European Asylum Support Office

Syria
Targeting of individuals

Country of Origin Information Report

March 2020

SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION

European Asylum Support Office

Syria
Targeting of individuals

Country of Origin Information Report

March 2020

More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu).
PDF: ISBN: 978-92-9485-134-5 doi: 10.2847/683510

BZ0120018ENN© European Asylum Support Office (EASO) 2019
Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged, unless otherwise stated.
For third-party materials reproduced in this publication, reference is made to the
copyrights statements of the respective third parties.

Cover photo: © 2018 European Union (photographer: Peter Biro), EU Civil Protectionand Humanitarian Aid, 13 November 2018, url (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS — 3

Acknowledgements
EASO would like to acknowledge Germany, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF),
Country Analysis, as the co-drafter of this report, together with the EASO COI sector.

The following departments and organisations have reviewed the report:
Finland, Finnish Immigration Service, Legal Service and Country Information Unit
ACCORD, the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation

It must be noted that the review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts or organisations
contributes to the overall quality of the report but does not necessarily imply their formal
endorsement of the final report, which is the full responsibility of EASO.

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Contents
Acknowledgements................................................................................................................................. 3Contents .................................................................................................................................................. 4
Disclaimer................................................................................................................................................ 8
Glossary and abbreviations ..................................................................................................................... 9
Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 10
Methodology .................................................................................................................................... 10
Quality control .................................................................................................................................. 10
Sources ............................................................................................................................................. 10
Structure and use of the report ........................................................................................................ 11
Map ....................................................................................................................................................... 12
1. Persons perceived to be opposing the government ......................................................................... 13
1.1 Treatment of persons perceived to be opposing the government ............................................ 14
1.1.1 Arbitrary arrest, detention and enforced disappearances ................................................. 14
1.1.2 Torture and other forms of ill-treatment ............................................................................ 16
1.1.3 Wanted lists......................................................................................................................... 16
1.1.4 Extrajudicial executions....................................................................................................... 17
1.2 Different profiles interpreted by the government as opposition............................................... 18
1.2.1 Members of anti-government armed groups ..................................................................... 18
1.2.2 Political activists, protesters and opposition party members............................................. 20
1.2.3 Civilians originating from, or residing in, areas perceived to be opposing the government...................................................................................................................................................... 21
1.3 Returnees from abroad .............................................................................................................. 23
1.3.1 Profiles of returnees ............................................................................................................ 23
1.3.2 Syrian refugees returning from Turkey ............................................................................... 24
1.3.3 Syrian refugees returning from Lebanon ............................................................................ 25
1.3.4 Syrian refugees returning from Jordan ............................................................................... 26
1.3.5 Clearance ............................................................................................................................. 26
1.3.6 Treatment upon return ....................................................................................................... 27
2. Persons fearing recruitment by the government armed forces and/or repercussions as military draft
evaders and deserters from the armed forces ..................................................................................... 31
2.1 Military service and official conscription .................................................................................... 31
2.2 Deferrals and exemptions .......................................................................................................... 34
2.2.1 Students .............................................................................................................................. 34

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2.2.2 Government employees ...................................................................................................... 34
2.2.3 Medical cases ...................................................................................................................... 35
2.2.4 Only sons ............................................................................................................................. 35
2.2.5 Exemption from military service by paying exemption fees, and risk of being called up as
reservist despite having paid the fee ........................................................................................... 36
2.3 Consequences of draft evasion and desertion ........................................................................... 36
2.3.1 Penalties for evading service............................................................................................... 36
2.3.2 Penalties for desertion ........................................................................................................ 37
2.4 Enforcement of amnesty for draft evaders and deserters ......................................................... 37
3. Persons perceived to be opposing the SDF/YPG .............................................................................. 39
3.1 Targeting of political opponents................................................................................................. 39
3.2 Targeting of persons with (perceived) links to ISIL ..................................................................... 41
3.3 Other profiles perceived as opposition ...................................................................................... 42
3.4 Targeting of persons associated with Turkey and/or the Syrian National Army........................ 43
3.5 List of illustrative incidents ......................................................................................................... 44
4. Persons fearing (forced) recruitment by Kurdish forces in areas under their influence .................. 46
4.1 Compulsory military service ....................................................................................................... 46
4.2 Forced recruitment ..................................................................................................................... 47
4.3 Recruitment of children .............................................................................................................. 48
5. Persons perceived to be supporting the government and/or opposing anti-government armed
groups ................................................................................................................................................... 50
5.1 Members of the government of Syria and Baath party officials ................................................ 51
5.2 Members of government forces and affiliated armed groups ................................................... 52
5.3 Civilians perceived to be collaborating with the government or the (pro-)government armed
forces and/or to oppose anti-government armed groups ............................................................... 54
5.3.1 Targeting by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham ..................................................................................... 54
5.3.2 Targeting by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)................................................ 56
6. Members of and persons perceived to be collaborating with SDF/YPG........................................... 58
6.1 Targeting by the Syrian National Army....................................................................................... 58
6.2 Targeting by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) ....................................................... 61
6.2.1 List of illustrative incidents ................................................................................................. 62
7. Journalists and other media professionals and bloggers.................................................................. 64
7.1 General overview........................................................................................................................ 64
7.2 Targeting by government forces and affiliated armed groups ................................................... 65
7.3 Targeting by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham ............................................................................................ 66
7.4 Targeting by the Syrian National Army....................................................................................... 67
7.5 Targeting by the SDF/YPG........................................................................................................... 67

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7.6 Targeting by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) ....................................................... 68
8. Human rights activists ....................................................................................................................... 69
8.1 Targeting by government forces and affiliated armed groups ................................................... 69
8.2 Targeting by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham ............................................................................................ 70
8.3 Targeting by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) ....................................................... 70
8.4 Targeting by the SDF/YPG........................................................................................................... 71
8.5 Targeting by the Syrian National Army....................................................................................... 71
9. Targeting of doctors and medical professionals ............................................................................... 72
9.1 Targeting by government forces and affiliated armed groups ................................................... 72
9.2 Targeting by non-state armed groups ........................................................................................ 73
9.3 Targeting by unspecified armed actors ...................................................................................... 74
10. Members of specific ethnic and religious groups ........................................................................... 75
10.1 Overview on ethno-religious demography ............................................................................... 75
10.2 The sectarian nature of the conflict in Syria............................................................................. 76
10.3 Sunni Arabs ............................................................................................................................... 77
10.3.1 Targeting by the government forces and affiliated armed groups ................................... 78
10.3.2 Forced displacement and denial of return ........................................................................ 78
10.3.4 Targeting by non-state armed groups............................................................................... 79
10.4 Kurds ......................................................................................................................................... 80
10.5 Druze......................................................................................................................................... 81
10.6 Alawites .................................................................................................................................... 82
10.7 Christians .................................................................................................................................. 84
10.8 Yazidis ....................................................................................................................................... 85
11. Palestinians ..................................................................................................................................... 87
11.1 Legal status of the Palestinian refugees in Syria ...................................................................... 87
11.2 UNWRA operations and available assistance ........................................................................... 87
11.3 Targeting in relation to participation of the Palestinian community in the armed conflicts ... 88
11.4 Other information on treatment of Palestinians...................................................................... 90
12. Children ........................................................................................................................................... 92
12.1 Child recruitment by government armed forces and other armed groups.............................. 92
12.2 Child labour............................................................................................................................... 94
12.3 Access to education .................................................................................................................. 94
12.4 Lack of documentation and risk of statelessness ..................................................................... 96
13. LGBTI ............................................................................................................................................... 98
13.1 Legal framework ....................................................................................................................... 98
13.2 State protection ........................................................................................................................ 98

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13.3 Treatment by non-state armed groups .................................................................................... 99
13.4 Societal discrimination ........................................................................................................... 100
13.5 Organisations .......................................................................................................................... 101
Annex I: Bibliography .......................................................................................................................... 102
Annex II: Terms of Reference .............................................................................................................. 137

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Disclaimer
This report was written according to the EASO COI Report Methodology (2012).1 The report is basedon carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced.
The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed with utmost
care. However, this document does not claim to be exhaustive. If a particular event, person ororganisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has not taken place orthat the person or organisation does not exist.
Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particularapplication for international protection. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative of aparticular legal position.
‘Refugee’, ‘risk’ and similar terminology are used as generic terminology and not in the legal sense as
applied in the EU Asylum Acquis, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the
Status of Refugees.
Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may bemade of the information contained in this report.
The drafting of this report was finalised on 5 December 2019. Some additional information was added
during the finalisation of this report in response to feedback received during the quality control
process, until 30 January 2019. Any event taking place after this date is not included in this report.
More information on the reference period for this report can be found in the methodology section of
the Introduction

1 The EASO methodology is largely based on the Common EU Guidelines for processing Country of Origin Information (COI),

2008, and can be downloaded from the EASO website: http://www.easo.europa.eu.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS — 9

Glossary and abbreviations
CoI

Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic

CPJ

Committee to Protect Journalists

DIS

Danish Immigration Service

FIS

Finnish Immigration Service

FSA

Free Syrian Army

GoS

Government of Syria

HTS

Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham

ISIL

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant; also known as Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria (ISIS), the Islamic State (IS), or Daesh

ISW

Institute for the Study of War

KNC

Kurdish National Council

NDF

National Defence Forces

NLF

National Liberation Front

OHCHR

Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights

PHR

Physicians for Human Rights

PYD

Democratic Union Party (Kurdish)

RSF

Reporters Sans Frontières/Reporters Without Borders

SAA

Syrian Arab Army

SDPP

Syrian Democratic People’s Party

SDF

Syrian Democratic Forces

SHRC

Syrian Human Rights Committee

SJAC

Syria Justice and Accountability Centre

SNA

Syrian National Army

SNHR

Syrian Network for Human Rights

SOHR

Syrian Observatory of Human Rights

UNRWA

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the
Near East

YPG

Kurdish People’s Protection Units

YPJ

Kurdish Women’s Protection Units

10 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALSIntroduction
The purpose of this report is to provide relevant information regarding the targeting of individuals in
Syria, for international protection status determination, including refugee status and subsidiary
protection, and in particular for use in EASO’s country guidance development on Syria.
This report is produced in line with the EASO COI Report Methodology (2019)2 and the EASO COI
Writing and Referencing Style Guide (2019).3
This report should be read in conjunction with other 2019-2020 EASO COI reports on Syria, such as
the reports titled Actors (December 2019), Situation of women (February 2020), Socio-economic
situation: Damascus City (February 2020), Exercise of authority in recaptured areas (January 2019) and
Security situation (November 2019). These reports provide relevant information regarding topics suchas the main armed actors, targeted violence, and armed conflict developments in Syria for the purposeof developing country guidance on Syria.

Methodology
The report contains information on the conflict in Syria since 2011 but focuses primarily on recent
trends, with updated information on 2019 where available. The information gathered is a result ofresearch using public, specialised paper-based and electronic sources until 5 December 2019. Some
additional information was added during the finalisation of this report in response to feedback
received during the quality control process, until 30 January 2020.
The terms of reference (ToR) of this report were defined by EASO based on discussions held and input
received from COI experts in the EASO COI specialist network on Syria and from policy experts in EU+
countries4 within the framework of a Country Guidance development on Syria. This report was drafted
for the purpose of developing analysis of particular profiles with regard to qualification for refugee
status.
ToR for this report can be found in the annex of this report.

Quality control
In line with the EASO COI Report Methodology, a peer review was performed by COI researchers fromthe departments listed as reviewers in the Acknowledgements section.

Sources
The report is based on information from UN reports, reports from human rights organisations,academic publications and news articles, that in different ways describe the situation of the profiles
covered in the report.
In addition to the paper-based and electronic sources that were consulted, the report also draws on
an interview conducted by EASO with Christopher Kozak, Editor and Senior Analyst at the Institute for
the Study of War. The sources are described in the Bibliography.

2 EASO, EASO Country of Origin Information (COI) Report Methodology, June 2019, url
3 EASO, Writing and Referencing Guide for EASO Country of Origin Information (COI) Reports, June 2019, url
4 All EU Member States plus Norway and Switzerland

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS — 11

Structure and use of the report
The report is divided into chapters that each discuss the different profiles of targeted persons as
defined in the ToR according to the actor(s) targeting them. For the profiles that may be targeted bymultiple actors, information was further split by actors of targeting. This is particularly the case for
Chapters 5 to 9.
EASO has published additional COI reports on Actors, Situation of women, Socio-economic situation:
Damascus City, Exercise of authority in recaptured areas and Security Situation. All reports are publicly
available at the EASO COI portal.5 Where relevant, in this report reference to these reports have been
made for further reading and more detailed information.

5 EASO, COI Report: Syria – Actors, December 2019, url; EASO, COI Report: Syria – Exercise of authority in recaptured areas,

January 2020, url; EASO, COI Report: Syria – Security situation, November 2019, url; EASO, COI Report: Syria – Situation of
women, February 2020, url; EASO, COI Report: Syria – Socio-economic situation in Damascus City, February 2020, url12 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

Map

Map 1: Syria, © United Nations6

6 Syria, Map No. 4204 Rev. 3, April 2012, United Nations, url

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1. Persons perceived to be opposing thegovernment
As of December 2019, the Government of Syria (GoS) controlled most of the country7, including the
major cities of Damascus, Aleppo, Homs and Hama, and nearly all the governorates capitals.8
The Syrian Armed Forces consist of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA), the navy, the air force, the intelligence
services and the National Defense Forces (NDF).9 Various pro-government militias, both local andforeign, were operating in Syria alongside the regular armed forces.10 These included local militiassuch as the NDF and non-Syrian militias made up of foreign fighters mainly backed by Iran.11
Syria’s security apparatus is composed of four main intelligence branches that are formallycoordinated by the National Security Bureau, which is overseen by the President's office: Air ForceIntelligence, Military Intelligence Department, General Intelligence Directorate and Political Security
Directorate.12
Detailed information on the mandate/structure, protection capabilities and integrity issues ofgovernment actors and affiliated armed groups is available in the EASO COI Report: Syria – Actors(December 2019).
Government forces harshly repressed the anti-government protests that erupted in 2011 and ensuing
military uprising. According to the US Congress-appointed Syria Study Group, throughout the conflict,the GoS has used ‘systematic torture, unlawful detentions and disappearances, and starvation andmedical deprivation sieges, as well as mass casualty weapons, including chemical weapons, against
civilians’.13 Civilians perceived to be either supporting the opposition or insufficiently loyal to GoS werearbitrarily arrested and detained.14
GoS is reported to view as political dissent the activities of wide categories of individuals, including
peaceful protesters, activists and critics of the government15, professionals such as humanitarian
workers, doctors, lawyers, journalists16, bloggers and online activists17, as well as draft evaders18 and

7 Based on reading of the following maps: ISW, Syria Situation Report: December 17-28, 2019, 9 January 2020, url;

Liveuamap, Syria, 31 December 2019, url
8 Lund, A., From Cold War to Civil War: 75 Years of Russian-Syrian Relations, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, July
2019, url, p. 33
9 CIA World Factbook, Syria, 16 September 2019, url
10 ACLED, Pro-government Militia Autonomy on the Battlefield in Syria, 22 March 2018, url
11 Finland, FIS, Syria: Fact-Finding Mission to Beirut and Damascus, April 2018, 14 December 2018, url, p. 5; Al-Masri, A.,
Analysis: The Fifth Corps and the State of the Syrian Army, Atlantic Council, 13 January 2017, url
12 EIP, Refugees Return in Syria: Dangers, Security Risks and Information Scarcity, July 2019, url, p. 8
13 Syria Study Group, Final Report and Recommendations, USIP, 24 September 2019, url, p. 17
14 UN Human Rights Council, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Deaths in Detention in the Syrian Arab Republic, 3 February 2016,
url, p. 4
15 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2018 - Syria, 13 March 2019, url, p. 18; SJAC, Walls Have Ears: An
Analysis of Classified Syrian Security Sector Documents, April 2019, url, p. 28
16 AI, Human rights in the Middle East and North Africa: Review of 2018 - Syria [MDE 24/9903/2019], 26 February 2019,url, p. 63
17 Freedom House, Freedom on the Net, 1 November 2018, url
18 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/40/70], 31 January 2019, url, p. 15

14 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

defected soldiers.19 Individuals living in opposition-controlled areas20, those in recaptured areas21,
returnees from abroad22, relatives of suspected armed groups members23 and those who have beenin contact with family members or friends residing in opposition-controlled areas, have also beentargeted.24
The sections below provide detailed information on specific profiles perceived to be opposing the GoS
and their treatment.

1.1 Treatment of persons perceived to be opposing the government
1.1.1 Arbitrary arrest, detention and enforced disappearances
More than 100 000 people have been detained, abducted or gone missing during Syria’s eight-year
civil war, largely at the hands of the GoS, according to Rosemary DiCarlo, UN Under-Secretary-Generalfor Political and Peacebuilding Affairs.25 Amnesty International (AI) noted that tens of thousands ofpeople are still missing, most of them since 2011, including ‘peaceful activists, humanitarian workers,
lawyers, journalists, peaceful critics and government opponents as well as individuals detained inplace of relatives wanted by the authorities’.26
The UN Human Rights Council described the practice of arbitrary arrests as follows: ‘Since March 2011,a countrywide pattern emerged in which civilians, mainly males above the age of 15, were arbitrarily
arrested and detained by the Syrian security and armed forces or by militia acting on behalf of theGovernment during mass arrests, house searches, at checkpoints and in hospitals’. GoS forces arrested
civilians perceived to be supporting the opposition or deemed insufficiently loyal to the government,
including residents in opposition-held areas and relatives of suspected armed opposition fighters,
among others.27
AI reported thousands of detainees in 2018 being held without trial, some since the outbreak of theconflict in 2011 including ‘peaceful critics and opponents of the government as well as family members
detained in place of relatives wanted by the authorities’.28 Documenting the period March 2011 toAugust 2019, the Syrian NGO Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR)29 noted around 144 899 people
are still detained or forcibly disappeared. GoS forces including the SAA, intelligence services andmilitias were responsible for 128 417 of these cases. 98 279 persons were reported to still be forcibly
disappeared, the majority of whom (83 574) by the GoS and affiliated forces.30

19 AI, Between Prison and the Grave: Enforced Disappearances in Syria, November 2015, url, p. 7; UN Human Rights Council,

Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/19/69], 22 February
2012, url, p. 13
20 UN Human Rights Council, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Deaths in Detention in the Syrian Arab Republic, 3 February 2016,
url, p. 4
21 OHCHR, Human Rights Digest Syria, The “unreconciled” concerns of civilians in Dar’a Governorate, May 2019, url, p. 8
22 EIP, Refugees Return in Syria: Dangers, Security Risks and Information Scarcity, July 2019, url, pp. 22-24
23 UN Human Rights Council, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Deaths in Detention in the Syrian Arab Republic, 3 February 2016,
url, p. 4
24 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/40/70], 31 January 2019, url, p. 15
25 UN News, Security Council Failing Thousands of People Detained, Abducted in Syria, Civil Society Speakers Say,
Demanding Information about Missing Persons’ Whereabouts, 7 August 2019, url
26 AI, Human rights in the Middle East and North Africa: Review of 2018 - Syria [MDE 24/9903/2019], 26 February 2019,url, p. 63
27 UN Human Rights Council, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Deaths in Detention in the Syrian Arab Republic, 3 February 2016,
url, p. 4
28 AI, Report 2017/18, the State of the World’s Human Rights, 2018, url, p. 353
29 The SNHR is, according to its website, ‘an independent, non-profit and non-governmental organization’. It documents
human rights violations in Syria. For more information, see SNHR, About us, n.d., url
30 SNHR, At Least 98,000 Forcibly Disappeared Persons in Syria since March 2011, 30 August 2019, url, pp. 5-6

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS — 15

According to the US Department of State (USDOS) annual report on human rights practices in Syria(covering 2018), since the start of the conflict in 2011 the four main intelligence agencies were
responsible for most arrests and detentions of persons perceived to oppose the government,
including peaceful demonstrators, human rights activists, and political dissidents and theirfamilies.31 In a June 2019 report, Human Rights Watch noted that the intelligence services were‘responsible for systematic rights abuses, have restricted access to aid, and mistreated those they
perceived as political opponents’. Arbitrary arrests, torture and extrajudicial killing of civilians, humanrights defenders and humanitarian workers have also been documented.32
An April 2019 report by the Syrian Justice and Accountability Centre (SJAC)33, based on a sample of
5 003 documents drawn from about 483 000 papers retrieved from Syria during the civil war, revealed
how the intelligence agencies created a wide network of informants and used phone surveillance toensure that the government kept a close watch of the most mundane of Syrians’ everyday life andrestrict criticism of Assad and his government. Peaceful protesters, media reporters, opposition
politicians, Kurdish leaders, defected soldiers, armed rebels, or extremist fighters were all viewed
through the same lens and faced detention and punishment for their actions. Only a few of the
documents also made reference to torture and death in detention.34
In an analysis of 164 government documents about detention, SJAC noted that:‘The majority of pages related to detention in the sample set were about individuals detainedfor protesting or for other forms of expression, including, in one case, for simply cursing thePresident during a dinner gathering. Despite this emphasis, however, it should be noted thatthe pages often lumped protesters, critical reporters (i.e., ‘enemy media’), members of armed
groups, and terrorists into a single category of ‘inciting elements.’ In some cases, the terms
appeared to be used interchangeably. There was an admission in the sample set that womenand children are among the detainees […]’35
Furthermore, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (CoI)
reported that civilians were arrested for communicating with their relatives in rebel-held territory or
abroad.36 According to interviews by the Finnish Immigration Service (FIS) with an anonymous expert
on Syria in September 2018, GoS appeared to remain capable of monitoring telephones and social
media of its citizens and to compile several lists of alleged government opponents.37
The abuses committed by the Syrian intelligence branches have led countries such as France andGermany to issue arrest warrants for the heads of these agencies on charges of war crimes and crimes
against humanity.38
While arbitrary arrests and detention would have to be illegal or at least challengeable in court under
the Syrian constitution, a 2011 decree allows the government to detain individuals for up to 60 days

31 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2018 - Syria, 13 March 2019, url, p. 18
32 HRW, Rigging the System. Government Policies Co-Opt Aid and Reconstruction Funding in Syria, 28 June 2019,url, pp. 5; 33-34
33 The Syrian Justice and Accountability Centre is an US based non-profit organization who collects and preserves
documentation of violations of human rights, humanitarian, and international criminal law in Syria. See url
34 SJAC, Walls Have Ears: An Analysis of Classified Syrian Security Sector Documents, April 2019, url, p. 28
35 SJAC, Walls Have Ears. An Analysis of Classified Syrian Security Sector Documents, April 2019, p. 16, url
36 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
15 August 2019, url, p. 13
37 Finland, FIS, Fact-Finding Mission to Beirut and Damascus, 14 December 2018, url, p. 38
38 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/40/70], 31 January 2019, url, p. 6

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without charge if suspected of ‘terrorism’ and related offenses.39 Regardless of the decree’s
stipulations, detention often outlasted 60 days and in many cases lasted indefinitely.40
The GoS had used the practice of enforced disappearance before 2011 as an instrument of social andpolitical control41, but the conflict has brought other armed actors and a refugee crisis into play whichmakes the location and identification of missing persons highly complicated.42

1.1.2 Torture and other forms of ill-treatment
The CoI has reported on the use of torture by government forces, especially the intelligence branches,noting in 2016 that ‘it is extremely rare to find an individual who has been detained by theGovernment who has not suffered severe torture’. Most of the victims were men between the agesof 18 and 60, but torture of women and children was also reported.43 USDOS noted that GoS forces
tortured perceived opponents; including during interrogations and the Counter Terrorism Court (CTC)
and courts-martial ‘relied on forced confessions and information acquired through torture to obtainconvictions’.44
The SNHR recorded that 14 298 individuals died due to torture between March 2011 and September
2019 and attributed approximately 99 % of these cases to GoS forces.45 During the first half of 2019,
SNHR reported that 159 individuals died due to torture with GoS forces being responsible inapproximately 89 % of cases.46
In March 2018, the CoI published a report on sexual and gender-based violence from March 2011 to
December 2017 finding that the rape of and sexual violence of women, girls and occasionally men
committed by GoS forces and associated militias during ground operations, raids and in detention
amounted to war crimes and crimes against humanity. Sexual violence was used during operations toarrest protesters and perceived opposition supporters, but also ‘to force confessions, to extract
information, as punishment, as well as to terrorise opposition communities’.47

1.1.3 Wanted lists
Several experts on Syria interviewed by the FIS during a fact-finding mission to Beirut and Damascus
in April 2018 reported that Syrians ended up wanted by the government for a wide variety of reasonsand sometimes for no reason at all. A checkpoint officer’s mood as well as having a similar name witha person that in fact opposes the government could lead to an arrest.48
Pro-opposition media outlet Zaman al-Wasl leaked one of those lists in 2018, which is said to originate
from the year 2015 and has since been widely shared online. It contains around 1.5 million names of

39 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2018 - Syria, 13 March 2019, url, p. 11
40 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2018 - Syria, 13 March 2019, url, p. 13
41 HRW, A Wasted Decade: Human Rights in Syria during Bashar al-Asad’s First Ten Years in Power, July 2010, url, pp. 5-10,

18-22
42 ILAC, Rule of Law Assessment Report Syria 2017, 19 April 2017, url, p. 145
43 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
11 August 2016, A/HRC/33/55, url, p. 15
44 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2018 - Syria, 13 March 2019, url, p. 5
45 SNHR, Death Toll due to Torture, n.d., url
46 SNHR, Death Toll due to Torture. Statistics of 2019, n.d., url
47 UN Human Rights Council, "I lost my dignity": Sexual and gender-based violence in the Syrian Arab Republic; Conference
room paper of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/37/CRP.3], 8March 2018, url, pp. 1, 4
48 Finland, FIS, Fact-Finding Mission to Beirut and Damascus, 14 December 2018, url, p. 39

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS — 17

people wanted for arrest by the government.49 Similar leaks (although containing not as many names)
were released by Zaman al-Wasl in 201650 and by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) in
201851, respectively.
While some sources seem to indicate a certain arbitrariness in the behaviour of Syria’s army personnel
and its allied militias, other (anonymous) sources from the FIS FFM report seem to confirm the general
assessment according to which there is a systematic pattern of targeting persons perceived to be
opposing the government.52 The CoI also noted that persons perceived to be opposition supporters‘were the most likely to be detained arbitrarily’.53
The practice of arresting Syrian citizens on unspecified grounds continued in 2019.54 In the first half of2019, SNHR documented 1 733 cases of arbitrary arrest at the hand of GoS forces throughout all
governorates.55
In September 2019, President Bashar al-Assad issued Legislative Decree No 20 of 2019, granting
general amnesty for crimes committed before 14 September 2019 for all or part of the penalty
concerned.56 A GoS-affiliated publication summarised the decree’s stipulations as follows: ‘the decreeminimizes major penalties like execution to life-time hard labour imprisonment while life sentences
are lessened to 20 years in prison. The decree also covers military service penalties. Deserters fromthe army must surrender themselves to benefit from the amnesty’.57 The decree foresees the releaseor decrease of punishment for some categories of prisoners, including some that were detained underthe ‘terrorism law’.58
Information on the implementation of the decree could not be found.

1.1.4 Extrajudicial executions
In a report published in June 2019, Human Rights Watch stated that it ‘extensively documented
abusive practices by the Syrian intelligence branches, including mistreatment, torture, arbitrary
detentions, and extrajudicial execution’.59

49 Zaman al-Wasl, 1.5 milyoun matloub li-nzam al-Asad [1.5 Million Wanted by the Assad Regime], n.d., url; Daily Star (The),

Syrians in exile search for answers in leaked “wanted list“, 6 April 2018, url; Swiss Refugee Council, Syrien: Fahndungslisten
und Zaman al Wasl [Syria: Wanted Lists and Zaman al-Wasl], 11 June 2019, url
50 Zaman al-Wasl, Khas bi-shabab Haleb wa-rijaliha: Muhrik maftuh min “Zaman al-Wasl“ li-lmatlubeen li-jaysh an-nizam[Especially for Aleppo’s youth and its men: “Zaman al-Wasl” search engine for those wanted by the regime’s army], 12
December 2016, url
51 SOHR, Qawayeem bi’akthar min 5 alaf ism matlub li-laihtiat fi-sufuf jayesh an-nizam tasil ila sharq al-asimat dimashq warifiha [lists of more than 5 thousand names required for reserve in the ranks of the regime’s army up to the east ofDamascus and its countryside], 18 December 2018, url
52 Finland, FIS, Fact-Finding Mission to Beirut and Damascus, 14 December 2018, url, pp. 40-41; UN Human Rights Council,
Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/40/70], 31 January
2019, url, p. 15
53 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/40/70], 31 January 2019, url, p. 15
54 SNHR, At least 183 Cases of Arbitrary Arrests Documented in Syria in October 2019, 2 November 2019, url; HRW, Syria:
Detention, Harassment in Retaken Areas, 21 May 2019, url
55 SNHR, At least 2,460 Cases of Arbitrary Arrests Documented in Syria in the First Half of 2019, 2 July 2019, url, pp. 7-8
56 SANA, President al-Assad issues legislative decree stipulating for granting amnesty for crimes committed before 14
September 2019, 15 September 2019, url
57 Syria Times (The), President al-Assad issues general amnesty, 15 September 2019, url
58 RFI, Syria president decrees amnesty, reduces sentences, 15 September 2019, url
59 HRW, Rigging the System: Government Policies Co-Opt Aid and Reconstruction Funding in Syria, 28 June 2019, url

18 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALSCiting the Human Rights Data Analysis Group, an NGO that uses a data analysis to estimate humanrights violations in armed conflict, AI stated that an estimated 17 723 people were killed in custodyacross Syria between 2011 and 2015, although the real number is thought to be higher.60
Since the summer of 2018, death registers have been issued by government authorities, officiallyconfirming for the first time the deaths of thousands of people in government custody, without
notifying their families or providing death certificates.61 In most cases, natural causes of death such as‘heart attack’ or ‘stroke’ were indicated.62 Former inmates interviewed by human rights organisations
stated that they were subjected to multiple forms of torture, and suffered illness as a result of
inadequate nutrition and hygiene while in detention.63 The massive and systematised torture andkilling of detainees in Syria’s state prisons over the course of the conflict is widely documented.64
According to an AI report published in 2017, between 5 000 and 13 000 people, mainly civilians
opposing the GoS, were executed at Saydnaya Prison [a military prison located 30 km north ofDamascus] over the course of five years.65 In December 2018, the Washington Post published anarticle suggesting that the rate of death sentences and executions in Syria’s prisons was increasing.
Testimonies of former detainees spoke of transfers of prisoners from other locations to Saydnaya to
be executed by hanging. The number of detainees in Saydnaya prison, which once held between
10 000 to 20 000 inmates, have begun to decrease ‘largely because of the unyielding executions’ with
one section being almost empty.66

1.2 Different profiles interpreted by the government as opposition
1.2.1 Members of anti-government armed groups
GoS has entered into so-called reconciliation agreements with different actors in most of the areas
the GoS forces have recaptured from various anti-government groups in the last few years.67 The
reconciliation agreements ‘ranged from compromises in which after a cease fire opposition fightersremained involved in security and governance roles in their areas, to cases of virtual opposition
surrender involving evacuations of fighters or even whole populations’.68
According to Lama Fakih, Middle East director at Human Rights Watch, active combat has ended inmuch of Syria, but nothing has changed in the way security services abuse the rights of ‘perceived
opponents of Assad’s rule’.69
Research by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) revealed that both civilians andformer opposition fighters have been arrested in so-called ‘reconciled’ areas retaken by GoS and ‘[…]60 AI, ‘It Breaks the Human’. Torture, Disease and Death in Syria’s Prisons, 18 August 2016, url, p. 7
61 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2018 - Syria, 13 March 2019, url, p. 4
62 Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, Death Notifications in the Syrian Arab

Republic, 27 November 2018, OHCHR, url, p. 3; AI, Syria: Families left alone to find answers about disappeared relatives,
30 August 2019, url
63 SHRC, The 17th Annual Report on Human Rights in Syria. January – December 2018, 24 January 2019, url, pp. 71-73
64 UN Human Rights Council, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Deaths in Detention in the Syrian Arab Republic, 3 February 2016,
url; AI, Human Slaughterhouse. Mass Hangings and Extermination at Saydnaya Prison, Syria, February 2017, url; SJAC, Walls
Have Ears: An Analysis of Classified Syrian Security Sector Documents, April 2019, url; New York Times (The), Inside Syria’s
Secret Torture Prisons: How Bashar al-Assad Crushed Dissent, 11 May 2019, url
65 AI, Syria, Secret campaign of mass hangings and extermination at Saydnaya Prison, 7 February 2017, url
66 Washington Post (The), Syria's once-teeming prison cells being emptied by mass murder, 23 December 2018, url
67 Adleh, F. and Favier, A., “Local reconciliation agreements” in Syria: A non-starter for peacebuilding, European University
Institute, June 2017, url, pp. 1-2
68 Hinnebusch, R., and Imady, O., Syria’s reconciliation agreements, Centre for Syrian Studies. University of St. Andrews,
12 February 2017, url, p. 1
69 HRW, Syria: Detention, Harassment in Retaken Areas, 21 May 2019, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS — 19

the regime’s clear priority is to eliminate remaining structures of resistance, whether civilian or former
fighter, and to discourage future rebellion’.70
As of late May 2019, as part of a ‘reconciliation deal’ sponsored by Russia, some former non-stategroups even retained their security control over some areas within government-controlled areas ofDar’a governorate.71 However, in similar deals struck in 2018, former opposition fighters were
provided only short-term protection: at first, former fighters were allowed to enlist in the government
forces’ Fifth Corps - an association of militias incorporated into the official military structure in 2016as a distinct army corps backed by Russia72 - under Russia’s supervision. It took only a few months forgovernment troops and allied militias to enter the ‘reconciled’ areas and carry out arbitrary arrestsand detentions. Reportedly, both civilians and former opposition fighters were targeted.73
Christopher Kozak, senior analyst at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), assessed that in practice,
the reconciliation agreements have been broken repeatedly and often. In particular, former activists
and opposition commanders have been arrested despite the reconciliation agreements and despite
having settlement cards. While Russia has invested heavily in taking reconciled opposition fighters andintegrating them into its Fifth Corps, GoS has detained a number of former opposition commanders
and fighters regardless of their affiliation with the Fifth Corps. Russia has tried issuing its own
identifications to individuals, saying that they are under Russian protection and should not be
arrested, which has worked to a limited degree, although there are still reports of opposition
leadership figures being detained regardless of any so-called guarantees from the Russians.74
The Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR) reported that in Dar’a governorate it
had received information that a few hundred reconciled fighters and civilians joined the pro-GoS
forces ‘in order to avoid being perceived as opposition affiliates or “terrorists” and putting themselves
and their families at risk of arrest and detention or retaliation by the authorities’.75 The CoI also notedin August 2019 that the secret police has conducted a campaign of arrests against former opposition
figures in southern Syria.76
In July 2019, SOHR reported that in June the security service had arrested two former commanders of
the rebel faction Shuhada al-Asimah Brigade, who had both signed reconciliation agreements andjoined GoS forces. They accused the men of killing informants and members of the GoS during thetime when the armed faction had been in control of parts of the area.77 In summer 2019, reports werereceived that the Palestine Branch of the military intelligence service had arrested three former rebel
commanders who had signed reconciliation agreements with GoS.78
Detailed information on the implementation of reconciliation agreements and consequences for the
population is available in EASO COI Report: Syria - Exercise of authority in recaptured areas (January
2020)

70 ACLED, The Risks of Reconciliation: Civilians and former fighters face continued threats in Syria, 25 January 2019, url
71 OHCHR, Human Rights Digest Syria, The “unreconciled“ concerns of civilians in Dar’a Governorate, May 2019, url, p. 3
72 Al-Jabassini, A., From Insurgents to Soldiers: The Fifth Assault Corps in Daraa, Southern Syria, Middle East Directions.

European University Institute, 14 May 2019, url, p. 5
73 Atlantic Council, The aftershocks of reconciliation in Syria: Reflections on the past year, 17 April 2019, url
74 EASO Interview with Christopher Kozak, Institute for the Study of War (ISW), 14 November 201975 OHCHR, Human Rights Digest Syria, The “unreconciled” concerns of civilians in Dar’a Governorate, May 2019, url, p. 5
76 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
15 August 2019, url, p. 13
77 SOHR, The regime’s security services arrests commanders and fighters of those who stuck “reconciliation andsettlement” deals in the south of Damascus, 23 July 2019, url
78 Despite the name, the Palestine Branch does not just target Palestinians in Syria but is one of the biggest branches ofthe military intelligence service, with Islamist movements as its main focus. SNHR, Syrian security branches and persons incharge, n.d., url20 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

1.2.2 Political activists, protesters and opposition party members
Political activism in Syria had been kept in check by the government for decades. The overarching
security apparatus made organisations register every activity with the Ministry of Social Affairs andLabour. Civil society organisations had to work either underground or under the patronage ofindividuals close to the government. Only due to the turmoil of the Syrian conflict were politicalactivists able to organise activities more freely in the years after 2011.79
Although a 2011 decree allowed for the registration of independent political parties, in practice thegovernment enforced it selectively, permitting only pro-government groups to form official parties.80
Since the beginning of the conflict in 2011, the GoS’ targeting of political activists and protesters who
sided with the opposition has been a key element in its counterinsurgency strategy.81 According to
Freedom House ‘opposition protests in government-held areas are usually met with gunfire, massarrests, and torture of those detained’. The government forces conduct regular raids to detain politicaland civic activists.82 Bertelsmann Stiftung noted that most of the political opposition members to the
Assad government have either fled Syria, were killed or are in prison.83
The prominent case of Bassel Khartabil Safadi, an outspoken supporter of the early demonstrators’
demands of peaceful government change attained a sizeable following online before he was arrested
in March 2012. As late as 2017, his family heard confirmation of his execution that took place in
October of 2015 while he was in custody.84
In other less prominent cases, confirmations of the individuals’ fate did not come until 2018 after thegovernment started issuing death notifications for previously arrested activists.85 In a 2015 report, AI
traced several more cases in which the state security actors and its allied militias arrested politicalactivists and protesters and/or forcibly disappeared them.86 According to AI, the targeted individuals
were politically active by organising and leading protests, leading chants and songs or merely
participating in demonstrations.87
Members of political parties, which are known to support the calls for overthrowing the Assadgovernment, are considered enemies of the state. For example, the Syrian Democratic People’s Party(SDPP) openly aligns itself with revolutionary forces.88 According to AI, a leading member of the SDPP
disappeared in October 2013 shortly before allegedly 20 members of the government’s security forces
raided his house, seizing his computer among other personal belongings.89 His fate remains
unknown.90
Former political activists living in areas recaptured by GoS claimed to have used smuggling networks
to be transported to rebel-held areas out of fear that they would risk arrest by GoS forces.91 USDOS

79 Middle East Institute, Hope amid Despair: Syrian Civil Society, 30 June 2015, url
80 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2019 - Syria, 4 February 2019, url; USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights

Practices 2018 - Syria, 13 March 2019, url, p. 46
81 UN Human Rights Council, Without a Trace: Enforced Disappearances in Syria, 19 December 2013, url, pp. 2-5; New YorkTimes (The), Syrian Arrests Are Said to Have Snared Tens of Thousands, 27 June 2012, url
82 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2019 - Syria, 4 February 2019, url
83 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2018 Country Report: Syria, 2018, url, p. 984 Washington Post (The), One of Syria’s best known-democracy activists has been executed, 2 August 2017, url
85 Atlantic (The), A Cruel Epilogue to the Syrian Civil War, 15 August 2018, url
86 AI, Between Prison and the Grave, November 2015, url, pp. 28-35
87 AI, Between Prison and the Grave, November 2015, url, pp. 28-33
88 SDPP, Homepage, n.d., url
89 AI, Between Prison and the Grave, November 2015, url, pp. 31-32
90 AI, Tens of Thousands: Fa’eq al-Mir, n.d., url
91 Syria Direct, Syrians in former opposition pockets still using smugglers, corrupt security officials to transport themselves
north amid ‘false promises’ of reconciliation, 11 April 2019, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS — 21

reported that Alawite opposition activists were reportedly victims of ‘arbitrary arrests, torture,detentions and killing’ by the GoS forces.92
According to Christopher Kozak, in Qamishli, Hasaka governorate, where the GoS retains partial
control on the ground, it has targeted individuals for arrest based on political activities.93
Targeting of political activists opposing GoS can also occur through other parties than the government
forces or its allied militias. It is worth mentioning that a very prominent activist named Raed Fares wasshot dead by unidentified gunmen in rebel-held territory in November 2018. However, it is not clear
whether the incident was linked to his profile as a government opponent.94

1.2.3 Civilians originating from, or residing in, areas perceived to be opposing thegovernment
The government’s territorial gains over the course of the Syrian conflict were followed by continued
arbitrary arrests and detention. In particular, as reported in the CoI, individuals perceived to be
opposition supporters were most likely to be detained arbitrarily by government forces and its allied
militias.95
Arbitrary arrests and enforced disappearances of alleged opposition supporters took place inreconquered areas such as Dar’a and Rural Damascus governorates.96 Civilians that had contact withrelatives of friends in opposition-held areas were also arrested and prevented from establishingfurther contact.97 Communicating with relatives abroad also led to arrests and monitoring of phones
was alleged by civilians residing in Douma, Rural Damascus.98 Women with familial ties to opposition
fighters were reportedly detained for intelligence-gathering purposes or retribution.99
According to figures by the human rights collective Syrian Association for Citizens’ Dignity (SYACD),(based on interviewees with residents and returnees to GoS-held areas), arbitrary arrests are about
twice as prevalent in reconquered areas than in areas that have remained under GoS-control since2011.100
Eastern Ghouta, one of the former rebel strongholds suffered the most bombardment during wartime.
After the government’s recapture in April 2018, security forces have been carrying out night-timeraids, mass arrests and forced disappearances and intelligence forces asserted themselves in every
aspect of daily life, as summarised in a policy paper by Middle East Institute and Etana.101 Out of a
population of about 180 000, in May 2019, approx. 1 500 were said to be arrested and 7 000 men to
be forcefully conscripted for military service since the GoS takeover.102

92 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2018 - Syria, 13 March 2019, url, p. 66
93 EASO Interview with Christopher Kozak, Institute for the Study of War (ISW), 14 November 2019
94 New York Times (The), Activist Who Used Humor to Highlight War Is Gunned Down in Syria, 23 November 2018, url;

Washington Post (The), One of Syria’s most famous activists killed by assassins in rebel stronghold, 23 November 2018, url
95 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/40/70], 31 January 2019, url, pp. 15-16
96 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
15 August 2019, url, p. 13; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on
the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/40/70], 31 January 2019, url, p. 15
97 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
15 August 2019, url, p. 15
98 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
15 August 2019, url, p. 14
99 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
15 August 2019, url, p. 13; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on
the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/40/70], 31 January 2019, url, p. 15
100 SYACD, Vengeance, repression and fear: Reality behind Assad’s promises to displaced Syrians, October 2019, url, p. 13
101 MEI/Etana, Despair and Decay: East Ghouta after 18 months of renewed regime rule, November 2019, url, p. 8102 MEI/Etana, Forgotten Lives: Life unde rregime rule in former opposition-held East Ghouta, May 2019, url, pp. 1, 7-9

22 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

According to Christopher Kozak of ISW, GoS treats individuals from former opposition-held areas witha heavy degree of suspicion. The scrutiny of individuals from former opposition-held areas is thehighest in Damascus, just given the concentration of security personnel in the city as well as theimportance of the capital to the government. Persons originating from the areas of Eastern Ghouta,
Darayya, and Hajar al-Aswad are also heavily scrutinised. The local population that remains in theformer opposition strongholds in Damascus is heavily monitored and needs to pass throughcheckpoints with time restrictions to enter Damascus, if they are allowed to enter at all. The security
presence is very high and there are routinely arrests of activists, medical personnel, former media
activists, basically anyone suspected of affiliation with the opposition in Eastern Ghouta.103
Following the takeover of Dar’a governorate by the GoS, OHCHR ‘received a number of worrying
reports of human rights violations and abuses by State and non-State actors, including executions,arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, looting and seizure of property’. Between July 2018
and March 2019, 380 people were arrested or detained, often for unclear reasons. In some cases,
the arrests were reportedly on suspicion of ‘terrorism’. Some 150 were soon released, but there
were at least 230 cases of enforced disappearance after that. Of those detained, 17 were arrested at
checkpoints as they were on the GoS’ ‘wanted lists’.104 OCHCR identified the Syrian intelligence
services Air Force Intelligence, Military Security and the Criminal Security department as being themain bodies responsible for the arrests.105
In southern Syria (Dar’a and Quneitra governorates), Kozak noted that there is also suspicion ofindividuals from former opposition-held areas and travel restrictions on locals, who for the most partare not allowed to leave southern Syria. While GoS controls within a given locality are less rigid insouthern Syria because, among other things, it does not have the manpower still to fully secure theareas that it reasserted control over in the past two years, violations are becoming routine. According
to Kozak, individuals are still restricted from travelling, subjected to increased scrutiny, and subjected
to detention by GoS, depending on their role in or their connections to individuals who had aleadership, activist, or militant role in southern Syria. These violations, Kozak assessed, are part of thegrievances that fuelled the resumption of protests in Dar’a city in late 2018 as well as the insurgent
violence that has been growing in southern Syria.106
Covering the period January to July 2019, the CoI noted that ‘throughout areas under the control ofgovernment forces, including Rif Dimashq and Dar’a Governorates, the Commission continued toreceive accounts of arbitrary detention and enforced disappearances’.107 In May 2019, Human Rights
Watch reported that in recaptured areas, Syrian intelligence agencies were reported to be arbitrarily
detaining, disappearing and harassing people, especially former armed and political opposition
leaders, media activists, aid workers, defectors, and family members of activists and former antigovernment fighters, even if the government had signed reconciliation agreements with them.108
According to an August 2019 report by the UN Security Council, the Syrian government’s security
forces have arbitrarily arrested and detained hundreds of persons since June 2019, the majority ofdetentions occurring in Dar’a, Rural Damascus, Damascus and Homs governorates.109

103 EASO Interview with Christopher Kozak, Institute for the Study of War (ISW), 14 November 2019104 OHCHR, Press briefing note on Dar’a, 21 May 2019, url
105 OHCHR, Human Rights Digest Syria, The “unreconciled” concerns of civilians in Dar’a Governorate, May 2019, url, p. 8106 EASO Interview with Christopher Kozak, Institute for the Study of War (ISW), 14 November 2019107 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/42/51], 15 August 2019, url, p. 13
108 HRW, Syria: Detention, Harassment in Retaken Areas, 21 May 2019, url
109 UN Security Council: Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018) and 2449 (2018); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2019/674], 21 August
2019, url, p. 6

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS — 23

Human Rights Watch also reported that in Damascus and Rural Damascus GoS restricted the access ofcivilians that wished to return and unlawfully demolished houses of residents ‘without providing
notice, alternative housing, or compensation’.110
Human Rights Watch claimed the government also punished family members of alleged opposition
supporters by applying a number of laws that violate their individual property rights.111 In recaptured
areas, GoS used the counter-terrorism Law No 19/2012 to seize properties of individuals deemed tohave been involved in terrorism activities. Under Law No 19, the state can freeze or confiscate both
movable or immovable property of such individuals. Around 70 000 Syrians reportedly faced asset
freeze decisions during 2017-2018, which were carried out by the Ministry of Finance. Family
members of those convicted of terrorism activities were included in some decisions, making it unclear
if they were also being convicted or barred from claiming any right on the properties seized.112
More information on the treatment of civilians in recaptured areas by GoS is available in the EASO COI
Report: Syria - Exercise of authority in recaptured areas (January 2020)

1.3 Returnees from abroad
The upcoming 2020 EASO COI report on “Syria: IDPs, returnees and internal mobility” will provide anextensive overview of the situation of refugees in neighbouring countries Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan,
and the underlying dynamics in those countries leading to the return of refugees to Syria.

1.3.1 Profiles of returnees
January 2020 data from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) showed thefollowing number of registered Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries113:
Location nameSourceData date% of allrefugees

RefugeePopulation

TurkeyUNHCR, Government
9 Jan 2020of Turkey

64.4%

3,576,659

LebanonUNHCR

31 Dec 2019

16.5%

914,648

JordanUNHCR

5 Jan 2020

11.8%

654,692

Iraq

UNHCR

31 Dec 2019

4.4%

245,810

Egypt

UNHCR

30 Nov 20192.3%

129,426

Other (North Africa) UNHCR

30 Nov 2018

0.6%

35,713It should be noted that the above UNHCR figures do not include Palestinian refugees from Syria
registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA).114
110 HRW, World Report 2019 - Syria, 17 January 2019, url
111 HRW, Syria. Suspect’s Families Assets Seized, 16 July 2019, url; Reuters, Syrian state seizes opponents’ property, rights

activists say, 12 December 2018, url
112 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/40/70], 31 January 2019, url, p. 16
113 UNHCR, Operational Portal, Total persons of concern, last updated 9 January 2020, url
114 AI, Q&A-Why are returns of refugees from Lebanon to Syria premature? Public Statement MDE 18/0481/2019, 12 June
2019, url, p. 1

24 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALSThe UNHCR data shows that between January and September 2019, 75 501 verified Syrian refugees
had ‘spontaneously returned’ to Syria. Of these, 7 803 had returned through ‘organised group returns
facilitated by the General Security office of Lebanon and spontaneous returns from Jordan’, and 97
self-organised returns from Jordan. UNHCR noted that the number of returnees in reality may behigher than those registered with UNHCR. UNHCR expects an increase in self-organised returns ofrefugees in 2019.115 As of 31 October 2019, there had been 216 719 ‘self-organized refugee returns’
documented by UNHCR from 2016-2019.116
Regarding demographic profiles of returnees, a World Bank/International Bank for Reconstruction andDevelopment report on mobility of displaced refugees, showed that ‘refugees who are single, or male,or not members of a nuclear family have been more likely to return.’ 117

1.3.2 Syrian refugees returning from Turkey
Since 2016, Turkey provides support for integration and voluntary return via its Directorate Generalof Migration Management (DGMM). Legally, returnees have to apply via the provincial branches of
DGMM which have to give monetary and in-kind support. There are no bi- or multilateral readmissionagreements nor does DGMM cooperate with Syrian organisations nor with UNHCR to facilitate thereturns. After approval, returnees are brought to the border, where they will be escorted by two
Turkish agencies working in Syria, ‘to cities under Turkey’s military control’.118
DGMM employs an encouraging policy, facilitating ‘go-and-see’ visits during which the protection
status is maintained, only to be revoked if the returnee does not return within the period of threemonths. According to Turkish government sources, cited by the researcher Mencutek, ‘in 2017 40,000
Syrians – some 15% of those who made go-and-see visits – remained, and in 2018 57% of the 252,000
Syrians undertaking go-and-see visits remained’.119
The DGMM reportedly cannot trace what happens with returning Syrians; neither is the UNHCR
present to verify and guarantee the voluntariness of returns.120 Whereas the government stated in
September 2019 that around 350 000 Syrians have ‘voluntarily’121 returned to Syria122, several sources
reported that forced returns and deportations were taking place.123 According to interviews by AI,
deportations were taking place through the border crossing of Bab al-Hawa. Some deportees reported
that they were arrested and imprisoned by Islamist groups on the Syrian side of the border.124
On 24 September 2019, Turkey announced to return one to two million Syrian refugees125 to the(Kurdish dominated) north-eastern part of Syria in so-called ‘safe zones’. These were created after a

115 UNHCR, Operational update Syria, October 2019, url, p. 10
116 UNHCR, Syria Regional Refugee Response: Durable Solutions – Self-organized Refugee Returns to Syria 2016-2019,[Updated 31 October 2019], url
117 World Bank (The)/IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), The Mobility of Displaced Syrians,
An economic and social analysis, 2019, url, p. 22
118 Mencutek, Zeynep Sahin, Encouraging Syrian return: Turkey’s fragmented approach, October 2019, url, pp. 28-29
119 Mencutek, Zeynep Sahin, Encouraging Syrian return: Turkey’s fragmented approach, October 2019, url, p. 29
120 Mencutek, Zeynep Sahin, Encouraging Syrian return: Turkey’s fragmented approach, October 2019, url, p. 30
121 Mencutek expressed doubts about the voluntariness of returns. The ‘precarious situation of Syrians in Turkey, marked
by the lack of full-scale protection, exploitative employment conditions, and the loss of hope in their future, pushes themto return.’ Their situation has further deteriorated in mid-2019. Mencutek, Zeynep Sahin, Encouraging Syrian return:
Turkey’s fragmented approach, October 2019, url, p. 30
122 Reuters, Turkey’s plan to settle refugees in northeast Syria alarms allies, 8 October 2019, url
123 Economist (The), Turkey tightens restrictions on Syrian refugees, 5 September 2019, url; RI, Insecure future,
Deportations and lack of legal work for refugees in Turkey, Field report, September 2019, url, pp. 4-5; COAR, Syria Update,
20 - 26 November 2019, url; AI, Sent to a War Zone: Turkey’s illegal deportations of Syrian refugees, 25 October 2019, url,
p. 11; Mencutek, Zeynep Sahin, Encouraging Syrian return: Turkey’s fragmented approach, October 2019, url, p. 30
124 AI, Sent to a War Zone: Turkey’s illegal deportations of Syrian refugees, 25 October 2019, url, p. 11
125 Reuters, Turkey’s plan to settle refugees in northeast Syria alarms allies, 8 October 2019, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS — 25

military operation ‘Peace Spring’ in October 2019, leading to the displacement of more than 160 000
Syrians.126
There are no exact figures of returned and/or deported Syrians from Turkey to Syria. UNHCR
estimated the numbers of self-organised returns by Syrian refugees from Turkey as of 30 June 2019to a total of 12 017.127
More information on the situation of refugees in Turkey and on Syrians deported from Turkey to Syria
will be covered in the upcoming 2020 EASO COI report on “Syria: IDPs, returnees and internal
mobility”.

1.3.3 Syrian refugees returning from Lebanon
Syrian refugees in Lebanon are under increasing pressure to return. Lebanese policy has increasingly
become stricter and has made it much more difficult for most Syrians to obtain documents and pay
fees; as a consequence, the majority live in illegality.128
As soon as the GoS seemed to be on the winning hand, the call for returns to Syria became louder,and refugees’ access to housing and employment in Lebanon became stricter and their livelihood
deteriorating. As a result, small-scale returns, facilitated by a variety of formal and informal Lebanese
agents, are taking place.129
Under a bilateral agreement with the GoS, the governmental General Security Office (GSO) is tasked
to facilitate voluntary returns. Per the agreement, the GSO sends lists of names of registered refugees(except names received from political parties unless is verified that the applicants have voluntarily
chosen to return to Syria) for pre-approval to Syrian authorities. The GoS has rejected the return of‘some refugees who are wanted for security reasons’.130 Application for return takes place via
registration centres, coordinated by the GSO. Criteria for approving the application are not known.
Applicants have to pay an ‘exit’ fee for the period they stayed in Lebanon without a residence permit.
At the border, the returnee’s passport is stamped with a ban to return to Lebanon ‘for a period oftime that is often unknown to refugees’.131
UNHCR estimated the numbers of self-organised returns by Syrian refugees from Lebanon as of
30 June 2019 to a total of 9 676.132 According to the GSO, about 170 000 Syrian refugees have returned
between December 2017 and March 2019.133 As of 24 April 2019, Syrians who entered Lebanon
irregularly can be legally deported to Syria134, and between May and August 2019, the GSO arrested
and deported 2 731 Syrians and handed them over to the Syrian authorities.135

126 Guardian (The), Recep Tayyip Erdoğan proposes 'safe zone' for refugees in Syria, 24 September 2019, url; Al Jazeera,

Turkey's military operation in Syria: All the latest updates, 18 October 2019, url; AI, Sent to a War Zone: Turkey’s illegal
deportations of Syrian refugees, 25 October 2019, url, p. 11
127 UNHCR, Update: Durable Solutions for Syrian Refugees, July/August 2019, url
128 HRW mentions a percentage of 74% of illegal Syrians residing in Lebanon. HRW, Lebanon: Syrians Summarily Deported
from Airport, 24 May 2019, url
129 Tamirace Fakhoury and Derya Ozkul, Syrian refugees’ return from Lebanon, Forced Migration Review, October 2019,url, pp. 26-28
130 AI, Q&A-Why are returns of refugees from Lebanon to Syria premature? Public Statement MDE 18/0481/2019, 12 June
2019, url, p. 3
131 Tamirace Fakhoury and Derya Ozkul, Syrian refugees’ return from Lebanon, Forced Migration Review, October 2019,url, p. 27
132 UNHCR, Update: Durable Solutions for Syrian Refugees, July/August 2019, url
133 Daily Star (The), Over 170,000 Syrian refugees have returned from Lebanon since Dec. 2017: General Security, 20 March
2019, url
134 Tamirace Fakhoury and Derya Ozkul, Syrian refugees’ return from Lebanon, Forced Migration Review, October 2019,url, p. 27
135 HRW, Syrians Deported by Lebanon Arrested at Home, 2 September 2019, url

26 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALSThere is no monitoring whether or not returns are voluntary. Fakhoury and Ozkul noted: ‘UNHCR has
been informally monitoring returns at border crossings although it has no authority to intervene.
There is no other independent monitoring at borders to ensure that returns are indeed voluntary’.136
Human Rights Watch reported in May 2019 that at least 16 Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR
were forced to sign voluntary return forms and deported from Lebanon, even while they expressedfear of torture or persecution if returned to Syria.137 At least three returnees were reportedly detained
upon arrival in Syria.138

1.3.4 Syrian refugees returning from Jordan
Jordan hosts about 1.4 million Syrians of which over 658 000 are registered with UNHCR.139 The Jordan
government announced in October 2018, on the occasion of the reopening of the Jaber–Nasib bordercrossing (to allow border-crossing trade140), that it did not support Syrians returning at that time. Asof October 2019, the government had not taken measures to facilitate large-scale voluntary returns,
according to researcher Morris. However, Morris also noted a ‘widespread sentiment among the
Jordanian public that Syrians have overstayed their welcome in Jordan’.141
Many Syrians are reluctant to return to Syria, for fear of military conscription and arrest bygovernment forces.142
As of March 2019, only about 2 % of Syrian refugees have returned.143 UNHCR’s July/August 2019
update on durable solutions estimated the numbers of self-organised returns by Syrian refugees from
Jordan as of 30 June 2019 at a total of 16 034.144

1.3.5 Clearance
Syrians wishing to return to their place of origin in GoS-retaken areas, are requested to gain security
approval by going through a ‘security clearance’ involving interrogation by Syrian security forces.145
This ‘clearance’ implies providing extensive information on any involvement they had with the political
opposition. Government guarantees ‘forgiveness’ to returnees when they tell the truth. However, inmany cases this does not work out as promised, as a recent survey amongst Syrians returning togovernment-held areas, cited in the Washington Post, revealed: ‘About 75 percent had been harassed
at checkpoints, in government registry offices or in the street, conscripted into the military despite
promises they would be exempted, or arrested’.146
It is not self-evident that returnees are allowed to return. A source interviewed by DIS noted thatthose not allowed to return were people whose names were on the ‘wanted’ lists and ‘the government

136 Tamirace Fakhoury and Derya Ozkul, Syrian refugees’ return from Lebanon, Forced Migration Review, October 2019,url, p. 27
137 HRW, Lebanon: Syrians Summarily Deported from Airport, 24 May 2019, url, p. 27
138 HRW, Syrians Deported by Lebanon Arrested at Home, 2 September 2019, url
139 UNHCR, Fact Sheet: Jordan, May 2019, url
140 Reuters, Syria says to reopen important Nassib crossing with Jordan on October 10, 29 September 2018, url
141 Morris, Julia, The politics of return from Jordan to Syria, Forced Migration Review, October 2019, url, p. 33
142 Al Monitor, Why Syrians on Jordan refuse to return home, 11 October 2019, url
143 FP, Turkey’s deportation policy is killing Syrian refugees, 8 August 2019, url
144 UNHCR, Update: Durable Solutions for Syrian Refugees, July/August 2019, url
145 AI, Q&A-Why are returns of refugees from Lebanon to Syria premature? Public Statement MDE 18/0481/2019, 12 June
2019, url, p. 3
146 Washington Post (The), Assad urged Syrian refugees to come home, 2 June 2019, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS — 27

wanted to send a message that those affiliated with armed opposition groups are not welcome in
Syria’.147
Detailed information on the ‘security clearance’ will be covered in the 2020 EASO COI report on “Syria:
IDPs, refugees and internal mobility”.

1.3.6 Treatment upon return
A source interviewed by the Danish Immigration Service (DIS) stated that returnees at the border may
be detained for a short period (between one hour and several days). The majority of these werereleased but he knew of 38 men who were still detained at the time of the interview. Other sources
added that persons who had evaded military conscription or who (or family members) had
connections with an armed opposition group, or who is part of an NGO inside or outside Syria, or istravelling back and forth to Syria from abroad, may face issues such as extortion, forced conscription,
arrest and detention.148
The OHCHR stated in February 2019 that despite changes in the situation in Syria, those returning facea lack of rule of law, widespread human rights violations and poor economic prospects, noting that‘safe and sustainable returns’ were not possible due to continuing hostilities.149
Some of the challenges that returnees may face, according to the European Institute of Peace (EIP),
are:
-

-

-

-

-

State guarantees as part of reconciliation agreements are not fulfilled, for both individuals
and communities. There are many reports of returnees having been arrested, detained,harassed or conscripted after they had completed the reconciliation process and received
protection papers;
The control of Syrian security sector over society is strengthening. The Syrian military andsecurity services arrest and detain individuals, ‘both to gather intelligence and punish thoseconsidered disloyal and to extract payments from families for the release of loved ones’;
Refugees and IDPs wanting to return have to reconcile with the state and fill in ‘extensive
forms that defy international practice for refugee returns’. These forms are difficult tounderstand and there is no adequate information on the procedures regarding returns andreconciliation;
Returnees are forced to give ‘extensive amounts of information’ about their contacts andactivities abroad. ‘There are no guarantees in place that this information will not be usedagainst the individual or others, [including their loved ones], in the future’;
The Syrian government does not allow international agencies to carry out data collection andto monitor returnees.150

Detailed information on the situation of returnees in Damascus, is available in the EASO COI report on
Socio-economic situation in Damascus City.

Consequences of illegal exit and applying for asylum abroad
According to a report by the DIS on the consequences of illegal exit, in August 2018, the GoS
announced that Syrians who had left the country illegally during the war would not encounter
problems because of illegal exit; whilst until then, under Law No 14 of 2014, illegal exit was punishable
147 Denmark, DIS/DRC, Syria: Security Situation in Damascus Province and Issues Regarding Return to Syria, 21 February

2019, url, p. 24
148 Denmark, DIS/DRC, Syria: Security Situation in Damascus Province and Issues Regarding Return to Syria, 21 February
2019, url, p. 26
149 UN Human Rights Council, UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria, Continued hostilities and lawlessness countrywide rendersafe and sustainable returns impossible, 28 February 2019, url
150 EIP, Refugees Return in Syria: Dangers, Security Risks and Information Scarcity, July 2019, url, pp. 4-5

28 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

with imprisonment and fines. Sources reported to DIS that they did not know of cases of people
punished solely for illegal exit, noting that those who face problems on return are those with othersecurity problems with the government.151 According to two sources interviewed by DIS, ‘by legalizing,
their status at a Syrian representation abroad prior to return to Syria, persons who have left Syria
illegally can return without facing any problem’.152
However, other sources indicated that Syrians who return must agree to sign loyalty pledges to thegovernment, including providing extensive background information and signed statements tocooperate with authorities, or must enter reconciliation agreements.153 See also Section 1.3.5.
Sources interviewed by DIS reported that there are no consequences known of having applied for
asylum abroad and that such applicants are not punished on return.154

Conscription in the Syrian army
A 2014 decree stipulated that men of the age of military conscription (18-42) ‘who are unwilling toserve but who wish to return to Syria must remain outside the country for at least four years and pay
an exemption fee of US$8,000’. Men over 42 years of age who had not served in the military had to
pay the same exemption fee.155 An amnesty (Decree No 18/2018), announced in October 2018,
removed the exemption fee for men who had not been conscripted yet. However, it did not remove
the mandatory military conscription as such.156 Also, according to the DIS, ‘arrest of reservists who
have evaded the military service is prohibited and names of reservists wanted for active duty are
dropped.’ The government emphasised that the circular was meant ‘to assure refugees that they will
not be detained upon return to Syria if they were previously wanted for reservist service in the Syrian
Arab Army’.157
Very few people applied for amnesty during the period (four months for those within the country, sixmonths if living abroad). ‘Instead, thousands of young men have been detained and investigatedbefore being forced into military service across the country in recent months,’ according to EIP.158
According to Morris, describing the situation of returnees from Jordan, ‘many fear reprisals due toperceived cowardice or disloyalty to the regime’.159
The 2019 EIP report mentioned the existence of ‘wanted lists’ with about 3 million names ofindividuals wanted, including for mandatory military service. These lists are reportedly ‘designed todeter disloyal individuals from returning’. The wanted lists also contain names of persons ‘believed tohave been involved in opposition-related activities, which range from protesting to working in media
or nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), and human rights activists and local administrative officials
under opposition control’.160
Detailed information on the military service in the GoS forces and consequences for draft evaders anddeserters is available in Chapter 2.

151 Denmark, DIS, Syria: Consequences of illegal exit, consequences of leaving a civil servant position without notice and thesituation of Kurds in Damascus, June 2019, url, pp. 6-7
152 Denmark, DIS, Syria: Consequences of illegal exit, consequences of leaving a civil servant position without notice and thesituation of Kurds in Damascus, June 2019, url, pp. 6-7
153 EIP, Return in Syria: Dangers, Security Risks, and Information Scarcity, July 2019, url; pp. 5-6; Washington Post (The), Assadurged Syrian refugees to come home. Many are being welcomed with arrest and interrogation, 2 June 2019, url;
154 Denmark, DIS/DRC, Syria: Security Situation in Damascus Province and Issues Regarding Return to Syria, 21 February
2019, url, p. 20
155 Araman, A. and Loutf, S., Return to Syria after evading conscription, Forced Migration Review, October 2019, url, p. 52
156 EIP, Refugees Return in Syria: Dangers , Security Risks and Information Scarcity, July 2019, url, p. 11
157 Denmark, DIS/DRC, Syria: Security Situation in Damascus Province and Issues Regarding Return to Syria, 21 February
2019, url, p. 29
158 EIP, Refugees Return in Syria: Dangers , Security Risks and Information Scarcity, July 2019, url, p. 11
159 Morris, Julia, The politics of return from Jordan to Syria, Forced Migration Review, October 2019, url, p. 32
160 EIP, Refugees Return in Syria: Dangers, Security Risks and Information Scarcity, July 2019, url, p. 12

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS — 29

Arrests, torture, detention
A report by the EIP, examining the concerns of all categories of returnees, found a worrying situation
with many arrests and torture cases by government security forces: ‘Even among the self-selecting“voluntary” returnees, hundreds of detentions and arrests have been reported […] Recent detainees
report having experienced brutal torture while in custody; deaths in custody have also beenrecorded’.161
The EIP identified some particular risk profiles which are more susceptible to arrests while adding thatarrests are taking place in all returning categories, ‘and it cannot be assumed that only those withinthese groups are at risk of being detained or arrested, now or in the future’:-‘those who return without seeking security permissions and reconciling before travelling,
individuals who worked in sectors or activities believed to be associated with the opposition(journalism, aid work, local councils, rescue workers),
men of military age,and those with family members who were forcibly displaced to Idlib or Aleppo’. 162

Reliable figures on arrests and detention cases of returnees are not available. According to returnees
and human rights organisations interviewed by the Washington Post, ‘hundreds of Syrian refugees
have been arrested after returning home as the war they fled winds down — then interrogated, forced
to inform on close family members and in some cases tortured’.163 The EIP report provides numerous
cases of returnees and IDPs having been arrested after returning to government-held areas.164
EIP reports that UNHCR has only limited access to IDPs and returnees, and is therefore unable tomonitor and collect data on their situation without government permission. The agency does in somecases subcontract local NGOs, such as the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC), to collect data and carryout surveys.165

Access to properties and housing
According to the Syrian Association for Citizens Dignity166 (SYACD) report on the situation of returnees
to government-held areas, the government’s urban development laws in the recaptured, destroyed
areas are reportedly ‘discriminatory’ and returnees are ‘systematically denied the right to theirproperty in an openly retaliatory manner’.167 Returnees to recaptured parts of Rural Damascus, Dar’a,Homs, and Aleppo were also asked to pay fees for water, electricity, phone, municipal and real estatetaxes during the period they fled.168
Morris also noted that returnees experience many difficulties to gain access to the properties thatthey held before fleeing the country, due to lack of documentation and identification. The newproperty law of April 2018 (Law No 10), amended in November 2018, gives Syrians a year to provetheir ownership and to reclaim their properties. After that period, authorities are allowed ‘toconfiscate property without compensating the owners or giving them an opportunity to appeal’.
However, as Morris reported, ‘many refugees are unclear as to which is the real deadline, and the
majority lack identification or property registration documents to make the claims in the first place’.169

161 EIP, Refugees Return in Syria: Dangers, Security Risks and Information Scarcity, July 2019, url, p. 4
162 EIP, Refugees Return in Syria: Dangers, Security Risks and Information Scarcity, July 2019, url, pp. 11-12, 25
163 Washington Post (The), Assad urged Syrian refugees to come home, 2 June 2019, url
164 EIP, Refugees Return in Syria: Dangers, Security Risks and Information Scarcity, July 2019, url, pp. 4-5
165 EIP, Refugees Return in Syria: Dangers, Security Risks and Information Scarcity, July 2019, url, p. 19
166 SYACD is ‘a movement fighting for the rights of displaced Syrians’. SACD, Vengeance, Repression and Fear: Reality

Behind Assad’s Promises to Displaced Syrians, October 2019, url
167 SYACD, Vengeance, Repression and Fear: Reality Behind Assad’s Promises to Displaced Syrians, October 2019, url, p. 4
168 SYACD, Vengeance, Repression and Fear: Reality Behind Assad’s Promises to Displaced Syrians, October 2019, url, p. 18
169 Morris, Julia, The politics of return from Jordan to Syria, Forced Migration Review, Forced Migration Review, October
2019, url, p. 32

30 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

According to a World Bank/International Bank for Reconstruction and Development report on mobilityof displaced refugees, looting, expropriations and damage of properties are major housing-related
concerns for Syrians. A lack of documents is also an important concern in several cities. In addition,
recent legal measures (such as Law No 10 in 2018, Law No 33 in 2017, and Legislatives Decrees Nos
40, 63, 66 in 2012) ‘seem to facilitate further confiscation and expropriation of property, especially of
refugees’.170

170 World Bank (The)/ IBRD, The Mobility of Displaced Syrians, An economic and social analysis, 2019, url, p. 19

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS — 31

2. Persons fearing recruitment by thegovernment
armed
forcesand/orrepercussions as military draft evaders anddeserters from the armed forces
When the Syrian civil war began in 2011, one of the GoS’ main issues was to provide manpower inorder to face armed rebel groups.171 During the conflict, the SAA lost many soldiers to casualties,
desertion, draft dodging, and defection.172
Some men have fled the country because they do not want to perform military service for fear of theirlives, while others have defected from the army or avoided military service out of political conviction
and in opposition to the GoS.173
The evasion of conscription has been reported as one of the main reasons for young men over the ageof 18 having fled Syria. ‘It is also one of the primary reasons why they cannot return’, according toresearchers Araman and Loutfi.174 UNHCR found that 75 % of Syrians hope to return one day, but the
military conscription that they ‘cannot avoid’ makes them reluctant to do so.175
A study conducted by SYACD, documenting the security situation of returnees and others living inareas covered by the ‘reconciliation agreements’ concluded that three quarters of the interviewed
persons or a relative were ‘wanted for recruitment’. Conscripted persons are ‘almost inevitably sent
to the most dangerous frontlines’ to fight.176 At times, family members of those evading military
service and deserters have faced retaliation by GoS in the form of intimidation and arrest.177

2.1 Military service and official conscription
Male citizens between the ages of 18 and 42 are obliged by law to perform their military service.178
According to Law No 35/2011, which amended the military conscription Law No 30 of 2007, military
service lasts between 18 to 21 months.179 Women may perform military service voluntarily.180
Registered Palestinians residing in Syria are also subject to conscription and usually serve in the ranksof the SAA-affiliated Palestine Liberation Army (PLA).181
While the law prescribes an age limit of 42 years for conscription, in practice the age limit for military
service and reserve duty has been increased, which practically lead to people in their late 40s and
171 Quartz, Syria’s young men face an impossible choice, 14 December 2016, url
172 Finland, FIS, Fact-Finding Mission Report, Syria: Military service, national defence forces, armed groups supporting

Syrian regime and armed opposition, Helsinki, 23 August 2016, url, p. 5
173 TIMEP, Brief: Legislative Decree No.18 – Military Service Amnesty, 6 December 2018, url
174 Ahmad Araman and Shaza Loutfi, Return to Syria after evading conscription, Forced Migration Review, October 2019,url, p. 52; see also Denmark, DIS/DRC, Syria: Security Situation in Damascus Province and Issues Regarding Return to Syria,
21 February 2019, url, p. 21
175 UNHCR, Fifth Regional Survey on Syrian Refugees, Perceptions and Intentions on Return to Syria, March 2019, url, p. 2
176 SYACD, Vengeance, Repression and Fear: Reality Behind Assad’s Promises to Displaced Syrians, October 2019, url, p. 3
177 TIMEP, Brief: Legislative Decree No.18 – Military Service Amnesty, 6 December 2018, url
178 International Crisis Group, Lessons from the Syrian State’s Return to the South, 25 February 2019, url, p. 10
179 Parliament of Syria (The), al-Marsoum at-Tashre’ee 35 li-am 2011 [Legislative Decree 35 for the year 2011], 1 June 2011,url
180 TIMEP, TIMEP Brief: Conscription Law, 22 August 2019, url
181 Finland, FIS, Fact-Finding Mission to Beirut and Damascus, 14 December 2018, 14 December 2018, url, p. 6; Atlantic(The), Assad is desperate for soldiers, 14 May 2018, url

32 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

early 50s being forced to sign up. Sources interviewed by FIS stated that the age limit is less dependent
on the universal draft than on the government’s mobilising efforts and local developments. Therefore,
the Syrian authorities are usually following younger people between the age of 18 and 27 more closely
while people older than that tend to avoid the recruitment more easily.182
Since the outbreak of the conflict, most conscripts have not been discharged even after their
compulsory military service has been fulfilled and had to continue their service.183 Until January 2018,
only a few serving in the military since 2011 were demobilised.184 The state media agency SANA
previously reported two demobilisation orders.185
According to Christopher Kozak of ISW, GoS is actually releasing some of the earliest classes ofconscripts, which had been in service since early 2011 and had never been released from their official
18-month terms of duty. GoS begun demobilising the earliest classes of conscripts drafted up to 20122013. However, there are still a lot of individuals serving past the term of their ostensible 18-month
mandatory service period, but GoS has finally begun some demobilisation, particularly due to publicpressure from pro-government populations.186 Further information on the implementation of thedemobilisation orders could not be found.
According to expert interviews carried out by FIS, it appears to be possible for a person to join andserve in the government-affiliated militias instead of doing the military service under the regular army.
This holds to be true especially for the retaken and ‘reconciled’ areas.187 The Fifth Corps - anassociation of militias incorporated into the official military structure in 2016 as a distinct army corps
backed by Russia188 - in particular is said to be the main alternative to the regular Syrian army regarding
military service. That has been the case especially in the reconciled areas, retaken by the government
in 2017 and 2018. According to information received by the FIS, the special status of the Fifth Corps
in terms of recruitment seems not to be limited to the reconciled areas. For example the Fifth Corps
elite unit, the Tiger Forces, were recruiting new fighters in Damascus area.189
Recruitment occurred in other pro-government militias such as the National Defense Forces (NDF),
which often attracts recruits due to better financial incentives than the SAA.190 A Syrian activist
interviewed by FIS assessed ‘that pro-government militias are the primary recruiters of new fightersin areas where these militias are more powerful than the Syrian army’.191
OHCHR noted that in Dar’a governorate civilians of military age were required to perform their military
service either in the army, intelligence services, or the NDF. By enlisting in the Fourth Division, menwere reportedly promised to remain inside Dar’a governorate and not being sent to fight elsewhere.
Hundreds of reconciled fighters and civilians joined the Fourth Division and other governmentaffiliated forces. Some have joined the Fifth Corps to avoid drafting by the SAA. Those refusing these

182 Finland, FIS, Fact-Finding Mission to Beirut and Damascus, 14 December 2018, url, p. 6
183 Atlantic (The), Assad is desperate for soldiers, 14 May 2018, url
184 Norway, Landinfo, Syria: Reactions against deserters and draft evaders, 3 January 2018, url, p. 5
185 SANA, ‫ الدورة عناصر المجندين للضباط االحتفاظ بموجبه تنهي إداريا أمرا تصدر للجيش العامة القيادة‬248 ‫ والدورة قبلها وما‬249 ‫سنوات خمس أتموا الذين‬‫[ احتفاظ‬The General Command of the Army issues an administrative order that ends the retention of officers recruited forthe elements of the 248th and earlier cycle and the 249th session who have completed five years of retention], 10
December 2018, url; SANA, Army’s General Command issues order on demobilizing conscripted officers of batch no. 103,
31 December 2018, url
186 EASO Interview with Christopher Kozak, Institute for the Study of War (ISW), 14 November 2019
187 Finland, FIS, Fact-Finding Mission to Beirut and Damascus, 14 December 2018, url, p. 8
188 Al-Jabassini, A., From Insurgents to Soldiers: The Fifth Assault Corps in Daraa, Southern Syria, Middle East Directions.
European University Institute, 14 May 2019, url, p. 5
189 Finland, FIS, Fact-Finding Mission to Beirut and Damascus, 14 December 2018, url, p. 9
190 Khatib, L. and Sinjab, L., Syria’s Transactional State How the Conflict Changed the Syrian State’s Exercise of Power,
Chatham House, October 2018, url, pp. 14-15; Finland, FIS, Fact-Finding Mission to Beirut and Damascus, 14 December
2018, url, p. 15
191 Finland, FIS, Fact-Finding Mission to Beirut and Damascus, 14 December 2018, url, p. 9

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS — 33

options would either attempt fleeing from government-held areas and risk arrest at checkpoints orremain in territories outside of the government’s access.192
However, according to other sources cited in the FIS report, the government has also begun toincorporate several militias into the official military structures. If fully implemented, joining a militia
may no longer allow an individual to avoid military conscription, nor for him to avoid deployment todistant front lines.193
According to Christopher Kozak, conscription intake remains relatively the same even though thesituation has stabilised somewhat. Mass conscription drives and arrests in Damascus, in core areas of
the Syrian Coast and in Homs and Hama governorates are still going on. Conscription activity inreconciled areas, such as northern Homs governorate or southern Syria also took place, primarily
because former opposition populations in these areas have largely been recruited into other pro-GoS
units such as the Fifth Corps or the wide array of pro-GoS paramilitary groups rather than conscripted
into the SAA.194
Kozak further noted that the bulk of the casualties in the SAA as indicated by GoS reporting, still comeprimarily from Latakia, Tartous, western Hama, western Homs, and Damascus governorates. These
areas have been the core recruitment ground for the SAA for quite some time, particularly the Syrian
Coast and western Homs and Hama governorates. These are the areas where reporting mentionedthat most young men have been recruited for military service and these areas still represent a
disproportionate amount of the formal SAA.195
Christopher Kozak assessed that conscription targets any military-aged male that the state can get its
hands on. Some populations are seen as more loyal and more effective, such as those from the coreheartland area mentioned above, but even Syrian Sunnis will be rounded up and sent to other units
that are perhaps less risky in grand scheme of the war. For example, many conscripts seen as lessreliable were sent to southern Syria (i.e. the SAA Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Divisions) because thoseunits remained primarily garrisoned and were not used for offensive operations, whereas more
offensive capable units were drawn primarily from the Syrian Coast and western Homs and Hama
governorates.
Kozak concluded that the GoS is conscripting as far as its reach extends across Syria. It has conductedconscription effort in Qamishli and conscripted individuals from Raqqa and Deir Ez-Zor governorates
who had fled from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) to western Syria. In Kozak’s
assessment, ‘it is fair to say that the Syrian Government has been an equal opportunity employer
when it comes to targeting young men for conscription’.196
In Qamishli, Hasaka governorate, where the GoS retains partial control on the ground it has conductedconscription campaigns. The SDF has been unwilling to cooperate in this regard and as of November
2019, had the ability to prevent the Syrian Government from exercising these activities on the groundin northern Syria.197 After the agreement between the SDF and GoS in mid-October 2019 that saw GoS
troops deployed in previously Kurdish-controlled areas, it was reported that Syrian Kurds from thearea fled to Iraq out of fear of being conscripted in the SAA.198
For child recruitment by government armed forces and affiliated armed groups, see Section 12.1.

192 OHCHR, Human Rights Digest Syria, The “unreconciled” concerns of civilians in Dar’a Governorate (May 2019), url, p. 5
193 Finland, FIS, Fact-Finding Mission to Beirut and Damascus, 14 December 2018, url, p. 8
194 EASO Interview with Christopher Kozak, Institute for the Study of War (ISW), 14 November 2019
195 EASO Interview with Christopher Kozak, Institute for the Study of War (ISW), 14 November 2019
196 EASO Interview with Christopher Kozak, Institute for the Study of War (ISW), 14 November 2019197 EASO Interview with Christopher Kozak, Institute for the Study of War (ISW), 14 November 2019
198 Defense Post (The), Fearing conscription into Assad’s army, Syrian Kurds flee to Iraq, 12 December 2019, url

34 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

2.2 Deferrals and exemptions
The law permits exemptions from military service for certain categories of individuals (described
below). However, the process for obtaining an exemption was assessed ‘to include more limitations
and more variation on case-by-case basis’. An AI researcher interviewed by FIS assessed that the way
the law is implemented for these exempted categories is not clear.199
According to Christopher Kozak, GoS has not reimposed its exemptions for protected categories ofindividuals such as government employees, students, and other classes that held a special status in
the prior conscription system but saw their status degraded over the course of the conflict. Kozak
assessed that the government has not loosened its scrutiny and focus on those ostensibly protected
populations and is still attempting to force government employees to enlist in the reserves andparamilitary formations, and still targeting students for conscription.200

2.2.1 Students
Students at universities may under certain conditions be exempted from military service though a2017 change in law has made it more difficult for university students to continue deferring theirconscription.201 DIS noted that amendments made to the Military Service Law in July 2019 byLegislative Decree No 12 introduced more restrictions on the age limits allowed to start different levelsof education and the number of study years during which students are permitted to request
exemption from military service.202
The FIS FFM report noted that students applying for a deferral from military service were put undermore scrutiny than before. Students without proper documentation were conscripted immediately.
Older students were more likely to be recruited, however. Persons who have reached the age of 27
were usually not given deferrals by the military police. According to an anonymous source quoted in
the report, there were ‘quite a few cases where people have student exemptions but were called
anyway to join the army’.203 Furthermore, the treatment of students was said to depend on the
military police unit responsible, for example, for a particular checkpoint, since the police themselves
might serve in their posts involuntarily: ‘Sometimes these guys [the military police] have been
recruited forcefully and they are not very sympathetic to people who have been able to dodge thedraft’.204
According to OHCHR’s information on Dar’a governorate, students who have suspended theireducation since the beginning of the civil unrest in 2011 were pardoned by the GoS and allowed toreturn to college. Those who returned were granted a deferment of their military service. Those who
were over 25 years old – the age limit for which the Syrian law states that students can remain atuniversity – were drafted in the army and other affiliated security bodies.205

2.2.2 Government employees
According to estimates by a humanitarian conflict analyst interviewed by FIS, government employees,
particularly those working in Damascus and in the government ministries, are not recruited for military
199 Finland, FIS, Fact-Finding Mission to Beirut and Damascus, 14 December 2018, url, pp. 6-7
200 EASO Interview with Christopher Kozak, Institute for the Study of War (ISW), 14 November 2019
201 Norway, Landinfo, Syria: Reactions against deserters and draft evaders, 3 January 2018, url, pp. 6, 8

‫الرئيس األسد يصدر مرسوما ر‬‫تشيعيا بتعديل مواد من قانون‬‫[ خدمة العلم‬President Assad issues a Legislative Decree [no.12] amending articles of the Military Service Law], 14 July 2019,url
203 Finland, FIS, Fact-Finding Mission to Beirut and Damascus, 14 December 2018, url, p. 7
204 Finland, FIS, Fact-Finding Mission to Beirut and Damascus, 14 December 2018, url, p. 7
205 OHCHR, Human Rights Digest Syria, The “unreconciled” concerns of civilians in Dar’a Governorate, May 2019, url, p. 6
202 DIS, Issues Regarding Military Service, October 2019, url, p. 5; SANA,EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS — 35

service. Another expert on the topic stated that government employees who were in fact recruited to
the Syrian army usually consisted of reservists who have been called to reserve duty to resume theirformer tasks.206
In November 2017, a new directive from the Prime Minister which applied to state employees
instructed public institutions to ‘terminate the employment of those avoiding mandatory military
service or reserve duty’. The directive was followed by an unknown number of dismissals.207 No further
information on the application of the exemption for government employees was found.

2.2.3 Medical cases
Reliable information concerning medical reasons for exemption from military service is difficult tocome by. Two sources interviewed by FIS stated that exemptions were still granted on the basis of
medical reasons. Other experts cited estimated that in the case of military conscription the
recruitment criteria in general have loosened. Accordingly, even old and obese men, who in the pastwould have been exempted relatively easily, were conscripted if required by the authorities.
According to one source, it is probable that a person will not be given an exemption unless his medical
condition is very clearly visible. The source also points out that in some cases it was possible for anindividual to get an exemption based on medical grounds if a bribe was paid.208

2.2.4 Only sonsThe Syrian Military Service Law provides that the only male child to his parents can be exempted frommilitary service. The exemption is also applicable if the parents of the only son are divorced, or if one
or both parents are deceased.209 DIS noted that ‘in addition, an only son will be exempted if he has
half-brothers or has become an only male child as a result of the death of one or more of his
brothers’.210
President Assad issued on 6 August 2014 Legislative Decree No 33, which amends a number of articlesof Legislative Decree No 30 for 2007 on the mandatory military service law. The amendments also
altered the number of sons per family who may postpone military service, with the numbers becoming
as follows: ‘1 may postpone if 2-4 brothers were performing mandatory, voluntary, or reserve military
service, 2 if there were 5-8 brothers in the service, and 3 if there were 9 or more brothers in theservice. Before the amendments, only one son could postpone’.211
According to an expert interviewed by FIS, a family’s only son can still benefit from the exemption
regulation, but the GoS has been tightening controls on this. Instead of renewing the exemption every
two years, the person concerned is obliged to renew it every single year. From there, the only son isrequired to renew his exemption until his mother reaches the age when she is not expected to be able
to give birth to another child (approximately by the age of 50, according to the source).212 No further
information on the application of the exemption for only sons could be found.

206 Finland, FIS, Fact-Finding Mission to Beirut and Damascus, 14 December 2018, url, p. 7
207 Syria Direct, Syrian public sector employees fired in latest government conscription effort, 7 December 2017, url
208 Finland, FIS, Fact-Finding Mission to Beirut and Damascus, 14 December 2018, url, p. 8
209 Syrian Arab Republic, Ministry of Defense, Only male child, n.d., url
210 Denmark, DIS, Issues Regarding Military Service, October 2019, url, p. 5
211 SANA, President al-Assad issues legislative decree amending mandatory military service law, 6 August 2014, url
212 Finland, FIS, Fact-Finding Mission to Beirut and Damascus, 14 December 2018, url, p. 8

36 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

2.2.5 Exemption from military service by paying exemption fees, and risk of being called up
as reservist despite having paid the fee
DIS noted that ‘according to Law 30/2007, Syrian young men, including registered Palestinians from
Syria, can pay a fee (‘Badal al-Naqdi’) to get an exemption from compulsory military service and not
be called up again. Since 2007, this decree has been amended several times, latest in 2014 and2017’.213
The opposition website Enab Baladi noted that exemption fees applies to a male living abroad for noless than four years, who could pay a fee of USD 5 000 before the war and USD 8 000 after to be
exempted from military service.214 According to the chief of Syria’s Immigration and Passports
Department interviewed by DIS in November 2018, not only persons who left the country legally, butalso those who left illegally can be exempted from their military service obligations.215 The deadline
for paying the fee is three months after receiving the call for conscription.216
However, based on DIS interviews with representatives of an international security organisation and
Human Rights Watch, the effectiveness and durability of the law that grants exemptions from military
service through the mentioned fee was questionable in light of their experience with previous decrees.
The security organisation’s representative considered such arrangements as being implementeddifferently on a case-by-case basis and that they in no way constitute a guarantee against forced
conscription. To the interviewee’s understanding, the only real exemption was given to either
someone beyond the military service age or someone who completed military service already.
Although, in both cases being called up (again) during the conflict remains an eventuality.217
The use of exemption fee has been linked with corruption218, bribery219, and discretionary
application.220

2.3 Consequences of draft evasion and desertion
2.3.1 Penalties for evading service
The punishment for evading conscription is defined in the Military Penal Code, but its application
remains arbitrary.221 According to the Syrian Military Penal Code (Articles 98, 99), draft dodgers arepunished with one to six months imprisonment in peacetime, after which they have to complete theirmilitary service in full. In wartime draft evasion is a criminal offense, punishable by up to 5 years inprison.222
According to interviews conducted by Landinfo with representatives of a Syrian civil society
organisation and an international organisation in 2016 and 2017, the Military Criminal Code’s

213 Denmark, DIS/DRC, Syria, Syria: Security Situation in Damascus Province and Issues Regarding Return to Syria, February

2019, url, pp. 27-28
214 Enab Baladi, Military Service Exemption Fee: Expensive Return Ticket To Homeland, 2 September 2019, url
215 Denmark, DIS/DRC, Syria Syria: Security Situation in Damascus Province and Issues Regarding Return to Syria, February
2019, url, p. 29
216 Syrian Arab Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, ‫[ البدل النقـدي‬Exemption Fee] n.d., url
217 Denmark, DIS/DRC, Syria: Security Situation in Damascus Province and Issues Regarding Return to Syria, February 2019,url, p. 29
218 Omran Center for Strategic Studies, Transformations of the Syrian Military: The Challenge of Change and Restructuring,
31 December 2018, url, pp. 174-175
219 Syria Direct, Damascus student to pay 8 months of salary in bribe to avoid military service, 20 April 2017, url
220 TIMEP, TIMEP Brief: Conscription Law, 22 August 2019, url
221 Swiss Refugee Council, Syrien: Aufschub des Militärdienstes für Studenten [Postponement of military service forstudents], 11 June 2019, url, p. 6
222 Syrian Arab Republic, Legislative Decree No. 61/1950, Military Penal Code, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS — 37

provisions were not consistently followed. Draft evaders were usually sent directly to the military.223
Sources interviewed by DIS for their report of 2017 also indicated that those who have evaded service
and were caught were then sent to compulsory military service.224

2.3.2 Penalties for desertion
Since the start of the conflict tens of thousands of officers and conscripted soldiers deserted.225 Manyfled the country while others remained in Syria and joined one of the armed insurgent groups.226
According to the Military Penal Code (Articles 100, 101), desertion is punishable by one to five years
imprisonment in peacetime and can result in a prison sentence up to twice as long in wartime. Those
who have left the country following desertion can be punished with a penalty of up to 15 years
imprisonment in wartime. Desertion to the enemy is punishable by life imprisonment or the death
penalty.227
Several experts on the topic interviewed by DIS in April 2017 noted that deserters were punished more
severely than draft evaders. Some sources stated that deserters would be viewed through the samelens as opposition members. Other sources noted that amnesties and local agreements have allowed
deserters to re-enter the military service and be sent to the front.228
Reporting for the period between mid-July 2018 and mid-January 2019, the CoI assessed that
conscript deserters were among the groups most likely to be detained arbitrarily by the GoS forces.229
In previous years, deserters were often punished in the same way as those who actively joined the
opposition. In targeted campaigns, the government systematically arrested defectors and military
personnel suspected of sympathising with the opposition.230 According to a 2015 AI report, the Syrian
government arrested defectors and had them forcefully disappeared.231

2.4 Enforcement of amnesty for draft evaders and deserters
Amnesty laws have been issued on several occasions since Syria's crisis began in March 2011 to grantdraft dodgers or deserters amnesty from prosecution.232 Some organisations stated that thesemeasures have not necessarily resulted in the return of refugees or draft evaders, because suchindividuals would still be required to complete their military service after turning themselves in.233
Legislative Decree No 18 issued in October 2018, granted a general amnesty to certain individuals in
Syria or abroad, accused of deserting or avoiding military service. However, the decree did not exempt

223 Norway, Landinfo, Reactions against deserters and draft evaders, 3 January 2018, url, p. 8
224 Denmark, DIS/DRC, Syria, Recruitment Practices in Government-controlled Areas and in Areas under Opposition

Control, Involvement of Public Servants and Civilians in the Armed Conflict and Issues Related to Exiting Syria, August 2017,
url, pp. 13-14
225 Norway, Landinfo, Reactions against deserters and draft evaders, 3 January 2018, url, p. 10; Atlantic (The), Assad isdesperate for soldiers, 14 May 2018, url
226 Al Jazeera, Interactive: Tracking Syria’s defections, 30 July 2012, url
227 Syrian Arab Republic, Legislative Decree No. 61/1950, Military Penal Code, url
228 Denmark, DIS/DRC, Syria, Recruitment Practices in Government-controlled Areas and in Areas under Opposition
Control, Involvement of Public Servants and Civilians in the Armed Conflict and Issues Related to Exiting Syria, August 2017,
url, p. 13
229 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/40/70], 31 January 2019, url, p. 15
230 UN Human Rights Council, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Deaths in Detention in the Syrian Arab Republic, 3 February 2016,
url, p. 4
231 AI, Between Prison and the Grave: Enforced Disappearances in Syria, November 2015, url, p. 7
232 TIMEP, TIMEP Brief: Conscription Law, 22 August 2019, url
233 TIMEP, Legislative Decree No.18 – Military Service Amnesty, 6 December 2018, url38 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

the person to whom amnesty was granted from military service.234 The amnesty had to be taken up
within four months for those residing within the country, or six months for those living abroad.235
Those who fought on the side of the armed opposition or dissented against GoS were excluded fromthe amnesty.236
On 28 October 2018, the Ministry of Defence issued a circular that provided for the implementationof the amnesty law. The circular forbids the arrest of reservists who had evaded military service andstates that the names of reservists who were wanted for active service would be removed from thelist. Those reservists can still be called up again in the event of war or a state of emergency, however.
According to some estimates, this decree could affect 800 000 people who have left the country orgone into hiding.237
According to the Atlantic Council, despite the October 2018 amnesty law, the GoS issued new lists ofpersons called for emergency military service, which contained 400 000 names, including a large
number of youths whose names had just been removed from the list by virtue of the amnesty
measure.238 Syria Direct239 reported in March 2019 on a case of a defector who returned to Syria
following the amnesty and was reportedly taken by the authorities upon his return. His whereabouts
were unknown.240
Representatives of the Center for Operational Analysis and Research (COAR)241 interviewed by DIS in
November 2018 assessed that very few individuals would be interested in using the amnesty law, themain reasons being that it does not pardon them for fulfilling the military service. Other interviewed
sources mentioned that GoS has not respected prior amnesties and reconciliation agreements,
fuelling distrust among Syrians. A Syrian official stated however, that following the amnesty ‘a crucial
number of both deserters and draft evaders had handed themselves in to the authorities’.242
Christopher Kozak stated that GoS resumed conscription earlier than the grace period prescribed by
the terms of the amnesty agreements, in some cases within weeks of reasserting control overreconciled areas. Kozak further assessed that GoS still has an intense need for manpower so it has anincentive to operate in this fashion to maximise the number of individuals conscripted into themilitary. Kozak expected that as the Syrian Civil War will shift into a new phase and the need for
manpower will become less intensive, GoS will likely become less lenient and individuals with a historyof having draft-dodged or evaded military service will be on the government radar for potential
detention or other punishments later.243
The grace period of four to six months granted by the amnesty expired on 9 April 2019.244 Information
on whether the amnesty was renewed could not be found.

234 Reuters, Syria’s offers amnesty to deserters and draft dodgers, 9 October 2018, url; Washington Post (The), Syria offers

amnesty to deserters and draft dodgers, 9 October 2018, url
235 EIP, Refugee return in Syria: Dangers, security risks and information scarcity, July 2019, url, p. 10
236 TIMEP, Legislative Decree No. 18 of 2018 (Military Service Amnesty), 20 August 2019, url, pp. 1-2
237 National (The), Syrian military clears men wanted for extra military service, 31 October 2018, url
238 Atlantic Council, Forced conscription continues despite amnesty by Syrian Government, 13 February 2019, url
239 Syria Direct is ‘an independent journalism organization focused on Syria’, founded in 2013. For more information see
url
240 Syria Direct, ‘Is it safe to go home?’ Amid promises of amnesty in Syria, defectors abroad weigh their options, 18 March
2019, url
241 COAR is a social enterprise that provides research and analysis related to the conflict in Syria as part of an EU-funded
project. For more information see url
242 Denmark, DIS/DRC, Syria: Security Situation in Damascus Province and Issues Regarding Return to Syria, February 2019,url, pp. 30-31
243 EASO Interview with Christopher Kozak, Institute for the Study of War (ISW), 14 November 2019244 TIMEP, Legislative Decree No. 18 of 2018 (Military Service Amnesty), 20 August 2019, url, p. 2

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS — 39

3. Persons perceived to be opposing the
SDF/YPG
As of December 2019, much of north-east Syria was under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces(SDF).245 The SDF are a Kurdish-led multi-ethnic force comprising of Kurds, Arabs and other ethnic
groups created in 2015 to support the US-led coalition in the war against ISIL.246 The Kurdish People’s
Protection Units (YPG) were established in 2012 as the military wing of the Kurdish Democratic Union
Party (PYD) – a Syrian branch of the EU247, US248 and Turkey-designated terrorist organisation
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).249 The SDF is dominated by the YPG who helped establish the SDF in
October 2015250, provides its core fighting forces and largely ensures its leadership.251
The October 2019 Turkish-led incursion into northeast Syria has led to territorial control changes innorth-east Syria, namely by occupying previously Kurdish-held territory stretching between Ras al-Ain
and Tall Abyad.252
SDF was neither in alliance with the Syrian opposition nor the government, but it was neverthelesslargely dependent on the GoS, which funded certain state institutions in the area and paid salaries tostate employees.253 In October 2019, the GoS and the Kurdish-controlled SDF announced anagreement that allowed the GoS troops to be deployed along the border with Turkey to assist Kurdish
forces in repelling the Turkish offensive.254 Christopher Kozak of ISW assessed in November 2019 that
the SDF are still in control on the ground in Kurdish-controlled territories and there has not been agovernance handover to the Syrian government following the agreement.255
Detailed information on the SDF, YPG and the Kurdish-controlled north-east of Syria is available in the
EASO COI Report: Syria – Actors (December 2019)

3.1 Targeting of political opponents
The Democratic Union Party, known as the PYD, is a Kurdish political party established by the Syrian
branch of the PKK in 2003.256 PYD is viewed as the dominant political actor in the Kurdish-controlledareas where it exercises ultimate control and making decisions for the entire region.257 Most of theKurdish opposition is united in the Kurdish National Council (KNC), an umbrella group for various

245 Based on reading of the following maps: ISW, Syria Situation Report: December 17-28, 2019, 9 January 2020, url;

Liveuamap, Syria, 31 December 2019, url
246 Syria Study Group, Final Report and Recommendations, USIP, 24 September 2019, url, p. 33
247 European Council, Council Decision of 17 June 2002 implementing Article 2(3) of Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 on
specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism and repealing
Decision 2002/334/EC, 18 June 2002, url
248 USDOS, Country Report on Terrorism 2018 - Chapter 5 - Kurdistan Workers’ Party, 1 November 2019, url
249 Syria Study Group, Final Report and Recommendations, USIP, 24 September 2019, url, p. 33
250 Syria Study Group, Final Report and Recommendations, USIP, 24 September 2019, url, pp. 8, 33
251 International Crisis Group, Squaring the Circles in Syria’s North East, 31 July 2019, url, p. 1; Syria Study Group, Final
Report and Recommendations, USIP, 24 September 2019, url, pp. 8, 33
252 COAR, Syria Update 06 - 12 November, 2019, 13 November 2019, url, pp. 3-4
253 International Crisis Group, Squaring the Circles in Syria’s North East, 31 July 2019, url, pp. 1, 13-14; Lund, A., Syria’s Civil
War: Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Swedish Defence Research Agency, December 2018, url, pp. 59-60
254 Al Jazeera, Syria's army to deploy along Turkey border as Kurds strike deal, 14 October 2019, url
255 EASO Interview with Christopher Kozak, Institute for the Study of War (ISW), 14 November 2019
256 Syria Study Group, Final Report and Recommendations, USIP, 24 September 2019, url, p. 33; Wimmen, H. and Seluck,M., The Rise of Syria’s Kurds, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 5 February 2013, url
257 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2019 - Syria, 4 February 2019, url, Political Rights and Civil Liberties; Wilkofsky,D., The future of northeast Syria, Atlantic Council, 13 August 2019, url40 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

Syrian Kurdish parties that was created in 2011.258 As of mid-2019, the KNC comprised of 14 parties.259
Several sources documented the arrest, detention and enforced disappearances260 of members of thepolitical opposition, including KNC, at the hand of local security forces.261
Several sources noted that the PYD and the affiliated Asayish engaged in arbitrary detentions,enforced disappearances and torture of political opponents such as the KNC, arrests of journalists,
members of human rights organisations and individuals who refused to cooperate with Kurdish
groups.262 During 2018, at least 20 members of the KNC were reported to have been arrested by the
Asayish, some of which were alleged to have been forcibly disappeared.263
According to the CoI, Kurdish forces arbitrarily arrested civilians supporting competing political parties
or individuals perceived to be insufficiently loyal. Instances of torture of political opponents byelements associated with the SDF and YPG on the Syrian Arab Republic were also reported.264
In a June 2018 article, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy noted that the PYD has previously
arrested KNC leaders, burned their offices, and prevented them from holding meetings andconferences.265 In the months preceding the 2017 local elections in north-east Syria, Kurdish
authorities launched a campaign of arrests of ‘illegal’ and unpermitted political parties, resulting in
the closure of nearly all opposition party offices.266
In January 2019, during attempts to unify the Syrian Kurdish political parties, the PYD-run
administration allowed ‘unlicensed’ political parties to open new local offices. Amidst therapprochement, the Kurdish National Congress - ‘a pan-Kurdish coalition of organizations with over
288 representatives’267 - reportedly pledged to investigate the existence of political prisoners.268 Prior
mediation attempts and agreements between the KNC and the PYD have failed in between 2012 and2014269 and in 2016.270 Due to the Turkish military offensive in north-east Syria (starting in October2019), talks about a deal between the PYD and KNC have emerged.271
According to a statement by the KNC, the PYD-Asayish prevented a cultural seminar held by a local
council in Qamishli on 15 September 2019. The head of the local council was reportedly arrested fora couple of hours. The KNC condemned the blocking of political activities by the PYD.272 According to
258 Syria Study Group, Final Report and Recommendations, USIP, 24 September 2019, url, p. 33; Chatham House, Governing

Rojava: Layers of legitimacy in Syria, December 2016, url, p. 3
259 Syria Study Group, Final Report and Recommendations, USIP, 24 September 2019, url, p. 33; Koontz, K., Borders Beyond
borders. The Many (Many) Kurdish Political Parties of Syria, Middle East Institute, October 2019, url, p. 8
260 HRW, World Report 2019 - Syria, 17 January 2019, url
261 AI, Human rights in the Middle East and North Africa: Review of 2018 - Syria [MDE 24/9903/2019], 26 February 2019,url, p. 62; HRW, World Report 2019 - Syria, 17 January 2019, url
262 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2018 - Syria, 13 March 2019, url, p. 55; HRW, Syria: Kurdish-led
Administration Jails Rivals, 10 September 2018, url; Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2019 - Syria, 4 February 2019,url
263 HRW, World Report 2019 - Syria, 17 January 2019, url
264 Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, Detention in the Syrian Arab Republic:
A Way Forward, OHCHR, 8 March 2018, url, p. 5
265 Washington Institute for Near East Policy (The), Why Syria’s Kurds are Struggling Politically, 12 June 2018, url
266 Kurdistan24, Syria’s Kurdish authorities close dozen political offices, 18 March 2017, url
267 Koontz, K., Borders Beyond borders. The Many (Many) Kurdish Political Parties of Syria, Middle East Institute, October
2019, url, p. 9
268 Kurdistan24, Syrian Kurdish groups attempt to unify after Trump withdrawal decision, 5 January 2019, url
269 Kurdistan24, Syrian Kurdish groups attempt to unify after Trump withdrawal decision, 5 January 2019, url; Stiftung
Wissenschaft und Politik, Günter Seufert (publisher), Die Kurden im Irak und in Syrien nach dem Ende derTerritorialherrschaft des »Islamischen Staates« [The Kurds in Iraq and Syria after the end of the territorial reign of the„Islamic State“], July 2018, url, p. 70
270 Koontz, K., Borders Beyond borders. The Many (Many) Kurdish Political Parties of Syria, Middle East Institute, October
2019, url, p. 7
271 Al Monitor, Feuding Syrian Kurdish political blocs dance around rapprochement, 6 August 2019, url
272 Kurdish National Council (KNC), A statement on the prevention by the PYD-run Asayish to hold a cultural seminar by the
local council of al-Kournish [translated from Arabic], 16 September 2019, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS — 41

a meeting protocol of the KNC-member Partîya Yekîtîya Kurdistani – Sûrîyê (PYKS) on 30 September
2019, the party offices in Qamishli and Amude remained closed and some political prisoners were notreleased.273 The events and allegations could not be verified.
SNHR reported that in December 2019 SDF arbitrarily arrested activists and members of civil society
who opposed their policies in Raqqa and Deir Ez-Zor governorates. Civilians were reportedly also
targeted for forced conscription or under the charge of cooperating with opposition factions.274
In 2014, Human Rights Watch published an extensive report on human rights violations (i.e. arbitraryarrests, due process violations, abuses in detention, unsolved disappearances and killings) committed
by the YPG, Asayish and other PYD institutions against members of the Kurdish opposition. Human
Rights Watch suggested that human rights violations persisted in Kurdish-controlled territories,
although less widespread and drastic than in other Syrian territories.275 With the establishment of
PYD-run administration, many opposition parties are said to have gone into exile276 or have reportedly
been suppressed by the PYD.277

3.2 Targeting of persons with (perceived) links to ISIL
In a January 2019 report, the CoI stated that ‘SDF relied heavily on international coalition air power,
causing a notable increase in civilian casualties and underscoring the link between explosive weapons
in densely populated areas and civilian harm’.278 During the first half of 2019, military raids carried out
by SDF against ISIL elements in Deir Ez-Zor governorate have led to civilian casualties. Some raids havebeen perceived by local communities as direct SDF attacks on tribal members.279
Sources interviewed by the International Crisis Group in 2019 noted that SDF/YPG arbitrarily detained
and indiscriminately killed civilians during anti-ISIL raids. At least 111 people were said to have been
wrongfully killed by SDF during anti ISIL-operations carried out in eastern Deir Ez-Zor during March
2019. SDF reportedly paid blood money to the tribes for some of the victims.280
Between July 2012 and September 2019, SNHR documented the detention or enforced disappearanceof 2 907 individuals by SDF. SNHR noted that in 2019 the SDF was responsible for raids, arrests andenforced disappearances. IDPs settled in Raqqa, Hasaka and Deir Ez-Zor governorates, wereparticularly targeted by SDF, whom it accused of ISIL affiliation.281
In a report published in February 2019, SNHR stated that there has been an increase in arrests andenforced disappearances in the Kurdish region. Between January and February 2019, SNHR
documented the arrests of at least 107 persons out of which 52 were forcibly disappeared by Kurdish
forces affiliated with the PYD. Amongst others, the arrests targeted IDPs residing in camps and273 Kurdish National Council (KNC), A statement on the meeting of the Yekiti Party Syria’s Central Committee [translated

from Arabic], 30 September 2019, url
274 SNHR, At least 6,671 Cases of Arbitrary Arrests Documented in 2019, 2 January 2020, url, p. 5
275 HRW, Under Kurdish Rule, 19 June 2014, url, pp. 3-6
276 SWP (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik), Günter Seufert (publisher), Die Kurden im Irak und in Syrien nach dem Endeder Territorialherrschaft des »Islamischen Staates« [The Kurds in Iraq and Syria after the end of the territorial reign oft he„Islamic State“], July 2018, url, p. 69
277 SWP (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik), Aljoscha Albrecht / Guido Steinberg, Kurden unter Druck [The Kurds underpressure], January 2019, url, p. 6; Washington Institute for Near East Policy (The), A Better Future For Syrian Kurdistan, 29
November 2017, url
278 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/40/70], 31 January 2019, url, p. 10
279 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/42/51], 15 August 2019, url, p. 8
280 International Crisis Group interviews with tribal notables, March 2019 and YPG official, May 2019. International Crisis
Group, Squaring the Circles in Syria’s North East, 31 July 2019, url, p. 19
281 SNHR, Nearly 3,000 Individuals Are Still Detained or Forcibly Disappeared by Syrian Democratic Forces, 10 September
2019, url, pp. 1-3

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suspected of having links with ISIL or armed opposition groups.282 Mistreatment of non-Kurdish
residents, particularly those suspected to be associated with ISIL was also reported.283
The CoI noted that ‘in areas under the control of SDF, thousands of women, men and children
continued to be unlawfully interned or detained, some of them held in deplorable conditions inmakeshift camps unfit to meet their basic needs’.284 The informal detention centres for ISIL fighters
and affiliates were reported to be severely overcrowded and lacking adequate medical care.285
Thousands of wives and children of ISIL fighters were also held in makeshift camps where the living
conditions were reported to be ‘deplorable’. With many countries of origin of foreign ISIL family
members refusing to repatriate them, these persons were held in ‘limbo’ by the SDF. 286
During anti-ISIL operations in Hasaka and Raqqa governorates carried out in 2015, AI stated that the
YPG forces engaged in razing of villages, confiscation of property and forced displacement of people
in retaliation for perceived affiliation or sympathies to ISIL or other armed groups. AI assessed thatthe forced displacement carried out by the Kurdish forces constituted war crimes.287
While the SDF regularly claims to arrest ISIL affiliates, SOHR reported that some of those arrested are
civil activists.288 SDF was accused of arresting activists involved in the uprising against the Assadgovernment. In August 2019, four activists were arrested in Raqqa under the accusation of being ISIL
members.289 SNHR also reported on several incidents of arrest of local activists and humanitarian
workers in Raqqa governorate under the accusation of ISIL affiliation.290 The Syrian for Truth & Justice- an NGO documenting human rights violations in Syria - reported that during August 2019 SDF andlocal security forces arrested at least 14 civilians in Raqqa for undisclosed reasons. The arrested
including six prominent civil society activists who started working in the governorate after the defeatof ISIL. Sources close to Kurdish authorities accused at least one of the activists arrested of being an
ISIL affiliate.291
Reporting for the period July 2017 to January 2018, the CoI noted that SDF arrested relatives ofmembers of the Free Syrian Army (FSA)292 and ISIL for interrogation.293

3.3 Other profiles perceived as opposition
Arabs have claimed to be marginalised in the governance of the areas where they constitute a majority
with decision-making ultimately resting in the hands of the Kurds.294

282 SNHR, An Increase in Arrests and Enforced Disappearances by Kurdish Self-Management Forces, 18 February 2019, url,

p. 2
283 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2019 - Syria, 4 February 2019, url
284 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/40/70], 31 January 2019, url, p. 4285 HRW, Northeast Syria: Article on men and boys being held by Kurdish-led armed group in informal detention centers, 8October 2019, url
286 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/42/51], 15 August 2019, url, pp. 15-16
287 AI, ’We Had Nowhere Else to Go’. Forced Displacement and Demolitions in Northern Syria, 13 October 2015, url, pp. 56
288 SOHR, Without warning…the SDF arrest 4 activists working in civil society organizations in Al-Raqqah city, 17 August
2019, url
289 Syrian Observer (The), In the Footsteps of ISIS, the SDF Pursues Activists in Raqqa, 21 August 2019, url
290 SNHR, Nearly 3,000 Individuals Are Still Detained or Forcibly Disappeared by Syrian Democratic Forces, 10 September
2019, url, p. 3
291 STJ, Syria: Prominent Activists Arbitrarily Arrested in Raqqa, 3 September 2019, url
292 The Free Syrian Army is the umbrella-armed group formed by the anti-government opposition in 2011. ISW, The Free
Syrian Army, March 2013, url, p. 9
293 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/37/72], 1 February 2018, url, p. 10
294 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Kurdish-Arab Power Struggle in Northeastern Syria, 24 July 2019, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS — 43

The US Congress-appointed Syria Study Group noted in a September 2019 report that ‘YPG’s heavyhanded approach to governing and resource allocation, has led to unrest in Arab tribal areas’.295 In
spring 2019, Arab residents launched protests in Deir Ez-Zor governorate against the Kurdish forcescomplaining of lack of services, discrimination, forcible conscription, and a failure to releaseprisoners.296 Deterioration of living conditions and arbitrary arrests of civilians under the accusationof having links with ISIL or Turkey were also identified as main causes for the protests.297 In Deir EzZor the local population is reportedly largely tribal and distrustful of the Kurdish-led forces whom theyaccuse of ‘trying to control them from outside’.298 Protests against SDF control were also held in
Hasaka and Raqqa governorates.299
Corruption, extortion and abuses of power at the hands of SDF personnel was also reported.300 Arabfighters that refused to join SDF claimed that they have been reportedly subjected to harassment,
arbitrary arrests, and confiscations of weapons and cars.301
Disputes between the PYD-led Kurdish administration in north-east Syria and Christian communities
over the school curriculum during 2018 have led to the temporary closure of 14 Assyrian and Chaldean
Catholic schools in the cities of Qamishli, Hasaka and Al-Malikiyeh for refusal to adopt the Kurdish
curriculum.302 Christian activists complained in protest that the ‘mandated curriculum denied them
their own unique ethnoreligious identities’ and that it aimed to promote Kurdish nationalism.303
In 2018, Assyrian and Chaldeans protesting the implementation of the PYD curriculum were reportedlyarrested or disappeared by PYD forces.304 In February 2019, the SNHR stated that teachers who refuse
to fully implement the PYD curriculum were arrested.305

3.4 Targeting of persons associated with Turkey and/or the Syrian
National Army
Since the capture of Afrin by Turkish forces and affiliated armed groups in March 2018, YPG and otherarmed groups were reported to having conducted ‘IED attacks, roadside ambushes, kidnappings andexecutions’ against the Turkey-backed groups that control the area and suspected collaborators. YPG,
together with two other linked armed groups - Ghadab al-Zaytoun and Hezen Rizgariya Efrine [Afrin
Liberation Forces] - claimed to have carried out about 220 attacks between late March 2018 and end
January 2019. While no reliable data on the number casualties was available, Bellingcat estimated thatat least 100 opposition members were killed as a result of the attacks. The attacks have also caused
civilian casualties. Ghadab al-Zaytoun has published videos depicting executions of civilians it accused

295 Syria Study Group, Final Report and Recommendations, United States Institute of Peace, 24 September 2019, url, p. 8
296 Reuters, Anti-Kurdish protests grow in Syria's Deir al-Zor: residents, locals, 8 May 2019, url; AP News, Anti-Kurdish

protests in east Syria could endanger US plans, 9 May 2019, url
297 Hassam, M., Protests in Deir Ezzor: Causes and Main Demands, Chatham House, August 2019, url
298 RI, An Uncertain Future. Fragility and Humanitarian Priorities in Northeast Syria, July 2019, url, p. 10299 Hassam, M., Protests in Deir Ezzor: Causes and Main Demands, Chatham House, August 2019, url
300 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/42/51], 15 August 2019, url, p. 8
301 Al Monitor, Deir ez-Zor Arab fighters 'punished for refusal to join SDF', 20 June 2019, url
302 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2018 - Syria, 13 March 2019, url; USCIRF, United States Commission
on International Religious Freedom 2019 Annual Report; Country Reports: Tier 1 Countries (Recommended for CPC
Designation): Syria, April 2019, url, p. 5
303 USCIRF, United States Commission on International Religious Freedom 2019 Annual Report; Country Reports: Tier 1
Countries (Recommended for CPC Designation): Syria, April 2019, url, p. 5
304 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2018 - Syria, 13 March 2019, url, pp. 33, 36
305 SNHR, An increasing frequency of arrests and enforced disappearances by Kurdish Self-Management Forces, 18
February 2019, url, p 2

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to be informants for Turkish authorities or members of the Turkish-supported civil administration of
Afrin.306
In Afrin, Aleppo governorate, the YPG is reported to wage ‘a low-level insurgency against the Turkish
military and its Syrian rebel allies’.307 According to a June 2019 report published by the Netherlands
Institute of International Relations, in Afrin Turkey has struggled to ‘establish a basic level of control
through tactics of suppression, confiscation and expulsion of the area’s Kurdish population and its
leaders which, in turn, has triggered a YPG-led insurgency’.308
The CoI report of August 2019 noted that YPG-associated Kurdish armed groups, Ghadab al-Zaytoun
and Hezen Rizgariya Efrine, ‘have engaged in asymmetric warfare against factions operating under the
Syrian National Army’.309
During July 2017 and January 2018, the CoI reported that SDF arrested relatives of members of the
FSA and ISIL for interrogation.310
In the wake of the Kurdish forces’ withdrawal from the areas captured by Turkey and affiliated Syrian
National Army (SNA) in the October 2019 offensive there were unconfirmed reports of SDF forces
killing civilians for perceived relations with the SNA in the area around the town of Ras al-Ain, Hasaka
governorate.311

3.5 List of illustrative incidents
•

•

•

•

In August 2019, SDF reportedly arrested six humanitarian workers in Raqqa city. While arrests
were considered to be part of a wider SDF security operation against ISIL cells the reasons fordetaining the humanitarian workers remained unknown. Different sources claimed that thearrests were made either for cooperation with the Syrian regime, Turkey or affiliation with
ISIL. SDF denied the arrests.312
On 16 August 2019, SDF arrested a media activist at his home in the city of Tabqa, Raqqa
governorate, reportedly on the basis of accusations from unidentified sources. He was taken
to an unidentified location. His fate and whereabouts were unknown.313
On 16 August 2019, SDF arrested the director of a non-governmental organisation in the cityof Karamah, Raqqa governorate for unknown reasons. His fate and whereabouts remain
unknown.314
In September 2019, OHCHR ‘documented at least seven incidents of arbitrary arrests orenforced disappearances of civilians, including media and human rights activists, that were

306 Bellingcat, Wrath of the Olives: Tracking the Afrin Insurgency Through Social Media, 1 March 2019, url; Bellingcat is an

open source investigative site.
307 DW, Explained: Why Turkey wants a military assault on Syrian Kurds, 9 October 2019, url
308 Van Leeuwen, J. and van Veen, E., Turkey in northwestern Syria. Rebuilding empire at the margins, Clingendael, June
2019, url, p. 4309 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 15 August
2019, url, p. 5
310 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/37/72], 1 February 2018, url, p. 10
311 Syria Direct, Civilians the only innocent party in ‘Operation Peace Spring’, 27 October 2019, url
312 Syria Direct, SDF arrest humanitarian workers in Raqqa, raising questions and concerns, 19 August 2019, url
313 UN Security Council: Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018) and 2449 (2018); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2019/820], 15 October
2019, url, p. 19
314 UN Security Council: Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018) and 2449 (2018); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2019/820], 15 October
2019, url, p. 19; Syria Direct, SDF arrest humanitarian workers in Raqqa, raising questions and concerns, 19 August 2019,url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS — 45•

perceived as critical of the SDF in areas under its control’. Some of the incidents took place inrural Deir Ez Zor governorate.315
On 13 September 2019, SDF raided the house of a media activist in the city of Tabqa in westernrural Raqqa governorate. The media activist was arrested and his laptop and mobile phone
confiscated. Family members were denied information on his situation and whereabouts,
which remained unknown.316
On 31 October 2019, a car bomb attack on a market in Afrin left at least eight people deadand 30 others wounded. Residents and members of rebel armed groups in the area blamed
the YPG for the attack.317 No group has claimed the attack.318
On 2 November 2019, 13 civilians were killed and more than 30 others injured following a carbomb attack in the town of Tal Abyad, in northern Syria close to the border with Turkey. Someof the casualties were members of Turkish-backed armed groups. No group has taken
responsibility for the attack but Turkish authorities have blamed it on YPG elements.319 ISW
reported that ‘likely YPG elements’ conducted vehicle-borne improvised explosive attacks(VBIED) on the SNA-held towns of Suluk, Hammam al-Turkman and Tal Abyad, in Turkishcontrolled areas in northern Syria.320

315 UN Security Council: Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258

(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018) and 2449 (2018); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2019/820], 15 October
2019, url, p. 19
316 UN Security Council: Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018) and 2449 (2018); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2019/820], 15 October
2019, url, p. 19
317 Reuters, Car blast kills eight in Syria's Afrin, near Turkish border, 31 October 2019, url
318 Middle East Eye, Car bomb kills at least eight in Syria's Afrin, 31 October 2019, url
319 New York Times (The), Explosion in Syrian Town on Turkish Border Kills 13, 2 November 2019, url; RFE/RL, Car Bomb In
Northern Syria Kills At Least 13, 2 November 2019, url
320 ISW, Syria Situation Report: October 23 – November 5, 2019, 8 November 2019, url

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4. Persons fearing (forced) recruitment by
Kurdish forces in areas under their influence
4.1 Compulsory military service
Compulsory military service was first introduced by the Kurdish administration on 14 July 2014 on thebasis of the Law on Mandatory Self-Defence Duty.321 The law first came into effect in Afrin in 2015.322
In 2017, the Legislative Council of the Jazirah Canton amended the Law on Mandatory Self-Defence
Duty.323 All amendments and previous versions of the Law became null and void after the General
Council (Majlis al-‘Am) agreed on 35 Articles regarding the ‘Duty of Self-Defence’ (mandatory
conscription) in June 2019.324
Geographically the law is confined to the areas of northern and eastern Syria under control of theKurdish-led Autonomous Administration.325
Conscription was mandatory for all male residents in the territories under the Autonomous
Administration after reaching 18 years (Article 1a, 2019). The law obliged Syrian nationals, so-called
Ajanib and Maktumeen Kurds [stateless Kurds]326 to join the SDF. Syrians from other parts of thecountry who have resided in the area longer than five years are obliged to join as well (Article 1j,2019). The military service has to be completed by the age of 40 years (Article 13).327 In the first versionof the law (2014) conscription was mandatory for all men between 18 and 30 years.328 Sourcesinterviewed in 2019 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands stated that military service
usually lasted six months, but during May 2018 to May 2019, it lasted 12 months.329
In the case of conscientious objection to military service or arrest, compulsory military service would
be 15 months as a punitive measure. Then the conscript is free to join a militia. Men serve in the YPG,
while women can serve in the Kurdish Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) - the women branch of the YPG- on a voluntary basis.330
According to a source interviewed in 2019 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, men who
served in the SAA also had to complete the mandatory military service in the Kurdish areas. According
to Article 10 (2019), the payment of a guaranty (kafāla) does not exempt from the mandatory military

321 Denmark, DIS/DRC, Syria. Update on Military Service, Mandatory Self-Defence Duty and Recruitment to the YPG,

September 2015, url, p. 21; Al Jazeera, Syria Kurds impose mandatory military service, 17 July 2017, url
322 Denmark, DIS/DRC, Syria. Update on Military Service, Mandatory Self-Defence Duty and Recruitment to the YPG,
September 2015, url, p. 21
323 Legislative Council of Jazirah Canton (Encumena Zagonsazi), Amended Law on the duty of self-defence, 14 August 2018,url
324 Basnews, The PYD administration decides Self-Defence Law (compulsory military service) [translated from Arabic], 22June 2019, url
325 Basnews, The PYD administration decides Self-Defence Law (compulsory military service) [translated from Arabic], 22June 2019, url; Enab Baladi, Enab Baladi publishes Draft Recruitment Law in Autonomous Administration-ruled Areas, 13
May 2019, url
326 For clarification on Ajanib and Maktumeen Kurds please see Stateless Journeys, Country Position Paper: Statelessness
in Syria, August 2019, url, pp. 14, 16-17
327 Basnews, The PYD administration decides Self-Defence Law (compulsory military service) [translated from Arabic], 22June 2019, url
328 Denmark, DIS/DRC, Syria. Update on Military Service, Mandatory Self-Defence Duty and Recruitment to the YPG,
September 2015, url, pp. 38-39
329 Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of Origin Information Report Syria. The security situation, July
2019, url, p. 63
330 Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of Origin Information Report Syria. The security situation, July
2019, url, p. 63

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS — 47

service.331 Sources interviewed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands stated that there
was also the possibility to pay in order to avoid serving in the military.332
Upon assignment the conscript needs to obtain a military booklet and present himself at a Centre for
Self-Defence Duty or have an excuse within the legal framework within 60 days; otherwise he will beconsidered as ‘late enlister’ (Article 1 h). Late enlisters serve for an additional month after the
mandatory service (Article 15) and have to pay a fine (Article 33).333
Students are entitled to postpone the military service under certain circumstances (for example theage until when a student can postpone the service differs depending on the level of education).
defined in Articles 16-22 (2019). Other reasons for deferral are defined in Article 25 (including forexample categories like those recently returned to Syria, siblings younger than 18 years and a passed
away or handicapped father). All deferral cases need a permission granted by the Self-Defence Duty
Department.334
Article 28 (2019) defines the cases of exemptions to the duty of self-defence (i.e. medical reasons,disabled, family members of martyrs holding a proving certificate thereof or only son).335
In February 2017, the PYD announced the possibility of joining the PYD-run security forces on a
voluntary basis, exempting the person from compulsory conscription. The call was towards men notyounger than 18 years and not older than 40 years. A volunteer would have to join for the duration of
28 months and receive a monthly salary of USD 100 Dollars.336 This information could not be verified.
Reportedly, sources from 2015 noted that the conscription in the Kurdish autonomous areas is similar
to the conscription system in the areas under the control of GoS. Assignment is reportedly based on
civil records and local informants (i.e. neighbours, Asayish). Similarly to GoS-controlled areas, lists ofpeople wanted for the military service were issued in 2015.337
A 2015 report by DIS stated that, while according to the law, members of ethnic and religious
minorities were obliged to serve, the law was not enforced; they rather joined on a voluntary basis.338
This information could not be corroborated by other sources. On other occasions, conscription policies
in Arab areas where halted after the intervention of tribal leaders, as was the case in Manbij and Tabqa
in 2017.339

4.2 Forced recruitment
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands stated in a 2019 report that ‘it is known that the
Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and YPG use forced recruitment in addition to the conscription system

331 Basnews, The PYD administration decides Self-Defence Law (compulsory military service) [translated from Arabic], 22June 2019, url
332 Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of Origin Information Report Syria. The security situation, July
2019, url, p. 63
333 Basnews, The PYD administration decides Self-Defence Law (compulsory military service) [translated from Arabic], 22June 2019, url
334 Basnews, The PYD administration decides Self-Defence Law (compulsory military service) [translated from Arabic], 22June 2019, url
335 Basnews, The PYD administration decides Self-Defence Law (compulsory military service) [translated from Arabic], 22June 2019, url
336 Omran Center for Strategic Studies, Military and Security Structures of the Autonomous Administration in Syria, 24
January 2018, url, p. 21
337 Denmark, DIS/DRC, Syria. Update on Military Service, Mandatory Self-Defence Duty and Recruitment to the YPG,
September 2015, url, p. 21
338 Denmark, DIS/DRC, Syria. Update on Military Service, Mandatory Self-Defence Duty and Recruitment to the YPG,
September 2015, url, p 23; EASO, COI Meeting Report Syria 30 November & 1 December 2017,March 2018, url, p. 63
339 Al Monitor, Manbij residents face off against SDF over conscription policy, 24 November 2017, url; Syria Direct, Tribal
leaders halt conscription policy by Kurdish-led forces in Manbij, Tabqa, 8 November 2017, url

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in the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria for men between the ages of 18 and 30 in order tosupplement their numbers’.340
Enab Baladi reported that in some cases recruitment conducted by the YPG didn’t respect the law.
Cases of arbitrary arrest for recruitment despite applicable postponements for education or medical
reasons were documented.341 According to Al Monitor, the SDF was intensifying its efforts to forcibly
recruit young men in Raqqa governorate, arresting 20 men in May 2019 for avoiding military service.
They were sent to training camps.342 The legal basis for the arrests was reportedly a decision issued
on 14 May 2019 by the SDF on mandatory military service in the Euphrates region.343
The CoI stated that the SDF continued to conscript men and children for the reporting period of July
2017 until January 2018, as part of the group’s forced conscription campaigns in the areas under its
control. The report stated that the individuals conscripted received basic training and were
subsequently sent to the frontlines. For the same reporting period, the CoI stated that there werereports that the SDF was asking families returning to Tall Abyad (Raqqa governorate) to volunteer one
man per family for military service, which deterred some families from returning to their homes. 344
The same source informed that some families chose to move from the areas under SDF in order toavoid reprisals, including arrest, for not accepting conscription.345
Different sources stated that members of the Arab communities, in areas under SDF control were also
subjected to forced recruitment by the SDF.346
In a 2018 report the CoI informed that in the governorates of Hasaka, northern Raqqa, and Aleppo
arrests of men of 18 years old and above, who attempted to avoid forced conscription were
documented. The perpetrators of these increasing arrests were the SDF, the YPG and Asayish, basedon various enforced conscription laws, according to the same source.347
IDPs alleged that, between July 2017 and January 2018, at Mabrouka camp in Hasaka governorate,
SDF forces were targeting certain families for forced conscription and that families without sons were‘reportedly made to pay $ 300 USD to SDF soldiers’.348

4.3 Recruitment of children
The recruitment and use of child soldiers by the YPG have been documented by Human Rights Watch
since 2014.349 The UN verified the recruitment and use of 313 children by YPG/YPJ operating under
the SDF umbrella in the period from January to December 2018. Child recruitment in Syria was

340 Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of Origin Information Report Syria. The security situation, July

2019, url, p. 66, para. 3.1.2
341 Enab Baladi, Compulsory military recruitment in Jazira Region: SDF imposing their authority, 12 July 2019, url
342 Al Monitor, SDF arrests Syrians who refuse to serve, 28 May 2019, url
343 Orient Net, SDF starts a brought campaign to draft Raqqa’s youth in mandatory military service, 16 May 2019, url
344 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
11 February 2018, url, p. 10, para. 43
345 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
11 February 2018, url, p. 10, para. 43
346 Syria Study Group, Final Report and Recommendations, USIP, 24 September 2019, url, p. 32; Netherlands (The), Ministryof Foreign Affairs, Country of Origin Information Report Syria. The security situation, July 2019, url, p. 63, para. 2.1.8
347 Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, Detention in the Syrian Arab Republic:
A way forward, OHCHR, 8 March 2018, url, p. 5, para. 16
348 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
11 February 2018, url, p. 28, para. 9349 HRW, “Maybe We Live and Maybe We Die”. Recruitment and Use of Children by Armed Groups in Syria, 22 June 2014,
url, pp. 27-28

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS — 49

particularly prevalent among the YPG and its offspring for female fighters YPJ. Of the children recruitedby the YPG/YPJ, 126 were girls.350
Human Rights Watch reported in August 2018 that the SDF recruited children, both boys and girls,
who come from IDP camps. Parents usually had no contact with their children once they wererecruited and only found out from authorities that their children were in training.351 Human Rights
Watch documented that the YPG recruited children from three displacement camps in north-east
Syria. Among these children were six girls, who voluntarily joined, though without obtaining
permission from their families.352
SNHR noted in a report (covering 1 January - 18 February 2019) that it documented four incidents ofconscription of children between the age of 13 and 17 years by the SDF. According to the SNHR, theSDF abducted these children from their families and did not provide them with any information on
their children’s whereabouts, aside from saying that they were taken to military training centres.353
In response to the UN and human rights organisation reporting, the SDF-leadership and umbrellaorganisation for the YPG/YPJ among others declared an end to using child soldiers in July 2018.354 In
December 2018, the SDF and the non-governmental organisation Geneva Call reported the SDF had
released 56 underage boys to their families.355 In June 2019, the SDF adopted an UN action plan toend the recruitment and use of children in conflict.356
The Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ)357, in a July 2019 report, documented cases of thedemobilisation of minors following the signing of the action plan between the SDF and the UN. The
source further stated that, at the time that the report was drafted, on 12 July 2019, there were still
underage recruits serving in the SDF.358
The Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor359 reported in September 2019 that the SDF had
abducted approximately 200 children from al-Hol camp and taken them to the group’s training
camps. The source cited relief sources stating that the majority of the children were between 13 and16 years old.360

350 UN General Assembly: Children and armed conflict; Report of the Secretary-General [A/73/907–S/2019/509], 30 July

2019, url, p. 27
351 HRW, Syria: Armed Group Recruiting Children in Camps, 3 August 2018, url
352 HRW, Key Steps Taken to End Use of Child Soldiers in Syria, 11 September 2018, url
353 SNHR, An increasing frequency of arrests and enforced disappearances by Kurdish Self-Management Forces, 18
February 2019, url, pp. 2-3
354 Newsweek, U.S. Ally in Syria declares end to using child soldiers, 9 July 2018, url
355 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2018 - Syria, 13 March 2019, url, p. 33
356 Defense Post (The), SDF signs UN plan to end use of children in Syrian conflict, 2 July 2019, url
357 Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ) is an initiative to document human rights violations committed in Syria. STJ works inall parts of Syria and builds its own database storing all documented accounts from population on the ground. STY isfounded among others by the German Federal Foreign Office, The Swiss Federal Department of Foreign affairs and theMinistry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. For more information please see url
358 STJ, SDF shall Demonstrate Full Commitment to Preventing Recruitment of Children Having Signed an Action Plan withUN, 15 July 2019, url, pp. 3-4
359 Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network is a network of 80 human rights organisations, institutions and individuals
based in 30 countries in Europe and the Mediterranean region. For more information see url
360 Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor, SDF kidnaps dozens of children and youths in eastern Syria, 18 September
2019, url

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5. Persons perceived to be supporting thegovernment
and/oropposing
antigovernment armed groups
This chapter covers targeting by three broader anti-government groups:

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and other armed groups active in the Idlib area
Anti-GoS armed groups operating in southern Syria (Dar’a and Rural Damascus governorate)
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)

Information on targeting by the SNA and the SDF/YPG is available in Section 6.1 and Chapter 3,
respectively.
The Idlib area in northwestern Syria is viewed as the armed opposition’s last stronghold.361 The
opposition-controlled area is generally referred to as Idlib, but it also includes neighbouring areas innorth-western Aleppo, northern Hama and Latakia governorates.362 As of January 2020, a GoS
offensive on the Idlib area is ongoing, resulting thus far in the capture of significant rebel-held
territories and massive displacement.363
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham or Organization for the Liberation of the Levant (HTS) is described as the mostimportant and powerful actor in the Idlib area.364 CSIS noted in an October 2018 report that HTS’s
primary objective is aimed at establishing Islamic rule in Syria through overthrowing the Assadgovernment and ousting Iranian militias.365 The US366, UN, EU367 and Turkey have designated HTS as aterrorist organisation affiliated with Al Qaeda.368
Christopher Kozak assessed that HTS also has a presence in southern Syria and noted that they might
be behind or at least deeply involved in the insurgent violence in southern Syria and Damascus,
whether in facilitating attacks or creating false groups to mask their return to insurgency in southern
Syria.369
Other significant opposition armed groups that are present and active in the Idlib area operate under
the umbrella of the National Liberation Front (NLF) - a Turkey-backed alliance of opposition-armed
groups370, which merged in October 2019 with the SNA.371 The group uses the brand of the Free Syrian

361 International Crisis Group, The Best of Bad Options for Syria’s Idlib, 14 March 2019, url, pp. 1, 6; Syria Study Group, Final

Report and Recommendations, United States Institute of Peace, 24 September 2019, url, p. 27
362 ISW, Syria Situation Report: September 11-24 2019, 27 September 2019, url; International Crisis Group, The Best of Bad
Options for Syria’s Idlib, 14 March 2019, url, p. 1
363 BBC, Syria war: Rebel-held Idlib 'hit by 200 air strikes in three days', 30 January 2020, url
364 International Crisis Group, The Best of Bad Options for Syria’s Idlib, 14 March 2019, url, p. 6; BBC, Syria: Who's in control
of Idlib?, 22 June 2019, url; al-Tamimi, A., From Jabhat al-Nusra to Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham: Evolution, Approach and Future,
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 29 June 2018, url, p. 5; HRW, Syria: Arrests, Torture by Armed Group, 28 January 2019, url
365 CSIS, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, 4 October 2018, url, p. 2
366 USDOS, Country Report on Terrorism 2018 - Chapter 5 - Al-Nusrah Front, 1 November 2019, url
367 EU, Official Journal of the European Union, Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/855 of 8 June 2018
amending for the 286th time Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directedagainst certain persons and entities associated with the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida organisations, 11 June 2018, url
368 HRW, Syria: Arrests, Torture by Armed Group, 28 January 2019, url
369 EASO Interview with Christopher Kozak, Institute for the Study of War (ISW), 14 November 2019
370 International Crisis Group, The Best of Bad Options for Syria’s Idlib, 14 March 2019, url, p. 21; Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War:
Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Swedish Defence Research Agency, December 2018, url, p. 57
371 Syrian Observer (The), Three Leaders Take Reins of National Army in Northern Syria: Who Are They?, 7 October 2019,url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS — 51

Army (FSA), the umbrella armed group formed by the anti-government opposition in 2011.372 Smaller,
predominantly Islamist armed opposition groups also operate in the Idlib area and include Hurras alDin (HAD)373, Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP)374 and Ansar al-Tawhid375, among others.
Detailed information on the armed groups in the Idlib area is available in the EASO COI Report: Syria– Actors (December 2019)
In southern Syria, armed groups such as Popular Resistance376 and Saraya Qasioun377, and unknown
perpetrators carried out IED explosions, assassinations and kidnappings on individuals including
members of GoS and affiliated armed groups, as well as reconciled fighters, commanders andfacilitators.378
While ISIL’s territorial control and governance in Syria ceased to exist after the capture of Baghouz in
March 2019, sources maintained that the group remains a serious threat in Syria. In 2019, ISIL wasreported to be forming cells across Syria, and that an increase in the number of ISIL attacks in areas
controlled by the Syrian government has been reported.379
Detailed information on ISIL is available in the EASO COI Report: Syria – Actors (December 2019)

5.1 Members of the government of Syria and Baath party officials
There is little information available regarding the targeting of members of the government and the
Baath Party in the rebel-held areas and other parts of Syria. In a video, Step News Agency, a US-based
activist news outlet380, made reference to former Baath Party members as potential targets by thearmed groups in Idlib. According to the news agency, GoS operated intelligence networks in Idlib
governorate, which comprised mainly of women, implanted elements among the fighters, andmerchants moving between government and rebel-held areas. Reportedly, the informants wereformer Baath Party members who retained allegiance to GoS. The source mentioned that the rebel
forces carried out a ‘cleansing operation’ that targeted former Baath Party members and defected
Syrian Army soldiers/officers.381 The information could not be corroborated by other sources.
Syria Direct reported in September 2019 that HTS conducted security operations which allegedly
targeted ISIL members, Kurdish agents, as well as individuals ‘working for the Syrian government’.
However, sources interviewed by Syria Direct claimed that ‘some of the charges are fabricated andbaseless’.382

372 International Crisis Group, The Best of Bad Options for Syria’s Idlib, 14 March 2019, url, p. 17
373 Syria Study Group, Final Report and Recommendations, United States Institute of Peace, 24 September 2019, url, p. 22
374 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War: Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Swedish Defence Research Agency, December 2018,

url, p. 56; International Crisis Group, The Best of Bad Options for Syria’s Idlib, 14 March 2019, url, p. 19
375 According to an activist, a rebel commander and a humanitarian analyst interviewed by International Crisis Group in
October-November 2018. International Crisis Group, The Best of Bad Options for Syria’s Idlib, 14 March 2019, url, p. 20
376 COAR, Sourthwestern Dar’a. Needs Oriented Strategic Area Profile, 2019, url, p. 37
377 ACLED, Regional Overview – Middle East, 23 April 2019, url
378 Al-Jabassini, A., Governance in Daraa, Southern Syria: The Roles of Military and Civilian Intermediaries, European
University Institute, 4 November 2019, url
379 UN Security Council, Twenty-fourth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted
pursuant to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities [S/2019/570],
15 July 2019, url, pp. 3, 5; UN Office of Counter-Terrorism, Ninth “Report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by
ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States incountering the threat”, 27 August 2019, url, p. 3
380 AP, Airstrikes, shelling kill 16 in Syria’s rebel-held areas, 17 December 2019, url
381 Step News Agency [YouTube], ‫[ تقرير خاص يعرض ألول مرة تقنيات التجسس الت يستخدمها األسد ف الشمال المحرر‬Special Reportage‫ي‬‫ي‬broadcast for the First Time: the Spying Technologies used by Assad in the Liberated North], posted on: 29 June 2019, url
382 Syria Direct, Hijacking of the “freedom revolution”: HTS imprisons activists in northwest Syria (interactive map), 15
September 2019, url

52 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

Newly established local resistance group Saraya Qasioun, which operates in Rural Damascus and Dar’agovernorates, claimed attacks on personnel of GoS/Baath Party and affiliated armed groups in April
2019.383

5.2 Members of government forces and affiliated armed groups
In a July 2019 report published by the Middle East Institute, journalist Danny Makki noted that there
have been ‘hit-and-run strikes on government checkpoints, assassinations, and a general sense oflawlessness’ in Dar’a. Among the casualties of the attacks were soldiers in the SAA, a representativeof local authorities and a rebel commander which supported reconciliation with the GoS. He addedthat the ‘killings are not believed to be entirely politically motivated, as some may be related topersonal and local issues, yet the violence is growing at an alarming rate’.384 Moreover, a European
University Institute research project report published in November 2019 stated that despite the wide
presence of the SAA and government security apparatuses in the western region of Dar’a, ‘the region
witnesses unclaimed guerrilla attacks, IED explosions, assassinations and kidnappings of former
rebels, government officials, Syrian army soldiers and security apparatus members’.385
SOHR documented 248 attacks and assassination attempts in Dar’a during June 2019 and January
2020. The attacks included detonating bombs, mines, booby-trapped cars and the use of light andmedium weapons. SOHR registered 171 casualties from the attacks, the majority of which weremembers of the GoS armed forces and affiliated groups (91), former opposition fighters reconciledwith GoS (29) and civilians (28).386
According to COAR, the Popular Resistance armed group ‘has undertaken a series of increasingly bold
attacks on government-linked targets since the turn of the year, but its origins are unknown, and it isrumoured to be a vehicle for carrying out attacks against figures the government considers
problematic’.387 The Popular Resistance claimed responsibility for the assassination of several
reconciled opposition fighters and reconciliation facilitators.388
Citing sources involved in the opposition to GoS in southern Syria since 2011, Syria expert Charles
Lister389 noted that a ‘substantial portion of attacks’ that took place during 2019 in southern Syria
were part of an organised armed insurgency against the GoS that was re-emerging in the area.390
An ‘agent of the Syrian regime’ was assassinated in April 2019 in Al-Hirak town in Dar’a governorate
by unknown individuals. The source observed that assassinations of the Syrian government agentsand militia members augmented in Dar’a governorate.391 It is not clear whether those agents were
civilians or held official status.
In July 2019, a military bus belonging to the Fourth Armored Division was hit with a bomb attack on
the road between Dar’a and al-Yabudah town by unknown perpetrators.392 The attack killed five Syrian
soldiers and injured 14 others according to Syrian police. SANA attributed the attack to terrorists

383 ACLED, Regional Overview – Middle East, 23 April 2019, url
384 Makki, D., As violence flares up in Daraa, control can be an illusion, Middle East Institute, 3 July 2019, url
385 Al-Jabassini, A., Governance in Daraa, Southern Syria: The Roles of Military and Civilian Intermediaries, European

University Institute, 4 November 2019, url
386 SOHR, Two separate attacks on checkpoints of the Air Force and Military Intelligence in rural Daraa wound and kill eight,
10 January 2020, url
387 COAR, Sourthwestern Dar’a. Needs Oriented Strategic Area Profile, 2019, url, p. 37
388 COAR, Sourthwestern Dar’a. Needs Oriented Strategic Area Profile, 2019, url, p. 43
389 Charles Lister is a senior fellow and Director of the Countering Terrorism and Extremism Program at the Middle East
Institute where he focuses his work primarily on the Syrian conflict. For more information see url
390 Lister, C., Southern Syria Shows the War’s Changed Nature, Asharq Al-Awsat, 2 October 2019, url
391 El-Dorar, ‫[ اغتيال أبرز عمالء النظام ف مدينة الحراك بدرعا‬Assassination of a prominent regime collaborator in the Hirak City in Dara’a],‫ي‬
13 April 2019, url
392 Syria Direct, Rising assassinations: Is Daraa going back to square one?, 24 July 2019, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS — 53

without mentioning the number of casualties.393 In another attack carried on the same day a generalof the Air Force Intelligence Directorate was killed in a car bomb attack in western Dar’a.394
In July 2019, both Saraya Qasioun and ISIL claimed an IED attack on an NDF commander inDamascus.395 In December 2019, Saraya Qasioun targeted a GoS checkpoint with an explosive attackin Eastern Ghouta suburbs of Damascus. No information on the casualties was available.396
In November 2019, Enab Baladi reported that a series of assassinations targeting officers andmembers of the Syrian government forces took place in Dar’a governorate. The assassinations led to
five military personnel being killed, among them an officer of the NDF, fighters and officers of Air ForceIntelligence as well as a former leader of an opposition armed group. No actor has claimed
responsibility for the assassinations.397
In areas controlled by the Syrian government, ISIL claimed attacks in Dar’a and launched larger-scaleattacks against Syrian security forces from the Badia desert in central Syria.398 Al-Masdar News, a proGoS news agency, reported in April 2019 that ISIL executed eight Syrian army soldiers following anambush in eastern Homs. The images of the execution were posted by ISIL.399 In November 2019, ISIL
claimed responsibility for the assassination of the head of the State Security branch of the GoS forcesin Enkhel, western Dar’a governorate.400
In addition to the fact that HTS seemed to ‘equate criticism of their rule with collaboration with the
Syrian government’401, several sources reported that the group did target individuals for affiliation
with the Syrian government. An International Crisis Group’s report published in March 2019 statedthat HTS and other armed groups carried out operations to arrest ‘so called “frogs” suspected of being
in contact with the regime’.402 According to the news agency Nedaa Syria, HTS arrested a cell affiliatedto GoS in the western part of Aleppo in July 2018.403 Local sources reported that the group executed‘agents’ collaborating with Russia in June 2019404 and arrested ‘agents’ collaborating with GoS in Idlib
governorate in May 2019.405

393 SANA, Several martyrs have been targeted in the targeting of a military vehicle by terrorists on the Yadoda road in

Daraa, 17 July 2019, url
394 Syria Direct, Rising assassinations: Is Daraa going back to square one?, 24 July 2019, url
395 Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary, 22-28 July 2019, url, p. 4
396 ISW, Syria Situation Report: December 17-28, 2019, 9 January 2020, url
397 Enab Baladi, Series of assassinations targeting Syrian regime figures in Daraa, 28 November 2019, url
398 International Crisis Group, Averting an ISIS Resurgence in Iraq and Syria, 11 October 2019, url, p. 23
399 Al-Masdar Al-Arabi, ISIS executes 8 Syrian soldiers after ambush in eastern Homs, 29 April 2019, url
400 Enab Baladi, ISIS makes its voice heard in Daraa, 6 November 2019, url
401 HRW, Syria: Arrests, Torture by Armed Group: Move to Solidify Control, Silence Critics, 28 January 2019, url
402 International Crisis Group, The Best of Bad Options for Syria’s Idlib, 14 March 2019, url, p. 28
403 Nedaa Syria, Tahrir al-Sham announces the arrest of a cell of the Syrian regime in Idlib, 30 July 2018, url
404 Radio Al-Kul, ‫ عمالء لروسيا ف الشمال السوري‬7 ‫[ تحرير الشام تعلن إعدام‬HTS announces the execution of 7 collaborators with Russia‫ي‬in the Syrian North], 1 June 2019, url; Shaam Network, ‫ عمالء لروسيا بريف إدلب‬7 ‫تحرير الشام تعدم‬, [Tahrir al-Sham executed 7
Russian agents in Idlib countryside], 1 June 2019, url
405 Jisr TV, ‫[ تحرير الشام تعلن القبض عىل عمالء للنظام ف قرية كلىل‬HTS announces the arrest of collaborators with the regime in Killi‫ي‬‫ي‬
village], 30 May 2019, url

54 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

5.3 Civilians perceived to be collaborating with the government orthe (pro-)government armed forces and/or to oppose antigovernment armed groups
5.3.1 Targeting by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham
Reporting on the human rights situation in Syria during 2019, Human Rights Watch noted that HTS‘arbitrarily arrested numerous residents in areas under its control’.406 Refugees International (RI)
noted that ‘reportedly, members of HTS frequently commit serious human rights abuses, includingharassment, assassinations, kidnapping, and torture’.407 The UN and Human Rights Watch reported
that in areas where HTS is operating civilians are unlawfully detained, kidnapped and tortured forexpressing political dissent.408 The UN Security Council noted in August 2019 that civilians, including
humanitarian workers and media activists have been targeted and received death threats for being
critical of HTS, as well as extorted and used for ransom.409 Between September and mid-October 2018,
SNHR documented at least 184 cases of detention of individuals, including local activists, humanitarian
workers and mosque preachers in Aleppo and Idlib governorates which it attributed to HTS.410
In an interview with EASO, Christopher Kozak stated that HTS is the primary actor targeting civilians
in Idlib governorate. Among other populations, it has targeted suspected informants, with routine
executions of suspected ISIL members and informants as well as suspected government and progovernment informants (i.e. people suspected of communicating with the Syrian Government and theRussians). There is less reporting in general out of Idlib governorate because the former proliferationof free activist media outlets has been increasingly clamped down on by HTS, and targeted forharassment, detention, or violence.411
According to Christopher Kozak, HTS also cracked down on populations that are seen as supportive of
the Free Syrian Army and the values of the original Syrian Revolution. HTS has particularly targetedcommunities that have a history of being strong supporters of the moderate secular oppositiongroups, whether because these towns were the geographic headquarters of those groups or because
the population was very vocal in their use of revolutionary symbology and slogans. In Ma’arat alNuman in the southern Idlib governorate, Atarib in western Aleppo governorate, Ariha south of Idlib
City, HTS routinely uses violence to disperse demonstrators and target local activists, media activists,
revolutionary activists, even organisers of anti-GoS marches if they were the symbols of the Free
Syrian Army such as the green, white and black flag. HTS has targeted those individuals either during
the protests themselves or at their homes later.412
Various sources referred to HTS’s practice of targeting civilians who criticised it or opposed its policies.
USDOS stated that ‘HTS detained political opponents, perceived government supporters and theirfamilies, journalists, activists, and humanitarian workers critical of HTS or perceived as affiliated withother rebel groups at odds with the HTS in Idlib’.413 According to a confidential source interviewed by

406 HRW, World Report 2020 - Syria, 14 January 2020, url
407 RI, Losing Their Last Refuge; Inside Idlib's humanitarian nightmare, September 2019, url, p. 23
408 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/42/51], 15 August 2019, url, p. 4; HRW, Syria: Arrests, Torture by Armed Group, 28 January 2019, url
409 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018) and 2449 (2018); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2019/674], 21 August
2019, url, p. 6
410 SNHR, Hay’at Tahrir al Sham Exploits the De-Escalation Agreement and Escalates Their Violations, 21 October 2018, url,
p. 1
411 EASO Interview with Christopher Kozak, Institute for the Study of War (ISW), 14 November 2019
412 EASO Interview with Christopher Kozak, Institute for the Study of War (ISW), 14 November 2019
413 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2018 - Syria, 13 March 2019, url, p. 26

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS — 55

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands in March 2019 ‘HTS uses its systematic practices ofarbitrary arrest, torture and extortion mainly as retaliation against (alleged) political opponents,
rather than targeting specific minorities’.414
In January 2019, Human Rights Watch reported that HTS was cracking down on ‘perceived opposition’,and stated that according to former detainees, detentions were carried out by members of HTS or its
affiliates. Human Rights Watch documented 11 arrests of Idlib residents; in six of the cases individuals
were apparently tortured. HTS claimed that arrests without judicial warrant are prohibited under its
rule unless ‘a suspect is almost certainly guilty and there is no time to retrieve an arrest warrant’.415
Syrian rights groups documented hundreds of other cases of detention by HTS in Idlib and Aleppo
governorates.416
SNHR claimed in an August 2019 report that HTS targeted activists and public figures with the aim to
intimidate the society in areas under its control.417 In September 2019, SOHR referred to HTS’s
tendency to target civilians who opposed the group’s policies and practices in the region under its
control. According to the report, the HTS considered civilians opposing it as agents, infiltrators, or‘frogs’ (‘a Syrian opposition moniker for someone in surreptitious contact with the GoS and prepared
to “jump” to the other side’418). SOHR shared an HTS circulation, which warned against any attempt
to hold demonstrations against any jihadist group in the region under its control; such demonstrations
would be treated as affiliation with GoS and participants would be treated as traitors.419
In August 2019, Enab Baladi reported that ‘a peaceful activist’ died while in detention by HTS for
criticism of the group.420 In November 2019, SOHR obtained audio records by an HTS commander inwhich ‘he called for the killing of all the demonstrators who went out or want to go out indemonstrations against the policy of Hayaat Tahrir Al-Sham and that call for the toppling of its leader“Abu Mohamed Al-Julani”’.421 Al Monitor reported that HTS arrests did not spare members of thegroup who criticised it, such as Abu al-Abd Ashidaa who accused, in a video, the leaders of HTS of
corruption.422
Syria Direct reported in September 2019 that HTS conducted security operations aimed at arresting
ISIL cells, GoS affiliates and Kurdish agents; some of those charges, according to sources interviewed
by Syria Direct, ‘are fabricated and baseless’.423 In March 2019, HTS publicly executed 10 alleged ISIL
members in Idlib governorate following a suicide bomb attack which killed HTS members.424
In addition to the GoS affiliates, HTS targeted civilians who are in favour of reconciliation with thegovernment. Columb Strack, principal Middle East and North Africa analyst at Risk Consultation/HIS
Markit, quoted in the Arab Weekly, stated that ‘HTS remains violently opposed to any kind of future

414 Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of Origin Information Report Syria: The security situation, July

2019, url, p. 42
415 HRW, Syria: Arrests, Torture by Armed Group: Move to Solidify Control, Silence Critics, 28 January 2019, url
416 HRW, Syria: Arrests, Torture by Armed Group: Move to Solidify Control, Silence Critics, 28 January 2019, url
417 SNHR, Hay’at Tahrir al Sham Kills an Activist Whom It forcibly Disappeared: Nearly 2,000 Syrians are Still Forcibly
Disappeared by Hay’at Tahrir al Sham Extremist Organization, 23 August 2019, url, p. 1
418 International Crisis Group, The Best of Bad Options for Syria’s Idlib, 14 March 2019, url, p. 28; BBC, Syria: Who's incontrol of Idlib?, 22 June 2019, url
419 SOHR, ‫[ هيئة تحرير الشام والشبيحة الموالية لها تهدد وتتوعد المتظاهرين المعارضي لها ف الشمال السوري‬HTS and its affiliated Shabbiha‫ي‬threatens demonstrators opposing it in the Syrian North], 3 September 2019, url
420 Syrian Observer (The), Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham Kills Activist Samer al-Saloum, 14 August 2019, url
421 SOHR, A security official in Hayaat Tahrir Al-Sham calls to kill all of those participating in demonstrations against Tahrir
Al-Sham and describes them as being agents of the regime and that Syria is for Hayaat Tahrir Al-Sham alone, 11 November
2019, url
422 Al Monitor, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham loses third leader in Syria this year, 19 September 2019, url
423 Syria Direct, Hijacking of the “freedom revolution”: HTS imprisons activists in northwest Syria (interactive map), 15
September 2019, url
424 New Arab (The), Syria's HTS publicly execute ten suspected IS militants following Idlib suicide bombing, 3 March 2019,
url

56 —

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

reconciliation with the Syrian government’.425 Another source noted that HTS succeeded in convincing
the tribes in its areas of control in Idlib to stand against reconciliation with the GoS.426
In its report covering 2018, Human Rights Watch mentioned that rebel groups in Idlib detained people
who attempted reconciliation with the Syrian government.427 HTS’s news agency, Ebaa, announced inAugust 2018 the arrest of more than 30 members of reconciliation committees.428 Moreover, SmartNews Agency429 reported that HTS executed a resident of Al-Hbeit village in April 2019 for being thehead of a reconciliation committee.430
With regards to targeting civilians who fall under this profile outside of the areas of control of armed
groups, the International Crisis Group stated in March 2019 that the rebel groups in Idlib governorate‘continue to kill Syrian soldiers and civilians in neighbouring areas of Latakia, Hama and Aleppo’.431
In areas under its control, HTS has reportedly imposed a conservative dress code for both men andwomen, banned alcohol, smoking and listening to music, and enforced segregation in schools,
hospitals and other public institutions.432 According to a confidential source interviewed by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands in March 2019 ‘in areas where HTS has control overeducational provision, women and children from the age of 9 are obliged to cover their bodies andhair. Disobedience would, among other things, be punished with violence or temporary suspension’.
433
According to USDOS (reporting on 2018) ‘HTS and its constituent armed groups forced members of
religious minorities to convert to Islam and adopt Sunni customs, contributing to minority flight from
HTS territories’.434
Christopher Kozak also noted that HTS has imposed in areas under its control hard-line religious
beliefs, application of strict sharia law punishments, and application of religious wardrobe restrictions.
In Idlib City in particular, this social control exercised by HTS gets denser and stronger the closer you
go to Syrian-Turkish Border. This includes towns like Sarmada, and Darkush - the area where the US
targeted Baghdadi.435
HTS has also targeted minority populations, but there are not many left in Idlib governorate. The mostsignificant are the Druze in Qalb Lawza north-west of Idlib City, which were forced to convert by HTS.436

5.3.2 Targeting by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)
While the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) ceased to control territory in Syria as of April
2019437, it still maintained a presence in government-held territories such as Homs438 and Dar’a

425 Arab Weekly (The), Idlib proves problematic for diplomats in Kazakhstan, 28 April 2019, url
426 Kanj Al, S., How each side of the Syrian conflict uses tribal influence, July 2019, url
427 HRW, World Report 2019 - Syria, 17 January 2019, urlً‫[ ر‬More than 30 promotors of reconciliation are
428 Ebaa News, ‫فردا من مروج “المصالحات” ف قبضة الجهاز األمت لهيئة تحرير الشام‬30 ‫أكث من‬
‫ي‬

‫ي‬

‫ي‬

taken into custody by the security apparatus of HTS] 8 August 2018, url
429 Smart News Agency is a Syrian news agency created by the France-based NGO Association de Soutien aux Media Libres.
430 Smart News Agency, ‫“[ "تحرير الشام" تعدم شخصا من جنوب إدلب بتهمة التعامل مع النظام‬HTS” executes a person from the south of Idlib
for collaborating with the regime] 18 April 2019, url
431 International Crisis Group, The Best of Bad Options for Syria’s Idlib, 14 March 2019, url, p. 26
432 RI, Losing Their Last Refuge; Inside Idlib's humanitarian nightmare, September 2019, url, pp. 22-23; International Crisis
Group, The Best of Bad Options for Syria’s Idlib, 14 March 2019, url, p. 10
433 Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of Origin Information Report Syria: The security situation, July
2019, url, p. 42
434 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2018 - Syria, 13 March 2019, url, p. 31
435 EASO Interview with Christopher Kozak, Institute for the Study of War (ISW), 14 November 2019436 EASO Interview with Christopher Kozak, Institute for the Study of War (ISW), 14 November 2019
437 Wilson Center, Timeline: the Rise, Spread, and Fall of the Islamic State, 30 April 2019, url
438 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve. Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, April 1, 2019‒June 30, 2019, 6
August 2019, url, p. 20

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS — 57

governorates.439 Moreover, based on interviews with Badiya residents and humanitarian workers,
International Crisis Group reported that there have been periodic attacks targeting Syrian military
positions in areas close to Palmyra.440 An increase in ISIL attacks in areas controlled by the GoS wasreported by the UN Office of Counter Terrorism441. ISIL was also reported to have a latent presence inrebel-held Idlib.442 On 27 October 2019, the US President announced the death of ISIL’s leader AlBaghdadi in a US special operation in northwest Syria.443 The group later confirmed the death of AlBaghdadi and identified Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi as the group’s new leader.444
In an interview with EASO, Christopher Kozak mentioned that ISIL elements still exist in southern Syria,
mainly in Dar’a governorate, and that the group maintains a latent presence in Idlib governorate. He
also stated that particularly in southern Syria ISIL claimed low-level attacks targeting in particular
reconciled opposition group leaders as well as local security forces and pro-GoS paramilitary groups.445
Christopher Kozak further added that ISIL claimed attacks are hard to dissociate from the ongoinginsurgency in southern Syria - the emergence of groups such as the Popular Resistance in Dar’a andSaraya Qasiyoun as well as the latent Al-Qaida presence in the south.446
An ISW report covering the period of 23 October – 5 November 2019 stated that in the wake of thedeath of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, ISIL members in southern Syria pledged allegiance to the group’s newleader, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi. Moreover, ISIL assassinated a Syrian state Security Officer
in Inkhil, Dar’a Province.447
The US Department of Defense (USDOD) noted in a report (covering the period 1 April 2019 – 30 June2019) that ISIL ‘carried out assassinations, suicide attacks, abductions, and arson of corps in both Iraq
and Syria’ without specifying the profiles of those targeted.448 SNHR reported that ISIL killed 82
civilians, of which 11 were children and seven women in the first half of 2019.449 The same source
mentioned that in June 2019 alone, ISIL killed nine civilians, including one woman and two children.450
ISIL carried out a car bomb attack in July 2019 that targeted a church in the Christian area of Qamishli,
which resulted in about a dozen casualties.451 In July 2018, ISIL carried out simultaneous attacks in
Sweida Governorate which left 200 individuals killed and 27 kidnapped.452
For targeting by ISIL in areas under Kurdish control see Chapter 6, Section 6.2.

439 EASO Interview with Christopher Kozak, Institute for the Study of War (ISW), 14 November 2019
440 International Crisis Group, Averting an ISIS Resurgence in Iraq and Syria, 11 October 2019, url, p. 23
441 UN Office of Counter-Terrorism, Ninth “Report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) tointernational peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering thethreat”, 27 August 2019, url, p. 3
442 EASO Interview with Christopher Kozak, Institute for the Study of War (ISW), 14 November 2019
443 US, White House, Remarks by President Trump on the Death of ISIS Leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, 27 October 2019, url
444 AP, Islamic State group announces successor to al-Baghdadi, 31 October 2019, url
445 EASO Interview with Christopher Kozak, Institute for the Study of War (ISW), 14 November 2019
446 EASO Interview with Christopher Kozak, Institute for the Study of War (ISW), 14 November 2019
447 ISW, Syria Situation Report: October 23 – November 5, 2019, 2019, url
448 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve. Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, April 1, 2019‒June 30, 2019, 6
August 2019, url
449 SNHR, 1,864 Civilians, Including Six Media Workers and 21 Medical and Civil Defence Personnel, Documented Killed in
Syria in the First Half of 2019, 01 July 2019, url, p. 8
450 SNHR, 1,864 Civilians, Including Six Media Workers and 21 Medical and Civil Defence Personnel, Documented Killed in
Syria in the First Half of 2019, 01 July 2019, url, p. 12451 Defense Post (The), The, Syria: Bomb explodes outside church in Qamishli Christian neighbourhood, 11 July 2019, url
452 HRW, World Report 2019 - Syria, 17 January 2019, url

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6. Members of and persons perceived to becollaborating with SDF/YPG
6.1 Targeting by the Syrian National Army
As of December 2019453, in northern Aleppo governorate, opposition armed groups backed by Turkey
controlled an area between the cities of Afrin, Azaz, Al-Bab and Jarabulus.454 In 2016, Turkey hadlaunched operation Euphrates Shield in northern Aleppo governorate to fight ISIL and contain YPG
gains in the area capturing the al-Bab area, including Jarabulus and other towns.455 In January 2018,
Turkish and affiliated local armed groups then launched an offensive dubbed Operation Olive Branchon the Kurdish-held Afrin district, in Aleppo governorate.456 In March 2018, the operation concluded
as Turkish forces declared Afrin city officially captured.457 Complete control of the Afrin region wasannounced by Turkish authorities on 23 March 2018.458
By the end of 2017, Turkey had incorporated the armed groups that fought alongside them in the
Euphrates Shield operation into the Syrian National Army (SNA), under the formal supervision of theso-called Syrian Interim Government’s459 Ministry of Defence.460 In October 2019, the merger between
the SNA and the National Liberation Front (NLF) - a Turkey-backed alliance of opposition-armed groups
present in the Idlib area461, under the Syrian National Army banner was announced by the so-called
Syrian Interim Government.462 The group uses the brand of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) – the umbrella
armed group formed by the anti-government opposition in 2011.463 Sources sometimes still use theformer name - FSA to refer to the SNA or its constituent groups.
The SNA supported the October 2019 Turkish-led incursion into Kurdish-controlled areas in north-east
Syria.464
Detailed information on the Syrian National Army is available in the EASO COI Report: Syria – Actors(December 2019)453 Based on reading of the following maps: ISW, Syria Situation Report: December 17-28, 2019, 9 January 2020, url;

Liveuamap, Syria, 31 December 2019, url
454 OHCHR, Between a Rock and a Hard Place – Civilians in North-western Syria, June 2018, url, p. 1; Lund, A., Syria’s Civil
War: Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Swedish Defence Research Agency, December 2018, url, p. 53
455 International Crisis Group, Squaring the Circles in Syria’s North East, 31 July 2019, url, p. 7
456 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/39/65], 9 August 2018, url, p. 5; al-Hilu, K., Afrin Under Turkish Control: Political, Economic and Social
Transformations, European University Institute, 25 July 2019, url, p. 3
457 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/39/65], 9 August 2018, url, p. 5458 al-Hilu, K., Afrin Under Turkish Control: Political, Economic and Social Transformations, European University Institute,
25 July 2019, url, p. 3
459 The Syrian Interim Government is the government established by the armed opposition to Assad in 2013. See USAID,
Syria Complex Emergency - Fact Sheet #1, Fiscal Year (FY) 2020, 8 November 2019, url, p. 4
460 al-Hilu, K., Afrin Under Turkish Control: Political, Economic and Social Transformations, European University Institute,
25 July 2019, url, p. 5
461 International Crisis Group, The Best of Bad Options for Syria’s Idlib, 14 March 2019, url, p. 21; Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War:
Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Swedish Defence Research Agency, December 2018, url, p. 57
462 Syrian Observer (The), Three Leaders Take Reins of National Army in Northern Syria: Who Are They?, 7 October 2019,url
463 ISW, The Free Syrian Army, March 2013, url, p. 9464 International Crisis Group, Steadying the New Status Quo in Syria’s North East, 27 November 2019, url, p. 2

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS — 59

The UN and other human rights organisations documented kidnappings, abductions, torture,
extortion and assassinations of civilians at the hands of armed groups operating under the SNA. 465
Looting, theft and expropriation of Kurdish properties by SNA factions in the aftermath of the captureof Afrin was also reported.466 Armed groups and criminal gangs in Afrin abducted civilians of Kurdish
origin, wealthy individuals including doctors, businesspersons and merchants for economic, politicaland security reasons. Perceived supporters of the Kurdish administration were ‘regularly arrested,detained, tortured and extorted’ by armed groups. Those suspected of affiliation with Kurdish
authorities were reportedly arrested and asked to pay fines of USD 400 for their release. Abductions
were carried out primarily at checkpoints or at the victim’s home during the night.467
Confiscation, looting, and destruction of the property of Kurdish civilians in the Afrin district at thehands of Turkish-backed armed groups was also reported.468 AI noted in August 2018 that interviewed
residents and IDPs from Afrin claimed they were subjected to arbitrary detention, enforced
disappearances and confiscation of property on their perceived affiliation with the PYD or YPG.469
Turkish-backed armed groups operating in Afrin, such as the Sultan Murad Brigades, Sultan Suleiman
Shah Brigade and the Hamza Division, were reported to have taken control of over 75 % of the region’s
olive industry valued at USD 150 million per year. The seizure was justified by Turkish authorities as
denial of potential revenues for the PKK.470 Farmers who had their orchards seized by SNA factions
were accused of being YPG members.471
In April 2019, SOHR reported that Turkish-backed forces arrested the president and members of theKurdish National Council in Afrin, as well as over 2 600 Kurdish citizens. Around 1 100 were reported
to still be in detention while the rest were released upon paying a ransom that in some cases reached
10 million Syrian pounds (approximately EUR 17 600).472 STJ documented 127 arrests conducted by
the SNA in Afrin during September 2019. Most of the arrested were members of the Kurdish forces,
but also civilians perceived to be supporting the YPG and a member of a Kurdish political party. The
arrests were reportedly arbitrary and did not respect due process. While 70 of the persons arrested
were released, the fate and whereabouts of 57 remained unknown, as of November 2019.473
SNHR reported that in December 2019 factions of the armed opposition operating in Afrin arrested
and kidnapped civilians, including women, for alleged cooperation with SDF.474
In Afrin there have been reports claiming that Turkey has tried to change the area’s demographic
composition in favour of Syrian Arabs and Turkmens.475 IDPs who returned to Afrin during 2018 found
465 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/42/51], 15 August 2019, url, pp. 11-12; AI, Syria: Tell Families of Missing the Fate of Loved Ones, 13 May 2019, url;
HRW, World Report 2019 - Syria, 17 January 2019, url
466 al-Hilu, K., Afrin Under Turkish Control: Political, Economic and Social Transformations, European University Institute,
25 July 2019, url, pp. 1; 5-6; HRW, Syria: Turkey-Backed Groups Seizing Property, 14 June 2018, url
467 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/42/51], 15 August 2019, url, pp. 10-11
468 HRW, Turkey/Syria: Civilians at Risk in Syria Operation, 11 October 2019, url; USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights
Practices 2018 - Syria, 13 March 2019, url
469 AI, Syria: Turkey must stop serious violations by allied groups and its own forces in Afrin, 2 August 2018, url
470 Al Monitor, Turkey's 'Olive Branch' takes root in Syrian olive business, 16 December 2018, url; SOHR, After displacing
more than 300000 Kurdish residents of Afrin people, Turkish-backed factions seize more than 75% of olive farms andreceive the price of the first season in advance, 20 September 2018, url
471 Al-Hilu, K., Afrin Under Turkish Control: Political, Economic and Social Transformations, European University Institute,
25 July 2019, url, pp. 16-17
472 SOHR, The Turkish authorities and “Olive Branch” operation forces arrest 2 leaders of the Kurdish National Council in
Afrin and raise to about 1100, the number their detainees in the area, 1 April 2019, url
473 STJ, Syria: 127 Arrests in Afrin during September 2019, 11 November 2019, url
474 SNHR, At least 6,671 Cases of Arbitrary Arrests Documented in 2019, 2 January 2020, url, p. 5
475 Al-Hilu, K., Afrin Under Turkish Control: Political, Economic and Social Transformations, European University Institute,
25 July 2019, url, p. 14; OHCHR, Between a Rock and a Hard Place – Civilians in North-western Syria, June 2018, url, pp. 67

60 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

their properties confiscated or destroyed by Turkish-backed armed groups. Some homes belonging to
Kurdish residents were redistributed to Sunni Muslim IDPs relocated from government-held areas
while returnees where informed that they are precluded from living in the area due to their real or
perceived affiliation to YPG.476
In October 2019, OHCHR reported that the areas of Afrin, al-Bab, Jarablus, and Azaz, controlled by
Turkish forces and affiliated armed groups ‘are continuing to face lawlessness and rampant criminality
and violence’. Civilians accused of affiliation with Kurdish armed or political groups were subjected to‘intimidation, ill-treatment, killing, kidnapping, looting and seizure of civilians’ houses’.477 RI also
reported on ‘systematic looting and pillaging of homes, shops, and farms in population centers takenover by SNA forces’.478
The CoI noted that it ‘finds that there are reasonable grounds to believe that members of the armed
groups in Afrin continued to commit the war crimes of hostage-taking, cruel treatment, torture’. 479
For the period of the Turkish-led incursion into north-east Syria in October 2019, AI claimed it gathered‘damning evidence of war crimes and other violations by Turkish forces and their allies’. AI claimed
that Turkish forces and affiliated armed groups including the SNA were responsible for indiscriminate
attacks on residential areas, summary killings and unlawful attacks that have killed and injured
civilians, among others.480 US Special Envoy for Syria, James Jeffrey, stated that US forces observed‘several incidents which we consider war crimes’ by Turkish-backed forces during the incursion into
Kurdish-held territories in north-east Syria.481
In October 2019, Hevrin Khalaf, a Kurdish female politician who was secretary general of the Kurdish
Future Syria Party, was summarily killed by members of Ahrar Al-Sharqiya, part of the Turkeysupported SNA. The incident took place on the international highway linking Raqqa to Qamishli.482 The
SNA-branded group Ahrar al-Sharqiya has been most frequently named as the perpetrator ofsummary killings and human rights abuses during the October 2019 offensive.483
In November 2019, Human Rights Watch stated that armed factions of the SNA ‘have summarily
executed civilians and failed to account for aid workers who disappeared while working in the ‘safe
zone’’. Refused returns of Kurdish families displaced by the Turkish-led incursion, killing of three
Kurdish returnees to Ras al-Ain, as well as looting and appropriation of property were also reported.484
STJ reported that since the capture of Tall Abyad in mid-October 2019 the SNA-affiliate armed groups
Levant Front and Ahrar al-Sharqiya have arrested 80 Arab young men who had previously served in
the SDF. While some were released upon surrendering their weapons, many were reportedly still in
detention.485

Syria Untold, Afrin on the Road to Arabization, 13 August 2018, url
476 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/39/65], 9 August 2018, url, p. 7
USCIRF, United States Commission on International Religious Freedom 2019 Annual Report; Country Reports: Tier 1
Countries (Recommended for CPC Designation): Syria, April 2019, url, p. 5
477 OHCHR, Press briefing note on Syria, 11 October 2019, url
478 RI, Displacement and Despair: the Turkish Invasion into Northeast Syria, 12 November 2019, url
479 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/42/51], 15 August 2019, url, p. 12
480 AI, Syria: Damning evidence of war crimes and other violations by Turkish forces and their allies, 18 October 2019, url
481 CNN, What to know about Trump's announcement today, 23 October 2019, url
482 AI, Syria: Damning evidence of war crimes and other violations by Turkish forces and their allies, 18 October 2019, url;
Washington Post (The), Grief, accusations surround killing of Kurdish politician in northeastern Syria, 16 October 2019, url
483 UN News, Syria war: executions condemned as violence continues ‘on both sides’ of border with Turkey, 15 October
2019, url; France24, Images document extrajudicial killings by Turkish-backed militia in Syria, 21 October 2019, url; Al
Monitor, Eastern Syria fighters accused of brutality after videos emerge, 13 November 2019, url
484 HRW, Syria: Civilians Abused in ‘Safe Zones’, 27 November 2019, url
485 STJ, Arrests and Tortures by the National Army in Tell Abiad, 9 January 2020, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS — 61

6.2 Targeting by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)
The Kurdish-controlled areas in northeast Syria comprise most of the territory that was previously
under ISIL control in Syria and which sources assessed as ‘the main theatre for ISIS’s insurgency’. In
Raqqa and Hasaka governorates ISIL is thought to operate sophisticated clandestine networks capableof carrying out more complex attacks.486 In an August 2019 report (covering the period from 1 April to
30 June 2019), USDOD identified Deir Ez-Zor governorate, parts of Raqqa governorate and Homs
governorate near Palmyra as the areas where ISIL displayed the strongest insurgent capabilities.487
Detailed information on ISIL is available in the EASO COI Report: Syria – Actors (December 2019)
In Deir Ez-Zor governorate, ISIL has maintained a low-level insurgency since losing Baghouz in early2019. The attacks included roadside bombs, drive-by shooting and assassinations of local SDF
collaborators. Arab elements of the SDF were particularly targeted in the area to deter the
predominantly Arab local population from cooperating with the SDF/YPG forces. According to sourcesinterviewed by the International Crisis Group, ISIL attacks in Deir Ez-Zor governorate ‘have been
concentrated in a strip along the Euphrates River between the towns of al-Buseira and al-Tayyana’. In
Deir Ez-Zor city ISIL has posted lists of SDF recruits and civilian employees on mosques demanding thatthey ‘repent’.488 ISIL tactics have also included assassinations and burning of field of crops in northern
Syria.489
ISW senior analyst Christopher Kozak assessed that ISIL activity during 2019 was relatively low level ascompared to previous years, but a gradual increase in attacks has been registered since June-July
2019, especially in northern Syria. ISIL primarily targeted checkpoints and headquarters of Asayish
forces. In the Euphrates River Valley, ISIL targeted governance officials, village elders, people
perceived as informants against ISIL, collaborators with the SDF or their affiliates with assassinations.
ISIL attacks also targeted political and military figures associated with the SDF, and individuals thathave participated in the SDF security apparatus (former members of the Asayish, former fighters with
Deir ez-Zour Military Council). Prisons where ISIL detainees were held were also targeted in Qamishliand Hasaka.490
USDOD reporting on the period from 1 July to 25 October 2019 also noted that ISIL cells conducted
frequent attacks on SDF and local government officials in Deir Ez-Zor governorate.491 In Kurdishcontrolled areas, the US Department of State reported to USDOD that ‘ISIS killed senior civilian andmilitary leaders, and posted death threats in public places’.492 Local Kurdish sources reported that ISIL
claimed 64 attacks in August 2019. ISIL targeted village elders (mukhtars) and local council leaders forassassination in Raqqa and Deir Ez Zor governorates. Attacks on local security forces were also
reported.493
During April and June 2019, the United States Central Command reported ISIL attacks on SDF forces
aiming to limit their movement and inflict casualties in Hasaka governorate. In Raqqa governorate,

486 According to International Crisis Group interview with an US official, 18 May 2019. International Crisis Group, Avertingan ISIS Resurgence in Iraq and Syria, 11 October 2019, url, pp. 23-24
487 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve. Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, April 1, 2019‒June 30, 2019, 6
August 2019, url, p. 20
488 International Crisis Group, Averting an ISIS Resurgence in Iraq and Syria, 11 October 2019, url, pp. 24-25
489 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve. Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, April 1, 2019‒June 30, 2019, 6
August 2019, url, p. 4
490 EASO Interview with Christopher Kozak, Institute for the Study of War (ISW), 14 November 2019491 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve. Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, July 1, 2019 – October 25,2019,18 November 2019, url, p. 6
492 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve. Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, July 1, 2019 – October 25,2019,18 November 2019, url, p. 40
493 Rojava Information Center, Database: August sleeper-cell attacks and raids, 11 September 2019, url

62 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALSISIL conducted assassinations and attacks on local elites ‘to prevent the establishment of capablesecurity and governance structures’.494
From March through mid-October 2019 ISIL claimed to have conducted 321 insurgent attacks in Deir
Ez-Zor governorate, 100 in Hasaka governorate, 98 in Raqqa governorate, 32 in Homs governorate, 9
in Aleppo governorate, 8 in Dara’a governorate, and 3 in Damascus.495 The UN Security Council
reported in July 2019 that ISIL has carried out at least 30 attacks against the US-led coalition forces in
Syria since the beginning of 2019.496

6.2.1 List of illustrative incidents










On 16 January 2019, an ISIL suicide bomber detonated a suicide vest (SVEST) at a restaurant
in Manbij, Aleppo governorate, killing 19 people, including local fighters, civilians and four
Americans.497
On 25 March 2019, ISIL fighters killed seven SDF fighters operating a checkpoint at theentrance to Manbij city.498
In April 2019, ISIL claimed responsibility for a car bomb in Raqqa that killed eight people,
including four SDF fighters.499
In May 2019, ISIL claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing on an SDF convoy near
Shaddadi, Hasaka governorate in which only injuries were reported.500
According to USDOD, in May 2019 ‘ISIL claimed a bombing in Manbij against an SDF command
post that killed “several” people outside the headquarters of the Manbij Military Council’.501
On 1 June 2019, at least seven civilians were killed and at least 11 others injured as a result of
two IED attacks that were claimed by ISIL. Both attacks took place in Raqqa city and targeted
an SDF checkpoint and vehicle, respectively.502
On 7 August 2019, a VBIED attack in the town of Qahtaniyah, Hasaka governorate, killed threechildren and injured at least two other civilians. ISIL claimed responsibility for the attack andalleged that it had targeted a vehicle belonging to the SDF in the area.503
On 8-9 October 2019, ISIL conducted a SVEST attack on the headquarters of the SDF and local
security forces in Raqqa city. SDF forces reportedly fought off the attack.504
In October 2019, suspected ISIL members shot dead a local mayor and SDF member in Shiheil
and Hawayij Thiban, Deir Ez Zor governorate.505

494 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve. Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, April 1, 2019‒June 30, 2019, 6

August 2019, url, p. 20
495 Washington Institute for Near East Policy (The), The Islamic State in Syria After the U.S. Withdrawal, 23 October 2019,url
496 UN Security Council, Letter dated 15 July 2019 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions
1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associatedindividuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council, 15 July 2019, url, p. 7
497 New York Times (The), ISIS Attack in Syria Kills 4 Americans, Raising New Worries About Troop Withdrawal, 16 January
2019, url
498 AP, 7 US-backed Kurdish fighters killed in ISIS attack in Manbij, 26 March 2019, url
499 Reuters, Bomb kills eight in Syrian city of Raqqa, 9 April 2019, url
500 Kurdistan24, ISIS suicide attack targets SDF demining convoy, 21 May 2019, url
501 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve. Lead Inspector General Report to the US Congress, April 1, 2019‒June 30, 2019, 6
August 2019, url, p. 20
502 UN Security Council: Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018) and 2449 (2018); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2019/674], 21 August
2019, url, p. 19
503 UN Security Council: Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018) and 2449 (2018); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2019/820], 15 October
2019, url, p. 18
504 ISW, Syria Situation Report: September 25 – October 10, 2019, 11 October 2019, url
505 Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary, 14-20 October 2019, url, p. 5

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS — 63



In January 2020, ISIL claimed responsibility for an SVBIED attack in Abu Hammam, Deir Ez-Zor
governorate targeting the former headquarters of the Asayish. Two children and a woman
were injured in the attack.506

For targeting by ISIL in areas outside Kurdish control see Chapter 5.

506 ISW, Syria Situation Report: December 17, 2019 – January 7, 2020, 9 January 2020, url

64 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

7. Journalists and other media professionals
and bloggers
7.1 General overview
The United Nations Secretary General stated that in 2018 there were reports of threats, injuries andkillings of journalists in the Syrian Arab Republic, as a result of the ongoing conflict.507 Similarly, for2017, the same source reported on journalists being threatened, injured and killed.508
Reporters Without Borders (RSF) stated that journalists were targeted by all the parties involved in
the conflict in Syria - the SAA, its allies and the armed opposition groups, such as HTS, ISIL, Turkishbacked forces and Kurdish-backed forces.509 According to an October 2019 UN Security Council Report,
non-state armed opposition groups and groups designated as terrorist groups by the Security Council,
such as HTS510, systematically targeted civilians in the northern part of Syria, including media
providers, through abductions, killings, imprisonments and torture.511
Freedom House described Syria as not free, with an aggregate freedom score of 0/100. Freedom ofpress was reported to be restricted and journalists faced censorship, detention, torture and death
while in custody. Freedom House also noted that journalists faced physical danger in the wholecountry, particularly from government forces and extremist groups.512
Syria rank 174th out of 180 countries in the 2019 RSF World Press Freedom Index.513 RSF stated thatjournalists were in danger of being arrested, abducted or killed in Syria, noting that in 2018 ‘at least’10 journalists were killed.514 According to the CPJ’s 2019 Global Impunity Index515, Syria rank second
among the 13 countries worldwide with the most impunity, meaning that the country had the second
lowest record of prosecution of individuals in relation to deaths of journalists.516
RSF also noted that very few of the new Syrian media that were created by citizen journalists517 after
2011 have survived.518
RSF noted that 10 journalists were killed in 2019 in Syria making 2019 the year with the least fatalities
among journalists since the start of the civil war in Syria. According to the same source, in 2019 Syria
continued to rank as one of the two deadliest countries worldwide for the media.519 The Committee

507 UN Security Council, Protection of civilians in armed conflict. Report of the Secretary-General, 7 May 2019, url, p. 8
508 UN Security Council, Protection of civilians in armed conflict. Report of the Secretary-General, 14 May 2018, url, p. 4
509 RSF, Syria, n.d., url
510 United Nations Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014),

2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018) and 2449 (2018), 15 October 2019, url, p. 13
511 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018) and 2449 (2018), 15 October 2019, url, p. 5
512 Freedom House, Freedom in the world, Syria, 4 February 2019, url
513 Reporters Without Borders, 2019 World Press Freedom Index, n.d., url
514 Reporters Without Borders, Syria, n.d., url
515 The Index and the chart rate countries based on their low record of prosecutions of individuals that kill journalists indirect retaliation for their work
516 CPJ, Getting away with murder, 29 October 2019, url
517 Citizen journalist: ‘an ordinary person without special training who records or writes about news stories, for example
on the internet’. Source: Cambridge Dictionary, citizen journalist, n.d., url
518 Reporters Without Borders, Syria, n.d., url
519 RSF, Worldwide round-up of journalists killed, detained, held hostage, or missing in 2019, 16 December 2019 – updated
17 December 2019, url, p. 8

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS — 65

to Protect Journalists (CPJ) stated that seven journalists520 were killed in 2019 in Syria521. The SHRC
documented eight journalists and media activists killed in 2019 in the country with 26 injured, mostly
during indiscriminate bombings or during bombings and shootings while covering the fighting.522
In its report covering 2018, SHRC stated that there was a decrease of human rights violations againstjournalists in comparison to the previous years.523 It documented the death of 16 journalists andmedia activists during 2018 and the injury of 13, primarily due to bullets and shelling fired
indiscriminately while they were covering the conflict.524
The Syrian Center for Journalistic Freedoms (SCJF) and the Syrian Journalists Association (SJA)525 notedin their report covering 2018 that different actors targeted media and media personnel in Syria andhighlighted that in 2018, ISIL was no longer among those actors.526 The report also stated that there
were 15 documented527 cases of media professionals killed in Syria in that year, while 32 werearrested, detained or abducted, and 25 injured.528 In the first half of 2019, from the beginning ofJanuary 2019 until the end of June, the SJA documented 46 violations committed against media
professionals in Syria.529

7.2 Targeting by government forces and affiliated armed groups
As documented by the SJA, the GoS was the main actor committing violations against media and media
personnel with 27 recorded in 2018 in Syria.530 AI stated that the Syrian security forces detained
thousands of individuals without trial and that tens of thousands of people that had disappeared
remained so, most of them since 2011, including journalists.531
In a May 2019 report SNHR noted that, after 2011, ‘the Syrian regime and its security services became
even more lethally brutal and oppressive towards any independent press and media covering eventsin the country’. The growth of citizen journalism in Syria contributed to the joint preparation of press
material in collaboration and coordination with international journalists and media outlets. This
constituted one main reason, according to the source, that the Syrian government targeted local
journalists. SNHR further stated that it documented ‘multiple, intensive, widespread and clear’
violations of the rights of journalists; journalists were targeted by snipers, arrested, tortured and520 One of these 7 journalists, according to the CPJ, was killed between September 2016 and July 2019
521 CPJ, 7 journalists killed in Syria, n.d., url
522 SHRC, The 18th Annual Report on Human Rights situation in Syria 2019, January 2020, url, p. 42
523 In the SHRC 2018 Annual Report are detailed lists of the documented violations against journalists during 2018. The

violations include death, injury and arrest and abduction. Source: SHRC, The 17th Annual Report on Human Rights in Syria
2018, January 2018 - December 2018, January 2019, url, p. 52
524 SHRC, The 17th Annual Report on Human Rights in Syria 2018, January 2018 - December 2018, January 2019, url, p. 52
525 The Syrian Journalists Association (SJA) is, according to its website, an independent democratic professional association
founded in 2012 with the aim to empower the freedom of expression and press in Syria. Source: Syrian Journalist
Association, About us, 30 June 2017, url
526 SCJF, Violations committed against media professionals in Syria. The 2018 Annual Report, 28 January 2019, Syrian
Journalists Association, url, p. 23
527 In the methodology section of the Report, it states that ‘The Centre collects information from victims’ families or theirrelatives or directly from the media professionals themselves apart from research, monitoring and consistent following of
information and updates from concerned different sources.’ Source: SCJF, Violations committed against media
professionals in Syria. The 2018 Annual Report, 28 January 2019, Syrian Journalists Association, url, p. 10528 SCJF, Violations committed against media professionals in Syria. The 2018 Annual Report, 28 January 2019, Syrian
Journalists Association, url, p. 13
529 SJA and SCJF, Violations committed against media professionals in Syria. Mid-year casualty count, 2019, url, p. 2
530 SCJF, Violations committed against media professionals in Syria. The 2018 Annual Report, 28 January 2019, Syrian
Journalists Association, url, p. 23
531 AI, Human Rights in the Middle East and North Africa. Review of 2018, 2019, url, pp. 62-63

66 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

forcibly disappeared. The Syrian government also attempted to discredit them, by undermining thecredibility of their reports and statements.532
OHCHR noted that those who refused reconciliation with GoS in Dar’a governorate following its
takeover in summer 2018 and evacuated to rebel-held areas ‘included fighters and their families, aswell as some who identified as journalists and humanitarian workers who claimed to fear being
targeted and/or detained by GoS should they decide to remain in Dar’a’.533
SNHR additionally reported that citizen journalists and media workers were also in danger in areasthat are not under the control of GoS, since they are part of the civilian population that was targetedby ‘double-tap’ aerial and artillery bombings.534 GoS also targeted journalists in the areas with which
it had entered into settlement processes, ‘persecuting citizen journalists there and arresting most ofthem’.535
SHRC also noted that in 2019, journalists that were loyal to the GoS were also targeted, as ‘a result ofa struggle for power centres that formed within the regime over the course of the war’.536

7.3 Targeting by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham
In a January 2019 report, the CoI stated that HTS arrested and imprisoned civilians that opposed or
criticised its rule, including journalists.537 Similarly, Human Rights Watch stated that HTS targetedjournalists, by arbitrarily arresting and kidnapping them.538
According to the CoI, individuals such as journalists, perceived to be violating the Islamic law (sharia)
as per HTS’s interpretation, were ‘routinely detained arbitrarily, tortured and subjected to illtreatment while in detention facilities known to be operated by the group’.539 The group has been
following the same pattern of arbitrary arrests since 2014, under its previous form as the Al-Nusra
Front or Jabhat al-Nusra.540 RSF documented the killing of two Syrian journalists in Syria, in late 2018.
The source noted that civil society accused HTS of being responsible for the deaths of the twojournalists.541 According to BBC, one of them was Raed Fares, a prominent Syrian radio journalist, who
was killed in the governorate of Idlib.542
Christopher Kozak of ISW noted that there is less reporting in general out of Idlib governorate because
the former proliferation of free activist media outlets has been increasingly clamped down on by HTS,
and targeted for harassment, detention, or violence.543
SNHR stated that HTS also targeted citizen journalists in the areas under its control, killing those it
perceived as a threat to its ideology and policies. The SNHR further stated that it documented ‘the532 SNHR, On World Press Freedom Day: citizen journalists in Syria face retirement or displacement, 3 May 2019, url, pp.

1-3
533 OHCHR, Human Rights Digest Syria, The “unreconciled” concerns of civilians in Dar’a Governorate, May 2019, url, p. 3
534 SNHR, On World Press Freedom Day: citizen journalists in Syria face retirement or displacement, 3 May 2019, url, p. 3535 SNHR, On World Press Freedom Day: citizen journalists in Syria face retirement or displacement, 3 May 2019, url, p. 3
536 SHRC, The 18th Annual Report on Human Rights in Syria in 2019, January 2020, url, p. 42
537 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
31 January 2019, url, p. 12538 HRW, World Report 2019 - Syria, 17 January 2019, url
539 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
31 January 2019, url, p. 12
540 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
31 January 2019, url p. 12
541 RSF, 2019 RSF Index: Middle East’s journalists deliberately targeted, 16 April 2019, url
542 BBC, Raed Fares: Syria radio host shot dead in Idlib, 24 November 2018, url
543 EASO Interview with Christopher Kozak, Institute for the Study of War (ISW), 14 November 2019

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arrests of dozens of citizen journalists by Hay’at Tahrir al Sham’s forces in retaliation for issuing
publications contrary to its policies or for participating in activism without obtaining permission’.544

7.4 Targeting by the Syrian National Army
In Aleppo governorate, according to a 2018 report by the CoI, the FSA-affiliated groups targeted
different individuals, including journalists. Based on reports by residents, the FSA-affiliated groups545,
after taking over an area, repeatedly proceeded to arbitrary arrests and detentions.546
Similarly, SNHR noted that citizen journalists in the areas under control of the ‘armed opposition’ (notfurther specified by the source) were targeted systematically; they were harassed, extorted,
intimidated, detained and tortured.547
The CoI reported that in February 2019 a journalist was arrested by an armed opposition group in
Afrin, Aleppo governorate under the accusation of ‘sharing information with foreign news agencies’.
The journalist was reportedly severely beaten during his interrogation.548

7.5 Targeting by the SDF/YPG
According to the SNHR, the SDF mostly supressed the freedom of press, particularly when opposing
the SDF’s policies. The source documented a large number of arrests, enforced disappearances andtorture of citizen journalists that criticised the policies and regime of the SDF in the areas under theircontrol.549
An October 2019 UN Security Council report stated that OHCHR documented at least seven incidents
of arrests and enforced disappearances of civilians, including media personnel perceived to criticise
the SDF, in the areas under their control.550
The CoI, in a 2018 report, stated that the SDF intimidated and arrested journalists that reported onalleged violations by the SDF and the international coalition in Raqqa city, Tall Abyad and Tabqa.551
Reporting for the period July 2017 to January 2018, the CoI stated that journalist and activists thatreported on human rights violations committed by SDF were subjected to intimidation and arbitraryarrests in Raqqa, Tall Abyad and Tabqa. Elements associated with the SDF detained several relativesof wanted activists in territories under its control for periods of up to six weeks to obtain information
about their whereabouts and pressure the activists to surrender.552

544 SNHR, On World Press Freedom Day: citizen journalists in Syria face retirement or displacement, 3 May 2019, url, p. 4
545 According to the same 2018 HRC Report, the following groups are part of the FSA-affiliated armed groups: Ahrar al-

Sham, Faylaq al-Sham, Jaish al-Nukhba, Jaish al-Sharqiya, Jabhat al-Shamiya and Nur al-Din al-Zinki. Source: UN Human
Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 9 August 2018,
url, p. 5
546 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
9 August 2018, url, pp. 6-7
547 SNHR, On World Press Freedom Day: citizen journalists in Syria face retirement or displacement, 3 May 2019, url, p. 4
548 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/42/51], 15 August 2019, url, p. 12549 SNHR, On World Press Freedom Day: citizen journalists in Syria face retirement or displacement, 3 May 2019, url, p. 4
550 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018) and 2449 (2018), 15 October 2019, url, p. 19
551 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
1 February 2018, url, p. 10
552 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/37/72], 1 February 2018, url, p. 10

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7.6 Targeting by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)
Human Rights Watch noted in its report covering 2019 that ‘ISIS seized thousands of individuals,
including activists, humanitarian workers, and journalists, whose fate remained unknown, according
to local human rights monitors and families of those kidnapped’.553 The report does not provide
further details on when the events took place.
The SNHR, in a May 2019 report, stated that citizen journalists were also targeted by ISIL who pursued,arrested and terrorised media personnel and citizen journalists. In addition, ISIL used citizen
journalists, forcing them to promote its ideology and propaganda. ISIL threatened them with tortureand death, according to the SNHR report, in order to make the citizen journalists comply.554 The source
did not provide the specific period when these violations took place.
According to a CoI 2018 report (covering the period between July 2017 and January 2018), ISIL
detained civilians, including journalists, in the governorates of Raqqa, Deir Ez-Zor and Hama, who wereaccused of reporting on alleged violations committed by ISIL.555

553 HRW, World Report 2020 - Syria, 14 January 2020, url
554 SNHR, On World Press Freedom Day: citizen journalists in Syria face retirement or displacement, 3 May 2019, url, p. 3
555 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,

1 February 2018, url, p. 15

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS — 69

8. Human rights activists
According to the organisation Front Line Defenders556, human rights defenders in Syria have been
facing an increased ‘risk of targeting and persecution’ after 2011. Human rights defenders were indanger of arbitrary arrests and detention, abductions, prosecution, death threats, restriction of
movement, defamation, as well as other forms of intimidation and harassment.557
AI stated that human rights activists were amongst the tens of thousands of people who have been
abducted or subjected to enforced disappearances since 2011 in Syria.558

8.1 Targeting by government forces and affiliated armed groups
According to the CoI, covering the period 11 July 2018 to 10 January 2019, activists were amongst themost likely individuals to be arbitrarily detained in Syria by the GoS forces in areas under theircontrol.559
The same source stated in August 2019 that government forces, after recapturing the Dar’agovernorate from armed groups, requested civilians to sign an oath of loyalty as part of thegovernment-imposed ‘reconciliation’ process. The oath included stipulations infringing on humanrights and one of the demands was for civilians to report the contact details of human rights
activists.560 Citing confidential sources, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands noted that,in the areas recaptured by the government and in cities like Douma, Daraa and the northern part ofHoms, the Syrian government, after the bombardments, proceeded to carry out arbitrary arrests anddetentions. One of the main groups targeted were human rights activists.561
A FIS report, based on a fact-finding mission to Damascus and Beirut in April 2018, stated that the GoS
had ‘a good capacity to monitor phones and social media’ and that, according to an interviewed Syrian
expert, the government monitored the phones of activists and that ‘they might be regularly taken infor questioning’.562
According to Human Rights Watch, Syrian intelligence branches arbitrarily detained individuals, andsubjected them to enforced disappearances and harassment in areas re-claimed from antigovernment groups. Human Rights Watch documented 11 cases of arbitrary detention,
disappearances and harassment of civilians from reconquered areas of Dar’a, Eastern Ghouta andsouthern Damascus. Activists were among those civilians targeted. In all cases, the targetedindividuals had signed reconciliation agreements with the government.563

556 The Front Line Defenders is an organization with the aim to protect human rights defenders at risk, who work in a non-violent manner with the goal to safeguard the rights included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Source: FrontLine Defenders, About us, n.d., url
557 Front Line Defenders, Syria, n.d., url
558 AI, Syria: Families left alone to find answers about disappeared relatives, 30 August 2019, url
559 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
31 January 2019, url, p. 15
560 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
15 August 2019, url, p. 13
561 Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of Origin Information Report: Syria. The Security Situation, July
2019, url, p. 44
562 Finland, FIS, Syria: Fact-finding mission to Beirut and Damascus, April 2018, 14 December 2018, url, p. 38
563 HRW, Syria: Detention, Harassment in Retaken Areas, 21 May 2019, url

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Different sources stated that human rights activists and defenders were arrested564, detained565 andkidnapped by government forces.566 Human rights activists were amongst those detained without
access to a fair public trial.567 They were also arrested and kidnapped mainly by GoS forces and themilitias affiliated to them.568 According to AI, after the government forces ceased the siege of Eastern
Ghouta, the security forces forcibly disappeared many of the individuals they had detained, activists
included. They were also tortured or subjected to other forms of ill-treatment, actions that resulted
to death in detention.569

8.2 Targeting by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham
SNHR informed that since September 2018 they recorded an escalation of HTS violations in the northof Syria, particularly in Idlib, where the group was conducting raids in villages, targeting and arresting
local activists among other individuals.570 The same source reported that they recorded at least 184
incidents of abductions and arbitrary arrests in the period of September until mid-October 2018,
including arrests of local activists that were criticising the group’s practices in social media.571
In its January 2019 report, the CoI noted that HTS targeted civilians criticising the group, including
activists. Activists, alongside other civilians, that were perceived to violate the group’s interpretationof the Islamic law (sharia) were regularly detained arbitrarily, tortured and mistreated while being
detained in facilities operated by the group.572
SOHR reported that in November 2019 HTS arrested what the source described as a ‘civilian activist’at the checkpoint of al-Bayda, amongst arrests of other individuals that opposed the group in the areas
under its control.573

8.3 Targeting by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)
According to the CoI, one of the steps that ISIL took in order to gain control in Syria was to target local
leaders and activists.574 The same source noted that during the reporting period July 2017 to January
2018 across the governorates of Raqqa, Deir Ez-Zor, and Hama, ISIL detained, among other civilians,
activists who were accused of reporting on alleged violations the group had committed.575

564 SNHR, Eight years since the start of the popular uprising in Syria, terrible violations continue, 11 March 2019, url , p. 6;

AI, Human rights in the Middle East and North Africa: Review of 2018 - Syria [MDE 24/9903/2019], 26 February 2019, url,
p. 60
565 USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 – Syria, 13 March 2019, url, p. 15; SNHR, Eight years since
the start of the popular uprising in Syria, terrible violations continue, 11 March 2019, url, p. 6;
566 SNHR, Eight years since the start of the popular uprising in Syria, terrible violations continue, 11 March 2019, url, p. 6;
567 The source states that tens of thousands of individuals were detained without access to fair trial. USDOS, Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 – Syria, 13 March 2019, url, p. 15
568 SNHR, Eight years since the start of the popular uprising in Syria, terrible violations continue, 11 March 2019, url, p. 6
569 AI, Human rights in the Middle East and North Africa: Review of 2018 - Syria [MDE 24/9903/2019], 26 February 2019,url, p. 60
570 SNHR, Hay’at Tahrir al Sham exploits the de-escalation agreement and escalates their violence,21 October 2019, url, p.
1; SNHR, The Annual Report of the most notable violations of human rights in Syria in 2018, 15 January 2019, url, p. 17
571 SNHR, Hay’at Tahrir al Sham exploits the de-escalation agreement and escalates their violence,21 October 2019, url,
p. 5
572 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
31 January 2019, url, p. 12573 SOHR, Hayyaat Tahrir al-Sham arrests 4 activists of its oppositionists in its areas of control and takes them to an
unknown destination, 12 November 2019, url
574 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
1 February 2018, url, p. 9575 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
1 February 2018, url, p. 15

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS — 71

In its annual report on human rights violations (covering 2018), SNHR stated that ISIL used torture
methods while interrogating detainees in order to extract information, intimidate, take revenge andspread fear. Activists constituted one of the groups576 that, according to the SNHR, suffered the ‘most
severe’ forms of torture at the hands of ISIL.577
Human Rights Watch stated that, according to local human rights organisations, ISIL ‘took into
custody’ at least 8 000 people in Syria, including activists, in the time that the group controlled
territory.578 Human Rights Watch documented many cases of individuals, including activists, who had
disagreements with local ISIL members, were detained by ISIL and whose whereabouts remain
unknown.579

8.4 Targeting by the SDF/YPG
OHCHR documented in September 2019 at least seven enforced disappearances or arbitrary arrestsof civilians including human rights activists. Those individuals were perceived as critical towards the
SDF in the areas under their control.580
According to the same source, the SDF targeted activists and journalists; they were ‘intimidated andarrested for reporting on alleged violations committed by the Syrian Democratic Forces and theinternational coalition in Raqqa city, Tall Abyad and Tabqa’. The report noted that there were cases of
the SDF arresting and detaining relatives of activists in order to obtain information about the locationof activists and to pressure them to come out of hiding.581
SNHR stated that the SDF, after claiming areas in the governorates of Raqqa and Deir Ez Zor, targeted
activists amongst other groups. They were subjected to beatings, and deprived of food and access tohealthcare.582

8.5 Targeting by the Syrian National Army
The CoI, in its August 2018 report, stated that, according to residents, the FSA-affiliated armed groups
displayed patterns of arbitrary arrests, kidnappings, detention and beatings in the areas under theircontrol, targeting, among other groups, activists.583 On February 2018, the Turkish air force launched
an attack against a convoy of vehicles allegedly carrying weapons, terrorists and ammunition, resulting
in at least one fatality and twelve injuries. The CoI informed that, after reviewing the evidence, theconvoy appeared to have carried activists, nurses, a doctor and demonstrators.584
AI noted that activists were also targeted by the pro-Turkey armed group Sultan Murad. They werearbitrarily detained and some were tortured and ill-treated in other ways.585

576 The other groups are military captives and abducted foreigners
577 SNHR, The Annual Report of the most notable violations of human rights in Syria in 2018, 15 January 2019, url, p. 59
578 HRW, Fate of ISIS Kidnapping Victims in Syria Remains Uncertain, 16 April 2019, url
579 HRW, Syria: Reveal Fate of Missing Victims of ISIS, 14 May 2019, url
580 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258

(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018) and 2449 (2018),15 October 2019, url, p. 19
581 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
1 February 2018, url, p. 10582 SNHR, Eight years since the start of the popular uprising in Syria, terrible violations continue, 11 March 2019, url, p. 9583 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
9 August 2018, url, pp. 6-7
584 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
9 August 2018, url, p. 6
585 AI, Human rights in the Middle East and North Africa: Review of 2018 - Syria [MDE 24/9903/2019], 26 February 2019,url, p. 62

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9. Targeting
professionalsof

doctorsandmedical

9.1 Targeting by government forces and affiliated armed groups
GoS forces have targeted doctors, nurses and assistant health personnel. Medical personnel working
at medical facilities has been subjected to military attacks by GoS and allied forces throughout theyears of conflict, according to the Syria Independent Monitoring (SIM) consortium, a group oforganisations reporting upon the request of the UK Government586, and Syria expert Aron Lund.587 The
CoI stated in a January 2019 report that ‘Since 2013, the Commission has documented how progovernment forces systematically target health-care infrastructure in opposition-held areas to deprive
both civilians and belligerents of medical treatment’.588
The US-based NGO Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) documented and mapped a total of 583 attacks
on at least 350 separate health facilities from March 2011 through August 2019, of which PHR
attributed more than 90 % to state forces.589
Aron Lund noted that some activists and UN officials wonder if a UN list of health facilities agreed to
be protected under the Geneva Convention and circulated to the Syrian, Russian and Turkish militarycommands for that purpose, may instead have been deliberately used to pick hospitals as targets. 590
The Guardian cited in June 2019 a call by prominent doctors that stated that Syrian and Russian air
force both took part in a bombing campaign in May 2019, which targeted more than 20 hospitals in
the north-west of Syria. The location of many of hospitals that were hit was on the UN list.591 According
to the CoI, government forces carried out airstrikes on at least four hospitals in Idlib governorate
between March and May 2019. All hospitals were included on the UN ‘deconfliction’ list and theircoordinates were available to GoS forces.592
In August 2019, the UN announced that the UN Secretary-General would launch an investigation into
hospital attacks in north-west Syria covering ‘destruction of, or damage to facilities on thedeconfliction list and UN-supported facilities in the area’.593 At the time of writing, no findings weremade public.
The New York Times published analysis of recordings of Russian pilots’ communications as well asother evidence the newspaper had obtained, which indicated Russian military aircraft bombing four
hospitals in Idlib on 5 May 2019.594 In May 2019, AI accused the Syrian military and its ally Russia of‘carrying out a deliberate and systematic assault on hospitals and other medical facilities in Idlib andHama’.595 Media sources reported in August and September 2019 that hospitals were being bombed
586 Syria Independent Monitoring Consortium, Protecting Healthcare in Syria, August 2018, url, p. 5
587 Lund, A., The UN Made a List of Hospitals in Syria. Now They’re Being Bombed, The Century Foundation, 13 June 2019,url
588 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/40/70], 31 January 2019, url, p. 7, footnote 12589 PHR, PHR Briefing to U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing on Protecting Health Care During Armed Conflict, 30
October 2019, url
590 Lund, A. The UN Made a List of Hospitals in Syria. Now They’re Being Bombed, The Century Foundation, 13 June 2019, url
591 Guardian (The), Stop the carnage: doctors call for an end to Syria hospital airstrikes, 2 June 2019, url
592 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
15 August 2019, url, pp. 9-10
593 UN Secretary General, Statement attributable to the Spokesman for the Secretary-General – on UN Board of Inquiry innorthwest Syria, 1 August 2019, url
594 New York Times (The), 12 Hours. 4 Syrian Hospitals Bombed. One Culprit: Russia, 13 October 2019, url
595 AI, Syria: Security Council must address crimes against humanity in Idlib, 17 May 2019, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS — 73

in Idlib.596 According to the World Health Organization (WHO), seven health centres were bombed inlate August 2019 in Idlib governorate.597
Various sources reported that many personnel working in health facilities were killed in the militaryattacks. For example, SNHR reported 53 medical personnel killed in 2018, the large majority by Syrian
state forces and allied militias.598 PHR reported 912 personnel killed in military attacks in the period
March 2011 to August 2019.599
PHR indicated in a briefing to the UN Security Council in July 2019 that Syrian government forces’attacks on medical facilities constituted crimes against humanity and were used as a ‘tactic of terror[which] turns places of safety and life into danger zones and death traps’.600 In an interview conductedin May 2019, Lynn Maalouf, Middle East research director for AI stated that ‘in all of their military
operations—Ghouta, Aleppo, Douma—the government of Syria has destroyed civilian facilities
deliberately to pressure the civilian population and the armed groups into surrendering’. Maalouf
further noted that in AI’s assessment ‘attacks against hospitals are widespread and systematic, andthis is what brings us to say the attacks against hospitals in Syria are a crime against humanity’.601

9.2 Targeting by non-state armed groups
According to PHR data, anti-government armed groups were responsible for 24 attacks on medical
facilities and ISIL for 10 since that start of the conflict in 2011.602
Several reports pointed out that medical personnel were arbitrarily arrested and mistreated by nonstate armed groups. The news outlet Smartnews, an opposition media agency, reported that a doctor
was kidnapped in Afrin by the SNA in January 2019.603 SOHR reported in October 2019 that a doctor
in Afrin was beaten by members of Turkish-backed armed groups when he asked militia members whocame for treatment to wait for their turn, and that another doctor in Afrin had been abducted fromhis house by pro-Turkish military police.604 AI reported in October 2019 that two civilian men, bothworking with a local medical organisation and transporting medicine, were abducted in northeast
Syria by Ahrar al-Sharqiya, a Turkish-backed Syrian group.605
Another opposition source - STJ reported in June 2018 about the abductions of four doctors in Idlib
Governorate by unknown persons and one by HTS.606 Enab Baladi noted in early 2019 that abductionsof medical personnel in Idlib seemed to be on the rise as tensions had otherwise begun to decrease.607
Syrian American Medical Society Foundation (SAMS) reported that in September 2019 HTS kidnapped

596 BBC, Syria war: Idlib’s secret hospitals hiding from air strikes, 12 September 2019, url; UN News, Hospitals among sevenhealth centres attacked in Syria’s north-east, 2 September 2019, url; CBS, Syrians trapped by Assad's ruthless Russianbacked barrage in Idlib beg for help, 29 August 2019, url
597 WHO, WHO statement on attacks on health facilities in north west Syria, 1 September 2019, url
598 SNHR, 91 medical, Civil Defense, and Red Crescent personnel Documented killed in Syria, and 198 attacks on their
Related Facilities in 2018. One Civil Defense Worker Documented Killed, and 11 Attacks on Vital Medical, Civil Defense
Facilities in December, 6 January 2019, url, p. 5
599 PHR, Briefing to U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing on Protecting Health Care During Armed Conflict, 30
October 2019, url
600 PHR, Briefing to the United Nations Security Council on Attacks on Health Facilities and Personnel in Syria, 30 July 2019,url
601 Lund, A. The UN Made a List of Hospitals in Syria. Now They’re Being Bombed, The Century Foundation, 13 June 2019, url
602 PHR, Illegal Attacks on Health Care in Syria, n.d., url
603 Smartnews, National Army fighters torture doctor in Afrin, 27 January 2019, url
604 SOHR, Members of the Turkey-loyal factions beat a doctor and an engineer in Afrin city as part of the series of continue
violations in the area, 4 October 2019, url
605 AI, Syria: Damning evidence of war crimes and other violations by Turkish forces and their allies, 18 October 2019, url
606 STJ, Idlib: Assaulting Medical Personnel Becomes more Frequent, 29 June 2018, url
607 Enab Baladi, The Medical Sector in the North of Syria Stumbling Forward, 3 January 2019, url

74 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

and beat up a doctor in north-west Syria, and then kidnapped him again while he was being treated
for the injuries from the beatings.608
In September 2019, a doctor who was abducted in Idlib by HTS was released several hours later after
the Idlib Doctor’s Union announced it was ceasing all medical treatment in the governorate, asreported by Counter Extremism Project, an international clearinghouse of extremist groups.609 STJ
pointed out that in some cases armed groups abducted doctors in order to intimidate.610
SNHR reported in January 2019 that ISIL had raided makeshift hospitals and dispensaries and abducted
some of the wounded, doctors, and paramedics.611
In some reported incidents, attacks could have been indiscriminate or unintended when being carriedout in connection with other military activity. One such incident occurred in November 2019 when a
Kurdish ambulance was hit by Turkish forces engaged in Turkey’s incursion in north-east Syria.
According to a representative of a humanitarian aid organisation interviewed by the Guardian, it was
hard to tell if the ambulance was deliberately targeted.612

9.3 Targeting by unspecified armed actors
PHR recorded 20 attacks on medical facilities by unknown actors since that start of the conflict in2011.613 In one such incident which took place in September 2019 in the western countryside of
Aleppo, two doctors were kidnapped by unidentified armed men who demanded ransom for theirrelease.614 The Gulf-based newspaper The National, writing in November 2018, reported that at least
12 doctors, as well as pharmacists and administrative health personnel were abducted in Idlib by gangs
and unnamed militias during the year.615 Reuters reported in 2018 that kidnapping for ransom in Idlib
had begun in 2016 and then increased, and that there were 10 such cases involving ‘armed gangs’
recorded in north-west Syria in 2018. Doctors became targeted because they are well-known,
comparatively well-paid and inclined to express views that put them at odds with their kidnappers,
according to Reuters.616
In June 2018, doctors and pharmacists in Idlib suspended their work for three days in protest against‘violations committed against the medical sector in the province’. Many doctors were reportedly
abducted by unknown actors, who demanded huge ransoms for their release.617 A doctor who was
abducted from a village in the Latakia countryside in August 2018 by unknown men was held for aweek, questioned and exposed to jihadist music and propaganda but not physically mistreated,according to the STJ.618

608 SAMS, SAMS’ statement on violations against humanitarian workers, 5 September 2019, url
609 Counter Extremism Project, Nusra Front (Jabat Fateh aal-Sham), n.d., url
610 STJ, Idlib: Assaulting Medical Personnel Becomes more Frequent, 29 June 2018, url
611 SNHR, 91 Medical, Civil Defense, and Red Crescent personnel Documented killed in Syria, and 198 Attacks on Their Related

Facilities in 2018. One Civil Defense Worker Documented Killed, and 11 Attacks on Vital Medical, Civil Defense facilities in
December, 6 January 2019, url
612 Guardian (The) Kurdish medics injured in apparent attack on ambulance in Syria, 10 November 2019, url
613 PHR, Illegal Attacks on Health Care in Syria, n.d., url
614 SOHR, Unidentified gunmen kidnap 2 doctors in the western countryside of Aleppo within the continued security chaos
in Idlib province and the surrounding countryside controlled by Hayyaat Tahrir Al-Sham and other factions, 16 May 2019,url
615 National (The), Medical workers in Syria's Idlib being kidnapped at an alarming rate, 10 November 2018, url
616 Reuters, 'Neither war nor peace': Doctors targeted in Syria's lawless rebel region, 21 December 2018, url
617 Enab Baladi, The Medical Sector in the North of Syria Stumbling Forward, 3 January 2019, url
618 STJ, Update: Armed men Kidnap Dr. Khali Agha and Hospitals Suspend Work in Protest, 14 August 2019, url

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10. Members of specific ethnic and religious
groups10.1 Overview on ethno-religious demography
There are different estimations regarding the ethnic and religious composition of the Syrian society.
According to USCIRF, the religious demography of Syria is as follows: 74 % Sunni, 13 % Alawite, Ismaili
and Shi’a, 10 % Christian, and 3 % Druze.619 The same breakdown of the population of Syria was sharedby the USDOS 2018 International Religious Freedom report.620 Syria expert Fabrice Balanche statedthat in 2010, the ethno-religious composition of Syrian society comprised of 65 % Sunni Arabs, 15 %Kurdish, 10 % Alawite, 5 % Christian, 3 % Druze, 1 % Ismaili, and 1 % Twelver Shia.621 In terms of ethnic
groups, the US Congressional Research Service (US CRS) estimated that 90.3 % are Arabs while
Kurdish, Armenian and other groups constitute 9.7 % of the population.622
Finally, according to Minority Rights Group International (MRGI), 75 % of Syrians are Sunni, 12 %Alawite, 2 % other Muslim, 10 % Christian, 3-4 % Druze, and 1 % Yazidi. The source observed that‘specific demographic data for Syria is unreliable. Some minority groups are defined primarily by
religion, others by ethnicity, and some are relatively recent immigrants. Many of them can also befound in neighbouring countries’.623
With regards to the distribution of the different religious groups, USDOS stated that Sunni Muslims
reside throughout the country, Shia Muslims in rural areas of Idlib and Aleppo governorates as well as
in and around Damascus, Aleppo and Homs. Alawites dwell in the coastal side of Syria with a presencein the cities of Latakia, Tartous, Homs and Damascus. Ismailis are concentrated in the city of Salamiya
in Hama governorate. Christians live in and around the cities of Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Hama,
Lattakia and in the Hasaka governorate. They constituted 10 % of the population of Syria, but as manyof them fled Syria due to the ongoing war, the percentage ‘is now considerably lower’. The Druze
reside mainly in Jabal Al-Druze in the Sweida governorate, while Yazidis are found in north-east
Syria.624 Christopher Kozak of ISW, interviewed by DIS in August 2019 stated that the number ofChristians, Druze, Alawites, and Twelver Shi’a ‘is very minimal’ in opposition-held areas.625
Syria’s sectarian distribution, however, has been modified according to Fabrice Balanche due to‘ethnic cleansing in different areas, whether under the aegis of the Syrian government, the rebels,
ISIL, or the Kurds’.626 According to MRGI, the demographics of Syria ‘have been redrawn’ as thereligious minorities relocated to government-held areas, leaving the north of the country largely
Sunni.627

619 USCIRF, 2019 Annual Report of the US Commission on International Religious Freedom, April 2019, url, p. 105
620 USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report: Syria 2018, 21 June 2019, url, p. 3
621 Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, Washington Institute of Near East Policy, 2018, url, p. 13
622 US CRS, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, 25 March 2019, url, p. 2
623 Minority Rights Group International, Syria, May 2018, url
624 USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report: Syria 2018, 21 June 2019, url, p. 4
625 Denmark, DIS, Syria - Access to Damascus Province for Individuals from Former Rebel-held Areas, September 2019, url,

p. 18
626 Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, Washington Institute of Near East Policy, 2018, url, p. XV
627 Minority Rights Group International, Syria, June 2019, url

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10.2 The sectarian nature of the conflict in Syria
Sources provide distinct views with regards to the sectarian nature of the Syrian conflict, and whether
religious and ethnic groups are targeted for their religious/ethnic affiliation or their (perceived)
political stance. In the case of ISIL, this is less problematic as according to USDOS, the group, together
with HTS, ‘targeted religious minorities, including Shia and Ismaili Muslims, Christians, Alawites, andYazidis, and members of the majority Sunni community who violated their strict interpretations ofIslamic law’.628 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands assessed following interviews withconfidential sources that ‘apart from ISIS, sources do not mention any other parties to the conflictthat target particular groups on grounds of ethnicity, religion, profession or other characteristics for
ideological motives. Enmity is based on opposing political affiliations and ideologies in which religion
may play a role’.629 An October 2019 report published by the Governance and Social Development
Resource Centre630 assessed that many ethno-religious groups ‘came under attack less for religious
reasons and more for perceived bias or sympathy with a particular protagonist in the conflict’. 631
Aron Lund assessed that ‘despite its lopsided internal sectarian make-up, the government continues
to uphold Baath Party secularism and promotes a vision of religious coexistence’.632
USDOS’s 2018 report on religious freedom observed that the attempts of the GoS to eliminate theopposition ‘was sectarian in its effects, although it was not motivated primarily by sectarianideology’.633 Yassin Al-Haj Saleh from the Century Foundation argued that the GoS used ‘minorities asa shield’ in its attempt to protect itself.634 According to MRGI, Assad mobilised ‘communal anxieties’in his war against the Syrian opposition, benefitting from the growing influence of extremism among
the latter, which ‘resulted in an increasingly sectarian landscape’.635
Fabrice Balanche observed that as a result of the war, ‘Syria’s sectarian identities have been awakened
more powerfully than ever’ and that ‘in April 2013, Syria’s battle map largely aligns with the map of
its sectarian distribution.636
According to Syria expert Raymond Hinnebusch, Syria ‘became a battleground of rivalry between Iranand the Sunni powers’ and sectarianism was used as the ‘main tool’ of the military interventions that
followed, each state ‘favoring sectarian groups aligned with its own sectarian composition’.637 The SAA
was supported by Shia militias from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and Lebanon, which continued tooperate in Syria, albeit at a lower scale since 2018.638 Sunni Arab rebels also received outside help in
the form of ‘air support, heavy weapons, and legions of foreign fighters’.639

628 USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report: Syria 2018, 21 June 2019, url, p. 13
629 Netherlands (the), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of Origin Information Syria: The Security Situation, July 2019, url,

p. 42
630 The Governance and Social Development Resource Centre is a research and knowledge management centre specialisingin governance, social development, conflict and humanitarian issues. For more information see url
631 Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, Challenges religious minorities face in accessing humanitarianassistance, 14 October 2019, url, p. 7
632 Lund, A., From Cold War to Civil War: 75 Years of Russian-Syrian Relations, Swedish Institute of International Affairs,
July 2019, url, p. 33
633 USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report: Syria 2018, 21 June 2019, url, p. 7
634 Al-Haj Saleh, Y., The Dark Path of Minority Politics: Why Privileging Minorities Will Only Perpetuate the Syrian
Catastrophe, The Century Foundation, 18 April 2019, url, p. 1
635 Minority Rights Group International, Syria, June 2019, url
636 Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, Washington Institute of Near East Policy, 2018, url, p. 3637 Hinnebusch, R., The Sectarian Revolution in the Middle East, R/evolutions: Global Trends & Regional Issues, Vol 4, No.
1, 2016, (ISSN: 2449-6413), pp. 120-152, 2016, url, p. 142
638 USCIRF, 2019 Annual Report of the US Commission on International Religious Freedom, April 2019, url, p. 106
639 Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, Washington Institute of Near East Policy, 2018, url, p. 13

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10.3 Sunni Arabs
As mentioned above, Syria’s Sunni population constitutes the majority and resides across the country.
However, according to Yassin Al-Haj Saleh, Syria’s Sunni Arabs ‘are far from being homogenous or
majoritarian’, and cannot be perceived as a unified group that may pose a threat to the otherminorities. He argued that most of the victims of the Syrian civil war were Sunni Arabs, and thatmembers of this group varied significantly in terms of their political affiliation and had ‘convergent
stances on public affairs’.640 This diversity of stance resulted in them being targeted by different actors.
Moreover, he stated that ‘it is certain that when international media reports that “70 percent of Syria
is composed of Sunni Arabs,” it disguises a huge diversity of practice and identity within this“majority”’.641 Fabrice Balanche subscribed to the view that Syria’s Sunnis cannot be regarded as a
unified community, but rather as a community divided into ‘practicing believers, atheists, secularists,
followers of Sufism, quietists, and radicals who wish to impose sharia law and strict(mis)interpretations of Islam’. Regional and tribal loyalties add to the divide between the Sunni
communities.642
Kheder Khaddour from the Carnegie Middle East Center argued that Syria’s Sunni Islamic religious
landscape was changed by the conflict that started in 2011. He added that the uprising ‘led to aterritorial and ideological separation between the Islam practiced in areas under regime control andoutside of them’.643
The relationship between Sunni Arabs and the other minorities in Syria is complex. According to the
USCIRF, the Assad government has much invested in ‘forging strategic ties with prominent Sunnifamilies and religious authorities’ in order to consolidate power, all while maintaining ‘a rigid but
uneasy framework of authority over the country’s diverse religious and ethnic groups’.644 However,
the majority of the high-ranking officers in the Syrian army and the security apparatus were
Alawites645, which created a sense of injustice among Syria’s Sunnis who felt left out. According toFabrice Balanche, ‘these sectarian feelings are more apparent in areas where Sunnis and Alawites live
in close proximity’.646 According to the USCIRF, the Syrian government marginalised Sunni Muslims
across the country, ‘handing traditional Sunni Muslim-held offices to Christian and Shi’a Muslim
loyalists’.647
As Middle East expert Daniel Gerlach put it, hatred towards minorities among the Sunni population
was fuelled by Sunni extremist groups, while the Syrian government fed on the existential fears ofminorities ‘of extinction, forced submission, or a total Islamist takeover’.648

640 Al-Haj Saleh, Y., The Dark Path of Minority Politics: Why Privileging Minorities Will Only Perpetuate the Syrian

Catastrophe, 18 April 2019, url, p. 4
641 Al-Haj Saleh, Y., The Dark Path of Minority Politics: Why Privileging Minorities Will Only Perpetuate the Syrian
Catastrophe, 18 April 2019, url, p. 11
642 Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, 2018, Washington Institute of Near East Policy, url, p. 13
643 Carnegie Middle East Center, Localism, War, and the Fragmentation of Sunni Islam in Syria, 28 March 2019, url
644 USCIRF, 2019 Annual Report of the US Commission on International Religious Freedom, April 2019, url, p. 105
645 Tsurkov, E., Between Regime and Rebels: A Survey of Syria’s Alawi Sect, The New York Reviews of Books, 22 July 2019,url
646 Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, 2018, Washington Institute of Near East Policy, url, p. 13
647 USCIRF, 2019 Annual Report of the US Commission on International Religious Freedom, April 2019, url, p. 107
648 Gerlach, D., A Turn Towards Idlib in Syria – Is the Goal to ‘Achieve Homogeneity’ in the Country, Washington Instituteof Near East Policy, 5 April 2019, url; Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2018 Country Report: Syria, 2018, url, p. 7

78 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

Sunni Arabs comprised most casualties of the Syrian war.649 A part of the Sunni population has
supported GoS throughout the conflict.650 Conditions for Sunni conscripts in the SAA were reportedly
worse than those of the Alawite minority. Sunni soldiers have been kept near the front lines formonths, were poorly paid and insufficiently supplied. By comparison, Alawites were reportedly kept
away from the front lines and said to receive preferential treatment, as stated in a December 2018
report.651

10.3.1 Targeting by the government forces and affiliated armed groups
As some of the rebel groups self-identified as Sunni Arab, this gave a sectarian element to GoS’targeting of the opposition.652 The Syrian government ‘reserved its harshest repression for the Sunni
Muslims population over its perceived support for the opposition movement’653, with USDOS making
reference to ‘continued reports’ that ‘the war waged by the Alawi dominated government against
opposition forces and terrorist groups resulted in significant casualties among the majority Sunni
population’. Allegedly, the government used systematic unlawful killings, enforced disappearances,
torture, and chemical weapons.654
USDOS cited analysts according to whom the use of foreign Shia militias in Syria against a ‘mostly Sunni
opposition further exacerbated sectarian divisions’.655 Such militias, the report added, were involved
in killings, arrests, and physical abuses of individuals in rebel-held areas; such actions were aimed at
defeating the rebels and intimidating ‘Sunni communities that might support opposition groups’.656
Furthermore, the Syrian news outlet, Jesr Press, reported that the residents of the Sunni-majority
town of Hujjeira, located to the south of Damascus, have been suffering from a lack in essential
services such as electricity and water due to authority negligence, while this phenomenon did notexist in Shia-inhabited neighbourhoods.657
USDOS stated that the government’s support for radio and television programmes that propagated‘the practice and study of a form of Islam it deemed appropriate’ continued, with only approved clerics
granted access to public channels. Furthermore, the government ‘continued to warn the Sunni
population against communications with foreign coreligionists that it described as communication for
purpose of political opposition or military activity’; for most of the other religious groups, however,such communication was not banned.658

10.3.2 Forced displacement and denial of return
Daniel Gerlach noted that the core supporters of the GoS would consider the ongoing expansion of
Syria’s Sunni majority as a threat to the country’s peaceful coexistence.659 USDOS cited multiple press

649 Tsurkov, E., Between Regime and Rebels: A Survey of Syria’s Alawi Sect, The New York Reviews of Books, 22 July 2019,url
650 Tsurkov, E., Between Regime and Rebels: A Survey of Syria’s Alawi Sect, The New York Reviews of Books, 22 July 2019,

url; Cambanis, T. et. al, Hybrid Actors. Armed Groups and State Fragmentation in the Middle East, The Century Foundation,
15 November 2019, url, pp. 59-60, 69
651 Khatib, L. and Sinjab, L., Syria’s Transactional State How the Conflict Changed the Syrian State’s Exercise of Power,
Chatham House, October 2018, url, p. 14
652 USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report: Syria 2018, 21 June 2019, url, p. 9653 USCIRF, 2019 Annual Report of the US Commission in International Religious Freedom, April 2019, url, p. 106
654 USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report: Syria 2018, 21 June 2019, url, p. 7
655 USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report: Syria 2018, 21 June 2019, url, p. 10
656 USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report: Syria 2018, 21 June 2019, url, p. 8657 Jesr Press, ‫ الخدمات عىل أساس طائف و التوسع اإليران مستمر‬:‫[ جنوب دمشق‬Southern Damascus: Services are provided on a sectarian‫ي‬‫ي‬basis and the Iranian expansion is ongoing], 4 October 2019, url
658 USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report: Syria 2018, 21 June 2019, url, p. 11-12
659 Gerlach, D., A Turn Towards Idlib in Syria – Is the Goal to ‘Achieve Homogeneity’ in the Country, Washington Institutefor Near East Policy, 5 April 2019, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS — 79

reports and human rights organisations which allegedly observed that ‘the vast majority of refugees
and displaced were Sunni and viewed with suspicion by the government’.660 This was particularly thecase in Damascus, where forced displacement of ‘mostly Sunni residents’ took place in the wake ofthe government’s military victories.661 According to Fabrice Balanche, ‘before and during the war, theAlawite and Druze/Christian districts were permitted to extend their boundaries close to the strategic
points that connect Damascus with the rest of the country, in the process cutting the Sunni areas offfrom each other and the rest of the rebellion’.662
Human Rights Watch reported on a new law, Law 10 of 2018, which ‘empowers the government toconfiscate residents’ property without due process or adequate compensation’. Moreover, inQaboun663 and Darayya664, the government blocked attempts of displaced civilian residents to returnto their homes and ‘unlawfully demolished residents’ private homes, without providing notice,alternative housing, or compensation’.665 Confidential sources interviewed in March 2019 by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands stated that ‘Sunnis and Christians are prevented fromreturning to their homes in Damascus’.666
Syrian security forces also refused to grant authorisation to ‘most Sunni Muslim civilians’ who wanted
to return to their homes in Homs city.667 Furthermore, this law, according to the Financial Times,
together with other measures like ‘vetting of Sunni men of fighting age; military service;imprisonment’, helped to change the face of Syria in favour of Iran-backed Shia groups.668 In a report,
the Middle East Media Research Institute claimed that ‘several websites reported that the regime wasnaturalizing thousands and even millions of Shi’ites, members of Iranian and Iran-backed militias thatare fighting alongside the Syrian army’.669

10.3.4 Targeting by non-state armed groups
According to Yassin Al-Haj Saleh, extremist groups like ISIL, HTS, and Jaysh Al-Islam targeted Sunnis‘who were deemed inadequately devout, or apostate’.670 Several rebel groups identified themselves
as Sunni Arab and built on the support of the Sunni group in their areas of control. They continued toapply their versions of sharia law, punishing non-devout individuals with floggings, imprisonment, or
executions for religious offenses such as blasphemy, apostasy and cursing God. Furthermore, HTS andaffiliated groups made use of schools and training camps to radicalise children.671

660 USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report: Syria 2018, 21 June 2019, url, p. 10
661 USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report: Syria 2018, 21 June 2019, url, p. 8662 Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, 2018, Washington Institute of Near East Policy, url, p. 32
663 According to Syria INGO Regional Forum (SIRF), Qaboun was classified by the UN as ‘besieged’ in April 2017, andunderwent ‘mass evacuations of residents to Idlib governorate’. SIRF, Syria Community Profile Update: Qaboun, December
2017, url, p. 1
664 According to PAX, the SAA started ‘a scorched earth campaign against Darayya that resulted in the destruction andcomplete depopulation of the city in August 2016.’ PAX, Siege Watch Final Report: Out of Sight, Out of Mind: The Aftermathof Syria’s Sieges, url, p. 18
665 HRW, World Report 2019 - Syria, 17 January 2019, url
666 Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of Origin Information Syria: The Security Situation, July 2019,url, p. 56
667 USCIRF, 2019 Annual Report of the US Commission in International Religious Freedom, April 2019, url, p. 107
668 Financial Times, Syria is witnessing a violent demographic re-engineering, 2 October 2019, url
669 Middle East Media Research Institute, Anti-Syrian Regime Websites: Regime Granting Citizenship to Millions of Iranians,
Hizbullah Operatives to Change Country’s Demographics From Sunni to Shi’ite Majority, Conceal the Fighters’ Presence inSyria, 21 November 2018, url
670 Al-Haj Saleh, Y., The Dark Path of Minority Politics: Why Privileging Minorities Will Only Perpetuate the Syrian
Catastrophe, 18 April 2019, url, p. 11
671 USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report: Syria 2018, 21 June 2019, url, pp. 14, 16

80 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALSMRGI stated that ‘there have also been previous reports of Kurdish armed groups demolishing Araband Turkmen homes in the region and displacing their residents’.672

10.4 Kurds
According to estimates from 2010, around 15 % of the population was Kurdish.673 Fabrice Balanche
noted that before the war the Kurds were about 3 million in Syria: 2 million ‘who feel they are Kurds’,
and 1 million who are ‘Arabised’ Kurds who were in Damascus or other areas before the war and moregenerations, and were not strongly involved in the ‘Kurdish cause’.674
Prior to March 2011, the number of stateless Kurds in Syria amounted to 517 000675, and they fell into
two categories: ajanib (foreigners) and maktumeen (concealed; not included in the registries).676 A RI
report published in 2006 stated that the ‘difficulties faced by stateless Kurds in Syria are numerous …
Individuals have irregular access to education, health care, livelihoods, travel, property ownership,judicial and political systems, and registration of businesses, marriages, and children’.677 USDOS notedthat ‘stateless Kurds do not have the right to inherit or bequeath assets, and their lack of citizenshipor identity documents restricted their travel to and from the country’.678
In April 2011, Decree No. 49 was issued679 whereby 326 489 ajanib were naturalised while 19 753
remained stateless. Regarding the maktumeen, 50 400 obtained Syrian nationality, while around
41 000 remained stateless.680 Citing Nadim Houry from Human Rights Watch, the DIS stated that
‘Ajanib Kurds who have obtained Syrian nationality were called to serve in the Syrian army like othercitizens when the uprising began … However, the government’s access to these Kurds has been limited
as most of them live in the PYD-dominated areas’.681
A DIS report published in June 2019 addressed the situation of Kurds in Damascus. According to thereport citing Fabrice Balanche and an international regionally based humanitarian organisation, there
have been no security incidents targeting Kurds in Damascus. The report added that Kurds inDamascus work in different sectors, and that some public positions ‘are restricted for Kurds, forinstance positions within Air Force’, and that stateless Kurds cannot work in the public sector.682
Finally, according to an international regionally based humanitarian organisation operating in Syria
cited by the DIS, while there is no social discrimination against Kurds in Damascus, they are prevented
from practicing their culture and ‘there is always a feeling of being second-class citizen and not being
welcomed’.683

672 Minority Rights Group International, Syria, June 2019, url
673 Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, Washington Institute of Near East Policy, 2018, url, p. 13
674 Balanche, F., EASO, EASO COI Meeting Report: Syria; 30 November & 1 December 2017; Valletta, Malta, March 2018,

url, p. 54
675 STJ, Syrian Citizenship Disappeared: How the 1962 Census Destroyed Stateless Kurds’ Lives and Identities, 2018, url, p.
5676 Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, From Syria to Europe: Experiences of Stateless Kurds and Palestinian Refugees
from Syria Seeking Protection in Europe, January 2019, url, p. 9
677 RI, Buried Alive: Stateless Kurds in Syria, January 2006, url, p. 2
678 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2018 - Syria, 13 March 2019, url, p. 53
679 Syrian Arab Republic, Legislative Decree No. 49 of 2011, ‫منح الجنسية العربية السورية للمسجلي ف سجالت أجانب الحسكة‬, 2011, url‫ي‬
680 STJ, Syrian Citizenship Disappeared: How the 1962 Census Destroyed Stateless Kurds’ Lives and Identities, 2018, url, pp.
18-20
681 Denmark, DIS, Syria: Military Service, Mandatory Self-Defense Duty and Recruitment to the YPG, 26 February 2015, url,
p. 8
682 Denmark, DIS, Syria: Consequences of illegal exit, consequences of leaving a civil servant position without notice andthe situation of Kurds in Damascus, June 2019, url, p. 9
683 Denmark, DIS, Syria: Consequences of illegal exit, consequences of leaving a civil servant position without notice andthe situation of Kurds in Damascus, June 2019, url, p. 10

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS — 81

In northern Syria, Turkish forces, together with Syrian allied groups, launched an operation entitled‘Operation Olive Branch’ between January and March 2018. The operation resulted in thedisplacement of 137 000 people, including ‘400 Kurdish converts to Christianity, who feared
repression from Islamist factions of the FSA’. Reportedly, the FSA seized or demolished property
belonging to Kurds in Afrin and resettled Sunni Muslim IDPs who came from Eastern Ghouta.684 An
OHCHR report published in June 2018 stated that ‘civilians, particularly ethnic Kurds from Afrin, arebeing targeted for discrimination by the de facto authorities’.685 Human Rights Watch noted thispractice of the FSA, which ‘seized, destroyed, and looted properties of Kurdish civilians in Afrin’.686 The
Financial Times concluded that ‘the aim is to change the demography and dilute the Kurds with a big
influx of Sunni Arabs’.687 Furthermore, HTS used ‘sectarian language to describe the Kurdishdominated People’s Protection Unit (YPG) and SDF’.688
For more information on targeting of Kurds see Chapter 6.

10.5 Druze
MRGI estimated that the Druze make up between 3 and 4 % of Syria’s population.689 In a research
paper published in August 2019 by the European University Institute, the Druze were described as ‘anethnicity that exists both as a tribe and a religious sect’.690 Syria’s Druze are concentrated in the Sweida
governorate to the south-east of Damascus.691 According to MRGI, the majority of the Druze avoided
taking sides in the Syrian conflict, remaining neutral.692 Another source stated that in the wake of theconflict in Syria, the Druze split to three categories: those who supported the Syrian opposition, those
who remained loyalist to the GoS, and those who maintained neutrality; the latter constituted the
majority of the Druze population.693
The Syrian Observer stated that the Druze refused to be conscripted in the SAA and joined local militias
instead. Although GoS turned a blind eye to those militias, the Syrian President called upon Druze men
to join the SAA.694
Since mid-2018, GoS and its allies, Russia and Iran, have been pressuring the Druze to find a solution
to the issue of the tens of thousands of youth who evaded conscription695, either by hiding or migrating
to Lebanon.696
In July 2018, ISIL targeted the Druze community in Sweida governorate with a deadly attack that
resulted in the death of 300 people and the kidnapping of 20 women and 16 children, most of whomwere released later.697 According to Human Rights Watch, one of the kidnapped was executed.698

684 USCIRF, 2019 Annual Report of the US Commission in International Religious Freedom, April 2019, url, p. 108
685 OHCHR, Between a Rock and a Hard Place – Civilians in North-western Syria, June 2018, url, p. 6686 HRW, World Report 2019 - Syria, 17 January 2019, url
687 Financial Times, Syria is witnessing a violent demographic re-engineering, 2 October 2019, url
688 USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report: Syria 2018, 21 June 2019, url, p. 15
689 Minority Rights Group International, Druze, March 2018, url
690 Al-Lababidi, M., The Druze of Sweida: the Return of the Regime Hinges on regional and Local Conflicts, European

University Institute, 28 August 2019, url, p. 1
691 Al-Lababidi, M., The Druze of Sweida: the Return of the Regime Hinges on regional and Local Conflicts, European
University Institute, 28 August 2019, url, p. 2
692 Minority Rights Group International, Druze, March 2018, url
693 Al-Lababidi, M., The Druze of Sweida: the Return of the Regime Hinges on regional and Local Conflicts, European
University Institute, 28 August 2019, url, p. 2
694 Syrian Observer (The), Assad Pressures Syria’s ‘Neutral’ Druze to Join His Conscripts, 15 November 2018, url
695 Al-Lababidi, M., The Druze of Sweida: the Return of the Regime Hinges on regional and Local Conflicts, European
University Institute, 28 August 2019, url, p. 2
696 USCIRF, 2019 Annual Report of the US Commission in International Religious Freedom, April 2019, url, p. 107
697 USCIRF, 2019 Annual Report of the US Commission in International Religious Freedom, April 2019, url, p. 107
698 HRW, World Report 2019 - Syria, 17 January 2019, url

82 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALSThe other location with a Druze presence in Syria is Jabal Al-Summaq in the Idlib Province. According
to Mohannad Hage Ali from the Carnegie Middle East Center, the Druze of Jabal Al-Summaq ‘sufferedpersecution under the then al-Qaeda affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra (Nusra Front) and were forced to fleeen masse as a result’.699 Christopher Kozak of ISW, interviewed by DIS in August 2019 noted that the
Druze residents of Qalb Lawza, Idlib governorate were forcibly converted to Islam by HTS.700 However,
the COI report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands stated that ‘sources report that
religious minorities such as Christians and Druze are treated fairly well by both the authorities andIslamic opposition groups’.701
According to Rami Abdurrahman of SOHR, interviewed by DIS in August 2019 ‘in general minorities
such as Christians, Shia Muslims, Alawites and Druze are not subjected to interrogation or checks at
the checkpoints in Damascus’.702

10.6 Alawites
Alawites numbered an estimated 2.1 million persons. They are located in the coastal part of northwest Syria, while also having sizeable communities in Homs and Hama governorates.703 MRGI notedthat ‘due to their close identification with the Assad regime, the Alawite community as a whole is indanger of violent persecution in post-2011 Syria, regardless of their degree of individual support for
the government’.704
Journalist Sam Dagher argued in an article written for the Atlantic that ‘though the Alawites represent
a small portion of the country overall, they hold key regime positions, dominate the police, and supply
the main fighting forces who have been defending the regime since 2011’.705 According to Elizabeth
Tsurkov, prior to the civil war in Syria, ‘87 percent of high-ranking Syrian Army officers, such as divisioncommanders, were Alawi. The various branches of the Mukhabarat are dominated and commanded
by Alawis, as are all the elite military and militia units’.706 Recruitment to the officer corps has long
favoured Alawites, and during the conflict the selection of recruits for officer training has concentrated
on Alawite-populated governorates such as Latakia and Tartous.707 According to a 2018 report by Aron
Lund, Alawites are overwhelmingly leading the Syrian Armed Forces.708
Moreover, Syria’s Alawites enjoyed a status of immunity due to their presumed loyalty, which
excludes them from torture and detention. Their relationship with the Sunni Syrians is characterisedby fear and distrust, which drives them to ‘support the regime’s minority rule even when it uses force

699 Hage Ali, M., The Weaponization of Minorities in Syria and Beyond, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 9January 2019, url
700 Denmark, DIS, Syria - Access to Damascus Province for Individuals from Former Rebel-held Areas, September 2019, url,
p. 18
701 Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of Origin Information Syria: The Security Situation, July 2019,url, p. 42
702 Denmark, DIS, Syria - Access to Damascus Province for Individuals from Former Rebel-held Areas, September 2019, url,
p. 16
703 MRGI, Alawis, March 2018, url
704 MRGI, Alawis, March 2018, url
705 Dagher, S., The Families who Sacrificed Everything for Assad: Syria’s Alawite community have been a key source of
support for the regime. But even they could turn on him, The Atlantic, 12 April 2018, url
706 Tsurkov, E., Between Regime and Rebels: A Survey of Syria’s Alawi Sect, The New York Reviews of Books, 22 July 2019,url
707 Khaddour, K., Strength in Weakness: The Syrian Army’s Accidental Resilience, Carnegie Middle East Center, 14 March
2016, url
708 Lund, A., Syria’s Civil War: Government Victory or Frozen Conflict?, Swedish Defence Research Agency, December 2018,
url, pp. 42-43

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS — 83

and intimidation to maintain the Syrian state’s nominally secular character’.709 According to Fabrice
Balanche, ‘most Alawites see the war as an existential fight against a Sunni Islamist threat’.710
Fabrice Balanche assessed in a June 2019 interview with DIS that ‘in general, if you are Alawite anduse good connections (Arabic: Wasta), your chance of being employed in public positions is muchhigher than other groups such as Christians, Sunni Arabs or Kurds’.711
Sam Dagher observed that almost every Alawite family was affected by the war; which many Alawites
viewed it as a price paid to preserve the community’s very existence rather than only to save the Assadgovernment. He argued that the war in Syria ‘has empowered many Alawite militia leaders andwarlords who demand more toughness from Assad … [who] needs these people, and knows that any
major rift within his Alawite community could cost him power in the parts of the country he does
control, even with the full support of Iran and Russia’.712
The Alawite minority was targeted by different non-state actors. Islamist groups within the armed
opposition groups destroyed Alawi shrines among other sacred places and monuments.713 Throughout
the conflict Alawite civilians were subjected to summary executions at the hands of anti-government
armed groups, ‘often in retaliation for government attacks on Sunni areas’.714 USDOS reported that
Alawite opposition activists were reportedly targeted by government forces for arbitrary arrest,
torture, detentions and killing.715 HTS continued to use derogatory terms in reference to supportersof the government ‘on the basis of their Alawite religious identity’. Moreover, in February 2018, theanti-GoS group Ahrar Al-Sham launched mortars on ‘the predominantly Alawite populated’ Esh AlWarwar neighbourhood of Damascus, which resulted in the death of at least seven civilians.716
Regarding the treatment of minorities in the Kurdish-controlled areas in north-east Syria, sourcesinterviewed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands in April 2018 and March 2019 notedthat Alawites are at risk ‘of being treated as adversaries’ based on their political affiliation with the
Syrian government rather than their religious affiliation.717
According to confidential sources interviewed in June 2019 by the same source, the Alawite
community has taken heavy casualties during the war, which has in turn led young Alawites to go into
hiding to avoid conscription, as well as to calls that non-Alawites from formerly-held opposition areas
should be sent to the front instead.718
Describing the situation of Alawites living on the Syrian Coast (Latakia and Tartous governorates),
Christopher Kozak noted that the Alawite population has taken a large demographic hit. In someinstances, between 60 % and 70 % of the Alawite young males have either served and were killed orwere wounded in action. Villages, smaller villages in particular, have been emptied of young men, butthere are still young men on the Syrian Coast. It is more the case that every family has someone thathas previously served, is currently serving, or has died fighting in the Syrian Civil War. The young men

709 Tsurkov, E., Between Regime and Rebels: A Survey of Syria’s Alawi Sect, The New York Reviews of Books, 22 July 2019, url
710 Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, Washington Institute of Near East Policy, 2018, url, p. 36
711 Denmark, DIS, Syria: Consequences of illegal exit, consequences of leaving a civil servant position without notice andthe situation of Kurds in Damascus, June 2019, url, p. 15
712 Dagher, S., The families who sacrificed everything for Assad: Syria’s Alawite community have been a key source of
support for the regime. But even they could turn on him, The Atlantic, 12 April 2018, url
713 USCIRF, 2019 Annual Report of the US Commission in International Religious Freedom, April 2019, url, p. 108
714 MRGI, Alawis, March 2018, url
715 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2018 - Syria, 13 March 2019, url, p. 66
716 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syria Arab Republic
A/HRC/39/65, 9 August 2018, url, p. 21
717 Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of Origin Information Syria: The Security Situation, July 2019,url, p. 43
718 Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of Origin Information Syria: The Security Situation, July 2019,url, p. 65

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that are home are either the ones that are not of age yet, have suffered combat injuries, or had otherfactors that have helped them avoid conscription.719

10.7 Christians
Syria’s Christians counted two million prior to the conflict, and the number dropped down to 450 000,with many of them migrating to Europe and the United States.720 As mentioned above, the Christianminority lives in and around the cities of Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Hama, Latakia and in the Hasaka
governorate.721 The Christians that stayed in Syria during the conflict were reported to be ‘heavily
concentrated in government-controlled areas or in the North East’.722 The CoI reported in a March2018 report that most Christians and Druze from Idlib governorate left the area out of fear of being
forced to convert to Islam, follow dress codes or having restricted freedom of movement on
women.723
Numerous sources tackled the targeting of Christians by different actors. According to the Voice ofAmerica, ISIL claimed a suicide attack that targeted a church in Qamishli in July 2019 and which
resulted in 12 casualties at least.724 In November 2019, ISIL claimed responsibility for the killing of an
Armenian Catholic pastor in eastern Deir Ez Zor governorate.725 In 2015, ISIL launched a massive attack
on Hasaka, which forced more than 9 000 Assyrian Christians to flee. According to USCIRF, few of them
returned to their homes, while the fate of 25 Christians abducted by ISIL earlier is still unknown,
including that of five religious leaders.726
Reportedly, HTS engaged in seizing the properties of Christians in its areas of control, especially of
those who fled their homes due to the security situation.727 Fabrice Balanche stated that the towns of
Mahardah and Suqaylabiyah in Hama governorate have been targeted by rebel groups and thataround 20 civilians were killed in Mahardah since May 2019.728 Moreover, despite their significant lossof territory, Al-Qaida affiliated groups in Idlib targeted the predominantly Christian town of Maharda
with missiles in September 2018 killing at least ten civilians and wounding 20.729 According to the NGO
Aid to the Church in Need, in February 2018, rebel groups bombarded the Christian neighbourhoodof Bab Touma in Damascus with mortars.730 Furthermore, in June 2018, the FSA seized a church in
Afrin to use it as a military base and burnt another.731
Reportedly, Syria’s Christians ‘feel threatened by religious intolerance among the opposition as theinfluence of violent extremist groups increased’.732 According to the Morocco-based research centre,
Mominoun Without Borders, Syria’s Christians supported the government because it was perceived
as a guarantor for their security, especially after the ethnic cleansing and the burning of churches in
719 EASO Interview with Christopher Kozak, Institute for the Study of War (ISW), 14 November 2019
720 Hage Ali, M., The Weaponization of Minorities in Syria and Beyond, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 9January 2019, url
721 USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report: Syria 2018, 21 June 2019, url, p. 4
722 Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, Challenges religious minorities face in accessing humanitarianassistance, 14 October 2019, url, p. 14
723 UN Human Rights Council, "I lost my dignity": Sexual and gender-based violence in the Syrian Arab Republic; Conference
room paper of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/37/CRP.3], 8March 2018, url, p. 14
724 VOA, Syrian Christians Targeted Again by Islamic State, 12 July 2019, url
725 Enab Baladi, ISIS claims responsibility for assassination of Armenian Catholic Church pastor in Deir Ezzor, 12 November
2019, url
726 USCIRF, 2019 Annual Report of the US Commission on International Religious Freedom, April 2019, url, p. 107
727 USCIRF, 2019 Annual Report of the US Commission in International Religious Freedom, April 2019, url, p. 108
728 Balanche, F., A Humanitarian Time Bomb in Idlib, Washington Institute of Near East Policy, 28 June 2019, url
729 USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report: Syria 2018, 21 June 2019, url, p. 13
730 Aid to the Church in Need, Syria: When the sky turned black with bombs, 21 February 2018, url
731 USCIRF, 2019 Annual Report of the US Commission on International Religious Freedom, April 2019, url, p. 108
732 USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report: Syria 2018, 21 June 2019, url, p. 16

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Ma’aloula and Qseir at the hands of the ‘armed opposition’.733 According to USDOS, Christians, among
other minorities, stated that ‘the government had their support because it protected them fromviolent Sunni extremists’.734
In the Kurdish-controlled areas, religious and ethnic minorities enjoyed religious freedom and safetyaccording to ‘representatives of religious and ethnic minorities living in the autonomous region’ citedby the USCIRF. The only reported point of dispute among Christians and the Kurdish authorities was
school curriculum, which escalated after the ‘authorities reportedly ordered the closure of up to twodozen Assyrian and Armenian schools, accusing them of having failed to implement an AA[Autonomous Administration]-approved curriculum’.735 USDOS elaborated that 14 Syriac Christians
schools were shut in Qamishli, Hasakah, and Al-Malikiyeh after ‘their refusal to implement a newschool curriculum that required courses to be taught in the Kurdish language’. The Syriac community
accused the SDF ‘of attempting to “erase” Syriac history and culture and imposing a Kurdish nationalist
curriculum’.736
A SNHR report published September 2019 stated that 124 attacks against Christian churches were
document between March 2011 and September 2019, of which 75 were by the GoS forces, 33 by
opposition armed groups, 10 by ISIL, two by HTS and four by other parties.737 According to the report,a large number of those churches were targeted more than once, some by more than one actor. 738
Examples of churches targeted in Syria included:

Greek Orthodox St. George’s Church in Eastern Ghouta on 8 February 2018 – Syrian
government forces.
Monastery of St. Elian in Homs governorate on 19 August 2015 – ISIL.
Latin Church on 25 October 2015, St. Joseph Church on 24 April 2016, St. Demetrius Church
on 2 July 2016, and Church of the Lady of Transition on 16 September 2016, in Aleppo city –Armed opposition.739

10.8 Yazidis
In October 2019, Time magazine stated that the Yazidi minority counted about 550 000 members,
mainly present in Iraq but with a ‘substantial number’ residing in northern Syria.740 MRGI noted that
Yazidi communities were located in the Jabal Sim’an and Afrin valley in the north-west, and a larger
number around Hasaka and Aleppo. Following ISIL attacks on Yazidis in Iraq, the majority of Syrian
Yazidis were estimated to have fled.741
Probably the most major event in which Yazidis were targeted was at the hands of ISIL in 2014, where
thousands of Yazidi women were abducted in Iraq and brought to Syria to be sold as sex slaves, solely
for their religious belief.742 Following the SDF offensive into the last ISIL-held territory in Syria, mass

733 Mominoun without Borders, ‫ هجرة مسيحت العراق و سوريا بي مواقف التشجيع و الرفض‬:‫[انحسار الوجود و فقدان الهوية‬The decline of existence‫ي‬and the loss of identity: the migration of Christians in Iraq and Syria. Between positions of encouragement and rejection],
2 April 2019, url, pp. 16, 24
734 USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report: Syria 2018, 21 June 2019, url, pp. 11-12
735 USCIRF, 2019 Annual Report of the US Commission on International Religious Freedom, April 2019, url, p. 108
736 USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report: Syria 2018, 21 June 2019, url, p. 16
737 SNHR, Targeting Christian Places of Worship in Syria is a Threat to World Heritage: The Syrian Regime Bears Primary
Responsibility for 61% of the Targeting of Christian Places of Worship in Syria, 5 September 2019, url, p. 5
738 SNHR, Targeting Christian Places of Worship in Syria is a Threat to World Heritage: The Syrian Regime Bears Primary
Responsibility for 61% of the Targeting of Christian Places of Worship in Syria, 5 September 2019, url, p. 7
739 SNHR, Targeting Christian Places of Worship in Syria is a Threat to World Heritage: The Syrian Regime Bears Primary
Responsibility for 61% of the Targeting of Christian Places of Worship in Syria, 5 September 2019, url, p. 9-13
740 Time, Yazidis in Iraq and Syria Fear Fresh Persecution After Turkey’s Offensive, 24 October 2019, url
741 MRGI, Syria, March 2018, url
742 USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report: Syria 2018, 21 June 2019, url, p. 15

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graves containing bodies of dozens of people, many considered to be Yazidi women, were found in
Baghouz, Deir Ez-Zor governorate.743
According to the CoI, after the fall of Baghouz in March 2019, a large number of Yazidi women were
found and taken to Al-Hol camp by the SDF, together with ISIL families. Many of these women‘concealed their ethnic and religious identities fearing retaliation by ISIL supporters and threats thatthe group might return’.744 In April 2019, the Yazidi Supreme Spiritual Council issued a declaration
accepting all Yazidi women survivors into their community, but excluding children born to ISIL fighters
as a result of rape.745
Different sources stated that in Afrin region – Aleppo governorate, the Yazidi minority was targetedby local actors. USDOS’s report cited media sources which stated that FSA forces rounded up Yazidis
in the region and forced them to convert to Islam and demolished their places of worship.746 The
destruction of Yazidi places of worship was corroborated by USCIRF747, and by the CoI which addedthat the Yazidi places of worship in Afrin region were looted and underwent destruction ‘in attacks
that appeared to have sectarian undertones’.748
In an undated statement published on the website Yazda.org, Yazidi community leaders including
politicians, academics, and activists condemned the ‘bad treatment of minorities, including Yazidis’ at
the hands of radical groups allied with Turkey. Yazidis alleged that 17 temples and religious sites weredestroyed in Afrin and thousands of Yazidis were displaced.749 In November 2019, it was reported by
local activists in north-east Syria that more than two dozen Yazidi villages were nearly deserted
following the Turkish-led incursion that started in October 2019.750
With regards to the recent Turkish-led incursion in northeastern Syria, the community leaders statedthat more than 50 000 Yazidis used to live in the eastern Euphrates region, and that ‘the current eventsin northeastern Syria, if not halted, will annihilate Yazidis from their ancestral homeland in Syria, which
will affect historical presence of Yazidi in the Middle East, particularly their ancestral homeland in Iraq
and Syria’.751 According to an October 2019 Voice of America article, eight Yazidi villages in northeastern Syria were deserted on the wake of the Turkish incursion.752

743 Reuters, Mass grave found in last Islamic State bastion: SDF, 28 February 2019, url
744 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/42/51], 15 August 2019, url, p. 16
745 Al Jazeera, Yazidis to accept ISIL rape survivors, but not their children, 29 April 2019, url
746 USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report: Syria 2018, 21 June 2019, url, p. 15
747 USCIRF, 2019 Annual Report of the US Commission on International Religious Freedom, April 2019, url, p. 108
748 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/39/65], 9 August 2018, url, p. 7
749 Yazda, Statement by Yazidi community Leaders on Turkish Invasion of NE Syria and targeting of Yazidis, n.d., url
750 New Arab (The), 'Now we await our fate': Displaced Yazidis fear loss of land in Syria, 1 November 2019, url
751 Yazda, Statement by Yazidi community Leaders on Turkish Invasion of NE Syria and targeting of Yazidis, n.d., url
752 Voice of America, Hundreds of Yazidis Displaced Amid Turkey’s Incursion in Northeast Syria, 16 October 2019, url

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11. Palestinians
According to figures provided by United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees(UNRWA) as of January 2018, there were 552 000 registered Palestinian refugees in Syria. They are
registered with UNRWA. Of these, an estimated 438 000 remained in the country. The remainder havefled the country. UNRWA provided services in nine official camps plus three unofficial camps.753

11.1 Legal status of the Palestinian refugees in Syria
ACAPS, a non-profit, non-governmental project which aims at providing independent, humanitarian
analysis, reported in March 2014 that the legal status of Palestinians in Syria generally falls into two
main categories:-

Palestinians who fled to Syria in or before 1956 and their descendants (approximately 85 % of
the total), andPalestinians refugees who fled to Syria after 1956 and their descendants.754

Palestinians who fall into the first category have the same rights as Syrian citizens in terms ofresidence, freedom of movement, work, trade and access to civil service positions and public services,while preserving their Palestinian nationality. Those who fled to Syria in 1956 can only work in the
public sector on short term contracts. Only those who fled in 1948 are required to perform compulsory
military service in the Palestine’s Liberation Army (PLA), a Palestinian unit within the Syrian Armed
Forces. Palestinians cannot vote or hold public office. They are prohibited from owning agriculturalland and are restricted to owning one house per person. They are registered with UNRWA. Those of
the second category were registered with UNRWA in other countries or the occupied Palestinian
Territories and are treated as Arab foreigners. They also have a 10-year renewable residence permit;
have to apply for work permits, cannot work in the public sector; can access public health andeducation services for free, with the exception of university education for which they must pay fees.755
Palestinian refugees in Syria have access to social services provided by GoS. UNRWA does not
administer or police the refugee camps, as this is the responsibility of the host authorities.756

11.2 UNWRA operations and available assistance
In 2018 UNRWA provided emergency cash assistance to 405 644 Palestine refugees and in-kind foodassistance to 395 499. Education was provided to more than 50 500 students, while health care wasmade available through 24 facilities.757
Palestinian refugees in Syria in particular were still vulnerable to displacement, loss of property andthe destruction of their neighbourhoods.758 UNRWA estimated than 90 % of Palestinians in Syria liveon less than USD 2 per person, per day.759

753 UNRWA, 2018, Where We Work, 2018, url
754 ACAPS, Syria Needs Analysis Project, Palestinians from Syria. Syria Needs Analysis Project, March 2014, url, p. 4
755 ACAPS, Syria Needs Analysis Project, Palestinians from Syria. Syria Needs Analysis Project, March 2014, url, pp. 4-5
756 UNRWA, Where We Work, 2018,url

757 UN General Assembly, Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine

Refugees in the Near East. 1 January–31 December 2018, 23 August 2019, url, pp. 13-14
758 UNOCHA, 2019 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, 1 March 2019, url, p. 5
759 UN General Assembly, Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East. 1 January–31 December 2018, 23 August 2019, url, p. 11

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According to UNRWA, around 60 % of Palestinians were displaced at least once since the onset of theconflict. More than 180 000 were estimated to have had their homes severely damaged or destroyed,
as was the case with Yarmouk, Dera’a and Ein el Tal camps that were hosting 30 % of the Palestinian
population in Syria. In 2018, UNRWA reported that the previously inaccessible areas of Yarmouk,
Yalda, Babila and Bayt Saham became accessible, and towards the end of the year, UNRWA was alsoable to access areas in southern Syria, such as Dera’a camp, and resumed the provision of services toPalestinians.760
Earlier figures provided by UNRWA (as of January 2018) revealed that the agency operated 104 schools
with a total of 47 585 students; the Damascus Training Centre; 26 primary health centres; fivecommunity rehabilitation centres, and 13 women's programme centres.761
In a November 2019 report, UNRWA stated that it ‘continues to face a financial crisis that is affecting
its ability to deliver essential services, including humanitarian assistance to Palestine refugees in
Syria’. Only 27.3 % of the 2019 financial requirements for Syria were covered, which has resulted in
the agency scaling down its operations, especially with regards to providing cash assistance, livelihood,and mental health and psychosocial services.762

11.3 Targeting in relation to participation of the Palestinian
community in the armed conflicts
During the initial conflict period, the Palestinian community split between support for the governmentand support for the rebels. The GoS-affiliated Palestinian armed groups such as the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine–General Command (PFLP-GC) sided with the government forces.763 In
Yarmouk, the largest Palestinian camp, the armed Palestinian faction - the Storm Brigades - fought
alongside Syrian rebels in the camp against GoS forces.764 According to Metwaly Abo Naser, aPalestinian journalist and resident of Yarmouk, in some Palestinian communities people of the middle
class, as well as intellectuals, tended to identify themselves with the uprising.765
Following fighting between armed groups on both sides in Yarmouk, the Syrian air force attacked thecamp in December 2012.766 Tom Rollins, a journalist reporting for The New Humanitarian, stated thatrebel control and government control alternated during the subsequent years.767 UNRWA reported
that by 2018, when the government had retaken control of the camp, the vast majority of houses havebeen affected and all basic infrastructure has been destroyed.768 In May 2019, UNRWA issued astatement condemning a rocket attack against a camp for Palestinian refugees near Aleppo which led

760 UN General Assembly, Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine

Refugees in the Near East. 1 January–31 December 2018, 23 August 2019, url, p. 11
761 UNRWA, Where We Work, 2018, url
762 UNRWA, Syria: UNRWA – Humanitarian Snapshot. November 2019, 27 December 2019, url
763 Hall, N., 13 March 2014, Palestinian Refugees and the Siege of Yarmouk, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
13 March 2014, url; Meir, D., The blind spot: Palestinian refugees from Syria in Lebanon. Maximilian Felsch; Martin
Wahlish. Lebanon and the Arab Uprisings: In the Eye of the Hurricane, Routledge, pp. 104-118, 2016, url, p. 7764 Hall, N., 13 March 2014, Palestinian Refugees and the Siege of Yarmouk, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
13 March 2014, url
765 Abo Naser, M. Syrian voices on the Syrian conflict: The plight of Palestinian refugees in Syria in the camps south ofDamascus, NOREF Expert Analysis, January 2017, url, p. 2
766 Meier, D., The Blind Spot: Palestinian Refugees from Syria in Lebanon, 6 December 2018 url, p. 6; Reuters, WRAPUP 1Syrian jets rocket Palestinian camp in Damascus –activists, 16 December 2012, url
767 New Humanitarian (The), Civilians trapped in Yarmouk face “unimaginable” end to siege, 23 April 2018, url
768 UNRWA, Almost all UNRWA installations in Yarmouk and Dera’a camp in Syria severely damaged or destroyed, 1
December 2018, url

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to at least 10 civilians being killed and more than 30 injured. The source did not indicate who was
responsible for the attack.769
The Action Group for Palestinians of Syria (AGPS), a London based human rights group monitoring anddocumenting the situation for Palestinian refugees in Syria, reported in 2019 about Palestinians who
had been abducted earlier in the conflict by GoS forces and were still unaccounted for.770 In November
2019, AGPS reported that it had documented the detention of 1 768 Palestinian refugees, including
108 women and girls, who were secretly held in Syrian government jails, and 327 refugees who hadgone missing in the country.771 The source did not provide information on the reason for their arrestor the period in which it occurred.
AGPS reported in 2019 about torture of Palestinian prisoners in government prisons.772 By October
2019, the AGPS had recorded 608 Palestinian victims of torture in GoS prisons.773
In May 2019, Human Rights Watch mentioned 15 Palestinians who were arrested in various towns in
Rural Damascus governorate, including Babila, Qudsieh and Yalda, whose residents were primarily
Palestinian, after the towns were retaken by government forces. The source noted two among thearrested had signed reconciliation agreements with the government.774
There were reports about arrests and detentions of returning Palestinian refugees. The Middle East
Monitor reported in December 2018 about returning Palestinian refugees who were arrested by GoS
after having returned voluntarily to Damascus. No reason for their arrest was provided.775 In the samemonth, the news outlet Al Modon reported that five Palestinian refugees were arrested after
returning to Damascus on a flight from Iran.776
In December 2018, the Middle East Monitor cited sources who stated that the GoS had arrested
Palestinian refugees who had returned voluntarily from Europe, one of its sources mentioning that‘the Syrian regime had arrested 13 Palestinian refugees’, five of them who were returning from
Europe.777
Journalists and researchers Olivia Macharis and Roger Asfar mentioned in an article published by the
Arab Reform Initiative, a Paris based think tank, that there is a concern among refugees that security
and intelligence in camps were gradually becoming assigned to the PLA. That created fears among
men of conscript age of becoming mandatorily conscripted to military service when they return.778
In November 2019, AGPS reported that 15 members of the PLA were pronounced dead after they had
broken away from their battalion. Several others were tortured to death in GoS jails.779 The source did
not give any specific information about the context in which the deaths had occurred.

769 UNRWA, UNNRWA Condemns the Killing of 10 Civilians in the Palestine Refugee Camp of Neirab in Aleppo, 16 May

2019, url
770 AGPS, Palestinian Refugee Mohamed Awad Forcibly Disappeared by Syrian Government, 16 November 2019 url; AGPS,
Palestinian Family Forcibly Disappeared in Syrian Jails for 6th Year, Action Group for Palestinians of Syria, 17 November 2019,
url
771
AGPS, Palestinian Refugee Mohamed Awad Forcibly Disappeared by Syrian Government, 16 November 2019 url; AGPS,
Palestinian Family Forcibly Disappeared in Syrian Jails for 6th Year, Action Group for Palestinians of Syria, 17 November 2019,url
772 AGPS, Palestinian Refugee Tortured to Death in Syria, Torture Death Toll Hits 608, 5 October 2019 url; AGPS, 8 Palestinians
from Syria Pronounced Dead in October, 13 November 2019, url
773 AGPS, Palestinian Refugee Tortured to Death in Syria, Torture Death Toll Hits 608, 5 October 2019, url
774 HRW, Syria: Detention, Harassment in Retaken Areas, 21 May 2019, url
775 Middle East Monitor, Syria regime arrests returning Palestinian refugees, 18 December 2018, url
776 Al Modon, Palestinians coming back to Damascus taken to Palestine Branch, 20 December 2018, url
777 Middle East Monitor, Syria regime arrests returning Palestinian refugees, 18 December 2018, url
778 Macharis, O. and Asfar, R., Palestinian Refugees of Syria’s Yarmouk Camp: Challenges and Obstacles to Return, Arab
Reform Initiative, 17 January 2019, url
779 AGPS, 15 PLA Fighters Pronounced Dead following Break-Away from Pro-Gov’t Forces, 19 November 2019, url

90 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALSMacharis & Asfar mentioned widespread fear of becoming arrested by the Syrian authorities, a fear
being shared even by Palestinians loyal to GoS. Trust in reconciliation agreements is generally low
among Palestinians opposed to the government. General insecurity and disorder in areas controlled
by pro-government militias has added to the mistrust.780
According to Samar Batrawi, a Palestinian scholar at King’s College, London, the People’s Front for the
Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC), an armed Palestinian faction with close links
to the Syrian government, has acquired a role in policing the refugee camps.781

11.4 Other information on treatment of Palestinians
Refuges have begun to return in a slow flow. UNRWA recorded a threefold increase in returns from
Lebanon and Jordan during the first half of 2019 compared to the first half of 2018. Still, the numbers
remained small with a total of 1 300 returnees as of June 2019.782
The following sources cited legal and socio-economically related obstacles to returning, as well as
entry restrictions. According to Erwin van Veen, a senior research fellow at Clingendael, theNetherlands Institute of International Relations, Law No 10 that was adopted in 2018 requires all
Syrians to register their private properties by providing proof of ownership, within a two months
period from the law was adopted. Those who do not comply risk that the Syrian state will takepossession of their properties.783
Macharis & Asfar mentioned the scale of destruction in Yarmouk having led many to believe that it
was the intention of the GoS to prevent former residents from returning and to ultimately dispossessthem of their properties.784 According to a displaced inhabitant of Yarmouk who spoke to the news
commentary Middle East Eye, ‘many displaced from the camp had been told that they will lose theirhomes for good because of Law 10, while others said that ‘they believed the law was being used topunish those who had supported the opposition.785 It was not clear whether Law No 10 will be appliedin Yarmouk, where as of January 2019 the authorities had only adopted a new urban plan for thecamp.786
Concerning Yarmouk camp, Macharis and Asfar reported that entry restrictions have been imposed;that one is not allowed to rebuild or resettle there; and that a general lack of livelihood due to few
jobs and high living costs is keeping former inhabitants away.787 The AGPS group reported in 2019 thatcivilian Palestinian refugees were denied access to their homes in the camp, while military officers andtheir families who used to live in the camp were allowed to re-enter and retrieve their homes andproperties.788 Christopher Kozak stated in a November 2019 interview with EASO that residents are

780 Macharis, O. and Asfar, R., Palestinian Refugees of Syria’s Yarmouk Camp: Challenges and Obstacles to Return, Arab

Reform Initiative, 17 January 2019, url
781 Batrawi, S., Palestinians and the Syrian War: Between Neutrality and Dissent, Al-Shabaka – the Palestinian Policy
Network, 29 January 2017, url
782 UNRWA, Syria: UNRWA – Progress Highlights. January-June 2019, June 2019, url
783 Van Veen, Creating a New Syria: Property, Dispossession, and Regime Survival, Syria Comment [blog], 15 April 2018, url
784 Macharis, O. and Asfar, R., Palestinian Refugees of Syria’s Yarmouk Camp: Challenges and Obstacles to Return, Arab
Reform Initiative, 17 January 2019, url; the Syrian government’s controversial programme allowing local authorities to takepossession of properties in the areas worst affected by the war’; Middle East Eye, 'No way back': The law that stops
displaced Syrians from ever going home, 8 April 2019, url
785 Middle East Eye, 'No way back': The law that stops displaced Syrians from ever going home, 8 April 2019, url
786 Macharis, O. and Asfar, R., Palestinian Refugees of Syria’s Yarmouk Camp: Challenges and Obstacles to Return, Arab
Reform Initiative, 17 January 2019, url
787 Macharis, O. and Asfar, R., Palestinian Refugees of Syria’s Yarmouk Camp: Challenges and Obstacles to Return, Arab
Reform Initiative, 17 January 2019, url
788 AGPS, Displaced Families Denied Return to Yarmouk Camp, Gov’t Officers Allowed In, 8 July 2019, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS — 91

not allowed to go back to Yarmouk Camp. The area is still a military zone and residents need to apply
for a day pass to get back and see their properties.789

789 EASO Interview with Christopher Kozak, Institute for the Study of War (ISW), 14 November 2019

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12. Children
The CoI stated in a report covering the period from September 2011 to the end of October 2019 that‘children’s right to life has been blatantly denied by all parties to the conflict’, further noting that avery large number of children were killed, maimed and injured.790
A June 2019 report by the Secretary General to the UN General Assembly stated that throughout 2018‘air strikes, barrel bombs and cluster munitions resulted in 1,854 child casualties’.791 The actors
responsible were according to the UN: the Syrian government forces (148), pro-government forces(96), ISIL (70), FSA-branded groups affiliated with the Olive Branch incursion (54), HTS (25), YPG/YPJ(10), Army of Islam (7), the international coalition against ISIL (4), Ahrar al-Sham (2) and unidentified
armed elements (550). Most child casualties occurred in Idlib, Rural Damascus and Aleppo
governorates.792

12.1 Child recruitment by government armed forces and otherarmed groups
The CoI stated in a report covering the period from September 2011 to the end of October 2019 that‘children, most frequently boys, but also on occasion girls, have been used in hostilities by parties tothe conflict for combat roles, to acts as spies, informants, or to serve at checkpoints, in violation ofinternational humanitarian law. Children have been forcibly recruited, enlisted or lured into violenceout of economic instability or grief, after witnessing violent acts inflicted on their loved ones bybelligerent parties’.793
In a June 2019 report by the Secretary General to the UN General Assembly it was reported that bothstate forces (including NDF and pro-government militias794) and non-state armed groups as
responsible for recruiting minors to their forces. During the reporting period January to December
2018, the UN verified a total of 806 children recruited, of which 670 were boys and 136 were girls.
22 % (179) of the total were under 15 years of age. 94 % (754) of the total had been used in combat
roles. The non-state groups that the report mentioned were Ahrar al Sham, groups affiliated with theFree Syrian Army (FSA), ISIL, Army of Islam, HTS, YPG, and Nur al-Din al-Zanki. The numbers of childrenthat reportedly have been recruited by these groups are listed below:-

YPG/YPJ (the women’s units of the YPG) (313)
HTS (187)
groups self-affiliated with the FSA (170)
Ahrar al-Sham (34)
ISIL (30)
Army of Islam (17)
Nur al-Din al-Zanki (16)790 UN Human Rights Council, “They have erased the dreams of my children”: children’s rights in the Syrian Arab Republic.

Conference Room Paper of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
January 2020, url, p. 7
791 UN Secretary General, Report by the Secretary General to the UN General Assembly, Children and armed conflict, 20
June 2019, url, p. 2
792 UN Secretary General, Report by the Secretary General to the UN General Assembly, Children and armed conflict, 20
June 2019, url, p. 27
793 UN Human Rights Council, “They have erased the dreams of my children”: children’s rights in the Syrian Arab Republic.
Conference Room Paper of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
January 2020, url, p. 10794 UN Secretary General, Report by the Secretary General to the UN General Assembly, Children and armed conflict, 20
June 2019, url, p. 41

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS — 93-

Syrian Government forces (10)unidentified armed elements (29).795

The majority of cases the UN had verified were in Idlib, Aleppo and Raqqa, and that at least 25
recorded child casualties resulted from combat.796
In 2017, seven groups self-affiliated with the FSA signed the Geneva Call, and NGO initiative to protect
children from the effects of armed conflict, intended to prohibit them from recruiting children.797
As long as ISIL held territory in Syria, it conducted child recruitment at a wider scale and in a differentmode than other armed groups. In a report about ISIL’s child recruitment published by King’s College,
London, analyst Gina Vale noted that during its rule ISIL claimed to have used 1 350 primary andsecondary schools for recruitment purposes and subjected over 100 000 male and female students to
its ideological curriculum. The analyst also stated that ISIL was conducting kidnappings partly fromorphanages, schools and family homes.798
The most prevalent actor that Christopher Kozak pointed to as recruiting children had been oppositiongroups, particularly the SNA, suggesting the explanation that they are often based on a more local
level built on a framework that started as village militias. Children were used as anything from supply
runners to active combatants in Idlib governorate and northern Aleppo governorate, Kozak said. With
the HTS and its affiliates, Kozak said less child recruitment had been seen, although it has been visible
in some other affiliated groups like the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) and other ethnic specific Al Qaeda
affiliates in north-west Syria where fighting becomes a communal activity. Kozak stressed that this did
not mean that the HTS was not using child fighters, he rather expected that they were, but it was lessvisible than among the SNA and ethnic Al Qaeda affiliates.799
Regarding pro-government forces, Kozak did not have any recent information but stated that there
has always been a problem with youths, particularly youths close but not quite of eligible age forconscription, who had been conscripted anyway.800 While in general sources interviewed by FIS were
not aware of child recruitment in the SAA, government-affiliated armed groups are said to have had
minors among their ranks, albeit ostensibly on a voluntary basis.801
Sources interviewed in a 2019 report by the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) mentioned that girls wereat risk of recruitment to armed groups. The source remarked that this was unlike prior years ofreporting by the organisation.802 It was noted in the report to the UN Security Council that out of themore than 40 % of the children recruited by the YPG/YPJ, 126 were girls, 20 of whom were below theage of 15 and 119 of whom served in combat roles.803
In June 2019, the SDF signed an action plan with the UN through which it committed itself to end andprevent the recruitment and use of children, and to identify and separate boys and girls it had within
its ranks.804

795 UN Secretary General, Report by the Secretary General to the UN General Assembly, Children and armed conflict, 20

June 2019, url, p. 27
796 UN Secretary General, Report by the Secretary General to the UN General Assembly, Children and armed conflict, 20
June 2019, url, pp. 27, 41
797 UN Security Council, Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict, Conclusions on children and armed conflict in the
Syrian Arab Republic, 18 July 2019, url, p. 3
798 ICSR, Cubs in the Lion’s Den: Indoctrination and Recruitment of Children Within Islamic State Territory, King’s College
London, 2018, url, pp. 3, 17
799 EASO Interview with Christopher Kozak, Institute for the Study of War (ISW), 14 November 2019
800 EASO Interview with Christopher Kozak, Institute for the Study of War (ISW), 14 November 2019
801 Finland, FIS, Fact-Finding Mission to Beirut and Damascus, 14 December 2018, url, p. 6
802 UNPFA, Voices from Syria 2019, 10 March 2019, url, p. 46
803 UN Secretary General, Report by the Secretary General to the UN General Assembly, Children and armed conflict, 20 June
2019, url, p. 27
804 UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, 1 July 2019, url

94 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALSFor detailed information on child recruitment by the SDF/YPG see also Section 4.3 Recruitment ofchildren.

12.2 Child labour
According to a study that the International Labour Organization (ILO) published in 2012, children who
worked outside of their homes and not resided together with their family became exposed to
exploitation by gangs or to joining gangs, to smoking and drug abuse, and to health hazards stemmingfrom handling dangerous equipment. Spending most of their day outside their home many working
children returned home alone after dark, exposing them to harassment such as sexual harassment.805
In an assessment of communities carried out by the UN and its humanitarian partners in 2019, it was
found that 85 % of the assessed communities reported ‘high occurrence’ of child labour thatprevented school attendance. The assessment did not specify which communities were assessed nor
any further estimate of the extent of the child labour.806
The World Food Program (WFP) reported in 2019 that child labour was a major coping strategy amongfemale headed households in conflict affected areas, but did not specify how widespread it was.807
The CoI noted in an August 2019 report that child labour was used as a negative coping mechanism toalleviate financial constraints.808
UNOCHA stated that 8 % of 2 887 households surveyed in Rukban IDP camp on the border to Jordan
indicated that they had resorted to child labour as a coping strategy to meet their basic needs.809 A
June 2019 report by UNOCHA covering north-west Syria stated that households experiencing multiple
displacement became exposed to an increased threat of resorting to child labour.810
UNOCHA’s rapid needs assessment in July 2019 stated that 51 % of key informants indicated that childlabour was occurring in communities across northern Idlib, likely exposing children there to abuse andexploitation. It also stated that boys were at greater risk of becoming subject to labouring than girls. 811

12.3 Access to education
The CoI stated that ‘children’s right to education was denied by all parties to the conflict’. Schools
were used for military purposes and repeatedly attacked by armed actors, including GoS forces, nonstate armed groups and terrorist organisations, which led to scores of child casualties.812
Sources from the World Bank interviewed by the International Crisis Group in July 2019 stated that‘around 40 % of educational facilities have been damaged, destroyed or occupied (used as shelters forthe displaced or confiscated by conflict parties)’.813 UNOCHA’s 2019 Humanitarian Needs Overview

805 ILO, National Study on Worst Forms of Child Labour in Syria, March 2012, url, pp. 93, 114-116
806 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019. Syrian Arab Republic, 1 March 2019, url, p. 2
807 FAO, Special Report – FAO/WFP Crop and food security assessment mission to the Syrian Arab Republic, 5 September

2019, url, p. 60
808 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
15 August 2019, url, p. 4
809 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic Rukban Humanitarian Update, 25 September 2019, url
810 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic Recent Developments in Northwestern Syria, Situation Report No. 6, 28 June 2019, url, p.
6
811 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, Recent Developments in Northwestern Syria Situation Report No. 8, 26 July 2019, url,
pp. 2-3, 7
812 UN Human Rights Council, “They have erased the dreams of my children”: children’s rights in the Syrian Arab Republic.
Conference Room Paper of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
January 2020, url, pp. 7, 13
813 International Crisis Group, Ways out of Europe’s Syria Reconstruction Conundrum, 25 November 2019, url, p. 3

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS — 95

assessed that 2.1 million children were out of school. Another 1.3 million children were at risk ofdropping out and one in three schools were damaged or destroyed.814
Attacks on schools were reported in 2019 by the UN Secretary General to have had a devastating
effect on the access to education. The report cited a total of 113 attacks on schools in Syria in 2018, a
69 % increase as compared to 2017. Of these attacks, 60 were attributed to the GoS air force, 24 were
attributed to government ground forces, 12 to pro-government militias, 2 to ISIL, 2 to YPG/YPJ, one to
HTS, and 12 to unidentified elements. 96 child casualties resulted from attacks on schools. Some
education personnel were killed, some detained.815
According to a study published in 2019 by the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and WFP,
‘many households have reported that children find it difficult to go back to school after years ofinterruption with households’ high need for income’. Many children were not motivated to continue
their studies but preferred to stay in work.816 UNOCHA reported that in Idlib governorate a total of
400 000 students from grades 1 to 12 were affected due to the cancellation of their final exams endue
to take place between April and June 2019.817
As for the country as a whole, the UN claimed that 24 schools were used as ammunition storage,
military bases and as detention facilities. 14 of the schools were used by YPG/YPJ, seven by groups
self-affiliated with FSA and Turkey’s Operation ‘Olive Branch’ in north-western Syria, two by HTS andone by ISIL. Three schools were attacked following the military use of them.818 There was no
information about the location of the three schools. On 31 August 2019, a school was hit directly andwas put out of service in Ma’arrat An Nu’man in Idlib governorate.819
UNOCHA reported in September 2019 that in north-western Syria alone, 59 individual schools weredamaged by the violence since late April 2019, and that less than a half of the 650 000 school aged
children in that part of the country could be accommodated in the remaining functioning schools.
UNOCHA’s report further stated that 150 000 school-aged children in north-western Syria were in
immediate need of educational services and that only half of the approximately 1 200 schools in thatpart of the country were functional.820
Save the Children reported in September 2019 that 87 educational facilities in north-west Syria weredamaged or impacted by fighting, 353 out of the 1 193 schools abandoned, while 205 were being used
as collective shelters. Parents were pledging teachers to close schools so their children would not be
attacked. Save the Children estimated that over 300 000 children, approximately half of the school
aged population of Idlib, was impacted.821
Around 98 % of communities assessed by UNOCHA in north-western Syria for a July 2019 report statedthat IDP children would be facing problems in accessing education, and 97 % of the communities
reported the same for children living in northern Idlib.822 In arrival locations, absorption capacity was

814 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019. Syrian Arab Republic, 1 March 2019, url, p. 7
815 UN Security Council, Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict, Conclusions on children and armed conflict in the

Syrian Arab Republic, 18 July 2019, url, pp. 27-28
816 FAO, Special Report – FAO/WFP crop and food security assessment mission to the Syrian Arab Republic, 5 September
2019, url, p. 60
817 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, Situation Report 1: Recent Developments in North-western Syria as of 10 May 2019, url,
pp. 1-2
818 UN General Assembly, Report by the Secretary General. Children and armed conflict, 20 June 2019, url, p. 28
819 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic Recent Developments in Northwestern Syria Situation Report No. 11, 6 September 2019,url, p. 4
820 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic Recent Developments in Northwestern Syria Situation Report No. 11, 6 September 2019,url, pp. 2-3
821 Save the Children, More than half of children in Idlib, Syria could miss out on school this year, 4 September 2019, url,
p. 2
822 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, Recent Developments in Northwestern Syria Situation Report No. 8, 26 July 2019, url, p.
3

96 —

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

overstretched for both IDP and host communities.823 A total of 94 schools were used as shelters by
IDPs due to violence in Idlib. Another 47 schools were damaged or otherwise affected as the result ofairstrikes and shelling since the beginning of May 2019 in southern Idlib and northern Hama.824
Schools were affected by hostilities in north-east Syria. The UN verified two incidents that took placein October and November 2019 in which schools in Raqqa governorate were damaged by rockets andcrossfire, respectively.825 UNICEF reported that a school in north-eastern Syria came under attack in
October 2019, during the Turkish-led incursion.826

12.4 Lack of documentation and risk of statelessness
The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child remarked in January 2019 that the lack of identity
documentation was particularly critical in the areas out of the control of the GoS, where 25 % ofadolescents did not have identity cards and a quarter of new-borns had not been registered since thebeginning of the conflict. The lack of identity documentation ‘equated to a lack of legal status of thechild and impeded access to all services – health, education and humanitarian assistance’.827
Sources interviewed by Landinfo in 2017 stated that outside of GoS-controlled areas, civil status
offices have either stopped to function or they operate outside the control of the government.828
Christopher Kozak of ISW observed that in recaptured areas the GoS has not given special priority tore-establishing the civil registration system. Kozak noted that the government had opened a civil
registry office in Eastern Ghouta within a few months preceding November. What was problematicfor the citizens, according to Kozak, was that they still had to go into Damascus to make any
registration, and in order to get through the checkpoints they also needed registration documents.
Kozak added that he believed that the government had recently opened a courthouse, a branch of theDamascus Court, to process some registration paperwork in Eastern Ghouta. He also remarked that insouthern Syria there is a similar absence of the state.
Kozak could not observe if GoS has devoted any special resources to recording births in oppositionheld areas or transferring registrations from opposition governance bodies. The government’s policy
was generally to reject opposition education records and civil registration records. Individuals werethus forced to redo everything through the government. The government has not followed up that
rejection with governance efforts to establish offices to process these records. Many individuals fromformer opposition-held areas are thus left in legal limbo. Their current records are not recognised, butthey are unable to get new ones, Kozak stated.829
According to a confidential source consulted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands in
2019, Syrians living in opposition-held areas can obtain birth documents at the central civil registry
office in Damascus, but they met various obstacles in attempting to do so. The source mentioned
obstacles such as having to cross the front line with the associated risks involved; the risk of being

823 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, Recent Developments in Northwestern Syria Situation Report No. 11 – as of 6 September

2019, url, p. 4
824 UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, Recent Developments in Northwestern Syria Situation Report No. 8, 26 July 2019, url,
p. 4
825 UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018) and 2449 (2018); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2019/949], 16
December 2019, url, p. 6
826 UNICEF, Nearly 70,000 children displaced as violence escalates in northeast Syria, Statement by UNICEF Executive
Director Henrietta Fore, 14 October 2019, url
827 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Committee on the Rights of the Child reviews the situation of Children in
Syria, 16 January 2019, url
828 Norway, Landinfo, Temanotat Syria: Identitetsdokumenter og pass [Report on ID documents and passports], 3 July 2017,
pp. 18-19, url
829 EASO Interview with Christopher Kozak, Institute for the Study of War (ISW), 14 November 2019

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS — 97

arrested by pro-government forces after having entered a government-controlled area; men of
conscription age running the specific risk of being arrested at government check points for evading
military service, and women risking to become sexually assaulted at checkpoints.
Another confidential source mentioned that Syrians in opposition-held areas may choose to give athird person in GoS-controlled area authorisation to apply and obtain a birth certificate, or use‘intermediaries’ to obtain a birth certificate illegally ‘by means of bribery and a smuggling network’.830
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) noted that ‘although women
have the same rights as men to register the births of their children, nationality is only transferred fromthe father and mothers therefore must struggle to register the births of their infants’.831 For children
born out of wedlock, to parents in inter-faith marriages and those born to incidents of sexual violence
the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child noted that they encountered difficulties in obtaining
birth certificates.832
In a March 2019 report, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has called upon the GoS to
amend legislation in order to remedy the obstacles to registering and gaining access to birth
registration documents for the profiles mentioned, and to consider recognising documents issued
locally by mukhtars or sheikhs.833

830 Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of Origin Information Report: Syria Documents, December 2019,url, p. 35
831 OECD Development Centre, Social Institutions and Gender Index. Syrian Arab Republic, 2019, url, p. 8
832 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Committee on the Rights of the Child reviews the situation of Children in
Syria, 16 January 2019, url
833 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of the Syrian Arab Republic,
6 March 2019, url, p. 6

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13. LGBTI
13.1 Legal framework
The Syrian legislation makes same-sex activities punishable by law as stipulated in the Penal Code of1949834 in Book Two under ‘morality and public morals’.835 Article 520 states: ‘any sexual intercourse
against the order of nature can be punished with up to three years of imprisonment’ [informaltranslation].836
Article 517 of the Penal Code states: 'Violation' of public decency in one of the means mentioned in
Article 208 is punishable with imprisonment from three months to three years’ [informal translation].
Article 208 of the Syrian Penal Code provides a definition for ‘public indecencies’ as follows [informaltranslation]:‘Considered as means for publicity:
1. Actions and movements if they took place in a public space (sphere), or a space accessible forthe public or visible, or if observed by outsiders/third parties due to the fault of the person
carrying them [actions and movements] out.
2. Speech or shouting whether uttered openly or transmitted by mechanical means whereby
they [the speech or shouting] are heard by third parties.
3. Writings, paintings, pictures (whether manual or solar [taken by camera], videos, signs, andall kinds of photography if displayed in public or in a space that is accessible for public orvisible, or if sold or presented for sale, or if distributed to one person or more’. 837
The International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA) interprets this text as ‘any act carried out in a
public or open area where one could possibly see, intentionally or accidentally, the act’.838 The law
makes no explicit reference to same-sex marriage.
According to the Rights in Exile Programme, the legal status of same-sex activity between women is‘unclear’.839
In 2018, it was reported that the GoS allowed an intersex person to change the gender and register a
new gender status on official documents.840

13.2 State protection
Anti-discrimination laws have not been established and hence there is no legal protection of LGBTI
people in Syria.
Recent reliable information on the enforcement of laws regarding LGBTI persons is available but
limited. According to GlobalGayz.com ‘instances of persecution are limited to nonexistent’ and ‘thelaw is de-facto suspended.’ Yet the same source mentions a leverage for mistreatment by Syrian

834 Syrian Arab Republic, Syrian Penal Code, 1949, url, no English translation available
835 Syrian Arab Republic, Syrian Penal Code, 1949, url. Information on the interpretation of the legal texts can be found in

HRW, LGBT Rights, n.d., url
836 Syrian Arab Republic, Syrian Penal Code, 1949, url; Information on the interpretation of the legal texts can be found in
HRW, LGBT Rights, n.d., url; ILGA, State-Sponsored Homophobia, 2019, url, p. 475; HRW, Annexe: Lois interdisant lecomportement homosexuel et l’expression du genre, April 2018, url, p. 82
837 Syrian Arab Republic, Syrian Penal Code, 1949, url, no English translation available
838 ILGA, State-Sponsored Homophobia, 2019, url, p. 475
839 Rights in Exile Programme, Syrian Arab Republic LGBTI resources, n.d., url
840 New Arab (The), Syria allows intersex person to register new gender status for first time, 10 February 2018, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS — 99

authorities towards LGTBI persons: ‘[…] the Syrian authorities can use individuals’ sexual orientation
to blackmail, harass and eventually abuse members of the LGBT community. Law enforcement officers
have zero tolerance toward the LGBT community’.841
The CoI noted in an August 2019 report that it was conducting an ongoing investigation into rape andsexual violence perpetrated in government-held areas against different profiles, including LGBTI.842
USDOS wrote that there were no reports of prosecutions of same-sexual conduct in 2018. However,in previous years police used legal charges to prosecute LGBTI persons. Furthermore, LGBTI individuals
have also been charged on the basis of drug abuse or social value abuse. According to local NGOs citedby USDOS, the GoS and its armed forces have detained, arrested, tortured, and killed individuals under
the pretext of accusing them of homosexual activities. There was no information available on thefrequency such incidents.843
ILGA described the human rights situation of homosexuals in Syria, stating that the country remained
a dangerous place for same-sex orientated people. Targeting by authorities took place before the civil
war began in 2011, and during the conflict that ensued. Cases of LGBTI persons who were subjected
to rape, beating, detention and torture at government checkpoints due to their sexual orientation
occurred during 2011 and 2016.844 Denial of equal opportunities to education and employment, as
well as societal stigmatisation were also mentioned as problems for LGBTI in a 2016 submission to the2016 Universal Periodic Review by the NGO-umbrella Alliance for Writing and Advocating Syrian UPR
Report.845
In a 2014 report, the CoI reported that ‘men were tortured and raped on the grounds of their sexual
orientation at government checkpoints in Damascus’.846
A 2014 report by All Survivors Project stated that:‘UN investigators and human rights organisations have documented serious human rights
violations against LGBT+ persons that are specifically related to the conflict, including cases ofsummary execution, arbitrary detention, torture, rape and other forms of sexual violence, as
well as harassment, discrimination and exploitation of men and women because of theirsexual orientation and gender identity, both by Syrian government security forces and nonstate armed groups’.847

13.3 Treatment by non-state armed groups
Sources reported that the ISIL and al-Nusra [HTS] abducted, tortured and killed ‘persons assumed or
perceived as gay’.848 USDOS wrote in its 2018 report that ‘the terrorist groups ISIS and HTS regularly
detained, tortured and killed LGBTI individuals in the territories they controlled’.849 The Independent
reported in 2017 on mistreatment and discrimination of LGTBI people and stating that ‘ISIS has

841 GlobalGAYZ.com, Syria, Middle East, n.d., url
842 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic[A/HRC/42/51], 15 August 2019, url, p. 17
843 USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 - Syria, 13 March 2019, url, p. 66
844 ILGA, State-Sponsored Homophobia, 2019, url, p. 475
845 Alliance for Writing and Advocating Syrian Universal Periodic Review Report, PHRO Joint Submission, 2016, url, p. 5
846 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
A/HRC/25/65, 12 February 2014, url, p. 12
847 All Survivors Project, “Destroy me from within”, 6 September 2018, url, pp. 21-22; HRW, The Double Threat for Gay Men
in Syria, April 2014, url
848 ILGA, State-Sponsored Homophobia, 2019, url, p. 476; The Sydney Morning Herald, 'It can't get any worse than being
gay in Syria today', 15 October 2015, url; Counter Extremism Project, ISIS Persecution of Gay People, 17 May 2017, url, p.
8849 USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 - Syria, 13 March 2019, url, p. 67

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brutally persecuted LGBT people for several years and considers being gay to be a crime punishable
by death’.850
A Turkish lawyer working on LGBTI rights interviewed for a 2018 report by All Survivors Project, statedthat in Syria LGTI persons are the ‘target of every group’. The report mentions the vulnerability of
LGBTI persons to blackmailing, including for sex. The source mentioned incidents of sexual violenceagainst a boy and a transgender women, perpetrated by ISIL and anti-GoS armed groups.851 Several
articles and reports noted the mistreatment LGBTI persons by ISIL between 2014 and 2017.852
The Rights in Exile Programme quoted the Syrian editor of GayMiddleEast.com to have said in June
2011: ‘[…] we still are afraid to be stopped by secret police and be humiliated’. The source further
stated: ‘It has been very dangerous to form any kind of gathering in Syria since the spark of theprotests […] Some pro-regime LGBT people have been threatening anti-regime gay people to expose
them to authorities and deliver their names to the secret police. They have been using online gay
dating sites to contact people and threaten them’.853

13.4 Societal discrimination
In interviews with Human Rights Watch conducted in October-November 2018, Syrian transgenderpersons claimed that they experienced threats, harassment and violence at the hands of family
members because of their gender identity.854 A Syrian transgender refugee in Berlin reflected on thetreatment of transgender people inside Syria stating that ‘in society, not only in Syria but in the Arabworld generally, one does not look kindly on homosexuals or transgender people’.855
In 2011, a homosexual author published an account on the website PinkNews explaining the type of
discrimination LGTBI people could possibly face in Syria:‘The plight of LGBT people in Syria starts with law criminalising homosexuality and goes
through the religious and social homophobia and beyond. I know gay men who have been
shot and tortured, while humiliation includes being tied down to be urinated on by family
members. Videos from police humiliations of gay men are passed around as jokes on mobile
phones, offensive words for “gay” and “lesbian” are still used widely even among the mostopen-minded people, homophobic jokes never fail to amuse people and everyone damns andcurses homosexuals whenever they are mentioned’.856
A homosexual interviewed in 2019 in northern Syria, stated that he fled to Idlib after he was forced
into marriage by his family.857 LGBTI persons were reported to be victims of ‘honour’ killings.858
Lesbianism is ‘less acknowledged’ than sexual activity between men. This might be due to women’s
general ‘restricted’ status within the Syrian society, ‘regardless of their sexuality’.859 A Syrian lesbian

850 Independent (The), ‘The Queer Insurrection’: Coalition forces fighting Isis in Syria form first LGBT unit, 25 July 2017, url
851 All Survivors Project, “Destroy me from within”, 6 September 2018, url, pp. 21-22
852 AFP, ISIS stones 2 ‘gay men’ to death in Syria: observer, 25 November 2014, url; Advocate, Reports: ISIS Executes Two

Gay Men In First Antigay Attacks, 30 November 2014, url; Human Dignity Trust, Syria, n.d., url; UN Human Rights Council,
Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 31 January 2019, url, p.12,
BuzzFeed News, Two Gay Men Who Fled ISIS Just Made U.N. History, 24 August 2015, url; Iraqi News, ISIS executes 4 forhomosexuality and sodomy in Mosul, 21 August 2016, url; Counter Extremism Project, ISIS Persecution of Gay people, May
2017, url
853 Rights in Exile Programme, Syrian Arab Republic LGBTI Resources, n.d., url
854 HRW, Don’t Punish me for Who I am, 3 September 2019, url, pp. 9-11
855 AFP, I will be a true women, says transgender Syrian Katia after finding safe haven in Berlin, 29 July 2018, url
856 Pink News, Comment: What life is really like for gay Syrians, 16 June 2011, url,
857 Raseef22, Sick or Bewitched: the Life of Three Homosexuals in Idlib, Syria, 19 August 2019, url
858 HRGJ Clinic, City University of New York School of Law, 26th Session of the UPR Working Group of the Human Rights
Council, Human Rights Violations Against Women and Girls in Syria, 25 July 2016, url, p. 3
859 Rights in Exile Programme, Syrian Arab Republic LGBTI Resources, n.d., url

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stated in 2011 for a PinkNews article that ‘no matter how you think it is hard for gays, it is even harderfor lesbians, be sure of it’.860 Deutsche Welle (DW) noted in 2012, quoting a Lebanese gay singer in
Syria: ‘Hassino says that while gay men in Syria face harassment, lesbians face even more difficulties.’
The singer referred to lesbians being forced into heterosexual marriages.861

13.5 Organisations
In their 2018 report, USDOS noted that no knowledge of the existence of any specific LGBTI
organisations was available. However, several online communities seem to exist ‘including an online
LGBTI-orientated magazine’.862 Furthermore, Facebook sites connected to LGBTI issues exist.863

860 Pink News, Comment: What life is really like for gay Syrians, 16 June 2011, url
861 DW, Gays join the Syrian uprising, 7 September 2012, url
862 USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2018 - Syria, 13 March 2019, url, p. 66
863 See for example the Facebook pages url, accessed 18 November 2019102 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT ON SYRIA: TARGETING OF INDIVIDUALS

Annex I: Bibliography
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Christopher Kozak is the Editor and Senior Analyst at the Institute for the Study of War where hefocuses on Syria with an emphasis on the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and its foreign
supporters, including Russia and Iran. Kozak is the author of An Army in All Corners: Assad’s Campaign
Strategy in Syria and has published numerous articles on the Syrian Civil War. He has also been invited
to provide briefings to political leaders, military officers and intelligence officials from the U.S. and its
foreign allies. He studied Arabic at the University of Amman in Jordan and received a B.S. in Political
Science and International Studies (Global Security) from the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 2014.

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Annex II: Terms of Reference
The report should aim to cover the situation of targeted individuals in Syria including, aiming to cover
the following research topics:
 Targeting of individuals and treatment by main actors
a. Who is targeted, by which actor, how, what is their treatment, why does targeting
occur, when has targeting happenedb. Possibility to access redress and protection and/or avoid or escape targeting

Research should aim to consider the main profiles: Persons perceived to be opposing the government Persons fearing recruitment by the government armed forces and/or repercussions as militarydraft evaders and deserters from the armed forces Persons perceived to be opposing the SDF/YPG Persons fearing (forced) recruitment by Kurdish forces in areas under their influence Persons perceived to be supporting the government and/or opposing anti-government armed
groups Members of and persons perceived to be collaborating with SDF/YPG Journalists and other media professionals and bloggers
 Human rights activists
 Doctors and other medical professionals
 Members of specific ethnic and religious groups
 Palestinians
 Children
 LGBTI persons

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doi: 10.2847/683510