Syria
Security situation
Country of Origin
Information Report
July 2021

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Acknowledgements
This report was co-drafted by the European Asylum Support Office COI Sector and Finland, Finnish
Immigration Service.

The following departments and organisations have reviewed the report:
The Netherlands, Office for Country Information and Language Analysis, Ministry of Justice(OCILA)
ACCORD, the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation(except Chapters 1, 2.1 and 2.10)
ARC, the Asylum Research Centre (except Chapters 2.2 - 2.9 and 2.11 - 2.14)

It must be noted that the review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts or organisations
contributes to the overall quality of the report, but does not necessarily imply their formal
endorsement of the final report, which is the full responsibility of EASO.

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Contents

Acknowledgements................................................................................................................................. 3Contents .................................................................................................................................................. 4
Disclaimer................................................................................................................................................ 7
Glossary and abbreviations ..................................................................................................................... 8
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 9
Methodology ...................................................................................................................................... 9
Sources ............................................................................................................................................... 9
Public sources ................................................................................................................................. 9
Arabic online sources ................................................................................................................... 10
Oral source information ............................................................................................................... 10
Sources on civilian fatalities ......................................................................................................... 10
Sources on security incidents ....................................................................................................... 11
Challenges in collecting information and research limitations .................................................... 11
Structure and use of the report ........................................................................................................ 11
Map ....................................................................................................................................................... 12
1. General description of the security situation in Syria....................................................................... 13
1.1 Overview of conflicts .................................................................................................................. 13
1.2 Political developments ............................................................................................................... 13
1.3 International involvement .......................................................................................................... 15
1.4 Armed actors .............................................................................................................................. 19
1.4.1 Syrian Arab Army and affiliated armed groups ................................................................... 19
1.4.2 The Syrian National Army .................................................................................................... 20
1.4.3 Syrian Democratic Forces .................................................................................................... 22
1.4.4 Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham .......................................................................................................... 25
1.4.5 Other anti-government armed groups in the Idlib area ..................................................... 26
1.4.6 Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) ........................................................................... 28
1.5 Recent security trends ................................................................................................................ 34
1.5.1 Areas under the control of the Government of Syria (GoS)................................................ 34
1.5.2 Areas under control of Turkish-backed armed groups ....................................................... 37
1.5.3 Kurdish-controlled areas in north-east Syria ...................................................................... 40
1.5.4 Areas in north-west Syria under anti-GoS armed groups control ....................................... 42

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

1.5.5 Tanf...................................................................................................................................... 44
1.6 Impact of violence on the civilian population ............................................................................ 45
1.6.1 Tactics and weapons used................................................................................................... 45
1.6.2 Security incidents ................................................................................................................ 50
1.6.3 Civilian fatalities .................................................................................................................. 54
1.6.4 Humanitarian situation ....................................................................................................... 57
1.6.5 Displacement and return .................................................................................................... 58
2. Governorate-level description of the security situation ................................................................... 62
2.1 Idlib governorate ........................................................................................................................ 62
2.1.1 General description of the governorate.............................................................................. 63
2.1.2 Conflict background and armed actors ............................................................................... 64
2.1.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ........................................... 70
2.2 Aleppo governorate .................................................................................................................... 80
2.2.1 General description of the governorate.............................................................................. 80
2.2.2 Conflict background and armed actors ............................................................................... 81
2.2.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ........................................... 88
2.3 Hama governorate .................................................................................................................... 104
2.3.1 General description of the governorate............................................................................ 104
2.3.2 Conflict background and armed actors ............................................................................. 105
2.3.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ......................................... 109
2.4 Latakia governorate .................................................................................................................. 119
2.4.1 General description of the governorate............................................................................ 120
2.4.2 Conflict background and armed actors ............................................................................. 120
2.4.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ......................................... 123
2.5 Tartous governorate ................................................................................................................. 130
2.5.1 General description of the governorate............................................................................ 131
2.5.2 Conflict background and armed actors ............................................................................. 132
2.5.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ......................................... 136
2.6 Homs governorate .................................................................................................................... 141
2.6.1 General description of the governorate............................................................................ 141
2.6.2 Conflict background and armed actors ............................................................................. 142
2.6.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ......................................... 148
2.7 Hasaka governorate .................................................................................................................. 157
2.7.1 General description of the governorate............................................................................ 157
2.7.2 Conflict background and armed actors ............................................................................. 159
2.7.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ......................................... 165
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2.8 Raqqa governorate ................................................................................................................... 184
2.8.1 General description of the governorate............................................................................ 184
2.8.2 Conflict background and armed actors ............................................................................. 185
2.8.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ......................................... 189
2.9 Deir Ez-Zor governorate............................................................................................................ 200
2.9.1 General description of the governorate............................................................................ 200
2.9.2 Conflict background and armed actors ............................................................................. 201
2.9.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ......................................... 206
2.10 Damascus governorate ........................................................................................................... 223
2.10.1 General description of the governorate.......................................................................... 223
2.10.2 Conflict background and armed actors ........................................................................... 224
2.10.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ....................................... 226
2.11 Rural Damascus governorate.................................................................................................. 234
2.11.1 General description of the governorate.......................................................................... 234
2.11.2 Conflict background and armed actors ........................................................................... 236
2.11.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ....................................... 239
2.12 Dar’a governorate................................................................................................................... 249
2.12.1 General description of the governorate.......................................................................... 249
2.12.2 Conflict background and armed actors ........................................................................... 250
2.12.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ....................................... 256
2.13 Quneitra governorate ............................................................................................................. 269
2.13.1 General description of the governorate.......................................................................... 270
2.13.2 Conflict background and armed actors ........................................................................... 270
2.13.3. Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ...................................... 274
2.14 Sweida governorate................................................................................................................ 279
2.14.1 General description of the governorate.......................................................................... 279
2.14.2 Conflict background and armed actors ........................................................................... 280
2.14.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ....................................... 283
Annex I: VDC data ............................................................................................................................... 291
Annex II: Chronology ........................................................................................................................... 292
Annex III: Bibliography ........................................................................................................................ 299
Annex IV: Terms of Reference ............................................................................................................ 401

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Disclaimer
This report was written according to the EASO COI Report Methodology (2019).1 The report is basedon carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced.
The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed with utmost
care. However, this document does not claim to be exhaustive. If a particular event, person ororganisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has not taken place orthat the person or organisation does not exist.
Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particularapplication for international protection. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative of aparticular legal position.
‘Refugee’, ‘risk’ and similar terminology are used as generic terminology and not in the legal sense as
applied in the EU Asylum Acquis, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the
Status of Refugees.
Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may bemade of the information contained in this report.
The drafting of this report was finalised on 28 May 2021. Any event taking place after this date is notincluded in this report. More information on the reference period for this report can be found in themethodology section of the Introduction.

1

The 2019 EASO COI Report Methodology can be downloaded from thehttps://coi.easo.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2019_EASO_COI_Report_Methodology.pdf

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EASO

COI

PortalCountry of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Glossary and abbreviations
ACLED

Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project

AOAVAction on Armed Violence

COAR

Center for Operational Analysis and Research

CoI

Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic

DIS

Danish Immigration Service

ERW

Explosive Remnants of War

FSA

Free Syrian Army

GoS

Government of Syria

HAD

Hurras al-Din

HTS

Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham

IED

Improvised Explosive Device

IRGC

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

ISIL

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant; also known as Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria (ISIS), the Islamic State (IS), or Daesh

ISW

Institute for the Study of War

NDF

National Defence Forces

NLF

National Liberation Front

OHCHR

Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights

PYD

Democratic Union Party (Kurdish)

SAA

Syrian Arab Army

SDF

Syrian Democratic Forces

SHRC

Syrian Human Rights Committee

SNA

Syrian National Army

SNHR

Syrian Network for Human Rights

SOHR

Syrian Observatory of Human Rights

STJ

Syrians for Truth & Justice

UNOCHA

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

USDOD

United States Department of Defense

VDC

Violations Documentation Center in Syria

YPG

Kurdish People’s Protection Units

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Introduction
The purpose of this security situation report is to provide relevant information for the assessment ofinternational protection status determination, including refugee status and subsidiary protection, andin particular for use in updating EASO’s country guidance development on Syria.
In order to support the assessment of the application of Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive ona serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence insituations of international or internal armed conflict, the security situation report examines the natureof armed conflicts taking place in the territory, the nature of the violence and presence of armed
actors in different areas, and the impact on civilians, for example in terms of casualties/fatalities andconflict-linked displacement.
This report is produced in line with the EASO COI Report Methodology (2019)2 and the EASO COI
Writing and Referencing Style Guide (2019).3

Methodology
This report analyses the security situation in Syria, focusing in particular on the situation of the civilian
population. The reference period is 2020 and the first three months of 2021. The information gathered
is a result of research using public, specialised paper-based and electronic sources until 21 April 2021.
Some limited additional information was added during the finalisation of this report in response to
feedback received during the quality control process, until 28 May 2021.
The terms of reference (ToR) of this report were defined by EASO based on discussions held and input
received from COI experts in the EASO COI specialist network on Syria and from policy experts in EU+
countries4 within the framework of a Country Guidance development on Syria. The Terms of Reference
for this report can be found in Annex IV of this report.

SourcesPublic sources
In accordance with EASO COI methodology, a range of different published documentary sources havebeen consulted on relevant topics for this report. These include: COI reports by governments;
information from civil society, advocacy groups, humanitarian organisations, and NGOs; internationaland NGO human rights reports; reports produced by various bodies of the United Nations; Syrian andregionally-based media and social media; academic publications and think tank reports andspecialised sources covering Syria. All information from these sources was consulted within time
constraints and within the research constraints posed by Syria’s challenging information-gathering
environment.

2 EASO, EASO Country of Origin Information (COI) Report Methodology, June 2019, url
3 EASO, Writing and Referencing Guide for EASO Country of Origin Information (COI) Reports, June 2019, url
4 All EU Member States plus Norway and Switzerland

9Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Arabic online sources
This report has included some Arabic-language sources in order to provide added value to theavailable COI. All Arabic sources have been assessed and cross-checked/corroborated with English
sources to the extent possible, in line with EASO COI Methodology. Arabic sources have been
informally translated by a native Arabic speaker. Due to the volume of Arabic sources used, for thecitation of all these non-English sources, this report does not follow the EASO Writing and Referencing
Guide signalling in the citation each time a source is translated. This is for maximal readability andefficiency.

Oral source information
EASO researchers conducted interviews in February 2021 with the following sources and included
relevant information from:••

Suhail Al-Ghazi, Syrian researcher and activist from Damascus. In addition to being the nonresident fellow at Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, he is also a member of Verify-Syria
fact checking platform. His research focuses on the military and security situation of Syria as
well as the socioeconomic situation in government-held areas.
An international humanitarian organisation working in Syria. The source preferred anonymity
for the sake of discretion and their personal and organisational safety.

Sources on civilian fatalities
The two main sources on civilian fatalities in Syria used in this report are the Violations Documentation
Centre in Syria (VDC) and the Syrian Network of Human Rights (SNHR).
The Violations Documentation Centre in Syria (VDC) is a non-profit human rights organisation
established in 2011 with the stated purpose to provide independent documentation of human rights
violations within Syria. VDC uses a network of human rights activists and media activists who collectinformation about conflict-related deaths. It also collects information from hospitals, funeral homes,
the victims’ families and some local media institutions. The data are then compared with and crosschecked against available video recordings and images of conflict events before being entered in the
VDC database. The data are verified further and updated as new information becomes available. VDC
database lists civilian and non-civilian fatalities by name, gender, age, and governorate. For civilian
fatalities, VDC also codes the cause of death which includes: shelling, shooting, bombing, arbitrary
execution, death resulted from torture, death resulted from deprivation of health care, and use ofprohibited weapons.5
VDC has provided EASO its updated data on civilian fatalities for 2020 and the first three months of2021, disaggregated by month and governorate. The data is available in Annex I in of this report.
The Syrian Network of Human Rights (SNHR) is a non-profit human rights organisation founded in 2011
which works on documenting human rights violations in Syria. SNHR relies on a network of volunteers
in each governorate to compile lists of civilian fatalities and verify victims’ identities by photo or video
and by speaking with family members, witnesses, and hospitals. SNHR reports fatalities by gender,
age, perpetrator, governorate, and other classifications. SNHR only records civilian fatalities – with the
exception of the death toll among victims who died due to torture, which includes armed combatants
and civilians.6

5 For detailed information on VDC’s methodology see url; EASO email correspondence with VDC, 21 April 2021
6 For detailed information on SNHR’s methodology see url; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 1,734 Civilians in

Syria in 2020, Including 99 in December, 1 January 2021, url, p. 4

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Sources on security incidents
For data on violent incidents, publicly available curated datasets from the organisation Armed Conflict
Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) have been used. ACLED is a project collecting, analysing andmapping information on crisis and conflict in Africa, south and south-east Asia and Middle East andprovides datasets on conflict incidents. ACLED collects data on violent incidents in Syria, coding each
incident with the time and place, type of violent incident, the parties involved and the number offatalities. The information is collected in a database that is openly accessible, searchable and kept
continuously up to date. The data primarily come from secondary sources such as media reports, butalso from reports by international institutions and non-governmental organisations and data provided
by local partners of ACLED.7
Security incidents numbers and associated graphs/maps at country and governorate level are basedon a publicly available ACLED curated dataset for Middle East (updated until 9 April 2021).8 Additionalsources have been researched to the extent possible to corroborate the ACLED findings.
Further information on ACLED’s methodology and the dataset used for this report is available in
Section 1.6.2

Challenges in collecting information and research limitations
The research environment in Syria is challenging. Availability of credible and up to date information islimited.9 The COVID-19 (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic has further limited the ability to conduct field researchand report on recent developments pertaining to specific issues.
In the context of the Syrian conflict, media coverage in both Syrian and international media must be
carefully weighed against each other. Source and information assessment took place in a highlypolarised and politicised context. Bias was mitigated to the extent possible through methodological
techniques such as crosschecking, corroborating, contrasting and comparing the information.

Structure and use of the report
The report is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on presenting an overview of the armed
conflicts in Syria, current political developments and information on the main parties to the conflict.
It goes on to describe the security trends in different parts of Syria during 2020 and first three monthsof 2021, with a focus on the nature of the violence and impact on civilians.
The second part provides a governorate-level description of the security situation. Each governorate
chapter includes a map, brief description of the governorate, background conflict dynamics and armed
actors present in the area, recent security trends, including information on civilian fatalities, security
incidents and trends, armed confrontations (etc.), displacement and return, and civilian infrastructure
impacted.

7 ACLED, Methodology, April 2019, url; ACLED, FAQ ACLED Sourcing Methodology, February 2020, url
8 For more details on ACLED’s reporting see Section 1.6.2. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (9 April 2021), url
9 The UN Human Rights Council mandated Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,

established on 22 August 2011 and tasked with investigating all alleged violations of international human rights law since
March 2011 in the Syrian Arab Republic, has been denied access to the territory held by the Government of the Syria (GoS).
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/46/54], 21 January 2021, url, p. 2

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Map

Map 1: Syrian Arab Republic, © United Nations10

10 Syria, Map No. 4204 Rev. 3, April 2012, United Nations, url

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

1. General description of the security
situation in Syria
1.1 Overview of conflicts
Several armed conflicts are taking place in Syria, according to the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict Project(RULAC):11
•
•
•
•
•

the United States (US)-led coalition against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is in
an international armed conflict with Syria, due to its military intervention in Syria without theconsent of the Government of Syria (GoS).
Syria is in an international armed conflict with Turkey, who has carried out military operations
against GoS12, ISIL and Kurdish armed groups in Syria, and controls parts of northern Syria withthe help of anti-GoS armed groups.13
Syria is involved in an international armed conflict with Israel as well, who has been
conducting air strikes on Iranian targets in Syria without the consent of the GoS.14
Syria is involved in a non-international armed conflict with various anti-GoS armed groups,
most notably Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Syrian National Army (SNA) and ISIL.15
Turkey is engaged in a non-international armed conflict in Syria with the Kurdish People’s
Protection Units (YPG) forces.16

The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab (CoI) determined that as ofFebruary 2012 ‘the intensity and duration of the conflict, combined with the increased organizational
capabilities of anti-Government armed groups, had met the legal threshold for a non-internationalarmed conflict. With this determination, the commission applied international humanitarian law in its
assessment of the actions of the parties during hostilities.’17
Further information on the conflict background in Syria is available in the EASO COI Report: Syria Security situation (May 2020) and EASO COI Report: Syria – Actors (December 2019).

1.2 Political developments
The UN Security Council Resolution 2254, adopted in December 2015, calls for creating a
constitutional committee that would draft a new constitution and organise UN supervised elections.18

11 RULAC is an online portal that identifies and classifies situations of armed conflict through independent assessment basedon open source information; it is located at the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, 17
December 2020, url
12 AP News, Syrian, Turkish armies engage in new deadly clashes in Idlib, 4 March 2020, url
13 RULAC, International armed conflicts in Syria, 15 April 2021, url
14 RULAC, International armed conflicts in Syria, 15 April 2021, url
15 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/46/54], 21 January 2021, url, paras 6-7, 11, 19; RULAC, International armed conflicts in Syria, 15 April 2021, url
16 Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, The War Report 2018, April 2019, url, p. 127
17 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/21/50], 16 August 2012, url, p. 1 paras 1-3
18 Syria Study Group, Final Report and Recommendations, USIP, 24 September 2019, url, p. 29

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

The Geneva peace talks led by the UN (in 201619 and 201720) have been unsuccessful, with the GoS
and opposition representatives failing to find common ground.21 Outside of UN auspices, Russia,
Turkey and Iran set up peace talks in January 2017 in what became known as the Astana process.22
The negotiations led to the creation of four so-called ‘de-escalation areas’ which stipulated thecessation of hostilities in certain areas between GoS and anti-GoS armed groups and terms for
improved humanitarian access, with Russia, Turkey and Iran acting as guarantors.23 Starting from the
beginning of 2018, three out of the four de-escalation zones have been retaken by GoS forces.24 The
last remaining de-escalation zone covering Idlib governorate and parts of Latakia, Aleppo and Hama
governorates have been subject to GoS military offensive in 2019 and early 2020.25
On 16 September 2019, Turkey, Russia and Iran announced that an agreement regarding thecomposition of the Constitutional Committee had been reached.26 The committee comprises of 150
delegates, including 50 delegates each representing respectively the GoS and the Syrian opposition. A
third list of 50 Syrian-national delegates27 chosen by the UN representing ‘Syrian experts, civil society,independents, tribal leaders and women’.28 A 45 member Constitution-drafting group, 15 from eachgroup, was set up in October 2019 following the committee’s first meeting.29 Subsequent sessions of
the Constitutional Committee held in November 201930, December 2020 and January 2021, failed tomake progress.31
In July 2020, parliamentary elections were held in GoS-controlled areas. The voting excluded Syrians
who live outside GoS-held areas in north-west and north-east Syria.32 The Ba’ath Party and its allies
joined under the ‘National Unity’ alliance won 70 % of the seats.33 The remaining seats went tomarginal parties connected to the Ba’ath Party and nominal independent candidates with ties to
President Assad.34 Observers stated that the process was marred by electoral fraud and politicalinterference.35 Former French ambassador to Syria Michel Duclos labelled the parliamentary elections
as a ‘mockery’.36 All candidates had to be ‘vetted by state security services, thus precluding the entryof earnest political opposition’.37

19 Atlantic (The), The End of the Beginning in Syria, 30 March 2016, url
20 BBC News, Syria war: Peace talks restart in Geneva, 16 May 2017, url; Guardian (The), 'Golden opportunity' lost as Syrian

peace talks collapse, 14 December 2017, url
21 CFR, Civil War in Syria, 10 March 2021, url
22 Syria Study Group, Final Report and Recommendations, USIP, 24 September 2019, url, p. 28
23 Al Jazeera, Syria's 'de-escalation zones' explained, 4 July 2017, url
24 International Crisis Group, The Best of Bad Options for Syria’s Idlib, 14 March 2019, url, p. 3
25 See Idlib and Aleppo chapters.
26 Asharq Al-Aswat, Russia, Iran, Turkey Say Syria Constitutional Committee Ready, 16 September 2019, url
27 US CRS, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, 12 February 2020, url, p. 19
28 AP News, UN envoy: More work needed on Syria constitutional committee, 21 December 2018, url
29 UN, Special Envoy Calls Launch of Constitutional Committee for Syria ‘Historic Moment’, but Warns Security Council
Conditions on Ground Must Improve, 22 November 2019, url
30 UN News, Syria: Lack of consensus following face-to-face talks, underscores need for broader process, 20 December 2019,url
31 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2021/160], 18 February 2021, url, p. 4; UN Secretary General, Note to Correspondents: Transcript of remarks by Mr. Geir
O. Pedersen, UN Special Envoy for Syria, following the conclusion of the Fifth Session of the Small Body of the Syrian
Constitutional Committee, 29 January 2021, url
32 COAR, Potemkin parliament: Baathists consolidate control as access to power shifts, 27 July 2020, url
33 Duclos, M., The Syrian parliamentary elections were a mockery, Atlantic Council, 31 July 2020, url
34 COAR, Potemkin parliament: Baathists consolidate control as access to power shifts, 27 July 2020, url
35 Shaar, K. and Akil, S., Inside Syria's Clapping Chamber: Dynamics of the 2020 Parliamentary Elections, MEI, 28 January
2021, url
36 Duclos, M., The Syrian parliamentary elections were a mockery, Atlantic Council, 31 July 2020, url
37 COAR, Potemkin parliament: Baathists consolidate control as access to power shifts, 27 July 2020, url

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Presidential elections were held on 26 May 2021 and resulted in Assad winning 95.1 % of the votes
and a fourth term as President of Syria.38 The elections were boycotted in areas outside GoS control.39
Syrian authorities claimed that more that 14 million Syrians voted in the presidential elections, aturnout of around 78 %.40
European countries have expressed their intention to reject the results of ‘any presidential elections
not based on United Nations Security Council resolution 2254’.41 A European Parliament resolution
from March 2021 stated that it ‘considers the upcoming 2021 Syrian Presidential elections to belacking any form of credibility in the eyes of the international community in the current context’.42
Following the May 2021 presidential elections, EU High Representative Joseph Borrell stated that they
‘met none of the criteria of a genuinely democratic vote’.43

1.3 International involvement
The conflict in Syria has drawn the involvement of countries such as Russia, Iran, Turkey, the US, Israel
and others.44 The conflict is viewed as being more about the geopolitical future of the Middle Eastrather than only about Syria.45
Russia intervened militarily in the Syrian conflict in September 2015, in support of the Syrian
government46 and is credited with changing the tides of war in Assad’s favour.47 Russia’s militarypresence was focused mainly on an aerial campaign with a naval component. Ground forces consisted‘primarily of special forces, which focused on training, advising, and assistant partner forces andconducting special reconnaissance missions’.48 Estimates from March 2020 put the number of Russian
troops in Syria at 5 000.49
Since 2012, Iran has supplied Assad’s troops with Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) advisors,a network of Shia foreign fighters from the Lebanese Hezbollah and various militias from Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and Iraq.50 Iran has also played an important role in the foundation of the Syrian progovernment militias such as the National Defense Forces (NDF), which were formed under IRGC
supervision.51 As of March 2020, Iran presence in Syria consisted of an estimated 3 000 IRGC militaryadvisors and between 30 000 to 50 000 affiliated foreign militias.52 In 2020, Iranian presence andinfluence was reported throughout Syria, with a higher concentration in Damascus, Aleppo, Deir Ez-

38 Euronews, Syria's Assad wins 4th term with 95% of vote, in election the West calls fraudulent, 28 May 2021, url
39 COAR, Al-Assad ‘Wins’ Re-Election with 95.1% of The Vote. Now What?, 31 May 2021, url
40 Euronews, Syria's Assad wins 4th term with 95% of vote, in election the West calls fraudulent, 28 May 2021, url
41 Asharq Al-Aswat, European Document Rejects 2021 Syrian Presidential Elections, 2 March 2021, url
42 European Parliament, resolution of 11 March 2021 on the Syrian conflict – 10 years after the uprising (2021/2576(RSP)),

11 March 2021, url
43 EEAS, Syria: Statement by the High Representative Josep Borrell on the presidential elections, 27 May 2021, url
44 Syria Study Group, Final Report and Recommendations, USIP, 24 September 2019, url, p. 1245 Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, The War Report 2018, April 2019, url, pp. 124-125
46 US CRS, Syria Conflict Overview: 2011-2018, 23 January 2019, url, p. 2; Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War: Government Victory or
Frozen Conflict?, Swedish Defence Research Agency, December 2018, url, p. 21
47 EPRS, Russia in the Middle East. From Sidelines to center Stage, November 2018, url, p. 2; Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War:
Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Swedish Defence Research Agency, December 2018, url, p. 21
48 Borshchevskaya, A., Shifting Landscape, Russia’s military role in the Middle East, Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
September 2019, url, p. 5
49 Lamrani, O., The Syrian Battlespace: A Net Assessment, Newlines Institute, 13 April 2020, url
50 Syria Study Group, Final Report and Recommendations, USIP, 24 September 2019, url, pp. 22-23; USDOD, Operation
Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, April 1, 2019‒June 30, 2019, 6 August 2019, url, pp. 2728
51 ISW, Iran’s Assad Regime, 8 March 2017, url, p. 3; Omran Centre for Strategic Studies, Changing the Security Sector in
Syria, 01 October 2017, url, p. 90
52 Lamrani, O., The Syrian Battlespace: A Net Assessment, Newlines Institute, 13 April 2020, url

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Zor, Homs and Quneitra governorates.53 Iranian-backed forces are fighting on behalf of the GoS
against anti-government groups and ISIL.54
Turkey has been involved in Syria’s conflict since 2011, supporting opposition groups attempting to
remove the Assad government from power, such as the Free Syrian Army (FSA)-branded factions andIslamist groups.55 Turkey’s main objective in Syria has been to prevent the Syrian Kurdish People’s
Protection Units (YPG) from ‘establishing an autonomous area along Syria’s northern border withTurkey’.56 The US Congressional Research Service (US CRS) stated that Turkey ‘maintains militaryforces in northern Syria as part of a broader campaign targeting Kurdish fighters’.57
As of March 2020, Turkey fielded between 3 000 to 4 000 troops in Syria, although the number
constantly fluctuates.58 In 2020 and early 2021, it maintained military outposts and troops in Idlib
governorate59, northern Aleppo governorate and in the area between Tal Abyad and Ras Al-Ain.60 In
2020, Turkey engaged in military confrontations with GoS forces in north-east61 and north-west
Syria62, as well as with Kurdish forces.63
The US-led Global Coalition Against Daesh [ISIL], currently comprised of 83 states, was formed in2014 to combat ISIL in Iraq and Syria64 and since September 2014 has carried out military operations
against ISIL and other targets in Syria.65 Under former US President Donald Trump, the US reduced its
involvement in the Syrian conflict66 and as of February 2021, 900 US troops remained in Syria deployed
in north-east Syria and around Tanf Garrison (Homs governorate).67 US operations against ISIL in Syria

53 Saban, N., Factbox: Iranian influence and presence in Syria, Atlantic Council, 5 November 2020, url
54 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve. Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, April 1, 2019‒June 30, 2019, 6

August 2019, url, p. 7; SOHR, Hama | Fierce clashes erupt between ISIS and NDF in the wake of kidnapping four persons, 4August 2020, url; HRW, “Targeting Life in Idlib”; Syrian and Russian Strikes on Civilian Infrastructure, October 2020, url, p.
136; Al Monitor, Iran risks confrontation with Turkey over Idlib, 3 March 2020, url
55 Manhoff, T., Turkey's Foreign Policy Towards Syria. From Neo-Ottoman Adventurism to Neo-Ottoman Realpolitik, KonradAdenauer-Stiftung, December 2017, url, p. 5; Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War: Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Swedish
Defence Research Agency, December 2018, url, pp. 17-18
56 US CRS, Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief, 9 November 2020, url, p. 17
57 US CRS, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, 27 July 2020, url, Summary
58 Lamrani, O., The Syrian Battlespace: A Net Assessment, Newlines Institute, 13 April 2020, url
59 Greco, A., Turkey Reinforces Positions in Greater Idlib to Pressure Russia into Negotiations, ISW, 7 October 2020, url; Carter
Center (The), Syria Weekly Conflict Summary 30 November - 6 December 2020, 9 December 2020, url
60 Al-Hilu, K., The Turkish Intervention in Northern Syria: One Strategy, Discrepant Policies, EUI, 14 January 2021, url, p. 4
61 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2020/813], 20 August 2020, url, p. 4
62 AA, Turkey neutralizes 101 Assad regime military personnel, 10 February 2020, url; DW, Turkey targets Syria troops indeadly counterattack, 3 February 2020, url
63 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/45/31], 14 August 2020, url, p. 2
64 Notable states that are members of the coalition include USA, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Jordan,
Morocco, the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom. See Geneva Academy ofInternational Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, The War Report 2018, April 2019, url, p. 125; See also Global Coalition,
83 Partners United in Ensuring Daesh’s Enduring Defeat, n.d., url
65 Business Insider, Trump reportedly wants to get out of Syria — here's how many troops the US has in the country, 4 April
2018, url
66 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War: Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Swedish Defence Research Agency, December 2018,
url, p. 30; International Crisis Group, Squaring the Circles in Syria’s North East, 31 July 2019, url, p. 1
67 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, October 1, 2020 – December 31
2020, 9 February 2021, url, p. 11

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

continued in 202068 and first three months of 2021.69 US airstrikes on Iranian-affiliated militias andtargets in Syria were also reported.70
Since the start of the conflict in 2011, Israel has carried out air strikes against mainly LebaneseHezbollah and Iranian targets in Syria71, which it considers representing a security threat to its
borders.72 These airstrikes continued in 202073, with Israel’s military claiming it hit 50 targets in Syria
during the year.74 Israeli airstrikes on GoS, Lebanese Hezbollah and Iranian targets were reported in
2021.75
According to the Council on Foreign Relations writing in March 2021, ‘external military intervention—
including the provision of arms and military equipment, training, air strikes, and even troops—in
support of proxies in Syria threatens to prolong the conflict’. International actors, including the US-led
coalition, Russia, Iran, Turkey and Israel operate ‘in proximity to one another complicating the civil
war and raising concerns over an unintended escalation’.76
For an overview of the number and location of military bases and posts of foreign forces in Syria as
documented by Jusoor for Studies77 in January 2021, see Map 2 below:

68 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, October 1, 2020 – December 31

2020, 9 February 2021, url, p. 54
69 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, January 1, 2021 – March 31, 2021,
4 May 2021, url, p. 63
70 BBC News, Biden takes first military action with Syria strike on Iran-backed militias, 26 February 2021, url
71 National Interest (The), Why Syria Hates Israel's Hard-To-Stop "Suicide" Drones, 9 March 2020, url; US CRS, Armed Conflictin Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, 12 February 2020, url, p. 1; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent
International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/46/54], 21 January 2021, url, p. 6
72 Reuters, Syrian state media: Israeli missile strike kills four civilians, 1 July 2019, url
73 BBC News, Syria war: Israel 'hits Iran-backed fighters near Damascus', 6 February 2020, url; MEE, Israel launches air strikes
in Syria, casualties reported, 6 February 2020, url
74 Asharq Al-Aswat, Israel Says it Hit 50 Syria Targets in 2020, 31 December 2020, url
75 Carter Center (The), Syria Weekly Conflict Summary 4 - 10 January, 13 January 2021, url; Carter Center (The), Syria Weekly
Conflict Summary 11-17 January 2021, 21 January 2021, url; Guardian (The), Deadliest Israeli airstrikes on Syria in years kill
57, say observers, 13 January 2021, url; Times of Israel, Israeli airstrikes said to hit targets near Damascus, 15 February 2021,
url
76 CFR, Civil War in Syria, 10 March 2021, url
77 Jusoor for Studies is ‘an independent institution specializing in information management and conducting studies andresearch related to the Syrian political and social affairs in particular and the Middle East region in general’. See Jusoor for
Studies, About us, n.d., url

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Map 2: © Jusoor for Studies, Map of the military bases and posts of foreign forces in Syria78

78 Jusoor for Studies, Map of the military bases and posts of foreign forces in Syria 6 January 2021, url

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

1.4 Armed actors
According to the Council on Foreign Relations, three main campaigns have driven the conflict in Syria:‘coalition efforts to defeat the Islamic State, violence between the Syrian government and opposition
forces, and military operations against Syrian Kurds by Turkish forces’.79

1.4.1 Syrian Arab Army and affiliated armed groups
The Syrian Armed Forces consist of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA), the navy, the air force, the intelligence
services and the National Defense Forces militia.80 Bashar al Assad acts as the commander in chief of
the SAA and the armed forces.81 Operational control of the forces was maintained by the Chief of Staffof the Syrian Armed Forces.82
As of 2020, the Syrian Armed Forces were estimated to have 169 000 military personnel of which
130 000 were serving in the SAA.83 The US Department of Intelligence estimated in a report covering
the period between July and September 2020, that the SAA had between 4 000 and 10 000 troops
deployed in north-east Syria, between the cities of Manbij (Aleppo governorate) and Tal Tamr (Hasaka
governorate).84
The SAA comprises of five main corps (the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th Corps), each consisting of divisions
and led by a major general. The 4th and 5th Corps were created under Russian initiative after September
2015.85 The two corps operated either under joint Russian-Syrian command (4th Corps) or explicit
Russian command (5th Corps).86 Apart from the five main corps, the SAA also has several semiindependent units: the Republican Guard, the Special Forces and the 4th Armoured Division, which
also fall under the command of the Chief of Staff.87
The SAA is said to rely often on key ‘praetorian units’ such as the Republican Guard, the 4th Armoured
Division and the Special Forces for offensive operations. These units are reportedly mainly composedof Alawites loyal to the GoS and reported to have receive preferential access to modern weapons.88
The 4th Division is described to be made up of ‘elite’ forces although in practice it is ‘a collection ofloosely affiliated units’89, reportedly under the command of the president’s brother - Maher Assad.90
According to a Human Rights Watch report which documented the GoS offensive on Idlib from April
79 CFR, Civil War in Syria, 10 March 2021, url
80 CIA, World Factbook, Syria, 25 February 2021, url
81 Article 105 of Constitution of Syrian Arab Republic Syria. See Constitution of the Syrian Arab Republic, published by ILO,

2012, url, p. 23; Omran Centre for Strategic Studies, Transformations of the Syrian Military: The Challenge of Change andRestructuring, 31 December 2018, url, p. 126; Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War: Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Swedish
Defence Research Agency, December 2018, url, p. 40
82 ISW, The Syrian Army Doctrinal Order of Battle, February 2013, url, p. 5
83 Tawazun, Syria Country Profile, 2020, url
84 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve. Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, July 1, 2020‒September 30, 2020,
3 November 2020, url, p. 63
85 HRW, “Targeting Life in Idlib”; Syrian and Russian Strikes on Civilian Infrastructure, October 2020, url, p. 135
86 Waters, G., The Lion and The Eagle: The Syrian Arab Army’s Destruction and Rebirth, Middle East Institute, 18 July 2019,url
87 HRW, “Targeting Life in Idlib”; Syrian and Russian Strikes on Civilian Infrastructure, October 2020, url, p. 135
88 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War: Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Swedish Defence Research Agency, December 2018,
url, p. 45; Waters, G., The Lion and The Eagle: The Syrian Arab Army’s Destruction and Rebirth, Middle East Institute, 18 July
2019, url
89 Waters, G., The Lion and The Eagle: The Syrian Arab Army’s Destruction and Rebirth, Middle East Institute, 18 July 2019,url
90 Waters, G., The Lion and The Eagle: The Syrian Arab Army’s Destruction and Rebirth, Middle East Institute, 18 July 2019,
url; Omran Centre for Strategic Studies, Transformations of the Syrian Military: The Challenge of Change and Restructuring,
31 December 2018, url, p. 28; Asharq Al-Awsat, Russia Pressures Maher Assad to Return his Forces to Damascus, 14 June
2020, url

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

2019 to March 2020, the main GoS units involved in the offensive included the 4th and 5th Corps, the25th Division (Tiger Forces), the Palestinian militia Liwa al-Quds and the NDF.91
A research conducted on pro-GoS Facebook pages which document deaths among the SAA and allied
forces recorded 2 331 combat-related deaths in 2020. Around half of all fatalities incurred by GoS
forces took place January and February 2020. For the year 2020, over 60 % of all GoS forces fatalities
were recorded on the north-west front (Latakia, west Aleppo, Idlib, north Hama governorates),
followed by 19 % on the central Syria front (Deir Ez-Zor, south Raqqa, east Homs, south Aleppo) and
14 % on the Southern front (Dar’a, Sweida, Quneitra, Damascus).92
US CRS stated that pro-GoS forces operating in Syria include Iran, Russia and the Lebanese Hezbollah.93
Various pro-government militias, both local and foreign94, were operating in Syria alongside theregular armed forces.95 These included local militias such as the National Defense Forces (NDF) andnon-Syrian militias made up of foreign fighters mainly backed by Iran.96
For deployments of the SAA up until 3 April 2020 see EASO COI Report: Syria - Security situation (May2020)
Detailed information on the mandate/structure, protection capabilities and integrity issues ofgovernment actors and affiliated armed groups is available in the EASO COI Report: Syria – Actors(December 2019).

1.4.2 The Syrian National Army
In northern Aleppo governorate and areas of Raqqa and Hasaka governorates, anti-GoS armed groups
are incorporated under the Syrian National Army (SNA), ‘a collection of Turkish-backed armed
opposition groups’.97 As of December 2020, the SNA together with Turkish armed forces was reported
to be in control of Operation Euphrates Shield (area between Azaz, Al-Bab, and Jarablus) andOperation Olive Branch (Afrin district)98 areas in northern Aleppo governorate99, and in the Operation
Peace Spring area between Tall Abyad (Raqqa governorate) and Ras al Ain (Hasaka governorate).100
The factions that comprise the SNA are hostile towards the GoS presence in south Aleppo governorate
and SDF forces controlling areas in the province, but follow Turkey’s order in conducting military
operations against either.101 According to a January 2021 report by Syrian researcher Khayrallah alHilu102, the SNA has not fought against the GoS in any of the three areas under its control. It has
engaged in military operations led by Turkey against the SDF or outside of Syria.103

91 HRW, “Targeting Life in Idlib”; Syrian and Russian Strikes on Civilian Infrastructure, October 2020, url, p. 136
92 Schoenborn, T. and Waters, G., The Military Casualties of the Syrian Civil War in 2020, International Review, 18 January

2021, url
93 US CRS, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, 27 July 2020, url, Summary
94 Ezzi, M., The Regime and Loyal Militias Will Struggle to Disentangle Their Relationship, Chatham House, July 2017, url
95 ACLED, Pro-government Militia Autonomy on the Battlefield in Syria, 22 March 2018, url
96 Finland, FIS, Syria: Fact-Finding Mission to Beirut and Damascus, April 2018, 14 December 2018, url, p. 5; Al-Masri, A.,
Analysis: The Fifth Corps and the State of the Syrian Army, Atlantic Council, 13 January 2017, url; Saban, N., Factbox: Iranian
influence and presence in Syria, Atlantic Council, 5 November 2020, url
97 COAR, Northern Corridor: Needs Oriented Strategic Area Profile, October 2019, url, p. 9
98 Clingendael, Turkey in northwestern Syria. Rebuilding empire at the margins, June 2019, url, p. 1
99 COAR, Northern Corridor. Needs Oriented Strategic Area Profile, October 2019, url, p. 9
100 Al-Hilu, K., The Turkish Intervention in Northern Syria: One Strategy, Discrepant Policies, EUI, 14 January 2021, url, p. 3
101 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War: Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Swedish Defence Research Agency, December 2018,
url, pp. 53-54
102 Khayrallah al-Hilu is a Syrian researcher for the Wartime and Post-Conflict in Syria project of the Middle East Directions
Programme at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University in Florence. Al-Hilu focuses onnorthern Syria. See Al-Hilu, K., The Turkish Intervention in Northern Syria: One Strategy, Discrepant Policies, EUI, 14 January
2021, url
103 Al-Hilu, K., The Turkish Intervention in Northern Syria: One Strategy, Discrepant Policies, EUI, 14 January 2021, url, p. 6

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

The SNA reportedly has between 30104 to 40105 distinct armed groups in its composition.106 It includes
armed opposition groups from northern Syria as well as displaced factions from Damascus, Rural
Damascus, Homs and Hama governorates.107 The Levant Front is regarded as the largest faction in the
SNA and the only one whose formation precedes Turkey’s military intervention in Syria in 2016. The
Levant Front is reported to be in control of Azaz.108 The Hamza Division, al-Mutasim Brigade and the51st Brigade are deployed in the Euphrates Shield Area between Azaz, Al-Bab and Jarablus.109 In Ras al
Ain, the Turkmen factions Sultan Murad Division and Hamza Division are reported to be in control.110
Major towns located between Tall Abyad and Ras al-Ayn are controlled by the Tajammu Ahrar alSharqiya faction.111 Afrin is dominated by the Sultan Murad Division.112
In October 2019, the merger between the SNA and the National Liberation Front (NLF) - a Turkeybacked alliance of opposition-armed groups that is present in the Idlib area113, under the Syrian
National Army banner was announced114 by the so-called Syrian Interim Government.115 Whilenominally the SNA is a unified structure that sits under the formal supervision of the so-called Syrian
Interim Government’s Ministry of Defence116, the constituent groups ‘each answer directly to Turkey
and maintain its pre-National Army form’.117 Several sources assessed that the SNA does not function
as a unified military structure, with each faction acting largely independent from another.118
Although united under the SNA banner, the constituent groups are in practice unaccountable to otheractors except Turkey119, compete with each other120 and are often unpopular with the local
population.121

104 AA, Free Syrian Army transforms into Syrian National Army, 09 October 2019, url
105 Kasapoglu, C., The Syrian National Army and the Future of Turkey’s Frontier Land Force, Jamestown Foundation, 12 March

2021, url
106 COAR, Northern Corridor. Needs Oriented Strategic Area Profile, October 2019, url, p. 9; For a non-exhaustive list of the
SNA comprising groups see: Carter Center (The), The Armed Opposition in Northwest Syria, 15 May 2020, url, p. 6
107 Al-Hilu, K., The Turkish Intervention in Northern Syria: One Strategy, Discrepant Policies, EUI, 14 January 2021, url, p. 5
108 Al-Hilu, K., The Turkish Intervention in Northern Syria: One Strategy, Discrepant Policies, EUI, 14 January 2021, url, pp. 56
109 Al-Hilu, K., The Turkish Intervention in Northern Syria: One Strategy, Discrepant Policies, EUI, 14 January 2021, url, p. 5
110 Al-Hilu, K., The Turkish Intervention in Northern Syria: One Strategy, Discrepant Policies, EUI, 14 January 2021, url, p. 7
111 Al-Hilu, K., The Turkish Intervention in Northern Syria: One Strategy, Discrepant Policies, EUI, 14 January 2021, url, p. 8
112 Al-Hilu, K., The Turkish Intervention in Northern Syria: One Strategy, Discrepant Policies, EUI, 14 January 2021, url, pp. 56
113 International Crisis Group, The Best of Bad Options for Syria’s Idlib, 14 March 2019, url, p. 21; Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War:
Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Swedish Defence Research Agency, December 2018, url, p. 57; Defense Post (The),
Syria Rebels Kill 15 Regime Loyalists After Russia Air Strike: Monitor, 28 October 2020, url
114 Al Monitor, Merger solidifies opposition in Syria, boosts Turkey's forces, 14 October 2019, url
115 The Syrian Interim Government is the government established by the armed opposition to Assad in 2013. See USAID, Syria
Complex Emergency - Fact Sheet #1, Fiscal Year (FY) 2020, 8 November 2019, url, p. 4
116 Al-Hilu, K., Afrin Under Turkish Control: Political, Economic and Social Transformations, EUI, 25 July 2019, url, p. 5
117 COAR, Northern Corridor: Needs Oriented Strategic Area Profile, October 2019, url, p. 9
118 Shaban, N., The Syrian National Army: Formation, Challenges, and Outlook, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, October
2020, url, p. 5; Enab Baladi, Violations by “SNA”…who to blame?, 12 June 2020, url; COAR, Northern Corridor: Needs Oriented
Strategic Area Profile, October 2019, url, p. 39; Hatahet, S., The Recovery of the Local Economy in Northern Aleppo: Reality
and Challenges, EUI, 25 March 2021, url, p. 4
119 Al-Hilu, K., The Turkish Intervention in Northern Syria: One Strategy, Discrepant Policies, EUI, 14 January 2021, url, pp. 56; COAR, Northern Corridor: Needs Oriented Strategic Area Profile, October 2019, url, p. 9
120 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/42/51], 15 August 2019, url, p. 11; OHCHR, Syria: Violations and abuses rife in areas under Turkish-affiliated armed
groups – Bachelet, 18 September 2020, url; STJ, Afrin: Clashes between Jaysh al-Islam and al-Jabha al-Shamiya lead to civilian
deaths, 24 February 2021, url
121 COAR, Northern Corridor. Needs Oriented Strategic Area Profile, October 2019, url, pp. 9, 40

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

The total strength of the SNA was estimated by Syria expert Charles Lister122 in a Middle East Institutearticle to be around 35 000 fighters123 whereas the US Defense Intelligence Agency assessed theTurkish-backed armed groups consists of between 22 000 and 50 000 fighters.124
See also the chapters on Aleppo governorate, Raqqa governorate and Hasaka governorate.
Further information on the SNA is available in the EASO COI Report: Syria – Actors (December 2019)and EASO COI Report: Syria - Security situation (May 2020)

1.4.3 Syrian Democratic Forces
The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF, Quwwat Suriya al-Dimuqratiya) are the main unified military forceof the the Autonomous Administration of North and East of Syria (hereafter ‘Autonomous
Administration’, AANES).125 The SDF was established in October 2015.126 According to Syria
researchers Harriet Allsopp and Wladimir van Wilgenburg, the SDF was based on an anti-ISIL alliance
between the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, YPG) and various armed
groups, e.g. local Arab and Syriac militias, and it has served as the official defence force of theAutonomous Administration since December 2016.127 According to a July 2020 analysis, the SDF is ‘amulti-ethnic, multi-religious force’ containing a representation128 from Arabs, Assyrians, Armenians,
Yezidis, Circassians and Turkmen.129 The SDF was established in order to support the US-led coalitionin the war against the ‘Islamic State’ (ISIL)130 and it is regarded as ‘the key powerbroker’ in north-east
Syria and the main partner of the US-led coalition in countering ISIL.131
The SDF exercises territorial control over most of Raqqa and Hasaka governorates, part of Deir Ez-Zor
governorate north-east of the Euphrates, and parts of Aleppo governorate around Manbij andKobane, and the area around Tal Rifaat.132
The main components of the SDF are the People’s Protection Units (YPG), Women’s Protection Units(YPJ), Sutoro Forces (Assyrian and Syriac Christians), Coalition of Jazira Brigades (Arab tribes including
Shummar, Sharabiyah, Jabbur, al-Bakkara, and fighters from Ras al Ain), Sanadid Forces (ArabShummar tribe), Syriac Military Council and Elite Forces (affiliated with the Al-Ghad al-Sourimovement).133

122 Charles Lister is a senior fellow and Director of the Countering Terrorism and Extremism Program at the Middle East

Institute where he focuses his work primarily on the Syrian conflict. For more information see url
123 Lister, C., Turkish-backed Syrian armed opposition groups to unite under one banner, Middle East Institute, 4 October
2019, url
124 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, October 1, 2019‒December 31,
2019, 4 February 2020, url, p. 49
125 Allsopp, H. & van Wilgenburg, W., The Kurds of Northern Syria. Governance, Diversity and Conflicts, I.B. Tauris, 2019, pp.
66–67; RIC, Beyond the Frontlines, 19 December 2019, url, p. 50
126 Allsopp, H. & van Wilgenburg, W., The Kurds of Northern Syria. Governance, Diversity and Conflicts, I.B. Tauris, 2019, pp.
66–67; RIC, Beyond the Frontlines, 19 December 2019, url, p. 9
127 Allsopp, H. & van Wilgenburg, W., The Kurds of Northern Syria. Governance, Diversity and Conflicts, I.B. Tauris, 2019, pp.
66–67.
128 Enab Baladi lists the SDF’s main components as follows: People’s Protection Units (YPG), Women’s Protection Units (YPJ),
Sutoro Forces (Assyrian and Syriac Christians), Coalition of Jazira Brigades (Arab tribes including Shummar, Sharabiyah,
Jabbur, al-Bakkara, and fighters from Ras al-Ayn), Sanadid Forces (Arab Shummar tribe), Syriac Military Council and Elite
Forces (affiliated with the Al-Ghad al-Souri movement). Enab Baladi, “Syrian Democratic Forces” Face A Decisive Battle: Who
Are They?, 12 October 2019, url
129 Holmes, A. A., Arabs Across Syria Join the Kurdish-Led Syrian Democratic Forces, MERIP, 28 July 2020, url
130 Syria Study Group, Final Report and Recommendations, USIP, 24 September 2019, url, p. 33
131 van Wilgenburg, W., Syrian Democratic Forces, ECFR, n.d, url
132 Based on reading of maps in ISW, Syria Situation Report: February 19 – March 22, 2021, 25 March 2021, url; Liveuamap,
Syria, 26 March 2021, url
133 Enab Baladi, “Syrian Democratic Forces” Face A Decisive Battle: Who Are They?, 12 October 2019, url

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

According to the United States Department of Defence (USDOD) report of August 2019, the SDF is the‘largest partner force’ of the US-led Coalition in Syria. USDOD names the YPG and the Syrian Arab
Coalition as SDF’s main components. In addition to the SDF, the ‘Syrian partner forces’ of the US-led
Coalition include the Provincial Internal Security Forces (PRISF) and the Internal Security Forces (InSF,
also known as Asayish). These organisations are responsible for counterinsurgency operations and forholding territory captured from ISIL, and consist of fighters recruited locally and operating in their
specific governorates.134 Both are further divided into three sub-elements assigned with specifictasks.135
In August 2019, USDOD states that the combined strength of US-led coalition’s ‘Syrian partner forces’
was 100 000 fighters. The desirable end strength of these forces was described to be 110 000 fighters,of which 30 000 in the SDF, 45 000 in the PRISF and 35 000 in the InSF.136 According to a YPG source
cited in Reuters article published in October 2019, the SDF had approximately 40 000 fighters on theeve of the Turkish incursion.137 In December 2020, Wladimir van Wilgenburg estimated that the SDF
pays the salaries of over 100 000138 fighters.139 In an interview with International Crisis Group in
November 2020, the SDF commander-in-chief Mazloum Kobane Abdi claimed that there are over
200 000 Syrians serving in civilian and military roles in the Autonomous Administration and in theSDF.140
The Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) were established in 2012 as the military wing of theKurdish Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat, PYD) – a Syrian branch of the EU141, US142
and Turkey-designated terrorist organisation Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK, Partîya Karkerên
Kurdistanê).143 The SDF is dominated by the YPG who helped establish the SDF in October 2015,
provides its core fighting forces and largely ensures its leadership.144 According to the International
Crisis Group, the SDF ‘generally accepts that the YPG is its core fighting force, which maintains
command and control’.145 According to COAR Global, the PYD/YPG have a dominating role in theAutonomous Administration as a whole.146 Researcher Amy Austin Holmes147 claims that despite of
the central role of the Kurds in the SDF, the majority of SDF’s rank-and-file consists of ethnic Arabs.148

134 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, April 1,2020–June

30,2019, 2 August 2019, url, pp. 29–30.
135 PRISF is further divided into the border security forces, the critical petroleum infrastructure security forces and the prison
security forces. InSF’s three elements include the police, the anti-terrorism security force (Hêzên Antî Teror, HAT) and theInternal Security Forces–General Security, specialized in human intelligence and reconnaissance. USDOD, Operation Inherent
Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, April 1,2020–June 30,2020, 4 August 2020, url, p. 65
136 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, April 1,2020–June
30,2019, 2 August 2019, url, p. 30.
137 Francis, E. & Perry, T., Syrian Kurds outgunned but vow to inflict toll on Turkish army, Reuters, 10 October 2019, url
138 This estimation is likely based on the above USDOD report of August 2019 and contains both the actual SDF and theassociated forces of PRISF and InSF, cf. Holmes, A. A., Arabs Across Syria Join the Kurdish-Led Syrian Democratic Forces,
MERIP, 28 July 2020, url
139 van Wilgenburg, W., The Future of the Syrian Democratic Forces: One Year after the Liberation of Baghouz and the Turkish
Invasion, LSE Middle East Centre, 14 December 2020, url
140 International Crisis Group, The SDF Seeks a Path Toward Durable Stability in North East Syria, 25 November 2020, url
141 European Council, Council Decision of 17 June 2002 implementing Article 2(3) of Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 on specificrestrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism and repealing Decision
2002/334/EC, 18 June 2002, url
142 USDOS, Country Report on Terrorism 2018 - Chapter 5 - Kurdistan Workers’ Party, 1 November 2019, url
143 Syria Study Group, Final Report and Recommendations, USIP, 24 September 2019, url, p. 33
144 International Crisis Group, Squaring the Circles in Syria’s North East, 31 July 2019, url, p. 1; Syria Study Group, Final Reportand Recommendations, USIP, 24 September 2019, url, pp. 8, 33
145 International Crisis Group, Squaring the Circles in Syria’s North East, 31 July 2019, url, p. 1
146 COAR, Emboldened Self-Administration bids for greater power, 11 January 2021, url
147 Amy Austin Holmes is a fellow at the Wilson Center and former associate professor at the American University in Cairoand visiting scholar at Harvard University. See url
148 Holmes, A. A., Arabs Across Syria Join the Kurdish-Led Syrian Democratic Forces, MERIP, 28 July 2020, url

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

In a similar manner, Rojava Information Center, an independent, volunteer-staffed news agency basedin SDF-controlled areas of Syria149, describes the SDF as ‘an Arab-majority force’.150
The Autonomous Administration has a political assembly, the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC)151,
which is described by Syria researchers Rena Netjes and Erwin van Veen as a political platform‘dominated’ by the PYD and responsible for running the Arab-majority areas of SDF-controlled northeast Syria (areas in Deir Ez-Zor, Raqqa and southern parts of Hasaka governorate).152 Allsopp andWilgenburg treat the SDC as ‘the political wing of the SDF’ since it has been responsible for ‘forming
administrative councils and governing in non-Kurdish majority areas’, including Manbij and Raqqa,
captured during the anti-ISIL campaign.153
The PYD and the YPG are deeply connected to the PKK on organisational and ideological levels154, with
PKK-members assigned with ‘key military and institutional responsibilities’ in its Syrian affiliates and‘key positions’ in the civilian institutions of the Autonomous Administration.155 The YPG and affiliatedlocal, political, security and administrative bodies’ are reported to contain Syrian and non-Syrian
Kurdish members of the PKK who returned to Syria after 2011. These individuals are known locally as‘cadres’ (kadros), On the basis of information from senior SDF members, Crisis Group describes thepresence of PKK-members in Syria as ‘significant’ and points out their ‘notable role’ in the anti-ISIL
campaign.156
In a Chatham House report, Zaki Mehchy157 (et al.) describes the ‘cadres’ as ‘Kurdish individuals withtechnical expertise and long-term links to the inner circles of the [PYD] or the [PKK]’.158 According to
Mehchy (et al.) these individuals ‘hold the ultimate power and purse strings within [Autonomous
Administration] institutions, and nothing can be implemented without their approval’, although they
are officially serving as ‘technical advisers’.159 The PKK-members active in the ranks of the SDF and theAutonomous Administration have been described as the ‘shadow authority’160 inside these institutions
and are seen by many as the ‘real power’161 in the SDF-controlled North-East Syria. This leading roleof the PKK, engaged in a renewed armed conflict with the Turkish state since July 2015162, has been
described, on the one hand, as a crucial obstacle163 for the end of hostilities in northern Syria and as afactor ‘adding to the feelings of resentment and exclusion’164 among the Arab residents of SDFcontrolled North-East Syria.

149 Rojava Information Center has collaborated with news agencies like CNN, BBC, Associated Press (AP) and The New YorkTimes. See url
150 RIC, Beyond the Frontlines, 19 December 2019, url, p. 50
151 RIC, Beyond the Frontlines, 19 December 2019, url, pp. 31-32
152 Netjes R. & van Veen, E., Henchman, Rebel, Democrat, Terrorist. The YPG/PYD during the Syrian conflict, Clingendael,
April 2021, url, pp. 2, 5
153 Allsopp, H. & van Wilgenburg, W., The Kurds of Northern Syria. Governance, Diversity and Conflicts, I.B. Tauris, 2019, p.
96
154 International Crisis Group, Prospects for a Deal to Stabilise Syria’s North East, 5 September 2018, url, p. 3
155 International Crisis Group, The PKK’s Fateful Choice in Northern Syria, 4 May 2017, url
156 International Crisis Group, The SDF Seeks a Path Toward Durable Stability in North East Syria, 25 November 2020, url
157 Zaki Mechchy is a Consulting Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House. He is also
the founder of also a co-founder of the Syrian Center for Policy Research (SCPR). See url
158 Mehchy Z. et al., Assessing control and power dynamics in Syria, Chatham House, November 2020, url, p. 22
159 Mehchy Z. et al., Assessing control and power dynamics in Syria, Chatham House, November 2020, url, p. 26
160 Mogelson, L., America’s Abandonment of Syria, The New Yorker, 20 April 2020, url
161 Zaman, A. and Wilkofsky, D., Child recruitment casts shadow over Syrian Kurds' push for global legitimacy, Al-Monitor, 7
December 2020, url
162 For further information, see International Crisis Group, Turkey’s PKK Conflict: A Visual Explainer, n.d. [last updated on 29
April 2021], url; RULAC, Non-international armed conflict in Turkey, n.d. [last updated 24 November 2020], url
163 International Crisis Group, The SDF Seeks a Path Toward Durable Stability in North East Syria, 25 November 2020, url
164 Megally, H. & El-Gamal, J. M., Preventing the Reemergence of Violent Extremism in Northeast Syria, UNESCWA & CIC,
March 2021, url, pp. 21-22

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

According to Crisis Group, SDF commander-in-chief Mazloum Kobane states that the SDF has ‘agreed
to gradually pull out all these non-Syrian cadres from their current positions, and ultimately from
Syria’.165 However, COAR Global report of January 2021 describes the PKK as ‘enormously influential
within the upper ranks of the SDF and, consequently, inside the Self-Administration as a whole’ andassesses that ‘abandoning or restructuring the PKK would require a major reconfiguration of northeast Syria’s political and security apparatus’.166
Further information on the SDF is available in the EASO COI Report: Syria – Actors (December 2019)and EASO COI Report: Syria - Security situation (May 2020)

1.4.4 Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham
Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham or the Organization for the Liberation of the Levant (HTS) is described as themost important and powerful actor in the Idlib area.167 The Center for Strategic and International
Studies noted in an October 2018 report that HTS’s primary objective is aimed at establishing Islamicrule in Syria through overthrowing the Assad government and ousting Iranian militias.168 The US169,
UN170, EU171 and Turkey have designated HTS as a terrorist organisation affiliated with Al Qaeda. 172
HTS has publicly distanced itself from Al Qaeda in 2017, claiming it is an independent entity.173 In 2020,
HTS has clashed with Al Qaeda-aligned factions operating in Idlib, significantly weakening theirposition.174
HTS is comprised of several armed factions, including Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (also known as Jabhat alNusrah and previously as the Al-Nusrah Front), Ansar al-Sham and Ajnad al-Sham, among others.175
Depending on the source, HTS’s strength is evaluated to be between 7 000 and 10 000 fighters.176
HTS has created several civilian bodies in the territory under its control, including a governance body
responsible for civilian functions – the Syrian Salvation Government177, a court system that applies
Sharia law and an extensive prison system.178 The Syrian Salvation Government is reportedly
significantly under-resourced, relying on 7 000 civil servants to administer a population of
approximately 3.2 million. Third parties have supplemented certain public services, such as

165 International Crisis Group, The SDF Seeks a Path Toward Durable Stability in North East Syria, 25 November 2020, url
166 COAR, Emboldened Self-Administration bids for greater power, 11 January 2021, url
167 International Crisis Group, The Best of Bad Options for Syria’s Idlib, 14 March 2019, url, p. 6; BBC News, Syria: Who's incontrol of Idlib?, 18 February 2020, url; Al-Tamimi, A., From Jabhat al-Nusra to Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham: Evolution, Approachand Future, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 29 June 2018, url, p. 5; HRW, Syria: Arrests, Torture by Armed Group, 28 January
2019, url
168 CSIS, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, 4 October 2018, url, p. 2
169 USDOS, Country Report on Terrorism 2019 - Chapter 5 - Al-Nusrah Front (ANF), 24 June 2020, url
170 UN Security Council, United Nations Security Council Consolidated List, n.d, url
171 EU, Official Journal of the European Union, Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/855 of 8 June 2018 amending
for the 286th time Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against
certain persons and entities associated with the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida organisations, 11 June 2018, url
172 HRW, Syria: Arrests, Torture by Armed Group, 28 January 2019, url
173 CSIS, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, 4 October 2018, url, pp. 1-2; International Crisis Group, The Jihadist Factor in Syria’s Idlib: A
Conversation with Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, 20 February 2020, url, p. 2
174 Drevon, J. and Haenni, P., How Global Jihad Relocalises and Where it Leads. The Case of HTS, the Former AQ Franchise in
Syria, EUI, January 2021, url, p. 31; Tsurkov, E., Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham, ECFR, n.d, url
175 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/43/57], 28 January 2020 [published 2 March 2020], url, p. 7
176 US CRS, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, 27 July 2020, url, p. 18; UN Security Council, Twenty-seventh
report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning
ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities [S/2021/68], 3 February 2021, url, p. 7
177 Al-Tamimi, A., From Jabhat al-Nusra to Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham: Evolution, Approach and Future, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung,
29 June 2018, url, p. 16
178 HRW, Syria: Arrests, Torture by Armed Group, 28 January 2019, url

25

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situationinternational and local NGOs in healthcare, volunteers in education and tribes in administrating
justice.179
HTS has cooperated with factions of the National Liberation Front (NLF) as part of a joint military
operations room (al-Fath al-Mubeen). It has banned the formation of alternative military operations
by other factions operating in the Idlib area without its permission.180 It has also cooperated withTurkey during the GoS offensive on Idlib in 2019 and early 2020181 and in its aftermath.182 HTS haslargely accepted the March 2020 ceasefire of hostilities in the Idlib area brokered by Turkey and Russia
and has been active in precluding other hard-line anti-GoS factions in the area from violating it.183
The CoI assessed that between July 2019 and January 2020, the GoS offensive had eroded the militaryand political control of HTS.184 Increased Turkish presence in Idlib and high-ranking defections fromthe group have further weakened HTS’ position.185 Despite these setbacks, HTS has managed toremain the dominant armed group in the area.186
Further information on HTS is available in the EASO COI Report: Syria – Actors (December 2019) andEASO COI Report: Syria - Security situation (May 2020)

1.4.5 Other anti-government armed groups in the Idlib area
The National Liberation Front (NLF) is a Turkish-backed alliance of opposition-armed groups that ispresent and active in the Idlib area.187 The NLF was formed in 2018 by rebel armed groups in the Idlib
area.188 The group is made up of moderate and Islamist factions189, including Feilaq-al Sham190, Ahrar
al-Sham191, the Free Idlib Army192, Jaish-al Ahrar193 and Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zinki.194

179 Drevon, J. and Haenni, P., How Global Jihad Relocalises and Where it Leads. The Case of HTS, the Former AQ Franchise in

Syria, EUI, January 2021, url, p. 7
180 Tsurkov, E., Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham, ECFR, n.d, url
181 Carter Center (The), The Armed Opposition in Northwest Syria, 15 May 2020, url, p. 4
182 International Crisis Group, Silencing the Guns in Syria’s Idlib , 15 May 2020, url, p. 20; Drevon, J. and Haenni, P., How
Global Jihad Relocalises and Where it Leads. The Case of HTS, the Former AQ Franchise in Syria, EUI, January 2021, url, p. 9
183 Carter Center (The), Power Through Strength Hayat Tahrir al-Sham solidifying control in northwest Syria, 9 November
2020, url; Drevon, J. and Haenni, P., How Global Jihad Relocalises and Where it Leads. The Case of HTS, the Former AQFranchise in Syria, EUI, January 2021, url, p. 7; Tsurkov, E., Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham, ECFR, n.d, url
184 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/43/57], 28 January 2020 [published 2 March 2020], url, p. 7
185 Carter Center (The), The Armed Opposition in Northwest Syria, 15 May 2020, url, pp. 7-9
186 UN Security Council, Twenty-seventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant
to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities [S/2021/68], 3 February
2021, url, p. 7; International Crisis Group, After Ten Years of War, Conflict Still Paralyses Syria, 15 March 2021, url
187 International Crisis Group, The Best of Bad Options for Syria’s Idlib, 14 March 2019, url, p. 21; Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War:
Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Swedish Defence Research Agency, December 2018, url, p. 57; Defense Post (The),
Syria Rebels Kill 15 Regime Loyalists After Russia Air Strike: Monitor, 28 October 2020, url
188 Lund, A., Syrian war: Understanding Idlib’s rebel factions, The New Humanitarian, 3 September 2018, url
189 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War: Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Swedish Defence Research Agency, December 2018,
url, p. 57
190 International Crisis Group, The Best of Bad Options for Syria’s Idlib, 14 March 2019, url, pp. 21-22
191 According to International Crisis Group interviews conducted in August, November and December 2018 with a former
rebel commander, a Syrian opposition politician, a former Syrian local governance official, a Syrian activist. International
Crisis Group, The Best of Bad Options for Syria’s Idlib, 14 March 2019, url, pp. 22-23
192 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War: Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Swedish Defence Research Agency, December 2018,
url, p. 57
193 Lund, A., A Jihadist Breakup in Syria, Foreign Affairs, 15 September 2017, url
194 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War: Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Swedish Defence Research Agency, December 2018,
url, p. 57

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

While the NLF formally merged with the SNA in October 2019195, it was reported that on the ground
it continues to function independently from it.196 NLF has also cooperated militarily with HTS against
GoS forces in Idlib as part of al-Fath al-Mubeen, a joint military operations room.197
Smaller, predominantly Islamist armed opposition groups also operate in the Idlib area and include
the Al Qaeda affiliate198 Hurras al-Din (HAD)199, the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP)200, the Khattab AlShishani Brigade comprised of Chechen fighters201, the Katiba al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (KTJ) made up offighters from central Asia202 and Ansar al-Tawhid203, among others.
Depending on the source, HAD was estimated to have around 2 500204 or between 3 500 to 5 000
fighters in Idlib.205 The group suffered significant leadership losses in 2020206, including its leader
Khaled al Aruri who was killed by a US drone strike.207 TIP is headquartered in Harim and estimated tohave between 3 000 to 4 500 fighters.208
HAD, together with other small opposition armed groups created the Fa-Ithibitu (‘So Be Steadfast’)
military operation room, separately from the one controlled by HTS.209 This led to clashes between
HTS and the So Be Steadfast coalition in mid-2020210 which resulted in HTS reasserting its dominancein the area.211
See also Chapter 2.1 Idlib. Further information on anti-GoS armed groups in the Idlib area is available
in the EASO COI Report: Syria – Actors (December 2019) and EASO COI Report: Syria - Security situation(May 2020)

195 Al Monitor, Who are Turkish-backed forces in latest Syria incursion?, 13 October 2019, url
196 Al Jazeera, Rebels kill dozens of soldiers in Syria's Idlib: State media, 23 January 2020, url; Al Monitor, Is Turkey planningto curb radicals in Idlib under strategy shift?, 16 February 2020, url
197 Tsurkov, E., Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham, ECFR, n.d, url
198 Zelin, A., Huras al-Din: The Overlooked al-Qaeda Group in Syria, Washington Institute of Near East Policy, 24 September
2019, url
199 Syria Study Group, Final Report and Recommendations, USIP, 24 September 2019, url, p. 22
200 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War: Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Swedish Defence Research Agency, December 2018,
url, p. 56; International Crisis Group, The Best of Bad Options for Syria’s Idlib, 14 March 2019, url, p. 19
201 UN Security Council, Twenty-seventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant
to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities [S/2021/68], 3 February
2021, url, p. 7-8
202 UN Security Council, Twenty-seventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant
to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities [S/2021/68], 3 February
2021, url, p. 7-8
203 According to an activist, a rebel commander and a humanitarian analyst interviewed by International Crisis Group in
October-November 2018. International Crisis Group, The Best of Bad Options for Syria’s Idlib, 14 March 2019, url, p. 20
204 UN Security Council, Twenty-seventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant
to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities [S/2021/68], 3 February
2021, url, p. 7
205 US CRS, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, 27 July 2020, url, p. 18
206 UN Security Council: Twenty-seventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant
to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities [S/2021/68], 3 February
2021, url, p. 7
207 US CRS, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, 27 July 2020, url, p. 18
208 UN Security Council, Twenty-seventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant
to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities [S/2021/68], 3 February
2021, url, p. 7-8
209 The groups participating in the operation room were Hurras al Din, Ansar al Islam, Ansar al Din, Tansiqiyat al-Jihad, andLiwa al-Muqatileen al-Ansar. See Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary, 22-28 June 2020, url, p. 2
210 Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary, 22-28 June 2020, url, p. 2; MEE, Civil war within civil war: HTS battles rival
militants, defectors in Syria's Idlib, 27 June 2020, url
211 Drevon, J. and Haenni, P., How Global Jihad Relocalises and Where it Leads. The Case of HTS, the Former AQ Franchise in
Syria, 2021, EUI, url, p. 10

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

1.4.6 Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)
The Sunni jihadist group ISIL (the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, also known as ISIS, IS and Daesh)
was originally created in 2006 by the Al Qaeda wing in Iraq and smaller Iraqi Sunni insurgent groups,
but later split from AQ under the ISIL moniker.212 ISIL is a UN and EU213 designated terrorist
organisation.214 ISIL began capturing territory in Syria in 2013 which attracted an international US-led
coalition military response. Turkey has conducted ground operations against ISIL since 2016.215 By
August 2017, the US-led coalition has conducted over 11 000 airstrikes in Syria against ISIL targets.216
GoS forces also fought against ISIL, reclaiming territories such as Palmyra217, while Russia claimed air
strikes on ISIL targets.218 ISIL lost territorial control in Syria in March 2019219, and has since operated
as a covert network.220
Syria and Iraq represent the ‘core area for ISIL’221, which ISIL operate as a single front.222 Former Special
Envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS James Jeffrey assessed in December 2020 that ISIL activity
in Syria is focused on GoS-held areas in the Badia desert (Syrian Central Desert)223 south of theEuphrates and east of Palmyra, where it manages to ‘intermittently hold some terrain’. The same
source further noted that ISIL was also maintaining a low-level insurgency along the Euphrates riverin north-east Syria.224 The UN Security Council noted in a February 2021 report that ISIL uses the areasof the Syrian desert in Deir Ez-Zor governorate as a safe haven and base for launching attacks against
GoS and SDF forces.225 The Center for Operational Analysis and Research (COAR) also reported that in2020 ISIL took control of several pockets in the Syrian Desert, near the Palmyra-Deir Ez-Zor road,where it launched dozens of attacks on GoS forces.226
According to an analysis by Gregory Waters227 of ISIL activity in 2020, the group ‘has greatly increased
its capabilities in central Syria over the past year, expanding its area of operations from the heart of
the Syrian Badia north to central Aleppo province, west to Salamiyah, Hamah, and south-west to

212 Cambanis, T. et. al, Hybrid Actors. Armed Groups and State Fragmentation in the Middle East, The Century Foundation,

15 November 2019, url, p. 106
213 European Council, Council of the European Union, EU terrorist list, n.d, url
214 UN Security Council, Security Council ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Amends One Entry on Its Sanctions
List, 11 October 2019, url
215 CFR, Civil War in Syria, 25 March 2021, url
216 USDOD, Airstrikes updates, n.d., url
217 New York Times (The), A Jewel in Syria Where ‘Ruins Have Been Ruined’ by ISIS, 4 April 2016, url
218 Al Jazeera, Only a third of Russian airstrikes in Syria target ISIL, US official says, 9 January 2016, url; Reuters, Four-fifths ofRussia's Syria strikes don't target Islamic State: Reuters analysis, 21 October 2015, url
219 Wilson Center, Timeline: the Rise, Spread, and Fall of the Islamic State, 28 October 2019, url
220 UN Security Council, Tenth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peaceand security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat [S/2020/95], 4
February 2020, url, p. 2
221 UN Security Council, Twenty-seventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant
to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities [S/2021/68], 3 February
2021, url, p. 3
222 Jeffrey, J., Part 1: The Future of ISIS, Wilson Center, 22 December 2020, url
223 The Badia desert is ‘a large territory not ruled effectively by any single entity. Its approximately 80,000 square kilometresare split administratively among seven governorates: Deir Ez-Zor, Hama, Raqqa, Homs, Aleppo, Rural Damascus and Sweida.
It contains no large urban centres apart from Palmyra, al-Sukhnah and al-Qaryatayn’. See Fahmi, G. et. al, The Remnants ofIslamic State in Syria: Military Action Alone Cannot Defeat It, EUI, April 2021, url, p. 5
224 Jeffrey, J., Part 1: The Future of ISIS, Wilson Center, 22 December 2020, url
225 UN Security Council, Twenty-seventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant
to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities [S/2021/68], 3 February
2021, url, p. 7
226 COAR, Syria in 2021, 28 January 2021, url
227 Gregory Waters is a non-Resident Scholar at the Middle East Institute and a research analyst at the Counter Extremism
Project. His research is focused on Syrian security forces and ISIL developments, primarily using open-source research. For
more information, see url

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Qaryatayn, Homs’. In the first half of 2020, ISIL concentrated its insurgent activity in activity in Deir EzZor and Homs governorates. In the second half of 2020, an increase of ISIL attacks and seizures ofvillages were reported in east Hama governorate, ‘from south of Uqayribat to north of Ithriya’ andaround the village of Rahjan.228
A March 2021 analysis by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) wrote that ISIL controls several small
swaths of territory in the mountainous areas of the Syrian Central Desert (Badia) from where it
launches attacks on GoS forces, as detailed below (see also Map 3):
•
•
•
•
•

north-east of Rahjan, towards Ithriya (Hama governorate);
Jabal Haiyan and Jabal Abu Rujmain areas around Palmyra (Homs governorate);east of Resafa, overlooking Tabqa Air Base (Raqqa governorate);
Jabal Bishri, in the area between Resafa, Shoula and Sukhna (Homs and Deir Ez-Zor
governorates);
In the area between Shoula and Faydat (Deir Ez-Zor governorate).229

228 Waters, G., ISIS in Syria: 2020 in Review, Newlines Institute, 10 February 2021, url
229 Kahan, E., ISIS Poised for a Ramadan Surge in Syria, ISW, 9 March 2021, url

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Map 3: © ISW, ISIS Control in the Central Syrian Desert August 2020 – February 2021

The US Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) noted that ISIL also operated in areas of Aleppo, Raqqa andHasaka, but it was less active.230 Limited ISIL presence has been reported in the Idlib area, despite
regular arrests of ISIL fighters by HTS.231

230 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, July 1, 2020‒September 30, 2020,

3 November 2020, url, p. 23
231 UN Security Council, Twenty-seventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant
to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities [S/2021/68], 3 February
2021, url, p. 730

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

According to US sources reporting to USDOD, there were 615 ISIL attacks recorded in Syria in 2020.
Around 50 % of these took place in Deir Ez-Zor governorate, followed by Homs, Raqqa and Hama
governorates. Small number of attacks were also reported in Hasaka, Aleppo, Dar’a, Idlib and Quneitra
governorates.232 According to an analysis by Gregory Waters, ISIL carried out at least 286 attacks in2020 of which 94 were classified as high-quality attacks. Based on GoS social media sources andinterviews conducted, the same source assessed that in 2020 ISIL attacks led to 432 GoS fighters and41 civilians being killed, while more than 211 were injured, without specifying whether these werefighters or civilians.233
The Rojava Information Center documented 572 ISIL attacks in north-east Syria in 2020 which led to
299 fatalities, a significant decrease from 2019 when it recorded 906 ISIL attacks which led to 415
persons being killed. Most of the attacks were documented in Deir Ez-Zor governorate and othermainly Arab inhabited areas of north-east Syria.234
Between January and September 2020, the largest number of ISIL attacks was recorded by USDOD in
Deir Ez-Zor governorate235, specifically in Deir Ez-Zor city and surrounding areas. ISIL operations werealso reported in the eastern Homs governorate around oil infrastructure and sporadically in Dar’a and
Sweida governorates. ISIL capabilities were reported in Homs, Aleppo, Quneitra and Dar’agovernorates.236 ISIL carried out limited complex attacks in GoS-held areas, for instance briefly
occupying several GoS positions in and around Al Suknah, Homs governorate in April 2020.237
Temporary seizure of villages by ISIL was also reported in the second half of 2020 in east Hama
governorate.238
BBC reported that in January 2021 ISIL launched more than 100 attacks in north-east Syria, mainly in
Deir Ez-Zor governorate. The attacks targeted persons perceived to have links to GoS or SDF, including
through assassinations, kidnappings and bombings. Persons deemed wealthy were also targeted for
extortion and demanded to pay large sums.239
ISIL reportedly operates in a decentralised manner, allowing decision-making to each independentcell.240 Most ISIL attacks were carried out by small cells241 using small-arms fire and IEDs for attacks on

232 Total based on cumulating quarterly reporting of ISIL attacks. USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve. Lead Inspector General

Report to the US Congress, January 1, 2020‒March 31, 2020, 13 May 2020, url, p. 51; USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve.
Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, April 1, 2020‒June 30, 2020, 4 August 2020, url, p. 27; USDOD, Operation
Inherent Resolve. Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, July 1, 2020‒September 30, 2020, 3 November 2020,
url, p. 23; USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, October 1 2020 –December 31 2020, 9 February 2021, url, p. 16
233 The author defines high quality attacks as attacks behind frontlines, those that result in seized positions, target GoS
officers, involve coordinated attacks on multiple positions, fake checkpoints, ambushes on military convoys, or attacks thatkill at least three soldiers or lead to POWs. Waters, G., ISIS in Syria: 2020 in Review, Newlines Institute, 10 February 2021, url
234 Rojava Information Center, Annual Sleeper Cell Report 2020, 16 January 2021, url, p. 2, 9
235 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, January 1, 2020‒March 31, 2020,
13 May 2020, url, pp. 51-52; USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, April
1, 2020‒June 30, 2020, 4 August 2020, url, p. 26; USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the
US Congress, July 1, 2020‒September 30, 2020, 3 November 2020, url, p. 23
236 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, January 1, 2020‒March 31, 2020,
13 May 2020, url, pp. 51-52
237 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, April 1, 2020‒June 30, 2020, 4August 2020, url, p. 26
238 Waters, G., ISIS in Syria: 2020 in Review, Newlines Institute, 10 February 2021, url
239 BBC News, IS brutality returning to Syrian towns, 7 February 2021, url
240 UN Security Council, Twenty-seventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant
to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities [S/2021/68], 3 February
2021, url, p. 6-7
241 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead IG Report to the US Congress, October 1 2020 – December 31 2020, 9 February
2021, url, p. 12

31

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

security forces and civilians.242 Larger-scale attacks which resulted in more casualties amongst security
forces were reported in GoS-held areas in Homs, Hama, Raqqa and Aleppo governorates.243 ISIL
attacks in GoS-held areas included complex ambushes and targeted assassinations against GoS
forces.244, attacks on tribal leaders in Deir Ez-Zor245, intimidation and extortion of local merchants andfarmers246, as well as a large-scale kidnapping of civilians in Hama governorate.247
While security operations against ISIL cells were carried out during the reference period248, observers
have deemed them insufficient to neutralise ISIL presence.249 The UN Security Council assessed thatcompared to Iraq, in Syria security operations against ISIL are not as stringent.250
The UN Security Council estimated in a report from February 2021 that ISIL has a combined 10 000
fighters active in Syria and Iraq.251 In a December 2020 interview, former Special Envoy for the Global
Coalition to Defeat ISIS James Jeffrey estimated ISIL to have between 8 000 and 16 000 fighters in Iraq
and Syria.252
Detained ISIL fighters and their families in north-east Syria number more than 100 000.253 Human
Rights Watch stated in March 2021 that around 63 400 suspected ISIL family members, the majority
women and children, are currently detained mainly at al Hol and Roj camps in north-east Syria. Nearly
43 000 foreigners, including women and children, who are suspected of ISIL links were also reported
to be detained in north-east Syria since ISIL’s territorial defeat in 2019, without being brought before
a court or repatriated.254 Detained ISIL fighters in north-east Syria number approximately 11 000, asignificant number of whom are foreign fighters.255

242 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, April 1, 2020‒June 30, 2020, 4August 2020, url, p. 26; USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, July 1, 2020‒
September 30, 2020, 3 November 2020, url, p. 22
243 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, July 1, 2020‒September 30, 2020,
3 November 2020, url, p. 23
244 Waters, G., ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency in September 2020, 1 October 2020, url
245 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, July 1, 2020‒September 30, 2020,
3 November 2020, url, p. 23; UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014),
2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of theSecretary-General [S/2021/160], 18 February 2021, url, p. 6
246 Jeffrey, J., Part 1: The Future of ISIS, Wilson Center, 22 December 2020, url
247 Waters, G., Mass Kidnapping in Central Syria Reveals Dynamics of ISIS Resurgence, Newlines Institute, 8 April 2021, url
248 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, April 1, 2020‒June 30, 2020, 4August 2020, url, p. 56; Jeffrey, J., Part 3: The Future of Anti-ISIS Coalition, Wilson Center, 22 December 2020, url; BBC News,
Syria war: Russian jets 'bomb IS positions in desert region', 24 February 2021, url
249 Enab Baladi, Islamic State in the Syrian Desert: an enemy used by different parties for strategic objectives, 10 January
2021, url; USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, January 1, 2021 – March
31, 2021, 4 May 2021, url, p. 69
250 UN Security Council, Twenty-seventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant
to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities [S/2021/68], 3 February
2021, url, pp. 6-7
251 UN Security Council, Twenty-seventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant
to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities [S/2021/68], 3 February
2021, url, pp. 6-7
252 Jeffrey, J., Part 1: The Future of ISIS, Wilson Center, 22 December 2020, url
253 HRW, World Report 2021 - Syria, 13 January 2021, url; UN Security Council, Letter dated 20 January 2020 from the Chairof the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning IslamicState in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to
the President of the Security Council, Letter dated 27 December 2019 from the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring
Team in accordance with paragraph (a) of annex I to resolution 2368 (2017) addressed to the Chair of the Security Council
Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant(Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities [S/2020/53], 20 January 2020, url, pp. 3, 7
254 HRW, Thousands of Foreigners Unlawfully Held in NE Syria, 23 March 2021, url
255 UN Security Council, Twenty-seventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant
to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities [S/2021/68], 3 February
2021, url, p. 20

32

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

During the reporting period, riots256, violence257 and small-scale escapes of ISIL suspects from prisonsand camps in north-east Syria258 were reported.
In 2020, Kurdish authorities in north-east Syria issued two general amnesties: one for 25 000 Syrians
affiliated with ISIL and another for low-level Syrian ISIL prisoners who were not charged with violent
crimes.259 Human Rights Watch stated that by October 2020 around 1 000 had been released.260
Kurdish authorities told reporters in October 2020 that 631 detainees with ‘no blood on their hands’
had been released.261 The Rojava Information Center reported that ISIL attacks in areas where thoseresidents returned did not change following the releases.262
Further information on ISIL is available in the EASO COI Report: Syria – Actors (December 2019) andEASO COI Report: Syria - Security situation (May 2020)

256 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, January 1, 2020‒March 31, 2020,

13 May 2020, url, p. 57; USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, April 1,
2020‒June 30, 2020, 4 August 2020, url, pp. 60-61
257 Jeffrey, J., Part 2: ISIS Prisoners and Families, Wilson Center, 22 December 2020, url
258 COAR, Series of Strikes Show Pressures Building on Northwest Syria Aid Response, 29 March 2021, url
259 HRW, World Report 2021 - Syria, 13 January 2021, url
260 HRW, World Report 2021 - Syria, 13 January 2021, url
261 AP News, Syria Kurds free hundreds of IS militants as part of amnesty, 15 October 2020, url; Al Jazeera, Syria Kurds free
more than 600 ISIL fighters as part of amnesty, 15 October 2020, url
262 Rojava Information Center, Report: ISIS sleeper-cell attacks reach record low despite mass releases, multiple Hol Camp
fatalities, 7 December 2020, url

33

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

1.5 Recent security trends

Map 4: © ISW, Control of terrain in Syria, 22 March 2021

1.5.1 Areas under the control of the Government of Syria (GoS)
As of March 2021, the GoS controlled most of the country263, including the major cities of Damascus,
Aleppo, Homs and Hama, and nearly all the governorates capitals (see also Map 4).264 Foreign actors
and pro-GoS militias exert significant influence over parts of the territory nominally under GoS
control.265 According to the US Department of State (USDOS), the Syrian government ‘possessed
limited influence over foreign military or paramilitary organizations’ operating in Syria, which included
Russian forces, the Lebanese Hezbollah, the IRGC and pro-government militias such as NDF.266

263 Based on reading of maps in ISW, Syria Situation Report: February 19 – March 22, 2021, 25 March 2021, url; Liveuamap,

Syria, 26 March 2021, url
264 Balanche, F., The Assad Regime Has Failed to Restore Full Sovereignty Over Syria, Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, 10 February 2021, url
265 Ezzi, M., Lebanese Hezbollah’s Experience in Syria, EUI, 13 March 2020, url, pp. 1, 3, 7; Al Monitor, Iranian forces form
new groups to boost influence in east Syria, 23 February 2021, url; SWP, Iran’s Multi-Faceted Strategy in Deir ez-Zor. FromFighting Terrorism to Creating a Zone of Influence, March 2020, url, p. 1; FP, Iran Is Trying to Convert Syria to Shiism, 15
March 2021, url
266 USDOS, 2020 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Syria, 30 March 2021, url, p. 1

34

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

The GoS controls only 15 % of the country’s international land borders while the rest are being
controlled by foreign actors. GoS allies control around 20 % of Syria’s borders. The Lebanese Hezbollah
controls the border with Lebanon from its bases in Homs and Rural Damascus. Iraqi Shia militias
backed by Iran control the border area with Iraq from Abu Kamal (Deir Ez-Zor governorate) to al Tanf
(Homs governorate). In Dar’a governorate, GoS control is not absolute and reconciled fighters
maintain some influence on the border with Jordan. In the north of Syria, GoS has control of only one
border crossing north of Latakia, the rest of the northern borders of Syria being under the control ofeither the Turkish-backed anti-GoS armed groups, HTS or SDF in conjunction with Russian forces.267
Freedom House stated that pro-government militias are ‘nominally loyal to the regime but often free
to exploit the population in areas they control’.268 In GoS-held areas in Deir Ez-Zor governorate whichhave been recaptured from ISIL, militias were reported to be in control269 and engaging in criminality
and extortion of civilians.270 Residents of the governorate of Sweida have accused GoS-affiliated forcesof tolerating or even supporting criminal networks operating in the province.271 While GoS has
sometimes engaged in operations to bring unaccountable pro-GoS militias under its control272,‘enforcement remains uneven’.273
During the reporting period, in some places in Damascus274, Rural Damascus, Homs275, Dar’a276,
Aleppo277 and Sweida278 governorates, armed clashes between pro-GoS militias were reported.279
Between April 2019280 and beginning of March 2020281, the GoS carried out a military offensive against
opposition-held areas in parts of Idlib, northern Hama and western Aleppo governorates282, leading

267 Balanche, F., The Assad Regime Has Failed to Restore Full Sovereignty Over Syria, Washington Institute for Near East

Policy, 10 February 2021, url; See also the map titled Syria’s borders are under external control presented by the same
sources here
268 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2020 - Syria, 9 April 2021, url
269 Berti, B. and Tsurkov, E., Life after the Caliphate: Human Security Challenges in Syria and Iraq, KAS, url, p. 15
270 International Crisis Group, Easing Syrian Refugees’ Plight in Lebanon, 13 February 2020, url, p. 23; Al Monitor, Pro-Iranmilitias in Syria soak merchants for cash at checkpoints, 21 December 2020, url
271 Al-Jabassini, A. and Ezzi, M., Tribal ‘sulh’ and the politics of persuasion in volatile southern Syria, EUI, 22 March 2021, url,
p. 10; Carter Center (The), Syria Weekly Conflict Summary 22-28 February 2021, 3 March 2021, url
272 COAR, Syria Update: 16-22 October 2019, 23 October 2019, url, p. 10; International Crisis Group, Easing Syrian Refugees’ُ ّ
Plight in Lebanon, 13 February 2020, url, p. 23; Al Modon, ‫[ من ُيلطخ سمعة سهيل الحسن؟‬Who is staining Suheil Hassan’s name],
23 April 2019, url
273 International Crisis Group, Easing Syrian Refugees’ Plight in Lebanon, 13 February 2020, url, p. 23
274 Syrian Observer (The), Clashes Continued Between the Fourth Division and Iranian Militias in Damascus, 5 April 2021, url
275 Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary, 6 July – 12 July 2020, url, p. 4
276 Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary, 22 June – 28 June 2020, url, pp. 1, 4; Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict
Summary, 6 July – 12 July 2020, url, p. 4; Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary, 17 August – 23 August 2020, url, p.
4
277 Syrian Observer (The), Fatemiyoun Arrest Six Fourth Division Soldiers Including an Officer in Aleppo, 2 April 2021, url
278 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/45/31], 14 August 2020, url, p. 5; COAR, The Syrian economy at war. Armed group mobilization as livelihood andprotection strategy, September 2020, url, pp. 7-8; Carter Center (The), Syria Weekly Conflict Summary for 28 September - 4
October 2020, 8 October 2020, url;
279 Al-Masri, A., Reliable no more? The current state of the Syrian armed forces, Atlantic Council, 22 September 2020, url
280 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/44/61], 3 September 2020, url, p. 3; UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139
(2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018) and 2449 (2018); Report of theSecretary-General [S/2019/674], 21 August 2019, url, pp. 1-2; USIP, Amid Humanitarian Crisis, Syrian Regime Intensifies Idlib
Offensive, 4 February 2020, url
281 BBC News, Syria war: Idlib ceasefire between Russia and Turkey begins, 6 March 2020, url
282 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2020/141], 21
February 2020, url, pp. 1-2, 535

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

to a high number of civilian casualties283, massive displacement of civilians and a humanitarian crisis.284
In early 2020, the GoS offensive in north-west Syria made advances in opposition-held areas innorthern Hama governorate and southern Idlib governorate.285 As of late February 2020, the GoS
offensive resulted in the capture of around 200 communities in eastern Idlib and western Aleppo
governorates since December 2019286 and managed to take control of the full length of the M5
Damascus-Aleppo highway.287
GoS-held areas situated in proximity to the frontlines in north-west Syria have been targeted bymortar and rocket attacks.288 According to information obtained by the CoI, attacks by opposition
forces based in north-west Syria (Idlib, northern Latakia, western Hama and western Aleppo
governorates) on GoS-held areas led to at least 202 civilians being killed and 456 others injured
between November 2019 and 1 May 2020.289
According to the International Crisis Group, GoS nominally controlled areas such as Dar’a, Deir Ez-Zor
city, and parts of Aleppo and Homs, ‘are inhospitable for returnees due to heavy destruction, the reignof abusive pro-regime militias, security problems such as ISIS attacks or a combination of all three’.290
During the reference period, ISIL attacks in GoS-held areas, predominantly targeting GoS security
forces were assessed by sources to have caused hundreds of casualties.291
For more information on ISIL activity in GoS-controlled areas see Section 1.4.6 Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant (ISIL).
In areas retaken by GoS through the so-called reconciliation agreements, such as Dar’a governorate,
eastern Ghouta or Quneitra, the CoI assessed that ‘the plethora of actors involved, combined withcompeting approaches to “reconciliation” […] contributed to a fragile security situation.’292 In Dar’agovernorate, tensions between GoS forces and opposition armed groups escalated in March 2020
leading to artillery shelling by the SAA and retaliatory attacks by opposition forces.293 Civilian
casualties were reported as a result of indiscriminate shelling and rocket attacks between the twoparties.294 Kidnappings of civilians and targeted killings of civilians, former opposition fighters andmembers of GoS security forces by unknown perpetrators were increasingly reported in 2020 in Dar’aand Sweida governorates.295
Between March and May 2020, the UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR)
documented 52 incidents of ‘apparently targeted killings’ in Dar’a governorate which resulted in 17
283 UN, Security Council: Syria, 28 February 2020, url; OHCHR, Press briefing note on Syria, 18 February 2020, url
284 UNOCHA, Under-Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Mark Lowcock: Statement on

Northwest Syria, 17 February 2020, url
285 COAR, Syria in 2021, 28 January 2021, url
286 UNOCHA, Recent Developments in Northwest Syria - Situation Report No. 9, 26 February 2020, url, p. 2
287 International Crisis Group, Silencing the Guns in Syria’s Idlib, 15 May 2020, url, p. 1
288 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/44/61], 3 September 2020, url, pp. 15-16
289 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/44/61], 3 September 2020, url, p. 15
290 International Crisis Group, Easing Syrian Refugees’ Plight in Lebanon, 13 February 2020, url, p. 22
291 Waters, G., ISIS in Syria: 2020 in Review, Newlines Institute, 10 February 2021, url; SOHR, 79 months since the declarationof Caliphate State | ISIS members kill over 100 regime soldiers and loyalists, while cells carry out nearly 65 operations in SDFheld areas, 28 February 2021, url
292 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/43/57], 28 January 2020 [published 2 March 2020], url, p. 14
293 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/45/31], 14 August 2020, url, p. 3
294 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/45/31], 14 August 2020, url, p. 5
295 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/45/31], 14 August 2020, url, p. 5; Carter Center (The), Syria Weekly Conflict Summary 22-28 February 2021, 3 March
2021, url36

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

civilians being killed.296 The CoI stated that at least 53 persons were killed in targeted assassinations
in Dar’a governorate between January and June 2020.297 According to data collected and verified byresearcher Abdullah Al-Jabassini298, at least 930 violent incidents took place between August 2018 andFebruary 2021 in Dar’a governorate which killed at least 790 individuals.299 Furthermore, reporting in
June 2020, the same source stated that ‘assassinations, kidnappings, IED attacks and fatalities inseemingly hit-and-run incidents’ are reportedly a frequent occurrence in Dar’a since the return of theprovince to GoS control in 2018.300 Between January and February 2021, a military escalation took
place between former opposition fighters and GoS forces in Tafas, Dar’a governorate301, an area
described as an enclave for former opposition fighters.302 Clashes between the two sides involved
shelling which led to casualties among the combatants.303
During the reference period, Israeli airstrikes on Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah targets.304 US
airstrikes on Iranian-backed militias located in Gos-held areas were reported.305
The economic situation in Syria sparked protests in Sweida in the first half of 2020306, with hundreds
of demonstrators calling for Assad to step down.307 The protests were meet with violence fromsecurity forces and arrests of activists were made.308

1.5.2 Areas under control of Turkish-backed armed groups
As of December 2020, Turkish-backed armed groups operating under the SNA umbrella are in controlof ‘Operation Euphrates Shield’ (area between Azaz, Al-Bab, and Jarablus) and ‘Operation Olive
Branch’ (Afrin district) areas in northern Aleppo governorate, and of ‘Operation Peace Spring’ area
between Tall Abyad (Raqqa governorate) and Ras al Ain (Hasaka governorate).309 The territorial
control over these areas remained unchanged as of March 2021 (see Map 4).
Insurgent attacks in areas under Turkish-backed armed groups were reported throughout 2020,
leading to civilian casualties.310 While no group normally claimed responsibility for the attacks, Turkey

296 OHCHR, Syria: Bachelet warns of ‘ticking time-bomb’ as civilian killings mount, 8 May 2020, url
297 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/45/31], 14 August 2020, url, p. 5
298 Abdullah Al-Jabassini holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Kent, United Kingdom. He is a NonResident Scholar at the Middle East Institute (Washington, D.C., United States), and a Research Fellow for the Wartime andPost-Conflict in Syria (WPCS) project at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies of the European University Institute(Florence, Italy). His research is focused on southern Syria, specifically Dar’a governorate. See url
299 Al-Jabassini, A. and Ezzi, M., Tribal ‘Sulh’ and the Politics of Persuasion in Volatile Southern Syria, EUI, 1 June 2020, url, p.
2
300 Al-Jabassini, A. and Ezzi, M., Tribal ‘Sulh’ and the Politics of Persuasion in Volatile Southern Syria, EUI, 1 June 2020, url, p.
2
301 Carter Center (The), Syria Weekly Conflict Summary 22-28 February 2021, 3 March 2021, url
302 Al-Jabassini, A. and Ezzi, M., Tribal ‘sulh’ and the politics of persuasion in volatile southern Syria, EUI, 22 March 2021, url,
p. 10;
303 COAR, Double Trouble: Southern Syria Erupts on Two Fronts, 1 February 2021, url
304 Asharq Al-Aswat, Israel Says it Hit 50 Syria Targets in 2020, 31 December 2020, url; Reuters, Israel strikes widely in Syria,
sending signal of aggressive post-Trump posture, 18 November 2020, url; Guardian (The), Deadliest Israeli airstrikes on Syria
in years kill 57, say observers, 13 January 2021, url
305 BBC News, Biden takes first military action with Syria strike on Iran-backed militias, 26 February 2021, url
306 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/45/31], 14 August 2020, url, p. 3
307 BBC News, Syria war: Assad sacks PM as economic crisis sparks protests, 11 June 2020, url
308 HRW, World Report 2021 - Syria, 13 January 2021, url; HRW, Syria: Protesters Describe Beatings, Arrests, 28 June 2020,
url; Ezzi, M., Sweida Protests: The Start of a New Syrian Revolution?, EUI, 16 June 2020, url
309 Al-Hilu, K., The Turkish Intervention in Northern Syria: One Strategy, Discrepant Policies, EUI, 14 January 2021, url, p. 3,
5; See also Map 4: ISW, Control of terrain in Syria, 22 March 2021
310 International Crisis Group, The SDF Seeks a Path Toward Durable Stability in North East Syria, 25 November 2020, url

37

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

has attributed them to YPG311 or as emanating from SDF-controlled areas.312 YPG-associated Kurdish
armed groups, Ghadab al-Zaytoun (Wrath of Olives) and Hezen Rizgariya Efrine (Afrin Liberation
Forces), were reported to ‘have engaged in asymmetric warfare against factions operating under the
Syrian National Army’313, and carrying out assassinations and car bombs against Turkish and SNA
forces.314 Ghadab al-Zaytoun reportedly operates in Afrin and the Euphrates Shield Area.315 Hezen
Rizgariya Efrine is comprised of experienced Kurdish fighters from Afrin and was reported to carry out
attacks316 and acts of sabotage against Turkish and SNA forces.317
The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) stated that out of
194 improvised explosive device (IED) attacks verified in 2020, almost two thirds occurred in areas
under the control of Turkish-backed armed groups: 83 attacks in Afrin, Jarablus, Al-Bab and Azaz
(Aleppo governorate), 29 attacks in Ras al Ain (Hasaka governorate) and 14 in Tall Abyad (Raqqa
governorates).318 Between 1 January and 14 September 2020, in areas under the control of Turkishbacked armed groups OHCHR documented at least 116 civilians killed and 463 injured as a result of
IED attacks by unidentified perpetrators and explosive remnants of war (ERW).319 In February 2021,
the Carter Center reported an increase in IED attacks and armed clashes in areas under SNA control innorthern Aleppo governorate. The attacks were directed at SNA factions and civilians.320 No groupclaimed responsibility for the attacks, but pro-opposition sources attributed them to the YPG.321
While USDOD stated in a report covering January-March 2020 that in the Operation Peace Spring area
between Tall Abyad and Ras al Ain conditions ‘have stabilised for the time being’322, the CoI reported
periodic clashes between Kurdish forces and SNA and Turkish military forces for the period between
January and July 2020.323 During 2020, cross-line attacks between SDF and GoS forces on one side and
SNA on the other were reported on the frontlines of Operation Peace Spring area.324 Inside the
Operation Peace Spring area, attacks using explosive devices which led to civilian casualties were also
reported.325

311 Aydintasbas, A., A new Gaza: Turkey’s border policy in northern Syria, ECFR, 28 May 2020, url; BBC News, Syria war:

Dozens killed in truck bomb attack at Afrin market, 28 April 2020, url; Carter Center (The), Syria Weekly Conflict Summary
15-21 February 2021, 24 February 2021, url
312 International Crisis Group, The SDF Seeks a Path Toward Durable Stability in North East Syria, 25 November 2020, url
313 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 15 August 2019,url, p. 5
314 Counter Extremism Project, Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), n.d., url
315 Omran Center for Strategic Studies, Indicators of Security Stability in Syria and Refugee Return: An evaluation of SelectCases, December 2020, url, pp. 8, 53-54
316 Enab Baladi, Targeting of Turkish presence escalates in northern Syria, 24 September 2020, url; Al Monitor, New Kurdish
group in Syria attacks Turkish-backed opposition in Afrin, 24 April 2021, url
317 Al Monitor, Syrian Kurds ponder Afrin’s recapture in shadow of Idlib crisis, 1 March 2020, url
318 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview. Syrian Arab Republic, March 2021, url, p. 12
319 OHCHR, Syria: Violations and abuses rife in areas under Turkish-affiliated armed groups – Bachelet, 18 September 2020,
url
320 Carter Center (The), Syria Weekly Conflict Summary 22-28 February 2021, 3 March 2021, url
321 Carter Center (The), Syria Weekly Conflict Summary 15-21 February 2021, 24 February 2021, url
322 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve. Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, January 1, 2020‒March 31, 2020,
13 May 2020, url, p. 49
323 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/45/31], 14 August 2020, url, p. 2
324 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2020/813], 20 August 2020, url, p. 4; UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014),
2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020);
Report of the Secretary-General [S/2020/1031], 14 October 2020, url, p. 3
325 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2020/813], 20 August 2020, url, p. 4; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission ofInquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/45/31], 14 August 2020, url, p. 2

38

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

The CoI reported that between January and April 2020, Afrin was affected by shelling and car bomb
explosions which led to civilian casualties and infrastructure damage.326 In spring of 2020 an increase
in attacks in Afrin was recorded which Turkey attributed to the YPG.327 On 28 April 2020, a vehicleborne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attack on a market in Afrin led to 51 people being killed,of whom at least 29 were civilians.328 Between March 2018 and July 2020, the Carter Center recorded
at least 215 attacks on Turkish forces and SNA factions in Afrin.329 ACAPS assessed in March 2021 that
Afrin is confronted with ‘severe insecurity, a high prevalence of explosive hazards, and widespreadcrime’.330
Between October and November 2020, UN Security Council reported insecurity in the Euphrates
Shield area between Azaz, Al Bab and Jarablus.331 The Carter Center assessed Al Bab as ‘an area of
frequent conflict’, documenting at least 120 incidents that took place between January and end of
July 2020.332 Fighting between SDF forces and SNA in the Al Bab area was reported in 2020.333 In March
2021, missile attacks on oil facilities near Al Bab and Jarablus were reported.334 COAR attributed theattack to Russian forces.335
Infighting between different factions of the SNA which have led to civilian casualties was reported in
2020336, including in Jarablus337, al-Bab338, Afrin339 and Ras al Ain.340 These type of incidents continued
in 2021.341 According to a January 2021 report by the Syria researcher Al-Hilu on areas under thecontrol of Turkish-backed armed groups, the level of security and violations against civilians is
influenced by the area’s demographic composition, the dominant SNA faction in control and thepresence of local population amongst its ranks. In areas where the dominant factions do not include
local fighters such as Ras al Ain or Afrin, ‘violations are abundant and security is minimal.’342 By
contrast, improved security and fewer violations against civilians were observed in Azaz, Marea, Tall

326 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/45/31], 14 August 2020, url, p. 9
327Aydintasbas, A., A new Gaza: Turkey’s border policy in northern Syria, ECFR, 28 May 2020, url
328 OHCHR, Syria: Bachelet warns of ‘ticking time-bomb’ as civilian killings mount, 8 May 2020, url
329 Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary 29 June – 5 July 2020, url, p. 3
330 ACAPS, Syria. Humanitarian needs in Afrin, 3 March 2021, url
331 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2020/1195], 11 December 2020, url, p. 3
332 Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary, 27 July – 4 August 2020, url, p. 3
333 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/45/31], 14 August 2020, url, p. 2-3
334 Al Jazeera, Missile strikes hit oil refineries in northern Syria, killing one, 5 March 2021, url; Reuters, Missile strikes hit oil
refineries in north Syria, killing one, 5 March 2021, url
335 COAR, 10 Years On: Adrift, the Syrian Aid Response Awaits a Paradigm Shift, 15 March 2021, url
336 OHCHR, Syria: Violations and abuses rife in areas under Turkish-affiliated armed groups – Bachelet, 18 September 2020,url
337 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2020/576], 24 June
2020, url, p. 18‫الشقية” ر‬‫بي “أحرار ر‬
338 Enab Baladi, ‫والشطة‬‫[ اتفاق لحل مشكلة الباب بريف حلب ن‬An agreement to solve the problem of al-Bab in the
countryside of Aleppo between “Ahrar al-Sharqiya” and the police], 1 April 2020, url; COAR, Syria update, 6 April 2020, url;‫[ اشتباكات ن‬Clashes between the Syrian factions on smuggling crossings], 17 May
Al Modon, ‫بي الفصائل السورية عىل معابر التهريب‬2020, url
339 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2021/160], 18 February 2021, url, p. 17; STJ, Afrin: Clashes between Jaysh al-Islam and al-Jabha al-Shamiya lead to civilian
deaths, 24 February 2021, url
340 Enab Baladi, Violations by “SNA”…who to blame?, 12 June 2020, url; Al Monitor, Turkish-backed rebels fight each otherin Ras al-Ain, Syria, 22 April 2020, url; SOHR, Ras al-Ain | Clashes between Turkish-backed factions leave several injured, andresidents of Luzi village give “Sultan Murad” five-days notice to hand over their son’s killer, 29 December 2020, url
341 STJ, Afrin: Clashes between Jaysh al-Islam and al-Jabha al-Shamiya lead to civilian deaths, 24 February 2021, url
342 Al-Hilu, K., The Turkish Intervention in Northern Syria: One Strategy, Discrepant Policies, EUI, 14 January 2021, url, p. 7

39

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Abyad, Suluk and al-Mabrukah, where the SNA factions controlling them either include locals in theirranks or share tribal links to the fighters.343
In a September 2020 briefing, OHCHR reported that ‘killings, kidnappings, unlawful transfers ofpeople, seizures of land and properties and forcible evictions’ were documented in areas under
Turkish-backed armed groups control, including Afrin, Ras al-Ain and Tall Abyad. The victims of theattacks included ‘people perceived to be allied with opposing parties or as being critical of the actionsof the Turkish-affiliated armed groups’, as well as those who could be extorted for ransom.344 In its
report covering 2020, Human Rights Watch stated that Turkey and the SNA ‘have indiscriminately
shelled civilian structures and systematically pillaged private property, arrested hundreds ofindividuals, and carried out at least seven summary executions in areas they occupy in north-east
Syria’.345
See also the chapters on See also the chapters on Aleppo governorate, Raqqa governorate and Hasaka
governorate.
Information on the conflict background and security dynamics prior to 2020 in areas under the control
of Turkish-backed armed groups, is available in the EASO COI Report: Syria - Security situation (May2020)

1.5.3 Kurdish-controlled areas in north-east Syria
As of March 2021, in north-east Syria the Kurdish-led SDF controlled most of Raqqa and Hasaka
governorates, part of Deir Ez-Zor governorate north-east of the Euphrates, and parts of Aleppo
governorate around Manbij and Kobane, and the area around Tal Rifaat.346 According to COAR, nosignificant changes regarding territorial control were recorded in north-east Syria during the reporting
period.347 Maps depicting territorial control in Syria over time similarly indicate that no significant
changes in control of terrain in north-east Syria took place during the reference period.348
The Kurdish-controlled areas in north-east Syria comprise of most of the territory that was previously
under ISIL control in Syria and are viewed as ‘the main theatre for ISIS’s insurgency’.349 During thereporting period, ISIL insurgent activity was reported in Kurdish-controlled areas350, particularly in Deir
Ez-Zor governorate.351 ISIL attacks predominantly targeted SDF forces and the international counter-

343 Al-Hilu, K., The Turkish Intervention in Northern Syria: One Strategy, Discrepant Policies, EUI, 14 January 2021, url, p. 8
344 OHCHR, Syria: Violations and abuses rife in areas under Turkish-affiliated armed groups – Bachelet, 18 September 2020,

url
345 HRW, World Report 2021 - Syria, 13 January 2021, url
346 Based on reading of maps in ISW, Syria Situation Report: February 19 – March 22, 2021, 25 March 2021, url; Liveuamap,

Syria, 26 March 2021, url
347 COAR, Syria in 2021, 28 January 2021, url
348 Liveuamap, Syria, 1 January 2020, url; Liveuamap 30 March 2021, url
349 According to International Crisis Group interview with an US official, 18 May 2019. International Crisis Group, Averting an
ISIS Resurgence in Iraq and Syria, 11 October 2019, url, pp. 23-24
350 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, October 1, 2019‒December 31,
2019, 4 February 2020, url, p. 39; Waters, G., ISIS in Syria: 2020 in Review, Newlines Institute, 10 February 2021, url; BBC
News, IS brutality returning to Syrian towns, 7 February 2021, url; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent
International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/45/31], 14 August 2020, url, p. 15
351 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, January 1, 2020‒March 31, 2020,
13 May 2020, url, p. 51; USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, April 1,
2020‒June 30, 2020, 4 August 2020, url, p. 27; USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the
US Congress, July 1, 2020‒September 30, 2020, 3 November 2020, url, p. 23; USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead
Inspector General Report to the US Congress, October 1 2020 – December 31 2020, 9 February 2021, url, p. 16; Rojava
Information Center, Annual Sleeper Cell Report 2020, 16 January 2021, url, p. 2, 940

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

ISIL coalition352, but civilians, including tribal leaders, local merchants and persons deemed wealthy
were also targeted.353
For more information on ISIL activity in Kurdish-controlled areas see Section 1.4.6 Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant (ISIL) and chapters on Aleppo governorate, Raqqa governorate, Hasaka governorate
and Deir Ez-Zor governorate.
Unclaimed IED attacks targeting civilians or security forces were reported in Kurdish-controlled areas
during the reference period.354
Tensions between US troops and Russian355 and GoS-affiliated forces in north-east Syria have beenreported, and in February 2020 a clash between pro-GoS forces and US troops was reported near
Qamishli.356
Clashes involving gunfire and shelling between SDF and SNA were reported to take place between Julyand September 2020 on the frontlines of the Operation Peace Spring area, specifically around Tal Tamr
and Ras al Ain.357 In autumn and early winter of 2020, military confrontations between Turkey and the
SNA on one side and the SDF on the other escalated around the town of Ain Issa, located in Raqqa
governorate at 45 km from Tall Abyad.358 The confrontations reportedly led to civilians being injured359
and the displacement of 6 500 residents from the city and an additional 3 000 form the surrounding
areas since mid-December 2020, according to the SDF-led administration.360 Clashes around Ain Issa
continued in 2021.361
Between 20 January 2021 and 2 February 2021, tensions have erupted between SDF authorities and
GoS forces controlling areas of Qamishli and Hasaka cities over distribution of humanitarianassistance.362 The tensions escalated on 20 January 2021 when Kurdish authorities imposed a
blockade of GoS-held neighbourhoods in the two cities, restricting ‘all traffic, including civilian,commercial and humanitarian shipments and partners’ from entering the areas, affecting foodassistance and other services for 220 000 people.363 In response, the GoS blocked the predominantly

352 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/45/31], 14 August 2020, url, p. 15
353 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, July 1, 2020‒September 30, 2020,
3 November 2020, url, p. 23; BBC News, IS brutality returning to Syrian towns, 7 February 2021, url; Jeffrey, J., Part 1: The
Future of ISIS, Wilson Center, 22 December 2020, url
354 OHCHR, Syria: Bachelet warns of ‘ticking time-bomb’ as civilian killings mount, 8 May 2020, url; Carter Center (The),
Weekly Conflict Summary, 6-12 April 2020, url, p. 5; Kurdistan24, IED attack injures civilians in Syria’s Manbij, 20 October
2020, url; SOHR, Al-Busayrah explosion update | Number of people injured rises in blast targeting collaborators with SDF,
east of Deir ez-Zor, 20 February 2021, url
355 WSJ, U.S. Troops in Standoffs With Russian Military Contractors in Syria, 5 February 2020, url; VOA, Reports: Tensions
Grow Between US, Russian Forces in Northeast Syria, 21 January 2020, url; CNN, Multiple US troops injured in collision witha Russian military convoy in Syria, 26 August 2020, url
356 BBC News, Syria war: 'One killed' as US troops clash with government loyalists near Qamishli, 12 February 2020, url
357 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, July 1, 2020‒September 30, 2020,
3 November 2020, url, p. 62
358 COAR, Syria update, 7 December 2020, url; Asharq Al-Awsat, Turkish Forces Shell Villages of Ain Issa Countryside, 16
December 2020, url; Airwars, Annual Report 2020, March 2021, url, p. 10
359 COAR, Syria in 2021, 28 January 2021, url; Al Jazeera, Civilians flee Ain Issa, northeast Syria as clashes escalate, 27
December 2020, url
360 COAR, Syria in 2021, 28 January 2021, url; Al Jazeera, Civilians flee Ain Issa, northeast Syria as clashes escalate, 27
December 2020, url
361 Al Monitor, Turkey reinforces military posts around Ain Issa amid clashes with Kurdish forces, 19 March 2021, url; MEE,First reported Turkish air strikes on Kurdish zone in Syria in 17 months, 21 March 2021, url
362 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2021/160], 18 February 2021, url, p. 2
363 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2021/160], 18 February 2021, url, p. 4

41

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Kurdish neighbourhood Sheikh Maqsoud in Aleppo city364 and restricted movements in in eastern
Aleppo and Manbij.365 Clashes between GoS-affiliated NDF and the SDF-internal forces, Asayish werereported.366 Pro-GoS protests which took place in Hasaka were reportedly met with violence byKurdish forces, leading to one person killed and several others wounded.367 A Russian-mediated deal
put an end to the situation at the beginning of February 2021, with the SDF agreeing to lift theblockade of the GoS-held areas in Qamishli and Hasaka, and the GoS reinstating the supply lines in
Kurdish inhabited areas in Aleppo.368

1.5.4 Areas in north-west Syria under anti-GoS armed groups control
In north-west Syria, the Idlib area incorporating parts of Idlib governorate, northern Hama, northern
Latakia and western Aleppo governorates are regarded as the last remaining stronghold of anti-GoS
armed groups369 and the largest obstacle in GoS’ campaign to regain territorial control of Syria.370 In
2019, GoS escalated the military operations in Idlib which continued through the first few months of2020.371
Since April 2019, an escalation of hostilities was reported, leading to high number of civilian deaths,
massive displacement and significant damage to infrastructure.372 By December 2019, GoS military
offensive intensified which in turn attracted an increased military involvement from Turkey in Idlib on
the side of anti-GoS armed groups.373 Between December 2019 and January 2020, military hostilities
increased significantly in parts of Idlib, northern Hama and western Aleppo governorates.374 On
5 March 2020, a ceasefire brokered by Russia and Turkey was agreed in the Idlib area, whereby asecurity corridor stretching 6 km to the north and 6 km to the south of the M4 highway wasestablished, where joint Russian and Turkish patrols would be carried out.375
Since cessation of hostilities in early March 2020, the UN Security Council reported that the ceasefire
in Idlib has largely held through the reporting period.376 In late March 2021 however, the UN Security
364 COAR, Double Trouble: Southern Syria Erupts on Two Fronts, 1 February 2021, url
365 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),

2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2021/160], 18 February 2021, url, p. 4
366 Al Monitor, Russia uses regime-SDF tensions to expand presence in northeast Syria, 27 January 2021, url; VOA, Fresh
Clashes Erupt Between Kurdish, Government Forces in Northeast Syria, 31 January 2021, url
367 VOA, Fresh Clashes Erupt Between Kurdish, Government Forces in Northeast Syria, 31 January 2021, url; New Arab (The),One killed in northeast Syria pro-regime rally, 31 January 2021, url
368 COAR, Sweeping Real Estate Sales Tax Reform Discussed, 8 February 2021, url
369 International Crisis Group, The Best of Bad Options for Syria’s Idlib, 14 March 2019, url, p. i; BBC News, Syria: Who's incontrol of Idlib?, 18 February 2020, url
370 ISW, Russia enables new Syria regime offensive in Idlib, 7 February 2020, url
371 US CRS, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, 27 July 2020, url, p. 16
372 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018) and 2449 (2018); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2019/674], 21 August 2019, url,
pp. 1-2
373 USIP, Amid Humanitarian Crisis, Syrian Regime Intensifies Idlib Offensive, 4 February 2020, url
374 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2020/141], 21
February 2020, url, pp. 1-2, 5
375 Al Jazeera, Turkey says Idlib ceasefire details largely agreed on with Russia, 12 March 2020, url
376 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2020/576], 24 June
2020, url, p. 3; UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014),
2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the SecretaryGeneral [S/2020/1031], 14 October 2020, url, p. 3; UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139
(2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533
(2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2020/1195], 11 December 2020, url, p. 3; UN Security Council, Implementationof Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018),
2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2021/160], 18 February 2021, url, p. 3

42

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Council noted an escalation of hostilities in north-west Syria, giving examples of the shelling of the
Atarib hospital and airstrikes on the area of the Bab al-Hawa crossing, and retaliatory mortar androcket attacks by anti-GoS armed groups on GoS military bases and neighbourhoods of Aleppo city.377
While the ceasefire led according to the CoI ‘to a decrease in hostilities and a significant drop in civilian
casualties’378, frequent ceasefire violations which included airstrikes379, exchanges of artillery fire,mutual artillery shelling across frontlines380 and limited raids381, were reported throughout the rest of2020 and in 2021. The fighting was concentrated around the Ghab plain and Jabal al-Zawiya, in thesouthern countryside of Idlib governorate382 and in areas around the M4 highway.383 Ceasefire
violations have resulted in civilian casualties.384
Joint Russian-Turkish patrols tasked with enforcing the March 2020 ceasefire along the M4 highway
portion in Idlib governorate have come under attack from anti-GoS armed groups operating in thearea, particularly by unknown groups which have been speculated to be associated with the Al Qaeda
affiliate HaD.385 HTS clashed with rival armed groups, including HaD in mid-2020 managing to reassert
its dominance in the area.386 Confrontations between the armed groups occasionally resulted incivilians being killed in the crossfire in July 2020.387

377 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),

2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2021/390], 22 April 2021, url, pp. 2-3
378 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/44/61], 3 September 2020, url, p. 4
379 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2020/813], 20 August 2020, url, p. 1; UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014),
2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020);
Report of the Secretary-General [S/2020/1195], 11 December 2020, url, p. 3
380 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2020/576], 24 June
2020, url, p. 3; UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014),
2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the SecretaryGeneral [S/2020/1031], 14 October 2020, url, p. 3
381 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2021/160], 18 February 2021, url, p. 3
382 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/45/31], 14 August 2020, url, p. 2
383 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2021/160], 18 February 2021, url, p. 3; UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014),
2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020);
Report of the Secretary-General [S/2020/1031], 14 October 2020, url, p. 3
384 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/44/61], 3 September 2020, url, p. 4; UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139
(2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533
(2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2020/813], 20 August 2020, url, p. 1
385 Carter Center (The), Power Through Strength Hayat Tahrir al-Sham solidifying control in northwest Syria, 9 November
2020, url; Carter Center (The), Syria Weekly Conflict Summary 4 - 10 January, 13 January 2021, url
386 Drevon, J. and Haenni, P., How Global Jihad Relocalises and Where it Leads. The Case of HTS, the Former AQ Franchise in
Syria, 2021, EUI, url, p. 10; Carter Center (The), Power Through Strength Hayat Tahrir al-Sham solidifying control in northwest
Syria, 9 November 2020, url; International Crisis Group: In Syria’s Idlib, Washington’s Chance to Reimagine Counterterrorism, 3 February 2021, url
387 Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary 20 July – 26 July 2020, url, p 4

43

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Since the March 2020 ceasefire, Turkey has reinforced its military presence in Idlib, particularly in the
Jabal Al-Zawyeh area388, and expressed its readiness to respond militarily in the event of a renewed
GoS offensive on the area.389
The GoS offensive on the Idlib area resulted in high number of civilian casualties390, over 1 million
people displaced between December 2019 and February 2020, and a massive humanitarian crisis.391
Between 1 November 2019 and 5 March 2020, at least 1 500 airstrikes, mainly air-to-ground missiles
and barrel bombs were launched at opposition-held areas in south-east Idlib and western Aleppo
governorates.392 Between April 2019 and late-February 2020, OHCHR verified that at least 1 750
civilians were killed as a result of the hostilities, although the actual number is considered to behigher.393 Between December 2019 and 31 March 2020, OHCHR recorded 552 civilian deaths in northwest Syria as a result of airstrikes and ground-based strikes by GoS and pro-GoS forces.394
A CoI report investigating 52 specific attacks on medical facilities, schools and markets in Idlib andwestern Aleppo governorate carried out between 1 November 2019 and 30 April 2020, found that
pro-GoS forces were responsible for 534 confirmed civilian casualties and opposition armed groups
for 48. The total number of civilian casualties was in the source’s assessment likely higher.395 According
to the CoI, confrontations between GoS and armed groups which took place between November 2019
and June 2020 in Idlib and western Aleppo governorate were ‘marked by war crimes, including
launching indiscriminate attacks resulting in death or injury to civilians’.396
See also chapters on Idlib governorate, Aleppo governorate, Hama governorate and Latakia
governorate.

1.5.5 Tanf
The Tanf border crossing is in the desert in the eastern part of Syria, on the main road between
Damascus and Baghdad, close to the tri-border area between Syria, Iraq and Jordan. US and allied
forces from the Global Coalition Against Daesh have controlled the area since 2016.397 Sources place
Tanf in Homs governorate.398 According to International Crisis Group, the Tanf base has ‘served as alaunching point for counter-ISIS operations and training for Syrian opposition factions’ fighting ISIL.399

388 COAR, No hasty retreat: Turkey moves stranded northwest outposts, 26 October 2020, url; International Crisis Group,

Silencing the Guns in Syria’s Idlib, 15 May 2020, url, p. 3
389 International Crisis Group, Silencing the Guns in Syria’s Idlib, 15 May 2020, url, p. 3
390 UN, Security Council, Syria, 28 February 2020, url; OHCHR, Press briefing note on Syria, 18 February 2020, url
391 UNOCHA, Under-Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Mark Lowcock: Statement on
Northwest Syria, 17 February 2020, url
392 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview. Syrian Arab Republic, March 2021, url, p. 12
393 UN, Security Council: Syria, 28 February 2020, url
394 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2020/141], 21
February 2020, url, p. 1; UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191
(2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2020/327], 23 April 2020, url, p. 4
395 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/44/61], 3 September 2020, url, p. 5
396 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/45/31], 14 August 2020, url, p. 18
397 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War. Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Swedish Defence Research Agency, December 2018,
url, p. 51
398 AI, Syria 2020, 7 April 2021, url; BBC News, Islamic State 'seizes key Syria-Iraq border crossing', 22 May 2015, url
399 International Crisis Group, Al-Tanf, Syria, 18 February 2020, url

44Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

USDOD stated that the tribal militia Mughawir al Thawra received training from US forces.400 In April
2020, there were reports that some members of the Maghawir Al-Thawra defected to the GoS.401
The Tanf border crossing and the surrounding areas are in a desolate desert area and contain no
ordinary settlements except the nearby Rukban refugee camp. The camp houses internally displaced
Syrians who have been denied entry to Jordan.402 As of August 2020, the camp continued to hostaround 10 000 IDPs in dire humanitarian conditions.403 In an April 2021 report, the UN Security Council
assessed that 12 000 inhabitants were living in the camp.404
Iranian and Iran-backed forces were deployed and set up checkpoints near the Tanf area. Incidents
have been recorded between US and Iranian and/or Iran-backed forces.405
For more information see chapter on Homs governorate.

1.6 Impact of violence on the civilian
population
1.6.1 Tactics and weapons used
GeneralThroughout the conflict government forces and associated armed groups have used a wide range oftactics to force opposition-held areas into surrender, including using sieges, bombings of civilian
populated areas406, blocking of humanitarian aid, denial of access to food and other basic services,targeted attacks on health facilities and other civilian targets.407 In 2018, the last sieges came to an
end as the government took control of all rebel-held neighbourhoods and villages in Damascus andsouthern Syria.408
Action on Armed Violence (AOAV), a not-for-profit organisation that records casualties caused by
explosive weapons at the global level409, uses a RSS reader to scan Google News for key terms which
relate to explosive weapons use such as: air strike, artillery, bomb, bombing, cluster bomb, cluster
munitions, explosion, explosive, grenade, IED, mine, missile, mortar, rocket, shell.410 Based on these
entries gathered by AOAV, in 2020, Syria ranked as the second worst impacted country globally from400 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, October 1, 2019‒December 31,

2019, 4 February 2020, url, p. 37
401 COAR, Syria Update, 21 April 2020, url; Defense Post (The), Defectors quit last US-backed rebel group in Syria, head for
regime territory, 16 April 2020, url
402 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War. Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Swedish Defence Research Agency, December 2018,
url, p. 52
403 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/45/31], 14 August 2020, url, p. 8-9
404 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2021/390], 22 April 2021, url, p. 4
405 International Crisis Group, Al-Tanf, Syria, 18 February 2020, url; Military Times, Iran-backed group launches attack nearsmall garrison in Syria housing American special operators, 16 February 2020, url
406 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/46/54], 21 January 2021, url, p. 3
407 Siege Watch, Final Report. Out of Sight, Out of Mind: The Aftermath of Syria’s Sieges, May 2018, url, p. 8; Damaan
Humanitarian Organization, Global Rights Compliance, World Peace Foundation, Accountability for Starvation Crimes: Syria,
August 2019, url, p. 1
408 Siege Watch, Final Report. Out of Sight, Out of Mind: The Aftermath of Syria’s Sieges, May 2018, url, p. 8
409 For more information about AOAV see url
410 AOAV, Methodology, n.d., url

45Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

explosive violence, with 844 incidents and 3 013 civilian deaths and injuries, according to AOAV data.
The data for 2020 showed a significant decline as compared to 2019 when AOAV recorded 1 479
incidents (a decrease by 43 %) and 7 256 civilian casualties (a decrease by 58 %). Airstrikes accounted
for the incidents responsible for causing most civilian casualties (37 % of the total civilian casualties),
followed by IEDs (35 %) and ground launched weapons (19 %). Of the total number of casualties
recorded by AOAV in 2020, 599 were attributed to Russian forces and 659 to GoS. For many attacks,
perpetrators could not be identified.411
According to AOAV, in 2020 Aleppo (1 287 civilian casualties in 2020 compared to 1 259 in 2019) andIdlib (998 civilian casualties in 2020 compared to 3 824 in 2019) were the worst impacted area by
explosive violence.412
Airwars413 conducts daily monitoring of civilian casualty claims relating to international military actions
in Iraq and Syria. It draws on a wide range of sources, including international and local news agencies
and NGOs, military briefings and social media sites.414 Airwars recorded at least 784 civilian deaths in
2020, of which around 46 % it attributed to Russia’s airstrikes on Idlib governorate carried out in thefirst two months of 2020.415 These figures represent a decrease from 2019 when Airwars recorded
1 099 civilians killed by Russian and/or GoS strikes.416 Following the March 2020 ceasefire, Airwars
stated that civilian casualties attributed to Russia fell to the lowest levels since its intervention began
in 2015.417 According to Airwars, Turkey-led military activities in 2020 reportedly led to 37 civilians
killed and 152 injured.418
In 2020, the US-led coalition officially declared 84 strikes in Syria according to Airwars. Between 18
and 20 civilians were killed as a result of US-led coalition actions according to Airwas’ assessments, a
96 % decrease in civilian casualties from 2019.419
Attacks against civilian targets and population
The CoI noted that throughout the conflict civilians have been targeted with weapons such as ‘“hellcannons”, barrel bombs and improvised explosive devices that were inherently indiscriminate as
constructed or as used’.420 Between 2011 and the end of 2020, the CoI stated that GoS forces haveused artillery and airstrikes ‘in a clearly indiscriminate manner’, including in civilian populated areas.421
Attacks on civilian targets and infrastructure were reported in 2020422 and 2021.423 Human Rights
Watch documented 46 ground and air attacks by Syrian-Russian forces on civilian objects and

411 AOAV, Explosive Violence Monitor 2020, March 2021, url, p. 12
412 AOAV, Explosive Violence Monitor 2020, March 2021, url, p. 12
413 Airwars is a collaborative, not-for-profit transparency project run by a team of professional researchers and analysts basedin the Middle East, Europe, North Africa and North America. It tracks and assesses claims of civilian non-combatant casualties
and ‘friendly fire’ deaths from international military actions – primarily air and artillery strikes. For more information see url
414 For more information on Airwars methodology see url
415 Airwars, Annual Report 2020, March 2021, url, p. 6
416 Airwars, Annual Report 2019, February 2020, url, p. 3
417 Airwars, Annual Report 2020, March 2021, url, p. 6
418 Airwars, Annual Report 2020, March 2021, url, p. 9
419 Airwars, Annual Report 2020, March 2021, url, p. 12
420 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/46/54], 21 January 2021, url, p. 8421 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/46/54], 21 January 2021, url, p. 6
422 Guardian (The), Idlib province bombing kills 21 in single day, 26 February 2020, url; UN Security Council, Implementationof Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018),
2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2020/141], 21 February 2020, url, pp. 6-7
423 Al Jazeera, Several killed in gov’t attack on hospital in northwest Syria, 21 March 2021, url

46

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

infrastructure in Idlib governorate alone which took place between March 2019 and March 2020. The
attacks led to at least 224 civilians killed and 561 wounded.424
During the period between 5 May 2019 and 25 February 2020, Amnesty International (AI)documented 18 air and ground attacks by GoS and Russian forces on schools and hospitals in Idlib,
north-western Hama and western Aleppo governorates.425 UNOCHA reported 61 attacks on schools
and education personnel in 2020 in Syria, 70 % of which were recorded in Idlib and 69 % were byairstrikes.426
The GoS and Russia have been accused of deliberately targeting hospitals in north-west Syria ‘using
coordinates these facilities had shared with Russia through a United Nations deconfliction427
mechanism’.428 An UN investigation on seven specific incidents that took place in 2019 involving
facilities on the UN deconfliction list concluded that it is ‘highly probable’ the GoS or its allies carriedout the air strikes on four civilian facilities (three hospitals and one school) in Idlib and Hama
governorates, although it noted that the evidence was not sufficient to reach a conclusive finding. The
board also found that it is ‘plausible’ that damage done to another hospital in Hama was attributable
to GoS and its allies.429
In 2020, the World Health Organisation (WHO) recorded 28 attacks on health care facilities in Syria(24 confirmed and 4 probable) which led to 13 persons killed and 42 injured. Most took place in Idlib(8), Aleppo (6), Deir Ez-Zor (7), and Hasaka (3) governorates.430 As of March 2021, Physicians for
Human Rights (PHR) had documented 599 attacks on healthcare since the start of the conflict, over
90 % being attributed to GoS and Russian forces. In 2020, PHR documented 8 attacks on hospitals innorth-west Syria.431 In March 2021, a hospital in Atareb, Aleppo governorate which was included in
the UN deconfliction mechanism was shelled by GoS armed forces, killing six civilians and wounding
an additional 16.432 The attack was condemned by the UN433 and EU.434

424 To document the 46 incidents, Human Rights Watch interviewed 113 victims and witnesses of the attacks, as well as

healthcare and rescue workers, teachers, local authorities, and experts on the Syrian and Russian militaries. Human Rights
Watch examined dozens of satellite images and over 550 photographs and videos taken at the attack sites, as well as logs ofobservers who monitored Syrian and Russian aircraft in the area (p. 2). HRW, “Targeting Life in Idlib”; Syrian and Russian
Strikes on Civilian Infrastructure, October 2020, url, p. 47
425 AI, ‘Nowhere is safe for us’: Unlawful attacks and mass displacement in north-west Syria [MDE 24/2089/2020], 11 May
2020, url, p. 5
426 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview. Syrian Arab Republic, March 2021, url, p. 13
427 Deconfliction is defined by UNOCHA as ‘the exchange of information and planning advisories by humanitarian actors withmilitary actors in order to prevent or resolve conflicts between the two sets of objectives — humanitarian and military — toremove obstacles to humanitarian action and to avoid potential hazards for humanitarian personnel’. See UN Secretary
General, Summary by the Secretary-General of the report of the United Nations Headquarters Board of Inquiry into certain
incidents in northwest Syria since 17 September 2018 involving facilities on the United Nations deconfliction list and United
Nations supported facilities, 6 April 2020, url, p. 6428 HRW, World Report 2020 - Syria, 14 January 2020, url
429 The investigation concerned incidents that took place between April – July 2019. UN Secretary General, Summary by the
Secretary-General of the report of the United Nations Headquarters Board of Inquiry into certain incidents in northwest Syria
since 17 September 2018 involving facilities on the United Nations deconfliction list and United Nations supported facilities,
6 April 2020, url, pp. 1-17
430 WHO, Health Cluster, Attacks on health care in Syria 1 Jan – 31 Dec 2020, 31 December 2020, url
431 PHR, Illegal Attacks on Health Care in Syria, n.d., url
432 Al Jazeera, Several killed in gov’t attack on hospital in northwest Syria, 21 March 2021, url; UN Security Council,
Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393
(2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2021/390], 22 April 2021,
url, p. 2
433 UN News, Secretary-General Strongly Condemns Recent Attacks in Syria, Including Artillery Strikes against United NationsSupported Hospital, url, 22 March 2021
434 Delegation of the European Union to Syria, Syria: Statement by the Spokesperson on the attack against a medical facility
in Atarib, northern Aleppo, 22 March 2021, url

47

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Use of IEDs and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW)
During the reference period, the UN Security Council reported that IEDs attacks were responsible formany recorded civilian casualties, and often used in civilian populated areas, including local
markets.435 The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) statedthat 194 IED attacks were verified in 2020, almost two thirds of which occurred in areas under thecontrol of Turkish-backed armed groups in Aleppo, Hasaka and Raqqa governorates.436
UNOCHA further reported that in 2020 an average of 76 explosive incidents per day were recorded in
Syria.437
Citing an advanced UNOCHA draft of the 2021 Humanitarian Needs Overview, the United Nations
Mine Action Service (UNMAS) stated that 10.3 million people living in Syria ‘are at risk from explosive
contamination and approximately one third of communities are estimated to be potentiallycontaminated’. UNMAS stated that in the governorates of Aleppo, Dar’a, Rural Damascus, Idlib, Raqqa
and Deir Ez-Zor, explosive ordnance causes civilian casualties and limits access and delivery ofhumanitarian aid.438 UNOCHA stated in a February 2021 report that explosive ordnance contamination
constitutes a major protection concern in Syria affecting the lives and livelihoods of the populations.439
UNMAS noted that since 2017 and up to October 2020, it has identified 429 areas contaminated withmines in north-west, north-east and southern Syria.440 An assessment carried out by the HALO Trust441
between late 2018 and 2020 in north-west Syria revealed that explosive ordnance contamination
affects 400 communities, impacting 1.6 million people.442 Based on interviews with 4 427 victims of
explosive ordnance in north-west Syria, the same source found that 61 % of them were caused byunintentional actions while 10 % resulted from people moving discovered explosive ordnance. Of all
victims recorded, 88 % were men and boys and 25 % children.443
The International Campaign to Ban Landmines identified 1 125 mine/ERW casualties in Syria in 2019,a drop from 1 465 in 2018. Due to limited availability of data and sources, the figures are thought tobe ‘substantially higher’ in reality.444 UNOCHA reported that 25 % of the 2 059 civilian casualties
documented by OHCHR in 2020 were victims of unexploded ordnance.445
Further information on the use of IEDs and ERW in Syria in previous years is available in the EASO COI
Report: Syria – Security situation (May 2020).

435 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),

2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2021/160], 18 February 2021, url, p. 5; UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014),
2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020);
Report of the Secretary-General [S/2020/1195], 11 December 2020, url, p. 5; UN Security Council, Implementation of Security
Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018),
2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2020/813], 20 August 2020, url, p. 6
436 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview. Syrian Arab Republic, March 2021, url, p. 12
437 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview. Syrian Arab Republic, March 2021, url, p. 10
438 UNMAS, Programmes: Syria, 21 March 20211, url
439 UNOHCA, Syrian Arab Republic. 2021 Needs and Response Summary, February 2021, url, p. 6
440 UNMAS, Programmes: Syria, 21 March 20211, url
441 A UK-based NGO. For more information see url
442 HALO Trust (The), A Hidden Emergency. Why Explosive Ordnance Contamination Must Be Addressed Now in Northwest
Syria, url, pp. 3, 6
443 HALO Trust (The), A Hidden Emergency. Why Explosive Ordnance Contamination Must Be Addressed Now in Northwest
Syria, url, p. 9444 International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Landmine Monitor 2020, 12 November 2020, url, p. 38
445 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview. Syrian Arab Republic, March 2021, url, p. 12

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Use of chemical weapons
According to US government sources, the GoS has used various chemical weapons at least 50 times
since the war began.446 A 2018 report by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons(OPCW) noted 143 alleged chemical attacks in open sources, between 1 December 2015 and8 October 2018.447 In a February 2019 report, the Global Public Policy Institute collected data on atleast 336 chemical weapons attacks over the course of the war, 98 % of which were attributed to the
Syrian government forces.448 As of January 2021, the CoI was able to document 38 chemical attacks
during the conflict of which 32 were attributed to Syrian government forces, one to ISIL, while for fiveothers the perpetrators remained unknown.449 In April 2021, OPCW released its finding following theinvestigation of an airstrike carried out on 4 February 2018 on Saraqeb (Idlib governorate), concludingthat there are ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ that a military helicopter belonging to the GoS Tiger
Forces dropped chlorine gas, affecting at least 12 Syrians on the ground.450
In one chemical weapon attack carried out in August 2013 by the Syrian government on rebel held
areas in eastern Ghouta, outside Damascus, around 1 400 civilians were killed.451 Following the 2013attack, Syria became party of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction.452 However, OPCW noted in
November 2020 that Syria still had outstanding issues related to its compliance with the treaty.453
Use of cluster munition and incendiary weapons
The Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor noted in August 2019 that ‘all of the country’s 14
governorates except Tartus have experienced the use of cluster munitions since 2012’. Since 2012,
the International Campaign to Ban Landmines recorded 686 cluster munitions attacks in Syria.454
Between 2010-2019, the same source documented 3 575 casualties from cluster munition attacks andcluster munition remnants in Syria, which ranked as the country with most such casualties in eachyear since 2012. In 2019, Syria incurred 232 casualties from cluster munitions, accounting for 81 % ofsuch casualties documented globally.455
The Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor recorded at least 11 cluster munition attacks between
1 August 2019 and 31 July 2020 and received information on at least two dozen other unverified
attacks in the same period. Most cluster munitions attacks were recorded in Idlib and Aleppo
governorates.456 Human Rights Watch investigated cluster munition attacks on schools in Idlib
governorate, carried out in January457 and February 2020458, which resulted in civilian casualties.

446 New York Times (The), U.S. Says Syria Has Used Chemical Weapons at Least 50 Times During War, 13 April 2018, url
447 OPCW, Summary of the Activities Carried Out by the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission to Syria, 10 October 2018, url, p. 4
448 GPPI, Nowhere to Hide. The Logic of Chemical Weapons Use in Syria, February 2019, url, pp. 3, 5
449 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/46/54], 21 January 2021, url, p. 8 paras 32
450 OPCW, Second Report by the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team Pursuant to Paragraph 10 of Decision C-SS4/Dec.3 “Addressing the threat from chemical weapons use” SARAQIB (Syrian Arab Republic) - 4 February 2018, 12 April
2021, url, p. 2
451 BBC News, Syria chemical attack: What we know, 24 September 2013, url; Washington Post (The), More than 1,400 killedin chemical weapons attack, U.S. says, 30 August 2013, url; Guardian (The), Syria conflict: chemical weapons blamed as
hundreds reported killed, 22 August 2013, url
452 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/46/54], 21 January 2021, url, p. 4
453 OPCW, Report by the Director-General. Progress on the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme, 24
November 2020, url, p. 3 para. 11.
454 International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Cluster Munition Monitor 2020, url, p. 16
455 International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Cluster Munition Monitor 2020, url, p. 53
456 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, Syria. Cluster Munition Ban Policy, 24 November 2020, url
457 HRW, Syria: Cluster Munition Attack on School, 22 January 2020, url
458 HRW, “Targeting Life in Idlib”; Syrian and Russian Strikes on Civilian Infrastructure, October 2020, url, pp. 115-116

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Further information on the use of cluster munitions and incendiary weapons in Syria in previous years
is available in the EASO COI Report: Syria – Security situation (May 2020).

1.6.2 Security incidents
The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) collects data on violent incidents in Syria,
coding each incident with the time and place, type of violent incident, the parties involved and thenumber of fatalities. The information is collected in a database that is openly accessible, searchable
and kept continuously up to date. The data primarily come from secondary sources such as media
reports, but also from reports by international institutions and non-governmental organisations anddata provided by local partners of ACLED.459 On Syria, ACLED incorporates data from a number ofpartners, including the Syrian Network for Human Rights, Airwars, the Carter Center, LiveUamap, Syria
Direct, Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), the London School of Economics’ Conflict andCivil Society Research Unit, the International Security and Development Center and Clingendael
Institute.460
ACLED codes security incidents as follows:
•

•
•

•
•
•

Battles: violent clashes between at least two armed groups. Battles can occur between armed
and organised state, non-state, and external groups, and in any combination therein. Subevents of battles are armed clashes, government regains territory and non-state actor
overtakes territory.
Violence against civilians: violent events where an organised armed group deliberately inflicts
violence upon unarmed non-combatants. It includes violent attacks on unarmed civilians suchas sexual violence, attacks, abduction/forced disappearance.
Explosions/remote violence: events where an explosion, bomb or other explosive device wasused to engage in conflict. They include one-sided violent events in which the tool for
engaging in conflict creates asymmetry by taking away the ability of the target to engage ordefend themselves and their location. They include air/drone strikes, suicide bombs,
shelling/artillery/missile attack, remote explosive/landmine/IED, grenade, chemical weapon.
Riots: are a violent demonstration, often involving a spontaneous action by unorganised,unaffiliated members of society. They include violent demonstration, mob violence.
Protests: public demonstration in which the participants do not engage in violence, thoughviolence may be used against them. It includes peaceful protests, protest with intervention,
excessive force against protesters.
Strategic developments: information regarding the activities of violent groups that is not itself
recorded as political violence, yet may trigger future events or contribute to political dynamics
within and across states. It includes agreements, change to group/activity, non-violent
transfer of territory, arrests.461

For the purpose of this report only the following type of events were included in the analysis: battles,
explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians. A country overview of the data on riots andprotests is also provided separately (see Section Protests and riots).
EASO used the publicly available ACLED curated dataset for Middle East (9 April 2021) for security
incidents figures, graphs and maps.462

459 ACLED, Methodology, April 2019, url; ACLED, FAQ ACLED Sourcing Methodology, February 2020, url
460 ACLED, Syria Partner Network, April 2019, url
461 ACLED, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Codebook, October 2017, url, pp. 7-14
462 ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (9 April 2021), url

50Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

According to the aforementioned ACLED dataset463, between 1 January 2020 and 31 March 2021
there were 12 565 security incidents recorded in Syria: 3 036 were coded as battles, 7 653 as
explosions/remote violence, and 1 876 as violence against civilians. Most security incidents wererecorded in Idlib (3 982), Aleppo (2 405) and Deir Ez-Zor (1 322) governorates. The lowest security
incidents figures were recorded in Quneitra (56), Damascus (41) and Tartous (1) governorates. As per
Figure 1 below, the highest total number of security events coded battles, explosions/remote violenceand violence against civilians throughout the reference period, was recorded between January andMarch 2020 and between November 2020 and February 2021.

Figure 1. Evolution of security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians between
1 January 2020 and 31 March 2021, based on ACLED data464

Figure 2 below provides a heatmap of the most affected areas in Syria by security events coded
battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilian during the reference period for thisreport.

Figure 2. Heatmap of security events (coded battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians) occurrences
between 1 January 2020 and 31 March 2021 based on ACLED data465

463 ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (9 April 2021), url
464 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (9 April 2021), url
465 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (9 April 2021), url

51

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Battles
Battles (armed clashes) is the category with the second most registered security incidents. During thereference period, there were 3 036 battles recorded by ACLED, an average of 202 battles/month. Most
battles were recorded in the governorates of Idlib (641) followed by Aleppo (601), Deir Ez-Zor (422)and Hasaka (369). No battles were recorded In Tartous governorate, while other governorate with
low number of battles were Damascus (3), Quneitra (19) and Sweida (22). As per Figure 3, most battles
were documented between January and March 2020, while the lowest numbers were recorded
between March and July 2020.466

Figure 3. Evolution of ‘battles’ events between 1 January 2020 and 31 March 2021 based on ACLED data467

Explosions/remote violence
Explosions/remote violence, which includes explosive devices, artillery fire and air strikes, is thecategory with the highest number of individual incidents by far with 7 653 incidents recorded by
ACLED between 1 January 2020 and 31 March 2021. The largest number of explosions/remoteviolence was registered in Idlib (3 213), followed by Aleppo (1 556) and Hama (736) governorates. No
explosions/remote violence were recorded in Tartous governorate, while other governorates with low
number of explosions/remote violence were Sweida (6), Damascus (13) and Quneitra (35).
As per Figure 4, figures were particularly high between January and March 2020, while the lowest
numbers were recorded between March and July 2020.

Figure 4. Evolution of ‘explosions/remote violence’ events between 1 January 2020 and 31 March 2021 based on ACLED
data468

Violence against civilians
The third largest category of incidents is violence against civilians with 1 876 incidents recorded by
ACLED between 1 January 2020 and 31 March 2021, an average of 124 incidents/month. Most

466 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (9 April 2021), url
467 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (9 April 2021), url
468 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (9 April 2021), url

52

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

incidents during the year were recorded in Deir Ez-Zor (434), Hasaka (376), Aleppo (248) and Dar’a(233) governorates. The lowest number of incidents were recorded in Tartous and Latakia (1 each)and Quneitra (2) governorates.
As per Figure 5, the highest number of incidents of violence against civilians were recorded at the endof September 2020 and then again between end of December 2020 and March 2021. The lowest
number of incidents was recorded between January and March 2020.

Figure 5. Evolution of ‘violence against civilians’ events between 1 January 2020 and 31 March 2021 based on ACLED data469

Protests and riots
According to ACLED data, between 1 January 2020 and 31 March 2021 there were 563 protests and64 riots. Most protests took place in Idlib (137), Deir Ez-Zor (106) and Hasaka (95) governorates. The
largest number of riots were recorded in the governorates of Deir Ez-Zor (17) followed by Hasaka (14)and Dar’a (12). As per Figure 6, most protest and riots were recorded in June-July 2020, November
2020 and March 2021.

Figure 6. Evolution of ‘protests’ and ‘riots’ events between 1 January 2020 and 31 March 2021 based on ACLED data470

Figure 7 below provides a heatmap of the most affected areas in Syria by protests and riots during thereference period for this report.

469 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (9 April 2021), url
470 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (9 April 2021), url

53Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Figure 7. Heatmap of riots and protests occurrences in between 1 January 2020 and 31 March 2021 based on ACLED data471

1.6.3 Civilian fatalities
Many international monitoring groups have given up on providing detailed estimates of the numberof fatalities because of the complexity of the situation and lack of access to first-hand information.472
The UN stopped publishing statistics on conflict-related deaths in 2014, stating that it was no longer
possible to arrive at accurate figures. The final estimate from 2016, partly based on UN’s own statistics
from 2014, was 400 000.473 In July 2019, Michelle Bachelet, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
stated that ‘several hundreds of thousands of children, women and men have been killed in Syria since2011 […] So many that it is no longer even possible to give a credible estimate.’474 Currently, mostinternational experts state that the number of fatalities in Syria since the war broke out in 2011 until
the present is somewhere around 500 000 or higher, but indicate that these are very roughestimates.475
There are several Syrian organisations that still attempt to keep count; however, the figures vary
between organisations. This is related to the fact that these organisations have varying methods,
ground presence, and access to information.476
In 2020, SNHR recorded 1 734 civilian fatalities, a drop by 48 % from 2019.477 VDC recorded 1 906
civilian fatalities in 2020, a decrease by 32 % compared to 2019.478 Other organisations documenting
civilian casualties in Syria had comparable figures for 2020. The Syrian Human Rights Committee(SHRC) recorded 1 750 civilian fatalities in 2020, although it does not provide information on theirresearch methodology.479

471 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (9 April 2021), url
472 New York Times (The), How Syria’s death toll is lost in the fog of war, 13 April 2018, url
473 Al Jazeera, Syria death toll: UN envoy estimates 400,000 killed, 23 April 2016, url
474 UN News, UN human rights chief fears world has grown numb to Syrian carnage, 26 July 2019, url
475 SOHR, More than 570 thousand people were killed on the Syrian territory within 8 years of revolution demanding

freedom, democracy, justice, and equality, 15 March 2019, url; New York Times (The), How Syria’s death toll is lost in the fogof war, 13 April 2018, url; USIP, The Current Situation in Syria, 26 August 2020, url; SOHR, On International Human Rights
Day: Millions of Syrians robbed of “rights” and 593 thousand killed in a decade, 9 December 2020, url; BBC News, Why has
the Syrian war lasted 10 years?, 12 March 2021, url
476 New Humanitarian (The), Counting under fire: the untold story of Syria’s casualty data, 27 October 2015, url; New Arab
(The), Will we ever really know how many people have died in Syria since 2011?, 28 January 2020, url
477 SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 1,734 Civilians in Syria in 2020, including 99 in December, 1 January 2021,
url, pp. 7-8
478 Data shared by VDC with EASO. Available in Error! Reference source not found.
479 SHRC, SHRC documents the killing of 1,750 people in 2020, 2 January 2021, url

54

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Month
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
AugustSeptember
OctoberNovember
December
Total

OHCHR
20204801035

SNHR
2020481
286
276
145
78
125
96
107
122
102
126
172
99
1734

VDC
2020482
320
339
178
150
121
94
130
132
96
141
131
74
1906

SHRC
2020483
320
277
161
110
90
174
110
115
81
141
94
77
1750

SNHR
2021484
113
138
177

VDC
2021485
126
125
153

SHRC
2021486
107
146
135

428

404

388

Figure 8. Civilian fatalities in 2020 and first three months of 2021. Monthly breakdown based on SNHR, SHRC (only for 2020)
and VDC data

OHCHR documented 2 059 documented civilian casualties in 2020 (1 035 deaths and 1 059 injured), a
15 % decrease from 2019.487 More than half of casualties recorded by OHCHR in 2020 were children,

480 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview. Syrian Arab Republic, March 2021, url, p. 12481 SNHR, 286 Civilians, including Four Medical and Civil Defense Personnel, Documented Killed in Syria in January 2020, 1

February 2020, url, p. 8; SNHR, 276 Civilians, including Six Medical Personnel and Two Media Workers, Documented Killed in
Syria in February 2020, 1 March 2020, url, p. 8; SNHR, 145 Civilians, including Two Medical Personnel, Documented Killed in
Syria in March 2020, 1 April 2020, url, p. 9; SNHR, 78 Civilians, including One Media Workers, Documented Killed in Syria in
April 2020, 1 May 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, 125 Civilians Documented Killed in Syria in May 2020, including Eight Who Died Dueto Torture and One Massacre, 1 June 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, 1,006 Civilians, including three Media Workers and 12 Medical
and Civil Defense Personnel, Documented Killed in Syria in the First Half of 2020, 1 July 2020, url, p. 16; SNHR, 107 Civilians,
including 26 Children and 11 Women, Documented Killed in Syria in July 2020, 2 August 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, 122 Civilians,
including 21 Children and Seven Women, Documented Killed in Syria in August 2020, 1 September 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR,
Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 102 Civilians, including 15 Children, 10 Women, Three Medical Personnel and 12
Victims Due to Torture, 1 October 2020, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 126 Civilians, including 18
Children, Eight Women, One Media Worker and 10 Victims Due to Torture, 1 November 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, Extrajudicial
Killing Claims the Lives of 172 Civilians, including 16 Children, 11 Women, and 30 Victims Due to Torture, 1 December 2020,
url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 1,734 Civilians in Syria in 2020, including 99 in December, 1 January
2021, url, p. 14
482 Data shared by VDC with EASO. Available inError! Reference source not found.Annex I: VDC Casualty data
483 SHRC, SHRC documents the killing of 1,750 people in 2020, 2 January 2021, url
484 Data only for January, February, and March 2021. SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 113 Civilians, Including 36
Children, Six Women, and Three Victims Due to Torture, in January 2021, 1 February 2021, url, p. 7; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing
Claims the Lives of 138 Civilians, Including 23 Children, 11 Women, and 14 Victims Due to Torture, in February 2021, 1 March
2021, url, p. 8; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 177 Civilians, Including 28 Children, 35 Women, One Medical
Worker, and 9 Victims Due to Torture, in March 2021, 1 April 2021, url, p. 7
485 Data only for January, February, and March 2021. Data shared by VDC with EASO. Available in Error! Reference source n
ot found.
486 SHRC, SHRC documents 107 victims in January 2021, 2 February 2021, url; SHRC, SHRC documents the killing of 146 people
in February, 2 March 2021, url; SHRC, SHRC documents the killing of 135 people in March 2021, 1 April 2021, url
487 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview. Syrian Arab Republic, March 2021, url, p. 12; Figures provided by OHCHR to
UNOCHA. OHCHR provided the following disclaimer: ‘Civilian casualties and incidents included are not comprehensive but
rather reflect what OHCHR could verify to reflect human rights concerns, patterns and the impact of the armed conflict andviolence on civilians in Syria. Actual civilian casualties could be higher’. See p. 100

55

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

while 25 % were victims of unexploded ordnance.488 For the period between 1 December 2019 and
31 March 2021, OHCHR recorded 3 028 civilian casualties (1 372 deaths and 1 656 injured).489
In the first three months of 2021, VDC and SNHR recorded 404 and 428 civilian fatalities, respectively(see Figure 9).
Civilian fatalities bygovernorate
Damascus
Rural Damascus
Idlib
Deir Ez-Zor
Aleppo
Dar'a
Hama
Homs
HasakaRaqqa
QuneitraSweidaLatakia
Tartous
Unknown
Total

VDC
2020490
100
51
419
207
446
202
35
44
125
140
3
58
2
3
71
1906

SNHR
2020491
8
28
472
301
402
217
54
14
118
106
3
8
3
1734

VDC
2021492
13
19
37
62
73
51
48
9
56
17
2
12
5
404

SNHR
2021493
1
3
61
59
104
44
63
10
73
16
2
2
428

488 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview. Syrian Arab Republic, March 2021, url, p. 12
489 Figures based on total number of civilian fatalities and injuries reported by OHCHR to the UN Security Council between 1

December 2019 and 31 March 2021. UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165
(2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020); Report of theSecretary-General [S/2020/141], 21 February 2020, url, p. 5; UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council
resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and
2504 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2020/327], 23 April 2020, url, p. 4; UN Security Council, Implementation of
Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018),
2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2020/576], 24 June 2020, url, p. 4; UN Security Council,
Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393
(2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2020/813], 20 August
2020, url, p. 5; UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014),
2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the SecretaryGeneral [S/2020/1031], 14 October 2020, url, p. 5; UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139
(2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533
(2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2020/1195], 11 December 2020, url, p. 5; UN Security Council, Implementationof Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018),
2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2021/160], 18 February 2021, url, p. 5; UN
Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332
(2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2021/390],
22 April 2021, url, p. 2
490 Data shared by VDC with EASO. Available in Annex I: VDC Casualty data
491 SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 1,734 Civilians in Syria in 2020, including 99 in December, 1 January 2021,
url, p. 12
492 Data only for January, February and March 2021. Data shared by VDC with EASO. Available in Annex I: VDC Casualty data
493 SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 113 Civilians, Including 36 Children, Six Women, and Three Victims Due toTorture, in January 2021, 1 February 2021, url, p. 7; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 138 Civilians, Including 23
Children, 11 Women, and 14 Victims Due to Torture, in February 2021, 1 March 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing
Claims the Lives of 177 Civilians, Including 28 Children, 35 Women, One Medical Worker, and 9 Victims Due to Torture, inMarch 2021, 1 April 2021, url, p. 7

56

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Figure 9. Civilian fatalities in 2020 and first three months of 2021 based on SNHR and VDC data. Monthly breakdown bygovernorate

VDC and SNHR also provide a monthly breakdown of civilian fatalities by the governorate in which
they occurred (see Figure 9). Most civilian casualties 2020 were recorded by the two sources in thegovernorates of Idlib, Aleppo, Deir Ez-Zor and Dar’a. Around 54 % of all civilian casualties documented
by SNHR and 47 % of those documented by VDC in 2020 were recorded in governorates where antiGoS armed groups retained some territorial control: Idlib, Aleppo, Hama and Latakia. For both SNHR
and VDC, the lowest number of civilian fatalities in 2020 were recorded in Tartous, Latakia andQuneitra governorates.s
Variations between the data provided by SNHR and VDC are clearly visible on some provinces: Idlib
governorate ranks first in terms of number of civilian fatalities in SNHR reporting, while the highest
number of civilian fatalities recorded by VDC in 2020 was in Aleppo governorate, followed closely by
Idlib. Significant discrepancies in the number of civilian fatalities reported are particularly visible inthe case of Damascus and Sweida governorates, with a significant higher number of civilian deaths
reported by VDC (100 for Damascus and 58 for Sweida) than those reported by SNHR (8 for Damascus
and 8 for Sweida). Variations in the figures are mainly related to differences in each organisation’s
methodology regarding the collection of data, cause of death included in the analysis, as well asvarying presence and access to information in different parts of the country.494

1.6.4 Humanitarian situation
Syria is estimated to have a population between 20.3495 and 22.1 million.496 UNOCHA assessed that asof January 2021, 13.4 million persons were in need497 of humanitarian and protection assistance inSyria, with 6 million having acute needs (a 20 % increase from 2020).498 The majority of persons inneed as assessed by UNOCHA live in Aleppo (around 2.7 million), Idlib (around 2.2 million), Rural
Damascus (around 2 million) and Damascus (around 1.1 million) governorates.499
A combination of factors, including the financial crisis in neighbouring Lebanon, international
economic sanctions500, and the COVID-19 pandemic501 contributed to a significant worsening of socioeconomic conditions in Syria during the reference period.502 The economic situation has also
contributed to a rapid deterioration of humanitarian conditions in Syria.503 Around 12.4 million Syrians

494 EASO email correspondence with VDC, 21 April 2021; See also section on Sources on civilian casualties for more

information
495 CIA, World Factbook, Syria, updated 17 April 2021, url
496 Syria, Central Bureau of Statistics, Estimate of the population in Syria by governorates, url
497 According to UNOCHA, People in Need (PIN) refers to ‘people whose physical security, basic rights, dignity, living
conditions or livelihoods are threatened or have been disrupted, and whose current level of access to basic services, goods
and protection is inadequate to re-establish normal living conditions within their accustomed means without assistance.
People in acute need refers to those facing more severe forms of deprivation in terms of their security, basic rights and living
conditions and face life-threatening needs requiring urgent humanitarian assistance’. UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs
Overview 2019 – Syrian Arab Republic, March 2019, url, pp. 5, 8
498 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic. 2021 Needs and Response Summary, 22 February 2021, url, p. 2
499 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic. 2021 Needs and Response Summary, 22 February 2021, url, p. 3
500 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/46/54], 21 January 2021, url, pp. 9-10
501 Daher, J., State Institutions and Regime Networks as Service Providers in Syria, EUI, June 2020, url, p. 2; WFP, The Socioeconomic Impacts of the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Syrian Arab Republic, October 2020, url, pp. 4, 14, 21, 35, 52; Said, S.,
The COVID-19 and the Syrian Economy – Implications for Social Justice, FES, July 2020, url, pp. 2-3
502 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/46/54], 21 January 2021, url, pp. 9-10; HRW, World Report 2021 - Syria, 13 January 2021, url
503 UNOCHA/WHO, COVID-19 Humanitarian Update No. 22, 1 February 2021, url, p. 3

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

were estimated to be food insecure at the beginning of 2021504, an increase from 9.4 million reported
in mid-2020.505 Around 2 million people are estimated to live in extreme poverty.506
As of 16 March 2021, there were 16 656 COVID-19 cases reported in GoS-held areas, the majority
being recorded in Damascus, Latakia and Aleppo. In areas outside GoS control there were an
additional 8 743 COVID-19 cases reported in north-east Syria, and 21 072 cases in north-west Syria.
The Syrian Ministry of Health reported 1 110 fatalities since the start of the pandemic in GoS-heldareas.507 UNOHCA assessed that only 58 % of hospitals and 53 % of primary health care centres in Syria
were entirely functional.508
As of July 2020, only one international border crossing - the Baba al Hawa509- was still authorised fora period of 12 months to deliver humanitarian aid out of the four crossings established by the UN
Security Council resolution 2165 (2014).510 This decision came after in January 2020, the UN Security
Council prolonged delivery of cross-border UN humanitarian aid for a period of six months throughtwo of four border crossings - the Bab al Salam and Bab al Hawa crossings between Turkey and northwest Syria.511
Donors pledged EUR 5.3 billion towards humanitarian relief efforts for Syria in 2021-2022 at theBrussels V Conference512 - a decrease on last year’s commitments and only around half the funds
needed.513
Further information on the socio-economic and humanitarian situation is available in the EASO COI
Report: Syria – Socio-economic situation in Damascus city (April 2021).

1.6.5 Displacement and return
UNHCR estimates that the conflict had driven some 5.6 million Syrian refugees out of the country by
April 2021.514 The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) stated in a March 2021 report that there are an
estimated 6.5 million IDPs in Syria, 70 % of which have been displaced for over five years.515
In 2020, a total of 1 822 000 IDP movements were recorded by UNOCHA across Syria, of which 73 %were movements within the same governorate. Most IDP movements took place in the governoratesof Idlib (1 070 000 IDP movements from or within the governorate, 1 030 000 IDP movements to orwithin the governorate and 821 000 IDP movements within the governorate), Aleppo (690 000 IDP
movements from or within the governorate, 726 000 IDP movements to or within the governorate
and 475 000 IDP movements within the governorate), Hasaka (11 000 IDP movements from or within
the governorate, 15 000 IDP movements to or within the governorate and 9 000 IDP movements
within the governorate) and Deir Ez-Zor (11 000 IDP movements from or within the governorate,
15 000 IDP movements to or within the governorate and 10 000 IDP movements within thegovernorate). The lowest number of IDP movements were registered in the governorates of Sweida
504 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic. 2021 Needs and Response Summary, 22 February 2021, url, p. 2
505 NRC, The Darkest Decade What displaced Syrians face if the world continues to fail them, March 2021, url, p. 8
506 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic. 2021 Needs and Response Summary, 22 February 2021, url, p. 2
507 UNOCHA/WHO, Syrian Arab Republic: COVID-19 Response Update No. 16 - 18 March 2021, 18 March 2021, url, p. 1
508 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic. 2021 Needs and Response Summary, 22 February 2021, url, p. 2
509 UN Security Council, Limited Cross-Border Access into North-West Syria Placing Strain on Humanitarians to Reach Manyin Need, Aid Worker Tells Security Council, 29 July 2020, url
510 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/46/54], 21 January 2021, url, p. 4
511 UN News, Security Council beats midnight deadline, renews Syria cross-border aid in contentious vote, 10 January 2020,
url
512 UNOCHA, Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region - Brussels V Conference, 29 - 30 March, 2021 - Co-chair's
Statement Annex: Fundraising, 30 March 2021, url
513 UNHCR, United Nations Chiefs urge donors to support record appeals for Syrians and the region, 29 March 2021, url
514 UNHCR, Syria Regional Refugee Response, data updated on 7 April 2021, url
515 NRC, The Darkest Decade What displaced Syrians face if the world continues to fail them, March 2021, url, p. 7

58

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation(1 000 IDP movements from or within the governorate, of which 998 were IDP movements within thegovernorate), Rural Damascus (3 000 IDP movements from or within governorate, of which 323 weremovements within the governorate) and Dar’a (1 000 IDP movements which took place within thegovernorate).516
UNOCHA provides a full breakdown of the total IDP movements by governorate for 2020 (seeFigure 10):Figure 10. © UNOCHA, IDP movements by governorate in 2020517

In February 2020 it was estimated that around 900 000 people, the majority women and children,
have been displaced since December 2019 by the hostilities in the Idlib area.518 In February 2020,
UNICEF estimated that more than 500 000 children have been displaced by the conflict in north-west
Syria since 1 December 2019. Tens of thousands of children and their families were reported to live intents and in open air.519 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) described the situation
in Idlib as ‘the worst wave of displacement we’ve seen during the Syrian conflict. Amid the harsh
winter conditions in Idlib, we see people trapped, isolated and running out of ways to cope.’520 Since
March 2020, the number of IDP movements has significantly decreased.521
For the period after the ceasefire that followed the Idlib offensive (March to December 2020), over
600 000 displacements were recorded in Idlib and Aleppo governorates alone. Furthermore, 65 % of
516 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic. IDP Movements Overview, Jan – Dec 2020, 16 February 2021, url
517 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic. IDP Movements Overview, Jan – Dec 2020, 16 February 2021, url
518 UN News, UN chief appeals for end to Syria’s ‘man-made humanitarian nightmare’, 21 February 2020, url
519 UNICEF, Over half a million children in northwest Syria forced to flee amid continued violence and harsh weather, 18

February 2020, url
520 ICRC, Syria: Civilians in urgent need of safety and life-saving assistance amidst unprecedented displacement, 25 February
2020, url
521 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview. Syrian Arab Republic, March 2021, url, pp. 14-15

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

those displaced in 2020 were due to security concerns while around 20 % claimed economic
reasons.522 NRC assessed that ’the ceasefire has largely held for much of 2020, but localised insecurity
and fighting between groups and parties to the conflict still caused some displacement.’523
In January and February 2021, around 63 000 IDP movements were recorded across Syria, the majority
occurring in north-west Syria, particularly in Idlib and Aleppo governorates. Most IDP movements
recorded in this timeframe took placed within the respective governorate.524 In March 2021, around40 000 IDP movements took place, 94 % of which took place within Idlib and Aleppo governorates.525
As of March 2021, there were around 2.7 million IDPs in north-west Syria, of which 1.6 million were
living in 1 379 IDP camps/sites.526 IOM assessed that around 220 000 persons living in north-west Syria
are at ‘immediate risk of displacement’.527
In terms of IDP spontaneous returns in 2020, UNOCHA recorded a total of 448 000 total spontaneous
returns, 75 % of which were returns within the governorate. The highest number of IDP return
movements took place in the governorates of Idlib (207 000 IDP return movements from or within thegovernorate, 235 000 IDP return movements to or within governorate and 178 000 IDP return
movements within governorate), Aleppo (145 000 IDP return movements from or within thegovernorate, 128 000 IDP return movements to or within the governorate and 101 000 IDP return
movements within governorate) and Hama (21 000 IDP return movements from or within thegovernorate, 15 000 IDP return movements to or within the governorate and 12 000 IDP return
movements within governorate). The lowest number of IDP returns was recorded in Sweida (833 IDP
return movements from or within the governorate of which 50 were within the governorate), Quneitra(1 000 IDP return movements from or within the governorate) and Tartous (1 000 IDP return
movements from or within governorate).528
UNOCHA provides a full breakdown of the total IDP spontaneous return movements by governoratefor 2019 (see Figure 11):522 NRC, The Darkest Decade What displaced Syrians face if the world continues to fail them, March 2021, url, p. 8
523 NRC, The Darkest Decade What displaced Syrians face if the world continues to fail them, March 2021, url, p. 9524 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, IDP Movements. January 2021, 2 March 2021, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, IDP

Movements. February 2021, 1 April 2021, url
525 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, IDP Movements. March 2021, 12 May 2021, url
526 UNOCHA, Recent Developments in Northwest Syria - Situation Report No. 26 - As of 26 March 2021, 26 March 2021, url,
p. 1
527 IOM, Syria Crisis. IOM Consolidated Appeal 2021, 15 March 2021, url, p. 3
528 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic. IDP Spontaneous Returns Stock and Flow Data, Jan – Dec, 2019, url

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Figure 11. © spontaneous IDP return movements by governorate in 2020529

Around 50 % of the total IDP return movements recorded in 2020 took place between March and May.
Of those returns, 94 % took place in Idlib and Aleppo governorates, indicating that the March 2020
ceasefire was an important factor influencing the return movements.530 In an analysis concerning thefirst half of 2020, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) assessed that more than
200 000 persons who were displaced by the GoS offensive in north-west Syria, returned between
March and July 2020. The infrastructure damage in many areas of return made them uninhabitable in
IDMC’s assessment.531
In January and February 2021, around 23 000 return movements were recorded across Syria, themajority occurring in north-west Syria, particularly in Idlib, Aleppo and Hama governorates. Most
return movements recorded in this timeframe took placed within the governorate.532 In March 2021,
around 23 000 IDP return movements took place, 35 % of which took place within Idlib and Aleppo
governorates. Quneitra governorate recorded the highest number of returns in March 2021, recording
8 200 spontaneous returns.533

529 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Spontaneous IDP Returnee Movements Overview, Jan - Dec 2020, 16 February 2021, url
530 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, March 2021, url, p. 16
531 IDMC, Internal displacement 2020: Mid-year update, 2020, url, p. 19
532 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic. IDP Spontaneous Returns. January 2021, 2 March 2021, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab

Republic. IDP Spontaneous Returns. February 2021, 1 April 2021, url
533 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic. IDP Spontaneous Returns. March 2021, 12 May 2021, url

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

2. Governorate-level description of the
security situation
2.1 Idlib governorate

Map 5: © MapAction, Idlib governorate534

534 MapAction, Idleb governorate, 29 July 2016, url

62Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

2.1.1 General description of the governorate
Idlib is located in north-west Syria, bordering Turkey to the north, Hama governorate to the south,
Aleppo governorate to the east, and Latakia governorate to the west. The governorate is divided into
five districts: Idlib, Ariha, Jisr-Ash-Shugur, Harim and Al Mara.535
Idlib city is the capital of the governorate and in 2011 had a population of over 2 million inhabitants.
The city is located on the strategic road between Aleppo and Damascus governorates and is also a‘cross border operation point from Turkey, through the Bab Al Hawa crossing’.536 Bab Al Hawa is the
only UN authorised border crossing in Syria open to humanitarian aid as per Security Council
Resolution 2533 (2020).537
The Syrian Central Bureau of Statistics estimated the population of Idlib governorate to be of
1 130 000 as of 2019.538 In 2019, other sources estimated that the province [governorate] andsurrounding areas was home to nearly 3 million people539, including original residents, fighters and
IDPs from other areas.540 In mid-2020, IDMC reported that approximately 70 % of the 2.8 million
population of Idlib were IDPs.541 In a March 2021 report, UNOCHA estimated the population of Idlib
governorate to be of 2 691 361.542
Arabs constitute the main ethnic group, with a Turkmen minority concentrated in the north-westernpart of the governorate, close to the border with Turkey.543 The majority of the population is Sunni.544
Shia Muslims were reported to reside in rural areas of Idlib and some Christians in Jisr al-Shughur
area.545 During the conflict, Shia settlements in the governorate came under attack by anti-GoS armed
groups. In the case of the predominantly Shia towns of Fuah and Kafriya, part of the population was
evacuated in 2017 to areas under GoS control following the so-called ‘Four Towns Agreement’, which
saw a population exchange agreed between GoS and anti-GoS armed groups.546
The Druze had a presence in Jabal Al-Summaq but reportedly ‘suffered persecution under the then alQaeda-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra (Nusra Front)’ and as of January 2019 were reported to have been
forced to flee en masse as a result.547 Most Christians and Druze from Idlib governorate left the areaout of fear of being forced to convert to Islam, follow dress codes or having freedom of movement
restricted on women.548

535 UNOCHA, Idleb Governorate Profile, August 2014, url, p. 22
536 REACH, Syria, Syrian Cities Damage Atlas, 16 March 2019, url, pp. 45-46
537 UN Security Council, Report by the UN Secretary-General on political, humanitarian and security-related developments

in December 2020 and January 2021, 18 February 2021, url; USDOS, Attacks on Civilians in Syria, Press Statement, 22 March
2021, url
538 Syria, Central Bureau of Statistics, Estimate of the population in Syria by governorates, n.d., url
539 Mercy Corps, 44 Syrian and International NGOs Call for Immediate End to Attacks on Civilians and Hospitals in Idlib, Syria,
24 May 2019, url; RI, Losing Their Last Refuge; Inside Idlib's humanitarian nightmare, September 2019, url, p. 4
540 International Crisis Group, The Best of Bad Options for Syria’s Idlib, 14 March 2019, url, pp. 1, 6; Syria Study Group, Final
Report and Recommendations, USIP, 24 September 2019, url, p. 27
541 IDMC, Internal displacement 2020: Mid-year update, 23 September 2020, url, p. 19
542 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview. Syrian Arab Republic, March 2021, url, p. 23
543 Based on reading of Map 29. Ethnic divisions in northern Syria, Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, 2018, url, p.
52
544 ACAPS, Idleb – Governorate profile, June 2014, url, p. 1
545 USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report: Syria 2019, May 2020, url, pp. 4, 15
546 Arfeh, H., The institutionalization of demographic change in Syria, Atlantic Council, 4 April 2019, url; Reuters, Evacuations
from besieged Syrian towns end after two-day halt, 21 April 2017, url; AI, ‘We Leave or We Die’: Forced Displacement under
Syria’s ‘Reconciliation’ Agreements, 2017, url, pp. 60-61
547 Hage Ali, M., The Weaponization of Minorities in Syria and Beyond, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 9 January
2019, url; UN Human Rights Council, "I lost my dignity": Sexual and gender-based violence in the Syrian Arab Republic, 8March 2018, url, pp. 14-15
548 UN Human Rights Council, "I lost my dignity": Sexual and gender-based violence in the Syrian Arab Republic, 8 March
2018, url, p. 14

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Before the conflict Idlib was marginalised economically and politically549 and ranked as one of thepoorest parts of Syria in terms of income, health and education in 2014.550

2.1.2 Conflict background and armed actors
Idlib was among the first provinces to join the 2011 uprising against the Assad government.551 The AlQaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra started in 2014 to take over Idlib from local rebel groups.552 Control
over Idlib city fluctuated for several years between the GoS forces and anti-GoS armed groups, until
in 2015 anti-GoS armed groups managed to gain full control.553 Idlib became the refuge for Syrians
fleeing the GoS forces, including activists and fighters from areas recaptured by the SAA.554 Between
2016 and 2018, tens of thousands of opposition fighters and their families from southern Syria andHoms City, were transferred to Idlib after refusing the terms of the so-called reconciliation agreementswith GoS.555 The governorate has been a stronghold of jihadist militants including Al Qaeda.556
In April 2017, 83 people, including 28 children and 23 women, died in a sarin gas attack on the townof Khan Sheykhun in Idlib. Another 293 people were injured including 103 children, in this single
attack.557
Since May 2017, following an agreement between Russia, Iran and Turkey, Idlib became a ‘deescalation’ area, for which the cessation of hostilities and establishment of observation posts was
stipulated. It remained the only de-escalation zone in Syria which was not recaptured by the GoS.558
However, GoS forces continued military operations in the area, recapturing half of the de-escalation
area by mid-2018.559 In September 2018, a deal between Russia and Turkey reached at Sochi, createda demilitarised zone in parts of Idlib province.560 It also stipulated the removal of heavy weapons byarmed groups561 and of ‘radical terrorist groups’ from inside the demilitarised zone.562 Turkey
established 12 military observation posts around the demilitarised area to monitor the
implementation of the agreement563 while Russia and Iran set up their own observation points in the
GoS-controlled areas surrounding the de-escalation area.564 HTS rejected the agreement and attacked
Turkish-backed rebel groups, thereby establishing more control over the Idlib area. This caused the
GoS to intervene militarily, supported by Russia and by April 2019, the Sochi agreement hadcollapsed.565 At the same time, the GoS was seeking control over the M5 highway, a major commercial

549 International Crisis Group, The Best of Bad Options for Syria’s Idlib, 14 March 2019, url, p. 1
550 ACAPS, Idleb – Governorate profile, June 2014, url, p. 1
551 International Crisis Group, The Best of Bad Options for Syria’s Idlib, 14 March 2019, url, p. 1; ACAPS, Idleb – Governorate

profile, June 2014, url, p. 4552 International Crisis Group, The Best of Bad Options for Syria’s Idlib, 14 March 2019, url, p. 1
553 REACH, Syria, Syrian Cities Damage Atlas, 16 March 2019, url, pp. 45-46; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, Flash Update 2.
Situation in Idleb, 30 March 2015, url; US CRS, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, updated 27 July 2020,
url, p. 16
554 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War. Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, December 2018, url, p. 54
555 Carter Center (The), Special Report. Internal Conflict in Northwest Syria, | Sep 2018 – Aug 2019, url, p. 1
556 International Crisis Group, The Best of Bad Options for Syria’s Idlib, 14 March 2019, url, p. 1; New York Times (The), U.S.
Sees Rising Threat in the West From Qaeda Branch in Syria, 29 September 2019, url
557 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
21 January 2021, url, p. 5
558 RI, Losing Their Last Refuge; Inside Idlib's humanitarian nightmare, September 2019, url, p. 8; UN Human Rights Council,
Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 21 January 2021, url, p. 5
559 US CRS, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, 25 March 2019, url, p. 11
560 RI, Losing Their Last Refuge; Inside Idlib's humanitarian nightmare, September 2019, url, p. 4
561 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/40/70], 31 January 2019, url, p. 5
562 International Crisis Group, The Best of Bad Options for Syria’s Idlib, 14 March 2019, url, p. i
563 Carter Center (The), Special Report. Internal Conflict in Northwest Syria, | Sep 2018 – Aug 2019, url, pp. 1-2
564 International Crisis Group, The Best of Bad Options for Syria’s Idlib, 14 March 2019, url, p. 3
565 RI, Losing Their Last Refuge; Inside Idlib's humanitarian nightmare, September 2019, url, p. 464

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situationroute running through Idlib and Aleppo governorates, linking Aleppo to Damascus and the south ofthe country.566 In August 2019, Syrian government forces recaptured the town of Khan Sheikhun insouthern Idlib area, forcing HTS to retreat. Khan Sheikhun’s position on the main road linking Idlib city
to Hama made it particularly important to the area.567 At the end of August 2019, Syrian government
forces recaptured Tamaniyah and other areas north of Khan Sheikhun.568 At the end of 2019 and in
Q1 2020, the GoS escalated the military operations in Idlib and further advanced its positions. This
offensive caused one of the worst displacement crises throughout the conflict (see Section 1.6.5).569

Map 6: © ISW, GoS campaign in the Idlib area 6 May 2019 – 7 February 2020570

566 Al Jazeera, The battle for Syria's Idlib explained in 400 words, 12 February 2020, url
567 Guardian (The), Rebels withdraw from key Syrian town as pro-Assad troops advance, 20 August 2019, url
568 Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary, 26 August – 1 September 2019, url, p. 2
569 US CRS, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, 12 February 2020, url, pp. 4, 16; UN Human Rights Council,

Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 21 January 2021, url, p. 6
570 ISW, Russia enables new Syria regime offensive in Idlib, 7 February 2020, url

65Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

During the offensive in 2019 and the beginning of 2020, civilian infrastructure was attacked anddestroyed including hospitals, markets, bakeries, schools and agricultural resources.571 Hundreds ofcivilians were killed, including women and children.572
Human Rights Watch described the April 2019-March 2020 military offensive by the GoS and theRussian forces as follows:‘The alliance launched dozens of air and ground attacks on civilian objects and infrastructure inviolation of the laws of war, striking homes, schools, healthcare facilities, and markets – theplaces where people live, work, and study. They used cluster munitions, incendiary weapons,
and improvised “barrel bombs” in populated areas to deadly effect. The attacks killed at least
1,600 civilians, destroyed and damaged civilian infrastructure, and forced the displacement ofan estimated 1.4 million people.’573
The Council on Foreign Relations described the situation as ‘the worst humanitarian crisis of Syria’snine-year war’.574
Anti-GoS armed groups
In January 2019, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) seized large areas of Idlib governorate following clashes
with rival armed groups575 and by August 2019 controlled over 90 % of Idlib governorate, alongsideadjacent parts of northern Hama and western Aleppo governorates.576 According to February 2020 US
estimates, HTS had between 7 000 to 10 000 fighters, or more577, whereas UN estimates of January
2020 were between 12 000 and 15 000 fighters.578 In February 2021, the UN estimated HTS had 10 000
fighters, mainly Syrians.579 HTS is sanctioned by the UN as a terrorist organisation.580
HTS became the dominant actor in the Idlib area.581 It also established an administrative body – theSalvation Government as a rival of the Syrian Interim Government.582 HTS controls the import anddistribution of fuel through a company called Watad Petroleum, ensuring earnings at approximately

571 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/42/51], 15 August 2019, url, p. 1; OHCHR, Increasing airstrike casualties in Syria being ignored – Bachelet, 26 July
2019, url; WHO, WHO deeply concerned about deteriorating health conditions in northwest Syria, 25 December 2019, url;
USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, October 1, 2019‒December 31,
2019, 4 February 2020, url, p. 10; International Crisis Group, The Eleventh Hour for Idlib, Syria’s Last Rebel Bastion, 6 February
2020, url, p. 1
572 OHCHR, Increasing airstrike casualties in Syria being ignored – Bachelet, 26 July 2019, url; UN Security Council,
Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393
(2017), 2401 (2018) and 2449 (2018), Report of the Secretary-General [S/2019/674], 21 August 2019, url, p. 1; UN News,
Vital Idlib aid deliveries resume after ‘heavy bombing’ – WFP, 14 February 2020, url
573 HRW, “Targeting Life in Idlib”, Syrian and Russian Strikes on Civilian Infrastructure, October 2020, url, p. 1
574 CFR, Can the World Alleviate Idlib’s Humanitarian Disaster Amid a Pandemic?, 6 April 2020, url
575 US CRS, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, 12 February 2020, url, p. 17
576 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/42/51], 15 August 2019, url, p. 9577 USDOS, Ambassador James Jeffrey On the Situation in Syria, 5 February 2020, url
578 UN Security Council, Letter dated 20 January 2020 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant toresolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida andassociated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council, 20 January 2020,
url, p. 7
579 UN Security Council, Twenty-seventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant
to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, 3 February 2021, url, p.
7580 UN Security Council, The List established and maintained pursuant to Security Council res. 1267/1989/2253, generated
on: 19 April 2021, url, p. 64
581 Lund, A., From Cold War to Civil War:75 Years of Russian-Syrian Relations, Swedish Institute of Internationals Affairs, July
2019, url, p. 35; BBC News, Syria war: Why does the battle for Idlib matter?, 18 February 2020, url
582 Clingendael, Strategies of Turkish proxy warfare in northern Syria, Back with a vengeance, November 2019, url, p. 13

66

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

USD 1 million per month. HTS reportedly also controls humanitarian aid and imposes taxes on local
businesses.583
According to Syria expert Aron Lund584, in 2018 the Idlib area was ‘governed by a patchwork of sharia
courts, local councils, exile government institutions, and direct rule by armed groups’.585 HTS’ andother groups’ courts imposed death sentences and were used to impose ‘draconian social structures’,
imposing religious dress codes disproportionately affecting women and girls, and also denying theirfreedom of movement without a male relative.586 The UN reported HTS ‘systematically imposed rules
and codes of conduct on civilians living in areas under its control that are fundamentally contrary tohuman rights, including the right to life, liberty and security of person, to freedom of movement, tofreedom of expression and to freedom of peaceful assembly and association. Through self-appointed
courts, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham members have inflicted harsh penalties and executed persons perceived
as critical of the rules or accused of affiliation with the Government.’ Furthermore, the UN reported
HTS seized property and houses.587
As of 11 April 2021, HTS was still the dominant group in the Idlib enclave, and continued to crack down
on defectors from its ranks and other armed opposition groups perceived as a threat to their control,
particularly Hurras al-Din (HAD)588, an Al Qaeda-linked group that split from HTS in 2018.589 The UN
estimated that, as of February 2021, HAD had between 2 000 and 2 500 fighters, although it was
weakened by leadership losses and overshadowed by HTS. HTS also regularly arrests ISIL fighters.590
Groups composed of mainly foreign fighters operate under the authority of HTS. One of these groups
is Khattab Al-Shishani Brigade (Chechen fighters)591, who claimed responsibility for attacks on the
Turkish-Russian joint patrols on the M4 highway in July and August 2020.592 Another such group is
Katiba al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (KTJ, Central Asian fighters).593
Other anti-GoS armed groups are predominantly Islamist groups, having different relations withTurkey594, and who ‘have an ambiguous or symbiotic relationship’ with HTS.595 The most importantones are the National Liberation Front (NLF) - a Turkish-backed alliance of opposition-armed groups596583 UN Security Council, Twenty-seventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant

to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, 3 February 2021, url, p.
7584 Aron Lund is fellow at the Century Foundation and guest researcher at the Stockholm International Peace ResearchInstitute (SIPRI). He has published widely on the Middle East-North Africa region, including three books about Syria. For more
information see url
585 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War: Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, December 2018, url, p. 53
586 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
21 January 2021, url, p. 12
587 UN Security Council, Report by the UN Secretary-General on political, humanitarian and security-related developments
in February and March 2020, 23 April 2020, url, pp. 4-5
588 Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary [storymap], 15 April 2021, url; Al-Monitor, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham intensifies
campaign against al-Qaeda affiliate in Idlib, 25 February 2021, url
589 Syria Study Group, Final Report and Recommendations, USIP, 24 September 2019, url, p. 22
590 UN Security Council, Twenty-seventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant
to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, 3 February 2021, url, p.
7591 UN Security Council, Twenty-seventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant
to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, 3 February 2021, url, p.
7592 Carter Center (the), The Russian-Turkish Joint Patrols in Idlib Governorate [interactive map], Syria Conflict Mapping, 17
February 2021, url
593 UN Security Council, Twenty-seventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant
to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, 3 February 2021, url, p.
7594 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War: Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, December 2018, url, p. 55
595 International Crisis Group, The Best of Bad Options for Syria’s Idlib, 14 March 2019, url, p. 17
596 International Crisis Group, The Best of Bad Options for Syria’s Idlib, 14 March 2019, url, p. 21; Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War:
Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, December 2018, url, p. 57

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

which merged with the SNA in October 2019597; and the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) - a UighurChinese-dominated jihadist militant faction present around the city of Jisr al-Shughour in western
Idlib.598 TIP is also called the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), and has 3 000 to 4 500
members.599 There were other smaller Islamist groups present in the Idlib area, including Ansar alTawhid, a splinter of Jabhat al-Nusra, that was active in around the towns of Saraqeb and Sarmin.600
Ansar Abu Bakr al Siddiq (AABS) is a relatively small group that pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda andactively opposes the presence of Turkish forces in Idlib. It claimed responsibility for several attacks
against Turkish troops in Idlib in 2021.601
Further information on HTS and other anti-GoS armed groups operating in Idlib is available in
Section 1.4.4 Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and Section 1.4.5 Other anti-government armed groups in the Idlib
area. Detailed information on the anti-GoS armed groups is available in the EASO COI Report: Syria –Actors (December 2019).
Syrian Arab Army and affiliated armed groups
According to Gregory Waters for International Review, deployments of the SAA in Idlib governorate
in 2019 included predominantly units of the Republican Guard, followed by those of the 3rd Corps andthe 5th Corps.602 For deployments of the SAA in Idlib governorate as of 17 March 2020 see
Section 2.1.2.2 of the EASO COI Report: Syria - Security situation (March 2020)
According to a Human Rights Watch report which documented the GoS offensive on Idlib from April
2019 to March 2020, the main GoS units involved in the offensive included the 4th and 5th Corps, the25th Division (Tiger Forces), the Palestinian militia Liwa al-Quds and the NDF.603
The SAA is supported by Russian air force and Iran-backed militias.604 US Secretary of State Michael
Pompeo assessed in a January 2020 statement that GoS military operations in Idlib were reinforced
by Russian, Iranian and Hezbollah forces.605
In March 2021, Gregory Waters reported on the presence of the Tiger Forces, 25th Division's Tarmeh
Regiment fighters in Ma'arrat al-Nu'man in Idlib governorate606; the presence of the 8th Division andRepublican Guard units in southern Idlib607; and on the Air Force Intelligence contracting out workwith the Tiger Forces' Sheikh Khalid Dhaher Group.608
TurkeyTurkey had 12 military observation points around the Idlib de-escalation zone which were set up after
the 2018 deal. In the beginning of 2020, several of these posts have come under fire or weresurrounded by GoS forces.609 At the same time, ‘several’ Turkish military personnel were killed

597 Enab Baladi, “National Army” Restructured Having Merged With “National Front for Liberation”, 5 October 2019, url
598 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War: Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, December 2018, url, p. 56; International Crisis Group,

The Best of Bad Options for Syria’s Idlib, 14 March 2019, url, p. 19
599 UN Security Council, Twenty-seventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant
to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, 3 February 2021, url, p.
7600 According to an activist, a rebel commander and a humanitarian analyst interviewed by International Crisis Group in
October-November 2018. International Crisis Group, The Best of Bad Options for Syria’s Idlib, 14 March 2019, url, p. 20
601 ISW, Syria Situation Report: February 19 - March 22, 2021, url
602 Waters, G., Current Syrian Army Deployments, International Review, 13 December 2019 [with updates], url
603 HRW, “Targeting Life in Idlib”; Syrian and Russian Strikes on Civilian Infrastructure, October 2020, url, p. 136
604 BBC News, Syria war: Government troops seize part of key Idlib town Saraqeb, 7 February 2020, url
605 USDOS, Attacks on the People of Idlib. Press Statement by Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, 27 January 2020, url
606 Waters, G., [Twitter], posted on: 14 March 2021, url
607 Waters, G., [Twitter], posted on: 12 March 2021, url
608 Waters, G., [Twitter], posted on: 22 December 2020, url
609 Al Jazeera, Turkey deploys tanks to Syrian border amid fresh Idlib violence, 2 February 2020, url

68Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

following SAA military operations in Idlib, prompting Turkish retaliatory attacks.610 The Turkish
Ministry of Defence reported that it had hit 115 Syrian targets and ‘neutralised’ 101 Syrian military
personnel.611 Turkish observation points in Idlib were reinforced with armoured personnel carriers
and tanks of Turkish Armed Forces (TAF).612 Additional armed vehicles and fighters were deployed byTurkey on its border with Syria.613 By mid-February 2020, Turkey was reported to have massed 30 000
troops and armour on the Syrian border and to have sent 5 000 troops to Idlib. Additionally, it had set
up military posts in the vicinity of Idlib city.614
At the end of February 2020, following a GoS attack, Turkey launched operation Spring Shield, whichhalted the GoS advance.615
In the second half of 2020, reports indicated Turkey’s withdrawal from military posts in Idlib616, while
as they were also reportedly building up troops again in 2021.617 In March 2021, France24 quoted aWestern diplomat interviewed by AFP, who stated that Turkey has 15 000 troops in the Idlib
enclave.618
ISIL
ISIL had a presence in north-west Syria since 2013, but was largely defeated following the GoS
offensive in Idlib in February 2018619 and a following HTS crackdown on the group and its affiliates.620
On 27 October 2019, former US President Donald Trump announced the death of ISIL leader Abu Bakr
al-Baghdadi following a raid by US Special Forces in Idlib governorate.621 According to the US DefenseIntelligence Agency covering Q4 2019, ‘HTS ranks countering ISIS among its top priorities because ISIS
elements in Idlib Province routinely attack HTS positions and leaders. In the last year [2019], HTS
publicly took credit for targeting ISIS leaders in the province.’622

610 Al Jazeera, The battle for Syria's Idlib explained in 400 words, 12 February 2020, url
611 AA, Turkey neutralizes 101 Assad regime military personnel, 10 February 2020, url
612 AA, Turkey’s deployment of reinforcements to observation points in Syria's Idlib, 10 February 2020, url
613 Al Jazeera, Turkey deploys tanks to Syrian border amid fresh Idlib violence, 2 February 2020, url
614 New York Times (The), Syrian Attacks Draw Turkey Deeper Into Syrian War, 12 February 2020, url
615 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,

21 January 2021, url, p. 6; Daily Sabah, Turkey launches Operation Spring Shield against regime aggression in Syria, 1 March
2020, url, accessed 17 May 2021
616 Al Monitor, Turkish forces withdraw from largest base in northeast Syria, 20 October 2020, url; MEMO, Turkey towithdraw military from positions in Syria due to 'potential risk', 11 December 2020, url
617 SOHR, Turkey’s military build-up | Forces bring in new column to their positions in “de-escalation zone”, 29 March 2021,
url
618 France24, Syria's Idlib: What future for the rebel holdout?, 8 March 2021, url
619 Carter Center (The), Special Report. Internal Conflict in Northwest Syria, | Sep 2018 – Aug 2019, url, Appendix 1
620 Carter Center (The), Special Report. Internal Conflict in Northwest Syria, | Sep 2018 – Aug 2019, url, Appendix 1; Al Jazeera,
After the Sochi agreement, HTS is facing internal divisions, 27 September 2018, url
621 USDOD, Press Briefing by Secretary Esper and General Milley in the Pentagon Briefing Room, 28 October 2019, url;
Ingram, H. and Whiteside, C., Caliph Abu Unknown: Succession and Legitimacy in the Islamic State, War on the Rocks, 25
November 2019, url
622 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, October 1, 2019‒December 31,
2019, 4 February 2020, url, p. 45

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

During the reference period, ISIL was reported to have maintained a latent presence in rebel-held
Idlib.623 In 2021, the Idlib de-escalation area continued to be a ‘limited safe haven’, reported the UN,
where ISIL leaders and fighters reside, although ‘HTS regularly arrests ISIL fighters.’624

2.1.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population
Security trends in 2020-2021
In 2020, the GoS forces and their allies continued their offensive to retake Idlib governorate fromvarious anti-GoS armed groups, a ‘remaining obstacle’ to the Assad regime’s regaining of control over
all of Syria’s territory.625 In January 2020, intensive airstrikes were conducted across Idlib governorate
in which barrel bombs were used. Civilian communities were also affected by shelling. The airstrikes
hit civilian locations such as markets and a mosque, in which numbers of civilians were killed andinjured.626 The GoS forces captured the strategic towns of Maaret al-Numan627 and Saraqeb628 locatedat the intersection of the key highways linking Damascus to Aleppo.629 As of late February 2020, the
GoS offensive advanced also in eastern Idlib630, and frontlines shifted rapidly.631 The UN called thegovernment and pro-government aerial bombardment across the north-west in February 2020, to be‘at some of the highest levels since the start of the conflict […] Daily clashes with non-State armed
groups included mutual artillery shelling and ground clashes with high numbers of casualties.632 The
offensive resulted in direct fighting between GoS forces and Turkish forces and a GoS-Russian airstrikeon a Turkish convoy killed 33 Turkish soldiers in Idlib on 27 February 2020.633 This triggered Turkey tolaunch Operation Spring Shield in order to stop the GoS offensive in Idlib governorate.634 Militaryactivity along the frontline areas subsequently increased, with several towns and villages, including

623 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, January 1, 2020‒March 31, 2020,

13 May 2020, url, p. 51; USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, April 1,
2020‒June 30, 2020, 4 August 2020, url, p. 27; USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the
US Congress, July 1, 2020‒September 30, 2020, 3 November 2020, url, p. 23; USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead
Inspector General Report to the US Congress, October 1 2020 – December 31 2020, 9 February 2021, url, p. 16; UN Security
Council, Twenty-seventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution
2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities [S/2021/68], 3 February 2021, url, p.
7624 UN Security Council, Twenty-seventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant
to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, 3 February 2021, url, p.
7
625 ISW, Russia enables new Syrian regime offensive in Idlib, 7 February 2020, url
626 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, Recent Developments in Northwest Syria - Situation Report No. 7, as of 29 January 2020,
url, p. 7
627 Al Jazeera, Syrian army takes Maaret al-Numan after heavy bombardment, 29 January 2020, url
628 Guardian (The), Syria: Fall of Saraqeb delivers Assad a strategic and symbolic prize, 10 February 2020, url
629 Guardian (The), Syria: Fall of Saraqeb delivers Assad a strategic and symbolic prize, 10 February 2020, url; Al Jazeera,
Syrian army takes Maaret al-Numan after heavy bombardment, 29 January 2020, url
630 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, Recent Developments in Northwest Syria - Situation Report No. 9, 26 February 2020, url,
p. 2
631 Al Jazeera, Turkish casualties as Syria rebels fight to hold on to key town, 27 February 2020, url; Guardian (The), Syrian
rebels retake key town in Idlib from Assad forces, 27 February 2020, url; SOHR, Backed by Russian airpower, regime forces
recapture Saraqib city only four days after Turkish forces and proxy factions captured it, 2 March 2020, url; Lister, C.,[Twitter], posted on 1 March 2020, url; UNOCHA, Recent Developments in Northwest Syria - Situation Report No. 9, 26
February 2020, url, p. 2
632 UN Security Council, Report by the UN Secretary-General on political, humanitarian and security-related developments
in February and March 2020, 23 April 2020, url, pp. 2-3
633 International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch. Tracking Conflict Worldwide, February 2020, url; Carter Center (the), The RussianTurkish Joint Patrols in Idlib Governorate [interactive map], Syria Conflict Mapping, 17 February 2021, url; New York Times(The), Airstrike Hits Turkish Forces in Syria, Raising Fears of Escalation, 27 February 2020, url; BBC News, Syria war: Alarm
after 33 Turkish soldiers killed in attack in Idlib, 28 February 2020, url
634 Carter Center (The), The Russian-Turkish Joint Patrols in Idlib Governorate, Syria Conflict Mapping, 17 February 2021, url

70Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Saraqeb, changing control multiple times.635 Rosemary DiCarlo, the UN Under-Secretary-General for
Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, described the situation in late February 2020 as follows:‘The security situation has continued to gravely deteriorate in and around Idlib. In the last ninedays, Syrian Government forces, with support from the Russian Federation air force, havecontinued to advance, taking a large swath of villages in southern Idlib. Air strikes also continue
in both front-line areas and population centres far removed from the fighting. During the same
period, non-State armed groups launched a counter-attack in eastern Idlib, retaking the city ofSaraqib, which they lost to Syrian Government forces in recent weeks. This action cut the Syrian
Government’s control of the strategic M5 highway. Turkish forces reportedly played asupporting role in this operation.’636
The CoI wrote in a February 2020 statement that:‘in the last two weeks, attacks on civilian infrastructure, including schools, markets, and medical
facilities causing civilian casualties, including many girls and boys, have been reported. The
deliberate and systematic targeting of hospitals follows a pattern already documented by theCommission, and may amount to war crimes. Continuing such attacks has been, and remains,completely unacceptable.’637
On 6 March 2020, a ceasefire in the Idlib area took effect, which was brokered by Russia and Turkey,
whereby a security corridor stretching 6 km to the north and 6 km to the south of the M4 highway
was established, where joint Russian and Turkish patrols would be carried.638 The first of such patrols
took place on 15 March 2020.639 More joint patrols followed on different parts of the corridor
throughout the period March to July 2020 and Turkey continued to establish military outposts in thearea. These patrols led to protests and conflict between Turkish forces and HTS, followed by IED
attacks targeting the patrols, which in turn evoked Russian/GoS air and artillery strikes against
opposition areas in Idlib in July 2020. Russia stopped the joint patrols in August 2020 and Turkish
forces continued patrolling without Russian forces. Armed confrontations increased again in thearea.640
The March 2020 ceasefire resulted in a lull in airstrikes and a reduction in the shelling in Idlib.641 IED
incidents however continued to occur.642 In May 2020, hostilities between non-state armed groups
picked up in Idlib leading to a worsening security situation again.643 As from June 2020, shelling and635 UN Security Council, Report by the UN Secretary-General on political, humanitarian and security-related developments

in February and March 2020, 23 April 2020, url, pp. 2-3
636 UN, Security Council: Syria, 28 February 2020, url
637 UN Human Rights Council, UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria: Parties to the conflict must act immediately and collectively
to bring meaningful respite to civilians in northwest Syria, 4 February 2020, url
638 Al Jazeera, Turkey says Idlib ceasefire details largely agreed on with Russia, 12 March 2020, url; Guardian (The), Putin andErdoğan agree Syria ceasefire after last-ditch talks, 6 March 2020, url; UN Security Council, Report by the UN SecretaryGeneral on political, humanitarian and security-related developments in February and March 2020, 23 April 2020, url, pp. 23
639 Al Monitor, Syrian opposition split over Russia-Turkey patrols in Idlib, 17 March 2020, url; Republic of Turkey, Ministry of
National Defense, First Joint Turkish-Russian Land Patrol Completed In Idlib, 15 March 2020, url; UN Security Council, Reportby the UN Secretary-General on political, humanitarian and security-related developments in February and March 2020, 23
April 2020, url, pp. 2-3
640 Carter Center (the), The Russian-Turkish Joint Patrols in Idlib Governorate [interactive map], Syria Conflict Mapping, 17
February 2021, url; UN Security Council, Report by the UN Secretary-General on political, humanitarian and security-related
developments in February and March 2020, 23 April 2020, url, pp. 2-3
641 UNOCHA, Syrian Arabic Republic, Recent Developments in Northwest Syria, Situation report no. 10, as of 12 March 2020,
url
642 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, Recent Developments in Northwest Syria, Situation report no. 13, as of 1 May 2020, url,
p. 2
643 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, Recent Developments in Northwest Syria, Situation report no. 14, as of 15 May 2020, url,
pp. 1-2

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

clashes increased again644, including in Idlib city and rural areas to the west of it where the violence‘since mid-June resulted in movement restrictions, the temporary closure of some roads, and civilian
casualties’.645 During the second half of 2020, hostilities took place along the M5 and south of the M4
highway. Intensified shelling and airstrikes were reported, affecting civilians.646
Also in 2021, fighting continued along the M4 and M5 highways in areas in Idlib governorate inhabitedby some 400 000 people.647 ‘Daily shelling, intermittent airstrikes, and in-fighting between non-statearmed groups’ was reported.648 Shelling affected southern rural Idlib649 and airstrikes affected civilianinhabited areas in northern Idlib.650 The UN Security Council reported in February 2021:‘In the north-west, the ceasefire in the Idlib de-escalation area was interspersed with air strikes,
artillery shelling and occasional raids across contact lines. Mutual shelling was concentrated inlocations south of the M4 highway, with some shelling directed at areas situated north of the
highway. Raids and ground-based clashes remained local, limited and intermittent. Aerial
bombardment predominantly focused on locations south of the M4 highway, with some
reportedly taking place north of the highway within southern Idlib. Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, which
has been designated a terrorist group by the Security Council, reportedly further consolidated
its power inside the Idlib de-escalation area, while also experiencing some pushback from localgroups.’ 651
Human Rights Watch assessed the systematic and strategic targeting of civilian infrastructure by the
GoS and Russian forces in their offensives, killing hundreds of civilians in air and ground strikes.652 Suchindiscriminate attacks continued in 2021.653
In March 2021, airstrikes affected civilian-inhabited areas in Sarmada and Qah in northern Idlib andKafr Shalaya in south Idlib. Shelling occurred on a daily basis in frontline areas throughout Idlib.654
There were furthermore reports of Russian planes bombing the town of Benin, south Idlib655; GoS
shelling of villages near Ariha656; and shelling by opposition of GoS forces’ positions.657 Turkish troops
continued to be targeted by non-state armed groups through IEDs and attacks against their armed
vehicles.658

644 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, Recent Developments in Northwest Syria, Situation report no. 15, as of 12 June 2020, url
645 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, Recent Developments in Northwest Syria, Situation report no. 17, as of 13 July 2020, url
646 UNOCHA, Syrian Arabic Republic, Recent Developments in Northwest Syria, Situation report no. 22, as of 18 November

2020, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Syrian Arabic Republic, Recent Developments in Northwest Syria, Situation report no. 21, as of 20
October 2020, url, p. 2; UNOCHA, Syrian Arabic Republic, Recent Developments in Northwest Syria, Situation report no. 19,
as of 21 August 2020, url, p. 2
647 UNOCHA, Syrian Arabic Republic, Recent Developments in Northwest Syria, Situation report no. 25, as of 26 February
2021, url, p. 2
648 UNOCHA, Syrian Arabic Republic, Recent Developments in Northwest Syria, Situation report no. 25, as of 26 February
2021, url, p. 2; UNOCHA, Syrian Arabic Republic, Recent Developments in Northwest Syria, Situation report no. 24, as of 26
january 2021, url, p. 1
649 SOHR, Ceasefire violations | Rebels shell regime positions in Jourin, while regime forces renew shelling Jabal Al-Zawiyah
and Sahl Al-Ghab, 14 January 2021, url
650 UNOCHA, Syrian Arabic Republic, Recent Developments in Northwest Syria, Situation report no. 26, as of 26 March 2021,
url, p. 2
651 UN Security Council, Report by the UN Secretary-General on political, humanitarian and security-related developments
in December 2020 and January 2021, 18 February 2021, url, p. 3652 HRW, Syria/Russia: Strategy Targeted Civilian Infrastructure, 15 October 2020, url
653 Care, Vital Aid Supplies Destroyed by Airstrikes at a CARE Warehouse in Northwest Syria, 23 March 2021, url; Cuts, M.,[Twitter], posted on: 21 March 2021, url; Alhor, F., [Twitter], posted on: 14 January 2021, url; Alhor, F., [Twitter], posted on:
21 March 2021, url; Alhor, F., [Twitter], posted on: 23 March 2021, url
654 UNOCHA, Syrian Arabic Republic, Recent Developments in Northwest Syria, Situation report no. 26, as of 26 March 2021,
url, p. 3
655 Alhor, F., [Twitter], posted on: 20 March 2021, url
656 White Helmets (The), [Twitter], posted on: 20 March 2021, url
657 NPA, Opposition bombs government sites in Syria’s Idlib and Hama countryside, 22 March 2021, url
658 ISW, Syria Situation Report: February 19 - March 22, 2021, url; Alhor, F., [Twitter], posted on: 22 March 2021, url

72

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

In 2020 and 2021, HTS also clashed with other armed opposition groups in Idlib, arrested opposition
leaders and members in order to assure its dominance over Idlib.659
REACH660 reported that from November 2020 until March 2021, around 50 % and more of interviewed
key informants (KIs) of the district of Ariha reported violent conflict as a threat to their communities,
with airstrikes as a commonly reported risk. In Idlib district, this amounted to 100 % of the KIs in the
sub-districts of Sarmin and Teftnaz. Also, in other sub-districts in Idlib governorate this risk was
regularly reported, e.g. in Kafr Takharim (Harim district), and Badama (Jisr-Ash-Shugur).661
As of March 2021, HTS and other anti-GoS armed groups controlled the north-western part of Idlib
governorate, while the GoS was in control of the areas in the southern part of the governorate,
including the M5 highway.662
See also Section 1.5.4 Areas in north-west Syria under anti-GoS armed groups control
Security incidents
During the reporting period there were 3 982 security incidents recorded by ACLED in Idlib
governorate, of whom 3 213 were coded as explosions/remote violence, 641 battles and 128 incidents
of violence against civilians.663
The highest number of security incidents were recorded between January and March 2020 (SeeFigure 12), after which the level of security incidents remained largely stable throughout the reporting
period.

Figure 12. Evolution of security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in Idlib
governorate in between 1 January 2020 and 31 March 2021, based on ACLED data664

659 Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary 20 July – 26 July 2020, url, p 4; Carter Center (The), Power Through Strength

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham solidifying control in northwest Syria, 9 November 2020, url; International Crisis Group: In Syria’s Idlib,
Washington’s Chance to Reimagine Counter-terrorism, 3 February 2021, url; Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary[storymap], 15 April 2021, url; Al Monitor, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham intensifies campaign against al-Qaeda affiliate in Idlib, 25
February 2021, url; Carter Center (The), Syria Weekly Conflict Summary 4 - 10 January, 13 January 2021, url
660 REACH provides humanitarian data and analysis on contexts of crisis, disaster and displacement. Created in 2010, REACH
is a joint initiative of IMPACT Initiatives, ACTED and the United Nations Operational Satellite Applications Programme(UNOSAT); REACH, Who we are, n.d., url; REACH uses a methodology of interviewing key informants (KIs), based insideresidents’ and IDPs’ communities in Idlib, either directly or remotely (via phone). KI profiles include for example: community
and religious leaders, NGO and health staff, teachers, vendors, etc.
661 REACH, Humanitarian Situation Overview of Syria (HSOS) [dashboard: Protection, north-west Syria, reported protection
risks, violent conflict, by IDPs and residents], March 2021, url
662 Based on reading of maps in ISW, Syria Situation Report: February 19 – March 22, 2021, 25 March 2021, url; Liveuamap,
Syria, 26 March 2021, url
663 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (9 April 2021), url
664 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (9 April 2021), url

73

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Idlib governorate – Security incidents
RemoteViolence against
District
Battlesviolence
civilians
5
249
1304
Al Ma’ra
7
129
1190
Ariha
53
33
39
Harim
49
213
582
Idlib
14
17
98
Jisr-Ash-Shugur
128
641
3213
Total
Figure 13. Security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in Idlib governorate
between 1 January 2020 and 31 March 2021. Breakdown by district based on ACLED data

During the reporting period, security incidents occurred in all districts of the governorate, with thelargest overall number being recorded in the district of Al Ma’ra, followed by Ariha, Idlib and Jisr-AshShugur (see Figure 13).
The following non-exhaustive list of security incidents illustrates the nature of the violence and its
impact on the civilian population:
•
•

•
•
•

On 11 January 2020, ‘intensive airstrikes’ in different parts of Idlib governorate, reportedly
killed 21 civilians, including 8 children and 5 women, and injured around 75 people.665
On 15 January 2020, airstrikes on an industrial area and a market in Idlib city killed 19 civilians
and injured at least 68 others. An airstrike on the same day in Ariha city on a market injured‘tens of people’. Also, on 15 January other airstrikes in the south of Idlib killed 8 people
including 5 children. Another 23 were wounded, including 9 children.666 Human Rights Watch
reported 22 civilian deaths for the attack in Idlib city.667
On 29 January 2020, air strikes destroyed the Ariha Surgical Hospital (also known as the alShami hospital), killing at least 14 civilians and wounding at least another 66. There werereasonable grounds to believe the strikes were carried out by Russia.668
On 11 February 2020, an airstrike on a commercial area in Idlib city killed 12 civilians andinjured 45 others.669
On 25 February 2020, an airstrike hit the Central Hospital (also known as the Governor
Hospital) in Idlib city, wounding at least four civilians.670 Also on 25 February 2020, ‘an airstrike
hit Rural Munib Kamisha school, killing 11 civilians, injuring more than 40 and completely
destroying the facility. Eight of those killed were children, two girls and six boys, all below theage of 15. The school was reportedly being used as a shelter for internally displaced
persons.’671

665 UNOCHA, Syrian Arabic Republic, Recent Developments in Northwest Syria, Situation report no. 6, as of 15 January 2020,

url, p.1
666 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, Recent Developments in Northwest Syria - Situation Report No. 7, as of 29 January 2020,
url, p. 7
667 HRW, “Targeting Life in Idlib”, Syrian and Russian Strikes on Civilian Infrastructure, October 2020, url, pp. 78-82
668 HRW, “Targeting Life in Idlib”, Syrian and Russian Strikes on Civilian Infrastructure, October 2020, url, pp. 49-52
669 HRW, “Targeting Life in Idlib”, Syrian and Russian Strikes on Civilian Infrastructure, October 2020, url, pp. 82-83
670 HRW, “Targeting Life in Idlib”, Syrian and Russian Strikes on Civilian Infrastructure, October 2020, url, pp. 53-56
671 UN Security Council, Report by the UN Secretary-General on political, humanitarian and security-related developments
in February and March 2020, 23 April 2020, url, pp. 16-17

74

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•

On 3 March 2020, ‘at least 13 civilians, including 7 boys and 1 girl, were killed and at least 18
civilians, including 3 women and 6 boys, were injured by a reported ground-based strike thatlanded in Idlib city.’672
On 5 March 2020, ‘at least 13 civilians, including 5 women and 2 girls, were killed and 21
civilians, including 4 women, 1 boy and 1 girl, were injured by a reported air strike that hit
near a shelter for internally displaced persons in Ma‘arratmisrin town.’673
On 15 March 2020, HTS executed a civilian reportedly due to affiliation with the GoS.674
On 17 March 2020, ‘two displaced civilians (one woman and one boy) were killed and four
civilians were injured after armed clashes reportedly broke out in “Qatari” camp for internallydisplaced persons in Kafr Lusin village.’675
On 3 August 2020, ‘three civilians were killed and one was injured by reported airstrikes that
impacted in a makeshift internally displaced persons camp near the town of Binnish in easternrural Idlib.’676
On 14 August 2020, ‘two civilians were killed and one was injured after a reported landmine
detonated in agricultural land near Nayrab in eastern rural Idlib.’677
On 15 August 2020, ‘nine civilians were injured when a reported landmine detonated inagricultural land near Khan Shaykhun in southern rural Idlib.’678
On 3 September 2020, ‘11 civilians, including 2 boys, were injured after a suspected
improvised explosive device attached to a motorbike reportedly detonated in Ma‘arratmisrin
in northern rural Idlib.’679
On 7 September 2020, ‘two civilians were killed and five, including a woman and a boy, were
injured after several ground-based strikes reportedly landed in the city of Ariha in southernrural Idlib. On the same day, a civilian was injured when reported ground-based strikes
impacted in the town of Kansafrah in southern rural Idlib.’680
On 4 November 2020, artillery shelling in Ariha district in Idlib affected multiple communities,
killing at least eight civilians and injuring 13 others.681
On 23 December 2020, ‘a civilian was killed and another was injured when a reported vehicleborne improvised explosive device was detonated near the Bab al-Hawa border crossing in
northern rural Idlib.’682
On 18 March 2021, a humanitarian worker was killed and 5 other civilians injured in cross-firein Idlib governorate.683

672 UN Security Council, Report by the UN Secretary-General on political, humanitarian and security-related developments

in February and March 2020, 23 April 2020, url, pp. 16-17
673 UN Security Council, Report by the UN Secretary-General on political, humanitarian and security-related developments
in February and March 2020, 23 April 2020, url, pp. 16-17
674 UN Security Council, Report by the UN Secretary-General on political, humanitarian and security-related developments
in February and March 2020, 23 April 2020, url, pp. 16-17
675 UN Security Council, Report by the UN Secretary-General on political, humanitarian and security-related developments
in February and March 2020, 23 April 2020, url, pp. 16-17
676 UN Security Council, Report by the UN Secretary-General on political, humanitarian and security-related developmentsin October and November 2020, 11 December 2020, url, p. 16
677 UN Security Council, Report by the UN Secretary-General on political, humanitarian and security-related developmentsin October and November 2020, 11 December 2020, url, p. 16
678 UN Security Council, Report by the UN Secretary-General on political, humanitarian and security-related developmentsin October and November 2020, 11 December 2020, url, p. 16
679 UN Security Council, Report by the UN Secretary-General on political, humanitarian and security-related developmentsin October and November 2020, 11 December 2020, url, p. 16
680 UN Security Council, Report by the UN Secretary-General on political, humanitarian and security-related developmentsin October and November 2020, 11 December 2020, url, p. 16
681 USAID, Syria ‑ Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #1, Fiscal Year (FY) 2021, 20 November 2020, url
682 UN Security Council, Report by the UN Secretary-General on political, humanitarian and security-related developments
in December 2020 and January 2021, 18 February 2021, url, p. 17
683 UNOCHA, Syrian Arabic Republic, Recent Developments in Northwest Syria, Situation report no. 26, as of 26 March 2021,
url, p. 2

75

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation••

On 21 March 2021, airstrikes in Sarmada and Qah areas in Idlib killed 3 civilians, and impacted
on humanitarian aid.684
On 8 April 2021, the Syrian government forces attacked a vehicle in south Idlib, killing 7 people
including 2 women and 3 children.685

Civilian fatalities

Month
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
AugustSeptember
OctoberNovember
December
Total

VDC 2020
146
124
46
6
1
7
2
30
13
20
22
2
419

SNHR 2020
123
128
50
12
15
21
9
24
18
29
24
18
471

VDC 202181415

SNHR 2021
17
25
19

37

61

Figure 14. Civilian fatalities as a result of armed conflict in Idlib governorate in 2020 and first three months of 2021. Monthly
breakdown based on VDC and SNHR data

In 2020, Idlib recorded between 419 (VDC data)686 and 471687 civilian fatalities (SNHR data)688, thesecond highest number of civilian fatalities recorded by VDC and the highest number of civilian
fatalities recorded by SNHR out of any province in Syria. Between 22 % (VDC data) and 27 % (SNHR
data) of all civilian fatalities documented by the two sources during the year were in Idlib governorate.
Most civilian fatalities were documented in the first two months of 2020.

684 UNOCHA, Syrian Arabic Republic, Recent Developments in Northwest Syria, Situation report no. 26, as of 26 March 2021,

url, p. 2
685 Cutts, M., [Twitter], posted on: 9 April 2021, url; Mark Cutts is the UN Deputy Regional Humanitarian Coordinator for
Syria.
686 Based on monthly civilian fatalities figures for 2020-2021 shared by VDC with EASO
687 In a January 2021 report, SNHR mentions 472 civilian fatalities in Idlib in 2020. This figure is the result of a revision of theirdata. EASO email correspondence with SNHR, 22 April 2021. See SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 1,734 Civilians
in Syria in 2020, including 99 in December, 1 January 2021, url, p. 12
688 Based on data extracted from monthly reports on civilian casualties published by SNHR. See: SNHR, 286 Civilians, including
Four Medical and Civil Defense Personnel, Documented Killed in Syria in January 2020, 1 February 2020, url, p. 8; SNHR, 276
Civilians, including Six Medical Personnel and Two Media Workers, Documented Killed in Syria in February 2020, 1 March
2020, url, p. 8; SNHR, 145 Civilians, including Two Medical Personnel, Documented Killed in Syria in March 2020, 1 April 2020,
url, p. 9; SNHR, 78 Civilians, including One Media Workers, Documented Killed in Syria in April 2020, 1 May 2020, url, p. 10;
SNHR, 125 Civilians Documented Killed in Syria in May 2020, including Eight Who Died Due to Torture and One Massacre, 1June 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, 1,006 Civilians, including three Media Workers and 12 Medical and Civil Defense Personnel,
Documented Killed in Syria in the First Half of 2020, 1 July 2020, url, p. 16; SNHR, 107 Civilians, including 26 Children and 11
Women, Documented Killed in Syria in July 2020, 2 August 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, 122 Civilians, including 21 Children andSeven Women, Documented Killed in Syria in August 2020, 1 September 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims
the Lives of 102 Civilians, including 15 Children, 10 Women, Three Medical Personnel and 12 Victims Due to Torture, 1
October 2020, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 126 Civilians, including 18 Children, Eight Women, One
Media Worker and 10 Victims Due to Torture, 1 November 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 172
Civilians, including 16 Children, 11 Women, and 30 Victims Due to Torture, 1 December 2020, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial
Killing Claims the Lives of 1,734 Civilians in Syria in 2020, including 99 in December, 1 January 2021, url, p. 1476

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

According to AOAV, in 2020 Idlib was the second worst impacted governorate by explosive violence,with 998 civilian casualties recorded, a decrease from 2019 when AOAV recorded 3 824 civilian
casualties.689
Human Rights Watch documented 46 ground and air attacks by Syrian-Russian forces on civilian
objects and infrastructure in Idlib governorate alone which took place between March 2019 andMarch 2020. The attacks led to at least 224 civilians killed and 561 wounded.690
Reporting on the situation in December 2020 and January 2021, the UN Security Council reported in
February 2021:‘Civilians were killed and injured as a result of ground-based strikes in southern Idlib andwestern Hama and armed clashes between and within various armed groups in the north-west,
northern and eastern parts of the country.’691
In the first three months of 2021, VDC documented 37 civilian fatalities in Idlib governorate, while
SNHR documented 61 civilian fatalities.
Infrastructure damage and explosives remnants of war
REACH reported that as of 1 August 2016, in and around the city of Idlib, 275 buildings had been
destroyed, 339 severely damaged, and 623 moderately damaged.692 As of June 2018, 311 buildings
were reported as destroyed, 418 as severely damaged and 686 as moderately damaged, with highest
damage density in the city centre.693 REACH furthermore reported that as of May 2019 for several subdistricts in the south of Idlib governorate and around the southern borders of the province, between
4 % and 13 % of agricultural lands had recently been burned, corresponding to ‘roughly 18 000
acres.694 Based on the Syria Multi-sector Needs Assessment of 2020, the Shelter Cluster assessed thatin Idlib governorate, 29.6 % of the population was living in damaged buildings and an additional 17.2 %in self-settled camps.695
Human Rights Watch compared satellite images of the town of Maarat al-Nu`man in southern Idlib
from before and after the GoS took control over it in January 2020. Imagery recorded in May 2020
showed destruction, debris and rubble across the town. Most of the town’s residential buildings andkey infrastructure showed ‘heavy damage’. Many buildings were likely destroyed by heavy machineryand explosives.696
Save the Children reported that as of March 2020, more than half of Idlib’s schools (570 out of 1 062)
had been destroyed, damaged or out of order due to insecurity, whilst an additional 74 schools havebeen ‘used as shelters for families escaping conflict’.697 Also the UN reported that airstrikes in 2020
damaged or destroyed schools.698 The UN Security Council noted that between December 2020 and
689 AOAV, Explosive Violence Monitor 2020, March 2021, url, p. 12
690 To document the 46 incidents, Human Rights Watch interviewed 113 victims and witnesses of the attacks, as well as

healthcare and rescue workers, teachers, local authorities, and experts on the Syrian and Russian militaries. Human Rights
Watch examined dozens of satellite images and over 550 photographs and videos taken at the attack sites, as well as logs ofobservers who monitored Syrian and Russian aircraft in the area (p. 2). HRW, “Targeting Life in Idlib”; Syrian and Russian
Strikes on Civilian Infrastructure, October 2020, url, p. 47
691 UN Security Council, Report by the UN Secretary-General on political, humanitarian and security-related developments
in December 2020 and January 2021, 18 February 2021, url, pp. 3 and 5
692 REACH, Syria – City of Idleb, Shelter Damage Assessment as of 1 August 2016 [box: damage trend], 23 October 2016, url
693 REACH, Syria, Syrian cities damage atlas, 16 March 2019, url, pp. 45-46
694 REACH, Syria – Northwest, Burned Agricultural Land as of 26th May 2019, 4 June 2019, url
695 Global Shelter Cluster, Syrian Arab Republic: Whole of Syria Shelter/NFI Sector Humanitarian Needs Overview 2021, 1
March 2021, url, pp. 6, 8
696 HRW, “Targeting Life in Idlib”, Syrian and Russian Strikes on Civilian Infrastructure, October 2020, url, pp. 45-46
697 Save the Children, Idlib, Syria: Two schools a day damaged or abandoned during escalation in fighting, 16 March 2020, url
698 UN Security Council, Report by the UN Secretary-General on political, humanitarian and security-related developments
in February and March 2020, 23 April 2020, url, pp. 5-6; UN Security Council, Report by the UN Secretary-General on political,
humanitarian and security-related developments in October and November 2020, 11 December 2020, url, p.

77

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

January 2021, UNICEF recorded one incident of hostilities causing damage to educational facilities
during the reporting period; namely, Al-Sabbagh school in Ariha was hit by a rocket.699
Reporting on the major military offensive between April 2019 and March 2020, Human Rights Watch
stated that health care infrastructure was regularly damaged or destroyed in airstrikes or shelling.700
In 2020, WHO recorded 8 attacks on health care facilities in Idlib, the most of any governorates in
Syria.701 Airstrikes targeting civilian infrastructure, including industrial and commercial areas occurredin 2020 and 2021 in Idlib governorate.702
UNMAS stated the following for Idlib among other places in Syria:‘the presence of explosive ordnance causes injuries and death, limits safe access to services and
impedes the delivery of humanitarian aid. While everyone in contaminated areas is at risk,children, farmers, construction workers and people on the move are particularly vulnerable.
Residential areas and key infrastructure, such as roads, schools, health centres, agriculturalland, and settlements remain unsafe or unserviceable because of contamination, further
compounding the social and economic impact of the crisis and possibilities for recovery. Ever
increasing numbers of casualties from which a large number of survivors sustain permanent
impairments, further contribute to heightening the demand on overwhelmed healthservices.’703
Unexploded cluster ammunition or other ordnances in Idlib causes a threat to civilians living in thearea. Especially children who play with or collect scrap metal or objects are at risk of becoming
victims.704
Displacement and return
According to a humanitarian official interviewed by Aron Lund in August 2018, an estimated 90 000
people have been transferred to Idlib as part of surrender agreements in 2018 alone.705
From January to December 2019, Idlib had the highest number of IDP movements in Syria, registering
1 096 000 IDP movements to or within the governorate, of which 950 000 were IDP movements within
the governorate while the rest came mainly from Hama (around 132 000) and Aleppo (around 14 000)governorates. Most IDP movements from Idlib during 2019 were to Aleppo governorate (around
285 000).706

699 UN Security Council, Report by the UN Secretary-General on political, humanitarian and security-related developments

in December 2020 and January 2021, 18 February 2021, url, p. 6
700 HRW, “Targeting Life in Idlib”, Syrian and Russian Strikes on Civilian Infrastructure, October 2020, url, pp. 49-52; 53-56;
72; See also: AI, ‘Nowhere is safe for us’, unlawful attacks and mass displacement in north-west Syria, 11 May 2020, url
701 WHO, Health Cluster, Attacks on health care in Syria 1 Jan – 31 Dec 2020, 31 December 2020, url
702 ISW, Syria Situation Report: February 19 - March 22, 2021, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, Recent Developments inNorthwest Syria - Situation Report No. 7, as of 29 January 2020, url, p. 7; HRW, “Targeting Life in Idlib”, Syrian and Russian
Strikes on Civilian Infrastructure, October 2020, url, pp. 78-82
703 UNMAS, Syria, in: Where do we work, updated October 2020, url
704 Syria Relief, 6-year-old killed by unexploded cluster bomb in Idlib, possibly 364 days after the initial attack, 2 January
2021, available from: url; SOHR, Old ordnance | Explosion injures child in western Idlib, 15 May 2021, url; HRW, Syria: Cluster
Munition Attack on School, 22 January 2020, url; MEE, In pictures: In northern Syria, recycling remnants of war is a familybusiness, 3 April 2021, url; Daily Sabah, More than 560,000 Syrians return despite cease-fire violations, 27 April 2021, url;
TRT, The War in Syria: UN says cluster bombs used on civilians in Idlib [YouTube video], 13 August 2019, url; Syria Relief, Twochildren injured by unexploded cluster munition in Idlib, 5 March 2021, url; Enab Baladi, Syrian families make a living out ofrecycling remnants of war [Image gallery], 5 March 2021, url; SOHR, In 72 hours | Man and three children killed by war
remnant in different parts of Syria, 5 May 2021, url; New Arab (The), Two children killed, three injured in Syria mine
explosions, 19 July 2020, url; HALO Trust (The), A hidden emergency, Why explosive ordnance contamination must be
addressed now in North-West Syria, 2020, url, p. 9
705 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War. Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Swedish Defence Research Agency, December 2018,
url, p. 54
706 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic. IDP Stock and Flow Data, Jan – Dec, 2019, url

78Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

As of November 2019, the Idlib and northern Aleppo enclave hosted 1.12 million IDPs.707 The GoS
military offensive in Idlib between December 2019 and March 2020 caused nearly 960 000 new
displacements to northern Idlib and Aleppo.708 IDMC reported most were displaced for a second or
third time.709 Following the March 2020 ceasefire, tens of thousands of those displaced returned totheir places of origin.710
For the year 2020, UNOCHA reported 1 070 000 IDP movements from or within Idlib governorate,
1 030 000 IDP movements to or within the governorate and 821 000 IDP movements within thegovernorate.711
UNOCHA reported for January 2021, 19 000 displacements from Idlib governorate, 13 000 within thegovernorate and 15 000 into Idlib governorate712; and for February 2021, 16 600 displacements from
Idlib governorate, 11 600 within the governorate and 14 400 to Idlib governorate.713 For March 2021,
UNOCHA reported 18 700 displacements from Idlib governorate, 11 300 within the governorate and
15 200 to Idlib governorate.714
In terms of IDP returns for 2019, Idlib had around 80 000 IDP return movements to or within thegovernorate, of which 77 000 were IDP return movements within the governorate, while the rest camefrom Aleppo and Hama governorates.715 Also for 2020, UNOCHA reported 207 000 IDP return
movements from Idlib governorate, 178 000 returns within the governorate and 235 000 IDP return
movements to the governorate.716 In the first three months of 2021, UNOCHA recorded 3 100 (January2021), 4 000 (February 2021) and 7 300 (March 2021) spontaneous IDP returns to or within Idlib
governorate, the majority being returns within the governorate.717
See also Section 1.6.5 Displacement and return

707 REACH, North-West Syria, situation overview, 16 March 2020, url
708 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,

21 January 2021, url, p. 6; IDMC, Internal displacement 2020: Mid-year update, 23 September 2020, url, p. 18; UN Security
Council, Report by the UN Secretary-General on political, humanitarian and security-related developments in February andMarch 2020, 23 April 2020, url, pp. 2-3
709 IDMC, Internal displacement 2020: Mid-year update, 23 September 2020, url, p.18
710 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, Recent Developments in Northwest Syria Flash Update, as of 2 April 2020, url, pp. 1-2;
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, Recent Developments in Northwest Syria, Situation report no. 13, as of 1 May 2020, url, p. 2
711 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, IDP Movements Overview, Jan-Dec 2020 [map], 16 February 2021, url
712 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements, January 2021, 2 March 2021, url
713 UNOCHA, Syrian Arabic Republic, IDP movements, February 2021, 1 April 2021, url
714 UNOCHA, Syrian Arabic Republic, IDP movements, March 2021, 12 May 2021, url
715 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic. IDP Spontaneous Returns Stock and Flow Data, Jan – Dec, 2019, url
716 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, Spontaneous IDP Returnee Movements Overview, Jan-Dec 2020 [map], 16 February 2021,
url
717 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic. IDP Spontaneous Returns. January 2021, 2 March 2021, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab
Republic. IDP Spontaneous Returns. February 2021, 1 April 2021, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic. IDP Spontaneous
Returns. March 2021, 12 May 2021, url

79Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

2.2 Aleppo governorate

Map 7: © MapAction, Aleppo governorate718

2.2.1 General description of the governorate
Aleppo governorate is located in the north of Syria, bordering Idlib governorate to the west, Hama
governorate to the south and Raqqa governorate to the east. In the north it shares a 221 km long
border with Turkey.719 Prior to 2011, Aleppo governorate hosted around 20 % of Syria’s population
and was ‘the major commercial and industrial hub’ of the country.720 According to 2011 estimates,
Aleppo governorate had a population of more than 4 867 991, making it the most populous provinceof Syria.721 Population estimates for 2019 issued by the Syrian Central Bureau of Statistics indicatedthat Aleppo governorate had 3 964 000 inhabitants.722 In a March 2021 report, UNOCHA estimatedthe population of Aleppo governorate to be of 4 014 129.723
The governorate is divided in eight districts: Jebel Saman, Afrin, A’zaz [Azaz], Al-Bab, Menbij [Manbij],
Jarablus, Ain Al-Arab [Kobane], and As-Safira.724 Located in Jebel Saman district, Aleppo city is the718 MapAction, Aleppo governorate, 29 July 2016, url
719 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic. Governorates profile, June 2014, url, p. 5
720 ACAPS, Regional Analysis Syria: AII – Governorate Profiles, 1 October-31 December 2014, 28 January 2015, url, p. 4
721 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic. Governorates profile, June 2014, url, p. 5
722 Syria, Central Bureau of Statistics, 2020 ‫[ المجموعة اإلحصائية‬Statistical Abstract 2020], n.d., url, ‫المؤشات الديموغرافية‬‫ر‬‫السكان و‬-2‫[ فصل‬Chapter2-

population and demographic indicators], Tab4
723 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview. Syrian Arab Republic, March 2021, url, p. 23
724 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic. Governorates profile, June 2014, url, p. 5

80

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

central city of the governorate.725 As of 2019, the UN estimated that around 1.6 million people were
living in Aleppo city.726
Before the conflict, over 70 % of the inhabitants of Aleppo governorate were Sunni, with minority
communities such as Christians, Kurds, Armenians and Turkmen also living in the province.727 USDOS
noted that Shia Muslims are present in the rural areas of Aleppo governorate, as well as in and around
Aleppo.728 According to Syria expert Fabrice Balanche729, ‘in 2012, the population of Aleppo [city] was
2.5 million: 1 million in the western district, another million in the east, and around 500,000 in thenorthern Kurdish neighborhoods of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiya.’730 Sheikh Maqsoud district in
Aleppo city ‘constitutes a Kurdish city within the city’.731
VDC and SOHR alleged that Turkey carried out demographic change in the Afrin region.732 According
to the VDC, Turkey’s empowerment of the SNA and the practices of the latter forced the Kurdish
inhabitants of Afrin to leave the area. The source added that thousands of eastern Ghouta rebels andtheir families, who were displaced to north-western Syria following reconciliation agreements with
the GoS, were settled in Afrin.733

2.2.2 Conflict background and armed actors
The city of Aleppo remained divided between the GoS-controlled west and rebel-controlled east
between 2012 and 2016734. The GoS forces retook control of the rebel-held part of Aleppo in
December 2016 after a prolonged siege735 in which between 250 000 and 275 000 residents were still
living in the rebel-held parts.736 In 2016, Turkey launched operation Euphrates Shield in northern
Aleppo governorate to fight ISIL and contain YPG gains in the area737, capturing the Al-Bab area,
including Jarablus and other towns.738 In January 2018, Turkish and affiliated local armed groups
launched another offensive dubbed Operation Olive Branch on the Kurdish-held Afrin district, in
Aleppo governorate739 which concluded in March 2018 when Turkish authorities announced complete
control of the Afrin region.740 In April 2019, the GoS forces launched an offensive aimed at recapturing
areas in northern Hama and southern Idlib, and in December 2019, the GoS forces advanced towards
the towns of Ma’aret Al-Numan and Saraqeb on the M5 highway that links Aleppo and Damascus741

725 UN Habitat and SDC, City Profile Aleppo Multi Sector Assessment, May 2014, url, p. 5
726 New Humanitarian (The), In Syria’s Aleppo, a slow rebuild begins, 30 January 2019, url
727 ACAPS, Aleppo – Governorate profile. Syria Needs Analysis Project, March 2013, url, p. 4
728 USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report: Syria 2019, June 2020, url, p. 3
729 Dr. Fabrice Balanche is an associate professor and research director at the University of Lyon 2, is an adjunct fellow at The

Washington Institute specialising in Lebanon and Syria since the 1990s. His expertise on Syria focuses on political geography,
conflict and sectarian issues. For more information see url
730 Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2018, url, p. 44
731 Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2018, url, p. 53
732 VDC-NSY, ) ‫ إدلب‬،‫التكية ف شمال غرب سوريا ( حلب‬‫[ القواعد العسكرية ر‬Turkey’s military bases in northeast Syria (Aleppo, Idlib)], 17 August 2020, url;‫ي‬
SOHR, Demographic change | At Turkish government’s orders, the Syrian National Coalition attempts to attract supporters
to back up projects in Afrin, 26 March 2021, url
733 VDC-NSY, ) ‫ إدلب‬،‫التكية ف شمال غرب سوريا ( حلب‬‫[ القواعد العسكرية ر‬Turkey’s military bases in northeast Syria (Aleppo, Idlib)], 17 august 2020, url‫ي‬
734 Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2018, url, p. 44
735 AI, ‘We Leave or We Die’: Forced Displacement under Syria’s ‘Reconciliation’ Agreements, 2017, url, p. 34-35; UNOCHA,
East Aleppo Crisis Situation Report No.3, 4 October 2016, url, p. 1
736 AI, ‘We Leave or We Die’: Forced Displacement under Syria’s ‘Reconciliation’ Agreements, 2017, url, p. 34
737 International Crisis Group, Squaring the Circles in Syria’s North East, 31 July 2019, url, p. 7
738 BBC News, Turkey 'ends' Euphrates Shield campaign in Syria, 30 March 2017, url
739 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/39/65], 9 August 2018, url, p. 5; Al-Hilu, K., Afrin Under Turkish Control: Political, Economic and Social
Transformations, EUI, 25 July 2019, url, p. 3
740 Al-Hilu, K., Afrin Under Turkish Control: Political, Economic and Social Transformations, EUI, 25 July 2019, url, p. 3
741 International Crisis Group, Silencing the Guns in Syria’s Idlib, 14 May 2020, url

81Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

amid intensification of hostilities.742 For more information about the background of the conflict in
Aleppo governorate until the end of 2019, see the EASO COI Report: Syria - Security situation (May2020).
The GoS forces continued to advance and bombard rebel-held areas in north-west Syria in February
2020743, and following the success in driving the rebels from the M5 highway and reopening it, theforces of the GoS, backed by Russian air force, recaptured several towns and villages in the northwestern countryside of Aleppo, and consolidated their control in the governorate.744 On
16 February 2020, the Turkish media outlet, TRT World, citing the SOHR, reported that the SAA,
backed by Russia and Iranian militias, captured 13 small towns and villages in the north and northwest Aleppo governorate.745 The Independent reported on 18 February 2020 that 30 villages in thewestern countryside of Aleppo were recaptured during the military operations of the Syrian Arab
Army (SAA).746 In March 2020, Russia and Turkey agreed a ceasefire in north-west Syria747, which
aimed at halting the military operations and freezing the frontlines.748
As regards territorial control, ORSAM, a research centre based in Ankara749, stated in November 2020,
that of the total area of Aleppo province, 52 % was under the control of the GoS, 8 % was jointly
controlled by the GoS and the Kurdish YPG, 16 % by the YPG/SDF, and 24 % by anti-GoS opposition
forces.750 Nawar Shaban, a conflict expert at the Omran Center for strategic Studies, specified that outof the 24 % of the governorate’s area controlled by opposition factions, 22 % was controlled by the
Syrian National Army (SNA), and 2 % by Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS).751 According to a Liveuamap, asof 23 March 2021, the southern, and most of the western and eastern parts of Aleppo governorate,
including the city of Aleppo appeared to be under the control of pro-GoS forces.752 In the western
Aleppo countryside as of January 2021 reporting, GoS forces were present 18 km from Bab Al-Hawacrossing.753 According to reporting from January-March 2021, the north and north-west of thegovernorate were controlled by Turkey and allied opposition factions, and the very western parts ofthe governorate, which include the towns of Daret Izza and Al-Atareb, were under the control of nonstate armed groups/HTS.754
The US CRS noted on 27 July 2020 that the Syrian Interim Government (SIG) which was founded in2013 ‘became increasingly affiliated with the Turkish government’ and was operating out of the

742 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),

2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020), 11 December 2020, url, para. 43
743 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020), 23 April 2020, url, para. 4; Reuters, Syrian forces seize
most of Aleppo province, on eve of Turkey-Russia talks, 16 February 2020, url
744 Al Jazeera, Syrian army strengthens Aleppo grip before Russia-Turkey talks, 16 February 2020, url; Reuters, Syrian forces
consolidate control of Aleppo, air strikes under way, 17 February 2020, url; Arab News, Assad’s forces take over Aleppo amid
fears of ‘catastrophe’, 17 February 2020, url; ISW, Syria Situation Report: February 5 - 18, 2020, 21 February 2020, url
745 TRT World, Syria regime seizes more Aleppo villages; car bomb kills four, 16 February 2020, url
746 Independent (The), The battle for Aleppo ends with liberation for some, Armageddon for others, 18 February 2020, url;
747 France24, Ceasefire agreed between Putin, Erdogan comes into effect for Syria’s Idlib, 5 March 2020, url; UN Human
Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 21 January 2021,
url, para. 19
748 Reuters, Ceasefire in Syria's Idlib comes at a cost for Turkey's Erdogan, 6 March 2020, url; UN Security Council,
Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393
(2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020), 23 April 2020, url, para. 4
749 ORSAM, About us, n. d., url
750 Saban, N., Analysis of territorial control in northwestern Syria and the HTS’s role, ORSAM, November 2020, url, p. 15
751 Shaban, N., The Syrian National Army: Formation, Challenges, and Outlook, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, October
2020, url, p. 3752 Based on reading of the following map: Liveuamap, Syria, 23 March 2021, url
753 COAR, Syria in 2021: Forecast for a protracted crisis, 28 January 2021, url
754 Liveuamap, Syria, 23 March 2021, url; ISW, Syria Situation Report: January 30 - February 18, 2021, 19 February 2021, url;
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 21
January 2021, url, p. 31

82

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Turkish-controlled areas of Aleppo governorate.755 Moreover, the area of Tal Rif’at as well as thenorth-eastern part of the governorate around Manbij was jointly controlled by the GoS and the SDF.756
Finally, in Aleppo city, Sheikh Maqsoud district, a Kurdish majority district, was reported by different
sources to be under the SDF control.757
Saban stated that five of the governorate’s seven border crossings with Turkey were controlled by the
SNA (namely, Jarablus, Al-Ra’e, Bab Al-Salam, Meidan, and Olive Branch), one was controlled by HTS(Atma), and one by GoS/SDF (Ain Al-Arab). Moreover, the source indicated that three of the bordercrossings were closed and the rest were not open to civilian crossing.758
Syrian Arab Army and affiliated armed groups
Recent information on the SAA deployments in Aleppo governorate could not be found. According toGregory Waters of International Review, deployments of the SAA in Aleppo governorate in 2019/2020
included predominantly units of the Republican Guard and of the 4th Division.759 For deployments of
the SAA in Aleppo governorate as of 3 April 2020, see Section 2.2.2.1 of the EASO COI Report: Syria Security situation (2020).
RussiaJusoor for Studies760 stated on 6 January 2021 that Russia had 10 military posts and bases in Aleppo
governorate. The Russian military sites were located in different areas including Tal Rifaat761, Manbij,
Kobane, Kuweires, and Al-Hader.762 In Aleppo city, the opposition website Zaman Al-Wasl763, reported
that in April 2020, the Russian army withdrew forces from some parts of the city due to the spread of
COVID-19.764
The Russian forces in Aleppo had a training role (e.g., training SAA crew in manoeuvring the Soviet T72 tanks765, in addition to their direct engagement in the battles, where, according to Al Jazeera, it
carried out 1 167 attacks in Aleppo governorate since September 2015, the second largest number ofattacks after Idlib.766
Iran and Iran-backed militias
Jusoor for Studies stated on 6 January 2021 that Iran had 15 military bases and posts in Aleppo
governorate.767 According to a June 2019 article, the IRGC and Iran-backed militias were reportedly incontrol of the eastern neighbourhoods of Aleppo city.768 Experts cited by Al Jazeera assessed that
Aleppo is ‘one of the main areas where Iran’s elite Revolutionary Guards have a strong military

755 US CRS, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, 27 July 2020, url, pp. 20-21
756 Liveuamap, Syria, 23 March 2021, url; ISW, Syria Situation Report: January 30 - February 18, 2021, 19 February 2021, url;

UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 21
January 2021, url, p. 31
757 Al Monitor, Syrian government, SDF trade accusations of violations of Russian-mediated cease-fire, 8 February 2021, url;
NPA, Aleppo’s Sheikh Maqsoud, Ashrafiya attract other neighborhoods’ residents, 21 February 2021, url; AA, YPG/PKK, Assadregime mutually ease blockades, 3 February 2021, url
758 ORSAM, Analysis of Territorial Control in Northwestern Syria and the HTS’s Role, November 2020, url, p. 18
759 Waters, G., Current Syrian Army Deployments, International Review, 13 December 2019, url
760 ‘An independent institution specializing in information management and conducting studies and research related to the
Syrian political and social affairs in particular and the Middle East region in general’. Jusoor, About us, n. d., url
761 SOHR, Turkish forces shell Tal Rifaat town hosting Russian military base, 28 February 2020, url
762 Jusoor for Studies, Map of the Military Bases and Posts of Foreign Forces in Syria,, 6 January 2021, url
763 Committee to Protect Journalists, Zaman Al-Wasl, n. d., url
764 Zaman Al-Wasl, Russia re-stationed forces in Aleppo due to Coronavirus, 22 April 2020, url
765 TASS, Russian military instructors hold series of drills with Syrian tank crews, 9 February 2021, url
766 Al Jazeera, ‫[ خمس سنوات عىل التدخل الروس ف سوريا‬Five years of the Russian intervention in Syria], 30 September 2020, url‫ي ي‬
767 Jusoor for Studies, Map of the Military Bases and Posts of Foreign Forces in Syria, 6 January 2021, url
768 Syrian Observer (The), Pro-Iran Militants Loot Aleppo’s Antiquities, 27 June 2019, url

83

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

presence supporting local militias’ that have been fighting alongside GoS forces.769 In an article
published by the Atlantic Council on 5 November 2020, Navvar Saban observed that Iran encouraged
the formation of local Shia militias and recruited Sunnis, notably clans, in Aleppo, Raqqa and Deir EzZor governorates. According to the source, fighters from these governorates were recruited under the
Local Defense Forces (LDF), which were considered as part of the SAA.770 The opposition news outlet,
Baladi, and the Lebanese newspaper, Al-Nahar, reported on a recent recruitment campaign launchedby Iran in eastern Aleppo countryside, aimed at creating a new militia dubbed ‘Ashbal Suleimani. The
sources added that Iran has sent IRGC members to train the new recruits.771 Another militia that Iranreportedly intended to create in Aleppo governorate was called Al-Imam Ali Brigade. According to AlArabiya, Iranian forces opened recruitment offices in Aleppo to this end, reportedly accepting SAA
defectors and draft evaders.772
According to western intelligence sources cited by France 24, Iran-backed militias ‘have long been
entrenched in Aleppo province’ where they had bases and a command centre773, and were reported
to take part in military operations in Aleppo governorate in early 2020.774 The opposition channel,
Syria TV, stated on 21 August 2020 that the following Iran-backed militias were present in Aleppo
governorate:• Abu Al-Fadl Al-Abbas (Iraqi militia – Nobbol and Zahra’a in northern Aleppo countryside);• Al-Imam Al-Hussein Brigade (Iraqi militia – 1 150 fighters – Aleppo city);• Al-Imam Al-Hijja Group (Syrian and Lebanese militia – 600 fighters – Aleppo);• Al-Baqer Brigade (Syrian militia – 500 fighters);• Soqour Al-Sahra’a (Desert Hawks – Syrian militia – 1 000 fighters – partly present in Aleppo).775
Moreover, Saban stated that Iran recruited fighters from the Shia minority in Syria, including in
northern Aleppo, and formed militias such as the Aleppo branch of the Imam Al-Hijja and the Mahdi
Army in Nobbol and Zahra’a.776
Jusoor Center for Studies stated that Hezbollah had 38 independent, joint or semi-shared military sites
in Aleppo governorate, the group’s largest presence in Syria.777 Two sources reported that Hezbollahbacked militias were present in Nobbol and Zahra’a, and that those militias looted and confiscatedabandoned property in northern Aleppo countryside and harassed returnees.778

769 Al Jazeera, Syrian military: Israeli air attack targeted Aleppo, 28 March 2019, url
770 Saban, N., Factbox: Iranian influence and presence in Syria, 5 November 2020, url
771 Baladi, ‫[ ميليشيا إيران تجتمع بوجهاء ف ريف حلب والهدف تشكيل عسكري جديد‬Iran’s militia meets community leaders in Aleppo countryside and the goal‫ي‬is to form a new military unit], 17 March 2021, url; Al-Nahar, "‫سليمان" تشكيل ميليشيوي إير يان ينافس الروس رشق حلب‬‫“[ أشبال‬Ashbal Suleimani” a new‫ي‬Iranian militia that competes with the Russians in eastern Aleppo], 17 March 2021, url
772 Al-Arabiya, ‫ وتغري الشباب بتسوية أوضاعهم مع النظام‬..‫[ إيران تجند ف حلب‬Iran recruits in Aleppo.. and entices the youth by settling their affairs with‫ي‬
the regime], 22 March 2021, url
773 France24, Syria says Israeli jets attacked military outposts near Aleppo, 5 May 2020, url
774 Al Monitor, What brought Iranian forces to Idlib front?, 3 February 2020, url
775 Syria TV, ‫ رصد شامل للميليشيات اإليرانية ف سوريا‬..‫[ بالتفاصيل واألرقام‬In detail and with numbers .. Comprehensive monitoring of Iran’s militias in‫ي‬Syria], 21 August 2020, url
776 Saban, N., Factbox: Iranian influence and presence in Syria, 5 November 2020, url
777 Jusoor for Studies, Map of the Military Bases and Posts of Foreign Forces in Syria, 6 January 2021, url
778 Al-Quds Al-Arabi, ‫[ ميليشيات نبل والزهراء تبسط سيطرتها شمال حلب… وتبحث عن مصادر للتمويل‬Nobbol and Zahra’a militias control northern Aleppo… and‫ي‬look for funding sources], 28 December 2020, url; Nedaa Post, ‫تستول عىل أمالك المهجرين شمال حلب‬‫[ المليشيات اإليرانية‬Iran’s militias take possession‫ي‬of IDP properties north of Aleppo], 26 February 2021, url

84

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Syrian National Army (SNA)
Sources estimated the number of SNA fighters at between 70 000 and 90 000.779 In December 2020,
the Hamza Division of the SNA opened the first SNA military base and training facility of its own in thecity of A’zaz.780
Shaban stated in October 2020 that the SNA comprised seven corps, the initial three that existed when
the SNA was established in 2017, in addition to four that were formed after the merger with the NLF
in 2019.781 In a study published in August 2020, Jusoor Center observed that the SNA was comprisedof three corps782 including 25 factions scattered among Afrin region and the towns of Mar’e, A’zaz, AlBab and Jarablus in Aleppo countryside, in addition to Tall Abyad and Ra’as Al-Ayn in Raqqa and Hasaka
governorates. Moreover, the NLF which maintained presence in parts of Aleppo countryside wascomprised of 20 factions, notably Faylaq Al-Sham, Ahrar Al-Sham, Jaysh Al-Ahrar and Soqour AlSham.783 The majority of the factions of the 1st Corps of the SNA report to the Turkish Army directly,
while the remainder of the factions coordinate their moves with Turkish security officers.784
COAR listed the following ‘security stakeholders’ in northern Aleppo:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

the SNA;
the Sultan Muhammad Al-Fatih brigade (mainly Arab combatants);
Muntasir Billah brigade (based in Jarablus, mainly comprised of Arab tribesmen from Raqqa
and Turkmen from Tall Abyad);Jaysh Al-Islam (based in Jarablus and Al-Bab, comprised mainly of combatants evacuated from
Rural Damascus);
Sultan Murad (based in Al-Bab, combatants are mainly from northern Aleppo with a large
number of Turkmen);
Fariq Hamza (based in A’zaz, combatants from northern Aleppo);
Al-Mutassim brigade (based in A’zaz and Al-Bab, was one of the larger FSA groups andcomprised combatants from Noureddine Al-Zinki group who were ousted from Idlib by HTS);andAl-Jabha Al-Shamiyya (based in Al-Ra’i, an umbrella group containing combatants from Ahrar
Al-Sham, Noureddine Al-Zenki, Jaysh Al-Islam, Liwa Al-Tawheed, and Suquor Al-Sham).785

Turkmen factions within the SNA, i.e. Sultan Murad and Hamza Division, were quite influential andwere heavily supported by Turkey. The Levant Front (Al-Jabha Al-Shamiya) was considered the largest
northern Syrian faction and comprised local fighters from northern Aleppo countryside as well asfighters from rural Raqqa.786 The Jamestown Foundation referred to the existence of rivalries, lack of

779 Özkizilcik, O., The Syrian National Army (SNA): Structure, Functions, and Three Scenarios

for its Relationship withDamascus, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, October 2020, url, p. 4; Shaban, N., The Syrian National Army: Formation,
Challenges, and Outlook, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, October 2020, url, p. 4
780 Daily Sabah, Turkey-backed SNA opens 1st military post in Syria's Azaz, 4 December 2020, url; TRT World, Syrian
opposition forces open first military barracks, 4 December 2020, url
781 Shaban, N., The Syrian National Army: Formation, Challenges, and Outlook, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, October
2020, url, p. 4
782 Arabi 21, )‫[ تعرف عىل تشكيالت "الجيش الوطن السوري" المعارض (ملف‬Get to know the composition of the opposition “SNA” (file)], 10 August 2020,‫ي‬url
783 Jusoor for Studies, ‫[ الجيش الوطن السوري تحديات التجربة والمآالت الممكنة‬The SNA: challenges of the experience and potential outcome], August‫ي‬2020, url, p. 9784 Jusoor for Studies, ‫[ الجيش الوطن السوري تحديات التجربة والمآالت الممكنة‬The SNA: challenges of the experience and potential outcome], August‫ي‬2020, url, p. 11
785 COAR, Northern Corridor NOSAP, October 2019, url, pp. 44-45
786 Al-Hilu, K., The Turkish Intervention in Northern Syria: One Strategy, Discrepant Policies, EUI, 14 January 2021, url, pp. 56, FN. 14

85

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

trust787, and diverse ideologies within the different SNA factions, and stated that the fighting against
the GoS forces has united those factions so far.788 These tensions between the different SNA factions
resulted in direct clashes789, five of which took place in Aleppo countryside between March and June
2020.790
In addition to the aforementioned corps, there were military and civilian police forces operating in the
Turkish-controlled areas of northern Aleppo.791 The military police operated under the SNA792 and wasestablished in the Euphrates Shield area in February 2018 and in the Olive Branch area in July 2018.793
According to Al-Hilu, a Syrian researcher at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at theEuropean University Institute, members of the military police forces ‘answer first and foremost to
their factions, prioritising their interests at the expense of the public interest, which is why the military
police remains weak and incapable of curtailing violations’. The source added that the civilian police
was supported by Turkey since it took control of northern Aleppo countryside, and that Syrians who
volunteered to join were trained in Turkey.794 The civilian police was established in early 2017 and was
headquartered in Jarablus. It comprised two bodies: the regular civil police which addressed issues
such as local criminality and traffic regulation, and public security which was better equipped andtrained and functioned as ‘internal security force’.795 In Afrin region, the VDC stated that there were
three civilian police centres located in Afrin city, Jendeires and Rajo as well as specialised police
stations that operated under those centres.796
TurkeyTurkey has deployed forces at around 21 military outposts in the northern Aleppo countryside and 12
main bases in Afrin region.797 The VDC also listed 21 Turkish outposts in the northern countryside of
Aleppo, situated mainly around Jarablus, Manbij, Al-Bab, Tadif, A’zaz, and Dabeq. The source shareda map featuring 17 Turkish outposts in Afrin region, the majority of which were to the east and southeast of Afrin city.798 In western Aleppo, a map published by Jusoor for Studies indicated that Turkey
has kept military bases and outposts in areas captured by the GoS in its offensive on Aleppo and Idlib
governments in February 2020. According to the map, such bases and outposts were located in
Anadan, Sheikh Aqil, Al-Rashideen, Al-Mougiz, and Tall Al-Ees.799 Sources reported that the Turkish
Army vacated three smaller positions in western Aleppo countryside, in Batbo school, in Kafr Naseh
school and in the area between Zardna and Abyen. Reportedly, the three positions contained 20

787 Jusoor for Studies, ‫[ الجيش الوطن السوري تحديات التجربة والمآالت الممكنة‬The SNA: challenges of the experience and potential outcome], August‫ي‬2020, url, p. 10788 Jamestown Foundation (The), The Syrian National Army and the Future of Turkey’s Frontier Land Force, 12 March 2021,
url
789 Jusoor for Studies, ‫[ الجيش الوطن السوري تحديات التجربة والمآالت الممكنة‬The SNA: challenges of the experience and potential outcome], August‫ي‬2020, url, p. 10
790 Enab Baladi, Violations by “SNA”…who to blame?, 12 June 2020, url
791 COAR, Northern Corridor NOSAP, October 2019, url, p. 39
792 Jusoor for Studies, ‫[ الجيش الوطن السوري تحديات التجربة والمآالت الممكنة‬The SNA: challenges of the experience and potential outcome], August‫ي‬2020, url, p. 9793 VDC-NSY, ) ‫ إدلب‬،‫التكية ف شمال غرب سوريا ( حلب‬‫[ القواعد العسكرية ر‬The Turkish military bases in northwest Syria (Aleppo, Idlib), 17 August 2020,‫ي‬url
794 Al-Hilu, K., The Turkish Intervention in Northern Syria: One Strategy, Discrepant Policies, EUI, 14 January 2021, url, pp. 67
795 COAR, Northern Corridor NOSAP, October 2019, url, p. 43
796 VDC-NSY, ) ‫ إدلب‬،‫التكية ف شمال غرب سوريا ( حلب‬‫[ القواعد العسكرية ر‬The Turkish military bases in northwest Syria (Aleppo, Idlib), 17 August 2020,‫ي‬url
797 Al-Hilu, K., The Turkish Intervention in Northern Syria: One Strategy, Discrepant Policies, EUI, 14 January 2021, url, p. 4
798 VDC-NSY, ) ‫ إدلب‬،‫التكية ف شمال غرب سوريا ( حلب‬‫[ القواعد العسكرية ر‬Turkey’s military bases in northeast Syria (Aleppo, Idlib)], 17 august 2020, url‫ي‬
799 Jusoor for Studies, ‫التكية ف إدلب‬‫[ دوافع ودالالت انسحاب النقاط العسكرية ر‬The drives and indications of the withdrawal of Turkish military outposts‫ي‬in Idlib], 23 October 2020, url

86Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

soldiers each, and the soldiers were ordered to join Turkish posts in Al-Zawiya Mount in Idlib as ‘their
mission was accomplished.’800
Syrian Democratic Forces
In Aleppo governorate, the SDF was in control of the Manbij area and an enclave to the north of Aleppo
city which contains the town of Tal Rifaat, known as Shahba801, as well as the Sheikh Maqsoud
neighbourhood of Aleppo.802
The SDF forces were in control of the areas around the cities of Manbij and Kobane, which were
captured from ISIL in 2016 and 2015, respectively.803 In October 2019, the GoS and the Kurdishcontrolled SDF announced an agreement that allowed the GoS troops to be deployed along the borderwith Turkey to assist Kurdish forces in repelling the Turkish offensive.804 GoS forces, accompanied by
Russian forces, were subsequently deployed to the cities of Manbij805 and Kobane.806 Several sourcesinterviewed by DIS between January and February 2020 noted that GoS lacked administrative
authority in SDF-controlled areas.807
Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham
In 2019, HTS seized large parts of Idlib and western Aleppo governorates following clashes with otheranti-GoS armed groups including the NLF808, and controlled over 90 % of Idlib governorate, alongsideadjacent parts of northern Hama and western Aleppo governorates.809
The Middle East Institute (MEI) reported that during the offensive of the GoS forces to recapture
southern Aleppo countryside and the western suburbs of Aleppo city in early 2020, ‘HTS used an uparmoured BMP-1 SVBIED [Suicide Vehicle-Born Improvised Explosive Device] against a loyalist positionat Al-Zahraa district on the outskirts of western Aleppo’ and in other places, as a battle strategy.810
According to the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), HTS ceased its assaults following theTurkish army deployments in Idlib, except during military campaigns launched by GoS forces, andabided by the ceasefire agreement. It also pushed other Jihadist factions away from the frontlines andconfiscated their heavy weapons.811 SOHR, cited by France 24 observed that on 30 April 2020, HTS
opened a trade crossing into GoS-held areas in western Aleppo countryside near Idlib’s provincial
borders, which incited protests against the group in north-west Syria.812

800 Al-Alam, ‫التك نقاطه العسكرية من حلب‬‫[ مصادر تكشف لماذا سحب الجيش ر‬Turkish sources revealed why the Turkish Army withdrew military points‫ي‬ً‫[ لماذا سحب الجيش ر‬Why did the Turkish Army withdraw militaryfrom Aleppo], 10 March 2021, url; Nedaa Post, ‫غرن حلب؟‬‫الت يك نقاطا عسكرية من‬‫ي‬points from western Aleppo?], 9 March 2021, url
801 Balanche, F., The Fragile Status Quo in Northeast Syria, The Washington Institute, 1 July 2020, url; Strategics, The
complicated Military Map in North-Eastern Syria, 24 January 2021, url
802 Balanche, F., The Fragile Status Quo in Northeast Syria, The Washington Institute, 1 July 2020, url
803 Defense Post (The), Syrian government forces set to enter Kobani and Manbij in SDF deal, 13 October 2019, url
804 Al Jazeera, Syria's army to deploy along Turkey border as Kurds strike deal, 14 October 2019, url
805 DW, Russia-backed Syrian forces enter key city Manbij in northern Syria, 15 October 2019, url
806 Defense Post (The), Syrian army troops enter symbolic Kurdish city of Kobani, 16 October 2019, url; New Yorker (The),
Turkey, Syria, the Kurds, and Trump’s Abandonment of Foreign Policy, 20 October 2019, url
807 Denmark, DIS, Syria Military Service, May 2020, url, p. 10
808 Carter Center (The), Special Report. Internal Conflict in Northwest Syria, | September 2018 – August 2019, url, pp. 1-2; AlJazeera, HTS offensive could draw in Syria and Turkey, 9 January 2019, url
809 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/42/51], 15 August 2019, url, p. 9; France24, Syrians in Idlib protest opening of trade link with regime, 1 May 2020,
url
810 MEI, Shifting Gears: HTS’s Evolving Use of SVBIEDs During the Idlib Offensive of 2019-20, 28 October 2020, url
811 ECFR, Guns and governance: How Europe should talk with non-state armed groups in the Middle East, n. d., url
812 France24, Syrians in Idlib protest opening of trade link with regime, 1 May 2020, url

87Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

2.2.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population
In March 2020, Russia and Turkey agreed to a ceasefire in north-west Syria813 which aimed at freezing
the frontlines and operating joint patrols on the M4 highway that links Aleppo and Latakia.814 In its
early stages, the ceasefire agreement saw no violations815, however, by mid-April 2020, Jusoor for
Studies, cited by Syria Direct, stated that the agreement was violated over 109 times by the GoS forces
which tried to break into areas in western Aleppo countryside, among others.816 In 2021, several
violations to the ceasefire agreement have been observed by Russia and Turkey in Aleppo
governorate, including five on 7 February 2021817 and four reported on 12 March 2021.818
Aleppo city and its surroundings
According to the CoI, as ‘armed groups and terrorist organizations’ were retreating from their areasof control during the military operations of the GoS forces, they launched ‘indiscriminate attacks
against residential areas under Government control in western Aleppo’. A Russian source cited by the
CoI reported on over 1 800 instances of shelling and more than 430 attacks by heavy weapons during
the period 9 January to 27 February 2020.819 According to the same source, civilians in Aleppo city‘recounted increasing incoming fire emanating from armed groups who controlled adjacentRashideen, Dawwar El-Maliyyeh and Lairamoun in western rural Aleppo’.820 The ICRC also reported on
intense shelling that affected several neighbourhoods in Aleppo city in the first weeks of 2020.821 On
21 March 2021, shells, allegedly launched by Turkish-backed armed groups, fell on Al-Fardos
neighbourhood in eastern Aleppo killing two and injuring 17 civilians.822
Sources reported on a state of lawlessness in the eastern neighbourhoods of Aleppo city. Reportedlythat part of the city was controlled by militias, and the government was absent.823 Moreover, looting,thefts, kidnapping, and extortion were prevalent in old Aleppo and Bab Al-Nayrab neighbourhoods
where the Barri clan were in control.824

813 France24, Ceasefire agreed between Putin, Erdogan comes into effect for Syria’s Idlib, 5 March 2020, url; UN Human

Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 21 January 2021,
url, para. 19
814 Reuters, Ceasefire in Syria's Idlib comes at a cost for Turkey's Erdogan, 6 March 2020, url; UN Security Council,
Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393
(2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020), 23 April 2020, url, para. 4
815 Al Jazeera, Turkey says no ceasefire violations in Syria’s Idlib, 7 March 2020, url; Reuters, Turkish defence minister seesno violations of ceasefire in Syria’s Idlib, 7 March 2020, url
816 Syria Direct, Will Damascus or HTS be the first to break the ceasefire in Idlib?, 16 April 2020, url
817 BW Business World, Russia Registers 28 Ceasefire Violations In Syria Over Past Day, 7 February 2021, url
818 Sputnik Arabic, ‫األختة‬‫ الساعة‬24‫ خرقا لوقف إطالق النار يف سوريا خالل الـ‬19 ‫[ روسيا ترصد‬Russia observes 19 violations to the ceasefire agreement in Syria‫ر‬ًin the past 24 hours], 12 March 2021, url; Al-Khabar, ‫خرقا لنظام وقف إطالق النار يف سوريا‬19 ‫[ رصد‬Observations of 19 violations to the ceasefire
regime in Syria], 12 March 2021, url
819 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 3September 2020, url, para. 18
820 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 3September 2020, url, para. 82
821 ICRC, Syria: A spike in civilian casualties, mass displacement in country’s northwest, 31 January 2020, url
822 NPA, Killed and wounded due to bombardment on Syria’s eastern Aleppo, 21 March 2021, url; Al-Khabar, .. ‫سقوط قذائف عىل حلب‬ً‫ مصابا‬17‫[ شهيدان و‬Mortars fell on Aleppo… Two martyrs and 17 people wounded], 21 March 2021, url
823 SOHR, ‫المعيش‬‫ر‬‫ مخلفات اآللة العسكرية تحصد أرواح ر‬:‫ سنوات من سيطرة النظام السوري‬4 ‫الشقية بعد‬‫[ أحياء حلب ر‬Eastern Aleppo‫أمن وسطوة “الشبيحة” تؤزم الواقع‬‫عشات‬‫ر‬‫ وأزمات وفلتان ي‬..‫المواطني‬‫ي‬neighbourhoods after 4 years in the control of the Syrian regime: remnants of the military machine claim dozens of lives..
Crises, lawlessness and influence of Shabiha complicate life], 21 December 2020, url; I am Human Story, ‫أمن وخروج عن‬‫حلب … فلتان ي‬‫[ سيطرة النظام السوري‬Aleppo… Lawlessness and exit from the Syrian regime’s control], 7 January 2021, url
824 SOHR, ‫المعيش‬‫ر‬‫ مخلفات اآللة العسكرية تحصد أرواح ر‬:‫ سنوات من سيطرة النظام السوري‬4 ‫الشقية بعد‬‫[ أحياء حلب ر‬Eastern Aleppo‫أمن وسطوة “الشبيحة” تؤزم الواقع‬‫عشات‬‫ر‬‫ وأزمات وفلتان ي‬..‫المواطني‬‫ي‬neighbourhoods after 4 years in the control of the Syrian regime: remnants of the military machine claim dozens of lives..
Crises, lawlessness and influence of Shabiha complicate life], 21 December 2020, url

88Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

A non-exhaustive list of security incidents that were reported to have taken place in Aleppo city in2020 and early 2021 included the following:••••

On 12 January 2020, ground-based strikes hit several residential areas in the city of Aleppo
resulting in the death of four civilians and the injury of three others.825
On 5 February 2020, reported ground-based strikes hit a residential area of Aleppo city,
causing the death of five family members.826
On 25 February 2020, four civilians were reportedly killed in two separate IED attacks in
Aleppo city.827
On 21 March 2021, the state-controlled news agency, SANA, reported that two civilians were
killed, and a few others wounded in a shelling that targeted the Al-Saliheen and Al-Fardos
neighbourhoods in the eastern part of Aleppo city.828

Western Aleppo governorate
The CoI stated on 3 September 2020 that the battles over Idlib governorate and western Aleppo
comprised ‘brief ground operations’ by the SAA, accompanied by ‘prolonged aerial offensives by proGovernment forces’. The source added that at least 1 500 air strikes, mainly air-to-ground missiles andbarrel bombs, were launched between 1 November 2019 and 1 March 2020.829 The ICRC observed an
intensification of battles in the first weeks of 2020 in Idlib and western Aleppo governorates.830
Between 20 January and 5 March 2020, at least 217 air strikes hit areas in western Aleppo, and the
CoI highlighted the example of Kafr Nouran town which was hit by 14 air strikes on 9 February 2020
alone.831 The Turkish news outlet, Anadolu, reported on 9 February 2020 that, in addition to Kafr
Nouran, Russian air strikes targeted the villages of Kafr Naha and Al-Rahhal in western Aleppo
governorate.832
The CoI provided the following chart which highlighted the hostilities against civilian facilities inwestern Aleppo and Idlib by actor in the period 1 November 2019 – 30 April 2020:

825 OHCHR, Syria: Bachelet condemns continued killings and displacements despite ‘ceasefire’, 17 January 2020, url
826 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),

2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020), 23 April 2020, url, p. 17; UN Human Rights Council,
Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 3 September 2020, url, para. 86
827 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020), 23 April 2020, url, p. 18
828 SANA, ‫الصالحي والفردوس بحلب‬‫حن‬‫[ استشهاد‬Martyrdom of two and injuring of others due to a shelling on‫ر‬‫مدنيي ر‬‫ر‬‫اثني وإصابة آخرين بينهم أطفال جراء قذائف عىل ر ي‬
Al-Saliheen and Al-Fardos in Aleppo], 21 March 2021, url; WHO, WHO condemns attacks on residential neighbourhoods in
Aleppo, 23 March 2021, url
829 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 3September 2020, url, para. 17
830 ICRC, Syria: A spike in civilian casualties, mass displacement in country’s northwest, 31 January 2020, url
831 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 3September 2020, url, paras. 33-34
832 AA, ‫اثني ف غارات روسية عىل ريف حلب‬‫الطتان التابع للمعارضة السورية مقتل‬‫ر‬‫[ حسب مرصد مراقبة ر‬Two civilians died in Russian air strikes on rural Aleppo‫مدنيي ر ي‬
according to the Syrian opposition aviation monitoring observatory], 9 February 2020, url

89Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Figure 15: Hostilities damaging medical facilities, schools and markets and entailing civilian casualties in Idlib and western
Aleppo in the period 1 November 2019 to 30 April 2020833

The CoI also included in its report of 3 September 2020 the following map of attacks impacting civilians
and civilian infrastructure in Idlib and western Aleppo governorates between November 2019 andJune 2020:

Figure 16: Attacks impacting civilian infrastructure, November 2019 – June 2020834

833 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 3September 2020, url, p. 5
834 UN, Attacks Impacting Civilians and Civilian Infrastructure, Map No. 4612, July 2020, url, p. 22

90

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

In 2020, WHO recorded six attacks on health care facilities in Aleppo governorate.835
A non-exhaustive list of security incidents that were reported to have taken place in western Aleppo
countryside in 2020 and early 2021 included the following:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

According to a UN Security Council report, a reported air strike targeted a bus near Urum AlKubra on 3 February 2020 and resulted in the death of nine family members, including three
women and four children.836
On 10 February 2020, at least 14 civilians were killed and 23 were injured in reported air
strikes that hit various areas in Abyan Sim’an town.837
The CoI reported that on 11 February 2020, a group of women who returned to Kfar Halab toretrieve some belongings were shot at by the 25th Special Mission Forces Division.838
On 17 February 2020, Reuters reported that ‘Russian and government air strikes’ targeted thetown of Daret Izza in the north of Aleppo, ‘wounding several civilians and forcing two hospitals
to close’.839
In its report of 23 April 2020, the UN Security Council reported on several air strikes that hit akindergarten and two schools in the areas of Anjarah, Jabal Sam’an and Daret Izzah in rural
Aleppo, that caused civilian deaths and material damage.840
On 8 and 18 May 2020, two civilians were killed in reported sniper fire near the villages ofMiznaz and Atareb.841
On 21 March 2021, artillery shelling, reportedly by GoS forces842, hit a hospital in Atareb town
in western Aleppo countryside. 843 The attack caused 6 deaths and 17 injuries, including among
patients and medical staff, and caused damage to the hospital.844

Turkish- and SNA-controlled areas
IED attacks and shelling
Since Turkey consolidated its control of northern Aleppo governorate, the Turkish Army and armed
groups affiliated with it have been targeted by Kurdish and unidentified armed groups.845 UNOCHA
stated that of the 194 IED attacks that were verified in 2020, 83 took place in Afrin, Jarablus, andA'zaz.846 Between 1 January and 14 September 2020, OHCHR documented at least 116 civilian deaths
and 463 injuries as a result of IED attacks by unidentified perpetrators and explosive remnants of war(ERW) in areas under the control of Turkish-backed armed groups.847

835 WHO, Health Cluster, Attacks on health care in Syria 1 Jan – 31 Dec 2020, 31 December 2020, url
836 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),

2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020), 23 April 2020, url, p. 17
837UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020), 23 April 2020, url, p. 18
838 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 3September 2020, url, para. 99
839 Reuters, Syrian forces consolidate control of Aleppo, air strikes under way, 17 February 2020, url
840 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020), 23 April 2020, url, para. 15
841 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020), 24 June 2020, url, p. 18
842 Daily Sabah, Assad regime attack on hospital kills 7 civilians in Syria's Idlib, 21 March 2021, url
843 WHO, WHO condemns attacks on residential neighbourhoods in Aleppo, 23 March 2021, url; Al Jazeera, Several killed in
gov’t attack on hospital in northwest Syria, 21 March 2021, url; France, Ministry for Europe and Foreign affairs, Syria – Attack
against a hospital in northwest Syria, 22 March 2021, url
844 WHO, WHO condemns attacks on residential neighbourhoods in Aleppo, 23 March 2021, url; Daily Sabah, Assad regime
attack on hospital kills 7 civilians in Syria's Idlib, 21 March 2021, url
845 Carter Center (The), Syria Weekly Conflict Summary 25-31 January 2021, 4 February 2021, url
846 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview. Syrian Arab Republic, March 2021, url, p. 12
847 OHCHR, Syria: Violations and abuses rife in areas under Turkish-affiliated armed groups – Bachelet, 18 September 2020,url

91

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

The Afrin region saw a spike in shelling and car bomb explosions that led to the death and injury of‘scores of inhabitants’ as well as to damage of civilian infrastructure between January and April
2020.848 The Carter Center assessed Al Bab as ‘an area of frequent conflict’, documenting at least 120
incidents that took place between January and end of July 2020.849 Fighting between SDF forces and
SNA in the Al Bab area was reported in 2020.850
In February 2021, the Carter Center reported an increase in IED attacks and armed clashes in areas
under SNA control in northern Aleppo governorate. The attacks were directed at SNA factions andcivilians.851 The attacks were unclaimed but pro-opposition sources attributed them to the YPG.852
Enab Baladi reported on 31 January 2021 that an VBIED attack targeted Afrin city and resulted in thedeath of eight people. According to the source, this attack was one of a series of attacks that hit areas
under the control of Turkish-backed factions in north-western Syria.853 ISW observed an ‘uptick in IED
attacks in Turkish-controlled areas of Syria’ between 24 December 2020 and 6 January 2021.854 ISW
reported on a ‘spate of likely-PKK perpetrated IED attacks’ in Turkish-controlled areas of Aleppo
governorate. According to the source, between 30 January and 16 February 2021, nine IED attacks
targeted SNA infrastructure and civilian sites in the cities and towns of Afrin, A’zaz, Bza’a, Al-Bab, Ras
Al-Ayn, Al-Ra’e, and Jandires, resulting in at least 26 deaths.855
In its Weekly Conflict Summary covering the period 1 – 7 March 2021, the Carter Center reported on
frequent shelling and clashes between Turkish armed forces and affiliated armed groups on the one
side and the YPG and GoS armed forces on the other. Reportedly, reinforcements by both sides havebeen observed on frontlines in northern and eastern Aleppo governorate.856
Attacks on oil refineries
GoS and Russian attacks on makeshift oil refineries in northern and north-eastern Aleppo werereported by several sources in 2021.857 On 10 January 2021, an unidentified drone attacked oil
refineries situated in Al-Bab countryside.858 Al Jazeera reported on attacks by Russian warships andforces aligned with the GoS that targeted makeshift oil refineries in Al-Hamran near Jarablus andTarhin near Al-Bab in March 2021. Reportedly, the attacks caused huge fires, destroyed more than
200 oil trucks, and caused some damage to civilian property.859 SOHR stated that four civilians were
killed and dozens injured in the attacks860, and Baladi News mentioned that in retaliation, the Turkish
forces shelled areas under the control of GoS/SDF in Manbij countryside.861 On 15 March 2021, Al
Jazeera reported that missiles launched from Kuweires air base in Aleppo targeted ‘civilian

848 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,

14 August 2020, url, para. 38
849 Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary, 27 July – 4 August 2020, url, p. 3
850 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/45/31], 14 August 2020, url, p. 2-3
851 Carter Center (The), Syria Weekly Conflict Summary 22-28 February 2021, 3 March 2021, url
852 Carter Center (The), Syria Weekly Conflict Summary 15-21 February 2021, 24 February 2021, url
853 Enab Baladi, ‫تفجت عفرين إل ثمانية أشخاص‬‫[ ارتفاع عدد ضحايا‬The number of the victims of Afrin explosion rose to eight people], 31 January‫ر‬2021, url
854 ISW, Syria Situation Report: December 16, 2020 - January 7, 2021, 11 January 2021, url
855 ISW, Syria Situation Report: January 30 - February 18, 2021, 19 February 2021, url
856 Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary| 1 - 7 March 2021, 7 March 2021, url, p. 2
857 SOHR, Aleppo countryside | Rocket attacks renew on the area of primitive oil refineries, 5 March 2021, url; EA Worldview,
UPDATED: More Russian Attacks on Oil Refineries in North Syria, 15 March 2021, url; Al-Bawaba, Drone Attack Strikes Oil
Refineries in North Syria, 10 January 2021, url
858 Al-Bawaba, Drone Attack Strikes Oil Refineries in North Syria, 10 January 2021, url
859 Al Jazeera, Syria: Oil refinery attacks raise fears of ‘grave escalation’, 11 March 2021, url
860 SOHR, Aleppo countryside | Rocket attacks renew on the area of primitive oil refineries, 5 March 2021, url
861 Baladi, ‫وعشات الجرىح بقصف روس عىل ريف حلب‬‫[ أربعة شهداء ر‬Four martyrs and dozens injured in a Russian strike on rural Aleppo], 6 March‫ي‬2021, url

92

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

settlements and fuel tankers’ in Al-Bab and Jarablus and caused injuries among civilians according toTurkey’s defence ministry cited in the report.862
ISIL activity
As regards ISIL activity in northern Aleppo governorate, USDOD stated in its report covering the firstquarter of 2020, that ‘since the Turkish incursion, ISIS clandestine cells have also focused operations’in three governorates including Aleppo’.863 ISW stated on 11 January 2021 that on 20 December 2020,
ISIL claimed ‘its first attack in Afrin, Aleppo Province since 2017, demonstrating expanding area of
operations’. The source added that ISIL targeted the SNA with VBIED, and that ISIL began claiming
responsibilities for attacks in Al-Bab and A’zaz in June 2020.864 In January 2021, SOHR documented‘over 51 operations, including armed attacks and explosions, carried out by ISIS cells in SDF-held areas’
including Aleppo.865
ISIL commanders and elements were reportedly targeted by likely US airstrikes in northern Aleppo
countryside on different occasions: in Afrin on 21 May 2020 (ISIL commander)866, near Al-Bab on
20 June 2020 (former Emir of Raqqa)867, and near Ihtaimlat on 20 July 2020 (ISIL militant).868
Further information on ISIL is available in Section 1.4.6 Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)
Lawlessness and infighting
The Syrian Observer, referring back to information of the outlet Baladi News, reported on a ‘state oflawlessness and an increase in the number of car and motorcycle bombings, in addition toassassinations and fighting among the factions’ that was prevalent in the SNA-controlled areas of
Aleppo governorate.869 On 16 February 2021, Syria TV, a Syrian opposition channel based in Turkey870,
reported on ‘ongoing tensions’ in Afrin city in the aftermath of skirmishes that involved Jaysh Al-Islamand Al-Jabha Al-Shamiyya (the Levant Front), two factions of the SNA. The source stated that a stateof apprehension was prevalent among the residents of the city who feared the resumption ofviolence.871 The clashes between the two SNA factions were also reported by Enab Baladi and Aleppo
Today.872 Later in February 2021, Al-Mayadeen, a Beirut-based pan-Arab TV channel873, reported that
the SNA launched a ‘large military campaign’ in areas under its control in northern Aleppo, mainly AlBab and Afrin, targeting factions of Al-Jabha Al-Shamiya (the Levant Front). Reportedly, the campaign
was spearheaded by the Hamzat, the Military Police, and Jaysh Al-Islam of the SNA.874 An incident of
infighting that affected civilians was reported to have taken place on 23 December 2020, when clashes

862 Al Jazeera, Turkey says civilians wounded in Syrian missile raids, 15 March 2021, url
863 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General report to the United States Congress: January 1, 2020‒March

31, 2020, 13 May 2020, url, p. 52
864 ISW, Syria Situation Report: December 16, 2020 - January 7, 2021, 11 January 2021, url
865 SOHR, SDF-controlled areas in January | Over 50 attacks by ISIS cells leave nearly 60 people dead and injured, and major
security campaigns against corruption and ISIS cells result in the arrest of dozens, 11 February 2021, url
866 ISW, Syria Situation Report: May 13 - 26, 2020, 30 May 2020, url
867 ISW, Syria Situation Report: June 10 - 23, 2020, 25 June 2020, url
868 ISW, Syria Situation Report: July 7 - 21, 2020, 23 July 2020, url
869 Syrian Observer (The), Security Chaos, Faction Infighting in Northern Aleppo, Baladi News, 16 February 2021, url
870 Syria TV, ‫[ عن تلفزيون سوريا‬About Syria TV], n. d., url
871 Syria TV, ‫ جيش اإلسالم والجبهة الشامية رصاع عىل النفوذ‬..‫[ عفرين‬Afrin.. Jaysh Al-Islam and Al-Jabha Al-Shamiyya, a struggle over control], 16
February 2021, url
872 Enab Baladi, ‫ قتيالن باشتباك ربي “جيش اإلسالم” و”الجبهة الشامية‬..‫[ ”عفرين‬Afrin.. Two deaths in clashes between Jaysh Al-Islam and Al-Jabha AlShamiyya], 13 February 2021, url; Aleppo Today, ‫الوطن يف عفرين‬‫[ قتيالن وجرىح باشتباكات ربي فصائل الجيش‬Two deaths and some injuries in SNA‫ي‬infighting in Afrin], 13 February 2021, url
873 France24, ‘Anti-Al Jazeera’ channel Al Mayadeen goes on air, 12 June 2012, url
874 Al-Mayadeen, ‫[ "حملة واسعة أطلقتها فصائل أنقرة ف ريف حلب الشمال بمواجهة "الجبهة الشامية‬Large campaign launched by Ankara factions in northern rural‫ي‬‫ي‬
Aleppo against Al-Jabha Al-Shamiya], 27 February 2021, url

93Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

between fighters of Al-Jabha Al-Shamiyya and Al-Mutasim brigade erupted near Shamarin village.
Reportedly, a number of IDPs were injured and tents were partially damaged.875
The CoI stated on 14 August 2020 that it ‘corroborated repeated patterns of systematic looting andproperty appropriation’ and ‘widespread arbitrary deprivation of liberty’ in Afrin, perpetrated byvarious brigades of the SNA. According to the CoI, SNA fighters looted and occupied property after
civilians fled the region, or even coerced residents, mainly those of Kurdish origins, to leave theirhouses.876 The VDC reported on the same trend877, and Enab Baladi reported on cases of real estateand crops seizure by SNA factions in Afrin.878 In a report dated 5 April 2021, the SOHR spoke of‘ongoing thefts and looting of civilians’ properties’ in the Olive Branch and Euphrates Shield areas.879
A non-exhaustive list of security incidents that were reported to have taken place in SNA-controlledareas of Aleppo governorate in 2020 and early 2021 included the following:
•
•
•
•

•
•
•

On 20 January 2020, a pregnant woman and her toddler son were killed, and two other boys
injured, in a shelling that hit their home in Afrin, reportedly from Tall Rif’at.880
On 10 February 2020, six civilians were killed and 12 injured in a VBIED attack in Afrin city.881
On 19 March 2020, an explosion of a VBIED in A’zaz city caused at least 2 deaths and 18
injuries among civilians.882
The UN Security Council reported that on 28 April 2020, at least 31 civilians were killed, and53 people injured ‘after a fuel truck reportedly exploded in Afrin city’.883 CoI reported on thesame incident, stating that at least 41 civilians were killed and 61 wounded and that the attack
was by a VBIED.884
On 1 and 2 May 2020, reported small arms fire between non-state actors resulted in nine
civilian injuries in Jarablus city. A similar incident took place in Al-Bab on 16 May and led tothe death of a pregnant woman and the injury of seven other civilians. 885
On 25 June 2020, another male civilian was killed in a drive-by shooting claimed by ISIL in AlBab city.886
On 19 July 2020, a VBIED attack in the village of Saju near A’zaz resulted in the death of eightcivilians and the injury of 76 others.887

875 SNHR, IDPs injured, tents damaged in north Aleppo camp in clashes between two Syrian National Army factions on Dec

23, 24 December 2020, url
876 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
14 August 2020, url, para. 46
877 VDC-NSY, ) ‫ إدلب‬،‫التكية ف شمال غرب سوريا ( حلب‬‫[ القواعد العسكرية ر‬Turkey’s military bases in northeast Syria (Aleppo, Idlib)], 17 august 2020, url‫ي‬
878 Enab Baladi, Real estate seizures, utilization, and royalties… Who protects property rights in Afrin?, 29 July 2020, url
879 SOHR, “Olive Branch” and “Euphrates Shield” areas in March | Over 20 arrests and kidnappings in Afrin…ongoing thefts
and looting of civilians’ properties…security chaos leaves nearly 40 people dead and wounded, 5 April 2021, url
880 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
14 August 2020, url, para. 39
881UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020), 23 April 2020, url, p. 18
882 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020), 23 April 2020, url, p. 18
883 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020), 24 June 2020, url, p. 18
884 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
14 August 2020, url, para. 42
885 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020), 24 June 2020, url, p. 18
886 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020), 20 August 2020, url, p. 18
887 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020), 20 August 2020, url, p. 19

94

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

•
•
•
•
•

On 6 October 2020, a reported VBIED detonated in Al-Bab city resulting in the death of 18
civilians and the injury of at least 62 others. According to the source, three humanitarian
workers were injured in the incident and an NGO ambulance was damaged.888
On 13 December 2020, armed clashes between armed groups in Jindayris city left two men
injured.889
On 31 January 2021, six people were killed and around 30 injured in a car bomb attack in A’zaz
city to the north of Aleppo.890
On 13 February 2021, a VBIED attack hit a marketplace in Al-Ra’e town, and resulted in one
death and 12 injuries among civilians.891
On 5 March 2021, missile strikes took place near Al-Bab and Jarablus and resulted in at least
one death and 10 injuries. According to the source, the attack was unclaimed.892

Further information on the security situation in areas under control of Turkish-backed armed groups
is available in Section 1.5.2 Areas under control of Turkish-backed armed groups
SDF-controlled areas
In Tal Rifaat area, UNICEF observed 29 security-related incidents, in January 2021.893 The Turkish army
targeted the vicinity of Meng airport and the town of Tal Rifaat resulting in damage to two houses on
26 December 2020894, and a group called Afrin Liberation Forces shelled Turkish forces in Afrin on
23 January 2021 in retaliation for targeting civilians in Tal Rifaat.895 Other incidents of reciprocalshelling between the SDF in Tal Rifaat and the Turkish army were reported on 18 February 2021896 andon 11 March 2021.897
In Manbij area, a VBIED detonated on 20 October 2020 and left five people injured.898 On
11 January 2021, Kurdistan 24, citing the SDF-backed Manbij Military Council, reported that Turkishbacked groups shelled Al-Gat and Al-Hoshariya with heavy weapons and mortar shells.899 On
8 February 2021, the villages of Al-Şaşat, Erbe Kilo, Iwn Dadat, Ereb Hesen, Um Edese and Cat in
Manbij region were bombed by Turkish forces.900
Reporting on the period between December 2020 and January 2021, the UN Security Council notedthat the contact lines in the areas of Tal Rifaat and Manbij ‘saw increased artillery shelling and small

888 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),

2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020), 11 December 2020, url, p. 17; see also:
Syria Relief and Development [Twitter], posted on: 6 October 2020, url; Al Jazeera, Truck bomb in Syria’s Al-Bab kills at least18, 6 October 2020, url
889 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020), 18 February 2021, url, p. 17
890 RT, ‫ قتىل وجرىح جراء انفجار سيارة مفخخة ف مدينة أعزاز شمال سوريا‬:‫[ وسائل إعالم‬Media sources: deaths and injuries in the explosion of a car bomb in Azaz
‫ي‬city, north of Syria], 31 January 2021, url
891 Al-Souria, ‫بتفجت استهدف سوق مدينة الراع بريف حلب‬‫[ ضحايا‬Casualties in a VBIED that targeted a market in Al-Ra’I town in Aleppo‫ر‬‫ي‬
countryside], 13 February 2021, url
892 Garda World, Syria: Missile strikes in Aleppo Governorate kill at least one person and injure 10 others, 5 March 2021, url
893 UNICEF, Whole of Syria Humanitarian Situation Report January 2021, 1 March 2021, url, p. 2
894 Syrian Documentation Center, Turkish targets in the vicinity of the “Meng” airport and “Tal Rifaat” in the northerncountryside of Aleppo., 26 December 2020, url
895 Kurdistan Monitor, Rojava – West Kurdistan – Syria – January 2021, n. d., url
896 Daily Sabah, YPG terrorists wound 6 children in rocket attack on Syria’s Afrin, 18 February 2021, url‫[ القوات ر‬Turkish forces resumes bombarding towns and villages in northern Aleppo
897 NPA, ‫التكية تجدد قصفها قرى وبلدات بريف حلب الشمال‬‫ي‬countryside], 11 March 2021, url; Al-Youm 7, ‫ قرى بريف حلب الشمال‬4 ‫[ القوات رالتكية تقصف‬Turkish forces bombard 4 villages in northern rural
Aleppo], 11 March 2021, url
898 SHRC, Injuries due to Explosion in Menbij, 20 October 2020, url; Kurdistan 24, IED attack injures civilians in Syria’s Manbij,
20 October 2020, url
899 Kurdistan 24, Turkish-backed groups shell Manbij countryside, 11 January 2021, url
900 ANF, Invading Turkish forces bomb Manbij, 8 February 2021, url

95

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situationarms fire’.901 Baladi News reported that skirmishes broke between SNA and SDF fighters on the Kafr
Khasher axis, three kilometres to the south of A’zaz.902 On 29 March 2021, the 3rd Corps of the SNA
attacked SDF positions on the Mara’anaz axis in the vicinity of A’zaz which resulted in the death andinjury of ten SDF fighters. Reportedly, during the attack, a Grad missile fell on the Shat road connecting
A’zaz and Afrin which led to its complete closure.903 In Manbij area, the SOHR reported on ‘violent
clashes with machineguns, accompanied by artillery fire’ which erupted in the northern countrysideof Manbij between forces of the Manbij Military Council and Turkish-backed factions.904
Finally, in the wake of tensions between the SDF and GoS in Qamishli that started on 2 January 2021905,
clashes erupted between GoS forces and Kurdish forces and militias in north-east Syria, and thetensions led to multiple sieges.906 GoS forces besieged the areas of Sheikh Maqsoud and Tal Rifaat in
Aleppo governorate in response to the siege imposed by the SDF on GoS-controlled areas of
Qamishli.907 The reciprocal blockades were eased gradually908 following a Russian-mediatedagreement to end the siege in Hasakah and Aleppo.909
A non-exhaustive list of security incidents that were reported to have taken place in SDF-controlledareas of Aleppo governorate in 2020 and early 2021 included the following:••

On 23 January 2021, reported ground-based strikes in Tall Rifaat caused four civilian deaths
and eight injuries.910
On 22 March 2021, the SOHR reported Turkish bases in Al-Bab city shelled several frontline
villages in the SDF-controlled areas in Aleppo governorate, including the village of Abbla, thesurrounding of Tal Rifaat, the village of Tal Jamil and the vicinity of Kafr Naya.911

Further information on the security situation in areas under control of Turkish-backed armed groups
is available in Section 1.5.3 Kurdish-controlled areas in north-east Syria
Israeli air strikes
In an article published on 22 April 2021, Reuters reported on an intensification of Israeli airstrikes thattargeted Iranian sites in Syria. The source quoted a Syrian military defector who stated that Israeli
airstrikes hit areas across Syria, including Aleppo.912 Reportedly, Israeli air strikes targeted positions of
GoS forces or Iran-backed militias in Al-Safireh in eastern Aleppo countryside on 5 May 2020913, in thevicinity of the artillery academy in Ramouseh, to the south of Aleppo city on 16 May 2020914, and Al-

901 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),

2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020), 18 February 2021, url, para. 6
902 Baladi, ‫[ مقتل عنرص من "الجيش الوطن" ف المواجهات مع "قسد" بريف حلب‬Death of a SNA fighter in skirmishes with SDF in Aleppo countryside], 9‫ي ي‬March 2021, url
903 Baladi, ‫ عفرين‬- ‫[ "قتىل من "قسد" وقصف صاروىح يقطع طريق "إعزاز‬Deaths among the “SDF” and a missile shelling blocks the A’zaz-Afrin road], 29‫ي‬March 2021, url
904 SOHR, Military escalation in Aleppo | Clashes erupt in Manbij, while regime forces and Turkish force trade fire in northerncountryside, 14 March 2021, url
905 Enab Baladi, “‫ الرد بالمظاهرات‬..‫[ قسد” تضغط عىل النظام بالحصار ف القامشىل‬SDF pressures the regime with siege in Qamishli.. Demonstrations in‫ي‬‫ي‬reaction], 12 January 2021, url
906 VOA, Fresh Clashes Erupt Between Kurdish, Government Forces in Northeast Syria, 31 January 2021, url
907 EPC, Dispute between the Kurdish Autonomous Administration and Al-Assad Regime in Al-Hasakah Governorate:
Background and Possibilities, 15 February 2021, url
908 AA, YPG/PKK, Assad regime mutually ease blockades, 3 February 2021, url
909 Al Monitor, Syrian government, SDF trade accusations of violations of Russian-mediated cease-fire, 8 February 2021, url
910 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020), 18 February 2021, url, p. 18
911 SOHR, Aleppo countryside | Turkish forces shell five villages and positions in Kurdish-held areas, 22 March 2021, url
912 Reuters, Israel intensifying air war in Syria against Iranian encroachment, 22 April 2021, url
913 France24, Syria says Israeli jets attacked military outposts near Aleppo, 5 May 2020, url
914 Al-Arabiya, ‫[ سماع دوي انفجارات ف حلب السورية‬Explosions were heard in the Syrian city of Aleppo], 20 May 2020, url‫ي‬96Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Safireh military complex, known for its production and storage of ballistic missiles and chemical
weapons, in Aleppo governorate on 11 September 2020.915
Security incidents
During the reporting period, there were 2 405 security incidents recorded by ACLED in Aleppo
governorate, of whom 1 556 were coded as explosions/remote violence, 601 battles and 248 incidents
of violence against civilians. According to ACLED’s dataset, Aleppo recorded the second highest
number of security incidents between 1 January 2020 and 31 March 2021 after Idlib governorate.

Figure 17. Evolution of security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in Aleppo
governorate in between 1 January 2020 and 31 March 2021, based on ACLED data916

Security incidents were recorded in all Aleppo governorate districts during the reporting period, withthe highest number of overall incidents being recorded in Jebel Saman, A’zaz and Afrin. The largest
number of battles took place in Jebel Saman, A’zaz, and Al Bab, while most incidents involving
explosions/remote violence were documented in Jebel Saman, A’zaz and Afrin. Incidents of violenceagainst civilians were particularly prevalent in Afrin (see Figure 18).
Aleppo governorate – Security incidents
RemoteViolence against
District
Battlesviolence
civilians
135
70
189
Afrin
6
4
15
Ain Al Arab
37
98
113
Al Bab2
3
5
As-Safira
39
128
507
A’zaz
5
35
33
Jarablus
15222
620
Jebel Saman
9
41
74
Menbij
248
601
1556
Total
Figure 18. Security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in Aleppo governorate
between 1 January 2020 and 31 March 2021. Breakdown by district based on ACLED data

915 ISW, Syria Situation Report: September 2 - 15, 2020, 18 September 2020, url
916 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (9 April 2021), url

97Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Civilian fatalities
In 2020, Aleppo had between 390917 (SNHR data)918 and 446 civilian fatalities (VDC data)919, the second
highest number of civilian fatalities recorded by SNHR, and the highest number recorded by VDC outof all governorates in Syria. Most civilian fatalities during 2020 were recorded in the months of January
and February.
In the first three months of 2021, VDC recorded 73 civilian fatalities in Aleppo governorate, while
SNHR recorded 104 civilian fatalities.
Month
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
AugustSeptember
OctoberNovember
December
Total

VDC 2020
74
117
23
56
31
14
26
13
21
42
22
7
446

SNHR 2020
66
77
15
9
58
20
29
12
22
35
36
11
390

VDC 2021222031

SNHR 2021
12
60
32

73

104

Figure 19. Civilian fatalities as a result of armed conflict in Aleppo governorate in 2020 and the first three months of 2021.
Monthly breakdown based on VDC and SNHR data

According to AOAV, in 2020 Aleppo was the worst impacted governorate by explosive violence, with
1 287 civilian casualties recorded, an increase from 2019 when AOAV recorded 1 259 civilian
casualties.920
Infrastructure damage and explosives remnants of war
In a report published in 2020, the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia
(ESCWA) and the University of St Andrews included Aleppo governorate in the group of governorates
917 In a January 2021 report, SNHR mentions 402 civilian fatalities in Aleppo in 2020. This figure is the result of a revision of

their data. EASO email correspondence with SNHR, 22 April 2021. See SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 1,734
Civilians in Syria in 2020, including 99 in December, 1 January 2021, url, p. 12918 Based on data extracted from monthly reports on civilian casualties published by SNHR. See: SNHR, 286 Civilians, including
Four Medical and Civil Defense Personnel, Documented Killed in Syria in January 2020, 1 February 2020, url, p. 8; SNHR, 276
Civilians, including Six Medical Personnel and Two Media Workers, Documented Killed in Syria in February 2020, 1 March
2020, url, p. 8; SNHR, 145 Civilians, including Two Medical Personnel, Documented Killed in Syria in March 2020, 1 April 2020,
url, p. 9; SNHR, 78 Civilians, including One Media Workers, Documented Killed in Syria in April 2020, 1 May 2020, url, p. 10;
SNHR, 125 Civilians Documented Killed in Syria in May 2020, including Eight Who Died Due to Torture and One Massacre, 1June 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, 1,006 Civilians, including three Media Workers and 12 Medical and Civil Defense Personnel,
Documented Killed in Syria in the First Half of 2020, 1 July 2020, url, p. 16; SNHR, 107 Civilians, including 26 Children and 11
Women, Documented Killed in Syria in July 2020, 2 August 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, 122 Civilians, including 21 Children andSeven Women, Documented Killed in Syria in August 2020, 1 September 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims
the Lives of 102 Civilians, including 15 Children, 10 Women, Three Medical Personnel and 12 Victims Due to Torture, 1
October 2020, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 126 Civilians, including 18 Children, Eight Women, One
Media Worker and 10 Victims Due to Torture, 1 November 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 172
Civilians, including 16 Children, 11 Women, and 30 Victims Due to Torture, 1 December 2020, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial
Killing Claims the Lives of 1,734 Civilians in Syria in 2020, including 99 in December, 1 January 2021, url, p. 14919 Based on monthly civilian fatalities figures for 2020-2021 shared by VDC with EASO
920 AOAV, Explosive Violence Monitor 2020, March 2021, url, p. 12

98

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situationthat sustained the highest damage to physical capital.921 Within this group, Aleppo sustained thehighest percentage of the total damage (32.5 %). The source stated that this high percentage ‘can be
explained by factors including urban size, population density and their large capital stock, mainly
industrial and infrastructure’ as well as by the longer periods of fighting in comparison with othergovernorates.922
Based on the Syria Multi-sector Needs Assessment of 2020, the Shelter Cluster assessed that in Aleppo
governorate, 28.3 % of the population was living in damaged buildings.923
In Aleppo city, as of December 2016, around 63 % of healthcare facilities have been damaged or
destroyed – with 35 % being completely destroyed. As of February 2017, almost 15 million tons ofdebris were left in the city which would take an estimated six years to clear.924 In February 2017 it wasestimated that the total cost of the damage to Aleppo city ranges somewhere between USD 6.2 billion
and USD 7.6 billion – 66 % of this is attributed to housing.925 Electricity in Aleppo city was supplied
primarily from generators and only private hospitals were reported to operate.926 According to areport dated 6 February 2019, access to functional water networks was reportedly limited, only three
in ten households could rely on the water network.927
SOHR observed that a considerable number of IDPs returned to their areas of origin in eastern Aleppo
city, ‘despite the prevalent destruction’. Reportedly, many returnees resided in inhabitable anddamaged buildings, and dozens were injured when their damaged buildings collapsed.928 The UKbased media outlet, the National929, stated on 29 March 2021 that the eastern part of Aleppo city‘remains in ruins, largely deserted and lacking in state services’. Residents of the area, cited by thesource, believed that the neglect from which the eastern part of the city suffered was ‘a form ofcollective punishment by the state in what was once the rebels’ most powerful stronghold’.930 On
28 August 2020, Enab Baladi shared pictures of the ‘destruction scenes in Salaheddine district in
Aleppo city’.931
The GoS authorised a small-scale rehabilitation of some historical sites in Old Aleppo, overseen by the
Aga Khan Foundation together with the Syrian Trust for Development and by the Russian charity,
Akhmad Kadyrov Foundation. Moreover, the activities of the United Nations Development Program(UNDP) were limited to the rehabilitation of a number of shops in four historical markets in Old
Aleppo.932 According to the Guardian, the Aga Khan Foundation supported the reconstruction of someof the markets, while foreign congregations helped to restore a number of churches.933 Furthermore,

921 ESCWA and University of St Andrews, Syria at War: Eight Years On, 2020, url, p. 50; The source defines loss to physicalcapital as including ‘private and public construction and equipment, such as housing stock, schools, hospitals and factories,
and power, water, sanitation, transport and communications infrastructure’. ESCWA and University of St Andrews, Syria at
War: Eight Years On, 2020, url, p. 49
922 ESCWA and University of St Andrews, Syria at War: Eight Years On, url, p. 50
923 Global Shelter Cluster, Syrian Arab Republic: Whole of Syria Shelter/NFI Sector Humanitarian Needs Overview 2021, 1
March 2021, url, pp. 6, 8
924 World Bank (The), The Toll of War: The Economic and Social Consequences of the Conflict in Syria, 2017, url, pp. 27, 39
925 World Bank (The), Syria Damage Assessment: of selected cities Aleppo, Hama, Idlib, March 2017, url, pp. iv, vi
926 New York Times (The), What ‘Victory’ Looks Like: A Journey Through Shattered Syria, 21 August 2019, url
927 World Bank (The), The Mobility of Displaced Syrians an Economic and Social Analysis, 6 February 2019, url, p. 137
928 SOHR, ‫المعيش‬‫ر‬‫ مخلفات اآللة العسكرية تحصد أرواح ر‬:‫ سنوات من سيطرة النظام السوري‬4 ‫الشقية بعد‬‫[ أحياء حلب ر‬Eastern Aleppo‫أمن وسطوة “الشبيحة” تؤزم الواقع‬‫عشات‬‫ر‬‫ وأزمات وفلتان ي‬..‫المواطني‬‫ي‬neighbourhoods after 4 years in the control of the Syrian regime: remnants of the military machine claim dozens of lives..
Crises, lawlessness and influence of Shabiha complicate life], 21 December 2020, url
929 National (The), About us, n. d., url
930 National (The), East Aleppo: Syria's former rebel bastion languishes in ruins, 29 March 2021, url
931 Enab Baladi, Destruction scenes in Salaheddine district in Aleppo, 28 August 2020, url
932 Syria Direct, ‫ ترميم انتقان مرتجل يهدد هوية المدينة التاريخية‬:‫[ آثار حلب‬Aleppo ruins: selective and improvised rehabilitation that jeopardises the‫ي‬historical identity of the city], 1 February 2021, url
933 Guardian (The), How Syria's blasted landmarks are starting to rise from the ruins, 29 August 2020, url

99Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

those with enough money in Aleppo city have repaired their homes or businesses to the best of theirabilities, and some cafés have opened, but no organised reconstruction project has been initiated.934
In western Aleppo countryside, the offensive to retake Idlib and the use of ‘explosive weapons withwide-area effects, including barrel bombs, in populated areas’ in north-west Syria caused destruction
and damage to civilian infrastructure, including healthcare facilities935, and left frontline areas close
to strategic locations in ruins.’936 REACH stated that the conflict ‘severely affected shelter conditions
for households residing in the assessed communities of return’ and that the ‘presence of completely
destroyed occupied shelters and severely damaged occupied shelters was reported in 72% and 79%
of communities, respectively’. The source, however, did not specify the percentages of damaged
shelters in the assessed communities in Aleppo governorate.937 A recent attack in western Aleppo
countryside took place on 21 March 2021, when artillery shelling targeted a hospital in Atareb andcaused six deaths and 16 injuries.938
Syria Recovery Trust Fund (SRTF), ‘a multi-donor trust fund initiated by the Group of Friends of the
Syrian People and its Working Group on Economic Recovery and Development’939, stated that innorthern Aleppo governorate, a ‘considerable amount of damage has been caused to theinfrastructure due to the growing population […] due to internal displacement which overloaded theinfrastructure and increased pressure on the distribution network.’940
In its situation report published on 2 March 2021, UNOCHA observed that the prevalence of explosive
hazards in residential areas and public spaces in north-west Syria ‘continues to be a particular risk tocivilians’. UNOCHA added that between 20 January and 23 February 2021, there have been seven IED
explosions and two incidents of ERW in north-west Syria that resulted in civilian casualties.941 WFP
also mentioned the existence of explosive hazards in north-west Syria.942 In Afrin, ACAPS, citing a key
informant interviewed on 26 January 2021, stated that the high prevalence of explosive hazards was
one of the reasons that resulted in ‘very high protection needs, especially for women, children, andthe Kurdish population’.943
A non-exhaustive list of incidents of explosive hazards that impacted civilians across Aleppo
governorate in 2020 and early 2021 included the following:••

On 17 March 2020, a boy was killed, and his father injured in a reported landmine explosion
in a field outside Ain Al-Arab in north-eastern Aleppo countryside.944
On 8 April 2020, two civilians were injured in the detonation of two landmines in the villagesof Alawshah and Tall Susin in northern Aleppo countryside.945

934 New Humanitarian (The), In Syria’s Aleppo, a slow rebuild begins, 30 January 2019, url
935 HRW, "Targeting Life in Idlib": Syrian and Russian Strikes on Civilian Infrastructure, 15 October 2020, url
936 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 3September 2020, url, para. 17
937 REACH, Northwest Syria - Conditions in Communities of Return Idleb, Aleppo, Hama June 2020, 17 July 2020, url, p. 4;
REACH collected data between 5 and 17 June 2020 from 3 – 5 key informants per assessed location covering 12 subdistricts
in northwestern Syria, including Daret Izza and Atarib in Aleppo governorate. REACH, Northwest Syria - Conditions in
Communities of Return Idleb, Aleppo, Hama June 2020, 17 July 2020, url, p. 1
938 IRC, Syria: IRC statement on hospital attack in western Aleppo, 21 March 2021, url
939 SRTF, Overview, n. d., url
940 SRTF, Rehabilitation of Water and Sanitation Infrastructure in a District in Northern Aleppo – Phase I, 30 November 2020,url
941 UNOCHA, Recent Developments in Northwest Syria Situation Report No. 25 - As of 26 February 2021, 26 February 2021,
url, p. 2
942 WFP, Syrian Arab Republic: mVAM Bulletin Issue no. 51, 31 December 2020, url, p. 1
943 ACAPS, Humanitarian needs in Afrin, 3 March 2021, url, p. 3
944 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020), 23 April 2020, url, p. 18
945 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020), 24 June 2020, url, p. 17

100

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

•
•

•
•
•
•

On 12 April 2020, the reported detonation of UXO resulted in the death of a civilian in Kafr
Nouran in western rural Aleppo.946
On 29 June 2020, a landmine reportedly detonated in Shu’ayb near Jarabulus and caused thedeath of a boy and the injury of another. Another landmine reportedly detonated in an
agricultural land in the Sukkariyah village in eastern rural Aleppo on 30 June 2020 and injured
two boys. 947
On 16 July 2020, an UXO detonated in Afrin city, injuring two boys who were playing with it.948
On 23 July 2020, three child siblings were killed, and 11 civilians were injured when a weapon
depot exploded near the ‘Armutah’ IDP camp near the village of Shamarin in A’zaz area.949
On 26 September 2020, a reported landmine detonated in an agricultural land in the villageof Qasim in north-western rural Aleppo and resulted in the injury of two civilians.950
On 10 March 2021, one child was killed, and three others injured when a landmine detonatedin Al-Myassar neighbourhood in the eastern part of Aleppo city.951

Mine Action Review stated that the Syrian Civil Defence conducted 289 cluster munition remnants(CMR) clearance tasks in Aleppo governorate in 2019 and destroyed 372 submunitions and 46 UXO.
The report also stated that Russian troops trained SAA engineers on mine clearance in a training centre
established in Aleppo in 2017.952
Displacement and return
In its Humanitarian Needs Overview of 2021, UNOCHA stated that as of August 2020, Aleppo
governorate had 1 235 200 IDPs.953 Between January and December 2020, Aleppo ranked as thesecond governorate in terms of IDP movements in Syria after Idlib, registering 690 000 IDP movementsfrom or within the governorate, 726 000 IDP movements to or within the governorate and 475 000
IDP movements within the governorate.954 The largest numbers occurred in January (around 132 600
IDPs, including 86 100 people arriving from within Aleppo governorate and 46 400 IDPs from Idlib
governorate) and February (around 291 000 IDPs, including 224 000 people arriving from within
Aleppo governorate and 66 000 from Idlib governorate).955 This displacement wave coincided with themilitary operations whereby the forces of the GoS, backed by Russian air force, recaptured several
towns and villages in the north-western countryside of Aleppo, and consolidated their control in thegovernorate.956 Moreover, the CoI observed that by mid-February 2020, nearly 160 000 IDPs fled thearea of Atarib and its environs in western Aleppo due to the military operations in western rural

946 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),

2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020), 24 June 2020, url, p. 17
947 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020), 20 August 2020, url, p. 18
948 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020), 20 August 2020, url, p. 19
949 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020), 20 August 2020, url, p. 19
950 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020), 14 October 2020, url, p. 17
951 ARTA, ‫[ وفاة طفل وإصابة ثالثة آخرين إثر انفجار لغم من مخلفات الحرب ف حلب‬Death of one child and injury of three others in the detonation of an ERW‫ي‬mine in Aleppo], 10 March 2021, url
952 Mine Action Review, Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2020, 1 October 2020, url, p. 168
953 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, March 2021, url, p. 14
954 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic. IDP Movements Overview, Jan – Dec 2020, 16 February 2021, url
955 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements January 2020, 25 February 2020, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP
Movements February 2020, 6 April 2020, url
956 Al Jazeera, Syrian army strengthens Aleppo grip before Russia-Turkey talks, 16 February 2020, url; Reuters, Syrian forces
consolidate control of Aleppo, air strikes under way, 17 February 2020, url; Arab News, Assad’s forces take over Aleppo amid
fears of ‘catastrophe’, 18 February 2020, url; ISW, Syria Situation Report: February 5 - 18, 2020, 21 February 2020, url

101

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Aleppo.957 The UN Security Council report of 23 April 2020 stated that around 400 000 IDPs moved to‘areas in northern Aleppo Governorate, including I‘zaz, Afrin, Jindayris and Bab’.958 UNOCHA observedthat the ‘relative calm’ following the ceasefire agreement of March 2020 was likely the driver behind
the IDPs movements registered in April959, May960, and June 2020961, ‘as many IDPs who have been
displaced from southern Idleb and western Aleppo governorates during the hostilities between
December 2019 and March 2020 returned to sub-districts near frontlines.’962
In 2021, UNOCHA reported on around 15 000 IDP movements (from locations within and from outside
the governorate) in January and around 12 200 IDP movements (from locations within and fromoutside the governorate) in February.963 In March 2021, UNOCHA reported around 19 300 IDP
movements from or within Aleppo governorate, 15 500 of which being recorded within thegovernorate.964
As regards the return movements in Aleppo governorate, UNOCHA indicated that in 2020 there were
145 000 IDP return movements from or within the governorate, 128 000 IDP return movements to orwithin the governorate and 101 000 IDP return movements within governorate.965 In April 2020,
UNOCHA observed a significant increase in spontaneous returns in Syria, most likely due to the‘relative calm observed on the ground’ following the ceasefire agreement of March 2020. The source
stated that IDPs from western Aleppo and Idlib governorates ‘began to gradually return to their areasof origin’, and in Aleppo governorate, the number of returnees was around 20 000 (from locations
within and outside the governorate).966 The CoI observed that most of the returns that took place after
the ceasefire agreement were documented in areas that ‘remained under the control of armed
groups’. The CoI added that around 140 000 IDPs displaced since December 2019 returned to areas in
Idlib and western Aleppo governorates, of whom 30 000 to Atarib.967 In its report of 24 June 2020, thereport of the UN Secretary-General stated that the return of IDPs in areas not controlled by the GoS
in Idlib and Aleppo governorates continued, with more than 180 000 IDPs returning to areas including
Atarib, Daret Izza and Taftanaz in rural Aleppo. The source added that a humanitarian assessment
mission to Huraytan subdistrict found that ‘limited returns’ of around 5 000 people took place in thearea. Reportedly, ‘the scale of destruction to residential property and public infrastructure and thedire lack of public services posed a major impediment to civilian returns.’968
In 2021, UNOCHA reported on 2 241 spontaneous returns (from locations within and outside thegovernorate) in January and 3 658 spontaneous returns (from locations within and outside the957 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 3September 2020, url, para. 64
958 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020), 23 April 2020, url, para. 5; see also: UN Human Rights
Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 3 September 2020, url,para. 59959 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements April 2020, 31 May 2020, url
960 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements May 2020, 25 June 2020, url
961 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements June 2020, 23 July 2020, url
962 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements May 2020, 25 June 2020, url
963 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements January 2021, 4 March 2021, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP
Movements February 2021, 1 April 2021, url
964 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, IDP Movements. March 2021, 12 May 2021, url
965 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic. IDP Spontaneous Returns Stock and Flow Data, Jan – Dec, 2019, url
966 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns April 2020, 2 June 2020, url
967 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 3September 2020, url, para. 79
968 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020), 24 June 2020, url, para. 6

102

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

governorate) in February.969 In March 2021, UNOCHA reported 2 600 spontaneous IDP returns to orwithin Aleppo governorate.970

969 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP movements and IDP spontaneous return movements data [second sheet tab –Summary since 2016], updated 1 April 2021, url
970 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic. IDP Spontaneous Returns. March 2021, 12 May 2021, url

103Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

2.3 Hama governorate

Map 8: © MapAction, Hama governorate971

2.3.1 General description of the governorate
Hama governorate is located in the central region of Syria and has internal borders with thegovernorates of Latakia and Tartous to the west, Idlib, Aleppo and Raqqa to the north, and Homs to
the south.972 The surface of the governorate is 10 180 km2, and it comprises five districts: Hama,
Misyaf [Masyaf], Muhardah [Muhradah], Suqailbiya [As-Suqaylabiyah], and Salamiyah [As-Salamiyeh].
It also comprises six cities, 27 towns, 578 villages, and 658 farms.973
The latest census conducted by the Central Bureau of Statistics in Syria was in 2004, and according towhich, the number of residents in Hama governorate was 1 384 953.974 The Syrian Central Bureau of
Statistics estimated the population of Hama governorate in 2019 to be 2 082 000.975 In a March 2021
report, UNOCHA estimated the population of Hama governorate to be of 1 487 074.976 With regards
to the capital of the governorate, the CIA estimated that the population of Hama city was 940 000 in
2021.977

971 MapAction, Hama governorate, 29 July 2016, url
972 UNCS and UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Reference Map, 17 January 2013, url
973 Al-Wahda, ‫[ حماه‬Hama], n.d., url
974 Syria, Central Bureau of Statistics, General Census, 2004, url
975 Syria, Central Bureau of Statistics, Estimate of the population in Syria by governorates, n.d., url
976 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview. Syrian Arab Republic, March 2021, url, p. 23
977 CIA, World Factbook, Syria, last updated: 3 May 2021, url

104

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

According to Fabrice Balanche, Sunni Muslims constituted the majority of the residents of Hama city,while Alawites are particularly absent from the city due to the hostility of its residents towards thisminority.978 The western countryside, on the other hand, is more diverse, and is ‘full of Alawite,
Christian, and Ismaili villages’.979 Syria’s Ismailis are concentrated in the area of Salamiya in eastern
Hama.980 Additionally, the governorate has a Christian presence981, particularly in the town of
Muhardah, which is ‘predominantly Christian’.982

2.3.2 Conflict background and armed actors
Hama governorate was impacted by the ‘early civil unrest in Syria’ and received a large number of
IDPs due to its proximity to areas of high tension.983 According to UNOCHA, Hama was ’amongst the
few governorates that were influenced by the early civil unrest in Syria’ and that since the start of2012, in Hama, ‘serious armed confrontations between opposition armed groups and GoS forces’
occurred984, the urban centre of Hama city witnessed limited fighting and has remained ’firmly’ under
the control of GoS.985 The totality of the city came under the control of the GoS forces in 2014, andthe northern and eastern countryside was captured by the opposition. Some areas were particularly
contested, such as those around Muhardah, Madiq Castle, Kafr Zeita, Talaf, and Aqrab.986 Between
2014 and 2017, several offensives and clashes occurred between government forces and oppositiongroups.987 The SAA and Iranian-backed militias intensified their operations in the governorate in2017.988
In a press release dated 19 February 2019, OHCHR observed an increase in ‘infighting amongst nonState actors and in the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in areas they control, including by
the extremist group, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS)’.989 BBC reported in February 2019 that the HTS‘swept through towns and villages in Idlib province, as well as adjoining parts of Aleppo and Hama’and forced some rebel factions out and others to surrender and recognise its ‘civil administration’.990
Moreover, a DIS/DRC report dated February 2019 reported on clashes between pro-GoS militias and
GoS forces, and on infighting between pro-GoS armed groups in Hama governorate. According to thesource, some of these clashes escalated to the use of heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled
grenades (RPGs) and caused casualties among civilians.991
In April 2019, the GoS forces’ bombardment of areas controlled by HTS in northern Hama
intensified.992 According to ACLED’s Regional Review of June 2019, clashes in northern Hama between
GoS forces and rebel groups continued amid ‘intensive airstrikes conducted by Russian and regime
forces’. However, the attempts of GoS forces to advance in opposition-held areas in northern Hama

978 Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2018, url, p. 6
979 Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2018, url, p. 43
980 Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2018, url, p. 15
981 USDOS, 2019 Report on International Religious Freedom: Syria, 10 June 2020, url, p. 4
982 Al Masdar News, Syrian Christians hold mass in Mhardeh town as life in north Hama gradually normalizes, 8 May 2017,url
983 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Governorates Profile, June 2014, url, p. 16
984 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Governorates Profile, June 2014, url, p. 16
985 World Bank (The), Syria Damage Assessment: of selected cities Aleppo, Hama, Idlib, March 2017, url, p. 12
986 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Governorates Profile, June 2014, url, p. 16
987 Washington Institute, Russia's Military Strategy in Syria Becoming Clearer as Its Forces Engage in Combat, 9 October 2015,

url; RFE/RL, Russian-Speaking Militants Prepare To Fight Assad In Hama, 22 October 2015, url; Syria Direct, Rebel
commanders: Hama offensive to ‘relieve pressure on Aleppo’, 1 September 2016, url; SOHR, Continued clashes in Hama
countryside, 3 April 2017, https://www.syriahr.com/en/64056/
988 MEI, Syrian Army, Iran-Controlled Militias Intensify Operations in Hama Province, 14 April 2017, url
989 OHCHR, Syria: Bachelet alarmed by upsurge in attacks and civilian casualties in Idlib, 19 February 2019, url
990 BBC News, Syria war: Jihadist takeover in rebel-held Idlib sparks alarm, 26 February 2019, url
991 DIS/DRC, Syria: Security Situation in Damascus Province and Issues Regarding Return to Syria, February 2019, url, p. 10
992 New Arab (The), Syrian regime offensive leaves 26 dead in Hama, 6 May 2019, url

105

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

were unsuccessful.993 Human Rights Watch stated that between 26 April and 3 June 2019, Syrian andRussian forces ‘carried out hundreds of attacks every day across areas in the Idlib, Hama, and Aleppo
governorates’, and used banned weapons and barrel bombs.994 By the end of June 2019 the SAA
brought ‘massive military reinforcements of heavy machinery, forces, in addition to military andlogistic equipment to the north-western countryside of Hama province’.995
In August 2019, the GoS accused rebel groups in north-western Syria of violating the Astanaagreement and resumed military operations and air raids in the area, causing civilian deaths.996 Laterthat month, the SAA encircled a cluster of rebel-held towns in Hama countryside and imposed a siege
on the area. Allegedly, the SAA opened a humanitarian corridor in the village of Suran for civilians toleave the region.997 The German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) stated that on
23 August 2019 the SAA ‘announced the conquest of Kafr Zeita, Latamneh, Latmin, Lahaya and Morek’
and that Hama province was ‘considered to be fully under the control of the regime’.998 On
24 August 2019, the Iranian Al-Alam TV reported that the SAA captured Latamneh in northern Hamaand secured the main towns in Hama countryside which were exposed to rebels’ rockets. According
to the source, the vast majority of northern Hama countryside was recaptured by the SAA by then.999
Towards the end of 2019, ‘an escalation of military operations in north-west Syria’, including in thenorthern part of Hama governorate was reported by different sources.1000
As of March 2021, the GoS controlled most of Hama governorate excluding a small swath of territory
in the north-western part of the province.1001 (see also Map 4).
Syrian Arab Army and affiliated armed groups
Recent information on SAA deployments in Hama governorate could not be found among the sources
consulted by EASO within time constraints. Units of the SAA were reported to be present in Hama
governorate in early March 2020. 1002 For deployments of the SAA in Hama governorate as of
3 April 2020 see the EASO COI Report: Syria - Security situation ( May 2020)
Al-Modon, in an article published on 15 May 2019, also referred to the deployment of the 5th Corps,
the 1st Division, the 11th Division, the 9th Division, and 79th Battalion in Hama governorate.1003
In its report of 3 September 2020, the CoI stated that the Hama Military Airbase was used to launch
an air strike on a commercial area in Idlib city that killed at least 19 civilians on 15 January 2020. The
report stated that ‘consisting with witness statements, flight spotters’ reports and overflight dataobtained by the Commission, indicate that a Syrian MiG 23 (Flogger) departed from Hama Military
Airbase at 2:06 p.m. hours and was observed flying towards Idlib city at the time of the attack on AlHal market.’1004

993 ACLED, Regional Overview – Middle East, 5 June 2019, url, p. 2
994 HRW, Russia/Syria: Flurry of Prohibited Weapons Attacks, 3 June 2019, url
995 Asharq Al-Awsat, Syrian Regime Brings Massive Military Reinforcements to Hama Countryside, 25 June 2019, url
996 Al Monitor, Syrian regime pays heavy price for two strategic towns in Hama, 9 August 2019, url
997 Al Jazeera, Syria’s army encircles rebels in Hama, imposing ‘choking siege’, 23 August 2019, url
998 Germany, BAMF, Briefing Notes, 26 August 2019, url, p. 6
999 Al-Alam TV, ‫[ الجيش السوري يقض عىل "مثلث الموت" و يسيطر عىل ريف حماة الشمال بالكامل‬Syrian Army eliminates the “Death Triangle” and Recaptures‫ي‬‫ي‬

the Entirety of Hama’s Northern Countryside], 24 August 2019, url
1000 Netherlands, Country of origin information report Syria, May 2020, url, p. 10; North Press, Intensive Russian airstrikes,
clashes in the de-escalation zones, 7 November 2019, url; UN News, Amidst uptick in violence and displacement, UN chiefcalls for ‘immediate cessation of hostilities’ in Syria, 24 December 2019, url
1001 Based on reading of maps in ISW, Syria Situation Report: February 19 – March 22, 2021, 25 March 2021, url; Liveuamap,
Syria, 26 March 2021, url
1002 Waters, G., Current Syrian Army Deployments, International Review, 13 December 2019, url
1003 Al Modon, ‫[ خريطة االنتشار العسكري ف جبهات ادلب و محيطها‬Map of military deployments on Idlib Fronts and the Adjacent Parts], 15 May‫ي‬2019, url
1004 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
3 September 2020, url, Annex III, paras. 9, 12

106

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Northern Hama was the core territory of the Tiger Forces, and the following sub-groups werereportedly present in the governorate: the Taha Regiment (which was from Sahl Al-Ghab), Sheikh
Mubarak Regiment (on the Abu Dali axis), the Tarmeh Regiment (outside its hometown of Qomhana),
Sahabat Regiment (near the town of Kawkab), and the Hawareth Regiment (in Sahl Al-Ghab).1005 AlModon stated that the Tiger Forces came second in terms of density and deployment in Hama
governorate. The source mentioned the following regiments that maintained a presence in thegovernorate: Tarmeh, Hawashem, Elite, and Hawareth.1006 The Tiger Forces are also known as the 25th
Special Mission Forces Division1007, and they were reportedly involved in targeting a Turkish convoy ofvehicles that was heading to evacuate a Turkish observation post in Hama countryside on
18 October 2020.1008 In addition to the Tiger Forces, sources referred to the presence of Al-Ghawar
militia (which is allegedly affiliated with the 4th Division)1009, the NDF, and Al-Quds Brigade in rural
Hama.1010
In an article about private security companies in Syria published on 10 September 2020, Manhal
Baresh stated that a category of such companies inherited dissolved loyalist militias, and maintained
presence in several governorates including Hama.1011 Another category comprised companies
affiliated with Russia, such as IS Hunters which was headquartered in Hama governorate.1012 The
company was ‘overseen entirely’ by the Wagner group and participated in battles against ISIL in theeastern Hama governorate.1013
Anti-GoS armed groups
In a report published on 20 January 2020, the UN Security Council, citing UN Member States, reportedon military operations and attacks conducted by Hurras al-Din (HAD) in different governorates
including Hama.1014 However, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) ‘continued to consolidate its control innorth-western Syria’ and on 27 July 2020, the group took over the military positions of HAD and the
Fathbatou Operations Room1015 along Al-Ghab Plain in Hama governorate.1016
An anonymous military observer, cited by Enab Baladi on 5 February 2021, stated that a group called
Ansar Al-Turkistan maintained eight military points in Al-Ghab Plain in western Hama governorate.
According to the source, the group is affiliated with the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) and comprised
1005 Waters, G., Understanding Syria’s Military Deployments in Idlib, International Review, 10 March 2019, url
1006 Al Modon, ‫[ خريطة االنتشار العسكري ف جبهات ادلب و محيطها‬Map of military deployments on Idlib Fronts and the Adjacent Parts], 15 May‫ي‬2019, url
1007 According to Enab Baladi, the group changed its name from the Tiger Forces to the ‘25th Special Mission Forces Division’ً‫[ إعالم روس ر‬Russian media
in August 2019 and was trained by Russian forces in Syria. Enab Baladi, ‫صورا لسهيل الحسن مع قوات خاصة روسية‬
‫ينش‬
‫ي‬
publish pictures of Suheil Al-Hasan with Russian special forces], 22 March 2021, url
1008 NPA, Russian-backed Syrian government forces target Turkish convoy in Syria, 18 October 2020, urlًً1009 Al-Abdullah, H., ‫وضباطا آخرين‬‫عميدا ف ر‬‫الشطة‬‫تهي وتأش‬‫[ ميليشيات تابعة لقوات األسد ر‬Militias affiliated with Assad forces humiliate and detain a police‫ي‬brigadier-general and other officers], 18 November 2019, url
1010 Al Modon, ‫[ خريطة االنتشار العسكري ف جبهات ادلب و محيطها‬Map of military deployments on Idlib Fronts and the Adjacent Parts], 15 May‫ي‬2019, url
1011 Baresh, M., Private Security Companies in Syria: New Agents at the Regime’s Service, European University Institute, 10
September 2020, url, p. 81012 Baresh, M., Private Security Companies in Syria: New Agents at the Regime’s Service, European University Institute, 10
September 2020, url, p. 17; Omran for Strategic Studies, Profiling Top Private Security Companies in Syria, 11 February 2019,url
1013 Baresh, M., Private Security Companies in Syria: New Agents at the Regime’s Service, European University Institute, 10
September 2020, url, p. 181014 UN Security Council, Letter dated 20 January 2020 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant toresolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida andassociated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council, 20 January 2020,
url, para. 171015 Fathbatou Operations Room is a ‘coalition of armed opposition groups, including Hurras al Din, Ansar al Islam, Ansar alDin, Tansiqiyat Al-Jihad, and Liwa Al-Muqatileen Al-Ansar’. Carter Center (The), WEEKLY CONFLICT SUMMARY | 27 July - 2
August 2020, 2 August 2020, url, FN. 6
1016 Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary | 27 July - 2 August 2020, 2 August 2020, url, p. 2

107

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

dozens of fighters who had defected from other factions such as Ahrar Al-Sham, HTS, and the FSA.1017
Moreover, Enab Baladi and Syria TV reported that a rebel faction called ‘Ansar Al-Tawheed’ targeteda Russian military command centre in Kafr Nabal in Idlib governorate in retaliation for the killing of 11
of the group’s militants by Russian forces in western Hama governorate in January 2021.1018
RussiaJusoor for Studies1019 stated on 6 January 2021 that Russia had 23 military bases and posts in Hama
governorate; the highest number out of all governorates according to the source. A map shared by
the source showed that the concentration of the Russian military sites was in the north of thegovernorate.1020
The Syrian opposition news agency, Orient, stated that Russian officers positioned in Hama military
airport dismantled what was known as ‘the Idlib Liberation Operations Room’ which operated fromthe airport and included Iran-backed militias, namely Al-Baqer Brigade, Al-Quds Brigade, the Syrian
Hezbollah, and remnants of Soqur Al-Sahra’a and Maghaweer Al-Bahr. According to the source, theRussian forces expelled those groups from the airport, accusing them of treason, ‘leaking coordinates
and information to Israeli jet fighters’, and facilitating the mobility of ISIL fighters in rural Hama.1021
On 28 February 2021, Orient stated that the Hama military airport was transformed into a Russian
military base and that Russia started to withdraw its forces from the city of Saraqeb, in Idlib
governorate, to the airport in Hama.1022
Iran and Iran-backed militias
According to Jusoor for Studies, Iran had six military bases and posts in Hama governorate. A map
shared by the source showed that Iranian military sites were present in Hama city and in the northernpart of the governorate.1023
As regards Hezbollah, Jusoor for Studies stated that the group had four military sites in Hama,
comprising points that were independent, joint or semi-shared with Iranian forces.1024 On 4 June 2019,
the Syrian platform SY24, shared a list of the prominent locations in Hama governorate in which
Iranian militias were allegedly deployed. The list included locations in Misyaf, az-Zawiya, Ma’rin
Mount, Shalyout village, Qomhana, and Salamiya. The source also referred to the existence ofrecruitment offices recruiting young men into militias affiliated with the IRGC.1025

1017 Enab Baladi, ‫التكستان” بقصف قوات النظام ف سهل الغاب‬‫[ قتىل وجرىح من “أنصار ر‬Deaths and injuries from Ansar Al-Turkistan in a GoS forces shelling‫ي‬in Al-Ghab Plain], 5 February 2021, url
1018 Enab Baladi, ‫روسيا ف كفرنبل‬ًً ‫[ فصيل يقول إنه استهدف‬A faction said that it targeted a Russian premise in Kafr Nabal], 7 February 2021,‫مقرا‬‫ي‬url; Syria TV, "‫جنون إدلب‬
‫نبل‬
‫ر‬
‫كف‬
‫ف‬
‫[ أنصار التوحيد" يقصف مقر العمليات‬Ansar Al-Tawheed shells the Russian operations command centre in Kafr
‫ي‬
‫الروس ي‬‫ي‬Nabal in southern Idlib], 7 February 2021, url
1019 ‘An independent institution specializing in information management and conducting studies and research related to the
Syrian political and social affairs in particular and the Middle East region in general’. Jusoor for Studies, About us, n. d., url
1020 Jusoor for Studies, Map of the Military Bases and Posts of Foreign Forces in Syria, 6 January 2021, url
1021 Orient, ‫ االحتالل الروس يحيل قادة ميليشيات أسد لمحاكم ميدانية ويسقط غرفة "تحرير إدلب‬:‫[ "إقصاء واتهامات بالخيانة‬Expulsion and accusations of treason: Russian‫ي‬occupation refers leaders of Assad militias to field courts and drops Idlib Liberation Room], 15 February 2021, url
1022 Orient, ‫ إعادة تمركز أم تفاهمات جديدة مع تركيا؟‬..‫الموالي‬‫[ انسحابات روسية من شاقب تصدم‬Russian withdrawals from Saraqeb shock loyalists.. Repositioning‫ر‬or new agreements with Turkey?], 28 February 2021, url
1023 Jusoor for Studies, Map of the Military Bases and Posts of Foreign Forces in Syria, 6 January 2021, url
1024 Jusoor for Studies, Map of the Military Bases and Posts of Foreign Forces in Syria, 6 January 2021, url
1025 Sy-24, ‫[ دراسة تكشف عن مواقع انتشار ميليشيات إيران ف حماة‬A SY24 Study Reveals the Locations of Iran-Backed Militias’ Deployments in Hama],‫ي‬
4 June 2019, url

108Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

2.3.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population
Military operations in northern Hama governorate
The military operations that were launched in 2019 in north-west Syria by GoS and pro-GoS forces
continued in the first quarter of 2020, and intense bombardment and airstrikes were reported. 1026
COAR observed that the advances of the GoS forces into northern Hama and southern Idlib
governorates in early 2020 ‘were the only significant territorial changes of the year [2020]’.1027 In
February 2020, GoS forces advanced in Al-Ghab Plain and captured several villages1028, while
opposition groups including HTS, Ansar Al-Tawheed and the Turkistan Islamic Party ‘staged a counter
offensive against 12 newly captured GoS locations’ including in Hama.1029
On 5 March 2020, Russia and Turkey agreed a ceasefire that would halt hostilities in north-west
Syria1030, which sparked the spontaneous return of 200 000 IDPs between 5 and 12 June 2020.1031
However, hostilities resumed in May 2020 as opposition factions recaptured Al-Manara (Al-Tanjara)
village in north-western Hama governorate1032, and the GoS forces shelled the villages of Ankawi,
Qahira, and Quleidin in the area.1033 On 19 and 20 May 2020, SOHR reported on clashes that erupted
on the Ankawi frontline in Al-Ghab Plain between GoS forces and opposition factions.1034
An increase in hostilities in southern Idlib and northern Hama governorates, including Russian air
strikes occurred in the first half of June 2020.1035 In its report of 20 August 2020, the UN Security
Council observed that ‘civilians were killed and injured as a result of shelling and intermittent airstrikes
by pro-Government forces’ in southern Idlib and western Hama governorates during the months ofJune and July 2020 despite the ceasefire agreement within the de-escalation area.1036 On
23 June 2020, reinforcements by both the GoS and the armed opposition forces to their respective
positions in Al-Ghab Plain in Hama governorate were reported.1037 Enab Baladi reported on
27 October 2020 that the NLF shelled positions of GoS forces including Jurin camp and Al-Ghab Plainin northern Hama governorate in retaliation for a Russian airstrike that targeted areas in western Idlib
governorate.1038 North Press reported on 27 November 2020 that GoS forces shelled ‘fortifications of
the opposition groups’ in Ankawi and Qelidin villages in north-western Hama. According to a fieldsource cited by North Press, the GoS shelling resulted in ‘widespread destruction of the infrastructure1026 Responsibility to Protect, R2P Monitor: Issue 54, 15 November 2020, url, p. 11; UN Security Council, Implementation of

Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018),
2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020), 21 February 2020, url, para. 141027 SOAR, Syria in 2021: Forecast for a protracted crisis, 28 January 2021, url
1028 SOHR, Regime forces advance further in Sahl Al-Ghab and ten villages separate them from having full control over Hama
province, and rebels carry out new offensive far east of Idlib backed by Turkish firepower, 28 February 2020, url
1029 Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary | 24 FEBRUARY – 1 MARCH 2020, 1 March 2020, url, p. 21030 Reuters, Turkey says agreed with Russia on details of Idlib ceasefire, 13 March 2020, url; BBC News, Syria war: Russia andTurkey agree Idlib ceasefire, 5 March 2020, url
1031 REACH, Northwest Syria - Conditions in Communities of Return: Idleb, Aleppo, Hama, 17 July 2020, url, p. 1
1032 Enab Baladi, ‫[ ”أول هجوم يستهدف قوات النظام ف إدلب منذ اتفاق “موسكو‬First attack targeting regime forces in Idlib since the Moscow agreement],‫ي‬
10 May 2020, url; Al-Arab, ‫ قتيال من قوات األسد ومجموعات جهادية رغم الهدنة‬22 ..‫[ يف خطوة تصعيدية‬In an escalation.. 22 deaths among
Assad forces and Jahadi groups despite the truce], 10 May 2020, url
1033 Enab Baladi, ‫[ ”أول هجوم يستهدف قوات النظام ف إدلب منذ اتفاق “موسكو‬First attack targeting regime forces in Idlib since the Moscow agreement],‫ي‬
10 May 2020, url
1034 SOHR, “De-escalation zone” | Regime forces attack rebels positions in Sahl Al-Ghab leaving casualties, 19 May 2020, url;
SOHR, “De-escalation zone” | Clashes renew in Sahl Al-Ghab and regime artillery pounds southern Idlib, 20 May 2020, url
1035 USAID, SYRIA – Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #9, Fiscal Year (FY) 2020, 2 July 2020, url, p. 3; Al Jazeera, Russian air raids
target NW Syria for first time in three months, 3 June 2020, url; SOHR, “De-escalation zone” | Nearly 30 Russian airstrikes
pound rural Idlib and Hama, and regime forces shell the villages of Jabal Al-Zawiya with artillery, 8 June 2020, url
1036 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020), 20 August 2020, url, para. 171037 Carter Center (The), WEEKLY CONFLICT SUMMARY | 22 June - 28 June 2020, 28 June 2020, url, p. 2
ً1038 Enab Baladi, ‫ “الجبهة الوطنية” توسع قصفها لنقاط النظام‬..”‫ردا عىل استهداف “فيلق الشام‬[In response to targeting Failaq Al-Sham.. NLF expands its shellingof regime positions], 27 October 2020, url

109Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situationand public and private properties’.1039 The same source reported on reinforcement of GoS forces being
gathered in Al-Ghab plain in western Hama governorate in December 2020.1040
Clashes and shelling between GoS and opposition forces in western rural Hama intensified in 2021.1041
On 5 February 2021, GoS forces positioned in Hakoura village in western Hama governorate targetedwith a missile a military car belonging to Ansar Al-Turkistan group in Kherbet Al-Naqous village.
Reportedly, seven of the group’s militants were killed and nine were injured in the attack.1042 Enab
Baladi and Aleppo Today reported that on 7 February 2021, clashes erupted at the Ankawi village axis
in western Hama governorate between rebel factions and GoS forces following the latter’s attempt toadvance in the area. Reportedly, SAA fighters were killed and injured during the clashes.1043
Violence during December 2019 and January 2020 inhibited humanitarian access to frontline or toparts of Idlib, northern Hama and southern Aleppo governorates affected by the conflict and claimed
civilian lives.1044 According to SHRC, 45 % of the documented killings in 2020 occurred in the first threemonths due to the GoS military operations that targeted Idlib governorate and Hama countryside.1045
The UN Security Council stated that more than 80 % of the deaths recorded during the months ofDecember 2019 and January 2020 occurred as a result of those attacks on Idlib and parts of Aleppoand Hama governorates.1046 In its Syria 2020 Human Rights report, USDOS stated that the ‘White
Helmets documented more than 2,200 airstrikes in January and February, including 32 cluster-bombattacks and 605 barrel bombs in Idlib, along with Aleppo and Hama.’1047 SNHR documented one cluster
munition and 1 546 barrel bomb attacks by GoS forces in Hama governorate between December 2019and March 2020.1048 According to the SNHR, at least 474 barrel bombs and four cluster munitions
attacks targeted north-west Syria, including Hama governorate during the first half of 2020, which
resulted in civilian casualties and civilian facility damage.1049 According to Responsibility to Protect,over 1 500 civilians were killed during the period April 2019 to March 2020 in north-west Syria,
including in Hama governorate, ‘nearly all of which are attributable to Syrian government and Russianforces’.1050
ISIL activities in eastern Hama governorate
Gregory Waters observed increased regular ISIL attacks against GoS forces in 2020, with the group
operating outside of its traditional strongholds of east Homs and west Deir ez-Zor, and launchingattacks in southern Raqqah, eastern Hamah, and southern Aleppo’. The source observed that ISIL
conducted high-quality attacks which ‘made up between one-third and one-half of all documented
1039 NPA, Government forces continue targeting opposition groups’ sites northwestern Syria, 27 November 2020, url
1040 NPA, ‫[ حشود قوات حكومية غرب حماة تزيد المخاوف من تجدد العمليات العسكرية‬Gathering of GoS forces in western Hama increases fears of renewed

military operations], 22 December 2020, url
1041 NPA, Syrian government intensifies bombing on opposition sites in Idlib, 30 March 2021, url; Emarat Today, ‫كبت ربي الجيش‬‫تصعيد ر‬‫غرن البالد‬‫[ السوري وفصائل مسلحة شمال‬Large escalation between the SAA and armed factions in northwest Syria], 8 February 2021, url;‫ي‬ANHA, Syrian Government Forces shell Idlib and Hama, 10 April 2021, url
1042 Enab Baladi, ‫التكستان” بقصف قوات النظام ف سهل الغاب‬‫[ قتىل وجرىح من “أنصار ر‬Deaths and injuries from Ansar Al-Turkistan in a GoS forces shelling‫ي‬‫[ قتىل وجرىح من "الحزب ر‬Deaths and injuries from the Turkistaniin Al-Ghab Plain], 5 February 2021, url; Syria TV, ‫غرن حماة‬‫كستان" بقصف للنظام‬
‫الت‬
‫ي‬
‫ي‬
Party in a regime shelling on western Hama], 5 February 2021, url‫ا‬1043 Enab Baladi, ‫تسلًل للنظام ف سهل الغاب‬‫[ فصائل إدلب تصد‬Idlib factions repel a regime infiltration in Al-Ghab Plain], 7 February 2021, url;‫ي‬
Aleppo Today, ‫[ قتىل وجرىح من قوات النظام بمحاولة تقدم فاشلة غرب حماة‬Deaths and injuries among the regime forces in a failed attempt to advancein western Hama], 7 February 2021, url
1044 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020), 21 February 2020, url, paras. 14, 35
1045 SHRC, SHRC documents the killing of 1,750 people in 2020, 2 January 2021, url
1046 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020), 21 February 2020, url, para. 141047 USDOS, Syria 2020 Human Rights report, 30 March 2021, url, p. 32
1048 SNHR, Destroying Ma’aret al Numan and Saraqeb cities and displacing their residents is a clear example of the Syrian
regime’s tactics in the recent military campaign since early December 2019 until March 2020, 29 May 2020, url, pp. 7, 81049 SNHR, The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in the First Half of 2020, 3 July 2020, url
1050 Responsibility to Protect, R2P Monitor: Issue 54, 15 November 2020, url, p. 11

110Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

attacks in exterior regions’.1051 In its weekly conflict summary of 20-26 April 2020, the Carter Center
reported on ‘increased confrontations between ISIS and GoS-aligned forces’ in Hama governorate1052,
and ISW, in its Syria Situation Report of 3 December 2020, also observed an expansion of ISIL attack
capabilities in central Syria.1053 The Bahrain-based Al-Watan newspaper spoke of an attrition strategy
adopted by ISIL through carrying out ambushes, IED and surprise attacks against GoS forces and allied
militias in the Aleppo-Hama-Raqqa triangle.1054 Temporary seizure of villages by ISIL was also reported
in the second half of 2020 in east Hama governorate.1055
Some of the security incidents involving ISIL that were reported in Hama governorate in 2020 included
the following:
•

•
•
•
•

•
•

The Carter Center stated that on 10 April 2020, pro-GoS forces, backed by Russian airstrikes,
clashed with ISIL elements in the Rahjan area in Hama governorate. The source, citing ACLED,
pointed out that this incident was the first of its kind to take place in Hama governorate since
2018.1056
In its weekly conflict summary of 20-26 April 2020, the Carter Center mentioned an ISIL IED
attack on a GoS forces vehicle in Ithariya on 20 April and clashes that erupted near the
Boufayyad Dam on 23 April.1057
Clashes between pro-Gos forces and ISIL elements were reported to have taken place near
Ithariya in northern Hama governorate between 6 and 7 July 2020. The clashes involved
shelling exchanges and Russian airstrikes.1058
Between 4 and 6 August 2020, GoS and NDF forces clashed with unknown groups, believed to
be ISIL, near Juay’ed village and in Jib Abyad village in eastern rural Hama.1059
On 26 October 2020, the SOHR reported on the resumption of ‘fierce battles’ involving ISIL
elements at ‘the frontlines of Al-Rahjan, Al-Shakousiyyah and Ithariya in the easterncountryside of Hama’. Reportedly, ISIL fighters captured a GoS military post and seizedweapons and ammunition despite the Russian and SAA airstrikes.1060
On 12 November 2020, ISW reported on an attack that killed 21 pro-GoS troops near Abu
Fayyad Dam in eastern Hama governorate.1061
On 8 April 2021, SOHR reported that ISIL fighters carried out a ‘surprise attack’ in areas in the
Oqayrabat region in eastern Hama countryside and clashed with GoS forces and loyalists.
According to the source, during the attack eight police officers were arrested, 11 civilians were
kidnapped, and around 40 people went missing.1062

Waters published the following map which compared ISIL activities in Syria between 2019 and 2020.
The map shows a significant increase in ISIL activities in eastern Hama governorate in 2020.1063 In the1051 Waters, G., Strengthening and Expanding: ISIS’ Central Syria Campaign, Newlines Institute,19 August 2020, url
1052 Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary 20 - 26 April 2020, 29 April 2020, url, p. 31053 ISW, Syria Situation Report: November 11 - December 1, 2020, 3 December 2020, url
1054 Al-Watan News, ‫ قتيل من النظام وداعش بمعارك البادية ف أقل من شهر‬100 ..‫[ سوريا‬Syria.. 11 deaths from the regime and Daesh in the Badiya battles‫ي‬in less than one month], 19 December 2020, url
1055 Waters, G., ISIS in Syria: 2020 in Review, Newlines Institute, 10 February 2021, url
1056 Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary | 6 - 12 April 2020, 12 April 2020, url, p. 21057 Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary | 20 - 26 April 2020, 26 April 2020, url, p. 31058 Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary | 6 July - 12 July 2020, 12 July 2020, url, p. 31059 SOHR, Second attack in 48 hours | Clashes renew between ISIS cells and regime forces in east Hama desert, 6 August
2020, url
1060 SOHR, ISIS resurgence in Syrian desert | Members renew attacks on regime forces’ positions in eastern Hama, andRussian jets intensify airstrikes, 26 October 2020, url
1061 ISW, Syria Situation Report: November 11 - December 1, 2020, 3 December 2020, url
1062 SOHR, ISIS resurgence | Nearly 20 regime police officers and civilians kidnapped and scores missing in surprise attack on
Al-Sa’an district, 6 April 2021, url
1063 Waters, G., Strengthening and Expanding: ISIS’ Central Syria Campaign, Newlines Institute,19 August 2020, url

111

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

second half of 2020, an increase of ISIL attacks and seizures of villages were reported in east Hama
governorate, ‘from south of Uqayribat to north of Ithriya’ and around the village of Rahjan.1064

Map 9: © Center for Global Policy, Comparing ISIS Syria activity1065

A March 2021 analysis by ISW wrote that ISIL controls several small swaths of territory in themountainous areas of the Syrian Central Desert (Badia) from where it launches attacks on GoS forces,
including in the area north-east of Rahjan, towards Ithriya (Hama governorate).1066
In 2021, sources reported on ongoing military operations involving ISIL and GoS forces and allied
militias in the Aleppo-Hama-Raqqa triangle.1067 In its report of 18 February 2021, the UN security
Council observed that ‘ISIL attacks focused on a triangle between Hama, Aleppo and Raqqah, as wellas the Salamiyah-Tabaqah road.’1068 The SOHR reported on 9 January 2021 that ISIL militants were‘able to advance and control posts in the areas of Shakozya and Al-Rahjan’ in Hama governorate,
following a violent attack launched by the group.1069 SOHR also reported on GoS large military
reinforcements along the Ithariya-Khanaser highway in January 2021 compelled by ISIL escalating
operations in the region.1070 Another deployment was reported to have taken place on 12 March 2021,
aimed at protecting a key highway that links Hama to Raqqa and Aleppo.1071 ISW observed on

1064 Waters, G., ISIS in Syria: 2020 in Review, Newlines Institute, 10 February 2021, url
1065 Waters, G., Strengthening and Expanding: ISIS’ Central Syria Campaign, Newlines Institute,19 August 2020, url
1066 Kahan, E., ISIS Poised for a Ramadan Surge in Syria, ISW, 9 March 2021, url
1067 SOHR, 19 killed in an ISIS attack in Hama, 3 February 2021, url; UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council

resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504
(2020) and 2533 (2020), 18 February 2021, url, para. 20; Iran Insider, ‫[ خسائر لميليشيا "حـزب هللا" و"قوات النمر" يف بادية حماة السورية‬Losses from
Hezbollah militia and Tiger Forces the Syrian Hama Badiya], 25 March 2021, url
1068 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020), 18 February 2021, url, para. 201069 SOHR, ISIS resurgence | Cells capture new positions in Hama desert, and kill nearly 20 regime soldiers and loyalists, 9January 2021, url
1070 SOHR, Syrian Regime Sends Military Reinforcements to Desert, 12 January 2021, url
1071 South Front, Syrian Army Deploys Troops in Eastern Hama to protect Highway from ISIS (Photos), 12 March 2021, url

112

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

9 March 2021 that GoS forces’ operations against ISIL were ‘plagued’ by limited operational capacity,
deficit in manpower and the incompetency of conscripts, as well as the friction between the GoS
backers, Russia and Iran.1072
Israeli airstrikes
ISW reported that on 4 June 2020, airstrikes, likely Israeli, targeted a GoS chemical weapon and missile
technology development labs near the city of Misyaf in western Hama governorate.1073 ISW also
reported on a set of airstrikes that targeted positions of the SAA 47th Regiment and the LebaneseHezbollah in Al-Salamiya, eastern rural Hama, on 23/24 June 2020.1074 On 25 December 2020, Israeli
air strikes targeted warehouses and research centres in Misyaf in Hama governorate. Reportedly, ten
militants, including six Iranians, were killed in the attack.1075 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL),
citing the SOHR, stated that the attack targeted and destroyed depots and rocket-manufacturing
facilities that belonged to Iran-backed militias. The source cited SANA which reported that the Syrian
air defences ‘intercepted the "hostile" rockets and destroyed most of them’.1076 On 22 January 2021,
Israeli air strikes reportedly targeting five positions of Iran-backed militias, hit a site near Hama city.
Reportedly, four members of the same family were killed, four civilians injured, and three houses
destroyed in the incident.1077 The SOHR reported on the same incident and stated that the deaths andinjuries among civilians were caused by shrapnel of missiles from the GoS air-defences.1078
Lawlessness and arrests
SOHR reported on a state of lawlessness prevalent in areas of northern Hama governorate controlled
by GoS forces and allied militias. The source stated that these areas were witnessing ‘growing
kidnappings, thefts and exploitation of children and women’.1079 In Hama city, around 20 people werearrested in February 2021 in the wake of a demonstration organised to commemorate the ‘1982
massacre’ of Hama.1080 Moreover, several sources reported that between 31 January and2 February 2021, GoS forces conducted a raid and arrest campaign in the Janoub Al-Malaabneighbourhood of Hama city that resulted in the arrest of nine or 11 people.1081 Reportedly, the reason
behind the arrests was ‘writing anti-government graffiti on some walls in the neighbourhood’.1082
Security incidents
According to ACLED data, there were 928 security incidents recorded in Hama governorate. Of these,
180 were coded as battles, 736 explosions/remote violence and 12 incidents of violence against
civilians. A significant spike in the number of security incidents was recorded in February 2020,

1072 ISW, ISIS Poised ro a Ramadan Surge in Syria, 9 March 2021, url, pp. 2-3
1073 ISW, Syria Situation Report: May 27 - June 9, 2020, 11 June 2020, url
1074 ISW, Syria Situation Report: June 24 - July 6, 2020, 9 June 2020, url
1075 NPA, Israeli airstrikes target defense laboratories in Syria’s Hama, 25 December 2020, url; Garda World, Syria: State

media reports that Israeli forces targeted Masyaf early Dec. 25., 25 December 2020, url
1076 RFE/RL, At Least Six Fighters Reported Killed In Israeli Strikes In Syria, 25 December 2020, url
1077 Germany, BAMF, Briefing Notes: Group 62 – Information Centre for Asylum and Migration, 25 January 2021, url, p. 81078 SOHR, New Israeli attack | Airstrikes hit Iranian positions nearby Hama, while shrapnel of regime air-defence missiles
kills an entire family, 22 January 2021, url
1079 SOHR, After decapitated body found in eastern rural Hama | Regime forces arrest more than 20 members, 25 January
2021, url
1080 AA, Syrians mark 1982 massacre with protest in Hama: 20 people arrested, regime forces deployed in region, according
to sources, 5 February 2021, url; Arabi 21, 1982 ‫[ قمع مظاهرة يف حماة السورية أحيت ذكرى مجزرة‬Crack down on a demonstration commemorating
the 1982 massacre in Hama], 5 February 2021, url
1081 Orient, ‫ وحملة اعتقاالت تطال أبناء المدينة‬..‫ جدران حماة تتحدى وتستذكر المجزرة‬:‫[ ألول مرة منذ عقود‬For the first time in decades: Hama’s walls defy andcommemorate the massacre.. and an arrest campaign targets the city’s residents], 5 February 2021, url; Syria TV, ‫حملة اعتقاالت لـ‬‫ َمن استهدفت؟‬..‫[ نظام األسد يف مدينة حماة‬An arrest campaign by the Assad regime in Hama city.. Who was targeted?], 3 February 2021, url
1082 SHRC, Arrests and releases in February 2021, 8 March 2021, url;

113

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

followed by a decrease from March till May 2020. The number of security incidents remained
relatively stable from June 2020 till March 2021 (see Figure 20).

Figure 20. Evolution of security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in Hama
governorate in between 1 January 2020 and 31 March 2021, based on ACLED data1083

Hama governorate – Security incidents
RemoteViolence against
District
Battlesviolence
civilians
666
95
As-Salamiyeh
2
108
573
As-Suqaylabiyah
2
4
44
Hama
1
2
6
Masyaf1
18
Muhradah
12
180
736
Total
Figure 21. Security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in Hama governorate
between 1 January 2020 and 31 March 2021. Breakdown by district based on ACLED data

Most security incidents were recorded in As-Suqaylabiyah district, followed by As-Salamiyeh andHama districts (see Figure 21).
A non-exhaustive list of security incidents that were reported to have taken place in Hama
governorate in 2020 and early 2021 included the following:••••

Reported ground-based strikes on western rural Hama killed one civilian in Qahira on
3 July 2020, injured two civilians in Dukmak on 14 July 2020, and killed one civilian and injured
another in Tall Wasit on 19 July 2020.1084
On 6 August and 24 September 2020, a total of four civilians were injured in reported groundbased attacks that hit the villages of Tall Wasit in western rural Hama and Jurin in northernrural Hama.1085
According to SHRC, on 29 September 2020, members of an Iraqi militia killed nine shepherds
in Al-Fasida in eastern Hama governorate.1086
On 5 October 2020, a reported ground-based attack injured five civilians on the road between
Qarqur and Shaykh Sindiyan in western Hama governorate.1087

1083 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (9 April 2021), url
1084 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),

2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020), 20 August 2020, url, pp. 19-20
1085 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020), 14 October 2020, url, p. 171086 SHRC, The 19th Annual Report on human rights in Syria 2020, January 2021, url, p. 15; see also: SNHR, Extrajudicial killingclaims the lives of 1,734 civilians in Syria in 2020, including 99 in December, 1 January 2021, url, p. 32
1087 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020), 11 December 2020, url, p. 17

114

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation••

On 26 December 2020, five people were killed in Al-Zaqoum in northern Hama after a civilian
car and a tractor were targeted by GoS guided missiles.1088
The SOHR reported that on 7 April 2021, a civilian was injured in a shelling by the Al-Fath AlMoubin Operations Room that targeted the village of Na’our Jurin in north-western Hama
governorate. According to the source, Al-Fath Al-Mubin Room was positioned in Al-Ghab plain
in Hama governorate.1089

Civilian fatalities
Month
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
AugustSeptember
OctoberNovember
December
Total

VDC 2020
1
1
5
1
2
3
1
8
3
3
7
35

SNHR 2020
2
2
5
1
5
3
3
4
10
16
3
54

VDC 202112630

SNHR 2021
11
3
49

48

63

Figure 22 Civilian fatalities as a result of armed conflict in Hama governorate in 2020 and first three months of 2021. Monthly
breakdown based on VDC and SNHR data

In 2020, Hama governorate had between 54 (SNHR data)1090 and 35 civilian fatalities (VDC data).1091
Most civilian fatalities were documented in September, October and November 2020. In the first threemonths of 2021, both VDC and SNHR recorded higher number of civilian casualties in Hama
governorate than in the entire 2020 (see Figure 22).

1088 SHRC, The 19th Annual Report on human rights in Syria 2020, January 2021, url, p. 15; SNHR, Extrajudicial killing claims

the lives of 1,734 civilians in Syria in 2020, including 99 in December, 1 January 2021, url, p. 35; Enab Baladi, ‫تعزيزات تركية إل إدلب‬‫[ وضحايا مدنيون بقصف للنظام يف ريف حماة‬Turkish reinforcements to Idlib and civilian casualties by the regime in rural Hama], 26 December
2020, url; UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020), 18 February 2021, url, p. 181089 SOHR, ‫المبي” عىل قرية ضمن مناطق قوات النظام ف ريف حماة‬‫[ إصابة مواطن يف قصف لـ”الفتح‬One citizen injured in an Al-Fath Al-Mubin shelling on a village‫ر‬‫ي‬with regime-controlled areas in rural Hama], 7 April 2021, url
1090 Based on data extracted from monthly reports on civilian casualties published by SNHR. See: SNHR, 286 Civilians,
including Four Medical and Civil Defense Personnel, Documented Killed in Syria in January 2020, 1 February 2020, url, p. 8;
SNHR, 276 Civilians, including Six Medical Personnel and Two Media Workers, Documented Killed in Syria in February 2020,
1 March 2020, url, p. 8; SNHR, 145 Civilians, including Two Medical Personnel, Documented Killed in Syria in March 2020, 1
April 2020, url, p. 9; SNHR, 78 Civilians, including One Media Workers, Documented Killed in Syria in April 2020, 1 May 2020,
url, p. 10; SNHR, 125 Civilians Documented Killed in Syria in May 2020, including Eight Who Died Due to Torture and One
Massacre, 1 June 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, 1,006 Civilians, including three Media Workers and 12 Medical and Civil Defense
Personnel, Documented Killed in Syria in the First Half of 2020, 1 July 2020, url, p. 16; SNHR, 107 Civilians, including 26
Children and 11 Women, Documented Killed in Syria in July 2020, 2 August 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, 122 Civilians, including 21
Children and Seven Women, Documented Killed in Syria in August 2020, 1 September 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, Extrajudicial
Killing Claims the Lives of 102 Civilians, including 15 Children, 10 Women, Three Medical Personnel and 12 Victims Due toTorture, 1 October 2020, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 126 Civilians, including 18 Children, Eight
Women, One Media Worker and 10 Victims Due to Torture, 1 November 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims
the Lives of 172 Civilians, including 16 Children, 11 Women, and 30 Victims Due to Torture, 1 December 2020, url, p. 9; SNHR,
Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 1,734 Civilians in Syria in 2020, including 99 in December, 1 January 2021, url, p. 141091 Based on monthly civilian fatalities figures for 2020-2021 shared by VDC with EASO

115

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Infrastructure damage and explosives remnants of war
In a report published in 2020, ESCWA and the University of St Andrews stated that Hama city sustained
4.4 % of the total damage to physical capital in Syria.1092 According to the source, violent clashes
occurred in the city of Hama in 2012, ‘before the bulk of the armed conflict moved to the rural areasof the governorate’ which were ‘less capital intensive with lower housing density’.1093
Based on the Syria Multi-sector Needs Assessment of 2020, the Shelter Cluster assessed that in Hama
governorate, 12.4 % of the population was living in damaged buildings.1094
Concerning Hama city, a report by the World Bank published in March 2017 stated that 6 % of thecity’s housing asset was damaged.1095 In its report of March 2019, REACH observed that Hama city
suffered low density damage compared to Aleppo and Raqqa, with a ‘damage density ranging from0.1 – 1.2 buildings per hectare across the majority of the city’. Moreover, the report noted that thedamage in Hama city was concentrated in one particular neighbourhood, Sabil, which underwent
complete demolition in 2012.1096
In Hama countryside, InterSOS, an independent humanitarian organisation1097, reported on
25 January 2021 that in its areas of intervention, which included northern Hama governorate, ‘mostof the houses [… were] destroyed or damaged’. The source added that there was no access toelectricity due to the damage to distribution channels and that access to water was only throughtankers.1098 In Al-Ghab Plain, ‘massive damage to public and private property’ was reported following
a GoS bombardment of the village of Ankawi on 9 March 2021.1099
PHR, an organisation that investigates and documents human rights violations1100, stated thatbetween April 2019 and February 2020, 40 attacks on medical facilities in north-west Syria, including
northern Hama governorate, were verified.1101 Amnesty International, citing UNOCHA, stated thatbetween April and September 2020, ‘at least 51 medical facilities and 59 schools were damaged as aresult of hostilities in Idlib, Hama and northern Aleppo.’1102
As regards explosive hazards, the SOHR reported on an ‘increasing number of people killed recently
by a landmine, unexploded bombs, and collapse of war-damaged residential buildings in various Syrian
areas and cities’ including Hama.1103 The following illustrative incidents involving landmines and UXO
were reported to have taken place in Hama governorate by different sources:•

Landmines in agricultural areas killed two civilians in Morek on 9 March 2020, and injured two
civilians in Ma’an on 17 March 2020.1104

1092 ESCWA and University of St Andrews, Syria at War: Eight Years On, url, p. 51; The source defines loss to physical capitalas including ‘private and public construction and equipment, such as housing stock, schools, hospitals and factories, andpower, water, sanitation, transport and communications infrastructure’. ESCWA and University of St Andrews, Syria at War:
Eight Years On, url, p. 49
1093 ESCWA and University of St Andrews, Syria at War: Eight Years On, url, p. 51
1094 Global Shelter Cluster, Syrian Arab Republic: Whole of Syria Shelter/NFI Sector Humanitarian Needs Overview 2021, 1
March 2021, url, pp. 6, 81095 World Bank (The), Syria Damage Assessment: of selected cities Aleppo, Hama, Idlib, March 2017, url, pp. 7-81096 REACH/UNITAR, Syria: Syrian Cities Damage Atlas, 16 March 2019, url, p. 40
1097 InterSOS, About Us, n. d., url
1098 InterSOS, Syria: 2020 saw fewer conflicts but increased poverty, 25 January 2021, url
1099 NPA, Government forces target opposition posts in Syria’s Hama, 9 March 2021, url
1100 PHR, About Us, n. d., url
1101 PHR, Physicians for Human Rights’ Findings of Attacks on Health Care in Syria, March 2021, url
1102 AI, Syria 2020, 7 April 2021, url
1103 SOHR, Old ordnance | Explosion kills two civilians in eastern countryside of Hama, and today’s death toll rises to fivepeople in the region, 26 February 2021, url
1104 UN Security council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020), 23 April 2020, url, p. 19

116

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation•

The UN Security Council reported that between 4 April and 16 May 2020, one death and four
injuries occurred due to reported landmine explosions in the villages of Rasm Al-Abd and
Shaykh Hilal, in the agricultural area in the outskirts of the town of Si’in, near Suran.1105• In June 2020, reported UXO killed three children and injured another in the towns of
Qumhanah and Suran in northern rural Hama.1106• On 8 November 2020, a reported UXO detonated in Qasr Al-Mukharram village in eastern
Hama governorate and killed three civilians.1107• Sources reported on 7 March 2021 that 13-25 people were killed and injured in a landmine
explosion that hit a bus in Al-Salamiyah countryside in eastern Hama governorate.1108
Mine Action Review stated that the Syrian Civil Defence conducted 137 cluster munition remnants(CMR) clearance tasks in Hama governorate in 2019 and destroyed 87 submunitions and 46 UXO.1109
Displacement and return
In 2020, UNOCHA recorded in Hama governorate 10 000 IDP movements from or within thegovernorate, 15 000 IDP movements to or within the governorate, 5 000 IDP movements from orwithin the governorate and 2 000 IDP movements within the governorate.1110
UNOCHA’s 2021 Humanitarian Needs Overview showed that as of August 2020, there were 22 320
IDPs in Hama governorate.1111 In 2021, UNOCHA estimated 314 IDP departures in January1112, 1 200 in
February (around 500 of whom were to Idlib governorate)1113, and 506 in March 2021.1114
As regards the returns, in 2020 UNOCHA recorded for Hama governorate 21 000 IDP return
movements from or within the governorate, 15 000 IDP return movements to or within thegovernorate and 12 000 IDP return movements within governorate.1115 In 2021, UNOCHA estimated
4 000 spontaneous returns in January (of whom, around 3 300 were to Suqailbiya)1116, 506 in
February1117, and around 1 300 in March 2021 (of which 1 000 were recorded within thegovernorate).1118
UNOCHA stated that it was likely that ‘the Russian Federation – Government of Turkey Idleb ceasefire
agreement in March 2020 was a critical factor’ for the overall increase in returns that took place in
2020.1119 Moreover, the mobilisation of GoS forces in northern Hama countryside in August 2020
incited fear of return of battles among the resident of Al-Ghab plain1120.

1105 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),

2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020), 24 June 2020, url, p. 181106 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020), 20 August 2020, url, p. 191107 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020), 11 December 2020, url, p. 18
ً‫ا‬1108 SOHR, 11 ‫جريحا حصيلة انفجار لغم بحافلة ف ريف سلمية رش رف حماة‬13‫[ قتيال و‬11 deaths and 13 injuries, the outcome of a landmine explosion that hit‫ي‬‫ي‬
a bus in Al-Salamiya countryside in eastern Hama], 7 March 2021, url; Xeber24, ‫المدنيي يف ريف حماة‬‫أرض يوقع قتىل وجرىح بصفوف‬‫[ لغم‬Landmine‫ر‬‫ي‬kills and injures civilians in Hama countryside], 7 March 2021, url; TASS, At least 18 civilians killed in two landmine explosions
in Syria’s Hama, 7 March 2021, url
1109 Mine Action Review, Clearing Cluster Munitions Remnants 2020, 1 October 2020, url, p. 168
1110 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic. IDP Movements Overview, Jan – Dec 2020, 16 February 2021, url
1111 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview, Syrian Arab Republic, March 2021, url, p. 141112 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements January 2021, 4 March 2021, url
1113 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements February 2021, 1 April 2021, url
1114 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, IDP Movements. March 2021, 12 May 2021, url
1115 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns Stock and Flow Data, Jan – Dec, 2019, url
1116 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns January 2021, 3 March 2021, url
1117 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns February 2021, 1 April 2021, url
1118 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic. IDP Spontaneous Returns. March 2021, 12 May 2021, url
1119 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview, Syrian Arab Republic, March 2021, url, p. 161120 NPA, Fears of military operations despite Turkish promises in Syria’s Ghab Plain, 12 August 2020, url

117

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

On 26 October 2020, Enab Baladi reported that lands in Al-Salamiya and Al-Ghab Plain belonging topeople residing in opposition-held areas or outside of Syria were put up for public auction by the AssetManagement Committee of the military and security commission of Hama. Reportedly, the procedure
was to ‘ensure the investment of olive groves for the agricultural season (2020)’.1121 In a reportpublished on 14 February 2021, SNHR stated that at least 440 000 dunums1122 of agricultural land
belonging to forcibly displaced persons were seized and auctioned by the GoS in suburbs of Hama andIdlib. According to the source, this practice was ‘widespread and deliberate’.1123 The auction
announcements concerned farmlands located around 134 villages and towns in Hama governorate.1124
Human Rights Watch stated on 8 April 2021 that ‘Syrian authorities are unlawfully confiscating thehomes and lands of Syrians who fled Syrian-Russian military attacks in Idlib and Hama governorates’.
According to the source, a pro-GoS militia and the Peasants’ Union were involved in the seizing andauctioning of these lands to GoS loyalists.1125

1121 Enab Baladi, Public auction in Hama to invest lands owned by displaced people or refugees abroad, 26 October 2020, url
1122 A dunum ‘is a unit of land area enclosing 1000 square metres’. Convert Units, Measurement unit conversion: dunam, n.

d., url
1123 SNHR, Public Auctions of Forcibly Displaced People’s Lands Are Another Syrian Regime Method to Seize Its Opponents’
Property in a Widespread and Deliberate Manner: At Least 440,000 Dunums of Agricultural Land Seized by the Syrian Regime
in the Suburbs of Hama and Idlib, 14 February 2021, url
1124 SNHR, Public auctions of forcibly displaced people’s lands are another Syrian regime method to seize its opponents’property in a widespread and deliberate manner, 14 February 2021, url, p. 111125 HRW, Syria: Government Stealing Opponents’ Land, 8 April 2021, url

118

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

2.4 Latakia governorate

Map 10: © MapAction, Latakia governorate1126

1126 MapAction, Syria 2013-2015, Latakia Governorate [map], last updated: 29 July 2016, url

119Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

2.4.1 General description of the governorate
Latakia governorate is situated in the north-west of the country and borders the Mediterranean Sea
on its western border. To the north, it shares an international border with Turkey. Latakia is borderedby Tartous to the south, Hama to the east, and Idlib to the north-east. Latakia is divided into four
administrative districts, from north to south: Latakia, Al-Haffa, Al-Qardaha, Jablah.1127 These four
districts are divided into altogether 20 sub-districts. They are located in their respective districts asfollows:•

Latakia: Latakia which includes the governorate capital by the same name, Bahalwaniyeh,
Rabe’ea, Qastal Maaf, Ein El-Bayda, Kasab;•

Al-Haffa: Hanadi, Salanfa, Ein Et-teeneh, Kansaba, Mzair’a, Al-Haffa;•

Al-Qardaha: Fakhura, Al-Qardaha, Jobet Berghal Harf Elmseitra;•

Jablah: Jabla, Ein Elsharqiyeh, Ein Shaqaq, Beit Yashout, Dalyeh, Qteilbiyyeh.1128

The main ethno-religious group in 2018 were Alawites. Other groups present were Kurds, Bujak andBayir Turkomans, Sunni Arabs, Nusairis (Arabic speaking Gnostics) and Levantines (Arabic speaking
Christians of various denominations), according to map provided by Michel Izady at Columbia
University.1129 The sub-districts of Rabia and Qastal Maaf to the north are mainly Sunni Turkmen
populated, as are the coastal villages of Burj Islam and Salib Al-Turkman, according to Syria analyst
Fabrice Balanche. About 50 % of the population were Alawite, 40 % were Sunni, and about 10 % were
Christians.1130
The Syrian Central Bureau of Statistics estimated the governorate’s population at 1 319 000 as by
2019.1131 According to the World Food Programme, interviewed by the DIS on 21 October 2020, thepopulation was about 1.2 million.1132 In a March 2021 report, UNOCHA estimated the population of
Latakia governorate to be of 1 215 928.1133
Latakia is the location of Syria’s main commercial port.1134 It is also Syria's main container port,
handling large volumes of metals, chemicals, machinery, and foodstuffs.1135 Latakia governorate,
together with neighbouring coastal governorate Tartous, constitute the main vegetable production
areas in Syria.1136

2.4.2 Conflict background and armed actors
The city of Latakia has been a stronghold for the Alawites and the Assad family.1137 Since the spring of
2012, Jabal Al-Akrad in the north-east, bordering Idlib governorate and Turkey, had been a rebel
stronghold, according to Fabrice Balanche.1138

1127 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic Governorates Profile (June 2014), June 2014, url, p. 191128 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Atlas, Syrian Arab Republic – Lattakia [map], 2017, url
1129 Izady, M., Syria: Ethnic Shift, 2010-mid 2018 (approximation), 2018-19, Atlas of the Islamic World and Vicinity [map], url
1130 Balanche, F., Latakia is Assad’s Achilles Heel, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 23 September 2015, url
1131 Syria, Central Bureau of Statistics, Estimate of the population in Syria by governorates, url
1132 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Tartous, Latakia and Quneitra, [Source: WFP],

December 2020, url, pp. 5, 38
1133 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview. Syrian Arab Republic, March 2021, url, p. 231134 Times (The), Tehran eyes vital Syrian port of Latakia as gateway to Mediterranean, 18 March 2019, url
1135 World Port Source, Port of Lattakia, 2021 (n.d.), url
1136 FAO/WFP, Special Report, FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to the Syrian Arab Republic, 5September 2019, url, pp. 21, 37
1137 L’Orient le Jour, Iran gains a foothold in Latakia, 26 March 2019, url
1138 Balanche, F., Latakia is Assad’s Achilles Heel, 23 September 2015, url

120

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

In an article for the International Review, analyst Gregory Waters stated that rebel forces had kept afoothold in Latakia for nearly the entire length of the civil war in Syria, creating a frontline in themountains. In August 2016 the small mountain town of Kabani was seized by rebels. StrategicallyKabani was of significance to the rebels’ defence of their gains in Idlib governorate further to the east,
according to Waters. The SAA started a counterattack shortly after the rebels had taken over Kabani,
meanwhile the rebel forces made other gains along the 30 km frontline. A new government offensive
was launched in April 2019, also this one without decisive results. Attacks and counter attacks
followed during the rest of 2019.1139
As of March 2021, Latakia governorate was under control was under GoS control except a strip along
the Turkish border and the border to Idlib governorate which was under anti-GoS armed groups.1140(see also Map 4).
According to ACLED’s control map for Syria for the third and fourth quarters of 2020, the governorate
was under government control. Except for the two northern subdistricts Rabeea and Qastal Maaf
which were marked as ‘active’, the remaining subdistricts were marked as ‘inactive’.1141
Syrian Arab Army and affiliated armed groups
State military forces of Syria and other countries, paramilitary forces supporting the GoS, and rebel
forces, have been present in the governorate. Since 2013, when the GoS managed to isolate rebel
strongholds to the mountain areas, there had been no need for it to permanently deploy troops onany massive scale in the governorate, the ISW stated. The population of loyalist paramilitary fighters
already existed there. The ISW also pointed to the largely Alawite and Christian populations, the GoS’reliable security apparatus, and the presence of paramilitary forces supporting the GoS forces there,
as reasons for the relative stability of the governorate.1142
Units of the SAA were reported to be present in Latakia governorate in early March 2020. For
deployments of the SAA in Latakia governorate as of 3 April 2020 see the EASO COI Report: Syria Security situation (May 2020).
The SAA’s Republican Guard together with the 4th Division reportedly led an attack on positions in
Kabani and Sirimaniyah held by the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), in July 2020. The two army units also
fired at opposition group positions in the Al-Ghaab Plain and Jabal Al-Zawiya region.1143
In an October 2020 interview with DIS, Omran Center for Strategic Studies, stated that Shabiha,
government-affiliated armed groups, were present across the governorate, and was assisting thegovernment in maintaining security.1144
Foreign state forces and affiliated groups
The Russian air force has acquired its own airbase in Latakia1145 in Hmeimim.1146 The Russian air force
conducts expeditionary operations to support the GoS.1147 Deutsche Welle reported in May 2020 that
Russia had called for talks with the Syrian government, aiming to expand its airbase as well as its naval
1139 Waters, G., Battle of Kabani: A Rare Defeat for the Syrian Army in 2019, International Review, 6 January 2020, url
1140 Based on reading of maps in ISW, Syria Situation Report: February 19 – March 22, 2021, 25 March 2021, url; Liveuamap,

Syria, 26 March 2021, url
1141 ACLED, The State of Syria: Q3 2020 – Q4 2020, 22 February 2021, url
1142 ISW, Regime regains ground on the coast, 22 August 2013, url
1143 Geopolitics News, Syrian Army launches heavy attack on jihadist strongholds in Latakia, 3 July 2020, url
1144 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Tartous, Latakia and Quneitra, [Source:
Omran Studies], October 2020, url, p. 81145 EPRS, Russia in the Middle East, From side lines to centre stage, November 2018, url, p. 51146 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Tartous, Latakia and Quneitra, October 2020,
url, p. 11; Al Jazeera, The battle for Syria's Idlib explained in 400 words, 12 February 2020, url
1147 Borshchevskaya, A., Shifting Landscape, Russia’s military role in the Middle East, Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, September 2019, url, p. 7

121

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situationbase in Tartous.1148 Security analyst Joseph Trevithick posted satellite images purportedly showing
works undertaken to extend a runway at the airbase, in a February 2021 article on The Drive/The
WarZone, a website providing information about security and military issues.1149
Asharq Al-Awsat reported in January 2021 that Turkish forces had set up a new military post in Jabal
Al-Akrad.1150
Syria analyst Gregory Waters indicated in a January 2020 article about the battle for Kabani, that the
Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), was present in the governorate.1151 Analyst Navvar Saban
at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies stated that Iran had organised militias manned by Syrian
Shias recruited from various areas of the country. One of these militias, the Al-Mukhtar Al-Thaqafi
Brigade, was operating in Latakia.1152According to Jusoor, an NGO, Russia had three bases and military
posts in Latakia, Iran six posts and bases, and Turkey two posts in the form of roadblocks.1153
Anti-GoS armed groups
Reuters news agency reported in 2019 about rebel positions in the Kubayna Mountains.1154 The Beirutbased news outlet Al-Masdar News mentioned in October 2019 that jihadists were holding on topositions in the Kabani area, while being attacked by the Syrian air force.1155 Al-Masdar News reported
in another posting in September 2019 that jihadists had taken over Atterah town in the Turkmen
mountains.1156 A map of control areas provided by the map service PoliticalGeographyNow indicated
HTS presence in Kabani in July 2020.1157
Bellingcat, an independent collective of researchers who use open sources and social media to track
armed conflicts, reported that Turkmen militias, who received limited Turkish support, were operatingin Latakia governorate. These groups had an agenda of Islam, Turkism and nationalism. They havebeen fighting to hold areas traditionally considered to be Turkmen, as well as against the Syrian
government. They were small groups, the most notable being the Second Coastal Division, a Turkmengroup which also includes Arabs. Most Turkmen groups in Latakia are part of the Second Coastal
Division. They could number up to 1 000 fighters, and were gaining growing support from Turkey.
Another Turkmen group operating in Latakia, the Sultan Abdulhamid Han brigade, counts around 50
fighters, Bellingcat reported in February 2019.1158 The International Business Times reported in July
2020 about positions held by the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) inside Kabani town.1159
Ethnic Turkoman and Uyghur militant groups in particular were present in the Kabani mountains, the
DIS reported in October 2020.1160 The Carter Center reported in March 2021 on the Fatah Al-Mubin
Operations Room, a coalition of armed groups including Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham, the Turkish-backed
opposition National Liberation Front, and Jaysh Al-Izza, having attacked GoS soldiers near Kabani.1161

1148 DW, Russia aims to boost military facilities in Syria, 30 May 2020, url
1149 Trevithick, J., Russia Is Extending One Of The Runways At Its Syrian Airbase, 5 February 2021, the Drive/The WarZone, url‫[ الجيش ر‬Turkish army creates 'steel shield' in northwestern Syria],‫التك ر‬1150 Asharq Al-Awsat, ‫ينش «درعا فوالذية »شمال غرب سوريا‬28 January 2021, url
1151 Waters, G., Battle for Kabani: A Rare Defeat for the Syrian Army in 2019, International Review, 6 January 2020, url
1152 Saban, N., Factbox: Iranian influence and presence in Syria, Atlantic Council, 5 November 2020, url
1153 Jusoor for Studies, Map of the military bases and posts of foreign forces in Syria, 6 January 2021, url
1154 Reuters, Oppositions say Syrian army fails to retake Latakia mountain, 19 May 2019, url
1155 Al Masdar News, Eight Syrian choppers swarm jihadist stronghold in northeast Latakia, 12 October 2019, url
1156 Al Masdar News, Jihadists capture first town in northern Latakia, Syrian Air Force enters battle, 9 July 2019, url
1157 Political Geography Now, Syria Control Map & Report: Frontlines Stable - July 2020, url
1158 Bellingcat, Syrian Turkmen Groups in Latakia: An Overview, 7 February 2019, url
1159 International Business Times, Syria's New Russian MiG 29 Unleash Hellfire on Turkey-backed Chinese Uyghur Muslim
Militants, 4 June 2020, url
1160 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Tartous, Latakia and Quneitra, [Source:
Omran Studies], December 2020, url, p. 81161 Carter Center (The), Syria Weekly Conflict Summary, 15-21 March 2021, 24 March 2021, url

122Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

2.4.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population
Security trends in 2020-2021
In January 2020, Gregory Waters noted that the fighting for Kabani had gone on for eight months.1162
Through all of 2020 and into 2021, sources reported about fighting continuing to take place between
the SAA and opposition groups posted in the governorate’s north-western border areas adjacent to
Idlib governorate and Turkey.1163 Defences in the Kabani hills belonging to TIP were attacked by the
SAA in September 2020, Al Masdar reported.1164 SOHR reported of members of the TIP firing at the
SAA’s positions in Kawkabah village in Jabal Shashaboo.1165 Turkish-backed groups were reportedly
shelling SAA’s positions in the Shalaf area in January 2021, according to Southfront, an analysis
organisation.1166
On 5 March 2020, Russia and Turkey agreed a ceasefire that froze the SAA’s advance on Idlib. A
security corridor was established along the M4 Highway connecting Latakia city, the governorate’s
capital, with Aleppo. A stretch of the highway became patrolled by Turkish and Russian forces.1167
Later in the year, sources reported that the Turkish military had set up posts or bases in northern
Latakia.1168 Gregory Waters reported that by the second week of March 2020, there were no major
military operations anywhere in Syria, and that the frontline had become ‘frozen’ in the north-west.
The number of combat-related deaths in March, April and May showed a sharp decrease in the levelof violence in north-west Syria when compared to the first two months of the year. With this decline,
the north-west ‘went quiet’, Waters reported.1169 Still, in the Jabal Al-Akrad area fighting continued
between GoS forces supported by Russian aircraft, and opposition groups. Qardaha town was shelledby HTS in mid-March 2020.1170
Russian military aircraft have been targeting opposition-held positions in the area during the reference
period for this report.1171 Russian airstrikes in Kabani town were reported 2-3 June 2020.1172 Russian
airstrikes in the outskirts of Kabani town were reported in January 2021, in a response to HTS targeting

1162 Waters, G., Battle for Kabani: A Rare Defeat for the Syrian Army in 2019, International Review, 6 January 2020, url
1163 Rudaw, Idlib militants launch renewed attack on the Syrian regime, while civilians protest both, 9 June 2020, url; SOHR,

Syrian Army Pounds Militant Positions In Northern Lattakia, 26 June 2020, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, Recent
Developments in Northwest Syria - Situation Report No. 18, 25 July 2020, url, p. 2: SOHR, Ceasefire violations, Regime forcesshell positions in Idlib, Hama and Latakia, while Turkistan Islamic Party attacks military position in Jabal Shashaboo, 7
December 2020, url; South Front, Russian Warplanes Deliver First Airstrikes On Greater Idlib In 2021 (Video, Photos), 9
January 2021, url; South Front, Military Situation in Syria on January 9, 2021, map update, 9 January 2021, url; SOHR,
Ceasefire violations | Oppositions shell and attack regime positions in Idlib and Latakia countryside, leaving scores dead andwounded, 8 January 2021, url
1164 Al Masdar News, Syrian Army strikes jihadist fortifications in strategic mountain region, 29 September 2020, url
1165 SOHR, Ceasefire violations | Regime forces shell positions in Idlib, Hama and Latakia, while Turkistan Islamic Party attacks
military position in Jabal Shashaboo, 7 December 2020, url
1166 South Front, Military Situation in Syria on January 9, 2021, map update, 9 January 2021, url. South Front Analysis &Intelligence is a public analytical umbrella organization focusing on issues of international relations, armed conflicts andcrises. url
1167 CNN, Turkey and Russia announce ceasefire in northwest Syria, 5 March 2020, url; MEE (Middle East Eye), Ceasefire
brokered by Turkey and Russia takes effect in Syria’s Idlib, 5 March 2020, url
1168 NPA, New Turkish military point established in Latakia countryside, Syria, 1 September 2020, url; SOHR, Turkey’s militarybuild-up | Turkish forces set up new military post in Jabal al-Akrad, as shelling and clashes intensify, 9 August 2020, url
1169 Waters, G., The Syrian Regime’s Combat losses in Spring 2020, and what lies ahead, MEI (Middle East Institute), June
2020, url, pp. 1, 2, 51170 Carter Center (The), Syria Weekly Conflict Summary, 9-15 March 2020, url, p. 21171 Al Masdar News, Russian, Syrian warplanes strike foreign jihadists in Hama, Latakia, 3 June 2020, url; Reuters, Russianplanes bomb opposition-held area in Syria's Latakia, say opposition, war monitor, 3 August 2020, url; South Front, Russian
Warplanes Deliver First Airstrikes On Greater Idlib In 2021 (Video, Photos), 9 January 2021, url; DW, Russia carries out first
Syria airstrikes in three months, 3 June 2020, url; AP News, Russia Airstrikes on northwest Syria after blast wounds 3
Russians, 14 July 2020, url; NPA, Russian airstrikes bombard opposition in Syria’s Latakia, 28 December 2020, url
1172 Carter Center (The), Syria Weekly Conflict Summary, 1-7 June 2020, url, p. 2

123

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

military positions of the SAA.1173 The International Business Times reported that Syrian military aircraft
concentrated their firing at TIP positions inside Kabani and Al-Sirmaniyeh towns in June 2020. Civilian
casualties were not reported.1174 The SAA advanced on ‘a frontline town’ in Latakia, near the Jabal AlAkrad mountain range, Reuters reported in August 2020. Civilian casualties were not reported.1175 Al
Masdar reported that the SAA was striking opposition positions in the Kabani hills in September. No
casualties were reported.1176
According to an international security organisation interviewed by DIS in October 2020, no major
security incidents were reported in the governorate’s capital Latakia City in 2020.1177 In thegovernorate as such, an international security organisation interviewed by DIS in October 2020
assessed that 99 % of the security incidents it recorded between 1 May and 31 October 2020 were‘indirect artillery fire’, and 1 % related to landmine/explosive remnants of war.1178 Opposition group
positions in the villages of Qarra Jai, Shamrawan, and Qalat Shanbar in Northern Latakia were shelled
by government forces in July 2020.1179 In October 2020, 94 % of the security related incidents were‘indirect artillery fire’ in the north-eastern part of the governorate.1180 By the end of the year, ground
operations by the government forces had not been reported by the sources consulted by the DIS sinceJuly, but rebel forces had been shelling government-controlled areas near the Kabani mountains.1181
Also, there had been drone attacks against the Russian airbase Hmeimim and in areas associated with
the SAA.1182 On 24 March 2021, the Carter Center reported that a GoS soldier was killed and several
others wounded near Kabani.1183
In an interview with the DIS on 23 October 2020, Navvar Saban at the Omran Studies stated that in
the city of Jableh, whose majority population is Alawite, the main security incidents took place
between Local Defence Forces (LDF) militias and GoS security services. Saban explained the incidents
as disputes over territory and control of land areas.1184
Protests over Syria’s economic situation took place in Latakia between January and October 2020, DIS
reported.1185 Arrests of civilians who had criticised corruption on social media were reported in thegovernorate in early 2021. Among those arrested were government employees, a televisionpresenter, and a prominent cartoonist. Tensions had reportedly increased in erstwhile GoS loyalist
areas among shortages of basic services, bread and fuel.1186 In an interview with EASO for this report,

1173 South Front, Russian Warplanes Deliver First Airstrikes On Greater Idlib In 2021 (Video, Photos), 9 January 2021, url
1174 International Business Times, Syria's New Russian MiG 29 Unleash Hellfire on Turkey-backed Chinese Uyghur Muslim

Militants, 4 June 2020, url
1175 Reuters, Russian planes bomb opposition-held area in Syria's Latakia, say opposition, war monitor, 3 August 2020, url
1176 Al Masdar News, Syrian Army strikes jihadist fortifications in strategic mountain region, 29 September 2020, url
1177 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Tartous, Latakia and Quneitra, [Source: aninternational security organisation], December 2020, url, p. 38
1178 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Tartous, Latakia and Quneitra, [Source:International security organisation], December 2020, url, p. 39
1179 NPA, HTS and Ansar al-Tawhid members wounded in Syria’s Idlib and Latakia, 1 July 2020, url
1180 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Tartous, Latakia and Quneitra, [Source:International security organisation], December 2020, url, p. 39
1181 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Tartous, Latakia and Quneitra, [Source:
Omran Studies; an international security organisation], December 2020, url, p. 91182 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Tartous, Latakia and Quneitra, [Source: aninternational security organisation], December 2020, url, p. 91183 Carter Center (The), Syria Weekly Conflict Summary, 15-21 March 2021, 24 March 2021, url
1184 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Tartous, Latakia and Quneitra, [Source:
Omran Studies], December 2020, url, p. 81185 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Tartous, Latakia and Quneitra, [Source:
Omran Studies], October 2020, url, p. 101186 MEI, Arrests in Syria’s Latakia signal discontent among pro-Assad communities, 4 February 2021, url

124Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

a humanitarian organisation working in Syria stated that there were reports of mild civil unrest in thegovernorate, due to the deterioration of the economic situation.1187
The DIS stated that the population could move freely within the governorate, but it considered theroads in Latakia not safe due to the presence of independent LDF, and that the government was
unable to implement full security on these roads.1188 Analyst Navvar Saban at the Omran Center for
Strategic Studies stated that the LDF were considered part of the Syrian army, albeit locally recruited
by Iran.1189 There are no areas within the governorate that have restricted access for civilians, except
for military installations, the Russian airbase and the port.1190 People could move freely within thecapital Latakia City.1191 There are checkpoints close to the airport in Latakia.1192 On 30 November 2020,
UNOCHA reported the airport as partially open to international traffic.1193
On 5 May 2020, media reported of a ‘rare’ and ‘unusual’ Israeli air attach against targets the Al-Haffa(Hifa) area, leaving one civilian dead.1194
Security incidents
During the reference period, there were 208 security incidents recorded by ACLED in Latakia
governorate, of whom 33 were coded as battles, 174 explosions/remote violence and 1 incidents ofviolence against civilians. Higher number of security incidents were recorded in July 2020 and January
2021 (see Figure 23).

Figure 23. Evolution of security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in Latakia
governorate in between 1 January 2020 and 31 March 2021, based on ACLED data1195

1187 Humanitarian organisation working in Syria, Teams interview, 17 February 2021
1188 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Tartous, Latakia and Quneitra, [Source:

Omran Studies], October 2020, url, p. 111189 Saban, N., Factbox: Iranian influence and presence in Syria, 5 November 2020, url. Navvar Saban is a conflict expert at
the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, an independent think-tank in Istanbul, Turkey, where he specializes in Iranian
influence in Syria, focusing on Shia militia activity.
1190 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Tartous, Latakia and Quneitra, [Source:
Omran Studies], October 2020, url, p. 111191 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Tartous, Latakia and Quneitra, October 2020[source: International security organisation, para. 18], url, p. 111192 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Tartous, Latakia and Quneitra, [Source:
Omran Studies], October 2020, url, p. 111193 UNOCHA/WHO, Syria: COVID-19 Humanitarian Update No. 21 As of 30 November 2020, url , p. 61194 MEE, Syria media: One person killed as Israeli air strikes target Assad home region, 5 May 2021, url; Enab Baladi, One
dead, six wounded in Israeli shelling of positions in western Syria, 5 May 2021, url
1195 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (9 April 2021), url

125Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Latakia governorate – Security incidents
RemoteViolence against
District
Battlesviolence
civilians
16117
Al-Hafa
1
2
Al-Qardaha
7
3Jablah1052
Latakia
1
33
174
Total
Figure 24. Security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in Latakia governorate
between 1 January 2020 and 31 March 2021. Breakdown by district based on ACLED data

Data retrieved from ACLED shows that the highest number of security incidents throughout thereporting period were recorded in the Al-Haffa and Latakia districts.
Included in ACLED’s coding of ‘Explosions/remote violence’ are air/drone strikes andshelling/artillery/missile attacks (for more information on ACLED methodology see Section 1.6.2
Security incidents). Accordingly, the high proportion of explosions/remote violence reported by ACLED
includes incidents of artillery mortar shelling, airstrikes and missile attacks of the kind listed as
illustrative security incidents below.
Illustrative security incidents
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Turkish forces targeted Syrian government and Russian positions in Latakia governorate withmissiles, the Daily Sabah reported on 28 February 2020.1196
Rudaw reported that opposition groups had announced some movements in Kabani in mid2020. Rudaw mentioned these movements in connection with a renewed offensive by
insurgents in Idlib against surrounding government forces at the time.1197
SOHR reported on 26 June 2020 that the SAA artillery targeted Mount Turkman in Latakia,
where several foreign jihadist groups such as the Turkistan Islamic Party and Ajnad Al-Kavkaz
reportedly were having positions.1198
On 25 July 2020, UNOCHA reported about ‘more frequent shelling along frontlines’ in Latakia
and other governorates.1199
SOHR reported on 2 August 2020 that GoS forces had been shelling targets in Idlib frompositions in Sashaboo, and that the GoS had sent reinforcements to the frontlines in the northeastern Latakia countryside.1200
On 3 August 2020, Reuters reported that Russian aircraft attacked opposition-held positionsin the Jabal Al-Akrad mountains in Latakia.1201
SOHR reported about regime forces firing rockets and artillery pieces at the Kabani area andKafradeen village in the Latakia countryside on 7 December 2020.1202
On 8 January 2021, SOHR reported about mortar fire on the Qal’at Shalaf frontlines in Jabal
Al-Akrad, and exchange of fire between rebel factions and regime soldiers on frontlines in1196 Daily Sabah, Turkey strikes Assad regime bastion Latakia, other targets in Syria with missiles, 28 February 2020, url
1197 Rudaw, Idlib militants launch renewed attack on the Syrian regime, while civilians protest both, 9 June 2020, url
1198 SOHR, Syrian Army Pounds Militant Positions In Northern Lattakia, 26 June 2020, url
1199 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, Recent Developments in Northwest Syria - Situation Report No. 18, 25 July 2020, url, p.

21200 SOHR, Military build-up | Regime forces bring in new reinforcement to Sahl Al-Ghab and rural Latakia, and shell factions’positions in rural Idlib, 2 August 2020, url
1201 Reuters, Russian planes bomb rebel-held area in Syria's Latakia, say opposition, war monitor, 3 August 2020, url
1202 SOHR, Ceasefire violations, Regime forces shell positions in Idlib, Hama and Latakia, while Turkistan Islamic Party attacks
military position in Jabal Shashaboo, 7 December 2020, url

126Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation•

Jabal Al-Turkmen, as well as bombardment of Shamrouran and Qarrah Jaghi village, all locatedin the northern Latakia countryside.1203
On 9 March 2021, armed opposition groups repelled an ‘infiltration attempt’ by government
forces in the countryside of Latakia.1204

Civilian fatalities
Month
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
AugustSeptember
OctoberNovember
December
Total

VDC 2020
112

SNHR 2020
71
1
9VDC 2021-

SNHR 2021---

Figure 25. Civilian fatalities as a result of armed conflict in Latakia governorate in 2020 and first three months of 2021.
Monthly breakdown based on VDC and SNHR data

In 2020, in Latakia governorate there were recorded between 2 (VDC data)1205 and 9 civilian
fatalities1206 (SNHR data).1207 No civilian fatalities were reported by SNHR or VDC for the first threemonths of 2021.

1203 SOHR, Ceasefire violations | Opposition shell and attack regime positions in Idlib and Latakia countryside, leaving scoresdead and wounded, 8 January 2021, url
1204 NPA, Opposition groups repel government forces’ infiltration attempt in Syria’s Latakia, 9 March 2021, url
1205 Based on monthly civilian fatalities figures for 2020-2021 shared by VDC with EASO
1206 In a January 2021 report, SNHR mentions 3 civilian fatalities in Latakia in 2020. This figure is the result of a revision of
their data. EASO email correspondence with SNHR, 22 April 2021. See SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 1,734
Civilians in Syria in 2020, including 99 in December, 1 January 2021, url, p. 121207 Based on data extracted from monthly reports on civilian casualties published by SNHR. See: SNHR, 286 Civilians,
including Four Medical and Civil Defense Personnel, Documented Killed in Syria in January 2020, 1 February 2020, url, p. 8;
SNHR, 276 Civilians, including Six Medical Personnel and Two Media Workers, Documented Killed in Syria in February 2020,
1 March 2020, url, p. 8; SNHR, 145 Civilians, including Two Medical Personnel, Documented Killed in Syria in March 2020, 1
April 2020, url, p. 9; SNHR, 78 Civilians, including One Media Workers, Documented Killed in Syria in April 2020, 1 May 2020,
url, p. 10; SNHR, 125 Civilians Documented Killed in Syria in May 2020, including Eight Who Died Due to Torture and One
Massacre, 1 June 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, 1,006 Civilians, including three Media Workers and 12 Medical and Civil Defense
Personnel, Documented Killed in Syria in the First Half of 2020, 1 July 2020, url, p. 16; SNHR, 107 Civilians, including 26
Children and 11 Women, Documented Killed in Syria in July 2020, 2 August 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, 122 Civilians, including 21
Children and Seven Women, Documented Killed in Syria in August 2020, 1 September 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, Extrajudicial
Killing Claims the Lives of 102 Civilians, including 15 Children, 10 Women, Three Medical Personnel and 12 Victims Due toTorture, 1 October 2020, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 126 Civilians, including 18 Children, Eight
Women, One Media Worker and 10 Victims Due to Torture, 1 November 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims
the Lives of 172 Civilians, including 16 Children, 11 Women, and 30 Victims Due to Torture, 1 December 2020, url, p. 9; SNHR,
Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 1,734 Civilians in Syria in 2020, including 99 in December, 1 January 2021, url, p. 14

127

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Infrastructure damage and explosive remnants of war
A report by SHRC in 2019 about the impact of cluster bombs on civilians in the de-escalation zone thatstretches into north-eastern Latakia, mentioned that residential areas had been targeted but thereport did not specify the impact and locations.1208
In a news release by OHCHR in September 2019 it was stated that during the government offensive tooust HTS fighters from areas including Latakia, ‘infrastructure essential to the survival of the civilian
population’, had been destroyed.1209 The exact locations and the extent of the destruction was,however, not stated.
Extensive wildfires erupted in October 2020 in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean Sea,
comprising Latakia. The fires inflicted severe damage on infrastructure and livelihoods across thegovernorate. The conditions causing the fires were attributed to climate change. 1210 The WorldBank stated in 2020 that war-related damage to land and property was not a prominent issue forpeople in Latakia. The World Bank estimated the percentage of the residential housing stock deprived
by the conflict in Latakia, at 10 %, considering it the least deprived of all governorates in Syria.1211
Based on the Syria Multi-sector Needs Assessment of 2020, the Shelter Cluster assessed that in Latakia
governorate, 0.4 % of the population was living in damaged buildings.1212
One of the seven public hospitals in Latakia governorate, the Ibrahim N’ama Hospital in Jableh, waspartially damaged and partially functioning, DIS reported in October 2020. Of all the public healthcenters, 90 % were undamaged. Nine public health centers were fully or partially damaged. Nine were
not functioning, six of them located in Al-Haffa, two in Al-Shamiye, and one in Latakia city.1213
The port of Latakia had not been damaged by the conflict, the World Bank reported in 2020. There
were 56 ongoing government-funded projects to reconstruct roads in the governorate that had beendamaged previously. The causes of the damages to these roads were not mentioned by the source.1214
Fuel shortages have been reported in the reference period. The shortages were ascribed to sanctions,
not to war damage.1215
A map of explosive munitions per affected community published by the Carter Center in November
2020, showed that most of the governorate’s communities were not contaminated with explosive
munitions. The highest density of affected communities was in the northern half of thegovernorate.1216
Displacement and return
For all of 2020, UNHCR recorded around 7 000 IDP movements from or within Latakia governorate(6 000 displaced within Latakia, 1 100 displaced from Latakia to Tartous governorate). In the same
period, 11 000 were displaced to or within the governorate (6 000 within the governorate, 5 000

1208 SHRC, Nearly 457 attacks by Syrian and Russian Regimes Using Cluster Munitions were Documented, 24 of them since

the Sochi Agreement, 16 April 2019, url;
1209 OHCHR, Escalating violence and waves of displacement continue to torment civilians during eighth year of Syrian conflict,
11 September 2019, url
1210 UNOCHA, OCHA Syria Flash Update #01 Humanitarian Impact of Wildfires in Coastal Areas As of 11 October 2020, url, p.
1; IFRC (International Federation of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent Societies), Emergency Plan of Action (EPoA) Syria:
Wildfires, 23 October 2020, url, p. 2
1211 World Bank (The), The Mobility of Displaced Syrians: An Economic and Social Analysis, 2020 url, pp. 114, 110
1212 Global Shelter Cluster, Syrian Arab Republic: Whole of Syria Shelter/NFI Sector Humanitarian Needs Overview 2021, 1
March 2021, url, pp. 6, 8
1213 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Tartous, Latakia and Quneitra, [Source:WHO], December 2020, url, p. 23
1214 World Bank (The), The Mobility of Displaced Syrians: An Economic and Social Analysis, 2020 url p. 161
1215 NPA, 8 September 2020, url; Transportation and fuel crisis, 17 December 2020, url; MEMO January 2021, url
1216 Carter Center (The), Explosive Munitions in Syria - Report 3 Aleppo, Idleb, and Latakia governorates, 13 November 2020,
url, p. 1

128

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

displaced to Latakia from the governorates of Damascus, Rural Damascus, Aleppo, Hama, Homs, andTartous.1217
In terms of return movements, UNOCHA recorded 3 000 IDP returns movements to Latakia
governorate in 2020.1218
In January 2021, there were 520 IDP movements from or within Latakia governorate, 830 IDP
movements to or within, and 365 IDP movements within the governorate.1219 In the same month there
were no return movements to the governorate from outside or from locations within, 73 returns from
Latakia, and no returns from locations within the governorate only.1220
In February 2021, there were 510 IDP movements from or within the governorate, 390 IDP movements
within, and 720 IDP movements to or within the governorate.1221 In the same month there were no
return movements to Latakia from outside or from locations within, 40 returns from the governorate,
and no returns from locations within Latakia only.1222
In March 2021, there were 540 IDP movements from or within the governorate (471 of which wererecorded within the governorate).1223 In terms of spontaneous IDP returns, in March 2021 UNOCHA
recorded 266 returns from the governorate.1224
IDP movements caused by the wildfires in the Latakia woodlands, were reported in October 2020.1225

1217 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements Overview, Jan - Dec 2020, 31 December 2020, url
1218 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic. Spontaneous IDP Returnee Movements Overview, Jan - Dec 2020, 16 February 2021, url
1219 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic. IDP Movements January 2021, 2 March 2021, url
1220 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, IDP Spontaneous Returns January 2021, 2 March 2021, url
1221 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, IDP Movements February 2021, 1 April, 2021, url
1222 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, IDP Spontaneous Returns February 2021, 1 April 2021, url
1223 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, IDP Movements. March 2021, 12 May 2021, url
1224 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic. IDP Spontaneous Returns. March 2021, 12 May 2021, url
1225 UNOCHA, OCHA SYRIA FLASH UPDATE #01 Humanitarian Impact of Wildfires in Coastal Areas As of 11 October 2020, url,

p. 1; IFRC (International Federation of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent Societies), Emergency Plan of Action (EPoA) Syria:
Wildfires, url , p. 2

129

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

2.5 Tartous governorate

Map 11: © MapAction, Tartous governorate map1226

1226 MapAction, Syria Governorate Maps – Tartous Governorate, last updated on 29 July 2019, url

130Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

2.5.1 General description of the governorate
Tartous and Latakia governorates form the coastal region of Syria. Tartous governorate borders theMediterranean Sea in the west, Latakia governorate in the north, the governorates of Hama and Homsin the east, and Lebanon in the south.1227 Tartous consists of five administrative districts that are
Tartous City, Baniyas, Dreikish, Safita and Sheikh Badr1228, which are subdivided into twenty-seven
sub-districts.1229 Tartous governorate constitutes a part of the Useful Syria, term coined by Bashar alAsad in 2016 encompassing also the governorates of Damascus and its countryside, Rif Dimashq (Rural
Damascus), Homs, Hama, and Latakia, which were considered more strategic and worth defending.1230
The Syrian Central Bureau of Statistics estimated the population of Tartous governorate in 2019 to be
1 152 000.1231 As of August 2020, WFP estimated the population of Tartous governorate at 930 000.1232
In a March 2021 report, UNOCHA estimated the population of Tartous governorate to be of929 366.1233
As of August 2020, UNOCHA estimated the total population, including both residents and IDPs of
Tartous governorate at 929 3661234, out of which 426 789 in Tartous district, 129 005 in Baniyas, 82 835
in Dreikish, 67 228 in Qadmous, 149 427 in Safita, 74 082 in Sheikh Badr district.1235
According to USDOS Syria 2020 International Religious Freedom Report, ‘continued population
displacement adds a degree of uncertainty to demographic analyses.’1236 Furthermore, the reportstates that he majority of Alawites live in the mountainous areas of the coastal Latakia governorate,
as well as in the cities of Latakia, Tartous, Homs and Damascus.1237 In 2015 Alawites were estimatedto constitute 80 % of Tartous city population, along with 10 % Sunnis and 10 % Christians.1238 Also,
population between Tartous and Homs was considered predominantly Alawite, with strong Christianminority in Safita, while Sunnis were concentrated around al-Hamidiyah.1239
Tartous is one of nine free investment zones in Syria, granted to foreign investors, from dominantly
Iran and Russia, to establish and operate projects, while benefiting from exemptions, concessions,guarantees, and exclusions of tax and custom duties.1240 In addition to Baniyas and Latakia, Tartous
port is one of Syria’s three Mediterranean export terminals.1241 According to the Alma Research and
Education Center, an Israeli non-profit and bipartisan organisation focused on geopolitics, in addition

1227 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, Tartous governorate, January 2016, url
1228 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic – Governorates Profiles, June 2014, p. 31, url
1229 UNHCR, UNHCR Syria / Tartous FO, End of year 2017 / Factsheet, January – December 2017, p. 1, url
1230 According to the source in 2011, the population of Tartous governorate was 797 000, where Alawites comprised 69 %,Sunnis 18 %, Ismailis 7 % and Christians 6 %. King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies (KFCRIS), Hussain Ibrahim
Qutrib, “Useful Syria” and demographic changes in Syria, 2016, p. 3-4, url
1231 Syria, Central Bureau of Statistics, Estimate of the population in Syria by governorates, n.d., url
1232 Denmark, DIS, Syria – security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Tartous, Latakia and Quneitra, 18
December 2020, [Source: WFP], url, p. 51233 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview. Syrian Arab Republic, March 2021, url, p. 231234 UNOCHA, Humanitarian needs overview – Syrian Arab Republic, Humanitarian programme cycle 2021, March 2021, p.
23, url1235 UNOCHA, Humanitarian needs overview – Syrian Arab Republic, Humanitarian programme cycle 2021, March 2021, p.
98, url
1236 USDOS, Syria 2020 International Religious Freedom Report, 12 May 2021, p. 3, url
1237 USDOS, Syria 2020 International Religious Freedom Report, 12 May 2021, p. 3, url
1238 Balanche, F., Latakia is Assad’s Achilles heel, Policy Analysis / Policy Watch 2489, Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, 23 September 2015, url
1239 Balanche, F., Latakia is Assad’s Achilles heel, Policy Analysis / Policy Watch 2489, Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, 23 September 2015, url
1240 Enab Baladi, Free zones… new investments stabilizing Iranian presence in Syria and reaping benefits, 6 March 2020, url;
Jamestown Foundation, Moscow plans enhanced military basing in Syria, Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 17 Issue: 79, 3 June
2020, url
1241 SOHR, Why Syria is a critical part of Russia’s energy strategy, 22 September 2020, url

131Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

to the Syrian ports of Baniyas and Latakia, Tartous port constitutes a key part of a maritime cargo
supply corridor, coordinated between Russia, Syria and Iran to secure the supply of oil1242, wheat1243,
and other products from Iran to Syrian ports, with the aim of circumventing US and European
sanctions.1244
In 2017, Syria and Russia signed a 49-year lease agreement, allowing an automatic renewal for another25 years for the development and modernisation of Russian permanent naval base (first establishedin 1971)1245, hosting the Military-Maritime Fleet (Voyenno-Мorskoi Flot - VMF) in Tartous port.1246 The
bill giving the agreement direct effect was passed by the Syrian parliament in June 2019.1247 The accessto Tartous port, grants Russia a posture to power-project not only within the eastern part but theentire Mediterranean Sea1248, the Middle East and North Africa.1249

2.5.2 Conflict background and armed actors
As of March 2021, Tartous governorate was under GoS control1250 (see also Map 4).
An undisclosed international security organisation interviewed by DIS in October 2020 stated thatgovernorates of Tartous and Latakia ‘can be considered as one entity with regards to the security
situation in 2020’.1251 Navvar Shaban of the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, another source
interviewed by the DIS, reported that throughout 2020, the GoS controlled Tartous governorate,
however contrary to the international security organisation stance, Shaban noted that the security
structure, imposed security measures, the behaviour of different security actors varies in different
areas in the two governorates.1252
Reportedly, anti-government armed groups are not present in the governorate of Tartous.1253
For a detailed background overview of the conflict preceding March 2020 please consult the EASO COI
Report: Syria - Security situation (May 2020).
Syrian Arab Army and affiliated armed groups
Navvar Shaban of the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, claims that the GoS security presence isstronger in majority Sunni villages, such as Baniyas in Tartous, where population movement is closely
1242 USNI, H. I. Sutton, Russian navy seen escorting Iranian tankers bound for Syria, 21 October 2020, url; Diyaruna, Iraniansupertanker arrives at Syria’s Tartous, 9 September 2019, url
1243 PressTV, Report: Russia, Iran, Syria working to secure oil, wheat shipments to Arab country, 18 April 2021, url
1244 Alma Research and Education Center, Tal Beeri, Russia and Iran present – the naval coordination mechanism for breaking
sanctions on Syria, 9 May 2021, url
1245 RIAC, Turkish and Russian Approaches to Security in the Eastern Mediterranean, 10 November 2020, url
1246 Sputnik International, Russia to expand capabilities of naval base in Syrian Tartus, 20 January 2017, url; ЭхоПетербурга (Echo of Petersburg), Путин поручил обсудить с Сирией передачу недвижимости и акватории (Putin
instructed discussion with Syria about the transfer of real estate and maritime areas), 29 March 2020, url
1247 France24, Syria parliament okays Russian lease of Tartus port: state media, 12 June 2019, url
1248 Jamestown Foundation, Moscow plans enhanced military basing in Syria, September 2020, Eurasia Daily Monitor
Volume: 17 Issue: 79, 3 June 2020, url
1249 ISW, Jennifer Cafarella, Testimony before US House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on
Middle East, North Africa and Global Counterterrorism, “10 years of war: examining the ongoing conflict in Syria”, 15 April
2021, p. 7, url, original url; FPRI, Igor Delanoë, Russian naval forces in the Syrian war, September 2020, p. 10, url; KAS, ErcanÇitlioğlu, A Turkish perspective on Syria, 26 September 2020, p. 37, 41, url
1250 Based on reading of maps in ISW, Syria Situation Report: February 19 – March 22, 2021, 25 March 2021, url; Liveuamap,
Syria, 26 March 2021, url
1251 The source works with analysis of the security situation in Syria and receives daily reports on the security
situation in the whole country. Denmark, DIS, Syria – security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Tartous,
Latakia and Quneitra, 18 December 2020, url, p. 7
1252Denmark, DIS, Syria – security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Tartous, Latakia and Quneitra, 18
December 2020, [Source: International security organisation, Omran Center] url, p. 71253 Denmark, DIS, Syria – security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Tartous, Latakia and Quneitra, 18
December 2020, [Source: International security organisation, Omran Center], url, p. 8132

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

monitored, together with social media accounts of some individuals.1254 The GoS security presence is
not so pronounced in other parts of the coastal area.1255
Local Defence Force (LDF) militias presence is reported to be greater in rural areas of Tartous
governorate. Reportedly, this may sometimes create security issues with GoS security agencies in rural
areas, due to LDFs’ potential targeting of individuals and imposition of their own security measuresand controls.1256
According to the sources interviewed by the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project(OCCRP), the Syrian president’s brother Maher al-Assad control extends over the coastal cities of
Latakia and Tartous, which official and unofficial ports have been considered a hotbed for smugglingof illegal goods into and out of Syria, used to finance militias under GoS control.1257 Maher al-Assadcommands the 4th Armoured division, which although headquartered in Damascus, has its security
bureau branch overseeing the Tartous and Latakia ports.1258
In August 2020, the Syrian Observer published a translation of an unverified article by the opposite
website, Shaam Network, which reported that allegedly Brigadier General Ibrahim Abbas wasappointed the head of the Tartous military branch.1259
RussiaAccording to Syria expert Fabrice Balanche, although the GoS now controls two-thirds of Syria’s
territory, compared to only a fifth in 2013, the GoS has failed to re-establish control over Syria’s skies
and territorial waters. Russia monitors its maritime zones from its naval base in Tartous, and most of
its airspace from the base in Hmeimim.1260 According to the Foreign Policy Research Institute, the 49
years lease agreement for Russia’s naval base at Tartous allows 11 vessels to dock there, and ‘Russia
is currently upgrading’ it ‘to make it more robust as a base’.1261 Russian and Syrian joint military
exercises are regularly conducted in the port of Tartous.1262 Russian military ships supply convoy
constitutes what is considered ‘the Syria Express’, which operates between Russia’s Black Sea ports
and the ports of Tartus, Banyas and Latakia, regularly supplying the GoS with armaments.1263 In 2019
publication of the National Defence Review (RDN, Revue Défense Nationale) of the French association,

1254 Denmark, DIS, Syria – security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Tartous, Latakia and Quneitra, 18

December 2020, [Source: Omran Center], url, p. 81255 Denmark, DIS, Syria – security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Tartous, Latakia and Quneitra, 18
December 2020, [Source: Omran Center] url, p. 81256 Denmark, DIS, Syria – security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Tartous, Latakia and Quneitra, 18
December 2020, [Source: Omran Center], url p. 81257 Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), Assad regime implicated in massive Captagon bust, 13 July
2020, url
1258 Jamestown Foundation, Can Kasapoglu, Could Russia lose the Syrian Arab army to Iran or general Maher al-Assad?,Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 18 Issue: 13, 26 June 2020, url
1259 The Syrian Observer, Assad regime’s latest military reassignments, 20 August 2020, url
1260 Balanche, F., , Policy Watch 3433, The Assad regime has failed to restore full sovereignty over Syria, Washington Institutefor Near East Policy, 10 February 2021, url; OHCHR, Syrian Arab Republic: approximate areas of influence as of November
2020, January 2021, url
1261 FPRI, Robert E. Hamilton, Chris Miller and Aaron Stein, Russia’s war in Syria – assessing Russian military capabilities andlessons learned, 10 September 2020, url, p. 123
1262 Russia, MDRF, Russian and Syrian military personnel conducted joint exercises to protect the waters of the port of Tartus,
where the Russian Navy is based, 25 May 2020, url; Russia, MDRF, A joint Russian-Syrian exercise took place in the
Mediterranean sea near the province of Tartus, 10 July 2020, url; Russia, MDRF, Russian and Syrian servicemen held a joint
training session to repel an attack by saboteurs on the Russian Navy's CSS point in Tartus, 24 December 2020, url
1263 NATO Defense College – Research Division, Chloé Berger and Cynthia Sallom, Russia in NATO’s south: expansionist
strategy or defensive posture?, NDC research paper no. 16, January 2021, url, p. 22

133

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

the National Defence Studies Committee (CEDN, Comité d’études de défense nationale) it is statedthat Russia supplies 2 000 tons of military equipment to Syria every day.1264
Navvar Shaban of the Omran Center for Strategic Studies claims that the presence of Russia’s military
in Tartous harbour deterred the presence of pro-government militias, unlike in other governorates.1265
Tartous city is reported to be one out of a total of 16 recruitment centres of Liwa al-Areen (The Den
Brigade), a Russian-backed formation, which reportedly was initially affiliated with the military
intelligence branch that directs all the military security branches.1266 Liwa al-Areen was formed in theal-Armen neighbourhood of the city of Homs on 1 March 2017. The formation is estimated tocomprise 1 130 fighters, and it claims to have more than 30 ‘martyrs’.1267
Similarly, Russia continues to operate a recruitment centre in Tartous for the 5th Assault Corps,
established in November 2016 under a joint Russian-Syrian command.1268 Other allegedly Russiabacked militia and an active constituent of the 5th Assault Corps with a military base in Tartous is
Sayadou Da’esh (SD – ISIS Hunters), established in February 2017 and operating under direct Russiancommand in Deir Ez-Zor.1269 Reportedly, Sayadou Da’esh was involved in liberation of Palmyra and its
surroundings from ISIS militants in 2017.1270
In August 2020, Diyaruna news website sponsored by the United States Central Command(USCENTCOM) to ‘highlight movement toward greater regional stability’, while focusing on‘developments that hinder’ both ‘terrorist activity and support for terrorism in the region’1271,
reported that Russian proxy militia fighters of the Wagner group, operate in all areas with Russianforces presence, including Tartous.1272
In November 2020, Asharq al-Awsat reported that allegedly under the guise of Russian companies,‘unknown parties’ were recruiting Syrians for between USD 1 000 and 2 000 per month, to fight for
Russian forces in Venezuela and Libya. Such activities were reported in Damascus, Homs, Tartous,
Latakia and ‘possibly other regions’.1273
In February 2021, Caravanserai, another news website sponsored by USCENTCOM sharing the same
mission as Diyaruna1274, reported that private security company, Al-Maham for Protection and Private
Guarding established in 2016, operates in Tartous, as a subsidiary owned by the Qaterji International

1264 RDN, Ana Pouvreau, La stratégie de la Russie en Méditerranée (Russian Strategy in the Mediterranean), Revue n° 822,

2019, p. 112-119, url, the original source is also quoted in the publication of NATO Defense College – Research Division, Chloé
Berger, Cynthia Sallom, Russia in NATO’s south: expansionist strategy or defensive posture?, NDC research paper no. 16,
January 2021, p. 22, url
1265 Denmark, DIS, Syria – security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Tartous, Latakia and Quneitra, 18
December 2020, [Source: Omran Center], url, p. 81266 Al-Tamimi, A. J., Liwa al-Areen: a Russian-backed formation, 20 June 2020, url
1267 Al-Tamimi, A. J., Liwa al-Areen: a Russian-backed formation, 20 June 2020, url
1268 NPA. Syria, Russia calls Druze youth to join government’s Fifth Corps in Syria’s Suwayda, 17 September 2020, url; AlJabassini, A., From Insurgents to Soldiers: The Fifth Assault Corps in Daraa, Southern Syria, EUI, 14 May 2019, url, pp. 2, 6
1269 Al-Jabassini, A., From Insurgents to Soldiers: The Fifth Assault Corps in Daraa, Southern Syria, EUI, 14 May 2019, url, p.
211270 RT, ‘Terrorists flee when they hear us coming’ – Syria’s ISIS hunters to RT (EXCLUSIVE), 6 April 2017, url
1271 Diyaruna, About us – Attributions, url; Caravanserai, Disclaimer, url
1272 Wagner Group is allegedly deployed in Horan, Palmyra, Daraa, Hama, Aleppo, Damascus, Latakia and Tartous. Diyaruna,
Russian private military companies pose grave threat to Syria: experts, 20 August 2020, url
1273 Asharq al-Awsat, Under guise of Russian companies, ‘unknown parties’ recruit Syrians to head to Venezuela, 8 November
2020, url
1274 Diyaruna, About us – Attributions, url; Caravanserai, Disclaimer, url

134Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Group1275 that has close relationship with Russia.1276 Reportedly, Al-Maham operates in and around
Damascus, in Homs, Tartous, Deir Ezzor and Aleppo. According to the sources, Al-Maham and similar
private security contractors have been engaged by Russia to expel ‘rival militias affiliated with the
Syrian regime and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)’ and ‘to lock in gains in theseregions -- now and during any future reconstruction’.1277 However, 2020 EUI report reported that AlMaham is based in Aleppo and affiliated to Iran, Syrian military intelligence and the 4th division security
bureau.1278
Iran and Iranian-backed armed groups
Phillip Smyth of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, claimed that ‘rebuilding Shiitedominated neighbourhoods in Damascus, Homs, Aleppo, Latakia and Tartus is a key element of Iran’s
strategy of bolstering its influence in Syria.’1279 Allegedly, Iran is behind demographic engineering plan
aimed at establishing its influence in the region, this scheme comprising in bringing Shiites who fled
their homes during the civil conflict, but also bringing in others from Lebanon and Iraq.1280
According to a report from 2019, Liwa Al-Baath (LAB – The Baath Brigade), an active constituent of the
5th Assault Corps, a pro-GoS militia composed of volunteer forces that initially joined Kata’ib Al-Baath(KAB – The Baath Battalions, first appeared in 2012 in Aleppo city), was posted to Tartous, Latakia andDamascus governorates.1281
The most prominent security companies affiliated to Iran and the Syrian military intelligence branch,which have inherited loyalist militias following their dissolution under Russian pressure in 2017
include: al-Areen Security and Protection LLC (licenced in 2017), Shield Security Guarding (2015) andal-Fajr Security LLC (2018). These companies have been reported to operate from Latakia and Tartous
ports to the major cities, including other locations.1282 Another private security company, Castle
Security and Protection LLC (licenced in 2017) is affiliated to Iran and Maher al-Assad, and it oversees
the secure passage of goods from Tartous port to Damascus and its countryside, Homs and Aleppo.
According to Castle Security media office, the company aims to reduce unemployment among theyoung and relatives of ‘martyrs’, which ‘explains why so many of its personnel are former National
Defence members’.1283

1275 Qaterji International Group owns several companies operating in tourism petroleum, transport and import-export

sectors, and the company and its owners have been sanctioned by US for helping smuggle Syria’s oil and arms and forfacilitating trade between GoS and ISIS. Diyaruna, Private security companies provide façade for Russian hegemony in Syria,
4 February 2021, url; Caravanserai, Private security companies provide façade for Russian hegemony in Syria, 3 February
2021, url
1276 Diyaruna, Private security companies provide façade for Russian hegemony in Syria, 4 February 2021, url; Caravanserai,
Private security companies provide façade for Russian hegemony in Syria, 3 February 2021, url
1277 Diyaruna, Private security companies provide façade for Russian hegemony in Syria, 4 February 2021, url; Caravanserai,
Private security companies provide façade for Russian hegemony in Syria, 3 February 2021, url
1278 Baresh, M., Private security companies in Syria: new agents at the Regime’s service, EUI, 10 September 2020, url, pp. 6,
13, 16-17
1279 Al Monitor, Is Syria unable, or unwilling, to fend off Iran coronavirus contagion?, 25 March 2020, url
1280 Al Monitor, Is Syria unable, or unwilling, to fend off Iran coronavirus contagion?, 25 March 2020, url
1281 Al-Jabassini, A., From Insurgents to Soldiers: The Fifth Assault Corps in Daraa, Southern Syria, EUI, 14 May 2019, url, p.
201282 Reportedly these companies are active in Damascus and Aleppo, at border crossings in Deir ez-Zor, between the cities of
Aleppo, Hama, Homs and Damascus, and from the al-Qa’im crossing on the Iraqi border to Damascus and Aleppo. Allegedly,
they also operated between internal border crossings in Idlib and Aleppo before their closure due to GoS recapture of theseareas in early 2020. Baresh, M., Private security companies in Syria: new agents at the Regime’s service, EUI, 10 September
2020, url, pp. 8, 13, 16-17
1283 Baresh, M., Private security companies in Syria: new agents at the Regime’s service, EUI, 10 September 2020, url, p. 16

135Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

2.5.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population
According to an international security organisation interviewed by DIS in October 2020, both Tartousand Latakia governorates can generally be considered safe areas when compared to the othergovernorates. The same sources noted that in the cities of Tartous and Latakias there were no major
security incidents between January and October 2020.1284
According to Navvar Shaban, the freedom of movement in Tartous governorate is generally
unrestricted, however the GoS cannot guarantee complete safety on the roads due to the presenceof independent LDFs. The same source assessed that the road between Damascus and Tartous is only
considered safe when the Russian military uses it.1285
Freedom of movement inside the city of Tartous is unrestricted, except for checkpoints when entering
the city. The checkpoints of all four GoS security services in Tartous city are located at the northernand southern entrances to the city.1286 Two DIS sources reported that in the governorate of Tartous
there are no access restricted areas for civilians, except military sites and installations, such as a
Russian naval base and the air defence systems.1287 The Air Force Intelligence has two checkpoints inthe city of Baniyas in Tartous governorate, and there are additional two checkpoints belonging toother security actors of the Syrian security apparatus. According to the international security
organisation, due to the Syrian security apparatus structure it is not possible to discern with certainty
which security actors are present at checkpoints.1288 Reportedly, none of checkpoints between
Damascus International Airport and the coastal governorates are manned by Russian or Iranian forces,
instead all are managed by SAA personnel or by Syrian security services.1289
As of 5 April 2021, UNOCHA reported that while most of land borders into Syria remain closed due to
implementation of precautionary anti-Covid-19 measures, there are some limited exemptions.
International commercial flights are ongoing, and the ports of Tartous and Latakia remain
operational.1290
Security incidents
According to ACLED data, during the reference period there was 1 security incident in Tartous
governorate, coded as violence against civilians.

1284 Denmark, DIS, Syria – security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Tartous, Latakia and Quneitra, 18

December 2020, [Source: International security organisation], url, p. 38
1285 Denmark, DIS, Syria – security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Tartous, Latakia and Quneitra, 18
December 2020, [Source: Omran Center], url, p. 111286 Denmark, DIS, Syria – security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Tartous, Latakia and Quneitra, 18
December 2020, [Source: Omran Center], url, p. 111287 Denmark, DIS, Syria – security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Tartous, Latakia and Quneitra, 18
December 2020, [Source: Omran Center, International security organisation], url, p. 11
1288 Denmark, DIS, Syria – security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Tartous, Latakia and Quneitra, 18
December 2020, [Source: International security organisation], url, p. 111289 Denmark, DIS, Syria – security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Tartous, Latakia and Quneitra, 18
December 2020, p. 12, url
1290 UNOCHA/WHO, Syrian Arab Republic: Covid-19, Humanitarian update no. 25, 5 April 2021, url, p. 2

136

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Tartous governorate – Security incidents
District

Battles

Remoteviolence

Violence against
civilians--

1

TartousFigure 26. Security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in Tartous governorate
between 1 January 2020 and 31 March 2021. Breakdown by district based on ACLED data

Between 1 May and 31 October 2020, according to an unnamed international security organisationinterviewed by the DIS, the following security incidents were recorded in the governorate of Tartous:
one incident of terrorism, 11 crime and 67 hazards.1291
Additional corroborating information providing a more detailed accounts of the above-mentioned
security incidents could not be consulted within the referenced DIS report, nor additional information
could be found among the sources consulted by EASO within the time constraints of this report.

Illustrative security incidents
•

•

•
•

The CoI, covering the period from 11 January 2020 to 1 July 2020, reported it documented 13
accounts of torture of persons held in detention by the Syrian authorities (some were released
prior to 10 January 2020), with some even being held over seven years.1292 Reportedly, someof incidents of torture took place in the Political Security Directorate branch in Tartous Central
Prison and Air Force Intelligence Branch 227.1293
On 10 March 2020, SANA reported that a Russian soldier died and two were injured, while
two civilians were killed and five were injured, when a Russian military vehicle collided with aminibus on al-Qadmous-Banias road in Tartous.1294 According to some other unspecified
sources, interviewed by Asharq Al-Awsat, the incident was an ISIL operation against Russianarmy patrol aimed at assassinating a high-ranking Russian officer.1295
On 21 August 2020, SOHR reported that GoS security services arrested a pro-GoS lieutenantcolonel from Safita city, who criticised the quality of food distributed to the military.1296
In December 2020, SOHR reported alleged ongoing popular discontent in Tartus city due toeconomic hardship, and over unaffordable prices of essentials, such as food.1297

1291 DIS collected the definitions of security incidents from the unnamed international security organisation via email,whereby: ‘Terrorism’ is divided into the categories: ‘small arms fire’, ‘assassinations’, ‘improvised explosive devices/vehicle
born improvised explosive devices’ and ‘others’; ‘Crime’ is divided into the categories: ‘robberies’, ‘kidnapping’,‘arrests/detentions’, ‘murders’ and ‘others’; ‘Hazards’ are divided into the categories: ‘car accidents’, ‘fires’, ‘unexploded
ordinances/explosive remnants of war’, ‘landmines’ and ‘others’. Denmark, DIS, Syria – security and socio-economic situationin the governorates of Tartous, Latakia and Quneitra, 18 December 2020, url, p. 39
1292 UN General Assembly (UNGA), Human Rights Council (HRC), 45 th session (4 September – 2 October 2020), Agenda item
4, Human rights situations that require the Council’s attention, Report of the Independent International Commission ofInquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic*,**, A/HRC/45/31, 14 August 2020, p. 6-7, url
1293 UN General Assembly, HRC, 45th session (4 September – 2 October 2020), Agenda item 4, Human rights situations that
require the Council’s attention, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic*,**, A/HRC/45/31, 14 August 2020, url, pp. 6-7
1294 SANA, Two Syrians and a Russian soldier die in traffic accident in Tartous countryside, 11 March 2020, url
1295 Asharq Al-Awsat, Russian soldier killed in ‘mysterious accident’ in Syria’s Tartous, 12 March 2020, url
1296 SOHR, For criticizing poor quality of food and rationing in regime army | Security services arrest regime officer popularamong loyalists, 21 August 2020, url
1297 SOHR, “Salary is not enough for buying even a chicken” and “we have not had meat for three years” | Popular discontent
grows in Tartus and entire regime-controlled areas over low income and unaffordable prices, 18 December 2020, url

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation•

On 24 April 2021, allegedly a suspected Israeli drone hit an unidentified oil tanker near the
port of Baniyas in Tartous governorate, resulting in no casualties.1298 Different news sources
attributed the oil tanker to Iran.1299

Civilian fatalities
Month
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
AugustSeptember
OctoberNovember
December
Total

VDC 20201113SNHR 2020-

VDC 2021-

SNHR 2021---

Figure 27. Civilian fatalities as a result of armed conflict in Tartous governorate in 2020 and first three months of 2021.
Monthly breakdown based on VDC and SNHR data

No civilian fatalities were recorded by SNHR in Tartous governorate in 2020 and the first three monthsof 2021.1300 Based on monthly civilian fatalities figures for 2020 and 2021, VDC shared with EASO,
three civilian deaths were recorded by VDC in Tartous in 2020.
Infrastructure damage and explosives remnants of war
In 2020, SNHR did not report any landmine victims in Tartous.1301 According to Landmine & Cluster
Munition Monitor, except Tartous governorate, in all other 13 governorates cluster munitions havebeen extensively used since 2012.1302 Until 10 December 2020, UNICEF did not record any childfatalities as a result of the impact of explosive ordnance in Tartous governorate.1303
Based on the Syria Multi-sector Needs Assessment of 2020, the Shelter Cluster assessed that in
Tartous governorate, 0.4 % of the population was living in damaged buildings.1304

1298 Carter Center (The), Syria weekly conflict summary 19-25 April 2021, 29 April 2021, url; Al Jazeera, Fire extinguished on

oil tanker off Syria after suspected attack, 25 April 2021, urlّ ‫( طائرة‬A drone targets an Iranian oil tanker off the coast of
1299 Enab Baladi, ‫مستة تستهدف ناقلة نفط إيرانية قرب ساحل بانياس للمزيد‬Baniyas), 24 April 2021, url; Al Jazeera, Fire extinguished on oil tanker off Syria after suspected attack, 25 April 2021, url;
NPA, Syria, Israel targets “strange thing” on Iranian ship off Syrian coast: source, 25 April 2021, url
1300 SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 1,734 Civilians in Syria in 2020, including 99 in December, 1 January 2021, ,url, p. 121301 SNHR, Syria is among the world’s worst countries for the number of mines planted since 2011, despite prohibition of
their use in international law, 10 December 2020, url, p. 71302 Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor, Syria impact, 17 February 2021, url
1303 UNICEF, United Nations Mine Action Service, Impact of explosive ordnance on children in Syria, 10 December 2020, url
p. 21304 Global Shelter Cluster, Syrian Arab Republic: Whole of Syria Shelter/NFI Sector Humanitarian Needs Overview 2021, 1
March 2021, url, pp. 6, 8

138

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

In October 2020, UNOCHA reported that 49 large-scale fires were recorded in Tartous governorate1305,
while the International Red Cross estimated that 200 000 people were affected in Homs, Latakia andTartous, with 12 500 requiring humanitarian assistance.1306 In the period between 1 September and15 October 2020, WFP estimated that 4 053 hectares of agricultural and forested land in Tartous
governorate were burned, more specifically in Baniyas (932), Dreikish (99), Safita (2 007), Sheikh Badr
(57) and Tartous (958) districts.1307 According to burn severity index, in Tartous governorate, 466
hectares suffered high severity, 1 696 med-high severity and 1 891 med-low severity.1308
Displacement and return
In 2020, UNOCHA reported for Tartous governorate around 4 000 IDP movements from or withingovernorate, 8 000 to or within Tartous governorate and 3 000 within the governorate.1309
By the end of October 2020, the Humanitarian Needs Assessment Programme (HNAP) report for Syria
estimated that Tartous governorate hosted around 182 274 IDPs, or around 20 % of its population,
estimated at 924 088.1310 According to HNAP report estimates done on basis of IDP household
survey1311, only 4 % of IDP households attempted to return to their place of origin (76 % originatedfrom the central and south regions, 11 % from the north-west, 9 % from the north, and 4 % from thenorth-east region), 70 % of IDPs were displaced between two-three times, 28 % between four-fivetimes and only 2 % once.1312 In Tartous governorate, the main push factors for last displacement of
IDP households were deterioration of economic situation at 96 % and conflict/security situation at
3 %. Likewise, the main pull factors are access to economic opportunities 96 % and improved security
situation at 3 %.1313
In August 2020 UNOCHA population task force estimated that Tartous governorate hosted 182 668
IDPs1314, with 92 565 IDPs located in Tartous district, 28 927 in Safita, 21 729 in Baniyas, 16 302 in
Dreikish, 14 663 in Sheikh Badr, and 8 482 in Qadmous.1315
In the first quarter of 2021, UNOCHA reported the total of 2 816 IDP movements for Tartous
governorate (953 in January, 1 031 in February, and 832 in March). Specifically, UNOCHA reported forJanuary 2021, 274 displacements from Tartous governorate, 184 within the governorate and 495 to
Tartous governorate; for February 2021, 293 displacements from Tartous governorate, 228 within thegovernorate and 510 to Tartous governorate; and for March 2021, 222 displacements from Tartous
governorate, 171 within the governorate and 439 to Tartous governorate.1316
Also for 2020, UNOCHA reported around 1 200 spontaneous IDP return movements from Tartous
governorate to Homs governorate.1317 In the first quarter of 2021, UNOCHA reported in 29, 126 and1305 UNOCHA, Syria: Flash Update #01 Humanitarian impact of wildfires in coastal areas as of 11 October 2020, 11 October

2020, url, p. 11306 IFRC, Emergency plan of action (EPoA) Syria: wildfires, 23 October 2020, url, pp. 1, 5; EEAS, European Union supports
humanitarian relief to Syrians affected by wildfires, 18 November 2020, url
1307 WFP, Syria fire incidents – analysis of fires outbreak across Syria, September – October 2020, 19 October 2020, url, p. 51308 WFP, Syria fire incidents – analysis of fires outbreak across Syria, September – October 2020, 19 October 2020, url, p. 61309 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, IDP movements overview, Jan – Dec, 2020, 4 March 2021, url
1310 HNAP, Syria – IDP report series 2020 governorate profiles, assessment Date(s): 01 Oct 2020 to 31 Oct 2020, url, p. 41
1311 Humanitarian Response – OCHA Services, HNAP: Governorate profiles – IDP report series 2020, assessment Date(s): 01
Oct 2020 to 31 Oct 2020, url
1312 HNAP, Syria – IDP report series 2020 governorate profiles, assessment Date(s): 01 Oct 2020 to 31 Oct 2020, url, p. 41
1313 HNAP, Syria – IDP report series 2020 governorate profiles, assessment Date(s): 01 Oct 2020 to 31 Oct 2020, url, p. 421314 UNOCHA, Humanitarian needs overview – Syrian Arab Republic, March 2021, url, pp. 23, 98
1315 UNOCHA, Humanitarian needs overview – Syrian Arab Republic, March 2021, url, p. 98
1316 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, IDP movements - January 2021, 4 March 2021, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, IDP
movements - February 2021, 1 April 2021, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, IDP movements - March 2021, 12 May 2021,
url
1317 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, Spontaneous IDP returnee movements overview, Jan – Dec 2020, 4 March 2021, url

139

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

52 spontaneous IDP return movements from Tartous governorate, in January, February and March
respectively.1318

1318 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, IDP spontaneous returns - January 2021, 4 March 2021, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab

Republic, IDP spontaneous returns - February 2021, 1 April 2021, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, IDP spontaneous
returns - March 2021, 12 May 2021, url

140Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

2.6 Homs governorate

Map 12: © MapAction, Homs governorate map1319

2.6.1 General description of the governorate
Homs governorate is located in central Syria and has borders with Iraq to the east and Lebanon to thewest. It has internal borders with Deir Ez-Zor, Raqqa, Hama, Tartous, and Rural Damascus
governorates.1320 The Syrian E-Government website stated that Homs governorate shares aninternational border with Jordan to the east as well.1321 While a report by the Swiss Agency for
Development and Cooperation and UN Habitat stated that Homs governorate comprises eight
districts1322, UNOCHA mentioned that it comprises only six: Homs, Al-Qusayr, Tal Kalakh, Ar-Rastan,
Al-Maghrim and Palmyra.1323 Homs is the largest governorate in Syria in terms of surface, and the thirdin terms of population, as of May 2014. The capital of the governorate is Homs city which is also thecentral city of Homs district.1324
The latest census conducted by the Central Bureau of Statistics in Syria was in 2004, and according towhich, the number of residents in Homs governorate was 1 529 402.1325 Homs governorate had

1319 MapAction, Homs Governorate, 29 July 2016, url
1320 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Reference Map, 17 January 2013, url
1321 Syria, E-Government, ‫[ عن سورية‬About Syria], n.d., url
1322 UN Habitat and SDC, City Profile – Homs: Multi Sector Assessment, May 2014, url, p. 51323 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Reference Map, 17 January 2013, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Governorates

Profile, June 2014, url, p. 131324 UN Habitat and SDC, City Profile – Homs: Multi Sector Assessment, May 2014, url, p. 51325 Syria, Central Bureau of Statistics, General Census, The Census of housing and population results 2004 on governorates
level, n.d., url

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

1 734 000 residents according to the official population estimates published by the Syrian Central
Bureau of Statistics for 2019.1326 In a March 2021 report, UNOCHA estimated the population of Homs
governorate to be of 1 465 616.1327
According to USDOS, in addition to Sunni Muslims who were present across the country, Homs
governorate had Twelver Shia, Alawite, and Christian residents. USDOS, citing the CoI, SNHR andhuman rights activists, reported that pro-GoS forces and militias ‘continued to seize the homes ofSunnis with the explicit intention of permanently displacing these individuals and thus altering thedemographics of areas held by the government’. Analysts cited by the source stated that ‘this wasevidenced by population shifts in Homs.’1328 According to Fabrice Balanche, the majority of the
inhabitants of Tal Kalakh were Sunni, and Alawites constituted 25 % of the population of Homs city,which also had a notable concentration of Christians when the civil unrest started.1329 ChristianSolidarity Worldwide reported that with the large numbers of Christians who fled the country, Homs
‘is left with a fraction of its of its previous Christian population’.1330 Moreover, Fabrice Balanche
observed that Homs ‘has long been internally divided into neighbourhoods with strong sectarian
identities, and the bloody confrontations seen during the initial phase of the uprising unfolded righton the boundaries between the Alawite and Sunni districts […]’.1331
Homs governorate has two oil fields (Hayan and Jazal which produce 6 000 and 3 000 barrels per day)as well as seven gas fields with a production capacity ranging between 300 000 and 3 000 000 m³ perday.1332 Moreover, the governorate had phosphate mines, notably in Khneifis, which attracted Russiancompanies.1333 The Financial Times reported in September 2019 that Russian mercenaries were on
patrol to protect the state-run General Fertiliser Company in Homs.1334

2.6.2 Conflict background and armed actors
The city of Homs was one of the most impacted cities in the war, and its old part suffered a two-yearlong siege till it became accessible again in May 2014.1335 Sectarian violence and forced displacement
occurred there in 2011 and only few neighbourhoods maintained their mixed sectarian elements suchas Al-Waer, Ikrima, and Id-Dikhar.1336 According to the Global Rights Compliance1337 and World Peace
Foundation1338, in 2012 the GoS forces applied a ‘kneel or starve’ strategy against rebel-heldneighbourhoods such as Baba Amr, accompanied by indiscriminate attacks.1339 In 2011, the SAA
deployed tanks in Homs city1340, and between mid-April and the end of August 2011, Syrian security
forces killed 587 civilians mainly in Homs city, Tal Kalakh, Ar-Rastan, and Talbiseh, according to Human

1326 Syria, Central Bureau of Statistics, Estimate of the population in Syria by governorates, n.d., url
1327 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview. Syrian Arab Republic, March 2021, url, p. 231328 USDOS, 2019 Report on International Religious Freedom: Syria, 10 June 2020, url, pp. 3, 91329 Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2018, url, pp. 6, 15
1330 Christian Solidarity Worldwide, Syria: general briefing, 20 May 2020, url
1331 Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2018, url, pp. 8-91332 BBC Arabic, ‫التوات الموجودة ف مناطق سيطرة األكراد رشق سوريا‬‫[ ر‬Resources in the Kurds-controlled areas in eastern Syria, 7 October 2019, url‫ي‬1333 ISPI, Rebuilding Syria: The Middle East’s Next Power Game?, 2019, url, p. 48
1334 FT, Moscow collects its spoils of war in Assad’s Syria, 1 September 2019, url

A key ingredient for the production of fertilisers is phosphate, and Syria has the third largest deposit of phosphate in theworld: Arab Weekly (The), Russia and Iran tussle for Syria’s war spoils, 7 September 2019, url
1335 UN Habitat and SDC, City Profile – Homs: Multi Sector Assessment, May 2014, url, pp. 3, 41336 Saleh, M., ‫ الطائفية و مجزرة الساعة ف حمص‬:‫[ حوار مع محمد (أبو عىل) صالح‬Dialogue with Muhammad (Abu Ali) Saleh: Sectarianism and the Clock‫ي‬‫ي‬
Massacre in Homs], 14 June 2019, url; Muhammad Saleh is a Marxist Syrian writer and activist.
1337 ‘An international legal partnership committed to enhancing compliance with international law, particularly international
humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights’. Global Rights Compliance, About Us, n. d., url
1338 ‘An operating foundation affiliated solely with Tufts University’s The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy [… which]aims to provide intellectual leadership for peace’. World Peace Foundation, About, n. d., url
1339 Global Rights Compliance and World Peace Foundation, Accountability for Starvation Crimes: Syria, June 2019, url, p. 31340 MSF, Syria: No way out, 12 March 2021, url; BBC News, Homs: Syrian revolution's fallen 'capital', 9 December 2015, url

142

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Rights Watch.1341 Following a series of surrendering negotiations, the SAA captured some of the rebelheld neighbourhoods of Homs in 2014 and a mass displacement took place.1342 In May 2017, the SAA
captured the totality of Homs city and hundreds of rebels and their family members were
evacuated.1343
In April 2018, the SAA launched a large-scale military operation in northern rural Homs1344 which
forced the rebel groups in the region to either negotiate their exit to northern Syria or to reconcile
with the GoS.1345 The GoS forces seized the last rebel enclave in Homs on 15 May 20181346, and buses
evacuated rebels and their families from the region to northern Syria.1347
In 2019 – 2020, there have been reports on numerous incidents involving ISIL and the SAA/progovernment forces, mainly in the eastern parts of the governorate. Such incidents included
ambushes1348 and IED attacks.1349 There have also been reports on clashes between government forces
and pro-GoS militias in some governorates including Homs, where the clashes escalated, and machineguns and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) were used causing injuries among civilians.1350 Moreover,weapons and munitions were seized by GoS-forces in Homs governorate1351, and a state of lawlessness
was reported in 2019.1352
For more information on the background of the conflict in Homs governorate in 2019 and 2020, see
the EASO COI Report: Syria - Security situation (May 2020)
With regards to territorial control as of 31 March 2021, the totality of Homs governorate wascontrolled by the GoS forces with the exception of Al-Tanf region which was controlled by the US andnon-state organised armed groups (see also Map 4).1353 Liveuamap also shows an area of ISIL presence
to the south-east of Al-Sukhna in eastern rural Homs.1354 Below is a description of the actors present
on the ground in Homs governorate and their places of deployment where information is available.

1341 HRW, “We Live as in War”: Crackdowns on Protestors in the Governorate of Homs, Syria, 11 November 2011, url
1342 Global Rights Compliance and World Peace Foundation, Accountability for Starvation Crimes: Syria, June 2019, url, p. 3;

see also: Syria Direct, Rebels head north after surrendering Old Homs, 7 May 2014, url
1343 Reuters, Syrian rebels leave last opposition district in Homs, 21 May 2017, url; France24, Assad regime regains total
control of Syrian city of Homs, 21 May 2017, url
1344 AA, Assad begins attacks to retake rebel-held areas in Homs, 20 April 2018, url
1345 RFE/RL, Syrian Rebels Accept Russian-Brokered Surrender Deal In Homs Enclave, 3 May 2018, url; VOA, Syrian
Government Seizes Last Rebel Enclave in Homs, 15 May 2018, url; AP News, Syrian government forces seize last rebel enclavein Homs, 15 May 2018, url
1346 AP News, Syrian government forces seize last rebel enclave in Homs, 15 May 2018, url
1347 Homs News, ‫ م‬2018 ‫الن مرت بها حمص عام‬‫ر‬‫[بانوراما األحداث ي‬Panorama of the main events that Homs witnessed in 2018], 31 December 2018,
url; Syria Direct, Rebel forces and civilians begin evacuating besieged Homs countryside: ‘We don’t want another Ghouta’, 7
May 2018, url; VOA, Rebels Begin Evacuation of Syria's Last Besieged Enclave, 7 May 2018, url
1348 Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary, 18 – 24 March 2019, url, pp. 3-4; Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict
Summary, 15 – 21 April 2019, url, pp. 3-4
1349 SOHR, The explosion of more IEDs and mines left behind by ISIS causes new casualties in the Syrian desert, 8 April 2019,
url; Middle East Institute, ISIS is escalating its insurgency in the Syrian desert, 13 April 2020, url; SOHR, ISIS resurgence inHoms desert | IED explodes in military bus, killing six regime soldiers and injuring ten others, 28 August 2020, url
1350 DIS/DRC, Syria. Security Situation in Damascus. Province and Issues Regarding Return to Syria, February 2019, url, p. 101351 SANA, ‫[ ضبط كميات من األسلحة و الذخائر ف ريف حمص‬Seizing of weapons and munition in Homs countryside], 14 July 2019, url; Al-khabar,‫ي‬‫الجنان بحمص يضبط أسلحة و ذخائر مخبأة بقرية كفرالها‬‫[ فرع األمن‬The Criminal Security Branch of Homs Seizes Weapons and Munition Hidden in Kafr‫ي‬
Laha Village], 10 November 2019, url
1352 Step News, ‫ دويلة "شيعية" ال تنقطع عنها المحروقات عىل عكس مناطق النظام‬..‫[ غرن حمص‬Western Homs.. a “Shiite” State with Constant Fuel supply, unlike‫ي‬‫ر‬‫فلتان أمن و فوض عارمة و عمليات خطف و قتل و ر‬
the Regime-held Areas], 14 April 2019, url; SOHR, ‫الرسي الخاضعة‬‫ابتاز تشهدها مدينة‬‫ي‬‫ان" شمال مدينة حمص‬‫ [ لنفوذ "الحرس الثوري اإلير ي‬A State of Lawlessness, Total Chaos, Abductions, and Extortion in Al-Rastan Town
Controlled by the Iranian Republican Guard in northern Homs], 3 October 2019 url; RT Arabic, ‫مجهولي يف ريف حمص رالش ر يف‬‫مدنيي برصاص‬4 ‫مقتل‬‫ر‬‫ر‬[4 Civilians were shot dead by unidentified individuals in eastern rural Homs], 16 March 2019, url
1353 Based on reading of the following maps: Carter Center (The), Syria Weekly Conflict Summary 22-28 March 2021, 31
March 2021, url, Fig. 1; Liveuamap, Syria, 31 March 2021, url
1354 Based on reading of the following map: Liveuamaps, Syria, 31 March 2021, url

143Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Syrian Arab Army and affiliated armed groups
According to an ISW report published in 2013, the 3rd Corps’ 11th Division was headquartered in Homs
governorate and was in charge of securing central Syria.1355 This was corroborated by a Middle East
Institute’s report published on 18 July 20191356 which stated that the 11th Division was mandated tosecure central Homs, and that by mid-war, it ‘was almost fully committed to Homs and Deir ez-Zor’.1357
Besides the 11th Division, the 60th and 67th Brigades as well as the 135th Regiment were reportedly
present in the eastern parts of Homs governorate, around Palmyra in particular.1358
Recent information on SAA deployments in Hama governorate could not be found among the sources
consulted by EASO within time constraints. Units of the SAA were reported to be present in Homs
governorate in early March 2020.1359 For deployments of the SAA in Homs governorate as of
3 April 2020 see Section 2.6.2.1 of the EASO COI Report: Syria - Security situation (May 2020).
On 15 October 2020, Baladi News, citing Nors for Studies, reported that the SAA deployed 350 fightersof the 95th Battalion Special Forces, which is a part of the 41st Regiment to Al-Sukhna town in eastern
Homs as well as 175 fighters of the 72nd Battalion Special Forces of the same Regiment in Talbiseh innorthern Homs governorate.1360 In Al-Sukhna region, Enab Baladi reported that the SAA had ‘fixed
military posts’ manned by the 18th Division, the 11th Division-Tanks, the Badiya National Defense,
Military Security Shield Forces, and the 4th Division’s Security Office. The source added that the Iranian
Baqir Brigade and the Quick Reaction Force were present in those posts as well, and that both groups
were affiliated with the Badiya Security Branch functioning under the Military Security in Palmyra
city.1361 Finally, the New Arab mentioned that some of the 5th Corps’ new recruits from southern Syria
were sent to training camps situated in Homs city.1362
In addition to the SAA, the following sources reported on the presence of other state security actorsin Homs governorate. Aen Al-Sham for Studies, a research centre collecting information from GoScontrolled areas and focusing on Damascus, Rural Damascus and Dar’a governorates1363, stated thatthe four intelligence directorates, i.e., Air Force, Military, State Security, and Political, had branches inevery governorate. The source mentioned Branch 318 (State Security) and Branch 261 (Political
Security) that existed in Homs governorate.1364 In the governorate’s southern and northerncountryside, the Carnegie Middle East Center observed that ‘the regime is hardly visible’, and that therole of the state was reduced to intelligence gathering.1365 Moreover, the COAR observed in August
2019 that local government police, which was allegedly commanded from the Russian Hmeimim Air
Base, was reportedly present in the northern rural part of the governorate.1366

1355 ISW, The Syrian Army: Doctrinal Order of Battle, February 2013, url, p. 91356 The author outlined the methodology used to collect information as follows: “All information comes from multiple

corroborating [social media] posts, as well as an interview with a Syrian loyalist connected to the military. As with any projectof this scale, there are bound to be omissions. Some units are still in flux, moving between divisions, or in the process of
being resurrected. Therefore, the following sections should be viewed as a working guide for the general state of the SAA
today.”
1357 MEI, The Lion and the Eagle: The Syrian Arab Army’s Destruction and Rebirth, 18 July 2019, url
1358 MEI, The Lion and the Eagle: The Syrian Arab Army’s Destruction and Rebirth, 18 July 2019, url
1359 Waters, G., Current Syrian Army Deployments, International Review, 13 December 2019, url
1360 Baladi, ‫ ما السبب؟‬..‫كبتة إل ريف حمص‬‫[ قوات النظام تستقدم تعزيزات ر‬Regime forces bring large reinforcements to Rural Homs.. Why?], 15 October
2020, url
1361 Enab Baladi, Al-Sukhna predominated by security chaos as regime and Iranian forces grapple with IS, 20 February 2021,
url
1362 New Arab (The), "‫ ذراع روسيا للتمدد ف جنوب سورية‬:"‫[ الفيلق الخامس‬The 5th corps: Russia’s arm to expand in southern Syria], 14 May 2020, url‫ي‬1363 Aen Al-Sham, ‫[ من نحن‬Who we are], n. d., url
1364 Aen Al-Sham, “‫“[ الظلمة أنفسهم” بحث عن أفرع مخابرات النظام السوري‬the unjust themselves” a research on the Syrian regime’s intelligence
branches], 10 August 2020, url
1365 Carnegie Middle East Center, Homs, a Divided Incarnation of Syria’s Unresolved Conflict, 15 May 2020, url
1366 COAR, Northern Rural Homs: Needs Oriented Strategic Area Profile, August 2019, url, p. 40

144

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Pro-GoS militias
The following pro-GoS militias were reportedly present in Homs governorate in 2020-2021.
National Defence Forces (NDF)
The NDF was formed in the city of Homs in 2012 with Iranian guidance and support.1367 Reportedly,
the NDF has become the main security actor in northern rural Homs and it constituted several groups
affiliated with different state security agencies.1368 Enab Baladi reported on 18 August 2020 that the
NDF opened a centre in Ar-Rastan town in rural Homs tasked with supporting the local security forces
and manning two checkpoints in the town.1369 Moreover, a map published by IranWire, a website
specialised in Iranian affairs1370, on 8 May 2020 showed a presence of the NDF in Homs city.1371
Liwa Al-Areen (The Den Brigade)
Liwa Al-Areen was formed in Homs city on 1 March 2017 and was initially affiliated with the MilitaryIntelligence branch before it became affiliated with the Russian forces.1372 The group was present inan area stretching from Maskanah in rural Homs to Breij in Rural Damascus, and from Al-Rastan to
Palmyra1373, and had 16 recruitment centres in different governorates including Homs (city andcountryside).1374 Moreover, the group counted 1 130 fighters and was ‘present in all the centres,
security checkpoints and fighting frontlines’.1375
Other Iran-backed militias
The Turkey-based opposition channel, Syria TV1376, stated on 21 August 2020 that the following Shia
militias were present in Homs governorate:•

Al-Imam Al-Rida: comprised of around 2 000 Alawi fighters from Syria and Lebanon, andpresent in eastern Homs countryside.
• Soqour Al-Sahra’a: fighters were trained by Iraqi militants and were present in rural Homs.1377
Al-Rida forces is another Shiite militia present in Homs governorate.1378 The pro-opposition website
Euphrates Post stated on 1 July 2019 that Al-Rida Forces was formed by Iran in 2011 as part of the
popular committees in the Shia-majority villages and neighbourhoods of the Homs governorate.
According to the source, the militia comprised 21 000 fighters, mainly Syrian Shiites, and was based inaround 50 villages in rural Homs including Um Al-Amad and Um Jneinat. Reportedly, its leadership
included leaders from the Lebanese Hezbollah and Iranian experts. The militia had headquarters andconscription offices in Al-Hazmiya, Al-Sabtiya, Al-Mazra’a, Al-Zarzouriya, Al-Abbasiya, and AlQaryatein, and a training centre in Al-Qusayr.1379

1367 Saban, N., Factbox: Iranian influence and presence in Syria, Atlantic Council, 5 November 2020, url
1368 COAR, Northern Rural Homs: Needs Oriented Strategic Area Profile, August 2019, url, p. 44
1369 Enab Baladi, ‫الرسي بريف حمص‬‫ر‬‫الوطن” يف‬‫[ افتتاح مقر لـ”الدفاع‬Opening of a NDF centre in al-Rastan in rural Homs], 18 August 2020, url‫ي‬1370 IranWire, ‫[ من نحن‬Who we are], n. d., url
1371 Based on reading of the following map: Iran Wire, ‫[ خريطة انتشار الميليشيات اإليرانية ف سوريا والعراق‬Map of the positions of Iranian militias in‫ي‬Syria and Iraq], 8 May 2020, url
1372 Al-Tamimi, A. J., Liwa Al-Areen: A Russian-Backed Formation, 20 June 2020, url
1373 Sawt Beirut, ‫ مليشيا تابعة لروسيا تعتقل ثالثة ضباط ف نظام األسد‬..‫[ الرصاع يحتدم‬Struggle intensifies.. Russian-affiliated militia arrests three officers of‫ي‬
Al-Assad regime], 13 August 2020, url
1374 Al-Tamimi, A. J., Liwa Al-Areen: A Russian-Backed Formation, 20 June 2020, url
1375 Al-Tamimi, A. J., Liwa Al-Areen: A Russian-Backed Formation, 20 June 2020, url
1376 Syria TV, ‫[ عن تلفزيون سوريا‬About Syria TV], n. d., url
1377 Syria TV, ‫ رصد شامل للميليشيات اإليرانية ف سوريا‬..‫[ بالتفاصيل واألرقام‬In details and numbers.. Comprehensive view of Iranian militias in Syria], 21‫ي‬August 2020, url; Pro-Justice, ‫ مفرخة إيران يف سوريا‬:‫[ الميليشيات الطائفية‬Sectarian Militias: Iran’s Hatchery in Syria], 10 June 2019, url
1378 Enab Baladi, 2020‫ و‬2013 ‫[ دراسة ترصد التمدد اإليران ف سوريا ربي عام‬A study observes the Iranian expansion in Syria between 2013 and 2020],
‫ي‬
‫ي ي‬
7 November 2020, url; Carnegie Middle East Center, The Shi‘a Revival, 4 May 2017, url; Strategic Thinking Group, ‫ النفوذ‬:‫حقائق‬‫ان يف سوريا‬‫[ والوجود اإلير ي‬Facts: the Iranian influence and presence in Syria], 13 November 2020, url
1379 Euphrates Post (The), ‫“[ "ميليشيا الرضا" أكت الفصائل العسكرية "الشيعية" ف سوريا‬Militia Al-Rida” the Biggest “Shiite” Armed Group in Syria], 1 July‫ي‬
2019, url

145

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

The Lebanese Hezbollah maintained presence in the border area of Homs governorate with Lebanon,
including in Al-Qusayr.1380 Jusoor for Studies indicated in January 2021 that Hezbollah had 11 militarysites, ‘in the form of independent, joint or semi-shared points with the Iranian forces’ in Homs
governorate.1381 Moreover, a map published by IranWire indicated that Hezbollah maintained apresence in the town of Al-Sukhna in eastern Homs governorate.1382
Iran Wire indicated the presence of the Forces of Martyr Muhammad Baqer Al-Sadr in Palmyra.
According to the source, the group’s task was to support the GoS’s general security and the Ministryof Interior, and its members wore police uniform.1383 Finally, SOHR reported on 6 February 2021 that
unidentified Iranian-backed militias had military headquarters at the northern entrance of AlQaryatayn village in eastern rural Homs.1384
Private security companies
Manhal Baresh1385 stated that private security companies in Syria varied in terms of affiliation.1386
Some of those companies were affiliated with the Security Bureau of the 4th Armoured Division, andwere ‘tasked with finding job opportunities for former militiamen and relatives of Alawites killed
fighting for the army or pro-regime militias, especially in Homs and the Damascus suburbs’.1387
Moreover, security companies affiliated with Russia were overseen by the Wagner Group and weremandated with protecting the Russian interests in Syria such as oil and gas fields west of Palmyra,
phosphate sites in the Khnayfis field and the main warehouses near the T4 airbase.1388
Iran
Jusoor for Studies stated on 6 January 2021 that Iran had 12 military sites (bases and posts) in Homs
governorate.1389 A map published in November 2020 by Atlantic Council showed an Iranian presence
in several positions in eastern and western Homs governorate.1390 Tehran Bureau, an Iran-focused
media centre1391, stated that Al-Shayrat Airbase was used by Iranian forces as a ‘forward operatingbase’ for supporting Iranian-backed militias throughout central Syria.1392 Moreover, COAR reported
on a presence of Iranian forces in the T4 Airbase near Homs city.1393 In Palmyra, Syria Files reported

1380 Based on reading of the following map: Saban, N., Factbox: Iranian influence and presence in Syria, 5 November 2020,

url; Syria TV, ‫ رصد شامل للميليشيات اإليرانية يف سوريا‬..‫[ بالتفاصيل واألرقام‬In details and numbers.. Comprehensive view of Iranian militias in Syria], 21
August 2020, url; Tehran Bureau, Iran’s Military Assets Inside Syria, 18 October 2020, url
1381 Jusoor for Studies, Map of the Military Bases and Posts of Foreign Forces in Syria, 6 January 2021, url
1382 Based on reading of the following map: Iran Wire, ‫[ خريطة انتشار الميليشيات اإليرانية ف سوريا والعراق‬Map of the positions of Iranian militias in‫ي‬Syria and Iraq], 8 May 2020, url
1383 IranWire, ‫[ خريطة انتشار الميليشيات اإليرانية ف سوريا والعراق‬Map of the positions of Iranian militias in Syria and Iraq], 8 May 2020, url‫ي‬1384 SOHR, After attack on Iranian militias’ headquarters in eastern Homs | Regime forces arrest ten people, including women,
for “cooperating with ISIS”, 6 February 2021, url
1385 ‘Syrian researcher working on the Wartime and Post-Conflict in Syria (WPCS) project within the Middle East Directions
Programme hosted by the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute in Florence’:
Baresh, M., Private Security Companies in Syria: New Agents at the Regime’s Service, European University Institute, 10
September 2020, url
1386 Baresh, M., Private Security Companies in Syria: New Agents at the Regime’s Service, European University Institute, 10
September 2020, url, p. 61387 Baresh, M., Private Security Companies in Syria: New Agents at the Regime’s Service, European University Institute, 10
September 2020, url, p. 131388 Baresh, M., Private Security Companies in Syria: New Agents at the Regime’s Service, European University Institute, 10
September 2020, url, pp. 17-18; Omran Centre for Strategic Studies, Profiling Top Private Security Companies in Syria, 11
February 2019, url
1389 Jusoor for Studies, Map of the Military Bases and Posts of Foreign Forces in Syria, 6 January 2021, url
1390 Based on reading of the following map: Saban, N., Factbox: Iranian influence and presence in Syria, 5 November 2020,
url
1391 Tehran Bureau, Our story, n. d., url
1392 Tehran Bureau, Iran’s Military Assets Inside Syria, 18 October 2020, url
1393 COAR, 10 Years On: Adrift, the Syrian Aid Response Awaits a Paradigm Shift, 22 March 2021, url

146Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

on a ‘heavy Iranian presence’ where militia fighters and their families settled in the town.1394 Finally,
Al-Mashareq, a website sponsored by the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM)1395, statedthat Iran and proxies held recruitment offices and indoctrination centres in different locations in Syria
including in Al-Qusayr in western rural Homs.1396
RussiaJusoor for Studies stated on 6 January 2021 that Russia had five military sites (bases or posts) in Homs
governorate.1397 Zaman Al-Wasl reported that Russian forces were building ‘a permanent militarybase’ near Palmyra1398, which was the second Russian post set up in the Homs desert after the one
established in Al-Qaryatayn.1399 Moreover, Russian jet fighters launched airstrikes against ISIL
positions and elements in Homs desert1400, using two SAA air bases in eastern Hama countryside.1401
The US-led Coalition
US and allied forces from the Global Coalition Against Daesh have controlled the Tanf area in the Homsdesert, close to the tri-border area between Syria, Jordan and Iraq since 20161402, which has been used
for launching anti-ISIL operations and training anti-GoS armed groups against ISIL.1403
For more information see Section 1.5.5 Tanf
ISIL
Despite its defeat in Syria in March 20191404, ISIL still maintains pockets in Homs governorate.1405 As
of September 2019, ISIL’s ‘strong presence’ was concentrated in Abu Rujmain mountain to the northof Palmyra, which has caves that enable ISIL fighters to hide.1406 Gregory Waters observed increased
regular ISIL attacks against GoS forces in 2020, with the group ‘operating outside of its traditional
strongholds of east Homs and west Deir ez-Zor, and launching attacks in southern Raqqah, eastern
Hamah, and southern Aleppo’.1407 A March 2021 analysis by ISW wrote that ISIL controls several small
swaths of territory in the mountainous areas of the Syrian Central Desert (Badia) from where it
launches attacks on GoS forces, including in Jabal Haiyan and Jabal Abu Rujmain areas around Palmyra(Homs governorate) and in Jabal Bishri, in the area between Resafa, Shoula and Sukhna (Homs andDeir Ez-Zor governorates).1408
The Middle East Institute stated that since the launch of anti-ISIL military operations by pro-GoS forcesin February 20211409, ISIL moved its militants deeper in the Syrian desert ‘near the junction of the1394 Syria Files, A Closer look on Iran’s Military Presence in Palmyra Airbase: Syria Files, 17 September 2020, url
1395 Al-Mashareq, About us, N. D., url
1396 Al-Mashareq, Iran bankrolls aggressive drive to recruit vulnerable Syrian youth into militias, 4 January 2021, url
1397 Jusoor for Studies, Map of the Military Bases and Posts of Foreign Forces in Syria, 6 January 2021, url
1398 Zaman Al-Wasl, Russia forces equip new base in Badiya desert: source, 4 March 2021, url
1399 Asharq Al-Awsat, Russia Sets up New Post Near Iranian Guards in Central Syria, 6 February 2021, url
1400 Daily Sabah, Russian airstrikes kill 21 'Daesh terrorists' in Syria: monitor, 20 February 2021, url
1401 Al Monitor, Russia launches air campaign against Islamic State in Syrian desert, 18 March 2021, url
1402 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War. Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Swedish Defence Research Agency, December 2018,

url, p. 51; Magruder Jr., D., Al Tanf garrison: America’s strategic baggage in the Middle East, Brookings Institution, 20
November 2020, url
1403 International Crisis Group, Al-Tanf, Syria, 18 February 2020, url
1404 Guardian (The), ISIS defeated, US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces announce, 23 March 2019, url
1405 Denmark, DIS/DRC, Syria: Security Situation in Damascus Province Regarding Return to Syria, February 2019, url, p. 9
[Interview with an International Security Organisation]; Al-Monitor, Islamic State escalates attacks in Syrian desert, 12
February 2021, url
1406 Chatham House, Pro-regime Militias and ISIS Militants Stand Against the Return of Palmyra’s People, September 2019,url
1407 Waters, G., Strengthening and Expanding: ISIS’ Central Syria Campaign, Newlines Institute,19 August 2020, url
1408 Kahan, E., ISIS Poised for a Ramadan Surge in Syria, ISW, 9 March 2021, url
1409 Syria TV, ‫[ روسيا و"النظام" يواصالن حملة جوية وبرية ضد "داعش" ف البادية‬Russia and the regime continue a ground and air campaign against Daesh‫ي‬in Badiya], 24 February 2021, url; Al Monitor, Islamic State escalates attacks in Syrian desert, 12 February 2021, url

147

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

borders of the governorates of Homs, Raqqa, and Deir ez-Zor’ and intensified its attacks in the Homs
Badiya.1410 Al-Monitor cited a journalist based in Idlib, who stated that ISIL ‘protected itself in a pocket
stretching between the Homs and Deir ez-Zor governorates, from the outskirts of Al-Sukhna to theborders of Al-Bukamal and Al-Mayadin in Deir ez-Zor’.1411

2.6.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population
ISIL insurgency
Sources spoke of an ISIL insurgency in central Syria in 2020.1412 Elizabeth Tsurkov, a PhD student at
Princeton University’s Department of Politics, interviewed by DIS on 22 April 2020, spoke of an ISIL
insurgency taking place in areas controlled by the GoS, especially in Badiya (Homs desert).1413 The CoIstated that ISIL remained active in central Syria during the first two months of 2020, and targeted the
SAA in Al-Sukhna region in Homs governorate, which prompted the GoS to increase security in eastern
Homs governorate.1414 USDOD stated that in the first quarter of 2020, ISIL launched attacks in Homs
governorate, among others, and targeted oil infrastructure and pro-GoS forces in the eastern part of
the governorate.1415 ISIL carried out limited complex attacks, for instance briefly occupying several
GoS positions in and around Al-Sukhna, Homs governorate in April 2020.1416 Attacks carried out by ISIL
against GoS forces in eastern Homs governorate and by unidentified men in Talbiseh in northern Homs
governorate were reported between 29 June and 5 July 2020.1417 Moreover, the security website,
Crisis 24, reported that on 28 August 2020, an IED attack targeted a bus carrying soldiers in Homs
governorate.1418
In an interview for DIS conducted on 19 May 2020, Dino Krause, a PhD candidate in international
security at the Danish Institute for International Studies, stated that since March 2020, ISIL carried out‘some sophisticated attacks’ in Homs governorate.1419 The source observed that ISIL has retained apresence in Homs governorate, but ‘has generally become stronger’ and increased its activity in thegovernorate.1420 ISW reported on 3 September 2020 that ISIL demonstrated ‘growing strength in thecentral Syrian desert’. Reportedly, ISIL elements clashed with SAA and Russian forces in eastern Homs
governorate and briefly controlled the Doubayat gas field located at 14 km south of Al-Sukhna.1421 In
an article published on 28 April 2020 by Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, Abdullah AlGhadhawi assessed that in 2020, ISIL’s attacks that targeted GoS forces in the area between Homs andsouthern Hasaka were ‘more pinpointed and deadly’. He observed that ISIL has been active in areas
including Homs desert, and that ‘it battled the regime in the towns of Sukhnah and Jibajib on the
highway connecting Deir ez-Zor and Homs, and escalated its operations from kidnapping to directconfrontations.’1422

1410 Hassan, M., ISIS and the Assad regime: Strategy and counter-strategy in Syria’s Badiya, MEI, 16 March 2021, url; The

Syrian Badiya is also known as the Syrian desert and extends over the governorates of Raqqa, Hama, Homs, Deir Ez-Zor, andAleppo: Al Monitor, Russia launches air campaign against Islamic State in Syrian desert, 18 March 2021, url
1411 Al Monitor, Islamic State escalates attacks in Syrian desert, 12 February 2021, url
1412 Waters, G., “A Force They Haven’t Seen Before”: Insurgent ISIS in Central Syria, MEI, 15 April 2020, url; Counter Extremism
Project, ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency in August 2020, 1 September 2020, url
1413 Denmark, DIS, Islamic State in Syria, 29 June 2020, url, pp. 25-26
1414 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
14 August 2020, url, para. 61415 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: January 1, 2020 – March 31, 2020, 13 May 2020, url, p. 52
1416 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve. Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, April 1, 2020‒June 30, 2020, 4August 2020, url, p. 26
1417 Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary | 29 June - 5 July 2020, July 2020, url, p. 41418 Crisis24, Syria: Bus carrying soldiers strikes IED in Homs province August 28, 30 August 2020, url
1419 Denmark, DIS, Islamic State in Syria, 29 June 2020, url, p. 161420 Denmark, DIS, Islamic State in Syria, 29 June 2020, url, p. 34
1421 ISW, Syria Situation Report: September 2 - 15, 2020, 18 September 2020, url
1422 Ghadhawi, A., ISIS in Syria: A Deadly New Focus, Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, 28 April 2020, url

148

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

The Carter Center, based on data from the Center and ACLED, stated that between 1 June 2019 and2 August 2020, 41 conflict events involving ISIL took place in Homs governorate, notably around AlSukhna.1423 According to Enab Baladi, Al-Sukhna area is strategically important due to the M20 whichis ‘the lifeline linking Deir ez-Zor province with other regime-held areas’ and ‘the sole supply line forregime forces deployed to Deir ez-Zor and the only ground border to connect Tehran with Damascus
after the U.S. forces established the Al-Tanf Base in the tri-border area in 2014.’1424 The source
observed that the ‘extensive military deployment by the regime and Iranian forces to Al-Sukhna did
not deter IS’ which claimed 38 attacks in 2020, and killed 177 people.1425
In response to the increasing attacks against its forces in eastern Homs governorate, the GoS broughtlarge reinforcements to Al-Sukhna area, reportedly in preparation to launch a new military operationin the Syrian Badiya against the group.1426 Al-Masdar reported on 2 January 2021 that the Russian air
force expanded its operations in central Syria and that in August 2020, ‘one of the largest aerial
operations of 2020 took place’. According to the source, the Russian airstrikes inflicted ‘heavy damage’on ISIL cells in eastern Homs and western Deir Ez-Zor governorates, but the terrorist group intensified
its attacks Al-Sukhna area towards the end of 2020.1427 On 22 November 2020, the SAA carried out
intensive air strikes targeting ISIL positions in the Syrian Badiya, including Al-Sukhna.1428
On 31 December 2020, Al-Hurra reported on ‘a state of public anger’ in Homs city following an ambush
that targeted buses transporting fighters of the 4th Division in the Deir Ez-Zor Badiya. According to thesource, 25 persons were killed in the attack, most of whom were from loyalist neighbourhoods ofHoms such as Al-Muhajireen, Al-Zahra’a, Wadi Al-Dahab, and Al-Sabil. The source explained that thestate of anger was due to the GoS’s refusal to acknowledge that those killed in the attack were official
fighters in its ranks.1429
Gregory Waters stated on 10 February 2021 that ‘security along […] [the two main highways fromDamascus to Palmyra] in both Homs and Hamah provinces has declined so rapidly that major proregime businessmen are reportedly personally funding new, high-salary security contracts.’1430 ISIL
activities in Homs governorate continued through the start of 2021, and the group continued ‘to be amajor threat’.1431 Reportedly, the residents of Al-Amiriya town in the Syrian Badiya left their town
towards Palmyra ‘for fear of ISIS sleeper cells in the area’.1432 On 24 February 2021, Russian jet fighters
carried out air strikes on ISIL positions in the Syrian desert, in support of the GoS’s operations aimed
at securing the Homs – Deir Ez-Zor road.1433

1423 Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary | 27 July - 2 August 2020, August 2020, url, p. 51424 Enab Baladi, Al-Sukhna predominated by security chaos as regime and Iranian forces grapple with IS, 20 February 2021,

url
1425 Enab Baladi, Al-Sukhna predominated by security chaos as regime and Iranian forces grapple with IS, 20 February 2021,

url
1426 Baladi, ‫ ما السبب؟‬..‫كبتة إل ريف حمص‬‫[ قوات النظام تستقدم تعزيزات ر‬Regime forces bring large reinforcements to Rural Homs.. Why?], 15 October

2020, url
1427 Al Masdar News, Syrian Army to face major ISIS threat in 2021, 2 January 2021, url
1428 Baladi, ‫[ غارات جوية مكثفة للنظام عىل مواقع "داعـش" ف البادية السورية‬Intensive air strikes by the regime on “ISIL” positions in the Syrian Badiya], 22‫ي‬November 2020, url; Al Masdar News, Syrian Army gears up for first major offensive against ISIS this year, 22 Novemberً2020, url; Al-Ittihad, ‫[ »الجيش السوري يمشط البادية بحثا عن عنارص «داعش‬Syrian Army searches Al-Badiya for Daesh elements], 27
November 2020, url
1429 Al-Hurra, ‫ وقائمة قتىل تكذب رواية النظام السوري‬.."‫"كمي الرابعة‬‫[ تفاصيل‬Details of the “4th Division ambush”.. and a list of names of those killed‫ر‬
belies the Syrian regime’s narrative], 31 December 2020, url
1430 Waters, G., ISIS in Syria: 2020 in Review, Newlines Institute, 10 February 2021, url
1431 Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary: Syria Weekly Conflict Summary 14 December 2020 - 3 January 2021, 7January 2021, url
1432 NPA, Residents in Syria’s Badiya displace due to ISIS attacks, 17 March 2021, url
1433 BBC News, Syria war: Russian jets 'bomb IS positions in desert region', 24 February 2021, url

149

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Lawlessness
Enab Baladi reported that the strategic Al Sukhna region of Homs was the site of attacks and ‘security
chaos’ affecting combatants and civilians. The source interviewed three civilian residents in Al-Sukhna
region who spoke of incidents of looting, security restrictions, lack of services and enforcement of thelaw, as well as the presence of landmines.1434 SOHR stated that on 3 December 2020, fighters of AlQuds brigade, a Russian-backed militia, stole 1 000 sheep owned by residents of Al-Sukhna and‘opened fire indiscriminately’ to terrorize the residents, and targeted with machine guns the
shepherds who managed to survive and escape’. No casualties were reported by the source.1435
In Homs city, Reuters, citing Syrian state media, reported on 19 January 2021 on a blast that hit a state
crude oil transportation company in Homs city. According to Reuters, the GoS did not specify thereasons behind the explosion but did not rule out that it was an attack. No casualties resulted.1436
In the city of Talbiseh in northern Homs countryside, unidentified gunmen attacked the State Security
branch with grenades on 16 November 2020.1437 Reportedly, State Security patrols subsequently
raided the area surrounding the targeted building and two security agents were injured when twogunmen shot at the patrol.1438 On 15 December 2020, another attack with light weapons and grenades
targeted a detachment of the Military Security branch in Ar-Rastan, which resulted in the death offour security agents, including an officer. The attack was claimed by a rebel group called Saraya AlMuqawama fi Homs (Resistance Brigades in Homs).1439 A researcher at Syria Inside, cited by Al-Quds
Al-Arabi1440, stated that Homs governorate, especially its northern countryside, has been witnessing
attacks targeting GoS, as well as Russian and Iranian, positions in the area. According to the source,
such attacks were carried out individually by frustrated locals, and not by organised armed groups.1441
SOHR reported on clashes between pro-GoS militias in the Al-Shaluh village on 19 August 2020 which
resulted in the injury of three militiamen, and on murders that took place in Al-Hashimiyeh village innorthern rural Homs, in Al-Rawda village in the eastern countryside of Homs, and in Al-Massoudia
village in Homs countryside, in July and August 2020.1442 SOHR, citing activists, reported on a state of
tension between pro-GoS groups in Talbiseh on 13 November 2020.1443 Aleppo Today reported on astate of chaos in the northern countryside of Homs and stated that the security branches in thegovernorate have instructed their detachments in Al-Rastan and Al-Houleh towns to ‘ensure that nosecurity disorder takes place’.1444
In western Homs governorate, sources reported on security tensions in Sheen town on
19 December 2020 when one man was shot dead and another injured by members of the 4th Division
1434 Enab Baladi, Al-Sukhna predominated by security chaos as regime and Iranian forces grapple with IS, 20 February 2021,

url
1435 SOHR, Homs desert | Russian-backed “Al-Quds Brigade” militia steal about 1,000 sheep, 5 December 2020, url
1436 Reuters, Syria says extinguishes huge fire near Homs refinery, no casualties, 19 January 2021, url
1437 SOHR, North of Homs | Gunmen attack State Security headquarters in Talbiseh city, 16 November 2020, url; Zaman Al-

Wasl, ‫[ هجوم يستهدف مبن "أمن الدولة" يف "تلبيسة" شمال حمص‬Attack targets State Security building in Talbiseh in northern Homs], 16 November
2020, url
1438 Zaman Al-Wasl, ‫[ هجوم يستهدف مبن "أمن الدولة" ف "تلبيسة" شمال حمص‬Attack targets State Security building in Talbiseh in northern Homs],‫ي‬
16 November 2020, url
1439 Aleppo Today, “‫بالرسي‬‫ر‬”‫“[ شايا المقاومة يف حمص” تعلن مسؤوليتها عن الهجوم عىل “مفرزة األمن‬Saraya Al-Muqawama fi Homs” claims responsibility for theattack on a security detachment in Al-Rastan], 17 December 2020, url; Al-Quds Al-Arabi, ‫مقتل أربعة بينهم ضابط من النظام السوري يف عملية لـ «شايا‬‫[ »المقاومة يف حمص‬Death of four including an officer in the Syrian regime in an attack by [“Saraya Al-Muqawama fi Homs”], 16
December 2020, url
1440 An independent Arabic newspaper based in the UK. Al-Quds Al-Arabi, Who we are, n. d., url
1441 Al-Quds Al-Arabi, ‫[ »مقتل أربعة بينهم ضابط من النظام السوري ف عملية لـ «شايا المقاومة ف حمص‬Death of four including an officer in the Syrian regime in‫ي‬‫ي‬an attack by [“Saraya Al-Muqawama fi Homs”], 16 December 2020, url
1442 SOHR, Security chaos | Clashes erupt among pro-regime militias in Homs province, leaving three militiamen injured, 19
August 2020, url
1443 SOHR, North of Homs | Gunmen attack State Security headquarters in Talbiseh city, 16 November 2020, url
1444 Aleppo Today, ‫[ النظام يوجه تعليمات عاجلة ألفرعه األمنية شمال حمص‬The regime issues urgent instructions to its security branches in northern
Homs], 13 February 2021, url

150

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

manning a checkpoint. Reportedly, the residents of the village attacked the checkpoint1445 and set fire
to it.1446
Finally, in eastern Homs countryside, SOHR reported that armed men, likely members of Iran-backed
militias, attacked shepherds in the Rasm Al-Taweel village, Jub Al-Jarrah region, with knives on
7 October 2020 and killed three of them.1447 The pro-opposition media outlet1448, Syria TV, reportingon the same incident, stated that nine people, including two women and three children, were killedin the attack.1449 On 4 November 2020, Iranian-backed militias opened fire and killed 11 civilians,
including four women, in Al-Rifa’i village in eastern Homs countryside.1450
Israeli airstrikes
Israeli air strikes targeted several locations in the governorate including Shayrat and Al-Daba air baseson 31 March 20201451, pro-Iranian militia near Palmyra on 20 April 20201452, and a Lebanese Hezbollah
ammunition depot in Palmyra district on 1 May 2020.1453 ISW also reported on the Israeli attack thattargeted a Hezbollah munition depot in the city of Homs on 1 May 2020. According to the source, theattack triggered a secondary explosion, and ISW cited GoS sources that claimed that the explosion
caused ‘material and human loss’.1454 Reuters, citing SOHR, reported that the target of this air strike
was a Hezbollah military base located on the Homs-Palmyra road and that sounds of the explosions
could be heard across the city.1455 On 2 September 2020, Israeli air strikes targeted the T4 base ineastern Homs.1456
In 2021, ISW stated that ‘Israel continues strikes on Iranian positions in Syria, prompting Russian fears
that shared infrastructure will be targeted’. The source reported on 19 February 2021 that Russian
attempts to have the Iranian militants leave the jointly controlled T4 airbase were unsuccessful.
Reportedly, the Russian troops evacuated the base and were redeployed to a nearby gas plant.1457
Security incidents
According to ACLED data, there were 147 security incidents recorded in Homs governorate, of whom
67 were coded as battles, 59 explosions/remote violence and 21 incidents of violence against civilians.
Higher number of security incidents were recorded between November 2020 and March 2021 (seeFigure 28).

1445 Xeber24, ‫[ توترات أمنية ف ريف حمص عقب مقتل شاب عىل يد عنارص الفرقة الرابعة‬Security tensions in rural Homs following the killing of a man by 4 th‫ي‬Division agents], 20 December 2020, url; SOHR, ‫الغرن‬‫شي بريف حمص‬‫كبت تشهده منطقة ر‬‫ توتر ر‬..‫[ عىل خلفية مقتل شاب برصاص عنارص من الفرقة الرابعة‬In the wake of the‫ي‬death of a man by 4th Division fire.. Sheen region in western rural Homs witnesses great tension], 20 December 2020, url
1446 Xeber24, ‫[ توترات أمنية ف ريف حمص عقب مقتل شاب عىل يد عنارص الفرقة الرابعة‬Security tensions in rural Homs following the killing of a man by 4 th‫ي‬Division agents], 20 December 2020, urlً
1447 SOHR, “‫لش رف‬‫ر‬‫المواس ف ريف حمص ا ر‬‫ من رعاة‬3 ‫ ميليشيات موالية إليران تقتل‬..”‫بالسكاكي‬‫[ ذبحا‬slayed with knives.. Pro-Iran militias kill three shepherds in
‫ر‬
‫ي‬
‫ي ي‬
eastern Homs countryside], 7 October 2020, url
1448 Media Landscapes, Syria, n. d., url
1449 Syria TV, ‫[ مجزرة بحق رعاة أغنام بينهم أطفال ونساء رش رف حمص‬Shepherds including children and women massacred in eastern Homs], 6 October‫ي‬
2020, url
1450 SOHR, New massacre | Iranian militias kill 11 civilians, steal sheep and set fire to several houses in eastern Homs, 4November 2020, url
1451 Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary | 30 March – 5 April 2020, April 2020, url, p. 3;1452 Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary | 20 – 26 April 2020, April 2020, url, p. 4; RFE/RL, Pro-Iranian Fighters
Reported Killed In Israeli Attack In Syria, 21 April 2020, url
1453 Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary | 27 April – 3 May 2020, May 2020, url, p. 41454 ISW, Syria Situation Report: April 29 - May 12, 2020, 14 May 2020, url
1455 Reuters, Syria says casualties in Homs blast, war monitor says Israel behind it, 1 May 2020, url
1456 Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary | 31 August - 6 September 2020, 6 September 2020, url, p. 41457 ISW, Syria Situation Report: January 30 - February 18, 2021, 19 February 2021, url

151

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Figure 28. Evolution of security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in Homs
governorate in between 1 January 2020 and 31 March 2021, based on ACLED data1458

District
Al Makhrim
Al Qusayr
Ar Rastan
Homs
TadmorTall Kalakh
Total

Homs governorate – Security incidents
RemoteViolence against
Battlesviolence
civilians
6
1
3
6
5
3
4
12
10
5
49
41
1
1
21
67
59

Figure 29. Security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in Homs governorate
between 1 January 2020 and 31 March 2021. Breakdown by district based on ACLED data

More than half of the security incidents recorded by ACLED during the reporting period were
documented in the district of Tadmor (64 %).
A non-exhaustive list of security incidents that were reported to have taken place in Homs governorate
in 2020 and early 2021 included the following:••••

ISIL cells killed six SAA soldiers in a landmine attack that targeted their bus in the area ofHamima to the east of Al-Sukhna city on 30 April 2020.1459
On 1 May 2020, several explosions at a weapons depot in the city of Homs were reported. At
least 15 civilians were injured.1460
SOHR reported that on 2 September 2020, airstrikes, likely to be Israeli, hit the area of the T4
airport in eastern Homs countryside.1461
On 4 November 2020, Iranian-backed militias opened fire and killed 11 civilians, including four
women, in Al-Rifa’i village in eastern Homs countryside.1462

1458 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (9 April 2021), url
1459 SOHR, ISIS resurgence: cells attack regime military bus in Homs, killing six soldiers, including high-ranking officer, 30 April

2020, url
1460 UN Security council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020), 24 June 2020, url, p. 18; Step News, ‫بالفيديو|| قتىل وجرىح نتيجة‬‫والنظام السوري يوضح‬..‫[ انفجارات مجهولة ترصب حمص وحلب‬In video.. Deaths and injuries in unidentified explosions that hit Homs and Aleppo.. The
Syrian regime clarifies], 1 May 2020, url
1461 SOHR, Israeli attacks | Airstrikes target T4 airport area in Homs countryside, and air defenses try to intercept, 2September 2020, url
1462 SOHR, New massacre | Iranian militias kill 11 civilians, steal sheep and set fire to several houses in eastern Homs, 4November 2020, url

152

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation•

On 19 January 2021, Reuters, citing Syrian state media, reported that an explosion hit ‘agovernment-owned crude oil transportation company’ in Homs city.1463

Civilian fatalities
Month
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
AugustSeptember
OctoberNovember
December
Total

VDC 2020
1
2
4
3
8
2
9
13
2
44

SNHR 2020
2
1
1
1
3
2
3
2
15

VDC 2021
612

SNHR 2021
5
2
3

9

10

Figure 30. Civilian fatalities as a result of armed conflict in Homs governorate in 2020 and first three months of 2021. Monthly
breakdown based on VDC and SNHR data

In 2020, Homs governorate had between 151464 (SNHR data)1465 and 44 civilian fatalities (VDC data).1466
For the first three months of 2021, SNHR recorded 10 civilian fatalities in Homs governorate, while
VDC recorded 9.
Infrastructure damage and explosives remnants of war
In a report published in 2020, ESCWA and the University of St Andrews included Homs governorate ina group of governorates that sustained the highest damage to physical capital (81.8 %).1467 Within this1463 Reuters, Syria says extinguishes huge fire near Homs refinery, no casualties, 19 January 2021, url; Daily Sabah, ‫ عدة‬..‫سوريا‬‫[ انفجارات تتسبب بحريق ضخم يف منشأة نفطية يف مدينة حمص‬Syria.. Several explosions cause a large fire in an oil facility in Homs city], 20 January 2021,

url
1464 In a January 2021 report, SNHR mentions 14 civilian fatalities in Homs in 2020. This figure is the result of a revision of

their data. EASO email correspondence with SNHR, 22 April 2021. See SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 1,734
Civilians in Syria in 2020, including 99 in December, 1 January 2021, url, p. 121465 Based on data extracted from monthly reports on civilian casualties published by SNHR. See: SNHR, 286 Civilians,
including Four Medical and Civil Defense Personnel, Documented Killed in Syria in January 2020, 1 February 2020, url, p. 8;
SNHR, 276 Civilians, including Six Medical Personnel and Two Media Workers, Documented Killed in Syria in February 2020,
1 March 2020, url, p. 8; SNHR, 145 Civilians, including Two Medical Personnel, Documented Killed in Syria in March 2020, 1
April 2020, url, p. 9; SNHR, 78 Civilians, including One Media Workers, Documented Killed in Syria in April 2020, 1 May 2020,
url, p. 10; SNHR, 125 Civilians Documented Killed in Syria in May 2020, including Eight Who Died Due to Torture and One
Massacre, 1 June 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, 1,006 Civilians, including three Media Workers and 12 Medical and Civil Defense
Personnel, Documented Killed in Syria in the First Half of 2020, 1 July 2020, url, p. 16; SNHR, 107 Civilians, including 26
Children and 11 Women, Documented Killed in Syria in July 2020, 2 August 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, 122 Civilians, including 21
Children and Seven Women, Documented Killed in Syria in August 2020, 1 September 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, Extrajudicial
Killing Claims the Lives of 102 Civilians, including 15 Children, 10 Women, Three Medical Personnel and 12 Victims Due toTorture, 1 October 2020, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 126 Civilians, including 18 Children, Eight
Women, One Media Worker and 10 Victims Due to Torture, 1 November 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims
the Lives of 172 Civilians, including 16 Children, 11 Women, and 30 Victims Due to Torture, 1 December 2020, url, p. 9; SNHR,
Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 1,734 Civilians in Syria in 2020, including 99 in December, 1 January 2021, url, p. 141466 Based on monthly civilian fatalities figures for 2020 and 2021 shared by VDC with EASO
1467 ESCWA and University of St Andrews, Syria at War: Eight Years On, url, p. 50; The source defines loss to physical capitalas including ‘private and public construction and equipment, such as housing stock, schools, hospitals and factories, and153

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situationgroup, Homs governorate accounted for a lower percentage of the total of (8 %). The source observedthat the damage in Homs, ‘though hard’, was localised, and that ‘most of these localized conflicts inthis governorate ended through local settlements’, unlike Raqqa which was recaptured through heavy
bombing.1468 Based on the Syria Multi-sector Needs Assessment of 2020, the Shelter Cluster assessedthat in Homs governorate, 15.2 % of the population was living in damaged buildings.1469
Furthermore, a Reach and UNITAR report published in March 2019 indicated that in Homs city, 3 082
buildings were destroyed, 5 750 suffered severe damage, and 4 946 moderate damage.1470
International Crisis Group stated in a February 2020 report that parts of Homs, ‘are inhospitable for
returnees due to heavy destruction’.1471
Enab Baladi, citing al-Watan website, reported on 30 July 2020 that the Public Works Directorate ofHoms city ‘ended the removal works of 105 properties of crumbling buildings threatening passers-by
and public safety in the city’, without specifying the neighbourhoods in which the works were carriedout.1472
The New Arab reported on 15 December 2020 that Al-Khalidiya neighbourhood in Homs city is still
destroyed and lacks basic services and daily needs, especially electricity and bread. According to thesource, the neighbourhood had around 90 000 residents before the war, and has now around 7 500
residents. Moreover, communication in the neighbourhood is almost non-existent, the schools arestill destroyed, the roads are damaged and the health centres are not sufficient.1473 Al-Ayyam reported
on 3 May 2020 that destruction and rubble are still prevalent in Al-Khalidiya neighbourhood and that
return to the neighbourhood is subject to cumbersome procedures.1474 Enab Baladi stated on
10 July 2019 that Al-Khalidiya neighbourhood was one of the neighbourhoods of Homs that sustained
the heaviest damage together with Jurat Al-Shayyah neighbourhood.1475
UNRWA reported on 2 May 2020 that at least one classroom in the Al-Shajara School in the Homs
Palestine refugee camp was damaged by a shrapnel ‘emanating from an explosion in an ammunition
depot outside the camp’.1476 WHO stated on 27 January 2021 that four health centres in Jaboureen,
Tir-Maaleh, Kafr-Nan, and Taldu in northern Homs governorate were renovated with Russian
support.1477
The following are examples of civilian casualties from landmines or UXO that were reported to havetaken place in Homs governorate in 2020-2021:•

Two children were killed in a landmine explosion near Palmyra city on 11 August 2020.1478

power, water, sanitation, transport and communications infrastructure’. ESCWA and University of St Andrews, Syria at War:
Eight Years On, url, p. 49
1468 ESCWA and University of St Andrews, Syria at War: Eight Years On, url, p. 50
1469 Global Shelter Cluster, Syrian Arab Republic: Whole of Syria Shelter/NFI Sector Humanitarian Needs Overview 2021, 1
March 2021, url, pp. 6, 81470 REACH/UNITAR, Syria: Syrian Cities Damage Atlas, 16 March 2019, url, p. 44
1471 International Crisis Group, Easing Syrian Refugees’ Plight in Lebanon, 13 February 2020, url, p. 221472 Enab Baladi, Homs governorate removes hundreds of “ramshackle” properties, 30 July 2020, url
1473 New Arab (The), ‫[ ىح الخالدية ف حمص السورية بال كهرباء وال خت‬Al-Khalidiya neighbourhood in Homs is without electricity and bread], 15‫ي‬‫ي‬
December 2020, url
1474 Al-Ayyam, ‫الن وضعتها حكومة األسد لعودة أهال ىح الخالدية؟‬
‫ر‬
‫ر‬
‫ي ي‬
‫[ ما الشوط ي‬What are the conditions that the Assad government put in place for the
return of the residents of Al-Khalidiya neighbourhood?], 3 May 2020, url
1475 Enab Baladi, ‫[ محافظة حمص تعمل عىل ترحيل األنقاض ف حن الخالدية وباب السباع‬Homs governorate removes the rubble from Al-Khalidiya and Bab Al‫ي ري‬
Siba’a neighbourhoods], 10 July 2019, url
1476 UNRWA, UNRWA Shocked at Shrapnel Incident Causing Damage to School Building in Homs, Syria, 2 May 2020, url
1477 WHO, WHO addresses health inequities in Syria and ensures improved access to health care for all, 27 January 2021, url
1478 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020), 14 October 2020, url, p. 18

154

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

•
•
•
•

On 2 and 3 October 2020, six boys were injured in reported UXO detonations in Baba Amr andWadi Al-Dhahab neighbourhoods of Homs city.1479
On 8 January 2021, a man was killed in a landmine explosion in an agriculture field in Dab’ah
village in south-eastern Homs governorate.1480
The SNHR reported that on 7 February 2021, a child was killed in a mine explosion in Jouret
Al-Arayes area of Baba Amr neighbourhood in Homs city. According to the source, the mine
was in the rubble of a destroyed building.1481
SOHR reported that on 15 April 2021, a landmine detonated and struck a bus in Wadi Abyad
Dam in the Tadmor Badiya in eastern Homs governorate. Reportedly, four people were killed
and ten were injured.1482

Displacement and return
In its Humanitarian Needs Overview of 2021, UNOCHA stated that in August 2020, the IDP populationin Homs governorate was 311 000, and that nearly 30 000 IDPs resided in ‘collective centers in Homs
and Hama’, and many were not able to return.1483 Between January and December 2020, UNOCHA
registered 3 000 IDP movements from and within Homs governorate, 2 000 IDP movements to andwithin the governorate and 1 000 IDP movements within the governorate.1484
In January and February 2020, UNOCHA indicated IDP movements from several governorates to
Latakia, including from Homs.1485 In October 2020, 501 IDPs left Homs governorate, mainly to Aleppo
and Idlib governorates, and 369 IDPs arrived to the governorate from outside, mainly from Deir EzZor.1486 In 2021, UNOCHA reported on 185 IDPs movements (from locations within and to outside thegovernorate) in January, 287 IDPs movements in February1487, and 192 IDP movements in March 2021(of which 85 were recorded within the governorate).1488
As regards return movements in Homs governorate, UNOCHA estimated that the number of returnees
in 2020 was 10 978.1489 The source noted that in September and October 2020, Tadmor town
(Palmyra) received around 600 and 500 IDP movements consecutively1490, and that Homs city received

1479 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),

2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020), 11 December 2020, url, p. 18; SANA, ‫إصابة‬‫ىح بابا عمر بحمص‬‫ أطفال بجروح جراء انفجار عبوة ناسفة من مخلفات‬5 [Five children injured in an UXO detonation in Baba Amr in Homs], 2 October‫ر‬‫اإلرهابيي يف ي‬

2020, url
1480 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020), 18 February 2021, url, p. 18; SOHR, ‫مقتل‬‫غرن حمص‬‫اع بريف‬‫[ مواطن جراء انفجار لغم‬Death of a citizen when a landmine remnant of war detonated in his tractor‫ر‬‫القصت ي‬‫أرض من مخلفات الحرب بجراره الزر ي‬‫ي‬in Al-Qusayr countryside in western Homs], 8 January 2021, url
1481 SNHR, Extrajudicial killing claims the lives of 138 civilians, including 23 children, 11 women, and 14 victims due to torture,including a child, in February 2021, 1 March 2021, url, p. 5; Al-Mawrid, ‫أرض يف يىح بابا عمرو بمدينة حمص‬‫[ مقتل طفل وإصابة آخر جراء انفجار لغم‬One child‫ي‬
was killed and others injured in a landmine detonation in Baba Amr neighbourhood in Homs city], 8 February 2021, url;
Zaman Al-Wasl, ‫أرض يف "بابا عمرو‬‫ مقتل طفل وإصابة آخر بانفجار لغم‬..‫[ "حمص‬Homs.. One child killed and others wounded in a landmine destination‫ي‬in Baba Amr], 8 February 2021, url
1482 SOHR, ‫ شهداء ف بادية حمص‬4 ‫باحن فطر الكمأة إل‬‫ر‬‫[ مخلفات الحرب ترفع عدد ضحايا‬Remnants of war raises the number of victims among mushroom‫ي‬‫ي‬
hunters to 4 martyrs in Homs Badiya], 18 April 2021, url
1483 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic 2021, March 2021, url, p. 141484 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic. IDP Movements Overview, Jan – Dec 2020, 16 February 2021, url
1485 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements January 2020, 25 February 2020, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic:
IDP Movements February 2020, 6 April 2020, url
1486 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements October 2020, 24 November 2020, url
1487 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements January 2021, 4 March 2021, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP
Movements February 2021, 1 April 2021, url
1488 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, IDP Movements. March 2021, 12 May 2021, url
1489 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP movements and IDP spontaneous return movements data [second sheet tab –Summary since 2016], updated 1 April 2021, url
1490 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns September 2020, 27 October 2020, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab
Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns October 2020, 24 November 2020, url

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

around 500 return movements in November and in December 2020.1491 In 2021, UNOCHA stated thatthe numbers of IDP returns to Homs governorate (including returns from locations within thegovernorate and from outside) were 892 in January (of whom around 400 to Homs city)1492, 692 in
February (of whom more than 300 to Homs sub-district)1493, and 527 in March.1494
The CoI observed that ‘Syrians are routinely denied return to their places of origin, notably due torestrictions on access placed by the Government and fear of arrest in retaken and formerly besieged
areas’ including Homs.1495

1491 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns November 2020, 6 January 2021, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab

Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns December 2020, 27 January 2021, url
1492 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic IDP Spontaneous Returns January 2021, 3 March 2021, url
1493 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic IDP Spontaneous Returns February 2021, 1 April 2021, url
1494 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic. IDP Spontaneous Returns. March 2021, 12 May 2021, url
1495 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
21 January 2021, url, para. 43

156

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

2.7 Hasaka governorate

Map 13: © MapAction, Hasaka governorate1496

2.7.1 General description of the governorate
Al-Hasakah governorate (hereafter ‘Hasaka’ governorate) is located in the north-eastern corner of
Syria, bordering Turkey to the north, Iraq to the east and the Syrian Raqqa and Deir Ez-Zor
governorates to the west and south-west respectively. Its capital, Hasaka, is basically located in the
middle of the governorate, on the intersection of the Khabour river and the road from Al-Qamishli(bordering Turkey to the north) towards Deir Ez-Zor (see Map 13).1497 There are four main districts in
the governorate: Hasaka, Ras al-Ayn [Ras al Ain], Qamishli, and Al-Malikiya, divided into, in total, 16
sub-districts, and a large number of small towns and villages.1498
Hasaka governorate is mainly under the control of the Autonomous Administration of North and Eastof Syria (hereafter ‘Autonomous Administration’, AANES) (see also Section 1.4.3 Syrian Democratic
Forces), with an unified military force, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)1499 and a political assembly,

1496 MapAction, Al-Hasakeh governorate, 29 July 2016, url
1497 MapAction, Al-Hasakeh governorate, 29 July 2016, url; UNOCHA, Humanitarian Atlas, Syrian Arab Republic, January 2017,

url, p. 121498 The district of Hasaka is further divided into sub-districts of Al-Hasakah, Areesha, Be’r Al-Hulo Al-Wardeye, Hole,Markada, Shadada and Tall Tamer; Al-Malikiya into sub-districts of Al-Malikiya, Jawadiya and Yarobiya; Qamishli into
subdistricts of Qamishli, Amuda, Tal Hmis and Qahtaniya; and Ras Al-Ayn into sub-districts of Ras Al-Ayn and Darbasiya.
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Atlas, Syrian Arab Republic, January 2017, url, p. 121499 Allsopp, H. & van Wilgenburg, W., The Kurds of Northern Syria. Governance, Diversity and Conflicts, I.B. Tauris, 2019, pp.
66–67; RIC, Beyond the Frontlines, 19 December 2019, url, p. 50

157

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC).1500 The Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its armed
wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), have a dominant role in the SDF1501, the SDC1502 and in theAutonomous Administration as a whole.1503 In this administrative context, Hasaka governorate isappointed with the name Jazira (or, in Kurdish, Cizire) and it has been considered as one of the‘cantons’1504 or, since 2018, one of the ‘regions’1505 under the Autonomous Administration.
Population estimates for 2019 issued by the Syrian Central Bureau of Statistics indicate that Hasaka
governorate had 1 803 000 inhabitants.1506 In a March 2021 report, UNOCHA estimated the
population of Hasaka governorate to be of 1 127 309 inhabitants.1507
According to Fabrice Balanche, Hasaka has an ethnic Kurdish majority.1508 Areas north of Hasaka city
are depicted by Balanche mainly as either Kurdish or mixed areas, populated by both Kurds and Arabs.
Southern Hasaka governorate is depicted as populated mainly by Arabs.1509 Hasaka’s Assyrian
Christian population is concentrated in Tal Tamr area.1510 Other ethnic and religious minorities present
in the governorate include Syriac Christians1511, Armenians and Yazidis.1512
According to Fabrice Balanche, Hasaka governorate was responsible for approximately one-third of
Syria’s total oil output before the outbreak of the conflict (in 2010) and the governorate maintains its
status as Syria’s largest producer of wheat.1513 Depending on the source, the areas controlled by SDF
produce between 701514 and 72 %1515 of Syria’s wheat. According to statistics provided in FAO/WFPSpecial Report of July 2017, Hasaka governorate’s share of Syria’s total wheat production wasapproximately 40.6 % in the 2015/2016 agricultural season and approx. 34.5 % in the 2016/2017
season.1516
According to an analysis by Kenneth R. Rosen, published by the Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, 95 % of Syria’s known reserves of oil and gas can be found in north-east Syria, with oilfields‘centred’ in areas around the cities of Hasaka and Deir ez-Zor (the later in GoS-controlled Deir Ez-Zor
governorate). Rosen notes that the oil fields located in Hasaka and Deir Ez-Zor governorates havebecome a natural, ‘strategic target’ since the outbreak of the conflict.1517 International Crisis Groupestimates that the oil fields in SDF-controlled North-East Syria (mainly Hasaka governorate and1500 Rojava Information Center, Beyond the Frontlines, 19 December 2019, url, pp. 31-32
1501 Haenni, P. & Guesnay, A., Surviving the Aftermath of Islamic State: The Syrian Kurdish Movement’s Resilience Strategy,

European University Institute, 17 February 2020, url, p. 1 n21502 Netjes R. & van Veen, E., Henchman, Rebel, Democrat, Terrorist. The YPG/PYD during the Syrian conflict, Clingendael,
April 2021, url, p. 21503 COAR, Emboldened Self-Administration bids for greater power, 11 January 2021, url
1504 Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2018, url, p. 541505 Rojava Information Center, Beyond the Frontlines, 19 December 2019, url, p. 101506 Syria, Central Bureau of Statistics, Estimate of the population in Syria by governorates, n.d., url
1507 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview. Syrian Arab Republic, March 2021, url, p. 231508 Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2018, url, p. 56
1509 Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2018, url, p. 52
1510 Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2018, url, p. 52; MRGI, Christians,
Armenians and Assyrians, March 2018, url
1511 Holmes, A. A., Despite Ceasefire Agreement, Turkey Implicated In More Than Eight Hundred Violations, Council on
Foreign Relations, 13 October 2020, url; MRGI, Christians, Armenians and Assyrians, March 2018, url
1512 MRGI, Syria, March 2018, url
1513 Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2018, url, pp.57-58
1514 WFP, Syrian Arab Republic – mWAM Bulletin Issue no. 51: December 2020, 31 December 2020, url
1515 Information provided by Syria Report and cited in: Christou, W. & Advani, R., Damascus struggles to secure wheat supply
amidst coronavirus crisis, Syria Direct, 18 May 2020, url; HRW, Syria: Bread Crisis Exposes Government Failure, 21 March
2021, url; Tsurkov, E. & Jukhada, Q., Kneel and Starve: Under the Watchful Eye of the Secret Police, Syrians Go Hungry,
Newlines Institute, 9 February 2021, url
1516 FAO/WFP, Special Report: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to the Syrian Arab Republic, 18 July
2017, url, p. 25
1517 Rosen, K. R., Who Benefits from a U.S. Oil Deal in Northeast Syria?, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Fikra
Forum, 18 September 2020, url

158

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

eastern parts of Deir Ez-Zor governorate) were the source ‘for more than 80 percent of the country’s
pre-war production’.1518

2.7.2 Conflict background and armed actors
Hasaka governorate is mainly under the control of the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces(SDF).1519 Their allies in the US-led coalition have presence in the governorate.1520 The Government of
Syria (GoS) maintains its own enclaves or ‘security zones’ inside the SDF-controlled cities of Hasaka
and Qamishli, while the GoS forces are also present at Qamishli airport.1521 In addition, the GoS forces
and their Russian allies are present in the Syrian-Turkish border and along the frontlines between the
SDF-controlled areas and the Turkish-controlled area in northern Hasaka governorate.1522 Since themilitary incursion in October 20191523, the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) and the Turkish-backed Syrian
armed groups operating under the umbrella of the so-called ‘Syrian National Army’ (SNA) have beenin control of a territory roughly delimited by the Syrian-Turkish border in the north, the M4 highway
in the south, administrative border between Raqqa and Hasaka governorates in the west and the
Khabur river in the east. This area includes the town of Ras al-Ayn (Serê Kaniyê) and its
surroundings.1524 Along with an adjoining territory of roughly equal size in northern Raqqa
governorate (see Chapter 2.8 Raqqa governorate), this area constitutes the so-called Operation Peace
Spring area.1525
The Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its armed wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG),
took over the Kurdish majority areas in northern Syria after the withdrawal of the GoS forces in July
2012.1526 According to Rena Netjes and Erwin van Veen, the areas under the PYD/YPG’s control in
Hasaka governorate in 2012 included also the mixed areas (populated mainly by both Kurds andArabs)1527 1528, and Balanche describes the events of 2012 as the ‘PYD takeover of Hasaka[governorate]’.1529 The PYD/YPG expanded their areas of control significantly between 2015 and 2018,
extending their reach ‘far beyond the majority-Kurdish areas’ with the help of US-led coalition and1518 International Crisis Group, Prospects for a Deal to Stabilise Syria’s North East, 5 September 2018, url, p. 81519 Based on reading of maps in Etana Syria, Military Control Across Syria [Map], 1 April 2021 [published on 6 April 2021],

url; Jusoor for Studies, Map of the military bases and posts of foreign forces in Syria [Map], 6 January 2021, url; UN Human
Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/46/54],
21 January 2021 [published 18 February 2021], url, p. 31 [Annex II J] [Map]1520 Balanche, F., The Fragile Status Quo in Northeast Syria, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1 July 2020, url;van Wilgenburg, W., The Future of the Syrian Democratic Forces: One Year after the Liberation of Baghouz and the Turkish
Invasion, LSE Middle East Centre, 14 December 2020, url
1521 International Crisis Group, The SDF Seeks a Path Toward Durable Stability in North East Syria, 25 November 2020, url;
Mehchy Z. et al., Assessing control and power dynamics in Syria, Chatham House, November 2020, url, p. 101522 Based on reading of maps in Balanche, F., The Assad Regime Has Failed to Restore Full Sovereignty Over Syria, The
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 10 February 2021, url; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent
International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/46/54], 21 January 2021 [published 18 February2021], url, p. 31 [Annex II J] [Map]1523 For further information on the October 2019 Turkish incursion, see EASO, Syria - Security Situation. May 2020, url
1524 Based on reading of maps in Etana Syria, Military Control Across Syria [Map], 1 April 2021 [published on 6 April 2021],
url; Al-Hilu, K., The Turkish Intervention in Northern Syria: One Strategy, Discrepant Policies, European University Institute,
14 January 2021 [first published in Arabic on 21 December 2020], url, p. 3; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/46/54], 21 January 2021 [published
18 February 2021], url, p. 31 [Annex II J] [Map]1525 Al-Hilu, K., The Turkish Intervention in Northern Syria: One Strategy, Discrepant Policies, European University Institute,
14 January 2021 [first published in Arabic on 21 December 2020], url, p. 31526 Allsopp, H. & van Wilgenburg, W., The Kurds of Northern Syria. Governance, Diversity and Conflicts, I.B. Tauris, 2019, p.
131527 The ethno-religious composition of Hasaka’s population is discussed above in Section 2.7.1
1528 Netjes R. & van Veen, E., Henchman, Rebel, Democrat, Terrorist. The YPG/PYD during the Syrian conflict, Clingendael,
April 2021, url, pp. 21-22
1529 Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2018, url, p. 54

159

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

seizing ‘Syria’s most significant oil fields’ and almost all the areas formerly held by ISIL east of theEuphrates river.1530
During the reference period for this report, there have been reports of recurrent shelling and armed
clashes between the Turkish forces/ Turkish-backed armed groups and the SDF along the frontlines
between the Operation Peace Spring area and the SDF-controlled areas in Hasaka and Raqqa
governorates.1531 (For further information on Hasaka, see Section 2.7.3 Recent security trends andimpact on the civilian population, for Raqqa, see Section 2.8.3 Recent security trends and impact on
the civilian population ). Immediately after the October 2019 incursion, international human rights
organisations reported on serious human rights violations and potential war crimes, including i.a.
summary killings of civilians and indiscriminate attacks targeting civilian areas, carried out by theTurkish forces and the Turkish-backed armed groups.1532 Serious human rights violations committed
by these actors were reported also during the reference period.1533 (For further information, see
Section Human rights violations in Operation Peace Spring area (Ras al-Ayn)).
During the reference period, tensions have been reported also between the SDF and the GoS forces1534
deployed in the governorate as well as between their respective allies the US-led Coalition and Russia.
These tensions have been linked to the control of north-east Syria’s oil.1535 The SDF controls Syria’s
main oil fields and depends on them for revenue1536, with the Autonomous Administration deriving
approximately 60 % of its total income from selling petroleum. In July 2020, the Autonomous
Administration signed a deal with US based oil company Delta Crescent Energy, LCC, in order to gain
more autonomy with regard to north-east Syria’s oil reserves. The Syrian government, Russia, Iran andTurkey all protested over the deal. The deal also drew criticism from local Arab tribes, aiming forautonomous control of fossil fuel reserves in their areas of influence.1537 It has been estimated thatthe deal increased tensions between the SDF and other actors operating in north-east Syria.1538
According to a field study by Hanny Megally and Jasmine M. El-Gamal, factors such as the partial US
withdrawal and the Turkish incursion in October 2019 have caused a ‘sense of insecurity’ and ‘ma[de]it nearly impossible for residents of the region to normalize their daily lives’. This insecurity isconnected to the ‘fear of the unknown’ connected to the potential ‘continuation of the conflict’ and‘further mass displacement’. Megally and El-Gamal note that this constant fear has affected thepsychological health of the respondents.1539

1530 International Crisis Group, Prospects for a Deal to Stabilise Syria’s North East, 5 September 2018, url, p. 1
1531 REACH, Humanitarian Situation Overview in Syria (HSOS): Northeast Syria, November 2020, 21 December 2020, url, p. 1;

UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/45/31], 14 August 2020 [published 15 September 2020], url, p. 2; USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead
Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, July 1,2020–September 30,2020,3 November 2020, url, p. 63; UN
Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332
(2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2021/390], 22 April 2021,
url, p. 3 [Para. 5]1532 AI, Syria: Damning evidence of war crimes and other violations by Turkish forces and their allies, 18 October 2019, url;
HRW, Syria: Civilians Abused in ‘Safe Zones’, 27 November 2019, url
1533 See, in particular, OHCHR, Syria: Violations and abuses rife in areas under Turkish-affiliated armed groups – Bachelet, 18
September 2020, url
1534 See, for example, UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191
(2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of theSecretary-General [S/2021/160], 18 February 2021, url, p. 4 [para. 10]1535 COAR, Cry Havoc: Assassinations Spark Anti-SDF Backlash, 17 August 2020, url; USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead
Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, July 1,2020–September 30,2020,3 November 2020, url, p. 60
1536 MEE, Syrian oil fields no longer priority for US forces, says Pentagon, 9 February 2021, url
1537 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, July 1,2020–
September 30,2020, 3 November 2020, url, p. 59
1538 COAR, Cry Havoc: Assassinations Spark Anti-SDF Backlash, 17 August 2020, url
1539 Megally, H. & El-Gamal, J. M., Preventing the Reemergence of Violent Extremism in Northeast Syria, UNESCWA & CIC,
March 2021, url, p. 25

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Syrian Democratic Forces
The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are the main unified military force1540 of the Autonomous
Administration currently in control of most of Hasaka governorate.1541 (See Section 1.4.3 Syrian
Democratic Forces for further information.)
According to Wladimir van Wilgenburg, the SDF has maintained the control of all the checkpoints
located in SDF-controlled North-East Syria.1542 This despite the presence of and/or pressure exerted
by the Government of Syria (GoS), Russian, Iranian, and Turkish forces (see Section 2.7.3 Recent
security trends and impact on the civilian population). According to Fabrice Balanche, the SyrianTurkish border in SDF-controlled parts of Hasaka governorate is in joint control of Russian forces andthe SDF. The SDF also controls the Syrian-Iraqi border north of the Euphrates river. With the assistanceof US forces deployed in the area, the SDF controls the Syrian side of Fish Khabur/Semalka bordercrossing in the Syrian-Iraqi border. Balanche claims that Fish Khabur/Semalka is the only bordercrossing open north of the Euphrates with the Iran-backed Iraqi Shia militias controlling most of the
Iraqi side and prohibiting the use of any other crossing points.1543 However, according to Harith Hasan
and Kheder Khaddour, the PYD/YPG-affiliated Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has utilised the informal
Al-Faw crossing between southern Hasaka governorate and Iraq’s Sinjar district (in Ninewa province)
for illegal crossing and smuggling activities.1544 (For further information on the PKK’ role in SDFcontrolled areas, see Section 1.4.3 Syrian Democratic Forces).
Syrian Arab Army and affiliated armed groups
According to an estimate by the US Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), cited in the USDOD report ofAugust 2020, the number of SAA and affiliated armed groups personnel deployed in SDF-controlledgovernorates of Hasaka and Raqqa after October 2019 and Turkish Operation Peace Spring ranges
between 4 000 and 10 000. In addition, the GoS has increased its recruitment efforts among the locals
to strengthen its ranks.1545
The GoS maintains its own enclaves or ‘security zones’ inside the SDF-controlled cities of Hasaka andQamishli.1546 According to Mehchy (et al.), these enclaves contain various governance andadministrative institutions, including ‘the governorship, the courthouse, the municipality, theprovincial council, the civil and land registries, the transportation directorate, the police, public banks,
the education directorate and the main branch of the Ba’ath Party’ and the branches of Syrian
intelligence services.1547 According to COAR Global, schools following the GoS curriculum operate in
Hasaka and Qamishli enclaves and are attended by a ‘considerable number of students’ in order togain education officially recognised both nationally and internationally.1548 In addition, the SAA

1540 Allsopp, H. & van Wilgenburg, W., The Kurds of Northern Syria. Governance, Diversity and Conflicts, I.B. Tauris, 2019, pp.

66–67; RIC, Beyond the Frontlines, 19 Decemb er 2019, url, p. 50
1541 Based on reading of maps in Etana Syria, Military Control Across Syria [Map], 1 April 2021 [published on 6 April 2021],
url; Jusoor for Studies, Map of the military bases and posts of foreign forces in Syria [Map], 6 January 2021, url; UN Human
Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/46/54],
21 January 2021 [published 18 February 2021], url, p. 31 [Annex II J] [Map]1542 van Wilgenburg, W., The Future of the Syrian Democratic Forces: One Year after the Liberation of Baghouz and theTurkish Invasion, LSE, 14 December 2020, url
1543 Balanche, F., The Assad Regime Has Failed to Restore Full Sovereignty Over Syria, The Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, 10 February 2021, url
1544 Hasan, H. & Khaddour, K., The Making of the Kurdish Frontier: Power, Conflict, and Governance in the Iraqi-Syrian
Borderlands, Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, 30 March 2021, url
1545 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, April 1,2020–June
30,2020, 4 August 2020, url, p. 51
1546 International Crisis Group, The SDF Seeks a Path Toward Durable Stability in North East Syria, 25 November 2020, url;
Mehchy Z. et al., Assessing control and power dynamics in Syria, Chatham House, November 2020, url, p. 101547 Mehchy Z. et al., Assessing control and power dynamics in Syria, Chatham House, November 2020, url, p. 101548 COAR, Double Trouble: Southern Syria Erupts on Two Fronts, 1 February 2021, url

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

controls the Qamishli airport.1549 With regard to the SAA’s military strength in Hasaka governorate,
Mehchy (et al.) claim that the SAA has ‘significant presence’ inside Hasaka and Qamishli enclaves andcontrols ‘critical military bases’ in the governorate.1550
Since October 2019, the GoS forces have been stationed (along with Russian forces) on the Syrian
Turkish border and on the internal border separating the areas controlled by Turkey and affiliatedarmed groups from the areas controlled by the SDF in Hasaka governorate.1551 The map on ‘The
Complex Operating Environment of North-eastern Syria’ in the USDOD report of February 2021 notes
the presence of GoS forces in the town of Tal Tamr.1552 According to the Carter Center report of
February the GoS has an enclave also in Tal Tamr town.1553 According to Fabrice Balanche, the SyrianTurkish border between Ras al-Ayn and Tigris river (the Iraqi border) is in joint control of Russian forces
and the SDF. Balanche claims that the GoS forces have only a symbolic presence of a few hundred
troops in the border area.1554
See the EASO COI Report: Syria - Security situation (May 2020) for more specific information on SAA
formations deployed in Hasaka governorate as of March 2020.1555
The US-led Coalition
According to Wladimir van Wilgenburg, the US-led Coalition has 500 personnel on the ground in thegovernorates of Hasaka and Deir Ez-Zor.1556 According to Fabrice Balanche, US troops are present inHasaka towns of Rmelan and Al-Shaddadi and they control the crossroads between the M4 highway
and the Amuda-Hasaka road and the road between Rmelan and the Fish Khabour border crossing with
Iraq.1557
The map on ‘The Complex Operating Environment of North-eastern Syria’ reproduced in the USDOD
report of February 2021 and based on analysis by ISW and Congressional Research Service notes thepresence of US forces in As-Shaddadi.1558 According to Jusoor Center for Studies map of January 2021,
the US has 19 military sites in Hasaka governorate: four in Al-Malikiya district (including one in
Rmelan), one in Qamishli, one east of Qamishli and one west of Qamishli, one south of Qamishli (along
the Qamishli–Hasaka road), two in Hasaka city and one directly south of the city, three along the Tal
Tamr–Qamishli road and two along the Tal Tamr–Hasaka road, one south of Tal Tamr and one in AlShadadi.1559 According to a map by researcher Levent Kemal, the US has 7 military sites in Hasaka
governorate: one in the city of Qamishli, three in Al-Malikiya district, one along the road between Tal
Tamr and Qamishli, one along the road from Qamishli to Hasaka and one in the southern part of thegovernorate (Al-Shadadi).1560

1549 International Crisis Group, The SDF Seeks a Path Toward Durable Stability in North East Syria, 25 November 2020, url;

Mehchy Z. et al., Assessing control and power dynamics in Syria, Chatham House, November 2020, url, p. 101550 Mehchy Z. et al., Assessing control and power dynamics in Syria, Chatham House, November 2020, url, p. 101551 Balanche, F., The Fragile Status Quo in Northeast Syria, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1 July 2020, url;van Wilgenburg, W., The Future of the Syrian Democratic Forces: One Year after the Liberation of Baghouz and the Turkish
Invasion, LSE Middle East Centre, 14 December 2020, url
1552 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress October 1,2020–
December 31,2020, 9 February 2021, url, p. 56
1553 Carter Center (The), Syria Weekly Conflict Summary 18 - 24 January 2021, 27 January 2021, url
1554 Balanche, F., The Assad Regime Has Failed to Restore Full Sovereignty Over Syria, The Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, 10 February 2021, url
1555 EASO, Syria - Security Situation. May 2020, url, pp. 135–136
1556 van Wilgenburg, W., The Future of the Syrian Democratic Forces: One Year after the Liberation of Baghouz and theTurkish Invasion, LSE Middle East Centre, 14 December 2020, url
1557 Balanche, F., The Fragile Status Quo in Northeast Syria, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1 July 2020, url
1558 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress October 1,2020–
December 31,2020, 9 February 2021, url, p. 56
1559 Jusoor for Studies, Map of the military bases and posts of foreign forces in Syria [Map], 6 January 2021, url
1560 Kemal, L., Suriye'de YPG bölgesindeki Rus ve ABD üsleri sayıları [Map] [Twitter], 1 March 2021, url

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According to an analysis by COAR Global from 19 October 2020, the US-led Coalition has ‘taken several
concrete steps to increase their footprint in and around oil-rich areas’ in both Hasaka and Deir Ez-Zor
governorates. These actions have included sending additional troops and equipment to Shaddadi basein southern Hasaka governorate.1561 According to the article by Arab News published in February 2021,
The US-led Coalition was planning to erect a new military base in Ayn Diwar area. The article cites
ISW’s Nicholas Heras, according to whom the ‘base would be located near the most important entry
point into north-east Syria from the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.’1562 The article is based on reporting by
the SOHR, which published its own analysis on the US-led Coalition’s actions to set up a new militarybase in Ayn Diwar and to significantly reinforce its military presence in north-east Syria.1563
RussiaAccording to the USDOD report of May 2020, Russia has at least 300 military police patrolling in northeast Syria.1564 According to an analysis by the DIA, cited in the USDOD report of August 2020, Russianforces have ‘a presence at the Qamishli airport1565 and [patrol] in [Hasaka and Raqqa governorates],
including in towns along the M4 highway leading to the Iraqi border’.1566 In late January 2021, ISW
reported that Russia had deployed 300 additional Military Police to areas in Hasaka (Amuda and Tal
Tamr) and Raqqa (Ayn Issa) governorates bordering the Turkish-controlled Operation Peace Springarea, as a reaction to increased hostilities and as a deterrent to possible Turkish incursion.1567
According to Fabrice Balanche, in Hasaka governorate, Russian forces are present in some militarybases and in the border zones between Syria and Turkey and between the areas controlled by the SDF
and the Operation Peace Spring area, where they have been stationed alongside the GoS forces since
October 2019. In addition, Russian and the GoS forces are stationed along the section of Khabur river
running between the cities of Tal Tamr and Hasaka. Since May 2020, the traffic along the M4 highway
between Ayn Issa and Tal Tamr has been restricted to convoys with Russian escorts and no SDF units
or local civilians were allowed to use this section of the highway on their own.1568 In May 2020, ISW
reported that four Russian-escorted convoys would be trafficking daily between Ayn Issa and Tal
Tamr.1569 The Syrian-Turkish border between Ras al-Ayn and the Tigris River (the Syrian-Iraqi border)
is in joint control of Russian forces and the SDF.1570
The map on ‘The Complex Operating Environment of North-eastern Syria’ in the USDOD report of
February 2021 notes the presence of Russian forces in three positions east and south of Qamishli cityand in the city of Tal Tamr.1571 According to Jusoor Center for Studies map of January 2021, Russia has
up to 13 military sites1572 in Hasaka governorate: five in or near the city of Qamishli, two in the Syrian–
1561 COAR, Fire on the coast: Damascus vows support — but not much, 19 October 2020, url
1562 Arab News, Anti-Daesh coalition to set up military base along Turkish-Syrian border, 16 February 2021 [updated on 24

February 2021], url
1563 SOHR, 77 months of International Coalition operations in Syria: Security campaigns with SDF result in the arrest of over
60 people, and large reinforcement of 250 trucks enter Syria, 23 February 2021, url
1564 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, January 1,2020–
March 31,2020, 13 May 2020, url, p. 621565 See also ISW, Syria Situation Report: March 18 - 31, 2020, 2 April 2020, url
1566 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, April 1,2020–June
30,2020, 4 August 2020, url, p. 51
1567 ISW, Syria Situation Report: January 8-29, 2021, 29 January 2021, url
1568 Balanche, F., The Fragile Status Quo in Northeast Syria, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1 July 2020, url
1569 ISW, Syria Situation Report: May 13 - 26, 2020, 30 May 2020, url
1570 Balanche, F., The Assad Regime Has Failed to Restore Full Sovereignty Over Syria, The Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, 10 February 2021, url
1571 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress October 1,2020–
December 31,2020, 9 February 2021, url, p. 56
1572 The source (Jusoor for Studies, Map of the Military Bases and Posts of Foreign Forces in Syria, 6 January 2021, url)
contains ambiguous information on the exact number of Russian military sites in Hasaka governorate. While the number ofRussian military sites varies between 11-13, this report refers to the most detailed of the maps on Russian military sites,

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Turkish border (with one west and another east from the city of Qamishli), one in Al-Malikiya district,
one in the city of Hasaka, three in or near Tal Tamr and one west of Tal Tamr in the border between
Turkish and SDF-controlled areas.1573 According to a map by researcher Levent Kemal, Russia has 7
military sites in Hasaka governorate: one in the city of Qamishli, two in the Syrian–Turkish border zone
west of Qamishli and four in the border separating Turkish-controlled Ras al-Ayn from SDF-controlledareas.1574 The main difference between the two estimates concerns the existence of Russian militarysites in Hasaka city and in Al-Malikiya district.
According to Balanche, Russian forces have attempted to erect a military outpost at Al-Malikiya andestablish control of the border crossing with Iraq (Semalka/Fish Khabur).1575 According to COAR Global,
on 3 and 4 June 2020, Russia reportedly attempted to establish military points in Kasan and Qasr Deeb
to gain a permanent military foothold in rural Al-Malikiya. However, Russian forces were forced towithdraw from the area after encountering, first, local civilian resistance and, later, US forces
inhospitable to their presence in the area.1576 ISW also noted these developments and claimed that
Russian forces withdrew their presence from Qamishli airport on 4 June as the result of their failed
expansion.1577 According to COAR Global, Russian forces had attempted to erect a military base in Ayn
Diwar area five times before 12 October, on which day they were yet again forced to pull back fromthe area. Ayn Diwar is located in Al-Malikiya district, close to Turkish border. COAR Global states that
the SDF had organised the local civilian population to block the Russian advance.1578
Turkey and affiliated armed groups
Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) and affiliated armed groups of the so-called ‘Syrian National Army’ (SNA)
control the territory roughly delimited by the Syrian–Turkish border in the north, the M4 highway inthe south, administrative border between Raqqa and Hasaka governorates in the west and the Khabur
river in the east. This area includes the town of Ras al-Ayn (Serê Kaniyê) and its surroundings.1579
According to Jusoor Center for Studies map of January 2021, Turkey has 4 military sites in this eastern
half of Operation Peace Spring area, all of them located in and around the town of Ras al-Ayn.1580
According to researcher Khayrallah al-Hilu, the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) are positioned in the townof Ras al-Ayn (two positions), in barracks, and in observation posts located along the M4 highway. In
addition, Turkish intelligence utilises the SNA to detect and suppress the opposition to Turkish rule inRas al-Ayn area and Turkey ‘relies’ on Syrian National Police and General Security forces operating in
the area.1581
The town of Ras al-Ayn, the main population centre of the eastern half of Operation Peace Spring area,
is controlled mainly by two Turkish-backed armed groups, Sultan Murad Division and Hamza Division,

depicting 13 such sites in different parts of the governorate. Jusoor for Studies, Map of Russia’s bases and posts in Syria[Map], 6 January 2021, url
1573 Jusoor for Studies, Map of Russia’s bases and posts in Syria [Map], 6 January 2021, url
1574 Kemal, L., Suriye'de YPG bölgesindeki Rus ve ABD üsleri sayıları [Map] [Twitter], 1 March 2021, url
1575 Balanche, F., The Assad Regime Has Failed to Restore Full Sovereignty Over Syria, The Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, 10 February 2021, url
1576 COAR, Self Administration bids to corner grain market as SYP collapses, 8 June 2020, url
1577 ISW, Syria Situation Report: May 27 - June 9, 2020, 11 June 2020, url
1578 COAR, Fire on the coast: Damascus vows support — but not much, 19 October 2020, url
1579 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/46/54], 21 January 2021 [published 18 February 2021], url, p. 31 [Annex II J] [Map]; Al-Hilu, K., The Turkish
Intervention in Northern Syria: One Strategy, Discrepant Policies, European University Institute, 14 January 2021 [firstpublished in Arabic on 21 December 2020], url, p. 3
1580 Jusoor for Studies, Map of the military bases and posts of foreign forces in Syria [Map], 6 January 2021, url
1581 Al-Hilu, K., The Turkish Intervention in Northern Syria: One Strategy, Discrepant Policies, European University Institute,
14 January 2021 [first published in Arabic on 21 December 2020], url, p. 4 [cf. map on p. 5]

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both operating under the official SNA umbrella. Other SNA groups are also present in the area.1582
According to al-Hilu, Turkey has placed the local administration in both Ras al-Ayn and Tall Abyad
under the administrative supervision of Şanlıurfa province.1583
ISIL
According to a May 2020 estimate by Aaron Y. Zelin, ISIL had conducted ‘numerous’ attacks in Hasaka
governorate during the preceding fourteen months.1584 (For further information, see Section ISIL’s
insurgency in Hasaka governorate). According to an analysis by Fabrice Balanche published in July
2020, ISIL has presence in southern parts of Hasaka governorate.1585
In the report published in November 2020, International Crisis Group assesses that ISIL has ‘residual’
presence in north-east Syria. While Crisis Group states that ISIL’s capabilities to launch attacks are still‘limited’, its fighters have the ability ‘to coalesce, set up checkpoints and extort protection moneyfrom local oil traders’ and ‘routinely threaten’ locals – including land and shop owners, factory
managers, doctors and others – in order to extort money (zakat) from those perceived to be wealthy
enough to pay.1586 However, although Crisis Group’s assessment covers the whole north-east Syria,
the types of incidents included in the assessment – e.g. the setting up of fake1587 checkpoints1588, thetargeting of oil traders1589 and the extortion of zakat from the local population1590 – have beenreported most notably in Deir Ez-Zor governorate (see Section ISIL’s insurgency in Deir Ez-Zor).

2.7.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population
The conflict between the SDF and the Turkish forces
According to the CoI, ‘periodic clashes’ involving the YPG, Turkish-backed armed groups (SNA) and theTurkish military continued to affect the security situation of north-east Syria in the first half of 2020
(11 January–1 July 2020).1591 According to the UN Security Council, during the reporting period
between February and March 2020, sources reported ‘intermittent artillery shelling and a limited
number of ground-based clashes’ in Ras al-Ayn and Tall Abyad frontlines.1592 The security situation
during the period between April and May 2020 was described in similar terms, affecting especially the1582 Al-Hilu, K.,The Turkish Intervention in Northern Syria: One Strategy, Discrepant Policies, European University Institute,

14 January 2021 [first published in Arabic on 21 December 2020], url, passim.; STJ, Syria: Crops Looted, Lands Seized in“Peace Spring” Territories, 11 March 2021, url, p. 41583 Al-Hilu, K., The Turkish Intervention in Northern Syria: On Strategy, Discrepant Policies, European University Institute, 14
January 2021, url, p. 3
1584 Zelin, A. Y. & Knights, M., The Islamic State's Resurgence in the COVID Era?, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
29 May 2020, url
1585 Balanche, F., The Fragile Status Quo in Northeast Syria, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1 July 2020, url[map]
1586 International Crisis Group, The SDF Seeks a Path Toward Durable Stability in North East Syria, 25 November 2020, url
1587 The term ‘fake checkpoint’ refers to checkpoints set up by ISIL but seemingly run by other armed actors, in this case,mainly the GoS or the SDF (drafters remark).
1588 Waters, G., Strengthening and Expanding: ISIS’ Central Syria Campaign, Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, 19
August 2020, url
1589 Haenni, P. & Guesnay, A.,., Surviving the Aftermath of Islamic State, EUI, 17 February 2020, url, p. 14
1590 Cockburn, P., After IS, LRB Vol. 43 No. 3, 4 February 2021, url; Al-Kanj, S., Islamic State regroups in Syrian Kurdish region,
Al Monitor, 9 November 2020, url
1591 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/45/31], 14 August 2020 [published 15 September 2020], url, p. 2
1592 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2020/327], 23 April
2020, url, p. 3 [para. 6]

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eastern and western ‘edges’ of the frontlines between the SDF-controlled Hasaka and Raqqa
governorates and the Operation Peace Spring area.1593
During the reporting period between June and July 2020, the UN Security Council reported ‘a risingnumber of cross-line attacks’ involving (Turkish-backed) ‘non-State armed groups’, the SDF and the
GoS forces along the Operation Peace Spring area’s frontlines. The attacks were described to affectespecially the ‘southern contact lines’ between Ras al-Ayn and Tall Abyad.1594 During this period,
security incidents were also reported along the Syrian-Turkish border. For example, ISW reported asuicide drone attack that was allegedly carried out by Turkish forces and targeted a meeting between
Russian forces and Kurdish Asayish in northern Hasaka governorate on 16 July 2020. At least two
Russian military police, two Asayish members and two others were injured in the incident.1595 USDOD
noted the clashes between GoS forces and Turkish-backed armed groups in areas bordering the
Operation Peace Spring area in Hasaka and Raqqa governorates between July and September 2020.1596
According to the UN Security Council, during the period between August and September, ‘several
cross-line attacks’ occurred in the southern frontlines of the Operation Peace Spring area, focusing
particularly around the town of Tal Tamr.1597 During the period between October and November 2020,
the UN Security Council reported an ‘increase in reports of mutual cross-line attacks’ and noted thatthe attacks were reported especially in the south-eastern frontlines (Tal Tamr) of the Operation Peace
Spring area.1598
According to an update by SOHR from 9 October 2020, 146 civilians, 510 SDF fighters, 279 Turkishbacked armed group fighters, 28 GoS soldiers and 10 Turkish soldiers had lost their lives as the resultof the Turkish incursion and the ensuing clashes along the Operation Peace Spring frontlines since
October 2019.1599 According to an analysis by Amy Austin Holmes (based on ACLED data) of October
2020, Turkey had violated the October 2019 ceasefire agreement, settling the frontlines of Operation
Peace Spring area, more than 800 times. In her analysis, Holmes focuses on the area of Tal Tamr,
mainly in control of SDF-affiliated Syriac and Assyrian armed groups, where the ceasefire agreement
had been violated 138 times.1600
According to REACH, in November 2020, north-east Syria ‘saw the most intense fighting since
February’ while ‘localized clashes’ broke out in the frontlines between the Operation Peace Springarea and the SDF-controlled parts of Hasaka and Raqqa governorates.1601 Starting from November
2020, clashes were reported especially in the frontlines near the town of Ayn Issa, in Raqqa
governorate. (For further information, see Section The conflict between the SDF and the Turkish forces(Ayn Issa frontline)). However, in November 2020, clashes were also reported in Ras al-Ayn and Tal
1593 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),

2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2020/576], 24 June
2020, url, p. 3 [para. 7]1594 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2020/813], 20 August 2020, url, p. 4 [para. 9]1595 ISW, Syria Situation Report: July 7 - 21, 2020, 23 July 2020, url
1596 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, July 1,2020–
September 30,2020,3 November 2020, url, p. 63
1597 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2020/1031], 14 October 2020, url, p. 3 [para. 8]1598 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2020/1195], 11 December 2020, url, p. 4 [para. 10]
1599 SOHR, “Peace Spring” a year on: A new map of influence…growing humanitarian disaster and continuous Turkish
violations, 9 October 2020, url
1600 Holmes, A. A., Despite Ceasefire Agreement, Turkey Implicated In More Than Eight Hundred Violations, Council on
Foreign Relations, 13 October 2020, url
1601 REACH, Humanitarian Situation Overview in Syria (HSOS): Northeast Syria, November 2020, 21 December 2020, url, p. 1

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Tamr areas.1602 According to Al-Monitor, in addition to strengthening their military positions in thefrontlines opposite Ayn Issa by setting up a new military base in Saida, the Turkish forces and Turkishbacked armed groups were also setting up military posts opposite Tal Tamr and Zirkan in lateNovember 2020.1603
According to ISW Syria Situation Report discussing the period between 16 December 20207 January 2021, Turkish forces’ escalating kinetic activity in the frontlines in Hasaka governorate
caused disturbance in the civilian life in the area.1604 According to the UN Security Council, ‘mutual
shelling and limited ground-based clashes’ were reported along the contact lines around Tall Tamer
and Abu Rasin between February and March 2021.1605 In March 2021, clashes between Turkish forces
and the SDF were reported also in northern Hasaka governorate. In early March, SOHR documented‘gunfire from Turkish territory’ targeting the Syrian border village of Shourk where both the SDF and
the GoS forces area reportedly positioned.1606 In late March 2021, renewed, intensive clashes between
the Turkish-backed armed groups and the SDF were reported in the vicinity of Tall Tamer.1607
According to the UN Security Council report of April 2020, the operations of Allouk water station were
cut several times in March 2020. The water station is located in eastern Operation Peace Spring area
and acts as the main source of water for approximately 460 000 people in Hasaka city, Al-Hol andArisha camps and other parts of SDF-controlled western Hasaka governorate.1608 During the reference
period for this report, several similar service cuts were reported. The UN Security Council reports
contain information on ‘multiple’ service cuts in April and May 20201609, ‘several’ disruptions between
June and July 20201610, ‘a two-week disruption’ that ended on 27 August 2020.1611 According to ISW,
Turkish forces and Turkish-backed armed groups utilised their control of the Allouk Water Station to
cut the water supply of Hasaka city and other areas in western Hasaka governorate on 5 July 2020.1612
According to Human Rights Watch, Turkish authorities had cut the operations of Allouk water station
multiple times since the beginning of 2020, failing ‘to ensure adequate water supplies to [SDFcontrolled] areas’ in Hasaka governorate and possibly ‘weaponising water’ in the context of theconflict between Turkey and the SDF.1613 In September 2020, OHCHR raised similar concerns about
Turkish-backed armed groups utilising water as a weapon.1614 According to the UN Security Council,
Allouk water station resumed its operations on 20 December 2020 (the duration of the preceding1602 Carter Center (The), Syria Weekly Conflict Summary 9-15 November 2020, 18 November 2020, url
1603 Tastekin, F., Is Turkey gearing up for military move against Syrian Kurds?, Al-Monitor, 25 November 2020, url
1604 ISW, Syria Situation Report: December 16, 2020 - January 7, 2021, 12 January 2021, url
1605 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),

2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2021/390], 22 April
2021, url, p. 3 [Para. 5]1606 SOHR, Al-Hasakah: Turkish forces attack border village, igniting popular anger, while Russian forces check the situation,
6 March 2021, url
1607 van Wilgenburg, W., Heavy fighting erupts near Tal Tamir in northern Syria, Kurdistan 24, 27 March 2021, url
1608 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2020/327], 23 April
2020, url, p. 18 [Annex]1609 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2020/576], 24 June
2020, url, p. 3 [para. 7]1610 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2020/813], 20 August 2020, url, p. 4 [para. 10]1611 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2020/1031], 14 October 2020, url, p. 3 [para. 10]1612 ISW, Syria Situation Report: June 24 - July 6, 2020, 9 July 2020, url
1613 HRW, Turkey/Syria: Weaponizing Water in Global Pandemic?, 31 March 2020, url
1614 OHCHR, Syria: Violations and abuses rife in areas under Turkish-affiliated armed groups – Bachelet, 18 September 2020,
url

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service cut is not mentioned in the report) only to have them cut again on 17 January and restored
once more on 23 January 2021.1615
SDF-affiliated Rojava Information Center (RIC) claims that arsons linked to hostilities between Turkey
and the SDF and targeting agricultural areas were carried out in different parts of north-east Syria in
May 2020.1616 According to a joint report by PAX for Peace and Syrians For Truth and Justice (STJ) of
August 2020, 436 882 acres of land burned in Hasaka governorate between 15 May and 25 July 2020.
Approximately 43 000 acres of this land were located along the front lines between the SDF-controlledareas and the Turkish-controlled Operation Peace Spring area, which is described as a ‘new pattern’when compared to similar crop fires in previous years.1617
According to PAX and STJ, the agricultural lands set aflame for several reasons: Some are set by
accident and some on purpose by the farmers themselves while others are set as ‘a side effect ofshelling and small-scale clashes occurring in the area’.1618 Both the SDF and the Turkish-backed armed
groups have been blamed for setting the fires on purpose, while in 2019 ISIL claimed responsibility forarsons targeting ‘apostates’ in both Syria and Iraq.1619 According to PAX and STJ, especially the Turkishbacked armed groups have utilised the threats of arson as a means to extort the farmers in theregion.1620
Human rights violations in Operation Peace Spring area (Ras al-Ayn)
Researcher Khayrallah al-Hilu describes the security situation in areas controlled by Turkey andaffiliated armed groups, including the Operation Peace Spring area, as ‘fragile’ and names two factors
affecting this assessment: the violations perpetrated by the Turkish-backed armed groups under the‘Syrian National Army’ (SNA) umbrella and the frequent security gaps, leading to armed
confrontations, bombings and assassinations, in particular areas.1621 The CoI reported a large numberof security incidents in the areas of Ras al-Ayn and Afrin in the first half of 2020 (11 January–
1 July 2020), including violations by Turkish-backed armed groups, shelling and attacks with vehicleborne improvised explosive devices (VBIED).1622
According to International Crisis Group article published in November 2020, there have been tens ofasymmetrical insurgent attacks in the Turkish-controlled Operation Peace Spring area since thebeginning of 2020. These attacks have originated from SDF-controlled areas, targeted Turkish-backed
armed groups and resulted in dozens of civilian casualties. Crisis Group estimates that the probabilityof ‘an escalatory cycle of violence, including potentially forceful Turkish military response, remains
high.’1623 According to a March 2020 update by the Carter Center, since October 2019, ‘explosive

1615 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),

2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2021/160], 18 February 2021, url, p. 4 [para. 11]
1616 Rojava Information Center, Annual Sleeper Cell Report for North and East Syria, January 2021, url, p. 41617 PAX/ STJ, Front Lines Aflame: Crop Fires Ravage Syria's Jazirah Region, Scorching Fields and Destroying Harvests, 24
August 2020, url, pp. 3, 37
1618 PAX/ STJ, Front Lines Aflame: Crop Fires Ravage Syria's Jazirah Region, Scorching Fields and Destroying Harvests, 24
August 2020, url, p. 31619 PAX/ STJ, Front Lines Aflame: Crop Fires Ravage Syria's Jazirah Region, Scorching Fields and Destroying Harvests, 24
August 2020, url, pp. 6-8
1620 PAX/ STJ, Front Lines Aflame: Crop Fires Ravage Syria's Jazirah Region, Scorching Fields and Destroying Harvests, 24
August 2020, url, p. 3
1621 Al-Hilu, K., The Turkish Intervention in Northern Syria: On Strategy, Discrepant Policies, European University Institute, 14
January 2021, url, p. 7
1622 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/45/31], 14 August 2020 [published 15 September 2020], url, p. 9 [para. 37]
1623 International Crisis Group, The SDF Seeks a Path Toward Durable Stability in North East Syria, 25 November 2020, url

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activity’ (e.g. IED’s) targeting Turkish forces and the Turkish-backed armed groups had concentratedin Ras al-Ayn and surrounding areas and in areas of Tall Abyad, Suluk and Hammam al-Turkman.1624
According to OMRAN, in the eastern parts of Operation Peace Spring area controlled byTurkey/Turkish-backed armed groups in Hasaka governorate, 28 assassinations or attacks with
explosives were reported between July 2019 and June 2020.1625 Of these attacks, 16 occurred between
January and June 2020. The attacks resulted in 170 casualties of whom 121 were civilians. OMRAN
notes that ‘civilian entities’ were targeted directly in 18 of the attacks.1626 The UN Security Council
notes that attacks within the Operation Peace Spring area, including attacks targeting civilians,
continued during the reporting period between August and September 2020. These attacks included
IED and VBIED attacks, as well as attacks conducted with small firearms.1627 According to ISW, the PKK
carried out IED attacks in Ras al-Ayn area (and other areas controlled by Turkey/Turkish-backed armed
groups) between 24 December 2020-6 January 2021 as a response to escalated clashes between
Turkey and the SDF in north-east Syria.1628
With regard to Ras al-Ayn, al-Hilu describes the violations perpetrated by Turkish-backed armed
groups as ‘abundant’ and security as ‘minimal’, with the armed groups in control of the area andwithout ties to the local community acting on the basis of their own discretion. This is explained by
the fact that, Sultan Murad Division and Hamza Division, the SNA formations most prevalent in thearea do not consist of locals but of fighters from other parts of Syria settled in the area with theirfamilies and with the blessing of Turkish authorities.1629 In contrast, violations have been rare in the
Arab towns of Al-Mabrukah and Suluk (latter in Raqqa governorate) where the SNA formation in
charge has tribal ties to the area and includes a significant number of local fighters.1630
According to a statement by the OHCHR from 18 September 2020, in the preceding months ‘analarming pattern’ of serious human rights violations, including ‘increased killings, kidnappings,
unlawful transfers of people, seizures of land and properties and forcible evictions’ had been reported
in the Operation Peace Spring area (in Ras al-Ayn and Tall Abyad areas) as well as in other parts ofTurkish-controlled northern Syria (Afrin in Aleppo governorate). These violations targeted people
considered as opponents and/or critics of the Turkish-backed armed groups as well as thoseconsidered affluent enough for ransom purposes. Women and children were also abducted anddisappeared. In addition, infighting between different armed groups subjected the civilian populationin these areas to indirect attacks leading to civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure.1631
Other types of serious human rights violations, e.g. torture and looting, by Turkish-backed armed werealso reported in Turkish-controlled northern Syria1632 and particularly in Operation Peace Springarea1633 during the reference period for this report.

1624 Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary: 9-15 March 2020, url, p. 41625 All the attacks were carried out with explosives: 18 with VBIED’s, 8 with landmines and 2 with IED’s. OMRAN Center for

Strategic Studies, Indicators of Security Stability in Syria and Refugee Return: An Evaluation of Select Cases, December 2020,
url, p. 53
1626 OMRAN Center for Strategic Studies, Indicators of Security Stability in Syria and Refugee Return: An Evaluation of SelectCases, December 2020, url, pp. 50–51
1627 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2020/1031], 14 October 2020, url, p. 3 [para. 8]
1628 ISW, Syria Situation Report: December 16, 2020 - January 7, 2021, 12 January 2021, url
1629 Al-Hilu, K., The Turkish Intervention in Northern Syria: On Strategy, Discrepant Policies, European University Institute, 14
January 2021, url, p. 71630 Al-Hilu, K., The Turkish Intervention in Northern Syria: On Strategy, Discrepant Policies, European University Institute, 14
January 2021, url, p. 81631 OHCHR, Syria: Violations and abuses rife in areas under Turkish-affiliated armed groups – Bachelet, 18 September 2020,
url
1632 USDOS, Syria 2020 Human Rights Report, 30 March 2021, url, p. 31633 SOHR, “Peace Spring” a year on: A new map of influence…growing humanitarian disaster and continuous Turkish
violations, 9 October 2020, url

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In the report published on 1 March 2021, the CoI notes the pattern of ‘arrests, beatings, kidnappings
and, on occasion, disappearances’, targeting mainly the returnees of Kurdish origin (and also women)that has been observed in Ras al-Ayn area after the Operation Peace Spring (although in a lesser scalethan in Afrin).1634 In addition, the CoI has observed ‘repeated patterns of systematic looting andproperty appropriation’ and ‘widespread arbitrary deprivation of liberty’ and holds various Turkishbacked armed groups responsible for these violations. Turkish-backed armed group members (andtheir families) have also taken control of the houses vacated by the fleeing residents and resorted into
various forms of coercion, including abductions, torture, and murder, to force some residents, mostof them ethnic Kurds, to flee their homes1635
The Carter Center reported on cases of looting in Operation Peace Spring area, and particularly in
Turkish-controlled parts of Hasaka governorate, during the first half of 2020.1636 In early April 2020,
infighting among Turkish-backed armed groups in Ras al-Ayn over rights to loot was also reported.
According to Carter Center this infighting was ‘a larger trend’ in Turkish-controlled areas.1637 According
to SOHR, the internal disputes between Turkish-backed armed groups in Operation Peace Spring area
intensified in the preceding few months (before the publication of SOHR’s October 2020 update)leading to infighting between the groups.1638 The CoI notes that the organisation received information
about the infighting between Turkish-backed armed groups in Ras al-Ayn in June 2020.1639 STJ reportof March 2021 contains information on 9 cases of crop looting and 3 cases of expropriation ofagricultural lands in Ras al-Ayn between April and June 2020, with cases of extorted land rent also
reported.1640
SOHR claims that human rights violations by Turkish-backed armed groups are connected to Turkish
policy of ‘demographic change’ in the Operation Peace Spring area.1641 The UN Security Council reportof June 2020, discussing the period between April and May 2020, notes the transfer of families of
Turkish-backed armed group fighters from Jarabulus area to Ras al-Ayn and Tall Abyad where thesefamilies took over the houses of civilians displaced from their homes.1642 According to al-Hilu, Turkey
has repopulated Ras al-Ayn with IDPs from other parts of Syria and with families of Turkmen fighters
deployed to the area. This demographic policy has been implemented at the expense of Ras al-Ayn’s
former inhabitants associated with the Autonomous Administration and forcibly displaced from thearea. Al-Hilu cites data according to which only 12 % of the population has returned to Ras al-Ayn withmost of the returnees being either members of the local Arab tribes or activists and other people
wanted by the SDF.1643 According to al-Hilu, Sultan Murad and Hamza Divisions have seizedapproximately 800 homes belonging to Kurds or Arabs associated with the Autonomous

1634 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/46/55], 11 March 2021 [published 1 March 2020], url, p. 13 [para. 38]
1635 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/45/31], 14 August 2020 [published 15 September 2020], url, pp. 10-11 [para. 46, 49 & 50]
1636 Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary: 9-15 March 2020, url, p. 4; Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary:
13-19 April 2020, url, p. 4; Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary: 15-21 June 2020, url, p. 6
1637 Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary: 6-12 April 2020, url, p. 5
1638 SOHR, “Peace Spring” a year on: A new map of influence…growing humanitarian disaster and continuous Turkish
violations, 9 October 2020, url
1639 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/45/31], 14 August 2020 [published 15 September 2020], url, p. 3 [para. 5]1640 STJ, Syria: Crops Looted, Lands Seized in “Peace Spring” Territories, 11 March 2021, url, p. 6
1641 SOHR, “Peace Spring” a year on: A new map of influence…growing humanitarian disaster and continuous Turkish
violations, 9 October 2020, url
1642 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2020/576], 24 June
2020, url, p. 6 [para. 18]1643 Al-Hilu, K., The Turkish Intervention in Northern Syria: On Strategy, Discrepant Policies, European University Institute, 14
January 2021, url, p. 9

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Administration.1644 Almost 2 000 families of SNA fighters have been settled to Ras al-Ayn from
northern Aleppo governorate.1645
According to the CoI, civilians making complaints to SNA leaders have faced threats, extortion,
detention and kidnappings for ransom at the hands of SNA members, with the CoI expressing concern
for ‘the prevalent and recurrent use of hostage-taking’ by Turkish-backed armed groups. In addition,
Turkish-backed armed groups have detained civilians, with the most frequent reason being supposed
links to the Autonomous Administration. While in detention, civilians have been subjected to beatings,
torture, deprivation of food and water. CoI notes that the detainees are mainly of Kurdish origin andthat both their faith and ethnicity have brought up during the interrogations, in some cases in thepresence of Turkish officials.1646 The CoI pays special attention to the fact that Turkish-backed armed
groups have allegedly detained at least 49 Kurdish and Yazidi women in the areas of Ras al-Ayn and
Afrin in the November 2019–July 2020 period. Women and girls residing in these areas have been
subjected to intimidation, detention, rape and sexual violence at the hands of SNA-members and they
have suffered psychological harm as a result of the stigma associated with the breach of ‘female
honor’. In addition, the CoI notes the allegations of abductions and forced marriages targeting Kurdish
women in these areas, with the members of Sultan Murad Brigade named as the main
perpetrators.1647
According to the CoI, Syrian nationals detained in Ras al-Ayn by Turkish-backed armed groups andindicted for crimes committed in the area have been transferred to Turkey in violation of Turkey’s
obligations as an occupying power in the Operation Peace Spring area.1648 In February 2021, Human
Rights Watch reported on at least 63 Syrian nationals detained by Turkish forces and Turkish-backed
armed groups between October and December 2019 in Ras al-Ayn and transferred to detention
facilities in Turkey. In Turkey, the detainees are facing charges under the Turkish Penal Code foralleged crimes committed in Syria.1649
With regard to violations reported specifically in Ras al-Ayn, the CoI names SNA’s Hamza Division as
the armed group responsible for ‘widespread and organized looting and property appropriation’.
Civilians from Ras al-Ayn, interviewed by the CoI, had fears about their ability to remain in the area or
to return from displacement into their looted homes. According to the CoI, civilian houses have been
appropriated also by the Turkish armed forces in Dawoudiya village, north of Tall Tamer, and utilised
thereafter for military purposes.1650 Concerning cases of arbitrary detention and torture, the CoI
discusses the case of two women detained at a jointly administered Turkish/SNA checkpoint in Ras alAyn area in November 2019 with one of the women threatened with rape and physically abused
during the interrogation.1651

1644 Al-Hilu, K., The Turkish Intervention in Northern Syria: On Strategy, Discrepant Policies, European University Institute, 14

January 2021, url, p. 71645 Al-Hilu, K., The Turkish Intervention in Northern Syria: On Strategy, Discrepant Policies, European University Institute, 14
January 2021, url, p. 91646 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/45/31], 14 August 2020 [published 15 September 2020], url, p. 12 [para. 52, 53 & 54]
1647 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/45/31], 14 August 2020 [published 15 September 2020], url, p. 13 [para. 56]
1648 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/45/31], 14 August 2020 [published 15 September 2020], url, p. 13 [para. 57]
1649 Human Rights Watch, Illegal Transfers of Syrians to Turkey, 3 February 2021, url
1650 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/45/31], 14 August 2020 [published 15 September 2020], url, pp. 11, 12 [para. 49, 50 & 51]
1651 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/45/31], 14 August 2020 [published 15 September 2020], url, p. 12 [para. 54]

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Tensions between the SDF and other actors in north-east Syria
According to the USDOD report discussing the period between January and March 2020, the local
communities in SDF-controlled areas face pressure from ‘state actors in the region’ to relinquish theirsupport to the SDF. The pressure is compounded by the ethnic rivalry between Arabs and Kurds,
communities’ sense of neglect and the allegations criticising the SDF’s repressive security
measures.1652 In the USDOD report discussing the period between April and June 2020, the GoS,
Russia, Turkey and Iran and affiliated militias are mentioned explicitly as the actors responsible forputting pressure on north-east Syria’s local Arab population.1653
According to USDOD, the GoS has exerted pressure on the populations of north-east Syria by holding
public tribal meetings to garner declarations of support, by conscripting or recruiting locals into progovernment forces, by proposing reconciliation arrangements and by threatening the population withviolence. Russia has exerted pressure by acting as a representative for the GoS, providing aid deliveries
and financial and economic incentives, deploying its military police and recruiting to Russian-backed
pro-government armed groups (also for the conflict in Libya). Iran, Hezbollah, and other Iranianbacked armed groups have exerted pressure by offering financial and economic incentives in exchange
for support or conversion to Shi’ism, by recruiting fighters to Iranian-backed groups and by deploying
these groups into local Arab community areas. Turkey has supported armed groups and tribal bodies
with ties to SDF-controlled areas, although USDOD estimates that these bodies have little sway overthe populations in SDF-held areas.1654
COAR Global speculates that the July 2020 oil deal between the Autonomous Administration and a
US-based company – and the concomitant strengthening of the US’ influence in north-east Syria –might be linked to the ‘increased protests, targeted assassinations, and politically-motivated violence’in the SDF-controlled areas that are ‘likely’ utilised by the GoS as a means to destabilize theAutonomous Administration.1655 According to an analysis by COAR Global from 31 August 2020, thesecurity incidents reported in north-east Syria ‘paint a picture of a region in which local parties to theconflict, regional actors, and international powers are all deploying increasingly hostile tactics to tip
the balance of power and secure parochial self-interest’.1656 These incidents include theconfrontations between the US and Russia (discussed below), the GoS attempts to exploit thegrievance of north-east Syria’s local Arab and tribal populations (discussed in the context of Deir EzZor governorate in Section Tribal protests in the SDF-controlled eastern Deir Ez-Zor), the (potentiallylinked) assassinations of local tribal notables and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army’s (SNA)
possible weaponisation of water targeting western Hasaka governorate (see above).
The tensions between the SDF and the GoS rose to prominence in late 2020/early 2021. According to
COAR Global, the SDF-affiliated Asayish detained three officers and dozens of other GoS forces’
members in Qamishli city on 10 January 2021. In addition, Asayish surrounded the GoS-controlled
Halko, Taye and Zanko neighbourhoods, blocking the movement of food and medicine. The blockade
led to protests in the GoS-controlled enclave and to similar blockade enforced by the GoS forces andtargeting the PYD/YPG-controlled Shaykh Maqsoud neighbourhood in Aleppo city. On
17 January 2021 the confrontation between the SDF and the GoS expanded to Hasaka city, where the
SDF enforced a blockade targeting the GoS-controlled enclave in the city. In addition, the SDF
presented the GoS with an ultimatum, requesting the withdrawal of the GoS forces from both cities
before 20 January 2021. COAR Global notes that the confrontation escalated a week after detention
1652 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, January 1,2020–

March 31,2020, 13 May 2020, url, p. 55
1653 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, April 1,2020–June
30,2020, 4 August 2020, url, p. 54
1654 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, April 1,2020–June
30,2020, 4 August 2020, url, p. 55
1655 COAR, Cry Havoc: Assassinations Spark Anti-SDF Backlash, 17 August 2020, url
1656 COAR, Self-Administration steps back from negotiations, as attacks step up across the northeast, 31 August 2020, url

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situationof civilian employees of the Autonomous Administration by the GoS Airforce Intelligence andreciprocal arrests by the Asayish targeting the GoS.1657
The blockades continued at the end of January 2021. The later half of the month saw more protests
in GoS-held enclaves in Hasaka and Qamishli, attended by local tribal figures. According to local media
sources, cited by COAR Global, Russian forces deployed additional troops to Qamishli airport on
23 January 2021, likely in order to put pressure on the SDF.1658 According to the UN Security Council,
the tensions between the GoS and the SDF also led to ‘mutual detention incidents, the arrest of
government forces and the prevention of government employees from accessing theirworkplaces’.1659 According to Wladimir van Wilgenburg, reporting for Kurdistan 24, NDF fightersattacked an Asayish checkpoint in Qamishli’s Halko neighbourhood on 23 January 2021. One NDF
fighter was killed in the attack. Wilgenburg describes the incident as an illustration of increasing
tensions between the GoS and the SDF in the city.1660 On 30 January 2021, NDF fighters attacked an
Asayish checkpoint in Marsho neighbourhood in Hasaka city. One person was killed and three others
were wounded in the incident that took place after the protests against the Asayish-enforced blockadeon the GoS enclave in the city.1661
The mediation by Russia led to the de-escalation of the confrontation on 2 February 2021.1662
According to COAR Global the blockades were partially lifted, allowing the movement of some goods,
including food and fuel.1663 According to the UN Security Council report of February 2021, the security
situation in the area ‘remained tense’.1664 In a April 2021 report, discussing the situation in Syria in
February and March 2021, the UN Security Council notes that ‘some de-escalation of tensions’ hadtaken place between the GoS and the SDF. However, it is also stated that the ‘security posture of bothparties remained heightened’ and that ‘sporadic confrontations and mutual detentions’ werereported.1665
According to an analysis by COAR Global, SDF-affiliated Asayish arrested six teachers in Darbasiyah,
northern Hasaka governorate on 20 January 2021 after they had been exposed for organising private
lessons following the GoS curriculum. The arrests led to protests organised by teachers and students
which were dispersed by the Asayish and led to more arrests.1666 Wilgenburg reports that the raids
took place on 19 January and that, all in all, seven teachers were arrested.1667 The UN Security Council
report of February 2021 notes that the SDF-affiliated authorities released the arrested teachers andstudents ‘after several days’, with only one teacher still in custody.1668

1657 COAR, Quamishli Clashes: GoS and SDF Seek Pressure Points, 18 January 2021, url
1658 COAR, Double Trouble: Southern Syria Erupts on Two Fronts, 1 February 2021, url
1659 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),

2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2021/160], 18 February 2021, url, p. 4 [para. 10]1660 van Wilgenburg, W., Syrian government troops attack Kurdish forces in Qamishlo, Kurdistan 24, 23 January 2021, url
1661 van Wilgenburg, W., Syrian regime-aligned militia, Kurdish-led forces clash in Hasakah; casualties reported, Kurdistan 24,
31 January 2021, url
1662 COAR, Sweeping Real Estate Sales Tax Reform Discussed, 8 February 2021, url; van Wilgenburg, W., Kurdish-led
authorities in Syria reach deal with Damascus to lower tensions, Kurdistan 24, 2 February 2021, url
1663 COAR, Sweeping Real Estate Sales Tax Reform Discussed, 8 February 2021, url
1664 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2021/160], 18 February 2021, url, p. 12 [para. 41]
1665 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2021/390], 22 April
2021, url, p. 3 [Para. 5]
1666 COAR, Double Trouble: Southern Syria Erupts on Two Fronts, 1 February 2021, url
1667 van Wilgenburg, W., Disputes, arrests over school curriculum in northeastern Syria, Kurdistan 24, 29 January 2021, url
1668 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2021/160], 18 February 2021, url, p. 6 [para. 23]

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Tensions between the US-led Coalition and Russia
According to the USDOD report published in November 2020, tensions between US-led Coalition andRussian forces increased in August with Russian forces increasing their encroachments into
SDF/Coalition-controlled areas, possibly as the result of oil deal made between the Autonomous
Administration and a US based oil company in late July 2020. The majority of these incidents occurred‘in or around the north-eastern Qamishli deconfliction zone’ with ‘Russian forces routinely enter[ing]the Coalition areas south of the deconfliction zone’ both on the ground and in the air.1669
On 25 August 2020, as a result of confrontation between US and Russian forces, a Russian military
vehicle hit an American military vehicle on purpose near Al-Malikiya.1670 Several US soldiers were
injured in the incident.1671 COAR Global connects the incident to tensions caused by the oil deal
between the Autonomous Administration and an US based oil company.1672 According to information
provided by CJTF-OIR, in addition to Russia, also the GoS forces were trying to increase their presencein Hasaka governorate.1673 According to USDoD, on 17 August 2020, the expansion of GoS presence inHasaka governorate led to an attack by GoS forces targeting US-led Coalition forces at a GoS
checkpoint.1674 According to ISW the incident involved also the SDF and took place in Tall al-Zahab.1675
One1676 or two1677 GoS soldiers were killed in the incident.
The USDOD report for February 2021 notes that the tensions between the US-led Coalition andRussian forces in north-east Syria decreased during the last three months of 2020, along with theRussian military activity. Between October and December 2020, the Russian forces were still
attempting to erect military posts near Malikiya and operating near Rmeila and Qahtaniya where theAugust 2020 confrontation took place, although their attempts to gain a foothold in the oilfields had
decreased.1678 However, the operation environment for US-led Coalition in north-east Syria remained‘complex’ due to the presence of Russian and GoS forces in the area.1679
Opposition to the SDF’s rule
According to an assessment by United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) and USDOS, cited in
the USDOD report of August 2020, the power-sharing arrangement between ethnic Kurds and Arabs
in the SDF-controlled North-East Syria is ‘imbalanced’ and encumbered by the enduring rivalries
between different Arab tribes.1680 The efforts by the SDF and the SDC to include Arab leaders havebeen limited. Local Arabs involved in SDF-affiliated military and civilian institutions ‘lack equal

1669 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, July 1,2020–

September 30,2020,3 November 2020, url, p. 60
1670 COAR, Self-Administration steps back from negotiations, as attacks step up across the northeast, 31 August 2020, url;
ISW, Syria Situation Report: August 19 - September 1, 2020, 4 September 2020, url
1671 COAR, Self-Administration steps back from negotiations, as attacks step up across the northeast, 31 August 2020, url;
ISW, Syria Situation Report: August 19 - September 1, 2020, 4 September 2020, url; USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve:
Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, July 1,2020–September 30,2020, 3 November 2020, url p. 61
1672 COAR, Self-Administration steps back from negotiations, as attacks step up across the northeast, 31 August 2020, url
1673 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, July 1,2020–
September 30,2020,3 November 2020, url p. 61
1674 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, July 1,2020–
September 30,2020, 3 November 2020, url p. 61
1675 ISW, Syria Situation Report: August 5 - 18, 2020, 20 August 2020, url
1676 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, July 1,2020–
September 30,2020, 3 November 2020, url p. 61
1677 ISW, Syria Situation Report: August 5 - 18, 2020, 20 August 2020, url
1678 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress October 1,2020–
December 31,2020, 9 February 2021, url, p. 60
1679 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress October 1,2020–
December 31,2020, 9 February 2021, url, p. 121680 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, April 1,2020–June
30,2020, 4 August 2020, url, p. 54

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situationinfluence and feel excluded from military and political decision-making processes’. Among the Arableaders involved, ‘decision-making authority is disproportionately concentrated in the hands of a small
number of individuals’ closely associated with the PYD.1681 A field study published by UNESCWA in
March 2021 describes this power-sharing arrangement as ‘one of the main grievances’, especiallyamong north-east Syria’s Arab population, and describes the sense of ‘overall disproportionately low
Arab participation in Kurdish-led governance and military structures’ and of the leading role of PKKtrained Kurds (the ‘cadres’, discussed further in Section 1.4.3 Syrian Democratic Forces) as its main
sources.1682
According to the CoI report discussing the first half of 2020, the SDF and associated actors detained
civilians and subjected them to torture and kept resorting to practice of using children in militaryroles.1683 The CoI notes eight cases where civilians, including ‘civil society workers, political activists
and persons of Arab ethnicity’, had been arbitrarily detained by the SDF and the YPG in thegovernorates of Hasaka and Raqqa. These civilians were held in SDF intelligence facilities or prisonsand their legal safeguards as detainees had been violated. The CoI also discusses two cases of tortureand ill-treatment, both from Hasaka governorate. First involved a member of an Arab tribe taken into
custody by the SDF military intelligence for supposedly collaborating with Turkey, held
incommunicado in different facilities between March 2019–March 2020 and subjected to solitaryconfinement, deprivation of food and water and methodological physical abuse by the SDF. Second
involved a political activist taken into SDF custody in November 2019 and subjected to solitaryconfinement, methodically administered physical abuse and torture during the detention.1684
In 2020, the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the Kurdish National Council (KNC) continued their socalled ‘unity talks’ in order to create a joint governing body1685 and potentially a wider ‘power-sharing
framework’1686 According to The Washington Institute’s Sirwan Kajjo, the central security related
disagreements between the PYD and the KNC are related to the forced military conscription by the
SDF and to the role of the Rojava Peshmerga, a competing KDP-backed armed force with 8 000 fighterscurrently based in the KRG.1687 Other security related contentious issues include the Autonomous
Administration’s need to distance itself from the PKK and to expel from its ranks the PKK’s non-Syrian‘cadres’1688, who have played a central role in its civilian and military institutions. At the end of thereference period, the ‘unity talks’ had stalled.1689
The Al-Monitor article published in December 2020 claims that the PKK is ‘likely signaling displeasure’
towards the ‘unity talks’ by resisting the efforts of the SDF commander-in-chief Mazlum Kobane toend child recruitment in the SDF-controlled areas. According to Al-Monitor, the PKK-affiliated
Revolutionary Youth (Ciwanen Soresger) has resumed the recruitment of minors in the SDF-controlledareas and targeted their parents with ‘threats and intimidation’.1690 According to COAR Global, armed
1681 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, April 1,2020–June

30,2020, 4 August 2020, url, p. 54
1682 Megally, H. & El-Gamal, J. M., Preventing the Reemergence of Violent Extremism in Northeast Syria, UNESCWA & CIC,
March 2021, url, pp. 21–22
1683 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/45/31], 14 August 2020 [published 15 September 2020], url, p. 151684 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/45/31], 14 August 2020 [published 15 September 2020], url, p. 161685 Kajjo, S., Prospects for Syrian Kurdish Unity, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 2020, url, p. 2,
passim.; Netjes, R. & Hauch, L., The Gordian knot of Kurdish unity talks in Syria, The Atlantic Council, 22 September 2020, url
1686 COAR, PYD-KNC peace talks: Whither peace in Syria’s northeast?, 28 September 2020, url
1687 Kajjo, S., Prospects for Syrian Kurdish Unity, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 2020, url, pp. 5-6
1688 COAR, PYD-KNC peace talks: Whither peace in Syria’s northeast?, 28 September 2020, url; Netjes, R. & Hauch, L., The
Gordian knot of Kurdish unity talks in Syria, The Atlantic Council, 22 September 2020, url
1689 Dri, K. F., Rojava parties blame each other for stalled unity talks, Rudaw, 1 April 2021, url; van Wilgenburg, W., US readyto facilitate return to contentious Syrian Kurdish dialogue: Envoy, Kurdistan 24, 29 March 2021, url
1690 Zaman, A. & Wilkofsky, D., Child recruitment casts shadow over Syrian Kurds’ push for global legitimacy, Al-Monitor, 7
December 2020, url

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situationindividuals likely associated with the PKK ‘attacked the offices of rival local Kurdish political parties’on 16 December 2020 in the cities of Amuda, Darbasiyah, Hasaka and Ayn al-Arab (Kobane). COAR
Global estimates that the attack was linked to the clash between the YPG and the Iraqi Peshmerga in
Fish Khabur/ Semalka border crossing on 15 December 2020.1691
During the reference period for this report, protests against the SDF and the affiliated civil
administration, reported especially in SDF-controlled Deir Ez-Zor governorate (see Section Tribal
protests in the SDF-controlled eastern Deir Ez-Zor), were reported also in Hasaka governorate.1692
ISIL’s insurgency in Hasaka governorate
According to Rojava Information Center (RIC), affiliated to the Autonomous Administration, 572
attacks, presumably carried out by ISIL, were reported in the SDF-controlled North-East Syria in 2020.
All in all, 299 people were reportedly killed in these attacks. The authorities conducted 221 security
operations targeting ISIL sleeper cells and 575 arrests targeting allegedly ISIL-affiliated individuals. The
wide majority of the attacks were carried out in eastern Deir Ez-Zor governorate, with only 134 attacks
reported in other parts of the SDF-controlled areas (for monthly figures, see Section ISIL’s insurgency
in Deir Ez-Zor).1693 According to RIC, in 2020, ISIL ‘switched tactics’ and focused on the assassination
campaign of ‘high valued targets’, i.e. local civilian and military leaders, instead of engaging in direct
clashes with the SDF (and other forces) at security checkpoints or military bases. As in the previous
year, ISIL also utilised IED’s and VBIED’s in its attacks.1694
According to information by USCENTCOM, cited in the USDOD report of May 2020, ISIL attacks in
Hasaka governorate decreased 80 % between January and March 2020 when compared to theprevious quarter.1695 Between April and June 2020, the US Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) did notobserve any increase in ISIL’s activities in Hasaka governorate.1696 According to RIC, in February 2020,
ISIL carried out 61 attacks in SDF-controlled North-East Syria. Only 4 of these were carried out inHasaka governorate, while no attacks were reported in ‘any of the northern Kurdish cities along theborder’.1697 However, according to the August 2020 report by the CoI, attacks by ISIL targeting the USled international coalition and the SDF in Hasaka governorate increased in the first half of 2020
(11 January-1 July 2020).1698 According to a 29 May 2020 assessment by Aaron Zelin, ISIL had
conducted 153 attacks in Hasaka governorate in the last 14 months.1699
According to the OMRAN Center for Strategic Studies, 11 assassinations or attacks with explosives
occurred in the SDF-controlled parts of Hasaka governorate in in the period between January and June
2020. None of these attacks took place in January, while 21700 attacks were reported in February, 1 in

1691 COAR, Need for seed: Damascus increasingly desperate for wheat, 21 December 2020, url
1692 Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary: 8-14 June 2020, url, p. 5; Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary:

22-28 June 2020, url, p. 5; Carter Center (The), Syria Weekly Conflict Summary 1 - 7 February 2021, 10 February 2021, url
1693 Rojava Information Center, Annual Sleeper Cell Report for North and East Syria, January 2021, url, p. 21694 Rojava Information Center, Annual Sleeper Cell Report for North and East Syria, January 2021, url, p. 31695 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, January 1,2020–
March 31,2020, 13 May 2020, url, p. 51
1696 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, April 1,2020–June
30,2020, 4 August 2020, url, p. 27
1697 Rojava Information Center, Annual Sleeper Cell Report for North and East Syria, January 2021, url, p. 3, 7
1698 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/45/31], 14 August 2020 [published 15 September 2020], url, p. 15 [para. 70]
1699 Zelin, A. Y. & Knights, M., The Islamic State's Resurgence in the COVID Era?, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
29 May 2020, url
1700 With regard to February 2020, the OMRAN report contains conflicting information on the number of incidents, witheither 1 or 2 incidents reported. Since the latter number is used by OMRAN to calculate the overall number of incidents
between July 2019–June 2020, this number is used here as well. See OMRAN Center for Strategic Studies, Indicators of
Security Stability in Syria and Refugee Return: An Evaluation of Select Cases, December 2020, url, p. 19

176

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

March, 1 in April, 5 in May, and 2 in June.1701 Between July 2019 and June 2020, all in all 50 attacks
were reported, including 26 attacks with explosives and 24 assassinations and resulting in 221
casualties. 152 of the reported casualties were civilians who were directly targeted in 22 of theattacks.1702 OMRAN states that the number of VBIED’s (22) reported in Hasaka governorate during theperiod between July 2019 and June 2020 demonstrated the ‘fragility’ of Autonomous Administration’s
security structure when it comes to preventing these attacks. OMRAN estimates that these attacks
were carried out by ISIL sleeper cells and actors associated with the GoS/Iran and hostile towards the
SDF and the YPG.1703
According to USDOD, ISIL continued its operations in Hasaka governorate between July and
September 2020, although in a less active manner than in Deir Ez-Zor or Homs. In late August, ISIL
assassinated 4 members of local SDF-affiliated militia in the southern Hasaka province which showedthat it was still capable in conducting operations in the governorate.1704 According to RIC, ISIL carriedout 45 attacks in the SDF-controlled North-East Syria in October 20201705, of which 7 took place inHasaka governorate.1706 According to journalist Zain al-Abidin, interviewed for the Al-Monitor article
published in November 2020, ISIL has targeted the SDF in the ‘area between southern Raqqa andsouth-eastern countryside of Hasaka[ governorate]’. According to al-Abidin, ISIL has ‘constantly’
targeted SDF patrols along the Kharafi road, linking the governorates of Deir Ez-Zor and Hasaka.1707
The UN Security Council report of April 2021, discussing the situation in Syria in February and March
2021, notes that ISIL continued to target the GoS forces and the SDF with ambushes and assassination
attempts also in Hasaka governorate.1708 According to the USDOD, ISIL’s ‘small-scale IED and hit-andrun attacks’ and assassinations continued in Syria in the period between January and March 20211709,
with assassinations targeting ‘tribal and civic leaders and other influential figures’ also in SDFcontrolled parts of Hasaka governorate.1710 USDOD notes that both members of security forces andcivilians were targeted by these assassinations.1711
The security situation in Al-Hol Camp
According to the UN Security Council report of February 2021, approximately 61 800 suspected ISIL
family members are still residing in Al-Hol Camp, 94 % of whom are women and children, of which

1701 OMRAN Center for Strategic Studies, Indicators of Security Stability in Syria and Refugee Return: An Evaluation of SelectCases, December 2020, url, pp. 16–19
1702 OMRAN Center for Strategic Studies, Indicators of Security Stability in Syria and Refugee Return: An Evaluation of SelectCases, December 2020, url, p. 19
1703 OMRAN Center for Strategic Studies, Indicators of Security Stability in Syria and Refugee Return: An Evaluation of SelectCases, December 2020, url, pp. 23, 27
1704 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, July 1,2020–
September 30,2020,3 November 2020, url pp. 23, 24.
1705 Rojava Information Center, Annual Sleeper Cell Report for North and East Syria, January 2021, url, p. 71706 Rojava Information Center, Annual Sleeper Cell Report for North and East Syria, January 2021, url, p. 61707 Al-Kanj, S., Islamic State regroups in Syrian Kurdish region, Al-Monitor, 9 November 2020, url
1708 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2021/390], 22 April
2021, url, p. 3 [Para. 6]1709 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, January 1,2021–
March 31,2021, 4 May 2021, url, p. 2
1710 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, January 1,2021–
March 31,2021, 4 May 2021, url, p. 16
1711 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, January 1,2021–
March 31,2021, 4 May 2021, url, p. 62

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

53 % are younger than 12 years of age.1712 In 2020, attacks1713 targeting the SDF-affiliated camp guards
and an increase in violent incidents in the camp were reported.1714
According to an analysis by COAR Global, the security situation on Al-Hol Camp worsened in January
2021, with 12 residents killed in the first 16 days of the month. COAR Global estimates that probably
the most significant factor weakening the conditions in the camp is the ‘inability of the camp
management to limit or mitigate residents’ exposure to radical ideology.1715 According to RIC, in
January 2021, 20 people were killed, 10 of them beheaded, in Al Hol camp in January 2021. 1716
According to the UN Security Council, the UN had received information on at least 14 killings in the
period between 1 and 28 January 2021.1717
In February 2021 all in all 19 deaths were recorded: 9 people were assassinated, including a memberof the SDF, and 9 people killed because of a fire.1718 In addition, a MSF-worker was killed by unknown
actors, which resulted in MSF halting temporarily its operations in the camp.1719 According to RIC, the‘trend of attacks’ by ISIL-affiliates in Al-Hol began in September 2020, when 6 attacks in the camp werereported.1720
According to the UN Security Council report of April 2021, discussing the situation in Syria in February
and March 2021, at least 42 residents of Al-Hol camp had been killed in 2021.1721 Late March 2021,
the SDF responded to the rising levels of violence by launching an anti-ISIL security operation inside
Al-Hol Camp with the support of US-led Coalition.1722 The security operation was concluded on
1 April 2021, with 125 camp residents detained as the result of the operation.1723
Security incidents
According to ACLED data, there were 1 251 security incidents recorded in Hasaka governorate, ofwhom 369 were coded as battles, 506 explosions/remote violence and 374 incidents of violenceagainst civilians. Higher levels of security incidents were recoded between September 2020 and
February 2021 (see Figure 31).1724

1712 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),

2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2021/160], 18 February 2021, url, p. 4 [para. 12]
1713 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, January 1,2020–
March 31,2020, 13 May 2020, url, p. 53
1714 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2020/1031], 14 October 2020, url, p. 41715 COAR, Double Trouble: Southern Syria Erupts on Two Fronts, 1 February 2021, url
1716 Rojava Information Center, Report: High Value Arrest and High Profile Assassinations Kick Off New Year, 7 February 2021,
url
1717 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2021/160], 18 February 2021, url, p. 4 [para. 12]
1718 Rojava Information Center, Report: High Arrests from SDF and Al Hol Murders Continue in February, 7 March 2021, url
1719 MSF, MSF denounces unsafe environment in Al-Hol camp in wake of staff killing, 2 March 2021, url
1720 Rojava Information Center, Annual Sleeper Ccell Report for North and East Syria, January 2021, url, p. 51721 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2021/390], 22 April
2021, url, p. 3 [Para. 7]1722 BBC News, Kurdish-led campaign under way to rid al-Hol camp of IS, 28 March 2021, url; Kajjo S. & Omer, Z., US-Backed
Syrian Forces Launch Anti-IS Campaign in al-Hol Camp, VOA, 29 March 2021, url
1723 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2021/390], 22 April
2021, url, p. 3 [Para. 7]1724 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (9 April 2021), url

178

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Figure 31. Evolution of security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in Hasaka
governorate in between 1 January 2020 and 31 March 2021, based on ACLED data1725

Security incidents were recorded in all Hasaka governorate districts during the reporting period.
However, significant with higher number of overall incidents being recorded in Hasaka (683) and Ras
Al Ain (434) districts (see Figure 32).1726
Hasaka governorate – Security incidents
RemoteViolence against
District
Battlesviolence
civilians
264
198
223
Hasaka14
3
18
Malikeyyeh
43
28
26
Qamishli
55
140
239
Ras Al Ain
374
369
506
Total
Figure 32. Civilian fatalities as a result of armed conflict in Hasaka governorate in 2020 and first three months of 2021.
Monthly breakdown based on VDC and SNHR data

Illustrative security incidents
•

•
•
•

On 6 March 2020, a VBIED attack targeted Turkish forces positioned in Hammam alTurkman1727, south of Tall Abyad. The attack targeted a joint checkpoint of TAF/Turkishbacked armed groups. Two Turkish soldiers and two SNA-members were killed and one soldier
injured.1728
On 16 March 2020, a VBIED exploded in Shaddadi city, injuring at least two civilians.1729
On 4 April 2020, a member of SDF-affiliated Asayish was killed in a clash with the NDF thattook place in an NDF-run checkpoint. One civilian was also killed in the incident.1730
On 2 May 2020, pro-GoS armed forces looted civilian properties in Abu Rasin and Tall
Tamer.1731

1725 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (9 April 2021), url
1726 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (9 April 2021), url
1727 Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary: 2-9 March 2020, url, p. 41728 Al-Ali, Z., Turkish soldiers killed in a car explosion south of Tal Abyad, NPA, 6 March 2020, url
1729 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),

2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2020/327], 23 April
2020, url, p. 19 [Annex]
1730 Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary: 30 March-5 April 2020, url, p. 51731 Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary: 27 April-3 May 2020, url, p. 5

179

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•

On 17 May 2020, exchange of small arms fire erupted between armed groups near Makran
village. One civilian was killed and another injured.1732
On 4 June 2020, the SDF fired into the air in order to break a peaceful protest in Shaddadi city,in the rural areas of southern Hasaka governorate, killing one civilian and wounding threeothers in the altercation.1733
On 5 June, a VBIED exploded in Ras al-Ayn city killing one child and wounding seven othercivilians.1734
On 6 June 2020, a VBIED exploded in the Ghanam livestock market in the town of Tall Halaf,
located in Ras al-Ayn area, killing four civilians and wounding four others.1735
On 23 June 2020, a VBIED exploded in a market in the town of Tall Halaf, located in Ras al-Ayn
area, killing five civilians and wounding 18 others.1736
On 3 July 2020, an exchange of machine gun and RPG fire broke out between armed groups
in Ras al-Ayn city, killing a child and wounding six other civilians.1737
On 11 August 2020, the UN Security Council noted an unspecified incident that led to ‘acivilian man’ getting killed at a checkpoint located near the town of Qahtaniya, in the rural
areas of northern Hasaka governorate.1738 According to United States Institute of Peace (USIP),
Qahtaniya area has been marked with tensions that have affected especially those more than
100 displaced families, who are ‘mostly Kurds not aligned with the dominant politicalparties’.1739
On 24 September 2020, a suspected VBIED exploded in the town of Tall Halaf, in Ras al-Ayn
area, wounding at least one civilian. Roughly an hour later another suspected VBIED explodedin the town killing two civilians and wounding six others.1740
On 1 November, the leader of Deir Ez-Zor Military Council Abu Khawla survived anassassination attempt in Hasaka city. On that same day, an Asayish commander was
assassinated in Markadah, in southern Hasaka governorate.1741
On 3 November 2020, the SDF arrested a Tayy tribe spokesman in Qamishli city, presumably
as a reaction to the tribe’s support for the presence of Turkish forces in areas surrounding thecity.1742 On 15 November, Tayy tribal leaders held a gathering in Jormuz area, declared their

1732 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),

2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2020/576], 24 June
2020, url, p. 18 [Annex]1733 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2020/813], 20 August 2020, url, p. 20 [Annex]1734 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2020/813], 20 August 2020, url, p. 20 [Annex]1735 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2020/813], 20 August 2020, url, p. 20 [Annex]1736 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2020/813], 20 August 2020, url, pp. 20–21 [Annex]
1737 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2020/813], 20 August 2020, url, p. 21 [Annex]1738 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2020/1031], 14 October 2020, url, p. 17 [Annex]1739 USIP, The Current Situation in Syria, 26 August 2020, url
1740 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2020/1031], 14 October 2020, url, p. 17 [Annex]
1741 ISW, Syria Situation Report: October 28 - November 10, 2020, 13 November 2020, url
1742 ISW, Syria Situation Report: October 28 - November 10, 2020, 13 November 2020, url

180Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

•
•
•

•

support for President Bashar al-Assad, the SAA and Russia and called for Arab tribes to expel
the SDF, US forces and Turkey from north-east Syria.1743
On 27 November 2020, a VBIED claimed the lives of three SNA fighters and injured four others
in a Turkish-backed armed group checkpoint in Mabrouka, in the eastern part of Operation
Peace Spring area. ISW estimates that the attack was carried out either by ISIL or the PKK.1744
On 2 January 2021, a VBIED exploded and killed two children and wounded one other civilian
in Ras al-Ayn.1745
On 22 January 2021, two female employees of local civil administration were abducted andbeheaded in the countryside of Shaddadi, in southern Hasaka governorate.1746 According to
Wladimir van Wilgenburg, reporting for Kurdistan 24, the victims’ bodies were discovered in
al-Dashisha, which is described by a local researcher as a ‘well-known’ ISL headquarters in
Hasaka governorate.1747 The killing of ‘the head of a local council and her deputy’ was also
noted by the UN Security Council.1748
On 25 February 2021, a VBIED exploded in Faruj market in Ras al-Ayn city, killing five civilians
and injuring one.1749

Civilian fatalities
Month
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
AugustSeptember
OctoberNovember
December
Total

VDC 2020
5
10
5
6
9
14
23
14
11
13
12
3
125

SNHR 2020
7
6
11
9
6
10
14
17
15
7
7
8
117

VDC 2021
1824
14

SNHR 2021
25
17
31

56

73

Figure 33. Civilian fatalities as a result of armed conflict in Hasaka governorate in 2020 and first three months of 2021.
Monthly breakdown based on VDC and SNHR data

1743 ISW, Syria Situation Report: November 11-December 1, 2020, 3 December 2020, url
1744 ISW, Syria Situation Report: November 11-December 1, 2020, 3 December 2020, url
1745 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),

2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2021/160], 18 February 2021, url, p. 18 [Annex]
1746 NPA, Women’s Board in AANES condemns beheading of two female civil employees, 24 January 2021, url
1747 van Wilgenburg, W., Two local female politicians abducted and killed in northeast Syria, Kurdistan 24, 24 January 2021,
url
1748 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2021/160], 18 February 2021, url, p. 5 [para. 20]
1749 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2021/390], 22 April
2021, url, p. 18 [Annex]

181Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

In 2020, Hasaka had between 1171750 (SNHR data)1751 and 125 civilian fatalities (VDC data).1752 Most
civilian fatalities were documented between July and September 2020. In the first three months of2021, SNHR recorded 56 civilian fatalities in Hasaka, while VDC recorded 73 civilian fatalities (seeFigure 33).
Infrastructure damage and explosives remnants of war
UNESCWA estimates the cost of physical capital loss of Hasaka governorate between 2011-2018
around USD 1.3 billion (1.6 % of all the damage inflicted on Syrian physical capital) and states that
there have been only ‘minimal and isolated episodes of conflict’ in the governorate under firm controlof the Kurdish forces.1753
According to Mine Action Review’s 2020 report on mine clearance, the retreating ‘Islamic State’fighters ‘left massive contamination of mines of an improvised nature and other improvised devices’
causing heavy damage to the returning civilians in areas under ISIL’s former influence in Hasaka
governorate.1754 Mine Action Review notes that international and national demining organisations
have taken part in demining activities in areas under SDF control in north-east Syria. Humanitarian
demining organisations and commercial companies have reportedly carried out ‘large-scale clearance’in former ISIL areas with a company called Tetra Tech operating in Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor and Baghuz andfocusing on critical infrastructure (healthcare, schools, water and electricity).1755
Mine Action Review’s 2020 report describes the ‘safe zone’, established during Turkey’s Operation
Peace Spring in October 2019 and covering parts of northern Hasaka and Raqqa governorates, as‘heavily contaminated by mines and improvised devices’.1756 The report adds that, according tohumanitarian organisations, the contamination of the Operation Peace Spring area has led to civilian
casualties.1757 The report notes that Turkey has cleared mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
in the area1758, although it has not provided details of the mine clearing operations (to the monitoringorganisations).1759

1750 In a January 2021 report, SNHR mentions 118 civilian fatalities in Hasaka in 2020. This figure is the result of a revision of

their data. EASO email correspondence with SNHR, 22 April 2021. See SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 1,734
Civilians in Syria in 2020, including 99 in December, 1 January 2021, url, p. 121751 Based on data extracted from monthly reports on civilian casualties published by SNHR. See: SNHR, 286 Civilians,
including Four Medical and Civil Defense Personnel, Documented Killed in Syria in January 2020, 1 February 2020, url, p. 8;
SNHR, 276 Civilians, including Six Medical Personnel and Two Media Workers, Documented Killed in Syria in February 2020,
1 March 2020, url, p. 8; SNHR, 145 Civilians, including Two Medical Personnel, Documented Killed in Syria in March 2020, 1
April 2020, url, p. 9; SNHR, 78 Civilians, including One Media Workers, Documented Killed in Syria in April 2020, 1 May 2020,
url, p. 10; SNHR, 125 Civilians Documented Killed in Syria in May 2020, including Eight Who Died Due to Torture and One
Massacre, 1 June 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, 1,006 Civilians, including three Media Workers and 12 Medical and Civil Defense
Personnel, Documented Killed in Syria in the First Half of 2020, 1 July 2020, url, p. 16; SNHR, 107 Civilians, including 26
Children and 11 Women, Documented Killed in Syria in July 2020, 2 August 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, 122 Civilians, including 21
Children and Seven Women, Documented Killed in Syria in August 2020, 1 September 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, Extrajudicial
Killing Claims the Lives of 102 Civilians, including 15 Children, 10 Women, Three Medical Personnel and 12 Victims Due toTorture, 1 October 2020, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 126 Civilians, including 18 Children, Eight
Women, One Media Worker and 10 Victims Due to Torture, 1 November 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims
the Lives of 172 Civilians, including 16 Children, 11 Women, and 30 Victims Due to Torture, 1 December 2020, url, p. 9; SNHR,
Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 1,734 Civilians in Syria in 2020, including 99 in December, 1 January 2021, url, p. 141752 Based on monthly civilian fatalities figures for 2020-2021 shared by VDC with EASO
1753 UNESCWA/ University of St Andrews, Syria at War; Eight Years On, 2020 [published on 23 September 2020], url, p. 50–
51
1754 Mine Action Review, Clearing the Mines 2020, 1 October 2020, url, p. 378
1755 Mine Action Review, Clearing the Mines 2020, 1 October 2020, url, p. 379
1756 Mine Action Review, Clearing the Mines 2020, 1 October 2020, url, p. 274
1757 Mine Action Review, Clearing the Mines 2020, 1 October 2020, url, p. 270
1758 Mine Action Review, Clearing the Mines 2020, 1 October 2020, url, p. 379
1759 Mine Action Review, Clearing the Mines 2020, 1 October 2020, url, p. 274

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

In January 2020, Turkish state-run news service Anadolu Agency cited a statement by the Turkish
Ministry of National Defense according to which Turkish forces had dismantled 891 landmines and1 660 IEDs in the Operation Peace Spring area.1760 In a similar statement from late March 2020, Turkish
MoD reported the dismantling of 38 claymore mines, three anti-tank mines and five kilograms of
explosive material.1761 In January 2021, Turkish pro-government newspaper Daily Sabah referred to a
MoD statement, according to which Turkish military had started to provide the landmine awarenesseducation for children living in the Operation Peace Spring area. In addition, Daily Sabah mentions
Turkey’s efforts to demine the ‘safe zone’ area.1762
Displacement and return
According to UNOCHA, approximately 11 000 IDPs were newly displaced in Hasaka governorate in2020. Of these, approximately 9 000 were displaced within Hasaka governorate while a significant
number of displacements to Deir Ez-Zor governorate (1 600) was also registered. Approximately 6 000
IDPs from other governorates were displaced to Hasaka. Significant numbers of arrivals from Aleppo(4 300), Raqqa (900) and Damascus (300) were registered.1763 In January 2021, 474 new IDPs from
Hasaka were registered. 411 of these were displaced within the governorate.1764 In February 2021,
approximately 2 300 new IDPs from Hasaka governorate were registered. 1 900 of these weredisplaced within the governorate.1765 In March 2021 UNOCHA recorded 286 IDP movements from orwithin Hasaka governorate, of which 144 took place within the governorate.1766
According to UNOCHA, approximately 9 000 IDPs returned to their homes located in Hasaka
governorate in 2020. Of these, approximately 8 000 were those displaced within the governorate.
Significant numbers of returnees from Damascus (900) and Rural Damascus (300) were also
registered. At the same time, approximately 6 000 IDPs residing in Hasaka returned to their homes inother governorates, mainly to Deir ez-Zor (3 800) and Raqqa (2 400).1767 In January 2021, 183 IDPs
returned to their homes in Hasaka governorate. Of these 176 were originally displaced within thegovernorate. In addition, 477 IDPs returned from Hasaka to other governorates.1768 In February 2021,
369 IDPs returned to their homes in Hasaka governorate. Of these 22 were originally displaced within
the governorate. In addition, 491 IDPs returned from Hasaka to other governorates.1769 In March 2021
UNOCHA recorded 202 IDP return movements from or within Hasaka governorate, of which 44 took
place within the governorate.1770

1760 AA, Turkey destroys hundreds of mines, IEDs in Syria, 9 January 2020, url
1761 AA, Turkey destroys dozens of mines in northern Syria, 27 March 2020, url1762 Daily Sabah, Turkish personnel educate children in northern Syria for protection from mines, 10 January 2021, url
1763 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements Overview, Jan - Dec 2020 (As of 31 December 2020), 8 March 2021, url
1764 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements (January 2021), 4 March 2021, url
1765 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements (February 2021), 1 April 2021, url
1766 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, IDP Movements. March 2021, 12 May 2021, url
1767 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Spontaneous IDP Returnee Movements Overview, Jan - Dec 2020 (As of 31 December2020), 8 March 2021, url
1768 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns (January 2021), 2 March 2021, url
1769 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns (February 2021), 1 April 2021, url
1770 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic. IDP Spontaneous Returns. March 2021, 12 May 2021, url

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2.8 Raqqa governorate

Map 14: © MapAction, Raqqa governorate1771

2.8.1 General description of the governorate
Ar-Raqqa (hereafter ‘Raqqa’) governorate is located in the north-central part of Syria. The governorate
has international borders with Turkey to the north, and borders to the west with Aleppo governorate,
to the east with Hasaka and Deir Ez-Zor governorates and to the south with Hama and Homs
governorates (see Map 14).1772 The governorate is divided in three districts with the respective
districts capitals: Ar-Raqqa (Raqqa city), Al-Thawra (Al-Tabqa), and Tall Abyad.1773
The Syrian Bureau of Statistics estimated the population of Raqqa governorate at 905 000 in 2019.1774
In a March 2021 report, UNOCHA estimated the population of Raqqa governorate to be of 707 696
inhabitants.1775
According to an analysis by Haian Dukhan (et al.), combining several different sources, Arabs affiliatedto local tribes form 90 % of Raqqa’s population, while the remaining 10 % consists of other ethnic

1771 MapAction, Ar Raqqa Governorate [map], 29 July 2016, url
1772 MapAction, Ar Raqqa Governorate [map], 29 July 2016, url; UNOCHA, Humanitarian Atlas, Syrian Arab Republic, January

2017, url, p. 15
1773 The district of Raqqa further divided into sub-districts of Raqqa, Karama, Maadan and Sabka; Tall Abyad into sub-districtsof Tall Abyad, Ayn Issa and Suluk; and Al-Thawra into sub-districts of Al-Thawra, Jurneyyeh and Mansura. UNOCHA,
Humanitarian Atlas, Syrian Arab Republic, January 2017, url, p. 15
1774 Syria, Central Bureau of Statistics, Estimate of the population in Syria by governorates, n.d., url
1775 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview. Syrian Arab Republic, March 2021, url, p. 23

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situationgroups, including Kurds, Turkmens, Circassians and Armenians. The majority of Raqqa’s Arab
population are Sunni Muslims.1776
According to Dukhan (et al.), the great majority of Raqqa’s population and resources are located inareas controlled by the SDF.1777 In 2020, media sources have emphasised the reinvigoration1778 of
Raqqa city’s civilian life, despite of the wide-ranging destruction inflicted on the city during the antiISIL campaign. According to an anonymous north-east Syria researcher, cited in COAR Global’s ‘Syria
in 2021’ forecast, Raqqa governorate ‘witnessed a clear intensification in reconstruction’ in 2020.
Rehabilitation of infrastructure has taken place in Raqqa city and the surrounding rural areas,
returning IDPs have turned Raqqa city into ‘an important commercial center’.1779 A similar trend has
been reported also with regard to Tabqa1780, another major city in SDF-controlled Raqqa governorate.
According to Enab Baladi, several civilian and military governance institutions associated with theAutonomous Administration and the SDF have their headquarters’ in Raqqa city and local residents
state that the Autonomous Administration has re-established ‘some aspects of civilian life’ in thecity.1781 The Washington Post describes the city as largely destroyed, but at the same time vibrant withpeople in areas spared from the destruction.1782 The New Yorker explains the fact that the ‘obliterated
city abounds with activity’ with the observation that the US-led Coalition’s air campaign left the
ground levels of taller multi-story buildings ‘more or less’ intact.1783
Depending on the source, the areas controlled by SDF produce between 701784 and 72 %1785 of Syria’s
wheat. According to statistics provided in FAO/WFP Special Report of July 2017, Raqqa governorate’s
share of Syria’s total wheat production was approximately 19.6 % in the 2015/2016 agricultural season
and approximately 19 % in the 2016/2017 season.1786
Raqqa’s economy and natural resources are discussed in detail in the EASO COI Report: Syria - Security
situation (May 2020).1787

2.8.2 Conflict background and armed actors
The central parts of Raqqa governorate are under the control of the Kurdish-dominated SDF. The GoS
and its allies control the southern parts of the governorate.1788 As the result of the Turkish military
incursion in October 20191789, the GoS forces and/or their Russian allies have been present along the1776 Dukhan, H. et al., The Kin Who Count: Mapping Raqqa’s Tribal Topology, Midde East Institute, 24 March 2021, url
1777 Dukhan, H. et al., The Kin Who Count: Mapping Raqqa’s Tribal Topology, MEI, 24 March 2021, url
1778 See, for example, Cockburn, P., After IS, LRB Vol. 43 No. 3, 4 February 2021, url; Mogelson, L., America’s Abandonmentof Syria, The New Yorker, 20 April 2020, url; Sly, L. & Martins, A., The former ‘caliphate capital’ is haunted by fears of an ISIS
comeback, The Washington Post, 22 May 2020, url
1779 COAR, Syria in 2021: Forecast for a Protracted Crisis, 28 January 2021, url, p. 13
1780 Kalo, R. & Kajjo, S., Rebuilding Efforts Continue in Syria’s Former IS Stronghold, VOA, 3 March 2021, url
1781 Al-Omar, H., Al-Raqqa: over a decade of the Syrian revolution, Enab Baladi, 29 March 2021, url
1782 Sly, L. & Martins, A., The former ‘caliphate capital’ is haunted by fears of an ISIS comeback, The Washington Post, 22 May
2020, url1783 Mogelson, L., America’s Abandonment of Syria, The New Yorker, 20 April 2020, url
1784 WFP, Syrian Arab Republic – mWAM Bulletin Issue no. 51: December 2020, 31 December 2020, url
1785 Information provided by Syria Report and cited in: Christou, W. & Advani, R., Damascus struggles to secure wheat supply
amidst coronavirus crisis, Syria Direct, 18 May 2020, url; HRW, Syria: Bread Crisis Exposes Government Failure, 21 March
2021, url; Tsurkov, E. & Jukhada, Q., Kneel and Starve: Under the Watchful Eye of the Secret Police, Syrians Go Hungry,
Newlines Institute, 9 February 2021, url
1786 FAO/WFP, Special Report: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to the Syrian Arab Republic, 18 July
2017, url, p. 25
1787 EASO, Syria - Security Situation. May 2020, url, pp. 146-148
1788 Based on reading of maps in Etana Syria, Military Control Across Syria [Map], 1 April 2021 [published on 6 April 2021],
url; Jusoor for Studies, Map of the military bases and posts of foreign forces in Syria [Map], 6 January 2021, url; UN Human
Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/46/54],
21 January 2021 [published 18 February 2021], url, p. 31 [Annex II J] [Map]1789 For further information on the October 2019 Turkish incursion, see EASO, Syria - Security Situation. May 2020, url

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main roads1790 in the SDF-controlled areas and in the frontlines1791 separating the SDF-controlled partsof Raqqa from the Turkish-controlled area in northern Raqqa governorate. Since October 2019, theTurkish Armed Forces (TAF) and the Turkish-backed Syrian armed groups operating under theumbrella of the so-called ‘Syrian National Army’ (SNA) have been in control of most of the territory
north of M4 highway in northern Raqqa governorate, including the border town of Tall Abyad and its
surroundings and the district of Suluk.1792 Along with an adjoining territory of roughly equal size innorthern Hasaka governorate (see Section 2.7.2), this area constitutes the so-called Operation Peace
Spring area.
During the reference period for this report, the security situation in Raqqa governorate has been
affected by ISIL’s growing insurgency. In 2020, ISIL’s activities increased especially in the GoScontrolled southern parts of Raqqa governorate. However, in early 2021, ISIL’s attacks increased also
in the SDF-controlled parts of the governorate (see Section ISIL’s resurgence in Raqqa governorate
below). In addition, there have been reports of recurrent shelling and armed clashes between the
Turkish forces/ Turkish-backed armed groups and the SDF along the frontlines between the Operation
Peace Spring area and the SDF-controlled areas in Hasaka and Raqqa governorates (for Raqqa, see
Section The conflict between the SDF and the Turkish forces (Ayn Issa frontline), for Hasaka, Section
The conflict between the SDF and the Turkish forces).
Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
As already stated above, the central parts of Raqqa governorate are under the control of the Kurdishdominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The structure of the SDF is discussed in Section 1.4.3
Syrian Democratic Forces.
The US-led Coalition
The information concerning the US-led Coalitions military presence in Raqqa governorate is
ambiguous. On the one hand, conflict maps by USDOD1793 and several other sources1794 show that the
US has no military sites in the governorate and it is the US-led Coalition’s position that Coalition forces
operating in north-east Syria have ‘limited their ground movements’ to Hasaka and Deir ez-Zor
governorates.1795 On the other, Jusoor Center for Studies map of January 2021 contains information
on 2 US military sites in Raqqa governorate: one immediately to the west and one immediately to theeast/north-east of Raqqa city.1796 The continued presence of US military bases in (SDF-controlled partsof) Raqqa governorate is also noted by media sources.1797

1790 Balanche, F., The Fragile Status Quo in Northeast Syria, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1 July 2020, url;

Jusoor for Studies, Map of the military bases and posts of foreign forces in Syria [Map], 6 January 2021, url
1791 Based on reading of maps in Balanche, F., The Assad Regime Has Failed to Restore Full Sovereignty Over Syria, The
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 10 February 2021, url; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent
International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/46/54], 21 January 2021 [published 18 February2021], url, p. 31 [Annex II J] [Map]1792 Based on reading of maps in Etana Syria, Military Control Across Syria [Map], 1 April 2021 [published on 6 April 2021],
url; Al-Hilu, K., The Turkish Intervention in Northern Syria: One Strategy, Discrepant Policies, European University Institute,
14 January 2021 [first published in Arabic on 21 December 2020], url, p. 3; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/46/54], 21 January 2021 [published
18 February 2021], url, p. 31 [Annex II J] [Map]1793 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress October 1,2020–
December 31,2020, 9 February 2021, url, p. 56
1794 Balanche, F., The Fragile Status Quo in Northeast Syria, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1 July 2020, url;
Kemal, L., Suriye'de YPG bölgesindeki Rus ve ABD üsleri sayıları [Map] [Twitter], 1 March 2021, url1795 USDoD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, January 1,2021–
March 31,2021, 4 May 2021, url, pp. 61-62
1796 Jusoor for Studies, Map of the military bases and posts of foreign forces in Syria [Map], 6 January 2021, url
1797 AA, US continues to reinforce military bases in Syria, 26 September 2020, url; Baladi, US building new military bases in
Syria’s Raqqa amid Russian expansion, 26 May 2020, url;

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Syrian Arab Army and affiliated armed groups
As already stated above, the GoS and its allies control the southern parts of Raqqa governorate andare also present in the SDF-controlled parts of the governorate (the main roads and the frontlines
between the SDF-controlled and the Turkish-controlled areas).
According to the USDOD report of August 2020, the number of SAA and affiliated armed groups
personnel deployed in SDF-controlled governorates of Hasaka and Raqqa after October 2019 ranges
between 4 000 and 10 000. It is also stated that the GoS has increased its recruitment efforts among
the locals to strengthen its ranks.1798 Since late 2020, the GoS forces have increased their presence at
the Ayn Issa frontline. The map on ‘The Complex Operating Environment of North-eastern Syria’ in the
USDoD report of February 2021 notes the presence of GoS forces in the town of Ayn Issa and in AlTabqa.1799 The GoS has reportedly controlled the Tabqa military air base since October 2019, although
the city itself is in SDF control.1800
See the EASO COI Report: Syria - Security situation (May 2020) for more specific information on SAA
formations deployed in Raqqa governorate as of March 2020.1801
RussiaThe Russian forces are present in the GoS-controlled Raqqa governorate and, to a limited extent, in
the SDF-controlled parts of the governorate.
According to Jusoor Center for Studies map of January 2021, Russia has 7 military sites in Raqqa
governorate: six north of the city of Raqqa (with three in the border area between Turkish-controlled
and SDF-controlled areas and one immediately north of the city) and one in Al-Tabqa (in the districtof Al-Thawrah).1802 According to a map by researcher Levent Kemal, Russia has 10 military sites in
Raqqa governorate: Eight north of the city of Raqqa (with five along the border with Turkish-controlledareas), one north-east of Raqqa city and one in Al-Thawra.1803 The information concerning theexistence of a Russian military site north-east of Raqqa city represents the main difference between
the two estimates.
Since late 2020, the Russian forces have increased their presence in the Ayn Issa frontline (see Section
The conflict between the SDF and the Turkish forces (Ayn Issa frontline)). The map on ‘The Complex
Operating Environment of North-eastern Syria’ in the USDoD report of February 2021 notes thepresence of Russian forces south of Ayn Issa.1804
Iran
According to a map published by the Atlantic Council and charting the influence of Iran and its militias
in Syria in 2020, Iranian-backed armed groups control the town of Resafa in southern Raqqa
governorate and have influence in the Euphrates river valley in the eastern part of the governorate,
near the administrative border between Raqqa and Deir Ez-Zor. The Iranian-backed groups are marked
to have influence also along the main roads in GoS-controlled parts of the governorate. These include
parts of the central road connecting Raqqa to Aleppo governorate to the west and Deir Ez-Zor
governorate to the east and road connecting Tabqa (Madinat Ath-Thawrah) to Homs governorate. In

1798 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, April 1,2020–June

30,2020, 4 August 2020, url, p. 51
1799 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress October 1,2020–
December 31,2020, 9 February 2021, url, p. 56
1800 Kalo, R. & Kajjo, S., Rebuilding Efforts Continue in Syria’s Former IS Stronghold, VOA, 3 March 2021, url
1801 EASO, Syria - Security Situation. May 2020, url, pp. 135–136
1802 Jusoor for Studies, Map of the military bases and posts of foreign forces in Syria [Map], 6 January 2021, url
1803 Kemal, L., Suriye'de YPG bölgesindeki Rus ve ABD üsleri sayıları [Map] [Twitter], 1 March 2021, url
1804 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress October 1,2020–
December 31,2020, 9 February 2021, url, p. 56

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addition, Iranian-backed armed groups are depicted to have a pocket of influence in Ayn Issa area,
bordering the Operation Peace Spring area controlled by Turkey and its affiliates.1805 According to an
analysis by Haian Dukhan and Ammar Alhamad, Iran has provided support to tribal militias in Raqqa
governorate in order to gain influence in the governorate.1806
Turkey and affiliated armed groups
According to Jusoor Center for Studies map of January 2021, Turkey has 9 military sites in the western
half of Operation Peace Spring area, three in and around the town of Tall Abyad, two in Suluk
subdistrict and four north of Ayn Issa, near the M4 highway and the frontline with the SDF.1807
According to researcher Khayrallah al-Hilu, Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) are positioned in the town ofTall Abyad (three positions) and in the military bases in Karmazah and Bir Asheq. In addition, TAF hasbarracks in the area and operates several observation posts located along the M4 highway. Although
Turkish intelligence services are present in Tall Abyad area, their direct involvement in detecting andsuppressing the opposition to Turkish rule is considered rare since Turkey utilises the SNA in thisrole.1808
According to al-Hilu, the town of Tall Abyad, the main population centre of the western half ofOperation Peace Spring area, is controlled by the Third Corps of the ‘Syrian National Army’ (SNA).1809
According to Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, the formations of SNA’s Third Corps are mainly affiliated toJabhat al-Shamiya (‘the Shami Front’/’the Levant Front’).1810 The STJ report of March 2021 names
Jabhat al-Shamiya, Faylaq al-Majd and Ahrar al-Sharqiya as the Turkish-backed groups in control of
Tall Abyad. Other SNA groups are also present in the area in limited numbers.1811
ISIL
ISIL has a presence in GoS-controlled southern Raqqa governorate.1812 According to March 2021
analysis by ISW, ISIL controls small patch of territory ‘east of Resafa, overlooking Tabqa air Base (inThawra district).1813
According to Gregory Waters’ analysis published in August 2020, the estimates concerning the numberof ISIS fighters operating in the Badia desert region (in western Deir Ez-Zor, northern Homs andsouthern Raqqa governorates) vary between 1 000 and 1 800 fighters. Based on the information
provided by an NDF officer and confirmed by SDF commander-in-chief Mazloum Kobane Abdi, Waters
states that ‘these fighters are organized into 15 to 20 active groups’ and notes that ‘approximately
70 % of all fighters [are] located in the urban belt along the western side of the Euphrates.’1814 In an
analysis published in February 2021 analysis, Waters’ notes that, in 2020, ISIL utilised its presence in
Raqqa to conduct attacks also in other Syrian governorates (e.g. Hama).1815

1805 Saban, N., Factbox: Iranian influence and presence in Syria, Atlantic Council, 5 November 2020, url
1806 Dukhan, H. & Alhamad, A., Iran’s Growing Network of Influence among Eastern Syrian Tribes, The Washington Institutefor Near East Policy/ Fikra Forum, 6 April 2021, url1807 Jusoor for Studies, Map of the military bases and posts of foreign forces in Syria [Map], 6 January 2021, url
1808 Al-Hilu, K., The Turkish Intervention in Northern Syria: One Strategy, Discrepant Policies, European University Institute,
14 January 2021 [first published in Arabic on 21 December 2020], url, p. 4 [cf. map on p. 5]
1809 Al-Hilu, K., The Turkish Intervention in Northern Syria: One Strategy, Discrepant Policies, European University Institute,
14 January 2021 [first published in Arabic on 21 December 2020], url, p. 8
1810 Al-Tamimi, A. J., The Structure of the Syrian National Army, 21 November 2019, url
1811 Syrians for Truth and Justice, Syria: Crops Looted, Lands Seized in “Peace Spring” Territories, 11 March 2021, url, p. 4
1812 Based on reading of maps in Etana Syria, Military Control Across Syria [Map], 1 April 2021 [published on 6 April 2021],
url; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/46/54], 21 January 2021 [published 18 February 2021], url, p. 31 [Annex II J] [Map]; Waters, G., Strengthening andExpanding: ISIS’ Central Syria Campaign, Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, 19 August 2020, url1813 Kahan, E., ISIS Poised for a Ramadan Surge in Syria, ISW, 9 March 2021, url1814 Waters, G., Strengthening and Expanding: ISIS’ Central Syria Campaign, Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, 19
August 2020, url
1815 Waters G., ISIS in Syria: 2020 in Review, Newlines Institute, 10 February 2021, url

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Besides the GoS-controlled areas, ISIL has also conducted attacks in SDF-controlled parts of Raqqa
governorate during the reference period of this report (see Section ISIL’s resurgence in Raqqa
governorate). According to Patrick Cockburn, ISIL ‘rules’ by night in ‘parts of the countryside around’
Raqqa1816, nominally under the control of the SDF. This presence of ISIL in SDF-controlled areas andthe targeting1817 of SDF’s members and associates as well as secular and non-practicing locals is
discussed further below, in the context of Deir Ez-Zor governorate (see Section ISIL’s insurgency inDeir Ez-Zor).

2.8.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population
ISIL’s resurgence in Raqqa governorate
In an analysis published in August 2020, Gregory Waters claims that ISIL has put into effect ‘an everexpanding insurgency’ against the Syrian Arab army (SAA) and its allies, mainly Russia, Iran andaffiliated militias, in central Syria, including southern Raqqa and western parts of Deir Ez-Zor
governorate. This insurgency began already in late 2017. However, since the beginning of 2019, the
ISIS cells operating in central Syria, including the ones based in the southern countryside of Raqqa
governorate, have become stronger and expanded their ‘geographic reach and effectiveness of their
attacks’. Waters estimates that ISIL attacks targeting GoS forces had become ‘increasingly regular’ insouthern Raqqa governorate after early 2020.1818
In an analysis of ISIL’s activities in Syria in 2020, Waters describes how ISIL cells were increasingly
active in the governorates of Aleppo, Hama and Raqqa in 2020. In August, ISIL commenced ‘a sustained
campaign along the Ithriya-Tabqa highway’, utilising firearms, landmines and fake checkpoints in
attacks targeting the GoS forces. In December 2020, ISIL’s attempts to disrupt the passenger traffic
along the highway with small arms fire continued, which caused ‘a precipitous decline in security along
a crucial trade route’. In addition, ISIL cells utilised the southern parts of Raqqa governorate to conductattacks in Aleppo and Hama governorates.1819 The USDOD report discussing ISIL’s activities between
July and September 2020 notes the ‘larger scale, high casualty attacks’ targeting GoS forces in Raqqa
governorate.1820
According to the USDOD, ISIL attacks in Raqqa governorate decreased 70 % in the first three monthsof 2020 when compared to the previous quarter.1821 ISIL attacks surged occasionally in Raqqa
governorate between April and June 2020, the biggest surge of 14 attacks in one week occurring
between 14 and 20 May, after which the number of ISIL attacks decreased to one per week. However,the DIA, cited in the USDOD report, did not observe any increase in ISIL’s capabilities or activities in
Raqqa governorate1822 According to an assessment by Aaron Zelin from 29 May 2020, ISIL conducted
168 attacks in Raqqa governorate in the preceding 14 months.1823 According to data collected by
Gregory Waters, ISIL conducted 46 attacks in Raqqa governorate in 2020, with 1 attack taking place in1816 Cockburn, P., After IS, LRB Vol. 43 No. 3, 4 February 2021, url
1817 Cockburn, P., After IS, LRB Vol. 43 No. 3, 4 February 2021, url; Al-Kanj, S., Islamic State regroups in Syrian Kurdish region,

Al-Monitor, 9 November 2020, url
1818 Waters, G., Strengthening and Expanding: ISIS’ Central Syria Campaign, Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, 19
August 2020, url
1819 Waters, G., ISIS in Syria: 2020 in Review, Newlines Institute, 10 February 2021, url
1820 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, July 1,2020–
September 30,2020, 3 November 2020, url p. 23
1821 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, January 1,2020–
March 31,2020, 13 May 2020, url, p. 51
1822 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, April 1,2020–June
30,2020, 4 August 2020, url, p. 27
1823 Zelin, A. Y. & Knights, M., The Islamic State's Resurgence in the COVID Era?, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
29 May 2020, url

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January, 2 in February, 2 in March, 1 in April, 2 in May, 1 in June, 4 in July, 9 in August, 9 in September,
5 in October, 2 in November and 8 in December 2020.1824
According to Waters, in the last three months of 2020, GoS and Russian forces engaged in regular
airstrikes targeting static ISIL targets in Raqqa governorate, in eastern Homs governorate and in therural parts of GoS-controlled Deir Ez-Zor governorate.1825 According to COAR Global, ‘local sources
across Syria’ estimated that, with regard to attacks carried out by ISIL, December 2020 was the mostactive month of 2020. COAR Global states that many of the reported attacks took place in SDFcontrolled eastern Deir Ez-Zor and in GoS-controlled western Deir Ez-Zor, in southern parts of Raqqa
governorate, and in Homs governorate.1826
With regard to SDF-controlled North-East Syria, ISIL’s activities have concentrated in Deir Ez-Zor
governorate. The SDF-controlled Raqqa governorate is mentioned only once in the RIC report on ISIL
attacks carried out in the SDF-controlled North-East Syria in 2020. While discussing the casualty figuresof October 2020 RIC notes that ISIL carried out 45 attacks in the SDF-controlled northeast Syria in
October 20201827, of which 4 took place in Raqqa governorate.1828
However, according to the August 2020 report by the CoI, Raqqa governorate saw attacks by ISIL
targeting both the SDF and the GoS forces in the first half of 2020 (11 January–1 July 2020). The CoI
estimates that ISIL resorted increasingly to asymmetric attacks during this period.1829 On 5 May, theSDF carried out arrests targeting alleged ISIL-affiliates in the towns of Jurneyyeh. On 6 May, similararrests were carried out in Raqqa city.1830 On 30 May 2020, ISIL claimed responsibility for injuring a
local SDF-affiliated mukhtar in Raqqa city.1831 On 14 July, several bombs exploded in Raqqa city.1832
According to ISW, ISIL carried out three simultaneous IED attacks near the Al-Tub al-Hadith Hospitaland one IED attack in Jazrah neighbourhood. ISW described the attack as a demonstration of ISIL’s
capabilities in the SDF-controlled city while no casualties were reported.1833
A local journalist cited in the Al-Monitor article published in November 2020 claims that ISIL has
targeted the SDF ‘especially in the area between southern Raqqa and the south-eastern countrysideof Hasaka[…]’.1834 According to the Al-Monitor article published in February 2021, many residents of
SDF-controlled Raqqa city are living in fear of ISIL, cells of which are still targeting civilians ‘withbombings in residential areas, assassinations and threats’. In addition, the article claims that ISIL is still
imposing its ‘taxation system’ (zakat) on some residents of the city.1835 The Washington Post statesthat many ISIL members were still present in the city in late 2019. Many locals claimed that ISIL was‘too despised’ by the local population to re-establish itself while many others claimed that ISIL’s cells
were ‘all around’ and ‘plotting to retake the city’.1836 According to a local civil society activist
interviewed by the New Yorker, ‘the prevalence of niqabs and veils’ among the women in Raqqa city
is partly the result of ISIL’s ‘lingering influence’ in the city.1837

1824 Waters G., ISIS in Syria: 2020 in Review, Newlines Institute, 10 February 2021, url
1825 Waters, G., ISIS in Syria: 2020 in Review, Newlines Institute, 10 February 2021, url
1826 COAR, Quamishli Clashes: GoS and SDF Seek Pressure Points, 18 January 2021, url1827 Rojava Information Center, Annual Sleeper Cell Report for North and East Syria, January 2021, url, pp. 3, 7
1828 Rojava Information Center, Annual Sleeper Cell Report for North and East Syria, January 2021, url, p. 6
1829 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/45/31], 14 August 2020 [published 15 September 2020], url, p. 15 [para. 70]
1830 Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary: 4-10 May 2020, url, p. 5
1831 Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary: 25-30 May 2020, url, p. 4
1832 ISW, Syria Situation Report: July 7 - 21, 2020, 23 July 2020, url; USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector
General Report to the United States Congress, July 1,2020–September 30,2020, 3 November 2020, url, p. 50
1833 ISW, Syria Situation Report: July 7 - 21, 2020, 23 July 2020, url1834 Al-Kanj, S., Islamic State regroups in Syrian Kurdish region, Al-Monitor, 9 November 2020, url
1835 Hammoud, H., Islamic State continues to terrorize Raqqa, Al-Monitor, 18 February 2021, url
1836 Sly, L. & Martins, A., The former ‘caliphate capital’ is haunted by fears of an ISIS comeback, The Washington Post, 22 May
2020, url1837 Mogelson, L., America’s Abandonment of Syria, The New Yorker, 20 April 2020, url

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According to Wladimir van Wilgenburg, in early January 2021, ISIL claimed seven attacks, including IED
and hit-and-run attacks, targeting the SDF and Asayish in Raqqa city and the SDF-controlled rural areasof Raqqa governorate. On 4 January 2021, multiple civilians were injured in an attack conducted in
Raqqa city. On 6 January, two Asayish members were killed in an attack conducted in the easterncountryside of Raqqa. On 10 January, a civilian was injured in an IED attack in Al-Malahi area in Raqqa
city.1838 On 8 February, an ISIL attack in the town of Kabush, located in north-western Raqqa
governorate, claimed the lives of four Asayish members. According to van Wilgenburg, ISIL attacks
targeting the SDF and its affiliates had increased since December 2020 in Raqqa governorate.1839
Human rights violations by the SDF
As already discussed above, in the context of Hasaka governorate, the power in SDF-controlled areas
has concentrated disproportionately in the hands of ethnic Kurds and a small group of Arab leaders
closely associated with the PYD (see Section Opposition to the SDF’s rule). According to US
Department of State, this unequal power-relationship applies also to Raqqa and Tabqa, both in Raqqa
governorate.1840 During the reference period for this report, there have been reports on violations by
the YPG, the SDF and their affiliates targeting Raqqa governorate’s civilian population, e.g. seizing
civilian property1841 and forced military conscription.1842
According to OMRAN, between October 2019 and December 2019, Raqqa city saw 19 people being
extrajudicially detained and 11 abducted in 9 separate incidents. All the detainees were civilians with
the YPG bearing the responsibility for all the incidents. Of the abducted, 7 were civilians and 4 YPG
members. ISIL was responsible for two abduction incidents targeting YPG members.1843 Between
January and March 2020, 17 people were extrajudicially detained and 19 abducted in 9 different
incidents. All the detainees were civilians with the YPG detaining 12 and Asayish detaining 5. The
abductions targeted 9 civilians, 8 YPG members and 2 members of the local administration. ISIL
abducted people in 3 separate incidents.1844
On 3 March 2020, SDF security forces conducted a raid targeting a local NGO operating in western
Raqqa governorate and detained the board chairman of the NGO and some of its employees.
According to local sources contacted by COAR Global, the SDF had recently conducted similar raids
targeting different local NGOs. Local sources associated the raids with the increased screening
measures the SDF had adopted since late 2019 to spot individuals opposing the Autonomous
Administration and possibly being affiliated with Turkish-backed armed groups.1845
The conflict between the SDF and the Turkish forces (Ayn Issa frontline)
As already discussed above in the context of Hasaka governorate, the UN Security Council reported‘intermittent artillery shelling’ and some ‘ground-based clashes’ along the frontlines between SDF1838 van Wilgenburg, W., ISIS increases attacks in Raqqa as Turkish-backed forces shell Ain al-Issa, Kurdistan 24, 12 January

2021, url
1839 van Wilgenburg, W., Asayish confirms deaths of 4 members in ISIS attack near Raqqa, Kurdistan 24, 11 February 2021,
url
1840 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, April 1,2020–June
30,2020, 4 August 2020, url, p. 54
1841 Enab Baladi, Accusations against “SDF” of seizing civilians’ property in Syria’s al-Tabqa, 25 October 2020, url; STJ, Raqqa:
The Northern Democratic Brigade Arbitrarily Seizes over 80 Houses, 9 December 2020, url
1842 Al-Omar, H., Conscription by SDF agonizing Raqqa residents, Enab Baladi, 20 February 2021, url; SNHR, Syrian Democratic
Forces Have Arrested/ Detained at Least 61 Teachers Over Educational Curricula and for Forced Conscription Since theBeginning of 2021. Persecution of Nearly 550 Teachers Arbitrarily Dismissed from Their Jobs for Refusing Forced Conscription
in the Governorates of Raqqa, Deir Ez-Zour and Hasaka, 19 February 2021, url
1843 OMRAN Center for Strategic Studies, Indicators of Security Stability in Syria and Refugee Return: An Evaluation of SelectCases, December 2020, url, p. 59
1844 OMRAN Center for Strategic Studies, Indicators of Security Stability in Syria and Refugee Return: An Evaluation of SelectCases, December 2020, url, p. 61
1845 COAR, Erdogan and Putin push pause on Idleb, 9 March 220, url

191

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

controlled Raqqa governorate and the Turkish-controlled Operation Peace Spring area between
February and May 2020.1846 According to the August 2020 report by the CoI, ‘periodic clashes’
involving the YPG, Turkish-backed armed groups and the Turkish military continued to affect the
security situation of north-east Syria in the first half of 2020 (11 January-1 July 2020).1847 Starting fromthe reporting period between June and July as well as continuing during the reporting period between
October and November 2020, a trend of increasing cross-line attacks was reported.1848
According to the USDOD report of February 2021, clashes between the SDF and Turkish forces reescalated in the period between October and December 2020 and led to ‘exchanges of artillery fireand IED attacks’ in areas around the town of Ayn Issa. In October 2020, Turkey threatened the SDF
with another military intervention if the SDF would not remove its forces from areas bordering Turkey.
In November and December, Turkish-backed armed groups made several advances into areas close to
Ayn Issa. However, the SDF managed to block these advances and reclaim the areas initially capturedby the SNA.1849 According to USDOD, on 25 November 2020, armed clashes broke out between
Turkish-backed armed groups and the SDF in north-east Syria. Several civilians are injured and at least
18 fighters from Turkish-backed armed groups killed in the clashes.1850
The Report of the Secretary-General to the UN Security Council of February 2021 notes ‘a sharp
increase in mutual shelling and ground-based clashes’ between Turkish forces and the SDF close to
Ayn Issa town since late November 2020. These clashes ‘resulted in the death, injury and displacementof civilians’.1851 REACH noted a significant escalation in fighting along the frontlines between the
Operation Peace Spring area and the SDF-controlled parts of Raqqa and Hasaka governorates in
November.1852 On 24 November 2020, ‘military clashes and landmine explosions’ were reported in
Ayn Issa area and REACH’s local informants reported on ‘threats from shelling, airstrikes, unexploded
ordnance (UXOs), or imminent conflict’.1853
According to an analysis by COAR Global, on 28 November, Turkish-backed armed groups operating
under the SNA umbrella targeted the area with shelling that injured several civilians. In addition,occasional clashes between the opposing parties were reported in the area. Again on 5 December, theTurkish forces and affiliated armed groups subjected the SDF positions in and around Ayn Issa and Abu
Rasin to heavy shelling. COAR Global estimates that the escalation followed the Turkish entrenchment
north of Ayn Issa and particularly the setting up of a new military base in Sayda, just about 100 m from
the M4 highway.1854

1846 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),

2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2020/327], 23 April
2020, url, p. 3 [para. 6]; UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191
(2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2020/576], 24 June 2020, url, p. 3 [para. 7]
1847 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/45/31], 14 August 2020 [published 15 September 2020], url, p. 2 [para. 5]
1848 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2020/813], 20 August 2020, url, p. 4 [para. 9]; UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139
(2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533
(2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2020/1195], 11 December 2020, url, p. 4 [para. 3 & para. 10]
1849 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress October 1,2020–
December 31,2020, 9 February 2021, url, pp. 60–61
1850 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress October 1,2020–
December 31,2020, 9 February 2021, url, p. 55
1851 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2021/160], 18 February 2021, url, p. 4 [para. 9]1852 REACH, Humanitarian Situation Overview in Syria (HSOS): Northeast Syria, November 2020, 21 December 2020, url, p. 1
1853 REACH, Humanitarian Situation Overview in Syria (HSOS): Northeast Syria, December 2020, 28 January 2021, url, p. 1
1854 COAR, Turkey pressures Ein Issa as the SDF pivots toward politics, 7 December 2020, url

192

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

According to USDOD, in December 2020, Russian forces planned to erect a military post in Ayn Issa toprevent further clashes from occurring in the area.1855 According to ISW, Turkish forces continued theshelling of SDF-controlled villages near Ayn Issa and their simultaneous attempts to capture thesevillages between 16 December 2020 and 5 January 2021. ISW estimates that Turkish forces escalated
their ‘kinetic activity’ in the frontlines in Raqqa governorate which disturbed the civilian life in thearea. On 6 January 2021, Turkish artillery shelled the vicinity of the Russian military base increasing
the tensions between the two parties.1856 In the report from 18 February 2021, the UN Security
Council states that while the active hostilities had ended in the vicinity of Ayn Issa ‘the area remained
tense.’1857
An ISW analysis from late January 2021 states that Russian forces had deployed 300 additional Military
Police to areas in Raqqa (Ayn Issa) and Hasaka governorates (Amuda and Tall Tamer) bordering theTurkish-controlled Operation Peace Spring area in north-east Syria. ISW estimates that the move wasa reaction to the escalation of hostilities in November 2020 and aimed at preventing a possible Turkishintervention.1858 The GoS forces were also strengthening their military presence in Ayn Issa area.1859
According to COAR Global, Ayn Issa is strategically important because of its location along the M4
highway, which connects the GoS-controlled areas to the SDF-controlled areas and the SDF-controlledareas in Aleppo governorate (Ayn al-Arab/Kobani and Manbij) to other SDF-controlled areas in northeast Syria. In addition, the town ‘acts as the gateway’ to Raqqa city.1860 Al-Monitor article from
10 March 2021 cites Firas Faham, an expert from Jusoor Center for Studies, who assesses that the GoS
and Russia are utilising the threat of Turkish incursion in order to reinforce the GoS presence and expel
the SDF from Ayn Issa area.1861 COAR Global’s analysis of December 2020 is compatible with Faham’s
assessment, stating that Russia has repeatedly ‘proposed that the SDF hand over administrative
control of Ayn Issa to the Government of Syria’.1862
Between January and March 2021, clashes between Turkish forces/Turkish-backed armed groups andthe SDF around Ayn Issa continued. According to Sirwan Kajjo, the clashes intensified in late December
2020 and early January 2021 as the result of attacks conducted by the Turkish-backed armed groups
against the SDF.1863 In early January 2021, Turkish attempts to infiltrate villages in Ayn Issa countrysideresulted in clashes that were accompanied with shelling.1864 According to the UN Security Council,‘mutual shelling and limited ground-based clashes’ were reported along the contact lines around Ayn
Issa between February and March 2021.1865 In February, REACH’s informants reported on the ‘threat
from shelling’ in Ayn Issa area.1866 In late March 2021, intensive clashes between the Turkish-backed
armed groups and the SDF broke out again in the vicinity of Ayn Issa.1867 According to USDoD, tensions
along the Syrian-Turkish border ‘remained high’ between January and March 2021 with Turkey
1855 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress October 1,2020–

December 31,2020, 9 February 2021, url, p. 6
1856 ISW, Syria Situation Report: December 16, 2020 - January 7, 2021, 12 January 2021, url
1857 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2021/160], 18 February 2021, url, p. 4 [para. 9]1858 ISW, Syria Situation Report: January 8-29, 2021, 29 January 2021, url1859 COAR, Al-Assad alienates minority supporters in a bid for the Sunni Arab majority, 14 December 2020, url; Al-Khateb, K.,
Why is Syrian military deploying in Kurdish-held areas?, Al-Monitor, 10 March 2021, url
1860 COAR, Turkey pressures Ein Issa as the SDF pivots toward politics, 7 December 2020, url
1861 Al-Khateb, K., Why is Syrian military deploying in Kurdish-held areas?, Al-Monitor, 10 March 2021, url
1862 COAR, Al-Assad alienates minority supporters in a bid for the Sunni Arab majority, 14 December 2020, url
1863 Kajjo, S., Fighting Continues Over Flashpoint Town in Northern Syria, VOA, 5 January 2021, url
1864 Syrian Observer (The), SDF, Armed Opposition Factions Clash in Ayn Issa, 14 January 2021, url
1865 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2021/390], 22 April
2021, url, p. 3 [Para. 5]1866 REACH, Humanitarian Situation Overview in Syria (HSOS): Northeast Syria, February 2020, 24 March 2020, url, p. 1
1867 van Wilgenburg, W., Syria: Heavy fighting between SDF and Turkey-backed groups continues around Ain Issa, Kurdistan
24, 23 March 2021, url

193

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

launching its first airstrikes in 17 months against the SDF positions around Ayn Issa on
20 March 2021.1868
Security incidents and human rights violations in Operation Peace Spring area (Tall Abyad)Researcher Khayrallah al-Hilu states that, according to Tall Abyad’s local council, in late 2020 thecivilian population of Tall Abyad area was approximately 140 000, of whom roughly 6 000 were IDPs
from other parts of Syria.1869 According to al-Hilu, with regard to the Operation Peace Spring area,
violations targeting Kurds and Arabs associated with the Autonomous Administration have been morerare in Tall Abyad than in Ras al-Ayn. This is explained by the fact that the SNA formation in control of
Tall Abyad has a significant number of local fighters in its ranks. This applies also for Arab towns of
Suluk and Al-Mabrukah (in Hasaka governorate), which are controlled by a formation with tribal ties
to the area and a significant number of local fighters.1870
During the reference period, human rights violations reported especially in the eastern part ofOperation Peace Spring area (for further information on Ras al-Ayn area, see Section Human rights
violations in Operation Peace Spring area (Ras al-Ayn)). However, similar violations have beenreported also in the western part of the area. According to the report by the CoI discussing thesituation in Syria in the first half of 2020 (11 January–1 July 2020), displaced families from Tall Abyadclaimed that they were unwilling to return to their homes because they were afraid of rape and sexual
violence at the hands of the members of Turkish-backed armed groups.1871 However, other serious
human rights violations described by the CoI report and allegedly committed in the areas under
Turkish-control were mainly concentrated in Ras al-Ayn and Afrin (see Section Human rights violations
in Operation Peace Spring area (Ras al-Ayn) and 2.2.3 Turkish- and SNA-controlled areas respectively).
According to the Carter Center, in June 2020, Turkish-backed armed groups initiated a series of arrests
targeting individuals allegedly affiliated with the SDF in ‘throughout’ Raqqa governorate. On 9 June,arrests were carried out in Ayn al-Arus and Badi. On 13 June, a tribal leader associated with the SDF
was arrested in Tall Abyad city.1872 According to OMRAN, in the western parts of Operation Peace
Spring area controlled by Turkey/Turkish-backed armed groups in Raqqa governorate, 30
assassinations or attacks with explosives were reported between July 2019 and June 2020.1873 Of these
attacks, 15 occurred between January and June 2020. The attacks resulted in 206 casualties. Of thesecasualties 176 were civilians who were targeted directly in 20 attacks.1874
A STJ report of March 2021 contains information on 3 cases of expropriation of agricultural lands in
Tall Abyad between April and August 2020, with cases of extorsion of rent for land use also
reported.1875

1868 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, January 1,2021–

March 31,2021, 4 May 2021, url, p. 61, 70
1869 Al-Hilu, K., The Turkish Intervention in Northern Syria: On Strategy, Discrepant Policies, European University Institute, 14
January 2021, url, p. 10
1870 Al-Hilu, K., The Turkish Intervention in Northern Syria: On Strategy, Discrepant Policies, European University Institute, 14
January 2021, url, p. 8
1871 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/45/31], 14 August 2020 [published 15 September 2020], url, p. 13 [para. 61]
1872 Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary: 8-14 June 2020, url, p. 6
1873 18 of these attacks were carried out with VBIED’s, 7 with landmines, 2 with IED’s, 2 with firearms, and 1 with grenades.
OMRAN Center for Strategic Studies, Indicators of Security Stability in Syria and Refugee Return: An Evaluation of SelectCases, December 2020, url, p. 53
1874 OMRAN Center for Strategic Studies, Indicators of Security Stability in Syria and Refugee Return: An Evaluation of SelectCases, December 2020, url, p. 51
1875 STJ, Syria: Crops Looted, Lands Seized in “Peace Spring” Territories, 11 March 2021, url, p. 14

194

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Security incidents
According to ACLED data, there were 1 238 security incidents recorded in Raqqa governorate, ofwhom 303 were coded as battles, 703 explosions/remote violence and 232 incidents of violenceagainst civilians. The number of security incidents remained steady for the first half of 2020,
registering an increase in security incidents between October 2020 and February 2021 (seeFigure 34).1876

Figure 34: Evolution of security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in Raqqa
governorate between January 2020 and March 2021, based on ACLED data1877

Most security incidents were recorded in Tall Abyad district, followed by Raqqa district which had thehighest number of incidents of violence against civilians out of all districts in the governorate (SeeFigure 35).1878

District
Raqqa
Ath-Thawrah
Tall Abyad
Total

Raqqa governorate – Security incidents
RemoteViolence against
Battlesviolence
civilians
139
85
145
42
62
88
51
156
470
232
303
703

Figure 35: Security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in Raqqa governorate
between 1 January 2020 and 31 March 2021. Breakdown by district based on ACLED data

Illustrative security incidents••

On 4 April 2020, unknown perpetrators killed eight civilians in the town of Ma’dan.1879
On 22 April 2020, a roadside IED exploded in Raqqa city, killing a child and injuring another.1880

1876 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (9 April 2021), url1877 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (9 April 2021), url
1878 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (9 April 2021), url
1879 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),

2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2020/576], 24 June
2020, url, p. 19 [Annex]
1880 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2020/576], 24 June
2020, url, p. 19 [Annex]

195

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

On 7 May 2020, ISIL assassinated a colonel acting as the chief of the GoS Air Force Intelligencein Dibsi Afnan sector in northern Raqqa governorate. According to Gregory Waters, thismarked ‘the northernmost known [ISIL] attack in [GoS]-held Raqqa’.1881
On 25 May 2020, a civilian was stabbed by an SDF-member in Raqqa city.1882
On 5 June 2020, an armed group operating in Tall Abyad city detained six family members ofan escaped detainee. According to the UN Security Council, one of the detainees was releasedon 6 June while there was no information of the fate of the remaining five detainees.1883
On 20 June, an UXO exploded and killed a child in Tall Abyad city.1884
On 7 July 2020, a VBIED exploded in Tall Abyad city killing six civilians and wounding at least
14 others.1885
On 18 July 2020, a landmine exploded in Hunaydah village, located in the rural parts ofwestern Raqqa governorate, killing two children.1886
On 6 August 2020, a hand grenade exploded in Tall Abyad city, injuring 20 civilians.1887
On 16 October 2020, a ground-based strike targeting Ayn Issa town killed one civilian andwounded eight others.1888
On 28 November 2020, a news source claimed that two civilians had been killed and several
others injured as the result of increased shelling at the Ayn Issa frontline.1889
On 31 December, Al-Qaeda-affiliate Hurras al-Din (‘Guardians of Religion’) attacked a Russianbase in Tall al-Samen with a VBIED.1890 According to Syria Direct, opposition sources claimed
that several Russian soldiers were killed or injured in the attack.1891 ISW reports that several
Russian soldiers were injured in the attack. According to ISW, the attack, utilising both a VBIEDand firearms, was the first carried out by Hurras al-Din outside north-west Syria.1892

1881 Waters, G., The Syrian Regime’s Combat Losses in Spring 2020, and What Lies Ahead, MEI, June 2020, url, p. 9; the exact

date of the incident is confirmed by Waters, G., May 7 - Lt Colonel Ahmad Mahmoud, Air Force Intelligence commander ofDibsi Afnan sector of W #Raqqa, killed by a landmine… [Twitter], 8 May 2020, url
1882 Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary: 25-30 May 2020, url, p. 5
1883 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2020/813], 20 August 2020, url, p. 20 [Annex]
1884 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2020/813], 20 August 2020, url, p. 20 [Annex]
1885 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2020/813], 20 August 2020, url, p. 20 [Annex]
1886 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2020/813], 20 August 2020, url, p. 20 [Annex]
1887 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2020/1031], 14 October 2020, url, p. 18 [Annex]
1888 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2020/1195], 11 December 2020, url, p. 18 [Annex]
1889 Enab Baladi, ‫عي عيش‬‫[ ضحايا نتيجة تصاعد قصف يستهدف “عاصمة قسد” ر‬Casualties from an escalation of shelling targeting ‘[SDF] capital’ Ayn
Issa], 28 November 2020, url
1890 ISW, Syria Situation Report: December 16, 2020 - January 7, 2021, 11 January 2021, url; Al Nofal, W., By targeting a
Russian base in Raqqa, Hurras al-Din sends a multifaceted message, Syria Direct, 6 January 2021, url
1891 Al Nofal, W., By targeting a Russian base in Raqqa, Hurras al-Din sends a multifaceted message, Syria Direct, 6 January
2021, url1892 ISW, Syria Situation Report: December 16, 2020 - January 7, 2021, 11 January 2021, url

196Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation•••

On 5 January 2021, a landmine exploded and killed two children in an agricultural area near
Ayn Issa.1893
On 26 January 2021, a roadside IED exploded and killed three civilians and wounded twoothers in Tall Abyad city.1894
Between 19 and 21 March 2021, one child was killed four other civilians injured in clashes
between the Turkish-backed armed groups and the SDF.1895

Civilian fatalities
Month
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
AugustSeptember
OctoberNovember
December
Total

VDC 2020
23
20
14
10
11
12
14
10
10
2
9
5
140

SNHR 2020
29
17
6
2
6
3
11
9
5
1
15
4
108

VDC 2021935SNHR 2021
5
4
7

17

16

Figure 36. Civilian fatalities as a result of armed conflict in Raqqa governorate in 2020 and first three months of 2021. Monthly
breakdown based on VDC and SNHR data

1893 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),

2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2021/160], 18 February 2021, url, p. 19 [Annex]
1894 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2021/160], 18 February 2021, url, p. 19 [Annex]
1895 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2021/390], 22 April
2021, url, p. 19 [Annex]; van Wilgenburg, W., Syria: Heavy fighting between SDF and Turkey-backed groups continues aroundAin Issa, Kurdistan 24, 23 March 2021, url

197

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

In 2020, Raqqa had between 1081896 (SNHR data)1897 and 140 civilian fatalities (VDC data).1898 Most
civilian fatalities were documented in January, February and July 2020. In the first three months of2021, SNHR recorded 16 civilian fatalities in Raqqa governorate, while VDC recorded 17 civilian
fatalities in the same period.
Infrastructure damage and explosives remnants of war
The situation of the civilian population of Raqqa governorate with regard to infrastructure damageand explosive remnants of war is analysed in the EASO COI Report: Syria - Security situation (May2020).1899
UNESCWA reports the damage to physical capital of Raqqa governorate around 6.7 billion USD (8.3 %of all the damage inflicted on Syrian physical capital) between 2011–2018 and notes how the US-led
coalition’s bombing campaign against ISIL in 2017 ‘destroyed the entire urban system’ in thegovernorate.1900
According to Mine Action Review’s 2020 report on mine clearance, the retreating ‘Islamic State’fighters ‘left massive contamination of mines of an improvised nature and other improvised devices’
causing heavy damage to the returning civilians in areas under ISIL’s former influence in Raqqa
governorate.1901 Mine Action Review notes that international and national demining organisations
have taken part in demining activities in areas under SDF control in north-east Syria. Humanitarian
demining organisations and commercial companies have reportedly carried out ‘large-scale clearance’in former ISIL areas with a company called Tetra Tech operating in Raqqa, Deir Ez-Zor and Baghuz andfocusing on critical infrastructure (healthcare, schools, water and electricity).1902
For information on the Turkish-controlled Operation Peace Spring area with regard to landmines andexplosive remnants of war, see Section Infrastructure damage and explosives remnants of war of the
Hasaka governorate chapter.
Displacement and return
According to UNOCHA, approximately 7 000 IDPs were newly displaced in Raqqa governorate in 2020.
Of these, approximately 5 000 were displaced within Raqqa governorate while significant numbers ofdisplacements to Deir Ez-Zor (1 400) and Hasaka (900) governorates were also registered.
1896 In a January 2021 report, SNHR mentions 106 civilian fatalities in Raqqa in 2020. This figure is the result of a revision of

their data. EASO email correspondence with SNHR, 22 April 2021. See SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 1,734
Civilians in Syria in 2020, including 99 in December, 1 January 2021, url, p. 121897 Based on data extracted from monthly reports on civilian casualties published by SNHR. See: SNHR, 286 Civilians,
including Four Medical and Civil Defense Personnel, Documented Killed in Syria in January 2020, 1 February 2020, url, p. 8;
SNHR, 276 Civilians, including Six Medical Personnel and Two Media Workers, Documented Killed in Syria in February 2020,
1 March 2020, url, p. 8; SNHR, 145 Civilians, including Two Medical Personnel, Documented Killed in Syria in March 2020, 1
April 2020, url, p. 9; SNHR, 78 Civilians, including One Media Workers, Documented Killed in Syria in April 2020, 1 May 2020,
url, p. 10; SNHR, 125 Civilians Documented Killed in Syria in May 2020, including Eight Who Died Due to Torture and One
Massacre, 1 June 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, 1,006 Civilians, including three Media Workers and 12 Medical and Civil Defense
Personnel, Documented Killed in Syria in the First Half of 2020, 1 July 2020, url, p. 16; SNHR, 107 Civilians, including 26
Children and 11 Women, Documented Killed in Syria in July 2020, 2 August 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, 122 Civilians, including 21
Children and Seven Women, Documented Killed in Syria in August 2020, 1 September 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, Extrajudicial
Killing Claims the Lives of 102 Civilians, including 15 Children, 10 Women, Three Medical Personnel and 12 Victims Due toTorture, 1 October 2020, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 126 Civilians, including 18 Children, Eight
Women, One Media Worker and 10 Victims Due to Torture, 1 November 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims
the Lives of 172 Civilians, including 16 Children, 11 Women, and 30 Victims Due to Torture, 1 December 2020, url, p. 9; SNHR,
Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 1,734 Civilians in Syria in 2020, including 99 in December, 1 January 2021, url, p. 141898 Based on monthly civilian fatalities figures for 2020-2021 shared by VDC with EASO
1899 EASO, Syria - Security Situation. May 2020, url, pp. 158–159
1900 UNESCWA/ University of St Andrews, Syria at War; Eight Years On, 2020 [published on 23 September 2020], url, p. 50–
51.
1901 Mine Action Review, Clearing the Mines 2020, 1 October 2020, url, p. 378
1902 Mine Action Review, Clearing the Mines 2020, 1 October 2020, url, p. 379

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Approximately 1 000 IDPs from other governorates were displaced to Raqqa. Significant numbers ofarrivals from Idlib (1 200) were registered.1903 In January 2021, no new IDPs from Raqqa wereregistered while 25 people from other governorates were displaced to Raqqa.1904 In February 2021,
19 new IDPs from Raqqa governorate were registered, all of them were displaced to othergovernorates. At the same time, 550 IDPs arrived to Raqqa from other governorates.1905 In March
2021, UNOCHA recorded 9 IDP movements which took place within the governorate.1906
According to UNOCHA, approximately 7 000 IDPs returned to their homes located in Raqqa
governorate in 2020. Of these, approximately 4 000 were displaced within the governorate, while
significant numbers of returnees from Hasaka (2 400) and Aleppo (400) governorates were also
registered. At the same time, approx. 1 000 IDPs residing in Raqqa returned to their homes in othergovernorates, mainly to Homs and Deir ez-Zor.1907 In January 2021, 160 IDPs returned to their homes
in Raqqa governorate. Of these none were originally displaced within the governorate. In addition, 4
IDPs returned from Raqqa to other governorates.1908 In February 2021, 60 IDPs returned to theirhomes in Raqqa governorate. Of these none were originally displaced within the governorate. No
returns to other governorates were registered.1909 In March 2021, UNOCHA recorded 366 IDP return
movements to the governorate.1910

1903 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements Overview, Jan - Dec 2020 (As of 31 December 2020), 8 March 2021, url
1904 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements (January 2021), 4 March 2021, url
1905 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements (February 2021), 1 April 2021, url
1906 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, IDP Movements. March 2021, 12 May 2021, url1907 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Spontaneous IDP Returnee Movements Overview, Jan – Dec 2020, 8 March 2021, url1908 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns (January 2021), 2 March 2021, url1909 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns (February 2021), 1 April 2021, url
1910 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic. IDP Spontaneous Returns. March 2021, 12 May 2021, url

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2.9 Deir Ez-Zor governorate

Map 15: © MapAction, Deir Ez-Zor governorate map1911

2.9.1 General description of the governorate
Deir Ez-Zor governorate is located in eastern Syria. The governorate has an international border with
Iraq to the east, and internal borders to with Homs to the south, with Raqqa to the west and with
Hasaka to the north. The Euphrates river passes through the governorate, dividing it into two parts.

1911 MapAction, Deir-ez-Zor Governorate, 29 July 2016, url

200Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation(see Map 15).1912 Deir Ez-Zor is administratively divided into three districts: Deir Ez-Zor, Al-Mayadin,
and Al-Bukamal (alternatively Albu Kamal, Abu Kamal), and into 14 sub districts.1913
The Central Statistics Bureau of Syria estimated that the population of Deir Ez-Zor governorate was
1 206 000 in 2019.1914 In a March 2021 report, UNOCHA estimated the population of Deir Ez-Zor
governorate to be of 765 352 inhabitants.1915
According to Ziad Awad, Deir Ez-Zor governorate has ‘overwhelmingly’ Sunni Arab population1916 andthe local society has been ‘characterised by ethnic, religious and sectarian homogeneity’.1917 In thereport published in October 2019, Awad estimates that approximately 350 000-400 000 people live in
GoS-controlled areas and states that the proportion of Shi’as is still ‘marginal’.1918 In the ACU reportof December 2017, the proportion of Shi’as was estimated as 2 %(almost 25 000 individuals)1919 of
Deir Ez-Zor’s total population.1920
The Syrian-Iraqi border crossing in Al-Bukamal has been described as ‘a major strategic thoroughfare
between Damascus and Baghdad’ and as ‘the focal point of a regional geopolitical rivalry’ between
Iran and the US/Israel.1921

2.9.2 Conflict background and armed actors
Deir Ez-Zor governorate is roughly divided into two areas of control. The western part of thegovernorate – that is, mainly the areas west of the Euphrates river – is controlled by the GoS and its
Iranian and Russian allies. This area covers the major cities (Deir Ez-Zor city, Mayadin and Al-Bukamal)
and the logistical route connecting GoS-controlled areas to the Syrian-Iraqi border. The eastern partof the governorate – most of the areas east of the Euphrates River – is controlled by the Kurdishdominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and their allies in the US-led coalition.1922 The GoS and its
allies had captured most of the areas west of the Euphrates river from the so-called ‘Islamic State’(ISIL) by the end of 2017. The GoS has controlled parts of Deir Ez-Zor city throughout the conflict.1923
The SDF and the US-led coalition captured the last ISIL-held territorial enclave on the eastern side of
the river in March 2019.1924
During the reference period for this report, the security situation in Deir Ez-Zor governorate has been
affected by ISIL’s expanding and intensifying insurgency, the tribal protests affecting the SDF1912MapAction, Deir-ez-Zor Governorate, 29 July 2016, url; UNOCHA, Humanitarian Atlas, Syrian Arab Republic, January 2017,

url, p. 131913 The district of Deir Ez-Zor is further divided into sub-districts of Deir ez-Zor, Basira, Khasham, Kisreh, Muhasan, Sur andTabi; Albu Kamal into sub-districts of Abu Kamal, Hajin, Jalaa and Susat; and Al-Mayadin into sub-districts of Al-Mayadin,
Ashara and Thiban. UNOCHA, Humanitarian Atlas, Syrian Arab Republic, January 2017, url, p. 131914 Syria, Central Bureau of Statistics, Estimate of the population in Syria by governorates, n.d., url
1915 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview. Syrian Arab Republic, March 2021, url, p. 23
1916 Awad, Z., Iran in Deir ez-Zor: Strategy, Expansion, and Opportunities, European University Institute, 21 October 2019,url, p. 17
1917 Awad, Z., Deir Al-Zor after Islamic State: Between Kurdish Self Administration and a Return of the Syrian Regime,
European University Institute, March 2018, url, [p. 19] [unnumbered]1918 Awad, Z., Iran in Deir ez-Zor: Strategy, Expansion, and Opportunities, European University Institute, 21 October 2019,url, p. 17
1919 An approximation calculated by the drafter.
1920 ACU utilises the estimates based on 2011 census according to which the total population of Deir ez-Zor is 1 237 413.
ACU, Displacement and Violations in Deir Ez-Zor and Ar-Raqqa, December 2017, url, p. 1
1921 Hasan, H. & Khaddour K., The Transformation of the Iraqi-Syrian Border: From a National to a Regional Frontier, Malcolm
H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, 31 March 2020, url
1922 Based on reading of maps in Etana Syria, Military Control Across Syria [Map], 1 April 2021 [published on 6 April 2021],
url; Jusoor for Studies, Map of the military bases and posts of foreign forces in Syria [Map], 6 January 2021, url; UN Human
Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/46/54],
21 January 2021 [published 18 February 2021], url, p. 31 [Annex II J] [Map]1923 For details, see EASO, Syria - Security Situation. May 2020, url, pp. 162–163
1924 For details, see EASO, Syria - Security Situation. May 2020, url, pp. 162–163

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controlled parts of Deir Ez-Zor governorate and the Iran-related security incidents (mainly US andIsraeli airstrikes) reported in GoS-controlled parts of the governorate (for further information, see
Section Iran-related security incidents in GoS-controlled Deir Ez-Zor). In addition, Syria’s major
oilfields1925 are located in the SDF-controlled eastern Deir Ez-Zor governorate. These include Al-Omar
oil field, which is the largest oil field in Syria. According to Fabrice Balance, Al-Omar oil field alone was
responsible for 50 % of Syria’s [pre-war] oil production.1926 However, in the article published in
September 2020, Kenneth R. Rosen describes Al-Omar oil field as ‘mostly abandoned’.1927
The control of Syria’s oil wealth was a significant source of tensions reported in both Deir Ez-Zor andHasaka governorates (for Deir Ez-Zor, see Section 2.9.3 Recent security trends and impact on thecivilian population, for Hasaka governorate, see Section Tensions between the SDF and other actors
in north-east Syria/Tensions between the US-led Coalition and Russia).
Syrian Arab Army and affiliated armed groups
The GoS forces – consisting mostly of the SAA formations and National Defense Forces (NDF) – control
the western part of Deir Ez-Zor governorate with the help of Iranian-backed armed groups and Russia.
According Kayla Koontz and Gregory Waters, the 17th Infantry Division of the SAA, led by Major
General Ghassan Mohammed since December 2017, is the most central SAA formation in Deir Ez-Zor
governorate. Since November 2019, Maj. Gen. Mohammed has also acted as the head of the Deir EzZor Military and Security Committee nominally in charge of all the military and security operations
conducted in the governorate.1928
According to Oula Alrifai and Ali Alleile, the GoS-controlled western parts of Deir Ez-Zor governorate
can be divided into two ‘spheres of influence’. The SAA is in control of the northern part of this area,‘run’ by the 4th Division and the 5th Corps. The southern part of GoS-controlled Deir Ez-Zor
governorate, including the cities of Mayadin and Al-Bukamal, is ‘increasingly dominated’ by the
Iranian-backed armed groups.1929 The fact that the 5th Corps is controlled1930 or at least backed1931 by
Russia while the 4th Division of the SAA is affiliated with Iran1932 complicates this dynamic.
In July 219 Gregory Waters stated that the 3rd Battalion of the 7th Brigade of the 5th Corps has beenpermanently present in Deir Ez-Zor governorate where it has both held territory and conducted antiISIL operations with units from the 17th Division. In addition, other 5th Corps Brigades have also
participated in the anti-ISIL operations conducted in the governorate.1933 However, Alrifai and Alleileclaim that the 5th Corps formations in Deir Ez-Zor governorate were transferred in their entirety to
Raqqa governorate in July 2020.1934

1925 Awad, Z., Deir Al-Zor after Islamic State: Between Kurdish Self Administration and a Return of the Syrian Regime,

European University Institute, March 2018, url, [p. 9] [unnumbered].
1926 Balanche, F., The Race for Deir al-Zour Province, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 17 August 2017, url
1927 Rosen, K. R., Who Benefits from a U.S. Oil Deal in Northeast Syria?, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Fikra
Forum, 18 September 2020, url
1928 Koontz, K. & Waters, G., Between the Coalition, ISIS, and Assad: Courting the Tribes of Deir ez-Zor, Middle East Institute,
3 November 2020, url, p. 4–5
1929 Alrifai, O. A. & Alleile A., Russian-Iranian Tensions in Deir al-Zour, The Washington Istitute for Near East Policy, 4September 2020, url
1930 Alrifai, O. A. & Alleile A., Russian-Iranian Tensions in Deir al-Zour, The Washington Istitute for Near East Policy, 4September 2020, url;
1931 Lavrov, A., The Efficiency of the Syrian Armed Forces: An Analysis of Russian Assistance, Malcolm H. Kerr, Carnegie Middle
East Center, 26 March 2020, url
1932 COAR, The Syrian economy at war, Part 1: Armed group mobilization as livelihood and protection strategy, September
2020, url, p. 8; Al-Dassouky, A., The Role of the Syrian Army’s Fourth Division, Chatham House, October 2020, url
1933 Waters, G., The Lion and The Eagle: The Syrian Arab Army’s Destruction and Rebirth, Middle East Institute, 18 July 2019,url
1934 Alrifai, O. A. & Alleile A., Russian-Iranian Tensions in Deir al-Zour, The Washington Istitute for Near East Policy, 4September 2020, url

202Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

According to Koontz and Waters, the Deir Ez-Zor NDF is led by tribal figure Firas Jeham and recruits
extensively among the tribes in the region.1935 According to Alrifai and Alleile, the GoS’ ‘efforts toestablish control on the ground’ in areas recaptured from ISIL in 2017 were ‘limited’ which gave thelocal NDF free reign and resulted in war crimes and human rights abuses, including looting and forced
appropriation of civilian property. After March 2019, the GoS’ presence in the western parts of Deir
Ez-Zor governorate has remained limited which has led to a ‘Iranian-Russian competition overresources and land’.1936
See EASO COI Report: Syria - Security situation (May 2020) for information on other SAA formations
deployed in Deir Ez-Zor governorate.1937
Iran and Iranian-backed armed groups
Iranian forces and other Iranian-affiliated armed groups are present in eastern Syria where they
provide support for other GoS-affiliated forces in their anti-ISIL operations and maintain control of theterritory captured from ISIL and the logistical routes connecting Syria (and Lebanon) to Iran (via
Iraq).1938 According to Jusoor Center for Studies map of January 2021, Iran has 13 military sites in Deir
Ez-Zor governorate. These sites are located mainly around the cities of Deir Ez-Zor, Al-Mayadin and
Al-Bukamal.1939 According to ORSAM analyst Ömer Behram Özdemir, Iranian-backed armed groups
are stationed along the line between Tabni (west of Deir Ez-Zor city) and Al-Bukamal (near the SyrianIraqi border) while they are also operating in the rural areas of western Deir Ez-Zor (bordering the
Badia desert).1940 Alrifai and Alleile estimate that almost 1 000 Iranian fighters and ‘a few hundred’
fighters from Iranian-backed Iraqi and Afghani armed-groups are deployed in Deir Ez-Zor
governorate.1941
According to a map published by the Atlantic Council and charting the influence of Iran and Iranianbacked armed groups in Syria in 2020, these control the cities of Al-Bukamal and Al-Mayadeen andhave permanent presence/military sites north-west of Al-Bukamal city, south-west of Deir Ez-Zor city,
and along the (military) road between unofficial border crossing south-west of Al-Bukamal/Qa’im
crossing and eastern Homs governorate. Outside these cities and other sites of more permanent
presence, Iranian-backed armed groups are noted to have influence along the main roads in western
Deir Ez-Zor governorate. These include the road running through the Euphrates river valley from AlBukamal/Qa’im border crossing to Raqqa governorate, the section of M20 highway running between
Deir Ez-Zor city and Homs governorate and the (military) road between unofficial border crossing
south-west of Al-Bukamal/Qa’im crossing and eastern Homs governorate.1942
According to Fabrice Balanche, the Iranian-backed armed groups are also in control of both theinternal border separating the western, GoS-controlled part of Deir Ez-Zor governorate from theeastern part of the governorate controlled by the SDF. These groups also control the Syrian-Iraqi
border south of the Euphrates.1943 According to Alrifai and Alleile, the IRGC and the Iranian-backed

1935 Koontz, K. & Waters, G., Between the Coalition, ISIS, and Assad: Courting the Tribes of Deir ez-Zor, Middle East Institute,

3 November 2020, url, p. 4–5
1936 Alrifai, O. A. & Alleile A., Russian-Iranian Tensions in Deir al-Zour, The Washington Istitute for Near East Policy, 4September 2020, url
1937 EASO, Syria - Security Situation. May 2020, url, pp. 163–164
1938 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, January 1,2020–
March 31,2020, 13 May 2020, url, p. 61; USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the UnitedStates Congress October 1,2020–December 31,2020, 9 February 2021, url, p. 57
1939 Jusoor for Studies, Map of the military bases and posts of foreign forces in Syria [Map], 6 January 2021, url
1940 Özdemir, Ö. B., Three Fronts of Iranian-Backed Militia in Deir ez-Zor, ORSAM, 22 February 2021, url
1941 Alrifai, O. A. & Alleile A., Russian-Iranian Tensions in Deir al-Zour, The Washington Istitute for Near East Policy, 4September 2020, url
1942 Saban, N., Factbox: Iranian influence and presence in Syria, Atlantic Council, 5 November 2020, url1943 Balanche F., The Assad Regime Has Failed to Restore Full Sovereignty Over Syria, The Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, 10 Fabruary 2021, url

203Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

armed groups are also active in ‘several villages’ east of the Euphrates river.1944 According to ISW, on
10 September 2020, the IRGC erected a military post in Hatlah, located on the eastern side of
Euphrates River, along the road from Deir Ez-Zor city to Hasaka. ISW estimates that the IRGC tried toextend its presence to mainly SDF-controlled eastern part of Deir Ez-Zor governorate in order to garnersupport among the local Arab tribes.1945
According to a Washington Institute for Near East Policy report of March 2021, Iran has also ‘takenover a great deal of key public and private infrastructure’, e.g. in health care sector, in the GoScontrolled western part of Deir Ez-Zor governorate. Iranian religious organisations have also takencare of the local population, promising aid ‘in return for loyalty and openness to Twelver Shia
teachings, values, and ways of life’.1946 In addition, Iranian forces have also recruited Syrians into theranks of various Iranian-backed armed groups to strengthen their influence in Deir Ez-Zor
governorate.1947 Ahmed al-Ramadan, the director of opposition-affiliated Euphrates Post interviewed
by Al-Monitor, describes the Fatemiyoun Brigade as ‘one of the largest Iranian militias deployed in
Deir ez-Zor’ and describes it as one of the groups increasing their recruitment efforts among local
youth in early 2021.1948
According to the map published by the Atlantic Council, Lebanese Hezbollah has military presence anda pocket of influence south of Deir Ez-Zor city.1949 Jusoor Center for Studies map of January 2021 charts
Hezbollah 7 military sites in Deir Ez-Zor governorate.1950 According to Özdemir, in addition to
Hezbollah, the following Iranian-backed armed groups have presence in GoS-controlled Deir Ez-Zor
governorate (as of 2021):
•
•
•
•
•
•

Liwa al-Quds
Liwa al-Baqir
The Fatemiyoun Brigade
The Zainebiyoun Brigade
Syrian1951 ‘Brigade 313’
Various Iraqi Shia militias (Badr Organization, Harakat al-Abdal, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba,
Kata’ib al-Imam Ali, Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, Liwa al-Tufuf, Liwa Zulfiqar)1952 1953

RussiaAccording to Jusoor Center for Studies map of January 2021, Russia has 7 military sites in GoScontrolled wester parts of Deir Ez-Zor governorate, all of them in Euphrates river valley with four in1944 Alrifai, O. A. & Alleile A., Russian-Iranian Tensions in Deir al-Zour, The Washington Istitute for Near East Policy, 4September 2020, url1945 ISW, Syria Situation Report: September 2 -15, 2020, 18 September 2020, url
1946 Alrifai, O. A., In the Service of Ideology: Iran's Religious and Socioeconomic Activities in Syria, The Washington Institutefor Near East Policy, 14 March 2021, url, p. 19
1947 Al-Khateb, K., Iranian forces form new groups to boost influence in east Syria, Al Monitor, 23 February 2021, url; Alrifai,
O. A., In the Service of Ideology: Iran's Religious and Socioeconomic Activities in Syria, The Washington Institute for Near
East Policy, 14 March 2021, url, p. 19
1948 Al-Khateb, K., Iranian forces form new groups to boost influence in east Syria, Al Monitor, 23 February 2021, url
1949 Saban, N., Factbox: Iranian influence and presence in Syria, Atlantic Council, 5 November 2020, url
1950 Jusoor for Studies, Map of the military bases and posts of foreign forces in Syria [Map], 6 January 2021, url
1951 For further information on Brigade 313 and other Iran-backed Syrian Shia militias, see Saban, N., Factbox: Iranian
influence and presence in Syria, Atlantic Council, 5 November 2020, url
1952 For more information on these groups, see Dury-Agri, J. R. et al., Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces.
Orders of Battle, ISW, December 2017, url
1953 Özdemir, Ö. B., Three Fronts of Iranian-Backed Militia in Deir ez-Zor, ORSAM, 22 February 2021, url

204Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

and around Deir Ez-Zor city.1954 According to Alrifai and Alleile, Russian forces operating in Deir Ez-Zor
governorate have pursued to ‘secure strategic sites’, including the Deir ez-Zor military airport.1955
In April 2020, Russian forces sent a patrol in Mayadin. Alrifai and Alleile estimate that the patrols
purpose was to ‘signal Iranian militias’ about Russia’s intentions to take over the oil resources southof Mayadin and that Russia intends to ‘contain [Iran’s] influence further south in Al-Bukamal’.1956 ISW
reports that Russian forces strengthened their positions near Al-Bukamal with 300 military personnel
and armoured vehicles on 16 December 2020 and set up a new military base with more armoured
vehicles in Al-Bukamal city on 5 January 2021. ISW speculates that this move demonstrated Russia’s
will to gain influence in areas traditionally in control of the Iranian-backed armed groups.1957
On 31 May 2020, opposition media Enab Baladi reported that Russia had begun the recruitment of
Syrian mercenaries for the Libya conflict, attempted before in southern Syria, also in GoS-controlled
Deir Ez-Zor.1958
Syrian Democratic Forces
For background information on the SDF, see Section 1.4.3 Syrian Democratic Forces.
According to Fabrice Balanche, the SDF controls the internal border between the Syrian governmentcontrolled western part and the SDF-controlled eastern part of Deir Ez-Zor governorate. In the easternpart of the governorate, SDF also controls the international border between Syria and Iraq.1959
However, Aaron Zelin claims that the eastern Deir Ez-Zor governorate can be considered as anadministrative hinterland for the SDF which focused mainly on Hasaka governorate. Zelin estimatesthat ISIL has benefitted from this lack of local control and support for the SDF in Deir Ez-Zor as well asfrom the October 2019 Turkish military incursion, which forced the SDF to relocate its forces closer toTurkish border. The partial withdrawal of US forces has also played a role.1960
The US-led Coalition
According to Fabriche Balanche, US troops have presence in the oilfields that stretch along the easternbank of the Euphrates river in south-east Deir Ez-Zour governorate.1961 The map on ‘The Complex
Operating Environment of North-eastern Syria’ in the USDOD report of February 2021 notes thepresence of US forces the eastern bank of Euphrates River, opposing the city of Mayadin.1962 According
to Jusoor Center for Studies map of January 2021, the US has 10 military sites in SDF-controlled easternparts of Deir Ez-Zor governorate: nine in the oilfields east/south-east of Deir Ez-Zor city and two
in/near the town of Sur.1963 According to a map by researcher Levent Kemal, the US has 8 military sites

1954 Jusoor for Studies, Map of the military bases and posts of foreign forces in Syria [Map], 6 January 2021, url
1955 Alrifai, O. A. & Alleile A., Russian-Iranian Tensions in Deir al-Zour, The Washington Istitute for Near East Policy, 4September 2020, url
1956 Alrifai, O. A. & Alleile A., Russian-Iranian Tensions in Deir al-Zour, The Washington Istitute for Near East Policy, 4September 2020, url
1957 ISW, Syria Situation Report: December 16, 2020 - January 7, 2021, 11 January 2021, url
1958 Enab Baladi, ‫ التجنيد الروس ف ليبيا يصل إل دير الزور‬..‫[ بالتفاصيل‬In detail.. The Russian recruitment to Libya arrives to Deir ez-Zor], 31 May‫ي ي‬
2020, url
1959 Balanche F., The Assad Regime Has Failed to Restore Full Sovereignty Over Syria, The Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, 10 Fabruary 2021, url
1960 Zelin, A. Y. & Knights, M., The Islamic State's Resurgence in the COVID Era?, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
29 May 2020, url
1961 Balanche, F., The Fragile Status Quo in Northeast Syria, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1 July 2020, url[map]
1962 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress October 1,2020–
December 31,2020, 9 February 2021, url, p. 56
1963 Jusoor for Studies, Map of the military bases and posts of foreign forces in Syria [Map], 6 January 2021, url

205Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situationin Deir Ez-Zor governorate: Six in the oilfields, one in the town of Sur and one close to administrative
border with Raqqa governorate.1964
According to an analysis by COAR Global from 19 October 2020, the US-led Coalition has increased its
military presence in Deir Ez-Zor governorate. Two military bases have been established in the SDFcontrolled eastern part of the governorate, one in near Jazerat Oil Field and another in Baghuz. In
addition, more troops and equipment has been sent to Al-Omar Oil Field base, situated north of AlMayadin city.1965
ISIL
ISIL has more permanent presence and activity in GoS-controlled western parts of Deir Ez-Zor
governorate.1966 According to Gregory Waters, it has been estimated that between 1 000 and 1 800
ISIL fighters operate in Badia desert region (in western Deir Ez-Zor, northern Homs and southern
Raqqa governorates), forming 15 to 20 groups with ‘approximately 70 % of all fighters located in theurban belt along the western side of the Euphrates’.1967 According to International Crisis Group, ISIL’s
fighters have the ability ‘to coalesce, set up checkpoints and extort protection money from local oil
traders’ and ‘routinely threaten’ locals – including land and shop owners, factory managers, doctors
and others – in order to extort money (zakat) from those perceived to be wealthy enough to pay. In
addition, ISIL has the ‘ability to train new recruits in desert areas west of the Euphrates’, supposedly
in GoS control.1968
The USDOD report of November 2020, describes the Middle Euphrates river valley and the desert
areas in Deir Ez-Zor governorate as ISIL’s ‘support zone’ which its members can utilise to avoid security
operations and to transfer arms, equipment and personnel across the Syrian-Iraqi border.1969 In
addition, the report mentions ‘the permissive environment’ provided by the lack of effective anti-ISIL
operations in the sparsely inhabited desert areas of GoS-controlled western Deir Ez-Zor, bordering
Homs governorate.1970

2.9.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population
ISIL’s insurgency in Deir Ez-Zor
In an analysis published in August 2020, Gregory Waters states that ISIL has put into effect ‘an everexpanding insurgency’ against the SAA and its allies, mainly Russia, Iran and affiliated militias, incentral Syria, including southern Raqqa and western parts of Deir Ez-Zor governorate. This insurgency
began already in late 2017. However, since the beginning of 2019, the ISIS cells operating in central
Syria, including the ones based in the rural and urban areas of GoS-controlled wester Deir Ez-Zor
governorate, have become stronger and expanded their ‘geographic reach and effectiveness of their
attacks’.1971According to the report published by OMRAN Center for Strategic Studies discussing thesecurity situation in Deir Ez-Zor governorate between July 2019 and June 2020, the number of1964 Kemal, L., Suriye'de YPG bölgesindeki Rus ve ABD üsleri sayıları [Map] [Twitter], 1 March 2021, url
1965 COAR, Fire on the coast: Damascus vows support — but not much, 19 October 2020, url
1966 Based on reading of maps in Etana Syria, Military Control Across Syria [Map], 1 April 2021 [published on 6 April 2021], url[Map]; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/46/54], 21 January 2021 [published 18 February 2021], url, p. 31 [Annex II J] [Map]1967 Waters, G., Strengthening and Expanding: ISIS’ Central Syria Campaign, Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, 19
August 2020, url
1968 International Crisis Group, The SDF Seeks a Path Toward Durable Stability in North East Syria, 25 November 2020, url
1969 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, July 1,2020–
September 30,2020, 3 November 2020, url p. 22
1970 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, July 1,2020–
September 30,2020, 3 November 2020, url p. 23
1971 Waters, G., Strengthening and Expanding: ISIS’ Central Syria Campaign, Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, 19
August 2020, url

206Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situationassassinations and attacks with explosives (162) reported during this period, and ‘likely’ carried out by
ISIL, indicates the existence of ‘a connected network for assassinations and explosions with thecapacity to act’ with the actors responsible for the security in different parts of the governorate‘unable to halt these incidents’.1972
According to an assessment by Aaron Zelin from late May 2020, Deir Ez-Zor had seen most ISIL attacks
in Syria, especially in 2020. Zelin notes that ISIL had conducted 638 attacks in Deir Ez-Zor governoratein the preceding 14 months.1973 According to the OMRAN Center for Strategic Studies, between July
2019 and June 2020, all in all 162 attacks were reported in Deir Ez-Zor governorate, including 123
assassinations and 39 attacks with explosives, resulting in 444 casualties. 191 of the reported
casualties were civilians who were directly targeted in 8 of the attacks.1974 With regard to Deir Ez-Zor’s
ISIL’s activities in Deir Ez-Zor in 2020, 94 assassinations or attacks with explosives occurred in thegovernorate in the period between January–June 2020. 17 of these took place in January, 12 in
February, 11 in March, 17 in April, 29 in May, and 8 in June.1975 According to data gathered by Gregory
Waters and presented in the article published by Newlines Institute, ISIL conducted 93 attacks in Deirez-Zor governorate in 2020, with 11 attacks in January, 3 in February, 6 in March, 11 in April, 13 inMay, 3 in June, 3 in July, 10 in August, 11 in September, 8 in October, 6 in November and 8 in December
2020.1976 According to US sources reporting to the USDOD, there were 615 ISIL attacks recorded in
Syria in 2020. Around 50 % of all ISIL attacks documented by USDOD in 2020 took place in Deir Ez-Zor
governorate.1977
According to Kayla Koontz and Gregory Waters, ISIL has increased attacks targeting shepherds andlocal militias in the GoS-controlled western Deir Ez-Zor governorate in order to breed generalinstability and anger against the SAA.1978 The SAA formation (the 17th Division) in charge of thegovernorate and the local tribal NDF are said to lack the willingness and the ability to cooperate inlaunching anti-ISIL operations in the governorate.1979 The security situation in GoS controlled Deir EzZor is described as ‘untenable’ and in need of expanded military support from the government andoperation level cooperation between the SAA and NDF.1980 Koontz and Waters note that, since January
2020, there has been a sharp increase of ISIL attacks in the urban areas between Deir Ez-Zor city andMa’adan. These attacks have targeted villages and members of Busaraya tribe that the GoS has reliedheavily on when establishing and expanding the Deir Ez-Zor branch of the NDF.1981 According to
Waters, ISIL receives assistance from NDF commanders with facilitating the smuggling of weapons and1972 OMRAN Center for Strategic Studies, Indicators of Security Stability in Syria and Refugee Return: An Evaluation of SelectCases, December 2020, url, p. 27
1973 Zelin, A. Y. & Knights, M., The Islamic State's Resurgence in the COVID Era?, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
29 May 2020, url
1974 OMRAN Center for Strategic Studies, Indicators of Security Stability in Syria and Refugee Return: An Evaluation of SelectCases, December 2020, url, p. 20
1975 OMRAN Center for Strategic Studies, Indicators of Security Stability in Syria and Refugee Return: An Evaluation of SelectCases, December 2020, url, pp. 16–19
1976 Waters G., ISIS in Syria: 2020 in Review, Newlines Institute, 10 February 2021, url [Table: ‘ISIS Accaks by Province’]
1977 Total based on cumulating quarterly reporting of ISIL attacks. USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve. Lead Inspector
General Report to the US Congress, January 1, 2020‒March 31, 2020, 13 May 2020, url, p. 51; USDOD, Operation Inherent
Resolve. Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, April 1, 2020‒June 30, 2020, 4 August 2020, url, p. 27; USDOD,
Operation Inherent Resolve. Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, July 1, 2020‒September 30, 2020, 3
November 2020, url, p. 23; USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, October
1 2020 – December 31 2020, 9 February 2021, url, p. 16
1978 Koontz, K. & Waters, G., Between the Coalition, ISIS, and Assad: Courting the Tribes of Deir ez-Zor, Middle East Institute,
3 November 2020, url, p. 1
1979 Koontz, K. & Waters, G., Between the Coalition, ISIS, and Assad: Courting the Tribes of Deir ez-Zor, Middle East Institute,
3 November 2020, url, p. 5
1980 Koontz, K. & Waters, G., Between the Coalition, ISIS, and Assad: Courting the Tribes of Deir ez-Zor, Middle East Institute,
3 November 2020, url, p. 11
1981 Koontz, K. & Waters, G., Between the Coalition, ISIS, and Assad: Courting the Tribes of Deir ez-Zor, Middle East Institute,
3 November 2020, url, p. 3–4, 5–6.

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human individuals across the Euphrates river. In addition, Waters notes an ISIL attack from midNovember 2020, in which an NDF commander was killed, allegedly as a result of intelligence sharedwith ISIL by a rival commander.1982
In 2020, ISIL cells have also been active in the SDF-controlled eastern Deir Ez-Zor governorate.
According to Zelin, in these areas, ISIL has engaged in revenge strikes against local leaders, staged
attacks against oil and gas supply lines, conducted raids targeting convoys and kidnapped people forransom and also for the purposes of prisoner swaps and intelligence gathering.1983 Koontz and Waters
state that ISIL is targeting local tribal leaders allied with the SDF with the aim of destabilising thesecurity and undermining the political legitimacy of the Autonomous Administration in the region.1984
Koontz and Waters point out that the increasing number of ISIL attacks in the SDF-controlled areas is
exacerbating the tensions rising from the fact that local tribes are the main targets of the attacks while
their ability to respond is subordinated to SDF’s security structure which is currently overburdened
and unable to reduce the number of attacks.1985
The CoI states that attacks by ISIL targeting the US-led international coalition and the SDF in Deir EzZor governorate increased in the first half of 2020 (11 January–1 July 2020).1986 At the same time, thesecurity situation in Deir Ez-Zor governorate ‘deteriorated’ also as the result of increased security
operations by the SDF targeting alleged ISIL members.1987 According to RIC, in 2020 ISIL cells operatingin the SDF-controlled North-East Syria carried out 572 attack, killing 299 people. The SDF-affiliatedauthorities conducted 221 security operations targeting ISIL sleeper cells and 575 arrests targeting
allegedly ISIL-affiliated individuals. The wide majority of the attacks were carried out in the SDFcontrolled eastern Deir Ez-Zor governorate.1988
The central factors of USDOD’s analysis on ISIL’s activities in Syria have remained constant through2020. In the period between January and March 2020, USDOD noted the ‘steady stream of attacks’ inDeir Ez-Zor governorate1989, with the attacks focusing on Deir Ez-Zor city and adjacent areas1990,
although the attacks in the governorate decreased 37 % when compared to the previous quarter.1991
According to RIC, in January 2020, ISIL carried out 50 attacks in SDF-controlled North-East Syria with
40 of the attacks taking place in Deir Ez-Zor governorate. 32 people, including 13 village elders were
killed in the attacks.1992 In February, ISIL carried out 61 attacks SDF-controlled North-East.1993 26
people were killed in these attacks.1994 In March 2020, ISIL carried out 48 attacks SDF-controlled

1982 Waters, G., ISIS in Syria: 2020 in Review, Newlines Institute, 10 February 2021, url
1983 Zelin, A. Y. & Knights, M., The Islamic State's Resurgence in the COVID Era?, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,

29 May 2020, url
1984 Koontz, K. & Waters, G., Between the Coalition, ISIS, and Assad: Courting the Tribes of Deir ez-Zor, Middle East Institute,
3 November 2020, url, p. 1
1985 Koontz, K. & Waters, G., Between the Coalition, ISIS, and Assad: Courting the Tribes of Deir ez-Zor, Middle East Institute,
3 November 2020, url, p. 9–10
1986 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/45/31], 14 August 2020 [published 15 September 2020], url, p. 15 [para. 70]
1987 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/45/31], 14 August 2020 [published 15 September 2020], url, p. 2 [para. 5]
1988 RIC, Annual Sleeper Cell Report for North and East Syria, January 2021, url, p. 2
1989 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, January 1,2020–
March 31,2020, 13 May 2020, url, p. 19
1990 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, January 1,2020–
March 31,2020, 13 May 2020, url, p. 52
1991 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, January 1,2020–
March 31,2020, 13 May 2020, url, p. 51
1992 Rojava Information Center, Annual Sleeper Cell Report for North and East Syria, January 2021, url, p. 3
1993 Rojava Information Center, Annual Sleeper Cell Report for North and East Syria, January 2021, url, pp. 3, 7
1994 Rojava Information Center, Annual Sleeper Cell Report for North and East Syria, January 2021, url, p. 8

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North-East Syria.1995 24 people were killed in these attacks1996, of which 73 % (35 attacks) were carriedout in Deir Ez-Zor governorate.1997
According to USDOD, in the period between April and June 2020, most ISIL attacks were carried out in
Deir Ez-Zor governorate. The majority of the attacks targeted the SDF and utilised small arms and
IEDs1998, while USDOD estimated that ISIL ‘continues to receive some support from Sunni
communities’ of the Middle Euphrates river valley.1999 According to RIC, ISIL carried out 47 attacks2000
in the SDF-controlled North-East Syria in April 2020.2001 29 people were killed in these attacks.2002 In
May 2020, ISIL carried out 84 attacks in SDF-controlled North-East Syria2003, killing 36 people.2004 In
June 2020, ISIL carried out 45 attacks2005, resulting in 22 fatalities.2006 RIC notes that 73 % of the attacks(33 attacks) were carried out in the ‘Arab dominant regions’ of SDF-controlled north-east Syria (i.e. in
Deir Ez-Zor, Raqqa and southern Hasaka governorates).2007 2008
USDOD notes that, between July–September 2020, ISIL’s activities in Syria focused on Deir Ez-Zor
governorate (along with Homs) and increased during the summer months. The attacks in GoScontrolled parts of the governorate were mostly IED-attacks, attacks carried out with small arms,
ambushes and assassinations.2009 USDOD assesses that the most significant ISIL attack in the period
between July–September 2020 occurred in GoS-controlled Deir Ez-Zor governorate on 27 August,when ISIL ambushed a NDF militia and killed at least 30 of its members.2010 According to RIC, ISIL
carried out 34 attacks SDF-controlled North-East Syria in July 2020.2011 18 people were killed in these
attacks.2012 In August 2020, ISIL carried out 64 attacks SDF-controlled North-East Syria.2013 32 people
were killed in these attacks.2014 Besides ISIL, the Turkish-backed SNA, the GoS-affiliated NDF and
Iranian-backed armed groups all conducted attacks in SDF-controlled North-East Syria in August2020.2015 In September 2020, ISIL carried out 51 attacks SDF-controlled North-East Syria2016, killing 15
people.2017

1995 Rojava Information Center, Annual Sleeper Cell Report for North and East Syria, January 2021, url, pp. 3, 7
1996 Rojava Information Center, Annual Sleeper Cell Report for North and East Syria, January 2021, url, p. 8
1997 Rojava Information Center, Annual Sleeper Cell Report for North and East Syria, January 2021, url, p. 4
1998 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, April 1,2020–June

30,2020, 4 August 2020, url, p. 27
1999 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, April 1,2020–June
30,2020, 4 August 2020, url, p. 27
2000 According to RIC, attacks in Ayn Issa carried out by Turkish-backed SNA-affiliated armed group Ahrar al-Sharqiya were
included in the reporting. RIC, Annual Sleeper Cell Report for North and East Syria, January 2021, url, p. 4
2001 Rojava Information Center, Annual Sleeper Cell Report for North and East Syria, January 2021, url, pp. 3, 7
2002 Rojava Information Center, Annual Sleeper Cell Report for North and East Syria, January 2021, url, p. 8
2003 Rojava Information Center, Annual Sleeper Cell Report for North and East Syria, January 2021, url, pp. 3, 7
2004 Rojava Information Center, Annual Sleeper Cell Report for North and East Syria, January 2021, url, p. 8
2005 Rojava Information Center, Annual Sleeper Cell Report for North and East Syria, January 2021, url, pp. 3, 7
2006 Rojava Information Center, Annual Sleeper Cell Report for North and East Syria, January 2021, url, p. 8
2007 Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2018, url, p. 52 [Map]; Netjes R.
& van Veen, E., Henchman, Rebel, Democrat, Terrorist. The YPG/PYD during the Syrian conflict, Clingendael, April 2021, url,
p. 5
2008 Rojava Information Center, Annual Sleeper Cell Report for North and East Syria, January 2021, url, p. 4
2009 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, July 1,2020–
September 30,2020, 3 November 2020, url p. 23
2010 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, July 1,2020–
September 30,2020, 3 November 2020, url p. 25
2011 Rojava Information Center, Annual Sleeper Cell Report for North and East Syria, January 2021, url, pp. 3, 72012 Rojava Information Center, Annual Sleeper Cell Report for North and East Syria, January 2021, url, p. 8
2013 Rojava Information Center, Annual Sleeper Cell Report for North and East Syria, January 2021, url, pp. 3, 72014 Rojava Information Center, Annual Sleeper Cell Report for North and East Syria, January 2021, url, p. 82015 Rojava Information Center, Annual Sleeper Ccell Report for North and East Syria, January 2021, url, p. 52016 Rojava Information Center, Annual Sleeper Cell Report for North and East Syria, January 2021, url, pp. 3, 72017 Rojava Information Center, Annual Sleeper Cell Report for North and East Syria, January 2021, url, p. 8

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According to USDOD, ISIL’s attacks in Syria in the period between October and December 2020 focusedon both the GoS-controlled areas and the SDF-controlled areas. The majority of the attacks werecarried out in the Middle Euphrates river valley, with almost 50 % of the attacks reported in Deir EzZor governorate.2018 All ISIL attacks were ‘small-scale attacks and assassinations’ and targeted both
civilians and members of both the SDF and GoS forces.2019 According to USDOD, ISIL claimed 27 attacks
targeting the SDF in this period.2020 Between October and December 2020, ISIL also continued its
assassination campaign targeting both military and civilian leadership in SDF-controlled areas in order
to increase the tensions between the SDF and the local population.2021 According to RIC, ISIL carriedout 45 attacks SDF-controlled North-East Syria in October 2020.2022 10 people were killed in these
attacks.2023 According to RIC, 31 attacks took place in Deir Ez-Zor, 7 in Hasaka, 4 in Raqqa and 3 in
Manbij.2024 In November 2020, ISIL carried out 16 attacks SDF-controlled North-East Syria in November
20202025, killing 15 people.2026 In December 2020, 34 attacks were carried out2027, resulting in 34
fatalities.2028 29 of these attacks were reported in the ‘Arab regions’.2029 2030
According to local sources cited by COAR Global and assessing the year 2020, ISIL was most active in
December 2020 and many attacks were reported in both SDF-controlled and GoS-controlled parts ofDeir Ez-Zor governorate.2031 According to the article by Sirwan Kajjo from 27 December 2020, ISIL
attacks in SDF-controlled Deir Ez-Zor governorate intensified in the preceding weeks. On
26 December 2020, the SDF and the US-led Coalition launched a campaign targeting ISIL cells innorthern Deir Ez-Zor governorate.2032 According to REACH, in November 2020, attacks by ISIL and the‘heightened tensions’ between the SDF-affiliated local authorities and the local population ‘increased
security concerns’ among the population in SDF-controlled Deir Ez-Zor.2033
According to the UN Security Council report of April 2021, discussing the situation in Syria in February
and March 2021, ISIL continued to target the GoS forces and the SDF with ‘ambush attacks andassassination attempts’ in Deir Ez-Zor and Hasaka governorates, as well as in eastern rural areas ofHoms governorate.2034 According to the USDOD, ISIL’s ‘small-scale IED and hit-and-run attacks’ andassassinations continued in Syria in the period between January and March 2021.2035 ISIL was said tomaintain a ‘significant presence in rural farming communities’ in the SDF-controlled areas andassassinations targeting ‘tribal and civic leaders and other influential figures’ continued in SDF-

2018 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress October 1,2020–

December 31,2020, 9 February 2021, url, p. 18
2019 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress October 1,2020–
December 31,2020, 9 February 2021, url, p. 152020 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress October 1,2020–
December 31,2020, 9 February 2021, url, p. 16
2021 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress October 1,2020–
December 31,2020, 9 February 2021, url, p. 152022 Rojava Information Center, Annual Sleeper Cell Report for North and East Syria, January 2021, url, pp. 3, 72023 Rojava Information Center, Annual Sleeper Cell Report for North and East Syria, January 2021, url, p. 82024 Rojava Information Center, Annual Sleeper Cell Report for North and East Syria, January 2021, url, p. 62025 Rojava Information Center, Annual Sleeper Cell Report for North and East Syria, January 2021, url, pp. 3, 72026 Rojava Information Center, Annual Sleeper Cell Report for North and East Syria, January 2021, url, p. 82027 Rojava Information Center, Annual Sleeper Cell Report for North and East Syria, January 2021, url, pp. 3, 72028 Rojava Information Center, Annual Sleeper Cell Report for North and East Syria, January 2021, url, p. 82029 Cf. ‘Arab dominant regions’ above.
2030 Rojava Information Center, Annual Sleeper Cell Report for North and East Syria, January 2021, url, p. 62031 COAR, Quamishli Clashes: GoS and SDF Seek Pressure Points, 18 January 2021, url
2032 Kajjo, S., US-Backed SDF Targets IS Militants in Eastern Syria, VOA, 27 December 2020, url
2033 REACH, Humanitarian Situation Overview in Syria (HSOS): Northeast Syria, November 2020, 21 December 2020, url, p. 1
2034 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2021/390], 22 April
2021, url, p. 3 [Para. 6]2035 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, January 1,2021–
March 31,2021, 4 May 2021, url, p. 2

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controlled parts of Deir Ez-Zor and Hasaka2036, with civilians also targeted by these attacks.2037 The
USDOD estimates that, in this period, ISIL was responsible for ‘near-daily attacks’ against the GoS andaffiliated forces, including Russia, in the Middle Euphrates river valley.2038
According to Al-Monitor article published in November 2020, ISIL leaders and other people affiliatedwith the organisation were able to maintain their presence in the area after the capture of ISIL’s last
territorial stronghold in Baghouz with the assistance of local tribes. Local journalist Zain al-Abidin
claims that ISIL’s capacity to operate in eastern Deir Ez-Zor governorate has been made possible, i.a.,by the SDF’s lack of popularity, the fear instilled by ISIL in the local population and the collaboration
between some SDF leaders and ISIL operatives in the region. Abidin claims that ISIL operatives aretargeting civilians in eastern Deir Ez-Zor governorate, forcing them to pay protection money or ‘taxes’(zakat) for the organisation and targeting the people dealing with drugs or selling tobacco, thosedeemed as secular, those having extramarital affairs or those ‘engage[d] in sorcery’.2039 These
practices of collecting zakat and ‘punishing’ of secular and non-practising Muslims’ by ISIL in parts ofnominally SDF-controlled Deir Ez-Zor are also noted by Patrick Cockburn.2040 Journalist Ahmed alSheble, cited in the Al-Monitor article published in November 2020, claims that, with regard to SDFcontrolled eastern Deir Ez-Zor governorate, ISIL is particularly active in the villages of Al-Shuhail, Hajin,
Susah and Baghouz.2041
According to the article by the BBC, ISIL carried out ‘more than 100 attacks in north-eastern Syria’ inJanuary 2021. The article notes that the attacks took place mainly in Deir ez-Zor province. A researcher
interviewed for the article focuses on ‘a small area east of Deir Ez-Zor city’, controlled by the SDF, andnotes that attacks in that area alone included assassinations, kidnappings, beheadings and bomb and
VBIED attacks. In addition, the researcher claims that in a town located in that particular unnamedarea, ISIL fighters are free to terrorize the local population at night-time, since the SDF leaves the area
after sunset. Similar claim is made by another local source who states that the area where she lives is‘almost under the IS members’ control’ at night-time and that every day ‘one or two people [are]getting killed’. Similar claim is made by Patrick Cockburn, according to whom ‘parts of the countrysidearound Deir [ez-Zor]’ are ruled by ISIL by night.2042 The source in the BBC article states that people
linked to the GoS or the SDF are mainly at risk while ‘shopkeepers and other businesspeople are also
being targeted’ with threats, extortion and kidnappings and killings of their family members. In
addition, there have been cases of local criminals posturing as ISIL members to extort the local
population.2043
Tribal protests in the SDF-controlled eastern Deir Ez-Zor
As already discussed above with regard to Hasaka and Raqqa governorates, the power in SDFcontrolled areas has concentrated disproportionately in the hands of ethnic Kurds and a small groupof Arab leaders closely associated with the PYD. Although the Kurds do not have representation in
Deir Ez-Zor local council, advisors affiliated with the PYD set limits on the council’s ability to makedecisions, and many local Arab leaders have complained that Kurds have too much control over the2036 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, January 1,2021–

March 31,2021, 4 May 2021, url, p. 162037 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, January 1,2021–
March 31,2021, 4 May 2021, url, p. 622038 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, January 1,2021–
March 31,2021, 4 May 2021, url, p. 62039 Al-Kanj, S., Islamic State regroups in Syrian Kurdish region, Al-Monitor, 9 November 2020, url
2040 Cockburn, P., After IS, LRB Vol. 43 No. 3, 4 February 2021, url
2041 Al-Kanj, S., Islamic State regroups in Syrian Kurdish region, Al-Monitor, 9 November 2020, url
2042 Cockburn, P., After IS, LRB Vol. 43 No. 3, 4 February 2021, url
2043 Thomson, M., IS brutality returning to Syrian towns, BBC, 7 February 2021, url

211Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

administrative institutions in the governorate.2044 Menchy (et al.) mention the fuel committee of Deir
Ez-Zor, responsible for ‘fuel allocation and distribution in [Deir ez-Zor] region’, as an example of‘widespread corruption’ within the Autonomous Administration governance structures and describes
the leading role of the PKK-affiliated ‘cadros’ (for further information see Section 1.4.3 Syrian
Democratic Forces) as one of the main factors enabling the committee’s abuse of power.2045
In March 2020, Al-Monitor’s Khaled al-Khateb reported that security conditions in SDF-controlled
eastern parts of Deir Ez-Zor governorate were deteriorating as a result of the SDF security operations
targeting civilians and ongoing demonstrations against the SDF, possibly provoked by locals associatedwith the GoS. Al-Khateb reports that The SDF has ‘a tight grip on all aspects of civilian life’ in theeastern parts of Deir Ez-Zor governorate and cites sources criticising both the corruption of local
councils connected to the SDF and the repressive measures adopted by the SDF-led administration
toward peaceful protesters. On 8 March 2020, the SDF-affiliated Deir Ez-Zor military council fired
directly on protesters in the town of Mohaymada, killing one civilian and wounding many others. On
13 March, the SDF-affiliated local security forces conducted raids in Jadeed Ekedat and in a refugee
camp in Mohaymada, supposedly as a reaction to a roadside bomb that exploded on 11 March in the
town of Shafa, targeting SDF-patrol and killing one and wounding dozens. Al-Khateb lists six incidents
from preceding months (early 2020) where the SDF-led local security forces had targeted protesters
with raids and arrests in SDF-controlled parts of eastern Syria.2046
According to COAR Global, the SDF announced the beginning of a new wide-ranging anti-ISIL campaign
on 4 June 2020 that covered SDF-controlled areas from southern rural Hasaka governorate to Baghouz
in eastern Deir Ez-Zor governorate. The campaign extended to areas on both sides of the Syrian-Iraqi
border and it was coordinated with Iraqi central government, the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga forces andthe US-led international coalition. On 10 June, SDF announced the end of the initial phase of thecampaign during which raids had been conducted in 65 locations and 110 individuals arrested. Local
sources told COAR Global that the campaign was a direct response to ISIL’s increasing activity in thearea, while they suspected that the campaign also targeted individuals opposing the SDF, including
individuals affiliated with the GoS.2047
On 4 August 2020, increasing tensions between the SDF and local tribes led to demonstrations in the
SDF-controlled towns of Al-Shuhayl, Theban and Al-Hawayiji.2048 The demonstrations were provokedby the assassination of Aqidat tribal chief Matsher Hamoud al-Hafl on 2 August 2020, as well as byother assassinations targeting prominent tribal figures in late July/early August.2049 ISW reports that
the SDF responded to the protests violently, opening fire at protestors and injuring 7.2050 According toAl-Monitor, the SDF opened fire towards protestors in Al-Hawayiji,2051 where, according to COAR
Global, ‘five civilians and four SDF members were injured in a shootout.’2052 Different sources claim
different parties responsible for the assassinations: According to Koontz and Waters ISIL claimed

2044 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, April 1,2020–June

30,2020, 4 August 2020, url, p. 542045 The source describes the ‘cadros’ as ‘Kurdish individuals with technical expertise and long-term links to the inner circlesof the Democratic Union Party (PYD) or the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)’. Mehchy Z. et al., Assessing control and power
dynamics in Syria, Chatham House, November 2020, url, p. 222046 In all, Al-Khateb lists eight incidents. However, two of these (Tabqa and Mansoura) occurred in Raqqa governorate. AlKhateb, K., Deir ez-Zor residents protest rule by Syrian Kurdish group, Al-Monitor, 20 March 2020, url
2047 COAR, Damascus scrambles to contain economic rage as protests spread, 15 June 2020, url
2048 COAR, Cry Havoc: Assassinations Spark Anti-SDF Backlash, 17 August 2020, url; Koontz, K. & Waters, G., Between the
Coalition, ISIS, and Assad: Courting the Tribes of Deir ez-Zor, Middle East Institute, 3 November 2020, url, pp. 7–8
2049 COAR, Cry Havoc: Assassinations Spark Anti-SDF Backlash, 17 August 2020, url; Al-Kanj, S., Who is behind wave of killingsof tribal sheikhs in east Syria?, 8 September 2020, url; Koontz, K. & Waters, G., Between the Coalition, ISIS, and Assad:
Courting the Tribes of Deir ez-Zor, Middle East Institute, 3 November 2020, url, pp. 7–8
2050 ISW, Syria Situation Report: July 22 - August 4, 2020, 6 August 2020, url
2051 Al-Kanj, S., Who is behind wave of killings of tribal sheikhs in east Syria?, 8 September 2020, url
2052 COAR, Cry Havoc: Assassinations Spark Anti-SDF Backlash, 17 August 2020, url

212Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

responsibility for one of the assassinations that targeted the Aqidat spokesman Suleiman al-Kassar.2053
According to RIC, ‘a Iranian-linked group’ was responsible for al-Hafl’s assassination.2054 The tribal
and/or local sources interviewed for the Al-Monitor assert the blame to the SDF.2055 COAR Global
notes the tendency of the local tribes to blame the SDF and claims assassinations and protests are‘likely’ part of the GoS’ strategy to destabilize the SDF-controlled North-East Syria.2056
Some Aqidat tribal figures gathered in GoS-held Deir Ez-Zor city between 5–9 August 2020 to form atribal militia opposing the US and the SDF presence in Deir Ez-Zor governorate.2057 The SDF held its
own gathering, hosted by the Bakir tribe, in eastern Deir Ez-Zor governorate to reach out to thetribes.2058 According to Koontz and Waters, the unrests in Deir Ez-Zor resulted in a formation of a new
local security force that was described as ‘not subject to the SDF’ by a local tribe (Shaytat).2059
According to US government sources, SDF-led administration also addressed the grievances of local
communities on the administrative level, e.g., by launching ‘community listening sessions in eachmajor population center’ and an anti-corruption campaign investigating the Autonomous
Administration officials. The DIA estimated that the unrests in SDF-controlled Deir Ez-Zor gave ISIL,
GoS and Iran new possibilities to gain support among the tribes and to destabilise SDF-controlled
North-East Syria, although the majority of local Arab population preferred the SDF over ISIL or thecorrupted and abusive GoS.2060
ISW reports that on 8 September 2020 members of Aqidad tribe violently captured members of the
SDF and expelled them from Jdid Aqidad.2061 Based on information reported by the local media, ananalysis by COAR Global notes that the SDF conducted a raid in the town of Jdid Aqidad and imposeda curfew on the town as a response to a reported ISIL attack targeting the SDF in the area. COAR Global
notes that the locals believe the SDF’s ‘raid campaign’ in Deir Ez-Zor aimed to display ‘overwhelming
force to deter future assassinations or unrest’.2062
In early December 2020, SOHR reported on ‘escalating protests’ against the corruption of the SDFcontrolled governance institutions in the rural parts of SDF-controlled Deir Ez-Zor governorate.2063
According to COAR Global, people of several towns in the rural SDF-controlled Deir Ez-Zor organised
demonstrations in early January 2021 against the 2014 ‘self-defence law’ that enables the forced
conscription to the SDF. The demonstrations resulted in ‘violent clashes and repression’, with the SDF
dispersing them with force. COAR Global notes that other demonstrations against ‘the worsening
living conditions, public services, and security conditions’ had taken place in previous weeks(December 2020).2064 According to the Al-Monitor article published on 8 January 2021, the protests
were motivated by the ‘lack of services, arbitrary arrests and alleged discrimination’ by the SDF.2065
According to Syrian Association for Citizens’ Dignity (SACD), the main grievance behind the protests
organised in late 2020 and early 2021 and ‘increased tensions’ in SDF-controlled Deir Ez-Zor was the2053 Koontz, K. & Waters, G., Between the Coalition, ISIS, and Assad: Courting the Tribes of Deir ez-Zor, Middle East Institute,

3 November 2020, url, pp. 7–8
2054 Rojava Information Center, Annual Sleeper Cell Report for North and East Syria, January 2021, url, p. 52055 Al-Kanj, S., Who is behind wave of killings of tribal sheikhs in east Syria?, 8 September 2020, url
2056 COAR, Cry Havoc: Assassinations Spark Anti-SDF Backlash, 17 August 2020, url
2057 COAR, Cry Havoc: Assassinations Spark Anti-SDF Backlash, 17 August 2020, url; ISW, Syria Situation Report: August 5 18, 2020, 20 August 2020, url
2058 ISW, Syria Situation Report: August 5 - 18, 2020, 20 August 2020, url
2059 Koontz, K. & Waters, G., Between the Coalition, ISIS, and Assad: Courting the Tribes of Deir ez-Zor, Middle East Institute,
3 November 2020, url, p. 102060 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, July 1,2020–
September 30,2020, 3 November 2020, url pp. 53–54
2061 ISW, Syria Situation Report: September 2 -15, 2020, 18 September 2020, url
2062 COAR, Lavrov touts Russia’s primacy in Damascus visit, 14 September 2020, url
2063 SOHR, Deir Ezzor demonstrations: Tens of residents protest corruption of SDF officials, 7 December 2020, url
2064 COAR, Emboldened Self-Administration bids for greater power, 11 January 2021, url
2065 Kittleson, S., Protests, info warfare continue in Syria’s Deir ez-Zor, Al-Monitor, 8 January 2021, url

213

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

December 2020 forced conscription of teachers and students into the SDF. SACD notes ‘the lack ofconcern of civil peace, the deterioration of the security situation and the high costs of living’ in SDFcontrolled Deir Ez-Zor.2066
According to USDOD, the GoS and Russian forces made attempts in the period between April and June
2020 to gain more access to major oilfields in the SDF-controlled North-East Syria (eastern Deir Ez-Zor
governorate). Between July and September 2020, these actors increased their attempts to extend
their influence over the SDF and put pressure on the US to eventually withdraw from Syria. However,no significant attempts were made to gain access to the SDF-controlled oilfields by force.2067 ISW
reports that on 18 August 2020 three Katyusha rockets were fired near a US-led Coalition base locatedat Conoco Oil Fields in SDF-controlled eastern Deir Ez-Zor governorate with no casualties or material
damages reported.2068 ISW reports that the 18 August attack was later claimed by an Iranian-backed
militia. On 29 August 2020, another Iranian-backed armed group attacked the US-led Coalition basein Conoco Oil Fields with mortars.2069 According to USDOD, the GoS and its allies (Russia and Iran)maintained their push to gain influence among the local tribes in the Middle Euphrates River Valley inlate 2020. However, USCENTCOM estimates that no major tribal groupings had drawn its support fromthe SDF.2070
According to the USDOD report of February 2021, discussing the period October between December
2020, the Autonomous Administration had addressed the grievances of local Arab population byincreasing tribal representation in some governance structures, by arranging eight dialogue sessions
with local communities and by agreeing to speed up the return process of Syrians interned in the AlHol camp to their homes in Deir Ez-Zor and Raqqa governorates.2071 In the report published in
November 2020, Syria analysts Kayla Koontz and Gregory Waters observe that Deir Ez-Zor’s tribal
population has been absorbed to a ‘significant extent’ into the respective security structures of the
GoS and the SDF. However, the lack of support from both the government and the autonomous
administration in the face of increasing ISIL attacks compromises the long-term stability of thegovernorate. 2072
Iran-related security incidents in GoS-controlled Deir Ez-Zor
On 11 March 2020, local media sources reported about clashes between militias loyal to the IRGC andthe 4th Division of the SAA over the control of a checkpoint in the city of Mayadeen, claiming the lifeof one civilian an injuring two others.2073 According to COAR Global this incident (reported originallyby Al-Modon) and similar clashes between pro-GoS armed groups have happened repeatedly since
the government and its allies took over the western parts of Deir Ez-Zor in late 2019. COAR Global
estimates that these clashes, motivated mainly by the competition over checkpoints, smuggling
routes, and other spoils of war, are a central factor driving the local conflict in GoS-controlled Deir EzZor.2074
According to OMRAN, between October and December 2019, Al-Bukamal city saw 36 people being
extrajudicially detained and 55 abducted in 11 separate incidents. 26 civilians were detained by the2066 SACD, SACD seriously concerned with the actions of SDF authorities in Deir Ezzor, 2 February 2021, url
2067 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, July 1,2020–

September 30,2020, 3 November 2020, url p. 59
2068 ISW, Syria Situation Report: August 5 - 18, 2020, 20 August 2020, url
2069 ISW, Syria Situation Report: August 19 - September 1, 2020, 4 September 2020, url
2070 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress October 1,2020–
December 31,2020, 9 February 2021, url, p. 57
2071 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress October 1,2020–
December 31,2020, 9 February 2021, url, p. 58
2072 Koontz, K. & Waters, G., Between the Coalition, ISIS, and Assad: Courting the Tribes of Deir ez-Zor, Middle East Institute,
3 November 2020, url, p. 1
2073 Al Modon, ‫[ الميليشيات اإليرانية تطرد الفرقة الرابعة من الميادين‬Iranian militias expel the Fourth Division from Al-Mayadeen], 11 March 2020, url
2074 COAR, Bump in the road for first Russian-Turkish patrol on the M4, 16 March 2020, url

214Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Local Defence Forces (LDF). 10 members of the GoS forces were detained by thee Russian military
police. 18 civilians and 37 members of the GoS forces were abducted. The GoS forces’ members wereabducted and later killed by ISIL while the faith of the civilians remains unknown.2075 Between January
and March 2020, 30 people were detained and 10 abducted in 9 different incidents in Al-Bukamal. 16of the detainees were civilians and 14 from the LDF. The arrests were carried out by the LDF and theRussian military police. 6 abductees were from the LDF, 3 civilians and 1 from GoS security services.
ISIL carried out 2 abductions in which 3 civilians and 2 members of the LDF were kidnapped.2076
According to Harith Hasan and Kheder Khaddour, the Al-Bukamal area in Syrian-Iraqi border is affectedby tensions between the GoS and Iranian-backed armed groups.2077 According to a local defected
member of the GoS forces interviewed in the Al-Monitor article published in December 2020, GoS
forces and Iranian-backed armed groups share the control of cities in the GoS-controlled western Deir
Ez-Zor governorate. The source notes that the potentially violent altercations between the GoS forces
and the Iranian-backed armed groups about the control of checkpoints and the right to exact feesfrom passers-by are a ‘daily’ phenomenon in the area.2078 In September 2020, Alrifai and Alleile also
noted the intensifying rivalry between Iran and Russia in GoS-controlled western Deir Ez-Zor that
‘could spill over into armed confrontations’.2079
During the reference period for this report, Israeli airstrikes targeting the Iranian-backed armed
groups (including Hezbollah, Liwa Fatemiyoun, IRGC and Kata’ib Hezbollah) in GoS-controlled areas of
Deir Ez-Zor governorate (mainly areas in and around Al-Bukamal), leading to casualties among thefighters.2080 On 25 February 2021, the US carried out an airstrike targeting facilities of a border control
point operated by Iran-backed Iraqi militias.2081 The airstrike was carried out near the city of AlBukamal2082 where it reportedly targeted Imam Ali air base.2083 SOHR claimed that the strikes killed atleast 17 militia members.2084 However, according to ISW, only one militia member was killed andanother two wounded in the strike.2085 The US officials described the operation as a response toattacks targeting US forces in Iraq (rockets attacks in Erbil in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region on 15 February)
and it gained special significance as the first military action by the Biden administration.2086

2075 OMRAN Center for Strategic Studies, Indicators of Security Stability in Syria and Refugee Return: An Evaluation of SelectCases, December 2020, url, p. 59
2076 OMRAN Center for Strategic Studies, Indicators of Security Stability in Syria and Refugee Return: An Evaluation of SelectCases, December 2020, url, p. 60–61
2077 Hasan, H. & Khaddour K., The Transformation of the Iraqi-Syrian Border: From a National to a Regional Frontier, Malcolm
H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, 31 March 2020, url
2078 Ahmed, A., Pro-Iran militias in Syria soak merchants for cash at checkpoints, Al Monitor, 21 December 2020, url
2079 Alrifai, O. A. & Alleile A., Russian-Iranian Tensions in Deir al-Zour, The Washington Istitute for Near East Policy, 4September 2020, url
2080COAR, 5th Corps and Government forces clash in Dar’a: A step-change for Syria’s most restive region as Oudeh and Russia
bid for more power?, 29 June 2020, url; COAR, Bump in the road for first Russian-Turkish patrol on the M4, 16 March 2020,
url; COAR, Changes to military service reflect Damascus’s unrealistic aims, growing socio-economic divide, 24 November
2020, url; COAR, Quamishli Clashes: GoS and SDF Seek Pressure Points, 18 January 2021, url; The Guardian/ AFP, Deadliest
Israeli airstrikes on Syria in years kill 57, say observers, 13 January 2021, url; ISW, Syria Situation Report: December 16, 2020
- January 7, 2021, 11 January 2021, url; ISW, Syria Situation Report: January 8-29, 2021, 29 January 2021, url; ISW, Syria
Situation Report: January 30 - February 18, 2021, 19 February 2021, url; ISW, Syria Situation Report: June 24 - July 6, 2020, 9
July 2020, url; ISW, Syria Situation Report: March 4-17, 2020, 20 March 2020, url; ISW, Syria Situation Report: November 11December 1, 2020, 3 December 2020, url; ISW, Syria Situation Report: September 2 -15, 2020, 18 September 2020, url
2081 BBC News, Biden approves US airstrike on Iran-backed militias in Syria, 26 February 2021, url; Rudaw/AFP, US strikes'Iranian-backed militant' site in Syria: Pentagon, 26 February 2021, url;
2082 Rudaw/AFP, US strikes 'Iranian-backed militant' site in Syria: Pentagon, 26 February 2021, url
2083 Al Jazeera, US attacks ‘Iranian-backed military infrastructure’ in Syria, 26 February 2021, url
2084 BBC News, Biden approves US airstrike on Iran-backed militias in Syria, 26 February 2021, url; Rudaw/AFP, US strikes'Iranian-backed militant' site in Syria: Pentagon, 26 February 2021, url
2085 ISW, Syria Situation Report: February 19 - March 22, 2021, 25 March 2021, url
2086 BBC News, Biden approves US airstrike on Iran-backed militias in Syria, 26 February 2021, url; CNN, US carries out air
strikes in Syria targeting Iranian backed militias, 26 February 2021, url

215

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Security incidents
According to ACLED data, in 2020 there were 1 322 security incidents recorded in Deir EzZor governorate, of whom 422 were battles, 466 explosive/remote violence and 434 incidents ofviolence against civilians.2087
The number of security incidents was highest between September and November 2020 and December
2020 and March 2021, lower levels being recorded in March, June and July 2020 (see Figure 37).2088

Figure 37: Evolution of security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in Deir EzZor governorate between January 2020 and March 2021, based on ACLED data2089

District
Albu Kamal
Al Mayadin
Deir Ez-Zor
Total

Deir ez-Zor governorate – Security incidents
Battles Remote violence Violence against civilians
53
51
148
96
122
126
285
249
192
434
422
466

Figure 38: Security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in Deir Ez-Zor governorate
between 1 January 2020 and 31 March 2021. Breakdown by district based on ACLED data

Security incidents were recorded in all three districts during the reference period, the highest number
being documented in Deir Ez-Zor district (see Figure 38).2090
Illustrative security incidents••

On 11 March 2020, a roadside IED exploded in the town of Sha’fah, killing one civilian andinjuring four others.2091
On 17 March 2020, a civilian was abducted and killed in Hawayji by unknown perpetrators.2092

2087 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (9 April 2021), url
2088 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (9 April 2021), url
2089 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (9 April 2021), url
2090 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (9 April 2021), url
2091 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),

2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2020/327], 23 April
2020, url, p. 19 [Annex]
2092 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2020/327], 23 April
2020, url, p. 19 [Annex]216

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

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On 19–20 April 2020, five civilians were abducted and later killed by unknown perpetrators.
Their bodies were discovered near the village of Turayf. 2093
On 23 April 2020, a drive-by shooting in Shahil city claimed the life of one civilian.2094
On 1 May 2020, a roadside IED exploded near the city of Busayrah, killing two children andinjuring three other civilians.2095
On 21 May 2020, a VBIED exploded in Busayrah city marketplace, killing a child and injuring
15 other civilians. Another VBIED exploded nearby soon after.2096
On 24 May 2020, online news outlet SY24 reported on a violent armed clash between Bakir
and Albufria tribes in the town of Mashakh, in SDF-controlled Deir Ez-Zor governorate, that
resulted in at least 10 civilian casualties.2097 According to COAR Global, the clash was amanifestation of a long term feud between the tribes and could have been caused by the factthat a Shaykh of the Bakir tribe had wielded his influence in the SDF-led local administration
for the benefit of his own tribe.2098
On 25 May 2020, a mine exploded in an agricultural area near the village of Mar'iyah, killing achild and injuring another civilian.2099
On 1 June 2020, a village chief was killed in Gharibah village, Basirah area in the rural parts ofeastern Deir ez-Zor governorate as a result of a drive-by-shooting later claimed by ISIL.2100
On 2 June 2020, ISIL claimed the assassination of the head of local commune (‘komin’) in
Breiha in SDF-controlled eastern Deir Ez-Zor governorate. According to COAR Global, andcontrary to the claim by ISIL, the assassination could have been a result of a personal blood
feud. Regardless of the actual cause of the assassination, the act can be seen as ademonstration of ISIL’s limited-scale salience in the governorate.2101
On 3 June 2020, an unknown party carried out a drive-by shooting in the Busaytin village inthe rural parts of northern Deir Ez-Zor governorate, killing a member of the Busaytin Local
Council.2102
On 15 June 2020, ‘unknown armed men’ attacked the Autonomous Administration
municipality building in Tayyani town and killed the town mayor.2103 According to the UN
Security Council gunmen assaulted the headquarters of the Tayyani Local Council in the town

2093 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),

2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2020/576], 24 June
2020, url, p. 19 [Annex]
2094 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2020/576], 24 June
2020, url, p. 19 [Annex]
2095 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2020/576], 24 June
2020, url, p. 19 [Annex]
2096 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2020/576], 24 June
2020, url, p. 19 [Annex]
2097 SY-24, ‫قتىل وجرىح باقتتال بي عشتتي ف دير الزور‬, 24 May 2020, url‫ر‬‫ر ر ي‬2098 COAR, M4 opens as Russia flexes muscles in NES, 1 June 2020, url
2099 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2020/576], 24 June
2020, url, p. 19 [Annex]
2100 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2020/813], 20 August 2020, url, p. 21 [Annex]
2101 COAR, Self Administration bids to corner grain market as SYP collapses, 8 June 2020, url
2102 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2020/813], 20 August 2020, url, p. 21 [Annex]
2103 Enab Baladi, ‫[ اغتيال رئيس بلدية تابع لـ”اإلدارة الذاتية” ف دير الزور‬The assassination of a mayor of the “Autonomous Administration” in Deir‫ي‬
Ezzor], 15 June 2020, url

217

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

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of Tayyani, located in the rural parts of eastern Deir Ez-Zor governorate. The chief of thecouncil was shot to death during the incident later claimed by ISIL.2104
On 25 June 2020, an UXO exploded in Al-Mayadin city in the eastern parts of Deir Ez-Zor
governorate, killing a child.2105
On 18 August 2020, an ISIL attack conducted by ISIL targeted a Russian convoy.2106 According
to an analysis by Gregory Waters, the attack took place at Tayem Gas Field, located near Deirez-Zor city, and claimed the lives of a Russian Major General, a senior commander of GoS
forces and four others.2107 According to ISW, the attack took place on 17 August and thecommander of the NDF in Mayadin district was killed in the attack.2108
On 27 August 2020, ISIL ambushed an NDF unit near al-Musarib, north of Deir ez-Zor city,
killing its commander and between 14 and 30 NDF fighters.2109
On 29 August 2020, a child was killed in sniper fire in the vicinity of Suwaydan Jazirah, locatedin the rural parts of eastern Deir Ez-Zor governorate.2110
On 11 September 2020, a drive-by shooting claimed the life of one civilian in Kubar town,
located in the rural parts of western Deir Ez-Zor governorate.2111
On 23 September 2020, a drive-by shooting claimed the life of one civilian in Basirah city,
located in the rural parts of eastern Deir Ez-Zor governorate. The responsibility for the attack
was later claimed by ISIL.2112
On 23 September 2020, a drive-by shooting claimed the life of one civilian in Dhiban, locatedin the rural parts of eastern Deir Ez-Zor governorate. The responsibility for the attack was later
claimed by ISIL.2113
On 28 September 2020, infighting among the GoS forces (Military Security and the local NDF)
broke out in al-Ashara. At least one civilian died as the result of the infighting.2114
On 17 October 2020, an UXO exploded in the town of Baghouz, killing two children andinjuring three others.2115

2104 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),

2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2020/813], 20 August 2020, url, p. 21 [Annex]
2105 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2020/813], 20 August 2020, url, p. 21 [Annex]
2106 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, July 1,2020–
September 30,2020, 3 November 2020, url p. 25
2107 Waters, G., Strengthening and Expanding: ISIS’ Central Syria Campaign, Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, 19
August 2020, url
2108 ISW, Syria Situation Report: August 5 - 18, 2020, 20 August 2020, url
2109 ISW, Syria Situation Report: August 19 - September 1, 2020, 4 September 2020, url
2110 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2020/1031], 14 October 2020, url, p. 18 [Annex]
2111 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2020/1031], 14 October 2020, url, p. 18 [Annex]
2112 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2020/1031], 14 October 2020, url, p. 18 [Annex]
2113 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2020/1031], 14 October 2020, url, p. 18 [Annex]
2114 Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary, Syria Weekly Conflict Summary for 28 September – 4 October 2020, 8
Octoober 2020, url
2115 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2020/1195], 11 December 2020, url, p. 18 [Annex]

218

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

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On 20 October 2020, a drive-by shooting claimed the life of a tribal leader in the town of
Sabhah, located in the rural parts of eastern Deir Ez-Zor governorate.2116
On 29 October 2020, an SDF-affiliated civilian administrator was slain by ISIL in al-Sabha.2117
On 11 November 2020, a body of a civilian allegedly murdered by ISIL was discovered in
Daman village, in the rural parts of eastern Deir Ez-Zor governorate.2118
On 18 November 2020, ISIL ambushed a SAA formation in Deir Ez-Zor governorate killing 10
SAA members, including a brigadier general.2119
Between 22–23 December 2020, a series of alleged ISIL attacks targeting SDF-affiliated civilian
and military leadership. A local official from Deir Ez-Zor died in one of the attacks (a carbomb).2120
On 12 December 2020, a landmine exploded and killed two civilians in Susah city, located in
the rural parts of eastern Deir Ez-Zor.2121
On 24 December 2020, ISIL ambushed a SAA transport vehicle close to al-Shula along the Deir
Ez-Zor City–Palmyra highway. ISW notes that the casualties caused by the attack remain
unreported. Another ambush along the same highway, near Kobajjep killed at least 30
soldiers. The ambushes targeted units from SAA’s 4th and 17th Division and involved IED’s andautomatic weapons fire. ISW estimates that ISIL’s attacks along the Deir Ez-Zor City–Palmyra
highway had ‘grown more spectacular’ and were threatening GoS’s ability to transportpersonnel and to conduct anti-ISIL operations in the area.2122
On 30 December 2020, ISIL attacked a GoS convoy in western parts of Deir Ez-Zor governorate
and killed up to 39 people.2123 According to an analysis by COAR Global, the attack occurred
near the town of Kebajib that is located approximately 50 km south-west of the city of Deir
Ez-Zor. COAR Global estimates that ‘at least 25 soldiers were killed and 13 were injured’ in theattack and notes that, according to Russian media, the attack claimed also the lives of 8
civilians.2124
On 6 January 2021, an UXO exploded and killed two children in Duwayr city, located in therural parts of eastern Deir Ez-Zor.2125
On 10 February 2021, ISIL attacked a GoS convoy in Al-Mayadin. At least 26 were killed in theattack, including 7 SAA members and Liwa al-Quds fighters.2126
On 5 March 2021, ISIL-related clashes broke out ‘on the main road running through Shahil
town close to an NGO-supported hospital’. The SDF responded to these clashes by assaulting

2116 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),

2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2020/1195], 11 December 2020, url, p. 18 [Annex]
2117 ISW, Syria Situation Report: October 28 - November 10, 2020, 13 November 2020, url
2118 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2020/11195], 11 December 2020, url, p. 17 [Annex]2119 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress October 1,2020–
December 31,2020, 9 February 2021, url, p. 542120 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress October 1,2020–
December 31,2020, 9 February 2021, url, p. 55
2121 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2021/160], 18 February 2021, url, p. 18 [Annex]
2122 ISW, Syria Situation Report: December 16, 2020 - January 7, 2021, 11 January 2021, url
2123 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress October 1,2020–
December 31,2020, 9 February 2021, url, p. 182124 COAR, Sanctions on Syria's Central Bank Set Course for a Grim 2021, 4 January 2021, url
2125 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2021/160], 18 February 2021, url, p. 18 [Annex]
2126 COAR, State Steps up as Soldiers Enter Public Service in Droves, 15 February 2021, url

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people inside the hospital, injuring several NGO staff members, patients and visitors andtemporarily detaining 12 people.2127
On 9 March 2021, a drive-by shooting claimed the life of a ‘prominent tribal figure’ in Hawayij
Diyab village.2128

Civilian fatalities
Month
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
AugustSeptember
OctoberNovember
December
Total

VDC 2020
25
15
21
14
25
5
6
25
16
14
21
20
207

SNHR 2020
33
23
31
29
20
17
8
21
23
18
46
36
305

VDC 2021222020SNHR 2021
23
22
14

62

59

Figure 39. Civilian fatalities as a result of armed conflict in Deir Ez-Zor governorate in 2020 and first three months of 2021.
Monthly breakdown based on VDC and SNHR data

In 2020, Deir Ez-Zor governorate had between 3052129 (SNHR data)2130 and 207 civilian fatalities (VDC
data).2131 Most civilian fatalities were documented in January, November and December 2020. In the2127 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),

2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2021/390], 22 April
2021, url, p. 3 [Para. 6]2128 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2021/390], 22 April
2021, url, p. 18 [Annex]2129 In a January 2021 report, SNHR mentions 301 civilian fatalities in Deir Ez-Zor in 2020. This figure is the result of a revisionof their data. EASO email correspondence with SNHR, 22 April 2021. See SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 1,734
Civilians in Syria in 2020, including 99 in December, 1 January 2021, url, p. 122130 Based on data extracted from monthly reports on civilian casualties published by SNHR. See: SNHR, 286 Civilians,
including Four Medical and Civil Defense Personnel, Documented Killed in Syria in January 2020, 1 February 2020, url, p. 8;
SNHR, 276 Civilians, including Six Medical Personnel and Two Media Workers, Documented Killed in Syria in February 2020,
1 March 2020, url, p. 8; SNHR, 145 Civilians, including Two Medical Personnel, Documented Killed in Syria in March 2020, 1
April 2020, url, p. 9; SNHR, 78 Civilians, including One Media Workers, Documented Killed in Syria in April 2020, 1 May 2020,
url, p. 10; SNHR, 125 Civilians Documented Killed in Syria in May 2020, including Eight Who Died Due to Torture and One
Massacre, 1 June 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, 1,006 Civilians, including three Media Workers and 12 Medical and Civil Defense
Personnel, Documented Killed in Syria in the First Half of 2020, 1 July 2020, url, p. 16; SNHR, 107 Civilians, including 26
Children and 11 Women, Documented Killed in Syria in July 2020, 2 August 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, 122 Civilians, including 21
Children and Seven Women, Documented Killed in Syria in August 2020, 1 September 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, Extrajudicial
Killing Claims the Lives of 102 Civilians, including 15 Children, 10 Women, Three Medical Personnel and 12 Victims Due toTorture, 1 October 2020, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 126 Civilians, including 18 Children, Eight
Women, One Media Worker and 10 Victims Due to Torture, 1 November 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims
the Lives of 172 Civilians, including 16 Children, 11 Women, and 30 Victims Due to Torture, 1 December 2020, url, p. 9; SNHR,
Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 1,734 Civilians in Syria in 2020, including 99 in December, 1 January 2021, url, p. 142131 Based on monthly civilian fatalities figures for 2020-2021 shared by VDC with EASO

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

first three months of 2021, SNHJR recorded 59 civilian fatalities, while VDC recorded 62 civilian
fatalities in Deir Ez-Zor governorate.
Infrastructure damage and explosives remnants of war
The situation of the civilian population of Deir Ez-Zor governorate with regard to infrastructuredamage and explosive remnants of war is analysed in the EASO COI Report: Syria - Security situation(May 2020).2132
UNESCWA estimates the physical capital loss of Deir Ez-Zor governorate around USD 5.5 billion (6.8 %of all the damage inflicted on Syrian physical capital) between 2011–2018 and explains the amount ofdamage by noting how intense hit-and-run clashes between the GoS forces and ISIL were ‘a constant
between 2014 and 2017’.2133
According to Mine Action Review’s 2020 report on mine clearance, the retreating ‘Islamic State’fighters ‘left massive contamination of mines of an improvised nature and other improvised devices’
causing heavy damage to the returning civilians in areas under ISIL’s former influence, including Deir
Ez-Zor governorate.2134 Mine Action Review notes that international and national demining
organisations have taken part in demining activities in areas under SDF control in north-east Syria.
Humanitarian demining organisations and commercial companies have reportedly carried out ‘largescale clearance’ in former ISIL areas with a company called Tetra Tech operating in Raqqa, Deir Ez-Zor
and Baghuz and focusing on critical infrastructure (healthcare, schools, water and electricity).2135
Displacement and return
According to UNOCHA, approximately 11 000 IDPs were newly displaced in Deir Ez-Zor governorate in2020. Of these, approximately 10 000 were displaced within Deir Ez-Zor governorate while asignificant number of displacements to Homs governorate (300) was also registered. Approx. 5 000
IDPs from other governorates were displaced to Deir Ez-Zor. Significant numbers of arrivals from
Hasaka (1 600), Raqqa (1 400), Damascus (900) and Aleppo (300) were registered.2136 In January 2021,
390 new IDPs from Deir Ez-Zor were registered, all of them were displaced within the governorate. In
addition, 170 IDPs were displaced to Deir Ez-Zor from other governorates.2137 In February 2021, 32
new IDPs from Deir Ez-Zor governorate were registered. All of them were displaced within thegovernorate. 172 IDPs arrived to Deir Ez-Zor from other governorates.2138 In March 2021, UNOCHA
recorded 115 IDP movements from or within the governorate.2139
According to UNOCHA, approximately 23 000 IDPs returned to their homes located in Deir Ez-Zor
governorate in 2020. Of these, approx. 12 000 were those displaced within Deir Ez-Zor governorate.
Most of the returnees from other governorates returned from Damascus (5 900) and Hasaka (3 800)
with smaller numbers also from Rural Damascus, Raqqa, and Aleppo.2140 In January 2021, 832 IDPs
returned to their homes in Deir Ez-Zor governorate. Of these 15 were originally displaced within thegovernorate. In addition, 13 IDPs returned from Deir Ez-Zor to other governorates.2141 In February
2021, 924 IDPs returned to their homes in Deir Ez-Zor governorate. Of these 78 were originally2132 EASO, Syria - Security Situation. May 2020, url, pp. 174–175
2133 ESCWA and University of St Andrews, Syria at War; Eight Years On, 2020 [published on 23 September 2020], url, p. 50–

51.
2134 Mine Action Review, Clearing the Mines 2020, 1 October 2020, url, p. 378
2135 Mine Action Review, Clearing the Mines 2020, 1 October 2020, url, p. 379
2136 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements Overview, Jan - Dec 2020 (As of 31 December 2020), 8 March 2021, url
2137 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements (January 2021), 4 March 2021, url
2138 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements (February 2021), 1 April 2021, url
2139 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, IDP Movements. March 2021, 12 May 2021, url
2140 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Spontaneous IDP Returnee Movements Overview, Jan – Dec 2020, 8 March 2021, url
2141 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns (January 2021), 2 March 2021, url

221Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

displaced within the governorate. No returns to other governorates were registered.2142In March
2021, UNOCHA recorded 1 100 IDP return movements to or within the governorate.2143

2142 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns (February 2021), 1 April 2021, url
2143 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic. IDP Spontaneous Returns. March 2021, 12 May 2021, url

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2.10 Damascus governorate

Map 16: © MapAction, Damascus governorate2144

2.10.1 General description of the governorate
Damascus governorate, which covers Syria’s capital, is located in the south-western part of Syria andis completely surrounded by the Rural Damascus (Rif Damashq) governorate. The governorate isdivided into 16 municipal districts: Barzeh, Qaboun, Jobar, Al-Shaghour, Al-Midan, Al-Qadam, Kafr
Sousa, Dummar, Al-Mazzeh, Rukn Al-Din, Al-Salihiyah, Al-Mouhajrin, Saroujah, Al-Qanawat, Old
Damascus, and Yarmouk camp.2145
Yarmouk is a refugee camp, located 8 km from Damascus city centre. It was set up in 1957 by the
Syrian government to house approximately 160 000 Palestinian refugees. Although the camp is
considered ‘unofficial’ by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees(UNRWA), the UN organisation supported it with health and education services.2146 In January 20192144 UNOCHA, Syria sub-districts maps [maps], n.d., url
2145 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, Governorates profile (June 2014), 6 August 2014, url, pp. 2-3; UNOCHA, Damascus

Governorate Reference map [map], n.d., url; ACU, The Demographic Change & Forced Displacement in Syria, 20 June 2017,
url, p. 182146 UNRWA, Yarmouk (unofficial camp), last updated 1 January 2019, url; BBC News, Profile: Yarmouk Palestinian refugee
camp, 7 April 2015, url

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

UNRWA described the camp as ‘largely destroyed’ and with ‘just a few dozen families’ living there.2147
Damascus city is largely integrated with large parts of the governorate of Rural Damascus throughcontiguous built-up areas. Hence, it is difficult to distinguish the administrative boundaries separatingthem.2148
The Syrian Central Bureau of Statistics estimated the city’s population at 2 079 000 as of 2019.2149 In a
March 2021 report, UNOCHA estimated the population of Damascus governorate to be of 1 827 501
inhabitants.2150 As of March 2021, the CIA estimated Damascus’ population at 2 440 000
inhabitants.2151
Accurate and updated information on the ethno-religious composition of Damascus is not available.
Throughout the conflict, the city’s demography was subject to constant change marked by new arrivals
and departures and ensuing overcrowding, a Syrian fellow with Synaps, an information network,
pointed out. Displaced communities from across the country have become packed together in thecapital, giving rise to a larger, more ‘segmented’ and more ‘heterogenous’ population.2152 Sunni
communities in former opposition-held areas in Damascus have been subject to mass displacement
to other parts of the country.2153 Conversely, Shias from other parts of the country have become
displaced to Damascus.2154
Government, national political institutions and administration, including large military and security
services establishments, are centred in Damascus. All major production facilities and most strategic
industries are state-run. In the 1990s, small, service-oriented industries in private sector began toassert themselves. Textile plants, the chemical industry, cement works, and food-processing factories
are for the most part spread out to the south, east, and north-east. Most of the population’s
requirements for food, clothing, and other consumer goods are met by private businesses. Major
highways connect Damascus with major cities as well as with the capitals of neighbouring
countries.2155 Damascus International Airport is located 30 km south-east of downtown
Damascus.2156 For more information, see the EASO COI Report: Syria - Socio-economic situation:
Damascus city (April 2021)

2.10.2 Conflict background and armed actors
During the conflict which in this governorate lasted from November 2012 until the government
regained control in May 2018, opposition groups infiltrated the Jobar district of Damascus city itself,
gaining partial control of this district (spring 2013) as well as those of Barzeh and Qabun north-east of
the city centre (summer 2013), and in the southern districts of Al-Qadam and Yarmouk, according to
the Norwegian COI unit Landinfo. Still, nearly all of Damascus governorate remained under GoS
control throughout the conflict. The areas in Damascus governorate remaining under GoS control
throughout the conflict mentioned by Landinfo, were Dummar, Al-Mazzeh, Kafr Sousa (with the2147 UNRWA, Yarmouk (unofficial camp), last updated 1 January 2019, url; BBC News, Profile: Yarmouk Palestinian refugee

camp, 7 April 2015, url
2148 Abdin, Y., The fragility of community security in Damascus and its environs, International Review of the Red Cross Conflictin Syria, 99 (3), 2017, url, pp. 897–925. Yassar Abdin is an urban planning expert based in Damascus. He is the former Deanof the Faculty of Architecture and of the High Institute of Regional Planning at Damascus University
2149 Syria, Central Bureau of Statistics, Estimate of the population in Syria by governorates, n.d., url
2150 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview. Syrian Arab Republic, March 2021, url, p. 232151 CIA, World Factbook, Syria, last updated: 30 March 2021 url
2152 Syrian fellow with Synaps, No Damascus like home, 10 February 2020, url. In this article, the author reflects over the
impact of the conflict on the demography of the author’s hometown, Damascus.
Synaps is an information network that among other services, publishes analysis and fieldwork, see url and url
2153 Ghosh-Siminoff, S., Demographic Engineering in Syria Sets the Stage for Future Conflicts, 13 March 2020, url
2154 Ezzi, M., Lebanese Hezbollah’s Experience in Syria, [Source: journalist Raed al-Salhani],13 March 2020, url, p. 82155 Encyclopaedia Britannica, Damascus, last updated 12 February 2021, url
2156 Damascus International Airport, Maps of Damascus airport, 2021 (n.d.), url

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exception of an opposition offensive in March 2013), Muhajerin, Al-Salihiyah, Rukn Al-Din, Saroujah,
Al-Qanawat, Old Damascus (Dimashq Al-Qadima), and most of Al-Shaghour and Al-Midan. Through2016-2018, the government gradually regained control of the suburbs.2157
According to the Carter Center, the conflict inside Damascus city mainly played out in opposition-heldareas, including the Jobar, Qaboun, Tishreen, and Barzeh neighbourhoods, areas that were connectedto eastern Ghouta, the opposition’s stronghold. Jobar was connected to the Zamalka and Ain Terma
areas of the Jaish Al-Islam. The Qaboun, Tishreen, and Barzeh neighbourhoods were kept separated
from eastern Ghouta by the government forces but were still able stay connected to eastern Ghouta
by underground smuggling tunnels controlled by the armed group Fajr Al-Summa. The southernneighbourhoods of Yarmouk Camp and Tadamoun frequently experienced conflict activity during theconflict in Damascus.2158 In May 2018, ISIL surrendered in Yarmouk and Tadamoun.2159 As thegovernment regained all of Damascus and Rural Damascus in May 2018, the SAA’s Fourth Division
eventually came in control of the whole of southern Damascus.2160
As of March 2021, Damascus governorate was under the control of the GoS (see also Map 4).2161
Syrian Arab Army and affiliated armed groups
According to Gregory Waters of International Review, as of 17 March 2020, deployments of the SAA
in Damascus included units of 2nd Corps and 3rd Corps.2162
According to analyst Mazen Ezzi, writing in March 2020, Lebanese Hezbollah maintains a headquarters
and a light weapons depot near the Ruqayya mosque2163, a Shia shrine in the al-Amarah quarter of the
Old City of Damascus.2164 Also located there are armed men wearing the Iranian Basij militia insignia.
A source interviewed by Ezzi in 2019, considered the Ruqayya shrine area a closed security area inwhich Shia militias from several countries are deployed to protect Shia pilgrims at the shrine, as wellas the Bab Al-Saghir cemetery. As of the March 2020 report, the Al-Shaghour neighbourhood, thecapital’s central Shia area, was reported to have been left open to the public without checkpoints.
Hezbollah maintained security in this area by operating a network of surveillance cameras distributed
around the old Damascus neighbourhoods, the Ruqayya shrine and the Umayyad Mosque. Ezzi listednine different militias operating in Damascus in support of Hezbollah, among these is Hurras AlShaghour Maqam (Guardians of The Shrine) which is charged with protecting the surroundings of the
Ruqayya and Sayyeda Zaynab shrines. Two other militias, the Abu Fadl Al-Shaghour Abbas Brigade and
the Zulfiqar Brigade, are similarly closely related to Hezbollah but at the same time owned or led by
the GoS’ Republican Guard respectively.2165 Furthermore, these two groups are described by analyst
Alexey Khlebnikov as of Iraqi origin, being largely sponsored by Iran.2166

2157 Norway, Landinfo, Syria, Konflikten i Damaskus – En tidslinje [Syria, the conflict in Damascus – a timeline], 8 September

2020; url, pp. 9, 152158 Carter Center (The), Explosive Munitions in Syria - Report 2 - Damascus City and Rural Damascus Governorate, January
2020, url, p. 102159 Waters, G., ‘A force the haven’t seen before’: Insurgent ISIS in Central Syria, MEI, 15 April 2020, url
2160 Ezzi, M., Post-Reconciliation Rural Damascus: Are Local Communities Still Represented?, EIU (European University
Institute), url, p. 15. Mazen Ezzi is a research contributor working on the Wartime and Post-Conflict in Syria project (WPCS)
within the Middle East Directions Programme of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University
Institute in Florence. Ezzi’s work focuses on the war economy in Syria and the areas under regime control.
2161 Based on reading of the following maps: Carter Center (The), Syria Weekly Conflict Summary 22-28 March 2021, 31
March 2021, url, Fig. 1; Liveuamap, Syria, 31 March 2021, url
2162 Waters, G., Current Syrian Army Deployments, International Review, 13 December 2019, url
2163 Ezzi, M., Lebanese Hezbollah’s Experience in Syria, 2020,13 March 2020, url, pp. 6-7
2164 Al-Rifai, O., In the Service of Ideology: Iran’s Religious and Socioeconomic Activities in Syria, March 2021 (n.d),
Washington Institute (The), Policy Notes No. 100, url, p. 62165 Ezzi, M., Lebanese Hezbollah’s Experience in Syria, [Source: journalist Raed al-Salhani ] 13 March 2020, url, pp. 6-7
2166 Khlebnikov, A., Russia and Syrian Military Reform, Challenges and Opportunities, 26 March 2020, Carnegie Middle East
Center, url. Alexey Khlebnikov is a consultant and Middle East expert at the Russian International Affairs Council.

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

According to Jussor for Studies, Hezbollah had 12 military sites in Damascus and Rural Damascus,
either independently or jointly with Iranian forces.2167
Also, Shia militias recruited by Iran from outside of Syria have some presence in Damascus, according
to analyst Navvar Saban, a conflict expert at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies. The Afghanmanned Fatemiyoun Brigade has an estimated 3 000 to 14 000 fighters spread between threebattalions in Damascus, Aleppo, and Hama governorates. The Pakistani-manned Zaynibion Brigade
has an estimated 1 000 to 5 000 fighters deployed in Damascus, Aleppo, Daraa, and Hama
governorates.2168
On the Russian presence, Mazen Ezzi stated that from October 2018 the Russian military had limited
its personnel to 100 in the three towns Yalda, Babbila and Beit Sahm.2169 Jusoor for Studies mapped
four Russian military bases in Damascus.2170
Anti-GoS armed groups
According to sources interviewed by the DIS in August 2020, ISIL and other opposition groups nolonger had any presence in Damascus or Rural Damascus.2171 Still, attacks carried out with explosives
have been reported in Damascus against military and security personnel. These attacks have generally
been attributed to an armed group called Saraya Qasioun.2172 The existence of this group was doubted,
however, by sources consulted by DIS in August and September 2020. These sources considered theattacks as internal acts of retribution carried out among military and security elements, rather thanas targeted attacks carried out by an organised group.2173 A first wave of attacks was reported to havetaken place between January and mid-March 2020. A subsequent lull lasted until late June. From thenon, the attacks picked up again.2174 Most of the attacks were reported to have taken place in Qudsaya
north-west of the capital and in eastern Ghouta, but some attacks reportedly took place inside thecapital itself.2175 While the attacks during the first wave had some impact on their surroundings, thosetaking place during the second wave were not reported to have impacted civilians.2176

2.10.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population
Security trends in 2020-2021
Since 2018, when the GoS retook all areas in Damascus and Rural Damascus from opposition groups,
there have been no major security incidents (such as battles or military operations etc.) in the two

2167 Jusoor for Studies, Map of the Military Bases and Posts of Foreign Forces in Syria, 6 January 2021, url
2168 Saban, N., Factbox: Iranian influence and presence in Syria, 5 November 2020, Atlantic Council, url. Navvar Saban is a

conflict expert at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, where he specializes in Iranian influence in Syria, focusing on Shia
militia activity. The Omran Center is an independent research institution focusing on Syria, located in Istanbul, Turkey. Saban
is also a non-resident researcher at the Orsam Center.
2169 Ezzi, M., Post-Reconciliation Rural Damascus: Are Local Communities Still Represented?, EUI, 27 November 2020, url, p.
152170 Jusoor for Studies, Map of the Military Bases and Posts of Foreign Forces in Syria, 6 January 2021, url
2171 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus, [Sources:
Syria Direct; Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR)], October 2020, url, pp. 35, 52
2172 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus, [Source:
international security organisation], October 2020, url, p. 13
2173 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus, [Sources: aninternational security organisation; Suhail Al-Ghazi; Jusoor; Syria Direct; Omran Studies], October 2020, url, p. 152174 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus, [Source:
international security organisation], October 2020, url, p. 152175 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus, [Source:
international security organisation, October 2020, url, p. 13
2176 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus, [Source:
international security organisation], October 2020, url, p. 14

226Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

governorates, the DIS reported in October 2020. The government’s control of security in the former
opposition held areas in Damascus was reported as ’calm’, and ‘firm’.2177
Among the security incidents that did take place, targeted killings and assassinations of GoS militaryand security service officers and affiliated officials was a major issue in in Damascus and Rural
Damascus governorates in 2020, according to the DIS.2178
In the month of February 2020, the number of IED incidents increased dramatically.2179 During thismonth, six explosions occurred in Damascus City and another two in Rural Damascus2180, a
comparatively high number considering the total of 17 for all of the previous year.2181 In October 2020,
the DIS reported that few security incidents had been heard of taking place in Yarmouk camp.2182
In an interview with EASO in February 2021, Syria expert Suhail Al-Ghazi stated that occasional Israeli
air raids have taken place against Iranian-backed militia bases in the capital and its countryside. These
air strikes did not target militia bases areas or buildings, but civilian houses may have been damaged
collaterally by air defence system activated by the GoS.2183 During the reference period of this report,
Israeli airstrikes on Damascus have been reported.2184 For instance, Enab Baladi reported that the‘eighth’ Israeli air attack in 2021 on government positions in Damascus and Rural Damascus had takenplace on 8 April.2185 No civilian casualties were reported in this attack.
During the reporting period, in some places in Damascus armed clashes between pro-GoS militias
were reported.2186
The DIS reported in October 2020 that kidnappings of civilians for ransom, including kidnapping ofchildren, had been increasing in Damascus and Rural Damascus governorates through the previous
months.2187 According to the SOHR, an increasing number of incidents of child kidnappings was
occurring in Damascus as well as in other governorates. Not only ransom but also organ trade wasmentioned as motives behind these kidnappings. ‘Widespread’ forcible recruitment to mercenaries
was mentioned as still another motivation, in which kidnapping gangs would snatch children andsubsequently hand them over to mercenaries. Both boys and girls, in particular displaced andundocumented ones, could become kidnapped. Child kidnappings became a pressing concern inDamascus in June 2020, according to the SOHR. Locations where kidnappings had taken place werementioned by the SOHR as the Al-Thalath Anzat and the Al-Thurayya parks in the Al-Maydan
neighbourhood; the main park and the Al-Ansari mosque park in the Al-Zahira neighbourhood; theNirmin park in the Al-Muhajireen neighbourhood, and the Tanzim Kafr Susah park, according to the2177 Global Times (The), 1 injured in Damascus explosion, 11 February 2020, url; Denmark, DIS, Syria: Security and socio-

economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus, [Source: Syria Direct], October 2020, url, p. 112178 Denmark, DIS, Syria: Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus,[Sources: an international security organisation; Suhail Al-Ghazi; Jusoor; Syria Direct; Omran Studies], October 2020, url, p.
132179 Denmark, DIS, Syria: Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus,[Source: an international security organisation], October 2020, url p. 132180 SOHR, Damascus deteriorating security: six explosions rock Damascus in 15 days, 26 February 2020, url
2181 Denmark, DIS, Syria: Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus,[Source: an international security organisation], October 2020, url, p. 132182 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus,[Sources: Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR); an international humanitarian organisation; an international security
organisation], October 2020, url, pp. 11, 13
2183 Al-Ghazi, S., Teams interview, 3 February 2021
2184 Al-Arabiya, Syrian capital rocked by explosions as Israel claims responsibility, 24 February 2020, url; Reuters, Syria says
Israel attacks areas around southern Damascus, 28 February 2021, url; France24, Syria shoots down Israeli missiles overDamascus, state media says, 16 March 2021, url
2185 Enab Baladi, Wounded in Israel’s eighth bombing in 2021 on the outskirts of Damascus, 8 April 2021, url
2186 Syrian Observer (The), Clashes Continued Between the Fourth Division and Iranian Militias in Damascus, 5 April 2021,
url; Asharq Al-Awsat, Iranian Militias, Syrian Regime Tussle over ‘Sayyida Zainab’, 16 May 2021, url
2187 Denmark, DIS, Syria: Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus,[Sources: Omran Studies; SOHR], October 2020, url, p. 14

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SOHR.2188 By December, the SOHR had recorded 39 kidnappings in Damascus and Rural Damascus in
2020.2189 Other sources have mentioned instances of kidnappings in Damascus.2190• On 6 January 2020, two young men working at the Al-Manarah International Hospital in
Damascus were kidnapped by unknown individuals near the Al-Shahbaa bridge, on their way in an
ambulance to Al-Suwaidaa city in order to hospitalize a patient.2191
The DIS mentioned lootings and rumours of lootings by pro-GoS militias in Jobar and Yarmouk during
2020, but also noted that the information was uncertain since no organisation had had access to thecamp and civilians’ access had been highly restricted. 2192
Movement between Damascus city and countryside was generally not restricted, the DIS reported,
except for Syrians and Palestinians whose names were on wanted lists for reasons related to military
service, political or anti-government activities, and criminal charges. Relatives of prominent politicalor armed activists have become harassed, interrogated or even arrested at checkpoints.2193
For more information about factors influencing scrutiny at checkpoints, see the EASO COI Report: Syria- Socio-economic situation: Damascus city (April 2021).
On 15 March 2021, the SOHR reported that security alert had become heightened and corresponding
measures tightened at GoS checkpoints. Some temporary checkpoints had been set up in side streets
as well as in main streets. At the same time, all side and main roads leading to the western Ghouta
areas as well as eastern Ghouta became closed, and the checkpoints separating the capital fromeastern Ghouta reinforced with GoS military.2194
For more information about checkpoints and freedom of movement in Damascus, please see EASOCOI Report: Syria - Socio-economic situation: Damascus city (April 2021).
Security incidents
According to ACLED data, during the reporting period there were 41 security incidents recorded inDamascus governorate, of whom 3 were coded as battles, 13 explosions/remote violence and 25
incidents of violence against civilians (see Figure 41). Nearly all (24 out of the 25) of the incidents
recorded by ACLED as ‘violence against civilians’, refer to violent attacks on unarmed civilians such as
sexual violence, attacks, abduction/forced disappearance.2195

2188 SOHR, Kidnapping mafias in Syria | Security chaos helps gangs to “flourish”, recruitment of children and organ trade aremajor motives behind kidnapping increase, 2 August 2020, url
2189 SOHR, SOHR Exclusive | 2020: 115 children and women among over 510 people kidnapped in Syria, with Afrin and regimeheld areas topping the list, 27 December 2020, url
2190 Al Ghazi, S., Microsoft Teams interview, 3 February 2021; SACD, Denmark is setting a dangerous precedent which must
be reversed, 1 July 2020, url
2191 SOHR Exclusive | 2020: 115 children and women among over 510 people kidnapped in Syria, with Afrin and regime-heldareas topping the list, 27 December 2020, url
2192 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus,[Sources: Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR); an international humanitarian organisation], October 2020, url, p. 112193 Denmark, DIS, Syria: Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus,[Sources: Syria Direct; Jusoor; SNHR; SOHR], October 2020, url, pp. 18-19
2194 SOHR, After killing and arresting six persons by security services | Regime checkpoints put on high alert in Damascus andcountryside, 15 March 2021, url
2195 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (9 April 2021), url

228Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Figure 40: Evolution of security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in Damascus
governorate between January 2020 and March 2021, based on ACLED data2196

District
Damascus

Damascus– Security incidents
RemoteBattlesviolence
3
13

Violence against
civilians
25

Figure 41: Security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in Damascus governorate
between 1 January 2020 and 31 March 2021. Breakdown by district based on ACLED data

Illustrative security incidents
A non-exhaustive list of security incidents reported to have taken place in Damascus governorate in2020 and early 2021 includes targeted attacks, kidnappings for ransom, lootings, and Israeli air strikes
on military targets:
•

•

•
•
•
•

One person was wounded when an explosive device attached to a car went off in the
Mezzeh area in Damascus 10 February 2020, the Chinese daily Global Times reported. The
targeted car was of a brand and type commonly used by security forces. There was nofurther information about who exactly was targeted.2197
In February 2020, Al-Jazeera reported of six people, two of them Palestinian militants andfour Iran-backed militia members, had been killed in an Israeli air raid on Damascus
city.2198 The attack lasted for 15 minutes, according to the Voice of America.2199 No civilian
casualties were reported by these sources.
On 18 February 2020, Xinhua reported that five civilians were wounded by an explosionin the Bab Musallah area of the capital.2200
Xinhua reported about another blast on 20 February 2020, having taken place in the
Marjeh area in the centre of Damascus.2201
A car bombing that killed four persons was reported near the Tishreen Stadium in central
Damascus on 25 February 2020 by Garda World, a Canada-based international security
company. No group had claimed responsibility.2202
On 14 March 2020, Enab Baladi reported of the ninth explosion taking place in Damascus
up to that point in 2020.2203

2196 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (9 April 2021), url
2197 Global Times (The), 1 injured in Damascus explosion, 11 February 2020, url
2198 Al Jazeera, Six killed in Israeli air raid on Damascus: Monitor, 24 February 2020, url
2199 VOA, Syrian Capital Rocked by Explosions as Israel Hits Targets, 23 February 2020, url
2200 Xinhua, 5 civilians wounded by blast in Damascus, 18 February 2020, url
2201 Xinhua, Explosive device rips through pickup in Syrian capital, 20 February 2020, url
2202 Garda World, Car bombing reported in Damascus February 25, 25 February 2020, url
2203 Enab Baladi, Ninth explosion in Syrian capital Damascus and its countryside since beginning of 2020, 14 March 2020, url

229

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

•
•
•
•
•

On the eve of parliamentary elections in July 2020, two explosions near the Anis Bin Malik
mosque in the Nahr Aisha area of Damascus killed one person and wounded another,
China Global Television Network reported.2204
The SOHR reported a car bomb having been set off in Damascus in September 2020.2205
In December 2020, the SOHR reported about an IED explosion near the bus terminal in
the al-Sumariya area, a residential area for GoS officers and GoS-loyal militias. Another
IED was found and dismantled in the same area by security forces.2206
In February 2021, Israeli rockets were fired against Damascus, reportedly targeting Iraniansites, the Times of Israel reported.2207 The source did not report civilian casualties.
France24 reported that Syrian air defenses had shot down Israeli rockets fired against
targets in Damascus on 10 March 2021.2208 The source did not report civilian casualties.

In an article 29 April 2020, Syria Direct mentioned a total of over 104 000 prisoners in government
prisons across the country to have died of torture during the conflict. Focusing on the ‘al-Khteeb’detention facility in Damascus, 3-8 deaths per day was pointed to as common in this particularfacility.2209 A map published by the UN in 2021 documented the occurrence of torture and deaths ingovernment prisons in Damascus.2210 A report to the UN stated in March 2021 that prisoners weretransferred to Damascus from other parts of the country in a centralised manner. Bodies of prisoners
who had died or were extrajudicially killed in the custody of the four main intelligence agencies areburied at these locations and were transferred from the Tishreen, Harasta and Mezzeh 601 militaryhospitals in Damascus to two specific mass burial sites in Najha and Qutayfa on the outskirts ofDamascus.2211
Civilian fatalities
Month
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
AugustSeptember
OctoberNovember
December
Total

VDC 2020
6
7
10
16
7
14
9
6
4
9
7
5
100

SNHR 2020
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
9

VDC 2021175SNHR 2021
1
-

13

1

2204 CGTV, Developing story: One killed in Damascus blast on eve of polls, 19 July 2020,

url

2205 SOHR, A car bomb exploded in the capital, Damascus, 19 September 2020, url
2206 SOHR, Damascus | IED explodes and security forces dismantle another one near bus terminal of al-Sumariya area, 15

December 2020, url
2207 Times of Israel (The), Israel said to hit Iranian targets in Syria after Tehran blamed for ship blast, 28 February 2021, url
2208 France24, Syria shoots down Israeli missiles over Damascus, state media says, 16 March 2021, url
2209 Syria Direct, Torture and death: Life in al-Khateeb detention center, 29 April 2020, url
2210 OHCHR, Violations verified in detention facilities in south Syrian Arab Republic, February 2021 (n.d.), url
2211 UN Human Rights Council, A decade of arbitrary detention and imprisonment - Report of the Independent International
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, Advance Edited Version, 11 March 2021, url, pp. 9-10230

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Figure 42. Civilian fatalities as a result of armed conflict in Damascus governorate in 2020 and first three months of 2021.
Monthly breakdown based on VDC and SNHR data

In 2020, Damascus governorate had between 92212 (SNHR data)2213 and 100 civilian fatalities (VDC
data).2214 In the first three months of 2021, SNHR recorded one civilian death in Damascus, whereas
VDC recorded 13 civilian deaths.
Infrastructure damage and explosive remnants of war
Based on satellite detection, REACH recorded the following conflict-induced damage to buildings, byaffected area as per 2016:
•
•
•
•
•

Jobar (straddling Damascus city and Rural Damascus governorate): 14.8 buildings damaged or
destroyed per hectare.
Barza (Barzeh) Al-Balad (straddling Damascus city and Rural Damascus governorate); and theareas of Midan Wastani and Bab Touma in central Damascus: ‘severe damage’.
Yarmouk: more than 80% of all buildings in Yarmouk camp and its surrounding areas.
Yarmouk and Hajar Aswad (in Rural Damascus) taken together: 2 109 buildings destroyed;
1 765 buildings severely damaged; 1 615 buildings moderately damaged.
Central Tadamoun: destruction with ‘high damage severity’.2215

Analysts Barend Wind of the University of Groningen, Netherlands, and Batoul Ibrahim of the Czech
University of Life Sciences, Prague, Czech Republic, pointed in an article in Habitat International, out
Barzeh and Yarmouk as ‘damaged’/’severely damaged’ in a map of housing damage they published in2020. Also, the authors considered the laws and decrees aimed at post-war reconstruction that the
government has adopted, not as a framework for reconstruction but as a deepening of pre-war urban
development plans. Reconstruction needs had not been a leading principle, the authors argued. 2216
The DIS reported in October 2020 that ‘no actual reconstruction process’ was taking place in thecapital. The government had not begun reconstruction in Jobar and Yarmouk, the two most damaged
areas. While it had taken some initiative to restore the infrastructure in these areas and some progress
had been made, this was limited and by far insufficient to make the areas habitable and suited to anormal life.2217

2212 In a January 2021 report, SNHR mentions 8 civilian fatalities in Damascus in 2020. This figure is the result of a revision of

their data. EASO email correspondence with SNHR, 22 April 2021. See SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 1,734
Civilians in Syria in 2020, including 99 in December, 1 January 2021, url, p. 122213 Based on data extracted from monthly reports on civilian casualties published by SNHR. See: SNHR, 286 Civilians,
including Four Medical and Civil Defense Personnel, Documented Killed in Syria in January 2020, 1 February 2020, url, p. 8;
SNHR, 276 Civilians, including Six Medical Personnel and Two Media Workers, Documented Killed in Syria in February 2020,
1 March 2020, url, p. 8; SNHR, 145 Civilians, including Two Medical Personnel, Documented Killed in Syria in March 2020, 1
April 2020, url, p. 9; SNHR, 78 Civilians, including One Media Workers, Documented Killed in Syria in April 2020, 1 May 2020,
url, p. 10; SNHR, 125 Civilians Documented Killed in Syria in May 2020, including Eight Who Died Due to Torture and One
Massacre, 1 June 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, 1,006 Civilians, including three Media Workers and 12 Medical and Civil Defense
Personnel, Documented Killed in Syria in the First Half of 2020, 1 July 2020, url, p. 16; SNHR, 107 Civilians, including 26
Children and 11 Women, Documented Killed in Syria in July 2020, 2 August 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, 122 Civilians, including 21
Children and Seven Women, Documented Killed in Syria in August 2020, 1 September 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, Extrajudicial
Killing Claims the Lives of 102 Civilians, including 15 Children, 10 Women, Three Medical Personnel and 12 Victims Due toTorture, 1 October 2020, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 126 Civilians, including 18 Children, Eight
Women, One Media Worker and 10 Victims Due to Torture, 1 November 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims
the Lives of 172 Civilians, including 16 Children, 11 Women, and 30 Victims Due to Torture, 1 December 2020, url, p. 9; SNHR,
Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 1,734 Civilians in Syria in 2020, including 99 in December, 1 January 2021, url, p. 142214 Based on monthly civilian fatalities figures for 2020-2021 shared by VDC with EASO
2215 REACH, Syria, Syrian Cities Damage Atlas, 19 March 2019, url, pp. 15-29
2216 Wind, B. and Ibrahim, B., The war-time urban development of Damascus: How the geography- and political economy of
warfare affects housing patterns, Habitat International, Vol. 96, February 2020, url, pp. 6-82217 Denmark, DIS (Danish immigration Service), Country Report Syria: Security and socio-economic situation in thegovernorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus, [Sources: SNHR; Syria Direct; Suheil Al-Ghazi], October 2020, url, p. 24

231

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

For more information about reconstruction in Damascus, also see the EASO-COI Report Syria Socioeconomic situation: Damascus City (April 2021).
Between 2013 and 2019, at least 13 094 individual explosive munitions were used across allneighbourhoods within Damascus city, the Carter Center reported. Most frequently used were various
types of munitions for shelling, but also rockets, mortar and artillery munitions and air-dropped
munitions such as barrel bombs. Nearly 70 % of munition use was concentrated in the former
opposition-held neighbourhoods of Jobar, Qaboun, Yarmouk Camp, Barzeh, Tadamoun, and Tishreen.
In government-controlled areas of the capital, especially Qassa, Al-Qadam, Abbasiyeen(Mamouniyah), Adawi, and the Old City, a total of 1 322 munitions was used . The remaining 2 855
munitions used represented 65 other areas of Damascus.2218
Tadamoun, a neighbourhood bordering Yarmouk, was located on the frontlines between Yarmouk
Camp and the opposition dominated Babila and Yalda areas in Rural Damascus. Tadamoun became
frequently fought over but remained under government control throughout the conflict. The fighting
in these neighbourhoods, close to the city centre and to static frontlines, was persistent but at lower
levels than more outlying areas, and fewer barrel bombs were used, according to the Carter Center.
The opposition groups in these areas were mainly using mortars and rockets with limited range andaccuracy. Shelling activity was thus limited to eastern and southern areas of the capital. The Carter
Center reported that the risk of remaining contamination was considerably reduced due to the strict
security environment in government-held areas of the capital, and to the capacity of government
forces to clear unexploded ordnances in the city. In contrast, opposition-held areas that had
experienced higher levels of conflict and had lower capacity of civil defence units to engage inclearance operations, became left with more unexploded ordnances.2219
Applying a failure rate of 10% - 30% to the total explosive munitions uses documented, the Carter
Center considered that between 24,430 – 73,290 explosive munitions at a minimum, have failed todetonate in north-west Syria, southern Syria, and in and around Damascus.2220 The Carter Center did
not provide figures of undetonated ordnances exclusively for Damascus governorate.
According to the DIS, in 2020 ERW and landmines were exploding and causing civilian casualties inDamascus and Rural Damascus on a weekly basis. Such incidents were, however, limited to areas
where major military confrontations had taken place before the summer of 2018, such as Jobar. To
some extent, ERW also remained a risk in Yarmouk.2221
Based on the Syria Multi-sector Needs Assessment of 2020, the Shelter Cluster assessed that inDamascus governorate, 1.2 % of the population was living in damaged buildings.2222
Displacement and return
UNOCHA data on displacement showed that between January and December 2020, around 4 000 IDP
movements were recorded from Damascus to Latakia (500), Tartous (500), Deir Ez-Zor (900), and AlHasakeh (300) governorates. In the same period, no IDP movements were recorded to Damascus

2218 Carter Center (The), Explosive Munitions in Syria - Report 2 - Damascus City and Rural Damascus Governorate, January

2020, url, pp. 3, 10-11
2219 Carter Center (The), Explosive Munitions in Syria - Report 2 - Damascus City and Rural Damascus Governorate, January
2020, url, pp. 3, 10-11
2220 Carter Center (The), Explosive Munitions in Syria – Report 3 - Northwest Syria: Aleppo, Idleb, and Latakia Governorates,
August 2020, url, p. 20
2221 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus, [Sources: aninternational security organisation; an international humanitarian organisation], October 2020, url, p. 142222 Global Shelter Cluster, Syrian Arab Republic: Whole of Syria Shelter/NFI Sector Humanitarian Needs Overview 2021, 1
March 2021, url, pp. 6, 8

232

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

governorate.2223 Around 1 000 IDP movements were recorded within Damascus governorate in2020.2224
In terms of IDP returnee movements, in 2020 UNOCHA recorded 10 000 such movements from orwithin Damascus, 930 movements to or within Damascus and 305 movements within Damascus.2225
In January 2021, there were 240 IDP movements from Damascus governorate, no movements within
the governorate, and no IDP movements to the governorate.2226 In the same month there were no
return movements to Damascus from outside or from locations within the governorate, 755 returns
from Damascus mostly to Deir Ezzor, and no returns from locations within Damascus only.2227
In February 2021, there were 205 IDP movements from Damascus governorate, no movements within,and 39 IDP movements to the governorate.2228 In the same month there were 90 return movements
to Damascus from outside or from locations within the governorate, 943 returns from Damascus
mostly to Deir Ezzor, and no returns from locations within Damascus only.2229
In March 2021, UNOCHA recorded 9 IDP displacement movements from Damascus governorate andaround 3 600 IDP return movements from the governorate.2230
Further information displacement and return in Damascus is available in the EASO COI report: Syria –Socio-economic situation in Damascus city (April 2021).

2223 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements Overview, Jan - Dec 2020, 31 December 2020, url
2224 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic. IDP Movements Overview, Jan – Dec 2020, 16 February 2021, url
2225 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic. Spontaneous IDP Returnee Movements Overview, Jan - Dec 2020, 16 February 2021, url
2226 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, IDP movements January 2021, 2 March 2021, url
2227 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, IDP Spontaneous Returns January 2021, 2 March 2021, url
2228 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, IDP Movements February 2021, 1 April, 2021, url
2229 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, IDP Spontaneous Returns February 2021, 1 April 2021, url
2230 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, IDP Movements. March 2021, 12 May 2021, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic. IDP

Spontaneous Returns. March 2021, 12 May 2021, url

233Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

2.11 Rural Damascus governorate

Map 17. MapAction, Rural Damascus governorate2231

2.11.1 General description of the governorate
Rural Damascus (Rif Dimashq in Arabic) is a largely agricultural governorate surrounding Damascus
city. It has international borders with Iraq and Jordan to the east and Lebanon to the west. It borders
Homs
governorate
tothenorth.2232
To
the
south
it
borders2233
Quneitra, Dara’a and Sweida governorates.
According to UNOCHA, the governorate is divided into 36 sub-districts: Kisweh, Babila, Jaramana,
Maliha, Kafr Batna, Arbin, Qudsiya, Douma, Harasta, Sabe Byar, Dhameer, Nashabiyeh, Ghizlaniyyeh,
Haran Al’awameed, Al Qutayfah, Jirud, Ma’loulah, Raheiba, At Tall, Sidnaya, Rankus, Yabroud, Esal ElWard, An Nabk, Deir Attiyeh, Az-Zabdani, Dimas, Ein Elfijeh, Madaya, Sarghaya, Qatana, Bait
Jan, Sa’sa, Markaz Darayya, Sahnaya, and Hajar Aswad.2234
Large parts of Rural Damascus governorate and Damascus city are largely integrated in contiguous
built-up areas. Hence, it is difficult to distinguish the administrative boundaries separating them.2235

2231 Mapaction, Syria 2013-2015, Rural Damascus Governorate [map], last updated:29 July 2016, url
2232 REACH, Rural Damascus Governorate, April 2018, Humanitarian Situation Overview in Syria (HSOS), April 2018, url, p. 1
2233 UNHCR, Provision of Life-Saving Assistance and Supporting Communities, End of Year Report 2018, 2019, url, p. 42234 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Atlas, Syrian Arab Republic, Syria sub-district maps, n.d., url
2235 Abdin, Y., The fragility of community security in Damascus and its environs, International Review of the Red Cross, Conflictin Syria No. 99 (3), 2017, url, pp. 899–900

234

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Bordering Damascus city to the east is an area named Eastern Ghouta. According to a map provided
by the Reach Initiative, Eastern Ghouta comprises Harasta, Arbin, Douma and Misraba sub-districts,
and the neighbourhoods Modira, Beit Sawa, Hammura, Zamalka, and Qaboun (in Damascus
governorate), Al-Masani, Aradi el-Jadide, Elauine, Hay Elsadie, Dahiet elasad, Hezzeh, Saqba, Ein
Terma, Kafr Batna, Eftreis, and Jisrein.2236 While REACH separates between 'neighbourhoods' and‘sub-districts in this map, the UNOCHA Humanitarian Atlas lists them all as ‘sub-districts’.2237 Yalda,
Babila and Beit Sham are commonly called 'the three southern Damascus towns', according to analyst
Mazen Ezzi at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy.2238 To the south-west, between
Damascus city and Darayya, is Western Ghouta.2239
The Syrian Central Bureau of Statistics estimated the population of Rural Damascus governorate in2019 to be 3 200 000.2240 In a March 2021 report, UNOCHA estimated the population of Rural
Damascus governorate to be of 3 023 110 inhabitants.2241
During the GoS offensive against Eastern Ghouta and Jobar in spring 2018, displacement took place
on a large scale, significantly decimating the population in the areas fought over, such as Eastern
Ghouta whose population became decimated by the half, according to ‘the best estimates available’
as provided by PAX, a Netherlands-based NGO.2242 According to Human Rights Watch, laws
subsequently passed by the GoS have forced many of the displaced into further displacement.2243
A map by Michael Izady provided by Columbia University in 2010 shows that most of the governorate
was inhabited by Sunni Muslim Arabs. To the west of Damascus City, the population is more mixed,
containing areas inhabited by Druze, Levantines (Arabic speaking Christians), Aramaeans, Circassiansin addition to Sunni Arabs. To the north the population includes Turkomans,
Levantines, Aramaeans and Imamis2244 (Twelver Shias).2245 A map published in 2015 by Reva Goujon,
an analyst at Stratfor, shows a Shia-populated area in the governorate that stretches north-west fromwest of Damascus City.2246
The fighting which ended in 2018 carried with it significant demographic changes in some of theformer opposition-held areas in the governorate. Rather than as an unintended consequence of thefighting, PAX described the large-scale displacement that has taken place there with the subsequent
vastly reduced population numbers, as a strategy of ‘demographic engineering’ applied by thegovernment for political reasons. In the spring of 2018, the population of one such area, Eastern
Ghouta, became decimated by the half during the final fighting, according to PAX. The combination ofsystematic forced population transfers and the creation of various kinds of obstacles to return, mostnotably Law No 10, ratified in April 2018, which would allow the government to confiscate displaced
persons’ real estate, has worked to make permanent the demographic changes that have taken place

2236 REACH, Syrian Cities Damage Atlas, 16 March 2019, url, p. 19
2237 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Atlas, Syrian Arab Republic, Syria sub-district maps, n.d., url
2238 Ezzi, M., Post-Reconciliation Rural Damascus: Are Local Communities Still Represented?, EIU (European University

Institute), 27 November 2020, url, p., p. 14. Mazen Ezzi is a research contributor working on the Wartime and Post-Conflictin Syria project (WPCS) within the Middle East Directions Programme of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
at the European University Institute in Florence. Ezzi’s work focuses on the war economy in Syria and the areas under regime
control.
2239 Al-Araby, Map – Syria – Ghouta, n.d., url
2240 Syria, Central Bureau of Statistics, Estimate of the population in Syria by governorates, n.d., url
2241 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview. Syrian Arab Republic, March 2021, url, p. 232242 PAX, Siege Watch Tenth Quarterly Report Part 1 – Eastern Ghouta February – April 2018, 30 April 2018, url, p. 80. PAX
works with committed citizens and partners to protect civilians against acts of war, to end armed violence, and to build justpeace.
2243 HRW, Rigging the System: Government Policies Co-Opt Aid and Reconstruction Funding in Syria, 28 June 2019, url
2244 Izady, M., Syria: Ethnic Composition in 2010, in: Atlas of the Islamic World and Vicinity, Columbia Univ. Gulf 2000, 2006
- present, 2010, url
2245 Encyclopedia Britannica, Twelver Shi’ah, updated 4 April 2019, url
2246 Goujon, R., Stratfor, The Geopolitics of the Syrian Civil War, 4 August 2015, url

235Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situationin such areas.2247 As Human Rights Watch noted, laws passed by the GoS ostensibly intended tofacilitate reconstruction, have actually had the effect of restricting the ability of people perceived to
be opposed to the government, to return to their homes thus forcing them into further
displacement.2248 For more information about Law No 10 and its impact, see the EASO COI report:
Syria – Socio-economic situation in Damascus city (April 2021).
Demographic changes began to take place in some former opposition held places in the governorate,
as Shias from other places in Syria as well as from foreign countries began to repopulate these places
instead of the original Sunni population, the Guardian reported in 2017. Original Sunni IDPs from
Zabadani, Madaya, Wadi Barada and Darayya were replaced by Syrian, Lebanese and Iraqi Shias. Citinga hospital director in Zabadani, the Guardian reported that the GoS’ motivation for this repopulation
was to remove Sunnis away from the areas between Damascus and Homs.2249 ‘Population swaps’ of
this kind has granted the GoS a stronger support base inside its territory of control, France 24 reported
in 2018, citing analyst Fabrice Balanche.2250
In 2018, REACH described Rural Damascus as a largely agricultural governorate.2251 The Food andAgriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP)
described Eastern Ghouta in 2018 as an urban/peri-urban area with a population of some 393 000
inhabitants.2252 The Middle East Institute (MEI) reported in 2019 that Eastern Ghouta’s economy relied
mainly on manufacturing, trade and agriculture.2253
The governorate’s road network connects the Syrian capital to any area beyond. The density of roads
is visible in a map provided by UNOCHA. The map also shows the main highways to the west
(connecting the capital with Lebanon), south (to Jordan via Daraa governorate), as wellas one highway going east stopping at the international airport, and one heading north-eastcrossing into Homs governorate.2254 Damascus International Airport is located 30 km south-east ofdowntown Damascus.2255

2.11.2 Conflict background and armed actors
The Carter Center characterised the conflict in Rural Damascus as pockets of resistance to thegovernment having formed in five general regions as the conflict started in 2011. These pockets
became formed in Eastern Ghouta, in areas south of Damascus city, in the Wadi Barida Valley to thenorth-west, in areas between the towns of Khan el Shih and Kisweh, and in the Beit Jan area in thesouth-west of the governorate. These pockets became key hubs for armed opposition groups. As thegovernment forces sought to retake them, static frontlines were formed, often lasting for several
years. In late 2015, Russia entered the military conflict in support of the Syrian government, whichthen became enabled to focus on retaking the pockets of resistance. In August 2016 the government
forces began their effort by approaching the Darayya area. Then followed areas near Khan El Shih andthe Wadi Barida in 2017. Eastern Ghouta, the southern Damascus neighbourhoods, and the Beit Jan

2247 PAX, Siege Watch Tenth Quarterly Report Part 1 – Eastern Ghouta February – April 2018, 30 April 2018, url, p. 80. PAX

works with committed citizens and partners to protect civilians against acts of war, to end armed violence, and to build justpeace.
2248 HRW, Rigging the System: Government Policies Co-Opt Aid and Reconstruction Funding in Syria, June 2019, url, p. 422249 Guardian (The), Iran repopulates Syria with Shia Muslims to help tighten regime's control, 14 January 2017, url
2250 France24, War, displacement reshuffle Syria's demographic map, 25 May 2018, url
2251 REACH, Rural Damascus Governorate, April 2018, Humanitarian Situation Overview in Syria (HSOS), April 2018, url, p. 1
2252 FAO/WFP, Special Report, FAO/WFP crop and food security assessment mission to the Syrian Arab Republic, 9 October
2018, url, p. 45
2253 MEI/ETANA Syria, Despair and Decay: Eastern Ghouta After 18 Months of Renewed Regime Rule, 14 November 2019,url, p. 152254 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic - Rural Damascus Reference Map, n.d., url
2255 Damascus International Airport, Maps of Damascus airport, 2021 (n.d.), url

236

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

area were retaken in 2018.2256 As of the spring and summer of 2018, the government regained fullcontrol over the governorate.2257 The government had succeeded by means of a mix of military action
and political deals.2258 The GoS security and military forces have since been governing the formerly
opposition-held areas.2259
As of March 2021, Damascus governorate was under the control of the GoS (see also Map 4).2260
More information on the background of the conflict is available in the EASO COI Report: Syria - Security
situation (May 2020).
Syrian Arab Army and affiliated armed groups
Units of the 2nd Corps of the SAA were reported to be present in Rural Damascus governorate in early
March 2020. For deployments of the SAA in Rural Damascus governorate as of 17 March 2020, see
Section 2.11.2 of the EASO COI Report: Syria - Security situation (May 2020).
The 4th Division of the SAA was reported by the CoI to have a presence in Madaya and Eastern
Ghouta.2261 In Douma, to the north-east of the capital, the following GoS actors were in control or
active, as the Omran Center for Strategic Studies stated in December 2020: GoS Military Security,
Criminal Security, Political Security, the Republican Guard, the Al-Khatib Branch of State Security, and
the Airforce Intelligence and Hezbollah.2262 Analyst Mazen Ezzi of the European University Instituteconsidered the Al-Khatib Branch of State Security, which in turn he deemed to be under influence of
the Russian military, to be the force controlling Douma since April 2018. Syrian State Security andRussian military police are partnering closely in Douma. This has allowed them to expel Syrian military
police and the SAA’s Fourth Division from patrolling.2263
In Moadhamiyat al-Sham, a town in Western Ghouta, responsibility for security has been transferredfrom the SAA’s Fourth Division to Military Security, which also supervised the local militia Shield of theCapital, and also ‘colluded’ with local leaders such as mukhtar Abu Jamal Mahmoud whose family
members had volunteered in local loyalist militia under his encouragement.2264
Russia and Iran, as well as Hezbollah, were maintaining a continued presence in Rural Damascus,
according to Mazen Ezzi.2265 Analyst Navvar Saban, stated that the IRGC keeps a base at the Damascus
International Airport, and a camp in Zabadani.2266 According to Jusoor for Studies, as by January 2021

2256 Carter Center (The), Explosive Munitions in Syria - Report 2 - Damascus City and Rural Damascus Governorate, January

2020, url, pp. 8-92257 International Crisis Group, Lessons from the Syrian State’s Return to the South, Middle East Report N°196, 25 February
2019, url, p. 1; Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War. Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut,
December 2018, url, p. 222258 Carter Center (The), Explosive Munitions in Syria - Report 2 - Damascus City and Rural Damascus Governorate, January
2020, url, p. 92259 Ezzi, M., Post-Reconciliation Rural Damascus: Are Local Communities Still Represented?, EUI, 27 November 2020, url, p.
222260 Based on reading of the following maps: Carter Center (The), Syria Weekly Conflict Summary 22-28 March 2021, 31
March 2021, url, Fig. 1; Liveuamap, Syria, 31 March 2021, url
2261 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/45/31], 14 August 2020, url, p. 8 para 30
2262 Omran Center for Strategic Studies, Indicators of Security Stability in Syria and Refugee Return: An evaluation of SelectCases, December 2020, url
2263 Ezzi, M., Post-Reconciliation Rural Damascus: Are Local Communities Still Represented?, EUI, 27 November 2020, url, pp.
6, 9.
2264 Ezzi, M., Post-Reconciliation Rural Damascus: Are Local Communities Still Represented?, EUI, 27 November 2020, url, pp.
20-21
2265 Ezzi, M., Post-Reconciliation Rural Damascus: Are Local Communities Still Represented?, EUI, 27 November 2020, url, p.
32266 Saban, N., Factbox: Iranian influence and presence in Syria, 5 November 2020, Atlantic Council, url. Navvar Saban is a
conflict expert at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, where he specializes in Iranian influence in Syria, focusing on Shia
militia activity. He is also a non-resident researcher at the Orsam Center.

237

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Iran was operating 27 bases and posts in Rural Damascus and Damascus City together. The same
source noted that Hezbollah had 12 military sites in Damascus and Rural Damascus, either
independently or jointly with Iranian forces.2267 In February 2021, the SOHR reported that Iranianpersonnel and Hezbollah recently turned farms into new military headquarters and createdunderground premises connected by trenches and tunnels for protection against Israeli air attacks.2268
Lebanese Hezbollah had a 'strong grip' in Western Ghouta, Ezzi noted, where it was sharing some sites
with the SAA’s Fourth Division. In this area, and in its border area to Lebanon, Hezbollah was focusing
on gathering intelligence on opposition groups and their activities.2269
In the Zabadani area north-east of the capital, Hezbollah exercised a 'tight military and security grip',according to Ezzi, who considered Zabadani a part of Hezbollah’s ‘sphere of influence’. Also, theFourth Armoured Division of the SAA, the GoS military intelligence and the NDF has been exerting
military and security influence over the Zabadani area.2270
Sayyida Zainab, a Shia town in southern Damascus, is controlled by Shia militias, most notably
Lebanese Hezbollah, Ezzi stated.2271 There, Hezbollah has established weapons armouries, intelligencecentres, operations rooms and prisons, and is the only force responsible for protecting the Sayyidah
Zaynab Shia shrine. There were also ‘dozens’ of other Shia militias based in the area, all closely related
to Hezbollah.2272
For Hezbollah, the southern Damascus countryside constitutes part of a larger strategic area thatprovides it with access to the Israeli border, Mazen Ezzi reported. In Qalamoun, Hezbollah wasmaintaining roads, tunnels and armouries, located in places that are considered to be ‘relatively safe’
from Israeli air raids. In this area, more than half of all the military manpower in Western Qalamoun
and 20 % of that in Eastern Qalamoun was filled by Hezbollah. Hezbollah is also deployed to theprotection of an Iranian IRGC base in Al-Nasiriya, Eastern Qalamoun.2273 The group was operating 12‘points’ that it operated either independently, jointly or in a ‘semi-shared’ manner with Iran in Rural
Damascus and Damascus City.2274
Mazen Ezzi stated that from October 2018, the Russian military presence had limited its duties to daily
patrols with around 100 personnel in Babila, Yalda and Beit Sahm, three towns located in Babila subdistrict and collectively known as ‘the southern Damascus towns’.2275 Russian forces were reportedly
in control of Eastern Ghouta. Their presence in Eastern Ghouta has averted assassinations andkidnappings, which have taken place in small numbers elsewhere in the governorate, according tosources interviewed by the DIS.2276

2267 Jusoor for Studies, Map of the Military Bases and Posts of Foreign Forces in Syria, 6 January 2021, url
2268 SOHR, Digging trenches and tunnels: Iranian militias and Hezbollah camouflage and boost positions in eastern Damascus

for fear of Israeli attacks, 9 February 2021, url
2269 Ezzi, M., Lebanese Hezbollah’s Experience in Syria, 2020,13 March 2020, url, p. 82270 Ezzi, M., Post-Reconciliation Rural Damascus: Are Local Communities Still Represented?, EIU (European University
Institute), 27 November 2020, url, pp. 6-8
2271 Ezzi, M., Post-Reconciliation Rural Damascus: Are Local Communities Still Represented?, EIU (European University
Institute), 27 November 2020, url,, p. 142272 Ezzi, M., Lebanese Hezbollah’s Experience in Syria, 2020, 13 March 2020, url, p. 62273 Ezzi, M., Lebanese Hezbollah’s Experience in Syria, 2020, 13 March 2020, url, pp. 8-92274 Jusoor for Studies, Map of the military bases and posts of foreign forces in Syria, 6 January 2021, url
2275 Ezzi, M., Post-Reconciliation Rural Damascus: Are Local Communities Still Represented?, EIU (European University
Institute), 27 November 2020, url, pp. 14-15
2276 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus, [Sources:
Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR); Syria Direct], October 2020, url, p. 11

238

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Anti-GoS armed groups
An increase in attacks reported against military and security personnel in early 20202277, has been
attributed to an armed group called Saraya Qasioun.2278 The existence of this group was, however,doubted by a source consulted by DIS.2279 These sources considered the reported attacks as acts
committed by individuals or internal assassinations among military and security elements, rather thanactivities by an organised armed group. Two such attacks were mentioned as belonging to a first wave
reported to have taken place between January and mid-March. Then there was a lull until June, after
which the attacks picked up again.2280 Most of the attacks were reported to have taken place in
Qudsaya north-west of the capital, and/or in Eastern Ghouta.2281 The attacks during the first wave
reported to have had some impact ‘on their surroundings’, while those during the second wave (sinceJune 2020) had not impacted civilians.2282
In an interview with Aymenn Jawad al Tamimi, an independent analyst and a specialist in the Syrian
conflict, a representative of the Saraya Qasioun explained that the group had been formed in early2019 by opposition elements who had been displaced from Damascus and its surrounding regions,and that it was operating in those areas. By mid-2020, the group’s representative claimed, the group
had carried out over 10 operations in those areas. As well as mentioning Saraya Qasioun’s opposition
to the GoS, the representative mentioned opposition to ‘the Russian and Iranian occupations’ as anadditional motivation.2283
ISIL
According to the map provided by the ISW, as of February 2020, ISIL was still sustaining a support zone
straddling the border with Sweida governorate, crossing Rural Damascus and continuing into Homs
governorate.2284 However, in October 2020, the DIS reported that ISIL and other opposition groups nolonger were present in the governorate and that state intelligence services had eliminated all
opposition cells in Rural Damascus. 2285

2.11.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population
Security trends in 2020-2021
Since 2018, when the GoS retook control of all areas in Rural Damascus there had been no major
security incidents (such as battles or military operations) in the governorate, with the exception of
Israeli airstrikes, GoS air defence missiles landing in inhabited areas and attacks against security
officials of the SAA.2286 According to Syria Direct, the government’s hold on security in Rural Damascus
2277 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus, [Sources:

Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR); Syria Direct], October 2020, url, p. 13; Asharq al-Awsat, Concerns among
Damascus residents after several blasts, 27 February 2020, url
2278 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus, [Source: aninternational security organisation],October 2020, url, p. 132279 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus, [Source:
Syria Direct], October 2020, url, p. 152280 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus, [Source:
international security organisation], October 2020, url, pp. 13, 152281 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus, [Source:
international security organisation], para. 3, October 2020, url, p. 132282 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus, [Source: aninternational security organisation], October 2020, url, p. 142283 Al-Tamimi, A. J., Saraya Qasioun: Interview, Pundicity [Blog], 7 July 2020, url
2284 ISW, Syria Situation Report: January 21 – February 4, 2020, url
2285 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus, [Sources:
Syria Direct, Jusoor], October 2020, url, p. 152286 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus, [Source:
Suhail Al-Ghazi], October 2020, url, p. 40

239

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

had remained 'firm'.2287 According to Omran, interviewed by DIS in August 2020, the number of
security incidents in the governorate had significantly decreased. The source however did not provide
figures.2288 Sources interviewed by DIS noted that in 2020, targeted attacks with explosives against
military and security officers and affiliated officials, had appeared as a major type of security incident
in the governorate.2289 In Palestinian refugee camps in the governorate, the situation was generallycalm.2290 There were no security incidents on the road connecting Damascus with Damascus
International Airport during 2020, according to sources interviewed by the DIS2291, but a certain riskof becoming detained at the checkpoints on the road remained.2292
Israeli airstrikes against military targets were reported in 2020 as well as in 2021. Airstrikes against
Syrian military posts south of Damascus were reported in July and August 2020.2293 The ISW recorded
Israeli strikes against military targets in December 2020 and January 20212294, and airstrikes on
3 February 2021 on sites south and south-east of Damascus and, on 15 February 2021, strikes on ‘Iranlinked weapons storage facilities near Damascus’, SAA First division troops near al-Kiswah and a SAA
Fourth Division headquarter near al-Bajaa.2295 The targets have been specific military targets.
Occasional air defence missiles fired by the GoS forces were reported as having landed on civilian
areas, causing casualties.2296
Suhail Al-Ghazi stated that the occasional Israeli air raids that had taken place against Iranian-backed
militia bases in the capital and its countryside, had not targeted civilian areas or buildings. However,civilian houses may have been damaged by air defence systems activated by the GoS. In 2020, an air
defence missile fell on a house near Damascus International Airport and caused the death of threecivilians.2297 Enab Baladi reported that the ‘eighth’ Israeli air attack in 2021 on government positions
in Rural Damascus and Damascus had taken place on 8 April 2021.2298 No civilian casualties werereported in this attack.
The OHCHR reported ‘widespread lawlessness’ such as arbitrary arrests, and general insecurity
prevailing in the previously besieged areas, including Ghouta, Dar’a and Douma.2299 Sourcesinterviewed by the DIS reported that a growing number of kidnappings of civilians for ransom,
including kidnapping of children, had taken place in Damascus and Rural Damascus governorates
during 2020.2300

2287 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus, [Source:

Syria Direct] October 2020, url, p. 35
2288 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus, [Sources:
Suhail Al-Ghazi, a non-resident fellow at Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy; Syria Direct; Jusoor] October 2020, url, pp.
11-12
2289 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus, [Sources: aninternational security organisation; Suhail Al-Ghazi; Jusoor; Syria Direct; Omran Studies], October 2020, url, p. 13. See also:
Asharq al-Awsat, Concerns among Damascus residents after several blasts, 27 February 2020, url
2290 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus, [Source: aninternational humanitarian organisation], October 2020, url, p. 112291 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus [Sources:
Syria Direct, Jusoor, Omran Studies, SOHR], October 2020, url, pp. 14-15
2292 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus [Source:
SNHR], October 2020, url, p. 142293 AP News, Syria says Israeli strike kills 2 soldiers, wounds 7, 31 August 2020, url
2294 ISW, Syria Situation Report: December 16, 2020 - January 7, 2021, url
2295 ISW, Syria Situation Report January 30 – February 18, 2021, url
2296 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus, October
2020, url, p. 14 [Source: Suhail Al-Ghazi], p. 40
2297 Al-Ghazi, S., interview, 3 February 2021
2298 Enab Baladi, Wounded in Israel’s eighth bombing in 2021 on the outskirts of Damascus, 8 April 2021, url
2299 OHCHR, Statement by Mr. Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, Chair of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the
Syrian Arab Republic, at 43rd Human Rights Council session, 9 March 2020, url
2300 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus [Sources:
Omran Studies, SOHR], October 2020, url, p. 14

240

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

In 2020, the CoI reported that ‘arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance and torture remained
pervasive’ in specific areas under GoS control, including Rural Damascus.2301 There was a high level ofextrajudicial detentions and abductions perpetrated in the cities of Douma and Daraa, the OmranCenter for Strategic Studies reported, involving a 'multitude of actors and … haphazard methods ofextrajudicial detentions and abductions'. In Douma city, the number amounted to 20 extrajudicial
detentions in the fourth quarter of 2019 and the first quarter in 2020, according to the Omran Center.
10 of these were abductions. Of a total number of 103 detainees, 78 were connected to thereconciliation process and 25 were civilians. Political Security was responsible for one operation,
Hezbollah for two, Civil Police for one, Khatib branch for one, Russian Military Police for two, and Air
Force Intelligence joined with Military Security in two incidents. One operation remained anonymous.
The number of abductees in the same period was 19, including 18 civilians and one military, with those
responsible being unidentified for all.2302 The CoI similarly reported on cases of arbitrary arrests,
enforced disappearances and detentions in areas such as Douma and Eastern Ghouta.2303
During the reporting period, in some places in Rural Damascus, governorate, armed clashes between
pro-GoS militias were reported.2304
In September 2020, protests against arrests, including arrests carried out without legal arrest warrants
issued by court, were reported to have taken place in Kanaker town.2305
Security incidents
According to ACLED data, during the reporting period there were 204 security incidents recorded in
Rural Damascus governorate, of whom 40 were battles, 39 explosions/remote violence and 125
incidents of violence against civilians.

Figure 43: Evolution of security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in Rural
Damascus governorate between January 2020 and March 2021, based on ACLED data 2306

2301 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/45/31], 14 August 2020, url, p. 4 para 13
2302 Omran Center for Strategic Studies, Indicators of Security Stability in Syria and Refugee Return: An evaluation of SelectCases, December 2020, url, pp. 66, 62, 60, 65
2303 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/43/57], 28 January 2020 [published 2 March 2020], url, p. 13 para 68
2304 MEMO, In-fighting erupts between Syria intelligence, army in Damascus, 8 July 2020, url
2305 Diyaruna, Rural Damascus arrests fuel anti-regime protests, 23 September 2020, url
2306 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (9 April 2021), url

241Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Rural Damascus governorate – Security incidents
RemoteViolence against
District
Battlesviolence
civilians
1
1
Al Qutayfah
22
1
An Nabk
113
2
1
At Tall2
3
Az-Zabadani
2
Darayya
5
11
7
Duma
1
10
8
Qatana3
11
17
Rural Damascus
1
Yabroud
125
40
39
Total
Figure 44: Security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in Rural Damascus
governorate between 1 January 2020 and 31 March 2021. Breakdown by district based on ACLED data

Most security incidents recorded by ACLED during the reporting period in Rural Damascus were coded
as violence against civilians, the highest number being documented in At Tall district, followed by Rural
Damascus and Duma districts (see Figure 44).
Illustrative security incidents
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Asharq al-Awsat reported that in February 2020, that there had been one IED incident on theroad between Saqba city and Hazza town, and one in Qatana town.2307
A car was blown up with an IED in Jaramana on 24 February, SANA reported on
1 March 2020.2308
The ISW reported two attacks by Saraya Qasioun in the towns of in Qatana (26 February 2020)and Jaramana (1 March 2020), and that the group previously had claimed two other attacks
in Beit Jinn and Sa’sa, all four towns located in the Damascus countryside.2309
Syria Call reported two targeted shootings of named members of the SAA’s Fourth Division,
claimed by Saraya Qasioun in Beit Jann, on 14 March 2020.2310
The SOHR reported that on 25 March 2020, an explosion caused by unidentified men throwing
a grenade against a military checkpoint near Kanaker town in western Rural Damascus. The
source did not report about any civilian casualties.2311
A checkpoint operated by GoS Military Security and Air Force Intelligence on the road between
Al-Dumayr and Al-Ruhayba areas in eastern Qalamoun in Rural Damascus, was shot against
by unidentified gunmen on 29 March 2020, the SOHR reported.2312
On 7 July 2020, Saraya Qasioun claimed the assassination of a person named Nizar Zaidan,
serving in the SAA’s Fourth Armoured Division.2313

2307 Asharq Al-Awsat, Concerns among Damascus residents after several blasts, 27 February 2020, url
2308 SANA, Material damage caused in IED blast in Damascus Countryside, 1 March 2020, url
2309 ISW, Situation Report, March 4-17, url
2310 Syria Call, [Facebook], IED kills a person in Damascus as 'Saraya Qasioun' launches 'vendetta operations', posted on: 14

March 2020, url
2311 SOHR, Accidental explosion: Grenade explodes in neighbourhood in Damascus, killing NDF member and injuring others,
30 March 2021, url
2312 SOHR, Accidental explosion: Grenade explodes in neighbourhood in Damascus, killing NDF member and injuring others,
30 March 2021, url
2313 Saraya Qasioun, 7 July 2020, url

242

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

•
•

•
•
•

•

The Syrian Observer reported in mid-July 2020 about more than 40 arrests having taken placein Douma.2314
Arrests of military defectors, draft evaders and people associated with reconciliation andreconciliation committee members that had fallen out with the GoS, continued into
September 2020 across Yalda, Babila and Beit Sham in southern Damascus, according toMazen Ezzi. These arrests had begun in 2018.2315
On 22 October 2020, the SOHR reported that the Mufti of Damascus and Rural Damascus had
been killed in an IED incident in Qudsaya.2316
A grenade exploded on the outskirts of a Baath Party neighbourhood in Jaramana, injuring achild, and there were reports about an IED exploding near the bus terminal in the Al-Sumariya
area without any casualties, the SOHR reported on 18 December 2020.2317
The SOHR reported that on various dates during the first half of February 2021, scatteredarrests and raids as well as large-scale arrests of up to 300 young people, many in order to be
recruited for compulsory and reserve military service, had been carried out in Douma andother cities and towns in Eastern Ghouta by Air-Force Intelligence and the Syrian military
police. The SOHR mentioned the locations Douma, Masraba, Harasta, Hamouria, Saqba, Kafr
Batna, Ain Tarma, Zamalka, Jisrin and Al-Meliha.2318
On 15 March 2021, the SOHR reported that the level of alert had been heightened, andcorresponding security measures tightened at GoS checkpoints. Some temporary checkpoints
were set up in side streets as well as main streets. At the same time, all side and main roads
leading to the western Ghouta areas as well as eastern Ghouta were closed, and thecheckpoints separating the capital from eastern Ghouta reinforced with additional GoS
military.2319

Civilian fatalities
Month
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
AugustSeptember
OctoberNovember
December
Total

VDC 2020
10
5
4
3
3
4
5
3
2
2
4
6
51

SNHR 2020
10
1
3
2
5
1
2
2
1
27

VDC 20214510SNHR 2021
2
1

19

3

2314 Syrian Observer (The), State Security Services Arrest Dozens in Douma for Forced Military Recruitment, 16 July 2020, url
2315 Ezzi, M., Post-Reconciliation Rural Damascus: Are Local Communities Still Represented?, EUI, 27 November 2020, url, pp.

15-162316 SOHR, Mufti of Damascus and countryside killed in IED explosion, 22 October 2020, url
2317 SOHR, Child injured in grenade explosion in Jaramana, 18 December 2020, url
2318 SOHR, Eastern Ghouta: Air-Force Intelligence arrests two women and young man from Douma city, 15 February 2021,
url
2319 SOHR, After killing and arresting six persons by security services: Regime checkpoints put on high alert in Damascus andcountryside, 15 March 2021, url

243Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Figure 45: Civilian fatalities as a result of armed conflict in Rural Damascus governorate in 2020 and first three months of2021. Monthly breakdown based on VDC and SNHR data

In 2020, Rural Damascus governorate had between 272320 (SNHR data)2321 and 51 civilian fatalities (VDC
data).2322 In the first three months of 2021, SNHR recorded 3 civilian fatalities in Rural Damascus, while
VDC recorded 19 civilian fatalities.
Infrastructure damage and explosives remnants of war
Sources consulted by DIS in October 2020 mentioned the following cities and areas in Rural Damascus
as those most damaged by the conflict: Yarmouk, Hajar Al-Aswad, Jobar, Douma, Harasta, Darayya,
Qaboun, Maliha, Arbin, Madyara, Ein Tarma, Zamalka and Hamouriya. Less affected were the
Qalamoun areas and the Wadi Barada, Madaya, Al-Zabadani and Baqqin villages.2323 Joseph Daher
mentioned cities such as Douma and Darayya having been subjected to massive destruction andsignificant displacement, while Qudsaya and Muadamiyat had been less affected.2324 After its
recapture by GoS, Darayya city and its surroundings have been almost completely lacking electricity,water and sanitation networks as well as other infrastructure. The government had not taken action
to renovate these networks, the DIS reported.2325
Based on the Syria Multi-sector Needs Assessment of 2020, the Shelter Cluster assessed that in Rural
Damascus governorate, 44.7 % of the population was living in damaged buildings.2326
Access to electricity and water in the governorate was limited to two to three hours a day, Refugee
Protection Watch reported. 2327 In Douma and Eastern Ghouta, residents had to rely on flashlights due
to lack of generators. Since the supply of potable water was scarce, people would resort to using water

2320 In a January 2021 report, SNHR mentions 28 civilian fatalities in Rural Damascus in 2020. This figure is the result of arevision of their data. EASO email correspondence with SNHR, 22 April 2021. See SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Livesof 1,734 Civilians in Syria in 2020, including 99 in December, 1 January 2021, url, p. 122321 SNHR, 286 Civilians, including Four Medical and Civil Defense Personnel, Documented Killed in Syria in January 2020, 1
February 2020, url, p. 8; SNHR, 276 Civilians, including Six Medical Personnel and Two Media Workers, Documented Killed in
Syria in February 2020, 1 March 2020, url, p. 8; SNHR, 145 Civilians, including Two Medical Personnel, Documented Killed in
Syria in March 2020, 1 April 2020, url, p. 9; SNHR, 78 Civilians, including One Media Workers, Documented Killed in Syria in
April 2020, 1 May 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, 125 Civilians Documented Killed in Syria in May 2020, including Eight Who Died Dueto Torture and One Massacre, 1 June 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, 1,006 Civilians, including three Media Workers and 12 Medical
and Civil Defense Personnel, Documented Killed in Syria in the First Half of 2020, 1 July 2020, url, p. 16; SNHR, 107 Civilians,
including 26 Children and 11 Women, Documented Killed in Syria in July 2020, 2 August 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, 122 Civilians,
including 21 Children and Seven Women, Documented Killed in Syria in August 2020, 1 September 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR,
Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 102 Civilians, including 15 Children, 10 Women, Three Medical Personnel and 12
Victims Due to Torture, 1 October 2020, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 126 Civilians, including 18
Children, Eight Women, One Media Worker and 10 Victims Due to Torture, 1 November 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, Extrajudicial
Killing Claims the Lives of 172 Civilians, including 16 Children, 11 Women, and 30 Victims Due to Torture, 1 December 2020,
url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 1,734 Civilians in Syria in 2020, including 99 in December, 1 January
2021, url, p. 142322 Based on monthly civilian fatalities figures for 2020-2021 shared by VDC with EASO
2323 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus, [Sources:
Syria Direct; Suhail Al-Ghazi; an international humanitarian organisation], October 220, url, p. 24, 54-55
2324 Daher, J., State Institutions and Regime Networks as Service Providers in Syria, June 2020, url, pp. 5-6. Joseph Daher is
Part-Time Professor at the EUI. He completed a Doctorate in Development Studies at SOAS, University of London (2015), anda Doctorate in Political Science at Lausanne University (2018), Switzerland. He currently teaches at Lausanne University andis a part time affiliate professor at the European University Institute, Florence (Italy). He is the author of Hezbollah: Political
Economy of the Party of God (Pluto Press, 2016) and Syria After the Uprisings: The Political Economy of State Resilience(Pluto Press 2019)2325 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus, [Source:
SNHR], October 2020, url, p. 552326 Global Shelter Cluster, Syrian Arab Republic: Whole of Syria Shelter/NFI Sector Humanitarian Needs Overview 2021, 1
March 2021, url, pp. 6, 82327 Refugee Protection Watch, Trapped in Between Lebanon and Syria: The Absence of Durable Solutions for Syria’s
Refugees, October 2020, url, p. 27. The Refugee Protection Watch (RPW) Coalition is comprised of Basmeh and Zeitooneh,
ALEF Act for Human Rights, PAX, 11.11.11 and Upinion.

244

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

wells, or they would buy water to drink and for cooking.2328 In Moadhamiyat Al-Sham alone, 1 500
residents had become ill by drinking water contaminated with sewers in October 2020, Mazen Ezzi
stated.2329
Hospitals were almost completely lacking in Darayya city and its surroundings, and no action toreconstruct those destroyed had been taken by the government, according to the DIS.2330 The Refugee
Protection Watch reported that health services in the governorate were considered good byrespondents to a survey the RPW had undertaken in late 2019/early 2020, and then again in a followup survey between July and September 2020. Most respondents, especially in Eastern Ghouta
expressed their approval of how the public health sector was functioning. In specific areas of Rural
Damascus, however, 40 % of the respondents described the health service system as 'poor' due to thelack of public health facilities and the excessive cost of private health care. Most respondents inmentioned private healthcare services as unaffordable. Despite public health facilities being available
in several areas, the quality of services was adversely affected by shortages of personnel and lack of
medical supplies. The RPW’s findings at the end of 2020 were in conformity with their findings earlier
in that year.2331 The lack of public hospitals in the governorate had forced many patients to travel toDamascus City or to seek private hospitals, Joseph Daher noted.2332
According to Joseph Daher, 39 schools in the Damascus countryside were completely destroyed as of
the beginning of the 2019 school year, and 500 schools in Damascus countryside needed renovations.
Daher considered some schools that had reopened in different localities of Eastern Ghouta, as far
from suited for education. Most of these schools were lacking sanitation and potable water. Classes
remained generally overcrowded.2333 In Darayya city and its surroundings, schools were almost
completely lacking, and the government had not acted to reconstruct those destroyed, the DIS
reported.2334 According to Refugee Protection Watch, the state of education in Eastern Ghouta wasconsidered ‘dire’.2335 Many students from Rural Damascus had to go to Damascus City to attend
school.2336 The DIS reported that that in the Palestinian refugee camps of Sbeineh, Khan Al-Shieh andQabr Al-Sit, it had been possible to rebuild clinics, schools, and the sewage and water networks.2337
According to UNMAS, explosive remnants of war (ERW) and other explosives has left settlements,
residential areas and agricultural land unsafe. Also, key infrastructure such as roads, schools andhealth centres are beyond serviceability, UNMAS stated.2338 Explosives used in Rural Damascus in the
period July 2013–May 2019, numbered at least 81 698, according to the Carter Center. Landmines,
unexploded ordnances and IEDs counted for just under 1 % of the total. The rest were groundlaunched explosive munitions. Shelling of unknown types, artillery munitions, and rockets of various
types accounted for most of the ground launched explosives used. Munitions dropped from airplanes
and barrel bombs dropped from helicopters have also been used. The largest contiguously damaged
2328 Refugee Protection Watch, Trapped in Between Lebanon and Syria:

The Absence of Durable Solutions for Syria’s
Refugees, October 2020, url, p. 272329 Ezzi, M., Post-Reconciliation Rural Damascus: Are Local Communities Still Represented?, EIU (European University
Institute), 27 November 2020, url , p. 212330 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus, [Source:
SNHR: 4], October 2020, url, p. 55
2331 Refugee Protection Watch, Trapped in Between Lebanon and Syria: The Absence of Durable Solutions for Syria’s
Refugees, October 2020, url, p. 9, 28
2332 Daher, J., State Institutions and Regime Networks as Service Providers in Syria, June 2020, url, p. 122333 Daher, J., State Institutions and Regime Networks as Service Providers in Syria, June 2020, url, p. 142334 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus, [Source:
SNHR], October 2020, url, p. 55
2335 Refugee Protection Watch, Trapped in Between Lebanon and Syria: The Absence of Durable Solutions for Syria’s
Refugees, October 2020, url, p. 292336 International humanitarian organisation working in Syria, interview, 17 February 2021
2337 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus, [Source: Theinternational humanitarian organisation], October 2020, url, p. 25
2338 UNMAS, Syria, October 2020, url

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area covered Jaramana, Kafr Batna, Harasta, Arbin, Hajar Aswad and Maliha, on the eastern side of
the capital. 85 % of the activity had affected seven areas in the governorate - Markaz Darayya, Harasta,
Douma, Kafr Batna, Zabadani, Nashabiyeh, Arbin, and Qatana. The communities Darayya, Harasta,
Douma, Zabadani, Khan Al-Shih, Arbin, and Ain Terma recorded 58% of munitions used in thegovernate.2339
Reporting to the UN Security Council in April 2021, the UN Secretary General mentioned that since its
first deployment to Rural Damascus in August 2020, the UNMAS explosive ordnance assessment team
had located and marked 630 items of explosive ordnance in the governorate.2340
Displacement and return
In 2020, UNOCHA reported for Rural Damascus governorate around 3 000 IDP movements from orwithin governorate, of which 323 were movements within the governorate.2341 In January 2021, there
were 15 IDP movements, all from Damascus, and 58 IDP movements from the governorate. 23 ofthese were to Tartous and 35 to Latakia.2342 In the same month there were 987 returns within Rural
Damascus and 22 returns from Rural Damascus to Homs.2343
In February 2021, there were 69 IDP movements from Rural Damascus governorate (which includes
displacement within the governorate), 46 movements within, and 46 movements to the governorate(which includes displacement to other locations within the governorate).2344 In the same month there
were 702 return movements to Rural Damascus from outside or from locations within, 702 returns
taking place within Rural Damascus only and 1 100 returns from the governorate (which includes
return to locations inside the governorate).2345 In March 2021, UNOCHA recorded 103 IDP movements
to or within the governorate, and 608 IDP returns to or within Rural Damascus.2346
A large number of IDPs from Eastern Ghouta, Harasta and Douma were living in Damascus City, aninternational humanitarian organisation working in Syria assessed.2347
In 2020, UNOCHA recorded 11 000 return movements from or within Damascus Rural governorate,out of which 6 000 return movements took place within the governorate.2348 987 return movements
to the governorate were recorded in January 2021.2349 There were 22 returns going out from thegovernorate to Homs in January 2021 and 987 taking place within the governorate, a total of 1 009 ofreturns from locations in Rural Damascus.2350
SNHR reported that displaced people were not completely prevented from returning to Rural
Damascus. However, returns to specific areas in Eastern Ghouta where neighbourhoods and homes
had been completely destroyed, such as in Douma, Harasta, Shefouniya and Arbin, were only partially

2339 Carter Center (The), Explosive Weapons Use in Syria - Report 2 - Damascus City and Rural Damascus Governorate, January

2020, url, p. 82340 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020) Report of the Secretary-General, 22 April
2021, url
2341 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, IDP movements overview, Jan – Dec, 2020, 4 March 2021, url
2342 UNOCHA, IDP movements and IDP spontaneous return movements data, 2 March 2021 url
2343 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, IDP Spontaneous Returns, January 2021, 2 March 2021, url
2344 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, IDP Movements, February 2021, 1 April 2021, url
2345 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, IDP Spontaneous Returns, February 2021, 1 April 2021, url
2346 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, IDP Movements. March 2021, 12 May 2021, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic. IDP
Spontaneous Returns. March 2021, 12 May 2021, url
2347 An international humanitarian organisation working in Syria, MS Teams interview, 17 February 2021
2348 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic. Spontaneous IDP Returnee Movements Overview, Jan - Dec 2020, 16 February 2021, url
2349 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP movements and IDP spontaneous return movements Data, 2 March 2021, url
2350 UNOCHA, IDP movements and IDP spontaneous return movements data, 2 March 2021, url

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permitted. Only persons who had obtained security permission, and who were able to repair theirhouses at their own cost, were permitted to return.2351
The CoI noted in August 2020 that ‘civilians reported that they were still being prevented fromreturning to their often-habitable houses in Qaboun, Jawbar, Yarmouk camp and parts of Darayya.’2352
Other sources interviewed by DIS in August-September 2020 noted that people were being allowed
to return to Darayya City except to the south-western area which houses the Shia memorial of
Sukayna, and to the north eastern part close to Mezzeh in Damascus. Still, as nearly 80 % of the housesin the Darayya area were destroyed, few people had returned. There were also some cases of people
who had not been given permission to rebuild their houses.2353 Procedures necessary to obtain
permission to rebuild were very cumbersome, creating barriers to bringing in building materials. Even
with a permission, bribing could be needed to get the materials through.2354 Access to Harran AlAwameed and to some areas in Darayya district and in Eastern Ghouta, was restricted. Access to
Sahnaya in Darayya district was not restricted, an area which had been controlled by the GoS during
the conflict.2355
Many civilians have returned to Al-Muadamiya, a city in Darayya sub-district, despite a number ofarrests that had taken place in this area.2356 As of mid-2020, some 15 000 people were reported to beliving in Darayya.2357 For accessing and returning to the destroyed areas in Eastern Ghouta such as
Douma, Harasta, Shefouniya and Arbin, a security approval was required.2358 People who had not been
active in the armed opposition would usually not face difficulties returning to Eastern Ghouta.2359
An international humanitarian organisation working in Syria interviewed by DIS in August 2020
reported that Palestinian refugees had returned to some of refugee camps in Rural Damascus.
Palestinian refugees from Yarmouk remained displaced, though, and some of those families wereresiding in camps in Rural Damascus.2360
Mazen Ezzi mentioned that a gradual and 'extremely limited' return had taken place to Zabadani. Ezzi
attributed this to the tight control over the area exercised by Hezbollah, which had allowed only a few
former residents to return.2361
The Syria Report reported about procedural obstacles put in place by the GoS that prevented people
from returning to Sbeineh town, a suburb in the Damascus countryside south of the capital. Also,

2351 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus, [Source:

SNHR] October 2020, url, 532352 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/45/31], 14 August 2020, url, p. 8 para 31
2353 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus, [Sources:
Syria Direct; Omran Studies; Syria Direct; Jusoor; Omran Studies], October 2020, url, p. 212354 Al-Araby, ‫ساحة إليران ومليشياتها‬... ‫[ داريا الممنوعة عىل أهلها‬Daria is forbidden to her family... Square for Iran and its militias], 3
April 2019, url
2355 Denmark, DIS, [Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus, [Source:
SOHR] October 2020, url, p. 21
2356 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus, [Source:
Syria Direct] October 2020, url, p. 212357 Al-Khabar, Four Years since the return of its residents… since the return of its residents…Darayya starts removing thetraces of the war, 28 August 2020, url
2358 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus, [Source:
SNHR] October 2020], url, p. 53
2359 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus, [Source:
Suhail Al-Ghazi], October 2020 url, p. 222360 Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus, [Source: aninternational humanitarian organisation in Syria], October 2020, url, p. 56
2361 Ezzi, M., Post-Reconciliation Rural Damascus: Are Local Communities Still Represented?, EUI, 27 November 2020, url, pp.
7-8

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houses belonging to residents supporting the opposition had reportedly been burnt and looted,
causing many displaced residents to decline from returning out of fear.2362

2362 Syria Report (The), Syrian Government Restricts Returns to Southern Damascus Suburb, 17 March 2021, url

248

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

2.12 Dar’a governorate

Map 18: © MapAction, Dar’a governorate2363

2.12.1 General description of the governorate
Dar’a governorate is located in the southern part of Syria, below Damascus, sharing borders with thegovernorates of Quneitra to the west, Rural Damascus to the north, As-Sweida to the east and aninternational border with Jordan to its south. Dar’a governorate is comprised of the three2363 MapAction, Dar’a governorate, 29 July 2016, url

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administrative districts of Dar’a, Izra’ and As Sanamayn.2364 Each district is sub-divided further into
sub-districts:•••

Dar’a district: Dar’a, Jizeh, Bushra Esh-Sham, Mseifra, Kherbet Ghazala, Da’el, Mzeireb, Ash
Shajara. Dar’a City is the governorate capital;
As Sanamayn district: As Sanamayn [includes district capital], Ghabagheb, Massimiyyeh;
Izra’ district: Izra’, Hrak, Sheikh Miskine, Nawa [district capital is Nawa town], Jasim, Tassil.2365

Dar’a city, the capital, is the largest city in the governorate.2366 According to 2019 estimates by the
Syrian Bureau of Statistics, the population of Dar’a governorate was approximately 925 000.2367 In a
March 2021 report, UNOCHA estimated the population of Dar’a governorate to be of 1 022 990
inhabitants.2368
The population of Dar’a is almost entirely Sunni Muslim, with some Christian communities.2369 Fabrice
Balanche describes it as a Sunni Arab ‘stronghold’ in the conflict with the Assad government.2370
However, COAR remarked that the south has also traditionally served as a ‘pillar’ of the Ba’ath party
system, producing a number of key party leaders, officials, and public servants, connections which
later impacted the manner in which the region entered into reconciliation agreements with the GoS
after its take-over by pro-government forces in 2018.2371
Dar’a governorate is strategically important as a transit route between Syria, Jordan, and Gulf states,
and, bordering the Golan Heights.2372 The M5 highway passes through the governorate connecting
Damascus to Jordan, and to Aleppo to the north.2373 Loss of control over these highways connecting
Damascus city with the GoS-controlled border crossing with Jordan would threaten GoS’ control overthe capital.2374 Its strategic value and proximity to Israeli and Jordanian border have made it significant
to the GoS in terms of investing in both services and troops.2375 These characteristics have made it‘traditionally one of the most militarised regions in Syria’, according to UNOCHA.2376

2.12.2 Conflict background and armed actors
Dar’a was the location where the first protests against the Assad government took place in 2011,leading to the outbreak of the war.2377 As a result, the governorate experienced ‘heavy fighting’causing displacement of large number of residents to locations inside and outside Syria.2378 Initially,

2364 Based on UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Reference Map, 17 January 2013, url
2365 UNOCHA, Dar’a Governorate Reference Map, December 2015, url; Alternative spellings can be found in: Integrity

Research and Consultancy, Research Summary Report: Local Governance in Dara’a Governorate, August 2014, url, p. 8
2366 Integrity Research and Consultancy, Research Summary Report: Local Governance in Dara’a Governorate, August 2014,
url, p. 52367 Syria, Central Bureau of Statistics, Estimate of the population in Syria by governorates, n.d., url
2368 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview. Syrian Arab Republic, March 2021, url, p. 232369 Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2018, url, p. 13, and map 2(Sectarian and Ethnic Distribution in Syria 2011) on p. XIII
2370 Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2018, url, p. 27
2371 COAR, Southwestern Dar’a: Needs Oriented Strategic Area Profile (NOSAP), September 2019, url, p. 182372 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic – Governorates Profile (June 2014), 6 August 2014, url, p. 37
2373 ACAPS, Regional Analysis Syria: AIIPart A II – Governorate Profiles, 1 October-31 December 2014, url, p. 26
2374 Integrity Research and Consultancy, Research Summary Report: Local Governance in Dara’a Governorate, August 2014,
url, p. 62375 Integrity Research and Consultancy, Research Summary Report: Local Governance in Dara’a Governorate, August 2014,
url, p. 62376 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic – Governorates Profile (June 2014), 6 August 2014, url, p. 37
2377 Integrity Research and Consultancy, Research Summary Report: Local Governance in Dara’a Governorate, August 2014,
url, p. 6; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic – Governorates Profile(June 2014), 6 August 2014, url, p. 37
2378 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic – Governorates Profile(June 2014), 6 August 2014, url, p. 37

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the protests in Dar’a were linked to frustrations with the GoS over decades of lack of interest in theregion from the state.2379
From 2012 to 2014, a first wave of conflict-related displacement occurred, pushing hundreds ofthousands to leave Dar’a.2380 In early 2015, ISIL temporarily moved into south-western Dar’a and the
ISIL-affiliate group Jaish Khaled Ibn Al-Walid (JKBW) briefly took over several communities in late 2016;
ISIL was later pushed back to the Yarmouk Basin.2381 As of August 2014, the GoS was able to retain
strategic control over larger urban centres including key portions of Dar’a city and the M5 highway,
which splits the governorate in two, thereby preventing the consolidation of local governance in
opposition areas.2382
In 2017, opposition-held parts of Dar’a (and Quneitra) were designated as one of four ‘de-escalation’zones by the US, Jordan, and Russia, created with the intention to allow hostilities to cease.2383
However, in June 2018, as the GoS gained a stronger position in the conflict, it began building up forcesin Dar’a and began a Russian supported bombing and shelling campaign against rebel positions,displacing 270 000 people.2384
In July 2018, with Russian support, the GoS retook control of Dar’a through a combination of military
campaigns and reconciliation agreements backed by the Russians. Some deals permitted local fighters
to keep their light weapons in exchange for surrender, and some were integrated into the Russian
directed 5th Corps of the SAA, ostensibly to fight against ISIL.2385
The reconciliation deals resulted in a ‘patchwork’ of agreements across different actors in Dar’a,leading to what COAR describes as having created ‘space for the emergence of unprecedented levels
of instability’ post-reconciliation.2386 Russia prioritised its negotiations in the south-eastern rural partsof Dar’a, while the GoS mainly conducted negotiations in western and northern Dar’a, while in otherareas, this sometimes occurred with both simultaneously. GoS deals leveraged local social capital andconnections to those who maintained ties with the government to urge locals to reconcile; Russian
deals, by contrast, focused on negotiating with armed opposition actors and retaining direct links with
Russia, most prominently by dealing with Ahmad Oudeh, commander of the Shabab As-Sunna groupin Busra El-Sham area, reconfiguring these opponents into new and reconciled groups of fighters,
including under the 5th Corps, to be led by Oudeh.2387 Government civilian institutions and local
councils were reportedly established and operating in ‘all areas’ including those under the control ofreconciled former non-state armed groups, as of a May 2019 UN report on Dar’a.2388
Since June 2019 and through 2020 the governorate’s strategic geographical location2389 combinedwith a ‘weak regime control’ in the south2390 led to an escalation of violence and insecurity. Foreign

2379 Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2018, url, p. 32380 COAR, Southwestern Dar’a: Needs Oriented Strategic Area Profile (NOSAP), September 2019, url, p. 142381 COAR, Southwestern Dar’a: Needs Oriented Strategic Area Profile (NOSAP), September 2019, url, pp. 13-14
2382 Integrity Research and Consultancy, Research Summary Report: Local Governance in Dara’a Governorate, August 2014,

url, p. 142383 International Crisis Group, Lessons from the Syrian State’s Return to the South, 25 February 2019, url, p. 1
2384 International Crisis Group, Lessons from the Syrian State’s Return to the South, 25 February 2019, url, p. 1
2385 International Crisis Group, Lessons from the Syrian State’s Return to the South, 25 February 2019, url, p. 22386 COAR, Southwestern Dar’a: Needs Oriented Strategic Area Profile (NOSAP), September 2019, url, p. 122387 COAR, Security Archipelago: Security Fragmentation in Dar’a Governorate, 3 December 2019, url, pp. 7-8; see also:
OHCHR, The “Unreconciled” Concerns of Civilians in Dar’a Governorate, May 2019, url, pp. 3-4
2388 OHCHR, The “Unreconciled” Concerns of Civilians in Dar’a Governorate, May 2019, url, p. 52389 SOHR, Daraa in one year: security chaos, overlapping interests and hidden conflict… people suffer the scourge of external
and internal interventions, 25 June 2020, url; Tokmajyan, A., How Southern Syria Has Been Transformed Into a Regional
Powder Keg, Carnegie Middle East Center, 14 July 2020, url
2390 Tokmajyan, A., How Southern Syria Has Been Transformed Into a Regional Powder Keg, Carnegie Middle East Center, 14
July 2020, url

251Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

actors expanded their influence in the area, particularly Israel in the shared border with the Golan
Heights, and Iran and Russia, that engaged in ‘an indirect competition for influence in the region.2391
Further background information about the security situation in Dar’a between 2018 and 2020,
including after reconciliation agreements is also available in the 2019-2020 EASO COI Reports: Syria:
Exercise of authority in recaptured areas (February 2020) and Syria: Security situation (May 2020).
Syrian Arab Army and affiliated armed groups
Following the GoS’ retaking of Dar’a in summer 2018, the state security agencies have taken control
over local governance and returned the area to a ‘security state’ according to International Crisis
Group.2392 After reconciliation, the six main pro-GoS actors deployed in Dar’a have been identified by
COAR as: the 4th Division, State Security Branch, Political Security Branch, Air Force Intelligence,
Military Security Branch, and the 5th Corps, each with supposed distinctions in mandate, but inpractice, overlapping and competing for local influence and acting as ‘local armed groups’ and ‘power
brokers’.2393
The 4th Division is among the most powerful army divisions and directly linked to the upper ranks of
the Assad government, while the Political Security Branch and Air Intelligence are known to have links
with Iran. Military Security Branch is a security agency which falls under the Defense ministry, and in
Dar’a, it functions as a key division of the army, as much as an intelligence and security service, while
also being perceived as close to Russia. It is present and influential in border communities along theIsraeli border, and it is also the most influential actor in Dar’a City.2394
The Russia-backed 5th Corps of the SAA formed from reconciled former opposition armed groups andfighters was created to prevent ‘security vacuums’ in Dar’a and contain Iranian influence in thearea.2395 The 5th Corps in Dar’a is led by Ahmad Oudeh and has a large presence in the eastern ruralparts of Dar’a, as the main influential armed actor. It coordinates with Russia exclusively.2396
For deployments of the SAA in Dar’a governorate as of 17 March 2020, see the EASO COI Report: Syria- Security situation (May 2020).
By June 2020, the 8th Brigade (of the Russian-backed 5th Corps) had nearly 1 600 fighters, 900 of whichwere former rebels.2397 The 8th Brigade continued to be the main armed actor in eastern Dar’a, also inview of the low control by the GoS forces. The 8th Brigade ‘preserves order and security by setting up
checkpoints and carrying out regular patrols’. Al-Jabassini reported that under 8th Brigade-Russian
military police ‘with the exception of a few violent incidents, areas that fall under their control enjoy
better security than other parts of the governorate’ because the Brigade confronts Syrian forces andorders them to remove checkpoints and stop abuses.2398 Control over checkpoints brings additional
financial gain to fighters ‘through regional war economy activities, including smuggling, humantrafficking, and the illegal narcotics trade’.2399
With headquarters in Busra al-Sham, the 8th Brigade concentrates most of its forces in eastern Dar’a(next to Sweida and the border with Jordan), although ‘small groups also operate elsewhere across2391 SOHR, Daraa in one year: security chaos, overlapping interests and hidden conflict…people suffer the scourge of external

and internal interventions, 25 June 2020, url
2392 International Crisis Group, Lessons from the Syrian State’s Return to the South, 25 February 2019, url, p. 92393 COAR, Security Archipelago: Security Fragmentation in Dar’a Governorate, 3 December 2019, url, p. 92394 COAR, Security Archipelago: Security Fragmentation in Dar’a Governorate, 3 December 2019, url, pp. 10-11, 17, 182395 COAR, Southwestern Dar’a: Needs Oriented Strategic Area Profile (NOSAP), September 2019, url, p. 40
2396 COAR, Security Archipelago: Security Fragmentation in Dar’a Governorate, 3 December 2019, url, p. 122397 Al-Jabassini, A., Rampant violence, military escalation, and the role of intermediaries in Daraa, Syria, MEI, 1 June 2020,
url
2398 Al-Jabassini, A., Rampant violence, military escalation, and the role of intermediaries in Daraa, Syria, MEI, 1 June 2020,
url
2399 COAR, The Syrian economy at war: Armed group mobilization as livelihood and protection strategy, September 2020, url

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Daraa governorate’. It is formed by four battalions, each with three companies, in addition to‘headquarters, supplies, reconnaissance, and fire-support companies’. They receive ‘logisticalsupport, ammunition, and arms, including rifles, artillery, anti-tank missiles, and machine guns,
through [Russia’s] Hmeimim airbase.’ The 8th Brigade has two main tasks: first, reconnaissance anddefence of northern Latakia from potential attacks by rebels based in Idlib; second, protect
headquarters, ‘manage checkpoints, and preserve general order in the eastern region of Daraa
governorate’. 2400
According to Al-Jabassini, the 8th Brigade is a relevant armed actor with ‘indispensable military,
security, and intermediary role’, capitalising from the ‘volatility and chaos in southern Syria’ and‘helping Russia to achieve its interests in the south’.2401 The 8th Brigade has established a ‘relatively
secure climate’ in eastern Dar’a, improved service delivery in parallel with government institutions.
The 8th Brigade and especially Oudah have established a central role in defusing tensions and reaching
agreements across Dar’a, given their military capacity and respect earned from clan elders andsheikhs.2402
Despite its relevant role, the 8th Brigade faces four significant challenges in the region, according to
Al-Jabassini: the lack of formal recognition by the Syrian Ministry of Defense, the ambitions of Iranand its proxies in southern Syria, the regular retaliations with local armed groups in Sweida, and theongoing rivalries among former rebel leaders.2403
In September 2020, COAR noted that ‘military recruitment in Dar’a is primarily conducted through theRussian-backed 5th Corps and the Iranian-backed 4th Division’ (although formally under the SAA, inpractice acting as proxies for Iran and Russia), providing recruits both with ‘protection against criminal
charges or outstanding security threats by the Syrian state’, but also generous salaries and militarytraining. Reportedly in June 2020, ‘several thousands of men applied to join the 5th Corps’ 8th
Brigade.’2404 Although the promise of a salary is important, Abdullah Al-Jabassini, researcher with afocus on wartime and post-conflict dynamics in southern Syria, argues that the primary reason former
rebels join the 8th Brigade is the protection and security they enjoy from being in the ranks, namelyfrom arbitrary detention at GoS checkpoints or other ‘regime transgressions’.2405
The Air Force Intelligence and Military Security also recruit in Dar’a, in practice ‘often overlap[ping]with recruitment to the 5th Corps and 4th Division’.2406
In July 2020, the 4th Division reportedly opened recruitment centres in Mzeireb and Zayzun andreceived 2 700 new recruits (mainly deserters from SAA and members of armed groups). The new
recruits also receive temporary ID cards that protect them from pending criminal and security charges
from the government. However, the short-term nature of the contracts brings uncertainty to fighters,that face both financial risk and arrest by Syrian authorities.2407
Hezbollah and Iran-backed groups
Iranian-backed local militias reportedly ‘hold sway’ in the south on the border between Jordan and
the Golan Heights where the government is unable to exert authority2408, side by side with the‘competing interests of the many actors that are active there: regime forces, local militias supported
by Iran, Hezbollah, Russian forces, and the local Sunni and Druze population, which includes the2400 Al-Jabassini, A., The Eighth Brigade: Striving for Supremacy in Southern Syria, EUI, 1 December 2020, url, p. 62401 Al-Jabassini, A., The Eighth Brigade: Striving for Supremacy in Southern Syria, EUI, 1 December 2020, url, pp. 6, 132402 Al-Jabassini, A., The Eighth Brigade: Striving for Supremacy in Southern Syria, EUI, 1 December 2020, url, pp. 7-82403 Al-Jabassini, A., The Eighth Brigade: Striving for Supremacy in Southern Syria, EUI, 1 December 2020, url, p. 82404 COAR, The Syrian economy at war: Armed group mobilization as livelihood and protection strategy, September 2020, url
2405 Al-Jabassini, A., The Eighth Brigade: Striving for Supremacy in Southern Syria, EUI, 1 December 2020, url, p. 62406 COAR, The Syrian economy at war: Armed group mobilization as livelihood and protection strategy, September 2020, url
2407 COAR, The Syrian economy at war: Armed group mobilization as livelihood and protection strategy, September 2020, url
2408 Reuters, New Assad statue triggers protest in cradle of Syrian revolt, 10 March 2019, url

253Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

remnants of the opposition to the Assad regime’.2409 Western Dar’a has seen Iranian influencestrengthening through its ‘state security affiliates and local proxies’ in that area2410, as well as in thesouth-west, where Hezbollah and other Iranian-militias operate.2411 These groups have also beenaccused of also being involved in assassinations against those opposed to their presence.2412 However,their members have also been the targets of attacks in Dar’a.2413
As of January 2021, Jusoor for Studies mapped 38 military bases and posts held by Iran and while
Hezbollah had 21 independent, joint or semi-shared points with Iranian forces in Dar’agovernorate.2414 The size of Iran-backed groups (and its proxies’) presence in the south of Syria isunclear. Israeli intelligence claimed that Iran had ‘800 operatives throughout Syria and works throughallied groups’; protests in areas outside the GoS control ‘often include demands for the departure of
so-called ‘Iranian militias’, referring to Hezbollah and other proxies of Iran. There are connections
between Iran and the SAA’s 4th Division and the Air Force Intelligence Directorate.2415
According to the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), ‘Iran is anchoring its presence in thesouthern Syrian provinces close to the Israeli border in order to create an additional front of friction
and conflict with Israel through its proxies.’2416
In southern Syria, Iran reportedly relies on local groups (homeland defence forces and local defence
militias), ‘that it recruits, equips, and trains; Syrian army units under Iranian influence (among themthe 4th Division, under the command of Maher al-Assad); and especially Hezbollah’: the Southern
Command (includes Hezbollah officers as advisers and supervisors in the Syrian army), and the Golan
File Unit (direct Hezbollah command).2417
According to Mazen Ezzi, research contributor of the Wartime and Post-Conflict in Syria project at theEuropean University Institute, Hezbollah pursues a planned presence in Dar’a, Quneitra, the ‘Triangleof Death’2418 and southern Damascus, as these are strategic areas of access to the Syrian Israeli border,
thus ‘giving it an opportunity to pose a threat to Israel’.2419
In Dar’a, Hezbollah has supported the creation of groups built from the remaining Shia in thegovernorate, including: Saraya al-Areen 313 (‘Brigades of Den 313’), composed of Busra Shia, the alImam al-Mahdi Brigade (Shia from Busra, Qarfa and al-Sheikh Maskin), and the Hadhart Abbas Brigade,in Izr’a. Hezbollah has four large military bases in southern Syria, three of which in Dar’a (a fourth inQuneitra). They are used as ‘training and preparation centres for new volunteers and arms andammunition depots’.2420

2409 INSS, The Struggle for Control of Southern Syria: Where is Israel?, 16 December 2020, url
2410 COAR, Southwestern Dar’a: Needs Oriented Strategic Area Profile (NOSAP), September 2019, url, p. 41
2411 Syria Direct, Mysterious assassinations, bombings as ‘security breakdown’ mires Daraa’s fragile peace, 28 February 2019,url
2412 Nofal, W., Will the Security Crisis in Southern Syria Spark a ‘New Revolution’, Chatham House, January 2020, url
2413 Carter Center (The), 11 attacks on Hezbollah individuals have occurred in the south of Syria since August 2019, Weekly

Conflict Summary, 13-19 January 2020, url, p. 32414 Jusoor for Studies, Map of the military bases and posts of foreign forces in Syria 6 January 2021, url
2415 Tokmajyan, A., How Southern Syria Has Been Transformed Into a Regional Powder Keg, Carnegie Middle East Center, 14
July 2020, url
2416 INSS, The Struggle for Control of Southern Syria: Where is Israel?, 16 December 2020, url
2417 INSS, The Struggle for Control of Southern Syria: Where is Israel?, 16 December 2020, url
2418 The Triangle of Death is located at the intersection of the governorates of Damascus, Dar’a and Quneitra. It was named
the Triangle of Death after the heavy losses suffered there by the Afghan Fatimiyoun Brigade in 2015. Ezzi, M., LebaneseHezbollah’s Experience in Syria, Wartime and Post-Conflict in Syria (WPCS), European University Institute, 13 March 2020,
url, p. 9, footnote 272419 Ezzi, M., Lebanese Hezbollah’s Experience in Syria, Wartime and Post-Conflict in Syria (WPCS), European University
Institute, 13 March 2020, url, p. 92420 Ezzi, M., Lebanese Hezbollah’s Experience in Syria, Wartime and Post-Conflict in Syria (WPCS), European University
Institute, 13 March 2020, url, p. 9254

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

On 20 June 2020 Iranian forces and Hezbollah were accused of attacking a bus transporting soldiersof the 5th Corps’ 8th Brigade. The bus hit a roadside IED near Kahil (eastern Dar’a), killing 9 soldiers andinjuring 13 others. The following days large protests took place in Busra al-Sham (headquarters of the
8th Brigade), against Iranian and Hezbollah presence in the south.2421
According to Abdullah Al-Jabassini, ‘Iran and Hezbollah see the Eighth Brigade as an actor that impedes
their plans to establish a long-term presence in Daraa’; on the one hand they cannot enter Busra alSham, ‘the main Shi’a population center in southern Syria, whose displaced Shi’a families are notallowed to return to the town by Ahmad al-Oda […], commander of the Eighth Brigade’, and on theother, the registration of more than 7 000 men to the 8th Brigade in June 2020 could signify a massive
addition to al-Oudah’s manpower, and thus pose a threat to Iran and Hezbollah presence in southern
Syria.2422
Opposition armed groups and fighters, including the Dar’a Popular Resistance (Al Muqawama al
Shabia Daraa)
Former opposition fighters and groups, including the Popular Resistance, were present in several areasof Dar’a, especially the western suburbs, such as the Yarmouk Basin2423 and al-Jaidour area2424, as wellas towns of Tafas, Muzayrib, and Tal Shihab, as well as being based in Dar’a City to a lesser extent.2425
One source, however, notes that although some violent incidents were claimed in the name of‘popular resistance’, this ‘does not denote a coherent movement, but is an expression of the pervasive
popular anger against the regime’s oppressive military policies in the area’.2426
The Dar’a Popular Resistance group emerged online in November 2018.2427 The group’s ‘origins,
memberships, and affiliations are largely unknown’ though according to COAR it could be either aguerrilla type insurgent group or even a ‘front’ for different state-linked forces to engage in‘interfactional rivalry’. The group has carried out a number of attacks against government targets,
including hit and run assaults and bombings on military headquarters and checkpoints, as well asassassinations of reconciled figures.2428 It has claimed to deter abuses by GoS and Iran and criticised
opposition figures who collaborate with Russia.2429 The group has carried out attacks on checkpoints
in Al-Sanamayn and against the Criminal Security Branch in Dar’a city, for instance.2430 Low levelattacks, ambushes, raids on military outposts continue to be reported as of November 2019.2431
Between December 2019 and March 2020, STJ documented the presence in Dar’a of both armed
former fighters and opposition military groups, of which the most relevant is the Popular Resistance.
2421 COAR, 5th Corps and Government forces clash in Dar’a: A step-change for Syria’s most restive region as Oudeh and Russia

bid for more power?, 29 June 2020, url, p. 2; Al-Jabassini, A., Is Ahmad al-Oda winning the “hearts and minds” of Daraa’s
people?, MEI, 22 June 2020, url
2422 Al-Jabassini, A., Is Ahmad al-Oda winning the “hearts and minds” of Daraa’s people?, MEI, 22 June 2020, url
2423 This includes area towns including Tasil, Koya, Bait Irah, Nafa`ah, Sahem el-Golan, al-Shabraq, Jilin, Hayt, al-Jumlah, Ain
Thakar, al-Shajara and al-Qusayr. STJ, Violence and Assassinations Mark a Sharp Increase since the Settlement Agreement –Daraa, 13 January 2020, url, pp. 5-6
2424 This includes the towns of Nawa, Jasim, al-Harah, and Nimr. STJ, Violence and Assassinations Mark a Sharp Increase since
the Settlement Agreement – Daraa, 13 January 2020, url, p. 62425 STJ, Violence and Assassinations Mark a Sharp Increase since the Settlement Agreement – Daraa, 13 January 2020, url,
pp. 5-62426 Etana Syria, Attacks & Assassinations in South-West Syria, 28 February 2021, url
2427 Al-Jabassini, A., From Rebel Rule to a Post-Capitulation Era in Daraa Southern Syria, EUI, June 2019, url, p. 15; COAR,
Southwestern Dar’a: Needs Oriented Strategic Area Profile (NOSAP), September 2019, url, p. 43; Carter Center (The), Conflictin Southern Syria (August 2018-July 2019), August 2019, url, p. 8, footnote 92428 COAR, Southwestern Dar’a: Needs Oriented Strategic Area Profile (NOSAP), September 2019, url, pp. 4, 37, 43; See also:
ISW, Russia’s Dead-End Diplomacy, November 2019, url, p. 27
2429 ISW, Russia’s Dead-End Diplomacy, November 2019, url, p. 272430 Al-Jabassini, A., From Rebel Rule to a Post-Capitulation Era in Daraa Southern Syria, European University Institute, June
2019, url, pp. 15-16
2431 ISW, Russia’s Dead-End Diplomacy, November 2019, url, p. 27; See also: Syria Direct, Mysterious assassinations,bombings as ‘security breakdown’ mires Daraa’s fragile peace, 28 February 2019, url

255Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Around 200 incidents recorded in the governorate during this period occurred in western andnorthern rural Daraa, particularly in Muzayrib, Tafas, Dael, Jasim, al-Shajara, Inkhil, Masakin Jaleen,
Jumla, Nawa, Tasil and al-Sanamayn.2432
Other emerging armed groups in Dar’a dissatisfied with the government since reconciliation identified
by sources include:•••

the Southern Companies (Siraya Janoubiya); first appeared online in February 2019.2433 Thisanti-government group targeted a Baath office in eastern Dar’a with an explosion, threatening
to target other government facilities if they did not ‘stay away from civilians’.2434
the Special Task Companies (Liwa al Muhim al Siraya); first appeared online in March 2019;
the Freemen of Kanaker (Ahrar Bilada Kanaker); first appeared online in April 2019.2435

Information on activity of the above emerging groups in Dar’a between January 2020 and the time ofwriting this report could not be found among the sources consulted by EASO within time constraints.
ISIL affiliates
ISIL has reportedly been active in Dar’a during 20192436, 20202437 and in early 2021.2438
Several attacks and security incidents were attributed to ISIS in Dar’a governorate in 2020 and 2021,
please see Illustrative security incidents.
Local ISIL-affiliate group Jaish Khaled Ibn Al-Walid (JKBW) formerly dominated parts of the south-westof Dar’a, but by July 2019 only two attacks by ISIS had been registered in Dar’a since the 2018 takeoverand reconciliation.2439 Information on ISIL-affiliated groups active in Dar’a governorate could not befound among the sources consulted by EASO within time constraints.

2.12.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population
Territorial control
During the reference period of this report Dar’a governorate was under nominal GoS control2440,
including some areas of the governorate that were formerly opposition-held and have been retakenor reconciled through local agreements.2441 The UN explained that territories ‘currently under theeffective control’ of GoS and its forces are those taken by military operations, including some 80 % ofeastern and north-eastern rural Dar’a (such as Lajjat, Busr al-Harir, al-Hirak, al-Maliha al-Sharqiya, alMaliha al-Gharbiya, Malihat al-Atash and Saida), areas of western rural Dar’a (including the former
ISIL-area al Yarmouk Valley), and parts of Dar’a City, such as Dar’a al-Mahatta, which have been understate control since 2011. The UN stated that ‘the rest of the territories in Dar’a remain under the2432 STJ, Fresh Wave of Violence Storms Already Vulnerable “Settlement Agreement” in Daraa, 10 May 2020, url
2433 Carter Center The), Conflict in Southern Syria (August 2018-July 2019), August 2019, url, p. 82434 Syria Direct, Mysterious assassinations, bombings as ‘security breakdown’ mires Daraa’s fragile peace, 28 February 2019,url
2435 Carter Center (The), Conflict in Southern Syria (August 2018-July 2019), August 2019, url, p. 82436 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, October 1, 2019‒December 31,

2019, 4 February 2020, url, p. 40, Carter Center (The), Conflict in Southern Syria (August 2018-July 2019), August 2019, url,
p. 38, footnote 13
2437 ISW, Syria situation report: April 1 - 14, 2020, 16 April 2020, url; USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector
General Report to the US Congress, January 1, 2020‒March 31, 2020, 13 May 2020, url, pp. 51-52
2438 ISW, Syria situation report: February 19 – March 22, 2021, 25 March 2021, url
2439 COAR, Southwestern Dar’a: Needs Oriented Strategic Area Profile (NOSAP), September 2019, url, p. 14; For a map, see
Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary, 22-28 July 2019, url, p. 4
2440 ISW, Syria Situation Report: January 8-21, 2020, 24 January 2020, url; US CRS, Armed conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S.
Response, 27 July 2020, url, p. 4; OHCHR, Syrian Arab Republic: Approximate areas of influence as of November 2020, Map
no. 4620.10, January 2021, url
2441 ISW, Syria Situation Report: January 8-21, 2020, 24 January 2020, url

256Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

effective control of former armed non-State groups, including those that agreed to the “reconciliation
deals”.’2442
Although the GoS had nominal control over the south2443 its military forces and presence remained‘vulnerable’. The Russian-backed strategy of return and inclusion of former rebel groups ‘transformed
the conflict in the south from open rebellion to low-intensity resistance’.2444
Syria expert Haid Haid, explained in a July 2019 paper that some parts of Dar’a were under ‘Russia’s
protection’ naming Busra al-Sham, al-Sahwa, Ma’araba, and al-Jizah; these include former rebel areasthat were recaptured through surrender deals organised by Russia. According to Haid, in these areas,‘regime forces are unable to enter those locations but can still create checkpoints at their outskirts
and entrances’ meaning that GoS’ ‘access and authority in those zones are largely limited to what
Russia allows it to do.’2445 The GoS, however, used conflict occasions to show its presence andinfluence, including when, in May 2020, it used the killing of nine local policemen by a former rebel toreinforce its presence in south-western Dar’a by deploying military units.2446
In areas of Dar’a city where former rebels maintain control as per the 2018 agreement, problems with
the GoS are solved through Russian mediation. They continue to carry light weapons, and many haveno affiliation with the GoS’ security or military institutions.2447
Tokmajyan further noted the volatility of control over Dar’a, noting that ‘the strategic impose of thesouth, the regime’s inability to reimpose its full sovereignty over the area, and the involvement of newactors such as Iran and Russia have granted this formerly peripheral region, where the interests ofmultiple actors now converge and conflict, a crucial role in regional affairs.’2448
In 2019, COAR described the south, including Dar’a, as being in a state of lawlessness, with both civilian
protests and growing armed opposition resistance.2449 A fragmented security environment, mixtureof reconciliation configurations, multiple and competing structures of authority, significant levels of
lawlessness, and frequent security incidents has created a ‘climate of instability’ in Dar’a. COAR statedthat it would be ‘inaccurate to state that the area is now under full government control’2450, notingthat there are ‘no clear patterns of influence or control’ and that presence and influence by different
armed groups can change across communities, ‘almost by kilometer’.2451
In its report of October 2020, the UN Security Council stated ‘In the southern part of the country,
insecurity and administrative restrictions continued to prevent sustained access to areas formerly
controlled by non-State armed groups, in particular in Dar‘a al-Balad neighborhood in Dar‘a city andin parts of western Dar‘a and Qunaytirah.’2452

2442 OHCHR, The “Unreconciled” Concerns of Civilians in Dar’a Governorate, May 2019, url, pp. 3-4
2443 ISW, Syria Situation Report: January 8-21, 2020, 24 January 2020, url; US CRS, Armed conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S.

Response, 27 July 2020, url, p. 4; OHCHR, [map] Syrian Arab Republic: Approximate areas of influence as of November 2020,
January 2021, url
2444 Tokmajyan, A., How Southern Syria Has Been Transformed Into a Regional Powder Keg, Carnegie Middle East Center, 14
July 2020, url, accessed 15 April 2021
2445 Haid, H., Understanding the characteristics of the new emerging state in Syria, Chatham House, June 2019, url
2446 Tokmajyan, A., How Southern Syria Has Been Transformed Into a Regional Powder Keg, Carnegie Middle East Center, 14
July 2020, url
2447 Tokmajyan, A., How Southern Syria Has Been Transformed Into a Regional Powder Keg, Carnegie Middle East Center, 14
July 2020, url
2448 Tokmajyan, Armenak, How Southern Syria Has Been Transformed Into a Regional Powder Keg, Carnegie Middle East
Center, 14 July 2020, url
2449 COAR, Security Archipelago: Security Fragmentation in Dar’a Governorate, 3 December 2019, url, p. 42450 COAR, Southwestern Dar’a: Needs Oriented Strategic Area Profile (NOSAP), September 2019, url, pp. 4-5
2451 COAR, Security Archipelago: Security Fragmentation in Dar’a Governorate, 3 December 2019, url, p. 42452 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020), 14 October 2020, url, para. 34

257

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In January 2021, COAR described the situation in the south as further fragmented, with ‘continued
unrest in Dar’a’ showing that ‘Russia faces limitations as a local power broker, and neither it nor the
Syrian Government has yet demonstrated the capacity to pacify southern Syria.’2453
Security trends in 2020-2021
The security situation in the south deteriorated throughout 20202454, revealing ‘chronic instability andstate fragmentation’.2455 Reporting on the period between January and July 2020, the CoI stated thatthe security situation in Dar’a ‘significantly deteriorated, with a number of incidents of armed violence
between the multitude of armed actors vying for control’.2456 The CoI highlighted ‘tensions between
local opposition fighters and government forces, as well as civilians’.2457 As reported by COAR,
assassinations and armed attacks continued, many directed at both GoS security forces and local civil
servants.2458
The UN Security Council’s October 2020 report indicated ‘continued clashes affecting civilians and theassassinations of fighters reconciled from former armed opposition groups and of Governmentaffiliated figures, as well as continued localized protests against Government raids, arbitrary
detention, conscription drives and the lack of public services. Intermittent clashes continued to takeplace, notably in the vicinity of Dar’a.’2459
In 2020, failed reconciliation agreements and a growing economic crisis exacerbated by the effects of
COVID-19, brought a ‘renewed insurgency’ to the south of Syria, leaving the GoS under‘unprecedented pressure’.2460 The growing insurgency, with ‘Former rebels, ISIS cells, and criminalgroups’ carrying out ‘more than 150 attacks resulting in the deaths of combatants, and dozens more
killing civilians’, paved way to the growth of the 5th Corps’ 8th Brigade as a ‘pseudo independent force
in the south’.2461 In eastern Dar’a, former opposition fighters ‘flocked’ to the Corps’s 8th Brigade,
expanding its manpower.2462
Between December 2019 and March 2020, Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ) recorded at least 200
incidents of violence in Dar’a, resulting in up to 131 deaths and ‘dozens’ injured, among militants andcivilians. Most incidents took place in ‘western and northern rural Daraa, especially in the cities andtowns of Muzayrib, Tafas, Dael, Jasim, al-Shajara, Inkhil, Masakin Jaleen, Jumla, Nawa, Tasil and alSanamayn’. A new trend in assassinations arose in Dar’a, with killings directed at ‘civil activists,
including doctors, media, and independent relief activists’.2463 Between March and May 2020, OHCHR
documented 52 incidents of ‘apparently targeted killings’ in Dar’a governorate which resulted in 17
civilians being killed.2464
In its August 2020 report, the CoI noted:‘Reports of targeted killings of individuals increased across Dar’a and Suwayda’ Governorates
during the reporting period, in what appeared to be retaliatory acts by numerous local armed
2453 COAR, Syria in 2021, Forecast for a Protracted Crisis, 28 January 2021, url
2454 COAR, Syria in 2021, Forecast for a Protracted Crisis, 28 January 2021, url; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the

Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 14 August 2020, url, para. 132455 COAR, Double Trouble: Southern Syria Erupts on Two Fronts, 1 February 2021, url
2456 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
14 August 2020, url, para. 132457 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
14 August 2020, url, para. 72458 COAR, Syria in 2021, Forecast for a Protracted Crisis, 28 January 2021, url
2459 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020), 14 October 2020, url, para. 122460 Carter Center, A Path to Conflict Transformation in Syria, A Framework for a Phased Approach, January 2021, url, p. 42461 International Review, The Military Casualties of the Syrian Civil War in 2020, 18 January 2021, url
2462 COAR, Syria in 2021, Forecast for a Protracted Crisis, 28 January 2021, url
2463 STJ, Fresh Wave of Violence Storms Already Vulnerable “Settlement Agreement” in Daraa, 10 May 2020, url
2464 OHCHR, Syria: Bachelet warns of ‘ticking time-bomb’ as civilian killings mount, 8 May 2020, url

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actors. Reportedly, there were at least 53 such killings across Dar’a between January and Junetargeting medical professionals, political actors with both pro- and anti-government stances,judges, members of armed groups who had “reconciled” their status, and members of the
security apparatus. In nearly all documented cases, the killings were carried out by men on
motorcycles using small arms, rendering identification of the perpetrator difficult.’2465
According to data collected and verified by researcher Abdullah Al-Jabassini2466, at least 930 violent
incidents took place between August 2018 and February 2021 in Dar’a governorate which killed atleast 790 individuals.2467
On 1 March 2020, Syrian forces launched an operation to secure greater control over al-Sanamayn
city.2468 ISW described the town as a ‘hotbed of insurgent and anti-regime activity’.2469 As al-Sanamayn
had been under GoS control prior to the 2018 reconciliation process in Dar’a, it had not entered aprevious settlement agreement with fighters.2470
The GoS operation to maintain control of the area prompted a reaction from the population, anddemonstrations quickly became violent with gunmen exchanged fire with the GoS military andsecurity personnel. The operation in al-Sanamayn ended through a mediated solution brokered by
Ahmad al-Audeh, commander of the Russian-backed 5th Corps, with armed rebels being given thepossibility to evacuate to other rebel-held areas, and the regime taking full control of al-Sanamayn.2471
Armenak Tokmajyan, wrote on the aftermath of the situation in al-Sanamayn:‘A conclusion from Al-Sanamayn and the [population’s] reaction to the regime’s takeover ofrebel-held areas is that where Russia brokered deals—Busra al-Sham, Daraa City, and Tafas—
there remains the possibility of organized armed resistance. In several instances, the arrest offormer rebels or civilians from Tafas and Daraa City at regime checkpoints located outside thezones covered by the Russian agreement provoked an escalation. Former rebels mobilized
their networks and threatened to destabilize the situation unless the detainees were released.
Some of those threats led to armed confrontations while others died out. However, the reality
remains that opposition groups are still able to defend themselves against the regime’s
transgressions. In Busra al-Sham the situation has been more complicated, characterized by a
mixture of restraint and defiance. The regime is more cautious with the Fifth Corps led by
Audeh, as it is protected by Russia. In fact, in several instances, Audeh and his comrades haveantagonized the regime’s military and security personnel without facing any
consequences.2472

2465 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,

14 August 2020, url, para. 172466 Abdullah Al-Jabassini holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Kent, United Kingdom. He is a NonResident Scholar at the Middle East Institute (Washington, D.C., United States), and a Research Fellow for the Wartime andPost-Conflict in Syria (WPCS) project at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies of the European University Institute(Florence, Italy). His research is focused on southern Syria, specifically Dar’a governorate. See url
2467 Al-Jabassini, A. and Ezzi, M., Tribal ‘Sulh’ and the Politics of Persuasion in Volatile Southern Syria, EUI, 1 June 2020, url,
p. 2
2468 SOHR, Fierce clashes erupt in Al-Sanamayn as regime forces storm the city using heavy weapons, 1 March 2020, url; ISW,
March 1 Attacks on Regime Positions Demonstrate Growing Strength of Southern Syria Insurgency, 3 March 2020, url; Syria
Direct, Clashes in Daraa evoke memories of the start of the Syrian revolution, 2 March 2020, url
2469 ISW, March 1 Attacks on Regime Positions Demonstrate Growing Strength of Southern Syria Insurgency, 3 March 2020,
url
2470 SOHR, The regime forces and Russia impose a new settlement in al-Sanamin and displace 26 of who reject it to the northof Syria, 3 March 2020, url
2471 Tokmajyan, Armenak, How Southern Syria Has Been Transformed Into a Regional Powder Keg, Carnegie Middle East
Center, 14 July 2020, url
2472 Tokmajyan, A., How Southern Syria Has Been Transformed Into a Regional Powder Keg, Carnegie Middle East Center, 14
July 2020, url

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For further information on the March 2020 al-Sanamayn operation, see the EASO COI Report: Syria Security situation (May 2020).
Between March and June 2020 tensions rose between local opposition fighters and GoS forces, as wellas civilians. In mid-March, artillery shelling by the SAA targeted the south of Dar’a, ‘triggering
retaliatory attacks by local militants near Nawa. The situation remained volatile in May and Junefollowing clashes, targeted killings, and the killing of nine Syrian police officers in Muzayrib. In
response to these incidents, the SAA deployed additional troops to the region.’2473
2020 saw a continuation of assassinations and bombings directed at government forces, former
opposition members and civilians.2474 Most incidents were unclaimed and perpetrators unknown.2475
In February 2021, ETANA, an independent civil society group with connections to the opposition2476,
indicated that ‘unknown perpetrators were responsible for 30% of attacks and 42% of assassinations’in the south of Syria.’2477 Local factors also contributed to the high murder rate in Dar’a, including‘revenge killings under retributive tribal justice and rivalries between smugglers and criminal gangs
operating in the province’.2478
Tensions with Israel continued with ‘Israeli airstrikes […] directed at a broad range of targets acrossthe Syrian Arab Republic, including Iranian and Iranian-backed actors’.2479 In April 2020, the Israel
Defense Forces (IDF) released a video showing senior officers of the SAA and Hezbollah conducting aninspection tour of pro-Assad positions close to the Golan Heights, either in Dar’a or Quneitra. The IDF
said that Israel would hold the GoS responsible for ‘any sabotage activity’ initiated from Syria against
Israel.2480 In May 2020, two rounds of likely Israeli air strikes attacked Iranian proxy and GoS forces in
Ma’ariya (western Dar’a governorate)2481 and the SAA’s 5th Mechanised Division near Izra (north-east
Dar’a).2482
Small-scale ISIL attacks were reported in Dar’a governorate in 2020.2483 In May 2020, an analysis
published by the Middle East Institute (MEI) indicated that ISIL was escalating its attacks in Dar’agovernorate, ‘claiming at least seven targeted assassinations, ambushes, and bomb attacks’.2484
Around the same time, ISW assessed that ISIL could be ‘reassert[ing its] presence in southern Syria’.2485
On 24 January 2021, after tribal clashes and threats made against the 4th Division by an ISIL-aligned
community leader from Tafas, the Iranian-backed Syrian Army 4th Division entered Tafas, despite

2473 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,

14 August 2020, url, para. 72474 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020), 14 October 2020, url, para. 20; MEE, Syria:
Hundreds gather in Daraa to celebrate anniversary of uprising, 18 March 2021, url; SNHR, The Most Notable Human Rights
Violations in Syria in January 2021, 4 February 2021, url, p. 32475 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020), 14 October 2020, url, para. 20; MEE, Syria:
Hundreds gather in Daraa to celebrate anniversary of uprising, 18 March 2021, url
2476 Etana Syria, History, n.d., url
2477 Etana Syria, Attacks & Assassinations in South-West Syria, 28 February 2021, url
2478 FT, Assassinations in southern Syria expose limits of Assad’s control, 28 April 2020, url, [subscription based]2479 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
14 August 2020, url, para. 7
2480 ISW, Syria Situation Report: April 1 – 14, 2020, 16 April 2020, url
2481 ISW, Syria Situation Report: April 29 – May 12, 2020, 14 May 2020, url
2482 ISW, Syria Situation Report: May 13-26, 2020, 30 May 2020, url
2483 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, January 1, 2020‒March 31,
2020, 13 May 2020, url, p. 51; USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, April
1, 2020‒June 30, 2020, 4 August 2020, url, p. 27; USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve. Lead Inspector General Report to the
US Congress, July 1, 2020‒September 30, 2020, 3 November 2020, url, p. 23; USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead
Inspector General Report to the US Congress, October 1 2020 – December 31 2020, 9 February 2021, url, p. 162484 Lister, C., ISIS’s dramatic escalation in Syria and Iraq, MEI, 4 May 2020, url
2485 ISW, Syria Situation Report: April 1 - 14, 2020, 16 April 2020, url

260Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

attempts from the Russian-supported 5th Corps to broker a solution. Several 4th Division members
were injured during clashes with former members of the opposition group Fajr al-Islam. Russia
threatened to launch airstrikes against Tafas (the first in Dar’a since 2018) if locals did not hand overa number of individuals wanted by the GoS by 28 January. This deadline was later changed to
1 February in order to enable a delegation from Dar’a to travel to Damascus to discuss a solution to
the crisis.2486
A Russian-supported agreement was signed between the GoS and the Central Reconciliation
Committee [a group of local figures and former leaders of the opposition groups2487] on
8 February 2021, obliging former opposition fighters to clear government buildings they had used as
their headquarters, as well as the hand-over of their weapons. In line with the agreement, Tafas
residents wanted by the GoS were permitted to leave Tafas for the eastern countryside of Da’ra.2488
According to Suhail al-Ghazi, research assistant at ORSAM and non-resident fellow at the Tahrir
Institute for Middle East Policy, writing on the outcomes and implementation of the agreement:‘[…] the Fourth Division was the main beneficiary of it. The Fourth Division was able to reachnew areas and establish checkpoints inside the western countryside and weaken the local
factions by forcing them to hand over their weapons. While Russia benefited by avoiding a
military escalation that might lead to the collapse of the reconciliation agreement if the
clashes spread to other regions, and Russia was able to establish its presence in the westerncountryside as well. Although the local factions and the Central Reconciliation Committee
were able to avoid the military operation and the destruction it carries, the loss of heavy
weapons in the region will weaken the factions in the future if the regime forces, especiallythe Fourth Division, try to expand and impose new conditions.2489
Security incidents
During the reporting period, ACLED recorded 716 security incidents in Dar’a governorate, of which,336 were coded as battles, 147 explosions/remote violence and 233 incidents of violence against
civilians. Higher levels of security incidents were documented in January 2021, May and July 2020.2490

Figure 46: Evolution of security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in Dar’agovernorate between January 2020 and March 2021, based on ACLED data2491

2486 ISW, Syria Situation Report: January 8-29, 2021, 29 January 2021, url
2487 Al-Ghazi, S., Insecurity in Southern Syria: Tracking Daraa, Quneitra and Suwayda (January – February 2021), Policy Brief

161, March 2021, url, p. 2
2488 Al Monitor, Damascus scrambles for more control in southern Syria, 15 February 2021, url
2489 Al-Ghazi, S., Insecurity in Southern Syria: Tracking Daraa, Quneitra and Suwayda (January – February 2021), Policy Brief
161, March 2021, url, pp. 3-4
2490 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (9 April 2021), url
2491 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (9 April 2021), url

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District
As-Sanamayn
Dar’a
Izra
Total

Dar’a governorate – Security incidents
RemoteViolence against
Battlesviolence
civilians
16
27
17
163
221
94
54
88
36
233
336
147

Figure 47: Security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in Dar’a governorate
between 1 January 2020 and 31 March 2021. Breakdown by district based on ACLED data

Security incidents were recorded in all governorate districts, with the highest number in Dar’a,followed by Izra and As-Sanamayn (see Figure 47).2492
Illustrative security incidents
A non-exhaustive list of security incidents that were reported to have taken place in Dar’a governorate
in 2020 and early 2021 included the following (grouped by the district in which they occurred):
Dar’a district [subdistricts: Dara’a, Jizeh, Bushra Esh-Sham, Mseifra, Kherbet Ghazala, Da’el, Mzeireb,
Ash Shajara]
•
•
•
•
•

•

•

In January 2020, locals set a municipal building was set on fire near Lajat after defacing it with
anti-GoS and anti-Iran graffiti and taking down a picture of Assad.2493
In January 2020, two civilians were kidnapped by an opposition member and two previous
abductees were found dead near Dar’a city.2494
On 19 February 2020, two local Oxfam aid workers were shot and killed by unknown gunmenon the road between Mzeireb and Yadoudeh in Dar’a governorate.2495
On 18 March 2020, in Jallayn (Dar’a), mortar and rocket attacks by the SAA killed six civilians,
including two children, and injured another civilian.2496
In April 2020, unidentified attackers killed a member of the Syrian Military Intelligence (SMI)on the road near al-Shajara, while unidentified militants detonated an IED on a Syrian Air ForceIntelligence vehicle north of Daraa City, leaving one SAFI member dead and a colonel injured.
Another IED was detonated by unidentified attackers in Da’il, killing three SAA soldiers andinjuring two others.2497
On 27 May 2020, unknown gunmen, reportedly ISIS, ambushed a convoy with members of
the Dar’a Central Committee and SAA 5th Corps 8th Brigade in Muzayrib, killing three membersof the Committee and injuring four other people, including two members of the SAA 8 th
Brigade. Mahmoud Bardan, a former Free Syrian Army commander who was a relevant
negotiator during the 2018 Assad-takeover of southern Syria, was one of the men killed.2498
On 4 August 2020, a civilian was killed in a reported drive-by shooting on the road connecting
Tafas and Muzayrib. On 7 August 2020, a civilian died in a reported drive-by shooting in Dar’acity.2499

2492 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (9 April 2021), url
2493 SOHR, Daraa in six months: Attacks and assassination attempts rise as security chaos continues, 2 January 2020, url
2494 Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary, 13-19 January 2020, url, pp. 3-4
2495 COAR, Syria Update: 24 February 2020 – Two aid workers killed as southern Syria teeters on the brink, 24 February 2020,

url
2496 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,

14 August 2020, url, para. 152497 ISW, Syria Situation Report: April 15 - 28, 2020, 30 April 2020, url
2498 ISW, Syria Situation Report: May 27 - June 9, 2020, 11 June 2020, url
2499 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020), 14 October 2020, url, p. 18

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•

On 13 August 2020, two distinct drive-by shooting incidents killed four civilians: one personon the road between Ma’raba and Ghasm, and another three people, including a boy and a
girl, in the village of Mudawwarah.2500
On 16 August 2020, in Tafas, a civilian with a disability was killed in a reported drive-by
shooting.2501
On 18 August 2020, ISIS claimed the assassination of a member of the Lebanese Hezbollah
and another person in Busra al-Harir. The next day, on 19 August 2020, ISIS claimed theassassination of a former journalist in Dar’aa city on 19 August, considering him ‘guilty ofoffending the Prophet’.2502
On 24 August 2020, in Da’il (northern rural Dar’a), two boys died and three other civilians,
including a boy, were injured in a roadside IED explosion and drive-by shooting.2503
On 27 August 2020, a civilian was killed in Jallayn, in a drive-by shooting.2504
On 28 August 2020, a civilian was reportedly killed by unknown attackers in his home in
Yadudah town in western rural Dar‘a.2505
On 10 September 2020, in Dar’a city, a civilian was killed in a drive-by shooting.2506
On 12 September, one civilian was killed in a drive-by shooting in Muzayrib.2507
On 26 September, three civilians were wounded in a reported drive-by shooting on the roadconnecting Yadudah and Muzayrib in western rural Dar‘a.2508
On 10 September 2020, suspected ISIS gunmen killed Brigadier General Tala Qassem of the
SAA 5th Corps, two members of the SAA’s 4th Division, and Muhammad Qasim al-Yunis, an
Iranian militia recruiter in Dar’a Province. On 15 September, suspected ISIS gunmen killed
Firas al-Naasan, Syrian Air Force Commander. Although ISIS has not claimed the attacks, ISW
assesses there are likely to be their responsibility, given it had claimed similar attacks in Dar’a
recently.2509
On 13 September 2020, two members of the SAA 5th Corps 8th Brigade and one Bedouin were
killed in clashes between local population and the 8th Brigade near al-Ghariya al-Sharqiya andal-Soura, in Dar’a governorate. Attackers are suspected ISIS.2510
In October 2020, unidentified gunmen killed at least five former opposition leaders reconciledwith Assad’s regime in the south-west of Dar’a governorate, including commander Adham alKarad on 14 October.2511
On 8 November 2020 local militias took control of al-Masakin checkpoint in north-western
Dar’a, allegedly killing five GoS soldiers.2512

2500 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),

2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020), 14 October 2020, url, p. 182501 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020), 14 October 2020, url, p. 182502 ISW, Syria Situation Report: August 19 - September 1, 2020, 4 September 2020, url
2503 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020), 14 October 2020, url, p. 192504 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020), 14 October 2020, url, p. 192505 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020), 14 October 2020, url, p. 192506 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020), 14 October 2020, url, p. 192507 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020), 14 October 2020, url, p. 192508 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020), 14 October 2020, url, p. 192509 ISW, Syria Situation Report: September 2-15, 2020, 18 September 2020, url
2510 ISW, Syria Situation Report: September 2-15, 2020, 18 September 2020, url
2511 International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch, Syria, October 2020, url
2512 International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch, Syria, November 2020, url

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In January 2021, unknown attackers ‘launched targeted killings of civil servants and IED
attacks against former rebels’.2513
On 14 March 2021 an ISIS militant shot and injured one SAA officer in Jubailiya (Dar’a).2514
On 16 March 2021, in the south-west of Dar’a governorate, gunmen loyal to the former
opposition commander known as Abu Tariq Al-Subaihi ambushed GoS troops, leaving 21
soldiers and an unknown number of gunmen dead.2515

Izra’ district (Sub-districts: Izra’, Hrak, Sheikh Miskine, Nawa, Jasim, Tassil)
•
•

•

•
•

•

•
•
•

•

Unknown gunmen opened fire with machine guns and a grenade on Air Force Intelligence
checkpoint in rural eastern Dar’a, near Karak al-Sharqi in January 2020.2516
A checkpoint was attacked in Nahta town, eastern Dar’a countryside, and about 20 GoS
soldiers were taken hostage by locals responding to the arrest of a local person, in January
2020. In the same week, Al Karak Sharqi town locals attacked a military checkpoint and tookeight soldiers hostage, seizing their weapons and materials, and pressuring the government
to release detainees.2517 Carter Center described these two events are the ‘most serious casesof civil disobedience in former opposition held areas since the GoS takeover’ in summer
2018.2518
Between 16 and 22 April 2020, ISIS gunmen attacked an unidentified pro-GoS military vehicle
on a road near Busra al-Harir in north Daraa Province, killing three and injuring two. After theattack, unidentified pro-GoS forces conducted an arrest campaign in Maliha al-Atash, southof Busra al-Harir, and reportedly detained six civilians.2519
In April 2020, ISIS gunmen attacked a GoS vehicle and killed two SAA commanders near Herakin north-east Dar’a governorate.2520
On 17 May 2020, ISIL militants killed two unidentified pro-GoS militants in the towns of alJizah and al-Nimr. On 18 May, ISIS assassinated a member of the SAA 15th Division in southeastern Dar’a governorate. 2521
On 12 July 2020, unknown gunmen killed Abu Bakr al-Hassan, a member of the Dar’a Central
Committee and former leader of the Free Syrian Army, in Jasim.2522
On 25 August 2020, a girl was killed in a drive-by shooting in Jasim.2523
On 10 September 2020, a civilian was killed in a drive-by shooting in Jasim.2524
On 12 September 2020, two civilians were injured in a drive-by shooting in Shaykh Miskin.2525
On 14 March 2021 – ISIS militant killed an SAA officer in al-Harak (Izra district).2526

As Sanamayn district (Sub-districts: As Sanamayn, Ghabagheb, Massimiyyeh)2513 International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch, Syria, February 2021, url
2514 ISW, Syria Situation Report: February 19 - March 22, 2021, 25 March 2021, url
2515 International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch, Syria, March 2021, url
2516 SOHR, Daraa in six months: Attacks and assassination attempts rise as security chaos continues, 2 January 2020, url
2517 SOHR, Tension mounts in Daraa’s Nahteh, and residents of other towns and villages threaten to escalate operations

against the Syrian regime, 12 January 2020, url; Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary, 6-12 January 2020, url, p. 32518 Carter Center, Weekly Conflict Summary, 6-12 January 2020, url, p. 32519 ISW, Syria Situation Report: April 15 - 28, 2020, 30 April 2020, url
2520 ISW, Syria Situation Report: April 15 - 28, 2020, 30 April 2020, url
2521 ISW, Syria Situation Report: May 13-26, 2020, 30 May 2020, url
2522 ISW, Syria Situation Report: July 7-21, 2020, 23 July 2020, url
2523 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020), 14 October 2020, url, p. 192524 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020), 14 October 2020, url, p. 192525 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020), 14 October 2020, url, p. 192526 ISW, Syria situation report: February 19 – March 22, 2021, 25 March 2021, url

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation••

On 1 March 2020, heavy clashes occurred in As-Sanamayn city between former rebels and
GoS forces, when the Syrian security forces launched a security operation to increase controlof the city, blocking entry/exit, and launching artillery bombardment.2527 At least threecivilians (including an imam) were killed, and several others were injured.2528
On 19 May 2020 attackers identified as ISIL gunmen fired on two members of the SAA 7th
Division in Kafr Shams in northern Dar’a.2529

Civilian casualties
MonthJanuary
February
March
April
May
June
July
AugustSeptember
OctoberNovember
December
Total

VDC 2020
9
7
24
13
22
18
32
22
7
20
15
13
202

SNHR 2020
14
22
18
6
17
16
28
28
11
21
19
17
217

VDC 20211820
13

SNHR 2021
13
13
18

51

44

Figure 48. Civilian fatalities as a result of armed conflict in Dar’a governorate in 2020 and first three months of 2021. Monthly
breakdown based on VDC and SNHR data

In 2020, Dar’a governorate had between 202 (VDC data)2530 and 217 civilian fatalities (SNHR data)2531
and. Most civilian fatalities were documented in July and August 2020. In the first three months of2021, SNHR recorded 44 civilian fatalities in Dar’a governorate, while VDC recorded 51 civilian
fatalities during the same period (See Figure 48).

2527 SOHR, Fierce clashes erupt in Al-Sanamayn as regime forces storm the city using heavy weapons, 1 March 2020, url
2528 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,

14 August 2020, url, para. 13-15
2529 ISW, Syria Situation Report: May 13-26, 2020, 30 May 2020, url
2530 Based on monthly civilian fatalities figures for 2020-2021 shared by VDC with EASO
2531 Based on data extracted from monthly reports on civilian casualties published by SNHR. See: SNHR, 286 Civilians,
including Four Medical and Civil Defense Personnel, Documented Killed in Syria in January 2020, 1 February 2020, url, p. 8;
SNHR, 276 Civilians, including Six Medical Personnel and Two Media Workers, Documented Killed in Syria in February 2020,
1 March 2020, url, p. 8; SNHR, 145 Civilians, including Two Medical Personnel, Documented Killed in Syria in March 2020, 1
April 2020, url, p. 9; SNHR, 78 Civilians, including One Media Workers, Documented Killed in Syria in April 2020, 1 May 2020,
url, p. 10; SNHR, 125 Civilians Documented Killed in Syria in May 2020, including Eight Who Died Due to Torture and One
Massacre, 1 June 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, 1,006 Civilians, including three Media Workers and 12 Medical and Civil Defense
Personnel, Documented Killed in Syria in the First Half of 2020, 1 July 2020, url, p. 16; SNHR, 107 Civilians, including 26
Children and 11 Women, Documented Killed in Syria in July 2020, 2 August 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, 122 Civilians, including 21
Children and Seven Women, Documented Killed in Syria in August 2020, 1 September 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, Extrajudicial
Killing Claims the Lives of 102 Civilians, including 15 Children, 10 Women, Three Medical Personnel and 12 Victims Due toTorture, 1 October 2020, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 126 Civilians, including 18 Children, Eight
Women, One Media Worker and 10 Victims Due to Torture, 1 November 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims
the Lives of 172 Civilians, including 16 Children, 11 Women, and 30 Victims Due to Torture, 1 December 2020, url, p. 9; SNHR,
Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 1,734 Civilians in Syria in 2020, including 99 in December, 1 January 2021, url, p. 14

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Infrastructure damage and explosive remnants of war
March 2021’s UNOCHA Humanitarian Needs Overview indicates that 10 years of conflict have left 15 %of residential properties uninhabitable in Dar’a city, and around 40 % of the water, sewage andirrigation substantially damaged in Dar’a city2532 Based on the Syria Multi-sector Needs Assessment of
2020, the Shelter Cluster assessed that in Dar’a governorate, 32.2 % of the population was living indamaged buildings.2533
In December 2019 the WHO published a study on public hospital capacity in Syria indicating there
were seven public hospitals in Dar’a governorate, out of which one was fully functional (Dar’a city2534),
five were partially functioning and one was not functioning (al-Hirak2535).2536 By 2019, six out of theseven public hospitals were partially damaged, and one had not suffered damage. Dar’a had thelowest percentage (38 %) of available beds in functional hospitals in the country - 311, versus theoriginal capacity - 810 (measured mainly in Jassem hospital, Nawa hospital, and the Dar’a national
hospital).2537 UNOCHA reported that the ‘largest ratio of non-functional primary health care centres
to population’ found in various governorates includes Dar’a.2538
The poor hospital infrastructure in Dar’a has suffered further pressure as a result of the COVID-19
pandemic. According to ETANA’s April 2021 report, Dar’a governorate is experiencing a major
coronavirus spike, and doctors struggle with poor infrastructure and lack of basic medical
equipment.2539 During 2020, the UN Security Council had already reported an increase of cases andinsufficient facilities to respond to all suspected cases across Syria, with surgeries being suspended
and wards adapted to receive COVID-19 patients.2540
In February 2019, International Crisis Group reported that since Assad’s retaking of Dar’a in 2018,
education, medical and economic resources had been depleted by the conflict and were slow torecover, despite the presence of the state.2541 Similarly, in May 2019, the UN reported that there had
been little improvement in the rehabilitation of Dar’a’s infrastructure, noting that electricity and waterremained unreliable and unevenly distributed, and that many civilians were unable to return to due
the widespread destruction and damage to their homes, as well as problems of looting. Access towater, housing, education, and basic needs in the governorate was reported to be difficult for many
residents.2542
By March 2021 in Dar’a governorate, UNMAS reported that explosive ordnance continued to cause‘injuries and death, limits safe access to services and impedes the delivery of humanitarian aid’,
preventing safe access to and use of residential areas and key infrastructure (roads, schools, healthcentres, agricultural land, and settlements). UNMAS notes that exact data collection on the topic isdifficult due to limited access to the contaminated areas.2543
The Carter Center released a report on the use of explosive weapons in southern Syria, which foundthat there were at least 31 518 instances of individual uses of explosive munitions across 135
2532 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview, Syrian Arab Republic, March 2021, url, p. 192533 Global Shelter Cluster, Syrian Arab Republic: Whole of Syria Shelter/NFI Sector Humanitarian Needs Overview 2021, 1

March 2021, url, pp. 6, 82534 PHR, Obstruction and Denial, Health System Disparities and COVID-19 in Daraa, Syria, December 2020, url, p. 52535 PHR, Obstruction and Denial, Health System Disparities and COVID-19 in Daraa, Syria, December 2020, url, p. 172536 WHO, Health Resources and Services Availability Monitoring System, HeRAMS Annual Report, January - December 2019,
Public Hospitals in the Syrian Arab Republic, 2020, url, p. 52537 WHO, Health Resources and Services Availability Monitoring System, HeRAMS Annual Report, January - December 2019,
Public Hospitals in the Syrian Arab Republic, 2020, url, pp. 12, 14-15
2538 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview, Syrian Arab Republic, March 2021, url, p. 25
2539 Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief: South Syria, 15 April 2021, url
2540 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020), 14 October 2020, url, para. 32541 International Crisis Group, Lessons from the Syrian State’s Return to the South, 25 February 2019, url, pp. 7-92542 OHCHR, Press briefing note on Dar’a, 21 May 2019, url
2543 UNMAS, Syria, March 2021, url

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communities in Dar’a between July 2013 and May 2019, representing 87 % of the ‘total activity’ using
explosive munitions in southern Syria. Ground launched munitions were the most common type usedin Dar’a (45 %). Most explosive weapons use was concentrated on Dar’a City and its rural
surroundings, as well as other major population areas where key armed groups’ centres were located;furthermore, explosive munitions were used for targeting roads during the period, particularly, theM5.2544
Displacement and return
From January to December 2020, UNOCHA recorded 1 161 IDP movements to locations in Dar’agovernorate; 1 011 individual displacements from within the province itself, and 150 from Sweida to
Dar’a.2545 During the same reference period, 13 275 persons spontaneously returned to locations in
Dar’a, 11 434 from within Dar’a, 1 139 from Quneitra, 576 from Sweida and 126 from Rural
Damascus.2546 Spontaneous IDP return movements in Dar’a accounted for three per cent of the total
returns in Syria in 2020.2547
Following the January 2021 clashes in Tafas between opposition faction’s fighter and the 4th Divisionof the SAA, around 10 000 people left Tafas and were displaced due to fears of an attack by the SAA
to the city.2548 UNOCHA recorded 291 IDP movements from or within Dar’a in February 2021.2549 No
IDP movements were recorded by UNOCHA in Dar’a governorate in March 2021.2550
In terms of returns to Dar’a in 2021, UNOCHA recorded no IDP return movements in January2551, 215
IDP return movements to the governorate in February2552, and 643 IDP return movements to or within
the governorate in March.2553
The CoI reported that after capturing Dar’a in summer 2018, the government ‘imposed a“reconciliation” process’ on civilians who remained in Dar’a, requiring civilians to sign oaths ofallegiance, and reveal names of wanted persons; ‘wanted lists’ were compiled and there were
accounts of enforced disappearances and arbitrary detention of civilians, especially humanitarian
workers seen to have ‘betrayed the country’ for recording attacks by the GoS.2554 Arrest and detentionof civilians following GoS takeover was widely documented by sources2555 and continued to be‘commonplace’ in Dara’a in early 2020.2556
UNOCHA reported that ‘Despite the difficult conditions confronting those IDPs who opt to return,including neighbourhoods contaminated with explosive hazards (26 % of all direct victims of explosive
ordnance recorded in the past five years are IDPs); depleted livelihoods and savings; damaged,
2544 Carter Center (The), Explosive Weapons Contamination in Syria, Report 1 - Southern Syria: As Sweida, Daraa, andQuneitra Governorates, November 2019, url, pp. 8-92545 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response, IDPs Tracking, Syrian Arab Republic, IDP movements, January-December 2020, last
update 27 January 2021, url
2546 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response, IDPs Tracking, Syrian Arab Republic, IDP Spontaneous Returns, January-December
2020, last update 27 January 2021, url
2547 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview, Syrian Arab Republic, March 2021, url, p.16
2548 SNHR, The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in January 2021, 4 February 2021, url, pp. 4, 92549 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, IDP Movements. February 2021, 1 April 2021, url
2550 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, IDP Movements. March 2021, 12 May 2021, url
2551 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, IDP Spontaneous Returns. January 2021, 1 April 2021, url
2552 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, IDP Spontaneous Returns. February 2021, 1 April 2021, url
2553 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic. IDP Spontaneous Returns. March 2021, 12 May 2021, url
2554 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
A/HRC/42/51, 15 August 2019, url, paras. 68-72
2555 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018) and 2449 (2018), S/2019/157, 19 February 2019, url, para. 15; HRW, Syria: Detention,
Harassment in Retaken Areas, 21 May 2019, url; OHCHR, The “Unreconciled” Concerns of Civilians in Dar’a Governorate, May
2019, url, p. 82556 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/43/57], 28 January 2020 [published 2 March 2020], url, para. 68

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

destroyed or looted properties; and limited or no access to basic services, under one million selforganized spontaneous IDP return movements have taken place since the beginning of 2018. Twothirds of these are concentrated in just seven districts across three governorates – Dar’a, Iz’ra and As
Sanamayn in Dar’a; Jebel Samen in north-western Aleppo; and Deir Ez-Zor, Abu Kamal and Al Mayadin
in Deir-Ez-Zor respectively.’2557
The January 2021 CoI report indicated that ‘In addition to the displacement and destruction, Syrians
are routinely denied return to their places of origin, notably due to restrictions on access placed by
the Government and fear of arrest in retaken and formerly besieged areas, in particular in Rif
Damashq, Daraa, Quneitra, Homs, Hama and Aleppo.’ 2558

2557 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview, Syrian Arab Republic, March 2021, url, p. 17
2558 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,

21 January 2021, url, para. 43

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

2.13 Quneitra governorate

Map 19: © MapAction, Quneitra governorate2559

2559 MapAction, Syria Governorate Maps – Quneitra Governorate, last updated 29 July 2016, url

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

2.13.1 General description of the governorate
The governorate of Quneitra (al-Qunaytirah) is situated in southern Syria, 70 km from Damascus2560,
and borders Lebanon, Jordan, and the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights.2561 The governorate is divided
into two districts: the district of Quneitra, which comprises the sub-districts of Quneitra, Masaada,
Khan Arnaba, Al-Khashniyyeh, and the district of Al Fiq, divided into the sub-districts of Fiq and AlButayhah.2562 The city of Quneitra remained abandoned after it was destroyed by Israel in 1974 2563
and is a part of a demilitarised buffer zone between Syrian and Israel under the supervision of UN
Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF).2564 The new provincial administrative centre is Madinat alBaath (Baath city).2565
According to the latest general census of the population and housing, conducted by the Syrian
government in 2004, the governorate of Quneitra had a population of around 66 600.2566 The Syrian
Central Bureau of Statistics estimated the population of Quneitra governorate in 2019 at 117 000.2567
In a March 2021 report, UNOCHA estimated the population of Quneitra governorate to be of 105 124
inhabitants.2568
As of March 2011, Syrian Arabs (Arabic speaking) constituted the largest part of the population of
Quneitra.2569 According to the division along the religious lines, the population of Quneitra is largely
Sunni Muslim; the religious minorities comprise the Druze2570 and Shi’a Muslims.2571 The Druze residein the town of Hader, the Syrian-controlled part of the Golan Heights.2572
Circassians, whose number was believed to be around 5 000 in 2011, inhabited the villages of Bir-Ajam
and Breiqa in the Golan Heights and were displaced in 2012 during the military operation against antigovernment rebels.2573

2.13.2 Conflict background and armed actors
The governorate of Quneitra became the area of fighting in May 2013 after the FSA captured theQuneitra crossing on the Syria-Israeli border.2574 The ‘Southern Front’ of FSA2575, which was formed in

2560 Jamestown Foundation (The), The Battle for al-Quneitra, the “Gateway to Damascus” in: Terrorism Monitor Volume 12,

Issue 5, 6 March 2014, url
2561 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, Governorates Profile (June 2014), 26 August 2014, url, p. 432562 MapAction, Syria Governorate Maps – Quneitra Governorate, last updated 29 July 2016, url
2563 AP News, Syrians celebrate retaking town near Israel-occupied Golan, 27 July 2018, url
2564 Encyclopaedia Britannica, Al-Qunaytirah, n.d., url
2565 Reuters, Syrian insurgents attack government-held town near Israel, 20 November 2014, url
2566 Syria, Central Bureau of Statistics, General Census, The census housing and population results 2004 on governorates
level, n.d., url
2567 Syria, Central Bureau of Statistics, Estimate of the population in Syria by governorates, n.d., url
2568 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview. Syrian Arab Republic, March 2021, url, p. 232569 Austria, Federal Ministry of the Interior & Austrian Ministry of Defence and Sports, Atlas Syria, 2015, url, p. 15
2570 Austria, Federal Ministry of the Interior & Austrian Ministry of Defence and Sports, Atlas Syria, 2015, url, p. 142571 MEI/Etana Syria, Manufacturing Division: The Assad Regime and Minorities in South-West Syria, March 2020, url, p. 1314. The source mentions the presence of Shia Muslims in the villages of Kwdana and Saida al-Jolan.
2572 Al Jazeera, Violence hits Druze village Hader in Syria’s Quneitra, 3 November 2017, url
2573 Meiqari, D., The Circassian Heritage in Syria within the Context of Multiply Displacements, Shattuck Center, CEU Schoolof Public Policy, 19 June 2019, url. In August 2019, ‘the first convoy of Circassians’ returned to their villages in Quneitra, see
MEI/ETANA Syria, Manufacturing Division, the Assad Regime and Minorities in South-West Syria, March 2020, url, p. 172574 FP, Syrian regime and rebel forces clash in the Golan Heights, 6 June 2013, url; Jamestown Foundation (The), The Battle
for al-Quneitra, the “Gateway to Damascus” in: Terrorism Monitor Volume 12, Issue 5, 6 March 2014, url
2575 FSA was formed in 2011 and evolved into Syrian National Army (SNA) in 2018. See, AA, Free Syrian Army transforms into
Syrian National Army, 9 October 2019, url. For the FSA forces that were located in Quneitra, see FSA Platform, Free Syrian
Army Forces [website], n.d. url.

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February 20142576 as an ‘umbrella organization for most armed opposition groups in the provinces ofDara’a and Quneitra’2577 had claimed to have 30 000 fighters in the provinces of Quneitra, Dar’a, andSweida.2578 In April 2014, FSA gained several strategic victories in Quneitra2579, such as a takeover ofthe Eastern Tel Ahmar Hills.2580 In the end of August 2014, FSA and Jabhat al-Nusra reportedly seized
the Quneitra crossing2581; clashes between GoS and the armed opposition intensified in September
2014, particularly in Madinat al-Baath.2582
After the seizure of the city of Quneitra by the armed opposition, the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF)
closed the Quneitra crossing. UN troops left the area in the same year, following the abduction of the
UN peacekeepers by the anti-GoS armed groups.2583 During 2014, GoS continued aerial
bombardments on the armed opposition, including in densely populated areas of Quneitra.2584 In June
2015, FSA started an offensive against GoS forces, claiming that Jabhat al-Nusra was kept away fromthe operation.2585
In May 2017, the establishment of four zones of de-escalation was designated by Russia, Turkey, andIran to end hostilities between anti-GoS armed groups and the governmental forces in Syria. According
to the agreement, parts of the provinces of Quneitra and Dar’a were included into the 4th zone of deescalation.2586 In May and June 2018, GoS forces, backed by Russian airstrikes, started retaking theterritories of Quneitra2587, which caused intense fighting.2588 Under a deal agreed between anti-GoS
armed groups and pro-government forces in July 2018, rebels and their families were evacuated from
Quneitra to Idlib.2589 By mid-August 2018, GoS had taken under its control the areas held formerly byanti-GoS armed groups and ISIL in Quneitra as well as other parts of southern Syria.2590 In October
2018, the Quneitra crossing reopened for the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) troops.2591
As of March 2021, Quneitra was under GoS control2592(see also Map 4).
Syrian Arab Army and affiliated armed groups
As noted by Gregory Waters in June 2019, the 1st Corp of the SAA (which was formed to serve the firstline of defence against Israel since 1980s and had stations of its 61st and 90th Infantry Brigades along
the Golan Heights2593) remained almost entirely deployed in the governorates of Quneitra andDar’a.2594 The deployments of SAA units in Quneitra consisted of three battalions of the 1st Corps’ 7th

2576 BBC News, Syria conflict: Rebels launch Quneitra offensive, 17 June 2015, url; Lister, C., The Free Syrian Army: Adecentralized insurgent brand, Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings, November 2016, url, p. 152577 Syria Direct, Protests in Daraa: Russia absent as Damascus weaponizes ‘tribal schisms,’ 5 February 2020, url
2578 BBC News, Syria conflict: Rebels launch Quneitra offensive, 17 June 2015, url
2579 Lister, C., The Free Syrian Army: A decentralized insurgent brand, Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings, November
2016, url, p. 15
2580 Syria Direct, ‘Almost complete control’ for rebels in southern Quneitra, 27 April 2014, url
2581 DW, Syrian rebels announce seizure of Golan Heights border crossing, 27 August 2014, url
2582 ICRC, Syria: Emergency relief for thousands displaced by fighting in Quneitra, 15 September 2014, url
2583 Jerusalem Post (The), Strategic Quneitra crossing between Syria and Israel reopened, 16 October 2018, url
2584 ACAPS, Regional Analysis, Syria, Strategic Needs Analysis Project, Q4 2014, 1 October - 31 December 2014, url, p. 47
2585 BBC News, Syria conflict: Rebels launch Quneitra offensive, 17 June 2015, url
2586 Al Jazeera, Syria’s ‘de-escalation zones’ explained, 4 July 2017, url
2587 Reuters, Syrian flag raised in Quneitra on Syrian side of Golan Heights, 26 July 2018, url
2588 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019 – Syrian Arab Republic, March 2019, url, p. 52589 Al Jazeera, Syria’s war: Evacuation of rebels from Quneitra begins, 21 July 2018, url
2590 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019 – Syrian Arab Republic, March 2019, url, p.19
2591 Jerusalem Post (The), Strategic Quneitra crossing between Syria and Israel reopened, 16 October 2018, url
2592 Based on reading of maps in ISW, Syria Situation Report: February 19 – March 22, 2021, 25 March 2021, url; Liveuamap,
Syria, 26 March 2021, url
2593 Holliday, J., Syrian Army, Doctrinal Order of Battle, Institute for the Study of War, February 2013, url, p. 82594 Waters, G., The Lion and the Eagle: The Syrian Arab Army’s Destruction and Rebirth, MEI, 18 July 2019, url

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Division 90th Brigade (3rd Battalion, deployed to Hader, Hassan Battalion and 3rd Battalion 4th Company)
and the 2nd Corps’ 14th Special Forces Division (36th Regiment), deployed to Jabal al-Sheikh.2595
As reported by the UN Secretary-General in June 2020, UNDOF observed ‘the continuous presence’ ofthe Syrian Armed Forces in the separation area, engaged in clearance of unexploded ordnance andtraining as well as staffing checkpoints, including in the proximity of the towns of al-Baath and Khan
Arnaba and along the main road that connects Quneitra to Damascus.2596
According to Gregory Waters, SAA started to conscribe into its units reconciled rebels from thegovernorates of Damascus, Dar’a, and Quneitra since 2016.2597 Al-Monitor reported in June 2019 the
GoS was recruiting former FSA members from Quneitra, among other Syrian governorates, to fight innorthern Syria, reportedly transferring the fighters to the northern countryside of Hama and Idlib since
early 2019.2598 During a meeting with the DIS in January 2020, Gregory Waters listed Quneitra among
the areas, in which the recruitment was taken place ‘more intensively’.2599
Iranian and Iranian-backed armed groups
Since the re-establishment of GoS control over southern Syria in 2018, opposition websites reported
on a growing presence of pro-Iranian forces and their incorporation into SAA units in proximity to
Syria’s border with Israel and Jordan.2600 In September 2019, the towns of Madinat al-Baath and Khan
Arnaba were reported as Hezbollah’s headquarters.2601 As reported by SOHR in February 2020, thestations of the Iranian-backed militias were found in the northern part of Quneitra, while local
commanders of these militias were recruiting youth of al-Habariyah, Sultanah, and other tows in theproximity to the Golan Heights through dignitaries of the area.2602
The size of Iranian forces and/or Iranian proxies in Syria is debated.2603 In March 2020, researcher
Mazen Ezzi reported that Hezbollah had one ‘large fixed’ military base in Quneitra, which served as a
training centre for recruits and an ammunition depot.2604 As of January 2021, Turkey-based research
institute Jusoor for Studies mapped in Quneitra five ‘military sites’ kept by Iran and seven ‘militarysites’ established by Hezbollah.2605 In April 2021, Israel-based Alma Research and Education Centre
reported on six pro-Iranian militias, present in Quneitra in 2019-2020, listing Sunni militias groups of
Majmuat 220 (Group 220), active in Madinat al-Baath and the surrounding areas, Majmuat Ahmad
Kabul (Ahmad Kabul Group) in Khan Arnaba and the northern countryside of Quneitra, Liwa’ Suqur alQuneitra (Suqur al-Quneitra Brigade) in Jabah and Khan Arnaba, Dir al-Quneitra (Shield of al-Quneitra)in Madinat al-Baath and the surrounding areas, and Majmuat Muhad Nasar (Muhad Nasar Group) in
Jubata al-Khashab and Druze militias of Majmuat Basil Hasun (Basil Hasun Group), reportedly active

2595 Waters, G., Current Syrian Army Deployments, International Review, 13 December 2019, data as of 17 March 2020, url.

No changes regarding the deployment of SAA in Quneitra were made by the source in 2020.
2596 UN Security Council, United Nations Disengagement Observer Force: Report of the Secretary-General, S/2020/506, 8
June 2020, url, para. 72597 Waters, G., The Growing Role of Reconciled Rebels in Syria, International Review, 21 April 2018, url
2598 Al Monitor, Ex-FSA fighters recruited by Damascus to fight opposition in northern Syria, 13 June 2019, url
2599 Denmark, DIS, Syria, Military Service, Report based on a fact-finding mission to Istanbul and Beirut (17-25 February 2020),
May 2020, url, p. 46
2600 Mozes, N., Websites Opposed To The Syrian Regime: Iran Continues To Consolidate Its Presence In Southern Syria, In
Violation Of Understanding Between Russia, Israel, Jordan, MEMRI, 4 January 2019, url
2601 SOHR, The Lebanese Hezbollah continues its efforts to bring the province of Al-Quneitra under its full control, 10
September 2019, url
2602 SOHR, Buying loyalty: Iran-backed militias offer young people in Al-Quneitra financial incentives, 12 February 2020, url
2603 Tokmajyan, A., How Southern Syria Has Been Transformed Into a Regional Powder Keg, Carnegie Middle East Center, July
2020, url, p. 162604 Ezzi, M., Lebanese Hezbollah’s Experience in Syria, EUI, 13 March 2020, url, p. 92605 Jusoor for Studies, Map of the Military Bases and Posts of Foreign Forces in Syria, 6 January 2021, url

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situationin Hader. Furthermore, the source stated that ‘activists’ of Sunni militia Liwa’ 313 Brigade, located in
Dar’a, might be also scattered around Quneitra.2606
IsraelIn 2020, Israel was frequently carrying out airstrikes, particularly against (pro)-Iranian forces andHezbollah.2607 In October 2020, special forces of the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) reportedly destroyed
two military positions on the Syrian side of the Golan Heights ‘in response to the Syrian military’s
growing presence in the buffer zone’.2608
RussiaRussian military police were deployed along the Golan Heights border in August of 2018, following therecapture of Quneitra by the GoS.2609 In September 2019, the Chief of the Russian Armed Forces’
Military Police in Syria confirmed the presence of Russian military police units in Quneitra, stating thatthe officers at the Russian observation points were monitoring ceasefire violations and IAF strikes on
Syrian targets.2610 In August 2020, a Russian military police unit was reportedly patrolling observation
posts on the Golan Heights.2611 Jusoor for Studies mapped two Russian ‘military sites’ in Quneitra asof 5 January 2021.2612 Furthermore, in 2020, Russia was reportedly recruiting Quneitra male
inhabitants to fight in Libya.2613
UNDOF
UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) troops returned to the Golan Heights after the Quneitra
crossing was reopened for UNDOF in October 2018.2614 As reported by the UN Secretary-General in
March 2021, Israel started restricting the movement of UNDOF and Observer Group Golan personnel
through the Quneitra crossing since early March 2020.2615
ISIL and other non-state armed groups
As reported by the Al-Masdar News (AMN) in October 2019, FSA, ISIL, and HTS (formerly Jabhat alNusra2616) had ‘active sleeper cells’ in the governorate of Dar’a and were carrying out ‘sporadic attacks
against the Syrian military and their allies’ in the governorates of Quneitra, Dar’a, and Sweida.2617 ISIL
was reported to maintain ‘its capabilities’ in Quneitra as of the first quarter of 20202618 and, while thenumber of attacks claimed by the group decreased between February and mid-April 2020, it thenattacked military convoys in Quneitra, as well as in Dar’a and Sweida in the second quarter of 2020.2619

2606 Alma Research and Education Center, The Iranian Shiite Axis Expansion – Establishment of Mercenary Local Militias inSouthern Syria, April 2021, url, pp. 9, 19-22
2607 RFE/RL, Pro-Iranian Fighters Reported Killed in Israeli Strikes in Syria, 25 November 2020, url; Al Jazeera, Syria says it
responded to ‘Israeli aggression,’ 4 February 2021, url
2608 Times of Israel (The), IDF destroys 2 Syrian military positions in rare cross-border raid – report, 14 October 2020, url
2609 Jerusalem Post (The), Strategic Quneitra crossing between Syria and Israel reopened, 16 October 2018, url
2610 TASS, Russian military police ensure peace in Syria’s Quneitra province, chief says, 23 September 2019, url
2611 Russia-Islamic world, Russian military police checked observation posts on the Golan heights in Syria, 31 August 2020,
url
2612 Jusoor for Studies, Map of the Military Bases and Posts of Foreign Forces in Syria, 6 January 2021, url
2613 Al Monitor, Why Russia’s grip on Syrian military is weaker than it seems, 21 April 2020, url
2614 Jerusalem Post (The), Strategic Quneitra crossing between Syria and Israel reopened, 16 October 2018, url
2615 UN Security Council, United Nations Disengagement Observer Force: report of the Secretary-General, S/2021/282, 22
March 2021, url, para. 182616 CISAS, Stanford University, n.d., url
2617 AMN News, ISIS ambushes Syrian Army vehicle carrying several soldiers in Daraa, 23 October 2019, url
2618 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, January 1, 2020 –March 21, 13 May 2020, url, p. 52
2619 UN Security Council, Twenty-sixth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant
to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, S/2020/717, 23 July
2020, url, para. 16

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

As expressed by Navvar Shaban, the Information Unit Manager and Military Expert at Omran Center
for Strategic Studies in his interview with DIS in October 2020, popular resistance groups, consistingof former rebel fighters who either did not reconcile with the GoS in 2018 or who reconciled but are
still fighting GoS covertly, were present in rural areas of Quneitra; however, according to the expert,
these groups ‘have not been operating and have not claimed responsibility for any attacks since May
2020’.2620 An international organisation interviewed by DIS, reported on the presence of ISIL and AlQaeda in Quneitra.2621

2.13.3. Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population
In January 2020, the CoI reported on a ‘fragile’ security situation in the governorates, in which thereconciliation process between the GoS and former opposition members was imposed, including thegovernorate of Quneitra. The report stated that the promises of the GoS, including ‘releasing thosethat had been arrested and detained, recognizing educational certificates and reinstating teachers,remained largely unfulfilled’ and that ‘сivilians in retaken areas indicated that the lack of respect for
the “reconciliation” processes and agreements was a significant factor of current fear and tension
among the population.’2622 Syria Direct noted that arrests of opposition members and confiscation of
their properties by GoS in the aftermath of the region’s recapture in summer 2018 increased popular
discontent.2623
In 2020, the GoS was reported to impose reconciliation terms with former opposition fighters insouthern Syria by forcing them to join the Fourth Division or, otherwise, deporting them to northern
Syria, which caused the escalation of violence in the governorates of Dar’a and Quneitra.2624 In April
2020, SOHR reported that GoS forces arrested ‘a number of civilians and youths wanted by the security
services’ in Al-Nasiriyah town in Quneitra district; a day before the arrest, SOHR documented atargeted killing of a GoS soldier by unknown gunmen in the same location.2625 In an interview with DIS
in February 2020, a ‘western diplomat working on Syria’ noted that ‘the harassment of families ofevaders and deserters is more prevalent in former opposition-controlled areas, such as Ghouta, Homs,
Hama, Aleppo, Dar’a, Quneitra [...].’2626
According to an international security organisation interviewed by DIS in October 2020, an increase insmall arms fire attacks, IEDs and VBIEDs attacks against GoS forces was recorded in Quneitra in 2020.
These attacks were sometimes claimed by ISIL while others have been attributed by the source toformer opposition fighters.2627

2620 DIS, Syria – Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Tartous, Latakia and Quneitra, December 2020,

url, pp. 13-14, 53
2621 Denmark, DIS, Syria – Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Tartous, Latakia and Quneitra,
December 2020, url, p. 132622 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
A/HRC/43/57, 28 January 2020, url, para. 72
2623 Syria Direct (The), Protests in Daraa: Russia absent as Damascus weaponizes ‘tribal schisms,’ 5 February 2020, url
2624 Al-Ghazi, S., Insecurity in Southern Syria: Tracking Daraa, Quneitra and Suwayda (January – February 2021), ORSAM,
March 2021, url, p. 82625 SOHR, Regime forces storm village in rural Al-Quneitra, arresting several civilians, 17 April 2020, url
2626 Denmark, DIS, Syria, Military Service, Report based on a fact-finding mission to Istanbul and Beirut (17-25 February 2020),
May 2020, url, p. 85
2627 Denmark, DIS, Syria – Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Tartous, Latakia and Quneitra,
December 2020, url, p. 41

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

During the reference period of this report, security checkpoints located in Quneitra as well as the GoS
military and police personnel were targeted, without any group claiming responsibility for theattacks.2628
In December 2020, the UN-Secretary General noted that ‘insecurity and administrative restrictions
continued to prevent sustained access to areas formerly controlled by non-State armed groups’ in thesouthern part of Syria, including to parts of Quneitra.2629 The situation remained unchanged as ofApril 2021.2630
In 2020, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) continued conducting airstrikes on territories in Quneitra, targeting
military positions of GoS forces and forces loyal to GoS2631 as well as pro-Iranian2632 and Hezbollah
forces.2633 The airstrikes continued in 2021.2634
Security incidents
According to ACLED data, there were 56 security incidents recorded in Quneitra governorate, of whom
19 were coded as battles, 35 explosions/remote violence and 2 incidents of violence against civilians.

Figure 49: Evolution of security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in Quneitra
governorate between January 2020 and March 2021, based on ACLED data2635

2628 SOHR, Gunmen attack regime ‘Air-force Intelligence’ vehicle in rural al-Quneitra southern Syria, 29 January 2020, url;

SOHR, Al-Quneitra countryside: Regime security agent killed and former opposition leader injured in two separate incidents,
9 November 2020, url; Syrian Observer (The), Two Attacks Target Assad Forces in Quneitra Countryside, 19 January 2021,
url; SOHR, Al-Quneitra: Unknown gunmen assassinate State Security agent in countryside, 1 January 2021, url; SOHR, Armedattack: Member of Al-Quneitra Council assassinated in Al-Baath city, 16 February 2021, url
2629 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020): Report of the Secretary-General,
S/2021/390, 22 April 2021, url, para. 33
2630 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),
2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020): report of the Secretary-General,
S/2021/160, 18 February 2021, url, para. 33
2631 MEMO, Israel bombs Syrian targets near Damascus, 6 February 2020, url; Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary,
2 – 9 March 2020, n.d., url, p. 3; Asharq Al-Awsat, Israeli Airstrikes on Central Syria Kill, Injure Regime Soldiers, 5 March 2020,
url; AMN News, Israeli helicopters strike Syrian army posts in Quneitra, 25 July 2020 url; Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict
Summary, 3 – 9 August 2020, n.d., url, pp. 1, 3; France24, Israeli jets strike targets in Syria in retaliation for Golan Heights
attack, 4 August 2020, url
2632 SOHR, New Israeli attack in rural Damascus and Quneitra: Eight non-Syrian militiamen killed, and rocket depots andvehicles destroyed in airstrikes on positions of pro-Iran militias and Lebanese Hezbollah, 25 November 2020, url
2633 Garda World, Syria: IDF airstrikes target suspected Hezbollah positions in Quneitra province on July 24/update 1, 24 July
2020, url; SOHR, Al-Quneitra: Three Hezbollah-backed militiamen killed in Israeli attacks on school in northern countryside,
21 October 2020, url
2634 AP News, Syrian military says Israeli strikes in the country’s south, 3 February 2021, url; Al-Jazeera, Syria says it responded
to ‘Israeli aggression,’ 4 February 2021, url
2635 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (9 April 2021), url

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Quneitra governorate – Security incidents
RemoteViolence against
District
Battlesviolence
civilians
1
Al Fiq2
19
35
Quneitra
2
19
35
Total
Figure 50: Security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in Quneitra governorate
between 1 January 2020 and 31 March 2021. Breakdown by district based on ACLED data

Almost all security incidents were recorded in the district of Quneitra, with only 1 security incident
recorded in the district of Al Fiq (see Figure 50).
Illustrative security incidents
•
•

•

•
•
•
•

In February 2020, a person, who was defined by SOHR as a member of the ‘Syrian resistanceto liberate Golan’ and identified as a person working at a police station by the Quneitra
governor, was killed in an Israeli drone strike in Hader.2636
In October 2020, SOHR reported on an IAF attack on a school that reportedly hosted groups
loyal to Hezbollah and Iranian forces in Al-Hurriyah village in the northern part of Quneitra, in
the result of which three militiamen of groups related to Hezbollah were reportedly killed.2637
As reported by SANA, the attack damaged the school’s roof, doors, and windows.2638
In November 2020, as reported by SOHR, a person who worked in ‘Al-Jisr security detachment’of Military Security was found killed by gunshot in Quneitra countryside; the same month, ‘aformer opposition leader’ who had reportedly joined the Military Security, was injured byunknown gunmen in Mumtana village.2639
In November 2020, a ‘regime member’ was reportedly killed in an IED explosion near thevillage of Jaba in the district of Quneitra.2640
In December 2020, an IED planted in proximity to the building of the Air-Force Intelligence
branch and recruitment centre in Khan Arnaba killed two members of the personnel.2641
In February 2021, a member of Quneitra Council was killed by unknown gunmen in Madinat
al-Baath.2642
In April 2021, a civilian was reportedly killed in a vehicle-borne IED explosion in the area ofRasm al-Karm of Umm Batina municipality, Quneitra district.2643

2636 Al Jazeera, 1 killed in Israel drone attack on Golan Heights: Syrian state TV, 27 February 2020, url
2637 SOHR, Al-Quneitra: Three Hezbollah-backed militiamen killed in Israeli attacks on school in northern countryside, 21

October 2020, url
2638 SANA, Material damage to school in Quneitra due to Israeli missile attack, 21 October 2020, url
2639 SOHR, Al-Quneitra countryside: Regime security agent killed and former opposition leader injured in two separate
incidents, 9 November 2020, url
2640 SOHR, Al-Quneitra countryside: Regime security agent killed and former opposition leader injured in two separate
incidents, 9 November 2020, url
2641 SOHR, IED attack: Explosion kills two Air-Force intelligence agents in al-Quneitra countryside, 14 October 2020, url
2642 SOHR, Armed attack: Member of Al-Quneitra Council assassinated in Al-Baath city, 16 February 2021, url
2643 SANA, A civilian martyred in explosive device blast in Quneitra countryside, 18 April 2021, url

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Civilian casualties
MonthJanuary
February
March
April
May
June
July
AugustSeptember
OctoberNovember
December
Total

VDC 2020
123

SNHR 2020
1
1
1
3

VDC 2021
1
1

SNHR 2021
2

2

2

Figure 51: Civilian fatalities as a result of armed conflict in Quneitra governorate in 2020 and first three months of 2021.
Monthly breakdown based on VDC and SNHR data

In 2020, Quneitra governorate both SNHR2644 and VDC2645 recorded 3 civilian fatalities each. In the first
three months of 2021, both sources recorded 2 civilian fatalities in Quneitra governorate (SeeFigure 51).
Infrastructure damage and explosive remnants of war
In its 2021 Humanitarian Needs Overview, UNOCHA listed Quneitra as one of the governorates withthe areas contaminated with explosive ordnance.2646 Syrian Civil Defence (SCD) was reported to beengaged in clearance of unexploded submunitions in Quneitra ‘over the past two years’.2647 Based on
the Syria Multi-sector Needs Assessment of 2020, the Shelter Cluster assessed that in Quneitra
governorate, 19 % of the population was living in damaged buildings.2648
According to open-source data collected by the Carter Center and ACLED, more than 4 000 individual
uses of explosive munitions (11 % of total use in southern Syria), were recorded in 55 communities in
Quneitra between July 2013 and May 2019. The use of shells of unknown type accounted for 58 % of2644 SNHR, 286 Civilians, including Four Medical and Civil Defense Personnel, Documented Killed in Syria in January 2020, 1

February 2020, url, p. 8; SNHR, 276 Civilians, including Six Medical Personnel and Two Media Workers, Documented Killed in
Syria in February 2020, 1 March 2020, url, p. 8; SNHR, 145 Civilians, including Two Medical Personnel, Documented Killed in
Syria in March 2020, 1 April 2020, url, p. 9; SNHR, 78 Civilians, including One Media Workers, Documented Killed in Syria in
April 2020, 1 May 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, 125 Civilians Documented Killed in Syria in May 2020, including Eight Who Died Dueto Torture and One Massacre, 1 June 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, 1,006 Civilians, including three Media Workers and 12 Medical
and Civil Defense Personnel, Documented Killed in Syria in the First Half of 2020, 1 July 2020, url, p. 16; SNHR, 107 Civilians,
including 26 Children and 11 Women, Documented Killed in Syria in July 2020, 2 August 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, 122 Civilians,
including 21 Children and Seven Women, Documented Killed in Syria in August 2020, 1 September 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR,
Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 102 Civilians, including 15 Children, 10 Women, Three Medical Personnel and 12
Victims Due to Torture, 1 October 2020, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 126 Civilians, including 18
Children, Eight Women, One Media Worker and 10 Victims Due to Torture, 1 November 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, Extrajudicial
Killing Claims the Lives of 172 Civilians, including 16 Children, 11 Women, and 30 Victims Due to Torture, 1 December 2020,
url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 1,734 Civilians in Syria in 2020, including 99 in December, 1 January
2021, url, p. 142645 Based on monthly civilian fatalities figures for 2020-2021 shared by VDC with EASO
2646 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview – Syrian Arab Republic, March 2021, url, p. 27
2647 Mine Action Review, Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2020, A Report by Mine Action Review for the Second Review
Conference of the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions, 1 October 2020, url, p. 167
2648 Global Shelter Cluster, Syrian Arab Republic: Whole of Syria Shelter/NFI Sector Humanitarian Needs Overview 2021, 1
March 2021, url, pp. 6, 8

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the instances, followed by air-dropped munitions, which constituted 22 % of the instances; landmines,
improvised explosive devises (IED), and unexploded ordnances (UXO) were used in 35 instances.
Territorially, 58 % of the instances of explosive munitions use was registered in Khan Arnaba subdistrict, with the towns of Mashara, Jbata al-Khashab, Madinat al-Baath, and Khan Arnaba constituting
35 % of the instances of the use of explosive munitions in this sub-district. High figures were also
recorded in the cities of Quneitra and Hamediyyeh; 38 % of all the instances were registered across
48 communities of the governorate.2649
Displacement and return
According to the 2020 report of the World Bank, the governorate of Quneitra received more than 10 %new inhabitants in the period between 2011 and 2018, experiencing thus the second largest (after
Idlib) proportionate influx of people; consequently, the population density in Quneitra increased byaround 34 %.2650
According to UNOCHA, there were no cases of IDP movements to or within Quneitra governorate in2020. In 2019 UNOCHA reported on 39 cases of internal displacement to or within Quneitra, which
revealed a sharp contrast to 24 787 cases of IDP movements to/within the governorate having beenrecorded by UNOCHA in 2018 and 21 801 cases in 2017. Similarly, UNOCHA recorded no cases ofreturn to/within Quneitra in 2020, compared to 8 583 cases registered in 2019, 42 751 cases
registered in 2018, and 665 cases recorded in 2017.2651 In 2020, UNOCHA reported that 1 100 return
movements were recorded from Quneitra to Dar’a governorate.2652
In the first three months of 2021, UNOHCA did not record any IDP movements or return movements
for Quneitra governorate.2653

2649 Carter Center (the), Explosive Weapons Contamination in Syria, Report 1, Southern Syria: As Sweida, Daraa, and Quneitra

Governorates, November 2019, url, pp. 9-102650 World Bank (The), The Mobility of Displaced Syrians: An Economic and Social Analysis, 2020, url, pp. 25, 27-28
2651 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP movements and IDP spontaneous return movements data for Jan-2020 [second
sheet tab – Summary since 2016], updated 1 April 2021, url
2652 UNOCHA, IDP movements and IDP spontaneous return movements data, 2 March 2021 url
2653
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, IDP Movements, February 2021, 1 April 2021, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, IDP
Spontaneous Returns, February 2021, 1 April 2021, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, IDP Spontaneous Returns, January
2021, 2 March 2021, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, IDP Movements. March 2021, 12 May 2021, url; UNOCHA, Syrian
Arab Republic. IDP Spontaneous Returns. March 2021, 12 May 2021, url

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2.14 Sweida governorate

Map 20: © MapAction, Sweida governorate2654

2.14.1 General description of the governorate
The governorate of Sweida is located in the southern part of Syria and has borders with thegovernorates of Daraa and Rural Damascus and an international border with Jordan to its south. 2655
Sweida governorate comprises three districts: As-Sweida, Shahba and Salkhad, which each have subdistricts.2656•••

As-Sweida sub-districts: As-Sweida [governorate capital2657], Mazraa and Mashnaf;
Salkhad sub-districts: Salkhad, Milh, Qarayya, Gharyeh and Thibeen;
Shahba sub-districts: Shahba, Ariqa, Shaqa and Little Sura.2658

2654 MapAction, Sweida Governorate, 29 July 2016, url
2655 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, Governorates Profile (June 2014), 26 August 2014, url, p. 92656 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, Governorates Profile (June 2014), 26 August 2014, url, p. 40
2657 UNOCHA, 2019 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, March 2019, url, p. 22658 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, Governorates Profile (June 2014), 26 August 2014, url, pp. 40-41

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The Syrian Bureau of Statistics estimated that the population in the governorate of Sweida in 2019was 530 000.2659 In a March 2021 report, UNOCHA estimated the population of Sweida governorate
to be of 380 495 inhabitants.2660
The Druze are an ethnicity that exist both as a religious sect and as a tribe.2661 The governorate of
Sweida is mainly populated by the Druze minority in Syria.2662 Many Druze live in the Jabal al-Arab(Jabal al-Druze) region of Sweida governorate.2663 The Druze make up 91 % of the governorate’s total
population. Other groups present as of 2018 included Christians (3 %) and Sunni Muslims (6 %), whohave Bedouin roots.2664 Throughout the war in Syria, the Druze population in Sweida has been treatedwith ‘a degree of caution’ by the GoS as a ‘politically sensitive minority’, and large-scale mass arrestsand bombings have largely been avoided in Sweida.2665

2.14.2 Conflict background and armed actors
Historically, the GoS has not exercised its power directly in Sweida as in other governorates, it had tomainly rely on local factions sponsored by intelligence agencies and security branches.2666 During theconflict, the governorate of Sweida has officially remained under government control, however, muchof its military and civil authority is from political and military factions within the governorate andpreoccupied with defending it from outside attackers.2667 Sweida remained neutral during the initial
uprising in Syria and during the ensuing conflict.2668 Its neutrality was enhanced by an implicit religious
hurum (excommunication), which dissuaded Druze males from joining any of the parties in theconflict, including conducting their obligatory military service outside Sweida governorate.2669
Sweida has largely avoided heavy attacks2670 and artillery shelling during the war.2671 In June 2015,
rebels from the Southern Front group tried to seize the al-Thaala military base, an important base to
Sweida’s defence. Local Druze militias collaborated with GoS forces and fended them off.2672 After the
GoS forces recaptured the suburbs of southern Damascus in May 2018, a large number of ISIL
terrorists evacuated their strongholds in the area and nearby and reportedly gathered in theirstronghold in al-Badia desert, which is located near the governorate of Sweida.2673

2659 Syria, Central Bureau of Statistics, Estimate of the population in Syria by governorates, n.d., url
2660 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview. Syrian Arab Republic, March 2021, url, p. 232661 Al-Lababidi, M., The Druze of Sweida: the Return of the Regime Hinges on Regional and Local Conflicts, European

University Institute, 28 August 2019, url, p. 1
2662 Al-Lababidi, M., The Druze of Sweida: the Return of the Regime Hinges on Regional and Local Conflicts, European
University Institute, 28 August 2019, url, p. 22663 USDOS, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Syria, 12 May 2021, url, p. 32664 Zaidan, T., Sweida: Conflict Dynamics and the Role of Civil Society, Conflict Research Programme, London School of
Economics and Political Science, 6 January 2020, url, p. 4. The report cites the Decision Support Office in Sweida Province asa source for these percentages.
2665 Edwards, M., 'Security chaos': Kidnappings and clashes threaten relative peace in Syria's Sweida, MEE, 1 July 2019, url
2666 Rollins, T., Kidnappings, cross-border clashes threaten increasingly fragile status quo in Syria’s South, MEI, 20 May 2020,
url
2667 Syria Direct, At least 150 people killed in devastating IS ground offensive, suicide attacks on Suwayda province, 25 July
2018, url; Syria Direct, The state of Syria’s south: A month-long reporting series from Syria Direct, 11 September 2017, url
2668 Al-Lababidi, M., The Druze of Sweida: the Return of the Regime Hinges on Regional and Local Conflicts, European
University Institute, 28 August 2019, url, p. 2; Hunaidi, S., ISIS Has Not Been Defeated. It’s Alive and Well in Southern Syria,
Foreign Policy, 3 April 2019, url
2669 Al-Jabassini, A. and Mazen Ezzi, Tribal “Sulh” and the politics of persuasion in volatile southern Syria, European University
Institute, 22 March 2021, url, p. 2
2670 MEE, 'Security chaos': Kidnappings and clashes threaten relative peace in Syria's Sweida, 1 July 2019, url
2671 SNHR, The brutal attacks on Suwayda governorate between the Terrorism of the Syrian Regime and ISIS. 154 civilians
killed, including 15 children, 16 October 2018, url, p. 1
2672 Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2018, url, p. 41
2673 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/40/70], 31 January 2019, url, p. 9, para. 37

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On 25 July 2018, coordinated attacks and suicide bombings by ISIL took place in the city of Sweida andin eastern rural Sweida.2674 In response, the GoS launched an offensive in rural Sweida on
6 August 2018 to force out the ISIL fighters from the region.2675 Syrian forces with Russian air support,
conducted over 35 airstrikes along the desert area that ISIL controlled at that time in east Sweida. 2676
The offensive ended officially on 19 November 2018, after clearing the al-Safa plateau in the eastern
Badia desert.2677
As of March 2021, Sweida governorate was under GoS control2678(see also Map 4).
Although compulsory military service ‘extends to Druze community’2679 based on the Syrian
Constitution2680, Druze community has been largely spared by the GoS to do military service, ‘a tacit
concession by the GoS in exchange for the community’s support’.2681 However, as of May 2020, Syrian
security forces were ‘keen to intervene in Sweida in order to reassert control’ and to go after those
who fled from military service.2682 As of February 2021, an estimated number of 20 000 people were
wanted for military service in Sweida, who remained under the protection of armed factions. Armedfactions’ checkpoints always stopped the military police to enter the Sweida governorate areas.2683
Syrian Arab Army and affiliated armed groups
Sweida governorate continued to remain under the control of the Syrian Arab Army as of January
2021, including its affiliated foreign troops such as Russia and Iran that each one operates five militarysites, and Hezbollah that operates three military sites in Sweida governorate.2684
According to a 2019 report by Mahmoud al-Lababidi on the Druze of Sweida, there were threebranches of the Syrian Security Services located in Sweida city: the Military Intelligence, the Air ForceIntelligence and the Political Security.2685 Deployments of the SAA as of 17 March 2020 included unitsof the 1st and 2nd Corps.2686
According to a January 2020 report on Sweida, the following pro-government militias were present in
Sweida:••••National Defence Forces (NDF) (pro-GoS, good terms with Hezbollah);
Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) (pro-GoS, good terms with Hezbollah);Ba’ath Brigades (pro-GoS);
Al-Bustan Association, (pro-GoS, good terms with Hezbollah);2674 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Dar’a, Qunaitra, Sweida. Situation Report No. 5. As of 2 August 2018, 2 August 2018, url,

p. 12675 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/40/70], 31 January 2019, url, pp. 5, 9, paras. 13 and 43
2676 Al Masdar News, Syrian Army scores major advance in east Sweida after Russian airstrikes hammer ISIS, 6 August 2018,
url, accessed
2677 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/40/70], 31 January 2019, url, p. 9, para. 42
2678 Based on reading of maps in ISW, Syria Situation Report: February 19 – March 22, 2021, 25 March 2021, url; Liveuamap,
Syria, 26 March 2021, url
2679 COAR, The Syrian economy at war, Part 1: Armed group mobilisation as livelihood and protection strategy, September
2020, 30 September 2020, url, p. 72680 Syria, Constitution of the Syrian Arab Republic – 2012, Article 46, url
2681 USIP, How will new U.S. sanctions impact Syria’s conflict? 17 July 2020, url
2682 Rollins, T., Kidnappings, cross-border clashes threaten increasingly fragile status quo in Syria’s South, MEI, 20 May 2020,
url
2683 ORSAM, Insecurity in southern Syria: tracking Daraa, Quneitra and Suwayda, (January – February 2021), March 2021, url,
p. 72684 Jusoor for Studies, Map of the military bases and posts of foreign forces in Syria, 6 January 2021, url
2685 Al-Lababidi, M., The Druze of Sweida: the Return of the Regime Hinges on Regional and Local Conflicts, European
University Institute, 28 August 2019, url, p. 10
2686 Waters, G., Current Syrian Army Deployments, International Review, 13 December 2019, url

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

•
•
•
•

Home Guards (pro-GoS local armed group created in Sweida by Nazih Jarbou’ the son offormer Aql Sheikh Hussein Jarbou);Tawhid party (Former Lebanese deputy Wi’am Wahhab, close to the GoS);
Al-Fahd Forces (close to Russia)2687;
The Atil group (pro-GoS created in 2015).2688

During 2020, the Iran-backed NDF asserted its presence in Sweida governorate.2689 For instance, theQarayya-based NDF from the south-western town of Sweida conducted the recruitment of 450 Druze
fighters into its ranks in response to the increasing tensions between local Druze and Eight Brigade(Fifth Corps).2690
ISIL
On 21 August 2020, SOHR indicated that ISIL re-emerged and was present in large parts of Homs andSweida desert.2691 According to a local source, ISIL cells were reportedly active in Al-Karaa area of
Sweida governorate2692 and as of May 2020, they were present in the area between Al-Karaa and Tilal
Al-Safa.2693 In its report covering the period between January and March 2020, USDOD also reported
on ISIL presence in Sweida governorate.2694 According to several ISW reports issued in March 2021,‘ISI[L] support zones’ remained in Sweida governorate.2695
On 29 August 2020, SOHR reported that
‘ISI[L] operations focused on positions in (1) an area between Al-Shawla desert in western Deir
Ezzor and Al-Bokamal desert in the east, (2) Deir Ezzor-Al-Mayadeen road, (3) Hmimah-T3
road to the flank of Palmyra city in eastern Homs, (4) Al-Rassafah area in Al-Raqqah
countryside, (5) Ithriyah area in northern Hama and (6) [Sweida] desert.’2696
On 11 October 2020, the SAA began a wide range of operation in ISIL suspected areas within the desertof Sweida.2697 On 16 March 2021, an article published by the MEI (Middle East Institute) reported that
ISIL was active in eastern Sweida governorate.2698
Factions, militias and gangs
According to a 2019 report, ‘armed family groups, gangs and militias’ dominated Sweida. They secured
funding either externally or domestically by the war economy. Some of these groups were supporting

2687 Zaidan, T., Sweida: Conflict Dynamics and the Role of Civil Society, Conflict Research Programme, London School of

Economics and Political Science, 6 January 2020, url, pp. 19, 222688 NPA, Syria’s Suwayda notables appeal to al-Karama forces to end local group’s violations, 12 November 2020, url
2689 COAR, The Syrian economy at war, part 1, armed group mobilisation as livelihood and protection strategy, September
2020, 30 September 2020, url
2690 COAR, The Syrian economy at war, part 1, armed group mobilisation as livelihood and protection strategy, September
2020, 30 September 2020, url; INSS, The Struggle for Control of Southern Syria: Where is Israel?, 16 December 2020, url
2691 SOHR, ISIS resurgence: Russian jets strike ISIS positions in the desert, and IED explosion in eastern Al-Suwaidaa kills or
injures six regime soldiers, 21 August 2020, url
ً2692 Suwayda24, 2020 ‫ شخصا ف حوادث عنف خالل شهر كانون الثان من عام‬14 ‫ توثق مقتل‬24 ‫[ السويداء‬informal translation ‘Suwayda24‫ي‬‫ي‬
documented the death of 14 people in violent incident in January 2020’], 3 February 2020, url
2693 Suwayda24, ‫[ تمشيط ورم هاون ف بادية السويداء بعد االشتباه بخاليا داعشية‬informal translation ‘Firing of mortar in the desert of‫ي‬‫ي‬
Sweida on suspected ISIS cells’], 22 May 2020, url
2694 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve. Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, January 1, 2020‒March 31,
2020, 13 May 2020, url, pp. 51-52
2695 ISW, Syria Situation Report: 19 February – 22 March 2021, 25 March 2021 url
2696 SOHR, ISIS attacks in one week 100 regime soldiers and loyal militiamen killed and go missing, despite Russian intense
airstrikes, 29 August 2020, url
2697 Suwayda24, ‫[ عمليات تمشيط واسعة ف بادية السويداء وإصابة قائد أحد القطاعات‬informal translation ‘sweeping operation in the‫ي‬
Sweida desert, injuring a sector commander’], 14 October 2020, url; SOHR, Sweeping operations: Five regime officers andsoldiers injured in landmine explosion in Al-Suwaidaa desert, 14 October 2020, url
2698 Hassan, M., ISIS and the Assad regime: Strategy and counter strategy in Syria’s Badia, MEI, 16 March 2021, url

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

the GoS, while some were neutral, and others were against the government. A large number of theindividuals wanted for military service joined militias and gangs, in order to secure protection and asalary.2699
In December 2020, SOHR sources indicated that Sweida governorate reportedly became a safe
sanctuary for gangs, where security situation has deteriorated, and kidnappings continued.2700
According to a February 2021 report, Sultan Pasha al-Atrash Battalion was created by Druze to fightISIL.2701 On 16 April 2021, residents of al-Qrayya town in south-east Suwayda created a ‘military’ local
armed group to prevent ‘pro-Lebanese Hezbollah livestock owners on their agricultural lands’.2702
Rijjal al-Karama (Men of Dignity) and Sheikh al-Karamah (Sheikh of Dignity) forces
In 2012, the movement Rijjal al-Karama (Men of Dignity2703) was established as a local Druze defence
force independent from the GoS2704, with Sheikh Wahid al-Bal‘ous as its leader2705 It also establishedthe neutrality of Sweida’s Druze towards the 2011 revolution.2706 The movement remained against
the conscription of Druze to the GoS army.2707
According to a February 2019 article, the Sheikh al-Karamah/Sheikh of Dignity forces reportedly
established a new faction in the city of Sweida called the Der’ Sheikh al-Karamah/Sheikh of Dignity
Shield. The group warned against any ‘violation to the governorate’s dignity’ and that ‘no arbitraryarrests in the mountain and no forced detention of citizens, requested to perform the military services
or politically prosecuted’ will be tolerated.2708 In December 2020, the Institute for National Security
Studies named the al-Karama as one of the local groups controlling Sweida.2709

2.14.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population
Security trends in 2020-2021
The Carter Center, in its May 2020 report, indicated that in the recent months conflict has restarted
in the south of Syria due to long-term ‘division and grievances between communities’.2710 According
to the CoI report of August 2020, security situation has drastically deteriorated in Sweida and Dar’agovernorates, where several armed groups fought against each other for control, which caused anumber of violent incidents.2711

2699 Al-Lababidi, M., The Druze of Sweida: the Return of the Regime Hinges on Regional and Local Conflicts, EUI, 28 August

2019, url, pp. 2, 92700 SOHR, Security chaos in southern Syria, gunmen attack cargo truck on Damascus-Al-Suwaidaa road, 5 January 2021, url
2701 Al Monitor, Syrian Regime scrambles to defuse tensions after insult to Druze leader, 9 February 2021, url
2702 NPA, Local military group formed in Syria’s Suwayda, 17 March 2021, url
2703 Al-Lababidi, M., The Druze of Sweida: the Return of the Regime Hinges on Regional and Local Conflicts, European
University Institute, 28 August 2019, url, p. 72704 Rollins, T., Kidnappings, cross-border clashes threaten increasingly fragile status quo in Syria’s South, MEI, 20 May 2020,
url
2705 Zaidan, T., Sweida: Conflict Dynamics and the Role of Civil Society, Conflict Research Programme, London School of
Economics and Political Science, 6 January 2020, url, p. 20
2706 Al-Lababidi, M., The Druze of Sweida: the Return of the Regime Hinges on Regional and Local Conflicts, European
University Institute, 28 August 2019, url, p. 72707 Zaidan, T., Sweida: Conflict Dynamics and the Role of Civil Society, Conflict Research Programme, London School of
Economics and Political Science, 6 January 2020, url, p. 20
2708 Enab Baladi, Sheikh of Dignity Shield: New Faction Found in Sweida, 22 February 2019, url
2709 INSS, The Struggle for Control of Southern Syria: Where is Israel?, 16 December 2020, url
2710 Carter Center (the), Analysing shifts in territorial control within Syria offers glimpse of future challenges, 13 May 2020,
url
2711 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
A/HRC/45/31, 14 August 2020, url, para. 13

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From mid-January 2020, there were reports of protests taking place in Sweida, related to the poor
living conditions and the rising prices.2712 On 7 June 2020, during the protest people in Sweida usedanti-GoS slogans due to the worsening of the socio-economic situation.2713 According to Human Rights
Watch, on 15 June 2020, security forces responded with beatings and arrests of the protesters in
Sweida.2714 The GoS used pro-government gangs called ‘shabiha’ to supress the protests withviolence.2715 On 10 July 2020, SOHR reported on the release of eight people by the security forces who
were arrested in mid-June during the protest, except one young man who was kept to do his
compulsory military service.2716 As of August 2020, the CoI reported that arbitrary detention, forced
disappearance and torture continued to exist in Sweida, ‘involving government security forces,
including the Military Intelligence Directorate and the Military Police’.2717
As of January 2021, security situation in Sweida remained reportedly chaotic including the absence of
security forces to maintain order and stability. There has been an increase in the killing of ‘government
security forces and unknown individuals’ in Sweida city.2718 As reported in January 2021, the killing of
GoS forces and elements of NDF has reportedly increased in Sweida governorate.2719
Kidnappings sometimes resulted into serious clashes between armed groups. For instance, In Marchand September 2020, local militias from Dar’a governorate clashed with militias from Sweida
governorate following the kidnapping of local residents.2720 On 24 February 2021, SOHR reported onarmed clashes between local factions and gangs after armed factions tried to arrest gangs who were
allegedly promoting drugs ‘near the municipal stadium and al-Bassel roundabout’ in Sweida City.2721
In January 2021, tensions between local armed factions and Military Intelligence branch in Sweida
increased and as a result, local armed factions were deployed on Damascus-Sweida road, where they
established a checkpoint to search every vehicle to arrest GoS officers. For instance, on
23 January 2021, local factions arrested a GoS officer on the aforementioned road.2722 In response to
the arrest of ‘draft dodgers’ by the GoS, armed factions kidnapped GoS soldiers to exchange themwith the arrested civilians from Sweida.2723
As of March 2021, Sweida governorate was characterised to be in a ‘state of lawlessness’ withwidespread violence, and uncontrolled criminal activities, external interference, security
fragmentation, massive presence of weapons, and tribal customs and traditions.2724 Due to theabsence of law in Sweida, during the recent years, tribal conflict resolution mechanism in Sweida has
been transformed into tarsh al-dam (bloodshed), which is used to solve issues related to ‘kidnappings,

2712 Carter Center (the), Weekly Conflict Summary, 13 - 19 January 2020, url, p. 4; Enab Baladi, Suwaida is protesting andestablishing wave of protests across Syria, 21 January 2020, url
2713 Daher, J., State institutions and regime networks as service providers in Syria, European University Institute, 25 June
2020, url, p. 222714 HRW, Syria, Protesters describe beatings, arrests, 28 June 2020, url
2715 USIP, How will new U.S. sanctions impact Syria’s conflict?, 17 July 2020, url
2716 SOHR, Al-Suwaidaa, regime security forces release all young men arrested in June demonstrations, only one driven to
mandatory service, 10 July 2020, url
2717 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
A/HRC/45/31, 14 August 2020, url, para. 13, 212718 NPA, Assassination of government forces on the rise in Syria’s Suwyada, 14 January 2021, url
2719 NPA, Assassinations of government forces on the rise in Syria’s Suwayda, 14 January 2021, url
2720 Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary, Syria weekly conflict summary 11-17 January 2021, 21 January 2021, url,
p. 12721 SOHR, With machine guns and RPGs, clashes in Sweida leaves injuries, 24 February 2021, url
2722 SOHR, After insulting spiritual Sheikh in Al-Suwayda, population discontent grows, and military intelligence branchreleases kidnapped person from the city to calm the situation, 26 January 2021, url
2723 Al-Ghazi, S., Insecurity in southern Syria: Tracking Daraa, Quneitra and Suwayda, (January – February 2021), ORSAM,
March 2021, url, pp. 7-82724 Al-Jabassini, A. and Ezzi, M., Tribal “Sulh” and the politics of persuasion in volatile southern Syria, EUI, 22 March 2021,
url, pp. 1, 2

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murder and other violent crimes’.2725 During the period between March 2020 and March 2021, sulhmechanism2726 was used to resolve conflict between the Daraa’s Eighth Brigade (sub-division of Fifth
Corps, established by Russia in Busra al-Sham town eastern Dar’a in October 20182727) and local armed
groups in western Sweida.2728 Eight Brigade has reportedly sought to prevent Druze population toaccess their agricultural land2729 although its presence near al-Qurraya town (Sweida) was aimed at
protecting eastern Busra al-Sham and its surrounding areas from kidnapping as the local armed groups
in Sweida were reportedly unable to do so.2730 Following the September 2020 heavy clashes between
local armed factions and Eight Brigade that caused 115 casualties in Sweida, GoS deployed troops in
Al-Qurayah and Samma areas in western countryside of Sweida at the border of Daraa to prevent
future clashes.2731 In November 2020, the Eight Brigade pulled out completely its forces from AlQurraya town following an agreement between the local dignitaries from Sweida and theneighbouring Daraa governorate.2732
As reported on 13 March 2021, the security situation in the South Syrian region including in Sweida
reportedly aggravated due to the killing and kidnaping of civilians2733 and was described as having
been chaotic in Sweida’s southern countryside during the past six months.2734
Residents of the governorate of Sweida have accused GoS-affiliated forces of tolerating or evensupporting criminal networks operating in the province.2735 Local criminal groups reportedly
controlled Ariqa town of Sweida and were viewed by locals as operating ‘under a cover provided by
the state security apparatuses’ as they conducted kidnapping, torture and murder in western Sweida
and on the main road between Damascus and Sweida City. Following a kidnapping incident on the
Sweida-Damascus main road, the Syrian military forces entered the city (Sweida) and pulled out after
several members of criminal groups decided ‘to join the Syrian military on the condition that theyremained in Sweida governorate’.2736
Security incidents
According to ACLED data, there were 66 security incidents recorded in Sweida governorate, of whom
22 were coded as battles, 6 explosions/remote violence and 38 incidents of violence against civilians.

2725 Rollins, T., Kidnappings, cross-border clashes threaten increasingly fragile status quo in Syria’s South, MEI, 20 May 2020,

url
2726 According to Al-Jabassini and Ezzi, sulh is ‘a traditional conflict-resolution mechanism, to resolve civilian disputes and tocontribute to maintaining some degree of local order’. It involves ‘ideals of collaboration, mediation and settlement tomaintain the order and stability of the larger community by persuading aggrieved parties to forego vengeance, accept faircompensation and reconcile’. It is exercised and managed by ‘local notables’, including clan sheikhs, family elders, Druze
clerics, and individuals that enjoy authority. Al-Jabassini, A. and Ezzi, M., Tribal “Sulh” and the politics of persuasion in volatilesouthern Syria, EUI, 22 March 2021, url, pp. 1, 3
2727 Al-Jabassini, A., The Eight Brigade: striving for suprimacy in Southern Syria, EUI, 1 December 2020, url, p. 32728 Al-Jabassini, A. and Ezzi, M., Tribal “Sulh” and the politics of persuasion in volatile southern Syria, EUI, 22 March 2021,
url, p. 1
2729 COAR, The Syrian economy at war, Part 1: Armed group mobilisation as livelihood and protection strategy, September
2020, 30 September 2020, url, S. 82730 Al-Jabassini, A. and Ezzi, M., Tribal “Sulh” and the politics of persuasion in volatile southern Syria, EUI, 22 March 2021,
url, p. 11
2731 SOHR, Repercussion of ‘Daraa Al-Suwaidaa’ conflict, regime troops deploy on administrative border between the two
provinces, five days after 115 gunmen killed and wounded, 4 October 2020, url
2732 Enab Baladi, Three military moves by ‘Eight Brigade’, efforts to increase its strength, 17 November 2020, url
2733 SOHR, Security chaos in south Syria, unknown gunmen shoot dead farmer after hijacking his motorcycle, while others
kidnap civilian in western Sweida, 13 March 2021, url
2734 NPA, Local military group formed in Syria’s Suwayda, 17 March 2021, url
2735 Al-Jabassini, A. and Ezzi, M., Tribal ‘sulh’ and the politics of persuasion in volatile southern Syria, EUI, 22 March 2021, url,
p. 10; Carter Center (The), Syria Weekly Conflict Summary 22-28 February 2021, 3 March 2021, url
2736 Al-Jabassini, A. and Ezzi, M., Tribal “Sulh” and the politics of persuasion in volatile southern Syria, EUI, 22 March 2021,
url, p. 10285

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Figure 52: Evolution of security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in Sweida
governorate between January 2020 and March 2021, based on ACLED data2737

Sweida governorate – Security incidents
RemoteViolence against
District
Battlesviolence
civilians28
12
4
Sweida4
6
1
Salkhad
6
4
1
Shahba
38
22
6
Total
Figure 53: Security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in Sweida governorate
between 1 January 2020 and 31 March 2021. Breakdown by district based on ACLED data

According to ACLED data, most security incidents documented by ACLED took place in Sweida district(see Figure 53).
Illustrative security incidents
A non-exhaustive list of security incidents that were reported to have taken place in Sweida
governorate in 2020 and early 2021 included the following (grouped by type of incident):
Kidnappings• On 6 January 2020, two paramedics working in in Al-Manara International Hospital in
Damascus were kidnapped at Jisr Shahbaa as they were on their way to relieve a patient in AlSuwaida city. The kidnappers were unknown.2738• According to the SOHR, two kidnapping attempts of citizens took place in Sweida by armed
gunmen; one on 25 February 2020 and one on 26 February 2020. The latter took place in thewestern countryside of Sweida, near a military checkpoint of the government.2739• On 3 April 2020, armed men blocked a road near by the town of Al-Mazra’a and kidnapped acivilian on a motorcycle.2740• On 26 March 2020, local armed local armed gang kidnapped for ransom people coming fromBusra al-Sham to sell cattle in a local market in Sweida.2741
Between 5 and 28 February 2021 several cases of kidnapping were reported by SOHR in Sweida.

2737 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (9 April 2021), url
2738 SOHR, Two paramedics kidnapped in rural Al-Suwaidaa, 6 January 2020, url
2739 SOHR, Insecurity in al-Suwaidaa increases: citizens kidnapped near military checkpoints, 26 February 2020, url
2740 SOHR, As tension continues in al-Suwaidaa countryside, unidentified gunmen kidnap a young man in al-Mazra’a town, 3

April 2020, url
2741 Rollins, T., Kidnappings, cross-border clashes threaten increasingly fragile status quo in Syria’s South, MEI, 20 May 2020,
url

286

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation•

On 5 February a woman disappeared from Melh village and a man was kidnapped by anarmed group for ransom in front of his house in Sweida city, who was later released by thehelp of local factions.
• On 12 February a child was kidnapped in front of his house in Sweida city and was later
released.
• On 15 February a civilian was kidnapped in Sweida city for ransom.
• On 17 February a civilian was kidnapped for ransom in the industrial area of Sweida city (whowas from Damascus).
• On 23 February, unknown people kidnapped a young man in front of his house on Al-Hayyroad in Sweida city.
• On 28 February, armed men on motorcycles kidnapped two farmers in Ara town in the southwestern countryside of Sweida, who were later released following the mediation by
dignitaries of Sweida and the commanders of the Fifth Corps (Russian-backed).2742• On 13 March 2021, unknown armed men kidnapped a man at a farm nearby Al-Darah village
in western Sweida governorate.2743
IED attacks• On 21 August 2020, SOHR reported that an IED blast took place in Sadd Al-Zalaf area in Sweida
desert, which killed three regime soldiers and injured three others.2744• On 14 October 2020, a vehicle belonged to the Fifth Brigade was hit by a mine in theneighbouring Tel Asadi, south-east of Zulf dam in Sweida desert injuring four officers and asoldier.2745 The mine has reportedly been planted by ISIL when they were in control of thearea in the past.2746
Clashes/attacks• On 13 February 2020, the SOHR documented an attack using machine guns against the
military security detachment in the city of Salkhad, in the governorate of Sweida. The attack
caused severe damage to citizens’ houses.2747• On 23 February 2020, the SOHR reported that clashes took place between members of Sheikh
al-Karama forces and the government’s military security forces at the telephone departmentbuilding in the city of Salkhad, in the governorate of Sweida. The source noted that machineguns were used and there was no information on casualties.2748• On 27 March 2020, violent clashes took place between local factions in Sweida and armed
men of Bosra al-Sham.2749• On 29 September 2020, fourteen people were killed, and several others were wounded during
clashes between armed groups and Eight Brigade in al-Qurraya area of Sweida.2750

2742 SOHR, Security Chaos, two unidentified men found dead in western Sweida, 9 February 2021, url
2743 SOHR, Security Chaos in South Syria, unknown gunmen shoot dead farmer after hijacking his motorcycle, while others

kidnap civilian in western Sweida, 13 March 2021, url
2744 SOHR, ISIS resurgence, Russian jets strike ISIS positions in the desert, and IED explosion in eastern Al-Suwaidaa kills or
injures six regime soldiers, 21 August 2020, url
2745 Suwayda24, ‫[ عمليات تمشيط واسعة ف بادية السويداء وإصابة قائد أحد القطاعات‬informal translation ‘sweeping operation in the‫ي‬
Sweida desert, injuring a sector commander’], 14 October 2020, url; SOHR, Sweeping operations, five regime officers andsoldiers injured in landmine explosion in Al-Suwaidaa desert, 14 October 2020, url
2746 Suwayda24, ‫[ عمليات تمشيط واسعة ف بادية السويداء وإصابة قائد أحد القطاعات‬informal translation ‘sweeping operation in the‫ي‬
Sweida desert, injuring a sector commander’], 14 October 2020, url
2747 SOHR, Insecurity in al-Suwaidaa increases: citizens kidnapped near military checkpoints, 26 February 2020, url
2748 SOHR, After kidnapping one of their members, “Sheikh al-Karama” forces attack security centers in Salkhad and detain
officers, 23 February 2020, url
2749 SOHR, As tension continues in al-Suwaidaa countryside, unidentified gunmen kidnap a young man in al-Mazra’a town, 3
April 2020, url
2750 Al-Jabassani, A., Soutern Syria : ‘Sibling feud’ or engineered violence, MEI, 7 October 2020, url; Carter Center (the),Weekly Conflict Summary, Syria weekly conflict summary for 28 September – 4 October 2020, 8 October 2020, url

287

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation•

On 5 January 2021, unknown armed men opened fire on a cargo truck on Sweida-Damascus
road, near Al-Mattuna village, to ‘hijack the car and kidnap its driver’.2751• On 13 March 2021, a farmer was killed by unknown armed men in Al-Kherbeh town in westerncountryside of Sweida who refused to give up his motorcycle to the attackers.2752 Nearby thesame area, earlier on 9 March 2021, two dead bodies of unknown men were discovered.2753• On 29 March 2021, armed men shot and killed a young man from Um al-Rumman town in thesouthern countryside of Sweida.2754 According to Suwayda24, on 29 March 2021, security
forces stormed a house in Al Nabauni village in Um al-Rumman town of Sweida killing a young
man.2755
Israeli airstrikes••

On 23 June 2020, four Israeli warplanes bombed Iranian militia bases, food stores andmunitions stock in Tal Al-Sahn area in the countryside of Sweida, which caused casualties.2756
During the same period, Israeli air raids targeted an Iranian proxy communication and radar
centre, causing two deaths and severe damage to the communication tower in Salkhad,
southern Sweida governorate.2757
On 6 January 2021, an Israeli airstrike launched two missiles on a radar facility of a battalionof the SAA in the west of the ‘Al-Dur’ village in the western countryside of Sweida, which
destroyed the radar and killed a member of the SAA.2758 According to Suhail Al-Ghazi, in
Sweida on 7 January 2021, an Israeli airstrike targeted a radar facility in Najran Brigade on the
countryside of Sweida.2759

Civilian fatalities
Month
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
AugustSeptember
OctoberNovember
December
Total

VDC 2020
4
6
18
8
1
4
1
6
1
3
3
3
58

SNHR 2020
1
1
1
2
1
2
8

VDC 2021246SNHR 2021
1
1

12

2

2751 SOHR, Security chaos in southern Syria, gunmen attack cargo truck on Damascus-Al-Suwaidaa road, 5 January 2021, url
2752 SOHR, Security Chaos in South Syria, unknown gunmen shoot dead farmer after hijacking his motorcycle, while others

kidnap civilian in western Sweida, 13 March 2021, url
2753 SOHR, Security chaos, two unidentified men found dead in western Sweida, 9 March 2021, url
2754 SOHR, After many killed and injured in security raid on Um Al-Romman village, Residents protest in front of ‘AlMuwahhidun Al-Druze House’ in Al-Suwaidaa city, 4 April 2021, urlً2755 Suwayda24, ‫[ جهات أمنية اقتحمت القرية وفتحت النار عشوائيا عىل المواطني‬informal translation ‘security forces stormed the village‫ر‬and killed opened fire indiscriminately on the residents’], 2 April 2021, url
2756 IranWire, Iran militia battered by Israeli air raids in Syria, 25 June 2020, url
2757 ISW, Syrian situation report: 24 June – 6 July 2020, 6 July 2020, url
2758 Suwayda24, ‫ ف السويداء‬2021 ‫ أشخاص ف الشهر األول من عام‬10 ‫[ توثيق مقتل‬informal translation ’the death of 10 people was‫ي‬‫ي‬documented in Sweida during the first month of 2021’], 3 February 2021, url
2759 Al-Ghazi, S., Insecurity in southern Syria: tracking Daraa, Quneitra and Suwayda, (January – February 2021), ORSAM,
March 2021, url, p. 6

288

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Figure 54: Civilian fatalities as a result of armed conflict in Sweida governorate in 2020 and first three months of 2021.
Monthly breakdown based on VDC and SNHR data

In 2020, Sweida governorate had between 8 (SNHR data)2760 and 58 civilian fatalities (VDC data).2761 In
the first three months of 2021, SNHR recorded 2 civilian fatalities, while VDC recorded 12 civilian
fatalities.
In 2020, Suwayda24, Syrian local news agency, documented 137 persons killed and 171 others injured
as a result of violent incidents in Sweida. Of the 137 fatalities recorded, 85 were civilians and 43 weremembers of the local armed factions in Sweida.2762 For instance, 14 people were killed in January2763,
29 people were killed in March2764, 14 people were killed in April2765, 4 people were killed in May2766,
8 were people killed in June2767, 9 people were killed in August2768, 24 people were killed in
September2769, 7 people were killed in October2770, 12 people were killed in November2771 and 8 people
were killed in December 2020.2772
Infrastructure damage and explosives remnants of war
Sweida governorate has been spared extensive damage in the conflict, compared to other areas ofSyria.2773 According to open-source data collected by the Carter Center and ACLED, at least 783
individual uses of explosive munitions (2 % of total use in southern Syria), were recorded in 69
2760 SNHR, 286 Civilians, including Four Medical and Civil Defense Personnel, Documented Killed in Syria in January 2020, 1

February 2020, url, p. 8; SNHR, 276 Civilians, including Six Medical Personnel and Two Media Workers, Documented Killed in
Syria in February 2020, 1 March 2020, url, p. 8; SNHR, 145 Civilians, including Two Medical Personnel, Documented Killed in
Syria in March 2020, 1 April 2020, url, p. 9; SNHR, 78 Civilians, including One Media Workers, Documented Killed in Syria in
April 2020, 1 May 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, 125 Civilians Documented Killed in Syria in May 2020, including Eight Who Died Dueto Torture and One Massacre, 1 June 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, 1,006 Civilians, including three Media Workers and 12 Medical
and Civil Defense Personnel, Documented Killed in Syria in the First Half of 2020, 1 July 2020, url, p. 16; SNHR, 107 Civilians,
including 26 Children and 11 Women, Documented Killed in Syria in July 2020, 2 August 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, 122 Civilians,
including 21 Children and Seven Women, Documented Killed in Syria in August 2020, 1 September 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR,
Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 102 Civilians, including 15 Children, 10 Women, Three Medical Personnel and 12
Victims Due to Torture, 1 October 2020, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 126 Civilians, including 18
Children, Eight Women, One Media Worker and 10 Victims Due to Torture, 1 November 2020, url, p. 10; SNHR, Extrajudicial
Killing Claims the Lives of 172 Civilians, including 16 Children, 11 Women, and 30 Victims Due to Torture, 1 December 2020,
url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 1,734 Civilians in Syria in 2020, including 99 in December, 1 January
2021, url, p. 14
2761 Based on monthly civilian fatalities figures for 2020-2021 shared by VDC with EASO
‫ا‬2762 Suwayda24, 2020 ‫قتيال ف السويداء حصيلة العنف عام‬137 [informal translation ‘137 people were killed as a result of violence‫ي‬
in 2020 in Sweida’], 2 January 2021, urlً2763 Suwayda24, 2020 ‫ شخصا ف حوادث عنف خالل شهر كانون الثان من عام‬14 ‫ توثق مقتل‬24 ‫[ السويداء‬informal translation ‘Suwayda24‫ي‬‫ي‬
documented the death of 14 people in violent incident in January 2020’], 3 February 2020, url
2764 Suwayda24, 2020 ‫ شخص ف السويداء خالل شهر أذار‬29 ‫ ترصد مقتل‬24 ‫[ السويداء‬informal translation ‘Suwayda24 traced the killing‫ي‬of 29 people in Sweida in March 2020’], 3 April 2020, urlً2765 Suwayda24, 2020 ‫ شخصا ف السويداء خالل شهر نيسان‬14 ‫[ مقتل‬informal translation ’14 people were killed in Sweida in April‫ي‬2020’], 5 April 2020, url
2766 Suwayda24, ‫ إثر حوادث عنف‬2020 ‫ أشخاص ف السويداء خالل شهر أيار‬4 ‫[ مقتل‬informal translation ’4 people were killed in Sweida‫ي‬in May 2020 as result of violent incidents’], 1 June 2020, url
2767 Suwayda24, 2020 ‫ أشخاص خالل شهر حزيران‬8 ‫ ترصد مقتل‬24 ‫[ السويداء‬informal translation ‘Suwayda24 report the killing of eightpeople during the month of June 2020’], 2 July 2020, urlً2768 Suwayda24, 2020 ‫اغسطس‬/‫ شخصا بي قتيل وجري ــح ف السويداء خالل شهر آب‬16 [informal translation '16 people killed and injured‫ر‬‫ي‬in Sweida in August 2020’], 9 August 2020, urlً2769 Suwayda24, 2020 ‫ شخصا ف شهر أيلول‬24 ‫ ترصد مقتل‬24 ‫[ السويداء‬informal translation ‘Suwayda24 reports the killing of 24‫ي‬people in September 2020’], 6 October 2020, url‫ أشخاص خالل شهر ر‬7 ‫ ترصد مقتل‬24 ‫[ السويداء‬informal translation ‘Suwayda24 reports 7 people
2770 Suwayda24, 2020 ‫تشين األول‬killed in October 2020’], 5 November 2020, urlً‫شخصا ف السويداء خالل شهر ر‬
2771 Suwayda24, 2020 ‫تشين الثان‬12 ‫ ترصد مقتل‬24 ‫[ السويداء‬informal translation ‘Suwayda tracks the‫ي‬‫ي‬killing of 12 people in Sweida during November 2020], 3 December 2020, url
2772 Suwayda24, 2020 ‫ أشخاص ف السويداء خالل شهر كانون األول‬8 ‫ توثق مقتل‬24 ‫[ السويداء‬informal translation ‘Suwayda24 documented‫ي‬
the killing of 8 people in Sweida in December 2020’], 2 January 2021, url
2773 Arab Weekly (The), Rising discontent in Syria’s Daraa, Sweida reflects simmering woes, 16 February 2020, url; MEE,
Unrest roils Syria's Sweida as pro- and anti-government protests continue, 10 June 2020, url

289

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

communities in Sweida between July 2013 and May 2019. Most type of munitions used in Sweida
were ground-launched explosive munitions (75 %), followed by aerial-launched munitions (21 %). Useof explosive munitions was particularly documented in Shahba district, with the majority recorded in
the Shaqa subdistrict where half of all explosive weapons used in Sweida were recorded.2774
Based on the Syria Multi-sector Needs Assessment of 2020, the Shelter Cluster assessed that in Sweida
governorate, 0.7 % of the population was living in damaged buildings.2775
In 2020, Suwayda24 documented the killing of three civilians as result of remnants of war in Sweida
governorate, including the explosion of IEDs and mines in areas where military operations took placein the past. In addition, during the same period, six people died accidently while manipulating
weapons in Sweida governorate.2776
Displacement and return
In the period between January and December 2020, UNOCHA recorded 998 IDPs movements within
Sweida governorate.2777 In January and February 2021, no IDP movement was reported by UNOCHA
from Sweida to other governorates or from other governorates to Sweida.2778 and 50 IDPs return
spontaneously during the same period (including from locations within Sweida).2779 In March 2021,
UNOCHA recorded 19 IDP movements from Sweida governorate and 127 IDP return movements fromthe governorate.2780
During the period between January to December 2020, UNOCHA recorded 50 return movements
within the Sweida governorate and 833 return movements from Sweida governorate.2781
On 3 May 2020, SOHR reported on the return of a large number of Christian families to their village,
Kharba in the countryside of Sweida following agreements with the factions who mediate
reconciliation with the GoS, notably Russian-backed 5th Corps affiliates. According to the source, these
Christians were forced to flee in 2014.2782

2774 Carter Center (the), Explosive Weapons Contamination in Syria, Report 1, Southern Syria: As Sweida, Daraa, and Quneitra

Governorates, November 2019, url, p. 72775 Global Shelter Cluster, Syrian Arab Republic: Whole of Syria Shelter/NFI Sector Humanitarian Needs Overview 2021, 1
March 2021, url, pp. 6, 8
‫ا‬2776 Suwayda24, 2020 ‫قتيال ف السويداء حصيلة العنف عام‬137 [informal translation ‘137 people were killed as a result of violence‫ي‬
in 2020 in Sweida’], 2 January 2021, url
2777 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, IDP movements overview, Jan-December 2020, n.d., url
2778 ONOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, IDP movements, January 2021, n.d., url; ONOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, IDP movements,
February 2021, n.d., url
2779 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, spontaneous IDP returnee movements overview, Jan-December 2020, n.d., url
2780
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, IDP Movements. March 2021, 12 May 2021, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic. IDP
Spontaneous Returns. March 2021, 12 May 2021, url
2781 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, IDP movements overview, Jan-December 2020, n.d., url
2782 SOHR, Al Suwaidaa, Tens of Christian families return to their village after six years of displacement, under agreementswith Russian backed factions, url

290Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Annex I: VDC data

291

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Annex II: Chronology
Date

Key events

November
1970
1973

Hafez al-Assad, a member of the socialist Baath Party and the minority Alawi sect,comes to power following a coup.2783
President Assad removes the constitutional requirement that the president must
be a Muslim. The army suppresses ensuing riots.2784
Syria and Egypt launch attacks on Israel. Syria fails to retake the Golan Heights
and hostilities end in a ceasefire.2785
Syria intervenes in the Lebanese civil war sending a force of 25 000 soldiers to
Lebanon to prevent the defeat of its Maronite Christian allies. It maintains
military presence in Lebanon for the next three decades and exerts significant
influence on Lebanese politics.2786 During its presence in Lebanon, Syria
maintained up to 30 000 soldiers in the country, had clashes with Israeli forcesand various Lebanese factions, and ‘lost thousands of soldiers throughout theconflict’.2787 According to AI, during Syria’s military presence in Lebanon ‘humanrights violations including enforced disappearance and torture were carried out
by Syrian military and intelligence personnel against Lebanese nationals,
Palestinian refugees and others.’2788
Islamist resistance to the Assad government grows.2789 After the Islamic
Revolution in Iran, Muslim groups instigate uprisings and riots in Aleppo, Homs
and Hama.2790
Rising internal unrest in 1979-81; Muslim Brotherhood attempts to topple Assadregime with targeted killings, guerrilla warfare, and large-scale uprisings. In 197981, Muslim Brotherhood militants kill over three hundred Assad supporters in
Aleppo alone; Syrian forces respond by killing two thousand members of the
Muslim Brotherhood.2791
The Golan Heights are formally annexed by Israel.2792

October
1973
June 1976

1980

December
1981
February
1982

1990

Muslim Brotherhood attacks on government and uprising in the city of Hama issuppressed in a month-long siege by the army.2793 An estimated 10 000 to 25 000
civilians are killed.2794 Special forces belonging to the intelligence services, inparticular the ‘Defence Brigades’ (Sirayat al-difa’ ) commanded by Rif’at al-Assad,
President Hafez al-Assad’s brother, are reported to carry out massive arrests ofcivilians, as well as torture and executions.2795
Iraq invades Kuwait. Syria joins the US-led coalition against Iraq.2796

2783 CIA, World Factbook, Syria, updated 31 March 2020, url
2784 BBC News, Syria profile – Timeline, 14 January 2019, url
2785 Encyclopaedia Britannica, Timeline of events, n.d., url
2786 Encyclopaedia Britannica, Timeline of events, n.d., url; BBC News, Syria profile – Timeline, 14 January 2019, url
2787 New York Times (The), Syrian Troops Leave Lebanon After 29-Year Occupation, 26 April 2005, url
2788 AI, Syria: Briefing to the Committee Against Torture, 20 April 2010, url, pp. 12-13
2789 Encyclopaedia Britannica, Timeline of events, n.d., url
2790 BBC News, Syria profile – Timeline, 14 January 2019, url
2791 CFR, Remembering the Hama Massacre, 2 February 2012, url
2792 BBC News, Syria profile – Timeline, 14 January 2019, url
2793 CFR, Remembering the Hama Massacre, 2 February 2012, url; BBC News, Syria profile – Timeline, 14 January 2019, url
2794 Carnegie Middle East Center, The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, 1 February 2012, url
2795 Ismael, Q., The Hamah Massacre - February 1982, Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence, 22 December 2009, url
2796 BBC News, Syria profile – Timeline, 14 January 2019, url

292

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

2000
2005

March
2011
July 2011
August2011
November
2011
November2011

May 2012
July 2012

November
2012

March
2013
August2013

President Assad dies and is succeeded by his second son, Bashar.2797
Syrian forces withdraw from Lebanon under international pressure following theassassination of Lebanese premier Rafiq al-Hariri2798, a critic of Syrian presence in
Lebanon.2799
Protesters in Dar’a city demanding release of political prisoners are shot dead by
security forces. Violent unrest spreads nationwide over the following months.2800
A group of SAA defectors announce the formation of the Free Syrian Army.2801
The Syrian National Council is formed in Istanbul, claiming to be the official
representative of the Syrian opposition.2802
OHCHR estimates that at least 3 500 civilians had been killed by GoS forces since
March 2011.2803
Al Qaeda affiliate Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) forms the Nusra Front (Jabhat alNusra) in Syria.2804 Since its founding, the group has ‘conducted formal military
campaigns, assassinations, hostage takings, and ‘lone wolf’ operations, including
suicide bombings’, claiming 57 of 70 suicide attacks conducted in Syria by June
2013.2805
Pro-GoS shabiha militias reportedly killmore than 100 people, including morethan 40 children and 30 women, in the village of Houla, Homs governorate.2806
An attack by the Free Syria Army on intelligence services in Damascus kills andinjures senior Syrian military and security officials responsible for the crackdown
against the opposition.2807 Rebels capture the eastern half of Aleppo city.2808
Syrian opposition leaders announce the formation of the National Coalition for
Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces in Qatar. Islamist factions are
excluded from the coalition.2809 The following month, the US, UK, France, Turkey
and Gulf states formally recognise opposition National Coalition as ‘legitimate
representative’ of Syrian people.2810
Raqqa is captured by rebels. The FSA, Nusra Front and ISI all operate in Raqqa.2811
Hundreds of people are killed by chemical weapons in an attack on the Damascus
suburbs of Eastern and Western Ghouta. The attack is suspected to have been
carried out by Assad forces.2812 US sources estimated that 1 400 persons were
killed in the attack.2813 UN investigation confirmed the attack was carried out

2797 Encyclopaedia Britannica, Timeline of events, n.d., url; BBC News, Syria profile – Timeline, 14 January 2019, url
2798 BBC News, Syria profile – Timeline, 14 January 2019, url
2799 Encyclopaedia Britannica, Timeline of events, n.d., url
2800 BBC News, Syria profile – Timeline, 14 January 2019, url
2801 USIP, Syria Timeline: Since the Uprising Against Assad, 2 July 2019, url
2802 USIP, Syria Timeline: Since the Uprising Against Assad, 2 July 2019, url
2803 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,

23 November 2011, url, p. 82804 US CRS, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, 12 February 2020, url, p. 32805 Counter Extremism Project, Nusra Front (Jabhat Fateh al-Sham), n.d., url, p. 32806 USIP, Syria Timeline: Since the Uprising Against Assad, 2 July 2019, url
2807 Encyclopaedia Britannica, Timeline of events, n.d., url
2808 BBC News, Syria profile – Timeline, 14 January 2019, url; USIP, Syria Timeline: Since the Uprising Against Assad, 2 July
2019, url
2809 BBC News, Syria profile – Timeline, 14 January 2019, url; Encyclopaedia Britannica, Timeline of events, n.d., url
2810 USIP, Syria Timeline: Since the Uprising Against Assad, 2 July 2019, url; BBC News, Syria profile – Timeline, 14 January
2019, url
2811 Wilson Center, Timeline: the Rise, Spread, and Fall of the Islamic State, 28 October 2019, url; USIP, Syria Timeline: Since
the Uprising Against Assad, 2 July 2019, url
2812 USIP, Syria Timeline: Since the Uprising Against Assad, 2 July 2019, url
2813 US CRS, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, 12 February 2020, url, p. 3

293

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

November
2013

January
2014
JanuaryFebruary
2014
June 2014
June 2014

September
2014
January
2015
February
2015
March
2015
May 2015

using the nerve gas sarin but does not specify the perpetrator, and does not givean exact number of victims.2814
Islamist groups Ahrar al-Sham, Jaish al-Islam, Suqour al-Sham, Liwa al-Tawhid,
Liwa al-Haqq, Ansar al-Sham and the Kurdish Islamic Front merge to form theIslamic Front. The group aims to overthrow the Assad government and replace itwith an Islamic government.2815
ISIL captures Raqqa city, which becomes its capital.2816
UN-brokered peace talks in Geneva fail, as Syrian authorities ‘refuse to discuss atransitional government’.2817
GoS helds presidential election. Assad wins the election with some 90 % of thevote. The opposition dismiss the results of the election.2818
The UN and EU2819 designated terrorist organisation2820 ISIL declares‘caliphate’2821 in territory from Aleppo in Syria to Diyala in eastern Iraq.2822 Since
the establishment of its rule in areas of Syria and Iraq, ISIL has killed hundreds ofcivilians, carrying out public executions, beheadings and crucifixions. Religious
minorities in Syria such as Shias, Ismailis, Alawites, and Christians, as well as Sunni
Muslims who did not adhere to the group’s religious laws were specificallytargeted.2823
US and a coalition of Arab countries launch air strikes against ISIL around Aleppo
and Raqqa.2824
Kurdish forces, with the help of US and coalition air strikes push ISIL out of Kobane
on Turkish border after four months of fighting.2825
ISIL militants abduct at least 200 Assyrian Christians in north-eastern Syria.2826
Most of them were released by February 2016 after ransom was paid to ISIL.2827
The Nusra Front and several allied militias capture the city of Idlib.2828
ISIL captures the ancient city of Palmyra in central Syria.2829 Jaish al-Fatah (Armyof Conquest) Islamist rebel alliance takes control of Idlib governorate, puttingpressure on GoS-held Latakia.2830

2814 Encyclopaedia Britannica, Timeline of events, n.d., url
2815 USIP, Syria Timeline: Since the Uprising Against Assad, 2 July 2019, url
2816 Wilson Center, Timeline: the Rise, Spread, and Fall of the Islamic State, 28 October 2019, url
2817 BBC News, Syria profile – Timeline, 14 January 2019, url
2818 Reuters, Assad wins Syria election with 88.7 percent of votes: speaker, 4 June 2014, url
2819 European Council, Council of the European Union, EU terrorist list, n.d, url
2820 UN Security Council, Security Council ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Amends One Entry on Its Sanctions

List, 11 October 2019, url
2821 Wilson Center, Timeline: the Rise, Spread, and Fall of the Islamic State, 28 October 2019, url; USIP, Syria Timeline: Since
the Uprising Against Assad, 2 July 2019, url
2822 BBC News, Syria profile – Timeline, 14 January 2019, url
2823 USDOS, 2018 Report on International Religious Freedom: Syria, 21 June 2019, url, p. 132824 BBC News, Syria profile – Timeline, 14 January 2019, url
2825 USIP, Syria Timeline: Since the Uprising Against Assad, 2 July 2019, url; BBC News, Syria profile – Timeline, 14 January
2019, url
2826 Reuters, Islamic State in Syria abducts at least 150 Assyrian Christians, 25 February 2015, url
2827 BBC News, Islamic State 'releases Assyrian Christian hostages', 22 February 2016, url
2828 USIP, Syria Timeline: Since the Uprising Against Assad, 2 July 2019, url
2829 BBC News, Syria profile – Timeline, 14 January 2019, url
2830 BBC News, Syria profile – Timeline, 14 January 2019, url

294

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

August2015
September
2015
October2015
December
2015
March
2016
August2016
December
2016

January
2017
March
2017

April 2017

GoS airstrikes on markets and residential areas in besieged Douma kill at least
112 people.2831
Russia carries out its first air strikes in Syria, claiming to target ISIL. US officials
claim that Russia is instead targeting Syrian opposition forces.2832
YPG and other armed groups merge to form the Syrian Democratic Forces. US
deploys its first military forces in Syria.2833
Homs is recaptured by GoS forces. Rebels are allowed to evacuate.2834
GoS forces, with Russian and Hezbollah support, recapture Palmyra from ISIL.2835
Turkey launches Operation Euphrates Shield in northern Syria, aimed at removing
ISIL militants and Kurdish forces from a section of the border area.2836
GoS forces, backed by Russian air support and Iranian-sponsored militias,
recapture Aleppo city.2837 AI reported that GoS and Russian forces carried out acampaign of ‘unlawful aerial attacks on civilians and civilian objects in eastern
Aleppo city, which included attacks that constituted war crimes’.2838 OHCHR
stated that it received reports of human rights violations perpetrated by GoS
forces, including ‘summary executions, arbitrary arrests, enforced
disappearances and forced conscription’. There were also allegations that
opposition groups Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (formerly Jabhat al-Nusra) and Ahrar alSham prevented civilians from leaving the city.2839
The Nusra Front merged with four smaller militant groups and rebranded itself
as Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS).2840 The US2841, UN, EU2842 and Turkey has
designated HTS as a terrorist organisation affiliated with Al Qaeda.2843
Airstrikes suspected to deploy a chemical weapon agent hit the Latamneh area inthe suburbs of Hama, injuring up to 70 persons.2844 Following investigation,
OPCW concluded in 2020 that the Syrian air force used sarin and chlorine in three
separate airstrikes on Latamneh, which affected up to 106 persons.2845
Between 802846 and 100 civilians2847 were killed in an alleged sarin gas attack on
the rebel-held town of Khan Sheikhoun, Idlib governorate. Two days after the
Khan Sheikhoun attack, the US ‘fired 59 cruise missiles at a Syrian airfield from2831 HRW, World Report 2016 - Syria, 27 January 2016, url
2832 USIP, Syria Timeline: Since the Uprising Against Assad, 2 July 2019, url; BBC News, Syria profile – Timeline, 14 January

2019, url
2833 US CRS, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, 12 February 2020, url, p. 32834 BBC News, Syria profile – Timeline, 14 January 2019, url
2835 Encyclopaedia Britannica, Timeline of events Timeline of events, n.d., url
2836 BBC News, Syria profile – Timeline, 14 January 2019, url
2837 BBC News, Syria profile – Timeline, 14 January 2019, url; USIP, Syria Timeline: Since the Uprising Against Assad, 2 July
2019, url
2838 AI, ‘We Leave or We Die’: Forced Displacement under Syria’s ‘Reconciliation’ Agreements, 2017, url, p. 37
2839 OHCHR, Statement by the Commission of inquiry on Syria on the situation of civilians affected by the capture of Aleppo,
14 December 2016, url
2840 Wilson Center, Al Qaeda’s Latest Rebranding: Hay’at Tahrir al Sham, 24 April 2017, url
2841 USDOS, Country Report on Terrorism 2018 - Chapter 5 - Al-Nusrah Front, 1 November 2019, url
2842 EU, Official Journal of the European Union, Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/855 of 8 June 2018
amending for the 286th time Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directedagainst certain persons and entities associated with the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida organisations, 11 June 2018, url
2843 HRW, Syria: Arrests, Torture by Armed Group, 28 January 2019, url
2844 UOSSM, Breaking: Chemical Weapons Attack in Latamneh, Hama Injures 70, 30 March 2017, url
2845 UN News, Syrian air force used deadly chemical weapons in 2017 attacks, global watchdog finds, 8 April 2020, url
2846 USIP, Syria Timeline: Since the Uprising Against Assad, 2 July 2019, url
2847 US CRS, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, 12 February 2020, url, p. 3295

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

October
2017

January
2018
April 2018

July 2018

which warplanes had flown the mission’.2848 It was the first direct US attack on a
Syrian government target. On 24 April, the Trump administration imposed
sanctions on 271 people involved in Syrian weapons development.2849 In
September 2017, a UN investigation found the Syrian government responsible forthe chemical attack.2850
The US-backed SDF defeat ISIL and retake Raqqa, after a four month campaign inwhich the city was largely destroyed.2851 The battle of Raqqa ‘was marked byviolations committed by all sides and came at an extremely high cost to
civilians’.2852 AI assessed that during the campaign to retake Raqqa that took
place from June to October 2017, more than 1 600 civilians were killed ‘as a direct
result of thousands of US, UK and French air strikes and tens of thousands of US
artillery strikes’.2853 Around 6 000 ISIL fighters were killed during the
campaign.2854
ISIL ‘used civilians as human shields in its defense of Raqqa and other towns, andemployed internationally banned landmines to hold off the advance of attacking
forces’.2855
Turkey together with FSA factions launch Operation Olive Branch2856, an offensive
on northern Syria aimed at ousting Kurdish forces controlling the area around
Afrin.2857
Claims of a new chemical attack carried out on 7 April in Eastern Ghouta's main
town of Douma, prompt the US, UK and France to carry out a wave of punitive
strikes on Syrian targets.2858 An investigation by OPCW found ‘reasonablegrounds that the use of a toxic chemical as a weapon took place. This toxic
chemical contained reactive chlorine. The toxic chemical was likely molecularchlorine.’2859
The GoS offensive carried out between February and April 2018 to recapture
Eastern Ghouta killed hundreds of civilians, while also ‘decimating numerous
homes, markets, and hospitals in bombardments amounting to the war crimes oflaunching indiscriminate attacks, and deliberately attacking protected
objects’.2860
GoS recaptures almost all of the south of the country2861, including Da’ra
governorate.2862

2848 USIP, Syria Timeline: Since the Uprising Against Assad, 2 July 2019, url
2849 New York Times (The), Dozens of U.S. missiles hit air base in Syria, 6 April 2017, url; New York Times (The), U.S. imposes

sanctions on Syrian Government workers after sarin attack, 24 April 2017, url
2850 Al Jazeera, Syria forces behind Khan Sheikhoun gas attack: UN probe, 6 September 2017, url
2851 USIP, Syria Timeline: Since the Uprising Against Assad, 2 July 2019, url
2852 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/37/72], 1 February 2018, url, p. 92853 AI, Syria: Unprecedented investigation reveals US-led Coalition killed more than 1,600 civilians in Raqqa ‘death trap’, 25
April 2019, url
2854 USIP, Syria Timeline: Since the Uprising Against Assad, 2 July 2019, url
2855 HRW, World Report 2018 - Syria, 18 January 2018, url
2856 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/39/65], 9 August 2018, url, p. 52857 BBC News, Syria profile – Timeline, 14 January 2019, url
2858 AI, Human rights in the Middle East and North Africa: Review of 2018 - Syria [MDE 24/9903/2019], 26 February 2019,url, p. 12859 OPCW, Report of the Fact-Finding Mission Regarding the Incident of Alleged USE of Toxic Chemical as a Weapon in
Douma, Syrian Arab Republic, on 7 April 2018, 1 March 2019, url, p. 42860 UN Human Rights Council, The siege and recapture of eastern Ghouta; Conference room paper of the Independent
International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/38/CRP.3], 20 June 2018, url, Summary
2861 BBC News, Syria profile – Timeline, 14 January 2019, url
2862 USIP, Syria Timeline: Since the Uprising Against Assad, 2 July 2019, url

296

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

November
2018
March
2019

April 2019

October
2019

December2019 –

A toxic gas attack reportedly injured some 100 people in Aleppo.2863 Syria andRussia claimed that rebels were responsible, but rebel groups denied theallegation.2864
SDF forces capture ISIL’s last stronghold in Baghouz village in Deir Ez-Zor
governorate, putting an end to ISIL’s territorial control in Syria.2865 The military
operations carried out by SDF and the US-led coalition against ISIL’s lastremaining pockets, ‘led to near complete destruction of towns and villages in andaround Hajin and Baghouz’.2866
Since losing its territorial control in Syria, ISIL operated as a covert network2867,
retaining ‘clandestine networks in a number of Syrian cities, and an insurgent
presence in much of rural Syria’.2868
GoS forces with Russian air support intensify airstrikes against rebel-held areas innorth-west Syria.2869 Further escalation of hostilities took place in July andAugust.2870
The GoS and Russia have been accused of deliberately targeting hospitals innorth-west Syria ‘using coordinates these facilities had shared with Russia
through a United Nations deconfliction mechanism’.2871 An UN investigation onseven specific incidents involving facilities on the UN deconfliction list concluded
that it is ‘highly probable’ the GoS or its allies carried out the air strikes on four
civilian facilities (three hospitals and one school) in Idlib and Hama provinces,although it noted that the evidence was not sufficient to reach a conclusive
finding. The board also found that it is ‘plausible’ that damage done to anotherhospital in Hama was attributable to GoS and its allies.
Regarding the attack carried out in May 2019 on Nayrab Palestine Refugee Campin Aleppo province, the board concluded that it is ‘probable’ that armed
opposition groups or Hayat Tahrir al-Sham were responsible for the attack.2872
Turkish forces, supported by the SNA launch Operation Peace Spring, a military
offensive against Kurdish forces in north-east Syria. In and around the area
between Ras al Ain and Tall Abyad, ‘civilians were subjected to myriad violationsof human rights and international humanitarian law by Syrian National Armyfighters.’2873
Military hostilities between GoS and anti-GoS armed groups increased
significantly in parts of Idlib, northern Hama and western Aleppo

2863 BBC News, Syria war: Aleppo 'gas attack' sparks Russia strikes, 25 November 2018, url
2864 Bellingcat, Open Source Survey of the Alleged November 24 2018 Chemical Attack in Aleppo, 28 November 2018, url
2865 Wilson Center, Timeline: the Rise, Spread, and Fall of the Islamic State, 28 October 2019, url
2866 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/42/51], 15 August 2019, url, p. 62867 UN Security Council, Tenth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peaceand security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat [S/2020/95], 4
February 2020, url, p. 22868 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, October 1, 2019‒December 31,
2019, 4 February 2020, url, p. 38
2869 USIP, Syria Timeline: Since the Uprising Against Assad, 2 July 2019, url
2870 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/43/57], 28 January 2020 [published 2 March 2020], url, p. 32871 HRW, World Report 2020 - Syria, 14 January 2020, url
2872 UN Secretary General, Summary by the Secretary-General of the report of the United Nations Headquarters Board of
Inquiry into certain incidents in northwest Syria since 17 September 2018 involving facilities on the United Nations
deconfliction list and United Nations supported facilities, 6 April 2020, url, pp. 1-172873 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/43/57], 28 January 2020 [published 2 March 2020], url, pp. 10-11

297

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

March
2020

May-July
2020

December2020

governorates.2874 The GoS offensive resulted in high number of civilian
casualties2875 and over 1 million people displaced between December 2019 andFebruary 2020.2876 On 5 March 2020, a ceasefire brokered by Russia and Turkey
was agreed in the Idlib area, establishing a security corridor where joint Russianand Turkish patrols would be carried.2877
As of May 2020, the EU has enacted sanctions on 295 persons and 78 entities inview of the situation in Syria. It also targets companies and business people
benefitting from their ties with the GoS and the war economy.2878 The list isavailable here. On 17 June 2020, USA officially enacted sanctions contained in the
Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act. The sanctions targeted 39 Syrian individuals,
including business executives.2879 The list is available here. In July 2020, a second
round of sanctions was imposed by USDOS which included 14 new designations,
including President Assad’s eldest son, Hafez.2880
Turkish and Kurdish forces clashed in the city of Ain Issa (Raqqa governorate),
forcing over 9 500 Syrian civilians to flee their homes.2881

2874 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015),

2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) and 2504 (2020); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2020/141], 21
February 2020, url, pp. 1-2, 52875 UN, Security Council: Syria, 28 February 2020, url; OHCHR, Press briefing note on Syria, 18 February 2020, url
2876 UNOCHA, Under-Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Mark Lowcock: Statement on
Northwest Syria, 17 February 2020, url
2877 Al Jazeera, Turkey says Idlib ceasefire details largely agreed on with Russia, 12 March 2020, url
2878 EU Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria,
28 May 2020, url
2879 USDOS, Syria Caesar Act Designations, 17 June 2020, url
2880 AP News, US slaps sanctions on Syrian president's eldest son, 29 July 2020, url
2881 Al Jazeera, Civilians flee Ain Issa, northeast Syria as clashes escalate, 27 December 2020, url; COAR, Syria in 2021, 28
January 2021, url

298

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

Annex III: Bibliography
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research focuses on the military and security situation of Syria as well as the socio-economic
situation in government-held areas.
An international humanitarian organisation working in Syria, Microsoft Teams interview,
17 February 2021. The source preferred anonymity for the sake of discretion and theirpersonal and organisational safety.

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aviationmonitoring
observatory],
9
February
2020,
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9January

2019,

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SNHR (Syrian Network for Human Rights), Syria is among the world’s worst countries for the numberof mines planted since 2011, despite prohibition of their use in international law, 10 December 2020,
https://sn4hr.org/wpcontent/pdf/english/Syria_Is_Among_the_Worlds_Worst_Countries_for_the_Number_of_Mines_Pl
anted_Since_2011_en.pdf, accessed 19 April 2021
SNHR (Syrian Network for Human Rights), Syrian Democratic Forces Have Arrested/ Detained at Least
61 Teachers Over Educational Curricula and for Forced Conscription Since the Beginning of 2021.
Persecution of Nearly 550 Teachers Arbitrarily Dismissed from Their Jobs for Refusing Forced
Conscription in the Governorates of Raqqa, Deir Ez-Zour and Hasaka, 19 February 2021,
https://sn4hr.org/blog/2021/02/19/55948/, accessed 20 April 2021
SNHR (Syrian Network for Human Rights), The brutal attacks on Suwayda governorate between the
Terrorism of the Syrian Regime and ISIS. 154 civilians killed, including 15 children, 16 October 2018,
http://sn4hr.org/wpcontent/pdf/english/The_brutal_attacks_on_the_province_of_Suwayda_en.pdf, accessed 20 April
2021

367

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

SNHR (Syrian Network for Human Rights), The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in
January 2021, 4 February 2021, https://sn4hr.org/blog/2021/02/04/55921/, accessed 19 April 2021
SNHR (Syrian Network for Human Rights), The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in theFirst Half of 2020, 3 July 2020, https://sn4hr.org/blog/2020/07/03/55155/, accessed 28 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Exclusive | 2020: 115 children and women among over
510 people kidnapped in Syria, with Afrin and regime-held areas topping the list, 27 December 2020,
https://www.syriahr.com/en/197830/, accessed 26 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), “De-escalation zone” | Clashes renew in Sahl Al-Ghab
and regime artillery pounds southern Idlib, 20 May 2020, https://www.syriahr.com/en/165603/,
accessed 26 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), “De-escalation zone” | Nearly 30 Russian airstrikes
pound rural Idlib and Hama, and regime forces shell the villages of Jabal al-Zawiya with artillery, 8 June
2020, https://www.syriahr.com/en/168918/, accessed 25 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), “De-escalation zone” | Regime forces attack rebels
positions in Sahl Al-Ghab leaving casualties, 19 May 2020, https://www.syriahr.com/en/165434/,
accessed 25 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), “Olive Branch” and “Euphrates Shield” areas in March |Over 20 arrests and kidnappings in Afrin…ongoing thefts and looting of civilians’ properties…security
chaos
leavesnearly40
peopledead
andwounded,
5
April
2021,
https://www.syriahr.com/en/212709/, accessed 29 March 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), “Peace Spring” a year on: A new map ofinfluence…growing humanitarian disaster and continuous Turkish violations, 9 October 2020,
https://www.syriahr.com/en/188093/, accessed 11 May 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), “Salary is not enough for buying even a chicken” and“we have not had meat for three years” | Popular discontent grows in Tartus and entire regimecontrolled areas over low income and unaffordable prices, 18 December 2020,
https://www.syriahr.com/en/196481/, accessed 7 April 2021, accessed 11 May 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), “ ‫ من رعاة‬3 ‫ ميليشيات موالية إليران تقتل‬..”‫ذبحا ً بالسكاكين‬‫[ المواشي في ريف حمص الشرقي‬slayed with knives.. Pro-Iran militias kill three shepherds in eastern Homs
countryside], 7 October 2020, "‫"ذبحا ً بالسكاكين‬.. ‫ من رعاة المواشي في ريف حمص‬3 ‫ميليشيات موالية إليران تقتل‬‫( الشرقي | المرصد السوري لحقوق اإلنسان‬syriahr.com), accessed 11 May 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), 11 ‫ جريحا ً حصيلة انفجار لغم بحافلة في ريف سلمية‬13‫قتيالً و‬‫[ شرقي حماة‬11 deaths and 13 injuries, the outcome of a landmine explosion that hit a bus in Al-Salamiya
countryside in eastern Hama], 7 March 2021, 11 ‫ جريحا ً حصيلة انفجار لغم بحافلة في ريف سلمية‬13‫قتيالً و‬‫( شرقي حماة | المرصد السوري لحقوق اإلنسان‬syriahr.com), accessed 28 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), 19 killed in an ISIS attack in Hama, 3 February 2021,
https://www.syriahr.com/en/203525/, accessed 23 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), 77 months of International Coalition operations in Syria:
Security campaigns with SDF result in the arrest of over 60 people, and large reinforcement of 250
trucks enter Syria, 23 February 2021, https://www.syriahr.com/en/206409/, accessed 23 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), 79 months since the declaration of Caliphate State | ISIS
members kill over 100 regime soldiers and loyalists, while cells carry out nearly 65 operations in SDFheld areas, 28 February 2021, https://www.syriahr.com/en/206975/, accessed 28 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), A car bomb exploded in the capital, Damascus, 19
September 2020, https://www.syriahr.com/en/184851/, accessed 28 April 2021
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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Accidental explosion: Grenade explodes inneighbourhood in Damascus, killing NDF member and injuring others, 30 March 2021,
https://www.syriahr.com/en/212085/, accessed 28 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), After attack on Iranian militias’ headquarters in eastern
Homs | Regime forces arrest ten people, including women, for “cooperating with ISIS”, 6 February
2021, https://www.syriahr.com/en/203910/, accessed 28 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), After decapitated body found in eastern rural Hama |Regimeforcesarrestmore
than20
members,
25
January2021,
https://www.syriahr.com/en/202154/, accessed 28 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), After insulting spiritual Sheikh in Al-Suwayda,
population discontent grows, and military intelligence branch releases kidnapped person from the city
to calm the situation, 26 January 2021, https://www.syriahr.com/en/202263/, accessed 20 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), After kidnapping one of their members, “Sheikh alKarama” forces attack security centers in Salkhad and detain officers, 23 February 2020,
http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=155757, accessed 20 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), After killing and arresting six persons by security services| Regime checkpoints put on high alert in Damascus and countryside, 15 March 2021,
https://www.syriahr.com/en/209177/, accessed 20 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), After many killed and injured in security raid on Um AlRomman village, Residents protest in front of “Al-Muwahhidun Al-Druze House” in Al-Suwaidaa city,
4 April 2021, https://www.syriahr.com/en/212667/, accessed 20 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Al Suwaidaa, tens of Christian families return to theirvillage after six years of displacement, under agreement with Russian backed factions,
https://www.syriahr.com/en/162883/, accessed 20 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Al-Busayrah explosion update | Number of people
injured rises in blast targeting collaborators with SDF, east of Deir ez-Zor, 20 February 2021,
https://www.syriahr.com/en/205924/, accessed 20 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Aleppo countryside | Rocket attacks renew on the areaof primitive oil refineries, 5 March 2021, https://www.syriahr.com/en/207640/, accessed 12 April
2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Aleppo countryside | Turkish forces shell five villages
and positions in Kurdish-held areas, 22 March 2021, https://www.syriahr.com/en/210719/, accessed
11 May 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Al-Hasakah: Turkish forces attack border village, igniting
popular anger, while Russian forces check the situation, 6 March 2021,
https://www.syriahr.com/en/207666/, accessed 15 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Al-Quneitra countryside: Regime security agent killed
and former opposition leader injured in two separate incidents, 9 November 2020,
https://www.syriahr.com/en/191780/, accessed 15 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Al-Quneitra: Three Hezbollah-backed militiamen killed
inIsraeliattacksonschoolinnortherncountryside,
21
October
2020,
https://www.syriahr.com/en/188972/, accessed 16 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Al-Quneitra: Unknown gunmen assassinate State
Security agent in countryside, 1 January 2021, https://www.syriahr.com/en/198521/, accessed 15
April 2021

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Al-Suwaidaa, regime security forces release all young
men arrested in June demonstrations, only one driven to mandatory service, 10 July 2020,
https://www.syriahr.com/en/174109/, accessed 20 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Armed attack: Member of Al-Quneitra Council
assassinated in Al-Baath city, 16 February 2021, https://www.syriahr.com/en/205353/, accessed 15
April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), As tension continues in al-Suwaidaa countryside,
unidentified gunmen kidnap a young man in al-Mazra’a town, 3 April 2020,
https://www.syriahr.com/en/159225/, accessed 20 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Backed by Russian airpower, regime forces recapture
Saraqib city only four days after Turkish forces and proxy factions captured it, 2 March 2020,
http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=156171, accessed 24 March 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Buying loyalty: Iran-backed militias offer young people
in Al-Quneitra financial incentives, 12 February 2020, http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=154865,
accessed 15 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Ceasefire violations | Opposition shell and attack regime
positions in Idlib and Latakia countryside, leaving scores dead and wounded, 8 January 2021,
https://www.syriahr.com/en/199580/, accessed 30 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory of Human Rights), Ceasefire violations | Rebels shell regime positions in
Jourin, while regime forces renew shelling Jabal Al-Zawiyah and Sahl Al-Ghab, 14 January 2021,
https://www.syriahr.com/en/200426/, accessed 29 March 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Ceasefire violations | Regime forces shell positions in
Idlib, Hama and Latakia, while Turkistan Islamic Party attacks military position in Jabal Shashaboo, 7
December 2020, https://www.syriahr.com/en/195125/, accessed 30 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Child injured in grenade explosion in Jaramana, 18
December 2020, https://www.syriahr.com/en/196529/, accessed 30 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Continued clashes in Hama countryside, 3 April 2017,https://www.syriahr.com/en/64056/, accessed 30 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Damascus | IED explodes and security forces dismantle
another one near bus terminal of al-Sumariya area, 15 December 2020,
https://www.syriahr.com/en/196140/, accessed 30 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Damascus deteriorating security: six explosions rockDamascus in 15 days, 26 February 2020, https://www.syriahr.com/en/155847/,
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Daraa in one year: security chaos, overlapping interestsand hidden conflict… people suffer the scourge of external and internal interventions, 25 June 2020,
https://www.syriahr.com/en/172282/#:~:text=Daraa%20governorate%20is%20of%20crucial%20imp
ortance%2C%20bothpolitically%20and,between%20the%20central%20and%20southeastern%20regions%20of%20Syria, accessed 12 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Daraa in six months: Attacks and assassination attempts
riseassecurity
chaoscontinues,
2
January2020,
http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=152049&__cf_chl_jschl_tk__=3720269edf599a85d0ac3436ce3b6a0
2395a88ef-1582876011-0Achjwx6mtCFKpdrt8YHdgaYQBnT4hDa3tYKT4k8mMX_Ln1sjV6gRgwl27qFlTItFuk_64osIUL62q0yILpqi
oU_oOeHd2-Nw9HDZ5t4mL7ybMlt4EnV_A-6h8T7w6yVJhmo0LPoBKWUDIZRPmjyC8zv905JIoC8u944eLd5ZUt0SV3TMmB42OFBwRBmCPyAeL38eJM2_x1

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

5XbuzkHNUbp5GHE_gzZ7fCcgN5sxhomvZzvhPt0hGsFyHUouNlmZ_MLvcJ7SBseu41reKw2ItYuOMQC
Aur_g00NEfv5PQtFZY, accessed 12 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Deir Ezzor demonstrations: Tens of residents protest
corruption of SDF officials, 7 December 2020, https://www.syriahr.com/en/195127/, accessed 2 April
2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Demographic change | At Turkish government’s orders,the Syrian National Coalition attempts to attract supporters to back up projects in Afrin, 26 March
2021, https://www.syriahr.com/en/211555/, accessed 2 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Digging trenches and tunnels: Iranian militias andHezbollah camouflage and boost positions in eastern Damascus for fear of Israeli attacks, 9 February
2021, https://www.syriahr.com/en/204263/, accessed 2 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Eastern Ghouta: Air-Force Intelligence arrests two
women and young man from Douma city, 15 February 2021, https://www.syriahr.com/en/205179/,
accessed 2 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Fierce clashes erupt in Al-Sanamayn as regime forces
storm the city using heavy weapons, 1 March 2020, http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=156071, accessed
12 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), For criticizing poor quality of food and rationing in
regime army | Security services arrest regime officer popular among loyalists, 21 August 2020,
https://www.syriahr.com/en/180622/
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Gunmen attack regime ‘Air-force Intelligence’ vehicle inrural al-Quneitra southern Syria, 29 January 2020, http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=153984, accessed
15 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Hama | Fierce clashes erupt between ISIS and NDF in
the wake of kidnapping four persons, 4 August 2020, https://www.syriahr.com/en/178008/, accessed
15 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Homs desert | Russian-backed “al-Quds Brigade” militia
steal about 1,000 sheep, 5 December 2020, https://www.syriahr.com/en/194850/, accessed 28 April
2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), IED attack: Explosion kills two Air-Force intelligenceagents in al-Quneitra countryside, 14 October 2020, https://www.syriahr.com/en/195997/, accessed
16 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), In 72 hours | Man and three children killed by war
remnant in different parts of Syria, 5 May 2021, https://www.syriahr.com/en/215507/, accessed 20
May 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Insecurity in al-Suwaida increases: citizens kidnappednear military checkpoints, 26 February 2020, http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=156044, accessed 20
April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), ISIS attacks in one week 100 regime soldiers and loyal
militiamen killed and go missing, despite Russian intense airstrikes, 29 August 2020,
https://www.syriahr.com/en/181796/, accessed 20 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), ISIS resurgence | Cells capture new positions in Hama
desert, and kill nearly 20 regime soldiers and loyalists, 9 January 2021,
https://www.syriahr.com/en/199589/, accessed 28 April 2021

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), ISIS resurgence | Nearly 20 regime police officers andcivilians kidnapped and scores missing in surprise attack on Al-Sa’an district, 6 April 2021,
https://www.syriahr.com/en/212895/, accessed 30 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), ISIS resurgence in Homs desert | IED explodes in militarybus, killing six regime soldiers and injuring ten others, 28 August 2020,
https://www.syriahr.com/en/181693/, accessed 27 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), ISIS resurgence in Syrian desert | Members renew
attacks on regime forces’ positions in eastern Hama, and Russian jets intensify airstrikes, 26 October
2020, https://www.syriahr.com/en/189781/, accessed 30 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), ISIS resurgence, Russian jets strike ISIS positions in thedesert, and IED explosion in eastern Al-Suwaidaa kills or injures six regime soldiers, 21 August 2020,
https://www.syriahr.com/en/180530/, accessed 20 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), ISIS resurgence: cells attack regime military bus in Homs,
killing six soldier, including high-ranking officer, 30 April 2020, https://www.syriahr.com/en/162466/,
accessed 29 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Israeli attacks | Airstrikes target T4 airport area in Homs
countryside,andair
defensestrytointercept,
2
September
2020,
https://www.syriahr.com/en/182459/, accessed 28 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Kidnapping mafias in Syria | Security chaos helps gangs
to “flourish”, recruitment of children and organ trade are major motives behind kidnapping increase,
2 August 2020, https://www.syriahr.com/en/178507/, accessed 28 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Military build-up | Regime forces bring in new
reinforcement to Sahl Al-Ghab and rural Latakia, and shell factions’ positions in rural Idlib, 2 August
2020, https://www.syriahr.com/en/177838/, accessed 28 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Military escalation in Aleppo | Clashes erupt in Manbij,
while regime forces and Turkish force trade fire in northern countryside, 14 March 2021,
https://www.syriahr.com/en/208929/, accessed 28 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), More than 570 thousand people were killed on the
Syrian territory within 8 years of revolution demanding freedom, democracy, justice, and equality, 15
March 2019, http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=120851, accessed 28 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Mufti of Damascus and countryside killed in IED
explosion, 22 October 2020, https://www.syriahr.com/en/189178/, accessed 28 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), New Israeli attack | Airstrikes hit Iranian positions
nearby Hama, while shrapnel of regime air-defence missiles kills an entire family, 22 January 2021,
https://www.syriahr.com/en/201619/, accessed 25 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), New Israeli attack in rural Damascus and Quneitra: Eight
non-Syrian militiamen killed, and rocket depots and vehicles destroyed in airstrikes on positions ofpro-Iran militias and Lebanese Hezbollah, 25 November 2020, https://www.syriahr.com/en/193381/,
accessed 15 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), New massacre | Iranian militias kill 11 civilians, steal
sheep and set fire to several houses in eastern Homs, 4 November 2020,
https://www.syriahr.com/en/191101/, accessed 11 May 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), North of Homs | Gunmen attack State Security
headquarters in Talbiseh city, 16 November 2020, https://www.syriahr.com/en/192322/, accessed 27
April 2021

372

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Old ordnance | Explosion injures child in western Idlib,
15 May 2021, https://www.syriahr.com/en/216309/, accessed 28 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Old ordnance | Explosion kills two civilians in easterncountryside of Hama, and today’s death toll rises to five people in the region, 26 February 2021,
https://www.syriahr.com/en/206697/, accessed 28 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), On International Human Rights Day: Millions of Syrians
robbed of “rights” and 593 thousand killed in a decade, 9 December 2020,
https://www.syriahr.com/en/195385/, accessed 28 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Ras al-Ain | Clashes between Turkish-backed factions
leave several injured, and residents of Luzi village give “Sultan Murad” five-days notice to hand overtheir son’s killer, 29 December 2020, https://www.syriahr.com/en/198154/, accessed 28 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Regime forces advance further in Sahl Al-Ghab and ten
villages separate them from having full control over Hama province, and rebels carry out new
offensive far east of Idlib backed by Turkish firepower, 28 February 2020,
https://www.syriahr.com/en/155987/, accessed 21 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Regime forces storm village in rural Al-Quneitra,arresting several civilians, 17 April 2020, https://www.syriahr.com/en/160558/, accessed 15 April
2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Repercussion of ‘Daraa Al-Suwaidaa’ conflict, regime
troops deploy on administrative border between the two provinces, five days after 115 gunmen killed
and wounded, 4 October 2020, https://www.syriahr.com/en/186899/, accessed 20 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), SDF-controlled areas in January | Over 50 attacks by ISIS
cells leave nearly 60 people dead and injured, and major security campaigns against corruption and
ISIS cells result in the arrest of dozens, 11 February 2021, https://www.syriahr.com/en/204758/,
accessed 10 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Second attack in 48 hours | Clashes renew between ISIS
cells and regime forces in east Hama desert, 6 August 2020, https://www.syriahr.com/en/178311/,
accessed 21 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Security chaos | Clashes erupt among pro-regime
militias in Homs province, leaving three militiamen injured, 19 August 2020,
https://syriahr.com/de/?p=180311, accessed 26 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Security chaos in south Syria, unknown gunmen shootdead farmer after hijacking his motorcycle, while others kidnap civilian in western Sweida, 13 March
2021, https://www.syriahr.com/en/208625/, accessed 20 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Security chaos in southern Syria, gunmen attack cargo
truck on Damascus-Al-Suwaidaa road, 5 January 2021, https://www.syriahr.com/en/198977/,
accessed 20 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Security chaos, two unidentified men found dead inwestern Sweida, 9 February 2021, https://www.syriahr.com/en/208060/, accessed 20 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Security chaos, two unidentified men found dead inwestern Sweida, 19 March 2021, https://www.syriahr.com/en/208060/, accessed 20 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Sweeping operations, five regime officers and soldiersinjuredinlandmine
explosionin
Al-Suwaidaa
desert,14
October
2020,
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373

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Syrian Army Pounds Militant Positions In Northern
Lattakia, 26 June 2020, https://www.syriahr.com/en/172003/, accessed 19 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Syrian Regime Sends Military Reinforcements to Desert,
12 January 2021, https://www.syriahr.com/en/200173/, accessed 19 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Tension mounts in Daraa’s Nahteh, and residents ofother towns and villages threaten to escalate operations against the Syrian regime, 12 January 2020,
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SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), The explosion of more IEDs and mines left behind by
ISIS causes new casualties in the Syrian desert, 8 April 2019, https://www.syriahr.com/en/123789/,
accessed 13 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), The Lebanese Hezbollah continues its efforts to bring
the province of Al-Quneitra under its full control, 10 September 2019,http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=140250, accessed 15 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), The regime forces and Russia impose a new settlement
in al-Sanamin and displace 26 of who reject it to the north of Syria, 3 March 2020,
http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=156265, accessed 12 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Turkey’s military build-up | Forces bring in new column
to their positions in “de-escalation zone”, 29 March 2021, https://www.syriahr.com/en/211920/,
accessed 20 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Turkey’s military build-up | Turkish forces set up new
military post in Jabal al-Akrad, as shelling and clashes intensify, 9 August 2020,
https://www.syriahr.com/en/178902/, accessed 13 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Turkish forces shell Tal Rifaat town hosting Russian
military base, 28 February 2020, http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=155995, accessed 13 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Two paramedics kidnapped in rural Al-Suwaidaa, 6January 2020, http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=152417, accessed 20 April 2021
SOHR (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Why Syria is a critical part of Russia’s energy strategy,
22 September 2020, https://www.syriahr.com/en/185204/, accessed 17 May 2021
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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

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Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

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Annex IV: Terms of Reference
In order to assess Article 15(c) QD: serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason
of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict, the security
situation report should provide information concerning the following:❑ General description of the security situation for the reference period between January
2020 and March 2021
o Overview of the conflict▪ General background of the conflict and recent developments in Syria with afocus on the period between January 2020 and March 2021
▪ Political developments▪ International involvemento Actors in conflicto Overview of actors
o Presence and areas of control/influenceo Type of weapons and tactics usedo Recent security trends and armed confrontations focusing on the period between
January 2020 and March 2021
▪ Geographical overview of the security situationo Impact of violence on the civilian populationo Tactics and weapons usedo Security incidents
o Civilian casualtieso Humanitarian situationo Infrastructure damage and explosive remnants of war
o Displacement and return❑ Security situation and conflict impact on civilians by governorates for the reference period
between January 2020 and March 2021
▪ General description (map, districts, population, ethno-religious composition)▪ Conflict background (actors, control/presence)▪ Recent security trends (include information on particularly affected/not
affected districts, where available)▪ Impact of the security situation on the civilian populationo Security incidents
o Civilian casualties
o Infrastructure damage and explosive remnants of war
o Displacement and return

401

Country of origin information report | Syria: Security situation

doi: 10.2847/851217

402