European Asylum Support OfficeIraq
Key socio-economic
indicators
For Baghdad, Basra and Erbil

Country of Origin Information Report

September 2020
SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION

European Asylum Support OfficeIraq
Key socio-economic
indicators
For Baghdad, Basra and Erbil

Country of Origin Information Report

September 2020

More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu).

ISBN: 978-92-9485-646-3

doi: 10.2847/63636

BZ-02-20-561-EN-N© European Asylum Support Office (EASO) 2020
Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged, unless otherwise stated.
For third-party materials reproduced in this publication, reference is made to the copyrightstatements of the respective third parties.

Cover photo©: David Roberto (iStock), 1174348812: Baghdad, Iraq - July 6, 2019: Many shops
on the street, 15 September 2019, https://www.istockphoto.com/photo/amazing-iraqculture-gm1174348812-326567507

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS— 3

Acknowledgements
This report was drafted by the EASO COI sector. The following national asylum and migration
departments and organisations have contributed by reviewing this report:
ACCORD, the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research
Poland, COI Unit, Office for Foreigners
The Netherlands, Office for Country Information and Language Analysis, Ministry of JusticeThe review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts or organisations contributes to theoverall quality of the report, but does not necessarily imply their formal endorsement of the final
report, which is the full responsibility of EASO.

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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Contents
Acknowledgements................................................................................................................................. 3Contents .................................................................................................................................................. 4
Disclaimer................................................................................................................................................ 7
Glossary and Abbreviations .................................................................................................................... 8
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 9
Terms of Reference ............................................................................................................................ 9
Methodology ...................................................................................................................................... 9
Structure and use of the report ........................................................................................................ 10
Map ....................................................................................................................................................... 11
1. General overview .............................................................................................................................. 12
1.1 Demographics ............................................................................................................................. 12
1.2 Humanitarian context ................................................................................................................. 13
1.3 IDPs/returnees ............................................................................................................................ 14
1.3.1 Number of IDPs and returnees............................................................................................ 14
1.3.2 Trends .................................................................................................................................. 14
1.3.3 Housing, living conditions, and food security ..................................................................... 17
1.3.4 Access to education............................................................................................................. 19
1.3.5 Access to health care........................................................................................................... 20
1.3.6 Employment opportunities ................................................................................................. 21
1.3.7 Legal restrictions on travel or residence inside Iraq ........................................................... 22
1.4 Women ....................................................................................................................................... 24
1.4.1 Employment ........................................................................................................................ 24
1.4.2 Working conditions ............................................................................................................. 25
1.4.3 Access to health care........................................................................................................... 26
1.4.4 Access to education/dropout rates ..................................................................................... 26
1.4.5 Freedom of movement ....................................................................................................... 26
1.4.6 Impact of COVID-19 on women .......................................................................................... 27
1.5 Children....................................................................................................................................... 27
1.6 Networks of support ................................................................................................................... 28
1.7 Obtaining lost documents for returnees and IDPs ..................................................................... 30
1.7.1 Implications of missing documents ..................................................................................... 30
1.7.2 Current arrangements and regulations in place ................................................................. 30

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS— 5

1.7.3 How to obtain lost documents ............................................................................................ 32
1.7.4 Obstacles and difficulties .................................................................................................... 33
1.8 Impact of COVID-19 .................................................................................................................... 33
2. Socio-economic indicators in Iraq – with a focus on Baghdad, Basra, and Erbil .............................. 36
2.1 Economy ..................................................................................................................................... 36
2.1.1 Country overview ................................................................................................................ 36
2.1.2 Baghdad............................................................................................................................... 38
2.1.3 Basra .................................................................................................................................... 38
2.1.4 Erbil...................................................................................................................................... 39
2.2 Employment ............................................................................................................................... 40
2.2.1 Country overview ................................................................................................................ 40
2.2.2 Baghdad............................................................................................................................... 42
2.2.3 Basra .................................................................................................................................... 42
2.2.4 Erbil...................................................................................................................................... 43
2.3 Poverty........................................................................................................................................ 43
2.3.1 Country overview ................................................................................................................ 43
2.3.2 Baghdad............................................................................................................................... 44
2.3.3 Basra .................................................................................................................................... 45
2.3.4 Erbil...................................................................................................................................... 46
2.4 Food security .............................................................................................................................. 46
2.4.1 Country overview ................................................................................................................ 46
2.4.2 Baghdad............................................................................................................................... 49
2.4.3 Basra .................................................................................................................................... 49
2.4.4 Erbil...................................................................................................................................... 50
2.5 Health care.................................................................................................................................. 50
2.5.1 Country overview ................................................................................................................ 50
2.5.2 Baghdad............................................................................................................................... 52
2.5.3 Basra .................................................................................................................................... 52
2.5.4 Erbil...................................................................................................................................... 53
2.6 Education .................................................................................................................................... 53
2.6.1 Country overview ................................................................................................................ 53
2.6.2 Baghdad............................................................................................................................... 56
2.6.3 Basra .................................................................................................................................... 56
2.6.4 Erbil...................................................................................................................................... 56
2.7 Housing and living conditions ..................................................................................................... 57
2.7.1 Country overview ................................................................................................................ 57

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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS

2.7.2 Baghdad............................................................................................................................... 58
2.7.3 Basra .................................................................................................................................... 59
2.7.4 Erbil...................................................................................................................................... 60
Annex 1: Bibliography ........................................................................................................................... 61
Annex 2: Terms of Reference ................................................................................................................ 76

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS— 7

Disclaimer
This report was written according to the EASO COI Report Methodology (2019).1 The report is basedon carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced.
The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed with utmost
care. However, this document does not claim to be exhaustive. If a particular event, person ororganisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has not taken place orthat the person or organisation does not exist.
Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particularapplication for international protection. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative of aparticular legal position.
‘Refugee’, ‘risk’ and similar terminology are used as generic terminology and not in the legal sense as
applied in the EU Asylum Acquis, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the
Status of Refugees.
Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may bemade of the information contained in this report.
The drafting of this report was finalised on 27 July 2020. Any event taking place after this date is notincluded in this report. More information on the reference period for this report can be found in themethodology section of the Introduction.

1 The EASO methodology is largely based on the Common EU Guidelines for processing Country of Origin Information (COI),

2008, and can be downloaded from the EASO website: url.

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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Glossary and Abbreviations
BTI

Bertelsmann Transformation Index

CSIS

Center for Strategic and International Studies

CSO

Central Statistical Organisation of Iraq

DRC

Danish Refugee Council

DTM

Displacement Tracking Matrix

ECHO

European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations

EPIC

Education for Peace in Iraq Center

FGD

Focus Group Discussion

HNO

Humanitarian Needs Overview (UNOCHA)

HPG

Humanitarian Policy Group

IDP

Internally Displaced Person

ILO

International Labour Organization

IQD

Iraqi Dinar

IRC

International Rescue Committee

ISF

Iraqi Security Forces

ISIL (also known as

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

ISIS, IS, Daesh)
IWPR

Institute for War and Peace Reporting

KRG

Kurdistan Regional Government

KRI

Kurdistan Region of Iraq

NRC

Norwegian Refugee Council

OHCHR

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

PMU (also PMF)

Popular Mobilisation Units; Popular Mobilisation Forces

PDS

Public Distribution System

PHC

Primary Health Care

PRS

Poverty Reduction Strategy

USD

United States Dollar

UNAMI

United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq

UN-HABITAT

United Nations Human Settlement Programme

UNHCR

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNOCHA

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

WFP

World Food Programme

WHO

World Health Organization

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS— 9Introduction
The purpose of this report is to provide relevant information for the assessment of international
protection status determination, including refugee status and subsidiary protection. In particular, it isintended to inform the update of the chapter on Internal Protection Alternative within the EASOCountry Guidance on Iraq 2020 update. This report aims to provide information on key socioeconomic indicators in Iraq focusing on the cities of Baghdad, Basra, and Erbil, and highlighting aspectsof the situation of women and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in those areas.
This report is an update to the EASO COI Report: Iraq Key Socio-economic Indicators, url, published in
February 2019.

Terms of Reference
The terms of reference of this report are based on the input received from policy experts from EU+
countries2 within the context of an EASO country guidance development on Iraq.
It was determined that the report will concentrate information on the main urban areas of Baghdad,
Basra, and Erbil, within the relevant national context. Members of the EASO COI Specialist Networkand the EASO Country Guidance Network were consulted and gave input on the ToR prior to its
finalisation. A section dedicated to the impact of COVID-19 on different sectors, e.g. economy,
education, freedom of movement, was added despite the fact that it was not included in the Termsof Reference.

Methodology
This report is produced in line with the EASO COI Report Methodology (2019)3 and the EASO COI
Writing and Referencing Style Guide (2019).4
Information in the report is the result of desk research of public, specialised paper-based andelectronic sources until 30 June 2020. Some additional information was added during the finalisationof this report in response to feedback received during the quality control process, until 31 July 2020.
In this quality review process, a review was carried out by COI specialists from the countries andorganisations listed in the Acknowledgments section of this report. All comments made by reviewers
were taken into consideration and most of them were implemented in the final draft of this report.
Furthermore, and since this report is an update to the previous Iraq Key Socio-economic Indicators
report published in February 2019, information from that report was included where no new
information was available.
The general time frame set for the content of this report was to capture trends between January 2019
and July 2020. Sources did not always differentiate information between national, governorate anddistrict, or city-level. Information was also sometimes only available for the national or governorate
level. Where possible, the distinction is made in the report.

2 EU Member States, Norway and Switzerland
3 The EASO methodology is largely based on the Common EU Guidelines for processing Country of Origin Information (COI),

2008, and can be downloaded from the EASO website: url
4 https://coi.easo.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2019_EASO_COI_Writing_and_Referencing_Guide.pdf

10 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Structure and use of the report
The report is divided into two main parts: general overview and indicators pertinent to the cities of
Baghdad, Basra and Erbil. The first part includes information on demographics, humanitarian context,
IDPs/returnees, women, children, networks of support, documents, and impact of COVID-19. The
second part comprises information on the socio-economic indicators specified in the ToRs. Eachsection is divided into four sub-sections: an overview of the indicator at a national level, and an updateon the situation in each of the three cities (I.e. Baghdad, Basra and Erbil) with regard to the indicators,
i.e. economy, employment, poverty, food security, health care, education, and housing and living
conditions.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Map

Map 1: UN, Iraq - Map No. 3835 Rev.6, July 20145

5

UN, Iraq - Map No. 3835 Rev.6, July 2014, url

— 11

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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS

1. General overview
1.1 Demographics
According to the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), the last full national
census was held in 1987 (the census of 1997 did not include the KRI). Efforts to collect full census data
have been hindered by insecurity, internal displacement and capacity problems.6 The Central
Statistical Organisation of Iraq (CSO) estimated the population to be 40 150 200 in 2020 and to reach51 311 700 in 2030.7 It is worth mentioning that a new demographic and habitation census is plannedby the CSO and the United Nations Human Settlement Programme (UN-HABITAT) at the end of 2020.8
Iraq has a very high proportion of young people, with about 37 % of the population aged between 0
and 14 years old.9 More than 70 % of the population lives in an urban environment, with much of the
population concentrated in the north, central and eastern parts of Iraq, mainly around the larger
urban centres. The major cities are the capital Baghdad (7.144 million inhabitants), Mosul(1.630 million), Basra (1.352 million), Kirkuk (1.013 million), Najaf (0.874 million), and Erbil(0.847 million).10
The country is administratively divided into 18 governorates, with the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI;
Dohuk, Sulaimaniya, Erbil) governed as an autonomous region by the Kurdistan Regional Government(KRG).11
The three largest demographic groups in Iraq are Shia Arabs, Sunni Arabs, and Kurds.12 It is estimatedthat 75-80 % of the inhabitants are Arab and 15-20 % are Kurdish. Minority groups include those such
as Turkmens, Yazidis, Shabaks, Kaka’is, Bedouins, Romanis, Assyrians, Circassians, Sabaean-Mandaens
and Persians. Islam is the country’s official religion, with 95-98 % of the population being Muslim(roughly 64-69 % Shia and 29-34 % Sunni). Christians make up 1 % of the population and otherreligions between 1 and 4 %.13
The majority of the population of the KRI identifies ethnically as Kurdish and is of Sunni Muslim
religion. Kurdish is the most widely spoken language in the KRI.14 The most widely spoken language inthe rest of the country is Arabic. Few Iraqis speak both Arabic and Kurdish. This amounts to a language
divide between north and south, though there has been some overlap,15 for example, Baghdad had alarge Kurdish community that spoke both languages.16 Kurds in Baghdad numbered about 300 000,
according to a report published by the Kurdish media source, Rudaw, in 2016.17

6 Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report – Iraq, 17 August 2020, url, p. 10‫( تقديرات سكان العراق ر‬2015-2030) [Iraqi Population Estimates for the Period (2015-2030], 30 June 2020, url
7 Iraq, CSO, ‫للفتة‬ًً‫البشية يوقعان عقدا ر‬‫[ العراق وبرنامج األمم المتحدة للمستوطنات ر‬Iraq and UN8 Iraq, CSO, ‫مشتكا لدعم تنفيذ التعداد العام للسكان نهاية العام الجاري‬HABITAT Sign a Contract to Support Conducting the Demographic Census in the End of This Year], 23 January 2020, url
9 US, CIA, The World Factbook; Iraq; People and Society, 17 June 2020, url
10 US, CIA, The World Factbook; Iraq; Economy, 17 June 2020, url
11 US, CIA, The World Factbook; Iraq, Government, 17 June 2020, url
12 MRG, Iraq, May 2018, url
13 US, CIA, The World Factbook; Iraq, People and Society 17 June 2020, url
14 Encyclopaedia Britannica, Kurd, 21 September 2018, url ; IWPR, Arabic-Kurdish Language Divide, 21 July 2006, url
15 IWPR, Arabic-Kurdish Language Divide, 21 July 2006, url
16 IWPR, Arabic-Kurdish Language Divide, 21 July 2006, url
17 Rudaw, Baghdad’s Kurdish population sees dramatic decline, official data shows, 9 April 2016, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS— 13

1.2 Humanitarian context
In its Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) of November 2019, UNOCHA stated that Iraq remained‘unstable with widespread humanitarian concerns’. The HNO observed that social, sectarian, andethnic tensions persisted in Iraq, together with intensifying ‘[p]olitical uncertainty and natural
disasters’. The report added that the most vulnerable people were those who were displaced in thewake of the 2014-2017 conflict against ISIL, and those whose livelihoods were impacted.18 According
to the UN Human Rights Council, insecurity in Iraq continued to ‘pose a challenge to host communities,
internally displaced persons, returnees and humanitarian actors, as remnant ISIL cells continue tocarry out attacks.’19 The European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) identified
reconstruction and development as major needs, and observed that the security situation in Iraq
remained unstable and that ‘mass protests were a source of serious concern’.20
In addition to security situation, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC) observed thatstorms and flooding caused 37 000 new displacements in 2019 as the Tigris and the Euphrates flooded
the adjacent plains and urban areas every year. Moreover, an additional 34 000 people from southern
Iraq were estimated to have been displaced due to water scarcity in the governorates of Basra, Missan,Thi Qar and Muthanna. Reportedly, many of the displaced persons moved to urban areas.21
1 381 332 IDPs currently remain in Iraq,22 78 % of which suffer from protracted displacement23. The
protracted displacement and/or returning goes with problems ‘related to resilience and recovery’,such as lack of livelihoods, lack of social cohesion, lack of shelter rehabilitation, and the inability of
local government to ‘conduct basic civil administration and provide basic and specialized services’.24
The UN Human Right Council observed that 4.1 million of the displaced population remained in needof humanitarian assistance.25 According to UNOCHA, 2.8 million people (i.e. 68 % of the people inneed) were ‘in acute need’.26 Moreover, in its situation report covering the period 1 January 2020 –31 March 2020, UNICEF stated that 1.89 million children in Iraq were in need of humanitarianassistance.27
Finally, Iraq has seen an increase in the number of COVID-19 cases. According to UNHCR, the numberof confirmed cases reached 77 506 as of 12 July 2020. More than 40 % of these cases have beenregistered in Baghdad, followed by Sulaimaniya and Basra. The number of deaths reached 3 150, andthe authorities in the KRI and in the central and southern governorates imposed restrictive measures
including curfew and travel bans. UNHCR observed that vulnerable displaced families faced risks which
included the socio-economic consequences incurred by lack of livelihoods, rise of domestic violence,and suspension of education activities.28 In the KRI, CARE surveyed more than 1 400 people and foundthat 74 % of the interviewees had to reduce their meals and 61 % had to make further debt in orderto survive the economic situation incurred by the COVID-19 crisis.29

18 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Iraq, November 2020, url, p. 4
19 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internallydisplaced persons, A/HRC/44/41/Add.1, 13 May 2020, url, p. 3
20 ECHO, Iraq, 20 May 2020, url, p. 1
21 IDMC, Global Report on Internal Displacement: Grid 2020, 23 April 2020, url, p. 33
22 IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Iraq Master List Report 116, 30 June 2020, url, p. 1
23 IDMC, Global Report on Internal Displacement: Grid 2020, 23 April 2020, url, p. 33
24 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan: Iraq, January 2020, url, p. 14
25 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internallydisplaced persons, A/HRC/44/41/Add.1, 13 May 2020, url, p. 5
26 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan: Iraq, January 2020, url, p. 14
27 UNICEF, 2020 Internal Displacement Crisis Humanitarian Situation Report, 23 April 2020, available at: url
28 UNHCR, Iraq: UNHCR COVID-19 Update XII, 12 July 2020, url, p. 2
29 CARE, CARE warns: Rapidly rising COVID-19 cases and massive lack of humanitarian funding put most vulnerable on thebrink of survival in Iraq, 9 July 2020, url

14 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS

1.3 IDPs/returnees
1.3.1 Number of IDPs and returnees
A UN Security Council report published on 6 May 2020 stated that the number of IDPs in Iraq wasaround 1.4 million people as of 27 January 2020, living in over 3 000 locations across the country,
including 67 IDP camps.30 The UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced
Persons estimated the number of IDPs in Iraq to be 1.5 million people, of which 70 % suffered from‘protracted displacement’.31 Finally, according to IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) dataset
covering May and June 2020, the number of IDPs was 1 381 332, of which 35 034 were in Baghdad,
236 496 in Erbil, and 6 528 in Basra.32
Regarding returnees, the DTM dataset of May and June 2020 indicated that the total number ofreturnees was 4 718 130 persons, most of whom were displaced between 2014 and 2017. According
to the dataset, returns were to the following governorates: Anbar (1 503 468) – Baghdad (90 228) –Dohuk (768) – Diyala (230 244) – Erbil (53 004) – Kirkuk (341 106) – Ninawa (1 807 170) – Salah Al-Din(692 142).33
The UN Human Rights Council stated that as of 31 December 2019, 4.6 million IDPs had returned totheir areas of origin and that the policies of the Iraqi government ‘have been instrumental inpromoting the returns; however, premature, coerced and forced returns, in addition to blocked
returns, have also been reported’. The report added that around 1.4 million people remained indisplacement as of 31 December 2019, many of them suffered from failed attempts to return.34 In areport published in January 2020, UNOCHA stated that at the time of data collection and analysis,
there were 370 000 IDPs living in camps and estimated that the number would drop to 288 000 by
January 2020, and to 180 000 by the end of 2020.35

1.3.2 Trends
Obstacles to return
The UN Security Council report of 6 May 2020 observed that the ‘rate of return of internally displaced
persons had slowed significantly in 2019, leading to a substantial proportion of the internally displaced
population in Iraq experiencing prolonged displacement’.36 The UN Special Rapporteur on the Human
Rights of Internally Displaced Persons indicated that 70 % of those who remained displaced ‘have been
displaced for longer than three years’. She added that, according to recent surveys, 90 % of them ‘do
not intend to return in the short term, and 70 per cent in the long term’.37 She also raised the issue of

30 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019): Report of the Secretary-General, S/2020/363, 6 May 2020,

url, p. 11
31 OHCHR, End of Mission Statement by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced
persons, Ms. Cecilia Jimenez-Damary, upon conclusion of her official visit to Iraq – 15 to 23 February 2020, 27 February 2020,
url
32 IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Iraq Master List Report 116 May – June 2020, 30 June 2020, url, pp. 2, 3
33 IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Iraq Master List Report 116 May – June 2020, 30 June 2020, url, pp. 1, 5
34 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internallydisplaced persons, A/HRC/44/41/Add.1, 13 May 2020, url, p. 3
35 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan: Iraq, January 2020, url, p. 14
36 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019): Report of the Secretary-General, S/2020/363, 6 May 2020,
url, p. 11
37 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internallydisplaced persons, A/HRC/44/41/Add.1, 13 May 2020, url, p. 12

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS— 15

secondary displacement and the risk it presented for IDPs who failed to return and who could ‘remain
under the radar and further slide into economic impoverishment and social marginalisation’.38
The Returns Working Group and IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix indicated that the number oflocations that have not witnessed any returns, as of April 2020, was 269 locations: Erbil (45), Ninawa(115), Kirkuk (13), Salah Al-Din (38), Diyala (43), Babil (13) and Anbar (2)39. Human Rights Watch, citing
humanitarian workers, stated that 242 areas in Iraq have not seen any returns, either due tocontamination with ISIL remnants of war or due to a ban on returns imposed by security forces
because of perceived sympathy to ISIL.40 UNOCHA also reported that ‘3,367 square kilometres of land
contaminated with explosive ordinances bars returns and impacts the exercise of rights’.41 The reportof the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons identified several
obstacles to the return of IDPs in Iraq. These included destroyed or damaged housing, land property
rights, long standing property disputes, land contamination by explosive remnants of war, lack of
livelihood opportunities, restrictions on freedom of movement, lack of social cohesion, trauma or fearof retaliation in the areas of origin, fear of ISIL resurgence, and perceived ISIL affiliation.42
Furthermore, in September 2019, the New Arab, citing unspecified UN and Iraqi parliamentary
reports, mentioned three reasons that have been impeding the return of IDPs to their areas of origin.
These included the refusal of militias controlling 16 cities and town, such as Jurf Al-Sakhr, Al-Awesat,
Yathreb, Baiji, Rabi’a, and Kharaghol, to allow families to return, the widespread destruction in areas
recaptured from ISIL, as well as tribal considerations.43 An official in the Iraqi Ministry of Interior
estimated that 250 000 families were perceived to have ISIL affiliation and could not return to theirareas of origin because of objections by Iraqi authorities or local communities.44
Notwithstanding the obstacles to returns mentioned above, the UN Security Council report observedthat in the five governorates previously held by ISIL (Salah Al-Din, Anbar, Ninawa, Kirkuk, and Diyala),
2 375 stabilisation projects in the areas of housing, livelihoods, education, etc. were completed as of
4 April 2020, and 215 others were still underway. Those projects enabled the return of 4.7 million
Iraqis to their homes as of 29 February 2020 according to the source.45

Voluntary returns
UNOCHA’s report of January 2020 stated that the number of IDPs in camps dropped from 449 858 to
293 402 from January to November 2019. This, according to the report was ‘a result of a combinationof voluntary returns and spontaneous departures catalysed by sudden camp consolidations andclosures initiated by the Government of Iraq.’46
Regarding the procedure for voluntary return, Human Rights Watch stated that three families formerly
residing in Kilo-18 IDP camp in Anbar were granted authorisation to return home after they had
fulfilled all the requirements which constituted finding a community leader (to act as a sponsor) andproviding ten testimonies that they have never been ISIL sympathisers. Furthermore, the report

38 OHCHR, End of Mission Statement by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced

persons, Ms. Cecilia Jimenez-Damary, upon conclusion of her official visit to Iraq – 15 to 23 February 2020, 27 February 2020,
url
39 RWG and IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix, Areas of origin having witnessed no return, April 2020, url
40 HRW, Iraq: Not a Homecoming, 14 June 2019, url
41 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Iraq, November 2019, url, p. 52
42 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internallydisplaced persons, A/HRC/44/41/Add.1, 13 May 2020, url, pp. 12-13
43 New Arab (The), ‫النازحي إىل مدنهم‬‫ن‬‫ جدل بشأن خطوات إعادة‬:‫[ العراق‬Iraq: Debate about the Steps of Returning IDPs to Their
Towns/Cities], 16 September 2019, url
44 HRW, Iraq: Not a Homecoming, 14 June 2019, url
45 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019): Report of the Secretary-General, S/2020/363, 6 May 2020,
url, p. 11
46 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan: Iraq, January 2020, url, p. 45

16 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS

observed a case where an elderly woman was asked to pay 40 000 USD to a majority tribe to beallowed to return to her home in Anbar.47
Finally, Human Rights Watch referred to possible cases of revenge attacks against returnees who
returned willingly to four villages in Sinjar. According to the source, 550 Arab families returned to theirvillages and were at risk of revenge attacks by their Yazidi neighbours. The returnees claimed that
their homes were destroyed and looted by armed forces upon their flight. The source added that onlya small Iraqi Army unit was present in the area to protect the returning families, who claimed being
attacked by local Popular Mobilisation Units (PMUs).48

Forced returns
UN agencies reported on cases of forced returns of IDPs, notably through the closure and merging ofcamps. UNOCHA warned about the severe effect of ‘involuntary and premature returns, and coerced
departures in camps’ on the physical and mental well-being of IDPs. Such returns, according to thesource, took place particularly in Ninawa, Salah Al-Din, Anbar and Kirkuk, and often resulted insecondary displacement.49 UNHCR’s Protection Update of August 2019 observed that departures from
IDP camps doubled in August compared to July 2019. The report referred to ‘forced evictions, forced
relocations and coerced departures’ resulting from camp closures in Salah Al-Din, Anbar, Kirkuk andNinawa.50 The UN Human Rights Council stated that as of 31 December 2019, 4.6 million IDPs had
returned to their areas of origin and that the policies of the Iraqi government ‘have been instrumental
in promoting the returns; however, premature, coerced and forced returns, in addition to blocked
returns, have also been reported’.51
The New Arab report also referred to recent attempts by the Iraqi government to return IDPs to theirareas of origin, some of which were allegedly forceful.52 Similarly, HRW observed that around 60 IDP
families were forced to return to their village of origin, Tal Abu Jarad, which was still in rubble.
According to the report, armed groups in the area engaged in recruiting one male member of eachfamily to join ‘a local neighbourhood watch’.53

Damaged property compensation scheme
Regarding compensation schemes in place, the Global Protection Cluster stated that Law No. 20 of2009 provided that the Iraqi government would ‘compensate all citizens, including IDPs, whose
properties were affected by war-related incidents’. This Law was amended by Law No. 57 of 2015
which stipulated that ‘all Iraqis affected or harmed during military operations and terrorist actions areentitled to financial compensation’. Five categories were eligible for compensation, one of which wasdamaged property.54 Furthermore, Law No. 2 of 2020 established compensation sub-committees in
Baghdad and the KRI in addition to those already established in conflict-affected governorates andgave the sub-committees more competences and authority.55
According to the report of the Global Protection Cluster, all property owners can submit compensation
claims. A copy of a valid ID document should be provided alongside other documents including a proof
47 HRW, Iraq: Not a Homecoming, 14 June 2019, url
48 HRW, Iraq: Not a Homecoming, 14 June 2019, url
49 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Iraq, November 2019, url, p. 52
50 UNHCR, Iraq Protection Update, August 2019, available at: url, p. 1
51 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internallydisplaced persons, A/HRC/44/41/Add.1, 13 May 2020, url, p. 3
52 New Arab (The), ‫النازحي إىل مدنهم‬‫ن‬‫ جدل بشأن خطوات إعادة‬:‫[ العراق‬Iraq: Debate about the Steps of Returning IDPs to Their
Towns/Cities], 16 September 2019, url
53 HRW, Iraq: Not a Homecoming, 14 June 2019, url
54 Global Protection Cluster, PROPERTY COMPENSATION GUIDELINES: Based on Iraqi Law 20, 2009, Law 57, 2015 (First
Amendment) and Law 2 of 2020 (Second Amendment), March 2020, url, p. 4
55 Global Protection Cluster, PROPERTY COMPENSATION GUIDELINES: Based on Iraqi Law 20, 2009, Law 57, 2015 (First
Amendment) and Law 2 of 2020 (Second Amendment), March 2020, url, p. 5

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS— 17

of ownership of ‘property title deed (tapoo)’. In case of loss of ownership documents, owners could
request a replacement either from Regional Real Estate Registration Offices or from the Central Officein Baghdad. Alternatively, the owner could obtain an Ownership Proof Form, which ‘should beendorsed by the Mukhtar, community leaders, municipal council, local authorities, and two witnesses.
All of them would have to validate that the property truly belongs to the said claimant’. High quality
pictures of the damaged property and the exact address should be provided with the claim as well.
For IDPs who are still in displacement, written claims by the Mukhtar, Mayor, and neighbours could
replace the pictures for assessing the damage.56
A report published by Minority Rights Group on 22 January 2020 stated that as of November 2019,
26 000 families from Ninawa governorate filed claims for property damage compensation. The report
pointed out to problems in the mechanism, mainly the ‘cumbersome procedure required to file aclaim, combined with the significant processing delays and alleged corruption’.57 UNOCHA also
observed that access to compensation schemes for damaged private property was ‘extremely
challenging’.58 The Global Protection Cluster stated that the procedures were ‘quite complex,
complicated, somewhat contradictory or ambiguous’ with no clear instructions or mechanism inplace.59 The UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons noted that‘[d]estroyed or damaged housing and other issues related to housing, land and property, such as lackof documentation to prove tenure, remain a significant obstacle for IDPs to return to their place oforigin’. The Special Rapporteur observed that despite the existence of mechanisms for compensation
for damaged property, IDPs were either unaware of those mechanisms, or faced obstacles when
applying due to lack of documents.60 In a later report published on 13 May 2020, the Special
Rapporteur stated that many compensation claims were left unprocessed, and added that ‘allegationsof corruption, nepotism and discrimination in the processing of claims are also a matter of concern’.61

1.3.3 Housing, living conditions, and food security
The UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons noted that ‘IDPs in
and out of camp settings lack (or have limited) access to food, housing, healthcare, education, andlivelihood opportunities.’ She pointed out that there were IDPs who were living in ‘sub-standard’shelters, and that the level of poverty was so high that IDPs were seen selling food and non-food items
they received.62 IOM dataset of 12 June 2020 indicated that out of 231 590 IDP households, 18 817
were living in critical shelters.63 UNOCHA estimated the number of individuals who lived in criticalshelters, e.g. unfinished or abandoned structures, makeshift shelters, and worn tents, to be around
700 000 and identified 1.5 million people who were in need of shelter and NFI (Non-Food Items)
support.64 According to UNOCHA, around 187 000 IDPs living outside of camps ‘fear eviction from theirhabitual residence’ due to failure to pay rent or family disputes over property , while property damage

56 Global Protection Cluster, PROPERTY COMPENSATION GUIDELINES: Based on Iraqi Law 20, 2009, Law 57, 2015 (First

Amendment) and Law 2 of 2020 (Second Amendment), March 2020, url, pp. 5-6
57 MRG, Mosul after the Battle: Reparations for civilian harm and the future of Ninewa, 22 January 2020, url
58 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Iraq, November 2019, url, p. 52
59 Global Protection Cluster, PROPERTY COMPENSATION GUIDELINES: Based on Iraqi Law 20, 2009, Law 57, 2015 (First
Amendment) and Law 2 of 2020 (Second Amendment), March 2020, url, p. 7
60 OHCHR, End of Mission Statement by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced
persons, Ms. Cecilia Jimenez-Damary, upon conclusion of her official visit to Iraq – 15 to 23 February 2020, 27 February 2020,
url
61 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internallydisplaced persons, A/HRC/44/41/Add.1, 13 May 2020, url, p. 12
62 OHCHR, End of Mission Statement by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced
persons, Ms. Cecilia Jimenez-Damary, upon conclusion of her official visit to Iraq – 15 to 23 February 2020, 27 February 2020,
url
63 IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Iraq IDPS Master List: Round 115, 12 June 2020, url, TAB ‘Summary’64 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Iraq, November 2019, url, p. 57

18 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS

was reported by 60 % of returnees.65 UNOCHA also maintained that around 370 000 IDPs residing incamps and 2 million ‘out-of-camp individuals’ are in need of shelter assistance. Moreover, around ‘halfof female-headed households living in critical shelter have heightened needs related to safety andprivacy’.66 Furthermore, the New Humanitarian stated that UNDP was rehabilitating 15 000 buildings
in west Mosul. According to the source, UNDP performed partial repairs only, while ‘[r]econstruction
is in the hands of the government, and entire neighbourhoods still lie in ruins‘.67
As for returnees, IOM noted that a total of 27 574, or 3 % of all returnee households were living inshelters classified as critical, i.e. uninhabitable buildings, informal settlements, and abandoned,
religious or school buildings, compared to 756 623 households living in non-critical shelters, mainly
host families, rented houses and habitable buildings.68 In Baghdad, 13 889 households returned to
non-critical shelters compared to 1 044 who returned to critical shelters. In Erbil, almost all the
returnee households returned to non-critical shelters.69 In its Humanitarian Response Plan of January– May 2019, UNOCHA observed that ‘[n]early all families who have returned to their areas of origin(an estimated 95 per cent) have returned to a habitual residence that is in a good condition’. According
to the report, returnees provided consistent reasons for return, which included ‘improvements in the
security situation, provision of services and rehabilitation of houses in areas of origin’.70
In its 2019 Iraq Factsheet, IOM stated that rental costs for two-bedroom houses ranged between 200750 USD in 2019, and the price depended on the location and size of the property. Reportedly, it waseasier for single men to rent apartments or studio apartments than to rent houses. Moreover, IOM
observed that there were no governmental agencies to assist returnees in finding accommodation,and the available option was real-estate agencies. Finally, the government provided housing loans tocitizens who possessed lands with areas of more than 100 square meters and who met certain
eligibility criteria. However, according to IOM, the programme is on hold in the KRI.71
With regard to sanitation conditions, UNOCHA estimated that 1.85 million people across Iraq were in‘critical need of sustained, equitable access to safe and appropriate WASH services’, of which 49 %were women and girls, 38 % children, and 4 % elderly.72 However, during the recent COVID-19 crisis,a Security Council report published on 6 May 2020 noted that ‘[h]ealth and water, hygiene andsanitization interventions for internally displaced persons were expanded in both camp and non-campsettings’.73
Concerning food security, UNOCHA stated that a ‘total of 425,000 returnees and 125,000 out-of-camp
IDPs are food insecure’, with the highest numbers being in Ninawa, Salah Al-Din, Anbar, and Diyala.
The report added that female-headed households were among the most vulnerable and that girls aged
between 6 and 17 were particularly affected and were ‘more likely to be denied food by caregivers
and … more prone to undertaking unsafe income generating activities’.74 Concerning water, UNOCHA
stated that ‘[a]s many as 46 per cent of households in camps, 36 per cent out of camps and 21 percent of returnee households are unable to access enough water for domestic use’.75

65 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Iraq, November 2019, url, p. 54
66 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Iraq, November 2019, url, p. 57
67 New Humanitarian (The), Nowhere to go: Mosul residents in limbo as camps close, 11 March 2020, url
68 IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Iraq: Returnees Master List – Round 115, 12 June 2020, url, Tab ‘Summary’69 IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Iraq: Returnees Master List – Round 115, 12 June 2020, url, Tab ‘Shelter Type by Gov

of Return’
70 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan: Monitoring Report January – May 2019, 27 August 2019, url, p. 871 IOM, Country Factsheet: Iraq, 2019, url, p.6
72 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Iraq, November 2019, url, p. 59
73 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019): Report of the Secretary-General, S/2020/363, 6 May 2020,
url, p. 10
74 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Iraq, November 2019, url, p. 47
75 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Iraq, November 2019, url, p. 20

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS— 19

With regard to livelihoods, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced
Persons stated that lack of livelihood opportunities affected female-headed households in particularand constituted an obstacle to returning to places of origin.76 UNOCHA estimated that 370 000 IDPs
in formal camps, 343 000 IDPs in out of camp settings, and 980 000 returnees could not ‘attain aminimum level of living standards.77
Finally, the Health Cluster stated that in March 2020, the Iraqi Ministry of Migration and Displacement
decided to suspend humanitarian assistance to IDPs residing in informal settlements in the Anbar
province. Reportedly, only in-camp IDPs will continue to receive assistance from the Ministry.78

1.3.4 Access to education
UNOCHA, in its Humanitarian Needs Overview of November 2019, estimated that in 2020, 1.22 million
IDP children aged 6 – 17 would need government assistance in the education sector. Currently, around
345 000 IDP children, and 815 500 returnee children ‘are particularly vulnerable and in-need ofassistance to access education’, notably in Ninawa, Al-Anbar, Salah Al-Din, Kirkuk, Al-Sulaimaniya, Erbiland Dohuk.79
The UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons expressed herconcern ‘at the extent to which internally displaced children in and out of camp settings are deprivedof education’. She added that internally displaced children in areas previously held by ISIL sufferedfrom discrimination and reduced mobility due to lack of documents. Additionally, children ‘born outof sexual violence’ or who had lost their father but did not hold a death certificate were unable toobtain birth certificates or other types of civil documentation, which in turn, barred their access to
education.80 A report jointly published by UNAMI and OHCHR in February 2020 observed that children
and young adults who lived in former ISIL-held areas ‘accumulated a substantial gap in their academic
knowledge due to years of missed education and also face challenges in obtaining the civil
documentation required to enrol in formal schooling’.81 Finally, the Special Rapporteur observed thatmany IDP children worked in order to contribute to the family income.82
The UNAMI/OHCHR report highlighted a gap in education provision for IDPs in areas previously heldby ISIL. According to the report, despite the Iraqi government’s directive ‘advising teachers to adhere
to standard “placement test” policies to enable children to re-enter the formal education system’,‘students living in IDP settings were more commonly held back from joining age appropriate grades
and were placed with younger children’ which resulted in high dropout rates in intermediate andsecondary education. Moreover, class over-crowdedness and time limitation, and ‘untreated societal
and individual trauma’ exacerbated the problem.83 In addition, and according to a mapping exercise
conducted in May 2019 by United Nations led Camp Coordination and Camp Management Cluster,76 OHCHR, End of Mission Statement by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced

persons, Ms. Cecilia Jimenez-Damary, upon conclusion of her official visit to Iraq – 15 to 23 February 2020, 27 February 2020,
url
77 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Iraq, November 2019, url, p. 20
78 Health Cluster Iraq, Health Cluster Bulletin No. 3, March 2020, url, p. 2
79 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Iraq, November 2019, url, p. 43
80 OHCHR, End of Mission Statement by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced
persons, Ms. Cecilia Jimenez-Damary, upon conclusion of her official visit to Iraq – 15 to 23 February 2020, 27 February 2020,
url
81 UNAMI and OHCHR, The Right to Education in Iraq: Part One: the legacy of ISIL territorial control on access to education,
February 2020, url, p. 4
82 OHCHR, End of Mission Statement by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced
persons, Ms. Cecilia Jimenez-Damary, upon conclusion of her official visit to Iraq – 15 to 23 February 2020, 27 February 2020,
url
83 UNAMI and OHCHR, The Right to Education in Iraq: Part One: the legacy of ISIL territorial control on access to education,
February 2020, url, p. 9

20 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS

ten IDP camps did not have education provisions at all, while the schools in Mosul operated in three
shifts, which reduced schooling time to four hours per day.84 UNICEF made reference to challenges inthe education sector which included ‘limited availability of physical structures, teaching materials, andqualified personnel.’85 In order to fill in this gap, the Iraqi Ministry of Education created the nationwide Accelerated Learning Programme (ALP), albeit for the primary curriculum only. Nevertheless, themajority of the residents of IDP camps and rural areas in governorates previously held by ISIL were
not able to benefit from such initiatives due to lack of freedom of movement.86
According to the UNAMI/OHCHR report, the current directives of the Ministry of Education require
several types of civil documents for school registration. Reportedly, 45 000 children in IDPS camps do
not have such documents, and most of the families who lived in former ISIL-held areas miss essential
documents. This has an impact on access to education. This is particularly relevant for children of
deceased fathers, as the directives of the Ministry of Education require the submission ofidentification documents for both the child and the parents.87 A report of the Danish Refugee Council(DRC), Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), and International Rescue Committee (IRC) pointed out that
discrepancies existed among governorates with regard to the required documentation for school
enrolment. The report found that in Salah Al-Din, only the student’s ID was required to attend, while
in Anbar, those of the student and the parents were requested.88 Finally, the Ministry of Education
issued a directive ‘allowing school-age children to register in schools without documentation but
requiring documents to be submitted by parents within one month of enrolment’. This directive,
according to UNAMI was not effective due to under-dissemination and the lengthy process to obtain
documents, which exceeded the one-month delay.89
As for what concerns returnee children who went to school abroad, IOM observed that the following
documents were required for school enrolment in Iraq: foreign school certificate certified by the Iraqi
embassy in the host country and the Ministries of Education/Higher Education and Foreign Affairs in
Iraq, ID of the student and parents, Food Ration Card, and personal photos. Additionally, high school
certificates had to be equalised by the Ministry of Higher Education.90

1.3.5 Access to health care
According to IOM’s 2019 Iraq Factsheet, the health system in Iraq is accessible to all citizens. For
adults, only the ID card is required to register at a clinic or hospital. When receiving vaccination, infants
are provided with leaflets and checklists, and parents are required to bring them along when they visit
the hospital. The information contained in the leaflet is obtained from the infant’s birth certificate andthe parents’ ID cards.91 As regards access to healthcare, Human Rights Watch observed that those
who missed documents did not have access to healthcare and could not get birth certificates for theirchildren.92

84 UNAMI and OHCHR, The Right to Education in Iraq: Part One: the legacy of ISIL territorial control on access to education,

February 2020, url, p. 10
85 UNICEF, 2020 Internal Displacement Crisis Humanitarian Situation Report, 23 April 2020, available at: url
86 UNAMI and OHCHR, The Right to Education in Iraq: Part One: the legacy of ISIL territorial control on access to education,
February 2020, url, pp. 10-11
87 UNAMI and OHCHR, The Right to Education in Iraq: Part One: the legacy of ISIL territorial control on access to education,
February 2020, url, p. 11
88 NRC, et al., Paperless people of post-conflict Iraq: Denied rights, barred from basic services and excluded fromreconstruction efforts, 16 September 2019, url, p. 11
89 UNAMI and OHCHR, The Right to Education in Iraq: Part One: the legacy of ISIL territorial control on access to education,
February 2020, url, p. 12
90 IOM, Country Factsheet: Iraq, 2019, url, p. 991 IOM, Country Factsheet: Iraq, 2019, url, p. 4
92 HRW, Iraq: Not a Homecoming, 14 June 2019, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS— 21

UNOCHA observed that less people were in need of humanitarian health support due to the return
movement that already took place, and ‘the gradual regeneration of basic government health services
in areas of return’. The source added that the need for trauma care at frontlines and for ‘life-saving
primary health care services’ has ceased to exist since the end of the conflict.93 Nevertheless, UNOCHA
observed that around 325 000 IDPs in camps and 500 000 in out-of-camp settings continued to be inneed of basic health services, ‘including essential primary health care services delivered byhumanitarian partners addressing gaps in Directorate of Health (DoH) capacity.’ Reportedly, around2 million returnees risked having their basic health needs unmet in 2020 in areas of return if
humanitarian actors were not able to provide services. The governorates of Al-Anbar, Babil, Baghdad,
Dohuk, Diyala, Erbil, Kirkuk, Al-Najaf, Ninawa, Salah Al-Din and Sulaimaniya remained the priority for
UNOCHA.94 Moreover, medicine cost was considered ‘the biggest barrier to accessing health services’,
while specific medicines for chronic illnesses were not consistently available or supplied by the
Directorate of Health.95
In a report published on 11 March 2020, the Iraq Protection Cluster observed that in Baghdad, 4 189
people were in need of psychosocial support in 2020, of which 656 were IDPs and 3 472 returnees. In
Erbil, the total number of people in need of psychosocial support was 10 598, of which 9 764 were
IDPs and 829 returnees. The report stated that in 2019, 13 implementing partners/NGOs were present
in Baghdad and 16 in Erbil, to cater for the psychosocial support needs.96
For information about the impact of COVID-19 on the healthcare system in Iraq, see Section 1.8 below.

1.3.6 Employment opportunities
UNOCHA remarked that the ‘main recovery need’ for IDPs was access to employment and work, thethird most important reported need for IDPs and returnees after food and medical care.97 IOM’s
Integrated Location Assessment III, published in January 2019, stated that access to employment andlivelihoods was a top concern for IDPs in nearly all of the over 4 000 locations it assessed in 2018.98
The lack of livelihoods translated into difficulties accessing basic needs such as food, household/nonfood items, and shelter.99 Moreover, in its Humanitarian Needs Overview of November 2019, UNOCHA
stated that ‘lack of livelihoods has been a primary barrier to sustainable returns, providing adisincentive for IDPs to return and a catalyst for secondary displacement for returnees’. According to
the report, indebtedness existed among returnees and IDPs outside of camps, and unemployment
among IDPs and returnees from Ninawa, Anbar, Salah Al-Din, Diyala, and Kirkuk was high.
Furthermore, UNOCHA estimated the number of people in need of livelihoods assistance to be
2.39 million in 2020.100 With regard to unemployment among IDPs, the World Bank stated in its reportof January 2018 that in the seven governorates affected by conflict, i.e. Anbar, Babil, Diyala, Kirkuk,
Ninawa, Salah Al-Din and Baghdad, unemployment reached 17.7 % and underemployment 9.7 %.
According to the report, the rate of unemployment in Anbar and Diyala was 33.6 % and 20.7 %respectively.101
In its Humanitarian Bulletin of April 2020, UNOCHA made reference to a government campaign in late2019 to recruit security personnel. Reportedly, the campaign ‘saw a number of internally displaced

93 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Iraq, November 2019, url, p. 50
94 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Iraq, November 2019, url, p. 49
95 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Iraq, November 2019, url, p. 20
96 Protection Cluster Iraq, Psychosocial Support (PSS) Activities in Iraq: 2019 Achievements & 2020 Needs, 11 March 2020,

url
97 UNOCHA, Iraq: Humanitarian Needs Overview - November 2018, 16 December 2018, url, pp. 51-52
98 IOM, Integrated Location Assessment Part III, 2 January 2019, url, p. 6
99 IOM, Integrated Location Assessment Part III, 2 January 2019, url, pp. 6, 34-35
100 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Iraq, November 2019, url, p. 45
101 World Bank Group, Iraq: Reconstruction and Investment, January 2018, url, p. 32

22 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS

persons (IDPs) gaining employment with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and as police officers.’
According to the Bulletin, the recruited personnel worked in rotation within or across governorates
and returned to their camp of residence for breaks.102
According to IOM’s Iraq Factsheet of 2019, the Iraqi government provides vocational training
programmes to address the issues of unemployment, lower skill levels and to respond to ‘the needsof an emerging private sector’. Returnees can request assistance from the Ministry of Labour andSocial Affairs, and have to provide ID and Food Ration Cards, in addition to other varying documents
to register at the Ministry.103

1.3.7 Legal restrictions on travel or residence inside Iraq
Article 44 of the Iraqi Constitution of 2005 stipulated that ‘[e]ach Iraqi has freedom of movement,
travel, and residence inside and outside Iraq’.104 On 11 February 2019, the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court
reiterated that Iraqi citizens enjoy freedom of travel inside and outside Iraq, and that this freedom
cannot be curtailed by any legislation.105 Information about the types of documents required forinternal mobility and about the (in)existence of legal restrictions on freedom of movement between
regions in Iraq was scarce, and the focus of the sources consulted during the drafting of this report
was on IDPs.
The UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons noted that Iraqi IDPs
faced ‘numerous barriers’ in the way to obtain civil documentation. She stressed the importance of
those documents for ‘the enjoyment of a wide range of human rights, in terms of IDPs accessing basic
services, education, healthcare and social security benefits, housing, land and property rights, andfreedom of movement’.106 In addition, she expressed her concern for ‘the restrictions on freedom of
movement imposed on IDPs’, notably through the requirement to obtain security clearance to be able
to travel. She added that ‘security clearances are required and often denied to members of families
perceived as affiliated to extremist groups’.107 Human Rights Watch’s report of 14 June 2019 statedthat members of the security forces in Iraq admitted that the ban on issuing security clearances to
IDPs who had lived under ISIL aimed at limiting their movement in order to keep them undersurveillance. The report added that movement without a valid ID card in Iraq could lead to arrest, andconsequently to torture.108 Moreover, The UN Special Rapporteur in the Human Rights of IDPs madereference to information according to which, IDPs were confined in their camps and needed escorts
to go to medical or legal services.109 UNOCHA observed that the need for legal assistance among IDPs
and returnees regarding civil documentation and Housing and Land Property remained high, withmore than 500 000 households missing essential documents. According to the report, persons missing
documents were susceptible to deteriorating living standards and rights violations.110

102 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Bulletin, April 2020, url, p. 1
103 IOM, Country Factsheet: Iraq, 2019, url, p. 5
104 Iraq, Constitution of Iraq, 2005, url, Art. 44‫ر‬
105 Al-Sumaria, ‫اق داخل البالد وخارجها‬‫ ال يجوز تقييد حرية سفر العر‬:‫[ المحكمة االتحادية‬Federal Court: Iraqis’ Freedom of Travel inside and‫ي‬outside Iraq Should not be Curtailed], 11 February 2019, url
106 OHCHR, End of Mission Statement by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced
persons, Ms. Cecilia Jimenez-Damary, upon conclusion of her official visit to Iraq – 15 to 23 February 2020, 27 February 2020,
url
107 OHCHR, End of Mission Statement by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced
persons, Ms. Cecilia Jimenez-Damary, upon conclusion of her official visit to Iraq – 15 to 23 February 2020, 27 February 2020,
url
108 HRW, Iraq: Not a Homecoming, 14 June 2019, url
109 OHCHR, End of Mission Statement by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced
persons, Ms. Cecilia Jimenez-Damary, upon conclusion of her official visit to Iraq – 15 to 23 February 2020, 27 February 2020,url
110 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Iraq, November 2019, url, p. 52

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS— 23

A report published on 16 September 2019 by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), the Danish
Refugee Council (DRC), and the International Rescue Committee (IRC) indicated that most of thesurveyed people ‘reported that a combination of the civil ID and security clearance was required topass through checkpoints in areas formerly controlled by IS’. In Salah Al-Din, people mentioned
difficulties in travelling within the governorate either because the security clearances they had were
not recognised by checkpoints, or because they were asked to obtain additional ‘security slips’ or tohave sponsorships.111. Finally, Human Rights Watch observed that failure to possess civil documents
and security clearance in Iraq resulted in a restriction on freedom of movement.112
In November 2019, UNHCR published ‘Country of Origin Information on Access and Residency
Requirements in Iraq (Update I)’. According to the document, persons originating from ‘formerly ISISheld or conflict-affected areas, particularly Sunni Arabs (including persons who returned to Iraq froma third country)’ needed a sponsor to access Missan, Muthanna, and Dohuk governorates. Entry to
the governorates of Babel, Baghdad, Basra, Diyala, Erbil, Kerbala, Kirkuk, Najef, Qadissiyah,
Sulaymaniyah and Wassit did not require sponsorship. Moreover, ‘Sponsorship requirements in orderto enter Basrah, Erbil, Qadissiyah and Sulaymaniyah Governorates via air or at internal land borders
were lifted in early 2019.’
With regard to residency, UNHCR observed the following requirements that concerned persons fromformerly ISIS-held or conflict-affected areas, particularly Sunni Arabs:


Baghdad governorate: two sponsors from the neighbourhood in which the person intends toreside and a support letter from the local Mukhtar.



Dohuk governorate: approval of the local Asayish obtained by approaching them with thesponsor from Dohuk. This was pertinent to ‘Arabs from formerly ISIS-held or conflict-affectedareas and Turkmen from Tal Afar’.



Diyala governorate: a sponsor from the neighbourhood in which the person intends to resideand a support letter from the local Mukhtar. In Khanaqin District, ‘letters from three entities
are required (mukhtar’s office, National Security, and Intelligence)’.

Kirkuk city: only a support letter from the local Mukhtar of the neighbourhood in which theperson intends to reside was required. Previous sponsorship requirements were lifted
following the re-establishment of central government control on 16 October 2017.

Southern governorates: a local sponsor and a support letter from the local Mukhtar.



Erbil and Sulaimaniya governorates: residency cards (or information cards) were obtained
from the local Asayish in the neighbourhood in which the person intends to reside and nosponsor was required. Single Arab and Turkmen men needed to ‘submit a support letter fromtheir employer in order to obtain a one-year, renewable residency card’. UNHCR stated that
persons who did not have regular employment obtained ‘only a one-month renewable
residency’ which made it difficult for them to find regular employment.

UNHCR concluded that ‘[a]ccess and residency requirements are not always clearly defined and/or
implementation can vary or be subject to changes depending mostly on the security situation’ andthat ‘[s]ponsorship requirements are generally not grounded in law nor are they officiallyannounced’.113

111

NRC et al., Paperless people of post-conflict Iraq: Denied rights, barred from basic services and excluded fromreconstruction efforts, 16 September 2019, url, p. 17112 HRW, Iraq: Not a Homecoming, 14 June 2019, url
113
UNHCR, Iraq: Country of Origin Information on Access and Residency Requirements in Iraq: Ability of Persons Originationfrom Formerly ISIS-Held or Conflict-Affected Areas to Legally Access and Remain in Proposed Areas of Relocation (Update I),
6 November 2019, available at: url, pp. 2, 3

24 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORSFor more information on obtaining lost documents for returnees and IDPs, see Section 1.7 below.

1.4 Women
1.4.1 Employment
The Iraqi National Development Plan of 2018 – 2022 acknowledged that women’s participation in thelabour market was weak (14.5 % in total, 12 % in rural areas and 14 % in urban areas).114 In a Blog post
published on the website of the World Bank on 27 August 2019, the authors stated that thepercentage of employed women in Iraq was 19 % of the total female population aged 15 and above.
Those with lower education were usually self-employed or worked in the informal sector.115 The World
Bank, based on ILO estimates, indicated that female unemployment in Iraq was 30.4 % of the female
labour force in 2019.116 Moreover, and according to the IOM 2018 demographic survey on the KRI, at
Erbil governorate-level, 10.7 % of women were ‘part of the labour force’, with a higher percentage inurban areas (11.1 %) compared to rural ones (8 %) at the KRI level.117
In its report of November 2019, REACH mentioned official plans and policies aimed to protect andpromote women’s employment. Those included the National Action Plan for the Implementation ofUnited Nations Security Council Resolution No. 1325, the 2014-2018 National Strategy for the
Advancement of the Status of Iraqi Women, and the Iraq Labour Law of 2015. Notwithstanding such
efforts, REACH concluded that there was notable inconsistency in the application of those policies,
especially in the private sector.118
The Iraqi National Development Plan of 2018 – 2022 outlined numerous challenges that hindered aneffective participation of women in the labour market. Such challenges included the ‘weak activationof women empowerment laws’ due to social and cultural factors, the cancellation of the Ministries of
Women Affairs and Human Rights, and the high rate of practices that infringed the Personal Status
Law such as child marriage. Moreover, lack of sensitivity to gender issues in the state budget,
discrimination against women with regard to social and economic roles, increase in the number ofwidows and orphans, and women’s insufficient education and skills also impacted women’s
employment.119 The objectives set in the Plan to improve the economic situation of women included
the improvement of women’s participation in the labour market through training and facilitation ofborrowing, and in the private sector through increasing small loans to women and focusing on theactivation of the chapter pertinent to women in the Iraqi Labour Law No. 37/2015.120
UNAMI observed that factors such as violence, insecurity, societal views of women and weak
performance of state functions impacted ‘the role of Iraqi women in rebuilding the country’.121
Moreover, Iraqi women tended to be highly affected by unreliable electric supply, which ‘impedes
income and productivity of women’s small sized businesses, and … discourages women from pursuingfurther education and or engaging in income-generating activities’.122

114 Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan 2018 – 2022, June 2018, url, p. 211
115 Canpolat, E. and Maier, E., Powering Women in Iraq, 27 August 2019, url
116 World Bank (The), Unemployment, female (% of female labor force) (modeled ILO estimate) – Iraq, 1 July 2020, url, TAB.

Data
117 IOM, Demographic Survey Kurdistan Region of Iraq, July 2018, url, p. 39
118 REACH, Iraq: Assessment on employment and working conditions of conflict affected women across key sectors,
November 2019, url, p. 3
119 Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan 2018 – 2022, June 2018, url, p. 211
120 Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan 2018 – 2022, June 2018, url, p. 212
121 UNAMI, Country Profile, n. d., url
122 Canpolat, E. and Maier, E., Powering Women in Iraq, 27 August 2019, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS— 25

In a survey conducted by the World Bank in the KRI, more than 70 % of the surveyed men and womenconsidered that women’s employment in the private sector was acceptable and more than 50 % of
the surveyed unemployed women indicated their willingness to work.123 Regarding the type ofoccupation for women in Erbil City, 82.3 % of the working women were employed in the public sector,
10.5 % in the private sector, 2.9 % were self-employed, and 1.9 % were daily wageworkers.124 The KRI
2020 Vision stated that around 80 % of the employed women in the KRI worked in the public sector.125
The KRI Vision 2020 acknowledged that ‘cultural considerations continue to restrict the equal accessof women to resources and leadership positions in society.’ The report stated that the majority ofwomen in the KRI reported that they lacked in educational qualification required for employment. The
goal of the KRG is ‘to narrow the literacy and school enrolment gap between men and women’ and to‘ensure that women have equal opportunities in all activities in society.’126

1.4.2 Working conditions
The World Bank stated that, ‘[i]rrespective of sector, women earn significantly less than men withsimilar characteristics’.127 In the same report, the World Bank reported that ‘[w]omen with low levelsof education and skills are often self-employed and concentrated in private sector activities. These areusually informal, low-paying jobs with almost no access to benefits such as health insurance, maternity
leave or pensions’, and those employed in the informal economy were excluded from Labour Codeprotections. Of the women who participated in the labour force, 70 % were employed in the public
sector and usually possessed secondary or higher education.128
According to REACH, 167 out of 416 surveyed women in former conflict areas, i.e. Anbar, Baghdad,
Dohuk, Erbil, Ninawa, Salah al-Din, and Sulaimaniya, reported not being aware of labour laws andpolicies in place. Moreover, having an employment agreement was higher among women employedin the health and education sectors compared to those employed in agriculture. With regard totransportation, numerous respondents indicated ‘walking as their form of transportation to work’.129
REACH also found that a ‘small portion of women’ reported on cases of verbal or sexual harassment
at work, and this was due to the sensitivity of the topic. Of this small portion, almost 50 % indicatedthat the victim of harassment quit or changed her job.130 USDOS noted that female IDPs, widows, andsingle women ‘were particularly vulnerable to economic exploitation and discriminatory employment
conditions’, and that single women and widows faced difficulties registering their children.131
Moreover, the challenges that women in the KRI faced in relation to employment were the lack inchildcare solutions, the requirement to return home before 5 p.m., and the ‘weak legislative
protection to women and families in the workplace’.132

123 World Bank (The), Helping Women in Kurdistan region of Iraq to Find Jobs, 21 March 2019, url
124 IOM, Demographic Survey Kurdistan Region of Iraq, July 2018, url, p. 100
125 KRG, Ministry of Planning, Kurdistan Region of Iraq 2020: A Vision for the Future, n.d., url, p. 16
126 KRG, Ministry of Planning, Kurdistan Region of Iraq 2020: A Vision for the Future, n.d., url, pp. 11-12
127 World Bank (The), Iraq systematic country diagnostic, 3 February 2017, url, p. 50
128 World Bank (The), Iraq systematic country diagnostic, 3 February 2017, url, p. 49
129 REACH, Iraq: Assessment on employment and working conditions of conflict affected women across key sectors,

November 2019, url, pp. 4-5
130 REACH, Iraq: Assessment on employment and working conditions of conflict affected women across key sectors,
November 2019, url, p. 5
131 USDOS, 2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 11 March 2020, url
132 World Bank (The), Helping Women in Kurdistan region of Iraq to Find Jobs, 21 March 2019, url

26 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS

1.4.3 Access to health care
The National Development Plan 2018 – 2022 indicated that the health services provided to women
suffered from shortage due to ‘the limited number of reproductive health and family planningcentres’. Shortage in female medical staff especially in rural areas and the insufficient awareness ofthe significance of early detection of women diseases added up to the challenges faced by women in
the process of integration in the labour market in Iraq.133
In the wake of COVID-19 situation in Iraq, the GBV Sub-Cluster stated that ‘[w]omen and girls may not
be able to access health care services if infected, as it is culturally unacceptable to put women andgirls in mixed-gender spaces without their relatives’. Moreover, women and girls may be left without
medical care if female health workers are not available as their families may not allow them to receive
medical checks by male health workers.134

1.4.4 Access to education/dropout rates
The National Development Plan 2018 – 2022 observed that the enrolment rates of male students inprimary, intermediate and secondary levels were higher than those of their female counterparts. The
report added that the dropout rate of females is ‘higher than males and increases with thedevelopment of education stages’, and that families were not ‘very keen on providing education totheir female children’.135 According to BTI 2020 Country Report, girls were less likely to go to school
than boys. Citing the World Bank, the report stated that 49 % of young men were enrolled in school
compared to 19 % of 17-year-old women. Consequently, illiteracy was higher among women (62 %compared to 47 % among men).136 Finally, the Iraqi CSO indicated that illiteracy among women aged
15-49 in 2018 was 2.3 % in Baghdad137 and 28.9 % in Basra138.

1.4.5 Freedom of movement
On 11 May 2020, the NRC published a report, which stated that displaced Iraqi women ‘are 11 percent more likely to face barriers impeding them from going back home after years of suffering in
displacement camps since the end of the war against Islamic State group in their areas of origin.’139
The UK Department for International Development observed that ‘[s]ocial and cultural barriers also
often hinder women’s participation in Iraq, particularly the patriarchal cultural norm whereby womenoften need permission to engage in activities outside the home’.140According to USDOS Country
Report on Human Rights Practices 2019, ‘[l]aw and custom generally do not respect freedom of
movement for women’. Reportedly, women could not apply for a passport or obtain Civil Status
Identification (required to access several services) without the consent of a male guardian orrelative.141 Freedom House observed the same practice and concluded that ‘[t]he movement of
women is limited by legal restrictions’.142

133 Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan 2018 – 2022, June 2018, url, p. 211
134 GBV Sub-Cluster Iraq: Guidance Note on GBV Service Provision during the Time of COVID-19, March 2020 url, p. 2
135 Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan 2018 – 2022, June 2018, url, p. 209
136 BTI, 2020 Country Report — Iraq, 29 April 2020, url, p. 23
137 Iraq, CSO, 2018 ‫[ الموجز االحصائ بغداد‬Baghdad Statistical Summary 2018, 21 June 2020, url‫ي‬

138 Iraq, CSO, 2018 ‫[ الموجز االحصائ البرصة‬Basra Statistical Summary 2018],21 June 2020, url‫ي‬

139 NRC, Iraqi women denied their property by relatives, tribes and militias, 11 May 2020, url
140 O’Driscoll, D., Women’s participation in peacebuilding and reconciliation in Iraq. K4D Helpdesk Report. Brighton, UK:

Institute of Development Studies, 24 November 2017, url, p. 7
141 USDOS – US Department of State: Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2019 - Iraq, 11 March 2020
url
142 Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2020 - Iraq, 4 March 2020, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS— 27

OXFAM stated that according to women surveyed in Diyala, the exclusion of women from livelihoods
in Iraq was not due to ‘deficiencies in the law’ but due to ‘the restricted freedom of movement that is
imposed on them either by social norms or perceived lack of safety and security, or both’.143 The reportfound that harassment played a role in the limitation of freedom of movement for IDP women.
Reportedly, in Kirkuk male relatives would accompany women in all their movements outside thehouse, or women would avoid contact with the host communities altogether. Moreover, women in
Hawija, Kirkuk governorate, tended to minimise their movement in town ‘in order to avoid the risk of
coming into contact with armed groups’.144
In a blog post published on the website of The World Bank in August 2019, the authors stated that
Iraqi women faced ‘increased sense of insecurity and limited mobility’ due to unreliable electricity
supply, as they were unable to leave the house at night.145

1.4.6 Impact of COVID-19 on women
On 23 March 2020, UNFPA published a report which warned of the potential impact COVID-19 crisis
could have on women in Iraq. According to the report, potential risks comprised limited access toservices, risk of exploitation and sexual violence, added burdens on women and girls as caregivers,
heightened risk of COVID-19 infection, increased number of female-headed households due toquarantine measures against male breadwinners, financial constraints for migrant women due toconfinement, and limited access to healthcare.146
The NRC report published on 11 May 2020 highlighted that COVID-19 related measures implemented
in Iraq rendered women more vulnerable. According to an assessment conducted by the source in
Dohuk, Ninawa, Anbar and Kirkuk governorates147, ‘66 % of respondents indicated that they would
not be able to pay their rent in the next three months.’148 Moreover, the Institute for War and Peace
Reporting (IWPR) launched a campaign to combat the rise of GBV during the COVID-19 lockdown
measures and cited a community police director who stated that ‘his department was focusing on
addressing social problems, “foremost violence against women, which has increased in the wake ofthe corona pandemic crisis”’.149
For more information on the impact of COVID-19 in Iraq, see Section 1.8 below.

1.5 Children
According to USDOS, the Iraqi Constitution and law ‘prohibit the worst forms of child labor’, and theminimum age for employment is 15 in areas under the authority of Iraq’s central government.
Nevertheless, the report stated that child labour existed throughout the country.150 The Iraqi CSO

143 OXFAM, Protection Landscapes in Diyala and Kirkuk, Iraq, March 2020, url, p. 23
144 OXFAM, Protection Landscapes in Diyala and Kirkuk, Iraq, March 2020, url, pp. 24-25
145 Canpolat, E. and Maier, E., Powering Women in Iraq, 27 August 2019, url
146 UNFPA, GBV Sub-Cluster Iraq, Guidance Note on GBV Service Provision during the Time of COVID-19, 23 March 2020, url,p. 2
147 In the report, the NRC explained the methodology as follows: ‘The information and analysis in this report isbased upon NRC’s programmatic experience in assisting women with housing, land and property issues in Iraq, in-depth
interviews with women and other key stakeholders, focus group discussions, including separate focus group discussions formen and women, and a large scale quantitative survey in 2019.’
148 NRC, Broken Home: Women’s housing, land and property rights in post-conflict Iraq, 11 May 2020, url, p. 6
149 IWPR, Iraq: Activists Join Police to Combat Domestic Violence, 19 May 2020, url
150 USDOS, 2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq, 11 March 2020, url

28 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS

indicated that child labour in Iraq was 7.3 % according to 2018 Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys.151 It
added that in 2018, child labour was 4.8 % in Baghdad, 13.1 % in Erbil and 4.9 % in Basra.152
UNOCHA observed that the deterioration in the economic situation and absence of income generating
activities resulted in ‘negative coping mechanisms, including drug trade and abuse, child labour,
prostitution and early marriage’153. OXFAM stated that 70 % of the FGD respondents in Diyala province
indicated that child labour was on the rise, notably among low-income and other vulnerable families.
According to the report, children ‘most commonly work in urban areas such as Jalawla and Khanaqin,
as street pedlars, beggars or rubbish collectors. They can also work part-time after school’.154 In Kirkuk,
the report observed that child labour was common, with children employed as ‘street pedlars, as
handymen at markets or at construction sites, with a high risk of exploitation into forced labour andother forms of violence and abuse’.155
OXFAM observed that there was sporadic information about recruitment of children by ISIL or stateaffiliated forces in Diyala.156 In Kirkuk, the report stated that recruitment of children was reported tohave taken place by armed militias in Taza and Hawija.157 For more information on the recruitment ofchildren by the different actors in Iraq, refer to Chapter 3.8.1 of EASO’s 2019 Targeting of Individuals
Report.
Human Rights Watch stated that one of the practices used by the PMUs in Sinsil, Diyala governorate,
to allow the return of IDP families was to recruit one male member of the family to join a local armed
unit for neighbourhood patrols. The report cited a local source who claimed that ‘there were at least
10 members under 18, the youngest 16’ in those patrols. Human Rights Watch acknowledged that
‘Iraq used to have a large number of child soldiers but has made real strides over the past decade to
reduce their ranks’ and warned that this practice ‘by local armed groups threatens that progress’.158
Moreover, a UN General Assembly/Security Council report published on 9 June 2020 indicated that in2016, three boys were recruited by the ISF and one by the PMU.159 However, USDOS maintained that‘[t]here were no reports that the central government’s Ministry of Defense conscripted or recruitedchildren to serve in the security services’ and that ‘[t]he government and Shia religious leaders
expressly prohibited children younger than 18 from serving in combat’. According to the report, thegovernment had limited ability to control child recruitment and use by certain PMU groups such as
Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haqq and Kata’ib Hezbollah.160

1.6 Networks of support
In a comment on EASO’s Key Socio-economic Indicators report published in 2019, Dr Chatelard161
explained that patronage or clientelism is a structuring force in Iraqi society, and recourse to nonstate support networks represents the most frequent coping mechanism adopted by all categories ofthe population to access social protection and economic resources. In the absence of rule of law andan equitable system for the allocation of public resources (including individual protection), accessingthese resources requires the mediation of political strongmen, religious figures and other influential‫ر‬‫[ ر‬Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys], 21 June 2020, url
151 Iraq, CSO, ‫المؤشات‬‫مؤشات المسح العنقودي المتعدد‬152 Iraq, CSO, 2018 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS6 ) Briefing, n. d., url, p. 34
153 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Bulletin, March 2020, 29 April 2020, url, p. 2
154 OXFAM, Protection Landscapes in Diyala and Kirkuk, Iraq, March 2020, url, p. 18
155 OXFAM, Protection Landscapes in Diyala and Kirkuk, Iraq, March 2020, url, p. 19
156 OXFAM, Protection Landscapes in Diyala and Kirkuk, Iraq, March 2020, url, p. 19
157 OXFAM, Protection Landscapes in Diyala and Kirkuk, Iraq, March 2020, url, p. 20
158 HRW, Iraq: Not a Homecoming, 14 June 2019, url
159 UN General Assembly and UN security General, Children and armed conflict, A/74/845–S/2020/525,

9 June 2020, url, p.

11
160 USDOS, 2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq, 11 March 2020, url
161 An independent consultant and social scientist currently associated with the Iraq (Erbil) branch of the Institut français duProche-Orient (French Institute in the Near East)EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS— 29

people who represent constituencies in exchange for allegiance. ‘Family ties (of which tribes areextensions), connections within the religious community, political parties, armed groups or militias,
together with all other forms of relationships people can tap into with a certain degree of trust (suchas neighbours, work colleagues, former classmates or members of the ethno-religious community)
may be mobilised to find a job, facilitate administrative procedures, speed up an application for social
assistance, gain access to better medical care, borrow money, etc.’162
Wasta is a system which ‘includes a range of actors involved in governance beyond the formal politicalsystem, like businessmen, into the governance system’, enforcing loyalties and affiliations. Tribalism
plays an intricate role in the wasta system across Iraq.163 According to the think-tank ‘The
Conversation’, wasta, ‘which involves serving those you favour and hold close, such as friends andfamily’ continued to serve Iraq’s elites who governed through this system at the expense of the
majority of citizens who have been struggling.164
In areas previously held by ISIL, REACH found that 407 out of 499 women who participated in surveys
and FGDs ‘reported asking friends and family contacts and networks for help in finding a job’.
According to the report, connections were indispensable to secure government contracts and IDPs
tended to rely more on friends and relatives than on political connections.165 In a report published on
23 October 2019, and based on more than 1 250 surveys conducted in Mosul and Tal Afar, DRC foundthat investment in support networks, which include family members, relatives, friends,
cultural/religious groups, and local businesses was important ‘to meet basic needs, often throughsmall cash loans or acquiring goods and services on credit’. Additionally, maintaining those networks
required certain social decorum, e.g. attending social events, meeting social obligations, andreciprocating behaviour.166 Furthermore, socially investing in such networks was a prerequisite foraccessing debt.167 Nevertheless, Humanitarian Policy Group observed that in Mosul ‘the networks
supporting people in displacement or under ISIL rule have now dissipated and have been replaced bya reported atmosphere of mistrust’. The report added that nepotism and corruption were pertinent
to securing jobs and receiving compensations, and that even working for NGOs was dependent on
connections.168

Welfare services
The IOM 2019 Iraq Factsheet stated that the Iraqi government provided basic services such as freeeducation, healthcare, and food rations to all citizens without discrimination, including returnees. The
welfare system varied between municipalities and provinces, and criteria existed, based on whichcases of people with vulnerabilities, e.g. disabled individuals and families with widows, were assessed.
The eligibility criteria were applicable to returnees who needed to register at the Ministry of Labour
and Social Affairs Offices and submit their ID and Food Ration Cards, as well as other documents the
Ministry might request.169 In addition to government assistance, UNOCHA stated in the 2020 Global
Humanitarian Overview that ‘humanitarian organizations will provide support related to well-being
and living standards for acutely vulnerable returnees’. According to the report, the focus in 2020 will

162 Chatelard, G., Comment made during the review of EASO’s 2019 Key Socio-economic Indicators - Iraq, 19 October 2018
163 Hesselink, E., On Coercion and Persuasion: How militia group Hashd al-Shaabi made strategic use of legitimacy sources inestablishing civilian compliance in Ninewa governorate, Iraq, in 2017 and 2018, Utrecht University, 2 August 2019, url, p. 27
164 Conversation (The), Iraq’s discontent – its roots and how to begin fixing it, 23 October 2019, url
165 REACH, Iraq: Assessment on employment and working conditions of conflict affected women across key sectors,
November 2019, url, p. 26
166 DRC and UKAID, Household Debt in Iraq: Borrowing in a time of Crisis, 23 October 2019, url, p. 10
167 DRC and UKAID, Household Debt in Iraq: Borrowing in a time of Crisis, 23 October 2019, url, p. 24
168 HPG, The humanitarian response in Iraq: Support beyond international assistance in Mosul, July 2019, url, p. 21
169 IOM, Country Factsheet: Iraq, 2019, url, p. 7

30 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS

be on 1.8 million persons who are the most vulnerable out of the 4.1 million persons in need ofassistance in Iraq.170
According to a UNOCHA report published in November 2019, IDP children residing outside of camps
as well as vulnerable children in host communities ‘require stronger linkages with social protection
safety nets to ensure access to education’.171 Furthermore, a report published in April 2019 by DRC
observed that female-headed households were more susceptible to stigmatisation and exclusion due
to lack of ‘strong community support networks to navigate potentially hostile environments’.172

1.7 Obtaining lost documents for returnees and IDPs
1.7.1 Implications of missing documents
Aid groups estimated that ‘in early 2019 at least 156,000 displaced people are missing at least someof their essential civil documentation’.173 A joint report published on 16 September 2019 by the
Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), and the International Rescue
Committee (IRC) stated that 80 000 families across Iraq were estimated to have members who missat least one civil document.174 UNHCR reported that from June to August 2019, a Multi-Cluster Needs
Assessment was conducted which revealed that ‘nearly 2.9 million individuals, including camp-based
and out-of-camp IDPs as well as returnees, are missing at least one form of civil documentation’.175
A policy research paper of the World Bank Group published in February 2020 stated that IDPs wereregistered by the Ministry of Migration and Displacement. Reportedly, registered IDP households
were issued special ID cards, which enabled them to receive government and NGO assistance.176
According to Landinfo, an ID card is essential, ‘since it is used in all contact with the public authorities,
the health service, the social welfare services, schools, and when buying and selling houses and cars.
In addition, the ID card must be presented when applying for other official documents, for example a
passport.’177 Furthermore, the difficulty in obtaining death or missing person certificate ‘impacts
women’s ability to access services’ in cases where relevant documents were issued in the names of
their husbands or fathers. This included claiming unpaid salaries of spouses.178

1.7.2 Current arrangements and regulations in place
The UNAMI/OHCHR report of February 2020 stated that ‘according to the Civil Status Law,
identification documents must be renewed in the applicant’s place of origin, requiring IDPs to returnto their hometown for this purpose’. The report added that the return of IDPs to areas previously heldby ISIL was problematic due to ‘local “decrees” and threats of violence’.179 The UN Special Rapporteuron the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons also observed that the current practice was that170 UNOCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview 2020, 4 December 2019, url, p. 45
171 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Iraq, November 2019, url, p. 43
172 NRC, Barriers from Birth: Undocumented children in Iraq sentenced to a life on the margins, April 2019, url, p. 14
173 HRW, Iraq: Not a Homecoming, 14 June 2019, url
174 NRC,et al., Paperless people of post-conflict Iraq: Denied rights, barred from basic services and excluded fromreconstruction efforts, 16 September 2019, url, p. 5
175 UNHCR, Iraq: UNHCR Civil Documentations for IDPs, 20 November 2019, available at: url, p. 1
176 Phadera, L. et al, Iraq’s Universal Public Distribution System : Utilization and Impacts During Displacement, World Bank
Group, February 2020, url, p. 6
177 Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Travel documents and other identity documents, 16 December 2015, url, p. 17
178 NRC et al., Paperless people of post-conflict Iraq: Denied rights, barred from basic services and excluded fromreconstruction efforts, 16 September 2019, url, p. 21
179 UNAMI and OHCHR, The Right to Education in Iraq: Part One: the legacy of ISIL territorial control on access to education,
February 2020, url, p. 12

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS— 31

IDPs needed to go to their places of origin to obtain civil documentation according to Iraqi law.
However, she made reference to an initiative by the Iraqi government and humanitarian partners ‘tosend mobile units to a number of IDP camps’.180
In a report published in December 2019, UNHCR stated that it collaborated with the Ministry ofInterior ‘to implement mobile missions to dispatch government officials to issue civil documentation
to IDPs in camps and out-of-camp locations’. Reportedly, the Ministry launched missions to issue civil
documents to IDPs in 15 camps in the governorates of Erbil, Dohuk, Ninawa, Sulaimaniya and Kirkuk.
By the end of December 2019, the Ministry of Interior managed to issue 9 678 Civil Status IDs, 17 854
Nationality Certificates, 471 Unified National IDs across three governorates.181
On 1 November 2019, Kirkuk Now announced the opening of the first centre to issue the new National
Card in Mosul, Ninawa governorate.182 The issue of the electronic biometric cards has started in
September 2015183, and according to Kirkuk Now, the National Card will replace four other documents
including the ID card, and the procedures to obtain the new document are much simpler as applicants
are able to book appointments online. The source cited the Governor of Ninawa who stated that theauthorities plan to open other offices across the governorate.184 In a press release issued on 31
October 2019, UNHCR announced the opening of this National Identification Document Centre in
Ninawa governorate. However, according to UNHCR, the new National Card will replace only two civil
documents, namely the civil ID status data and the citizenship certificate. Moreover, UNHCR statedthat by the end of 2020, 600 000 people in Ninawa would benefit from the new centre.185 On 10
February 2020, the Iraqi Ministry of Interior announced the closure of three old civil document officesin Missan governorate in preparation for adopting the new National Card system.186 Finally, Iraq
Network Press, a media platform, reported that there have been complaints about a mistake in the
blood type field on the new National Card, with citizens blaming the authorities of filling the field witha default O+.187
Regarding the issue of civil status cards for Iraqi citizens living abroad, the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign
Affairs stated that ‘[t]he Consular Section organizes the papers to obtain the Civil Status Card and send
them to the General Directorate of Travel and Nationality / Directorate of Civil Status’. According to
the Ministry, the applicant has to submit an application form ‘used to obtain the Civil Status Card forthe first time or to renew it or to get damaged or lost alternate form and stamp with the circular stampof the consulate.’ The form can be filled by the head of the family, the ‘family housewife’, the ownerof the record, the guardian, or the legal agent. It has to include the following information: ‘[t]henumber of the page, the record, the name of the directory and the governorate, in which theregistration happened according to the census of 1957 and full descriptions and the names of those
the applicant wants to give them a personal card. The applicant must sign and write his full name andaddress in the cell provided and the form must be stamped by the consul.’ Moreover, an amount of
750 IQD (equivalent to 1 USD according to the source) has to be paid, and the applicant can authorise

180 OHCHR, End of Mission Statement by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced

persons, Ms. Cecilia Jimenez-Damary, upon conclusion of her official visit to Iraq – 15 to 23 February 2020, 27 February 2020,url
181 UNHCR, IRAQ | UNHCR CIVIL DOCUMENTATION FOR IDPS, December 2019, url, p. 2‫[ البطاقة الوطنية الموحدة تدخل ن‬Unified National Card Enters into Force in Ninawa for
182 Kirkuk Now, ‫حت التنفيذ نق نينوى للمرة األوىل‬‫ي‬the First Time], 1 November 2019, url
183 EASO, Iraq: Internal Mobility, February 2019, url, p. 21‫[ البطاقة الوطنية الموحدة تدخل ن‬Unified National Card Enters into Force in Ninawa for
184 Kirkuk Now, ‫حت التنفيذ نق نينوى للمرة األوىل‬‫ي‬the First Time], 1 November 2019, url
185 UNHCR, Press Release - With the support of UNHCR: Inauguration of the first National Identification Document Centre in
Ninewa Governorate, 31 October 2019, available at: url
186 Iraq, Ministry of Interior, ‫[ محافظة ميسان تعلن ايقاف العمل بثالثة دوائر لغرض العمل بالبطاقة الوطنية‬Missan governorate announces
the closure of three departments in order to switch to the National Card], 10 February 2020, url
187 INP Plus, ‫ فما هو؟‬.. ‫[ !خطأ فادح نق إصدار البطاقة الوطنية العراقية الموحدة نق عدة محافظات عراقية‬A Grave Error in the Issue of the Iraqi‫ي‬‫ي‬
Unified National Card in Several Iraqi Governorates.. What Is It?], 25 June 2019, url

32 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS

another Iraqi citizen residing in Iraq to follow up with the Civil Affairs Department. Once issued, theDepartment of Nationality and Civil Status sends the card to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which inturn sends it to the embassy or the mission concerned.188 The same information is found on thewebsites of the Iraqi embassies in Brussels189, Berlin190, Vienna191, and Bern192 among others.

1.7.3 How to obtain lost documents
The UNAMI/OHCHR report outlined the current process for obtaining new civil registration documents
in Iraq. The first step is to apply for security clearance by submitting one’s name to the intelligence
forces in the applicant’s area. Names are checked against a database of ISIL affiliates, and theapplication is denied if a relative’s name appears in the database. Moreover, the report stated thatcases of denial of security clearance, destruction of application and/or the old documents, and arrestof applicants were reported to UNAMI.193 A report published earlier by Human Rights Watch on 14
June 2019 described the same procedure.194
With regard to IDPs obtaining security clearance, Human Rights Watch described different practices
in different locations. First, it described a process called tabriya (acquittal), whereby IDP families who
had a missing relative could lodge a complaint against that relative over ISIL affiliation before a judge.
The judge would then issue a document enabling the family to obtain security clearance. The source
cited a woman in Qaim who was allegedly forced to do tabriya after her return. Moreover, tabriya isrejected in certain areas where there is a ‘blanket ban’ on the return of IDP families with ISIL links. The
second practice is the issuance of special pink ID cards in Karma, Anbar governorate, to more than 200
returning families who have relatives suspected with ISIL affiliation. According to the report, theauthorities in the town stated that ‘the families were allowed to return home and can use thedocuments to travel through checkpoints but will be permanently marked by the pink cards’. The third
practice was to force one male member of the family to join a local armed unit of the PMU in Sinsil,
Diyala, to conduct ‘neighborhood patrols’ without a pay.195
Finally, the NRC/DRC/IRC report observed that persons with a missing or deceased relative could not
obtain documents until the government locates the body of the relative. Due to the difficulty inproving death, the relatives are required to declare the person missing in a police station with thetestimony of two men or four women. The Criminal Investigation Court will then open a case and therelatives are required to publish a public notice in the newspaper. When two years have passed
without news from the missing persons, the relatives can request that the person be declared deadby the Personal Status Court, although this can take up to four years according to the source.196 A
Human Rights Council report dated 5 June 2018 made reference to what could be considered as‘certificate of absence’ issued by a judge and valid for three years. According to the report, ‘thesecertificates may be withheld from families of disappeared suspected ISIL members, including thosethat went missing after surrendering to ISF or affiliated forces.’197

188 Iraq, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, THE CIVIL STATUS ID, n. d., url
189 Iraq, Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Brussels, The Civil Status ID, n. d., url
190 Iraq, Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Berlin, The Civil Status ID, n. d., url
191 Iraq, Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Vienna, The Civil Status ID, n. d., url
192 Iraq, Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Bern, The Civil Status ID, n. d., url
193 UNAMI and OHCHR, The Right to Education in Iraq: Part One: the legacy of ISIL territorial control on access to education,

February 2020, url, p. 12
194 HRW, Iraq: Not a Homecoming, 14 June 2019, url
195 HRW, Iraq: Not a Homecoming, 14 June 2019, url
196 NRC et al., Paperless people of post-conflict Iraq: Denied rights, barred from basic services and excluded fromreconstruction efforts, 16 September 2019, url, p. 21
197 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her
mission to Iraq, 5 June 2018, url, pp. 15-16

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS— 33

As regards Iraqi living abroad, the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated that the procedure toobtain a lost document is similar to the regular procedure described in 1.7.2 above. The only
difference is that the consul has to write down the statement of the applicant which must include
information about the place, time, and the way in which the document was lost.198

1.7.4 Obstacles and difficulties
The NRC/DRC/IRC report of 16 September 2019 indicated a number of challenges that people withlost documents had to face in order to obtain new ones. The first was high costs: persons interviewed
for the study stated that they had to pay 200 000 IQD (equivalent to 148 EUR199) to obtain a civil ID,
and 50 000 IQD (equivalent to 37 EUR) for a blood test required to formalise marriages in Tikrit. In
addition, respondents flagged widespread corruption, bribery, and Wasta, especially in Mosul.200
Moreover, over-crowdedness of the civil directorates (most serious in Salah Al-Din and Ninawa),
scatteredness of courts and bureaucracy made it difficult for Iraqis to obtain documents. In Mosul,
IDPs and returnees signalled significant delays in the process of document renewal, which hinderedthem from travelling for work.201 Finally, as paperless persons are required to go to their areas of origin
to replace documents, many cannot for financial or security reasons. Those who are blocked fromreturning to their areas of origin often cannot proceed further with the process to obtain
documents.202

1.8 Impact of COVID-19
The World Health Organization (WHO) stated that as of 17 July 2020, there have been 83 867
confirmed cases of COVID-19, with 3 432 deaths in Iraq.203 In an attempt to limit the spread of thepandemic, the Iraqi government announced a nation-wide curfew that entered into force on 17 March
2020; in the KRI, the curfew started on 14 March 2020.204 According to UNHCR COVID-19 update
published on 12 July 2020, the KRG extended movement restrictions until further notice and banned
movement between governorates. The Government of Iraq imposed partial curfew from 19:00 to
06:00 during weekdays and 24 hours during weekends in the central and southern governorates.
Moreover, mass gatherings as well as the majority of public spaces were closed until further notice ata national level.205
UNOCHA reported on the impact of COVID-19 and the consequent movement restriction measureson IDPs. The impact included delayed cash distributions, limitation on physical mobility, and increased
prices and scarcity of items. Additionally, UNOCHA observed that ‘some IDPs resorted to engaging
unauthorized vendors to enable the cash-out process, who charged them a significant commission toaccess their money’ due to the closure of banks. Finally, UNOCHA also stated that due to the COVID19 impact on the Iraqi economy, the WFP extended its list of ‘people identified as most at risk of foodinsecurity’ to include additional 10 000 IDPs and 35 000 refugees.206

198 Iraq, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, THE CIVIL STATUS ID, n. d., url
199 Exchange rates from url accessed on 9 June 2020
200

NRC et al., Paperless people of post-conflict Iraq: Denied rights, barred from basic services and excluded fromreconstruction efforts, 16 September 2019, url, p. 19
201 NRC et al., Paperless people of post-conflict Iraq: Denied rights, barred from basic services and excluded fromreconstruction efforts, 16 September 2019, url, pp. 17, 20
202 NRC et al., Paperless people of post-conflict Iraq: Denied rights, barred from basic services and excluded fromreconstruction efforts, 16 September 2019, url, pp. 20-21
203 WHO, WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard: Iraq, 21 June 2020, url
204 Health Cluster Iraq, Health Cluster Bulletin No. 3, March 2020, url, p. 3
205 UNHCR, IRAQ | UNHCR COVID-19 UPDATE XII, 12 July 2020, url, p. 1
206 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Bulletin, April 2020, url, p. 3

34 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORSA UN Security Council report published on 6 May 2020 made reference to COVID-19 crisis and all thesubsequent preventive measures giving rise to ‘concerns regarding the population’s economic welfare
and access to health resources’. According to the report, protests against the imposed measures andtheir impact on livelihoods were organised in Baghdad and other locations.207 In a briefing to the
Security Council on 12 May 2020, the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-Generalfor Iraq stated that the imposed curfew ‘brought commercial activity to a near standstill, imperillingthe already problematic livelihoods of many Iraqis who rely on daily earnings to feed themselves andtheir families’.208 According to DRC, the restrictive measures imposed by the Iraqi government ‘havealready had drastic consequences on the country’s economy’. Reportedly, 83 % of respondents in theassessed areas, i.e. Dohuk, Erbil, Diyala, and Salah Al-Din, did not have any household member
currently working, and 97.7 % reported that they had to incur debt to meet basic needs.209
Moreover, UNAMI stated that it received ‘credible reports of social stigmatization of infected persons
in their communities, including verbal and physical attacks against them and their property’.210 The
report observed that the COVID-19 crisis, together with the drop in oil prices, had severely affected
the economic situation in Iraq.211 The Security Council Report on the Implementation of Resolution
2470 (2019) stated that on 7 April 2020, the Iraqi government allocated a sum of 600 billion IQD(500 million USD) ‘to mitigate the economic impact of the curfew on approximately 10 million affected
citizens over the next two months’.212
Regarding the impact of COVID-19 on the healthcare system in Iraq, Education for Peace in Iraq Center(EPIC) observed that there has been an exponential increase in the number of COVID-19 cases since
mid-May. The report added that the ‘situation at many of Iraq’s hospitals deteriorated rapidly, as
waves of new cases exposed their capacity to cope with extraordinary pressure and overwhelmed
their overworked and under-resourced staff.’213 Moreover, WHO data showed that 6.2 % of the
COVID-19 cases were Health Care Providers214, which might have catastrophic repercussions on thehealthcare system in Iraq, which is already suffering from a limited number of health care providers.215
Finally, the EPIC report suggested that the actual numbers of COVID-19 deaths might be higher thanthe official ones due to the difficulty in registering death cases that occur outside hospitals.216
Finally, regarding the impact of COVID-19 on education, UNICEF stated that schools in federal Iraq
have been closed since 27 February 2020 in order to limit the spread of the virus. Closure of schools
was extend each time the Ministry of Health extended curfews and movement restriction. This,according to UNICEF, ‘leaves all school-age children, who make up around 30 per cent of the estimatedpopulation of 37 million, without access to learning.’217

207 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019): Report of the Secretary-General, S/2020/363, 6May 2020,

url, p. 13
208 UNAMI, Briefing to the Security Council by Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Iraq Jeanine
Hennis-Plasschaert, 12 May 2020, url
209 DRC, Labor Market and Livelihoods Competency Assessment : Iraq, April 2020, url, p. 15
210 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019): Report of the Secretary-General, S/2020/363, 6 May
2020, url, p. 9
211 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019): Report of the Secretary-General, S/2020/363, 6 May
2020, url, p. 13
212 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019): Report of the Secretary-General, S/2020/363, 6 May
2020, url, p. 3
213 EPIC, IRAQ’S HEALTH SYSTEM AT RISK: THE STRUGGLE TO FIGHT COVID-19 AND SAVE LIVES, 25 June 2020, url, pp. 1-2
214 WHO, Iraq COVID-19 dashboard, n. d., url
215 EPIC, IRAQ’S HEALTH SYSTEM AT RISK: THE STRUGGLE TO FIGHT COVID-19 AND SAVE LIVES, 25 June 2020, url, p. 3
216 EPIC, IRAQ’S HEALTH SYSTEM AT RISK: THE STRUGGLE TO FIGHT COVID-19 AND SAVE LIVES, 25 June 2020, url, p. 5
217 UNICEF, 2020 Internal Displacement Crisis Humanitarian Situation Report, 23 April 2020, available at: url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS

— 35

36 —

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS

2. Socio-economic indicators in Iraq – with afocus on Baghdad, Basra, and Erbil
2.1 Economy
2.1.1 Country overview
In a report published in the second half of 2019, the World Bank reported on a ‘broad-based’ recoveryof the Iraqi economy incurred by the increase in the oil production and improvements in the
agriculture and electricity sectors. The expansion in the oil sector was estimated to be 4.4 % and theservices sector was also reported to have improved.218 Moreover, the report stated that consumption‘picked up’ in 2019, while ‘overall investment’ made little progress because of ‘persistent public
investment management constraints and unfavorable business environment’.219 The public debt wasreportedly on the rise in 2019 due to increased reliance on domestic financing.220 Bertelsmann StiftungTransformation Index (BTI) indicated that in Iraq, the private sector is weak, and that the ‘economy islargely public or semi-public’.221
Notwithstanding the above-mentioned observations of the World Bank in the first half of 2019, theSpecial Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Iraq predicted in May 2020 that
the Iraqi economy would contract by 9.7 %.222 BTI stated that, for the reporting period 1 February
2017 – 31 January 2019, Iraq’s economy ranked 168 out of 190 worldwide, making it ‘one of theweakest in the world’. The factors that contributed to this were corruption and political instability, as
well as ‘visa requirements, shortages in electricity supply, customs regulations, “unreliable dispute
resolution mechanisms” and a lack of access to finance’.223 The source noted that ‘private limited
liability companies (LLCs) constitute the main organs of investment in Iraq, with branch offices offoreign corporations also contributing significantly to the private sector’, which remained weak. 224
Moreover, the CSO indicated that the inflation rate increased by 0.7 % for the period July – September
2019 compared to the previous quarter.225
BTI observed that the Iraqi economy is dependent on global oil prices as 90 % of the government
revenue comes from oil.226 This, according to UNOCHA, has resulted in high rates of unemployment,
as the public sector became the main employer while the private sector was incapable of employing‘the thousands of college graduates searching for jobs’.227 The CIA World Factbook also observed that

218 World Bank Group, Iraq Economic Monitor – Turning the Corner: Sustaining Growth and Creating Opportunity for Iraq’s

Youth, Fall 2019, url, p. 3
219 World Bank Group, Iraq Economic Monitor – Turning the Corner: Sustaining Growth and Creating Opportunity for Iraq’s
Youth, Fall 2019, url, p. 4
220 World Bank Group, Iraq Economic Monitor – Turning the Corner: Sustaining Growth and Creating Opportunity for Iraq’s
Youth, Fall 2019, url, p. 7
221 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2020 Country Report — Iraq, 29 April 2020, url, p. 19
222 UNAMI, Briefing to the Security Council by Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Iraq Jeanine
Hennis-Plasschaert, 12 May 2020, url
223 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2020 Country Report — Iraq, 29 April 2020, url, p. 20
224 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2020 Country Report — Iraq, 29 April 2020, url, p. 21
225 Iraq, CSO, ‫ مـؤش ـرات اإلنــذار المبك ــر للـربــع الثالث لس ــنة‬2019 [Early Warning Indicators for the Third Quarter of 2019], 2019, url, p.
5
226 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2020 Country Report — Iraq, 29 April 2020, url, p. 19
227 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Iraq, November 2019, url, p. 11

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS— 37

the oil sector dominated the economy, and provided around 85 % of government revenue and 80 %of foreign exchange earnings.228
Following a decision taken by OPEC to reduce the production of oil, the KRG and the Iraq government
agreed to reduce the production of oil accordingly.229 The UN report stated that ‘Baghdad and Erbil
continued to affirm that the disbursement of salaries to government employees would not beaffected’ by the worldwide decrease in oil prices. Moreover, the report cited the KRG, whichannounced that civil servants in the KRI would continue to receive their salaries.230 However, the New
Arab stated that in mid-April, Baghdad decided to stop paying the KRI its share of the federal budget
and claimed outstanding payments from Erbil. According to the source, the budget allocated by thefederal government to the KRG each month corresponds to 50% of the public salaries in the region.231
Several sources referred to corruption and governance-related issues as the major challenges the Iraqi
economy has been facing. The World Bank Group categorised weak governance and wide spread
corruption as a main factor that hindered private sector development.232 BTI observed that ‘corruption
and the lack of institutional capacity remain endemic, undermining governmental performance inprotecting socioeconomic and political outcomes, and civil liberties and the rights of citizens’.233
Moreover, the source reiterated that high levels of corruption and the weak rule of law have damaged
the ‘already crippled economy’.234 In addition, the Special Representative of the United Nations
Secretary-General for Iraq stated that corruption ‘is perhaps the greatest source of dysfunction in
Iraq’, affecting the everyday life of the Iraqi citizen and putting off investors.235 According to the 2020
Index of Economic Freedom published by the Heritage Foundation, ‘[b]ribery, money laundering,
nepotism, and misappropriation of public funds are common’ and government officials engaged incorruption and enjoyed impunity.236
There have been rising concerns regarding the impact of the COVID-19 crisis and the plummeting oil
prices on the economic situation in Iraq. The report of the UN Security Council reiterated that ‘[t]heeconomic situation of Iraq has been severely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic and declining global
oil prices’.237 The WFP Iraq Market Monitor Report of April 2020 echoed the same concern. The reportobserved that the COVID-19 crisis and the global drop in oil prices risk reversing ‘the economic gainsof the previous year ’which saw a GDP growth of 4.4 %.238
The World Bank Group stated that ‘Iraqis have taken the streets in October 2019 to protest lack ofjobs, ramping corruption, and poor quality of services. The demonstrators were mostly young,between the ages of 18 to 30, and were mobilized by social demands.’239 According to an article
published by Al-Monitor on 21 May 2020, demonstrations in Iraq were resumed after around twomonths of quiet.240 A recent wave of protests was incited by government measures taken in the wake
228 US, CIA, The World Factbook: Iraq, 17 June 2020, url
229 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019): Report of the Secretary-General, S/2020/363, 6 May

2020, url, p. 4
230 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019): Report of the Secretary-General, S/2020/363, 6 May
2020, url, p. 3
231 New Arab (The), In Iraqi Kurdistan, plunging oil prices raise fears of economic collapse, 28 May 2020, url
232 World Bank Group, Iraq Economic Monitor – Turning the Corner: Sustaining Growth and Creating Opportunity for Iraq’s
Youth, Fall 2019, url, p. 11
233 BTI, 2020 Country Report — Iraq, 29 April 2020, url, p. 4
234 BTI, 2020 Country Report — Iraq, 29 April 2020, url, p. 27
235 UNAMI, Briefing to the Security Council by Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Iraq Jeanine
Hennis-Plasschaert, 12 May 2020, url
236 Heritage Foundation (The), 2020 Index of Economic Freedom: Iraq, 2020, url, p. 265
237 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019): Report of the Secretary-General, S/2020/363, 6 May
2020, url, p. 13
238 WFP, Iraq Market Monitor Report, Issue No. 30, April 2020, url, p. 2
239 World Bank Group, Iraq Economic Monitor – Turning the Corner: Sustaining Growth and Creating Opportunity for Iraq’s
Youth, Fall 2019, url, p. 13
240 Al-monitor, Iraqi protests resume as new government builds support for reform, 21 May 2020, url38 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORSof the economic crisis in Iraq. On 17 June 2020, Aljazeera reported that hundreds of people took to
the streets in central and southern provinces in Iraq to protest the government’s decision to stop thecompensations/salaries it has been paying to Rafha refugees.241 According to Iraq Business News, theCouncil of Ministers decided on 9 June 2020 to limit the payments to former political prisoners, socalled Rafha Detainees, to one person per family, i.e. the head of household, provided that he/she
does not receive other government salaries.242 Previously, the benefits were paid to each member of
those families.243

2.1.2 Baghdad
Baghdad City is the capital of Iraq, home to the Iraqi federal government. A large part of Iraq’s
manufacturing is located in Baghdad, with the exception of heavy industry. The government is thecity’s principal employer.244 The governorate of Baghdad is the centre of the Iraqi economic,
commercial, banking and financial sectors. It is also an important hub for the oil and gas industry, as
well as for the production of tobacco, leather and cement. Baghdad International Airport is the main
airport in Iraq and the capital is well connected by roads and rail to the rest of the country. Baghdad
City is home to four universities and a number of educational and research institutions.245
New York Times outlined several simultaneous crises Iraq has been undergoing, including theplummeting oil prices, COVID-19 and the nation-wide curfew imposed to slow the spread of the virus,
the anti-government protests, and the attacks launched by Iran-backed militias against US troops.
According to the source, ‘[c]onstruction workers, street vendors, domestic workers and taxi drivers
have been forced to stay at home’ because of the curfew, and are ‘on the edge of hunger’.246

2.1.3 Basra
According to Sajad Jiyad, Basra’s oil exports constituted around 98 % of Iraq’s federal revenues in
2019, ‘with a monthly average of around $6.5bn’. Despite this massive oil export, the source observedthat poverty and lack of basic services were prevalent in the governorate and were the driver behindthe protests that took place in 2018 and 2019. Moreover, the source referred to governance-related
issues Basra has been facing since 2003, especially with regard to the responsibilities of the local andthe federal governments. Finally, the source concluded that the population growth rate (current
population stands at 4 million in Basra city and 1 million in the rural part of the governorate), the ruralto-urban migration driven by environmental change, the drop in global oil prices and the COVID-19
crisis may have an impact on the economy of Basra.247
On 3 January 2020, Al-Arabiya reported that the US embassy in Baghdad urged all US citizens to leave
Iraq immediately, in the wake of the targeting of the commander of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC) and a commander of an Iraqi militia in a US airstrike. The Iraqi Oil Ministry

241 Aljazeera, ‫ من هم ولماذا يتظاهرون اآلن؟‬..‫[ الرفحاويون نق العراق‬Rafhawis in Iraq.. Who Are They and Why Are They Protesting‫ي‬Now?], 17 June 2020, url
According to the source, the Rafha refugees are considered by the Iraqi law as activists who participated in the 1991
revolution against the regime of Saddam Hussein and who were forced to flee Iraq to the neighbouring city of Rafha in Saudi
Arabia.
242 Iraq Business News, Cabinet Ends Double Payments to fmr Detainees at Camp Rafha, 24 June 2020, url
243 NRT, Iraq cuts benefits to families who sheltered in Rafha camp during gulf war, 22 June 2020. url
244 Encyclopaedia Britannica, Iraq, 25 October 2018, url
245 NCCI, Baghdad Governorate Profile, December 2015, url, p. 2
246 New York Times (The), Oil Prices Crash, Virus Hits, Commerce Stops: Iraq Is in Trouble., 29 March 2020, url
247 Jiyad, S., Failure of Governance in Basra puts all of Iraq at Risk, LSE, 2 April 2020, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS— 39

announced that some US citizens working in the oil industry in Basra were leaving in compliance with
their embassy’s call.248

2.1.4 Erbil
The KRI economy is dominated by government employment, construction, wholesale and retail trade,
and agriculture. It also has a growing oil industry.249 In a 2016 report, the World Bank described the
KRI economy as being dominated by government employment which amounted to more than 50 % in
total employment, and by a high dependency on the oil sector.250 According to a Minority Rights GroupInternational 2017 report ‘90 % of all Kurdish government revenues come from the oil and gas
sector.’251
The Erbil governorate is the commercial and administrative centre of the KRI. It is rich in natural
resources, especially oil and gas, while the food supply is dependent on agriculture and food products
imported from Iran and Turkey.252 According to IOM, ‘the city of Erbil is a trade center in Iraq and atransit point for most imported materials reaching Iraq from abroad, particularly from Turkey.’253 Its
attractiveness to tourists makes Erbil the most visited region of the KRI, representing two thirds of
tourist arrivals.254 According to a 2017 analysis by Mark A. DeWeaver, economist at the American
University of Iraq Sulaimani, the KRI has entered into the third year of an economic recession that has
started with the 2014 crash in world oil prices (which fell by over 50 % in the second half of thatyear).255 Following tensions in 2014 over oil revenue sharing between the regional and federal
government256, the relations between Erbil and Baghdad worsened after the KRG held an
independence referendum in September 2017 that saw 93 % of voters overwhelmingly endorsing thesecession from Iraq.257 The vote, which was opposed by Baghdad and Iraq’s neighbouring countries,
Turkey, Iran and Western powers, was met with military and economic retaliation from Baghdad,
which included forced closure of Erbil International Airport and re-gaining control of disputed
territories such as the oil-rich area of Kirkuk.258
The World Bank noted in April 2018 that as a result of Iraq’s punitive measures ‘KRG has lost half of
its oil revenue’ and the ‘federal budget proposes to reduce transfers to KRG from ID12 trillion [about
EUR 8.86 billion] in 2017 to ID6.7 trillion [about EUR 4.95 billion] in 2018 and requires KRG to transfer
the entirety of its remaining oil export receipts to the federal government.’259 The World Bank pointed
out that lower level of transfers could be insufficient to pay salaries to KRG’s civil servants and themilitary and ‘could further increase vulnerability in KRG’.260 In a May 2018 report, the United States

248 Al-Arabiya, Iraq oil ministry confirms US oil workers leaving Basra, 3 January 2020, url
249 Georges, V., et. al, Initiatives to Improve Quality of Education in the Kurdistan Region — Iraq: Administration, School

Monitoring, Private School Policies, and Teacher Training. Kurdistan Regional Government, 2016, url, pp. 3-4
250 World Bank (The), The Kurdistan region of Iraq - Reforming the economy for shared prosperity and protecting thevulnerable, 2016, url, pp. x-xi
251 MRG, Crossroads: The future of Iraq’s minorities after ISIS, 7 June 2017 url, p. 21
252 IOM, Community Stabilization Handbook: An overview of community transition and recovery achievements in Iraq 20152016, 19 January 2017, url, p. 138
253 IOM, Community Stabilization Handbook: An overview of community transition and recovery achievements in Iraq 20152016, 19 January 2017, url, p. 138
254 World Bank (The), The Kurdistan region of Iraq - Reforming the economy for shared prosperity and protecting thevulnerable (Vol. 2): Main report, 2016 url, p. 52
255 DeWeaver, M. A., Making Ends Meet: Economic Reforms in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, in IRIS Iraq Report , American
University of Iraq-Sulaimani, 2017, url, p. 2
256 CRF, The Time of the Kurds, 29 July 2015, url
257 Reuters, Iraqi Kurds gear up for elections hoping to end turmoil, 11 September 2018, url
258 IPS, Homebound: Hardship Awaits Internally Displaced Iraqis, 18 April 2018, url
259 World Bank (The), Iraq Economic Monitor From War to Reconstruction and Economic Recovery, April 2018 url, p. x
260 World Bank (The), Iraq Economic Monitor From War to Reconstruction and Economic Recovery, April 2018 url, p. 15

40 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORSInstitute of Peace estimated that ‘KRG’s debt is at least USD 17 billion [about EUR 15 billion], anunsustainable level that is probably in excess of 100 % of the region’s GDP.’261
The recent plummeting of oil prices has exacerbated the economic crisis in the KRI according to the
New Arab. The source quoted the KRG Prime Minister, who declared that ‘[t]he Kurdish economy wasslashed by more than 90 percent since the recent oil price crash’. The crisis affected all economy
sectors including the services sector and private businesses. Furthermore, there were plans in midMay to diversify the economy and to invest in sectors other than oil, such as agriculture, industry andtourism.262

2.2 Employment
2.2.1 Country overview
As of 2017, the public sector was Iraq’s largest employer, representing an estimation of 42 %-50 %263
and as high as 60 % of all jobs.264 The sector employed people mainly in education, defence, and theMinistry of Interior. Public sector wages accounted for 40 % of the government’s budget in 2017.265
The same trend was noted in the KRI. It is estimated that in 2016 the public sector, excluding the oneof the KRG, accounted for approximately 1.8 million employees. The Ministry of Education provided
the most jobs, more than 650 000.266 It is estimated that the public sector in the KRI in 2018 provided
for 682 021 jobs.267
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) estimated that in 2017 approximately 40 % of the total
employment in Iraq was self-employment.268 In the private sector, construction constituted 15 % of
all private sector employment. Private sector manufacturing companies existed, but 97 % were large
companies owned by the government. Moreover, agriculture used to be the sixth largest economic
sector, but the years of conflict, climate change, legislative challenges, and low investment in newtechnologies negatively impacted the sector.269
Unregistered or informal work accounted for about 20 % of Iraq's employment.270 Iraqis facedcompetition on the job market by foreign workers, residing and working in Iraq either legally orillegally. The media reported that employers may prefer foreign workers either because of specificqualifications or because they would accept lower wages.271
A report published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on 26 May 2020 statedthat there are no reliable figures regarding unemployment in Iraq, but indicators show that ‘Iraq mayneed to find some 300,000-450,000 additional new jobs for its young men and women per year during
2020-2030’.272 A DRC report published in April 2020 stated that 2.5 million unemployed Iraqis were inurgent need for jobs.273 Based on 2017 data, the WFP stated that unemployment rates were at 10.8 %,261 USIP, Kurdistan Region’s Debt Crisis Threatens Iraq’s Economy, 9 May 2018, url
262 New Arab (The), In Iraqi Kurdistan, plunging oil prices raise fears of economic collapse, 28 May 2020, url
263 IMF, Iraq – Selected Issues: IMF Country Report 17/252, August 2017, url, pp. 5-6
264 BTI, Iraq Country Report, 2018, url, p. 30 ; Mirza, A. “The Rentier Trap in Iraq: Comments and Recommendations’’, cited

in: Atlantic council, Beyond Security: Stabilization, Governance, and Socioeconomic Challenges in Iraq, July 2018, url
265 IMF, Iraq – Selected Issues: IMF Country Report 17/252, August 2017, url, pp. 5-6
266 IMF, Middle East and Central Asia Department, Public Wage Bills in the Middle East and Central Asia, 2018, url, p. 51
267 LSE Middle East Centre Blog, url, 31 July 2018, url
268 World Bank Data, Self-employed, total (% of total employment) (modelled ILO estimate), September 2018, url
269 DRC, Labor Market and Livelihoods Competency Assessment : Iraq, April 2020, url, pp. 9-10
270 Gunter, F. R., The Political Economy of Iraq, Cheltenham, Elgar 2013, p. 195
271 Arab Weekly (The), Foreign workers seeking jobs in Iraq despite perils, 18 February 2018, url; Washington Post (The),
Protests are mounting in Iraq? Why?, 21 July 2018, url
272 CSIS, Strategic Dialogue: Shaping a U.S. Strategy for the “Ghosts” of Iraq, 26 May 2020, url, p. 31
273 DRC, Labor Market and Livelihoods Competency Assessment : Iraq, April 2020, url, p. 9

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS— 41

and rose to over 15 % in 11 provinces. Moreover, unemployment rates exceeded 25 % in some of the
districts of Muthanna, Thi-Qar, Wasit, Missan and Salah Al-Din.274 The following map shows theunemployment percentages across Iraq:

Map 2: WFP Percentage of Unemployment 2019 based on 2016 data 275

According to the CIA Factbook, and based on 2017 estimates, unemployment among young people
aged 15-24 was 25.6 % in total, 22 % among males and 63.3 % among females.276 The World Bank,
based on ILO estimates, indicated almost no change in unemployment rates in 2019 compared to
2018. According to the dataset, unemployment reached 12.86 % in 2018 and 12.82 in 2019277; for men
the rates were 10.10 % in 2018 and 10.08 % in 2019278 and for women 30.85 % in 2018 and 30.40 % in2019279.
IOM’s Iraq Factsheet stated that improvement in the security situation resulted in an increase in
private investment, notably in the liberated areas where jobs in the sectors of tourism andentertainment were created. The wages, according to the Factsheet ranged between 200 USD and
2 500 USD depending on the level of education and skills. Furthermore, employment centres werecreated in most cities, and the government approved a programme to ‘assist workers with wages ofless than one USD per day and unemployed people’. Finally, IOM observed that there was no
unemployment cash assistance at a national level.280

274 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 40
275 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 42
276 US, CIA, The World Factbook: Iraq, 17 June 2020, url
277 World Bank (The), Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (modelled ILO estimate), 21 June 2020, url, TAB: Data
278 World Bank (The), Unemployment, male (% of male labor force) (modelled ILO estimate), 21 June 2020, url, TAB: Data
279 World Bank (The), Unemployment, female (% of female labor force) (modelled ILO estimate), 21 June 2020, url, TAB: Data
280 IOM, Country Factsheet: Iraq, 2019, url, p. 5

42 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS

2.2.2 Baghdad
According to the WFP, Baghdad governorate had the lowest unemployment rates ranging from 6 to
10 % (2016 data)281, while unemployment among persons aged 15 – 24 was 5-7 % (2017 data)282.
According to the CSO, unemployment among young people aged 15-24 was 18.6 % in 2016 in
Baghdad283, while the total unemployment rate in 2017 was 9.3 %.284 No more recent data could befound in the course of preparing this report.

2.2.3 Basra
Employment opportunities in southern Iraq are described as ‘limited’ due to the dominance of the oil
industry and DFAT reported in 2018 that people were moving to other areas of Iraq such as Baghdad,in search of employment.285
Oil dominated the economy, but provided only one percent of the labour force nationally.286 Oilcompanies in Basra frequently hire foreign workers instead of Iraqis, fuelling frustrations of the local
population with higher unemployment rates in the south.287 In response, the government approved aregulation that requires that 50 % of oil workers employed by foreign companies are Iraqis.288 NRC
conducted a market assessment in Basra and found that 80 % of the employers interviewed in thebusiness survey considered the private sector in Basra to be the main sector providing employment.
Of the respondents, 60 % reported that the main type of business was commerce/trading, while ‘7%each reported basic metal production, forestry wood, health, mechanical and electric engineering oil
and gas production, and oil refining and services sectors as main business types in Basra’.289
Rural employment in the Basra governorate is mainly agriculturally based; the sector has been
negatively impacted by water salinity and shortages in 2018.290
An NRC Fact Finding Mission from September 2018 found that residents of Basra stated thatunemployment had worsened in recent years and armed groups were ‘often the only employer’,noting that it was extremely hard to find employment, even in day labour.291 Some analysts statedthat returning former Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) members who left to fight ISIL have put
additional pressure on services and demand for employment.292 With regard to challenges young
people faced in making money, the NRC surveyed 40 young job seekers in Basra. Reportedly, thechallenges to youth employment were ‘corruption (34%), lack of employment opportunities (20%),
employers’ preference to hire foreign workers to nationals in the private sector (18%), lack ofexperience and skills among youth (9%), customs and traditions, (5%) and lack of national production(14%)’.293

281 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 42
282 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 43‫[ ر‬Employment and Unemployment Indicators], n. d., url
283 Iraq, CSO, ‫مؤشات التشغيل والبطالة‬284 Iraq, CSO, 2018 ‫[ الموجز االحصائ بغداد‬Statistical Summary Baghdad 2018],n. d., url‫ي‬

285 Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report – Iraq, 9 October 2018, url, p. 30
286 National (The), In Iraq’s oil-rich Basra, shanty towns flourish, 19 April 2018, url
287 National (The), In Iraq’s oil-rich Basra, shanty towns flourish, 19 April 2018, url;

Al Monitor, Basra protests spark
government scramble to create jobs, 22 August 2018, url
288 Al Monitor, Basra protests spark government scramble to create jobs, 22 August 2018, url
289 NRC, Market Assessment Report: Basra City, November 2019, url, pp. 15-16
290 NRC, Basra Livelihoods Technical Assessment, 21 October 2018, url
291 NRC, Basra Fact-Finding Mission Report #2, 22 September 2018, url, p. 3; the FFM took place from 26 to 29 August 2018
292 FP, Northern Iraq May Be Free, but the South is Seething, 9 November 2018, url; NRC, Basra Fact Finding Mission Report#1, 9 September 2018, url, p. 2, the FFM took place from 26 to 29 August 2018
293 NRC, Market Assessment Report: Basra City, November 2019, url, p. 26

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS— 43

Finally, the WFP stated that Basra governorate had an unemployment rate of 11 – 15 % (2016 data)294
while unemployment among persons aged 15 – 24 was 8-10 % (2017 data).295 According to the CSO,
unemployment among the youth aged 15-24 in Basra was 25.5 % in 2016296 and was 7.6 % in total in
2017.297 No more recent data could be found in the course of preparing this report.

2.2.4 Erbil
According to the IOM 2018 demographic survey, the labour force participation in Erbil City was
registered at 65.9 % of men and 14.8 % of women.298 Regarding the type of occupation, IOM data
showed that 43.7 % of Erbil’s city labour force had been working in the public sector, 13 % in theprivate sector, 18.7 % were self-employed, and 19.2 % were daily wageworkers.299
In Erbil governorate, the majority of the population is employed in the public sector, and 78 % of theemployed population had a written employment contract whereas informal employment was more
prone to take place in sectors such as construction and wholesale/retail sectors.300 In these sectors,
UNHCR writes, ‘only 30 % of workers are legally employed and receive wages instead of salaries.’301
The WFP observed that unemployment rates in Erbil governorate ranged between 11 % and 15 %(2016 data).302 Unemployment amongst persons aged 15 – 24 was 8-10 %, based on 2017 data.303
According to the CSO, unemployment among the youth aged 15-24 in Erbil was 13.6 % in 2016.304 No
more recent data could be found in the course of preparing this report.

2.3 Poverty
2.3.1 Country overview
BTI stated that 22.5 % of the Iraqi population is under poverty line, with poverty rates rising from 3.5
to 12.5 % in the KRI and reaching 41.2 % in areas held by ISIL and 30 % in southern provinces.305
Moreover, UNESCO observed that ‘[p]overty headcount ration at $1.90 a day’ was at 2.5 %.306 The
Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Iraq predicted that poverty rates
would double to reach 40 % in 2020.307 On 2 July 2020, Al-Sumariya stated that the Iraqi Minister ofLabour and Social Affairs announced that due to the COVID-19 crisis and the plummeting of oil prices,
poverty in Iraq increased from 22 % to 34 %.308

294 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 42
295 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 43‫[ ر‬Employment and Unemployment Indicators], n. d., url
296 Iraq, CSO, ‫مؤشات التشغيل والبطالة‬297 Iraq, CSO, 2018 ‫[ الموجز االحصائ البرصة‬Statistical Summary Basra 2018], n. d., url‫ي‬

298 IOM, Demographic Survey Kurdistan Region of Iraq, July 2018, url, p. 105
299 IOM, Demographic Survey Kurdistan Region of Iraq, July 2018, url, p. 100
300 UNHCR, Displacement as challenge and opportunity Urban profile: Refugees, internally displaced persons and hostcommunity Erbil Governorate, Kurdistan Region of Iraq, April 2016, url, p. 34
301 UNHCR, Displacement as challenge and opportunity Urban profile: Refugees, internally displaced persons and hostcommunity Erbil Governorate, Kurdistan Region of Iraq, April 2016, url, p. 30
302 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 42
303 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 43‫[ ر‬Employment and Unemployment Indicators], 21 June 2020, url
304 Iraq, CSO, ‫مؤشات التشغيل والبطالة‬305 BTI, 2020 Country Report — Iraq, 29 April 2020, url, p. 17
306 UNESCO, Iraq : General Information, n. d., url
307 UNAMI, Briefing to the Security Council by Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Iraq Jeanine
Hennis-Plasschaert, 12 May 2020, url
308 Al-Sumariya, ‫ بالمئة نق البالد‬34 ‫ اىل‬22 ‫[ العمل تعلن زيادة نسبة الفقر من‬Ministry of Labour announces that poverty rates increased‫ي‬from 22 % to 34 % in the country], 2 July 2020, url44 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORSIn Iraq, the social safety net is ‘expansive’ as a high percentage of the population is employed in the
public sector or receives pensions.309 IOM observed that public sector employees could retire at theage of 65 after having served for 25 years. In Baghdad, however, employees can retire at the age of
55 or after having worked for 25 years, or 15 years for employees with medical issues. Regarding theprivate sector, IOM stated that ‘[s]ome employees in the private sector may receive a pension stipend,which is managed by their employer.’310
According to WFP, poverty alleviation mechanisms existed and were enacted by the government.
These included the Public Distribution System (PDS), which distributed food rations to over 95 % of
Iraqi families, Social Protection Network (which supported more than 1.2 million vulnerable Iraqi
families by providing economic and social safety nets), education subsidies and public healthcare.311
The PDS continues to function, but has been impacted by the political instability in the country, andprovisions have not been delivered regularly.312 USDOS observed that the PDS was implemented‘sporadically and irregularly, with limited access in recently liberated areas’. Reportedly, not allcommodities were distributed each month, and the system was not accessible to all IDPs since it isrequired that citizens ‘redeem PDS rations or other services only at their registered place ofresidence’.313
The Iraqi government launched the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) for 2018-2022. The challenges
the PRS aimed at addressing were related to security and stability, good governance, fair distribution
and diversification of income, mitigating the negative impact of economic reforms on the poor, andthe high costs of the war on terrorism and the IDP crisis in the aftermath of the war against ISIL.314
Dr Chatelard commented that women without male relatives, including women-headed households,
divorced women and widows are placed in a vulnerable position economically and in terms of
exposure to harassment, and have difficulty finding employment, noting that the situation is notmarkedly better for widows, who also ‘lack the protection of a male relative and necessaryconnections to find employment and sustain dependent children’.315 UNOCHA reported in 2017 that
IDPs, particularly women in female-headed households, widows, disabled women and girls andteenage girls, were at risk of falling victim to abuse and experienced difficulties in getting humanitarianaid.316 IDPs in Baghdad with female-headed households had a higher proportion of people reporting
having no livelihood source and a high reliance on humanitarian aid and government assistance tocover their basic needs.317

2.3.2 Baghdad
The WFP Socio-economic Atlas of Iraq provided the following wealth index quintile for Baghdad:
poorest (17 %), lower-middle (24 %), middle (19 %), upper-middle (21 %), and richest (19 %). With
regard to household assets, the Atlas indicated the following breakdown for Baghdad: owner (67 %),rented (19 %), free with owner agreement (11 %), and random house (3 %).318 According to Oxford

309 BTI, 2020 Country Report — Iraq, 29 April 2020, url, pp. 22-23
310 IOM, Country Factsheet: Iraq, 2019, url, p. 7
311 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 40
312 BTI, 2020 Country Report — Iraq, 29 April 2020, url, p. 22
313USDOS, 2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 11 March 2020, url
314 Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Strategy for the Reduction of Poverty in Iraq 2018-2022, January 2018, url, pp. 1-2
315 Chatelard, G., Comment made during the review of this report, 19 October 2018
316 UNOCHA, Humanitarian needs overview, January 2017, p. 15, url
317 REACH, Comparative Multi-Cluster Assessment of IDPs Living in Camps, April 2018, url, p. 18
318 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 101

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS— 45

Poverty and Human Development Initiative 2019 dataset, 1.14 % of the population of Baghdad
governorate were in severe poverty, and 4 % were vulnerable to poverty in 2018.319
Baghdad has a high proportion of female-headed IDP households who were living in camps (24 % of
those surveyed by REACH as of April 2018).320 IOM also noted in October 2017 high numbers ofvulnerable groups in the population: ‘Baghdad hosts 17 % of IDPs in need of protection – 30 % ofmothers under 18, 18 % of female heads of household and 17 % of all physically and/or mentallychallenged individuals. A total of 5 % of physically and/or mentally challenged returnees are also
hosted in the governorate.’321
Internally displaced people and returnees in Baghdad reported that access to employment was a top
concern for those living in Baghdad.322 IOM stated that it was estimated that 88 % of IDPs relied on
earnings from informal labour, less than 20 % depended on pensions, 17 % were dependent on
support from family and friends, and 26 % relied on cash aid.323 A joint IOM/Georgetown University
study noted that, compared to other governorates, in Baghdad, the highest percentage of IDPs
(73.7 %) reported to be able to have an adequate standard of living. Local charities and aidorganisations based in Baghdad play an important role in providing assistance for IDPs living in thecapital. In addition, a relevant portion of IDPs had already relatives residing in the city, who provided
them with support.324

2.3.3 Basra
According to Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative 2019 dataset, 2.25 % of the
population of Basra governorate were in severe poverty, and 8.79 % were vulnerable to poverty in
2018.325
Poverty varies significantly between districts in Basra governorate.326 The World Bank found in 2015that Basra district itself had the highest poverty rate in the governorate, followed by Al Zubair, Al
Khaseeb, Al Qurna, Al Hartha, Al Deer, and Shatt Al Arab.327
In Basra City, begging has become a growing problem, with beggars forming organised systems andgangs, and become associated with, or run by criminal networks.328 Some female beggars have beenreported to drug their children whom they bring with them to beg.329 In impoverished areas of Basra,
gangs form to make a living from sifting through the garbage of wealthier inhabitants of the city.330

319 Alkire, S. et al., The Global Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative,

2019, url, Tab 5.1 MPI Region
320 REACH, Comparative Multi-Cluster Assessment of IDPs Living in Camps, April 2018, url, p. 15
321 IOM, Iraq Displacement Tracking Matrix, Integrated Location Assessment II, Governorate Profiles, October 2017, url, p. 5
322 IOM, Iraq Displacement Tracking Matrix, Integrated Location Assessment II, Governorate Profiles, October 2017, url, p.
32
323 IOM, Iraq Displacement Tracking Matrix, Integrated Location Assessment II, Governorate Profiles, October 2017, url, p.
25
324 IOM, SFS/Georgetown University, Access to durable solutions among IDPs in Iraq; Part One, April 2017, url, p. 23
325 Alkire, S. et al., The Global Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative,
2019, url, Tab 5.1 MPI Region
326 NCCI, Basrah Governorate Profile, December 2015, url, p. 5
327 World Bank The), Where are Iraq’s Poor: Mapping Poverty in Iraq, 2015, url, p. 56
328 Niqash, Mister can you spare a dinar – life with the beggar mafia of Basra, 30 January 2014, url
329 Niqash, Mister can you spare a dinar – life with the beggar mafia of Basra, 30 January 2014, url
330 Niqash, Mister can you spare a dinar – life with the beggar mafia of Basra, 30 January 2014, url

46 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS

2.3.4 Erbil
According to Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative 2019 dataset, zero % of the
population of Erbil governorate were in severe poverty, and 5.32 % were vulnerable to poverty in
2018.331
According to a 2015 World Bank assessment, the poverty rate in Erbil governorate was 4.1 %.332 2018
data from IOM showed that 29 % of households surveyed in Erbil governorate lived on a monthly
income between IQD 500 000 and 750 000 (about EUR 368 – 550) whereas 25.9 % earned between
IQD 250 000 and 500 000 (about EUR 184 – 368) and 21.1 % had a monthly income situated between
IQD 750 000 and 1 000 000 (about EUR 550 – 735).333 8.2 % of the Erbil governorate households
surveyed lived on a monthly income lower than IQD 250 000 (about EUR 184). When compared toother KRI governorates higher income households were more prevalent in Erbil (16 %).334
The IOM 2018 KRI demographic survey findings noted that female-headed households are moreprevalent in Erbil (10.7 %) and Sulaimaniya (11.2 %) and, in general, more in urban than in rural
locations (11 % versus 8 %).335 Female-headed households have fewer job opportunities as a result of
their responsibilities at home and because of the stigma around working as a divorcee or widow.336
Without having an income source, female-headed households are more likely to be supported byfamily, friends and institutions.337 IOM wrote that ‘nearly 50 % of female-headed households also relyon pensions as a source of income, an expected finding considering that female household headshipis often associated with widowhood at older ages.’338

2.4 Food security
2.4.1 Country overview
The Iraqi National Development Plan 2018-2022 warned that 4 095 377 donums (approximately 4 095
square kilometres) of Iraq’s agricultural land were in danger of desertification.339
In its Iraq Socio-economic Atlas for 2019, the WFP estimated that in 2017, 11 % of Iraqi families
depended on agriculture for livelihood, which was Iraq’s main source of food security. Agriculture
contributed to 9 % of the total GDP, and only 27 % of Iraq’s surface was suitable for farming.
Furthermore, the report stated that extreme weather changes, land degradation, and displacement
and infrastructure damage incurred by war could pose a threat to agriculture in Iraq.340
Regarding the percentages of food insecure families across Iraq, the WFP stated that food insecurity
among men in urban areas was 1.8 % and in rural areas 4.9 %, while among women the percentages
were 1.5 % in urban areas and 7.6 % in rural areas.341 The following maps show the distribution offood insecurity per gender and at a governorate level as well as the food security zones in Iraq:

331 Alkire, S. et al., The Global Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative,

2019, url, Tab 5.1 MPI Region
332 World Bank (The), Where are Iraq’s Poor: Mapping Poverty in Iraq, 2015, url, p 28
333 IOM, Demographic Survey Kurdistan Region of Iraq, July 2018, url, p. 44
334 IOM, Demographic Survey Kurdistan Region of Iraq, July 2018, url, p. 44
335 IOM, Demographic Survey Kurdistan Region of Iraq, July 2018, url, p. 22
336 Kaya, Z. N. and Luchtenberg, K. N., Displacement and Women’s Economic Empowerment: Voices of Displaced Women in
the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, 2018, url, p. 23
337 IOM, Demographic Survey Kurdistan Region of Iraq, July 2018, url, p. 45
338 IOM, Demographic Survey Kurdistan Region of Iraq, July 2018, url, p. 45
339 Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan 2018-2022, June 2018, url, p. 226
340 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 19
341 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 34

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Map 3: WFP Percentage of food insecure households 2019 based on 2016 data 342

342 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 34

— 47

48 —

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Map 4: WFP Food Security Zones 2019343

According to WFP, the percentages of people who are vulnerable to food insecurity were significantly
higher, amounting to around 50 % in urban areas and 60 % in rural areas.344
With regard to water resources in Iraq, the Ministry of Planning noted the existence of a serious water
resources problem stemming from external and internal factors such as the drop in the levels of waterof the Euphrates and Tigris, climate change, and high contamination level.345 BTI stated that the main
reason behind water scarcity in Iraq was the ‘increasing number of projects and dams that affect waterflow along the Tigris and Euphrates rivers’ in Turkey.346 Iraq experienced prolonged drought anddecades of aging water infrastructure, which has depleted its ability to provide water and sanitation
to the population; rural populations have the greatest difficulty accessing water and sanitation.347
Water access has improved since 2010, however many Iraqis still rely on ‘informal wells, government
and NGO water trucks and unreliable tap systems’ while Iraq’s freshwater continues to be depleted.348
Water shortages are reported.349
In a report dated 30 April 2020, the WFP observed a tendency to hoard food for the COVID-19
lockdown period, which led to a surge in food prices towards the end of March. However, the prices
stabilised in April due to price control measures and the distribution of essential food items throughthe PDS. However, the WFP stated that ‘the fall in global oil prices resulted in a significant revenue
shortfall for oil-based economies such as Iraq’s’ and warned that if this situation persisted, social

343 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 33
344 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 35
345 Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan 2018-2022, June 2018, url, pp. 132-133
346 BTI, 2020 Country Report — Iraq, 29 April 2020, url, p. 25
347 IRIN, Water shortage leads people to drink from rivers, 18 February 2007, url
348 EPIC, Drought in the land between two rivers, 18 July 2017, url
349 World Bank (The), Iraq Economic Monitor, October 2018, url, p. 6

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS— 49

safety nets such as the PDS could become difficult to sustain.350 The average of goods availability at anational level was 8.5 out of 10, and markets across the country showed very good resilience in termsof supply chain.351 With regard to food prices, the WFP noted that the year-on-year (y/y) price of
wheat flour in Iraq was 21 % higher in 2019. The highest y/y price increase was for eggs (28 %), while
items such as tomatoes and beans underwent a month-on-month price increases of 24 % and 15 %consecutively.352

2.4.2 Baghdad
The WFP Socio-economic Atlas of Iraq stated that in Baghdad, 53 % of households were food secure,
46 % marginally food secure and 1 % food insecure.353 The WFP Iraq Market Monitor indicated nonsignificant changes in month-on-month prices in Baghdad markets for March-April, but low
predictability of future changes.354
The production of wheat in Baghdad governorate dropped significantly, from 159 984 tons in 2017 to
91 141 tons in 2018. Similarly, the production of barley dropped from 10 378 tons in 2017 to 5 466
tons in 2018. However, the production of dates increased from 124 176 tons in 2017 to 130 593 tons
in 2018.355
The World Bank stated that the residents of Baghdad deal with daily water service interruptions,especially in summer. Droughts356, inadequate infrastructure, along with rapid population growth andthe inflow of IDPs have led to water shortages and the outbreak of waterborne diseases. Sewer pipes
leakages contaminate drinking water networks. Families are thus forced ‘to spend a significant
fraction of their income on medical treatment and to purchase bottled water’.357
Drinking and agricultural water available in Baghdad City is of poor quality. It is estimated that thelevel of organic material pollution in water in the capital is three times higher than national and WHO’slimits. In Sadr City, for example, the only source of clean water is bottled, which is inaccessible for thepoorer population.358

2.4.3 Basra
The WFP Iraq Market Monitor indicated insignificant changes in month-on-month prices in Basramarkets for March-April, but predictability of future changes was low.359
The production of wheat dropped by more than half in Basra governorate, from 38 643 tons in 2017
to 15 637 tons in 2018. Similarly, the production of barley dropped from 1 225 tons in 2017 to 584
tons in 2018. The production of dates, however, remained almost the same: 37 556 tons in 2017 to
37 816 tons in 2018.360

350 WFP, Iraq Market Monitor Report, Issue No. 30, April 2020, url, p. 4
351 WFP, Iraq Market Monitor Report, Issue No. 30, April 2020, url, p. 3
352 WFP, Iraq Market Monitor Report, Issue No. 30, April 2020, url, p. 4353 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 101
354 WFP, Iraq Market Monitor Report, Issue No. 30, April 2020, url, p. 3
355 Iraq, CSO, 2018 ‫[ الموجز االحصائ بغداد‬Statistical Summary Baghdad 2018], n. d., url‫ي‬

356 Al Jazeera, Iraqi farmers, including in the areas near Baghdad Iraq's farmers hit hard by water shortages, 3 August 2018,

url
357 World Bank (The), Iraq: 5 Million Residents in Baghdad to Benefit from Improved Water Supply and Wastewater Services,

31 February 2018, url, EPIC, Drought in the land between two rivers, 18 July 2017, url
358 EPIC, Drought in the land between two rivers, 18 July 2017, url
359 WFP, Iraq Market Monitor Report, Issue No. 30, April 2020, url, p. 3
360 Iraq, CSO, 2018 ‫[ الموجز االحصائ البرصة‬Statistical Summary Basra 2018], n. d., url
‫ي‬

50 —

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORSIn 2015, it was reported that Basra had above average high rates of access to the public water networkand ‘improved water sources’, however, the quality of the water was poor.361 Access to safe drinking
water represented one of the main problems in Basra.362 Southern Iraq’s freshwater, particularly in
Basra, was largely from the Shatt Al-Arab waterway, which has become heavily salty due to upstream
dams, drought, and pollution. In recent years, water shortages have caused reduced cultivation ofcrops, such as rice and wheat.363 Following a fact-finding mission to Basra City in September 2018, NRC
found that the water crisis has negatively impacted livelihoods in agriculture in rural areas around
Basra364, and forced 3 780 people from rural areas of southern Iraq to be displaced in August 2018.365
Due to water scarcity, a rise in rural to urban displacement was noted in Basra in September 2018.366
In November 2018, IOM reported that the number of families displaced by the water crisis anddrought in southern governorates was 3 522 (most of whom were in Thi Qar).367

2.4.4 Erbil
The WFP Iraq Market Monitor observed ‘high price changes’ in month-on-month prices in Erbilmarkets for March-April, with a high predictability of future changes.368
Access to safe drinking water was nearly universal in Erbil governorate, with 89.7 % of households
having the public network/tap as a source of freshwater supply, whereas 8.9 % relied on wells.369
Sources indicated that water shortages might occur in KRI as a result of rapid population increase andwaste.370 The quality of Erbil’s drinking water was evaluated to be within acceptable limits.371 Houses
in Erbil governorate were equipped with sanitation facilities, such as connection to the public sewage
network with covered canal (25.6 %) or septic tanks (71.8 %).372

2.5 Health care
2.5.1 Country overview
In a report published on 2 March 2020, Reuters stated that ‘Iraq’s healthcare system is in crisis’, andsuffered from shortages of drugs and medical personnel. Reuters observed that the healthcare system
in Iraq was centralised, whereby Baghdad received ‘the bulk of funding’ and Basra was underfunded.
The report added that ‘[w]here the rest of Iraq has 1.1 hospital beds and 0.8 doctors per 1,000 people,
Kurdistan has 1.5 beds and 1.4 doctors’. In order to improve the capacity of the healthcare system,
the Ministry of Health enabled the investment of the private sector, which resulted in an increase of
4 % in the number of beds per 1 000 people in the first half of 2019 in Iraq. 373 The Congressional
Research Service (CRS) pointed out that Iraq’s health systems, public and private, suffered fromlimited capacity and significant shortcomings. The report, citing the World Bank, stated that ‘Iraq has

361 NCCI Iraq, Basrah Governorate Profile, December 2015,

url, p. 5

362 UNIAU, Basrah Governorate Profile, November 2010, available at: url, p. 1
363 Bloomberg, Basra’s Tap Water is Too Salty and Polluted Even for Washing, 2 August 2018, url
364 NRC, Basra Fact-Finding Mission Report #2, 22 September 2018, url, p. 3; the FFM took place from 26 to 29 August 2018
365 NRC, Iraq: Basra’s children face disease outbreak in rundown schools, 23 October 2018,url

366 NRC, Basra Fact Finding Mission Report #1, 9, September 2018, url, p. 8; the FFM took place from 26 to 29 August 2018
367 IOM, Iraq Water Crisis (Central/South), November 2018, url
368 WFP, Iraq Market Monitor Report, Issue No. 30, April 2020, url, p. 3
369 IOM, Demographic Survey Kurdistan Region of Iraq, July 2018 url, p. 50
370 Denmark, DIS, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Access, Possibility of Protection, Security and Humanitarian Situation,

11 April 2016, url, p. 59; Rudaw, Erbil water shortages to be solved by new pipeline: governor, 8 July 2018, url
371 Jadoon, S., et al., Evaluation of Drinking Water Quality in Erbil City Kurdistan, Region-Iraq, Journal of Environment andEarth Science, Vol.5, No.21, 2015, url, p. 17
372 IOM, Demographic Survey Kurdistan Region of Iraq, July 2018, url, p. 49
373 Reuters, The medical crisis that’s aggravating Iraq’s unrest, 2 March 2020, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS— 51

approximately 0.8 physicians and 1.3 hospital beds per 1,000 people (below the global averages of 1.5
and 2.7, respectively)’.374
The WFP observed that the Iraqi State provided ‘universal healthcare and medical supplies at a
subsidised cost’ to all Iraqis. The source also reported on a low rate of less than one hospital per
100 000 persons. According to the report, even ‘[l]ower incidences of hospitals and physicians areobserved in the governorates of Kirkuk, Thi-Qar, Nainawa, Maysan and Anbar’.375

Map 5: WFP Number of Hospitals per 100 000 Population 2019376

In its Iraq Country Factsheet 2019, IOM observed that public hospitals and clinics charged minimal
fees, but might not provide all medical services. Moreover, most of the infrastructure wasrehabilitated, save for the newly liberated areas. IOM stated that there might be waiting times forcertain medical specialisations, particularly in big cities. Furthermore, patients should visit a clinic fordiagnosis first before they were referred to the appropriate healthcare facility. The costs of medical
services depended on numerous factors (e.g. age and gender) and costs of medications depended on
diagnoses. Additionally, in public hospitals medications were provided at a lower cost but were subject
to shortages.377 Reuters, citing Iraq’s former Minister of Health, stated that in 2018, ‘more than 85%
of drugs on Iraq’s essential medicines list were either in short supply or completely unavailable’, withcancer drugs being ‘among the scarcest and most smuggled’. Moreover, Reuters observed thatpharmacies were full with smuggled drugs that either could be unsafe or expired.378
Although reliable data is sparse for the post-2008 period, the deterioration of the security situation
after the ISIL offensive in 2014 has intensified the need for mental care and specialised staff, according
to EPIC.379 In 2018, it was estimated that between 15 and 20 % of the country’s population faced

374 CRS, Iraq and U.S. Policy, 16 June 2020, url, p. 2
375 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 40
376 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 51
377 IOM, Country Factsheet: Iraq, 2019, url, p. 4
378 Reuters, The medical crisis that’s aggravating Iraq’s unrest, 2 March 2020, url
379 EPIC, Iraq’s quiet mental health crisis, 05 May 2017, url

52 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS

mental health issues.380 WHO representatives, interviewed by Landinfo and DIS, in 2018 noted thatwith regard to mental health ‘there are huge needs and the available services do not meet thedemand.’381 The growing mental health needs haven not been met due to a shortage of specialised
staff, as, according to IRIN news, there were only 80 clinical psychologists in the country, working
alongside a limited number of psychiatrists.382

2.5.2 Baghdad
According to the WFP Socio-economic Atlas, and based on 2017 data, there was one government
hospital for 140 001-177 000 persons in Baghdad governorate. Regarding the overall number ofhospitals (public and private), the WFP estimated a range of 50-95 in Baghdad governorate, with arate of 10.1-15 % of physicians for every 10 000 persons.383 Moreover, mortality rates for children
under five in Baghdad were 20.1-30 percent.384 The CSO stated that in 2017, the numbers ofgovernmental hospitals and Primary Healthcare centres were 95 and 257 consecutively.385 According
to the National Development Plan 2018-2022, and based on 2016 data, there was a deficit of 110
governmental hospitals and 538 primary health care units in Baghdad between the standard andactual numbers.386
The WHO Iraq Health Cluster Response Monitoring Interactive Dashboard 2018 indicated that in the
Baghdad governorate, six organisations were operating health facilities in 12 locations. This included
one facility for mental health and eight for treatment of common diseases.387 According to the Country
Cooperation strategy for WHO in Iraq, inadequate mental health services were provided as primarycare across all Iraq. In 2016, two trauma centres were opened in Baghdad. A UNAMI/OHCHR report
noted that in 2016 there were 45 NGOs in Baghdad who had registered with the Ministry of Labour
and Social Affairs and were specifically providing medical support on disability. According to the NGOs
surveyed by the UNAMI/OHCHR report, there was only one centre for plastic limbs and medical
cushions in Baghdad and one specialised hospital for persons with disabilities with spinal cord
injuries.388

2.5.3 BasraIn a report published on 2 March 2020, Reuters stated that the healthcare system in Basra wasunderfunded, despite the governorate’s massive oil production. According to the report, doctors andnurses in Basra were ‘overworked’. Additionally, Basra suffered from a shortage in vital medical
equipment, and had only three CT scanners and one MRI unit per million residents, ‘a fraction of theaverage rate of 34 CT scanners and 24 MRI units for developed countries’.389
According to the WFP Socio-economic Atlas, and based on 2017 data, there was one government
hospital for 177 001-227 100 people in Basra governorate.390 The WFP noted that Basra governorate
had a range of 16-26 public and private hospitals, while the rate of physicians per 10 000 persons was

380 Rudaw, Seminar examines mental health challenges in post-conflict Iraq, 2 April 2018, url
381 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Northern Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)

in the disputed areas, incl. possibility to enter and access the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), 5 November 2018, url, p. 54
382 IRIN News, Iraq’s growing mental health problem, 16 January 2017, url
383 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, pp. 51,52
384 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 61
385 Iraq, CSO, 2018 ‫[ الموجز االحصائ بغداد‬Statistical Summary Baghdad 2018], n. d., url‫ي‬
386 Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan 2018-2022, June 2018, url, p. 173
387 WHO, Iraq Health Cluster Response Monitoring Interactive Dashboard 2018, url
388 UNAMI, Report on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Iraq, December 2017, url, p. 12-13
389 Reuters, The medical crisis that’s aggravating Iraq’s unrest, 2 March 2020, url
390 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 51

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS— 53

at 8.1-10 %.391 Moreover, mortality rates for children under five in Basra were 30.1-40 %.392 The CSO
stated that in 2017, the number of healthcare facilities in Basra was 246, of which 19 weregovernmental hospitals and 139 were Primary Healthcare centres.393 According to the National
Development Plan 2018-2022, and based on 2016 data, there was a deficit of 42 governmental
hospitals and 154 primary health care units in Basra between the standard and actual numbers.394

2.5.4 Erbil
In the three governorates of the KRI, the ratio of government hospitals to residents was significantly
higher, i.e. one hospital per 60 000-75 000.395 According to the WFP, Erbil governorate had a range of
27-49 public and private hospitals and a higher rate of 15.1-19 physicians per 10 000 persons.396
Moreover, mortality rates for children under five in Erbil were 10.1-20 %.397 Additionally, Reutersobserved that in the KRI, there was 1.5 hospital beds per 1 000 people.398 According to the National
Development Plan 2018-2022, and based on 2016 data, there was a deficit of 11 governmental
hospitals and a surplus of 96 primary health care units in Erbil between the standard and actual
numbers.399
Many of the basic primary care services were provided in the KRI, however not in a consistent way.400
The PHC [Primary Health Care] system covers all Iraqis, including non–KRI residents who are Iraqi
citizens. However, non-KRI residents who do not have citizenship of Iraq cannot avail themselves ofhealth facilities and medicines under the same terms as Kurdistan citizens.401 The same source notedthat ‘all citizens are eligible for a broad package of health care, dental, and emergency services inpublic hospitals and PHCs. The services provided are limited by the budget, available equipment andmedicines, and the education and training of the staff’.402 Syrian refugees residing in the KRI had theright to access public healthcare.403 The distribution of PHC centres was not necessarily uniform acrossthe Kurdistan Region, with most main PHCs serving too many people, and most sub-centres serving
too few people. The centres providing services to a larger population were, however, equipped withmore doctors and nurses than the sub-centres.404 In August 2018, Rudaw reported that medication
was illegally imported into the KRI and that this included counterfeit medication.405

2.6 Education
2.6.1 Country overview
In its report for 2019, the civil society movement ‘Global Campaign for Education’ noted an increasein education funding for 2019, but this increase, according to the source, would not be enough to

391 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, pp. 51-52
392 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 61
393 Iraq, CSO, 2018 ‫[ الموجز االحصائ البرصة‬Statistical Summary Basra 2018], n. d., url‫ي‬

394 Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan 2018-2022, June 2018, url, p. 173
395 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 51
396 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, pp. 51,52
397 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 61
398 Reuters, The medical crisis that’s aggravating Iraq’s unrest, 2 March 2020, url
399 Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan 2018-2022, June 2018, url, p. 173
400 Moore, M., Ross C. A. et al., The future of health care in the Kurdistan Region – Iraq, 2014, url, p. 70
401 Moore, M., Ross C. A. et al., The future of health care in the Kurdistan Region – Iraq, 2014, url, p. 60
402 Moore, M., Ross C. A. et al., The future of health care in the Kurdistan Region – Iraq, 2014, url, p. 60
403 Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights, Asuda, Broken Lives: Violence against Syrian refugee women and girls in the Kurdistan

Region of Iraq, March 2018, url, p. 4
404 Moore, M., Ross C. A. et al., The future of health care in the Kurdistan Region – Iraq, 2014, url
405 Rudaw, 27 August 2018, KRG cracks down on counterfeit medications worth millions, url

54 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS

rehabilitate thousands of schools damaged during the conflict in areas previously held by ISIL.406 BTI
stated that Iraq suffered from ‘weak educational infrastructure, especially in areas liberated from theIS group’. Reportedly, one out of five schools was destroyed during the conflict against ISIL.407
The National Development Plan 2018-2022 noted that male enrolment rates at primary, intermediateand high schools were higher than those of females based on 2016 data. Moreover, dropout rates offemale students were higher than those of their male counterparts.408 BTI observed that decades ofconflict in Iraq have led to a decline in school attendance, especially as some families and children feelthere is no bright future ahead’.409 The CSO provided the following data for 2018/2019 at a national
level:
Primary education: Number of schools 17 235 – Enrolment 6 501 053 – Dropout 127 891 –Number of teachers 290 664.
Secondary education: Number of schools 8 139 – Enrolment 3 140 110 – Dropout 72 658 –Number of teachers 168 330.
Vocational education: Number of schools 314 – Enrolment 50 603 – Dropout 1 607 – Numberof teachers 10 976.410

The following maps show the primary, lower and upper secondary school attendance ratios per
gender:

Map 6: WFP Primary School Attendance Ratio 2019411

406 Global Campaign for Education, Iraq Spotlight Report 2019, 2019, url, p. 7
407 BTI, Iraq Country Report, 2018 url, p. 25
408 Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan 2018-2022, June 2018, url, p. 209
409 BTI, Iraq Country Report, 2018, url, p. 25‫[ ر‬Education Indicators], n. d., url
410 Iraq, CSO, ‫مؤشات التعليم‬411 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 84

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Map 7: WFP Lower Secondary School Attendance Ratio 2019412

Map 8: WFP Upper Secondary School Attendance Ratio 2019413

412 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 85
413 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 86

— 55

56 —

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS

2.6.2 Baghdad
The 2016/2017 school enrolment rates in Baghdad were 97 % for elementary school, 67.7 % forsecondary, 34.6 % preparatory, and 66.3 % high school.414 The CSO stated that during the school year
2017/2018, 1 573 526 students were enrolled in primary schools and 788 082 in secondary schools in
Bagdad.415 Moreover, the WFP provided the following breakdown of the education level of household
members who were +10 of age: illiterate (9 %), read only (2 %), read and write (14 %), primary (33 %),intermediate (15 %), secondary (12 %), diploma (5 %), and higher (9 %).416
The National Development Plan observed that ‘2908 buildings are needed for kindergarten, 2849
elementary schools, 353 middle and high schools in Baghdad’ to reach the standard number based on
Baghdad residents’ criteria.417
Unlike the rest of the country, where private schools were still underdeveloped, Baghdad had anestimated 5 % of private schools.418 Higher quality education in private and international schools in
Baghdad was accessed by wealthy families. The average fee for private school was approximately
USD 1 300 (EUR 1 145) per month.419

2.6.3 Basra
The National Development Plan 2018-2022 stated that in 2016/2017, school enrolment rates in Basraprovince were 96.5 % for elementary school, 59.8 % secondary school, 28.2 % preparatory school, and60.8 % high school.420 Moreover, there was a gap of 1 022 buildings for kindergarten and 734 forelementary schools, and a surplus of 47 buildings for middle and high school buildings in Basraprovince.421 The CSO stated that for the school year 2017/2018, 602 512 were enrolled in primaryschools and 291 393 in secondary schools.422

2.6.4 Erbil
Based on a 2018 survey, the WFP stated that the percentage of children attending primary school in
Erbil province was 20.1-25 %.423 A joint report by the Erbil Refugee Council, IOM, the Joint Crisis
Coordination Centre, UNHCR, UN-HABITAT, OCHA and UNFPA stated that ‘[b]asic and high school
education are provided mainly through public schools, which are free to the residents of the Kurdistan
Region.’424 The economic crisis in KRI has seriously affected education financing which has consistently
decreased since 2012-2013, significantly impacting Erbil governorate, where the implementation rateof the education budget dropped from 45.9 % in 2021-2013 to 3.7 % in 2015-2016.425
Erbil governorate hosts three universities and a number of colleges and other education facilities. 426
According to IOM’s 2018 demographic survey Erbil governorate scored among the highest literacy
414 Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan 2018-2022, June 2018, url, p. 170
415 Iraq, CSO, 2018 ‫[ الموجز االحصائ بغداد‬Statistical Summary Baghdad 2018], n. d., url‫ي‬

416 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 101
417 Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan 2018-2022, June 2018, url, p. 170
418 World Bank (The), Iraq: reconstruction and investment, part 2, January 2018, url, p. 25
419 Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report Iraq, 9 October 2018, url, p. 9420 Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan 2018-2022, June 2018, url, p. 170
421 Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan 2018-2022, June 2018, url, p. 171
422 Iraq, CSO, 2018 ‫[ الموجز االحصائ البرصة‬Statistical Summary Basra 2018],21 June 2020, url‫ي‬

423 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 83
424 UNHCR, Displacement as challenge and opportunity Urban profile: Refugees, internally displaced persons and hostcommunity Erbil Governorate, Kurdistan Region of Iraq, April 2016, url, pp. 23-24
425 UNICEF, The Cost and Benefits of Education in Iraq: An analysis of the education sector and strategies to maximize thebenefits of education, 21 May 2017, available at: url, p. 33
426 NCCI, Erbil Governorate Profile, December 2015, url, p. 3

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS— 57

levels in KRI with around 80 % of respondents being able to read and write.427 School attendance level
for Erbil governorate was recorded at 37 %, whereas 45.9 % were not currently attending and 17.1 %had never attended.428 An article on Opendemocracy.net states that ‘economic problems’ caused
most of the drop outs from school in the city of Sulaimaniya. The article furthermore states that 25 %of the schools in the KRI are ‘completely unserviceable’ and 50 % of the schools need renovation.429
Corroborating information could not be found.

2.7 Housing and living conditions
2.7.1 Country overview
Housing
According to the National Development Plan 2018-2022, there was a housing deficit of 2.5 million
units in Iraq by the end of 2016, 50 % of which in Baghdad and Ninawa governorates. Moreover, theplan referred to ‘[p]ersistent gaps in housing provision among provinces and between rural and urban
areas’. Rapid population growth and constant growth in informal settlements inside and around cities(mainly Baghdad and Basra) were aspects of the current housing situation in Iraq.430
In its Humanitarian Needs Overview of November 2019, UNOCHA observed that around 700 000
people (out of 2.4 million estimated to be in need of shelter and NFI assistance) remained in criticalshelter, such as makeshift shelters, unfinished or abandoned buildings, worn tents or publicbuildings.431 Regarding IDPs, destruction of housing was a ‘primary issue’ keeping people in situationsof displacement in conflict-affected areas, according to IOM, in 2018, noting that the worst house
destruction was reported to be in Anbar, and IDPs were significantly more likely to cite this as a reason
for lack of return.432

Electricity, hygiene, sewerage and sanitation
UNOCHA reported in February 2018 that 5.4 million persons in Iraq were in need of water, hygiene
and sanitation assistance.433 They estimated this dropped to 2.3 million people in need of water andsanitation access as of December 2018.434 UNICEF noted that between 1 January 2020 and 31 March
2020, 1.85 million people, of which 851 000 were children and 943 000 females) were in need of ‘atleast one form of humanitarian WASH support.435
The delivery of electricity was chronically deficient; already before the conflict, it was reported that
supply was insufficient. Years of neglect have led to a dilapidated electricity infrastructure. Poweroutages were very common.436 IOM reported in its 2019 ILA III that overall, public electricity wasavailable in most residences in locations where IDPs/returnees lived, but that the availability of daily
hours of electricity was quite varied depending on the region. The southern governorates had 20 hoursof electricity per day, while Ninawa and Salah al-Din had the lowest availability at 10 hours per day.437
On 4 June 2020, Reuters reported that Iraq has signed an agreement with Iran to import electricity for

427 IOM, Demographic Survey Kurdistan Region of Iraq, July 2018, url, p. 34
428 IOM, Demographic Survey Kurdistan Region of Iraq, July 2018, url, p. 35
429 Open Democracy, Corruption corrodes Kurdish education, 15 October 2018, url
430 Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan 2018-2022, June 2018, url, p. 158
431 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Iraq, November 2019, url, p. 57
432 IOM, Reasons to Remain – Categorizing Protracted Displacement in Iraq, November 2018, url, p. 13
433 UNOCHA, Iraq: 2018 Humanitarian Response Plan, 14 February 2018, url, p. 5
434 UNOCHA, Iraq: Humanitarian Needs Overview - November 2018, 16 December 2018, url, pp. 6, 37
435 UNICEF, 2020 Internal Displacement Crisis Humanitarian Situation Report, 23 April 2020, available at: url, p. 3
436 World Bank (The), Iraq Economic Monitor, From War to Reconstruction and Economic Recovery, 2018, url, p. 6
437 IOM, Integrated Location Assessment Part III, 2 January 2019, url, p. 30

58 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS

two years (2020 and 2021).438 However, due to the US sanctions on Iran, the Iraqi government isenvisaging to switch to the Gulf Countries for energy supply. According to Al-Mada, 80 % of the project
to link Iraq’s electricity grids to the Gulf Cooperation Council grid has been finalised.439 Kurdistan 24,
citing AFP, stated that this agreement ‘was hailed as a “landmark deal” and is planned to provide 500
megawatts of electricity to Iraq’s “overstretched grid by 2020”’.440
IOM remarked that nationally, ‘the most inefficient [infrastructure and services] sectors appeared to
be sewerage and waste management/disposal, which existed but were only functioning in locations
where around 10 % of returnees and 40 % of IDPs lived. While these services were mostly present in
the KRI, the main problem in the north-central governorates seemed to be the absence of both
services, whereas malfunctioning was reported in the south.’441
Large parts of the Iraqi population were not connected to sewer systems.442 The conflict with ISIL has
impacted the state of critical infrastructure in Iraq, particularly in areas that were difficult to reach,and in recently retaken areas from ISIL, greater damage to water infrastructure was affecting nondisplaced populations.443 UNOCHA reported that 1.4 million people, including IDPs from Ninawa,
Kirkuk, Salah al-Din, and Anbar, who lived in 33 camps, were in need of water and sanitation support
and access due to inadequate facilities and sanitation coverage.444

2.7.2 Baghdad
A map published by WFP showed that Baghdad governorate had 334-1022 informal settlements.445
Based on estimates for 2017, the National Development Plan 2018-2022 indicated the existence of
1 022 informal settlements and 136 689 informal housing units in Baghdad province.446
Regarding water and sanitation, the WFP Socio-economic Atlas stated that 70 % of the households in
Baghdad had continuous availability of drinking water while 30 % had irregular availability. Moreover,
91 % obtained drinking water from the general network while 9 % relied on bottled water.447 The CSO
stated that 86.9 % of Baghdad inhabitants were served with drinking water networks in 2017.448 The
National Development Plan 2018-2022 indicated a deficit of 35 % in drinking water demand coveragein Baghdad outskirts.449
The National Development Plan also stated that the sewer system in Baghdad was old and ‘has
exceeded its design life’, and that it suffered from various problems especially in the rain season.450
The WFP Atlas observed that 52 % of toilets were with siphon and 48 % without.451 The CSO indicatedthat in 2017, 75.9 % of Baghdad inhabitants were served with a sewer system.452

438 Reuters, Iran signs two-year contract with Iraq to export electricity: IRNA, 4 June 2020, url
439 Al-Mada, ‫ من خطوط النقل الخليجية‬% 80 ‫[ الكهرباء تعلن إكمال‬Electricity Department announces that 80 % of the GCC lines havebeen finalised], 26 June 2020, url
440 Kurdistan 24, US hails Gulf Arab plan to supply electricity to Iraq, 17 July 2020, url
441 IOM, Integrated Location Assessment Part III, 2 January 2019, url, p. 28
442 BTI, Iraq Country Report, 2018 url, p. 8
443 REACH, Iraq, Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment (MCNA), December 2017, url, p. 4
444 UNOCHA, Iraq: Humanitarian Needs Overview - November 2018, 16 December 2018, url, p. 37
445 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 46
446 Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan 2018-2022, June 2018, url, p. 158
447 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 101
448 Iraq, CSO, 2018 ‫[ الموجز االحصائ بغداد‬Statistical Summary Baghdad 2018],n. d., url‫ي‬
449 Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan 2018-2022, June 2018, url, p. 161
450 Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan 2018-2022, June 2018, url, p. 163
451 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 101
452 Iraq, CSO, 2018 ‫[ الموجز االحصائ بغداد‬Statistical Summary Baghdad 2018], n. d., url‫ي‬EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS— 59

IOM stated that overall, infrastructure in Baghdad appeared to be mostly functioning.453 Poweroutages were however commonplace.454 The damage to the housing stock in the governorate of
Baghdad was estimated to amount to IQD 337.5 billion (EUR 251.2 million).455 Significant residential
damage was mainly reported in Abu Ghraib (3 %) and Mahmoudiya (7 %) areas.456
The large inflow of IDPs and migrants to urban areas has put notable pressure on the housing market
in Baghdad.457 According to a 2018 academic study, an estimated 187 000 housing units in Baghdad(around 31 % of the capital housing stock) were inappropriate. The housing shortage, along with lackof construction materials and scarce serviced urban lands, were the main reasons for an increase of
housing costs.458 Housing prices in Baghdad varied depending on the area, with prices being lower
outside the centre. IOM reported that an unfurnished house in suburban Baghdad of 200m2 could rent
for USD 100-300 [EUR 87-263], while inside Baghdad a house of that size would cost USD 750-1000[EUR 658-877].459
In terms of living costs in Iraq, IOM stated that on average a family would spend monthly: USD 13[EUR 11] on gas, USD 9-22 [EUR 8-19] on water, USD 22-30 [EUR 19-26] on public electricity, and thesame on private or community generators.460

2.7.3 Basra
A WFP map showed that the governorate of Basra had the same rate of informal settlements as
Baghdad, i.e. 334-1022.461 The National Development Plan 2018-2022 indicated the existence of 677
informal settlements and 62 602 informal housing units in Basra province.462
In a report published on 22 July 2019, Human Rights Watch stated that Iraqi authorities ‘have failed
to properly manage and regulate Iraq’s water sources, depriving the people in Iraq’s southern Basragovernorate … of their right to safe drinking water’. According to the report, Basra’s main water source
was the Shatt Al-Arab River with its fresh water canals. Human Rights Watch also observed that over
300 000 residents in the Basra governorate were not connected to the water and sewage network,
which led them to ‘contaminate groundwater with raw sewage and to illegally tap into the piping
network to access water, exposing the systems to wastage and revenue loss, decreased waterpressure, and potential contamination.’ Moreover, public water plants in Basra were not equippedwith the technology required ‘to remove dissolved constituents from seawater intrusion from theShatt Al-Arab, which render chlorine less effective in removing harmful substances’. Finally, salinity
and other problems related to water quality have impacted agriculture, raising livestock and fisheries
in the governorate.463 The CSO stated that 90 % of Basra inhabitants were served with drinking water
networks in 2017.464 Concerning water coverage, the National Development Plan 2018-2022 indicated453 IOM, Iraq Displacement Tracking Matrix, Integrated Location Assessment II, Governorate Profiles, October 2017, url, p.

10
454 Reuters, As Baghdad life improves, some still seek refuge in its past, url
455 World Bank, Iraq reconstruction & investment part 2 Damage and Needs Assessment of Affected Governorates, January

2018, url, p. 16
456 IOM, Iraq Displacement Tracking Matrix, Integrated Location Assessment II, Governorate Profiles, October 2017, url, p. 6
457 World Bank, Iraq - Systematic Country Diagnostic, 3 February 2017, url, p. 44
458 Al-Hafith, Omar, B.K. Satish (et al.), A systematic assessment of architectural approaches for solving the housing problem
in Iraq, in: Frontiers of Architectural Research, July 2018, url, p. 2
459 IOM, Information on Return and Reintegration in Iraq, December 2015, url, pp. 7-8
460 IOM, Information on Return and Reintegration in Iraq, December 2015, url, p. 5
461 WFP, Iraq Socio-economic Atlas, 2019, url, p. 46
462 Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan 2018-2022, June 2018, url, p. 158
463 HRW, Basra is Thirsty: Iraq’s Failure to Manage the Water Crisis, 22 July 2019, url
464 Iraq, CSO, 2018 ‫[ الموجز االحصائ البرصة‬Statistical Summary Basra 2018], n. d., url
‫ي‬

60 —

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORSa deficit of 26 % in drinking water demand coverage in Basra province.465 The CSO indicated that in2017, only 34.1 % of Basra inhabitants were served with a sewer system466.
Regarding electricity, the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington (AGSIW) observed that high tension
lines were damaged during the years of conflict, and that although the damage was concentrated in
the north, ‘it affected the whole country, including the southern oil province of Basra’ as all
governorates were interconnected by the national grid.467 According to an article published by Meed,a source for business intelligence and economic analysis, on 12 June 2020, Iraq imported 1 200 MWof electricity from Iran in average. Moreover, the source stated that an independent power projectnear Basra (i.e. Rumaila power plant) was underway, and that the second phase ‘has come online’.
Reportedly, the project will produce 3 000 MW.468
On 26 November 2019, Al-Monitor reported on ‘deadly protests’ in Basra, where several people were
killed.469 On 3 October 2019, BBC reported that in Basra, people protested over power shortages,
unsafe drinking water, corruption and unemployment for weeks.470 On 24 November 2019, Euronews
reported that Basra ‘has seen weeks of protests against poor quality of services, especially chronic
shortages of clean water and acute power shortages, leaving residents with only a few hours ofelectricity per day.’471

2.7.4 Erbil
IOM 2018 data showed that ‘nearly all families in Erbil governorate live in proper housing, such as anentire house occupied by a single household (92.1 %); a house shared by more than one household(6.3 %); or an apartment/flat (1.4 %).’472 Erbil governorate’s rate of urbanisation was estimated to beover 80 % as result of the influx of economic migrants and IDPs.473 IOM assessed in 2017 that the
infrastructure was mostly functioning in all districts.474
According to the demographic survey of the KRI conducted by IOM in 2018 ‘access to the electricity
grid in the KRI is universal but supply is limited and households have an average supply of 17 hours
per day.’475 In Erbil governorate the average number of hours per day of public electricity supply was
15.6.476

465 Iraq, Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan 2018-2022, June 2018, url, p. 161
466 Iraq, CSO, 2018 ‫[ الموجز االحصائ البرصة‬Statistical Summary Basra 2018], n. d., url‫ي‬

467 AGSIW, Iraq’s Electricity Challenges Mount as Oil Revenue Slows to a Trickle, 15 May 2020, url
468 Meed, The 3,000MW Rumaila plant is being developed as an independent power project, Power Technology, 12 June

2020, url
469 Al-Monitor, Protests spread in oil-rich Basra as death toll rises, 26 November 2019, url
470 BBC, Iraq protests: Curfew imposed in Baghdad amid widespread unrest, 3 October 2019, url
471 Euronews, Iraq protests: Basra streets fill with black smoke, burning tyres, 24 November 2019, url
472 IOM, Demographic Survey Kurdistan Region of Iraq, July 2018, url, p. 48
473 IOM, Demographic Survey Kurdistan Region of Iraq, July 2018, url, p. 14
474 IOM, Integrated Location Assessment Part II – Governorate Profiles, October 2017, url, p. 14
475 IOM, Demographic Survey Kurdistan Region of Iraq, July 2018, url, p. 50
476 IOM, Demographic Survey Kurdistan Region of Iraq, July 2018, url, p. 50

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS— 61

Annex 1: Bibliography
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Annex 2: Terms of Reference
Reference period: January 2019 to 6 July 2020.

1. General overview
This report will include two main sections: one providing a general overview, and one providing adescription of the situation in each of the three cities Bagdad, Basra and Erbil by a set of indicators.
The general overview will include separate chapters on IDPs/returnees, women children, and single
persons.
The chapter on IDPs/returnees will focus on housing and living conditions, access to education, healthcare and employment, and on obtaining lost ID documents (current arrangements and regulations inplace, state of issuing offices in areas recaptured from ISIL).
The chapter on women will focus on employment, working conditions, access to health care, accessto education/dropout rates, and freedom of movement for women.
The chapter on the situation for children will focus on child labour (legislation, statistics,
underreporting, prevalence in IDP/returnee communities, underage recruitment and/or use by armed
actors (such as the PMUs).
The chapter on networks of support for single persons will cover both men and women. It will focus
on family and community networks, political and patronage networks, and wasta. The importance of
networks for security will be covered, as well as the prevalence of organizations/arrangements
providing support to persons without network.

2. Baghdad, Basra and Erbil, by indicator. Focus on the situation inside each city.
In this chapter, the following indicators will be applied: Economy, employment, poverty, food security,
health care, education, and housing and living conditions.
There will be separate paragraphs for each of the three cities under each of the indicators, covering
the reference period.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAQ: KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS— 77

doi: 10.2847/63636
doi: