September 2022

Syria:
Security situation

Country of Origin Information

Syria: Security situation
Country of Origin Information Report

September 2022

Manuscript completed in September 2022
Neither the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) nor any person acting on behalf of the
EUAA is responsible for the use that might be made of the information contained within thispublication.
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2022
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ISBN 978-92-9400-465-9 doi: 10.2847/19498

BZ-07-22-901-EN-N© European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), 2022
Cover photo/illustration: The old Roman city of Palmyra in the middle of the Syrian desert,
Trent Inness, © Istock 1313877475, 2021
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. For any use or reproductionof photos or other material that is not under the EUAA copyright, permission must be sought
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SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

Acknowledgements
EUAA would like to acknowledge the following national asylum departments andorganisations as co-drafters of this report:•

Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation(ACCORD)•

Germany, Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), Country Analysis•

Finland, Finnish Immigration Service, Legal Service and Country Information Unit

The following departments and organisations have reviewed respective parts of this report•

Austria, Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum, Country of Origin Information
Department•

Belgium, Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons(CGRS), Centre for Documentation and Research (Cedoca)•

The Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of Origin (COI) unit•

Slovakia, Migration Office, Department of Documentation and Foreign Cooperation

All parts of this report have been reviewed by at least one reviewer.
It must be noted that the review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts ororganisations contributes to the overall quality of the report, but does not necessarily imply
their formal endorsement of the final report, which is the full responsibility of the EUAA.

5

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMContents
Acknowledgements............................................................................................................ 5Contents ............................................................................................................................ 6
Disclaimer .........................................................................................................................10
Glossary and abbreviations ............................................................................................... 11
Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 13
Methodology...............................................................................................................................................13
Defining the terms of reference ......................................................................................13
Collecting information.........................................................................................................13
Quality control .......................................................................................................................14
Sources .........................................................................................................................................................14
Sources on civilian casualties ..........................................................................................14
Sources on security incidents ..........................................................................................14
Map of the Syrian Arab Republic .......................................................................................16
1.

General description of the security situation .......................................................... 17
1.1. Overview of conflicts ...................................................................................................................... 17
1.2. Political developments ................................................................................................................... 17
1.3. International involvement............................................................................................................ 20
1.3.1. Russia.......................................................................................................................... 20
1.3.2. Iran ............................................................................................................................... 20
1.3.3. Turkey...........................................................................................................................21
1.3.4. US-led Coalition against ISIL ...............................................................................22
1.3.5. Israel.............................................................................................................................23
1.4. Armed actors ....................................................................................................................................25
1.4.1. Syrian Arab Army and affiliated armed groups.............................................25
1.4.2. The Syrian National Army.....................................................................................29
1.4.3. Syrian Democratic Forces .....................................................................................31
1.4.4. Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham.............................................................................................34
1.4.5. Other anti-government armed groups in the Idlib area.............................36
1.4.6. Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as ISIS, IS or
Daesh)...................................................................................................................................... 37
1.5. Recent security trends and armed confrontations during the reference period ......41
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SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

1.5.1. Areas under the control of the Government of Syria (GoS) ......................41
1.5.2. Areas under control of Turkish-backed armed groups .............................43
1.5.3. Kurdish-controlled areas in north-east Syria .................................................45
1.5.4. Areas in north-west Syria under anti-GoS armed groups control.......... 47
1.5.5. Tanf.............................................................................................................................. 50
1.6. Impact of violence on the civilian population ........................................................................51
1.6.1. Tactics and weapons used ...................................................................................51
1.6.2. Security incidents ....................................................................................................55
1.6.3. Civilian fatalities .......................................................................................................58
1.6.4. Displacement and return ......................................................................................62
2.

Governorate-level description of the security situation .......................................... 67
2.1. Idlib governorate............................................................................................................................. 67
2.1.1. General description of the governorate..........................................................68
2.1.2. Conflict background and armed actors ...........................................................68
2.1.3. Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ................ 72
2.2. Aleppo governorate.......................................................................................................................82
2.2.1. General description of the governorate..........................................................82
2.2.2. Conflict background and armed actors ...........................................................83
2.2.3. Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ................86
2.3. Hama governorate....................................................................................................................... 100
2.3.1. General description of the governorate....................................................... 100
2.3.2. Conflict background and armed actors ..........................................................101
2.3.3. Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ..............104
2.4. Latakia governorate ...................................................................................................................... 114
2.4.1. General description of the governorate......................................................... 115
2.4.2. Conflict background and armed actors .......................................................... 115
2.4.3. Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ............... 116
2.5. Tartous governorate .................................................................................................................... 123
2.5.1. General description of the governorate........................................................ 124
2.5.2. Conflict background and armed actors ......................................................... 124
2.5.3. Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population .............. 126
2.6. Homs governorate........................................................................................................................ 129
2.6.1. General description of the governorate........................................................ 129

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

2.6.2. Conflict background and armed actors .........................................................130
2.6.3. Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population .............. 135
2.7. Hasaka governorate..................................................................................................................... 143
2.7.1. General description of the governorate........................................................ 143
2.7.2. Conflict background and armed actors ......................................................... 144
2.7.3. Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population .............. 148
2.8. Raqqa governorate....................................................................................................................... 157
2.8.1. General description of the governorate........................................................ 157
2.8.2. Conflict background and armed actors ......................................................... 158
2.8.3. Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population .............. 162
2.9. Deir Ez-Zor governorate............................................................................................................. 169
2.9.1. General description of the governorate......................................................... 169
2.9.2. Conflict background and armed actors ......................................................... 170
2.9.3. Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population .............. 173
2.10. Damascus governorate.............................................................................................................. 182
2.10.1. General description of the governorate....................................................... 182
2.10.2. Conflict background and armed actors....................................................... 183
2.10.3. Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ............ 185
2.11. Rural Damascus .............................................................................................................................190
2.11.1. General description of the governorate........................................................190
2.11.2. Conflict background and armed actors ........................................................ 192
2.11.3. Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population.............. 194
2.12. Dar’a governorate.......................................................................................................................203
2.12.1. General description of the governorate......................................................203
2.12.2. Conflict background and armed actors ......................................................2042.12.3. Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ...........209
2.13. Quneitra governorate ................................................................................................................ 222
2.13.1. General description of the governorate...................................................... 223
2.13.2. Conflict background and armed actors ...................................................... 223
2.13.3. Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population............ 225
2.14. Sweida governorate................................................................................................................... 233
2.14.1. General description of the governorate...................................................... 233
2.14.2. Conflict background and armed actors ...................................................... 234

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SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

2.14.3. Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population............ 238
Annex I: Bibliography ..................................................................................................... 248
Public sources ........................................................................................................................................ 248
Annex II: Terms of Reference ..........................................................................................301

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Disclaimer
This report was written according to the EUAA COI Report Methodology (2019). The report isbased on carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced.
The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed withutmost care. However, this document does not claim to be exhaustive. If a particular event,person or organisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has
not taken place or that the person or organisation does not exist.
Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particularapplication for international protection. Terminology used should not be regarded asindicative of a particular legal position.
‘Refugee’, ‘risk’ and similar terminology are used as generic terminology and not in the legal
sense as applied in the EU Asylum Acquis, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.
Neither the EUAA, nor any person acting on its behalf, may be held responsible for the use
which may be made of the information contained in this report.
On 19 January 2022, the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) became the European
Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA). All references to EASO, EASO products and bodies should
be understood as references to the EUAA.
The drafting of this report was finalised on 17 August 2022. Any event taking place after thisdate is not included in this report. More information on the reference period for this report canbe found in the methodology section of the Introduction.

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SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

Glossary and abbreviations
Term

Definition

AANES

Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria

ACLED

Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project

AOAVAction on Armed Violence

COAR

Center for Operational Analysis and Research

ERW

Explosive Remnants of War

GoS

Government of Syria

HAD

Hurras al-Din

HTS

Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham

IED

Improvised Explosive Device

ISIL

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant; also known as Islamic State of
Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Islamic State (IS), or Daesh

NDF

National Defence Forces

NLF

National Liberation Front

OHCHR

Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights

PYD

Democratic Union Party (Kurdish)

SAA

Syrian Arab Army

SDF

Syrian Democratic Forces

11EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

TermDefinition

SHRC

Syrian Human Rights Committee

SNA

Syrian National Army

SNHR

Syrian Network for Human Rights

SOHR

Syrian Observatory of Human Rights

STJ

Syrians for Truth & Justice

UNCOI

Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian
Arab Republic

UNOCHA

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

USDOD

United States Department of Defense

UXO

Unexploded Ordnance

WINEP

Washington Institute for Near East Policy

YPG

Kurdish People’s Protection Units

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SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

Introduction
The purpose of this security situation report is to provide relevant information for theassessment of international protection status determination, including refugee status andsubsidiary protection, and in particular for use in updating EUAA’s country guidancedevelopment on Syria.
In order to support the assessment of the application of Article 15(c) of the Qualification
Directive on a serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason ofindiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict, the security
situation report examines the nature of armed conflicts taking place in the territory, the natureof the violence and presence of armed actors in different areas, and the impact on civilians, forexample in terms of casualties/fatalities and conflict-linked displacement.
The report covers the period of April 2021 – July 2022, and it is an update of the EUAA COI
Report: Syria – Security situation (July 2021). A limited update of sections addressing thejustice system in government-held areas and areas under the control of the Autonomous
Administration of North and East Syria, previously covered in the EUAA COI Report: Syria –Actors (December 2019), is also included.

Methodology
This report was jointly drafted by national COI departments in EU+ countries1 and ACCORD
and reviewed by EUAA and national COI departments in EU+ countries, as mentioned in the
Acknowledgements section.
This report is produced in line with the EUAA COI Report Methodology (2019)2 and the EUAA
COI Writing and Referencing Style Guide (2019). 3

Defining the terms of reference
The terms of reference (ToR) of this report were defined by EUAA based on discussions held
and input received from COI experts in the EUAA COI specialist network on Syria and frompolicy experts in EU+ countries within the framework of a Country Guidance development on
Syria. The Terms of Reference for this report can be found in Annex II of this report.

Collecting information
The information gathered is a result of research using public, specialised paper -based andelectronic sources until 25 July 2022. Some limited additional information was added during

1

All EU Member States plus Norway and Switzerland.
EUAA, EUAA Country of Origin Information (COI) Report Methodology, June 2019, url
3
EUAA, Writing and Referencing Guide for EUAA Country of Origin Information (COI) Reports, June 2019, url
2

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

the finalisation of this report in response to feedback received during the quality control
process, until 17 August 2022.

Quality control
To ensure that the authors respected the EUAA COI Report Methodology and that the Termsof Reference were comprehensively addressed, a review was carried out by COI specialists
from the countries and organisations listed as reviewers in the Acknowledgements section. Allcomments made by the reviewers were taken into consideration and almost all of them were
implemented in the final draft of this report, which was finalised on 17 August 2022. EUAA also
performed the final quality review and editing of the text.

Sources
In accordance with EUAA COI methodology, a range of different published documentarysources have been consulted on relevant topics for this report. These include: COI reports bygovernments; information from civil society, advocacy groups, humanitarian organisations, andNGOs; international and NGO human rights reports; reports produced by various bodies of theUnited Nations; Syrian and regionally-based media and social media; academic publications
and think tank reports and specialised sources covering Syria. All information fr om thesesources was consulted within time constraints and within the research constraints posed by
Syria’s challenging information-gathering environment.

Sources on civilian casualties
The main source on civilian fatalities in Syria used in this report is the Syrian Network of
Human Rights (SNHR). The Syrian Network of Human Rights (SNHR) is a non-profit humanrights organisation founded in 2011 which works on documenting human rights violations in
Syria. SNHR relies on a network of volunteers in each governorate to compile lists of civilian
fatalities and verify victims’ identities by photo or video and by speaking with family members,
witnesses, and hospitals. SNHR reports fatalities by gender, age, perpetrator, governorate,
and other classifications. It only records civilian fatalities – with the exception of the death toll
among victims who died due to torture, which includes armed combatants and civilians. 4
Where available, information from other sources documenting civilian casualties in the Syrian
conflict (UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Syrian Human Rights Committee, The
Syrian Observatory for Human Rights) has been included.

Sources on security incidents
For data on violent incidents, publicly available curated datasets from the organisation Armed
Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) have been used. ACLED is a project
collecting, analysing and mapping information on crisis and conflict in Africa, south and southeast Asia and Middle East and provides datasets on conflict incidents. It collects data on
4

For detailed information on SNHR’s methodology see url; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 1,734
Civilians in Syria in 2020, Including 99 in December, 1 January 2021, url, p. 4

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SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

violent incidents in Syria, coding each incident with the time and place, type of violent
incident, the parties involved and the number of fatalities. The information is collected in a
database that is openly accessible, searchable and kept continuously up to date. The dataprimarily come from secondary sources such as media reports, but also from reports byinternational institutions and non-governmental organisations and data provided by local
partners of ACLED.5
Security incidents numbers and associated graphs/maps at country and governorate level are
based on a publicly available ACLED curated dataset for Middle East ( updated until
12 August 2022).6 Additional sources have been researched to the extent possible tocorroborate the ACLED findings.
Further information on ACLED’s methodology and the dataset used for this report is available
in 1.6.2 Security incidents.

Structure and use of the report
The report is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on presenting an overview of thearmed conflicts in Syria, current political developments and information on the main parties tothe conflict. It goes on to describe the security trends in different parts of Syria between April
2021 and July 2022, with a focus on the nature of the violence and impact on civilians.
The second part provides a governorate-level description of the security situation. Eachgovernorate chapter includes a map, brief description of the governorate, background conflict
dynamics and armed actors present in the area, recent security trends, including information
on civilian fatalities, security incidents and trends, armed confrontations (etc.), displacement
and return, and civilian infrastructure impacted.

5

ACLED, Methodology, April 2019, url; ACLED, FAQ ACLED Sourcing Methodology, February 2020, url
For more details on ACLED’s reporting see Section 1.6.2. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (12 August2022), url
6

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Map of the Syrian Arab Republic

Map 1: Syrian Arab Republic, © United Nations7

7

Syria, Map No. 4204 Rev. 3, April 2012, United Nations, url

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SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

1.

General description of the security
situation

1.1.

Overview of conflicts

The United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic (referred to in this report as the UNCOI) noted, in February 2022, that five foreign
military forces - including Iran, Israel, Russia, Turkey and the United States of America -, ‘aswell as non-State armed groups and UN-designated terrorist groups’ continued to be active in
Syria.8
Syria continued to be involved in international armed conflicts, including against the US-led
coalition to fight Daesh/ISIL (the so-called Global Coalition, currently comprising 85
members) 9, as well as against Turkey and Israel, both of which continued to occupy parts of
Syrian territory.10 Moreover, Syria – together with its allies Russia and Iran-backed LebaneseHezbollah11 and other Shia militia – continued to be involved in several non-internationalarmed conflicts, including against armed groups opposing the Government of Syria (GoS) suchas Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Ahrar al-Sham, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the Syrian
National Army (SNA), the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) group, and others. Noninternational armed conflicts on Syrian territory further included ongoing infighting between
various non-State armed groups, as well as Turkey’s attacks on Kurdish militias and ISIL andIsrael’s attacks on Hezbollah.12
Further information on the conflict background in Syria is available in section 1.1 of the EUAA
COI Report: Syria - Security situation (July 2021) and in the EUAA COI Report: Syria - Actors(December 2019).

1.2.

Political developments

Presidential elections were held on 26 May 2021. Of 51 potential candidates, President Assadand two more men were eventually registered to run: a former cabinet minister and the leaderof an opposition party ‘tolerated’ by the GoS. These two other candidates obtained 1.5 % and
3.3 % of the valid votes, respectively, while the incumbent president received the remaining
more than 95 % votes.13 The elections were not monitored by the United Nations. 14 The New
Arab, a London-based news outlet focusing on the MENA region, reported that the country’s
8

UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 4
9Global Coalition (The), Mission, n.d., url
10
RULAC, International armed conflicts in Syria, 24 May 2022, url
11
CFR, What is Hezbollah?, 25 May 2022, url
12
RULAC, Non-international armed conflicts in Syria, 24 May 2022, url
13
UK, House of Commons Library, Syria: 2021 presidential election and future prospects, 9 June 2021, url, pp. 6, 11
14
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/48/70, 13 August 2021, url, para. 12

17EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

leadership had invited observers from ‘friendly and brotherly’ countries such as Russia, Iran,China, and Belarus.15 Ahead of the elections, President Assad reportedly pardoned persons
convicted of smuggling, drug abuse and foreign currency trading, and released some of theprisoners.16 Likewise, the president released a number of persons held in detention for
expressing some form of criticism on social media. While Reuters reported on the release of
several hundreds of persons, the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) noted that 81
persons were released under the amnesty. Opponents and political detainees were reportedly
not included in the amnesty decree and neither pardoned nor released.17 Further informationon the presidential elections is available in section 1.2 of the EUAA COI Report: Syria - Security
situation (July 2021).
The UN Security Council Resolution 2254, adopted in December 2015, calls for creating a
constitutional committee that would draft a new constitution and organise UN supervised
elections.18 A sixth session of the constitutional committee’s drafting group took place in
October 2021, where draft constitutional texts on four titles were presented. However, noconsensus on further steps could be reached between representatives of the GoS and the
opposition,19 an outcome that the UN Special Envoy for Syria called ‘a disappointment’. 20 A
seventh meeting in March 2022 ended with ‘no substantial progress’, according to a report by
Al Jazeera.21 At the constitutional committee’s eight meeting in June 2022, draft constitutional
texts and revisions were discussed. In a concluding statement, the UN Special Envoy
observed the continued inability of the parties included to reach an agreement.22 A ninth
meeting, scheduled for the end of July 2022, was cancelled after the GoS delegation statedthat it would only participate if Russia’s demand for a change of venue were met. A
representative of Russia had previously requested a move to a ‘more neutral’ place than
Geneva.23
Further information on the constitutional committee is available in section 1.2 of the EUAA COI
Report: Syria - Security situation (July 2021). According to some analysts, doubts overconfidence-building measures, the format’s failure to represent all key stakeholders 24 , and adisproportionate focus on the Constitution at the expense of other issues such as, forexample, the creation of a transitional government, were some of the underlying causes for

15

New Arab (The), Belarusian observers arrive to monitor 'fake' Syrian presidential elections amid voter intimidation,
23 May 2021, url
16
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/48/70, 13 August 2021, url, para. 13
17
SNHR, The Syrian Regime has Released 81 Individuals Under Amnesty Decree No. 13 of May 2021 and Arrested
Nearly 176 Since its Issuance, 15 July 2021, url, pp. 9, 17; Reuters, Syria releases hundreds of social media critics
ahead of election, 11 May 2021, url
18
Syria Study Group, Final Report and Recommendations, USIP, 24 September 2019, url, p. 29
19
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 7; UN Special Envoy for Syria Geir O. Pedersen, Briefing to the
Security Council on Syria, 27 October 2021, url , paras. 3, 6
20
UN Special Envoy for Syria Geir O. Pedersen, Briefing to the Security Council on Syria, 27 October 2021, url,para. 821
Al Jazeera, Syria constitutional talks fail again in Geneva, 25 March 2022, url
22
UN OSES, United Nations Special Envoy for Syria Mr. Geir O. Pedersen statement at the conclusion of the eight
session of the small body of the Syrian constitutional committee, 3 June 2022, url
23
Syria Direct, Syrian Constitutional Committee at an impasse following cancellation of its ninth session, 26 July
2022, url
24
COAR, 18th Round of ‘Astana Talks’ Fizzles as Guarantors Lose Momentum, 20 June 2022, url; Al Jazeera, Syria
constitutional talks fail again in Geneva, 25 March 2022, url

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SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

the ongoing lack of progress.25 Qatar, Russia and Turkey reportedly launched a new trilateral
consultation process in March 2021, after a meeting of the countries’ foreign ministers in
Doha, noting that this format was not meant to interfere with the Astana process26, where
representatives of the GoS, the opposition and the so-called guarantor states (Russia, Iran andTurkey) meet for peace talks. The latest meeting in Astana took place in June 2022, however,with no substantive progress.27
Some states in the region reportedly made some efforts to re-establish diplomatic, security
and economic ties with the GoS28, with President Assad visiting the UAE in March 2022 29 andJordan deciding to resume ties with the GoS.30 For some countries, however, a politicalsolution to the conflict and the safe return of refugees reportedly remained preconditions for
Syria’s re-admission into the League of Arab States.31 Moreover, the Center for Operational
Analysis and Research (COAR) observed that the GoS’s alliance with Russia might negatively
impact further regional rapprochement after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. 32 Despite initialreports on thousands of Syrians being recruited by Russia to fight in Ukraine 33, as of June
2022, a large-scale presence of Syrian fighters in the country was not observed by US
officials.34 In July 2022, the EU imposed several restrictive measures against six Syrian
nationals and one company involved in the recruitment of Syrian mercenaries to fight on theside of the Russian forces against Ukraine. 35
On 12 July 2022, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 2642 extending the mandate todeliver humanitarian aid via the Bab Al-Hawa border crossing for six months, with a possible
further six-month extension depending on a separate resolution.36 The previous one-year
mandate had expired on 10 July 2022, and an extension for another 12 months had beenvetoed by Russia.37

25

Enab Baladi, Constitution or political transition; what do Syrians need?, 18 May 2022, url; Al Jazeera, Syria
constitutional talks fail again in Geneva, 25 March 2022, url
26
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/48/70, 13 August 2021, url, para. 15
27
COAR, 18th Round of ‘Astana Talks’ Fizzles as Guarantors Lose Momentum, 20 June 2022, url
28
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 829
COAR, Iranian Foreign Minister to Damascus, Welcoming Arab Normalisation or Reminding of Tehran Influence?,
28 March 2022, url
30
Alajlouni, L., Jordan is pushing for rapprochement with Syria. But is it to reinforce artificial stability in the region?,
Atlantic Council, 19 October 2021, url
31
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 8
32
COAR, Crisis in Ukraine: Impacts for Syria, 10 March 2022, url
33
SOHR, SOHR: Over 40,000 Syrians reportedly register to fight for Russia in Ukraine, 15 March 2022, url; AP,
Explainer: Will Russia bring Syrian fighters to Ukraine?, 11 March 2022, url
34
Al-Monitor, Russia remains committed to Syria’s Assad despite Ukraine war, Pentagon says, 8 June 2022, url
35
EU, Official Journal of the European Union, Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1274 of 21 July 2022, url
36
ECHO, Syria: Statement by High Representative Borrell and Commissioner Lenarčič on the renewal of crossborder humanitarian deliveries, 13 July 2022, url
37
UN, Security Council Renews Cross-Border Aid Operations into Syria’s North-West for Six Months, Adopting
Resolution 2642 (2022) as ‘Compromise’ amid Divisions, 12 July 2022, url

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

1.3.

International involvement

1.3.1.

RussiaAs of February 2022, Russia had by its own account about 63 000 military personnel
deployed to Syria, according to an AFP report. 38 Experts quoted by Enab Baladi, a Syrian
independent news site, noted that this number might include not only fighting forces, but also
personnel with non-combat missions, experts and consultants, and forces and militia‘unofficially’ linked with the Russian government. 39 Moreover, Russia controlled an airbase at
Hmeymim, near Latakia, established in 2015, and a naval base at the port of Tartous. The latter
had already been used by the Soviet Navy in the 1980s but has since then been expanded
and upgraded.40 Both military bases have reportedly been leased by the GoS to Russia41 for aperiod of 49 years.42 As of the beginning of 2022, Russian forces had 114 military, security, andoperational points in Syria.43
In September 2021, Russia brokered an agreement between the GoS and local opposition
forces, ending a 10-week siege of the Dar’a Al-Balad area of Dar’a city by pro-GoS forces,
during which tens of thousands of civilians were displaced and others killed or injured. 44 For
more information see also section 1.5.1 and 2.12.3 of this report.
Since the beginning of Russia’s war against Ukraine in February 2022, there had been media
reports on the withdrawal of Russian military personnel from some of their positions in Syria(including the Syrian desert, and areas around Aleppo, Idlib and at borders with Turkey andIsrael) 45 and their regrouping at the Russian-controlled Hmeymim airbase and other airports.
Reports suggested they might be redeployed to Russia or Ukraine.46 Some vacated positions
were reportedly turned over to Iran-backed militia.47

1.3.2.

Iran

As of the beginning of 2022, Iranian forces had 333 military, security, and operational points in
Syria, including 186 sites of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), 80 sites ofHezbollah, an Iran-backed, Lebanese armed group48, and 67 sites that were shared by both

38

AFP, Russia’s growing ties to Syria amid military backing, 28 February 2 , url
Enab Baladi, The truth about 60,000 Russian troops in Syria, 9 June 2022, url
40
Kjellen, J. and Lund, A., From Tartous to Tobruk: The Return of Russian Sea Power in the Eastern Mediterranean,
FOI, 11 February 2022, url, pp. 6-7
41
According to an AFP report, Tartous has been leased to the Russian company Stroytransgaz. The same company
reportedly received a 50-year concession to extract phosphate in the Palmyra region. AFP, Russia’s growing ties to
Syria amid military backing, 28 February 2022.
42
Kjellen, J. and Lund, A., From Tartous to Tobruk: The Return of Russian Sea Power in the Eastern Mediterranean,
FOI, 11 February 2022, url, p. 83.
43
Jusoor for Studies, Foreign Forces Points in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022, 27 December 2021, url
44
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, paras. 20, 23
45
MEMO, Rumoured Russian scale-back from Syria prompts regional alarm, 30 May 2022, url
46
Syria Direct, Amid war in Ukraine, Russia withdraws and Iran expands in Syria, 4 May 2022, url; Enab Baladi,
Russia reduces forces in Aleppo, transfers some to Hmeimim, 22 March 2022, url
47
Syria Direct, Amid war in Ukraine, Russia withdraws and Iran expands in Syria, 4 May 2022, url
48
CFR, What is Hezbollah?, 25 May 2022, url
39

20

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

forces. Of all foreign forces in Syria, the number of Iranian sites has increased the most in
2021, according to Jusoor for Studies.49
Iranian IRGC militias located in Hasaka governorate have reportedly increased andstrengthened their military presence in the governorate’s southeast in early 2022.50 Similarly,
Iran has reportedly increased its influence in Deir Ez-Zor governorate by providing services tothe local population, helping to improve their living conditions and by recruiting local Syrian
men into Iran-linked militia groups. Some of these militia groups reportedly consisted offoreign fighters including Iranians, Afghans and Pakistanis.51 Attacks on US-military bases innorth-eastern Syria in 2021 and early 2022 were reportedly often attributed to forces loyal to
Iran operating in the region.52
Moreover, Iran has increased its military presence in Syria’s southern governorates, including
Dar’a, Sweida and Quneitra governorates. According to Jusoor for Studies, the number of
outposts held by Iran, Iran-aligned forces and the Lebanese Hezbollah in these areas has
more than doubled from 40 military and security outposts in August 2018 to 88 by August2021.53
Further information on Iranian involvement in Syria is available in section 1.3 of the EUAA COI
Report: Syria - Security situation(July 2021).

1.3.3.

TurkeyAs of the beginning of 2022, Turkish forces had 122 military, security and operational points in
Syria, especially along the Syrian-Turkish border in the country’s north and north-west.54
Turkish forces and Turkish-backed opposition groups reportedly continued to attack SDFpositions in northern Syria during the reference period, including through shelling and arial
bombardment.55 Turkey’s military operations in northern Syria reportedly aimed at creating a‘buffer zone’ along the Turkish-Syrian border (see also section 1.3 of the EUAA COI Report:
Syria - Security situation (July 2021) and section 1.5.2 Areas under control of Turkish-backed
armed groups of this report). Perceiving the Kurdish-dominated YPG (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel,
People’s Defense Units), the SDF and the PYD (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat, Democratic Union
Party) as linked to the PKK (Partîya Karkerên Kurdistanê, Kurdistan Workers’ Party) in Turkey56,
49

Jusoor for Studies is ‘an independent institution specializing in information management and conducting studies
and research related to the Syrian political and social affairs in particular and the Middle East region in general’.
Jusoor for Studies, Foreign Forces Points in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022, 27 December 2021, url
50
Hassan, M. and Al-Ahmed, S., Iran’s growing presence in Syria’s al -Hasakah poses a direct threat to US forces, 24
March 2022, url
51
Washington Post (The), Iran is putting down roots in eastern Syria, outcompeting Assad’s regime in signing up
fighters, 28 January 2022, url
52
Hassan, M. and Al-Ahmed, S., Iran’s growing presence in Syria’s al -Hasakah poses a direct threat to US forces, 24
March 2022, url
53Jusoor for Studies, Mapping the Iranian Military’s Footprint in Southern Syria from August 2018 to August 2021,
20 August 2021, url
54Jusoor for Studies, Foreign Forces Points in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022, 27 December 2021, url
55
Carter Center (The), The Quarterly Review on Syria Military and Security Dynamics, January – March 2022, 13
May 2022, url
56
YPG and PYD reportedly received substantial support from the PKK in the first years of the Syrian civil war anduntil today continue to be strategically dominated by the organisation. See Netjes, R. and van Veen, E., Henchman,
Rebel, Democrat, Terrorist. The YPG/PYD during the Syrian conflict, Clingendael CRU Report, April 2021, url, p. 1

21

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Turkey justified its cross-border operations as ‘self-defence’57, claiming that operations to free‘borders from the threat of terrorism’ did ‘not target the territorial integrity and sovereignty’ of
its neighbours, while Syria noted that it considered any Turkish military incurs ions into thecountry ‘war crimes and crimes against humanity’. 58 Areas in northern Syria under Turkish
control were reportedly put under the administration of governors of Turkish cities beyond theborder, while the Syrian pound was replaced with Turkish currency.59 Moreover, sources havereported that Turkey increased water shortages and risks of drought in Kurdish-led areas ofSyria by cutting water supplies 60 at least 24 times in 2020 alone.61 Turkish authorities havedenied these claims.62 For more information see also section 1.5.2 Areas under control of
Turkish-backed armed groups of the EUAA COI Report: Syria - Security situation (July 2021).

1.3.4.

US-led Coalition against ISILAt the beginning of 2022, the US-led coalition forces had 28 military, security and operational
points in Syria, the majority of them in North-eastern Syria63, which constituted a slightdecrease compared to the same period a year earlier, when the coalition had 33 sites.64 As of2022, the USA had about 900 troops based in Syria, according to the International Institute forStrategic Studies (IISS) Military Balance 202265 including between 100 and 200 soldiers at the
Tanf base (see also section 1.5.5 Tanf of this report).66
According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs(UNOCHA), US-forces carried out air strikes in northern Syria, targeted at individual membersof Al-Qaida and ISIL in the second half of 2021.67 The then leader of ISIL, Abu Ibrahim AlQuraishi, was killed during a helicopter raid by US special forces in Idlib province in February
2022.68 In May 2022, Syrian media reported on the return of US forces to some of the militarybases from which they had withdrawn in 2019, including the 17 th Division base in the north of
Raqqa, Tabqa airport to the south of Raqqa, and possibly also the Kharab Ishk base southeastof Kobane [Ain Al Arab]. The report suggested this return might be linked to Turkey’s

57Çevik, S., Turkey’s Military Operations in Syria and Iraq, SWP Comment No. 37 May 2022, 30 May 2022, url, pp. 1-

2
58

UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), S/2022/492,
16 June 2022, url, paras. 21, 22
59Çevik, S., Turkey’s Military Operations in Syria and Iraq, SWP Comment No. 37 May 2022, 30 May 2022, url, p. 2
60
Al-Monitor, Turkey's war of attrition against Syria's Kurds, 17 November 2021, url; New Arab (The), Syrian Kurds
warn of 'disastrous' water shortages, accuse Turkey as military offensive looms, 12 June 2022, url; DW, Syria: Are
water supplies being weaponized by Turkey?, 24 January 2021, url; BTI, Syria, 2022 Country Report, 23 February2022, url, p. 9
61
BTI, Syria, 2022 Country Report, 23 February 2022, url, p. 9
62
New Arab (The), Syrian Kurds warn of 'disastrous' water shortages, accuse Turkey as military offensive looms, 12June 2022, url; DW, Syria: Are water supplies being weaponized by Turkey?, 24 January 2021, url
63Jusoor for Studies, Foreign Forces Points in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022, 27 December 2021, url
64Jusoor for Studies, Map Of The Military Bases And Posts Of Foreign Forces In Syria, 6 January 2021, url
65
Adar, S. et al., The War in Ukraine and Its Impact on Syria, SWP Comment No. 32 April 2022, 28 April 2022, url, p.
3
66
WINEP, D., The Future of al-Tanf Garrison in Syria, WINEP, 6 December 2021, url
67
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 5
68
Al Jazeera, ISIL leader detained in Syria: US-led coalition, 16 June 2022, url

22

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

announcement of a new military operation in Syria.69 No further information confirming theactual return of US forces to these areas was found.

1.3.5.

IsraelIn 2021, Israel reportedly carried out 28 large-scale military strikes in Syria, that affected 57
sites in 11 governorates, most of them in Damascus and Rural Damascus (24 sites) and thesouthern governorates of Quneitra, Dar’a and Sweida (14 sites). 84.2 % of these attacks weretargeting IRGC and Hezbollah forces, 1.8 % were targeting only Hezbollah and 14 % weretargeting GoS forces. The attacks were reportedly focused on sites hosting militaryequipment, arms depots, and surveillance systems. 70 The port of Latakia was targeted in two
airstrikes in the second half of 2021 71, while an attack on Damascus International Airport inJune 2022, allegedly to stop the shipment of arms to Hezbollah, led to a temporary halt ofcommercial flights as the runway and several buildings were damaged. 72
For an overview of the number and location of military bases and posts of foreign forces in
Syria as documented by Jusoor for Studies in January 2022, see Map 2 below:

69

Syria Direct, Military and civilian sources: US forces redeploy to former positions in northeastern Syria, 31 May
2022, url
70
Jusoor for Studies, The Israeli Strikes in Syria during 2021, 31 December 2021, url
71
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 5
72
AP, Israel strike crippling Syria’s main airport hikes tensions, 14 June 2022, url

23

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Map 2: Military bases and posts of foreign forces in Syria. © Jusoor for Studies 73

24

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

1.4.

Armed actors

Map 3: Syrian Arab Republic: Approximate areas of influence as of December 2021, © UN
Geospatial 74

1.4.1.

Syrian Arab Army and affiliated armed groups

The Syrian Armed Forces consist of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) (which includes theRepublican Guard), the Naval Forces, Air Forces, Air Defence Forces and National Defence
Forces (which include pro-government militia and auxiliary forces). During the reporting
period, the SAA was supported by a number of militia forces, the Russian armed forces, theLebanese Hezbollah, Iranian backed Shia militias as well as Iran’s IRGC.75
President Bashar al-Assad is the Supreme Commander of the Army and Armed Forces, with
the Minister of Defence, the Head of the National Security Bureau and the Minister of Interior
directly linked to him. All appointments and promotions of commanders, chiefs, directors and73

Jusoor for Studies, Map of foreign forces’ points in Syria, The end of 2021, the beginning of 2022, 27 December
2021, url74
UN Geospatial, Syrian Arab Republic: Approximate areas of influence a s of December 2021, January 2022, url
75
US, CIA, World Factbook, Syria, Military and Security, last updated 2 August 2022, url

25

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

officers of all armed forces units are being carried out or approved by President Bashar alAssad personally.76
Major General Muhammad Al-Hajj Ali, a defector and high-ranking career soldier in the Syrian
army until 2021, explained in a report for Harmoon Center for Contemporary Studies that as ofAugust 2021, there remained a maximum of 150 000 fighters in the SAA, most of whom were
deployed at checkpoints and to guard their commanders. 95 % of military personnel
professionally employed by the SAA belong to the Alawite sect (with conscripts coming fromall sects), with discrimination based on sectarian affiliation as well as corruption being
described as ‘deeply’ entrenched in all divisions.77
In contrast to the situation before 2011, SAA leaders allegedly lack control over their divisions.
Army divisions are said to be controlled by the government’s intelligence services 78 and to beunder the authority of Iranian and Russian influence. 79 The army is no longer considered acohesive force, but rather a coalition of regular forces and allied militias, 80 such the National
Defence Forces (NDF81) 82 or Palestinian militias (the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) and Liwa
al-Quds).83 Militias affiliated to Russia and Iran were reported as controlling most of GoS-held
regions in April 2021 and a growing number of men were choosing to join militias rather thanthe SAA.84 Private security companies are also extending their influence. 85
The Fourth Division (formerly Defence Companies), led by the president’s brother, Maher alAssad, and supported by Iran, had developed into a parallel army that deployed its forces
throughout Syria with the aim of protecting Damascus and the GoS from attacks. In an analysis
published by the Middle East Institute (MEI) the Fourth Division was described as ‘superior’ to
the SAA, ‘morally, financially, and militarily’. The Division consists of four brigades (38, 40, 41
and 42) with regiments number 555, 666 and 54 as well as a number of specialized factions
and brigades affiliated with it. It is estimated to comprise 16 000 fighters and to own 500
tanks, as well as armoured vehicles. The Fourth Division reportedly includes a 600 -menstrong suicide battalion, which has until now not been used, as well as a Chemistry Battalion.
Over 95 % of officers in the Fourth Division are Alawites. 86

76

OMRAN Center for Strategic Studies, The Chain of Command in the Syrian Military: Formal and Informal Tracks, 9November 2021, url, p. 3
77
Al-Haj Ali, M. and Ibrahim, K., Restructuring the army in the new Syria, 16 August 2021, url, p. 25, 28
78
Al-Haj Ali, M. and Ibrahim, K., Restructuring the army in the new Syria, 16 August 2021, url, p. 26
79
OMRAN Center for Strategic Studies, The Chain of Command in the Syrian Military: Formal and Informal Tracks, 9November 2021, url, p. 1; Al-Haj Ali, M. and Ibrahim, K., Restructuring the army in the new Syria, 16 August 2021, url,p. 26
80
Caravenserai, Hollowed out Syrian army unable to act independently from Russia, Iran, 5 April 2021, url
81
The NDF was created by the Syrian government at the beginning of the civil war to incorporate local progovernment militias into an effective source of manpower. According to Aymenn Jawad al -Tamimi, a Syria
researcher at Swansea University (UK), ‘many of the NDF were originally from popular committees or intelligencebodies’ (VOA, Who Are Syria’s National Defense Forces?, 26 August 20220, url)82
Abu Layla, O., How Iranian Militias Have Swallowed Deir Ezzor, WINEP, 16 February 2022, url
83
ORSAM, Pro-Regime Palestinian Militias in Syria, 2 August 2021, url
84
Caravenserai, Hollowed out Syrian army unable to act independently from Russia, Iran, 5 April 2021, url
85
Al-Mashareq, Private security firms proliferate in Syria as regime's military falters, 5 March 2021, url
86
Alghadawi, A., The Fourth Division: Syria’s paral lel army, MEI, 24 September 2021, url

26

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

During the reporting period, GoS forces continued to arbitrarily detain people, with detention
leading to torture, ill-treatment, and in some instances to death of detainees. 87
Further information on the Syrian Arab Army is available in the EUAA COI Report: Syria –Actors (December 2019) and EUAA COI Report: Syria - Security situation (July 2021).
(a)Developments regarding the Syrian government justice system

A detailed description of the judiciary and penal system in areas controlled by the Syrian
government can be found in section 2.2 of the EUAA COI Report: Syria - Actors (December2019).
According to an analysis by the International Legal Assistance Consortium (ILAC), there havebeen little systematic or structural changes to the justice system in areas controlled by the
GoS in recent years. Institutions of justice persistently fell ‘far short’ of meeting international
standards of impartiality and independence, especially in the running of the ‘exceptional
courts’.88 The justice system was described by judges as being under the control of the Ba’ath
Party, the President and the security services. 89 While it goes against the Syrian constitution tointerfere with the civil judiciary, prosecutors and judges were in practice required to belong to
the ruling party90, with 90 % of judges being Ba’ath Party members.91 The entire judicial system
was said to be highly politicised92, with people who are perceived to belong to the opposition,
mainly Sunni Arabs and Kurds, facing likely discrimination by the state.93 As one analysis
reported, ‘[t]he power of the security services overrides any separation of powers’.94
Corruption and bribery were assessed by ILAC to continue diminishing the independence ofthe judiciary.95 More than half of the 533 respondents of interviews carried out by the Syrian
Association for Citizens’ Dignity (SACD), an association formed by a group of displaced people
from Syria, in September and October 2020 considered that existing corruption and a lack of
independence impeded a fair access to the judicial system. 96 The Global Protection Cluster
and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) confirmed in June 2022
that ‘an insufficiently transparent, accountable and reliable justice system is causing additional
obstacles for civilians to access their rights’.97 Lawyers had to pay money to court employees
to ensure the smooth processing of a case. The amount required for bribes depended on theamount paid by the opposing counsel.98 It was uncommon to hold officials accountable for87

UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 22; SNHR, The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria
in June and the First Half of 2022, 7 July 2022, url, p. 16
88
ILAC, Syria 2021, 2021, url, p. 16
89
ILAC, Syria 2021, 2021, url, p. 17
90
Freedom House, Syria, 2022, url, F1
91
ILAC, Syria 2021, 2021, url, p. 18
92
BTI, Syria, 2022, url, p. 12
93
Freedom House, Syria, 2022, url, F4
94
BTI, Syria, 2022, url, p. 12
95
ILAC, Syria 2021, 2021, url, p. 18
96
SACD, Normalisation of Horror, Security and Living Conditions in Assad-held Syria, 2020, url, p. 39
97
Global Protection Cluster and UNHCR, Protection Analysis Update, June 2022, 24 June 2022, url, p.12
98
ILAC, Syria 2021, 2021, url, p. 20

27

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

corruption. According to the Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index (BTI) , officials were
only held to account, if it was in the government’s interest to do so. 99
Also in the ‘exceptional courts’, the Counter-Terrorism Court and the Military Field Courts,
which are part of a parallel system of, operating outside the regular court structure, bribery
was rife.100 Many of the trials held in the Counter-Terrorism Court were allegedly rushed, did
not follow legal procedures and had no possibility of appeal. 101 Civilians were tried by military
officers in field courts, as well as in conventional military courts, with judges being subordinate
to the military.102 ILAC reported that Syrian laws and judicial procedures could not be
implemented effectively due to interference from the executive. Civilians who were tried
before ‘exceptional courts’, were deprived of the protection by Syrian’s procedural andsubstantive law.103
In areas which had not been continuously under GoS control, such as Aleppo, Dar’a, Sweida
and East Ghouta, efforts had been made to reinstall official state justice structures, but justicecontinued to remain largely absent.104 The UNCOI noted the continued seizure of property
through public auctions in areas retaken by GoS forces, with the majority of affected owners
being displaced persons. In September 2021, the Ministry of Justice adopted a circular, whichmakes security clearances of both the representative and the represented, a pre-condition for
power-of-attorney arrangements, which further inhibits the possibility of having a third-party
act on behalf of an absent or missing Syrian with regards to their property. During the samemonth, Presidential Decree No. 237, facilitating expropriation in parts of Qaboun and Harasta
in northern Damascus, was established.105
On 28 March 2022, the GoS passed an anti-torture law (Law No. 16 of 2022). It criminalises
torture with a penalty of minimum of three years’ imprisonment and imposes the death penalty
in the case of rape or death. The law prohibits authority from ordering torture and makes
evidence gathered through torture invalid. 106 At the same time, Article No. 16 of Law No. 14 of1969 remains in force, which stipulates that ‘it is prohibited to prosecute any of the employeesof the State Security Department for crimes they commit while carrying out the specific tasks
entrusted to them or in the course of carrying out them unless pursuant to a prosecution orderissued by the director’. It is furthermore not possible to apply the law retroactively. 107 The antitorture law’s effectiveness and intention was amongst others questioned by Amnesty
International,108 Human Rights Watch 109 and Syrians on social media110.111

99

BTI, Syria, 2022, url, p. 13
ILAC, Syria 2021, 2021, url, pp. 20-21
101
BTI, Syria, 2022, url, p. 12
102
Freedom House, Syria, 2022, url, F2
103
ILAC, Syria 2021, 2021, url, p. 45
104
ILAC, Syria 2021, 2021, url, p. 9
105
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, paras. 45-49
106
HRW, Torture in Syrian Prisons is Not a Joke, 1 April 2022, url
107
Enab Baladi, No more “coffee cups” in Syrian security basements due to newly anti -torture law, 6 April 2022, url
108
AI, Syria: New anti-torture law “whitewashes” decades of human rights violations, 31 March 2022, url
109
HRW, Torture in Syrian Prisons is Not a Joke, 1 April 2022, url
110
Enab Baladi, No more “coffee cups” in Syrian security basements due to newly anti -torture law, 6 April 2022, url
111
Additional information about the Anti-Torture Law can be found here: STJ, Syria: Anti-Torture Law Issued 35
Years After the Convention against Torture Went Effective, 12 July 2022, url
100

28

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

In mid-April 2022, the GoS issued Law No. 20 of 2022, which amended the existing
cybercrime law of 2012. According to the new law, online criticism of the constitution andpresident or state could lead to imprisonment of up to 15 years and penalties of up to 15
million Syrian Pounds.112 A prison sentence of between three to five years will apply to people
publishing ‘“fake news” which “undermines the prestige of the state” or “prejudices national
unity”’.113 Beginning of June it was reported that 11 people were arrested in Aleppo for‘spreading “fake news” on social media’.114
On 30 April 2022, President Bashar al-Assad issued a general amnesty for terrorism crimes,
with hundreds of Syrians released from detention. 115 No formal list of names was published,which, according to Le Monde, made it difficult to assess its scope.116 According to SNHR, 476
people were released under the amnesty decree by May 2022. 117
At the same time, the death penalty continued to be applied. In October 2021, the GoS
executed 24 people for allegedly starting wildfires. 118 A review committee was reinstated in
April 2022. The committee has the power to review death penalties imposed by the Syrian
criminal courts, but not those of the special courts.119 Official mechanisms aimed at
safeguarding women’s rights were reported to not be functional and the law was reported todiscriminate against LGBT+ people and criminalise same-sex relations.120

1.4.2.

The Syrian National Army

The Syrian National Army (SNA) is the second largest opposition coalition in Syria (after Hay’at
Tahrir al-Sham) and is composed of multiple Free Syrian Army factions, with many of thefactions functioning as distinct units and engaging in armed infighting. 121 SNA was supported
by Turkey and was active within the Turkish-controlled areas in northern Syria,122 namely
northern Aleppo governorate as well as areas of Raqqa and Hasaka governorates 123, withTurkey paying the SNA’s salaries and coordinating SNA’s major offensives. 124 According to AlSharq Strategic Research the number of SNA fighters has increased to 80 000 since its
merger with the National Front for Liberation from Idlib (Arabic: ‫الجبهة الوطنية للتحرير‬, Al-Jabhat alWataniya lil-Tahrir).125

112

New Arab (The), Syria cybercrime law could see minor onli ne criticism result in 15 year jail terms, 22 April 2022,
url
113
MEMO, Syrians to be imprisoned for up to 15 years for minor criticism of regime, under new cybercrime law, 24
April 2022, url
114
New Arab (The), Syrian regime arrests citizens under new cybercrime law, 2 June 2022, url
115
COAR, ‘Terrorism’ Amnesty Is Wartime Syria’s Most Sweeping, 9 May 2022, url
116
Le Monde, In Syria, an unprecedented amnesty revives the trauma of families of prisoners and missing persons,
17 May 2022, url
117
SNHR, The Syrian Regime Has Released 476 People Under Amnesty Decree 7/2022 and Is Still Detaining Some
132,000 of Those Arrested Since March 2011, 16 May 2022, url, p.1
118
Freedom House, Syria, 2022, url, F3
119
STJ, Syria: The President Enforces Death Sentences through a Formal Pardon Committee, 7 June 2022, url
120
Freedom House, Syria, 2022, url, F4
121
Carter Center (The), The State of the Syrian National Army, 15 March 2022, url, p. 3
122
Carter Center (The), The State of the Syrian National Army, 15 March 2022, url, p. 3
123
Carter Center (The), The State of the Syrian National Army, 15 March 2022, url, p. 4
124
Hauch L., Syria’s eastern factions unite in the Liberation and Construction Movement, MEI, 2 June 2022, url
125
Al-Sharq Strategic Research, The Past, Present, and Future of the Syrian National Army, 31 August 2021, url

29

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

In June 2021, Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ), an independent, nongovernmentalorganization, working on documenting human rights violations in Syria, published findings thatformer ISIL members had gained positions in various factions of the SNA, including as first andsecond-level leaders and security officials.126
The SNA lacked the unified central command of a conventional army. 127 In order to consolidate
the divided factions of the SNA, efforts were made to merge factions into bigger formations. A
variety of mergers were conducted throughout 2021.128 By January 2022 a single formation,
called the Azm Operations Room, incorporated most of the major SNA groups. 129 As of 1 March
2022, the Azm Operations Room consisted of Division 13 (incorporating the Sultan
Muhammad Faith Brigade, Semerkand Brigade and Al-Wakkas Brigade), the Second Division,
the Third Legion (incorporating the Sultan Malek Shah Brigades, Liwa 51, Jaish al-Islam, Liwa
al-Salam, Al-Jabha al-Shamiya and Faylaq al-Majid), Suqur al-Shamal, the Thaeroun Front for
Liberation (incorporating the First Division, Levant Revolutionaries, Sham Legion North Sector,
Muntasir Billah, Sultan Murad, Suleiman Shah Brigade, Al-Mutasim Brigade, Hamza Division
and Special Forces Division) and the Liberation and Construction Movement (incorporating
Ahrar al-Sharqiya, Suqur al-Sham, Al-Sharqiya Army and the 20 th Division).130 The Liberation
and Construction Movement (LCM) was formed in Raqqa and according to a MEI article choseto become a coalition in its own right. It claimed to command 7 000 fighters across northern
Aleppo, Afrin and in a corridor between Ras al-Ayn and Tall Abyad.131
Despite the regrouping, violent clashes continued in April 2022 between different factions of
the SNA in Aleppo governorate.132
According to Syria Direct, an independent Syrian online news source, the main SNA faction
involved in infighting between January and middle of May 2022 was the Hamza Division (11incidents), followed by al-Jabha al-Shamiya and Ahrar al-Sham (five incidents each), Ahrar alSharqiya (four incidents) and Thaeroon for Liberation, Failaq al-Sham and the Military Police(three incidents each).133
In June 2022 it was reported that the SNA prepared for a new Turkish operation announced
by Turkey against the (Kurdish-led) SDF in Tal Rifaat and Manbij, Aleppo governorate.134 SNA
artillery strikes against the SDF were reported in al-Jat, Menj and al-Halwanji in northern
Aleppo.135

126

STJ, Ongoing Violations Without Accountability, 28 June 2021, url, p. 3
Al-Sharq Strategic Research, The Past, Present, and Future of the Syrian National Army, 31 August 2021, url
128
The details of the various mergers conducted can be found in Carter Center (The), The State of the Syrian
National Army, 15 March 2022, url, pp. 8-16
129
Carter Center (The), The State of the Syrian National Army, 15 March 2022, url, p. 8130Carter Center (The), The State of the Syrian National Army, 15 March 2022, url, p. 16
131
Hauch L., Syria’s eastern factions unite in the Liberation and Construction Movement, MEI, 2 June 2022, url
132
Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief: North-West Syria – 01 July 2022, 1 July 2022, url
133
Syria Direct, Chronic infighting and uncontrolled weapons turn civilian lives into a nightmare in Turkish-backed
opposition areas of northern Syria, 24 May 2022, url
134
Al Jazeera, Turkish-backed Syrian forces expect military operation soon, 10 June 2022, url
135
Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief: North-West Syria – 01 July 2022, 1 July 2022, url
12730

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

During the reporting period, abuses by the SNA continued against civilians, including arbitrary
detention, abduction, torture and other ill-treatment.136
For further information, please see sections 2.2 Aleppo governorate,2.8 Raqqa governorate
and 2.7 Hasaka governorate of this report.
Further information on the SNA is available in the EUAA COI Report: Syria – Actors (December2019), EUAA COI Report: Syria - Security situation (July 2021) and EUAA COI Report: Syria –Targeting of individuals (September 2022).

1.4.3.

Syrian Democratic Forces

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are an armed force led by the People’s Protection Units(Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, YPG). It is militarily and financially supported by the US to fight ISIL
in northeast Syria.137 The SDF is a mixed force, with Arab, Kurds and fighters of other minorities
within its ranks.138 In comparison, the YPG, which leads the SDF, features Kurdish fighters from
Syria, Iraq, Turkey and Iran, and is linked to the PKK. 139
The SDF’s control stretches across the governorates of Aleppo, Deir Ez-Zor, Hasaka andRaqqa.140 Particularly in the governorates of Deir Ez-Zor, Hasaka and Raqqa, the SDF controls
areas purely inhabited by Arabs.141 According to Clingendael, approximately 70 %of the
population under SDF control are Syrian Arabs. 142
No up-to-date numbers of soldiers enrolled with the YPG and SDF respectively could befound.
Throughout the second half of 2021, the SDF – together with the US-led Coalition against ISIL
– frequently carried out counter-terrorism operations against ISIL, mainly in Deir Ez-Zor
governorate, and occasionally in Hasaka and Raqqa governorates. 143 In March 2022, theinternational coalition and the SDF conducted military exercises with heavy weapons,
including Bradley tanks and anti-armour weapons, in areas of Deir Ez-Zor countryside. The
SDF continued to fight ISIL cells in rural Deir Ez-Zor and Hasaka governorate.144

136

UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, paras. 82-88; AI, Amnesty International Report 2021/22 – Syria, 29
March 2022, url, p. 353; SNHR, The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in June and the First Half of2022, 7 July 2022, url, p. 16
137
Clingendael, Henchman, Rebel, Democrat, Terrorist - The YPG/PYD during the Syrian conflict, April 2021, url, p. 5
138
Clingendael, Henchman, Rebel, Democrat, Terrorist - The YPG/PYD during the Syrian conflict, April 2021, url,
p. 44
139
Clingendael, Henchman, Rebel, Democrat, Terrorist - The YPG/PYD during the Syrian conflict, April 2021, url, p. 5
140
Balanche, F.,, How to Preserve the Autonomy of Northeast Syria, WINEP, 15 March 2022, url
141
Clingendael, Henchman, Rebel, Democrat, Terrorist - The YPG/PYD during the Syrian conflict, April 2021, url, p.
31
142
Clingendael, Henchman, Rebel, Democrat, Terrorist - The YPG/PYD during the Syrian conflict, April 2021, url, p.
68
143
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 98
144
Syrian Observer (The), U.S. Maneuvers with SDF in Eastern Syria with Heavy Weapons, 28 March 2022, url

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

During the reporting period, the SDF engaged in extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests andunlawful detention of civilians.145(a)Developments regarding the justice system in the Autonomous Administrationof North and East Syria (AANES)A description of the judiciary and penal system in the Kurdish-controlled areas of North andEast Syria can be found in section 3.1.4 of the EUAA COI Report: Syria - Actors (December2019).
In Northeast Syria, two justice systems continue to operate next to each other, the justicesystem of the GoS and that of the AANES, which is not recognised by the GoS.146 As the
AANES lacks a recognised property register and a civil register, courts under its jurisdiction
cannot establish the sales and transfer of property or register parenthood, divorce, ormarriage.147
The AANES justice system is based on the ‘Social Contract’, a document which lays out theessential aspects of coexistence, as agreed on by the people. 148 In June 2021, authorities of
the AANES announced the formation of a committee to reformulate the Social Contract. 149 In
May 2022, the Social Contract Drafting Committee held its second meeting, as part of which it
read the contract to the public and participants were able to share their opinions andsuggestions.150
Within the AANES system, local laws (nearly 70 of them) are applied next to Syrian criminaland civil law. This has led to confusions on which law to apply.151 In addition, as a result of thesocial law principle applied in the region, it is possible for judges to completely ignore thewritten law and use social justice principles (i.e., social conventions) instead. 152
The social justice system under the AANES was described as having a great number ofdifferent and distinct institutions, with their work varying significantly 153, particularly between
the different regions under AANES control. 154 Key councils were missing in certain
governorates, such as in Deir Ez-Zor, and were described as ineffective in other areas. 155
Before a case (mainly civil cases) can be brought to court, it must pass through a Peace andConsensus Committee (PCC), which is a non-judicial body existing in every neighbourhood
145

UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, paras. 102-106; SNHR, The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in
Syria in June and the First Half of 2022, 7 July 2022, url, p. 16
146
ILAC, Syria 2021, 2021, url, p. 168
147
ILAC, Syria 2021, 2021, url, p. 128
148
ILAC, Syria 2021, 2021, url, p. 115
149
Enab Baladi, Charter of Autonomous Administration: Infringement of society components’ rights?, 7 March 2022,
url
150
ANF News, Northern and Eastern Syria Social Contract Drafting Committee holds second meeting in Amûdê, 17
May 2022, url
151
ILAC, Syria 2021, 2021, url, p. 118
152
ILAC, Syria 2021, 2021, url, p. 120
153
ILAC, Syria 2021, 2021, url, p. 125
154
ILAC, Syria 2021, 2021, url, p. 164
155
OMRAN Center for Strategic Studies, The Autonomous Administration: A Judicial Approach to Understanding
the Model and Experience, 4 March 2022, url, p. 137

32

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

across the AANES and which is made up of three to five people of the area, who have noparticular training or qualification.156 It was reported that also within the court system,
practitioners were either trained in a different legal system or completely untrained in law.157
Of 326 judges appointed in AANES, 30 % had a high school diploma, 5 % were holders ofbachelor’s degrees in disciplines other than law and 65 % were lawyers, half of whom were
new graduates.158 64 % of the appointed judges were Kurds, 33 % Arabs and 3 % of different
ethnicity, such as Assyrians, Turkmen and Circassians. Of the ‘People’s Defence’ court, 100 %of judges were Kurds.159
The court system was reported by ILAC as suffering from a ‘fundamental lack of
independence from the executive’.160 Lawyers in the AANES reported interference by the PYD,
YPG and/or PKK in the administration of justice, particularly if courts are perceived to interferewith security or military interests.161 According to the OMRAN Center for Strategic Studies, PKK
cadres dominated social justice institutions and supervised them with regards to finances,
security and administration. They were further reported as intervening in legal cases,
bypassing judges and legal mechanisms.162 Gaps in the legal system, which undermine due
procedures and the right to a fair trial, were said to remain, especially in cases of politicalcharacter.163 The rule that every security practice had to inform the Prosecution Commission
prior to an arrest was not followed in practice. The security forces and the anti-crime bureau‘kidnapped people and interrogated [them] for an indeterminate period of time’, without being
held accountable.164 As reported by an attorney in the AANES, SDF security services (Asayish)arrested civilians without presenting a warrant, without an order from the public prosecutor
and without informing them of their right to be represented by a lawyer. Defendants did nothave lawyers present during interrogations or in court. Arbitrary detention of political
opponents took place during the reporting period, such as the imprisonment of four membersof the Kurdistan Democratic Party-Syria in July 2021.165
Capital punishment is outlawed in the AANES.166 Torture, which led to death, was reported tocontinue to take place in SDF detention facilities.167

156

ILAC, Syria 2021, 2021, url, pp. 132-133
ILAC, Syria 2021, 2021, url, p. 125
158
OMRAN Center for Strategic Studies, The Autonomous Administration: A Judicial Approach to Understanding
the Model and Experience, 4 March 2022, url, pp. 137-138
159
OMRAN Center for Strategic Studies, The Autonomous Administration: A Judicial Approach to Understanding
the Model and Experience, 4 March 2022, url, p. 138
160
ILAC, Syria 2021, 2021, url, p. 172
161
ILAC, Syria 2021, 2021, url, pp. 123-124
162
OMRAN Center for Strategic Studies, The Autonomous Administration: A Judicial Approach to Understandin g
the Model and Experience, 4 March 2022, url, p. 138
163
Enab Baladi, Detainees in northeastern Syria: Autonomous Administration breaking their own legal code, 21
August 2021, url
164
ILAC, Syria 2021, 2021, url, pp. 157-158
165
Enabd Baladi, Detainees in northeastern Syria: Autonomous Administration breaking their own legal code, 21
August 2021, url
166
ILAC, Syria 2021, 2021, url, p. 118
167
MEE, Syria: Families in northeast say sons tortured to death in SDF prisons, 8 July 2021 , url; STJ, Northeastern
Syria: Detainees Tortured and Maltreated, 18 January 2022, url; Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor, Syria: Investigate
deaths of detainees in SDF prisons, 9 March 2022, url
157

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

The general situation with regards to repatriating ISIL detainees or putting them on trial
remained unresolved during the reporting period. 168 An ‘extraordinary court’, the ‘people’s
defence’ court, tries crimes considered as terrorism. It does not allow the right to a defence
and the applicable counter-terrorism law has not been made public.169
At the end of March 2021, representatives of 18 Arab, Assyrian, Kurdish, Syriac and Yazidi
tribes in northeast Syria agreed to reaffirm a tribal judicial system, called Madbata, to resolveinter-clan disputes, robberies, lootings and actions of revenge in the Jazira region of Hasaka
governorate.170 In March 2022 it was reported that also the people of eastern Deir Ez-Zor
turned to tribal settlements as a result of a lack of judicial alternatives that were accepted by
the population.171

1.4.4.

Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham

Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham or the Organization for the Liberation of the Levant (HTS) is a Sunni
Islamist group under the leadership of Abu-Muhammad Al-Jawlani. It is based in north-western
Syria and opposes the GoS of President Bashar Al-Assad. Its predecessor, Jabhat al-Nusra
was linked to al-Qaida. HTS continues to be listed as a terrorist organization by thegovernments of Australia, Canada, the US and the UK, among others. 172 The group sought its
removal from the lists of terrorist organizations and built its function more like a government
than a non-state actor, while continuing to ’glamorize terrorism abroad’, espouse ’extremist
views’ and crack down on opponents.173
During the reporting period, HTS was the dominant armed actor in the province of Idlib, part of
Aleppo’s western countryside, the Syrian coast’s mountains, and the al-Ghab Plain in northwestern Hama.174 According to the UN Security Council, HTS retained around 10 000
fighters 175, whom the organization largely recruited within Syria.176 Since the Turkish Operation
Spring Shield177 in 2020, northern Idlib had become a Turkish protectorate. 178 HTS did not
attack Turkish forces and Turkey used a soft power approach towards HTS.179 Russia, in

168

ILAC, Syria 2021, 2021, url, pp. 170-171
OMRAN Center for Strategic Studies, The Autonomous Admi nistration: A Judicial Approach to Understanding
the Model and Experience, 4 March 2022, url, p. 32
170
Al-Monitor, Tribes in east Syria resort to their own judiciary over lack of trust in official courts, 4 April 2021, url
171
Enab Baladi, Amid judiciary absence, “Tribal Justice” reigns in Deir Ezzor, 28 March 2022, url
172
Australia, Australian National Security, Hay’at Tahrir al -Sham, 9 April 2022, url
173
Zelin, Aaron, From Global Jihad to Local Regime: HTS Builds Different Forms of Legitimacy, 6 August 2021, url;
Zelin, Aaron, The Age of Political Jihadism, A Study of Hayat Tahrir Al -Sham, 9 May 2022, url
174
Enab Baladi, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham dismantling “jihadist” groups to win international recognition, 20 July 2021, url
175
UN Security Council, Letter dated 11 July 2022 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant toresolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security
Council, S/2022/547, 15 July 2022, url, para. 44
176
Australia, Australian National Security, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, 9 April 2022, url
177
Operation Spring Shield was a military operation conducted by the Turkish forces against the Syrian army and its
allies in Idlib governorate in March 2020 (see: Al -Monitor, Turkey launches Operation Spring Shield against Syrian
forces, 1 March 2020, url)178
Clingendael, Turkey’s interventions in its near abroad: The case of Idlib, September 2021, url, p. 1
179
Clingendael, Turkey’s interventions in its near abroad: The case of Idlib, September 2021, url, p. 4
169

34

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

contrast, reserved its right to strike HTS on the basis that it was an UN-designated terroristgroup.180
HTS divided its areas of influence into sectors, each of which is headed by a militarycommander, called an ‘emir’, with Al-Jawlani being the general emir of the organization. These
sectors include Idlib, Hama, Aleppo, the coast and the border. HTS consists of its generalarmy, Jabhat al-Nusra, the Red Bands ‘Islamist commando’ (which carries out special
operations), and a public security agency, with security officials and detectives working in a
civilian capacity. According to the MENA Research and Studies Centre, HTS worked withbooby-trapped vehicles, suicide bombers and self-made ‘Elephant’ missiles. It manufactures
mortar cannons and ammunition and possesses more than 160 tanks and armoured
vehicles.181 HTS is active in recruiting new fighters.182
The Chechen Jund Al-Sham (Soldiers of the Levant)183 evacuated its military positions after
HTS put pressure on the group to either join HTS’s ranks or to leave the country.184 Other
foreign groups, which were loyal to HTS and worked under its supervision, such as Ansar alTawhid, the Turkestan Islamic Party, Ajnad al-Kavkaz and Uzbek groups did not dissolve. 185
The move to request Jund Al-Sham to join forces or leave the country was described by the
opposition news outlet Enab Baladi and Senior Fellow at Georgetown University, Nagwan
Soliman, as being part of HTS’s aim to rebrand its organization 186, as well as a step toimplement Turkey’s wish 187 and to eliminate rivals.188 At the same time, HTS moved to
expanding its engagements with tribes in Idlib. 189 In October 2021, fighting erupted between
HTS and Jund al-Sham and Jund Allah in western Idlib and the northern Latakia countryside.190
During the reporting period, HTS continued extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests and unlawful
detention of civilians.191
Further information on HTS is available in the EUAA COI Report: Syria – Actors (December2019), EUAA COI Report: Syria - Security situation (July 2021) and EUAA COI Report: Syria –Targeting of individuals (September 2022).

180

Clingendael, Turkey’s interventions in its near abroad: The case of Idlib, September 2021, url, p. 8
MENA Research and Studies Center, Hay’at Tahrir al -Sham, 16 November 2021, url
182
Al-Monitor, Syrian government steps up attack against Islamist enclave, 19 January 2022, url; Enab Baladi, “HTS”
brings in new blood to its ranks, 8 February 2022, url
183
Doukaev, A., Chechnya’s Veteran Fighters Have Their Backs to the Wall, Jamestown Foundation (The), 2 August2021 url
184
Al-Monitor, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham kicks Chechen jihadis out of Idlib, 15 July 2021, url
185
Al-Monitor, Jihadist group in Idlib vows to keep foreign fighters in Syria, 15 September 2021, url
186
Enab Baladi, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham dismantling “jihadist” groups to win international recognition, 20 July 2021,
url; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The New Jihadists and the Taliban Model, 20 December 2021, url
187
COAR, HTS Cracks Down on Rival Groups as Northwest Pressure Builds, 1 November 20 21, url
188
Al-Monitor, Jihadist group in Idlib vows to keep foreign fighters in Syria, 15 September 2021, url
189
Zelin, Aaron, Hanging on in Idlib: Hayat Tahrir al -Sham’s Expanding Tribal Engagement, 11 June 2021, url;Carnegie Middle East Center, Why Kabul has an Echo in Idlib, 17 September 2021, url
190
COAR, HTS Cracks Down on Rival Groups as Northwest Pressure Builds, 1 November 2021, url
191
SNHR, The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in June and the First Half of 2022, 7 July 2022 , url,
p. 16
181

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

1.4.5.

Other anti-government armed groups in the Idlib area

During the reporting period, Idlib hosted dozens of mainly Islamic armed groups, of which HTS
is dominant, with others in the area being 192 Ansar al-Islam, Ansar al-Tawhid, Ansar al-Din,
Ajnad al-Kavkaz, the Turkistan Islamic Movement193, Katibat al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad (KTJ) andImam Bukhari Jamaat, which is mainly made up of Uzbek fighters. 194
The Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), also known as the Turkistan Islamic Party(TIP), mainly operated in Idlib and comprised between 1 000 and 2 000 fighters. The group
allied with HTS when carrying out terrorist operations and held armed training sessions.195
While KTJ joined HTS, Imam Bukhari Jammat acted independently. Al-Monitor reported that
the Uzbek jihadis were deployed mainly in the mountainous regions of north-western Syria.
While Imam Bukhari Jammat has been designated a terrorist organization by the US since
2018196, KTJ, which is estimated to have between 500 and 1 200 fighters 197, joined the list on
March 7, 2022. KTJ has further been added to the UN Security Council sanctions list. 198
HTS actively took steps against rival groups in Idlib (see section 1.4.4), including Hurras al-Din,
Sham al-Islam and the Kurdish jihadi group Ansar al-Islam, by arresting their leaders andmembers.199 The umbrella group of al-Qaida-inspired factions, Hurras al-Din (HAD), allegedly
dissolved itself, but its factions remained in the region. Similarly, Jund Al-Sham, which
disintegrated upon HTS’ request has not been eliminated. 200 According to the UN Security
Council, HAD was at its ‘weakest point’, counting between 1 000 and 3 000 fighters, withmany having relocated to the south, around Dar’a and Sweida, having lost many of its leadersin Idlib. HAD merely retained a ‘residual presence’ in Idlib.201
The National Liberation Front (NLF), which is affiliated to the Turkis h backed SNA (formerly
Free Syrian Army) 202 continued to be militarily active in Idlib as late as June 2022. 203

192

Serwer D., Divided Syria: An examination of stabilization efforts and prospects for state continuity, MEI, 26 April
2022, url
193
Al-Monitor, Turkey’s blind eye to jihadis worsens its predicaments in Syria, 16 September 2021, url
194
Al-Monitor, Uzbek fighters complicate makeover campaign by jihadi group in Idlib, 19 August 2021, url
195
UN Security Council, Letter dated 11 July 2022 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant toresolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), AlQaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security
Council, S/2022/547, 15 July 2022, url, para. 45
196
Al-Monitor, Uzbek fighters complicate makeover campaign by jihadi group in Idlib, 19 August 2021, url
197
STJ, Who is Katibat al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad?, 20 April 2022, url, p. 8
198
USDOS, Terrorist Designation of Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad, 7 March 2022, url
199
Al-Monitor, Jihadi group steps up arrests of rivals, former jihadi allies in Idlib, 9 February 2022, url
200
Al-Monitor, Turkey’s blind eye to jihadis worsens its predicaments in Syria, 16 September 2021, url
201
UN Security Council, Twenty-ninth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted
pursuant to resolution 2368 (2017)2368 (2017)2368 (2017)2368 (2017)2368 (2017)2368 (2017)2368 (2017)2368(2017)2368 (2017)2368 (2017)2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al -Qaida and associated individuals and entities,
S/2022/83, 3 February 2022, url, para. 38
202
Al-Monitor, Political, military wings of Islamist movement clash in Idlib, 11 May 2021, url
203
SOHR, Military escalation | Regime ground forces shell National Liberation Front positions killing one member
and injuring four others, 9 June 2022, url

36

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

See also section 2.1 Idlib governorate. Further information on anti-GoS armed groups in the
Idlib area is available in the EUAA COI Report: Syria – Actors (December 2019) and EUAA COI
Report: Syria - Security situation (July 2021).

1.4.6.

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as ISIS, IS
or Daesh)

ISIL in Syria has its centre in the desert south of the Euphrates, called al-Badia204 , where ISIL
militants are brought together and trained prior to being dispatched to Syria or Iraq. 205 US-led
Coalition officials and ISIL experts interviewed by the European University Institute (EUI)
estimated that, as of February 2022, ISIL had around 1 000 active fighters in Syria and Iraq
combined and was supported by 5 000 to 10 000 non-combatants.206 The UN Security
Council estimated its strength at between 6 000 and 10 000 fighters across Syria and Iraq,
with the group’s operational leaders being mainly based in Syria. 207
ISIL continued to exert its influence on the local population in eastern Deir Ez-Zor, which is
described as an ISIL stronghold. In south-eastern Deir Ez-Zor (in the triangle of cities of al-Zir,
Dhiban and al-Buseyrah) ISIL demanded and received protection money from traders.
Targeted killings remained frequent in the area and ISIL put pressure on civilians’ lifestylechoices by subjecting them to threats. It further appointed a sharia judge, who intervened incases of theft or debt. In north-eastern Deir Ez-Zor, ISIL regularly targeted or killed AANES
representatives, leading to an administrative vacuum. ISIL is said to have embedded itself
within the local shepherd communities.208 In the city of Sweida, ISIL started imposing flying
checkpoints at night, while in the city of Tayyana all officials are assumed to having pledged
allegiance to ISIL.209 From the end of 2021, ISIL militants from north-eastern Syria started toinfiltrate Deir Ez-Zor’s National Defence Forces and at least one ISIL cell penetrated thesouthern Homs countryside.210

204International Crisis Group, Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and North-eastern Syria, 18 July 2022, url, p. 3;
Haenni, P and Quesnay, A, Coming Up Through the Cracks, EUI, 5 April 2022, url, p. 2
205
Haenni, P and Quesnay, A, Coming Up Through the Cracks, EUI, 5 April 2022, url, p. 8
206
Haenni, P and Quesnay, A, Coming Up Through the Cracks, EUI, 5 April 2022, url, p. 5
207
UN Security Council, Letter dated 11 July 2022 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant toresolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security
Council, S/2022/547, 15 July 2022, url, para. 41
208
Haenni, P and Quesnay, A, Coming Up Through the Cracks, EUI, 5 April 2022, url, p. 5
209
Haenni, P and Quesnay, A, Coming Up Through the Cracks, EUI, 5 April 2022, url, p. 6
210International Crisis Group, Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and North-eastern Syria, 18 July 2022, url, p. 13

37

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Map 4: IS Regional Resurgence, © Patrick Haenni and Arthur Quesnay, European
University Institute 211
The UN Security Council described ISIL’s activities in Syria from June to December 2021 as a‘rural insurgency’. During the second half of 2021, insurgent activities by ISIL in Syria werelimited, but training of combatants continued. Operations during that time were focused on theeastern side of Euphrates, in Deir Ez-Zor. ISIL further pursued attacks in Hama and Homs
governorates and was actively present in Damascus, Dar’a, Hasaka, Raqqa and Sweida.212
According to the International Crisis Group, ISIL cells carried out an average of 10 to 15 attacks
on GoS forces per month in late 2021, most of them in eastern Homs and rural western Deir
Ez-Zor. The trend continued into 2022.213 The UN assessed the situation in Dar’a as ‘unstable’,with ISIL having at least 300 fighters in the area, in addition to sleeper cells located around the
Hawran mountains. The Idlib de-escalation zone remained an important strategic location for

211

Haenni, P and Quesnay, A, Coming Up Through the Cracks, EUI, 5 April 2022, url, p. 10
UN Security Council, Twenty-ninth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted
pursuant to resolution 2368 (2017)2368 (2017)2368 (2017)2368 (2017)2368 (2017)2368 (2017)2368 (2017)2368(2017)2368 (2017)2368 (2017)2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities,
S/2022/83, 3 February 2022, url, paras. 35-37
213
International Crisis Group, Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and North-eastern Syria, 18 July 2022, url, p. 13
212

38

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

ISIL, and ISIL activity was observed near the Turkish border. 214 The UN Security Council
confirmed the continuation of this trend for the first half of 2022. 215
According to an analysis by researcher Gregory Waters, ISIL carried out at least 299 attacks in
the GoS-controlled areas of Aleppo, Deir Ez-Zor, Hama, Homs and Raqqa governorates in
2021. ISIL conducted at least 70 ‘high’ quality attacks.216 The group killed at least 422 people
in central Syria and in September 2021 conducted its first attack in Damascus since 2018. At
the same time GoS forces and their allies secured territory from ISIL and cut their activity
nearly in half during the second half of 2021. 217
Following increased attacks by ISIL in central Syria in 2020, the GoS, supported by Russia andIranian forces, launched four major offensives against ISIL in the first half of 2021: the first in
western Deir Ez-Zor in January 2021, the second in east Homs in mid-April, the third insouthern Raqqa in mid-May and the fourth in late spring in eastern Hama. 218 The operations
led to a decrease in ISIL attacks from April 2021 until the end of the year.219
According to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) there are two ISIL
insurgencies waged in Syria, one west and one east of the Euphrates, with ISIL waging a high intensity campaign east of the river against GoS forces, while at the same time struggling toestablish solid footing in the areas under SDF control. ISIL nevertheless remained active inareas under SDF control, by intimidating and extorting locals, as well as killing and abducting
SDF personnel. According to WINEP, ISIL attack claims continued steadily from January to
September 2021.220
Receiving reliable data of ISIL attacks is complicated by the fact that the organization is known
to underreport its attacks in the Syrian central desert, as analysed by Gregory Waters andCharlie Winter, associate fellow at the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT).221
The US Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve, which has as its aim tomilitarily defeat ISIL, reported that during the second quarter of 2021, ISIL used Syr ia’s central
desert to launch attacks at GoS forces. ISIL further ‘retained a strong presence’ in the al-Hol
camp in north-eastern Syria.222 In the third quarter of 2021 it was reported that ISIL claimed
fewer attacks compared to the previous quarter but continued low-level insurgency. ISIL
214

UN Security Council, Twenty-ninth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted
pursuant to resolution 2368 (2017)2368 (2017)2368 (2017)2368 (2017)2368 (2017)2368 (2017)2368 (2017)2368(2017)2368 (2017)2368 (2017)2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al -Qaida and associated individuals and entities,
S/2022/83, 3 February 2022, url, paras. 35-37
215
UN Security Council, Letter dated 11 July 2022 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant toresolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security
Council, S/2022/547, 15 July 2022, url, paras. 41-44
216
High quality attacks are defined by G. Waters as attacks behind frontlines, resulting in seizing of positions, target
regime officers, coordinated attacks on several positions, ambushes on military convoys and attacks oncheckpoints killing at least three soldiers or leading to prisoners of war.
217
Waters, G., The Central Syria ISIS Insurgency in 2021, Counter Extremism Project, January 2022, url, p. 2
218
Waters, G., The Central Syria ISIS Insurgency in 2021, Counter Extremism Project, January 2022, url, pp. 2-3
219
Waters, G., The Central Syria ISIS Insurgency in 2021, Counter Extremism Project, January 2022, url, p. 4
220
WINEP, A Tale of Two Islamic State Insurgencies in Syria, 17 September 2021, url
221Waters, G. and Winter, C., Islamic State under-reporting in central Syria, MEI, 2 September 2021, url
222
USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve, Quarterly Report to the United States
Congress April 1, 2021 – June 30, 2021, 3 August 2021, url

39EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

seemed to consolidate in the desert and prepare for increased activity. The group at the sametime continued recruitment and indoctrination at the al-Hol camp223, which holds approximately
57 000 displaced people, mainly women and children. A further 10 000 ISIL fighters aredetained in SDF facilities.224
In January 2022, ISIL conducted its biggest military operation in Syria since the fall of Baghouz
in March 2019. The group attacked al-Sina’a prison, located in the city of Hasaka andcontrolled by the SDF and the US-led Coalition 225, and took control of two adjacentneighbourhoods for five days.226 According to an analysis published by EUI, the operation
demonstrated ISIL’s continuous centralised structure and its capability of mobilising forces.227
For the US Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve the attack demonstrated
ISIL’s continuous ability to launch complex attacks. 228
In February 2022 ISIL’s leader, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Quraishi, killed himself following a
US raid in Idlib governorate. In March 2022 his successor, Abu Hasan al-Hashemi al-Qurayshi,
was announced.229
In early April 2022, ISIL escalated its attacks against GoS forces and allied militias in the Syrian
desert, known as Badia. The attacks targeted big military convoys, military barracks and oilfields. ISIL fighters used a variety of weapons, including medium- and short-range missiles,
heavy machine guns, mines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), Grad rockets and mortars.
The new tactics inflicted a heavy loss on GoS forces. Attacks were also launched in Deir EzZor, Homs and Raqqa governorates, focusing on oil fields run by companies close to the
GoS.230 Throughout the first quarter of 2022, ISIL operated mainly in Badia and acrossnorthern and eastern provinces of Syria, while top ISIL leaders ‘likely remained in the western
Idlib governorate’. In northeastern and southern Syria, ISIL worked on extending theirinfluence among the Sunni Arab population. The group further retained a ’smaller, but still
active presence in the northern Raqqah and Hasakah governorates ’.231
Further information on ISIL is available in the EUAA COI Report: Syria – Actors (December2019) and EUAA COI Report: Syria - Security situation (July 2021).

223

USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve, Quarterly Report to the United States
Congress July 1, 2021 – September 30, 2021, 3 November 2021, url
224
US, CRS (United States Congressional Research Service), The Islamic State, 10 May 2022, url
225
Haenni, P and Quesnay, A, Coming Up Through the Cracks, EUI, 5 April 2022, url, p. 2
226
Haenni, P and Quesnay, A, Coming Up Through the Cracks, EUI, 5 April 2022, url, p. 4
227
Haenni, P and Quesnay, A, Coming Up Through the Cracks, EUI, 5 April 2022, url, p. 2
228
USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve, Quarterly Report to the United States
Congress January 1, 2022 – March 31, 2022, 3 May 2022, url, p. 3
229
France 24, Islamic State names new leader, confirms death of predecessor, 10 March 2022, url
230
Al-Monitor, Islamic State escalates attacks in Syrian desert, 20 April 2022, url
231
USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress
January 1, 2022 – March 31, 2022, 3 May 2022, url, p. 21

40

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

1.5.

Recent security trends and armed confrontations
during the reference period

1.5.1.

Areas under the control of the Government of Syria (GoS)

As of the beginning of 2022, the GoS had control over 63.38 % of the state’s territory,
including central and southern Syria, the governorates along the Mediterranean coast, andparts of eastern Syria and Aleppo. The GoS also controlled Syria’s most important cities suchas Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, or Hama. GoS control over Dar’a governorate increased after amilitary operation, while it remained ‘fragile’ in Sweida, with the GoS’ focus on strengthening
its security services and state institutions in the region, as reported by Jusoor for Studies.232
According to iMMAP, an international NPO, 66 % of the Syrian population were living in GoScontrolled areas as of November 2021, including 10.4 million residents and 3.2 million
internally displaced persons (IDPs).233
From June 2021, the GoS besieged a neighbourhood of Dar’a city, Dar’a al-Balad, for 75 days,
where intense fighting took place and over 38 000 residents were temporarily displaced.234
After shelling and a ground offensive conducted by pro-GoS forces,235 including the Fourth
Division236, an agreement was reached on 8 September and the GoS ended the siege.237 As
part of their attack on Dar’a al-Balad, the pro-GoS forces used improvised rocket-assisted
munition and other rocket munitions in tightly populated areas, resulting in loss of civilian lives
and denying residents access to food and health care. 238 The UNCOI is investigating whether
these attacks amount to war crimes.239
Violent incidents, including retaliatory killings with victims on both sides and targeted killingsof persons refusing to ‘reconcile with the government’ continued in November and December
2021 across Dar’a countryside.240 Similarly, targeted killings, IED attacks, exchanges of fire,
clashes and abductions were reported from Dar’a, Quneitra and Sweida governorates in thefirst half of 2022241, involving GoS forces and pro-GoS militia groups, former members of232

Jusoor for Studies, Map of military control in Syria end of 2021 and beginning of 2022, 24 December 2021, url
iMMAP, The Current Status of Social Support in Syria, January 2022, url, p. 17
234
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 5
235
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 23-31; New Arab (The), Syrian Insight: What do the regime andRussia want from Daraa province?, 24 September 2021, url
236
Reuters, Syrian army steps up offensive on rebel redoubt in southwestern city, 31 August 2021, url
237
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 32; France 24, Syrian army enters opposition bastion under
Russian-negotiated truce, 9 September 2021, url
238
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 35
239
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 35
240
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, paras. 33-34
241
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), S/2022/492,
16 June 2022, url, para. 6
233

41

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

armed opposition groups, ISIL fighters and other unidentified actors.242 Violent incidents
including killings and assassination attempts in Dar’a governorate were also reported in thecontext of drug trade and other criminal activities, as well as previous, political and personal
conflicts.243
Violent incidents in April and May 2022, including killings of GoS-affiliated individuals, werealso reported from Rural Damascus governorate. Reportedly, the perpetrators of these attacks
remained unknown except for two incidents for which ISIL claimed responsibility. 244 The Syrian
Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported on attacks on military checkpoints in Rural
Damascus in June245 and July246 2022 and on the killings of alleged collaborators with GoS
forces,247 among other violent incidents. SOHR reportedly has registered 78 murders in GoScontrolled areas since early 2022.248
Hostilities, clashes and mutual shelling of pro-GoS and opposition forces along the frontlines
in the north-west of Syria (Idlib and western Aleppo governorates) continued throughout thereference period, causing the death of civilians and displacement. 249 In June 2021, the SAA
was reportedly shelling the southern parts of north-western Idlib. The forces then changed
location to the Badia desert to fight ISIL, together with the Russian air force. 250 Shellings by
GoS forces of areas in Idlib continued from July, killing civilians.251 Between July andDecember 2021, the UNCOI documented an increase in air strikes and shelling by pro-GoS
forces in Idlib. During July and August in particular, intense shelling was conducted south of
the M4 highway.252 Air strikes by pro-GoS forces further targeted Operation Euphrates Shieldareas in the north of the country.253

242

UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), S/2022/330,
19 April 2022, url, para. 26
243
COAR, Dar’a Killings Highlight Unseen Local Toll of Syria’s Drug Trade, 6 June 2022, url
244
Arab Weekly (The), Violence surges in countryside surrounding Damascus, 2 July 2022, url
245
SOHR, Anti-regime attack | Gunmen open fire on regime checkpoint in Qudsaya, Rif Dimashq, while regime
forces amass troops and block the area’s entrances, 15 June 2022, url
246
SOHR, Security chaos | Gunmen with weapons with silencers attack Military Security checkpoint killing two andinjuring others in Rif Dimashq, 30 July 2022, url
247
SOHR, Rampant security chaos | Collaborator with regime’s security services killed after being kidnapped for tendays south of Damascus, 27 July 2022, url; SOHR, Dispute over people smuggling | Collaborator with regime
security branches shot dead in Rif Dimashq, 7 August 2022, url
248
SOHR, 78th crime in regime-held areas in 2022 | Young man stabbed to death in fights among young men in
Yabroud city in western Qalamoun, 10 July 2022, url
249
Al-Monitor, Idlib sees new escalation between Syrian government, opposition forces, 22 June 2022, url; UN
Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 51; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/48/70, 13 August 2021, url, para. 46; Carter Center (The),
Quarterly Review | April through June 2021, 20 July 2021, url, p. 2
250
Asharq Al-Awsat, Syria Regime Reroutes Forces from Idlib to Badia Desert in Clampdown on ISIS, 18 June 2021,
url
251
France 24, Syria army shells rebel bastion, killing seven: monitor, 22 July 2021, url
252
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Ar ab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 5
253
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 5

42

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

1.5.2.

Areas under control of Turkish-backed armed groups

The areas under control of Turkish-backed armed groups are two discontinuous areas along
the Syrian-Turkish border encompassing most of northern Aleppo and segments of thenorthern governorates of Raqqa and Hasaka.254 Turkey has organised these armed groups
under the umbrella of Syrian National Army (SNA). 255 Between 2016 and 2020, Turkey
conducted four major military operations in northern Syria. In the course of Operation‘Euphrates Shield’, Turkish-backed forces seized control over 2 055 square kilometres ofnorthern Aleppo governorate in August 2016. With Operation ‘Olive Branch’, Turkey captured
Afrin district in January 2018. Through Operation ‘Peace Spring’ Turkey expanded the areas
under its control east of the Euphrates River in late 2019. A subsequent operation called‘Spring Shield’ was conducted in north-western Idlib governorate in February 2020, whichfurther consolidated Turkish control over the northern areas of Syria. According to a July 2022
article by Hamidreza Azizi, fellow researcher at the German Institute for International andSecurity Affairs (SWP), Turkey and Turkish-backed forces hold about 10 % of Syria’s territory asa result of these operations.256
For April and May 2021, the UN Secretary-General reported on ‘low-level mutual shelling’ andsporadic fighting between pro-GoS forces and non-state armed opposition groups along thefront lines near Al-Bab in northern Aleppo governorate, but also on an intensification of mutual
shelling and fighting along the contact lines in Afrin, A’zaz, and Tal Rifaat, including reports ofcivilian casualties.257 For the period between April and June 2021, the Carter Center, anongovernmental organization focused on human rights and conflict prevention and solution,
reported frequent shelling and skirmishes at the frontlines between Kurdish-controlled andTurkish-held areas, with a clear increase in incidents at the end of June 2021 and with most of
the conflict events taking place in Raqqa Governorate (30 of 47 incidents). Tensions
reportedly escalated after a rocket hit Al-Shifa Hospital in Afrin on 12 June 2021.258
Between July and September 2021, fighting between Turkish forces/Turkish-backed armed
groups and various Kurdish armed groups reportedly increased, including shelling, clashes,
and airstrikes, with a rise in conflict events reported for Manbij region, Tall Abyad andDardara.259 Moreover, at the end of September 2021, Russia was reported to have conductedairstrikes on territory held by Turkish-backed forces in Afrin.260 For the fourth quarter of 2021,
the Carter Center reported that the conflict had slightly decreased, ‘with much of the activity’
taking place in Tal Tamr, Ras Al-Ain, Afrin, A’zaz, and Ain Issa, and with more than 95 % of the
documented airstrikes and shelling activity reportedly stemming from the Turkish side. 261

254

PHR, Destruction, Obstruction, and Inaction - The Makings of a Health Crisis in Northern Syria, December 2021,
url, p. 5; Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review | April through June 2021, 20 July 2021, url, p. 5
255
COAR, Northern Corridor: Needs Oriented Strategic Area Profile, October 2019, url, p. 9
256
Azizi, H., How Iran sees Turkey’s plan for a new military operation in Syria, MEI, 1 July 2022, url
257
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020), S/2021/583, 17 June
2021, url, para. 4258
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review | April through June 2021, 20 July 2021, url, p. 5
259
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review | July Through September 2021, 26 October 2021, url, p. 6
260
Al-Monitor, Russia bombs Turkey's allies in Syria ahead of Putin-Erdogan summit, 28 September 2021, url
261
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review | October-December 2021, 28 March 2021, url, p. 7

43

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

In its report covering the period from 1 July 2021 to 31 December 2021, the UNCOI mentioned
that, although the overall security situation had improved in northern Aleppo and the Ras AlAin and Tall Abyad areas compared to the ‘immediate aftermath of Operation Peace Springand Operation Olive Branch’, people were still living ‘amid fear of shelling and improvised
explosive devices’. Northern Aleppo saw several incidents of bombardment and vehicle-borne
IEDs while the area between Ras Al-Ain and Tall Abyad reportedly witnessed a period of
relative calm. Civilians in this ‘highly volatile region’ were reported to be confronted with‘several conflicts, involving both pro-government and Turkish forces as well as non-State
armed groups’, including SNA and SDF forces.262
The Carter Center recorded an increase in conflict incidents between Kurdish and Turkishbacked armed groups for the period between January and March 2022 compared to theprevious quarter.263 For April and May 2022, the UN Secretary-General reported on
significantly increasing hostilities in northern Syria, ‘including but not limited to’ Tal Rifaat innorthern Aleppo, Manbij, Ain Issa and Tal Tamr.264 In June 2022, the London-based digitalnews organisation Middle East Eye reported that HTS militants had seized control over anumber of villages in the southern Afrin area that were previously held by Turkish-backed
armed groups.265
In July 2022, Calvin Wilder, analyst at the Washington D.C.-based think tank Newlines Institutefor Strategy and Policy, described the front lines between areas under Turkish-backed forces
and SDF-held territories as ‘largely static’ since October 2019, and as complicated to maintainand oftentimes marked by violence.266 Along the frontline, ‘tit-for-tat strikes’ by Turkishaffiliated armed groups and the SDF continued to occur, resulting in the deaths of bothsoldiers and civilians. According to Wilder, the situation was particularly ‘tense’ in Tal Rifaat, an
isolated area under SDF control west of the Euphrates, and along the frontline near Manbij
and the SDF’s main territories in the east of the Euphrates, where artillery shelling and drone
attacks were regularly witnessed.267
According to various news reports published in July 2022, Turkey was planning anothermilitary operation in northern Syria. The operation is reported to be aiming at clearing a 30-

262

UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 74
263
Carter Center (The), The Quarterly Review on Syrian Military and Security Dynamics | January-March 2022, 13
May 2022, url, p. 8
264
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), S/2022/492,
16 June 2022, url, para. 1 (in Key points)
265
MEE, Syria's rebel divisions laid bare as HTS takes Afrin villages from Turkish-backed groups, 23 June 2022, url
266
Wilder, C., The Deteriorating Security Situation in Northeast Syria, Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, 11
July 2022, url
267
Wilder, C., The Deteriorating Security Situation in Northeast Syria, Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, 11
July 2022, url

44

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

kilometer-deep ‘security zone’ of Kurdish armed groups.268 As of early July, the cities of Manbij
and Tal Rifaat were named as the main targets of the potential offensive.269
Internal fighting between SNA factions reportedly exacerbated the overall instability in areas
held by Turkish-backed armed groups. These internal conflicts were described as being far
greater than those witnessed within the Kurdish-backed forces or the HTS and wereconsidered ‘a severe problem for the political leadership and residents within Turkish-heldareas’.270 According to an April 2022 news article, SNA infighting occurred almost daily andmainly in the cities of Jarablus, al-Bab, Afrin, Ras Al-Ain und A’zaz. As these clashes often took
place amidst residential areas, residents were reported to be negatively affected andsometimes even injured271 or killed.272
As reported by UNOCHA in its Humanitarian Needs Overview, most of the 309 IED attacks
recorded in the first months of 2021 happened in areas controlled by ‘armed groups in Turkish
operations areas of Aleppo Governorate’, particularly in residential areas and markets. 273

1.5.3.

Kurdish-controlled areas in north-east Syria

According to a UN map (see Map 3) depicting estimated areas of influence as of January2022, areas under control of Kurdish forces - including the Kurdish People’s Protection Units(YPG) and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) - comprise Hasaka governorate (except for the
Turkish-controlled so-called Operation Peace Spring area, see also section 1.5.2 of this report)
as well as parts of Aleppo, Raqqa and Deir Ez-Zor governorates in north-eastern Syria.
Moreover, Manbij and its surrounding area, the area around Tal Rifaat and strips of land along
the border with Turkey are under joint control of GoS and pro-GoS forces and Kurdish forces,
while some parts of Syria’s international border zone with Turkey are controlled by Turkish
forces and affiliated non-state armed groups.274
Clashes between the GoS-aligned NDF and Kurdish security forces in Qamishli city in the
period from 20 to 25 April 2021 ended with Kurdish forces taking control over Tayyneighbourhood, an area of the city that has an Arab majority. Fighting erupted following thearrest of an NDF leader and member of the Arab Tayy tribe by Kurdish security forces. At least
10 NDF fighters and 3 Kurdish security forces were reportedly killed in the fighting. 275
According to a UN report of June 2021, the clashes between GoS forces and Kurdish security
forces in Qamishli city led to the temporary displacement of up to 20 000 people and killed 14
civilians, including 3 children. Fighting lasted for several days and also affected UN
268

MEMO, Kurdish SDF calls on Russia, Iran to prevent planned Turkish military operation, 17 July 2022, url; VOA,US Officials Speak Out Against Turkish Plans for Northern Syria, 13 July 2022, url; Wilder, C., The Deteriorating
Security Situation in Northeast Syria, Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, 11 July 2022, url; Azizi, H., How Iransees Turkey’s plan for a new military operation in Syria, MEI, 1 July 2022, url
269
Wilder, C., The Deteriorating Security Situation in Northeast Syria, Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, 11
July 2022, url
270
Carter Center (The), The State of the Syrian National Army, 15 March 2022, url, pp. 3-4
271
Al-Monitor, Factional infighting escalates in northern Syria, 19 April 2022, url
272
New Arab (The), Two civilians shot in inter-rebel fighting in northern Syria, 8 April 2022, url
273
UNOCHA, 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022 , url, p. 14
274
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, p. 22
275
COAR, Quamishli Clashes Bring Arab-Kurd Tensions to the Surface, 26 April 2021, url

45EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

humanitarian aid transports, which were prevented from entering the city until a ceasefire wasagreed.276
In March 2022, GoS forces began blocking the delivery of flour, fuel and medicines to Kurdishmajority and Kurdish-controlled Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh neighbourhoods in Aleppo,
allegedly to prevent smuggling and the delivery of supplies to four unlicensed bakeries. In an
apparently retaliatory move, Kurdish security forces blocked bakeries in GoS-controlled areas
in Qamishli and Hasaka in early April 2022, and reportedly briefly took control of the GoScontrolled city centre of Qamishli.277
In June 2022, villages around Manbij were reportedly attacked with heavy weapons by
Turkish forces and associated groups, while SDF and GoS forces reinforced their positions in
the area and sought support from local Arab tribes in anticipation of a large-scale military
operation announced by Turkey.278 For the same reason, SDF declared a state of emergency
in July 2022.279
Clashes and mutual shelling between Turkish armed forces and Turkish-backed armed
opposition groups on the one side and Kurdish armed groups on the other side continued
with varying intensity throughout the reference period. Periods of increased tensions werereported in the Ain Issa and Tall Abyad areas in Raqqa governorate in June 2021 280, in the
Manbij area in Aleppo governorate, in Dardara in Hasaka governorate, and in Tall Abyad in the
period from July to September 2021 281, and across northern Syria in the first quarter of 2022.
Of 233 conflict events recorded by the Carter Center in the period from January to March thatyear, 46 were clashes between groups, while 186 were shelling and aerial bombardment by
Turkish armed forces and their allies targeting SDF positions. 282 SNA and SDF were reportedly
frequently involved in mutual shelling and skirmishes along the line of control near Ain Issa in
Raqqa and Tal Tamr in Hasaka governorates 283, which at times resulted in civilian casualties.284
An SDF commander was killed by a Turkish drone strike near Qamishli in Hasaka governorate
in August 2021.285 In the same month, a Turkish soldier and two Turkish-backed fighters werereportedly killed in Ras Al-Ain countryside by an explosive device of suspected SDF origin.

276

UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), S/2021/583,
17 June 2021, url, para. 13; WFP, WFP Syria Situation Report #4, April 2021, 24 May 2021, url, p. 2
277
New Arab (The), Aleppo: Syrian regime continues siege of Kurdish neighbourhoods as SDF retaliates in
Qamishli, 19 April 2022, url; COAR, SDF Imposes Siege on Government of Syria Enclaves in Response to Siege ofSheikh Maqsoud, 18 April 2022, url
278
Al-Monitor, Syrian Kurds, Arabs join forces to defend Manbij ahead of Turkish military operation, 24 June 2022,
url
279
Wilder, C., The Deteriorating Security Situation in Northeast Syria, Newlines Institute, 11 July 2022, url
280
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review | April through June 2021, 20 July 2021, url, p. 5
281
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review | July Through September 2021, 26 October 2021, url, p. 6282
Carter Center (The), The Quarterly Review on Syrian Military and Security Dynamics | January-March 2022, 13
May 2022, url, pp. 8-9283
Hoffman, M. and Makovsky, A., Northern Syria Security Dynamics and the Refugee Crisis, CAP, 26 May 2021, url
284
STJ, Ain Issa: A Father, His Three Children, Killed in an Artillery Attack by the Elite Army, 8 September 2021, url
285
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review | July Through September 2021, 26 October 2021, url, p. 6

46

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

Airstrikes by Turkish forces targeting Kurdish forces in northern Syria reportedly continue dthroughout the month.286
ISIL continued to carry out attacks during 2021 and the first six months of 2022 across Deir EzZor and Hasaka governorates and the SDF continued to carry out counter-operations in theregion east of the Euphrates.287 While most of the SDF and the US-led Coalition’s counterterrorism operations took place in Deir Ez-Zor governorate, some were conducted also in
Hasaka and Raqqa governorates.288 On 20 January 2022, ISIL attacked al-Sina prison in thecity of Hasaka in an attempt to free imprisoned former members of the group. The attack andensuing siege of the prison and of two nearby neighbourhoods by SDF forces lasted forseveral days and caused scores of casualties, including civilians. 289 Around 45 000 civilians
from the nearby neighbourhoods were displaced. However, by April 2022 most of them had
been able to return.290

1.5.4.

Areas in north-west Syria under anti-GoS armed groups control

Please also see section 1.5.2 of this report for an overview on the situation in north-westernareas under control of Turkish-backed armed groups, and section 1.5.4 of the EUAA COI
Report – Syria: Security situation (2021) for information on developments in north-westernareas prior to April 2021.
The areas of north-west Syria under control of anti-GoS armed groups include the northernparts of Idlib governorate, parts of western Aleppo governorate as well as small parts of
Latakia and Hama governorates. The main towns are Idlib city, Jisr Al-Shoghour and Ariha.291
The opposition-held areas of north-west Syria are administered by the Syrian Salvation
Government (SSG), which is affiliated with HTS.292 Over the course of several years, HTS had
cracked down on Hurras al-Din (HAD) and ISIL cells and in summer 2021 started to pressure‘smaller jihadi outfits to merge into HTS or disband and/or depart Idlib altogether’.293 As of
September 2021, HTS was the ‘the unchallenged, de facto governor’ of areas controlled by
286

International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Syria, August 2021, url
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), S/2021/735,
18 August 2021, url, para. 9; UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165
(2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and
2585 (2021), S/2021/1029, 15 December 2021, url, para. 12; UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council
resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018),
2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), S/2022/492, 16 June 2022, url, para. 5288
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 98
289
Haenni, P. and Quesnay, A., Coming Up Through the Cracks: The Islamic State’s Resurgence in Syria and Iraq,
EUI, Policy Brief Issue 2022/16, 5 April 2022, url, p. 4
290
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), S/2022/330,
19 April 2022, url, para. 17
291
Based on reading of the following maps: Liveuamap, Syria, as of 21 July 2022, url; Carter Center (The), The
Quarterly Review on Syrian Military and Security Dynamics | January-March 2022, 13 May 2022, url, p. 4; Balanche,F., Idlib May Become the Next Gaza Strip, WINEP, 26 March 2020, url
292
US, CRS, Syria and U.S. Policy, 19 April 2022, url
293
Lister, C., The Fight for Supremacy in Northwest Syria and the Implications for Global Jihad, September 2021,
CTC, Vol. 14, Issue 7, url, p. 48
287

47

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

the opposition in north-western Syria, and as such controlled the ‘most populous region of
Syria outside of regime control’.294
According to a February 2022 report, despite the ceasefire agreement of March 2020
between Russia and Turkey to prevent a GoS offensive, the north-western area was affectedby some of the most intense aerial bombardment by GoS and Russian forces in Syria.295 Aftera lull in violence following the ceasefire, hostilities intensified in the first six months of 2021. 296
Over the year 2021, airstrikes by GoS and Russian forces struck sites with civilian presence,
including hospitals, markets, schools, IDP settlements, and farms in the north-western parts ofthe country.297
In April and May 2021, ‘mutual artillery shelling and clashes between pro-GoS forces and nonState armed groups’ occurred on a daily basis in the Idlib de-escalation area.298 However, thelevel of violence was reported to have remained relatively low. In late April and early May
shelling increased, following an attack by HTS on GoS positions. HTS also continued to target
rival groups during April and May.299 HTS reportedly killed and arrested HAD members in
April300, while rural Idlib was affected by air strikes. 301 In June and July 2021, air strikes andshelling increased in north-west Syria, including in Jabal Al-Zawiyah region in southern Idlib.302
SNHR documented ‘a sudden military escalation by the Syrian-Russian alliance forces’ in early
June 2021 around Jabal Al-Zawiyah area which resulted in ‘civilian casualties and significant
material damage to vital facilities’.303 In June and July, more than 20 civilian fatalities were
documented by the UN in areas held by anti-GoS groups in north-west Syria. Airstrikes on
military sites, including HTS sites, were carried out mostly south of the M4 highway, also
damaging civilian infrastructure. Over 20 000 people were displaced in June 2021 due to theconflict in the north-west, resulting in the largest displacement in the area since the March
2020 ceasefire.304

294

Lister, C., The Fight for Supremacy in Northwest Syria and the Implications for Global Jihad, September 2021,
CTC, Vol. 14, Issue 7, url, p. 45
295
Hall, N., Rescuing Aid in Syria, CSIS, February 2022, url, p. 17
296
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 51
297
USDOS, 2021 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Syria, 12 April 2022, url, pp. 1-2
298
Please see section 2.1.2 of the url for further information regarding the establishment of de-escalation areas.
299
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020), S/2021/583, 17 June
2021, url, para. 3
300
International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Syria, April 2021, url
301
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020), S/2021/583, 17 June
2021, url, para. 3; International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Syria, May 2021, url
302
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (20 21), S/2021/735,
18 August 2021, url, para. 1 in ‘Key points’; International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Syria, July 2021, url;
International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Syria, June 2021, url
303
SNHR, Russian and Syrian Regime Forces Committed Violations That Constitute War Crimes During Unlawful
Attacks on and Around the Jabal al Zaweya Area, 9 September 2021, url
304
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), S/2021/735,
18 August 2021, url, para. 3

48

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATIONIn August and September 2021, violence further intensified in the Idlib de-escalation area.305
Airstrikes and shelling resulted in the killing and wounding of civilians, including women andchildren. Civilian infrastructure was damaged almost daily by intensifying air strikes, mostly
south of the M4 highway.306 In early September the outskirts of an IDP camp in Ma‘arrat Misrin
were affected by air strikes.307 The escalation of Russian airstrikes in Turkish-held territory in
Aleppo governorate in September 2021 led to concerns over a possible new military offensive
to secure the strategic M4 highway in Idlib Governorate. This and attacks against refugee
camps in Aleppo and Idlib Governorates resulted in the displacement of civilians in the north west.308
In October 2021, HTS attacked two of rival groups, Junud Al-Sham and Jund Allah, in Latakia
governorate, leading to Junud Al-Sham agreeing to withdraw from confrontation areas.309 In
October and November 2021, shelling and clashes between armed opposition groups and
GoS forces continued310, including south of the M4 highway in Idlib Governorate. 311 Attacks inthe north-west of the country also impacted humanitarian operations, as there were hostilities
close to warehouses of the United Nations and their partners, and to delivery routes anddistribution points.312
Between July and December 2021, more than 80 % of conflict-related activities in Idlib were
pro-GoS shelling and aerial bombardment in predominantly southern Idlib. 313 In late December
2021 violence escalated, when pro-GoS forces attacked residential areas.314 Shelling andclashes between armed opposition groups and GoS forces continued across contact lines in
the north-west in December 2021 and January 2022. In early January 2022, an air strike
affected the Arshani water pumping station, and until 20 January 2022 access to water in Idlib
city remained below previous levels.315

305

UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), S/2021/890,
21 October 2021, url, para. 3; International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Syria, September 2021, url; International
Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Syria, August 2021, url
306
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), S/2021/890,
21 October 2021, url, para. 3
307
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), S/2021/890,
21 October 2021, url, para. 3308
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review | July Through September 2021, 26 October 2021, url, p. 4309
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review | October-December 2021, 31 December 2021, url, p. 5
310
International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Syria, November 2021, url; International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch –Syria, October 2021, url
311
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021),
S/2021/1029, 15 December 2021, url, para. 4
312
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 ( 2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021),
S/2021/1029, 15 December 2021, url, para. 5313
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review | October-December 2021, 31 December 2021, url, p. 3314
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 51
315
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), S/2022/135,
21 February 2022, url, para. 4

49

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMIn February and March 2022, shelling and clashes between armed opposition groups and GoS
forces continued across contact lines in the north-west. However, in comparison with the endof 2021, ‘the pace of such strikes decreased.’ 316 In February 2022, a US special forces raid inAtma town in Idlib governorate resulted in the killing of several civilians and ISIL fighters andraised concerns that Idlib might still be an ISIL hideout. 317
According to a report by the Carter Center, conflict activity decreased from 992 events
recorded in the previous quarter to 934 in the first quarter of 2022. Over 80 % of the activity inthe north-west region took place in Aleppo and Idlib governorates. 318 In late April 2022, thetempo of air strikes increased again 319, and in May 2022 Russian forces continued to carry out
air-strikes in Idlib governorate.320 In the first half of July 2022, HTS and the Turkish-backed
armed groups intensified attacks of GoS posts on the southern and eastern fronts. The
opposition forces launched the campaign in response to increasing land and air attacks by
GoS and Russian forces in the countryside of Idlib earlier in July. 321
As of June 2022, more than 2.8 million people in the north-west remained internallydisplaced. According to the UN Secretary General, ‘continued attacks on the civilian
population in the north-west exposed them to serious violations of international humanitarianlaw’.322

1.5.5.

Tanf

Tanf Garrison is a US-controlled military base established in 2016 and is located in close
proximity to Syria’s borders with Jordan and Iraq. It is surrounded by a 55-kilometerdeconfliction zone, based on a 2016 understanding between the USA and Russia. About 300
members of the Syrian opposition group Maghawir Al-Thawra (MaT), reportedly former military
officers, were estimated to be spread around the deconfliction zone and collaborating with thecoalition forces on operations against ISIL. MaT was reportedly also occasionally involved inpreventing ISIL drug smuggling operations in the border region and in providing security foraid deliveries to the Rukban refugee camp located near the Tanf base323, which hosted an
estimated 7 000 to 10 000 Syrian IDPs.324 However, according to an article by Euro-Med
Human Rights Monitor of April 2022, Rukban has not received any humanitarian aid since2019, when GoS forces began blocking the entry of any supplies into the camp in an attempt
to push the camp’s residents to return to areas under GoS-control. With Jordan’s borders
316

UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), S/2022/330,
19 April 2022, url, para. 4317
International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Syria, February 2022, url
318
Carter Center (The), The Quarterly Review on Syrian Military and Security Dynamics | January-March 2022, 13
May 2022, url, p. 4
319
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), S/2022/492,
16 June 2022, url, para. 4
320
International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Syria, May 2022, url
321
Al-Monitor, Syrian government, Russia escalate attacks in Idlib amid looming Turkish operation, 17 July 2022, url
322
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), S/2022/492,
16 June 2022, url, para. 4
323
WINEP, D., The Future of al-Tanf Garrison in Syria, WINEP, 6 December 2021, url
324
Al-Monitor, Desperate residents flee Syrian refugee camp as supplies run out, 16 June 2022, url

50

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

closed due to the COVID-19 pandemic since 2020, and coalition forces reportedly notproviding humanitarian assistance 325, the camp’s residents had relied on smugglers to bring inand sell basic goods, according to media reports. A crackdown on smugglers in May 2022
interrupted this supply line and brought residents ‘to the brink of famine’ 326 until a food convoy
by Jordanian traders was allowed to enter the camp in June 2022. 327
A drone attack on Tanf was reported in October 2021 328, while MaT positions around Tanf
were reportedly attacked in airstrikes in June 2022. According to media reports, the latterattack was carried out by Russian forces who allegedly issued a warning ahead. 329
Further information on Tanf is available in section 1.5.5 of the EUAA COI Report: Syria Security situation (July 2021).

1.6.

Impact of violence on the civilian population

1.6.1.

Tactics and weapons used(a)GeneralAccording to Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) 330, the extent of explosive violence in the
country continued to fall in 2021. Syria, however, was the second-worst impacted country
worldwide for the second year in a row in this regard. From 2015 to 2019, Syria had been theworst impacted country. The data for 2021 showed a 33 % decrease in civilian casualties (from3 013 in 2020 to 2 016 in 2021). Idlib and Aleppo remained the worst impacted regions.
Compared to 2020, however, the number of casualties in both regions decreased. In Aleppo,
the number fell from 1 287 civilian casualties from explosive weapons in 2020 to 714 in 2021,
and in Idlib from 998 in 2020 to 671 in 2021. The perpetrators of attacks frequently remained
unknown, but according to AOAV, the GoS’s use of explosive weapons resulted in at least
659 civilian casualties. Russian explosive violence resulted in 132 civilian casualties andTurkey was responsible for at least 118 civilian casualties resulting from explosive violence. 331
Please also see section 1.6.3 of this report for further information on civilian casualties.
According to Airwars 332 in 2021, Russia and the GoS did not make a concerted effort to seize
Idlib governorate. However, at least 22 and up to 280 civilians in total were allegedly killed by
325

Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor, Syria: 8,000 IDPs in Rukban camp need urgent humanitarian intervention, 6
April 2022, url
326
MEE, Rare food convoy to camp on Syria-Jordan border signals shift in Amman policy, 19 June 2022, url
327
MEE, Rare food convoy to camp on Syria-Jordan border signals shift in Amman policy, 19 June 2022, url; New
Arab (The), Al-Rukban camp receives first shipment from Jordan in four years, 13 June 2022, url
328
New Arab (The), Explosions at Syria's Al-Tanf base used by US-led coalition forces: monitor, 20 October 2021,
url
329
Enab Baladi, Bombing US garrison at al -Tanf is a Russian warning, not only a “message”, 23 June 2022, url;
Syrian Observer (The), Targeting U.S.-led Forces in al-Tanf, Russia’s ‘Proof of Existence’, 28 June 2022, url
330
AOAV is a not-for-profit organisation that records casualties caused by explosive weapons at the global level.
For more information about AOAV see AOAV, What do we do to address the impact of weapons?, n.d., url
331
AOAV, Explosive Violence Monitor 2021, 2022, url, p. 19
332
Airwars is a not-for-profit transparency watchdog which tracks, assesses, archives and investigates civilian harm
claims resulting primarily from explosive weapons use in conflict-affected nations including Iraq, Syria, Libya,
Somalia and Yemen. For more information see Airwars, Who we are, n.d., url

51

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

their air and artillery strikes, the majority in the Idlib region. 333 In 2021, Turkey did not launchmajor new offensives, and Airwars recorded ‘a total of 26 locally alleged civilian harm
incidents from Turkish-led actions in Syria, resulting in at least 29 civilian deaths’.334 According
to Airwars, the US-led Coalition against ISIL continued to operate at a low level. In total,
between 15 and 27 civilians were likely killed by US-led Coalition actions in 20 incidents
throughout 2021.335 Regarding allegations of civilian harm against Kurdish forces during 2021,
Airwars noted that Kurdish forces reportedly killed between 40 and 63 civilians, including in asingle event in Afrin on 19 November 2021, where up to 17 civilians were allegedly injured
during shelling.336(b)

Weapons used

In June 2022, the UNCOI released a report on attacks on civilians in Syria over the past ten
years. The report mentions indiscriminate attacks on densely populated areas by GoS forces,
including the use of unguided munitions and high explosive munitions with wide area effects
over the past ten years.337 According to the UN Secretary General’s June 2022 report,
covering April and May 2022, ‘[c]ivilians were killed and injured as a result of air strikes,
ground-based strikes, attacks with various types of improvised explosive devices and gunfire’.
Civilian objects were also affected by hostilities. 338 In its February 2022 report (covering Julyto December 2021) the UNCOI reported frequent attacks involving IEDs339, the use of
improvised rocket-assisted munitions and other unguided rocket artillery, which are known tobe highly inaccurate.340 In the first nine months of 2021 a total of 309 IED incidents, killing 242
civilians and injuring 502 civilians, were recorded by the Office of the High Commissioner on
Human Rights (OHCHR). The incidents included vehicle borne IEDs and explosive remnants ofwar (ERW). Most of the IED incidents were recorded in Turkish operation areas in Aleppo
governorate, mainly occurring in residential areas and markets. 341 The UNCOI also reported
the use of artillery strikes and unguided munitions342, including unguided Grad rockets 343, theuse of precision-guided artillery shells, including the Krasnopol-type344 , and drone strikes.345

333

Airwars, Annual Report 2021, May 2022, url, p. 13
Airwars, Annual Report 2021, May 2022, url, p. 14
335
Airwars, Annual Report 2021, May 2022, url, p. 14
336
Airwars, Annual Report 2021, May 2022, url, p. 15
337
OHCHR, Civilians under attack in Syria; Towards preventing further civilian harm, Independent International
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 28 June 2022, url, p. 4
338
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), S/2022/492,
16 June 2022, url, para. 3339
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 6, 76
340
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 27
341
UNOCHA, 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 14
342
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 56
343
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 57
344
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 58
345
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 99
334

52

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

According to AOAV, in 2021, ground-launched weapons, mainly shelling, accounted for themost civilian harm (58 % of civilian casualties) of all weapon types. In 2021, the second-highest
cause of civilian casualties were IEDs (26 % of civilian casualties). Air launched weapons,
which had caused the highest proportion of civilian casualties between 2015 and 2020, were
responsible for 11 % of the civilian casualties in 2021. Compared to 2020, this was 81 % less.346
According to information provided by the International Network on Explosive Weapons (INEW)
in its monthly published Explosive Weapons Monitor, ground-launched weapons caused
between 46 % and 77 % of the total civilian casualties between October 2021 and April 2022.
Directly emplaced weapons (e.g. improvised explosive devices, landmines, roadside bombs,
car bombs) caused between 11 % and 31 %, and air launched-weapons (airstrikes, air-dropped
bombs, air-launched missile) between 7 % and 38 % of civilian casualties in the same period.347
In areas affected by intense hostilities, including Idlib, Homs, Hama, Aleppo, Raqqa, Deir Ez Zor, Hasaka, Damascus, Quneitra and Dar’a, explosive ordnance contamination is widespread.
About one in three communities was potentially contaminated by explosives. 348 UNHCR notesthat 805 people were killed and nearly 3 000 others injured by mines and explosive ordnancein Syria, in 2021. An estimated half of the Syrian population lived in areas contaminated with
explosive ordnance.349 In March 2022 the Carter Center published a report mapping
unexploded ordnance in Syria between December 2012 and May 2021. According to thereport, between 100 000 and 300 000 explosive munitions failed to detonate in this period,
although the count is likely to be higher.350 In 2021, SNHR recorded the killing of 176 civilians
as a result of landmine explosions. According to the organisation, the use of prohibited andindiscriminate munitions caused the maiming or death of civilians even years after they wereoriginally deployed.351 According to a joint report by the International Campaign to Ban
Landmines (ICBL) and the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC), Syria is the only country to haveexperienced continued use of cluster munitions since 2012, with at leas t one attack during theperiod of 1 August 2020 and 31 July 2021.352 According to another report by the Carter Center,between January 2021 and March 2022, at least 248 incidents of civilians or other persons
being killed by leftover landmines and other unexploded ordnances (UXO) were reported.353(c)

Use of chemical weapons

No information on the usage of chemical weapons within the reference period for this report
could be found.
The Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) of the Organisation for the Prohibition ofChemical Weapons (OPCW) concluded in April 2021 ‘that units of the Syrian Arab Air Force

346

AOAV, Explosive Violence Monitor, 2022, url, p. 19
INEW, Explosive Weapons Monitor, Recent Updates, n.d., url; The Explosive Weapons Monitor also provides(less detailed) monthly information on the period between May and September 2021.
348
UNOCHA, 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 12
349
UNHCR, Protection Analysis Update, June 2022, url, p. 16
350
Carter Center (The), A Call for Action: Data on Unexploded Ordnance in Syria and Its Implications, December
2012 – May 2021, March 2022, url, p. 3351
SNHR, Annual report on death toll of civilians in 2021, 1 January 2022, url, p. 6
352
ICBL and CMC, Cluster Munition Monitor 2021, September 2021, url, p. 14353
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review | January-March 2022, 13 May 2022, url, p. 17
347

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

used chemical weapons in Saraqib on 4 February 2018’.354 A January 2022 report of an OPCW
fact-finding-mission concluded that a ‘chemical blister agent was used as a weapon’ in Marea
in September 2015355, and in February 2022, another OPCW fact-finding-mission concluded
that an ‘industrial chlorine cylinder was used as a weapon’ in Kafr Zeita on 1 October 2016.356
In April 2021, certain rights and privileges of the GoS at the OPCW were suspended by stateparties to the Chemical Weapons Convention.357 According to Human Rights Watch, GoS
forces had used chlorine and the nerve agent sarin over the course of the war, while ISIL
militants had used sulphur mustard on several occasions.358(d)Attacks against civilian targets and population

Concerning the siege on Dar‘a and other attacks in the wider region, the UNCOI in its
February 2022 report noted that tactics used by pro-GoS forces ‘violated the right to accessto food and health care, and freedom of movement, and may amount to collective
punishment’. The use of rocket munitions in densely populated areas ‘may amount to the war
crime of launching indiscriminate attacks resulting in death or injury to civilians, or damage tocivilian objects, including medical facilities’.359 According to the UNCOI, witnesses andsurvivors claimed that ‘attacks appeared to be aimed at harming civilians, increasing
destruction and displacement and weakening chances for economic recovery or stability in
opposition-held areas’ in the north-west of the country.360 Idlib city and Ariha town faced
indiscriminate attacks on densely populated civilian areas, resulting in fatalities and thedamaging of two schools, residential and commercial buildings. According to the UNCOI, ‘inneither case was there any indication of a military objective in the targeted urban areas’.361 In
July 2021, in Sarjah village, first responders were targeted with precision artillery strikes on a
civilian home and in September 2021, in Mar’yan village a medical clinic was struck precisely
by two munitions. The clinic was the last functional medical centre in the Jabal al-Zawiyah area
and was severely damaged in the attack.362
Regarding northern Aleppo and the Ras al-Ayn and Tall Abyad regions, the UNCOI describedstrikes by pro-GoS forces or the SDF on populated areas and noted that these attacks and IED

354

OPCW, OPCW Releases Second Report by Investigation and Identification Team, 12 April 2021, url
OPCW, OPCW issues Fact-Finding Mission report on chemical weapons use allegation in Marea, Syria, in
September 2015, 26 January 2022, url
356
OPCW, OPCW issues Fact-Finding Mission report on chemical weapons use allegation in Kafr Zeita, Syria, on 1
October 2016, 1 February 2022, url
357
OPCW, Conference of the States Parties adopts Decision to suspend certain rights and privileges of the Syrian
Arab Republic under the CWC, 22 April 2021, url
358
HRW, World Report 2022 - Syria, 13 January 2022, url359
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 35
360
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 51
361
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 56
362
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 59
355

54

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

attacks ‘may amount to the war crime of launching indiscriminate attacks resulting in death or
injury of civilians’.363
According to the Wold Health Organization’s (WHO) Surveillance System for Attacks on HealthCare (SSA), in the year 2021, 31 attacks on healthcare were reported country-wide, most being
recorded in Dar’a, Deir Ez-Zor and Aleppo governorates.364 Between January and March
2022, WHO reported six attacks on healthcare facilities which led to three health careproviders killed and one patient injured.365

1.6.2.

Security incidents

The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) collects data on violent incidents in
Syria, coding each incident with the time and place, type of violent incident, the parties
involved and the number of fatalities. The information is collected in a database that is openly
accessible, searchable and kept continuously up to date. The data primarily come fromsecondary sources such as media reports, but also from reports by international institutions
and non-governmental organisations and data provided by local partners of ACLED. 366 On
Syria, ACLED incorporates data from a number of partners, including SNHR, Airwars, theCarter Center, Liveuamap, Syria Direct, SOHR, the London School of Economics’ Conflict andCivil Society Research Unit, the International Security and Development Center andClingendael Institute.367
ACLED codes security incidents as follows:•
Battles: violent clashes between at least two armed groups. Battles can occur between
armed and organised state, non-state, and external groups, and in any combination therein.
Sub-events of battles are armed clashes, government regains territory and non-state actor
overtakes territory.
•
Violence against civilians: violent events where an organised armed group deliberately
inflicts violence upon unarmed non-combatants. It includes violent attacks on unarmed civilians
such as sexual violence, attacks, abduction/forced disappearance.
•
Explosions/remote violence: events where an explosion, bomb or other explosive
device was used to engage in conflict. They include one-sided violent events in which the toolfor engaging in conflict creates asymmetry by taking away the ability of the targets to engage
or defend themselves and their location. They include air/drone strikes, suicide bombs,
shelling/artillery/missile attack, remote explosive/landmine/IED, grenade, chemical weapon.
•
Riots: are a violent demonstration, often involving a spontaneous action by unorganised,unaffiliated members of society. They include violent demonstration, mob violence.
•Protests: public demonstration in which the participants do not engage in violence,
though violence may be used against them. It includes peaceful protests, protests withintervention, excessive force against protesters.

363

UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, para. 81
364
WHO/ Health Cluster, Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care. Syrian Arab Republic. Annual Report
2021, 3 February 2022, url, p. 2
365
WHO/ Health Cluster, Syrian Arab Republic: Attacks on health care in Syria, 1 Jan - 31 Mar 2022, 5 May 2022, url
366
ACLED, Methodology, April 2019, url ACLED, FAQs: ACLED Sourcing Methodology, February 2020, url
367
ACLED, Syria Partner Network, April 2019, url

55

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM•
Strategic developments: information regarding the activities of violent groups that is
not itself recorded as political violence, yet may trigger future events or contribute to political
dynamics within and across states. It includes agreements, change to group/activity, non -violent
transfer of territory, arrests.368
For the purpose of this report only the following type of events were included in the analysis:
battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians. A country overview of thedata on riots and protests is also provided separately (see section Protests and riots).
EUAA used the publicly available ACLED curated dataset for Middle East ( 12 August 2022) for
security incidents figures, graphs and maps.369
According to the aforementioned ACLED dataset 370, between 1 April 2021 and 1 August 2022
there were 12 194 security incidents recorded in Syria: 2 345 were coded as battles, 7 466 as
explosions/remote violence, and 2 383 as violence against civilians. Most security incidents
were recorded in Aleppo (2 776), Idlib (2 253) and Hasaka (1 671) governorates. The lowest
security incidents figures were recorded in Quneitra (58), Damascus (21) and Tartous (6)governorates.

Figure 1: Evolution of security events coded ‘battles’, ‘explosions/remote violence’ and‘violence against civilians’ between 1 April 2021 and 1 August 2022371(a)Battles

Battles (armed clashes) is the category with the third most registered security incidents. During
the reference period, there were 2 345 battles recorded by ACLED, an average of 146
battles/month. Most battles were recorded in the governorates of Aleppo ( 493), Deir Ez-Zor(437) and Dar’a (383). The lowest number of battles were recorded in Tartous (1), Damascus(2), and Quneitra (14).372

368

ACLED, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Codebook, January 2021, url, pp. 7-17
ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (12 August 2022), url
370
ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (12 August 2022), url
371
EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East ( 12 August2022), url
372
EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (12 August2022), url
369

56

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

Figure 2: Evolution of security events coded ‘battles’ between 1 April 2021 and 1 August2022373(b)

Explosions/remote violence

Explosions/remote violence, which includes explosive devices, artillery fire and air strikes, is thecategory with the highest number of individual incidents by far with 7 466 incidents recordedby ACLED between 1 April 2021 and 1 August 2022, an average of 466 incidents/month. The
largest number of explosions/remote violence was registered in Idlib (1 943), followed by Aleppo(1 893) and Raqqa (912) governorates. The lowest number of explosions/remote violence were
documented in Tartous (3), Damascus (11) and Sweida (11).

Figure 3: Evolution of security events coded ‘explosions/remote violence’ between 1 April
2021 and 1 August 2022374(c)Violence against civilians

The second largest category of incidents is violence against civilians with 2 383 incidents
recorded by ACLED between 1 April 2021 and 1 August 2022, an average of 148
incidents/month. Most incidents during the year were recorded in Hasaka ( 576), Deir Ez-Zor(402) and Aleppo (390) governorates. The lowest number of incidents were recorded in
Tartous and Latakia (2 each) and Quneitra (5) governorates.

373

EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (12 August2022), url
374
EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (12 August2022), url

57

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Figure 4: Evolution of ‘violence against civilians’ events between 1 April 2021 and 1 August2022 based on ACLED data 375(d)Protests and riots

According to ACLED data, between 1 April 2021 and 1 August 2022 there were 384 protests
and 105 riots. Most protests took place in Aleppo (103), Hasaka (69) and Deir Ez-Zor
governorates (61). The largest number of riots were recorded in the governorates of Deir EzZor (50) followed by Hasaka (18) and Sweida (17).

Figure 5: Evolution of events coded ‘protests’ and ‘riots’ between April 2021 and 1 August2022 based on ACLED data 376

1.6.3.

Civilian fatalities

Many international monitoring groups have given up on providing detailed estimates of thenumber of fatalities because of the complexity of the situation and lack of access to first-handinformation.377 The UN stopped publishing statistics on conflict-related deaths in 2014, statingthat it was no longer possible to arrive at accurate figures. 378 In September 2021, the UN
released its first casualty figure since 2014, stating that it had identified 350 209 individuals

375

EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middl e East (12 August2022), url
376
EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (12 August2022), url
377
New York Times (The), How Syria’s death toll is lost in the fog of war, 13 April 2018, url
378
BBC News, Syria war: UN calculates new death toll, 24 September 2021, url

58

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

killed between March 2011 and March 2021.379 This figure included 27 126 children.380 Of theoverall fatality number, 143 350 or 40.9 % were identified as civilian deaths.381 Currently, mostinternational experts state that the number of overall fatalities in Syria since the war broke out
in 2011 is somewhere around 500 000 or higher, but indicate that these are very roughestimates.382 According to SOHR, the overall death toll reached 606 000 between March 2011
and May 2021, of which the organisation itself had documented about 495 000 fatalities.383
SOHR recorded 3 746 fatalities during the year 2021, among them 1 505 civilians, which
represents the lowest annual death toll recorded since the beginning of the conflict in 2011.384
There are several Syrian organisations that still attempt to keep count; however, the figures
vary between organisations. This is related to the fact that these organisations have varying
methods, ground presence, and access to information. 385

379

OHCHR, High Commissioner for Human Rights to the Human Rights Council: 350,209 Civilians Have Been Killedin the Syrian Conflict, 24 September 2021, url, BBC News, Syria war: UN calculates new death toll, 24 September
2021, url380
UN Human Rights Council, Civilian Deaths in the Syrian Arab Republic, Report of the United Nations HighCommissioner for Human Rights [A/HRC/50/68], 28 June 2022, url, para. 19
381
UN Human Rights Council, Civilian Deaths in the Syrian Arab Republic, Report of the United Nations HighCommissioner for Human Rights [A/HRC/50/68], 28 June 2022, url, para. 23
382
SOHR, Total death toll | Over 606,000 people killed across Syria since the beginning of the “Syrian Revolution”,
including 495,000 documented by SOHR, 1 June 2021, url; USIP, The Current Situation in Syria, 26 August 2020,
url; SOHR, More than 570 thousand people were killed on the Syrian territory within 8 years of revolution
demanding freedom, democracy, justice, and equality, 15 March 2019, url; New York Times (The), How Syria’s death
toll is lost in the fog of war, 13 April 2018, url; SOHR, On International Human Rights Day: Millions of Syrians robbed
of “rights” and 593 thousand killed in a decade, 9 December 2020, url; BBC News, Why has the Syrian war lasted
11 years?, 15 March 2022, url
383
SOHR, Total death toll | Over 606,000 people killed across Syria since the beginning of the “Syrian Revolution”,
including 495,000 documented by SOHR, 1 June 2021, url
384
SOHR, SOHR: 3,746 Syrians Were Killed, Including Civilians, Duri ng 2021, 23 December 2021, url
385
New Humanitarian (The), Counting under fire: the untold story of Syria’s casualty data, 27 October 2015, url; New
Arab (The), Will we ever really know how many people have died in Syria since 2011?, 28 January 2020, url

59EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Civilian
fatalities bygovernorate

OHCHR
2021386

SHRC
2021387

SNHR
2021388

Damascus

2

1

3

Rural Damascus

1

13

80

Idlib

214

256

93

386

OHCHR
2022389

SNHR
2022390

UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 14
SHRC, The 20th Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syria, 9 January 2022, url, p. 5
388
Based on data extracted from monthly reports on civilian fatalities published by SNHR. See: SNHR, Extrajudicial
Killing Claims the Lives of 113 Civilians, Including 36 Children, Six Women, and Three Victims Due to Torture, inJanuary 2021, 1 February 2021, url, p. 7; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 138 Civilians, Including 23
Children, 11 Women, and 14 Victims Due to Torture, in February 2021, 1 March 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR, Extrajudicial
Killing Claims the Lives of 177 Civilians, Including 28 Children, 35 Women, One Medical Worker, and 9 Victims Dueto Torture, in March 2021, 1 April 2021, url, p. 7; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 96 Civilians, Including
15 Children, 11 Women, and Nine Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in May 2021, 1 June 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR,
Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 723 Civilians in Syria in the First Half of 2021, 1 July 2021, url, p. 9; SNHR,
Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 129 Civilians, Including 44 Children, 17 Women, and 10 Victims Due toTorture, in Syria in July 2021, 1 August 2021, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 94 Civilians,
Including 32 Children, 10 Women, and Seven Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in August 2021, 1 September 2021, url,
p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 86 Civilians, Including 23 Children, Nine Women, and Eight
Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in September 2021, 1 October 2021, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims theLives of 84 Civilians, Including 22 Children, Four Women, and Seven Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in October
2021, 1 November 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 86 Civilians, Including 16 Children,
Eight Women, and Six Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in November 2021, 1 December 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR, 1,271
Civilians, Including 299 Children, 134 Women, and 104 Victims of Torture, Killed in Syria in 2021, 1 January 2022, url,
p. 13
389
Figures based on total number of civilian fatalities reported by OHCHR to the UN Security Council between 1
December 2021 and 31 May 2022. UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014),
2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020)
and 2585 (2021); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2022/135], 21 February 2022, url, para 2; UN Security Council,
Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393
(2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2022/330], 19 April 2022, url, para 2 (in Key points); UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council
resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018),
2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2022/492], 16 June 2022, url, para.
2 (in Key points)
390
Figures based on number of civilian fatalities documented by SNHR in the following reports: SNHR, 69 Civilians,
Including 18 Children, Four Women and Eight Victims Due to Torture, Killed in Syria in January 2022, 1 February2022, url, p. 8; SNHR, 161 Civilians, Including 28 Children, Six Women and 66 Victims Due to Torture, Documented
Killed in Syria in February 2022, 1 March 2022, url, p. 9; SNHR, 67 Civilians, Including 20 Children, Three Women,
and Seven Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Killed in Syria in March 2022, 1 April 2022, url, p. 8; SNHR, 101
Civilians, Including 17 Children, 14 Women, and Six Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in
Syria in April 2022, 1 May 2022, url, p. 9; SNHR, 78 Civilians, Including 14 Children, 11 Women, and Eight Victims
Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in Syria in May 2022, 1 June 2022, url, p. 8; SNHR, 568
Civilians, Including 115 Children, 53 Women, and 101 Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in
Syria in the First Half of 2022, 2 July 2022, url, p. 12; SNHR, 86 Civilians, Including 21 Children, Eight Women, andFive Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in Syria in July 2022, 1 August 2022, url, p. 9
387

60

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

Civilian
fatalities bygovernorate

SHRC
2021387

SNHR
2021388

Deir Ez-Zor

216

201

72

Aleppo

214

237

108

Dar’a

255

203

146

Hama

94

88

27

Homs

30

28

14

Hasaka

125

154

63

Raqqa

77

75

24

Quneitra4

10

1

Sweida5

13

23

Latakia-

2-

Tartous

-

-

-

1237

1271

Total

OHCHR
2021386747

OHCHR
2022389256

SNHR
2022390654

Figure 6. Civilian fatalities in 2021 and first seven months of 2022. Monthly breakdown
based on SNHR, SHRC (only for 2021) and OHCHR (only for 2021 and for the period 1
December 2021 – 31 May 2022) data

61

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

In 2021, SNHR recorded 1 271 civilian fatalities 391, a drop by 27 % compared to 2020.392 Other
organisations documenting civilian casualties in Syria had comparable figures for 2021. The
Syrian Human Rights Committee (SHRC) recorded 1 237 civilian fatalities in 2021, although it
does not provide information on their research methodology. 393
SNHR provides a breakdown of civilian fatalities by the governorate in which they occurred(see Figure 6). Most civilian fatalities 2021 were recorded by SNHR in the governorates of
Idlib, Aleppo, Dar’a and Deir Ez-Zor. Around 46 % of all civilian fatalities documented by SNHR
were recorded in governorates where anti-GoS armed groups retained some territorial
control: Idlib, Aleppo, Hama and Latakia. The lowest number of civilian fatalities recorded in
2021 by SNHR were in Tartous (no civilian deaths), Latakia (2) and Quneitra (10) governorates.
In the first seven months of 2022, SNHR documented 654 civilian deaths across Syria, most ofwhom were recorded in Dar’a, Aleppo and Idlib governorates.
OHCHR documented 1 874 civilian casualties in 2021 (747 civilian deaths and 1 127 civilians
injured) 394 , a 11 % decrease from 2020 when it recorded 2 095 civilian casualties (1 036 civilian
deaths and 1 059 civilians injured).395 For the period between December 2021 and May 2022,
OHCHR documented a further 256 civilian deaths and 276 civilians injured as a result ofarmed conflict in Syria.396

1.6.4.

Displacement and return

UNHCR estimated that the conflict had driven some 5.6 million Syrian refugees out of thecountry by June 2022.397 At the end of 2021, 6.7 million Syrians were living in internal
displacement, with around 80 % of displaced households having lived in displacement for atleast four years.398 A general decrease in large-scale displacements was noted during 2020
and 2021 due to an overall reduction of violence, with displacements in 2021 happening

391

SNHR, 1,271 Civilians, Including 299 Children, 134 Women, and 104 Victims of Torture, Killed in Syria in 2021 , url, 1January 2022, url, p. 7392
For the year 2020 SNHR documented 1734 civilian fatalities in Syria. See EUAA, COI Report: Syria - Security
situation, July 2021, url, p. 55
393
SHRC, SHRC documents the killing of 1,750 people in 2020, 2 January 2021, url
394
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 14
395
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview. Syrian Arab Republic, March 2021, url, p. 12. Figures provided by
OHCHR to UNOCHA. OHCHR provided the following disclaimer: ‘Civilian casualties and incidents included are notcomprehensive but rather reflect what OHCHR could verify to reflect human rights concerns, patterns and theimpact of the armed conflict and violence on civilians in Syria. Actual civilian casualties could be higher’. See p. 100.
396
Figures based on total number of civilian injured reported by OHCHR to the UN Security Council between 1
December 2021 and 31 May 2022. UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014),
2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020)
and 2585 (2021); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2022/135], 21 February 2022, url, para. 2; UN Security Council,
Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393
(2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2022/330], 19 April 2022, url, para. 2; UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139
(2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533
(2020) and 2585 (2021); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2022/492], 16 June 2022, url, para. 2
397
UNHCR, Syria Regional Refugee Response, data updated on 7 July 2022, url
398
IDMC, Country Profile Syrian Arab Republic, Overview, last updated 19 May 2022, url

62

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

around the frontline areas as well as in areas with sudden outbreaks of conflict, such as in
Dar’a.399
In 2021, a total of about 456 000 IDP movements were recorded by UNOCHA across Syria, of
which 76 % were movements within the same governorate. Most IDP movements took place inthe governorates of Idlib (71 000 from the governorate, 152 000 within the governorate and
24 000 to the governorate), Aleppo (22 000 from the governorate, 125 000 within thegovernorate, 70 000 to the governorate), Dar’a (1 000 from the governorate and 43 000
within the governorate), Hasaka (2 000 from the governorate, 13 000 within the governorate
and 1 000 to the governorate) and Latakia (2 000 from the governorate, 5 000 within thegovernorate and 6 000 to the governorate). The lowest number of IDP movements wereregistered in the governorates of Sweida (19 IDP movements from the governorate), Quneitra(68 IDP movements from the governorate) and Raqqa (134 IDP movements from thegovernorate, 9 within the governorate and 808 to the governorate).400
UNOCHA provides a full breakdown of the total IDP movements by governorate for 2021 (seeMap 5):

Map 5: IDP movements by governorate in 2021, © UNOCHA 401
In July 2021, GoS forces started a military offensive against armed opposition groups in Dar’a
Al-Balad in the south of the country, in the course of which 36 000 civilians were displaced.
399

UNHCR, Protection Analysis Update, June 2022, url, p. 12
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements Overview, Jan – Dec 2021, 21 March 2022, url
401
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements Overview Jan – Dec 2021, 21 March 2022, url
400

63EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

The siege of the city ended with a ceasefire agreement in September 2021. Between Juneand August 2021, nearly 100 000 people were displaced due to hostilities in north-west Syria,‘the largest displacement since a ceasefire was agreed [there] in March 2020’. 402
Between January and April 2022, around 65 300 IDP movements were recorded across Syria,
the majority occurring in north-west Syria, particularly in Idlib and Aleppo governorates. Most
IDP movements recorded in this timeframe took place within the respective governor ate.403 In
May 2022, 15 975 IDP movements were recorded, 81 % of which were recorded in Idlib andAleppo governorates.404
In terms of IDP spontaneous returns in 2021, UNOCHA recorded a total of 169 000
spontaneous returns, 77 % of which were returns within the governorate. The highest numberof IDP return movements took place in the governorates of Idlib (3 000 from the governorate,
35 000 within the governorate and 7 000 to the governorate), Aleppo (3 000 from thegovernorate, 28 000 within the governorate and 3 000 to the governorate), Rural Damascus(8 000 from the governorate, 21 000 within the governorate and 1 000 to the governorate)and Dar’a (17 000 within the governorate and 1 000 to the governorate). The lowest number of
IDP returns was recorded in Sweida (786 IDP return movements from the governorate, 144
within the governorate and 32 returning to the governorate), Tartous (1 000 IDP return
movements from the governorate) and Latakia (about 2 000 IDPs leaving to return to theirgovernorate).405
UNOCHA provides a full breakdown of the total IDP spontaneous returnee movements bygovernorate for 2021 (see Map 6):

402

AI, Amnesty International Report 2021/22 – Syria, 29 March 2022, url, pp. 353-354, 356
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements January 2022, 24 February 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab
Republic: IDP Movements February 2022, 11 April 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements March
2022, 9 May 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements April 2022, 15 June 2022, url
404
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements May 2022, 13 July 2022, url
405
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Spontaneous IDP Returnee Movements Overview Jan – Dec 2021, 21 March
2022, url
403

64

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

Map 6: Spontaneous IDP returnee movements by governorate in 2021, © UNOCHA406
Between January and April 2022, around 41 900 return movements were recorded acrossSyria, the majority occurring in Rural Damascus governorate followed by Idlib. Over these fourmonths, the majority of return movements (over 80 %) took place within the governorate, apartfrom March 2022, where only 46 % of returns took place within the governorate. 407 In May
2022, about 9 550 spontaneous returns were recorded, the majority of which were returns toand within Idlib and Rural Damascus governorates. 408
Of the overall 169 000 spontaneous returns,409 107 510 were recorded between January andAugust 2021, representing less than a third of the number recorded for the same period in
2020. Most of these returns were described as returns out of temporary displacement
following sudden outbreaks of hostilities, such as in Dar’a in the summer of 2021.410 UNHCR
stated in June 2022 that surveys carried out since 2017 had revealed that the number ofreturns of Syrian refugees remained very limited and decreased over the years. Among themain reasons given for not returning were safety and security concerns, while reasons for

406

UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Spontaneous IDP Returnee Movements Overview Jan – Dec 2021, 21 March
2022, url
407
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns January 2022, 24 February 2022, url; UNOCHA,
Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns February 2022, 11 April 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic:
IDP Spontaneous Returns March 2022, 9 May 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns
April 2022, 15 June 2022, url
408
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns May 2022, 13 July 2022, url
409
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Spontaneous IDP Returnee Movements Overview, Jan – Dec 2021, 21 March
2022, url
410
UNOCHA, 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, 22 Febr uary 2022, url, p. 18

65

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

returning were the need to protect assets and properties as well as the worsening economic
situation in the displaced location, especially for those returning from outside Syria. 411

411

UNHCR, Protection Analysis Update, June 2022, url, p. 14

66

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

2.

Governorate-level description of the
security situation

2.1.

Idlib governorate

Map 7: © MapAction, Idlib governorate412

412

MapAction, Idleb governorate, 29 July 2016, url

67EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

2.1.1.

General description of the governorate

Idlib is located in north-west Syria, bordering Turkey to the north, Hama governorate to thesouth, Aleppo governorate to the east, and Latakia governorate to the west. The governorate
is divided into five districts: Idlib, Ariha, Jisr-Ash-Shugur, Harim and Al Mara.413 Idlib city is thecapital of the governorate and, in 2011, its population amounted to over 2 million inhabitants.
The city is located at the strategic road between Aleppo and Damascus governorates and isalso a ‘cross border operation point from Turkey, through the Bab Al Hawa crossing’.414 Bab alHawa, the sole border crossing for humanitarian aid destined for areas controlled by anti-GoS
armed groups in north-west Syria,415 is located in Idlib’s northern Harim district.416
The Syrian Central Bureau of Statistics estimated the population of Idlib governorate to be of
1 172 089 as of 2021.417 In a February 2022 report, UNOCHA estimated the population of Idlib
governorate to be of 2 858 020.418 According to UNOCHA, the total population of Idlib area419
is 3.16 million of whom 2.01 million are IDPs.420 For more information on the ethnic and religious
composition of Idlib’s population, see the EUAA COI Report: Syria - Security situation (July 2021).

2.1.2.

Conflict background and armed actors

Idlib governorate is divided into areas controlled by the GoS and areas controlled by anti-GoS
armed groups. Anti-GoS armed groups control the western and northern parts of thegovernorate, which cover virtually all the areas north and immediately south of M4 highway.421
After the Turkish military deployment and/or incursion into areas controlled by anti-GoS armed
groups in Idlib governorate (Operation Spring Shield) in early March 2020, a ceasefire 422 wasmediated by Russia and Turkey between GoS and anti-GoS armed groups. Ever since the March
2020 ceasefire, the areas of control in and around the so-called ‘Idlib de-escalation area’423

413

UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic. Governorates Profiles, June 2014, url, p. 22
REACH, Syria, Syrian Cities Damage Atlas, 16 March 2019, url, pp. 45-46
415
UN Security Council, Security Council Renews Cross-Border Aid Operations into Syria’s North-West for Six
Months, Adopting Resolution 2642 (2022) as ‘Compromise’ amid Divisions, 12 July 2022, url
416
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: United Nations cross-border operations under UNSC resolutions (As of 31 May2022), 1 June 2022, url
417
Syria, Central Bureau of Statistics, Estimate of the population in Syria by governorates, n.d, url
418
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview. Syrian Arab Republic, February 2022, url, p. 23
419
The area discussed by UNOCHA as ‘Idleb area’ coincides with the so-called ‘Idlib de-escalation area’ or ‘deescalation zone’, covering those parts of Idlib governorate controlled by anti-GoS armed groups as well asadjoining areas in western Aleppo and northern Hama and Latakia governorates.
420
UNOCHA, Northwest Syria: Factsheet (As of 14 July 2022), 14 July 2022, url, p. 1
421
See the maps in Jusoor for Studies, Military Control in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022, 24 December
2021, url [Map]; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the
Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url, p. 22 [Annex II] [Map]; Liveuamap, Syria, as of 21 July
2022, url
422
For details, see UN Security Council, Letter dated 6 March 2020 from the representatives of the RussianFederation and Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, 6 March 2020, url
423
The term ‘Idlib de-escalation area’ or ‘Idlib de-escalation zone’ covers the areas controlled by anti-GoS armed
groups in Idlib governorate as well as the adjoining, similar areas in western Aleppo and northern Hama andLatakia governorates. On the establishment of Idlib de-escalation area (and other similar areas) see the previous
EUAA COI Report: Syria - Security situation (July 2021) and Jaecke, G. & Labude, D., De-escalation zones in Syria,
KAS, June 2020, url
414

68

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

have ‘stabilised’424 , the major frontlines have remained ‘stagnant’ 425 and Syria has experienceda ‘period without significant frontline changes’426.
For more information on the conflict background, the March 2020 ceasefire and its effects on
the security situation in Idlib governorate and the wider Idlib de-escalation area, see the EUAA
COI Report: Syria - Security situation (July 2021).
(a)Anti-GoS armed groups

Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) controls 427 those parts of Idlib governorate under the control of antiGoS armed groups and has almost complete control over the wider Idlib de-escalation area.428
HTS has been described as ‘the predominant terrorist group in Idlib’ 429 and, more generally, as
the dominant430 and military superior 431 armed group in the governorate. HTS maintains its
power 432 in the governorate through the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) which has been
described as HTS’s ‘political arm’433. HTS has approximately 10 000 fighters under its
command.434 For further information on HTS, see section 1.4.4 above.
There are also other anti-GoS armed groups present in Idlib governorate and the wider Idlib deescalation area. The Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement/Turkistan Islamic Party (ETIM/TIP),
which has approximately 1 000-2 000 fighters,435 operates ‘under’436 HTS or is ‘closely allied’437

424

Clingendael, Turkey’s interventions in its near abroad: The case of Idlib, September 2021, url, p. 7
FT, Syria: what is Turkey’s grand plan?, 25 July 2022, url
426
Carter Center (The), The State of the Syrian National Army, March 2022, url, p. 3
427
Carter Center (The), The State of the Syrian National Army, March 2022, url, p. 3; UN Security Council, Letter
dated 3 February 2022 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989
(2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associatedindividuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council [S/2022/83], 3
February 2022, url, para. 37
428
UN Security Council, Thirtieth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted
pursuant to resolution 2610 (2021) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al -Qaida and associated individuals and entities[S/2022/547], 15 July 2022, url, para. 44
429
UN Security Council, Thirtieth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted
pursuant to resolution 2610 (2021) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al -Qaida and associated individuals and entities[S/2022/547], 15 July 2022, url, para. 44
430
International Crisis Group, Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and North-eastern Syria, 18 July 2022, url, p. 2
431
Solomon, C., HTS: Evolution of a Jihadi Group, Wilson Center, 13 July 2022, url
432
Serwer, D. & van Wijk, K., Divided Syria: An examination of stabilization efforts and prospects for state continuity,
Middle East Institute, 26 April 2022, url
433
The Syria Report, Salvation Government Imposes Lease Contract Regulations, 15 February 2022, url
434
UN Security Council, Letter dated 3 February 2022 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant toresolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security
Council [S/2022/83], 3 February 2022, url, para. 37
435
UN Security Council, Thirtieth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted
pursuant to resolution 2610 (2021) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al -Qaida and associated individuals and entities[S/2022/547], 15 July 2022, url, para. 45
436
UN Security Council, Letter dated 3 February 2022 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant
to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security
Council [S/2022/83], 3 February 2022, url, para. 39
437
UN Security Council, Thirtieth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted
pursuant to resolution 2610 (2021) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al -Qaida and associated individuals and entities[S/2022/547], 15 July 2022, url, para. 45
425

69

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

with the group and present mainly in Idlib.438 HTS’s rival, al-Qaida-affiliated jihadist group Hurras
al-Din (HAD), has ‘a few thousand fighters’ in the whole of Syria439 but merely ‘a residual
presence’ in the governorate, which included the leaders of the organization.440 According to
Enab Baladi, HAD’s organizational strength has been diminished and the group has been
deprived of its main religious leaders because of the crackdown by HTS and because of theairstrikes by the US-led Coalition.441
Other jihadist groups present in Idlib governorate during the reporting period include groups
consisting mainly of foreign fighters, such as Jund al-Sham and Jund Allah,442 and Ansar Abu
Bakr al-Siddiq (AABS), an alleged HTS splinter group, hostile towards the latter and, sinceAugust 2020, conducting attacks against Turkish forces deployed in the governorate.443
The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA), centered in Aleppo governorate, has presence
in Idlib governorate 444 and a headquarters in Idlib city.445 The SNA-affiliated446 National
Liberation Front (NLF) is part of the Fath al-Mubin Operations Room (together with HTS and
Jaysh al-Izza447) 448 and is fighting alongside HTS in the Idlib frontlines.449(b)Syrian Arab Army and affiliated armed groups

The GoS controls the southern and eastern parts of Idlib governorate, including the DamascusAleppo highway (M5) and its immediate surroundings. 450 At the time of writing, specificinformation on SAA deployments in Idlib governorate during the reference period could not befound. Information on particular SAA formations and units deployed in the governorate (before
April 2021) is available in previous reports: EUAA COI Report: Syria - Security situation (July2021) and EUAA COI Report: Syria – Security situation (May 2020).

438

UN Security Council, Thirtieth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted
pursuant to resolution 2610 (2021) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al -Qaida and associated individuals and entities[S/2022/547], 15 July 2022, url, para. 45
439
UN Security Council, Thirtieth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted
pursuant to resolution 2610 (2021) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities[S/2022/547], 15 July 2022, url, para. 44
440
UN Security Council, Letter dated 3 February 2022 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant
to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security
Council [S/2022/83], 3 February 2022, url, para. 38
441
Enab Baladi, Al-Jolani’s strategy, US-led Coalition strikes exhaust Hurras al-Din group, 29 June 2022, url
442
See, e.g. COAR Global, Syria Update, 1 November 2021, url, p. 4; Enab Baladi, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham driving out
foreign factions, why?, 4 November 2021, url; Syrian Observer (The), Shishani Leaves and HTS Attacks Whoever
Remains, 27 October 2021, url
443
Al-Monitor, HTS arrests members of little-known Syrian group behind attacks against Turkish army in Idlib, 15
July 2022, url
444
Al Sharq Strategic Research, The Past, Present, and Future of the Syrian National Army, 31 August 2021, url
445
Al-Monitor, Syrian jihadist group, Turkish-backed opposition reportedly consider merger, 8 October 2021, url
446
Carter Center (The), The State of the Syrian National Army, March 2022, url, p. 8
447
Jaysh al-Izza has been described by researcher Aymenn Jawad al -Tamimi as ‘the most notable’ FSA-affiliatedarmed group that is not operating as a part of Turkish-backed SNA and NFL coalitions. Tamimi, A. J., Jaysh al -Izza
Statement on Prisoner Swap with Syrian Government [blog], 30 January 2022, url
448
Enab Baladi, Rationales for the Syrian regime’s military escalation in northwestern Syria, 16 June 2021, url
449
Al-Monitor, Idlib sees new escalation between Syrian government, opposition forces, 22 June 2022, url
450
See the maps in Jusoor for Studies, Military Control in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022 [map], 24
December 2021, url; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on
the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url, p. 22 [Annex II] [map]70

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

GoS’s allies Russia and Iran have also presence in GoS-controlled parts of Idlib governorate.
According to Jusoor for Studies, in late 2021/early 2022, Russian forces were deployed to six
different positions in Idlib governorate. Iranian forces and those of its Lebanese ally Hezbollah
were deployed to 22 different positions in the governorate. 451(c)TurkeyTurkey has been described as ‘the ultimate protector’ 452 of the Idlib de-escalation area in a
Financial Times article. Turkish forces were deployed in anti-GoS controlled Idlib governorate
during the so-called Operation Spring Shield,453 and one analyst estimates that Turkey has
deployed approx. 8 000 soldiers ‘around Idlib [de-escalation area]’.454 However, a smaller
contingent of Turkish forces, stationed in observation posts and monitoring the ceasefire
between GoS and anti-GoS armed groups, was deployed to the Idlib de-escalation area alreadyin October 2017.455 According to Jusoor for Studies, in late 2021/early 2022, Turkish forces were
deployed to 48 different positions in the parts of Idlib governorate controlled by anti-GoS armed
groups.456 They have observation posts along the frontlines separating the anti-GoS areas fromthe GoS-controlled Idlib governorate.457 According to STJ, Turkish forces have ‘mobilized forces
to over 53 locations in the areas south of Idlib’, which includes the Jabal al-Zawiyah [Mount
Zawiyah] region.458 During the reporting period, Turkish forces deployed in Idlib governorate
have been reinforced in order to deter the potential GoS advancement.459
(d)

ISIL

ISIL had presence in Idlib governorate (and the wider Idlib de-escalation zone).460 According to
the UN Security Council, the Idlib de-escalation zone provides a ‘limited safe haven’ 461 and‘continues to serve as a strategic location for ISIL’.462 The International Crisis Group estimatedthat ISIL ‘has continued to maintain communication and transit networks’ also in Idlib, and ISIL’s
451

See the map in Jusoor for Studies, Foreign Forces Points in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022 [map], 27
December 2021, url
452
FT, Syria: what is Turkey’s grand plan?, 25 July 2022, url
453
Clingendael, Turkey’s interventions in its near abroad: The case of Idlib, September 2021, url, p. 4
454
FT, Syria: what is Turkey’s grand plan?, 25 July 2022, url
455
Jaecke, G. & Labude, D., De-escalation zones in Syria, KAS, June 2020, url, p. 7;456
See the map in Jusoor for Studies, Foreign Forces Points in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022 [map], 27
December 2021, url
457
See the map in UN Human Rights Council, Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the
Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url, p. 22 [Annex II] [map]458
STJ, Idlib: Turkish Forces Stationed at Civilian Properties Against Their Will, 29 April 2021, url
459
Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief: North-West Syria – 04 November 2021, 4 November 2021, url; Etana Syria, Syria
Military Brief – North-West Syria – 30 November 2021, 30 November 2021, url
460International Crisis Group, A Death In Idlib: The Killing of the Top ISIS Leader and Its Impact, 4 February 2022,
url; UN Security Council, Letter dated 3 February 2022 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant
to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security
Council [S/2022/83], 3 February 2022, url, para. 37
461
UN Security Council, Letter dated 3 February 2022 from the Chair of the Securi ty Council Committee pursuant toresolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security
Council [S/2022/83], 3 February 2022, url, para. 37
462
UN Security Council, Thirtieth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted
pursuant to resolution 2610 (2021) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities[S/2022/547], 15 July 2022, url, para. 44

71

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

clandestine cells are present in the area, 463 although most of ISIL’s attempts to establish ‘anactive network’ in the governorate have been quelled by HTS.464 In addition, the same source
stated that ISIL ‘maintains hideouts for id-level and senior commanders’ in northern and northwestern Syria due to the fact that they are able to ‘enjoy a degree of anonymity’ among theareas IDP population.465

2.1.3.
(a)

Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population
Security trends during the reporting period

The conflict between GoS and anti-GoS armed groups
According to the UN Security Council, the ‘overall level of violence in the Idlib de-escalation
area remained relatively low’ between April and May 2021. However, armed hostilities, including
artillery shelling and armed clashes, occurred daily and were concentrated mainly along thefrontlines between GoS and anti-GoS armed groups. In late April and early May 2021, a raid by
HTS on GoS positions was followed by an increase in shelling. Meanwhile, the civilian
population of the de-escalation area was exposed to ‘[d]aily shelling, renewed airstrikes,
infighting between non-State armed groups and the prevalence of explosive hazards inresidential areas and public spaces’.466
According to the Carter Center, between April and June 2021, persistent armed clashes andshelling between the parties were reported along the frontlines affecting the civilian populationin the areas controlled by both GoS and anti-GoS armed groups.467 In June 2021, an escalationin the hostilities was reported,468 with the UN Security Council reporting an increase in shelling
and airstrikes as well as ‘limited clashes’ between parties 469 and the UN documenting ‘morethan 53 civilian deaths in non-government-held parts of the north-west’470 between June andJuly 2021. Turkish forces were also involved in the fighting on the side of the anti-GoS armed

463

International Crisis Group, A Death In Idlib: The Killing of the Top ISIS Leader and Its Impact, 4 February 2022,

url
464

International Crisis Group, Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and North-eastern Syria, 18 July 2022, url, p. 2
International Crisis Group, Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and North-eastern Syria, 18 July 2022, url, p. i
466
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), and 2533 (2020), 17 June 2021, url, para. 3
467
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review, April through June 2021, url, p. 2
468
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review, April through June 2021, p. 4, url; UN Security Council, Implementation of
Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401
(2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), 18 August 2021, url, para. 3
469
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), 18 August
2021, url, para. 3
470
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), 18 August
2021, url, p. 1 [Key points]
465

72

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

groups.471 The hostilities, including most of the airstrikes, 472 were concentrated in the Jabal alZawiyah area in southern anti-GoS-controlled Idlib.473
The UNCOI reported ‘a notable increase’ in airstrikes and shelling conducted by GoS and allies
in Idlib governorate between 1 July and 31 December 2021. 474 According to it, the clashes
between GoS forces and anti-GoS armed groups escalated during the first half of 2021. While
the second half of the year saw continuous clashes and shelling between the parties, UNCOI
notes two separate escalations in the GoS attacks, the first one before the meeting in Sochi
between Russia and Turkey in late September 2021 and the second one in late December
2021.475 UNCOI paid special attention to the escalation of GoS shelling targeting the areas southof the M4 highway in July and August 2021,476 while describing the villages located south of the
highway, and especially in the Jabal al-Zawiyah area, as ‘the most exposed to attacks.’477
In accordance with UNCOI’s reporting, the UN Security Council reported a further
intensification of hostilities between August and September 2021, including airstrikes andshelling, in the Idlib de-escalation area, with the airstrikes focusing mainly in areas south of theM4 highway (Jabal al-Zawiyah) and causing damage to civilian infrastructure. 478 The
International Crisis Group noted the role of Russian airstrikes in September 2021’s escalation.479
According to the UNCOI, between July and December 2021, GoS forces conducted attacks
against residential areas.480 These attacks included ‘indiscriminate attacks on densely
populated civilian areas’ targeting both Idlib city and the town of Ariha. 481 Witnesses andsurvivors of these attacks claimed that the apparent aim was to harm the civilian population, toincrease destruction and displacement and to obstruct the prospects of attaining economic
recovery or stability in areas controlled by the anti-GoS armed groups.482 The UN described theescalation in October 2021 as ‘the most significant increase in hostilities in northwest Syria since
the ceasefire agreement of March 2020.’483 UNCOI documented 42 and received reports of as
471

Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review, April through June 2021, url, p. 4; Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief: NorthWest Syria – 01 July 2021, 1 July 2021, url
472
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), 18 August
2021, url, para. 3
473
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review, April through June 2021, url, p. 4474
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, 8 February 2022, url, para. 5475
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, 8 February 2022, url, para. 51
476
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, 8 February 2022, url, para. 5477
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, 8 February 2022, url, para. 55
478
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), 21 October
2021, url, para. 3
479
International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch – Syria, September 2021, url
480
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, 8 February 2022, url, para 51
481
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, 8 February 2022, url, para 55
482
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, 8 February 2022, url, para 51
483
UN, Four children killed on their way to school in northwest Syria, 20 October 2021, url

73EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

many as 64 children killed as a result of hostilities in north-west Syria between 1 July 2021 – 31
December 2021. UNCOI stated that the number of child victims indicates ‘the pervasive lack of
security’ in north-west Syria.484
According to the UN Security Council, civilians were killed and injured as the result of sporadic
shelling and airstrikes in Idlib de-escalation area and its surroundings between August and
September 2021. The UN Security Council notes that ‘[m]any of these attacks appeared to betargeting civilians or were carried out near locations of civilian character’.485 While assessing thelevel of conflict-related violence in anti-GoS controlled Idlib, Clingendael report published in
September 2021 points out that Russian forces ‘regularly strike HTS targets inside northern Idlib’
and GoS forces have conducted ‘regular attacks against HTS elements along the M4 [highway].’
In turn, HTS has conducted ‘sporadic attacks’ targeting, both, joint Russian-Turkish patrols andTurkish forces.486 Between October and November 2021, civilians were killed and injured as theresult of airstrikes and shelling reported in the Idlib de-escalation area and its surroundings.487
Since December 2021, there has been practically no change in the assessment by the UN
Security Council of the continuing hostilities in north-western Syria. Airstrikes, shelling andarmed clashes are reported along the frontlines between GoS and anti-GoS armed groups 488
and some of these incidents are described as ‘attacks on the civilian population’.489 Between
January and March 2022, the Carter Center reported 357 conflict-related events in Idlib
governorate.490 The hostilities were concentrated 491 in areas south of the M4 highway (Jabal alZawiyah), with the absolute majority (nearly 90%) of airstrikes and shelling attributed to either
GoS or Russian forces.492 According to the International Crisis Group, after a decline in Russian
airstrikes following the Russian invasion of Ukraine after 24 February 2022, airstrikes resumed
in Idlib governorate on 28 March 2022.493

484

UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, 8 February 2022, url, para 51
485
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021 ), 21 October
2021, url, para. 20
486
Clingendael, Turkey’s interventions in its near abroad: The case of Idlib, September 2021, url, p. 8487
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), 15
December 2021, url, para. 3
488
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) an d 2585 (2021), 21 February2022, url, para. 4; UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014),
2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585
(2021), 19 April 2022, url, para. 4489
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (201 4), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), 19 April
2022, url, para. 4; UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014),
2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585
(2021), 16 June 2022, url, para. 4490
Carter Center (The), The Quarterly Review on Syrian Military and Security Dynamics, January-March 2022, url,
p. 5
491
See ‘Figure 4’ in Carter Center (The), The Quarterly Review on Syrian Military and Security Dynamics, JanuaryMarch 2022, url, p. 6492
Carter Center (The), The Quarterly Review on Syrian Military and Security Dynamics, January-March 2022, url,
p. 4493
International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch – Syria, March 2022, url

74

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

According to the International Crisis Group, mutual shelling between GoS and anti-GoS armed
groups escalated in Idlib governorate in April 2022. 494 According to Etana Syria495 ‘intenseshelling against military and civilian targets resumed’ and became more intense as the month
passed.496 Russian airstrikes were also reported in the governorate. 497 In May 2022, Etana Syria
reported that GoS and its affiliates resumed with the shelling targeting towns in southern rural
Idlib while ‘Russian bombardment against opposition areas’ had reportedly ‘slowed’ since theinvasion of Ukraine.498 According to Etana Syria, in June 2022, GoS ‘continued to target bothmilitary and civilian targets with artillery fire’ 499 in Idlib de-escalation area and an attemptedadvance into southern Idlib governorate by the GoS forces was reported.500
In July 2022, an escalation between GoS and anti-GoS armed groups in and around the Idlib
de-escalation area was reported. GoS and Russia targeted the areas in southern Idlib
governorate with shelling and airstrikes. Anti-GoS armed groups, both HTS and Turkish-backed
groups, responded with shelling on GoS positions in Idlib’s southern and eastern frontlines. 501
Further shelling was recorded on areas controlled by GoS eastern and southern rural Idlib.502
On 22 July 2022, a Russian airstrike on a village near the city of Jisr-Ash-Shugur killed sevencivilians and wounded several others. 503 As a result, hostilities between GoS forces and their
allies and anti-GoS armed groups escalated in late July 2022. 504 In the course of the escalation,
anti-GoS armed groups shelled the areas controlled by GoS in eastern and southern rural Idlib 505
while GoS and Iranian forces targeted the Idlib de-escalation area with intense shelling 506.
Also in August 2022, SOHR reported mutual hostilities between GoS and anti-GoS armed
groups in Idlib governorate. On 14 August 2022, hostilities were reported along the Jabal AlZawiyah frontlines.507
The infighting between anti-GoS armed groups
Clingendael reported, in September 2021, that the infighting between HTS and ‘smaller
extremist religious groups’, including the likes of al-Qaida-affiliated HAD, ‘continue to plague avulnerable and swollen population of IDPs’ in northern Idlib. 508 According to Syria analyst Orwa
494

International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch – Syria, April 2022, url
Etana Syria is an NGO associated with the Syrian opposition that publishes occasional updates on the politicaland security developments in Syria. For more information see, Etana Syria, About us, n.d., url
496
Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief – North-West Syria – 28 April 2022, 28 April 2022, url
497
Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief – North-West Syria – 28 April 2022, 28 April 2022, url; International Crisis Group,
Crisis Watch – Syria, April 2022, url
498
Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief – North-West Syria – 02 June 2022, 2 June 2022, url
499
Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief: North-West Syria – 01 July 2022, 1 July 2022, url
500
Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief: North-West Syria – 01 July 2022, 1 July 2022, url
501
Al-Monitor, Syrian government, Russia escalate attacks in Idlib amid looming Turkish operation, 17 July 2022, url
502
Asharq al-Awsat, Regime Forces Ramp up Attacks in Syria’s North, 1 August 2022, url
503
Guardian (The), Russian airstrike on rebel-held region in Syria kills seven people, 22 July 2022, url; Al Jazeera,
Seven killed in Russian air attack on Syria’s Idlib, 22 July 2022, url
504
Al-Monitor, Syrian escalation risks all-out conflict involving Turkey, Russia, Iran, 1 August 2022, url
505
Al-Monitor, Syrian escalation risks all-out conflict involving Turkey, Russia, Iran, 1 August 2022, url; SOHR, With
over 180 shells Factions shell 25 positions in regime areas in Aleppo, Idlib, Hama and Lattakia, 22 July 2022, url
506
Asharq al-Awsat, Regime Forces Ramp up Attacks in Syria’s North, 1 August 2022, url
507
SOHR, Renewed bombardment Al-Fath Al-Mubin rebels and regime forces exchange fire on frontlines of Jabal
Al-Zawiyah, Sahl Al-Ghab and Jabal Al-Krad, 14 August 2022, url
508
Clingendael, Turkey’s interventions in its near abroad: The case of Idlib, September 2021, url, p. 8495

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Ajjoub, HTS has engaged in ‘periodic crackdowns’ against al-Qaida and ISIL elements present
in anti-GoS-controlled Idlib. However, in June 2021, Ajjoub described al-Qaida’s presence in
Idlib as ‘insignificant.’509 During the reporting period, HTS cracked down on other anti-GoS
armed groups in Idlib de-escalation zone,510 including members of Jund al-Sham and Jund
Allah,511 Hizb ut-Tahrir,512 and Ansar Abu Bakr al-Siddiq513. Although at least one of thesecrackdowns took place in the context of civil discontent against HTS rule, 514 no civilian casualties
were reported.
Airstrikes against jihadist targets
UNCOI documented two airstrikes conducted by Russian and US forces against jihadist targets
in Idlib governorate that led to (collateral) civilian casualties in November and December 2021. 515
On 3 February 2022, US forces conducted a special operation in Atmeh town, killing ISIL leader
Abdullah Qardash (nom de guerre Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Quraishi). According to theInternational Crisis Group, 10 civilians were killed in the attack. 516 On 28 June 2022, US-led
Coalition carried out a drone strike in Idlib governorate that killed HAD leader Abu Hamza alYemeni.517(b)Security incidents

During the reporting period there were 2 253 security incidents recorded by ACLED in Idlib
governorate, of whom 1 943 were coded as explosions/remote violence, 197 battles and 113
incidents of violence against civilians.518

509

Ajjoub, O., HTS is not al-Qaeda, but it is still an authoritarian regime to be reckoned with, MEI, 24 June 2021, url
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review, April through June 2021, url, pp. 6, 7
511
International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch – Syria, July 2021, url
512
Al-Monitor, Jihadi group takes on Salafist opponents in Idlib, 25 February 2022, url
513
Al-Monitor, HTS arrests members of little-known Syrian group behind attacks against Turki sh army in Idlib, 15
July 2022, url
514
Al-Monitor, Jihadi group takes on Salafist opponents in Idlib, 25 February 2022, url
515
The airstrikes were aimed against members of Al -Qaida (the US strike on 3 December 2021) and HAD-affiliatedJund al-Sham (the Russian strike on 11 December 2021). UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent
International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 8 February 2022, url, paras. 62, 63, 64.
516International Crisis Group, A Death In Idlib: The Killing of the Top ISIS Leader and Its Impact, 4 February 2022, url
517
Al Jazeera, US kills ‘senior leader’ of al-Qaeda-linked group in Syria, 28 June 2022, url; Etana Syria, Syria Military
Brief: North-West Syria – 01 July 2022, 1 July 2022, url
518
EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (12 August2022), url
510

76

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

Figure 7. Evolution of security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence andviolence against civilians in Idlib governorate between 1 April 2021 and 1 August 2022,
based on ACLED data 519

District

Battles

Remote violence

Violence against
civilians

Al Ma’ra

65

748

4

Ariha

52

858

10

Harim

15

28

47

Idlib

52

257

42

Jisr-Ash-Shugur

13

52

10

Total

197

1943

113

Figure 8. Security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against
civilians in Idlib governorate between 1 April 2021 and 1 August 2022. Breakdown by districtbased on ACLED data 520
During the reporting period, security incidents occurred in all districts of the governorate, withthe largest overall number being recorded in the district of Ariha, followed by Al Ma’ra and Idlib(see Figure 8).
519

EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (12 August2022), url
520
EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middl e East (12 August2022), url

77EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM(c)

Civilian fatalities

In 2021, SNHR recorded 256 civilian fatalities in Idlib governorate 521, while in the first sevenmonths of 2022 it documented 93 civilian fatalities 522 (see Figure 9).
Month

SNHR 2021

SNHR 2022

January17

13

February

25

32

March

19

6

April

15

14

May

16

10

June

26

5

521

Based on data extracted from monthly reports on civilian fatalities published by SNHR. See:
SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 113 Civilians, Including 36 Chi ldren, Six Women, and Three Victims
Due to Torture, in January 2021, 1 February 2021, url, p. 7; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 138
Civilians, Including 23 Children, 11 Women, and 14 Victims Due to Torture, in February 2021, 1 March 2021, url, p. 8;
SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 177 Civilians, Including 28 Children, 35 Women, One Medical Worker,
and 9 Victims Due to Torture, in March 2021, 1 April 2021, url, p. 7; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 96
Civilians, Including 15 Children, 11 Women, and Nine Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in May 2021, 1 June 2021, url, p.
8; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 723 Civilians in Syria in the First Half of 2021, 1 July 2021, url, p. 9;
SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 129 Civilians, Including 44 Children, 17 Women, and 10 Victims Due toTorture, in Syria in July 2021, 1 August 2021, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 94 Civilians,
Including 32 Children, 10 Women, and Seven Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in August 2021, 1 September 2021, url,
p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 86 Civilians, Including 23 Children, Nine Women, and Eight
Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in September 2021, 1 October 2021, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims theLives of 84 Civilians, Including 22 Children, Four Women, and Seven Victims D ue to Torture, in Syria in October
2021, 1 November 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 86 Civilians, Including 16 Children,
Eight Women, and Six Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in November 2021, 1 December 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR, 1,271
Civilians, Including 299 Children, 134 Women, and 104 Victims of Torture, Killed in Syria in 2021, 1 January 2022, url,
p. 13
522
Based on data extracted from monthly reports on civilian fatalities published by SNHR. See: SNHR, 69 Civilians,
Including 18 Children, Four Women and Eight Victims Due to Torture, Killed in Syria in January 2022, 1 February2022, url, p. 8; SNHR, 161 Civilians, Including 28 Children, Six Women and 66 Victims Due to Torture, Documented
Killed in Syria in February 2022, 1 March 2022, url, p. 9; SNHR, 67 Civilians, Including 20 Children, Three Women,
and Seven Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Killed in Syria in March 2022, 1 April 2022, url, p. 8; SNHR, 101
Civilians, Including 17 Children, 14 Women, and Six Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in
Syria in April 2022, 1 May 2022, url, p. 9; SNHR, 78 Civilians, Including 14 Children, 11 Women, and Eight Victims
Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in Syria in May 2022, 1 June 2022, url, p. 8; SNHR, 568
Civilians, Including 115 Children, 53 Women, and 101 Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in
Syria in the First Half of 2022, 2 July 2022, url, p. 12; SNHR, 86 Civilians, Including 21 Children, Eight Women, andFive Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in Syria in July 2022, 1 August 2022, url, p. 978

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATIONMonth

SNHR 2021

SNHR 2022

July

45

13

August22

September

16

October

26

November

19

December

10

Total

256

93

Figure 9. Civilian fatalities as a result of armed conflict in Idlib governorate in 2021 and firstseven months of 2022. Monthly breakdown based on SNHR data(d)Conflict-related infrastructure damage and explosive remnants of war

According to the WHO Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care (SSA), in the year 2021,
several (2-3) attacks on healthcare were reported in Idlib governorate. 523 Between January andMarch 2022, WHO did not report any attacks on healthcare facilities in Idlib governorate.524
According to Chatham House researcher Abdulkarim Ekzayez, entire facilities have beentargeted in most of the attacks on healthcare in Idlib governorate and other areas controlled byanti-GoS armed groups. As the result, in many cases hospitals were either completely or partiallydestroyed, which has caused ‘a severe disruption of the health system in these areas’.525
According to the UNCOI, the emergency services in the southern parts of Idlib governorate, themain locus of hostilities between GoS and anti-GoS armed groups, were provided by a single
healthcare facility.526 International Rescue Committee noted that attacks on healthcare facilities
have directly impacted 59 % of north-west Syria’s civilian population.527 According to the UN
Security Council, an airstrike on 2 January 2022 hit the Arshani water pumping station, on which

523

WHO/ Health Cluster, Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care. Syrian Arab Republic. Annual Report
2021, 3 February 2022, url, p. 2
524
WHO/ Health Cluster, Syrian Arab Republic: Attacks on health care in Syria, 1 Jan - 31 Mar 2022, 5 May 2022, url
525
Ekzayez, A., Attacks on healthcare in the Syrian conflict, Chatham House, November 2021, url, p. 13
526
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, 8 February 2022, url, para 53
527
International Rescue Committee, A decade of destruction: attacks on health care in Syria, 3 March 2021, url

79EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

225 000 residents of Idlib city depend as their water source. 528 Schools in Idlib governorate
were also damaged as the result of the ongoing conflict during the reporting period. 529 The
highest number of incidents was reported between June and July 2021 when shelling androcket attacks impacted five schools in the governorate.530
The extent of conflict-related infrastructure damage in Idlib governorate is discussed further in
EUAA COI Report: Syria - Security situation (July 2021).
According UNOCHA, Idlib is one of those Syrian governorates where the contamination by
explosive ordnance is assessed as ‘widespread’ due to previous or still ongoing hostilities.531
The Mine Action Syria Response report published in May 2022 estimates that the majority of
security incidents involving explosive ordnances recorded by the United Nations Mine Action
Service (UNMAS) occurred in Idlib and Aleppo governorates.532 According to the Halo Trust
report on explosive ordnance contamination in north-west Syria from December 2020, theareas in north-west Syria, including Idlib de-escalation area and adjoining areas in GoScontrolled Idlib governorate, are extensively contaminated by explosive ordnances . In theseareas contamination was confirmed in over 400 communities (representing 41 % of all thesurveyed communities) and it is blocking the use of farmlands in 73 % of confirmed cases.533
According to the Carter Center report published in March 2022, explosive munitions have beenused extensively in Idlib governorate,534 and the governorate is contaminated by 17 750-53 000
UXOs.535
According to a Mine Action Review536 report published in September 2021, cluster munitions
were used in Idlib governorate during the first quarter of 2021. 537 Fields, villages, roadsides and528

The pumping station resumed its operations at full capacity on 20 January 2022. UN Security Council,
Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393
(2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), 21 February 2022, url, para. 4529
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), and 2533 (2020), 17 June 2021, url, para.
27; UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) , 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), 18 August
2021, url, para. 25; UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014),
2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585
(2021), 21 October 2021, url, para. 26; UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139
(2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533
(2020) and 2585 (2021), 15 December 2021, url, para. 27; UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council
resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018),
2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), 21 February 2022, url, para. 27
530
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), 18 August
2021, url, para. 25
531
UNOCHA, 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syri an Arab Republic, February 2022, url, p. 12
532
Mine Action Syria Response (The), Explosive ordnance in Syria: i mpact and required action, May 2022, url, p. 6
533
Halo Trust (The), A hidden emergency: Why explosive ordnance contamination must be addressed now inNorthwest Syria, December 2020, url, p. 3
534
Estimation based on the map in Carter Center (The), A Call for Action: Data on Unexploded Ordnance in Syria
and Its Implications. December 2012 – May 2021, March 2022, url, p. 20 [map]535
Carter Center (The), A Call for Action: Data on Unexploded Ordnance in Syria and Its Implications. December
2012 – May 2021, March 2022, url, p. 20
536
Mine Action Review is an independent project conducting ‘primary research and analysis on landmine andcluster munition remnant contamination, survey, and clearance’. The project’s reports are published by NorwegianPeople’s Aid (NPA). For further information, see Mine Action Review, About Us, n.d., url
537
Mine Action Review, Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2021, 1 September 2021, url, p. 178

80

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

areas around hospitals and schools are contaminated by UXO’s, such as landmines and IEDs,
while the large-scale displacement affecting the governorate has ‘sharply increased’ the size ofthe economically disenfranchised population living in the proximity of the contaminatedareas.538 According to Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor report published in April 2021,
landmines have claimed the lives of 144 people in Idlib governorate between March 2011 andMarch 2021.539(e)Displacement and return

In the 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview, UNOCHA stated that the number of IDPs in Idlib
governorate was 1 868 494 (as of February 2022).540 According to UNOCHA, around 71 000
persons were displaced from the governorate, 152 000 within the governorate and 24 000 to
the governorate in 2021. A significant number of displacements from Idlib took place to Aleppo
governorate (69 200).541 In 2021, new displacements were mostly recorded around the frontline
areas.542
Between January and June 2022, IDP movements tracked by UNOCHA were concentrated
mainly in north-west Syria, with 77-85 % of them taking place between the governorates of
Aleppo and Idlib. Altogether, between January and June 2022, approximately 54 000 IDPs
were displaced from Idlib, of whom 46 800 were displaced within the governorate. UNOCHA
estimates that, during the first half of 2022, access to services and livelihoods was the main
incentive for these and other IDP movements within Syria. 543
According to UNOCHA, approximately 42 000 total IDP returns were recorded in Idlib
governorate in 2021. Of these, 3 000 returned from the governorate, 35 000 within thegovernorate and 7 000 to the governorate.544 Between January and June 2022, approximately
19 400 IDPs returned to their homes in Idlib, of whom 13 500 were originally displaced within
the governorate. In addition, around 500 returned from Idlib to other governorates. UNOCHA
does not provide information on the factors determining their return. 545

538

Mine Action Syria Response (The), Explosive ordnance in Syria: impact and required action, May 2022, url, p. 20
Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor, Syria’s Landmines: Silent Killing, April 2021, url, p. 16
540
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview. Syrian Arab Republic, February 2022, url, p. 23
541
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements Overview, Jan - Dec 2021 (As of 31 December 2021), 21 March
2022, url
542
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview. Syrian Arab Republic, February 2022, url, p. 17
543
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements (January 2022), 24 February 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab
Republic: IDP Movements (February 2022), 11 April 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements(March 2022), 9 May 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements (April 2022), 15 June 2022, url;
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements (May 2022), 13 July 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP
Movements (June 2022), 5 August 2022, url
544
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Spontaneous IDP Returnee Movements Overview, Jan – Dec 2021 (As of 31
December 2021), 21 March 2022, url
545
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns (January 2022), 24 February 2022, url; UNOCHA,
Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns (February 2022), 11 April 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic:
IDP Spontaneous Returns (March 2022), 9 May 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous
Returns (April 2022), 15 June 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns (May 2022), 13
July 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns (June 2022), 5 August 2022, url
539

81

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

2.2.

Aleppo governorate

Map 8: © MapAction, Aleppo governorate 546

2.2.1.

General description of the governorate

Aleppo governorate is located in the north of Syria, bordering Idlib governorate to the west,
Hama governorate to the south and Raqqa governorate to the east. The governorate is divided
in eight districts: Jebel Saman, Afrin [Efrin], A’zaz [Azaz], Al-Bab, Manbij [Menbij], Jarablus, Ain
Al Arab [Kobane], and As-Safira.547
The Syrian Central Bureau of Statistics estimated the population of Aleppo governorate to beof 4 117 970 as of 2021.548 In a February 2022 report, UNOCHA estimated the population of
Aleppo governorate to be of 4 184 360.549 The population of Aleppo city was estimated at 2 098
million.550 According to UNOCHA, the total population of those areas in northern Aleppo under
Turkish control551 is approximately 1.38 million, of whom 850 000 are IDPs.552 For more
546

MapAction, Aleppo governorate, 29 July 2016, url
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic. Governorates Profiles, June 2014, url, p. 5
548
Syria, Central Bureau of Statistics, Estimate of the population in Syria by governorates, n.d, url
549
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview. Syrian Arab Republic, February 2022, url, p. 23
550
US CIA World Factbook, Syria, last updated 22 August 2022, url
551
The area discussed by UNOCHA as ‘Turkish Operation Area’ coincides with the areas captured by Turkish
forces and affiliated anti-GoS armed groups during the so-called ‘Euphrates Shield’ and ‘Olive Branch’ military
operations.
552
UNOCHA, Northwest Syria Factsheet (As of 14 July 2022), 14 July 2022, url
547

82

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

information on the ethnic and religious composition of Aleppo’s population, see the EUAA COI
Report: Syria - Security situation (July 2021).

2.2.2.

Conflict background and armed actors

Aleppo governorate is divided into areas controlled by anti-GoS armed groups, areas controlled
by the GoS and several separate areas and enclaves controlled by the SDF/YPG. 553
For more information on the background of the conflict in Aleppo governorate up until April
2021, see the previous EUAA COI Report: Syria - Security situation (July 2021).
(a)Anti-GoS armed groups

Anti-GoS armed groups control the northern parts of the governorate, including the areas
adjacent to the Turkish border in Afrin, A’zaz, Al-Bab and Jarablus districts and areas west of
Aleppo city adjoining the anti-GoS controlled areas in Idlib governorate.554 The SNA, a coalition
formed by a number of anti-GoS armed groups and supported by Turkey, is centred in Aleppo
governorate.555 Although Turkey is described as ‘the supreme authority’ in the so-called
Euphrates Shield (A’zaz, Al-Bab and Jarablus districts) and Olive Branch (Afrin district) areas,
SNA is responsible for maintaining the security in these areas. 556
HTS is the dominant armed group in the Idlib de-escalation area covering the areas controlled
by anti-GoS armed groups in western Aleppo governorate. The crossings of al-Ghazawiya andDeir Ballut separate 557 the HTS-controlled areas from northern Aleppo controlled by Turkey and
SNA.558 HTS has also supported rival SNA armed groups and set out to gain presence in Turkish
controlled parts of Aleppo covertly by creating a ‘front group’ that has operated in these areas
since June 2021 559 and overtly by entering these areas directly in late June 2022 560. The
developments in late June 2022 are discussed in detail in section 2.2.3 below.

553

See the maps in Jusoor for Studies, Military Control in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022 [map], 24
December 2021, url; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on
the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url, p. 22 [Annex II] [map]; Liveuamap, Syria, as of 21 July
2022, url
554
See the maps in Jusoor for Studies, Military Control in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022 [map], 24
December 2021, url; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on
the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url, p. 22 [Annex II] [map]555
Carter Center (The), The State of the Syrian National Army, March 2022, url, p. 3
556
Hatahet, S., The Recovery of the Local Economy in Northern Aleppo: Reality and Challenges, EUI, 25 March
2021, url, p. 7
557
Al-Monitor, Standoff between rival groups locks down north Syria crossing, 26 April 2022, url; Middle East Eye,
Syria's rebel divisions laid bare as HTS takes Afrin villages from Turkish-backed groups, 23 June 2022, url
558
See the map in Operations & Policy Center, Al-Zaraee, N. & Shaar, K., The Economics of Hayat Tahrir al -Sham,
MEI, 21 June 2021, url
559
Zelin, A. Y., Jaysh al-Qa’qa’: A New HTS Front Group In Olive Branch and Euphrates Shield Territory?, Syrian
Jihadism [blog], 13 June 2021, url
560
Al-Monitor, Syrian armed groups clash outside Aleppo, 29 June 2022, url; MEE, Syria's rebel divisions laid bareas HTS takes Afrin villages from Turkish-backed groups, 23 June 2022, url

83EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM(b)

Syrian Arab Army and affiliated armed groups

The GoS controls the central and southern parts of the governorate, including the DamascusAleppo highway (M5) and its immediate surroundings.561 According to the International Crisis
Group, Aleppo city is primarily in the control of GoS forces, although there have been occasional
hostilities amongst the GoS-affiliated militias and between the militias and the SAA. 562 Amongthe GoS forces stationed in Aleppo city, the two most prominent ones are the 4 th Division of the
SAA and the Air Force Intelligence. In addition, Liwa al-Quds, a pro-GoS militia aligned with
Russia, is also present in the city.563 More information on particular SAA formations and units
deployed in the governorate (before April 2021) is available in previous EUAA reports: EUAA
COI Report: Syria - Security situation (July 2021) and EUAA COI Report: Syria – Security situation(May 2020).
GoS forces (along with Russia) are also present in SDF-controlled areas in northern Aleppo
governorate, including Manbij and Ain al-Arab, where GoS forces have cooperated with SDF
along the Turkish border and along the frontlines between SDF- and Turkish/SNA-controlledareas.564 GoS forces are also stationed in SDF-controlled Tal Rifaat.565 Following theannouncement of a potential Turkish military operation in northern Syria, GoS and affiliatedarmed groups have also deployed more units into SDF-controlled areas in northern Aleppo
governorate,566 including Ain al-Arab,567 Manbij,568 and Tal Rifaat.569(c)Kurdish armed groups (SDF/YPG)

SDF/YPG are in control and/or have presence in Aleppo city 570 (in the neighbourhoods of Sheikh
Maqsoud and Ashrafiya) 571, in Tal Rifaat area north of Aleppo city and in Manbij and Ain al-Arab(Kobane) in eastern Aleppo governorate. 572 SDF has mobilized troops, fortified its positions
along the frontlines with Turkish-backed armed groups and deployed additional reinforcements
561

See the maps in Jusoor for Studies, Military Control in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022 [map], 24
December 2021, url; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on
the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url, p. 22 [Annex II] [map]562International Crisis Group, Syria: Ruling over Aleppo’s Ruins, Middle East Report N°234, 9 May 2022, url, p. i
563
International Crisis Group, Syria: Ruling over Aleppo’s Ruins, Middle East Report N°234, 9 May 2022, url, p. 7564
See the map in Balanche, F., How to Preserve the Autonomy of Northeast Syria [map], WINEP, 15 March 2022,
url
565
Al-Monitor, Is Syrian government withdrawing from Tal Rifaat in favor of Turkey?, 14 July 2022, url
566
Reuters, Syrian, Russian forces boosted after Turkey signals operation, officials say, 7 June 2022, url
567
Al-Monitor, Syrian Kurds seek support amid Turkish threats of military action, 20 July 2022, url; Etana Syria, Syria
Military Brief – North-West Syria – 30 November 2021, 30 November 2021, url; Syria Direct, Allied with Damascus,
SDF prepares for Turkish operation in northern Syria, 21 July 2022, url
568
Al-Monitor, Is Syrian government withdrawing from Tal Rifaat in favor of Turkey?, 14 July 2022, url; Al-Monitor,
Syrian Kurds seek support amid Turkish threats of military action, 20 July 2022, url; Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief– North-West Syria – 30 November 2021, 30 November 2021, url; FT, Syria: what is Turkey’s grand plan?, 25 July
2022, url; Syria Direct, Allied with Damascus, SDF prepares for Turkish operation in northern Syria, 21 July 2022, url
569
FT, Syria: what is Turkey’s grand plan?, 25 July 2022, url; Syria Direct, Allied with Damascus, SDF prepares for
Turkish operation in northern Syria, 21 July 2022, url
570
See the maps in Jusoor for Studies, Military Control in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022 [map], 24
December 2021, url; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on
the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url, p. 22 [Annex II] [map]571
COAR Global, Syria Update, 18 April 2022, url, p. 4; New Arab (The), Aleppo: Syrian regime continues siege of
Kurdish neighbourhoods as SDF retaliates in Qamishli, 19 April 2022, url
572
See the maps in Jusoor for Studies, Military Control in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022 [map], 24
December 2021, url; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on
the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url, p. 22 [Annex II] [map]84

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

from Raqqa city to different parts of eastern Aleppo countryside. 573 In July 2022, SDF and GoS
established joint military operations rooms in Manbij and Tal Rifaat while preparing for apotential Turkish military operation.574(d)TurkeyTurkish forces have presence alongside the anti-GoS armed groups in the so-called Operation
Olive Branch and Operation Euphrates Shield areas controlled by these groups in the northern
Aleppo governorate.575 According to Jusoor for Studies, in late 2021/early 2022, Turkish forceswere deployed to 57 different positions in the governorate. 576 According to the UNCOI, Turkish
forces have established observation posts along the frontlines separating the anti-GoS
controlled areas west of Aleppo city from the GoS-controlled central Aleppo governorate.577
Turkey has continued to strengthen 578 its forces and anti-GoS armed groups (SNA) in Aleppo
governorate, while preparing for a potential military incursion into northern Syria.579 On 23 May
2022, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced Turkey’s intentions 580 to launch a new
military operation in Syria and, on 1 June 2022, named Tal Rifaat and Manbij as the targets ofthis operation.581(e)RussiaAccording to Jusoor for Studies, in late 2021/early 2022, Russian forces were deployed to 12
different positions in Aleppo governorate. These positions were located in the areas controlled
by GoS and in the areas/enclaves of Manbij and Tal Rifaat controlled by the SDF/YPG. 582 Russianforces are deployed to Aleppo city, where they also monitor the entrances to the city, as wellas in the eastern and northern parts of the governorate. 583 In June 2022, Russian forces, alongwith GoS and Iranian forces, have been mobilized to SDF-controlled areas in northern Aleppo
governorate, including Ain al-Arab, Manbij and Tal Rifaat.584

573

Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief: North-West Syria – 01 July 2022, 1 July 2022, url
Syria Direct, Allied with Damascus, SDF prepares for Turkish operation in nor thern Syria, 21 July 2022, url
575
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url, p. 22 [Annex II] [Map]576
See the map in Jusoor for Studies, Foreign Forces Points in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022 [map], 27
December 2021, url
577
See the map in UN Human Rights Council, Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the
Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url, p. 22 [Annex II] [map]578COAR Global, Syria Update, 6 June 2022, url, p. 6; Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief: North-West Syria – 01 July
2022, 1 July 2022, url
579
COAR Global, Syria Update, 18 July 2022, url, p. 6; Al-Monitor, Is Syrian government withdrawing from Tal Rifaat
in favor of Turkey?, 14 July 2022, url
580
COAR Global, Syria Update, 30 May 2022, url, p. 4; Al Jazeera, Erdogan: New military operation in Syria ‘soon’,
24 May 2022, url
581
Al-Monitor, Erdogan announces military operations in Syria's Manbij, Tal Rifaat, 1 June 2022, url; Reuters,
Erdogan says Turkey to rid Syria's Tal Rifaat, Manbij of terrorists, 1 June 2022, url
582
See the map in Jusoor for Studies, Foreign Forces Points in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022 [map], 27
December 2021, url
583
Enab Baladi, Russia reduces forces in Aleppo, transfers some to Hmeimim, 22 March 2022, url
584
Reuters, Syrian, Russian forces boosted after Turkey signals operation, officials say, 7 June 2022, url
574

85

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

(f)

Iran

According to Jusoor for Studies, in late 2021/early 2022, Iranian forces, including those of
Lebanese Hezbollah, were deployed to 86 different positions in Aleppo governorate. These
positions were located in the areas controlled by GoS as well as in the Tal Rifaat enclave
controlled by the SDF/YPG.585 Iran-affiliated clientelist networks function in GoS-controlled partsof Aleppo governorate, supporting e.g. the tribal Baqir militia (Liwa al-Baqir) in Aleppo city.586 As
of July 2022, Iran has deployed forces to SDF-controlled northern Aleppo governorate,587
including Tal Rifaat.588
(g)

ISIL

ISIL has presence in the parts of Aleppo governorate controlled by Turkish -backed anti-GoS
armed groups (SNA), where it is, according to the International Crisis Group, ‘taking advantage
of competition among Syrian rebel groups and an incoherent security structure to find transit
routes and temporary refuge.’589 ISIL is also active in GoS-controlled southern Aleppo
governorate,590 where locals have been targeted by the group.591

2.2.3.
(a)

Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population
Security trends during the reporting period

The conflict between GoS and anti-GoS armed groups
According to the Carter Center, between April and June 2021, hostilities related to the conflict
between GoS and anti-GoS armed groups were reported in Aleppo governorate. 592 In thecontext of these hostilities, the UN Security Council reported ‘low-level mutual shelling andoccasional skirmishes’ in al-Bab frontlines in northern Aleppo governorate between April andMay 2021.593 According to the Carter Center, 438 conflict-related events were reported in thegovernorate between April and June 2021, 594 with the most of them attributed to either GoS or
Turkish forces (see the subsection on ‘The conflict between Turkey and Kurdish armed groups’

585

See the map in Jusoor for Studies, Foreign Forces Points in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022 [map], 27
December 2021, url
586
Awad, Z., Tribes and Power in Aleppo City, European University Institute, 13 Ja nuary 2022, url, pp. 10-11; thecontinuing presence of Liwa al-Baqir in Aleppo city is noted also in International Crisis Group, Syria: Ruling over
Aleppo’s Ruins, Middle East Report N°234, 9 May 2022, url, p. 7
587
Reuters, Syrian, Russian forces boosted after Turkey signals operation, officials say, 7 June 2022, url
588
Al-Monitor, Syrian Kurds seek support amid Turkish threats of military action, 20 July 2022, url
589
International Crisis Group, Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and North-eastern Syria, 18 July 2022, url, p. 2;
Al-Monitor, Free Syrian Army defends areas of influence against IS, HTS cells, 1 July 2022, url
590
International Crisis Group, Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and North-eastern Syria, 18 July 2022, url, p. 12;
Waters, G. & Winter, C., Islamic State Under-Reporting in Central Syria: Misdirection, Misinformation, or
Miscommunication?, MEI, September 2021, url, pp. 3, 15
591International Crisis Group, Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and North-eastern Syria, 18 July 2022, url, p. 12
592
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review, April through June 2021, url, p. 4593
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), and 2533 (2020), 17 June 2021, url, para. 4594
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review, July Through September 2021, url, p. 2

86

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

below).595 The UN Security Council reports that, between June and July 2021, rocket attacks
targeted ‘civilian objects’ in GoS-controlled Aleppo city for the first time since March 2021. 596
According to the UNCOI, airstrikes conducted by GoS and Russia targeted Operation Euphrates
Shield areas between July and December 2021. 597 Between July and September 2021, theCarter Center reported 581 conflict-related events in Aleppo governorate and emphasized theescalation of hostilities between GoS and anti-GoS armed groups and, in particular, the increasein Russian airstrikes targeting areas under Turkish/SNA control in the governorate. 598
According to Etana Syria, in October 2021, an attempted GoS advance towards Kafr Noran inwestern Aleppo was repelled by anti-GoS armed groups.599 According to the UN Security
Council, between August and September 2021, shelling and armed clashes along the northern
Aleppo frontlines, were accompanied by airstrikes targeting the rural areas in southern Afrin
district.600 Between October and December 2021, the Carter Center reported 396 conflictrelated events in Aleppo governorate,601 while the hostilities involving GoS and anti-GoS armed
groups continued,602 leading to mutual shelling603 and concentrating in areas west andsouthwest of Aleppo city.604
According to the Carter Center, between January and March 2022, 420 conflict events werereported in Aleppo governorate,605 with the hostilities concentrating in the same areas as in late
2021.606 GoS shelled towns and villages located in the vicinity of the frontlines in northern
Aleppo governorate.607 Between April and June 2022, the Carter Center reported 691 conflict
events in Aleppo governorate,608 with the hostilities concentrating, as in the earlier months of2022, in areas west and southwest of Aleppo city.609 According to Etana Syria, in April 2022,
mutual shelling between GoS and Turkish forces/SNA took place in Aleppo governorate.
Russian airstrikes and shelling were also reported. 610 In May 2022, occasional escalations ofviolence took place between GoS and Turkish forces/SNA. Meanwhile, Russian forces targeted595

See ‘Figure 4’ in Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review, April through June 2021, url, p. 4
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), 18 August
2021, url, para. 4597
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, 8 February 2022, url, para 5598
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review, July Through September 2021, url, pp. 2, 4599
Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief: North-West Syria – 04 November 2021, 4 November 2021, url
600
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), 21 October
2021, url, para. 4
601
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review, October-December 2021, url, p. 3
602
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review, October-December 2021, url, p. 3
603
Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief – North-West Syria – 30 November 2021, 30 November 2021, url
604
See ‘Figure 3’ in Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review, October -December 2021, url, p. 4605
Carter Center (The), The Quarterly Review on Syrian Military and Security Dynamics, January-March 2022, url, p.
5606
See ‘Figure 4’ in Carter Center (The), The Quarterly Review on Syrian Military and Security Dynamics, JanuaryMarch 2022, url, p. 6
607
Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief North West Syria 9 February 2022, 9 February 2022, url
608
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review of Syrian Political and Military Dynamics, April -June 2022, url, p. 2609
See the map in Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review of Syrian Political and Military Dynamics, April -June 2022,
url, p. 7
610
Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief – North-West Syria – 28 April 2022, 28 April 2022, url
596

87EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Operation Euphrates Shield and Operation Olive Branch areas with airstrikes. 611 In June 2022,
an attempted GoS advance and other hostilities were reported in western Aleppo frontlines. 612
In late July 2022, hostilities between GoS forces/Russia and anti-GoS armed groups escalated
also in western Aleppo governorate, with GoS forces ‘stepping up their attacks on the region
on a daily basis’613 and HTS and other anti-GoS armed groups bombing GoS-controlled areas inwestern rural Aleppo.614
The conflict between Turkey and Kurdish armed groups (SDF/YPG)
Between April and May 2021, UN Security Council reported an intensification of clashes andmutual shelling along the frontlines in Afrin, A’zaz and Tal Rifaat that led to civilian casualties.615
According to the Carter Center, the hostilities between Turkish forces (and the SNA) and‘Kurdish armed groups’616 (SDF/YPG) in ‘northern Syria’, including Aleppo governorate,escalated between April and June 2021. 617 The hostilities took place along the frontlines
between the parties as well as in the parts of Aleppo governorate controlled by the Turkish
forces and their SNA allies. In June 2021, the hostilities led to mutual shelling in the Aleppo
frontlines after a rocket strike on 12 June 2021 targeted the Al-Shifa Hospital in (SNA-controlled)
Afrin,618 with both YPG and Russia suspected for the attack. 619
The escalation in northern Aleppo’s frontlines continued between June and July 2021. 620
According to the UNCOI, ‘sporadic exchanges of shelling’ and an increase in the number ofdrone strikes carried out by Turkish forces took place during the period between July andDecember 2021.621 UNCOI describes the areas in northern Aleppo governorate as ‘highly
volatile’ and notes how, in these areas, civilians ‘are caught between several conflicts’ and ‘live
amid fear of shelling and improvised explosive devices’ (IED’s), with GoS forces, Turkish forces,
the Turkish-backed SNA and the Kurdish-dominated SDF all involved in the hostilities. 622 On 5
and 6 August 2021, the town of Al-Bab and its surroundings were targeted with missile attacks,

611

Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief – North-West Syria – 02 June 2022, 2 June 2022, url
Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief: North-West Syria – 01 July 2022, 1 July 2022, url
613
Asharq al-Awsat, Regime Forces Ramp up Attacks in Syria’s North, 1 August 2022, url
614
Al-Monitor, Syrian escalation risks all-out conflict involving Turkey, Russia, Iran, 1 August 2022, url
615
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), and 2533 (2020), 17 June 2021, url, para. 4616
In addition to SDF and YPG, these groups include the so-called ‘Afrin Liberation Forces’ (Hêzên Rizgariya Efrînê,HRE), which are described by the Carter Center as ‘the primary Kurdish armed group operating within Turkish -held
Alepo Governorate’. Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review, April through June 2021, url, p. 6; for further information
on HRE, see Al-Monitor, New Kurdish group in Syria attacks Turkish-backed opposition in Afrin, 24 April 2021, url
617
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review, April through June 2021, url, p. 1
618
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review, April through June 2021, url, p. 5; According to the UN Security Council, in
addition to damage suffered by the hospital itself, at least 13 people were killed and 26 wounded in the attack,including health care workers. UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014),
2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2 504 (2020), 2533 (2020)
and 2585 (2021), 18 August 2021, url, paras. 4, 25.
619
International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch – Syria, June 2021, url
620
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), 18 August
2021, url, para. 4621
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, 8 February 2022, url, para 5622
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, 8 February 2022, url, para 74
612

88

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

allegedly carried out by SDF,623 that resulted in at least 24 injured civilians and damaged civilians
homes.624 According to UNOCHA, the August 2021 hostilities marked the first time Al-Bab andthe surrounding areas were affected by violence since the March 2020 ceasefire. All in all, atleast 20 civilians were killed and at least 41 others injured as the result of these hostilities. 625
Between October and November 2021, hostilities were reported particularly in Tal Rifaat
frontline,626 where a Kurdish armed group operating in Tal Rifaat conducted a missile striketargeting Turkish forces in A’zaz city on 10 October 2021, and Turkish forces retaliated byshelling SDF/YPG-controlled areas 627. On 20 October 2021, an airstrike likely carried out by aTurkish drone in Ain al-Arab targeted a non-military vehicle stationed in front of the Social
Justice Building. Two people were killed while at least three others were wounded in theairstrike. 628
Between December 2021 and March 2022, ground-based strikes reported by OHCHR caused
civilian casualties in some cities including (i.a.) cities of A’zaz, Al-Bab and Jarablus,629 and in Afrincity and in villages in Ain al-Arab [Kobane] area630. These strikes were likely associated with the
hostilities between Turkey and Turkish-backed SNA and SDF/YPG and/or GoS forces.
According to the International Crisis Group, mutual rocket attacks and/or shelling between
Turkish forces and Kurdish armed groups took place mid-February 2022 in A’zaz and Tal
Rifaat.631 Between January and March 2022, the Carter Center reported an increase in hostilities
between Turkish forces and Kurdish armed groups. 632 As in late 2021,633 the hostilities wereconcentrated in and around Tal Rifaat.634
Between April and May 2022, UN Security Council reported a significant increase in the
hostilities in the areas of Tal Rifaat and Manbij in northern Aleppo, 635 including ‘an increase in

623

SNHR, The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in August 2021, 4 September 2021, url, pp. 6, 18
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), 21 October
2021, url, para. 4625
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview. Syrian Arab Republic, February 2022, url, p. 22
626
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), 15
December 2021, url, para. 4; see also the concentration of conflict events in Tal Rifaat area in ‘Figure 3’ in Carter
Center (The), Quarterly Review, October-December 2021, url, p. 4
627
International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch – Syria, October 2021, url
628
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, 8 February 2022, url, para 100
629
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), 19 April
2022, url, pp. 20-21 [Annex I]
630
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) , 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), 21 February2022, url, p. 19 [Annex I]
631
International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch – Syria, February 2022, url
632
Carter Center (The), The Quarterly Review on Syrian Military and Security Dynamics, January-March 2022, url,
p. 8633
See ‘Figure 3’ in Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review, October -December 2021, url, p. 4634
See ‘Figure 4’ in Carter Center (The), The Quarterly Review on Syrian Military and Security Dynamics, JanuaryMarch 2022, url, p. 6635
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (201 4), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), 16 June
2022, url, p. 1 [Key points]
624

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

shelling, drone strikes and rocket attacks.’ 636 Between April and May 2022, OHCHR also
reported several ground-based strikes causing civilian casualties in (Turkish-controlled) areasof Afrin, A’zaz and Al-Bab.637
According to Etana Syria, in June 2022, mutual shelling between Turkish forces/SNA and SDF
and an increasing number of Turkish drone strikes took place in the frontlines in northern rural
Aleppo.638 According to the Newlines Institute, SNA and armed groups associated with SDF
have ‘engaged in tit-for-tat strikes’ that have resulted in civilian casualties. Newlines Instituteestimates that civilians have been killed as a result of, both, indiscriminate shelling andseemingly deliberate attacks that have also caused damage to civilian infrastructure andimpended their freedom of movement. These hostilities have taken place, among others, along
the frontlines in Aleppo governorate, with the Manbij frontline reportedly subjected to ‘regular
artillery shelling and drone attacks’.639
Early July 2022, Turkish forces targeted the military positions of both GoS and SDF in Tal Rifaat
area with suspected drone strikes while hostilities between Turkish -backed anti-GoS armed
groups and SDF took place in the rural areas of northern Aleppo governorate. 640 According to
COAR Global, on 19 July 2022, Turkish forces targeted Iranian militias positioned in eastern
Afrin district and GoS forces positioned in Tal Rifaat. 641 In late July 2022, hostilities escalated
between Turkish forces and SDF in northern Aleppo governorate. In the course of theescalation, Turkish forces shelled areas in Ain al-Arab and Tal Rifaat, the latter hostilities injuring
several civilians, while SDF retaliated by targeting areas controlled by Turkish-backed armed
groups in Afrin district and near A’zaz city. 642
On 16 August 2022, Turkish forces conducted airstrikes that hit GoS positions near Ain alArab.643 According to SOHR, 17 people were killed in the airstrikes targeting joint GoS-SDF
positions, including 13 GoS soldiers and 4 SDF fighters, 644 although Al Jazeera notes thediscrepancies in the estimated casualty figures of the attack.645 On that same day, SDF targeteda Turkish border post opposite Ain al-Arab with a rocket attack646 and Turkish forces shelled

636

UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), 16 June
2022, url, para. 21
637
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020 ) and 2585 (2021), 16 June
2022, url, p. 19 [Annex I].
638
Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief: North-West Syria – 01 July 2022, 1 July 2022, url
639
Newlines Institute, The Deteriorating Security Situation in Northeast Syria, 11 July 2022, url
640
Al-Monitor, Is Syrian government withdrawing from Tal Rifaat in favor of Turkey?, 14 July 2022, url
641
COAR Global, Syria Update, 25 July 2022, url, p. 7
642
Al-Monitor, Syrian escalation risks all-out conflict involving Turkey, Russia, Iran, 1 August 2022, url
643
Al Jazeera, Several Syrian soldiers killed in ‘Turkish air raids’, 17 August 2022, url; Reuters, Three Syrian soldierskilled in Turkish air strike on military posts -state media, 16 August 2022, url
644
SOHR, Death toll update / Two Turkish soldiers killed and three others injured in SDF rocket attack on Turkish
border post off Ain Al-Arab (Kobani), 17 August 2022, url
645
Al Jazeera, Several Syrian soldiers killed in ‘Turkish air raids’, 17 August 2022, url
646
Al Modon, ‫بعد قصف مخفر داخل تركيا‬..‫[ القوات التركية تحرق مواقع قسد‬Turkish forces set SDF positions in flames.. after
the bombing of an outpost inside Turkey], 16 August 2022, url; SOHR, SDF rocket attack / Five Turkish soldierskilled and injured at Syria-Turkey border near Ain Al-Arab (Kobani), 16 August 2022, url

90

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATIONSDF positions in Ain al-Arab,647 Manbij,648 and Tal Rifaat.649 According to an update by SOHR
published on 16 August 2022, one civilian was killed and seven other persons injured in the
hostilities between Turkish forces and SDF that were still ongoing in the western Ain al-Arabcountryside.650 On 17 August 2022, the shelling of SDF controlled villages, including Tal Rifaat,
continued in northern Aleppo governorate. 651
Infighting among anti-GoS armed groups
Infighting between different anti-GoS armed groups in Turkish-controlled northern Aleppo wasreported during the reporting period.652 According to the Carter Center, the infighting between
different SNA armed groups is ‘common’653 and contributes to ‘the general instability’ in Turkish
controlled parts of northern Syria,654 and presents ‘a severe problem’ to the civilian populationin these areas.655 According to Syria Direct’s local source in Al-Bab, the infighting means‘increasing chaos and insecurity in the area,’ while ‘the clashes between the factions have led
to civilian casualties from indiscriminate bullets.’ In addition, the source notes the danger thatthe recruitment of criminals by different SNA groups poses to (al-Bab’s) civilian population.656
According to COAR Global’s assessment from late June 2022, ‘the insecurity and chaos’ in the
SNA-controlled areas in northern Aleppo governorate is mainly affecting the areas’ civilian
population. Besides the infighting between different SNA factions, these areas are exposed toother security incidents, such as IED-attacks, bombings and assassinations.657 In April 2022,
COAR Global noted that ‘[t]he security situation in northwest Syria remains unstable, withmultiple bombings that target SNA actors, varyingly attributed to [ISIL], the SDF, and theGovernment of Syria’.658
According to UNOCHA, most of the IED attacks that took place in Syria between January and
September 2021 ‘were documented in areas under the control of armed groups in Turkish
operations areas of Aleppo governorate, including mainly in residential areas and inside

Nidaa Post, ‫ عنصرا من قوات األسد بغارات تركية شرق حلب‬22 ‫[ مصرع‬22 members of Assad forces killed in Turkish
raids east of Aleppo] , 16 August 2022, url; SOHR, SDF rocket attack / Five Turkish soldiers killed and injured at
Syria-Turkey border near Ain Al-Arab (Kobani), 16 August 2022, url
648
Al Modon, ‫بعد قصف مخفر داخل تركيا‬..‫[ القوات التركية تحرق مواقع قسد‬Turkish forces set SDF positions in flames.. after
the bombing of an outpost inside Turkey], 16 August 2022, url; Nidaa Post, ‫ عنصرا من قوات األسد بغارات تركية‬22 ‫مصرع‬‫[ شرق حلب‬22 members of Assad forces killed in Turkish raids east of Aleppo] , 16 August 2022, url
649
Referred in the source with the name ‘al-Shahba’ ( ‫) الشهباء‬. Al Modon, ‫بعد قصف مخفر‬..‫القوات التركية تحرق مواقع قسد‬‫[ داخل تركيا‬Turkish forces set SDF positions in flames.. after the bombing of an outpost inside Turkey], 16 August
2022, url
650
SOHR, SDF rocket attack / Five Turkish soldiers killed and injured at Syria-Turkey border near Ain Al-Arab(Kobani), 16 August 2022, url
651
SOHR, Renewed bombardment / Turkish shells struck Kurdish-held areas north of Aleppo, 17 August 2022, url
652
See Carter Center (The), The State of the Syrian National Army, March 2022, url, pp. 4-6; UN Security Council,
Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393
(2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), 18 August 2021, url, para. 4653
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review, July Through September 2021, url, pp. 4-5
654
Carter Center (The), The State of the Syrian National Army, March 2022, url, p. 3655
Carter Center (The), The State of the Syrian National Army, March 20 22, url, p. 4656
Syria Direct, Mergers and tensions within the Syrian National Army: A ‘struggle for existence’, Syria Direct, 19
April 2022, url
657
COAR Global, Syria Update, 20 June 2022, url, p. 9658
COAR Global, Syria Update, 11 April 2022, url, p. 9647

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

markets’.659 UN Security Council notes the resumption of IED attacks that killed civilians in
Jarablus, A’zaz and Afrin between June and July 2021 660 and in Al-Bab and Afrin between
August and September 2021.661
According to the Carter Center, the incidents of infighting among SNA factions increased
sharply between April and June 2022.662 In June 2022, infighting between two SNA factions,one of them allied to HTS, led to HTS advancing into Turkish-/SNA-controlled northern
Aleppo.663
According to Etana Syria, the infighting resulted in ‘dozens of deaths and injuries.’ 664 According
to Middle East Eye, on 19 June 2022, HTS took control of several villages in rural southern andsouthwestern Afrin district, which marked the first time HTS fighters had entered into so-called
Operation Olive Branch areas.665 According to Al-Monitor, the infighting led to both military andcivilian casualties.666
ISIL activities
During the reporting period, ISIL’s presence has been reported in, both, northern parts of
Aleppo controlled by anti-GoS armed groups 667 and in southern parts of the governorate
controlled by GoS.668
According to Al-Monitor, Turkish-backed anti-GoS armed groups have cracked down on ISIL’s
cells in northern rural Aleppo. However, ISIL is still operating in these areas and conducts
recurrent terrorist operations. Arrest operations targeting ISIL members were carried out on 30
May and 23 June 2021. On 24 June 2021 clashes between the police affiliated to Turkishbacked armed groups and ISIL were reported in the city of al-Bab.669 According to COAR Global,
on 6 April 2022, five SNA members were killed in a shooting incident north of A’zaz that waslater claimed by ISIL.670 On 12 July 2022 a senior ISIL leader Maher al-Agal, allegedly linked to659

UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview. Syrian Arab Republic, February 2022, url, p. 14
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), 18 August
2021, url, para. 4661
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), 21 October
2021, url, para. 4662
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review of Syrian Political and Military Dynamics, April -June 2022, url, p. 8
663
Al-Monitor, Syrian armed groups clash outside Aleppo, 29 June 2022, url; see also Carter Center (The),
Quarterly Review of Syrian Political and Military Dynamics, April -June 2022, url, p. 9
664
Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief: North-West Syria – 01 July 2022, 1 July 2022, url
665
COAR Global, Syria Update, 4 July 2022, url, pp. 6-7
666
Al-Monitor, Syrian armed groups clash outside Aleppo, 29 June 2022, url
667
Al-Monitor, Free Syrian Army defends areas of influence against IS, HTS cells, 1 July 2022, url; COAR Global,
Syria Update, 18 July 2022, url, p. 8; France 24, US drone strike kills leader of Islamic State group in Syria,
Pentagon says, 13 July 2022, url
668International Crisis Group, Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and North-eastern Syria, 18 July 2022, url, p. 3,
passim.; Waters, G. & Winter, C., Islamic State Under-Reporting in Central Syria: Misdirection, Misinformation, or
Miscommunication?, MEI, September 2021, url, p. 5
669
Al-Monitor, Free Syrian Army defends areas of influence against IS, HTS cells, 1 July 2022, url
670
COAR Global, Syria Update, 11 April 2022, url, p. 9660

92

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

SNA-affiliated Ahrar al-Sharqiya,671 was killed by US forces in a drone strike near Jindires 672 in
SNA-controlled northern Aleppo governorate.
ISIL activities were reported in the Badia, the central Syrian desert covering (among other areas)
GoS-controlled southern Aleppo governorate, 673 where ISIL attacks are reportedly ‘fairly
consistent’674 and where, in 2021, ISIL was reportedly ‘preying on the [local] population’.675
Tensions in SDF-controlled areas
In late May/early June 2021, at least eight people were killed in Manbij after SDF suppressed
the popular protests against forced conscription 676 (the so-called “self-defence duty”) and the
SDF rule in the region 677.
In March 2022, a siege was put in place by GoS around the SDF/YPG-controlled
neighbourhoods of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh in Aleppo city. 678 The siege lasted for three
weeks 679 and prevented the entry of basic necessities such as flour, fuel, and medical aid into
these neighbourhoods.680 According to SOHR, members of the 4 th Division of the SAA and State
Security, the actors responsible for maintaining the siege had ‘clamped down’ on theneighbourhoods’ residents.681 On the basis of several unnamed sources, ANHA Hawar News
Agency, a Kurdish online news source sympathetic to the PYD/YPG, claims that, during thesiege, members of the 4 th Division searched the residents’ cellphones and threatened those
who did not ‘pay royalties and taxes to the Division’s members’ with kidnapping. 682
Israeli airstrikes
On 19 July 2021, Israeli forces carried airstrikes against Iranian targets in Al-Safirah area insouthern Aleppo.683 No civilian casualties were reported.

671

France 24, US drone strike kills leader of Islamic State group in Syria, Pentagon says, 13 July 2022 , url
COAR Global, Syria Update, 18 July 2022, url, p. 8; France 24, US drone strike kills leader of Islamic State groupin Syria, Pentagon says, 13 July 2022, url
673International Crisis Group, Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and North-eastern Syria, 18 July 2022, url, p. 3,
passim.; Waters, G. & Winter, C., Islamic State Under-Reporting in Central Syria: Misdirection, Misinformation, or
Miscommunication?, MEI, September 2021, url, p. 5
674
Waters, G. & Winter, C., Islamic State Under-Reporting in Central Syria: Misdirection, Misinformation, or
Miscommunication?, MEI, September 2021, url, p. 15675International Crisis Group, Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and North-eastern Syria, 18 July 2022, url, p. 12
676
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018) , 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), 18 August
2021, url, para. 6
677
Reuters, Eight killed in protests against Kurdish-led forces in northern Syrian city, 1 June 2021, url ; Syria Direct,
Beyond conscription: What does Manbij’s unrest reveal about SDF rule in northeast Syria?, 8 June 2021, url
678
COAR Global, Syria Update, 18 April 2022, url, p. 4
679
International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch – Syria, April 2022, url
680
COAR Global, Syria Update, 18 April 2022, url, p. 4681
SOHR, Amid lack of flour in most of bread bakeries / Fourth Division “besieges” SDF-held neighbourhoods in
Aleppo, 5 April 2022, url
682
ANHA Hawar News Agency, They fight Democratic Nation Project in Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh, 20 April
2022, url
683
AP, Syria reports Israeli airstrikes in northern Aleppo province, 20 July 2021, url; Reuters, Syrian air defencesintercept Israeli attack over Aleppo - state media, 20 July 2021, url
672

93EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM(b)Security incidents

During the reporting period, there were 2 776 security incidents recorded by ACLED in Aleppo
governorate, of whom 1 893 were coded as explosions/remote violence, 493 battles and 390
incidents of violence against civilians. 684 Aleppo recorded the largest number of security
incidents during the reference period out of all governorates.

Figure 10. Evolution of security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence andviolence against civilians in Aleppo governorate between 1 April 2021 and 1 August 2022,
based on ACLED data 685

684

EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East ( 12 August2022), url
685
EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (12 August2022), url

94

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

District

Battles

Remote violence

Violence against
civilians

Afrin

103

264

231

Ain Al Arab

3

80

15

Al Bab

101

196

45

As-Safira

2

5

-

A’zaz

121

759

38

Jarablus

53

73

8

Jebel Saman

60

384

23

Menbij

50

132

30

Total

493

1893

390

Figure 11. Security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against
civilians in Aleppo governorate between 1 April 2021 and 1 August 2022. Breakdown by
district based on ACLED data 686
Security incidents were recorded in all Aleppo governorate districts during the reporting
period, with the highest number of overall incidents being recorded in May 2022. The largest
number of battles took place in A’zaz and Afrin, while most incidents involving
explosions/remote violence were documented in A’zaz and Jebel Saman. Incidents ofviolence against civilians were particularly prevalent in Afrin (see Figure 11).
(c)

Civilian fatalities

In 2021, SNHR recorded 237 civilian fatalities 687 in Aleppo governorate while in the first sevenmonths of 2022 it documented 108 civilian fatalities (see Figure 12).688

686

EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middl e East (12 August2022), url
687
Based on data extracted from monthly reports on civilian fatalities published by SNHR. See: SNHR, Extrajudicial

95

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Month

SNHR 2021

SNHR 2022

January

12

19

February

60

25

March

32

11

April

17

15

May

13

8

June

31

13

July

8

17

August13

Killing Claims the Lives of 113 Civilians, Including 36 Chi ldren, Six Women, and Three Victims Due to Torture, inJanuary 2021, 1 February 2021, url, p. 7; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 138 Civilians, Including 23
Children, 11 Women, and 14 Victims Due to Torture, in February 2021, 1 March 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR, Extrajudicial
Killing Claims the Lives of 177 Civilians, Including 28 Children, 35 Women, One Medical Worker, and 9 Victims Dueto Torture, in March 2021, 1 April 2021, url, p. 7; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 96 Civilians, Including
15 Children, 11 Women, and Nine Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in May 2021, 1 June 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR,
Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 723 Civilians in Syria in the First Half of 2021, 1 July 2021, url, p. 9; SNHR,
Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 129 Civilians, Including 44 Children, 17 Women, and 10 Victims Due toTorture, in Syria in July 2021, 1 August 2021, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 94 Civilians,
Including 32 Children, 10 Women, and Seven Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in August 2021, 1 September 2021, url,
p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 86 Civilians, Including 23 Children, Nine Women, and Eight
Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in September 2021, 1 October 2021, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims theLives of 84 Civilians, Including 22 Children, Four Women, and Seven Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in October
2021, 1 November 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 86 Civilians, Including 16 Children,
Eight Women, and Six Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in November 2021, 1 December 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR, 1,271
Civilians, Including 299 Children, 134 Women, and 104 Victims of Torture, Killed in Syria in 2021, 1 January 2022, url,
p. 13
688
Based on data extracted from monthly reports on civilian fatalities published by SNHR. See:; SNHR, 69 Civilians,
Including 18 Children, Four Women and Eight Victims Due to Tor ture, Killed in Syria in January 2022, 1 February2022, url, p. 8; SNHR, 161 Civilians, Including 28 Children, Six Women and 66 Victims Due to Torture, Documented
Killed in Syria in February 2022, 1 March 2022, url, p. 9; SNHR, 67 Civilians, Including 20 Children, Three Women,
and Seven Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Killed in Syria in March 2022, 1 April 2022, url, p. 8; SNHR, 101
Civilians, Including 17 Children, 14 Women, and Six Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in
Syria in April 2022, 1 May 2022, url, p. 9; SNHR, 78 Civilians, Including 14 Children, 11 Women, and Eight Victims
Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in Syria in May 2022, 1 June 2022, url, p. 8; SNHR, 568
Civilians, Including 115 Children, 53 Women, and 101 Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in
Syria in the First Half of 2022, 2 July 2022, url, p. 12; SNHR, 86 Civilians, Including 21 Children, Eight Women, andFive Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in Syria in July 2022, 1 August 2022, url, p. 9

96

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATIONMonth

SNHR 2021

September

10

October23

November

8

December

10

Total

237

SNHR 2022

108

Figure 12. Civilian fatalities as a result of armed conflict in Aleppo governorate in 2021 andfirst seven months of 2022. Monthly breakdown based on SNHR data(d)Conflict-related infrastructure damage and explosive remnants of war

According to the UN Security Council, schools 689 and hospitals 690 in Aleppo governorate weredamaged as the result of the ongoing conflict during the reporting period. The incident with thehighest number of casualties occurred on 12 June 2021, when the Shifa hospital in Afrin wasshelled, killing at least 13 people and injuring 26 others.691 According to WHO Surveillance
System for Attacks on Health Care (SSA), in the year 2021, multiple (5-7) attacks on healthcare
were reported in Aleppo governorate.692 Between January and March 2022, WHO reported one
attack on healthcare in Aleppo governorate.693 The extent of conflict-related infrastructuredamage in Aleppo governorate is discussed further in EUAA COI Report: Syria - Security
situation (July 2021).
According to 2022 UN Humanitarian Needs Overview, Aleppo is one of those Syrian
governorates where explosive ordnance contamination is assessed as ‘widespread’ as theresult of previous or still ongoing hostilities.694 Mine Action Syria Response report published in
689

UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), 19 April
2022, url, para. 33
690
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), 18 August
2021, url, para. 26; UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014),
2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585
(2021), 19 April 2022, url, para. 34
691
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2 449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), 18 August
2021, url, para. 26
692
WHO/ Health Cluster, Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care. Syrian Arab Republic. Annual Report
2021, 3 February 2022, url, p. 2
693
WHO/ Health Cluster, Syrian Arab Republic: Attacks on health care in Syria, 1 Jan - 31 Mar 2022, 5 May 2022, url
694
UNOCHA, 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, February 2022, url, p. 12

97

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

May 2022 estimates that the majority of security incidents involving explosive ordnances
recorded by UNMAS occurred in Aleppo and Idlib governorates. 695
According to the Carter Center report published in March 2022, explosive munitions have beenused extensively in the areas in and around Aleppo city, 696 and the governorate is contaminatedby 17 250 - 51 500 UXO.697 According to a report by Mine Action Review published in September
2021, attacks with cluster munitions were carried out in Aleppo governorate during the firstquarter of 2021.698
According to Mine Action Syria Response, 87 % of communities in Aleppo governorate, andespecially the communities in northern Aleppo, have reported explosive ordnancecontamination in their areas, which is also reportedly affecting between 30 -70 % of the farmlandin the governorate. In 2021, children lost their lives in Aleppo city as the result of explosive
ordnance contamination sustained before 2017. 699 According to Euro-Mediterranean Human
Rights Monitor report published in April 2021, landmines have claimed the lives of 704 people
in Aleppo governorate between March 2011 and March 2021. 700 From September 2021 to April
2022, iMMap data revealed 204 deaths and 336 injuries in connection with landmine incidents
in Aleppo governorate.701(e)Displacement and return

UNOCHA stated that the number of IDPs in Aleppo governorate was 1 283 773 (as of February2022).702 In 2021 UNOCHA recorded for Aleppo governorate approximately 22 000
displacements from the governorate, 125 000 within the governorate, and 70 000 to thegovernorate. Significant numbers of arrivals from Idlib (69 200) and Hasaka (700) wereregistered.703
Between January and June 2022, IDP movements tracked by UNOCHA were concentrated
mainly in north-west Syria, with 77-85 % of them taking place between the governorates of
Aleppo and Idlib. Altogether, between January and June 2022, about 23 700 IDPs weredisplaced from Aleppo, of whom 14 366 were displaced within the governorate. UNOCHA
estimates that, during the first half of 2022, access to services and livelihoods was the main
incentive for IDP movements within Syria.704

695

Mine Action Syria Response (The), Explosive ordnance in Syria: impact and required action, May 2022, url, p. 6
Estimation based on the map in Carter Center (The), A Call for Action: Data on Unexploded Ordnance in Syria
and Its Implications. December 2012 – May 2021, March 2022, url, p. 20 [map]697
Carter Center (The), A Call for Action: Data on Unexploded Ordnance in Syria and Its Implications. December
2012 – May 2021, March 2022, url, p. 20
698
Mine Action Review, Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2021, 1 September 2021, url, p. 178
699
Mine Action Syria Response, Mine Action Syria Response (The), Explosive ordnance in Syria: impact andrequired action, May 2022, url, p. 19
700Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor, Syria’s Landmines: Silent Killing, April 2021, url, p. 16
701
iMMAP, Progress, Challenges and Forecast of Humanitarian Mine Action, 31 May 2022, url, pp. 11-13
702
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview. Syrian Arab Republic, February 2022, url, p. 23
703
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements Overview, Jan - Dec 2021 (As of 31 December 2021), 21 March
2022, url
704
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements (January 2022), 24 February 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab
Republic: IDP Movements (February 2022), 11 Apri l 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements
696

98

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

According to UNOCHA, approximately 31 000 IDPs returned to their homes located in Aleppo
governorate in 2021. Of these, about 28 000 were those displaced within Aleppo governorate.
Most of the returnees from other governorates returned from Idlib (1 000), Hasaka (900) and
Latakia (500).705
Between January and June 2022, 3 028 IDPs returned to their homes in Aleppo, of whom 2 300
were originally displaced within the governorate. In addition, approx. 1 338 returned from
Aleppo to other governorates. UNOCHA did not provide information on the factors determining
their return.706(March 2022), 9 May 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements (April 2022), 15 June 2022, url;
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements (May 2022), 13 July 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP
Movements (June 2022), 5 August 2022, url
705
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Spontaneous IDP Returnee Movements Overview, Jan – Dec 2021 (As of 31
December 2021), 21 March 2022, url
706
UNOCHA , Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns (January 2022), 24 February 2022, url; UNOCHA,
Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns (February 2022), 11 April 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic:
IDP Spontaneous Returns (March 2022), 9 May 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous
Returns (April 2022), 15 June 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns (May 2022), 13
July 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns (June 2022), 5 August 2022, url

99EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

2.3.

Hama governorate

Map 9: © MapAction, Hama governorate707

2.3.1.

General description of the governorate

Hama governorate is located in the central region of Syria and has internal borders with thegovernorates of Latakia and Tartous to the west, Idlib, Aleppo and Raqqa to the north, andHoms to the south.708 The governorate comprises five administrative districts: Hama, Misyaf(Masyaf), Muhardah (Muhradah), Suqailbiya (As-Suqaylabiyah), and Salamiyah (AsSalamiyeh).709
The Syrian Central Bureau of Statistics estimated the population of Hama governorate in 20 21
to be 2 146 823.710 In a February 2022 report, UNOCHA estimated the population of Hama
governorate to be just under 1 500 000.711 With regards to the capital of the governorate, theCIA estimated that the population of Hama city was 964 000 in 2022.712

707

MapAction, Hama governorate, 29 July 2016, url
UNCS and UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Reference Map, 17 January 2013, url
709
UNOCHA, 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 102
710
Syria, Central Bureau of Statistics, Estimate of the population in Syria by governorates, n.d., url
711
UNOCHA, 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 23
712
US, CIA, World Factbook, Syria, last updated: 7 June 2022, url
708

100

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

According to Fabrice Balanche, Sunni Muslims constituted the majority of the residents ofHama City, while Alawites are essentially absent from the city due to the hostility of its
residents towards this minority.713 The city’s western countryside, on the other hand, wasdescribed as being ‘full of Alawite, Christian, and Ismaili villages’.714 Syria’s Ismailis 715 are mainly
found in the Salamiya716 area east of Hama City. Additionally, Hama governorate has a
Christian presence.717
According to reporting by UNHCR, in GoS-held areas checkpoints existed ‘at the entrances tocities and towns and major highways’, including the M5 motorway that runs through Hama
governorate.718

2.3.2.

Conflict background and armed actors

As reported in section 2.3.3 of the previous EUAA COI Report: Syria – Security situation (July2021), during 2020 and the first quarter of 2021, the military operations in north-west Syria by
GoS and pro-GoS forces continued, as did clashes and shelling between GoS and opposition
forces in western rural Hama. This included ISIL attacks against GoS forces, resulting inmilitary operations involving ISIL, GoS forces and allied militias in central and eastern Hama
governorate.719
As of February 2021, Hama governorate was under GoS control, ‘apart from the area
bordering Idlib province in the Sahl al-Ghab area’, which is controlled by factions of HTS.720 A
confidential source interviewed at the end of January 2021 by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign
Affairs indicated that this area was controlled by factions of anti-GoS armed groups andHTS,721 whilst the remaining territory of Hama governorate was under the control of the GoS. 722
An article by the Middle East Eye (MEE) from February 2022 reported that HTS continued tocontrol ‘slivers of territory’ in Hama governorate. 723 The territorial control in the governorate
remained unchanged during the reference period of this report. 724
713

Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, WINEP, 2018, url, p. 6
Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, WINEP, 2018, url, p. 43
715
USDOS, 2021 Report on International Religious Freedom: Syria, 2 June 2022, url, p. 4716
Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, WINEP, 2018, url, p. 15
717
USDOS, 2021 Report on International Religious Freedom: Syria, 2 June 2022, url, p. 4
718
UNHCR, International Protection Considerations with regard to people fleeing the Syrian Arab Republic, Update
VI, March 2021, url, p. 20 (Footnote 47)
719
EUAA, COI Report: Syria - Security situation, July 2021, url, pp. 111-112
720
Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of origin information report Syria, 14 June 2021, url, p. 28.
In May 2017, an agreement was signed by Russia, Iran and Turkey to end hostilities between forces fighting on
behalf of GoS and opposition groups in four de-escalation zones, primarily in opposition-held areas of Syria. One of
the zones covered north-eastern areas of Latakia, Idlib, western areas of Aleppo and northern areas of Hama.
Presently, this de-escalation zone remains the last of the four zones not retaken by the GoS. Denmark, DIS, Syria –Security and socio-economic situation in Tartous and Latakia governorates, September 2021, url, p. 12, footnote 48
721
Netherlands, (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of origin information report Syria, 14 June 2021, url, p. 28.
The article by MEE noted that ‘Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) […] controls around half of Idlib province as well as sliversof territory in the neighbouring provinces of Aleppo, Hama and Latakia’ - MEE, Syria: Civilians killed in attack on oil
company in restive north-west, 16 February 2022, url
722
UN, Syrian Arab Republic: Approximate areas of influence as of December 2021, January 2022, url
723
MEE, Syria: Civilians killed in attack on oil company in restive north-west, 16 February 2022, url
724
See the maps in Jusoor for Studies, Military Control in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022 [map], 24
December 2021, url; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on
714

101

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM(a)

Syrian Arab Army and affiliated armed groups

Within the time constraints of this report, very limited specific information was found on the SAA
and its affiliated armed groups in Hama governorate among the sources consulted. For
deployments of the SAA in Hama governorate as of May 2021 see section 2.3.2 of the EUAA
COI Report: Syria - Security situation (July 2021).
The information that was available in the reference period noted the presence of the Syrian
military’s Fourth Division, involved in seizing and auctioning off land of forcibly displaced
locals,725 and the presence of the Syrian Military Security Service’s Branch 219 (HamaGovernorate Branch).726
The Center for Middle Eastern Studies (ORSAM) referred the presence of the Palestinian
militant group Liwa al-Quds in Hama, whose unit has been trained and supplied with weapons
by Russia, and specifically stated that it ‘sometimes engages under tension with various
military groups of the regime in Hama and Deir Ez-Zor and especially with the Iran-backed 4tharmored division’.727(b)RussiaWhilst the presence of Russian troops was noted through the reporting of military operations
involving Russian forces, mainly in northern and western Hama governorate ,728 additional
information published within the reference period for this report stating the composition andstrength of Russian forces could not be found within the time constraints of this report.
According to a map by Jusoor for Studies displaying foreign military points in Syria at the turnof the year 2021/22, Russia had a total of 24 stationing sites in Hama governorate.729 A July
2022 article by SOHR mentioned the existence of Russian forces, ‘groups of the regimebacked 25th Division and other Russian-backed militias’ being stationed in Mirza fortress,
north-west of Jurin, which overlooks the Sahl Al-Ghab area.730(c)Iran and Iran-backed militias

Whilst the presence of Iranian troops was noted through the reporting of military operations
involving Iranian forces and its proxies,731 additional information published within the reference

the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url, p. 22 [Annex II] [map]; Liveuamap, Syria, as of 21 July
2022, url
725
Hall, N., Rescuing Aid in Syria, CSIS Middle East Program, February 2022, url, p. 38. For background informationon the Fourth division see Alghadawi, A., The Fourth Division: Syria’s parallel army, MEI, 24 September 2021, url
726
Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of origin information report Syria, 14 June 2021, url, p. 15(Footnote 79)
727
ORSAM, Pro-Regime Palestinian Militias in Syria, 2 August 2021, url
728
For example, SNHR, The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in the First Half of 2021, 5 July 2021, url,
p. 3, 4; ACLED, Regional Overview: Middle East 11-17 September 2021, 22 September 2021, url; SNHR, The Most
Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in April 2022, 7 May 2022, url, p. 3
729
Jusoor for Studies, Foreign Forces Points in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022, 27 December 2021, url
730
SOHR, Hama | Turkish forces start establishing new military post near Russian camp in Sahl Al -Ghab, 7 July
2022, url
731
For example, ACLED, Regional Overview: Middle East 9-15 April 2022, 21 April 2022, url; ORSAM, Pro-Regime
Palestinian Militias in Syria, 2 August 2021, url

102

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

period for this report stating the composition and strength of the Iranian military could not befound within the time constraints of this report.
According to a map by Jusoor for Studies displaying foreign military points in Syria at the turnof the year 2021/22, Iran had a total of 18 stationing sites in Hama governorate.732(d)Anti-GoS armed groups

As of February 2021, ‘the area bordering Idlib province in the Sahl al-Ghab area’ wascontrolled, according to a confidential source interviewed by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, by factions of anti-GoS armed groups and HTS,733 whilst the remaining territory ofHama governorate was under the control of the GoS.734
The UN Security Council noted that, in the second half of 2021, the Eastern Turkistan Islamic
Movement (ETIM)/Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), serving under the HTS ‘umbrella’, was present
in Hama governorate, amongst others.735(e)Turkey and Turkish-backed armed opposition groups

As reported by a pro-GoS source, during October 2021, Turkish military reinforcements in theform of personnel, weapons and ammunition were observed in the Hama governorate
countryside of the Sahl al-Ghab area.736 In July 2022, it was reported that Turkish forces were
establishing new military posts in the Sahl Al-Ghab area in north-western Hama
governorate.737
According to a map by Jusoor for Studies displaying foreign military points in Syria at the turnof the year 2021/22, Turkey had a total of one stationing site in Hama governorate.738
(f)

ISIL

ISIL’s presence and activities, as reported in section 2.3.3 of the previous EUAA COI Report:
Syria - Security situation (July 2021), continued throughout 2021, specifically in northern 739 and732

Jusoor for Studies, Foreign Forces Points in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022, 27 December 2021, url
Netherlands, (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of origin information report Syria, 14 June 2021, url, p. 28.
The article by MEE noted that ‘Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) […] controls around half of Idlib province as well as sliversof territory in the neighbouring provinces of Aleppo, Hama and Latakia’ - MEE, Syria: Civilians killed in attack on oil
company in restive north-west, 16 February 2022, url
734
UN, Syrian Arab Republic: Approximate areas of influence as of December 2021, January 2022, url
735
UN Security Council, Twenty-ninth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted
pursuant to resolution 2368 (2017)2368 (2017)2368 (2017)2368 (2017)2368 (2017)2368 (2017)2368 (2017)2368(2017)2368 (2017)2368 (2017)2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al -Qaida and associated individuals and entities,
S/2022/83, 3 February 2022, url, para. 39
736
Syrian Documentation Center, The Syrian army strikes military reinforcements for the militants in the countrysideof Hama, 13 October 2021, url
737
SOHR, Hama / Turkish forces start establishing new military post near Russian camp in Sahl Al -Ghab, 7 July
2022, url
738
Jusoor for Studies, Foreign Forces Points in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022, 27 December 2021, url
739
UN Security Council, Twenty-eighth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted
pursuant to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al -Qaida and associated individuals and entities,
S/2021/655, 21 July 2021, url, paras. 31-32; UN Security Council, Thirteenth report of the Secretary-General on thethreat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in supportof Member States in countering the threat, S/2021/682, 27 July 2021, url, para. 25
733

103

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

eastern Hama.740 The UN Security Council noted that, in the second half of 2021, whilst ISIL
operations focused on Deir Ez-Zor, attacks also occurred in Hama governorate.741 The Carter
Center stated in December 2021 that ISIL’s activity remained ‘predominantly concentrated in
the Badia desert region’, including parts of Raqqa, Deir-ez-Zor, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo
Governorates.742 However, Gregory Waters stated that, by the second half of 2021, ISIL
reportedly withdrew most of its cells from east Hama. 743 ACLED changed ISIL’s status in
Salamiyeh sub-district in Hama governorate from ‘active’ in Q3 of 2021 to ‘inactive’ in Q4 of2021.744 However, the International Crisis Group reported in November 2021 that Hama (andnorthern Homs) was the governorate where ISIL had ‘regained strength’, 745 whilst the same
source reported that in early 2022 ISIL activity was ‘nearly non-existent in Hama
governorate’.746

2.3.3.
(a)

Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population
Security trends during the reporting period

During the reference period for this report, the security situation in Hama governorate
continued to be dominated by military operations in western areas by GoS and pro-GoS
Russian forces, with tensions described by the UN as ‘remained high’. 747 During the lastquarter of 2021, conflict events recorded high numbers of shelling and aerial bombardments
by GoS and Russia.748 Isolated Israeli and Turkish instigated airstrikes were reported, thoughmainly in 2021.749
Military operations in northern and western Hama governorate
The military operations that were launched in 2019 in north-west Syria by GoS and pro-GoS
Russian forces continued in 2021 and for the first half of 2022, with reported shellings and/or
aerial bombardments striking mainly military sites, but also damaging civilian infrastructure.750
740

Waters, G. and Winter, C., Islamic State Under-Reporting in Central Syria: Misdirection, Misinformation, or
Miscommunication?, MEI, 2 September 2021, url; Waters, G., The Central Syria ISIS insurgency in 2021, January2022, url, pp. 3-4
741
UN Security Council, Twenty-ninth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted
pursuant to resolution 2368 (2017)2368 (2017)2368 (2017)2368 (2017)2368 (2017)2368 (2017)2368 (2017)2368(2017)2368 (2017)2368 (2017)2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al -Qaida and associated individuals and entities,
S/2022/83, 3 February 2022, url, para. 36
742
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review | October-December 2021, 31 December 2021, url, p. 13
743
Waters, G., The Central Syria ISIS insurgency in 2021, January 2022, url, pp. 5, 44-45
744
ACLED, The State of Syria: Q3 2021 – Q4 2021, 8 February 2022, url
745International Crisis Group, Syria: Shoring Up Raqqa’s Shaky Recovery, 18 November 2021, url
746International Crisis Group, Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and North-eastern Syria, 18 July 2022, url, p. 13
747
UN Security Council, Escalating Conflict, Deepening Economic Crisis in Syria Pushing Humanitarian Needs toHighest Levels Since Start of Conflict, Senior Officials Tell Security Council, 24 August 2021, url
748
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review | October-December 2021, 31 December 2021, url, p. 4749
For example, MEE, Syria: Israeli air strikes reportedly kill 11 pro-government fighters, 9 June 2021, url; SNHR, The
Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in the First Half of 2021, 5 July 2021, url, p. 4
750
SNHR, The Most Notable Human Rights Violati ons in Syria in April 2021, 5 May 2021, url, p. 3; SOHR, “Deescalation zone” | Regime forces shell Kabana hills in Latakia, and renew artillery fire on Hama and Idlib, 24 May
2021, url; Carter Center (The), Weekly Conflict Summary, 24-30 May 2021, 30 May 2021, url, p. 3; SNHR, The Most
Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in May 2021, 6 June 2021, url, p. 3; UN Security Council, Implementationof Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401
(2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), S/2021/735, 18 August 2021, url, p. 2; SOHR, “De-104

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

In July 2022 shellings were continued to be reported in Sahl Al-Ghab, specifically in thevillages of Al-Ankawi and Al-Sarmaniyah, with no reported casualties.751
In August 2021, as at least 29 airstrikes and daily shelling were recorded in ‘towns and villagesaround the frontlines in southern Idleb […] northern Latakia and western Hama’.752
Military operations in southern Hama governorate
In a Skype meeting between an international security organisation and the Danish Immigration
Service (DIS) in April 2022, the security situation along the Hama-Homs corridor in southern
Hama governorate was described as ‘relatively stable after a month [as of March 2022]
without any serious insurgent activity’.753 However, the security situation around Rastan city,
located in northern Homs and southern Hama governorate, was described as ‘complicated’
due to the ongoing presence of anti-GoS armed groups, shelling between GoS forces andanti-GoS armed groups, and attacks on the road.754
ISIL activities in eastern Hama governorate
Gregory Waters and Charlie Winter observed in April 2021 that ISIL ‘is alive and well in central
Syria – specifically in the part of rural Homs, eastern Hama, southern Aleppo, southern Raqqa,
and western and southern Deir Ez-Zor that are collectively known as the Badia’.755 On 6 April
2021, ISIL conducted a large attack by launching multiple ambushes against civilians andsecurity forces on the highway along the east Hama-east Homs border, kidnapping more than
60 civilians which were later exchanged against detained ISIL family members. 756
According to the UN Secretary-General, ‘multiple parties’ suffered attacks by ISIL during April
and May 2021, resulting in ‘dozens of casualties’ in areas of Homs, Hama, Raqqah and Deir Ez-

escalation zone” | Russian jet strikes Kabana hills in northern Latakia, while rockets hit positions in southern I dlib
and western Hama, 24 July 2021, url; SOHR, Along with exchange of fire on Idlib frontlines / Opposition Factions
bombard regime positions in countryside of Latakia and Hama, 27 July 2021, url; SNHR, The Most Notable Human
Rights Violations in Syria in July 2021, 4 August 2021, url, p. 4; UN Security Council, Implementation of Security
Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449
(2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), S/2021/735, 18 August 2021 , url, p. 2; Syrian Documentation
Center, The Syrian army responds to the militants attacks in the countryside of “Hama” and “Idlib”, 14 August 2021,
url; SNHR, The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in September 2021, 4 October 2021, url, p. 3; Syrian
Documentation Center, Dead and wounded militants during targeting by the Syrian army on their positions in the
countryside of “Hama”, 9 November 2021, url; Syrian Documentation Center, The Syrian-Russian Air Force raids the
positions of the militants in the Hama and Idlib countryside, 3 January 2022, url; ACLED, Regional Overview: Middle
East 26 February-4March 2022, 10 March 2022, url; ACLED, Regional Overview: Middle East 19-25 March 2022, 31
March 2022, url; SNHR, The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in May 2022, 7 June 2022, url, p. 2
751
ANHA, Damascus troops shell positions in Sahl Al -Ghab north-west of Hama, 16 July 2022, url
752
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, Developments in north-west Syria and Ras Al Ain-Tell Abiad, Situation Report
No. 30, August 2021, 13 September 2021, url, p. 2753
Denmark, DIS, Syria, Security and Socioeconomic Situation in Homs Governorate [source: International security
organisation], May 2022, url, p. 25
754
Denmark, DIS, Syria, Security and Socioeconomic Situation in Homs Governorate, May 2022, url, pp. 25, 27
755
Waters, G. and Winter, C., Islamic State Under-Reporting in Central Syria: Misdirection, Misinformation, or
Miscommunication?, MEI, 2 September 2021, url
756
Waters, G., The Central Syria ISIS insurgency in 2021, January 2022, url, p. 4

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Zawr Governorates’.757 Reportedly, an attack by ISIL in June 2021 in eastern Hama was the lastattack against a GoS outpost, wounding a few soldiers and causing some material damage.758
In September 2021, ISIL attacked a joint GoS and Liwa Al Baqir position in the Ithariyah desert,
killing eight military forces.759 According to Gregory Waters and Charlie Winter, during thesecond half of 2021 ISIL cells ‘reportedly withdrew from east Hama’.760 In April 2022,
increased airstrikes by Russia against ISIL positions were recorded in Raqqa and Hama
governorates,761 whilst the UN recorded ‘sporadic attacks’ by ISIL, including against civilians,amongst others in Hama.762
Israeli airstrikes
In June 2021, Israeli airstrikes hit several military targets in central Syria, including in Hama
governorate.763 According to the SOHR, 12 Israeli airstrikes have been recorded across Syria
between the beginning of 2022 and 13 May 2022, two of which were reported in Hama.764
ACLED reported that in April and May 2022, airstrikes targeting positions of the IRGC,
Hezbollah, GoS and pro-Iran militias were conducted by Israel in western Hama. 765 During
another attack in May 2022, five Syrians were killed, including one civilian, and seven injured,
including a child,766 during Israeli missile attacks on reportedly Iranian-linked targets in Masyafarea.767
Russian air and drone strikes
In April 2021, an unidentified military drone, reportedly operated by Russia, killed one civilian
and wounded one other during a strike in the area of Kherbet Elnaqus. 768 The month of June
2021 was described as seeing an ‘unprecedented’ increase in ‘the pace of military
operations’769 in north-western Syria especially in ground bombardments, targeting populatedareas, which resulted also in counter-shelling by non-state armed factions and HTS.770 Further
airstrikes were reported to have taken place in September 2021 on areas in Hama ‘controlled

757

UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020), S/2021/583, 17 June
2021, url, para. 5. For more information on one of these attacks in May 2021 see Syrian Documentation Center, The
Syrian army responds to an ISI attack in Hama countryside, 10 May 2021, url
758
Waters, G., The Central Syria ISIS insurgency in 2021, January 2022, url, p. 4759
ACLED, Regional Overview: Middle East 4-10 September 2021, 16 September 2021, url
760
Waters, G., The Central Syria ISIS insurgency in 2021, January 2022, url, p. 5761
ACLED, Regional Overview: Middle East 16-22 April 2022, 28 April 2022, url; ACLED, Regional Overview: Middle
East 7-13 May 2022, 19 May 2022, url
762
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), S/2 022/492,
16 June 2022, url, para. 5
763
MEE, Syria: Israeli air strikes reportedly kill 11 pro-government fighters, 9 June 2021, url
764
SOHR, Israeli attacks in 2022 | 33 targets destroyed and nearly 70 people killed and wounded in 12 attacks sofar, 15 May 2022, url
765
ACLED, Regional Overview: Middle East 9-15 April 2022, 21 April 2022, url
766
SNHR, The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in May 2022, 7 June 2022, url, p. 4
767
International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Syria, May 2022, url
768
ACLED, Regional Overview: Middle East 17-23 April 2021, 28 April 2021, url
769
SNHR, The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in the First Half of 2021, 5 July 2021, url, p. 3
770
SNHR, The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in the First Half of 2021, 5 July 2021, url, p. 4

106

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

by rebels and Islamist factions’,771 and in October 2021 772 and in April 2022, with aconcentration in the western suburbs of Hama.773 On 22 April 2022, reportedly Russian
missiles partially destroyed an unused high school building in al Enkawi village in the western
suburbs of Hama governorate, which was, according to the SNHR, under ‘joint control’ of the‘Armed Opposition’ and HTS at the time of the attack.774
Turkish shelling
The month of June 2021 saw shelling conducted by Turkish forces on the Jourin military campand other military facilities housing Syrian military personnel. 775 Additional information
published within the reference period for this report could not be found within the time
constraints of this report.
(b)Security incidents

During the reporting period, there were 974 security incidents recorded by ACLED in Hama
governorate. Of these, 86 were coded as battles, 878 explosions/remote violence and 10
incidents of violence against civilians.776

Figure 13: Evolution of security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence andviolence against civilians in Hama governorate between 1 April 2021 and 1 August 2022,
based on ACLED data 777

771

ACLED, Regional Overview: Middle East 11-17 September 2021, 22 September 2021, url
SNHR, The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in October 2021, 4 November 2021, url, p. 4773
SNHR, The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in April 2022, 7 May 2022, url, p. 3
774
SNHR, The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in April 2022, 7 May 2022, url, p. 20
775
SNHR, The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in the First Half of 2021, 5 July 2021, url, p. 4
776
EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (12 August2022), url
777
EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (12 August2022), url
772

107

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMDistrict

Battles

Remote violence

Violence against
civilians

As-Salamiyeh

21

158

5

As-Suqaylabiyah

58

673

2

Hama

4

21

1

Masyaf3

10

2

Muhradah

-

16

-

Total

86

878

10

Figure 14: Security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against
civilians in Hama governorate between 1 April 2021 and 1 August 2022. Breakdown by
district based on ACLED data 778
By far, most security incidents recorded by ACLED were in As-Suqaylabiyah district, followedby As-Salamiyeh district. Significantly lower level of security incidents were documented in theother districts during the reporting period (see Figure 14).
A non-exhaustive list of security incidents that were reported to have taken place in Hama
governorate during the reference period for this report included the following:••

On 6 April 2021, some 60-70 civilians and members of the GoS-allied militia NDF were
kidnapped and a number of security forces members killed and injured by ISIL militants
near the Tuwaynan Dam, along the Homs-Hama border, with the majority freed laterthat same day in exchange for detained family members of ISIL fighters. 779
One fisherman was killed, another injured, when Russia fired a missile against the Asi
riverbanks on 19 April 2021.780 On the same day, a man was killed and another injured
as a result of a drone strike in the village of Khirbat al-Naqus.781

778

EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middl e East (12 August2022), url
779
Waters, G. and Winter, C., Islamic State Under-Reporting in Central Syria: Misdirection, Misinformation, or
Miscommunication?, MEI, 2 September 2021, url. Waters, G., The Central Syria ISIS insurgency in 2021, January2022, url, p. 23; UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191
(2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020 ) and 2533 (2020), S/2021/583,
17 June 2021, url, para. 5780
SNHR, The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in April 2021, 5 May 2021, url, p. 3
781
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020), S/2021/583, 17 June
2021, url, p. 19

108

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

•

•
•

•
•
•

•

Following an attack on Na’ur Jurin town by armed groups against a GoS military campon 20 June 2021, a two-year old girl was hit in the head by shrapnel and died, whilst
her father and brother sustained injuries.782
On 19 July 2021, 11 civilians were injured when a ground-based strike hit the village ofNa’ur Jurin in north-western rural Hama.783
Unguided artillery or rockets, originating from Jurin, under control of pro-GoS forces,
hit a house in Qastoun village, both in Hama countryside, on 7 August 2021, ‘killing
four children, and injuring nine others (eight children and one woman), all members of
the same family’.784
On 1 September 2021, a girl was killed as her building was under artillery shelling inNa’our Jourin village in the western suburbs of Hama governorate by HTS.785
Two civilians were injured when a strike hit a residential area in the village of Na’ur
Jurin in north-western rural Hama on 23 October 2021.786
On 30 October 2021, one civilian was killed, two children wounded, and homes andcivilian properties damaged, when ‘Turkish-backed armed factions’ fired rockets
against the town of Gorin in Al-Ghab Plain, north-western Hama.787
Three civilian men were killed following the explosion of ERW on 27 February 2022 in
the city of Salamiyah.788

782

UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/48/70, 13 August 2021, url, para. 66; UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council
resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018),
2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), S/2021/735, 18 August 2021 , url, p. 20
783
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (202 0), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), S/2021/735,
18 August 2021, url, p. 19
784
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syr ian Arab
Republic, A/HRC/49/77, 8 February 2022, url, p. 26
785
Syrian Documentation Center, A child victim and several injuries as a result of the armed men’s targeting of thetown of “Jorin” west of Hama, 1 September 2021, url; SNHR, On World Children’s Day: Tenth Annual Report on
Violations against Children in Syria, 20 November 2021, url, p. 35
786
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021),
S/2021/1029, 15 December 2021, url, p. 20
787
Syrian Documentation Center, Civilian casualties due to militants attacks on “Al -Ghab Plain”, Hama countryside,
30 October 2021, url
788
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), S/2022/330,
19 April 2022, url, p. 22

109

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM(c)

Civilian fatalities

Month

SNHR 2021

SNHR 2022

January

11

4

February

3

2

March

49

4

April

2

2

May

4

3

June

5

1

July

3

11

August6September

3

October1

November

1

December

-

Total

88

27

Figure 15: Civilian fatalities as a result of armed conflict in Hama governorate in 2021 andfirst seven months of 2022. Monthly breakdown based on SNHR data

110

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

In 2021, SNHR recorded 88 civilian fatalities 789 in Hama governorate while in the first sevenmonths of 2022 it documented 27 civilian fatalities (see Figure 15).790(d)

Conflict-related infrastructure damage and explosive remnants of war

In a report published in 2020, the UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia
(UNESCWA) and the University of St Andrews (United Kingdom) stated that Hama City
sustained 4.4 % of the total damage to physical capital in Syria.791 Based on the UN Syria MultiSector Needs Assessment of 2021, the Shelter Cluster assessed that in Hama governorate,
6.06 % of the overall population was living in damaged buildings. 792
According to UNOCHA, explosive ordnance contamination is ‘widespread’ in Hama
governorate.793 In March 2022 the Carter Center published a report mapping unexploded
ordnance in Syria between December 2012 and May 2021. According to the report, between
188 - 994 of explosive munitions were used in this period, contributing to ‘UXO contamination’of 19 000 – 56 750.794 Cluster munition attacks were documented in Hama governorate during2020 and the first quarter of 2021.795 The Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor documented
789

Based on data extracted from monthly reports on civilian fatalities published by SNHR. See: SNHR, Extrajudicial
Killing Claims the Lives of 113 Civilians, Including 36 Children, Six Women, and Three Victims Due to Torture, inJanuary 2021, 1 February 2021, url, p. 7; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 138 Civilians, Including
23 Children, 11 Women, and 14 Victims Due to Torture, in February 2021, 1 March 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR, Extrajudicial
Killing Claims the Lives of 177 Civilians, Including 28 Children, 35 Women, One Medical Worker, and 9 Victims Dueto Torture, in March 2021, 1 April 2021, url, p. 7; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 96 Civilians, Including
15 Children, 11 Women, and Nine Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in May 2021, 1 June 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR,
Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 723 Civilians in Syria in the First Half of 2021, 1 July 2021, url, p. 9; SNHR,
Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 129 Civilians, Including 44 Children, 17 Women, and 10 Victims Due toTorture, in Syria in July 2021, 1 August 2021, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 94 Civilians,
Including 32 Children, 10 Women, and Seven Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in August 2021, 1 September 2021, url,
p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 86 Civilians, Including 23 Children, Nine Women, and Eight
Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in September 2021, 1 October 2021, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims
the Lives of 84 Civilians, Including 22 Children, Four Women, and Seven Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in October
2021, 1 November 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 86 Civilians, Including 16Children, Eight Women, and Six Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in November 2021, 1 December 2021, url, p. 8;
SNHR, 1,271 Civilians, Including 299 Children, 134 Women, and 104 Victims of Torture, Killed in Syria in 2021, 1
January 2022, url, p. 13
790
Based on data extracted from monthly reports on civilian fatalities published by SNHR. See: SNHR, 69 Civilians,
Including 18 Children, Four Women and Eight Victims Due to Torture, Killed in Syria in January 2022, 1 February2022, url, p. 8; SNHR, 161 Civilians, Including 28 Children, Six Women and 66 Victims Due to Torture, Documented
Killed in Syria in February 2022, 1 March 2022, url, p. 9; SNHR, 67 Civilians, Including 20 Children, Three Women,
and Seven Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Killed in Syria in March 2022, 1 April 2022, url, p. 8; SNHR, 101
Civilians, Including 17 Children, 14 Women, and Six Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in
Syria in April 2022, 1 May 2022, url, p. 9; SNHR, 78 Civilians, Including 14 Children, 11 Women, and Eight Victims
Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in Syria in May 2022, 1 June 2022, url, p. 8; SNHR, 568
Civilians, Including 115 Children, 53 Women, and 101 Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in
Syria in the First Half of 2022, 2 July 2022, url, p. 12; SNHR, 86 Civilians, Including 21 Children, Eight Women, andFive Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in Syria in July 2022, 1 August 2022, url, p. 9
791
UNESCWA and University of St Andrews, Syria at War: Eight Years On, 8 January 2020, url, p. 51; The source
defines loss to physical capital as including ‘private and public construction and equipment, such as housing stock,schools, hospitals and factories, and power, water, sanitation, transport and communications infrastructure’.
UNESCWA and University of St Andrews, Syria at War: Eight Years On, 8 January 2020, url, p. 49
792
Shelter Cluster/UNHCR, Syrian Arab Republic: Whole of Syria Shelter/NFI Sector. Humanitarian Needs Overview
2022, 4 January 2022, url, p. 6793
UNOCHA, 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 12794
Carter Center (The), A Call for Action: Data on Unexploded Ordnance in Syria and Its Implications, December
2012 – May 2021, March 2022, url, pp. 20, 24
795
Mine Action Review, Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2021, 1 September 2021, url, p. 178

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

and categorised in Hama governorate 25 civilian casualties, 15 civilians killed and 40 civilians
injured & killed linked to 320 explosive incidents in the first quarter of 2021. 796 Non-exhaustive
documented incidents were reported in April, 797 May,798 July,799 October,800 November,801 andDecember 2021,802 where civilian deaths occurred due to explosions caused by landmines ormunitions remnants, mostly in the suburbs. In 2022, such incidents were reported (nonexhaustive) in February,803 March,804 April,805 and May,806 with most of the victims being
children.
(e)

Displacement and return

In 2021, in Hama governorate UNOCHA recorded approximately 5 200 IDP movements fromthe governorate, 820 IDP movements within the governorate, and about 1 200 IDP
movements to the governorate.807
UNOCHA’s 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview showed that, as of August 2021, there were
226 911 IDPs in Hama governorate, which was also the number of IDPs categorised as‘vulnerable residents’.808
In 2022, UNOCHA reported 212 IDP departures from and 98 arrivals to Hama governorate inJanuary,809 486 departures and 530 arrivals in February,810 219 departures and 212 arrivals in
March 2022811 and 184 departures and 62 arrivals in April 2022.812
In 2021 in Hama governorate, UNOCHA recorded 5 000 IDP returnee movements from thegovernorate, 13 000 returnee movements within the governorate and 2 000 IDP returnee

796

Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor, Syrian Arab Republic: Explosive Hazard R isks Governorate Profile, May
2021, url, Estimated # of civilians killed & injured per year [Open source data on explosive incidents since 2015] andEstimated # of explosive incidents by governorate, district & sub-district.
797
SNHR, The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in April 2021, 5 May 2021, url, p. 4; UN Security
Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014) , 2258 (2015), 2332
(2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020), S/2021/583, 17 June 2021, url, p. 19
798
SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 96 Civilians, Including 15 Children, 11 Women, and Nine Victims
Due to Torture, in Syria in May 2021, 1 June 2021, url, p. 4
799
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), S/20 21/735,
18 August 2021, url, p. 20
800
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021),
S/2021/1029, 15 December 2021, url, p. 20
801
SNHR, The Most Notable Human Rights Viol ations in Syria in November 2021, 4 December 2021, url, p. 4
802
SNHR, The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in December 2021, 4 January 2022, url, p. 4; Waters,G., The Central Syria ISIS insurgency in 2021, January 2022, url, p. 62
803
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), S/2022/330,
19 April 2022, url, p. 22804
SNHR, The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in March 2022, 7 April 2022, url, p. 4805
SNHR, The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in April 2022, 7 May 2022, url, p. 4806
SNHR, The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in May 2022, 7 June 2022, url, p. 4
807
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements Overview Jan – Dec 2021, 21 March 2022, url
808
UNOCHA, 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, pp. 23, 102
809
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements January 2022, 24 February 2022, url
810
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements February 2022, 11 April 2022, url
811
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements March 2022, 9 May 2022, url
812
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements April 2022, 15 June 2022, url

112

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

movements to the governorate.813 In 2022, UNOCHA recorded 247 spontaneous returns to
the governorate from locations within Hama and from outside in January,814 728 in February,815
and 594 in March,816 and 589 in April 2022.817

813

UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Spontaneous IDP Returnee Movements Overview, Jan – Dec 2021, 21 March
2022, url
814
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns January 2022, 24 February 2022, url
815
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns February 2022, 11 April 2022, url
816
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns March 2022, 9 May 2021, url
817
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns April 2022, 15 June 2022, url

113EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

2.4.

Latakia governorate

Map 10: © MapAction, Latakia governorate818

818

MapAction, Syria 2013-2015, Latakia Governorate [map], last updated: 29 July 2016, url

114

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

2.4.1.

General description of the governorate

Latakia governorate is situated in the north-west of the country and borders the Mediterranean
Sea on its western border. To the north, it shares an international border with Turkey. Latakia isbordered by Tartous to the south, Hama to the east, and Idlib to the north-east. Latakia is divided
into four administrative districts, from north to south: Latakia, Al-Haffa, Al-Qardaha, Jablah.819
The Syrian Central Bureau of Statistics estimated the population of Latakia governorate to beof 1 345 855 as of 2021.820 In a February 2022 report, UNOCHA estimated the population of
Latakia governorate to be of 1 274 433.821 For more information on the ethnic and religious
composition of Latakia’s population, see the EUAA COI Report: Syria - Security situation (July2021).

2.4.2.

Conflict background and armed actors

Latakia governorate is mainly controlled by GoS. Anti-GoS armed groups control a narrow sliceof territory in the north-eastern corner of the governorate limited by the Turkish border andadjoining the anti-GoS controlled areas in Idlib and Hama governorates. 822(a)Syrian Arab Army and affiliated armed groups

For the reference period of the report, information on the SAA deployments in Latakia
governorate could not be found. Information on particular SAA formations and units deployedin the governorate (before April 2021) is available in previous EUAA reports: EUAA COI Report:
Syria - Security situation (July 2021) and EUAA COI Report: Syria – Security situation (May 2020).
(b)

RussiaAccording to Jusoor for Studies, in late 2021/early 2022, Russian forces were deployed to threedifferent positions in GoS-controlled Latakia governorate.823 The Hmeimin Air Base, describedas Russia’s main base 824 , as well as one of ‘the main hubs’ (along the navy base in the port of
Tartous) for Russia’s military intervention in Syria825 is located in the governorate. However, it
has been estimated that ‘the Russian military is not well established outside the Hmeimin
Base,’826 and, in May 2022, there were reports that Russian forces had withdrawn to Hmeimin

819

UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic. Governorates Profiles, June 2014, url, p. 19
Syria, Central Bureau of Statistics, Estimate of the population in Syria by governorates, n.d, url
821
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview. Syrian Arab Republic, February 2022, url, p. 23
822
See the maps in Jusoor for Studies, Military Control in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022 [map], 24
December 2021, url; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on
the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url, p. 22 [Annex II] [map]; Liveuamap, Syria, as of 21 July
2022, url
823
See the map in Jusoor for Studies, Foreign Forces Points in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022 [map], 27
December 2021, url824
Daraj, Syria: Did Russia Allow Israel to Bomb Latakia Port?, 19 December 2021, url; Enab Baladi, Russia reduces
forces in Aleppo, transfers some to Hmeimim, 22 March 2022, url
825
VOA, Russia Expands Military Facilities in Syria, 12 May 2021, url826
Al Shami, I., Mapping Russian Soft Power: How Coastal Syrians Engage with Russia, WINEP, 26 May 2022, url
820

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Air Base and transferred other bases in Latakia governorate to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC) and Hezbollah.827
(c)

Iran

According to Jusoor for Studies, in late 2021/early 2022, Iranian forces were deployed to eight
different positions in GoS-controlled Latakia governorate. Jusoor’s map does not contain
information on the presence of Lebanese Hezbollah in the governorate.828 Back in March 2019,
media sources speculated that GoS had given Iran the right to administer the port of Latakia. 829
In May 2022, the International Crisis Group noted the reports according to which the control of
Russian bases in Latakia (the main Hmeimin base not included) had been transferred to IRGC
and Hezbollah.830(d)Anti-GoS armed groups

During the reference period, HTS strengthened its control over areas controlled by anti-GoS
armed groups in north-eastern Latakia governorate after forcing jihadist groups Jund al-Shamand Jund Allah to reduce their presence in the area. 831 For further information see thesubsection on ‘Infighting among anti-GoS armed groups.
(e)TurkeyAccording to Jusoor for Studies, in late 2021/early 2022, Turkish forces were deployed to two
positions in the north-eastern parts of Latakia governorate controlled by anti-GoS armed
groups.832 Turkish military posts have been established in the governorate in the context ofmonitoring the wider Idlib de-escalation zone.833

2.4.3.
(a)

Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population
Security trends during the reporting period

The conflict between GoS and anti-GoS armed groups
According to the Carter Center, between April and June 2021, incidents related to the conflict
between GoS and anti-GoS armed groups were reported also in Latakia governorate. 834 The UN
827

International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch – Syria, May 2022, url
See the map in Jusoor for Studies, Foreign Forces Points in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022 [map], 27
December 2021, url
829
See, e.g. L’Orient-Le Jour, L’Iran avance ses pions à Lattaquié, « terrain russe », 22 March 2019, url; Syrian
Observer (The), Iran to Take Lattakia Port, 18 March 2019, url
830
International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch – Syria, May 2022, url
831
COAR Global, Syria Update, 1 November 2021, url, p. 4; Enab Baladi, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham driving out foreign
factions, why?, 4 November 2021, url
832
See the map in Jusoor for Studies, Foreign Forces Points in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022 [map], 27
December 2021, url
833
See Asharq al-Awsat, Turkey Sets Up Military Post Near Latakia, 10 August 2020, url; NPA, New Turkish Military
Point Established in Latakia Countryside, Syria, 1 September 2020, url
834
See ‘Figure 4’ in Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review, April through June 2021, url, p. 4
828

116

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

Security Council reports ‘an increase in violence’ in the so-called Idlib de-escalation zone
between June and July 2021, in the context of which air assaults took place also in Latakia
governorate.835 In June 2021, HTS and other anti-GoS armed groups operating in Idlib deescalation area targeted GoS positions in the rural areas of northern Latakia with recurring
shelling.836 According to the Carter Center, 38 conflict events were reported in Latakia
governorate between July and September and 23 between October and December 2021. 837
The hostilities were concentrated in the north-eastern part of the governorate controlled by theanti-GoS armed groups.838
According to Etana Syria, in October 2021, an attempted GoS advance in Jabal al-Turkman area
in northern Latakia was repelled by anti-GoS armed groups. Russian airstrikes against targets innorthern Latakia were also reported. These and other Russian airstrikes targeting anti-GoS
areas in Idlib and Aleppo governorates caused wide ranging material damage and resulted incivilian casualties.839
Between January and March 2022, the Carter Center reported 24 conflict-related events in
Latakia governorate.840 As in 2021, the hostilities concentrated mainly in the north-eastern
corner of the governorate under anti-GoS armed groups.841 Between April and June 2022, theCarter Center reported 35 conflict-related events in Latakia governorate.842 As in the earlier
months of 2022, the hostilities were concentrated in the area controlled by the anti-GoS armed
groups in north-eastern Latakia.843
According to Etana Syria, in April 2022, Russian airstrikes were carried out in Latakia
governorate. In addition, shelling took place in Jabal al-Akrad area.844 In May 2022, Etana Syria
documented incidents of GoS shelling in northern Latakia governorate. 845 Hostilities were
documented in the area also in June 2022.846 These hostilities included shelling by HTS
targeting GoS-controlled town of Kassab on 15 June, intense shelling by GoS forces on 18 Junetargeting anti-GoS areas in Latakia governorate 847 and shelling by anti-GoS armed groups
targeting GoS positions in Jabal al-Akrad area.848

835

UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), 18 August
2021, url, para. 3
836
Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief: North-West Syria – 01 July 2021, 1 July 2021, url
837
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review, October-December 2021, url, p. 3
838
See ‘Figure 3’ in Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review, October -December 2021, url, p. 4
839
Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief: North-West Syria – 04 November 2021, 4 November 2021, url
840
Carter Center (The), The Quarterly Review on Syrian Military and Security Dynamics, January-March 2022, url,
p. 5
841
See ‘Figure 4’ in Carter Center (The), The Quarterly Review on Syrian Military and Security Dynamics, JanuaryMarch 2022, url, p. 6
842
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review of Syrian Political and Military Dynamics, April -June 2022, url, p. 2
843
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review of Syrian Political and Military Dynamics, April -June 2022, url, p. 7
844
Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief – North-West Syria – 28 April 2022, 28 April 2022, url
845
See the map on ‘Military Developments in North-West Syria’ in Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief – North-West Syria– 02 June 2022 [map], 2 June 2022, url
846
See the map on ‘Military Developments in North-West Syria’ in Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief: North-West Syria– 01 July 2022 [map], 1 July 2022, url
847
Al-Monitor, Idlib sees new escalation between Syrian government, opposition forces, 22 June 2022, url
848
Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief: North-West Syria – 01 July 2022, 1 July 2022, url

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

In mid-July 2022, SOHR reported mutual rocket and heavy machine gun fire between GoS
forces and anti-GoS armed groups of the Fath al-Mubin Operations Room.849 In late July 2022,
hostilities between GoS forces and Russia and anti-GoS armed groups escalated also in northeastern Latakia governorate, with anti-GoS armed groups bombing GoS-controlled areas in
Kabbana and Jabal al-Turkman region.850 In mid-August 2022, SOHR reported exchanges ofshelling and heavy machine-gun fire between GoS and anti-GoS armed groups along the
Kabbana frontline in northern Latakia’s Jabal al-Akrad region.851
Infighting among anti-GoS armed groups
According to the Carter Center, between October and December 2021, a military operation by
HTS targeting rival anti-GoS armed groups was reported in northern Latakia governorate. 852 The
hostilities broke out on 25 October 2021 between HTS and two jihadist groups, Jund al-Shamand Jund Allah,853 consisting for the most part of foreign fighters. 854 The goal of the operation
was reportedly to extend HTS’s control over the areas with alleged HAD and ISIL presence innorthern Latakia and western Idlib countryside. 855 The hostilities ended on 27 October 2021,
when, both, Jund al-Sham and Jund Allah members had withdrawn 856 their positions and HTS
took over the areas controlled by these groups in the Jabal al-Turkman region 857 and returnedto the frontlines between GoS and anti-GoS armed groups in Latakia governorate 858. However,the International Crisis Group reports that the crackdown on jihadist groups in eastern Latakia
and western Idlib governorates continued also in November 2021, with Jund Allah (still) as theprimary target.859 According to Al-Monitor, a security settlement between HTS and Jund Allah
was announced on 7 November 2021. In accord with this settlement, Jund Allah members wereto disarm and participate in a Sharia training course supervised by ETIM/TIP (for further
information on ETIM/TIP, see section 2.1.2.), after which they are allowed to reside in HTScontrolled areas as civilians.860
Israeli airstrikes
According to the International Crisis Group, Israeli missile strikes against ‘Iran-linked targets’
took place on 5 May 2021 in rural Latakia (and Hama) governorates, killing one civilian. 861
According to the UNCOI, two Israeli air strikes hit the port in Latakia during the reporting period
849

SOHR, De-escalation zone / Regime forces and Al-Fateh Al-Mubin factions trade fire on Jabal Al-Akrad and Sahl
Al-Ghab frontlines, 14 July 2022, url
850
Al-Monitor, Syrian escalation risks all-out conflict involving Turkey, Russia, Iran, 1 August 2022, url; SOHR, With
over 180 shells Factions shell 25 positions in regime areas in Aleppo, Idlib, Hama and Lattakia, 22 July 2022, url
851
SOHR, Renewed bombardment / Al-Fath Al-Mubin rebels and regime forces exchange fire on frontlines of Jabal
Al-Zawiyah, Sahl Al-Ghab and Jabal Al-Krad, 14 August 2022, url
852
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review, October-December 2021, url, p. 1
853
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review, October-December 2021, url, p. 5; COAR Global, Syria Update, 1
November 2021, url, p. 4
854
COAR Global, Syria Update, 1 November 2021, url, p. 4855
The Syrian Observer, Shishani Leaves and HTS Attacks Whoever Remains, 27 October 2021, url
856
According to the Syrian Observer, Jund al-Sham members moved to ETIM/TIP-controlled areas in rural Idlib
governorate. The Syrian Observer, Shishani Leaves and HTS Attacks Whoever Remains, 27 October 2021, url; Jund
Allah members were relocated to (SNA-controlled) Afrin. COAR Global, Syria Update, 1 November 2021, url, p. 4
857
COAR Global, Syria Update, 1 November 2021, url, p. 4
858
Enab Baladi, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham driving out foreign factions, why?, 4 November 2021, url
859
International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch – Syria, November 2021, url
860
Al-Monitor, HTS makes rival jihadis in Syria's Idlib take Sharia courses, give up weapons, 20 November 2021, url
861
International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Syria, May 2021, url

118

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

between July and December 2021.862 These attacks took place on 7 and 28 December 2021.863
According to the Guardian, the attack on 7 December targeted an Iranian arms shipment while
the origin of ‘arms and munitions’ targeted in the 28 December attack was uncertain. 864 The
International Crisis Group reports that two GoS affiliated militia members were killed in the laterattack.865 No civilian casualties were reported.
On 20 July 2022, Russian forces shot down two drones over Hmeimin Air Base. No casualties
or damage were reported.866(b)Security incidents

During the reference period, there were 192 security incidents recorded by ACLED in Latakia
governorate, of whom 49 were coded as battles, 141 explosions/remote violence and 2
incidents of violence against civilians.867

Figure 16. Evolution of security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence andviolence against civilians in Latakia governorate between 1 April 2021 and 1 August 2022,
based on ACLED data 868

862

UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, 8 February 2022, url, para 5863
Guardian (The), Israeli airstrike sets port of Latakia ablaze, says Syrian media, 2 8 December 2021, url;
International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Syria, December 2021, url
864
Guardian (The), Israeli airstrike sets port of Latakia ablaze, says Syrian media, 28 December 2021, url
865International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Syria, December 2021, url
866
New Arab (The), Russia says it shot down two drones over Hmeimim base in Syria, 21 July 2022, url; Reuters,
Russian forces in Syria shot down two drones aimed at air base - Interfax, 21 July 2022, url
867
EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (12 August2022), url
868
EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (12 August2022), url

119EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMDistrict

Battles

Remote violence

Violence against
civilians

Al-Hafa

40

102

-

Al-Qardaha

-

3

-

Jablah1

2-

Latakia

8

34

2

Total

49

141

2

Figure 17. Security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against
civilians in Latakia governorate between 1 April 2021 and 1 August 2022. Breakdown by
district based on ACLED data 869
Around 74% of all security incidents documented by ACLED in Latakia governorate during thereference period were recorded in Al-Hafa district (see Figure 17).

869

EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middl e East (12 August2022), url

120

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION(c)

Civilian fatalities

In 2021, SNHR recorded two civilian fatalities in Latakia governorate (both documented inAugust 2021) 870, while for the first seven months of 2022 no civilian fatalities were
documented.871(d)Conflict-related infrastructure damage and explosive remnants of war

According to WHO Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care (SSA), in the year 2021
several (2-3) attacks on healthcare were reported in Latakia governorate. SSA did not provide
additional details on these attacks.872 Between January and March 2022, WHO did not reportany attacks on healthcare in Latakia governorate. 873 The extent of conflict-related infrastructuredamage in Latakia governorate is discussed further in EUAA COI Report: Syria - Security
situation (July 2021).
According to Mine Action Review report published in September 2021, Latakia governorate has
experienced attacks with cluster munitions since 2012. 874 According to the Carter Center reportpublished in March 2022, explosive munitions have been used mainly in the northern parts of
Latakia governorate,875 and the governorate is contaminated by 3 000-9 250 UXO.876 According
870

Based on data extracted from monthly reports on civilian fatalities published by SNHR. See: SNHR, Extrajudicial
Killing Claims the Lives of 113 Civilians, Including 36 Chi ldren, Six Women, and Three Victims Due to Torture, inJanuary 2021, 1 February 2021, url, p. 7; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 138 Civilians, Including 23
Children, 11 Women, and 14 Victims Due to Torture, in February 2021, 1 March 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR, Extrajudicial
Killing Claims the Lives of 177 Civilians, Including 28 Children, 35 Women, One Medical Worker, and 9 Victims Dueto Torture, in March 2021, 1 April 2021, url, p. 7; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 96 Civilians, Including
15 Children, 11 Women, and Nine Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in May 2021, 1 June 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR,
Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 723 Civilians in Syria in the First Half of 2021, 1 July 2021, url, p. 9; SNHR,
Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 129 Civilians, Including 44 Children, 17 Women, and 10 Victims Due toTorture, in Syria in July 2021, 1 August 2021, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 94 Civilians,
Including 32 Children, 10 Women, and Seven Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in August 2021, 1 September 2021, url,
p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 86 Civilians, Including 23 Children, Nine Women, and Eight
Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in September 2021, 1 October 2021, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims theLives of 84 Civilians, Including 22 Children, Four Women, and Seven Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in October
2021, 1 November 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 86 Civilians, Including 16 Children,
Eight Women, and Six Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in November 2021, 1 December 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR, 1,271
Civilians, Including 299 Children, 134 Women, and 104 Victims of Torture, Killed in Syria in 2021, 1 January 2022, url,
p. 13
871
Based on data extracted from monthly reports on civilian fatalities published by SNHR. See: SNHR, 69 Civilians,
Including 18 Children, Four Women and Eight Victims Due to Torture, Killed in Syria in January 2022, 1 February2022, url, p. 8; SNHR, 161 Civilians, Including 28 Children, Six Women and 66 Victims Due to Torture, Documented
Killed in Syria in February 2022, 1 March 2022, url, p. 9; SNHR, 67 Civilians, Including 20 Children, Three Women,
and Seven Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Killed in Syria in March 2022, 1 April 2022, url, p. 8; SNHR, 101
Civilians, Including 17 Children, 14 Women, and Six Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in
Syria in April 2022, 1 May 2022, url, p. 9; SNHR, 78 Civilians, Including 14 Children, 11 Women, and Eight Victims
Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in Syria in May 2022, 1 June 2022, url, p. 8; SNHR, 568
Civilians, Including 115 Children, 53 Women, and 101 Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in
Syria in the First Half of 2022, 2 July 2022, url, p. 12; SNHR, 86 Civilians, Including 21 Children, Eight Women, andFive Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in Syria in July 2022, 1 August 2022, url, p. 9872
WHO/ Health Cluster, Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care. Syrian Arab Republic. Annual Report
2021, 3 February 2022, url, p. 2
873
WHO/ Health Cluster, Syrian Arab Republic: Attacks on health care in Syria, 1 Jan - 31 Mar 2022, 5 May 2022, url874
Mine Action Review, Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2021, 1 September 2021, url, p. 178
875
Estimation based on the map in Carter Center (The), A Call for Action: Data on Unexploded Ordnance in Syria
and Its Implications. December 2012 – May 2021, March 2022, url, p. 20 [map]876
Carter Center (The), A Call for Action: Data on Unexploded Ordnance in Syria and Its Implications. December
2012 – May 2021, March 2022, url, p. 20

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

to Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor report published in April 2021, landmines haveclaimed the lives of two people in Latakia governorate between March 2011 and March 2021.877(e)Displacement and return

UNOCHA stated that the number of IDPs in Latakia governorate was 449 317 (as of February2022).878 According to UNOCHA, approximately 7 000 IDPs were newly displaced in Latakia
governorate in 2021. Of these, around 5 000 were displaced within Latakia governorate whiledisplacements to Tartous (800) and Hama (200) were also registered. Around 6 000 IDPs fromother governorates were displaced to Latakia. Significant numbers of arrivals from Aleppo(2 000), Hama (900), Homs (900), Tartous (800), Rural Damascus (400), Damascus (400) andDar’a (200) were registered.879
Between January and June 2022, 3 339 IDPs were displaced from Latakia, of whom 2 330 weredisplaced within the governorate. In addition, 2 655 IDPs were displaced to Latakia from othergovernorates. UNOCHA estimates that, during the first half of 2022, access to services andlivelihoods was the main incentive for these and other IDP movements within Syria. 880
According to UNOCHA, 16 IDPs returned to their homes located in Latakia governorate in 2021,
all of them were those displaced within Latakia governorate. 881 In January 2022, approx. 1 600
IDPs returned to their homes in Latakia governorate, of whom all (1 600) were originallydisplaced within the governorate, while 200 IDPs returned from Latakia to othergovernorates.882 UNOCHA does not provide information on the factors determining these
returns.883 Between February and May 2022, no returns to Latakia governorate werereported.884

877Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor, Syria’s Landmines: Silent Killing, April 2021, url, p. 16
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview. Syrian Arab Republic, February 2022, url, p. 23
879
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements Overview, Jan - Dec 2021 (As of 31 December 2021), 21 March
2022, url
880
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements (January 2022), 24 February 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab
Republic: IDP Movements (February 2022), 11 April 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements(March 2022), 9 May 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements (April 2022), 15 June 2022, url;
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements (May 2022), 13 July 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP
Movements (June 2022), 5 August 2022, url
881
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Spontaneous IDP Returnee Movements Overview, Jan – Dec 2021 (As of 31
December 2021), 21 March 2022, url
882
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns (January 2022), 24 February 2022, url
883
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Spontaneous IDP Returnee Movements Overview, Jan – Dec 2021 (As of 31
December 2021), 21 March 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns (January 2022), 24
February 2022, url
884
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns (February 2022), 11 April 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian
Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns (March 2022), 9 May 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP
Spontaneous Returns (April 2022), 15 June 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns(May 2022), 13 July 2022, url
878

122

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

2.5.

Tartous governorate

Map 11: © MapAction, Tartous governorate map885

885

MapAction, Syria Governorate Maps – Tartous Governorate, last updated on 29 July 2019, url

123EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

2.5.1.

General description of the governorate

Tartous and Latakia governorates form the coastal region of Syria. Tartous governorate
borders the Mediterranean Sea in the west, Latakia governorate in the north, the governoratesof Hama and Homs in the east, and Lebanon in the south.886 It consists of five administrative
districts: Baniyas, Dreikish, Safita, Sheikh Badr and Tartous City,887 which are in turnsubdivided into 27 sub-districts.888 The governorate is considered a ‘regime stronghold’ andreferred to as an ‘island of stability’.889
The Syrian Central Bureau of Statistics estimated the population of Tartous governorate in
2021 to be 1 171 802.890 In a February 2022 report, UNOCHA estimated the population of
Tartous governorate to be 943 100.891
In a 2018 publication, the share of Alawites in Tartous City was estimated to be 80 %.892
In 2017, Syria and Russia signed a 49-year lease agreement, allowing an automatic renewal for
another 25 years for the development and modernisation of a Russian permanent naval base(first established in 1971) 893 in the port of Tartous – the ‘only navy facility the Kremlin possesses
outside the former Soviet Union’,894 and which grants Russia a ‘symbolic “power projection”
into the Mediterranean Sea’,895 the Middle East and North Africa.896 According to a news reportof September 2021, a ‘sizable’ naval contingent is based at the port supporting Russian air andground operations in Syria.897 For example, it was reported in June 2021, that the Russian
military conducted naval manoeuvres off the coast of Tartous governorate, including the‘search for enemy submarines and repelling air attacks’. 898

2.5.2.

Conflict background and armed actors

The governorate saw violent incidents in the earlier years of the conflict, especially in 2011 and2013 when there were ‘violent clashes in the Sunni-majority city of Baniyas’, and in 2016 when
ISIL targeted Tartous city in a number of separate bomb attacks, killing almost 100 people. 899
According to section 2.5.3.1 of the EUAA COI Report: Syria - Security situation (May 2020)
886

UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, Tartous governorate, January 2016, url
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic – Governorates Profiles, June 2014, url, p. 31
888
UNHCR, UNHCR Syria / Tartous FO, End of year 2017 / Factsheet, January – December 2017, url, p. 1
889
Haider, S., Kinship Ties in Safe Areas During the Syrian Conflict: The Case of Tartous, MED, 12 May 2022, url,
p. 5
890
Syria, Central Bureau of Statistics, Estimate of the population in Syria by governorates, n.d., url
891
UNOCHA, 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 23
892
Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, WINEP, 2018, url, p. 38
893
RIAC, Turkish and Russian Approaches to Security in the Eastern Mediterranean, 10 November 2020, url. For
more detailed information and analysis see Kjellen, J. and Lund, A., From Tartous to Tobruk, The Return of Russian
Sea Power in the Eastern Mediterranean, FOI, 11 February 2022, url
894
VOA, Russia Expands Military Facilities in Syria, 12 May 2021, url
895
McDermott, R., Moscow plans enhanced military basing in Syria, Jamestown Foundation, 3 June 2020, url
896
ISW, Jennifer Cafarella, Testimony before US House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on Middle East, North Africa and Global Counterterrorism, “10 years of war: examining the ongoing
conflict in Syria”, 15 April 2021, url, p. 7
897
RFE/RL, Putin, Assad Meet For First Time in Over A Year, 14 September 2021, url
898
Syrian Documentation Center, Russian military exercises on the Syrian coasts, 30 June 2021, url
899
Reuters, Bombs kill nearly 150 in Syrian government-held cities: monitor, 23 May 2016, url; Al Jazeera, Syria’s
war: Blasts hit Tartous, Homs, Hasaka, 6 September 2016, url
887

124

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

there were two security incidences recorded in 2019, whilst only one security incident(‘violence against civilians’) was recorded between 1 January 2020 and 31 March 2021 – seesection 2.5.3 of the EUAA COI Report: Syria - Security situation (July 2021).
During the reference period, the whole of Tartous governorate was under GoS control.900
For a detailed background overview of the conflict preceding March 2020 please consult
section 2.5.2 of the EUAA COI Report: Syria - Security situation (May 2020).
(a)Syrian Arab Army and affiliated armed groups

Very limited specific information was found on the SAA and its affiliated armed groups among
the sources consulted within time constraints. For deployments of the SAA in Tartous
governorate as of May 2021 see section 2.5.2 of the EUAA COI Report: Syria - Security situation(July 2021).
According to the sources interviewed by the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting
Project (OCCRP), the Syrian president’s brother Maher al-Assad, who is commander of the
SAA’s 4th Armoured Division,901 controls the coastal cities of Latakia and Tartous, whose official
and unofficial ports have been considered a hotbed for smuggling of illegal goods into andout of Syria, which in turn are used to finance militias under GoS control.902(b)RussiaWhilst the presence of Russian naval and airforce was noted,903 very limited additional
information published within the referencing period for this report stating the composition,
strength and additional locations of Russian forces in Tartous governorate could be foundamong the sources consulted within time constraints of this report. For such information as of
May 2021 see section 2.5.2 of the EUAA COI Report: Syria - Security situation (July 2021).
According to a map by Jusoor for Studies displaying foreign military points in Syria at the turnof the year 2021/22, Russia had one stationing site in Tartous governorate.904
In February 2022 it was reported that six large assault ships by the Russian Navy 905 had arrived
at the port of Tartous, whose location was considered the ‘logistical center of the Russian
Navy’.906

900

See the maps in Jusoor for Studies, Military Control in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022 [map], 24
December 2021, url; UN, Syrian Arab Republic: Approximate areas of influence as of December 2021, January2022, url; Liveuamap, Syria, as of 21 July 2022, url
901
Alghadawi, A., The Fourth Division: Syria’s parallel army, MEI, 24 September 2021, url
902
OCCRP, Assad regime implicated in massive Captagon bust, 13 July 2020, url
903
For example VOA, Russia Expands Military Facilities in Syria, 12 May 2021, url; SOHR, Russian Naval Ships Arriveat Syria’s Tartus, 5 February 2022, url; MEE, Russia's defence minister arrives in Syria ahead of naval drills, 15
February 2022, url; SNHR, The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in February 2022, 4 Ma rch 2022, url,
p. 3
904
Jusoor for Studies, Foreign Forces Points in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022, 27 December 2021, url
905
SOHR, Russian Naval Ships Arrive at Syria’s Tartus, 5 February 2022, url; MEE, Russia's defence minister arrives
in Syria ahead of naval drills, 15 February 2022, url; SNHR, The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in
February 2022, 4 March 2022, url, p. 3
906
SNHR, The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in February 2022, 4 March 2022, url, p. 3

125EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM(c)

Anti-GoS armed groups

According to an international security organisation and an expert at Omran Center for
Strategic Studies, both interviewed in October 2020, anti-GoS groups were not present in thegovernorate of Tartous.907 No further information on the presence of anti-GoS armed groups
was found during the reference period.

2.5.3.
(a)

Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population
Security trends during the reporting period

Two Israeli airstrikes have been documented in the reporting period. 908
On 3 November 2021, Israel’s military targeted Tartous City with airstrikes aiming to hit Iran controlled arms depots,909 whilst injuring two soldiers.910 On 2 July 2022, Israeli airstrikes
south of Tartous, near the town of al-Hamidiyah, hit former poultry farms reportedly now usedby Lebanon’s Hezbollah,911 wounding two civilians.912(b)Security incidents

During the reference period, there were six security incidents recorded by ACLED in Tartous
governorate, of whom one was coded as battle, three incidents of remote violence and 2 ofviolence against civilians (see Figure 18).

District

Battles

Remote violence

Violence against
civilians

Banyas-1-

Safita--2

Tartous

1

2

-

Total

1

3

2

907

DIS, Syria – security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Tartous, Latakia and Quneitra [original
sources: International security organisation (p. 40) and Omran (p. 52 ), 18 December 2020, url, p. 40 and 52
908
SOHR, SOHR: Syria says Israel struck near Homs, Tartus in the third alleged attack in 2 weeks, 10 November
2021, url;
MEE, Israel strike on Syria hits poultry farms, wounds two civilians, ministry says, 2 July 2022, url
909
SOHR, SOHR: Syria says Israel struck near Homs, Tartus in the third alleged attack in 2 weeks, 10 November
2021, url
910
International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch - Syria, November 2021, url
911
MEE, Israel strike on Syria hits poultry farms, wounds two civilians, ministry says, 2 July 2022, url
912
Al Jazeera, Syria says Israeli strike on Tartous coast wounds two civilians, 2 July 2022, url

126

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

Figure 18: Security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against
civilians in Tartous governorate between 1 April 2021 and 1 August 2022. Breakdown by
district based on ACLED data 913
Within the time constraints and during the reference period for this report, illustrative security
incidents targeting or impacting civilians could not be found among the sources consulted
beyond those relating to the Israeli airstrike wounding two civilians in July 2022 and reported
on further above.
(c)

Civilian fatalities

SNHR did not record any civilian fatalities in Tartous either in 2021 914 or the first seven monthsof 2022.915(d)Conflict-related infrastructure damage and explosive remnants of war

According to Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor, in all governorates, with the exception of
Tartous governorate, cluster munitions have been extensively used since 2012. 916 The same

913

EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (12 August2022), url
914
Based on data extracted from monthly reports on civilian fatalities published by SNHR. See: SNHR, Extrajudicial
Killing Claims the Lives of 113 Civilians, Including 36 Children, Six Women, and Three Victims Due to Torture, inJanuary 2021, 1 February 2021, url, p. 7; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 138 Civilians, Including 23
Children, 11 Women, and 14 Victims Due to Torture, in February 2021, 1 March 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR, Extrajudicial
Killing Claims the Lives of 177 Civilians, Including 28 Children, 35 Women, One Medical Worker, and 9 Victims Dueto Torture, in March 2021, 1 April 2021, url, p. 7; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 96 Civilians, I ncluding
15 Children, 11 Women, and Nine Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in May 2021, 1 June 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR,
Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 723 Civilians in Syria in the First Half of 2021, 1 July 2021, url, p. 9; SNHR,
Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 129 Civilians, Including 44 Children, 17 Women, and 10 Victims Due toTorture, in Syria in July 2021, 1 August 2021, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 94 Civilians,
Including 32 Children, 10 Women, and Seven Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in August 2021, 1 September
2021, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 86 Civilians, Including 23 Children, Nine Women, andEight Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in September 2021, 1 October 2021, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims
the Lives of 84 Civilians, Including 22 Children, Four Women, and Seven Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in October
2021, 1 November 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 86 Civilians, Including 16Children, Eight Women, and Six Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in November 2021, 1 December 2021, url, p. 8
915
Based on data extracted from monthly reports on civilian fatalities published by SNHR. See: SNHR, 1,271
Civilians, Including 299 Children, 134 Women, and 104 Victims of Torture, Killed in Syria in 2021, 1 January 2022, url,
p. 13; SNHR, 69 Civilians, Including 18 Children, Four Women and Eight Victims Due to Torture, Killed in Syria in
January 2022, 1 February 2022, url, p. 8; SNHR, 161 Civilians, Including 28 Children, Six Women and 66 Victims Dueto Torture, Documented Killed in Syria in February 2022, 1 March 2022, url, p. 9; SNHR, 67 Civilians, Including 20
Children, Three Women, and Seven Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Killed in Syria in March 2022, 1 April
2022, url, p. 8; SNHR, 101 Civilians, Including 17 Children, 14 Women, and Six Victims Who Died Due to Torture,
Were Documented Killed in Syria in April 2022, 1 May 2022, url, p. 9; SNHR, 78 Civilians, Including 14 Children, 11
Women, and Eight Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in Syria in May 2022, 1 June 2022,
url, p. 8; SNHR, 568 Civilians, Including 115 Children, 53 Women, and 101 Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were
Documented Killed in Syria in the First Half of 2022, 2 July 2022, url, p. 12; SNHR, 86 Civilians, Including 21
Children, Eight Women, and Five Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in Syria in July 2022, 1
August 2022, url, p. 9916
Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor, Syria impact, last updated: 15 November 2021, url

127EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

source did not record any civilian casualties (injured or killed) linked to four explosive incidents
in the first quarter of 2021.917(e)Displacement and return

In 2021, UNOCHA recorded in Tartous governorate approximately 1 000 IDP movements fromthe governorate, 3 000 IDP movements within the governorate, and 4 000 IDP movements to
the governorate.918 UNOCHA showed that, as of August 2021, there were 182 297 IDPs in
Tartous governorate, who were also classified as ‘vulnerable residents’.919
In 2022, UNOCHA reported 85 IDP departures from Tartous governorate in January,920 70 in
February,921 65 in March922 and 114 in April 2022923.
As regards returns, UNOCHA in 2021 recorded for Tartous governorate approximately 1 000
IDP returnee movements from the governorate, and no IDP returnee movements within thegovernorate nor to the governorate.924 In 2022, UNOCHA reported no spontaneous returns to
the governorate from locations within Tartous and outside in January,925 February,926 March927
or April 2022.928

917

Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor, Syrian Arab Republic: Explosive Hazard Risks Governora te Profile, May
2021, url, Estimated # of civilians killed & injured per year [Open source data on explosive incidents since 2015] andEstimated # of explosive incidents by governorate, district & sub-district
918
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements Overview Jan – Dec 2021, 21 March 2022, url
919
UNOCHA, 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 104
920
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements January 2022, 24 February 2022, url
921
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements February 2022, 11 April 2022, url
922
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements March 2022, 9 May 2022, url
923
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements April 2022, 15 June 2022, url
924
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Spontaneous IDP Returnee Movements Overview, Jan – Dec 2021, 21 March
2022, url
925
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns January 2022, 24 February 2022, url
926
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns February 2022, 11 April 2022, url
927
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns March 2022, 9 May 2022, url
928
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns April 2022, 15 June 2022, url

128

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

2.6.

Homs governorate

Map 12: © MapAction, Homs governorate map929

2.6.1.

General description of the governorate

Homs governorate is located in central Syria and has borders with Iraq to the east and
Lebanon to the west. It has internal borders with Deir Ez-Zor, Raqqa, Hama, Tartous, and Rural
Damascus governorates.930 The Syrian E-Government website stated that Homs governorateshares an international border with Jordan to the east as well. 931 UNOCHA mentioned in a
February 2022 report that Homs governorate comprised six administrative districts: Homs, AlMakhrim, Al-Qusayr, Ar-Rastan, Tadmor (Palmyra) and Tall Kalakh.932 Homs was the largest
governorate in Syria in terms of surface, and the third in terms of population, as of May 2014.
The capital of the governorate is Homs city which is also the central city of Homs district. 933
The Syrian Central Bureau of Statistics estimated the population of Homs governorate in 2021
to be 1 790 376.934 In a February 2022 report, UNOCHA estimated the population of Homs

929

MapAction, Homs Governorate, 29 July 2016, url
UNCS and UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Reference Map, 17 January 2013, url
931
Syria, E-Government, ‫[ عن سورية‬About Syria], n.d., url
932
UNOCHA, 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 102
933
UN Habitat and SDC, City Profile – Homs: Multi Sector Assessment, May 2014, url, p. 5
934
Syria, Central Bureau of Statistics, Estimate of the population in Syria by governorates, n.d, url
930

129

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

governorate to be 1 520 596.935 With regards to the capital of the governorate, the CIA
estimated that the population of Homs city was 1 398 000 in June 2022.936 For more
information on the ethnic and religious composition of Homs population, see the EUAA COI
Report: Syria - Security situation (July 2021).
In 2015, Homs City was reported to be one of the country’s most important industrial centres.
Reportedly, Syria’s largest oil refinery stood there, and the city was also a ‘hub of an importan t
road and rail network’ linking the country’s s main towns and cities. 937 Homs was also reported
to have a strategic importance for GoS because it connected the capital Damascus withcoastal GoS strongholds.938 In 2019, it was reported that Homs governorate had two oil fields(Hayan and Jazal) as well as seven gas fields. 939 Furthermore, in June 2022, the first gas wellin a gas field in Zumlat al-Muhr, which was reportedly discovered in late 2021, wasinaugurated in Homs governorate.940

2.6.2.

Conflict background and armed actors

The city of Homs was among the most impacted cities in the war. Its old part suffered a twoyear-long siege till it became accessible again in May 2014. 941 Sectarian violence and forced
displacement occurred there in 2011 and only few neighbourhoods maintained their mixed
sectarian elements such as Al-Waer, Ikrima, and Id-Dikhar.942 In May 2017, the SAA captured
the totality of Homs city and hundreds of rebels and their family members were evacuated.943
In early 2018, the SAA launched a military operation in northern rural Homs 944 which forced therebel groups in the region to either negotiate their exit to northern Syria or to reconcile with
the GoS.945 The GoS forces seized the last rebel enclave in Homs on 15 May 2018,946 andbuses evacuated rebels and their families from the region to northern Syria. 947 For more
information on the background of the conflict in Homs governorate up until April 2021, see theprevious EUAA COI Report: Syria - Security situation (July 2021).
935

UNOCHA, 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 23
US, CIA, World Factbook, Syria, last updated: 7 June 2022, url
937
BBC News, Homs: Syrian revolution's fallen 'capital', 9 December 2015, url
938
Reuters, Battles intensify in Syria's strategic city of Homs, 8 July 2013, url; New Humanitarian (The), Decoder:
The Battle for Khaldiyeh, 30 July 2013, url
939
BBC Arabic, ‫[ الثروات الموجودة في مناطق سيطرة األكراد شرق سوريا‬Resources in the Kurds-controlled areas in eastern
Syria], 7 October 2019, url
940
COAR, Recent Tensions Highlight the Enduring Syrian Refugee Crisis, 13 June 2022, url
941
UN Habitat and SDC, City Profile – Homs: Multi Sector Assessment, May 2014, url, pp. 3, 4942
Saleh, M., ‫ الطائفية و مجزرة الساعة في حمص‬:‫[ حوار مع محمد (أبو علي) صالح‬Dialogue with Muhammad (Abu Ali) Saleh:
Sectarianism and the Clock Massacre in Homs], 14 June 2019, url; Muhammad Saleh is a Marxist Syrian writer andactivist.
943
Reuters, Syrian rebels leave last opposition district in Homs, 21 May 2017, url; France24, Assad regime regains
total control of Syrian city of Homs, 21 May 2017, url
944
AA, Assad begins attacks to retake rebel-held areas in Homs, 20 April 2018, url
945
Enab Baladi, After Daraa, seeds of unrest in Homs, 24 August 2021, url; RFE/RL, Syrian Rebels Accept RussianBrokered Surrender Deal In Homs Enclave, 3 May 2018, url; VOA, Syrian Government Seizes Last Rebel Enclave inHoms, 15 May 2018, url; AP News, Syrian government forces seize last rebel enclave in Homs, 15 May 2018, url
946
AP News, Syrian government forces seize last rebel enclave in Homs, 15 May 2018, url
947
Homs News, ‫ م‬2018 ‫[بانوراما األحداث التي مرت بها حمص عام‬Panorama of the main events that Homs witnessed in2018], 31 December 2018, url; Syria Direct, Rebel forces and civilians begin evacuating besieged Homs countryside:‘We don’t want another Ghouta’, 7 May 2018, url; Reuters, Rebels begin evacuation of Syria's last besieged enclave,
7 May 2018, url
936

130

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

In a map produced by the UN, as of December 2021 the majority of Homs governorate wasshown to be under GoS control, with some ISIL presence in the east of the governorate.948 The
map further shows a so-called US-declared 55-km exclusion zone949 stretching between thesoutheast of the governorate and neighbouring Rural Damascus governorate around Tanf,950
controlled by US troops and Mughawir al-Thawra (MaT),951 a rebel group952 consisting offormer Syrian military officers.953
According to a Syrian human rights organisation interviewed by DIS, the GoS had control oftowns in eastern parts of the governorate, including Tadmor and Al-Sukhna. The old city ofHoms was controlled by different GoS intelligence services. Furthermore, in northern Homs
governorate, GoS forces were in control of government buildings and police stations, while
former rebel fighters who had reconciled with the government were in control of the rest ofthat area and the cities.954 The Lebanese Hezbollah controlled the area in and around AlQusayr city, southwest of Homs city.955
In March 2022 , an analysis published by MEI reported that Iran controlled parts of the borderalong Homs governorate to the east.956 Outside of the urban areas and towns in the Badia957
desert, ISIL was present, according to DIS sources. The group reportedly operated northeastof Tadmor, around Abu Rajmin, which included regions 30 to 50 km east of Homs city. 958
Below is a description of the actors present on the ground in Homs governorate and theirplaces of deployment where information is available.
(a)Syrian Arab Army and affiliated armed groups

For deployments of the SAA in in Homs governorate as of May 2021 see section 2.6.2 of theprevious EUAA COI Report: Syria - Security situation (July 2021).
In February 2021, it was reported that the SAA had ‘fixed military posts’ manned by the 18th
Division, the 11 th Division-Tanks, the Badia National Defense, Military Security Shield Forces,
and the 4th Division’s Security Office in Al-Sukhna, where the Iranian Baqir Brigade and the948

UN, Syrian Arab Republic: Approximate areas of influence as of December 2021 [Map], January 2022, url
UN, Syrian Arab Republic: Approximate areas of influence as of December 2021 [Map], January 2022, url
950
Liveuamap, Syria, as of 21 July 2022, url; UN, Syrian Arab Republic: Approximate areas of influence as ofDecember 2021 [Map], January 2022, url
951
USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress
January 1, 2022 – March 31, 2022, 3 May 2022, url, p. 64
952
Edwards, M., and Al-Homsi, O., Jordan returns refugees to desolate Syrian border camp, rights groups cry foul,
TNH, 16 September 2020, url
953
WINEP, D., The Future of al-Tanf Garrison in Syria, WINEP, 6 December 2021, url
954
Denmark, DIS, Syria – Security and Socioeconomic Situation in Homs Governorate [source: Syri an human rights
organisation interviewed by DIS], May 2022, url, pp. 27-28
955
Denmark, DIS, Syria – Security and Socioeconomic Situation in Homs Governorate [source: Syrian human rights
organisation interviewed by DIS], May 2022, url, p. 27; Enab Baladi, Eight years under Hezbollah’s rule: al -Qusayr
today, 21 June 2021, url
956
Hassan, M. and Al-Ahmed, S., Iran’s growing presence in Syria’s al -Hasakah poses a direct threat to US forces,
MEI, 24 March 2022, url
957‘Parts of rural Homs, eastern Hama, southern Aleppo, southern Raqqa, and western and southern Deir ez-Zor […]are collectively known as the Badia’. Waters, G. and Winter, C., Islamic State Under-Reporting in Central Syria:
Misdirection, Misinformation, or Miscommunication?, MEI, 2 September 2021, url
958
Denmark, DIS, Syria – Security and Socioeconomic Situation in Homs Governorate [source: Syrian human rights
organisation interviewed by DIS], May 2022, url, p. 28
949

131

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Quick Reaction Force, both affiliated with the Badia Security Branch functioning under the
Military Security in Tadmor city, were reportedly present too. 959 In August 2021, Enab Baladi
reported that GoS had increased the number of military troops and equipment in the city ofHoms and northern rural Homs.960
A security analyst for an NGO working in GoS-held areas stated, in a February 2022 report,that Military Intelligence in northern Homs had a ‘robust presence’ in Talbiseh and Rastan. 961 In
March 2022, due to a major operation against ISIL cells,962 the GoS dispatched reinforcementsfrom its Special Forces and the Desert Commandos Regiment to eastern rural Homs, inparticular to Tadmor and Al-Sukhna. In support of the operation, Iranian militias too sent ‘huge
military reinforcements’ there. This included the dispatch of ‘large numbers’ of the Afghan
Fatemiyoun 963 militia and the Iraqi militia Al-Nujaba from Deir Ez-Zor, Raqqa and Hama
governorates. Russia also sent major reinforcements from the NDF militias in Hama to Tadmorin March 2022.964 Reportedly, the Zainabiyoun militia, the Iraqi Hezbollah and the 47th
Regiment as well as Division 17 participated in the operation in the area’s Jabal Ma’moor
region.965
The presence of NDF was reported in the eastern countryside of Homs governorate. 966
Russian forces and the Russian-backed Syrian 5th Corps 967 started withdrawing or regrouping
from some positions in Homs governorate in early 2022.968 The large Mahin depot for militaryarms east of Homs city was turned over to the Hezbollah and Iran-backed militias in April
2022, after the Russian forces and the 5th Corps withdrew to the military airport in Tadmor. In
mid-April, they withdrew from there too and turned the military airport over to Iranian backed
militias.969 Also, an Enab Baladi article published in March 2022 indicated that the 5 th Corps
had a presence in the Tadmor desert.970
Furthermore, a May 2022 Baladi News article indicated that dozens of Iranian militias wereoperating in Homs governorate, particularly in Tadmor and its surroundings. According to thearticle, this region was ‘practically completely under Iranian control’. 971 The Fatemiyoun
Brigade, together with GoS forces and other pro-Iranian militias, reportedly held the Tiyas
959

Enab Baladi, Al-Sukhna predominated by security chaos as regime and Iranian forces grapple with IS, 20
February 2021, url
960
Enab Baladi, After Daraa, seeds of unrest in Homs, 24 August 2021, url
961
Hall, N., Rescuing Aid in Syria, CSIS, 15 February 2022, url, p. 34
962
Baladi News, ‫[ خسائر كبيرة لقوات النظام في حمص‬Heavy losses for the regime forces in Homs], 10 March 2022, url
963
MEMO, Iran sends military reinforcements to Syria's Homs, 16 March 2022, url
964
MEMO, Iran sends military reinforcements to Syria's Homs, 16 March 2022, url
965
Baladi News, ‫[ خسائر كبيرة لقوات النظام في حمص‬Heavy losses for the regime forces in Homs], 10 March 2022, url
966
For example, Baladi News, ‫ هجوم جديد يستهدف قوات النظام بريف حمص‬..‫[ تكبدت خسائر مادية وبشرية‬Human and material
loss: another attack on regime forces in Homs countryside], 24 December 2021, url; Baladi News, ‫تحت أنظار الطائرات‬‫ هجوم مسلح يخلف خسائر بصفوف ميليشيا "الدفاع الوطني" شرق حمص‬..‫[ الروسية‬Under the gaze of Russian airplanes: armed
attack causes losses in the ranks of the ‘National Defense’ militia east of Homs], 15 November 2021, url
967
MEMO, Russia, Iran-backed militias clash in Syria's Palmyra, 5 May 2022, url; Enab Baladi, Homs: Hezbollah joins
recruitment market, Fifth Corps most preferred by needy youth, 24 March 2022, url
968
Syria Direct, Amid war in Ukraine - Russia withdraws and Iran expands in Syria, 4 May 2022, url
969
Syria Direct, Amid war in Ukraine - Russia withdraws and Iran expands in Syria, 4 May 2022, url
970
Enab Baladi, Homs: Hezbollah joins recruitment market, Fifth Corps most preferred by needy youth, 24 March
2022, url
971
Baladi News, ‫ب هللا" واشتباكات بين الحرس الثوري و"الدفاع الوطني‬.‫ خسائر لـ "حـز‬..‫[ " حمص‬Homs: Hezbollah’s losses andclashes between the IRGC and the National Defense Forces], 4 May 2022, url

132

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

airbase (T4 airbase).972 Furthermore, Afghan and Iraqi militias under IRGC command reportedly
controlled the road connecting Deir Ez-Zor and Homs, while the road between Homs city andTadmor was controlled by the 4 th Division of the SAA.973 The presence of Russian-backed
private security companies in Homs governorate was noted in the reference period, without
additional details.974(b)Lebanese Hezbollah

A Syrian human rights organisation interviewed by DIS in April 2022 reported that the
Lebanese Hezbollah controlled the area in and around Al-Qusayr city, southwest of Homs
city.975 In late March 2022, it was reported that the IRGC had seized the Zumlat al-Muhr gas
field in the desert in Homs from GoS. Reportedly then, Hezbollah, on orders of the IRGC
dispatched its forces to the gas field 976 to turn it into a military base.977
(c)

ISIL

ISIL maintained pockets in Homs governorate.978 ISIL cells were reportedly present in the
Syrian Badia region,979 ‘primarily in the central Badia desert in Homs’980 where they extended
through the eastern countryside of Homs and Hama and reached the rural areas of Deir EzZor and Raqqa.981 From there, it continued to launch attacks in the named governorates. 982 In
July 2022, the UN Security Council reported that ISIL had mounted ‘sporadic attacks’ in Syria,
which were focused on a number of Syrian governorates, including the eastern part of Homs

972

ACLED, Regional Overview – Middle East (2-8 October 2021), 13 October 2021, url
Denmark, DIS, Syria – Security and Socioeconomic Situation in Homs Governorate [source: Syrian human rights
organisation interviewed by DIS], May 2022, url, p. 28
974
Waters, G. The Central Syria ISIS Insurgency in 2021, January 2022, url, p. 3975
Denmark, DIS, Syria – Security and Socioeconomic Situation in Homs Governorate [source: Syrian human rights
organisation interviewed by DIS], May 2022, url, p. 27
976
COAR, Recent Tensions Highlight the Enduring Syrian Refugee Crisis, 13 June 2022, url
977
Ayn al-Furat, ‫[ حـزب هللا اللبـناني ينشر عنـاصره في حقل زملة المهر ببادية حمص بأوامـر من الحـرس الثـوري اإليـراني‬The LebaneseHezbollah dispatches its forces to the Zumlat al-Muhr field in the Badia of Homs, on orders of the IRGC], March
2022, url
978
Baladi News, ‫ هجوم جديد يستهدف قوات النظام بريف حمص‬..‫[ تكبدت خسائر مادية وبشرية‬Human and material loss: anotherattack on regime forces in Homs countryside], 24 December 2021, url; Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review |October-December 2021, 28 March 2021, url, p. 13; UN Security Council, Fourteenth report of the Secretary-Generalon the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts insupport of Member States in countering the threat, S/2022/63, 28 January 2022, url, para. 29; Netherlands (The),
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of origin information report Syria, 14 June 2021, url, p. 26
979
Baladi News, ‫ هجوم جديد يستهدف قوات النظام بريف حمص‬..‫[ تكبدت خسائر مادية وبشرية‬Human and material loss: anotherattack on regime forces in Homs countryside], 24 December 2021, url; Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review |October-December 2021, 28 March 2021, url, p. 13
980
UN Security Council, Fourteenth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) tointernational peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering
the threat [S/2022/63], 28 January 2022, url, para. 29
981
Baladi News, ‫ من قوات النظام قتلوا في حماة وحمص‬7 ‫ صفحات موالية تنعي‬..‫[ بينهم ضابط‬7 regime forces, including an officer,
killed in Hama and Homs according to local sources], 8 June 2021, url
982
UNOCHA, 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 11; UN Security
Council, Letter dated 3 February 2022 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions
1267 (1999) 1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al Qaida
and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council,
S/2022/83, 3 February 2022, url, para. 36
973

133

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

governorate, ‘utilizing insurgent tactics’.983 According to a January 2022 UN Secretary Generalreport, the hideouts in the desert were used ‘for training, possibly for regional operations oreven to revive an external operations capability’. 984 According to the July 2022 UN Security
Council report, some of its Member States believed that ISIL had taken up its ‘training activities
that had been previously curtailed, especially in the Badiya desert’.985
In July 2022, the International Crisis Group reported that ISIL activity had remained low in thegovernorate in early 2022, although the group, having come under ‘increased pressure’, had
shifted to a ‘defensive stance, relying on mines, other explosive devices and harassing fire toslow regime patrols and keep them out of the Badia’s remotest parts’. The source further
elaborated that the group had reached capabilities comparable to those in 2019 despite theexperienced challenges. ISIL cells had further carried out 10 to 15 monthly attacks on GoS
forces, the majority of which were carried out in Deir Ez-Zor and eastern Homs governorate.
According to the International Crisis Group this trend had continued into 2022, but with ISIL’s
position having become ‘slightly stronger’ than in 2019. Moreover, the group had penetrated
southern rural Homs since the end of 2021 close to the town of Mheen and was starting togradually carry out operations there.986(d)Anti-GoS armed groups

An August 2021 Enab Baladi article reported that the al-Tawhid Army was one of the major
factions of rural Homs governorate and that its members have had their headquarters in thecity of Talbiseh. They were the only faction to maintain its military formation after reaching asettlement in early 2018 with GoS under Russian guarantees. Russian security clearances
allowed the group’s members to possess weapons. Reportedly, the GoS, however, started
attempts to dissolve the group by causing some to join the conflict in Libya as mercenaries
and by imprisoning many of the group’s leaders. According to the same source, members of
the group, who were still in the region, were operating via loosely organised sleeper cells in
GoS-held areas, from where they were targeting officers of the GoS and security elements inthe area.987 Sources indicated the presence of the anti-GoS armed group ‘Saraya 2011’ inHoms governorate, who claimed to have killed two officers of GoS forces in the second half of2021.988 For additional information on anti-GoS groups as of May 2021 see section 2.6.2 of the
EUAA COI Report: Syria - Security situation (July 2021).

983

UN Security Council, Letter dated 11 July 2022 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant toresolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security
Council, 15 July 2022, url, para. 43
984
UN Security Council, Fourteenth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) tointernational peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering
the threat [S/2022/63], 28 January 2022, url, para. 29
985
UN Security Council, Letter dated 11 July 2022 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant toresolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security
Council, 15 July 2022, url, para. 43
986International Crisis Group, Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and North-eastern Syria, 18 July 2022, url, p. 13
987
Enab Baladi, After Daraa, seeds of unrest in Homs, 24 August 2021, url
988
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review | July Through September 2021, 26 October 2021, url, p. 10; Enab Baladi,‫[ فصيل مسلح يتبنى قتل عنصر من قوات النظام في ريف حمص‬An armed faction claims the killing of a member of the regime
forces in Homs], 12 August 2021, url; Enab Baladi, After Daraa, seeds of unrest in Homs, 24 August 2021, url

134

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

2.6.3.
(a)

Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population
Security trends during the reporting period

During the reference period for this report, the security situation in Homs governorate
remained stable, with a decrease of security incidents in urban centres. 989 Attacks on and by
militias and ISIL took place in the Badia desert region.990 According to an April 2021 article by
the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA), ‘ungoverned spaces’, like in the
Homs desert, had emerged due to the ‘complexity of the security landscape’ in the country. 991
In mid-April 2021, a major GoS operation against ISIL hideouts started in eastern Homs. Forcesof the 4th Division, NDF and Syrian private military contractors, supported by Russian airstrikes,
seized Kawm, a strategic town at the Highway to Raqqa, from ISIL. Subsequently, the area,
previously ‘heavily populated’ by ISIL cells, was emptied from ISIL activity. From June until
autumn 2021, GoS proceeded via smaller operations stepwise into the mountains north of
Tadmor.992
In March 2022, another major operation in the Badia region of eastern rural Homs against ISIL
hideouts was carried out by Russian and Iranian forces993 and the GoS, particularly in Tadmorand Al-Sukhna.994
In May 2022, fighting between pro-Iranian militias and Russian forces was reported in thisarea as well.995 Furthermore, military areas and sites which belong to Iranian forces and Iran affiliated militias who operate in Homs governorate were reportedly targeted by Israeli
airstrikes.996 In the northern part of Homs governorate, in particular around Rastan city, thesecurity situation was described as ‘complicated’ due to the presence of former GoS armed
groups,997 many members of which have reconciled with the GoS.998 Shelling between antiGoS forces and GoS-forces was frequent in the area.999 Moreover, sources stated thatkidnappings occurred in several Syrian governorates, including Homs governorate. 1000
Reportedly, former anti-GoS groups have committed abductions and extortions of989

Denmark, DIS, Syria – Security and Socioeconomic Situation in Homs Governorate [source: Syrian human rights
organisation interviewed by DIS], May 2022, url, p. 25; Austria, BFA Staatendokumentation, Syria Country Reportfrom the COI-CMS, Version 7, [source: Austrian Embassy in Damascus] 24 January 2022, available with
subscription, url, p. 35
990
Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Algemeen Ambtsbericht Syrië [Country of origin information report
Syria], May 2022, url, p. 16
991
GIGA, Not a Storm in a Teacup: The Islamic State after the Caliphate, April 2021, url, p. 6
992
Waters, G. The Central Syria ISIS Insurgency in 2021, January 2022, url, p. 3
993
Baladi News, ‫[ خسائر كبيرة لقوات النظام في حمص‬Heavy losses for the regime forces in Homs], 10 March 2022 , url;
994
MEMO, Iran sends military reinforcements to Syria's Homs, 16 March 2022, url
995
MEMO, Russia, Iran-backed militias clash in Syria's Palmyra, 5 May 2022, url
996International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Syria, November 2021, url; International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch –Syria, October 2021, url; International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Syria, August 2021, url; International Crisis Group,
CrisisWatch – Syria, July 2021, url
997
Denmark, DIS, Syria - Security and Socioeconomic Situation in Homs Governorate [source: Syrian human rights
organisation and international security organisation], May 2022, url, pp. 25, 27
998
Denmark, DIS, Syria - Security and Socioeconomic Situation in Homs Governorate [source: Syrian human rights
organisation], May 2022, url, p. 27
999
Denmark, DIS, Syria - Security and Socioeconomic Situation in Homs Governorate [source: international security
organisation], May 2022, url, p. 25
1000
Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Algemeen Ambtsbericht Syrië [Country of origin information
report Syria], May 2022, url, p. 17

135

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

businessmen on the roads in the northern Homs area, towards Rastan city and on the way to
Talbiseh city.1001
An international security organisation interviewed by DIS in its May 2022 report stated that it
had not documented any security incidents caused by the Hezbollah in the area in and around
Al-Qusayr city since August 2021.1002
ISIL activities
ISIL was active in the eastern part of Homs governorate in the reference period, where it
carried out attacks 1003 on units and convoys of the SAA,1004 SAA-affiliated forces 1005 andcivilians.1006 While in June 2021, almost daily clashes between ISIL and GoS forces or militia
forces had reportedly occurred for months in the Badia region,1007 the UN Secretary Generalreported in January 2022 that the number of ISIL attacks had decreased.1008 However,according to an international security organisation interviewed by DIS, the first quarter of2022 saw an increase in ISIL attacks in eastern Homs governorate, particularly in the central
desert of Homs governorate in March 2022,1009 which resulted in the abovementioned militaryintervention by the GoS and affiliated forces. 1010
Russian forces carried out air strikes against ISIL hideouts in eastern Homs in the reference
period.1011 In October 2021, Russian airstrikes, in collaboration with GoS forces, targeted ISIL
1001

Denmark, DIS, Syria - Security and Socioeconomic Situation in Homs Governorate [source: Syrian human rights
organisation], May 2022, url, p. 27
1002
Denmark, DIS, Syria – Security and Socioeconomic Situation in Homs Governorate [source: International
security organisation interviewed by DIS], May 2022, url, p. 26
1003
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), S/2021/890,
21 October 2021, url, para. 9; UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165
(2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and
2585 (2021), S/2021/735, 18 August 2021, url, para. 9; International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Syria, March 2022,
url
1004
Austria, BFA Staatendokumentation, Syria Country Report from the COI -CMS, Version 7, [source: Austrian
Embassy in Damascus] 24 January 2022, available with subscription, url, p. 35; SOHR, ISIS ambush kills and injures
regime members in Homs desert, 10 February 2022, url
1005
ACLED, Regional Overview – Middle East (11 December 2021-7 January 2022), 13 January 2022, url; SOHR, ISIS
attacks positions of regime forces and affiliated militias in eastern Homs, 26 April 2022, url
1006
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), S/2022/492,
16 June 2022, url, para. 5
1007
Baladi News, ‫ من قوات النظام قتلوا في حماة وحمص‬7 ‫ صفحات موالية تنعي‬..‫[ بينهم ضابط‬7 regime forces, including an officer,
killed in Hama and Homs according to local sources], 8 June 2021, url
1008
UN Security Council, Fourteenth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) tointernational peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering
the threat, S/2022/63, 28 January 2022, url, para. 29
1009
International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Syria, March 2022, url; ACLED, Regional Overview - Middle East (5 - 11
March 2022), 17 March 2022, url
1010
Denmark, DIS, Syria - Security and Socioeconomic Situation in Homs Governorate [international security
organisation], May 2022, url, p. 25
1011
International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Syria, June 2022, url; Denmark, DIS, Syria - Security andSocioeconomic Situation in Homs Governorate [international security organisation], May 2022, url, p. 10; SOHR, 20
Russian airstrikes hit ISIS hideouts in Al-Raqqah and Homs deserts amid escalation in ISIS activity, 26 April 2022,
url; SOHR, Russian jets target ISIS hideouts in Al-Sokhnah desert in eastern Homs countryside, 11 April 2022, url;
ACLED, Regional Overview - Middle East (19 - 25 March 2022), 31 March 2022, url; SOHR, Russian airstrikes hit ISIS136

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

hideouts in the area around Al-Sukhna on the road between Deir Ez-Zor and Homs.1012
Reportedly, Russian air strikes against ISIL targets were frequent in the first week of March2022 and were followed by a series of daily air strikes in collaboration with SAA air force in
mid-March in eastern Homs for a week.1013
Israeli airstrikes
In June 2021, Israeli airstrikes hit several military targets in central Syria, including in Ho ms
governorate.1014 Israeli airstrikes on Homs governorate were moreover documented from Julyto November 2021.1015(b)Security incidents

During the reporting period, there were 256 security incidents recorded by ACLED in Homs
governorate, of whom 72 were coded as battles, 157 explosions/remote violence and 27
incidents of violence against civilians.1016

Figure 16: Evolution of security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence andviolence against civilians in Homs governorate between 1 April 2021 and 1 August 2022,
based on ACLED data 1017

hideouts in Palmyra desert, east of Homs, 31 March 2022, url; International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Syria,
January 2022, url; SOHR, Four Russian fighter jets strike ISIS positions in Homs and Deir Ezzor, 16 November 2021,
url; Germany, BAMF, Briefing Notes, 26 April 2021, url, p. 9
1012
Al-Monitor, Russia ramps up strikes on Islamic State in Syrian desert, 7 October 2021, url
1013
Denmark, DIS, Syria - Security and Socioeconomic Situation in Homs Governorate [international security
organisation], May 2022, url, p. 10
1014
MEE, Syria: Israeli air strikes reportedly kill 11 pro-government fighters, 9 June 2021, url
1015International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Syria, November 2021, url; International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch –Syria, October 2021, url; ACLED, Regional Overview – Middle East (2-8 October 2021), 13 October 2021, url; ACLED,
Regional Overview – Middle East (9-15 October 2021), 21 October 2021, url; Germany, BAMF, Briefing Notes, 11
October 2021, url, p. 11; International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Syria, August 2021, url; International Crisis Group,
CrisisWatch – Syria, July 2021, url; ACLED, Regional Overview – Middle East (17-23 July 2021) , 23 July 2021, url, p. 1
1016
EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle Ea st (12 August2022), url
1017
EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (12 August2022), url

137

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMDistrict

Battles

Remote violence

Violence against
civilians

Al Makhrim

-

5

3

Al Qusayr

1

4

2

Ar Rastan

2

2

7

Homs

7

18

9

Tadmor59

127

6Tall Kalakh

3

1

-

Total

72

157

27

Figure 20: Security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against
civilians in Homs governorate between 1 April 2021 and 1 August 2022. Breakdown by
district based on ACLED data 1018
Around 75 % of all security incidents documented in Homs governorate during the reference
period were recorded in Tadmor district (see Figure 20).
A non-exhaustive list of security incidents that were reported to have taken place in Homs
governorate during the reference period for this report included the following:••

On 6 April 2021, 60 civilians and NDF fighters were ambushed by ISIL fighters near theTuwayan Dam along the border between Homs and Hama. Reportedly, ‘most if not allof them had been captured alive’1019 and the majority was later freed in exchange fordetained ISIL family members.1020
On 12 June 2021, a landmine left behind by ISIL in the area around Jabal Abu Rajmin,north of Tadmor, reportedly exploded killing two civilians and injuring another. 1021

1018

EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (12 August2022), url
1019
Waters, G. and Winter, C., Islamic State Under-Reporting in Central Syria: Misdirection, Misinformation, or
Miscommunication?, MEI, 2 September 2021, url
1020
Waters, G. and Winter, C., Islamic State Under-Reporting in Central Syria: Misdirection, Misinformation, or
Miscommunication?, MEI, 2 September 2021, url; Waters, G. The Central Syria ISIS Insurgency in 2021, January2022, url, p. 4
1021
SANA, Two civilians martyred and another wounded in a mine explosion in Palmyra countryside, 12 June 2021,
url

138

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION••

In early October 2021, Israeli airstrikes targeted the Tiyas airbase (T4 airbase). 1022
On 20 October 2021, the US base in Al-Tanf was targeted by a weaponized drone.1023
The attack was reportedly carried out by Iran-affiliated forces.1024
On 19 November 2021, the explosion of a landmine, reportedly left behind by ISIL
members in a residential area in Tadmor district, killed two children and injured twoothers.1025
In January and March 2022, military buses were attacked by ISIL near Tadmor leading
to casualties among the soldiers.1026
On 5 May 2022, it was reported that the Russian-backed 5th Corps clashed with an
IRGC-backed militia close to Tadmor city.1027
On 1 June 2022, a woman was reportedly abducted, tortured and raped by forces
affiliated with the NDF in northern Homs governorate.1028
On 20 July 2022, it was reported that unidentified gunmen believed to be ISISL
members attacked a vehicle between Al-Kom and Al-Tabiya villages in the countrysideof eastern Homs.1029 On 23 July 2022, it was reported that GoS checkpoints and otherareas near the Al-Hail oil field in the countryside of eastern Homs were attacked by
ISIL forces.1030

•

•
•
•
•

(c)

Civilian fatalities

Month

SNHR 2021

SNHR 2022

January5-

February

2

1

March

3

2

April

2

2

May

1

3

1022

ACLED, Regional Overview – Middle East (2-8 October 2021), 13 October 2021, url
SANA, Multiple explosions rock US base at al-Tanf area in Homs countryside, 21 October 2021, url
1024International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Syria, October 2021, url
1025
SANA, Two children martyred in landmine blast in Palmyra, 19 November 2021, url
1026
ANI, 13 soldiers killed in bus ambush in Syria's Homs: State media, 7 March 2022, url
1027
MEMO, Russia, Iran-backed militias clash in Syria's Palmyra, 5 May 2022, url
1028
Shaam Network, " ‫[ الشبكة السورية" تدين قيام قوات األسد باختطاف سيدة من حمص وتعذيبها واغتصابها‬Syrian Network
condemns kidnapping, torturing and raping of woman in Homs by Assad’s forces] , 10 June 2022, url
1029
SOHR, ISIS attack | Casualties among Al-Nugabaa Iraqi militias in the Syrian desert, 20 July 2022, url
1030
SOHR, ISIS offensive | Regime soldiers killed and injured in attack on their checkpoints and posts east of Homs,
23 July 2022, url
1023

139

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Month

SNHR 2021

SNHR 2022

June

-

3

July

1

3

August-September

1

October4

November

8

December

1

Total

28

14

Figure 7: Civilian fatalities as a result of armed conflict in Homs governorate in 2021 andfirst seven months of 2022. Monthly breakdown based on SNHR data
In 2021, SNHR recorded 28 civilian fatalities 1031 in Homs governorate while in the first sevenmonths of 2022 it documented 14 civilian fatalities.1032

1031

Based on data extracted from monthly reports on civilian fatalities published by SNHR. See: SNHR, Extrajudicial
Killing Claims the Lives of 113 Civilians, Including 36 Children, Six Women, and Three Victims Due to Torture, inJanuary 2021, 1 February 2021, url, p. 7; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 138 Civilians, Including 23
Children, 11 Women, and 14 Victims Due to Torture, in February 2021, 1 March 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR, Extrajudicial
Killing Claims the Lives of 177 Civilians, Including 28 Chil dren, 35 Women, One Medical Worker, and 9 Victims Dueto Torture, in March 2021, 1 April 2021, url, p. 7; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 96 Civilians, Including
15 Children, 11 Women, and Nine Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in May 2021, 1 June 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR,
Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 723 Civilians in Syria in the First Half of 2021, 1 July 2021, url, p. 9; SNHR,
Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 129 Civilians, Including 44 Children, 17 Women, and 10 Victims Due toTorture, in Syria in July 2021, 1 August 2021, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 94 Civilians,
Including 32 Children, 10 Women, and Seven Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in August 2021, 1 September 2021, url,
p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 86 Civilians, Including 23 Children, Nine Women, and Eight
Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in September 2021, 1 October 2021, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims theLives of 84 Civilians, Including 22 Children, Four Women, and Seven Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in October
2021, 1 November 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 86 Civilians, Including 16 Children,
Eight Women, and Six Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in November 2021, 1 December 2021, url, p. 8
1032
Based on data extracted from monthly reports on civilian fatalities published by SNHR. SNHR, 1,271 Civilians,
Including 299 Children, 134 Women, and 104 Victims of Torture, Killed in Syria in 2021, 1 January 2022, url, p. 13;
SNHR, 69 Civilians, Including 18 Children, Four Women and Eight Victims Due to Torture, Killed in Syria in January

140

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION(d)

Conflict-related infrastructure damage and explosive remnants of war

According to an international security organization interviewed by DIS, a large part of the cityof Homs has been destroyed by the conflict. As of April 2022, the organization estimated thatapproximately 30 to 40 % ‘of the pre-war city’ was destroyed.1033 Based on the UN Syria Multisector Needs Assessment of 2021, the Shelter Cluster assessed that in Homs governorate,
9.22 % of the overall population was living in damaged buildings. 1034 In a May 2021 news
article, Reuters stated that the ‘city centre and several neighbourhoods were almost entirely
destroyed after years of air strikes and barrel bombs, and still lie in ruin and deserted’.1035 Mostof the destruction was reportedly concentrated in the old neighbourhoods of Homs city (AlKhalidiyah, Bab Al-Seba'a, Bab Al-Draib, Al-Bayadah, and Al-Hamidiyah), but also in somenewer neighbourhoods (Al-Qusour, Jurat Al-Shayyah, and Al-Qarabees).1036
As of July 2021, 651 buildings were reported to be damaged in the city of Tadmor (45completely, 112 severely and 444 partially destroyed). 1037 The destruction caused by past years'
conflict had reportedly also affected educational buildings in Tadmor. 1038 In Al-Qaryatayn town,
525 buildings were allegedly damaged (79 completely, 190 severely and 256 partiallydestroyed) as of July 2021.1039 As of July 2022, most of Rastan’s neighbourhoods werereported to be still in ruins, with ‘costs of restoring homes […] far too expensive for mostresidents’.1040
In February 2022, UNOCHA noted that explosive ordnance contamination remained prevalent
in regions particularly affected by the conflict, including in Homs governorate.1041 A September
2021 article by Syria’s public international news organization SANA reporting on the death of afamily due to a landmine explosion in Tadmor stated that mines and explosive devices laid byterrorist organizations in villages, towns, and agricultural areas in the run -up to their defeat in
the region were particularly complex to locate and defuse. 1042 In a 2022 report on UXO in

2022, 1 February 2022, url, p. 8; SNHR, 161 Civilians, Including 28 Children, Six Women and 66 Victims Due toTorture, Documented Killed in Syria in February 2022, 1 March 2022, url, p. 9; SNHR, 67 Civilians, Including 20
Children, Three Women, and Seven Victims Who Di ed Due to Torture, Were Killed in Syria in March 2022, 1 April
2022, url, p. 8; SNHR, 101 Civilians, Including 17 Children, 14 Women, and Six Victims Who Died Due to Torture,
Were Documented Killed in Syria in April 2022, 1 May 2022, url, p. 9; SNHR, 78 Civilians, Including 14 Children, 11
Women, and Eight Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in Syria in May 2022, 1 June 2022,
url, p. 8; SNHR, 568 Civilians, Including 115 Children, 53 Women, and 101 Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were
Documented Killed in Syria in the First Half of 2022, 2 July 2022, url, p. 12; SNHR, 86 Civilians, Including 21
Children, Eight Women, and Five Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in Syria in July 20 22, 1
August 2022, url, p. 91033
Denmark, DIS, Syria - Security and Socioeconomic Situation in Homs Governorate [source: international security
organisation], May 2022, url, p. 26
1034
Shelter Cluster/UNHCR, Syrian Arab Republic: Whole of Syria Shelter/NFI Sector. Humanitarian Needs Overview
2022, 4 January 2022, url, p. 6
1035
Reuters, Homs, former rebel stronghold, prepares to vote, 25 May 2021, url
1036
Enab Baladi, With no hope or wish to return, Syrians sell destroyed properties in Homs, 1 July 2021, url
1037
Enab Baladi, With no hope or wish to return, Syrians sell destroyed properties in Homs, 1 July 2021, url
1038
SANA, Department of Education in Homs Rehabilitate school in Palmyra, 22 May 2022, url
1039
Enab Baladi, With no hope or wish to return, Syrians sell destroyed properties in Homs, 1 July 2021, url
1040
Syria Report (The), Demolished Properties and Exaggerated Returnee Numbers in Rural Homs, 7 June 2022, url
1041
UNOCHA, 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 12
1042
SANA, A man and his wife and daughter martyred in mine explosion west of Palmyra, 9 September 2 021, url

141EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Syria, the Carter Center assumed that there are 1 200 to 3 500 or 5 250 to 15 500 1043
unexploded ordnance in Homs governorate.1044(e)Displacement and return

UNOCHA stated in a February 2022 report that the IDP population in Homs governorate was
303 971, of which about 4 500 lived in camps.1045 In 2021, UNOCHA recorded approximately
2 040 IDP movements from Homs governorate, 40 IDP movements to the governorate as well
as 961 movements within the governorate.1046 In 2022, UNOCHA reported 155 IDP departuresfrom and 61 IDP arrivals to Homs governorate in January,1047 155 departures and 55 arrivals in
February,1048 150 departures and no arrivals in March,1049 130 departures and 25 arrivals in
April,1050 and 10 IDP movements within the governorate as well as 190 departures and 45
arrivals to the governorate in May 2022.1051
As regards returns, in 2021 UNOCHA recorded approximately 11 000 returns within Homs
governorate, 1 000 spontaneous IDP returnee movements from the governorate and 5 000
IDP returnee movements to the governorate.1052 In 2022, UNOCHA recorded 138 returns
within, approximately 8 spontaneous IDP returns from and 471 returns to the governorate inJanuary,1053 141 returns within, 5 returns from and 487 to the governorate in February, 1054 75
returns within, 6 returns from and 723 to the governorate in March,1055 213 returns within, 98
returns from and 482 returns to the governorate in April, 1056 and 240 returns within, 6 returns
from and 695 returns to the governorate in May. 1057

1043

Please note that the Carter Center presents two different ranges for the amount of UXO contamination in Homs
governorate.
1044
Carter Center (The), A Call for Action: Data on Unexploded Ordnance in Syria and its Implications. December
2012 – May 2021, March 2022, url, pp. 16, 24
1045
UNOCHA, 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 23
1046
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements Overview, Jan – Dec 2021, 21 March 2022, url
1047
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements January 2022, 24 February 2022, url
1048
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements February 2022, 11 April 2022, url
1049
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements March 2022, 9 May 2022, url
1050
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements April 2022, 15 June 2022, url
1051
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements May 2022, 13 July 2022, url
1052
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Spontaneous IDP Returnee Movements Overview, Jan – Dec 2021, 21 March
2022, url
1053
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns January 2022, 24 February 2022, url
1054
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns February 2022, 11 April 2022, url
1055
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns. March 2022, 9 May 2021, url
1056
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns April 2022, 15 June 2022, url
1057
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns May 2022, 13 July 2022, url

142

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

2.7.

Hasaka governorate

Map 13: © MapAction, Hasaka governorate1058

2.7.1.

General description of the governorate

Al-Hasakah governorate (hereafter ’Hasaka’ governorate) is located in the north-eastern
corner of Syria, bordering Turkey to the north, Iraq to the east and Syrian Raqqa and Deir EzZor governorates to the west and south-west respectively. Its capital, Hasaka, is located in the
middle of the governorate, on the intersection of the Khabour river and the road from Qamishli(bordering Turkey to the north) towards Deir-Ez Zor.1059 There are four main districts in thegovernorate: Hasaka, Ras al-Ayn, Qamishli, and al-Malikiya, divided into, in total, 16 subdistricts, and a large number of small towns and villages. 1060
Population estimates for 2021 issued by the Syrian Central Bureau of Statistics indicate that
Hasaka governorate had 1 865 169 inhabitants. 1061 In a February 2022 report, UNOCHA
estimated the population of Hasaka governorate to be of 1 148 643 inhabitants. 1062

1058

MapAction, Al-Hasakeh governorate, 29 July 2016, url
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Atlas, Syrian Arab Republic, 2017, al Hasakeh Governorate, url
1060
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Atlas, Syrian Arab Republic, 2017, al Hasakeh City, url
1061
Syria, Central Bureau of Statistics, Estimate of the population in Syria by governorates, n. d., url
1062
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview, Syrian Arab Republic, February 2022, url, p. 23
1059

143

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMInformation on Hasaka’s ethnic structure, as well as its strategic importance for Syria’s wheat
and oil production can be found in an earlier issue of this report: EUAA, Syria Security
Situation, Country of Origin Information Report, July 2021, pp. 157-159.

2.7.2.

Conflict background and armed actors

During the reporting period, Hasaka governorate was mainly under the control of the Kurdishled SDF.1063 Their allies in the US-led Coalition against ISIL had presence in thegovernorate.1064 The GoS maintained its own enclaves or ‘security zones’ inside the SDFcontrolled cities of Hasaka and Qamishli, while the GoS forces also control Qamishli airport. 1065
In addition, the GoS forces and their Russian allies were present in the Syrian-Turkish borderand along the frontlines between the SDF-controlled areas and the Turkish-controlled area innorthern Hasaka governorate.1066 According to Jusoor for Studies, there has also been astationing point for Iranian forces in GoS-controlled Hasaka (city) at the turn of the year
2021/22.1067
Since the military incursion in October 2019 dubbed Operation Peace Spring 1068, the Turkish
Armed Forces (TAF) and the Turkish-backed Syrian armed groups operating under theumbrella of the so-called ‘Syrian National Army’ (SNA) have been in control of a territory
roughly delimited by the Syrian-Turkish border in the north, the M4 highway in the south,administrative border between Raqqa and Hasaka governorates in the west and the Khabur
river in the east. This area includes the town of Ras al-Ayn (Serê Kaniyê in Kurdish) and its
surroundings.1069 Along with an adjoining territory of roughly equal size in northern Raqqa
governorate (see Chapter 2.8 Raqqa governorate), this area constitutes the so-called
Operation Peace Spring area.1070

1063

Based on reading of maps in UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission ofInquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url [Annex II: Estimated areas of influence,
January 2022], p. 22; Etana Syria, Military Control Across Syria [Map], 1 July 2022, url; Jusoor for Studies, Foreign
Forces Points in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022, 27 December 2021, url; Liveuamap, Syria, as of 21 July
2022, url
1064
USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress 1 January2022 – 31 March 2022, [publicly released on] 17 May 2022, url, p. 67
1065
International Crisis Group, The SDF Seeks a Path Toward Durable Stability in North East Syria, 25 November
2020, url; Mehchy Z. et al., Assessing control and power dynamics in Syria, Chatham House, November 2020, url,
p. 10; Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Country of origin information report Syria,
June 2021, url, p. 25
1066
Based on reading of maps in UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission ofInquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url [Annex II: Estimated areas of influence,
January 2022], p. 22; Etana Syria, Military Control Across Syria [Map], 1 July 2022, url; Jusoor for Studies, Foreign
Forces Points in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022, 27 December 2021, url
1067
Jusoor for Studies, Foreign Forces Points in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022 , 27 December 2021, url
1068
For further information on the October 2019 Turkish incursion, see EUAA, Syria - Security Situation. May 2020,
url
1069
Based on reading of maps in UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission ofInquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url [Annex II: Estimated areas of influence,
January 2022], p. 22; Etana Syria, Military Control Across Syria [Map], 1 July 2022, url; Jusoor for Studies, Foreign
Forces Points in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022, 27 December 2021, url; Carter Center (The), The State of
the Syrian National Army, 15 March 2022, url, p. 4
1070
Al-Hilu, K., The Turkish Intervention in Northern Syria: One Strategy, Discrepant Policies, European University
Institute, 14 January 2021 [first published in Arabic on 21 December 2020], url, pp. 5-6

144

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION(a)

Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)

Hasaka governorate is mainly under the control of the Autonomous Administration of North
and East of Syria (hereafter ‘Autonomous Administration’, AANES) (see also Section 1.4.3
Syrian Democratic Forces), with a unified military force, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) 1071
and a political assembly, the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC). 1072 The Kurdish Democratic
Union Party (PYD) and its armed wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), have a dominantrole in the SDF 1073 and the SDC.1074 In this administrative context, Hasaka governorate is also
called Jazeera (in Kurdish, Cizire) and it has been one of the ‘cantons’1075 or one of the‘regions’1076 (since 2018) under the Autonomous Administration.
(b)

Syrian Arab Army and affiliated armed groups

The GoS maintains its own enclaves or ‘security zones’ inside the SDF-controlled cities of
Hasaka and Qamishli.1077 GoS forces were also stationed on the Syrian Turkish border and on
the internal border separating the ’Operation Peace Spring’ area from the areas controlled by
the SDF in Hasaka governorate 1078, including around the frontline town of Tal Tamr. 1079
Elements of the SAA’s 4th Division were reported to control the largest military base in thegovernorate - the Tartab Regiment -, located in the southest part of Qamishli.1080(c)

The US-led Coalition against ISIL

According to Fabrice Balanche, US troops were present in Hasaka towns of Rmelan and
Shaddada and controlled the crossroads between the M4 highway and the Amuda-Hasaka
road and the road between Rmelan and the Fish Khabour border crossing with Iraq. 1081 In July
2021, the SOHR reported that large reinforcements have entered the base in Shaddada. 1082
Media reports from April 2022 confirmed the expansion of the Shaddada military base, which
now reportedly has the largest US military presence in all of Syria. 1083 According to Jusoor for

1071

ECFR, MENA armed groups, Syrian Democratic Forces (Syria), n. d., url; RIC, Beyond the Frontlines, 19 December
2019, url, p. 50
1072
RIC, Beyond the Frontlines, 19 December 2019, url, pp. 31-32
1073
Haenni, P. & Guesnay, A., Surviving the Aftermath of Islamic State: The Syrian Kurdish Movement’s Resilience
Strategy, European University Institute, 17 February 2020, url, p. 1, fn 2
1074
Netjes R. & van Veen, E., Henchman, Rebel, Democrat, Terrorist. The YPG/PYD during the Syrian conflict,
Clingendael, April 2021, url, p. 44
1075
Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, WINEP, 2018, url, p. 54
1076
RIC, Beyond the Frontlines, 19 December 2019, url, p. 10
1077
Duch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of origin information report Syria, June 2021, url, p. 25; International
Crisis Group, The SDF Seeks a Path Toward Durable Stability in North East Syria, 25 November 2020, url
1078
Based on reading of the map in UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commissionof Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url [Annex II: Estimated areas of influence,
January 2022], p. 22
1079
Enab Baladi, Three sides blamed; Who bombs northern Aleppo?, 12 June 2022, url; New Arab (The), Four killed
in 'rare' clash between Syrian regime troops, Kurdish forces: monitor, 2 March 2022, url
1080
Hassan, M. and al-Ahmed, S., Iran’s growing presence in Syria’s al-Hasakah poses a direct threat to US forces,
MEI, 24 March 2022, url
1081
Balanche, F., The Fragile Status Quo in Northeast Syria, WINEP, 1 July 2020, url
1082
SOHR, ‫ “التحالف الدولي” يستقدم تعزيزات عسكرية ولوجستية كبيرة إلى شمال شرق سورية‬.‫[ بهدف إنشاء قاعدة جديدة‬With the aim ofestablishing a new base, the “international coalition” brings large military and logistical reinforcements tonortheastern Syria], 24 July 2021, url
1083
Syrian Observer (The), How are U.S. Bases Distributed in Northeastern Syria, 22 April 2022, url

145

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Studies, the US-led Coalition had a total of 17 stationing points in Hasaka governorate at theturn of the year 2021/22.1084(d)RussiaAccording to Jusoor for Studies, Russia had a total of 16 stationing points in Hasaka at the turnof the year 2021/22.1085 Russian forces were present in several military bases in the borderzones between Syria and Turkey as well as between the areas controlled by the SDF and the
Operation Peace Spring area, respectively. 1086 According to earlier reporting by Fabrice
Balanche, they had been stationed alongside the GoS forces since October 2019 and, since
May 2020, the traffic along the M4 highway between Ain Issa and Tal Tamr had been
restricted to convoys with Russian escorts and no SDF units or local civilians were allowed touse this section of the highway on their own. 1087
According to a news report from July 2022, Russian ground patrols further expanded to areasin the countryside of Qamishli1088, following the deployment of warplanes and helicopters near
Qamishli airport and the launch of reconnaissance flights in the same area a month earlier. 1089
(e)

Iran

According to Jusoor for Studies, Iran had one stationing point in Hasaka at the turn of the year
2021/22.1090 According to two experts at the MEI, as of March 2022 the Iranian militarypresence was concentrated in the southeast of the governorate, particularly around themilitary base at Tartab Regiment, at Qamishli airport, and as part of the Military Intelligence
branch in Hasaka city which Iran reportedly controls. 1091
(f)

Turkey and affiliated armed groups

Turkey and SNA forces controlled the territory roughly delimited by the Syrian–Turkish borderin the north, the M4 highway in the south, administrative border between Raqqa and Hasaka
governorates in the west and the Khabur river in the east. This area includes the town of Ras
al-Ayn (Serê Kaniyê) and its surroundings.1092

1084

Jusoor for Studies, Foreign Forces Points in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022, 27 December 2021, url
Jusoor for Studies, Foreign Forces Points in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022, 27 December 2021, url
1086
Based on reading of maps in Jusoor for Studies, Foreign Forces Points in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of2022, 27 December 2021, url; USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the UnitedStates Congress 1 January 2022 – 31 March 2022, [publicly released on] 17 May 2022, url, p. 67
1087
Balanche, F., The Fragile Status Quo in Northeast Syria, WINEP, 1 July 2020, url
1088
NPA, Russian forces patrol areas of Syria’s Qamishli for first time, 30 July 2022, url
1089
Asharq al-Awsat, Russia deploys jets to US-held regions in Syria’s East, 29 May 2022, url; Daily Sabah, Russianforces conduct air patrols in Syria's Tal Rifaat area, 4 June 2022, url
1090
Jusoor for Studies, Foreign Forces Points in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022, 27 December 2021, url
1091
Hassan, M./ al-Ahmed, Samer, Iran’s growing presence in Syria’s al-Hasakah poses a direct threat to US forces,
MEI, 24 March 2022, url
1092
Based on reading of maps in UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission ofInquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url [Annex II: Estimated areas of influence,
January 2022], p. 22; Etana Syria, Military Control Across Syria [Map], 1 July 2022, url; Jusoor for Studies, Foreign
Forces Points in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022, 27 December 2021, url; Al-Monitor, The stumbling
blocks facing Turkey’s new operation plan in Syria, 30 May 2022, url
1085

146

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

The town of Ras al-Ayn, the main population centre of the eastern half of Operation Peace
Spring area, was controlled mainly by two Turkish-backed armed groups, Sultan Murad
Division and Hamza Division, both operating under the official SNA umbrella.1093
In February 2022, four other SNA groups, Ahrar al-Sharqiya, Jaysh al-Sharqiya, the 20 thDivision, and Suqur al-Sham, announced the formation of the Liberation and Construction
Movement (LCM). Its representatives claim to command 7 000 fighters across Aleppo andAfrin and between Ras al-Ayn (Hasaka) and Tal Abyad (Raqqa), operating within the SNA
umbrella.1094 According to researcher Khayrallah al-Hilu, Turkey has placed the local
administration in both Ras al-Ayn and Tal Abyad under the administrative supervision ofŞanlıurfa province in November 2019.1095 Şanlıurfa is a province of the Republic of Turkey.
According to Jusoor for Studies, Turkey had a total of four stationing points in Hasaka at theturn of the year 2021/22.1096
(g)

ISIL

International Crisis Group noted in a July 2022 report that, while ISIL has concentrated its
attacks in Deir-Ez Zor, the group is also present in the south and east of Hasaka
governorate1097, confirming assessments by the US Department of Defense (USDOD) 1098 andthe Rojava Information Center 1099. According to a report to the UN Security Council from July
2022, ‘[ISIL] [a]ctivities were concentrated in Dayr al-Zawr, southern Raqqah and Hasakah,eastern Homs and southwestern Dar’a and Suwayda’ Governorates.’ 1100 The Shaddadi
countryside which is located at the boundaries between Deir Ez -Zor and Hasaka governorates
was assessed by some SDF commanders to serve as an ISIL storehouse for weapons andsupplies.1101
In January 2022, ISIL was able to conduct a large-scale attack on al-Sina’a prison in Hasaka(city).1102

1093

Al-Hilu, K.,The Turkish Intervention in Northern Syria: One Strategy, Discrepant Policies, European University
Institute, 14 January 2021 [first published in Arabic on 21 December 2020], url, p. 11.; STJ, Syria: Crops Looted,
Lands Seized in “Peace Spring” Territories, 11 March 2021, url, p. 4
1094
Hauch, L., Syria’s eastern factions unite in the Liberation and Construction Movement: A conversation with theleadership, MEI, 2 June 2022, url
1095
Al-Hilu, K.,The Turkish Intervention in Northern Syria: One Strategy, Di screpant Policies, European University
Institute, 14 January 2021 [first published in Arabic on 21 December 2020], url, p. 3
1096
Jusoor for Studies, Foreign Forces Points in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022, 27 December 2021, url
1097
International Crisis Group, Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and North-eastern Syria, 18 July 2022, url, p. 2
1098
USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress 1 January2022 – 31 March 2022, [publicly released on] 17 May 2022, url, p. 21
1099
RIC, Annual Sleeper Cell Report for Norh and East Syria, February 2022, url, p. 2
1100
UN Security Council, Thirtieth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted
pursuant to resolution 2610 (2021) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al -Qaida and associated individuals and entities, 15
July 2022, S/2022/547, url, para. 43, p. 12
1101
International Crisis Group, Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and North-eastern Syria, 18 July 2022, url, p. 21
1102
International Crisis Group, Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and North-eastern Syria, 18 July 2022, url, p. 20

147

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

2.7.3.
(a)

Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population
Security trends during the reporting period

The conflict between the SDF and Turkish-backed armed groups
According to the UNCOI, the overall security situation deteriorated in the territories underSDF-control during the period from 1 July 2020 to 30 June 2021 1103 and life remained insecureduring the second half of 2021 (1 July 2021 to 31 December 2021). 1104
For the period between July and December 2021, the UNCOI stated that armed clashes in andaround the city of Tal Tamr led casualties and displacement of civilians living in the area. 1105 In
August 2021, the Turkish military reportedly intensified its artillery, drone and conventional air
strikes in areas west of Qamishli, in Ras al-Ayn, and in areas close to Abu Rasayn and Tal
Tamr, resulting in the deaths of both military personnel and civilians. 1106 Clashes between
Turkish-backed forces and the SDF continued throughout September 2021, notably near Tal
Tamr1107 and public hints from the Turkish government at an imminent ground offensive into
northern Syria1108 have been met with joint military manoeuvres and exercises by the Russian
military and SDF fighters across Raqqa and Hasaka.1109
In December 2021, Turkish forces shelled rural Tal Tamr 1110, forcing residents of villages in thearea to flee and evacuate the front lines. 1111
While no further ground offensive took place in 2021, Turkey launched an air campaign inearly February 2022 against targets in northern Syria and northern Iraq. 1112 Jusoor for Studies
registered a new military escalation on part of Turkey against SDF and YPG targets in thatsame areas in April 2022.1113 For its reporting period of April to May 2022, the UN Security
Council reported ‘increased hostilities […] in the northern part of the country’, particularly in the
Abu Rasayn area and in the Tal Tamr subdistrict of Hasaka. 1114
1103

UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic [A/HRC/48/70], 13 August 2021, url, para. 94
1104
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url, para. 94
1105
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url, para. 94
1106
Kurdistan 24, Turkish drone targets vehicle near northern Syrian town of Qamishlo: Source, 22 August 2021, url;al-Monitor, Syrian Kurdish parties feel abandoned by US in wake of Turkish-backed attack, 8 September 2021, url;
SOHR, ‫ قتيل وجريحا بينهم قياديين من “ قسد” بقصف طائرة مسيرة تركية على مقر عسكري في ريف الحسكة‬20 ‫[ نحو‬About 20 people
were killed and wounded, including leaders of the “SDF” in the bombing of a Turkish drone on a military
headquarters in the countryside of Hasaka], 20 August 2021, url
1107
International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch, September 2021, url
1108
Reuters, Turkey says it will do "what is necessary" after Syria attacks, 13 October 2021, url; Al-Monitor, Turkey’s
parliament votes to extend mandate for troops in Iraq, Syria, 26 October 2021, url
1109
Enab Baladi, SDF look to Russia for support against Turkey, 10 November 2021, url
1110
SOHR, Killing two SDF members/ Turkish forces renew shelling on Al-Hasakah along with clashes on frontlines,
13 December 2021, url
1111
COAR, Syria Update, Cross-Line Convoy Sets up Debate on Early Recovery and Cross-Border Quid Pro Quo, 20
December 2021, url
1112
France 24, Turkey strikes Kurd targets in Iraq, Syria, 2 February 2022, url; Rudaw, Turkey’s recent bombardment
amounts to declaration of war: Mazloum Abdi, 2 February 2022, url
1113
Jusoor for Studies, New military escalation by Turkey against the PKK in Syria: Causes and effects, 4 April 2022,
url
1114
UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General, 16 June 2022, S/2022/492, url, para. 4

148

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

According to a May 2022 report by iMMAP, ‘Turkish forces and Turkish backed groups are
frequently bombing villages around Turkish controlled [Operation Peace Spring] area. They
also frequently target SDF commanders, vehicles, and social figures with drones. These
attacks left many casualties and increased in 2022, also in areas that have witnessed
relatively little violence in past years, such as Qamishli.’ 1115
Fighting between the SDF and GoS forces
After the GoS-backed, NDF reportedly killed one Asayish officer in Qamishli in April 2021 1116,
clashes broke out between the two sides that lasted for several days, resulting in both militaryand civilian casualties.1117 According to an anonymous source from inside the SDF, Russia was
asked to mediate between the two parties, which led to the NDF retreating from the Tayy andHalako neighbourhoods1118 and the patrolling of Russian military units in the area to guarantee
the truce.1119 Tensions between the SDF and GoS-forces escalated again in March 2022, when
clashes in Tal Tamr reportedly left two SAA soldiers and two SDF-militiamen dead. Both Syrian
state news and a SDF spokesperson confirmed the incident, but disagreed over the
progression of events.1120
In April 2022, the SDF confiscated several governmental administrative offices in GoScontrolled neighbourhoods in Qamishli and Hasaka (city) and closed a highway leading to
Qamishli airport, effectively putting the area under siege. 1121 While the security forces whoentered the neighbourhoods pulled back again after two days, they maintained a blockade ofgoods and reportedly prevented entry of wheat, food, and fuel.1122 Eventually, the siege waslifted after a total of 20 days when the two parties came to reach a diplomatic solution. 1123
Ras al-Ayn (Operation ‘Peace Spring’) area
During the reference period, clashes among different armed factions of the SNA escalated
throughout northern Syria where the SNA holds territory1124 , also affecting Ras al-Ayn area butreportedly not having led to any civilian casualties there.1125
1115

iMMAP, Progress, Northeast Syria. Challenges and Forecast of Humanitarian Mine Action, 31 May 2022, url, p. 8
Rojava Information Center, via Twitter @RojavaIC, 20 April 2021, url; Rûdaw, One dead in clashes between
Rojava and Syrian regime-backed forces in Qamishli, 21 April 2021, url
1117Rûdaw, At least two children killed in Qamishli clashes: medi cal source, 22 April 2021, url; NPA, Child killed, 2civilians wounded by pro-Syrian government NDF’s bullets in Qamishli, 22 April 2021, url
1118
Al-Monitor, Syrian government, Kurdish forces end dispute in Qamishli, 30 April 2021, url
1119
NPA, Russian, Asayish Forces Patrol Qamishli’s Al-Tai Neighborhood Amid Return Of Residents, 28 April 2021,
url
1120
France 24, 4 dead in rare Syria-Kurdish clash: monitor, 1 March 2022, url
1121
Reuters, U.S.-backed Kurds tighten siege of Syrian army-run enclaves in northeast, 14 April 2022, url; Enab
Baladi, SDF seizes six state buildings in Qamishli, 14 April 2022, url; Jusoor for Studies, Tit-for-Tat siege in Sheikh
Maqsoud and Qamishli between SDF and the Syrian regime: causes and scenarios, 12 April 2022, url1122
New Arab (The), Syrian Kurdish-led forces withdraw from regime zones in Qamishli, 15 April 2022, url
1123
SOHR, Preliminary agreement l Regime forces agree with Asayish to lift blockade on Al -Sheikh Maqsoud and AlAshrafieh neighbourhoods in Aleppo in return for lifting siege on Al -Hasakah and Al-Qamishli, 28 April 2022, url
1124
Al-Monitor, Factional infighting escalates in northern Syria, 19 April 2022, url; New Arab (The), ‫االشتباكات بين فصائل‬‫[ "الجيش الوطني" تتزايد خلل رمضان في الشمال السوري‬Clashes between the "National Army" factions are increasing fromRamadan in northern Syria], 7 April 2022, url
1125
New Arab (The), ‫[ االشتباكات بين فصائل "الجيش الوطني" تتزايد خلل رمضان في الشمال السوري‬Clashes between the"National Army" factions are increasing from Ramadan in northern Syria], 7 April 2022, url; SOHR, Peace Spring
1116

149

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

According to UNCOI’s report covering the second half of 2021, people in the Ras al-Ayn area
‘continued to live amid fear of shelling and improvised explosive devices’, although the region‘experienced a relatively calm period’ compared with neighbouring northern Aleppo. 1126
General opposition to the SDF’s rule
In May 2021, several protests erupted in several SDF-controlled areas, including Hasaka (city),
against the AANES after it had raised fuel prices in light of an accelerating economic crisis 1127,
following a similar move by Damascus in the GoS-controlled territories.1128 According toestimates of the SACD, demonstrations were held in 15 protest points in various regions andvillages across Hasaka.1129 The SDF reportedly shot five protesters in the city of alShaddada.1130

ISIL insurgency
During the period from June to July 2021, the UN Security Council documented continuing
ISIL attacks across Hasaka governorate leading to both military casualties as well as
destruction of energy infrastructure.1131 In January 2022, ISIL militants attacked the al-Sina’a
detention centre in Hasaka (city) in what turned out to be the largest attack carried out by ISIL
since its territorial defeat in 2019.1132 They managed to storm the prison, free some of theinmates and hold their position inside the building for several days before the SDF, withmilitary support from the US-led Coalition against ISIL, eventually recaptured the place.1133
According to the SDF, the fighting caused at least 200 deaths among the inmates and 27
deaths of its own fighters. Further, it led to the temporary displacement of about 45 000
inhabitants of the neighbourhoods near the detention centre. 1134 Estimates on the number of
escaped ISIL prisoners reportedly varied between several hundred and a ‘low double’-digit
number.1135

areas | New armed clashes with RPGs in Ras al -Ayn (Sere Kaniye), 10 July 2021, url; SOHR, Factional infighting | AlHamza Division member killed in Ras Al-Ain city (Sere Kaniye), 21 March 2022, url1126
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url, para. 74
1127
New Arab (The), Fuel price hike sparks deadly Syria Kurd protests, 18 May 2021, url
1128
France 24, Damascus hikes fuel prices by more than 50 percent, 16 March 2021, url
1129
SACD, SACD statement on the wave of public demonstrations in Al -Hasakah and the suppression by the Syrian
Democratic Forces, 26 May 2021, url
1130
Etana, Syria Military Brief: Northeast Syria, 31 May 2021, url
1131
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021) [S/2021/735],
18 August 2021, url, para. 9
1132
New York Times (The), U.S. Allies Retake Control of Prison in Syria, Subduing ISIS Fighters, 30 January 2022, url
1133
New York Times (The), Kurdish-Led Forces End Prison Siege, Defeating ISIS Fighters, 26 January 2022, url;
COAR, Syria Update, IS Prison Raid, Biggest Attack since ’19, Displaces 45,000, 31 January 2022, url1134
Reuters, UNICEF says fears grow over fate of 850 children in besieged Syrian prison, 25 January 2022, url;
UNOCHA, Syria: Qamishli Flash Update 2: Displacement from Al -Hasakeh (as of 27 January 2022), 27 January2022, url
1135
Hassan, M. and Al-Ahmed, S., A closer look at the ISIS attack on Syria’s al -Sina Prison, MEI, 14 February 2022,
url; COAR, IS Prison Raid, Biggest Attack since ’19, Displaces 45,000, 31 January 2022, url

150

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

Covering the months February and March 2022, the UN Security Council noted ISIL carriedout ‘sporadic attacks, including on civilians’ in areas including Hasaka governorate.1136 During
April and June 2022, SDF operations against ISIL were carried out including in Hasaka
governorate.1137
Security situation in al-Hol camp
In late March and the beginning of April 2021, the SDF conducted a two-week-long security
operation in al-Hol camp that, according to the SDF’s own account, led to the arrest of 125
suspected ISIL affiliated individuals, including six senior leaders of the group.1138 Preceding the
SDF’s raid, a deteriorating security situation existed inside al-Hol camp, resulting in an
increase of violence and more than 40 reported killings since the beginning of 2021. 1139
According to the SDF’s own account, the security situation in al-Hol stabilized in the following
weeks.1140
In July 2021, the SDF released 82 families, 229 women and children in total, from al-Hol
camp.1141 Reportedly, most were in detention for familial relationships with (suspected) ISIL
members.1142
In March 2022, the SDF and Asayish forces, in coordination with the US-led Coalition against
ISIL, conducted several raids in al-Hol, securing weapons, ammunition and tunnels.1143
However, only two weeks after, ISIL militants from within the camp reportedly managed tostage an attack on its guards, resulting in the destruction of tents and deaths of both
combatants and civilians. According to one report, the SDF were said to be expecting anattempted take-over of al-Hol after ISIL’s earlier attack on al-Sina’a prison in January.1144
By the end of June 2022, al-Hol reportedly witnessed 25 murders since the beginning of theyear.1145(b)Security incidents

During the reporting period, there were 1 671 security incidents recorded by ACLED in Hasaka
governorate, of whom 285 were coded as battles, 810 explosions/remote violence and 576
incidents of violence against civilians.1146

1136

UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General [S/2022/330], 19 April 2022, url, para. 5
USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve I Quarterly Report to the United States
Congress I April 1, 2022 – June 30, 2022, 29 July 2022, url, p. 54
1138
VOA, Crackdown at Syria's al-Hol Camp Nets Senior Islamic State Operative, 2 April 2021, url
1139
UNICEF, Two children killed in al-Hol camp in Syria, statement from Bo Viktor Nylund, UNICEF Representative in
Syria, 24 March 2021, url; Asharq al-Awsat, ‫[ حملة أمنية في مخيم الهول بعد تصاعد االغتياالت‬Security campaign in Al-Hol
camp after the escalation of assassinations], 30 March 2021, url1140
SDF - Coordination & Military Ops Center, via Twitter @cmoc_sdf, 10 April 2021, url
1141
Rudaw, 82 Syrian families leave Al-Hol camp towards their areas in Raqqa, 16 July 2021, url
1142
Al-Monitor, More women prisoners linked to Islamic State released from al -Hol camp, 31 July 2021, url
1143
Asharq al-Awsat, Kurdish Forces Launch Massive Raids in Syria’s Al -Hol Camp, 14 March 2022, url
1144
Syria.tv, ‫ اشتباكات عنيفة وأنباء عن قتلى وجرحى في مخيم الهول‬."‫[ تمرد لخليا "داعش‬A rebellion by ISIS cells. Violent clashes
and reports of dead and wounded in al-Hol camp], 29 March 2022, url; COAR, Syria Update, Syrian Minister Asserts
Syria’s ‘Right’ to Access International Climate Funds, 4 April 2022, url
1145
ANHA, ISF: A decapitated woman found in Al -Hol camp, 25 June 2022, url
1146
EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East ( 12 August2022), url
1137

151

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Figure 22. Security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against
civilians in Hasaka governorate between 1 April 2021 and 1 August 2022. Breakdown by
district based on ACLED data 1147
Most security incidents were recorded in Hasaka and Ras Al Ain districts during the reporting
period. Incidents of violence against civilians were significantly higher Hasaka district ascompared with the other districts of the governorate (see Figure 23 below).

District

Battles

Remote violence

Violence against
civilians

Hasaka

167

416

405

Malikeyyeh

4

21

32

Qamishli

26

29

65

Ras Al Ain

88

344

74

Total

285

810

576

Figure 23. Security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against
civilians in Hasaka governorate between 1 April 2021 and 1 August 2022. Breakdown by
district based on ACLED data 1148

1147

EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (12 August2022), url
1148
EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (12 August2022), url

152

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

Illustrative security incidents
•
•
•
•

•

•

•

•

•

On 2 April 2021, the SDF declared an end to a five-day raid in al-Hol camp. 125
suspects on extremism were said to be arrested.1149
On 27 April 2021, Russia deployed its military police to Qamishli 1150 after clashes
between the Asayish and the NDF lasted for days. 1151
On 18 May 2021, SDF personnel reportedly opened fire on demonstrators who
protested against rising fuel prices, killing at least one civilian in al-Shaddadi.1152
On 18 August 2021, Turkish troops and Turkey-backed Syrian forces shelled the areaof Abu Rassine (Navçeya Ebû Rasên), killing, according to the SDF, two civilians andwounding 15 people.1153
On 21 January 2022, ISIL fighters launched a large-scale attack on al-Sina’a prison in
the Ghuwayran neighbourhood in Hasaka (city) 1154 that lasted for over a week andended with several hundred persons having been killed after SDF forces ended thesiege and regained control over the prison on 30 January 2022. 1155
On 2 February 2022, Turkey’s armed forces have launched air raids targeting YPG
positions in the district of al-Malikiya (Dêrik) as part of their Winter Eagle (Kış Kartalı) 1156
operation.1157 According to SOHR, at least four persons were killed when two rockets
hit a civilian power plant near the district’s centre of the same name. 1158
On 8 February 2022, guards of the al-Hol refugee camp under the SDF command
opened fire on its residents, resulting in one fatality and five injuries, when a group of
women and children attacked the security forces. One member of the security forces
was also injured.1159
On 29 March 2022, ISIL members exchanged fire with Asayish forces at the al-Hol
refugee camp, involving automatic rifles and rocket propelled grenades. According to
SOHR, two civilians and one ISIL fighter were killed. Ten civilians were injured. 1160
On 22 July 2022 an airstrike by the TAF reportedly killed three SDF members near
Qamishli, including a deputy commander.1161

1149

AP News, Syrian Kurdish forces end sweep in camp housing IS families, 2 April 2021, url
AP News, Russian military intervenes to halt clashes in Syrian city, 27 April 2021, url
1151
AP News, Clashes between Kurdish, government forces kill 1 in Syria, 21 April 2021, url
1152
SNHR, Two civilians shot dead by SDF in al Shaddadi city in Hasaka suburbs on May 18, url; SOHR, Rise of fuelprices/ Popular protest in Autonomous Administration-held areas against the new decision, 18 May 2021, url
1153
AP News, Shelling in northern Syria kills 5; at least 15 wounded, 18 August 2021, url
1154
New York Times (The), ISIS Fighters Attack Syria Prison to Free Fellow Jihadists, 21 January 2022, url;
SOHR, Ghuwayran attack latest updates/ ISIS members cremated bodies of hostages in stove of the prison’s
kitchen, 5 February, url
1155
New York Times (The), U.S. Allies Retake Control of Prison in Syria, Subduing ISIS Fighters, 30 January 2022, url
1156
Turkish Ministry of National Defense, Derik, Sincar ve Karacak Bölgelerine İcra Edilen Kış Kartalı Hava Harekâtı
Hakkında Açıklama [Statement on the Winter Eagle Air Operation to Derik, Sinjar and Karacak Regions], 1 February2022, url
1157
Reuters, Turkish warplanes attack Kurdish fighters in Iraq, Syria, 2 February 2022, url
1158
AP News, Turkish jets target Kurdish positions in Iraq, Syria; 4 die, 2 February 2022, url
1159
New York Times (The), Violence Erupts at Syrian Camp for ISIS Families, Leaving a Child Dead, 9 February2022, url
1160
AP News, Clashes in Syrian camp housing IS families kill at least 3, 29 March 2022, url
1161
Washington Kurdish Institute, Kurdistan’s Weekly Brief, 26 July 2022, url; Rudaw, SDF commander vows toavenge fighters killed in drone strike, 24 July 2022, url
1150

153

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM(c)

Civilian fatalities

Month

SNHR 2021

SNHR 2022

January25

9February

17

3

March

31

5

April

12

21

May

12

7

June

6

10

July

13

8

August13

September

9

October2

November

7

December

7

Total

154

63

Figure 24. Civilian fatalities as a result of armed conflict in Hasaka governorate in 2021 andfirst seven months of 2022. Monthly breakdown based on SNHR data

154

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

In 2021, SNHR recorded 154 civilian fatalities 1162 in Hasaka governorate while in the first sevenmonths of 2022 it documented 63 civilian fatalities (see Figure 24).1163(d)

Conflict-related infrastructure damage and explosive remnants of war

UNESCWA estimates the cost of physical capital loss of Hasaka governorate between 2011
and 2018 at around USD 1.3 billion (1.6 % of all the damage inflicted on Syrian physicalcapital).1164 Based on the Syria Multi-Sector Needs Assessment of 2021, the Shelter Cluster
assessed that in Hasaka governorate, 85.41 % of the overall population 1165 was living indamaged buildings.1166
According to Mine Action Review and the Carter Center, the Hasaka governorate is largely
contaminated with improvised mines and other improvised devices, mainly because retreating
ISIL fighters planted booby traps before territory was retaken from SDF. 1167 The contamination

1162

Based on data extracted from monthly reports on civilian fatalities published by SNHR. See: SNHR, Extrajudicial
Killing Claims the Lives of 113 Civilians, Including 36 Children, Six Women, and Three Victims Due to Torture, inJanuary 2021, 1 February 2021, url, p. 7; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 138 Civilians, Including 23
Children, 11 Women, and 14 Victims Due to Torture, in February 2021, 1 March 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR, Extrajudicial
Killing Claims the Lives of 177 Civilians, Including 28 Children, 35 Women, One Medical Worker, and 9 Victims Dueto Torture, in March 2021, 1 April 2021, url, p. 7; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 96 Civilians, Including
15 Children, 11 Women, and Nine Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in May 2021, 1 June 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR,
Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 723 Civilians in Syria in the First Half of 2021, 1 July 2021, url, p. 9; SNHR,
Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 129 Civilians, Including 44 Children, 17 Women, and 10 Victims Due toTorture, in Syria in July 2021, 1 August 2021, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 94 Civilians,
Including 32 Children, 10 Women, and Seven Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in August 2021, 1 September 2021, url,
p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 86 Civilians, Including 23 Children, Nine Women, and Eight
Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in September 2021, 1 October 2021, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims theLives of 84 Civilians, Including 22 Children, Four Women, and Seven Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in October
2021, 1 November 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 86 Civilians, Including 16 Children,
Eight Women, and Six Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in November 2021, 1 December 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR, 1,271
Civilians, Including 299 Children, 134 Women, and 104 Victims of Torture, Killed in Syria in 2021, 1 January 2022, url,
p. 13
1163
Based on data extracted from monthly reports on civilian fatalities published by SNHR. See: SNHR, 69 Civilians,
Including 18 Children, Four Women and Eight Victims Due to Torture, Killed in Syria in January 2022, 1 February2022, url, p. 8; SNHR, 161 Civilians, Including 28 Children, Six Women and 66 Victims Due to Torture, Documented
Killed in Syria in February 2022, 1 March 2022, url, p. 9; SNHR, 67 Civilians, Including 20 Children, Three Women,
and Seven Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Killed in Syria in March 2022, 1 April 2022, url, p. 8; SNHR, 101
Civilians, Including 17 Children, 14 Women, and Six Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in
Syria in April 2022, 1 May 2022, url, p. 9; SNHR, 78 Civilians, Including 14 Children, 11 Women, and Eight Victims
Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in Syria in May 2022, 1 June 2022, url, p. 8; SNHR, 568
Civilians, Including 115 Children, 53 Women, and 101 Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in
Syria in the First Half of 2022, 2 July 2022, url, p. 12; SNHR, 86 Civilians, Including 21 Children, Eight Women, andFive Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in Syria in July 2022, 1 August 2022, url, p. 91164
UNESCWA/University of St Andrews, Syria at War; Eight Years On, 2020, 23 September 2020, url, p. 51
1165
The source assessed a total of 33 171 households country-wide. The data are representative on sub-district level
for total population and on district level for population groups (confidence level is 95% and margin of error is 10%).
Shelter Cluster/UNHCR, Syrian Arab Republic: Whole of Syria Shelter/NFI Sector. Humanitarian Needs Overview
2022, 4 January 2022, url, p. 1
1166
Shelter Cluster/UNHCR, Syrian Arab Republic: Whole of Syria Shelter/NFI Sector. Humanitarian Needs Overview
2022, 4 January 2022, url, p. 6
1167
Carter Center (The), A Call for Action: Data on Unexploded Ordnance in Syria and its Implications. December
2012 – May 2021, March 2022, url, p. 23; Mine Action Review, Clearing the Mines 2020, 1 October 2020, url, p. 378

155

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

causes heavy damage to civilians.1168 The Carter Center assumes that there are 1 500 to 4 500
unexploded ordnance in the Hasaka governorate. 1169
Mine Action Review notes that international and national demining organisations as well as
commercial companies have taken part in demining activities in areas under SDF control innorth-east Syria.1170 Furthermore, according to the Carter Center, the SDF also clears
unexploded ordnance in those territories. 1171
Regarding contamination, Hasaka (city), Shaddadi, Tal Tamr, and Ras al-Ayn remain thegovernorate’s most severely affected districts, according to a report by iMMAP. 1172 From
September 2021 to April 2022, the report lists 372 deaths and 144 injuries in connection withlandmine incidents for Hasaka governorate.1173(e)Displacement and return

UNOCHA stated in a February 2022 report that the IDP population in Hasaka governorate was120 246.1174 In 2021, UNOCHA recorded approximately 1 000 IDP movements from Hasaka
governorate, 400 IDP movements to the governorate as well as 13 000 movements within thegovernorate.1175
In the first half of 2022, IDP departures from Hasaka governorate amounted to 2 501,
displacements within the governorate amounted to 2 162, and IDP arrivals to the governorate
amounted to 3 415.1176
For 2021, UNOCHA’s registered about 4 000 IDP returnee movements from Hasaka
governorate, 765 IDP returnee movements within the governorate, and around 1 100 returnee
movements to the governorate.1177
In the first half of 2022, IDP returns to Hasaka governorate amounted to 384 (, IDP returns
within the governorate amounted to 262, and IDP returns from the governorate amounted to
1 036.1178

1168

Mine Action Review, Clearing the Mines 2020, 1 October 2020, url, pp. 270, 378
Carter Center (The), A Call for Action: Data on Unexploded Ordnance in Syria and its Implications. December
2012 – May 2021, March 2022, url, p. 23
1170
Mine Action Review, Clearing the Mines 2020, 1 October 2020, url, p. 379
1171
Carter Center (The), A Call for Action: Data on Unexploded Ordnance in Syria and its Implications. December
2012 – May 2021, March 2022, url, p. 23
1172
iMMAP, Progress, Challenges and Forecast of Humanitarian Mine Action, 31 May 2022, url, p. 11
1173
iMMAP, Progress, Challenges and Forecast of Humanitarian Mine Action, 31 May 2022, url, p. 11
1174
UNOCHA, 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 23
1175
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements Overview, Jan – Dec 2021, 21 March 2022, url
1176
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements, January 2022, 24 February 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab
Republic: IDP Movements, February 2022, 11 April 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements,
March 2022, 9 May 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements, April 2022, 15 June 2022, url;
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements, May 2022, 13 July 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP
Movements, June 2022, 5 August 2022, url
1177
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Spontaneous IDP Returnee Movements Overview, Jan – Dec 2021 (as of 31
December 2021), 21 March 2022, url
1178
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns, January 2022, 24 February 2022, url; UNOCHA,
Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns, February 2022, 11 April 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic:
IDP Spontaneous Returns, March 2022, 9 May 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous
1169

156

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

2.8.

Raqqa governorate

Map 14: © MapAction, Raqqa governorate 1179

2.8.1.

General description of the governorate

Ar-Raqqa (hereafter ‘Raqqa’) governorate is located in the north-central part of Syria. The
governorate has international borders with Turkey to the north, and borders to the west with
Aleppo governorate, to the east with Hasaka and Deir Ez-Zor governorates and to the southwith Hama and Homs governorates.1180 The governorate is divided in three districts with its
respective capitals: Raqqa (Raqqa city), al-Thawra (Tabqa), and Tal Abyad.1181

Returns, April 2022, 15 June 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns, May 2022, 13
July 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns, June 2022, 5 August 2022, url
1179
MapAction, Ar Raqqa Governorate [map], 29 July 2016, url
1180
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Atlas, Syrian Arab Republic, January 2017, url, p. 15
1181
The district of Raqqa further divided into sub-districts of Raqqa, Karama, Maadan and Sabka; Tall Abyad into subdistricts of Tal Abyad, Ayn Issa and Suluk; and al -Thawra into sub-districts of al-Thawra, Jurneyyeh and Mansura.
See, also: UNOCHA, Humanitarian Atlas, Syrian Arab Republic, January 2017, url, p. 15

157

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMThe Syrian Bureau of Statistics estimated the population of Raqqa governorate at 940 333 in
2021.1182 In a February 2022 report, UNOCHA estimated the population of Raqqa governorate
to be of 773 026 inhabitants.1183
According to an analysis published by MEI, ethnic Arabs affiliated to local tribes form 90 % of
Raqqa’s population, while the remaining 10 % consist of other ethnic groups, including Kurds,
Turkmens, Circassians and Armenians. The majority of Raqqa’s Arab population are Sunni
Muslims. The great majority of Raqqa’s population and resources are located in areas
controlled by the SDF.1184

2.8.2.

Conflict background and armed actors

The central parts of Raqqa governorate are under the control of the Kurdish -led SDF. The GoS
and its allies control the southern parts of the governorate.1185 As the result of the Turkish
military incursion in October 2019, the GoS forces and/or their Russian allies have beenpresent along the main roads 1186 in the SDF-controlled areas and in the frontlines1187 separating
the SDF-controlled parts of Raqqa from the Turkish-controlled area in northern Raqqa
governorate. Since October 2019, the TAF and the Turkish-backed Syrian armed groups
operating under the umbrella of the SNA have been in control of most of the territory north ofM4 highway in northern Raqqa governorate, including the border town of Tal Abyad and its
surroundings and the sub-district of Suluk.1188 Along with an adjoining territory of roughly equal
size in northern Hasaka governorate (see Section 2.7.1), this area constitutes the so-called
Operation Peace Spring area.1189
The Russian military does not hold territory, but individual stationing posts from which its
forces conduct joint patrols with either Turkish troops or the SDF. 1190

1182

Syria, Central Bureau of Statistics, Estimate of the population in Syria by governorates, n. d., url
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview, Syrian Arab Republic, February 2022, url, p. 23
1184
Dukhan, H. et al., The Kin Who Count: Mapping Raqqa’s Tribal Topology, MEI, 24 March 2021, url
1185International Crisis Group, Syria: Shoring Up Raqqa’s Shaky Recovery, 18 November 2021, url, Appendices A (p.
22) and B (p. 23); Jusoor for Studies, Map of Military Control in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022, 24
December 2022, url; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on
the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url [Annex II: Estimated areas of influence, January2022], p. 22; Liveuamap, Syria, as of 21 July 2022, url
1186
IMMAP, Thematic Report 6, Operation Peace Spring and Potential Turkish Intervention Scenarios, October 2021,
url, p. 18; Jusoor for Studies, Map of Military Control in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022, 24 December
2022, url
1187
International Crisis Group, Syria: Shoring Up Raqqa’s Shaky Recovery, 18 November 2021, url, p. i
1188
Based on reading of maps in Etana Syria, Military Control Across Syria [Map], 1 July 2022, url; UN Human Rights
Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab R epublic [A/HRC/49/77],
8 February 2022, url [Annex II: Estimated areas of influence, January 2022], p. 22
1189
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url [Annex II: Estimated areas of influence, January 2022], p. 22
1190
International Crisis Group, Syria: Shoring Up Raqqa’s Shaky Recovery, 18 November 2021, url, p. i
1183

158

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION(a)

Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)

SDF controls the central parts of the governorate 1191 including Raqqa city1192, and governs thisterritory with the aid of affiliated local councils such as the Raqqa civil council.1193 In July 2022,
GoS forces have reportedly further reinforced their presence in the governorate’s countryside
by sending in additional personnel and heavy military equipment after having coordinated themove with the SDF and Russia.1194(b)

The US-led Coalition against ISILThe USDOD does not release fixed locations of single military sites, but instead marks vaguely
its areas of operations in Northeast Syria, which it calls ‘the Eastern Syria Security Area—which
includes parts of Hasaka and Deir Ez-Zor governorates east of the Euphrates River’1195 anddoes not show any presence in Raqqa governorate. 1196 Also, Jusoor for Studies does notinclude any stationing points by the US-led Coalition for Raqqa governorate at the turn of theyear 2021/22.1197 According to an opposition website’s article from April 2022, the US-led
Coalition in Northeast Syria does, in fact, confines its presence to the governorates Hasaka
and Deir-Ez Zor.1198
However, in May 2022, there were news reports of a US military return to bases in Northeast
Syria from which they had withdrawn in 20191199, including the 17th Division base north of Raqqa(city) and the airbase at Tabqa.1200(c)Syrian Arab Army and affiliated armed groups

As already stated above, the GoS and its allies control the southern parts of Raqqa
governorate and are also present in the SDF-controlled parts of the governorate (the main
roads and the frontlines between the SDF-controlled and the Turkish-controlled areas).1201
Beginning in June 2022, the SAA had sent additional troops to Raqqa’s borders with
1191

International Crisis Group, Syria: Shoring Up Raqqa’s Shaky Recovery, 18 November 2021, url, Appendices A (p.
22) and B (p. 23); Jusoor for Studies, Map of Military Control in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022, 24
December 2022, url; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on
the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url [Annex II: Estimated areas of influence, January2022], p. 22; Liveuamap, Syria, as of 21 July 2022, url
1192International Crisis Group, Syria: Shoring Up Raqqa’s Shaky Recovery, 18 November 2021, url, p. i
1193
International Crisis Group, Syria: Shoring Up Raqqa’s Shaky Recovery, 18 November 2021, url, pp. 10-11
1194
Asharq al-Awsat, Syrian Regime Forces Deploy Quality Weapons in SDF Areas, 8 July 2022, url
1195
USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress 1 January2022 – 31 March 2022, [publically released on] 17 May 2022, url, p. 64
1196
USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress 1 January2022 – 31 March 2022, [publically released on] 17 May 2022, url, p. 67
1197
Jusoor for Studies, Foreign Forces Points in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022, 27 December 2021, url
1198
Syrian Observer (The), A spokesman for the Syrian Tribes and Clans Council revealed to Nedaa Post the
distribution of U.S. bases in northeastern Syria, 22 April 2022, url
1199
Jusoor for Studies, Potential for US forces return to locations they vacated in 2019 in Aleppo, Raqqa, 17 May
2022, url
1200
Syria Direct, Military and civilian sources: US forces redeploy to former positions in northeastern Syria, 31 May
2022, url
1201
International Crisis Group, Syria: Shoring Up Raqqa’s Shaky Recovery, 18 November 2021, url, Appendices A(p. 22) and B (p. 23); Jusoor for Studies, Map of Military Control in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022, 24
December 2022, url; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on
the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url [Annex II: Estimated areas of influence, January2022], p. 22

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Turkey.1202 As of July 2022, GoS forces, including the 93 Brigade, were stationed around theAin Issa frontline.1203
According to the USDOD’s first quarterly report of 2022, the SAA was present roughly along
the 42 Highway south of Raqqa (city), which leads west out of the governorate, and controls asection of the M4 highway on the southern edge of Lake Assad.1204 An earlier published, butmore detailed map by the International Crisis Group paints a similar picture, only adding asmall insular area of political control within the SDF-controlled territory south of Tabqa1205,
which is the Tabqa military air base that the GoS holds control over since October 2019,
although the city itself is under SDF control. 1206(d)

RussiaAccording to Jusoor for Studies, Russia had a total of seven military sites in Raqqa
governorate: six north of the city of Raqqa (with three in the border area between Turkishcontrolled and SDF-controlled areas and one immediately north of the city) and one further
south in Tabqa.1207 In its 2022’s first quarterly report, the USDOD notes two Russian bases;
one at Ain Issa and one south of Raqqa (city) bordering different areas of territorial control
between the SDF, the GoS and Iran-aligned militias.1208
(e)

Iran

According to a map published by the Atlantic Council and charting the influence of Iran and its
militias in Syria in 2020, Iranian-backed armed groups were in control the town of Resafa insouthern Raqqa governorate and had influence in the Euphrates river valley in the easternpart of the governorate, near the administrative border between Raqqa and Deir Ez-Zor andon the main roads in GoS-controlled parts of the governorate. In addition, Iranian-backed
armed groups were depicted to have a pocket of influence in Ain Issa area, bordering the
Operation Peace Spring area controlled by Turkey and its affiliates. 1209 According to an MEE
analysis, Iran has provided support to tribal militias in Raqqa governorate in order to gain
influence in the governorate.1210
According to Jusoor for Studies, Iranian Forces had a total of 15 stationing points in Raqqa at
the turn of the year 2021/22, mostly situated in GoS-controlled areas with the exception of
three, which are positioned in mostly SDF-controlled territory around Tabqa.1211

1202

Reuters, Syrian, Russian forces boosted after Turkey signals operation, officials say, 7 June 2022, url
Asharq al-Awsat, Syrian Regime Forces Deploy Quality Weapons in SDF Areas, 8 July 2022, url; Syria Direct,
Allied with Damascus, SDF prepares for Turkish operation in northern Syria, url
1204
USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress 1 January2022 – 31 March 2022, [publicly released on] 17 May 2022, url, p. 67
1205
International Crisis Group, Shoring Up Raqqa’s Shaky Recovery, 18 November 2021, url, p. 22
1206
VOA, Rebuilding Efforts Continue in Syria’s Former IS Stronghold, 3 March 2021, url
1207
Jusoor for Studies, Foreign Forces Points in Syria End of 2021 and Beginni ng of 2022, 27 December 2021, url
1208
USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress 1 Janua ry
2022 – 31 March 2022, [publicly released on] 17 May 2022, url, p. 67
1209
Saban, N., Factbox: Iranian influence and presence in Syria, Atlantic Council, 5 November 2020, url
1210
Dukhan, H./ Alhamad, A., Iran’s Growing Network of Influence among Eastern Syrian Tribes, WINEP/ Fikra
Forum, 6 April 2021, url
1211
Jusoor for Studies, Foreign Forces Points in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022, 27 December 2021, url
1203

160

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION(f)

Turkey and affiliated armed groups

In February 2022, four SNA groups, Ahrar al-Sharqiya, Jaysh al-Sharqiya, the 20 th Division, andSuqur al-Sham, announced the formation of the Liberation and Construction Movement (LCM).
Its representatives claim to command 7 000 fighters across Aleppo and Afrin and between
Ras al-Ayn (Hasaka) and Tal Abyad (Raqqa), operating within the SNA umbrella. The LCM issaid to maintain ‘a particularly strong presence in the [Operation] Peace Spring area’, more soin its western parts, ‘where it controls the vital Tufaha crossing that connects it with SDF -heldparts of Raqqa province.’1212
According to a map by Jusoor for Studies displaying foreign military points in Syria at the turnof the year 2021/22, Turkey has a total of ten stationing sites in Raqqa, all of which are locatedin the Operation Peace Spring area.1213
(g)

ISIL

For its 2021 report, the Rojava Information Center described ISIL’s influence, while most of its
attacks took place in Deir-Ez Zor, ‘to run north well into’ Raqqa and Hasaka governorates.1214
According the USDOD’s report from May 2022, ISIL ‘retained a smaller, but still active
presence in the northern Raqqa and Hasaka governorates’, compared with its stronger
presence in Central Syria’s desert.1215
Senior SDF security officers shared information with the International Crisis Group in May
2021, according to which ISIL had recently conducted attacks in both SDF- and GoS-controlledareas of the governorate.1216 ISIL cells were reported by International Crisis Group to operate inrural areas of Kabash and Hazima in northern Raqqa province.1217
In a more recent report by the International Crisis Group, the authors conclude that Raqqa’s
residents are at ‘high risk of ISIL recruitment’1218, but attacks by the militants werecomparatively lower in Raqqa than in other governorates since at least the beginning of
2021.1219 According to the report, ‘[ISIL] keeps a low profile in Raqqa, where the SDF is stronger
and where it fears provoking a US-led Coalition against ISIL return, though it still uses theprovince as a conduit for smuggling of people, goods and weapons.’1220

1212

Hauch, L., Syria’s eastern factions unite in the Liberation and Construction Movement: A conversation with theleadership, MEI, 2 June 2022, url
1213
Jusoor for Studies, Foreign Forces Points in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022, 27 December 2021, url
1214
RiC, Annual Sleeper Cell Report 2021, February 2022, url, p. 2
1215
USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress 1 January2022 – 31 March 2022, [publically released on] 17 May 2022, url, p. 21
1216
International Crisis Group, Syria: Shoring Up Raqqa’s Shaky Recovery, 18 November 2021, url, pp. 17-18
1217International Crisis Group, Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and North-eastern Syria, 18 July 2022, url, p. 20
1218
International Crisis Group, Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and North-eastern Syria, 18 July 2022, url, p. ii
1219
International Crisis Group, Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and North-eastern Syria, 18 July 2022, url, p. 4
1220
International Crisis Group, Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and North-eastern Syria, 18 July 2022, url, pp.
19-20

161

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

2.8.3.
(a)

Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population
Security trends during the reporting period

According to the UNCOI, the overall security situation deteriorated in the territories underSDF-control during the period from 1 July 2020 to 30 June 2021 1221 and life remained insecureduring the second half of 2021 (1 July 2021 to 31 December 2021). 1222
The conflict between the SDF and Turkish-backed armed groups Turkish (proxy) forces
For the second half of 2021, the UNCOI documented continued fighting in and around the cityof Ain Isa, ‘leading to deaths, injuries and ongoing displacement among civilians living close to
the front lines inside territory controlled by the [SDF].’ 1223 SNA and SDF were reportedly
frequently involved in mutual shelling and skirmishes along the line of control near Ain Issa in
Raqqa1224 , which at times resulted in civilian casualties.1225 Between October and November
2021, the UN Security Council registered mutual shelling and clashes particularly in Ain
Issa.1226
In January 2022, the Turkish military reportedly carried out a retaliatory operation, killing 22
members of the YPG and PKK1227, after an earlier explosion at a border post at Tal Abyad in
Turkish-controlled northern Raqqa governorate killed three Turkish soldiers.1228 The SDF
denied involvement in the attack.1229 In February 2022, non-specified areas in Raqqa weretargeted by Turkey’s ‘Winter Eagle’ military operation against Kurdish forces by air, although toa lesser degree than areas in Hasaka (See 2.7.3 Recent security trends and impact on thecivilian population, Hasaka).1230
During the first quarter of 2022, the Carter Center recorded an increase in conflict events in
Raqqa governorate, documenting 37 clashes and aerial bombardments. 1231 In a report by the
UN Security Council covering April and May 2022, it documented ‘an increase in shelling,drone strikes and rocket attacks’ in parts of Raqqa. 1232

1221

UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic [A/HRC/48/70], 13 August 2021, url, para. 94
1222
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url, para. 94
1223
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url, para. 96
1224
Hoffman, M. and Makovsky, A., Northern Syria Security Dynamics and the Refugee Crisis, CAP, 26 May 2021, url
1225
STJ, Ain Issa: A Father, His Three Children, Killed in an Artillery Attack by the Elite Army, 8 September 2021, url
1226
UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General [S/2021/1029], 15 December 2021, url, para. 4
1227
Syria.tv, ‫ عملياتنا العسكرية سوف تتصاعد في سوريا‬:‫[ وزير الدفاع التركي‬Turkish Defense Minister: Our military operations
will escalate in Syria], 12 January 2022, url
1228
Al-Arabiya, Three Turkish soldiers killed on Syria border, 8 January 2022, url
1229
ANHA, Youssef identifies 3 main goals behind Turkey's allegations of being attacked by SDF, 12 January 2022,
url
1230
Asharq al-Awsat, Turkey Expands Strikes on SDF in Northern Syria, 3 February 2022, url; International Crisis
Group, Crisis Watch (Syria), February 2022, url
1231
Carter Center (The), The Quarterly Review on Syrian Military and Security Dynamics, January-March 2022, url, p.
14
1232
UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General [S/2022/492], 16 June 2022, url, para. 21

162

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

General opposition to the SDF’s rule
In January 2022, a protest against fuel and bread shortages in al-Suwaydiyah withapproximately 100 participants left at least three civilians wounded, after SDF personnel
opened fire on the crowd. The SDF also imposed a curfew in the village, conducted raids, andreportedly arrested more than 46 people.1233 In light of these events, the AANES was said tohave dismissed dozens of its own employees who participated in the protests and arrested
several people in western Raqqa.1234
For March 2022, ACLED observed an almost threefold increase of abductions by the SDF in
Hasaka and Raqqa governorates, ‘driven by acts of forced conscription’, according to thesource.1235

ISIL insurgency
According to observations and interviews by the International Crisis Group with civil society
representatives from May 2021, the threat of unexploded mines from the battle against ISIL
has overall receded in Raqqa governorate. However, “[…] intermittent ISIS attacks continue,
including by improvised explosive devices, hit-and-run assaults and assassinations in both thecity and the governorate at large, especially in the eastern al-Karama sub-district, a former ISIS
stronghold.”1236
However, most of ISIL’s attacks in Raqqa governorate were said to have targeted security
forces in GoS-controlled areas in the south, likely because of its proximity to a strong ISIL
presence in neighbouring Homs and Hama governorates, where it had seemingly regained
strength.1237
In October 2021, the SDF conducted several security operations throughout northeast Syria,
including Raqqa (city), in cooperation with the US-led International Coalition against ISIL. Twoactive leaders of an active ISIL cell were said to be arrested in Raqqa city. 1238
Following the attack on al-Sina’a prison in Hasaka (see 2.7.3 2.7.3Recent security trends andimpact on the civilian population), the SDF and the PYD militia reportedly arrested about 50
suspects in raids in SDF-controlled Raqqa city and al-Jarniyah in January 2022. The arrested
were said to be transferred to Ayed prison in Tabqa, west of Raqqa (city).1239 Similar arrests
reportedly took place in the eastern countryside of Raqqa. 1240 During April and June 2022,

Syria.tv, ‫[ جرحى برصاص "قسد" خلل احتجاجات على أزمة المحروقات في الرقة‬Wounded by "SDF" bullets during protests
against the fuel crisis in Raqqa], 10 January 2022, url
1234
Syria.tv, "‫"[ اإلدارة الذاتية" تفصل موظفين لمشاركتهم باحتجاجات غربي الرقة‬Autonomous Administration" dismisses
employees for their participation in protests west of Raqqa], 12 January 2022, url
1235
ACLED, Regional Overview: Middle East (26 March – 1 April 2022), 7 April 2022, url
1236International Crisis Group, Syria: Shoring Up Raqqa’s Shaky Recovery, 18 November 2021, url, p. 17
1237International Crisis Group, Syria: Shoring Up Raqqa’s Shaky Recovery, 18 November 2021, url, p. 18
1238
NPA, SDF, Coalition Arrested 57 ISIS Members In Syria’s Northeast In A Month, 2 November 2021, url
1239
Syria News Agency, “‫ شخصا‬50 ‫“[ قسد” تطلق حملة اعتقاالت في دير الزور وأخرى في الرقة تسفر عن اعتقال‬SDF” launches acampaign of arrests in Deir ez-Zor and another in Raqqa, which results in the arrest of 50 people], 27 January2022, url; COAR, Syria Update, HRW Report Highlights Human Rights Risks. Is Nexus the Solution?, 7 February2022, url
1240
NPA, SDF Arrests 27 People Suspected Of Belonging To ISIS In Syria’s Raqqa, 31 January 2022, url
1233

163

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

SDF operations against ISIL were carried out including in Raqqa governorate. 1241 Regarding thefirst half of 2022, the UN Security Council documented a concentration of ‘sporadic attacks […]utilizing insurgent tactics’ in north-eastern Syria including Raqqa governorate.1242(b)Security incidents

During the reporting period, there were 1 561 security incidents recorded by ACLED in Raqqa
governorate, of whom 254 were coded as battles, 912 explosions/remote violence and 395
incidents of violence against civilians.

Figure 25. Evolution of security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence andviolence against civilians in Raqqa governorate between 1 April 2021 and 1 August 2022,
based on ACLED data 1243
Security incidents were recorded in all districts of the governorate. Most security incidents
were recorded in Tall Abyad district, which also had the highest number of remote violence
incidents. The largest number of incidents of violence against civilians was recorded in Raqqa
district (see Figure 26).

District

Battles

Remote violence

Violence against
civilians

Raqqa

110

128

245

Ath-Thawrah

51

209

66

1241

USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve I Quarterly Report to the United States
Congress I April 1, 2022 – June 30, 2022, 29 July 2022, url, p. 54
1242
UN Security Council, Thirtieth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted
pursuant to resolution 2610 (2021) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al -Qaida and associated individuals and entities[S/2022/547], 15 July 2022, para. 43, p. 121243
EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (12 August2022), url

164

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

District

Battles

Remote violence

Violence against
civilians

Tall Abyad

93

575

84

Total

254

912

395

Figure 26. Security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against
civilians in Raqqa governorate between 1 April 2021 and 1 August 2022. Breakdown by
district based on ACLED data 1244
Illustrative security incidents
•
•

•

•
•

In April 2021, clashes that initiated in Qamishli (Hasaka) between the SDF and the GoSbacked NDF spilled over to Ain Issa countryside.1245
In September 2021, STJ reported on the death of four civilians, including three children,
after their house near Ain Issa was hit by a strike following an exchange of artillery fire
between SDF and Jaysh al-Nukhba (Elite Army), an SNA-affiliated armed group.1246
On 3 February 2022, Turkey’s armed forces have apparently expanded their Winter Eagle(Kış Kartalı) 1247 operation to targets in Raqqa governorate, reportedly conducting around 10
air raids on separate targets in both Hasaka and Raqqa.1248 No information could be foundregarding potential casualties.
On 1 June 2022, at least three people were killed and 10 more injured when a rocket hit
Tal Abyad. The SDF denied responsibility for the attack.1249
On 20 June 2022, ISIL attacked a bus on a highway connecting Raqqa with Homs in thearea of Jabal al-Bishri, killing at least 13 people, most of which were GoS soldiers. The
Syrian Ministry of Defence and SOHR conflicted over whether it was a civilian or a militar ybus.1250

1244

EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (12 August2022), url
1245
Enab Baladi, Fresh clashes in al-Qamishli: Who is to benefit, and how will they affect the region’s future?, 27
April 2021, url
1246
STJ, Ain Issa: A Father, His Three Children, Killed in an Artillery Attack by the Elite Army, 8 September 2021, url
1247
Turkish Ministry of National Defense, Derik, Sincar ve Karacak Bölgel erine İcra Edilen Kış Kartalı Hava Harekâtı
Hakkında Açıklama [Statement on the Winter Eagle Air Operation to Derik, Sinjar and Karacak Regions], 1 February,url
1248
Asharq al-Awsat, Turkey Expands Strikes on SDF in Northern Syria, url
1249
AP News, Rocket attack in rebel-held Syrian town kills at least 3, 1 June 2022, url
1250
Reuters, Islamic State claims responsibility for attack that killed 13 in Syria's Raqqa, 20 June 2022, url; AlJazeera, At least 13 killed in northern Syria bus attack, 20 June 2022, url; SOHR, ISIS attack | 15 regime soldierskilled in Al-Raqqah desert, 20 June 2022, url

165

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM•

On 29 July 2022, four Asayish members were killed when reportedly a Turkish drone hit
their car in the area of Ain Issa.1251(c)Civilian fatalities

Month

SNHR 2021

SNHR 2022

January

5

1

February

4

4

March

7

6

April

14

2

May

8

1

June

2

7

July

4

3

August15

September

9

October3

November2

December

2

Total

75

24

Figure 27. Civilian fatalities as a result of armed conflict in Raqqa governorate in 2021 andfirst seven months of 2022. Monthly breakdown based on SNHR data

166

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

In 2021, SNHR recorded 75 civilian fatalities 1252 in Raqqa governorate while in the first sevenmonths of 2022 it documented 24 civilian fatalities (see Figure 27).1253(d)Conflict-related infrastructure damage and explosive remnants of war

According to February 2022 estimates by local officials, 30 % of the governorate’s capital,
Raqqa city, remains destroyed.1254 UNESCWA reports the damage to physical capital of Raqqa
governorate at around 6.7 billion USD (8.3 % of all the damage inflicted on Syrian physicalcapital) between 2011 and 2018, noting the US-led Coalition’s bombing campaign against ISIL
in 2017 ‘destroyed the entire urban system’ in the governorate. 1255
According to reports from Mine Action Review and the Carter Center, Raqqa governorate isheavily contaminated with mines causing damage to civilians, mainly because retreating ISIL
forces left behind improvised mines and other improvised devices. 1256 Overall, the Carter
Center estimates in its 2021 report the number of unexploded devices in Raqqa governorate
between 1 750 to 5 750.1257 According to COAR, the city of Raqqa is particularly affected. 1258

1251

Syrian Observer (The), Dozens of Bodies Found in Mass Grave in Northern Syria, 29 July 2022, url
Based on data extracted from monthly reports on civilian fatalities published by SNHR. See: SNHR, Extrajudicial
Killing Claims the Lives of 113 Civilians, Including 36 Children, Six Women, and Three Victims Due to Torture, inJanuary 2021, 1 February 2021, url, p. 7; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 138 Civilians, Including 23
Children, 11 Women, and 14 Victims Due to Torture, in February 2021, 1 March 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR, Extrajudicial
Killing Claims the Lives of 177 Civilians, Including 28 Children, 35 Women, One Medical Worker, and 9 Victims Dueto Torture, in March 2021, 1 April 2021, url, p. 7; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 96 Civilians, Including
15 Children, 11 Women, and Nine Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in May 2021, 1 June 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR,
Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 723 Civilians in Syria in the First Half of 2021, 1 July 2021, url, p. 9; SNHR,
Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 129 Civilians, Including 44 Children, 17 Women, and 10 Victims Due toTorture, in Syria in July 2021, 1 August 2021, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 94 Civilians,
Including 32 Children, 10 Women, and Seven Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in August 2021, 1 September 2021, url,
p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 86 Civilians, Including 23 Children, Nine Women, and Eight
Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in September 2021, 1 October 2021, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims theLives of 84 Civilians, Including 22 Children, Four Women, and Seven Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in October
2021, 1 November 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 86 Civilians, Including 16 Children,
Eight Women, and Six Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in November 2021, 1 December 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR, 1,271
Civilians, Including 299 Children, 134 Women, and 104 Victims of Torture, Killed in Syria in 2021, 1 January 2022, url,
p. 13
1253
Based on data extracted from monthly reports on civilian fatalities published by SNHR. See: SNHR, 69 Civilians,
Including 18 Children, Four Women and Eight Victims Due to Torture, Killed in Syria in January 2022, 1 February2022, url, p. 8; SNHR, 161 Civilians, Including 28 Children, Six Women and 66 Victims Due to Torture, Documented
Killed in Syria in February 2022, 1 March 2022, url, p. 9; SNHR, 67 Civilians, Including 20 Children, Three Women,
and Seven Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Killed in Syria in March 2022, 1 April 2022, url, p. 8; SNHR, 101
Civilians, Including 17 Children, 14 Women, and Six Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in
Syria in April 2022, 1 May 2022, url, p. 9; SNHR, 78 Civilians, Including 14 Children, 11 Women, and Eight Victims
Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in Syria in May 2022, 1 June 2022, url, p. 8; SNHR, 568
Civilians, Including 115 Children, 53 Women, and 101 Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in
Syria in the First Half of 2022, 2 July 2022, url, p. 12; SNHR, 86 Civilians, Including 21 Children, Eight Women, andFive Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in Syria in July 2022, 1 August 2022, url, p. 9
1254
VOA/Associated Press, Poverty, Fear Drive Exodus from Syria's One-time IS Capital, 22 February 2022, url
1255
UNESCWA/University of St Andrews, Syria at War; Eight Years On, 2020, 23 September 2020, url, pp. 50-51
1256
Carter Center (The), A Call for Action: Data on Unexploded Ordnance in Syria and its Implications. December
2012 – May 2021, March 2022, url, p. 23; Mine Action Review, Clearing the Mines 2020, 1 October 2020, url, pp.
270, 378
1257
Carter Center (The), A Call for Action: Data on Unexploded Ordnance in Syria and its Implications. December
2012 – May 2021, March 2022, url, p. 23
1258
COAR, Demining in Ar-Raqqa, 27 February 2022, url, p. 1
1252

167

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Regarding contamination, Raqqa city remains the governorate’s most severely affecteddistrict, according to a report by iMMAP. From September 2021 to April 2022, the report lists
194 deaths and 148 injuries in connection with landmine incidents for Raqqa governorate.1259(e)Displacement and return

UNOCHA stated in a February 2022 report that the IDP population in Raqqa governorate was
114 860.1260 In 2021, UNOCHA recorded approximately 143 IDP movements from Raqqa
governorate, 9 IDP movements within the governorate as well as 817 movements to thegovernorate.1261 In the first half of 2022, there were 157 IDP departures from Raqqa
governorate, 134 displacements within the governorate, and 208 IDP arrivals to thegovernorate.1262
For 2021, UNOCHA’s registered about 1 400 IDP returnee movements to Raqqa governorate,
705 IDP returnee movements within, and about 500 returnee movements from thegovernorate.1263
In the first half of 2022, IDP returns to Raqqa governorate amounted to 20, no IDP returns
within the governorate, and 1 284 IDP returns from the governorate.1264

1259

iMMAP, Progress, Challenges and Forecast of Humanitarian Mine Action, 31 May 2022, url, pp. 11-13
UNOCHA, 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 23
1261
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements Overview, Jan – Dec 2021, 21 March 2022, url
1262
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements, January 2022, 24 February 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab
Republic: IDP Movements, February 2022, 11 April 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements,
March 2022, 9 May 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements, April 2022, 15 June 2022, url;
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements, May 2022, 13 July 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP
Movements, June 2022, 5 August 2022, url
1263
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Spontaneous IDP Returnee Movements Overview, Jan – Dec 2021 (as of 31
December 2021), 21 March 2022, url
1264
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns, January 2022, 24 February 2022, url; UNOCHA,
Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns, February 2022, 11 April 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic:
IDP Spontaneous Returns, March 2022, 9 May 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous
Returns, April 2022, 15 June 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns, May 2022, 13
July 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns, June 2022, 5 August 2022, url
1260

168

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

2.9.

Deir Ez-Zor governorate

Map 15: © MapAction, Deir Ez-Zor governorate map1265

2.9.1.

General description of the governorate

Deir Ez-Zor governorate is located in eastern Syria. The governorate has an international
border with Iraq to the east, and internal borders to with Homs to the south, with Raqqa to thewest and with Hasaka to the north. The Euphrates River passes through the governorate,

1265

MapAction, Deir-ez-Zor Governorate, 29 July 2016, url

169

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

dividing it into two parts (see Map 15) 1266, also known as al-Shamiya and al-Jazeera.1267
Administratively, Deir Ez-Zor is divided into three districts: Deir Ez-Zor, al-Mayadin, and alBukamal (alternatively Albu Kamal, Abu Kamal), and into 14 sub districts. 1268
The Central Statistics Bureau of Syria estimated that the population of Deir Ez-Zor governorate
was 1 266 561 in 2021.1269 In a February 2022 report, UNOCHA estimated the population of
Deir Ez-Zor governorate to be of 1 107 720 inhabitants. 1270
The SDF-controlled areas to the east of the Euphrates River are believed to currently hostabout 70 % of the governorate’s total population.1271

2.9.2.

Conflict background and armed actors

Deir Ez-Zor governorate is roughly divided into two areas of control. The western part of thegovernorate – that is, mainly the areas west of the Euphrates River – is controlled by the GoS
and its Iranian and Russian allies. This area covers the major cities (Deir Ez-Zor city, al-Mayadin
and al-Bukamal) and the logistical route connecting GoS-controlled areas to the Syrian-Iraqi
border. The eastern part of the governorate – most of the areas east of the Euphrates River –is controlled by the Kurdish-led SDF.1272
While Jusoor Studies, by the end of 2021, still assumed a presence of the US-led Coalition
against ISIL forces at al-Bukamal1273, other experts stated in March 2022 that ‘Iran now controls
the al-Bukamal crossing and the entire border separating the Deir Ez-Zor Governorate from
Iraq’.1274 However, there seems to have been an agreement between the GoS and the SDF toestablish a corridor between its each controlled areas to enable the SDF access to the bordercrossing with Iraq.1275(a)Syrian Arab Army and affiliated armed groups

The GoS forces – consisting mostly of the SAA formations and the NDF – control the westernpart of Deir Ez-Zor governorate with the help of Iranian-backed armed groups and Russia.1276

1266

MapAction, Deir-ez-Zor Governorate, 29 July 2016, url; UNOCHA, Humanitarian Atlas, Syrian Arab Republic,
January 2017, url, p. 13
1267
SACD, Deir ez-Zor sees few options as widely rejected ‘reconciliation’ starts, 11 January 2022, url
1268
The district of Deir Ez-Zor is further divided into sub-districts of Deir ez-Zor, Busayra, Khasham, Kisreh,
Muhasan, Sur and Tabi; Albu Kamal into sub-districts of Abu Kamal, Hajin, Jalaa and Susat; and al -Mayadin into subdistricts of al-Mayadin, Ashara and Thiban (See: UNOCHA, Humanitarian Atlas, Syria n Arab Republic, January 2017,
url, p. 13)
1269
Syria, Central Bureau of Statistics, Estimate of the population in Syria by governorates, n. d., url
1270
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview, Syrian Arab Republic, February 2022, url, p. 23
1271
SACD, Deir ez-Zor sees few options as widely rejected ‘reconciliation’ starts, 11 January 2022, url
1272
Based on reading of maps in UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission ofInquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url [Annex II: Estimated areas of influence,
January 2022], p. 22; Etana Syria, Military Control Across Syria [Map], 1 July 2022, url; Jusoor for Studies, Foreign
Forces Points in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022, 27 December 2021, url; Liveuamap, Syria, as of 21 July
2022, url
1273
Jusoor for Studies, Foreign Forces Points in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022, 27 December 2021, url
1274
Hassan, M./ al-Ahmed, S., Iran’s growing presence in Syria’s al-Hasakah poses a direct threat to US forces, MEI,
24 March 2022, url
1275
Jusoor for Studies, SDF to open the ‘al-Baghuz – al-Bukamal’ Crossing. Motives and potential risks, 20 January2022, url
1276
Koontz, K. & Waters, G., Between the Coalition, ISIS, and Assad: Courting the Tribes of Deir ez-Zor, MEI, 3
November 2020, url, pp. 4–5

170

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

According to Oula Alrifai and Ali Alleile, Syria experts at the WINEP1277, the GoS-controlledwestern parts of Deir Ez-Zor governorate can be divided into two ‘spheres of influence’. The
SAA is in control of the northern part of this area, ‘run’ by the 4th Division and the 5th
Corps.1278(b)

Iran and Iran-backed armed groups

Iranian forces and other Iranian-affiliated armed groups are present in eastern Syria where
they provide support for other GoS-affiliated forces 1279, operate smuggling routes along the
Iraqi-Syrian border 1280, and allegedly work to antagonize the local population against the SDF
and the US-led Coalition against ISIL.1281 The southern part of GoS-controlled Deir Ez-Zor
governorate, including the cities of al-Mayadin and al-Bukamal, is ‘increasingly dominated’ by
the Iranian-backed armed groups 1282 and continued to be so recently.1283According to an article
by the Washington Post from January 2022, Iran-backed armed groups are more successful inrecruiting members than the GoS’ own security forces, while also providing more benefits to
its members.1284
Omar Abu Layla, a specialist on affairs in Deir Ez-Zor at the WINEP1285, describes the IRGC as‘the administrative, military, and financial nucleus of the Iranian-backed militias in Deir Ezzor
governorate’1286, whose largest headquarters in eastern Syria are based near the al-Assad
Hospital in southern Deir Ez-Zor. In addition to the militias associated with the IRGC, Iran also
backs Afghan and Pakistani Shia forces and militias comprised solely of Syrian
recruits.1287Between the years 2021/22, Jusoor for Studies counted a total of 27 ‘places of
Iranian military points’ in Deir Ez-Zor, all of which are located in GoS-controlled territory.1288(c)RussiaAccording to Jusoor for Studies, Russia had 10 military sites in GoS-controlled Deir Ez-Zor by
the turn of the year 2021/22, most of them in the Euphrates river valley. 1289 According to Alrifaiand Alleile, Russian forces operating in Deir Ez-Zor governorate have pursued to ‘secure1277

See: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Experts (Oula A. Alrifai), n.d., url; WINEP, Experts (Ali Alleile),n.D., url
1278
Abu Layla, O., How Iranian Militias Have Swallowed Deir Ezzor, WINEP, 16 February 2022, url
1279
Saban, N., Factbox: Iranian presence in Syria’s Deir ez-Zor province, Atlantic Council, 18 May 2021, url
1280
Asharq al-Awsat, Iran-backed Militias Use Vegetable Trucks to Smuggle Weapons into Syria, 6 December 2021,
url
1281
USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress 1 January2022 – 31 March 2022, [publicly released on] 17 May 2022, url, p. 71
1282
Alrifai, O. A. & Alleile A., Russian-Iranian Tensions in Deir al-Zour, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
4 September 2020, url1283
Abu Layla, O., How Iranian Militias Have Swallowed Deir Ezzor, WINEP, 16 February 2022, url
1284
Washington Post (The), Iran is putting down roots in eastern Syria, outcompeting Assad’s regime in signing up
fighters, 28 January 2022, url
1285
See: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Experts (Omar Abu Layla), n.d., url
1286
Abu Layla, O., How Iranian Militias Have Swallowed Deir Ezzor, WINEP, 16 February 2022, url
1287
Abu Layla, O., How Iranian Militias Have Swallowed Deir Ezzor, WINEP, 16 February 2022, url; The source says
Afghan but mentions both the Fatemiyoun and the Zainabiyoun Brigade; the first is said to be Afghan, the latter
Pakistani. See: Jamestown Foundation (The), The Shia Fatemiyoun Brigade: Iran’s Prospective Proxy Militia in
Afghanistan, 26 March 2021, url; Jamestown Foundation (The), The Zainabiyoun Brigade: A Pakistani Shiite Militia
Amid the Syrian Conflict, 27 May 2016, url
1288
Jusoor for Studies, Foreign Forces Points in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022, 27 December 2021, url
1289
Jusoor for Studies, Foreign Forces Points in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022, 27 December 2021, url

171EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

strategic sites’, including the Deir Ez-Zor military airport.1290 Significant Russian presence in alMayadin district as well as control over areas of Deir Ez-Zor city was also reported.1291(d)Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)

According to Fabrice Balanche, the SDF controls the internal border between the GoScontrolled western part and the SDF-controlled eastern part of Deir Ez-Zor governorate. 1292 In
the eastern part of the governorate, the SDF’s control over the international border between
Syria and Iraq began to crumble, when, according to a report from March 2022, Iran took
control over the al-Bukamal crossing ‘and the entire border separating the Deir Ez-Zor
Governorate from Iraq’.1293 A WINEP analysis claimed that the eastern Deir Ez-Zor governorate
can be considered as an administrative hinterland for the SDF which focused mainly on
Hasaka governorate. ISIL has reportedly benefitted from this lack of local control and support
for the SDF in Deir Ez-Zor as well as from the October 2019 Turkish military incursion, which
forced the SDF to relocate its forces closer to Turkish border. 1294
Recently, the SDF have increasingly been challenged in Deir Ez-Zor, either by popular
unrest1295 or by ISIL attacks.1296(e)

The US-led Coalition against ISILThe US-led Coalition against ISIL has reportedly reinforced its presence in Deir Ez-Zor during
the referenced period of this report 1297, guarding particularly the both strategically important alOmar oil field and the Tabiya (Conoco) 1298 gas plant.1299 According to a map in the USDOD’s
July 2022 report, its forces are displayed along the eastern bank of the Euphrates River, in thevicinity of the governorate’s capital, Deir Ez-Zor city.1300 According to Jusoor for Studies, theUS-led Coalition forces had a total of nine stationing sites Deir Ez-Zor governorate by the turnof the year 2021/22.1301

1290

Alrifai, O. A./ Alleile A., Russian-Iranian Tensions in Deir al-Zour, WINEP, 4 September 2020, url
SACD, Deir ez-Zor sees few options as widely rejected ‘reconciliation’ starts, 11 January 2022, url
1292
Balanche F., The Assad Regime Has Failed to Restore Full Sovereignty Over Syria, WINEP, 10 February 2021, url
1293
Hassan, M./ al-Ahmed, S., Iran’s growing presence in Syria’s al-Hasakah poses a direct threat to US forces, MEI,
24 March 2022, url
1294
Zelin, A. Y. & Knights, M., The Islamic State's Resurgence in the COVID Era?, WINEP, 29 May 2020, url
1295
Enab Baladi, Arabs look for missing representation in SDF-controlled areas, 12 April 2022, url
1296
NPA, ISIS, Government Outlets Claim Responsibility For Attacks In Syria’s Deir Ez-Zor, 19 January 2022, url
1297
NPA, US Fighting Vehicles Drive To Syria’s Deir Ez-Zor, 6 December 2021, url; MEMO, US beefs up militarypresence in Syria oil fields, 8 January 2022, url
1298
The gas field is located in Tabiya, on the outskirts of Deir ez-Zor (city), but was named after the US company
which discovered the site and built a processing plant there. See: Reuters, U.S. -backed forces capture big gas fieldin Syria's Deir al-Zor: senior commander, 23 September 2017, url;
It has been fought over in the past, even after ISIL’s territorial defeat. See: New York Times (The), How a 4-Hour
Battle Between Russian Mercenaries and U.S. Commandos Unfolded in Syria, 24 May 2018, url
1299
Asharq al-Awsat, US Forces Conduct Drills in Bases Attacked by Iran, 9 April 2022, url
1300
USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve I Quarterly Report to the United States
Congress I April 1, 2022 – June 30, 2022, 29 July 2022, url, p. 55
1301
Jusoor for Studies, Foreign Forces Points in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022 [Map], 27 December 2021,
url
1291

172

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

(f)

ISIL

The Rojava Information Center concluded in its report covering the year 2021, that ‘the vast
majority of ISIS attacks took place in the relatively unstable, Arab-majority region of Deir EzZor.’ And ‘[t]hough officially under SDF control, the security situation in Deir Ez-Zor remains
precarious.’1302 In the second half of 2021, according to the UNCOI, ISIL activity contributed toa particularly volatile security situation in Deir Ez-Zor, ‘with continuous Da’esh attacks andcounter-terrorism operations in response.’1303
According to a report by the International Crisis Group from July 2022, ISIL’s reach in Deir EzZor has recently increased, frightening residents and thereby making it harder for ISIL’s
adversaries to gather intelligence from the local population. 1304 Most of ISIL’s attacks in thegovernorate since late 2021 have taken place in Deir Ez-Zor’s western (GoS-controlled)countryside.1305 Reporting on the first half of 2022, the UN Security Council noted that ISIL
continued to concentrate its attack in Deir Ez-Zor governorate, among other areas.1306

2.9.3.
(a)

Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population
Security trends during the reporting period

According to the UNCOI, the overall security situation deteriorated in the territories underSDF-control during the period from 1 July 2020 to 30 June 2021 1307 and life remained insecureduring the second half of 2021 (1 July 2021 to 31 December 2021). 1308
In May 2022, Deir Ez-Zor governorate also witnessed airstrikes near the town of Masyaf on
what is believed to be a base for Iranian and Iran-affiliated militias 1309 and near al-Bukamal on a
convoy by the IRGC 1310, both assumed to be conducted by the Israeli military.
Infighting among GoS forces
In May 2021, members of the NDF reportedly clashed with members of Liwa al-Quds in Deir
Ez-Zor city.1311 In another incident, different factions within the NDF clashed with each other,
causing several injuries and temporarily cut off the city from its western countryside. 1312
1302

RiC, Annual Slepper Cell Report 2021, February 2022, url, p. 2
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url, para. 95
1304International Crisis Group, Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and North-eastern Syria, 18 July 2022, url, p. ii
1305International Crisis Group, Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and North-eastern Syria, 18 July 2022, url, p. 13
1306
UN Security Council, Fifteenth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) tointernational peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering
the threat [S/2022/576], 26 July 2022, url, para 28
1307
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic [A/HRC/48/70], 13 August 2021, url, para. 94
1308
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url, para. 94
1309
Times of Israel (The), Syria says airstrikes target area where Iran-backed forces known to operate, 7 May 2022,
url
1310
NPA, Airstrikes Hit IRGC Convoy East Of Syria’s Deir Ez-Zor, 21 May 2022, url
1311
Deir ez-Zor 24, Clash between militias in Deir Ezzor requires intervention by Republican Guard, n. d., url
1312
The Euphrates Post, ‫[ استنفار في دير الزور وعزلها عن ريفها الغربي بعد خلفات بين عناصر ميليشيا “الدفاع الوطني‬Alert in Deirez-Zor; isolated from its western countryside after disputes between members of the “National Defense” militia], 7
May 2021, url;
1303

173

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

In the same month, a SAA major general has been arrested by the military police, reportedly
due to his personal differences with Iranian militias in Deir Ez-Zor.1313
General opposition to the SDF’s rule
Preceding an already strained relationship between the SDF and Arab tribes, described as‘hostile’ by COAR 1314 , protests erupted in May 2021 across the SDF-controlled areas innortheast Syria, triggered mainly by a decision of the AANES to raise fuel prices. In Deir Ez-Zor
city, protesters took to the streets in the governorate’s capital and blocked roads in the
countryside.1315 Similar protests over rising commodity prices took place again in March 1316 andApril 2022, when protesters again blocked roads in Deir Ez-Zor’s countryside.1317 However,unlike in Hasaka governorate, there seemingly have been no violent crackdowns by security
forces or reports of casualties.
Protests against SDF recruitment campaigns were also reported in December 2021. 1318
In the same month, violent protests erupted in the city of Busayra 1319 in Deir Ez-Zor’s easterncountryside after reports of mass arrests and alleged executions of local men at the hands of
the SDF.1320 Days prior, several SDF bases in Busayra have been attacked by ISIL. 1321

ISIL insurgency
In April and May 2021, there have been numerous killings in Deir Ez-Zor, often attributed to
ISIL-activity1322: for example, in one instance, unknown gunmen on motor bikes killed a
religious official from Deir Ez-Zor’s Civil Council in the western countryside1323 and, in anotherincident, a SDF leader was shot and killed by unknown gunmen on motorbikes in the

Al-Hal Net, ‫ « الميليشيات اإليرانيّة» تعتقل أعلى رتبة عسكريّة للقوات الحكوميّة في دير الزور‬.‫[ لعدم رضاها عنه‬Not being satisfied
with him, "Iranian militias" arrest the highest military rank of government forces in Deir ez-Zor], 11 May 2021, url;
Zaman al-Wasl, ‫ النظام يعتقل رئيس اللجنة األمنية والعسكرية في دير الزور‬..‫[ تواصل مع األمريكيين‬Communicated with theAmericans. The regime arrests the head of the security and military committee in Deir ez-Zor], 9 May 2021, url
1314
COAR, Northeast Syria Social Tensions and Stability Monitoring: April Update, 28 May 2021, url1315
Al-Hurra, ‫ غليان شعبي "ولغز" وراء مضاعفة أسعار المحروقات‬.‫[ شرق سوريا‬Eastern Syria. Popular upheaval and a "mystery"behind the doubling of fuel prices], 18 May 2021, url
1316
SOHR, Renewed protests in SDF-held areas/ Residents demand improvement of living conditions in Deir Ezzor
countryside, 25 March 2022, url
1317
Kurdistan 24, Protesters in Syria’s Deir al-Zor demand better living conditions from the Kurdish-led
administration, 24 April 2022, url; SOHR, Renewed protests in SDF-held areas/ Protestors call for improving living
conditions west of Deir Ezzor, 24 April 2022, url
1318
New Arab (The), ‫[ تجدد المظاهرات ضد "قسد" احتجاجا على التجنيد اإلجباري‬Renewed demonstrations against the "SDF" inprotest against the forced conscription], 7 December 2021, url; Jesr Press, ‫مظاهرات في ريف دير الزور احتجاجا على انتشار‬‫[ الفساد وفقدان الطحين‬Demonstrations in the countryside of Deir ez-Zor protesting the spread of corruption and the lossof flour], 4 December 2021, url
1319
Sada al-Sharqieh, via Twitter @Sada_AlSharqieh, 13 December 2021, url
1320
Al-Monitor, Pentagon: Four Islamic State fighters killed in nighttime Syria raid, 13 December 2021, url; SOHR, AlBusayrah security campaign targets “arm dealers and ISIS affiliates”, while death toll jumps to four, 13 December
2021, url; Enab Baladi, ‫[ إنزال جوي لـ”قسد” بدعم من التحالف يخلّف ثلثة قتلى وعددا من المعتقلين شرقي دير الزور‬An airdrop of"SDF" with the support of the coalition leaves three dead and a number of detainees east of Deir Ezzor], 13
December 2021, url
1321
NPA, ISIS Claims Responsibility For Attacks On SDF Headquarters In Syria’s Deir Ez-Zor, 12 December 2021, url
1322
UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General [S/2021/583], 17 June 2021, url, para. 5
1323
NPA, Unidentified Individuals Assassinated Cleric In Syria’s Deir Ez-Zor, 31 May 2021, url
1313

174

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

governorate’s East.1324 The Asayish conducted several raids targeting ISIL, focusing on both
Deir Ez-Zor’s northern and northeastern countryside 1325, as well as its eastern 1326 andnorthwestern 1327 countryside.
In June 2021, ISIL militants reportedly established temporary checkpoints in the easterncountryside of Deir Ez-Zor, stopping civilians and enforcing radical Islamic. 1328 The
governorate’s eastern countryside is considered to be the area where the SDF’s authority is
weakest, according to COAR.1329
In December 2021, Deir Ez-Zor’s eastern countryside became the focal point of clashes
between the SDF and ISIL militants, when several attacks by ISIL on SDF bases in Busayra1330
prompted a joint military operation between the SDF and the US-led Coalition against ISIL
reportedly resulting in both military and civilian casualties. 1331 In the same month, ISIL militants
attacked the SDF-controlled Subaihan oil field1332 and were likely behind an IED-attack
targeting a bus carrying workers on their way back from the GoS-controlled Kharata oilfield.1333
At the turn of the year 2021/22, ISIL cells reportedly carried out an average of 10 to 15 attacks
on GoS forces per month, many of them in rural western Deir Ez-Zor.1334
A general trend of ISIL gaining ground in Deir Ez-Zor either by staging attacks on the SDF andcivilians, by imposing taxes on the local population or by kidnapping and exacting ransom
from people could be observed by the turn of the year 2021/22. 1335
In February 2022, following an attempted jailbreak in Hasaka (see section 2.7.3), ISIL
conducted a string of attacks in the SDF-controlled areas of Deir Ez-Zor.1336 In April 2022, ISIL
militants reportedly attacked the GoS-controlled Kharata oil field in the governorate’s
southwest1337 in what appeared to be part of a larger campaign against GoS targets in the1324Rûdaw, Unknown gunmen assassinate SDF leader in Deir ez-Zor, 4 May 2021, urlRûdaw, 14 ISIS suspects arrested in new Deir ez-Zor operation, 12 May 2021, url; ANHA, Second operation by
SDF in Wadi Al-Ajeej in less than month, what for?, 11 May 2021, url
1326
NPA, ‫[ األسايش تنفذ عمليتين أمنيتين بريفي الحسكة ودير الزور‬The Asayish carry out two security operations in the
countryside of Hasaka and Deir Ezzor], 31 May 2021, url1327
SDF Press Center, Our Forces Dismantle Daesh Terrorist Cells In Deir Ezzor Western Countryside, 24 May 2021,
url
1328
SY 24, ‫ “حسبة داعش” تظهر مجددا وتهدد األهالي بالقتل‬.‫[ ديرالزور‬Deir ez-Zor. "Daesh Hesba" reappears and threatens thepeople with death], 9 June 2021, url; Al-Monitor, Islamic State revives religious police in northeast Syria, 21 June
2021, url
1329
COAR, Syria Update, Bye, Bye Badia: IS Challenges SDF in Bid for Wider Relevance, 28 June 2021, url
1330
NPA, ISIS Claims Responsibility for Attacks On SDF Headquarters In Syria’s Deir Ez-Zor, 12 December 2021, url
1331
Al-Monitor, Pentagon: Four Islamic State fighters killed in nighttime Syria raid, 13 December 2021, url; SOHR, AlBusayrah security campaign targets “arm dealers and ISIS affiliates”, while death toll jumps to four, 13 December
2021, url; Enab Baladi, ‫[ إنزال جوي لـ”قسد” بدعم من التحالف يخلّف ثلثة قتلى وعددا من المعتقلين شرقي دير الزور‬An airdrop of"SDF" with the support of the coalition leaves three dead and a number of detainees east of Deir Ezzor], 13
December 2021, url
1332
Al-Monitor, Islamic State cells impose levy on oil investors in northeastern Syria, 29 December 2021, url; BaladiNews, ‫ـش" يداهم حقل نفطيا في دير الزور‬.‫“[ تنظيم "داعـ‬ISIS” raids an oil field in Deir ez-Zor], 16 December 2021, url
1333
Al-Monitor, Oil workers killed in Islamic State attack in Syria, 3 December 2021, url; Asharq al-Awsat, ‫ من‬10 ‫مقتل‬‫[ عمال حقل نفطي بهجوم شمال شرقي سوريا‬10 oil field workers killed in northeastern Syria attack], 3 December 2021, url
1334International Crisis Group, Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and Nor th-eastern Syria, 18 July 2022, url, p. 13
1335
Al-Monitor, Islamic State ramps up activities in eastern Syria, 6 January 2022, url
1336International Crisis Group, Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and North-eastern Syria, 18 July 2022, url, p. 26,
fn 1331337
Euphrates Post (The), “‫“[ تنظيم الدولة” يهاجم حقل نفطيا غربي دير الزور‬ISIS” attacks an oil field west of Deir Ezzor], 6
April 2022, url; al-Badia 24, via Twitter @ALBADIA24, 7 April 2022, url
1325

175

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMSouth of Deir Ez-Zor and areas across its neighbouring governorates. 1338
For the first half of 2022, the UN Security Council registered a concentration of ISIL activities
in Deir E z-Zor governorate among other areas in Syria. It described them at ‘sporadic attacks[…] utilizing insurgent tactics.’1339
Most of ISIL-related activity documented by the Carter Center in the first half of 2022 wasrecorded in Deir Ez-Zor governorate.1340 According to International Crisis Group July 2022
report, SDF-raids backed by airpower from the US-led Coalition ‘often cause harm to civilians,
including wrongful arrests, due to faulty intelligence.’ 1341 In that same report, the authors
conclude that, because of the militants’ ability to easily cross SDF- and GoS-controlled areasand ‘[d]espite regular arrests and killings of ISIS fighters, security in Deir al-Zor in 2021 and2022 was the same or worse than in 2020.’1342(b)Security incidents

During the reporting period, there were 1 177 security incidents recorded by ACLED in Deir EzZor governorate, of whom 437 were battles, 338 explosive/remote violence and 402 incidents
of violence against civilians.1343

Figure 28. Evolution of security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence andviolence against civilians in Deir Ez-Zor governorate between 1 April 2021 and 1
August 2022, based on ACLED data 1344

1338

Al-Monitor, Islamic State escalates attacks in Syrian desert, 20 April 2022, url
UN Security Council, Thirtieth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted
pursuant to resolution 2610 (2021) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al -Qaida and associated individuals and entities[S/2022/547], 15 July 2022 url, para. 43
1340
Carter Center (The), The Quarterly Review on Syrian Military and Security Dynamics, January-March 2022, 13
May 2022, url, p. 16; Carter Center (The), The Quarterly Review on Syrian Military and Security Dynamics, April -June
2022, 5 August 2022, url, p. 13
1341
International Crisis Group, Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and North-eastern Syria, 18 July 2022, url, p. 15
1342
International Crisis Group, Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and North-eastern Syria, 18 July 2022, url, p. 22
1343
EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (12 August2022), url
1344
EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (12 August2022), url
1339

176

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

District

Battles

Remote violence

Violence against
civilians

Albu Kamal

67

62

52

Al Mayadin

97

61

98

Deir Ez-Zor

273

215

252

Total

437

338

402

Figure 29. Security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against
civilians in Deir Ez-Zor governorate between 1 April 2021 and 1 August 2022. Breakdown by
district based on ACLED data 1345
Security incidents were recorded in all districts, but significant higher numbers were
documented in Deir Ez-Zor district (see Figure 29).
Illustrative security incidents
•

•

•
•

On 17 April 2021, unknown attackers shot and killed two Syrian aid workers in SDF controlled Busayra1346 According to COAR, it is believed to be the first incident in which aid
workers have been targeted in the area. 1347
On 27 June 2021, the US Air Force carried out airstrikes against two sites used for
ammunition storage and logistical purposes by (Iran-affiliated) Iraqi militias Kata’ib
Hezbollah and Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada along the Syrian-Iraqi border.1348 In an apparent
retaliation attack, US troops in the vicinity of al-Omar oil field came under fire from artillery
rounds the next day.1349
On 18 July 2021, a US drone strike destroyed a truck by Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, shortly
after it crossed the border to Syria. SOHR reported that the driver was killed. 1350
On 8 November 2021, the Asayish, with the support of the US-led Coalition, reportedly
thwarted a plan by an ISIL cell to attack Hasaka’s Sina’a prison by raiding a hide-out in the
countryside north of Deir Ez-Zor (city).1351 The next day, retaliation attacks followed, when

1345

EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middl e East (12 August2022), url
1346
UNOCHA, Press Release: United Nations Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator for Syria, ImranRiza, condemns killing of two aid workers in Deir-Ez-Zor, Syria, 18 April 2021, url
1347
COAR, Syria Update, Quamishli Clashes Bring Arab-Kurd Tensions to the Surface, 26 April 2021, url
1348
New York Times (The), U.S. Carries Out Airstrikes in Iraq and Syria, 27 June 2021 (updated 28 August 2021), url;
USDOD, Statement by the Department of Defense (Immediate Release), 27 June 2021, url
1349
Reuters, U.S. troops come under fire in Syria after strikes against Iran-backed militias, 29 June 2021, url
1350
AP News, Militia officials: US drone destroys militia truck in Syria, 18 July 2021, url
1351
NPA, Asayish Thwarts ISIS Attack On Prison In Syria’s Hasakah, 9 November 2021, url

177

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMISIL militants attacked the SDF headquarters in Busayra and several other bases
throughout the SDF-controlled areas.1352
On 2 December 2021, 10 workers of the GoS-controlled Kharata oil field were killed in an
IED attack on a transport bus.1353 State media called it a ’terrorist attack’ and blamed ISIL
for it.1354
On 13 December 2021, the SDF stated to have killed five suspected ISIL militants during araid in Busayra, on the east bank of the Euphrates River. Reportedly, the raid was
conducted as a joint operation with the US-led Coalition against ISIL. SOHR said that twoof those killed were executed after being captured.1355 Meanwhile, state media reported
that several civilians were supposedly kidnapped in Busayra by US forces. 1356
On 7 April 2022, artillery hit a base housing US troops, injuring two members of the US-led
Coalition against ISIL. SOHR reported that five rockets in total were fired from positions
where Iran-backed militias were based.1357
On 28 April 2022, ISIL militants attacked a former SDF spokesman’s home in Abu
Khashab, killing him and six other people. According to media reports, the gunmen arrived
on motorcycles and opened fire as their targets gathered for Iftar, the fast-breaking meal
during Ramadan.1358

•

•

•

•

(c)

Civilian fatalities

Month

SNHR 2021

SNHR 2022

January

23

8

February

22

6

March

14

14

April

16

12

May

17

13

June

8

12

1352

VOA, IS Cells in NE Syria Retaliate for Foiled Prison-Break Plot, 9 November 2021, url
AP News, Report: 10 oil workers killed in attack on bus in Syria, 2 December 2021, url
SANA, Ten workers of al-Kharata oil file martyred in a terrorist attack in Deir Ezzor, 2 December 2021, url 1355 AP
News, US-backed Syria forces say 5 IS suspects killed in raid, 13 December 2021, url
1355
AP News, US-backed Syria forces say 5 IS suspects killed in raid, 13 December 2021, url
1356
Reuters, Syria state media say U.S. forces 'kidnapped civilians' near Deir al -Zor, 13 December 2021, url
1357
AP News, Attack in east Syria injures 2 US-led coalition members, 7 April 2022, url
1358
AP News, Suspected IS militants kill 7 Syrians at Ramadan iftar meal, 28 April 2022, url
1353

178

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATIONMonth

SNHR 2021

SNHR 2022

July

21

7

August8September

20

October

13

November

16

December

23

Total

201

72

Figure 30. Civilian fatalities as a result of armed conflict in Deir Ez-Zor governorate in 2021
and first seven months of 2022. Monthly breakdown based on SNHR data
In 2021, SNHR recorded 201 civilian fatalities 1359 in Deir Ez-Zor governorate while in the firstseven months of 2022 it documented 72 civilian fatalities.1360

1359

Based on data extracted from monthly reports on civilian fatalities published by SNHR. See: SNHR, Extrajudicial
Killing Claims the Lives of 113 Civilians, Including 36 Children, Six Women, and Three Victims Due to Torture, inJanuary 2021, 1 February 2021, url, p. 7; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 138 Civilians, Including 23
Children, 11 Women, and 14 Victims Due to Torture, in February 2021, 1 March 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR, Extrajudicial
Killing Claims the Lives of 177 Civilians, Including 28 Children, 35 Women, One Medical Worker, and 9 Victims Dueto Torture, in March 2021, 1 April 2021, url, p. 7; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 96 Civilians, Including
15 Children, 11 Women, and Nine Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in May 2021, 1 June 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR,
Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 723 Civilians in Syria in the First Half of 2021, 1 July 2021, url, p. 9; SNHR,
Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 129 Civilians, Including 44 Children, 17 Women, and 10 Victims Due toTorture, in Syria in July 2021, 1 August 2021, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 94 Civilians,
Including 32 Children, 10 Women, and Seven Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in August 2021, 1 September 2021, url,
p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 86 Civilians, Including 23 Children, Nine Women, and Eight
Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in September 2021, 1 October 2021, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims theLives of 84 Civilians, Including 22 Children, Four Women, and Seven Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in October
2021, 1 November 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 86 Civilians, Including 16 Children,
Eight Women, and Six Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in November 2021, 1 December 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR, 1,271
Civilians, Including 299 Children, 134 Women, and 104 Victims of Torture, Killed in Syria in 2021, 1 January 2022, url,
p. 13
1360
Based on data extracted from monthly reports on civilian fatalities published by SNHR. See: SNHR, 69 Civilians,
Including 18 Children, Four Women and Eight Victims Due to Torture, Killed in Syria in January 2022, 1 February2022, url, p. 8; SNHR, 161 Civilians, Including 28 Children, Six Women and 66 Victims Due to Torture, Documented
Killed in Syria in February 2022, 1 March 2022, url, p. 9; SNHR, 67 Civilians, Including 20 Children, Three Women,
and Seven Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Killed in Syria in March 2022, 1 April 2022, url, p. 8; SNHR, 101

179

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM(d)

Conflict-related infrastructure damage and explosive remnants of war

UNESCWA estimates the physical capital loss of Deir Ez-Zor governorate around USD 5.5
billion (6.8 % of all the damage inflicted on Syrian physical capital) between 2011–2018 andexplains the amount of damage by noting that between 2014 and 2017 intense hit-and-run
clashes between the GoS forces and ISIL took place. 1361
In March 2022 the Carter Center published a report mapping unexploded ordnance in Syria
between December 2012 and May 2021. According to the report, around 39 951 explosive
munitions were used in this period in Deir Ez-Zor governorate, contributing to ‘UXO
contamination’ of between 4 000 – 12 000.1362
Regarding explosive ordnance contamination, Deir Ez-Zor is considered one of Syria’s mostaffected governorates, according to a report by iMMAP. However, as the report notes, thesituation in Deir Ez-Zor is more difficult to assess due to ‘access issues in the south and east of
the governorate’. From September 2021 to April 2022, the report lists 392 deaths and 232
injuries in connection with landmine incidents for Deir Ez-Zor governorate.1363
Mine Action Review reports that international and national demining organisations as well as
commercial companies have taken part in demining activities in areas under SDF control innorth-east Syria. The company Tetra Tech ‘focused on critical infrastructure such as
healthcare, schools, water and electricity’. 1364 According to the Carter Center, the SDF is also
involved in the clearance of unexploded ordnance in the areas under its control. 1365(e)

Displacement and return

UNOCHA stated in a February 2022 report that the IDP population in Deir Ez-Zor governorate
was 39 274.1366 In 2021, UNOCHA recorded approximately 1 000 IDP movements from Deir EzZor governorate, 2 000 IDP movements within the governorate as well as 700 movements
towards it.1367 In the first half of 2022, there were 1 510 IDP departures from Deir Ez-Zor
governorate, 1 363 displacements within the governorate amounted), and IDP arrivals to thegovernorate amounted to 1 564.1368

Civilians, Including 17 Children, 14 Women, and Six Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in
Syria in April 2022, 1 May 2022, url, p. 9; SNHR, 78 Civilians, Including 14 Children, 11 Women, and Eight Victims
Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in Syria in May 2022, 1 June 2022, url, p. 8; SNHR, 568
Civilians, Including 115 Children, 53 Women, and 101 Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in
Syria in the First Half of 2022, 2 July 2022, url, p. 12; SNHR, 86 Civilians, Including 21 Children, Eight Women, andFive Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in Syria in July 2022, 1 August 2022, url, p. 9
1361
UNESCWA/University of St Andrews, Syria at War; Eight Years On, 2020, 23 September 2020, url, pp. 50-51
1362
Carter Center (The), A Call for Action: Data on Unexploded Ordnance in Syria and Its Implications, December
2012 – May 2021, March 2022, url, p. 23
1363
iMMAP, Progress, Challenges and Forecast of Humanitarian Mine Action, 31 May 2022, url, pp. 9, 13
1364
Mine Action Review, Clearing the Mines 2020, 1 October 2020, url, p. 379
1365
Carter Center (The), A Call for Action: Data on Unexploded Ordnance in Syria and its Implications. December
2012 – May 2021, March 2022, url, p. 23
1366
UNOCHA, 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 23
1367
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements Overview, Jan – Dec 2021, 21 March 2022, url
1368
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements, January 2022, 24 February 2 022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab
Republic: IDP Movements, February 2022, 11 April 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements,

180

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

For 2021, UNOCHA’s registered about 8 000 IDP returnee movements to Deir Ez-Zor
governorate and 3 000 IDP returnee movements within.1369 In the first half of 2022, there were
6 673 IDP returns to Deir Ez-Zor governorate, 4 914 IDP returns within the governorate and4 927 IDP returns from the governorate.1370

March 2022, 9 May 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements, April 2022, 15 June 2 022, url;
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements, May 2022, 13 July 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP
Movements, June 2022, 5 August 2022, url
1369
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Spontaneous IDP Returnee Movements Overview, Jan – Dec 2021 (as of 31
December 2021), 21 March 2022, url
1370
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns, January 2022, 24 February 2022, url; UNOCHA,
Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns, February 2022, 11 April 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic:
IDP Spontaneous Returns, March 2022, 9 May 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous
Returns, April 2022, 15 June 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns, May 2022, 13
July 2022, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns, June 2022, 5 August 2022, url

181

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

2.10. Damascus governorate

Map 16: © MapAction, Damascus governorate 1371

2.10.1. General description of the governorate
Damascus governorate, which includes Syria’s capital, is located in the south -western part ofthe country and is completely surrounded by Rural Damascus (Rif Damashq) governorate. The
governorate is divided into two districts, Damascus city and Yarmouk. Damascus city itself
comprises 15 sub-district-level areas: Barzeh, Qaboun, Jobar, Al-Shaghour, Al-Midan, AlQadam, Kafr Sousa, Dummar, Al-Mazzeh, Rukn Al-Din, Al-Salihiyah, Al-Mouhajrin, Saroujah, AlQanawat, and Old Damascus.1372
The Syrian Central Bureau of Statistics estimated the city’s population at 2 103 405 as of mid2021.1373 In a February 2022 report, UNOCHA estimated the population of Damascus
governorate to be 1 828 845.1374

1371

UNOCHA, Syria sub-districts maps [maps], n.d., url
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, Governorates profile (June 2014), 6 August 2014, url, pp. 2-3
1373
Syria, Central Bureau of Statistics, Estimate of the population in Syria by governorates, n.d., url
1374
UNOCHA, 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab R epublic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 23
1372

182

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

National government and administrative institutions, including large military and security
services establishments, are centred in Damascus. 1375 A wide peripheral boulevard surrounds
Damascus city, flanked by ‘wide avenues that create ruptures in the urban space’. Balanche
refers to this urban planning as part of the GoS’s anti-insurgency strategy, through which it‘likely sought to optimize the movement of armored vehicles’.1376
Major highways connect Damascus with major cities as well as with the capitals ofneighbouring countries.1377 Damascus International Airport is situated 30 km south-east ofcentral Damascus.1378
For information on the ethnic and religious composition of Damascus governorate see the
EUAA COI Report: Syria - Socio-economic situation: Damascus city (August 2022).

2.10.2. Conflict background and armed actors
Maps published by several sources indicated that the GoS and affiliated groups were incontrol of Damascus governorate throughout the reference period of this report. 1379
The GoS special forces were able to defend the capital during the entire war, and while Sunni
rebels captured the suburbs in the early stages of the conflict, they were never able toadvance towards the central districts. The Al-Midan neighbourhood was briefly occupied by
the rebel Free Syrian Army in 2012, but GoS forces soon regained control. It was noted that,while Al-Midan is a predominantly Sunni neighbourhood, it is mostly inhabited by upper - andmiddle-class families who apparently did not side with the rebels.1380
The Carter Center emphasised that the conflict inside Damascus city mainly played out in
opposition-held areas, including the Jobar, Qaboun, Tishreen, and Barzeh neighbourhoods
that were connected to eastern Ghouta, the opposition’s stronghold. The southernneighbourhoods of Yarmouk Camp and Tadamoun also frequently experienced conflict
activity.1381 The GoS forces, backed by Iran and Russia, regained complete control of thecapital in 2018.1382 Since then, the Damascus area has been characterised by a ‘relative
absence of anti-regime activities’.1383 Over 20181384 and 20191385, the GoS removed security
barriers that had been erected between neighbourhoods in proportion ‘to the security

1375

Encyclopaedia Britannica, Damascus, last updated 12 February 2021, url
Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, WINEP, 2018, url, p. 32
1377
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Damascus, last updated 12 February 2021, url
1378
Damascus International Airport, Maps of Damascus airport, 2021 (n.d.), url
1379
Based on reading of the following maps: Liveuamap, Syria, as of 21 July 2022, url; Carter Center (The), The
Quarterly Review on Syrian Military and Security Dynamics | January-March 2022, 13 May 2022, url, p. 2; UN, Syrian
Arab Republic: Approximate areas of influence as of December 2021, January 2022, url; Jusoor for Studies, Map ofmilitary control in Syria: End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022, 24 December 2021, url; Liveuamap, Syria, as of 21 July
2022, url
1380
Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, WINEP, 2018, url, p. 31
1381
Carter Center (The), Explosive Munitions in Syria - Report 2 - Damascus City and Rural Damascus Governorate,
January 2020, url, p. 101382
SOHR, Soldier killed in rare Damascus bombing, 15 February 2022, url
1383
Haid, H., Assad’s fake narrative of a ‘safe’ Damascus, Arab News, 1 July 2022, url
1384
Enab Baladi, Damascus checkpoints are being removed… Has Syria become “safe”?!, 27 June 2018, url
1385
Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus,[source: Syria Direct], October 2020, url, p. 35
1376

183

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

conditions of each area and its proximity to the security centres and intelligence branches’. 1386
The GoS has since sought to present Damascus city as a ‘haven of calm’ within Syria, although
this view has been contested by Haid Haid, 1387 a Syrian columnist and consulting fellow with
Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa programme, who pointed to recurring attacks
on members of the security forces in the city.1388 Most notably, it was reported that an IED
attack on a bus with employees of the Military Housing Corporation killed 14 people in
October 2021.1389(a)Syrian Arab Army and affiliated armed groups

The SAA’s First1390 and Fifth Corps 1391, as well as its Republican Guard1392 reportedly had their
headquarters in the capital. The Fourth Armoured Division, comprising four brigades (38, 40,
41, and 42) and led by Maher al-Assad, has the mission ‘to secure Damascus and protect theregime from any significant threats’, particularly from within.1393 As of September 2021, it wasreported to operate two supply and repair points in the military section of Damascus airport
and at Mezzeh military airport.1394(b)

Iran and Iran-backed armed groups

A map published by Jusoor for Studies shows multiple Hezbollah and Iranian bases as being
located in the Damascus area.1395 In the governorate, as of late 2019, Hezbollah was surveilling
the Shiite al-Shaghour neighbourhood, the vicinity of the Umayyad Mosque, and the Sayyidah
Ruqayya shrine area where the Hezbollah headquarters is located. The area around the
Sayyidah Ruqayya shrine has been described as a ‘closed security area’ where Shia militias ofvarious nationalities are deployed ‘to protect Shia pilgrims at the shrine and the Bab al-Saghir
cemetery’.1396(c)Anti-GoS armed groups

While sources interviewed by the DIS in August and September 2020 stated that ISIL andother opposition groups no longer had a presence in Damascus governorate, 1397 a February
2022 report of the UN Security Council noted that ISIL had an ‘active presence’ in Damascus

1386

Enab Baladi, Damascus checkpoints are being removed… Has Syria become “safe”?!, 27 June 2018, url
Haid, H., Assad’s fake narrative of a ‘safe’ Damascus, Arab News, 1 July 2022, url
1388
Chatham House, Haid Haid, n.d., url
1389
COAR, Deadly Bus Blast Evinces Security Risks in Damascus and Beyond, 2 5 October 2021, url, p. 4
1390
Al-Khanadeq, ‫ سر من أسرار االنتصار‬:‫[ القوات البرية السورية‬Syrian ground forces – a secret for victory], 26 November
2021, url; Suwayda 24, ‫البلد جنوب األول للفيلق جديد قائد‬.. ‫[ السوري الجيش في تغييرات‬New commander of the 1st Corps in thesouth of the country... Changes in the Syrian army], 30 April 2022, url
1391
Al-Khanadeq, ‫ سر من أسرار االنتصار‬:‫[ القوات البرية السورية‬Syrian ground forces – a secret for victory], 26 November
2021, url
1392
Waters, G., Understanding Syria’s Military Deployments in Idlib, International Review, 10 March 2019, url
1393
Alghadawi, A., The Fourth Division: Syria’s parallel army, MEI, 24 September 2021, url
1394
Alghadawi, A., The Fourth Division: Syria’s parallel army, MEI, 24 September 2021, url
1395
Jusoor for Studies, Map of the military bases and posts of foreign forces in Syria, 6 January 2021, url
1396
Ezzi, M., Lebanese Hezbollah’s Experience in Syria [source: journalist Raed al-Salhani], EUI, 13 March 2020, url,
pp. 6-7
1397
Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus,[sources: Syria Direct; Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR)], October 2020, url, pp. 35, 52
1387

184

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

governorate.1398 In the UN Security Council report covering the first half of 2022, one member
state noted ‘occasional’ ISIL activity in Damascus.1399
Two deadly high-profile attacks on GoS security personnel were claimed by the armed
insurgent factions Hurras al-Din, an al-Qaida loyalist group,1400 and a little-known group named
Saraya Qasioun.1401 The latter group has been active since 2019 and was reported to havebeen carrying out a ‘low-level insurgency in and around Damascus’. While Saraya Qasioun has
claimed attacks targeting GoS forces, COAR noted that some doubted the group’s capability
to stage such attacks, pointing to local sources alleging in 2021 that some of these attacks
were ‘inside jobs’1402 perpetrated between GoS officers.1403 Sources interviewed by the DIS in
August 2020 even questioned the existence of opposition cells in Damascus 1404 and of Saraya
Qasiun specifically.1405

2.10.3. Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population(a)

Security trends during the reporting period

While it was noted that attacks had become rare inside Damascus governorate since the GoS
recaptured the surrounding countryside in 2018, 1406 during the reference period there wereseveral reported incidents targeting officials or supporters of the GoS. These included threedeadly bombings of military buses in August 2021,1407 October 2021,1408 and February 20221409
and an IED attack on a non-civilian individual in April 2022.1410 One of the incidents was an
attack in Masaken al-Haras, an area that is predominantly inhabited by Alawite members of
the GoS military and security establishment and their families and is known for its tightsecurity.1411 Though attacks often went unclaimed, Haid assessed that it was likely that former

1398

UN Security Council, Twenty-ninth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted
pursuant to resolution 2368 (2017)2368 (2017)2368 (2017)2368 (2017)2368 (2017)2368 (2017)2368 (2017)2368(2017)2368 (2017)2368 (2017)2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al -Qaida and associated individuals and entities,
S/2022/83, 3 February 2022, url, para. 36
1399
UN Security Council, Fifteenth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) tointernational peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering
the threat [S/2022/576], 26 July 2022, url, para 28
1400
COAR, Hurras al-Din Lays Claim to Deadly Damascus Bus Blast, 9 August 2021, url
1401
COAR, Deadly Bus Blast Evinces Security Risks in Damascus and Beyond, 25 October 2021, url, p. 4
1402
COAR, Deadly Bus Blast Evinces Security Risks in Damascus and Beyond, 25 October 2021, url, p. 41403
Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus,[source: Syria Direct], October 2020, url, p. 35
1404
Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus,[source: Jusoor for Studies], October 2020, url, p. 45
1405
Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus,[source: Syria Direct], October 2020, url, p. 35
1406
COAR, Hurras al-Din Lays Claim to Deadly Damascus Bus Blast, 9 August 2021, url; DW, Deadly twin bus blasts
rock Syria, 20 October 2021, url
1407
COAR, Hurras al-Din Lays Claim to Deadly Damascus Bus Blast, 9 August 2021, url; SANA, A military bus
explosion in Damascus causes martyrdom of the driver and injury of three others, 4 August 2021, url
1408
BBC News, Syria war: Deadly bomb blasts hit military bus in Damascus, 20 October 2021, url
1409
SOHR, Soldier killed in rare Damascus bombing, 15 February 2022, url
1410
SOHR, Damascus | IED explodes in car on Al-Motahaliq road, 6 April 2022, url
1411
COAR, Hurras al-Din Lays Claim to Deadly Damascus Bus Blast, 9 August 2021, url

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

rebels (i.e. individuals with the ‘motives, skills, and resources to carry out attacks’) were behindsome of the incidents reported in Damascus city and its surroundings. 1412
In September 2021, ISIL claimed responsibility for destroying a gas pipeline supplying the DeirAli and Tishreen power plants, as well as two power pylons. The group referred to the attack
as being part of a new ‘economic war’ against the GoS. 1413
Moreover, several strikes by Israeli forces were recorded during the reference period,
targeting locations at or near Damascus International Airport 1414 including military posts andwarehouses of GoS forces, Iranian troops or Iran-backed militias.1415(b)Security incidents

During the reporting period there were 21 security incidents recorded by ACLED in Damascus
governorate, of whom 2 were coded as battles, 11 explosions/remote violence and 8 incidents
of violence against civilians. All security incidents were recorded in Damascus city.

Figure 31: Evolution of security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence andviolence against civilians in Damascus governorate between 1 April 2021 and 1
August 2022, based on ACLED data 1416
Very few security incidents were recorded in Damascus governorate during the reference
period for this report. These include the following:•

On 4 August 2021, a bus transporting Syrian military personnel detonated at theentrance of Masaken al-Haras (Guards’ residences) near Mashru’a Dummar inDamascus city. The driver was reportedly killed, and three other persons were injured.
While the state-run news agency SANA stated that the explosion had been caused by

1412

Haid, H., Assad’s fake narrative of a ‘safe’ Damascus, Arab News, 1 July 2022, urlInternational Crisis Group, Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and North-eastern Syria, 18 July 2022, url, p. 14,
footnote 58
1414
SOHR, After suspension of attacks for more than a month | Israeli strikes hit military sites in Damascus andmiddle of Syria, 8 June 2021, url; SOHR, Death toll update | Israeli missiles hitting vicinity of Damascus airport killfour regime fighters and civil servant, 23 May 2022, url; SOHR, Israeli attack on Damascus airport | Runway andcontrol tower sustain damage and air flights transported to Aleppo airport, 10 June 2022, url
1415
SOHR, Israeli attacks in 2022 | 33 targets destroyed and nearly 70 people killed and wounded in 12 attacks sofar, 15 May 2022, url
1416
EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (12 August2022), url
1413

186

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

•

•

•

•

a short circuit that ignited the fuel tank of the bus, 1417 COAR noted that Hurras al-Din, an
al-Qaida loyalist group, had claimed responsibility for the incident. 1418
On 20 October 2021, two IEDs planted on a military bus in Damascus city killed 14
people and injured several others, SANA reported. 1419 All victims were reported to havebeen employees of the Military Housing Corporation. The insurgent group Saraya
Qasioun claimed responsibility for the attack.1420 It was noted that this was thedeadliest attack in the capital since March 2017.1421
On 15 February 2022, an SAA soldier was killed and more than 10 others were
wounded when an IED planted in a military transport bus detonated in the Al-Barakma
area of Damascus city.1422
On 24 February 2022, rocket fire from Israeli forces hit posts and weapons storages of
Iran-backed militias near Damascus International Airport and air-defence systems
south of Damascus city, killing seven people, including two GoS soldiers, two Syrians
linked to Hezbollah, and three members of Iran-backed militias.1423
In July 2022, the Washington Post reported with reference to the Syrian state news
agency SANA that three Syrian soldiers were killed and seven others injured in Israeli
air strikes on Damascus. The death toll later rose to five, according to the Jordanianstate television.1424

1417

SANA, A military bus explosion in Damascus causes martyrdom of the driver and injury of three others, 4 Augus t
2021, url
1418
COAR, Hurras al-Din Lays Claim to Deadly Damascus Bus Blast, 9 August 2021, url
1419
SANA, 14 martyrs in terrorist attack on military bus, Damascus-video, 20 October 2021, url
1420
COAR, Deadly Bus Blast Evinces Security Risks in Damascus and Beyond, 25 October 2021, url, p. 4
1421
DW, Deadly twin bus blasts rock Syria, 20 October 2021, url; BBC News, Syria war: Deadly bomb blasts hit
military bus in Damascus, 20 October 2021, url
1422
SOHR, Soldier killed in rare Damascus bombing, 15 February 2022, url
1423
SOHR, Israeli attacks in 2022 | 33 targets destroyed and nearly 70 people killed and wounded in 12 attacks sofar, 15 May 2022, url
1424
Washington Post (The), Russian and Israeli planes hit Syria in separate strikes, kill at least 10, 22 July 2022, url

187

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM(c)

Civilian fatalities

In 2021, SNHR recorded one civilian fatality (documented in January 2021)1425 in Damascus
governorate, while in the first seven months of 2022 it recorded three civilian fatalities (two in
May 2022 and one in June 2022).1426(d)Conflict-related infrastructure damage and explosive remnants of war

In a report published in 2020, UNESCWA and the University of St Andrews (United Kingdom)
stated that Damascus governorate sustained about 3 % of the total damage to physical capitalin Syria.1427 Yarmouk refugee camp was affected by severe property damage during theconflict years. As of March 2021, UNRWA noted that the basic infrastructure of the Yarmouk
refugee camp remained heavily damaged.1428
The Carter Center reported that between December 2012 and May 2021, 31 744 explosives
were deployed in Damascus city.1429 The source estimated that the use of explosives resulted
in a contamination of the city by 3 000–9 500 pieces of UXO.1430 While it was noted that UXO

1425

Based on data extracted from monthly reports on civilian fatalities published by SNHR. See: SNHR, Extrajudicial
Killing Claims the Lives of 113 Civilians, Including 36 Children, Six Women, and Three Victims Due to Torture, inJanuary 2021, 1 February 2021, url, p. 7; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 138 Civilians, Including 23
Children, 11 Women, and 14 Victims Due to Torture, in February 2021, 1 March 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR, Extrajudicial
Killing Claims the Lives of 177 Civilians, Including 28 Children, 35 Women, One Medical Worker, and 9 Victims Dueto Torture, in March 2021, 1 April 2021, url, p. 7; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 96 Civilians, I ncluding
15 Children, 11 Women, and Nine Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in May 2021, 1 June 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR,
Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 723 Civilians in Syria in the First Half of 2021, 1 July 2021, url, p. 9; SNHR,
Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 129 Civilians, Including 44 Children, 17 Women, and 10 Victims Due toTorture, in Syria in July 2021, 1 August 2021, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 94 Civilians,
Including 32 Children, 10 Women, and Seven Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in August 2021, 1 September 2021, url,
p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 86 Civilians, Including 23 Children, Nine Women, and Eight
Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in September 2021, 1 October 2021, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims theLives of 84 Civilians, Including 22 Children, Four Women, and Seven Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in October
2021, 1 November 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 86 Civilians, Including 16 Children,
Eight Women, and Six Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in November 2021, 1 December 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR, 1,271
Civilians, Including 299 Children, 134 Women, and 104 Victims of Torture, Killed in Syria in 2021, 1 January 2022, url,
p. 13
1426
Based on data extracted from monthly reports on civilian fatalities published by SNHR. See: SNHR, 69 Civilians,
Including 18 Children, Four Women and Eight Victims Due to Torture, Killed in Syr ia in January 2022, 1 February2022, url, p. 8; SNHR, 161 Civilians, Including 28 Children, Six Women and 66 Victims Due to Torture, Documented
Killed in Syria in February 2022, 1 March 2022, url, p. 9; SNHR, 67 Civilians, Including 20 Children, Three Women,
and Seven Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Killed in Syria in March 2022, 1 April 2022, url, p. 8; SNHR, 101
Civilians, Including 17 Children, 14 Women, and Six Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in
Syria in April 2022, 1 May 2022, url, p. 9; SNHR, 78 Civilians, Including 14 Children, 11 Women, and Eight Victims
Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in Syria in May 2022, 1 June 2022, url, p. 8; SNHR, 568
Civilians, Including 115 Children, 53 Women, and 101 Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in
Syria in the First Half of 2022, 2 July 2022, url, p. 12; SNHR, 86 Civilians, Including 21 Children, Eight Women, andFive Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in Syria in July 2022, 1 August 2022, url, p. 9
1427
UNESCWA and University of St Andrews, Syria at War: Eight Years On, 8 January 2020, url, p. 51; The source
defines loss to physical capital as including ‘private and public construction and equipment, such as housing stock,schools, hospitals and factories, and power, water, sanitation, transport and communications infrastructure’.
UNESCWA and University of St Andrews, Syria at War: Eight Years On, 8 January 2020, url, p. 49
1428
UNRWA, Yarmouk (unofficial camp), n.d., url
1429
Carter Center (The), A Call for Action: Data on Unexploded Ordnance in Syria and Its Implications: December
2012 – May 2021, March 2022, url, p. 18
1430
Carter Center (The), A Call for Action: Data on Unexploded Ordnance in Syria and Its Implications: December
2012 – May 2021, March 2022, url, p. 18

188

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

clearance efforts by GoS and Russian forces largely went unreported, 1431 the Carter Center
pointed to the specific risks a substantial presence of UXO poses in the densely populated
Damascus area.1432 Furthermore, in a September 2021 report, Mine Action Review indicatedthat Damascus governorate was one of 13 governorates that had experienced use of cluster
munitions since 2012.1433
In May 2022, four civilians died under a collapsing building in the Jobar neighbourhood ofDamascus city. The building had previously been shelled by the GoS and Russian air forces.1434(e)Displacement and return

According to UNOCHA, as of January 2022 there were 609 682 IDPs.1435 In 2021, UNOCHA in
Damascus governorate recorded approximately 1 000 IDP movements from the governorate
and 398 IDP movements to the governorate.1436
In 2022, UNOCHA reported 80 IDP departures from and 7 IDP arrivals to Damascus
governorate in January,1437 65 departures and 20 arrivals in February, 1438 255 departures inMarch,1439 133 departures and 27 arrivals in April, 1440 and 139 departures and 8 arrivals in
May.1441
As regards returns, in 2021 UNOCHA recorded for Damascus governorate approximately
11 000 spontaneous IDP returnee movements from the governorate and some 2 000 IDP
returnee movements to the governorate.1442 In 2022, UNOCHA recorded 53 spontaneous IDP
returns from and 197 returns to the governorate in January,1443 382 returns from and 307 to thegovernorate in February,1444 some 1 800 returns from and 221 returns to the governorate in
March,1445 and 276 returns from the governorate in April, 1446 and 160 returns from thegovernorate in May.1447
Information on reasons for displacement and return movements from or to Damascus
governorate could not be identified within the time constraints of this report.

1431

Mine Action Review, Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2021, 1 September 20 21, url, p. 181
Carter Center (The), A Call for Action: Data on Unexploded Ordnance in Syria and Its Implications: December
2012 – May 2021, March 2022, url, p. 18
1433
Mine Action Review, Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2021, 1 September 2021, url, p. 178
1434
SOHR, Following previous airstrikes | Four civilians die under collapsing building in Jobar, 23 Ma y 2022, url
1435
UNOCHA, 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 23
1436
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements Overview Jan – Dec 2021, 21 March 2022, url
1437
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements January 2022, 24 February 2022, url
1438
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements February 2022, 11 April 2022, url
1439
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements March 2022, 9 May 2022, url
1440
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements April 2022, 15 June 2022, url
1441
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements May 2022, 13 July 2022, url
1442
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Spontaneous IDP Returnee Movements Overview, Jan – Dec 2021, 21 March
2022, url
1443
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns January 2022, 24 February 2022, url
1444
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns February 2022, 11 April 2022, url
1445
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns March 2022, 9 May 2021, url
1446
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns April 2022, 15 June 2022, url
1447
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns May 2022, 13 July 2022, url
1432

189

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

2.11.

Rural Damascus

Map 17. MapAction, Rural Damascus governorate1448

2.11.1.

General description of the governorate

Rural Damascus (Rif Dimashq in Arabic) is a largely agricultural governorate surrounding
Damascus city.1449 It is located in the south-western part of Syria and has international borders
with Jordan and Iraq to the south and east and Lebanon to the west. Internally, it borders Homs
governorate to the north and Quneitra, Dara’a and Sweida governorates to the south.1450
The governorate comprises nine administrative districts: Rural Damascus, Douma (Duma), Al
Qutayfah, An Nabk, Yabroud (Yabrud), At Tall, Az-Zabadani, Darayya, and Qatana. The
governorate’s territory is further subdivided into a total of 36 subdistricts. 1451 Moreover, thegovernorate comprises 28 towns and 190 villages. Large parts of Damascus city’s environs that

1448

Mapaction, Syria 2013-2015, Rural Damascus Governorate [map], last updated:29 July 2016, url
REACH, Rural Damascus Governorate, April 2018, Humanitarian Situation Overview in Syria (HSOS), April 2018,
url, p. 1
1450
UNCS and UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Reference Map, 17 January 2013, url
1451
UNOCHA, 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, pp. 103-104
1449

190

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

fall under the administration of Rural Damascus governorate are integrated with the capital’surban landscape in contiguous built-up areas.1452
The territory administrated by Rural Damascus governorate includes a largely suburban area
named Eastern Ghouta bordering Damascus city to the east 1453 that comprises 22
communities,1454 including Douma, Harasta, Arbin, Misraba and Jisrein. 1455 To the southwest of
the capital, there is an area called Western Ghouta that comprises Darayya and Moadamiya.1456
The Central Bureau of Statistics estimated that the governorate’s population at 3 371 987 as of
mid-2021.1457 In a February 2022 report, UNOCHA estimated the population of Rural Damascus
governorate to be 3 026 227.1458 According to a map provided by Fabrice Balanche in 2018, thewestern areas of Rural Damascus governorate were mostly inhabited by Sunni Arabs. In theareas surrounding the capital, there were some communities of Druze 1459 and Christians.1460
Twelver Shia Muslims were present around Damascus city, 1461 notably in Sayyida Zainab, aShiite-dominated town 1462 located south of the capital1463 that is characterised by ‘a dense
population mix of Sunni Syrians, Iraqis and groups of Shia from Foua, Kefraya, al-Nubl and alZahraa’.1464 The eastern parts of the governorate were inhabited by Bedouins. 1465
According to Balanche (2018), some lower-ranking GoS officials were residing in the small
Druze/Christian towns in the Damascus suburbs (Jaramana, Jdeidat Artouz, and Sahnaya). 1466
Meanwhile, conservative Sunni populations inhabited localities in the Ghouta area 1467 such as
Douma,1468 Zamalka, Daraya,1469 Qudsaya,1470 and the three ‘southern Damascus towns’ (Yalda,
Babila and Beit Sahm).1471

1452

Abdin, Y., The fragility of community security in Damascus and its environs, in: International Review of the Red
Cross, Issue 99, No. 3, 2017, url, p. 900
1453
REACH, Syrian Cities Damage Atlas, 16 March 2019, url, p. 19
1454
Al Jazeera, Inside Syria: How life goes on in a besieged town, 24 May 2017, url
1455
REACH, Syrian Cities Damage Atlas, 16 March 2019, url, p. 19
1456
Al Jazeera, Inside Syria: How life goes on in a besieged town, 24 May 2017, url
1457
Syria, Central Bureau of Statistics, Estimate of the population in Syria by governorates, n.d., url
1458
UNOCHA, 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab R epublic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 23
1459
Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, WINEP, 2018, url, p. Xiii
1460
USDOS, 2021 Report on International Religious Freedom: Syria, 2 June 2022, url, p. 4; Balanche, F.,
Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, WINEP, 2018, url, p. Xiii
1461
USDOS, 2021 Report on International Religious Freedom: Syria, 2 June 2022, url, pp. 3-4
1462
NPA, Sayyidah Zaynab In Damascus; Heart Of Iran’s Expansionist Project In Syria, 1 June 2022, url; Ezzi, M.,
Post-Reconciliation Rural Damascus: Are Local Communities Still Represented?, EUI, 27 November 2020, url, p. 17;
1463
NPA, Sayyidah Zaynab In Damascus; Heart Of Iran’s Expansionist Project In Syria, 1 June 2022, url
1464
Salaam Times, Afghan militiamen involved in escalating drug war in Syria, 30 May 2022, url
1465
Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, WINEP, 2018, url, p. Xiii
1466
Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, WINEP, 2018, url, p. 32
1467
Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, WINEP, 2018, url, p. 32
1468
Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, WINEP, 2018, url, p. 32; Ezzi, M., Post-Reconciliation Rural
Damascus: Are Local Communities Still Represented?, EUI, 27 November 2020, url, p. 12
1469
Balanche, F., Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War, WINEP, 2018, url, p. 32
1470
Ezzi, M., Post-Reconciliation Rural Damascus: Are Local Communities Still Represented?, EUI, 27 November
2020, url, p. 15
1471
Ezzi, M., Post-Reconciliation Rural Damascus: Are Local Communities Still Represented?, EUI, 27 Novem ber
2020, url, p. 17

191

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

2.11.2. Conflict background and armed actors
The GoS recaptured Rural Damascus governorate in 2018, 1472 defeating the armed oppositionin Eastern Ghouta1473 in a Russian-supported1474 military offensive launched between Februaryand April 2018,1475 during which GoS forces used chemical weapons against Douma city, 1476 thelargest opposition stronghold in the vicinity of the capital from 2011 to 2018. According to one
estimate, 70 % of the local infrastructure of Eastern Ghouta was destroyed.1477 In towns like
Douma, Zabadani,1478 Darayya1479 and Hajar al-Aswad1480 most of the population wasdisplaced.1481 For more information on the conflict background in Rural Damascus governorate,
see section 2.11.2 of the EUAA COI Report: Syria - Security situation (July 2021).
Maps published by several sources indicated that, throughout the reference period of thisreport, the GoS and affiliated groups were controlling all of the governorate’s territory except
for a zone in its easternmost section.1482 This so-called US-declared 55-km exclusion zone1483
around Tanf (the zone also extends into Homs governorate) 1484 was being controlled by US
troops and MaT.1485 As of March 2022, an estimated 200 US forces were garrisoned at AtTanf.1486(a)Syrian Arab Army and affiliated armed groups

At the time of writing, specific information on SAA deployments in Idlib governorate during thereference period could not be found. Information on particular SAA formations and units
deployed in the governorate (before April 2021) is available in previous reports: EUAA COI
Report: Syria - Security situation (July 2021) and EUAA COI Report: Syria – Security situation(May 2020).

1472

Haid, H., Assad’s fake narrative of a ‘safe’ Damascus, Arab News, 1 July 2022, urlInternational Crisis Group, Lessons from the Syrian State’s Return to the South, 25 February 2019, url, p. 1
1474
SACD, Before Mariupol, there was Douma: How Russia’s tactics of targeting civilians were transplanted from
Syria to Ukraine, 6 May 2022, url
1475
International Crisis Group, Lessons from the Syrian State’s Return to the South, 25 February 2019, url, p. 1
1476
SNHR, The Syrian Regime’s Chemical Attacks on Khan Sheikhoun and Douma Remain with No Accountability
for Five Years, 7 April 2022, url, p. 21477
Al Ra’i, N., Facets of Syrian Regime Authority in Eastern Ghouta, EUI, 23 August 2019, url, p. 1-2
1478
Ezzi, M., Post-Reconciliation Rural Damascus: Are Local Communities Still Represented?, EUI, 27 November
2020, url, p. 8
1479
SACD, UN report on Syrian returnees leaves too much out to be useful, 12 January 2022, url
1480
Syria Report (The), Returnee Numbers Remain Very Low in Al -Hajar Al-Aswad as Looting Continues, 8 March
2022, url
1481
Ezzi, M., Post-Reconciliation Rural Damascus: Are Local Communities Still Represented?, EUI, 27 November
2020, url, p. 8
1482
Based on reading of the following maps: Liveuamap, Syria, as of 21 July 2022, url; Carter Center (The), The
Quarterly Review on Syrian Military and Security Dynamics | January-March 2022, 13 May 2022, url, p. 2; UN, Syrian
Arab Republic: Approximate areas of influence as of December 2021 [Map], January 2022, url; Jusoor for Studies,
Map of military control in Syria: End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022, 24 December 2021, url; Liveuamap, Syria, as of
21 July 2022, url
1483
UN, Syrian Arab Republic: Approximate areas of influence as of December 2021 [Map], January 2022, url
1484
Liveuamap, Syria, as of 21 July 2022, url; UN, Syrian Arab Republic: Approximate areas of influence as ofDecember 2021 [Map], January 2022, url
1485
USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve, Quarterly Report to the United States
Congress January 1, 2022 – March 31, 2022, 3 May 2022, url, p. 64
1486
USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve, Quarterly Report to the United States
Congress January 1, 2022 – March 31, 2022, 3 May 2022, url, p. 64
1473

192

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATIONAs of December 2021, SAA’s Fourth Armored Division reportedly withdrew from its positions in
Eastern Ghouta, which were taken over the Military Security service.1487
More recent information regarding the presence of the SAA and affiliated armed groups in thegovernorate could not be found within the time constraints of this report.
(b)

RussiaA map published by Jusoor for Studies in January 2021 showed several Russian bases as being
located in the governorate, including in Douma, near Damascus airport and to the west ofDamascus city.1488(c)

Iran and Iran-backed militias

According to a local source quoted by Kurdish media network North Press Agency (NPA) in
June 2022, the Damascus region is one of three Syrian regions that are of interest to Iran. 1489 A
map published by Jusoor for Studies in January 2021 showed multiple Iranian bases/posts as
being clustered in the surroundings of Damascus city. 1490 Bases or posts run by LebaneseHezbollah were shown in Sayyida Zainab, at locations north of Damascus city, in Al-Dumayr,
and along the Lebanese border, amongst others. Moreover, the map showed that there wereseveral Iranian and Hezbollah bases/posts along the internal border with Quneitra governoratein the southwest.1491
In Sayyida Zainab, where an absence of GoS institutions allowed Iranian institutions to
expand,1492 there were ‘Iranian, Afghan, Pakistani, Iraqi and Lebanese Hizbullah militia
elements’, each with their own sectors, a local newspaper editor told Salaam Times 1493 in May
2022.1494 As of late 2019, Hezbollah maintained a direct presence in the town, running
intelligence centres, operations rooms, prisons and weapons armouries. In addition, dozens oflocal Shia militias with close links to Hezbollah were based in the town. 1495 In December 2021, it
was reported that the adjacent Al-Bahdaliya area (Babila district) also saw a presence of Iranbacked militias and their families.1496
Moreover, as of January 2022, the IRGC and Iran-backed militias were reported to be almost
exclusively in control of Al-Dimas military airbase west of Damascus city.1497

1487

NPA, Government-Backed Armored Division Withdraws From Rif Dimashq, 28 December 2021, url
Jusoor for Studies, Map of the military bases and posts of foreign forces in Syria, 6 January 2021, url
1489
NPA, Sayyidah Zaynab In Damascus; Heart Of Iran’s Expansionist Project In Syria, 1 June 2022, url
1490
Jusoor for Studies, Map of the military bases and posts of foreign forces in Syria, 6 January 2021, url
1491
Jusoor for Studies, Map of the military bases and posts of foreign forces in Syria, 6 January 2021, url
1492
NPA, Sayyidah Zaynab In Damascus; Heart Of Iran’s Expansionist Project In Syria, 1 June 2022, url
1493
Salaam Times is a news website sponsored by the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM). See url
1494
Salaam Times, Afghan militiamen involved in escalating drug war in Syria, 30 May 2022, url
1495
Ezzi, M., Lebanese Hezbollah’s Experience in Syria [source: journalist Raed al -Salhani], EUI, 13 March 2020, url,
p. 6
1496
SOHR, Iran increases presence south Damascus | Afghan families of Iranian proxies leave Palmyra and head to
Sayyida Zainab area, 21 December 2021, url
1497
SOHR, SOHR: Hezbollah Expands Old Military Base in Syria, 3 January 2022, url
1488

193

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM(d)Anti-GoS armed groups

Sources interviewed by the DIS in August and September 2020 stated that ISIL and otheropposition groups no longer had a presence in Rural Damascus governorate. 1498 However, ayear later, ISIL claimed an attack on a major gas pipeline southeast of Damascus city in
September 2021 1499 and two bombings near Kisweh (south of Damascus city) in May 2022.1500
The anti-GoS armed group Saraya Qasioun was reported in previous years to be active in andaround Damascus.1501 Its activity and even existence was doubted by several sources. 1502 During
the reporting period, no further information on this group was found.
For further information on past activities of anti-GoS armed groups in Rural Damascus
governorate, see section 2.11.2 of the EUAA COI Report: Syria - Security situation (July 2021).

2.11.3. Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population(a)

Security trends during the reporting period

Security incidents recorded over the reporting period included multiple cases of assassinations
and assassination attempts targeting members of GoS military forces and GoS-affiliatedmilitias,1503 at least one instance of assassination of a former opposition commander, 1504 attacks
involving IEDs,1505 several attacks by unknown gunmen on SAA checkpoints, 1506 and several
instances of civilians being killed in infighting between members of GoS forces ,1507 community
disputes,1508 and gang-related crime.1509 COAR reported that, between May 2021 and May 2022,
1498

Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus,[sources: Syria Direct; Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR)], October 2020, url, pp. 35, 52
1499
AFP, IS claims Syria gas pipeline attack, 18 September 2021
1500
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 25 33 (2020) and 2585 (2021), S/2022/492,
16 June 2022, url, para. 5
1501
COAR, Deadly Bus Blast Evinces Security Risks in Damascus and Beyond, 25 October 2021, url
1502
Denmark, DIS, Security and socio-economic situation in the governorates of Damascus and Rural Damascus,[source: Syria Direct], October 2020, url, p. 35; COAR, Deadly Bus Blast Evinces Security Risks in Damascus andBeyond, 25 October 2021, url
1503
SOHR, Western Rif Dimashq | Member of 4th Division stabbed to death in Muadamiyat al -Sham, 20 May 2021,
url; SOHR, Reef Dimashq | Regime force lieutenant killed by unknown gunmen in military checkpoint at Lebanese Syrian borders, 6 July 2021, url; SOHR, Attempted assassination | Regime- backed militia leader targeted in Rif
Dimashq, 9 December 2021, url; SOHR, Two separate attempted assassinations | Unknown gunmen try to killleaders of 4th Division and military security local militia in west Damascus, 5 January 2022, url; SOHR, Fourth crimein Rif Dimashq since early 2022 | Failed assassination attempt of a “political security” volunteer in eastern Ghouta,
12 January 2022, url; Haid, H., Assad’s fake narrative of a ‘safe’ Damascus, Arab News, 1 July 2022, url
1504
SOHR, Rif Dimashq | Most prominent military opposition commander shot dead in Jabal Al -Sheikh, 13 January2022, url
1505
Haid, H., Assad’s fake narrative of a ‘safe’ Damascus, Arab News, 1 July 2022, url; NPA, Two IED Blasts In Syria’s
Rif Dimashq Leave Four Casualties, 16 May 2022, url
1506
SOHR, Motor bike attack | Tensions rise in western reef Dimashq after targeting regime forces checkpoint withgrenade, 12 July 2021, url; SOHR, Anti-regime attack | Gunmen open fire on regime checkpoint in Qudsaya, Rif
Dimashq, while regime forces amass troops and block the area’s entrances, 15 June 2022, url; SOHR, Armed attack| Two members of the 4th Division killed in western Qalamoun, 7 July 2022, url
1507
SOHR, Armed clashes | Child killed and four injured by gunfire and grenade explosions during infighting
between two NDF members in western Qalamoun in Rif Dimashq, 26 June 2022, url
1508
SOHR, Rif Dimashq | Dispute over a bread basket killed civilian in western Rif Dimashq, 10 July 2021, url; SOHR,
Growing security chaos in regime-held areas | Family clashes leave injuries in Rif Dimashq, 14 February 2022, url
1509
SOHR, For ransom | Young man killed by a gang in horrific crime in Reef Dimashq, 7 September 2021, url

194

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

several explosions were reported inside Damascus city and its vicinity. 1510 Haid Haid observedthat between April and June 2022, 16 attacks had been reported in and around Damascus,
resulting in the deaths of 13 persons affiliated with the GoS. Places in Rural Damascus
governorate that witnessed attacks included Qatana, Kisweh, Beit Jinn and Al Worood, Beit
Sahm, Hudjara, and Fer Yaboos, Hawsh Nasri, Qudsaya and Sbeneh. 1511
As Haid pointed out, pro-GoS media outlets refrained from reporting on every incident andtended instead ‘to downplay the uptick in violence’. Moreover, GoS-supported media ‘generally
portrayed the targets as civilians’, whereas independent news sources reported that the
majority of the casualties were GoS fighters or combatants. 1512
The reported incidents included two bombings in the countryside of Kisweh (in Deir Khabiyeh)1513
for which ISIL claimed responsibility.1514 The other attacks recorded in the second quarter of2022 went unclaimed, Haid assessed that it was likely that former rebels (i.e. individuals withthe ‘motives, skills, and resources to carry out attacks’) were behind some of these reported
incidents, although it was also possible that some incidents were ‘inside jobs’ between pro-GoS
groups (especially when these involved shootings). 1515 An instance of deadly infighting between
pro-Iranian militiamen reportedly took place in Sayyida Zainab in early May 2022.1516 Further
reports analysing security trends, especially outside the second quarter of 2022, could not befound within the time constraints of this report.
Airstrikes and missile attacks by Israeli forces on targets in Rural Damascus governorate werereported during the reference period.1517 These strikes included attacks targeting locations at ornear Damascus International Airport,1518 including military posts and warehouses of GoS forces,
Iranian troops or Iran-backed militias.1519 In addition, the Air-Defence Battalion in Al-Dumayr 1520
(northeast of Damascus city) 1521 and the Zakia area (south of Damascus city) 1522 were attacked.

1510

COAR, Islamic State Claims Responsibility for Damascus Bombings, 23 May 2022, url, p. 4
Haid, H., Assad’s fake narrative of a ‘safe’ Damascus, Arab News, 1 July 2022, url
1512
Haid, H., Assad’s fake narrative of a ‘safe’ Damascus, Arab News, 1 July 2022, url
1513
Haid, H., Assad’s fake narrative of a ‘safe’ Damascus, Arab News, 1 July 2022, url
1514
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2 504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), S/2022/492,
16 June 2022, url, para. 5
1515
Haid, H., Assad’s fake narrative of a ‘safe’ Damascus, Arab News, 1 July 2022, url
1516
NPA, Sayyidah Zaynab In Damascus; Heart Of Iran’s Expansionist Project In Syria, 1 June 2022, url
1517
International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Syria, April 2021, url; International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Syria,
August 2021, url; International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Syria, January 2022, url; International Crisis Group,
CrisisWatch – Syria, March 2022, url; International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Syria, May 2022, url
1518
SOHR, After suspension of attacks for more than a month | Israeli strikes hit military sites in Damascus andmiddle of Syria, 8 June 2021, url; SOHR, Death toll update | Israeli missiles hitting vicinity of Damascus airport killfour regime fighters and civil servant, 23 May 2022, url; SOHR, Israeli attack on Damascus airport | Runway andcontrol tower sustain damage and air flights transported to Aleppo airport, 10 June 2022, url
1519
SOHR, Israeli attacks in 2022 | 33 targets destroyed and nearly 70 people killed and wounded in 12 attacks sofar, 15 May 2022, url
1520
SOHR, After suspension of attacks for more than a month | Israeli strikes hit military sites in Damascus andmiddle of Syria, 8 June 2021, url
1521
TV 7 Israel News, Syria alleges overnight IDF airstrikes, 9 June 2021, url
1522
Ynetnews, Israel strikes south of Damascus, Syrian state media reports, 17 February 2022, url
1511

195

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Several persons, including GoS soldiers, allied militia fighters and IRGC members werereportedly killed in these attacks.1523(b)Security incidents

During the reporting period there were 202 security incidents recorded by ACLED in Rural
Damascus governorate, of whom 36 were battles, 62 explosions/remote violence and 104
incidents of violence against civilians.1524

Figure 32: Evolution of security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence andviolence against civilians in Rural Damascus governorate between 1 April 2021 and 1
August 2022, based on ACLED data 1525

District

Battles

Remote violence

Violence against
civilians

Al Qutayfah

1

2

1

An Nabk-

2-

At Tall3-

87

Az-Zabadani

4

4

1

Darayya

1

1

1

1523

International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Syria, June 2021, url; International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Syria,
February 2022, url; International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Syria, March 2022, url; International Crisis Group,
CrisisWatch – Syria, May 2022, url
1524
EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (12 August2022), url
1525
EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (12 August2022), url

196

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

District

Battles

Remote violence

Violence against
civilians

Duma

14

24

5

Qatana4

4

2

Rural Damascus

8

23

6

Yabroud

1

2

1

Total

36

62

104

Figure 33: Security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against
civilians in Rural Damascus governorate between 1 April 2021 and 1 August 2022.
Breakdown by district based on ACLED data1526
Most security incidents recorded by ACLED during the reporting period in Rural Damascus
were coded as violence against civilians, the highest number being documented in At-Tall
district (see Figure 33). However, most incidents of violence against civilians documented in
At-Tall concerned information released on deaths of civilians under torture in GoS prisons.
Most cases reported referred to civilians who have been under arrest for multiple years.
A non-exhaustive list of security incidents that were reported to have taken place in Rural
Damascus governorate during the reference period for this report includes the following:•••

On 6 July 2021, clashes near the town of Kfer Yaboos, allegedly between GoS soldiersand a group of smugglers, resulted in the death of an army officer while leaving fourother GoS soldiers injured, according to the opposition website Sowt Al-Asima.1527
On 24 February 2022, rocket fire from Israeli forces hit posts and weapons storages of
Iran-backed militias near Damascus International Airport and air-defence systems in
Kisweh and Sayyida Zainab south of Damascus city, killing seven people, including two
GoS soldiers, two Syrians linked to Hezbollah, and three members of Iran -backed
militias.1528
On 7 March 2022, two IRGC colonels were killed in an Israeli missile attack targeting theoutskirts of Damascus city, the IRGC reported.1529

1526

EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (12 August2022), url
1527
Sowt Al-Asima, Officer killed, Four Regime Soldiers Injured in Rural Damascus, The Syrian Observer, 7 July
2021, url
1528
SOHR, Israeli attacks in 2022 | 33 targets destroyed and nearly 70 people killed and wounded in 12 attacks sofar, 15 May 2022, url
1529
Al Arabiya, Iran says IRGC members killed in Israeli missile strike i n Syria, vows revenge, 9 March 2022, url

197

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM•

In early May 2022, seven people, among them a 12-year old child, were killed in Sayyida
Zainab during infighting between Iran-backed militants due to disputes over money
issues.1530
On 16 May 2022, two IEDs exploded in the Deir Khabiyeh area1531 of the Kisweh
countryside,1532 killing two persons and injuring one 1533 or two others.1534 As COAR
assessed, those killed were ‘members of local militia committees affiliated with the
Fourth Division’.1535 ISIL claimed responsibility for these attacks.1536
On 7 July 2022, unidentified gunmen targeted a checkpoint in Assal Al-Ward town inwestern Qalamoun, killing two members of the SAA 4 th Division, SOHR reported.1537

•

•

(c)

Civilian fatalities

Month

SNHR 2021

SNHR 2022

January--

February

2

67

March

1

2

April

1

-

May

1

2

June

-

4

July

2

5

August-

1530

NPA, Sayyidah Zaynab In Damascus; Heart Of Iran’s Expansioni st Project In Syria, 1 June 2022, url
NPA, Two IED Blasts In Syria’s Rif Dimashq Leave Four Casualties, 16 May 2022, url
1532
COAR, Islamic State Claims Responsibility for Damascus Bombings, 23 May 2022, url, p. 4
1533
COAR, Islamic State Claims Responsibility for Damascus Bombings, 23 May 2022, url, p. 4
1534
NPA, Two IED Blasts In Syria’s Rif Dimashq Leave Four Casualties, 16 May 2022, url
1535
COAR, Islamic State Claims Responsibility for Damascus Bombings, 23 May 2022, url, p. 4
1536
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), S/2022/492,
16 June 2022, url, para. 5; COAR, Islamic State Claims Responsibility for Damascus Bombings, 23 May 2022, url,
p. 4
1537
SOHR, Armed attack | Two members of the 4th Division killed in western Qalamoun, 7 July 2022, url
1531

198

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATIONMonth

SNHR 2021

September

2

October2

November-

December

2

Total

13

SNHR 2022

80

Figure 34: Civilian fatalities as a result of armed conflict in Rural Damascus governorate in
2021 and first seven months of 2022. Monthly breakdown based on SNHR data
In 2021, SNHR recorded 13 civilian fatalities 1538 in Rural Damascus governorate while in the firstseven months of 2022 it documented 80 civilian fatalities (see Figure 34).1539 Most of thecivilian fatalities were documented by SNHR in February 2022, when GoS released death

1538

Based on data extracted from monthly reports on civilian fatalities published by SNHR. See: SNHR, Extrajudicial
Killing Claims the Lives of 113 Civilians, Including 36 Children, Six Women, and Three Victims Due to Torture, inJanuary 2021, 1 February 2021, url, p. 7; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 138 Civilians, Including 23
Children, 11 Women, and 14 Victims Due to Torture, in February 2021, 1 March 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR, Extrajudicial
Killing Claims the Lives of 177 Civilians, Including 28 Children, 35 Women, One Medical Worker, and 9 Victims Dueto Torture, in March 2021, 1 April 2021, url, p. 7; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 96 Civilians, Including
15 Children, 11 Women, and Nine Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in May 2021, 1 June 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR,
Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 723 Civilians in Syria in the First Half of 2021, 1 July 2021, url, p. 9; SNHR,
Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 129 Civilians, Including 44 Children, 17 Women, and 10 Victims Due toTorture, in Syria in July 2021, 1 August 2021, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 94 Civilians,
Including 32 Children, 10 Women, and Seven Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in August 2021, 1 September 2021, url,
p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 86 Civilians, Including 23 Children, Nine Women, and Eight
Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in September 2021, 1 October 2021, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims theLives of 84 Civilians, Including 22 Children, Four Women, and Seven Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in October
2021, 1 November 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 86 Civilians, Including 16 Children,
Eight Women, and Six Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in November 2021, 1 December 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR, 1,271
Civilians, Including 299 Children, 134 Women, and 104 Victims of Torture, Killed in Syria in 2021, 1 January 2022, url,
p. 13
1539
Based on data extracted from monthly reports on civilian fatalities published by SNHR. See SNHR, 69 Civilians,
Including 18 Children, Four Women and Eight Victims Due to Torture, Killed in Syria in January 2022, 1 February2022, url, p. 8; SNHR, 161 Civilians, Including 28 Children, Six Women and 66 Victims Due to Torture, Documented
Killed in Syria in February 2022, 1 March 2022, url, p. 9; SNHR, 67 Civilians, Including 20 Children, Three Women,
and Seven Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Killed in Syria in March 2022, 1 April 2022, url, p. 8; SNHR, 101
Civilians, Including 17 Children, 14 Women, and Six Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in
Syria in April 2022, 1 May 2022, url, p. 9; SNHR, 78 Civilians, Including 14 Children, 11 Women, and Eight Victims
Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in Syria in May 2022, 1 June 2022, url, p. 8; SNHR, 568
Civilians, Including 115 Children, 53 Women, and 101 Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in
Syria in the First Half of 2022, 2 July 2022, url, p. 12; SNHR, 86 Civilians, Including 21 Children, Eight Women, andFive Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in Syria in July 2022, 1 August 2022, url, p. 9

199

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

notifications for persons arrested in previous years who have died in custody. Most of themwere originally from Deir al-Asafir town.1540(d)Conflict-related infrastructure damage and explosive remnants of war

No information on infrastructure damage arising from conflict activities during th e reference
period could be found within the time constraints of this report. For information on destructions
caused by the conflict that ended in Rural Damascus in April 2018 and the (lack of)reconstruction of damaged infrastructure up to March 2021, see section 2.11.3 of the EUAA COI
Report: Syria - Security situation (July 2021).
A Syrian economist interviewed in November 2021 by Al-Mashareq, a news website sponsoredby the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), estimated that in Rural Damascus onlyaround 10 % of the debris resulting from the war had been cleared, ‘despite government
decisions and decrees on the removal of rubble and cracked buildings in preparation for thereconstruction process’.1541
The Carter Center reported that, between December 2012 and May 2021, 153 042 explosive
munitions were deployed in Rural Damascus governorate and that the governorate showed a‘heavy distribution’ of explosive munitions use, with 82.8 % of such munitions in Damascus andRural Damascus concentrated in the latter area. The source estimated that the use of explosives
resulted in a contamination of the governorate by 15 250–46 000 pieces of UXO,1542 although
the Mine Action Review noted that UXO clearance efforts by GoS and Russian forces largely
went unreported.1543 Furthermore, in a September 2021 report, Mine Action Review indicatedthat Rural Damascus was one of 13 governorates that had experienced use of cluster munitions
since 2012.1544 In February 2022, the UN Secretary-General reported that mine clearance
operations supported by UNMAS had started in Western Ghouta in what was referred to as the‘first humanitarian mine action clearance activities in a government-controlled area’ in Syria.1545
As of end of March 2022, the same source reported that a total of 372 000 m2 had been clearedof mines since the beginning of the operations. 1546
During the reporting period, a number of civilians (including children) were killed in explosions
caused by landmines or munitions remnants, including in Douma city, 1547 Deir al-Asafir (also1540

SNHR, 161 Civilians, Including 28 Children, Six Women and 66 Victims Due to Torture, Documented Killed in
Syria in February 2022, 1 March 2022, url, p. 5
1541
Al-Mashareq, Neglect, rampant corruption afflict regime-controlled Syria, 15 November 2021, url
1542
Carter Center (The), A Call for Action: Data on Unexploded Ordnance in Syria and Its Implications: December
2012 – May 2021, March 2022, url, p. 18
1543
Mine Action Review, Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2021, 1 September 2021, url, p. 181
1544
Mine Action Review, Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2021, 1 September 2021, url, p. 178
1545
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), S/2022/135,
21 February 2022, url, para. 30
1546
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021), S/2022/330,
19 April 2022, url, para. 38
1547
SOHR, Old ordnance | Child killed in landmine explosion nearby Douma city in Rif Dimashq, 31 May 2022, url

200

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

Eastern Ghouta),1548 Jaramana,1549 Az-Zabadani,1550 Harasta city,1551 and Yabroud Balkalmon in
the north-western part of the governorate.1552 Moreover, in April 2022 two people died when abuilding in Daraya collapsed, likely as a result of indirect damage caused by nearby
bombardment during the war.1553(e)Displacement and return

According to UNOCHA, as of January 2022 there were 1 115 922 IDPs in the governorate.1554 In
2021, UNOCHA in Rural Damascus governorate recorded approximately 3 150 IDP movementsfrom the governorate, 846 IDP movements inside the governorate, and 150 IDP movements to
the governorate.1555
In 2022, UNOCHA reported 645 IDP departures from and 6 IDP arrivals to Rural Damascus
governorate in January,1556 381 departures and no arrivals in February, 1557 577 departures andno arrivals in March,1558 754 departures and 55 arrivals in April,1559 and 348 departures and 74
arrivals to the governorate.1560
As regards returns, in 2021 UNOCHA recorded for Rural Damascus governorate approximately
8 000 spontaneous IDP returnee movements from the governorate, 21 000 IDP return
movements inside the governorate, and 1 000 IDP returnee movements to the governorate. 1561
In 2022, UNOCHA recorded approximately 500 spontaneous IDP returns from and 500 returns
to the governorate in January,1562 around 500 returns from and 200 to the governorate in
February,1563 some 640 returns from and 1 640 returns to the governorate in March, 1564 200
returns from and 200 returns to the governorate in April, 1565 and 400 returns from and 100
returns to the governorate in May.1566
In December 2021, the GoS allowed residents of Hajar al-Aswad to return to their homes uponreceiving approval from the governorate’s authorities. 1567 However, according to the Syria
Report, as of early March 2022 only 40 families had been able to return to the ‘nearly deserted

1548

SOHR, War ordnance | Child killed in explosion in Rif Dimashq, 7 March 2022, url
PRC, Palestinian Refugee Child Killed by Explosive Ordnance in Syria Displacement Camp, 25 April 2022, url
1550
SOHR, Old ordnance | Child killed and another injured in landmine explosion in Rif Dimashq, 20 July 2022, url
1551
SOHR, Second case in 24 hours | Landmine explosion kills civilian in Rif Dimashq, 21 July 2022, url
1552
SOHR, War remnants | Shell explosion kills three civilians including woman in Rif Dimashq, 4 February 2022, url
1553
Syria Report (The), Building Collapses in Darayya After Indirect Damage from Prior Bombing, 26 April 2022, url
1554
UNOCHA, 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 23
1555
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements Overview Jan – Dec 2021, 21 March 2022, url
1556
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements January 2022, 24 February 2022, url
1557
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements February 2022, 11 April 2022, url
1558
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements March 2022, 9 May 2022, url
1559
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements April 2022, 15 June 2022, url
1560
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements May 2022, 13 July 2022, url
1561
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Spontaneous IDP Returnee Movements Overview, Jan – Dec 2021, 21 March
2022, url
1562
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns January 2022, 24 February 2022, url
1563
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns February 2022, 11 April 2022, url
1564
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns. March 2022, 9 May 2021, url
1565
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns April 2022, 15 June 2022, url
1566
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Spontaneous Returns May 2022, 13 July 2022, url
1567
SACD, UN report on Syrian returnees leaves too much out to be useful, 12 January 2022, url
1549

201

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

town’, ‘as rubble still covers large areas of the town and basic public services remain absent.’ 1568
A Syrian economist interviewed by Al-Mashareq news website in November 2021 indeed
explained that the limited clearance of debris from the war in Rural Damascus governorate
contributed to the small number of persons returning to war-affected areas and has in fact‘caused dozens of families to move to other areas’. 1569

1568

Syria Report (The), Returnee Numbers Remain Very Low in Al -Hajar Al-Aswad as Looting Continues, 8 March
2022, url
1569
Al-Mashareq, Neglect, rampant corruption afflict regime-controlled Syria, 15 November 2021, url

202

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

2.12. Dar’a governorate

Map 18: © MapAction, Dar’a governorate1570

2.12.1. General description of the governorate
Dar’a governorate is located in the southern part of Syria, below Damascus, sharing borders
with the governorates of Quneitra to the west, Rural Damascus to the north, Sweida to theeast and an international border with Jordan to its south. Dar’a governorate is comprised of
1570

MapAction, Dar’a governorate, 29 July 2016, url

203EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

the three administrative districts of Dar’a, Izra’ and As-Sanamayn.1571 Each district is subdivided further into sub-districts:•

Dar’a district: Dar’a, Jizeh, Bushra Esh-Sham, Mseifra, Kherbet Ghazala, Da’eel,
Mzeireb, Ash Shajara, Dar’a City is the governorate capital;•

As Sanamayn district: As Sanamayn [includes district capital], Ghabagheb,
Massimiyyeh;•

Izra’ district: Izra’, Hrak, Sheikh Miskine, Nawa [district capital is Nawa town], Jassim,
Tassil.1572

According to 2022 estimates by UNOCHA, the population of Dar’a governorate was 1 025 484
inhabitants.1573 The last official estimations of the Syrian Bureau of Statistics from 2021
numbered the population of Dar’a approximately 966 430. 1574
Dar’a governorate is strategically important as a transit route between Syria, Jordan, and Gulf
states, because of the border to the Golan Heights.1575 The M5 highway passes through thegovernorate connecting Damascus to Jordan, and leads northwards connecting Aleppo to thenorth.1576
In recent years drug production and cross-border drug trafficking increased in the south of
Syria1577, including in Dar’a governorate. COAR concludes in its July 2022 report that ‘Dar’agovernorate can be understood both as a key drug production region and as the main
thoroughfare for the transit of Syrian […] narcotics into Jordan, and from there, towards theGulf.’1578

2.12.2. Conflict background and armed actors
The governorate of Dar’a, where the first protests against the Assad government began in
2011,1579 played a significant role in the conflict as an opposition stronghold. 1580 In 2018
however, the GoS was able to regain control over the area with the support of Russia througha combination of military campaigns,1581 and reconciliation agreements with opposition

1571

Based on UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Reference Map, 17 January 2013, url; UNOCHA, Humanitarian Atlas.
Syrian Arab Republic, n.d., url
1572
UNOCHA, Dar’a Governorate Reference Map, December 2015, url; Alternative spellings can be found in:
Integrity Research and Consultancy, Research Summary Report: Local Governance in Dara’a Governorate, August
2014, url, p. 81573
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview. Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 23
1574
Syria, Central Bureau of Statistics, Estimate of the population in Syria by governorates, n.d., url
1575
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic – Governorates Profile (June 2014), 6 August 2014, url, p. 37
1576
UNOCHA, Dar’a Governorate Reference Map, December 2015, url
1577
Syria Direct, Southern Syria’s drug war: Jordan’s options ‘limited’ as Iran expands, 6 June 2022, url
1578
COAR, Smugglers and Security Agents: Fragmentation and Decentralisation in Southern Syria’s Captagon
Networks, July 2022, url, p. 8
1579
Integrity Research and Consultancy, Research Summary Report: Local Governance in Dara’a Governorate,
August 2014, url, p. 6; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic – Governorates Profile (June 2014), 6 August 2014, url, p. 37
1580
Guardian (The), Syria: Assad shells former opposition stronghold Deraa, 29 July 2021, url
1581
COAR, Southwestern Dar’a: Needs Oriented Strategic Area Profile (NOSAP), September 2019, url, p. 12; COAR,
Syria Update, 5 July 2021, url

204

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

factions.1582 During the negotiations, the GoS-affiliated Security Committee represented theinterests of the government1583, while locals were represented by negotiation committees,consisting of ‘opposition figures, former rebel leaders and local notables’. Two majorcommittees were established in Tafas and Dar’a al-Balad.1584 The latter was known as theCentral Committee of Dar’a (DCC).1585 Since 2018, the governorate was hence nominally under
the control of the GoS1586, while its control in certain parts of the governorate, such as Tafas 1587
and Dar’a al-Balad, was limited by the de facto semi-autonomy, allowing locals to take care of‘local affairs and to continue to manifest opposition’.1588 The influence of the GoS was limited
in 2018 by the acceptance to have restrictions on its presence of military and security forcesfrom ‘the areas that participated in the negotiations’,1589 including Dar’a al-Balad and Tafas.1590
In the western part of the governorate, where negotiations and agreements took place inTafas and ‘its surrounding areas’, large numbers of former rebels were reported to haverejected the agreement and stayed unreconciled ‘or have signed contracts to join the ranks of
the regime’s military and security forces as an ostensible tactic to guarantee security, continue
possessing their light weapons and remain in their localities’.1591
Over the years, the demands of locals asked for in the agreements of 2018 have not been met
in the eyes of the Daarawi population. From June 2019 onwards, through 2020 as well as
2021, the governorate’s strategic geographical location 1592 combined with a ‘weak regime
control’ in the south 1593 led to an increase of assassinations, clashes and overall insecurity. 1594
Foreign actors expanded their influence in the area, particularly Israel at the armistice line with

1582

Syria Direct, Months into new Daraa settlement, assassinations continue unabated, 29 December 2021, url;
COAR, Syria Update, 5 July 2021, url
1583
Enab Baladi, Daraa returns to Syrian regime’s control by forced settlement agreements, 17 October 2021, url
1584
Al-Jabassini, A., Dismantling Networks of Resistance and the Reconfiguration of Order in Southern Syria, EUI,
October 2021, url, p. 2, fn. 2
1585
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review, April through June 2021, 30 June 2021, url, p. 10
1586
Based on reading of maps in UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission ofInquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url [Annex II: Estimated areas of influence,
January 2022], p. 22; Etana Syria, Military Control Across Syria [Map], 1 July 2022, url; Jusoor for Studies, Foreign
Forces Points in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022, 27 December 2021, url
1587
Asia Times, Assad’s strategy in southern Syria fated to fail, 11 August 2022, url
1588
Al-Jabassini, A., Dismantling Networks of Resistance and the Reconfiguration of Order in Southern Syria, EUI,
October 2021, url, p. 4
1589
Syrian Observer (The), Jabassini: Regime Negotiates Deployment of Eighth Brigade in Daraa al -Balad, 30 July
2021, url
1590
Asia Times, Assad’s strategy in southern Syria fated to fail, 11 August 2022, url
1591
Al-Jabassini, A., Dismantling Networks of Resistance and the Reconfiguration of Order in Southern Syria, EUI,
October 2021, url, p. 5
1592
SOHR, Daraa in one year: security chaos, overlapping interests and hidden conflict… people suffer the scourgeof external and internal interventions, 25 June 2020, url; Tokmajyan, A., How Southern Syria Has Been
Transformed Into a Regional Powder Keg, Carnegie Middle East Center, 14 July 2020, url
1593
Tokmajyan, A., How Southern Syria Has Been Transformed Into a Regional Powder Keg, Carnegie Middle East
Center, 14 July 2020, url
1594
Al-Ghazi, S., Insecurity In Southern Syria: Tracking Daraa, Quneitra and Suwayda (January – February 2021),
ORSAM, March 2021, url, pp. 1-2; SOHR, Daraa in one year: security chaos, overlapping interests and hidden
conflict… people suffer the scourge of external and internal interventions, 25 June 2020, url; Syria Direct, Months
into new Daraa settlement, assassinations continue unabated, 29 December 2021, url; Carter Center (The), The
Quarterly Review on Syrian Military and Security Dynami cs, January – March 2022, 13 May 2022, url, pp. 10-11

205

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

the Golan Heights, as well as Iran and Russia, who engaged in ‘an indirect competition for
influence in the region’.1595
Further information on the conflict background and actors in Dar’a is available in the EUAA
COI Report: Syria - Security Situation (July 2021), EUAA COI Report: Syria - Security situation(May 2020) and EUAA COI Report: Syria – Actors (December 2019).
(a)Syrian Arab Army and affiliated armed groups

As of August 2021, the 4th Division was present in ‘Daraa city, Daraa western countryside, alYarmouk Basin’.1596 According to Syria Direct, the 4 th Division had a limited presence in thegovernorate after the settlement agreements in September 2021, while increasing its
presence again in mid-May 2022 by opening recruiting offices.1597
The Tiger Forces 1598 were reported in August 2021 to be present in Dar’a city and having
weapons, armoury and artillery to their use, while having excellent relations to Russia andgood ties to Iran.1599
As of August 2021, the Air Force Intelligence and Military Security Branch were present
throughout the governorate, using light and medium weapons and fostering excellent ties toIran, while balancing good relations with Russia. The NDF as well as the Local Defense
Forces 1600 were reported to be primarily present in the northern and western countryside while
being in possession of light and medium weapons.1601
COAR reported that the 4th Division, Hezbollah, and the Military Intelligence within Dar’agovernorate were deeply involved in drug production as well as drug trafficking, especiallyconcerning Captagon.1602

1595

SOHR, Daraa in one year: security chaos, overlapping interests and hidden conflict… people suffer the scourgeof external and internal interventions, 25 June 2020, url
1596
Al-Ghazi, S., Shaban, N., Policy Brief 186: Daraa Fragile Security Disrupted By Foreign Actors Amid The
Emergence Of New Powers, ORSAM, August 2021, url, p. 3
1597
Syria Direct, Southern Syria’s drug war: Jordan’s options ‘limited’ as Iran expands, 6 June 2022, url
1598
The Tiger forces were described in 2018 as a ‘Syrian Air Intelligence-affiliated militia fighting for the Syrian
government and backed by Russia.’ While in 2019, the militia was reportedly integrated in the SAA as the 25 thSpecial Task Forces Division. Waters, G., The Tiger Forces - Pro-Assad Fighters Backed By Russia, MEI, October
2018, url, p. 4/Summary; Waters, G., The 25 th Division: Syria’s Tiger Forces get Rebranded. International Review, 20
August 2019, url
1599
Al-Ghazi, S., Shaban, N., Policy Brief 186: Daraa Fragile Security Disrupted By Foreign Actors Amid The
Emergence Of New Powers, ORSAM, August 2021, url, p. 3
1600
The Local Defense Forces (LDF) are the largest Iran-backed armed forces within Syria. They consist of different
militias and are integrated in the SAA. In 2020, they reportedly consisted of 50 000 fighters.
Navvar, S., Factbox: Iranian influence and presence in Syria, Atlantic Council, 5 November 2020, url
Despite its integration into the SAA in 2017 the LDF remained lead by and dependent on I ran.
Enab Baladi, The Syrian Army: Between Russian control and Iranian infiltration, 13 November 2019, url
1601
Al-Ghazi, S., Shaban, N., Policy Brief 186: Daraa Fragile Security Disrupted By Foreign Actors Amid The
Emergence Of New Powers, ORSAM, August 2021, url, p. 3
1602
COAR, Smugglers and Security Agents: Fragmentation and Decentralisation in Southern Syria’s Captagon
Networks, July 2022, url, pp. 8-9

206

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION(b)

RussiaAccording to Jusoor for Studies, Russia operated four security and military points within thegovernorate at the end of 2021.1603 In August 2021, the STJ noted that the Russian Military
Police had posts in Dar’a city as well as Izra’ and Busra al-Sham and did ‘conduct patrols in therest of the province’.1604 A May 2022 report of the Turkey-based think tank ORSAM stated that
there were no military bases or camps under direct Russian control in the south of Syria. 1605
According to some sources Russia decreased its troops in the south since February 20221606,
were they had a rather strong presence in the last years of the conflict. Included in thewithdrawal were ‘mercenaries affiliated with the Wagner company’ as well as ‘200 soldiersfrom the pro-Russian 5th Division’.1607 These reports remained unconfirmed.1608
For a long time, the Russian forces in Dar’a were perceived as a mediator by the former antiGoS opposition. However this perception was challenged in the siege of Dar’a al-Balad in
June and July 2021, when Russian troops were said to have a leading role in the siege.1609
Russia also played a major role as a main mediator in the settling of the siege of Dar’a alBalad.1610 COAR argued that the developments in the governorate, especially the siege of
Dar’a al-Balad, indicated a shift in Russia’s approach in the south from a conciliatory role
towards a more aggressive stance.1611
The Russian-backed 5th Corps of the SAA composed of the reconciled former opposition
armed groups and fighters was created to prevent ‘security vacuums’ in Dar’a and contain
Iranian influence in the area.1612 The 8th Brigade of the 5th Corps in Dar’a had a large presencein the eastern rural parts of Dar’a, as the main influential armed actor. 1613 It had its mainstronghold in Busra al-Sham1614 and controlled in August 2021 also the town Ma’araba
according to STJ.1615 It coordinated with Russia exclusively 1616 and remained hostile to Iran and
the GoS.1617 However, in October 2021 local media outlets reported on the dismantling of the1603

Jusoor for Studies, Foreign Forces Points in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022, 27 December 2021, url
STJ, Syria: A Timeline of the Siege of Daraa al -Balad, 27 August 2021, url, p. 111605Haşıl, H., Policy Brief 216 - The Ukraine Crisis And Russian Forces In Syria, Orsam, June 2022, url, p. 7
1606
Enab Baladi, ‫درعا‬.. ‫[ سوريا جنوبي تمركز نقاط تُخلي روسيا‬Dar’a…Russia evacuates outposts in southern Syria], 24 May
2022, url; Haşıl, H., Policy Brief 216 - The Ukraine Crisis And Russian Forces In Syria, Orsam, June 2022, url, p. 7
1607Haşıl, H., Policy Brief 216 - The Ukraine Crisis And Russian Forces In Syria, Orsam, June 2022, url, p. 7
1608
Prasad, H., Blog: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Complicates the Situation in Syria, Carter Center (The), 7 June
2022, url
1609
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review, April through June 2021, 30 June 2021, url, p. 10
1610
STJ, Syria: The 75-Day Siege of Daraa al-Balad, 26 October 2021, url, pp. 6-11
1611
COAR, Syria Update, 5 July 2021, url
1612
COAR, Southwestern Dar’a: Needs Oriented Strategic Area Profile (NOSAP), September 2019, url, p. 40
1613
COAR, Security Archipelago: Security Fragmentation in Dar’a Governorate, 3 December 2019, url, p. 12; STJ,
Syria: A Timeline of the Siege of Daraa al-Balad, 27 August 2021, url, p. 11
1614
Al-Ghazi, S., Shaban, N., Policy Brief 186: Daraa Fragile Security Disrupted By Foreign Actors Amid The
Emergence Of New Powers, ORSAM, August 2021, url, p. 5
1615
STJ, Syria: A Timeline of the Siege of Daraa al -Balad, 27 August 2021, url, p. 11
1616
COAR, Security Archipelago: Security Fragmentation in Dar’a Governorate, 3 December 2019, url, p. 12
1617
Haid, H., Russia maintains grip on Syria despite Ukraine commitments, Arab News, 17 June 2022, url
1604

207

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

8th Brigade1618 and its far-reaching integration into the Military Security branch.1619 COAR
reported on 8 November 2021, that the 8 th Brigade was to be dissolved in the countryside andintegrated into military structures, while it would remain in the city of Busra al-Sham.1620
According to Syria Direct as of June 2022, the 8th Brigade is now affiliated with the MilitaryIntelligence Division 238, located in Sweida.1621(c)Iran and Iranian-backed armed groups

According to Jusoor for Studies, Iranian-affiliated forces and Hezbollah operated 22 militaryand security points within the Dar’a governorate, at the end of 2021. 1622 Sources interviewed
by Syria Direct indicated the presence of Iran and Hezbollah in Dar’a, especially in the westerncountryside close to the Golan heights and the Jordanian border. 1623 Hezbollah presence wasfurther reported in the al-Lajat area in southern Dar’a countryside1624 , on the Dar’a-Damascus
highway, and in the eastern and western countryside. 1625 Hezbollah was reportedly involved in
drug production and trafficking in Dar’a governorate, 1626 which led to protests among the
population.1627
Several reports assume that Iranian(-backed) forces would try to fill the void left in case of adecreasing Russian presence in the south of Syria.1628 In May 2022 Ahram Online reported
information from a defected Syrian army officer that the number of military points controlled by
Iranian-affiliated militias in the south more than doubled to a number of approximately 150 in
the last two years.1629 This information could not be corroborated.

1618

Syrian Observer (The)/Al-Souria Net, Russia Ceases Financial Support to Daraa Eighth Brigade, 14 October 2021,

url
1619

Horan Free League, ‫الثامن اللواء في قيادي‬: ‫[ العسكرية المخابرات شعبة في عناصره وملفات ”الريح مهب“ في اللواء‬A commander in the
Eigth Brigade: The Brigade is in ‘the wind’ and the files of its members are in the Military Intelligence Directorate], 11
October 2021, jurl
1620
COAR, Syria Update, 8 November 2021, url
1621
Syria Direct, Southern Syria’s drug war: Jordan’s options ‘limited’ as Iran expands, 6 June 2022, url
1622
Jusoor for Studies, Foreign Forces Points in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022, 27 December 2021, url
1623
Syria Direct, Months into new Daraa settlement, assassinations continue unabated, 29 December 2021, url
1624
Enab Baladi, Families from Daraa countryside return home after three years of displacement, 25 May 2021, url
1625
Al-Ghazi, S., Shaban, N., Policy Brief 186: Daraa Fragile Security Disrupted By Foreign Actors Amid The
Emergence Of New Powers, ORSAM, August 2021, url, p. 3
1626
Daher, J., Ahmad, N., Taha, S., Smuggling between Syria and Lebanon, and from Syria to Jordan: The Evoluti on
and Delegation of a Practice, EUI, 19 April 2022, url, p. 7; COAR, Smugglers and Security Agents: Fragmentation
and Decentralisation in Southern Syria’s Captagon Networks, July 2022, url, p. 8
1627
NPA, People In Syria’s Daraa Take To Street Against Iran, 15 July 2022, url
1628Haşıl, H., Policy Brief 216 - The Ukraine Crisis And Russian Forces In Syria, Orsam, June 2022, url, p. 7; Syria
Direct, Amid war in Ukraine, Russia withdraws and Iran expands in Syria, 4 May 2022, url
1629
Ahram Online, Russian withdrawal threats to Syria, 28 May 2022, url

208

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

(d)

ISIL

ISIL reportedly still has a presence 1630 in Dar’a with activities especially taking place in thesouthwest of the governorate 1631 and the presence of sleeper cells in the governorate. 1632
According to the International Crisis Group, cells are not necessarily connected to the overall
network in Syria, but could be ‘remnants of a historically isolated ISIS affiliate that controlled
parts of the Yarmouk river basin at the intersection of the Syrian, Israeli and Jordanianborders.’1633 According to a report of the UN Security Council, one member state sharedestimations of more than 300 fighters within Dar’a ‘in addition to sleeper cells located aroundthe Hawran mountains’.1634 ISIL-linked groups reportedly conducted a number ofassassinations within Dar’a in 2022, including the killing of the DCC member Musab alBardan1635, which entailed a number of retaliation killings.1636

2.12.3. Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population(a)

Security trends during the reporting period

The security situation in Dar’a governorate deteriorated during the reporting period,1637 while
the security control remained fragmented with GoS having ‘only tenuous control’.1638
During the reporting period high numbers of assassinations and attacks on individuals werereported.1639 While most of the conflict incidents, attacks and assassinations targeting ‘GoS
officials and former opposition fighters’ with local influence were reportedly conducted by

1630

International Crisis Group, Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and North-eastern Syria, 18 July 2022, url, p. 1,
fn. 2; UN Security Council, Letter dated 11 July 2022 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant toresolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da ’esh), AlQaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security
Council [S/2022/547], 15 July 2022, url, para. 43
1631
UN Security Council, Letter dated 11 July 2022 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant toresolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security
Council [S/2022/547], 15 July 2022, url, para. 43
1632
Al-Jabassini, A., Dismantling Networks of Resistance and the Reconfiguration of Order in Southern Syria, EUI,
October 2021, url, p. 5
1633
International Crisis Group, Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and North-eastern Syria, 18 July 2022, url, p. 1,
fn. 2
1634
UN Security Council, Letter dated 3 February 2022 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant
to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security
Council [S/2022/83], 3 February 2022, url, para. 36
1635
Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief: South Syria – 03 March 2022, 3 March 2022, url; Enab Baladi, Syrian regime vs.
IS: Game of death in Daraa, 4 March 2022, url
1636
Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief: South Syria – 03 March 2022, 3 March 2022, url
1637
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic [A/HRC/48/70], 13 August 2021, url, para. 19; Enab Baladi, Syrian regime vs. IS: Game of death in Daraa, 4March 2022, url; Al-Jabassini, Migration from Post-War Southern Syria: Drivers, Routes, and Destinations, EUI, 6
January 2022, url, p. 7; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry
on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/48/70], 13 August 2021, url, para. 23
1638
Daher, J., Ahmad, N., Taha, S.,, Smuggling between Syria and Lebanon, and from Syria to Jordan: The Evolution
and Delegation of a Practice, EUI, 19 April 2022, url, pp. 6-7
1639
International Crisis Group, Crisiswatch, Tracking Conflict Worldwide, Syria, n.d., url; Al-Jabassini, A., Migrationfrom Post-War Southern Syria: Drivers, Routes, and Destinations, EUI, 6 January 2022, url, p. 7; New Arab (The),
Former Baath official, relatives killed in southern Syria: reports, 28 June 2022, url

209EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM‘unidentified armed actors’, GoS officials and former opposition members accuse each otherof perpetrating the attacks.1640 In the period running up to the presidential elections in May
2021 assassinations and killings attempts rose.1641 The Carter Center counted up to 123 attacks
on GoS-members and former opposition members in Dar’a in the second quarter of 2021. 1642
The overall increase in violence was accompanied by the refusal of several communities toparticipate in the elections.1643 In Tafas, Dar’a al-Balad and Busra al-Sham no voting took place
as a way of protest against the GoS1644 and to emphasize the wish of semi-autonomy in thegovernorate.1645
Siege of Dar’a al-Balad and other locations
As part of the reconciliation agreements concluded in communities in Dar’a in 2018, someformer opposition fighters were allowed to defer military conscription, keep light weapons andhence ‘allowed to remain active’.1646 In the aftermath of the presidential elections in May 2021
and in an attempt to restore its security grip and its influence over the area1647, the GoS
demanded the surrender of ‘light personal weapons’ 1648, which the Central Committee of Dar’a(DCC) rejected1649, as well as the transfer of wanted individuals.1650 In reaction, the GoS-forceson 24 June 2021 started to blockade roads and supply routes to Dar’a al-Balad1651, aneighbourhood of Dar’a city where reconciled opposition groups have been in partial
control.1652 The resulting siege of the area that restricted the supply of food and electricity,1653
lasted for ten weeks while the GoS increased pressure by military shelling. 1654 With only the1640

Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review, October Through December 2021, 31 December 2021, url, p. 10; Carter
Center (The), Quarterly Review, April through June 2021, 30 June 2021, url, p. 8
1641
Carter Center (The), The Quarterly Review on Syrian Military and Security Dynamics, January – March 2022, 13
May 2022, url, p. 11; Reuters, Syria’s Assad wins 4th term with 95% of vote, in election the West calls fraudulent, 28
May 2021, url
1642
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review, April through June 2021, 30 June 2021, url, pp. 7-9
1643
Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief: South Syria – 31 May 2021, 31 May 2021, url
1644
Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief: South Syria – 31 May 2021, 31 May 2021, url
1645
COAR, Syria Update, 5 July 2021, url
1646
Carter Center (The), The Quarterly Review on Syrian Military and Security Dynamics, January – March 2022, 13
May 2022, url, pp. 10-11
1647
Al-Ghazi, S., Policy Brief 184: Insecurity In Southern Syria: The Case Of Quneitra And Suwayda (April – June2021), ORSAM, August 2021, url, p. 1
1648
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic [A/HRC/48/70], 13 August 2021, url, para. 23
1649
The Central Committee of Dar’a is ‘a group composed of former opposition fighters negotiating with Russia andthe GoS about local governance grievances’, Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review, April through June 2021, 30
June 2021, url, p. 10
1650
Al- Al-Ghazi, S., Shaban, N., Policy Brief 186: Daraa Fragile Security Disrupted By Foreign Actors Amid The
Emergence Of New Powers, ORSAM, August 2021, url, p. 8; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent
International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/48/70], 13 August 2021, url, para. 21
1651
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic [A/HRC/48/70], 13 August 2021, url, para. 21; Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review, April through June
2021, 30 June 2021, url, p. 10
1652
COAR, Syria Update, 5 July 2021, url1653
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url, para. 23; Al Bawaba, Assad Regime Imposes Full Siege on Daraa, 28
June 2021, url1654
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url, para. 24

210

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

Saraya entry to the neighbourhood being partially open since 12 August 2021 1655, people had
to bear ‘invasive security checks’1656, pay bribes to access and leave the area and had only
very limited access to food, water and electricity. 1657 The only medical centre consisting of one
makeshift clinic was damaged during the shelling and was closed and declared inoperable on
27 July 2021.1658 Shelling as well as a ground offensive by the GoS-forces started at the end of
July 2021 when local opposition groups refused to agree to the conditions demanded by the
GoS.1659
The DCC and the GoS-affiliated Security Committee reached a first agreement to end thesiege of Dar’a al-Balad on 24 July.1660 The agreement ‘collapsed’ on 27 July 2021, leading to aground offensive and renewed shelling of the besieged area by the GoS and its affiliatedforces such as Hezbollah and other militias.1661 The UNCOI reported the usage of ‘improvised
rocket-assisted munitions as well as other unguided rocket artillery’ by the GoS-affiliatedforces, which are reported to be ‘highly inaccurate’. 1662 Furthermore, fighting between local
forces and GoS-forces broke out in numerous towns and villages in the governorate, including
al-Yadoudah, Umm al-Miadhin, Tafas, al-Karak and Nawa, resulting in several deaths. 1663
Various towns became targets for GoS-shelling.1664
GoS and the DCC signed another agreement in early September 2021. 1665 In this agreement
the complete surrender of weapons, the establishment of nine GoS-operated checkpoints
within Dar’a al-Balad, status settling for wanted individuals, the postponement of military
services for draft evaders, as well as the presence of GoS-forces in specified locations within
Dar’a al-Balad, were stipulated.1666 Furthermore, about 70 opposition figures had to resettlewith their families to areas in northern Syria, which are not controlled by the GoS.1667 The siege
and violence accompanying it were the ‘largest and deadliest confrontation in the governorate
since the 2018 takeover’.1668 in October 2021, STJ published a list of more than 40 names of1655

UNOCHA, Syria. Dara’a Flash Update 3, Hostilities in Dara’a Governorate, As of 23 August 2021, 23 August
2021, url, p. 1; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the
Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url, para. 28
1656
Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief: South Syria – 01 July 2021, 1 July 2021, url1657
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url, para. 23
1658
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url, para. 25
1659
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url, para. 24
1660
STJ, Syria: A Timeline of the Siege of Daraa al -Balad, 27 August 2021, url, pp. 7-9
In the agreement the GoS-Security Committee and the Central Committee of Dar’a stipulated the surrender ofsome 70 personal weapons (instead of the demanded 200), the establishment of renewed status settlement
processes for individuals in the governorate, and the setup of three GoS-checkpoints operated by the Military
security and former opposition members together. COAR, Syria Update, 26 July 2021, url
1661
STJ, Syria: The 75-Day Siege of Daraa al-Balad, 26 October 2021, url, p. 3
1662
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url, para 27
1663
STJ, Syria: The 75-Day Siege of Daraa al-Balad, 26 October 2021, url, p. 4
1664
UNOCHA, Syria, Humanitarian Situation in Dar’a Governorate – Situation Reports No. 02, 27 September 2021,
url, p. 2; STJ, Syria: The 75-Day Siege of Daraa al-Balad, 26 October 2021, url, p. 5
1665
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url, paras. 5, 32
1666
STJ, Syria: The 75-Day Siege of Daraa al-Balad, 26 October 2021, url, pp. 11-12
1667
SACD, Did Daraa mark the end of reconciliation agreements in Syria?, 8 November 2021, url
1668
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review, October Through December 2021, 31 December 2021, url, p. 9

211

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

locals, mostly civilians, killed in the siege.1669 GoS-forces established checkpoints in thereconciled areas, including Dar’a al-Balad and other towns and communities in thegovernorate.1670 The developments thus left more GoS-forces present in the governorate, withthe exception of the south-eastern part, which is a stronghold of the 8th Brigade.1671
In the village of al-Yadoudah, in the northwest of Dar’a al-Balad local fighters attacked GoScheckpoints on 27 July 2021, reportedly in support of the besieged people in Dar’a al-Balad.
On 29 July 2021, the GoS responded with the shelling of areas in al-Yadoudah, resulting inseveral casualties.1672 Following disagreements concerning the transfer of weapons by local
forces to the GoS, the town of Jasim was also besieged, with its main roads blocked andshelling of residential areas according to Enab Baladi. 1673
The agreement reached in Dar’a al-Balad was in similar forms replicated in agreements andstatus settlement processes in other restive towns in the governorate.1674 According to Enab
Baladi the agreement was first replicated in al-Yadoudah in the western part of Dar’a.1675
Starting with Jasim more towns and areas in the north reconciled and ‘the regime forces
settled the security status of hundreds of people from the Daraa northern countryside, withthe city of al-Sanamayn being the last to join the settlements with the regime.’ 1676
In November 2021, UNOCHA reported that agreements were reached in approximately 51
communities across the governorate and that one quarter of these were met in the sub-districtof al-Shajarah.1677 Hundreds of residents and members of the 8 th Brigade reportedly made useof the settlement processes during the initial time of status settlement activities in thegovernorate, which ended on 25 October and continued in a smaller scale in bigger cities in
Dar’a.1678 Reports mentioned by the UNCOI estimated that more than 12 000 people from
Dar’a governorate reconciled through those processes and approximately 1 700 weapons
were surrendered.1679
Although many reconciliation agreements were already met and violent incidents decreased
significantly in September 2021 1680, there were different incidents like temporary roadblockades to the towns al-Sura, al-Jizah and Alma as well as al-Hrak city resulting from thenegotiation process between 14 and 21 October 2021. 1681 Moreover, weeks after the agreed
1669

STJ, Syria: The 75-Day Siege of Daraa al-Balad, 26 October 2021, url, pp. 13-14
Enab Baladi, Daraa returns to Syrian regime’s control by forced settlement agreements, 17 October 2021, url
1671
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review, October Through December 2021, 31 December 2021, url, p. 10; Carter
Center (The), The Quarterly Review on Syrian Military and Security Dynamics, January – March 2022, 13 May 2022,
url, p. 11
1672
Enab Baladi, Daraa returns to Syrian regime’s control by forced settlement agreements, 17 October 2021, url
1673
Enab Baladi, Daraa returns to Syrian regime’s control by forced settlement agreements, 17 October 2021, url
1674
STJ, Syria: The 75-Day Siege of Daraa al-Balad, 26 October 2021, url, p. 12
1675
Enab Baladi, Daraa returns to Syrian regime’s control by forced settlement agreements, 17 October 2021, url
1676
Enab Baladi, Daraa returns to Syrian regime’s control by forced settlement agreements, 17 October 2021, url
1677
UNOCHA, Syria, Humanitarian Situation in Dar’a Governorate – Situation Reports No. 03, 19 November 2021, url,
p. 2
1678
Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief: South Syria – 4 November 2021, 4 November 2021, url
1679
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url, para. 20
1680
Al-Jabassini, A., Migration from Post-War Southern Syria: Drivers, Routes, and Destinations, EUI, 6 January2022, url, p. 7
1681
UNOCHA, Syria, Humanitarian Situation in Dar’a Governorate – Situation Reports No. 03, 19 November 2021, url,
p. 2
1670

212

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

establishment of nine GoS-operated security checkpoints in Dar’a al-Balad, the GoS dissolved
three of those.1682 The increase in tensions in 2022 lead to the GoS ‘tightening security’ inproximity to the governorate capital including reinforcement of troops. 1683
On 22 July 2022, GoS-forces reportedly ‘clashed with former opposition leaders known for
their affiliation to ISIL in al-Yadoudah.1684 At the end of July 2022, the GoS demanded thesurrender of wanted people from Dar’a governorate, which was refused by the population. On
27 July 2022, GoS-troops encircled and cut off the town of Tafas and started shelling Tafas aswell as the town of al-Yadoudah. One day later a ceasefire-deal was reached between
representatives of Tafas and the GoS, 1685 which collapsed shortly after.1686 In the agreement,
the negotiating parties agreed on the surrender of the wanted individuals and the withdrawalof the GoS-forces from the town after searching certain houses. The situation remained tense,with the town being cut off by road blockades and shelled by GoS-forces for more than two
weeks. As of 15 August 2022,1687 the situation had somewhat stabilised amid reports of apreliminary agreement being reached between the parties.1688
Continuing tensions, assassinations, and attacks
Despite the settlement agreements insecurity prevailed in Dar’a.1689 In 2021, Dar'a had thehighest proportion of homicides in all of Syria, with 115 out of a total of 414, according to an EUI
report.1690 The Horan Free League, a local pro-opposition media platform, reported on an
overall of 637 killings in 2021, with a peak in July (106) and August (90), but quite constantlevels between 59 and 67 cases each in the months of September until December 2021.
Accordingly, almost half of the victims were reported to be civilians.1691
According to the Carter Center, the overall conflict incidents decreased in the months
following the reconciliation agreements of September 2021, while reports on ‘attacks onformer opposition fighters doubled from the 3 rd quarter’.1692 Following this increase of violence
between opposition groups and pro-GoS forces in Dar’a al-Balad, tensions were rising incommunities all over the governorate in November and December 2021 with ‘numerous
reported improvised explosive device attacks and instances of targeted or retaliatory killings
on both sides’.1693 The UN Security Council reported in December 2021 and January 2022 on

1682

Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief: South Syria – 4 November 2021, 4 November 2021, url
Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief: South Syria – 1 July 2022, 1 July 2022, url
1684
COAR, Syria Update, 25 July 2022, url
1685
New Arab (The), As violence proliferates in Syria’s south, cracks appear in regime-held areas, 28 July 2022, url
1686
Asia Times, Assad’s strategy in southern Syria fated to fail, 11 August 2022, url
1687
NPA, Calm in Syria’s Daraa Following Reports Of Agreement, 15 August 2022, url
1688
NPA, Preliminary Deal Between Government, Locals West Of Syria’s Daraa, 13 August 2022, url; NPA, Calm in
Syria’s Daraa Following Reports Of Agreement, 15 August 2022, url
1689
New Arab (The), Former Baath official, relatives killed in southern Syria: reports, 28 June 2022 , url
1690
Al-Jabassini, A., Migration from Post-War Southern Syria: Drivers, Routes, and Destinations, EUI, 6 January2022, url, p. 7
1691
Horan Free League, ‫ تقرير حقوقي‬- ‫[ سقوط التسوية‬The Fall of the settlement – A human rights report], 1 January2022, url, p. 7
1692
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review, October Through December 2021, 31 December 2021, url, pp. 8-10
1693
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url, para. 33
1683

213

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM‘targeted killings of civilians and former members of non-State armed opposition groups’.1694
Syria Direct reported in December 2021 that the highest number of a purported escalation ofassassinations took place in western Dar’a countryside.1695
Covering the second half of 2021, the UNCOI noted that the course of action of the assailants
targeting opposition members was ‘consistent with previously identified patterns of targetedkillings’, whereby ‘victims were shot with small arms by individuals riding motorcycles or othervehicles.’1696 During the period from February to May 2022, the UN Security Council reported
further continuing violence in the overall south-western region of Syria, consisting of‘improvised explosive device attacks’, gunfights, assassinations, kidnappings, as well as
clashes of limited extend.1697 The New Arab reported that violence escalated in April 2022,
when reportedly more than 50 people were assassinated. The targets were primarily ‘civilians
or former-opposition fighters given amnesty by the regime’ while 20 casualties werereportedly GoS-affiliates.1698
Furthermore, the Carter Center reported on increasing attacks on former opposition members
as well as GoS-soldiers during the first half of 2022, documenting 171 attacks during thisperiod, with a peak in April 2022. Most of the targets of unclaimed attacks were ‘officials andsoldiers associated with various GoS armed groups.’ 1699 In March1700 and April1701 2022, the
GoS deployed additional forces to the region in response to the exacerbating security
situation.1702 According to Etana, the GoS increased pressure primarily on former opposition
strongholds in Jasim and Dar’a al-Balad in March 2022, while threatening with another military
escalation.1703
Drug smuggling and increase of criminal activities, including kidnappings
The security situation was further aggravated by the prevalence of drugs. 1704 According to
New Lines Institute, Captagon manufacturing sites are located in various GoS-held territories,

1694

UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021),[S/2022/135], 21 February 2022, url, para. 22
1695
Syria Direct, Months into new Daraa settlement, assassinations continue unabated, 29 December 2021, url
1696
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url, para. 33
1697
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021)[S/2022/330], 19 April 2022, url, para. 26; UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139
(2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533
(2020) and 2585 (2021) [S/2022/492], 16 June 2022, url, para. 6
1698
New Arab (The), 51 killed in Syria’s Daraa province in April as violence escalates, 2 May 2022, url
1699
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review on Syrian Mil itary and Security Dynamics, April – June 2022, url, pp. 11-12
1700
Enab Baladi, Syrian regime vs. IS: Game of death in Daraa, 4 March 2022, url; Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief:South Syria – 03 March 2022, 3 March 2022, url
1701
Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief – South Syria – 12 May 2022, 12 May 2022, url
1702
Enab Baladi, Syrian regime vs. IS: Game of death in Daraa, 4 March 2022, url; Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief:South Syria – 03 March 2022, 3 March 2022, url; Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief – South Syria – 12 May 2022, 12
May 2022, url
1703
Etana Syria: Syria Military Brief: South Syria – 06 April 2022, 6 April 2022, url
1704
Al-Jabassini, A., Migration from Post-War Southern Syria: Drivers, Routes, and Destinations, EUI, 6 January2022, url, pp. 7-8

214SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

including Dar’a.1705 Routes through Dar’a as well as Sweida are used to smuggle Captagon to
Jordan and further to the Gulf states.1706 GoS-forces, especially the 4 th Division are reportedly
linked to the drug trafficking assisted by Hezbollah. 1707 The Military Intelligence was reported
to be an important actor in production and transport as well. 1708 The 4th Division, Hezbollah andthe Military Intelligence were relying on local actors to carry out the drug trafficking. In Dar’athese actors consist primarily of ‘rebels turned regime collaborateurs’ 1709 that are often backed
by a local militia.1710 An EUI report pointed out that individuals, who have been prompted torefrain from their drug smuggling activities, were killed in Dar’a.1711 According to Syria Direct,
individuals involved in drug trafficking were increasingly targeted in southern Syria since May
2022, while it is unclear who is conducting this supposed campaign. 1712 A COAR report citedthe case of an unnamed group that has been facing attacks because of its involvement in drugtrafficking.1713
In general, Al-Jabassini reported increasing criminal activities like ‘[t]heft, homicide, robbery,mugging, and profit kidnapping (especially of children)’ at the beginning of 2022.1714 Gangs
were conducting kidnappings for ransom in the governorate. On 2 November 2021 forexample, an eight-year-old boy was abducted on his way home from school and held for threemonths until his family paid an enormous ransom for his release in February 2022. During thistime, he was reportedly mistreated and tortured. 1715
Tribal and cross-border conflicts
Tribes also clash in some incidents, for example on 25 June 2021, when the tribes of al-Zoubi
and al-Kiwan clashed in Tafas over the alleged killing of a member of the Kiwan tribe.1716 In
addition, tensions between residents of Dar’a and neighbouring Sweida prevailed in thereporting period.1717 for further information see section 2.14.3.

1705

New Lines Institute, Intelligence Briefing – The Captagon Threat – A Profile of Illicit Trade, Consumption, andRegional Realities, April 2022, url, p. 16
1706
Daher, J., Ahmad, N., Taha, S.,, Smuggling between Syria and Lebanon, and from Syria to Jordan: The Evolution
and Delegation of a Practice, EUI, 19 April 2022, url, p. 6
1707
New Lines Institute, Intelligence Briefing – The Captagon Threat – A Profile of Illicit Trade, Consumption, andRegional Realities, April 2022, url, pp. 17, 19; Daher, J., Ahmad, N., Taha, S., Smuggling between Syria and Lebanon,and from Syria to Jordan: The Evolution and Delegation of a Practice, EUI, 19 April 2022, url, p. 7; Syria Direct, Who
is assassinating suspected drug traffickers in southern Syria?, 19 July 2022, url
1708
COAR, Smugglers and Security Agents: Fragmentation and Decentralisation in Southern Syria’s Captagon
Networks, July 2022, url, pp. 8-9
1709
Daher, J., Ahmad, N., Taha, S., Smuggling between Syria and Lebanon, and from Syria to Jordan: The Evolution
and Delegation of a Practice, EUI, 19 April 2022, url, p. 7
1710
COAR, Smugglers and Security Agents: Fragmentation and Decentralisation in Southern Syria’s Captagon
Networks, July 2022, url, p. 8
1711
Daher, J., Ahmad, N., Taha, S., Smuggling between Syria and Lebanon, and from Syria to Jordan: The Evolution
and Delegation of a Practice, EUI, 19 April 2022, url, p. 7
1712
Syria Direct, Who is assassinating suspected drug traffickers in southern Syria?, 19 July 2022, url
1713
COAR, Smugglers and Security Agents: Fragmentation and Decentralisation in Southern Syria’s Captagon
Networks, July 2022, url, p. 9
1714
Al-Jabassini, A., Migration from Post-War Southern Syria: Drivers, Routes, and Destinations, EUI, 6 January 2022,
url, p. 7
1715
BBC News, Syria: Kidnapped boy released after video of beating sparks outcry, 14 February 2022, url
1716
Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief: South Syria – 01 July 2021, 1 July 2021, url
1717
Carter Center (The), A Call for Action: Data on Unexploded Ordnance in Syria and Its Implications December
2012 – May 2021, March 2022, url, p. 14

215

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM(b)Security incidents

During the reporting period, there were 965 security incidents recorded by ACLED
in Dar’a governorate, of whom 383 were coded as battles, 268 explosions/remoteviolence and 314 incidents of violence against civilians.1718

Figure 35. Evolution of security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence andviolence against civilians in Dar’a governorate between 1 April 2021 and 1 August 2022,
based on ACLED data 1719

District

Battles

Remote violence

Violence against
civilians

As-Sanamayn

29

20

28

Dar’a

248

189

176

Izra

106

59

110

Total

383

268

314

Figure 36. Security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against
civilians in Dar’a governorate between 1 April 2021 and 1 August 2022. Breakdown by
district based on ACLED data 1720
Security incidents were recorded in all governorate districts, with the highest number being
documented in Dar’a and Izra districts. As-Sanamayn recorded significantly lower number of
security incidents than the other two districts (see Figure 36).

1718

EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (12 August2022), url
1719
EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (12 August2022), url
1720
EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (12 August2022), url

216

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

Illustrative security incidents
A non-exhaustive list of security incidents that were reported to have taken place in Dar’agovernorate in 2021 and 2022 included the following:•

On 29 July 2021, unknown individuals attacked areas close to the Dar’a National
Hospital, damaging it and killing a child running errands. As a result of the damage, it
was declared partially inoperable. 1721•

A woman was hit and killed by GoS-shelling in her home in Tafas on 26 August2021.1722•

Two civilians were killed in shelling of Dar’a al-Balad conducted by GoS-forces on 29
August 2021, while one woman was killed by pro-GoS-shelling on the village of
Masakin Jalin.1723•

Two teachers died in shelling on Nawa, which happened shortly after an IED-attack
that left some GoS-forces dead earlier on 29 November 2021. 1724•

On 20 October 2021, armed individuals attacked a GoS-checkpoint, resulting in one
person ‘injured by a stray bullet’.1725•

On 30 October 2021, the explosion of a landmine killed two boys and one girl near
Kutaybah.1726•

On 10 February 2022, unknown assailants attacked the car of a Dar’a Central
Committee member, killing him and another person.1727•

On 9 April 2022, two armed unknown perpetrators attacked an UNRWA health clinic in
Dar’a refugee camp with a grenade and firearms. Nobody was wounded and only
limited damage was recorded.1728•

On 11 June 2022, 11 farmers, the majority being children and women, died through the
explosion of a remnant landmine, while on their way to work. Another 28 people were
injured.1729•

On 29 June 2022, former secretary-general of the Baath Party branch in Dar’a, Kamal
al-Atmeh, and four of his relatives were killed in their house by unknown attackers. 1730

1721

UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url, para. 25
1722
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url, para. 29
1723
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url, para. 29
1724
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url, para. 34
1725
Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief: South Syria – 4 November 2021, 4 November 2021, url
1726
UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General [S/2021/1029], 15 December 2021, url, p. 20
1727
Enab Baladi, Syrian regime vs. IS: Game of death in Daraa, 4 March 2022, url
1728
European Commission, ECHO Daily Flash Updates, European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations,
12 April 2022, url
1729
AOAV, 11 agricultural labourers killed, 34 injured in landmine explosion, Daraa Governorate, Syria, 14 June 2022,
url; SOHR, SOHR: 11 killed in Syria landmine explosion, 14 June 2022, url
1730
New Arab (The), Former Baath official, relatives killed in southern Syria: reports, 28 June 2022, url; Syrian
Observer (The)/Al-Modon, Daraa: Assassination of Baath Party Branch Secretary and his Family, 29 June 2022, url

217

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM(c)

Civilian fatalities

Month

SNHR 2021

SNHR 2022

January

13

15

February

13

20

March

18

16

April

18

26

May

24

21

June

17

32

July

31

16

August14

September

14

October

7

November

23

December

11

Total

203

146

Figure 37. Civilian fatalities as a result of armed conflict in Dar’a governorate in 2021 andfirst seven months of 2022. Monthly breakdown based on SNHR data218

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

In 2021, SNHR recorded 203 civilian fatalities 1731 in Dar’a governorate, while in the first sevenmonths of 2022 it recorded 146 civilian fatalities.1732(d)Conflict-related infrastructure damage and explosive remnants of war

According to UNOCHA, during the shelling and siege in 2021 an estimated 18 000 people
were affected by fighting causing damage to approximately 1 198 ‘residential buildings’ in
Dar’a al-Balad. During the course of fighting, those buildings were severely damaged while
7 % of the buildings were completely destroyed. The neighbourhoods of Alabbasiah andGhernata were most affected by the damage.1733 This destruction added to the difficult
situation around housing and accommodations with 15 % of housing in Dar’a governorate
being already declared destroyed or unfit to live in. 1734 Based on the UN Syria Multi-sector
Needs Assessment of 2021, the Shelter Cluster assessed that in Dar’a governorate, 22.6 % of
the population live in damaged buildings.1735 During the shelling in 2021, the Dar’a National
Hospital in Dar’a al-Balad was damaged.1736 After several years of conflict, only two hospitals in
the governorate are fully functioning.1737 The Health Cluster Whole of Syria provided

1731

Based on data extracted from monthly reports on civilian fatalities published by SNHR. See: SNHR, Extrajudicial
Killing Claims the Lives of 113 Civilians, Including 36 Children, Six Women, and Three Victims Due to Torture, inJanuary 2021, 1 February 2021, url, p. 7; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 138 Civilians, Including 23
Children, 11 Women, and 14 Victims Due to Torture, in February 2021, 1 March 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR, Extrajudicial
Killing Claims the Lives of 177 Civilians, Including 28 Children, 35 Women, One Medical Worker, and 9 Victims Dueto Torture, in March 2021, 1 April 2021, url, p. 7; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 96 Civilians, I ncluding
15 Children, 11 Women, and Nine Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in May 2021, 1 June 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR,
Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 723 Civilians in Syria in the First Half of 2021, 1 July 2021, url, p. 9; SNHR,
Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 129 Civilians, Including 44 Children, 17 Women, and 10 Victims Due toTorture, in Syria in July 2021, 1 August 2021, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 94 Civilians,
Including 32 Children, 10 Women, and Seven Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in August 2021, 1 September 2021, url,
p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 86 Civilians, Including 23 Children, Nine Women, and Eight
Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in September 2021, 1 October 2021, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims theLives of 84 Civilians, Including 22 Children, Four Women, and Seven Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in October
2021, 1 November 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 86 Civilians, Including 16 Children,
Eight Women, and Six Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in November 2021, 1 December 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR, 1,271
Civilians, Including 299 Children, 134 Women, and 104 Victims of Torture, Killed in Syria in 2021, 1 January 2022, url,
p. 13
1732
Based on data extracted from monthly reports on civilian fatalities published by SNHR. See: SNHR, 69 Civilians,
Including 18 Children, Four Women and Eight Victims Due to Torture, Killed in Syria in January 2022, 1 February2022, url, p. 8; SNHR, 161 Civilians, Including 28 Children, Six Women and 66 Victims Due to Torture, Documented
Killed in Syria in February 2022, 1 March 2022, url, p. 9; SNHR, 67 Civilians, Including 20 Children, Three Women,
and Seven Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Killed in Syria in March 2022, 1 April 2022, url, p. 8; SNHR, 101
Civilians, Including 17 Children, 14 Women, and Six Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in
Syria in April 2022, 1 May 2022, url, p. 9; SNHR, 78 Civilians, Including 14 Children, 11 Women, and Eight Victims
Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in Syria in May 2022, 1 June 2022, url, p. 8; SNHR, 568
Civilians, Including 115 Children, 53 Women, and 101 Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in
Syria in the First Half of 2022, 2 July 2022, url, p. 12; SNHR, 86 Civilians, Including 21 Children, Eight Women, andFive Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in Syria in July 2022, 1 August 2022, url, p. 91733
UNOCHA, Syria, Humanitarian Situation in Dar’a Governorate – Situation Reports No. 03, 19 November 2021, url,
p. 1
1734
UNOCHA, Syria, Humanitarian Situation in Dar’a Governorate – Situation Reports No. 03, 19 November 2021, url,
p. 2
1735
Global Shelter Cluster, Syrian Arab Republic: Whole of Syria Shelter and NFI Sector Humanitarian Needs
Overview, 4 January 2022, url, p. 6
1736
UNOCHA, Syria. Dara’a Flash Update, Hostilities in Dara’a Governorate, As of 2 August 2021, 3 August 2021, url;
UNOCHA, Syria, Humanitarian Situation in Dar’a Governorate – Situation Reports No. 02, 27 September 2021, url,
p. 2
1737
WHO, Health sector Syria hub update for Southern Syria (Dara’a, Quneitra, Sweida), 5 May 2022, url, p. 15

219

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

information on attacks on health care within Syria. While not specifying the targets of attacks ,they registered nine attacks within Dar’a governorate between January 2021 and March
2022.1738
Different actors in the conflict have used explosive munition and ordnances including
landmines, especially in ‘areas that have witnessed military operations.’ 1739 According to aEuro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor report published in April 2021, landmines haveclaimed the lives of 238 people in Dar’a governorate between March 2011 and March 2021 .1740
The Carter Center estimated in a March 2022 report that there were between 7 750 and
23 500 unexploded ordnances in the governorate, after the estimated use of 78 031 explosive
munitions during conflict in the area. The area around Dar’a city was especially estimated tobe contaminated by explosive remnants.1741
According to the European Commission ECHO Flash Update, 18 children were killed or injured
by explosive remnants in the governorate of Dar’a from the beginning of 2022 until 16 June
2022.1742(e)Displacement and return

According to UNOCHA, as of January 2022 there were 103 155 IDPs in the governorate.1743
From January to December 2021, UNOCHA recorded 43 055 IDP movements in Dar’agovernorate, with a peak of 42 673 movements in August.1744 This correlates with the time ofthe siege and shelling in Dar’a al-Balad, were two thirds of the inhabitants of Dar’a al-Balad1745,
approximately 38 000 people, fled the escalation of violence. This number includes 1 400
IDPs who had been living in shelters in Dar’a city, as well as 3 000 Palestinian refugees. 1746
Almost all IDP movements (43 000) recorded by UNOCHA in 2021 took place within thegovernorate.1747
In 2022, the numbers show increased IDP movements in May, and report 508 recorded IDP
movements,1748 330 of which took place within the governorate itself.1749 According to Etana,

1738

Health Cluster Whole of Syria, Attacks on healthcare in Syria 1 Jan – 31 March 2022, 5 May 2022, url
Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor, Syria: 11 killed by landmine explosion should draw attention to combating
mines urgency, 12 June 2022, url
1740
Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor, Syria’s Landmines: Silent Killing, April 2021, url, p. 16
1741
Carter Center (The), A Call for Action: Data on Unexploded Ordnance in Syria and Its Implications December
2012 – May 2021, March 2022, url, pp. 15-16
1742
European Commission, ECHO Daily Flash Updates, European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations,
16 June 2022, url
1743
UNOCHA, 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 23
1744
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic – IDP movements and IDP spontaneous return movements Data May 2022, 14
July 2022, url, in the sheet: Summarysince2016
1745
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url, p. 6
1746
UNOCHA, Syria, Humanitarian Situation in Dar’a Governorate – Situation Reports No. 03, 19 November 2021,
url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022. Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 18
1747
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic – IDP Movements Overview, Jan – Dec 2021 (As of 31 December 2021), 21
March 2022, url
1748
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic – IDP movements and IDP spontaneous return movements Data May 2022, 14
July 2022, url, in the sheet: Summarysince2016
1749
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic – IDP movements and IDP spontaneous return movements Data May 2022, 14
July 2022, url, in: Table_Origin_vs_Departure
1739

220

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

the continuing insecurity in the south of Syria leads young people to leave the region in highnumbers.1750 Sources, contacted by Al-Jabassini, indicated that approximately 8 000 to 10 000
people fled Dar’a and Syria altogether, between June and December 2021, 1751 reportedly
driven primarily by security and economic concerns.1752
The UNOCHA data on IDPs spontaneous returns shows that throughout 2021, 17 517 return
movements were recorded in Dar’a, with a peak of 15 367 movements in September 2021 1753,
when violence declined in several communities in the governorate. Hence, most of these
movements took place primarily inside the governorate itself, with 17 000 movements. 1754
Although the majority of IDPs resulted from the siege of Dar’a al-Balad was able to return after
the new settlement agreement, the houses of as many as 3 700 persons are estimated to be
destroyed to a degree that was preventing their return. Those people were still hosted byfriends or family as of November 2021.1755 The contamination by explosive hazards wasanother reported major reason for people being hesitant or unable to return to their homes.1756
According to Etana, approximately 200 civilians were able to return to their homes in Lajat in
the east of Dar’a governorate in May 2021. According to the same source, the residents weredisplaced by Hezbollah,1757 while Enab Baladi reported that the families had fled ISILattacks.1758 Reportedly the returnees’ homes had been seized by Hezbollah 1759 and the 9th
Division1760 and their return was negotiated by ‘former opposition and Russia’, especially withthe 8th Brigade being involved.1761 Etana reported that five families who had perceived
permission by the Military Intelligence returned to their homes in al-Tayf in the Lajat region in
October 2021, while 30 other families were denied the return. 1762
In 2022, the return numbers were peaking as high as 634 in February and 585 in May. 1763

1750

Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief: South Syria – 03 March 2022, 3 March 2022, url; Etana Syria: Syria Military Brief:South Syria – 06 April 2022, 6 April 2022, url
1751
Al-Jabassini, A., Migration from Post-War Southern Syria: Drivers, Routes, and Destinations, EUI, 6 January 2022,
url, p. 6
1752
Al-Jabassini, A., Migration from Post-War Southern Syria: Drivers, Routes, and Destinations, EUI, 6 January2022, url, pp. 7-8; NPA, Expatriates from Syria’s Daraa Fear Returning Home, 1 August 2022, url
1753
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic – IDP movements and IDP spontaneous return movements Data May 2022, 14
July 2022, url, in the sheet: Summarysince2016
1754
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic – Spontaneous IDP Returnee Movements Overview, Jan – Dec 2021 (As of 31
December 2021), 21 March 2022, url
1755
UNOCHA, Syria, Humanitarian Situation in Dar’a Governorate – Situation Reports No. 03, 19 November 2021,
url, p. 1
1756
UNOCHA, Syria, Humanitarian Situation in Dar’a Governorate – Situation Reports No. 02, 27 September 2021,
url, p. 1; UNOCHA, Syria, Humanitarian Situation in Dar’a Governorate – Situation Reports No. 03, 19 November
2021, url, p. 1
1757
Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief: South Syria – 31 May 2021, 31 May 2021, url
1758
Enab Baladi, Families from Daraa countryside return home after three years of displacement, 25 May 2021, url
1759
Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief: South Syria – 31 May 2021, 31 May 2021, url; Enab Baladi, Families from Daraa
countryside return home after three years of displacement, 25 May 2021, url
1760
Enab Baladi, Families from Daraa countryside return home after three years of displacement, 25 May 2021, url
1761
Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief: South Syria – 31 May 2021, 31 May 2021, url; Enab Baladi, Families from Daraa
countryside return home after three years of displacement, 25 May 2021, url
1762
Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief: South Syria – 4 November 2021, 4 November 2021, url
1763
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic – IDP movements and IDP spontaneous return movements Data May 2022, 14
July 2022, url, in the sheet: Summarysince2016221

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

2.13. Quneitra governorate

Map 19: © MapAction, Quneitra governorate 1764

1764

MapAction, Syria Governorate Maps – Quneitra Governorate, last updated 29 July 2016, url

222

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

2.13.1. General description of the governorate
The governorate of Quneitra is situated in southern Syria, 70 km from Damascus 1765, andborders Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel.1766 The governorate is divided into two districts: thedistrict of Quneitra, which comprises the sub-districts of Quneitra, Masaada, Khan Arnaba andal-Khashniyyeh, of which large parts are under Israeli control or administered by UNDOF (UNDisengagement Observer Forces). Especially Masaada is almost entirely under Israeli or
UNDOF administration. The second district, al-Fiq, is divided into the sub-districts of Fiq and
Al-Butayhah, with the latter being completely under Israeli control, while only a small part of
Fiq is still under Syrian control.1767 The city of Quneitra remained abandoned after it wasdestroyed by Israel in 1974 and is part of the demilitarised buffer zone between Syria andIsrael under the supervision of UNDOF.1768 The new provincial administrative centre is Madinat
al-Baath (Baath city).1769
According to 2022 estimates by UNOCHA, the population of Quneitra governorate consistedof 113 165 inhabitants.1770 The last official estimations of the Syrian Bureau of Statistics from2021, number the population of Quneitra on approximately 123 790. 1771

2.13.2. Conflict background and armed actors
GoS-control has been contested in Quneitra between 2013 and 2018 by different armed GoSopposition forces including the FSA and Jabhat al-Nusra.1772 In August 2018, GoS-forces
regained control over areas formerly held by armed groups as well as by ISIL.1773 The retrievalof control was realised through intense fighting 1774 during a ‘Russian-backed offensive’, and awithdrawal agreement negotiated with the armed opposition forces. In October 2018 thetemporarily closed Quneitra crossing was reopened1775 for UNDOF-Observers.1776 In a map
produced by the UN, as of December 2021, the whole Syrian controlled part of Quneitra
governorate appeared to be under GoS control. UNDOF was present in the demilitarised area
between Quneitra governorate and the Golan Heights. 1777 As of July 2022, Liveuamap
confirms this status.1778

1765

Jamestown Foundation (The), The Battle for al-Quneitra, the ‘Gateway to Damascus’, in: Terrorism Monitor
Volume 12, Issue 5, 6 March 2014, url
1766
Based on UNOCHA, Quneitra Governorate Reference Map, 1 February 2016, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab
Republic – Governorates Profile (June 2014), 6 August 2014, url, p. 43
1767
Based on UNOCHA, Quneitra Governorate Reference Map, 1 February 2016, url
1768
Encyclopedia Britannica, Al-Qunayṭirah, n.d., url
1769
Reuters, Syrian insurgents attack government-held town near Israel, 20 November 2014, url
1770
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview. Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 23
1771
Syria, Central Bureau of Statistics, Estimate of the population in Syria by governorates, n.d., url
1772
DW, Syrian rebels announce seizure of Golan Heights border crossing, 27 August 2014, url; ICRC, Syria:
Emergency relief for thousands displaced by fighting in Quneitra, 15 September 2014, url
1773
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019. Syrian Arab Republic, March 2019, url, p. 19
1774
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019. Syrian Arab Republic, March 2019, url, p. 5
1775
Reuters, Explainer – What is the significance of the Golan Heights, 21 March 2019, url
1776
BBC News, Golan Heights profile, 25 March 2019, url
1777
UN, Syrian Arab Republic: Approximate areas of influence as of December 2021, January 2022, url
1778
Liveuamap, Syria, 29 July 2022, url

223

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Further information on the conflict background and actors in Quneitra is available in the EUAA
COI Report: Syria - Security Situation (July 2021), EUAA COI Report: Syria - Security situation(May 2020) and EUAA COI Report: Syria – Actors (December 2019).
(a)Syrian Arab Army and affiliated groups

The Military Security branch sitting in Sasa, Rural Damascus was reportedly also involved in
Quneitra.1779 According to a report by Suhail al-Ghazi from March 2021, the Fourth Division as
well as the Military Security branch were ‘attempting to expand into Quneitra governorate togive cover for the entry of Iranian forces to enter into the province […]’. 1780 As of November
2021, the SAA Brigade 90 was present in several locations in Quneitra.1781
As reported by the UN Secretary-General in March 2022, UNDOF observed ‘the continued
presence’ of the Syrian Armed Forces in the separation area, engaged in clearance of
unexploded ordnance and training as well as staffing checkpoints.1782 In one incident on 8
June 2022, the Israeli Defense Forces destroyed a checkpoint built by the SAA in thedemilitarised zone, close to the village of al-Malgah.1783(b)

RussiaAccording to Jusoor for Studies, Russia operated in the end of 2021 two stationing points
within the governorate.1784 A May 2022 report of the Turkey-based think tank ORSAM statedthat there were no military bases or camps under direct Russian control in the south of Syria
and as a result the Russian presence was hard to measure.1785 According to Etana, there was
one Russian military location close to the town of al-Kom, affiliated with the 90 th Brigade, close
to the highway to Damascus in March 2022.1786(c)

Iran and Iranian-backed armed groups

Ahram Online reported in May 2022 on information from an officer who has defected from the
SAA that the number of military points controlled by Iranian-affiliated militias in the south morethan doubled to a number of approximately 150 in the last two years.1787 This information could
not be corroborated. According to COAR, the presence of Iranian-backed forces in Quneitra,
as well as a ‘weaker state security presence’ left the governorate more volatile than other

1779

Syria Direct, ‘Expelling the usurper’: Legal avenues to retake homes stolen by Hezbollah in Quneitra thwarted
by security concerns, 17 May 2021, url
1780
Al-Ghazi, S., Insecurity in Southern Syria: Tracking Daraa, Quneitra and Suweyda (January – February 2021),
ORSAM, url, p. 5
1781
Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief: South Syria – 4 November 2021, 4 November 2021, url
1782
UN Security Council, United Nations Disengagement Observer Force – Report of the Secretary General[S/2022/247], 18 March 2022, url, para. 14
1783
Times of Israel (The), Israeli tanks said to destroy Syrian army outpost built in Golan demilitarized zone, 8 June
2022, url
1784
Jusoor for Studies, Foreign Forces Points in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022, 27 December 2021, url
1785Haşıl, H., Policy Brief 216 - The Ukraine Crisis And Russian Forces In Syria, Orsam, June 2022, url, p. 7
1786
Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief: South Syria – 03 March 2022, 3 March 2022, url
1787
Ahram Online, Russian withdrawal threats to Syria, 28 May 2022, url

224

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

areas.1788 Jusoor for Studies assessed that Iranian-affiliated forces and Hezbollah operated 19
security and military points within the governorate at the end of 2021.1789(d)IsraelThe Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) carried out airstrikes, particularly against (pro-)Iranian forcesand Hezbollah,1790 as well as surface-to-surface attacks on targets close to the ceasefireline.1791
(e)

ISIL

According to the International Crisis Group, ISIL still has some cells within Quneitra and‘occasionally claimed attacks’ in the governorate. However, those cells, as well as in Dar’agovernorate, would not need to be connected to the overall Syria network, but could be‘remnants of a historically isolated ISIS affiliate that controlled parts of the Yarmouk river basin
at the intersection of the Syrian, Israeli and Jordanian borders.’1792

2.13.3. Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population(a)

Security trends during the reporting period

According to the Carter Center, reports on increasing violence in Dar’a as well as Sweida andQuneitra accumulated in the run-up to the May 2021 presidential elections resulting in a surge
in tensions and attacks by unidentified armed actors on GoS-officials and former opposition
fighters.1793 An attack on a GoS-affiliated security checkpoint (reports differ whether the post
was operated by an Iranian militia1794 , military security1795, or military1796) close to the towns ofJaba and Umm Batnah,1797 by an unidentified armed group1798 killed four people.1799 In reaction,
GoS-affiliated forces, according to different reports including Syrian Military Intelligence
1788

COAR, Syria Update, 10 May 2021, url
Jusoor for Studies, Foreign Forces Points in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022, 27 December 2021, url
1790
International Crisis Group, Crisiswatch, Tracking Conflict Worldwide, Syr ia, n.d., url, see August 2021, May 2022;
Times of Israel (The), Syria says IDF chopper bombs site near border, 1 injured, in rare daytime strike, 10 May 2021,
url
1791
Times of Israel (The), Israeli tanks said to fire into Syria, wounding shepherds who approached border, 12 August
2022, url
1792
International Crisis Group, Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and North-eastern Syria, 18 July 2022, url, p. 1,
fn. 2
1793
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review, April through June 2021, 30 June 202 1, url, p. 9
1794
Enab Baladi, To end tension in Quneitra, families and former opposition fighters deported to nor thern Syria, 20
May 2021, url
1795
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic [A/HRC/48/70], 13 August 2021, url, para. 22
1796
COAR, Syria Update, 10 May 2021, url
1797
SOHR, ‫قوات النظام تحاصر بلدة قرب الجوالن المحتل بريف القنيطرة وسط مفاوضات بين وجهاء البلدة وضباط النظام‬[Regime forces besiege a town near the occupied Golan in the Quneitra countryside, amid negotiations between
the town’s notables and the regime’s officers], 1 May 2021, url; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/48/70], 13 August 2021, url,para. 22; COAR, Syria Update, 10 May 2021, url
1798
Enab Baladi, To end tension in Quneitra, families and former opposition fighters deported to northern Syria, 20
May 2021, url; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the
Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/48/70], 13 August 2021, url, para. 22
1799
COAR, Syria Update, 10 May 2021, url
1789

225

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

forces 1800 and Hezbollah troops 1801, encircled the town of Umm Batnah 1802 and started shellingthe area on 1 May 2021.1803 The ensuing siege, was the first recorded in the governorate since
its recapture by the GoS in 2018. The confrontation lasted until 15 May 2021 and led to thetemporary displacement of residents from the town during the shelling. 1804 As condition to theend of the siege ’30 former opposition fighters and their families’ had to transfer to northwest
Syria.1805 GoS justified the transfer with the allegation of the concerned being involved in‘terroristic activities’. 1806 According to reports, Russia brokered the agreement1807, while Enab
Baladi spoke of mediation from the Quneitra Reconciliation Committee as well as the Dar’aCentral Committee.1808
Attacks and assassination attempts on individuals, especially GoS-affiliates and Hezbollah
members were recorded in the reporting period. Suhail Al-Ghazi1809 reported that 12 people
were killed in these incidents between April and June 2021, among them four civilians and twochildren. On 23 April 2021, two children were killed in a bombing attack targeting their father,
who was reported to be a former rebel who joined the military security. 1810 On 21 April 2021,
armed individuals killed two members of the Air Force Intelligence, while they were on patrolin Ghadeer al-Bustan.1811 On 31 August 2021, two civilians died because of the explosion of an
IED in Jubata al-Khashab, without claims for responsibility.1812 For the period between February
and May 2022, the UN Security Council reported continuing security threats, including
assassinations, shootings, ‘limited-scale clashes’, as well as ‘improvised explosive device
attacks’ in the southern governorates of Dar’a, Sweida and Quneitra.1813
The opposition newspaper Zaman al-Wasl reported attacks on Hezbollah-affiliated individuals
in mid-2022. One prominent figure of the GoS, reportedly close to Iranian forces in the region,
who is also said to be involved in drug trafficking, was killed on 6 July 2022 by the IDF. 1814 In
June 2022, one former FSA member, who reportedly joined Hezbollah in 2018, was killed by
1800

COAR, Syria Update, 10 May 2021, url
Al-Ghazi, S., Policy Brief 184: Insecurity In Southern Syria: The Case Of Quneitra And Suwayda (April – June2021), ORSAM, August 2021, url, p. 2
1802
COAR, Syria Update, 10 May 2021, url
1803
Enab Baladi, To end tension in Quneitra, families and former opposition fighters deported to northern Syria, 20
May 2021, url; Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief: South Syria – 03 May 2021, 3 May 2021, url
1804
Enab Baladi, To end tension in Quneitra, families and former opposition fighters deported to northern Syria, 20
May 2021, url
1805
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review, April through June 2021, 30 June 2021, url, p. 10
1806
Asharq Al-Awsat, ‘Settlement Agreement’ Displaces 150 Syrians to Al -Bab in the North, 21 May 2021, url
1807
Asharq Al-Awsat, ‘Settlement Agreement’ Displaces 150 Syrians to Al -Bab in the North, 21 May 2021, url
1808
Enab Baladi, To end tension in Quneitra, families and former opposition fighters deported to northern Syria, 20
May 2021, url
1809
Suhail al-Ghazi is a research assistant at the ORSAM Center for Middle Eastern Studies and a non-resident
fellow at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy.
1810
Al-Ghazi, S., Policy Brief 184: Insecurity In Southern Syria: The Case Of Quneitra And Suwayda (April – June2021), ORSAM, August 2021, url, p. 4
1811
Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief: South Syria – 03 May 2021, 3 May 2021, url
1812
Al-Monitor, Two killed in southern Syria explosion, 31 August 2021, url
1813
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021)[S/2022/330], 19 April 2022, url, para. 26 ; UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions
2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020),
2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021) [S/2022/492], 16 June 2022, url, para. 6
1814
Jerusalem Post (The), Syrian militant killed in alleged Israeli drone strike in Qunei tra – report, 6 July 2022, url;
Syrian Observer (The), Assassinations Target Iranian Militiamen in Quneitra, 13 July 2022, url
1801

226

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATIONan IED ‘planted by unknown assailants in the village of al-Asbah’.1815 Furthermore, according to
the article one Hezbollah-member was killed on 12 July 20221816 by unidentified gunmen on
the road connecting Jaba and Umm Batnah.1817 Syria Direct reported in July 2022 that he wasinvolved in drug trafficking in the south, seeing the assassination as one in a row of attacks on
individuals involved in smuggling in the governorates of Dar’a, Sweida and Quneitra. 1818
Israeli attacks
During the reporting period, airstrikes by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) on targets
connected to GoS and Iranian-backed forces 1819, as well as attacks by tank fire and snipers in
an attempt to contain Hezbollah’s forces close to its borders 1820 were reported. On 10 May
2021 for example, the IDF struck a target in the village of Hader1821 where – according to The
Times of Israel – there is a stronghold of GoS-forces as well as Iran and Hezbollah forces. 1822
The wounded person was officially declared to be a civilian, while SOHR reported him to be amember of Hezbollah.1823 Furthermore, Israeli tanks conducted attacks on different targets,
destroying one SAA-outpost close to the village of al-Maalqah, within the demilitarized zone in
June 2022.1824 In another incident in August 2022, Israeli tank fire targeted the Syrian side,
injuring two persons. Different sources disagreed whether those two were shepherds or
Hezbollah-affiliates.1825 According to New Lines Institute, Captagon manufacturing sides arelocated in different GoS-held territories, including Quneitra.1826 GoS-forces, especially the 4 th
Division and Hezbollah are allegedly linked to the drug trafficking.1827(b)

Security incidents

During the reporting period, there were 58 security incidents recorded by ACLED in Quneitra
governorate, of whom 14 were coded as battles, 39 explosions/remote violence and 5

1815

Syrian Observer (The), Assassinations Target Iranian Militiamen in Quneitra, 13 July 2022, url
Syria Direct, Who is assassinating suspected drug traffickers in southern Syria?, 19 July 2022, url1817
Syrian Observer (The), Assassinations Target Iranian Militiamen in Quneitra, 13 July 2022, url
1818
Syria Direct, Who is assassinating suspected drug traffickers in southern Syria?, 19 July 2022, url
1819
International Crisis Group, Crisiswatch, Tracking Conflict Worldwide, Syria, n.d., url; Times of Israel (The), Syria
says IDF chopper bombs site near border, 1 injured, in rare daytime strike, 10 May 2021, url; Al-Ghazi, S., Policy Brief
184: Insecurity In Southern Syria: The Case Of Quneitra And Suwayda (April – June 2021), ORSAM, August 2021, url,
p. 3
1820
Jerusalem Post (The), Syrian militant killed in alleged Israeli drone strike in Quneitra – report, 6 July 2022, url;
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022, url, para. 5
1821
International Crisis Group, Crisiswatch, Tracking Conflict Worldwide, Syria, n.d. , url; Times of Israel (The), Syria
says IDF chopper bombs site near border, 1 injured, in rare dayti me strike, 10 May 2021, url
1822
Times of Israel (The), Syria says IDF chopper bombs site near border, 1 injured, in rare daytime strike, 10 May
2021, url
1823
SOHR, 2021 – Israel attacks Syria on nearly 20 occasions, destroying over 70 targets and killing nearly 130
people, 28 December 2021, url
1824
Times of Israel (The), Israeli tanks said to destroy Syrian army outpost built in Golan demilitarized zone, 8 June
2022, url
1825
Times of Israel (The), Israeli tanks said to fire into Syria, wounding shepherds who approached border, 12
August 2022, url
1826
New Lines Institute, Intelligence Briefing – The Captagon Threat – A Profile of Illicit Trade, Consumption, andRegional Realities, April 2022, url, p. 16
1827
New Lines Institute, Intelligence Briefing – The Captagon Threat – A Profile of Illicit Trade, Consumption, andRegional Realities, April 2022, url, pp. 17, 19
1816

227

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

incidents of violence against civilians. All security incidents were recorded in the district ofQuneitra.1828

Figure 38. Evolution of security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence andviolence against civilians in Quneitra governorate between 1 April 2021 and 1 August 2022,
based on ACLED data 1829
Illustrative security incidents
A non-exhaustive list of security incidents that were reported to have taken place in Quneitra
governorate in 2021 and 2022 included the following:•

On 20 April 2021, ISIL members claimed the killing of two fighters of the 112 th Brigadein the town of Ghadeer al-Bustan.1830•

On 1 May 2021, unknown gunmen attacked GoS-affiliates at a checkpoint in proximity
to Umm Batnah,1831 killing four of the operating forces.1832•

On 3 May 2021, a retired Air Force Intelligence brigadier general was shot dead by
unknown armed individuals 1833 in the town of Girgis.1834•

On 4 June 2021, a Hezbollah member was killed in his car by an IED near al-Muallaqa,
while his wife was wounded.1835

1828

EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (12 August2022), url
1829
EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (12 August2022), url
1830
Al-Ghazi, S., Policy Brief 184: Insecurity In Southern Syria: The Case Of Quneitra And Suwayda (April – June2021), ORSAM, August 2021, url, p. 4
1831
Enab Baladi, To end tension in Quneitra, families and former opposition fighters deported to northern Syria, 20
May 2021, url; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the
Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/48/70], 13 August 202 1, url, para. 22
1832
COAR, Syria Update, 10 May 2021, url
1833
Al-Ghazi, S., Policy Brief 184: Insecurity In Southern Syria: The Case Of Quneitra And Suwayda (April – June2021), ORSAM, August 2021, url, p. 4
1834
Baladi, ‫[ القنيطرة في متقاعدا ضابطا يغتالون مجهولون‬Unidentified assailants assassinate a retired officer in Quneitra], 3
May 2021, url
1835
Al-Ghazi, S., Policy Brief 184: Insecurity In Southern Syria: The Case Of Quneitra And Suwayda (April – June2021), ORSAM, August 2021, url, p. 4

228

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION•On 25 June 2021, one man was killed and two boys wounded when an IED, attachedto their car exploded in the town of Girgis.1836 On 16 October 2021, an Israeli sniper
reportedly shot a former Druze lawmaker in a village close to the Golan Heights. 1837•

On 6 July 2022, a Syrian soldier was killed by an Israeli airstrike in the town ofHader.1838•

On 9 July 2022, SOHR reported on two GoS soldiers that were shot dead byunidentified gunmen, while on route on public roads. One incident took place inproximity to al-Jabaliyah, the other one between the two towns of al-Qurkas and alQusaibah.1839•

On 22 July 2022, SOHR reported that unidentified assailants killed one member of theMilitary Security, while targeting his brother, a commander of the Military Intel in
Mumtanah.1840(c)

Civilian fatalities

Month

SNHR 2021

SNHR 2022

January--

February

-

1

March

2

-

April

5

-

May

-

-

June

-

-

July

-

-

August-1836

UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021) [S/2021/735],
18 August 2021, url, p. 21
1837
International Crisis Group, Crisiswatch, Tracking Conflict Worldwide, Syria, n.d., url
1838
Times of Israel (The), Syrian soldier said killed in Israeli drone strike near Golan border, 6 July 2022, url
1839
SOHR, New assassination – Unidentified gunmen shoot regime soldier dead in Al -Qonaitara, 9 July 2022, url
1840
SOHR, Security vacuum – Brother of commandor of military intelligence branch killed in armed attack on
headquarters in al-Quneitra countryside, 22 July 2022, url

229

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Month

SNHR 2021

September

2

October-November

1

December

-

Total

10

SNHR 2022

1

Figure 39. Civilian fatalities as a result of armed conflict in Quneitra governorate in 2021 andfirst seven months of 2022. Monthly breakdown based on SNHR data
In 2021, SNHR recorded 10 civilian fatalities 1841 in Quneitra governorate while in the first sevenmonths of 2022 it documented one civilian fatality1842 (see Figure 39).

1841

Based on data extracted from monthly reports on civilian fatalities published by SNHR. See: SNHR, Extrajudicial
Killing Claims the Lives of 113 Civilians, Including 36 Children, Six Women, and Three Victims Due to Torture, inJanuary 2021, 1 February 2021, url, p. 7; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 138 Civilians, Including 23
Children, 11 Women, and 14 Victims Due to Torture, in February 2021, 1 March 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR, Extrajudicial
Killing Claims the Lives of 177 Civilians, Including 28 Children, 35 Women, One Medical Worker, and 9 Victims Dueto Torture, in March 2021, 1 April 2021, url, p. 7; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 96 Civilians, I ncluding
15 Children, 11 Women, and Nine Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in May 2021, 1 June 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR,
Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 723 Civilians in Syria in the First Half of 2021, 1 July 2021, url, p. 9; SNHR,
Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 129 Civilians, Including 44 Children, 17 Wom en, and 10 Victims Due toTorture, in Syria in July 2021, 1 August 2021, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 94 Civilians,
Including 32 Children, 10 Women, and Seven Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in August 2021, 1 September 2021, url,
p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 86 Civilians, Including 23 Children, Nine Women, and Eight
Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in September 2021, 1 October 2021, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims theLives of 84 Civilians, Including 22 Children, Four Women, and Seven Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in October
2021, 1 November 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 86 Civilians, Including 16 Children,
Eight Women, and Six Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in November 2021, 1 December 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR, 1,271
Civilians, Including 299 Children, 134 Women, and 104 Victims of Torture, Killed in Syria in 2021, 1 January 2022, url,
p. 13
1842
Based on data extracted from monthly reports on civilian fatalities published by SNHR. See: SNHR, 69 Civilians,
Including 18 Children, Four Women and Eight Victims Due to Torture, Killed in Syria in January 2022, 1 February2022, url, p. 8; SNHR, 161 Civilians, Including 28 Children, Six Women and 66 Victims Due to Torture, Documented
Killed in Syria in February 2022, 1 March 2022, url, p. 9; SNHR, 67 Civilians, Including 20 Children, Three Women,
and Seven Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Killed in Syria in March 2022, 1 April 2022, url, p. 8; SNHR, 101
Civilians, Including 17 Children, 14 Women, and Six Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in
Syria in April 2022, 1 May 2022, url, p. 9; SNHR, 78 Civilians, Including 14 Children, 11 Women, and Eight Victims
Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in Syria in May 2022, 1 June 2022, url, p. 8; SNHR, 568
Civilians, Including 115 Children, 53 Women, and 101 Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in
Syria in the First Half of 2022, 2 July 2022, url, p. 12; SNHR, 86 Civilians, Including 21 Children, Eight Women, andFive Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in Syria in July 2022, 1 August 2022, url, p. 9230

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION(d)

Conflict-related infrastructure damage and explosive remnants of war

Based on the UN Syria Multi-sector Needs Assessment of 2021, the Global Shelter Cluster
assessed that in Quneitra governorate, 15.07 % of the assessed shelter consisted of damagedbuildings.1843
Even though Quneitra was spared from large-scale fighting compared to other areas of Syria,
the governorate witnessed its ‘own internal tensions between armed factions and GoS armed
groups’ as well as Israeli missiles targeting Iranian-backed and Hezbollah locations. Thesealso led to explosive remnants like airstrike munition, as well as landmines and IEDs resulting
from land-based operations.1844 In its 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview, UNOCHA listed
Quneitra as one of the governorates with areas contaminated with explosive ordnance. 1845
The Carter Center estimated in March 2022 that of about 11 802 explosive munitions used in
the governorate, approximately 100 – 300 still pose a threat to the civil population as UXO.1846
According to a Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor report published in April 2021,
landmines have claimed the lives of three people in Quneitra governorate between March2011 and March 2021.1847(e)Displacement and return

According to UNOCHA, as of January 2022 there were 3 752 IDPs in the governorate.1848
From January to December 2021, UNOCHA did not record any IDP movements to or from
Quneitra governorate and only 68 IDP movements within the governorate. 1849 According to
the UNOCHA dataset up to four movements each within April and May 2022 were recorded
within the governorate itself.1850 Etana highlighted that the continuing insecurity in the south
leads young people in increasing numbers to leave the region. 1851 The events in Umm Batnah
in April and May 2021 resulted in the temporary displacement of residents from the town
during the shelling1852 as well as in the evacuation of 30 families, approximately 150 persons,from Umm Batnah to al-Bab in the northwest of Syria, which is under control of SNA
factions.1853 According to an article by Syria Direct, Hezbollah and affiliated forces seized
1843

Global Shelter Cluster, Syrian Arab Republic: Whole of Syria Shelter and NFI Sector Humanitarian Needs
Overview, 4 January 2022, url, p. 6
1844
Carter Center (The), A Call for Action: Data on Unexploded Ordnance in Syria and Its Implications December
2012 – May 2021, March 2022, url, p. 14
1845
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview. Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 12
1846
Carter Center (The), A Call for Action: Data on Unexploded Ordnance in Syria and Its Implications December
2012 – May 2021, March 2022, url, p. 16
1847Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor, Syria’s Landmines: Silent Killing, April 2021, url, p. 16
1848
UNOCHA, 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 23
1849
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: IDP Movements Overview, Jan - Dec 2021 (As of 31 December 2021), 21 March
2022, url
1850
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic – IDP movements and IDP spontaneous return movements Dara Apr -2022, 17June 2022, url, in: Table_Origin_vs_Departure; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic – IDP movements and IDP
spontaneous return movements Data May 2022, 14 July 2022, url, in: Table_Origin_vs_Departure
1851
Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief: South Syria – 03 March 2022, 3 March 2022, url; Etana Syria: Syria Military Brief:South Syria – 06 April 2022, 6 April 2022, url
1852
Enab Baladi, To end tension in Quneitra, families and former opposition fighters deported to northern Syria, 20
May 2021, url
1853
Asharq Al-Awsat, ‘Settlement Agreement’ Displaces 150 Syrians to Al -Bab in the North, 21 May 2021, url; MEMO,
Assad regime evicts 30 families from southern Syria, 24 May 2021, url

231

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

approximately 25 houses of displaced persons that at least in parts wanted to return under
Russian-brokered settlement agreements in 2018. The affected families are still not able toreturn to their homes. The seizure was justified with security reasons because of the close
proximity to the Israeli border.1854
In 2021, UNOCHA recorded 4 800 returns of the overall 8 902 returns to Quneitra, around halfof which came from Rural Damascus governorate, and 1 000 return movements within thegovernorate itself.1855 During the first half of 2022, low number of return movements wererecorded, such as 38 in March 20221856 and 29 in May 2022 (all within the governorate 1857).1858

1854

Syria Direct, ‘Expelling the usurper’: Legal avenues to retake homes stolen by Hezbollah in Quneitra thwarted
by security concerns, 17 May 2021, url
1855
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic – Spontaneous IDP Returnee Movements Overview, Jan – Dec 2021 (As of 31
December 2021), 21 March 2022, url
1856
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic – IDP movements and IDP spontaneous return Data Mar-2022, 20 May 2022,
url, in: Table_Origin_vs_Departure
1857
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic – IDP movements and IDP spontaneous return Data Mar-2022, 20 May 2022,
url, in: Table_Origin_vs_Departure
1858
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic – IDP movements and IDP spontaneous return movements Data May 2022, 14
July 2022, url, in the sheet: Summarysince2016

232

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

2.14. Sweida governorate

Map 20: © MapAction, Sweida governorate1859

2.14.1. General description of the governorate
The governorate of Sweida is located in the southern part of Syria and has borders with thegovernorates of Dar’a and Rural Damascus and an international border with Jordan to its
south. Sweida governorate comprises three districts: As-Sweida, Shahba and Salkhad, which
each have subdistricts.1860
The Syrian Bureau of Statistics estimated that the population in the governorate of Sweida in
2021 was 540 409.1861 In a February 2022 report, UNOCHA estimated the population of
Sweida governorate to be of 380 050 inhabitants. 1862 The Druze community makes up 91 % of1859

MapAction, Sweida Governorate, 29 July 2016, url
Based on UNOCHA, As Sweida Governorate Reference Map, December 2015, url; UNOCHA, Syrian Arab
Republic – Governorates Profile (June 2014), 6 August 2014, url, pp. 9, 40
1861
Syria, Central Bureau of Statistics, Estimate of the population in Syria by governorates, n.d., url
1862
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview. Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 23
1860

233

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

the governorate’s total population. Other groups present as of 2018 included Christians (3 %)and Sunni Muslims (6 %), who have Bedouin roots. 1863
The societal structure of the governorate was described as ‘semitribal family community’ by
Nowras Aziz, a France-based journalist of Sweida origin. He further explains that therefore theuse of weapons is not an expedient measure in dispute resolution and that ‘[a]ny confrontation
with any member of the Suwayda families will lead to a confrontation between villages andareas.’1864 Often so called sulh (reconciliation) delegations, consisting of local notables, arenecessary to solve a conflict.1865 Because of the increasing insecurity and absence of the GoS,
Sweida residents increasingly turn towards tribal law to settle disputes.1866
Factors such as the geographical proximity to Jordan, the limited GoS-control, theconsiderable influence of armed gangs and high crime rate in the governorate havecontributed in making Sweida one of Syria’s smuggling hotspots.1867 In recent years drug
production and cross-border drug trafficking increased since the GoS’ recapture of southern
Syria in general1868, including in Sweida governorate.1869

2.14.2. Conflict background and armed actors
During the conflict, the governorate of Sweida has officially remained under GoS control.
However, much of its military and civil authority comes from political and military factions
within the governorate, preoccupied with defending it from outside attackers. 1870 Historically,
the GoS has not exercised its power directly in Sweida, having mainly relied on local armed
factions sponsored by intelligence agencies and security branches. 1871 Those armed factions
sometimes receive security cards from the GoS that enable its owners to move freely
throughout the governorate. In return, they are supposed to keep the area under control andfulfill other orders in the interest of the GoS. 1872

1863

Zaidan, Taim, Sweida: Conflict Dynamics and the Role of Civil Society, Conflict Research Programme, London
School of Economics and Political Science, 6 January 2020, url, p. 4. The report cites the Decision Support Office in
Sweida Province as a source for these percentages.
1864
Al-Monitor, New Druze political party, military faction take shape in Suwayda, 18 July 2021 , url
1865
Al-Jabassini, Abdullah; Ezzi, Maen, Tribal ‘Sulh’ and the Politics of Persuasion in Volatile Southern Syria, EUI, 22
March 2021, url, p. 11
1866
Al-Monitor, Violence on rise in Syria’s Suwayda, 17 February 2022, url
1867
Daher, Joseph; Ahmad, Nizar; Taha, Salwan, Smuggling between Syria and Lebanon, and from Syria to Jordan:
The Evolution and Delegation of a Practice, EUI, 19 April 2022, url, pp. 6-7
1868
Syria Direct, Southern Syria’s drug war: Jordan’s options ‘limited’ as Iran expands, 6 June 2022, url
1869
COAR, Smugglers and Security Agents: Fragmentation and Decentralisation in Southern Syria’s Captagon
Networks, July 2022, url, p. 10
1870
Syria Direct, At least 150 people killed in devastating IS ground offensive, suicide attacks on Suwayda province,
25 July 2018, url; Syria Direct, The state of Syria’s south: A month-long reporting series from Syria Direct, 11
September 2017, url
1871
Syria Direct, In Suwayda, ‚organized gangs‘ serve as an arm of Damascus and violence threatens to ignite
interfamilial conflicts, 15 June 2022, url; MEI, Kidnappings, cross-border clashes threaten increasingly fragile status
quo in Syria’s south, 20 May 2020, url; Enab Baladi, Multiple conflicting forces on the ground portend possible
clash in Syria’s As-Suwayda, 3 October 2021, url
1872
New Arab (The), Suweida gang leader confesses to working for Syrian military Intelligence, 22 July 2021, url;
Syria Direct, In Suwayda‚ organized gangs‘ serve as an arm of Damascus and violence threatens to ignite
interfamilial conflicts, 15 June 2022, url; Enab Baladi, Multiple conflicting forces on the ground portend possible
clash in Syria’s As-Suwayda, 3 October 2021, url

234

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATIONAs of July 2022, Sweida governorate was formally under GoS-control,1873 while various
sources point out the chaotic character of the fragmented security control in Sweida
governorate.1874
Further information on the conflict background and actors in Sweida is available in the EUAA
COI Report: Syria - Security Situation (July 2021), EUAA COI Report: Syria - Security situation(May 2020) and EUAA COI Report: Syria – Actors (December 2019).
(a)Syrian Arab Army and affiliated armed groups

As of December 2021, Sweida governorate continued to remain under the formal control of
the SAA, including its affiliated foreign troops such as Russia and Iran. 1875 In August 2021, the15th Division was reported to be present in the southeast of the governorate.1876 According to
Syria Direct, the 8th Brigade, located in Busra al-Sham, Dar’a, now is affiliated with the MilitaryIntelligence Division 238, located in Sweida.1877 The Military Intelligence in Sweida is according
to COAR deeply involved in drug trafficking.1878 Enab Baladi reported in July 2022 thatdifferent GoS-affiliated militias were present in the governorate, including the NDF.1879(b)

RussiaAccording to Jusoor for Studies, Russia operated in the end of 2021 nine security and military
points within the governorate.1880 Russian delegations were trying to play a role as mediatorsin the reporting period of 2021, because of the proximity to the Russian-backed 5th Corps,
having a major stronghold in Busra al-Sham on the eastern border in the Dar’a governorate.
However, as COAR pointed out, Russia is lacking ‘direct relations with important stakeholders
in As-Sweida’ and is distrusted by the Druze majority.1881 According to some sources Russia
decreased its troops in the south since February 2022 1882, although these reports remain
unconfirmed.

1873

Based on reading of maps in Liveuamap, Syria, 29 July 2022, url; UN, Syrian Arab Republic: Approximate areasof influence as of December 2021, January 2022, url
1874
Enab Baladi, Rise in kidnapping sparks fear among people of As-Suwayda, 7 October 2021, url; Al-Monitor,
Violence on rise in Syria’s Suwayda, 17 February 2022, url; Daher, J.; Ahmad, N.; Taha, S., Smuggling between Syria
and Lebanon, and from Syria to Jordan: The Evolution and Delegation of a Practice, EUI, 19 April 2022, url, p. 6
1875
Jusoor for Studies, Foreign Forces Points in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022, 27 December 2021, url
1876
Al-Ghazi, S., Shaban, N., Policy Brief 186: Daraa Fragile Security Disrupted By Foreign Actors Amid The
Emergence Of New Powers, ORSAM, August 2021, url, p. 3
1877
Syria Direct, Southern Syria’s drug war: Jordan’s options ‘limited’ as Iran expands, 6 June 2022, url
1878
COAR, Smugglers and Security Agents: Fragmentation and Decentralisation in Southern Syria’s Captagon
Networks, July 2022, url, p. 10
1879
Enab Baladi, Multiple conflicting forces on the ground portend possible clash in Syria’s As-Suwayda, 3 October
2021, url; Enab Baladi, “Wait for the next”: Iran warns As-Suwayda residents as ‘next’ can exceed reprisals, 5 July
2022, url
1880
Jusoor for Studies, Foreign Forces Points in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022, 27 December 2021, url
1881
COAR, Syria Update, 26 April 2021, url
1882
Enab Baladi, ‫درعا‬.. ‫[ سوريا جنوبي تمركز نقاط تُخلي روسيا‬Dar’a…Russia evacuates outposts in southern Syria], 24 May
2022, url; Haşıl, H., Policy Brief 216 - The Ukraine Crisis And Russian Forces In Syria, Orsam, June 2022, url, p. 7

235

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM(c)Iran and Iranian-backed armed groups

According to Jusoor for Studies, by the end of 2021, Iranian-affiliated forces and Hezbollah
operated eight stationing points within the governorate. 1883 The Lebanese Hezbollah isreported to be involved in cross-border drug trafficking.1884 The NDF were present in Sweida
and are linked to Iran,1885 with whom they foster excellent relations.1886 According to Nowras
Aziz, a journalist of Sweida origin, there were no Iranian-held positions in the eastern area of
the governorate.1887
(d)

ISIL

The UN Security Council reported in February and July 2022 on an ‘active presence’ 1888 andactivities 1889 of ISIL in Sweida governorate. In a map of July 2022 Etana indicated that ISIL
activity areas were within Sweida governorate. 1890 According to Nowras Aziz, as of August2021 no ISIL members were present in the eastern area of the governorate.1891(e)Factions, militias and gangs

New armed groups involved in criminal activities such as kidnappings, emerged during thereporting period.1892 According to a report by Nizar Ahmad, from the European University
Institute, gangs and armed groups are often named after the town or village ‘they operate’
in.1893
One of the local factions backed by the Military Intelligence 1894 is the so-called
Falhout/Falahout-group, after its leader Raji Falhout/Falahout.1895 It is also known as the al-Fajr
movement.1896 According to Suhail al-Ghazi, it splintered from the Rajjal al-Karama

1883

Jusoor for Studies, Foreign Forces Points in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022, 27 December 2021, url
Enab Baladi, Syria’s As-Suwayda: drug trafficking stop on road from Lebanon to Jordan, 25 February 2022, url
1885
Enab Baladi, Multiple conflicting forces on the ground portend possible clash in Syria’s As-Suwayda, 3 October
2021, url
1886
Al-Ghazi, S., Shaban, N., Policy Brief 186: Daraa Fragile Security Disrupted By Foreign Actors Amid The
Emergence Of New Powers, ORSAM, August 2021, url, p. 3
1887
Al-Monitor, New Druze political party, military faction take shape in Suwayda, 18 July 2021, url
1888
UN Security Council, Letter dated 3 February 2022 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant
to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and enti ties addressed to the President of the Security
Council [S/2022/83], 3 February 2022, url, para. 36
1889
UN Security Council, Letter dated 11 July 2022 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant toresolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security
Council [S/2022/547], 15 July 2022, url, para 43
1890
Etana Syria, Military Control Across Syria – July 2022, July 2022, url
1891
Al-Monitor, New Druze political party, military faction take shape in Suwayda, 18 July 2021, url1892
Al-Ghazi, S., Policy Brief 184: Insecurity In Southern Syria: The Case Of Quneitra And Suwayda (April – June2021), ORSAM, August 2021, url, p. 4
1893
Ahmad, N., Kidnapping for Ransom: Gangs Threaten Civil Peace in Sweida, EUI, 15 March 2022 , url, p. 2
1894
Enab Baladi, Multiple conflicting forces on the ground portend possible clash in Syria’s As-Suwayda, 3 October
2021, url
1895
Syria Direct, In Suwayda, ‚organized gangs‘ serve as an arm of Damascus and violence threatens to ignite
interfamilial conflicts, 15 June 2022, url
1896
Syrian Observer (The), Recap: Suweida Recolts Against Corruption, 29 July 2022, url
1884

236

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

movement.1897 It has its main stronghold in the town of Atil, north of As-Sweida city, where they
are in possession of various ‘light and medium weapons as well as vehicles equipped withmachine guns and ammunition depots’. According to media reports the gang consists of 30
members and is infamous for cutting of the main road connecting As-Sweida withDamascus 1898, and being involved in criminal activities, such as drug trafficking, kidnapping
and burglary.1899
Other factions/gang operating during the reporting period included:•

The Falhout gang which was reportedly situated close by in Qanawat and suspectedby locals of being affiliated with Russian forces. It reportedly had a strength of 50
people 1900 In July 2022, the gang was dissolved following clashes with other local
armed factions (see section 2.14.2)•

The gang of Fadia al-Andari, in the northeast of the governorate, which is affiliated with
the Military Intelligence, has its main stronghold and its arms and equipment in thevillage of al-Taiba.1901•

In the capital As-Sweida many gangs are affiliated with the security branches. Amongthem the Mizhar group which is reported to carry out kidnappings for ransom.1902•

A group of 50 operates in southern Syria and is reportedly affiliated to Hezbollah. It
possessed light and medium weapons as well as armed cars. Its stronghold is Salkhad.
Enab Baladi also alleges that the group is involved in drug trafficking.1903

Local armed groups were founded in attempts to ‘counter those gangs and maintain the
security of As-Suwayda and its civilian residents.’1904 The Rajjal al-Karama movement (‘Men of
Dignity’) was established as a local Druze defence force independent from the GoS in 2012. 1905
According to Suhail al-Ghazi ‘the movement turned from an opposition movement towards aneutral stand and focuses on attempts to establish some kind of security and protection for
Sweida residents’.1906 It reportedly plays an important role in the security situation in the

1897

Al-Ghazi, S., Policy Brief 184: Insecurity In Southern Syria: The Case Of Quneitra And Suwayda (April – June2021), ORSAM, August 2021, url, p. 7
1898
Enab Baladi, Multiple conflicting forces on the ground portend possible clash in Syria’s As-Suwayda, 3 October
2021, url1899
New Arab (The), Suweida gang leader confesses to working for Syrian military Intelligence, 22 Ju ly 2021, url;
Enab Baladi, Rise in kidnappings sparks fear among people of As-Suwayda, 07 October 2021, url
1900
Enab Baladi, Multiple conflicting forces on the ground portend possible clash in Syria’s As-Suwayda, 3 October
2021, url
1901
Enab Baladi, Multiple conflicting forces on the ground portend possible clash in Syria’s As-Suwayda, 3 October
2021, url
1902
Enab Baladi, Multiple conflicting forces on the ground portend possible clash in Syria’s As-Suwayda, 3 October
2021, url
1903
Enab Baladi, Multiple conflicting forces on the ground portend possible clash in Syria ’s As-Suwayda, 3 October
2021, url
1904
Enab Baladi, Multiple conflicting forces on the ground portend possible clash in Syria’s As-Suwayda, 3 October
2021, url1905
Rollins, T., Kidnappings, cross-border clashes threaten increasingly fragile status quo in Syria’s south, MEI, 20
May 2020, url
1906
Al-Ghazi, S., Policy Brief 184: Insecurity In Southern Syria: The Case Of Quneitra And Suwayda (April – June2021), ORSAM, August 2021, url, p. 8

237

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

region.1907 Enab Baladi reported in October 2021 that the group would consist of up to 2 000
fighters.1908 There were some reports on tensions between the Men of Dignity movement andthe Falhout group.1909
In July 2021 a new Druze political party emerged, called al-Liwa Party1910 /Syrian Brigade Party,
which, according to its own account, opposes the GoS and Hezbollah.1911 The armed wing of
this party was called the Anti-Terrorism Force (ATF) and consisted primarily of Druze fightersfrom the region. It says its foundation was based on the aim to provide security for the
population in the face of increasing violence and of the neglect and mistreatment of Sweida
by the GoS. The declared goal of the armed unit is to fight gangs and criminal groups,
especially if funded and backed in their crimes by the GoS. Further more, it wants to limit the
Iranian influence.1912 According to Suhail al-Ghazi, the armed wing consisted of approximately
40 individuals in August 2021 1913, while in October 2021 Enab Baladi cited unconfirmed
information that the group would consist of up to 1 000 fighters.1914 Enab Baladi reported risingtensions between the ATF, which by then claimed to be supported by the US-backed MaT
group,1915 and the GoS-backed groups.1916 ATF was reportedly disbanded in June 2022 after its
commander had died following clashes with GoS forces and affiliated local groups.1917 (seesection 2.14.2 for further information)

2.14.3. Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population(a)

Security trends during the reporting period

In Sweida governorate ‘lawlessness, chaos and rampant criminal and political violence’ were
impacting security situation during the reporting period. Local farmed factions and criminal
gangs were reportedly trying to establish their own areas of influence at the expense of the
GoS.1918 Reporting on the period between February and May 2022, the UN Security Council
stated that continuing security threats in the governorate of Dar’a, Quneitra and Sweida

1907

New Arab (The), Suweida gang leader confesses to worki ng for Syrian military Intelligence, 22 July 2021, url;
COAR, Smugglers and Security Agents: Fragmentation and Decentralisation in Southern Syria’s Captagon
Networks, July 2022, url, p. 10
1908
Enab Baladi, Multiple conflicting forces on the ground portend possible clash in Syria’s As-Suwayda, 3 October
2021, url
1909
Enab Baladi, Rise in kidnappings sparks fear among people of As-Suwayda, 07 October 2021, url; Enab Baladi,
Multiple conflicting forces on the ground portend possible clash in Syria’s As-Suwayda, 3 October 2021, url
1910
Enab Baladi, Multiple conflicting forces on the ground portend possible clash in Syria’s As-Suwayda, 3 October
2021, url
1911
Al-Ghazi, S., Policy Brief 184: Insecurity In Southern Syria: The Case Of Quneitra And Suwayda (April – June2021), ORSAM, August 2021, url, p. 6
1912
Al-Monitor, New Druze political party, military faction take shape in Suwayda, 18 July 2021, url
1913
Al-Ghazi, S., Policy Brief 184: Insecurity In Southern Syria: The Case Of Quneitra And Suwayda (April – June2021), ORSAM, August 2021, url, p. 7
1914
Enab Baladi, Multiple conflicting forces on the ground portend possible clash in Syria’s As-Suwayda, 3 October
2021, url
1915
Enab Baladi, “Wait for the next”: Iran warns As-Suwayda residents as ‘next’ can exceed reprisals, 5 July 2022,
url
1916
Enab Baladi, Rise in kidnappings sparks fear among people of As-Suwayda, 07 October 2021, url
1917
Syria Direct, In Suwayda, ‘organized gangs’ serve as an arm of Damascus and violence threatens to ignite
interfamilial conflicts, 15 June 2022, url
1918
Daher, J., Ahmad, N., Taha, S., Smuggling between Syria and Lebanon, and from Syria to Jordan: The Evolution
and Delegation of a Practice, EUI, 19 April 2022, url, pp. 6-7

238

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

included ‘improvised explosive attacks, targeted killings, exchanges of fire’ as well as clashesof limited extent and kidnappings. Parties involved included GoS forces and affiliated militias,
former members of anti-Gos armed groups, ISIL and unidentified elements.1919
Fighting between local forces and GoS-forces
The Carter Center reported increasing violence including in Sweida governorate,
accumulating in the run-up to the May 2021 presidential elections, resulting in a surge intensions and attacks by unidentified armed actors on GoS-officials and former opposition
fighters.1920 Furthermore, it reported an increase in violence in Sweida during the second halfof 2021, consisting especially of violence related to armed groups.1921 Al-Monitor connected
the increasing violence to the lack of rule of law within the governorate. 1922 Local disputes attimes evolved to clashes between various armed groups and forces, sometimes including
GoS-forces,1923 or even the civilian population.1924 For example, tensions between the ATF andpro-GoS NDF led to multiple confrontations between the two parties, including clashes on 10
August 2021 in Al-Raha that were resolved through pressure exercised by the residents of thearea. However, another flare-up led to the establishment of a GoS checkpoint close to thevillage of al-Harisa.1925 In December 2021, the International Crisis Group reported troop
reinforcements in Sweida, as well as armed conflicts between local forces and GoS-troops in
Sweida city.1926
Two major gangs that controlled parts of the road connecting Damascus and Sweida wer e
dispersed in 2021.1927 One gang from Shahba, which was affiliated with Air ForceIntelligence1928 left the city in July 2021 because of pressure by the ‘local community’, when it
had lost popular support by killing a popular activist.1929 In contrast, COAR reported that thedriving force in the eviction of the gang were ‘the city’s most prominent families’ motivated by
the killing of three civilians.1930 Furthermore, according to a EUI report of March 2022 one

1919

UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021)[S/2022/330], 19 April 2022, url, para. 26; UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139
(2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533
(2020) and 2585 (2021) [S/2022/492], 16 June 2022, url, para. 6
1920
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review, April through June 2021, 30 June 2021, url, p. 9
1921
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review, October Through December 2021, 31 December 2021, url, p. 11
1922
Al-Monitor, Violence on rise in Syria’s Suwayda, 17 February 2022, url
1923
Enab Baladi, Rise in kidnappings sparks fear among people of As-Suwayda, 07 October 2021, url; COAR, Syria
Update, 26 July 2021, url
1924
COAR, Syria Update, 26 July 2021, url
1925
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review, July Through September 2021, url, pp. 9-10; Carter Center (The),
Quarterly Review, April through June 2021, 30 June 2021, url, p. 11
1926
International Crisis Group, Crisiswatch, Tracking Conflict Worldwide, Syria, n.d., url
1927
Suwayda24, ‫ التفاصيل منذ بدايتها‬..‫[ انتفاضة شعبية ضد العصابات اإلجرامية في شهبا‬A popular uprising against criminal gangsin Shahba. Details from its beginning], 18 July 2021, url; COAR, Syria Update, 26 July 2021, url
1928
Enab Baladi, Multiple conflicting forces on the ground portend possible clash in Syria’s As-Suwayda, 3 October
2021, url
1929
Suwayda24, ‫ التفاصيل منذ بدايتها‬..‫[ انتفاضة شعبية ضد العصابات اإلجرامية في شهبا‬A popular uprising against criminal gangsin Shahba. Details from its beginning], 18 July 2021, url; COAR, Syria Update, 26 July 2021, url
1930
COAR, Syria Update, 26 July 2021, url

239

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

gang having its stronghold in Ariqa got dissolved by GoS-forces, after it has been urged by the
GoS to halt kidnappings, but failed to do so.1931
Increasing tensions between local armed groups and GoS forces led to confrontations during
the first half of 2022.1932 Clashes between GoS-forces and local armed groups occurred in thefirst months of 2022, resulting from local groups targeting checkpoints. 1933 For example in
Sweida city, local factions in March 2022 took over a GoS-checkpoint by force. GoS-troops
regained control over the checkpoint shortly.1934
According to the Carter Center, clashes between the ATF and GoS-affiliated groups occurred
on a regular basis, especially with the NDF in the villages of al-Raha and al-Harisa.1935 On 8
June 2022, clashes broke out between the ATF and forces of the Military Intelligence
Directorate supported by Iran, Hezbollah,1936 and GoS-affiliated militias 1937 in the village ofKhazma. This led to the death of a number of members 1938 as well as of the ATF commander,
while his forces were dispersed and its members fled to areas in the desert.1939 The group wasreportedly disbanded as of July 2022.1940
Criminal gang activities, including drug trafficking and kidnapping for ransom
An increase in assassinations, kidnappings and attacks ‘targeting the headquarters of local
factions, dignitaries and political and human rights activists’ in the governorate in 2021, wasreported especially since August 2021.1941 Suwayda24, a Syrian local news agency, publishedreports that indicated that 134 individuals were killed in 2021 in violent incidents. According to
the report 35 civilians were killed by known assailants for reasons such as personal disputes,
revenge or theft, while 27 civilians were killed under unclear circumstances. Furthermore,
three civilians were killed by branches of the intelligence services, three by the Military

1931

Ahmad, N., Kidnapping for Ransom: Gangs Threaten Civil Peace in Sweida, EUI, 15 March 2022 , url, p. 4
Carter Center (The), The Quarterly Review on Syrian Military and Security Dynamics, January – March 2022, 13
May 2022, url, pp. 12-13; Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review on Syrian Military and Security Dynamics, April –June 2022, url, pp. 11-12
1933
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review on Syrian Military and Security Dynamics, January – March 2022, url, p.
13; Enab Baladi, ‫[ فصائل محلية تزيل حاجزا للنظام وسط السويداء واألخير يعود بتعزيزات‬Local factions remove a barrier of theregime in the center of Sweida city, the latter returns with reinforcements], 16 March 2022, url
1934
Enab Baladi, ‫[ فصائل محلية تزيل حاجزا للنظام وسط السويداء واألخير يعود بتعزيزات‬Local factions remove a barrier of theregime in the center of Sweida city, the latter returns with reinforcements], 16 March 2022, url1935
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review on Syrian Military and Security Dynamics, April – June 2022, url, p. 12
1936
Enab Baladi, “Wait for the next”: Iran warns As-Suwayda residents as ‘next’ can exceed reprisals, 5 July 2022,
url
1937
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review on Syrian Military and Security Dynamics, April – June 2022, url, p. 12
1938
Suwayda24, ‫قو ة مكافحة اإلرهاب ؟‬ّ ‫[ هل انتهت‬Is the Anti-Terror Force over?], 9 June 2022, url
1939
Syria Direct, In Suwayda, ‚organized gangs‘ serve as an arm of Damascus and vi olence threatens to ignite
interfamilial conflicts, 15 June 2022, url; Enab Baladi, “Wait for the next”: Iran warns As-Suwayda residents as ‘next’
can exceed reprisals, 5 July 2022, url1940
Carter Center (The), Quarterly Review on Syrian Military and Security Dynamics, April – June 2022, url, p. 12;
1941
Jusoor for Studies, Policing as-Suwayda As A Key Pretext By The Regime And Its Allies For Further Intervention
In The Governorate, 15 September 2019, url
1932

240

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATIONIntelligence, two by the ATF.1942 In the first half of 2022, Suwayda24 counted at least 85 killed
persons.1943
Several sources reported on cases of abduction and kidnapping for ransom during thereporting period.1944 Since 2018, kidnappings for ransom became a major security threat forresidents within Sweida. Especially ‘wealthy persons and businessmen, whether Druze or fromother governorates’ seem to be targeted, but not exclusively. Armed groups and gangs, ofwhich several are backed by the GoS, increasingly operated in this field to generate
income.1945 In some cases, those gangs and groups received security passes issued by the
GoS that enable them ‘to cross checkpoints and postpone [their] mandatory military
service.’1946 A report published in March 2022 by EUI mentions estimations of 500 kidnapped
persons in Sweida governorate from 2018 until 2021, amounting to approximately 10 persons
per month kidnapped for ransom. Reportedly, torture of kidnapped persons is common andthere are cases in which the [non-Druze] victims were killed, after the families were not able to
pay the ransom.1947 According to Suwayda24, 140 civilians were kidnapped in 2021. This
number includes kidnappings, coercive detention and arbitrary arrests.1948
Kidnappings and criminal activities of gangs linked GoS forces, were also reported during thefirst quarter of 2022.1949 Suwayda24 reported in July 2022 that the Military Security branchaffiliated1950 Falhout-gang kidnapped two citizens of Shahba, resulting in parts of the
population protesting against the kidnapping by conducting retaliation-takings of citizens from
Attil, where the leader of the gang stems from, as well as blocking the road connecting thetown to Damascus for several days.1951 On 26 July 2022, the Rajjal al-Karama movement
attacked and took over the headquarter of the Falhout-gang in Attil, killing or arresting all
gang-members present. The leader, Raji Falhout apparently was warned and went into
hiding.1952 The movement found supplies for drug production as well as GoS-issued ID cards
Suwayda24, ‫ ارتفاع العنف ضد المدنيين‬..2021 ‫ قتيل خلل‬134 :‫[ السويداء‬Sweida: 134 people killed during 2021… anincrease of violence against civilians], 1 January 2022, url
1943
Suwayda24, 2022 ‫ قتيل في الشهر األول‬29 :‫[ السويداء‬Sweida: 29 people killed in the first month 2022], 2 February2022, url; Suwayda24, 2022 ‫ قتيلن وأربعة مصابين في فبراير شباط‬:‫[ السويداء‬Sweida: Two killed and four injured in
February 2022], 1 March 2022, url; Suwayda24, 10 2022 ‫ أشخاص بين قتيل وجريح في السويداء خلل آذار‬, [10 people killed
or injured in Sweida during March 2022], 2 April 2022, url; Suwayda24, ‫ مدنيا في شهر نيسان الفائت‬16 ‫ مقتل‬:‫السويداء‬[Sweida: 16 civilians killed in April], 2 May 2022, url; Suwayda24, ‫ شخصا في السويداء خلل أيار الماضي‬25 ‫[ مقتل‬25 people
killed in Sweida during May], 1 June 2022, url; Suwayda24, ‫ قتلى الشهر الماضي في السويداء‬8 :‫[ رصد العنف‬Monitoring
violence: 8 people killed last month in Sweida], 1 July 2022, url
1944
UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258
(2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020) [S/2021/583], 17 June
2021, url, para. 6; Enab Baladi, Rise in kidnappings sparks fear among people of As-Suwayda, 07 October 2021, url;
Ahmad, N., Kidnapping for Ransom: Gangs Threaten Civil Peace in Sweida, EUI, 15 March 2022, url; Al-Monitor,
Violence on rise in Syria’s Suwayda, 17 February 2022, url1945
Ahmad, N., Kidnapping for Ransom: Gangs Threaten Civil Peace in Sweida, EUI, 15 March 2022 , url, p. 3
1946
Ahmad, N., Kidnapping for Ransom: Gangs Threaten Civil Peace in Sweida, EUI, 15 March 2022 , url, p. 3
1947
Ahmad, N., Kidnapping for Ransom: Gangs Threaten Civil Peace in Sweida, EUI, 15 March 2022, url, pp. 2-3
1948
Suwayda24, ‫السويداء‬: 140 ‫ في واالعتقال للخطف تعرضوا مدنيا‬2021 [Sweida: 140 civilians were kidnapped and arrested in2021], 2 January 2022, url
1949
Carter Center (The), The Quarterly Review on Syrian Military and Security Dynamics, January – March 2022, 13
May 2022, url, pp. 12-13
1950
Syrian Observer (The), Recap: Suweida Revolts Against Corruption, 29 July 2022, url
1951
Suwayda24, ‫مغلقة السويداء‬.. ‫[ العسكري األمن عصابات من يتصاعد الغضب‬Sweida is closed…Anger escalates from military
security gangs], 24 July 2022, url; Suwayda24, ‫السويداء‬: ‫[ العسكري األمن جماعات ضد ينفجر شعبي غضب‬Sweida: Popular anger
erupts against military security groups], 23 July 2022, url
1952
Syrian Observer (The), Recap: Suweida Recolts Against Corruption, 29 July 2022, url
1942

241

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

proving the ‘affiliation with the regime’s security forces’, while the GoS denied any connection
to the gang.1953 International Crisis Group reported that 17 persons were killed and dozens
wounded during the confrontation.1954 Most of the killed persons were reportedly members of
the Falhout-gang, while the rest belonged to the Rajjal al-Karama movement.1955
Tensions among local groups in Qurayya and cross-border with Dar’a residents
Tensions were reportedly rising between Dar’a and Sweida due to ‘land disputes and mutual
kidnappings.’1956 In April 2021, according to local media, tensions refaced between Druze local
forces in Qurayya, and Bedouins, who are accused by the population to have supported the
8th Brigade in clashes with local armed groups in the past year. Reportedly, Russian
representatives tried without success to mediate between the factions and establish a way ofreturn for displaced Bedouins.1957 Clashes between the two groups broke out several times
throughout the reporting period.1958 On 29 June 2022, they resulted in three persons killed
and numerous Bedouins displaced to neighbouring Dar’a. 1959 According to Etana Syria,
kidnappings conducted by the Bedouins additionally aggravate the situation and trigger
retributive kidnappings and clashes.’1960
Furthermore, cross governorate border kidnappings increased in 2021, leading to a rise intensions.1961 In June 2021 for example, a group from Sweida kidnapped a Dar’a resident fromthe town Busr al-Harir in the Dar’a governorate and demanded ransom from his family. Since
the responsible gang did not release the victim, his family kidnapped numerous people from
Sweida in return.1962 In July 2021, a farmer from the village was kidnapped and brought toDar’a. In return, his family and local armed groups abducted around 10 Dar’a residents.
Reportedly, all abductees of the latter events were released at the end of September.1963(b)

Security incidents

According to ACLED data, there were 82 security incidents recorded in Sweida governorate, ofwhom 36 were coded as battles, 11 explosions/remote violence and 35 incidents of violenceagainst civilians.1964

1953

New Arab (The), As violence proliferates in Syria’s south, cracks appear in regime-held areas, 28 July 2022, urlInternational Crisis Group, Crisiswatch, Tracking Conflict Worldwide, Syria, n.d., url
1955
Al Arabiya News, At least 17 dead in rare clashes in Syria’s Sweida, 28 July 2022, url
1956
Al-Ghazi, S., Policy Brief 184: Insecurity In Southern Syria: The Case Of Quneitra And Suwayda (April – June2021), ORSAM, August 2021, url, p. 4
1957
Suwayda24, ‫[ السويداء في الجيران بين خلف لحل ”الحارة مختار“ دور تلعب روسيا‬Russia plays the role of ‘Mukhtar al-Hara’ inorder to resolve dispute between neighbours in Sweida], 13 April 2021, url
1958
Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief: South Syria – 1 July 2022, 1 July 2022, url; Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief –South Syria – 12 May 2022, 12 May 2022, url; Suwayda24, ‫القريّا مزارعي على جديد اعتداء‬.. ‫[ ؟ األزمة حل يُعطّ ل من‬New attack on
farmers of the villages…Who is obstructing the solution to the crisis?], 25 May 2022, url
1959
Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief: South Syria – 1 July 2022, 1 July 2022, url
1960
Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief: South Syria – 1 July 2022, 1 July 2022, url; Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief –South Syria – 12 May 2022, 12 May 2022, url
1961
Ahmad, N., Kidnapping for Ransom: Gangs Threaten Civil Peace in Sweida, EUI, 15 March 2022, url, p. 3
1962
Al-Ghazi, S., Policy Brief 184: Insecurity In Southern Syria: The Case Of Quneitra And Suwayda (April – June2021), ORSAM, August 2021, url, p. 4
1963
Enab Baladi, Rise in kidnappings sparks fear among people of As-Suwayda, 07 October 2021, url
1964
EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (12 August2022), url
1954

242

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

Figure 40. Evolution of security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence andviolence against civilians in Sweida governorate between 1 April 2021 and 1 August 2022,
based on ACLED data 1965

District

Battles

Remote violence

Violence against
civilians

Sweida28

6

26

Salkhad5

1

1

Shahba

3

4

8

Total

36

11

35

Figure 41. Security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against
civilians in Sweida governorate between 1 April 2021 and 1 August 2022. Breakdown by
district based on ACLED data 1966
Most security incidents documented by ACLED took place in Sweida district (see Figure 41).
Illustrative security incidents
A non-exhaustive list of security incidents that were reported to have taken place in Sweida
governorate in 2021 and 2022 included the following:•

In May 2021, a 75-year-old resident of Dar’a was kidnapped in Sweida while on his way
to sell his products. The kidnappers demanded a ransom of approximately 7 000
USD.1967

1965

EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (12 August2022), url
1966
EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (12 August2022), url
1967
Enab Baladi, ‫السويداء‬.. ‫[ األهالي مخاوف يثير الخطف حاالت في ارتفاع‬Sweida: A rise in kidnappings raises fears among thepeople], 3 October 2021, url

243EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM•

In July 2021, a farmer was kidnapped and transferred to Dar’a governorate, whileworking on his land near the village of Samma.1968•

On 27 January 2022, Jordanian soldiers reported the killing of at least 27 armed
smugglers who crossed the border from Sweida in an attempt to traffick large
quantities of amphetamines. Several other smugglers were able to flee back to
Syria.1969•

On 11 February 2022, GoS-soldiers shot a civilian at a checkpoint in al-Shahba city.1970•

On 21 April 2022, two individuals were shot under unclear circumstances near thevillage Kharba.1971•

On 6 June 2022, the Falhout-gang kidnapped the Sweida police chief as well as thehead of the Criminal Security Branch in Sweida, using a roadblock close to the town ofSalim.1972(c)Civilian fatalities

Month

SNHR 2021

SNHR 2022

January

1-

February

-

-

March

1

1

April

2

7

May

-

8

June

-

4

July

1

3

1968

Enab Baladi, Rise in kidnappings sparks fear among people of As-Suwayda, 7 October 2021, urlReuters, Jordan says 27 drug smugglers killed at border with Syria, 27 January 2022, url; Daher, J., Ahmad, N.,
Taha, S., Smuggling between Syria and Lebanon, and from Syria to Jordan: The Evolution and Delegation of a
Practice, EUI, 19 April 2022, url, p. 9
1970
UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General [S/2022/330], 19 April 2022, url, p. 22; SOHR, Al-Suwayda– Regime soldiers shoot young man at a checkpoint in Al-Shahba city, 11 February 2022, url
1971
Zaman al-Wasl, ‫السويداء‬.. ‫[ "خربا" في غامضة بظروف شخصين مقتل‬Sweida, two people were killed under mysterious
circumstances in Kharba], 22 April 2022, url
1972
Syrian Observer (The)/Al-Modon, Suweida: Kidnapping of Head of Criminal Security Branch and Police Chief, 6June 2022, url
1969

244

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATIONMonth

SNHR 2021

August1

September-

October3

November

1

December

3

Total

13

SNHR 2022

23

Figure 42. Civilian fatalities as a result of armed conflict in Sweida governorate in 2021 andfirst seven months of 2022. Monthly breakdown based on SNHR data
In 2021, SNHR recorded 13 civilian fatalities 1973 in Sweida governorate while in the first sevenmonths of 2022 it documented 23 civilian fatalities 1974 (see Figure 42).
1973

Based on data extracted from monthly reports on civilian fatalities published by SNHR. See: SNHR, Extrajudicial
Killing Claims the Lives of 113 Civilians, Including 36 Children, Six Women, and Three Victims Due to Torture, inJanuary 2021, 1 February 2021, url, p. 7; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 138 Civilians, Including 23
Children, 11 Women, and 14 Victims Due to Torture, in February 2021, 1 March 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR, Extrajudicial
Killing Claims the Lives of 177 Civilians, Including 28 Children, 35 Women, One Medical Worker, and 9 Victims Dueto Torture, in March 2021, 1 April 2021, url, p. 7; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 96 Civilians, Including
15 Children, 11 Women, and Nine Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in May 2021, 1 June 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR,
Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 723 Civilians in Syria in the First Half of 2021, 1 July 2021, url, p. 9; SNHR,
Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 129 Civilians, Including 44 Children, 17 Women, and 10 Victims Due toTorture, in Syria in July 2021, 1 August 2021, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 94 Civilians,
Including 32 Children, 10 Women, and Seven Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in August 2021, 1 September 2021, url,
p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 86 Civilians, Including 23 Children, Nine Women, and Eight
Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in September 2021, 1 October 2021, url, p. 9; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims theLives of 84 Civilians, Including 22 Children, Four Women, and Seven Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in October
2021, 1 November 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR, Extrajudicial Killing Claims the Lives of 86 Civilians, Including 16 Children,
Eight Women, and Six Victims Due to Torture, in Syria in November 2021, 1 December 2021, url, p. 8; SNHR, 1,271
Civilians, Including 299 Children, 134 Women, and 104 Victims of Torture, Killed in Syria in 2021, 1 January 2022, url,
p. 13
1974
Based on data extracted from monthly reports on civilian fatalities published by SNHR. See: SNHR, 69 Civilians,
Including 18 Children, Four Women and Eight Victims Due to Torture, Killed in Syria in January 2022, 1 February2022, url, p. 8; SNHR, 161 Civilians, Including 28 Children, Six Women and 66 Victims Due to Torture, Documented
Killed in Syria in February 2022, 1 March 2022, url, p. 9; SNHR, 67 Civilians, Including 20 Children, Three Women,
and Seven Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Killed in Syria in March 2022, 1 April 2022, url, p. 8; SNHR, 101
Civilians, Including 17 Children, 14 Women, and Six Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in
Syria in April 2022, 1 May 2022, url, p. 9; SNHR, 78 Civilians, Including 14 Children, 11 Women, and Eight Victims
Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in Syria in May 2022, 1 June 2022, url, p. 8; SNHR, 568
Civilians, Including 115 Children, 53 Women, and 101 Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in
Syria in the First Half of 2022, 2 July 2022, url, p. 12; SNHR, 86 Civilians, Including 21 Children, Eight Women, andFive Victims Who Died Due to Torture, Were Documented Killed in Syria in July 2022, 1 August 2022, url, p. 9245

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM(d)

Conflict-related infrastructure damage and explosive remnants of war

Even though Sweida was spared from large-scale fighting compared to other areas of Syria
and hence avoided extensive damage in the conflict 1975, the governorate witnessed its ‘own
internal tensions between armed factions and GoS armed groups’, in which explosive
munition gets commonly used.1976 Based on the UN Syria Multi-sector Needs Assessment of2021, the Global Shelter Cluster assessed that in Sweida governorate, 4.59 % of the residents
lived in damaged buildings 1977, a significant increase from 0,7 % in the same assessment in2020.1978 The Health Cluster Whole of Syria While counted three attacks against healthcare in
Sweida governorate between January 2021 and March 2022, without providing additional
information.1979
The internal tensions and attacks left explosive remnants such as landmines and IEDs behind.
UXOs still gets used in internal disputes and conflicts to date. 1980 The Carter Center estimatedthat from about 2 101 munitions used in the governorate, approximately 200 – 625 pose athreat to the civil population as unexploded ordnance. 1981 According to a Euro-Mediterranean
Human Rights Monitor report published in April 2021, landmines have claimed the lives ofthree people in Quneitra governorate between March 2011 and March 2021.1982 According toSuwayda24, at least eight civilians died in 2021 due to explosions of remnants of war within
the governorate in 2021. Most of the victims were reportedly children. 1983(e)

Displacement and return

According to UNOCHA, as of January 2022 there were 71 313 IDPs in the governorate.1984
From January to December 2021, UNOCHA recorded 19 IDP movements from Sweida
governorate. In early 2022, IDP movements increased, from nine in January 2022 (21 in
February; 68 in March) to 56 in April 2022, with a sharp increase to 546 in May 2022. The
source did not provide information on the reason for displacement.1985 Etana reported that thecontinuing insecurity in the south of Syria is driving young people out of the region and toleave Syria in increasing numbers.1986 Clashes between residents of the two governorates of
Dar’a and Sweida also caused IDP movements. For example, on 29 June 2022, clashes

1975

Arab Weekly (The), Rising discontent in Syria’s Daraa, Sweida reflects simmering woes, 16 February 2020, url
Carter Center (The), A Call for Action: Data on Unexploded Ordnance in Syria and Its Implications December
2012 – May 2021, March 2022, url, p. 14
1977
Global Shelter Cluster, Syrian Arab Republic: Whole of Syria Shelter and NFI Sector Humanitarian Needs
Overview 2022, 4 January 2022, url, p. 6
1978
Global Shelter Cluster, Syrian Arab Republic: Whole of Syria Shelter and NFI Sector Humanitarian Needs
Overview 2021, 1 March 2021, url, p. 6
1979
Health Cluster Whole of Syria, Attacks on healthcare in Syria 1 Jan – 31 March 2022, 5 May 2022, url
1980
Carter Center (The), A Call for Action: Data on Unexploded Ordnance in Syria and Its Implications December
2012 – May 2021, March 2022, url, p. 14
1981
Carter Center (The), A Call for Action: Data on Unexploded Ordnance in Syria and Its Implications December
2012 – May 2021, March 2022, url, p. 16
1982
Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor, Syria’s Landmines: Silent Killing, April 2021, url, p. 16
1983
Suwayda24, ‫ ارتفاع العنف ضد المدنيين‬..2021 ‫ قتيل خلل‬134 :‫[ السويداء‬Sweida: 134 people killed during 2021… anincrease of violence against civilians], 1 January 2022, url
1984
UNOCHA, 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 23
1985
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic – IDP Movements May 2022, 13 July 2022, url
1986
Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief: South Syria – 03 March 2022, 3 March 2022, url; Etana Syria: Syria Military Brief:South Syria – 06 April 2022, 6 April 2022, url
1976

246

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

erupted between Bedouins and Druze armed groups within Sweida, which resulted in three
persons being killed and numerous Bedouins being displaced to neighbouring Dar’a. 1987
The UNOCHA data on IDP spontaneous returnees for 2021 shows that there were 176 IDPS
return movements to Sweida governorate, around 400 IDP return movements from thegovernorate and 144 IDP return movements within the governorate. 1988 In 2022, 156 returns to
the governorate were recorded (53 in February, nine in April, 94 in May) until May.1989

1987

Etana Syria, Syria Military Brief: South Syria – 1 July 2022, 1 July 2022, url
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Spontaneous IDP Returnee Movements Overview, Jan – Dec 2021 (As of 31
December 2021), 21 March 2022, url
1989
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic – IDP movements and IDP spontaneous return movements Data May 2022, 14
July 2022, url, in the sheet: Summarysince2016
1988

247

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Annex I: Bibliography
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Abu Layla, O., How Iranian Militias Have Swallowed Deir Ezzor, The Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, 16 February 2022, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/howiranian-militias-have-swallowed-deir-ezzor
ACAPS, Regional Analysis Syria: Part AII – Governorates Profile, 1 October – 31 December
2014, 28 January 2015, https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/5_p-regionalanalysis-for-syria-part-aii-governorate-profiles-oct-dec-2014.pdf, accessed 25 July 2022
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AFP (Agence-France Press), Islamic State Claims Syria Gas Pipeline Attack, 18 September
2021, available at: https://www.voanews.com/a/islamic-state-claims-syria-gas-pipeline-attack/6234229.html
AFP, Russia’s growing ties to Syria amid military backing, 28 February 2, Russia's growing ties
to Syria amid military backing (france24.com)
Aftandilian, Gregory, The Ukraine Crisis Further Complicates Foreign Intervention in Syria,
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Ahmad, Nizar, Kidnapping for Ransom: Gangs Threaten Civil Peace in Sweida, 15 March 2022,
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Ahram Online, Russian withdrawal threats to Syria, 28 may 2022,
https://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/50/1203/466799/AlAhram-Weekly/World/Russianwithdrawal-threats-to-Syria.aspx, accessed 14 July 2022
Ajjoub, Orwa, HTS is not al-Qaeda, but it is still an authoritarian regime to be reckoned with,
MEI (Middle East Institute), 24 June 2021, https://www.mei.edu/publications/hts-not-al-qaeda-itstill-authoritarian-regime-be-reckoned, accessed 20 July 2022
AI (Amnesty International), Amnesty International Report 2021/22 – Syria, 29 March 2022,
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AI (Amnesty International), Syria: New anti-torture law “whitewashes” decades of human rights
violations, 31 March 2022, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/03/syria-new-antitorture-law-whitewashes-decades-of-human-rights-violations/rl
Al Allaf, A. and Said, S., Policy Brief: Russian Investment in Syrian Phosphate: Opportunities
and Challenges, EUI, 4 February 2021,

248

SYRIA: SECURITY SITUATION

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owed=yAl Bawaba, Assad Regime Imposes Full Siege on Daraa, 28 June 2021,
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Al Jazeera, ‘Economic blockade’: Syrian city punished for anti-govt protests, 21 April 2022,
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Al Jazeera, Syria: Sweida protesters decry corruption, poor living standards, 11 February 2022,
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Annex II: Terms of Reference
The research should cover the period between April 2021 – July 2022. Background informationand older trends should be kept very brief and crosslinked as much as possible with previous
EUAA COI reports published, such as Security situation (July 2021) and Security situation (May2020). Significant changes to the justice system in GoS-controlled areas and SDF-controlledareas should be addressed under the respective actor. The aim of including the sections on thejustice system is to provide a limited update on these topics, which were previously covered in
the EUAA COI Report Actors (December 2019).
❑ General description of the security situation

▪

▪

▪

Overview of the conflicto

Political developmentsoInternational involvementoRecent security trends and armed confrontations during the reference period

Actors in conflicto

Brief description and capacityoPresence and areas of control/influence of the different actorsoType of weapons and tactics used

Overview of the security situationoSecurity incidentsoCivilian casualtiesoConflict-related infrastructure damage and explosive remnants of waroConflict-induced displacement and return❑ Security situation and conflict impact on civilians by governorates
The below structure is to be replicated for each governorate.

▪
▪
▪
▪

General description of the governorate
Actors involved in the conflict during the reference period
Recent security trends
Impact of the security situation on the civilian population▪ Security incidents▪ Civilian casualties▪ Conflict-related infrastructure damage and explosive remnants of war▪ Conflict-induced displacement and return (indicate the reason for
displacement/return or lack of such info.)301