Syria: Targeting of Individuals
Country of Origin Information Report

September 2022

Manuscript completed in August 2022
Neither the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) nor any person acting on behalf of the
EUAA is responsible for the use that might be made of the information contained within thispublication.
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2022
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ISBN 978-92-9400-464-2 doi: 10.2847/674393 BZ-07-22-900-EN-N© European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), 2022
Cover photo/illustration: The picture shows a refugee camp in Idlib near the Syrian-Turkish
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SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

Acknowledgements
This report was co-drafted by the EUAA COI Sector together with the Austrian Centre forCountry of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation (ACCORD).
The following departments and organisations have reviewed the report:•

Denmark, Danish Immigration Service•

France, Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA),
Information, Documentation and Research Division•

Sweden, Swedish Migration Agency, Country of Origin Information, Section for
Information Analysis

It must be noted that the review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts ororganisations contributes to the overall quality of the report, but does not necessarily imply
their formal endorsement of the final report, which is the full responsibility of the EUAA.

5

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMContents
Acknowledgements............................................................................................................ 5Contents ............................................................................................................................ 6
Disclaimer .........................................................................................................................10
Glossary and abbreviations ............................................................................................... 11
Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 13
Methodology...............................................................................................................................................13
Defining the terms of reference......................................................................................13
Collecting information.........................................................................................................14
Quality control .......................................................................................................................14
Sources .........................................................................................................................................................14
Structure and use of the report............................................................................................................14
Maps.................................................................................................................................15
1. Persons perceived to be opposing the Government of Syria (GoS) .................................16
1.1 Treatment of persons perceived to be opposing the Government of Syria ..................16
1.1.1 Arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance ............................................18
1.1.2 Torture, other forms of ill-treatment and extrajudicial killings................... 20
1.1.3 Wanted lists ...................................................................................................................21
1.2 Specific profiles perceived by the government as opposition..........................................22
1.2.1 Members of political opposition parties.............................................................22
1.2.2 Political activists and protesters ..........................................................................24
1.2.3 Civilians originating from, or residing in areas perceived to be opposing
the government/reconquered areas ............................................................................26
1.2.4 (Former) members of anti-government armed groups ................................28
1.2.5 Returnees from abroad perceived as opposition..........................................29
2. Persons fearing recruitment by the government armed forces, military draft evaders anddeserters.......................................................................................................................... 37
2.1 Changes to the military service law ............................................................................................ 37
2.2 Legal status of conscientious objectors...................................................................................38
2.3 Recruitment strategies....................................................................................................................39
2.4 Deployment strategies ....................................................................................................................41
2.5 Implementation practice regarding amnesties ......................................................................426

SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORT

2.6 Implementation practice regarding exemptions ...................................................................44
2.7 Treatment of draft evaders, deserters and defectors .........................................................46
3. Persons with (perceived) links to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) ............ 49
3.1 Raids against ISIL and arrests .......................................................................................................49
3.2 Situation of persons with (perceived) links to ISIL in detention ........................................51
4. Members of and persons perceived to be collaborating with the Syrian Democratic
Forces/Kurdish People’s Protection Units......................................................................... 53
4.1 Targeting by the Syrian National Army (SNA)..........................................................................53
4.2 Targeting by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)..............................................56
5. Persons perceived to be opposing the Syrian Democratic Forces/Kurdish People’s
Protection Units ............................................................................................................... 58
5.1 Profiles perceived as opposing Syrian Democratic Forces/Kurdish People’s
Protection Units and the Democratic Union Party .......................................................................58
5.2 Treatment of persons perceived as opposing SDF/YPG and PYD ............................... 60
5.2.1 Political opponents of the Democratic Union Party (PYD)......................... 60
5.2.2 Persons with (perceived) links to ISIL ...............................................................62
5.2.3 Persons with (perceived) links to the Syrian National Army
(SNA)/Turkish forces...........................................................................................................62
5.3 Forced and child recruitment.......................................................................................................64
6. Persons associated with the Government of Syria (GoS)............................................... 67
6.1 Treatment of GoS officials, members of the Syrian Arab Army and pro-government
fighters by different armed actors...................................................................................................... 67
6.2 Civilians perceived as supporting the GoS .............................................................................69
6.2.1 Targeting of reconciled former opposition fighters and other persons
associated with reconciliation.........................................................................................69
6.2.2 Targeting by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) .......................................................70
6.2.3 Targeting by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) ...................... 71
6.2.4 Arrests by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) ............................................ 72
7. Journalists and other media professionals .................................................................... 73
7.1 General overview............................................................................................................................... 73
7.2 Targeting by government forces and affiliated armed groups ........................................ 75
7.3 Targeting by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)................................................................................ 77
7.4 Targeting by the Syrian National Army (SNA)......................................................................... 78
7.5 Targeting by the Syrian Democratic Forces/Kurdish People’s Protection Units ....... 78
8. Doctors and other medical personnel ........................................................................... 80
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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

8.1 Targeting by government forces and affiliated armed groups ........................................ 80
8.2 Targeting by non-state armed groups ......................................................................................82
8.3 Targeting by unspecified armed actors....................................................................................84
9. Sunni Arabs.................................................................................................................. 86
9.1 Targeting by the government forces and affiliated armed groups..................................86
9.2 Forced displacement and denial of return ..............................................................................88
10. Kurds .......................................................................................................................... 89
10.1 Stateless Kurds .................................................................................................................................89
10.2 Targeting in territories controlled by the Syrian National Army (SNA) .........................91
10.3 Targeting in territories under control of the GoS ................................................................94
11. Christians .................................................................................................................... 95
12. Palestinians ................................................................................................................ 98
12.1 Recent situation of Palestinians ..................................................................................................98
12.2 Legal status of the Palestinian refugees in Syria.................................................................98
12.3 UNRWA operations and available assistance ................................................................... 100
12.4 Situation in Palestinian refugee camps .................................................................................102
12.5 Restrictions on return ..................................................................................................................103
12.6 House, land and property issues ............................................................................................105
12.7 Instances of targeting of Palestinians by different actors ..............................................106
13. Women ..................................................................................................................... 108
13.1 General overview of violations against women ..................................................................10813.2 Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) ........................................................................109
13.2.1 Rape, intimate partner violence, family violence, and domestic violence
109
13.2.2 Honour crimes ......................................................................................................... 111
13.2.3 Sexual harassment................................................................................................ 112
13.2.4 Early and forced marriage .................................................................................. 112
13.3 Profiles of vulnerable women .................................................................................................... 114
13.3.1 Female-headed household/single/widowed ................................................ 114
13.3.2 Women activists ..................................................................................................... 115
13.3.3 Women in IDP Camps........................................................................................... 116
13.4 Situation of women in areas controlled by non-state armed groups .......................... 117
13.4.1 Situation of women in the Kurdish-controlled areas .................................. 117

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SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORT

13.4.2 Situation of women in areas controlled by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham(HTS)…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………118
13.4.3 Situation of women in areas controlled by the Syrian National Army
(SNA) ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..119
14. LGBTIQ persons ......................................................................................................... 121
14.1 Legal framework.............................................................................................................................. 121
14.2 Treatment of LGBTIQ persons by GoS and armed groups........................................... .122
14.3 Treatment of LGBTIQ persons by society and family ...................................................... 125
Annex 1: Bibliography...................................................................................................... 127
Oral sources, including anonymous sources ............................................................................... 127
Public sources ......................................................................................................................................... 127
Annex 2: Terms of Reference .......................................................................................... 174

9EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Disclaimer
This report was written according to the EUAA COI Report Methodology (2019). The report isbased on carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced.
The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed withutmost care. However, this document does not claim to be exhaustive. If a particular event,person or organisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has
not taken place or that the person or organisation does not exist.
Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particularapplication for international protection. Terminology used should not be regarded asindicative of a particular legal position.
‘Refugee’, ‘risk’ and similar terminology are used as generic terminology and not in the legal
sense as applied in the EU Asylum Acquis, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.
Neither the EUAA, nor any person acting on its behalf, may be held responsible for the use
which may be made of the information contained in this report.
On 19 January 2022, the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) became the European
Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA). All references to EASO, EASO products and bodies should
be understood as references to the EUAA.
The drafting of this report was finalised on 19 August 2022. Any event taking place after thisdate is not included in this report. More information on the reference period for this report canbe found in the methodology section of the Introduction.

10

SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORTGlossary and abbreviations
Term

Definition

AANES

Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria

Ajanib

Ajanib and Maktoumeen Kurds are residents of Hasaka
governorate who were not officially registered during a census
carried out in 1962 and have since been left stateless together
with their descendants

GAPAR

General Administration for Palestinian Arab Refugees

GoS

Government of Syria

HTS

Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham

KNC

Kurdish National Council

LGBTIQ

Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender/Transsexual, Intersex andQueer/Questioning

Maktoumeen

See Ajanib

PKK

Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê)PYD

Democratic Union Party (Kurdish)

SAA

Syrian Arab Army

SDF

Syrian Democratic Forces

SHRC

Syrian Human Rights Committee

SNA

Syrian National Army

SNHR

Syrian Network for Human Rights

11EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

TermDefinition

SOHR

Syrian Observatory of Human Rights

STJ

Syrians for Truth & Justice

UNCOI

Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian
Arab Republic

UNFPA

United Nations Population Fund

UNOCHA

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

YPG

Kurdish People’s Protection Units

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SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORT

Introduction
The purpose of this report is to provide relevant information regarding the targeting ofindividuals in Syria, for international protection status determination, including refugee status
and subsidiary protection, and in particular for use in the update of EUAA’s Country Guidanceon Syria.
This report addresses topics related to the targeting of individuals by different armed actors
operating in Syria, including the Government of Syria, the Syrian Democratic Forces, Hay’at
Tahrir al-Sham, the Syrian National Army, and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant among
others. Targeting of individuals by sectors of society is also addressed where relevant.
This report is an update of the EUAA COI Report: Syria – Targeting of individuals (March
2020). It also provides updated information on profiles and topics covered previously in thefollowing EUAA COI reports: EUAA COI Report – Situation of women (February 2020), EUAA
COI Report – Military service (April 2021), and EUAA COI Report – Situation of returnees fromabroad (June 2021).
The reference period for the events described in this report is from January 2020 until August2022. For certain profiles the reference period is slightly different, depending on when they
were last updated in a EUAA COI report: (March 2021 – August 2022 for Persons fearing
recruitment by the government armed forces, military draft evaders and deserters, and May
2021 – August 2022 for Returnees from abroad perceived as opposition).

Methodology
This report is produced in line with the EUAA COI Report Methodology (2019) 1 and the EUAA
COI Writing and Referencing Style Guide (2019). 20F

1FThis report was jointly drafted by EUAA COI Sector and ACCORD, and reviewed by EUAA andnational COI departments in EU+ countries 3 mentioned in the Acknowledgements section.
2F

Defining the terms of reference
The terms of reference (ToR) of this report were defined by the EUAA based on discussions
held and input received from COI experts in the EUAA COI specialist network on Syria andfrom policy experts in EU+ countries within the framework of a Country Guidancedevelopment on Syria.
The ToR for this report can be found in the Annex II: Terms of Reference.

1
2

EUAA, EUAA Country of Origin Information (COI) Report Methodology, June 2019, url
EUAA, Writing and Referencing Guide for EUAA Country of Origin Information (COI) Reports, June 2019, url

3

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Collecting information
The information gathered is a result of research using public, specialised paper -based,
electronic, and oral sources until 4 August 2022. Some additional information was added
during the finalisation of this report in response to feedback received during the quality
control process, until 19 August 2022.

Quality control
To ensure that the authors respected the EUAA COI Report Methodology and that the Termsof Reference were comprehensively addressed, a review was carried out by COI specialists
from the countries and organisations listed as reviewers in the Acknowledgements section. Allcomments made by the reviewers were taken into consideration and almost all of them were
implemented in the final draft of this report, which was finalised on 19 August 2022. EUAA also
performed the final quality review and editing of the text.

Sources
The information in this report results from desk research of public specialised paper -based,
electronic and oral sources, which were consulted within the time frame and the scope of theresearch.
The report draws from current publications of the UN Human Rights Council’s Independent
International Commission of Inquiry, as well as from Syrian human rights organisations such as
the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights(SOHR), Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ) and the Syrian Human Rights Committee (SHRC). In
addition to the paper-based and electronic sources that were consulted, drafters conducted
an extensive interview in English via email correspondence with a Syrian academic, who hasrare access to state military and security actors as well as employees at various government
institutions in the capital. The source preferred anonymity for security reasons and to ensure
the safety of his contacts.
The sources that are used in this report are further described in the Bibliography section.

Structure and use of the report
The report is divided into sections that each discuss the different profiles of targeted persons
as defined in the ToR according to the actor(s) targeting them. For the profiles that may betargeted by multiple actors, information was further split by actors of targeting.

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SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORT

Maps

Map 1: Syrian Arab Republic, © United Nations 4
3F

4

Syria, Map No. 4204 Rev. 3, April 2012, United Nations, url

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

1. Persons perceived to be opposing theGovernment of Syria (GoS)
1.1 Treatment of persons perceived to be opposing theGovernment of Syria
Civilians’ vulnerability to becoming targets of the GoS or other actors is influenced by anumber of factors such as one’s individual profile, where in the country the person is located,
the stage of conflict, and—crucially—which actor is in control of the relevant area. Thus, anindividual’s likelihood of being targeted may be subject to changes over time. 5 As aconfidential source interviewed by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs observed,‘anyone who speaks out as an opponent of the ruling group in the part of the country where
he or she is located runs the risk of being persecuted by that group’. 6
4F

5F

As of July 2022, the GoS had control over approximately two-thirds of the country’s territory.
Besides the nation’s capital Damascus city and its surrounding Rural Damascus (Rif Dimashq)
governorate, the GoS’s control stretched across Tartous and Latakia in the west, parts of Idlib
and Aleppo in the north, Hama, Homs and parts of Raqqa and Deir Ez-Zor in the centre andsouth-east, and Dar’a, Sweida and Quneitra in the south. 7
6F

The forces through which the GoS exerts power comprise the Syrian Armed Forces, which
consist of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) (including the Republican Guard), the navy, the air force,the air defence forces and the National Defence Forces (NDF) (a pro-government militia). 8
Local pro-GoS militias and foreign Shiite militias have been operating alongside the regular
armed forces. 9
7F

8F

Syria’s security apparatus, meanwhile, is composed of four main intelligence agencies: theDepartment of Military Intelligence, Air Force Intelligence Directorate, General Intelligence
Directorate and Political Security Directorate. Each agency has central branches in Damascus
as well as regional-, city-, and local-level branches across the country. 10 These branches arecalled ‘security branches’. 11 As Human Rights Watch noted, nearly all security branches have
9F

10F

5

Sweden, Migrationsverket, Syrien - Säkerhetssituationen och civilas utsatthet april–november 2021 [Report on the
security situation and vulnerability of civilians (covering April - November 2021)], 31 December 2021, url, p. 40
6Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of origin information report Syria, 14 June 2021, url, p. 75
7Liveuamap, Syria [Map], 11 July 2022, url; see also ACLED, The State of Syria: Q3 2021 – Q4 2021, as of 31
December 2021, url; ISW, Syria Situation Report: March 22 - April 19, 2021, 23 April 2021, url
8
US, CIA, World Factbook, Syria, last updated 6 July 2022, url
9Ezzi, M., The Regime and Loyal Militias Will Struggle to Disentangle Their Relationship, Chatham House, July 2017,
url; Omran Center for Strategic Studies, The Security Landscape in Syria and its Impact on the Return of Refugees:
An Opinion Survey, 17 December 2020, url, p. 34; Abu Layla, O., How Iranian Militias Have Swallowed Deir Ezzor,
WINEP, 16 February 2022, url
10
HRW, “Our Lives Are Like Death”: Syrian Refugee Returns from Lebanon and Jordan, 20 October 2021, url, p. 33
11
SNHR, Syrian Security Branches and Persons in Charge, 1 April 2013, url, p. 1

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SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORT

unofficial detention facilities of varying size in their basements. In addition, these agencies‘also have other secret detention sites’. 12
1FOne estimate published in December 2020 put the number of members of the security
apparatus at around 100 000, which amounted to ‘1 secret police officer for every 129
citizens’. 13 According to the European Institute of Peace (EIP), a Brussels-based non-profit
foundation specialised in conflict resolution, the GoS has at its disposal an extensive range oftools for intelligence gathering, surveillance and for ‘punishing anyone perceived to be adissident or insufficiently loyal’ to it. 14
12F

13F

In GoS-controlled areas, enforced disappearances, military trials, and torture were reportedly‘rampant’ 15, with sources indicating that any suspicion of anti-GoS activity was sufficient to put
a person at risk of arrest 16 and reprisal by the authorities. 17 A wide range of categories ofindividuals have been targeted by the GoS 18, including political activists 19, protesters 20 andothers who expressed criticism of the government (including on social media) 21, lawyers andhuman rights defenders 22, pro-democracy student activists, members of political parties otherthan the ruling Baath Party 23, men of military age 24 , returnees from abroad 25, IDPs returningfrom parts of Syria outside of GoS control 26, and former armed opposition fighters who thensettled their position with the GoS through so-called reconciliation 27 agreements. 28 Moreover,
the authorities went after individuals who did not themselves participate in opposition
activities but whose family members or neighbourhoods were associated with such
14F

15F

16F

17F

18F

19F

20F

21F

2F

23F

24F

25F

26F

12

27F

HRW, “Our Lives Are Like Death”: Syrian Refugee Returns from Lebanon and Jordan, 20 October 2021, url, p. 33
Omran Center for Strategic Studies, The Security Landscape in Syria and its Impact on the Return of Refugees: An
Opinion Survey, 17 December 2020, url, p. 34
14EIP, Refugee Return to Syria, September 2021, private document held on file, p. 23
15
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2022: Syria, February 2022, url
16
Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2022 Country Report - Syria, 23 February 2022, url, p. 7
17
SJAC, The State of Justice in Syria 2022, March 2022, url, p. 10
18
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/46/55, 11 March 2021, url, para. 15
19
AI, Ten years on justice for Syrians more important than ever, 12 March 2021, url; Sweden, Migrationsverket,
Syrien - Säkerhetssituationen och civilas utsatthet april–november 2021 [Report on the security situation andvulnerability of civilians (covering April - November 2021)], 31 December 2021, url, p. 40
20SHRC, The 20th Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syria, 9 January 2022, url, p. 46; USDOS,
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Syria, 12 April 2022, url, p. 6
21
Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of origin information report Syria, 14 June 2021, url, p. 75
22AI, Ten years on justice for Syrians more important than ever, 12 March 2021, url
23
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Syria, 12 April 2022, url, pp. 48, 58
24
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/46/55, 11 March 2021, url, para. 15
25
AI, “You’re going to your death”, Violations against Syrian refugees returning to Syria, 7 September 2021, url, pp.
27-28
26
MEI, Data shows nowhere in Syria is safe for return, 22 February 2022, url
27
GoS has entered into so-called reconciliation agreements with different actors in most of the areas the GoS
forces have recaptured from various anti-government groups. The reconciliation agreements ‘ranged fromcompromises in which after a cease fire opposition fighters remained involved in security a nd governance roles intheir areas, to cases of virtual opposition surrender involving evacuations of fighters or even whole populations’.
See: Hinnebusch, R., and Imady, O., Syria’s reconciliation agreements, Centre for Syrian Studies. University of St.
Andrews, 12 February 2017, url, p. 1; Adleh, F. and Favier, A., “Local reconciliation agreements” in Syria: A nonstarter for peacebuilding, European University Institute, June 2017, url, pp. 1-2. Detailed information on the socalled reconciliation agreements and impact on the population is available in the EUAA COI Report: Syria - Exercise
of authority in recaptured areas (January 2020)
28
SHRC, The 20th Annual Report of the Human Ri ghts Situation in Syria, 9 January 2022, url, p. 8, 46
13

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

activities. 29 In many cases, an individual’s level of vulnerability to being targeted was linked tomore than one aspect of their identity including, for example, aspects of place of residence,
political opinion or religious affiliation. 30
28F

29F

1.1.1 Arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance
Since the beginning of the Syrian uprising in 2011, the GoS carried out mass arrests during
protests and military operations. It also arbitrarily detained individuals at checkpoints andborders 31 or during raids. 32 Sources varyingly estimated that tens of thousands 33 or even
hundreds of thousands 34 of people, including political activists, human rights defenders,journalists, humanitarian aid workers and lawyers have been arbitrarily detained and forcibly
disappeared 35, often in ‘a sweeping and indiscriminate manner’. 36 Arbitrary detention wasreported to take place in civil and military prisons as well as in security branches ofintelligence agencies. 37 Many of the reported arrests without judicial warrants were carried out
by forces affiliated with the country’s four main intelligence agencies. 38 As the EIP explained,
the security branches of the intelligence agencies take into custody individuals who haveinitially been detained by the police or —in the case of wanted persons—by the branch itself
or another intelligence agency. Many returnees from abroad and reconciled individuals are
summoned for interrogation. Once a person is in the custody of a security branch, a ‘cycle ofinformation gathering, interrogation, and (often) torture begins.’ 39 The UN Human Rights
Council’s Independent International Commission of Inquiry (UNCOI) in March 2021 noted thatof more than 500 former detainees of GoS and pro-GoS forces it interviewed 40, almost none
were allowed to present their case before the judiciary within a reasonable time. Persons
arrested were usually not told the reason for their arrest and if informed of their charges, they
were not presented with any evidence supporting the accusations against them. 41
30F

31F

32F

3F

34F

35F

36F

37F

38F

39F

40F

29

SHRC, The 20th Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syria, 9 January 2022, url, p. 47
Sweden, Migrationsverket, Syrien - Säkerhetssituationen och civilas utsatthet april–november 2021 [Report on
the security situation and vulnerability of civilians (covering April - November 2021)], 31 December 2021, url, p. 40
31
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/46/55, 11 March 2021, url, para. 15
32
SNHR, At Least 2,218 Arbitrary Arrests/ Detentions Documented in Syria in 2021, 242 of Them in December:
Detainees in 2021 Include 85 Children and 77 Women, 2 January 2022, url, p. 2
33
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/46/55, 11 March 2021, url, para. 15
34
SNHR, At Least 2,218 Arbitrary Arrests/ Detentions Documented in Syria in 2021, 242 of Them in December:
Detainees in 2021 Include 85 Children and 77 Women, 2 January 2022, url, p. 2
35
AI, Ten years on justice for Syrians more important than ever, 12 March 2021, url
36
SNHR, At Least 2,218 Arbitrary Arrests/ Detentions Documented in Syria in 2021, 242 of Them in December:
Detainees in 2021 Include 85 Children and 77 Women, 2 January 2022, url, p. 2
37
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 37
38
SNHR, At Least 2,218 Arbitrary Arrests/ Detentions Documented in Syria in 2021, 242 of Them in December:
Detainees in 2021 Include 85 Children and 77 Women, 2 January 2022, url, p. 2
39
EIP, Security and Detention in Syria, September 2021, pri vate document held on file, p. 25
40
The UNCOI conducted an analysis of 2 658 testimonies relating to arbitrary detention by forces belonging to
main groups of parties to the conflict for the period 2011–2020. UN Human Rights Council, Report of the
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/46/55, 11 March 2021, url,para 13
41
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/46/55, 11 March 2021, url, para. 16
30

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During the year 2020, the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) documented 908 cases ofarbitrary arrest by the GoS forces 42, followed by 1 032 cases during the year 2021 43 and 471 in
the first six months of 2022. 44 Across the years 2020 and 2021, the highest occurrences ofsuch arrests were recorded in Dar’a, Rural Damascus and Aleppo governorates. 45 The Syrian
Human Rights Committee (SHRC) noted that during 2021, residents of areas that had
undergone reconciliation with the GoS were specifically targeted, particularly in Dar’a andRural Damascus. 46
41F

42F

43F

4F

45F

Many protesters detained by the GoS forces between 2011 and 2021 were subsequently
classified as forcibly disappeared. 47 Estimates of human rights organisations regarding thenumber of such disappearances since 2011 have varied widely, although all suggest thatdisappearances are a common practice. 48 During 2020, approximately 1 185 persons were
forcibly disappeared (across all parties to the conflict). 49 For 2021, SHRC noted a significant
reduction in new enforced disappearances. 50
46F

47F

48F

49F

On 30 April 2022, Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad issued Legislative Decree No 7 of 2022
which included a general amnesty for ‘terrorism crimes’ (as stipulated in the Anti-Terrorism
Law No 19 of 2012 and Syria’s Criminal Law No 148 of 1949) committed by Syrians before 30
April 2022, with the exception of crimes that led to a person’s death. 51 The UN Security
Council wrote that the amnesty applies to persons who have been sentenced for committing
terrorist crimes, to those being investigated on charges of having committed such crimes andthose who are wanted for terrorism crimes committed in the country and abroad. The amnesty
did not cover persons charged under other laws, political prisoners and prisoners ofconscience detained on non-terrorism related chargers. 52 On its website, the Syrian embassyin Bahrain stated that it started receiving applications from Syrian nationals living abroad who
50F

51F

42

SNHR, At Least 1,882 Cases of Arbitrary Arrest/ Detention Documented in Syria in 2020, 149 of Them in
December: Detainees Include 52 Children and 39 Women, 2 January 2021, url, p. 11
43
SNHR, At Least 2,218 Arbitrary Arrests/ Detentions Documented in Syria in 2021, 242 of Them in December:
Detainees in 2021 Include 85 Children and 77 Women, 2 January 2022, url, p. 11
44
SNHR, The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in January 2022, 4 February 2022, url, p. 22; SNHR,
The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in February 2022, 4 March 2022, url, p. 19; SNHR, At Least
1,024 Arbitrary Arrests/Detentions Documented in Syria in the First Half of 2022, Including 49 Children and 29
Women, with 164 of These Cases Documented in June, 5 July 2022, url, p. 17
45
SNHR, At Least 1,882 Cases of Arbitrary Arrest/ Detention Documented in Syria in 2020, 149 of Them in
December: Detainees Include 52 Children and 39 Women, 2 January 2021, url, p. 12
SNHR, At Least 2,218 Arbitrary Arrests/ Detentions Documented in Syria in 2021, 242 of Them in December:
Detainees in 2021 Include 85 Children and 77 Women, 2 January 2022, url, p. 12
46
SHRC, The 20th Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syria, 9 January 2022, url, p. 46
47
SNHR, The Tenth Annual Report on Torture in Syria on the International Day in Support of Victims of Torture, 26
June 2021, url, p. 2
48
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Syria, 12 April 2022, url, p. 6
49
Syrian Network, [Twitter], posted on: 10 April 2021, url
50
SHRC, The 20th Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syria, 9 January 2022, url, p. 47
51
Syria Report, (The), Syria’s Latest Amnesty Decree and ‘Terrorism’ Convicts, 11 May 2022, url; COAR, ‘Terrorism’
Amnesty Is Wartime Syria’s Most Sweeping, 9 May 2022, url
52
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 ( 2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021); Report of
the Secretary-General [S/2022/492], 16 June 2022, url, para 27

19

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

wish to officially verify whether they are included in the amnesty, and emphasised that theapplications must be submitted in person. 53
52F

Regarding the implementation of the amnesty, the Office of the United Nations HighCommissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) noted in a June 2022 report that it received
information on the release of dozens of detainees and prisoners from the GoS security
branches, detention centres and prisons. 54 The SNHR subsequently reported in July 2022 that
following the decree’s entry into force, some 539 individuals were released from various civil
and military prisons and security branches. 55 At the same time, the source noted that at least
132 000 Syrians arrested by the GoS since March 2011 were still in detention or forcibly
disappeared as of May 2022. 56
53F

54F

5F

There were reports that family of detainees recently released by the amnesty were extorted
under the threat that otherwise their files would not be closed and they therefore ran the riskof being rearrested. 57
56F

1.1.2 Torture, other forms of ill-treatment and extrajudicial killings
Besides arbitrary detentions and enforces disappearances, the GoS was reported to use
torture and sexual violence as a method of control, intimidation and extortion. 58 Former
members of the intelligence apparatus indicated that persons detained by the GoS weresystematically subjected to torture and other ill-treatment. 59 SNHR noted that in the absenceof any discernible fixed rules or boundaries for interrogators, the amount and frequency of
torture inflicted on a detainee entirely depended upon the mood of the person in charge ofthe relevant security branch. The source lists the following GoS entities as having been
implicated in torture as ‘perpetrators, enablers or accomplices’: the Ministry of Defence, theMinistry of Interior, the intelligence services, the judiciary, civil prisons, military hospitals, theMinistry of Endowments (Awqaf), and the Office of Burial Services. 60
57F

58F

59F

Between March 2011 and June 2020, SNHR documented at least 14 235 deaths from torture at
the hands of the GoS. 61 SNHR recorded 130 deaths from torture in GoS custody during the full
60F

53

Syria, Embassy of the Syrian Arab Republic in Manama, ‫[ اعالن حول مرسوم العفو الرئاسي‬Announcement regarding thepresidential amnesty decree], n. d., url
54
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021); Report of
the Secretary-General [S/2022/492], 16 June 2022, url, para 27
55
SNHR, At Least 1,024 Arbitrary Arrests/Detentions Documented in Syria in the First Half of 2022, Including 49
Children and 29 Women, with 164 of These Cases Documented in June, 5 July 2022, url, p. 11
56
SNHR, The Syrian Regime Has Released 476 People Under Amnesty Decree 7/2022 and Is Still Detaining Some
132,000 of Those Arrested Since March 2011, 16 May 2022, url, p. 7
57
New Arab (The), Syrian regime ‘blackmails’ families of released detainees, demands money, 24 May 2022, url;
Daily Sabah, Assad regime releases prisoners in exchange for money despite amnesty, 16 May 2022, url
58
SJAC, The State of Justice in Syria 2022, March 2022, url, p. 10
59
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/46/55, 11 March 2021, url, para. 25
60
SNHR, The Tenth Annual Report on Torture in Syria on the International Day in Support of Victims of Torture, 26
June 2021, url, pp. 2, 8
61
SNHR, The Ninth Annual Report on Torture in Syria on the International Day in Support of Victims of Torture, 26
June 2020, url, pp. 7-8

20

SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORT

year of 2020 62, 78 in 2021 63 and 90 in the first six months of 2022. 64 At the same time, the
UNCOI, between March 2011 and December 2020, interviewed a total of 474 individuals who
were direct victims of torture and 463 who were subjected to inhuman treatment by GoS
forces. Moreover, 1 170 interviewees were witnesses or had credible information of such
violations. 65
61F

62F

63F

64F

On 30 March 2022, GoS passed a law criminalising torture with a three-year prison sentenceor the death penalty if torture includes rape or murder. 66 Human rights groups pointed out that
the GoS has not taken action in investigating or holding accountable those involved in
torture. 67 SNHR stated that new law does not include crimes of torture committed before the
law’s date of entry into force, therefore not covering crimes of torture committed since thestart of the conflict. 68 The same source documented 90 deaths by torture attributed to GoS an
affiliated forces in the first half of 2022. 69
65F

6F

67F

68F

1.1.3 Wanted lists
The authorities reportedly kept extensive lists of persons wanted for arrest or questioning. 70 In
mid-2018, the head of Air Force Intelligence, Jamil Hassan, was reported as saying in a private
meeting that the country’s wanted lists contained 3 million names, which amounted to 12.5 %of Syria’s population before the conflict. These lists reportedly included the names ofindividuals suspected of involvement in perceived opposition activities such as participation inprotests, working for NGOs, human rights activists and local council officials in areas
controlled by the opposition, and men wanted for military service. 71 People were not informed
if their name was added to a wanted list or if they were wanted for arrest. 72
69F

70F

71F

There was no clear, legal procedure for persons to be able to check their ‘wanted status’ andthe process was not protecting returnees from human rights abuses. 73 Walid Al-Nofal, an
independent reporter interviewed by Human Rights Watch in June 2021, explained that ‘there
is no centralised database for ‘wanted’ lists’, and one security clearance ‘will not necessarily
include all agencies’. 74 Another expert interviewed by Human Rights Watch in July 2021,
researcher Suhail Al-Ghazi, stated on the other hand that ‘there may be a centralised database
72F

73F

62

SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 1,734 Civilians in Syria in 2020, Including 99 in December, 1January 2021, url, p. 16
63
SNHR, 1,271 Civilians, Including 299 Children, 134 Women, and 104 Victims of Torture, Killed in Syria in 2021, 1
January 2022, url, p. 1564
SNHR, 568 Civilians, Including 115 Children, 53 Women, and 101 Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were
Documented Killed in Syria in the First Half of 2022, 2 July 2022, url, p. 14
65
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/46/55, 11 March 2021, url, para. 20
66
HRW, Torture in Syrian Prisons is Not a Joke, 1 April 2022, url
67
MEE, UN to launch drive to uncover Syria’s missing as death toll rises, 29 June 2022, url
68
SNHR, At Least 1,024 Arbitrary Arrests/Detentions Documented in Syria in the First Half of 2022, Including 49
Children and 29 Women, with 164 of These Cases Documented in June, 5 July 2022, url, p. 5
69
SNHR, The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in June and the First Half of 2022 At Least 47 Attacks
on Vital Civilian Facilities Documented, Including Six on Medical Facilities, 7 July 2022, url, p. 20
70
EIP, Refugee Return to Syria, September 2021, private document held on file, p. 25
71
HRW, “Our Lives Are Like Death”: Syrian Refugee Returns from Lebanon and Jordan, 20 October 2021, url, p. 49
72
EIP, Refugee Return to Syria, September 2021, private document held on file, p. 25
73
HRW, “Our Lives Are Like Death”, 20 October 2021, url, pp. 50-51; AI, “You’re going to your death”, 7 September
2021, url, p. 17
74
HRW, “Our Lives Are Like Death” [Source: Walid al -Nofal, independent reporter], 20 October 2021, url, p. 49

21

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

of wanted lists’, but at the same time ‘different intelligence branches maintain their own lists’.
Since 2011, computers have been installed at checkpoints where the security officers ‘type in
the name of the person and they arrest them if the name appears’. 75
74F

It is common practice for individuals wanting to return to Syria to use their informal network of
personal connections or to pay a broker to check whether they are on any wanted list before
approaching the Syrian authorities. 76 According to EIP, most people who paid middlemen to
check whether they were on wanted lists, could not access information about a particular listof ‘high-value targets’ including ‘fugitives, activists, and others perceived to be of particularinterest to the security apparatus’, even by paying bribes. 77 Thus, returnees who appear on
this list ‘may be able to pass through the border crossing without problems, but will then bedetained afterwards’, the source noted. 78
75F

76F

7F

Lists may also be held at the local level. A July 2021 report from Dar’a governorate indicatedthat a list of wanted persons in the city of al-Sanamayn contained 139 names, including thoseof former members of armed opposition groups who were in control of southern Syria until
July 2018. According to a local source interviewed by the new website Enab Baladi, the GoS
was updating wanted persons lists on an almost daily basis. 79
78F

Persons on wanted lists were vulnerable to being arrested or forcibly disappeared ‘at official
ports of entry and exit, such as land border crossings and airports, as well as checkpoints andgovernment offices on regime-held territory’. 80 Human Rights Watch received reports ofreturnees who were faced with human rights violations and persecution, despite having had
their name checked against wanted lists, with the checks coming back clear. 81 Similarly, EIP
stated that there have been cases of returnees who had their names checked and were
informed that it was safe for them to return and who then ended up being detained ‘almost
immediately after they cross back into government-held territory’. 82
79F

80F

81F

1.2 Specific profiles perceived by the government as
opposition
1.2.1 Members of political opposition parties
The GoS has been reported to ban ‘genuine’ political opposition. 83 Political opponents of the
GoS have been among those arrested, tortured and disappeared by the GoS since the conflict
82F

75

HRW, “Our Lives Are Like Death” [Source: Suhail al -Ghazi, researcher, Center for Middle Eastern Studies,
Istanbul], 20 October 2021, url, p. 50
76
EUAA, Country of Origin Information Report, Syria: Situation of returnees from abroad, June 2021, url, p. 20; HRW,
“Our Lives Are Like Death” [Source: Suhail al-Ghazi, researcher, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Istanbul], 20
October 2021, url, p. 48
77
EIP, Refugee Return to Syria, September 2021, private document held on file, pp. 25-26
78
EIP, Refugee Return to Syria, September 2021, private document held on file, pp. 26-27
79
Enab Baladi, More Daraa residents wanted by regime forces, 7 July 2021, url
80
EIP, Refugee Return to Syria, September 2021, private document held on file, p. 25
81
HRW, “Our Lives Are Like Death”, 20 October 2021, url, pp. 50-51
82
EIP, Refugee Return to Syria, September 2021, private document held on file, p. 26
83
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2022: Syria, February 2022, url

22

SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORT

began in 2011. 84 Although the government, through a decree in 201185 and constitutional
reforms in 2012, formally eased rules regarding political participation of parties other than theruling Baath Party 86, the decree also banned parties that are ‘based on religion, regional
affiliation, and other criteria’. According to Freedom House, ‘in practice, all legal politicalgroups and independents are either part of, allied with, or heavily vetted’ by the auth orities. 87
The US Department of State (USDOS) noted that the GoS had ‘little tolerance’ even for parties
allied with the Baath Party as part of the National Progressive Front. 88 However, a Syrian
academic interviewed by the EUAA observed that the GoS was relatively tolerant towards
independent politicians and members of parties labelled as ‘domestic’ opposition (such as thecoalition Popular Front for Change and Liberation), for as long as they focused on promoting
national dialogue and a peaceful solution to the Syrian crisis, reaffirm the unity and territorial
integrity of Syria, and refrain from calling for the toppling of the Syrian President. Nevertheless,members of domestic opposition are not completely immune to arrest, and many of themwere, on several occasions, harassed or even briefly arrested by security forces. 89
83F

84F

85F

86F

87F

8F

In an email response from April 2022, a Syrian academic interviewed by the EUAA wrote that
the GoS security forces target members of political parties who ‘cross the red line’, which is to
openly call for the overthrow of the President. 90 The GoS used its intelligence and security
apparatus to ‘monitor and punish opposition movements that could meaningfully challenge to
Assad’s rule’ 91 and reportedly harassed parties such as the Communist Union Movement, Arab
Social Union and Communist Action Party. There were reports of arrests of members ofprohibited Islamist parties, including the Muslim Brotherhood of Syria and Hizb ut-Tahrir.92 One
opposition party known for taking a hard-line stance towards the GoS is the leftist Syrian
Democratic People’s Party (SDPP). 93 A leading SDPP member was arrested in Damascus anddisappeared in October 2013 94 and as of April 2020, his whereabouts remained unknown. 95
Thus, human rights groups reported that opposition activists shied away from forming parties
out of fear that the GoS might use party lists to pursue opposition members. 96
89F

90F

91F

92F

93F

94F

95F

Further information regarding the treatment of members of political opposition parties could
not be found within the time constraints of this report.

84

NPR, Syrian Election Shows The Extent Of Assad's Power, 27 May 2021, urlThis decree permitted new political parties to register but also came with significant obstacles r egarding theformation of new parties. Also, it prohibited parties on the basis of criteria such as religious and regional affiliation.
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2022: Syria, February 2022, url
86
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2022: Syria, February 2022, url
87
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2022: Syria, February 2022, url
88
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Syria, 12 April 2022, url, p. 58
89
Syrian academic, email correspondence, 25 April 2022
90
Syrian academic, email correspondence, 25 April 2022
91
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2022: Syria, February 2022, url
92
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Syria, 12 April 2022, url, p. 58
93
Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, The Syrian Democratic People’s Party, n.d., url
94
AI, Between Prison and the Grave, November 2015, url, p. 31
95
Elaph, ‫„[ "العميم "فائق المير اسعد‬General“ Fa’iq Al-Mir As‘ad], 22. April 2020, url
96
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Syria, 12 April 2022, url, p. 48
85

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

1.2.2 Political activists and protesters
Since the uprising began in 2011, individuals who voiced their dissent through prote sts faced
repression from the security apparatus 97, which as of 2021 ‘monitored political meetings andrelied on informer networks’. 98 These repressions included firing live bullets, killings andarrests without judicial warrants, with the detainee often not knowing which security organ
was behind the arrest. 99 Following their arrest, participants in protests were subjected to‘beatings, insults, threats’ and denial of access to their families or lawyers. As SNHR observed,
torture has been commonly inflicted upon political protesters since the early days of theuprising. Many of these detainees were later classified as forcibly disappeared. Moreover,torture, both physical and psychological, often resulted in the detainee’s death. 100
96F

97F

98F

9F

Persons who took part in previous opposition activities, for instance by joining a protest during
the early stages of the uprising, were targeted with arbitrary arrests ‘individually in a slow
systematic manner’ in more recent years (including in 2021) as the GoS reportedly considered‘any sort of opposition a crime that is not subject to the statute of limitations nor to settlements
sponsored by Russia’. 101
10F

Other arrests were carried out in connection with current opposition activities, especiallytargeting participants of protests against the GoS or military operations in Dar’agovernorate. 102
10F

In June 2020, security forces responded to protests in the city of Sweida by beating andarresting protesters. 103 While the demonstrators were initially expressing their concerns about
rapidly deteriorating economic conditions, the protests soon began to include ‘calls for“regime change”, the withdrawal of Russian and Iranian forces from Syria, and the release ofdetainees’. 104 On 15 June 2020, reports emerged that demonstrators were attacked by
uniformed security forces and pro-government militiamen, commonly referred to as shabiha.105
As documented by the UNCOI, at least 15 men were detained in connection with these
protests and allegedly held at Military Police branch in Sweida, with ‘neither lawyers nor family
members [...] permitted to make contact’ with them. 106 Following the arrests, three detainees
were informed that they would be transferred to Sweida Criminal Court for trial. Meanwhile,
the authorities reportedly threatened to transfer the remaining arrested men to the antiterrorism court in Damascus. 107 While the UNCOI stated that it was informed in July 2020 that
102F

103F

104F

105F

106F

97

SNHR, On the 10 th Anniversary of the Popular Uprising, 15 March 2021, url, p. 2
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Syria, 12 April 2022, url, p. 41
99
SNHR, On the 10 th Anniversary of the Popular Uprising, 15 March 2021, url, p. 2
100
SNHR, The Tenth Annual Report on Torture in Syria on the International Day in Support of Victims of Torture, 26
June 2021, url, p. 2
101
SHRC, The 20th Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syria, 9 January 2022, url, p. 46
102
SHRC, The 20th Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syria, 9 January 2022, url, p. 46
103
HRW, Syria: Protesters Describe Beatings, Arrests, 28 June 2020, url
104
AI, Syria: Peaceful protesters detained in Sweida must be released immediately, 24 June 2020, url
105
HRW, Syria: Protesters Describe Beatings, Arrests, 28 June 2020, url
106
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/45/31, 14 August 2020, url, para. 24
107
AI, Syria: Peaceful protesters detained in Sweida must be released immediately, 24 June 2020, url
98

24

SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORT

the protesters had been released ‘following pressure from local actors’ 108, the Syria Justiceand Accountability Centre (SJAC) reported as of December 2020 that ‘while some of these
individuals were released after short periods in detention, the fates of others remain
unknown.’ 109
107F

108F

Also in June 2020, patrols of the Airforce Intelligence in the city of Saqba (Rural Damascus
governorate) attempted to arrest young people who had blocked a highway and distributed
leaflets calling on local residents to demonstrate against the worsening living conditions due
to high prices and lack of job opportunities. 110
109F

In February 2021, a number of civilians, including government employees, were arrested in
Latakia (a GoS stronghold) after criticising poverty and government corruption on social
media. 111
10F

New protests over deteriorating living conditions and government corruption erupted in
Sweida city in February 2022. While there were no reports of clashes, ‘busloads of armed
Syrian security forces reached Sweida from Damascus and other neighbouring cities to patrolthe city’, in what an activist described as ‘a show of force and oppression’. 112 While security
forces were reinforced in the governorate, there were no harsh crackdowns or large-scalearrests 113, although it was later reported that the GoS imposed an ‘economic blockade’ on
Sweida as a punishment for these protests.114 According to a local student activist, this resulted
in a further increase in prices of groceries and basic items. 115
1F

12F

13F

14F

Arrests were also reported among individuals with ‘a clear political position’, including civilsociety activists. 116 Both in 2020 and 2021, it was reported that GoS forces ‘detained
individuals linked to local human rights groups, prodemocracy student groups, and otherorganizations perceived to be supporting the opposition, including humanitarian groups’. 117
However, as SHRC noted, this group represented ‘the lowest number among the detainees’ in2021, with the majority of them freed soon after their arrest. 118 At the same time, numerous
prominent civilian activists arrested after the uprising in 2011 reportedly remained in detention
as of end of 2021. 119
15F

16F

17F

18F

108

UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/45/31, 14 August 2020, url, para. 24
109
SJAC, The State of Justice: Syria 2021, March 2021, url
110
SOHR, Rif Dimashq | Unknown individuals set tires on fire and block side streets in Saqba, protesting
deteriorating living conditions, 19 June 2020, url
111
MEE, Arrests in Syria's Latakia signal discontent among pro-Assad communities, 4 February 2022, url
112
Al Jazeera, Syria: Sweida protesters decry corruption, poor living standards, 11 February 2022, url
113
COAR, Swelling As-Sweida Protests Highlight Discontent Across Government Areas, 14 February 2022, url
114
Al Jazeera, ‘Economic blockade’: Syrian city punished for anti-govt protests, 21 April 2022, url
115
Al Jazeera, ‘Economic blockade’: Syrian city punished for anti -govt protests, 21 April 2022, url
116
SHRC, The 20th Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syria, 9 January 2022, url, p. 46
117
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2020 - Syria, 30 March 2021, url, p. 48; USDOS, Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Syria, 12 April 2022, url, p. 48
118
SHRC, The 20th Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syria, 9 January 2022, url, p. 46
119
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Syria, 12 April 2022, url, p. 21

25

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

1.2.3 Civilians originating from, or residing in areas perceived to be
opposing the government/reconquered areas
Since the uprising began in 2011, GoS forces targeted a variety of groups in ‘restive’ areas,
including military-aged men, human rights activists, health and rescue workers, family
members of wanted persons 120, and other residents whose regional or personal affiliations
were associated with opposition activities. 121 Arbitrary detention of civilians was documented
in reconquered areas. 122 Between July 2020 and June 2021, the UNCOI received 13 reports ofdeaths in detention from Dar’a and Rural Damascus, including the death of a man who wasarrested in 2018 after the recapture of the area by GoS forces despite having reconciled. 123
19F

120F

12F

12F

Residents who were displaced from Aleppo city during the conflict to other areas held by antiGoS armed groups or to Turkey were reportedly viewed with suspicion of sympathising withthe opposition by the GoS. Local sources interviewed by the International Crisis Group in
Aleppo stated that individuals who underwent reconciliation have been asked to visit the
intelligence services branch where some have been arrested or forcibly disappeared. 124
123F

Civilians who fled besieged areas (for example, eastern Aleppo governorate and eastern
Ghouta in Rural Damascus) were subjected to internment in facilities called ‘IDP’ shelters, the
UNCOI reported. 125 Also, the GoS engaged in practices of seizing lands and properties of its
opponents, redistributing these assets among members of the security services and local proGoS militias. Amongst others, it did so on the basis of Legislative Decree 63 of 2012 thatallows confiscation of property owned by those perceived by the GoS to be ‘terrorists’. In what
was reported as a new development, in the suburbs of Hama city and the eastern andsouthern suburbs of the city of Idlib where the GoS retook control in 2019 and 2020, security
committees announced a series of public auctions between June and November 2020,
offering temporal leases on agricultural lands belonging to persons who fled to areas outside
GoS control. 126 People who had their land and property confiscated in these two governorates
in 2020 reported that it was seized ‘without notice or compensation’. 127
124F

125F

126F

Human Rights Watch Syria researcher pointed out that individuals in GoS-controlled areas
who are originally from areas currently controlled by anti-government groups may also be
perceived as holding anti-government views. 128
127F

120

UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/46/55, 11 March 2021, url, para. 15
121
SHRC, The 20th Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syria, 9 January 2022, url, p. 47
122
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/46/55, 11 March 2021, url, para. 17
123
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/48/70, 13 August 2021, url, para. 31, 33
124International Crisis Group, Syria: Ruling over Aleppo’s Ruins, 9 May 2022, url, pp. 19-20
125
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/46/55, 11 March 2021, url, para. 17
126
SNHR, Public Auctions of Forcibly Displaced People’s Lands Are Another Syrian Regime Method to Seize Its
Opponents’ Property in a Widespread and Deliberate Manner, 14 February 2021, url, pp. 2-3, 6, 8
127
HRW, Syria: Government Stealing Opponents’ Land, 8 April 2021, url
128
UNHCR, International Protection Considerations with Regard to People Fleeing the Syrian Arab Republic –Update IV, March 2021, url, p. 96, footnote 460

26

SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORT

Individuals in territories retaken by the GoS forces were ‘under constant risk’ of military
conscription raids conducted by the GoS in those areas, according to the Omran Center for
Strategic Studies. 129 Regarding persons who were forcibly conscripted by GoS forces in thoseareas, Sara Kayyali assessed that these individuals were ‘very likely to be considered asholding an anti-government opinion’. 130
128F

129F

Local media and human rights groups reported about several arrests of young men in Dar’agovernorate in late 2021 and early 2022 131, including individuals who had accepted
reconciliation deals. 132
130F

13F

Meanwhile, in Dar’a, the authorities released 62 detainees in November 2020 who had
previously been detained for what a pro-GoS newspaper referred to as ‘incidents’ in thegovernorate. 133 Detainee releases were also reported in Damascus. 134 In February and March
2021, the GoS released more than 100 detainees from Dar’a, most of whom had been arrested
despite signing reconciliation agreements in 2018. Those released comprised rebel fighters,
recruits within the ranks of the GoS forces, and civilians, including a small number of womenand former employees of humanitarian organisations. 135 In November and December 2021,
dozens of more people, again mostly people from Dar’a who had been detained between
2018 and 2020, were released. 136 As reported by the NGO Syrians for Trust and Justice (STJ),
the families of a number of released detainees had to pay ‘exorbitant sums of money orbribes’ to lawyers or GoS officers to have their loved ones freed. 137
132F

13F

134F

135F

136F

GoS forces carried out arrests in eastern Ghouta of former opposition fighters who haveunderwent reconciliation and of ‘workers who had participated and served in civil affairs ininstitutions that used to be active during the [armed] factions’ control of the region’. 138 In
November 2020, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported that a former civil
servant at the local council of Al-Rastan city (northern countryside of Homs governorate) who
was arrested for ‘dealing with the opposition factions’ subsequently died under torture. 139
More generally, the GoS did not permit employees to return to their previous workplaces in
137F

138F

129

Omran Center for Strategic Studies, The Security Landscape in Syria and its Impact on the Return of Refugees:
An Opinion Survey, 17 December 2020, url, p. 34
130
UNHCR, International Protection Considerations with Regard to People Fleeing the Syrian Arab Republic –Update IV, March 2021, url, p. 96, footnote 460
131
NPA, Government forces arrest young men in Syria’s Daraa, 5 October 2021, url; NPA, Government armed grouparrests young men in Syria’s Daraa, 17 January 2022, url; SOHR, Reacting to arrest of three young men | Gunmen
block Damascus-Daraa highway, 7 February 2022, url
132
SOHR, Reacting to arrest of three young men | Gunmen block Damascus-Daraa highway, 7 February 2022, url
133
Washington Post, Escalating violence in strategic Syrian city belies Assad’s claim that he’s in control, 24
November 2020, url
134
HRW, World Report 2022 - Syria, 13 January 2022, url
135
STJ, Daraa: Dozens Arrested and Released After Signing Government Settlement Agreement, 1 June 2021, url136
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 32
137
STJ, Daraa: Dozens Arrested and Released After Signing Government Settlement Agreement, 1 June 2021, url
138
SOHR, Eastern Ghouta: Chronic crises…lack of basic services…Syrian regime blamed for deliberately
marginalizing the region, 3 December 2020, url
139
SOHR, Arrested two years ago: Civilian from Al-Rastan north of Homs dies under torture in regime prisons, 14
November 2020, url

27

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

areas it had recaptured from opposition forces as it perceived them as ‘traitors’, the OmranCentre for Strategic Studies observed in late 2020. 140
139F

For information on the treatment of returnees from abroad originating from areas previously
under opposition control, please see Subsection 1.2.5 Specific profiles of returnees fromabroad interpreted as opposition.

1.2.4 (Former) members of anti-government armed groups
The GoS entered into so-called reconciliation agreements with different actors in areas its
forces recaptured from various anti-GoS groups. 141 Between July 2018, when reconciliationagreements were signed between the GoS and opposition movements in Dar’a 142, andNovember 2020, a total of 193 former rebel fighters who had put down their arms were killed,
including by unidentified assailants, according to the Daraa Martyrs Documentation Office, aBelgium-based monitoring group. Among the victims were individuals who had agreed to join
the Syrian armed forces or had returned to life as civilians. 143 Moreover, between July 2018
and February 2021, the same source estimated that 92 former opposition members anddefectors were forcibly disappeared across southern Syria, while ‘the number of people whohave been killed under torture during the same time and whose families were notified of their
death has reached 31.’ 144 Assassinations of former reconciled rebel fighters were further
reported in 2022 in Dar’a, with one local media activist claiming that the perpetrators areaffiliated with the GoS. 145
140F

14F

142F

143F

14F

In Dar’a, following months of heavy fighting and a siege of the anti-GoS stronghold andregional capital Dar’a Al-Balad, a reconciliation agreement brokered by Russia was announced
in September 2021. The agreement ‘mandated the entry of the Syrian government to theseareas, and that civilians and opposition fighters sign so-called reconciliation agreements to beallowed to stay’. 146 GoS forces reportedly signed reconciliation agreements with more than
12 000 people and collected 1 700 weapons. 147 The GoS transferred persons who refused tojoin reconciliation agreements to Idlib governorate. 148
145F

146F

147F

The GoS reportedly subjected those refusing to join reconciliation agreements to ‘threats andretaliatory acts’. For example, in October 2020, gunmen in Dar’a shot dead Adham al-Karad, a140

Omran Center for Strategic Studies, The Security Landscape in Syria and its Impact on the Return of Refugees:
An Opinion Survey, 17 December 2020, url, p. 34
141
Adleh, F. and Favier, A., “Local reconciliation agreements” in Syria: A non-starter for peacebuilding, EUI, June
2017, url, pp. 1-2; Syria Direct, Reconciliation without forgiveness: Defectors and former opposition members face‘deferred execution’, 9 February 2021, url; Al-Monitor, Syrian government completes reconciliation deals in Daraa
area, 25 October 2021, url
142
Syria Direct, Reconciliation without forgiveness: Defectors and former opposition members face ‘deferred
execution’, 9 February 2021, url
143
Washington Post, Escalating violence in strategic Syrian city belies Assad’s claim that he’s in control, 24
November 2020, url
144
Syria Direct, Reconciliation without forgiveness: Defectors and former opposition members face ‘deferred
execution’, 9 February 2021, url
145
Al Monitor, Who's to blame for ongoing assassinations in Syria's Daraa province?, 10 August 2022, url
146
HRW, World Report 2022 - Syria, 13 January 2022, url
147
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 20
148
HRW, World Report 2022 - Syria, 13 January 2022, url

28

SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORT

well-known former rebel commander who ‘continued to voice opposition to the government
even after Assad’s forces recaptured the area’. 149 In October 2021, GoS forces destroyedhouses of former opposition fighters in eastern Dar’a who were reluctant to reconcile.
Moreover, two men were killed and another was arrested in a further raid by GoS forcestargeting persons refusing to reconcile.150 In summer 2021, the SAA detained dozens ofvillagers following deadly armed clashes with residents of Al-Mutai village in eastern Dar’a.
While most of them were freed soon thereafter (with some reportedly showing signs of illtreatment), one detainee died from torture. 151
148F

149F

150F

At the same time, safeguards provided in reconciliation agreements reportedly failed toguarantee protection, and GoS forces have been reported to target residents of retaken areas
who had signed such agreements with arbitrary detention, disappearances, andmistreatment. 152 Several persons interviewed between July 2020 and June 2021 by the
UNCOI emphasised that even for those who did accept reconciliation, ‘the spectre of arbitraryarrests remained omnipresent.’ 153 A January 2022 academic paper by researcher Abdullah AlJabassini 154 quoted an interviewee from Dar’a as saying that ‘many people who wereassassinated or arrested had settled their status.’ 155 Sources reported that a number of former
members of opposition armed groups were reportedly arrested in Dar’a 156 and eastern
Ghouta 157 during the reporting period.
15F

152F

153F

154F

15F

156F

1.2.5 Returnees from abroad perceived as opposition
The GoS’s treatment of returnees from abroad has been covered extensively in Sections 2, 3
and 5 of the EUAA COI Report on Syria: Situation of Returnees from abroad (June 2021). This
subsection will therefore focus on relevant information that has become available since April
2021.

149

Washington Post, Escalating violence in strategic Syrian city belies Assad’s claim that he’s in control, 24
November 2020, url
150
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 34
151
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 40
152
HRW, World Report 2022 - Syria, 13 January 2022, url
153
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/48/70, 13 August 2021, url, para. 33
154
Abdullah Al-Jabassini holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Kent, United Kingdom. He isa Non-Resident Scholar at the Middle East Institute (Washington, D.C., United States), and a Research Fellow for the
Wartime and Post-Conflict in Syria (WPCS) project at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies of theEuropean University Institute (Florence, Italy). His research is focused on southern Syria, specifically Dar’agovernorate. See url
155
Al-Jabassini, A., Migration from Post-War Southern Syria: Drivers, Routes, and Destinations, Wartime and PostConflict in Syria, EUI, 6 January 2022, url, p. 8
156
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 32
157
SOHR, Eastern Ghouta: Chronic crises…lack of basic services…Syrian regime blamed for deliberately
marginalizing the region, 3 December 2020, url

29

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMUNHCR counted 35 680 self-organised returns from neighbouring countries to Syria in 2021
and 16 676 for 2022, from a total number of about 5 607 233 registered refugees from Syria,
as of May 2022. 158
157F

(a)

Security clearance and ‘status settlement/reconciliation’

Individuals returning to Syria may need to go through two return procedures: security clearance
and status settlement. 159 These procedures are run by the Syrian intelligence. 160 However,sources indicated that no clear-cut distinction existed between making an application for
security clearance and settling one’s status. 161 As the EIP observed, ‘there is no single set of
uniform procedures that a returnee must undergo before going back to Syria, nor any processthat provides guarantees about security on their return, even where there is a process for
specific groups or in specific circumstances.’162
158F

159F

160F

16F

Sources indicated that Syrian citizens are generally not formally obliged to obtain security
clearance as no such general requirement exists under Syrian law. 163 Indeed, Human Rights
Watch quoted a Syrian lawyer as saying that both the security clearance and the reconciliation
process were extra-legal in nature and that they were in violation of the Syrian Constitution. 164
162F

163F

Although security clearance (muwafaka amniya) was defined by the Danish Immigration Service(DIS) as ‘a process through which the Syrian authorities crosscheck whether a person is on awanted list and is to be considered a security threat’ 165, in practice this process can take anumber of different forms. Thus, more broadly speaking, obtaining security clearance can beunderstood as a background check 166 on whether an individual has an ‘unsettled’ security issue
such as participation in protests, criticising the government or taking up arms against the GoS. 167
164F

165F

16F

Sources emphasised that completing security clearance did not guarantee that individuals
would not be arrested or detained by the authorities upon returning to Syria. 168 Amnesty
International (AI) documented 12 cases of refugees 169 who went through security clearance at
the Syrian embassy in Amman or returned through an organised return operation and where
nevertheless arrested by intelligence officials upon their return. 170 According to Nessma Bashi,
167F

168F

169F

158

UNHCR, Operational Data Portal, Refugee Situation, updated 31 May 2022, url
Denmark, DIS, Syria: Issues regarding return, October 2021, url, p. 8
160
Syria Direct, ‘Syria is safe, refugees should return’: The dangers of the growing narrative, 29 June 2021, url; Al
Jumhuriya, ‫[ متاهة الموافقة األمنية‬Maze of security approval], 14 March 2022, url
161
EUAA, Country of Origin Information Report, Syria: Situation of returnees from abroad, June 2021, url, p. 20;
HRW, “Our Lives Are Like Death”: Syrian Refugee Returns from Lebanon and Jordan, 20 October 2 021, url, p. 47
162
EIP, Refugee Return to Syria, September 2021, private document held on file, p. 29
163
Denmark, DIS, Syria: Issues regarding return [source: Danish Mini stry of Foreign Affairs], October 2021, url, p. 9;
HRW, “Our Lives Are Like Death”: Syrian Refugee Returns from Lebanon and Jordan, 20 October 2021, url, p. 48
164
HRW, “Our Lives Are Like Death”: Syrian Refugee Returns from Lebanon and Jordan, 20 October 2021, url, p. 49
165
Denmark, DIS, Syria: Issues regarding return, October 2021, url, p. 8
166
HRW, “Our Lives Are Like Death”: Syrian Refugee Returns from Lebanon and Jordan, 20 October 2021, url, p. 48
167
Denmark, DIS, Syria: Issues regarding return, October 2021, url, p. 13
168
EUAA, Country of Origin Information Report, Syria: Situation of returnees from abroad, June 2021, url, pp. 20-21;
HRW, “Our Lives Are Like Death”: Syrian Refugee Returns from Lebanon and Jordan, 20 October 2021, url, p. 50;
AI, “You’re going to your death”, Violations against Syrian refugees returning to Syria, 7 September 2021 , url, pp.
16-17; Syria Direct, ‘Syria is safe, refugees should return’: The dangers of the growing narrative, 29 June 2021, url
169
Amnesty International interviewed ‘a total of 41 Syrian individuals: 20 returnees; and 19 relatives and two closefriends of returnees who were subjected to violations’(see: AI, “You’re going to your death”, 7 September 2021, url,p. 9). Interviews concerning the twelve cases of refugees who were arrested despite security clearance wereconducted on 21 October, 16 November 2020 and on 19 January, 7 April, 20, 21 May 2021. (see: AI, “You’re goingto your death”, 7 September 2021, url, p. 17)
170
AI, “You’re going to your death”, 7 September 2021, url, p. 17
159

30

SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORT

Legal Fellow at the Syria Justice and Accountability Centre, security clearance ‘could mean thatthey make it to Syria for a day and the next day they get a call and need to go to a security
branch’. 171
170F

As part of their return process, many returnees were required to fill out retu rn or reconciliation
forms in order to reconcile their status with the state authorities ‘while attempting todemonstrate a clean record or seek “forgiveness” from the state’. 172 While AI noted that thisprocess was not available abroad and could only be undertaken once the returnee is back in
Syria 173, the EIP indicated that certain issues could be settled from abroad, including rectifying
illegal departure without an exit stamp (if the person fled from the impact of armed groups’
attacks in their area), failure to complete military service, or bureaucratic issues .174
17F

172F

173F

According to Suhail al-Ghazi, a Syrian researcher specialised in return dynamics, mostreturnees, including but not limited to those who are from recaptured areas or who left illegally,
are required to provide personal information to the authorities and ‘reconciliate’. 175 As explainedby Human Rights Watch, most returnees were required to undergo the process of reconciliation,no matter the circumstances of how they left (whether legally or illegally) and whether they wereintending to return to a retaken or a reconciled area. 176 Human Rights Watch was told that mostof the men interviewed who had returned to Syria from Jordan had to settle their status. 177
174F

175F

176F

As part of the reconciliation process, returnees were obliged to provide personal information to
the GoS. 178 According to EIP, return forms had the specific aim to gather intelligence. 179 EIP notedthat these forms ask questions on the individual’s or their relatives’ past that create ‘interest
profiles’ that would ‘likely lead to [their] interrogation and/or arrest’. In recent years, this also
included requests to provide information relating to social media accounts (either their own orthose of diaspora members), sometimes including passwords to log into those accounts. 180
17F

178F

179F

The UNCOI reported on the case of a returnee from abroad to Homs governorate in
December 2019 after having underwent reconciliation, who was arrested, detained andtortured by the intelligence services. He was subsequently released after his family paid
bribes for his release. 181 The news network SY24 reported in December 2021 on the arrest of afamily upon their return to Damascus from northern Syria, despite the father of the family
having had applied for reconciliation. 182
180F

18F

171

Syria Direct, ‘Syria is safe, refugees should return’: The dangers of the growing narrative, 29 June 2021, url
EIP, Refugee Return to Syria, September 2021, private document held on file, pp. 30 -31
173
AI, “You’re going to your death”, Violations against Syrian refugees returning to Syria, 7 September 2021, url, p.
16
174
EIP, Refugee Return to Syria, September 2021, private document held on file, pp. 29 -30
175
HRW, “Our Lives Are Like Death”: Syrian Refugee Returns from Lebanon and Jordan, 20 October 2021, url, pp.
47-48
176
HRW, “Our Lives Are Like Death” [Source: Suhail al -Ghazi, researcher, Center for Middle Eastern Studies,
Istanbul], 20 October 2021, url, pp. 47-48
177
HRW, “Our Lives Are Like Death”, 20 October 2021, url, p. 48
178
HRW, “Our Lives Are Like Death” [Source: Suhail al -Ghazi, researcher, Center for Middle Eastern Studies,
Istanbul], 20 October 2021, url, pp. 47-48
179
EIP, Refugee Return to Syria, September 2021, private document held on file, p. 30
180EIP, Refugee Return to Syria, September 2021, private document held on file, pp. 30 -31
181
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/48/70, 13 August 2021, url, para. 33
182
SY24, ‫[ مخابرات النظام تعتقل عائلة كاملة في دمشق‬Regime intelligence arrests whole family in Damascus], 17 December
2021, url
172

31

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

As an additional requirement to return, it was reported that all citizens entering Syria had toexchange USD 100 at the border, using the Syrian Central Bank’s exchange rate 183, which
resulted in travellers merely receiving a fraction of the amount in return. 184 The compulsory
exchange of USD 100 was critiqued for infringing freedom of movement. 185 Some returnees
further reported having to pay household bills for properties and back-dated taxes, from thetime the property was vacated until their return. 186
182F

183F

184F

185F

(b)

Consequences of illegal exit and applying for asylum abroad

In 2019, Syria’s Ministry of Interior issued Circular No 342 which stated that persons who left
Syria irregularly without obtaining an exit stamp would not face issues with the authorities
upon return. Thus, the EIP observed that returnees are no longer obliged to report to asecurity branch to answer questions regarding their irregular exit. However, for purposes ofpaying overdue bills and taxes, they are required to explain the reasons for their departure to
the criminal police. This reportedly ‘takes the form of a criminal investigation’ and the police‘may forward their explanation of their unlawful exit to a security branch’. This information, andthe fact of illegal exit itself, may be ‘sufficient grounds to prompt a summons , interrogations,
and/or arrest and detention’. Moreover, EIP noted that there is ‘little monitoring’ as to how
policies such as Circular No 342 are implemented in practice.187
186F

DIS indicated that ‘officially, a person who has exited illegally from Syria might be subjected toprosecution upon return, unless the person has obtained a status settlement prior to return .’188
A Syrian human rights organisation that requested anonymity interviewed in April 2022 by DIS
stated that those who left Syria illegally have to report to local intelligence services where they
‘will be questioned about the reason for their leave and about their activities while staying
abroad’. According to the source, if someone reported them to the authorities for being
involved in opposition activities, they would ‘risk being subject to further interrogation,
detention and/or money extortion’, otherwise nothing more would happen to them. 189
187F

18F

A Syrian expert in Turkey told EIP in August 2021 that returnees who had left the country
illegally, that is, without an exit stamp, were required to officially explain to criminal police theirreasons for leaving irregularly. The criminal police had the power to forward the statement to asecurity branch, as such making the individual into a ‘person of interest’, which might ‘prompt
a summons, interrogations, and/or arrest and detention’. 190
189F

According to returnees’ testimonies collected by AI, Syrian officials perceived individuals wholeft the country as having been disloyal and supportive of the opposition ‘either because of
the fact that they fled or because of the place where they sought refuge’. Refugees were

Syrian Today, ‫ مصيدة يصعب الخروج منها دون أضرار‬.. ‫ مطار دمشق الدولي‬: ‫[ سوريون‬Syrians: Damascus international
airport a trap that's hard to get out of without damage], 29 August 2021, url
184
In January 2022 the formal exchange rate was SYP 2,500/USD. At the same time, the informal market exchange
rate in Damascus was SYP 3,661/USD. (see: WFP Syria, Market Price Watch Bulletin, February 2022, Issue 87, 16
March 2022, url, p. 5)
185
Atlantic Council, Strapped for dollars, the Syrian government is forcing its citizens to pay up, 5 April 2021, url
186
HRW, “Our Lives Are Like Death”, 20 October 2021, url, p. 55
187
EIP, Refugee Return to Syria, September 2021, private document held on file, pp. 48-49
188
Denmark, DIS, Syria: Treatment upon return, May 2022, url, p. 11
189
Denmark, DIS, Syria: Treatment upon return [source: Syrian human rights organisation], May 2022, url, p. 23
190
EIP, Refugee Return to Syria, September 2021, private document held on file, pp. 48-49
183

32

SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORT

perceived ‘as traitors, given that they readily incriminate the Syrian government before hostcounties in order to obtain protection there’. 191
190F

Meanwhile, the DIS cited a Syrian human rights organisation that requested anonymity
interviewed in April 2022 as saying that the mere fact of having applied for asylum abroad
does not make an individual subject to mistreatment, noting that the GoS is aware that large
numbers of Syrians living abroad are refugees and that applying for asylum was the only
pathway for them to get residency in their host country. 192
19F

According to the Voices for Displaced Syrians Forum (VDSF) and Operations and Policy
Center (OPC) 193, nearly half (48%) of the returnees to GoS areas interviewed 194 reported thatthey or a family member had experienced persecution due to having left Syria illegally, forapplying for asylum abroad or because of their area of origin. 195
192F

193F

194F

(c)

Treatment of returnees

Due notably to GoS restrictions on UN and UNHCR, no systematic monitoring of returnees has
been carried out and as a result, and as a result, obtaining information about the extent of
mistreatment and violations committed by GoS against returnees is not possible. 196 In a panel
discussion organised by the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center and the European
Institute of Peace on 11 April 2022, a researcher from Human Rights Watch stated that she‘cannot identify a profile which will predict who will or will not face human rights abuse on
return’. 197 According to a Syrian human rights organisation that requested anonymity
interviewed in April 2022 by DIS ’there is no clear pattern for the way the returnees aretreated by the authorities’, noting that the individual officer in charge of the checkpoint or of
the case of the returnee plays a significant role in the outcome. 198
195F

196F

197F

Sources noted that persons who departed from Syria were viewed with suspicion by the
Syrian authorities for leaving the country. 199 According to Suhail al-Ghazi, ‘nearly everyone
who returns will face some form of interrogation’. ‘Whether it’s a cup of tea with the security
agencies or a full-blown torture session, they want to know why people left.’ 200 According to a
Syrian human rights organisation that requested anonymity interviewed by DIS in April 2022,
in general terms, returnees who have not engaged in opposition activities and departed Syria
198F

19F

191

AI, “You’re going to your death”, Violations against Syrian refugees returning to Syria, 7 September 2021, url, pp.
6, 15
192
Denmark, DIS, Syria: Treatment upon return [source: Syrian human rights organisation], May 2022, url, pp. 9-10
193
Operations and Policy Center (OPC, formerly Orient Policy Center) is a Syrian-led and owned ‘independent thinktank and service provider. Established in 2014, OPC conducts original research and provides consulting services toenhance policymaking, development programs, and humanitarian response projects’ .
The report was conducted together with Voices for Displaced Syrians Forum (VDSF), which ‘gathers 40+ Syrian civilsociety organizations operating in Syria and refugee-hosting countries, including Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, andIraq. Established in 2019, the VDSF advocates for the achievement of durable solutions to protect, respond to, andimprove the quality of life of displaced Syrians inside Syria and abroad’ . (See: VDSF and OPC, Is Syria Safe for
Return? Returnees’ Perspective, November 2021, url, p. 2)
194
Interviewees in GoS-controlled areas were interviewed in Damascus and Jaramana, with a sample of 300
respondents, divided equally between residents, IDPs and returnees included. (See: VDSF and OPC, Is Syria Safe
for Return? Returnees’ Perspective, November 2021, url, p. 13)
195
VDSF and OPC, Is Syria Safe for Return? Returnees’ Perspective, November 2021, url, p. 38
196
Denmark, DIS, Syria: Treatment upon return, May 2022, url, pp. 5; 22
197
Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center and EIP, The Context of a Refugee Return in Syria [online video], 11
April 2022, url, [17:35-17:57]
198
Denmark, DIS, Syria: Treatment upon return [source: Syrian human rights organisation], May 2022, url, p. 22
199
HRW, “Our Lives Are Like Death”: Syrian Refugee Returns from Lebanon and Jordan, 20 October 2021, url, p.
28; SJAC, The State of Justice in Syria 2022, March 2022, url, p. 10
200
HRW, “Our Lives Are Like Death”: Syrian Refugee Returns from Lebanon and Jordan, 20 October 2021, url, p. 29

33

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

only due to the war tend not to face problems upon return unless somebody in their absence
has reported them to the authorities alleging that they were, for example, involved in activities
opposing the GoS. However, the same source noted that ‘profiled’ opposition members andtheir families tended to be interrogated, detained, and extorted for money upon their return. 201
20F

Several reports published during the reference period documented violations against
returnees based on interviews with returnees and their relatives. 202 AI documented 66 casesof individuals – children, women and men – who were subjected to human rights violations
upon their return to Syria. Among the 66 cases, 59 were subjected to ‘unlawful or arbitrary
detention, torture and other ill-treatment including rape and sexual violence, and enforced
disappearance’, after returning to Syria, due to being perceived as affiliated with the
opposition, as a result of their displacement. 203 It further documented 33 cases of returnees
being tortured or ill-treated during detention and interrogation 204 , with violations beingcommitted by Syrian authorities against women and men alike. One third of the cases
involving human rights violations against returnees documented by AI took place in Damascus
or the Damascus area. 205
201F

20F

203F

204F

SNHR recorded approximately 218 arrests of returnees (refugees and IDPs) to areas under
government control during 2021, including women and children. 206 SHRC documented an
undisclosed number of arrests at international travel ports, especially Damascus International
Airport, during the same year. 207
205F

206F

Returnees from abroad were arrested for a variety of reasons, most frequently on broad
accusations of ‘terrorism’, often based on the claim that a relative was affiliated with thepolitical/armed opposition or because the returnee originated from an area previously held by
the opposition 208 or considered pro-opposition, such as Zabadani or Ghouta in Rural
Damascus governorate. Out of the 66 total cases recorded by AI, security organisations
detained eight returnees ‘because one of their close relatives was an alleged “terrorist”’. 209
207F

208F

Sources reported on cases of returnees who were arrested, forcibly disappeared or killed by
the intelligence services for sending money from abroad to support their family in Dar’a(accusation of financing terrorism) 210, for their alleged participation in protests or political
opposition groups in the early days of the Syrian uprising or for purportedly criticising Syria. 211
Others were accused of spying on behalf of or otherwise supporting the governments of their
host countries (e.g. Lebanon, Turkey or the Gulf countries). 212 The authorities reportedly also
209F

210F

21F

201

Denmark, DIS, Syria: Treatment upon return [source: Syrian human rights organisation], May 2022, url, pp. 9-10
See especially the following reports: AI, “You’re going to your death”, Violations against Syrian refugees
returning to Syria, 7 September 2021, url; HRW, “Our Lives Are Like Death”: Syrian Refugee Returns from Lebanon
and Jordan, 20 October 2021, url, pp. 48-50
203
AI, “You’re going to your death”, 7 September 2021, url, pp. 5, 7
204
AI, “You’re going to your death”, 7 September 2021, url, p. 7
205
AI, “You’re going to your death”, 7 September 2021, url, p. 8
206
SNHR, Eleventh Annual Report, 21 January 2022, url, p. 24
207
SHRC, The 20th Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syria, 9 January 2022, url, p. 46
208
AI, “You’re going to your death”, Violations against Syrian refugees returning to Syria, 7 September 2021, url, p.
7
209
AI, “You’re going to your death”, Violations against Syrian refugees returning to Syria, 7 September 2021, url, pp.
28-29
210
HRW, “Our Lives Are Like Death”: Syrian Refugee Returns from Lebanon and Jordan, 20 October 2021, url, p. 31
211
AI, “You’re going to your death”, Violations against Syrian refugees returning to Syria, 7 September 2021, url, pp.
29, 31
212
AI, “You’re going to your death”, Violations against Syrian refugees returning to Syria, 7 September 2021, url, p.
20
202

34

SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORT

targeted returnees who professed support for the GoS, which according to AI confirmed thegovernment’s ‘hostile perceptions towards those who sought safety outside of the country’.213
21F

Most formerly detained returnees interviewed by Human Rights Watch indicated that they had
been subjected to several types of torture, ‘from beatings with metal rods or wooden sticks toelectric shocks, often inflicted with escalating levels of pain. 214 Among the 66 total cases
documented by AI were 14 cases of sexual violence against women, children and men
committed by members of the security apparatus, including seven instances of rape. 215
213F

214F

A detention expert told EIP in May 2021 that returnees who were detained after returning to
Syria regularly reported that security branch interrogators requested lists of names of family,
friends, colleagues, neighbours, refugees, IDPs or people of the same (displaced) community
as the returnees, using torture to extract the information. 216
215F

Syrians may be named in so-called personal grievance cases filed against them by individual
plaintiffs, including GoS loyalists. This was reported to be an ‘increasingly prevalent’phenomenon particularly in areas that were previously held by the opposition or have been
‘associated with significant opposition activity’. The accused person is not notified, and thecase may not appear on the wanted lists held by the Passports and Immigration Department.
Depending on the nature of the claim, such a case may be processed via the security systemrather than the civilian justice system. In one example, the EIP quoted a local source from atown in Homs governorate who estimated that as many as 75 % of refugees from the town in
Homs governorate have been denounced in personal grievance cases filed by GoS loyalists.
Besides, the authorities may also pursue individuals not on the basis of their personal profile(which may be verifiable on a wanted list) but along ‘community or family lines’. According to
the EIP, this may create ‘risks not linked to specific geographical areas or governorates’. 217
216F

As regards Legislative Decree No 7 issued on 30 April 2022 (see Section 1.1.1 Arbitrary
detention and enforced disappearance for more details), the chairperson of the Arab andForeign Affairs committee at the Syrian People’s Assembly stated that the amnesty covers
more than 95% of Syrians abroad who are in the opposition. He added that the decree isintended to encourage the return of Syrian refugees to Syria. 218 However, Syrians for Truth
and Justice (STJ), an independent NGO documenting human rights violations in Syria, statedon 25 May 2022 that ‘it will be difficult, and even impossible, for the Syrian judiciary to apply
Decree No 7 to tens of thousands of male and female detainees and forcefully disappeared
people held by security services’ due to the impunity those security services enjoy, and ‘tofree those held by the pro-regime Syrian National Defence and the armed militias active in
Syria, such as the Iranian and Lebanese, since their prisons and detention centres are beyond
the state’s control’. 219
217F

218F

213

AI, “You’re going to your death”, Violations against Syrian refugees returning to Syria, 7 September 2021, url, p.

21
214

HRW, “Our Lives Are Like Death”: Syrian Refugee Returns from Lebanon and Jordan, 20 October 2021, url, p. 36
AI, “You’re going to your death”, Violations against Syrian refugees returning to Syria, 7 September 2021, url, pp.
22-23
216
EIP, Refugee Return to Syria [Source: Detention Expert], September 2021, private document held on file, p. 24
217
EIP, Refugee Return to Syria, September 2021, private document held on file, pp. 27 -28
218
Syria, People’s Assembly, ‫[ بطرس مرجانة ضيف جريدة الوطن‬Boutros Marjaneh interviewed by Al-Watan Newspaper], 30
May 2022, url
219
STJ, Syria: Amnesty Decree No.7 is an Inadequate Step Considering Law No. 19 and the Counter -Terrorism
Court, 25 May 2022, url
215

35

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

The pro-opposition media Orient News reported on 31 May 2022 that 33 Syrian men returningfrom Lebanon were arrested at checkpoints in the outskirts of Qutaifeh in Rural Damascus.
The source added that the returns took place in the wake of the amnesty decree and that the
majority of the arrested men were draft evaders. 220 Moreover, SY24, reported on 7 June 2022
that a family of three, including a 12-year-old child, were arrested in Barzeh neighbourhood in
Damascus city by the political security branch. According to the source, the family had
returned from Lebanon in early March 2022 and the arrest was based on accusations ofcollaboration with foreign entities and providing logistical information on the positions andmovements of the GoS forces in Damascus. 221
219F

20F

220

Orient News, 33 ‫[ شابا سوريا يدفعون ثمنا باهظا لتصديقهم "عفو" بشار األسد‬33 Syrian young men pay a high price for believing
Bashar Al-Assad’s amnesty], 31 May 2022, url
221
SY24, “‫ أمن النظام يعتقل عائلة عادت حديث اً إلى دمشق‬..”‫[ العفو الكاذب‬the false amnesty.. Regime security arrest a newly returnedfamily to Damascus], 7 June 2022, url

36

SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORT

2. Persons fearing recruitment by thegovernment armed forces, military draft
evaders and deserters
Please see the EUAA COI Report on Syria: Military service published in April 2021 for moredetailed background information. The following section mainly focuses on recent
developments not included in the April 2021 report.

2.1 Changes to the military service law
All men between 18 and 42 years of age are required to perform military service for a durationof between 18 and 21 months, depending on their level of education. Once military service iscompleted, men can be called for reserve duty until 42 years of age. 222
21F

According to sources cited in a June 2021 report by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, reservists ‘can be called up for military training and active service in the event of war or
emergencies’. Usually they ‘perform the same duties assigned to officers and recruits
performing their compulsory service’. 223
2F

The law permits exemptions from military service for certain categories of individuals. The only
male child of a family and students may be exempted and there may be exemptions on healthgrounds. 224 Students can defer their conscription on a yearly basis while they are studying. 225
The law also allows for the payment of an exemption fee; however, this only applies forpeople residing abroad and reservists are not eligible for the payment of the fee. 226
23F

24F

25F

In November 2020 Legislative Decree 31/2020 amended key provisions of Legislative
Decree 30/2007 (Syrian Military Service Law). Syrians who reside abroad for one, two, three orfour years may now pay USD 10 000, 9 000, 8 000 or 7 000 respectively to acquire
exemptions. 227 Persons subject to military service, who want to pay the exemption fee and‘whose residence has exceeded five years after reaching the age of military enlistment shall
26F

222

EUAA, Country of Origin Information Report, Syria: Military Service, April 2021, url, p. 13
Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of origin information report Syria, 14 June 2021, url, p. 38
224
EUAA, Country of Origin Information Report, Syria: Military Service, April 2021, url, pp. 28-32
225
Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 58; Syrian academic, email correspondence, 25 April
2022
226
EUAA, Country of Origin Information Report, Syria: Military Service, April 2021, url, pp. 28-32
227
SLJ, Legal Briefing – November 2020, 3 December 2020, url; Syria, Legislative Decree 31, President Bashar Al Assad issues the LD # 31/2020, amending some articles of the LD# 30 date 03/05/2007, as amended, whichcontains the Military Service Law, url, art. 1
223

37

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

be fined USD 200 for each year delay’. 228 Residents ‘determined to serve in a non-field
service’ in the military can now pay USD 3 000 for an exemption. 229
27F

28F

Article 97 of Legislative Decree 30/2007 applies to men who have evaded compulsory military
service and have not paid the exemption fee when reaching the age of 43 years. 230 Sincepassing the first version of the country’s conscription law, Legislative Decree 30/2007,
Article 97 has been amended five times until December 2019. 231 In February 2021, Article 97
was again amended and now ‘empowers the Ministry of Finance to immediately confiscateand sell an individual’s property without providing notice or giving the individual an
opportunity to challenge the decision’. Previously the law ‘required a conditional assets
seizure for those who failed to pay the exemption fee, pending court judgment’. 232 The headof the army’s Exemption and Reserve branch, Brigadier-General al-Bitar had threatened in avideo from February 2021 that ‘42-year-old draft evaders will not be exempted frommandatory service unless they paid the exemption fee in cash’ adding that ‘those who do not
pay will be penalized by the executive seizure of their assets, or those of their relatives.’ 233
After public outcry the Syrian foreign ministry clarified that relatives would not be impacted. 234
However, the report by the UNCOI published August 2021 noted that the Ministry of Financefroze the assets of individuals and their family members based on the recent amendments. 235
29F

230F

231F

23F

23F

234F

2.2 Legal status of conscientious objectors
Article 46 of the Syrian Constitution of 2012 states that ‘compulsory military service shall be asacred duty’ and ‘defending the territorial integrity of the homeland and maintaining thesecrets of state shall be a duty of every citizen.’ 236
235F

It is not possible to conscientiously object to conscription 237, although Legislative Decree
30/2007 allows deferrals for compulsory service and exemptions for certain persons. 238
According to the USDOS, in 2020, the ‘government continued to exempt Christian and Muslim
religious leaders from military service based on conscientious objection’. However, Muslim
religious leaders were required to pay a levy for exemption. 239
236F

237F

238F

228

Syria, Legislative Decree 31, President Bashar Al -Assad issues the LD # 31/2020, amending some articles of theLD# 30 date 03/05/2007, as amended, which contains the Military Service Law, url, art. 1
229
Syria, Legislative Decree 31, President Bashar Al -Assad issues the LD # 31/2020, amending some articles of theLD# 30 date 03/05/2007, as amended, which contains the Military Service Law, url, art. 1
230
EUAA, Country of Origin Information Report, Syria: Military Service, April 2021, url, p. 34
231
Al-Mustafa, M., Drain Society, Feed the Military, Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, 20 February
2020, url
232
HRW, Syrian ‘Military Evaders’ Face Unlawful Seizure of Property, Assets, 9 February 2021, url
233
Enab Baladi, Syrian regime haunts draft evaders in Aleppo, 28 July 2021, url
234
Atlantic Council, Strapped for dollars, the Syrian government is forcing its citizens to pay up, 5 April 2021 , url
235
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Ara b
Republic, A/HRC/48/70, 13 August 2021, url, para. 42
236
Syria, Constitution, Constitution of the Syrian Arab Republic, 26 February 2012, url, art. 46
237
ICMP, Syria: Towards Addressing The Issue Of Missing Persons, 15 July 2021, url, p. 10; Al-Monitor, Syrians
dodge military conscription, 16 May 2022, url
238
TIMEP, TIMEP Brief: Conscription Law, 22 August 2019, url
239
USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report 2020 - Syria, 12 May 2021, url, p. 9

38

SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORT

2.3 Recruitment strategies
Since March 2020 Syria has seen no major military offensives across formal frontlines. 240
Skirmishes, shelling, and airstrikes continued, but the frontlines were basically frozen.
According to the Center for Operational Analysis and Research (COAR), localised violence
continued, but scope and intensity of the armed conflict in the country were ‘pale incomparison to conditions witnessed between 2012 and 2019’. 241
239F

240F

Following the outbreak of COVID-19 and the cessation of major military operations in Syria inearly 2020, military recruitment drives by the SAA reportedly slowed down. However, the SAA
regularly called on new conscripts and reservists. 242 In October 2021, a circular was issued,‘announcing the conscription of male Syrians in age of conscription’. 243
241F

24F

The GoS sends out notifications to the houses of men who have reached the age of military
service, telling them to register for military service. The names of the men called up for military
service are recorded in a central database which is accessed by officers at checkpoints and at
the border. 244
243F

In July 2021, in Aleppo, the Military Police and Military Security Service were ‘operating patrols
across the city after Aleppo’s draft centers ordered mandatory military evaders to join thearmy following Eid al-Adha holidays’. A member of the Military Security Service said that the
campaign aims to get hold of over 14 000 potential recruits in the governorate. 245 In
September 2021, mobile checkpoints were deployed in Homs governorate and eight civilians,among them young men wanted for military service, were arrested. 246
24F

245F

Professor Uğur Ümit Üngör 247 noted in December 2021 that even if the authorities are notactively searching for draft evaders they might be caught at checkpoints when travelling
between or around cities. 248 Professor Uğur Üngör describes the situation of two draft
evaders, who were in hiding and did not leave their house over years. At checkpoints lists ofdraft evaders are checked and ‘if you're on the list, they arrest you on the spot.’ 249 A former
officer in the Syrian army interviewed by the Swedish Migration Agency in April 2022 stated
246F

247F

248F

240

COAR, Syria in 2022: New Aid Approaches For an Evolving Crisis, 6 January 2022, url, p. 3; BBC News, Why has
the Syrian war lasted 11 years?, 15 March 2022, url
241
COAR, Syria in 2022: New Aid Approaches For an Evolving Crisis, 6 January 2022, url, p. 3
242
EUAA, Country of Origin Information Report, Syria: Military Service, April 2021, url, p. 15
243
NRC, Quarterly Legal and Policy Return Update, October - December 2021, private document held on file, p. 5
244
EUAA, Country of Origin Information Report, Syria: Military Service, April 2021, url, p. 20
245
Enab Baladi, Syrian regime haunts draft evaders in Aleppo, 28 July 2021, url
246
Enab Baladi, ‫[ قوات النظام تعتقل مدنيين في ريف حمص الشمالي‬Regime forces arrest civilians in the northern Homs
countryside], 3 September 2021, url
247Uğur Ümit Üngör is professor of Holocaust and Genocide Studies at the Institute for War, Holocaust and
Genocide Studies (NIOD) in Amsterdam.
248
Austria, BFA Staatendokumentation, Anfragebeantwortung der Staatendokumentation zu Syrien: Wehrdienst[query response on Syria: military service] [source: Uğur Ümit Üngör], 27 January 2022, url, p. 11
249
Austria, BFA Staatendokumentation, Anfragebeantwortung der Staatendokumentation zu Syrien: Wehrdienst[query response on Syria: military service] [source: Uğur Ümit Üngör], 27 January 2022, url, p. 15

39

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMthat most draft evaders are recruited at checkpoints where their name is checked against the
databases with lists of conscripts. 250
249F

According to confidential sources interviewed in January and June 2022 by the Netherlands
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, men from former opposition-held areas were especially enlisted as
reservists, including those over the age of 42. 251 Confidential sources interviewed in January
and February 2022 by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that they had
knowledge of cases of returnees who were called up to serve as conscripts or reservists. 252
250F

251F

AI stated that inside Sweida governorate, the Druze are ‘protected through an agreement withthe government from forced conscription’. 253 According to sources, between 30 000 254 and
50 000 255 young men evading military service sought refuge in Sweida governorate. Most do
not leave the governorate out of fear of being conscripted. 256
25F

253F

254F

25F

The GoS is generally not able to recruit conscripts in SDF-controlled areas. 257 Some sources
reported that forced recruitment in the SAA is being carried out in GoS-controlled security
squares located in Hasaka and Qamishli 258, while others contrarily din not expect that persons
entering these security squares would be conscripted.259
256F

257F

258F

As for demobilisation efforts, according to a confidential source interviewed in January 2021
by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘most reservists and military personnel have
served for an indefinite period’ since 2011. 260 Over the course of 2021, the president of Syria
issued two administrative orders to discharge certain groups of reservists who had alreadyserved a certain number of years. 261 In June 2021, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
cited COAR, which stated that the effect of the ‘demobilisation was still very limited inscope.’ 262 While reservists who met the criteria of the orders were demobilised, ‘thousands of
259F

260F

261F

250

Sweden, Migrationsverket, Syrisk militärtjänst (version 2.0) [Syria Military service] [source: former officer in the
Syrian army; Syrian lawyer active in Damascus], 22 April 2022, url, p. 10251
Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Algemeen ambtsbericht Syrië [Country report Syria], May 2022, url,
p. 53
252
Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Algemeen ambtsbericht Syrië [Country report Syria], May 2022,
url, p. 53
253
AI, Syria: Peaceful protesters detained in Sweida must be released immediately, 24 June 2020, url
254
New Arab (The), Why protests in Suweida are deeply troubling for the Syrian regime, 11 February 2022, url
255
Syria Untold, Men evading military service in southern Syria’s Suwayda feel ‘trapped’, 9 January 2020, url
256
New Arab (The), Why protests in Suweida are deeply troubling for the Syrian regime, 11 February 2022, url
257
EUAA, Country of Origin Information Report, Syria: Military Service, April 2021, url, p. 18; Denmark, DIS, Syria –Military recruitment in Hasakah Governorate, 1 July 2022 [source: Journalist and writer], url, p. 50
258
Denmark, DIS, Syria – Military recruitment in Hasakah Governorate, 1 July 2022 [source: Fabrice Balanche, Local
residents, Representation of AANES in KRI], url, pp. 44, 58, 65259
Denmark, DIS, Syria – Military recruitment in Hasakah Governorate, 1 July 2022 [source: Wladimir van
Wilgenburg, Syrian Kurdish Journalist], url, pp. 60, 72
260
Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of origin information report Syria, 14 June 2021, url, p. 39
261
SANA, ‫[ الرئيس األسد يصدر أمراً إداري اً بإنهاء االحتفاظ واالستدعاء للضباط االحتياطيين وصف الضباط واألفراد‬President Al-Assad issues anadministrative order to end the retention and summons of reserve officers, non-commissioned officers and officers],
10 May 2021, url; SANA, ‫[ الرئيس األسد يصدر أمراً إداري اً بإنهاء االحتفاظ واالستدعاء لضباط احتياطيين وصف ضباط وأفراد احتياطيين‬President
Al-Assad issues an administrative order to end the retention and summons of reserve officers, non-commissioned
officers and reserve personnel], 12 October 2021, url
262
Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of origin information report Syria, 14 June 2021, url, p. 39

40

SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORT

other civilians were called up for reserve military duty’, according to a confidential source
interviewed by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs in March 2021. 263
26F

According to a confidential source interviewed in March 2022 by the Netherlands Ministry ofForeign Affairs, persons with special military expertise might serve for longer than the twoyears prescribed by the military service law, while those with professions that are in great
demand in society, such as doctors, were more likely to be demobilised after completing theofficial duration of the military service. 264
263F

In October 2021, a new demobilization order was issued concerning the following categories:
officers who had served as reservists for at least two years on 31 December 2021, doctors
specialized in the management of medical services who had served as reservists for at le ast
two years on 31 December 2021, and non-commissioned officers and reservists who had
served at least 6.5 years on 31 December 2021. 265 Confidential sources interviewed by the
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that the exact number of persons to whom thisdemobilization order applied is unknown and that doctors concerned by this order needed
additional permission from their unit in order to leave the army. 266
264F

265F

No further information on demobilisation efforts could be found among the sources consulted
within time constraints.

2.4 Deployment strategies
According to Kheder Khaddour 267, interviewed in December 2021 by the Austrian BFA
Staatendokumentation, persons who did not pay the exemption fee and are wanted formilitary service would first be detained for one to three weeks and then sent to the army. A
specialised military officer decides who is drafted into the army as a soldier. Whether a draft
evader is sent directly to the front ‘depends on the military situation at the moment on the
ground’. Draft evaders would not be treated differently from regularly recruited soldiers in thearmy. Persons with a university degree will more likely have to work in an office, whilesomeone without a degree is more likely to be deployed to the front. A person’s specialisation‘is more important than whether you were conscripted normally or not’. 268
26F

267F

In a December 2021 interview with the Austrian BFA Staatendokumentation, Fabrice
Balanche 269 explained that returnees who did not pay their exemption fee have to do their
268F

263

Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of origin information report Syria, 14 June 2021, url,
pp. 38-39
264
Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Algemeen ambtsbericht Syrië [Country report Syria], May 2022,
url, p. 53
265
Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Algemeen ambtsbericht Syrië [Country report Syria], May 2022,
url, p. 55
266
Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Algemeen ambtsbericht Syrië [Country report Syria], May 2022,
url, p. 55
267
Kheder Khaddour is a non-resident scholar at the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut.
268
Austria, BFA Staatendokumentation, Anfragebeantwortung der Staatendokumentation zu Syrien: Wehrdienst[query response on Syria: military service] [source: Kheder Khaddour], 27 January 2022, url, pp. 17-19
269
Fabrice Balanche is an associate professor and research director at the University of Lyon 2 and adjunct fellow
at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

41

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

military service and may be sent directly to the front lines. He does not know of draft evaders
returning to GoS-controlled areas, but describes an example from Dar’a. As the GoS regained
control over the area the inhabitants were given 18 months ‘to get conscripted or go touniversity etc and after that they were integrated by force into the army and sent to the frontline to die’. 270
269F

According to Uğur Üngör, arrested draft evaders are immediately sent to the army and mostoften ‘to an active war zone where the violence is the most threatening’. However, Üngör also
notes that draft evaders returning after some years abroad might be punished withimprisonment. According to the source, ‘it's likely that you will be first imprisoned for a period
and then when you are released, you're immediately released with an order to report to thenearest army point to be recruited and sent to battle’. The GoS ‘can afford actually taking
people into prison instead of arresting them and directly send them to the front, which is what
would have happened in 2016 or 2017’. 271
270F

A case study on a family who returned from Lebanon in 2019 described in the September
2021 EIP report noted that one son of military age was detained at a checkpoint near theDamascus suburbs soon after returning. He was ‘transferred to Sednaya Military Pr ison, where
he was badly tortured, before being forcibly conscripted into the Syrian army and deployed tofrontlines in north-western Syria’. 272
271F

2.5 Implementation practice regarding amnesties
Since March 2011 the GoS has issued 18 amnesty decrees. 273 These general decrees either‘retroactively nullified previously established legal liability only for a varying selection ofcrimes, or specifically for army desertion or evasion of military service’. 274 Most decrees are
partial and selective in nature and several exemptions ‘end up excluding the release ofdetainees who were arrested for their role in the uprising or for their political position’. Their
implementation often takes place ‘with a considerable level of corruption and extortion’. 275
Also, the amnesties targeting military service ‘still required beneficiaries to complete theirservice after turning themselves in’. 276
27F

273F

274F

275F

Decree 13/2021 was issued before the presidential elections in May 2021 and granted ageneral amnesty for crimes committed before 2 May 2021. 277 The decree included ‘army
deserters who turn themselves in within three months if they are in the country, or within six
276F

270

Austria, BFA Staatendokumentation, Anfragebeantwortung der Staatendokumentation zu Syrien: Wehrdienst[query response on Syria: military service] [source: Fabrice Balanche], 27 January 2022, url, p. 13
271
Austria, BFA Staatendokumentation, Anfragebeantwortung der Staatendokumentation zu Syrien: Wehrdienst[query response on Syria: military service] [source: Uğur Ümit Üngör], 27 January 2022, url, pp. 15-16
272
EIP, Refugee Return to Syria, September 2021, private document held on file, p. 28
273
SACD, Normalisation of Horror - Security and Living Conditions in Assad-held Syria, 9 August 2021, url, p. 27
274
Both, Pieter, Manipulating National Trauma: The Assad Regime’s Wartime Instrumentalisation of Presidential
Amnesties, EUI, October 2021, url, p. 2
275
SACD, Normalisation of Horror - Security and Living Conditions in Assad-held Syria, 9 August 2021, url, p. 27
276
Both, Pieter, Manipulating National Trauma: The Assad Regime’s Wartime Instrumentalisation of Presidential
Amnesties, EUI, October 2021, url, p. 6
277
SANA, President al-Assad grants general amnesty for crimes committed before May 2nd, 2 May 2021, url

42

SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORT

months if they are abroad’. 278 The obligation to serve in the military remained unaffected. 279
According to Mustafa al-Qasem, a former judge who defected from the GoS, the effectivenessof the decree is limited, as the GoS leaves the possibility to apply the decree selectively. 280
Official data indicating how many people benefited from the May 2021 amnesty are missing.
According to the Syrian Association for Citizens’ Dignity (SACD), an association formed by agroup of displaced people from Syria, amnesty decrees are used by the GoS to ‘relieveinternational pressure and mislead both Syrians and international actors’. 281
27F

278F

279F

280F

The latest legislative decree regarding desertion, Decree 3/2022 282, was announced by the
GoS in January 2022. Persons who present themselves to officials within three months, if they
are inside the country or four months if they are abroad, are granted an amnesty for the full
penalty stipulated in Articles 100 and 101 of the Military Penal Code. 283 According to thesearticles, desertion is punishable by one to five years imprisonment in peacetime. In times ofwar, it can result in a prison sentence up to twice as long. Those who have left the country
following desertion in wartime can face a penalty of up to 15 years imprisonment. 284 The
amnesty however did not waive the requirement to serve in the military. 285
281F

28F

283F

284F

In January 2022, the chairman of the National Security Committee in the People’s Assembly,
Fayez al-Ahmad, advised ‘the fugitives to return and settle their situation quickly’. Lawyer
Abdel Nasser al-Hoshan, however, notes that desertion is not limited to the crime of internaland external escape. Articles 102 and 103 of the Military Penal Code stipulate penalties forfleeing by conspiracy, fleeing the enemy and fleeing in wartime. 286
285F

SACD noted that ‘the Syrian regime has repeatedly proven how unreliable it is by constantly
breaching its promises and agreements.’ 287 After regaining control over Dar'a and Quneitra
governorates in southern Syria in July 2018 a reconciliation agreement settled the status ofcompulsory military service evaders and people wanted by the GoS security apparatus.
However, ‘despite the settlements, regime forces have arrested hundreds of Daraa andQuneitra residents.’ 288
286F

287F

After the GoS completed the settlement procedures in the western and northern Dar'acountryside in October 2021, it launched similar procedures in Dar'a’s eastern countryside.

278

MEE, Syria: Amnesty announced ahead of presidential elections, 2 May 2021, url
Austria, BFA Staatendokumentation, Syria Country Report from the COI -CMS, Version 7, [source: Austrian
Embassy in Damascus] 24 January 2022, available with subscription, url, p. 60
280
Syria Direct, Bashar al-Assad issues general amnesty excluding prisoners of conscience: Who benefits and why
now?, 10 May 2021, url
281
SACD, Normalisation of Horror - Security and Living Conditions in Assad-held Syria, 9 August 2021, url, p. 27
282
See SANA, ‫ تاريخ قبل المرتكبة والخارجي الداخلي الفرار جرائم عن عاما عفوا يمنح األسد الرئيس‬25-1-2022 [President al-Assad grants ageneral amnesty for crimes of internal and external flight committed before 25 -1-2022], 25 January 2022, url
283
Enab Baladi, General amnesty: Syrian regime’s trap to capture military defectors, 18 January 2022, url; COAR, IS
Prison Raid, Biggest Attack since ’19, Displaces 45,000, 31 January 2 022, url
284
EUAA, Country of Origin Information Report, Syria: Military Service, April 2021, url, p. 35
285
COAR, IS Prison Raid, Biggest Attack since ’19, Displaces 45,000, 31 January 2022, url
286
Syrian Observer (The), Mixed Reactions Following Desertion Amnesty, 27 January 2022, url; Syria, Law No. 61 of1950, as amended (Military Penal Code) [unofficial translation], 16 February 2017, url
287
SACD, Syrian regime’s amnesties are public relations stunts with dangerous consequences for displaced
Syrians, 28 January 2022, url
288
Enab Baladi, Syrian regime closes in on opposition pockets in Quneitra and Daraa despite settlements, 26 May
2021, url
279

43

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

However, locals in Dar'a governorate ‘do not trust the settlements’. Under the agreements
army defectors were given three months to join their military units while draft evaders had six
months to report to conscription. 289 However, according to a January 2022 report by Abdullah
Al-Jabassini, the General Recruitment Directorate (GRD) in April 2021 ‘issued a decision which
granted evaders from compulsory and reservist military services [from Dar'a] a one-year
deferment’. In June 2021 the GRD instructed the granting of travel permits to these males. The
decisions ‘allowed hundreds of young adult males to leave Syria legally during the second halfof 2021’. 290
28F

289F

In January 2022, a new reconciliation drive in western Ghouta for military-age men wasannounced by the Syrian Military Security granting draft evaders a period of three months tojoin military units. 291
290F

2.6 Implementation practice regarding exemptions
The law stipulates certain categories eligible for exemption, such as being the only male childin a family, being unfit due to health reasons and having paid an exemption fee. 292 According
to a Syrian academic interviewed by the EUAA, males who had clearly visible medical
conditions and were unfit to perform military service still got exemptions. However, themedical committee that examines individuals was quite strict in its judgements. In some cases,
males who had a certain medical condition could still be conscripted into the army to perform
non-field military activities. 293 Confidential sources interviewed by the Netherlands Ministry ofForeign Affairs in January and February 2022 noted that it often happens that medical
exemptions are ignored, and the person still has to undergo military service. Another source
interviewed in November 2021 by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs mentioned
however a case in which a person was exempted from military service on grounds ofpersistent obesity. 294
291F

29F

293F

A family’s only son receives a temporary exemption that he would have to renew until hewould - dependant on certain conditions - receive a permanent exemption. Until a family’s
only son receives a permanent exemption from military service, he has to renew his temporary
military deferment, which is granted for one or more years. 295 In October 2021, the Austrian
Embassy in Damascus mentioned ‘increasing reports of the conscription of men who are theonly sons in a family’. 296
294F

295F

289

Enab Baladi, Daraa returns to Syrian regime’s control by forced settlement agreements, 17 October 2021, url
Al-Jabassini, A., Migration from Post-War Southern Syria: Drivers, Routes, and Destinations, Wartime and PostConflict in Syria, EUI, 6 January 2022, url, p. 10
291
COAR, IS Prison Raid, Biggest Attack since ’19, Displaces 45,000, 31 January 2022, url; Voice of Damascus,‫” بإشراف “األمن العسكري‬.. ‫[ في زاكية بريف دمشق ” تسوية أمنية “جماعية‬Under the supervision of the “Military Security” .. a“collective” security settlement in Zakiya in Damascus countryside], 25 January 2022, url
292
Syria, Ministry of Defence, ‫[ الحاالت العامة لإلعفاء‬general reasons for exemption], n.d., url
293
Syrian academic, email correspondence, 25 April 2022
294
Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Algemeen ambtsbericht Syrië [Country report Syria], May 2022,
url, p. 54
295
Syrian academic, email correspondence, 25 April 2022
296
Austria, BFA Staatendokumentation, Syria Country Report from the COI -CMS, Version 7, [source: Austrian
Embassy in Damascus] 24 January 2022, available with subscription, url, p. 60
290

44

SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORTIn October 2021 the Austrian Embassy in Damascus reported that ‘exemptions for students inparticular have become increasingly difficult to claim, and students have been drafted on acase-by-case basis.’ 297 However, a Syrian academic interviewed by the EUAA stated thatstudents were not recruited as long as they had a valid one-year military deferment and thesedeferments could not be arbitrarily annulled. 298
296F

297F

Fabrice Balanche notes that many conscripts that reside abroad use the option to pay to get
exempted from military service. Rules regarding this option change regularly and besides theofficial fee, bribes have to be paid. In practice the process to get an exemption takes a longtime. 299
298F

Whether the exemption from military service is respected after payment of the fee, or whether
the person is nevertheless conscripted, depends on the individual profile, according to UğurÜngör. Also, arbitrariness and unpredictability are a factor. 300 Balanche, however, stated thatafter payment of the exemption fee, no conscription would happen. 301 A Syrian human rights
organisation that requested anonymity interviewed by DIS in April 2022 noted that ‘there havebeen no reports that those who have paid the exemption fee of USD 8 000 have faced issues
upon return.’ 302 Sources interviewed by the Swedish Migration Agency in April 2022 statedthat persons who paid the exemption fee and have confirmation of the exemption on theirmilitary booklet would not be conscripted. 303
29F

30F

301F

302F

According to Kheder Khaddour, to get the exemption people usually send the amount ofmoney to their family in Syria, who takes care of the process from inside the country.
Conscripts then receive a document and show this at the immigration office. Then the name ofthe person disappears from the list for military service and the person can enter Syria. This
procedure, however, is mainly used by Syrians in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Egypt and the Gulf
States. Conscripts living in Europe, where the ‘corruption networks’ are not accessible,
therefore need people inside Syria. 304 However, according to information published by the
Syrian embassy in Berlin the procedure can be launched entirely through the Syrian
embassies operating in several EU countries. The fee itself can be paid either to the embassyin EUR or by a relative in Syria in USD. 305
30F

304F

Sources interviewed by DIS in August and October 2020 noted that ‘when the exemption fee
has been paid, the person will receive a stamp in his military service book indicating his

297

Austria, BFA Staatendokumentation, Syria Country Report from the COI -CMS, Version 7, [source: Austrian
Embassy in Damascus] 24 January 2022, available with subscription, url, p. 60
298
Syrian academic, email correspondence, 25 April 2022
299
Austria, BFA Staatendokumentation, Anfragebeantwortung der Staatendokumentation zu Syrien: Wehrdienst[query response on Syria: military service] [source: Fabrice Balanche], 27 January 2022, url, pp. 2-3
300
Austria, BFA Staatendokumentation, Anfragebeantwortung der Staatendokumentation zu Syrien: Wehrdienst[query response on Syria: military service] [source: Uğur Ümit Üngör], 27 January 2022, url, pp. 3-5
301
Austria, BFA Staatendokumentation, Anfragebeantwortung der Staatendokumentation zu Syrien: Wehrdienst[query response on Syria: military service] [source: Fabrice Balanche], 27 January 2022, url, p. 13
302
Denmark, DIS, Syria: Treatment upon return [source: Syrian human rights organisation], May 2022, url, p. 23
303
Sweden, Migrationsverket, Syrisk militärtjänst (version 2.0) [Syria Military service] [source: former officer in the
Syrian army; Syrian lawyer active in Damascus], 22 April 2022, url, p. 8304
Austria, BFA Staatendokumentation, Anfragebeantwortung der Staatendokumentation zu Syrien: Wehrdienst[query response on Syria: military service] [source: Kheder Khaddour], 27 January 2022, url, pp. 5-6
305
Syrian Embassy in Berlin, n.d., url

45EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

exemption from military service’. The person will also be handed a confirmation of thepayment, which will have to be presented at ‘the Recruitment Division in Syria upon return’. 306
305F

2.7 Treatment of draft evaders, deserters and defectors
According to Kheder Khaddour, not performing military service is seen as disloyalty or evenpolitical dissent towards the GoS. 307 Khaddour, however, also noted that draft evaders aretargeted on an individual basis rather than in systematic action. 308 Uğur Üngör adds that draft
evaders are regarded ‘very negatively’ by the authorities. They are seen as cowards andtraitors. In a war situation, military field tribunals with summary execution are possible, as draft
evasion is regarded as betrayal of the nation. 309 Balanche noted that the GoS does notnecessarily regard persons evading military service as opposed to the government in general.
He described an example from Latakia: the son of a family went to Lebanon after his university
degree, ‘but there is no retaliation on the family’. The GoS knows that ‘many people escaped
just because they don't want to die’ and not because they are opposed to the government. 310
Balanche explained that he has no example of draft evaders who did not do their military
service and then returned to the government area. 311
306F

307F

308F

309F

310F

According to a Syrian human rights organisation that requested anonymity interviewed by DIS
in April 2022, draft evaders and military deserters who have not been involved in any
opposition activities are detained for a short period (a few days or weeks) and then sent tomilitary service. The same source noted that family members of draft evaders and deserters
do not face any repercussions from authorities. 312
31F

According to AI, ‘military conscription has been a motive of arrest’ for returnees. Fourinterviewed returnees told the organisation that ‘after intelligence forces released them,authorities ordered them to do their military service’ and two of them were forced to join thearmy after they were released. 313
312F

According to SACD, every person returning to Syria ‘is a potential detainee’. However, ‘there
is a particularly great fear for the lives of army defectors who might consider returning.’ 314
31F

306

Denmark, DIS, Syria: Issues regarding return, October 2021, url
Austria, BFA Staatendokumentation, Anfragebeantwortung der Staatendokumentation zu Syrien: Wehrdienst[query response on Syria: military service] [source: Kheder Khaddour], 27 January 2022, url, pp. 9-10308
Austria, BFA Staatendokumentation, Anfragebeantwortung der Staatendokumentation zu Syri en: Wehrdienst[query response on Syria: military service] [source: Kheder Khaddour], 27 January 2022, url, p. 11309
Austria, BFA Staatendokumentation, Anfragebeantwortung der Staatendokumentation zu Syrien: Wehrdienst[query response on Syria: military service] [source: Uğur Ümit Üngör], 27 January 2022, url, p. 9310
Austria, BFA Staatendokumentation, Anfragebeantwortung der Staatendokumentation zu Syrien: Wehrdienst[query response on Syria: military service] [source: Fabrice Balanche], 27 January 2022, url, p. 8311
Austria, BFA Staatendokumentation, Anfragebeantwortung der Staatendokumentation zu Syrien: Wehrdienst[query response on Syria: military service] [source: Fabrice Balanche], 27 January 2022, url, p. 13
312
Denmark, DIS, Syria: Treatment upon return [source: Syrian human rights organisation], May 2022, url, p. 23
313
AI, “You’re going to your death”, Violations against Syrian refugees returning to Syria, 7 September 2021, url,
p. 36
314
SACD, Syrian regime’s amnesties are public relations stunts with dangerous consequences for displaced
Syrians, 28 January 2022, url
307

46

SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORT

After seeking refuge in Lebanon, the husband of a 25-year-old woman from Sayida Zeinab inDamascus was arrested in early 2018 for deserting the army in 2015. After being detained fornine months the man took part in the reconciliation process and agreed to re-enter the army.
The wife described to HRW that her husband was beaten in prison and tortured while serving
the army, ‘all because he deserted the Army previously’. 315
314F

According to Üngör ‘imprisonment equals torture’ and detained draft evaders most likely‘undergo all of the forms of torture that the regime is infamous for’. Everybody in prison is
tortured and the treatment of a soldier could even be worse. Also, a conviction under the antiterror law for a draft evader ‘is possible, but draft evasion in itself is a bad enough crime in
Syria’. 316
315F

According to a study by Refugee Protection Watch (RPW)317 on refugee returnees withresearch rounds conducted in March and August 2021 318, ‘an overwhelming majority of
respondents (70 %) were concerned that either they themselves and/or friends or relatives will
be forcibly conscripted into the Syrian Arab Army’. 43 % of the interviewed returnees knew a
person at risk of being re-enlisted or were themselves at risk, although they already had
served in the army. Some respondents had their names checked ‘to ensure that they were notwanted for the military or for any other security reasons’. According to RPW, however, ‘simply
checking their name for a record does not provide a full guarantee of safety, especially for
military aged men.’319
A male respondent from Douma city explained to RPW that one of his relatives was called‘from the military detachment for a follow-up, he went but never returned’. Another male
respondent from Rural Damascus, said that he was informed at the border that he was called
for reserve service in the military and was given three months to enrol, although he hadalready completed his mandatory service.320
In July 2021 Military Police and Military Security Service operated patrols in a recruitment drive
across Aleppo city. A member of the Military Security Service said that persons who wereordered to join the army and who had not shown up at their draft centres would face punitive
measures. According to him, ‘they will have to serve longer than standard military service
terms’ and ‘some of these young men might be sentenced to two years in prison if they refuse
to perform mandatory military service’. According to a staffer from a draft centre in the Hanano

315

HRW, “Our Lives Are Like Death”: Syrian Refugee Returns from Lebanon and Jordan, 20 October 2021, url,
pp. 34-35
316
Austria, BFA Staatendokumentation, Anfragebeantwortung der Staatendokumentation zu Syrien: Wehrdienst[query response on Syria: military service] [source: Uğur Ümit Üngör], 27 January 2022, url, pp. 16-17
317
Refugee Protection Watch (RPW) is a coalition formed in 2019 by the Lebanese, Syrian and European
organisations ALEF – Act for Human Rights, Basmeh and Zeitooneh, PAX, Upinion and 11.11.11. ‘Since 2019, RPW has
conducted research and advocacy on protection issues facing Syrian refugees in Lebanon, as well as on theconditions for safe, voluntary, informed and dignified return to Syria’ . (see: RPW, About, n.d., url)
318
RPW, “I Haven’t Known the Taste of Safety for Ten Years” - Syrians Trying to Survive in Lebanon and Syria, 17
November 2021, url, pp. 12-13
319
RPW, “I Haven’t Known the Taste of Safety for Ten Years” - Syrians Trying to Survive in Lebanon and Syria, 17
November 2021, url, p. 32
320
RPW, “I Haven’t Known the Taste of Safety for Ten Years” - Syrians Trying to Survive in Lebanon and Syria, 17
November 2021, url, p. 32

47

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Barracks in Mount Simeon the measures include a fine between SYP 43 000 and SYP 187 000[about EUR 15 and EUR 66], and additional time in prison.321
In April 2021 measures regarding persons who want to transfer their real estate ownership in
Aleppo governorate were reported. The granting of security permits needed for thesetransactions ‘became subject to close scrutiny’. Certain applicants, including evaders ofcompulsory military service and reserve service, are denied these permits.322 In September
2021, SOHR reported on the arrest carried out by the Military Police against draft evaders inareas of Deir Ez-Zor governorate under GoS control.323
Regarding the role of background of draft evaders, Uğur Üngör says that ‘sanctions are prettymuch similar for all draft evaders’. Even draft evaders from privileged Alawite families from
Latakia and with contacts to the regime cannot return to Syria, unless someone in theintelligence apparatus removes their name from the wanted list, otherwise they are at risk ofbeing detained and drafted into the army.324

321

Enab Baladi, Syrian regime haunts draft evaders in Aleppo, 28 July 2021, url
Enab Baladi, No security permits: Aleppo residents hit by regime’s new arbitrary real estate measures, 17 April
2021, url
323
SOHR, Rising arrests | Regime security service arrest 40 persons of regime-backed factions and those fled
conscription in Deir Ezzor, 17 September 2021, url
324
Austria, BFA Staatendokumentation, Anfragebeantwortung der Staatendokumentation zu Syrien: Wehrdienst[query response on Syria: military service] [source: Uğur Ümit Üngör], 27 Ja nuary 2022, url, p. 20
322

48

SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORT

3. Persons with (perceived) links to theIslamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)
The following information relates only to the area under control of the Kurdish-led
Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES). No information on persons withperceived links to ISIL in other regions of the country could be found.

3.1 Raids against ISIL and arrests
During the reference period, the SDF carried out raids in areas under its control east of theEuphrates in order to root out suspected ISIL members, some of which were supported by air
strikes carried out by the Global Coalition.325 Local media reported on anti-ISIL raids taking
place in the governorates Deir Ez-Zor326, Raqqa327 and Hasaka.328 While in June 2021 the SDF
was described as having ‘tightened the grip’ in Raqqa and movement of ISIL cells being
limited there329, an SDF military leader in Deir Ez-Zor stated in October 2021 that anti-terror
units were doing at least one operation every day targeting ISIL members in nearby towns.330
Deir Ez-Zor was described as the region under the Kurdish-led AANES with an Arab-majority
where most ISIL attacks took place in 2021 and where many ISIL-affiliates were said to still
live.331
During SDF raids carried out during the reference period, villagers were arrested on suspicion
of being ISIL members 332 or having links with ISIL cells.333 When undertaking raids and325

SHRC, The 20th Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syria, 9 January 2022, url, p. 50; Rudaw, USKurdish raid kills five “dangerous” ISIS fighters in eastern Syria: statement, 13 December 2021, url; NPA, SDF and
Global Coalition arrest four ISIS members in Syria’s Deir ez-Zor, 8 May 2021, url; USDOD, Operation Inherent
Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, October 1, 2021‒December 31, 2021, 8 February2022, url, pp. 72-73
326
NPA, SDF kills ISIS leader and arrests another in Syria’s Deir ez-Zor, 16 February 2022, url; Diyaruna, SDF,
international coalition take out ISIS cell in eastern Syria raid, 14 December 2021, url; Enab Baladi, ..”‫التحالف و”قسد‬‫[ مداهمة واعتقال ألشخاص في دير الزور‬Global Coalition and SDF carry out raid and arrest people in Deir Ez-Zor], 7 December
2021, url; Baladi News, ‫[ قسد تنفذ حملة اعتقاالت في دير الزور ومخيم الهول بالحسكة‬SDF carries out campaign of arrest in Deir EzZor and Al-Hol Camp in Hasaka], 17 August 2021, url; NPA, SDF and Global Coalition arrest four ISIS members in
Syria’s Deir ez-Zor, 8 May 2021, url
327
Baladi News, ‫[ قسد تشن حملة مداهمات في الرقة‬SDF carries out raids in Raqqa], 5 February 2022, url
328
Al-Hurra, ‫ هل تستطيع قسد حماية الحسكة؟‬..‫[ حظر تجوال بالليل ومداهمات بالنهار‬Nightly curfews and raids during the day – can the
SDF protect Hasaka?], 6 February 2022, url; Xeber24, ‫[ قسد واألسايش تنفذ حملة مداهمة ألوكار داعش بريف الحسكة‬SDF andAsayish carry out raid in ISIL hideouts in rural Hasaka], 22 January 2022, url; Zaman Al-Wasl, ‫ اعتقال رجل إثر‬..‫الحسكة‬‫[ مداهمة لـ"قسد" في "مركدة‬Hasaka: Man arrested during SDF-raid in Markada], 3 October 2021, url; Baladi News, ‫قسد تنفذ‬‫[ حملة اعتقاالت في دير الزور ومخيم الهول بالحسكة‬SDF carries out campaign of arrest in Deir Ez-Zor and Al-Hol Camp in
Hasaka], 17 August 2021, url
329
Al-Monitor, Kurdish-led forces intensify crackdown on Islamic State cells in northeast Syria, 30 June 2021, url
330
Guardian (The), ‘A lull not a loss’: Islamic State is rebuilding in Syria, say Kurdish forces, 14 October 2021, url
331
RIC, Annual Sleeper Cell Report (2021) For North And East Syria, February 2022, url, p. 2
332
Euphrates Appeal Media Network, ‫قسد تنتقم من المكون العربي باعتقال العشرات من األهالي في الحسكة‬. [SDF takes revenge on
Arabs by arresting dozens of people in Hasaka], 1 February 2022, url;
333
Baladi News, ‫[ قسد تشن حملة مداهمات في الرقة‬SDF carries out raids in Raqqa], 5 February 2022, url; SNHR, The Tenth
Annual Report on Enforced Disappearance in Syria on the International Day of the Victims of Enforced

49

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

subsequent arrests, the SDF reportedly provided no arrest warrant and took detainees tounknown locations.334 SNHR also documented cases of kidnapping by SDF forces on accountof suspected ISIL ties or affiliations.335 Some of these detainees were later released, others
remained disappeared.336 Arrests made by the SDF also targeted citizens with no ties to ISIL337
and SDF subsequently released these persons after civil and tribal mediation. 338 According to
SNHR, women were also targeted by the SDF with detention, among other reasons for being
relatives of suspected ISIL-members, with the aim of pressuring family members to turnthemselves in.339
The UNCOI reported that SDF members arrested male civilians, including media workers andactivists, during raids conducted ‘in the context of large-scale anti-terrorism operations
initiated in summer 2020’. For example, one man recounted that following a critical social
media post, he was arrested along with six neighbours and held in detention for about amonth, accused of having links to ISIL. During a similar raid in August 2020, another man wasarrested for purportedly being connected to ISIL sleeper cells. After being interrogated by US
military personnel at the coalition base in Deir Ez-Zor, he was taken to Kasra prison where he
was held incommunicado for at least 20 days and tortured by Asayish members durin ginterrogations. In both cases, the detainees were neither presented to a court nor given
access to a legal counsel.340 SDF members also accused medical staff of ‘terrorism’ as theystormed a hospital in Deir Ez-Zor in the aftermath of a March 2021 attack that was attributed to
ISIL. At least 12 civilians in the hospital, including 8 medical personnel, were detained andsubjected to beatings before they were released the same day. 341
Furthermore, sources reported on the security of civilians being affected by anti-ISIL raids. In
November 2021 residents of Sobha village in eastern Deir Ez-Zor turned out in protests after
two residents had been arrested by the SDF and a person from the same family wasreportedly killed in an anti-ISIL operation.342 According to SOHR, another operation targetingsuspected ISIL hideouts in Deir Ez-Zor carried out in December 2021 lead to four civilians

Disappearances; Long Years of Constant Grief and Loss, 30 August 2021, url, p. 27; SOHR, SDF-held areas inFebruary 2022 | 40 deaths in acts of violence…ongoing military escalation by Turkish forces…ongoing protests overworsening living conditions, 6 March 2022, url
334
SHRC, The 20th Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syria, 9 January 2022, url, p. 50
335
SNHR, The Tenth Annual Report on Enforced Disappearance in Syria on the International Day of the Victims of
Enforced Disappearances; Long Years of Constant Grief and Loss, 30 August 2021, url, p. 27
336
SHRC, The 20th Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syria, 9 January 2022, url, p. 50
337
Enab Baladi, ‫ مداهمة واعتقال ألشخاص في دير الزور‬..”‫[ التحالف و”قسد‬Global Coalition and SDF carry out raid and arrest
people in Deir Ez-Zor], 7 December 2021, url; International Crisis Group, Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central andNorth-eastern Syria, 18 July 2022, url, p. 15
338
Enab Baladi, ‫ مداهمة واعتقال ألشخاص في دير الزور‬..”‫[ التحالف و”قسد‬Global Coalition and SDF carry out raid and arrest
people in Deir Ez-Zor], 7 December 2021, url ; SNHR, The Tenth Annual Report on Enforced Disappearance in Syria
on the International Day of the Victims of Enforced Disappearances; Long Years of Constant Grief and Loss, 30
August 2021, url, p. 27
339
SNHR, International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women: Tenth Annual Report on Violations
against Females in Syria Mostly at the Hands of the Syrian Regime; At Least 29,661 Children Have Been Killed in
Syria Since March 2011 Including 181 Due to Torture, with 5,036 Forcibly Disappeared, 25 November 2021, url, p. 25
340
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/48/70, 13 August 2021, url, para. 102, 103341
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/48/70, 13 August 2021, url, para. 104
342
Enab Baladi, ‫ مداهمة واعتقال ألشخاص في دير الزور‬..”‫[ التحالف و”قسد‬Global Coalition and SDF carry out raid and arrest
people in Deir Ez-Zor], 7 December 2021, url

50

SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORT

being killed in the crossfire.343 On 20 January 2022, ISIL fighters launched an attack on AlSina’a prison in Hasaka city in which ISIL suspects are being held. 344 A few days later, the SDF
announced its recapture of the prison and the surrender of the remaining ISIL fighters in theprison, but clashes continued around the area of the prison until 30 January.345 These clashes
between ISIL fighters and SDF caused an unspecified number of civilian casualties as well as
the temporary displacement of up to 45 000 residents from the southern part of the city. 346 In
the wake of the prison attack, a local media source reported dozens of arbitrary arrests
targeting local Arab residents, accusing them of being ISIL members. It also alleged thatduring the clashes, fleeing residents were prevented from entering predominantly Kurdish
neighbourhoods because ISIL elements were suspected among them.347 At the beginning of
February 2022, the majority of those displaced had reportedly returned to their homes, while
about 100 people remained displaced in a collective shelter. 348

3.2 Situation of persons with (perceived) links to ISIL in
detention
During the battles between Kurdish-led forces and ISIL in the north of Syria from 2017 to 2019,
persons with perceived links to ISIL were taken to detention facilities run by the SDF. Many of
the Syrian detainees were subsequently sentenced by courts of the Kurdish-led AANES.349 In
mid-2020, the AANES declared to have brought 8 650 cases to trial and having convicted
1 881 Syrian nationals for association with ISIL, with a further 1 600 detainees awaiting judicial
process.350 The wives and children of ISIL suspects, many of whom are foreign nationals, weretaken to displacement camps such as Al-Hol and Al-Roj which were characterised by appalling
living conditions and limited medical care and food.351 In 2021, tens of thousands of persons
suspected of ties to ISIL were still being held in Al-Hol without any access to due process,among them women and children.352
HRW stated to have received a number of allegations since 2019 that SDF had abused ISIL
suspects in detention but was not able to verify the reports.353 SNHR stated that detainees
held by the SDF under pretexts such as having links to ISIL were held without trial and343

Al Jazeera, US-backed SDF forces carry out deadly operation in eastern Syria, 13 December 2021, url
HRW, Northeast Syria: Fate of Hundreds of Boys Trapped in Siege Unknown, 4 February 2022, url; Al-Ahmed, S.
and Hassan, M., A closer look at the ISIS attack on Syria’s al -Sina Prison, MEI, 14 February 2022, url
345
USAID, Syria - Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #3, Fiscal Year (FY) 2022, 4 February 2022, url, p. 2
346
UNOCHA, Syria: Qamishli Flash Update - Flash Update 1: Displacement from Al-Hasakeh (as of 23 January2022), 23 January 2022, url, p. 1
347
Euphrates Appeal Media Network, ‫قسد تنتقم من المكون العربي باعتقال العشرات من األهالي في الحسكة‬. [SDF takes revenge on
Arabs by arresting dozens of people in Hasaka], 1 February 2022 , url
348
USAID, Syria - Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #4, Fiscal Year (FY) 2022, 4 March 2022, url, p. 2
349
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic A/HRC/46/55, 11 March 2021, url, para. 54
350
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic [A/HRC/45/31], 14 August 2020, url, para. 77
351
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic A/HRC/46/55, 11 March 2021, url, para. 55
352
AI, Amnesty International Report 2021/22 – Syria, 29 March 2022, url, p. 355
353
HRW, Northeast Syria: Fate of Hundreds of Boys Trapped in Siege Unknown, 4 February 2022, url
344

51

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

prevented from communicating with legal representatives or their families. 354 There werereportedly also cases of children being detained on suspicion of having ties with ISIL. 355
The conditions in prisons for ISIL suspects were described as ‘dire’ 356, with ‘severely
overcrowded cells with open latrines and poor ventilation’ and lacking adequate medicalcare.357 Women’s detention centres were reportedly found to be similarly overcrowded andlacking ventilation and hygiene. Female inmates were subjected to abusive treatment. 358
Throughout 2020 and 2021, the Kurdish-led AANES decided to release groups of Syrian ISILsuspects interned at Al-Hol camp in Hasaka governorate.359 According to USDOS, mostresidents of Al-Hol camp had no connection to ISIL, but there were some women and children
with family ties to ISIL fighters.360 Releases were often granted following guarantees from Arabtribes.361 The aim of these guarantees was to enable the released families to return to theirhome communities. However, many of those released from Al-Hol remained ostracised fromtheir communities because of their perceived links to ISIL and there were no efforts toreintegrate these persons back into society. 362 An additional mechanism introduced in January
2021 allowed Al-Hol IDPs and detainees to apply for a release pending a vetting process
undertaken by Asayish (Kurdish Internal Security Forces)363 forces. Upon approval, applicants
were reportedly handed over to municipal authorities with no reintegration support, while atthe same time there were reported cases of individuals being prosecuted by Asayish after
their release from Al-Hol.364

354

SNHR, The Tenth Annual Report on Enforced Disappearance in Syria on the International Day of the Victims of
Enforced Disappearances; Long Years of Constant Grief and Loss, 30 August 2021, url, p. 27355
SNHR, On World Children’s Day: Tenth Annual Report on Violations against Children in Syria, 20 November
2021, url, p. 38; OHCHR, Position of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection ofhuman rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism on the human rights of adolescents/juveniles
being detained in North-East Syria. Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, May 2021, url, p. 4
356
OHCHR, Position of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights andfundamental freedoms while countering terrorism on the human rights of adolescents/juveniles being detained in
North-East Syria. Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, May 2021, url, p. 3
357
HRW, Thousands of Foreigners Unlawfully Held in NE Syria, 23 March 2021, url; VOA, IS Attack on Syrian Prison
Exposes Squalid Conditions for Detainees, 25 January 2022, url
358
SNHR, International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women: Tenth Annual Report on Violations
against Females in Syria Mostly at the Hands of the Syrian Regime; At Least 29,661 Children Have Been Killed in
Syria Since March 2011 Including 181 Due to Torture, with 5,036 Forcibly Disappeared, 25 November 2021, url, p. 25
359
Al-Monitor, More women prisoners linked to Islamic State released from al -Hol camp, 31 July 2021, url; VOA,
Kurdish Authorities Release 324 Syrian Nationals From al-Hol Camp, 16 September 2021, url; EUAA, Country of
Origin Information Report, Syria Security situation, July 2021, url, p. 33
360
USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, October 1, 2021 ‒December 31, 2021, 8 February 2022, url, p. 26
361
National (The), Syrian families released from Al Hol struggle for acceptance after ISIS trauma, 12 April 2021, url; Al
Jazeera, Kurdish-led authorities to remove Syrians from al-Hol camp, 5 October 2020, url
362
National (The), Syrian families released from Al Hol struggle for acceptance after ISIS trauma, 12 April 2021, url
363
Kurdistan24, Kurdish Asayish forces besieged Syrian government bakery in Qamishlo: SOHR, 9 April 2022, url
364
COAR, Mapping and Assessing Release and Reintegration Models from NE Syria Camps, 27 February 2022, url

52

SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORT

4. Members of and persons perceived to becollaborating with the Syrian Democratic
Forces/Kurdish People’s Protection Units
According to a Syrian academic interviewed by the EUAA, there were no specific criteria of a
profile (such as place of origin, ethnic origin or family ties) that would make someone more
likely to be perceived as having links to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) or the Kurdish
People’s Protection Units (YPG). Since the YPG-led SDF has Arabs as well as other ethnic
groups in their ranks, being Kurdish or hailing from a predominantly Kurdish region would not
automatically lead to being perceived as collaborating with SDF or YPG. Rather, it would be
locals or informants hiding among the local population who would identify collaborators.365

4.1 Targeting by the Syrian National Army (SNA)The Syrian National Army (SNA) is an entity originally formed in December 2017 by the
oppositional Syrian Interim Government based in Turkey through the unification of rebel
factions fighting in Afrin and northern Aleppo governorate.366 Although the main objective
behind the formation of the SNA had been to unite all the different military factions that fought
during the Turkish military operations in Syria367, each faction retained its own command andformation under a central umbrella.368 The SNA has consequently been characterised byinternal rivalries, mergers and splits.369 SNA components were mainly present in northern
Aleppo governorate, and to a lesser extent in Idlib, Raqqa and Hasaka governorates. 370 Turkey
has supplied the SNA with training, salaries and weapons in exchange for using SNA fightersin its military operations. Laying the ground for collaboration between the Turkish state andthe SNA was among other factors a common enemy, first the GoS but also later the Syrian
Kurds representing the political party PYD and its military wing YPG. 371

365

Syrian academic, email correspondence, 25 April 2022
Syria Direct, The Syrian National Army: For the Syrian revolution or against the Kurds?, 15 October 2019, url
367
The Turkish military operations were ’Euphrates Shield’ in 2016/2017, ‘Olive Branch’ in 2018, and ‘Peace Spring’in 2019. For a map breaking down the three regions resulting from these military operations which are now
controlled by the Turkish-backed SNA, please see map on p. 3 of this report: Al -Hilu, K., The Turkish Intervention in
Northern Syria: One Strategy, Discrepant Policies, EUI, 14 January 2021, url
368
Saban, N., The Past, Present, and Future of the Syrian National Army, Al Sharq Strategic Research, 31 August
2021, url
369
Carter Center (The), The State Of The Syrian National Army - Shifting networks of the Turkish-backed armed
opposition in Syria’s Northwest, March 2022, url, p. 1; Al-Monitor, Turkey aims to keep tensions high in northeast
Syria through targeted killings, 18 January 2022, url
370
Saban, N., The Past, Present, and Future of the Syrian National Army, Al Sharq Strategic Research [Infograph,Map], 31 August 2021, url; Carter Center (The), The State Of The Syrian National Army - Shifting networks of theTurkish-backed armed opposition in Syria’s Northwest, March 2022, url, p. 4
371
Clingendael Institute, Strategies of Turkish proxy warfare in northern Syria, Turkey and the armed Syrian
opposition: From Free Syrian Army to Syrian National Army, November 2019, url
366

53EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

In areas under their control, the SNA reportedly perpetrated torture, sexual violence, looting
and arbitrary detention.372 During the year 2021, SNA members were reportedly responsible
for arbitrary arrests resulting in alleged cases of extrajudicial killings, incommunicado
detention as well as looting and seizure of properties. 373
STJ documented more than 200 arbitrary arrests in November and December 2020, with
about half of the detained being released sometime later. A frequent charge brought against
the arrested women and men was dealing with the Kurdish-led AANES, another charge washaving performed the mandatory self-defence duty when the area was still under Kurdish
control.374 In February 2021, HRW reported arbitrary arrests of more than 60 Syrians (bothArabs and Kurds) carried out by SNA and Turkish forces in north-east Syria in 2019 and thesubsequent transport of detainees to Turkey. According to the families of some of thearrested, the detainees were members of the PYD, but only held administrative positions andnever fought with the YPG. In October 2020 five of the 63 detainees received life sentences
in Turkey. A review by HRW of the Turkish case documents revealed that in most cases the
Turkish authorities provided no evidence that ’the detainees were active fighters with the
Kurdish-led authorities or that they committed crimes’.375
An Afrin-based human rights organisation reported 14 arrests of civilians at the beginning ofApril 2022 on charges of having previously dealt with the AANES. A court affiliated with theTurkish backed Military Police in the area sentenced a local resident to three years in prison
for having ‘intelligence contact and affiliation with the Kurdish Protection Units (YPG) and theAutonomous Administration’. In Jindires district, two men were arrested by a local SNA faction,
one for previously having performed his compulsory military service for the AANES, the otherfor doing guard shifts at the time the region was under Kurdish control. 376
A woman arrested in Afrin in 2018 and released two years later described how she and her
fellow detainees were held in a prison run by the SNA faction Hamza Division, where they
were subjected to various forms of torture and rape. One of the accusations levelled against
her was being associated with the PKK and the GoS377, however, no formal charges were everbrought against her, nor was there an official legal process. 378
In May 2021, a man detained by a SNA faction in Tall Abyad reportedly died under torture. 379
In September 2021, another SNA faction arrested a man during a home raid in Ras Al-Ayn on
charges of having dealings with the SDF. Several days later the faction handed over his deadbody to his family, apparently having suffered torture in custody. 380 STJ reported on the arrest
372

GCR2P, R2P Monitor, Issue 60 (1 March 2022), 1 March 2022, url, p. 15
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Syria, 12 April 2022, url, pp. 16, 24-25, 29-30
374
STJ, Syria: 237 Persons Arrested in “Peace Spring” and “Olive Branch” Territories — in November andDecember 2020, 22 January 2021, url
375
HRW, Illegal Transfers of Syrians to Turkey, 3 February 2021, url
376
NPA, In week… Syria’s north witnesses casualties, arrests by Turkish-backed factions, 15 April 2022, url
377
Turkey considers the YPG to be an extension of the PKK, see WINEP, Turkey vs. the YPG: What’s Next?, 16
November 2021, url
378
Jerusalem Post (The), Erdogan’s secret prisons in Syria, 15 April 2022, url
379
STJ, Northeast Syria: Two Men Die from Torture and Medical Negligence, 20 January 2022, url
380
SNHR, 1,271 Civilians, Including 299 Children, 134 Women, and 104 Victims of Torture, Killed in Syria in 2021, 1
January 2022, url, p. 17; STJ, Northeast Syria: Two Men Die from Torture and Medical Negligence, 20 January2022, url
373

54

SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORTof eight men and one woman in September 2021 in Ras Al-Ayn and Tall Abyad by SNAaffiliated factions on charges of ‘dealing with the Autonomous Administration’ or, in one case,on claims that the man’s son had joined the SDF. One of the detainees died in detention after
having been tortured by members of the Suqour Al-Sunna armed group.381
In March 2022, STJ reported two cases of deaths in SNA custody. A man who had tried tonegotiate payment for the release of his nephew (who had previously been arrested forallegedly being affiliated with the PKK) was then himself detained, severely beaten andsubsequently died in custody.382 Another man was arrested on his way from Jalama to Jindiresin Afrin region and accused of working for the YPG, even though he had reportedly beenpreviously arrested by the YPG. Shortly after, the dead body of the man was delivered to his
family, bearing marks of torture.383
There were reports of confiscation of property and looting affecting the local population livingin SNA-held territories.384 For example, by October 2020 in the town Ras Al-Ayn an estimated
800 homes had been seized by the SNA factions Hamza Division and Sultan Murad Divisioncontrolling the town. The homes had belonged to Kurdish and Arab residents affiliated withinstitutions of the AANES.385
International Crisis Group noted in a November 2021 report with reference to local sourcesthat Turkish forces continued to attack senior YPG members along the Turkish-Syrian borderand buffer zone on several occasions, thereby allegedly also killing civilians, as a senior SDF
member claimed.386 Drone strikes targeting individuals linked to the Kurdish-led AANES werereported in Ayn Al-Arab and Qamishli in the last quarter of 2021, leading to civilian casualties.
The UNCOI noted that the targeting appeared deliberate and that it was likely that Turkish
drones were used in the attacks. Turkish authorities have not admitted their involvement. 387 In
2022, several SDF commanders were killed in targeted Turkish air strikes. 388
For violations committed by the SNA against the local Kurdish population in general, pleaserefer to Section 10. Kurds.

381

STJ, Syria: 52 Arrested in “Olive Branch” and “Peace Spring Strips” in September 2021, 15 October 2021, url, pp.
3-5
382
STJ, Afrin: Ahrar al-Sharqiya Tortures a Civilian to Death, 1 March 2022, url
383
STJ, Afrin: Al-Sham Legion Tortured a Civilian to Death, 31 March 2022, url384
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 89; STJ, Syria: Sultan Murad and Mu’tasim Divisions Pillage theIndustrial Zone in Ras al-Ayn/Serê Kaniyê, 6 October 2021, url
385
Al-Hilu, K., The Turkish Intervention in Northern Syria: One Strategy, Discrepant Policies, EUI, 14 January 2021,
url, p. 7
386International Crisis Group, Syria: Shoring up Raqqa’s shaky recovery, 18 November 2021, url, p. 17
387
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 99-101
388
Asharq Al-Aswat, Ankara Announces Killing of 2 SDF Leaders in Northeastern Syria, 19 April 2022, url; Rudaw,
SDF commander vows to avenge fighters killed in drone strike, 24 July 2022

55

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

4.2 Targeting by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant(ISIL)
Over the course of the reference period, ISIL carried out kidnappings and assassinations
targeting SDF members 389, persons working for the AANES, tribal leaders as well as civilians,
predominantly in the countryside of Deir Ez-Zor governorate.390 USDOS also reported thatduring the first three months of 2022, ISIL targeted persons affiliated with SDF and the
AANES.391
In the January 2022 ISIL coordinated attack on Ghweiran/Al-Sina prison in Hasaka city 392 andensuing clashes, at least 181 people were reportedly killed, among them 50 police, SDF
members and prison guards.393
Regional media reported on cases of kidnapping carried out by ISIL during the reference
period, including several such cases in the first quarter of 2022 alone.394 In some of thesecases, persons were kidnapped and subsequently killed, such as in the case of a civilian killedin January 2022 for allegedly cooperating with the SDF 395 and two SDF members found deadin Deir Ez-Zor in March 2022.396
Tribal leaders became potential assassination targets for ISIL when they were perceived to besupportive of SDF authority.397 In the summer of 2020, a sheikh from the Aqidat tribe and a
spokesperson for the same tribe were killed in SDF-held areas, with ISIL claiming

389

International Crisis Group, Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and North-eastern Syria, 18 July 2022, url,
Executive summary
390
International Crisis Group, Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and North-eastern Syria, 18 July 2022, url,
Executive summary; NPA, SDF kills ISIS leader and arrests another in Syria’s Deir ez-Zor, 16 February 2022, url;
NPA, ‫[ داعش يتبنى اختطاف شخص وقتله شرقي دير الزور‬ISIL claims kidnapping and killing of person in eastern Deir ez-Zor], 13January 2022, url; NPA, ISIS suspect arrested in Syria’s Deir ez-Zor, 30 November 2021, url; Syria TV, ‫العثور على جثتي‬‫[ عنصرين من "قسد" خطفهما "داعش" شرقي دير الزور‬Bodies of two SDF members found who were kidnapped by ISIL in eastern
Deir ez-Zor], 29 March 2022, url; NPA, ISIS claims responsibility for killing tribal notable in Syria’s Deir ez-Zor, 3
December 2021, url
391
USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, January 1, 2022 ‒March 31, 2022, 3 May 2022, url, p. 73
392
OHCHR, Press briefing notes on Syria, 25 January 2022, url
393
BBC News, Kurdish-led forces say they have retaken Syrian prison seized by IS, 26 January 2022, url
394
Syria TV, ‫[ العثور على جثتي عنصرين من "قسد" خطفهما "داعش" شرقي دير الزور‬Bodies of two SDF members found who were
kidnapped by ISIL in eastern Deir ez-Zor], 29 March 2022, url; Al-Hurra, ‫ داعش وجماعات مسلحة تبتز العائالت‬..‫الخطف ألجل الفدية‬‫[ السورية‬Kidnapping for ransom – ISIL and armed groups extort Syrian families], 7 March 2022, url; Asharq Al-Awsat,‫[ خاليا « داعش» تكثف عملياتها باتجاه الخطف‬ISIL cells intensify their kidnapping operations], 28 February 2022, url; NPA, ‫داعش‬‫[ يتبنى اختطاف شخص وقتله شرقي دير الزور‬ISIL claims kidnapping and killing of person in eastern Deir ez-Zor], 13 January2022, url; Xeber24, ‫[ داعش يخطف عدد من المدنيين في دير الزور‬ISIL kidnaps a number of civilians in Deir ez-Zor], 3 April
2020, url
395
NPA, ‫[ داعش يتبنى اختطاف شخص وقتله شرقي دير الزور‬ISIL claims kidnapping and killing of person in eastern Deir ez-Zor],
13 January 2022, url
396
Syria TV, ‫جثت عنرصين من "قسد" خطفهما "داعش" رش يق دير الزور‬‫[ العثور عىل‬Bodies of two SDF members found who were‫ي‬kidnapped by ISIL in eastern Deir ez-Zor], 29 March 2022, url
397
UN Security Council, Twenty-eighth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted
pursuant to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al -Qaida and associated individuals and entities,
S/2021/655, 21 July 2021, url, para. 33; International Crisis Group, Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and Northeastern Syria, 18 July 2022, url, p. 22

56

SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORT

responsibility.398 In November 2021, ISIL claimed responsibility for the assassination of a tribal
sheikh in Suwar district about 40 kilometres north of the Deir Ez-Zor city. An ISIL-affiliatedoutlet claimed that the sheikh was killed because of his collaboration with the SDF.399
ISIL further targeted civilians cooperating with the SDF 400, local teachers and civil servants
accused of collaboration, as well as clerics supporting the SDF. 401 In one incident, ISIL
threatened dozens of people from the town of Jadeed Akidat, by publishing a list of theirnames and describing them as ‘apostates’ because of affiliations with the SDF, further sayingthat if they did not ‘repent’ they would be killed and their homes destroyed. 402

398

Koontz, K. and Waters, G., Between the Coalition, ISIS, and Assad: Courting the Tribes of Deir ez-Zor, MEI, 3
November 2020, url
399
NPA, ISIS claims responsibility for killing tribal notable in Syria’s Deir ez-Zor, 3 December 2021, url
400International Crisis Group, Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and North-eastern Syria, 18 July 2022, url, p. 22
401
Al-Monitor, Kurdish-led forces intensify crackdown on Islamic State cells in northeast Syria, 30 June 2021, url
402
Abu Layla, O., How Iranian Militias Have Swallowed Deir Ezzor, WINEP, 16 February 2022, url

57

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

5. Persons perceived to be opposing the
Syrian Democratic Forces/Kurdish People’s
Protection Units
5.1 Profiles perceived as opposing Syrian Democratic
Forces/Kurdish People’s Protection Units and the
Democratic Union Party
The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a Kurdish-led alliance backed by the United States 403,
have been described as the ‘key powerbroker in north-eastern Syria’.404 The SDF is a multiethnic force consisting of Kurds and Arabs, as well as Christians, Yezidis and Turkmen. 405 It
operates through the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration406, an officially unrecognised
government entity under the effective control of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which isideologically linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). 407 The PYD’s military arm is thePeople’s Protection Units (YPG)408, which forms a major component of the SDF.409
Kurdish forces as of mid-July 2022 controlled the territories east of the Euphrates River(Hasaka and parts of Raqqa, Deir Ez-Zor and eastern Aleppo) with the exception of an areaspanning north-eastern Raqqa and north-western Hasaka that is under the occupation of
Turkish forces. West of the Euphrates, the Kurdish forces control the areas of Manbij and Tall
Rifaat, located in the north-eastern and western parts of Aleppo governorate.410
Kurdish forces in the SDF-controlled areas have been targeting individuals with real or
perceived links to a variety of groups or activities. Against the backdrop of ongoing intraKurdish tensions, the SDF continue to arbitrarily arrest persons who have links to politicalparties opposing the PYD or the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration 411 or criticise theirpolicies.412 These detainees included political activists 413, humanitarian workers 414 , civil society
activists and media professionals.415 For information on the treatment of journalists by
403

International Crisis Group, Syria: Shoring Up Raqqa’s Shaky Recovery, 18 November 2021, url, pp. 1, 8
Wilgenburg, W., Syrian Democratic Forces (Syria), ECFR, n.d., url
405
Wilson Center, SDF’s Arab majority rank Turkey as the biggest threat to NE Syria, 2019, url, p. 2
406
Wilgenburg, W., Syrian Democratic Forces (Syria), ECFR, n.d., url
407
CSIS, Rescuing Aid in Syria, 14 February 2022, url, pp. 6, 8
408
SSG, Final Report and Recommendations, USIP, 24 September 2019, url, p. 33
409
International Crisis Group, Syria: Shoring Up Raqqa’s Shaky Recovery, 18 November 2021, url, p. 1
410
Liveuamap, Syria [Map], 13 July 2022, url
411
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 102
412
SNHR, The Tenth Annual Report on Enforced Disappearance in Syria on the International Day of the Victims of
Enforced Disappearances; Long Years of Constant Grief and Loss, 30 August 2021, url, p. 27
413
SHRC, The 20th Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syria, 9 January 2022, url, p. 50
414
SNHR, The Tenth Annual Report on Enforced Disappearance in Syria on the International Day of the Victims of
Enforced Disappearances; Long Years of Constant Grief and Loss, 30 August 2021, url, p. 27
415
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 102
404

58

SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORTSDF/YPG, see Section 7.5 Targeting by the SDF/YPG of this report. The majority of these
individuals were either affiliated to parties within the Kurdish National Council (KNC)416
including the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) 417, or worked for organisations closely aligned
to the KNC.418 The KNC has been long accused by the PYD of entertaining too close relations
with Turkey and its proxy factions in Syria. 419 In other cases, as reported in Hasaka
governorate in the first half of 2021, the SDF arrested teachers who taught students based on
the GoS curriculum and opened fire on demonstrators protesting against a policy of theKurdish-led Autonomous Administration that was linked to a rise in fuel prices, killing at least
seven people.420
Moreover, the SDF reportedly targeted individuals under the pretext of fighting terrorism.421
The SDF, primarily through their anti-terrorism unit YAT [Yekîneyên Antî Teror], have been
carrying out raids against suspected members of ISIL. During these campaigns, accused
individuals have been arrested without judicial warrants and taken to unknown places. Someof the detainees were later released while others have reportedly disappeared. 422 Members of
the SDF have reportedly also detained relatives of persons involved in the armed
opposition/the Syrian National Army (SNA).423 Moreover, there have been accusations that
Kurdish militias displaced communities of Arabs and Turkmens in the context of anti-ISIL
operations.424
In many reported cases of repression, detention and enforced disappearance of critics of theKurdish-led Autonomous Administration or SDF, those targeted were ethnic Arabs.425 This
included arbitrary arrests of Arabs who were protesting against Kurdish-led Autonomous
Administration on issues such as poor services and high prices as well as the SDF’s policy of
forcibly conscripting Arab residents.426 In late May and early June 2021, SDF personnel, in
attempts to disperse crowds, opened fire on protesters in the (Arab-majority)427 Manbij area ofnorth-eastern Aleppo governorate 428, killing several Arab protesters.429

416

The KNC is a coalition of Syrian Kurdish political parties backed by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in Iraq.
The KNC’s opposition to the PYD is based on the latter’s links to the PKK and history of suppression of opposition
parties. MEI, Borders Beyond Borders: The Many (Many) Kurdish Political Parties of Syria, October 2019, url, pp. 6-7
417
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 103-104
418
SHRC, The 20th Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syria, 9 January 2022, url, p. 50
419
COAR, PYD-KNC peace talks: Whither peace in Syria’s northeast?, 28 September 2020, url420
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commi ssion of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/48/70, 13 August 2021, url, para. 99, 106421
SNHR, The Tenth Annual Report on Enforced Disappearance in Syria on the International Day of the Victims of
Enforced Disappearances; Long Years of Constant Grief and Loss, 30 August 2021, url, p. 28
422
SHRC, The 20th Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syria, 9 January 2022, url, p. 50
423
SNHR, The Tenth Annual Report on Enforced Disappearance in Syria on the International Day of the Victims of
Enforced Disappearances; Long Years of Constant Grief and Loss, 30 August 2021, url, p. 27
424
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2022: Syria, February 2022, url
425
SNHR, The Tenth Annual Report on Enforced Disappearance in Syria on the International Day of the Victims of
Enforced Disappearances; Long Years of Constant Grief and Loss, 30 August 2021, url, p. 27
426
SHRC, The 20th Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syria, 9 January 2022, url, pp. 50-51
427
RFI, Arab-Kurd unrest in Syria's Manbij leave 6 dead: monitor, 2 June 2021, url
428
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/48/70, 13 August 2021, url, para. 100
429
RFI, Arab-Kurd unrest in Syria's Manbij leave 6 dead: monitor, 2 June 2021, url

59EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

The policy of forced conscription manifested in the arrest of hundreds of people in various
Arab-majority areas controlled by the SDF following a conscription law issued by the Kurdishled Autonomous Administration in 2019.430 According to the SNHR, conscription campaigns
have also involved abductions and detentions of children.431 Across various Kurdish-controlledareas, kidnappings with the aim of recruitment into the YPG and Revolutionary Youth
Organisation were primarily targeting teenage Kurdish girls. 432

5.2 Treatment of persons perceived as opposing
SDF/YPG and PYD
5.2.1 Political opponents of the Democratic Union Party (PYD)
During the reference period, intra-Kurdish power-sharing negotiations aimed at unifying the
PYD and KNC into a single Kurdish political party reportedly made progress towards anagreement433, with restrictions on the KNC’s political activities relaxed as the talks
progressed.434 A new umbrella structure called ‘Kurdish National Unity Parties’ (PYNK),
comprising 25 Kurdish parties including the PYD and various KNC-affiliated Kurdish parties,
was formed in May 2020.435
Nonetheless, the reference period saw a number of reports of detentions of individuals
perceived as holding views opposing the PYD, the most powerful political force in the Kurdishheld areas.436 As the SNHR noted, the majority of these detainees (including political activists)
were released, although in exceptional cases detainees died from torture in prisons of theKurdish-led Autonomous Administration.437
In one case highlighted by the UNCOI, Asayish arrested a member of the KDP (an affiliate of
the KNC) at his home Hasaka city in May 2021, allegedly to have him testify in a corruption
case. The following month, it was revealed that he had died in the city’s military hospital, withhis body found bearing marks of torture.438
In July 2021, masked persons in different towns arrested four KDP members, including twojournalists. They were subsequently held incommunicado. Three of the detainees, including
one of the two journalists, were reportedly freed in November 2021.439 Further arrests of KDP
members and local journalists, allegedly by a group linked to the PYD, were reported in
430

SHRC, The 20th Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syri a, 9 January 2022, url, p. 50
SNHR, The Tenth Annual Report on Enforced Disappearance in Syria on the International Day of the Victims of
Enforced Disappearances; Long Years of Constant Grief and Loss, 30 August 2021, url, p. 28
432
SHRC, The 20th Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syria, 9 January 2022, url, p. 51
433
WINEP, Intra-Kurdish Unity Talks in Northeastern Syria Are Potentially in Jeopardy, 20 April 2021, url
434
COAR, PYD-KNC peace talks: Whither peace in Syria’s northeast?, 28 September 2020, url
435
Orsam, Background of PYD-KNC Union Meetings in Syria, 10 February 2021, url
436
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2022: Syria, February 2022, url
437
SHRC, The 20th Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syria, 9 January 2022, url, p. 50
438
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 103
439
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 104
431

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February 2022.440 In February 2022, an unidentified armed group set the car of a lawyer
affiliated to the KNC on fire 441, while several arson attacks on KNC offices in Hasaka,
Darbasiya, Malikiya and Kobane were reported in April 2022. 442 While the KNC blamed the
PYD for setting the offices on fire 443, the latter refuted these charges.444
In Arab-majority areas, protests against SDF rule became a common feature of life since 2017.
While the SDF purports that it is run by a multi-ethnic coalition based on democratic principles,‘Arabs living under its rule claim it is dominated by Kurdish political interests, and run for theirbenefit’, with local residents occupying the lowest positions under the governance of Kurdish imposed military councils.445 USDOS reported that ‘protests generally occurred throughout thenorth-east on a variety of topics without interference from local authorities.’446
The UNCOI reported on violence committed against civilian protesters who were against
specific policies of the Kurdish-led AANES. For example, in May 2021, SDF personnel in rural
Hasaka governorate opened fire on demonstrators who were protesting a decision by the
Kurdish-led AANES resulting in a threefold rise in fuel prices, killing at least sevenindividuals.447 In late May/early June 2021, protests erupted in the Manbij area following adecision that mandated the conscription of men aged 18 to 21 (the decision was later revoked).
SDF members opened fire at protesters448, killing five and injuring dozens of others.449 The
protests had ostensibly been triggered by a series of raids carried out by SDF units in searchof males of conscription age.450
The SDF claimed that during these protests in Manbij, as well the May 2021 protests in Hasaka
mentioned further above, some people allegedly used armed violence and attacked SDF
military positions. As of August 2021, investigations into these incidents were reported to beongoing.451
In September 2021, demonstrators and journalists in Qamishli who were covering protests
against the arrests of KNC members and civilians were reportedly beaten by supporters of the
Revolutionary Youth Movement452, an organisation described as an arm of the PKK.453
According to Jusoor for Studies, this movement, alongside the Kurdistan Women Union (KWU),
has been accused of ‘multiple human rights violations’ linked to the ‘suppression and440

Kurdistan24, KNC calls on US to stop arrests and media restrictions in northern Syria, 21 February 2022, url
Kurdistan24, KNC calls on US to stop arrests and media restrictions in northern Syria, 21 February 2022, url
442
Al-Monitor, Intra-Syrian Kurdish tensions rise amid Turkey's new anti-PKK offensive, 20 April 2022, url
443
COAR, Under Pressure: New Plans in Turkey to Ease Syrians’ ‘Voluntary’ Return, 3 May 2022, url
444
Al-Monitor, Intra-Syrian Kurdish tensions rise amid Turkey's new anti -PKK offensive, 20 April 2022, url
445
Syrian Observer (The), In Raqqa, SDF from Liberator to Occupier, 17 June 2021, url
446
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Syria, 12 April 2022, url, pp. 47-48
447
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/48/70, 13 August 2021, url, para. 99
448
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/48/70, 13 August 2021, url, para. 100
449
SHRC, The 20th Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syria, 9 January 2022, url, pp. 50-51
450
COAR, Deadly SDF Crackdown as Conscription Sparks Menbij Unrest, 7 June 2021, url451
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/48/70, 13 August 2021, url, para. 101
452
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 105
453
Jusoor for Studies, SDF and the Revolutionary Youth Organization: The nature of the relationship and its effects,
28 December 2021, url
441

61EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

confrontation of demonstrations and activists’ who opposed the Kurdish-led AANES’ policies.
These two organisations launched ‘repeated attacks on the offices, members and rallies
organised by the “Kurdish National Council”’, including an attack on the KNC office in AlDarbasiyah in December 2021.454
The Kurdish-led AANES, starting from 2020, also closed down private schools that offered
tuition in Arabic in Qamishli, arresting those operating them. 455 According to the SNHR, theSDF arbitrarily arrested 61 teachers between 1 January 2021 and 15 February 2021, including
over matters relating to school curricula.456 Amongst others, Asayish members arrested six
teachers in Darbasiya (Hasaka governorate) in January 2022 who had been ‘tutoring students
enrolled in university exams on the government curriculum’.457 These arrests were linked to
the fact that from 2016 onwards, the Kurdish-led AANES, was removing the GoS’ school
curriculum in Kurdish-majority areas, replacing it with its own Kurdish curriculum. However, as
the Kurdish graduation certificates were not recognised in other parts of the country and thus
limited pupils’ prospects of pursuing higher education, some parents sent their children to
private schools or paid private tutors to teach them based on the Arabic GoS-accredited
curriculum.458
During protests calling for the release of the teachers detained in January 2021, someparticipants were assaulted and ten protesters (including teachers and pupils) were arrested.
As the UNCOI reported, prior to being released, the teachers were ‘forced to sign a pledge
that they would no longer tutor students per the government curriculum’. The following month,eight more teachers were detained on similar grounds in Amuda (also Hasaka governorate).459

5.2.2 Persons with (perceived) links to ISIL
For information regarding the treatment of persons with perceived links to ISIL, see also
Section 3. Persons with (perceived) links to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) of thisreport.

5.2.3 Persons with (perceived) links to the Syrian National Army
(SNA)/Turkish forces
During the reference period, Syrian human rights groups and other sources reported that the
SDF intelligence service and Asayish arrested individuals of various profiles who weresuspected of collaboration with the SNA and Turkish forces, including espionage for Turkish

454

Jusoor for Studies, SDF and the Revolutionary Youth Organization: The nature of the relationship and its effects,
28 December 2021, url
455International Crisis Group, Syria: Shoring Up Raqqa’s Shaky Recovery, 18 November 2 021, url, p. 14456
SNHR, Syrian Democratic Forces Have Arrested/ Detained at Least 61 Teachers Over Educational Curricula andfor Forced Conscription Since the Beginning of 2021, 19 February 2021, url, p. 5457
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/48/70, 13 August 2021, url, para. 106
458
International Crisis Group, Syria: Shoring Up Raqqa’s Shaky Recovery, 18 November 2021, url, p. 14459
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/48/70, 13 August 2021, url, para. 106

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SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORT

intelligence services.460 In July 2020, for example, SDF intelligence arrested three Kurdish
individuals in Kobane for allegedly ‘spying for Turkish intelligence’. Amongst others, they wereaccused of informing Turkish intelligence about military movements and of providing thecoordinates of the venue of a local event which was subsequently targeted in a Turkish drone
attack that left several people dead.461 A similar case of arrest, followed by a confession, wasreported in Deir Ez-Zor in October 2021.462
Individuals arrested for alleged espionage on behalf of Turkish intelligence also included SDF
personnel. In November 2020, the SOHR reported that SDF military security arrested two
Kurdish SDF members from Hasaka for ‘communicating with Turkish intelligence’. One ofthem, a driver of the SDF’s deputy commander-in-chief, reportedly confessed that he wasreceiving money for reporting to Turkish intelligence the movements of the deputy
commander-in-chief. The other person was reportedly working as an SDF security guard andused to inform Turkish intelligence about military delegations and commanders. 463 In
December 2020, a member of the border control from the Derbasiya countryside wasarrested by Asayish. He was reportedly involved in human trafficking and ‘suspected ofcollaborating with Turkish-backed factions’.464
In November 2020, the SDF arrested a man during a raid on his home in a village in thenorthern suburbs of Raqqa on unspecified allegations that he was dealing with the SNA. He
was taken to an undisclosed location.465 The following month, Asayish arrested a couple inrural Hasaka ‘after the wife returned from a visit to her family in the area of rural Abu Racine,which is under the control of Turkish-backed factions’.466 Most recently, in February 2022, a
man and woman were arrested in the city of Manbij for allegedly ‘communicating with ISIS andTurkish forces’.467
According to the SNHR, Kurdish forces have also targeted civilians who were relatives of SNA
members.468 In June 2020, Asayish arrested a young woman in the Ayn Issa area (Raqqa
governorate) whose father was working for the SNA. She was arrested while travelling to

460

See, for example, SOHR, Security campaign | SDF intelligence arrests three persons in Ain Al -Arab (Kobani) for“spying for Turkish intelligence”, 10 July 2020, url; SNHR, SDF arrested a civilian in Skeirou village in Raqqa
suburbs on November 25, 29 November 2020, url; SOHR, Al-Raqqah | Asayish Forces arrest young woman in rural
Ain Issa, as her father works for Turkish-backed “National Army”, 16 June 2020, url; ISW, Syria Situation Report:
October 28 - November 10, 2020, 13 November 2020, url
461
SOHR, Security campaign | SDF intelligence arrests three persons in Ain Al -Arab (Kobani) for “spying for Turkish
intelligence”, 10 July 2020, url
462
ANHA, SDF captures MIT agent in rural Deir-ez-Zor, 28 October 2021, url
463
SOHR, Al-Raqqah | SDF intelligence arrests driver of “SDF commander-in-chief’s deputy” and another official for“communicating with Turkish intelligence”, 3 November 2020, url
464
SOHR, For “collaborating with Turkish-backed factions” | “Asayish” arrests civilians in rural Hasakeh, and AlShabiba Al-Thawriya searches passers-by in al-Derbasiya streets, 27 December 2020, url
465
SNHR, SDF arrested a civilian in Skeirou village in Raqqa suburbs on November 25, 29 November 2020, url
466
SOHR, For “collaborating with Turkish-backed factions” | “Asayish” arrests civilians in rural Hasakeh, and Al Shabiba Al-Thawriya searches passers-by in al-Derbasiya streets, 27 December 2020, url
467
SOHR, Ongoing security campaign | “Intelligence” service and SDF arrest seven ISIS cells, including women andchild, 18 February 2022, url
468
SNHR, The Tenth Annual Report on Enforced Disappearance in Syri a on the International Day of the Victims of
Enforced Disappearances; Long Years of Constant Grief and Loss, 30 August 2021, url, p. 27

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

areas controlled by Turkish forces and their proxy factions. Following her arrest, the Asayish
turned the woman over to the SDF intelligence service. 469
Against the backdrop of Turkish efforts aimed at reaching out to disaffected local tribal actors
in Kurdish-controlled areas 470, the SDF arrested two sheikhs from Arab tribes in November
2020. The arrests were made after some tribal representatives had called for ‘a Turkishpresence around Qamishli’.471
While little information could be found on the subsequent treatment of those detained for their
alleged links to Turkish forces, in December 2020 it was reported that one person from Ain
Issa (rural Raqqa governorate) who had been arrested for ‘spying and communicating with theTurkish intelligence and Turkish-backed factions’ died under torture. He had initially beenarrested by Asayish, who then handed him over to the SDF national intelligence security
department.472

5.3 Forced and child recruitment
As the SHRC reported, individuals continued to be targeted in 2021 in connection with theconscription law passed by the Kurdish-led AANES in 2019473, which applies to all Kurdishcontrolled areas including most of Hasaka governorate, large parts of Raqqa and Deir Ez -Zor
and the cities of Kobane and Manbij in eastern Aleppo governorate.474 Raqqa city and its
countryside, as well as Aleppo’s eastern countryside were the scene of large-scale arrest andrecruitment campaigns in early 2021.475
Following a May 2021 amendment that expanded eligibility for conscription to those aged
between 18 and 31 years, the SDF carried out large-scale campaigns in various Arab-majority
communities to arrest476 and forcibly recruit boys and girls born between 1990 and 2003.
These campaigns were reported in the cities of Raqqa, Deir Ez-Zor, Qamishli, Hasaka, Ain AlArab, Al-Malikiyah and Al-Darbasiyah, amongst others. SDF units reportedly ‘pursued young
men in their homes and arrested anyone who refused to comply with these decisions’. 477 In
the city of Raqqa and nearby villages, for example, 150 men were arrested by the SDF in late
May 2021 for avoiding conscription.478 During the period from 1 January to 15 February 2021,

469

SOHR, Al-Raqqah | Asayish Forces arrest young woman in rural Ain Issa, as her father works for Turkish-backed“National Army”, 16 June 2020, url
470
COAR, Northeast Syria Social Tensions and Stability Monitoring: April Update, 28 May 2021, url, p. 5; Syrian
Observer (The), In Raqqa, SDF from Liberator to Occupier, 17 June 2021, url
471
ISW, Syria Situation Report: October 28 - November 10, 2020, 13 November 2020, url
472
SOHR, Torture victims | Person dies in SDF intelligence service’s prison, after arrest for “communicating with theTurks and factions”, 2 December 2020, url
473
SHRC, The 20th Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syria, 9 January 2022, url, p. 50
474
Enab Baladi, Under guise of duty: patterns of coercion enabled by SDF’s draft law, 15 April 2021, url
475
SOHR, SDF’s mandatory conscription campaign | SDF arrests nearly 400 young men from al-Raqqa, and sends
them to its centres, 12 March 2021, url; Enab Baladi, Under guise of duty: patterns of coercion enabled by SDF’s
draft law, 15 April 2021, url
476
SHRC, The 20th Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syria, 9 January 2022, url, p. 50
477Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor, Syria: Manbij Military Council’s decision to stop forced conscription is notenough – civilians must be protected, 3 June 2021, url
478
Carter Center (The), Syria Weekly Conflict Summary, 24 - 30 May 2021, Syria Mapping Project, 2 June 2021, url

64

SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORTSNHR reported that teachers from the governorates of Hasaka, Raqqa and Deir Ez -Zor werearrested and dismissed by SDF for refusing military conscription.479
In Manbij city and its countryside, more than 150 local young men were arrested in 2021 withthe aim of ‘enrolling them into forced conscription camps’. 480 With tensions rising due todeaths and injuries in ensuing protests in Manbij in late May/early June 2021 (for further
information on these protests, see Section 5.2 Treatment of persons perceived as opposing
SDF/YPG and PYD of this report), the SDF stopped these mass arrests and suspended
conscription following agreements with tribal elders. 481 Meanwhile, the SHRC reported that the
SDF resorted to carrying out individual arrests for recruitment purposes. 482
The SDF and its components (including the YPG and the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ)), as
well as the affiliated Asayish, have been reported to recruit and use children in large numbers,
with approximately 500 cases documented by the United Nations between mid-2018 and mid2020. Meanwhile, the UN Secretary-General noted that these cases had dropped significantly
following the signing of a joint action plan against child recruitment with the United Nations inJune 2019, with 119 cases recorded in 2020 483, compared to 216 cases in the first half of2019.484 However, for the year 2021, the UN Secretary-General recorded an increase in casesof recruitment and use of children by the SDF to 221 cases (220 by the YPG/YPJ and one caseby another component of SDF).485 Other sources reported on the recruitment of minors by SDF
in 2022486, although some sources pointed out that those minors who have joined SDF havedone so voluntarily.487
Sources reported that recruitment of children into the ranks of PKK and its military arms wascontinuing into late 2021/early 2022488, including through kidnappings. According to theSHRC, most of these kidnappings have been targeting ‘young Kurdish girls, between the agesof 14 and 17’ who were then sent to closed camps where they were indoctrinated with PKK
ideology.489 The Kurdish Revolutionary Youth Movement and the Kurdistan Women Union(KWU) specifically have been accused of recruiting children490 through ‘military and ideological479

SNHR, Syrian Democratic Forces Have Arrested/ Detained at Least 61 Teachers Over Educational Curricula andfor Forced Conscription Since the Beginning of 2021, 19 February 2021, url, p. 5
480
SHRC, The 20th Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syria, 9 January 2022, url, p. 50
481
UNSG, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332
(2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), S/2021/735, 18 August
2021, url, para. 6
482
SHRC, The 20th Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syria, 9 January 2022, url, p. 51
483
UNSG, Children and armed conflict. Report of the Secretary-General, S/2021/437, 23 April 2021, url, para 179
484
UNSG, Children and armed conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, S/2021/398, 23 April 2021, url, para. 7, 8, 10
485
UNSG, Children and armed conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, S/2022/493, 23 June 2022, url, para 189
486
Denmark, DIS, Syria - Military recruitment in Hasakah Governorate, 1 July 2022 [source: Child protection actor;
International humanitarian coordinator, url, pp. 38, 41, 47
487
Denmark, DIS, Syria – Military recruitment in Hasakah Governorate, 1 July 2022 [source: Child protection actor,
Syrian Kurdish journalist, Wladimir van Wilgenburg], url, pp. 40, 60, 71
488
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 107; Jusoor for Studies, SDF and the Revolutionary Youth
Organization: The nature of the relationship and its effects, 28 December 2021, url; SHRC, The 20th Annual Reportof the Human Rights Situation in Syria, 9 January 2022, url, p. 51; Denmark, DIS, Syria - Military recruitment inHasakah Governorate, 1 July 2022 [source: expert from the International Crisis Group], url, p. 46
489
SHRC, The 20th Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syria, 9 January 2022 url, p. 51
490
Jusoor for Studies, SDF and the Revolutionary Youth Organization: The nature of the relationship and its effects,
28 December 2021, url; SOHR, Child soldiers | “Al-Shabiba Al-Thawriyah” abducts and recruits displaced girl from
Afrin countryside despite all demands to end children recruitment, 26 February 2022, url

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training camps and events’.491 Recruitment of minors by the PYD-affiliated Revolutionary Youth
Movement was reported to take place at end of 2021 in north-eastern Syria and the AlShahbaa area of Aleppo.492 According to the SOHR, in the first quarter of 2022, theRevolutionary Youth Movement was responsible for kidnapping 14 children aged between 13
and 16 years, including at least eight girls, across various Kurdish-controlled areas.493
A confidential source interviewed by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs in January
2021 elaborated that the SDF conscripted minors without parental consent and kept them intraining camps without informing their parents about their children’s whereabouts. The source
observed that the SDF indoctrinated the children for combat roles and —after a six- to eightmonth training period—deployed them ‘in combat operations and/or in tasks such astransporting ammunition, cleaning and manning checkpoints’. The same source pointed to atleast 34 cases of children being conscripted by the SDF between May 2020 and January
2021, of whom 13 were then returned to their families following ‘pressure from families,
important local figures such as tribal leaders and the media’. It also recorded the death of one
child in combat operations while in the service of SDF. 494

491

Jusoor for Studies, SDF and the Revolutionary Youth Organization: The nature of the relationship and its effects,
28 December 2021, url
492
STJ, Northeastern Syria: Complaints about Child Soldiers Falling on the Autonomous Administration ’s Deaf Ears,
13 January 2022, url, p. 3493
SOHR, SDF-controlled areas in January 2022 | Nearly 527 deaths in acts of violence…ongoing military escalation
by Turkish forces…growing protests…and Ghuwayran attack tops the agenda, 6 February 2022, url; SOHR, SDFheld areas in February 2022 | 40 deaths in acts of violence…ongoing military escalation by Turkish forces…ongoingprotests over worsening living conditions, 6 March 2022, url; SOHR, SDF-held areas in March 2022 | 22 deaths inacts of violence…escalating public protests…disastrous living conditions and poor public services, 7 April 2022, url
494
Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of origin information report Syria, 14 June 2021, url, p. 44

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SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORT

6. Persons associated with the Governmentof Syria (GoS)
6.1 Treatment of GoS officials, members of the Syrian
Arab Army and pro-government fighters by different
armed actors
Attacks and other acts of violence reported during the reference period targeted a variety of
individuals affiliated with the GoS. These incidents included (attempted) assassinations ofmayors 495, members of city councils 496, and the Dar’a Central Committee.497 Attacks andassassinations also targeted government employees498, including members of intelligences
services 499, police officers500, former members of the Baath Party501, and persons affiliated with
the GoS armed forces or pro-Assad militias.502 In many of the cases found, the acts werecarried out by unidentified armed men in the countryside of Dar’a 503 (where security
deteriorated from June 2019 onwards) 504 and Quneitra governorate.505

495

See, for example, UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on
the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/48/70, 13 August 2021, url, para. 27; SOHR, Eastern countryside of Daraa | New
assassination targeting head of town collaborator with regime security services in southern Syria, 28 February
2021, url; SOHR, Car bomb attack | Village mayor killed in Daraa, 23 December 2021, url; NPA, Ten Individuals Lost
Lives Within Week In Syria’s Daraa, 20 May 2022, url
496
SOHR, Assassinations | Unknown assailants shoot dead chief of “Al-Sanamayn City Council”, 26 October 2020,
url; SOHR, Armed attack | Member of Al-Quneitra Council assassinated in Al-Baath city, 16 February 2021, url
497
SOHR, Two assassinations in few hours | Central Committee member and a deputy mayor killed in Daraa
countryside, 9 December 2021, url
498
Al Monitor, Who's to blame for ongoing assassinations in Syria's Daraa province?, 10 August 2022, url
499
SOHR, Al-Suwaidaa | In response to arresting civilian, local gunmen kidnap the governor’s driver and member ofintelligence service, 29 July 2020, url; SOHR, Al-Quneitra | Regime officer and “collaborator” assassinated insouthern countryside, while Israeli aircraft flies over Yarmouk Basin, 5 September 2021, url; SOHR, Escalating
attacks in Daraa | Five killed in three assassinations since morning, 10 January 2022, url; NPA, Ten Individuals Lost
Lives Within Week In Syria’s Daraa, 20 May 2022, url
500
OHCHR, Syria: Bachelet warns of ‘ticking time-bomb’ as civilian killings mount, 8 May 2020, url
501
New Arab (The), Former Baath official, relatives killed in southern Syria: reports, 28 June 2022, url
502
SOHR, Assassination attempt | Unknown assailants shoot informer of “Air -Force Intelligence” in northern Homs,
7 September 2020, url; Asharq Al-Awsat, Hezbollah Senior Official Killed in Syria’s Southern Daraa Province, 28June 2021, url; Al Monitor, Who's to blame for ongoing assassinations in Syria's Daraa province?, 10 August 2022,
url
503
See, for example, SOHR, Assassinations | Unknown assailants shoot dead chief of “Al -Sanamayn City Council”,
26 October 2020, url; SOHR, Eastern countryside of Daraa | New assassination targeting head of town collaborator
with regime security services in southern Syria, 28 February 2021, url; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/48/70, 13 August 2021, url,para. 27; SOHR, Two assassinations in few hours | Central Committee member and a deputy mayor killed in Daraa
countryside, 9 December 2021, url; SOHR, Car bomb attack | Village mayor killed in Daraa, 23 December 2021, url
504
SOHR, Escalating attacks in Daraa | Five killed in three assassinations since morning, 10 January 2022, url
505
See, for example, SOHR, Armed attack | Member of Al -Quneitra Council assassinated in Al-Baath city, 16
February 2021, url; SOHR, Al-Quneitra | Regime officer and “collaborator” assassinated in southern countryside,
while Israeli aircraft flies over Yarmouk Basin, 5 September 2021, url

67EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Between January 2020 and the end of 2021, at least nine mayors 506 and one deputy mayor
were targeted in assassinations or attempted assassinations. For example, in December 2021,
the deputy mayor of Enkhel town in the northern Dar’a countryside was killed by unknown
gunmen who stormed the building of the local municipal assembly.507 In another caserecorded in the same month, a car bomb killed the mayor of Al-Naima village (easterncountryside of Dar’a) and injured members of his family. 508 In some of the cases, reports
specified that the targeted mayors had been collaborating with the GoS security services.509
Targeted members of city councils included the chief of the Al-Sanamayn city council(northern countryside of Dar’a), who was shot dead by unknown assailants. 510 Another senior
government official, a Dar’a Central Committee member who was in charge of thegovernorate’s western sector, was assassinated by unidentified gunmen in the town of Tel
Shihab (western Dar’a) in December 2021. 511
Assassinations of members of pro-GoS forces in Dar’a included the June 2021 killing of asenior Hezbollah leader, Aref al-Jahmani, by unidentified gunmen while he was travelling offduty on a highway. His militia, operating in Saida (eastern Dar’a), was believed to have staged
missions, such as the killings of local opposition activists, for the Damascus-based intelligence
division ‘215’512, a prison run by the Military Intelligence Directorate.513
Meanwhile, in Sweida governorate, in the aftermath of crackdowns by security forces on local
protesters 514 , local militia members in late July 2020 abducted a member of the GeneralIntelligence Department and the driver of Sweida’s governor during a highway blockade. 515
For more information on the situation in Dar’a and Sweida governorates, see EUAA COI
Report Syria: Security situation (July 2021) and upcoming update.

506

NPA, Local mayor assassinated in Syria’s eastern Daraa countryside, 28 January 2021, url; UN Human Rights
Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/48/70,
13 August 2021, url, para. 27; SOHR, Collaborated with regime security services | Head of town dies of injuries
sustained in eastern Daraa countryside, 1 February 2021, url; SOHR, Eastern countryside of Daraa | New
assassination targeting head of town collaborator with regime security services in southern Syria, 28 February
2021, url; Syrian Observer (The), Assassinations Continue in Daraa, With the Mayor of Atman as the Last of its
Victims, 7 June 2021, url; SOHR, Car bomb attack | Village mayor killed in Daraa, 23 December 2021, url
507
SOHR, Two assassinations in few hours | Central Committee member and a deputy mayor killed in Daraa
countryside, 9 December 2021, url
508
SOHR, Car bomb attack | Village mayor killed in Daraa, 23 December 2021, url
509
SOHR, Collaborated with regime security services | Head of town dies of injuries sustained in eastern Daraa
countryside, 1 February 2021, url; SOHR, Eastern countryside of Daraa | New assassination targeting head of town
collaborator with regime security services in southern Syria, 28 February 2021, url
510
SOHR, Assassinations | Unknown assailants shoot dead chief of “Al -Sanamayn City Council”, 26 October 2020,
url
511
SOHR, Two assassinations in few hours | Central Committee member and a deputy mayor killed in Daraa
countryside, 9 December 2021, url
512
Asharq Al-Awsat, Hezbollah Senior Official Killed in Syria’s Southern Daraa Province, 28 June 2021, url
513
Syrian Observer (The), Branch 215. A Slaughterhouse in Syria, 3 January 2020, url
514
HRW, Syria: Protesters Describe Beatings, Arrests, 28 June 2020, url
515
SOHR, Al-Suwaidaa | In response to arresting civilian, local gunmen kidnap the governor’s driver and member ofintelligence service, 29 July 2020, url

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SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORT

6.2 Civilians perceived as supporting the GoS
There were multiple reports of civilians being targeted with guns or improvised explosive
devices (IED) for alleged acts perceived as collaboration with GoS entities, including its
security services.516 Amongst others, unidentified assailants carried out attempted or
successful assassinations of alleged informants/collaborators of the Air-Defence Intelligence(in Dar’a) 517, the Airforce Intelligence Directorate (in Dar’a518 and the northern countryside ofHoms 519), and the Department of Military Intelligence (mostly in Dar’a 520 but also in Quneitra521).
In two cases of assassination of alleged collaborators from early 2022, the reports indicatedthat those targeted were the son of an employee of a state-run TV channel522 and the son of aformer army general, respectively.523

6.2.1 Targeting of reconciled former opposition fighters and otherpersons associated with reconciliation
During the reference period, sources reported a number of targeted killings of former armed
opposition members by unidentified gunmen in Dar’a. 524 In late 2021, SACD reported a‘sweep’ of assassinations of young men in Dar’a who had undergone the so-called
reconciliation process.525 These assassinations targeted reconciled individuals who had
afterwards joined the Military Intelligence Division or collaborated with it, but also others who
were no longer involved with any armed force. 526

516

See, for example, SOHR, Assassination attempt | Unknown assailants shoot informer of “Air -Force Intelligence”
in northern Homs, 7 September 2020, url; SOHR, Southern Syria | New assassination targeting collaborator withsecurity services in northern countryside of Daraa governorate, 14 January 2021, url;SOHR, Deteriorating security in
Daraa | Unknown gunmen assassinate regime “collaborator”, 2 February 2021, url;
NPA, Four killed by anti-government militants in Syria’s Daraa, 11 July 2021, url; SOHR, Escalating attacks in Daraa |Five killed in three assassinations since morning, 10 January 2022, url;
517
SOHR, Assassination attempt | Unknown gunmen open fire on “informant” of “Air -Defence Intelligence” ineastern Daraa, 6 January 2021, url;
518
NPA, Four killed by anti-government militants in Syria’s Daraa, 11 July 2021, url
519
SOHR, Assassination attempt | Unknown assailants shoot informer of “Air-Force Intelligence” in northern Homs, 7
September 2020, url
520
SOHR, Deteriorating security in Daraa | Unknown gunmen assassinate regime “collaborator”, 2 Febr uary 2021,
url; SOHR, Escalating attacks in Daraa | Five killed in three assassinations since morning, 10 January 2022, url;
SOHR, Ongoing security chaos in Daraa | Unknown gunmen assassinate “collaborator” with Military Intelligence
Branch, 16 March 2022, url
521
SOHR, Attacked two days ago | “Collaborator” with regime security services dies of his wounds in southern AlQuneitra, 24 January 2022, url
522
SOHR, Southern Syria | New assassination targeting collaborator with security services in northern countrysideof Daraa governorate, 14 January 2021, url
523
SOHR, Security chaos in Daraa | Unidentified gunmen assassinate collaborator with regime forces in westerncountryside, 27 January 2021, url
524
See, for example, STJ, Fresh Wave of Violence Storms Already Vulnerable “Settlement Agreement” in Daraa, 10
May 2020, url; SOHR, Assassinations | Unknown assailants shoot dead chief of “Al -Sanamayn City Council”, 26
October 2020, url; SOHR, Daraa since early 2022 | 12 attacks kill 11 people, mostly civilians, 11 January 2022, url;
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic [A/HRC/45/31], 14 August 2020, url, para. 17; Carter Center (The), Syria Weekly Conflict Summary 22 -28
February 2021, 3 March 2021, url; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commissionof Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/48/70, 13 August 2021, url, para. 25
525
Detailed information on the so-called reconciliation agreements and impact on the population is available in the
EUAA COI Report: Syria - Exercise of authority in recaptured areas (January 2020)
526
SACD, Assassinations sweep Daraa province with regime top suspect, 10 December 2021, url

69EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMOther unclaimed assassinations, reported in autumn 2020 in Rural Damascus, targeted
prominent civilian figures who had mediated reconciliation deals between the GoS and
opposition fighters.527 These included the killing of Sheikh Mohammed Adnan Afyouni, one of
Syria’s most senior Sunni clerics, who in 2016 had played a ‘highly active’ behind-the-scenesrole in the reconciliation agreement in the then-opposition-held towns of Qudsaya andHameh.528 Moreover, in late 2020 an IED explosion targeted the car of a member of the local
reconciliation committee in the town of Ataman in Dar’a’s western countryside.529

6.2.2 Targeting by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)
Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an armed group which emerged in early 2017 as the successor
organisation of Jabhat al-Nusra (an al-Qaeda affiliate) 530, as of mid-April 2022 controlled thenorth-western half of Idlib, areas in western Aleppo governorate, parts of north-eastern
Latakia, and north Hama.531
According to the UNCOI, as of early February 2022, HTS subjected its perceived political
opponents to a ‘pattern of arbitrary detention ’ that was part of a ‘systematic effort to stifle
political dissent’.532 The group has a history of executing civilians for a number of offences
based on sentences handed down by sharia courts, including for espionage 533, withexecutions ‘frequently carried out in secret, usually in buildings occupied by Hay’at Tahrir alSham’s security apparatus’.534
A number of individuals were targeted based on allegations of collaboration with the GoS. For
example, in April 2020, a former member of parliament was put to death for allegedly passing
on information to pro-GoS forces.535 In June 2021, SNHR reported that HTS detained five
civilians in Idlib for their alleged involvement in communicating and reconciling with the
GoS.536 The group executed several persons it accused of having provided coordinates of
military positions 537 or other details about the local situation to the GoS forces 538, including a

527

SOHR, IED attacks | Explosion targets prominent “reconciliation” figure in Zakyah, Rif Dimashq, 14 September
2020, url; AP, Report: Bombing kills Syrian cleric key to deals with rebels, 22 October 2020, url
528
Makki, D., Assassination of Top Cleric Invokes New Challenges & Old Memories in Syria, Newlines Institute, 10
November 2020, url
529
SOHR, IED attacks | Explosion targets member of “reconciliation commission” in western Daraa, 21 November
2020, url
530
CSIS, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), n.d., url
531
Liveuamap, Syria [Map], n.d., url
532
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 54, 67, 72
533
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/46/55, 11 March 2021, url, para. 67
534
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/44/61, 3 September 2020, url, para. 94
535
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/44/61, 3 September 2020, url, para. 94
536
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Syria, 12 April 2022, url, p. 31
537
See, for example, SOHR, Confessing collaboration with regime in documentary movie | HTS executes young
man and woman from Idlib, 11 January 2022, url; SOHR, For “collaborating with regime and providing them withcoordinates of officers’ locations” | HTS executes mosque imam “preacher” in Idlib, 18 February 2022, url; SOHR,
On charges of “communicating with Syrian regime” | HTS executes man from Idlib, 17 February 2022, url
538
SOHR, HTS executes a person in Idlib for espionage, 1 April 2020, url

70

SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORT

young man and woman 539 and an imam in early 2022.540 In January 2022, it was reported that
the Idlib-based ‘Salvation Government’ and HTS media agencies posted a documentary filmthat showed several alleged collaborators confessing to ‘dealing with regime forces, informing
coordinates for military positions, detonating IEDs in residential positions and providing
coordinates to target residential areas with warplanes’. 541
Moreover, the UNCOI pointed to reports and witness accounts indicating that HTS confiscatedproperties of individuals who fled the area or were perceived as political opponents, including
alleged GoS supporters. The UNCOI also reported that HTS targeted the property of minority
groups such as Christians.542

6.2.3 Targeting by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)
ISIL, as reported in March 2021, targeted and detained ‘perceived enemies, including alleged
supporters or members of armed opposition groups or the Government and its forces’. 543 A
Syrian academic interviewed by the EUAA noted that there are numerous reports of incidents
where ISIL selectively targeted SAA soldiers and other members of the GoS security forces,
government employees, Baath Party officials and tribal notables. 544 Such incidents were
mostly reported in Raqqa and Deir Ez-Zor (including the Badia region).545 ISIL reportedly also
carried out attacks in Dar’a governorate, where it claimed responsibility for at least 37 attacks
between January 2020 and April 2022, which targeted SAA soldiers, members of theintelligence services, Baath Party officials, former opposition fighters, and civilians.546 For
example, in April 2020, the group claimed responsibility for assassinating the Secretary of the
Baath Party’s Nawa Branch (Dar’a governorate) 547 while suspected ISIL gunmen killed awoman accused of communicating with GoS forces in the eastern countryside of Deir EzZor.548 In May 2020, ISIL executed four people in the Al-Sukhnah area in the Homs
countryside for ‘providing the regime forces with information about ISIS locations’.549 In May
2022, ISIL claimed responsibility for two bombings south of Damascus which killed two
members of local militia committees affiliated with the Fourth Division. 550

539

SOHR, For “collaborating with regime and providing them with coordinates of officers’ locations” | HTS executes
mosque imam “preacher” in Idlib, 18 February 2022, url
540
SOHR, For “collaborating with regime and providing them with coordinates of officers’ locations” | HTS executes
mosque imam “preacher” in Idlib, 18 February 2022, url
541
SOHR, Confessing collaboration with regime in documentary movie | HTS executes young man and woman from
Idlib, 11 January 2022, url
542
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 72
543
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/46/55, 11 March 2021, url, para. 72
544
Syrian academic, email correspondence, 25 April 2022
545
New Arab (The), Islamic State group militants kill three regime fighters in Syrian Desert, 22 June 2022, url; VOA,IS Kills 9 Pro-Regime Fighters in Eastern Syria, Monitor Says, 23 June 2022, url
546
Syrian academic, email correspondence, 25 April 2022
547
ISW, Syria Situation Report: April 1 - 14, 2020, 16 April 2020, url
548
SOHR, ISIS cells kill a woman in Al-Zar village for “communicating with regime forces”, 7 April 2020, url; Carter
Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary | 6 - 12 April 2020, 12 April 2020, url
549
SOHR, ISIS resurgence | Four people executed for “spying for regime”, 17 May 2020, url
550
COAR, Islamic State Claims Responsibility for Damascus Bombings, 23 May 2022, url

71EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

6.2.4 Arrests by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
There were several reports of members of the SDF arresting individuals with links to the GoS,
including several Baath Party members from the party’s Hasaka branch551 and members of the
Arab Al-Baggara tribe in Deir Ez-Zor (on allegations that they were recruiting people to join
GoS-funded local armed resistance units ‘to undermine the SDF’) .552 The SDF also arrested anumber of persons on accusations of spying/collaborating with the GoS or Iranian militias,
including civilians 553 and members of the SDF 554 or the Kurdish-led AANES.555 For example, inJune 2021, in Ain Issa city in the northern countryside of Raqqa governorate, four SDF
members were arrested for spying for the GoS. According to SDF claims, the men wererecruited and paid by GoS intelligence services to carry out assassinations against SDF
commanders.556 In another case, the SDF and international coalition troops in February 2022
arrested nearly 30 people in Al-Basira city (Deir Ez-Zor governorate) for allegedly collaboratingwith Iranian militias, based on recorded conversations between the arrested individuals andIranian militias located nearby.557

551

SOHR, SDF-held areas in March 2022 | 22 deaths in acts of violence…escalating public protests…disastrous
living conditions and poor public services, 7 April 2022, url; Asharq Al-Awsat, SDF Arrests 4 Members of Baath
Party in Syria's Hasakeh, 15 March 2022, url
552
COAR, Northeast Syria Social Tensions and Stability Monitoring: April Update, 28 May 2021, url, pp. 2-3
553
SOHR, Security campaign | SDF and Coalition forces arrest person in eastern Deir Ezzor for “working for ISIS
cells”, 4 September 2021, url; SOHR, “Dealing with Iranian militias” | SDF arrests nearly 30 collaborators during raid
campaign with “International Coalition” in Deir Ezzor, 9 February 2022, url
554
SOHR, For “spying for regime” | SDF arrest four agents recruited by the regime intelligence service toassassinate commanders in Ain Issa, 26 June 2021, url
555
COAR, Northeast Syria Social Tensions and Stability Monitoring: April Update, 28 May 2021, url, p. 5556
SOHR, For “spying for regime” | SDF arrest four agents recruited by the regime intelligence service toassassinate commanders in Ain Issa, 26 June 2021, url
557
SOHR, “Dealing with Iranian militias” | SDF arrests nearly 30 collaborators during raid campaign with
“International Coalition” in Deir Ezzor, 9 February 2022, url

72

SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORT

7. Journalists and other media professionals
7.1 General overview
Human rights organisations indicate that journalists and media workers in Syria were exposed
to major risks and threats during the reference period 558, including arrests and detention559,
abductions 560, physical danger 561 and attacks 562 as well as killings.563 The Reporters Sans
Frontières’s (RSF) World Press Freedom Index ranked Syria 174 th in 2020, 173rd in 2021 and171st in 2022 out of 180 countries.564 Freedom House described Syria as not free, with anaggregate freedom score of 1/100 for 2021 and 2022. Freedom of press was reported to be
restricted and journalists faced censorship, torture and death while in custody. 565 According to
the Global Impunity Index 2021 of the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), Syria ranked
second among the 12 countries with the highest levels of impunity in the world, indicating thatthe country had the second-lowest prosecution rate in connection to the deaths ofjournalists.566
Journalists were targeted by various parties involved in the conflict in Syria: the GoS, Turkish backed forces, forces affiliated with the Kurdish-led AANES, as well as groups such as HTS
and ISIL.567 According to RSF, although the situation for journalists remains extremely
dangerous throughout Syria, the few areas that the GoS has not yet retaken pose aparticularly high risk for journalists.568 The report of the UN Secretary General for April 2020
specifically indicated that in areas under the control of various non-state armed groups in thenorth of Syria, journalists were targeted for allegedly belonging to an opposing party or forbeing critical of the armed group controlling the area. 569 According to a January 2022 article
by RSF, independent media professionals are almost certainly perceived as enemies and‘could be crushed between the fronts’ in areas not controlled by the GoS. Additionally,journalists and media personnel have repeatedly faced direct attacks. 570

558

SHRC, The 20th Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syria, 9 January 2022, url, p. 27; Freedom
House, Freedom in the World 2022: Syria, February 2022, url; RSF, Syria, 2022, url
559
SHRC, The 19th Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syria, January 2021, url, p. 33; RSF, Syria, 2022,
url
560
SHRC, The 20th Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syria, 9 January 2022, url, p. 27; SCM, Syria:
The Black Hole for Media Work - 10 Years of Violations, May 2021, url, pp. 33-34; RSF, Syria, 2022, url
561
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2022: Syria, February 2022, url
562
SCM, Syria: The Black Hole for Media Work - 10 Years of Violations, May 2021, url, p. 21
563
SHRC, The 20th Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syria, 9 January 2022, url, p. 27; SHRC, The
19th Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syria, January 2021, url, p. 33; SCM, Syria: The Black Hole forMedia Work - 10 Years of Violations, May 2021, url, p. 39; RSF, Syria, 2022, url
564
RSF, Syria, 2022, url
565
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2021: Syria, March 2021, url; Freedom House, Freedom in the World
2022: Syria, February 2022, url
566
CPJ, Killers of journalists still get away with murder, 28 October 2021, url
567
SHRC, The 20th Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syria, 9 January 2022, url, p. 27
568
RSF, Germany: Second group of endangered journalists rescued from Syria, 2 February 2022, url
569
UNSG, Implementation of resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393
(2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020), S/2020/327, 23 April 2020, url, para. 12
570
RSF, Germany: Second group of endangered journalists rescued from Syria, 7 February 2022, url

73EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMSHRC 571 and CPJ documented four killings of media workers and journalists in 2020 572,
while573 the Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression (SCM) recorded six cases ofextrajudicial killings and executions of journalists in 2020 compared to 12 in 2019 and 27 in
2018.574 In 2021, SHRC recorded the killing of one civil defence journalist 575, while CPJ did notcite any killing of a journalist during this period. 576 For the period January to May 2022, the
SNHR had not registered any murders of journalists or media workers. 577
In 2020, SCM reported on 12 attacks against media professionals, defined as physicalviolence, compared to two in 2019 and three in 2018 578, while SHRC documented four
incidents, in which journalists and media workers were injured in 2020 579 and nine such
incidents in 2021.580
In terms of detentions of media professionals, CPJ listed four cases each in 2020 and 2021. 581
For 2021, SHRC 582 counted 33 arrests of media professionals, noting that SDF and associatedsecurity agencies were responsible for 19 of these, followed by security agencies of the GoS
with seven arrests, HTS with six arrests and the SNA with one arrest. 583
Ten years after the anti-GoS riots that marked the beginning of the Syrian civil war, RSF
reported that between March 2011 and March 2021, at least 300 professional and non professional journalists were killed by the various parties to the conflict while reporting, 300
were arrested and over 100 were still missing. 584 SNHR stated that between March 2011 andMay 2022, 711 journalists and media workers were killed. Statistics show that the majority ofjournalists and media professionals who were detained or have been forcibly disappeared asof May 2022 were initially arrested in Aleppo governorate, followed by Deir Ez -Zor
governorate and Damascus.585

571

Please note that in the SHRC Annual Report for 2020, there is a discrepancy between the number of journalists
killed (p. 33) cited in the text and the cases listed in the respective table (p. 35).
572
SHRC, The 19th Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syria, January 2021, url, p. 35; CPJ, Syria, last
updated 2022, url573
Please note that discrepancies in the figures provided by different sources may be a result of differences in theterminology and definitions used (e.g., definition of ‘journalist’ and ‘media worker’ or distinctions regarding theircause of death, etc.). For more detailed information on definitions and terminology, see, e.g., CPJ, Methodology,
n.d. url; SCM, Syria: The Black Hole for Media Work - 10 Years of Violations, May 2021, url, p. 2; SHRC, The 20th
Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syria, 9 January 2022, url, p. 27
574
SCM, Syria: The Black Hole for Media Work - 10 Years of Violations [Chart], May 2021, url, p. 39
575
SHRC, The 20th Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syria, 9 January 2022, url, p. 29
576
CPJ, Syria, last updated 2022, url
577
SNHR, The Annual Report on the Most Notable Violations against Media Workers in Syria on World Press
Freedom Day, 4 May 2022, url, p. 14
578
SCM, Syria: The Black Hole for Media Work - 10 Years of Violations [Chart], May 2021, url, p. 21
579
SHRC, The 19th Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syria, January 2021, url, pp. 35-36
580
SHRC, The 20th Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syria, 9 January 2022, url, pp. 29-32
581
CPJ, Syria, last updated 2022, url582
Please note that only SHRC's 2021 annual report includes specific data on arrests of journalists; the 2020 annual
report did not include this data.
583
SHRC, The 20th Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syria, 9 January 2022, url, pp. 27-28
584
RSF, Toll of ten years of civil war on journalists in Syria, 12 March 2021, url
585
SNHR, The Annual Report on the Most Notable Violations against Media Workers in Syria on World Press
Freedom Day, 4 May 2022, url, pp. 12, 17

74

SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORT

7.2 Targeting by government forces and affiliated armed
groupsAlthough the constitution stipulates limited freedom of expression, including for the press,
those who attempted to exercise this right often faced abuse, mistreatment, arrest, or death at
the hands of the GoS according to USDOS586, reportedly making areas controlled by the GoS
one of the most difficult places for journalists.587 The Syrian Arab Republic is considered oneof the most restrictive places for media and journalism. Since 1974, Syrian journalists mustregister with the state-run Union of Syrian Journalists, which sets strict barriers to admission.
Since the 2011 civil war, the GoS has restricted press freedom even further. 588
In its report on human rights practices in Syria for 2021, USDOS reported on the detention,
arrest, harassment and killings of journalists and other writers by forces of the GoS for
allegedly speaking critically of the state.589 This reportedly was also the case for journalists
associated with pro-GoS networks.590 ‘Harassment included intimidation, banning individuals
from the country, dismissing journalists from their positions, and ignoring requests forcontinued accreditation.’591 The GoS forces routinely detained, intimidated, and tortured
YouTubers and other citizen journalists.592 Of the above-mentioned 66 violations against
media personnel recorded by SCM in 2020, 12 were attributed to the GoS.593
In March 2018, the GoS ‘gave itself a new tool for cracking down’594 on what it considered
online crimes by creating a so-called anti-cybercrime department as well as cybercrime courtsthat put massive pressure on journalists and media professionals.595 In October 2020, theMinister of Information announced that arrests of journalists would stop, however, arrests
continued.596
As part of a campaign to ‘combat the spread of false news and rumors’, in January 2021, eightpeople, including a well-known Damascus television host, were arrested for comments madeon Facebook.597 Ahead of the presidential election in May 2021, the GoS released 400 civil
servants, judges, lawyers, and journalists detained during the year under Syria’s cybercrime

586

USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Syria, 12 April 2022, url, p. 40
New Arab (The), Syrian regime forces raid home of former state media journalist after Assad comments, 8
February 2022, url
588
MEE, Syria's Assad approves new law tightening freedom of speech, 28 Mar ch 2022, url
589
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Syria, 12 April 2022, url, p. 42
590
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Syria, 12 April 2022, url, p. 42; New Arab (The),
Syrian regime forces raid home of former state media journalist after Assad comments, 8 February 2022, url
591
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Syria, 12 April 2022, url, p. 42
592
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Syria, 12 April 2022, url, p. 42; see, e.g. VOA,
Syria's Civil War Marks Rise and Fall of Country's Journalism, 16 March 2021, url; GCHR, Syria: Prominent media
figure and seven citizens arrested for using Facebook to express their views, 5 February 2021, url; SHRC, Re-arrestof former detainee Mazen al-Hamada, 24 February 2020, url
593
SCM, Syria: The Black Hole for Media Work - 10 Years of Violations, May 2021, url, pp. 126-128
594
RSF, Syria, n.d, url
595
SOHR, Violations against media activists | Nearly 750 activists and journalists killed, while hundreds forcibly
disappeared, 24 November 2020, url; Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2022 Country Report - Syria, 23 February 2022,
url, p.11; RSF, Syria, 2022, url
596
Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2022 Country Report - Syria, 23 February 2022, url, p.11
597
IFEX, Syria: Eight arrested for critical online posts, 8 February 2021, url
587

75EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

law. The majority of the released social media critics were ‘supporters of Syrian authorities’
handling of the uprising in 2011’ and were detained for online posts criticising the economic
situation and state corruption.598 In February 2022, a journalist from Tartous was arrested after
criticising on Facebook a lavish reception held by Assad at the presidential palace, while theeconomic situation of the general population was deteriorating. 599 The journalist waspreviously arrested twice for reporting on corruption.600
The 2018 anti-cybercrime law further threatened the already precarious abilities to express
opinions online.601 In March 2022, Syria’s president signed into law a bill imposing new
restrictions on the media further limiting freedom of expression. While under the 2018 law only
Syrians residing abroad could be sentenced to imprisonment, the new legislation also
provides for imprisonment of at least six months for Syrians residing within the country for
spreading ‘fake or exaggerated news’ deemed harmful to the state. The new law also
stipulates at least one year in jail for Syrians who wrote or verbally called for the cession of
Syrian territory.602
In April 2022, Syria’s President ratified Cybercrime Law No 20 of 2022 which classified certain
acts as cybercrime, including ‘publishing online content that the government finds
objectionable, as well as publishing digital content on the internet with the intention of“overthrowing or changing the regime in the country”, or “undermining the prestige of thestate and compromising national unity”’. The new law prescribed penalties for these acts
which ranged from one month to 15 years in prison, as well as fines of between SYP 200 000
to SYP 15 million.603 In June 2022, the GoS arrested 11 persons in Aleppo under the new
cybercrime law under the accusation of spreading ‘fake news’, after having ‘communicated’
with social media pages who were run from outside Syria. 604 The arrest of citizen journalists
including women carried out by the Criminal Security Branch was recorded in the cities of
Latakia, Tartus and Damascus on charges of cooperation in reporting news to foreign media
outlets.605
Moreover, in its country report on Syria, the Austrian BFA Staatendokumentation refers toreports indicating that family members of journalists working for opposition media in Europe
were arrested, detained for days and allegedly tortured. 606

598

Reuters, Syria releases hundreds of social media critics ahead of election, 11 May 2021, url
RSF, Syrian journalist detained for third time in 18 months, 9 February 2022, url; Enab Baladi, After criticizing alAssad, Kenan Wakkaf is missing and abandoned by fellow journalists, 2 March 2022, url
600
RSF, Syrian journalist detained for third time in 18 months, 9 February 2022, url
601
GCHR, Syria: Newly enacted Anti-Cybercrime Law threatens online freedom of opinion and expression, 16 May
2018, url
602
MEE, Syria's Assad approves new law tightening freedom of speech, 28 March 2022, url; Media Line (The),
Assad Signs New Syrian Law That Limits Freedom of Speech, 29 March 2022, url
603
Civicus, Media networks and journalists face brutal repression, 10 May 2022, url
604
New Arab (The), Syrian regime arrests citizens under new cybercrime law, 2 June 2022, url
605
SNHR, At Least 1,024 Arbitrary Arrests/Detentions Documented in Syria in the First Half of 2022, Including 49
Children and 29 Women, with 164 of These Cases Documented in June, 5 July 2022, url, p. 9606
Austria, BFA Staatendokumentation, Syria Country Report from the COI -CMS, Version 7 [source: Uğur ÜmitÜngö], 24 January 2022, url, p. 140
599

76

SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORT

7.3 Targeting by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)
Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) continued to repress freedom of expression in areas under its
control.607 Harsh punishments and executions of individuals deemed critical of the rules orsuspected of having ties to the GoS were imposed by self-appointed courts.608 Throughout thereferencing period, reports on arrests of journalists and media activists for criticising HTS
continued.609 While some of the detained media activists were reportedly released withindays, others remained in detention.610
According to journalists and media activists, the safety of journalists depended on the degree
to which they praise the HTS and its civilian arm, the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG).
Media activists were arrested without judicial involvement and without clearly communicatedcharges, and at times were subjected to detention under harsh conditions, torture, and illtreatment. Many media activists and journalists resorted to using pseudonyms and worked insecrecy, in fear of arrest.611 Other journalists described being intimidated and threatened by
the HTS, which forced them to leave.612 According to the USDOS report on human rights
practices in Syria for 2021, the HTS ‘routinely targeted and killed both local and foreign
journalists’.613
In July 2020, the HTS-linked SSG imposed a regulation which prescribed that journalists were
not allowed to work in areas under its control without obtaining its permission. Since then, an
SSG-issued press card is required in order to carry out media work. Journalists who do notcarry a card risked restriction of movement as well as arrest. According to one cardholder, thecard facilitates work by allowing taking photographs in public, without being restricted by
security forces. In order to obtain this card, journalists are required to provide a range of
information to the SSG. ‘Media activists and correspondents working in north-western Syria
heavily criticized these procedures.’ By applying for the card, some journalists fear
subordination to the SSG as well as its interference in their reporting.614 According to the
UNCOI, HTS interfered in media reporting during the second half of 2021.615

607

UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 67; AI, Amnesty International Report 2021/22 – Syria, 29 March
2022, url, p. 355; UNSG, Implementation of resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332
(2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020), S/2020/327, 23 April 2020, url, para. 12
608
UNSG, Implementation of resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393
(2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020), S/2020/327, 23 April 2020, url, para. 12
609
Al-Monitor, Journalists flee northwest Syria as intimidation ramps up, 18 April 2022, url; AI, Amnesty International
Report 2021/22 – Syria, 29 March 2022, 29 March 2022, url; Syrian Observer (The), HTS Arrests Media Activist in
Syria’s Idleb, 10 March 2022, url; NPA, Journalists in HTS prisons in Syria’s Idlib face unknown fate, 23 February2022, url; Al-Monitor, Syrian journalists in Idlib face crackdown from jihadist-affiliated government, 26 October
2020, url
610
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 68
611
NPA, Journalists in HTS prisons in Syria’s Idlib face unknown fate, 23 February 2022, url; RSF, Sexist hatecampaign against Idlib-based reporter, 4 March 2020, url
612
Al-Monitor, Journalists flee northwest Syria as intimidation ramps up, 18 April 2022, url
613
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Syria, 12 April 2022, url, p. 42
614
Al-Monitor, Syrian journalists in Idlib face crackdown from jihadist-affiliated government, 26 October 2020, url
615
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/48/70, 13 August 2021, url, para. 71

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

In May 2021, the SSG released a statement criticising media outlets and media workers innorthern Syria for allegedly not complying with the media regulations it had introduced. In themonths leading up to the statement, the group clamped down on several media workers. 616
During the same month, a media activist and reporter from the northern Idlib Governorate wasallegedly forced to sign a pledge not to post anything critical about HTS on his personal
Facebook page, according to SNHR.617

7.4 Targeting by the Syrian National Army (SNA)
In an April 2020 report, the UN Secretary-General stated that in northern Syria armed groups
controlling the area systematically targeted civilians, including journalists, who wereconsidered members of an opposing party or perceived to be critical of the de facto
authorities. The ‘whereabouts and fate’ of many of these individuals remained uncertain. 618 A
February 2022 report by the UNCOI referred to continuing reports of the SNA detaining
civilians for criticising its factions and indicated that investigations into arbitrary detention ofjournalists were underway. According to the report, released detainees cited torture and illtreatment in SNA detention centres in 2021.619
In August 2022, journalists covering protests against the SNA-led administration of Al Bab citywere threatened with arrest by members of the SNA affiliated police for their reporting.620

7.5 Targeting by the Syrian Democratic Forces/Kurdish
People’s Protection Units
During the reference period, SDF continued to obstruct freedom of expression, to target
civilians, who were considered members of an opposing party or perceived to be critical of thede facto authorities, and to harass the media including arrests of its personnel. 621 According to
the UNCOI, sufficient reasons exist to believe that the SDF ‘continued to unlawfully deprive […]media workers of their liberty’.622
The US broadcaster Voice of America (VOA) reported in a March 2021 article, that northeastern Syria, controlled by the US-backed SDF, is considered to be ‘marginally more open to616

BBC Monitoring, Syria jihadist-backed authority criticises media 'breaches', 7 May 202 1
SNHR, The Annual Report on the Most Notable Violations against Media Workers in Syria on World Press
Freedom Day, 4 May 2022, url, pp. 10, 11
618
UNSG, Implementation of resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017),
2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020), S/2020/327, 23 April 2020, url, para. 12619
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 83-84
620
Syrian Observer (The), Turkish-Backed Civil Police Attacks Journalists in al-Bab, 3 August 2022, url621
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 104-105; UNSG, Implementation of resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165
(2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020), S/2020/327,
23 April 2020, url, para. 12622
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 106
617

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SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORT

media’ than other parts of Syria.623 However, while international journalists are largely treatedfriendly, local reporters may face arrests, harassment or attacks if reporting critically on thelocal administration. According to VOA, ‘[r]ed lines for media often include major corruption
cases, oil deals made by the local administration and military matters, particularly thoserelated to terrorism.’624
A Dutch journalist who has reported repeatedly from north-eastern Syria in recent years wasquoted by VOA in 2021 as saying that the situation for local media workers had improved
slightly since 2013: while critical reporters were expelled from the country in the past, they
have more recently been subjected to short-term arrests.625
During the reference, period cases of repressions against journalists, including arrests werereported, as the following examples illustrate: In April and May 2020, the authorities in Northeastern Syria reportedly revoked the press credentials of three local reporters. One of thejournalists was subjected to a 60-day work ban for using the word ‘killed’ instead of ‘martyr’. 626
In March 2021, RSF reported an increase in arrests of journalists by the SDF, often in the formof enforced disappearances and without notifying their families. 627 I
Journalists who covered demonstrations against child recruitment by the SDF were briefly
detained in December 2021 628, while those covering demonstrations against the arbitraryarrest of KNC members were beaten by members of the Kurdish Revolutionary Youth
Movement.629

623

VOA, Syria's Civil War Marks Rise and Fall of Country's Journalism, 16 March 2021, url
VOA, Reporter Kidnapped, Beaten in Northeast Syria, 19 January 2022, url
625
VOA, Syria's Civil War Marks Rise and Fall of Country's Journalism, 16 March 2021, url
626
VOA, Reporter’s Credentials Yanked in Northeast Syria for ‘Offending Martyrs’, 13 May 2020, url
627
RSF, Wave of Kurdish arrests of Syrian journalists, 8 March 2021, url
628
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 105; VOA, Reporter Kidnapped, Beaten in Northeast Syria, 19
January 2022, url629
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para 105
62479EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

8. Doctors and other medical personnel
For information on attacks on medical facilities, please see the EUAA COI report on Syria:
Security Situation published in July 2021.

8.1 Targeting by government forces and affiliated armed
groups
As of June 2022, Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) recorded the killings of 945 medical
personnel630 since 2011, with 93 % of deaths attributed to GoS or their allied forces. Over halfof all medical personnel killed was due to aerial attacks and shelling. 631 As of March 2022,
PHR stated that at least 167 health personnel have been executed or tortured before their
death by GoS forces since the start of the conflict. Most of these cases had occurred in Rural
Damascus governorate, with 157 recorded deaths of medical personnel.632
According to SNHR, GoS forces and allied militia were considered to be responsible for thedeath of nine medical workers and for at least nine attacks on medical facilities in 2020, as
well as for the death of one medical worker and attacks on at least two medical facilities in
2021.633 Russian forces were held responsible for the death of four medical professionals aswell as for at least 13 attacks on medical facilities in 2020. In 2021, SNHR was not able todocument any deaths of medical workers or attacks on medical facilities in attacks attributed
to Russian forces.634 In February 2022, SNHR reported on the extrajudicial killing of one
medical worker by GoS forces.635 SHRC recorded fewer attacks on medical and emergency
rescue personnel and facilities in 2020 and 2021 respectively compared to previous years 636,
but noted that assaults by security and military personnel in areas under different control
continued, and civilians attacking health professionals were taking advantage of the poor
application of law in these areas.637
The UNCOI noted in several reports published during the reporting period the deliberatetargeting of medical facilities and medical personnel by GoS forces since the beginning of the630

PHR’s definition of ‘medical personnel’ includes doctors, nurses, paramedics, pharmacists, dentists,
veterinarians, lab technicians, and health professional students. PHR, Medical Personnel Are Targeted in Syria,
updated June 2022, url
631
PHR, Medical Personnel Are Targeted in Syria, updated June 2022, url
632
PHR, Physicians for Human Rights’ Findings of Attacks on Health Care in Syria. Findings as of March 2022,
March 2022, url
633
SNHR, Eleventh Annual Report: The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in 2021: The State’s Collapse
and Society’s Fragmentation, 21 January 2022, url, pp. 12, 34
634
SNHR, Eleventh Annual Report: The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in 2021: The State’s Collapse
and Society’s Fragmentation, 21 January 2022, url, p. 43635
SNHR, The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in February 2022, 4 March 2022, url, p. 18
636
SHRC, The 19th Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syria, January 2021, url, p. 25; SHRC, The 20th
Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syria, 9 January 2022, url, p. 21
637
SHRC, The 20th Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syria, 9 January 2022, url, p. 21

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SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORT

conflict.638 In February 2022, the UNCOI reported on the use of precision-guided artillery
shells by pro-GoS forces in north-western Syria against first responders in an incident in Sarjah
village in July 2021, killing two people and injuring five, as well as against a medical facility inMar’yan village in September of the same year. The UNCOI stated that these apparently
deliberately targeted attacks potentially constituted war crimes 639, as it had already observedwith regard to previous incidents such as a rocket attack by GoS forces 640 on a cave hospitalin Atarib in western Aleppo in March 2021 641, where 8 civilian patients were killed and 13
injured, including 5 medical personnel.642
According to a report by SNHR on the detention or enforced disappearance of medical
personnel in the period March 2011 to February 2021, at least 3 364 personnel were stilldetained or forcibly disappeared across Syria as of February 2021. 643 The UNCOI made asimilar observation in its March 2021 report.644 SNHR noted that GoS forces were responsiblefor 99 % of all recorded cases of arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance of healthcare personnel, namely 3 329, including 282 women. Most of these cases took place in the
period 2011 to 2014, apparently deliberately targeting medical personnel who treated injured
protesters and opponents of the GoS.645 PHR observed that detentions and enforced
disappearances aimed not only at punishing medical professionals for helping injured
opponents 646, but also to deprive non-government-controlled areas from access to medicalcare.647
Several NGOs noted in a joint submission to the UN Human Rights Council in November 2021
the continued displacement of doctors and medical personnel in north-eastern Syria becauseof threats, abductions and being targeted by GoS and terrorist groups.648

638

See, for example, UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on
the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/43/57, 28 January 2020, url, para. 29; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/44/61, 3 September 2020,
url, para. 71; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the
Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/46/54, 21 January 2021, url, para. 29
639
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 59, 65
640
SNHR holds both, Syrian government and Russian forces responsible for the attack. See SNHR, In Tandem with
the Brussels V Conference, the Largest Russian Military Escalation in Nearly a Year, with al Atareb Hospital and Bab
al Hawa Border Crossing Bombed, 29 March 2021, url, pp. 4-8. PHR and SAMS similarly note that publicly available
documents point to either Syrian government or Russian forces as the perpetrators. PHR and SAMS, ‘No place issafe for health care’. The attack on Syria’s Al-Atareb Hospital, July 2021, url, p. 9641
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/48/70, 13 August 2021, url, para. 64
642
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/48/70, 13 August 2021, url, para. 54
643
SNHR, At Least 3,364 Health Care Personnel Still Arrested/Forcibly Disappeared, 98% by the Syrian Regime, 27
February 2021, url, p. 5644
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/46/55, 11 March 2021, url, para. 15
645
SNHR, At Least 3,364 Health Care Personnel Still Arrested/Forcibly Disappeared, 98% by the Syrian Regime, 27
February 2021, url, pp. 5-6
646
PHR, The Survivors, the Dead, and the Disappeared. Detention of health care workers in Syria, 2011 -2012,
November 2021, url, p. 8647
PHR, The Survivors, the Dead, and the Disappeared. Detention of health care workers in Syria, 2011 -2012,
November 2021, url, p. 4648
UN Human Rights Council, Summary of stakeholders’ submissions on Syrian Arab Republic,
A/HRC/WG.6/40/SYR/3, 1 November 2021, url, para. 48

81

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMSHRC reported in March 2020 on the GoS’ denial of any cases of Covid-19 infections and on
the death of at least one medical professional that was attributed to leaking information about
the virus – the leader of the radiology department of Qirdaha hospital, who was shot in thehead a few days after having spoken about the spreading of the disease in the region. 649 Two
doctors in a GoS-controlled area in Aleppo were reportedly attacked in September 2020 after
the death of a Covid-19 patient. The perpetrators reportedly included a policeman. The casewas never brought before court.650 After the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic in spring
2020, medical professionals reported on threats and intimidations by intelligence services
present in hospitals and clinics, warning them not to register Covid-19 deaths, but to document
them as pneumonia cases instead.651

8.2 Targeting by non-state armed groups
As of March 2022, PHR recorded the killings of at least 53 medical personnel by non-statearmed groups since the beginning of the conflict. Moreover, eight killings were reportedlycommitted by international coalition forces, three by Kurdish forces and one by Turkis h forces.
Three killings were attributed either to SDF or GoS forces.652
At least 14 medical personnel detained or forcibly disappeared by SDF in the period March2011 to February 2021, remained in detention or were unaccounted for, according to SNHR.
Other perpetrators included ISIL which was responsible for the detention or enforced
disappearance of five medical personnel, including two women, as well as HTS and the SNA
each with presumably being responsible for 8 detained or forcibly disappeared medical
personnel.653
In March 2021, SDF fighters reportedly raided the Public Surgical Hospital of Al-Shiheel city in
Deir Ez-Zor governorate, where they verbally and physically abused medical personnel andaccused them of being ‘terrorists’. SDF members reportedly damaged medical equipment anddetained eight civilians, including a doctor and three nurses (at least twelve civilians including
eight medical personnel, according to another report)654 , who were brought to a detention
facility where they were submitted to further beatings and abuse.655
In June 2021, 2 medical personnel were killed and 3 more injured in a rocket attack on AlShifa hospital in the city of Afrin, which caused the death of all together 15 persons, while 43
were injured.656 Moreover, artillery shelling destroyed the emergency ward, where victims
649

SHRC, Syrian regime continues to deny the corona virus crisis, 22 March 2020, url
SPHN, Responsibility to Protect: Syrian Healthcare Workers in the Face of COVID -19, February 2021, url, p. 3
651
Tsurkov, E. and Jukhadar, Q., Ravaged by war, Syria’s health care system is utterly unprepared for a pandemic,
MEI, 23 April 2020, url
652
PHR, Physicians for Human Rights’ Findings of Attacks on Health Care in Syria, March 2022, url
653
SNHR, At Least 3,364 Health Care Personnel Still Arrested/Forcibly Disappeared, 98% by the Syrian Regime, 27
February 2021, url, p. 5654
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquir y on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/48/70, 13 August 2021, url, para. 104
655
SNHR, Eleventh Annual Report: The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in 2021: The State’s Collapse
and Society’s Fragmentation, 21 January 2022, url, p. 55; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent
International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/48/70, 13 August 2021, url, para. 104
656
Syria Direct, Who is behind the massacre at Afrin’s al-Shifa Hospital?, 14 June 2021, url
650

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SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORT

from a first attack on Afrin less than an hour earlier had been brought, as well as other parts of
the hospital.657 While Turkey and the Turkish-backed SNA, which control Afrin, accused the
YPG, PYD and PKK of being responsible for the attack, SDF denied any responsibility. 658 STJ
concluded that GoS forces and their Russian allies were ‘most likely’ responsible for theattack.659
In January 2020, SDF-affiliated gunmen reportedly stormed a hospital in Al-Kasrah in Deir EzZor, beating medical personnel and severely injuring one nurse. Reasons for the attack were
unknown.660 In July 2020, SOHR reported that a doctor at Al-Fayhaa hospital in the village of
Abreeh in the Deir Ez-Zor countryside was beaten by a leader of the Deir Ez-Zor military
council, allegedly for not allowing him to film injured patients. 661 Three nurses at the National
Hospital in Al-Raqqa city were reportedly injured in an attack by SDF forces after one of theirrelatives died of Covid-19 in October 2020.662
Arab medical personnel from Deir Ez-Zor and Raqqa reportedly were reluctant to accesstrainings offered at facilities in the Kurdish-controlled areas, as they feared persecution should
they later return to SNA -controlled areas or to Turkey in search of work. 663
SHRC reported on the arrest of a nurse working in a hospital in Idlib city by HTS fighters inJanuary 2021.664 SOHR reported on the arrest of a doctor in his clinic in Al-Dana city innorthern Idlib by a HTS security patrol in July 2021 for unknown reasons. 665
In the period April 2013 to January 2022, SNHR recorded the killing of at least 36 medical
personnel, half of them women, by ISIL.666 In the same period, five medical personnel wereabducted by ISIL, including two women.667 SNHR noted that ISIL often focused on killing or
abducting well-known personalities and activists, including medical personnel, with the aim of657

UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/48/70, 13 August 2021, url, para. 79
658
Syria Direct, Who is behind the massacre at Afrin’s al -Shifa Hospital?, 14 June 2021, url; UN Human Rights
Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/48/70,
13 August 2021, url, para. 79
659
STJ, Syria: An Investigation on the Attack on Afrin’s Al -Shifaa Hospital, 20 October 2021, url, pp. 55-56
660
New Arab (The), Kurdish militia filmed beating up hospital staff in eastern Syria, 2 January 2020, url; SOHR,
Popular resentment ignites after SDF members assaulted medical staff in a rural Deir Ezzor hospital, 1 January
2020, url
661
SOHR, After the incident of beating and insulting medical staff | Administration of Al -Fayha hospital closes the
hospital and decides to relocate it to Al-Hasakeh city, 7 July 2020, url
662
Reported by Insecurity Insight with reference to ACLED data, see Insecurity Insight, Attacks on Health Care
Monthly News Brief, October 2020, url, p. 4
663
PHR, Destruction, Obstruction, and Inaction, December 2021, 15 December 2021, url, p. 11
664
SHRC, Arrests and Releases in January 2021, 8 February 2022, url
665
SOHR, Idlib. HTS arrests doctor in al-Dana, 15 July 2021, url
666
SNHR, The Most Notable ISIS Violations against Syrian Society and ISIS’ Contribution to Distorting the Popular
Uprising Calling for Freedom and Dignity, 10 February 2022, url, p. 11
667
SNHR, The Most Notable ISIS Violations against Syrian Society and ISIS’ Contribution to Distorting the Popular
Uprising Calling for Freedom and Dignity, 10 February 2022, url, p. 14

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

instilling as much fear as possible in the population668, but also to deprive society of highly
educated people.669

8.3 Targeting by unspecified armed actors
As of March 2022, PHR recorded the killings of at least 43 medical personnel by unknown
forces since the beginning of the conflict. 670 SNHR recorded 6 killings of medical professionals
in 2021, and 5 killings in 2020, committed by unknown perpetrators. 671 In the first half of 2022,
the same organisation documented 6 attacks on medical facilities and the death of 5 medical
personnel killed at the hands of unspecified parties.672
During the reference period, the UNCOI observed an increase in reports on targeted killings
across Sweida and Dar’a Governorates 673, including where medical personnel were among thevictims of targeted killings.674 In most cases, the UNCOI noted in August 2020, the killings
reportedly were carried out by men on motorcycles and with small arms, making identificationof the perpetrators difficult.675 In some cases, medical doctors who had treated fighters
seemed to be specifically targeted.676 In one incident, in April 2021, a former paramedic who
had been active in the period when Dar’a governorate was under control of armed groups,
and who had reportedly refused so-called reconciliation with the GoS, was shot dead in frontof his children by unidentified gunmen.677
Several local sources reported on the killing or attempted killing of medical personnel by
unknown perpetrators during the reporting period, including in February 2020 678 and February
2022679 in Dar’a governorate, in December 2020 in Idlib city 680, as well as in March 681 and668

SNHR, The Most Notable ISIS Violations against Syrian Society and ISIS’ Contribution to Distorting the Popular
Uprising Calling for Freedom and Dignity, 10 February 2022, url, p. 10
669
SNHR, The Most Notable ISIS Violations against Syrian Society and ISIS’ Contribution to Distorting the Popular
Uprising Calling for Freedom and Dignity, 10 February 2022, url, p. 17
670
PHR, Physicians for Human Rights’ Findings of Attacks on Health Care in Syria, March 2022, url
671
SNHR, Eleventh Annual Report: The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in 2021: The State’s Collapse
and Society’s Fragmentation, 21 January 2022, url, p. 59
672
SNHR, The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in June and the First Half of 2022, 7 July 2022, url,
pp. 21, 23
673
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/48/70, 13 August 2021, url, para. 24; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent
International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/45/31, 14 August 2020, url, para. 17
674
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/48/70, 13 August 2021, url, para. 25; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent
International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/45/31, 14 August 2020, url, para. 17
675
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/45/31, 14 August 2020, url, para. 17
676
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/45/31, 14 August 2020, url, para. 18
677
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/48/70, 13 August 2021, url, para. 26
678
SOHR, Three separate assassinations leave three persons dead in rural Daraa, 2 February 2020, url
679
SNHR, The most notable human rights violations in Syria in February 2022, 4 March 2022, url, p. 5680
SOHR, Idlib. Assassination attempt on displaced doctor from southern Damascus to Idlib province, 21 December
2021, url
681
SNHR, Pharmacist killed by unidentified gunmen in Swaidan Jazira village in Deir Ez-Zour suburbs on March 27,
29 March 2021, url

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SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORT

October 682 2021, and in March 2022683 in Deir Ez-Zor governorate. In January 2022, a doctor
reportedly working for the ICRC was stabbed and injured in an attack by unknown
perpetrators in Al-Hol camp, Hasaka governorate, according to a local media report. 684
Likewise in Al-Hol camp, a nurse working for the Kurdish Red Crescent was shot dead a day
earlier by unknown gunmen, although it was presumed that ISIL was behind the attack.685 A
community health worker working for a UN-funded health project was killed in a car bomb
explosion in Al-Bab city (Aleppo governorate) in February 2021. 686

682

SOHR, Deir Ezzor security instability. Unidentified gunmen storm hospital and open fire on a doctors [sic] inside,
16 October 2021, url
683
SNHR, The most notable human rights violations in Syria in March 2022, 7 April 2022, url, p. 4
684
Kurdistan24, Foreign doctor injured in stabbing attack in Syria's al -Hol camp: Report, 12 January 2022, url
685
New Arab (The), Doctor, nurse shot dead in separate eastern Syria attacks, 14 January 2022, url; Kurdistan24,
Kurdish paramedic killed in notorious al-Hol camp, 12 January 2022, url
686
UN, Syria, Office of the Deputy Regional Humanitarian Coordinator for the Syria Crisis, Statement by Mark Cutts,
17 February 2021, url, p. 1; SNHR, Humanitarian association volunteer killed in a blast of IED of unknown origin in al
Bab city in Aleppo on Feb 16, 17 February 2021, url

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

9. Sunni Arabs
Sunni Arabs constitute the majority of the Syrian population but, according to various experts,
cannot be considered a homogeneous or unified group. 687 According to Kheder Khaddour
from the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, the conflict ‘reshaped Sunni Islamic
identity in Syria’, resulting in a situation characterised by several competing Sunni identities.688
As Sunni Arabs differed significantly in their political affiliations during the Syrian civil war, they
became targeted by different actors.689 For more detailed background information on intraSunni diversity in Syria, please see Section 10.3 of the previous EUAA COI report on Syria:
Targeting of Individuals published in March 2020.
In its annual report for 2021, SHRC raised concerns over of the broad prevalence of
educational deprivation and illiteracy in Syria, which affected certain regions and populationgroups to a greater extent, namely areas that rebelled strongly against the GoS and whichwere primarily inhabited by Arabs and Sunnis.690 In 2021, it was reported that among the 40
highest-ranking officers heading various Syrian army units, either all were held by Alawites 691
or only one Sunni was represented.692 Sunni officers who did retain high-ranking posts
commanded less influential units and were put under close supervision of officially lowerranking Alawite colleagues.693

9.1 Targeting by the government forces and affiliatedarmed groups
For 2021, USDOS reported in its annual report on religious freedom that Sunnis , the largest
demographically in the country, were found to be the group most frequently subjected tohuman rights abuses and violations by the GoS, including unlawful killings, torture, arbitrary
detention, confiscation of property and enforced disappearances . The report also maintainedthat the majority of those deemed opponents of the GoS were Sunnis.694 Although the political

687

Al-Haj Saleh, Y., The Dark Path of Minority Politics: Why Privileging Minorities Will Only Perpetuate the Syrian
Catastrophe, TCF, 18 April 2019, url, p. 4; Khaddour, K., Localism, War, and the Fragmentation of Sunni Islam in
Syria, Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, 28 March 2019, url; Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil
War, WINEP, url, p. 13
688
Khaddour, K., Localism, War, and the Fragmentation of Sunni Islam in Syria, Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle
East Center, 28 March 2019, url
689
Al-Haj Saleh, Y., The Dark Path of Minority Politics: Why Privileging Minorities Will Only Perpetuate the Syrian
Catastrophe, TCF, 18 April 2019, url, pp. 4, 11
690
SHRC, The 20th Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syria, 9 January 2022, url, p. 37
691
USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report 2020 - Syria, 12 May 2021, url, p. 1
692
Pierret, T., Syria’s “Sunni Question” Is Here to Stay, Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs, 24 March
2021, url
693
Pierret, T., Syria’s “Sunni Question” Is Here to Stay, Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs, 24 March
2021, url
694
USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report 2021 - Syria, 2 June 2022, url, p. 7

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elite included Sunnis, the Sunni majority makes up most of the anti-GoS opposition and has
been the most heavily repressed by the authorities because of this perceived affiliation.695
For more information on the situation of individuals affiliated or associated with the opposition,please see Section 1. Persons perceived to be opposing the government.
Sunni Arabs were the hardest hit by the war and the GoS’ repressions and have experienced
the greatest exodus/displacement from the country. This demographic group, who used torepresent a clear majority of the population, was estimated to make up only between 49 %and 52 % of the population in 2020. The demographic shifts are reportedly benefiting the
GoS.696
A May 2020 report by the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center noted that thestructural damage caused during the war allegedly occurred ‘along sectarian lines, with amajority of destroyed areas being Sunni’.697 Thomas Pierret argues in March 2021 that during
the Syrian civil war collective punishment of whole communities was reserved for Sunni
towns.698
Kheder Khaddour stated that Syria’s March 2011 uprising profoundly changed the country's‘Sunni Islamic religious landscape’. In areas under its authority, the GoS sustained a ‘security based version of Islam’ by supporting religious interpretations it considered tolerable. 699
According to a joint NGO statement published in a November 2021 report by the UN Human
Rights Council, the Syrian law required all religious groups to register with the GoS.
Membership in an organisation considered by the GoS to be linked to Sunni fundamentalism,
may result in arrest, torture, and execution. 700
In November 2021 it was reported that Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad eliminated theposition of Grand Mufti of Syria. The mufti’s main task, issuing fatwas, was transferred to acouncil appointed by the GoS called the ‘Scientific Jurisprudence Council’, composed of anumber of religious groups and minorities, among them Sunni Muslim representatives. Experts
reportedly assumed that the fatwas of the newly established council will not correspond to thewishes of the Syrian Sunnis, given that their representatives will only be serving as membersof the multi-sectarian council.701

695

Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2022: Syria, February 2022, url
Orient XXI, Syria: Communitarianism as a Combat Strategy, 1 April 2020, url
697
Abou Zainedin, S. and Fakhani, H., Syria’s Reconstruction Between Discriminatory Implementation andCircumscribed Resistance, Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, 15 May 2020, url
698
Pierret, T., Syria’s “Sunni Question” Is Here to Stay, Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs, 24 March
2021, url699
Khaddour, K., Localism, War, and the Fragmentation of Sunni Islam in Syria, Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle
East Center, 28 March 2019, url
700
UN Human Rights Council, Summary of Stakeholders’ submissions on Syrian Arab Republic,
A/HRC/WG.6/40/SYR/3, 1 November 2021, url, para. 36
701
Arab Weekly (The), Doing away with the Mufti in Syria, 19 November 2021, url
696

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9.2 Forced displacement and denial of return
The GoS continued to impede the return of Syrians through laws such as Law No 10/2018,
which was reportedly used for the confiscation of property and land of refugees and IDPs
without due process.702 According to a November 2021 research paper focusing on
displacement and rezoning in north-eastern Damascus, the GoS has been pursuing an
expropriation policy that unjustifiably undercuts the rights of ‘forcibly displaced local
communities’.703 By doing so, ‘extended families of foreign militias and imported loyal
populations’ were settled in various areas. 704 Sunnis reportedly suffered disproportionatelyfrom the negative impact of Law No 10/2018.705 More detailed background information on Law
No 10/2018 can be found in Section 3.5.3 of the EUAA COI report on Syria: Socio-economic
situation: Damascus City (April 2021).
With reference to the Damascus suburbs bombed during the war, a September 2020 thinktank publication referred to a ‘demographic swap in which Shiites from Iran and Afghanistan
were transferred to the area once the Sunnis were expelled‘ in order to consolidate the Shiite
presence and supplant Sunni Arab communities. 706 As noted by former Syrian diplomat
Bassam Barabandi to the US magazine Foreign Policy (FP) in January 2022, the strong ties
between the Syrian president and Iran also hinders the return of the predominantly Sunni
refugee population. According to Barandi, Iran seeks to have a major impact on Syria’s future,
but a ‘large Sunni Arab population [would] make that almost impossible. That’s why Iran nevertalks about the refugee issue.’707 On instances of denied return of displaced Sunnis reported
prior to January 2020, please see Section 10.3.2 of the previous EUAA COI report on Syria:
Targeting of Individuals published in March 2020.

702

Arab News, Assad flogs off stolen Syrian lands to the Ayatollahs, 20 February 2022, url; Manara Magazine,
Crimes Against Syrian Human Plurality: Critiquing Legitimacy in Syria Under the Assad Government, 5 November
2021, url; USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report 2021 - Syria, 2 June 2022, url, p. 9
703
Ezzi, M., On the Edge of the Capital: Social Engineering in North-Eastern Damascus, EUI, 5 November 2021, url,
p. 22
704
Arab News, Assad flogs off stolen Syrian lands to the Ayatollahs, 20 February 2022, url, 8
705
USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report 2021 - Syria, 2 June 2022, url, p. 9706
New Global Order (The), The Demographic Catastrophe in Syria, 23 September 2020, url
707
FP, The Human Cost of Normalizing Assad, 3 January 2022, url

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SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORT

10. Kurds
For information on targeting of persons with (perceived) links to SDF/YPG, see Section 4.
Members of and persons perceived to be collaborating with the Syrian Democratic
Forces/Kurdish People’s Protection Units.

10.1 Stateless Kurds
A large part of the Kurdish population – 120 000, about 20 % of the entire Syrian population atthat time - became stateless following the census of 5 October 1962 in Hasaka governorate.
The census divided the local population into three categories: Syrian citizens, foreigners(ajanib, Sg.: ajnabi), and maktoumeen (concealed, muted, Sg. maktoum/a). As a result, ajanib
and maktoumeen who did not hold any other citizenship, were left stateless. They were also
considered to be illegal residents since they were not officially registered in the country. 708
Syrian Kurds represented the overwhelming majority of those who lost citizenship, although
individuals of other population groups such as Arabs and Christians were affected as well, asa member of the Peoples’ Assembly noted to the Kurdish news website Rudaw.709
A Syrian academic interviewed by the EUAA noted that according to local sources, nearly 10 %of the people who were stripped of the Syrian citizenship based on the 1962 census were
Arabs who descended from big tribes and resided near the Syrian-Iraqi borders, such as
Shammar, Adwan, Al-Baggara, and Harb.710 Children inherited the status of their father, asprescribed by the Syrian law. Consequently, even children whose mother was a Syrian citizen
would be considered ajnabi or maktoumeen if their father belonged to one of these twocategories.711
Ten years after the issuance of Decree 49/2011, which granted citizenship to individuals
registered as ajnabi712, nearly 20 000 ajnabi still remained stateless.713 There were several
reasons for this: ajnabi who lacked the necessary documentation, or were not able to submit
an application in person inside Syria as required were excluded from obtaining citizenship. 714
Some stateless Syrians refrained from submitting an application as they mistrusted
government institutions or feared harassment from the security services whose permission

708

Benslama-Dabdoub, M., Colonial legacies in Syrian nationality law and the risk of statelessness, July 2021, url,
pp. 26-27
709
Rudaw, Syria’s stateless Kurds can’t afford to become citizens, 1 December 2020, url; Rudaw, ‫عضو بمجلس الشعب‬‫ تمنح الكورد مكتومي القيد حق المطالبة بالجنسية‬49 ‫المادة‬: ‫[ السوري لرووداو‬Member of the Syrian People's Assembly to Rudaw: Article
49 grants the Kurds who are not registered the right to claim citizenship], 16 November 2020, url; STJ, Syrian
Citizenship Disappeared. How the 1962 census destroyed stateless Kurds’ lives and identities, 15 September 2018,
url, p. 7
710
Syrian academic, email correspondence, 25 April 2022
711
ENS and ISI, Stateless in Syria. Country Position Paper, August 2019, url, p. 15. According to the Syrian Nationality
Law, mothers can transfer their nationality to their children only in case the child is born inside Syria and the father
is unknown, see NRC and ISI, Syrian nationality law, n.d., url
712
STJ, Decades of statelessness and the absence of basic rights, 6 July 2021, url, p. 4, FN 2
713
STJ, Decades of statelessness and the absence of basic rights, 6 July 2021, url, p. 6714
ENS and ISI, Stateless in Syria. Country Position Paper, August 2019, url, p. 17

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was required for the application process.715 STJ monitored the legal proceedings of citizenshipapplications of 17 stateless families - including stateless Kurds - in the period November 2020
to February 2021 and noted that only five families eventually were naturalized. In all cases,
families reported difficulties in hiring lawyers or receiving security permissions, and with civil
servants who delayed or denied applications or had insufficient knowledge of the legal
framework. Moreover, in many cases papers were denied by government or security services
without giving any explanation.716
Sources interviewed by DIS in January 2022 stated that either most or all ajanab were
granted Syrian citizenship after the implementation of Decree 49/2011717 and that those whoare still ajanab deliberately refrained from applying for citizenship to avoid military service. 718
Decree 49/2011 did not include maktoumeen who consequently were not able to apply for
citizenship under this law719, despite a Ministerial statement annexed to Decree 49/2011, which
was supposed to facilitate that, as a Syrian academic interviewed by the EUAA pointed out.
Citizenship applications of thousands of maktoumeen based on this decree were still inprocess and there was no reported case in which a maktoum had been granted citizenshipdirectly this way.720 At present, the only apparent way for maktoumeen to obtain citizenshipwas to be registered as ajanib and then to apply for naturalisation under Decree 49/2011,
which required the services of a lawyer. 721 Rudaw reported in December 2020 on
maktoumeen who had to pay USD 500 to USD 2 000 to their lawyers to obtain an identity
card and citizenship.722 Decree 49/2011 did not foresee any form of reparation orcompensation for those who were deprived of Syrian citizenship in the context of the Hasaka
census of 1962.723 As of July 2021, more than 46 000 maktoumeen were living in Syria, noted
STJ with reference to an inside source in the Hasaka Civil Affairs Directorate.724 However, theRepresentation of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) in the
Kurdistan Region of Iraq stated in a January 2022 interview with DIS that the number of
maktoumeen living in north-east Syria is of around 20 000.725
In GoS-controlled areas, stateless Kurds were denied the right to work, form and join tradeunions, and the right to social security, health care and education. They had no right to travel
freely without prior permission of the security service. Stateless persons were denied the right
715

STJ, Decades of statelessness and the absence of basic rights, 6 July 2021, url, p. 6
STJ, Decades of statelessness and the absence of basic rights, 6 July 2021, url, pp. 17-20
717
Denmark, DIS, Syria - Military recruitment in Hasakah Governorate, 1 July 2022 [source: Political analyst;
Representation of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq,
Suleimania; University professor, url, pp. 54; 58; 68
718
Denmark, DIS, Syria - Military recruitment in Hasakah Governorate, 1 July 2022 [source: Representation of theAutonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, Suleimania], url, p. 58
719
ENS and ISI, Stateless in Syria. Country Position Paper, August 2019, url, p. 17
720
Syrian academic, email correspondence, 25 April 2022
721
STJ, Syrian Citizenship Disappeared. How the 1962 census destroyed stateless Kurds’ lives and identities, 15
September 2018, url, p. 48; Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Algemeen ambtsbericht Syrië [Country
report Syria], May 2022, url, p. 48
722
Rudaw, Syria’s stateless Kurds can’t afford to become citizens, 1 December 20 20, url
723
VDC, ‫ الذي جعل آالف الكرد السوريين بال جنسية‬1962 ‫ في الحسكة‬24 ‫[ إحصاء ال‬The 24th census in Hasaka in 1962, which
rendered thousands of Syrian Kurds stateless], 6 October 202 1, url; STJ, Syrian Citizenship Disappeared. How the
1962 census destroyed stateless Kurds’ lives and identities, 15 September 2018, url, p. 22
724
STJ, Decades of statelessness and the absence of basic rights, 6 July 2021, url, p. 4725
Denmark, DIS, Syria - Military recruitment in Hasakah Governorate, 1 July 2022 [source: Representation of theAutonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, Suleimania], url, p. 58
716

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SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORT

to register property in their name (and had to rely on registering it in the name of relatives),
nor could they hire a lawyer, unless they had permission from the political security branch.
They were not allowed to inherit or bequeath property.726
The Kurdish-led AANES reportedly did not differentiate between stateless Kurds and thoseholding citizenship. Ajanib and maktoumeen had equal access to the AANES’ services andinstitutions, and to education. Enjoying these rights in the Kurdish-controlled areas, however,would not affect their status within the framework of Syrian national law. In the Kurdish controlled areas, stateless Kurds were obliged to do military service under the AANES ‘SelfDefence Law’.727 According to an iMMAP report of December 2021, the Kurdish-led AANES in
Qamishli city728 issued special identity cards for maktoumeen, which allowed them to passInternal Security Forces (ISF) and SDF checkpoints. They were, however, not recognised by
the GoS and its security and military forces.729 Due to their lack of citizenship and any official
identity documents, stateless persons faced numerous problems, especially those who havebeen displaced into GoS-controlled territory or who have sought refuge abroad.730

10.2 Targeting in territories controlled by the Syrian
National Army (SNA)
As of May 2021, Kurds reportedly constituted about 25 % of the population in Afrin, while
before Turkey’s Olive Branch operation in 2018, 96 % (92 %, according to another report) 731 of
the population had been Kurds.732 Since 2018, thousands of internally displaced Syrian Arabs,
fighters’ families and Turkmen were relocated to the area with Turkey’s support, while morethan half of the Kurdish population had left. Many of the IDPs relocated to Afrin reportedly
originated from Ghouta as well as from Aleppo, Rural Damascus, Homs, Idlib and Hama
governorates 733, while many of the Turkmen families relocated to Afrin had previously fledfrom Iraq, or were families of fighters from the Turkmen-majority Sultan Murad Division.734 Twolocal human rights organisations issued statements in September 2021 and February 2022
that Turkey was constructing new settlements with the financial support of organisations from
Kuwait and of Israeli Palestinians, such as the Muslim Brotherhood charity ‘Living in Dignity’, to726

USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Syria, 12 April 2022, url, p. 55; STJ, Decades ofstatelessness and the absence of basic rights, 6 July 2021, url, pp. 12-13
727
ENS and ISI, Stateless in Syria. Country Position Paper, August 2019, url, pp. 16-17; Syria Direct, ‘Shadow of ahuman’: Syria’s stateless Kurds navigate shifting authorities decades after losing citizenship, 18 October 2018, url;
Denmark, DIS, Syria - Military recruitment in Hasakah Governorate, 1 July 2022, url, p. 48; RIC, Translation: Lawconcerning military service in North and East Syria, 10 June 2020, url, art. 1(A) and (D)728
Qamishli city is located in Al-Hasakah governorate close to the Syrian-Turkish border. Most of the city is undercontrol of the Kurdish Autonomous Administration, however, a few areas, including the city’s airport, are under thecontrol of the GoS. iMMAP, Return and Reintegration Profile No. 16 Quamishli City, December 2021, url, pp. 9-10729
iMMAP, Return and Reintegration Profile No. 16 Quamishli City, December 2021, url, p. 32
730
ENS and ISI, Stateless in Syria. Country Position Paper, August 2019, url, pp. 16-17
731
Ceasefire Center for Civilian Rights and YASA, Cultivating Chaos: Afrin after operation Olive Branch, July 2020,
url, p. 7
732
Kurdistan24, Kurds becoming a minority in Kurdish region of Afrin: Statement, 30 May 2021, url; Human Rights
Organisation–Afrin–Syria [Facebook], 28 May 2021, url
733
ACAPS, Syria. Humanitarian Needs in Afrin, 3 March 2021, url, p. 2
734
Ceasefire Center for Civilian Rights and YASA, Cultivating Chaos: Afrin after operation Olive Branch, July 2020,
url, p. 20

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

house families of pro-Turkish militia members.735 Similarly, the Kurdish Hawar News Agency
reported on the construction of mosques and Islamic schools financed by Muslim
Brotherhood-affiliated organisations.736
ACAPS stated in March 2021 that at least 80 % of Afrin’s total population of 442 000 (including
154 682 residents, 285 550 IDPs, and 2 596 returnees) were in need of humanitarianassistance, with the Kurdish population reportedly being one of the most affected groups.737
Access to shelter was reportedly particularly problematic for Kurdish residents, as in manycases their property had been looted, occupied by IDPs from GoS-controlled areas or thefamilies of SNA fighters. Other residents, predominantly of Kurdish origin, had reportedly been
forced to leave their homes through threats, extortion, detention, and abduction by SNAaffiliated local militia groups.738 Fighters of SNA factions had reportedly forced former
residents to pay large sums of money to take some of their belongings from their houses, or toshare their houses with families relocated by the militia groups. 739 The UNCOI reported inAugust 2020 that it had received accounts by Kurdish civilians from Afrin and Ras Al-Ayn on
the looting and appropriation of their property by members of SNA factions, including Division
14, Brigade 142 (Suleiman Shah Brigade) and Division 22 (Hamza Brigade). 740 Al-Monitor
reported in May 2020 on similar incidents in Tall Abyad. 741 In Ras Al-Ayn, members of the
Sultan Murad and Hamza Divisions reportedly confiscated about 800 houses belonging toKurds and Arabs affiliated with AANES institutions.742
Moreover, Kurdish neighbourhoods were reportedly discriminated when it came to theprovision of services such as electricity supplies and road network maintenance. 743 The
UNCOI noted in its February 2022 report that in Afrin ‘patterns of looting, pillage, occupationand confiscation’ continued, in particular during the olive harvest season, to the detriment of
displaced owners. Armed groups reportedly seized the harvest of thousands of olive trees,
including under the pretext of ‘taxes’, ignoring the fact that the absent owners had formal orinformal powers of attorneys for the management of their property. Some owners reportedly
got their property back by paying bribes to SNA factions while some owners, who had filed
official complaints to retrieve their property or receive compensation, reportedly had sufferedthreats, beatings, abductions and even killings by members of the armed groups. In Ma’batli
and Bulbul, Aleppo governorate, members of the Levant Front and the Sultan Murad Division,

735

Human Rights Organisation–Afrin–Syria [Facebook], 21 February 2022, url; National Initiative for Afrin[Facebook], 13 September 2021, url ; NPA, Turkey goes ahead implementing demographic change in Syria’s Afrin,
21 February 2022, url; NPA, Civil organization warns of demographic change’s seriousness in Syria’s Afrin, 13
September 2021, url
736
Hawar News Agency, Turkey continues the crime of demographic change in occupied Afrin, 24 September
2021, url
737
ACAPS, Syria. Humanitarian Needs in Afrin, 3 March 2021, url, pp. 1-2
738
ACAPS, Syria. Humanitarian Needs in Afrin, 3 March 2021, url, p. 5
739
Ceasefire Center for Civilian Rights and YASA, Cultivating Chaos: Afrin after opera tion Olive Branch, July 2020,
url, pp. 20-21
740
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/45/31, 14 August 2020, url, para. 47-50
741
Al-Monitor, Turkey's occupation of northern Syria includes population transfers, 7 May 2020, url
742
Al-Hilu, K., The Turkish Intervention in Northern Syria: One Strategy, Discrepant Policies, EUI, 14 January 2021,
url, p. 7
743
Al-Hilu, K., The Turkish Intervention in Northern Syria: One Strategy, Discrepant Policies, EUI, 14 January 2021,
url, p. 14

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reportedly sold the rights to harvest olives to third parties, although the displaced owners had
objected.744
AI noted in its 2021 report on Syria that the SNA continued to commit abuses such as arbitrary
detention, abduction, as well as torture and ill treatment against civilians – predominantly of
Kurdish origin - in Afrin and Ras Al-Ayn.745 Similarly, the UNCOI noted in its August 2021 reportthat several SNA-affiliated armed groups including Division 22 (the Hamza Brigade), Division
14 (the 141st Brigade) and Division 13 (the Muhammad Al-Fatih Brigade), and Faylaq Al-Shamcontinued to unlawfully detain civilians, the majority of them Kurds. Former detainees reported
that they were beaten and tortured by SNA members to coerce confessions and otherinformation, which in some cases was later taken as the main source of evidence in criminal
proceedings. The detainees were not told why they had been detained and were transferred
to a centralized prison only after they had been forced to confess. Only then were they
allowed to contact a lawyer and their families.746 STJ reported that in Afrin in 2021, 584 people
were detained - in most cases for political reasons, including cases where people ‘werearrested for the simple fact that they were Kurds’. 747 USDOS reported on alleged extrajudicial
killings, including of a Kurdish Yezidi civilian, by SNA-affiliated Faylaq al-Sham militia in August2020 748, and noted that victims of abductions by Turkish-backed armed groups were often of
Kurdish or Yezidi origin or activists who had been critical of these armed groups. 749
Syrian human rights groups noted in a joint submission to the UN Human Rights Council
Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review in November 2021 that authorities in Afrin
had ceased to issue official documents in the Kurdish language, publishing them in Arabic or
Turkish instead. Moreover, also traffic signs and other institutional signs were changed into
Arabic and Turkish. The Kurdish school curriculum was replaced with Turkish and Arabic and afocus on Islamic religious education.750 ACAPS noted in its March 2021 report that the Kurdish
population’s access to education and health care was restricted due to language barriers. 751 A
Kurdish man interviewed by Al-Monitor in March 2022 spoke about restrictions by the local
administration regarding the celebration of Nowruz in Afrin and surrounding districts when thearea came under control of the Turkey-backed SNA.752
The UNCOI noted in its August 2020 report that it was investigating reports on the detentionof at least 49 Kurdish and Yazidi women by SNA factions in Ras Al-Ayn and Afrin in the period
November 2019 to July 2020.753 It further noted that in these areas, Kurdish women faced
intimidation by SNA faction members, creating a climate of fear which in effect made them744

UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 89-91
745
AI, Amnesty International Report 2021/22 – Syria, 29 March 2022, url, p. 355
746
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/48/70, 13 August 2021, url, para. 80-82
747
STJ, Syria: 584 Persons Arrested in Afrin Over 2021, 11 January 2022, url, p. 3
748
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2020 - Syria, 30 March 2021, url, p. 28
749
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Syria, 12 April 2022, url, p. 33
750
UN Human Rights Council, Summary of Stakeholders’ submissions on Syrian Arab Republic,
A/HRC/WG.6/40/SYR/3, 1 November 2021, url, para. 77
751
ACAPS, Syria. Humanitarian Needs in Afrin, 3 March 2021, url, pp. 4, 6
752
Al-Monitor, Nowruz not what it used to be for Afrin’s Kurds, 23 March 2022, url753
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commissi on of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/45/31, 14 August 2020, url, para. 56

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unable to leave their homes.754 Detained women and girls were reportedly subjected to rapeand sexual violence.755 Some women were reportedly abducted or forced into marriage,
primarily by members of the Sultan Murad Division. 756

10.3 Targeting in territories under control of the GoS
Syrian human rights groups noted in a joint submission to the UN Human Rights Council in
November 2021, that as the Syrian constitution recognised only the Arabic language,authorities engaged in preventing speakers of Kurdish and other minority languages fromspeaking their native language. Kurds were reportedly frequently detained for teaching
Kurdish in private classes or were sentenced on charges of undermining national harmony or
trying to annex parts of Syria’s territory to a foreign country. 757 USDOS noted in its 2021
Human Rights Report that the GoS continued to restrict the use and teaching of the Kurdish
language, the publication of books and other materials in Kurdish, as well as other forms of
Kurdish cultural expressions. The Kurdish population ‘faced official and societal discrimination
and repression’ and ‘regime-sponsored violence’, according to USDOS.758
In spring 2022, tensions increased between the GoS and the Kurdish-led AANES, after the
GoS imposed restrictions, and later a total ban, on the entry of basic food items, especiallyflour 759, but also other items such as fuel and medical aid 760, into the Kurdish-majority
neighbourhoods of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyye, under control of the Kurdish-led AANES.
The blockade forced local bakeries to close, prompting residents to go to GoS-controlled
neighbourhoods to buy necessary food items, especially bread. Shortage of basic items andincreasing prices have led to deterioration in living conditions in the two neighbourhoods.761
As a retaliatory measure, the Kurdish-led AANES imposed a blockade on bakeries in Qamishliand Hasaka, and later also ‘security measures’ on areas in Qamishli that were under control of
the GoS, similarly causing food shortages in these areas. 762

754

UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/45/31, 14 August 2020, url, para. 59, 61;755
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/45/31, 14 August 2020, url, para. 59, 61; openDemocracy, How Syria’s Afrin became hell for Kurds,
11 November 2020, url; Al-Monitor, Turkish-backed rebels leave trail of abuse, criminality in Syria’s Afrin, 22 July
2021, url
756
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/45/31, 14 August 2020, url, para. 62
757
UN Human Rights Council, Summary of Stakeholders’ submissions on Syrian Arab Republic,
A/HRC/WG.6/40/SYR/3, 1 November 2021, url, para. 61
758
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Syria, 12 April 2022, url, p. 66
759
STJ, Aleppo: The Syrian Government Denies Basic Foodstuffs to Kurdish Neighborhoods, 12 April 2022, url
760
COAR, SDF Imposes Siege on Government of Syria Enclaves in Response to Siege of Sheikh Maqsoud, 18 April
2022, url
761
STJ, Aleppo: The Syrian Government Denies Basic Foodstuffs to Kurdish Neighborhoods, 12 April 2022, url;
SOHR, Amid lack of flour in most of bread bakeries | Fourth Division “besieges” SDF-held neighbourhoods in
Aleppo, 5 April 2022, url
762
COAR, SDF Imposes Siege on Government of Syria Enclaves in Response to Siege of Sheikh Maqsoud, 18 April
2022, url

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11. Christians
Christian communities in Syria included a variety of denominations, such as the Greek or
Byzantine Orthodox Church, the Greek Catholic Church, Maronites, Armenian, Suryanis(members of the Syriac Orthodox Church), members of the Syrian Catholic Church andChristian Assyrians (belonging to the Assyrian Ancient Church of the East or the Chaldean
Catholic Church).763 Most Christians continue to live in and around Damascus, Aleppo, Latakia,
Homs, Hama and Hasaka governorate.764 US sources estimated that 10 % of the population are
Christians.765 However, the number of Christians is estimated to have fallen to 3.3 % of Syria’s
entire population, according to a report published by the Christian NGO Open Doors. 766 SOHR
noted in June 2021 that only about 300 to 500 Christians were still living in regions controlled
by HTS, including in Idlib city and the countryside, while before 2015, there had been almost
20 000 Christians residing in Idlib City and four villages, Al-Ya’qoubiyyah, Al-Qinniyah, AlGhassaniyah and al-Jadidah.767 About 30 Christian families were living Raqqa city as ofFebruary 2022.768
According to Syrian law, Christian groups, like all other religious groups, must register with the
GoS. Registered religious groups and clergy receive free utilities and enjoy some tax
exemptions. Public schools are run by the GoS and are non-sectarian, however, Christian andDruze communities are allowed to operate some public schools. Religious instruction is
mandatory in public schools but covers only Christianity and Islam. 769 Christian and Muslim
religious leaders are exempted from mandatory military service based on conscientious
objection.770 The Personal Status Law stipulates that a Muslim man may marry a Christian
woman, but a Muslim woman may not marry a Christian man. A Christian woman marrying a
Muslim is not entitled to inherit property or wealth from her husband, even if sh e converts.771
Conversions are generally reportedly rare due to societal conventions and religious rules andconverts face pressure from society to move to other areas within the country or to emigrate
to freely practice their new religion. Conversion from Islam to Christianity is prohibited bylaw.772
The US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) noted that in the Kurdishcontrolled areas, Christians and other religious groups were able to openly express andexercise their religious beliefs, including converting to other religions.773 There were however

763

MRG, Syria: Christians, Armenians and Assyrians, March 2018, url; USDOS, International Religious Freedom
Report 2021 - Syria, 2 June 2022, url, p. 4
764
USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report 2021 - Syria, 2 June 2022, url, p. 4765
USCIRF, Annual Report 2021 - Syria, 21 April 2021, url, p. 45; USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report
2021 - Syria, 2 June 2022, url, p. 3
766
Open Doors, World Watch List Syria 2022, url
767
SOHR, Exclusive interviews. Tens of Christians live in HTS-held villages, despite repression, 9 June 2021, url
768
SOHR, Four years after liberation of Al-Raqqah city. Christians are still deprived of practicing their rituals inchurches, 4 February 2022, url
769
USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report 2021 - Syria, 2 June 2022, url, pp. 5-6
770
USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report 2021 - Syria, 2 June 2022, url, pp. 10-11
771
USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report 2021 - Syria, 2 June 2022, url, p. 6
772
USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report 2021 - Syria, 2 June 2022, url, p. 15
773
USCIRF, Annual Report 2021 – Syria, 21 April 2021, url, p. 44

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

concerns by Syriac Christian communities regarding the school curriculum. 774 Several
students, teachers and members of the Syriac Christian Orthodox Creed Council werearrested mainly in Hasaka governorate and Ein Arab city in Aleppo governorate by SDF in
September 2021, after they had criticised and refused to adopt the school curriculum
introduced by the Kurdish-led AANES in the areas under their control. SNHR specificallymentioned the arrest of two council members in Qamishli city. Both were reportedly released
the following day.775 SHRC explained that the main reason for rejecting the curriculum was that
it was not recognised by institutions outside the Kurdish-controlled areas, preventing students
from pursuing higher education.776
Sources reported on the confiscation of homes and property of Christians by HTS in areas
under its control.777 The UNCOI noted in February 2022 that it had received reports andwitness accounts that HTS confiscated or used private property such as houses and land of
individuals who had fled the country and that Christians and other minority groups were
specifically targeted.778 ‘Islamist factions’ operating in Idlib governorate imposed so-called‘jizya’ taxes (a tax historically imposed on non-Muslims by Muslim rulers)779 on Christians, topressure them to leave their homes. An office of ‘Christians’ properties’, established by HTS,
reportedly notified Christian tenants and property owners to consult with HTS administrative
offices before renewing contracts or setting new terms, including increasing the rent ofhouses or shops.780 Christians who fled their homes in Idlib were reportedly also prohibited by
HTS from appointing someone to appeal against rulings handed down by Sharia courts
regarding their property.781 HTS reportedly banned Christians from ringing the bells andcelebrating holidays in the only church in a neighbourhood in Idlib city. They were, however,allowed to pray inside secretly. Media was reportedly not allowed to report from theneighbourhood in a manner that would reflect the Christian populations’ grievances.782
USCIRF pointed in its 2022 Annual Report to HTS seizing properties and churches ofChristians and restricting their right to worship in the north-western region of Idlib.783
Individuals converted to Christianity reportedly faced threats in areas under control by Turkish
forces and the SNA. USCIRF reported in its 2021 Annual Report on the case of a Kurdish
convert to Christianity who was detained and charged with apostasy by an SNA-backed court
in Afrin.784 According to Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW), a Christian NGO advocating for
freedom of religion or belief, the man was detained in August 2020 by Failaq Al-Sham, an
Islamist militia and part of the SNA, after refusing to hand over a school building to the group,
774

USCIRF, Annual Report 2021 – Syria, 21 April 2021, url, p. 44; SNHR, 193 Arbitrary Arrests/ Detentions
Documented in Syria in September 2021, Including 10 Chil dren and Five Women, 2 October 2021, url, p. 6775
SNHR, 193 Arbitrary Arrests/ Detentions Documented in Syria in September 2021, Including 10 Children and Five
Women, 2 October 2021, url, pp. 6, 14
776
SHRC, The 20th Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syria, 9 January 2022, url, p. 38
777
HRW, World Report 2022 - Syria, 2022, url; Enab Baladi, “Absent Christian”… Confiscation of real property of
Idlib’s Christians, 11 July 2020, url; SOHR, Exclusive interviews. Tens of Christians live in HTS-held villages, despite
repression, 9 June 2021, url
778
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 72
779
See Britannica, jizyah, last updated 24 September 2019, url
780
USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report 2020 - Syria, 12 May 2021, url, p. 16781
SOHR, HTS confiscates property of Christian community in Idlib, 25 April 2020, url
782
SOHR, Exclusive interview. Elderly Christian describes suffering of Christians in HTS-held areas, 20 May 2021, url
783
USCIRF, Annual Report 2022 – Syria, 25 April 2022, url, p. 34
784
USCIRF, Annual Report 2021- Syria, 21 April 2021, url, p. 45

96

SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORT

where he was working as headmaster, and that was supposed to be transformed into an
Islamic school.785 He was reportedly released in March 2021. 786 USDOS reported withreference to local news media reports that in August 2020 some militia groups that form partof the Turkish-backed SNA abducted 14 Syrian Kurds living in Afrin, who had converted toChristianity.787
In March 2021, STJ issued a report on the looting of crops and land confiscations by six SNAaffiliated militia groups in Ras Al-Ayn and Tall Abyad in the period April to August 2020. The
twelve incidents described in the report included the looting of crops of a Christian family inthe eastern countryside of Ras Al-Ayn and the looting of crops of several Christian farmers in
Abbah village by members of the Sultan Murad Division. The militia later also confiscated oneof the farmer’s agricultural lands.788
In June 2020, SOHR reported on one incident in Dar’a governorate, where a Christian womanfrom Izra’a city was abducted by unknown perpetrators. 789 Two Christian men were shot by
unknown perpetrators in the eastern countryside of Dar’a in April 2022.790

785

CWS, Kurdish man arrested and accused of apostasy, 13 August 2020, url
CWS, Kurdish Christian man released after seven months in detention, 1 March 2021, url
787
USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report 2020 - Syria, 12 May 2021, url, pp. 13-14, see also SyriacPress,
SYRIA: 14 Kurds kidnapped from Turkish-occupied Afrin after converting to Christianity, 19 August 2020, url
788
STJ, Syria: Crops Looted, Lands Seized in “Peace Spring” Territories, March 2021, 11 March 2021, url, p. 10789
SOHR, Kidnappings in Daraa. Communication lost with Christian young woman in Izra’a, 19 June 2020, url
790
NPA, Two Christian Civilians Killed In Syria’s Daraa, Apr 21, 2022, url
786

97EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

12. Palestinians
12.1 Recent situation of Palestinians
According to figures provided by United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian
Refugees (UNRWA) as of 31 December 2020, there were 569 990 Palestinian refugees791
registered with UNRWA in Syria.792 As of 31 December 2020, an estimated 438 000 stayed in
Syria. The remainder have fled the country. 793 52 % of the estimated Palestinian refugees thatremained in Syria were women and 31 % were children.794 As of December 2021, there were 12
camps in the country, nine of which were official and three unofficial camps. The official camps
were the Dera'a Camp, the Hama Camp, the Homs Camp, the Jaramana Camp, the Khan
Dunoun Camp, the Khan Eshieh Camp, the Neirab Camp, the Qabr Essit Camp and theSbeineh Camp. The unofficial camps were the camps Ein el Tal, Latakia and Yarmouk. UNRWA
stated that it had access to 10 out of 12 camps, without naming them.795
In January 2021, UNRWA estimated that 40 % of Palestinian refugees residing in Syria werestill displaced, of whom two thirds were displaced at least once since the onset of theconflict.796 Palestinian refugees in state of protracted displacement were subject to the‘combined impact of the conflict, COVID-19 and an economic crisis’ which were ‘reinforcing an
already dire humanitarian situation’ according to UNRWA. 797

12.2 Legal status of the Palestinian refugees in Syria
The legal status of Palestinian refugees in Syria evolved along a number of displacementflows into the country since 1948.798 The majority of Palestinian refugees in Syria remainstateless with only 3 500 Palestinians having obtained Syrian citizenship, ‘most probably
before 1948’.799 Based on Legislative Decree 276 of 24 November 1969, Palestinian refugees
cannot apply for Syrian citizenship.800 However, a Palestinian refugee woman who is married
to a Syrian national can apply for citizenship by handing in an application to the Immigration
791

The total number of people registered with UNRWA in Syria amounts to 658 058 including non-refugee wives,
husbands and descendants as well as adopted descendants and frontier villagers registered with UNRWA.
UNRWA, UNRWA Registered Population Dashboard, n.d., url, p. 4
792
UNRWA, UNRWA Registered Population Dashboard, n.d., url, pp. 3, 4
793
UNRWA, Where We Work, n.d., url
794
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arabic Republic, February 2022, url, p. 45
795
UNRWA, Where We Work, n.d., url
796
UN General Assembly, Report of the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 27 August 2021, url, para. 13; UNRWA, UNRWA and EU help
Palestine refugees in Syria with emergency cash assistance, 4 March 2022, url
797
UN General Assembly, Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East. 1 January–31 December 2020, 18 August 2021, url, para. 9798
Omran Center for Strategic Studies, Palestinians of Syria: Violations of Rights and Identity Challenges, October
2019, url, p. 18; Albanese, F. and Takkenberg, L., Palestinian Refugees in International Law, 2020, url, pp. 220-221
799
Albanese, F. and Takkenberg, L., Palestinian Refugees in International Law, 2020, available with subscription,url, p. 221
800
Albanese, F. and Takkenberg, L., Palestinian Refugees in International Law, 2020, available with subscription,url, p. 223

98

SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORTand Passports Department under the Ministry of Interior 801 according to Article 8 of theLegislative Decree 276. From the date of the application, the marriage has to remain valid for
two years. During this period of time, the woman has to be residing in Syria. 802 With reference
to an independent source interviewed by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), DIS
reported in October 2021 that in case the woman has a child or is pregnant, ‘the application
will always be approved.’803
ACAPS, a non-profit, non-governmental project which aims at providing independent
humanitarian analysis, reported in March 2014 that the legal status of Palestinians in Syria
generally falls into two main categories:-

Palestinians who fled to Syria in or before 1956 and their descendants (approximately
85 % of the total), andPalestinians who fled to Syria after 1956 and their descendants. 804

Palestinians who fall into the first category, while preserving their Palestin ian nationality, havethe ‘same rights as Syrian citizens in terms of residence, freedom of movement, work, trade
and access to civil service positions and public services’ based on Law 260 of July 1956. 805
However, for those who fled to Syria in 1956, work in the public sector is only possible on
short term contracts. Compulsory military service in the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), a
Palestinian unit within the Syrian Armed Forces, is only required from those who fled in 1948.
Under the named law, Palestinians cannot vote or hold public office. They are not allowed toown agricultural land and can only own one house per person. 806 According to a 2020
publication on Palestinian refugees in international law by researchers Albanese andTekkenberg, those who arrived in the period between 1948 and 1956 were registered as‘Palestinian refugees’ by the governmental General Administration for Palestinian Arab
Refugees (GAPAR)807 in charge of regulating and administering the presence of Palestinian
refugees in the country and closely cooperating with UNRWA. 808 The registration with GAPAR
officially confers legal status to Palestinian refugees in Syria. Palestinian refugees registered801

Denmark, DIS, Syria: Palestinians in Damascus and rural Damascus governorates, October 2021, url, p. 9; Syria,
Parliament of Syria, 24/11/1969 ‫ تاريخ‬276 ‫[ قانون الجنسية المرسوم التشريعي رقم‬Legislative Decree No. 276 of 1969], 24November 1969, url, no English translation available; UNRWA, Regional Information Relating to Women’s
Nationality, n.d., url, p. 2
802
UNRWA, Regional Information Relating to Women’s Nationality, n.d., url, p. 2; Syria, Parliament of Syria,
24/11/1969 ‫ تاريخ‬276 ‫[ قانون الجنسية المرسوم التشريعي رقم‬Legislative Decree No. 276 of 1969], 24 November 1969, url, art. 8,
no English translation available.
803
Denmark, DIS, Syria: Palestinians in Damascus and rural Damascus governorates [source: independent source
interviewed by the Danish MoFA on 11 August 2020], October 2021, url, p. 9804
ACAPS, Palestinians from Syria: Syria Needs Analysis Project, March 2014, url, p. 4805
Law 260 of 1956 is ‘the main instrument that gives Palestinians substantial legal rights and protection in Syria
while preserving their original nationality’. The rights established by this law were expanded by subsequent laws
and regulations. Albanese, F. and Takkenberg, L., Palestinian Refugees in International Law, 2020, available with
subscription, url, p. 222
806
ACAPS, Palestinians from Syria: Syria Needs Analysis Project, March 2014, url, p. 4; Albanese, F. and
Takkenberg, L., Palestinian Refugees in International Law, 2020, available with subscription, url, pp. 222-223
807
The Palestine Arab Refugee Institute (PARI) was founded in 1949 by the Syrian authorities and was later
renamed General Administration for Palestinian Arab Refugees (GAPAR). It deals with issues regarding Palestinians
in Syria and operates under the Ministry of Social Affairs. Denmark, DIS, Syria: Palestinians in Damascus and rural
Damascus governorates, October 2021, url, p. 9; Albanese, F. and Takkenberg, L., Palestinian Refugees inInternational Law, 2020, available with subscription, url, p. 222, footnote 358
808
Albanese, F. and Takkenberg, L., Palestinian Refugees in International Law, 2020, available with subscription,url, p. 221

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

with GAPAR with some restrictions are treated equal to Syrian nationals 809 and are allowed tojoin the PLA.810 Refugees registered with UNRWA have access to the agency’s education,
health and social services.811
Those in the second category mentioned by ACAPS were ‘registered with UNRWA in othercountries or the occupied Palestinian Territories and are treated as Arab foreigners’. 812 They
have a renewable 10-year residence permit, have to apply for work permits and cannot work in
the public sector. Meanwhile, they have free access to public health and education services,
except for university education, for which they have to pay fees. 813 Albanese and Tekkenberg
stated that Palestinian refugees who belong to this group do not enjoy the same status as the
GAPAR-registered refugees, despite having access to all UNRWA services. While the two
authors confirmed that Palestinians belonging to this group have restricted access toemployment and education, they noted that these Palestinians do not have access togovernmental health services ‘except for minor interventions’. 814 However, they may beregistered with GAPAR by presidential decree or, in the case of female Palestinian refugees,
by marrying a refugee who is registered with GAPAR. 815
Based on their registration status, Albanese and Tekkenberg define four categories ofPalestinian refugees in Syria. Those who were registered with both GAPAR and UNRWA;
those who were registered with GAPAR only; those registered with UNRWA only; andPalestinians living in Syria without being registered at all. All Palestinian refugees arriving
before 1956 were registered with GAPAR. Those who met the UNRWA definition of Palestinian
refugee were also registered with UNRWA, which applied to the majority of Palestinian
refugees arriving in Syria prior to 1956.816 According to GAPAR, as of January 2022, 563 613
Palestinian refugees were registered with GAPAR. 817

12.3 UNRWA operations and available assistance
As stated by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) in February2022, Palestinian refugees in Syria continued to experience ‘dire humanitarian and protection

809

Albanese, F. and Takkenberg, L., Palestinian Refugees in International Law, 2020, available with subscription,url, p. 222; Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of origin information report Syria, 15 May 2020,
url, p. 44
810
Albanese, F. and Takkenberg, L., Palestinian Refugees in International Law, 2020, available with subscription,url, p. 223
811
Albanese, F. and Takkenberg, L., Palestinian Refugees in International Law, 2020, available with subscription, url,
p. 222; Omran Center for Strategic Studies, Palestinians of Syria: Violations of Rights and Identity Challenges,
October 2019, url, pp. 20-22
812
ACAPS, Palestinians from Syria: Syria Needs Analysis Project, March 2014, url, p. 4813
ACAPS, Palestinians from Syria: Syria Needs Analysis Project, March 2014, url, pp. 4-5
814
Albanese, F. and Takkenberg, L., Palestinian Refugees in International Law, 2020, available with subscription, url,
p. 225815
Albanese, F. and Takkenberg, L., Palestinian Refugees in International Law, 2020, available with subscription,url, p. 224
816
Albanese, F. and Takkenberg, L., Palestinian Refugees in International Law, 2020, available with subscription,url, p. 221
817
Syria, GAPAR, 3/1/2022 ‫[ جدول تعداد الالجئين الفلسطينيين المسجلين في الهيئة العامة لالجئين الفلسطينيين العرب حتى تاريخ‬Table ofPalestinian Refugees registered with GAPAR until 3 January 2022], url

100

SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORT

needs’, with 420 000 (96 %) of them in need of humanitarian assistance.818 A UNRWA survey
conducted in May 2021 found that 82 % of the individuals in the 503 Palestinian refugee
households in Syria who took part in the survey lived on less than USD 1.9 [approximately
EUR 1.7]819 per day, including the UNRWA cash assistance. 820 In a January 2021 interview with
DIS, consultant and analyst Musaab Balchi stated that the services of the agency had declined‘with the overall situation in Syria’. While there was high demand in needs, UNRWA was
unable to cover the demand with the services it provided, according to Balchi. 821
In 2020 UNRWA provided emergency cash assistance to 415 781 Palestinian refugees and inkind food assistance to 145 365 of ‘the most vulnerable’822.823 As of March 2022, UNRWA
provided cash assistance to 145 000 Palestine refugees of ‘the most vulnerable categories’. 824
Figures provided by UNRWA as of 31 December 2020 revealed that the agency operated 102
schools with a total of 50 609 students; 23 primary health centres; five community
rehabilitation centres, and 13 women's programme centres. 825 The agency further supports
livelihoods through a microfinance programme and offers water and sanitation service to thecamps for Palestinian refugees that are accessible to it.826
In recent years, UNRWA’s funding gap grew, which led to a limited provision of humanitarianassistance to Palestinian refugees in Syria. 827 As of 31 October 2021, 49.6 % of the total
UNRWA funding requirements in Syria for 2021 were pledged or received from donors andpartners.828
As of late 2018, almost all UNRWA installations needed rehabilitation or reconstruction due tosevere damages. This was particularly the case in Yarmouk, Ein el Tal and Dar'a. In August
2021, UNRWA reported that the situation ‘remained similar in 2020’.829 In March 2021, UNRWA
reported that 40 % of its classrooms were lost due to the conflict and almost 25 % of UNRWA’s
health centres were unusable at the time. 830 As stated by UNRWA in undated website entries,

818

UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arabic Republic, February 2022, url, p. 45
Exchange rates from European Commission, Exchange rate (InforEuro), n.d., url, accessed on 28 March 2022
820
UNRWA, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan Emergency Appeal 2022, 2022, url, p. 14
821
Denmark, DIS, Syria: Palestinians in Damascus and rural Damascus governorates [source: Palestinian consultant
and analyst Musaab Balchi], October 2021, url, p. 71
822
Female-headed households, families with members with disabilities or headed by an older person, andunaccompanied minors or orphans; UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arabic Republic, February2022, url, p. 45; UNRWA, UNRWA and EU help Palestine refugees in Syria with emergency cash assistance, 4March 2022, url
823
UNRWA, Annual Operational Report 2020, 10 August 2020, url, p. 7
824
UNRWA, UNRWA Cash Assistance: Vital Assistance for Palestine Refugees in Syria, 25 March 2022, url
825
UNRWA, Where We Work, n.d., url
826
UNRWA, Where We Work, n.d., url
827
UNRWA, Syria Regional Crisis: Emergency Appeal 2021, url, pp. 3, 9; DW, UN Palestinian refugee agency stillshort of cash, 18 February 2022, url; UNRWA, UNRWA issues emergency call for humanitarian assistance amid endof-year shortfall; salaries of 28,000 staff at risk, hopes to avoid suspension of essential services, 9 November 2020,
url
828
UNRWA, Syria – Humanitarian Snapshot, September & October 2021, url
829
UN General Assembly, Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East. 1 January–31 December 2020, 18 August 2021, url, para. 55
830
UNRWA, 5th Brussels Conference on Syria: UNRWA Calls for Support to Help Palestine Refugees, 29 March
2021, url
819

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

installations in five of a total of five camps majority of UNRWA in Rural Damascus governorate
have been reconstructed wholly or in parts and were functional. 831

12.4 Situation in Palestinian refugee camps
With reference to UNRWA figures provided to DIS as of January 2021, 327 995 Palestinian
refugees’ residential addresses were registered in Damascus and Rural Damascus
governorates, of whom 68 % lived outside the six camps located in these governorates. 832
However, the actual place of residence may differ from what is recorded. 833
As of the beginning of 2022, the basic safe water and electricity provision infrastructure had
not been completely restored in the camps Yarmouk, Dar'a and Ein el Tal. 834 According to
UNRWA, the situation in Dar'a governorate was precarious throughout 2021. 835 The escalationof tensions between GoS forces and non-state armed groups led to clashes during August2021 and resulted in the displacement of 36 000 civilians, including 3 000 Palestinian
refugees from Dar'a refugee camp.836
As reported by DIS in October 2021 with reference to an international organisation, there were
frequent power shortages in Damascus and Rural Damascus governorates. The situation in
Palestinian camps according to the source ‘can be even worse than in other areas’. 837 DIS
further reported referring to an interview with Action Group for Palestinians of Syria (AGPS) 838
that all camps were connected to the public electricity infrastructure, but they only hadelectricity for two to four hours per day, which correlated with the general situation in these
two governorates.839 In contrast, the international organisation interviewed by DIS in February
2021 stated that there was no intact water or electricity infrastructure in Yarmouk camp and‘no repair of this has been initiated.’840 In general, residents of these camps would therefore
have to rely on private generators running on gas, which is expensive and difficult to get as aresult of shortages.841 Only Jaramana, Khan Dunoun, Sbeineh and Khan Eshieh camp were stillconnected to the water network after 2011. However, the water network did not operate
831

UNRWA, Jaramana Camp, n.d., url; UNRWA, Khan Dunoun Camp, n.d., url; UNRWA, Khan Eshieh Camp, n.d., url;
UNRWA, Qabr Essit Camp, n.d., url; UNRWA, Sbeineh Camp, n.d., url
832
Denmark, DIS, Syria: Palestinians in Damascus and rural Damascus governorates [source: UNRWA’s emergency
database], October 2021, url, p. 14
833
Denmark, DIS, Palestinian Refugees [source: interview with UNRWA], June 2020, url, p. 45
834
UNRWA, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan Emergency Appeal 2022, 2022, url, p. 15; UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs
Overview: Syrian Arabic Republic, February 2022, url, p. 45
835
UNRWA, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan Emergency Appeal 2022, 2022, url, p. 14
836
UNRWA, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan Emergency Appeal 2022, 2022, url, p. 14; UNRWA, Syria - Humanitarian
Snapshot, July & August 2021, url; New Arab (The), Palestinian refugees being killed, displaced amid Syrian
regime's Daraa assault: UNRWA, 17 August 2021, url; UNOCHA, Syria: Dar’a Governorate Situation Report, 7September 2021, url, pp. 1-2
837
Denmark, DIS, Syria: Palestinians in Damascus and rural Damascus governorates [source: interview withinternational organisation], October 2021, url, p. 66
838
AGPS is a London-based human rights organisation that monitors the situation of Palestinian refugees in Syria .
839
Denmark, DIS, Syria: Palestinians in Damascus and rural Damascus governorates [source: interview with AGPS],
October 2021, url, p. 58
840
Denmark, DIS, Syria: Palestinians in Damascus and rural Damascus governorates [source: interview withinternational organisation], October 2021, url, p. 66
841
Denmark, DIS, Syria: Palestinians in Damascus and rural Damascus governorates [source: interview with AGPS],
October 2021, url, p. 58

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consistently and not all areas of these camps were connected to it. There was a need for
additional water from private suppliers in almost all camps, mainly provided through water
trucking.842 In September 2021, the Syria Report stated that Damascus governorate had
started to provide electricity and drinking water to some points in Yarmouk. Residents had toextend the lines to their places of residency at their personal cost. 843
UNRWA reported four incidents of unauthorized entry by Syrian authorities or third parties in
its installations in 2020, of which one was an incursion that involved an armed group. 844
UNRWA is not responsible for administering or policing the refugee camps, as the hostauthorities are responsible for matters of safety and public order in UNRWA’s operating
territories.845

12.5 Restrictions on return
In its Emergency Appeal for 2022, UNRWA stated that the total number of Palestinian
refugees returning from outside the country decreased in the first eight months of 2021 as aresult of border closures and restrictions due to COVID-19 prevention measures.846 In August
2021, UNRWA reported that 1 383 Palestinian refugees, mostly from Lebanon and Jordan, hadreturned to Syria during 2020.847 Between January 2021 and December 2021, 1 039
Palestinian refugees had returned to Syria. 848
Palestinian refugees registered with GAPAR who have left the country legally and were inpossession of a valid Syrian travel document were able to return to the country 849, regardlessof the duration of their absence.850 Their return procedures were similar to those of Syrian

842

Denmark, DIS, Syria: Palestinians in Damascus and rural Damascus governorates [source: interview with AGPS],
October 2021, url, p. 58; Denmark, DIS, Syria: Palestinians in Damascus and rural Damascus governorates [source:
interview with Palestinian consultant and analyst Musaab Balchi], October 2021, url, p. 70
843
Syria Report (The), Yarmouk Camp: Daily Security Approval Allows Temporary Return, 21 September 2021, url
844
UN General Assembly, Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East. 1 January–31 December 2020, 18 August 2021, url, para. 55
845
UNRWA, Where We Work, n.d., url; Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of origin information
report Syria, 15 May 2020, url, p. 45; Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of origin information
report Syria, 14 June 2021, url, p. 79
846
UNRWA, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan Emergency Appeal 2022, 2022, url, p. 15
847
UN General Assembly, Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East. 1 January–31 December 2020, 18 August 2021, url, para. 12
848
UNRWA, Syria – Humanitarian Snapshot, November & December 2021, January 2022, url
849
Denmark, DIS, Syria: Palestinians in Damascus and rural Damascus governorates [source: Denmark, MoFA query
responses from 22 September 2021 and 14 October 2021 available to DIS, Palestinian consultant and analyst
Musaab Balchi], October 2021, url, pp. 36, 72
850
Denmark, DIS, Syria: Palestinians in Damascus and rural Damascus governorates [source: Denmark, MoFA query
responses from 22 September 2021 and 14 October 2021 available to DIS], October 2021, url, p. 36

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citizens.851 In an interview with DIS, AGPS stated in March 2021 that Palestinian refugees were
subject to scrutiny and needed a security approval to return to the country. 852
Palestinian refugees registered with GAPAR who want to return to Syria from outside thecountry, but have unsettled issues with the Syrian authorities have to apply for status
settlement.853 In an interview with DIS in January 2021, Tom Rollins, journalist and researcher
with a focus on Syria, stated that the likelihood for persons from camps formerly held by the
opposition, such as Yarmouk, Sbeineh or Khan Eshieh, to have their security clearance
rejected, was higher in comparison to people who come from places that were controlled by
GoS throughout the conflict.854
Return to some camps, such as Handarat (northern Aleppo), has been prevented due to thelarge-scale destruction of buildings.855
In October 2020, referring to a statement by an administrative official of Damascus
governorate, Al-Monitor reported that former residents of Yarmouk camp would be allowed toreturn to the camp on the condition that the houses they wanted to return to were safe or did
require only small renovation. Furthermore, returnees needed to prove ownership of theirproperty and ‘obtain approvals from the security authorities’.856 UNRWA reported that theofficial registration process for those wishing to return to Yarmouk camp started on
10 November 2020.857 According to an AGPS report published in April 2021, Syrian security
and administrative bodies were still preventing the return of people to Yarmouk camp. The
source stated that security bodies granted or refused approvals for entering the camp after
verifying ownership of a property in Yarmouk or proof of residency, for example by checking
the ownership documents, a personal ID card or an electricity or water bill.858 Information
obtained from Palestinian activists interviewed by Al Jazeera in March 2021 stated that the
Syrian authorities only allowed pro-GoS Palestinians to return to Yarmouk camp.859
As of the beginning of 2022, approvals for over 2 000 families based on GoS data and around
700 families according to UNRWA calculations have been granted.860 By mid-2021 UNOCHA
recorded that 480 vulnerable Palestine refugee families had returned to Yarmouk, while851

Denmark, DIS, Syria: Palestinians in Damascus and rural Damascus governorates [source: interview with AGPS],
October 2021, url, p. 59; Denmark, DIS, Syria: Palestinians in Damascus and rural Damascus governorates [source:
interview with international organisation], October 2021, url, p. 67; Denmark, DIS, Syria: Palestinians in Damascus
and rural Damascus governorates [source: Denmark, MoFA query response from 22 September 2021 available toDIS], October 2021, url, p. 36; Denmark, DIS, Syria: Palestinians in Damascus and rural Damascus governorates[source: interview with Palestinian consultant and analyst Musaab Balchi], October 2021, url, p. 72
852
Denmark, DIS, Syria: Palestinians in Damascus and rural Damascus governorates [source: interview with AGPS],
October 2021, url, p. 59
853
Denmark, DIS, Syria: Issues regarding return [source: Syria, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, Syrian
Embassy in Stockholm], October 2021, url, p. 12
854
Denmark, DIS, Syria: Palestinians in Damascus and rural Damascus governorates [source: interview with Tom
Rollins], October 2021, url, p. 76
855
AGPS, Residents of Handarat Camp Enduring Protracted Displacement, 29 April 2021, url
856
Al-Monitor, Palestinians displaced from Syria's Yarmouk camp to finally go home, 13 October 2020, url
857
UNRWA, Syria: UNRWA – Progress Highlights of Emergency Appeal January – June 2021, url; UNRWA, Syria,
Lebanon and Jordan Emergency Appeal 2022, 2022, url, p. 15
858
AGPS, ً‫ فلسطينيو دمشق وريفها نموذج ا‬- ‫[ أوروبا وإعادة الجئي سورية‬Back from Europe: Syria’s refugees – Palestinian refugeesof Damascus and Rural Damascus], 2 April 2021, url, p. 5859
Al Jazeera, ‘Afraid of Return’, Palestinians Fearful of Life in Yarmouk Camp, 30 March 2021, url
860
UNRWA, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan Emergency Appeal 2022, 2022, url, p. 15, footnote 14

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noting that the camp lacked basic infrastructure and services. 861 As of June 2021, 1 642
Palestinian refugees (400 families) were living in the camp at the time. 862 The sources do notprovide further information on the reasons for approval of return or profile of returnees. Withreference to UNRWA data, AGPS stated that 38 826 families were living in Yarmouk before
the outbreak of the conflict in 2011.863 Around 120 returnee families were living in Ein al Talcamp as of June 2021.864
According to AGPS, so-called reconciliation committees created lists of people who wanted toreturn to their homes in Sbeineh (Rural Damascus) camp. These lists were checked by security
bodies who administered the return after checking and verifying. As a first step, military andgovernment personnel were allowed to return. Civilians, who had family members abroad,were obliged to prove that those family members had left the country regularly and via official
border crossings by presenting a document certified by the Department of Immigration. The
source further stated that families of missing, detained or absent persons or persons affiliatedwith the opposition were subject to stricter procedures than others. 865 Referring to statementsof activists, AGPS stated that around 40 % of the Hussayniya camp population were notallowed to return to their homes and properties in Rural Damascus by the Syrian army as ofApril 2021.866
In mid-2021, AGPS reported that 15 Palestinian refugees who returned via Damascus werearrested. The source further stated that Palestinian returnees were often summoned forinterrogation after they arrived in Syria.867

12.6 House, land and property issues
Syrian authorities confiscated houses and property of various groups, including displaced
persons, within the framework of antiterrorism and national security legislation. 868
Furthermore, Liwa Al-Quds, a pro-GoS militia consisting of Palestinians, reportedly confiscatedhomes and shops of (perceived) pro-opposition Palestinians in Neirab, a Palestinian refugee
camp in central Aleppo.869

861

UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 45
UNRWA, Syria: UNRWA – Progress Highlights of Emergency Appeal January – June 2021, url
863
AGPS, ً‫ فلسطينيو دمشق وريفها نموذج ا‬- ‫[ أوروبا وإعادة الجئي سورية‬Back from Europe: Syria’s refugees – Palestinian refugeesof Damascus and Rural Damascus], 2 April 2021, url, p. 5
864
UNRWA, Syria: UNRWA – Progress Highlights of Emergency Appeal January – June 2021, url
865
AGPS, ً‫ فلسطينيو دمشق وريفها نموذج ا‬- ‫[ أوروبا وإعادة الجئي سورية‬Back from Europe: Syria’s refugees – Palestinian refugeesof Damascus and Rural Damascus], 2 April 2021, url, pp. 5-6
866
AGPS, ً‫ فلسطينيو دمشق وريفها نموذج ا‬- ‫[ أوروبا وإعادة الجئي سورية‬Back from Europe: Syria’s refugees – Palestinian refugeesof Damascus and Rural Damascus], 2 April 2021, url, p. 6
867
AGPS, ‫ الجئ اً فلسطيني اً اعتقلهم األمن السوري بعد عودتهم من أوروبا ودول الجوار إلى سورية‬15 [15 Palestinian Refugees arrested by
Syrian security after they returned from Europe and Syria’s neighbouring countries], 17 June 2021, url
868
SJAC, Return is a Dream, Options for Post-Conflict Property Restitution in Syria, September 2018, url, p. 12; PAX
and Impunity Watch, Violations of Housing, Land and Property Rights, An Obstacle to Peace in Syria, March 2020,
url, pp. 5-6; TIMEP, Part 1, Violations in Government-held Areas, 4 February 2021, url; HRW, Syria: Government
Stealing Opponents’ Land, 8 April 2021, url
869
Syria Report (The), Neirab Camp: Liwa Al -Quds Seizes Properties of Pro-Opposition Palestinians, 20 January
2021, url; AGPS, Pro-Gov’t Group in Syria Seizes Palestinian Property in Neirab Camp, 17 October 2020, url
862

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According to an AGPS report published in October 2020 on the expropriation of Palestinian
refugees in Syria, dozens of Palestinian families in Syria in different parts of the country losttheir properties. The properties were divided among GoS institutions such as security bodies
or certain ministries, said the source. It further stated that laws made it possible for official
bodies or individuals who belong to militias that fought alongside GoS forces or ‘certain
confessional groups’ to use the houses. Referring to sources from inside Syria, AGPS s tatedthat GoS, its security bodies and militias have seized movable and immovable property ofPalestinian refugees in several Palestinian camps and settlements. 870

12.7 Instances of targeting of Palestinians by different
actorsReportedly Palestinian refugees in Syria have been targeted by the GoS throughout theconflict in the whole country, including in Damascus and Rural Damascus governorates. 871
According to a report published in July 2020 by SNHR, 3 196 Syrian Palestinians were killed
by GoS forces between March 2011 and July 2020 and 2 663 imprisoned by GoS during thistime period were still detained or remained forcibly disappeared. The source mentions GoS
repression against Palestinians for supporting the anti-GoS opposition in the conflict.872 SNHR
further stated that GoS was ‘responsible for approximately 87 % of all the violations’ inflicted
on Palestinian refugees in Syria since 2011 according to its own database. 873 In April 2021,
AGPS reported that more than 1 700 Palestinian refugees were still imprisoned in Syria, while
over 620 had died under torture in prison, including women, children and elderly persons. The
source does provide details on the reasons behind the imprisonment.874 AGPS reported in
April 2021 that Syrian security bodies periodically summon males from Khan Eshieh camp
(Rural Damascus) for interrogation. The men are blackmailed, arrested and threatened witharrest and forced to pay money.875 AGPS further reported on the arrest of a number ofPalestinian refugees by GoS security forces in 2020, including 56 Palestinian children aged 10
to 16 years.876 Residents of Hussayniya camp according to the source also complain about atightened security situation including arrest campaigns and home raids by GoS and affiliatedpopular forces.877

870

AGPS, ‫[ االستيالء على امالك الالجئين الفلسطينيين في سورية‬Seizure of Palestinian refugee properties in Syria], 2020, url, p. 7
Denmark, DIS, Syria: Palestinians in Damascus and rural Damascus governorates, October 2021, url, p. 21872
SNHR, 3,196 Syrian Palestinians Were Killed by Syrian Regime Forces, including 491 Due to Torture, Between
March 2011 and July 2020, and 49 Appeared in Caesar Photos, 29 July 2020, url, pp. 3, 6
873
SNHR, 3,196 Syrian Palestinians Were Killed by Syrian Regime Forces, including 491 Due to Tor ture, Between
March 2011 and July 2020, and 49 Appeared in Caesar Photos, 29 July 2020, url, p. 3
874
AGPS, Over 1,700 Palestinian Refugees Secretly Held in Syrian Prisons, 17 April 2021, url
875
AGPS, ً‫ فلسطينيو دمشق وريفها نموذج ا‬- ‫[ أوروبا وإعادة الجئي سورية‬Back from Europe: Syria’s refugees – Palestinian refugeesof Damascus and Rural Damascus], 2 April 2021, url, p. 5
876
AGPS, ً‫ فلسطينيو دمشق وريفها نموذج ا‬- ‫[ أوروبا وإعادة الجئي سورية‬Back from Europe: Syria’s refugees – Palestinian refugeesof Damascus and Rural Damascus], 2 April 2021, url, pp. 5 - 7
877
AGPS, ً‫ فلسطينيو دمشق وريفها نموذج ا‬- ‫[ أوروبا وإعادة الجئي سورية‬Back from Europe: Syria’s refugees – Palestinian refugees ofDamascus and Rural Damascus], 2 April 2021, url, p. 6
871

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SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORT

A number of sources stated that looting by pro-GoS militias and GoS forces on a large-scale
has happened in Yarmouk.878 As stated by consultant and analyst Musaab Balchi in aninterview with DIS, it did not take place on a similar scale in the other camps. 879
For information on targeting in relation to participation of the Palestinian community in thearmed conflicts until March 2020, please refer to Section 11.3 of the previous EUAA COI reporton Syria: Targeting of Individuals published in March 2020.

878

Denmark, DIS, Syria: Palestinians in Damascus and rural Damascus governorates [source: interview with
Palestinian consultant and analyst Musaab Balchi], October 2021, url, p. 69; AGPS and PRC, Palestinians of Syria(PRS): Destruction and Reconstruction – Annual Field Report 2019, 10 April 2021, url, p. 25; Rollins, T., Talking aboutwater pipes: The fraught reconstruction of Syria’s Yarmouk camp, MEI, 6 May 2020, url
879
Denmark, DIS, Syria: Palestinians in Damascus and rural Damascus governorates [source: interview with
Palestinian consultant and analyst Musaab Balchi], October 2021, url, p. 69

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13. Women
13.1 General overview of violations against women
Please also see the EUAA COI report on Syria: Situation of women, published in February
2020, for further background information on the situation of women.
Women and girls were disproportionately affected by gender-based violence.880 In 2021,
women and girls in all governorates faced physical violence, psychological and emotional
violence, sexual violence, social violence, forced and early marriage, denial of economic
resources and education, movement restrictions, and exploitation. 881
Violence against women was treated as a social matter rather than a criminal one by security
forces. According to observers cited by USDOS, ‘when some abused women tried to file a
police report, police did not investigate their reports thoroughly, if at all, and that in othercases police officers responded by abusing the women.’882 According to UNOCHA, theprevalence of gender-based violence, ‘impunity of perpetrators, and the absence of functional
institutions that guarantee women’ and girls’ rights and safety, negatively impact women andgirls and limiting their freedom and eroding their resilience.‘ Women and girls are relegated topositions of subordination by inequitable gender norms’ and face obstacles in accessing thejob market, which is ‘still constrained by social norms and family restrictions’. 883
Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) was present in Syria ‘prior to 2011, but the ongoing
conflict has dramatically increased the frequency of SGBV, changing its nature, broadening its
scope, and multiplying the perpetrators involved’.884 According to UNOCHA, armed hostilities
restricted freedoms of women and girls, ‘trapping them in cycles of vulnerability and abuse’.885
Based on the information collected from eight sources documenting civilian deaths 886 during
the period March 2011 to March 2021, OHCHR identified 26 727 women fatalities whichamounted to one in every 13 deaths recorded. 887 Between March 2011 and March 2022 SNHR
documented at least 16 228 cases of adult women dying at the hands of the different actors
involved in the conflict. GoS forces (among them army, security forces, local militias and Shiite
foreign militias) were responsible for 11 952 deaths, amounting to approximately 74 % of880

UNOCHA, 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 57
UNFPA, Voices from Syria 2022; Assessment Findings of the Humanitarian Needs Overview, 23 December
2021, url, p. 10; UNOCHA, 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 59;
UNFPA, Overview of Funding Needs: UNFPA Regional Syria Crisis Response, updated May 2022, url, p. 3
882
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Syria, 12 April 2022, url, p. 63
883
UNOCHA, 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, pp. 57-58
884
The Syrian Initiative to Combat Sexual and Gender-based Violence, The Realities of SGBV in Syria, February
2020, url, p. 38
885
UNOCHA, 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 8
886
The sources are: Damascus Center for Human Rights Studies, Center for Statistics and Research – Syria, SNHR,
SOHR, Violations Documentation Center, Syrian Arab Republic Government records, Syria Shuhada records, and
OHCHR Syria records. UN Human Rights Council, Civilian Deaths in the Syrian Arab Republic; Report of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights [A/HRC/50/68], 28 June 2022, url, para 13
887
UN Human Rights Council, Civilian Deaths in the Syrian Arab Republic; Report of the United Nations HighCommissioner for Human Rights [A/HRC/50/68], 28 June 2022, url, para 19
881

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SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORT

extrajudicial killings compared to the other parties, as observed by the source. 888 SNHR further
noted that as of March 2022, 9 774 women arrested since March 2011 were still under arrestor subject to enforced disappearance. 8 096 of these cases were attributed to GoS forces. 889
At least 93 women died due to torture between March 2011 and March 2022. Of these, 74
died at the hands of GoS forces.890 SNHR also recorded at least 11 523 incidents of sexual
violence against females in the same period. GoS forces were responsible for 8 013 of theseincidents.891
According to SNHR, 134 women ‘were documented as being killed at the hands of the parties
to the conflict and the controlling forces in Syria in 2021’. In 32 of these cases, the women
were killed by GoS forces. Seven women were killed by Russian forces. Armed Opposition
factions/Syrian National Army forces killed two women. Furthermore, two women were killedby the Kurdish-led SDF.892
SNHR documented approximately 2 218 cases of arbitrary arrest or detention in 2021,
including 77 women. GoS forces were responsible for the arbitrary arrest or detention of 23
women. Armed Opposition factions such as the SNA were responsible for the arbitrary arrest
or detention of 47 women. The SDF were responsible for the arbitrary arrest or detention ofseven women.893

13.2 Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV)
13.2.1 Rape, intimate partner violence, family violence, and domestic
violence
Rape and sexual assault are criminalised but the law is not effectively enforced. Spousal rapeis specifically excluded. If the rapist marries the victim, punishment is reduced or suspended.
Rape and sexual violence were described as ‘endemic, underreported, and uncontrolled in
the country’.894

888

SNHR, On International Women’s Day: Multiple Violations Committed by Various Parties to the Conflict in Syria,
Oppression of Women in All Groups’ Areas of Control Perpetuates a State of Lack of Development, Equality, andSecurity, 8 March 2022, url, pp. 5-6
889
SNHR, On International Women’s Day: Multiple Violations Committed by Various Parties to the Conflict in Syria,
Oppression of Women in All Groups’ Areas of Control Perpetuates a State of Lack of Development, Equality, andSecurity, 8 March 2022, url, pp. 6-7
890
SNHR, On International Women’s Day: Multiple Violations Committed by Various Parties to the Conflict in Syria,
Oppression of Women in All Groups’ Areas of Control Perpetuates a State of Lack of Development, Equality, andSecurity, 8 March 2022, url, p. 7
891
SNHR, On International Women’s Day: Multiple Violations Committed by Various Parties to the Conflict in Syria,
Oppression of Women in All Groups’ Areas of Control Perpetuates a State of Lack of Development, Equality, andSecurity, 8 March 2022, url, p. 8892
SNHR, Eleventh Annual Report: The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in 2021: The State’s Collapse
and Society’s Fragmentation, 21 January 2022, url, pp. 6-11
893
SNHR, Eleventh Annual Report: The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in 2021: The State’s Collapse
and Society’s Fragmentation, 21 January 2022, url, pp. 6-11
894
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Syria, 12 April 2022, url, p. 62

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Domestic violence is not specifically prohibited by law and ‘men may discipline their female
relatives in a form permitted by general custom.’895 SNHR stated that domestic violence wasrarely reported, making this type of violations difficult to document.896
Incidents of domestic violence ‘increased significantly during the Covid-19 pandemic’.897 The
pandemic, rising food prices and economic downturn pushed many Syrians into
unemployment. As men lost their work and spent more time at home, intimate partner,
physical, and family violence against women and girls, as well as further restrictions on
women’s and girls’ movements increased.898 In its Voices from Syria 2022 report899, The
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) noted a ‘dramatic increase in reports’ of intimate
partner violence in 2021. It was reported that physical or verbal violence might be ‘triggeredby a woman simply expressing her opinion on a family matter’. Being forced into a position ofinferiority, being denied access to a phone, friends and relatives, and having their movements
controlled were some forms of intimate partner violence mentioned by the respondents. 900
UNFPA further mentioned that community members are unwilling or unable to intervene in
intimate partner violence.901
Similarly to intimate partner violence, family violence was ‘perceived as on the rise due to the
combined effects of the economic crisis, COVID-19, unemployment and displacement’.
Adolescent girls faced various forms of violence perpetrated by parents and older andyounger brothers. Respondents frequently mentioned ‘the use of physical violence to control
adolescent girls’ behaviours and ensure their adherence to gender norms’.902
Regarding SGBV outside the home, the UNCOI maintained that rape and other forms of sexual
violence were used by GoS and affiliated forces against women to extract information, as
punishment, or to humiliate them and their families. 903 Armed groups were reported to haveperpetrated sexual and gender-based violations since late 2011 in Damascus and Aleppo ‘formotives related to exploitation, sectarianism or revenge’. 904

895

USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Syria, 12 April 2022, url, p. 62
SNHR, On International Women’s Day: Multiple Violations Committed by Various Parties to the Conflict in Syria,
Oppression of Women in All Groups’ Areas of Control Perpetuates a State of Lack of Development, Equality, andSecurity, 8 March 2022, url, p. 18
897
STJ, How is Violence Against Women Written into Syrian Laws and Society?, Seeking a remedy to the historicalinjustice against women is a moral and legal responsibility which falls upon states, communities, and individuals.,
November 2021, url, p. 9898
UNOCHA, 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 13; UNFPA,
Voices from Syria 2022; Assessment Findings of the Humanitarian Needs Overview, 23 December 2021, url, p. 37
899
The Voices from Syria 2022 presents data collected in the framework of the 2022 UNOCHA humanitarianneeds overview. The report is based on both quantitative and qualitative data from a variety of sources (involving
focus group discussions, secondary literature desk review, etc.). UNFPA, Voices from Syria 2022; Assessment
Findings of the Humanitarian Needs Overview, 23 December 2021, url, pp. 20-21
900
UNFPA, Voices from Syria 2022; Assessment Findings of the Humanitarian Needs Overview, 23 December
2021, url, p. 37
901
UNFPA, Voices from Syria 2022; Assessment Findings of the Humanitarian Needs Overview, 23 December
2021, url, p. 37
902
UNFPA, Voices from Syria 2022; Assessment Findings of the Humanitarian Needs Overview, 23 December
2021, url, p. 38
903
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/46/55, 11 March 2021, url, para. 21
904
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/46/55, 11 March 2021, url, para. 33
896

110

SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORTIn 2021, respondents to a UNFPA survey mentioned rape ‘more frequently than in past years,
in particular within the context of kidnapping and detention’, however, according to UNFPA ‘alevel of discomfort in discussing this specific type of GBV’ was revealed. 905 UNFPA noted
other cases of family violence where young girls, some before marriage, were subjected tovirginity tests, ‘an invasive inspection of their genitalia of no scientific merit’. 906 According to an
expert cited by UNFPA, as a result of GBV ‘women and girls resort mainly to negative coping
mechanisms: early marriage, dropping out from school, keeping women and girls in the house,
isolation, mental health issues, self-withdrawal, suicide attempts.’907

13.2.2 Honour crimes
In March 2020, Legislative Decree No 2 for the year 2020 was issued, cancelling Article 548of the Penal Code.908 The article was known as the ‘mitigating circumstances excuse’. The law
had previously been amended in 2011 909, however, Article 548 treated ‘honour killings’ as a
provoked crime or non-premeditated murder until March 2020. This led to perpetrators facing
lower sentences in relation to other murder cases. 910 However, not all courts under GoS
control dealt with ‘honour killing’ cases in this way by passing lower sentences. 911
Following the repeal of Article 584, ‘in many areas, practice has not caught up to the change.’
Investigating honour killings is often not a priority, as it is regarded as a family matter. Other
articles of the Penal Code allow judges to reduce sentences if mitigating circumstances apply,
such as including the events that can lead to an honour killing. In some cases, families broughtchildren forward as the perpetrator. Because of their age, they are usually immediately
released.912
The extent to which honour killings occur in Syria is not known.913 No official statistics are kept
regarding ‘honour’ used as a defence in murder and assault cases and so-called honour
crimes were reportedly rarely prosecuted. 914 A confidential source interviewed by the Dutch
MFA in March 2022 stated that honour killings are recorded mainly in areas where tribes play

905

UNFPA, Voices from Syria 2022; Assessment Findings of the Humanitarian Needs Overview, 23 December
2021, url, p. 28
906
UNFPA, Voices from Syria 2022; Assessment Findings of the Humanitarian Needs Overview, 23 December
2021, url, p. 28
907
UNFPA, Voices from Syria 2022; Assessment Findings of the Humanitarian Needs Overview, 23 December
2021, url, pp. 49-50
908
SANA, A new law on canceling article no. 548 of Penal Code which grants mitigating excuse for “honor crimes”,
17 March 2020, url; STJ, A Woman Disappeared in Southern Syria — Reports Say She was Killed for Honor, 25
August 2021, url
909
Enab Baladi, New law abolishes honor killings’ mitigating excuse in Syria, 14 March 2020, url
910
SJAC, Spike in “Honor Killings” Fuels Protests for Accountability in Northeast Syria, 12 August 2021, url; STJ,
How is Violence Against Women Written into Syrian Laws and Society?, Seeking a remedy to the historical injusticeagainst women is a moral and legal responsibility which falls upon states, communities, and individuals., November
2021, url, pp. 4-5
911
SJAC, Spike in “Honor Killings” Fuels Protests for Accountability in Northeast Syria, 12 August 2021, url
912
SJAC, Spike in “Honor Killings” Fuels Protests for Accountability in Northeast Syria, 12 August 2021, url
913
Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Algemeen ambtsbericht Syrië [Country report Syria], May 2022, url,
p. 61
914
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Syria, 12 April 2022, url, p. 63

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

an important role such as Sweida or north-east Syria, but they are not limited to a specificethnic group.915
There are indications that ‘honor killings increased following the onset of the crisis in 2011 .’916
In November 2020, Al-Monitor reported an increase in ‘honour killings’ of women in the city of
Sweida. A women’s rights activist interviewed by Al-Monitor stated that many women and girls
in Sweida were killed by their brothers, husbands or other relatives for inheritance. The victims
were accused of being involved in obscene acts to justify the crime as ‘honour killing’.917
Between January 2020 and February 2021, STJ documented three honour killings in thegovernorates of Dar’a and Sweida.918 SNHR recorded 24 gender-based killings of women
between March 2021 and March 2022. Most of these killings were labelled ‘honour crimes’,some being recorded in in Hasaka city in June 2021, in the towns of Taftanaz and Hazzano in
Idlib governorate as well as in Damascus city in December 2021. 919
Please also see Section 13.4.2 Situation of women in areas controlled by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham(HTS) and Section 13.4.3 Situation of women in areas controlled by the Syrian National Armyand other Turkish-backed armed groups for details regarding honour killings in areas
controlled by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and Syrian National Army (SNA) forces.

13.2.3 Sexual harassment
Discrimination in employment on the basis of gender is prohibited by law, however, sexual
harassment is not explicitly prohibited. The law was not effectively enforced and ‘sexual
harassment was pervasive and uncontrolled.’920
UNFPA described in a 2021 report cases of ‘sexual harassment and assault, including verbal
comments and inappropriate touching’. Sexual harassment of particularly adolescent girls
occurred in public transport and private taxis, schools, markets and public spaces. Working
women and girls tended ‘to be exposed to increased levels of sexual harassment and assault,
as well as sexual exploitation in exchange for work or wages’.921

13.2.4 Early and forced marriage
The Personal Status Law of 2019 puts the legal age for marriage at 18 for women and 15 formarriages consented by the male guardian of the girl and authorized by a judge. 922 Childmarriage had reportedly increased ‘alarmingly’ since the beginning of the conflict in 2011,
915

Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Algemeen ambtsbericht Syrië [Country report Syria], May 2022, p.

61
916

USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Syria, 12 April 2022, url, p. 63
Al-Monitor, Honor killings against women increase in southeast Syrian city, 25 November 2020, url
918
STJ, Under the Guise of Honor: Women Continue to Fall Victims to Violence Across Syria, May 2021, url, p. 3
919
SNHR, On International Women’s Day: Multiple Violations Committed by Va rious Parties to the Conflict in Syria,
Oppression of Women in All Groups’ Areas of Control Perpetuates a State of Lack of Development, Equality, andSecurity, 8 March 2022, url, pp. 18-19
920
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Syria, 12 April 2022, url, p. 64
921
UNFPA, Voices from Syria 2022; Assessment Findings of the Humanitarian Needs Overview, 23 December
2021, url, pp. 27-28
922
Syrian Arab Republic, ‫ المتضمن تعديل بعض مواد من قانون األحوال الشخصية السوري‬4 ‫[ قانون‬Law 4 amending some articles of
the Syrian Personal Status Law], 7 February 2019, url
917

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SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORT

however, there is a lack of comprehensive data. Child marriage disproportionately andsignificantly affected adolescent girls. Reasons of the increased risk included income
insecurity and rising poverty.923 In its February 2022 report, UNOCHA stated that 71% of thecommunities interviewed924 mentioned child marriage as an issue for adolescent girls. 925
Early marriage continued to increase while the age of marriage decreased for girls.
Adolescent girls between 12 and 17 years of age continued to be disproportionately affectedby early marriage. The economic situation was linked to the rise in early marriage, whereby
girls were perceived as burdens for parents and relief was sought through marriage. Financial
hardship and protection from sexual violence was used as justification for early marriage. 926
According to UNOCHA, across the country households were ‘reverting to negative coping
mechanisms’, including ‘child labour and child marriage and the sale of productive assets’.927
Economic hardship made families push their adolescent girls into marriage. However, earlymarriage was sometimes also regarded as a way out of family violence and became itself acoping mechanism.928 The UN report of the Secretary-General from March 2021 stated that ‘in
2020, there were cases of girls as young as 10 being forced to marry’ and there were reportsthat parents in north-west Syria forced prepubescent girls ‘to take hormones to induce
puberty in anticipation of early marriage’.929
ISIL had practiced forced marriage in a widespread manner. 930 Forced marriage was also
noted in areas under control of HTS and the GoS, however, SNHR was ‘unable to document
widespread use of this practice by the two parties due to the difficulty of determining thiscrime’. Women and their families feared speaking out on this issue. 931
Respondents surveyed in a UNFPA 2021 report described cases regarding the ‘practice of
forcing widows and, sometimes, divorced women to marry again’. In order to avoid having toabandon their children, the only available option for widows is often to marry the deceased
husband’s brother. Divorced women are forced to remarry, as the new husband is seen as the923World Vision International, Stolen Future: War and Child Marriage in Northwest Syria, 25 June 2020, url, pp. 910; UNFPA, Syria’s decade of conflict takes massive toll on women and girls, 15 March 2021, url
924
UNOCHA’s assessment was based on data collection from 33 171 interviewed households across Syria.
UNOCHA, 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 23
925
UNOCHA, 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 59
926
UNFPA, Voices from Syria 2022; Assessment Findings of the Humanitarian Needs Overview, 23 December
2021, url, pp. 31-32
927
UNOCHA, 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 8
928
UNFPA, Voices from Syria 2022; Assessment Findings of the Humanitarian Needs Overview, 23 December
2021, url, p. 50
929
UNSG, Conflict-related sexual violence; Report of the Secretary-General, S/2021/312, 30 March 2021, url, p. 21
930
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/46/54, 21 January 2021, url, para. 53; SNHR, On International Women’s Day: Multiple Violations
Committed by Various Parties to the Conflict in Syria, Oppression of Women in All Groups’ Areas of Control
Perpetuates a State of Lack of Development, Equality, and Security, 8 March 2022, url, p. 19
931
SNHR, On International Women’s Day: Multiple Violations Committed by Various Parties to the Conflict in Syria,
Oppression of Women in All Groups’ Areas of Control Perpetuates a State of Lack of Development, Equality, andSecurity, 8 March 2022, url, p. 19

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person who will preserve the honour and save the family from having to look after the woman
and supporting her financially.932
Sources reported in 2022 on an increase in the number of customary marriages in Syria.933
The Syria Report defines customary marriage as ‘a marriage contract between a man and awoman that is usually carried out by a religious cleric either orally or in writing’. 934 Reportedly,
this type of marriage has become common among young Syrian men who want to avoid
obtaining marriage licenses from military recruitment centres. 935 In addition, a researcher at
the Syrian Dialogue Centre attributed the increase in customary marriage rates in Syria to theeconomic situation whereby women’s need for financial support was exploited.936 As opposed
to official marriages, customary marriages may lead to the wife’s loss of her financial, housing,land and property (HLP) rights937 as the husband is not bound by any legal obligations towards
the wife.938 The Syria Report stated that a customary marriage has to be registered in order for
the woman to obtain her right to the dowry payment for example. 939

13.3 Profiles of vulnerable women
13.3.1 Female-headed household/single/widowed
Divorced and widowed women were stigmatised and exposed to ‘specific forms of
discrimination, abuse, and GBV’. Judgement by society led to verbal violence. The stigma
affected every aspect of life and made divorcees and widows one of the most marginalizedgroups. In order to marry again, widows and divorced women were forced to abandon theirchildren.940 Divorced women and girls specifically faced disproportionate stigma. They andtheir children faced rejection from their families, as the women were often blamed for the
divorce and ‘accused of having shamed or brought dishonour to their families’. 941
Divorced and widowed women were at risk of being excluded from humanitarian services942,
faced financial exploitation when trying to access humanitarian assistance and were deprived
932

UNFPA, Voices from Syria 2022; Assessment Findings of the Humanitarian Needs Overview, 23 December
2021, url, p. 33
933
Souria TV, ‫[ القاضي الشرعي في دمشق يحذر من ارتفاع معدالت الزواج العرفي في سوريا‬Sharia judge in Damascus warns of anincrease in the rates of customary marriages in Syria], 10 January 2022, url; Al-Quds Al-Arabi, ‫ارتفاع معدالت «الزواج‬‫[ العرفي» في سوريا… وباحثون يربطون ذلك بتداعيات الحرب‬Increase in customary marriage rates in Syria… Researchers link thisto the outcomes of war], 11 January 2022, url; Al-Hal, ‫ نساء بال حقوق وأطفال مكتومو القيد‬:‫[ الزواج العرفي في سوريا‬Customary
marriage in Syria: women with no rights and unregistered children], 31 March 2022, url
934
Syria Report (The), Explained: How Customary Marriage Harms Women’s HLP Rights, 12 April 2022, url
935
Souria TV, ‫[ القاضي الشرعي في دمشق يحذر من ارتفاع معدالت الزواج العرفي في سوريا‬Sharia judge in Damascus warns of anincrease in the rates of customary marriages in Syria], 10 January 2022, url
936
Al-Quds Al-Arabi, ‫[ ارتفاع معدالت «الزواج العرفي» في سوريا… وباحثون يربطون ذلك بتداعيات الحرب‬Increase in customary
marriage rates in Syria… Researchers link this to the outcomes of war], 11 January 2022 , url
937
Syria Report (The), Explained: How Customary Marriage Harms Women’s HLP Rights, 12 April 2022, url
938
Al-Hal, ‫ نساء بال حقوق وأطفال مكتومو القيد‬:‫[ الزواج العرفي في سوريا‬Customary marriage in Syria: women with no rights andunregistered children], 31 March 2022, url
939
Syria Report (The), The Financial ‘Privileges’ Granted to Syrian Women through Marriage, 26 April 2022, url
940
UNFPA, Voices from Syria 2022; Assessment Findings of the Humanitarian Needs Overview, 23 December
2021, url, pp. 47-48
941
UNFPA, Voices from Syria 2022; Assessment Findings of the Humanitarian Needs Overview, 23 December
2021, url, pp. 47-48
942
UNOCHA, 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 59

114

SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORTof inheritance and control over their assets by relatives. 943 In the long-term ‘inheritancedeprivation and denial of ownership meant that women and girls faced higher risks ofhomelessness and eviction, and remained dependent on male family members for shelter.’944
In addition, the lack of access to civil documentation constituted a severe problem for people
living in northern Aleppo, Raqqa, Hasaka, Deir Ez-Zor and Idlib. Particularly widowed or
divorced women were restricted in ‘their ability to inherit property, get custody of children,
legally remarry, or register children born through subsequent relationships, increasing their
exposure to violence and stigma’.945
Female-headed households faced a substantially higher risk of exploitation and abuse,including GBV, relative to other vulnerable population groups. 946 Widows and divorced women
faced a greater risk of ‘sexual exploitation when seeking accommodation, trying to accessservices, and within the workplace’.947 They were affected by sexual harassment from
employers and landlords 948 and they were especially likely to have to resort to survival sex. 949
In urban areas or larger displacement camps, widows were sometimes living in ‘widows’
camps’. These camps are meant to provide women and their children with protection.
Adolescent boys and adult men are usually banned from entering these areas. While womenmight enjoy the relative safety in the camps it ‘also comes with severe restrictions andlimitations to women’s freedom, in addition to potentially increasing the stigma that widows
face’. For example, widows are forced to abandon older children, as adolescent boys are notallowed to reside in the ‘widows’ camps’. Women and girls within these sites face violation of
their basic rights and exacerbated GBV risks, including mainly movement restrictions andeconomic violence as well as sexual exploitation, abuse and early marriage.950

13.3.2 Women activists
Women participated in public life, the political process and in most professions. Women madeup for around 13 % of the members of Parliament.951 Women involved in the political sphere
and women human rights defenders were ‘frequently silenced, belittled, harassed andtargeted - online and offline - simply for demanding participation or because they are affiliatedto a feminist or gender equality network or movement’.952 According to a July 2021 reportpublished by Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), women human
943

UNFPA, Voices from Syria 2022; Assessment Findings of the Humanitarian Needs Overview, 23 December
2021, url, pp. 47-48
944
UNFPA, Voices from Syria 2022; Assessment Findings of the Humanitar ian Needs Overview, 23 December
2021, url, p. 35
945
UNOCHA, 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 26
946
UNOCHA, 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 37
947
UNFPA, Voices from Syria 2022; Assessment Findings of the Humanitarian Needs Overview, 23 December
2021, url, p. 48
948
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2020 - Syria, 30 March 2021, url, p. 64
949
UNFPA, Voices from Syria 2022; Assessment Findings of the Humanitarian Needs Overview, 23 December
2021, url, p. 29
950
UNFPA, Voices from Syria 2022; Assessment Findings of the Humanitarian Needs Overview, 23 December
2021, url, p. 48
951
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Syria, 12 April 2022, url, pp. 58; 66
952
OHCHR, Syrian Women´s Rights Civil Society Conference, Combatting violence against women as a barrier towomen’s participation in decision-making and peace-building, Statement Birgit Van Hout, UN Human Rights(OHCHR) Regional Representative for Europe, 9 December 2021, url

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rights defenders and activists ‘face several risks including restrictions to freedom of
movement, arbitrary detention and enforced disappearances, displacement and violence,
including sexual violence in detention’.953
SNHR documented ‘many cases of women workers and activists being subjected to multiple
types of violence in north-east and north-west Syria’ between March 2021 and March 2022.
Women active within the community, politics, media and the humanitarian sector were
exposed to various types of risks and threats, as well as to both verbal and physical assault.
Violations included recurring summons to security centres or being forced to vow to stop theiractivities and work. In some of the cases documented by SNHR ‘the levels of violence reached
the point of threats or death’. Some women were forced to stop their work and women’sfamilies were threatened. Activities and programs ‘related to sexual violence against womenor the political empowerment of women’ in women's centres were sometimes suspended,
mainly in areas under HTS control. Many forms of violence against women varied from one
area to another, although violations against women ‘were similar in practice by the controlling
parties in north-west and north-east Syria, in areas under the control of HTS, Syrian National
Army, and SDF’.954
Between March 2021 and March 2022 SNHR recorded ‘at least 107 incidents of assault andintimidation against women activists and workers, or against centers for women in connection
with their activities in north-east and north-west Syria’. HTS was responsible for 27 incidents,
the SDF for 19 incidents and ‘Armed Opposition factions/Syrian National Army’ for 23
incidents. Unidentified perpetrators and extremist cells were responsible for 38 incidents. 955

13.3.3 Women in IDP Camps
According to UNOCHA ‘camps, overcrowded living arrangements, shelters lacking privacy orinability to lock homes or having sealed windows and doors are shelter issues that create GBV
risks for women and girls.’956 As of the beginning of 2022, 1.72 million people were living in
1 397 ‘last-resort sites’ in the governorates of Aleppo and Idlib in north-west Syria, ‘of which 80
per cent are women and children’.957
In north-eastern Syria, 49 % of IDP households were headed by females. Women and children
in overcrowded informal sites faced ‘serious protection and GBV risks’ due to ‘no proper siteplanning, limited or no access to services nor camp management structures’. 958 UNFPA notedthat in IDP camps, ‘the dire economic situation, combined with the harsh living conditions can

953

WILPF, Joint Submission for the UPR of Syria 40th session of the UPR Working Group, 15 July 2021, url, p. 12
SNHR, On International Women’s Day: Multiple Violations Committed by Various Parties to the Conflict in Syria,
Oppression of Women in All Groups’ Areas of Control Perpetuates a State of Lack of Development, Equality, andSecurity, 8 March 2022, url, p. 9955
SNHR, On International Women’s Day: Multiple Violations Committed by Various Parties to the Conflict in Syria,
Oppression of Women in All Groups’ Areas of Control Perpetuates a State of Lack of Development, Equality, andSecurity, 8 March 2022, url, p. 10
956
UNOCHA, 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 57
957
UNOCHA, 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 17
958
UNOCHA, 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 62
954

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SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORT

expose women and girls to transactional sexual exploitation, or survival sex’. In an IDP camp in
Hasaka, for example, an increase in prostitution was reported. 959
IDP women headed households reported lower rates of employment than male-headedhouseholds and were ‘nine times more likely to report having had no income in the last monthcompared to male-headed households’.960 Al-Monitor reported in February 2022 that
deteriorating security conditions and absence of the family’s breadwinner prompted women in
IDP camps in north-west Syria to seek work, which was often arduous and physicallydemanding.961
IDP women faced problems in exercising their right to pass on their nationality to theirchildren, especially in areas outside GoS control, due to missing civil documentation or lack ofrecognition of documents.962
Female ISIL members in Al-Hol camp imposed ISIL ideology and norms on displaced womenand children and committed violent actions, including murder on those who perceived to
oppose ISIL.963

13.4 Situation of women in areas controlled by non-statearmed groups
13.4.1 Situation of women in the Kurdish-controlled areas
Between March 2011 and March 2022, the SNHR documented the SDF as being responsiblefor 165 women being killed964 and 522 being arrested or subjected to enforced
disappearance.965 SDF were also responsible for two cases of torture against women 966 and 12

959

UNFPA, Voices from Syria 2022; Assessment Findings of the Humanitarian Needs Overview, 23 December
2021, url, p. 29
960
UNOCHA, 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 36
961
Al-Monitor, Women in northwest Syria take on physically demanding jobs, 15 February 2022, url
962
WILPF, Joint Submission for the UPR of Syria 40th session of the UPR Working Group, 15 July 2021, url, p. 10
963
Soz, J., The Crisis of Female Jihadists in Al-Hawl Displacement Camp, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 14 July 2022, url; SHRC, The 20th Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syria, 9 January 2022, url,
pp. 52-53
964
SNHR, On International Women’s Day: Multiple Violations Committed by Various Parties to the Conflict in Syria,
Oppression of Women in All Groups’ Areas of Control Perpetuates a State of Lack of Development, Equality, andSecurity, 8 March 2022, url, pp. 5-6
965
SNHR, On International Women’s Day: Multiple Violations Committed by Various Parties to the Conflict in Syria,
Oppression of Women in All Groups’ Areas of Control Perpetuates a State of Lack of Development, Equality, andSecurity, 8 March 2022, url, pp. 6-7
966
SNHR, On International Women’s Day: Multiple Violations Committed by Various Parties to the Conflict in Syria,
Oppression of Women in All Groups’ Areas of Control Perpetuates a State of Lack of Development, Equality, andSecurity, 8 March 2022, url, p. 7

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

cases of sexual violence against females in the same period.967 In 2021, two women were
killed968 and seven women arrested or detained by SDF. 969
In areas under control of the SDF, women who demanded their right to work and freedom of
opinion faced attacks by the SDF, resulting in detention in some cases. SNHR further
documented discrimination against Arab women, including denial or suspension of work andrestrictions on freedom of movement. Women activists faced threats because of theiropinion.970

13.4.2 Situation of women in areas controlled by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham(HTS)
In 2021, HTS continued to arbitrarily detain activists, humanitarian workers, and civilians in
Idlib. HTS was ‘increasingly interfering in every aspect of civilian life, limiting women’s
movements, imposing dress codes and even hair styles’. 971
HTS targeted women media workers and activists for exercising freedom of expression, suchas speaking out against the group’s rule. Women activists were detained by the group without
respect for judicial guarantees. For example, an activist was held incommunicado by HTS for
at least three months before being released in January 2021. In March 2021 , HTS members
raided the premises of an education organisation in Idlib following a gathering against
polygamous marriages’. The group shut down the offices and confiscated the keys of thepremises.972
Summarising the key trends in arbitrary imprisonment and detention, the UNCOI noted that
HTS ‘detained women and girls, for instance for travelling without a male member of theirfamily or for being “inappropriately dressed”’.973 The group also ‘banned women and girls fromwearing makeup, forbade women from living alone’.974 In 2020, HTS operated all-female
police units to support the religious Hisbah police in enforcing regulations among women.
Punishments ‘ranged from corporal punishment, such as lashing, to execution’.975

967

SNHR, On International Women’s Day: Multiple Violations Committed by Various Parties to the Conflict in Syria,
Oppression of Women in All Groups’ Areas of Control Perpetuates a State of Lack of Development, Equality, andSecurity, 8 March 2022, url, p. 8968
SNHR, Eleventh Annual Report: The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in 2021: The State’s Collapse
and Society’s Fragmentation, 21 January 2022, url, pp. 6-11
969
SNHR, Eleventh Annual Report: The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in 2021: The State’s Collapse
and Society’s Fragmentation, 21 January 2022, url, pp. 6-11
970
SNHR, On International Women’s Day: Multiple Violations Committed by Various Parties to the Conflict in Syria,
Oppression of Women in All Groups’ Areas of Control Perpetuates a State of Lack of Development, Equality, andSecurity, 8 March 2022, url, p. 15
971
HRW, World Report 2022 - Syria, 13 January 2022, url
972
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/48/70, 13 August 2021, url, para. 70, 73
973
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/46/55, 11 March 2021, url, para. 63
974
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Syria, 12 April 2022, url, p. 66
975
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2020 - Syria, 30 March 2021, url, p. 66

118

SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORTThe group was using women’s organisations and institutes, such as its Women’s Preaching
Office in Idlib governorate, ‘to tighten its grip on civil society and expand its public base,
despite its multiple violations against women’.976
Between March 2011 and March 2022, SNHR documented HTS as being responsible for 77
women being killed977 and 44 being arrested or subjected to enforced disappearance.978
A January 2022 report by SNHR further documents incidents in which women who have been
involved in public affairs have been subjected to harassment and intimidation in an effort toforce them to abandon their work in the areas controlled by HTS. The report also documents
at least 108 incidents in which women were targeted because of their work or opposition to
HTS practices between early 2014 and December 2021. 979
Between January 2020 and February 2021 STJ documented ‘five honor killings, committed in
the villages of Salqin, Atmeh, and Killi, among others’ in Idlib governorate, which is ‘almost
entirely controlled by the military faction Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)’.980 For example, inFebruary 2021 a father shot and killed his daughter ‘for allegedly taking her hijab off on thestreet and bringing dishonor to his name’. In November 2020, a father stabbed and killed his
daughter ‘for bringing dishonor upon the family name because she became pregnant after anaffair.’ Both incidents occurred in Idlib’s countryside. 981

13.4.3 Situation of women in areas controlled by the Syrian National
Army (SNA)
Between July 2020 and June 2021, the UNCOI ‘continued to document gender-based
violations, including of a sexual nature’ in northern Aleppo and Ra’s al-Ayn regions. Formerly
detained women described that members of the SNA forces had subjected them to multiple
rapes, beatings and torture, including regularly denying them access to food. Other women
were harassed, assaulted and threatened during interrogation sessions or while being held insolitary confinement. The UNCOI noted that there were ‘reasonable grounds to believe that
SNA elements committed torture, cruel treatment and outrages upon personal dignity,
including rape and other forms of sexual violence, which constitute war crimes’.982
Between March 2011 and March 2022, SNHR documented that the SNA and other armed
opposition factions were responsible for the killing of 882 women, the arrest or enforced
disappearance of 857, as well as for two case of torture and 11 cases of sexual violence
976

Al-Monitor, Syrian jihadist faction establishes 'Women's Preaching Group' in Idlib, 29 October 2021, url
SNHR, On International Women’s Day: Multiple Violations Committed by Various Parties to the Conflict in Syria,
Oppression of Women in All Groups’ Areas of Control Perpetuates a State of Lack of Development, Equality, andSecurity, 8 March 2022, url, pp. 5-6
978SNHR, On International Women’s Day: Multiple Violations Committed by Various Parties to the Conflict in Syria,
Oppression of Women in All Groups’ Areas of Control Perpetuates a State of Lack of Development, Equality, andSecurity, 8 March 2022, url, pp. 6-7
979
See SNHR, The Most Notable Hay’at Tahrir al Sham Violations Since the Establishment of Jabhat al Nusra toDate, 31 January 2022, url, pp.65-68
980
STJ, Under the Guise of Honor: Women Continue to Fall Victims to Violence Across Syria, May 2021, url, p. 3
981
STJ, Under the Guise of Honor: Women Continue to Fall Victims to Violence Across Syria, May 2021, url, pp. 4-5
982
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/48/70, 13 August 2021, url, para. 86-92
977

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against women.983 In 2021, two women were killed984 and 47 women arrested or detained by
SNA and other armed opposition factions.985 Other sources reported in 2022 on cases ofsexual harassment986, abuse and detention of women at the hands of SNA armed factions. 987
According to SNHR, Armed Opposition factions/Syrian National Army carried out various typesof harassment against women, including the summoning of working women and media
activists to security headquarters, for their criticism of the practices of the SNA forces.988
Between January 2020 and February 2021, STJ documented ‘at least seven honor killings,
mostly committed in the areas of Azaz, Afrin, Jarabulus, and al-Bab’ in the northerncountryside of Aleppo, which was ‘controlled by the Turkey-backed Syrian National Army
(SNA)’.989

983

SNHR, On International Women’s Day: Multiple Violations Committed by Various Parties to the Conflict in Syria,
Oppression of Women in All Groups’ Areas of Control Perpetuates a State of Lack of Development, Equality, andSecurity, 8 March 2022, url, pp. 5-8
984
SNHR, Eleventh Annual Report: The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in 2021: The State’s Collapse
and Society’s Fragmentation, 21 January 2022, url, pp. 6-11
985
SNHR, Eleventh Annual Report: The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in 2 021: The State’s Collapse
and Society’s Fragmentation, 21 January 2022, url, pp. 6-11
986
Syria Direct, Blackmail, threats, bullying, harassment: Women working in the public sphere targeted in northern
Syria, 4 July 2022, url
987
STJ, Peace Spring: Violations Against Women at Opposition-Run Smuggling Points, 20 June 2022, url; STJ,
Input for the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its Causes, and Consequences During Their Visit toTurkey, 22 June 2022, url
988
SNHR, On International Women’s Day: Multiple Violations Committed by Various Parties to the Conflict in Syria,
Oppression of Women in All Groups’ Areas of Control Perpetuates a State of Lack of Development, Equality, andSecurity, 8 March 2022, url, p. 14
989
STJ, Under the Guise of Honor: Women Continue to Fall Victims to Violence Across Syria, May 2021, url, p. 3

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14. LGBTIQ persons
For targeting of LGBTIQ individuals from the outbreak of the armed conflict in Syria in 2011 up
until January 2020, please refer to Section 13 of the previous EUAA COI report on Syria:
Targeting of Individuals published in March 2020.

14.1 Legal framework
The Syrian legislation makes same-sex activities punishable by law as stipulated in Article 520of the Penal Code of 1949.990 Article 520 states: ‘any sexual intercourse against the order ofnature can be punished with up to three years of imprisonment’ [informal translation]. 991
Article 517 of the Penal Code states: ‘Violation of public decency in one of the means
mentioned in Article 208 is punishable with imprisonment from three months to three years’[informal translation]. According to Article 208 ‘public indecencies’ are defined as follows[informal translation]:‘1. Actions and movements if they took place in a public space (sphere), or a space
accessible for the public or visible, or if observed by outsiders/third parties due to thefault of the person carrying them [actions and movements] out.
2. Speech or shouting whether uttered openly or transmitted by mechanical means
whereby they [the speech or shouting] are heard by third parties.
3. Writings, paintings, pictures (whether manual or solar [taken by camera], videos,signs, and all kinds of photography if displayed in public or in a space that isaccessible for public or visible, or if sold or presented for sale, or if distributed to one
person or more’.992
The International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA), based on its interpretation of this text,
defines a violation of public decency as any ‘act carried out in a public or open area where
one could possibly see, intentionally or accidentally, the act’. 993 The law makes no explicit
reference to same-sex marriage.

990

Syria, 2011 ‫ لعام‬1 ‫ المعدّل بــ المرسوم التشريعي‬1949 ‫ لعام‬148 ‫[ قانون العقوبات العام‬Penal Code 148 of 1949, as amended by
Legislative Decree no. 1 of 2011], 2011, url, no English translation available. Information on the interpretation of thelegal texts can be found in HRW, LGBT Rights, n.d., url
991
Syria, 2011 ‫ لعام‬1 ‫ المعدّل بــ المرسوم التشريعي‬1949 ‫ لعام‬148 ‫[ قانون العقوبات العام‬Penal Code 148 of 1949, as amended by
Legislative Decree no. 1 of 2011], 2011, url, art. 520; ILGA, State-Sponsored Homophobia, December 2020, url, p.
137; HRW, Annexe: Lois interdisant le comportement homosexuel et l’expression du genre, April 2018, url, p. 82
992
Syria, 2011 ‫ لعام‬1 ‫ المعدّل بــ المرسوم التشريعي‬1949 ‫ لعام‬148 ‫[ قانون العقوبات العام‬Penal Code 148 of 1949, as amended by
Legislative Decree no. 1 of 2011], 2011, url, art. 208
993
ILGA, State-Sponsored Homophobia, December 2020, url, p. 137

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According to a confidential source interviewed by Ministry of Foreign Affairs of theNetherlands in March 2022, in practice LGBTI persons are not prosecuted under Articles 515
and 520 but rather they are charged with drug-related offences or prostitution.994
According to a June 2021 Center for Operational Analysis and Research (COAR) report, ‘the
Syrian legal system is inherently hostile to LGBTQ+ individuals, who are a disfavoured class inseveral critical ways.’995 A November 2020 article by Syria Untold stated that Syrian law does
not provide for protection from ‘discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity’.
Moreover, there is no legal basis for transgender people to change their documents
accordingly. Since only the sexes male and female were acknowledged by the Syrian law,transgender and gender non-conforming individuals were in ‘constant danger of verbal andphysical violence whenever they present their IDs’, according to the article. Surgeries werelegally allowed only for intersex individuals in possession of a doctor’s diagnosis. 996 In 2018, it
was reported that the GoS allowed an intersex person to change the gender and register a
new gender status on official documents.997
A source interviewed in March 2022 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands
stated that he was ‘not aware of the presence of trans men in Syria and that [trans] for m thesmallest part of the entire Syrian LGBTIQ community and would only begin transition fromwoman to man outside of Syria.998 Another source stated that not only is specialist care fortransgender people unavailable in Syria, but the entire LGBTIQ community was likely toexperience difficulties in seeking mainstream or specific medical care. 999

14.2 Treatment of LGBTIQ persons by GoS and armed
groups
According to GlobalGayz.com, a travel and culture website that focusses on LGBTIQ mattersaround the world, ‘instances of persecution are limited to non-existent’ and Article 520 is ‘defacto suspended.’ Yet the same source mentions being an LGBTIQ individual to be a leveragefor mistreatment by Syrian authorities by stating that ‘the Syrian authorities can us e
individuals’ sexual orientation to blackmail, harass and eventually abuse members of the LGBT
community. Law enforcement officers have zero tolerance toward the LGBT community.’1000 As
reported by USDOS in April 2022, the abovementioned Syrian legal provis ions were used in
the past by police to prosecute LGBTIQ individuals. However, USDOS further stated that noprosecutions were reported under the law during 2021. With reference to a report of COAR,
USDOS explained that the ‘lack of protections in the legal framework created an environmentof impunity for rampant, targeted threats and violence against LGBTQI+ individuals .’ According
to USDOS, NGO reports ‘indicated the regime had arrested dozens of LGBTQI+ persons since2011 on charges such as abusing social values; selling, buying, or consuming illegal drugs; and994

Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of Origin Information Report Syria, June 2022, url, p. 57
COAR, LGBTQ+ Syria: Experiences, Challenges, and Priorities for the Aid Sector, June 2021, url, p. 12
996
Syria Untold, Voices breaking the silence, 3 November 2020, url
997
New Arab (The), Syria allows intersex person to register new gender status for first time, 10 February 2018, url
998
Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of Origin Information Report Syria, June 2022, url, p. 58
999
Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of Origin Information Report Syria, June 2022, url, p. 59
1000
GlobalGAYZ.com, Syria, Middle East, n.d., url
995

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SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORT

organizing and promoting “obscene” parties’.1001 According to an October 2020 article by
Syria Direct, Article 520 of the Syrian Penal Code is rarely applied, but LGBTIQ people insteadare ‘prosecuted under other petty charges, such as disturbing public order’. 1002 The director of
SNHR as cited in an April 2022 article by Al-Monitor stated that the LGBTIQ community in
Syria was ‘unable to obtain its rights given the strong rejection of all religions and the societal
culture’ against it and therefore ‘no entity is able to defend them.’1003
A source interviewed in March 2022 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands
stated that it is not possible to an LGBTIQ person to request protection from the authorities.
This does not only apply if the authorities commit the violence themselves, but also if itconcerns (expected) violence from society. The person in question runs the risk of beingarrested, humiliated, mistreated or abused.1004
In August 2020, the All Survivors Project (ASP) and SNHR stated that the Syrian armed conflict
evolving from 2011 onwards had led to an ‘increased vulnerability of LGBTI persons to sexual
violence in Syria’. However, according to ASP and SNHR, this was the exacerbation of analready existing discrimination and persecution problem against LGBTIQ individuals. 1005 A
source interviewed in March 2022 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands statedthat in both government and opposition areas, the number of cases of discrimination,
violence, exploitation and violation of civil, political and socio-economic rights for LGBTIQ
people is ‘quite high’ [informal translation].1006
In a report published in July 2020, based on 44 interviews with Syrian homosexual andbisexual men, transgender women and non-binary individuals, as well as four heterosexual
men, HRW stated that all of their interview partners had experienced sexual violence inSyria.1007 42 of the interviewees were living in Lebanon by the time of the interview and twoothers in the Netherlands and Italy, respectively. 1008 The report further stated that the violence
had occurred in a variety of settings, such as ‘Syrian detention centers, checkpoints, central
prisons, and within the ranks of the Syrian army’. 1009 While heterosexual men and boys in Syria
are vulnerable to sexual violence, men who are or are perceived to be homosexual orbisexual as well as transgender women are ‘particularly at risk’ according to HRW. 1010
HRW further reported that male adults and minors were sexually assaulted and raped indetention centres, regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity. LGBTIQ peopleinterviewed by HRW, however, believed that ‘perpetrators increased or intensified the1001

USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 - Syria, 12 April 2022, url, p. 72
Syria Direct, At home and abroad, LGBT Syrians fight to have their voices heard, 11 October 2020, url
1003
Al-Monitor, Rare Syrian NGO formed to defend LGBT community, 21 April 2022, url
1004
Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of Origin Information Report Syria, June 2022, url, p. 59
1005
ASP and SNHR, Joint submission by the Syrian Network for Human Rights and ASP to the UN Human Rights
Committee on the Syrian Arab Republic, 130th Session, 21 August 2020, url, p. 3; see also UK, House of Commons
Library, LGBT+ rights and issues in the Middle East, 9 February 2022, url, p. 37; MOSAIC and Gender Justice &Security, Impacts of the Syrian Civil War and Displacement on SOGIESC populations, December 2020, url, p. 6;
Reuters, 'I wish they killed you': trauma of Syrian LGBT+ rape survivors, 29 July 2020, url
1006
Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of Origin Information Report Syria, June 2022, url, p. 58
1007
HRW, “They Treated Us in Monstrous Ways”, July 2020, url, p. 1
1008
HRW, “They Treated Us in Monstrous Ways”, July 2020, url, p. 7
1009
HRW, “They Treated Us in Monstrous Ways”, July 2020, url, p. 2
1010
HRW, “They Treated Us in Monstrous Ways”, July 2020, url, p. 1
1002

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

violence’1011 once they learned that the interviewees were LGBTIQ individuals. LGBTIQ
individuals who served in the GoS army had faced sexual violence such as rape by othermembers of the army and in military prisons.1012 HRW found that there was a fear among
LGBTIQ people to join the Syrian army, because the prevalence of sexual violence in the army
and in military prisons against LGBTIQ people was widely known. Out of the fear to join thearmy, most LGBTIQ individuals fled the country, according to the source. HRW interviewees
stated that they or friends of them serving in the army were taken to Tadmur Prison andPalestine Branch for being LGBTIQ individuals. 1013 Moreover, based on the HRW interviews,
male adults and minors were targeted at checkpoints, regardless of their sexual orientation orgender identity, while gay and bisexual persons and transgender women were ‘targeted fortheir “soft looks”’.1014 If an LGBTIQ person was identified, particularly by security forces atcheckpoints, this could ‘escalate into physical and sexual violence, arrest and detention’. 1015
According to a January 2021 report of the UNCOI, ‘[u]nauthorized “courts”’ created by Hay’at
Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) and other armed groups issued death sentences, particularly ‘against
women and sexual minorities, including men accused of homosexuality’. Additionally, thereport informed that executions of homosexuals also took place in ISIL-controlled areas.1016 In
an April 2022 article by Al-Monitor, a homosexual man from Rural Damascus is cited to havestated that he was betrayed to HTS, upon which he ‘was arrested and faced the most severe
forms of torture and humiliation for eight months’ before being released. Another LGBTIQ
individual told Al-Monitor that he was arbitrarily arrested by HTS in 2021. His ‘mental andhealth condition severely deteriorated because of the beating’ he was exposed to, and he
was transferred to a hospital on the fourth day of his arrest, before he was released. However,
HTS members ‘kept raiding’ his house ‘almost daily for a month’ before he managed to moveto the countryside, from where he was planning to leave the country. 1017
MOSAIC and Gender Justice & Security published a study in December 2020 based on sevenfocus group discussions with LGBTIQ people and ten in-depth interviews with key informants
conducted between September 2019 and September 2020 in Syria, Lebanon and Turkey. 1018
The study found that while ‘[n]o-one denied the omnipresence of the threat of violence’, muchof it was regarded as coming from other civilians such as family members, and armed actors
were ‘less prominent in the narratives’ of the respondents. 1019 Respondents of focus group
discussions in Aleppo were an exception in that matter. They highlighted that there was a ‘riskof being “disappeared” by militias’1020 or kidnapped.1021 However, a constant in the
1011

HRW, “They Treated Us in Monstrous Ways”, July 2020, url, p. 32
HRW, “They Treated Us in Monstrous Ways”, July 2020, url, pp. 32-33, 37
1013
HRW, “They Treated Us in Monstrous Ways”, July 2020, url, p. 37
1014
HRW, “They Treated Us in Monstrous Ways”, July 2020, url, p. 38
1015
HRW, “They Treated Us in Monstrous Ways”, July 2020, url, p. 44
1016
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic A/HRC/46/54, 21 January 2021, url, paras. 52-53
1017
Al-Monitor, Rare Syrian NGO formed to defend LGBT community, 21 April 2022, url
1018
MOSAIC and Gender Justice & Security, Impacts of the Syrian Civil War and Displacement on SOGIESC
populations, December 2020, url, p. 11
1019
MOSAIC and Gender Justice & Security, Impacts of the Syrian Civil War and Displacement on SOGIESC
populations, December 2020, url, p. 28
1020
MOSAIC and Gender Justice & Security, Impacts of the Syrian Civil War and Displacement on SOGIESC
populations, December 2020, url, p. 28
1021
MOSAIC and Gender Justice & Security, Impacts of the Syrian Civil War and Displacement on SOGIESC
populations, December 2020, url, p. 32
1012

124

SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORT

respondents' narratives were the threat of ‘harassment and abuse by state authorities’. 1022
Respondents of the study further mentioned the fear of being entrapped over social media
sites by both GoS security agents and members of Islamist armed groups who would pose as
homosexual men in dating applications or on social media with the aim of trapping LGBTIQ
persons.1023
Within the time constraints of this report, no recent information on targeting of LGBTIQ
individuals in SDF/YPG held regions could be found.

14.3 Treatment of LGBTIQ persons by society and family
A February 2022 report of the House of Commons Library stated that ‘LGBT+ individuals
within Syrian society have long been targeted and subjected to violence by not only theregime and pro-regime militias, but also their families who seek to defend the family“honour”.’1024 Respondents of the abovementioned MOSAIC and Gender Justice & Security
study further reported of harassment on a daily basis and the need to reduce their visibility as
LGBTIQ individuals by adjusting their behaviour as well as violent threats from family
members, including the threat to report them to militias.1025 Few respondents received support
by family members. Some had lost their inheritance rights. 1026 A confidential source
interviewed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands stated that ‘sexual orientationof an LGBTIQ person is seen as a problem by the community rather than by the authorities .’1027
According to the Rights in Exile Programme, ‘Lesbianism is less acknowledged in Syriansociety due to the greater restrictions faced by women by virtue of their gender, regardless of
their sexuality.’1028 In its 2021 report, COAR stated that the stigma faced by all LGBTIQ people
in Syria was probably ‘even more pronounced for women because of a widespread view thatwomen carry (and therefore risk) the collective honour of the family’. COAR reported of case s,
where women who were open about their LGBTIQ identity were forbidden to communicate
outside the family. Furthermore, they could be subjected to violence or ‘conversion therapy’ or
be forced to marry.1029 According to one focus group discussion held by MOSAIC and Gender
Justice & Security, ‘lesbians in some families in Aleppo were kept essentially as “domestic
slaves”’ and were forbidden to have contact outside the family. 1030

1022

MOSAIC and Gender Justice & Security, Impacts of the Syrian Civil War and D isplacement on SOGIESC
populations, December 2020, url, p. 61023
MOSAIC and Gender Justice & Security, Impacts of the Syrian Civil War and Displacement on SOGIESC
populations, December 2020, url, p. 32
1024
UK, House of Commons Library, LGBT+ rights and issues in the Middle East, 9 February 2022, url, p. 37
1025
MOSAIC and Gender Justice & Security, Impacts of the Syrian Civil War and Displacement on SOGIESC
populations, December 2020, url, p. 32
1026
MOSAIC and Gender Justice & Security, Impacts of the Syrian Civil War and Displacement on SOGIESC
populations, December 2020, url, p. 32
1027
Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of Origin Information Report Syria, June 2022, url, p. 58
1028
Rights in Exile Programme, Syrian Arab Republic LGBTI resources, n.d., url
1029
COAR, LGBTQ+ Syria: Experiences, Challenges, and Priorities for the Aid Sector, June 2021, url, p. 15
1030
MOSAIC and Gender Justice & Security, Impacts of the Syrian Civil War and Displacement on SOGIESC
populations, December 2020, url, p. 32

125

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In an October 2020 article, Syria Direct reported about experiences of LGBTIQ individuals in
Syria interviewed by the source. According to one of the interviewees, the more affluent areasof Malaki and Bab Touma in Damascus served ‘as a safe space for LGBT Syrians’ in contrast to
more conservative neighbourhoods. According to Syria Direct, in more conservative
neighbourhoods, LGBTIQ individuals were not afraid of the law ‘but rather [of] how society will
cast judgement upon them’.1031 As reported by COAR in June 2021, ‘the cultural elite in Syria’s
most cosmopolitan cities, Damascus and Aleppo, have shown some toleration for semi-overt
expressions of homosexual identity’. However, only a ‘privileged few’, namely ‘ruling class
LGBTQ+ Syrians’ have enjoyed this acceptance and ‘relative liberty’. 1032
Another Syria Direct interviewee recounted how he was locked in the house after his familyfound out that he was gay. His phone was taken away and he was threatened to be
imprisoned or burned alive if he ever went ‘back to being gay’. Of seven additional LGBTIQ
individuals from Damascus, Latakia, Sweida and Homs governorates interviewed by Syria
Direct, six ‘had experienced some form of physical and verbal abuse, public humiliation or hadreceived threats from their peers’. One 25-year-old transgender man remained locked in thehouse by his parents for the past seven years. Another interviewee explained that his former
hometown, the central city of Hama, was conservative and stated that his parents had thrown
him out in 2018.1033
In an interview with Reuters, a HRW Syria researcher, reported based on documented cases
by HRW how families of gay people in Syria, who had been attacked for being ‘soft’, had told
them to ‘[g]et out, leave the country’ and had wished that they had rather been killed. 1034
According to the June 2021 COAR report, LGBTIQ individuals in Syria faced ‘hiring
discrimination and abuse in the workplace’. Furthermore, they had experienced hostiletreatment by landlords and neighbours.1035

1031

Syria Direct, At home and abroad, LGBT Syrians fight to have their voices heard, 11 October 2020, url
COAR, LGBTQ+ Syria: Experiences, Challenges, and Priorities for the Aid Sector, June 2021, url, p. 15
1033
Syria Direct, At home and abroad, LGBT Syrians fight to have their voices heard, 11 October 202 0, url1034
Reuters, 'I wish they killed you': trauma of Syrian LGBT+ rape survivors, 29 July 2020, url
1035
COAR, LGBTQ+ Syria: Experiences, Challenges, and Priorities for the Aid Sector, June 2021, url, p. 18
1032

126

SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORT

Annex 1: Bibliography
Oral sources, including anonymous sources
Syrian academic, email correspondence, 25 April 2022. The source, who has rare access tostate military and security actors as well as employees at various government institutions in
the capital, preferred anonymity for security reasons and to ensure the safety of his contacts.

Public sources
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Implementation and Circumscribed Resistance, Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center,
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2022
Abu Layla, O., How Iranian Militias Have Swallowed Deir Ezzor, WINEP (Washington Institutefor Near East Police), 16 February 2022, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policyanalysis/how-iranian-militias-have-swallowed-deir-ezzor, accessed 12 April 2022
Adleh, F. and Favier, A., “Local reconciliation agreements” in Syria: A non -starter forpeacebuilding, European University Institute, June 2017,
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/46864/RSCAS_MED_RR_2017_01.pdf?sequence=1, accessed 2 March 2022
ACAPS, Palestinians from Syria: Syria Needs Analysis Project, March 2014,
https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/14_palestinians_from_syria_march_201
4.pdf, accessed 25 April 2022
ACAPS, Syria. Humanitarian Needs in Afrin, 3 March 2021,
https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20200302_acaps_short_note_syria_hu
amitarian_needs_in_afrin.pdf, accessed 27 April 2022
ACCORD (Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation),
Anfragebeantwortung zu Syrien: Lage von LGBT-Personen, insbesondere in den kurdischen
Gebieten, Lage von transidenten Personen [a-11244] [Query response on Syria: Situation of
LGBTI persons, esp. in Kurdish areas], 3 April 2020, available at:https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/2027731.html, accessed 27 April 2022
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as of 31 December 2021, https://acleddata.com/2022/02/08/the-state-of-syria-q3-2021-q42021/, accessed 12 April 2022

127

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Adleh, F. and Favier, A., “Local reconciliation agreements” in Syria: A non-starter forpeacebuilding, EUI (European University Institute), June 2017,
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25 April 2022
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Property in Neirab Camp, 17 October 2020, https://www.actionpal.org.uk/en/post/10794/newsand-reports/pro-gov-t-group-in-syria-seizes-palestinian-property-in-neirab-camp, accessed
18 May 2022
AGPS (Action Group for Palestinians of Syria), ‫[ االستيالء على امالك الالجئين الفلسطينيين في سورية‬Seizureof Palestinian refugee properties in Syria], 2020,
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Europe and Syria’s neighbouring countries], 17 June 2021,
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128

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ًً‫رز‬
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151

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152

SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORTSNHR (Syrian Network for Human Rights), At Least 3,364 Health Care Personnel Still
Arrested/Forcibly Disappeared, 98% by the Syrian Regime, 27 February 2021,
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153

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SNHR (Syrian Network for Human Rights), On World Children’s Day: Tenth Annual Report on
Violations against Children in Syria, 20 November 2021, https://snhr.org/wpcontent/pdf/english/On_World_Childrens_Day_Tenth_Annual_Report_on_Violations_against_Children_in_Syria_en.pdf, accessed 3 March 2022
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Lands Are Another Syrian Regime Method to Seize Its Opponents’ Property in a Widespreadand Deliberate Manner, 14 February 2021, https://snhr.org/wpcontent/pdf/english/Public_Auctions_of_Forcibly_Displaced_Peoples_Lands_Are_Another_S
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hers_Over_Educational_Curricula_en.pdf, accessed 27 April 2022
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Since the Establishment of Jabhat al Nusra to Date, 31 January 2022, https://snhr.org/wpcontent/pdf/english/The_Most_Notable_Hayat_Tahrir_al_Sham_Violations_Since_the_Establishment_of_Jabhat_al_Nusra_to_Date_1_en.pdf, accessed 21 April 2022
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in January 2022, 4 February 2022, https://snhr.org/wpcontent/pdf/english/The_Most_Notable_Human_Rights_Violations_in_Syria_in_January_202
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SNHR (Syrian Network for Human Rights), The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria
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SNHR (Syrian Network for Human Rights), The Most Notable ISIS Violations against Syrian
Society and ISIS’ Contribution to Distorting the Popular Uprising Calling for Freedom andDignity, 10 February 2022, https://snhr.org/wpcontent/pdf/english/The_Most_Notable_ISIS_Violations_against_Syrian_Society_and_ISIS_C
154

SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORT

ontribution_to_Distorting_the_Popular_Uprising_Calling_for_Freedom_and_Dignity_en.pdf,
accessed 27 April 2022
SNHR (Syrian Network for Human Rights), The Ninth Annual Report on Torture in Syria on theInternational Day in Support of Victims of Torture, 26 June 2020, https://snhr.org/wpcontent/pdf/english/The_Ninth_Annual_Report_on_Torture_in_Syria_on_the_International_D
ay_in_Support_of_Victims_of_Torture_en.pdf, accessed 12 April 2022
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Amnesty Decree 7/2022 and Is Still Detaining Some 132,000 of Those Arrested Since March
2011, 16 May 2022, https://snhr.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/R220507E.pdf, accessed 18
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SNHR (Syrian Network for Human Rights), The Tenth Annual Report on Enforced
Disappearance in Syria on the International Day of the Victims of Enforced Disappearances;
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he_International_Day_of_the_Victims_of_Enforced_Disappearances_Long_Years_of_Consta
nt_Grief_and_Loss_en.pdf, accessed 11 March 2022
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ay_in_Support_of_Victims_of_Torture_en.pdf, accessed 12 April 2022
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suffering of Christians in HTS-held areas, 20 May 2021, https://www.syriahr.com/en/216698/,
accessed 27 April 2022
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Huma Rights), Exclusive interviews. Tens of Christians live in
HTS-held villages, despite repression, 9 June 2021, https://www.syriahr.com/en/217843/,
accessed 27 April 2022
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Huma Rights), Four years after liberation of Al-Raqqah city.
Christians are still deprived of practicing their rituals in churches, 4 February 2022,
https://www.syriahr.com/en/238162/, accessed 27 April 2022
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Huma Rights), HTS confiscates property of Christian community
in Idlib, 25 April 2020, https://www.syriahr.com/en/161606/, accessed 27 April 2022
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Christian young woman in Izra’a, 19 June 2020, https://www.syriahr.com/en/170645/, accessed
27 April 2022
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Huma Rights), Sohr: Two People Wounded In Turkish Shelling
On Christian Town In Northeastern Syria, 17 April 2022, https://www.syriahr.com/en/247510/,
accessed 27 April 2022

155

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SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), “Dealing with Iranian militias” | SDF arrests
nearly 30 collaborators during raid campaign with “International Coalition” in Deir Ezzor, 9February 2022, https://www.syriahr.com/en/238767/, accessed 26 April 2022
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), After the incident of beating and insulting
medical staff | Administration of Al-Fayha hospital closes the hospital and decides to relocate it
to Al-Hasakeh city, 7 July 2020, https://www.syriahr.com/en/173750/, accessed 27 April 2022
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Al-Quneitra | Regime officer and “collaborator”
assassinated in southern countryside, while Israeli aircraft flies over Yarmouk Basin, 5September 2021, https://www.syriahr.com/en/222085/, accessed 26 April 2022
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Al-Raqqah | Asayish Forces arrest young woman
in rural Ain Issa, as her father works for Turkish-backed “National Army”, 16 June 2020,
https://www.syriahr.com/en/170105/, accessed 20 April 2022
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Al-Raqqah | SDF intelligence arrests driver of“SDF commander-in-chief’s deputy” and another official for “communicating with Turkish
intelligence”, 3 November 2020, https://www.syriahr.com/en/190970/, accessed 20 April 2022
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Al-Suwaidaa | In response to arresting civilian,
local gunmen kidnap the governor’s driver and member of intelligence service, 29 July 2020,
https://www.syriahr.com/en/177163/, accessed 26 April 2022
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Amid lack of flour in most of bread bakeries |Fourth Division “besieges” SDF-held neighbourhoods in Aleppo, 5 April 2022,
https://www.syriahr.com/en/245885/, accessed 19 May 2022
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Armed attack | Member of Al-Quneitra Council
assassinated in Al-Baath city, 16 February 2021, https://www.syriahr.com/en/205353/,
accessed 26 April 2022
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Arrested two years ago: Civilian from Al-Rastan
north of Homs dies under torture in regime prisons, 14 November 2020,
https://www.syriahr.com/en/192194/, accessed 12 April 2022
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Assassination attempt | Unknown assailants
shoot informer of “Air-Force Intelligence” in northern Homs, 7 September 2020,
https://www.syriahr.com/en/183001/, accessed 26 April 2022
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Assassination attempt | Unknown gunmen open
fire on “informant” of “Air-Defence Intelligence” in eastern Daraa, 6 January 2021,
https://www.syriahr.com/en/199135/, accessed 26 April 2022
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Assassinations | Unknown assailants shoot deadchief of “Al-Sanamayn City Council”, 26 October 2020, https://www.syriahr.com/en/189936/,
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156

SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORTSOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Attacked two days ago | “Collaborator” withregime security services dies of his wounds in southern Al-Quneitra, 24 January 2022,
https://www.syriahr.com/en/236038/, accessed 26 April 2022
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Car bomb attack | Village mayor killed in Daraa,
23 December 2021, https://www.syriahr.com/en/231881/, accessed 26 April 2022
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Child soldiers | “Al-Shabiba Al-Thawriyah”
abducts and recruits displaced girl from Afrin countryside despite all demands to end children
recruitment, 26 February 2022, https://www.syriahr.com/en/240936/, accessed 20 April 2022
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Collaborated with regime security services |Head of town dies of injuries sustained in eastern Daraa countryside, 1 February 2021,
https://www.syriahr.com/en/203161/, accessed 26 April 2022
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158

SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS – COI REPORTSOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Popular resentment ignites after SDF members
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Annex 2: Terms of Reference
The research should focus on the period between January 2020 – August 2022 with the aim ofincluding the most recent information available. For certain profiles the reference period is slightly
different as they have been updated separately (March 2021 – August 2022 for Military service, May
2021 – August 2022 for returnees from abroad).
Background information and older trends should be kept very brief and crosslinked as much as possible
with previous reports published: Targeting of Individuals (March 2020), Situation of women (February2020), Military service (April 2021) and Situation for Returnees from abroad (June 2021)
Research should cover the following profiles:❑ Persons perceived to be opposing the Government of Syria (GoS)❑ Persons fearing recruitment in the Syrian Arab Army, military draft evaders anddeserters❑ Persons with (perceived) links to ISIL
❑ Members of and persons perceived to be collaborating with the Syrian Democratic
Forces/Kurdish People’s Protection Units❑ Persons perceived to be opposing the Syrian Democratic Forces/Kurdish People’s
Protection Units❑ Persons associated with the Government of Syria (GoS)❑ Journalists and other media professionals❑ Doctors, other medical personnel❑ Sunni Arabs❑ Kurds❑ Christians❑ Palestinians❑ Women❑ LGBTIQ persons

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