European Asylum Support Office

SyriaInternally displaced
persons, returnees andinternal mobility
Country of Origin Information Report

April 2020

SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION

European Asylum Support Office

SyriaInternally displaced
persons, returnees andinternal mobility

Country of Origin Information Report

April 2020

More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu).
PDF: ISBN: 978-92-9485-158-1

doi: 10.2847/460038

BZ0220013ENN© European Asylum Support Office (EASO) 2020
Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged, unless otherwise stated.
For third-party materials reproduced in this publication, reference is made to the
copyrights statements of the respective third parties.

Cover photo: © DFID - UK Department for International Development, Syrian women andgirls in an informal tented settlement in the Bekaa Valley, Lebanon, 3 February 2017, (CC BY
2.0) https://www.flickr.com/photos/dfid/31874898573

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT SYRIA: INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS, RETURNEES AND INTERNAL MOBILITY—3

Acknowledgements
EASO would like to acknowledge Sweden, Swedish Migration Agency, Country of Origin Information,
Section for Information Analysis, as the drafter of this report.

The following departments and organisations have reviewed the report:
Denmark, Danish Immigration Service (DIS)ACCORD, the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation

It must be noted that the review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts or organisations
contributes to the overall quality of the report, but does not necessarily imply their formal
endorsement of the final report, which is the full responsibility of EASO.

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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT SYRIA: INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS, RETURNEES AND INTERNAL MOBILITY

Contents
Acknowledgements................................................................................................................................. 3Contents .................................................................................................................................................. 4
Disclaimer................................................................................................................................................ 6
Glossary and abbreviations ..................................................................................................................... 7
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 8
Methodology ...................................................................................................................................... 8
Sources ............................................................................................................................................... 8
Quality control .................................................................................................................................... 8
Structure and use of the report .......................................................................................................... 8
Map ....................................................................................................................................................... 10
1. Background ....................................................................................................................................... 11
2. Situation of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) ............................................................................... 13
2.1 The underlying factors behind displacement resulting from the civil war ................................. 13
2.2 General patterns of displacement .............................................................................................. 14
2.3 Internally displaced persons in former rebel-held areas............................................................ 15
2.4 Internally displaced in northern Syria......................................................................................... 15
2.4.1 North-west Syria-Idlib province .......................................................................................... 15
2.4.2 North-east Syria................................................................................................................... 17
3. Situation of returnees ....................................................................................................................... 19
3.1 Background ................................................................................................................................. 19
3.2 The situation of returnees from areas included in the reconciliation agreements ................... 20
3.2.1 The reconciliation agreements - an overview ..................................................................... 20
3.2.2 The impact of the reconciliation agreements on return ..................................................... 22
3.3 Return of Syrian refugees ........................................................................................................... 24
3.3.1 Lebanon ............................................................................................................................... 24
3.3.2 Turkey .................................................................................................................................. 25
3.3.3 Jordan .................................................................................................................................. 29
3.4 Return procedures ...................................................................................................................... 30
3.4.1 Security clearance ............................................................................................................... 30
3.4.2 Regulating status in post-reconciliation areas .................................................................... 32
3.4.3 Wanted lists......................................................................................................................... 32
3.4.4 Military conscription in post-reconciliation areas .............................................................. 33

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3.5 Arrests, detentions and violations committed against returnees .............................................. 33
3.6 Legal obstacles to housing, land and property rights ................................................................. 34
4. Particular groups ............................................................................................................................... 36
4.1 Women ....................................................................................................................................... 36
4.2 Children....................................................................................................................................... 37
5. Mobility ............................................................................................................................................. 39
5.1 Checkpoints in government-controlled areas ............................................................................ 39
5.2 Checkpoints in rebel–held areas in Idlib province:..................................................................... 41
5.3 Damascus International Airport ................................................................................................. 41
Bibliography .......................................................................................................................................... 42
Terms of Reference ............................................................................................................................... 53

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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT SYRIA: INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS, RETURNEES AND INTERNAL MOBILITY

Disclaimer
This report was written according to the EASO COI Report Methodology (2019).1 The report is basedon carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced.
The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed with utmost
care. However, this document does not claim to be exhaustive. If a particular event, person ororganisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has not taken place orthat the person or organisation does not exist.
Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particularapplication for international protection. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative of aparticular legal position.
‘Refugee’, ‘risk’ and similar terminology are used as generic terminology and not in the legal sense as
applied in the EU Asylum Acquis, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the
Status of Refugees.
Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may bemade of the information contained in this report.
The first draft of this report was finalised on 12 December 2019. Some additional information wasadded during the finalisation of this report in response to feedback received during the quality control
process, until 12 March 2020. Any event taking place after this date is not included in this report. Moreinformation on the reference period for this report can be found in the methodology section of theIntroduction.

1 The EASO methodology is largely based on the Common EU Guidelines for processing Country of Origin Information (COI),

2008, and can be downloaded from the EASO website: http://www.easo.europa.eu.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT SYRIA: INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS, RETURNEES AND INTERNAL MOBILITY

Glossary and abbreviations
COAR

Centre for Operational Analysis and Research

DGMM

General Directorate for Migration and Management

EIP

European Institute for Peace

HDP

Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi)

HTS

Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham

IDPInternally Displaced Person

ISIL

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, also known as Islamic State (IS),
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), or Daesh

ISW

Institute for the Study of War

KRI

Kurdish Region of Iraq

LFIP

Law No 6458 on Foreigners and International Protection

OHCHR

United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

PDMM

Provincial Directorate for Migration Management

SAA

Syrian Arab Army

SACD

Syrian Association for Citizen’s Dignity

SARC

Syrian Arab Red Crescent

SDF

Syrian Democratic Forces

Sha´bt Tajneed

local military recruitment branch

SNHR

Syrian Network for Human Rights

STJ

Syrians for Truth and JusticeTaswiyat al-Wad´

the process of regulating one’s status

UNOCHA

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

UNRWA

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the
Near East

YPG

Kurdish People’s Protection Unit

—7

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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT SYRIA: INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS, RETURNEES AND INTERNAL MOBILITY

Introduction
This report was drafted by a Country of Origin Information (COI) specialist from the Swedish Migration
Agency, Country of Origin Information, Section for Information Analysis, as referred to in the
Acknowledgements section.
The purpose of this report is to analyse the situation of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) andreturnees in Syria and to provide an overview of legal and practical issues relating to access, freedomof movement and internal mobility in Syria. This information is relevant for international protection
status determination, including refugee status and subsidiary protection, and in particular to informthe EASO country guidance development on Syria.

Methodology
This report is produced in line with the EASO COI Report Methodology (2019)2 and the EASO COI
Writing and Referencing Style Guide (2019).3
The drafting of this report was finalised on 12 December 2019. Some additional information wasadded during the finalisation of this report in response to feedback received during the quality control
process, until 12 March 2020.
For the Terms of Reference (ToR) of this report, EASO provided input to the Swedish Section for
Information Analysis, based on discussions held with COI experts and senior policy experts from EU+
countries4 within the framework of a Country Guidance development on Syria. The Section for
Information Analysis defined its ToR taking into account this input.
The ToR can be found in the annex of this report.

Sources
The report is based on information from UN reports, reports from human rights organisations,academic publications and news articles, relevant when analysing the situation of IDPs and returnees
in Syria.

Quality control
In order to ensure that the report respects the EASO COI Report Methodology, a review was carriedout by COI specialists from the countries and organisations listed as reviewers in the
Acknowledgements section.

Structure and use of the report
After a brief background chapter, the report first discusses the situation of IDPs in Syria, the underlying
factors and general patterns of displacement, and then focuses on the situation of IDPs in various
areas of Syria: rebel-held areas, and several areas in the north.
The next chapter discusses the situation of returnees, the procedures and obstacles for returning. The
chapter starts with a general background and the situation of returnees originating from areas
2 EASO, EASO Country of Origin Information (COI) Report Methodology, June 2019, url
3 EASO, Writing and Referencing Guide for EASO Country of Origin Information (COI) Reports, June 2019, url
4 All EU Member States plus Norway and Switzerland

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT SYRIA: INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS, RETURNEES AND INTERNAL MOBILITY—9

included in the reconciliation agreements, next it focuses on returnees from neighbouring countries
Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan. The chapter further discusses the return procedures within Syria, on
security clearance, on regulating one’s status in post-reconciliation areas, and the issue of military
conscription. Finally, the chapter highlights issues of arrests, detentions and violations against
returnees, and legal obstacles for returnees.
The fourth chapter highlights the situation of specific groups of IDPs and returnees: women andchildren. The final chapter focuses on internal mobility and checkpoints in government-controlled andin rebel-held areas.
The report should be read in conjunction with other recent EASO reports on Syria, in particular:••••

Syria – Socio-economic situation: Damascus City (February 2020)5
Syria – Situation of women (February 2020)6
Syria – Exercise of authority in recaptured areas (January 2020)7
Syria – Targeting of individuals (March 2020)8

5 EASO, COI Report Syria: Socioeconomic situation in Damascus city, February 2020, url
6 EASO, COI Report Syria: Situaiton of women, February 2020, url
7 EASO, COI Report, Syria: Exercise of authority in recaptured areas, January 2020, url
8 EASO, COI Report, Syria: Targeting of individuals, March 2020, url10 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT SYRIA: INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS, RETURNEES AND INTERNAL MOBILITY

Map

Map 1: Syria, © United Nations99 Syria, Map No. 4204 Rev. 3, April 2012, United Nations, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT SYRIA: INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS, RETURNEES AND INTERNAL MOBILITY— 11

1. BackgroundAs the Syrian conflict entered its ninth year, the Assad government seems to have, as some observers10
put it, emerged triumphant. Following the Russian intervention in 2015, the rebel opposition lost
major territorial holdings, as did the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (hereafter ISIL), which wasdealt its last blow in Baghouz in March 2019. Accordingly, Assad now retains control, at the time ofwriting, over two thirds of the country.11 Three areas remain outside government control; Al-Tanf,
bordering to Iraq and Jordan, controlled by US forces and allied militias12, the north-western borderarea to Turkey including Idlib, controlled by Turkish military and allied rebel forces13, and the northeastern part of the country, controlled by the Kurdish SDF allied coalition, prior to the Turkish incursion
in October 2019.14
The situation in Syria remains volatile, despite a decrease in hostilities following the Assadgovernment’s takeover of earlier rebel-held areas. The root causes that gave way for the uprisingremain in place, if not worse, according to the Syria analyst Aron Lund.15 The country remains underpressure as a result of international sanctions. Large parts of the country’s industrial base lie in ruins
and the state lacks the funds and resources to rebuild the country.16 The Syrian pound continues toplummet. The pound lost more than 8 % of its value in November 2019 alone. The fall is mainly
attributed to the economic crisis in neighbouring Lebanon, which remains Syria’s only entry point to
the global market, as well as Syria’s access to foreign capital.17
The brain drain from the country has also been severe. Poverty rates have surged and millions of
Syrians depend on humanitarian aid, as well as remittance from the equal number of millions living
abroad sending back money to relatives at home.18
The civilian population is carrying the brunt of the hostilities. As many rural areas and suburbs fell
under rebel control in 2012 these areas became the scene of intense fighting19 which prompted
millions to leave their homes in pursuit of safety, within, as well as outside, Syria’s borders. Aron Lund,in his report on the Syrian civil war (December 2018) maintained that approximately 73 % of the Syrian
population live in areas under governmental control.20 The Independent International Commission of
the Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic estimated in its report from August 2019 that the conflict has
led to approximately 13 million civilians having fled their homes, including 6.7 million refugees outside
the country21, and the 6.1 million people who continue to live in protracted displacement inside Syria,
as of August 2019.22

10 Guardian (The), Syria: Assad has decisively won his brutal battle, 30 December 2018, url; National Interest (The), Assad has

won and America must go, 17 September 2018, url; National (The), As the Syrian war nears its end, a tense new struggle ismaterializing, 13 September 2018, url
11 Foreign Policy, Assad has not won anything, 11 July 2019, url
12 EASO, Syria: Security Situation, November 2019, url, p. 14
13 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War: Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, December 2018, url, p. 23
14 Washington Institute for Near East Policy (The), Turkey’s Syria Incursion: What spurred it, and what’s next, 11 October
2019, url
15 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War: Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, December 2018, url, p. 23; Foreign Policy, Assad has
not won anything, 11 July 2019, url
16 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War: Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, December 2018, url, p. 39
17 COAR, Syria Update, 13-19 November 2019, url
18 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War: Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, December 2018, url, p. 39
19 EASO, Syria: Security Situation, November 2019, url, p. 12
20 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War: Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, December 2018, url, p. 23
21 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/40/51], 15 August 2019, url, para. 76
22 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response, IDP tracking, August 2019, url12 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT SYRIA: INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS, RETURNEES AND INTERNAL MOBILITY

The unfolding events following the Turkish invasion along the border areas in northern Syria in
October 201923 resulted into further displacement of over 200 000 civilians. The deteriorating security
and humanitarian situation spilled over into the Kurdish Region of Iraq (hereafter KRI) and prompted
19 497 persons (as of 15 January 2020), to cross the border since the operation began.24
In 2019, the Syrian government escalated the military operations in the Idlib area against rebel groups
which continued through the first two months of 2020.25 Ongoing hostilities in southern Idlib, northern
Hama and western Aleppo governorates generated over 200 000 IDP movements each in the monthsof May and December 2019.26 By December 2019, the Syrian government’s military offensive
intensified which in turn has attracted an increased military involvement from Turkey in Idlib on theside of anti-government armed groups.27 The conflict led to a humanitarian crisis in Idlib which the UN
Under-Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator described as having thepotential to become the ‘biggest humanitarian horror story of the 21st Century’.28

23 Guardian (The), Turkey unleashes airstrikes against Kurds in north-east Syria, 9 October 2019, url
24 IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Displacement Movements from Syria, Weekly update #12: 9-15 January 2020, n.d.,url
25 US CRS, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, 12 February 2020, url, p. 16
26 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements, May 2019, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements,
December 2019, url
27 USIP, Amid Humanitarian Crisis, Syrian Regime Intensifies Idlib Offensive, 4 February 2020, url
28 UNOCHA, Under-Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Mark Lowcock: Statement on
Northwest Syria, 17 February 2020, url

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2. Situation of Internally Displaced Persons(IDPs)
2.1 The underlying factors behind displacement resulting from thecivil war
The peaceful demonstrations that began in the southern city of Dar’a in 2011 turned violent after the
Syrian military laid siege to the city to quell the protestors, thereby transforming the civilian uprising
into an armed conflict. This subsequently developed into the opening of other fronts between
government forces and large numbers of armed groups, as well as terrorist organisations such as ISIL.
Hostilities and violations perpetrated against the civilian population forced millions to flee within andbeyond the borders of Syria. The offensive to retake eastern Aleppo in 2016 resulted in thedisplacement of nearly 160 000 persons, leaving the city in ruins. The diminishing areas of safety andthe targeting of civilian infrastructure, such as schools and healthcare facilities, forced many into
displacement on several occasions (so-called multiple displacement).29
The negotiations of cessation of hostilities, brokered by the United States and Russia in February and
September 201630 brought about a temporary truce, and a subsequent decline in displacement.31
Soon after the agreement, fighting broke out again in the affected areas, generating new movementsof displacement.32
The de-escalation-zones33 negotiated between Russia, Iran and Turkey in 2017, with the aim to bring
down intense hostilities, were expected to reduce violence in non-government-controlled areas of
Idlib, and Dar’a provinces as well as Eastern Ghouta and Homs enclaves. However, renewed
government offensives on the de-escalation zones led to new waves of displacement instead.34
Starting from the beginning of 2018, three out of the four de-escalation zones have been retaken by
GoS forces.35 The last remaining de-escalation zone covering Idlib governorate and parts of Latakia,
Aleppo and Hama governorates is subject to an ongoing GoS military offensive.36 In February 2020 itwas estimated that around 900 000 people, the majority women and children, have been displacedsince December 2019 by the hostilities in the Idlib area.37

29 IDMC, Syria, n.d., url
30 New York Times (The), Russia and the United States reach new agreement on Syria conflict, 9 September 2016, url
31 IDMC, Syria, n.d., url
32 BBC News, Syria War: Aleppo ceasefire ends with clashes, 22 October 2016, Syria War: Aleppo ceasefire ends with clashes,

22 October 2016, url
33 The de-escalation zone consisted of four ceasefire areas set up in Syria as a result of the Astana talks between Russia, Iranand Turkey in May 2017. The purpose of the zones was to bring an end to intensive fighting between the Syrian government
and armed rebel groups in western and southern Syria. The zones included greater Idlib area, the Rastan pocket in Homs
governorate, Eastern Ghouta (including Rural Damascus), and rebel held areas in southern Syria (parts of Dara´a and Quinetra
governorates). Three of the four areas were able to reach as ceasefire through Russian intervention, leaving only one zone,
Idlib, which remains a stronghold for hardline rebel fighters who refused to lay down their weapons when the Assadgovernment retook control of in western and southern Syria. See: Aljazeera, Syria´s `de-escalation zones´ explained, 4 July
2017, url; Middle East Institute, Moscow faces new challenges in Idlib “de-escalation zone”, 27 November 2017, url
34 IDMC, Syria, n.d., url
35 International Crisis Group, The Best of Bad Options for Syria’s Idlib, 14 March 2019, url, p. 3
36 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/43/57], 28 January 2020 [published 2 March 2020], url, pp. 3, 6-8
37 UN News, UN chief appeals for end to Syria’s ‘man-made humanitarian nightmare’, 21 February 2020, url

14 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT SYRIA: INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS, RETURNEES AND INTERNAL MOBILITY

The government offensive in Deir Ez-Zor in September 201738, against ISIL, triggered further
displacement.39 The US-backed Syrian Democratic forces (SDF) offensive on ISIL’s proclaimed capital,
Raqqa, in October 2017, caused almost the city’s entire population40 (220 000 according to IDMC), as
well as an additional 250 000 persons across the governorate, to flee their homes.41 In the beginningof 2019, large-scale operations carried out by the SDF with US-led coalition support against remaining
ISIL-controlled territory in Deir Ez-Zor governorate led to waves of displacements from these areas,‘in which tens of thousands of fleeing civilians were taken to makeshift settlements, including Al-Hol
camp, straining the already severely overstretched humanitarian resources’.42
In October 2019, Turkish forces supported by a coalition of anti-government armed groups launcheda military offensive in north-east Syria against Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces-controlled areas,
capturing the area between the cities of Tel Abyad and Ras al-Ain.43 The offensive led to thedisplacement of almost 200 000 persons.44

2.2 General patterns of displacement
According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (hereafter
UNOCHA), some 6.1 million people continue to live in protracted displacement inside Syria.45 The
majority of the IDPs, around 3.5 million, are located in areas controlled by the Government of Syria.
Approximately 30 % of the IDP population, around 1.88 million, are located in north-west Syria, while
another 460 000 IDPs are living in the Kurdish-controlled areas (prior to the Turkish operation).46
Subsequent shifts in the security situation generate repeated, multiple, displacements, as IDPs leave
their place of displacement to return home, only to flee again when hostilities resume, or keep moving
onwards as hostilities unfold.47 In 2018, around 1.6 million population movements were recorded,
including multiple displacements for many families.48 The number of IDP movements recorded
between January and November 2019 has reached around 1.5 million.
According to UNOCHA’s update (25 February 2020) regarding IDP movement, Idlib province recorded
the largest number of IDP movements (total 1 579 032 individuals). This is followed by Aleppo (total
224 836 individuals), Hama (total 194 075 individuals) and Deir Ez-Zor (total 105 956 individuals).49
IDPs face particular hardship, including restriction in freedom of movement through encampment
policies, or due to perceived affiliation to terrorist groups, for example ISIL.50 Humanitarian accessremains a challenge in many parts of Syria, due to ongoing hostilities, presence of explosive remnants,
interference in humanitarian activities and administration regulations imposed by the Syrian

38 Rudaw, Updated: US-backed SDF launches offensive in Syria’s Deir ez-Zor, 9 September 2017, url
39 REACH Initiative, Syria- Deir ez Zor Offensive: Overview of displacement patterns, dynamics and intentions as conflict

escalates, 28 September 2017, url
40 Aljazeera, What will happen to post-ISIL Raqqa?, 17 October 2017, url
41 IDMC, Syria, n.d., url
42 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 15 August 2019,url, Summary
43 AI, Human rights in the Middle East and North Africa: Review of 2019; Syria, 18 February 2020, url
44 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/43/57], 28 January 2020 [published 2 March 2020], url, p. 4
45 The lastest UNOCHA figures available on the IDP stock are as of July 2019. UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response, Syrian Arab
Republic, IDP Movements, as of January 2020, last update: 25 February 2020, url
46 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response plan, Monitoring Report, January-May 2019, September 2019, url, pp. 9-10
47 IDMC, Syria, n.d., url
48 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response plan, Monitoring Report, January-May 2019, September 2019, url, p. 5
49 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response, Syrian Arab Republic, IDP Movements, as of January 2020, last update: 25 February
2020, url
50 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response plan, Monitoring Report, January-May 2019, September 2019, url, p. 8

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government and also non-state actors, currently in control of areas outside the domain of the Syrian
authorities, for example northern Syria.51

2.3 Internally displaced persons in former rebel-held areas
The humanitarian situation in areas retaken by the government remains challenging. One suchchallenge is the ability of humanitarian organisations to provide assistance to those affected by thehostilities in these areas. The Syrian government has imposed restrictions regarding the work ofhumanitarian organisations. The government restricted access to UN humanitarian aid agencies
across Syria52, granted selective approval of humanitarian projects, and required humanitarian actors
to partner with security-vetted local actors. These obstacles hamper humanitarian assistance fromreaching the neediest segments of the population, one of which is composed of IDPs. In addition,
humanitarian organisations have very limited leverage to negotiate with the government.53
UNICEF’s situation report, covering the period January - August 2019, maintained that the situation
remained dire in southern Syria, where over 970 000 persons, located in Sweida, Dar’a and Quneitra
provinces were reportedly in need of humanitarian assistance. These areas suffer from high densityof displacement and return where local communities are overburdened, suffering from poor service
conditions.54

2.4 Internally displaced in northern Syria
2.4.1 North-west Syria-Idlib province
In north-western Syria the security situation continues to deteriorate as civilians face intense violence
resulting from continuous ground shelling and airstrikes.55
Around three million civilians are reportedly trapped in Syria’s remaining opposition stronghold of
Idlib.56 Almost half of that population were previously displaced from earlier rebel-held areas57,
reclaimed by the Syrian government in past years, such as Aleppo and Ghouta.58 According to areport59 from September 2019 published by Refugees International on the situation in Idlib, two thirdsof the population of Idlib is in need of humanitarian assistance.60
In February 2019, Syria and Russia announced a campaign to reclaim the country´s last opposition
stronghold in Idlib, as well as securing the major routes (the M4 and M5) linking Damascus to Aleppo
and Latakia through Idlib.61 Hostilities escalated in April 2019 between the Syrian armed forces andopposition armed groups62, resulting in the displacement of nearly 600 000 persons. Large numbersof the displaced are sheltered in the northern districts of Idlib governorate, along the Turkish border,
which remains closed.63 Many of the displaced are currently residing in host communities that are

51 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response plan, Monitoring Report, January-May 2019, September 2019, url, p. 11
52 AI, Human rights in the Middle East and North Africa: Review of 2019; Syria, 18 February 2020, url
53 HRW, Rigging the System: Government Policies Co-Opt Aid and Reconstruction Funding in Syria, 28 June 2019, url
54 UNICEF, Whole of Syria Humanitarian Results, August 2019, url
55 UN News, Hundreds of thousands of civilians at risk in Syria amid ongoing violence in northeast and northwest, 8 November

2019, url
56 New Humanitarian (The), Civilians see no future in Idlib as Syrian forces tighten grip, 6 January 2020, url
57 Refugees International, Losing Their Last Refuge, September 2019, url, p. 4
58 Guardian (The), Three million caught in crossfire as Assad vows to capture every inch of Syria, 24 August 2019, url
59 Refugees International, Losing Their Last Refuge, September 2019, url, p. 4
60 Refugees International, Losing Their Last Refuge, September 2019, url, p. 4
61 Refugees International, Losing Their Last Refuge, September 2019, url, p. 862 DW, Syria Idlib caught between hell and a hard place, 30 July 2019, url
63 UNICEF, Whole of Syria Humanitarian Results, August 2019, url

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dependent on humanitarian assistance for their most basic needs. Some of the displaced have foundtemporary shelter in unfinished buildings or collective sites, such as schools and mosques.64
Ongoing hostilities in southern Idlib, northern Hama and western Aleppo governorates generated over
200 000 IDP movements each in the months of May and December 2019.65 In February 2020, it wasestimated that around 900 000 people, the majority women and children, have been displaced since
December 2019 by the hostilities in the Idlib area.66
Tens of makeshift encampments are spread along the Idlib countryside, out of reach for relief
organisations, forcing the displaced population to fend for themselves. Living conditions arereportedly harsh and the absence of humanitarian relief is proving unsustainable for the displaced
population.67 Settlements for IDPs were reportedly being hit by attacks, resulting in civilian injuries,
deaths and further displacement. Insufficient camps lead IDPs to sleep outside in freezing
temperatures, with children dying because of the cold.68
Entire towns and villages have been reportedly razed to the ground69 and emptied of communities.70
Some humanitarian actors suspended their operations in southern Idlib due to insecurity.71
Recent influx to host communities puts immense pressure on existing water supplies, and the accessto sanitation and hygiene facilities.72 UNOCHA reported in its situation report on north-west Syria, asof 15 January 2020, a continued need to increase water supplies and WASH-services (i.e. water,
sanitation and hygiene services) in order to prevent hygiene-related diseases.73
Medical facilities continue to be targeted as a result of the military escalation. The United Nations
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reported that 61 medical facilities weredamaged since hostilities broke out in April 2019. Some of the facilities were reportedly hit on multiple
occasions.74 In a press release by Amnesty International (AI) on 17 May 2019, the organisation statedthat the Syrian government, aided by Russia, was carrying out systematic and deliberate attacks on
hospitals and medical facilities. AI further added that staff from four hospitals in Idlib and Hama weretargeted despite sharing their coordinates with the Syrian and Russian governments.75
The concentration of IDPs has triggered tensions between different groups, who are more or lessconfined within the boundaries of Idlib province, with nowhere to go. Communal tensions between
old and new groups of IDPs grow as they compete over the limited resources made available to them.
Similar resentment is growing amongst the local residents against the IDP population. In addition, the
IDP population has caused profound change to the social fabric of the local communities in Idlib
province.76
In March 2020, a ceasefire brokered by Russia and Turkey was agreed in the Idlib area, whereby asecurity corridor stretching 6 kilometres to the north and 6 kilometres to the south of the M4 highway

64 Refugees International, Losing Their Last Refuge, September 2019, url, pp. 10-11
65 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements, May 2019, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements,

December 2019, url
66 UN News, UN chief appeals for end to Syria’s ‘man-made humanitarian nightmare’, 21 February 2020, url
67 SOHR, Tens of informal camps in Idlib countryside are outside the scope of relief organization, 18 November 2019, url
68 UNOCHA, Under-Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Mark Lowcock: Statement on
Northwest Syria, 17 February 2020, url
69 UNOCHA, Growing Humanitarian Concerns in North-west, 23 December 2019, url, p. 1
70 International Crisis Group, The Eleventh Hour for Idlib, Syria’s Last Rebel Bastion, 6 February 2020, url, p. 1
71 UNOCHA, Growing Humanitarian Concerns in North-west, 23 December 2019, url, p. 2
72 Refugees International, Losing Their Last Refuge, September 2019, url, p. 12
73 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Recent Developments in Northwest Syria: Situation Report No. 6-as of 15 January 2020,
url, pp. 5-6
74 UN News, Hundreds of thousands of civilians at risk in Syria amid ongoing violence in northeast and northwest, 8 November
2019, url
75 AI, Syria: at least 15 hospitals targeted in Idlib and Hama since beginning of May, 17 May 2019, url
76 Refugees International, Losing Their Last Refuge, September 2019, url, p. 16

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT SYRIA: INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS, RETURNEES AND INTERNAL MOBILITY— 17

was established, where joint Russian and Turkish patrols would be carried out.77 The agreement does
not have any provisions on a potential safe zone for IDPs.78

2.4.2 North-east Syria
Over two million live in this region, where 1.3 million are reportedly in need of humanitarianassistance. These include 700 000 internally displaced, prior to the Turkish offensive, of which 130 000
are living in 12 camps, or informal settlements. The overall majority of the displaced are living in hostcommunities and shelters in al-Hasakah, Raqqa and Deir Ez-Zor province.79
The situation of IDPs following the Turkish offensive
The Turkish Operation Peace Spring in north-east Syria on 9 October 201980 triggered a new wave ofdisplacement, whereby over 200 000 persons fled their homes. As of 12 November 2019, 74 381
persons remain in displacement.81
Despite various ceasefires brokered in conjunction to the Turkish offensive, sporadic fighting
continues in various areas. However, recent hostilities do not appear to have triggered new flows of
IDPs. Nevertheless, the humanitarian situation following the offensive is dire, and many communities
are struggling to provide services for the IDPs, in terms of food items, as well as non-food items,
including fuel. Health facilities are under pressure, due to lack of staff and resource shortages. The cityof al-Hasakah is particularly affected, and the local authorities have reported that it cannot absorb
more numbers of IDPs.82
The Turkish operation caused international humanitarian actors to evacuate.83 Only a few
international relief workers have returned. UNHCR continues to work from Qamishli, providing
emergency items and community-based protection in camps, collective shelters and hostcommunities.84 Local relief workers working for international humanitarian organisation have fled
because they are concerned that they may be targeted as a result of the return of the Syrian
government to the region. Local organisations and civil society groups have stepped up their efforts
to provide relief. However, their resources are limited.85
The Kurdish self-administration launched a number of internet-based campaigns for the boycott ofTurkish goods, in retaliation for the Turkish incursion. As a result, market conditions have worsened.
The north-east depends heavily on Turkish goods, which are not only cheaper than commodities
produced in government-controlled areas, but also higher in quality. The closure of the bordercrossings of Semalka (linking Syria with the Kurdish Region in Iraq) and the al-Aoun in Menbij (linking
SDF-held territories to north-west Syria), two vital consumer lifelines, are likely to cause serious foodshortages (such as flour), but also cause further increase in prices.86

77 Aljazeera, Turkey says Idlib ceasefire details largely agreed on with Russia, 12 March 2020, url
78 BBC, Syria war: Idlib ceasefire between Russia and Turkey begins, 6 March 2020, url
79 Refugees International, Displacement and Despair: The Turkish invasion of northeast Syria, 12 November 2019, url
80 On 9 October 2019, Turkey launched an offensive, code-named Operation Peace Spring, into northeast Syria aimed topush back the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) from the border area, and also to secure a “safe zone” along the Syrian borderwhere up to two million Syrian refugees, residing in Turkey, can be returned (BBC News, Turkey-Syria offensive. Erdoganvows to press on with ‘safe zone’, 16 October 2019, url. The SDF are led by the Kurdish People´s Protection Units (YPG),
which Turkey considers as a terrorist organisation. CNN, Turkey launches military offensive in Syria, days after Trump
announced pullback of US troops, 10 October 2019, url
81 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: North east Syria displacement, 12 November 2019, url
82 Refugees International, Displacement and Despair: The Turkish invasion of northeast Syria, 12 November 2019, url
83 Refugees International, Displacement and Despair: The Turkish invasion of northeast Syria, 12 November 2019, url
84 UNHCR, Syria Situation Report for the North East Syria Humanitarian Emergency, 16 October 2019, url, p. 1
85 Refugees International, Displacement and Despair: The Turkish invasion of northeast Syria, 12 November 2019, url
86 COAR, Syria Update, 13-19 November 2019, url

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Syrian Refugees in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq
The Turkish Operation Peace Spring sparked a mass exodus of civilians towards the KRI. Approximately
19 500 refugees have as of mid-January 2020, arrived in the KRI.87 The overall majority of the Syrian
refugees are hosted in three major camps within Dohuk province: Domiz, Bardash and Gawilan.88 The
majority of the refugees come from the provinces of al-Hasakah (58 %), Aleppo (32 %) and Raqqa(10 %). Those fleeing from al-Hasakah province mainly originate from al-Hasakah centre (13 %) andQamishli centre (17 %), whilst those fleeing from Aleppo province mainly originate from Ain al-Arab(Kobani) (23 %).89
Refugees arriving to the KRI reported to have been prevented by the SDF from leaving Syria, thereby
forcing them to seek illegal means by paying smugglers, around USD 50090 to 70091, to cross into theKRI.92
Refugees arriving to KRI consist of a large number of young men who fear conscription into the SDF,
or alternatively the Syrian Arab Army (SAA). This comes amid the recent agreement reached between
the SDF and the Syrian government, allowing the Syrian army access to the Kurdish territories, inexchange for protection from the Turkish forces.93 Other refugees fear retribution and abuse by
Turkish-backed militias, similar to those committed by the same forces in Afrin in 2018.94
Although the flow of refugees entering the KRI has abated, Syrian refugees continue to trickle into
Iraq in search of a safe haven.95 Kurdish officials have expressed concerns that the numbers of arrivals
from Syria could reach 250 000.96

87 IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Displacement Movements from Syria, Weekly update #12: 9-15 January 2020, n.d.,url
88 IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Displacement Movements from Syria, Weekly update #12: 9-15 January 2020, n.d.,url
89 IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Displacement Movements from Syria, Weekly update #12: 9-15 January 2020, n.d.,url
90 Reuters, Displaced by war, Kurdish families stuck at Syria-Iraq border point, 21 October 2019, url
91 Middle East Eye, Turned away at the Iraqi border, displaced Syrians resort to smugglers, 21 October 2019, url
92 Reuters, Displaced by war, Kurdish families stuck at Syria-Iraq border point, 21 October 2019, url
93 Middle East Eye, Turned away at the Iraqi border, displaced Syrians resort to smugglers, 21 October 2019, url
94 Rudaw, Syrian Refugees resort to smugglers to enter Kurdistan Region of Iraq, 16 October 2019, url
95 Drafter’s comment, see also IOM’s Daily update of the Data Tracking Matrix regarding Displacement Movements from
Syria, url; Refugees International, Displacement and Despair: The Turkish Invasion of Northeast Syria, 12 November 2019,url
96 Refugees International, Displacement and Despair: The Turkish invasion of northeast Syria, 12 November 2019, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT SYRIA: INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS, RETURNEES AND INTERNAL MOBILITY— 19

3. Situation of returnees
3.1 Background
The Syrian civil war has gradually fragmented the country, politically, socially and geographically.
Given the Syrian forces’ territorial gains over the past years, the government is trying to foster theimage of stability97 and is now calling on refugees to return.98 This contravenes the Syrian
government´s earlier approach on return, which perceived the mass exodus as a means of gaining amore homogenous society and ensuring subservience from the civilian population.99 Members of the
Syrian armed forces previously threatened refugees and IDPs contemplating return to their areas oforigin.100
UNOCHA’s Humanitarian response reported over 460 000 spontaneous IDP returns, between January
and November 2019.101 The same source recorded the highest number of IDP spontaneous return, as
of November 2019, to the province of Dar’a (total 87 274 individuals), the majority of which (total
85 807 individuals) were previously displaced within the province. The second highest number of
spontaneous returns is recorded to Idlib province (total 85 807 individuals). Other provinces recording
high numbers of return are reported to Deir Ez-Zor (total 58 570 individuals), followed by Aleppo (total
52 955 individuals), al-Hasakah (total 41 783 individuals) and Rural Damascus (total 41 267
individuals).102
According to authors Robin Yassin-Kassab and Leila al-Shami, cited in Clingendael, Netherlands
Institute of International Relations, the Syrian government’s policy of besiegement over the past years
is also a significant driver that contributed to the levels of displacement, through the evacuation ofrebel armed groups. In some areas, government sieges and bombardment led to high death rates,
while in other areas the sieges resulted in large numbers of displacement.103 According to the
Clingendael Institute, the policy benefited the government by ‘neutralising’ any perceived dissent informer opposition strongholds. Similar strategic considerations are being applied to the government’s
return policy in retaken areas that fall under the so-called ‘reconciliation agreements’ (see 3.2.1), in
which the government has made few active efforts to return refugees or IDPs to their places oforigin.104
Notwithstanding the Assad government’s earlier position on return, the matter is controversial as it iscomplex, and has according to the Syrian Association for Citizen’s Dignity (SACD) frequently received
less attention in the political forums concerning the conflict in Syria, ranging from the UN-sponsored
Geneva talks to the Astana talks.105 The government’s new approach to return has subsequently

97 Clingendael, Four Ways in Which the Syrian Regime Controls Refugee Return, September 2018, url, p. 2
98 NBC News, Syrian Government calls on refugees to return home, 4 July 2018, url
99 Clingendael, Four Ways in Which the Syrian Regime Controls Refugee Return, September 2018, url, p. 2

‫الالجئي الر ن‬‫ن‬
100 DW, ‫اغبي بالعودة‬‫ أحد أبرز ضباط األسد يهدد‬:"‫"شبيغل‬, [Shabighil: Assads high ranking officer threatens refugees wanting
to return], 11 September 2017, url; Clingendael, Four Ways in Which the Syrian Regime controls refugee return, September
2018, url, p. 3
101 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Return, as of November 2019, update: 23
December 2019, url
102 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Return, as of November 2019, update: 23
December 2019, url
103 Clingendael, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Four Ways in Which the Syrian Regime Controls Refugee
Return, September 2018, url, p. 3
104 Clingendael, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Four Ways in Which the Syrian Regime Controls Refugee
Return, September 2018, url, pp. 3-4
105 SACD, Between Hammer and Anvil: Motives and Experiences of Syrians Forced to Return to Assad-held Areas, n.d.
[October 2019], url, p. 3

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brought the issue to the forefront. Neighbouring countries such as Lebanon106 and Turkey107 have also
increased pressure on Syrian refugees to return. Economic and political challenges facing bothcountries are additional push factors to return refugees to Syria108 (see sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2). The
Turkish military offensive in October 2019, Operation Peace Spring109, was partly aimed to establish asafe zone in which up to two million Syrian refugees in Turkey could be returned.110 Noteworthy, themajority of Turkey’s 3.6 million Syrian refugees are Sunni Arabs, originating from areas outside theKurdish-dominated areas of the north-east. A population movement of this magnitude is feared tohave an altering effect on the demographic balance in the area.111
Some of the challenges for displaced persons seeking to return include: lack of state guarantees, toboth individuals and communities; lack of adequate procedural information; as well as imposed
restrictions from the Syrian government on international agencies carrying out data collection andmonitoring of returnees.112
A study conducted by SACD113 documenting the security situation of returnees and others living inareas covered by the ‘reconciliation agreements’ concluded that nearly 60 % of the interviewees
reported that they were considering leaving ‘the regime-held areas they are currently in’. Most of theinterviewees attributed their motives to leave to lack of decent livelihood, as well as lack of security,
fear of arrest and the risk of conscription.114
The following two sections examine the situation of returnees to areas under the so-called
reconciliation agreements and the return of Syrian refugees from neighbouring countries, that is,
Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey.

3.2 The situation of returnees from areas included in thereconciliation agreements
3.2.1 The reconciliation agreements - an overview
The popular uprising that broke out in 2011 soon morphed into an armed conflict which left the Syrian
government in control of 25 % of Syrian territory in 2015.115 At the time, the government’s territorial
losses had included Idlib, eastern Homs, and Dar´a in south, Aleppo, Deir Ez-Zor116, as well as the vital
south-western suburbs of Damascus.117

106 AP, In Lebanon, Syrian refugees face new pressure to go home, 20 June 2019, url; Foreign Policy, Time is running out for

Syrians in Lebanon, 14 August 2019, url
107 BBC News, Turkey-Syria offensive: Erdogan vows to press with `safe zone´ plan, 16 October 2019, url
108 AP, In Lebanon, Syrian refugees face new pressure to go home, 20 June 2019, url; Foreign Policy, Time is running out for
Syrians in Lebanon, 14 August 2019, url; BBC News, Turkey-Syria offensive: Erdogan vows to press with `safe zone´ plan, 16
October 2019, url
109 New Arab (The), What is next after Operation Peace Spring?, 15 January 2020, url
110 Reuters, Turkey’s plan to settle refugees in northeast Syria alarms allies, 8 October 2019, url
111 Aljazeera, Full text of Turkey, Russia agreement on northeast Syria, 22 October 2019, url; New Arab (The), What is next
after Operation Peace Spring?, 15 January 2020, url
112 EIP, Refugees Return in Syria: Dangers , Security Risks and Information Scarcity, July 2019, url, p. 4
113 The study is based on research conducted by the Syrian Association for Citizen’s Dignity (SACD) based on testimonies frompeople who have returned to government-held areas and those who remained in formerly opposition controlled areas after
they were retaken by Syrian government forces. SACD, Vengeance, Repression and Fear: Reality behind Assad´s promise todisplaced people, n.d. [October 2019], url
114 SACD, Vengeance, Repression and Fear: Reality behind Assad´s promise to displaced people, n.d. [October 2019], url, pp.
32-33
115 Time, These 5 facts explain Bashar Assad´s hold in Syria, 22 September 2015, url
116 Guardian (The), String of losses in Syria leaves Assad regime increasingly precarious, June 2015, url
117 Reuters, Syrian rebels fight to break blockade of Damascus suburbs, 24 September 2013, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT SYRIA: INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS, RETURNEES AND INTERNAL MOBILITY— 21

Despite ongoing military escalations and sieges, local negotiations were brokered between the Syrian
government and opposition representatives since the early stages of the conflict. Some of the talks
led to local ceasefires, but were often broken whenever one of the sides felt strong enough to launch
an offensive.118 The first of these ceasefires were reached in Braze119, northern Damascus120, shortly
followed by a ceasefire in the Old City of Homs in February 2014.121 The Russian intervention in 2015,
was the game changer that tilted the military balance in favour of the Assad government, hence,bringing about significant changes in negotiations dynamics that led to conclusive local agreements.
These agreements came to be known as Reconciliation Agreements.122 The evacuation of the rebelheld community of Daraya in August 2016, was the first reconciliation agreement used by the Syrian
government to recapture rebel-held territories.123 In September 2015, the Russian air force alongside
Syrian and Iranian-backed forces on the ground, started to launch attacks on rebel-held areas acrossthe country. In July 2016, government forces encircled the rebel-held eastern part of Aleppo.124 Aftera protracted siege on the city, rebel forces negotiated a deal - brokered by Russia and Turkey - in
December 2016125, agreeing to surrender and subsequently evacuate alongside civilians to rebelcontrolled areas in Idlib province.126 Similar agreements were reached as rebel-held areas fell, often
after sieges that forced rebels to surrender.127 A common characteristic for the areas brokered
through reconciliation agreements is that they all were besieged at some point in time during theconflict, some for years, before an agreement was eventually reached. The situation for the besieged
areas vary from one place to another, and as well in duration.128 The primary aim of the agreements
is to subsume both the population and territories into the state, according to the PhD researcher
Marika Sosnowski, at the University of Melbourne.129 Professor Raymond Hinnesbusch and Research
Fellow Omar Imady, at the Centre for Syrian Studies, University of St Andrew, divide the reconciliationagreements into four categories:
1. Unbalanced agreements, which led to the displacement of the entire population. This was thecase in Zabadani, Daraya and Qalamoun.
2. Submissive agreements, which are less punitive, requiring opposition fighters and activists tosubmit in return for lifting the sieges and restoring services. This was implemented in the casesof Qudsaya, al-Tal, Madaya and al-Hama (Rural Damascus), as well as the suburbs of eastern
Damascus, among others. In these areas opposition fighters were incorporated into the local
militias. Members of the reconciliation delegations became local leaders with temporary
authority.
3. Balanced agreements, where rebels were allowed to maintain control of their areas provided
they handed over heavy weaponry, and who subsequently seized all aggression against the
government forces. In return, the siege was lifted and the displaced were allowed to return.
The Barzeh and Jiroud ceasefires in 2014 fall under this category, as well as Jiroud al-Sananayn
in Dar´a.
4. The fourth category of reconciliations were those reached through bargaining, where
opposition groups held control over crucial resources for the government, like Wadi Barada
that controlled vital water sources, on which the capital Damascus relied for its supply of
drinking water. In the town of Masha, rebels held control over gas pipelines, which supplied
118 Adleh, F., Favier, A., Local Reconciliation Agreements, June 2017, url, p. 2
119 Reuters, Damascus ceasefire bring respite but no end to conflict, 14 March 2014, url
120 Reuters, Damascus ceasefire bring respite but no end to conflict, 14 March 2014, url
121 Middle East Eye, Besiege, bombard, retake: Reconciliation agreements in Syria, 28 March 2018, url
122 Adleh, F., Favier, A., Local Reconciliation Agreements, June 2017, url, p. 2
123 Middle East Eye, Besiege, bombard, retake: Reconciliation agreements in Syria, 28 March 2018, url,
124 EASO, Syria: Security Situation, November 2019, url, p. 13
125 New Yorker (The), The battle for Aleppo, Syria’s Stalingrad, ends, 13 December 2016, url
126 BBC News, Aleppo Syria Battle: Evacuation of rebel-held east, 15 December 2016, url
127 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War: Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, December 2018, url, p. 22
128 EASO, Syria: Exercise of authority in recaptured areas, January 2020, url, p. 13
129 Middle East Eye, Besiege, bombard, retake: Reconciliation agreements in Syria, 28 March 2018, url

22 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT SYRIA: INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS, RETURNEES AND INTERNAL MOBILITY

power plants in Damascus. The thermal power plant in Aleppo was the bargaining chip
between the regime and the rebels during the siege.130
More information on the reconciliation agreements in the reclaimed areas can be found in the EASO
COI report Syria: Exercise of authority in recaptured areas (January 2020).131

3.2.2 The impact of the reconciliation agreements on return
The situation in the areas under the reconciliation agreements is described in the EASO COI report
Syria: Exercise of authority in recaptured areas (January 2020), drafted by the Norwegian COI unit
Landinfo.132
The areas under the reconciliation agreements, according to the report, are described as follows:
Rural Damascus governorate/Eastern Ghouta
These suburbs cover large areas surrounding Damascus. Most of the areas that were taken by
opposition groups were reclaimed in 2018. Many of these areas were severely pressured during the
SAA’s siege.133
The siege in Daraya went on for long time, before it was reclaimed in 2016. The town was almost
entirely depopulated. Many were displaced to neighbouring Muadamiya or Damascus. Others were
evacuated to Idlib. Reportedly, segments were allowed to return in the summer of 2018.134
Madaya and Zabadani are two affected suburbs that reached an agreement with the Syrian
government. The agreement was part of a so-called four-town-agreement that was reached with thetowns of Zabadani and Madaya on the one part, and the towns of Fu’a and Kafraya, in Idlib-province
on the other part.135 According to one source mentioned in the EASO report on the exercise of
authority in recaptured areas, drafted by Landinfo, the deal was brokered through Qatari and Iranian
mediation, in 2017. Another source in the same report maintains that the deal was signed by Ahrar
al-Sham, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and Hezbollah. A large segment of the population of Zabadani
was displaced to Madaya, while others fled to Lebanon. As of November 2018, according to the headof Zabadani local council, around 4 500 families had returned since. Reportedly, the poor conditions
in Lebanon have prompted many to return.136
Duma, another contested area in Eastern Ghouta was besieged for a number of years before anagreement could be reached, in April 2018, after the government opened humanitarian corridors, by
the SAA and the Russian forces, allowing civilians to leave. The area also suffered heavy bombardment
by the governmental forces. The destruction is widespread, but access has improved. Residents andvisitors have to acquire permission from the authorities to enter or leave the suburb.137
Fleeing civilians were registered and screened by the authorities before they were reverted to centres,
established for displaced from Eastern Ghouta.138 The European Institute for Peace (EIP) stated in its
report on refugee return to Syria that IDP shelters operated as detention centres.139 The Middle East
Institute reported that the shelters are spread in number of locations across Eastern Ghouta, such as

130 Hinnebusch, R., Imady, O., University of St. Andrew, Centre for Syrian Studies, Syria’s Reconciliation Agreements, 2017,

url, pp. 7-11
131 EASO, Syria: Exercise of authority in recaptured areas, January 2020, url
132 EASO, Syria: Exercise of authority in recaptured areas, January 2020, url
133 EASO, Syria: Exercise of authority in recaptured areas, January 2020, url, p. 22
134 EASO, Syria: Exercise of authority in recaptured areas, January 2020, url, pp. 22-23
135 EASO, Syria: Exercise of authority in recaptured areas, January 2020, url, p. 25
136 EASO, Syria: Exercise of authority in recaptured areas, January 2020, url, pp. 26-27
137 EASO, Syria: Exercise of authority in recaptured areas, January 2020, url, p. 28
138 EASO, Syria: Exercise of authority in recaptured areas, January 2020, url, p. 28
139 EIP, Refugees Return in Syria: Dangers , Security Risks and Information Scarcity, July 2019, url, p. 28

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT SYRIA: INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS, RETURNEES AND INTERNAL MOBILITY— 23

al-Doier, al-Nashabia, Adra Electricity Center, Adra School and al-Horjaleh (which was later closed). As
of January 2019, 40 000 persons were reportedly residing in the shelters.140
Another area that suffered destruction is the suburb of Yarmouk. The suburb, home to 160 000
UNRWA-registered Palestinian refugees, was the scene of heavy fighting in 2012, forcing 140 000
Palestinians and thousands of Syrians to flee. Larger parts of the Yarmouk refugee camp fell under ISIL
control in 2015, which forced more Palestinians to flee to neighbouring areas. The suburb was
subsequently reclaimed by the Syrian forces in the spring of 2018. Most of Yarmouk suburb stands inruins today. Between 40 to 60 % of the suburb has been destroyed. According to UNRWA sources
Landinfo spoke to in the spring of 2019, around 4 000 Palestinians remained in Yarmouk. Persons
wishing access to the area have to acquire permission from the authorities to visit the premises.
Visitors are also required to leave their identification cards at the check points when entering, and to
retrieve them when leaving.141
Dar´a governorate
Dar´a city had been under opposition control for several years before the SAA launched an offensiveon the city in June 2018, hence submitting the city to government control. Russian intervention playeda pivotal role in the negotiations, which resulted in the evacuation of 15 000 individuals to Idlib,
including 5 000 opposition fighters.142 International Crisis Group stated in its report-Lessons from the
Syrian State’s return to the south- that the Syrian government’s retake of the south was faster andless destructive. One of the contributing factors to that is attributed to rebel commanders who opted
to accept the Russian-mediated surrender deals. The agreement underlined the return of stateauthority to previously rebel-held areas, and by doing so the rebels would be allowed to keep theirlight weapons. The rebels were also to undergo a vetting process that would take them off the security
agencies’ wanted lists.143
The EASO report on the exercise of authority in recaptured areas, drafted by Landinfo, also stated that
armed rebels were still in control of parts of the city, as of May 2019. Regular Syrian forces and police
are as a result of the reconciliation agreements not allowed to enter areas which were controlled byarmed opposition groups.144 Attacks continue to take place even after the government gain control ofcities and the province. Mass arrests of previous members of the negotiations’ delegations have also
been reported.145
Aleppo governorate
The siege on eastern Aleppo, between July and December 2016, resulted in a Russian brokered
agreement with the Ahrar al-Sham, resulting in the evacuation of the fighters and their families.146 The
offensive has left the neighbourhood in ruins. Reconstruction is limited and the overall majority of the
population of eastern Aleppo remain displaced in other parts of Aleppo.147
Homs governorate
The most affected areas within Homs city are al-Wa´ir and Baba Amr. Both areas were heavily targetedby fighting during the conflict, leaving behind heavy devastation. Baba Amr is one of the first areas
where the opposition gained control, and where the destruction, as result, has been the hardest.148
140 Middle East Institute/Etana Syria, Forgotten Lives: Life under regime rule in former opposition-held East Ghouta, May

2019, url, p. 8
141 EASO, Syria: Exercise of authority in recaptured areas, January 2020, url, pp. 32-33
142 EASO, Syria: Exercise of authority in recaptured areas, January 2020, url, p. 34
143 International Crisis Group, Lessons from the Syrian State’s return to the south, 25 February 2019, url, p. i
144 EASO, Syria: Exercise of authority in recaptured areas, January 2020, url, p. 35
145 EASO, Syria: Exercise of authority in recaptured areas, January 2020, url, p. 35
146 AI, We leave or we die, 2017, url, pp. 8-9
147 EASO, Syria: Exercise of authority in recaptured areas, January 2020, url, p. 38
148 EASO, Syria: Exercise of authority in recaptured areas, January 2020, url, p. 39

24 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT SYRIA: INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS, RETURNEES AND INTERNAL MOBILITY

The area did not undergo an agreement, but instead, rebel forces were asked to withdraw toneighbouring rebel-held areas, allowing the Syrian government to reclaim the territory. Despitedevastation, civilians are reported to have returned, in smaller numbers.149
Al-Wa´ir had undergone several agreements (2014, 2015 and 2016) before a conclusive ceasefire wasreached. In February 2017, Syrian forces launched a new offensive, which resulted in an agreement
between local representatives and Russian officers. The agreement resulted in the evacuation of
20 000 civilians to Idlib province150, including 3 700 opposition fighters. Some of the evacuees havereportedly returned, totalling 1 150 individuals. Further reports mentioned in Landinfo´s reportmaintain that 600 individuals returned from Jarablus shortly after evacuation, due to the hard living
conditions there. Around 45 000 of al-Wa´ir’s 100 000 inhabitants are reported to be living in thetown.151

3.3 Return of Syrian refugees
The Syrian conflict has created one of the world´s largest humanitarian crises.152 UNHCR has registereda total 5 556 732 Syrian refugees, as of 9 January 2020, who fled to neighbouring countries, which
includes Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt.153
Most refugees in neighbouring countries do not live in camp settings, but are located in urban settings
across their countries of refuge, relying on cash-based transfers for their livelihood.154
The Syrian government’s consolidated control over larger areas of Syrian territory in recent years has
also caused pressure in neighbouring countries to return refugees.155 Neighbouring countries arefacing increased domestic pressure for the refugees to return.156
The international community remains divided on how to tackle the refugee issue, particularly as thefighting decreases. Western countries, including the United States, remain reluctant to therepatriation of refugees, while Russia and Iran are calling for return of refugees.157
This section examines the situation of Syrian refugees in neighbouring Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan,
and the underlying dynamics in the designated countries, leading to the return of refugees to Syria.

3.3.1 Lebanon
The Syrian refugee crises caused major challenges for the Lebanese government.158 The country hosts
approximately 1.5 million Syrians159, of which 914 648 are registered with UNHCR.160 The refugee
situation in Lebanon has had significant implications on the country’s economic and social stability. In
addition, foreign aid to Lebanon continues to drop. In 2018, 18 to 22 % of the required aid wasreceived, subsequently forcing agencies like UNHCR to limit its support to the most vulnerable
families.161

149 EASO, Syria: Exercise of authority in recaptured areas, January 2020, url, p. 40
150 AI, We leave or we die, 2017, url, p. 48
151 EASO, Syria: Exercise of authority in recaptured areas, January 2020, url, p. 39
152 Mercy Corps, Quick Facts: What we need to know about the Syrian crisis, n.d., url
153 UNHCR, Operational Portal, Syria Regional Refugee Response, update 9 January 2020, url
154 IPS, Syrian crisis enters ninth year with 11 million refugees oversee & 6 million home, 13 March 2019, url
155 EIP, Refugees Return in Syria: Dangers , Security Risks and Information Scarcity, July 2019, url, p. 1
156 Guardian (The), Syria’s neighbours press for help to return refugees, April 2019, url
157 Middle East Institute, International politics of Syrian refugee return: The case of Lebanon, 20 August 2019, url
158 Middle East Institute, International politics of Syrian refugee return: The case of Lebanon, 20 August 2019, url
159 New Humanitarian (The), Syrian deportations leave behind hardship, fear in Lebanon, 17 September 2019, url
160 UNHCR, Operational Portal, Syria Regional Refugee Response, Lebanon, updated 31 December 2019, url
161 Middle East Institute, International politics of Syrian refugee return: The case of Lebanon, 20 August 2019, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT SYRIA: INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS, RETURNEES AND INTERNAL MOBILITY— 25

The refugee issue has further divided the country domestically, where pro-Assad coalitions (Hezbollah,
and the president’s Free Patriotic Movement) support return, as they fear that the continued presenceof Syrian refugees is likely to tilt the demographic balance, and that could lead to instability. AntiAssad parties have opposed forced return, projecting the implications return would have on dissents
and conscripts.162
In April 2019, Lebanon’s Higher Defence Council, an inter-ministerial body in charge of national
defence policy, took the decision to deport refugees who entered Lebanon ‘illegally’ after the date of
24 April 2019.163 The decision was implemented on 13 May 2019 by the General Security
Directorate.164 More than 2 700 Syrian refugees were deported between 21 May and
28 August 2019165, by the General Security Directorate.166
As anti-refugee sentiments continue to grow, Lebanese authorities have restricted refugees’ accessto jobs. In June 2019, the Higher Defence Council ordered the destruction of 5 600 structures housing
Syrian refugees, deeming them illegal.167 In 2014, Lebanese authorities imposed an annual fee of
USD 200 for refugees wishing to obtain or renew their resident permits. In May 2015, UNHCR
suspended the registration of Syrian refugees at the request of the government of Lebanon.168 In 2017,
the Lebanese government took the decision to waive the annual USD 200 fee for refugees that
registered with UNHCR prior to 1 January 2015, or obtained their residency at least once in 2015 or2016. According to Human Rights Watch almost 500 000 people are not registered by UNHCR. The
waiver does not, however, include Palestinian refugees from Syria.169
As of February 2019, the Russian Ministry of Defence stated that over 52 000 Syrian refugees had
returned from Lebanon to Syria since July 2018.170 A similar statement was cited by the head ofLebanon’s General Security Directorate, General Abbas Ibrahim, in an article published by Reuters in
September 2018. General Ibrahim maintained that the return was coordinated with the Syrian
government, whereby list of names were sent to Damascus for approval.171
UNHCR’s July/August 2019 update on durable solutions records a total of 9 676 returns by Syrian
refugees from Lebanon during 2019. The number of returnees consists of those monitored or verified
by UNHCR. The Lebanese General Security Directorate recorded an additional 484 individuals notknown to UNHCR. According to the same source, as of June 2019, the numbers of returns from
Lebanon recorded by UNHCR between 2016 and up to 2019 reached a total of 40 230.172

3.3.2 Turkey
Turkey hosts the largest number of Syrian Refugees in the region, around 3.6 million as of
19 March 2020.173 According to the Directorate General of Migration and Management 63 452 Syrian
refugees are living in shelter centres.174 The rest live in Turkish cities and towns.175 Around half a

162 Middle East Institute, International politics of Syrian refugee return: The case of Lebanon, 20 August 2019, url
163 Aljazeera, Syrian refugees panic as threat of deportation rises in Lebanon, 25 July 2019, url
164 AI, Lebanon: Authorities must immediately halt deportations of Syrian refugees, 27 August 2019, url
165 New Humanitarian (The), Syrian deportations leave behind hardship, fear in Lebanon, 17 September 2019, url
166 AI, Lebanon: Authorities must immediately halt deportations of Syrian refugees, 27 August 2019, url
167 Middle East Eye, Lebanon deported nearly 2,500 Syrian refugees in three months: Amnesty, 27 August 2019, url
168 HRW, Lebanon: New Refugee Policy a Step Forward, 14 February 2017, url
169 HRW, Lebanon: New Refugee Policy a Step Forward, 14 February 2017, url
170 EIP, Refugees Return in Syria: Dangers , Security Risks and Information Scarcity, July 2019, url, p. 19
171 Reuters, Fifty thousand Syrians returned to Syria from Lebanon this year, official, 25 September 2018, url
172 UNHCR, Update: Durable Solutions for Syrian Refugees, July/August 2019, url
173 UNHCR, Operational portal: Turkey, last updated 19 March 2020, url
174 Turkey, Ministry of Interior, Directorate General of Migration Management, Statistics: Distribution of Syrian refugees inthe scope of temporary protection according to shelter centers, as of 24 January 2020, url
175 New York Times (The), What’s the future of Syrian refugees in Turkey?, 18 July 2019, url

26 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT SYRIA: INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS, RETURNEES AND INTERNAL MOBILITY

million Syrians are registered in Istanbul, however, estimates suggest that twice as many Syrians are
actually living in the city.176
Turkey grants temporary protection for refugees from Syria.177 According to the European Council of
Refugees and Exiles (ECRE)/Asylum Information Database (AIDA) country report on Turkey, Temporary
protection is a discretionary measure (stipulated in Article 91 of Law No 6458 on Foreigners andInternational Protection (LFIP), April 2013) that is deployed in situations induced by mass influx ofrefugees, and where individual eligibility processes are deemed impractical. The General Directorate
for Migration and Management (DGMM), under the Ministry of Interior, is the lead agency responsible
for the registration and processing of applications of Syrian nationals wishing to take up residence inTurkey.178 Registration is carried out by the provincial directorates within the DGMM – known as theProvincial Directorate for Migration Management (PDMM). Prior to registration applicants arescreened in a pre-registration interview for exclusion assessment, whereby a security check is carriedout within 30-days. Following registration applicants are issued a Temporary Protection Identity Card.
Applicants whose claims fall within the criteria of exclusion will not be granted a Temporary Protection
Identity Card.179
However, these policies are not always followed. Instead, as will be shown in this section, indications
show growing concern in the shift in the Turkish government’s treatment of Syrian refugees over theyears. AI stated in its October 2019 report that Syrian refugees are finding it increasingly difficult toregister with the authorities.180 A number of Provincial Directorates (PDMM) have in recent months
stopped registering refugees, these according to AI include the provinces of: Antalya, Aydin, Balikesir,
Bursa, Canakkale, Edirne, Istanbul, Izmir, Kirklareli, Kocaeli and Mugla.181 The ECRE/AIDA country
report on Turkey also stated that the PDMM in provinces like Istanbul, Hatay and Mardin had de facto
stopped registering and granting documents to newly arriving Syrians, with the exception tovulnerable cases. The report also stated that other areas like Sanliurfa still registered newcomers.182
According to AI, Syrians with expired identity cards do not manage to have them renewed by theTurkish authorities. Without valid identity documentation, Syrians refugees are unable to access
community services, like healthcare, education or social assistance.183
Turkey’s economy is struggling and unemployment rates stand at 13 %. Turks in socially andeconomically impeded areas believe that Syrian refugees are competing for their jobs, and that the
government grants Syrian refugees more privileges. A study conducted by Kadir Has University in
Istanbul showed that 67.7 % of the participants were ‘not content with the presence of Syrian
refugees’ in Turkey.184 In June 2019, locals attacked shops and other properties belonging to Syriansin the district of Kucukcekmece in western Istanbul.185 Similar incidents were reported in Ankara in2016.186 In September 2019, shops belonging to Syrian refugees were attacked in Adana, after a Syrian
man was falsely accused of sexually assaulting an 11-year-old boy.187
In July of 2019, Turkish authorities imposed a one-month deadline on unregistered refugees in
Istanbul, pushing them to return to their area of registration within Turkey, or face deportation.

176 BBC News, Syrian migrants in Turkey face deadline to leave Istanbul, 20 August 2019, url
177 ECRE/AIDA, Country Report: Turkey: Introduction to the asylum context in Turkey, updated 16 April 2019, url
178 ECRE/AIDA, Country Report: Turkey: Temporary protection procedure, scope and activation procedure, updated 16 April

2019, url
179 ECRE/AIDA, Country Report: Turkey: Registration under temporary protection, 16 April 2019, url
180 AI, Sent to a War Zone: Turkey’s illegal deportations of Syrian refugees, 25 October 2019, url, p. 15
181 AI, Sent to a War Zone: Turkey’s illegal deportations of Syrian refugees, 25 October 2019, url, p. 15
182 ECRE/ AIDA, Country Report: Turkey: Registration under temporary protection, 16 April 2019, url
183 AI, Sent to a War Zone: Turkey’s illegal deportations of Syrian refugees, 25 October 2019, url, p. 15
184 New York Times (The), What’s the future of Syrian refugees in Turkey?, 18 July 2019, url
185 Reuters, ‘They want to kill you’: Anger at Syrians erupts in Istanbul, 9 July 2019, url
186 Al-Monitor, Syrian Refugees becoming scapegoats for Turkey’s troubles, 11 July 2019, url
187 Ahval, A group attacks foreigner’s shops in Turkey’s Adana over sexual assault rumors, 20 September 2019, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT SYRIA: INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS, RETURNEES AND INTERNAL MOBILITY— 27

Syrians who spoke to the BBC at the time said that many were being deported to Idlib, inside Syria.
They further added that they are being forced to sign voluntary return documents that they cannot
read or understand.188 The deadline was later extended until 30 October 2019.189
Syrian refugees who previously entered on tourist visas were able to legalise their stay by extending
their visas in the country. The Syrian opposition media outlet Zaman al-wasl cited in an article,
published in November 2019, that the Turkish authorities will no longer extend tourist visas forforeigners in the country, as of 1 January 2020. The article further cited that the decision taken by theTurkish authorities further requires all foreign residents wishing to extend their residency to apply fora work permit, or other residence permits.190
The Syrian refugee issue has also become the focus of political debate in Turkey. Following themunicipal elections in March 2019, Syrian refugees have become scapegoats for Turkey’s faltering
economy, according to media reports.191 President Erdogan’s political opponents have criticised him
for allowing Syrian refugees to enter the country. One of them is the newly elected mayor of Istanbul,
Ekrem Imamoglu, who in an interview to Reuters maintained the need to ‘create a basis for Syrian
migrants to return’.192 However, Islamist groups have on the other hand criticised Erdogan for his
decision to establish a ‘safe zone’ in Syria to repatriate Syrian Refugees in Turkey.193
The proposal for the ‘safe zone’, which Erdogan announced in parliament in September 2019194,
according to an article published by al-Monitor, includes the resettlement of around 1 million Syrians
into 140 villages, with 5 000 inhabitants and 50 districts of 30 000 inhabitants.195
The issue of the repatriation of Syrian refugees exacerbated following the Turkish incursion into
northern Syria in October 2019. According to an article published by al-Monitor on 11 October 2019,
experts and human rights groups have warned that Turkey’s repatriation plans are in violation withinternational law and refugee rights. The same article also mentioned that lawmakers from the proKurdish People’s Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi (HDP)) expressed concerns on theconsequences the repatriation will have on the demographic balance in northern Syria196, where large
segments of Syria’s Kurdish and other minority population lives.197 Refugee expert and president of
the Research Centre on Asylum and Migration, Metin Corabatir, maintained in an interview with alMonitor, that most Syrians will not return voluntarily. He also warned of spill-overs which could cause
further instability in the ‘safe zone’.198
On 22 October 2019, Turkey and Russia held talks in Sotchi, in conjunction to the Turkish operation innorth-east Syria. The parties reached an agreement allowing Turkey to control the area between the
Syrian towns of Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ain. The Memorandum of Understanding which resulted fromthe talks also includes a joint commitment ‘“to facilitate the return of refugees in a safe and voluntarymanner”’.199
Turkey’s interior minister, Suleyman Soylu, said in 2019 that around 350 000 have voluntarily returned
to Syria.200 A research conducted by AI revealed that Turkey is unlawfully deporting refugees to danger
188 BBC News, Syrian migrants in Turkey face deadline to leave Istanbul, 20 August 2019, url
189 Aljazeera, Deadline extended for unregistered Syrians to leave Istanbul, 21 August 2019, url

190 Zaman al-Wasl, ‫السوريي‬‫ن‬‫ قرار ترك يضيق الخناق عىل‬..‫حول اإلقامة السياحية‬,[ concerning tourist residency… Turkish decision tightens‫ي‬
the noose on Syrians], 21 November 2019, url (access 8 December 2019)
191 Al-Monitor, Syrian Refugees becoming scapegoats for Turkey’s troubles, 11 July 2019, url
192 Reuters, ‘They want to kill you’: Anger at Syrians erupts in Istanbul, 9 July 2019, url
193 Al-Monitor, Erdogan plays Syrian refugee card against Europe, 11 September 2019, url
194 Hurriyet Daily News, Erdogan calls on politicians to unite for Turkey, 1 October 2019, url
195 Al-Monitor, Is Erdogan resettlement plan for Syrians refugees really viable?, 11 October 2019, url
196 Al-Monitor, Is Erdogan resettlement plan for Syrians refugees really viable?, 11 October 2019, url
197 New York Times (The), Who are the Kurds, and why is Turkey attacking them in Syria?, 14 October 2019, url
198 Al-Monitor, Is Erdogan resettlement plan for Syrians refugees really viable?, 11 October 2019, url
199 Aljazeera, Full text of Turkey, Russia agreement on northeast Syria, 22 October 2019, url
200 Economist (The), Turkey tightens restrictions on Syrian refugees, 5 September 2019, url

28 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT SYRIA: INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS, RETURNEES AND INTERNAL MOBILITY

in Syria. The Turkish government denies the statement, maintaining that returns are carried out in avoluntary manner.201 Human Rights Watch conducted 12 telephone interviews, as well as two in
person, with Syrians who had been deported to Idlib province. The deported Syrians maintained thatthe police handed them over to the immigration authorities, who held them for various periods(between one hour and 42 days), without charging them, before deporting them. The persons were
given various reasons to their detention, like not having protection permits or that their permit had
expired. The interviewees stated that they were forced to sign forms, but were not allowed to readthem. Some of those interviewed stated that they were slapped or coerced into signing the forms.202
An article published by the Economist in September 2019, reported that officials acknowledged thatrefugees deemed a threat to public order or security are regularly forced to choose between returning
to Syria or spending a year in a detention centre. The same article also added that the state news
agency further reported on the deportation of over 6 000 persons, from a single border crossing in
the first six months of 2019.203
An article published by the Syrian media outlet, Enab Baladi, reported on ongoing deportations of
Syrians from Bab al Hawa crossing point. According to statistics made available by the crossing point’s
public relations office on 3 December 2019, over 5 800 persons are believed to have been deported
since November 2019. The deportees were mainly persons who had entered Turkey illegally (throughsmuggling) or did not have documentation in Turkey (i.e. identity cards); a third category of deportees
were Syrians who had work but could not obtain a permit to work in the country.204
The Centre for Operational Analysis and Research (COAR) stated in its Syria update 2026 November 2019 that between 40 to 70 Syrians have been deported to northern Syria from Urfa
province since 15 November 2019. The deportees were all holders of temporary protection status, butwere deported for working without permits in Urfa. The deportees were offered the option ofdeportation or a one-year imprisonment in Turkey. COAR further cited other returns of Syrians underunclear circumstances from the border crossing of Bab al-Salameh. Approximately 100 Syrians are
believed to have returned to Syria on a daily basis during the reporting period, en route to Turkishheld areas in Syria. COAR maintains that the increase in recent deportations indicates that theeconomic concerns that prompted Istanbul to push back Syrians from the city have now spread toother provinces. The increase in the number of returns is difficult to assess given the lack of reliabledata on the actual drivers behind the return, for example voluntary return or coercion from the partof the authorities. However, COAR maintains that the recent deportations from Urfa may serve as anindication of Turkey’s willingness to move forward with its plans to return refugees to the ‘safe zone’
it has set up in Syria.205
Provisions for voluntary return are not included in Turkish law. AI cites the lack of clarity as to whether
the authorities engage in ‘voluntary return’ interviews, assuring refugees free and voluntary consent
to return. According to testimonies collected by AI from Syrian refugees, all return documents were
disguised as ‘voluntary return’. Refugees were either misled or threatened into signing a form sayingthat they were to be sent to Syria.206 The overall majority of the deportees are men. Family membersof the deportees are usually prompted to return to Syria shortly after due to the vulnerability of theirsituation following the deportation of the main breadwinner. Deportations appear to take place

201 AI, Sent to a War Zone: Turkey’s illegal deportations of Syrian refugees, 25 October 2019, url, pp. 11-12
202 HRW, Syrians being deported to danger, 24 October 2019, url
203 Economist (The), Turkey tightens restrictions on Syrian refugees, 5 September 2019, urlّ
204 Enab Baladi, ‫لي من تركيا إىل سوريا‬‫المرح ن‬‫“باب الهوى” يعلن عدد‬. [Bab al Hawa announces the number of deportees from Turkey to
Syria], 8 December 2019, url
205 COAR, Syria Update, 20 - 26 November 2019, url, section 4
206 AI, Sent to a War Zone: Turkey’s illegal deportations of Syrian refugees, 25 October 2019, url, pp. 11, 12

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT SYRIA: INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS, RETURNEES AND INTERNAL MOBILITY— 29

through the border crossing of Bab al-Hawa. One deportee was reported by AI to have been arrested
and imprisoned by Islamist groups on the Syrian side of the border.207
UNHCR’s July/August 2019 update on durable solutions records a total of 12 017 self-organised
returns by Syrian refugees from Turkey as of June 2019. This number of returnees consists of thosemonitored or verified by UNHCR.208

3.3.3 Jordan
Jordan is, according to UNHCR, one of the countries most affected by the Syria crisis, hosting thesecond highest share of refugees per capita in the world.209 The country hosts 1.4 million Syrians, ofwhich over 658 000 are registered with UNHCR.210 Syrians started arriving to Jordan at the outbreakof the crisis in 2011. Around 84 % of Syrian refugees live in urban settings, and 16 % in three camps;
Zaatari, Azraq and Emirati Jordanian camp.211
In 2014, the Jordanian government imposed restrictions, controlling entry of Syrians into thecountry.212 In June 2016, Jordan closed its borders to Syrian refugees, declaring its northern and northeastern borders a military zone, following a bomb attack that killed six Jordanian security personnel213
close to the Rukban Camp. The camp situated on the border to Jordan, hosts IDPs who earlier fledfrom eastern Syrian cities and towns taken over by ISIL in 2014.214
According to an article published in al-Monitor in August 2019, an estimate of 11 000 to 24 000
displaced Syrians are also believed to be living in the remote camp of Rukban. Living conditions arereported to be harsh and humanitarian assistance is scarce. The article cited that the last delivery of
aid to the camp was in February 2019.215 Camp residents wishing to return to their place of origin aresent to government-run shelters where they risk forced disappearances and other violations.
Reportedly, returnees to Homs have faced prolonged stays in government-run shelters in Homs,
undergoing security clearance before they were allowed to resume residency in their place of origin.216
However, despite security restrictions following the Rukban crisis, Jordanian and Syrian authorities
agreed to open the Nassib border crossing in October 2018, primarily to restore trade. The strategic
border crossing is a transit route for goods transported between Turkey, Lebanon and the Gulf States,
and therefore a crucial source of revenue for both Syria and Jordan prior to 2011.217
UNHCR’s July/August 2019 update on durable solutions estimated the numbers of self-organised
returns by Syrian refugees from Jordan during 2019 to a total of 16 037, which is the highest recorded
since 2016. 218
Despite the rising figures in return, and efforts undertaken by the Jordanian authorities to encourage
Syrians to return, many remain reluctant to return to Syria, fearing for their well-being, citing
government arrests carried out against earlier returnees, including destruction of property,

207 AI, Sent to a War Zone: Turkey’s illegal deportations of Syrian refugees, 25 October 2019, url, pp. 5, 14
208 UNHCR, Update: Durable Solutions for Syrian Refugees, July/August 2019, url
209 UNHCR, Fact Sheet: Jordan, May 2019, url
210 UNHCR, Submission by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for the Office of the High Commissioner for

Human Rights’ Compilation Report, Universal Periodic Review: 3rd Cycle, 31st Session, n.d., url, p. 1
211 UNHCR, Fact Sheet: Jordan, May 2019, url
212 UNHCR, Submission by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights’ Compilation Report, Universal Periodic Review: 3rd Cycle, 31st Session, n.d., url, p. 1
213 New York Times (The), Jordan closes border to Syrian refugees after suicide bomb kills 6, 21 June 2016, url
214 Foreign Policy (FP), Turkey’s deportation policy is killing Syrian refugees, 8 August 2019, url
215 Al-Monitor, Syrians in makeshift displacement camp face ‘impossible choice’, 27 August 2019, url
216 Al-Monitor, Syrians in makeshift displacement camp face ‘impossible choice’, 27 August 2019, url
217 Reuters, Syria says to reopen important Nassib crossing with Jordan on October 10, 29 September 2018, url
218 Based on reading of MapSelf-Organized Syrian refugee returns as verified by UNHCR as of 30 June 2019. See: UNHCR,
Update: Durable Solutions for Syrian Refugees, July/August 2019, url, p. 1

30 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT SYRIA: INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS, RETURNEES AND INTERNAL MOBILITY

deteriorating living conditions and lack of community services in Syria.219 A survey examining living
conditions for Syrian refugees in Jordan between 2017 and 2018, carried out by Norway’s FAfo
institute for Labor and Social Research, in collaboration with Jordan’s Ministry of Planning andInternational Cooperation, took up the issue of refugees’ attitude towards return. 88 % of respondents
stated that they were likely to remain in Jordan two years from the date of the interview.220

3.4 Return procedures
3.4.1 Security clearance
All Syrians wishing to return to their place of origin have to, at some stage, interact with the security
sector, where they are obliged to provide information to the authorities, about themselves, as well asfamily members, in order to receive permission or clearance to return. The procedure applies to all
Syrians, that is Syrian refugees and diaspora returning from abroad or IDPs looking to return from
opposition-held areas to areas controlled by the government, or reconciliation areas. Returnees are
required to fill in certain forms. Those who do not submit the forms cannot return, or could be
subjected to access restriction and may also risk arrest. Below are two comparative examples ofrepatriation forms issued by UNHCR and the Government of Syria respectively, published by theEuropean Institute of Peace.221
Table 1: Example Repatriation Forms: UNHCR (left) and Government of Syria (right)222
UNHCR example Voluntary Repatriation Syrian Information Bulletin
Form
Linked cases:
Family/Group Number:
Address/Location in Camp:
Identity/Ration Card Number:
Family Name:First Name:
Sex:
Year of Birth:
Place of Birth:
Relationship:
Skills:Special Needs:
Intended departure date:
Reception Centre:
Intended destination:
I, the undersigned principal applicant,declare that I (and my
Dependents) after due consideration wish
to be repatriated to:....

Name and Surname:
Father:Mother:Date of birth:
Place and number of register:
National ID number:Previous address:
Current address:
Cell phone number, Landline:
Brief of your life:
Political orientation:
Current job:
Previous job:
Sentences and arrests:
Have you ever raised a gun against the
SAA?
Have you ever committed a crime
against innocent civilians or
Had blood on your hands?
Have you travelled outside thecountry?

219 Al-Monitor, Why Syrians in Jordan refuse to return home, 11 October 2019, url
220 Tiltnes, Å., Zhang, H. and Pedersen, J., The Living Conditions of Syrian Refugees in Jordan, April 2019, url, p. 137
221 Refugees Return in Syria: Dangers, Security Risks and Information Scarcity, July 2019, url, p. 20
222 EIP, Refugees Return in Syria: Dangers, Security Risks and Information Scarcity, July 2019, url, p. 20

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT SYRIA: INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS, RETURNEES AND INTERNAL MOBILITY— 31

Do you have any relatives detained
during the current events?
Date: --/--/2018
Name and signature
Left thumb fingerprint

The Danish Immigration Service (DIS) cited in its February 2019 report - the Chief of Immigration andPassport Department in Damascus, stating that Syrians wishing to return to Syria have to apply for
return at the nearest Syrian representation at their country of residence, that is, the embassy or
consulate. The applicant is requested to inform how and why he or she left the country, and what heor she has been doing in the host country, as well as provide information concerning his or her sourceof income in the host country. The source further maintained that the information is later forwarded
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry then conducts a security check of the applicant in orderto verify the applicant’s Syrian nationality. The purpose of the procedure is, according to the source,
twofold: 1) to ensure that the person entering the country is a Syrian national, and 2) to inform theapplicant as to whether there are criminal charges brought against him/her. The report further
maintained that persons with criminal charges are likely to face problems upon return, unless they
can settle their issues with the government before returning to Syria.223
In formerly besieged areas the forms are more extensive. Other than the information mentioned in
the Information Bulletin form, applicants are also required to provide detailed responses regarding:••••involvement in protests, riots , and armed terrorist activities;
information on terrorist groups, their commanders, command centres, and positions;information on weapon warehouses, ammunition, explosives, or material set to be used in
terrorist activities;
details on the involvement of relatives in current events.224

Returnees are required to fill the forms in designated IDP-shelters, which reportedly operate as
detention centres.225 This, for example, is the case for returnees to Eastern Ghouta. Thousands ofreturnees were held in shelters for weeks before they could return. Accordingly, an estimated 40 000
persons were reported to be still held in these shelters as of January 2019. In addition, even civilians
who remained in their homes or in the areas of Eastern Ghouta, prior to the government’s takeover,are obliged to complete the forms before they can move through checkpoints.226
The forms also require information about the activities and whereabouts of family members. EIP
maintains that these requirements are a way for the security apparatus to reinforce its control overthe population – a sort of ‘security through fear’. The process also acts as a means for the government
to re-kindle its former reliance on informants to provide allegations, or false information against thoseperceived as a threat to the government.227
For those returning from Lebanon, sources interviewed by the International Crisis Group maintainedthat security clearance issued by central intelligence services in Damascus is mandatory. While the223 DIS/DRC, Syria: Security Situation in Damascus Province and Issues Regarding Return to Syria, February 2019, url, pp. 20-21
224 EIP, Refugees Return in Syria: Dangers, Security Risks and Information Scarcity, July 2019, url, p. 21
225 EIP, Refugees Return in Syria: Dangers, Security Risks and Information Scarcity, July 2019, url, p. 21
226 EIP, Refugees Return in Syria: Dangers, Security Risks and Information Scarcity, July 2019, url, p. 21
227 EIP, Refugees Return in Syria: Dangers, Security Risks and Information Scarcity, July 2019, url, p. 22

32 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT SYRIA: INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS, RETURNEES AND INTERNAL MOBILITY

clearance helps reduce uncertainty that the returnees face, it ‘does not protect would-be returnees
from abusive militias or future persecution’.228

3.4.2 Regulating status in post-reconciliation areas
Persons from former rebel-held areas, wishing to regulate their status with the Syrian authorities are
scrutinised by security agencies, with the support of pro-government local committees at the person’splace of residence.229 However, it remains unclear who the targeted profiles are. Haid Haid, aconsulting Research Fellow in the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House,maintains that some sources concluded that all males and females between 18 and 55 years should
fill the required forms, while other sources state that only anti-government groups, or theirinternational supporters, armed groups and media or political opposition are subject to government
scrutiny. Haid attributes part of the confusion to the variety in the implementation of the process,which in turn depends on the level of anti-government resistance, as well as the actors controlling theregained area (e.g. the Syrian government, Iran, Russia).230
Applicants wishing to regulate their status have to fill two forms, one contains questions about theapplicants’ personal data, career, political orientation, criminal records and terrorist activities, as well
as relatives’ activities. The second form contains detailed information about the individuals’ role inany anti-government activities, such as demonstrations, armed rebellion and terrorist activities,
including information about terrorist activities in the area, as well as names, whereabouts of rebel
groups and their leaders.231
The information is then sent to the local security branch to crosscheck against information, files, they
have on the applicant. Haid maintains that the government uses multiple levels of verification toassess the credibility of the submitted information. For those with no record, a new file is created,particularly if they had ties with oppositional elements. The information is also crosschecked withother security branches, however, according to Haid, that seldom happens due to rivalry andcompetition between the security branches. Once the information is verified the applicants receive adocument, proving that they have successfully completed the process. The document will also enable
them to pass through checkpoints. Rejections are attributed to giving false information. Rejectedindividuals are also asked to refile their applications at their local security branch, which likely resultsin detention. The prevalence of using informants is widely abused, often to pursue grudges orvendettas.232 People who are denied security clearance cannot obtain documentation, or open
businesses.233

3.4.3 Wanted lists
The head of Air Force Intelligence, Jamil Hassan, stated in a private meeting reported by an opposition
news outlet last year that there are three million names on the Syrian government’s wanted list. The
list includes persons wanted for military service. However, the figures are hard to verify, and anti-

228 International Crisis Group, Easing Syrian Refugees’ Plight in Lebanon, 13 February 2020, url, p. 19
229 EASO, Syria: Exercise of authority in recaptured areas, January 2020, url, p. 16. For more information on the process ofregulating one’s status, see International Crisis Group, Lessons from the Syrian State’s Return to the South, Middle East
Report N°196, 25 February 2019, url, p. 2, and DIS, Access to Damascus Province for Individuals from Former Rebel-held
Areas, September 2019, url
230 Haid, H., The details of ‘Reconciliation Deals’ expose how they are anything but, Chatham House, August 2018, url
231 Haid, H., Chatham House, The details of ‘Reconciliation Deals’ expose how they are anything but, August 2018, url
232 Haid, H., Chatham House, The details of ‘Reconciliation Deals’ expose how they are anything but, August 2018, url
233 Haid, H., Chatham House, The details of ‘Reconciliation Deals’ expose how they are anything but, August 2018, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT SYRIA: INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS, RETURNEES AND INTERNAL MOBILITY— 33

government media outlets (e.g. Zaman al wasl, Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR)) havebeen known to publish names of persons wanted by the Syrian government.234

3.4.4 Military conscription in post-reconciliation areas
The Syrian government has applied various coercive methods to pressure targeted rebel areas tosurrender. Negotiation committees were established, mainly composed of local mediators with ties
to the government. Once an agreement was reached, the negotiation committee would register all
the names of activists and armed combatants, and whether they wished to remain or leave. The lists
were later submitted to the various intelligence and military security bodies for assessment as to who
can remain and who is to be relocated.235 Combatants between the ages of 18-42 were given a six
month grace period to settle their affairs and register with the local military recruitment branch(Sha´bt Tajneed). This process came to be known as Taswiyat al-Wad´. Those who do not reportvoluntarily risk being arrested and forcibly enlisted.236

3.5 Arrests, detentions and violations committed against returnees
The Syrian government’s regular restrictions on humanitarian agencies hamper these organisations
from playing a part in the repatriation of Syrians, often leaving these agencies and organisations withlittle space to negotiate with the government. UN and international organisations that want tooperate in Syria can do so only if they partner with government-approved local actors. The Syrian
security agencies regularly engage with these local partners, and can therefore gain access to theirbeneficiary lists and programming. As a result, organisations often find themselves having to comply
with the demands of the government, so as not to lose access, or even risk being shut down.237 UNHCR
has only limited access to communities of IDPs and returnees, and is therefore unable to monitor andcollect data on IDPs or returnees without government permission. The agency has in some cases
subcontracted local NGOs, such as the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) to carry out surveys and‘protection missions’ in the country.238
The EIP report on refugee return in Syria cites data collected from the UN system, as well as Syrian
human rights organisations, like Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) and Urnammu, relating toarrests and detention of IDPs and returnees. SNHR documented 312 arrests carried out in Syria of
persons who returned from abroad in 2017, and no less than 719 in 2018. The organisation further
reported over 5 600 arrests carried out in 2018 against returnees inside Syria to governmentcontrolled areas.239 Both organisations attributed the rise in the number of detentions, reportedly
since October 2018, to the increase in the numbers of return to formerly held opposition areas. EIP
further noted that returnees from Idlib to Hama and Idlib to Eastern Ghouta are particularly vulnerable
to arrest, as well as those returning without prior clearance.240
Despite having reconciled their status, and completed their papers with the authorities, returnees
from rebel-controlled areas are reported to have faced detention upon return.241 The town ofZabadani reported some arrests of returnees. Although most have been released after questioning,some remain missing. Locals in Zabadani also report being stopped and harassed at checkpoints, and234 EIP, Refugees Return in Syria: Dangers, Security Risks and Information Scarcity, July 2019, url, p. 14
235 Haid, H., Chatham House, Joining the Enemy: How Syrian regime reintegrates former rebel fighters, July 2018, url
236 Haid, H., Chatham House, Joining the Enemy: How Syrian regime reintegrates former rebel fighters, July 2018, url
237 HRW, Rigging the System: Government Policies Co-Opt Aid and Reconstruction Funding in Syria, 28 June 2019, url
238 EIP, Refugees Return in Syria: Dangers, Security Risks and Information Scarcity, July 2019, url, p. 23
239 EIP, Refugees Return in Syria: Dangers, Security Risks and Information Scarcity, July 2019, url, p. 23
240 EIP, Refugees Return in Syria: Dangers, Security Risks and Information Scarcity, July 2019, url, p. 23
241 EIP, Refugees Return in Syria: Dangers, Security Risks and Information Scarcity, July 2019, url, pp. 23-24

34 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT SYRIA: INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS, RETURNEES AND INTERNAL MOBILITY

having their phones searched. Others have been questioned for communicating with relatives in
Idlib.242
The threat of detention, torture and death by Syrian security state upon return can reportedly be
unpredictable. Refugees interviewed by the International Crisis Group between November 2018 andJuly 2019 stated ‘that refraining from anti-regime activities does not guarantee safe return’.243 In
September 2019, Human Rights Watch reported on the arrest and detention of Syrian refugees
returning from Lebanon. Witnesses Human Rights Watch spoke to said that they were arrested anddeported by the General Security Directorate in Lebanon, whereupon they were handed over to the
Syrian border authorities upon deportation. Recent detainees informed that they were tortured ingovernment custody within months of their return to Syria.244
Syrian refugees in Lebanon have pointed out that another risk they fear upon returning is the practiceof writing a taqrir (a ‘report’, meaning reporting people to the security agencies). They reported on
instances of detention upon return as a result of being denounced by neighbours or even family
members. The practice of writing a taqrir is reportedly used either to avoid being targeted, forpersonal gain or vengeance.245

3.6 Legal obstacles to housing, land and property rights
Several regions are inhospitable for return due to heavy destruction.246 For people returning this is
likely to pose several challenges, particularly for those returning to reconciled areas. According to Syria
Direct, an independent Syrian news site, the Syrian government is using old and new laws relating toproperty rights to implement reconstruction projects through arbitrary demolition within former
opposition-held areas.247 Human Rights Watch reported on demolitions carried out by the Syrian
armed forces between 2012 and 2013 in Damascus and Hama as means to punish the civilian
population in previous opposition strongholds, causing thousands of families to lose their homes.248
In April 2018, the government adopted a new law, aiming to speed up expropriation procedures forreconstruction, as well dealing with illegal/informal settlements. The law, which goes under the nameof Law 10, established a 30-day deadline for people to prove ownership over property subject toexpropriation.249
Law 10 is an extension of Presidential Decree 66, which was adopted in 2012. The decree wasdesignated to target informal settlements in Damascus for development.250 However, the timeframe
stipulated in Law 10 was later amended in 2018 by Law 42, which gives property owners one year toestablish ownership of property. Residents who can prove property ownership are given shares in newproperty developments, provided that they comply with other registration laws.251
The government has further issued 45 laws and decrees related to housing, land and property, whichhave subsequently resulted in hampering returns. One such law is Law 3 of the year 2018. The law
concerns the removal of rubble of buildings damaged as a result of natural or abnormal causes.

242 EIP, Refugees Return in Syria: Dangers, Security Risks and Information Scarcity, July 2019, url, p. 25
243 International Crisis Group, Easing Syrian Refugees’ Plight in Lebanon, 13 February 2020, url, p. 22
244 HRW, Syrians deported by Lebanon arrested at home, 2 September 2019, url
245 International Crisis Group, Easing Syrian Refugees’ Plight in Lebanon, 13 February 2020, url, p. 16
246 International Crisis Group, Easing Syrian Refugees’ Plight in Lebanon, 13 February 2020, url, pp. 22, 24
247 Syria Direct, `A new Syria´: Law 10 reconstruction projects to commence in Damascus, 19 November 2018, url
248 HRW, Razed to the Ground, 30 January 2014, url
249 HRW, Q&A: Syria’s new property law, 29 May 2018, url
250 Syria Direct, `A new Syria´: Law 10 reconstruction projects to commence in Damascus, 19 November 2018, url
251 Syria Direct, `A new Syria´: Law 10 reconstruction projects to commence in Damascus, 19 November 2018, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT SYRIA: INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS, RETURNEES AND INTERNAL MOBILITY— 35

However, the broad definition to the term rubble stipulated by the law, has resulted in the closing ofneighbourhoods and residential areas, and therefore denied civilians to access their homes.252
Decrees 11 and 12, adopted in 2016 are another example of obstacles civilians face to access theirproperties. Decree 11 stops property registration in areas affected by an emergency security situation,
and Decree 12, which concerns production of digital copies of real estate records, contains loopholes
which allow government and local officials to claim property via witnesses.253
Another controversial decree is Decree 63 of 2012, which legislates the right to confiscate ‘movableand immovable’ property belonging to persons accused of terrorism against the state.254 An article
published by the Lebanese anti-Syrian news site al-Modon, cited that Syria’s Ministry of Financepublished lists of 40 000 cases of seizure of assets in 2017 on the grounds of terrorist activities
perpetrated by their owners, compared to 2016 were the ministry reported 30 000 such cases.
According to the article, the government has also compiled lists of implicated Syrians nationals living
abroad, as well as family members of government opponents, including children.255

252 Syria Direct, `A new Syria´: Law 10 reconstruction projects to commence in Damascus, 19 November 2018, url
253 Syria Direct, `A new Syria´: Law 10 reconstruction projects to commence in Damascus, 19 November 2018, url
254 Syria Direct, `A new Syria´: Law 10 reconstruction projects to commence in Damascus, 19 November 2018, url
255 Al-Modon,‫ ألف حجز احتياط‬70 :‫ [ اإلرهاب االقتصادي للنظام‬Economic terrorism for the regime: 70 thousand temporary‫ي‬
confiscation], 8 November 2018, url36 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT SYRIA: INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS, RETURNEES AND INTERNAL MOBILITY

4. Particular groups
The UNOCHA reported in its Humanitarian Needs review for 2019, that humanitarian needs in Syria
remain severe and complex. The report estimates that 11.7 million people are in need of humanitarianassistance. The report attributed the situation to the ongoing hostilities, and to new and protracted
displacement, as well as the increase in the number of increased self-organised returns.256
This section examines the impact of the population movements, resulting from the conflict in Syria,
on two particular groups within the IDP and returnee population: women and children.

4.1 Women
A joint report by Amnesty International UK (AI UK), Gender Action for Peace and Security (GAPS),
Women’s International League for Peace & Freedom, Women Now for Development in response to
the UK national action plan on women, peace and security (hereafter the joint response on the UK
national action plan) maintained that accessibility to humanitarian assistance to IDP women islimited.257
The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) disclosed in two reports on gender-based violence –Voices from Syria 2018 and 2019 – that displaced women and girls without male support or protection,
specifically those living in camps and shelters, are more susceptible to violence than men and boys,
including sexual violence, child marriage and movement restrictions.258 The report further reported
on women coerced into marrying men at distribution centres, or distribution staff, for a short periodof time – for sexual purposes – in order to receive assistance.259
IDP women residing in informal camp settings do not have regular access to sexual and reproductive
health services. And when such services are available, they are often understaffed or lack specialist
gynaecologists. Lack of information on where to go, or not having access to transportation, in addition
to relatives that prevent women from gaining access to needed services are other challenges IDP
preventing women from obtaining the health services they need.260
The Syrian American Medical Society reported that women generally suffer disproportionately fromthe lack of access to medical services in times of conflict. Displaced and refugee women suffer evenmore under these circumstances. Decline in international funding further reduces women access tohealth services. Displacement and refugee life have negative consequences on women’s mental
health, often triggered by lack of food and livelihood opportunities, in addition to social burdens suchas having to ensure care and education for their children. Women access to mental health services isless in comparison to men.261
A UN Women report on gender and return noted, based on initial regional trends that female refugees
may be returning at a larger rate, in comparison to male refugees. The report attributed conscription
to military service as the reason deterring male Syrian refugees from wanting to return. Another

256 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Return, as of November 2019, update 12

December 2019, url, p. 5
257 Amnesty International UK (AI UK), Gender Action for Peace and Security (gaps), Women’s International League for Peace& Freedom, Women Now for Development, Syria Response Consultations on the UK National Action Plan on Women, Peaceand Security, May 2017, url, p. 22
258 UNFPA, Voices from Syria 2018, November 2017, url, p. 34; UNPFA Voices from Syria 2019, 10 March 2019, url, p. 24
259 UNFPA, Voices from Syria 2018, November 2017, url, p. 58; UNPFA Voices from Syria 2019, 10 March 2019, url, p. 11
260 Amnesty International UK (AI UK), Gender Action for Peace and Security (gaps), Women’s International League for Peace& Freedom, Women Now for Development, Syria Response Consultations on the UK National Action Plan on Women, Peaceand Security, May 2017, url, p. 22 ; UNPFA, Voices from Syria 2019, 10 March 2019, url, p. 47
261 Syrian American Medical Society, Women health services lacking for Syrian refugees, 14 February 2019, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT SYRIA: INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS, RETURNEES AND INTERNAL MOBILITY— 37

reason for the high number of female returns is ascribed to the high male death rates caused by the
conflict, which has contributed to demographic population changes, and subsequently led to anincrease in the number of Syrian female-headed households.262
International Crisis Group reported that many women living in Lebanon do not want to return because
they would have to leave their husbands or sons behind or, when returning together, see themconscripted in the army.263
IDP returnees, and refugees returning to their place of origin generally face a number of challenges
when it comes to obtaining vital information to bolster their decision to return (e.g. security legal
issues, return procedures), as well as accessing basic goods and services.264 According to the UN
Women report on gender and return, women have less access to information on return than men.
The report attributes this lack of information to a number of factors: the lack of social network, lackof access to social media, ownership of mobile telephone and low literacy rates. This, according to thereport, puts women more at risk to exploitation and abuse.265
Another challenge mentioned by UN Women relate to legal disadvantages women face in accessing
their rights to housing, land and property (HLP), as women do not have equal rights when it comes toinheritance and property issues. In addition, women are less likely to have HLP registered in theirnames.266
The same applies to accessibility to identification and civil documentation. Many registry offices
around the country were either closed or destroyed as a result of the conflict. The absence ofdigitalised records in some areas can result in permanent loss of information for those IDPs who havelost their original documents.267 International Rescue Committee determined in its report on
documentation in northern Syria that IDPs ran a considerable risk of losing their documents. Womenare particularly dependent on marriage certificate in order to claim access property, financial benefits
and child custody in the absence of their husbands.268
For more information on the situation of women in Syria, including IDP women, see the EASO COI
report Syria – Situation of women (February 2020).269

4.2 Children
United Nations estimates that 4.7 million children (out of a total of 11 million people in need) are inneed of humanitarian assistance, including 3.1 million under the age of five requiring nutritional
support.270
UNICEF reported that 2.6 million children in Syria are displaced as a result of the conflict.271 The
upheaval resulting from displacement has diminished the capacity of many host communities toabsorb and provide services to large numbers of IDPs, including children’s access to education. This

262 UN Women Regional Office for Arab States, Why gender matters in the Discussion on Returns to Syria, n.d., url
263 International Crisis Group, Easing Syrian Refugees’ Plight in Lebanon, 13 February 2020, url, p. 22
264 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Return, as of November 2019, update 12

December 2019, url, p. 5
265 UN Women Regional Office for Arab States, Why gender matters in the Discussion on Returns to Syria, n.d., url
266 UN Women Regional Office for Arab States, Why gender matters in the Discussion on Returns to Syria, n.d., url
267 Forced Migration Review (FMR), Establishing legal Identity for displaced Syrians, FMR 57, February 2018, url
268 International Rescue Committee, Identify Me: The Documentation Crisis in Northern Syria, July 2016, url, p. 2
269 EASO, COI Report: Syria – Situation of women, February 2020, url
270UNICEF, UNICEF Appeal, Syrian Arab Republic, update 3 December 2020, url
271 UNICEF, Syria Crisis Fast Facts, August 2019, url38 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT SYRIA: INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS, RETURNEES AND INTERNAL MOBILITY

has resulted in an increase in the level of children dropping out of school, which in turn has an impact
on the increase of child labour and underage marriage.272
Displaced children are also vulnerable to recruitment to armed groups. Human Rights Watch reported
an increase in child recruitment by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), for military
participation within the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Recruitment is reported to be taking place
inside displacement camps under YPG control. Interviews carried out by Human Rights Watch in three
displacement camps in north-eastern Syria report that the YPG and the Asayish (Kurdish internal
security) were encouraging young boys and girls to enlist. The interviewed families of those children
who enlisted were not informed of their children’s whereabouts. The interviewed families stated that
their children enlisted in order to support the family. One mother said that she received USD 300 amonth for her daughter’s enlistment. 273
The United Nations asserted the recruitment of children for combat purposes in the report of theSecretary-General: Children and Armed Conflict. The report stated that the majority of the children
were recruited by the YPG, followed by HTS and groups affiliated to the Free Syrian Army (FSA).274 The
report does not specify on the recruitment of displaced children.
Children born in formerly rebel-held areas lack recognised documentation. The same applies forchildren to Syrian refugees in Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan.275

272 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Return, as of November 2019, update 12

December 2019, url, pp. 11, 13
273 HRW, Syria: Armed group recruiting children in camps, 30 August 2018, url
274 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General: Children and Armed Conflict, 20 June 2019, url, para. 174
275 NRC, Dangerous Ground: Syria’s refugees face an uncertain future, n.d., url, p. 17

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT SYRIA: INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS, RETURNEES AND INTERNAL MOBILITY— 39

5. Mobility
Checkpoints have become a way of life in Syria and an important source of income for those who man
them. There are several reports of harassment and intimidation of travellers attempting to drive
through the multitude of checkpoints that have been set up throughout the conflict.276

5.1 Checkpoints in government-controlled areas
Government checkpoints are run by a wide range of security agencies, such as the main branches ofthe state intelligence services, that is, the Air Force Intelligence, the Military Intelligence Directorate
and State Security Directorates, as well as regular units from the SAA.277
The DIS, in conjunction with the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) published a report on the security
situation in Damascus province based on interviews conducted in November 2018. The report cites
an international organisation that stated that there has been an improvement in the general situation
in Damascus province since May of 2018. The number of checkpoints within Damascus province havebeen reduced with about 90 % inside Damascus. In an interview with Christopher Kozak, from theInstitute for the Study of War (ISW), Kozak stated that checkpoints were mainly focused at theentrances of Damascus, that is, highways headed towards Lebanon, Damascus International Airport,
as well as the M5 headed toward Homs. Prior restrictions on the road between the airport andDamascus city are reportedly lifted.278
Controls conducted at checkpoints in Damascus vary. Reportedly, checkpoints carried out within thecity are carried out in a hasty manner, while being more thorough in areas outside the city. The
performance also varies depending on the security agents manning the checkpoints. According tosources interviewed by DIS/DRC, the Air Force Intelligence is considered the strictest of all the
branches, and are therefore likely to be the most rigorous in their checks.279
Further information regarding requirements and process for access to Damascus province forindividuals from former rebel-held areas can be found in the Danish Immigration Service report- Syria:
Security Situation in Damascus Province and Issues Regarding Return to Syria.280
Information regarding mobility and freedom of movement in Damascus city can be found in the EASO
COI report Syria: Socio-economic situation in Damascus city (February 2020).281
COAR Global, an independent research and analysis enterprise, stated in a meeting with the DIS/DRC
in Beirut, in November 2018 that the security situation in other government-controlled areas vary.
Government control becomes more decentralised the further away one travels from the capital
Damascus.282
According to the report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic from 11 September 2019, government forces have set up checkpoints every 200 metresthroughout Duma, to restrict and control movement of civilians wishing to exit the area. Residents are

276 Orient Net, Assad Checkpoints; pay more, pass quicker, 9 February 2016, url
277 DIS/DRC, Syria: Security Situation in Damascus Province and Issues Regarding Return to Syria, February 2019, url, p. 12
278 DIS/DRC, Syria: Security Situation in Damascus Province and Issues Regarding Return to Syria, February 2019, url, pp. 11-13279 DIS/DRC, Syria: Security Situation in Damascus Province and Issues Regarding Return to Syria, February 2019, url, pp. 12-13280 DIS/DRC, Syria: Security Situation in Damascus Province and Issues Regarding Return to Syria, February 2019, url, p. 12
281 EASO, COI report Syria: Socio-economic situation in Damascus city, February 2020, url
282 DIS/DRC, Syria: Security Situation in Damascus Province and Issues Regarding Return to Syria, Appendix 1: Meeting
minutes, Meeting With COAR-Global, Beirut 17 November 2018, Published February 2019, url, p. 56

40 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT SYRIA: INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS, RETURNEES AND INTERNAL MOBILITY

required to obtain permission to commute to Damascus. Reportedly, soldiers manning thecheckpoints in Duma had access to a computerised system to track movements of civilians.283
Checkpoints set up in Eastern Ghouta have divided the area into enclaves, whereby checkpoints areplaced at crossroads, connecting cities and towns. The checkpoints were initially manned by the SAA
and the Republican Guards, before they were handed over to personnel from State Security and the
Air Force Intelligence. Mobile searches are conducted at the checkpoints, and civilians are questioned
about the contents, as well as deleted items on their phones.284 In Zabadani for example, mobile
searches led to the arrests and questioning of civilians, allegedly for communicating with relatives in
Idlib.285
According to the Middle East Institute report on Eastern Ghouta, there are ten fixed crossing points
around Eastern Ghouta and at the entrances of some of the strategic sites. Six of the ten crossing
points surround densely populated areas. These crossing points are entirely supervised by the
Republican Guards and State Security, where the vast majority of arrests, and forced conscriptions,
reportedly take place. The military areas Zamalka, Ein Tarma and the 7th Bridge Crossing, are restricted
to military personnel only. The Jobar district is reportedly the most isolated and heavily restricted
areas, where civilians are denied access, with the exception for labourers working for the 4th Divisionthat have approved access to the area. In the areas south-east of Ghouta, where checkpoints are
subject to mixed supervision, civilians are able to move more easily. These areas are primarily small
isolated communities and therefore less populous. Internal security checkpoints separate this partfrom other areas, blocking access leading to the main central road of Eastern Ghouta.286
Several incidents of infighting between government agencies over disputes pertaining to checkpoint
bribes have also been reported.287 According to Kozak (ISW), flying checkpoints, established bygovernment forces to search for conscripts and draft evaders, are more frequent in former rebel-heldareas, such as Eastern Ghouta.288 People’s names are checked against wanted lists at checkpoints,
however not on regular or systematic bases. Each security branch within the government’s security
has its own lists. However, the different branches do not coordinate the lists with each other. It is
generally difficult for people to obtain personal information from the Syrian authorities concerning
their status, and whether they are subjects of interest to the authorities. Trying to access information
is a risk in itself, which can lead to arrests.289 Additionally, persons interviewed by EIP reported that
persons who earlier did not have problems with the authorities have recently found themselves onarrest lists, suggesting that the lists are continuously updated (so-called live lists) where names areadded or subtracted.290
The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic reported that‘a network of checkpoints remained across “reconciled areas”, including in Dar’a and eastern
Ghutah [Ghouta], in contravention of the assurances made during “reconciliation processes”.
This has severely restricted the freedom of movement of the civilian population, primarily
affecting adult men who feared apprehension and forced conscription. Recently, the use of
rapidly deployed ad hoc checkpoints in Duma, has instilled additional fear among the
population.’

283 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/40/51], 15 August 2019, url, para 73
284 EIP, Refugees Return in Syria: Dangers, Security Risks and Information Scarcity, July 2019, url, p. 29
285 EIP, Refugees Return in Syria: Dangers, Security Risks and Information Scarcity, July 2019, url, p. 25
286 Middle East Institute/Etana Syria, Forgotten Lives: Life under regime rule in former opposition-held East Ghouta, May
2019, url, p. 62
287 EIP, Refugees Return in Syria: Dangers, Security Risks and Information Scarcity, July 2019, url, p. 29
288 DIS/DRC, Syria: Security Situation in Damascus Province and Issues Regarding Return to Syria, February 2019, url, p. 12
289 DIS/DRC, Syria: Security Situation in Damascus Province and Issues Regarding Return to Syria, February 2019, url, p. 15
290 EIP, Refugees Return in Syria: Dangers, Security Risks and Information Scarcity, July 2019, url, p. 12

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT SYRIA: INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS, RETURNEES AND INTERNAL MOBILITY— 41

Checkpoints have been used by the security services for extortion, which in turn have obstructed
access to basic services.291
COAR-Global further listed in its meeting with the DIS/DRC profiles likely to face scrutiny when passing
checkpoints: ‘Individuals who originate from reconciled area, former oppositions activists, individuals
wanted for conscription, anyone with any relation to political actors (both secular or Islamist),
individuals from large and famous families who are known to the government and individuals who
have similar names to wanted people’.292

5.2 Checkpoints in rebel–held areas in Idlib province:
As of 2 April 2019, field researchers of the Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ) monitoring crossings andcheckpoints in areas held by rebel from HTS in Idlib identified four main checkpoints between theareas of control of HTS and the Syrian government forces: Al-Rashdeen, Tel al-Sultan/Tel Touqan,
Murek and Qalat al-Madeeq.293
The checkpoints were by April 2019 primarily run by HTS, with the exception of Tel al-Sultan/Tel
Touqan which is controlled by the al-Sham legion. Al-Rasheen checkpoint was also used as a prisoner‘swap’ crossing point. The other checkpoints were opened and closed at intervals on the side of the
Syrian government forces.294
No information could be found relating to the procedures undertaken by the HTS or other rebel
factions manning checkpoints in Idlib.

5.3 Damascus International Airport
Information regarding Damascus Airport and flight connections can be found in the EASO COI report
Syria: Socio-economic situation in Damascus city (February 2020).295

291 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/43/57], 28 January 2020 [published 2 March 2020], url, p. 14
292 DIS/DRC, Syria: Security Situation in Damascus Province and Issues Regarding Return to Syria, Appendix 1: Meeting
minutes, Meeting With COAR-Global, Beirut 17 November 2018, February 2019, url, p. 58
293 STJ, Fact Sheet: Crossings and Checkpoints in Hayat Tahrir al-Sham-held territories, 2 April 2019, url
294 STJ, Fact Sheet: Crossings and Checkpoints in Hayat Tahrir al-Sham-held territories, 2 April 2019, url
295 EASO, COI report Syria: Socio-economic situation in Damascus city, February 2020, url42 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT SYRIA: INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS, RETURNEES AND INTERNAL MOBILITY

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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT SYRIA: INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS, RETURNEES AND INTERNAL MOBILITY— 45

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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT SYRIA: INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS, RETURNEES AND INTERNAL MOBILITY— 53

Terms of Reference
The ToR mainly focus on the general situation of IDPs, returnees (including return of refugees fromneighboring countries as well as other countries) and subsequently the challenges these groups arefacing, in their place of displacement and/or upon return to their place of origin. Other related topics
include: identifying particular groups of IDPs or returnees that maybe subject of interest to the Syrian
government, or other actors, within the area of displacement or upon return.
Research should aim to cover:
•

•

•

•

IDPs
o
o

General background of the IDP situation
An overview of the patterns/trends of displacement, numbers, location of
displacement, place of origino Humanitarian situation in the place of displacemento Challenges facing IDPso Prospects of returno Protracted displacement
Returneeso An overview of the pattern of return, numbers, location of returno The situation of returnees, earlier displaced within the countryo Humanitarian situation in the place of origin
o The situation of returnees from abroado Prospects and challenges pertaining to returno Procedures for return (government decrees, legislation ….)
Particular groups IDPs/Returneeso Conscripts, draft evaders, particularly from previously rebel held areaso Persons originating from formerly rebel held areaso Womeno Childreno Other groups
Internal mobilityo Road security (ex. checkpoints)o Accessibility procedures into formerly rebel held areaso Entry procedures for returnees from abroado Security clearance and the consequences it has on persons wishing to return to theirplace of origin, or take up residence in other parts of the country.

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doi: 10.2847/460038