European Asylum Support Office

EASO
Country of Origin
Information Report
Mali
Country Focus

December 2018SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION

European Asylum Support Office

EASO
Country of Origin
Information Report
Mali
Country Focus

December 2018

Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which
may be made of the information contained herein.
More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu).
ISBN 978-92-9476-057-9
doi: 10.2847/24182© European Asylum Support Office (EASO) 2018
Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged, unless otherwise stated.
For third-party materials reproduced in this publication, reference is made to the copyrights
statements of the respective third parties.
Cover photo: © Mariam Dembélé, Bozo, village au Mali (2011)

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: MALI - COUNTRY FOCUS — 3

Acknowledgements
EASO would like to acknowledge the following national asylum and migration departments as thedrafters of this report:
France, Office Français de Protection des Réfugiés et Apatrides (OFPRA), Division del'Information, de la Documentation et des Recherches (DIDR)
Italy, Ministry of the Interior, National Commission for the Right of Asylum, International
and EU Affairs, COI unit
The following departments reviewed this report, together with EASO:
Denmark, Danish Immigration Service, Section Country of Origin Information
Luxembourg, Ministère des Affaires étrangères et européennes, Direction del’Immigration, Service Réfugiés
Norway, Landinfo
The Netherlands, Immigration and Naturalisation Service, Office for Country of Origin
Information and Language Analysis (OCILA)Dr Bruce Whitehouse, Associate Professor of Anthropology and Director of the Global Studies
Program in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology of Lehigh University, PA, researcher,and author of numerous publications on the country and the region reviewed this report.

It must be noted that the review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts ororganisations contributes to the overall quality of the report, but does not necessarily imply theirformal endorsement of the final report, which is the full responsibility of EASO.

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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: MALI - COUNTRY FOCUS

Contents
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................... 3Contents ............................................................................................................................................ 4
Disclaimer .......................................................................................................................................... 6
Glossary and abbreviations ............................................................................................................... 7
Introduction..................................................................................................................................... 10
Methodology............................................................................................................................... 10
Defining the terms of reference ............................................................................................. 10
Collecting information ............................................................................................................ 10
Quality control ........................................................................................................................ 11
Structure of the report................................................................................................................ 12
Map ................................................................................................................................................. 13
1. Background information.............................................................................................................. 14
1.1 Geography ............................................................................................................................. 14
1.2 Population, ethnic groups, languages ................................................................................... 14
1.2.1 Population and ethnic groups........................................................................................ 14
1.2.2 Languages ...................................................................................................................... 17
1.3 Religion.................................................................................................................................. 17
2. State structure ............................................................................................................................. 18
2.1 Administrative structure ....................................................................................................... 18
2.2 Constitution and state structure ........................................................................................... 19
2.2.1 Executive ........................................................................................................................ 19
2.2.2 Legislative ...................................................................................................................... 21
2.2.3 Judiciary ......................................................................................................................... 22
2.3 Security forces, army, police ................................................................................................. 28
2.3.1 Forces Armées Maliennes (FAMa) [Malian Armed Forces] ........................................... 28
2.3.2 Internal security ............................................................................................................. 29
3. Crisis in northern Mali ................................................................................................................. 31
3.1 Political history ...................................................................................................................... 31
3.2 Actors of the crisis in northern Mali ..................................................................................... 33
3.3 Current political situation ..................................................................................................... 36
4. Southern regions (Kayes, Koulikoro, Ségou and Sikasso) ............................................................ 38
4.1 Levels of violence .................................................................................................................. 39
4.1.1 Terrorism ....................................................................................................................... 40

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: MALI - COUNTRY FOCUS — 5

4.1.2 Social and political violence........................................................................................... 42
Bibliography .................................................................................................................................... 46
Terms of Reference ......................................................................................................................... 67

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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: MALI - COUNTRY FOCUS

Disclaimer
This report was written according to the EASO COI Report Methodology (2012). 1 The report isbased on carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced.
The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed with utmost
care. However, this document does not claim to be exhaustive. If a particular event, person ororganisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has not taken placeor that the person or organisation does not exist. Any event taking place after the finalisation ofthis report is not included.
Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particularapplication for international protection. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative ofa particular legal position.
‘Refugee’, ‘risk’ and similar terminology are used as generic terminology and not in the legal sense
as applied in the EU Asylum Acquis, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating
to the Status of Refugees.
Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may
be made of the information contained in this report.
The target users are asylum caseworkers, COI researchers, policymakers, and decision-making
authorities.
The drafting of this report (including reviewing) was finalised on 19 September 2018. Any event
taking place after this date is not included in this report. More information on the reference period
for this report can be found in the Methodology section of the Introduction.

1 The EASO methodology is largely based on the Common EU Guidelines for processing Country of Origin Information(COI), 2008, and can be downloaded from the EASO website: http://www.easo.europa.eu.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: MALI - COUNTRY FOCUS — 7

Glossary and abbreviations
ACRT

Alliance des communautés de la région de Tombouctou [Alliance ofCommunities of the Timbuktu Region]

ADEMA

Alliance pour la Démocratie en Mali [Alliance for Democracy in Mali]

AFISMA

African-led International Support Mission to MaliAMB

Al-Mulathamun Battalion/ al-Murabitun

AQIM

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

CMA

Coalition des Mouvements de l’Azawad [Coordination of Azawad Movements]

CM-FPR.1

Coordination des mouvements et forces patriotiques de résistance n°1[Coordination of Patriotic Movements and Forces of the Resistance #1]

CM-FPR.2

Coordination des mouvements et forces patriotiques de résistance n°2[Coordination of Patriotic Movements and Forces of the Resistance #2]

CPA

Coalition du peuple pour l’Azawad [Coalition of the people for Azawad]

CODEM

Convergence pour le Développement du Mali [Convergence for theDevelopment of Mali]

CNDH

Commission Nationale Des Droits De L’Homme [National Commission for
Human Rights]

CNID

Congrès national d’initiative démocratique [National Congress for Democratic
Initiative]

CRA

Centre de réflexion et d’action [Centre for reflection and action]

CSPRE

Comité stratégique de pilotage de la réforme de l’Etat (Strategic Steering
Committee for State Reform)

DNAPES

Direction National de l'Administration Pénitentiaire et de l’Education Surveillée[National Directorate of Penitentiary Administration and Supervised
Education]

ECOWAS

Economic Community of West African States

EUCAP

European Union Capacity Building Mission

EUTM

European Union Training Mission

FACO

Force armée contre l’occupation [Armed force against occupation]

FAMa

Forces Armées Maliennes [Malian Armed Forces]

FARE

Forces Alternatives pour le Renouveau et l'Emergence [Alternative Forces for
Renewal and Emergence]

FARK

Front d’action pour la région de Kayes [Action Front for the Kayes region]

FLM

Front de libération du Macina (Macina Liberation Front)

FLN

Forces de libération du Nord [Front for the Liberation of the North]

FLNA

Front de libération nationale de l'Azawad [National Liberation Front of
Azawad]8—

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: MALI - COUNTRY FOCUS

FPA

Front populaire de l’Azawad [Popular Front of Azawad]

GATIA

Groupe Autodéfense Touareg Imghad et Alliés [Tuareg Imghad self-defense
group and allies]

GSPC

Groupe Salafiste Pour la Prédication et le Combat [Salafist Group for Preaching
and Combat]. Another name for AQIM

HCUAHaut conseil pour l’unité de l’Azawad [High Council for the Unity of Azawad]

ICC

International Criminal Court

IDLO

International Development Law Organization

IDPs

Internally displaced persons

ISSAT

International Security Sector Advisory Team

JCPE

Justices de paix à compétence étendue [Justices of the peace with extended
powers]JNIM

Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin [Group for the Support of Islam andMuslims]

MAA.1

Mouvement Arabe de l’Azawad [Arab Movement of Azawad], former FLNA

MAA.2

Mouvement Arabe de l’Azawad [Arab Movement of Azawad]

MDAC

Ministére de la Defense et des Anciens Combattants [Ministry of Armed Forcesand Former Combatants]

MIA

Mouvement islamique de l’Azawad [Islamic Movement of Azawad]

MINUSMA

Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations unies pour la stabilisation au
Mali [United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in
Mali]

MNA

Mouvement National de l’Azawad [National Movement of Azawad]

MNLA

Mouvement National de Libération de l’Azawad [National Movement of
Liberation of Azawad]

MoAF

Ministry of Armed Forces and Former Combatants

MoI

Ministry of Internal Security and Civil Protection

MPLA

Mouvement Populaire pour la Libération de l’Azawad [Popular Movement for
the Liberation of Azawad]

MPSA

Mouvement populaire pour le salut de l’Azawad [Popular movement for thesalvation of Azawad]

MSA

Mouvement pour le salut de l’Azawad [Movement for the salvation of Azawad]

MTNM

Mouvement Touareg du Nord Mali [Tuareg movement of northern Mali]MUJAOMouvement pour l’Unicité et le Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest [Movement for
Unity and Jihad in West Africa]NP

National Police (La Police Nationale)

PARENA

Parti pour la renaissance nationale [National Renaissance Party]

PKO

peacekeeping operation

RPM

Rassemblement pour le Mali [Rally for Mali]EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: MALI - COUNTRY FOCUS — 9

SADI

Solidarité Africaine pour la Démocratie et l'Indépendance [African Solidarity for
Democracy and Independence]

URD

Union pour la République et la Démocratie [Union for Republic and Democracy]

UNDP

United Nations Development Program

UNESCO

United Nations Organization for Education, Science and Culture

UNFPA

United Nations Population FundUN OCHA

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

URD

Union pour la République et la Démocratie [Republic and Democracy Union]

US DoS

United States Department of State

10 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: MALI - COUNTRY FOCUS

Introduction
This report was written in the framework of the 2018 EASO Operating Plan to Italy, Measure IT 3.0:
Support to the National Asylum Commission and Territorial Commissions. 2 The French OFPRA
welcomed a COI specialist from Italy in their headquarters in Paris, where a dedicated French COI
specialist supported the Italian COI unit in drafting a report on selected topics on Mali. The codrafters of this report are mentioned in the Aknowledgements section.

Methodology
Defining the terms of reference
In a country focus report, EASO aims to provide information focusing on selected topics ofparticular relevance for international protection status determination (refugee status andsubsidiary protection), in this case for Malian applicants. It is not meant to be a general descriptionof the human rights situation in the country, nor a comprehensive overview of all topics at stake
in international protection status determination.
The terms of reference (ToR) were based on a list of information needs provided by Italian asylum
authorities, a systematic review of queries from Italian territorial commissions and courts
processing applications for international protection from Malian applicants in 2017, as well as
input from the EASO COI specialist network on West Africa. ToR were finalised during a meeting
held in February 2018 with the drafters, and can be found in annex to this report under Terms ofReference.
The above-mentioned input suggested that a significant number of Malian applicantions forinternational protection in Italy originate from the southern part of the country, namely from
Kayes, Koulikoro, Ségou and Sikasso. As a result, during the definition of ToR, it was decided tohighlight the sourthern regions in this report. It was also agreed that the situation in the south ofMali would not be clear without an overview of the north and central areas. For that reason, theinformation related to those regions available in this report should be seen as backgroundinformation.

Collecting information
The information is mostly the result of desk research of public, specialised paper-based andelectronic sources until 19 September 2018 and was supplemented with information collectedfrom field work in Mali conducted by OFPRA’s COI specialist (see Quality Control).
The information has largely been retrieved from open sources, namely international and Mali
NGOs, think tanks, media and academic research, both during the deployment of the IT researcher
to OFPRA (1-21 February 2018), and during several rounds of peer and external reviews thatfurther contributed to the information collection process (see Quality Control). All consulted
sources are listed in the bibliography.
For data on violent incidents, the datasets from the organisation Armed Conflict Location andEvent Data Project (ACLED) have been used. ACLED collects information about incidents of violenceand protests in developing states, including Mali. In a database, ACLED indicates the kind ofviolence, the actors, the location, the course of events and the number of fatalities (deaths). ACLED
collects its information from local, regional, national and continental media sources, as well as

2 EASO, Operating Plan Agreed by EASO and Italy, 15 December 2017, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: MALI - COUNTRY FOCUS — 11

from international media sources such as Agence France Presse (AFP) and Associated Press (AP). 3
The database is publicly available and is continuously updated. 4 Additional sources have been
researched to the extent possible to corroborate the ACLED findings.
It should be borne in mind that ACLED data may not always be accurate. In the northern areas of
the country or frontline areas inaccessible to regular media reporting, there may beunderreporting of incidents, whereas, in areas with large media coverage and presence ofinternational forces and national armed forces, overreporting may occur.
According to ACLED’s codebook (in which their methodology is explained), for incidents where theoriginal source has reported that several or many were killed, ACLED codes the number of fatalities
as 10. 5 This method has a significant impact on overall numbers of fatalities reported.
ACLED registers civilian deaths under the category ‘violence against civilians’, defined as follows:‘deliberate violent acts perpetrated by an organized political group such as a rebel, militia
or government force against unarmed non-combatants. These conflict events harm or kill
civilians, and are the sole act in which civilians are an actor (…). “Violence against civilians”
also includes inflicting significant harm (e.g. bombing, shooting, torture, rape, mutilationetc) or accosting victims (e.g. kidnapping and disappearances). It does not include incidents
in which people are not physically harmed (e.g. looting or burning, destruction of sacredspaces, and forced displacement).’ 6
Fatalities are counted only once. For example, in ACLED’s Codebook it is stated:‘If summarized fatalities are reported, but events occur across several days or in multiple
locations simultaneously, the total number is divided and that fraction is recorded for eachday of the event (if over 1). If an odd number, the proportion of fatalities is divided byassigning the first day the additional fatality and distributed as evenly as possible. No
information for number of harmed people is recorded in any other space besides the notes
column, if available.’ 7
In this report, the ACLED data are regarded merely as estimates and indications of trends inviolence.
In Table 1, an overview of violent incidents and the corresponding fatalities is presented in the
period 1 September 2017 until 30 August 2018. In addition, the table presents two subsets of data:on violent incidents and fatalities by ACLED that are the result of violence reported as ‘violenceagainst civilians’, and on incidents and fatalities that are the result of ‘remote violence’ (violence
in which the actor is not present, such as car bombs, improvised explosive devices (IEDs)), ‘battleno change of territory’ (a battle in which the government reaquires control of territory),‘riots/protests’ and ‘strategic development’ (activity by rebel groups/militia/governments that
does not involve active fighting but is within the context of the war/dispute). 8

Quality control
In order to ensure that the authors respected the EASO COI Report Methodology, a review was
carried out by COI specialists from the countries listed as reviewers in the Acknowledgements
section, and by EASO. In addition, a review of the report was carried out by researcher/academic
Bruce Whitehouse. EASO performed the final quality review and editing of the text.

3 ACLED, Codebook, 2017, url, pp. 20-21

4 ACLED, Realtime Data (2017-2018), n.d., url
5 ACLED, Codebook, 2017, url, p. 20
6 ACLED, Codebook, 2017, url, p. 20
7 ACLED, Codebook, 2017, url, p. 20

8 ACLED, Codebook, 2017, url, pp. 8-9

12 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: MALI - COUNTRY FOCUS

The quality control process led to further research and the inclusion of some additional information
up to 19 September 2018, in response to feedback received during the respective reviews. Allcomments made by the reviewers were taken into consideration and most of them were
implemented in the final draft of this report.

Structure of the report
This report is divided into four main chapters: the first provides general background information
on topics like geography, population, ethnic groups and religion. The second chapter describes
Mali’s state structure, including its administration, judiciary, and security forces. On chapter three,readers can find an overview of the 2012 crisis in northern Mali, including the main actors, as wellas an overview of the current political situation in the country. The last chapter is dedicated to thecountry’s security situation in the southern regions, namely Kayes, Koulikoro, Ségou and Sikasso.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: MALI - COUNTRY FOCUS — 13

Map

Map 1: Mali, March 2013, ©United Nations 9

9 UN, Map no. 4231 rev. 3, March 2013, url

14 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: MALI - COUNTRY FOCUS

1. Background information
1.1 Geography
Mali, a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), is large country of
1 240 000 km2 landlocked and bordered by seven countries: Senegal, Mauritania, Algeria, Niger,
Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea. 10
The territory that forms today’s Mali has been the centre of the ‘great Western empires’ of Ghana(Soninke, between current Mali, Senegal and Mauritania) 11, Mali (Maninka, between current Maliand Guinea) 12, and the Songhoy Empire (in the Gao and Timbuktu regions, between current Mali
and Niger). 13 This ‘golden age’, that refers to the period between the eighth to the sixteenth
centuries, constitutes the main historical reference for most of Mali’s ethnic groups today. 14
Until recently, Mali was geographically and economically divided between the north and the south(south and south-west). Dating back from before independence, the south of Mali was often
referred to as the ‘useful Mali’, while the rural and arid north lived in extreme poverty and wasseen as relying on various trafficking activities (drugs, cars, weapons and migrants). The conceptof ‘useful Mali’ continued after the country’s independence. 15 The main cultivated areas of thecountry are south of the Niger River. 16 Cotton, one of Mali’s main exports 17, is largely grown in
the regions of Sikasso, Ségou, Koulikoro and Kayes. 18 Millet, sorghum, or peanuts, for example arealso produced in the region, due to most favourable weather conditions. 19

1.2 Population, ethnic groups, languages
1.2.1 Population and ethnic groups
2017 estimates indicate Mali has a population of 18.5 million persons. 20 Data from 2012 and 2013indicates that around 34.1 % of the population were Bambara. Rough estimates on other ethnic
groups include the Fulani or Peul (14.7 %), the Sarakole (10.8 %), the Senufo-Minyanka (10.5 %),the Dogon (8.9 %), the Malinke (8.7 %), the Bobo (2.9 %), the Songhai (1.6 %), the Tuareg (between
9 %-10 % 21), and other smaller communities such as the Bozo-Somono, the Khassonke or the Arab
(Maure). 22

10 Imperato, P. J., and Imperato, G. H., Historical Dictionary of Mali, 2008; Maïga, I., An ka Mali don, 1993, p. 74; ECOWAS,

Mali, basic information, n.d., url

11 Person, Y., L’Empire du Ghana, n.d., url

12 Leymarie, P. and Perret, T., Les 100 clés de l'Afrique, 2006, p. 308; Cisse, Y. T. and Kamissoko, W., La grande geste duMali, des origines à la fondation de l’Empire, 1988, p. 78, 96, 192-193, 280-283
13 Leymarie, P. and Perret, T., Les 100 clés de l'Afrique, 2006, p. 308; Fierro, A., Songhaï ou Songhay Empire, n.d., url;Imperato, P. J. and Imperato, G. H., Historical Dictionary of Mali, 2008, p. 345
14 Skattum, I., Mali: In Defence of Cultural and Linguistic Pluralism, 2008, url, pp. 98-121
15 Perret, T., Mali: une crise au Sahel, 2014, p. 93; Panon, X., Dans les coulisses de la diplomatie française, 2015; Thibaud,
B. and Francois, A., Systèmes de production et durabilité dans les pays du Sud, 2010
16 Groupe URD, The difficult handling of a complex crisis in Northern Mali, February 2015, url, p. 13
17 FAO, Mali, Country Fact Sheet on Food and Agriculture Policy Trends, July 2017, url, p. 2
18 Camara, M., Atouts et limites de la filière coton au Mali, 2015, url, p. 17
19 Camara, M., Atouts et limites de la filière coton au Mali, 2015, url, pp. 13, 20, 152, 195; Groupe URD, The difficult
handling of a complex crisis in Northern Mali, February 2015, url, p. 13
20 UNFPA, World Population Dashboard - Mali, 2017, url
21 Grégoire, E., Islamistes et rebelles touaregs maliens, 2013, url ; Modica, B., Les Touaregs au Mali et au Niger, 4November 2015, url
22 CIA World Factbook, Mali, last updated 9 February 2018, url; Tabouret-Keller, A., Le nom des langues I., Les enjeux dela nomination des langues, 1997, pp. 5-20; Calame-Griaule, G. and Brasseur, G., Les établissements humains au Mali,EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: MALI - COUNTRY FOCUS — 15

Pastoralist and nomadic groups live in the Sahel 23 and the Sahara 24 regions of northern Mali. 25
The Sudanic zone 26 is the agricultural region. More than half of the population is rural, living insmall villages surrounded by cultivated lands, mainly along the Niger River and the Senegal River. 27
Several conflicts in Mali are related to the Tuareg. They are a nomadic people that can be found,among other places, in northern Mali. The name Tuareg was probably an invention of thenineteenth century to facilitate the categorisation of the many different nomadic tribes of thesouthern Sahara. The Tuareg are not a single community with the same set of values andbeliefs. The loyalty to their tribe has always been more important than the loyalty towards theTuareg as a whole. The importance of religion can also vary among the different tribes. 28
During the colonial times, France granted a special status to the Tuareg chiefdoms through theestablishment of a system of governance close to the British indirect rule. French administration,
willing to avoid revolts, was not interested in ruling the vast desert and uneconomic part of thecountry. 29
Soninke are the majority in the western region. They live in Mali, Senegal and Mauritania, in the
Senegal River valley. The men have a very ancient tradition of migration, while the women remain
at home working hard to sustain a living. 30 Climate changes and droughts have driven Soninke
people to leave their land and search for work abroad 31, firstly in other countries in Africa, then in
Europe. 32
90 % of the Malian population lives in the south. 33 Sources agree that being the majority,
southerners did not prioritise the development of the north. Low motivation and lack of resources
encouraged the authorities to concentrate their efforts on the south. This has maintained theisolation of the north and increased the difficulties to control it. Poverty has also resulted insignificant corruption of some political leaders and military officers. The profits derived fromcomplicity with traffickers of all kinds, and even with hostage takers, have led some community
leaders and officials to perpetuate the absence of the rule of law in the northern region. 34
47 % of the Malian population is under 15 and 53 % is under 18. On average, youths remain
economically dependent until 26, and the economic support ratio in 2014 was of 43 people
working to support 100 people including themselves. 35

1969, p. 246; Gallais, J., Signification du groupe ethnique au Mali, May-August 1962, url, pp. 106-129; HRW, Mali: Abuses
Spread South, 19 February 2016, url
23 Conversation (The), Sahel region, Africa, 28 February 2017, url
24 OECD, An Atlas of the Sahara-sahel, 19 December 2014, url
25 Codrington, S., Planet Geography, 2005, p. 260
26 Mali is divided into three climatic zones: the Sudanic, the Sahelian and the Saharan zones. The Sudanic corresponds
to the south and represents 16% of the territory (700 to 1,000 mm of annual precipitation); the Sahelian in the Centre
and West, accounting for 44% of the territory (200 to 400 mm precipitation) and the Saharan in the North, with 40% of
the territory (little or no rain). UN and ICC, Mali, An Investment Guide to Mali, October 2006, url
27 Encyclopædia Britannica, Mali, n.d., url
28 Morgan, A., What do the Tuareg want?, 9 January 2014, url
29 Grégoire, E., Islamistes et rebelles touaregs maliens, 2013, url
30 Manchuelle, F., Les diasporas des travailleurs soninké (1848-1960), 1 January 2004, pp. 328-329
31 Gonin, P. and Lassailly-Jacob, V., Les réfugiés de l’environnement, Une nouvelle catégorie de migrants forcés?, 2002,
url, pp. 139-160
32 Barou, J., Les Soninké d’hier à demain, 1990, url, p. 10
33 CIA Factbook, Mali, Economy overview, 24 January 2018, url
34 Ngassam, R. N., Mali - Azawad, zone de non-droit, September 2016, url; Chena, S. and Tisseron, A., Rupture d’équilibres
au Mali, 2013, url, para. 12, 14, 15, 16
35 Mali, Feuille de route nationale: Tirer pleinement profit du dividende démographique en investissant massivement
dans la jeunesse, June 2017, url

16 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: MALI - COUNTRY FOCUS

The rate of school enrolment has continuously increased up to 57.3 % in 2015. This means that
more than 4 out of 10 children aged from 7 to 12 were not attending the first cycle of basic
education in 2015. The literacy rate is higher in urban areas (57.2 %) than in rural areas (30.1 %). 36

Migratory movements
Since the 1970s, the inhabitants of the western region of Mali have relied more on the diaspora tofinance development than on the state: social services and infrastructure have been funded bymigrants and are still maintained by the remittances they send. 37
In the 1970-1980s severe droughts hit northern Mali, forcing thousands of Tuaregs to go into exile(namely to neighbouring countries, Algeria, Libya, Niger, Mauritania and Burkina Faso). 38
Since the 1990s, the Tuareg-Fulani hostility has taken on a new dimension in a context ofenvironmental degradation. 39 Conflicts between nomadic herders and farmers arose fromcompetition over increasingly scarce natural resources (conversion of pastures to rice fields) andethnic / cultural antagonisms. 40
Additionally, since the advent of democracy in 1992, land disputes and identity tensions have taken
a more violent dimension because of the remoteness of the central state and the feeling ofabandonment of populations living far from the capital, neglected by development projects mainly
concentrated in the south and west of the country. 41
The ‘connectivity’ and ‘cross-border relationships’ characterise the ‘smooth space’ of the Sahara
desert and a weak state unable to control the territory where smuggling and trafficking are therule 42; northern regions of Mali have been the most affected by illegal trafficking: cars, weapons,
drugs, cigarettes and migrants 43. Hostage taking or kidnapping has become a financial funding
source for the activities of criminal organisations in the Sahel. 44 Traffickers have now much more
armed protection, GPS and money than the few personnel posted in the 119 border posts ofMali. 45 Political and economic fragility of Mali is compounded by the presence of Jihadist groups
linked to Al-Qaeda in the north. 46
In Mali, a complex system of alliances between tribes and families (sanankuya) ensured peace andcordial understanding between communities. 47 Traditional mechanisms of conflict management
seem however to be steadily declining, although modern justice is also not perceived as more
effective by the population. 48

36 Mali, INSM, Enquête modulaire et permanente auprès des ménages, August 2015, url

37 Fouchard, A., Dans la région de Kayes, au Mali, les habitants comptent sur la diaspora, pas sur l’Etat, 23 May 2017, url;

Boulanger, C. and Mary, K., Les Maliens en France et aux États-Unis, 2011, url, pp. 17-28; Meynial, C., Mali: les héros dela diaspora, 3 February 2018, url
38 Morgan, A.ndy, Les clés de la guerre dans le Nord, 8 April 2012, url
39 Raineri, Luca, The Peul-Fulani community and conflict in northern Mali, January 2015, url, p. 9
40 International Crisis Group, Central Mali, An Uprising in the Making?, 6 June 2016, url; Daniel, S., Mali: conflitséleveurs/agriculteurs, 12 September 2016, url; Guichaoua, Yvan and Ba-Konare, Dougoukolo A.O., Djihad, révolte etauto-défense au centre du Mali, 12 October 2016, url; Moseley, William G., et al, La décentralisation et les conflits entre
agriculteurs et éleveurs dans le delta intérieur du Niger, 2002, url, pp. 101-118
41 Thiam, A., Centre du Mali: enjeux et dangers d’une crise négligée, March 2017, url, pp. 20-22, 36, 40, 48; GEMDEV andUniversité du Mali, Mali-France, Regards sur une histoire partagée, 1 November 2005, url, p. 311
42 Strazzari, F., Azawad and the rights of passage, January 2015, url, pp. 2, 4
43 Ngassam, R. N., Mali - Azawad, zone de non-droit, September 2016, url, para. 30
44 Ngassam, R. N., Mali - Azawad, zone de non-droit, September 2016, url, para. 33
45 Strazzari, F., Azawad and the rights of passage, January 2015, url, p. 3
46 L’Express, Mali: des djihadistes d’Ansar ed-Dine tués dans une opération française, 15 February 2018, url
47 Canut, C. et Smith, E., Pactes, alliances et plaisanteries, pratiques local, discours global, 2006, url, pp. 22-23
48 Interpeace and IMRAP, Portraits croisés, Analyse locale des dynamiques de conflit et de résilience dans la zone deKoro-Bankass, Juin 2017, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: MALI - COUNTRY FOCUS — 17

1.2.2 Languages
According to Mali’s constitution, French is the country’s official language. According to Marianne
Opheim, educational researcher at Oslo University, only 5 to 10 % of the population master the
French language (typically someone who studied, lives in urban centres and works as a civil servant,teacher or politician) 49, whereas Bambara [bamanankan 50] is the main language for around 40 %of the population and the lingua franca understood by about 80 % of Malians. 51
The Bambara language, dominant in the south and in the urban environment, is in constantevolution, except in the north, where Songhai and Tuareg resist to this domination. 52

1.3 Religion
The 2009 census indicates that nearly 95 % of the population is Muslim; 3 % is Christian and 2 %has traditional beliefs. 53 These statistics indicate that only 2 % claim not to be Muslim or Christian
but most people who adhere either to Islam or Christianity practice traditional beliefs to someextent. 54
The Tijâniyyah is the main Muslim religious brotherhood 55 in Mali, but the Qadiriyyah is very
important in the central region among the Fulani people, an inheritance from the Macina Empire
whose legitimacy was grounded in the Qadiriyyah. 56
Although religious freedom is guaranteed by the constitution, and Mali is a secular state on paper,
religion occupies an increasingly significant part of Malian public space. 57 There is an overlap
between religion and politics, illustrated by the political and social role of important Muslim
scholars, such as Mahmoud Dicko, President of Mali’s High Islamic Council, especially since the2009 debate about the Family Code. 58
Fear among the population whether the country is turning into an ‘Islamic State’ led several
religious leaders, Christian and Muslims, to condemn fundamentalism and jihadism 59 AntiWahhabis rhetoric emerged in 2012, leading to the stigmatisation of all movements opposed to
Sufism as being terrorist / jihadist. 60

49 Opheim, M., Les filles et l’école au Mali, 2000, url, pp. 153-154
50 Ethnologue, Bamanankan, n.d., url

51 Opheim, M., Les filles et l’école au Mali, 2000, url, fn. 3, p. 154

52 Dumestre, G., La dynamique des langues au Mali, 1994, section 3-12; Canut, C., Dynamique plurilingue et imaginaire
linguistique au Mali, 1996, url, pp. 55-76
53 Mali, Ministère de l’Economie, du Plan et de l’Intégration, DNSI, Mali, recensement général de la population et del’habitat, 2009, url; US DoS, International Religious Freedom Report for 2016, 2017, url
54 Dasre, A. and Hertrich, V., Comment aborder les pratiques religieuses en Afrique Subsaharienne?, 2017, url
55 In principle Islam does not recognise spiritual hierarchy. Yet Muslim mysticism, or Sufism, since the 12th century,organised itself into associations under the authority of a spiritual master leading a common ritual. In Arabic, thesereligious brotherhood are called t'ariqā/t'uruq, i.e. ‘way’ or ‘road to Allah’. Members of the t'ariqā are called ikhwān,which means ‘brothers’. Hamès, C., Cheikh Hamallah ou Qu'est-ce qu'une confrérie islamique (Tarîqa)?, 1983, url, pp.
67-83; Triaus, J. L., Robinson, D., La tijâniyya: une confrérie musulmane à la conquête de l’Afrique, 2000, pp. 9-36
56 Tobie, A., Le centre du Mali: violences et instrumentalisation croisées, December 2017, url; Imperato, Pascal Jamesand Imperato, Gavin H., Tijaniya brotherhood, 25 April 2008, pp. 292-293
57 Coulibaly, M.and Hatløy, A., Religious issues and ethnicity in Southern Mali, 2015, url
58 Sommerfelt, T. and Jesnes, K., Laïcité in Southern Mali: Current public discussions on secularism and religious freedom,
2015, url
59 US DoS, International Religious Freedom Report for 2016, 2017, url
60 Sommerfelt, T. and Jesnes, K., Laïcité in Southern Mali: Current public discussions on secularism and religious freedom,
2015, url

18 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: MALI - COUNTRY FOCUS

2. State structure
2.1 Administrative structure
Mali is divided into régions [regions], plus the Bamako District. 61 Until 2012, the country was
divided into eight regions: Kayes, Koulikoro, Sikasso, Ségou, Mopti, Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal. 62
The government’s administrative re-organisation initiated in 2012 intended to further decentralise
the state’s administration. 63 According to Mali’s legislation adopted that year, the country is
divided into the Bamako District and 19 administrative regions: Kayes, Koulikoro, Sikasso, Ségou,Mopti, Timbuktu, Gao, Kidal, plus Taoudénit, Ménaka, Nioro, Kita, Doila, Nara, Bougouni, Koutiala,San, Douentza and Bandiagara. 64
In practice, however, only the eight original regions plus Taoudénit and Ménaka are currently
operational, with the latter two having the respective governors nominated in 2016. 65
The ten regions are further divided into cercles (and further into arrondissements andcommunes) 66 and carry out differentiated administrative competences at a decentralised level. 67
Below is a summary of regions and cercles (after 19 January 2016):
RegionCercles

Kayes

Bafoulabé, Diéma, Kayes, Kéniéba, Kita, Nioro du Sahel, Yélimané

Koulikoro

Banamba, Dioïla, Kangaba, Kati, Kolokani, Koulikoro, Nara

SikassoBougouni, Kadiolo, Koutiala, Kolondiéba, Sikasso, Yanfolila, Yorosso

Ségou

Barouéli, Bla, Macina, Niono, San, Ségou, Tominian

Mopti

Bandiagara, Bankass, Djenné, Douentza, Koro, Mopti, Ténenkou,
Youwarou

Timbuktu

Diré, Goundam, Gourma-Rharous, Niafunké, Timbuktu

Gao

Ansongo, Bourem, Gao, Ménaka

KidalAbeïbara, Kidal, Tessalit, Tin-Essako

Taoudéni

Foum Alba, Achouratt, Al-Ourche, Boudje-Béha

MenakaMénaka, Andéramboukane, Inékar, Tidermène 68

Bamako is the capital of Mali, and its administrative centre. It is located on the banks of the Niger
river. The city is part of the Bamako District, further divided into six communes. Official Malian data

61 Mali, Loi 017 et 018, Journal Officiel n°10, 53ème année, 2 March 2012, url

62 Mali, Ministere de la Décentralisation et de la Réforme de l’Etat, Cercles, [2016], url
63 Maliactu.net, Mali: Le Mali compte désormais dix régions, 23 January 2016, url

64 Mali, Loi 017 et 018, Journal Officiel n°10, 53ème année, 2 March 2012, url; L’Essor, Mali: Décentralisation: Régions : lanouvelle organisation en marche?, 6 February 2018, url
65 Mali, Ministere de la Décentralisation et de la Réforme de l’Etat, Cercles, [2016], url; Malinet, Reforme administrative
au Mali: Le nombre des régions passe à 10, [2016], url; Mali, Loi 017 et 018, Journal Officiel n°10, 53ème année, 2 March
2012, url
66 Mali, Loi 017 et 018, Journal Officiel n°10, 53ème année, Cércles, 2 March 2012, url
67 Bamako.com, Nouvelles Circonscriptions Administratives: De quoi le Premier Ministre a-t-il peur pour ne pas nommer
les Gouverneurs des 10 autres nouvelles Régions du Mali?, 17 March 2016, url
68 Mali, Ministere de la Décentralisation et de la Réforme de l’Etat, Cercles, [2016], url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: MALI - COUNTRY FOCUS — 19

indicates over 3 million people live in Bamako, many of which are young migrants from otherregions of Mali and from neighbouring countries. 69
Adam Sangaré is the Mayor of Bamako Capital District since 6 July 2007. 70
Regions have a key role in the country’s regional administration: they are in charge of the social,economic and cultural development in their territory, and coordinate actions for development
both of the local authorities and of the central government. Other functions of the regions are
related to technical education, health, communications and energy. 71
National defense, justice (legislation, courts’ and tribunals’ organisation), diplomacy, currency,
direction and coordination of development policies are areas under the authority of the central
government. 72

2.2 Constitution and state structure
The 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Mali provides for the separation of powers, dividing theminto the executive (le Gouvernement), legislative (l'Assemblée nationale) and judicial (la Coursuprême et les autres cours et tribunaux) branches. 73
However, sources indicate that checks and balances are weak due to the highly centralised natureof the system and the effective roles the President exerts over all three branches 74, including the
judiciary. 75 One source indicates that the influence on the judiciary is not direct, but exerted
through the power of appointing the highest positions in the judicial organs, namely judges in theSupreme Court, the Superior Council of the Magistracy and the Constitutional Court. 76
A referendum on constitutional amendments was postponed sine die, after intense mobilisationfrom the opposition, that raised suspicions that this was a move to reinforce the powers of theexecutive. 77

2.2.1 Executive
President
According to the Constitution, the president is the head of state, commander in chief of the armed
forces, and presides over the Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature [Superior Council of the
Judiciary/Higher Council of the Magistracy]. 78 The president is elected by popular vote by absolutemajority; if the candidate does not cast an absolute majority in the first round, a second round will
be organised. The president can serve up to two five-year terms. 79
Ibrahim Boubacar Keita has been the President of Mali since September 2013. 80

69 Mali, Site officiel de la Mairie du District de Bamako, District de Bamako, n.d., url

70 Mali, Site officiel de la Mairie du District de Bamako, District de Bamako, Présentation de Monsieur le Maire, n.d.,url;
Jeune Afrique, Adama Sangaré, maire de Bamako: "Il faut consolider la base de l’Adéma à travers le Mali", 21 November
2017, url
71 United Cities and Local Governments & OECD, Main subnational governments responsibilities, October 2016, url
72 UK Aid, Corade and CRS, Governance at the grassroots, An Analysis Of Local Government Structures In The Sahel
Regions Of Niger, Burkina Faso, And Mali, Mali, August 2014, url, p.6
73 Mali, Portail Officiel de l’Administration Malienne, La constitution du Mali, 14 February 1992, url
74 Bertelsmann Stiftung, Transformation Index BTI 2018 Mali, 2018, url; US Aid, Democracy, Human Rights, And
Governance Assessment Of Mali Final Report, June 2014, url
75 Global Integrity, Mali, n.d., url
76 IDLO, Clingendael, A Crisis Of Confidence, Competence And Capacity: Programming Advice For Strengthening Mali’s
Penal Chain, November 2015, url, p. 20
77 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2018, Mali, 2018 url
78Mali, Portail Officiel de l’Administration Malienne, La constitution du Mali, art. 29, 44, 45, 14 February 1992, url
79 Mali, Portail Officiel de l’Administration Malienne, La constitution du Mali, 14 February 1992, art. 33 url
80 BBC, Mali’s new President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita sworn in, 4 September 2013 (url)20 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: MALI - COUNTRY FOCUS

The last Presidential elections were held in 2018 in two rounds (29 July 2018 and 12 August 2018).
Ibrahim Boubacar Keita won the second round by a majority of 67.17 %. His opponent, Soumaila
Cissé obtained 32.83 % of the votes. 81
A few days before the first round of elections in July 2018, Cissé raised issues on the electoral
register process and the risk of fraud. 82
The president nominates (and dismisses) the prime minister and government members, under theprime minister’s proposal. 83 The president presides over the Conseil des Ministres [Council of
Ministers]. 84

Government
The executive power in Mali is exercised by the government, through the prime minister, who acts
as head of government. In that role, he directs and coordinates all governmental activity, andensures the execution of the laws. The prime minister is responsible for the execution of thenational defense policy. 85
The Ministers and Prime Minister together form the Cabinet. The Cabinet of the Prime Minister isthe body collectively responsible before the National Assembly (Article 54 of the Constitution) withregard to its programme or on a declaration of the general policy of the Cabinet (Article 78 of theConstitution). 86
Oversight of the government is exerted by the Parliament, through Committees of enquiry andmissions to government departments. Parliamentarians can address members of the government
both orally in the parliament and in writing. 87
Other government institutions are Le Haut Conseil des Collectivités territoriales [High Council of
Territorial Collectivities]. This body is responsible for ‘studying and giving a reasoned opinion about
any policy concerning local and regional development.’ 88 Since it represents the communities, itcannot be dissolved. Its mission is connected with the implementation of the decentralisation
process and to that purpose it carries out participatory interventions in local and regional issues. 89
Additionally, Le Conseil Economique, Social et Culturel (Economic, Social and Cultural Council) is abody responsible for economic, social and cultural development 90 and takes part in any
commission of national interest that is concerned with social and cultural issues. 91

81 Mali, MATCL, 2eme Tour de l’Election Presidentielle, Resultats Provisiores Complets, 15 August 2018, url; Mali, Cour

Constitutionnelle, Arret N°2018-04/Cc-Ep Du 20 Août 2018 Portant Proclamation Des Resultats Definitifs Du Second TourDe L'election Du President De La Republique Bamako 20 August 2018, url
82 RFI, Mali: la présidentielle agitée par les accusations de fichier électoral parallèle, 22 July 2018, url
83 Mali, Portail Officiel de l’Administration Malienne, La constitution du Mali, art. 38, 14 February 1992, url
84 Mali, Portail Officiel de l’Administration Malienne, La constitution du Mali, art. 39, 14 February 1992, url
85 Mali, Portail Officiel de l’Administration Malienne, La constitution du Mali, art. 53-55, 14 February 1992, url
86 Globalex, Guide to Legal Research in Mali, The Constitution The Government, November/December 2016, url
87 IPU, Mali Assemblée Nationale, Parliamentary Oversight, Accountability and oversight over the actions of theGovernment administration, n.d., url
88 Mali, Portail Officiel de l’Administration Malienne, La constitution du Mali, Titre Xi Des Collectivites Territoriales, 14
February 1992, url
89 Mali, Portail Officiel du Gouvernment du Mali, Les institutiones, Le Haut Conseil des Collectivités du Mali, n.d., url
90 Mali, Portail Officiel de l’Administration Malienne, La constitution du Mali, Titre II, De l'État et de la souveraineté, art.
25, 14 February 1992, url
91 Mali, Portail Officiel du Gouvernment du Mali, Les institutions Le Conseil Economique, Social et Culturel, n.d., url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: MALI - COUNTRY FOCUS — 21

In December 2017, Abdoulaye Idrissa Maiga and his government resigned. 92 President Keïta
nominated Soumeylou Boubèye Maiga for the post. 93 Soumeylou is the fifth prime minister under
Keita’s presidency. 94 The new government’s team counts 36 ministers. 95

2.2.2 Legislative
The legislative power in Mali is exerted by the Assemblée Nationale [National Assembly], theunicameral parliament of Mali. The National Assembly has 147 members, directly elected for a five
years’ term. 13 are women. The current president of the National Assembly is Issaka Sidibé. 96
The voting is carried out by a majority system in single-seat constituencies in two rounds. The
minimum age required for voting is 18 years; to be eligible, candidates have to have domicile in
Mali for at least one year, be 21 years of age or over, and have Malian citizenship. 97
The last general elections took place on 24 November and 15 December 2013. The next elections
are expected to be held in November-December 2018. The largest parliamentary force following
the results of last elections was the Rassemblement pour le Mali (RPM) [Rally for Mali], President
Ibrahim Bubacar Keita's party, which won 66 seats. Parties supporting the President, including theAlliance pour la Démocratie en Mali (ADEMA) took as a whole 115 out of 147 seats in the National
Assembly. The election results by party were: 98
Abbreviation

Party

Result

RPM
URD

Rassemblement pour le Mali [Rally for Mali]
Union pour la République et la Démocratie[Republic and Democracy Union]
Alliance pour la Démocratie en Mali
[Alliance for Democracy in Mali]
Forces Alternatives pour le Renouveau etl'Emergence [Alternative Forces for
Renewal and Emergence]
Convergence pour le Développement duMali [Convergence for Mali’s Development]
Solidarité Africaine pour la Démocratie etl'Indépendance [African Solidarity for
Democracy and Independence]
Congrès national d’initiative démocratique[Democratic Initiative National Congress ofMali]

66 seats
17 seats(led by Soumaila Cissé)
16 seats

ADEMA
FARE
CODEM
SADI
CNID
Independents
PARENA

Parti pour la renaissance[National Renaissance Party]

6 seats
5 seats
5 seats
4 seats

4 seats
nationale 3 seats

The next parliamentary elections are foreseen to be held in November-December 2018. 99

92 Maliactu, Mali: démission surprise du Premier ministre et du gouvernement (officiel), 29 December 2017, url
93 Le Monde, Un nouveau premier ministre nommé au Mali, 30 December 2017, url

94 Maliactu, Mali: démission surprise du Premier ministre et du gouvernement (officiel), 29 December 2017, url

95Atlasinfo, Mali: le nouveau Premier ministre forme son gouvernement, 31 December 2017, url; France 24, Le nouveau

gouvernement du Mali a été formé, 31 December 2017, url
96 IPU, Mali Assemblée Nationale (National Assembly), General Information, n.d., url
97 IPU, Mali Assemblée Nationale (National Assembly), Electoral System, n.d., url
98 IPU, Mali Assemblée Nationale (National Assembly), Last elections, n.d., url
99 IPU, Mali Assemblée Nationale (National Assembly), Last elections, n.d., url

22 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: MALI - COUNTRY FOCUS

2.2.3 Judiciary
Mali’s justice system is one of ‘legal pluralism’, where multiple legal systems coexist, both in civil
and criminal cases. The 1992 Constitution allows for legislation from multiple systems (including
traditional or customary), provided that they did not conflict with the Constitution itself. 100
In the framework of the Malian legal system, formal actors of justice (lawyers, judges) coexist with
‘informal’ or customary providers of justice, namely qadis, imams, village chiefs, family heads andelders. 101
One source states that Malian people living in urban areas usually resort to state actors of justice,whereas in rural areas people prefer to settle through customary justice actors. 102 The source
adds that these are more present where the state does not exist, therefore the village chief
represents only real authority. 103

State law
The state legal system of Mali is inherited from codes of French law. Following the independence
from France, other laws were enacted to harmonise legal provisions to the Malian environment.
However the French civil rules were still maintained. 104
The Constitution guarantees judicial independence in Mali. 105 Magistrates are subjected only tothe law and the President of the Republic assisted by the Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature[Supreme Judicial Council] guarantees their independence. 106 Mali is the only sub-Saharan country
that has a specific code of judicial ethics for the magistrates, the Code de Déontologie[Deontological code], where judicial diligence is considered an ethical duty. 107
Although checks and balances of powers are provided for by the Malian Constitution and the law,some sources state that the executive exerts influence over the judicial system 108 and over theother branches of government. 109

Customary law
Research indicates that the implementation of customary justice in Mali varies significantly along
regional, ethnic and religious parameters/lines: the actors of customary justice do not follow acommon legal basis or common traditions so that similar cases can be differently approached andjudgements be different. 110
Interviews conducted in Bamako and Mopti during research showed that Malians often prefer toseek justice from customary leaders as these tend to preserve societal cohesion and make more
efforts in trying to find compromising solutions. 111

100 GlobaLex, Guide to Legal Research in Mali,

State and Customary Law: Legal pluralism, November/December 2016,
url; Clingendael, Beyond dichotomy: recognising and reconciling legal pluralism in Mali, url, p. 36
101 Clingendael, Under the microscope: Customary justice systems in northern Mali, 26 July 2017, url
102 GlobaLex, Guide to Legal Research in Mali, State and Customary Law: Legal pluralism, November/December 2016,
url
103 Clingendael, Beyond dichotomy: recognising and reconciling legal pluralism in Mali, url, p. 36
104 GlobalSecurity.org, Mali Government, [2017], url
105 Mali, Portail Officiel de l’Administration Malienne, La constitution du Mali, art. 81, 14 February 1992, url
106 GlobaLex, Guide to Legal Research in Mali, The Judicial Power, November/December 2016, url
107 Law Library of Congress (The), Malian Rules of Judicial Ethics: A Comparative Study, September 2014, url, p. 4; Global
Integrity, Mali, 2018, url, para. 3
108 US DoS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016, Mali, 3 March 2017, url
109 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2018, Mali, Funcioning of government, 2018, url; Global Integrity, Mali, 2018,
url; IDLO, Clingendael, A Crisis Of Confidence, Competence And Capacity: Programming Advice For Strengthening Mali’s
Penal Chain, November 2015, url, p. 20
110 Clingendael, Beyond dichotomy: recognising and reconciling legal pluralism in Mali, url, p. 35
111 Clingendael, Under the microscope: Customary justice systems in northern Mali, July 2017, url; US DoS, Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016, Mali, 3 March 2017, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: MALI - COUNTRY FOCUS — 23

There are several providers of customary justice in Mali, namely family elders, religious leaders(Cadi or Qadi), traditional communicators or local government actors. 112
Cadi decide on disputes and play extrajudicial roles, such as mediators and managers of public
works. 113 Some Cadi in the north of Mali also take decisions on criminal matters, though to alimited extent. 114
The traditional justice mechanisms are easily accessible, not expensive, and familiar. 115
However, the system often lacks neutrality and transparency, leaving people unaware of their civilrights. Women generally have a lower status in the family, so they have less power of negotiationcompared to men, particularly with their husbands. Customary justice is affected by corruption
and politicisation, though to a lesser extent than state justice authorities. 116

Courts
According to the Constitution of Mali, the judiciary power is exerted by the Cour Suprême [Supreme
Court] and other courts and tribunals. 117
In 2011, the Law on Judicial Organisation established the following judicial institutions 118:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

La Cour Suprême [Supreme Court] 119;
La Cour constitutionelle [Constitutional Court] 120;
La Haute Cour de justice [High Court of Justice] 121;
6 Cours d'Appel [Courts of Appeal] 122;
Les Cours of Assises [Courts of Assizes] 123;
6 Cours Administratives d'Appel [Administrative Appeal Courts];
17 Tribunaux de Grande Instance [Grand Courts];
41 Tribunaux d’Instance [District Courts];
12 Tribunaux du Travail [Labour Courts];
Tribunaux de Commerce [Commercial Courts];
6 Tribunaux Administratifs [Administrative Courts];
12 Tribunaux pour Enfants [Juvenile Courts];
Tribunaux militaires [Military Courts]. 124

112 Clingendael, Under the microscope: Customary justice systems in northern Mali, July 2017, url, p. 36.

113 Clingendael, Under the microscope: Customary justice systems in northern Mali, July 2017, url, pag. 15

114 MINUSMA and HRD/OHCHR, Rapport sur la situation des droits de l’homme au Mali du 1er novembre 2013 au 31 mai

2014, 20 March 2015, url, p. 34
115 Clingendael, Beyond dichotomy: recognising and reconciling legal pluralism in Mali, url, p. 37
116 Clingendael, Beyond dichotomy: recognising and reconciling legal pluralism in Mali, url, p. 37
117 Mali, Portail Officiel de l’Administration Malienne, La constitution du Mali, art. 81, 14 February 1992, url
118 Mali, Loi N° 2011-037/du 15 juil 2011, Portant Organisation Judiciaire, 15 July 2011, url
119 The Supreme Court ensures the unity of national law, is the highest court of appeal for civil, criminal andadministrative law cases. LegiGlobe, Mali Constitution et système institutionnel, May 2015, url; GlobaLex, Update: Guide
to Legal Research in Mali, The Judicial Power: The Judiciary, November/December 2016, url
120 GlobaLex, Update: Guide to Legal Research in Mali, The Constitutional Court (Art. 85 -94 Constitution),
November/December 2016, url
121 LegiGlobe, Mali, Organisation judiciaire, 28 May 2015, url
122 There are six Courts of Appeal. They receive appeals deriving from judgements of Grand Courts, District Courts,
Commercial Courts, Labor Courts and Juvenile Courts. LegiGlobe, Mali, Organisation judiciaire, 28 May 2015, url
123 Criminal cases are judged in first and last instance by specific judicial bodies of the Courts of Appeal “le Cour d’Assises”[Courts of Assizes]. The Courts of Assizes are seated in non permanent sessions, one for each Court of Appeal. Specialised
Cours of Assizes are competent for judging criminal cases involving minors. LegiGlobe, Mali, Organisation judiciaire, 28
May 2015, url
124 Globalex, Update: Guide to Legal Research in Mali, Judicial Organisation, November/December 2016, url

24 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: MALI - COUNTRY FOCUS

In 2016 there were three operational courts of appeal and three more were expected to beworking in the coming years. 125
The 2011 judicial reform abolished the Justices de Paix à Compétence Etendue (JPCE) [Justices ofthe peace with extended powers], being replaced by District courts. In practice, some justices ofthe peace are said to be still active; although under the law they do not exist any longer, they areable to reach people when the Grand Court and the relating district are far away from theircommunity. 126

Territorial distribution of the jurisdictions
Judges and lawyers are unevenly distributed across Mali. There are around 630 judges and 334
lawyers available for a total population of 15 million inhabitants; most judicial bodies are based in
Bamako, making access to justice difficult for the rural population. 127
The Supreme Court, The Constitutional Court and the High Court of Justice are in Bamako. 128
Below is the 2011 territorial distribution of jurisdictions in Mali:
Court

RegionCity/Place

Cour d’Appel [Court of Appeal] Bamako District, Kayes,
Sikasso, Ségou, Mopti, Gao
Cour Administrative d’Appel Bamako District, Kayes,[Administrative Court of Sikasso, Ségou, Mopti, Gao
Appeal]Tribunal de Grande Instance[Grand Court]

Tribunal d’Instance [District
Court]

TribunaldeCommerce Bamako District, Kayes,[Commercial Court]
Sikasso, Ségou, Mopti, Gao

Six communes of Bamako
District, Kayes, Koulikoro,
Sikasso,
Ségou,
Mopti,
Timbuktu, Gao, Kidal, Kati,
Koutiala
Yelimane, Diema, Nioro duSahel, Bafoulabe, Kenieba,
Toukoto,Nara
Ouelessebougou,
Kangaba,
Kolokani, Banamba, Fana,
Doila, Bougouni, Yanfolila,
Kadiolo, Kignan, Kolondieba, Y
orosso, Kimparana,
San,
Tominian,Bla,
Markala,Niono; Macina, Baraoueli,
Bandiagara, Bankass, Djenne,
Koro, Teninkou, Douentza,
Youwarou, Diré, Goudam,
Gouma-Rharous,
Niafunke,
Ansongo, Bourem, Menaka

125 GlobaLex, Update: Guide to Legal Research in Mali, The Judicial Power: The Judiciary, November/December 2016, url

126 LegiGlobe, Mali, Organisation judiciaire, 28 May 2015, url; GlobaLex, Update: Guide to Legal Research in Mali, The

Judicial Power: The Judiciary, November/December 2016, url
127 Bertelsmann Stiftung, Transformation Index BTI 2018, Mali, Rule of Law, 2018, url, p. 11
128 Mali, Tribunal de Commerce de Niamey, Organization Judiciaire du Mali, n.d., url; Mali, La Cour Constitutionnelle, url;
GlobaLex, Update: Guide to Legal Research in Mali, The Judicial Power: The Judiciary, November/December 2016, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: MALI - COUNTRY FOCUS — 25

Tribunal
Administratif Bamako District, Kayes,[Administrative Court]
Sikasso, Ségou, Mopti, Gao
Tribunal du Travail [Labour
Court]
Tribunal
pour[Juvenile Court]

Enfants

Bamako District, Kayes, Kita,
Koulikoro,
Kati,
Sikasso,
Koutiala,
Ségou,
Mopti,
Timbuktu, Gao, Kidal
Where a Grand Court orDistrict Court exists; one courtfor Bamako District 129

Military Courts are in Kayes, Bamako and Mopti. 130
Le Pôle judiciaire spécialisé contre le terrorisme et le banditisme transfrontalière [the Specialised
Judicial Unit in the Fight Against Terrorism and Transnational Crime] acts within the Tribunal deGrande Instance de la Commune VI [Grand Court of Commune V] of the District of Bamako. 131

Availability and efficiency of the judiciary
The functioning of the justice system in Mali has been affected by the security situation in the
country since 2012, especially in the north, leading to a ‘fragile’ stability. 132
Different sources report low efficiency 133, corruption 134, lack of resources (human andmaterial) 135, as hindrances to the functioning of the Malian judicial system.
A study by the Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, an inter-governmental research centre based in
Norway, indicates that the judiciary in Mali is permeable to corruption and insufficiently
independent ‘to pursue politicised cases’. 136
One source states that Malian people living in urban areas usually resort to state actors of justice,whereas in rural areas people prefer to settle through customary justice actors, 137 as the latter arepresent where the state is not, are informal and reconciliation-oriented. 138
Researchers indicate that some of the main challenges to an efficient justice system in Mali are: its
complicated structure; the general use of the French language; the costs to reach it and use it,
especially for rural populations, and ‘endemic corruption’. Additionally, an overall lack of
information on procedures and laws hampers most Malian citizens’ access to formal justice in the
country. 139 In a 2015 survey, 60 % of the respondents indicated dissatisfaction with the Malianjustice system. 140

129 Mali, Loi N° 2011-038 du 15 juil 2011 portant creation de juridictions, 15 July 2011, url
130 LegiGlobe, Mali, Organisation judiciaire, 28 May 2015, url

131 LegiGlobe, Mali, Organisation judiciaire, 28 May 2015, url; Maliactu.net, Mali: Communique du Conseil des Ministresdu Mercredi 14 Octobre 2015, 14 October 2015, url
132 Transparency International, Mali: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption, 19 October 2017, url, p. 2
133 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2016, Mali, 2016, url
134 Bertelsmann Stiftung, Transformation Index BTI 2018 Mali, 2018, url, p. 11; US DoS, Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices for 2016, Mali, 3 March 2017, url; Transparency International, Mali: Overview of corruption and anticorruption, 19 October 2017, url
135 Bertelsmann Stiftung, Transformation Index BTI 2018 Mali, 2018, url, p. 11
136 Transparency International, Mali: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption, 19 October 2017, url
137 GlobaLex, Update: Guide to Legal Research in Mali, State and Customary Law: Legal pluralism, November/December
2016, url
138 Clingendael, Beyond dichotomy: recognising and reconciling legal pluralism in Mali, October 2015, url, p. 36
139 Clingendael, Beyond dichotomy: recognising and reconciling legal pluralism in Mali, October 2015, url, p. 57
140 IDLO, Clingendael, A Crisis Of Confidence, Competence And Capacity, November 2015, url, p. 16

26 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: MALI - COUNTRY FOCUS

A survey conducted by the World Bank Group on the public perception of the Malian justice system
revealed that citizens consider judges and magistrates, business executives and the police as thosemost involved in corruption. 141
As a reaction to the malfunctioning of the judiciary, some sources report on a potential resurfacingof a ‘lynching culture’ in Mali, with citizens taking justice in their hands. 142
The practice known as ‘article 320’ takes its name from the price of one litre of gasoline(CFA 300 francs), and a box of matches (CFA 20 francs), in 1991. The perpetrators would douse thesuspect in petrol and strike a match. 143
Mob justice has grown in recent years, with ‘dozens of people […] brutally killed’, for crimes likemotorbike theft. According to one source, the authorities have not charged any perpetrators, andthere is no case law available from Malian criminal courts. The source argues that at times, thepolice can be targeted by ‘article 320’ if the perpetrators perceive the police as trying to rescue
their original target, or if the police force tries to bring the perpetrator to justice. 144
For more information on extrajudicial conflict resolution, see 2.3.2 Efficiency and integrity of the
security forces .

Justice against impunity
Sources agree that the Malian government is making efforts to prosecute abuses committed during
the 2012-13 conflict, although not those committed by the armed forces. 145
Human rights organisations have noted the proceedings against two relevant figures in the 201213 conflict: the former leader of the military junta, Amadou Haya Sanogo, and the Islamic
commissioner of Gao, Aliou Mahamane Touré. 146 The prosecution of Al Hassan, chief of the Islamic
police in Timbuktu in 2012-2013, was transferred to the International Criminal Court (ICC), where
he stands accused of war crimes and other serious gender-based crimes. 147
On December 2016, the Ministry of Justice announced the creation of a special investigationsgroup within the Specialised Judicial Unit for the fight against terrorism and transnational crime todeal with serious crime. The group is not yet fully operational. 148
The Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Mali reported to the UN Security
Council on February and March 2018 that no relevant progress was observed in the judiciary as
regards the fight against impunity for which the Malian government had committed itself under
the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement. Except for the sentencing of Aliou Mahamane Touré andthe conviction of Ahmad Al Mahdi Al Faqi (member of the Islamic police of Timbuktu in 2012) for

141 Transparency International, Mali: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption, 19 October 2017, url; Afrobarometer,

In Mali, citizens’ access to justice compromised by perceived bias, corruption, complexity, in The Afrobarometer Dispatch
No. 166, 19 October 2017, url, pp. 2, 5
142 Kansaye, B., Mob justice in West Africa: The enforcement of the so-called “Article320” in Mali, May 2018, url;
Bamada.net, Justice Populaire Au Mali: Le Syndrome De L’Article 320 Gagne De Nouveau Les Rues De Bamako, 4 May
2016, url
143 Kansaye, B., Mob justice in West Africa: The enforcement of the so-called “Article320” in Mali, May 2018, url;
Bamada.net, Justice Populaire Au Mali: Le Syndrome De L’Article 320 Gagne De Nouveau Les Rues De Bamako, 4 May
2016, url
144 Kansaye, B., Mob justice in West Africa: The enforcement of the so-called “Article320” in Mali, May 2018, url;
Bamada.net, Justice Populaire Au Mali: Le Syndrome De L’Article 320 Gagne De Nouveau Les Rues De Bamako, 4 May
2016, url
145 FIDH and AMDH Mali, Choosing justice in the face of crisis, December 2017, url, p. 5; HRW, World report 2018, Mali,
Events of 2017, 2018, url
146 FIDH and AMDH Mali, Choosing justice in the face of crisis, December 2017, url
147 FIDH, Mali, Al Hassan to the ICC: a milestone for justice, 3 April 2018, url
148 HRW, World report 2018, Mali, Events of 2017, 2018, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: MALI - COUNTRY FOCUS — 27

the destruction of monuments in the Timbuktu region, most abuses and violations of human rights
and international humanitarian law have not yet been prosecuted. 149

Detention and prisons
The Direction National de l'Administration Pénitentiaire et de l’Education Surveillée (DNAPES)[National Directorate of Penitentiary Administration and Supervised Education], under the
Ministry of Justice, is responsible for the prisons and detention centres in Mali, including themonitoring of conditions in those facilities. 150 According to ISSAT, ‘it is unclear whether it [DNAPES]
is effective or even active.’ 151
There are 59 [another source mentions 54 152] prisons and detention centres in Mali, including four
agricultural penitentiaries (Kénieroba, Baguinéda, Tana and Konséguela), where end-of-sentence
prisoners receive reintegration skills. 153
Overcrowding was mentioned by several sources as one of the main issues in the penitentiary
system in Mali. As an example, the Central Prison in Bamako was designed for 400 prisoners, andheld 1 964 persons in 2017. 154.
Human Rights Watch states that the slowness of the Malian judicial system contributes to prison
overcrowding, since detainees are kept in extended pretrial detention. 155
Poor condition of the detention facilities 156 and difficulties in reintegrating ex-prisoners 157 werereported. Human Rights Watch indicates that in 2017, the Malian government made ‘some effort[…] to rehabilitate and improve prison conditions’. 158
Prisoners are generally separated by gender 159. ISSAT however indicates that the Malian Centre
on Women and Children and the Ministry of Women, Children and the Family reported that out of
54 detentions centres, 41 had no dedicated sections for minors, although it is prescribed bynational legislation. 160
The Commission Nationale Des Droits De L’Homme (CNDH) [National Commission for Human
Rights] is the Malian independent authority responsible for protecting and promoting humanrights, and preventing acts or torture and other punishment or cruel, inhumane and degrading
treatments, and it can visit - regularly and unannounced - detention centres and prisons and reportand recommend actions to the competent authorities. 161
Despite that capacity, the US DoS reports that the CNDH only conducted visits on a regular basis
to Bamako’s Central Prison, not outside the capital. Its last visit to a military detention centre
occurred in 2012. According to the US DoS, in 2016 the CNDH reported the death in prison of 27
inmates due to unhealthy prison conditions. 162

149 UN HRC, Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Mali, 2 February 2018, url, pp. 6-7

150 ICPR, World Prison Brief, Mali, [2014], url; US DoS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017, Mali, 20

April, url
151 ISSAT, Mali SSR Background note, 7 December 2017, url
152 ISSAT, Mali SSR Background note, 7 December 2017, url
153 LegiGlobe, Mali, 28 May 2015, url
154 LegiGlobe, Mali, 28 May 2015, url; US DoS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017, Mali, 20 April, url
155 HRW, World report 2018, Mali, Events of 2017, 2018, url
156 LegiGlobe, Mali, 28 May 2015, url; US DoS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017, Mali, 20 April, url
157 LegiGlobe, Mali, 28 May 2015, url
158 HRW, World report 2018, Mali, Events of 2017, 2018, url
159 US DoS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017, Mali, 20 April, url
160 ISSAT, Mali SSR Background note, 7 December 2017, url
161 Mali, Loi N°2016-036 Portant la Creation De La Commission Nationale Des Droits De L’homme, 7 July 2016, url;
Juriafrica, The Human Rights Commission Was Established in Mali, 19 March 2017, url
162 US DoS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017, Mali, 20 April 2018, url

28 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: MALI - COUNTRY FOCUS

Amnesty International reported the existence of an unofficial place of detention in Bamako, known
as Sécureté d’Etat [State Security], where no inspections are carried out, nor are lawyers and family
members allowed to meet with detainees. Detainees include persons accused of terrorism andsuspected members or sympathisers of armed groups. 163

2.3 Security forces, army, police
The Malian security sector includes various bodies; their tasks are controlled and overseen by
civilian authorities and legal provisions are available in order to prevent violations by the actors of
the security sector. 164
The executive branch holds the power to govern the actions of all armed forces; it exerts control
at all levels and expresses guidelines and priorities. The president of the republic is thecommander-in-chief of the armed forces and presides over the National Defense Council, thatprovides general guidance for national defense, and over the Committee for National Defense, thatgives military guidance for national defence. 165
The president is the supreme commander of the armed forces; the prime minister is responsible
for the implementation of the defense policy. 166

2.3.1 Forces Armées Maliennes (FAMa) [Malian Armed Forces]
The Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) are responsible for the defence of the country. During times ofpeace, the FAMa support the maintenance of public order. 167
The FAMa include the Armée de Terre [Land Force] and the Armée de l'Air [Air Force]. The
Gendarmerie Nationale [National Gendarmerie] and the Garde Nationale [National Guard] are alsopart of the FAMa, all under the authority of the Ministère de la Defense et des Anciens Combattants(MDAC) [Ministry of Armed Forces and Former Combatants]. 168
The operational control of the National Guard and the National Gendarmerie is shared between
the MDAC and the Ministère de la Sécurité et de la Protection Civile [Ministry of Internal Security
and Civil Protection]. 169
In 2015, the Active Malian Armed Forces consisted of a staff of 15 800 personnel. 170
The 2015 Loi d'orientation et de la programmation militaire [Military Orientation and Programming
Law] foresaw the modernisation of the FAMa and the enrolment of 10 000 volunteers, increasing
the number of FAMa to 20 000 by 2019. 171
In 2017, 5 000 new soldiers joined the Malian army 172 and another 5 000 were recruited in
2018. 173

163 Amnesty International, Mali, Des Exactions Perpetrées Dans Un Contexte D’instabilité Croissante, January 2018, url,

p. 10
164 ISSAT, Mali SSR Background note, 7 December 2017, url
165 ISSAT, Mali SSR Background note, 7 December 2017, url
166 Mali, Forces Armées Mailennes, Site Officiel, n.d., url; ISSAT, Mali SSR Background note, 7 December 2017, url;
defenceWeb, Mali Military, 8 August 2013, url
167 ISSAT, Mali SSR Background Note, Defence, last update 20 July 2018, url
168 Mali, Ministère De La Defense Et Des Anciens Combattants, n.d., url
169 Mali, Ministère de la Sécurité et de la Protection Civile, n.d., url
170 World Bank, Mali, Armed forces personnel, 2015, url
171 GlobalSecurity, Mali Army, n.d., url
172 Maliactu.net: Armée: 5000 nouvelles recrues en 2017, 10 May 2017, url
173 Mali, Forces Armées Maliennes, Official Website, n.d., url; Malijet, Armée: nouvelle phase de recrutement en 2018,22 January 2018, url; Mali, Forces Armées Maliennes, Listes des Candidats Admissibles au Concours de Recrutement deL’armée, [2018], url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: MALI - COUNTRY FOCUS — 29

2.3.2 Internal security
Internal security and public order in Mali is maintained by the following bodies and institutions:
•
•
•
•
•

La Police Nationale [National Police - NP];La Police Judiciaire [Judicial Police];
La Garde Nationale [National Guard];
La Gendarmerie Nationale [National Gendarmerie];
La Direction Générale de la Sécurité d'Etat [General Directorate of State Security], thegovernment’s intelligence service. 174

National Police
The National Police is a civilian force under the authority of the Ministère de la Sécurité et de laProtection Civile [Ministry of Internal Security and Civil Protection]. 175
The NP is mandated to protect people and property, identify and record criminal offenses, gather
evidence, and find and arrest perpetrators; it can also seek and gather intelligence to informgovernment decision-making. 176 The NP operates in urban areas. 177
The NP can also participate in peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance missions, and inprotection and civil defense actions. 178
It includes three main corps of civil servants: the police commissioners, the police inspectors andthe police sous-officiers. 179 The NP is employs over 6 000 individuals, 700 of whom are women. 180

Judicial Police
The Judicial Police is part of the National Police and is mandated to report violations of criminal
law, gather evidence, track down suspects and support investigating authorities after a case isopened. The Judicial Police is administratively under the MoI while they are directed by the publicprosecutor. 181

National Guard
The National Guard is a military force responsible for providing security to Malian institutions andpolitical and administrative authorities, prison service, keeping public safety and order, and thesurveillance of Mali’s territory. 182 According to the US DoS 2017 report, it has ‘specialised bordersecurity units, which were largely ineffective’. 183
The National Guard also has special units on camel – the meharist units (or Camel Corps) - to patrol
exclusively the desert in the north of Mali. These units gather intelligence and patrol borderareas. The National Guard also participates in peacekeeping and humanitarian assistancemissions. 184

174 Mali, Ministère de la Sécuritè et de la Protection Civile Organisation, n.d.,url; ISSAT, Mali SSR Background note, 7
December 2017, url
175 ISSAT, Mali SSR Background note, 7 December 2017, url; Mali, Police Nationale du Mali, n.d., url
176 ISSAT, Mali SSR Background note, 7 December 2017, url; Mali, Ministère de la Sécuritè et de la Protection Civile, La
Police Nationale, Mission, n.d., url
177 US DoS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016, 3 March 2017, url
178 Mali, Ministère de la Sécuritè et de la Protection Civile, La Police Nationale, Mission, n.d., url
179 Mali, Ministère de la Sécuritè et de la Protection Civile, La Police Nationale, Mission, n.d., url
180 ISSAT, Mali SSR Background note, 7 December 2017, url; Mali, Ministère de la Sécuritè et de la Protection Civile, La
Police Nationale, Mission, n.d., url
181 ISSAT, Mali SSR Background note, 7 December 2017, url
182 Mali, Ministère de la Sécuritè et de la Protection Civile, La Garde Nationale, n.d., url
183 US DoS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017, Mali, 20 April, url
184 Mali, Ministère de la Sécuritè et de la Protection Civile, La Garde Nationale, n.d., url30 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: MALI - COUNTRY FOCUS

Administratively it falls under the authority of the MDAC, and when deployed responds to the
Ministry of Internal Security and Civil Protection. 185

National Gendarmerie
The National Gendarmerie is a military formation that keeps internal security and order; it
participates in the defence of the territory, and peace and humanitarian assistance missions. 186
It shares responsibilities with the National Police and the National Guard, including gathering
intelligence and protecting private property 187, mainly in rural environment. 188
It falls under the authority of the Ministry of Security and Civil Protection and the Ministry of Armed
Forces. 189 2015 data indicates 4 000 staff members, 100 of whom are women. 190
According to ISSAT, since the 2012 crisis in the north of Mali, the government has deployed an
additional 2 026 gendarmes and police officers to the region, where only 469 were present before
the coup. 191
The General Directorate of State Security investigates any criminal case, and can temporarily
detain people at the discretion of its Director General, mainly in terrorism and national security
cases. 192

Efficiency and integrity of the security forces
ISSAT states that Mali’s internal security apparatus has always suffered from lack of resources, low
pay and inadequate training. Especially in the north of Mali, the security services are insufficiently
established, with low concentration of infrastructure and staff. Cross-border crime is difficult tomonitor due to porous borders, and the influx of illegal transfers of small arms, human trafficking
and trade of illicit drugs has been difficult to address. Police officers and gendarmes have beenaccused of extortion and bribery at checkpoints. 193 There are reports of gender-based violence(GBV) by security forces. 194 For more on GBV, see 4.1.2 Social and political violence.
In 2016, the International Crisis Group noted that although the government took measures tosecure central Mali, violence was spreading; as a reaction, communities were arming themselves
and militias were becoming stronger. 195
In June 2018, Malian security forces were responsible for the extrajudicial killing of 15 Fulani
civilians in central Mali. 196
A 2015 survey shows that 65 % of the interviewees were dissatisfied or highly dissatisfied with theefficiency of the police and gendarmerie. Only 10 % responded they had contacted the police toreport a crime. 60 % of the respondents were dissatisfied with the Malian justice system. 197

185 ISSAT, Mali SSR Background note, 7 December 2017, url

186 Mali, Ministère de la Sécuritè et de la Protection Civile, La Gendarmerie Nationale, Mission, n.d., url; ISSAT, Mali SSR

Background note, 7 December 2017, url
187 ISSAT, Mali SSR Background note, 7 December 2017, url
188 US DoS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016, Mali, 3 March 2017, url
189 ISSAT, Mali SSR Background note, 7 December 2017, url
190 ISSAT, Mali SSR Background note, 7 December 2017, url; US DoS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for
2016, Mali, 3 March 2017, url
191 ISSAT, Mali SSR Background note, 7 December 2017, url
192 US DoS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016, Mali, 3 March 2017, url
193 ISSAT, Mali SSR Background note, 7 December 2017, url
194 UN, Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sexual Violence in Conflict, Mali, [April 2018],
url
195 International Crisis Group, Central Mali: An Uprising in the Making?, 6 July 2016, url
196 ECFR, Mali’s impunity problem and growing security crisis, 28 June 2018, url
197 IDLO, Clingendael, A Crisis Of Confidence, Competence And Capacity: Programming Advice For Strengthening Mali’s
Penal Chain, November 2015, url, p. 16

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: MALI - COUNTRY FOCUS — 31

In January 2015, the EU Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP) was established in Mali to assist theinternal security forces with reasserting the government’s authority over the whole of the country.
In January 2017 the Council of the European Union extended the EUCAP mission until
January 2019. 198
Domestic violence is an issue. Despite some governmental measures, there is no reliable data, andISSAT indicates that the police has been reluctant to intervene in such cases. 199
Tensions between the population and the army persists since the time of the authoritarian rule.
Underpayment, lack of training, and unsuccessful battles against the terrorist groups undermined
the legitimacy and the image of the Malian army. Furthermore, the security forces patrolling andintervening to stop community tensions and protect civilians were also accused of targeting
specific ethnic groups and committing serious violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law, including extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, torture, and arbitraryarrest. 200
Suspecting nomadic Fulani populations of complicity with jihadi groups, FAMa troops haveincreasingly been accused of abuse against Fulani civilians. 201 Over 70 cases of torture or illtreatment of suspected Islamist rebels were reported and violations have been documented by
Human Rights Watch during the 2013 offensive to take back the north. Very few cases were
investigated and none of the allegedly responsible persons was prosecuted. 202
Mali’s army is reported to be overstaffed but it is not possible to know to what extent due to aphenomenon of absenteeism. In the lower ranks, soldiers are often ill-equipped with militaryequipment from different countries and not well trained. 203

3. Crisis in northern Mali
3.1 Political history
The great western empires period was followed by internal wars and the formation of smaller
states, most often ethnically based, such as the Bambara kingdom (in the Ségou region) 204, theFulani kingdom of Macina (in the Mopti region) 205 and the Wasulu Empire (Maninka, between
current Mali, Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia). 206 The country was colonised by France in the latenineteenth century under the name of Soudan Français. 207 It became independent on
22 September 1960. 208

198 EUCAP Sahel Mali, About us and our mandate, n.d., url

199 ISSAT, Mali SSR Background note, 7 December 2017, url; US DoS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for

2016, 3 March 2017, url
200 ISSAT, Mali SSR Background note, 7 December 2017, url; HRW, World report 2018, Mali, Events of 2017, 2018, url
201 Centre FrancoPaix en résolution des confits et missions de paix, Insecurity, the Breakdowon of Social Trust, and Armed
Actor Governance in Central and Northern Mali, August 2017, url, p. 13
202 HRW, Collapse, Conflict And Atrocity In Mali, May 2014, url, p. 2
203 Global Security, Mali Army / Forces Armées Maliennes, n.d., url
204 Fierro, A., Kaarta, Encyclopaedia Universalis, n.d., url; Imperato, P. J. and Imperato, G. H., Historical Dictionary of Mali,
2008, p. 348
205 Piault, M., Afrique noire (culture et société), religions, n.d., url; Fierro, A., Kaarta, n.d., url; Imperato, P. J. andImperato, G. H., Historical Dictionary of Mali, 2008, p. 351
206 Ajayi, J. F. A., General History of Africa, Vol. VI: Africa in the nineteenth Century until the 1880s, 1989; Gann, L. H. andDuigan, P., The History and politics of colonialism 1870-1914, 1969
207 Imperato, P. J. and Imperato, G. H., Historical Dictionary of Mali, 2008; Niane, D. T. , L’Afrique du XIIe au XVIe siècle,2000
208 Imperato, P. J. and Imperato, G. H., Historical Dictionary of Mali, 2008, p. 357; Konate, D., Travail de mémoire etconstruction nationale au Mali, 2006; Boilley, P. et al., Mali, Encyclopaedia Universalis, n.d., url

32 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: MALI - COUNTRY FOCUS

The first republic of Mali was a socialist non-aligned country until the military coup in 1968. 209
President Modibo Keïta refused to extend this model as it opposed the socialist nature of his
regime which intended, on the contrary, to directly administer the whole country and to break thepower of the feudal chieftaincies. 210
Each regime experienced a Tuareg rebellion, claiming for better living conditions, better
integration in the development policies 211 and more autonomy in the ruling of northern regions
they call Azawad, referring to a historical region of 800 000 km2 above the ancient city of Timbuktu,
comprising Gao and Kidal. Since the 1990s, Azawad is the keyword of the Tuareg political claim forindependence. The Tuaregs, who claim autonomy for Azawad, are the majority in the region of
Kidal, but not in that of Gao and Timbuktu, which they believe belongs to them. 212
The first Tuareg rebellion occurred between 1962 and 1963 to claim for the preservation of therole of the Tuareg chieftaincy, but it had been suppressed violently by the authorities and many
Tuareg fled the country to escape the massacres of the Malian army. 213
According to the former French diplomat Laurent Bigot [currently independent consultant], Tuareg
demands are similar as those of other ethnic groups who ‘suffer in the same way from corruptionthat plagues the Malian administration at all level and the lack of development’, underlining that
Tuareg are not the majority of the population, even in the northern regions of Mali. 214
Many Tuareg went to Libya in the 1970s where they received military training by the regime of
Gadhafi. They formed the Islamic Legion between 1972 and 1985. When they returned to Mali,
they not only brought their military knowhow, but also a radical interpretation of Islam. 215 On
27 June 1990, a gendarmerie post was attacked in Menaka (north) by the Mouvement Populaire
pour la Libération de l’Azawad (MPLA) [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad], a rebel
group led by Iyad Ag Ghaly. 216
In 1990, poverty and democratic aspirations were spreading in the country and the population was
calling for a multiparty regime. 217 With the help of Algerian mediation, a peace agreement was
signed in January 1991 in Tamanrasset (Algeria), between the Malian government and the MPLA.
Some fighters were integrated in the Malian national armed forces. The MPLA was thendissolved. 218
On 26 March 1991, two months after the signature of the agreement that largely weakened thepower of the government 219, a coup overthrew President Moussa Traoré, and General Amadou
Toumani Touré organised democratic elections in 1992. 220

209 Boilley, P. et al., Mali, Encyclopaedia Universalis, n.d., url

210 Grégoire, E., Islamistes et rebelles touaregs maliens, 2013, url

211 Morgan, A., Les clés de la guerre dans le Nord, 8 April 2012, url;Bernus, E., Etre Touareg au Mali, url, p. 26; GRIPCI,
Le conflit touareg au Mali et au Niger, 2002, url
212 Tagnan, R. A. , Au Mali, pas de statut juridique et politique pour l’Azawad, 3 April 2017, url
213 Boilley, P., Les Touaregs Kel Adagh, Dépendances et révolte, Collection Hommes et Sociétés, 1999, pp. 348-350
214 Bigot, L., Les défis du Sahel: Focus sur la crise au Mali [online video], 22 June 2012, url
215 Douglas-Bowers, D., The Crisis in Mali: A Historical Perspective on the Tuareg People, 1 February 2013, url
216 Roger, B., Mali: retour sur le régime de Moussa Traoré en dix dates, 25 March 2016, url; Boilley, P. et al., Mali,
Encyclopaedia Universalis, n.d., url
217 Roger, B., Mali: retour sur le régime de Moussa Traoré en dix dates, 25 March 2016, url; Boilley, P. et al., Mali,
Encyclopaedia Universalis, n.d., url
218 Sahel and West Africa Club, Cahiers de l’Afrique de l'Ouest, Un atlas du Sahara-Sahel, 19 december 2014, p. 184;
Mali, Accord sur la cessation des hostilités, 6 January 1991, url
219 Grégoire, E., Islamistes et rebelles touaregs maliens: alliances, rivalités et ruptures, 2013, url
220 Roger, B., Mali: retour sur le régime de Moussa Traoré en dix dates, 25 March 2016, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: MALI - COUNTRY FOCUS — 33

After two democratic mandates of Alpha Oumar Konaré (1992-1997 and 1997-2002), Amadou
Toumani Touré came back as a civilian to run as president for the 2002 elections and became thesecond president of the Republic of Mali. 221
In 2006-2007, a new Tuareg rebellion occurred in the north of Mali. Together with the politicalclaims, Tuareg were fighting to take control over the city of Kidal, a key passage for drug traffickers.
This rebellion paved the way to the 2012 multidimensional crisis: 222•••

In January 2012, the northern part of the country was occupied by Islamist armed groups.
Some Tuareg independent activists joined these terrorist groups.
In March, a military coup weakened the rule of law and strengthened the rebellion.
On 6 April 2012, the Tuareg rebellion through the Mouvement National de Liberation del’Azawad (MNLA) [National Movement of Liberation of Azawad] voice, unilaterally
declared the independence of the state of Azawad. 223 After that, the jihadi groups(MUJAO, Ansar al-Din) joined in and marginalised the MNLA. 224

Terror attacks and general insecurity led hundreds of thousands of civilians to flee the fighting
areas and move to the south of Mali or to neighbouring countries. 225

3.2 Actors of the crisis in northern Mali
The Malian state and loyalist militias are committed to defend the territorial integrity andsovereignty of Mali and to preserve national unity. Since the 2012 crisis, the number of armed
groups has increased with each negotiation round, raising contradictory requests and making
peace every time more difficult to reach. From two [MNLA and the Haut conseil pour l’unité del’Azawad – HCUA (High Council for the Unity of Azawad)], they are now eight associated with thePeace process, in two different coalitions: the Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA)[Coordination of Azawad Movements] (former rebellion, anti-Bamako) and the Platform (proBamako).
Gathered under the Platform [loyalist militias] are the following armed groups in Mali: 226•••

Groupe autodéfense touareg Imghad et alliés (GATIA): [Tuareg Imghad self-defence group
and allies], led by El Hadj Ag Gamou;
Coordination des mouvements et forces patriotiques de résistance n°1 (CM-FPR.1):[Coordination of Patriotic Movements and Forces of the Resistance #1] is a coalition of
mainly Songhai self-defense militias such as Ganda-Koy, Ganda-Izo, Forces de libération du
Nord (FLN) [Front for the Liberation of the North]; CM-FPR.1 is opposed to CM-FPR.2 whichis part of the CMA, opposed to Bamako; 227
Alliance des communautés de la région de Tombouctou (ACRT): [Alliance of Communitiesof the Timbuktu Region], the Force armée contre l’occupation (FACO) [Armed force against

Perret, T., Medias et démocratie au Mali, Le journalisme dans son milieu, 2005, url, pp. 18-32; Boilley, P.,
Présidentielles maliennes: l’enracinement démocratique?, 2002, url, pp.171-182
222 Strazzari, F., Azawad and the rights of passage, January 2015, url; Musilli, P. and Smith, P., The lawless roads: an
overview of turbulence across the Sahel, 10 June 2013, url
223 Ngassam, R. N., Mali - Azawad, zone de non-droit, September 2016, url
224 L'Evénement, Rebelles touaregs: “Pourquoi nous reprenons les armes…”, 5 April 2012, url; Guidere, M., Ansar Dine
est le véritable maître du Nord-Mali, 28 June 2012, url; France24, La ville de Gao est tombée aux mains des islamistes,
28 June 2012, url
225 Thiam, A., Centre du Mali: enjeux et dangers d’une crise négligée, March 2017, url, p. 7
226 Maïga, I., Armed groups in Mali: Beyond the labels, June 2016, url, p. 6; Bamada.net, 12 principaux groupes armés au
Mali…qui sont les vrais maîtres?, 22 May 2015, url; Boutellis, Arthur and Zahar, Marie-Joëlle, A Process in Search of
Peace, June 2017, url, p. 11
227 Bamada.net, 12 principaux groupes armés au Mali…qui sont les vrais maîtres?, 22 May 2015, url
221

34 —

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: MALI - COUNTRY FOCUS•

occupation], the Centre de réflexion et d’action (CRA) [Centre for reflection and action] 228
and other groups such as the loyalist MAA.2 (opposed to MAA.1) are part of the
CMFPR; (229)
Mouvement populaire pour le salut de l’Azawad (MPSA): [Popular movement for thesalvation of Azawad] was created in August 2014 from a split of the MAA. 230

Ethnically based insurgent groups considered as non-terrorist rebel armed groups by Bamako,
associated in the Peace Process as the CMA (Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad): 231•••

Mouvement national pour la libération de l’Azawad (MNLA): [National Movement for the
Liberation of Azawad] is a secular Tuareg rebel organisation which merged with Ansar Dine
in 2012. 232 Its leader is Bilal Ag Cherif. The movement first fought for the independence ofthe northern Azawad region in 2012 but after several blowbacks, the group lost its
importance and start claiming for autonomy in 2013. 233 MNLA resulted from the merging
of the Mouvement national de l’Azawad (MNA) [National Movement of Azawad] and theMouvement Touareg du Nord Mali (MTNM) [Tuareg movement of northern Mali]; 234
Haut conseil pour l’unité de l’Azawad (HCUA) [High Council for the Unity of Azawad]; 235
Mouvement Arabe de l’Azawad (MAA.1) [Arab Movement of Azawad], former Front delibération nationale de l'Azawad (FLNA) [National Liberation Front of Azawad]. 236

Other groups are or have been partially linked to the CMA:
•
•
•
•
•

Mouvement islamique de l’Azawad (MIA) [Islamic Movement of Azawad] 237
Coalition du peuple pour l’Azawad (CPA) [Coalition of the people for Azawad] 238
Coordination des mouvements et forces patriotiques de résistance n°2 (CM-FPR.2)[Coordination of Patriotic Movements and Forces of the Resistance #2], a split from the
CMFPR 239
Mouvement pour le salut de l’Azawad (MSA) [Movement for the salvation of Azawad]
Front populaire de l’Azawad (FPA) [Popular Front of Azawad] quitted the CMA in
November 2014. 240

Jihadi terrorist armed groups that cannot be included in the Peace process: 241

228 Jeune Afrique, Mali: formation de groupes d'autodéfense pour "libérer" le Nord, 22 July 2012, url; McGregor, A.,

Mali’s Ganda Iso Militia Splits Over Support for Tuareg Rebel Group, 21 February 2014, url
229 Boutellis, A. and Zahar, M., A Process in Search of Peace, June 2017, url, pp. 4-5
230 Bamada.net, 12 principaux groupes armés au Mali… qui sont les vrais maîtres?, 22 May 2015, url
231 RFI, Mali: les mouvements de l’Azawad créent une coordination militaire, 29 October 2014, url
232 Tracking Terrorism, National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), 2018, url
233 Welsh, M. Y., Making sense of Mali's armed groups, 17 January 2013, url
234 Plantade, Y., La nouvelle géopolitique post-Kadhafi explique les problèmes actuels au Mali, 12 March 2012, url
235 Nord-Sud Journal, Alghabass Ag Intalla: "les combattants qui s’engagent savent qu’ils peuvent mourir au combat, Ce
ne sont pas des chômeurs que nous envoyons pour toucher un salaire", 16 February 2017, url; Moulaye, Z., Les défis etenjeux sécuritaires dans l’espace sahélo-saharien, la perspective du Mali, 2016, url
236 Bache, D., Mali: signature de l'accord de paix, sans les principaux groupes rebelles, 16 May 2015, url; Nord-Sud Journal,
Alghabass Ag Intalla: "les combattants qui s’engagent savent qu’ils peuvent mourir au combat, Ce ne sont pas deschômeurs que nous envoyons pour toucher un salaire", 16 February 2017, url
237 RFI, Mali: le MNLA accueille avec méfiance la création du MIA, scission d’Ansar Dine, 25 January 2013, url
238 Sangare, B., Négociations avec les groupes rebelles armés: Médiateurs antinomiques pour négociations
compliquées?, 24 February 2014, url
239 Bamada.net, 12 principaux groupes armés au Mali… qui sont les vrais maîtres?, 22 May 2015, url
240 Le Potentiel, Mali: Démission du FPA de la coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad: Le MNLA plus que jamais seul,
5 December 2014, url
241 FIDH, Mali: Terrorism and impunity jeopardize the fragile peace agreement, 11 May 2017, url; Macé, C., Mali : lesgroupes armés du Nord enterrent la hache de guerre, 22 September 2017, url; Boisbouvier, C., Me Baber Gamo (Mali):’Les accords d’Alger marchent bien, c’est un processus’, 13 July 2017, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: MALI - COUNTRY FOCUS — 35

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), other known names: Groupe Salafiste Pour laPredication et le Combat (GSPC) [Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat - Salafist Group for Calland Combat]; Tanzim al-Qa’ida fi Bilad al-Maghrib al-Islamiya. 242
AQIM is mostly composed of Algerians and Mauritanians that have been complicit to kidnappingsin northern Mali since 2003. The structure of the leadership is unclear but it generally believed that
Abdel Malek Droukdel aka Abu Musab abdel Wadoud is the group’s leader. 243
Before 2006, the group was known as the Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et le combat until itchanged its name into al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 244 after joining Al-Qaeda officially. 245
Ethnic Arabs and Tuareg later joined the group, as did people from Senegal and Niger. AQIM could
gain in popularity by working together with Ansar Dine. 246 It is mostly regionally focused but has
gained an openly anti-Western stance and rhetoric. It has declared its aspirations to overthrow
African regimes that it considers to be ‘apostates’ in order to create an Islamic State. 247
Ansar Dine
Other known names: Ansar Dine; Ansar al-Din; Ançar Dine; Ansar ul-Din; Ansar Eddine; Defendersof the Faith. 248
Ansar Dine is a religiously motivated group that is composed of ethnic Tuareg and Berbers. The
group was established in 2011 and recognised as a foreign terrorist organisation in March 2012. 249
The group is led by Iyad Ag Ghali although it is an umbrella organisation of Al-Qaeda. 250
The organisation took over the north of Mali in cooperation with AQIM and MUJAO after the coupof 2012. 251 It enforced a fundamental interpretation of the Sharia and destroyed several UNESCOWorld Heritage sites in regions under its control. 252
French and African forces could force Ansar Dine out of many population centres after 2013. Iyad
Ag Ghali seems to remain under their control however. 253
Ansar Dine recruits its members on a local basis in the hope to establish a longer lasting presencein the regions under their control. The goal of this organisation is to establish a fundamentalist
interpretation of the Sharia in the whole of the Muslim world. Ansar Dine’s influence does however
not extend further than northern Mali. 254
Mouvement pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO) [Movement for Unity andJihad in West Africa], created in 2011, is a splinter group from AQIM with which it is still
cooperating. 255
It has very similar goals to Ansar Dine in that it strives to establish the Sharia as a ruling principle
in the Muslim World. Contrary to this group, it does not recruit local Malians. It is believed that the
242 US DoS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2016, Foreign Terrorist Organizations: Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),
19 July 2017, url
243 Welsh, M. Y., Making sense of Mali's armed groups, 17 January 2013, url
244 Bossard, L., Terrorisme saharo sahélien en Afrique de l’Ouest, April 2016, pp. 67-71
245 US DoS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2016, Foreign Terrorist Organizations: Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),
19 July 2017, url
246 Welsh, M. Y., Making sense of Mali's armed groups, 17 January 2013, url
247 US DoS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2016, Foreign Terrorist Organizations: Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),
19 July 2017, url
248 US DoS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2016, Foreign Terrorist Organizations: Ansar al-Dine (AAD), 19 July 2017, url
249 US DoS, Country Report on Terrorism 2015, Chapter 6, Ansar al-Dine, 2 June 2016, url
250 Welsh, M. Y., Making sense of Mali's armed groups, 17 January 2013, url
251 Welsh, M. Y., Making sense of Mali's armed groups, 17 January 2013, url
252 US DoS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2016, Foreign Terrorist Organizations: Ansar al-Dine (AAD), 19 July 2017, url
253 US DoS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2016, Foreign Terrorist Organizations: Ansar al-Dine (AAD), 19 July 2017, url
254 Welsh, M. Y., Making sense of Mali's armed groups, 17 January 2013, url, p. 8
255 Boutellis, Arthur and Zahar, Marie-Joëlle, A Process in Search of Peace: Lessons from the Inter-Malian Agreement,
June 2017, url36 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: MALI - COUNTRY FOCUS

group is financed by drug traffickers of the Gao Region. It has mostly been involved with fighting
separatist groups in northern Mali like the MNLA. 256
Al-Mulathamun Battalion (AMB) / al-Murabitun
Other known names: al-Mulathamun Brigade; al-Muwaqqi'un bil-Dima; Those Signed in Blood
Battalion; Signatories in Blood; Those who Sign in Blood; Witnesses in Blood; Signed-in-Blood
Battalion; Masked Men Brigade; Khaled Abu al-Abbas Brigade; al-Mulathamun Masked Ones
Brigade; al-Murabitun; The Sentinels. 257
AMB was founded in 2012 by Mokhtar Belmokhtar from Algeria 258 after he split with AQIM. AMB
and MUJAO merged in 2013 to become al-Murabitun. 259
Al-Murabitun was responsible for taking hostages at the Radisson Blu Hotel in November 2015 aswell as for attacks on Sevare in August 2015 and La Terrasse in Bamako in March 2015. It is believedthat Al-Murabitun was still cooperating with AQIM. The group is not very popular among locals
because of its goal to create a Caliphate with a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. 260
The Al-Mulathamun Battalion and MUJAO merged in 2013 to become al-Murabitun. The
organisation re-merged with AQIM in late 2015. 261
Front de Libération du Macina (FLM) [Liberation Front of Macina] or Katiba Ansar Dine Macina
first appeared in February 2015. It is based in the Mopti region. 262 Hamadoun Koufa, who controls
the organisation, is a preacher and poet, as well as a member of the Dawa sect. The group consists
mostly of ethnic Fulani or Peul. 263
The FLM has been allied officially to AQIM, Ansar Dine and al-Murabitun since March 2017. 264
Katiba Khalid Ibn Walid – Ansar Dine of the South claimed the responsibility for the attacks in
Misséni and Fakola (south, Ivoirian border) in June 2015. Its leader, Souleymane Keïta, wasarrested in March 2016. 265
Like Ansar Dine Macina, Ansar Dine of the South are linked to Iyad Ag Ghali. Its founding members
are former members of the Islamic police in Timbuktu dating back to when the city was ruled by
AQIM and Ansar Dine. 266

3.3 Current political situation
Secessionist rebels and terrorist groups took control of the northern regions of Mali just after thearmy staged a coup in Bamako, in March 2012. Between 2012 and 2013, the country was divided
into two parts: the north where various terrorist groups inspired by (or based on) Islamic
fundamentalism ruled by acts of terrorism, and the south, under the central authority of the Malian
256 Welsh, M. Y., Making sense of Mali's armed groups, 17 January 2013, url

257 US DoS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2016, Foreign Terrorist Organizations: Al-Mulathamun Battalion (AMB), 19 July

2017, url

258 BBC, BBC Profile, Al-Murabitoun, 16 January 2016, url

259 US DoS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2016, Foreign Terrorist Organizations: Al-Mulathamun Battalion (AMB), 19 July

2017, url

260 BBC, BBC Profile, Al-Murabitoun, 16 January 2016, url

261 US DoS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2016, Foreign Terrorist Organizations: Al-Mulathamun Battalion (AMB), 19 July
2017, url
262 Boutellis, A. and Zahar, M. , A Process in Search of Peace: Lessons from the Inter-Malian Agreement, June 2017, url
263 Carayol, R., Mali: le Front de libération du Macina, un nouveau Boko Haram?, 25 August 2015, url
264 Boutellis, A. and Zahar, M., A Process in Search of Peace: Lessons from the Inter-Malian Agreement, June 2017, url
265 Le Monde, Un important chef djihadiste aurait été arrêté au Mali, 31 March 2016, url; Powelton, F., Mali : arrestation
du plus important chef djihadiste du sud du pays, 1 April 2016, url
266 Le Monde, Deux groupes djihadistes progressent dans le centre et le sud du Mali, 23 September 2015, url; RFI, Quisont les groupes jihadistes actifs au centre et au sud du Mali?, 8 September 2015, url; Maïga, I., Armed groups in Mali:
Beyond the labels, June 2016, url, p. 8

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: MALI - COUNTRY FOCUS — 37

state. The town of Mopti in the central delta of the Niger River formed the border line that
separated these two zones. 267
With Mali being the most affected country in the Sahel by jihadist mobilisation, the UN adopted
the Resolution 2085 on 20 December 2012, to authorise the creation of an international force
under African leadership: the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA). 268
On 10 January 2013, the small city of Konna, near Mopti was taken by a coalition of terrorist groups(AQMI, Mujao, Ansar Dine, MNLA). 269 Worried that they could reach Bamako swiftly, the interim
Malian government called for French military assistance and France launched the Serval
Operation 270 on 11 January 2013 -before AFISMA- to stop the progression of the terrorist groups
toward the capital and assist the Malian national armed forces. The terrorist groups withdrew fromurban centres but they were able to hide in the rural areas in northern and central Mali. 271
Beside the Serval intervention, led by the French army, the African-led International Support
Mission to Mali was created in January 2013 before becoming the United Nations
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in July 2013. 272 After
operations Serval and Epervier, France launched the Barkhane Operation to fight against jihadi
armed groups in the whole Sahel, in August 2014. The headquarter is in Ndjamena (Chad). 273
Under pressure from the international community and hoping to restore peace and stability, Mali
held presidential elections in July 2013 under protection of UN troops. 274 Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta
was elected President. 275 Governmental stability was not achieved, a fact which is illustrated by
the succession of prime ministers in Mali – five since 2013. 276
The first Peace Agreement was signed in Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) in 2013, between the Malian
government and the MNLA but the fighting between rebels and the army / loyalist militias (GATIA
and Ganda militias) / MINUSMA did not stop in the north. 277

267 France, Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires étrangères, Présentation du Mali, 5 January 2018, url; Kone, D.,

Rebellions Touarègues: Les trous d’air de l’histoire du Mali, 6 December 2013, url; International Crisis Group, Central
Mali, An Uprising in the Making?, 6 June 2016, url; Tamboura, S., Mopti-Ségou: La rébellion gagne le sud, 2015, url; Jouve,
A., Forces et groupes armés au Mali: qui est qui?, 24 March 2016, url; L’Express, Le Mali coupé en deux: que veulent lesTouareg?, 3 April 2012, url
268 UN Security Council, Resolution 2085, 20 December 2012, url; Boutellis, A. and Zahar, M., A Process in Search of
Peace: Lessons from the Inter-Malian Agreement, June 2017, url, p. 10
269 RFI, Mali: les islamistes sont entrés dans Konna, 10 January 2013, url; Maliweb.net, Attaque de Konna: C’était, il y a
un an!, 9 January 2014, url
270 In July 2014, the military operation Serval became operation Barkhane, based in Chad, with 3 000 French troops. LaDépêche, Le Petit Bleu, L’opération Serval devient Barkhane, 14 July 2014, url
271 Libération, La France au Mali, les ambiguïtés d’une intervention, 15 January 2013, url; Financial Times, The West has
let negligence in the Sahel turn into a nightmare, 20 January 2013, url; Le Temps, Opinions, Charbonneau, Bruno, Guerre
au Mali: que cache le consensus?, 17 January 2013, url; Le Temps, Opinions, Arcand, Jean-Louis, Ce qui attend la France
au Mali, après les frappes, 22 January 2013, url
272 Tounkara, A., Hiérarchisation ethnique et extrémisme violent au centre du Mali Vers une nouvelle rébellion dans uncontexte d’insécurité généralisée, 4 July 2017, url ; RFI, Mali: la Cédéao souhaite que la Misma se transforme en mission
de paix, 1 March 2013, url; Poulin, T., Historique de l’opération MISMA, Réseau de recherche sur les Opérations de Paix,
3 April 2013, url
273 BBC, Sahel-Armées: Barkhane succède à Serval, 13 July 2014, url; Les Echos, L’opération Serval est "terminée" au Mali,
place à l’opération Barkhane, 13 July 2014, url
274 New York Times (The), Mali Holds Elections After Year of Turmoil, 28 July 2013, url; Guardian (The), Mali elections:high turnout reported in presidential vote, 28 July 2013, url
275 France, Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires étrangères, Présentation du Mali, 5 January 2018, url
276 France, Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires étrangères, Présentation du Mali, 5 January 2018, url
277 RFI, Chassé de Kidal, le gouvernement malien décrète un cessez-le-feu, 22 May 2014, url; Libération, AFP, Au Mali,
Kidal et Ménaka sous contrôle des rebelles, 22 May 2014, url38 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: MALI - COUNTRY FOCUS

In 2015, after years of talks, the Algiers Peace Agreement was signed between the Malian
government, GATIA, CMA and CM-FPR 278, categorised as non-terrorist armed groups 279, eventhough collusion is denounced by Barkhane between those groups and the terrorist armed
groups. 280
Sources indicate that the situation in the north remains unstable. 281 There are still clashes
between the CMA (former rebellion) and the GATIA (member of the Platform, pro-Bamako). The
implementation of the 2015 agreement for peace and reconciliation has made little progress since
it was signed, especially with regard to disarmament. However, the signatory movements agreed
to a ceasefire on 20 September 2017, together with a timeline for its implementation. They werethen received by President Keïta, who seemed to be seeking political success as the election
deadline approached (July 2018). The dialogue has led to significant symbolic advances such as thereturn of the governor to Kidal (from where he was expelled in 2014) and GATIA to Takelot (30 km
south of Kidal), previously under the control of the CMA. 282
Attacks against MINUSMA have resulted in the death of 146 soldiers of the peacekeeping operation
between March 2013 and October 2017. 283 Terrorist groups use their ability to carry out
coordinated attacks as a way to declare their opposition to the progress of the peace agreement.
They have been redeploying to the centre of the country, where communal clashes and theabsence of the state gives them room to manoeuvre. 284
The deterioration of trust between populations and state institutions especially in the central andnorthern regions, where impunity prevails with regard to the exactions of the police, makes Mali
appear to be a failed state that cannot offer its citizens with public services and protection. 285
All of this endangers the reconciliation process for the restoration of lasting peace and the rule oflaw. 286

4. Southern regions (Kayes, Koulikoro,
Ségou and Sikasso)
Until 2015, all sources consulted divided Mali between north and south, and the city of Mopti as
the informal border zone. Between 2016 and 2017, the figures of conflict events reported by ACLED

278 Libération, Interview to Pierre Boilley, La situation au Mali a empiré, 3 June 2015, url; RFI, L’accord de paix pour lenord du Mali officiellement ratifié, 20 June 2015, url
279 Tobie, A., Beyond the peace agreement: How can civil society contribute to peace in Mali?, 14 November 2016, url;Maïga, I., Armed groups in Mali: Beyond the labels, June 2016, url, p. 6
280 E. Night Watch, Les groupes armés signataires (GAS), une façade politique aux organisations terroristes?, 6 December
2017, url ; RFI, Forces et groupes armés au Mali: qui est qui?, 24 March 2016, url
281 Le Monde, Analyse, Châtelot, Christophe, Au Mali, l’impossible paix ?, 15 March 2017, url; Le Monde, Analyse, Remy,
Jean-Philippe, Accords de paix d’Alger: une dernière chance pour le Mali, 1 March 2015, url; Le Point, AFP, Mali: un"accord de paix et de réconciliation" signé à Alger, 1 March 2015, url; RFI, Mali: les défis de la mise en œuvre de l’accord
de paix, 21 June 2015, url
282 FIDH, Mali: Terrorism and impunity jeopardize the fragile peace agreement, 11 May 2017, url; Libération, Mali: lesgroupes armés du Nord enterrent la hache de guerre, 22 September 2017, url; RFI, Interview with Me Baber Gamo (Mali):"Les accords d’Alger marchent bien, c’est un processus", 13 July 2017, url
283 UN, Fiche d'information sur les opérations de maintien de la paix en cours, 31 October 2017, url
284 HRW, Mali: Abuses Spread South. Islamist Armed Groups’ Atrocities, Army Responses Generate Fear, 19 February
2016, url; FIDH, Mali: Terrorism and impunity jeopardize the fragile peace agreement, 11 May 2017, url
285 Tobie, A., Beyond the peace agreement: How can civil society contribute to peace in Mali?, 14 November 2016, url
286 FIDH-AMDH, Face à la crise, faire le choix de la justice, December 2017, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: MALI - COUNTRY FOCUS — 39

increased in Mopti, making it the region with the highest percentage of such events in the wholecountry. 287
If earlier assessments indicated that the 2012 crisis was restricted to the north of Mali, the conflict
events in the Mopti region between 2012 and 2017 have made it a region of concern, with the
involvement of jihadist fighters in local and community conflicts. 288
However, there is no stable and defined front line, and there are no identified actors. Until 2015,
no accurate analysis explained the phenomenon of violence targeting traditional authorities,
security forces, individuals and even schools developing in the region. 289
The FLM - led by the radical preacher Amadou Koufa [also referred to as Amadou Kouffa or
Hamadoun Kouffa] 290 and integrated in the global jihadist movement - has operated in central andwestern regions of Mali. 291
This group targeted representatives of the state authorities or traditional leaders specifically. It
also claimed to be responsible for the attacks in Sévaré in August 2015 and in Bamako in
November 2015. These terrorist attacks were also claimed by Al-Murabitun. 292

4.1 Levels of violence
The security situation in the northern and central regions of Mali has led to vast internal
displacement. 293 August 2018 UNHCR data indicates 69 993 persons were internally displaced in
Mali, 294 and 139 842 Malian refugees were in Niger, Mauritania and Burkina Faso. 295
The peak number was reached in June 2013 with 353 455 internally displaced persons (IDPs). With
the progressive pacification of the northern regions, the number of IDPs decreased slowly. 296 Until
2015, 25 % of the internally displaced went to Bamako 297, but very few of them returned to theirhomes. April 2015 was the lowest level of IDPs. 298 According to UN OCHA ‘more than 10,000
people were displaced in the Ségou and Mopti regions further to an intercommunity conflictrecorded in February 2017 in the administrative districts of Macina and Niono (Ségou region) […]In 2017, the Ségou region hosted the largest number of internally displaced people (IDPs) in the
country.’ 299 In January 2018, there are still 47 706 IDPs and Timbuktu hosts the majority ofthem. 300

287 ACLED, Mali, March 2017 Update, March 2017, url

288 Tobie, A., Le centre du Mali : violences et instrumentalisation croisées, December 2017, url, p. 1; ACLED, Mali, March2017 Update, March 2017, url
289 Tobie, A., Le centre du Mali : violences et instrumentalisation croisées, December 2017, url, p. 5
290 International Crisis Group, Central Mali, An Uprising in the Making?, 6 June 2016, url; Reuters, Mali’s Islamist conflictspreads as new militant group emerges, 19 August 2015, url; Tobie, A., Le centre du Mali : violences etinstrumentalisation croisées, December 2017, url
291 International Crisis Group, Central Mali, An Uprising in the Making?, 6 June 2016, url
292 Switzerland, ODM, Note Mali: Situation sécuritaire, 14 March 2016, url; Reuters, Mali’s Islamist conflict spreads as
new militant group emerges, 19 August 2015, url; International Crisis Group, Central Mali, An Uprising in the Making?, 6June 2016, url; Tobie, A., Le centre du Mali : violences et instrumentalisation croisées, December 2017, url; Maïga, I.,
Armed groups in Mali: Beyond the labels, June 2016, url, p. 7
293 Slate Afrique, Les déplacés invisibles de Bamako, 26 October 2012, url
294 UNHCR, Operational Portal, Mali, IDPs, 31 August 2018, url
295 UNHCR, Operational Portal, Refugee situation: Mali situation, 31 August 2018, url
296 Mali, DNDS, Matrice de Suivi des déplacements (DTM), January 2018, url
297 Bertrand, M., Du District au "grand Bamako" (Mali): réserves foncières en tension, gouvernance contestée, 19
December 2015, url; Slate Afrique, Les déplacés invisibles de Bamako, 26 October 2012, url
298 Mali, DNDS, Matrice de Suivi des déplacements (DTM), January 2018, url
299 UNOCHA, Mali: population movements related to armed conflict and intercommunity violence, March 2017, url
300 Mali, DNDS, Matrice de Suivi des déplacements (DTM), January 2018, url; USAID, Mali, complex emergency fact sheet#1, 14 Septmeber 2017, url40 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: MALI - COUNTRY FOCUS

The densely populated city of Bamako, with two million inhabitants is now experiencing an
inexorable rise of urban violence. According to UN Security Council ‘armed banditry continued toconstitute the most significant threat to civilians.’ 301
In rural areas, traditional community-based conflict resolving mechanisms have been weakened
since the 2012 crisis. 302 The ongoing war exacerbated community tensions and led to easy
exploitation of frustrations by any local leader or armed group. 303 The preventive aspect oftraditional conflict management mechanisms is no longer efficient. That explains the emergenceof ‘hybrid’ actors in the Mopti region, such as Ginna Dogon and Takital Pulakuu, who ‘mobilize bothtraditional and liberal-democratic registers’. 304
Inter-community conflicts have led to numerous human rights violations. 305 Like in central Mali,
the security forces use unrestrained and indiscriminate force to maintain law and order in thesouthern part of the country. 306
In 2016, the violence reached a worrying level: according to the International Federation of Human
Rights Leagues ‘more than 385 attacks killed at least 332 people, including 207 civilians in the northand center of the country’ 307, in a combination of terrorist attacks, targeted killings and intercommunity conflicts. This goes with other human rights violations such as torture, kidnapping,arbitrary detention and extortion of all kinds, amounting to at least 630 cases. These figures rose
to double since 2015. 308

4.1.1 Terrorism
The violence from the northern regions is spreading to the central and south of Mali and affecting
civilians. In 2015, terrorist groups killed at least 44 civilians all over the territory of Mali, including
Bamako and Sévaré (near Mopti). Since 2015, Islamist armed groups attacked army bases, policeand gendarmerie posts, as well as civilian targets, including in central and southern Mali. In
Bamako, a nightclub (La Terrasse) 309 and a luxury hotel (Radisson Blu) 310 were targeted, as was
the army garrison town of Sévaré, and the one of the Ségou region. 311
The terrorist groups responsible for the attacks in the south ‘include Al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar Dine, Al-Murabitoun, and the Macina Liberation Front (Front du libération
du Macina, or FLM), which emerged in January 2015’. 312

301 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali, 31 May 2016, url, p. 5

302 Sidibe, B., Résolution traditionnelle des conflits au Mali, 6 June 2008, url; Allegrozzi, I. and Ford, E., Reconstruire lamosaïque, Perspectives pour de meilleures relations sociales après le conflit armé au Nord du Mali, October 2013, url(303) Interpeace and IMRAP, Portraits croisés, Analyse locale des dynamiques de conflit et de résilience dans la zone deKoro-Bankass, Région de Mopti, June 2017, url, pp. 39-45; Sangare, B., Le Centre du Mali: épicentre du djihadisme?, 20
May 2016, url
304 Bagayoko, N. and Kone, F. R., Les mécanismes traditionnels de gestion des conflits en Afrique subsaharienne, June
2017, url
305 HRW, Mali: Abuses Spread South, Islamist Armed Groups’ Atrocities, Army Responses Generate Fear, 19 February
2016, url; Bamada.net, Conflits intercommunautaires: revisiter les mécanismes traditionnels de règlement, 18 May 2016,url
306 UACDDDD, Communiqué de presse, 27 December 2017, url; UACDDDD, Communiqué de presse, 22 December 2017,
url; mali7.net, Violence-injustice: La justice populaire se déchaine à Bamako, 14 August 2017, url; maliactu.net, Mali:
forces de l’ordre-population: Pourquoi tant de violences ?, 5 February 2018, url
307 FIDH-AMDH, Mali, Terrorism and Impunity Jeopardize the Fragile Peace Agreement, May 2017, url
308 Le Monde Afrique, Les violences au Mali ont atteint un niveau inquiétant en 2016, 13 January 2017, url; maliactu.net,
Mali: forces de l’ordre-population: Pourquoi tant de violences ?, 5 February 2018, url
309 L’Express, Mali: ce que l’on sait de l’attaque d'un restaurant à Bamako qui a fait 5 morts, 7 March 2015, url; BBC, Malibar attack kills five in Bamako, 7 March 2015, url
310 RFI, Un an après l’attaque, le Radisson de Bamako affiche complet, 20 November 2016, url
311 HRW, Mali: Abuses Spread South, 19 February 2016, url
312 HRW, Mali: Abuses Spread South, 19 February 2016, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: MALI - COUNTRY FOCUS — 41

In March 2017, a new terrorist group emerged, the Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM)[Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims]. 313 This group is al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Mali andWestern Africa, and is the result of the merger between Ansar Dine, Al-Murabitoon, and AQIM, all
Al-Qaeda affiliates in West Africa. Adionally, the Macina Liberation Front was also ‘absorbed’,
contributing to JNIM’s ‘credentials and territorial control’ in central Mali. The group is led by Iyad
Ag Ghaly, leader of Mali’s Tuareg uprising, who has publicly pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda. 314
The group is mainly active in Mali, but also in Niger and Burkina Faso 315 (where they claimed the
2 March 2018 attacks on the French Embassy and army headquarters 316). They oppose France inparticular, who has been in the country since 2012; but also France’s western partners and all
countries involved in UN missions. The group ‘seeks to incite the West African Muslim community
to “remove oppression” and expel non-Muslim “occupiers”’ and declared their tacticts to be‘“combat action against security forces, rather than attacks on the population”’. 317

Chronology of main events
Since the launch of operation Serval in 2013, the terrorist threat has increased in the southern
regions. 318
Between 1 September 2017 and 30 August 2018, ACLED 319 registered around 26 security incidents
in the southern regions of Mali (Bamako, Kayes, Koulikouro, Ségou and Sikasso), which resulted inapproximately 100 fatalities. 320
Table 1 presents the number of security incidents per region and the number of estimated deaths.
The table also gives the number of incidents and fatalities of incidents categorised as ‘violenceagainst civilians’.
Table 1
RegionTotalsViolence against civilians

No. Incidents

No. Fatalities

No. Incidents

No. Fatalities

Bamako

1

1

0

0

Kayes

2

2

0

0

Koulikouro

6

11

3

3

Ségou

15

81

5

16

Sikasso

2

5

0

0

TOTAL

26

100

8

19

Source: ACLED 321

According to this table, most of the incidents in the reference period in the southern regions ofMali occurred in Ségou. In contrast, very few incidents were registered in Bamako, Kayes,
Koulikouro or Sikasso. Out of the 26 security incidents, 8 can be classified as ‘violence against
civilians’, resulting in 19 fatalities. Most of these incidents and fatalities occurred in Ségou, where
5 incidents were recorded as violence against civilians, resulting in 16 fatalities. The incidents
313 Fair Observer, The Al-Qaeda Affiliates Merger in Mali, 28 March 2017, url
314 CSIS, Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), 5 September 2018, url

315 CSIS, Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), 5 September 2018, url

316 Long War Journal, Al Qaeda branch in Mali claims Burkina Faso attacks, 3 March 2018, url
317 CSIS, Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), 5 September 2018, url

318 RFI, Bamako frappée au cœur: une première depuis l’opération Serval, 7 March 2015, url
319 For more information on this source, refer to the Introduction of this report.
320 ACLED, Real Time data (1 September 2017 – 30 August 2018), url
321 ACLED, Real Time data (1 September 2017 – 30 August 2018), url42 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: MALI - COUNTRY FOCUS

classified otherwise mainly concerned battles between JNIM and the Dozo militias, or JNIM andthe military or police forces. 322
During the same reference period but in the northern regions of Gao, Kidal and Timbouktou, there
were a total of 288 incidents (with around 634 fatalities), of which 70 are classified as ‘violenceagainst civilians’, resulting in 162 fatalities. 323
On 15 August 2018, Dozo militia members abducted two civilians in the area of Kalala, one wasreleased against ransom while the other remains missing.
In January 2018, two Malian customs officials were killed by jihadists in Toubakoro (Cercle of
Banamba, Koulikoro), 200 km north of Bamako. 324
On 19 October 2017, the gendarmerie commander in Guire (Cercle of Nara, Koulikoro) was
abducted and his driver found dead. JNIM claimed the attack on 20 October 2018. 325
On 9 October 2017, militants executed an alleged informer in Boudjiguire (Cercle of Nara,
Koulikoro); on 14 October, Bamako military killed four militants, suspected of perpetrating theattack. 326
On 6 October 2017, the Church of the Douna-Pen was ransacked and burned by armed men. 327
On 18 June 2017, AQIM attacked the touristic Kangaba camping hotel in Yirimadio, near Bamako.
Four civilians and a soldier were killed. 328
During 2017, soldiers killed and buried at least 15 people suspected of terrorism in common graves,
while more than 25 were subjected to forced disappearance. Dozens of other suspects were
subjected to severe ill treatment during interrogations. 329

4.1.2 Social and political violence
Political violence is not common in Mali. Election campaigns or parliamentary debates can give rise
to abusive language or insults, but no physical violence had been reported until the murder
attempt of chronicler Madou Kanté (Maréchal Madou) in July 2017. The web activist broadcasted
Madou-ka-Journal where he often denounced corruption and nepotism in Mali. He was shot andwounded in his car. Also Master Soumy, a member of the platform An tè A bana - whose members
fight against the project to revise the constitution, was threatened because of his positions. 330
During the first round of the Malian presidential elections held on 29 July 2018, small incidents
with no victims occurred in several locations in the north, mainly in the regions of Kidal andTimbuktu, where there is limited or no state presence. 331
The second round of presidential elections took place on 12 August 2018; thanks to some heavy
security presence, again only minor incidents were reported (including shut down of polling

322 ACLED, Real Time data (1 September 2017 – 30 August 2018), url
323 ACLED, Real Time data (1 September 2017 – 30 August 2018), url

324 VOA, Deux douaniers tués au nord de Bamako au Mali, 24 January 2018, url; L’Express, Près de 40 tués en 24 heures

dans des attaques au Mali, 25 January 2018, url
325 Bamada.net, Cercle De Nara: Des Blessés Suite À Une Tentative D’enlèvement Du Préfet, 10 December 2017, url
326 Qatar Tribune, Soldiers kill four suspected militants in Central Mali, says military statement, 14 October 2017, url
327 Afrikinfos, Koro: L’église de Douna-pen saccagée et brûlée par des hommes armés!, 6 October 2017, url
328 La Dépêche, Mali: 5 tués dans l’attentat près de Bamako, revendiqué par une alliance liée à Al-Qaïda, 19 June 2017,
url; Le Monde Afrique, Au Mali, l’"attaque djihadiste" a fait au moins cinq victimes, 19 June 2017, url; Le Point Afrique,Mali: ce que l’on sait de l’attaque du campement Kangaba, 20 June 2017, url
329 HRW, World report 2018, Mali, Events of 2017, 2018, url
330 Bamako.com, Violence politique au Mali: Ne pas franchir le Rubicon, 26 July 2017, url; Maliactu, Mali : "Madou ka
journal", un web-activiste échappe à une tentative d’assassinat, 25 July 2017, url; Le Républicain, La Plateforme an tè aBanna-Touche pas à ma constitution lance un ultimatum au président IBK, 10 August 2017, url
331 Studio Tamani, Violences le jour du scrutin: «644 électeurs n’ont pas voté», url; Guardian (The), Mali votes in runoff
election amid heavy security presence, 12 August 2018, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: MALI - COUNTRY FOCUS — 43

stations or destruction of election material by gunman). 332 The EU Election Observation Mission
to the Presidential Mali Elections 2018 indicates that the elections were generally calm, despite
the incidents in the centre and north of the country. 333 One source indicates that no post-election
violence was reported. 334
Mohamed Youssouf Bathily, also known as Ras Bath and nicknamed ‘the supreme guide’ by his
followers, is a Malian radio broadcaster that continuously denounces politicians and demands thedeparture of President Keïta. His statements have earned him prosecution for ‘inciting
disobedience’. He was released on the 27 November 2017 after a lengthy procedure. 335
Students have always been involved in politics (even before the uprising of 1991 against the
dictatorship), in which they played a central role. 336 Clashes occurred in the University of Bamako
or on the streets, in strikes or demonstrations (on the rate of scholarship fees, the payment ofscholarship or corruption of teachers). The students union is also a place of potential
confrontation. 337
Daily violence is reported in the Malian newspapers. Domestic violence and rape are common;
rape is punishable by 5 to 20 years in prison, but it remains a cultural taboo and very few victims
report it. The association Wildaf-Mali, the local branch of Women in Law and Development in
Africa, revealed that about 300 women are raped each year in Mali and this phenomenon has
increased in the wake of the 2012 crisis. 338
In 2016, Amnesty International reported repetitive violations of human rights in the Sikasso region
such as sexual violence, rape, tortures. 339 In 2017, MINUSMA ‘documented 16 cases of conflictrelated sexual violence, most of which concerned women and girls travelling by public
transportation on the axis connecting key regions of Gao, Timbuktu, Ménaka, Mopti and the Niger
border.’ Perpetrators included members of the HCUA, the CMFPR 2, the MSA and the Malian
Defense and Security forces. 340
In urban areas, hip hop is a widespread culture 341, and rap has become a popular form of
expression among youth. For years, it was mainly a political way of expression, but with theWestern influence, mainly from the USA, violence has appeared on the rap scene. 342 Elders
describe the new generation of rappers as encouraging youth to debauchery, alcoholism andviolence. 343 Rap rival groups fight in the capital city of Bamako, especially in night clubs. 344 Rap
singer Issa Diabaté, also known as Iba Montana, has recently made a video clip to advertise
violence and drugs where he rants at the crowd brandishing a machete. 345 The mayor of the fourth
332 Guardian (The), Mali votes in runoff election amid heavy security presence, 12 August 2018, url; Washington Post,

Mali’s elections saw some Islamist militant violence, Here’s what these patterns suggest, 7 September 2018, url
333 EU, MOE UE Mali 2018, Déclaration préliminaire de la MOE UE Mali, 14 August 2018, url
334 Guardian (The), Mali votes in runoff election amid heavy security presence, 12 August 2018, url
335 Le Monde, Qui est Ras Bath, l’agitateur vedette du Mali?, 16 February 2018, url; RFI, Mali: l’activiste «Ras Bath» relaxé,
28 November 2017, url; MaliNet, Urgent: Faute de preuve contre Ras Bath, le parquet abandonne les poursuites,
December 2017, url
336 Maliactu.net, Mali: Le syndicalisme dans le monde enseignant: Appel à l’Union et à l’Unité, 15 September 2014, url;
Sy, O., Reconstruire l’Afrique: vers une nouvelle gouvernance fondée sur les dynamiques locales, 2009, pp. 34-35
337 Maliactu.net, Mali: Violence continue à l’Université de Bamako: L’étudiant en 2ème année Allemand tué à coups decouteau, 25 January 2017, url; Bamada.net, Université malienne: Un corps malade!, 3 February 2018, url
338 Le Monde Afrique, Le Mali sous le choc d’une vidéo de viol collectif, 9 February 2018, url
339 Amnesty International, Sikasso: présentation de restitution des enquêtes relatives aux violations des droits del’homme, 4 January 2017, url
340 UN, Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sexual Violence in Conflict, Mali, [April 2018],
url
341 Urban Dictionary, Hip Hop, 14 May 2015, url
342 Le pays, Mali: Quand le rap explose et dérape…, 21 January 2014, url
343 MaliPremier, Alcool, Sexe et Violence: Le Rap doit-il être interdit au Mali?, 19 January 2018, url
344 RHHM.Net, Affrontement violent entre les groupes de Gaspi et de King KJ, 8 January 2017, url
345 Les Observateurs, France24, Iba Montana, le rappeur malien armé qui séduit les jeunes et inquiète les autorités, 25
January 2018, url44 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: MALI - COUNTRY FOCUS

municipality of Bamako has forbidden him to perform ‘to preserve peace and avoid any
disturbance to the public order’. 346
In rural areas, inter-community conflicts now affect almost the entire country and the state seems
unable to maintain peace and order. Most of the time the Fulani community – widespread all overthe country – is involved: against Tuareg in the north, against Dogon or Bambara 347 in the centre,
against Soninké or Malinké in the west and against Bambara in the south. 348 Most of the time,
Fulanis appeared not to be the aggressors by the large numbers of victims in their ranks. 349
The situation of the Fulani community is at stake as they are the largest ethnic minority in Mali,but feel marginalised by the state and threatened by other ethnic communities, for example theTuaregs. The perceived lack of security amongst the Fulani prompt them to establish self-defense
groups. The fact that young Fulani men seem to be over-represented in armed groups (also in jihadi
groups) may also be a consequence of marginalisation and perceived lack of security. Fulanis andTuaregs have always been in competition for the exploitation of pastoral resources and the theftof livestock in central and northern Mali. 350
In the western part of Mali, the Front d’action pour la région de Kayes (FARK) [Action Front for theKayes region] was created in 2016 to defend the interests of the population of the eight circles of
the Kayes region. This apolitical association advocates for the economic and social development of
the region, underlining its difference with armed groups from other regions. 351
In 2016, the population in the southern part of Mali was less satisfied with the government policy
than the northern population. The highest rates of dissatisfaction were recorded in Kayes (60.1 %),Bamako (70 %) and Kidal (74.2 %), while in the Gao and Ménaka regions, people were rather
satisfied (63 % and 75 % respectively) with the actions of the government. 352 The feeling of general
impunity was shared by more than 75 % of the Malian citizens. 353
The 2018 presidential elections were won by Ibrahim Boubacar Keita. 354 His opponent, Soumaila
Cissé raised issues of election fraud. 355 For more on the president and elections, see 2.2.1
Executive - President.

Chronology of main events
During the first round of presidential elections in Mali held on 29 July 2018, no incidents wererecorded in the southern areas of Kayes, Sikasso, Koulikoro, Mopti, Gao and Bamako. Incidents
with no victims occurred in several locations in the north, mainly in the regions of Kidal andTimbuktu, where there is limited or no state presence. 356
In June 2018, following a dispute among mining workers and the mining company (Somilo) in
Kéniéba (Kayes), protesters attacked public buildings, the ‘préfecture’, and the houses of the346 Maliactu.net, Mali: Iba Montana pire que GASPI: Un réel danger pour la jeunesse malienne, 27 December 2017, url;

Maliactu.net, C’est la mairie de la Commune IV qui a donné le ton de sanction contre le jeune rappeur Issa Diabaté alias
Iba Montana, 11 January 2018, url
347 RFI, Mali: violents affrontements communautaires dans la région de Ségou, 23 March 2017, url
348 Maliactu.net, Mali: Nord, centre et ouest du Mali: L’Etat submergé par des violences communautaires, 5 June 2016,url
349 Sangare, B., Le Centre du Mali: épicentre du djihadisme?, 20 May 2016, url
350 International Crisis Group, Central Mali, An Uprising in the Making?, 6 June 2016, url; Sangare, Boukary, Le Centre duMali: épicentre du djihadisme?, 20 May 2016, url
351 Info-Matin, Mali: Développement de la région de Kayes: le FARK hausse le ton, 14 January 2018, url
352 Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Mali-mètre: Que pensent les Maliens, March 2017, url, pp. 8-9
353 Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Mali-mètre: Que pensent les Maliens, March 2017, url, p. 34
354 Mali, MATCL, 2eme Tour de l’Election Présidentielle, Résultats Provisoires Complets, 15 August 2018, url; Mali, Cour
Constitutionnelle, Arrêt N°2018-04/Cc-Ep Du 20 Août 2018 Portant Proclamation des Résultats Définitifs du Second Tourde L'élection Du Président de La République Bamako, 20 August 2018, url
355 RFI Afrique, Mali: la présidentielle agitée par les accusations de fichier électoral parallèle, 22 July 2018, url
356 Studio Tamani, Violences le jour du scrutin: «644 électeurs n’ont pas voté», url; Guardian (The), Mali votes in runoff
election amid heavy security presence, 12 August 2018, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: MALI - COUNTRY FOCUS — 45

mayor and of his two deputies. The protests were a reaction to the ‘discriminatory’ hiring criteria
by the mining company. Official reporting indicates one person was killed during the protests. 357
In February 2018, two youth associations competing for representation on the National YouthCouncil clashed in Kéniéba (Kayes), resulting in the death of 15 people. 358
In February 2018, four suspects were arrested in Bamako after the sexual assault of a 14-year-old
girl. They published a video of their crime. They have been imprisoned in the central prison of
Bamako awaiting trial. 359
In December 2017, the population of Konsiga - a village near Kayes in western Mali -, blocked theentrances of the town hall demanding the departure of the mayor, whom they consider not to belegitimately elected. Violent clashes took place between protesters and security forces. Eightdemonstrators and five members of the security forces were wounded. 360
In December 2017, students fought each other to join the Association des élèves et étudiants duMali [Students’ Association of Mali]. A student died and two others were injured. 361
In December 2017, three farmers from Zémésso village (San circle) were killed by the Malian
security forces and eight were arrested and imprisoned because of an land dispute that has beenongoing since 2011. 362
On 10 August 2017, a police sergeant named Aboubacar Konaté was beaten up in Bamako by acrowd after having insulted a woman who rejected his advances. 363
In July 2017, two robbers were burned by a crowd in the Bamako market. 364
In June 2017, conflicts between Fulani and Dogon communities erupted in Koro, in the Mopti
region, near the border of Burkina Faso. The army reported 31 people dead (27 Fulani and 4 Dogon)
and 9 injured. 365

357 Intellivoire.net, Mali: Randgold indique que le gouvernement se penche sur la violence près de sa mine, 12 June 2018,

url; RFI, Mali: tensions et violences dans le sud du pays à Kéniéba, 12 June 2018, url

358 KayesInfo.net, La ville de Kenieba a été le théâtre de scènes de violences, 19 February 2018, url

359 Le Monde Afrique, Le Mali sous le choc d’une vidéo de viol collectif, 9 February 2018, url; Jeune Afrique, Vidéo d’unviol collectif au Mali: une enquête est ouverte, 0 February 2018, url; RFI, La vidéo d'un viol collectif secoue le Mali, 7
February 2018, url; Maliactu.net, Mali: Viol collectif: Le présumés coupables déférés hier à la Maison centrale d’arrêt, 16
February 2018, url
360 RFI, Mali : troubles et violences à Konsiga, dans la région de Kayes, 16 December 2017, url
361 AfricaNews, Affrontements meurtriers à l’université de Bamako, au Mali, 20 December 2017, url; TV5 Monde, Mali :affrontements dans une faculté de Bamako, 20 December 2017, url
362 UACDDDD, Communiqué de presse, 27 December 2017, url; UACDDDD, Communiqué de presse, 22 December 2017,url
363 Mali7.net, Violence-injustice: La justice populaire se déchaine à Bamako, 14 August 2017, url
364 Mali7.net, Violence-injustice: La justice populaire se déchaine à Bamako, 14 August 2017, url
365 Jeune Afrique, Mali: une trentaine de morts dans des violences entre Peuls et Dogons dans le centre du pays, 20 June
2017, url

46 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: MALI - COUNTRY FOCUS

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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: MALI - COUNTRY FOCUS — 67

Terms of Reference
EASO Mali Country Focus
Including Southern areas/regions of Mali
Terms of Reference
40 pages, excluding bibliography
1. Background information – Southern areas/regions
1.1 Social/Ethnic background/languages/…
1.2 Religious
1.3 Political history and current situation
2. State authority
2.1 Administration
2.1.1 Structure (formal and informal)
2.2 Security forces
2.2.1 Police
2.2.2 Army
2.3 Judiciary
2.3.1 Courts (formal and informal)
2.3.2 Prisons(under state authority, all topics should take into account availability and accessibility)
3. North and central areas/regions
3.1 Levels of violence
3.2 Chronology of main events
4. Southern areas/regions
4.1 Levels of violence
4.2 Chronology of main events

68 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT: MALI - COUNTRY FOCUS

doi: 10.2847/24182