Somalia
ActorsCountry of Origin
Information Report

July 2021

More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu)
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ISBN 978-92-9465-186-0

doi: 10.2847/446144

BZ-02-21-871-EN-N© European Asylum Support Office, 2020
Cover photo, Untying the camel © Shafi – Somali Nomad, 2007 (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)
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Country of origin information report | Somalia: Actors

Acknowledgements
This report was jointly written by the COI Sector of EASO, together with contributions from France.
EASO would like to acknowledge the Information, Documentation and Research Division (DIDR) COI
unit of the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless People (Office Français deProtection des Réfugiés et Apatrides – OFPRA), as the co-drafter of this report.
The following departments and organisations have reviewed the report, together with EASO:••

Austria, Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum, Country of Origin Information Department,
Africa Desk
Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation (ACCORD)

It must be noted that the drafting and review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts ororganisations contributes to the overall quality of the report, but does not necessarily imply theirformal endorsement of the final report, which is the full responsibility of EASO.

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Country of origin information report | Somalia: Actors

Contents
Acknowledgements................................................................................................................................. 3Contents .................................................................................................................................................. 4
Disclaimer................................................................................................................................................ 8
Glossary and Abbreviations .................................................................................................................... 9
Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 12
Map Somalia - Approximate Territorial Control (30 April 2021) .......................................................... 14
Clan Maps.............................................................................................................................................. 16
Map by Abikar (1999) ....................................................................................................................... 17
Map by Lewis (1955)......................................................................................................................... 18
1. Country background.......................................................................................................................... 19
2. Federal Government of Somalia ....................................................................................................... 22
2.1 State Structure and Governance ................................................................................................ 23
2.2 Territorial control and areas of influence................................................................................... 25
2.3 Access to justice through formal and informal systems............................................................. 26
2.3.1 Nature and limits of the formal justice system (statutory law) .......................................... 28
2.3.2 Customary justice - Xeer and Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) .................................. 30
2.3.3 Shari’ah law ......................................................................................................................... 33
2.3.4 Death penalty, trials, and human rights standards in the judiciary .................................... 35
2.4 Security forces ............................................................................................................................ 37
2.4.1 SNA ...................................................................................................................................... 37
2.4.2 Special Forces ...................................................................................................................... 39
2.4.3 NISA ..................................................................................................................................... 39
2.4.4 Somali Police Force ............................................................................................................. 40
2.4.5 Prison forces, prisons, and detention ................................................................................. 42
2.4.6 Security forces’ human rights conduct................................................................................ 43
3. Clans .................................................................................................................................................. 45
3.1 Spatial organisation and mobility in the Somali arena ............................................................... 46
3.1.1 Major clans .......................................................................................................................... 46
3.1.2 Minor clans, casted communities and non-Somali groups ................................................. 47
3.2 Protection and security .............................................................................................................. 49
3.2.1 Intra clan protection............................................................................................................ 49
3.2.2 Extra clan protection ........................................................................................................... 49
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3.3 Traditional customary law - Xeer ................................................................................................ 51
3.4 Clan militias’ role, recruitment, and engagement in disputes ................................................... 52
3.4.1 Establishment of a clan militia ............................................................................................ 52
3.4.2 Evolution of clan militias in Somalia.................................................................................... 53
3.5 Clans and Al-Shabaab ................................................................................................................. 55
3.5.1 Clans within Al-Shabaab ...................................................................................................... 55
3.5.2 Minor clans and Al-Shabaab................................................................................................ 56
3.5.3 The role of the elders .......................................................................................................... 56
3.6 Overview of clan militias abuses ................................................................................................ 56
4. Al-Shabaab ........................................................................................................................................ 58
4.1 Presence, territorial control, areas of influence, and outreach ................................................. 58
4.2 Armed forces, the Amniyat, and modus operandi ..................................................................... 59
4.2.1 The Jabahaat ....................................................................................................................... 59
4.2.2 Amniyat ............................................................................................................................... 59
4.2.3 Modus operandi and tactics ................................................................................................ 60
4.3 Governance and services, taxation, and infiltration................................................................... 61
4.3.1 Governance and services .................................................................................................... 61
4.3.2 Taxation ............................................................................................................................... 63
4.3.3 Infiltration............................................................................................................................ 64
4.4 Access to justice under Al-Shabaab ............................................................................................ 65
4.5 Overview of abuses .................................................................................................................... 66
5. AMISOM and AFRICOM..................................................................................................................... 67
5.1 AMISOM...................................................................................................................................... 67
5.1.1 Strength and regional presence .......................................................................................... 68
5.1.2 Activities and capacity ......................................................................................................... 69
5.1.3 AMISOM’s human rights conduct ....................................................................................... 71
5.2 AFRICOM..................................................................................................................................... 72
5.2.1 Strength and regional presence .......................................................................................... 72
5.2.2 Activities and capacity ........................................................................................................ 73
5.2.3 Impact on civilians ............................................................................................................... 73
6. Islamic State in Somalia (ISIS-Somalia) ............................................................................................. 74
6.1 Presence, territorial control, outreach ....................................................................................... 74
6.2 Strength ...................................................................................................................................... 76
6.3 Overview of abuses .................................................................................................................... 76
7. Federal Member States and Somaliland ........................................................................................... 77
7.1 Jubbaland .................................................................................................................................... 775

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7.1.1 Relevant dynamics, territorial control, and governance..................................................... 78
7.1.2 FMS armed forces ............................................................................................................... 79
7.1.3 Other actors/forces ............................................................................................................. 80
7.1.4 Access to justice .................................................................................................................. 80
7.1.5 Security forces’ human rights conduct................................................................................ 81
7.2 South-West ................................................................................................................................. 82
7.2.1 Relevant dynamics, territorial control, and governance..................................................... 82
7.2.2 FMS armed forces ............................................................................................................... 84
7.2.3 Other actors/forces ............................................................................................................. 85
7.2.4 Access to justice .................................................................................................................. 86
7.2.5 Security forces’ Human Rights Conduct .............................................................................. 87
7.3 Benadir and Mogadishu.............................................................................................................. 88
7.3.1 Relevant dynamics, territorial control, and governance..................................................... 88
7.3.2 BRA forces ........................................................................................................................... 90
7.3.3 Other actors/forces ............................................................................................................. 90
7.3.4 Access to justice .................................................................................................................. 91
7.3.5 Security forces’ human rights conduct................................................................................ 92
7.4 Hirshabelle .................................................................................................................................. 92
7.4.1 Relevant dynamics, territorial control, and governance..................................................... 93
7.4.2 FMS armed forces ............................................................................................................... 94
7.4.3 Other actors/forces ............................................................................................................. 94
7.4.4 Access to justice .................................................................................................................. 95
7.4.5 Security forces’ human rights conduct................................................................................ 96
7.5 Galmudug ................................................................................................................................... 96
7.5.1 Relevant dynamics, territorial control, and governance..................................................... 96
7.5.2 FMS armed forces ............................................................................................................... 99
7.5.3 Other actors/forces ............................................................................................................. 99
7.5.4 Access to justice ................................................................................................................ 100
7.5.5 Security forces’ human rights conduct.............................................................................. 101
7.6 Puntland.................................................................................................................................... 101
7.6.1 Relevant dynamics, territorial control, and governance................................................... 102
7.6.2 FMS armed forces ............................................................................................................. 105
7.6.3 Other actors/forces ........................................................................................................... 106
7.6.4 Access to justice ................................................................................................................ 106
7.6.5 Security forces’ human rights conduct.............................................................................. 107
7.7 Somaliland ................................................................................................................................ 108
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7.7.1 Relevant dynamics, territorial control, and governance................................................... 109
7.7.2 Armed forces ..................................................................................................................... 112
7.7.3 Other actors/forces ........................................................................................................... 113
7.7.4 Access to justice ................................................................................................................ 113
7.7.5 Security forces’ human rights conduct.............................................................................. 115
Annex 1: Bibliography ......................................................................................................................... 117
Annex 2: Terms of Reference .............................................................................................................. 141

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Disclaimer
This report was written according to the EASO COI Report Methodology (2019). 1 The report is basedon carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced.
The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated, and analysed with utmost
care. However, this document does not claim to be exhaustive. If a particular event, person, ororganisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has not taken place orthat the person or organisation does not exist.
Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particularapplication for international protection. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative of aparticular legal position.
‘Refugee’, ‘risk’ and similar terminology are used as generic terminology and not in the legal sense as
applied in the EU Asylum Acquis, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the
Status of Refugees.
Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may bemade of the information contained in this report.
The drafting of this report was finalised on 14 May 2021; however the reference period of the reportcovers the period 2020 – 30 April 2021, or earlier whenever relevant. Any event taking place after thisdate is not included in this report. Some additional information was added during the finalisation
phase in response to feedback received during the quality control process, until 18 June 2021. Moreinformation on the reference period for this report can be found in the methodology section of theIntroduction.

1

The 2019 EASO COI Report Methodology can be downloaded from the EASO COI Portal, url

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Glossary and Abbreviations
4.5 power-sharing
formulaA power-sharing formula under which key positions in the state andparliamentary seats are allocated on a proportional basis across the
4 major clans and 0.5 to minorities

AbbaanHead of a caravan, who provides safe crossing of a clan’s territory

ADR

Alternative Dispute Resolution Centres

AMISOM

African Union Mission in Somalia

AFRICOM

The United States Africa Command

Amniyat

Al-Shabaab’s intelligence wingAS

Al-Shabaab; militant Islamist organisation in Somalia

ASNE

Al-Shabaab North-East

ASWJ

Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama‘a

BRA

Benadir Regional Administration

Casualty

A person who is killed, wounded or incapacitated by some event

CID

Criminal Investigations Department

Danab‘Lightning’, advanced infantry battalion

Darwish (State level)

State level armed forces/militias/paramilitary/special police

Darwish (Federal Police)

Paramilitary unit of the Somali Police Force distinct from the statelevel unofficial darwish

Diya

Payment of compensation (see also mag or jilib)

Emir

The highest leader of Al-Shabaab

DESS

Duguf Enterprise Security Services

DPC

District Peace Committees

ENDF

Ethiopian National Defence Force

Fatality

A person who is killed by an incident or by violence

FGM/C

Female genital mutilation and cutting

FOB

Forward Operating Base

FFM

Fact-Finding Mission

FGS

Federal Government of Somalia

FMS

Federal Member States

Gobol

Somali administrative region

Gorgor‘The Eagles’, Somali commando force trained by Turkish military

GuurtiHouse of Elders

Hanbali

One of the two main shari’ah schools (madhab) present in Somalia

Hadd crimes

Crimes that are ‘against the rights of God’ under Islamic religious law

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IED‘Cheetah’ forces, special police unit of the SPF trained and funded byTurkeyImprovised Explosive Device

Ijtihad

The interpretation of the shari’ah

InfaaqEmergency money/funds raised by Al-Shabaab

ISIS-Somalia

Islamic State in Somalia, or ISS; a Somalia-based affiliate of the
Iraq/Syria-based IS (also called the Islamic State of Iraq in theLevant/Syria (ISIS), or Daesh)

Jabahaat

Military wing of Al-Shabaab

Jaysh

Al-Shabaab ‘army’, battalion

JSP

Jubbaland State Police

JISA

Jubbaland Intelligence and Security Agency

KDF

Kenya Defence Force

Macawiisleey

Clan militia operating in the Lower Shabelle region

Madhab

Shari’ah school

Mag

Payment of compensation (see also diya)

Maktab

Al-Shabaab Ministry

MCP

Mogadishu Central Prison

MPCC

Mogadishu Prison and Court Complex

Murtadd

Apostates; those who convert away from Islam

NIS(Somaliland) National Intelligence Service

NISA(Somali) National Intelligence and Security Agency

PISA

Puntland Intelligence and Security Agency

PMP

Puntland Maritime Police

PMPF

Puntland Maritime Police Force

PMSC

Private Military and Security Companies

PSF

Puntland Security ForcePSP

Puntland State Police

Qadi

Islamic judge

Qisas

Retaliation under shari’ah law

Sab

Minority group, occupational caste

Saabe

Somali ancestor for the Rahanweyn/Digil-Mirifle clan family

SamaaleSomali ancestor for Somali clans (Dir, Isaaq, Darood, Hawiye)

SEMG

UN Security Council Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea

Shafi’i (Shafi’s)

One of the two main shari’ah schools (madhab) present in Somalia

SNA

Somali National Army

Haramcad10

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SNAF

Somaliland National Armed Forces

SPF

Somali Police ForceS/VBIED

Suicide/Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device

TCC

AMISOM troops-contributing countries

Ugaas

Clan elders

Ulama

Islamic scholars

UNGU

UN Guard Unit

UPDF

Ugandan People’s Defence Force

Wali

Governor

Wilayaad

Al-Shabaab regional administration

Xeer

Customary (clan) law

Zakat

Religious tax under shari’ah Islamic law

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Introduction
The purpose of this report is to provide relevant context information in view of the assessment ofinternational protection status determination, including refugee status and subsidiary protection.
Among others, the report is intended to inform the development of Country Guidance on Somalia(2022).
The report provides background information and mapping of relevant state and non-state
actors/conflict dynamics in Somalia, upon which subsequent reports will build. These forthcoming
EASO COI reports will focus on the Somalia Security Situation, Targeted Profiles and Key SocioEconomic Indicators and are due to be published later in 2021.
This report provides an overview of the main state and non-state actors in the Somali context,
including their armed forces, at federal as well as at member state level. Details on relevant dynamics,
territorial control/influence, governance as well as access to justice are also provided. Finally, thereport provides an overview about the human rights conduct and abuses of main armed
groups/security forces.

Methodology
This report is produced in line with the EASO COI Report Methodology (2019) 2 and the EASO COI
Writing and Referencing Style Guide (2019). 3

Defining the terms of reference
The terms of reference of this report build on the input received from policy experts from EU+
countries 4 within the context of country guidance development on Somalia. Terms of reference forthis report can be found in Annex 2.

Collecting information
Given the broad scope of the report, the information gathered results from extensive desk researchusing predominantly public, specialised paper-based, and electronic sources until 14 May 2021. In very
few instances, which were duly referenced and described, restricted or non-public information has
been used to cover specific details.
The sources used are referenced in the Bibliography. Wherever information could not be found within
the timeframes for drafting this report after carefully consulting a range of sources, this is stated in
the report. The main sources consulted are included in the bibliography.

Quality control
To ensure that the authors respected the EASO COI Report Methodology, a review was carried out by
COI specialists from the countries and organisations listed as reviewers in the Acknowledgements
section. All comments made by the reviewers were taken into consideration and almost all of themwere implemented in the final draft of this report, which was finalised on 18 June 2021. EASO also
performed the final quality review and editing of the text.

2

EASO, EASO Country of Origin Information (COI) Report Methodology, June 2019, url
EASO, Writing and Referencing Guide for EASO Country of Origin Information (COI) Reports, June 2019, url
4
EU Member States plus Norway and Switzerland
3

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Sources
The report relies on a wide range of sources and publications, including: local and international thinktanks analysis, IO, NGO, and local organisations reports, grey literature, books, academic journals,
media reports, and security bulletins.

Structure and use of the report
The report is divided into seven chapters. After providing a country overview in Chapter 1 (Country
Background), the report goes on to describe the main country-wide state and non-state actors in
Somalia and in the Somali conflict, namely: the Federal Government of Somalia, the clans, al-Shabaab,
AMISOM and AFRICOM, ISIS. For each one of these respective actors, the report details:
strength/presence, characteristics, justice provisions and human rights conduct/abuses.
Chapter 7 provides sub-chapters for each Federal Member State (Jubbaland, South West State,
Hirshabelle, Benadir/Mogadishu, Galmudug, Puntland), as well as Somaliland, adopting the same
approach detailed above. Each sub-chapter includes a brief description of the state, background on
relevant dynamics, territorial control, governance, local armed forces, access to justice, as well as
security forces’ human rights conduct.

Note on Transliteration
A national orthography for the Somali language was codified relatively late by adopting a Latin script(21 October 1972). Nevertheless, even today, Somali lacks a commonly applied and binding
orthography.
In this text, Somali place, clan and personal names usually follow Somali orthography: ‘long vowels
are indicated by doubling them’, as in Darood or Abbaan, ‘the Latin ‘c’ stands for a sound close to the
Arabic ‫( ع‬ayn), while ‘x’ denotes the strongly aspirated ‫( ح‬ha)’. 5 However, given the fact that othersources adopt different conventions, the reader will sometimes find other forms of place, clan, andpersonal names in the text, including where direct citations are used or in references. See also theintroductory note on Clan Maps.
Somalis, notably Somali men, are frequently better known by their nicknames than by their formalnames. The same applies to public figures and politicians mentioned in the text, whose nickname isprovided in quotation marks, such as in ‘better known’ or ‘also known’ as ‘Qoor Qoor’.

5

Hoehne M., Between Somaliland and Puntland, 2015, url, p. 7

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Map Somalia - Approximate Territorial Control(30 April 2021)
6[see next page]

6 Political Geography Now, Somalia – Approximate Territorial Control as of 30 April 2021, n.d., non public source

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Figure 1. Political Geography Now, Somalia - Approximate Territorial Control as of 30 April 2021 (www.polgeonow.com)

Please note: This map was produced by Political Geography Now. The depictions on this map do not
imply any opinion whatsoever on the part of EASO concerning legal status or effective control overany country, territory, city, or area. Every effort is made to ensure this map is free of errors, but there
is no guarantee that the map or its features are either spatially or temporally accurate or fit for aparticular use. This map is provided without any warranty of any kind whatsoever, either express or
implied.
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Clan Maps
Below are two maps showing clan distribution at a detailed level (mostly sub-clan). Originally, they arebased respectively on: (1) the map by Abdulqaadir Abikar (1999); 7 and (2) the map by the British
anthropologist and expert in Somali clans, Ioan M. Lewis, attached to his 1955 book titled Peoples ofthe Horn of Africa: Somali, Afar and Saho. 8 Both maps are published below in an edited version, as
reworked by SEM Laenderanalyse, to make them more readable and more clearly laid-out than theoriginal.
Please note: the nomadic lifestyle of many Somalis, the extensive migration movements since 1991
and the disagreements regarding clan genealogies make it virtually impossible to produce a precise
map. These discrepancies are clearly visible when comparing the two maps below, for example the
distribution of the Hawiye in Southern Somalia. Contrary to what the maps show, for the most part
there are no exact and clearly defined borders between clan territories.
As already noted in the Note on Transliteration, it is equally important to notice that the spelling ofclan names may vary. In the maps below, the spellings used by the original authors have been
reproduced verbatim. The spelling variations between the two authors are reflected in the maps (e.g.
Gelimes by Lewis 1955 vs Gilmays by Abikar 1999).
Although there is a long timespan between the publication of these maps (1955 and 1999
respectively), the differences between the maps should not be understood as changes in the Somaliclan distribution within this timeframe.

7 Abikar, A., Clan Distribution of the Somalis in Horn of Africa, 1999, as in: ACCORD, Clans in Somalia – Report on a lecture

by Joakim Gundel, COI Workshop Vienna, 15 May 2009 (Revised Edition), 2009, url, p. 30

8 Lewis, I.M., Peoples of the Horn of Africa: Somali, Afar and Saho, International African Institute, 1955

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Map by Abikar (1999) 9

Figure 2. Clan Distribution by Abikar (1999)

9

Abikar, A., Clan Distribution of the Somalis in Horn of Africa, 1999, as in: ACCORD, Clans in Somalia – Report on a lecture
by Joakim Gundel, COI Workshop Vienna, 15 May 2009 (Revised Edition), 2009, url, p. 30

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Map by Lewis (1955) 10

Figure 3. Clan Distribution by Lewis (1955)

10 Lewis, I.M., Peoples of the Horn of Africa: Somali, Afar and Saho, International African Institute, 1955

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1. Country backgroundAt the beginning of 2021, Somalia was experiencing a renewed phase of political instability andelectoral impasse, in addition to the on-going humanitarian crisis (Covid-19, drought, food security,
floods) and the ongoing conflict with the militant group Al-Shabaab. 11
Often labelled as a ‘mediated’ state or ‘hybrid’ political entity, Somalia presents a wide range of state,state-like non state actors, and other social, political, and military actors. With various levels ofoutreach, they interplay with each other at national and regional level resulting in a great variety ofde facto governance arrangements in ‘ungoverned spaces’. 12 Although developing simultaneously andbeing intertwined with each other, main conflict and confrontation dynamics can be presented foranalytical purposes in different layers, which can be listed as follows:•

The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and the Federal Member States (FMS). The Federal
Government of Somalia embodies the national state apparatus and represents Somalia’sinternationally recognised interlocutor. 13 Based in Mogadishu and with a very limited outreach, 14
it depends heavily on foreign donors for its survival (UN system, EU system, US, UK, Turkey, UAE,
among others). 15 At the regional level, the Federal States’ administrations function as thelegitimate political powers, usually with stronger territorial anchoring and clearer clan affiliation. 16
Nevertheless, they operate with different degrees of governance performance, administrative
capacity, territorial control, and security. 17 These Federal Member States (FMS) are, from south
to north: Jubbaland, South-West, Benadir (Mogadishu), Hirshabelle, Galmudug, and Puntland. 18 A
first fault line in the Somali context runs between the FGS and the Federal Member States, which
often compete among them over political power, legitimacy, resources, territorial control,monopoly of the force. 19 For details see Section 2 on The Federal Government of Somalia andSection 7 on the Federal Member States and Somaliland.

•

Intra-State Control and Governance Dynamics. As mentioned above, the various Federal Member
States operate with different degrees of governance performance, institution building, security
and stability. 20 While state and local level administrations are in most cases still in the making or
just entered a consolidation phase, effective governance and control of the state territory is rarely
undisputed or unitary.21 Besides al-Shabaab presence in South-Central Somalia (see below), a
number of issues may transversally affect the consolidating state administrations. 22 Such issues,
which encompass internal political instability, lack of political consensus across state
constituencies, clan rivalries, land and resources disputes, foreign and federal (military) meddling,

11 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 17 February 2021, url, para. 2-17, 54-60; HRW, World Report 2020 – Somalia, 13 January

2021, url; HIPS, State of Somalia – 2020 Report, url, pp. 3-4
12 Menkhaus, K., Governance without Government in Somalia - Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping, 2007,
url, p. 78; Herring, E. et al., Somalia, fragmented hybrid governance and inclusive development, 9 October 2020, url, p. 186;
Stremlau, N., Governance Without Government in the Somali Territories, 9 January 2019, url
13 Bryden M., Somalia Redux? Assessing the new Somali Federal Government, August 2013, url, pp. 1-3
14 Stremlau, N., Governance Without Government in the Somali Territories, 9 January 2019, url
15 Development Initiatives, A complex and protracted state of crisis, 2020, url
16 HIPS, Dysfunctional Federalism, July 2020, url, pp. 8- 11, 15, see also 13-20;
17 Unpublished written information from a security organisation provided to EASO, 2020
18 HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, February 2021, url, p. 9
19 HIPS, Dysfunctional Federalism, July 2020, url, pp. 8- 12, see also 13-20
20 Unpublished written information from a security organisation provided to EASO, 2020
21 Unpublished written information from a security organisation provided to EASO, 2020
22 UNSOM, Political Affairs, 2021, url

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at times result into break-away or competing local administrations. 23 For details see Section on
Clans and ad-hoc sections for each Federal Member States and Somaliland.
•

The Intra- and Inter-Clan Rivalries. Another major fault line that runs through the Somali context
is constituted by clan rivalries and conflicts. Somalia’s political and cultural landscape is deeply
rooted in the clan system as well as in racial discriminations. 24 The Somali society is divided into
four or five main clan families - (Dir/Isaaq, Darood, Hawiye, Rahanweyn or Digil-Mirifle), each oneof them comprising several clans, sub-clans, and sub-sub clans – as well as some minority clans
and clan families, and ethnic minorities. 25 Somali clans are distributed across the Somali national
territory – as well as beyond it - and represent, especially ever since the outbreak of the civil war
in 1991, ‘political-territorial-military’ and ‘identity’ units (although to some extent unstable andtransient).26 Clans often compete with each other, as well as against other actors, such the FGS or
the FMS, for political, resource and territorial control, while resorting to a system of variablegeometry and instrumental alliances. 27 For details see Section on Clans and ad-hoc sections foreach Federal Member States and Somaliland.

•

The Al-Shabaab – anti-Al-Shabaab Conflict. Somalia is a party to a non-international armed
conflict with Al Shabaab, 28 according to the Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts project (RULAC). 29 Al
Shabaab is designated as a terrorist group by the UK 30 and the US. 31 The FGS, the FMS, someclans and Darwish militias, as well as other international actors, such as AMISOM (the African
Union Mission in Somalia) and AFRICOM (the US African Command), are all engaged, although invarious degrees and forms, in the long-standing war against al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab is Somalia’s‘armed Islamist extremist and self-declared al-Qaeda affiliate organisation’ 32 that controls ‘tractsof rural central, southern, and western Somalia’, 33 while permeating the Somali society beyond
it. 34 For details see Section 4 on Al-Shabaab and Section 5 on AMISOM and AFRICOM.

•The Anti-ISIS Conflict. The Islamic State in Somalia (ISS or ISIS-Somalia) is a jihadist Islamist groupwith affiliation to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria/Levant (ISIS/ISIL/Daesh). 35 Various armed
forces, including AFRICOM, the Federal State Security Forces, and the Puntland armed forces areengaged in various degrees in a warfare against the Islamic State in Somalia, which is described as‘largely a Puntland group,’ though it has claimed attacks in Mogadishu. 36 Al-Shabaab and ISS also

23 ACLED, A turbulent run-up to elections in Somalia, 7 April 2021, url

24 Eno M.A and Kusow A. M., Racial and Cast Prejudice in Somalia, 2014, url, pp. 91-93

25 ACCORD, Clans in Somalia – Report on a lecture by Joakim Gundel, COI Workshop Vienna, 15 May 2009 (Revised Edition),
2009, url, pp. 11-20
26 de Waal A., The Prairie Fire that Burned Mogadishu: The Logic of Clan Formation in Somalia, December 2018, url, pp. 1-2,
see also pp. 3, 5, 6, 15, 18, 25; See also: ACCORD, Clans in Somalia – Report on a lecture by Joakim Gundel, COI Workshop
Vienna, 15 May 2009 (Revised Edition), 2009, url, p. 8
27 de Waal A., The Prairie Fire that Burned Mogadishu: The Logic of Clan Formation in Somalia, December 2018, url, pp. 6,
10, 13-19, 30
28 RULAC, Non-international armed conflict in Somalia, 30 April 2021, url
29 RULAC is a project of the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights that identifies andclassifies situations of armed conflict, providing an independent and impartial analysis of conflicts and applicableinternational law. RULAC, About RULAC, n.d., url
30 UK, Home Office, Proscribed terrorist groups or organisations, [Updated] 23 April 2021, url
31 USDOS, Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, n.d., url
32 International Crisis Group, Somalia: Al-Shabaab – It Will Be a Long War, Africa Briefing no. 99, 26 June 2014, url, p. 1
33 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 120; see also International Crisis Group, Somalia’s
Current Security and Stability Status, Testimony by Dr. EJ Hogendoorn, 14 March, 2018, url
34 UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, 28 September 2020, url, p. 3; International Crisis Group,
Somalia: Al-Shabaab – It Will Be a Long War, Africa Briefing no. 99, 26 June 2014, url, pp. 1, 12-14
35 Weiss, C., Reigniting the Rivalry: The Islamic State in Somalia vs. al-Shabaab, CTC Sentinel, April 2019, url, pp. 29, 32
36 EIP, The Islamic State in East Africa, September 2018, url, pp. 14-17; see also: Weiss, C., Reigniting the Rivalry: The
Islamic State in Somalia vs. al-Shabaab, CTC Sentinel, April 2019, url, pp. 30-31

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Country of origin information report | Somalia: Actors

fight with one another, causing rival clashes and assassinations between the groups. 37 For details
see Section 6 on ISIS.
•

Puntland versus Somaliland. Somaliland is an area of Somalia that declared independence fromthe rest of Somalia in 1991. Among other territorial disputes across Somalia, Puntland and disputecontrol of the Sool and Sanaag regions that border the two state administrations as well as thearea of Ayn, part of Togdheer region. Sool and Sanaag fall within Somaliland’s boundaries, as per
the old Anglo-Italian border and protocol (1894), and as put forward by the Somaliland
government. The two dominant clans in the area (Warsangeli and Dhulbahante) belong to thesame Darood/Harti clan family for which Puntland constitutes the core and institutional ‘home’. 38
In other words, as Somali expert Hoehne puts it ‘Somaliland, therefore, is based on a territorial
logic and Puntland on a genealogical logic’. 39 For details see relevant sub-sections within the
Sections 7.6 Puntland and 7.7 Somaliland.

•

The FGS versus Somaliland. The core issue of contention between the two political entities
remains Somaliland’s political status, in light of its 1991 declaration of independence from the restof Somalia. The FGS rejects this declaration. At the same time the international community is more
and more willing to engage with the government of Somaliland (including at business anddiplomatic level), without bestowing for this reason international recognition to the break-away
administration. 40 Since 2015 Somalia and Somaliland have not seriously re-engaged inreconciliation talks, failing to do so also at the beginning of 2020. 41 For details see Section 7.7
Somaliland.

•

Foreign influence on the FGS and the FMS. Reportedly, Gulf monarchies compete for power andresources across the Horn of Africa and in Somalia. 42 The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar
each provide weapons or military training to sided factions on the ground, exert political influence,and compete for ‘contracts to manage ports or exploit natural resources’. 43 More in general, Saudi
Arabia and the UAE consider the Somali coastline as their ‘western security flank’, while Qatar andTurkey, among others, invest in development and business projects especially in Mogadishu. 44
Within this context, the SFG is aligned with Turkey and Qatar, 45 while Puntland and Somaliland
are supported by the UAE. 46 Other key regional players and influencers are bordering Kenya andEthiopia, as well as Eritrea. 47 Kenya’s ‘alleged interference in Somalia’s internal affairs’ extends toJubbaland, a crucial security partner, 48 while Ethiopia’s interference to, among others, South-

37 Weiss, C., Reigniting the Rivalry: The Islamic State in Somalia vs. al-Shabaab, CTC Sentinel, April 2019, url, pp. 29, 32

38 ISS, Overlapping claims by Somaliland and Puntland – The case of Sool and Sanaag, November 2019, East Africa Report

No. 27, url, pp. 3-5; Hoehne M., Between Somaliland and Puntland, 2015, url, pp. 19-21, 36

39 Hoehne M., Between Somaliland and Puntland, 2015, url, p. 21

40 International Crisis Group, Somalia-Somaliland: The Perils of Delaying New Talks, 12 July 2019, url

41 Garowe Online, Somalia: EU tries to revive stalled talks between FGS and Somaliland, 13 May 2020, url

42 Global South, The Middle East powerhouses & geopolitics of Somalia’s fault lines, 23 September 2020, url

43 New York Times (The), With Guns, Cash and Terrorism, Gulf States Vie for Power in Somalia, 22 July 2019, url
44 Reuters, Harboring ambitions: Gulf states scramble for Somalia, 1 May 2018, url
45 HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, February 2021, url, p. 28

46

New York Times (The), With Guns, Cash and Terrorism, Gulf States Vie for Power in Somalia, 22 July 2019, url

47 Africa Report (The), Horn of Africa Cooperation: Mixed responses to new regional bloc, 9 September 2020, url

48 ISS, Kenya-Somalia dispute threatens an embattled Horn of Africa, 16 March 2021, url; Majid N. and Abdirahman K., The

Jubbaland Project and the Transborder Ogadeen, 23 February 2021, url, pp. 6-7

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Country of origin information report | Somalia: Actors

West State, 49 the Gedo region, 50 and the central government. 51 In the course of 2020, beginningof 2021, the FGS has also continued to ‘strengthen its relationship’ with Eritrea. 52

2. Federal Government of Somalia
As of April 2021, the Federal Government of Somalia is still under the de facto presidency of Mohamed
Abdullahi Mohamed, also known as ‘Farmaajo’. His political mandate expired on 8 February 2021,
while parliamentarian and (then) presidential elections were actually due before that, ideally basedon the ‘one-person, one-vote’ principle. 53 Farmaajo’s government failed to delivery on this principle,
as well as on timely indirect elections. 54 Ever since the country has been experiencing a strongly
polarised electoral and political impasse, mirrored in inconclusive as much as tense rounds ofconsultation with the various stakeholders, 55 as well as occasional armed confrontations (downtown
Mogadishu) with opposition forces (February and April 2021). 56 As of April 2021, a proper electoral
agreement between the FGS and the FMS, notably Puntland and Jubbaland, as well as the Council of
the Presidential Candidates, which comprises all opposing presidential candidates, is still in themaking. In Dhusamareb first (August 2020), and then in Mogadishu on 17 September 2020, the parties
reached a first compromise. 57 Based on this new electoral model, which is still an indirect system,‘electoral colleges will be used to select representatives for the House of the People, while seats in
the Upper House will be voted on by state assemblies. The election will be managed by federal andstate level committees and, under the proposed timetable would be completed by early February
2021.’ 58 Each electoral college, which will vote for a seat in parliament, will consist of 101 delegates(selected on the basis of local clan distribution). 59
However, according to sources from April-May 2021, the actual implementation of the Dhusamareb
agreement, including the supervision of the entire electoral process, which requires high level ofpolitical dialogue, remains a major source of contention among the parties. Opposition lawmakers,
together with Upper House Speaker, leaders of Puntland and Jubbaland, and Presidential aspirants(Council of Presidential Candidates), formed the National Salvation Forum (or Council) to advocate at

49 Majid N. and Abdirahman K., The Jubbaland Project and the Transborder Ogadeen, 23 February 2021, url, pp. 5-7

50 International Crisis Group, Ending the Dangerous Standoff in Southern Somalia, Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°158, 14

July 2020, url, pp. 3-6

51 HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, February 2021, url, pp. 27-28; International Crisis Group, Ending the Dangerous

Standoff in Southern Somalia, Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°158, 14 July 2020, url, pp. 3-6
52 HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, February 2021, url, p. 27
53 Al Jazeera, Somali opposition leaders ‘no longer recognise president’, 8 February 2021, url; Guardian (The), Inside
Somalia’s impasse: election talks collapse amid mistrust and blame, 8 April 2021, url
54 Africa Report (The), Somalia’s delayed presidential elections: Top 7 issues to follow, 4 February 2021, url; VOA, Somali
Opposition Refuses to Recognize President Farmajo as Term Expires, 8 February 2021, url
55 Daily Sabah, What is behind Somalia’s 2021 electoral impasse?, 15 April 2021, url; Guardian (The), Inside Somalia’s
impasse: election talks collapse amid mistrust and blame, 8 April 2021, url
56 New York Times (The), Gunfire Erupts in Mogadishu as Somalia’s Political Feud Turns Violent, 30 April 2021, url; Reuters,
Forces opposed to Somali president control parts of Mogadishu, 27 April 2021, url; Reuters, Somali ex-leader says soldiers
attacked his home, blames president, 26 April 2021, url; Al Jazeera, Rival groups clash in Somali capital over president’s
mandate, 25 April 2021, url; BBC News, Somali capital gunfire amid election protests, 19 February 2021, url; Washington
Post (The), Clashes in Mogadishu throw Somalia’s political crisis into dangerous new phase, 19 February 2021, url
57 Hiiraan Online, Farmaajo, FMS leaders strike electoral deal in week-long talks, 17 September 2020, url; Garowe Online,
Hope for Somalia as leaders near striking inclusive election deal in Mogadishu, 17 September 2020, url; Africa Report (The),
Somalia’s delayed presidential elections: Top 7 issues to follow, 4 February 2021, url; Guardian (The), Inside Somalia’s
impasse: election talks collapse amid mistrust and blame, 8 April 2021, url
58 Somali Dialogue Platform and Somali Public Agenda, Protecting stability and inclusivity in Somalia’s indirect election
process, December 2020, url, p. 2
59 Somali Dialogue Platform and Somali Public Agenda, Protecting stability and inclusivity in Somalia’s indirect election
process, December 2020, url, p. 2

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Country of origin information report | Somalia: Actors

national and international level for a democratic transition. 60 The incumbent president Farmaajo
term’s extension, which the House of the People (the lower chamber of the Parliament) voted on
12 April 2021, 61 was met with political unrest, international criticism, and street protests, which also
broke out in armed fighting downtown Mogadishu. 62 The two-years term extension was thenrepealed, 63 while the current prime minister, Mohamed Hussein Roble, seems to have assumed acentral role in bridging the country from a state of political turmoil towards elections. 64

2.1 State Structure and GovernanceAs per Article 1 of the Provisional Constitution, Somalia is a Federal State. Article 3 (3) underlines that‘the Federal Republic of Somalia is founded upon the fundamental principles of power sharing in afederal system.’ To this regard Article 51 (2) emphasises that ‘every government shall respect andprotect the limits of its powers and the powers of other governments.’ 65 Article 48 stipulates that thestate is composed of two levels of government: the federal government and the federal member
states, which include both state and local governments. Article 54 assigns foreign affairs, national
defence, citizenship and immigration and monetary policy to the exclusive jurisdictions of the federal
government, 66 while for all other issues affecting the FGS and the FMS’ territories article 52 foresees
that:‘the Federal Government and Federal Member State governments shall ensure thatmeetings between the Presidents of the Federal Member States and high ranking officials
be held regularly to discuss issues that affect their territories, including: water resources,
agriculture, animal husbandry, pasture and forestry, the prevention of erosion and theprotection of the environment, health, education, relations and dialogue amongst
traditional leaders, and the protection and development of traditional law, relations
amongst religious scholars and youth.’ 67
The FGS of Somalia comprises the following institutional bodies:•

The Federal Parliament. The legislative branch consists of a House of the People and theUpper House. 68 Article 64 of the Provisional Constitution states that the House of the People
comprises 275 ordinary members. De jure they shall be directly elected by the citizens ofSomalia, but de facto they are (still) indirectly selected through a clan-based power-sharing
formula (the 4.5 formula, see below for details). 69 Article 72 states that the Upper House‘shall be elected through a direct, secret and free ballot by the people of the Federal
Member States’. In practice the members of the Upper House are elected by the Federal

60Wardheer News, Somalia’s Newly Established National Salvation Forum Sends an Open Letter to ICs on the Current
Political Deadlock, 21 March 2021, url; Somali Dispatch, National Salvation Forum opens a Critical Conference in
Mogadishu, 23 March 2021, url; Radio Dalsan, Somalia’s National Salvation Forum contacts African Union ahead of
mediation talks, 23 April 2021, url; New Humanitarian (The), Back from the brink? Somalia’s political crisis explained, 20
May 2021, url
61 VOA, Somali Lower House of Parliament Extends President’s Term for Two Years, 12 April 2021, url
62 BBC News, Somalia violence: Rival units fight amid row over president's term, 25 April 2021, url; Guardian (The),
Somalia’s rival factions spread across Mogadishu as they jockey for power, 21 April 2021, url; Africa Report (The), Somalia:
Chaos over term extension as Farmaajo blames opponents, foreign interest, 30 April 2021, url
63 Reuters, Somalia's parliament votes to cancel presidential term extension, 2 May 2021, url
64 East African (The), Somalia's Farmaajo backs down from controversial term extension, 28 April 2021, url
65 Somalia, Provisional Constitution, 1 August 2012, url
66 Somalia, Provisional Constitution, 1 August 2012, url
67 Somalia, Provisional Constitution, 1 August 2012, url
68 USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2019 – Somalia, 24 June 2020, url, p. 1
69 USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2019 – Somalia, 24 June 2020, url, p. 1

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Country of origin information report | Somalia: Actors

•

•

•

•
•

Member States assemblies, 70 and under Article 72, ‘their number shall be no more than fiftyfour (54) members based on the eighteen (18) regions that existed in Somalia before
1991’. 71 On 27 June 2020 the House of the People approved the Benadir Region
Representation Bill, which gives the region 13 seats in the Upper House and raises to 67 thetotal number of senators; 72
The President. Article 87 (1) states that the President is the Head of the State, the symbol ofnational unity, and the guardian of the Constitution. Article 89 (1) states that ’The Houses of
the Federal Parliament shall elect the President’. Under Article 90, presidential responsibilities
are provided for, such as: ‘(b) [serving as] the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces’ (…),(c) appoint the Prime Minister (…), (f) signs draft laws passed by the Federal Parliament’and(j) appoint the Chairman of the Constitutional Court, the High Court, and other judges at theFederal Government Level’; 73
The Executive Branch. The Council of Ministers is the highest executive authority of theFederal Government. Currently Somalia’s Prime Minister is Mohamed Hussein Roble, whose
new cabinet, comprising 71 ministers (including state and deputy ministers), was endorsed by
the House of People on 23 October 2020. Roble replaced Hassan Ali Kheyre, who was prime
minister between 23 February 2017, and 25 July 2020, when he lost the vote of parliamentary
confidence; 74
The Judiciary. As per art. 108 of the Provisional Constitution, the judiciary power which shallbe independent of the legislative and executive branches, shall reflect a national court
structure organised in three levels, which are: (a) The Constitutional Court; (b) The Federal
Government level courts, whose highest court is the Federal High Court; (c) The Federal
Member State level courts, whose highest court is the Federal Member State High Court. 75
For more details about the actual implementation of these law provisions and effectivenessof the judiciary see section below on Access to Justice;
The Security Forces. For the purposes of this report, they are addressed separately in thesection below on Security Forces.
Governance. As per Articles 49(4) and (5) of the Somali Provisional Constitution, ‘the number
and the boundaries of the districts in a Federal Member State shall be determined by a law
enacted by the parliament of the Federal Member State.’ Under 49(5), while ‘Federal Member
State boundaries shall be based on the boundaries of the [eighteen (18)] administrative
regions as they existed before 1991’. 76

Apart from the constitutional provisions, Somalia is de-facto ruled by a gentlemen agreement among
the major clan-families that dominate the Somali arena who have a shared understanding that ‘elites
across clan and factional lines will enjoy at least some access to resources flowing from the federal
state’ and that where their clan family is dominant, clan elites enjoy a ‘monopoly on resources’. Thisagreement, which was fully codified at the end of the Mbagathi peace process in 2004, remains a setof informal understanding about the ‘rules of the game’, which were meant to be temporary but stillpermeate the Somali politics (the ‘stickiness of the Somali elite bargain’). 77 Based on this agreement,
also known as the 4.5 power-sharing formula, key positions in the State apparatus, including
parliamentary seats, are (more or less) proportionally distributed among the 4 main clan families

70 USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2019 – Somalia, 24 June 2020, url, p. 1
71 Somalia, Provisional Constitution, 1 August 2012, url, artt. 55, 64, 71-72

72 Halbeeg, The Politics of Representation: ‘Mogadishu Status Conundrum’, Policy Brief no. 2, July 2020, url, p. 7
73 Somalia, Provisional Constitution, 1 August 2012, url

74 Daily Nation, Somalia: Parliament Endorses New Prime Minister Roble's Cabinet, 25 October 2020, url
75 Somalia, Provisional Constitution, 1 August 2012, url, art. 108

76 Somalia, Provisional Constitution, 1 August 2012, url, art. 49, 72

77

Menkhaus K., Elite Bargains and Political Deals Project: Somalia Case Study, UK Stabilisation Unit, February 2018, url, pp.
3, see also pp. 4, 17-19

24

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Actors(Darood, Hawiye, Rahanweyn and Dir), 78 as well as the 0.5 quota representing (non-Somali) minorities(for more details see section on Clans). 79 This gave the dominant clans ‘artificial equilibrium in thegovernment’, with the presidency and premiership alternating between Hawiye and Darood, thespeakership of the parliament assigned to the Rahanweyn, and the supreme court to the Dir. 80
As of April 2021, this is the situation at FMS level:•••

Jubbaland, South-West, Hirshabelle, Galmudug, and Puntland, although in different degrees,
have substantially taken shape. Each one of these FMS has its own president, parliamentaryassembly, (special) police, and armed forces. 81 However, at local and regional level, theboundaries between official and unofficial security forces, including darwish forces,
paramilitary and clan militias, are particularly blurred. 82
Benadir Regional Administration (BRA) comprises the federal capital Mogadishu, and hence
the site of the FGS. Its status is still unsettled, and it is undergoing a disputed institutionalbuilding process whose end-result is still uncertain. 83 Currently the Major of Mogadishu serves
as the head of the BRA, and is appointed by the president of the FGS. 84
Somaliland, which comprises 5 of the ‘national’ 18 administrative regions to which theprovisional constitution refers (art. 72), is a break-away state that declared its independence
from Somalia already in 1991. See for more details the Country background, Territorial control
and areas of influence (below), and the subchapter on Somaliland.

For more information about FMS, see Section 7 on Federal Member States and Somaliland.

2.2 Territorial control and areas of influence
In terms of territorial control, the federal government of Somalia has made massive progress since2010, when it controlled only a small district in Mogadishu. Since then, it has, with the essential
support of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), pushed al-Shabaab out of many urban
centres in South-Central Somalia. However, these gains are described as being dependent oninternational military support and ‘fragile’, 85 while al-Shabaab’s territorial control is described as‘fluid’ and yet still capable of carrying out ‘massive attacks’: ‘the group typically leaves an area aheadof an AMISOM offensive, but experts say that UN-backed forces do not have the capacity to holdrecaptured territory and that militants usually return’. 86 In other words, al-Shabaab has been
described as very resilient and representing a serious and tangible threat in many parts of southern,
central, and western Somalia, especially in the rural areas, and along supply routes between towns. 87
Moreover, as security expert Dr. Vanda Felbab-Brown 88 puts it ‘forward operating bases [FOB, secured

78

Ahmed M.N., Somalia's Struggle to Integrate Traditional and Modern Governance Systems: The 4.5 Formula and the2012 Provisional Constitution, in Journal of Somali Studies, Vol. 6 Nr. 1, June 2019, url, pp. 44-45
79
Eno, M. A. and Eno, O. A., Intellectualism amid Ethnocentrism: Mukhtar and the 4.5 Factor, 2011, url, pp. 137-145
80 HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, p. 9
81 HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, February 2021, url, pp. 9-18; HIPS, Dysfunctional federalism, July 2020, url, pp. 7-14
82 Felbab-Brown V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, pp. 113-151
83 Halbeeg, The Politics of Representation: ‘Mogadishu Status Conundrum’, Policy Brief no. 2, July 2020, url
84 HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, February 2021, url, p. 18
85 International Crisis Group, Somalia’s Current Security and Stability Status, Testimony by Dr. EJ Hogendoorn, 14 March,
2018, url
86 CFR, Al-Shabaab – Backgrounder, 19 May 2021, url
87 International Crisis Group, Somalia’s Current Security and Stability Status, Testimony by Dr. EJ Hogendoorn, 14 March,
2018, url; Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, pp. 120-121
88 Dr. Vanda Felbab-Brown is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute where she focuses on international and internal
conflict, non-traditional security threats, and insurgency, among others. She has conducted fieldwork on a range ofcountries, including Somalia. Brookings, Vanda Felbab-Brown, n.d., url

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Country of origin information report | Somalia: Actors

forward operational level military position] are regularly overrun and destroyed by al-Shabaab’. 89 As
a result the Somali national forces struggle ‘to hold [newly] cleared territories, even losing some key
areas in recent years’, 90 while AMISOM remains ‘mostly hunkered in “garrison mode”.’ 91 Finally, the
FGS and its federal security forces compete at regional level with the FMS and other regional actors
relevant at that level (state level darwish militias, clan militias, paramilitary groups, special police
forces). The state security architecture remains deeply fractured, with impacts in all other domains.
As a consequence, the FMS’ security, political, and administrative powers are often still weak andoverlap or outrightly replace that of the federal government, which is often unable to enforce its
presence and central power. 92
The US Lead Inspector General, in a report from November 2020, states that:‘Al-Shabaab controls or exerts influence in large portions of southern Somalia and, to alesser extent, central Somalia. The group’s largest concentration of fighters is in theLower Shabelle and Lower Juba regions. At a September policy organization event, Major
General Anderson said that al-Shabaab had created a “de facto safe haven” in southern
Somalia that, with difficult terrain and unsympathetic clan networks, was very difficult
for Somali and international forces to penetrate and influence. USAFRICOM reported that
there was little change in al-Shabaab’s areas of influence or control during the quarter.’ 93
For an overview of areas of influence/control territory in Somalia, please see the Map Somalia –Approximate Territorial Control (Figure 1).

2.3 Access to justice through formal and informal systems
Article 105 (2) of the Somali Provisional Constitution (2012) stipulates that the ‘judicial structure shallbe regulated by a law enacted by the Federal Parliament.’ 94 The Somali Parliament has yet to adopt
the laws clarifying the structure of the judicial branch. However, in line with the constitutional
provisions (Article 108), most of the FMS, including the BRA, organised their own justice system
around a three-tiered approach developed during the Siad Barre era: 95•••

Court of First Instance: located at District level, it deals with routine civil and minor criminalcases;
Appeals Court: located at the capital of the region (regions are called gobol in Somali), anddealing with cases escalated by the Court of First Instance;
State Supreme Court: located at the capital of the FMS, it adjudicates serious crimes (such as
capital and rape cases) and works as constitutional court at state level.

The structure of the courts outlined here above is integrated and complemented by the following
bodies of the judicial branch: 96

89 Felbab-Brown V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 118
90 Felbab-Brown V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 118
91 Felbab-Brown V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 119

92 Felbab-Brown V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 121, see also pp. 121-123

93 US DoD, East Africa Counterterrorism Operation, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, 1 July –30 September 2020, url, p. 15

94 Somalia, Provisional Constitution, 1 August 2012, art. 105, url

95 HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, pp. 15-

18
96 HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, pp. 1617

26

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Actors(a) Federal and States Ministries of Justice;(b) Offices of the Attorney General at Federal and States level. In 2019 president Farmaajo appointed
Suleiman Mohamed Mohamud as the new federal attorney general. Under his mandate he introduced
a set of reforms aimed at expanding access to justice and fighting corruption, including tackling humantrafficking, money laundering, illegal fishing off the coast of Somalia, gender-based violence andcrimes against journalists (for which he appointed special prosecutors); 97 no information on state levelattorneys general could be found within the given time limits and among the consulted sources;(c) Federal Supreme High Court, with Mr Bashe Yusuf Ahmed as chief justice as of May 2018; 98(d) Judicial Services Commission: which is tasked with advising the Federal Government on theadministration of justice including recruitment, dismissal, and any legal action taken against judges; 99(e) Constitutional Court of Somalia: which is still to be established; 100(f) Human Rights Commission: which is still to be established; 101(g) Military Courts. The Somali justice system relies on military courts for prosecutions 102 of a broad
range of cases, including terrorism-related offences in ‘proceedings that violate fair trial standards’,
according to Human Rights Watch. 103 Also known as court-martials, Garowe Online states they areused for trying and then sentencing ‘hard-core criminals,’ mostly those associated with al-Shabaab
activities. 104
On a more political note, and as a consequence of the power sharing agreement among major clanfamilies that de facto rule over Somalia – the so called 4.5 formula (see for details section on State
Structure and Governance) – the Dir clan family reportedly dominates the judicial branch (attorney
general and chief justice are usually from the Dir clan family). 105 Within this context, in 2018, the FMS
and the FGS reached an important agreement in Jowhar, the so-called Jowhar agreement, which laid
down the foundation of an integrated judicial system between Federal and State administrations.
Basically, the three-tiered FMS courts were given the authority to litigate local and federal cases atfirst instance (district), appeal, and state supreme court levels. At the same time, the federal supremehigh court was given the exclusive authority to make a final, unappealable adjudication of all cases. 106
However, the formal justice system outlined above is only a portion of the composite justice systemthat operates in Somalia today. Mediation or arbitration through customary law elders, as well as
adjudication through Shari’ah courts coexist, complement or replace official justice venues. 107 Verybroadly, their subject specialisation can be described as follows:

97 HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, p. 26

98 Face2Face Africa, All you need to know about the newly appointed 36-year-old chief justice of Somalia, 28 May 2018, url;

East African (The), Somali chief justice tells off president over sacking, 28 May 2018, url
99 Somalia, Ministry of Justice, n.d, url
100 HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, pp. 1617
101 HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, p. 15
102 USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2020 - Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 10; UNSG, Situation in
Somalia, 13 August 2020, url, p. 9; UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 May 2020, url, p. 8; HRW, Submission to the Universal
Periodic Review of Somalia, October 2020, url, p. 9, see also pp. 8-9
103 HRW, Submission to the Universal Periodic Review of Somalia, October 2020, url, p. 9, see also pp. 8-9
104 Garowe Online, Puntland Military Court sentences militants to death and jail terms, 28 September 2020, url
105 HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, p. 9106 HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, pp. 2122
107 Expanding Access to Justice Program, Access to Justice Assessment Tool 2020, Somalia Baseline Study Brief, url, pp. 1-2;
HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, pp. 26-27

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Country of origin information report | Somalia: Actors•••

Official justice system: in principle all cases, civil and criminal, which, based on gravity, can be
escalated from the district court to the court of first instance or the state supreme court; 108
Traditional (xeer) justice: main source of justice for the settlement of clan disputes, conflict
resolutions, land disputes and (group) collective responsibilities; 109 within this context, andfrom a customary point of view, practices such as female genital mutilation and cutting(FGM/C), as well as restrictions to women’s inheritance rights are tolerated in many areas,even though both contradict shari’ah principles (which are still unequal between men andwomen). 110 In general, xeer serves as a form of ‘collective security and social insurance’. 111
Shari’ah courts: rights-based justice applied primarily for family matters, including domestic
civil cases, marriage, divorce, personal status, inheritance, minor civil matters; within thiscontext practices such as domestic violence and forced marriage are often presented(although not exclusively) as condoned or required under Islam. 112 Another area of prominent
application is business and commercial disputes. 113

Al-Shabaab courts in the territory controlled by the militant group, as well as beyond it, complement
this picture. For all details see sections below on Customary Justice and on Shari’ah Law, as well as on
Access to Justice under Al-Shabaab.

2.3.1 Nature and limits of the formal justice system (statutory law)
Somalia has legal pluralism where statutory, customary, and religious legal frameworks areintertwined. Shariah is the state religion and the basis of both statutory and customary law; as such it
holds wide legitimacy in the population. 114 In terms of legal traditions, while ‘some [federal] states are
far ahead of others in terms of clarifying local laws’, most of the FMS ‘apply a mishmash of British
Common Law, Italian Continental Law, Shariah and customary xeer in their statutory courts’. 115
However, if Somalia’s legal framework remains nominally varied and plural, it is inherently andpredominantly based on Shari’ah law. 116 Shari’ah enjoys in fact high legitimacy and is ingrained withsocial norms that do not contravene Islam’s basic tenets. 117 From a constitutional point of view, art. 2of the Somali Provisional Constitution stipulates that (1) ‘Islam is the religion of the State’, that (2) ‘No
religion other than Islam can be propagated in the country’, and that (3) ‘No law which is not compliant
with the general principles and objectives of Shari’ah can be enacted’. 118
Within this context, sources report on several issues affecting the statutory administration of justicein Somalia:

108 Le Sage A., Stateless Justice in Somalia - Formal and Informal Rule of Law Initiatives, July 2005, url, pp. 18, 32, 38
109 Expanding Access to Justice Program, Alternative Dispute Resolution Initiatives in Somalia, June 2020, url, p. 2
110 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, p. 22

111 IDLO, Enhancing legal empowerment - Working with Customary Justice Systems: Post-Conflict and Fragile States, Paper

no. 2, 2011, url, p. 8112 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, pp. 20-22

113 Le Sage A., Stateless Justice in Somalia - Formal and Informal Rule of Law Initiatives, July 2005, url, p. 39; Expanding

Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, p. 29
114 Expanding Access to Justice Program, Access to Justice Assessment Tool 2020, Somalia Baseline Study Brief, November
2020, url, p. 1
115 HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, p. 17
116 Expanding Access to Justice Program, Access to Justice Assessment Tool 2020, Somalia Baseline Study Brief, November
2020, url, pp. 1-2
117 HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, pp. 17,
27
118 Somalia, Provisional Constitution, 1 August 2012, art. 2, url

28

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Actors(1) limited resource persons: in 2017 only about 200 judges, 70 prosecutors, 16 lawyers, and439 support staff were active in the country; this would give a ratio of 2 judges and 0,7
prosecutors every 100 000 inhabitants, one of the lowest in the world; 119(2) limited preparation and training: most court officials have not been trained in Somali law
and follow customary procedure in practice; 120(3) limited budget and resources (including equipment, offices) at disposal: for instance, of theoverall 2020 federal budget, ‘only $13,4 million’, or 6,4% of the total $476 million budget, areallocated to the entire (federal) justice system; 121(4) limited independence of the judiciary: reportedly judicial officials are often at the mercy ofpoliticians, who can either appoint and dismiss them, or use their ‘power of the purse’; 122(5) inadequate compensation: judicial personnel are not adequately compensated to pay for
their work and their own security (guards);(6) lack of protection: judicial officials are constantly exposed to security risks, including for theirown life;(7) lack of enforcement of both civil and criminal decisions (lack of policing capacity, social
tendency to shop for better outcomes by other non-statutory courts, little consequences for
ignoring court decisions, which is often socially accepted, if not praised);(8) widespread corruption and systemic mismanagement, which in turn deeply affect the levelof trust of the ordinary people in the statutory judicial system. 123
The cases settled through statutory courts are just a small portion of all cases adjudicated in Somalia:
according to some estimates, ‘between 80-90% of all legal cases in Somalia are settled through theinformal justice system, of which xeer is the most prominent’. 124 Reportedly, in the course of 2020,
the Somali Judiciary (Somaliland excluded) received 19 668 cases, filed 11 099 of them, and heard a
total of 8 569 cases. 125 Reportedly, in the course of 2019 instead, federal and FMS courts filed a totalof 15 576 cases, with the overwhelming majority being civil cases, 11 098 in total, and 4 478 criminalcases. Reportedly, the breakdown per year per court administration is the following: Federal Supreme
Court, 203 cases filed in 2020, 91 in 2019; Benadir (16 courts as of 2019), 1 963 cases filed in 2020, 2423 in 2019; Puntland (34 courts as of 2019), 6 408 cases filed in 2020, 7 135 in 2019; Jubbaland (5courts as of 2019), 597 cases filed in 2020, 1 136 in 2019; South-West (14 courts as of 2019), 1 097
cases filed in 2020, 674 in 2019; Galmudug (4 courts as of 2019), 66 cases filed in 2020, 2 179 in 2019;
Hirshabelle (12 courts as of 2019), 765 cases filed in 2020, 1 938 in 2019. 126
Access to statutory justice. Access to statutory justice is also hindered by costs, which is a variable
that ‘interacts with clannism, as local minority clans tend to be poorer and less well connected’. 127
119 World Bank, Somalia Security and Justice Public Expenditure Review, 31 January 2017, url, pp. 48-49

120 Expanding Access to Justice Program, Access to Justice Assessment Tool 2020, Somalia Baseline Study Brief, November

2020, url, pp. 1-2

121 HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, p. 22

122 HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, p. 22

123 HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, pp. 22-

25; Expanding Access to Justice Program, Access to Justice Assessment Tool 2020, Somalia Baseline Study Brief, url, pp. 1-2;
Le Sage A., Stateless Justice in Somalia - Formal and Informal Rule of Law Initiatives, July 2005, url, pp. 31- 32
124
HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, p. 28
125 Somalia, Supreme Court of Somalia, Awoodda Garsoorka – Buugga Sanadka Garsoorka 2020 [Judiciary Branch – Justice
Report 2020], 2021, n.d., p. 5
126 Data for 2019 drawn from HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures,
January 2021, url, p. 19; Data for 2020 drawn from Somalia, Supreme Court of Somalia, Awoodda Garsoorka – Buugga
Sanadka Garsoorka 2020 [Judiciary Branch – Justice Report 2020], 2021, n.d., pp. 5-11
127 Expanding Access to Justice Program, Access to Justice Assessment Tool 2020, Somalia Baseline Study Brief, November
2020, url, p. 2

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Country of origin information report | Somalia: Actors

HIPS notes that among civil cases land disputes are the most frequent cases, and ‘court fees areproportional to the value of the property in dispute’. 128 At the same time ‘most justice seekers canneither afford nor otherwise access qualified advice or representation’, 129 which is higher for land
disputes. 130 Conversely, elders, ulama (Islamic scholars, men of knowledge), 131 and al-Shabaab courts
work free of charge: elders require refreshments, remote al-Shabaab courts transportation. 132‘Lawyers or civil society are mostly available to main urban areas, especially Mogadishu, but quality isunreliable. Most other communities rely on elders’. 133
Against this backdrop, statutory justice is not the preferred means to seek and access justice among
the Somalis. 134 As stated by IDLO (International Development Law Organisation) ‘rebuilding Somalia’s
formal justice system is a highly challenging, complex, and long-term undertaking’, while ‘there havenot been any effective formal justice institutions in the country for over two decades.’ 135 The legal
plurality that prevails in the country ‘leads citizens to shop for the best justice system where they canobtain most favourable outcome’: either by elders, ulama, or al-Shabaab courts. 136
Many people in Somalia who live in government or state-controlled territory seek justice by going toshari’ah law courts run by the militant group al-Shabaab. Notably, they resort to al-Shabaab courts
not necessarily as their first stop, but rather as appeals courts. They seek better outcomes or just fora ‘fast and efficient’ system, while they blame the statutory courts as slow and corrupt. 137 For moredetails see the sections below on 2.3.2 Customary Justice and 2.3.3 Shari’ah Law and 4.3 Access toJustice under Al-Shabaab.
However, as per the UN Somalia Country Results Report, in the course of 2020, legal aid services (8880 beneficiaries), alternative dispute resolution centres (3 622 beneficiaries, see below for further
details), and mobile courts (425 beneficiaries) have expanded access to justice, reaching a total of
12 958 beneficiaries, including 7 658 women. 138

2.3.2 Customary justice - Xeer and Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
Reportedly, according to some estimates, more than 80% of all civil and criminal cases in Somalia aresettled through a traditional xeer system, which is perceived by many Somali citizens as effective, fastand compliant with Shariah law but most importantly provides ‘enforceable judgments’. 139 As the
Expanding Access to Justice Program 140 puts it, since ‘Somalia’s statutory system remains in its earlyrecuperation from state collapse, customary justice institutions figure as the first ports of call for the

128 HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, p. 24

129 Expanding Access to Justice Program, Access to Justice Assessment Tool 2020, Somalia Baseline Study Brief, November

2020, url, p. 1
130 HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, p. 24
131 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, p. 45
132 Expanding Access to Justice Program, Access to Justice Assessment Tool 2020, Somalia Baseline Study Brief, November
2020, url, p. 2
133 Expanding Access to Justice Program, Access to Justice Assessment Tool 2020, Somalia Baseline Study Brief, November
2020, url, p. 2
134 HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, p. 17
135 IDLO, Reforming and modernizing the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) system in Somalia, 5 September 2017, url
136 HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, p. 17
137 HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, pp. 2627
138 UN, Country Results Report Somalia 2020, March 2021, url, pp. 22, 61
139 HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, p. 4
140
Expanding Access to Justice Program is a 5-year program funded by USAID to support the expansion and protection ofhuman rights in Somalia. EAJ, EAJ’s Approach, n.d., url

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Country of origin information report | Somalia: Actors

majority of communities’, 141 while overall ‘[m]ale elders are the principal justice providers’. 142 The
Somali customary mediation and justice system, which is known as xeer, predates any rights-based
justice institutions in Somalia. Xeer has never been fully codified: it is an oral law passed down throughgenerations and comprising a penal section (murder, aggression, thievery) and a civil section (family,
private property, territory, and hospitality). 143
Basic principles of xeer include following:(1) ‘collective payment of diya (blood compensation, usually paid with camels and other livestock) for
death, physical harm, theft, rape and defamation, as well as the provision of assistance to relatives’;in such cases, based on xeer, the responsibility is collectively borne by the clan;(2) ‘maintenance of inter-clan harmony by sparing the lives of “socially respected groups” (including
the elderly, the religious, women, children, poets and guests), entering into negotiations with “peaceemissaries” in good faith, and treating women fairly without abuse’;(3) ‘family obligations including payment of dowry, the inheritance of a widow by a dead husband’s
brother (dumal), a widower’s rights to marry a deceased wife’s sister (higsian), and the penalties for
eloping’;(4) ‘resource-utilisation rules regarding the use of water, pasture and other natural resources;
provision of financial support to newlyweds and married female relatives; and the temporary or
permanent donation of livestock and other assets to the poor’. 144
It is worth noting that matters of family relations and of private property are the areas of xeer where‘shari’ah has been absorbed most completely’. 145 At the same time in matters of collective
responsibility, family issues, and nature of punishments, shari’ah precepts have been often
subordinated to clan tradition. 146 Main areas of conflict with shari’ah law revolve around collective
responsibility and the specific treatment of women by xeer. As to the latter the xeer practices of dumal(forced marriage of a widow to a male relative of her deceased husband), higsian (the forced marriageof the sister of a deceased wife to the widower), and godobtir (the forced marriage of a girl into an
aggrieved clan as part of a diya payment) openly contradict shari’ah precepts. Additionally, womenare also traditionally denied the right to inherit capital assets ‘such as camels, horses, buildings,
seagoing vessels and frankincense plantations’, while ‘domestic abuse by a husband against his wife
is generally tolerated’. 147
More in general, children and women can only have access to traditional justice through a male tutelar
personality, husband, brother, father or uncle, 148 since they are not considered by the society as
responsible. 149 Stigma is associated to women directly seeking justice and presenting their case to amale dominated justice system and in the context of a patriarchal society. 150
Under the xeer system, clan elders act as mediators or arbiters, and play a central role ‘in the
resolution of local and intra-clan disputes’. 151 In practice, ‘[t]hey listen to both sides of a dispute and
141 Expanding Access to Justice Program, Alternative Dispute Resolution Initiatives in Somalia, June 2020, url, p. 1

142 Expanding Access to Justice Program, Access to Justice Assessment Tool 2020, Somalia Baseline Study Brief, November

2020, url, pp. 1-2
143 Le Sage A., Stateless Justice in Somalia - Formal and Informal Rule of Law Initiatives, July 2005, url, pp. 32-33
144 Le Sage A., Stateless Justice in Somalia - Formal and Informal Rule of Law Initiatives, July 2005, url, pp. 32-33
145 Le Sage A., Stateless Justice in Somalia - Formal and Informal Rule of Law Initiatives, July 2005, url, p. 33
146 Le Sage A., Stateless Justice in Somalia - Formal and Informal Rule of Law Initiatives, July 2005, url, p. 16
147 Le Sage A., Stateless Justice in Somalia - Formal and Informal Rule of Law Initiatives, July 2005, url, pp. 37-38
148
Expanding Access to Justice Program, Alternative Dispute Resolution Initiatives in Somalia, June 2020, url, p. 23
149
van Notten, M., The Law of the Somalis: A Stable Foundation for Economic Development in the Horn of Africa, 2005,
pp. 104-105
150
Expanding Access to Justice Program, Alternative Dispute Resolution Initiatives in Somalia, June 2020, url, pp. 23-24
151
Expanding Access to Justice Program, Alternative Dispute Resolution Initiatives in Somalia, June 2020, url, p. 2

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Country of origin information report | Somalia: Actors

propose an often compensation-based solution, which both sides will have vowed to accept prior to
the process.’ 152 Xeer plays a central role for the regulation of access to resources (such as grazing areas
and water), local dispute settlement, and the maintenance of security.153 Reportedly, xeer isinherently dynamic, ‘with an important caveat encapsulated in the Somali saying’: ‘only during
peacetime can the xeer be changed.’ 154
This all notwithstanding, in some parts of Somalia, especially in the southern regions, the legitimacyof the clan elders has been partially undermined. With the elders’ co-optation into political agendas,
and the onset of a Salafi-inspired militancy (then al-Shabaab), many (politically appointed or selfinaugurated) clan elders have lost their prominent role in resolving large-scale conflict. As a result,‘[i]n Southern Somalia, xeer was therefore accompanied or even replaced in some locations by various
forms of emerging shari’ah courts.’ 155 For more details see section below 2.3.3 Sharia’ah Law.
However, since 2014, given the overall prominence of the customary justice system in Somalia, xeer
has been adopted as a supplementary approach to justice by the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) of the FGS.
Officially renamed Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), which is used as a synonym for xeer, thisinitiative has taken the form of ‘ADR centres’ operating in several urban centres and under theadministration of the MoJ (with the support of IDLO and UNDP). 156 In 2019, various ADR centres had
been setup in the following locations:







Benadir Region (Mogadishu): Hamar JabJab, Hodan, Karaan;
South West State: Dinsoor, Baidoa;
Puntland: Bosasso, Garowe, Galkacyo, Badhan, Buhodle, Dahar, Burtinle;
Galmudug: Dhusamareb;
Hirshabelle: Jowhar;
Jubbaland: Kismayo, Garbahaarey.157

According to MoJ ADRU (Ministry of Justice, Alternative Dispute Resolution Unit) since August 2018,
ADR centres have resolved about 400 cases, mostly family and land cases. 158 Other case types, in orderof importance, are work relations, rent issues, and commercial disputes. ‘In Baidoa and Kismayo,
however, practitioners noted that they handle criminal cases as well, albeit to varying degrees, which
would contravene the MoJ’s ADR SOPs’. 159 In 2016 the Somali government issued a xeer policy basedon which the informal justice system cannot manage complex crimes. In these cases, including when
adjudicators fail to reach a mutual agreement between the parties, they should refer the issue to theformal system. This way the formal and the informal systems should be complementary in Somalia. 160
For more details about FMS and regional justice systems (including local ADR centres) see FMS level
chapters.

152

Expanding Access to Justice Program, Alternative Dispute Resolution Initiatives in Somalia, June 2020, url, p. 2
Expanding Access to Justice Program, Alternative Dispute Resolution Initiatives in Somalia, June 2020, url, p. 2
154
Expanding Access to Justice Program, Alternative Dispute Resolution Initiatives in Somalia, June 2020, url, p. 4; see also
Expanding Access to Justice Program, Pathways and Institutions for Resolving Land Disputes in Mogadishu, January 2020,
url, p. 11
155
Expanding Access to Justice Program, Alternative Dispute Resolution Initiatives in Somalia, June 2020, url, p. 3
156
Expanding Access to Justice Program, Alternative Dispute Resolution Initiatives in Somalia, June 2020, url, pp. 1-2
157 Expanding Access to Justice Program, Alternative Dispute Resolution Initiatives in Somalia, June 2020, url, p. 8
158 Expanding Access to Justice Program, Alternative Dispute Resolution Initiatives in Somalia, June 2020, url, p. 17
159 Expanding Access to Justice Program, Alternative Dispute Resolution Initiatives in Somalia, June 2020, url, p. 17
160 IDLO, Justice for the Vulnerable: Alternative Dispute Resolution in Somalia, 20 March 2020, url; Expanding Access toJustice Program, Alternative Dispute Resolution Initiatives in Somalia, June 2020, url, p. 27
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Country of origin information report | Somalia: Actors

2.3.3 Shari’ah law
As summarised in the Expanding Access to Justice Program report on ‘The Shari’ah in Somalia’ (2020),
Shari’ah is the source of law for the Somali (pluralist) legal framework in force:‘Justice provision in Somalia is a combination of statutory, shari’ah and customary xeer
norms. Traditionally, xeer is agreed upon and applied by clan elders, while shari’ah restsin the hands of ulama [Islamic scholars], but only prima facie. The xeer itself and elders
draw strongly on their knowledge of shari’ah, which in turn leaves space for local customs
and customary law in particular to influence its specific application. In turn, bothinfluence the practice of statutory law, which is constitutionally required to conform withshari’ah across all Somali state entities.’ 161
However, the role shari’ah plays remains largely informal. No formal legal code is written down, while
the system lacks a proper institutional infrastructure 162:
‘Although shari'ah is recognized as the basis of all law in all three major constitutions[Somalia, Somaliland and Puntland] and is thus highly formalized in law, in juridical
practice it largely plays an informal role. There are no formal shari'ah institutions in
Somalia. Shari’ah runs in parallel with customary xeer and statutory judiciary. Similarly,
to xeer, shari'ah mostly acts as a dispute resolution mechanism, in which parties
voluntarily agree to abide by shari’ah rulings. Neither xeer nor shari’ah comprise directmeans of enforcement other than both parties’ assent to their rulings.’ 163
One of the greatest issues affecting shari’ah application to justice in Somalia is the ‘complete lack ofregulatory supervision’ over shari’ah education or training curricula for aspiring scholars and judges. 164
Decisions are made according to the legal reasoning of the court judges, as informed by their own
educated understanding of the Qu’ran – in most cases inspired by the Shafi’i madhab (see below), atleast outside al-Shabaab-controlled areas. In practice ‘most shari’ah judges were educated solely
through informal religious studies in Somalia’, while a small number received formal training from
Sudan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. 165
Shari’ah schools. Two Shari’ah schools contend each other in Somalia today: on the one hand theShafi’i madhab (school), which is the traditional way, the used-to-be prevalent approach to religion of
the Shafi’i Sufi Somalia. On the other hand, the Hanbali madhab, which is the approach adopted
among others by al-Shabaab, and whose influence is growing by the day in Somalia, making the Shafi’i
madhab progressively receding. This is also reflected in ulama’s orientation throughout Somalia, who
now prevalently accord their preference to the Hanbali school: ‘many respondents noted thatmadrasas, Islamic schools, and Islamic colleges in their respective cities are increasingly teaching
Salafism and the Hanbali madhab’. 166 Reportedly, Salafism constitutes 40 % of teachings in SouthWest state, 50% in Mogadishu, and 60% in Puntland, whereas the used-to-be prevalent Sufism has adeclining presence across Somalia, around 20-30% of teachings. 167
There is not a clear-cut partition of Somalia among the two schools, but the urban/rural divide
represent the predominant conflict fault-line between them: most people in rural South-Central
Somalia follow the Hanbali madhab, ‘whether by choice or by necessity, conforming with al-Shabaab’s

161 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, p. 2

162 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, p. 20
163 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, p. 20
164 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, p. 23

165 Le Sage A., Stateless Justice in Somalia - Formal and Informal Rule of Law Initiatives, July 2005, url, p. 39

166 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, p. 14, see also pp. 6-9, 14-15

167 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, footnote no. 44 p. 14, see also pp. 4-5, 9,

14-15

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Country of origin information report | Somalia: Actors

doctrines’. 168 In general, Salafism is strongest in rural areas, and rural populations do not have anyother option than to accept the mode of adjudication available to them. In urban contexts instead‘[w]here the Federal Government of Somalia, the Government of Puntland State of Somalia, and AhlSunna Wa Jama’ exert direct control [Galmudug], space for the teachings of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and
Hanbali jurisprudence is curtailed, or simply grows more slowly.’ 169 In urban areas, Sufi communities
are more common, and direct Sufi influence is strongest in Galmudug (see for more details section 7.5
Galmudug).
In Islam, ijtihad ‘is the interpretation of the shari’ah using independent reasoning based on judgement
or analogy, drawing on Qur’an and Sunnah as primary sources, and on secondary scholarly opinion’. 170
Essentially the main difference between the Shafi’i school and the Hanbali (Wahabi) school, among
others, 171 is that the Shafi’i ‘provides a framework for deducting Islamic laws based on independent
assessments and local conditions’, while in the Hanbali school ‘Islamic texts (Qur’an and Sunnah)should be read literally and do not require further enunciation’. 172
Hadd crimes. This is full of implications also with regards to Shari’ah criminal law and (corporal)
punishments. The so-called hadd crimes (hudūd plural) are punishments that are mandated by
Shari’ah in relation to crimes that are ‘against the rights of God’: illicit sexual relations (zina), theft,making unproven accusations of zina, drinking intoxication, apostasy and highway robbery. 173 In these
instances, the actual punishments are death (including by stoning), lashes and amputation of thehand. However, traditionally the application of hudūd has been severely limited by the strict
requirements for evidence.174 In al-Shabaab dominated or jurisdiction areas though, the jurisdictionof hadd crimes belongs to the qadi (judge) court, which ‘apply the fixed punishment quite frequently
and seem not to be restricted by secular regulations’. 175 For more details see section on Access toJustice under Al-Shabaab.
Still based on Shari’ah (Hanbali and Shafi’i schools agree on this), in cases of murder or bodily harm,
retaliation (qisas) may only be demanded if the offence was proved to be intentional. But even inthese cases general rules of evidence are stricter than otherwise.176 If the qadi assesses the case as
accidental or semi-accidental, or if evidence is lacking, the perpetrator must pay diya and the
responsibility is then shifted onto the group. 177 Moreover, after the qadi’s assessment, victims are
given the opportunity to choose between retaliation (qisas) and compensation (diya). Reportedly,
irrespective of al-Shabaab control or presence, Somalis seem to prefer compensation over retaliationin cases of bodily harm, and retaliation instead in cases of intentional homicide. 178
For more information on Shari’ah, see the section on Access to Justice, Formal and Informal Systems.
As previously mentioned, Shari’ah passes decisions mainly on family matters (marriage, divorce,
inheritance), but also land, business and commercial disputes. Shari’ah law provisions for inheritance
168 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, p. 15

169 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, p. 15, see also pp. 6-9, 14-15
170 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, p. 6

171 Skjelderup M., Punishment on Stage: Application of Islamic Criminal Law by Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, Master

Thesis, Autumn 2011, url, pp. 34, 43-45, 94-97

172 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, pp. 6-7
173 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, p. 46

174 Skjelderup M., Punishment on Stage: Application of Islamic Criminal Law by Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, Master

Thesis, Autumn 2011, url, pp. 59-60; Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, p. 46

175 Skjelderup M., Punishment on Stage: Application of Islamic Criminal Law by Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, Master

Thesis, Autumn 2011, url, p. 60, see also pp. 55-57

176 Skjelderup M., Punishment on Stage: Application of Islamic Criminal Law by Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, Master

Thesis, Autumn 2011, url, pp. 54, 57

177 Skjelderup

M., Punishment on Stage: Application of Islamic Criminal Law by Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, Master Thesis,
Autumn 2011, url, p. 54
178 Skjelderup M., Punishment on Stage: Application of Islamic Criminal Law by Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, Master
Thesis, Autumn 2011, url, pp. 56-57

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Country of origin information report | Somalia: Actors

are less discriminatory towards women than customary provisions (for instance if inheriting from themother, male and female heirs inherit the same amount, while if inheriting from the father, male heirs
receive more, including all financial responsibilities). 179
Given this informal character, shari’ah justice takes place within very limited infrastructures andcompeting justice norms. The relevant justice providers (statutory judges, elders, ulama) often
collaborate with each other, and can resort to reciprocal referrals, along basic patterns. These forms
of de facto collaboration are not systematised and depend on interpersonal relationships. 180 Usuallyparties involved in a dispute approach first a family mediator or a clan elder; then escalate the issue,
if not resolved, to clan elders and ulama, who often work together (or share the same office). Ulama
may also be called upon to advice in their respective field of specialisation by clan elders. Statutory
courts work in parallel, but there is significant interaction between ulama and statutory judges(advisory assistance, documentation provision, etc.). Finally, ulama are the final instance for casesthat cannot be settled by elders or statutory judges. 181
For more details on how shari’ah is applied by Al Shabaab and in the areas it controls, see Section
4.3 Access to Justice under Al-Shabaab.

2.3.4 Death penalty, trials, and human rights standards in the judiciary
As reported by the independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia (August 2020), the
FGS ‘has not yet abolished the death penalty, nor has it declared a moratorium on executions’. 182
More in detail, ‘death penalty law in Somalia is not compliant with international human rights
standards in that death sentences are pronounced for crimes that do not qualify for the imposition of
the death penalty’. 183 Additionally, ‘it has been reported but not confirmed that executions are also
carried out by the Somali National Army’. 184
The Advocates for Human Rights, along with The World Coalition Against the Death Penalty, in theirsubmission to the 38th Session of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review about Somalia(October 2020), indicate that the government of Somalia, and other actors within the jurisdiction ofSomalia, ‘continue to impose and carry out death sentences for crimes other than the intentional
killing of a person’, including crimes committed while under the age of 18. ‘These death-eligible crimes
include political crimes, such treason and espionage, and crimes that endanger public safety, even if
they do not result in death’. 185 Within this context, military courts often pronounce death sentences
to civilians and carry out executions at a higher rate than civilian courts, reportedly without giving
defendants any option to appeal the decision. 186•

Trials. While independence and impartiality of the judiciary is not always respected by thegovernment, local courts often depend on local clans and are affected by clan politics. On the
one hand, judges’ lack of accountability leads to abuse of power. On the other hand, their lackof security severely affects their ability ‘to perform their jobs without fear’.187 The right to afair and public trial is often not enforced at all, the authorities not respecting most rights
relating to trial procedures. Among others, ‘[t]he law does not address confronting witnesses,

179 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, p. 38
180 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, p. 20

181 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, pp. 21-22

182 UN Human Rights Council, Situation of Human Rights in Somalia, 24 August 2020, url, para. 35
183 UN Human Rights Council, Situation of Human Rights in Somalia, 24 August 2020, url, para. 36
184 UN Human Rights Council, Situation of Human Rights in Somalia, 24 August 2020, url, para. 36

185 Advocates for Human Rights (The), Somalia-Universal Periodic Review-Death Penalty-October 2020, October 2020, url
186 Advocates for Human Rights (The), Somalia-Universal Periodic Review-Death Penalty-October 2020, October 2020, url
187 USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2020 - Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 10

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Country of origin information report | Somalia: Actors

the right to appeal a court’s ruling, the provision of sufficient time and facilities to prepare adefence, or the right to present one’s own evidence and witnesses’. 188•

Military and Civil Courts. In the period 5 November 2019 – 9 February 2021, the UNSG, in his
various reports on the situation in Somalia, attributed to Somali authorities following death
sentences/executions (sub-period): (a) 12 executions (6 in Somaliland, 3 in Mogadishu, 2 inJubbaland and 1 in Puntland), while courts, mostly military ones, issued several death
sentences - 23 in Mogadishu, 24 in Puntland, 2 in South-West State and 1 in Jubbaland –(5 November 2020 – 9 February 2021); 189 (b) eight death sentences were issued by the Somali
military courts in Jubbaland, Puntland and Mogadishu to four al-Shabaab suspects and four
members of the Somali security forces (5 May – 4 August 2020); 190 (c) one suspected pro-ISIL
affiliate sentenced to death by the Mogadishu military court after being found guilty of killinga police officer; two civilian men executed in Bosasso, (Puntland), after being sentenced todeath for raping and killing a 12-year-old girl in Galkacyo; five members of the Somali security
forces (police and military) sentenced to death by military courts in Mogadishu, South-WestState, Jubbaland and Somaliland (5 February 2020 – 4 May 2020); 191 (d) 14 death sentences
pronounced, and 7 executions were carried out (5 November 2019 – 4 February 2020). 192
According to the Human Rights Council report on the situation of human rights in Somalia(August 2020), at least a dozen executions were reportedly carried out in 2019, while from5 August 2019 to 4 February 2020, a total of 22 death sentences were pronounced and 11
executions were carried out. 193•

Military Courts. In its 2021 report, the USDOS notes that military courts tried civilians, andthat defendants rarely had legal representation or the right to appeal. 194 Based on the same
report, ‘government officials continued to claim that a 2011 state of emergency decree gave
military courts jurisdiction over crimes, including those committed by civilians, in areas fromwhich al-Shabaab had retreated’. 195 Human Rights Watch notes that ‘military courts have
tried a broad range of offenses and defendants, including children, in trials that violate basic
fair trial standards’. 196 In 2019, the federal government established a court and prison facility
in Mogadishu (see Prison Forces for further details) to facilitate the transfer of Al-Shabab
related cases from military to civilian courts. Reportedly, ‘the handover has yet to happen’. 197•

Shari’ah Courts. Among others, for details about corporal and capital punishments see section
on Shari’ah Law.

•

Al-Shabaab Courts. For corporal and capital punishments as well as other convictions underal-Shabaab justice system please see relevant section on Access to Justice under Al-Shabaab.

•Customary Justice. No information on this point could be found within the given time limits
and among the consulted sources.

188 USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2020 - Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 11
189 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 17 February 2021, url, p. 9
190 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 August 2020, url, p. 9
191 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 May 2020, url, p. 8

192 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 February 2020, url, p. 8

193 UN Human Rights Council, Situation of Human Rights in Somalia, 24 August 2020, url, p. 9

194 USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2020 - Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 11
195 USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2020 - Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 11

196 HRW, Submission to the Universal Periodic Review of Somalia, October 2020, url, pp. 2, see also pp. 8-9; HRW, The

Courts of “Absolute Power”, Fair Trial Violations by Somalia’s Military Court, 14 May 2014, url
197 HRW, Submission to the Universal Periodic Review of Somalia, October 2020, url, p. 9, see also pp. 8-9

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Country of origin information report | Somalia: Actors

2.4 Security forces
As per Article 126 of the Provisional Constitution, the FGS ‘shall guarantee the peace, sovereignty andnational security of the Federal Republic of Somalia and the safety of its people through its security
services, including: (a) The armed forces; (b) The intelligence services; (c) The police force; (d) The
prison forces.’ 198

2.4.1 SNAThe Somali National Army’s official strength is difficult to ascertain precisely, although various sources,
place it above and around 20 000 soldiers in the last few years. In February 2020, the UN Panel ofExperts on Somalia, reported that 21 209 ‘soldiers were registered in the human resourcesmanagement system of the Ministry of Defence of the Federal Government of Somalia’; 199 quotinginternational military advisors and military trainers interviewed in January 2020, Felbab-Brown, aleading security expert on Somalia, reports that ‘[o]fficially numbering 27,000 soldiers’ the SNA is‘more likely composed of around 23,000’; 200 Paul D. Williams, a scholar specialised on AMISOM,
reports that, at the time of the London Conference on Somalia (May 2017), the SNA ‘was estimatedat 2100 officers, 18,700 soldiers and NCOs, as well as nearly 3900 orphans, disabled and retirees’. 201
Official numbers differ however from de facto military capacity: an Operational Readiness Assessmentof the Somali Defence Ministry, from late 2017, ‘revealed that most SNA battalions were operating at
only about two-thirds of their official strength’; 202 reportedly the assessment ‘found only 16,000[troops], of which around 9,000 had fighting capability’ 203. A media report from the same period
indicates that ‘[r]eliable military sources told VOA that the actual number of soldiers on duty is far
lower, possibly fewer than 10,000.’ 204
Sources report on the type and nature of issues affecting the SNA:••

presence of ghost, old, and sick soldiers; 205
presence of untrained and unqualified units. UN, EU, Ethiopian, Turkish, UAE, British, andAmerican military assistance (among others) falls short of covering in full the prevalent and still
unmatched training needs; 206

198 Somalia, Provisional Constitution, 1 August 2012, art. 126, url

199 UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, 28 September 2020, url, p. 23
200 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 118

201 Williams P.D., Building the Somali National Army: Anatomy of a failure, 2008–2018, 27 February 2019, url, p. 373

202 Williams P.D., Building the Somali National Army: Anatomy of a failure, 2008–2018, Journal of Strategic Studies, 27
February 2019, url, pp. 366, 373
203 IPI, Transitioning to National Forces in Somalia: More Than an Exit for AMISOM, April 2019, url, p. 8
204 VOA, Somalia: Up to 30 Percent of Soldiers Unarmed, 19 December 2017, url
205 Williams P.D., Building the Somali National Army: Anatomy of a failure, 2008–2018, Journal of Strategic Studies, 27
February 2019, url, p. 388; Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 118
206 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 118; Williams P.D., Building the Somali National
Army: Anatomy of a failure, 2008–2018, Journal of Strategic Studies, 27 February 2019, url, pp. 367-368, 378-380, 387;

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Country of origin information report | Somalia: Actors

•
•
•
•

lack of equipment, heavy weapons, and operational capacity (mobility, communicationequipment, field defences): 207 reportedly, between 60 % 208 and 70 % 209 of the army’s personnel
lacks any real military capacity; 210
lack of unity: the army is more a conglomeration of militias than a coherent fighting force, being
reconstituted via a clan-based recruitment drive; 211
lack of loyalty: issue of soldiers’ loyalty to the SNA versus the clan of belonging; 212
unpaid or low salaries and widespread corruption. 213

Such capacity issues have a considerable impact on the effective capacity of the SNA to engage inmilitary operations with al-Shabaab. 214 A 2018 Security Council Letter from the Secretary General,states that, based on the findings of the same Operational Readiness Assessment quoted above, ‘ascurrently manned, trained and equipped, the Somali National Army is a fragile force with extremely
weak command and control and military capabilities’. Moreover, it adds that ‘in many areas, theSomali National Army is static and wholly defensive in nature, limited to occupying ground, andwithout the ability to hold newly recovered areas’ – including any Forward Operating Base (FOB) – ‘or
prevent al-Shabaab from retaking territory.’ 215 Similar analyses were put forward by other sources
and confirmed in later years. 216
By May 2017, the SNA was organised in 12 brigades, over 30 battalions, and comprised various special
units, such as the presidential guard, military police, the Danab advanced infantry, and the health unit
(for more details see section below about Special Forces). 217 The SNA was meant to take over fromAMISOM full responsibility of the security sector, including FOBs, in the wider context of the revised
Somali-led Transition Plan, 218 however this transition is ‘badly off track’ according to the US
Department of Defense.219 Security Council Resolutions 2520 (2020) and 2568 (2021), set out AMISOM
objectives, strategic objectives, and functions, that will enable the implementation of the Somalia
Transition Plan, and the phased handover of responsibilities to Somali security forces, planned forlater in 2021. 220 For more details see section on AMISOM.

207 Williams P.D., Building the Somali National Army: Anatomy of a failure, 2008–2018, Journal of Strategic Studies, 27

February 2019, url, pp. 387; Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 118
208 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 118
209 Williams P.D., Building the Somali National Army: Anatomy of a failure, 2008–2018, Journal of Strategic Studies, 27
February 2019, url, pp. 387
210 Williams P.D., Building the Somali National Army: Anatomy of a failure, 2008–2018, Journal of Strategic Studies, 27
February 2019, url, pp. 387; Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 118
211 Williams P.D., Building the Somali National Army: Anatomy of a failure, 2008–2018, Journal of Strategic Studies, 27
February 2019, url, pp. 380-382; Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, pp. 118-119;
212 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 119; Williams P.D., Building the Somali National
Army: Anatomy of a failure, 2008–2018, Journal of Strategic Studies, 27 February 2019, url, pp. 382-384;
213 Williams P.D., Building the Somali National Army: Anatomy of a failure, 2008–2018, Journal of Strategic Studies, 27
February 2019, url, pp. 376-380, 382, 387
214 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, pp. 118-119
215 UN Security Council, Letter dated 5 July 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security
Council, 6 July 2018, url, p. 4
216 AMISOM, Report of the chairperson of the African Union Commission on the African Union-United Nations, 4th Joint
Review of the African Union Mission in Somalia, 27 June 2018, url, pp. 4-5; UN Security Council, Letter dated 24 May 2019from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, Enclosure II, Report of the Chairperson of
the African Union Commission on the fifth African Union-United Nations joint review of the African Union Mission in
Somalia, url, p. 12; Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 118
217 Williams P.D., Building the Somali National Army: Anatomy of a failure, 2008–2018, Journal of Strategic Studies, 27
February 2019, url, p. 373
218 IPI, Transitioning to National Forces in Somalia: More Than an Exit for AMISOM, April 2019, url, pp. 7-10
219 US DoD, East Africa Counterterrorism Operation, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, 1 July –30 September 2020, url, p. 19
220 UN Security Council, Resolution 2568, 12 March 2021, url; UN Security Council, Resolution 2520, 29 May 2020, url

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Country of origin information report | Somalia: Actors

2.4.2 Special Forces•

Danab Infantry Brigade. Danab (‘Lightning’) is an advanced infantry battalion that is trained,
equipped and mentored by the United States and kept largely separate from the rest of the
SNA. Reportedly it is the only multiclan and meritocratic SNA unit that is able to conductsustained offensive operations. 221 At the end of September 2020, the Danab Brigade had 945
soldiers, out of a total of 3 000 soldiers authorized in the 2017 London Security Pact, withunits operational in four of Somalia’s five member states. 222 In the quarter July-September
2020 the Danab brigade had reportedly conducted approximately 80 percent of SNA offensive
operations in Somalia and nearly all counterterrorism operations against al-Shabaab. 223•

Gorgor Brigades. Gorgor (‘The Eagles’) is the Somali commando force trained by Turkish
military assistance, both in Somalia and in Turkey. Reportedly, as of September 2020, about
2 500 troops or 5 infantry battalions of the Gorgor brigade had been trained in Somalia(TURKSOM base in Mogadishu) and in Turkey, with target of 5 000. 224 Sources claim the
instrumental use of these forces for political manoeuvring by the incumbent president andadministration (at the time of writing, April 2021): on occasion of the recent protests anddemonstrations over the delayed electoral process (beginning of 2021); 225 in February 2020,
when the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) deployed Gorgor troops, as well as Haramcad
Police Units (see below for more details), to the Gedo region of Jubbaland (Beled Hawo), andin Galgadud region (Dhusamareb), resulting in clashes against the Ahl al-Sunna wal Jama’a(ASWJ) militia. 226 For regional details see sections on Jubbaland and Galmudug, among others.

2.4.3 NISA
In 2020 the total number of National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) staff, based on official
estimates, would be 3 200, but the real number of operative agents is estimated to be far less. 227 The
head (director general) of the NISA is Fahad Yasin Haji Dahir, who allegedly has strong ties with Qatar(and Turkey). 228 Under the Farmaajo administration, NISA was divided into security and intelligencesections, allegedly ‘to facilitate control from the office of the president and the prime minister’. 229
NISA’s intelligence section is headed by Sakariye Ismail Ahmed Hersi, the former head of the Amniyat.
The security section carries out most of NISA’s operations against al-Shabaab resorting to its special

221 Williams P.D., Building the Somali National Army: Anatomy of a failure, 2008–2018, Journal of Strategic Studies, 27
February 2019, url, pp. 367, 373-374
222 US DoD, East Africa Counterterrorism Operation, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, 1 July –30 September 2020, url, pp. 20-21
223 US DoD, East Africa Counterterrorism Operation, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, 1 July –30 September 2020, url, pp. 20-21
224 AA, 1 of 3 Somalian troops to be trained by Turkey: Envoy, 4 August 2020, url; AA, Somali commandos trained by Turkey
back home, 9 March 2021, url
225 Reference (The), Gorgor Militia: Turkey and Qatar’s card to control Somalia, 25 February 2021, url; Arab Weekly (The),
Turkish-trained special forces take Somalia back to days of civil war, 20 February 2021, url
226 Somali Affairs, Opposition politician calls on Turkey to stop funding troops involved in Somalia violence, 4 March 2020,
url; Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor, 13 October 2020, url
227
Ingiriis M. H., Insurgency and international extraversion in Somalia: the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA)
and Al-Shabaab's Amniyat, African Security Review, 28 July 2020, url, pp. 133-143
228 Ingiriis M. H., Insurgency and international extraversion in Somalia: the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA)
and Al-Shabaab's Amniyat, African Security Review, 28 July 2020, url, p. 133; The Reference, Gorgor Militia: Turkey and
Qatar’s card to control Somalia, 25 February 2021, url; AEI, Somalia’s intelligence chief worked with an al Qaeda affiliate,
so why do we fund him?, 16 November 2020, url
229 Ingiriis M. H., Insurgency and international extraversion in Somalia: the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA)
and Al-Shabaab's Amniyat, African Security Review, 28 July 2020, url, p. 138

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Country of origin information report | Somalia: Actors

units: Danab (‘Lightning’), Waran (‘Spear’) and Gaashaan (‘Shield’), with its two units Alpha Group andBravo Group. 230
NISA is present in Mogadishu, Benadir Region, South West State, Hirshabelle, and Galmudug. 231 Before
transferring the policing of Mogadishu to the SPF (2018), NISA was responsible for management of
the security in Mogadishu, Lower Shabelle, Hirshabelle, and Galmudug including operating
checkpoints, conducting search operations, and carrying out arrests of al-Shabaab suspects. 232
NISA is reportedly affected by a number of issues impacting its effectiveness, including:• Infiltration: apparently NISA has been heavily infiltrated by al-Shabaab; 233• Dependency on international donors and foreign intelligence services: Western and Arabs
intelligence services, including from Turkey, meddle into NISA’s mandate and activities;
allegedly ‘foreign intelligence trainers on behalf of Qatar are choosing new local recruits for
NISA’; 234• Internal divisions: NISA agents used to divide themselves between agents falling under
Qatar’s influence versus agents falling under United Arab Emirates’ influence (UAE); anotherrelevant division (used to be at least) between supporters of the Aala Sheikh (‘Family of the
Sheikh’) politico-economic group and Damul Jadiid (‘New Blood’) politico-economic group; 235• Politicisation: NISA’s mandate and external assistance has been used to monitor and weaken
not just the activities of al-Shabaab but also of political opponents. 236• Extrajudicial activities: they contributed to further tarnish the agency’s own image andreputation; 237 for more details on abuses see section below on Security forces’ human rights
Conduct.

2.4.4 Somali Police ForceThe 2012 provisional constitution mandates the federal police to be led by civilian oversight throughthe Ministry of Internal Security, having responsibilities for law enforcement and internal order in
Somalia; however, many parts of the country are out of state control and military actors such as
AMISOM and the SNA are in practice the ‘primary internal security providers’. 238 According to theSomali national security architecture, internationally endorsed in London in May 2017 as Somalia’scommitment to reform security and policing services, the new Somali Police Force (SPF) would number
32 000 staff, divided into federal police and (regional) state police. 239 ‘This design assumes that someexisting militias — specifically, the state level darwish, which are not currently recognized under

230 Ingiriis M. H., Insurgency and international extraversion in Somalia: the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA)

and Al-Shabaab's Amniyat, African Security Review, 28 July 2020, url, p. 133
231 UNSOM and OHCHR, Protection of Civilians Report, Building the Foundation for Peace, Security and Human Rights in
Somalia, 1 January 2017 – 31 December 2019, 2020, url, p. 23
232 UNSOM and OHCHR, Protection of Civilians Report, Building the Foundation for Peace, Security and Human Rights in
Somalia, 1 January 2017 – 31 December 2019, 2020, url, pp. 23-24, 70
233 Ingiriis M. H., Insurgency and international extraversion in Somalia: the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA)
and Al-Shabaab's Amniyat, African Security Review, 28 July 2020, url, pp. 130-133, 139
234 Ingiriis M. H., Insurgency and international extraversion in Somalia: the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA)
and Al-Shabaab's Amniyat, African Security Review, 28 July 2020, url, p. 133
235 Ingiriis M. H., Insurgency and international extraversion in Somalia: the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA)
and Al-Shabaab's Amniyat, African Security Review, 28 July 2020, url, pp. 132-133
236 Ingiriis M. H., Insurgency and international extraversion in Somalia: the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA)
and Al-Shabaab's Amniyat, African Security Review, 28 July 2020, url, pp. 134, 140
237 Ingiriis M. H., Insurgency and international extraversion in Somalia: the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA)
and Al-Shabaab's Amniyat, African Security Review, 28 July 2020, url, pp. 134, 136, 138
238 USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2020 – Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 1
239 London Somalia Conference, Security Pact, 11 May 2017, url, pp. 5-6

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Country of origin information report | Somalia: Actors

Somalia’s security architecture or constitution — will be integrated into the SNA and SPF’. 240 This
integration could involve, according to the best estimates, up to 20 000 darwish-like forces. However,in 2020, the existing size of the SPF, including state-affiliated darwish, was estimated at 8 000 staff,
leaving out scope for greater absorption. 241 As per the UN Somalia Country Results Report for 2019,
the New Policing Model (the federated policing system) saw the expansion of FMSs police services
with following breakdown: 550 police officers in Jubbaland, 850 in South-West State, 400 in
Hirshabelle, and 3 500 in Puntland. 242
The Somali Police Force re-established its Darwish Department in the course of 2019. Darwish unitsof the Federal Police Force are tasked with border policing, protecting government infrastructures andpersonnel, as well as providing assistance and relief in case of disasters. ‘State Police Darwish units
are to fight terrorism and armed insurgency within FMS’. 243
However, as reported by UNSOM, the Somali Police Force ‘provides policing services in Mogadishu,
Benadir Region, while its presence remains relatively low in Hirshabelle, Galmudug, South West State,
and Jubbaland’. 244 In the course of 2018 the management of the security of Mogadishu city wastransferred from NISA to SPF. Prior to this, the role of SPF was limited to carrying out duties at police
stations and Government buildings. 245
Based on a study conducted in 2016 by a local Somali think tank, SIDRA, in average Somali police
officers are male and young, with most of them being less than 40 years of age. Based on the same
study only about 750 officers were women. 246
The federal police consists of, among others, the following units:•••

Darwish (a paramilitary unit distinct from the state level unofficial darwish), 247 to patrol
borders, operate across state borders and handle national emergencies. 248 In particular, the(federal) Darwish is aimed at to be deployed to areas liberated by the SNA and AMISOM, tohelp hold the areas and pave the way for local civilian police to operate. 249
Birmad Forces. 250 No specific information on these units could be found within the given time
limits and among the consulted sources.
Haramcad Forces, also known as Cheetah forces, are a special police unit of the SPF trained
and funded by Turkey. 251 Same as for the Gorgor Brigades they are allegedly used by theincumbent administration in Somalia (April 2021) for political advantage. 252

240 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 122
241 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 139
242 UN Somalia, Country Results Report 2019, June 2020, url, p. 19

243 UN Somalia, Country Results Report Somalia 2019, June 2020, url, p. 19

244 UNSOM and OHCHR, Protection of Civilians Report, Building the Foundation for Peace, Security and Human Rights in

Somalia, 1 January 2017 – 31 December 2019, 2020, url, p. 20
245 UNSOM and OHCHR, Protection of Civilians Report, Building the Foundation for Peace, Security and Human Rights in
Somalia, 1 January 2017 – 31 December 2019, 2020, url, pp. 23-24, see also footnote no. 70
246 SIDRA, Assessment Study On Female Police Officers In Police Forces In Somalia, November 2017, url, pp. 5, 16
247 Goobjoog News, Parliament approves security architecture with few amends, 2 May 2017, url
248 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 122
249 EUCAP Somalia, 300 special Federal Darwish police graduate from pre-deployment training in Mogadishu, 15 February
2020, url
250 Goobjoog News, Parliament approves security architecture with few amends, 2 May 2017, url
251 Sahan, The Somali Wire, Issues Jan-April 2021, n.d., source requiring registration
252 Horn Observer, Somali police detain, confiscate equipment and intimidate journalists at gunpoint in Mogadishu, 20
February 2021, url; Garowe Online, Turkey under pressure to stop funding troops involved in Somalia violence, 5 March
2020, url;

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Country of origin information report | Somalia: Actors•••

Rapid Response Team; 253 Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Unit; 254 Tax Protection Unit; 255
Diplomat Guards . 256 No specific information on these units could be found within the given
time limits and among the consulted sources.
Criminal Investigations Department (CID): 257 tasked with handling major crimes like massacresand cross-state offenses, while the (federal member) state police would conduct policing up
to station level. 258
Somali Coast Guard. 259 Reportedly, ‘Somalia’s consists of only a handful of inflatable andshort-range patrol boats’. 260

Within this context, some federal member states are reluctant to hand over or disband the state level(militias, paramilitary) darwish forces under their control. They tend to re-label them ‘special police’,
which allows them to retain control over these forces and ‘protect themselves against Mogadishu’s
attempts to centralize power’. These forces, either named ‘darwish’ or ‘special police’, do not qualify
for federal payroll or international financial support. 261 For regional details about local darwish or
special police forces and the on-going integration process, please see the regional chapters within
section 7 on Federal Member States and Somaliland.

2.4.5 Prison forces, prisons, and detention•

The Somali Custodial Corps. By the end of 2019, 625 custodial corps staff - 479 males and 146
females - underwent training on following topics: Bangkok rules (for the treatment of women
prisoners), incident management or rehabilitation/human rights, prison duties, advance andbasic medical training, and training in biometric registration. 262 Reportedly, however,untrained guards are often unable to provide security to inmates. 263 No specific informationon the overall capacity of the custodial corps could be found within the given time limits andamong the consulted sources.

•

Prisons. Location and distribution of prison establishments in Somalia remains difficult toascertain, same as for the number of prisoners and detainees throughout the country,
including juvenile and female prisoners. Prisons’ institutions, which are often dilapidated, 264
include those in: 265- Hargeisa, in Somaliland;- Bosasso, Galkacyo 266 and Garowe, in Puntland; 267- Mogadishu Central Prison (MCP), Mogadishu Prison and Court Complex (MPCC),
Kismayo, Baidoa, Beledweyn, in South-Central Somalia. 268

253 EUCAP Somalia, 300 special Federal Darwish police graduate from pre-deployment training in Mogadishu, 15 February

2020, url

254 EUCAP Somalia, EUCAP Somalia enhances Somali Police Explosive Ordinance Unit’s first aid capacity, 16 March 2021, url
255 Goobjoog News, Parliament approves security architecture with few amends, 2 May 2017, url
256 Goobjoog News, Parliament approves security architecture with few amends, 2 May 2017, url

257 Goobjoog News, Parliament approves security architecture with few amends, 2 May 2017, url
258 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 122

259 Goobjoog News, Parliament approves security architecture with few amends, 2 May 2017, url
260 Rubin, M., It's Time for a U.S. Navy Port Call in Somaliland, 31 July 2020, url

261 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, pp. 122-123
262 UN Somalia, Country Results Report Somalia 2020, March 2021, url, p. 60

263 USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2019 - Somalia, 11 March 2020, url, p. 5
264 USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2019 - Somalia, 11 March 2020, url, p. 5

265 UNODC, Good prison health is good public health: Responding to COVID-19 in Somalia's prisons, 12 May 2020, url;

World Prison Brief, Somalia, n.d, url;
266 UNODC, Good prison health is good public health: Responding to COVID-19 in Somalia's prisons, 12 May 2020, url
267 World Prison Brief, Somalia, n.d, url
268 UNODC, Good prison health is good public health: Responding to COVID-19 in Somalia's prisons, 12 May 2020, url

42Country of origin information report | Somalia: Actors•

Detention conditions. Urban prisons in Somalia, especially following large security incidents,
are at times overcrowded, with authorities often not separating pre-trial detainees fromconvicted prisoners, especially in the southern and central regions. 269 In these areas prison
conditions are believed to be ‘harsh’ and at times life threatening. 270 In its 2019 Country
Report on Human Rights Practices in Somalia, the USDOS indicated that ‘[p]rison conditions
in most areas of the country remained harsh due to poor sanitation and hygiene, inadequate
food and water, and lack of medical care’. 271 The following year’s 2020 USDOS report also
stated this, while noting that ‘[o]nly inmates in the MCP, the MPCC, and Garowe and Hargeisa
Prisons had daily access to showers, sanitary facilities, adequate food and water, and outdoor
exercise’.272 In particular, Garowe Prison in Puntland and Hargeisa Prison in Somaliland
reportedly met international standards and were well managed. 273 Otherwise, ‘[i]nmates inmost prisons relied on their family and clan to supplement food and water provisions’. 274 The
same applies to access to health services, whereby authorities usually required families ofinmates to pay for the cost; as a result, inmates without family or clan support had very limitedaccess to such services. Within this context, ‘[d]isease outbreaks, such as tuberculosis andcholera, continued to occur, particularly in overcrowded prisons’ such as the Mogadishu
Central Prison (MCP), with life threatening consequences, especially during the rainyseason. 275 Complementing this picture, the same report indicates that several facilities at FMS
level suffered from frequent flooding, for which reason prisoners had to be moved totemporary facilities, usually at police stations. 276•

Pre-Trial Detention. As reported by USDOS in its latest report, ‘lengthy pretrial detention’ is acommon issue in Somalia, although estimates on the average length and prevalence are notavailable. 277

2.4.6 Security forces’ human rights conduct
USDOS indicated in its 2020 report on human rights practices in Somalia that ‘significant human rights
issues included: unlawful or arbitrary killings, including extrajudicial killings, by government forces;
torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment by the government; arbitrary arrest or detention’.
Another set of issues revolved around ‘political prisoners or detainees’, ‘politically motivateddisappearances’, and ‘serious restrictions on free expression, the press, and the internet, including
violence, threats of violence, or unjustified arrests or prosecutions against journalists, and criminal
libel laws’. Finally, another set of issues revolved around ‘lack of investigation of and accountability
for violence against women’, including conflict-related sexual violence, and ‘recruitment of children
for use in armed conflict’. 278
In the period 5 November 2019 – 9 February 2021, the UNSG, in its various reports on the situation in
Somalia, attributed to Somalia security forces the following civilian casualties (sub-periods): (a) 76

269 USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2020 - Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 6
270 USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2020 - Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 6
271 USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2019 - Somalia, 11 March 2020, url, p. 5
272 USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2020 - Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 6
273 USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2020 - Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 6
274 USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2020 - Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 6
275 USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2020 - Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 6
276 USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2020 - Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 7
277 USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2020 - Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 9

278 USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2020 - Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, pp. 1-4

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Country of origin information report | Somalia: Actors(5 November 2020 – 9 February 2021); 279 (b) 32 (5 August – 4 November 2020); 280 (c) 39 (5 May –4 August 2020); 281 (d) 64 (5 February – 4 May 2020); 282 (e) 8 per cent of 392 (5 November 2019 –4 February 2020). 283 In the course of 2019 UNSOM/OHCHR attributed the following civilian casualties
to the various security forces: 55 to SPF; 284 37 to SNA; 285 2 to NISA. 286
Other type of violations detailed per security institution that were reported in the reference period:•

SNA. In the period 5 November 2019 – 9 February 2021, the SNA was attributed: 9 verified
incidents of conflict-related sexual violence (5 November 2020 – 9 February 2021); 287 4
incidents of conflict-related sexual violence and 13 boys deprived of liberty (5 August –4 November 2020); 4 incidents of conflict-related sexual violence (5 May – 4 August 2020); 288
a total of 16 incidents of deprivation of liberty affecting 37 boys attributed in general to theSomali security forces (5 February 2020 – 4 May 2020). 289 In its 2020 report on children andarmed conflict in Somalia – covering the period 1 August 2016 – 30 September 2019, theUNSG attributed to the SNA hundreds of violations against children, including childrecruitment (391 cases), deprivation of liberty for alleged association with al-Shabaab or proISIL elements (492 cases), killing and maiming of children (297 cases), rape and sexual violence(133 cases), attacks on schools and hospitals (8 cases), denial of humanitarian access (5cases). 290•

SPF and (other) Somali Authorities. In the period 5 November 2019 – 9 February 2021, theSomali Police Force (and the Somali authorities in general) arbitrarily arrested and detained
the following persons (sub-periods): 61 individuals, including 7 al-Shabaab suspects, 14
journalists and 25 alleged clan militia (5 November 2020 – 9 February 2021); 40 individuals(including 24 a-Shabaab suspects and 2 ISIL suspects), mostly in the context of security
operations (5 August – 4 November 2020); 291 85 individuals, including 70 al-Shabaab suspects(5 May – 4 August 2020); 292 89 individuals, most of them suspected of being al-Shabaab
members (55), and 49 of whom were subsequently released without charge (5 February –4 May 2020). 293 During the same period the Somali Police Force was attributed thedeprivation of liberty of more than 60 boys. 294 In the period 5 November 2019 – 9 February
2021, the Somali Police Force was attributed following incidents of conflict-related sexual
violence (sub-periods): 7 verified incidents (5 November 2020 – 9 February 2021); 295 4
incidents (5 August – 4 November 2020); 296 one verified incident (5 February – 4 May

279 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 17 February 2021, url, p. 9

280 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 November 2020, url, p. 8
281 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 August 2020, url, p. 8
282 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 May 2020, url, p. 8283 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 February 2020, url, p. 7

284 UNSOM and OHCHR, Protection of Civilians Report, Building the Foundation for Peace, Security and Human Rights in

Somalia, 1 January 2017 – 31 December 2019, 2020, url, p. 20
285 UNSOM and OHCHR, Protection of Civilians Report, Building the Foundation for Peace, Security and Human Rights in
Somalia, 1 January 2017 – 31 December 2019, 2020, url, p. 18
286 UNSOM and OHCHR, Protection of Civilians Report, Building the Foundation for Peace, Security and Human Rights in
Somalia, 1 January 2017 – 31 December 2019, 2020, url, p. 24
287 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 17 February 2021, url, p. 10
288 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 November 2020, url, p. 9; UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 August 2020, url, p. 10
289 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 May 2020, url, p. 8
290 UNSG, Children and Armed Conflict in Somalia, 4 March 2020, url, pp. 5-12
291
UNSG, Situation Report Somalia, 13 November 2020, url, p. 8
292
UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 August 2020, url, p. 9
293
UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 May 2020, url, p. 8
294 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 November 2020, url, p. 9; UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 August 2020, url, p. 9; UNSG,
Situation in Somalia, 13 May 2020, url, p. 9295 UNSG, Situation Report Somalia, 17 February 2021, url, p. 10
296 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 November 2020, url, p. 944

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Actors2020). 297 In its 2020 report on children and armed conflict in Somalia – covering the period
1 August 2016 – 30 September 2019, the UNSG attributed to the SPF hundreds of violations
against children, including child recruitment (172 cases), deprivation of liberty for alleged
association with al-Shabaab or pro-ISIL elements (303 cases), killing and maiming of children(50 cases), rape and sexual violence (24 cases), attacks on schools and hospitals (2 cases). 298•

NISA. As per the USDOS report, in the course of 2020, ‘NISA agents routinely conducted mass
security sweeps against al-Shabaab and terrorist cells as well as criminal groups. The
organization held detainees for prolonged periods without following due process andmistreated suspects during interrogations’.299 In the period 5 February – 4 May 2020 a totalof 16 incidents of deprivation of liberty affecting 37 boys were attributed to the Somali
security forces in general. 300 In its 2020 report on children and armed conflict in Somalia –covering the period 1 August 2016 – 30 September 2019 –, the UNSG attributed to NISA otherviolations against children, including deprivation of liberty for alleged association with alShabaab or pro-ISIL elements (18 cases), and one denial of humanitarian access. 301 In the
period 2017 - 2019, UNSOM/OHCHR attributed to NISA the arbitrary arrest and detention of
14 civilians (4 journalists, 10 al-Shabaab suspects). 302•

Custodial Corps. For an overview see section on Prison Forces.

Overall, the country task force on monitoring and reporting on grave violations against children inarmed conflict verified the following grave violations in the various reporting periods: (a) 5 November– 9 February 2021: 1 121 grave violations, 153 of which attributed to federal and state armed forces; 303(b) 5 August – 4 November 2020: 945 grave violations, 8.9 per cent of which attributed to federal andstate armed forces; 304 (c) 5 May – 4 August 2020: 546 grave violations, 83 of which attributed tofederal and state armed forces; 305 (d) 5 February – 4 May 2020: 826 grave violations, 104 of which
attributed to federal and state armed forces; 306 (e) 5 November 2019 – 4 February 2020: 407 grave
violations, 64 of which attributed to federal and state armed forces. 307

3. Clans
Layered in all aspects of life, the clan is both a tool for identification and a way of life. Even a religious
and cross-clan militant group like al-Shabaab (Xarakada Mujaahidiinta al-Shabaabi), more commonly
called al-Shabaab, must deal with the clan variable. 308 Nevertheless, the clan situation is nothomogenous. Some lineages are powerful, some others are weaker and yet others are considered as
non-Somali and thereby marginalized from normal life. 309
297 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 May 2020, url, pp. 9-10

298 UNSG, Children and Armed Conflict in Somalia, 4 March 2020, url, pp. 5-12

299 USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2020 - Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 5
300 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 May 2020, url, p. 9

301 UNSG, Children and Armed Conflict in Somalia, 4 March 2020, url, pp. 7, 12

302 UNSOM and OHCHR, Protection of Civilians Report, Building the Foundation for Peace, Security and Human Rights in

Somalia, 1 January 2017 – 31 December 2019, 2020, url, p. 24
303 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 17 February 2021, url, pp. 9-10
304 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 November 2020, url, p. 9305 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 August 2020, url, p. 9306 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 May 2020, url, p. 9
307 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 February 2020, url, pp. 9-10308 DBpedia, Al-Shabaab (militant group), n.d., url
309 ACCORD, Clans in Somalia – Report on a lecture by Joakim Gundel, COI Workshop Vienna, 15 May 2009 (Revised
Edition), 2009, url, pp. 11-20

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Country of origin information report | Somalia: Actors

3.1 Spatial organisation and mobility in the Somali arena
Somali people traditionally occupy an area that stretches from the Indian Ocean to the eastern
highlands of Ethiopia and from the Gulf of Aden to the northern part of Kenya. 310 They are the most
expansive population of the Horn of Africa. 311 In terms of ethnology, Somalis are considered as asegmentary society, like the Afar and Oromo people in Ethiopia. 312 This means that they are divided
into a multitude of segments or lineages based on the genealogical distance from a common
ancestor. 313 That phenomenon thereby governs the relationship between two people (among others,
ability to marry, payment of the blood-revenge price, level of solidarity, degree of consideration or
respect). 314

3.1.1 Major clans
Somalis are roughly divided into five large family clans or lineage beams that form the largest part ofthe population: 315• the Dir are settled in a large territory in Djibouti, in the western part of the Somaliland and beyond
the border that the two countries share with Ethiopia. They are also present in the Southern partof Somalia; 316• the Isaaq are present in the middle part of the Somaliland and beyond the Ethiopian border. 317
Some people claim that Isaaq are part of the Dir 318 but for Marc Fontrier there is no proof of thisassertion in the genealogical trees; 319• the Darood are settled in Puntland, in the eastern part of Somaliland, in eastern Ethiopia and in
the southernmost part of Somalia; 320• the Hawiye are present in central Somalia and in the South of the Somali regional State in
Ethiopia; 321• the Rahanweyn, sometimes called the Digil-Mirifle group, inhabit Somalian Mesopotamia,
between the Jubba and the Shabelle rivers. 322 At the opposite of the other Somalis who claim
descent from a common ancestor called Samaale, they claim to be the descendants of anotherfigure, Saabe. As such, they are also called Saab people. 323
310 Lewis I. M., A Modern History of the Somali. Revised, Updated and Expanded, 2002, p. 1

311 Harper, M., Getting Somalia Wrong? Faith, War and Hope in a shattered State, 2012, p. 31
312 Interview with French researcher intelligence officer Marc Fontrier, 1 April 2021

313 Lewis I. M., A Modern History of the Somali. Revised, Updated and Expanded, 2002, pp. 6-7

314 Lewis, I. M., A Pastoral Democracy: A Study of Pastoralism and Politics Among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa,

1963, pp. 11-16; ACCORD, Clans in Somalia – Report on a lecture by Joakim Gundel, COI Workshop Vienna, 15 May 2009
(Revised Edition), 2009, url, pp.7-11
315 Bader, C., Le sang et le lait: Brève histoire des clans somali, 1999; UNHCR, New issues in Refugee Research – Working
Paper N°65 – Pastoral society and transnational refugees: population movements in Somaliland and eastern Ethiopia 19882000, August 2002, url, pp. 2-3
316 ACCORD, Clans in Somalia – Report on a lecture by Joakim Gundel, COI Workshop Vienna, 15 May 2009 (Revised
Edition), 2009, url, p. 13
317 ACCORD, Clans in Somalia – Report on a lecture by Joakim Gundel, COI Workshop Vienna, 15 May 2009 (Revised
Edition), 2009, url, p. 13
318 UNHCR, New issues in Refugee Research – Working Paper N°65 – Pastoral society and transnational refugees:
population movements in Somaliland and eastern Ethiopia 1988-2000, August 2002, url, p. 2 footnote no. 5
319 Interview with French researcher intelligence officer Marc Fontrier, 1 April 2021
320 Lewis I. M., A Modern History of the Somali. Revised, Updated and Expanded, 2002, pp. 6-7
321 Bader, C., Le sang et le lait: Brève histoire des clans somali, 1999
322 UNHCR, New issues in Refugee Research – Working Paper no. 65 – Pastoral society and transnational refugees:
population movements in Somaliland and eastern Ethiopia 1988-2000, August 2002, url, p.3; ACCORD, Clans in Somalia –Report on a lecture by Joakim Gundel, COI Workshop Vienna, 15 May 2009 (Revised Edition), 2009, url, p. 11
323 Interview with French researcher intelligence officer Marc Fontrier, 1 April 2021

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Country of origin information report | Somalia: Actors

Clans have traditional territories, linked to the migrations of the Somali people during their history. 324
Traditionally, a Somali man can settle on the territory of another clan—but there are rules. 325 Someclans have close ties (by blood or by contract) that allow some individuals to settle, live or travel
without any problem. However, people that cross a territory, for any reason, must be sure to have theclan’s protection. 326
With the parliamentary system, the ability to represent the entire population has been a crucial point.
Some elements from the Somali area, notably northern lineages, have settled in the large cities of theSouth, creating a heterogenous social tissue from the clan point of view. Since this era, it can beconsidered that every lineage beam and every large clan (tol) is represented in the major cities ofSouth Somalia. 327 Also, wars, famine and droughts have pushed numerous people out of theirtraditional territory. These populations spread across the southern parts of the country, notably in IDP
camps. 328 Considering these dynamics, the clan-territory association remains relevant but sometimes
must be relativized, notably in urban contexts. 329

3.1.2 Minor clans, casted communities and non-Somali groups
Since there are smaller communities that live amongst larger ones, some segments of the Somalian
population are considered as minorities. 330 These communities are divided into three categories:
minor clans, non-Somali groups and casted people. All of these have in common that they live amongst
larger clans. 331
A minor clan is a Somali clan that lives next to or within the traditional territory of larger ones. The
main minor clans are: 332• the Biyomaal are part of the large family clan of the Dir but inhabit Southern Somalia. Sincesome communities live amongst more numerous clans - from the Hawiye and the Ogaadeen(the major Darood lineage clan in Ethiopia) in particular – they can be considered as minor clan
in several parts of the country; 333• the Sheekhaal, are a kind of trans-clan lineage. This means that they live amongst numerous‘major’ clans from the North and the South of the Somali area. They have the special status of‘religious clan’ that gives them a prestigious aura, 334 and are often included as Hawiye. 335

324 Lewis I. M., A Modern History of the Somali. Revised, Updated and Expanded, 2002, pp. 18-39
325 Interview with French researcher intelligence officer Marc Fontrier, 1 April 2021

326 Fontrier, M., Abou-Bakr Ibrahim, Pacha de Zeyla - Marchand d’esclaves, 2018, pp. 85-87, 93-96

327 Fontrier, M., Annales de Somalie – L’Etat démantelé – 1991-1995, 2012; Fontrier, M., Annales de Somalie - L’illusion duchaos – 1995-2000, 2015; Lewis, I.M, Understanding Somalia and Somaliland: culture, history and society, 2008, pp. 27-92
328 UNHCR, Fact sheet on internal displacement, 10 March 2021, url
329 Interview with French researcher intelligence officer Marc Fontrier, 1 April 2021
330 Lewis, I.M, Understanding Somalia and Somaliland, 2008, pp. 5-11
331 ACCORD, Clans in Somalia – Report on a lecture by Joakim Gundel, COI Workshop Vienna, 15 May 2009 (Revised
Edition), 2009, url, p. 14-20
332 ACCORD, Clans in Somalia – Report on a lecture by Joakim Gundel, COI Workshop Vienna, 15 May 2009 (Revised
Edition), 2009, url, p. 14-20
333 Canada, IRB, Somalia: The Biyomal [Biimaal, Biyomaal, Biymaal, Biyamal] clan, including work, history, religious
affiliation, location within the country, particularly Nus Dunya; the Rahanweyn [Rahanwen] clan, including location in the
country; treatment of the Biyomal clan by the Rahanwen clan (2013- September 2015), 2 October 2015, url; Interview with
French researcher intelligence officer Marc Fontrier, 1 April 2021
334 Canada, IRB, Somalia: Information on the Shekhal Ghendershe and whether they are part of the ‘untouchables’; theirlocation and derivation, 1 December 1991, url; Minority Rights Group International, Minorities and indigenous peoples inSomalia, last update in May 2018, url; ACCORD, Somalia: Situation of the ‘Shakhal’, ‘Ajuran’, ‘Shashi’, and ‘Wayten’ clans,
15 March 2004, url
335 International Crisis Group, Jubaland in Jeopardy: the Uneasy Path to State-Building in Somalia, 21 May 2013, url

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Country of origin information report | Somalia: Actors••

the Asharaaf, commonly called Ashraf, are also a religious clan but mainly live amongst the
Rahanweyn. They have an important role in the religious education; 336
the Ajuuraan live with the Hawiye. They claim to be a ‘royal’ clan since they descend from thepeople of the Ajuuraan sultanate which probably took root in the XIIth century. 337

Amongst the minor clans also feature the Tunni, 338 the Garre 339 and the Begedi, 340 who mainly livewith the Rahanweyn. 341
A casted community (Sab) is a group that lives at the margins of Somali society. These small
communities are traditionally supposed to fulfill a precise function, such as craftsmen or sorcerers. 342
The main ones are:• the Tumaal, that traditionally work as blacksmiths and live in small communities; 343• the Midgaan, who mainly live as hunter-gatherers and leather-craftsmen, shoemakers
notably; 344• the Ybir/Yibro, who are involved in numerous celebrations such as marriages. They also makeamulets. Their traditional activity revolves around magic and rituals; 345• the Madhibaan (also called Gabooye), Hawarsame and Habar Yaquub are also casted
communities that live across the Somali area. 346
In Somalia also exist groups that are considered as non-Somali minorities. They speak anotherlanguage and have specific traditions and cultures. These mainly live in southern Somalia. The maingroups are: 347••

the Bantu, also called Jareer, are farmers from the Somalian Mesopotamia. They speak Arabic,
Swahili or the May language; 348
the reer Benaadir (or Benadiri) are a coastal group. Part of them, the reer Xamar, traditionally
lives in Mogadishu as merchants. 349

There are also the Bajuni (who inhabit the islands of the southern Somalia) 350 and the Barwaani andJaaji, also called reer Maanyo 351.

336 Minority Rights Group International, Minorities and indigenous peoples in Somalia, last update in May 2018, url; seealso ACCORD, Somalia: Situation of the ‘Shakhal’, ‘Ajuran’, ‘Shashi’, and ‘Wayten’ clans, 15 march 2004, url
337 Interview with French researcher intelligence officer Marc Fontrier 1 April 2021; ACCORD, Somalia: Situation of the‘Shakhal’, ‘Ajuran’, ‘Shashi’, and ‘Wayten’ clans, 15 March 2004, url
338 Canada, IRB, Somalia: The Tunni ethnic group, including regions where its members reside; treatment by society,authorities and Al Shabaab; relationship with other clans (2012-December 2014), 22 December 2014, url
339 Canada, IRB, Somalia: Information on the Garre tribe, 1 March 1995, url
340 Canada, IRB, Somalia: Information on the Begedi clan, 1 September 1997, url
341 Interview with French researcher intelligence officer Marc Fontrier 1 April 2021
342 Bader, C., Le sang et le lait : Brève histoire des clans somali, 1999; Interview with French researcher intelligence officer
Marc Fontrier, 1 April 2021
343 Canada, IRB, Somalia: Additional information on the Tumaal including their location, present situation, and whether or
not they are related to the Midgan, 1 November 1996, url
344 Interview with French researcher intelligence officer Marc Fontrier 1 April 2021
345 Interview with French researcher intelligence officer Marc Fontrier 1 April 2021
346 ACCORD, Clans in Somalia – Report on a lecture by Joakim Gundel, COI Workshop Vienna, 15 May 2009 (Revised
Edition), 2009, p.15 url
347 Interview with French researcher intelligence officer Marc Fontrier 1 April 2021
348 Menkhaus, K., Bantu ethnic identities in Somalia, 2003, url, pp. 323-339
349 Canada, IRB, Somalia: The Reer Hamar and/or Benadiri, including the location of their traditional homeland, affiliatedclans and risks they face from other clans, 3 December 2012, url
350 Canada, IRB, Somalia: Information regarding the Bajuni tribe around Kismayo, particularly the language they speak, 1April 1990, url
351 Interview with French researcher intelligence officer Marc Fontrier 1 April 2021

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Country of origin information report | Somalia: Actors

3.2 Protection and security
In the Somali space, people are traditionally attached to a territory where their kin are supposed tobe more numerous. 352

3.2.1 Intra clan protection
Theoretically, the more distant from the individual’s circle someone is, the more protection andsolidarity are likely to be weaker. 353
Probably the most important level of solidarity in Somali society, the jilib does not refer to a particularnumber of individuals or a level in the genealogical tree. 354 It refers to the group below which thecommunity assumes the payment of ‘the blood price’, diya in Arabic, mag in Somali. 355 Thus, in theory,a jilib can be constituted of hundreds of reer (lineages/families) as well as just a few ones. 356 It is asolidarity link that ties together several reer or families, traditionally within a clan (tol). 357 In theory,
inside the jilib, the community must help individuals in case of smaller or larger problems, reaching as
far as the mutilation or the murder of someone from another clan (blood price). 358 There is a little jilib
and a big jilib. The payment of a murder is linked to the big jilib while mutilations are linked to thelittle one. Both are codified in the xeer, the traditional law. 359 Since the xeer is a little different acrossthe Somali area, there does not exist a precise price for each jilib. For example, clans considered asricher, such as the sedentary ones, pay more than the others. 360

3.2.2 Extra clan protection
Social protection can also be provided through arrangements with other clans. 361 In any case, thisprotection results from a pact (hes-heshiis) passed by two communities that must agree on its exact
terms: the kind of protection, means of resolution of the conflicts, marriage rules, and so on. 362 In
most cases the hes has a given duration. When this duration ends, the solidarity links between two
individuals or groups evaporate likewise. 363
However, there are binds of protection and solidarity without duration or agreement. In these cases,
many phenomena can influence the relations between individuals, such as the xeer, the traditionallaw, but also the natural social balance and games of power. In the Somali perception, there areseveral level of clan protection corresponding to different scales of social closeness, including theneighbourhood (daris), those related (saar), the people who are included in the intra clan logic but
352 Interview with French researcher intelligence officer Marc Fontrier 1 April 2021

353 Fontrier, M., Autour de la Notice sur l’Ogadine d’Arthur Rimbaud, Editions Sépia, Paris, 2017, p. 28

354 IRSEM, Les défis politiques et stratégiques en Somalie, Les Cahiers de l’IRSEM, n°13, 2012, url, pp. 75, 211

355 Van Notten, M., The Law of the Somalis: A Stable Foundation for Economic Development in the Horn of Africa, 2005, p.

179
356 Van Notten, M., The Law of the Somalis: A Stable Foundation for Economic Development in the Horn of Africa, 2005, p.
64
357 Pérouse de Montclos, M.A., Diaspora et terrorisme, 2003, url, p. 28
358 Van Notten, M., The Law of the Somalis: A Stable Foundation for Economic Development in the Horn of Africa, 2005, p.
20
359 Prunier, G., Ségmentarité et violence dans l’espace somali, 1840-1992, 1997, url, pp. 381-383
360 Interview with French researcher intelligence officer Marc Fontrier, 1 April 2021
361 Van Notten, M., The Law of the Somalis: A Stable Foundation for Economic Development in the Horn of Africa, 2005, pp.
49-61
362 Van Notten, M., The Law of the Somalis: A Stable Foundation for Economic Development in the Horn of Africa, 2005, pp.
50-51, 59-61, 76
363 Interview with French researcher intelligence officer Marc Fontrier, 1 April 2021

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Country of origin information report | Somalia: Actors

are, from the lineage point of view, out of it (soo rac, in Somali language ‘those who follows’),
corresponding to those who are out of the intra clan logic but can serve the interests of the group(sheegad, in Somali language ‘those who are merely trading’ or ‘those who lie about their origin’), andthe protected ones (magan, in Somali language ‘those who beg for mercy’). 364 With each of theselevels comes a given intensity of protection. For example, the relations with a daris are traditionallypeaceful, while with a sheeqad they can be violent, marginalizing or discriminating. The example ofthe magan is particularly explicit. They are indeed supposed to have the same rights as people of theprotecting clan, but they do not have the same social consideration. 365
Another important form of protection is the abbaan. 366 When Somalis move within their space, their
genealogy, and their abtiris (count of the fathers) are both identifying tools in the social space andpart of their identity. In a context of travel, the abtiris allows the interlocutor to know if a stranger has
the right or not to peacefully cross the territory. 367 To cross (or live) peacefully the land, the traveler
must obtain a ‘guide’ who can testify that the foreign individual is allowed by the clan to cross theterritory. This helper will provide a protection called abbaan. 368
Essentially, the abbaan is the head of a caravan. He provides safe crossing of his clan’s territory. 369
Usually, when it arrives at the edge of the abbaan’s territory, the caravan must find another abbaan.
It happens, in the cases of such major and powerful merchants as Abu Bakr Ibrahim pasha was in the
XIXth century, that one abbaan is enough to cross large parts of the country. 370 These cases are highly
uncommon and imply that the merchant possesses the power to pay and to make a strong pact inadvance with all the actors who could be met. More generally, abbaan can also be understood as amore general system whereby nomadic clans provide a form of protection to those who may wish to
cross their territory (cars, trucks or pedestrians). 371
Michael van Notten adds that in the Somali system, foreigners (from the clan) are denied of their legal
personality. They are considered as guests (marti) so they need a patron, a guardian who is calledabbaan. 372
Another type of alliance can in a certain way be conceived of as a form of protection and security
provided by the clan: the gaashaanbuur. 373 Classically, this is a military alliance that integrates one orseveral clans or parts of these to make war. Notably, a reason for a gaashaanbuur to come into being
can be the protection of the group’s interests.374 Researchers do not agree on a strict definition of thisconcept. For example, French professor Gerard Prunier defines it as a [informal translation]‘pragmatical alliance of minor clans and individuals marginalized by a certain situation of conflict inorder to ensure the immediate survival of the groups and persons threatened’. 375 For Marc Fontrier,this phenomenon does not concern minor clans only. In his view, some clans have a reer

364 Interview with French researcher intelligence officer Marc Fontrier, 1 April 2021

365 Prunier, G., Ségmentarité et violence dans l’espace somali, 1840-1992, 1997, url, pp. 382-383
366 Fontrier, M., Marc, Abu Bakr, pacha de Zeyla - marchand d’esclaves, 2018, p. 85

367 Interview with French researcher intelligence officer Marc Fontrier, 1 April 2021

368 Fontrier, M., Marc, Abu Bakr, pacha de Zeyla - marchand d’esclaves, 2018, pp. 85-89

369

Fontrier, M., Marc, Abu Bakr, pacha de Zeyla - marchand d’esclaves, 2018, p. 86

370 Fontrier, M., Marc, Abu Bakr, pacha de Zeyla - marchand d’esclaves, 2018, p. 86

371 World Bank, Private sector response to the absence of government institutions in Somalia, 30 July 2004, p. 10 url

372 Van Notten M., The Law of the Somalis: A Stable Foundation for Economic Development in the Horn of Africa, 2005, p.

50

373 Interview with French researcher intelligence officer Marc Fontrier, 1 April 2021; see also de Waal, A., The Prairies Firethat Burned Mogadishu: The Logic of Clan Formation in Somalia, December 2018, url, p. 27

374 Interview with French researcher intelligence officer Marc Fontrier 1 April 2021

375 Prunier, G., Ségmentarité et violence dans l’espace somali, 1840-1992, 1997, url, pp. 382

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Country of origin information report | Somalia: Actors

gaashaanbuur. He defines this as an alliance of individuals from same or different clans in order tomake war. 376

3.3 Traditional customary law - Xeer
Somalis follow a dual system of rules, the Islamic one, the shari’ah, and the traditional one, the xeer. 377
The essence of the xeer is to balance the relations between individuals and between groups. 378 Gerard
Prunier defines this as [informal translation] ‘the oral corpus of laws that rules the social behaviour ofa group tied by the custom (tol herleh)’. 379 For example, the price for the murder or mutilation of amember of another clan (jilib) is set by the xeer, 380 as well the inheritance of lands or material
possessions. 381 The elders perform justice and are supposed to be experts of the xeer. 382 The shari’ah
is also respected, while it was traditionally conceived as a distant religious ideal. 383 It must be noticed
that now, this phenomenon tends to be modified in many parts of the country, notably in the cities
and the territories under control of al-Shabaab. 384
In Somali culture the xeer and the shari’ah are personified by two important figures: 385
 the warrior (waranle) is a man of honour who lives in a non-religious world. He follows the xeer; 386
 the religious (wadaad), is a man who reached holiness by his knowledge and behavior.387 He
follows the shari’ah. 388
For Somalis, the xeer is both holy and profane 389 as shown in a Somali proverb: ‘God created me froma seed, but it is my ancestor that gave me the xeer’. 390 Marc Fontrier specifies that when aconfrontation between the xeer and the shari’ah occurs, the first one is often preferred, as anotherproverb shows: ‘If you have choice between the xeer and the sharia, choose the xeer’. 391 As detailed
further above (section on Customary Justice – Xeer and Alternative Dispute Resolution), this is the
traditional tendency but this assertion must be relativized since al-Shabaab and rigorist groups areworking to push the shari’ah as a superior rule, particularly in the areas controlled by the terroristgroup and in rural areas (section on Shari’ah Law). 392

376 Interview with French researcher intelligence officer Marc Fontrier 1 April 2021

377 van Notten M., The Law of the Somalis: A Stable Foundation for Economic Development in the Horn of Africa, 2005, pp.

33-48
378 Van Notten M., The Law of the Somalis: A Stable Foundation for Economic Development in the Horn of Africa, 2005, pp.
49-62
379 Prunier, G., Ségmentarité et violence dans l’espace somali, 1840-1992, 1997, url, pp. 379-401
380 Van Notten, M., The Law of the Somalis: A Stable Foundation for Economic Development in the Horn of Africa, 2005, pp.
55-56, 70, 100, 112, 177-182,183, 186
381 Van Notten M., The Law of the Somalis: A Stable Foundation for Economic Development in the Horn of Africa, 2005, pp.
60-61, 179, 183
382 Van Notten, M., The Law of the Somalis: A Stable Foundation for Economic Development in the Horn of Africa, 2005, pp.
64-65
383 Prunier, G., Ségmentarité et violence dans l’espace somali, 1840-1992, 1997, url, pp. 381-382; van Notten, M., The Lawof the Somalis: A Stable Foundation for Economic Development in the Horn of Africa, 2005, p. 34
384 Interview with French researcher intelligence officer Marc Fontrier 1 April 2021
385 Mohamed-Abdi, M, Les boulversements induits par la guerre civile en Somalie: Castes marginals et minorités, 2000, url,
pp. 131-133
386 Mohamed-Abdi, M, Les boulversements induits par la guerre civile en Somalie: Castes marginals et minorités, 2000, url,
p. 132387 Mohamed-Abdi, M, Les boulversements induits par la guerre civile en Somalie: Castes marginals et minorités, 2000, url,
p. 132388 Lewis, I. M., Blood and Bone: The call of Kinship in Somali Society, 1994, pp. 41, 49, 60, 75, 164, 170, 207
389 Lewis I. M., A Modern History of the Somali. Revised, Updated and Expanded, 2002
390 Iye A. M., Le verdict de l’arbre – le Xeer Issa: essai sur une démocratie endogène africaine, 1992, p. 156
391 Interview with French researcher intelligence officer Marc Fontrier 1 April 2021
392 Interview with French researcher intelligence officer Marc Fontrier 1 April 2021

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Country of origin information report | Somalia: Actors

Rights and duties are set by the xeer. 393 If the traditional law may be somewhat different from a clan
to another, it is ultimately quite homogeneous. In fact, the differences are not strictly in xeer itself but
rather in its fields of applicability. 394 The xeer applies inside the clan and the genealogy. 395 Djiboutian
researcher Ali Moussa Iye, talking about xeer Ciise – also known as Issa, one of the main Dir clans fromthe North, in Djibouti, Western Somaliland and over the Ethiopian border - says that each Ciise is theequal of another Ciise. The author does not specify Somali people, but precisely Ciise kin.396
As already mentioned, children and women have access to traditional justice through a male tutelar
personality, husband, brother, father or uncle, since they are not considered by the society as
responsible. 397 For example, they do not pay the mag; their tutor will, because he is supposed to be
responsible for the actions of his woman or daughter. Also, the xeer codifies and justifies behaviors incontradiction with human rights such as FGM, 398 rapes during clashes, 399 the obligation to renounce
inheritance (lands and possessions) when a marriage occurs outside of the clan, 400 and so on. 401
For an overview about access to justice in Somalia, customary justice and alternative dispute
resolutions, and how they interplay with the shari’ah system see section on Access to Justice, Formal
and Informal Systems.

3.4 Clan militias’ role, recruitment, and engagement in disputes
Clan militias are important actors of political life across Somalia. 402 They are also destabilizing
elements, since their actions can be violent, uncontrollable and, sometimes, random. Identifying fixedpatterns can be difficult since they are protean. 403 However, some crucial aspects at the basis of thephenomenon can be presented as follows.

3.4.1 Establishment of a clan militia
A clan militia is generally an armed group based on lineage. 404 For Marc Fontrier, clan militias are theresult of the convergence of several individuals’ interests. 405 As stated above, the notion of pact
(hes/heshiis) is the origin point of this particular social organizational form. The strict basis of a militia
is someone who succeeds in federating several individuals’ interests. From this point, around these393 Harper, M., Getting Somalia Wrong? Faith, War and Hope in a shattered State, 2012, pp. 40, 115, 120
394 Interview with French researcher intelligence officer Marc Fontrier 1 April 2021

395 Prunier, G., Ségmentarité et violence dans l’espace somali, 1840-1992, 1997, url, p. 382

396 Iye, A. M., Le verdict de l’arbre – le Xeer Issa: essai sur une démocratie endogène africaine, 1992, p. 155

397 Van Notten M., The Law of the Somalis: A Stable Foundation for Economic Development in the Horn of Africa, 2005, p.

104-105398 Van Notten M., The Law of the Somalis: A Stable Foundation for Economic Development in the Horn of Africa, 2005, p.
104
399 Van Notten M., The Law of the Somalis: A Stable Foundation for Economic Development in the Horn of Africa, 2005, p.
105
400 Van Notten M., The Law of the Somalis: A Stable Foundation for Economic Development in the Horn of Africa, 2005, p.
105
401 Expanding Access to Justice Program, Access to Justice Assessment Tool – Baseline Study in Somaliland: 2020, 2020, url,
pp. 10-30
402 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, pp. 113-115; de Waal, A., The Prairie Fire that Burned
Mogadishu: The Logic of Clan Formation in Somalia, December 2018, url, pp. 2-6
403 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, pp. 113-118
404 de Waal A., The Prairies Fire that Burned Mogadishu: The Logic of Clan Formation in Somalia, December 2018, url, pp. 131
405 Interview with French researcher intelligence officer Marc Fontrier, 1 April 2021

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Country of origin information report | Somalia: Actors

people, the ability to become a large militia depends on the ability of members to federate otherinterests in their turn. It is a fractal organization in which an inner circle reproduces itself up to thelimit of its influence. This limit is represented by the ability of the group to attract a greater numberof supporters. Considering this definition of the militia, Marc Fontrier specifies that when thefederation of interests concerns the clan, and the modus operandi may be violent, it is possible todefine it as a clan militia. 406 Even a group like al-Shabaab, defined as a religious or extremist militia,
could be partly defined as a clan militia since several clans (Cayr or Ayr from the Hawiye Habar Gidirfor example ) form a strong basis within it. 407 Basically, for Marc Fontrier, there are two types of militiasin the Somali space: 408••

the economic ones, where the aim of associating is to improve the level of resources or money.
This one is largely based on the clan mode;the political ones, where the aim is to take or keep the power. Here, the center is often a strong
figure like in the case of Siyad Barre’s regime, supported by the Marehan clan. For Marc Fontrier,since the traditional way of life in Somali culture is strongly allergic to any kind of coercion, thispattern can be considered as imported from the outside, 409 as al-Shabaab shows. 410

For Marc Fontrier, political conflicts between militias - as could be seen in the 1990’s between the two
United Somali Congress (USC) groups, 411 Abgaal and Habar Gidir 412 - are typical of the conflict
emerging between the original way of life of Somali people and a ‘western’ way to conceive state andterritories, pushing some individuals to claim a power that traditional society would never grant
them. 413
In most cases, the federation of interests corresponds to an economic imperative.414 Setting up andkeeping a militia united and functional requires money. 415 Funding is a crucial issue for thesustainability and the performance of any clan militias. 416

3.4.2 Evolution of clan militias in Somalia
Historically, clan militias have always existed as alliances sealed within the genealogical structure. 417
Nevertheless, since colonization and the attempt of Westerners (the French in Djibouti, the English in
Somaliland and the Italian in Somalia) to impose a state system in Somalia, more armed groups
emerged and started to fight themselves and against the new authorities. 418 In 1960 former colonies
of British Somaliland and Italian Somalia achieved independence and merged as a new state, Somali

406 Interview with French researcher intelligence officer Marc Fontrier, 1 April 2021

407 Interview with French researcher intelligence officer Marc Fontrier, 1 April 2021; see also Hiraal Institute, Taming theClans: Al-Shabab’s Clan Politics, 31 May 2018, url, pp. 1-2
408 Interview with French researcher intelligence officer Marc Fontrier, 1 April 2021
409 Al Shabaab ideology’s roots are in the gulf states and in Afghanistan of the 1990’s; de Gayffier-Bonneville A.C., Lesorganization combattantes irrégulières de Somalie, in Stratégique, 103, 2013/2, pp. 139-161, url
410 Interview with French researcher intelligence officer Marc Fontrier, 1 April 2021
411 Fontrier M., Annales de Somalie – L’Etat démantelé – 1991-1995, 2012, pp. 45-68
412 Guardian (The), Clans and crisis in Somalia, 6 May 2007, url; Prunier G., Somalia: Civil War, Intervention and Withdrawal
1990-1995, 1 July 1995, url
413 Interview with French researcher intelligence officer Marc Fontrier, 1 April 2021
414 Menkhaus K., Non-State Security Providers and Political Formation in Somalia, April 2016, url, pp. 11-15
415 Pérouse de Montclos, M.A., Diaspora et terrorisme, 2003, url, pp. 16, 19, 55, 169-216 and 238
416 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, pp. 128, 136-137
417 Fontrier M., Annales de Somalie – L’Etat démantelé – 1991-1995, 2012, pp. 11-23
418 Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies, Decentralized Unitary System: A Possible Middle Ground Model for Somalia,
May 2015, url; Prunier G., Somalia: Civil War, Intervention and Withdrawal 1990-1995, 1 July 1995, url; ACCORD,
Understanding Civil Militia Groups in Somalia, 2016, url; Pérouse de Montclos M.A., Boko Haram et le terrorisme islamiste
au Nigéria: insurrection religieuse, contestation politique ou protection sociale, June 2012, url

53Country of origin information report | Somalia: Actors

Republic. Nine years later, the army took power and Muhammad Siyad Barre became President until
1991 and the collapse of the State. 419 During this period, several armed groups started to fight theregime. 420 These groups, based on lineage, were the first occurrence of the term of Somali ‘clan
militias’. 421
At this point, three main groups led the struggle against the government of Siyad Barre: the Somalian
National Movement (SNM), based on several Isaaq clans, 422 the Somalian Salvation Democratic Front(SSDF) based on the Harti lineages from the Darood, 423 mainly the Majeerteen, and the United Somalia
Congress (USC), based on several Hawiye clans from the Abgaal and Habar Gidir. 424 These threemilitias are particularly interesting because of their impact on the structuration of present-day
Somalia. After the collapse of the state in 1991, these groups became the basis of new
administrations. 425 USC took the power in South Somalia, SSDF, settled in the actual Puntland, became
the main political entity, and SNM roughly became the administration of the Somaliland. 426
In the early 1990’s, USC split into two main clan factions: the Habar Gidir one, whose leader was
Xuseen Maxamed Faarax Caydiid (USC-Caydiid) and the Abgaal, led by Cali Mahdi Maxamed (USCMahdi). 427 Both fought for power in Mogadishu and Somalia, setting up a context of perpetual civil
war in the South of the country. 428 Seeking to remove itself from the agitated southern area, SNM
declared itself independent in 1991. 429 In turn, in 1998, the SSDF removed itself from the southernarea declaring its autonomy. 430 These three clan militias are examples of armed groups that became
official states or federated states. 431
Simultaneously, conflict situations are inherited from the clashes between and within these militias.
For example, clashes between Somaliland ant Puntland can be explained by the fact that the easternpart of Somaliland is inhabited by Darood populations that feel closer to Puntland’s lineages. 432 On
the other hand, in Southern Somalia, the decade of the 1990s was characterized by a struggle between
the two major clans of the Mogadishu area, the Abgaal and the Habar Gidir. 433 Indeed, the chaotic
situation since this period enabled the emergence of numerous armed groups of variable sizes andsponsored by local people and diaspora, but also by several foreign actors. 434 Their purpose could bepolitic or economic, on a lineage basis or on a religious one. From the late 1990’s, southern territories
became so fragmented that the conflict was no longer a struggle between two major forces but
between several ones of variable strength. 435 For example, Macawiisleey is a recently founded clan
militia that operates in the Lower Shabelle region. The approximately 200 fighters that constitute it

419 Mabire J-C., Somalie, l’interminable crise, April 2003, url, pp. 57-80

420 Fontrier M., Annales de Somalie – L’Etat démantelé – 1991-1995, 2012, pp. 25-44
421 Interview with French researcher intelligence officer Marc Fontrier, 1 April 2021

422 Lewis I.M., Blood and Bone – the call of kinship in Somali Society, 1993, pp. 177-219

423 Fontrier M., Annales de Somalie – L’Etat démantelé – 1991-1995, 2012, pp. 135-160

424 Prunier G., Somalia: Civil War, Intervention and Withdrawal 1990-1995, 1 July 1995, url; Fontrier M., Annales de Somalie– L’Etat démantelé – 1991-1995, 2012, pp. 29-32
425 Fontrier M., Annales de Somalie – L’Etat démantelé – 1991-1995, 2012, pp. 69-183
426 Prunier G., Somalia: Civil War, Intervention and Withdrawal 1990-1995, 1 July 1995, url;
427 Fontrier M., Annales de Somalie – L’Etat démantelé – 1991-1995, 2012, pp. 99-110
428 Britannica, Somalia, n.d., url ; Prunier, P., Somalia : Civil War, Intervention and Withdrawal 1990-1995, 1/7/1995, url
429 Hoehne M. V., L’Etat ‘de facto’ du Somaliland, in Politique Africaine, translated by Botiveau R., April 2010, url, p. 178
430 Fontrier M., Annales de Somalie - L’illusion du chaos – 1995-2000, 2015, pp. 355-366
431 Prunier G., Somalia: Civil War, Intervention and Withdrawal 1990-1995, 1 July 1995, url
432 Hoehne M. V., L’Etat ‘de facto’ du Somaliland, in Politique Africaine, translated by Botiveau R., April 2010, pp. 175-199,
url
433 Fontrier M., Annales de Somalie – L’Etat démantelé – 1991-1995, 2012 ; Fontrier M., Annales de Somalie - L’illusion duchaos – 1995-2000, 2015, pp. 103-140
434 Pérouse de Montclos, M.A., Diaspora et terrorisme, 2003, url, pp. 169-188
435 Interview with French researcher intelligence officer Marc Fontrier, 1 April 2021

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are mainly farmers and pastoralists whose purpose is to fight al-Shabaab. It is thus an example of
popular reaction to al-Shabaab pressure. 436
For a detailed overview of current clan militias and armed groups at state and regional level see
relevant section on FMS Armed Forces and on Other Actors/Forces within each Federal Member
States and Somaliland.

3.5 Clans and Al-Shabaab
The relations between al-Shabaab and clans are ambiguous. 437 As seen previously, traditionally, thexeer and the clan logic rule Somali life. 438 Al-Shabaab denies this phenomenon and tries to make theshari’ah the supreme arbiter. 439 However, al-Shabaab deals with the clan system and often appears
to take advantage of it. 440

3.5.1 Clans within Al-Shabaab
In 2019, al-Shabaab was estimated as having between 5 000 and 10 000 members. 441 Inside theorganization, it is claimed that 50% of the executive council and officials are from Hawiye lineages. 442
Other clans are also represented like the Darood Marehan. 443 However, all major lineages are
represented in the organization. 444 Some clans are so well-represented in the leadership of somedepartments of the organization that they are considered as ‘the “owners” of entire branches’. For
example, sources claim that the Amniyat, the intelligence service, is controlled by Murusade, Habar
Gidir and Duduble clans, 445 of the Hawiye clan family. 446
Several clans are indeed actively supporting the group, and ultimately, it may happen that
recruitment, from an al-Shabaab perspective, is not carried out strictly speaking under duress. Youngmen, especially in past years, may have chosen to join al-Shabaab for ideological reasons, under thepressure of family or simply for economic purposes. 447 However, in more recent years forced
recruitment, of children notably, is backfiring. 448 On its territory, al-Shabaab considers that every
citizen must fight for the organization but since its coercive ability is variable, sometimes it must findways to be attractive. Clan loyalty, as will be seen, constitutes an effective attraction tool. 449

436 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 129

437 ISS, Radicalisation and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia, September 2014, url

438 Iye A. M., Le verdict de l’arbre – le Xeer Issa: essai sur une démocratie endogène africaine, 1992, pp. 16-18

439 LPI, Alternative for Conflict Transformation in Somalia. A snapshot and analysis of key political actors’ views andstrategies, 2014, url, p. 32
440 Interview with French researcher intelligence officer Marc Fontrier, 1 April 2021
441 Council on Foreign Relations, Al-Shabab, 10 January 2020, url
442 Hiraal Institute, Taming the Clans: Al-Shabab’s Clan Politics, 31 May 2018, url p. 1
443 Interview with French researcher intelligence officer Marc Fontrier, 1 April 2021
444 Hiraal Institute, Taming the Clans: Al-Shabab’s Clan Politics, 31 May 2018, url , p. 1
445 Hiraal Institute, Taming the Clans: Al-Shabab’s Clan Politics, 31 May 2018, url , pp. 1-2
446 Abikar, Clan Map - Somali Clans according Abikar 1999, in this report, url
447 ISS, Radicalisation and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia, September 2014, url, p. 5
448 HRW, Somalia: Al-Shabab Demanding Children, 14 January 2018, url; UN Office of the Special Representative of theSecretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Somalia, 7 August 2020, url; CISAC, Stanford University, Mapping
Militant Organizations, Al Shabaab, January 2019, url
449 CISAC, Stanford University, Mapping Militant Organizations, Al Shabaab, January 2019, url; Chonka P., What you need toknow to Understand al-Shabaab, 21 September 2016, url

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3.5.2 Minor clans and Al-Shabaab
The cross-clan policy of al-Shabaab can be attractive for minorities in Somalia. More precisely, alShabaab is not against the clan logic, but it asserts that religion is what binds together all clans. 450
Religion becomes a higher rule. 451 For some members from minor clans, the situation may beconsidered as better under the rule of al-Shabaab. 452 Involvement in the ranks of the organization
would be a good way to improve their situation. Al-Shabaab uses the popular frustration against majorclans for its own interest. 453 Minor clans, threatened by major ones, could find more appealing asystem where religion prevails over clan, and which is therefore more egalitarian. Some minor clans
have been marginalized since the collapse of the Siyad Barre’s State. 454 Joining al-Shabaab can be seen
as an opportunity to take revenge on the past and on major clans that took their lands. 455 Al-Shabaab
recruited widely amongst marginalized clans such as the Jareer with the promise of regular pay andimprovement of their social situation. 456

3.5.3 The role of the elders
Somali society considers the elders as wise figures that know the traditions and the rules. 457 Given
this, their influence is important in the communities. 458 Since the federal states cannot fulfill all thedemands from all the clans, frustration increases amongst some communities. This allows al-Shabaab
to propose alliances and a different project than the Somalian Government’s one. 459 In al-Shabaab’s
attempt to deal with communities, clan elders are key figures in the control of territories and their
inhabitants. They push young men to become involved in the ranks of the organization, becoming
important providers of recruits for it. 460 However, their role is more complex than simple recruiters.
They can constitute important elements in population control thanks to their mediation abilities aswell as their ability to provide information. Clan elders are also facilitating the recovering of the taxes(zakat). 461

3.6 Overview of clan militias abuses
Clan militias are active in Somalia and can be considered as violent actors since they also perpetrate
inhuman and violent actions on the population, notably torture and other degrading treatments. 462
Still a few years ago (August 2017), the Danish Demining Group’s noted that ‘clashes involving rival
clan militias remain the single most common form of armed conflict in Somalia, typically comprising

450 Hansen S.J., Al-Shabaab in Somalia - The history and ideology of a militant Islamist group 2005-2012, 2013, pp. 31-47
451 Chonka P., What you need to know to Understand al-Shabaab, 21 September 2016, url
452 Interview with French researcher intelligence officer Marc Fontrier, 1 April 2021

453 ISS, Radicalisation and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia, September 2014, url, p. 3

454

Chonka P., What you need to know to Understand al-Shabaab, 21 September 2016, url

455 ISS, Radicalisation and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia, September 2014, url, p.6; see also Menkhaus K., Non-State

Security Providers and Political Formation in Somalia, April 2016, url, p. 23
456 Chonka P., What you need to know to Understand al-Shabaab, 21 September 2016, url; see also ISS, Radicalisation and
al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia, September 2014, url, p. 6457 Prunier G., Ségmentarité et violence dans l’espace somali, 1840-1992, 1997, url, pp. 379-401
458 Van Notten, M., The Law of the Somalis: A Stable Foundation for Economic Development in the Horn of Africa, 2005, p.
64
459 ISS, Radicalisation and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia, September 2014, url, p. 7
460 Shire M. I, Dialoguing and negotiating with Al-Shabaab: the role of clan elders as insiders-partial mediators, in Journal of
Eastern African Studies, 15:1, 2021, url, pp. 1-22; ISS, Radicalisation and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia, September
2014, url
461 Interview with French researcher intelligence officer Marc Fontrier, 1 April 2021
462 USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2020 - Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 5

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35% to 40% of [the] total security incidents[s] per month’. These clashes are mainly driven by land
disputes, vendetta and resource disputes. 463
In the period 5 November 2019 – 9 February 2021, the UNSG, in its various reports on the situation in
Somalia, attributed to clan militias the following violations (sub-periods): (a) (5 November –9 February 2021) 28 civilian casualties; 33 grave violations against children; 45 verified incident ofconflict-related sexual violence; 464 (b) (5 August – 4 November 2020) 16 civilian casualties; 4.35 percent of 945 grave violations affecting children; 12 verified incidents of conflict-related sexual
violence; 465 (c) (5 May – 4 August 2020) 39 civilian casualties; 31 grave violations against children; 1
incident of conflict-related sexual violence; 466 (d) (5 February – 4 May 2020) 78 civilian casualties; 48
grave violations against children; 467 (e) (5 November 2019 – 4 February 2020) 2 per cent of the overall
civilian casualties (392) reported by UNSOM in the period; 19 incidents of conflict-related sexual
violence. 468
In its 2020 report on children and armed conflict in Somalia – covering the period 1 August 2016 –30 September 2019, the UNSG attributed to clan militias 494 verified violations against children,
including: child recruitment (169 cases); deprivation of liberty (4 cases); killing and maiming of children(158 cases), rape and sexual violence (103 cases), attacks on schools and hospitals (7 cases),
abductions (32 cases), denial of humanitarian access (25 cases). 469 The violations reported here above
are in line with those reported by UNSOM during the period 1 January 2017 – 31 December 2019. 470
Between 1 January 2017 and 31 December 2019, UNSOM and OHCHR documented 2 338 civilians
killed and 2 795 injured. 8% of these - 386 civilian casualties - were attributed to clan militias action,with following breakdown per federal member state: ‘Hirshabelle (101 – 51 killed and 50 injured),
Galmudug (83 – 44 killed and 39 injured), Somaliland (68 – 35 killed and 33 injured), and South West
State (60 – 41 killed and 19 injured)’. 471 In line with the above, throughout 2020, many battles occurredamong clans and subclans, notably for the control of land and water resources. Galmudug, Hiran,
Lower and Middle Shabelle and Sool regions appear to have been particularly affected by thephenomenon. The violence and the number of the clashes forced state and federal authorities tointervene several times between April and the end of the year. 472

463 Danish Demining Group, Dadaab Returnee Conflict Assessment, August 2017, url, p. 20
464 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 17 February 2021, url, pp. 9-10

465 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 November 2020, url, pp. 8-9
466 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 August 2020, url, pp. 8-10

467

UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 May 2020, url, pp. 7, 9

468 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 February 2020, url, pp. 8, 10

469 UNSG, Children and Armed Conflict in Somalia, 4 March 2020, url, pp. 5-12

470 UNSOM and OHCHR, Protection of Civilians Report, Building the Foundation for Peace, Security and Human Rights in

Somalia, 1 January 2017 – 31 December 2019, 2020, url, pp. 32-34
471 UNSOM and OHCHR, Protection of Civilians Report, Building the Foundation for Peace, Security and Human Rights in
Somalia, 1 January 2017 – 31 December 2019, 2020, url, pp. 1, 17
472 USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2020 - Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, pp. 3-4

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4. Al-Shabaab
4.1 Presence, territorial control, areas of influence, and outreach
Al Shabaab is an Islamist Sunni Salafi jihadist 473 armed group based in Somalia formed in the early
2000s. The group seeks to establish an Islamic caliphate state in Somalia. It has carried out attacks
across the region and had previously held sway over Mogadishu and large rural areas. However it had
been pushed out of major urban centres by military campaigns. 474 Al-Shabaab controls ‘tracts of rural
central, southern, and western Somalia’, 475 other more limited areas in other parts of the country(Galgala range in the Golis mountains in Puntland), 476 as well as portions of territory in north-eastern
Kenya (Mandera county). 477 In South-Central Somalia, their military presence often extends from therural areas to the main supply routes serving the main urban centres and their surrounding areas. 478
When these cities do not fall directly under their military control, they are often besieged by thegroup. 479 Al-Shabaab de-facto controls territory and vast portions of hinterland along the Juba and the
Shabelle valleys (Middle Juba, Lower Juba, Bay, Lower Shabelle, Middle Shabelle), 480 large coastal andhinterland swaths around Harardhere, El Dher, and El Buur in Central Somalia (Galgadud), 481 and othervast portions of territory in other regions (Hiraan, Bakool, Gedo, Mudug). 482 However, as detailed in
the section on Territorial Control/Areas of Influence about the FGS, the border between al-Shabaab
and anti-al-Shabaab controlled areas is locally ‘fluid’, 483 although overall it seems to have reached astalemate since 2015. 484 For an overview of the situation as of 30 April 2021 please see the Map
Somalia – Approximate Territorial Control (Figure 1).
Moreover, military presence and territorial control do not correspond to al-Shabaab’s area ofinfluence. As reported by the Panel of Experts on Somalia, in its latest report (September 2020), ‘AlShabaab’s control of populations extends beyond the areas in which it has a geographical presence’.
This is achieved ‘through threats and violence enacted against individuals or communities, infiltrationand control of information sources, and the manipulation of formal institutions such as the financial
sector’. 485 Felbab-Brown, a Somali security expert, corroborates this point in her latest report on
Somalia, whereby she states that ‘[a]lthough al-Shabaab has mostly not sought to enlarge the area
under its formal control, it has recently conducted offensive operations’, among others, ‘to enforce
the collection of taxes from local populations’. 486 In 2018 Hiraal Institute noted that al-Shabaab was
473 International Crisis Group, Somalia: Al-Shabaab – It Will Be a Long War, Africa Briefing no. 99, 26 June 2014, url, p. 7
474 CFR, Al-Shabaab – Backgrounder, 19 May 2021, url

475 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 120; see also International Crisis Group, Somalia’s

Current Security and Stability Status, Testimony by Dr. EJ Hogendoorn, 14 March, 2018, url; Hiraal Institute, The Evolutionof Al-Shabaab, 3 April 2018, url, p. 4
476 EASO, COI Query - Security situation in Puntland and Somaliland (January – 15 November 2019), 12 December 2019, url,
p. 7; VOA, Al-Shabab Raid on Somalia Military Base Kills Several Soldiers, 2 June 2018, url
477 ISS, Winning community trust can help rid Kenya of al-Shabaab, 28 April 2021, url; VOA, Al-Shabab Threat Rising in
Kenya's Northeast, 15 January 2021, url; Hiraal Institute, The Evolution of Al-Shabaab, 3 April 2018, url, p. 4
478 UN Security Council, Letter dated 12 October 2020 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant toresolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia addressed to the President of the Security Council, 15 October 2020, url, pp. 711; NUPI, Assessing the effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Somalia, 2018, url, pp. 32-35, 44
479 Hiraal Institute, The Evolution of Al-Shabaab, 3 April 2018, url, p. 4
480 Control/Areas of Influence Map in this report, June 2021, url
481 Saferworld, Clans, contention and consensus - Federalism and inclusion in Galmudug, June 2020, url, p. 32
482 UN Security Council, Report Somalia of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, 9 November 2018, url, p. 22, 107;
see also Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 121; and Map Somalia – Approximate
Territorial Control in this report
483 CFR, Al-Shabaab – Backgrounder, 19 May 2021, url
484 Hiraal Institute, The Evolution of Al-Shabaab, 3 April 2018, url, p. 4
485 UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, 28 September 2020, url, p. 3
486 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 121

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Country of origin information report | Somalia: Actors‘still able to collect taxes in most parts of the country, including in the areas outside its control’, 487 andthat the al-Shabaab Education Office, while using terror tactics, was ‘trying to impose its curriculumon areas outside its control […] such as in Mogadishu and Kismayo’. 488
In terms of military outreach, al-Shabaab ‘remain[s] undeterred in attacking Somali National Army and
AMISOM forces’ in the (contested) regions in South-Central Somalia, 489 while it retains operational
military capacity in Puntland and Somaliland, with presence south of Puntland as well. 490 Moreover,
it regularly conducts bomb attacks and assassinations in Mogadishu (Benadir). 491 For more details
about ‘financial’ outreach please see the section below on Taxation. In terms of ‘service’ and‘ideological’ outreach please see sections on Governance and Services and on Access to Justice.

4.2 Armed forces, the Amniyat, and modus operandi
4.2.1 The Jabahaat
In 2020, al-Shabaab ‘military wing’ 492 was estimated at 5 000 – 7 000 active combatants. 493 Known asJabahaat ('fronts' in Arabic; singular Jabha), it comprises six main Jaysh (‘army’), two special ones, areinforcement department, and a special battalion:••••

Regular Jaysh, with 700-1000 men each, are: Jubas; Gedo; Bay and Bakol; Lower Shabelle andBenadir; Middle Shabelle, Hiraan and Galgadud; and Mudug;
Special Jaysh, with about 300 men each, are: the Galgala Jaysh and the Kenya Jaysh;
The Gurmadka Dhexe, the reinforcements department/units which has another 500 men.
When AS is attacked or is about to attack, this Jabha is sent to reinforce the troops alreadydeployed in the regions.
The Saleh Nabhan Battalion or Abu ZubAyr Battalion, is a special battalion with at least another
700 men, that is designed to take the battlefield from the enemy and provide supplies. Every
Jabha contributes 100 men and technical equipment to this battalion.

Each Jabha has mine specialists, Jugta Culus (infantry small unit with stronger firepower), Fursaan(rapid reinforcements for emergency situations), medical units, as well as communications,registrations, transportation, media, and Daawa officers (whose job it is to raise the morale of alShabaab fighters). Ranks within the Jabha are as follows: Emir Majmu'a: commander of 10 men; Emir
Fasila: commander of 32 men; Emir Sariya: commander of 99-120 men; Emir Katiba: commander of
300 men; and Emir Jaysh - commander of a military region of 700-1000 men. 494

4.2.2 Amniyat
Amniyat is ‘the most powerful of all al-Shabaab’s security agencies’ and ‘the most organised, wellequipped and feared force in all of al-Shabaab’. Unlike the NISA, it is ‘structured as an institutional

487 Hiraal Institute, The Evolution of Al-Shabaab, 3 April 2018, url, p. 4488 Hiraal Institute, The Fighters Factory: Inside Al-Shabab's Education System, 15 May 2018, url, p. 4
489 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 17 February 2021, url, para. 15

490 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 121

491 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 17 February 2021, url, para. 14; see also Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias inSomalia, 2020, url, p. 121
492 Hiraal Institute, Al-Shabab's Military Machine, December 2018, url, p. 3
493 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 120
494 Hiraal Institute, Al-Shabab's Military Machine, December 2018, url, pp. 1-7

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Country of origin information report | Somalia: Actors

unit’ that does not base its existence ‘either on an individual rule or on an external patron’. 495 The
Amniyat is used in combination with the Jabahaat in the group's wider strategy of defeating the allied
forces. In particular, the Amniyaat is used to undermine local governance and enforce al-Shabaabrules in enemy territory. 496 ‘The Amniyat exploits the political power contestation within and without
the Federal Government powerholders’. 497
Amniyat’s main roles and core activities include serving as: 498
•
•

•
•

a (counter)-intelligence agency;
a special paramilitary force: carries out killings and assassinations against alleged
collaborators of the government;a justice provider: ‘it often acts outside the al-Shabaab justice system to punish alleged spies
within the movement’, including summary executions without trial in court; 499
an ideological guide: the Amniyat is responsible for the so-called Daawa, which is meant toserve al-Shabaab’s ideological mission. 500 The Amniyat works as the main tool to maintain
unity within the movement and to discipline its fighters. 501 More in general, it addresses theSomali society at large: as reported by International Crisis Group in 2014, before any
specialised military training takes place, potential al-Shabaab members undergo at least six
months ‘orientation'. The same applies to traditional Quranic schools (dugsi) that have been
upgraded to formal madrasas, especially in rural areas. 502

4.2.3 Modus operandi and tactics
As detailed in a recent Hiraal Institute’s report (2020), ‘the regional Jabahaat are used to maintainsieges on population centres that fall to the allied forces by manning checkpoints, laying ambushes,and conducting harassment raids on allied bases’. Reportedly the main aim would be ‘to keep theallies on edge for as long as possible in order to wear them out when the real attack by the special
battalion is launched’. 503
Within this context, al-Shabaab relies on a range of attack’s types. In the period 5 November 2020 – 9
February 2021 there were in average about 140 incidents per month, as per UN data. 504 The average
number of incidents was 64 per month during the first half of 2020 as per Hiraal Institute data. 505
Attacks’ types are: 506

495 Ingiriis M. H., Insurgency and international extraversion in Somalia: the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA)

and Al-Shabaab's Amniyat, African Security Review, 28 July 2020, url, p. 128
496 Hiraal Institute, Al-Shabab's Military Machine, December 2018, url, p. 3
497 Ingiriis M. H., Insurgency and international extraversion in Somalia: the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA)
and Al-Shabaab's Amniyat, African Security Review, 28 July 2020, url, p. 132
498 Ingiriis M. H., Insurgency and international extraversion in Somalia: the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA)
and Al-Shabaab's Amniyat, African Security Review, 28 July 2020, url, p. 129
499 Ingiriis M. H., Insurgency and international extraversion in Somalia: the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA)
and Al-Shabaab's Amniyat, African Security Review, 28 July 2020, url, p. 129
500 International Crisis Group, Somalia: Al-Shabaab – It Will Be a Long War, Africa Briefing no. 99, 26 June 2014, url, pp. 1718
501 Ingiriis M. H., Insurgency and international extraversion in Somalia: the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA)
and Al-Shabaab's Amniyat, African Security Review, 28 July 2020, url, p. 129
502 International Crisis Group, Somalia: Al-Shabaab – It Will Be a Long War, Africa Briefing no. 99, 26 June 2014, url, p. 12503 Hiraal Institute, Al-Shabab's Military Machine, December 2018, url, p. 3
504 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 17 February 2021, url, para. 15
505 Hiraal Institute, Semi-annual Somalia Security Report 2020, 16 July 2020, url, p. 5
506 UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, 28 September 2020, url, para. 44-46, 51; see also Hiraal
Institute, Semi-annual Somalia Security Report 2020, 16 July 2020, url, pp. 1-6; UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 17 February
2021, url, para. 15

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•
•

•
•
•
•

raids or hit-and-run attacks. They remain the main source of incidents, many of which involve
brief exchanges of heavy gunfire; 507
use of improvised explosive devices (IED, S/VBIED). Improvised explosive devices continue tobe al-Shabaab’s most used type of attack/weapon. At the same time there has been a decreasein vehicle-borne improvised explosive device incidents while person-borne improvised
explosive devices or suicide vests remain a concern; 508
large-scale complex attacks; 509
mortar attacks. Many of these targeted the Aden Adde International Airport complex in
Mogadishu, the launching areas being assessed to be located in the Wadajir district ofMogadishu; 510
assassinations; 511
hand grenades. 512

As reported by the Hiraal Institute raids, IED explosions, and assassinations account for more than
80% of the total attacks in the first half of 2020, each one of them for about one third of thispercentage. 513
In terms of targets, the Hiraal Institute reports that ‘the group's main target continues to be the SNA
and AMISOM. Its second priority is the Somali police force and civil servants working for the FGS andthe FMS’. Among the FMS, reportedly the main focus is Jubbaland, where al-Shabaab increased its
attacks, ‘trying to capitalise on that FMS's worsening relations with the FGS and Ethiopia.’ 514

4.3 Governance and services, taxation, and infiltration
4.3.1 Governance and services
As reported by International Crisis Group, at the peak of its territorial control, ‘Al-Shabaab establisheda relatively devolved Islamic government, along the lines laid out by Islamic scripture, with functional
maktab (ministries) and wilayaad (regional administration)’. 515 According to the International Crisis
Group, the theological administration of Al Shabaab’s ‘prioritisation of Sharia implementation isdifficult for [federal] governments to compete against, not least because of the disciplined armed
following it can call on to enforce judgements’ as a ‘basic but functioning alternative’ to the
Mogadishu-based governments described as weak. 516 Reportedly, in 2014 al-Shabaab maintained thefollowing ministries operational: the interior ministry; social issues and regional affairs (arimaha
bulshada iyo siyaasada gobolada); information (iclamka/warfafinta), including the Al-Kataib mediaarm; and justice (qadha), with judges in each region. Internal committees oversaw importantfunctions such as zakat (alms) collection (lujnah zakawaat) and humanitarian response (lujnah
iqaathah). 517

507 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 17 February 2021, url, para. 15

508 UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, 28 September 2020, url, para. 44-46
509 UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, 28 September 2020, url, para. 48-50
510 UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, 28 September 2020, url, para. 51
511 Hiraal Institute, Semi-annual Somalia Security Report 2020, 16 July 2020, url, pp. 1-6
512 Hiraal Institute, Semi-annual Somalia Security Report 2020, 16 July 2020, url, pp. 1-6
513 Hiraal Institute, Semi-annual Somalia Security Report 2020, 16 July 2020, url, pp. 4-5
514 Hiraal Institute, Semi-annual Somalia Security Report 2020, 16 July 2020, url, p. 9515 International Crisis Group, Somalia: Al-Shabaab – It Will Be a Long War, Africa Briefing no. 99, 26 June 2014, url, p. 11
516 International Crisis Group, Somalia: Al-Shabaab – It Will Be a Long War, Africa Briefing no. 99, 26 June 2014, url, p. 7

517 International Crisis Group, Somalia: Al-Shabaab – It Will Be a Long War, Africa Briefing no. 99, 26 June 2014, url, pp. 11,

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Al-Shabaab’s governing council, the Shura, 518 or Executive Council, 519 is assisted at regional and local
level by local shura councils: ‘when establishing its presence, Al-Shabaab […] establishes a local Shuraof clan elders that it purports to consult; however the group, or specifically the emir, maintains theprerogative to overrule the Shura if necessary’. 520 From a governance point of view, the group’s usual
local structures comprise regional governors (emirul wilayaad), and, at local district level, that of ‘emir,hasba (moral police), Amniyat (internal intelligence agency) and Shura’. 521 Basically clan elders are
employed at district and regional level, and they are organised hierarchically across the 10 Somali
regions in which al-Shabaab has an administrative presence: one elder is the head of all elders in eachregion, and one elder is the head of all regional elders. 522
Although essentially all Somali clan families are represented within al-Shabaab, the Hiraal Institute
pointed out in 2018 that ‘still reflecting the clan make-up of the original founders, only a select numberof clans are represented in the group's top leadership’. Reportedly the Hawiye clan members
dominate the Executive Council (50%), the 220 al-Shabaab officials holding positions in every
department and at every administrative level (district, regional, ‘national, 43% overall), the Amniyat
top 27 officials (56%), and the 54 top Jabha officials (57%). 523
In relation to involvement in schooling, source write:•

education: as reported by the Hiraal Institute, ‘Al-Shabaab has a dual education system’: 524(1) On the one hand the Islamic Institutes system, ‘which is mandatory and is used to create
a pool of new recruits to the group’. These schools are based on clan boundaries: clans areallocated quotas of children aged 8-15 that they have to hand over to Al-Shabaab for
education, which is paid by the clan. In these school children ‘are indoctrinated […] and madeto understand current affairs through a Jihadi worldview’. After graduating, which mostchildren do within two years, many are sent directly to a (military) training camp (if they
have passed age 15, the Islamic age of maturity). Within this context, if elders refuse tocollaborate with AS or delay the process they are imprisoned, according to defectors.
Similarly, parents trying to protect their children from this system have resorted to‘desperate measures’, including buying children from poorer clans, thus ensuing a form ofchild trade. 525(2) On the other hand, the regular school system, which is optional. These schools can beattended by students belonging to those clans that have provided the allocated number ofchildren to the AS recruitment schools. These schools teach an AS-designed syllabus. While
Islamic schools ‘sometimes “steal” promising students from the regular AS schools byoffering them a fast-track system’, parents, to avoid all this, tend ‘to send their children to
government areas to pursue education’. Most of these sent-away kids are boys, howeveralso girls whom are feared to be about to be married to an AS man ‘are also sent to otherregions of the Somali World’. 526(3) Finally, the group also has a ‘bush university that produces jurists and Islamic clerics who
spread and reaffirm AS ideology’. 527•

military recruitment and training;

518 UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, 28 September 2020, url, para. 3519 Hiraal Institute, Taming the Clans: Al-Shabab's Clan Politics, 31 May 2018, url, p. 1

520 International Crisis Group, Somalia: Al-Shabaab – It Will Be a Long War, Africa Briefing no. 99, 26 June 2014, url, p. 7

521 International Crisis Group, Somalia: Al-Shabaab – It Will Be a Long War, Africa Briefing no. 99, 26 June 2014, url, p. 12522 Hiraal Institute, Taming the Clans: Al-Shabab's Clan Politics, 31 May 2018, url, p. 3

523 Hiraal Institute, Taming the Clans: Al-Shabab's Clan Politics, 31 May 2018, url, pp. 1-3

524 Hiraal Institute, The Fighters Factory: Inside Al-Shabab's Education System, 15 May 2018, url, p. 2

525 Hiraal Institute, The Fighters Factory: Inside Al-Shabab's Education System, 15 May 2018, url, pp. 2, 2-3
526 Hiraal Institute, The Fighters Factory: Inside Al-Shabab's Education System, 15 May 2018, url, p. 3
527 Hiraal Institute, The Fighters Factory: Inside Al-Shabab's Education System, 15 May 2018, url, p. 2

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fiscal system: see below the section on Taxation for details;
justice: the administration of justice, see section on Access to and administration of justice fordetails.

4.3.2 Taxation
The Panel of Experts on Somalia reports (September 2020) that ‘Al-Shabaab employs a diversified“taxation” system across southern and central Somalia, dividing the territory into 10 distinct regionsof revenue collection’, and that the revenues collected in each of these 10 regions ‘are directed to acentralized location near the al-Shabaab controlled town of Jilib, Lower Juba region’. 528 Whilecorroborating this, the Hiraal Institute, in a report on al-Shabaab financial system (2018), indicatesthat the group has ‘two main departments that collect taxes from the public: the Zakawaat Office andthe Finance Office. The former is tasked with collecting non-monetary taxes such as livestock and farm
produce, while the latter collects all monetary taxes.’ 529
In practice al-Shabaab derives its funding from a number of sources: 530
•

•

•
•
•

checkpoints taxation: Al-Shabaab operates multiple checkpoints across main supply routes insouthern and central Somalia; 531 Al-Shabaab usually charges a one-time payment and issues a
receipt that secures travel through the group’s territory (safe passage); 532 within this context
a major source of income is the taxation of cargo trucks;
business extortion: Al-Shabaab ‘keeps a list of business owners and an estimate of theirworth’. 533 For instance, business entities in Kismayo are required to pay Al -Shabaab a monthly
remittance regardless of the commodity sold (between USD 300 and USD 600 depending on
the size of the company); 534 reportedly Al-Shabaab’s operatives ‘are active’ in major cities
across Somalia, also outside Al-Shabaab controlled areas: among others, they are present ‘inalmost all areas of Mogadishu, including the Villa Somalia neighbourhood; most of Bosassoand Jowhar; and, to a lesser extent, much of Baidoa and Kismayo’; 535
imports taxation at major seaports: importing companies are reportedly charged USD 4 per
tonne of imported goods. Al-Shabaab has infiltrated, among others, Mogadishu and Kismayo
ports; 536
real estate companies, including land and development sales; 537
livestock, agricultural produce and irrigation taxes: as Hiraal Institute reported already in
2018, the ‘Zakawaat is collected by troops mobilised from different AS departments, assisted
by clan elders […]. The starting rate is one camel out of every 25 camels owned and one goatout of every 40 goats’.538 Farmers under Al-Shabaab controlled areas are taxed at harvest time(about 10%), 539 and again upon selling. They are not allowed to use rivers and their canals
unless they pay special taxes for irrigation of farms; 540

528 UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, 28 September 2020, url, para. 3529 Hiraal Institute, The AS Finance System, July 2018, url, p. 1

530 UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, 28 September 2020, url, pp. 7-13; Hiraal Institute, A

Losing Game, Countering Al-Shabaab Financial System, October 2020, url, pp. 1-11; Hiraal Institute, The AS Finance System,
July 2018, url, pp. 1-8
531 UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, 28 September 2020, url, para. 9532 Hiraal Institute, A Losing Game, Countering Al-Shabaab Financial System, October 2020, url, pp. 3, 7
533 Hiraal Institute, The AS Finance System, July 2018, url, pp. 2-3
534 UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, 28 September 2020, url, para. 11535 Hiraal Institute, A Losing Game, Countering Al-Shabaab Financial System, October 2020, url, p. 2
536 UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, 28 September 2020, url, para. 11-13
537 Hiraal Institute, A Losing Game, Countering Al-Shabaab Financial System, October 2020, url, p. 5
538 Hiraal Institute, The AS Finance System, July 2018, url, p. 1
539 Hiraal Institute, The AS Finance System, July 2018, url, pp. 1-2
540 Hiraal Institute, A Losing Game, Countering Al-Shabaab Financial System, October 2020, url, p. 3

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Country of origin information report | Somalia: Actors•••

Zakat collection: Zakat is the annual religious obligation to pay a specific percentage of aperson’s wealth to the poor. Zakat is usually levied at an annual rate of 2.5 per cent of the net
wealth of an individual or business; traders and business owners based outside Al-Shabaab’s
controlled territory must also pay the Zakat. 541
Infaaq: used to raise emergency funds when the local Al-Shabaab government is short incash; 542
government officials. Reportedly, government officials, including top commanders of the SNA,
as well as government contractors, pay taxes or leave part of their salaries to the group ‘so as
not to be targeted by the group’. 543

This taxation system is underpinned by intimidation, fears over business continuity and personalsafety, and violence in the case of non-compliance. 544 As stated by the Hiraal Institute ‘the tax
collection by AS is enabled by little or no security protection afforded to businessmen in much of
the country.’ 545
Al-Shabaab runs multiple bank accounts and relies on a web of formal domestic banking systems tofacilitate the storage and onward transfer of its funds. 546 Various sources agree that al-Shabaab runs
a considerable budgetary surplus. 547 The UN Panel of Experts on Somalia, indicates that in 2019, alShabaab’s annual operational expenditure was approximately USD 21 million, with USD 16.5 million
allocated to Al -Shabaab’s military and logistical support units (of these, 40 % of the funds wereallocated to the purchase of weapons and ammunition), while USD 4.9 million was allocated to the Al-Shabaab intelligence arm, the Amniyat. 548 By contrast, the Hiraal Institute estimates, conservatively,that ‘the monthly tax collected by the group amount to at least $15M, more than half of which comesfrom Mogadishu’. 549

4.3.3 Infiltration
Reportedly, al-Shabaab ‘has penetrated both the government and the security forces’. 550 Already in2014 International Crisis Group stated that, although al-Shabaab had to be faced militarily, as amovement it was a much deeper social phenomenon: ‘even as it takes conventional losses, especiallyof territory, it apparently continues to infiltrate all walks and stations of Somali life, including some
SFG agencies.’ 551 Corroborated by many other sources, 552 this point has been put forward also withregards to the NISA: ‘Through NISA’s clannism and cronyism, al-Shabaab infiltrates the government
intelligence agency by sending trained informers who share (sub)clan genealogies with the541 Hiraal Institute, The AS Finance System, July 2018, url, pp. 2, 4

542 Hiraal Institute, Taming the Clans: Al-Shabab's Clan Politics, 31 May 2018, url, p. 3; Hiraal Institute, The AS Finance

System, July 2018, url, p. 5
543 Hiraal Institute, A Losing Game, Countering Al-Shabaab Financial System, October 2020, url, pp. 6-7;
544 UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, 28 September 2020, url, para. 4, 12; see also Hiraal
Institute, A Losing Game, Countering Al-Shabaab Financial System, October 2020, url, pp. 1, 5-6
545 Hiraal Institute, A Losing Game, Countering Al-Shabaab Financial System, October 2020, url, p. 2
546 UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, 28 September 2020, url, para. 4, 23
547 Hiraal Institute, A Losing Game, Countering Al-Shabaab Financial System, October 2020, url, p. 1; UN Security Council,
Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, 28 September 2020, url, para. 32
548 UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, 28 September 2020, url, para. 31
549 Hiraal Institute, A Losing Game, Countering Al-Shabaab Financial System, October 2020, url, p. 5
550
Finland, Finnish immigration Service, Somalia Fact-Finding Mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation andhumanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, url, p. 13
551
International Crisis Group, Somalia: Al-Shabaab – It Will Be a Long War, Africa Briefing no. 99, 26 June 2014, url, p. 12
552
VOA, Somalia Assesses Al-Shabab Moles' Infiltration of Government, 15 August 2019, url; Harper M., Everything you
have told me is true – The many faces of Al-Shabaab, 2019; Maruf H. and Joseph D., Inside Al-Shabaab - The Secret History
of Al-Qaeda’s Most Powerful Ally, 2018; Keating M. and Waldman M., eds., War and Peace in Somalia – National
Grievances, Local Conflict and Al-Shabaab, 201864

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authorities’; and ‘whereas it is not easy to find a government informer in the midst of the Amniyat, it
is not that difficult to find an al-Shabaab informer inside NISA’. 553

4.4 Access to justice under Al-Shabaab
As reported by USAID in 2020 slowness, ‘corruption, inadequate education among judges and ulama,
the lack of enforcement capacity among ulama and elders, and the lack of equipment opens up space
for alternative justice providers, first and foremost Al Shabaab’. 554 This is also reported by a recent
HIPS report (2021) that indicates that ‘[f]or years, it was a well-established fact that many people inSomalia who live in government or state-controlled territory seek justice by going to Shariah law
courts run by the militant group al-Shabaab’. 555
Al-Shabaab follows the Hanbali madhab, based on which Islamic texts (Qur’an and Sunnah) should beread literally and do not require further enunciation. This interpretation does not accept jurist
discretion. 556 Al-Shabaab’s justice system consists of: 557
•
•
•
•
•

Deegaan courts, local court for the respective area, village, or district. Each one of themconsists of 2–4 judges, usually from the local area;
Regional courts;
Mobile courts;
Appeals Court located in Lower Shabelle;Special Court called Radul Madaalim. This deals with cases involving prominent individuals,
groups, or clans.

Reportedly, al-Shabaab courts are predominantly located in Baidoa and Afgoye. 558 ‘In Mogadishu
there are Al-Shabaab courts in Heliwaa, one in Daynile, one in Bakara, at Arbacow area of KM 13, andEelasha Biyaha’. 559 One of the main reasons behind the population’s gravitation to al-Shabaab’s
administration of justice is its ability to enforce decisions and render these in a transparent, timely,
and legitimate manner. 560 These decisions are based on shari’ah, which is widely held by the
population as the basis of law and justice. 561 Within this context, Somali public persons, ‘up to a
general of the Somali National Army’, as well as USAID’s research interviewees, state that they prefer
Al Shabaab courts when it comes to land disputes.562 This point is supported, among others, by the
HIPS recent study, whereby it is stated that the majority of cases dealt by al-Shabaab courts are civil
and, among these, mostly related to land or business disputes. 563

553 Ingiriis M. H., Insurgency and international extraversion in Somalia: the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA)

and Al-Shabaab's Amniyat, African Security Review, 28 July 2020, url, p. 131
554 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, p. 25; see also Muibu D., Justice andTerror – Al-Shabaab’s Informal Justice Mechanism, 5 January 2019, url
555 HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, p. 26
556 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, pp. 6-7
557 Expanding Access to Justice Program, Pathways and Institutions for Resolving Land Disputes in Mogadishu, January
2020, url, p. 17
558 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, pp. 25-26
559 Expanding Access to Justice Program, Pathways and Institutions for Resolving Land Disputes in Mogadishu, January
2020, url, p. 17
560 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, pp. 25, 27. See also Muibu D., Justiceand Terror – Al-Shabaab’s Informal Justice Mechanism, 5 January 2019, url; Kluijver R., Al-Shabaab Governance, 10 July
2019, url
561 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, p. 27; Expanding Access to Justice
Program, Pathways and Institutions for Resolving Land Disputes in Mogadishu, January 2020, url, p. 17
562 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, p. 25
563 HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, p. 27

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There is no functional formal judicial system in al-Shabaab controlled areas. 564 Those who live underpermanent al-Shabaab control use their court system and enforce their decisions with intimidationand threats, even in areas they do not control and those who lose their cases are ‘ordered to abide by
the outcome of a divine order, or just the full force of al-Shabaab’. 565 Al-Shabaab ‘interprets andimplements shari’ah in its strictest form’, according to the Hanbali reading, which is not so widely
supported by the local communities. Furthermore, ‘in all territories controlled by Al Shabaab, shari’ah
is not only implemented strictly, but violently: stoning for adultery, hand amputation for theft,
detentions and floggings for other deviations or transgressions’.566 Corporal punishments for the socalled Hadd crimes (‘violations of God’s limits’) in case of theft, banditry, unlawful sexual intercourse,
alcohol consumption and drug abuse (punished with lashing), as well as drug dealing (punished withlashing) and espionage (punished with shooting) make ‘the legal reality under al-Shabaab’s regime far
more brutal than under most other Islamic inspired regimes in the contemporary Muslim world’. 567
Moreover, al-Shabaab administration of justice is not always popular among women as women; andmilitants use a ‘narrow interpretation of shari’ah law’ 568: ‘Al-Shabaab limits women’s rights andmovement in public in a severe manner. Women are forced to adhere to a specific dress code and beaccompanied by a male guardian; they cannot engage in commerce if they would be in contact withmen, and further restrictions’. Finally, ‘the group also enforces a strict gender division in public
transportation and in public interactions’. 569
In general, those living in non-al-Shabaab controlled areas ‘never choose’ al-Shabaab’s courts as thefirst stop for resolving matters; instead, their courts operate like appeals courts. Within this context,
regarding the use of Al Shabaab courts: ‘this phenomenon became so brazenly common’ that
Somalia’s chief justice, Bashe Yusuf Ahmed, warned citizens who lost their cases not to seek justice inthese courts. 570
Other Offences and Detention. Al-Shabaab keeps persons in detention in areas under its control inthe southern and central regions. Reportedly, detainees are held ‘under inhuman conditions for
relatively minor offenses’, including ‘smoking, having illicit content on cell phones, listening to music,
watching or playing soccer, wearing a brassiere, or not wearing a hijab’. In general, prison conditions
under al-Shabaab, and where traditional authorities control detention, are often harsh and lifethreatening. 571

4.5 Overview of abuses
USDOS indicated in its 2020 report on human rights practices in Somalia that the 2020 conflict,involving the government, militias, and al-Shabaab ‘resulted in death, injury, and displacement ofcivilians’. Within this context ‘Al-Shabaab committed the majority of severe human rights abuses,
particularly terrorist attacks on civilians and targeted killings, including extrajudicial and politicallymotivated killings’ as well as disappearances. Moreover, al-Shabaab was responsible for inhuman anddegrading punishments, rapes and conflict-related sexual violence, attacks on employees of
nongovernmental organizations and the United Nations. Finally, ‘Al-Shabaab also blocked
humanitarian assistance, conscripted child soldiers, and restricted freedoms of speech, press,
564 USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2020 - Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 11565 HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, p. 27
566 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, p. 27

567 Skjelderup M., Punishment on Stage: Application of Islamic Criminal Law by Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, Master

Thesis, Autumn 2011, url, pp. III, 59-80

568 Kluijver R., Al-Shabaab Governance, 10 July 2019, url

569 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, p. 27

570 Expanding Access to Justice Program, Pathways and Institutions for Resolving Land Disputes in Mogadishu, January

2020, url, p. 17; HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January
2021, url, pp. 26-27
571 USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2020 - Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 7

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assembly, and movement’. 572 Against this backdrop, the UNSG, in its latest report on children andarmed conflict (2020) underlines ‘the devastating situation’ of children affected by armed conflict inSomalia. Among others they are affected by recruitment, use, abduction, rape and other forms ofsexual violence ‘exceeding the numbers verified in other conflict situations’ and ‘with Al-Shabaab as
the main perpetrator’. 573
In the period 5 November 2019 – 9 February 2021, the UNSG, in its various reports on the situation in
Somalia, attributed to al-Shabaab the following violations (sub-periods): (a) 144 civilian casualties, 774
grave violations against children, including abduction, killing/maiming, recruitment and use, rape andsexual violence (5 November 2020 – 9 February 2021); 574 (b) 163 civilian casualties, 54 civilians
abducted, 74.3 per cent of 945 grave violations against children, including abduction, killing/maiming,
recruitment and use, rape and sexual violence (5 August – 4 November 2020); 575 (c) 132 civilian
casualties, 320 grave violations against children, including abduction, killing/maiming, recruitment
and use, one incident of conflict-related sexual violence (5 May – 4 August 2020); 576 (d) 75 civilian
casualties, 526 grave violations against children, including abduction, killing/maiming, recruitment
and use, and sexual violence (5 February – 4 May 2020); 577 (e) (83 per cent of 392 civilian casualties,
275 grave violations against children, including abduction, killing/maiming, recruitment and use, rapeand sexual violence 5 November 2019 – 4 February 2020). 578
In its 2020 report on children and armed conflict in Somalia – covering the period 1 August 2016 –30 September 2019, the UNSG attributed to al-Shabaab more than 10 000 violations against children,
including child recruitment (4 910 cases), killing, maiming and executing of children (953 cases), rapeand sexual violence (157 cases), attacks on schools and hospitals (194 cases), abductions (4 376 cases),denial of humanitarian access (82 cases). 579 The violations reported here above are in line with thosereported by UNSOM during the period 1 January 2017 – 31 December 2019. 580

5. AMISOM and AFRICOM
5.1 AMISOMThe African Union Mission in Africa (AMISOM) is a ‘multidimensional and multinational peace support
operation with nearly 20 000 forces on the ground’. 581 AMISOM has been supporting Somalia’s
transition to restoring a state presence since 2007. 582 Security Council Resolution 2568 (2021)‘authorise[s] the Member States of the African Union to maintain the deployment of 19,626
uniformed AMISOM personnel until 31 December 2021, inclusive of a minimum of 1,040 AMISOM

572 USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2020 - Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 2
573 UNSG, Children and Armed Conflict in Somalia, 4 March 2020, url, para. 2
574 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 17 February 2021, url, para. 44, 50

575 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 November 2020, url, para. 39, 41, 45
576 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 August 2020, url, para. 49, 55-56, 58
577 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 May 2020, url, pp. 8-10

578 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 February 2020, url, pp. 7-9

579 UNSG, Children and Armed Conflict in Somalia, 4 March 2020, url, para. 18, 19, 37, 43, 56

580 UNSOM and OHCHR, Protection of Civilians Report, Building the Foundation for Peace, Security and Human Rights in

Somalia, 1 January 2017 – 31 December 2019, 2020, url, pp. 32-34

581 ISS, Regional conflicts add to Somalia’s security concerns, 15 December 2020, url

582 ISS, Regional conflicts add to Somalia’s security concerns, 15 December 2020, url; see also AMISOM, AMISOM Mandate,n.d., url67

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Actors

police personnel including five Formed Police Units’. The support staff comprises as well ‘70 AMISOM
civilian personnel supported by the UN Support Office in Somalia’. 583
According to UN Security Council Resolution no. 2568, AMISOM is tasked with three strategic
objectives:•••‘Reduce the threat posed by Al Shabaab and armed opposition groups with a view to enablinga stable, federal, sovereign and united Somalia’;‘Support actively the transfer of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the SSF by helping
to build the capacity of the SSF’ (see to this regard the Somali-led Transition Plan mentioned
under the SNA, and the plan’s setbacks) 584;
‘Assist the FGS, FMS and SSF in providing security for the political process at all levels’. 585

Against this backdrop, AMISOM is supported by the United Nation. They provide logistical support
package - through UNSOS (United Nations Support Office in Somalia) - to UNSOM, AMISOM uniformed
personnel as well as 70 AMISOM civilians, and ‘to 13,900 SSF, including an appropriate share of thestate and federal police’. 586
AMISOM’s components:•••

police (1 040 staff): ‘has the mandate to train, mentor, monitor and advice the Somali Police
Force (SPF) with the aim of transforming it into a credible and effective organisation adhering
to strict international standards’; 587
military (about 18 500 staff): engaged with reducing the threat posed by Al Shabaab and otherarmed opposition groups, this component provides protection to the country’s Federal
Institutions ‘helps secure Somalia’s key infrastructure including its airports and seaports’; 588
civilian (70 staff): the civilian component comprises five branches, namely: (1) Mission Support,(2) Political Processes, (3) Stabilisation and Early Recovery, (4) Protection, Human Rights andGender, as well as (5) Security Sector Reform.

AMISOM is also engaged with humanitarian activities (hospitals, food and medicine distribution,
infrastructures), 589 as per its mandate: it ‘[c]ontributes towards securing and maintaining main supply
routes in collaboration with the SSF, including to areas recovered from Al Shabaab’ and more inparticular ‘supply routes essential to improving the humanitarian situation, which may includecommercial goods essential to meeting the basic needs of civilians, those critical for logistical support
to AMISOM, and routes that support the delivery of the STP’. 590

5.1.1 Strength and regional presence
AMISOM relies on contingents from troops-contributing countries (TCC). Each one of these countries
has been assigned different sectors (two maritime and six land sectors, the latter corresponding
basically to Somali regions) in South-Central Somalia, where AMISOM’s activities are focused. Below

583 UN Security Council, Resolution no. 2568, 12 March 2021, url, p. 5

584 ISS, AMISOM should provide more than security in Somalia, 25 February 2021, url
585 UN Security Council, Resolution no. 2568, 12 March 2021, url, pp. 5-6
586 UN Security Council, Resolution no. 2568, 12 March 2021, url, p. 8
587 AMISOM, AMISOM Police, n.d., url

588 AMISOM, AMISOM Military Component, n.d., url

589 Xinhua, AMISOM soldiers intensify humanitarian activities in Somalia, 5 June 2019, url; see also AMISOM, AMISOM

Humanitarian Work, n.d., url
590 UN Security Council, Resolution no. 2568, 12 March 2021, url, p. 6

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a breakdown of the estimated maximum contribution (contingents) per country, de facto presence atthe end of 2019, and sectors assigned to them: 591
•
•
•
•
•

Uganda: 6 200 troops, de facto 5 759, leads in Sector 1: Benadir (Mogadishu) and Lower
Shabelle;
Burundi: 5 400 troops, de facto 3 920, leads in Sector 5: Middle Shabelle;
Ethiopia: 4 400 troops, de facto 4 123, leads in Sector 3: Bay, Bakol, Gedo; and Sector 4;
Kenya: 4 300 troops, de facto 3 856, leads in Sector 2: Lower Juba, Middle Juba; and Sector 6:
Kismayo;Djibouti: 1 800 troops, de facto 1 784, deployed in Sector 4: Hiraan, Galgadud.

As to the police component, AMISOM comprises (as of 2018):••

233 Individual Police Officers (from Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Zambia),
located in Mogadishu, Kismayo, Baidoa, Jowhar, and Beledweyne;
480 officers in three Formed Police Units located in Mogadishu (Uganda, Nigeria), Kismayo(Sierra Leone), and Baidoa (Uganda). 592

AMISOM aviation unit, under the command and control of the Force Commander, comprises a crewof 140 personnel and 7 military aircrafts (including 4 helicopters) out of the 12 authorized for
AMISOM. 593

5.1.2 Activities and capacity
Within each Sector AMISOM clusters its activities around Forward Operating Bases (FOBs), which are
strategically important for organising and launching military operations. 594 Some FOBs are located inurban centres and along supply routes, while others fall in more remote areas. 595 According to amilitary expert with strong focus on Somalia, as of April 2021 the number of FOBs is about 77 (the highpoint was about 87). 596 FOBs are strategically important in the fight against al-Shabaab, and they arein turn a frequent target of al-Shabaab attacks. 597
AMISOM, since its inception in 2007, has achieved several objectives, including:(a) facilitated the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from Mogadishu;(b) protection of two Transitional Federal Governments and currently of the FGS;(c) reduced the areas under al-Shabaab direct control, including Mogadishu, and other several
dozen urban centres or settlements in South-Central Somalia, such as Kismayo, Baidoa, and more
recently Janale 598 (for an overview of control territory/areas under SNA/AMISOM’s and allied

591 NUPI, Assessing the effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Somalia, 2018, url, pp. 18, 56; see also AMISOM,

AMISOM Military Component, n.d., url; UNSOM and OHCHR, Protection of Civilians Report, Building the Foundation for
Peace, Security and Human Rights in Somalia, 1 January 2017 – 31 December 2019, 2020, url, p. 26
592 NUPI, Assessing the effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Somalia, 2018, url, p. 62
593 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 17 February 2021, url, para. 78
594 NUPI, Assessing the effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Somalia, 2018, url, pp. 14, 34, 67, 101; see also
Williams P.D., Lessons for “Partnership Peacekeeping” from the African Union Mission in Somalia, October 2019, url, pp.
11-13
595 NUPI, Assessing the effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Somalia, 2018, url, pp. 14, 60; see also Sahan, The
Somali Wire, Issues Jan-April 2021, n.d., source requiring registration
596 Military Expert, email, 10 March 2021
597 NUPI, Assessing the effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Somalia, 2018, url, pp. 14, 34, 37, 67, 101
598 UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, 28 September 2020, url, pp. 15, 24

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forces influence in Somalia, please see the Map Somalia – Approximate Territorial Control (Figure1) and section 2.2 Territorial Control/Areas of Influence);(d) helped to facilitate the establishment of South-Central Somalia’s new regional administrations:Jubbaland (2013), South West (2014), Galmudug (2015), and Hirshabelle (2016);(e) secured two (s)election processes (2012, 2017);(f) provided security to the international diplomatic and humanitarian communities in order forthem to operate out of Mogadishu and across South-Central Somalia. 599
AMISOM’s effectiveness is impacted by a number of issues, such as:
•

•
•

•
•

•

•

mandate. Unlike almost any UN peacekeeping operations, AMISOM was not given an explicit
mandate for the protection of civilians. More recently though, both the UN Security Counciland AU Peace and Security Council ‘have urged AMISOM to do what it can to track and reduce
civilian harm, including from its own activities’. However, as P.D Williams, a renowned
AMISOM expert, puts it ‘a small, under-resourced force that is unable to protect itself is hardly
in a position to proactively protect civilians’; 600
resources and capabilities. Reportedly AMISOM lacks the resources and the capabilities ‘todestroy al-Shabaab’s combat capabilities’. 601 It is focused ‘on containing, disrupting anddegrading al-Shabaab’ rather than engaging in effective offensive operations; 602
holding new territories and the establishment of local police forces/administrations. In thisarea, AMISOM lacks the necessary tools to stabilise the territory and protect populations
effectively. ‘Most importantly, it has lacked an effective and legitimate set of host state
partners to govern the areas recovered from al-Shabaab and deliver a real peace dividend to
the populations there’; 603
coordination of various forces/contingents. The mission struggles ‘to be more than the sum of
its national parts. This was due to a lack of unified command and control between its force
headquarters and the troop-contributing countries’; 604
low level of trust with the SNA and local forces. Low levels of trust between AMISOM and the
SNA, and the latter’s limited capabilities, have severely impacted on AMISOM’s exit strategy,
the reconfiguration of its forces, as well as the dismantling and transfer of FOBs to the
responsibility of the SNA; 605
regional dynamics and other international actors. AMISOM’s areas of operation has been thetheatre as well of other parallel operations conducted independently by Kenya, Ethiopia andthe US, 606 often playing instrumentally into regional power dynamics and the relationshipbetween the FGS and the FMS; 607
divisive Local Politics: Somalia’s Federal Government and the regional administrations argue
over the details of the new national security architecture (2017), thus preventing AMISOM
from implementing it properly, and thus affecting in turn the work and the effectiveness of
AMISOM.608

599 Williams P.D., The Positive Impacts and Challenges Facing the African Union Mission in Somalia, 3 December 2019, url

600 Williams P.D., Lessons for “Partnership Peacekeeping” from the African Union Mission in Somalia, October 2019, url, p.

7

601 NUPI, Assessing the effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Somalia, 2018, url, p. 78
602 NUPI, Assessing the effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Somalia, 2018, url, p. 78
603 NUPI, Assessing the effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Somalia, 2018, url, p. 86

604 Williams P.D., The Positive Impacts and Challenges Facing the African Union Mission in Somalia, 3 December 2019, url

605 Williams P.D., Lessons for “Partnership Peacekeeping” from the African Union Mission in Somalia, October 2019, url, p.

13

606 NUPI, Assessing the effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Somalia, 2018, url, pp. 40-41
607 Global Risk Insights, Somalia – A Triple Threat to Instability?, 20 January 2021, url

608 Williams P.D., Lessons for “Partnership Peacekeeping” from the African Union Mission in Somalia, October 2019, url, p.

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Operational Impact. Attacks on al-Shabaab are mostly conducted by AFRICOM (airstrikes) and special
operations attacks by the Danab and Gorgor brigades. In the period January – June 2020, ‘although it
was the second most-targeted entity by al-Shabaab, AMISOM was the least active in initiating attacks
against the group’. 609

5.1.3 AMISOM’s human rights conduct
AMISOM overall conduct with respect to international humanitarian law and human rights law
standards has improved in the last few years according to UN reports. 610 Harm to civilians, including
through indirect fire, allegations of sexual abuse, and episodes of corruption and misconduct weremore frequently reported in the period 2013-2015. 611
In the period 5 November 2019 – 9 February 2021, the UNSG, in its various reports on the situation in
Somalia, attributed to AMISOM following violations (sub-periods): (a) two incidents of alleged
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law on 30 November 2020 (5 November –9 February 2021); 612 (b) one civilian casualty caused in the reporting period 5 August – 4 November
2020; 613 (c) (5 May – 4 August 2020) two incidents of alleged violations of human rights andinternational humanitarian law involving seven civilian casualties; two grave violations againstchildren in armed conflict; 614 (d) (5 February – 4 May 2020) three per cent (or eight) of the overall
civilian casualties (277) reported by UNSOM in the period; two alleged incidents of violations of humanrights and international humanitarian law involving 10 civilians; 615 (e) (5 November 2019 – 4 February2020) two per cent of the overall civilian casualties (392) reported by UNSOM in the period; twoalleged violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. 616
As a more general trend, AMISOM was held responsible for seven casualties in 2019 – or two per centof the cases according to UN Somalia Country Results Report 2019, 617 compared to 21 in 2018 and 94
in 2017. 618 Within this context, and more in general ‘[a]s regards documenting and attributing
responsibility for violations of human rights and international humanitarian law allegedly committed
by AMISOM’, UNSOM/OHCHR state in their report on protection of civilians in Somalia that ‘theblurring of identities between AMISOM and non-AMISOM forces remains challenging where troops ofa same country, particularly the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) and the Ethiopian National Defense Force(ENDF) continue to operate in the same locations’. 619
In its 2020 report on children and armed conflict in Somalia – covering the period 1 August 2016 –30 September 2019, the UNSG attributed to AMISOM 64 violations against children, out of a total
14 856 verified by the country task force.620 Moreover, UNSOM/OHCHR reported that in the period
2017-2019 AMISOM deprived 10 children of their liberty (out of a total of 853 verified cases) during
609 Hiraal Institute, Semi-annual Somalia Security Report 2020, 16 July 2020, url, pp. 10-11

610 UN Security Council, Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict, Conclusions on children and armed conflict inSomalia, 11 August 2020, url, pp. 4, 8; UN Security Council, Report Somalia of the Monitoring Group on Somalia andEritrea, 9 November 2018, url, p. 6
611 NUPI, Assessing the effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Somalia, 2018, url, pp. 73-77
612 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 17 February 2021, url, para. 49
613 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 November 2020, url, para. 39
614 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 August 2020, url, para. 54-56
615 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 May 2020, url, para. 44, 51
616 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 February 2020, url, para. 49, 54
617 UN Somalia, Country Results Report 2019, June 2020, url, p. 46
618 UNSOM and OHCHR, Protection of Civilians Report, Building the Foundation for Peace, Security and Human Rights in
Somalia, 1 January 2017 – 31 December 2019, 2020, url, pp. 3, 25
619 UNSOM and OHCHR, Protection of Civilians Report, Building the Foundation for Peace, Security and Human Rights in
Somalia, 1 January 2017 – 31 December 2019, 2020, url, p. 25
620 UNSG, Children and Armed Conflict in Somalia, 4 March 2020, url, para. 18

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military operations, specifying that ‘these children are recruited or used by parties to the conflict orthey are arrested and deprived of their liberty for their alleged association with parties to theconflict’. 621 During the same period AMISOM was held responsible for 42 children casualties and one
attack on a school. 622
In the course of 2020, as per the USDOS Somalia Human Rights Report, AMISOM was listed among theactors conducting extra-judicial killings of civilians – ‘either deliberately or inadvertently’ - although
to a much lesser extent compared to other security forces. 623 As per the same report, AMISOM forces‘were implicated in rapes and other unspecified grave abuses of human rights while conducting
military operations against al-Shabaab in Lower and Middle Shabelle, according to an advocacy
organization.’ 624 Among others, AMISOM admitted to have inadvertently shot and killed three womenin the course of a firefight with al-Shabaab on 8 June 2020. 625
During the same period, 5 November 2019 – 9 February 2021, UNSOM provided support to AMISOM
for the implementation of the human rights due diligence policy and mitigation measures in order toprevent violations. Such activities included communication activities (leaflets), monitoring/reporting,and training. 626 Trainings on international human rights law and international humanitarian law wereconducted by AMISOM, including with the assistance of UNSOM/OHCHR, also in the period 20172019. 627

5.2 AFRICOM
5.2.1 Strength and regional presence
The United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM)’s East Africa Counterterrorism Operation ‘seeks to
disrupt, degrade, and deny victory to al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia in Somalia and neighbouring
countries’. Its main goal is to make ‘terrorist organizations’ not able ‘to threaten the U.S. homeland,
U.S. persons, international allies or destabilize the region.’ 628 Over the period October 2019September 2020, ‘USAFRICOM has characterized al-Shabaab as the most “dangerous,” “capable,” and“imminent” threat on the African continent,’ while it ‘remains adaptive, resilient, and capable ofattacking Western and partner interests in Somalia and East Africa.’ 629
USAFRICOM has a Military Coordination Cell in Somalia. Located on Mogadishu’s ocean-side
international campus (Halane), and initially created in 2013 by US Africa Command, this unit is tasked
with ‘establishing coordination between the African Union Mission in Somalia and U.S. forces in the
country’. 630However, as from January 2021, the US military troops in Somalia have been withdrawn,

621 UNSOM and OHCHR, Protection of Civilians Report, Building the Foundation for Peace, Security and Human Rights in

Somalia, 1 January 2017 – 31 December 2019, 2020, url, pp. 32-33
622 UNSOM and OHCHR, Protection of Civilians Report, Building the Foundation for Peace, Security and Human Rights in
Somalia, 1 January 2017 – 31 December 2019, 2020, url, p. 33
623 USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2020 - Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, pp. 2, 13
624 USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2020 - Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 5
625 USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2020 - Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 3

626 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 17 February 2021, url, p. 9; UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 November 2020, url, p. 9; UNSG,

Situation in Somalia, 13 August 2020, url, p. 9; UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 May 2020, url, pp. 8-9; UNSG, Situation in
Somalia, 13 February 2020, url, p. 9
627 UNSOM and OHCHR, Protection of Civilians Report, Building the Foundation for Peace, Security and Human Rights in
Somalia, 1 January 2017 – 31 December 2019, 2020, url, p. 27
628 US DoD, East Africa Counterterrorism Operation, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, 1 July –30 September 2020, url, p. 11
629 US DoD, East Africa Counterterrorism Operation, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, 1 July –30 September 2020, url, p. 12
630 AFRICOM, Military Coordination Cell – Somalia, n.d., url

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as per the US presidential directive. 631 If on the one hand ‘a very limited’ US presence remains, on theother hand the ‘U.S. vowed to continue to engage Somali forces and maintain pressure against alShabab’. 632 Their military presence in Somalia was of approximately 700 troops, who, in January 2021,
were then relocated to other African countries such as Kenya and Djibouti, the latter being home ofthe only permanent US military base in Africa. 633 At the end of 2020, the impacts of the withdrawal
over the activities of USAFRICOM in Somalia were still unknown. 634

5.2.2 Activities and capacity
USAFRICOM is particularly engaged in the following activities:••••

drone and airstrike campaigns: attacks are conducted by both US Special Operations Command
under AFRICOM, and by the CIA, and are reported in almost all parts of Somalia; 635
supporting the training of the Danab Infantry Brigade (see section on Special Forces);
supporting the development of the Somali National Security Architecture, and of the revised
Somali Transition Plan;
operational, technical, and material support to Somali military operations (such as Badbaado).
636

Based on USAFRICOM data, in the last quarter of 2019, and in the first, second, and third quarters of
2020, USAFRICOM conducted 7, 33, 9, and 7 airstrikes, respectively, for a total of 56 strikes. 637 In thecourse of 2020, Airwars reported instead a total of 72 events: 54 declared, and 18 alleged, while for2021, as of April, 7 declared and 4 alleged strikes. 638 For the previous years, USAFRICOM
acknowledged that it had conducted 35 air strikes in 2017, 47 in 2018, and 63 in 2019. 639

5.2.3 Impact on civilians
The 2020-2021 airstrikes resulted, based on Airwars data, in:••militants fatalities: between 103 and 119 militant fatalities in 2020 (for declared strikes), andbetween 82 and 88 for alleged strikes; between 8 and 14 fatalities in 2021 (for declared strikes),and 14 – 28 fatalities for alleged strikes;
civilian casualties (including fatalities): 1 confirmed civilian fatality and three injured from an air
strike on 2 February 2020 in Jilib (confirmed by USAFRICOM); 640 between 6 and 12 ‘fairly’ reported
fatalities, 10 ‘weakly’ reported, and 3-4 ‘discounted’ in 2020; in 2021, 1 ‘fairly’ reported civilian
fatality. 641

631 BBC News, Trump orders withdrawal of US troops from Somalia, 5 December 2020, url; New York Times (The), Trump

Orders All American Troops Out of Somalia, 16 December 2020, url;
632 VOA, US Military Pulls Last Troops Out of Somalia, 17 January 2021, url
633 AP, US military says its troop removal from Somalia is complete, 17 January 2021, url; see also VOA, US Military Pulls
Last Troops Out of Somalia, 17 January 2021, url
634 New York Times (The), Trump Orders All American Troops Out of Somalia, 16 December 2020, url
635 Airwars, US Forces in Somalia, 26 March 2021, url
636 US DoD, East Africa Counterterrorism Operation, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, 1 July –30 September 2020, url, pp. 16-22; see also Airwars, US Forces in Somalia, 26 March 2021, url
637 US DoD, East Africa Counterterrorism Operation, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, 1 July –30 September 2020, url, p. 16
638 Airwars, US Forces in Somalia, 26 March 2021, url
639 UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, 28 September 2020, url, para. 142
640 UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, 28 September 2020, url, p. 35
641 Based on a reading of the 2020 figures in the graph of alleged civilian deaths titled ‘Reported civilian deaths from US
Forces strikes in Somalia 2007-2021’ available at: Airwars, US Forces in Somalia, 26 March 2021, url

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Within this context, USAFRICOM rejected allegations of civilian casualties concerning another 25
incidents in 2020.642 Based on various HRW and AI’s investigations, USAFRICOM failed to provide
justice or reparation to several victims of possible violations of international humanitarian law (21deaths and 11 injured out of 9 strikes investigated between 2017 and March 2020 by AI). 643 Many ofthese victims were ‘labelled’ as terrorists although no evidence could be found about their being
members of al-Shabaab or otherwise directly participating in hostilities. 644 Also for previous periods,
the effective number of civilian casualties caused by US airstrikes remains highly contested,notwithstanding official claims by USAFRICOM. 645 As stated by AI, ‘to us it’s very likely that the real
scale of civilian casualties is much higher than has been documented’. 646

6. Islamic State in Somalia (ISIS-Somalia)
Formed in October 2015, Abnaa ul-Calipha – the Islamic State in Somalia (ISS or ISIS-Somalia) - wasrecognized by Islamic State of Iraq and Syria/the Levant (ISIL/ISIS/Daesh) as an affiliated group andofficial wilayat, or province, in December 2017 when it was called Wilayat al Somal. 647

6.1 Presence, territorial control, outreach
In relation to its ideological underpinnings and linkage to ISIL/ISIS, ‘on 22 October 2015, along with
about 20 supporters, Sheikh Abdulqadir Mumin, an al Shabaab ideological leader in charge of around
300 troops in the Golis Mountains in Puntland, announced his allegiance (bayah) to al Baghdadi’, 648
the leader of the jihadist group Islamic State of Iraq and Syria/the Levant(ISIS/ISIL/Daesh). 649 Ever
since, the Islamic State in Somalia ‘had established a secure base in Puntland’ and has expanded its
activities to other parts of Somalia, including Mogadishu. 650 After the death of al-Baghdadi, in October
2019, ISIS-Somalia pledged allegiance to the new ISIL leader, Abu Ibrah im al-Hashimi al-Qurashi. Whilethe current emir (April 2021) is still Mumin, the group’s new deputy is Abdirahman Fahiye, andAbdirashid Luqman is head of proselytizing and indoctrination. 651
More recently, the US Lead Inspector General, in its latest report on counterterrorism operations ineast Africa from September 2020, indicated that ‘[c]ompared to al-Shabaab, ISIS-Somalia has
conducted few attacks in Somalia over the past 2 years, mostly in the northern Bari province and in

642 UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, 28 September 2020, url, p. 35

643 AI, Somalia: US must not abandon civilian victims of its air strikes after troop withdrawal, 7 December 2020, url; AI,

Somalia: Zero accountability as civilian deaths mount from US air strikes, 1 April 2020, url; see also HRW, Somalia:
Inadequate US Airstrike Investigations, 16 June 2020, url
644 AI, Somalia: Zero accountability as civilian deaths mount from US air strikes, 1 April 2020, url; see also AI, Somalia: US
must not abandon civilian victims of its air strikes after troop withdrawal, 7 December 2020, url
645 AI, Investigations into civilian casualties from US air strikes in Somalia needed urgently, 16 September 2019, url, p. 1; AI,
USA/Somalia: Shroud of secrecy around civilian deaths masks possible war crimes, 20 March 2019, url; AI, The hidden US
war in Somalia – Civilian casualties from airstrikes in Lower Shabelle, 2019, url, pp. 34-64
646 Irish Times (The), Civilians among victims of US air strikes in Somalia, says rights group, 30 September 2019, url
647 Defence Post (The), Abnaa ul-Calipha (Islamic State in Somalia), n.d., url
648 EIP, The Islamic State in East Africa, September 2018, url, p. 12
649 New York Times (The), Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, ISIS Leader Known for His Brutality, Is Dead at 48, 31 October 2019, url
650 EIP, The Islamic State in East Africa, September 2018, url, pp. 4, 12, 14-17, 25-27, 32
651 UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, 28 September 2020, url, p. 19

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Mogadishu.’ 652 However, the group continues to engage with its propaganda and media activities,
including through the weekly publication, al-Naba. 653•••

Presence in Puntland: 654 as of September 2020, although degraded in its operational
capabilities, ISIS-Somalia has retained a ‘steady but small presence’ in northern Somalia. 655
Puntland’s Bari region is the cradle of many ISS fighters, notably the districts of Qandala,Caluula, Iskushuban (including the Timiirshe settlement), Bossaso, Qardho, and Bandar
Bayla; 656 allegedly ISIS also has support networks within the Puntland governing structures,
especially in Galkacyo and Bossaso; 657 reportedly the group’s operational basis remain in theGolis Mountains (east of Bossaso), 658 and south of the port town of Qandala. 659
Presence in Mogadishu and South-Central Somalia: ‘[T]owards the end of 2017 and into
2018’ ISIS-Somalia began to shift its main operational focus to South-Central Somalia, notably
to Mogadishu, ‘challenging the dominance of al Shabaab in the key battleground against theFederal Government of Somalia (FGS)’. 660 However, as indicated by various UNSG reports, inthe period May 2020 – February 2021, the group’s activities in Mogadishu have been very
limited. 661 Since late 2017, ISS has also been active around Afgoye (South West State, Lower
Shabelle region), and in Beledweyne (Hirshabelle, Hiraan region). 662
Presence in Somaliland: reportedly, as by NISA sources quoted by the European Institute ofPeace’s 2018 report on IS in East Africa, ‘ISS has established links with human traffickers basedin Somaliland and regard it as something of a collection point and transit hub for new
recruits’.663

The group has regularly clashed with al-Shabaab (including ASNE), while operationally andideologically challenging its dominance. 664 There was a period of extreme rivalry and a ruthless
campaign of elimination by al-Shabaab reported in 2017 665However EIP reported in 2018 that inPuntland, ‘al Shabaab members have established a degree of coexistence with ISS, and even,according to some reports, a basic level of cooperation in key areas such as Bossaso’. At the sametime, in South-Central Somalia, notably in Mogadishu, al-Shabaab remains wary of the risk of losing

652 US DoD, East Africa Counterterrorism Operation, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, 1 July –30 September 2020, url, p. 16

653 US DoD, East Africa Counterterrorism Operation, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, 1 July –30 September 2020, url, p. 16

654 EIP, The Islamic State in East Africa, September 2018, url, pp. 14-17

655 US DoD, East Africa Counterterrorism Operation, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, 1 July –30 September 2020, url, p. 16

656 EIP, The Islamic State in East Africa, September 2018, url, p. 16
657 EIP, The Islamic State in East Africa, September 2018, url, p. 17

658 UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, 28 September 2020, url, para. 68; OWP, Islamic State inSomalia, 2020, url
659 EASO, COI Query - Security situation in Puntland and Somaliland (January – 15 November 2019), 12 December 2019, url,
p. 7; EASO, Country of Origin Information Report – Somalia Security Situation, 2017, url, p. 108; see also ISS, East African
terror groups are exploiting the seas, 13 October 2020, url
660 EIP, The Islamic State in East Africa, September 2018, url, p. 4
661 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 August 2020, url, para. 24; UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 November 2020, url, para. 16;
UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 17 February 2021, url, para. 17
662 Weiss C., Reigniting the Rivalry: The Islamic State in Somalia vs. al-Shabaab, in CTC Sentinel, April 2019, Volume 12, Issue
4, url, pp. 30-31
663 EIP, The Islamic State in East Africa, September 2018, url, p. 32
664 Weiss C., Reigniting the Rivalry: The Islamic State in Somalia vs. al-Shabaab, in CTC Sentinel, April 2019, Volume 12, Issue
4, url, pp. 29-30; Warner J. and Weiss C, A Legitimate Challenger? Assessing the Rivalry between al-Shabaab and the IslamicState in Somalia, November 2017, Volume 10, Issue 10, url, pp. 27-31
665 Warner J. and Weiss C, A Legitimate Challenger? Assessing the Rivalry between al-Shabaab and the Islamic State inSomalia, November 2017, Volume 10, Issue 10, url, pp. 27-31

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more ground to the rival group. 666 There was also a ‘renewed flurry of clashes and assassinations’between the two groups reported by the CTC Sentinel’s research into ISS attack data in 2018. 667

6.2 Strength
Sheikh Abdulqadir Mumin, ISIS-Somalia leader, is a clan elder from the Ali
Salebaan/Majeerteen/Darood. Reportedly, he has organised ISIS-Somalia along traditional clan lines,by giving prevalence, among his senior lieutenants, to the Ali Salebaan/Darood clan. More recently(mid 2018), however, he has tried progressively to include individuals from South-Central Somalia,
including from the Hawiye clan. 668
As of September 2020, ‘USAFRICOM estimated the group’s force size to be in the low hundreds’. 669 At
the beginning of 2020, Felbab-Brown reported the group as having about 200 men, ‘mostly restricted
to the area of Qandala’, but also in other safe heavens such as in the strategic port of Bossaso. 670 In
mid-2018, the NISA ‘estimated that ISS had around 200 members throughout the country, almost allwith Mumin in Puntland’.671 Conservatively, the Puntland authorities, in May 2018, estimated ISS
strength to be ‘at something over 75 fighters, down from a peak of 150’. 672 However, in the course of2020, ISIS-Somalia attempted to enlist new fighters. Reportedly, in February 2020, about 30 fighters,
including seven foreign fighters, joined the group in Bari region. 673
As a more general trend, as of mid-2018, EIP reported that ISIS in Puntland ‘was struggling’. Reportedly‘it was disconnected from the rest of the Islamic State, apart from its media operatives, had no
territory to rule, a diminishing membership (in part because of defections), little capacity to mountoperations, and poor technical skills’. 674 Conversely, the ISS threat in South-Central Somalia wasreportedly more substantial in 2018, having the group established itself in Mogadishu and thesurrounding area and having built a sustainable attack capacity. 675

6.3 Overview of abuses
USDOS stated in its Human Rights report for 2020 that ‘ISIS-Somalia claimed attacks against Somali
authorities and other targets in Puntland, where it is based, and around Mogadishu, but there waslittle local reporting on its claims’. The same report indicates that ‘ISIS-Somalia targeted businessleaders for extortion in urban areas’, also ‘with violence when they did not meet extortion demands’.
Finally, the group ‘carried out increased small-scale IED attacks and killings in Puntland, Mogadishu,
and Lower Shabelle, where the group maintains pockets of presence’. 676 According to a 2019 article
on ISS by the CTC Sentinel, ‘the Islamic State’s expansion inside Somalia carries significant implications
for the overall security of the country. Civilians, especially private enterprises, will likely continue tobe extorted if ISS continues to grow its operations. Additionally, Somali personnel will most likely

666 EIP, The Islamic State in East Africa, September 2018, url, pp. 30-31

667 Weiss C., Reigniting the Rivalry: The Islamic State in Somalia vs. al-Shabaab, in CTC Sentinel, April 2019, Volume 12, Issue

4, url, p. 32

668 EIP, The Islamic State in East Africa, September 2018, url, p. 21

669 US DoD, East Africa Counterterrorism Operation, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, 1 July –30 September 2020, url, p. 16

670 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia,2020, url, p. 135
671 EIP, The Islamic State in East Africa, September 2018, url, p. 14
672 EIP, The Islamic State in East Africa, September 2018, url, p. 14

673 UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, 28 September 2020, url, p. 20
674 EIP, The Islamic State in East Africa, September 2018, url, p. 24

675 EIP, The Islamic State in East Africa, September 2018, url, pp. 24, 29

676 USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2020 - Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, pp. 13, 1576

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Actors

continue to be assassinated by both ISS and al-Shabaab in various population centres across thecountry.’ 677

7. Federal Member States and Somaliland
As per the Somali Provisional Constitution (2012) the Somali federalism comprises the FGS, FMS andthe local government, 678 while the ‘FMS interior ministries influence the formation of local
governments, as district councils are selected in line with the ‘4.5’ clan system’.679 Within this context,
as per the Wadajir National Framework on Local Governance - that was agreed between Somalia’s
Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation (MoIFAR) and its counterparts in Galmudug,
Hirshabelle, South-West and Jubbaland – the focus area in terms of governance revolves around theestablishment of district councils. 680
The State Ministries of Interior of the above-mentioned member states prioritised the formation of
district councils in 25 locations out of their nominal 58 districts: in 6 districts (out of 11) in Galmudug,in 7 districts (out of 18) in South-West, in 5 districts (out of 15) in Hirshabelle, and in 7 districts (out of
14) in Jubbaland. As of May 2020, of these prioritised 25 district councils, 5 were completed: 3 in South
West, 1 Hirshabelle, 1 in Galmudug, none in Jubbaland. 681
Puntland is administratively and institutionally more developed, see for more details the ad-hoc
section 7.6 Puntland. Somaliland is not part of this architecture, and as a self-proclaimed independent
state will be addressed separately at the end of this section 7 (section 7.7 Somaliland).

7.1 Jubbaland
Jubbaland (or Jubaland) Federal Member State administration came into being in 2013. 682 Jubbalandcomprises Middle Jubba, Lower Juba and Gedo regions, 683 although control of Lower Juba and of
Kismayo (the port town and state capital) ‘is the biggest prize’ as International Crisis Group puts it. 684
Overall the state is dominated and predominantly inhabited by Darood/Ogaadeen clans – also present
in neighbouring northeast Kenya and southeast Ethiopia. Leading Somalia experts from LSE note that
Jubbaland’s state project ‘represented a return of Ogadeen identity and pride within the wider Somali
milieu’, with Ahmed Madobe – the current Ogadeni state president – as ‘its star’. 685
In terms of (remaining) clan composition, while Kismayo city is cosmopolitan, the dominant clans in
town are Darood/Harti (long-term ‘immigrants’ from present-day Puntland and Somaliland),Darood/Marehan (more recent immigrants from central Somalia and Gedo) and miscellaneousHawiye communities. Areas outside Kismayo are inhabited, apart from Ogadeni, by Bantu (also known
derogatorily as Jareer), some Digil-Mirifle, Awramleh (a small Irir clan) and Galja’al and Sheekhal (often
included as Hawiye). The Bajuni (a Swahili speaking group) inhabit the coastal districts near the Kenya

677 Weiss C., Reigniting the Rivalry: The Islamic State in Somalia vs. al-Shabaab, in CTC Sentinel, April 2019, Volume 12, Issue

4, url, p. 33

678 Somalia, Provisional Constitution, 1 August 2012, url
679 HIPS, Dysfunctional federalism, July 2020, url, p. 9

680 Unpublished written information from a security organisation provided to EASO, 2020
681 Unpublished written information from a security organisation provided to EASO, 2020

682 International Crisis Group, Ending the Dangerous Standoff in Southern Somalia, Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°158, 14

July 2020, url, p. 9683 HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, February 2021, url, p. 12684 International Crisis Group, Jubaland in Jeopardy: the Uneasy Path to State-Building in Somalia, 21 May 2013, url
685 Majid N. and Abdirahman K., LSE Blog, The Jubbaland Project and the Transborder Ogadeen, 23 February 2021, url

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border. The Gedo region was created (in 1975 by president Siad Barre) as a predominately
Darood/Marehan clan area. 686

7.1.1 Relevant dynamics, territorial control, and governanceRelevant Dynamics. In 2019 the local electoral commission conducted a ‘highly contested
parliamentary selection and presidential election’. 687 As reported by HIPS in 2021, ‘after failing tomeaningfully weaken President Madoobe in Kismaayo, the FGS eventually recognized him as the“interim president” of Jubbaland in June 2020’. 688 At the same time, his administration is supported
by Kenya, 689 which considers Jubbaland ‘a buffer zone’, and ‘a strategic foothold in Somalia’. 690
Territorial Control and Influence. Since 2012 Ahmed Madobe, and his militia group, predominantly
drawn from the Ogaadeen clan, have been in charge of the town and the port of Kismayo, of which
they also control the surroundings, while they hardly control the rest of Jubbaland. 691 A large portionof the regional state is in fact controlled by al-Shabaab. The group controls almost all of Middle Juba
region, where they have their capital (Jilib), and the majority of Lower Jubba. 692 Moreover, thenorthern Gedo region is currently (April 2021) under the control of a distinct regional administration
which is loyal to incumbent president Farmaajo, who has his clan base (Marehan) there. 693 De facto,at the beginning of 2020 ‘the FGS began a concerted effort to wrest the entire Gedo province from
Jubbaland and encircle the administration of President Madoobe.’ 694 As reported by various sources,
the FGS deployed federal forces, backed by local militias, to Beled Hawo, 695 a border town near Kenya,‘and dislodged the local administration that was loyal to Jubbaland’. 696 In March 2021, Hassan Janaan,
the former security minister of the Jubbaland state, who had for months military challenged the FGS
in the area, defected together with his 400 troops.697 The Gedo administration is also supported by
Ethiopian forces operating outside of AMISOM. 698
Governance. In terms of governance structure and state-building process, the situation in Jubbalandcan be summarised as follow:• constitution: the provisional constitution of the Jubbaland state of Somalia was adopted on
1 August 2015; 699• president. Jubbaland’s President is Ahmed Madobe (or Madoobe), who was elected by the
Jubbaland parliament in August 2019 for a four-year term; 700

686 International Crisis Group, Jubaland in Jeopardy: the Uneasy Path to State-Building in Somalia, 21 May 2013, url
687 HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, January 2020, url, pp. 6-7
688 HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, February 2021, url, p. 13

689 International Crisis Group, Ending the Dangerous Standoff in Southern Somalia, Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°158, 14

July 2020, url, pp. 2, 10; Felbab-Brown V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, pp. 131-132
690 HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, January 2020, url, pp. 6-7
691 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, pp. 131-132
692 HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, February 2021, url, p. 12693 International Crisis Group, Ending the Dangerous Standoff in Southern Somalia, Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°158, 14
July 2020, url, pp. 1-7
694 HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, February 2021, url, p. 13
695 International Crisis Group, Ending the Dangerous Standoff in Southern Somalia, Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°158, 14
July 2020, url, p. 6; HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, February 2021, url, p. 13
696 HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, February 2021, url, p. 13
697 Somali Guardian, Ex Jubaland Security Minister surrenders to Somalia’s Government, 24 March 2021, url
698 International Crisis Group, Ending the Dangerous Standoff in Southern Somalia, Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°158, 14
July 2020, url, p. 6; Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 132
699 Jubaland, Provisional Constitution of the Jubaland State of Somalia: August 1, 2015, 2020, url
700 Al Jazeera, Somalia’s Jubaland region re-elects Ahmed Mohamed as president, 22 August 2019, url

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•
•

•

•

parliament. The Jubbaland parliament, based in Kismayo, comprises 75members, 701 whom wereselected during summer 2019 for a four-year term. 702
regional governors, governments and assemblies: (a) the federally recognised Gedo governor is
Osman Nur Haji ‘Moalimu’, while he is rejected by Madobe. 703 The current Gedo administration isloyal to the FGS; 704 (b) the Middle Juba administration is not set up yet, being the territory underal-Shabaab control; (c) Lower Juba: Kismayo and surrounding areas are controlled by the
Jubbaland State administration (Madobe), the rest of the territory being under al-Shabaab
control; 705
districts, district commissioners, and district councils. Overall Jubbaland comprises 14 districts,
with following breakdown per region: (a) Gedo region: Baardheere, Belet (Bulo) Xaawo (BeledHawo), Ceel Waaq (El Wak), Doolow, Garbahaarey, Luuq (and Burdhubo 706); as of May 2020,
Mogadishu had appointed new district commissioners (loyal to the FGS) in all of them, exception
made for El Wak; 707 (b) Middle Juba region: Bu'aale, Jilib, Sakow; (c) Lower Juba region: Afmadow,
Badhaadhe, Jamaame, Kismayo. 708 As of December 2020, among the prioritised district councils
in Jubbaland (Afmadow, Bardheere, Beled Xaawo, Dolow, Garbaharrey, Kismayo and Luuq) 709 –see section on Federal Member States and Somaliland for more details – only the District Council
in Afmadow was formed; 710
Local Council of Elders. In an unspecified number of locations across South-Central Somalia local
councils of elders reportedly ‘continue to provide a multi-faceted forum covering a range ofreconciliation, judicial and governance functions’. 711

7.1.2 FMS armed forces
Jubbaland State Forces (JSF) numbers about 5 000 individuals, and is comprised of: 712•••

Jubbaland Darwish. Madobe’s Ras Kamboni movement/militia was transformed into
Jubbaland Darwish, ‘special police’, after 2014. They present themselves as the state’s
paramilitary police, but they are predominantly drawn from the Ogaadeen clan (Madobe’sclan) for membership;
Jubbaland State Police (JSP). As per the UN Somalia Country Results Report for 2019, there
are about 550 police officers in Jubbaland; 713
Jubbaland Intelligence and Security Agency (JISA).

According to a 2020 study on militias in Somalia, ‘the Jubbaland State Forces, while independently
supported by Kenya, have not received official United Nations approved financial assistance andtraining, including human rights training, from actors operating under a United Nations framework.
701 Jubaland, Provisional Constitution of the Jubaland State of Somalia: August 1, 2015, 2020, url, art. 32
702 Somaliland, 73 new MPs are chosen for Jubbaland State of Somalia, 13 August 2019, url

703 International Crisis Group, Ending the Dangerous Standoff in Southern Somalia, Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°158, 14

July 2020, url, p. 4
704 International Crisis Group, Ending the Dangerous Standoff in Southern Somalia, Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°158, 14
July 2020, url, pp. 4-5
705 Felbab-Brown V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, pp. 131-132
706 International Crisis Group, Ending the Dangerous Standoff in Southern Somalia, Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°158, 14
July 2020, url, pp. 4-5, see also footnote no. 15
707 International Crisis Group, Ending the Dangerous Standoff in Southern Somalia, Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°158, 14
July 2020, url, pp. 4-5, see also footnote no. 15
708 EASO, Country of Origin Information Report – Somalia Security Situation, 2017, url, pp. 67, 72, 75
709 Unpublished written information from a security organisation provided to EASO, 2020
710 UN Somalia, Country Results Report Somalia 2020, March 2021, url, pp. 24, 57
711 Unpublished written information from a security organisation provided to EASO, 2020
712 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, pp. 127, 132
713 UN Somalia, Country Results Report 2019, June 2020, url, p. 19

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Madobe thus needs to raise money by licit and illicit taxation in and around Kismayo to maintain his
forces.’ 714

7.1.3 Other actors/forces
Apart from the local FMS ‘official’ armed forces, other actors/armed forces present in Jubbaland
include (the list is not exhaustive):•••

the SNA. SNA units are present in Kismayo. Reportedly, they tend to collaborate with the JSF
as long as they do not retain non-Ogaadeen clan members. 715 Other SNA units are present in
the Lower Juba, while one SNA brigade and two battalions are deployed in the Gedo region,and they are reportedly drawn from Farmaajo’s clan, the Marehan. 716 One of these isreportedly SNA 43 Battalion deployed in Beled Hawo; 717
Ethiopian Troops. Within AMISOM: Ethiopian troops are present in Kismayo by virtue of their
participation in sector 6, and in Gedo by virtue of their leading of Sector 3. Outside AMISOM:
Ethiopian troops are deployed in the Gedo region, in support of the FGS, reportedly at theEthiopian border and in Dolow; 718
AMISOM Troops and Police Forces. The Gedo region is under the leadership of ENDF
(Ethiopian National Defence Forces), this region falling under Sector 3. Middle and Lower Juba
fall instead under the leadership of the KDF (Kenyan Defence Forces). 719 See for further details
section on AMISOM Strength, Characteristics, and Regional Presence.

7.1.4 Access to justice
For a first overview of the justice systems in Somalia see sections on Access to Justice, Formal andInformal Systems (including Customary Justice and Shari’ah Law) and on Access to Justice under AlShabaab.
Gedo region is both a seat of scholarship among the early Sufi (jama’a), and the site from which thefirst Salafi movement in Somalia, the Ubereey, developed at the beginning of the 20th century. As aconsequence, current interpretations of the Shari’ah in Gedo and across Jubbaland are also influenced
by the Hanbali madhab. 720
Across Jubbaland, in the areas controlled by al-Shabaab the prevalent form of justice is Hanbali
adjudication (strict interpretation of shari’ah law, see for further details section on Al-Shabaab. The
group operates both stationary and mobile courts. 721
In the government-controlled areas of Jubbaland, in Lower Juba and in the Gedo region, the same as
elsewhere in Somalia, ‘there is increased collaboration between statutory courts, clan elders, andreligious leaders, with shari’ah and xeer being the most active’. However, only courts have executory
powers, and ‘verdicts by ulama and elders need to be enforced by the court and police in order to be
implemented’. This notwithstanding, the shari’ah is widely invoked as a source of law: by statutory

714 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, pp. 127, 132
715 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 132
716 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 132

717 Sahan, The Somali Wire, Issues Jan-April 2021, n.d., source requiring registration

718 International Crisis Group, Ending the Dangerous Standoff in Southern Somalia, Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°158, 14

July 2020, url, pp. 2, 5, 6, 10, see also footnote 19
719 NUPI, Assessing the effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Somalia, 2018, url, pp. 18, 56; see also AMISOM,
AMISOM Military Component, n.d., url
720 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, p. 29
721 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, p. 29

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judges, by military judges who conform with shari’ah in adjudicating criminal matters, by ulama, who
often apply shari’ah to various matters, including land disputes. 722
Mechanisms for justice include:
•

•
•
•

•

Statutory Courts. According to the FGS Justice Report (2019) as quoted by HIPS in 2021, a
total of five statutory courts were operating in Jubbaland in 2019. 723 In line with theconstitutional provisions (Article 108), and most of the FMS practice, Jubbaland organised its
own justice system around a three-tiered approach, with District (and regional court), Appeal,and Supreme Courts. 724 Reportedly, judges and prosecutors in Jubbaland are not paid forextended periods of time; 725
Shari’ah Courts in Jubbaland. No specific information on this point could be found within thegiven time limits and among the consulted sources;
Xeer, Elders and Elders Councils. Customary justice (xeer) through elder councils, guurti ormalaq, work as the first port of call when a dispute arises; 726
ADR Centres. Both in Kismayo and in Garbahaarey, various ADR centres, which apply xeer asa supplementary approach to justice under the administration of the local MoJ, have been set
up (see for more details section on Customary Justice (xeer) and Alternative Dispute
Resolution). 727 In Kismayo following centres are reportedly operational: ADR centre at the MoJ
State Office, Kismayo ADR centre; other forms of ADR: Community Action Groups, Community
Dispute Resolution Committees, Land Dispute Management Committee, and a Guurti; 728
District Peace Committees. An unspecified number of DPCs have been set up and are runningin Lower Juba and in Gedo region. 729

7.1.5 Security forces’ human rights conduct
Felbab-Brown reports that if on the one hand the JSF protect Kismayo from al-Shabaab, on the other
hand they ‘function as Madobe’s praetorian guard and private enforcement entity against rival
politicians, clan leaders, business leaders and other independent voices’. She adds that ‘they suppress
any opposition political activity’ and that, based on her own research, ‘Somali interlocutors widely
attribute assassinations of clan elders who have spoken up against Madobe to Madobe’s forces.’
Moreover, she indicates that ‘opposition politicians or NGOs often cannot operate in Kismayo andleave for Mogadishu’, that ‘no fair and transparent elections have been held in Kismayo since 2012’,
and that ‘during the 2019 elections, Madobe banned opposition members from running for or casting
votes in Jubbaland’s Parliament’. 730 Finally she adds that ‘land grabbing from minority clans andvulnerable populations without arms has characterized Madobe’s rule’ and that ‘the taxes his
administration levies are seen as biased, with higher fees for rival clans and opposition groups.’ 731
In the period 5 November 2019 – 9 February 2021, the UNSG, in its various reports on the situation in
Somalia attributed to Jubbaland security forces the following violations: (a) nine verified incidents of
722 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, p. 29

723 HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, p. 19
724 HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, p. 15
725 HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, p. 23
726 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, p. 30; Expanding Access to Justice

Program, Access to Justice Assessment Tool 2020, Somalia Baseline Study Brief, url, pp. 1-2; HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s
Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, p. 27-28
727 HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, p. 29;
Expanding Access to Justice Program, Alternative Dispute Resolution Initiatives in Somalia, June 2020, url, p. 8
728 Expanding Access to Justice Program, Alternative Dispute Resolution Initiatives in Somalia, June 2020, url, p. 11
729 Saferworld and Conflict Dynamics International, Sustainable community approaches to peacebuilding in securitised
environments: case study of Somalia, February 2020, url, p. 5
730 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 133
731 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 133

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conflict-related sexual violence, and two incidents of alleged violations of human rights andinternational humanitarian law at the hands of the Jubbaland police (reporting period 5 November
2020 – 9 February 2021); 732 (b) two cases of conflict-related sexual violence at the hands of the
Jubbaland forces, and deprivation of liberty affecting 22 boys and one girl detained at the hands ofJubbaland state forces and Jubbaland police (reporting period 5 August – 4 November 2020); 733 (c)two cases of deprivation of liberty affecting children at the hands of the Jubbaland state forces(reporting period 5 May – 4 August 2020); 734 (d) two cases of deprivation of liberty affecting children
at the hand of the Jubbaland state forces (reporting period 5 November 2019 – 4 February 2020). 735
The UNSG indicated, in its latest report on Children and Armed Conflict (March 2020 – covering theperiod 1 August 2016 – 30 September 2019), that the country task force had verified the following
violations at the hand of the Jubbaland security forces: 129 cases of child recruitment; 736 59 cases ofchildren deprived of their liberty for alleged association with al-Shabaab or pro-ISIL elements in
Somalia; 737 59 cases of killing and maiming of children; 738 75 cases of children victims of rape or sexual
violence; 739 one case of denial of humanitarian access. 740 The violations reported here above are inline with those reported by UNSOM during the period 1 January 2017 – 31 December 2019. 741
For other violations (including grave violations against children) generally attributed to both federal
and state forces see section on FGS security institutions – security forces’ human rights conduct.

7.2 South-West
The South-West Federal Member State administration came into being in 2014. 742 The state is one of
the most populous in Somalia, with ‘exceptionally rich farmland’ in between the Jubba and the
Shabelle river valleys. 743 It is comprised of three regions: Lower Shabelle, Bay and Bakool. 744 In termsof clan composition, the state is predominantly inhabited by the mainly sedentary agro-pastoralist
clan known as Digil-Mirifle or Rahanweyn. They speak Af-Maay-tiri, which is quite distinct from AfMaxaa-tiri, the Somali spoken by nomadic-pastoralists. 745 Reportedly, among the Digil-Mirifle subclans, the Leysan sub-clan dominates in the Bakool region. 746

7.2.1 Relevant dynamics, territorial control, and governanceRelevant Dynamics. Prominent political and security dynamics taking place in South-West State are:732 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 17 February 2021, url, pp. 9-10
733 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 November 2020, url, p. 9734 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 August 2020, url, p. 9735 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 February 2020, url, p. 10

736 UNSG, Children and Armed Conflict in Somalia, 4 March 2020, url, p. 5
737 UNSG, Children and Armed Conflict in Somalia, 4 March 2020, url, p. 7
738 UNSG, Children and Armed Conflict in Somalia, 4 March 2020, url, p. 8

739 UNSG, Children and Armed Conflict in Somalia, 4 March 2020, url, pp. 9-10
740 UNSG, Children and Armed Conflict in Somalia, 4 March 2020, url, p. 12

741 UNSOM and OHCHR, Protection of Civilians Report, Building the Foundation for Peace, Security and Human Rights in

Somalia, 1 January 2017 – 31 December 2019, 2020, url, pp. 32-34
742 HIPS, Dysfunctional federalism, July 2020, url, p. 6743 HIPS, Dysfunctional federalism, July 2020, url, p. 4744 HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, February 2021, url, p. 14
745 ACCORD, Clans in Somalia – Report on a lecture by Joakim Gundel, COI Workshop Vienna, 15 May 2009 (Revised
Edition), 2009, url, pp. 11, 13-14
746 International Crisis Group, Somalia’s South West State: A New President Installed, a Crisis Inflamed, 24 December 2018,url

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Presidential and Parliamentary elections. In December 2018, the South West State held thepresidential election. Days prior to the election, presidential candidate Mukhtar Robow wasarrested by the FGS security forces, assisted by Ethiopian troops. Robow, a member of theLaysan sub-clan, was a co-founder and former deputy of al-Shabaab. After defecting from AlShabaab in 2013, he had managed to gain wide popular support as a potential ‘liberator’. 747
Robow was then put under house arrest in Mogadishu, while Abdulaziz Hassan Mohamed –better known as ‘Lafta Gareen’, the preferred candidate of the FGS - became president,
although ‘widely seen as lacking local legitimacy’. 748 In March 2020, the new parliament of theSouthwest state was selected by clan elders, while the number of MPs was reduced from 149
to 95. In April, the parliament elected Dr. Ali Said Faqi as its new speaker. Still, in April 2020
the parliament extended the mandate of President Lafta Gareen by one-year, de facto
granting him a 5-year term instead of the 4 year-term foreseen by the state constitution(reportedly in order to align parliamentary and presidential elections timeframes); 749
Clan rivalries. No specific information on this point could be found within the given time limits
and among the consulted sources.

Territorial Control and Influence. In terms of territorial control, the South West State remains one
the most affected by al-Shabaab presence and attacks. The group controls large swathes of territory
in all three provinces: Lower Shabelle, Bay and Bakool. As a consequence, travel between the main
cities ‘is done largely by air’, 750 besides by other means such as mini-buses when security conditions
allow for it. 751
In Bakool, whose regional capital is Xuudur (also Hudur, or Huddur), reportedly there are no federal
government or state-level authorities present. 752 While Mukhtar Robow’s militia is still active in the
Hudur district, the town is also an AMISOM ENDF base, and the area is surrounded by al-Shabaab. 753
At the same time the Bakool region is governed by a governor with support of Ethiopian forces
allegedly operating independently from AMISOM. 754 Bay region is the site of the regional and (defacto) state capital Baidoa. 755 The town hosts a major AMISOM garrison, however al-Shabaab controls
access to water, electricity and education services, 756 as well as it runs its own courts downtown. 757
The Lower Shabelle region, with Marka as the regional capital, is indisputably the area mostly affectedby al-Shabaab at state level, 758 such as in occasion of the recent (April 2021) Barire and Awdhegle
armed clashes. 759 In the context of Operation Badbaado, the SNA and AMISOM have successfully
recaptured four main towns (Jannaale, Sabiid, Bariirre and Awdhiigle) in the area. 760 However, mostof the region remains under the direct control or influence of al-Shabaab, and many districts/towns

747 HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, January 2020, url, p. 4; see also International Crisis Group, Somalia’s South West

State: A New President Installed, a Crisis Inflamed, 24 December 2018, url
748 HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, January 2020, url, pp. 4-5
749 HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, February 2021, url, pp. 14-15
750 HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, February 2021, url, p. 14
751 Norway, Landinfo, Somalia: Praktiske og sikkerhetsmessige forhold på reise i Sør-Somalia [Somalia: Practical and safety
conditions when traveling in Southern Somalia], 28 June 2019, url, pp. 7-9
752 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 123
753 HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, February 2021, url, p. 14
754 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 123
755 UN Habitat, Baidoa Urban Profile, June 2020, url, p. 8
756 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 121
757 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, p. 25
758 Sahan, The Somali Wire, Issues Jan-April 2021, n.d., source requiring registration
759 Maruf H., Al-Shabab Attacks Military Bases in Southern Somalia, VOA, 3 April 2021, url
760 Unpublished written information from a security organisation provided to EASO, 2020; HIPS, The State of Somalia
Report, February 2021, url, p. 14

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experience a worsening of the overall security and institutional situation (such as Afgoye, Awdheegle,
Marka, and Wenlaweyn). 761
Governance. In terms of governance structure and state-building process, as of April 2021 thesituation in South West state can be summarised as follow:
•
•
•
•

•

•

Constitution: the constitution of the South West state of Somalia was adopted in November
2014; 762
President. South West State President is Abdulaziz Hassan Mohamed (Lafta Gareen), who waselected by the South West parliament in December 2018 for a four-year term, 763 later extended
to five; 764
Parliament. The South West parliament, based in Baidoa, comprises 95 members, who wereselected in March 2020 for a four-year term; 765
Regional governors, governments and assemblies: (a) in Bakool, with regional capital Xuudur (also
Hudur, or Huddur), federal government (including the SNA) or state-level authorities arereportedly not present. 766 Bakool’s governor is supported by Ethiopian forces operating
independently from AMISOM; 767 (b) Bay region hosts the regional and (de facto) state capital
Baidoa. 768 (c) Lower Shabelle, with Marka as the regional capital, is strongly affected by al-Shabaabpresence and activities. 769 No specific information on regional assemblies or other governors
could be found within the given time limits and among the consulted sources;
Districts, district commissioners, and district councils. Overall the South West State comprises 16
districts, with the following breakdown per region: (a) Bakool region: El Barde, Xudur (Hudur),
Tayeeglow (Tiyeglow), Waajid, and Rab Dhuure; (b) Bay region: Baidoa, Buur Hakaba, Dinsoor, andQansax Dheere; and (c) Lower Shabelle region: Afgooye, Baraawe (Barawa), Kurtunwaarey, Marka(Merka), Qoriyoley, Sablaale, and Wanla Weyne (Wanlaweyn). 770 As of December 2020, out of the
7 prioritised district councils in South West - Baidoa, Baraawe, Berdaale, El Barde, Dinsoor, Hudur,
and Wanlawey – three were formed, those in Berdaale, Dinsoor, and Hudur; 771
Local councils of elders. In an unspecified number of locations across South-Central Somalia local
councils of elders reportedly ‘continue to provide a multi-faceted forum covering a range ofreconciliation, judicial and governance functions’. 772

7.2.2 FMS armed forces•

The South West ‘Special’ Police or Darwish. The South West darwish forces were establishedin 2014 with the aim to retake territory from al-Shabaab as well as to strengthen the newly
established state administration vis-à-vis the FGS. Originally selected by clan elders, they
disbanded in part in the following years on various accounts: lack of military capacity, reverted
to clan militias, colluded with SNA, surrendered to al-Shabaab. 773 As of 2020 they number
about 2 900 fighters, deployed to eight districts – out of the 18 districts of the South West761 Unpublished written information from a security organisation provided to EASO, 2020

762 RBC Radio, SOMALIA: South-west state endorses a new constitution, 8 November 2014, url

763 VOA, Somali Region Gets New President After Deadly Election Campaign, 19 December 2018, url
764 HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, February 2021, url, p. 15

765 HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, February 2021, url, p. 15

766 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 123
767 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 123
768 UN Habitat, Baidoa Urban Profile, June 2020, url, p. 8769 Sahan, The Somali Wire, Issues Jan-April 2021, n.d., source requiring registration

770 EASO, Country of Origin Information Report – Somalia Security Situation, 2017, url, pp. 86, 91, 94

771 Unpublished written information from a security organisation provided to EASO, 2020; UN, Country Results Report

Somalia 2020, March 2021, url, pp. 24, 57
772 Unpublished written information from a security organisation provided to EASO, 2020
773 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 130

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State. Each one of them has a 300-man contingent, while in the capital Baidoa, reportedly,about 500 Special Police forces operate. 774 Felbab-Brown states that ‘[d]espite its problematicbackground and record, the group is increasingly seen by local, federal and even someinternational actors as a source of force generation for the SNA’. 775
The South-West State Police. This is an official entity formally recognized under Somalia’s
security architecture. As of 2020 it numbers 824 officers and 12 US-trained investigators,
while recruitment is clan based in the given area. This police force is ‘tasked with community
policing, traffic policing, criminal investigations and countering gender violence’. 776

7.2.3 Other actors/forces
Apart from the local FMS ‘official’ armed forces, other actors/armed forces present in South-WestState include (the list is not exhaustive):
•

•
•

•

•

•

SNA. Various SNA units, including the SNA 14 October Battalion advanced element in Marka,
Battalion 7 in Afgoye, Battalion 26 in Wanlaweyn, and Danaab headquarters in Bali Doogle. 777
As of January 2020, between 600 and 700 members of the South-West Special Police (darwish)
were integrated into the SNA in the Bakool region, reportedly with no actual vetting
procedure. 778 As of December 2018, some 250 fighters from Mukhtar Robow’s militia were
integrated into the SNA, reportedly with no actual vetting procedure; 779
Somali Police Force. Reportedly the federal-level police force has 270 officers deployed in theSouth West State ‘in supervisory positions at police stations’. 780 For more details see section
on the Somali Police Force;
AMISOM, the ENDF, and the UPDF. The South West State encompasses part of Sector 3(Bakool and Bay) under the Ethiopian leadership (Ethiopian National Defence Force, ENDF),
and part of Sector 1 (Lower Shabelle) under the Ugandan leadership (Ugandan People’s
Defence Force, UPDF). For more details about AMISOM and its police contingent (also inSouth-West) see section on AMISOM Strength and regional presence;
Mukhtar Robow’s Militia. Mukhtar Robow’s militia, which is still active in the Hudur Districtof Bakool region, is predominantly drawn from the Rahanweyn clan and its Laysan sub-clan(Robow’s power base). Reportedly, between 100 and 200 of ‘his original militiamen, who werepart of al-Shabaab and defected with him’, have been placed by the NISA on its payroll: they
are supplied with weapons and money. Another 250 fighters instead were integrated into the
SNA; 781
Macawiisleey. Macawiisleey, is an Hawadle-led782 clan militia operating in the Lower Shabelle
region made of about 200 fighters. The name derives from the long sarong-like skirts worn by
its members, pastoralists and farmers, who organized recently to fight al-Shabaab’s excessive
taxation. The group, organised on a voluntary basis and sustained by the local communities,
has no support from the SNA or AMISOM; 783
Other Clan Militias. While instrumentally siding with al-Shabaab, the Bimal or Biyomal or
Biyomaal clan militia has engaged for years in a fierce confrontation with the local Habar Gidir

774 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 130
775 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 130
776 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 130

777 Sahan, The Somali Wire, Issues Jan-April 2021, n.d., source requiring registration
778 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 140
779 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 141
780 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 130
781 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 131

782 Keating M. and Waldman M., eds., War and Peace in Somalia – National Grievances, Local Conflict and Al-Shabaab,

Hurst and Company London, 2018, p. 101

783 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 129

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clan militia over the control of the land in and around the town of Marka. 784 In September
2020, after months-long process of negotiations, they reached a peace agreement. 785

7.2.4 Access to justice
For a first overview of the justice systems in Somalia see sections on Access to Justice, Formal andInformal Systems (including Customary Justice and Shari’ah Law) and on Access to Justice under AlShabaab.
In the South West state, same as elsewhere in Somalia, access to justice runs in parallel acrossdifferent channels: 786
•

•

•
•

Statutory Courts. According to the FGS Justice Report (2019) as quoted by HIPS in 2021, a totalof 14 statutory courts were operating in the South-West State in 2019.787 In line with theconstitutional provisions (Art. 108), and most of the FMS practice, the South West State
organised its own justice system around a three-tiered approach, with District (and regional
court), Appeal, and Supreme Courts. 788 These courts are sub-divided into shari’ah and statutory
courts. In Baidoa, ulama act as statutory court judges, with titles, they are employed by the
courts. Most cases reaching statutory courts are land disputes and murder cases (after thecustomary justice fails to settle a dispute); usually, in murder cases, collective responsibility
and compensation are applied in line with customary law, whereas capital and individual
punishment would be likely to spark retaliations and communal violence. Fees at statutory
courts include USD 50 per person for opening a case (Gal-Fur). If the case is business-related,the court charges USD 5 for every USD 100 of the amount in dispute. 789 Reportedly, judges andprosecutors in South West are not paid for extended periods of time; 790
Shari’ah Courts (shari’ah law, ulama). Most cases are actually handled outside (Shari’ah)courts, whereby ulama operate also from local mosques, schools or home offices. They address
predominantly inheritance, divorce, family disputes, land disputes, and commercial/businessdisputes. Fees: normally ulama do not charge a fee but receive donations. Popular ulama,
those held as the most knowledgeable, are known within the community and they are the ones
most often chosen to handle cases. According to estimates, individual ulama can handle
between 30-60 cases per month. However, they lack implementation and enforcement
capacity; 791
xeer, elders and elders councils. Customary justice (xeer) through elder councils, guurti ormalaq, work as the first port of call when a dispute arises. 792 These are distributed across thestate’s territory;
ADR Centres. Various ADR centres, which apply xeer as a supplementary approach to justiceunder the administration of the local MoJ, have been set up (see for more details section on
Customary Justice (xeer) and Alternative Dispute Resolution). More in particular, in Baidoa thefollowing centres are reportedly operative: Isha Centre (Isha village, Section One), State784 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 127; UNifeed, Somalia – Marka Reconciliation, 21

September 2020, url
785 UNifeed, Somalia – Marka Reconciliation, 21 September 2020, url
786 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, pp. 29-30
787 HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, p. 19
788 HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, p. 15;
Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, p. 29
789 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, pp. 29-30
790 HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, p. 23
791 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, pp. 29-30
792 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, p. 31; Expanding Access to Justice
Program, Access to Justice Assessment Tool 2020, Somalia Baseline Study Brief, url, pp. 1-2; HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s
Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, p. 27-28

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Community Center (at the State Presidential Palace), Wadajir Center (Wadajir village), Horseed
Center (Horseed village), Hawl-wadaag Center (Hawlwadaag village); 793
District Peace Committees. An unspecified number of DPCs have been set up and are runningin Bay and Bakool regions; 794
Al-Shabaab Courts. Al-Shabaab courts are popular in the areas under their control, but not
exclusively. Reportedly, in South Central Somalia, al-Shabaab courts are predominantly locatedin Baidoa (Bay region) and Afgoye (Lower Shabelle region). In cases in which a decision cannot
be reached by ulama (see above) or lacks enforcement, parties might turn to al-Shabaabcourts. 795

7.2.5 Security forces’ human rights conduct
Felbab-Brown reports that ‘[b]ecause of international human rights training and international
payments of salaries tied to human rights performance, the frequency of human rights violations by
the South-West State Police has decreased’. 796 On the occasion of Mukhtar Robow’s arrest and theensuing protests, human rights violations increased significantly when the international community
froze payment of salaries and officers increased extortion to generate income. 797
In the period 5 November 2019 – 9 February 2021, the UNSG, in its various reports on the situation in
Somalia, attributed to South-West security forces the following violations: (a) one incident of conflictrelated sexual violence at the hand of the South-West State forces (reporting period 5 August –4 November 2020); 798 (b) one incident of conflict-related sexual violence at the hand of the SouthWest Special Force personnel (reporting period 5 May – 4 August 2020); 799 (c) two journalists
arbitrarily arrested (period 5 February – 4 May 2020). 800
The UNSG indicated, in its latest report on Children and Armed Conflict (March 2020 – covering theperiod 1 August 2016 – 30 September 2019), that the country task force had verified the following
violations at the hand of the South-West security forces: 22 cases of child recruitment; 801 7 cases ofchildren deprived of their liberty for alleged association with al-Shabaab or pro-ISIL elements in
Somalia; 802 42 cases of killing and maiming of children; 803 42 cases of children victims of rape or sexual
violence; 804 three attacks on schools and hospitals; 805 one case of child abduction. 806 The violations
reported here above are in line with those reported by UNSOM during the period 1 January 2017 –31 December 2019. 807
For other violations (including grave violations against children) generally attributed to both federal
and state forces see section on FGS security institutions – security forces’ human rights conduct.

793 Expanding Access to Justice Program, Alternative Dispute Resolution Initiatives in Somalia, June 2020, url, pp. 10-11
794 Saferworld and Conflict Dynamics International, Sustainable community approaches to peacebuilding in securitised

environments: case study of Somalia, February 2020, url, p. 5
795 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, pp. 25-26
796 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 131
797 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 131
798 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 November 2020, url, p. 9799 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 August 2020, url, p. 10
800 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 May 2020, url, p. 8
801 UNSG, Children and Armed Conflict in Somalia, 4 March 2020, url, p. 5
802 UNSG, Children and Armed Conflict in Somalia, 4 March 2020, url, p. 7
803 UNSG, Children and Armed Conflict in Somalia, 4 March 2020, url, p. 8
804 UNSG, Children and Armed Conflict in Somalia, 4 March 2020, url, pp. 9-10
805 UNSG, Children and Armed Conflict in Somalia, 4 March 2020, url, p. 10
806 UNSG, Children and Armed Conflict in Somalia, 4 March 2020, url, p. 11
807 UNSOM and OHCHR, Protection of Civilians Report, Building the Foundation for Peace, Security and Human Rights in
Somalia, 1 January 2017 – 31 December 2019, 2020, url, pp. 32-34

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7.3 Benadir and Mogadishu
Geographically, Benadir is the traditional coastal region in South Central Somalia that stretches overvarious coastal towns, from Cadale in the north (Middle Shabelle) to Kismayo in the south (Lower
Juba), including Mogadishu, Marka, and Brava (also Barawa or Baraawe). 808 From an administrative
point of view instead, Benadir is one of the regions (gobol) of Somalia, and it covers basically the same
area as the city of Mogadishu, the site of the FGS: ‘Benadir, the capital city, remains a province under
the direct authority of the FGS’. 809 Benadir, as an administrative region, comprises the 17
administrative districts of the capital Mogadishu, which make it, by far, the most populated gobol in
Somalia. 810
The capital city, Mogadishu, ‘prides itself as a mother of the nation’, ‘a microcosm of Somalia’, withan ‘heterogenous population drawn from many clans’. 811 However, the dominant clan family is the
Hawiye with several sub-clans (Abgaal, Habar Gidir and Murasade). At the same time the Darood clanfamily – which dominates over some neighbourhoods - and minorities such as Yibr (sab) and Sheikhal
are also present. 812 As of 2021, Mogadishu’s population is estimated to be above 2.3 million people. 813
These would include between 500 000 814 and 800 000 815 IDPs. Reportedly they are mostly
concentrated in two districts, Daynille and Kaxda, which are located in the outskirts of Mogadishu(with over 55% of the IDP population as per 2016 data). 816

7.3.1 Relevant dynamics, territorial control, and governanceRelevant dynamics. Article 9 of the Somali Provisional Constitution stipulates that the status of thecapital city of Somalia (Mogadishu) ‘shall be determined in the constitutional review process, and thetwo houses of the Somali Federal Parliament shall enact a special law with regards to this issue’. 817
With adoption of this law still pending, in January 2021 President Farmaajo signed the Benadir Region
Representation Bill that allocates 13 additional Upper House seats to Benadir. However, the bill, which
was not approved within a constitutional review process, is in direct violation of the provisional
constitution, which caps the number of senators at 54, divided equally among Somalia’s 18 regions. 818
Currently, the Benadir region has no representation in Upper House of the Somali parliament. 819
Against this backdrop, the status of Mogadishu (and of the Benadir region) remains highly disputed.
On the one hand, at least a portion of the city residents would like to make of Benadir a stand-alone
self-governing entity, 820 on the other hand the FGS leadership opposes this, as the central government‘would lose vast powers’: ‘the FGS president appoints mayors and several deputies and mobilizes

808 Encyclopaedia Britannica, Benadir, n.d., url; Enciclopedia Treccani, Benadir, n.d., url;809 HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, February 2021, url, p. 9810 HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, February 2021, url, p. 18

811 Halbeeg, The Politics of Representation: ‘Mogadishu Status Conundrum’, Policy Brief no. 2, July 2020, url, pp. 5-7
812 ACCORD, Clans in Somalia – Report on a lecture by Joakim Gundel, COI Workshop Vienna, 15 May 2009 (Revised

Edition), 2009, url, p. 15, 19
813 World Population Review, Mogadishu, 2021, url
814 UNHCR, Operation Portal – IDP Situations, CCCM Cluster Somalia, 9 April 2020, url
815 Halbeeg, The Politics of Representation: ‘Mogadishu Status Conundrum’, Policy Brief no. 2, July 2020, url, p. 3
816 Somalia, MoIFAR, Internal Displacement Profiling in Mogadishu, April 2016, url, pp. 3-4
817 Somalia, Provisional Constitution, 1 August 2012, url
818 Halbeeg, The Politics of Representation: ‘Mogadishu Status Conundrum’, Policy Brief no. 2, July 2020, url, pp. 7-8; HIPS,The State of Somalia Report, February 2021, url, p. 19
819 Halbeeg, The Politics of Representation: ‘Mogadishu Status Conundrum’, Policy Brief no. 2, July 2020, url, pp. 7-8
820 HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, February 2021, url, p. 18; Halbeeg, The Politics of Representation: ‘Mogadishu Status
Conundrum’, Policy Brief no. 2, July 2020, url, pp. 5-6

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them as needed for political, financial and security reasons’. 821 Another crucial aspect is the allocationof the seats earmarked for the Benadir region: the usual 4.5 power sharing formula is put forward as
a possible criteria for their distribution, while critics of this clan-based system fear it would ignite again
infightings among ‘rival clans competing to assert their dominance over Mogadishu’. 822
Territorial Control and Influence. Mogadishu is officially controlled by the FGS security institutions
and AMISOM. 823 At the same time al-Shabaab has heavily infiltrated the state apparatus (see section
on Al-Shabaab Infiltration), 824 it exerts its activities right in the heart of the city, including tax
collection 825 and terrorist attacks, 826 (see section on Al-Shabaab and subsections for details), and‘wishes to influence’ the resident population. 827
Governance. In terms of governance structure, as of April 2021 the situation in Benadir can besummarised as follow:• The Benadir Regional Administration (BRA). While the FGS has its site in Mogadishu and exerts
its authority over it (see for details the section on the Federal Government of Somalia), at
regional administrative level the town is governed by the Benadir Regional Administration(BRA). The BRA is headed by a mayor, who is assisted by its deputy, its executives (taxes, town
clerk), and a secretary general. The BRA is comprised of a number of departments, including,among others: a) Human Resource Management b) Finance c) Taxation d) Market e) Revenuesf) Public Assets & Trade. 828 No specific information on the regional assembly could be foundwithin the given time limits and among the consulted sources;• Mayor of Mogadishu. The city of Mogadishu is governed by the city mayor – appointed by the
FGS’s president - who acts as well as the governor of the BRA. As of 23 August 2019, Omar
Mohamud Mohamed, better known as Omar ‘Finnish’ - or ‘Filish’ 829- is the mayor of
Mogadishu and the head of Benadir Regional Administration; 830• Districts, district commissioners, and district councils. Mogadishu is divided into 17 districts.
These are: Abdiaziz, Bondhere, Daynile, Dharkenley, Hamar-Jajab, Hamar-Weyne, Hodan,
Howl-Wadag, Huriwa (Heliwa), Kaxda, Karan, Shangani, Shibis, Waberi, Wadajir (Medina),
Warta Nabada (previously Whardiigleey), and Yaqshid. 831 A district commissioner heads eachof these districts, 832 assisted by a deputy, district officers, a district security commander
and/or police commissioner, judges and traditional leaders. Reportedly, as of December 2020,
no District Councils existed in Benadir. 833 As of May 2020, no district council was formed in
the Heliwa and the Kaxda districts, while no information was available among the consulted
sources for the other districts. 834
821 HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, February 2021, url, p. 18

822 Halbeeg, The Politics of Representation: ‘Mogadishu Status Conundrum’, Policy Brief no. 2, July 2020, url, p. 7

823 Finland, Finnish immigration Service, Somalia Fact-Finding Mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation andhumanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, url, p. 7

824Finland, Finnish immigration Service , Somalia Fact-Finding Mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation andhumanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, url, pp. 12-14
825 Finland, Finnish immigration Service , Somalia Fact-Finding Mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation andhumanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, url, pp. 3, 6, 13-14, 28
826 Finland, Finnish immigration Service, Somalia Fact-Finding Mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation andhumanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, url, pp. 3, 4, 7-12
827 Finland, Finnish immigration Service, Somalia Fact-Finding Mission to Mogadishu in March 2020, Security situation andhumanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, url, p. 17
828 Benadir Regional Administration, Government of Somalia, About Benadir and Benadir/Departments, n.d., url
829 Horn Observer, Farmajo wants Sharif to help him demilitarise Mogadishu, 5 May 2021, url
830 APA News, From warlord to Mogadishu mayor, 23 August 2019, url; Teller Report, Somalia: "Omar Finnish" Named New
Mayor of Mogadishu – RFI, 23 August 2019, url
831 Benadir Regional Administration, Government of Somalia, About Benadir, n.d., url
832 Benadir Regional Administration, Government of Somalia, About Benadir, n.d., url
833 UN Somalia, Country Results Report Somalia 2020, March 2021, url, pp. 57
834 Unpublished written information from a security organisation provided to EASO, 202089

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Actors•

Local Councils of Elders. As of May 2020, in Heliwa, a local council of elders was up andrunning, while in Kaxda it was not set up yet.835

7.3.2 BRA forces
As to the Federal Forces and Security Institutions please see the relevant section on security
institutions under the FGS.
•

Benadir Regional Police. In April 2021, the outgoing President Farmaajo removed former
Benadir Regional Police Commander, General Sadaq Omar Mohamed ‘aka Sadaq John’, fromhis post for protesting against term extension. 836

7.3.3 Other actors/forces
Apart from the FGS ‘official’ armed forces (see section on FGS security forces), other actors/armed
forces present in Benadir include (the list is not exhaustive):•

AMISOM. AMISOM contingents are deployed in Benadir (and Mogadishu) under Ugandan
command. 837 For further details see section on AMISOM;•

Clan militias. A number of clan and personal militias are easily mobilised in Mogadishu. This has
occurred on more than one occasion during the first months of 2021 on the backdrop of the ongoing political and electoral impasse whereby the incumbent government and opposition forces
have clashed against each other, also militarily; 838•

Private Military and Security Companies (PMSC). Sources report there are several types of private
military security firms operating in Mogadishu. 839 Bancroft, GardaWorld, and G4S are among theprivate security companies supposed ‘to support the state-building and humanitarian
engagement of (primarily) Western countries and the associated multi-lateral and nongovernmental organisations in place on the ground’. 840 Reportedly these companies are ‘heavily
reliant upon so-called ‘local’ partners’ who provide strategic information, and constitute ‘a pointof access into clan, kinship and personal relations and the political capital necessary to operate’. 841
More in particular, Bancroft, in collaboration with AMISOM, secured an area of land around
Mogadishu’s airport that has over the years become a ‘green zone’ for the international
community, including international and local firms. Among others, PMSCs are primarily tasked
with risk management services, armed security, and convoy protection, while playing the role ofgatekeepers between the green zone and the city; 842

835 Unpublished written information from a security organisation provided to EASO, 2020

836 Goobjoog News, Mogadishu police boss kicked out after ‘ordering’ parliament to go home, 12 April 2021, url
837 Sahan, The Somali Wire, Issues Jan-April 2021, n.d., source requiring registration

838 Reuters, Somali government forces, opposition clash in Mogadishu over election protest, 19 February 2021, url;

Reuters, Forces opposed to Somali president control parts of Mogadishu, 27 April 2021, url; The New Arab, Can Somalia's
prime minister end the country's election crisis?, 4 May 2021, url
839 Majid N., Norman J., LSE Blog, Private Military and Security Companies in Somalia, 27 August 2020, url; See also:
Menkhaus K., Non-State Security Providers and Political Formation in Somalia, April 2016, url, p. 30
840 Majid N., Norman J., LSE Blog, Private Military and Security Companies in Somalia, 27 August 2020, url; Menkhaus K.,
Non-State Security Providers and Political Formation in Somalia, April 2016, url, p. 30
841 Norman J., LSE, CRP, Private Military and Security Companies and the Political Marketplace in Mogadishu, 13 August
2020, url, p. 1
842 Norma J., LSE, CRP, Private Military and Security Companies and the Political Marketplace in Mogadishu, 13 August
2020, url, pp. 1-2

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Duguf Enterprise Security Services (DESS). DESS is one of the main local enterprises for security
services. Recently they renewed their contract as security providers for the UN System(UNSOS); 843
UN Guard Unit (UNGU). UNGU contingents from Uganda are tasked with protecting the UN
compounds in Mogadishu. 844 About 600 officers and enlisted troops, protect the UN Assistance
Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), as well as other parts of
the UN system; 845
ISSEE. Formerly known as International School for Search ant Explosives Engineers, this UK funded
company provides support to the Somali government and its (international) partners. 846

7.3.4 Access to justice
For a first overview of the justice systems in Somalia see sections on Access to justice, formal andinformal systems (including customary justice and shari’ah law) and on Access to justice under AlShabaab.
As to justice facilities and institutions in Mogadishu, the situation can be summarised as follows:
•

•
•
•

•

Statutory Courts. According to the FGS Justice Report (2019) as quoted by HIPS in 2021, a totalof 16 active courts (in most of the districts) were operating in Benadir in 2019. 847 They areorganised according to the usual three-tiered approach (Court of First Instance - also known as
Benadir Courts, active at district level, Appeals Court, and Supreme Court); 848
Shari’ah Courts. No specific information on this point could be found within the given time
limits and among the consulted sources;
Al-Shabaab (Mobile) Courts. Al-Shabaab also operates mobile courts in Mogadishu. 849 ‘In
Mogadishu there are al-Shabaab courts in Heliwaa, one in Daynile, one in Bakara, at Arbacow
area of KM 13, and Eelasha Biyaha’.; 850
xeer, Elders and Elders Councils. Customary justice (xeer) through elder councils, guurti ormalaq, work as the first port of call when a dispute arises. 851 Along with official ADR centres(see below), several other voluntary ‘ADR’ centres and spontaneous initiatives are run byelders; 852
ADR Centres. There are three ADR centres, established and run by the MoJ ADRU (Unit), which
apply xeer as a supplementary approach to justice. They cover most of Mogadishu’s districts.
They are located in following districts: (1) Kaaraan (covering the districts of Kaaraan, Abdiaziz,
and Yaqshiid), (2) Hamar Jabjab (covering the districts of Hamar Weyn, Bondheere, Waberi,and Shangani), and (3) Hodan (covering Hodan, Howlwadag, Wardhiigley, Wadajir,andDharkenley). ADR centres members are selected by the MoJ and district authorities, after

843 Africa Intelligence, Duguf becomes go-to security provider for UN in Somalia, 7 January 2021, url

844 UN News, Service and Sacrifice: Ugandan 'Blue Helmets' support UN efforts to bring peace to Somalia, 18 April 2019, url
845 UNSOS, New UN Guard Unit starts duties protecting world body’s staff in Mogadishu, 29 July 2019, url; UN News,

Service and Sacrifice: Ugandan 'Blue Helmets' support UN efforts to bring peace to Somalia, 18 April 2019, url
846 Africa Intelligence, London deploys ISSEE deminers to Somalia, 10 February 2021, url; ISSEE, website, n.d., url
847 HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, p. 19
848 HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, p. 15
849 Expanding Access to Justice Program, Pathways and Institutions for Resolving Land Disputes in Mogadishu, January
2020, url, pp. 14, 17-18
850 Expanding Access to Justice Program, Pathways and Institutions for Resolving Land Disputes in Mogadishu, January
2020, url, p. 17
851 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, p. 31; Expanding Access to Justice
Program, Access to Justice Assessment Tool 2020, Somalia Baseline Study Brief, url, pp. 1-2; HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s
Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, p. 27-28
852 Expanding Access to Justice Program, Alternative Dispute Resolution Initiatives in Somalia, June 2020, url, p. 991

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Actors•

consultation with local elders. 853 These three ADR branches are provided by the ADRU with a
one room office, a secretary, and a monthly transportation allowance of USD100 while they‘solve around 35–40 cases per month’; 854
District Peace Committees (DPC): 17 District Peace Committees are active in Mogadishu: ‘They
work similarly to newer ADR centers established by the MoJ’, although most of the time ‘DPCs
work independently, and without support from donors or the government’. ‘Members
volunteer without salaries or incentives, often out of a sense of duty’. 855 They are run by local
communities with support from SOYDEN, a local NGO. As reported by USAID, ‘[a]lthough the
DPCs’ main objective was to build and maintain local peace, they often perform de facto local
justice provision and dispute resolution, based on the xeer and its related norms andprocesses’. 856 ‘Community members select committee members, who then allocate positions
within the committee among themselves’. ‘The committees work directly with district courts(where available) and police, which refer cases that are likely to be resolvable by mediation’. 857

7.3.5 Security forces’ human rights conduct
For an overview on the human rights conduct of the FGS security institutions, which are based in
Mogadishu, see section under the FGS on Security Forces’ Human Rights Conduct.
The USDOS latest report on human rights practices in Somalia (2021), states that in the course of 2020‘[t]here were only a handful of lawsuits during the year seeking damages for or cessation of humanrights abuses’, and that ‘[t]he Benadir Regional Court… received four cases pertaining to abuses by
NISA, police, and the Mogadishu municipality’. Moreover, ‘[i]ndividuals generally do not pursue legal
remedies for abuses due to a lack of trust and confidence in the fairness of judicial procedures’. 858
Journalists and media workers continued to face challenges exercising their right to freedom of
expression. 859 Among others, in the period 5 November 2019 – 4 February 2020, the UN Secretary
General reported about seven journalists who were harassed and threatened by security forces in
Benadir. 860

7.4 Hirshabelle
Hirshabelle, the youngest member state in the Somali federal system, was established in 2016. It
comprises two regions: Hiraan, whose dominant clan is the Hawadle and has its regional capital in
Beletweyne, 861 and the Middle Shabelle region, whose dominant clan is the Abgaal (both clans belong
to the Hawiye clan-family), which has its regional capital in Jowhar. 862 Among others the state hosts alarge Bantu community - also called Jareer (‘hard’ hair) - in the Shabelle valley. 863

853 Expanding Access to Justice Program, Alternative Dispute Resolution Initiatives in Somalia, June 2020, url, p. 9854 Expanding Access to Justice Program, Pathways and Institutions for Resolving Land Disputes in Mogadishu, January

2020, url, p. 16
855 Expanding Access to Justice Program, Alternative Dispute Resolution Initiatives in Somalia, June 2020, url, pp. 5, 9
856 Expanding Access to Justice Program, Alternative Dispute Resolution Initiatives in Somalia, June 2020, url, p. 5
857 Expanding Access to Justice Program, Alternative Dispute Resolution Initiatives in Somalia, June 2020, url, pp. 9-10
858 USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2020 - Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 12859 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 August 2020, url, p. 9
860 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 February 2020, url, pp. 8-9
861
UN Habitat, Beledweyne Urban Profile, 2020, November 2020, url, p. 6
862
HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, February 2021, url, p. 16
863
Somali Bantu, Somali Bantu History, March 2018, url; Minority Rights, Somalia Bantu, March 2018, url; Bantu Ethnic
Identity in Somalia, Annale d’Ethiopie, url, pp. 323-324

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7.4.1 Relevant dynamics, territorial control, and governanceRelevant Dynamics. As reported by HIPS, during the negotiation process that led to the establishmentof the federal member state, these two dominant clans entered into an informal agreement toexchange the state capital and the presidency: the Abgaal agreed to give the presidency to Hawadle
in exchange for the state capital being based in Jowhar. 864
In November 2020, when Ali Abdullahi Hussein – from the Hawiye-Abgaal sub-clan, better known as
Ali ‘Gudlawe’, an ally of the current FGS leadership (Farmaajo) – was elected president of the
Hirshabelle state with 86 votes, political protests and a separatist movement surfaced again in
Hiraan. 865 Members of the local dominant Hawadle clan protested against the Abgaal’s supposed
power grab on the state administration. This was perceived as a violation of the informal agreement
which underpinned the state formation, 866 which then led to the formation of an armed separatist
movement – the Hiraan Salvation Council (see below for more details). 867 This movement isdemanding the traditional (and still intact) Hiraan province to be separated from Hirshabelle, and ‘tobe divided into two administrative regions’, so to be able to constitute a federal member state initself. 868 The movement opposes as well the presence of Federal Government aligned state officials in
Beletweyne, 869 including the Hirshabelle State vice president and the police commissioner. 870
Territorial Control and Influence. As reported by HIPS, a significant portion of the state territory iscontrolled by al-Shabaab, notably the entire northern section of the Middle Shabelle province, as well
as ‘key districts’ in Hiiraan region. 871 The group has also managed to disrupt major supply routes,
including the main road linking Mogadishu-Balcad-Jowhar-Mahadaay and then leading to Bula Burtoand Beletweyne. 872 AMISOM and FGS officials use airplanes to travel around and supply Hiraan
districts. Jowhar, the state capital, is regularly exposed to attacks from the group. 873
Governance. In terms of governance structure and state-building process, as of April 2021 thesituation in Hirshabelle state can be summarised as follow:
•
•

864

Constitution: the constitution of the Hirshabelle state of Somalia was adopted on 5 October
2016; 874
President. Hirshabelle State President is Ali Abdullahi Hussein (better known as Ali ‘Gudlawe’),
who was elected by the Hirshabelle parliament in November 2020 for a five-year term (after
the parliament had amended the state constitution which originally foresaw a four-yearterm); 875

HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, February 2021, url, p. 16

865 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 17 February 2021, url, p. 2; HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, February 2021, url, p. 3;

ACLED, A turbulent run-up to elections in Somalia, 7 April 2021, url
866 HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, February 2021, url, p. 17
867 Hiraan, Hiiraan resistance faction gives HirShabelle Gov't officials 48 hrs to exit from Beletweyne, 16 February 2021, url
868 HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, February 2021, url, p. 17
869 ACLED, A turbulent run-up to elections in Somalia, 7 April 2021, url; Hiiraan Online, Hiiraan resistance faction gives
HirShabelle Gov't officials 48 hrs to exit from Beletweyne, 16 February 2021, url
870 Hiiraan Online, Hiiraan resistance faction gives HirShabelle Gov't officials 48 hrs to exit from Beletweyne, 16 February
2021, url
871 HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, February 2021, url, p. 17
872 UN Security Council, Letter dated 12 October 2020 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant toresolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia addressed to the President of the Security Council, 15 October 2020, url, pp. 910; NUPI, Assessing the effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Somalia, 2018, url, pp. 32-35, 44
873 HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, February 2021, url, pp. 17-18
874 Legal Expert, email, 10 May 2021
875 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 17 February 2021, url, p. 2; HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, February 2021, url, p. 17

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•
•

•

•

Parliament. The Hirshabelle parliament, based in Jowhar, comprises 99 members, who were
sworn in in October 2020, 876 for a four-year term; 877
Regional Governors, Governments and Assemblies: (a) In Hiraan, the regional governor is Ali
Jeyte (November 2020); 878 (b) Middle Shabelle region, with the state capital Jowhar is the siteof the state government. 879 No specific information on the regional assembly could be foundwithin the given time limits and among the consulted sources;
Districts, district commissioners, and district councils. Overall, the Hirshabelle State comprises
seven districts, with following breakdown per region: (a) Hiraan: Belet Weyne (Beledweyne),
Buulo Barde (Bulo Burto, Buloburde), and Jalalaqsi; (b) Middle Shabelle: Adale, Adan Yabal,
Balcad (Balad), and Jowhar. 880 As of May 2020, out of the five prioritised district councils in
Hirshabelle – Balcad, Beletweyene, Buulobarde, Jowhar and Warsheikh – only Warsheikh’s wascompleted, while preparatory efforts were underway in Beletweyne; 881
Local council of elders. In an unspecified number of locations across South-Central Somalia
local councils of elders reportedly ‘continue to provide a multi-faceted forum covering a rangeof reconciliation, judicial and governance functions’. 882

7.4.2 FMS armed forces••

Hirshabelle Darwish. No specific information on this point could be found within the given time
limits and among the consulted sources.
Hirshabelle State Police (and State Police Darwish Units and Special Police Units). As of
February 2020, a total of about 800 police officers were or were going to be trained at the
Jowhar Police Training Centre, 883 while at least 579 were in service as of May 2020. 884

7.4.3 Other actors/forces
Apart from the local FMS ‘official’ armed forces, other actors/armed forces present in Hirshabelle
include (the list is not exhaustive):••

SNA and SPF. Various SNA/SPF units (including battalions, Danab and Haramcad forces) arepresent in Hirshabelle; 885
AMISOM Military and Police. Burundi National Defence Forces (BNDF) are responsible for the
Middle Shabelle Region (Sector 5), while Djibouti Forces are responsible for the Hiraan region(together with Galgadud it makes sector 4).886 An unspecified number (in the tens) of AMISOM
Individual Police Officers are stationed in Jowhar and Beletweyne; 887

876 HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, February 2021, url, p. 17; Hirshabelle, The Interim Constitution of the Regional Stateof Hirshabelle adopted 5th October 2016 by the Delegates, 2016, non public source, art. 33
877 Hirshabelle, The Interim Constitution of the Regional State of Hirshabelle adopted 5th October 2016 by the Delegates,
2016, non-public source, Article 33
878 Hiiraan Online, Clan militia join ‘separatist’ General Hud faction in Hiiraan region, 30 November 2020, url
879 HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, February 2021, url, p. 16
880 EASO, Country of Origin Information Report – Somalia Security Situation, 2017, url, pp. 97, 100
881 Unpublished written information from a security organisation provided to EASO, 2020
882 Unpublished written information from a security organisation provided to EASO, 2020
883 UNSOM, The NPM Newsletter, No. 29, August 2019, url, p. 2; UNSOM, The NPM Newsletter, No. 35, February 2020, url,
p. 2
884 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 May 2020, url, para. 68
885 Sahan, The Somali Wire, Issues Jan-April 2021, n.d., source requiring registration
886 NUPI, Assessing the effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Somalia, 2018, url, pp. 18, 56; see also AMISOM,
AMISOM Military Component, n.d., url
887 NUPI, Assessing the effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Somalia, 2018, url, p. 62

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•

•
•
•
•

Hiraan Salvation Council. General Abukar Haji Warsame, better known as General Abukar‘Hud’ (or ‘Xuud’) is at the head of the armed separatist movement which has its base on theoutskirts of Beletweyne. The group, which has an unspecified number of fighters, receives
support from the Hawiye-Galjacel (Gaal-jecel) clan militia (also known as Westland Militia) 888
in Hiraan; 889
Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a. This multi-clan Sufi armed group has a limited presence in Hiraan. 890
See for details the section on Galmudug Other Actors/Forces;
Macawiisleey. Sources report local Macawiisleey militia presence and activities in
Hirshabelle; 891
Bantu/Shidle Militia. Reported presence and activities; 892
Hawiye/Abgaal Militia. Reported presence and activities. 893

7.4.4 Access to justice
For a first overview of the justice systems in Somalia, see sections on Access to Justice, Formal andInformal Systems (including Customary Justice and Shari’ah Law) and on Access to Justice under AlShabaab.
As to justice facilities and institutions in Hirshabelle, the situation can be summarised as follows:
•

•
•
•
•

Statutory Courts. The state is ‘far behind in institutionalizing its judicial branch’. 894 According
to the FGS Justice Report (2019) as quoted by HIPS in 2021, a total of 12 active courts (in mostof the districts) 895 were operating in Hirshabelle in 2019. They are organised according to theusual three-tiered approach (Court of First Instance, at district level, Appeals Court, and State
Supreme Court); 896
Al-Shabaab Courts. Al-Shabaab mobile courts operate in Hirshabelle; 897
Shari’ah Courts. See for general background information the section on Shari’ah Law;
xeer, elders and elders councils. Customary justice (xeer) through elder councils, guurti ormalaq, work as the first port of call when a dispute arises; 898
ADR Centres. There are ADR centres in Jowhar, which apply xeer as a supplementary approachto justice, and which were established by the MoJ ADRU (Unit); 899

888 Keating M. and Waldman M., eds., War and Peace in Somalia – National Grievances, Local Conflict and Al-Shabaab,

Hurst and Company London, 2018, p. 101

889 Hiiraan Online, Clan militia join ‘separatist’ General Hud faction in Hiiraan region, 30 November 2020, url; Hiiraan

Online, Fighting heard in Beledweyne after days of protest, 4 December 2020, url; Hiiraan Online, Farmaajo pushing Hiiraan
to the brink through suppression and military force- Ex-Minister Godah Barre, 5 December 2020, url; ACLED, A turbulent
run-up to elections in Somalia, 7 April 2021, url
890 Saferworld, Clans, contention and consensus - Federalism and inclusion in Galmudug, June 2020, url, p. vii
891 Strategic Intelligence, Several Al Shabaab Killed, Dozen Injured After Macawiisley Militia Attacks Militant Camp In
Beledweyne, 23 October 2019, url; International Crisis Group, Tracking Conflict Worldwide, May 2021, url
892 Sheikh Abass K., Conflict Assessment Report – Hirshabelle State, 2017, url, pp. 9-10, 13
893 Sheikh Abass K., Conflict Assessment Report – Hirshabelle State, 2017, url, pp. 9-10, 13-14
894 HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, p. 18
895 HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, p. 19
896 HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, p. 15
897 Africa News, Somali state opens sharia court to rival al Shabaab justice system, 26 July 2017, url; Garowe Online,
Somalia: People warned against seeking justice in Al-Shabaab courts, 30 December 2018, url; see also Expanding Access toJustice Program, Pathways and Institutions for Resolving Land Disputes in Mogadishu, January 2020, url, pp. 14, 17
898 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, p. 31; Expanding Access to Justice
Program, Access to Justice Assessment Tool 2020, Somalia Baseline Study Brief, url, pp. 1-2; HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s
Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, p. 27-28
899 Expanding Access to Justice Program, Alternative Dispute Resolution Initiatives in Somalia, June 2020, url, p. 8

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District Peace Committees (DPCs). An unspecified number of DPC operate in both Hiraan andMiddle Shabelle region. 900

7.4.5 Security forces’ human rights conduct
Journalists and media workers faced challenges exercising their right to freedom of expression. 901
Among others, in the period 5 November 2019 – 4 February 2020, the UNSG reported about eight
journalists briefly arrested, and other media organisations suspended. 902 The USDOS in its humanrights report noted that in the course of 2019, the National Union of Somali Journalists (NUSOJ)
documented 25 cases of arbitrary arrests or prolonged detentions of journalists and other media
workers, of which eight occurred in Hirshabelle. 903 In January 2019 more than 10 businessmen werearrested by Hirshabelle authorities after being accused of paying taxes to al-Shabaab. 904For otherviolations (including grave violations against children) generally attributed to both federal and state
forces, see section on FGS Security Institutions – Security Forces’ Human Rights Conduct.

7.5 Galmudug
Galmudug state, which was established in 2015, comprises 1.5 administrative regions: Galgadud g(also Galgadug) and approximately half of Mudug. 905 The state is predominantly inhabited by clans of
the Hawiye family, notably Hawiye-Habar Gidir, of the Saad (centred in Galkacyo), Suliman (centred in
Adaado), and Air (or Cayr) subclans (centered in Dhusamareb). Among others, Hawiye-Murasade,Hawiye-Abgaal, Hawiye-Habar Gidir-Duduble and Saruur, as well as smaller enclaves of DaroodMarehan and Dir are also present. 906
The Mudug region is de facto split into two entities, with Puntland controlling the northern half, 907
including half of the city of Galkacyo, along the Tomaselli line (clan-based demarcation). 908 This divide
mirrors clan divisions between two rival clan families: the Darood (specifically Majeerteen-Omar
Mahmood sub-clan) who dominate Galkacyo’s Puntland-administered north, and the Hawiye(specifically Habar Gidir-Saad sub-clan) who dominate the south of the town. 909

7.5.1 Relevant dynamics, territorial control, and governanceRelevant Dynamics. HIPS commented in one of its recent policy briefs that ‘[i]n many ways, Galmudug
stands out among federal member states, as it is the home state of the current president’ [Farmaajo],
as well as of ‘many of Somalia’s well-known politicians and prominent business people’, and yet, ‘themost dysfunctional state in the federation’. 910

900 Saferworld and Conflict Dynamics International, Sustainable community approaches to peacebuilding in securitised

environments: case study of Somalia, February 2020, url, p. 5
901 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 August 2020, url, p. 9
902 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 February 2020, url, p. 9
903 USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2019 - Somalia, 11 March 2020, url, p. 16
904 USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2019 - Somalia, 11 March 2020, url, p. 7905 Saferworld, Clans, contention and consensus - Federalism and inclusion in Galmudug, June 2020, url, pp. iii, 5, 26
906 Saferworld, Clans, contention and consensus - Federalism and inclusion in Galmudug, June 2020, url, p. 19; see also
HIPS, The Galmudug Crisis: A Blueprint For Sustainable Settlement, Policy Brief 19, September 2019, url, pp. 3-4
907 HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, February 2021, url, p. 15; International Crisis Group, Galkacyo and Somalia’s
Dangerous Faultlines, 10 December 2015, url
908 International Crisis Group, Galkacyo and Somalia’s Dangerous Faultlines, 10 December 2015, url
909 International Crisis Group, Galkacyo and Somalia’s Dangerous Faultlines, 10 December 2015, url
910 HIPS, The Galmudug Crisis: A Blueprint For Sustainable Settlement, Policy Brief 19, September 2019, url, p. 1;
Saferworld, Clans, contention and consensus - Federalism and inclusion in Galmudug, June 2020, url, p. 5

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Besides minorities, the state is officially inhabited by 11 sub-clans, each one of them with its politicalleverage. However, three among these sub-clans outsize the others in terms of overall power andinfluence, the Habar Gidir- Saad, Suliman, and Air, whose disunity is ‘central to the fragmentation of
the state’. 911 In addition to the 11 sub clans that formed the state in 2015, ‘Galmudug has a dizzying
number of actors with considerable sway over the various parts of the state’. 912 Among these:
•

•

•

•

Ahlu Sunna Wal-Jama’ah: the multi-clan (Ayr, Dir and Marehan clans) 913 armed Sufi group, at
length supported by Ethiopia, 914 used to be the most powerful military actor in the state. ‘For
over a decade, the ASWJ has successfully fended off Al Shabaab from the areas under its
control, particularly the capital Dhusamareb and surrounding districts’, without the assistanceof AMISOM. 915 In the period 2016-2018, during the Galmudug’s state building process ASWJ
was incorporated into the FMS political system. As per the Djibouti Agreement from January
2018, ASWJ agreed to join the State administration and to integrate its forces into Galmudug’s
forces and the national army. 916 During this period ASWJ was also granted 89 seats in the
Galmudug parliament (whose seat was in Adaado) –‘making it the largest group politically in
the FMS’. 917 However, in the period 2019-2020, the group, also weakened by internal disputes,
progressively lost its political and military power, affected by the rivalry between the State andthe FGS administration. In the 2020 election process the number of seats allocated to the group
was reduced to 20, drawn from the existing clan allocations. 918 From a military perspective see
section below on Other Actors/Forces;
Galkacyo Community. In 2019, the Galkacyo community concluded a three-day conference
aimed at consolidating its political position within the federal member state, by demandingthat it should be allocated the presidential seat (the state capital is Dhusamareb while Adaado
is the seat of the State Parliament); 919
Adaado Coalition. This group or ‘camp’ is comprised of local clan leaders and national
politicians who have broader political ambitions in the state and in the country. 920 Adaado is a
strategic city that connects Gaalkacyo (and northeastern regions) to the rest of the Galmudug’s
state, 921 and is now the seat of the State legislature, 922 after contending it with Dhusamareb; 923
clan rivalries. Although in recent years ‘major inter-clan conflicts appear to have decreased
between Galmudug’s districts and there is a level of freedom of movement across the region’,sub-clan relations remain fractured and tense in rural areas, where low-level conflicts are
frequent, and where clan militias are not disarmed. 924 See for more details section on Other
Actors/Forces.

Territorial Control and Influence. As of January 2021, as reported by HIPS ‘Al-Shabaab continued tocontrol almost the entire eastern shore and parts of the center’ of the Galmudug state, ‘including four
911 HIPS, The Galmudug Crisis: A Blueprint For Sustainable Settlement, Policy Brief 19, September 2019, url, p. 4912 HIPS, The Galmudug Crisis: A Blueprint For Sustainable Settlement, Policy Brief 19, September 2019, url, p. 2
913 Saferworld, Clans, contention and consensus - Federalism and inclusion in Galmudug, June 2020, url, p. 19

914 HIPS, The Galmudug Crisis: A Blueprint For Sustainable Settlement, Policy Brief 19, September 2019, url, p. 4; Felbab-

Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, pp. 129, 141
915 HIPS, The Galmudug Crisis: A Blueprint For Sustainable Settlement, Policy Brief 19, September 2019, url, p. 2
916 Saferworld, Clans, contention and consensus - Federalism and inclusion in Galmudug, June 2020, url, p. 11
917 Saferworld, Clans, contention and consensus - Federalism and inclusion in Galmudug, June 2020, url, p. 11
918 Saferworld, Clans, contention and consensus - Federalism and inclusion in Galmudug, June 2020, url, pp. 19-20
919 HIPS, The Galmudug Crisis: A Blueprint For Sustainable Settlement, Policy Brief 19, September 2019, url, p. 3
920 SPA and Interpeace, Galmudug Reconciliation: Processes, Challenges, and Opportunities Ahead, February 2021, url, pp.
15-19
921 HIPS, The Galmudug Crisis: A Blueprint For Sustainable Settlement, Policy Brief 19, September 2019, url, p. 3
922 SPA and Interpeace, Galmudug Reconciliation: Processes, Challenges, and Opportunities Ahead, February 2021, url, p.
17; Goobjoog News, Adado town is the seat of Galmudug State Assembly says president Farmaajo, 23 January 2018, url
923 Berghof Foundation, Conflict Assessment, Galmudug State, 2019, url, p. 9924 Saferworld, Clans, contention and consensus - Federalism and inclusion in Galmudug, June 2020, url, p. 33

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major districts: El-Dheer, El-Buur, Galhareeri and Haradheere’, out of the ten in the state. 925 Morevoer,‘the militant group is only about 40 kilometers outside the state capital Dhuusamarreeb’. 926 The
remaining six districts are reportedly controlled by a ‘patchwork of militias loyal to a local sub clan’,over which the state ‘was never able to consolidate power, thus remaining perpetually weak andpoor’. 927 The area (that used to be) of operation for ASWJ - especially in the Dhusamareb, Balanbal,
and Caabudwaaq districts, 928 is one of the few areas in Somalia, apart from Puntland and Somaliland,‘where unfettered travel on roads is possible for 200–300 kilometres’. 929
Governance. While ‘[m]any institutions – especially at the district level – are yet to be fully formalisedor have developed unevenly’, 930 in terms of governance structure and state-building process, as ofApril 2021 the situation in Galmudug state can be summarised as follows:
•
•

•
•
•

•

Constitution: Galmudug’s eleven main clans agreed on a state constitution on occasion of the
Adaado conference in July 2015; 931
President. Galmudug’s president is Ahmed Abdi Karie (better known as ‘Qoor Qoor’), ‘a former
FGS minister who was openly supported by Mogadishu’, and who was elected by the stateparliament on 2 February 2020, at the end of a very contested electoral process with a majorityof 66 out of 77 votes cast; 932
Parliament. Galmudug’s parliament, now based in Adaado, comprises 89 members, who wereselected according to local clan distribution by a clan elder council of 25 members (Guurti) atthe beginning of 2020 for a four-year term; 933
Regional governors, governments and assemblies: (a) Galgadud has its regional capital in
Dhusamareb, while (b) Mudug region has its regional capital in Galkacyo. 934 No information on
this point could be found within the given time limits and among the consulted sources;
Districts, district commissioners, and district councils. Officially the Galmudug State comprises
eight districts, with following breakdown per region: (a) Galgadud: Ceel Dheere (El Dher), Ceel
Buur (El Buur), Dhuusamarreeb (Dhusa Mareb or Dhusamareb), Abudwaaq, and Caadado(Adado); (b) Mudug: Galkacyo South, Harardhere, and Hobyo. 935 As of June 2020, out of the six
prioritised district councils in Galmudug – Balamballe, Abudwaaq, Dhusamareb, Galkacyo(South), Hobyo and Adaado, 936 see section on Federal Member States and Somaliland for moredetails – only the district councils in Adaado and Galkacyo South were established; 937
Local council of elders. In an unspecified number of locations across South-Central Somalia
local councils of elders reportedly ‘continue to provide a multi-faceted forum covering a rangeof reconciliation, judicial and governance functions’. 938

925 HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, February 2021, url, p. 16; HIPS, The Galmudug Crisis: A Blueprint For Sustainable

Settlement, Policy Brief 19, September 2019, url, p. 2
926 HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, February 2021, url, p. 16
927 HIPS, The Galmudug Crisis: A Blueprint For Sustainable Settlement, Policy Brief 19, September 2019, url, p. 2
928 Saferworld, Clans, contention and consensus - Federalism and inclusion in Galmudug, June 2020, url, p. 18
929 Saferworld, Clans, contention and consensus - Federalism and inclusion in Galmudug, June 2020, url, p. 11
930 Saferworld, Clans, contention and consensus - Federalism and inclusion in Galmudug, June 2020, url, p. 32
931 Saferworld, Clans, contention and consensus - Federalism and inclusion in Galmudug, June 2020, url, p. 10
932 HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, February 2021, url, pp. 15-16
933 Saferworld, Clans, contention and consensus - Federalism and inclusion in Galmudug, June 2020, url, pp. 18-21; HIPS,The State of Somalia Report, February 2021, url, p. 16
934 Saferworld, Clans, contention and consensus - Federalism and inclusion in Galmudug, June 2020, url, p. 10935 Saferworld, Clans, contention and consensus - Federalism and inclusion in Galmudug, June 2020, url, pp. 31-32; see also
EASO, Country of Origin Information Report – Somalia Security Situation, 2017, url, pp. 103, 105
936 Unpublished written information from a security organisation provided to EASO, 2020
937 Saferworld, Clans, contention and consensus - Federalism and inclusion in Galmudug, June 2020, url, p. 32; UN, Country
Results Report Somalia 2020, March 2021, url, pp. 24, 57; FCA, District Council formation lays foundation for good
governance in Galkacyo district, Somalia, 31 December 20202, url
938 Unpublished written information from a security organisation provided to EASO, 202098

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Actors

7.5.2 FMS armed forces••

Galmudug’s Darwish. No specific information on this point could be found within the given
time limits and among the consulted sources.
Galmudug’s State Police. ‘The United Nations supported the Galmudug administration in reestablishing the state police by coordinating training on human rights and community policing
for 700 officers’. 939

7.5.3 Other actors/forces
Apart from the local FMS ‘official’ armed forces, other actors/armed forces present in Galmudug
include (the list is not exhaustive):
•

•

•
•
•

SNA and SPF presence. Felbab-Brown states that ‘there are essentially no SNA and SPF forcesin Galmudug’. 940 However, as reported by the UNSG in May 2020, ‘heavy fighting erupted’between ASWJ, the SNA and the special Haramcad police in the Dhusamareb area of Galmudugin February 2020. 941 Repotedly, the SNA 21 Division and Gorgor Units are deployed in andaround Dhusamareb. 942
Ahlu Sunna Wal-Jama’ah (ASWJ). The multi-clan (Ayr, Dir and Marehan clans) 943 armed Sufi
group, at length supported by Ethiopia, 944 was formed already in 1991 with the aim to oppose
jihadist groups, including more recently, al-Shabaab. 945 Operating mostly in Galmudug, and inpart Hiraan, by 2017 it was estimated to have about 5 000 soldiers. 946 Reportedly, the group’s
religious orientation (Sufism) and strong pastoralist background would explain theirdetermination in keeping liberated areas from al-Shabaab, 947 among others in Dhusamareb
Balanbal, and Caabudwaaq districts. 948 The group has been in part integrated into the SNA andthe local Galmudug’s forces. Apparently, prior to the integration, there hadn't been any vettingof the militiamen despite allegations of human rights violations, among which childrecruitment.949 No civilian casualties were attributed to ASWJ in 2017, one in 2018 and four in
2019; 950
AMISOM Military and Police. Djibouti Forces are responsible for the Galgadud region, whichis part of Sector 4 together with Hiraan region. 951 As of February 2021, 227 Djiboutian troops
were deployed in Dhusamareb where a FOB is under construction. 952
Clan Rivalries/militias. As of June 2020, the main fault-lines can be summarised as follows:
Balambal, Gurieel and Heraale (Abuwaaq and Adaado districts): conflicts in these areas overland, pasture and water resources date back decades. They see, among others, two main
opposing clans, Marehan and Dir. 953

939 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 17 February 2021, url, p. 12

940 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 141
941 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 May 2020, url, para. 9942 Sahan, The Somali Wire, Issues Jan-April 2021, n.d., source requiring registration

943 Saferworld, Clans, contention and consensus - Federalism and inclusion in Galmudug, June 2020, url, p. 19

944 HIPS, The Galmudug Crisis: A Blueprint For Sustainable Settlement, Policy Brief 19, September 2019, url, p. 4; Felbab-

Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 141
945 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 129
946 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, pp. 129-130
947 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 129
948 Saferworld, Clans, contention and consensus - Federalism and inclusion in Galmudug, June 2020, url, pp. 11, 18
949 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, pp. 141-142
950 UNSOM and OHCHR, Protection of Civilians Report, Building the Foundation for Peace, Security and Human Rights in
Somalia, 1 January 2017 – 31 December 2019, 2020, url, p. 16
951 NUPI, Assessing the effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Somalia, 2018, url, p. 56
952 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 17 February 2021, url, p. 14
953 Saferworld, Clans, contention and consensus - Federalism and inclusion in Galmudug, June 2020, url, p. 33

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•

•

•

•

Clan boundary clashes in and around Galkacyo: the move towards federalism escalated preexisting clan conflicts over land, infrastructure and resources in disputed areas. ‘This followed
moves by the Saad clan, which is dominant in South Galka’yo, to protect its own territory fromcoming under Puntland’s control while also expanding its influence in West Mudug, and areas
traditionally controlled by the Majeerteen and Leelkase clans’. 954
Intra-clan conflicts among Dir factions in relation to their support, or not, to ASWJ; 955 within
this context, the Huurshe-Xeraale conflict, exemplified the past competition between
Dhusamareb and Adaado. Xeraale group was aligned with the Galmudug administration basedin Adaado, whereas the Huurshe camp supported Dhusamareb. This led to militaryconfrontations which were eventually appeased with the mediation of the FGS in the courseof 2019. 956
As a by-product of federalism, smaller clans sometimes attempt to form their own constituency
out of an existing district or territorial area under their control so as to claim a political positionand office – which may be rejected by bigger clans. This led again to inter-clan conflicts
between Marehan and Dir over Heraale. 957
Other clan rivalries and active flashpoints: for the full overview see referenced report infootnote. 958

7.5.4 Access to justice
For a first overview of the justice systems in Somalia see sections on Access to Justice, Formal andInformal Systems (including Customary Justice and Shari’ah Law) and on Access to Justice under AlShabaab.
As to justice facilities and institutions in Galmudug, the situation can be summarised as follows:
Statutory Courts. The state is ‘far behind in institutionalizing its judicial branch’, while
Galmudug’s president ‘Qoor Qoor’ ‘only appointed a chief justice to the supreme court inAugust 2020, six months after he was elected. And the supreme court, like other courts in thestate, does not even have offices’. 959 According to the FGS Justice Report (2019) as quoted by
HIPS in 2021, a total of four active courts were operating in Galmudug in 2019. 960 They areorganised according to the usual three-tiered approach (Court of First Instance, at districtlevel, Appeals Court, and State Supreme Court). 961 Overall, the judiciary remains quite ‘weak’
and access to justice a priority for Galmudug’s citizens. 962• Al-Shabaab Courts. Al-Shabaab (mobile) courts operate in areas under its control in south andcentral Somalia. 963• Shari’ah Courts. See for general background information the section on Shari’ah Law.
•

954 Saferworld, Clans, contention and consensus - Federalism and inclusion in Galmudug, June 2020, url, p. 33
955 Saferworld, Clans, contention and consensus - Federalism and inclusion in Galmudug, June 2020, url, p. 34

956 SPA and Interpeace, Galmudug Reconciliation: Processes, Challenges, and Opportunities Ahead, February 2021, url, pp.

25-26
957 Saferworld, Clans, contention and consensus - Federalism and inclusion in Galmudug, June 2020, url, pp. 33-34
958 SPA and Interpeace, Galmudug Reconciliation: Processes, Challenges, and Opportunities Ahead, February 2021, url, pp.
26-27
959 HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, p. 18
960 HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, p. 19
961 HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, p. 15
962 SPA and Interpeace, Galmudug Reconciliation: Processes, Challenges, and Opportunities Ahead, February 2021, url, p.
40
963 Garowe Online, Somalia: People warned against seeking justice in Al-Shabaab courts, 30 December 2018, url; see also
Expanding Access to Justice Program, Pathways and Institutions for Resolving Land Disputes in Mogadishu, January 2020,
url, pp. 14, 17;100

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Actors•••

Elders and elder councils. Customary justice (xeer) through elder councils, guurti or malaq,
work as the first port of call when a dispute arises; 964
ADR Centres. There are ADR centres established and run by the MoJ ADRU (Unit) in
Dhusamareb; 965
District Peace Committees (DPCs). In September 2020, SOYDEN coordinated the formation of
a District Peace Committee in Dhusamareb. 966

7.5.5 Security forces’ human rights conduct
In the reporting period 5 May – 4 August 2020, one incident of deprivation of liberty affecting children
was attributed to the Galmudug state forces, as indicated in the UNSG situation report on Somalia. 967
In the reporting period 5 November 2019 – 9 February 2020, the UNSG noted that Galmudug police
issued a directive ordering hotels not to host meetings and conferences without prior approval. 968
The UNSG indicated, in its latest report on Children and Armed Conflict (March 2020 – covering theperiod 1 August 2016 – 30 September 2019), that the country task force lists the following violations
by the Galmudug security forces: 168 cases of child recruitment; 969 10 cases of children deprived of
their liberty for alleged association with al-Shabaab or pro-ISIL elements in Somalia; 970 33 cases ofkilling and maiming of children; 971 25 cases of children victims of rape or sexual violence; 972 7 attacks
on schools and hospitals; 973 one case of child abduction; 974 9 cases of denial of humanitarian accessaffecting aid delivery to children. 975 The violations reported here above are in line with those reported
by UNSOM during the period 1 January 2017 – 31 December 2019. 976
For other violations (including grave violations against children) generally attributed to both federal
and state forces see section on FGS Security Institutions – Security Forces’ Human Rights Conduct.

7.6 Puntland
Reportedly, Puntland is ‘the most stable and most developed state in the union’. It is comprised of the(traditional Siad Barre-era) regions of Bari, Nugaal, and part of Mudug, 977 while it also claims the Sooland Sanaag regions (as well as Ayn) based on kinship ties. 978 At the same time, Somaliland controls
part of Sool and Sanaag and claims sovereignty over these two regions as purportedly inherited from964 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, p. 31; Expanding Access to Justice

Program, Access to Justice Assessment Tool 2020, Somalia Baseline Study Brief, url, pp. 1-2; HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s
Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, p. 27-28
965 Expanding Access to Justice Program, Alternative Dispute Resolution Initiatives in Somalia, June 2020, url, p. 8
966 SOYDEN, Report on the Formation of Dusamareeb District Peace Committee, Dusamareeb District, Galmudug State, 2629 September 2020, 10 October 2020, url; Expanding Access to Justice Program, Alternative Dispute Resolution Initiatives
in Somalia, June 2020, url, p. 10
967 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 August 2020, url, p. 9
968 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 February 2020, url, p. 9969 UNSG, Children and Armed Conflict in Somalia, 4 March 2020, url, p. 5
970 UNSG, Children and Armed Conflict in Somalia, 4 March 2020, url, p. 7
971 UNSG, Children and Armed Conflict in Somalia, 4 March 2020, url, p. 8
972 UNSG, Children and Armed Conflict in Somalia, 4 March 2020, url, pp. 9-10
973 UNSG, Children and Armed Conflict in Somalia, 4 March 2020, url, p. 10
974 UNSG, Children and Armed Conflict in Somalia, 4 March 2020, url, p. 11
975 UNSG, Children and Armed Conflict in Somalia, 4 March 2020, url, p. 12
976 UNSOM and OHCHR, Protection of Civilians Report, Building the Foundation for Peace, Security and Human Rights in
Somalia, 1 January 2017 – 31 December 2019, 2020, url, pp. 32-34
977 HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, February 2021, url, p. 9
978 ISS, Mahmood O., Overlapping claims by Somaliland and Puntland – The case of Sool and Sanaag, November 2019, East
Africa Report No. 27, url, pp. 5, 25 footnote no. 2

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the colonial period. 979 As per its state constitution however, Puntland comprises eight regions - Bari,
Nugaal, Sool, Ayn, Karkaar (carved out of Bari), Mudug, Haylan (carved out of Sanaag), and Sanaag, 980
to which Gardafuu (carved out of Bari) was added in 2013. 981
Puntland, as an autonomous state within the Somali Federal State, was established on 1 August 1998
‘as an entity representing clans belonging to the Harti clan collective’. 982 Most of Puntland’s
population comes from the Darood/Harti descent group, with the political base of Puntland being
Hartinimo (Harti meaning solidarity). Basically, the Darood/Harti clan collective comprises theMajerteen, the dominant clan in Puntland, the Dhulbahante (prevalent in the Sool region), and theWarsangeli (prevalent in the Sanaag region). 983 ‘Its borders are, therefore, genealogically defined, andextend to where Harti and some smaller Darood groups, such as Awrtable and Leylkase, reside in thenorth-east’. 984
With over two decades of existence, Puntland developed significant institution-building andgovernance mechanisms. However, it is still affected by a number of issues, including security,
humanitarian, political, and socio-economic challenges. 985

7.6.1 Relevant dynamics, territorial control, and governanceRelevant dynamics. Prominent political and security dynamics taking place in Puntland are:••Tensions with the FGS. Ever since his election to state president, Said Abdullahi Deni has
embodied the strenuous defence of Puntland’s (but also other FMS) right to selfdetermination, against Mogadishu’s ‘wanton interventions’ in the state internal and politicalaffairs. A role that the president continues to play today, largely supported by his power base.
In the course of 2020 these tensions led to political confrontations with the FGS over various
issues, including: (a) final (national) exams for newly graduated students; (b) the alleged illegal
activities and conduct of number of MPs, who were finally stripped of their immunity and thenlost their seat. 986 At the time of the writing (April 2021), and in the morasses of the electoral
agreement, Puntland opposes the federal president Farmaajo term’s extension, together withthe members of the National Salvation Council (see introduction); 987
Clashes with Somaliland. The contested regions of Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn are at the core of
the long-standing controversy with Somaliland over their political and military control. 988
Tukaraq, among others, has been the centre of major fighting between the two states in thepast few years (2018-2020); 989

979 ISS, Mahmood O., Overlapping claims by Somaliland and Puntland – The case of Sool and Sanaag, November 2019, East

Africa Report No. 27, url, pp. 3-5
980 Puntland State of Somalia, Constitution, December 2009, English Translation 2011, url, art. 7
981 Wardheer News, Civil Protest in Gardafuu Region of Puntland, 11 June 2020, url
982 Hoehne M., Between Somaliland and Puntland, Rift Valley Institute – Contested Borderlands, 2015, url, p. 36
983 Hoehne M., Between Somaliland and Puntland, Rift Valley Institute – Contested Borderlands, 2015, url, pp. 21, 36, 56;
ISS, Mahmood O., Overlapping claims by Somaliland and Puntland – The case of Sool and Sanaag, November 2019, East
Africa Report No. 27, url, pp. 3-5
984 Hoehne M., Between Somaliland and Puntland, Rift Valley Institute – Contested Borderlands, 2015, url, p. 36
985 HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, February 2021, url, p. 9986 HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, February 2021, url, pp. 10-11
987 Garowe Online, Somali opposition team up with Federal States to form National Salvation Council, 18 march 2021, url
988 ISS, Mahmood O., Overlapping claims by Somaliland and Puntland – The case of Sool and Sanaag, November 2019, East
Africa Report No. 27, url, pp. 3-5
989
HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, February 2021, url, p. 10; UN Security Council, Letter dated 12 October 2020 fromthe Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia addressed to the
President of the Security Council, 15 October 2020, url, p. 11; Letter dated 7 November 2018 from the Chair of the Security

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•

•

•

Clashes with Galmudug. Pending the definition of the boundary between Puntland andGalmudug and of the status of Galkacyo, tensions and repeated clashes between armed forces
persist in and around the regional capital, whose control is split between Galmudug (Galkacyo
South) and Puntland (Galkacyo North), along the Tomaselli line (see for more details thesection on Galmudug); 990
Security Issues. Al-Shabaab presence and activities seem to have intensified in Puntland in thecourse of 2020 and beginning of 2021 (suicide bombings, governors targeting, Bosasso prison
assault, 991 among others). 992 For more details see section on Islamic State in Somalia (ISISSomalia) and Al-Shabaab.
Clan Rivalry. Dumay: intra Dhulbahante clashes between the Qayad and Baharsame sub-clans,
which has been an on-going issue since the early 2000s, erupting again violently between
September and October 2018; 993

Territorial Control and Influence. Besides part of the contested areas with Somaliland (see below),
Puntland controls the northern part of the Mudug region, 994 including north Galkacyo, 995 andcomprises as well Nugal and Bari regions. 996 Reportedly (2017 source), the Islamic State-affiliatedgroup ISIS ‘has its core area in the Iskushuban district’, in the Bari region, 997 while it retains operational
basis in the Golis Mountains (east of Bossaso), 998 and is also present in the areas south of the port
town of Qandala. 999 Al-Shabaab is also present in the Galgala range in the Golis Mountains. 1000
Although both groups controls effectively only marginal portions of these areas, their operational
freedom is quite substantial in the region. 1001 For more details please see sections on ISIS and AlShabaab, Map Somalia – Approximate Territorial Control (Figure 1), and the Report on the Security
Situation.
As far as the Sool and Sanaag regions are concerned, the regions administrative borders do notcorrespond to clan distribution and affiliation across the two sides of the border. The contested areas
approximately cut in two the territory of the administrative regions, along a longitudinal direction,
where Harti-sub clans (Dhulbahante and Warsengeli) border with Isaaq-sub clans. 1002 Within thiscontext, Somaliland has made inroads into Sool through its presence in Las Anod (taken in 2007), andCouncil Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the
President of the Security Council, 9 November 2018, url, pp. 5, 33, 35-36
990 SPA and Interpeace, Galmudug Reconciliation: Processes, Challenges, and Opportunities Ahead, February 2021, url, pp.
32, 39; Somaliland Standard, Somalia: Rival forces loyal to Puntland & Galmudug clash in Galka’ayo, 3 May 2020, url;
Somali Dispatch, Fighting Erupts between Galmudug and Puntland, 3 May 2020, url; International Crisis Group, Galkacyo
and Somalia’s Dangerous Faultlines, 10 December 2015, url
991 Reuters, Al Shabaab militants storm Somali jail, seven soldiers killed, 5 March 2021, url
992 HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, February 2021, url, p. 10; International Crisis Group, Tracking Conflict Worldwide,
Somalia, May 2021, url
993 ISS, Mahmood O., Overlapping claims by Somaliland and Puntland – The case of Sool and Sanaag, November 2019, East
Africa Report No. 27, url, p. 16
994 HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, February 2021, url, p. 15, footnote no. 65
995 International Crisis Group, Galkacyo and Somalia’s Dangerous Faultlines, 10 December 2015, url
996 HIPS, The State of Somalia Report, February 2021, url, p. 9997 EASO, Country of Origin Information Report – Somalia Security Situation, 2017, url, p. 108
998 OWP, Islamic State in Somalia, 2020, url
999 EASO, Country of Origin Information Report – Somalia Security Situation, 2017, url, p. 108; see also ISS, East African
terror groups are exploiting the seas, 13 October 2020, url
1000 EASO, COI Query - Security situation in Puntland and Somaliland (January – 15 November 2019), 12 December 2019,url, p. 7; VOA, Al-Shabab Raid on Somalia Military Base Kills Several Soldiers, 2 June 2018, url
1001 Jamestown Foundation (The), Horton M., Terrorism Monitor, No Foothold for al-Shabaab in Somaliland, 14 August
2020, url
1002 Hoehne M., Between Somaliland and Puntland, Rift Valley Institute – Contested Borderlands, 2015, url, pp. 34-37

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Tukaraq (taken in 2018), appearing ‘to maintain the upper hand militarily’ in the region. 1003 At thesame time, ‘Sanaag remains an area where both sides retain a presence, albeit with greater linkages
to Puntland’. 1004 In the course of 2019, few episodes of military defection from Somaliland to Puntland
led to the militarisation of the area, as well as to skirmishes and military confrontations around thetowns of Yube and Badhan (east of Erigabo). 1005 The Warsengeli had until then resisted thedeployment of armed forces in their territory, while their elites had established relationships withboth Somaliland and Puntland, in line with their reputation of ‘borderlands entrepreneurs’ (along with
Dhulbahante clan elites). 1006 Ultimately, though, they repositioned themselves more in association to
Puntland, which, as a result, strengthened its military and administrative control of the region. 1007
Governance. In terms of governance structure and state-building process, as of April 2021 thesituation in Puntland state can be summarised as follow:• Constitution: Puntland State Constitution was ratified by 478 delegates representing the Puntlandcommunities on 18 April 2012. 1008
• President. Puntland’s president, Saed Abdullahi Deni, formerly FGS planning minister, was electedby the state parliament on 8 January 2019, with a majority of 35 votes out of the 66 of the Houseof Representatives. 1009
• Parliament. Puntland’s parliament, which is based in Garowe, comprises 66 members, who wereselected by traditional elders according to a clan-based system (17 Dhulbahante, 9 Warsengeli,
and, among others, Majeerteen) 1010 at the end of 2018. 1011 De jure though, the House ofRepresentatives, should be elected directly by the people of Puntland, through universal suffrage,
for a five-year term. 1012
• Regions, regional governors and deputy governors. As per the State Constitution Puntlandcomprises of 8 regions - Bari, Nugaal, Sool, Ayn, Karkaar, Mudug, Haylan, and Sanag, 1013 to which
Gardafuu (carved out of Bari) was added in 2013. 1014 In line with art. 120 ‘Decentralization ofRegional and District Administrations’, Puntland’s governance system ‘shall be based on
decentralisation’, with the Puntland’s State ‘divided into regions and districts’, to be restricted
and demarcated by the Government. 1015
• Districts, district commissioners, and district councils. As per the State Constitution (art. 123),‘[e]ach region of Puntland, for the purpose of local administration, shall be divided into districts.
A special law shall determine the number, name and boundaries of the districts’. 1016 Moreover,‘[e]ach district shall have economic and administrative autonomy, and shall be administered by a1003 ISS, Mahmood O., Overlapping claims by Somaliland and Puntland – The case of Sool and Sanaag, November 2019, East

Africa Report No. 27, url, pp. 9-111004 ISS, Mahmood O., Overlapping claims by Somaliland and Puntland – The case of Sool and Sanaag, November 2019, East

Africa Report No. 27, url, p. 91005 ISS, Mahmood O., Overlapping claims by Somaliland and Puntland – The case of Sool and Sanaag, November 2019, East

Africa Report No. 27, url, pp. 12-14

1006 Hoehne M., Between Somaliland and Puntland, Rift Valley Institute – Contested Borderlands, 2015, url, pp. 24, 150; ISS,

Mahmood O., Overlapping claims by Somaliland and Puntland – The case of Sool and Sanaag, November 2019, East Africa
Report No. 27, url, pp. 6-7, 21-22;
1007 ISS, Mahmood O., Overlapping claims by Somaliland and Puntland – The case of Sool and Sanaag, November 2019, East
Africa Report No. 27, url, pp. 12-14
1008 Interpeace, A historic moment: Puntland’s constitution now ratified, 20 April 2012, url;
1009 VOA, Somalia's Puntland Region Elects New President, 8 January 2019, url
1010 ISS, Mahmood O., Overlapping claims by Somaliland and Puntland – The case of Sool and Sanaag, November 2019, East
Africa Report No. 27, url, p. 81011 Garowe Online, Somalia: Puntland gets new Parliament that will vote for president January 8, 1 January 2019, url; HIPS,The State of Somalia Report, January 2020, url, pp. 5-61012 Puntland State of Somalia, Constitution, December 2009, English Translation 2011, url, art. 60
1013 Puntland State of Somalia, Constitution, December 2009, English Translation 2011, url, art. 71014 Wardheer News, Civil Protest in Gardafuu Region of Puntland, 11 June 2020, url
1015 Puntland State of Somalia, Constitution, December 2009, English Translation 2011, url, art. 120
1016 Puntland State of Somalia, Constitution, December 2009, English Translation 2011, url, art. 123

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District Council’, elected by the citizens of each district for a period of five years. 1017 Puntlandcomprises several districts, with following breakdown per region: (a) Mudug region: Galkacyo(North), Jiriban, Galdogob; (b) Nugal region: Garowe, Eyl, and Burtinle; (c) Bari Region: Alula,
Qandala, Bossaso, Iskushuban, Gardo (Qardho), and Bandera Beila; contested regions with
Somaliland, Sool and Sanaag, consist of the following districts, (d) Sool region: Las Anod, Taleh,
Hudun, Ainado; (e) Sanaag region: El Afwein, Erigabo, Las Qoray. 1018 Reportedly, as of December
2020, districts councils were set-up and running in Puntland; 1019
Local council of elders. No specific information on this point could be found within the given time
limits and among the consulted sources.

•

7.6.2 FMS armed forces
As per Art. 86 of the Puntland constitution, the state security forces comprise of: (a) Border Police(Darawishta); (b) Police; (c) Intelligence forces; and (d) Correctional forces. 1020
•
•

•

•
•

Puntland State Police (PSP). Reportedly, as per the UN Somalia Results Report 2020, the PSP ‘isthe only functioning state police service’ among the FMS police services. 1021 As per the UN
Somalia Country Results Report for 2019, there are 3 500 police officers in Puntland. 1022
Puntland Maritime Police (PMP). A formal security actor embedded in the Somali National
Security Architecture, the group has between 100 and 200 members, although essentially no
enforcement capacity and no vessels. ‘While almost inactive in terms of anti-piracy operations,
it has fought the PMPF over access and control of Bosasso’. 1023
Puntland Darwish or ‘Special Police’. Puntland previous President, Abdiweli Gaas, agreed tointegrate 2 400 darwish forces into the SNA. However, the current president Deni, in January
2020 recalled them and put them under his control (after the FGS failed to pay their salaries).
At the moment no PMPF (see below) or PSF (see below) are going to be integrated into theSomali National Security Architecture. The failure in the planned integration has contributed
to worsen the relationships between the FGS and Puntland. The actual current number of
darwish forces under the control of the Puntland administration is difficult to ascertain. 1024
Puntland Intelligence and Security Agency (PISA). On 23 September 2019 Puntland’s current
President Said Abdullahi Deni appointed Mukhtar Mohamed Hassan as the new head of PISA
on a permanent basis. 1025
Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF). Numbering about 500 men, the PMPF was originally
set up by the United Arab Emirates as a tool to counteract piracy activities in the Gulf of Aden
by tackling pirates on land in Puntland. Still funded by the UAE, this force has no basis in
Somalia’s constitution and operates outside of Somalia’s security architecture. Over the years
the PMPF has become involved in Puntland politics, clan rivalries, and geopolitical conflicts,
while being used to combat al-Shabaab and IS forces as well. Today, it still works as thepraetorian guard of current Puntland’s administrations, with the UAE trying however todiscourage its use as presidents’ personal militia. 1026 At the same time the PMPF has

1017 Puntland State of Somalia, Constitution, December 2009, English Translation 2011, url, art. 123

1018 FSNAU, Somalia – Administrative Maps, n.d. url; Also: Somalia Supreme Court of Somalia, Judiciary Report Assessment

2020, 2021, unpublished report, p. 211019 UN, Country Results Report Somalia 2020, March 2021, url, p. 57; UN, Country Results Report Somalia 2019, June 2020,
url, p. 63
1020 Puntland State of Somalia, Constitution, December 2009, English Translation 2011, url, art. 86
1021 UN, Country Results Report Somalia 2020, March 2021, url, p. 60
1022 UN Somalia, Country Results Report 2019, June 2020, url, p. 191023 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 135
1024 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 142
1025 Garowe Online, Puntland president appoints new intelligence chief, 24 September 2019, url
1026 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, pp. 133-136

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supplanted various official policy functions in Bosasso, while claiming to be conducting antipirate and intelligence operations ‘against pirates and potential pirates’. Among other Emiratecompanies operating there, the Emirate business company P&O manages the port ofBosasso. 1027 Within this context (see also Country Background), Qatari and Emirates competinginterests and agenda in the area have allegedly led to the instrumental use of the PMPF (andIS) on the one hand (on the side of the Emirates), against al-Shabaab and Qatari interests on
the other hand (on the side of Qatar). 1028
Puntland Security Force (PSF). Numbering about 600 soldiers - 1 000 according to Somali expert
Felbab-Brown, 1029 the group is ‘mentored and supported by the United States of America’,
reports directly to the President of Puntland, and is meant to contrast terrorist activities. 1030
The PSF operates outside of Somalia’s constitution and security architecture, and was set upby the US as a ‘separate private auxiliary group’. 1031

7.6.3 Other actors/forces
Apart from the local FMS ‘official’ armed forces, other actors/armed forces present in Puntland
include (the list is not exhaustive):•

Yulux ex-Militia. Isse Yulux, a well-known pirate, brought back to Puntland his 350-man expirate militia and set up commercial operations in seven Puntland cities, transitioning frompiracy into business and politics. Since 2018 his men have been allegedly engaged in aclandestine militia war against PMPF (supported by the UAE) and the new (Emirate) logisticalcompany which has been contracted for the management of the port of Bossaso, thus
replacing Yulux-linked company. Reportedly Yulux maintains relations with both al-Shabaaband ISIS. 1032

7.6.4 Access to justice
For a first overview of the justice systems in Somalia see sections on Access to Justice, Formal andInformal Systems (including Customary Justice and Shari’ah Law) and on Access to Justice under AlShabaab.
As to justice facilities and institutions in Puntland, the situation can be summarised as follows:•

Statutory Courts. Puntland has by far the most advanced (formal) judicial system among the
FMS. It was established with Law. No. 2 1999, which stipulates a three-tiered system withDistrict/First Instance Courts, Courts of Appeal in the regional capitals, and the State Supreme
Court in the state capital Garowe. Completing this, Puntland also established a Higher Judicial
Council (to oversee the judiciary) and the Office of the Attorney General, which includes its
deputy and the nine Prosecutors of the nine regions of Puntland. 1033 According to the Supreme
Court of Somalia in its Report Assessment of the Judiciary for 2020, Puntland courts have1027 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, pp. 135-136
1028 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 136
1029 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 134

1030 UN Security Council, Letter dated 1 November 2019 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant toresolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia addressed to the President of the Security Council, 1 November 2019, url, p. 138

1031 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 134
1032 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 134

1033 HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, p. 9;

see also Somalia, Supreme Court of Somalia, Awoodda Garsoorka – Buugga Sanadka Garsoorka 2020 [Judiciary Branch –Justice Report 2020], 2021, n.d., p. 21

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•
•
•

•
•
•

received 6 408 cases in 2020 (4 233 civil, 2 168 penal, plus others). 1034 Reportedly the numberof cases received by the statutory system in Puntland was instead 7 135 in 2019, processed by
34 active statutory courts.1035 Still based on the same report the total staff of the judiciary is
234 people, including: ‘Judges, Prosecutors, Assistants, Drivers, Servants and Guardians’; 1036
Military Courts. No specific information on this point could be found within the given time
limits and among the consulted sources;
Al-Shabaab (Mobile) Courts. No specific information on this point could be found within thegiven time limits and among the consulted sources;
Shari’ah Courts. See for general background information the section on Shari’ah Law. As per
the Puntland constitution, (Art. 9.1) ‘Islam shall be the only religion of Puntland State ofSomalia’, and (Art. 9.2) ‘no other religion shall be propagated in Puntland State’. Moreover,(Art. 9.3-4), ‘the laws and culture of the people shall be based on the Islamic religion, and ‘any
law and any culture that contravenes Islam shall be prohibited’; 1037
xeer, elders and elder councils. Customary justice (xeer) through elder councils, guurti ormalaq, works as the first port of call when a dispute arises; 1038
ADR Centres. There are ADR centres established and run by the MoJ ADRU (Unit) in Bosasso,
Garowe, Galkacyo, Badhan, Buhodle, Dahar and Burtinle; 1039
District Peace Committees (DPCs). No specific information on this point could be found within
the given time limits and among the consulted sources.

7.6.5 Security forces’ human rights conduct••

PMPF. Reportedly, the seizing by the PMPF of policy functions beyond its mandate has caused
conduct issues: ‘the raids into people’s houses have at times proven deadly to civilians’, without
a proper distinction ‘between innocent citizens and criminals’. Reportedly lacking adequate
human rights training, PMPF officers also tend ‘to round up people from neighbourhoods andplace them in detention without charges for days’. 1040
PISA. PISA intelligence service, among other authorities, has also been criticised for illegallydetaining journalists. 1041

In the period 5 November 2019 – 9 February 2021, the UNSG, in its various reports on the situation in
Somalia, attributed to Puntland security forces following violations: (a) 1 death sentence executed andanother 24 issued; 1042 seven verified incidents of conflict-related sexual violence (reporting period
5 November 2020 – 9 February 2021); 1043 (b) two cases of arbitrary arrest of journalists, two cases ofchildren deprivation of liberty (reporting period 5 August – 4 November 2020); 1044 (c) two cases of1034 Somalia, Supreme Court of Somalia, Awoodda Garsoorka – Buugga Sanadka Garsoorka 2020 [Judiciary Branch – Justice

Report 2020], 2021, n.d., pp. 7-81035 HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, p. 191036 Somalia, Supreme Court of Somalia, Awoodda Garsoorka – Buugga Sanadka Garsoorka 2020 [Judiciary Branch – Justice

Report 2020], 2021, n.d., p. 221037 Puntland State of Somalia, Constitution, December 2009, English Translation 2011, url

1038 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, p. 31; Expanding Access to Justice

Program, Access to Justice Assessment Tool 2020, Somalia Baseline Study Brief, url, pp. 1-2; HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s
Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, p. 27-28
1039 Expanding Access to Justice Program, Alternative Dispute Resolution Initiatives in Somalia, June 2020, url, p. 81040 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia, 2020, url, p. 135
1041 Puntland Post, Puntland Intelligence Agency Under Fire For Illegally Detaining A Journalist, 12 January 2021, url; AI,
Somalia: Authorities must end arbitrary arrests and persecution of journalists in Puntland, 9 March 2021, url
1042 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 17 February 2021, url, p. 91043 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 17 February 2021, url, p. 101044 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 November 2020, url, pp. 8-9

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deprivation of liberty affecting children (reporting period 5 May – 4 August 2020); 1045 (d) fivejournalists arbitrarily arrested (reporting period 5 February – 4 May 2020); 1046 one journalist arbitrarily
arrested (reporting period 5 November 2019 – 4 February 2020). 1047
The UNSG indicated, in its latest report on Children and Armed Conflict (March 2020 – covering theperiod 1 August 2016 – 30 September 2019), that the country task force had verified the following
violations at the hand of the Puntland security forces: 61 cases of child recruitment; 1048 21 cases ofkilling and maiming of children; 1049 seven cases of children victims of rape or sexual violence; 1050 one
case of denial of humanitarian access affecting aid delivery to children. 1051 The violations reported
here above are in line with those reported by UNSOM during the period 1 January 2017 –31 December 2019. 1052
In a letter addressed to the Security Council, the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea
documented, in the period 2017-October 2018, a ‘disturbing account of the detention, torture andexecution of children by Puntland authorities’. 1053 In the same report, the Monitoring Group
documented several instances of forced evictions of internally displaced persons in Bossaso, Galkacyo
and in the areas affected by the conflict between Somaliland and Puntland in Sool region. 1054
For other violations (including grave violations against children) generally attributed to both federal
and state forces see section on FGS Security Institutions – Security Forces’ Human Rights Conduct.

7.7 Somaliland
Somaliland declared its independence in 1991 while the civil war was occurring in the rest of Somalia.
Ever since Somaliland has embarked an institution-building and democratisation process, combining
in a hybrid entity traditional and modern forms of governance, that make it stand out compared toother parts of Somalia. 1055
Somaliland, in terms of clan representation, consists of members of the Dir clan – Gadabursi, Issa or
Ciise, members of the Isaaq clan, which are the dominant group, members of the Dhulbahante andWarsangeli clans of the Darood/Harti family, 1056 as well as other minority groups, such as the
Gaboye. 1057 In some clan genealogies, Isaaq are subsumed under the Dir although, given their size andpolitical weight, they constitute a clan-family on their own.1058 Within the Isaaq, the three major clans

1045 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 August 2020, url, p. 91046 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 May 2020, url, p. 81047 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 February 2020, url, p. 81048 UNSG, Children and Armed Conflict in Somalia, 4 March 2020, url, p. 51049 UNSG, Children and Armed Conflict in Somalia, 4 March 2020, url, p. 81050 UNSG, Children and Armed Conflict in Somalia, 4 March 2020, url, pp. 9-101051 UNSG, Children and Armed Conflict in Somalia, 4 March 2020, url, p. 121052 UNSOM and OHCHR, Protection of Civilians Report, Building the Foundation for Peace, Security and Human Rights in

Somalia, 1 January 2017 – 31 December 2019, 2020, url, pp. 32-34

1053 UN SEMG, Letter dated 7 November 2018 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions

751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security Council, 9November 2018, url, pp. 6, 39-40
1054 UN SEMG, Letter dated 7 November 2018 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions
751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security Council, 9November 2018, url, p. 41
1055 Hersi M. F., State fragility in Somaliland and Somalia: A contrast in peace and state building, August 2018, url, pp. 9-11;
Walls M., The Emergence of a Somali State: Building Peace from Civil War in Somaliland, in African Affairs, July 2009, url
1056 Hoehne M., Between Somaliland and Puntland, Rift Valley Institute – Contested Borderlands, 2015, url, pp. 20-21
1057 Vitturini E., The Gaboye of Somaliland: Legacies of Marginality, Trajectories of Emancipation, PhD Thesis, 2017, url, p. 31058 Hoehne M., Between Somaliland and Puntland, Rift Valley Institute – Contested Borderlands, 2015, url, p. 20

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are: Habar Awal, Habar Jeclo, and Garhajis, with the latter including the Habar Yonis and Idagalle. 1059
Somaliland is allegedly dominated by the Habar Jeclo-Habar Awal political alliance, which is referred
to in Somaliland as the ‘rainbow alliance’. 1060

7.7.1 Relevant dynamics, territorial control, and governanceRelevant Dynamics. Prominent political and security dynamics taking place in Somaliland are:•

International recognition. On 1 July 2020 Taiwan decided to exchange diplomatic offices with
Somaliland, 1061 while Turkey, Ethiopia, and Djibouti have already their consulates in Hargeisa. 1062
While also Denmark has an office, 1063 Kenya decided at the end of 2020 to open its own consulate
by the end of March 2021. 1064 Moreover, the Spanish navy has conducted exercises with
Somaliland’s coast guard, and the United Arab Emirates leased a base in Berbera. However, ‘noneof these countries nor the African Union interpret their involvement as undermining broader
diplomatic policies or bestowing formal recognition of [Somaliland’s] independence’. 1065

• Clan rivalries, including in:— Somaliland as a whole: Somaliland is reportedly dominated by the political alliance
between the Habar Awal and the Habar Jeclo, with the latter in particular opposedby the third main clan group in Somaliland, the Habar Yonis (together with the
Idagalle part of the Garhajis clan). 1066 These clans are dominant in central Somaliland,
while west and east of Somaliland are the site of different clans. The Gadabursi (Dirclan family, together with the Issa) are dominant in the west, while two Darood/Harti
clans (Warsengeli and Dhulbahante) are dominant in the east; 1067
— Erigabo and El Afweyne district: the conflict between Habar Jeclo and Habar Yonis
sub-clans of the Isaaq clan, 1068 which has surfaced recurrently in El Afweyne, erupted
again in 2019, 1069 when defecting colonel Aare was initially received by Puntland andset up his base in Qardo. However, after relocating back to Somaliland’ controlled
regional capital of Erigabo, he was received by Somaliland government officials andagreed to surrender his 900 rebel soldiers. 1070 This also led, reportedly, to end
acrimonies between the two clans resident in El Afweyne district, 1071 the Habar

1059 Hoehne M., Between Somaliland and Puntland, Rift Valley Institute – Contested Borderlands, 2015, url, p. 20; ISS,

Mahmood O., Overlapping claims by Somaliland and Puntland – The case of Sool and Sanaag, November 2019, East Africa
Report No. 27, url, p. 51060 ISS, Mahmood O., Overlapping claims by Somaliland and Puntland – The case of Sool and Sanaag, November 2019, East
Africa Report No. 27, url, pp. 12, 27
1061 Rubin M., It's Time for a U.S. Navy Port Call in Somaliland, 31 July 2020, url
1062 BBC News, Somaliland and Taiwan: Two territories with few friends but each other, 13 April 2021, url
1063 Denmark, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark in Somalia, About us, n.d., url
1064 New York Times (The), Somalia Severs Diplomatic Ties With Kenya, 16 December 2020, url
1065 Rubin M., Somaliland – Key to Winning America's Longest War, 7 March 2019, url
1066 ISS, Mahmood O., Overlapping claims by Somaliland and Puntland – The case of Sool and Sanaag, November 2019, East
Africa Report No. 27, url, pp. 12-13; see also International Crisis Group, Averting War in Northern Somalia, 27 June 2018,url
1067 ISS, Mahmood O. and Farah M., High stakes for Somaliland’s presidential elections, East Africa Report 15, October
2017, url, pp. 8-91068 International Crisis Group, Averting War in Northern Somalia, 27 June 2018, url; see also Horn Diplomat, Somaliland:State sternly warns perpetrators of recurrent El-Afweyne Skirmishes, 23 July 2017, url
1069 ISS, Mahmood O., Overlapping claims by Somaliland and Puntland – The case of Sool and Sanaag, November 2019, East
Africa Report No. 27, url, pp. 10-13
1070 Somaliland Sun, Somaliland: Rebel Colonel Arre Disbands Militia Returns to the Fold, 2 January 2020, url
1071 Somaliland Sun, Somaliland: Government Ends Three Months Clan Insurgency in Saanag Region, 6 June 2020, url;

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Jeclo/Biide and the Habar Yonis/Saad Yonis. 1072 However, later in 2020, the Xaqdoon
clan militia, which was established in El Afweyne in April 2020, took to the arms tofight against claimed grievances, to then hand them over three months later after
reaching an agreement with government officials. 1073•

Contested Areas. Sool, Sanaag and Cayn are contested between Somaliland and Puntland. Seerelevant section within Puntland’s chapter as well as below.

Territorial Control and Influence. As security expert Michael Horton puts it ‘the government ofSomaliland exerts consistent control over most of the territory that it claims’. 1074 Despite its limited
resources, Somaliland has overall denied al-Shabaab a foothold in the country: ‘Al-Shabaab has failed
to establish an enduring presence in the autonomous but unrecognized Republic of Somaliland’commented the expert at the end of 2019.1075 While ‘Al-Shabaab’s Amniyat maintains its own networkof informants’ in the country, Somaliland’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) and army rely
extensively on Human Intelligence (HUMINT), community-led efforts, and close ties with local elites,‘to monitor and assess potential encroachments by al-Shabaab’. 1076 A combination of informal andformal intelligence gathering capabilities and networks, (NIS, police and army intelligence officers,
informal local networks) are keys to this success. 1077
However, in November 2019, with about 70 fighters, al-Shabaab made a first attempt at penetrating
the Sanaag region, briefly occupying the town of Gacan-Maroodi, around the Garof Hills area in the
Yube district (about 50 km east of Erigavo). 1078 Reportedly, within hours Somaliland managed to repel
this attempt, by deploying NIS and army officers that marshalled local militias. In late October 2020,a renewed attempt by al-Shabaab led to their taking control of several villages still in the Sanaag region(Miri, Masha-Aled, Habasha Haw-Ali, Markeet), this time in an area under Puntland’s influence, in
between the strategic towns of Lasqoray (on the coast) and Badhan. 1079 Concomitantly, ‘both alShabaab and ISS use small vessels to move men and material into Somaliland from small ports in
Puntland’. 1080
As far as the contested regions with Puntland (Sool, Sanaag and Cayn) are concerned, see section on
Puntland – Territorial Control and Influence.
Governance. Somaliland’s governance structure is fairly developed compared to other parts ofSomalia. 1081 Main institutions at national and local level can be described as follows:1072 ISS, Mahmood O., Overlapping claims by Somaliland and Puntland – The case of Sool and Sanaag, November 2019, East

Africa Report No. 27, url, p. 26

1073 Somaliland Sun, Somaliland: Government Ends Three Months Clan Insurgency in Saanag Region, 6 June 2020, url;

International Crisis Group, Tracking Conflict Worldwide, Somaliland June 2020, url
1074 Horton M., How Somaliland Combats al-Shabaab, Combating Terrorism Center, CTC Sentinel, November 2019, Vol. 12,
Issue 10, url, pp. 20-25
1075 Horton M., Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, No Foothold for al-Shabaab in Somaliland, 14 August 2020, url;
Horton M., How Somaliland Combats al-Shabaab, Combating Terrorism Center, CTC Sentinel, November 2019, Vol. 12,
Issue 10, url, pp. 20-25
1076 Horton M., Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, No Foothold for al-Shabaab in Somaliland, 14 August 2020, url
1077 Horton M., How Somaliland Combats al-Shabaab, Combating Terrorism Center, CTC Sentinel, November 2019, Vol. 12,
Issue 10, url, p. 22
1078 Horton M., Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, No Foothold for al-Shabaab in Somaliland, 14 August 2020, url;Long War Journal, Shabaab moves into Somaliland town, 18 November 2019, url
1079 Somali Guardian, Al-Shabaab captures villages along the disputed Somaliland-Puntland border, 25 October 2020, url;
Critical Threats, Gulf of Aden Security Review, 11 December 2020, url; Critical Threats, Gulf of Aden Security Review, 30
October 2020, url;
1080 Horton M., How Somaliland Combats al-Shabaab, Combating Terrorism Center, CTC Sentinel, November 2019, Vol. 12,
Issue 10, url, p. 221081 Hersi M. F., State fragility in Somaliland and Somalia: A contrast in peace and state building, August 2018, url, pp. 13-15

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•
•

•

•

•

Constitution: Somaliland’s State Constitution 1082 was drafted by a ‘constituent assembly’ madeup of 150 members of local clans and political entities, and then approved by referendum (with
1.1 million eligible voters) on 31 May 2001; 1083
President. Somaliland’s president is Muse Bihi Abdi, formerly a member of the Somali National
Movement (a group originally meant to ‘challenge the hardline military regime of Mohamed
Siad Barre’ 1084). Through direct general election (Art. 83 Somaliland’s Constitution 1085), he waselected as state president, with 55 %of the vote, on 13 November 2017, for a five-year term; 1086
Parliament. Somaliland’s parliament, an example of modern-traditional (hybrid) institution
building, 1087 comprises the House of Representatives (82 members), which is elected and is themain legislative body (art. 39-56 of the Somaliland Constitution), and the House of Elders (82members) - Guurti, in Somali, which is currently indirectly elected by the various communities
and is the revising chamber for the legislation (art. 57-73 of the Somaliland Constitution); 1088
Regions, districts and chairmen. The new Regions & Districts Self-Management Law (Law No
23/2019) legislates about regional and district administration, as per art. 109-112 ofSomaliland’s Constitution. This law confirms that the country consists of six (6) regions, and 102
districts, with following breakdown: a) Maroodijeex (19 Districts); Togdheer (22 Districts);
Sanaag (19 Districts); Awdal (12 Districts); Sool (21 Districts); Saaxil (8 Districts). 1089 However,based on the traditional (Siad Barre era) partition of Somalia that is relevant here, Somaliland
consists of following districts per region: (a) Awdal: Zeylac, Lughaye, Boroma, and Baki; (b)Togdheer: Sheikh, Odweine, Burao, and Buhodle; (c) Woqooyi Galbeed: Gebiley, Hargeisa, andBerbera; (d) Sool region: Las Anod, Taleh, Hudun, Ainado; (e) Sanaag region: El Afwein, Erigabo,
and Las Qoray. 1090 As per art. 111 of the Somaliland Constitution, ‘[t]he Chairman of the region
shall be appointed by the Government and shall act as the representative of the central
government in the region and the districts that come under it’; 1091
Regional, district, and village councils. As per the State Constitution (art. 111), ‘[t]he regions
and the districts of the country shall have legislative councils’, which in some cases are de
facto selected, instead of elected, for a five-year term. 1092 While the Regional Councils are
currently not elected, 1093 as of December 2020, all districts councils were reportedly set-up andrunning in Somaliland. 1094 Village councils’ members instead (not exceeding 7) ‘are nominatedby the Chairmen of the Districts, on the advice of the elders and other prominent persons of
the villages and are appointed by the District Councils’. 1095

1082 Somaliland, Somaliland Law - Somaliland Constitution, updated translation, April 2005, url
1083 Participidia, Somaliland Constitutional Referendum, n.d., url

1084 Rakiya O. and Saeed M., Somaliland: Where There Has Been Conflict but No Intervention, 2015, url
1085 Somaliland, Somaliland Law - Somaliland Constitution, updated translation, April 2005, url
1086 VOA, Somaliland Ruling Party Candidate Bihi Wins Election, 21 November 2017, url

1087 Renders M., Appropriate 'Governance-Technology'? Somali Clan Elders and Institutions in the Making of the 'Republicof Somaliland', Afrika Spectrum 42, GIGA, 2007, pp. 439-459, url

1088 Somaliland, Somaliland Law - Somaliland Legislative Branch, n.d., url

1089 Somaliland, Somaliland Law - Local Government Law, March 2020, url
1090 FSNAU, Somalia – Administrative Maps, n.d. url

1091 Somaliland, Somaliland Law - Somaliland Constitution, updated translation, April 2005, url
1092 Somaliland, Somaliland Law - Somaliland Constitution, updated translation, April 2005, url
1093 Somaliland, Somaliland Law - Local Government Law, March 2020, url

1094 UN Somalia, Country Results Report Somalia 2020, March 2021, url, p. 57; UN, Country Results Report Somalia 2019,

June 2020, url, p. 63
1095 Somaliland, Somaliland Law - Local Government Law, March 2020, url

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7.7.2 Armed forces
Reportedly, Somaliland spends one-third of its (2019) national budget - between USD 233 and USD
350 million according to different estimates - on security and defence. 1096
National Intelligence Service (NIS). Somaliland’s NIS relies on a web of formal and informal
intelligence networks, nested in local communities, and which include army and police forces
intelligence officers. 1097
• Somaliland’s Police. Reportedly the Somaliland Police fields a nationwide police force, men
and women, of under 6 000 people, which receive training and aid from UK. This force
includes: 1098
o Special Police Unit (SPU): tasked with safeguarding foreign organisations and theirpersonnel;o Rapid Response Units (RRU): tasked with counterterrorism operations;o Somaliland’s National Armed Forces. The SNAF comprise of the army and the navy,
there is no air force. The Somaliland Army is relatively small, numbering according
to different estimates between less than 8 000 1099 and 15 000 1100 soldiers, it
receives some military training and aid from UK and the EU, 1101 as well as theUAE. 1102• Somaliland Coast Guard. Also supported by the UK and the EU, Somaliland’s coastguard set up
observation posts along the 528 miles coastline. However, given its limited resources, thecoastguard can only actively monitor limited portions of its coastline. Towards addressing thisshortage, while replicating the successful intelligence model, the coast guard ‘trained anddeputized local residents as shoreline monitors’. However, the force remains largely unable topatrol the coastal area near Puntland (Sanaag region). 1103 If on the one hand as of November
2019, ‘there have been no recorded acts of piracy originating from Somaliland’s coast’, on theother hand ‘both al-Shabaab and ISS use small vessels to move men and materiel into
Somaliland from small ports in Puntland’. 1104 In 2018, Sweden donated three boats aimed atenhancing the Coast Guard capacity in countering Human-Trafficking and to improve theirmaritime capabilities. 1105•

The condition of the armed forces in Somaliland can be summarised as follows: ‘The armed forces ofSomaliland do not possess aircraft, and even transport vehicles are in short supply. The government

1096 Horton M., How Somaliland Combats al-Shabaab, Combating Terrorism Center, CTC Sentinel, November 2019, Vol. 12,

Issue 10, url, p. 22; Rubin M., Somaliland – Key to Winning America's Longest War, 7 March 2019, url

1097 Horton M., How Somaliland Combats al-Shabaab, Combating Terrorism Center, CTC Sentinel, November 2019, Vol. 12,

Issue 10, url, p. 22;1098 Horton M., How Somaliland Combats al-Shabaab, Combating Terrorism Center, CTC Sentinel, November 2019, Vol. 12,

Issue 10, url, p. 221099 Horton M., How Somaliland Combats al-Shabaab, Combating Terrorism Center, CTC Sentinel, November 2019, Vol. 12,

Issue 10, url, p. 22

1100 Rubin M., Somaliland – Key to Winning America's Longest War, 7 March 2019, url

1101 Horton M., How Somaliland Combats al-Shabaab, Combating Terrorism Center, CTC Sentinel, November 2019, Vol. 12,

Issue 10, url, p. 221102 UN SEMG, Letter dated 7 November 2018 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions

751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security Council, 9November 2018, url, pp. 17-18
1103 Horton M., How Somaliland Combats al-Shabaab, Combating Terrorism Center, CTC Sentinel, November 2019, Vol. 12,
Issue 10, url, p. 221104 Horton M., How Somaliland Combats al-Shabaab, Combating Terrorism Center, CTC Sentinel, November 2019, Vol. 12,
Issue 10, url, p. 221105 EUCAP Somalia, Boats donated by Sweden to the Somaliland Coast Guard reach Berbera’s Port on 14 October, 14
October 2018, url

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struggles to rapidly deploy soldiers and police to where they are required, especially in areas withrough terrain and few roads. First rate HUMINT and the close relationships with community leaders is
the government’s primary way of compensating for these deficiencies’. 1106
Moreover, in reason of the arms embargo on Somalia that was imposed pursuant to Security Council
resolution 733 (1992) and partially lifted in 2013, 1107 Somaliland, which is not internationallyrecognised, is not allowed to purchase weapons or other military material that can be used for kinetic
operations. As a consequence, the Somaliland army and police force lack critical equipment, especiallyfor communications. Additionally, ‘recruits to Somaliland’s police and army are required to supply
their own personal weapon or purchase one before enlisting’. 1108

7.7.3 Other actors/forces
Apart from the official armed forces, other actors/armed forces present in Galmudug include the
Xaqdoon Militia. The Xaqdoon clan militia, which was established in April 2020 in El Afweyne, took to
the arms to fight against claimed grievances, to then hand them over three months later after reachingan agreement with government officials. 1109

7.7.4 Access to justice
For a first overview of the justice systems in Somalia - which, to some extent, apply to Somaliland as
well - see sections on Access to Justice, Formal and Informal Systems (including Customary Justice andShari’ah Law).
About Somaliland’s justice system, USAID reports that ‘justice provision in Somaliland operates
similarly to that in Somalia’, whereby it combines statutory courts with both Xeer and Shari’ah. While
all three systems are recognized by the Constitution of Somaliland, which views them ascomplementary, ‘Somaliland residents also often opt for either xeer or shari’ah to avoid the high fees
for lawyers and to find a resolution in a matter of days rather than wait for several weeks to be heard
by a statutory court, which are equally accused of corruption’. 1110 Differently though to other parts ofSomalia, ‘the population in Somaliland tends to use shari’ah given its unequivocal verdict, rather thanturning to elders for immediate de-escalation. 1111
Saferworld and SONSAF (Somaliland Non-State Actors Forum) reported in 2018 that ‘[a]ccess to justiceis improving in Somaliland’s urban areas but is still lacking in harder-to-reach rural areas’. To this end,
the introduction of mobile courts has expanded access to formal justice, but ‘there remain serious
challenges in aligning formal justice systems with Sharia and customary law.’ 1112
As to three justice systems in Somaliland (xeer, Shari’ah, statutory), the situation can be summarised
as follows:
Statutory Courts

1106 Horton M., Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, No Foothold for al-Shabaab in Somaliland, 14 August 2020, url
1107 UN SEMG, Letter dated 7 November 2018 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions

751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security Council, 9November 2018, url, p. 31108 Horton M., How Somaliland Combats al-Shabaab, Combating Terrorism Center, CTC Sentinel, November 2019, Vol. 12,
Issue 10, url, p. 221109 Somaliland Sun, Somaliland: Government Ends Three Months Clan Insurgency in Saanag Region, 6 June 2020, url;
International Crisis Group, Tracking Conflict Worldwide, Somaliland June 2020, url
1110 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, p. 28
1111 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, p. 28
1112 Saferworld and SONSAF, Building a peaceful, just and inclusive Somaliland: SDG16+ priorities for action, Briefing, May
2018, url, p. 7

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As to the judiciary branch, the Somaliland Constitution stipulates a three-tiered system, in line withthe rest of Somalia, 1113 and headed by the State Supreme Court (and Constitutional Court) in the state
capital Hargeisa. Art. 99 (The structure of the judiciary) stipulates that the branch consist of the ‘judges
and the members of the Procuracy’, and that the Courts shall consist of the Supreme Court, the Appeal
Courts of the Regions, the Regional Courts, the District Courts; and the Courts of the National Armed
Forces (which has ‘special jurisdiction in hearing criminal charges brought against the members of thearmed forces in peace or war’). 1114 Based on Law No. 24/2003 & 2006, The Organisation of the
Judiciary Law, District Courts deal with the following: (a) All claims based on Shari’ah, which areprimarily matters relating family law and succession; (b) Civil litigation concerning suits for amounts
up to 3 million Somaliland Shillings; (c) Criminal cases punishable by imprisonment for up to 3 years
or fines up to 3 million Somaliland Shillings. Complementing this, the Regional Courts deal with more
complex and severe cases (both civil and criminal) that do not fall within the jurisdiction of the District
Courts (including labour and employment claims). 1115 Basically, ‘only statutory courts have fulljurisdiction and claim to enforcement over all civil and criminal cases’. 1116
Based on a study conducted in 2019 by Saferworld, in cooperation with local partners, Somaliland
doubled the number of (statutory) judges in less than a decade, numbering 186 in 2018. Other positive
developments have been the rollout of mobile courts to each region of Somaliland, and theappointment of female prosecutors and court registrars. However, a number of issues still affectaccess to (statutory) justice in Somaliland: (a) gender representation: female registrars account forless than 20 per cent of the total workforce, and as of 2018 no single female judge was appointed; (b)the main laws of Somaliland such as the Penal Code, Civil Code, Criminal Procedure Code and Civil
Procedure Code are outdated laws that predate the constitution and the democratization process; (c)the legal knowledge of the general public is steadily improving but is still somewhat limited about(official) justice providers; (d) lengthy legal procedures, with high legal fees, together with a shortageof professionally trained lawyers; (e) judiciary institutions have very limited presence in rural areasand nomadic communities; (f) lack of confidence of the public in the fairness of court decisions andlegal systems; (g) perceived lack of professionalism in the institution of the police, coupled with low
implementation of court decisions hinders the enforceability for judgement holders. 1117
Other issues pointed out in the USDOS Human Rights Practices report for 2020 are ‘serious shortagesof trained judges’, limited legal documentation, and widespread allegations of corruption. 1118 At thesame time, the same report indicates that in Somaliland ‘defendants generally enjoyed a presumptionof innocence and the right to a public trial, to be present at trial, and to consult an attorney at allstages of criminal proceedings’. 1119
Shari’ah Courts
Approximately 30% of all cases arbitrated in Somaliland are resolved through shari’ah ‘courts’,
although major ulama work from office spaces that do not necessarily qualify as such. Moreover, if on
the one hand shari’ah court decisions can be legally enforced by the government, on the other handparties must voluntarily agree to abide by the rulings of the shari’ah courts. 1120 The prominent role of
Shari’ah as a source of law and adjudication in Somaliland is also evident in the State Constitution:(Article 5.1) ‘Islam is the religion of the Somaliland state, and the promotion of any other religion in
the territory of Somaliland, other than Islam, is prohibited’; (Article 5.2) ‘The laws of the nation shall
1113 HIPS, Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System, Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures, January 2021, url, p. 151114 Somaliland, Somaliland Law - Somaliland Constitution, updated translation, April 2005, url, artt. 98, 100, 104
1115 Somaliland, Somaliland Law - Somaliland Judicial System, April 2008, url

1116 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, p. 28
1117 Saferworld, Improving access to justice in Somaliland, 2019, url, pp. 3-111118 USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2020 - Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 101119 USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2020 - Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 111120 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, p. 28

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be grounded on and shall not be contrary to Islamic Sharia’; and (Article 5.3) ‘The state shall promotereligious tenets (religious affairs) and shall fulfil Sharia principles and discourage immoral acts andreprehensible behavior’. 1121 Within this context, ulama in Somaliland, including Sufi ulama, principally
follow the Shafi’i madhab, however the number of Saudi-influenced Hanbali madhab is growing. 1122
Shari’ah courts are particularly relevant for family law and succession, but also for business, finance,
and technology related cases, which cannot be directly solved through xeer. 1123 At the same time
Shari’ah courts and Qaadis - Shari’ah judges that are evaluated by the Ministry of Religious Affairs andlicensed by the Ministry of Justice - can only adjudicate civil cases.1124 ‘Although more accessible toand amenable towards women and women’s rights than most customary justice providers, thetension over different interpretations of the shari’ah can invalidate testimonies of women in somecases’. 1125
Other justice mechanisms:
xeer, elders and elder councils. Differently from other (regional) State in Somalia, ‘[r]ather thanturning to elders for immediate de-escalation’, Somalilanders tend to use Shari’ah courts as a firstport of adjudication. 1126 As a result, in Somaliland xeer and Shari’ah arbitrations are ‘almost
equally engaged’; 1127
ADR Centres. ADR initiatives have been piloted in Somaliland in the period 2004-2007. 1128 No
current information on this point could be found within the given time limits and among theconsulted sources;
District Peace Committees (DPCs). No specific information on this point could be found within thegiven time limits and among the consulted sources.

•••

7.7.5 Security forces’ human rights conduct
In the period 5 November 2019 – 9 February 2021, the UNSG, in its various reports on the situation in
Somalia, attributed to Somaliland security forces the following violations: (a) execution of six death
sentences; 1129 (b) two cases of arbitrary arrest of journalists (reporting period 5 August – 4 November2020); 1130 (c) three journalists arbitrarily arrested (reporting period 5 May – 4 August 2020); 1131 (d) 11
journalists arbitrarily arrested, and four media outlets suspended, while a new government directive
was passed ordering hotels not to host meetings and conferences without prior approval (reporting
period 5 November 2019 – 4 February 2020). 1132
The UNSG indicated, in its latest report on Children and Armed Conflict (March 2020 – covering theperiod 1 August 2016 – 30 September 2019), that the country task force had verified two cases ofchildren deprived of their liberty for alleged association with al-Shabaab or pro-ISIL elements in
Somalia. 1133

1121 Somaliland, Somaliland Law - Somaliland Constitution, updated translation, April 2005, url
1122 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, p. 281123 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, p. 281124 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, p. 281125 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, p. 281126 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, p. 281127 Expanding Access to Justice Program, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, p. 31

1128 Expanding Access to Justice Program, Alternative Dispute Resolution Initiatives in Somalia, June 2020, url, pp. 3-4
1129 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 17 February 2021, url, p. 91130 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 November 2020, url, pp. 8-91131 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 August 2020, url, p. 91132

UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 13 February 2020, url, p. 81133 UNSG, Children and Armed Conflict in Somalia, 4 March 2020, url, p. 7

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Within this context, the USDOS noted in its latest report (for 2020) that Somaliland authorities‘regularly harassed journalists through arbitrary detention when they reported on government
shortcomings or union with Somalia, particularly in the Sool and Sanaag regions’. 1134 Additionally, they‘continued to detain Somaliland residents employed by the federal government in Mogadishu,
sometimes for extended periods’, while they viewed representing Somaliland within or to the federal
government as treason, punishable under Somaliland law. 1135 The Independent Expert on the situationof human rights in Somalia reported in 2020 about ‘the systemic abuse of power by police officers anda culture of impunity’ in Somaliland that ‘have caused a breakdown of trust between the police andthe community’: ‘officers reportedly continue to torture, beat, threaten, harass and arbitrarily arrest
civilians, especially journalists, human rights defenders and persons allegedly suspected ofterrorism’.1136
In the context of the Somaliland-Puntland confrontation over Sool and Sanaag, fighters were captured
and detained by both parties. As of October 2018, Somaliland was detaining 14 combatants from thePuntland security forces. The Monitoring Group received testimonies claiming that fighters from
Puntland had been tortured and killed by Somaliland security forces on 24 May 2018, in revenge forthe killing of a Somaliland commander. 1137

1134 USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2020 - Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 171135 USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2020 - Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 121136 UN Human Rights Council, Situation of Human Rights in Somalia, 24 August 2020, url, p. 121137 UN SEMG, Letter dated 7 November 2018 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions

751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security Council, 9November 2018, url, p. 40

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Annex 1: Bibliography
Oral sources
Interview with French researcher and intelligence officer Marc Fontrier, 1 April 2021. Marc Fontrier is
a French scholar with research focus on Somalia and the wider Horn of Africa. He has publishedextensively about Somalia and has a past of 20 years in intelligence services as head of the SubSaharan area. He holds a PhD and has worked for NATO and UN as a consultant. He also has years offield experience in Somalia. DIDR conducted the interview.
Legal Expert, email, 10 May 2021. The legal expert has been working on legal and constitutional
issues in Somalia and elsewhere in the Horn of Africa for the past several years. EASO contacted thissource.
Military Expert, email, 10 March 2021. This military expert has been working on Somalia security andmilitary issues for the past several years. EASO contacted this source.
Non-public sources
Hirshabelle, The Interim Constitution of the Regional State of Hirshabelle adopted 5th October 2016
by the Delegates, 2016, non-public source
Political Geography Now, Somalia – Approximate Territorial Control as of 30 April 2021, non public
source. Political Geography Now (PolGeoNow) is a private company that chronicles changes to theworld's countries, borders, and capitals, as well as territorial control in conflict zones and disputed
territories. EASO procured this map.
Unpublished written information from a security organisation provided to EASO, 2020. This
organisation works on Somalia security and stability. One of its tasks is the monitoring and analysisof the stabilisation process in Somalia. The organisation provided unpublished information to EASO
for the purposes of this report and wishes to remain anonymous for security reasons.
Somalia, Supreme Court of Somalia, Judiciary Report Assessment 2020, 2021, unpublished report
Written sources
AA (Anadolu Agency), 1 of 3 Somalian troops to be trained by Turkey: Envoy, 4 August 2020,
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/1-of-3-somalian-troops-to-be-trained-by-turkey-envoy/1931275,
accessed on 14 May 2021
AA (Anadolu Agency), Somali commandos trained by Turkey back home, 9 March 2021,
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/somali-commandos-trained-by-turkey-back-home/2169184,
accessed on 14 May 2021
Abikar, A., Clan Distribution of the Somalis in Horn of Africa, 1999, as in: ACCORD, Clans in Somalia.
Report on a Lecture by Joakim Gundel, December 2009,https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1193130/90_1261130976_accord-report-clans-in-somaliarevised-edition-20091215.pdf, accessed on 14 May 2021
ACCORD (Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation), Clans in
Somalia – Report on a lecture by Joakim Gundel, COI Workshop Vienna, 15 May 2009 (Revised
Edition), 2009, https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4b29f5e82.pdf, accessed on 14 May 2021

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ACCORD (Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation), Somalia:
Situation of the ‘Shakhal’, ‘Ajuran’, ‘Shashi’, and ‘Wayten’ clans, 15 March 2004,
https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/1302015.html, accessed on 14 May 2021
ACCORD (Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation),
Understanding Civil Militia Groups in Somalia, 2016, https://www.accord.org.za/conflicttrends/understanding-civil-militia-groups-somalia/, accessed on 14 May 2021
ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project), A turbulent run-up to elections in Somalia, 7April 2021, https://acleddata.com/2021/04/07/a-turbulent-run-up-to-elections-insomalia/?__cf_chl_jschl_tk__=8c3c36faaaad11d62a74e5e9e130eaca8adcdc9d-1618318621-0AVhlF_gs7K2XvzYulxj5XVxOrduLaFREf32Mrp07HRu_vSBdMPHetcCKUP0QF8AVnJcjOHMNbVoCzbyD
V4Zs7h5LxJA98RdfbO4tyyXV0Scf6p5D552Y7SGKTWeJt9wRYlQ8oDV0nqZ_qTclklNqp9oPLtT5ArR8ew
NmBXhNCB6bH8cxd3qV7ro5R58mE0UUyTd6JWp4eB65Nhx9wi1iCUdSXfVtOuxHJRISbC4hLMdlaYnr7
huQ_BVBVaXfCshAwBRH_Edg_crMEQHLmw_FE_UjLMnU3FzbXJCJDJqrWi6D_CUE5EHZ9Q-OocbhpXE60nMdBRLz1j0FYVrP5dczup3O265XmxI3XudnW8Kpm9Nody9tTR9PjzJmE3FYIAJ60ClZ10LCVBtnGP
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ance_Systems_The_45_Formula_and_the_2012_Provisional_Constitution_JOURNAL_OF_SOMALI_S
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119Country of origin information report | Somalia: Actors

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East African (The), Somali chief justice tells off president over sacking, 28 May 2018,https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/rest-of-africa/somali-chief-justice-tells-off-presidentover-sacking-1394826, accessed on 14 May 2021
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Finland, Finnish immigration Service, Somalia Fact-Finding Mission to Mogadishu in March 2020,
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Garowe Online, Somalia: EU tries to revive stalled talks between FGS and Somaliland, 13 May 2020,
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127

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14 May 2021

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Annex 2: Terms of Reference
Maps [Control map of Somalia; Clan distribution map]
1. Country background, conflict(s) layers, and disputes overview
2. The Federal Government of Somalia – FGS
2.1 State structure and governance
2.2 Territorial control
2.3 Judiciary and penal system
2.4 Security forces
2.5 Security Forces’ Human Rights Conduct
3. Clans
3.1 Area of settlement/ mapping of main clan distribution, size, intra-inter clan mobility
3.2 Clan protection (forms and limits) and customary security providers
3.3 Traditional customary law and access to justice (xeer)
3.4 Clan militias role, recruitment, and engagement in disputes
3.5 Relationship with Al-Shabab
3.6 Overview of Clan Militias Abuses
4. Al-Shabaab: presence, territorial control, bodies, functioning, outreach
4.1 Armed forces and Amynat
4.2 Modus operandi
4.3 Access and administration of justice under Al-Shabaab
4.4 Overview of abuses
5. AMISOM, AFRICOM
5.1. Strength and characteristics, regional presence, control
5.2. Modus Operandi
5.3. Human Rights Conduct
6. ISIS Somalia: presence, territorial control, outreach
6.1 Strength
6.2 Overview of abuses
7. The Federal Member States and Somaliland
7.1 JUBBALAND: state-building process, territorial control, bodies
7.1.1 FMS Armed Forces
7.1.2 Other actors/forces
7.1.3 Access to Justice141

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7.1.4 Security Forces’ Human Rights Conduct
7.2. SOUTH-WEST: state-building process, territorial control, bodies
7.2.1 FMS Armed Forces
7.2.2 Access to Justice7.2.3 Other actors/forces
7.2.4 Security Forces’ Human Rights Conduct
7.3. BENADIR & MOGADISHU: territorial control, bodies
7.3.1 BRA Forces
7.3.2 Access to Justice7.3.3 Other actors/forces
7.3.4 Security Forces’ Human Rights Conduct
7.4. HIRSHABELLE: state-building process, territorial control, bodies
7.4.1 FMS Armed Forces
7.4.2 Access to Justice7.4.3 Other actors/forces
7.4.4 Security Forces’ Human Rights Conduct
7.5. GALMUDUG: state-building process, territorial control, bodies
7.5.1 FMS Armed Forces
7.5.2 Access to Justice7.5.3 Other actors/forces
7.5.4 Security Forces’ Human Rights Conduct
7.6. PUNTLAND: state-building process, territorial control, bodies
7.6.1 FMS Armed Forces
7.6.2 Access to Justice7.6.3 Other actors/forces
7.6.4 Security Forces’ Human Rights Conduct
7.7. SOMALILAND: state-building process, territorial control, bodies
7.7.1 Armed Forces
7.7.2 Access to Justice7.7.3 Other actors/forces
7.7.4 Security Forces’ Human Rights Conduct

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doi: 10.2847/446144

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