.S. supply can not only enhance theirsense of energy security, but also help preserve or
increase latitude in their bilateral dealings withMoscow.
Another emphasis by the Administration has been on
coal exports. The President has consistently
campaigned to reverse the fortune of the U.S. coalindustry, whose demise is attributed by theAdministration to regulatory burden than the structuralchange in U.S. energy system. For example, in lateJuly, the U.S. Department of Treasury appears to have

■ エネルギーの今 ― CSIS より

reversed the Obama administration’s 2013 ban on
public financing for coal power projects. That samemonth, the Administration announced a commercial
agreement to supply U.S. coal to Ukraine, to alleviate
supply shortages induced by the armed conflict inregions like Donetsk where much of its reserves arelocated.

T

he viability of “energy dominance”, however,faces one inconvenient reality. While U.S.
sellers resoundingly outline various benefits of U.S.
energy exports, the United States will always sell
into the world at the best price that the commodity
can command. In other words, the sellers would not
lower export prices to match the prevailing price in a
destination market—be it the National Balancing
Point in Europe or the Qatari price in Asia—just tohelp the government deliver on diplomaticcommitment. Moreover, the United States is still a
net importer of oil, and is yet to become a net
exporter of gas today.
As for coal exports, lifting the financing ban may be apolitically expeditious measure, but it is uncertain as
to whether the measure would have a material effecton U.S. coal exports. The outlook for U.S. coalexports depends significantly on the availability ofcoal export terminals on the west coast, if the UnitedStates seeks to take advantage of continued demand
growth in Asia. Today, the majority of U.S. coalexports find markets abroad via Atlantic and Gulf
coast ports, and most of the planned coal export
projects elsewhere in the United States—namely in
the Pacific Northwest—have stalled, either for
economic reasons or due to strong local opposition.
Even a west coast export terminal would not guarantee
U.S. dominance of the Asian coal market, as distancedoes not stand in the favor of U.S. supply, with coal
hungry Asian economies already surrounded byseveral major coal exporting countries.

Notwithstanding the questionable viability of“energy dominance”, some have noted that therhetorical shift from “independence” to “dominance”
is a positive development as captives crave
independence while competitors strive to dominate.

Even for those who are more cautious to embrace
the new rhetoric, the abandonment of “energyindependence” as an organizing framework should
be welcoming as it reflects the sense of liberationfrom the perennial anxiety over resource constraints
that had driven U.S. energy policymaking since theoil embargos of the 1970s. The notion of “energyindependence” also over-valued self-sufficiency andignored the global nature of energy markets.

Meanwhile, the implications of promoting“energy dominance” to a national goal aremuch less academic and a cause for concern. In hisspeech at a petroleum conference in May 2016, thenrepublican presidential candidate Trump said,“American energy dominance will be declared astrategic, economic and foreign policy goal of theUnited States.” Putting “energy dominance” at theforefront of U.S. foreign policy can be tricky. The
centrality of “energy dominance” through exports
renders U.S. action to become prone to accusation foreconomic self-aggrandizement even if it were untrue.
Now that the United States has discarded the senseof energy insecurity, it is not a time to become
preoccupied with a vision of leadership that ismeasured against the volume of fossil fuel exports.
Leadership aspiration can and should encompass
continued effort to capture the economic benefits
arising from energy industries like solar, wind andenergy storage. Such aspiration in turn would
accord the United States greater influence in setting
the course of the global economy and the energy
system that enables stability and prosperity.

※著者略歴：Jane Nakano is a senior fellow at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies. Her areas of expertise
include U.S. energy policy, energy security issues in Asia,
global gas market dynamics, and global nuclear energy trends.
She frequently writes and speaks on these issues at conferences
and to the media. Also, she has testified before Congress onenergy issues in Asia. Prior to joining CSIS in 2010, Ms. Nakano
was with the U.S. Department of Energy and served as the lead
staff on energy engagements with China and Japan.
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