World Atlasof Illicit FlowsCENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC - A former Seleka soldier looks
at a woman washing extracted soil and small rocks as shepans for gold near an open-pit at the Ndassima gold mine near
Djoubissi, north of Bambari May 9, 2014.
© REUTERS / Siegfried Modola

Contents
01
Notes &
references
Nellemann, C.; Henriksen, R., Pravettoni, R.,
Stewart, D., Kotsovou, M., Schlingemann, M.A.J,
Shaw, M. and Reitano, T. (Eds). 2018. World atlasof illicit flows. A RHIPTO-INTERPOL-GI Assessment. RHIPTO -Norwegian Center for Global
Analyses, INTERPOL and the Global Initiative
Against Transnational Organized crime.
www.rhipto.org www.interpol.int
ISBN 978-82-690434-2-6
Printed by RHIPTO
Layout by Daniel, C., Zoï Environment Network
Disclaimer
The contents of this report do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of RHIPTO,
INTERPOL, or the Global Initiative Against
Transnational Organized Crime. The designations employed and the presentations do not
imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the institutions or contributoryorganizations concerning the legal status ofany country, territory, city, company or area or
its authority, or concerning the delimitation of
its frontiers or boundaries. The issues related
to terrorism are addressed only by RHIPTO and
INTERPOL under their respective mandates.

6

07

76

Introduction: Environmental crime has becomelargest financial driver of conflict

The Trans-Sahara: Migrants, drugs and arms

02

08

12

90

Environmental crime:
The largest conflict finance sector

Migrant smuggling and human trafficking

03

09

18

102

Illegal trade and exploitation of fuel:Oil and charcoal

Foreign fighters: Travelling along smuggling
networks

04

10

42

108

Illegal mining in contexts of conflict

Drugs and threat finance

05

11

54

132

Illegal logging: The largest, least risky and mostprofitable illicit environmental industry

Terrorist and rebel finance: Taxation, drugs,
counterfeits, natural resources and migrants

06

12

60

Wildlife crime and waste

140

Conclusion: The cost of war – environmental crime
surges as threat finance for war profiteers

Acronyms &abbreviations
AQIM

al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

bpd

barrels per day

CAR

Central African RepublicCIA

Central Intelligence Agency

coltancolumbite–tantalites

DRC

Democratic Republic of the Congo

FARC

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s ArmyGDPgross domestic product

HTS

Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham

INTERPOL

International Criminal Police Organization

IUU

illegal, unreported and unregulated

JNIM

Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin

KDF

Kenya Defence Forces

4

Preface
Peace, development and security are the most
crucial concerns for any country. Yet national
and international efforts are increasingly undermined by criminal networks. Indeed, transnational organized crime is infiltrating every cornerof society, and continues to diversify its scope ofoperations.
Of particular concern has been the growth andconvergence of criminal networks exploiting governance weaknesses during local conflicts andsustaining non-state armed groups and terrorists.
This atlas identifies more than 1,000 routes used
for smuggling drugs and natural resources as wellas human trafficking. The report provides the first
consolidated global overview of these illicit flows
and their significance in conflicts worldwide. It
also forms a foundation for further developmentof actionable intelligence.

Jürgen Stock
INTERPOL
Secretary General

The findings reveal that the incomes of non-statearmed groups and terrorist groups are diversifying
and becomingly increasingly based on organizedcrime activities, sustaining conflicts worldwide.
Illegal exploitation and taxation of gold, oil andother natural resources are overtaking traditional
threat finance sectors such as kidnapping for ransom and drug trafficking.
At the same time these non-state armed groups
only take a fraction, around 4 per cent, of all illicit
finance flows by organized crime in or near conflicts. The implication is that combating organized crime must be considered a significant factor
in conflict prevention and resolution.
This report provides a new impetus for our continued efforts to stem these illicit flows and combat
the threat posed by transnational organized crimein terms of peace, development and security.

Christian Nellemann
RHIPTO Norwegian Center
for Global Analysis

Mark Shaw
Global Initiative
against Transnational
Organized Crime

5

KENYA, Nairobi - Volunteers carry elephant tusks to a burning
site on April 22, 2016 for a historic destruction of illegal ivory
and rhino-horn confiscated mostly from poachers in Nairobi’snational park. Kenya on April 30, 2016 burnt approximately
105 tonnes of confiscated ivory, almost all of the country’s
total stockpile. Several African heads of state, conservation
experts, high-profile philanthropists and celebrities are slated
were present at the event which sent a strong anti-poachingmessage. © AFP PHOTO / Tony Karumba

01 Introduction

Environmental crime has becomelargest financial driver of conflictIntroduction:
Environmental crime has becomelargest financial driver of conflictThis atlas of illicit flows presents over a thousand
smuggling routes worldwide of goods and services
associated with environmental crimes, drugs andpeople. Conflict and terrorism are today funded onan unprecedented scale by transnational organizedcrime and by illicit revenue from natural resources.
While it is not possible to establish with certainty
the exact value of revenues flowing to criminalizedgroups and non-state armed groups, it is possible
to generate a rough snapshot based on the major
non-state armed groups.
The proceeds of environmental crime – which encompasses not just wildlife crime, but also fuelsmuggling and illicit mining of gold, diamonds
and other minerals and resources – have become
the largest source of income for non-state armed
groups and terrorist organizations. Combined, environmental crimes, including those that involve thesale or taxation of natural resources, account for
38% of the financing of conflicts and of non-statearmed groups, including terrorist groups; followedby drugs (at 28%); other forms of illegal taxation,
extortion, confiscation and looting (26%); external
donations (3%); and money extorted through kidnapping (3%).1 This evidence-based report aims toquantify how these illicit flows finance the major
non-state armed groups.
Broadly speaking, environmental crimes generate
the single-largest overall threat finance to conflicts
today. The lack of criminal investigation, enforcement efforts or attention from the international
community has enabled environmental crime toprovide a ‘free ticket’ to armed criminalized groups
and war profiteers, and it is gaining increasing interest as a source of financing among insurgents,
terrorist groups and criminal cartels, in addition totheir traditional financing sources from drug trafficking and kidnapping for ransom. The interest innatural resources is rising, especially gold and other minerals, and timber, among many armed andcriminal groups, and this can be currently seen in
the Great Lakes region of Africa, Colombia, Peru andCentral America, and South East Asia.
The biggest source of revenue – that is, from one
single illicit product category – for non-state armed
groups in conflict is drugs, which, as mentioned,
account for 28% of their funding. Most of this revenue comes from taxation of drugs by groups suchas FARC and the Taliban. Illegally procured oil, gas,
gasoline and diesel provides 20% of their income(this was the predominant source of financing forIslamic State in 2014 and 2015). Illegal income fromoil is also crucial for organizations outside of theseven main global insurgent and terrorist groups
discussed in detail here, including funding organized crime in conflict zones. Gasoline and diesel
smuggling is a key source of criminal networks’ financing particularly in parts of Latin America, Libya
and Nigeria.
After drugs and oil, taxation and extortion, and illegal mining, follow, with both representing 17%
of revenue. Then, kidnapping for ransom, and external funding and donations each represent 3%.
Charcoal and antiquities constitute 1% each, butthese categories feature more predominantly as
financial sources in particular regions, especiallycharcoal. Combined, these illicit flows directly fundan estimated 96 900 full-time fighters, and an unknown number of part-timers, associated with theseven most notable non-state insurgent and terrorist groups, plus the multitude of non-state armed
groups active in north-eastern DRC.

8

Recent surveys by INTERPOL of member countries
showed over 84% reported convergence of environmental crime with other forms of serious crime. Similarly, EUROPOL reported in 2017 that 45% of criminal groups in Europe were involved in several crime
types – a sharp increase against the 2013 figure.2
Some 40 000 members of the Taliban totalled an
estimated annual income of US$75–95 million fromtaxation – particularly of drugs, land and agricultural
produce – and from donations from abroad. In mid2017, Islamic State made an estimated US$10 million a month.3 Today, with dramatic losses of territory,
Islamic State probably has at their disposal no morethan a quarter of this. This comes largely from confiscations and illegal taxation. In all likelihood, theyalso have considerable reserves, of an unknown size.
This figure is 98% down from their high of US$549–1
693 million in 2014.4 The merged al-Qaeda groups
Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in Syria and Jama’at
Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) in the Sahel makean estimated US$18–35 million and US$5–35 million, respectively, from illegal taxation, donations, kidnapping for ransom, extortion, smuggling of counterfeit cigarettes, drugs and illegal taxation.
Al-Shabaab receives an estimated US$20 million,
half from the illicit charcoal trade and the rest fromother forms of taxation,5 while Boko Haram madean estimated US$5–10 million mainly from taxation, bank robberies, donations from other terroristgroups and kidnapping for ransom. Over 8 000 rebels6 inside the DRC make at least US$13 million7 ayear from the exploitation and taxation of natural resources – and this sum is but a small portion of thetotal estimated value attributed to illegally exploited
resources in the eastern DRC, which has been put atover US$770 million a year.

The smuggling and facilitation of migrants along
the trans-Saharan routes have evolved into a highly lucrative industry for armed groups, with an estimated annual revenue of US$450–765 million (ofwhich US$89–236 million is accounted for within
Libya alone).8 Organized criminals use smuggling
networks that also increasingly enable foreign fighters to move across borders to safe havens, and to
stockpile or ship resources by means of formal andinformal networks of financial flows. Over 2 600 unaccounted-for (predominantly Islamic State) foreign
fighters have left Syria and Iraq, an unknown numberof them via Libya, using these illicit smuggling networks, and they use them to get access to forged papers, as well as routes to safe havens.
Collectively, for the seven main extremist groups of
insurgents and terrorists (referred to above) – alShabaab, Boko Haram, FARC, HTS, JNIM, IslamicState and the Taliban, plus the DRC fighters, thecombined funding totals about US$1–1.39 billion
a year. Taxation of natural resources and drugs isthe most significant, readily available and accessible source of income, ranging from taxation ofvehicles at checkpoints, agricultural produce, protection money targeting commercial activity to religious taxes.
The 96 900 fighters who make up the seven extremistgroups (and the DRC combatants) earn an average of
US$12 342 a year each. Although this is well above a
typical combatant’s ‘salary’, which can be as low as
US$100 a month, this amount also includes the funding for their campaigns, the cost of weapons, logistics, bribes and operations, and expenses for governance provision. In some cases, such as the Taliban
and FARC, and most likely Islamic State too, a large
amount is saved for future governance efforts.

Besides groups that are designated as terrorist organizations, and including regular organized-crimegroups in and around conflict, the scale of criminal
economies is in the US$24–39 billion range (withprofits far lower). This indicates that threat financerevenue to terrorism and major insurgencies represents about 4% of the total illicit finance to organizedcrime in or near conflict.9

elite, are therefore directly stimulated by continued or
renewed conflict in many of the world’s most deadly
contexts. Conflicts, and the resultant severe impactof lost development on the lives of a rising numberof people, are likely to continue to increase until therole of the profiteers of organized crime in conflicts isaddressed as a primary threat to peace, development
and stability.

This means that transnational organized-criminalgroups targeting primarily natural resources and environmental crimes, in or near conflicts, get by far thelargest slice of their revenue in conflict zones, often
associated with corruption, and powerful politicaland military elites.

Environmental crimes have grown to the point where
they account for 64% of illicit and organized-crime finance, or between US$22.8 billion and US$34 billionof the criminalized economy in fragile states in ornear conflict areas. This threat must be addressedin peacekeeping and in enforcement and prevention,otherwise it will continue to grow and undermine development and security in decades to come.

The costs to the natural and human environment,
and to peace, sustainable development and security are severe, including development prospects
for nearly two billion people, 535 million of whom
are children,10 and causing forcible displacement of
65 million people,11 and with an estimated 127 000
people killed in conflicts (the figure is from 2017).12
Fragility, conflict and violence are critical development challenges that threaten efforts to end extreme
poverty. The proportion of the extreme poor living inconflict-affected countries has been projected to rise
to more than 60% by 2030.13 By comparison, the percentage of people living on only US$1.9 a day globally has dropped from 44% in 1980 to 9.6% in 2015.14
Conflicts also drive 80% of all humanitarian needs,
while they reduce gross domestic product (GDP)growth by two percentage points per year, on average, according to the World Bank.15
Environmental crimes, and associated transnationalorganized crime, which are often deeply embedded
in state and non-state armed forces and the political

9Powerful elites engaged in organized crime gainfrom sustaining conflicts and fund non-state armed
groups, which undermines the rule of law and good
governance. This, in turn, enables criminal elites tobenefit from instability, violence and lack of enforcement and, hence, their subsequent exploitation of illicit flows during conflict.
Strengthening information and analysis is essential to be able to prevent, disrupt and defeat bothviolent armed groups and the organized-criminal actors that provide these armed groups (andthemselves) with an environment of impunity andinstability.
In order to ensure early prevention and intervention in conflict, it is therefore imperative to forcefully address the role of organized crime and illicit
flows in benefiting non-state armed groups and thepowerful elites engaged in criminal activity.

The rising transnational environmental crime smuggling networks

North andCentral Americas
United States

Mexico

$
$

$

$

$

Western andCentral Europe$

Central America

$

$
$

$

$
$

$

Caribbean$$$

Colombia
$

$

$

$

$

Italy

$
$
$

South America

International organized crime network

Bolivia

Ivory and rhino horns
Wood and wood products
Heroin and cocaine
Migrant trafficking
Human traffiking

BrazilWestern
AfricaNigeria

Main players
Region Regional origin or destination
Country of origin
Transit country
Country of destination/market$

DRC

Tax havenInternationally active
criminal organization

Sub-SaharanAfricaSources: UNODC annual report questionnaire and individual drug seizure database, and The
Afghan Opiate Trade and Africa, 2016; CITES; The Global Initiative Against Transnational
crimes, The Illegal Fishing and Organized Crime Nexus, 2016, and Organized Crime: a
Cross-cutting Threat to Sustainable Development, 2015; INTERPOL, Vessel Tracking for
Analysis of Timber and Fisheries Crime, 2015; RHIPTO investigation, 2015 and 2016.
RHIPTO 2016

10

$

$

Japan

$

$
$

East Asia$

China

Hong Kong$$$

RussiaSouth East
Asia
Thailand

Malaysia

Oceania
Indonesia

Middle East

South Asia

$

Kenya
Tanzania$

Mozambique

South Africa

11

PERU - Aerial view of an illegal gold mining area in La Pampa,
Madre de Dios, southern Peruvian jungle on July 14, 2015. In
an unprecedented operation in mid-July, Peru managed toeliminate 55 camps for illegal gold mining in the area of La
Pampa, in the region of Madre de Dios, where 60,000 hectaresof forest have been destroyed by this activity.
© AFP PHOTO / Ernesto Benavides

02 Environmental crime
The largest conflict finance sector

BURKINA FASO, Poura - January 3, 2008: To the goldmine ofPoura the gold diggers come from everywhere in the hope offinding a little gold. Women, children and men of of all ages arehere in a universe of dust under a blazing sun. In Burkina Faso,
illicit gold mining is for some the only activity that keeps themout of desperate poverty.
© iStock / Gilles Paire

14

Environmental crime
The largest conflict finance sector
The term ‘environmental crime’ is often understood to collectively describe illegal activities
harming the environment and aimed at beneﬁting
certain individuals, groups or companies throughthe exploitation and theft of, or trade in natural resources. The term encompasses serious crimes
and transnational organized crime, often linked
to other forms of crime, tax fraud, corruption andthreat finance. In all these manifestations, environmental crime comes with massive costs tocountries worldwide.16
•

•

•

•

Major environmental crimes, drives and impacts
152

Environmental crime now slightly more lucrative than human trafficking, and is the thirdlargest criminal sector worldwide, moving up
from the 4th largest, after drugs, counterfeit
goods and trafficking.

Illegal logging
and trade

Illegal ﬁsheries: estimated US$11–24 billion.

•

Illegal mining: estimated at US$12–48 billion.

•

The illegal wildlife trade: estimated at US$7–
23 billion.
Forestry crimes, including corporate crimes
and illegal logging, account for an estimated
US$51–152 billion.

At stake:
Livelihoods
Species extintion
Endangered forests
National economies:
Illegal logging between 15 and 30 % of
the global legal trade

50.7

Illegal, Unreported,
Unregulated fishing
At stake:
23
11
Fish stocks depletion

Climate change emissions
from deforestation and forest
degradation

Loss of revenues
for local fishers and States
Targeted species:
tuna, toothfish, sharks

Illegal exploitationand theft of oil
At stake:
23
19
Pollution and ecosystem depletion

Corruption
National
Local

Corporate
crime

Loss of revenues fornational economies

The cost impact of environmental crime is rising by 5% to 7% annually, or two to three times
the rate of the global economy.

•

•

38%

Environmental crime is now estimated to beequivalent to US$110–281 billion annually(2018 figures), an approximately 14% (9%–20%)
increase from the previous official estimate in2016 and 44% higher (32%–57%) than the firstestimate in 2014, disregarding inflation. Thisis mainly a result of improved estimates andcriminal intelligence, alongside the addition ofillicit oil (which contributes about 9% of the total value).

Forestry crimes including illegal logging, valued at US$51–152 billion annually.

of incomes that
finance the largest armed
groups derive fromenvironmental crimes

International
National

Lack oflegislation
National

Maﬁas
Lack of law
International enforcement
National
National

Conﬂict
National
Regional

At stake:

23

International

International
Domestic

7

Annual revenue losses
Minimum and maximun estimates,
Billion dollars

Wildlife poaching
and trafficking

At stake:48

Species extinction

Increasing
demandResource depletion
Gold, diamond, rare earth...
Livelihoods (local communities)

10

Loss of raw material
for local industry

12

At stake:
Ecosystem depletion
Human health12
Trade and dumping of
hazardous waste

Illegal extraction andtrade in minerals

15

RHIPTO 2018

SUDAN - Men working in gold mine, north Sudan, 1 December
2007. © iStock / Maciek67

•Illegal trafficking and dumping of toxic andelectronic waste: US$10–12 billion.

•

Illegal exploitation and theft of oil – previously
unaccounted for due to lack of information –adds an additional minimum US$19–23 billion
to the total (or 9% of the total environmental
crime figure).

•

Loss of government revenue through lost tax
income due to criminal exploitation is equivalent to at least US$11–28 billion annually.

•

Environmental crime is increasingly converging with other forms of organized crime, suchas drugs, cybercrimes, corruption, tax fraud
and money laundering.

The wide range in the values given above reﬂects
the lack of statistics in this ﬁeld, but these figures are based on best sources and criminal intelligence from INTERPOL and other sources.
The cost impact makes environmental crime
the third largest crime category in the world
after drug trafﬁcking (US$344 billion), counterfeit
crimes (US$288 billion), with human trafﬁcking(US$157 billion) – fourth by some estimates.
Unlike any other known form of crime, environmental crime is aggravated by its impact on theenvironment and therefore its cost to future generations. Deforestation, dumping of chemicals andillegal ﬁsheries (and others) damage the environment, causing loss of clean air and water, exacerbating extreme weather conditions, reducing foodsecurity and thereby threatening overall healthand societal wellbeing. These crimes also deprive
governments of much-needed revenue and undermine legal businesses.

TURKEY - Turkish drivers with hundreds of tanker trucks lining
up on their way to get oil from Iraq at Turkey’s Habur border
point in this Aug. 16, 2002 file photo. Although U.N sanctions
limit Iraq’s oil exports, more than 80,000 barrels of Iraqi crude
are smuggled into Turkey each day.
© AP Photo / Burhan Ozbilici

18

03 Illegal trade &exploitation of fuelOil and charcoal

19

IRAQ – October 2015: Smoke rises as Iraqi security forces andallied Popular Mobilization Forces shell Islamic State group
positions at an oil field outside Beiji, some 250 kilometers (155
miles) north of Baghdad, Iraq. Ramadi and the city of Beiji, home
to Iraqs largest oil refinery.
© AP Photo20

Illegal trade and exploitation of fuel:Oil and charcoal
Illegally procured oil, gas, gasoline and diesel sales
account for 20% of the income of non-state armed
groups in conflict, and this segment was the predominant source of income for Islamic State in 2014
and 2015. Oil also features as a source of income
for rebel groups and organized crime – derived
from gasoline and diesel smuggling in parts of Latin America, Libya and Nigeria. Al-Shabaab makes
an estimated US$20 million, where half is from theillicit charcoal trade and the rest on other taxation.

Niger Delta

UNODC estimated in 2009 that 55 million barrelsof oil (145 000 barrels per day) are smuggled (or‘bunkered’) out of the Niger Delta each year. At an
estimated price of US$20 per barrel, this comes toabout US$1.1 billion.17 In a more recent Chatham
House report, government loss from illicit trade
in hydrocarbons in Nigeria amounted to between
US$3 billion and 8 billion. That study estimates aloss of 100 000 bpd in the first quarter of 2013.18
Nigeria’s 7 000 kilometres of oil pipeline (at least)
are difficult to secure. Sabotage was responsible
on average for 44% of losses that occurred between 2004 and 2011.19 When it comes to oil theft,
the typical methods are hot tapping (creating abranch connection, for example under water) andcold tapping (where bombing a pipeline is used to
install a spur pipeline). Barges then transport thestolen oil downriver to tankers in the Gulf of Guinea;20 some of it is transported by trucks in barrels.
Another way in which oil is stolen is through corruption. Meanwhile, non-state armed groups, likethe Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger
Delta, and the Niger Delta Avengers, benefit fromthe proceeds of oil thefts.21

MexicoSome 23 500 bpd of crude and refined oil are stolen
through tapping of the state-owned Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex) pipelines. The cost has been put by
the Mexican government at US$1.17 billion (March
2016 figure). Much of this is caused by criminal col-

21

20%

of incomesto the largest
armed groups arederived from oil
and gaslusion conducted by Pemex personnel, for example
identifying tapping valves, and helping to install sophisticated equipment for tapping. In addition, thereis theft, through coercion or stealth and ‘kidnappings’
trucks where the oil is ransomed.22 Among the perpetrators, the Zetas cartel (which has captured 38.9%
or US$372 million of the illegal market) is the dominant player, followed by the Jalisco New Generation
Cartel (21.4% market share, or US$212 million)23 andthe Gulf Cartel, with 16.3%, or US$158 million.

Ghana experiences a wide variety of illicit hydro-

carbon activities. These include transshipments
via the offshore Saltpond Oil Field (which sells
100 000 barrels per year, but 470 000 barrels wereshipped in 2014); oil tanker hijackings; tappingand siphoning of pipelines; and fuel smuggling
caused by a 50% subsidy on oil price at a rate of
US$13 million per year, according to official numbers.24

In Morocco illicit hydrocarbon activity is centredon illegal supply chains and smuggling. Stolen
crude oil from Nigeria is laundered through Ghana’s
Saltpond Field, and sold on to the SAMIR field in
Morocco, which exports it. Oil price subsidies inAlgeria also cause smuggling overland – according to one report by official sources, smuggling
accounted for 1.5 billion litres (9.4 million barrels)in 2013, with losses of US$2 billion per year.25 The
estimated amount equates to an oil price of over
US$200 per barrel, which is halved here to reachan estimated total value of US$1 billion.

8 000 000 000

1 100 000 000

Mexico1 170 000 000

1 170 000 000

Ghana

13 000 000

13 000 000

Morocco1 000 000 000

1 000 000 000

830 000 000

1 730 000 000

Angola4 800 000 000

14 500 000 000

Libya

750 000 000

1 000 000 000

Turkey2 500 000 000

2 500 000 000

Total

19 063 000 000

23 013 000 000

Iran/Pakistan

Estimated overview of IS finances

US$ millions
500

Oil income

Oil and Gas income

Oil income

200

16.5

10.5

Max

Min

Other income

100

Other income

Hydrocarbon crime is also widespread in a number of other countries, although reliable estimatesof its scale are missing from the data. These include Uganda (principally the result of smuggling, by former DRC rebels called the Opec Boys);
Mozambique (corruption); Thailand (smugglingfrom Malaysia caused by subsidized prices there);
Azerbaijan (smuggling from neighbouring countries).35

300

Other income

Because of its strategic location, Turkey is a major
node in many illicit trafficking flows, not least oil.
Smuggling is the major issue in Turkey, much it theresult of price disparities. At their height, IslamicState earned up to US$1.4 billion a year from salesof oil and gas – a large proportion of it to Turkey.
While oil smuggling across the border from Syria
has existed for some time, it increased by 300%
when the Syrian civil war started.33 According to
official numbers from the energy ministry, smuggling accounts for up to 2.7 million tonnes a year,
at a tax loss of US$2.5 billion a year.34

400

Oil income

About US$750 million to US$1 billion worth of
Libyan oil is smuggled to Malta each year, according to the Daphne Project and the Libyan National
Oil Corporation.31 The oil is transferred from ship
to ship about 12 miles off the Malta coast.32

Net income

a production rate of about 1.63 million bpd in 2018,
making Angola as the second largest producer of
crude oil in Africa. The company’s official net profit in 2017 was US$224 million,27 and yet its profit
margin was just 0.7%.28 Human Rights Watch and
The International Monetary Fund have said thisis because tens of billions of dollars are missing
from official accounting figures.29 A conservative
estimate of 5% to 15% of total production is lostto corruption, which equates to between US$4.8
billion and US$14.5 billion a year.30

Oil low (US$)

Nigeria / Niger Delta

2014

2015

2016

22

117

2017

Expenses

Angola’s state-owned oil company, Sonangol, has

Oil high (US$)

Other income

In the border area between Iran and Pakistan,diesel smuggling has taken over from drug smuggling for some locals. The low Iranian oil price (approximately 15 US cents per litre, compared with
US$1.06 in America) leads to smuggling volumesof 100 to 130 tankers a day, each carrying 25 000
to 40 000 litres. Smuggling activity has a revenue
potential of between US$0.83 billion and 1.73 billion a year.26

0IRAQ – A Sunni gunman stands at a checkpoint on the road near
Biji city, northern Iraq, June 2014.
© EAP / STR

23

Taxation and extortion
Islamic State made most of their income at thegroup’s peak in 2013 and 2014 from oil, but wereforced into using more coercive fundraising methods when they came under pressure two years later.
They are one of the terrorist groups with the largest
financial reserves, likely to be well over a hundred
million US dollars. And the group has the ability andintent to recruit low-level individual terrorists while
exercising increasing ability to undertake highly
dangerous and more sophisticated attacks, like theone in November 2017in Egypt that killed 305, including in Western countries. The group’s finances
have plummeted since a high in 2014:
September 2014
US$1.1 billion with US$436 million in expenses
February 2015
US$670 million with US$435 million in expenses
February 2016
US$285 million with US$222 million in expenses
June 2017
US$130 million with US$117 million in expenses
January 2018
US$6–24 million in expenses, half locally raised,half from reserves
In 2017 and 2018, Islamic State incurred very heavy
financial and military losses, with a 95% drop in income. However, they are likely to retain in excessof US$100 to US$200 million in reserves and arestill independent of expat finance. The group havebecome so weakened that they are not in a position to conduct their earlier robust and systematic
funding campaign. However, a lot of their wealth islikely laundered, for example through investment
in real estate. And their ‘brand name’ is still strong,
not least because of their credible threats of resurgence as well as their reputation for use of extreme
violence, so these investments remain relatively secure. In the meantime, they will resort to local taxation and extortion, as well as confiscation, as forms
of income, which is what most insurgent groups

17%

of incomes funding
the largest armed
groups derive from
illicit taxation andextortion, excluding
taxation of drugs.

turn to when under pressure, and which IslamicState has already shown a strong tendency for.

Smuggling of diesel and gasoline tomafia-run militant groups

At the time of writing, Islamic State’s capacity is
unlikely to be more than 5 000 fighters in Iraq and
Syria. The big unknown, however, is how many areon the run but who may still maintain strong loyalty to the organization. That figure is likely to be in
the region of 5 000 at least, giving a total capacity of about 10 000. In addition, there are returned
foreign fighters, about 20% of whom had left thegroup’s territories at various stages. There are an
estimated 5 600 foreign fighters affiliated with IS,
who have returned to their home countries.36

Various criminalized militia groups export diesel
out of Libya. In October 2017, Italian police disrupted a group smuggling diesel through an Italianmafia network. The mafia were engaged in a Libyan fuel-smuggling ring in which at least €30 million(US$35 million) of diesel was sold in gas stations
in Italy and Europe. A Libyan group used smallboats to steal fuel from Libya’s National Oil Corporation refinery in Zawiya, a port city west of Tripoli.
The fuel was then transferred to a larger ship off
the coast of Malta and shipped to Italy.

In terms of funding, at a fairly basic subsistence
minimum and with some transportation and bribe
costs of US$100–200 a month for 5 000 fighters,
and additional costs of maintaining the organization, hiding high-value targets, and sustaining
intelligence and counter-intelligence costs of another US$200 per fighter, Islamic State would haveestimated current expenses of between US$6 million and US$24 million. They are likely to be able
to raise half of this, funding the balance from theirreserves. In their current situation, therefore, theorganization is likely to think less in terms of salaries, and more in terms of emergency burden sharing and long-term survival as a group.

There is a huge amount of fuel-smuggling activity
between Colombia and Venezuela; Tunisia and Libya; Iran and Afghanistan; and Nigeria, Cameroon
and Chad. Very often, militant groups engage inthe smuggling of fuel themselves, or tax impoverished people engaged in it. The smuggling occurs
at all levels, from highly organized rings using roadtankers, to buried funnels cross border between
Syria and Turkey, to small refineries. In some cases, small quantities are smuggled in canisters byroad to individual low-level dealers or sellers.

24Islamic State: Estimated incomes (in US$ millions), in Syria/Iraq, 2014–2017
2014

2015

2016

2017

Oil and gas

150-450 / 400-1,400

435-550 / 84-244

200-250 / 48-95

Lacking / 10-17

Taxes and fees

300-400 / 26-170

400-800 / 77-258

200-400 / 70

Lacking / 107

Kidnap/ransom

20-40 /87

Lacking / 20

10-30 / 20

Lacking / 10

Antiquities

Lacking / 36

Lacking / 22-55

Lacking

Lacking

Foreign donations

Unknown

Insignificant/ 40

Insignificant

Insignificant

Looting / confiscations

500-1,000 / Included above

200-350 / 240

110-190 / 138-216

Lacking / Included above

Sum income all sources

970-1,890 / 549-1,693

1,035-1,650 / 523-815

520-870 / 262-309

Lacking / 127-134

Expenses (salaries, arms,

285-586285-586221

117259-1,107229-238

40-87

10-17

transport, social services)

Net income

Sources: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, King’s College, 2017 and RHIPTO Norwegian Center for Global Analysis 2014-2017 (in bold) 38, 39, 40, 41.
The numbers are generally roughly compatible with estimates from captured Islamic State accounts from Deir-ez-Zor Governorate from January 2015.42, 43

SYRIA – Islamic State in Palmyra, Syria.
© Unknown photographer.

25Syria smuggling routes from and into Turkey, 2016

Tunceli
BingölElâzığ

Muş
TatvanBitlisMalatyaNiğde
Diyarbakır

Siirt

BatmanAdıyaman
Kahramanmaraş

TURKEY
MardinŞanlıurfa
Tarsus
Icel

Zakho

Nusaybin
Al Qamishli

Gaziantep

Adana

Dahuk

Kilis
İskenderun

Izaz

Al Hasakah

ManbijTall Afar

Antioch
AleppoSamandagi

Madinat ath Thawrah

Idlib

Ar Raqqah

Al Ladhiqiyah

IRAQ

Dayr az Zawr
Hamah

SYRIA

Tartus
Homs

TadmurTarābulus

Abu Kamal

LEBANONAd Nabk

BeirutB'abdaHezbollah
YPG (Kurds)

Smuggling
Ar RutbahOil

IS fighters

Antiquities

Turkmen fighters

Main oil export route

Haifa
Nazareth

Palestinian
Territories

Ramla

Regime forces

Jabhat al-Nusra

Oil/gas field
Mobile refinery

Damascus

Al Qunaytirah

Tel AvivISIS

Oil facilities

Douma

Saida

ISRAEL(As of February 2016)

Rebels

Zahlé

Nabatiye et Tahta

Control of the territory

NablusRamallahJerusalem

Dar'a

As Suwayda

Border crossing point
Port

Irbid

Concentration ofoil tanker trucks

Al Mafraq
As SaltAmman

Az Zarqa

JORDAN
26

Sources: Institute for the Study of War; Financial
Times; Norwegian Center for Global Analysis;
Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation
RHIPTO - 2016

Mosul

Syrian and Iraqi smuggling routes from and into Turkey

Diyarbakir

TURKEY

Kahramanmaras
Adana

Tarsus

Dortyol
Iskenderun

Icel

Kilis

Izaz
SarmadaHatay

Besaslan

Hacipasa
Kharbet al-Jawz

Mediterranean
Sea

Hakkari

Mardin

Zakho

IRAN

Al Qamishli

Jarablus

Dahuk

Sari Kani

Tell Abiad

Al Hasakah

ManbijAleppoAl-Ya'rubiyah
Madinat
ath Thawrah

Idlib

Al Ladhiqiyah

Siirt

Sanliurfa

Gaziantep

Ceyan

BatmanSYRIAAr Raqqah

Tall Afar

Mosul

Ash Shaddadi

Irbil

KirkukDayr az Zawr

Hamah

As Sulaymaniyah

IRAQ

TartusHoms
Abu Kamal

PalmyraTrablous

Qasr-e Shirin

LEBANON
BeirutAd Nabk

Zahle

Dar'a

Palestinian
Territories

BaqubahAr Ramadi

Damascus

Mandali

Al Fallujah
BaghdadAl Musayyib

As Suwayda

KarbalaAl Hillah

JORDANAn NajafAmman

Al Kut

Ad Diwaniyah

Ash Shatrah

ISRAELSAUDI ARABIAISIS territory control(As of April 2017)

Actually controlled
Gained in 2017
Lost in 2017
Lost in 2016
Lost in 2015

Old smuggling scheme
Route active in 2016
and now reduced orclosedBorder crossing point
active in 2016 and now
closedActual smuggling routes
IS fighters
Antiquities
Oil
Border crossing point
active in 2017

Oil facilities
Oil/gas field
Mobile refinery
Concentration ofoil tanker trucks

27

Sources: Institute for the Study of War; Financial
Times; Norwegian Center for Global Analysis;
Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation
RHIPTO - 2017

SOMALIA – New recruits belonging to Somalia’s al-Qaeda-linked
al-Shabaab rebel group march during a passing out parade at a
military training base in Afgoye, west of the capital, Mogadishu
February 17, 2011.
© REUTERS / Feisal Omar

28

29

HAITI – Charcoal sellers wait for customers at the Titanyen
Market outside of Port-au-Prince, Haiti, on March 20, 2018. This
market is filled with sellers and buyers on Tuesday and Friday.
© AFP PHOTO / Hector Retamal

30

31

1%

of the income of
the largest armed
groups is derived fromcharcoal

Charcoal – Africa’s black gold
In Africa, 90% of wood consumed is used for fueland in the form of charcoal (the regional range
is 49–96%). The charcoal production was 32.4
million tonnes in 2016, with a market value of approximately US$9.7–25.9 billion. Illicit taxing ofcharcoal, commonly up to 30% of the product’s
value, is carried out on a regular basis by organized-criminal groups, militias and terrorist groups
across Africa. Given an official tax rate of 5% to10%, the annual revenue lost to the fiscus fromnot taxing the charcoal trade is between US$0.5
and US$2.6 billion to African countries.

Al-Shabaab: The rise and fall andrise of charcoal income
As of 2018, al-Shabaab had a fighting force ofapproximately 5 000. By comparison, there areabout 200 Islamic State fighters in Somalia.48 AlShabaab have been linked to over 4 500 fatalities
in 2017.49 Their largest attack to date happened in
October 2017, when more than 300 were killed bya truck bomb in Mogadishu.50 Their support zones,
as well as striking ranges, are spread throughout
the southern and central part of the country, inboth inland and coastal areas.51

Militias in the DRC are estimated to make between US$14 million and US$50 million annually
on illicit taxes.44 Al-Shabaab’s primary income isfrom informal taxation at roadblock checkpoints
and ports. In one case, in Somalia’s Badhaadhe
District, from 2012, they were able to make up
to US$50 000 a day from one particularly lucrative checkpoint by taxing trucks transporting
charcoal.45 Trading in charcoal and taxing ports
generated at their highest point an estimated annual total of US$38–56 million for al-Shabaab in
2012/13. The overall value of the illicit charcoal
export trade from Somalia has been estimated at
US$360–384 million a year in 2012, dropping to
US$120 million by 2017.46

Al-Shabaab’s primary income is from charcoal. In
2011 and 2012, the group were taxing the charcoal
trade out of six ports, the biggest being Kismayo
and Barawe. They took money from all those involved in the trade: producers, workers, transporters, buyers, operators of small boats and port
workers. These were all taxed at 2.5%, which isequivalent to the religious tax zakat. In addition,dhows were charged docking fees and exporters
an export tax.52 By November 2012, the illegal charcoal export trade was generating for al-Shabaab anincome from illicit taxes of between US$38 million
and US$56 million53, from 9 to 10 million sacks ofexported charcoal weighing 25 to 30 kg. The charcoal was shipped to the United Arab Emirates at a
rate of 500 000 to 600 000 sacks a month, and 200
000 to 300 000 sacks a month to Saudi Arabia.

Increasingly, transnational criminal networks aretaking control of the Somali charcoal trade. The
supply side in Kismayo, Somalia, and the receiving side in Dubai are connected through the socalled All Star Group of companies, comprising
suppliers, traffickers and investors in both locations. According to an informant to the Groupof Experts (who subsequently received death
threats from al-Shabaab’s Amniyat unit), the All
Star Group is alleged to cooperate with both thepresident of Somalia’s Jubba interim administration and al-Shabaab over profit sharing in the
charcoal trade and export terms.47

Although they were the major player in this illicit
market, not all of the income from the trade benefited al-Shabaab. Later they were squeezed out inlarge measure by the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF).
Al-Shabaab were also making money from a seriesof other taxation activities, including taxing sugar
imports into Kismayo, although this generated onlya modest US$400 000 to us$800 000 a year.54 At
that time, one exceptionally profitable checkpoint,
at Buulo Xaaji, generated the group a daily incomeof US$35 000 (US$12.8 million a year) from taxing 90 to 100 trucks a day at a rate of US$250 to
US$500 per vehicle, depending on its size.55
32

By 2014, the charcoal price had increased, and alShabaab had honed their taxation systems, generating about US$7.5–15 million from checkpoints
alone. In addition, it took a 30% to 40% share of
all charcoal exports out of Kismayo, where the export tax had risen to US$3.75 per bag – with atleast 6.57 million bags exported from Kismayo
and Barawe, al-Shabaab generated at least US$8.2
million to US$9.8 million – this from illicit export
taxes alone.56 Meanwhile, that year, it also accrued
income from numerous other inland forms of taxation – taxes on production, work, transport, buying
and loading. With vehicle checkpoints and export
tax from charcoal generating US$20 million, alShabaab was probably earning in 2014 close to
the same as during its financially most rewarding
year, 2012. But that would soon change.
From late 2015, al-Shabaab shifted almost entirely
away from the charcoal trade, even to the point ofenforcing their own ban, and attacking those involved in the trade within their own territory. This
happened in conjunction with their losing control
over Kismayo Port in September 2012 (although
they retained a share of the trade for another couple of years) and Barawe Port in October 2014; abreakdown in revenue sharing with Interim Jubba
Administration President Ahmed Mohamed Islam;and the KDF increasing their share of the trade bycharging export tax of US$2 per bag at Kismayo
and establishing an AMISOM base at the Buur
Gaabo charcoal stockpile. At the same time, theinternational enforcement of the export ban has
become more effective.57
Following their losses in charcoal revenue, alShabaab have diversified their income streams by
doubling down on taxation across all aspects ofprivate and commercial life in an effort to compensate. They tax everything: drinking water at wells,
intensified zakat collection, extortion of businesses in person or by text messages, agriculture andThe illegal charcoal trade controlled by al-Shabaab

UZBEKISTANAZERBAIJANTURKMENISTANTURKEYSYRIA
BeirutLEBANON

Damascus

BaghdadAmman
Jerusalem

AFGHANISTAN

IRAN

IRAQ

Cairo

KUWAIT

KuwaitPAKISTAN
LIBYA

EGYPT

KhasabManamaQATAR

RiyadhDoha Dubai
Abu Dhabi

UNITED ARAB
EMIRATESSAUDI ARABIA

Creek
of Sharjah
Muscat

OMAN

Jizan
CHAD

YEMEN

Khartoum

Sanaa

AsmaraAl Ahmadi

SUDAN

Aden
DJIBOUTI
Djibouti
SOMALILAND
Hargeysa

Addis Ababa

CENTRAL AFRICAN REP.

ETHIOPIA

SOUTH SUDANSOMALIA

Charcoal illegal trade
Country of origin

Juba

Mogadishu

UGANDA
CONGO

KENYA

Kampala

DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC
OF THE CONGONairobi

RWANDA

Kigali

Main importer
Other importer
Area controlled by
the al-Shabaab militia

BaraaweBuulo Xaaji
checkpoint
Anole

Main shipping lane
Secondary shipping lane
Main shipping port

Kismaayo

Koday

Other important shipping port

Buur Gaabo

Al Shabaab “taxing” checkpoint

Bujumbura

BURUNDI

Sources: UN Security Council, Somalia report of theMonitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea submitted inaccordance with resolution 2060, 2012TANZANIA

33

SOMALIA – Kenya Defence Forces and Somali Transitional
Federal Government (TFG) soldiers take part in a joint patrol ata charcoal depository formerly under the control of al-Shabaabmilitants in Burgabo, south of Kismayu in Somalia in this in
December 2011. Kenyan forces fighting militants in Somalia
are taking cuts from charcoal and sugar smuggling, earningthemselves about $50 million a year and boosting an illegal tradethat helps fund the Islamists, a rights group said on November
12, 2015.
© REUTERS / Noor Khamisl

34

livestock taxation, and they train young cadres as
tax collectors, identifiable by their uniforms.58 The
group has also intensified the taxation of distribution of development aid as well as commerce, using checkpoints, which has driven up local prices.59
In late 2016 to early 2017, however, al-Shabaab
resurrected their taxation of the charcoal trade,using checkpoints on the road to Buur Gaabo
and Kismayo, as well as still controlling the main
production areas in Lower and Middle Juba.60
The charcoal trade in general, and therefore alShabaab’s tax revenue, is smaller however,61 as isreflected in the lower tax of US$2.5 per bag, downfrom US$3 in 2016.62 The group’s estimated revenue from charcoal is currently about US$10 million
a year.63 The shift back to illicit charcoal taxation
was possibly due to their having found that alternative income sources proved both more resource
intensive to collect and less fruitful.
In addition to their charcoal income, the groupprobably makes another US$10 million from other forms of taxation. For example, from a single
checkpoint at Leego (which generates US$1.8 million), livestock markets at Safarnooley and Wajid(US$1.6 million and US$0.9 million, respectively),and protection money from three companies, alShabaab make US$4.3 million.64 This would seemto correlate well with about 4 500 fighters earning
about US$100 a month, and perhaps 500 Amniyat and senior leaders earning US$500 a month,65
giving a total of US$8.4 million in salary expenses, and about US$11.6 million in other costs, including transportation, ammunition, food, training
camps, religious education and bribes.
Widely cited rumours that al-Shabaab had major
sources of income from ivory have been refuted.66
Similar rumours about their involvement in the East
African heroin route trade have not been refuted,

35

but the Group of Experts had, as of 2015, not foundany evidence for it.67 Al-Shabaab remain a threat tostability, albeit mainly in Somalia and neighbouring Kenya, including their retaliatory responses totemporary territorial losses and disputes over theirshare of the charcoal trade, which impede their political influence over clan leaders in Somalia.
For African countries experiencing ongoing conflicts, including Mali, Central African Republic,
DRC, Sudan and Somalia, a conservative estimate
is that, in total, the militia and terrorist groups inthose countries may gain US$111–289 million annually, depending upon prices, from their involvement in, and taxing of, the illegal or unregulated
charcoal trade.68
With current trends in urbanization and a projected population increase of another 1.1 billion people in sub-Saharan Africa by 2050, the demandfor charcoal is expected to at least triple over the
next three decades. This will have severe impacts,
including large-scale deforestation, pollution andsubsequent health problems in slum areas, especially for women. The increased demand forcharcoal will also rapidly accelerate emissions
from both forest loss and emissions of short-lived
climate pollutants in the form of black carbon. It
is estimated that there are over 1 900 charcoal
dealers in Africa alone, at least 300 of which export minimum orders of 10 to 20 tonnes of charcoal per shipment.69 Their minimum daily orders
exceed the official total annual exports for somecountries. For East, Central and West Africa, thenet profits, combined, from trading and taxing unregulated, illicit or illegal charcoal are estimated at
between US$2.9 and US$7.8 billion.70 When one
compares this figure with the street value heroin
and cocaine in the region, which is US$2.65 billion,
the scale of the illicit charcoal market becomesstarkly apparent.

SOMALIA – The Somali National Army patrol the area for
extremist group Al-Shabaab on 22 March 2014
© United Nations Photo / Flickr

36

al-Shabaab and ISIS presence in Somalia, 2017

DJIBOUTI

Caluulaa sh

Djibouti

Aw

BerberaBoorama
Burco

Hargeysa

Addis Ababa

HurdiyoCeerigaabo

QardhoBandarbeyla

SOMALIA
Laascaanood

Garoowe
EylETHIOPIA

Galkayo

SOMALIA

Shebe
le

a
Gen

Dhuusa MareebleFerferBeledweyne
Dolo Bay

ManderaLuuq

Mereeg

Garbahaarey

Mogadishu

KENYA

Marka

Terrorist groups' presence
al-Shabaab

Bu'aaleISIS

Attacks and casualties, 2017

JamaameAttacks involving al-Shabaab
Fatalities reported

Kismaayo

Nairobi

Buur Gaabo

73

TANZANIA

50

10

5

Sources: Norwegian Cnter for Global Analyses; ACLED Database

37

The impacts of unsustainable charcoal production

Estimated annual deforestation rates
caused by charcoal production

AfricaSquare kilometres, 2009

Asia
CentralAmerica 390

29 760

2 400

5 100
South America

Charcoal production

AfricaMillion tonnes, 2009

Asia
CentralAmerica
1 061

26 116

5 006

7 621
South America

Grenhouse gas emissions
caused by charcoal production

AfricaMillion tonnes, 2009

Asia
CentralAmerica

67.3

2.8
19.7

Methane*13.0*

Carbondioxide (CO2)

CO2 equivalentSouth America

Source: Chidumayo, E., N., Gumbo, D., J., The environmental impacts of charcoal production in tropical ecosystems of the World, 201238

Bags of charcoal line a road in Africa.
© SHUTTERSTOCK / Peter Wollinga
RHIPTO 2016

Wood charcoal production in Africa

MOROCCOTUNISIALIBYA

ALGERIA

EGYPT

Western Sahara

MAURITANIA

MALI
NIGER

GAMBIAGUINEABISSAU

SUDAN

CHAD

SENEGAL
BURKINAFASO
GUINEACÔTED’IVOIRE

SIERRALEONETOGOERITREADJIBOUTIBENINNIGERIA

GHANA

Charcoal officially producedby country

CENTRAL AFRICAN
REPUBLIC

LIBERIAEQ. GUINEA

Tonnes, 2012
4 000 000ETHIOPIA

SOUTH
SUDAN

CAMEROONGABONSOMALIAUGANDA
CONGO

KENYA

DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC
OF CONGO

RWANDA

1 000 000

BURUNDI

500 000
100 000

TANZANIA

MALAWI

4 000

Total charcoal production trend in Africa

ANGOLAZAMBIA

Million tonnes
30

MOZAMBIQUE
ZIMBABWE

25

NAMIBIABOTSWANAMADAGASCAR

20
15

SWAZILANDLESOTHO

10

SOUTH AFRICA
5
Source: FAOSTAT, accessed May 2014

0

39
1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010 2012

The charcoal supply chain

Price of a bag ofcharcoal at retail market
Percentage of the total
selling price, Malawi

Forestry
department

Production site
Producer
Armed groups
roadblocks

Police or otherofficial authority

Roadside vendor

33

6

Middlemen

Packing

Police or otherofficial authority

12
Private taxes
and bribes
Armed groups
roadblocks
25
Transport
Wholesale market
3
Market fee
Retail market

21
Point of control, roadblockwith informal taxation andbribery

RetailerInternational
market,shipping

Household40

International
market via
Internet

Sources: Kambewa, P., et al., Charcoal: the reality, 2007

SOMALIA – Naasa Hablood mountain in Somaliland.
© iStock / Muendo41

SOMALIA – Boys pan for gold at a riverside at Iga Barriere, 25 km(15 miles) from Bunia, in the resource-rich Ituri region of eastern
Congo February 16, 2009.
© Reuters / Finbarr O’Reilly42

04 Illegal mining incontexts of conflict43

Illegal mining incontexts of conflict

17%of the income financing
the largest armed groups isderived from illegal mining

The Great Lakes: Gold and minerals in
the world’s most violent organizedcrime conflict
The illicit exploitation of natural resources in eastern DRC is valued at over US$1.25 billion a year; thisfalls to between US$722 and US$862 million if diamonds are excluded from the picture (which may
also be sourced outside eastern DRC). Of this figure,an estimated 10% to 30% (i.e. US$72 million–426
million per annum) goes into the coffers of transnational organized-criminal groups.

Around 98% of the net profits from illegal exploitation of natural resources, particularly gold, charcoal
and timber, go to transnational organized-criminal
networks operating in and outside of the DRC. The
significance of charcoal as a conflict resource islikely to increase given increasing demand and a
growing regional energy deficit (see Chapter 3 formore on charcoal).71

The annual net profits to organized crime in the eastern DRC – and these are conservative estimates –derive from:Armed groups in eastern DRC retain around 2%(equivalent to US$13.2 million per annum) of the
net profits from illegal smuggling. This income represents the basic subsistence cost for maintaining
at least 8 000 armed fighters a year, and enables
defeated or disarmed groups to continually resurface and destabilize the region. Revenue from illegal natural resources exploitation finances a highnumber of well over 25 armed groups (up to 49,
according to some estimates) continuing to destabilize eastern DRC. While the armed groups havetheir own proven survival strategies, transnationalorganized-crime networks might try to ‘divide andrule’ armed groups in eastern DRC to prevent any
single armed group from achieving a dominant roleand potentially interfering with illegal exploitation
rackets run by transnational criminal networks.72i) Gold (US$40–120 million)ii) Timber (US$16–48 million)iii) Charcoal (US$12–35 million)iv) 3T minerals (US$7.5–22.6 million)v) Diamonds sourced mainly from outside the conflict zone (US$16–48 million)vi) Other, including wildlife (ivory and fisheries), local
taxation schemes, cannabis and other resources(US$14.3–28 million).
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO – Karawa, August24, 2013. An upaved road in rural Congo, a lot of people
are walking on the road which connects two villages in theprovince of Equateur.
© iStock / Guenter Guni

44

Natural resources and armed groups in the Kivu provinces, DR CongoCENTRAL
AFRICANREPUBLIC

SOUTH
SUDAN
ETHIOPIA
Juba

Onaba

Nimule
Arua

Watsa

Isiro

UGANDA
NORTH
KIVU

Lake
Albert

KENYA

Bunia

Bafwasende

TororoBeni
Kisangani

ButemboKampalaLake
EdwardDEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF
CONGO

Lake
Victoria

Nairobi

RWANDA

Lake
Kivu

KigaliTo Mombasa

BukavuKindu

MwengaKampene

SOUTH
KIVU

Uvira

BURUNDI
Bujumbura

Fizi Banaka

MiningGold
Cassiterite
Diamond
Wolframite
ColtanCopperKigomaLake
Tanganyika

45

Wood
and charcoal
TANZANIA
Degraded forest andcharcoal production
Smuggling routes
Charcoal
Wood
Border crossing point

Armed groups
Local airport
Main road

Source: Norwegian Center For Global
Analysis, 2015; MONUSCO; International
Peace Information Service (IPIS) 2014.

Mai Mai Mongol

Kivu armed groups’ areas of influence

Beni[Various
Local
Defence]

AlliedDemocratic
ForcesUGANDAFPC/UPCPMai Mai
FDLR
Raia Mutomboki

Butembo

TSHOPO

Armed groups

OthersVarious local defence groups

FARDC presence
SectorLake
EdwardRegiment

NORD-KIVU

Battalion
RUD (FDLR)
Mai Mai
FDLR
Soki/Kasongo

FDLR
FOCA

NDC
Sheka

Selected armed groups count(Higher estimates)

APCLS

Walikale

FDC/
Guides/
MAC

Raia Mutomboki

MANIEMA

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
OF THE CONGO

Nyatura
Sud

CNDP
M27

Mai Mai
Kifuafua

Mai Mai
Kirikicho

Raia
Mutomboki
Kalehe

Goma
Lake
Kivu

RWANDA

Raia Mutomboki
Walungu/Kabare

Shabunda

Mai-Mai Mongol
Kabare Bukavu

Walungu

NDC
MCC Bede

MwengaMai MaiNyakiliba

FDLR
FOCA

[Various
Local
Defence]

Mai-Mai Kifuafua

BURUNDIMai MaiFujo-Nerere
Mai Mai
Mayele

FPLC

500

FRPI
Mai-Mai Yakutumba

Minembwe
Mai Mai
Mulumba Chochi

Mai Mai
Sikatenda

1 000

PARECOFNL

Mai MaiMusombe/IlungaMai Mai
Kapopo/Eradi

SUD-KIVU

ACPLS
ADF/NALU[Various
Local
Defence]

Raia Mutomboki
Shabunda

MANIEMA

4 000

FDLR

[Various
Local
FDDH Defence]

Masisi

Mai-Mai Simba

200

Mai-Mai Kirikitcho

Mai Mai
UCCB/Brown
Lake
Tanganyika

FRF

TANZANIA
Yakutumba

FPJC

North Kivu
DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF
THE CONGOFNL (Burundian)South Kivu

Mai-Mai Populaire

46

40

Source: Norwegian Center For Global Analysis, 2015; UNODC, 2011;
based on a map from Christoph Vogel, 2014.

Juba

Resource smuggling and armed g roup control
in eastern DRC

SOUTH SUDAN

Aketi
Moroto
Bumba

Wamba

Mongbwalu

ITURI

Masindi

Bunia
BasokoMbale

Bafwasende
Yangambi

Kisangani

MubendeBeni

UGANDA

Butembo

Jinja

KampalaKatwe

NORD-KIVU
LubutuTSHOPO

Buluko

Ikela

Goma

DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF
THE CONGORWANDA
Kigali

BukavuMwanzaKindu

SUD-KIVU

Mwenga

Uvira

Lodja

BURUNDI

KampeneSANKURU

Bujumbura

KasongoLusambo

Armed group control

KigomaK ABINDA

Kananga

KabindaMbuji-Mayi

Gandajika

TANZANIA

Kongolo

Lubao

Demba

Mwene-Ditu

Gold
Diamonds
Cassiterite
ColtanOthersKasuluMANIEMA

DibayaArtisanal mines

T ANGANIK A
KabaloCongolese Army (FARDC)
Rebel groups

Smuggling
NyunzuCharcoal, woodand minerals
Gold smuggling hub
Main border crossing point

Kalemie

Sources: Norwegian Center For Global
Analysis, 2015; International Peace
Information Service (IPIS) 2017.

47
KaremaDRC – Chai, North Kivu, March 29, 2014:
FDLR rebel soldiers reloading ammo before patrols start in Chai,
North Kivu, DR Congo.
© iStock / Jon Brown

48

49

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC – Prospectors work at an openpit at the Ndassima gold mine, near Djoubissi north of Bambari
May 9, 2014.
© Reuters / Siegfried Modola

50Armed groups, border-corridor movement and clashes in CAR
October 2017

SUDAN

Niyala

CHAD

U
Birao
GordilU

U

Akoursoubak

Ouanda-Djallé

U
Ndele

U

Ouadda

U
U

Kabo
U
Azene

U
U

Kaga Bandoro
Bossangoa
Dekoa

Bouar

Yakossi

Obo

Bossembele
Zemio

U
Boali

Bangassou

U

U

BanguiBerberatiU

CarnotU

Yaloké

Bambari

Sibut

Bossemptele

Bria

U

Bozoum

SOUTH
SUDAN

CENTRAL AFRICAN
REPUBLIC

Paoua

MobayeMbaiki
Nola

LibengeTranshumanceU

CAMEROON

Livestock movement
Entry point
Conflict, 2016

Density of livestockHigh
MediumLow

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF
THE CONGO

MINUSCA army presence
Republic of Congo
Cameroon
MoroccoBangladesh
Pakistan
Mauritania
ZambiaBurundiREPUBLIC OF
CONGO

Sources: Norwegian Center for Global Analyses, 2017; IPIS, 201751

DRC – U.N. peacekeepers drive their tank as they patrol past
the deserted Kibati village near Goma in the eastern Democratic
Republic of Congo, August 7, 2013.
© Reuters / Thomas Mukoya

52

Illegal mining of gold and coltan in
Latin America by FARC and drug
cartels
Illegal mining, especially of gold but also otherminerals, is gaining increasing interest in Latin
America among non-state armed groups, as wellas traditional drug cartels, which are finding safer,
alternative income streams through taxation or illegal logging and mining in the Peruvian, Brazilian
and Colombian parts of the Amazon, and in themountainous areas of Colombia. Similar trends
are observed in parts of Central America. Like in
Africa, natural resources, such as gold and timber,are easy to launder and sell in Latin America, with
virtually no interventions from law-enforcement
agencies, except for in Brazil. Hence, the risk,
compared to that of the drug trade, is minimal.
Most of the world’s tantalum comes from Brazil
and Australia (it is also mined in China, the DRC,
Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Russia and Rwanda). Tantalum is also produced in Thailand andMalaysia as a by-product of tin mining and smelting. Tantalum raw materials occur in many other countries, such as Canada, Colombia, Egypt,
Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Venezuela andZimbabwe. The level of production in these countries varies from exploration deposits to active
artisanal mining and inactive major mines. Tantalum is a notable and well-documented threat
finance source to rebel groups and organizedcrime networks.

Coltan, a contraction used for columbo-tantalites, is refined to produce tantalum. Members of
FARC, who have been observed in the Colombian
Amazon, are involved in taxing coltan ore beingtransported through the area. This illicit tax has
been valued at about US$7 per kilogram of coltan
ore. Paramilitaries, it has been alleged, were running the business in collusion with the army andpolice. Sometimes taxes have paid with crack cocaine, which is possible given the area’s proximity
to drug-producing areas.
Coltan ore has been priced at an average of
US$180 to US$200 per kilogram (in the period
2011–2015). Its commercial value is calculatedon the tantalum oxide content: a concentrate
may contain between 10% and 30% tantalum oxide. This corresponds with a front-line ore priceof US$27 to US$60 per kilogram (possibly much
lower) depending on purity and distance from themine, suggesting a vehicle checkpoint or river tax
of between 11% and 27%.
Illegal coltan mining, alongside gold mining, hasbeen allegedly tied to some cartels, possibly drug
cartels such as the Sinaloa cartel and the Cifuentes
Villa family, but this anecdotal information has notbeen verified. Much of the coltan is transported
through Brazil and exported, and can be bought
online, such as on the internet platform Ali Baba.

53

DRC – The forest in the Itombwe Reserve, South Kivu.
© Riccardo Pravettoni

54

05 Illegal logging

The largest, least risky and mostprofitable illicit environmental industry

55

MADAGASCAR – Toamasina, April 12, 2014: Loading of rosewood
on trucks at the port of Toamasina (Tamatave).
© iStock / Pierre-Yves Babelon

56Illegal logging: Thelargest, least risky
and most profitableillicit environmental
industry

1%Less than 1% of theincome of the largest
armed groups comesfrom timber

The UN Environment Programme and INTERPOL
estimate that 62% of all suspected illegal tropicalwood entering the US and 86% entering the EU
arrives in the form of paper, pulp or wood chips,
and not as roundwood, sawnwood or furnitureproducts, which have tended to receive the mostattention in the past.73
The more than 30% lower market prices fetchedby illegal tropical wood in recent years – of which
INTERPOL has estimated that 50% to 90% of thewood felled in tropical countries is traded illegally – has probably contributed to the downfall ofmany European forestry and paper industries, andthe loss of over 270 000 jobs in the industry from2000 to 2010.74 Overall, the European forestry
sector (which employed over 3.3 million people in2016) has shed about 560 000 jobs since 2000,
equivalent to 17% of the workforce.
Across the EU-28, manufacturing employment
levels fell by 16.8% during the 2000–2015 period,
while the largest losses were recorded in furniture
manufacturing (which saw 29% lower employment). Pulp, paper and paper products lost 22.2%,
while employment in the manufacturing of wood
products dropped by 26.5%. Asian paper and pulp
companies now account for nearly half of the
global market share.75

57

BRAZIL – Forest on Awá land is being illegally cleared by settlers.
© Survival / Fiona Watson

58Illegal logging and log laundering

Getting "cross borderpermits" throughbribesCutting
Illegal cutting

CountryA

CountryB

Re-importing

Smuggling
Transport

Protected
areaMilling

Hacking to obtain false
road transport or logging
permits

Concession

Mixing illegal timberwith legal local timber

ExportingCutting wider
along roadcorridors

Getting "permits"through bribes
Cutting down in andaround palm oil
plantations

Cutting beyond concessions

Cutting down in andaround palm oil
plantations

Underreporting actual
capacity and production inmills with a modest legal
production

Fake documents attestingproduction from plantations

Exporting
Processing roundwood into chips or paper
before exporting, making traceability very
difficult or impossible

Plantation
Illegal operation

Laundering operation

Legal operation
59

Rhinos grazing.
© iStock / 2630ben

60

06 Wildlife crime & waste

61

BulukoPrimary ivory trafficking routes in Tanzania
Lake
Victoria

BukobaMachakosMusomaKonza

KigaliRWANDA
Cyangugu Cyangugu

Ngara

Biharamulo

MwanzaBURUNDI
Bujumbura

Ngorongoro

KakonkoShinyanga

KahamaMakamba

Lamu

Witu

Moshi

Voi

Kilifi

Mbulu

Mombasa

Same

Nzega

KanyatoMalindiArushaOldeaniRuyigiBururi

KENYA
Tsavo

Geita

Cankuzo

MwengaNamanga

Nyahanga

Babati

KasuluSingidaKigomaTanga

TaboraUvinza

Korogwe

Mkokotoni

ManyoniNyunzuZanzibar

MpandaDodomaKaremaManonoChake Chake

Itigi

Sikonge

Lake
Tanganyika

Wete

Bagamoyo

Mpwapwa
KilosaTANZANIA

Morogoro
KibahaDar es
SalaamMikumi

Kipili

Indian
Ocean

Kibiti
IringaSumbawanga

Luanza

Mbeya

Mbala
TundumaNchelenge
Kawambwa

ZAMBIA
Protected areas

NjombeTukuyuChitipa

Lindi

KarongaKasamaMtwaraChinsali

SongeaNational park

MasasiTunduru

Other protected area

Trafficking routes

Mbamba Bay

Mzuzu
Nkhata Bay

Main route
Other route

Kilindoni

IfakaraMpika

Mocimboa

Lake
MalawiMzimbaLundazi

MOZAMBIQUE
Sources: Norwegian Center for Global
Analisys, 2015, UNEP, WCMC, Protected Planet

Pemba

Nkhotakota

62
Chipata

MALAWI

Lichinga

Marrupa

Montepuez

Wildlife crime andwaste
Insignificant as conflict financeexcept for marginalized groups
Elephants and rhinos
The number of elephants killed in Africa is in therange of 20 000 to 25 000 a year (2016 numbers)out of a population of 415 428 (+/− 20 111) plus a
possible additional 117 000 to 135 000 elephants.
The latter number is based on less certain estimates. In total, this gives a broad range of 395 000
to 570 000 elephants.76 For the forest elephant, thepopulation is estimated to have declined by about
62% between 2002 and 2011.77 Poached African
ivory may fetch an end-user street value in Asia ofan estimated US$165–188 million of raw ivory per
year, and this figure does not include ivory from
Asian sources.78
In the case of rhinos, about 94% of the animals arepoached in Zimbabwe and South Africa, which havethe largest remaining rhino populations. In thosecountries, poaching has increased dramatically –from 13 (the number recorded in 2007) to 1 215 in2014, declining slightly to 1 028 by 2017.79 Poachingof rhino horn involves organized syndicates. Rhinos
have disappeared entirely from several Asian and
African countries in recent years. The value of rhino
horn poached in 2013 was valued in downstream
markets at between US$63.8 million and US$192
million, but the value is much less at the supply endof the chain.80
Wildlife and forest crime play a relatively small rolein threat finance to organized crime and non-statearmed groups, including terrorist groups. It is estimated that less than 1% of the overall income to nonstate armed groups comes from ivory. Ivory provides
a portion of the income raised by militia groups in the
DRC and CAR, and is most likely a primary source ofincome for the Lord’s Resistance Army, which currently operates in the border triangle of South Sudan,
CAR and DRC. Ivory also provides a source of income
to the Sudanese Janjaweed and other horseback
gangs operating across Sudan, Chad and Niger.

Given the estimated elephant populations and thenumber of projected elephants that are killed within the striking range of these militia groups, theannual income from ivory to militias in the whole
sub-Saharan region is likely to be in the range of
US$4.0 million–12.2 million.81
Poaching is also a threat to Asian rhinos. Over 70%
of Indian Greater One-horned rhinos were in Kaziranga National Park by 2008, with an estimatedpopulation of 2 401 in 2015. Poaching is currently athreat in Kaziranga, with 123 rhinos killed between
2006 and 2015. The poaching trend has increased
dramatically: 58% of these rhinos were killed between just 2013 and 2015.
In Nepal, rhino populations diminished by 88%, to
100 animals in 1960 in just one decade as a resultof poaching. A Rhinoceros Action Plan for Nepal
was developed in 2017. Earlier, an intense protection scheme, including deployment of the army, theDepartment of National Parks and Wildlife Conservation, and the translocation of 87 rhinoceros took
place between 1986 and 2003 (at an average costof US$4 000 each).
When the war broke out in Nepal in 1996, tourism
dropped by 41% in two years and rhino numbers decreased by a third in five years to a population of just408 by 2005, as they were poached by armed groups
for cash. Dedicated rangers and anti-poaching units
in the Bardia and Chitwan national parks fought
hard to rescue remaining rhinos at the height of theconflict. After the war, the campaign continued, thistime against organized-criminal networks smuggling
rhino horn to China via Pokhara and Kathmandu. As
populations reached their lowest, protecting the remaining rhinos became vital. Due to intense efforts,
the year 2015 passed without the loss of a single rhino to poaching in Nepal (likewise 2011 and 2013).
63

ZAMBIA – Lower Zambezi national Park, 2011.
© Unknown photographer.

African rhino smuggling
Main trafficking hubs
Main routes
Main country of origin
Main transit country
Secondary transit country
Main destination
Secondary destination

Number of rhino horn
seizures by country
53
1

CHINA
The Netherlands
Germany
Ireland UK
Belgium

Tibet

Hong Kong
Hanoi

VIETNAMMALAYSIATHAILAND
Assam
Bangkok(INDIA)
Singapore
MYANMAR

Czech Republic

NEPAL

Slovakia

OMAN
YEMEN

KENYA
TANZANIAZAMBIA MOZAMBIQUE

Black rhinoceros, a dramatic loss

BOTSWANA

Number of black rhinos in Africa, thousands
100

NAMIBIA

80

1 200
1 000

60

SOUTH
AFRICA

40

South Africa

Other countries(2014-15 only)

800
600
400

20
0
1960

Southern African rhino poaching

Rhinos reported illegally killed
1 400

200
1970

1980

1990

2000

0

2010

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Source: TRAFFIC, The South Africa – Viet Nam
Rhino Horn Trade Nexus, 2012; TRAFFIC data, 201564

MAURITANIA

MALI

CHAD

GUINEASIERRA LEONEDJIBOUTI

BENIN
TOGO

LIBERIAERITREABURKINAFASO

GAMBIAGUINEABISSAU

SUDAN

NIGER

SENEGAL

CÔTED’IVOIREETHIOPIANIGERIACENTRAL AFRICAN
REPUBLIC

GHANA

SOUTH
SUDAN

CAMEROON
DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC
OF CONGO

EQ. GUINEA
GABON

KENYA

Somaliland

SOMALIAUGANDACONGO

RWANDA
BURUNDITANZANIA

Elephants and rhinos
threatened by conflict

MALAWIANGOLAZAMBIA

Conflicts and security incidents

MOZAMBIQUE

Major battle (more than 50 fatalities)
Battle and other security incident
with more than 1 casualty
Riot or protest
Violence against civilians

Protected areas and animal range

MADAGASCARZIMBABWE
BOTSWANANAMIBIA

Protected area

SWAZILAND

Elephant known range

LESOTHO

Rhino known range

SOUTH AFRICA
Note: A battle is defined as a violent interaction between twopolitically organized armed groups at a particular time andlocation.
A riot is defined as a violent disturbance of the public peace by
three or more persons assembled for a common purpose.
A protest is defined as a spontaneous, non-violent gathering ofcivilians for a political purpose

Source: Armed Conflict Location and Events Dataset (ACLED); African ElephantDatabase (AED)/IUCN/SSC African Elephant Specialist Group (AfESG)

RHIPTO 201665

Greater one-horned rhino smuggling in Nepal

Dandeldhura
Moradabad
RampurTIBET(CHINA)

Jumla

XigazeGyangze

Dhangarhi
Pilibhit

BardiaBareilly
BudaunSalyanN E PA L
Baglung

Nepalganj

PokharaShahjahanpur
Bhairawa

Bahraich

Sitapur

Chitwan
Parsa

Main smuggling routeB H U TA N

Kathmandu
Bhimphedi
HetaudaRamechhap

GangtokBirganj
Lucknow

Other smuggling routeProtected area in Nepal
Habitat of the great one-horned rhinocero

Ilam

Gorakhpur

Faizabad

Rajbiraj

INDIA

Thimphu

Biratnagar

Siliguri
Alipur Duar

Muzaffarpur

Corridor for the movement of the rhinos
Bottleneck

PurniaForested area

Patna

Urban area

Bhagalpur

Annual mortality of the greater one-horned rhinoceros in Nepal
40

BANGLADESH
Natural death

35

Poaching

30

Dhaka

25
20
15
10
5
0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

66

2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Sources: RHIPTO 2018; Thapa, K., et al., Past, present and future conservation of
the greater one-horned rhinoceros Rhinoceros unicornis in Nepal, 2011; Nepal
Department of National Parks and Wildlife Conservation, 2017

NEPAL – A relocated rhino charges a Nepalese forestry andtechnical team after being released as part of a relocation projectin Shuklaphanta National Park, some 510 km from Kathmandu
on April 4, 2017. Conservationists on April 3 captured a rare onehorned rhinoceros in Nepal as part of an attempt to increase thenumber of the vulnerable animals, which are prized by wildlife
poachers.
© AFP PHOTO / Prakash Mathema67

Pangolin, the world’s most trafficked mammal

CHINA

INDIA
LAO

MYANMAR

VIETNAMPHILIPPINES

Pangolin trafficking

THAILAND

Myanmar, a new hub for
pangolin trafficking to China
INDIA(Assam)Main smuggling routes

CHINA

MALAYSIA

Main country of origin
Transit country
Main destination

INDONESIAMYANMAR
LAOS

Pangolin seizures, 2010-2015
Individuals or kilograms of scales
4 200
THAILAND
1 000

100

Road
Sea or riverAir
Not specified

Confiscation site
Main roads used
for trafficking

68

Sources: Environmental investigation Agency, 2015; Nijman, V., et al., Pangolin trade in the Mong La
wildlife market and the role of Myanmar in the smuggling of pangolins into China, 2016

Pangolins
Every year, between 400 000 and 2.7 million pangolins are hunted in the forests of central Africa. Hunting pangolins has increased by over
150% since 2000,82 making the pangolin one of
the world’s most trafficked animals in the illegal
wildlife trade. It is estimated that at least a million pangolins were traded in Asia in 10 years.83
In 2015, Vietnamese customs officers trained by
the UNODC-WCO Container Control Programme
seized around 4 000 kg of pangolin scales (alongwith 1 023 kg of ivory).84 In January 2017, Tanzanian authorities seized 6 000 kg of scales destined for Asian markets.85

Pangolin© iStock / Daniel Haesslich

69

Tiger
© iStock / THEPALMER

70

85% of the global trade in tigers takes place within the EU

BHUTAN
Thimphu

United States

CHINA

INDIA
BANGLADESH
Dhaka

MYANMAR
Hanoi
Naypyidaw

RangoonLAOS

VIETNAM

Vientiane

THAILAND
Illegal trafficking
in big cats

Tiger habitat
Resident
Possibly extinct

UK

FranceBelgium

Spain

Netherlands
Germany

Czech Republic
Switzerland
PolandAustria
MonacoBelarus
Hungary
Croatia
Italy
Romania
UkraineRussiaJapan

Malta
EuropeTurkeyChina

VietnamUnited Arab Emirates
Tiger habitat
Resident
Possibly extinct

ThailandIndia

Indonesia

Import and export of tigers
Top 20 importers of live tigers, 1975-2017
Top 20 exporters of tigers
Quantity
911
500
50
Main destination of tigers exported from Europe
Source : CITES database 2018, UNODC and RHIPTO 2018

71

Malaysia

Bangkok

CAMBODIA
Phnom Penh

INDONESIA – Navy ship blowing up a foreign fishing vesselcaught fishing illegally in the waters near Bitung, North Sulawesi,
20 May 2015. According to media reports, Indonesia has sunk 41
foreign boats across the country, as part of an ongoing push tostop illegal fishing in its waters.
© EPA

72

Trafficking in waste:
The rise of global dumping grounds
Some 41.8 million metric tonnes of electronic
waste (e-waste) were generated in 2014, and thisnumber is set to increase to 50 million metrictonnes by 2018.86 According to various estimates,
the amount of e-waste properly recycled and disposed of is between just 10% and 40% of the total.
The presence of the informal economy makes precise estimates of the value of this sector difficult
to ascertain. However, using an estimate formulated by INTERPOL that attributes an average valueof US$500 to each tonne of e-waste, the volumeof e-waste handled informally, or which is unregistered, including illegally, amounts to US$12.5–18.8
billion annually.87 It is unknown how much of thise-waste falls within the illegal trade or is simply
dumped. Its role in threat finance to conflicts is peripheral or insignificant. However, organized-criminal groups, including the Italian mafia, have been
engaged in it for decades.

Fisheries crime: Fraud andimpunity on the world’s seas
Close to 10% of the world’s catches are dumped
at sea if they fail to meet the regulatory standards
required.88 Great concern has been expressed overillegal fishing off the coast of West Africa and its
impact on the livelihoods of local fishermen. Illegal,
unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing off West
Africa, which makes up between one third and half
the total catch, is worth US$2.3 billion in 2015.89
In Somalia, illegal fishing has been posited as acause of the rise in piracy through lost livelihoods.
Losses incurred by foreign illegal vessels off Somalia
have been estimated to be in the region of US$100–
300 million.90 IUU fishing off Senegal, with a catch ofabout 261 000 tonnes a year, incurred a loss of about
US$300 million in 2012, or 2% of GDP.91 Many vessels
offload illegal catches to other ships at sea.

73

The role of IUU fishing for threat finance is peripheral, although some fisheries are used to pay illegal
taxes. The role of fishing vessels and recreational
vessels in transporting drugs – whether from Colombia, or along the west and east African coasts –is significant, however. Furthermore, fishing vessels
are key to transporting foreign fighters, including
across the Caspian Sea, the Mediterranean, and off
the Horn of Africa and Yemen.

Swirl of fish
© iStock / Tammy616

74

Illegal, unreported, unregulated fishing
ILLEGAL FISHINGLEGAL FISHING

Fish catch is registered andchecked by authorities

Fishing that violates national laws
or international obligations.

Fishing within a country’s
Exclusive Economic Zone without
permission

UNREPORTED FISHING

Documents are forged toprovide legal ground to illegallycaught fish

Fish gets to the market or to theprocessing factory?
Fishing that has not been reported,or has been misreported, to therelevant national authority

UNREGULATED FISHING?

AFishing by vessels under the flag of acountry they are not part of, or notpart of a fishery organisation

Fishing outside of regulated zones,
breaking international law toconserve living marine resources

Global losses from IUU fishing are estimated to be
between US$10 billion and US$23.5 billion annually,
between 10 and 22% of total fishery production

Sources: NOAA; IEEP, an independent review of the eu illegal, unreported and unregulated regulations, 2011.

75

CHAD – This photo was taken in the Chadian desert. A groupof migrants were travelling in a truck that broke down Mondou,
Chad, December 8, 2012.
© iStock / yoh4nn

76

07 The Trans-Sahara
Migrants, drugs and arms

77

Trans-Saharan trafficking and threat financeOctober 2017

TURKEYTUNISALGIER

Islamic
State
TRIPOLI

Ouargla

MOROCCO

GNA/
GNC
Islamic
State
Misrata
Militia Sabha

AQIM
Deb Deb
ALGERIAWestern
SaharaAQIM

MAURITANIANOUAKCHOTT

Jama’at Nusrat
al-Islamwal-Muslimin

MALI

MUJAO

DAKAR

Sirte

AQIM

Haftar/LNA
LIBYA

TibestiMountains

Tamanrasset
MadamaArlit

Aïr
Mountains

Kidal
AgadezGao Menaka
NIAMEY

ZinderBANJULGAMBIA

Dongola

UNITED
ARAB
EMIRATES

Nile River

SUDAN

CHAD
Lake Chad

EGYPT

Kufra
district

Zouar

NIGER

Ansar Bayt / Islamic StateAl Maqdis in the Sinai

Cairo

Ghat

Tessalit

Jama’at Nusrat
al-Islamwal-Muslimin

LEBANON

Benghazi

KHARTOUM
Janjaweed/
RSF
South
Darfur
Kordofan

ERITREAASMARA

Kassala

BURKINA
SENEGALFASO Ouagadougou
BISSAUBAMAKO
Sokoto Boko
NiyalaGUINEA BISSAU
Maiduguri
Haram
Kadugli
GUINEA
BENIN
CONAKRY
MalakalJEM
Kano
SIERRA
Abuja
FREETOWN
TOGOLEONE
NIGERIACENTRAL
Ex-Seleka AFRICAN
LIBERIA CÔTE
Lome
Anti
MONROVIA
SOUTH
GHANA
REPUBLIC Balaka
D'IVOIRE
LAGOS
SUDAN
TEMA
ABIDJANJUBADOUALACAMEROONBANGUIDJIBOUTIADDIS ABABA
GambelaSAO TOME
Main transit point
Small-arms supply routes
Small-arms supply
routes by airGoods, counterfeit, humantrafficking and drugs route
Human trafficking
Charcoal and othernatural resources

GABON

Bottleneck on trafficking
routes of strategic importance
AQIM Militia groups fighting overthe control of bottlenecks
Main regional conflicts and areas ofreported operations by militia groups
Area* with severe resource gap for livestock
feed for the period 2011-2030. Cattle need tomove south in the fattening period*Information available for Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad only

Source: RHIPTO - Norwegian Centre for Global Analyses, 2016

78

KAMPALADEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF THE
CONGO

al-Shabaab

ISIS

SOMALIA

Nairobi

RWANDA
BURUNDIDJIBOUTICITYETHIOPIA

KENYA

Major trafficking and trade axis
taxed by militants or run by organized crime

AQAP

Massawa

UGANDA

LIBREVILLE

YEMEN

Mombasa

Al Shabab

MOGADISHU

The Trans-Sahara:
Migrants, drugs andarms
Armed groups in the Trans-Sahara engage in numerous forms of trafficking, including smuggling
cigarettes, drugs and arms. However, their main
source of income is from extorting taxes, andthrough their involvement in supplying the human-trafficking industry, including supply of 4x4
vehicles.92 Taxes are extorted of between 10%
and 30% of the price depending on the commodity and its place in the supply chain. In addition,
armed groups invest incomes from cigarette andarms trafficking, ransom and ex-pat finance inimproving the logistical base of smugglers, andsubsequently tax them 30–50% of their incomesfrom traditional trafficking.
Drugs are trafficked by ship and air from Brazil
and Venezuela, landing in West Africa, especially Guinea-Bissau. Drugs transported in motherships are consolidated into smaller units in fastboats or sailing vessels at sea, which head northto Cape Verde or the Canary Islands and then onwards to mainland Europe. Those that arrive on
the African mainland are trafficked onwards using all manner of transport, but commonly 4x4sthat driven by highly organized groups. Much ofthese flows pass through Morocco and Algeria, as
well as Libya. Cocaine also arrives in containers
in West Africa, and in East Africa by air via Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia.
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), as wellas its splinter groups Al-Mourabitoun (now reformed after a two-year split) and Ansar Dine,

are now increasingly changing how they financethemselves, shifting their attention away fromkidnapping for ransom and cigarette smuggling
to protection-taxing the trafficking of drugs, predominantly cocaine originating in Latin America,
an activity that pays much higher dividends. For
AQIM, these illicit protection taxes are charged at
a rate of between 10% and 30%. The group has
been significantly bolstered by having had access to a steady supply of arms from Libya since2011, which has strengthened their position to offer ‘protection’. AQIM has also invested cigarette
smuggling profits in traffickers’ infrastructuresince the mid-2000s, in return for a cut of trafficking profits. This affords a discreet and hands-off
approach to how they make money, earning a possible rate of 5% of the value of drugs trafficked
through key hotspots.
The estimated trafficked volume of cocaine in
the region is around 18 tonnes per year, and its
price rises from US$1 600–2 500/kg in Colombia to around US$20 000–30 000/kg as it passes
through checkpoints. If, hypothetically, AQIM and
Al-Mourabitoun could tax only one in three routesegments and only two out of the four major drugroutes in the region, one could put an estimateof their likely annual income from these flows at
around US$7.5 million to US$22.5 million a year,
or US$2.5 million to US$7.5 million.
Armed groups are also involved in the smuggling
and trafficking of migrants. For example, Islam-79

ic State in the Sirte region of Libya allegedly operated a vehicle checkpoint near Al Nuwfayah,
where receipts were issued for migrants to passthrough. With an estimated 150 000 to 170 000
migrants and fees for transit and onward travel
at around US$3 000 to US$4 500 per migrant, theoverall migrant business in the Trans-Sahara, including Libya, is now estimated to be worth between US$450 million and US$765 million.
If armed groups tax criminal entrepreneurs or takethe commonly used illegal tax rate of 10% to 30%,
and less than 5% goes to terrorist organizations,armed groups in the region may make as much as
US$45 million to US$229 million a year.93 Meanwhile, terrorist groups, like JNIM, Ansar al-Sharia
and, for a time, Islamic State, are likely to makearound US$22 million to US$38 million.94
It is believed that smuggling of drugs and cigarettes continues to be a relatively important income mainstay for regional terrorist groups, but it
is also evident that migrant trafficking and investing in entrepreneurs and traffickers – irrespectiveof what they transport – are becoming safer andmore common sources of income for terrorist organizations, such as JNIM. This may also explain
the aggressive attacks made by JNIM during
2017 on UN forces north and east of Bamako in
Mali – seen as an attempt to enable them to exert taxes on the routes from the west to the Gao–
Kidal–Menaka–Tessalit ‘smuggling highway’ to
Algeria and Libya.95

LIBYA – Tuareg in Acacus Mountains.
© iStock / Cinoby

80

81

LIBYA – In this March 5, 2011 photo, an anti-government rebel
sits with an anti-aircraft weapon in front an oil refinery in Ras
Lanouf, eastern Libya. The fight forthe Ras Lanuf refinery andnearby Sidr depot threatens to spiral into open conflict between
rival factions vying for power from east and west.
© AP Photo / Hussein Malla

82

Migrant routes to Libya

ITALY

TUNIS

ALGERIA

Sousse
Sfax
Gabes

LAMPEDUSA
MALTA
TRIPOLI
Gharyan

MOROCCOAl Bayda

Tarhuna
Bani Walid

Benghazi
Ajdabiya

Sirte

Ghadamis
DebdebShweref

Tassili
Mountains

Ubari

CAIRO

Hun

LIBYA

EGYPT

Tazerbo

Al QatrunAïrMountains

MALI

Tummo

DirkouTibestiMountains

Agadez NIGERERITREA

SUDAN

KassalaKHARTOUM

Lake Chad
NDJAMENAASMARA

Gonder

MetemaNiyalaDJIBOUTI

Bahir Dar

BENIN
TOGO

HumeraGedaref

Zinder

NIAMEY

Faya Largeau

CHAD

TahouaOUAGADOUGOU

for traffic movements
Salvador Triangle
Ethnic group presence
ToubouTouareg
1.

MadamaArlit

1 Area of strategic importance

Kufra

1

Tessalit

Transit point
Main hubMain hub disputed by different forces

Sabha

Ghat
Tamanrasset

Main smuglging routes
Arms
Migrants and refugees
Main route, as of end 2017
No more in use

DarnahTobruqBole Mikhel
ADDIS ABEBANIGERIA
SOUTH SUDAN

GHANA

Las Aanod Garaway

Beledweyne

RHIPTO - JANUARY 2018

Source: IOM, 2014; UNHCR, Mixed Migration Trends
In Libya, 2017; United States Institute for Peace,
2014; Norwegian Center For Global Analysis, 2017

Mogadishu

Refugees, migrants andterritorial control in Sabha

H AY A BDELKAFI

Migrant detention zones anddeparting points in Libya

Magarha HQ

Zone of departure
Mediterranean Sea
Migrant hotspots
A L M AHDIYAH

Nigerian
ConsulateSecurity
Directorate

A L T HANWIYAHCity Hall

Tripoli

Gathering area
Living area
Working area
H IJARAH

Territory controlled by
Tebu
Gaddifa
MagarhaAwlad Suleyman

Hospital

A L M ANSHIYAH

Jigjiga

ETHIOPIACAMEROONA L -J ADID

Somaliland

Wachale Hargeise

IOM Office

A L Q URDAH

Warshefana
GharyanZintanRHIPTO - JANUARY 2018

Sabha Airport

Source: UNHCR, Mixed
Migration Trends In Libya, 2017

Detention areas
Area where migrants aregathered by smugglers
before the departure

Misrata
Tarhuna(Smugglers tend to
avoid this area)

83

Main area
Secondary area
Former main departurearea, no longer in use

Bani Walid

Control ot the territory
Portion of the route usedby smugglers controlled by
the clan indicatedArea controlled by
the clan indicated

RHIPTO - JANUARY 2018

Source: UNHCR, Mixed
Migration Trends In Libya, 2017

GREECE

Libya territory control and conflict
January 2018

Sabratha

TUNISIA

Tripoli

ZuwarahAl Khums

Az Zawiyah

Derna

Al Aziziah

Misrata
GharyanBenghazi

TobrukNalut
ShinawinSurt
Ajdabiya
Al Qaryahash Shargiyah

Dirj

Marsa al BregaAl Jaghbud

Ghadamis
Hun

WaddanAwjilanMaradah

ALGERIA

Jaid

ZillahAl Fuqaha
Birak
Adiri

LIBYA
Sabha

EGYPT

Awbari

TmessaUmm
el Araneb

Tazirbu
ZighanWaw al Kabir

Ghat

Al Qatrun
Madrusah
Al WighTahrami

Al Kufrah

Rabyanah

Al Jawf

Control of territory
GNA (Government of National Accord)
LNA (Libyan National Army)
AmazighTouareg
Tebu
Criminal gangs
Safe haven for smugglers
LNA expanded control between
July 2017 and January 2018

Militias presence
ISIS
Misratan militias

ToummoArmed conflicts
and violence, 2017
Actor involved
ISIS
Misrata militias
Other actor
Fatalities

Ma¯tan as Sarra141

Al ¯Uwaynat

SUDAN

CHAD

50
25
5

Sources: United Nations; ACLED database, accessed in October 2017
RHIPTO - 201884

Attacks in Mali linked to violent-extremist groups

ALGERIA

Attacks from extremist groups
2017
2016
2015
2014
Include rebels, political militias and ethnic militias

Attack against UN Division orInternational Army Force2017
2014-2016
Tessalit

Fatalities
55

MALI

10
1
Source: ACLED, 2017

MAURITANIA
Gao

SENEGAL

MenakaNIGER
Djenné
Ségou

BamakoBURKINA FASONIGERIA
Attacks against local defense
and security forces in Mali

GUINEA

80

BENIN

60
40

GHANA

SIERRA LEONE

200CÔTE D'IVOIRE

2015 2016 2017
RHIPTO 2017

LIBERIA85

MALI – Malian soldiers patrol the roads during the visit of the
Malian Prime Minister in Menaka Mali on May 9 2018.
© AFP PHOTO / Sebastien Rieussec

86

87

SAHARA – Young Tuareg with camel on Western Sahara
Desert in Africa.
© iStock / Hadynyah

88

Jab
al b
in

Migrant routes and political threats in Niger

Gh
una
ym
ah

Fezzan area.
Risk of spillover of Libya’s instability
into the south

Salvador Pass(triborder point)
AhagarMountains(triborder point)

gar

Ta

ag
Ah
-n-

Madama

ua

io
ssil

ALGERIA

LIBYA

TibestiMountains

Djado
Plateau
Djado
Deo Timmi
Séguédine
Adrar Bous

Assamakka
Arlit

Ténéré Erg

Iferouâne

Dirku

Aïr
Mountains

Bilma

NIGER

MALI
Political threat. Marginalized tribes
and local issues spilling over theborderAgadezTaskerTchinTabaradele

Route to avoid moving
within Chad territory

TanoutTahouaAyorouTillaberiBorderpatrol issues

Birni
NkonniNiameyNguigmiMadaoua

Goure

ZinderMaradi

Diffa

Dosso
Ouagadougou

Lake Chad

Fada
Ngourma

NIGERIAGaya

BURKINA
FASO
Kandi

TOGO
GHANA

CHAD

CAMEROON
Sahara Desert

BENIN

Boko Haram incursions in
Niger

Sahel
Erg and other desert
Presence of Touareg
Presence of Toubou

Migrant routes
Using ATW to avoid official roads
Stopover point
Border police post
French military base or facility
American military base

Political threat frombordering country
Terrorist attacks, Jan 2017 - Jan 2018
Islamic State’s Adnane Abou Walid al-Sahrahoui,
killing UN and France soldiers amongst others
Attacks from Boko-Haram in and nearby Niger

0200
Sources: RHIPTO; Reuters press review 2018
RHIPTO - February 201889

400 KmGREECE – Refugee migrants, arrived on Lesvos in inflatabledinghy boats, they stay in refugee camps waiting for the ferry to
mainland Greece. October 12, 2015, 2015.
© Shutterstock / Anjo Kan

90

08 Migrant smuggling& human trafficking

91Migrant smuggling
and human trafficking  
Human smuggling and trafficking are now probably,
economically speaking, the fourth largest global
crime sector – estimated at an annual market value of at least US$157 billion.96 Globalization and increasing access to transport from any corner of theplanet have made it possible for criminal networks
to organize the movement of enslaved victims, andof refugees and migrants at unprecedented levels,
even for mass movements.
EUROPOL and INTERPOL estimated the value of
migrant traffic from outside Europe to Europe in2015 to be in the order of US$5 billion to 6 billion
each year.97 According to various other estimates,
human smugglers made revenues of about US$4.2
billion smuggling people into Europe; US$672 million from the onward journey inside Europe; total
revenues in 2015 of US$4.9 billion. The profit margins for human smugglers (in the range of 10% to50%) are US$42 million to US$2.1 billion for entry
into Europe; US$67 to US$301 million for the onward journey; total profits in 2015: US$489 million
to US$2.3 billion.98

Nepal: Trafficking networks
grew during the civil war andcontinued post-war
During the civil war in Nepal, many trafficking networks expanded, as is often the case during conflicts. However, unlike with the poaching of rhino
horn, the incidence of which was reduced or evenstopped as a result of targeted efforts after the war,trafficking of women and children for forced labourand prostitution in Nepal continued, and these activities now fuel organized crime.

Libya: Migrant trafficking in conflict
Based on numbers of migrants arriving in Italy in
2016, combined with detailed price levels for thedifferent legs of the journey, it is possible to calculate revenues and profits to armed groups on thevarious legs. Along the eastern route, there wereabout 43 000, whereas on the western route thenumber was between 143 000 and 300 000, withthe two flows merging in Sabha. The average prices charged within Libya to the north-west coast is
US$300 to US$500, with an additional US$200 to
US$250 for the departure by boat. The traffickers
and smugglers may gain a profit of 15% to 30% of
the income. With an estimated 186 000 to 343 000
passing through Libya in 2016, and with no indication of a significant decrease in flow, the annual
revenue to all armed groups combined is US$93
million to US$244 million, with a net profit of US$13
million to US$71 million.101

92

Mali and Niger:
Migrants, cigarettes and conflict
JNIM conducted an eastward offensive in 2017, including attacks on forces of the UN mission in Mali,
MINUSMA. JNIM also operates from the south-east
corner of Mauritania. From there, they advance out,using caches of arms, as far as south of Bamako.
Formerly parts of AQIM’s Sahara branch, Ansar Dine,
Katibat Macina and Al-Mourabitoun merged withJNIM in early 2017. The group is based in the Sahel,
its core area being northern Mali. They have been
responsible for a large number of attacks on UN
peacekeeping forces in Mali, operating out of Mauritania and Mali, and in south-west Libya and Algeria.
It is likely that they will increasingly move into Niger
to gain control of smuggling networks as income opportunities. Their precise sources of finance are unknown, but it is derived mainly from ransom money,cigarette and drug smuggling, illicit taxation, protection money and return from investments in migrantsmugglers (e.g. trucks and finance).
JNIM’s income is probably in the range of US$7
million to US$20 million for drugs and ransom, andUS$11 million to US$15 million from return of investments in the migrant trafficking trade, which is largely outside JNIM-controlled areas, apart from sometraffic from the south-west. JNIM is the big potential
future winner among the Salafist/jihadist groups.
Some expat finance is believed to be involved. The
group probably has about 3 500 to 4 500 fighters.

Migrant trafficking into and within European Union and approximate costs in 2015

EU and Schengen country
EU non-Schengen country
Non-EU and Schengen country
Main origin country
Border with reinforced surveillance or fence
Temporary and local reintroductionof border controls

ICELAND

Migration routes
Eastern Mediterranean andWestern Balkan route
Apulia and Calabria route
Central Mediterranean routeWestern Mediterranean routeWestern Africa route

FINLANDNORWAYESTONIASWEDEN

Main route
Secondary route

LATVIAIRELAND

Number of trafficked migrants

RUSSIAN FEDERATIONLITHUANIAUNITED
KINGDOM

790

KAZAKHSTANPOLAND250CZECHREPUBLICSLOVAKIAHUNGARY
AUSTRIA
SWITZERLANDSLOVENIAGERMANY15
2 or less250

Cost of the voyage

FRANCECROATIA

1 000 Approximate price paid toorganized crime groups

PORTUGAL

ITALY

SPAIN

ROMANIASERBIA

AFGHANISTANBULGARIA
MACEDONIA

TURKEYALBANIAGREECE

1 000

1 000
SYRIA

2 000

MOROCCO

1 500

ALGERIA

600

1 500

EGYPT

LIBYA

1 500
MALI

1 500
SUDAN

NIGER

ERITREA

Sources: Frontex; International Organization For Migration (IOM);International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD);
Norwegian Center for Global Analisys (RHIPTO)

93

RHIPTO 2016

NIGER – West African refugees travelling north to Libya acrossthe Sahara and then on to Europe. Niger, 2005.
© Nature Picture Library / Steve O. Taylor

94

95

Migrant routes, costs and criminal groups' profit
into and within European Union

FINLANDNORWAYEU and Schengen country
EU non-Schengen country
Non-EU and Schengen country

SWEDENESTONIA

Border with reinforced surveillance or fence
Temporary and local reintroductionof border controls

LATVIA

Main routes and priceEuros, 2015
Within Europe
250

LITHUANIA

Into Europe
1 000
1 500
2 500

POLAND

Organized crime annual profit
Million Euros, 2015
100 Into Europe
10 Within Europe

GERMANY

1.6

CZECH
REPUBLIC

AUSTRIA
SWITZERLANDSLOVAKIAHUNGARYSERBIA47

ITALY

PORTUGALROMANIA49

SLOVENIACROATIA

Eastern
Borders route69

BULGARIA

71

Western
Balkan route915

TURKEY

4

MACEDONIA48

ALBANIAGREECE

SPAIN

772

7.5

Western
Mediterranean
route

CentralMediterranean route

Eastern Mediterranean
route

118
Sources: Frontex 2016; Norwegian Center for Global Analisys (RHIPTO)

96

RHIPTO 2016

Migrants in the EU: main countries of origin and destination

First-time asylum applicant, 2015

SwedenThousands

Finland

430
100
50
10

United Kingdom
Germany

Pakistan

Netherlands

Countryof origin

Belgium

Country ofdestination

Main destinations

HungaryCH

Primary destination
Second and third destination
by number of asylum seeker

Note: only the first 10 countries by origin
and destination, and only the first threedestinations by country are represented

Unknown

UkraineAfghanistan

Austria

France
Iran
Italy

Spain

KosovoIraq

Albania
Syria

Eritrea

Somalia

Nigeria
Source: Eurostat 2016

97

RHIPTO 2016

Human trafficking in Nepal - Patterns
DESTINATIONSPUSH FACTORS

Gulf
Countries

Conflicts

Impoverishment
Open border

Familydisruption

China

Natural hazards

Impunity

Domestic violence
Patriarchy

Illiteracy

ord
ss b
Cro

Ov

ers

er t

eas

raffi

tra

cki

ffic

ng

kin

g

India

Nepal

RECRUITMENT AND
TRANSPORTATION

Forced labour

Fraudulent marriage
Deception: offering
jobs and education

Sex industry

Provoking unconsciousness
with drugs

Brothelsce

REASON FOR
TRAFFICKING

98

tion
duc
Ab

Coe
r
VULNERABILITY

atic

HIGH

tem

LOW

Sys

LOW

cio
n

HIGH

vio

len

SOCIAL STATUS

ENSLAVEMENT PROCESS

Sources: Maiti Nepal; Interpol; Hodge, D., and Lietz,
C., The International Sexual Trafficking of Womenand Children: A Review of the Literature, 2009.

Trafficking of women and girls in Nepal
CHINA
SETI
MAHAKALIKARNALI

Chainpur
BHERI

Delhi

Silghadi

DHAWALAGIRIRAPTIGANDAKIBAGMATI

Kathmandu

Jumlikhalanga

INDIA

LUMBINI
BaglungSyangja

NARAYANISAGARMATHA

Sandhikharka

MumbaiJANAKPUR

MECHI

KOSHI

InaruwaPune

To otherindian cities

High trafficking risk districts

LEBANON
ISRAEL

Documented trafficking
border crossing point

IRAQ
Main destinations

JORDAN

Kolkata

KUWAITSAUDIARABIA

BAHRAIN
QATAR
UAE
OMAN

Estimates of trafficked girls and womenfor brothel based prostitution
Thousands
12
8
1.5
0.3

Estimates
not available

Sources: Maiti Nepal; NHRC, Trafficking in Person Especially on Women and99Children in Nepal, 2008, Interpol; Press Review.

To SouthEast Asia

Migrants to the US bypass
the Mexican border using multiple
entry points
In the Americas, the UNODC estimated that in 2010
there are 3 million illegal entries to the US each year,with 60% to 75% entering secretly, and over 90%
paying a smuggler. Of these, between 14 500 and
17 500 are victims of human trafficking.99 Facilitating smuggling across the Mexico–US border has
been estimated to generate an income of US$6.6
billion a year,100 and links to drug trafficking cartels are often insinuated. Meanwhile, US efforts tocounter this threat have resulted in the creation of aborder patrol of paramilitary proportions, with over
60 000 border-patrol officers. However, smuggling
hubs that move migrants into the US are far from
confined to the Mexican border alone. Addressing
the smuggling networks requires more sophisticated approaches.

USA – A Border Patrol agent looks out from his small river patrol boat
momentarily resting against the Texas bank while monitoring the Rio GrandeRiver for illegal aliens crossing into the U.S. Such encounters are a dailyexperience in the Rio Grande Valley sector of Border Patrol operations.
© iStock / Vic Hinterlang

100Trafficker gang arrests and Latin-American
migrant smuggling hubs in the US

Gang member arrests, by gang
Latin
Kings

18thStreet

Ernesto Ramos Mexican
Antonini PHP Mafia

Linda Vista
Crips

MS-13
BloodsChirizos

Surenos 13

BarrioAztecaGangster
Disciples

Raza
Unida

M18

Trinitarios
Crips

Tiny
Radical Latin
CountsTango Santiago
Blast Iglesia
PHP Norteno

Texas Syndicate

CANADA

BostonMinneapolis
Detroit

ChicagoNew York
Philadelphia

San Francisco
San Jose

UNITED STATES
Los Angeles
Atlanta

Main commercial hubs

HoustonAnti-immigration filters
Militarized barrier“Frontera olvidada”: jointly controlled by
USA and Mexico

Miami

Gang member arrests, 2013
MEXICO

150

100

50

25

5

Immigration as workforce
Percentage of irregularmigrants integrated in theworkforce
0

2

4

6

8

BELIZEGUATEMALA

10

Fonti: The Washington Post, Who’s crossing the Mexico border? A new survey tries to find out, 2013; Brooking Institute, Metro North America: Metros as Hubs of Advanced Industries
and Integrated Goods Trade, 2013; Buzzfeed, The Deported: Life On The Wrong Side Of The Border For Repatriated Mexicans, 2013; Center for immigration studies., 2013

EL SALVADOR

101

HONDURASNICARAGUACOSTA RICA
PANAMASYRIA – An explosion after an apparent US-led coalition airstrikeon Kobane, Syria, as seen from the Turkish side of the border,
near Suruc district, 24 October 2014, Sanliurfa, Turkey.
© Shutterstock / Orlok

102

09 Foreign fighters

Travelling along smuggling networks

103Foreign fighters:
Travelling along
smuggling networks
There are at least 5 600 foreign fighters associated with Islamic State.102 These combatants movealong several routes: from Libya to Egypt, Mali and
Mauritania onwards to Senegal and out of the African continent; from Turkey to the Caucasus, especially Azerbaijan, then across the Caspian Sea
and via Iran or Turkmenistan to central Asia (Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan andTajikistan); via Turkey to the Balkans, especiallyBosnia and Herzegovina. Many have also returned
to Western Europe, and to Tunisia and Morocco.
Claims of large numbers of Islamic State foreign
fighters from Africa’s Great Lakes region are false.

RUSSIA – Cheznya.
© Unknown photographer.

Some 14 900 foreign fighters leaving conflict zones
have at least in part used these routes for travelback to their home countries; of these, some 5 395
are imprisoned; 6 837 have returned home but without having been apprehended by the criminal-justice system. This leaves over 2 600 unaccounted
for, in addition to some 7 000 killed, mainly in Syria
and Iraq.103
Organized-crime groups use smuggling networks
that increasingly enable foreign fighters to moveacross borders to safe havens, as well as build up
or migrate resources through formal and informal
networks of financial flows. The over 2 600 unaccounted-for foreign fighters have left Syria and Iraq,
and an unknown number travelled via Libya, using
these illicit smuggling networks for access to resources such as forged papers, as well as routes
to safe havens.

RUSSIA – Cheznya.
© Unknown photographer.

104

Flow of foreign fighters into Syria and Iraq

Finland

NorwayDenmarkUK
Ireland

Russia2 400

SwedenNetherlands
Germany

Belgium
France
1 700

Austria
Switzerland
BosniaItaly

Portugal

Romania
SerbiaKosovoAlbania

Tunisia
6 000

Algeria

Uzbekistan

Georgia

Macedonia

Azerbaijan

Turkey
2 200

Spain

MoroccoKazakhstan

Moldova

LebanonIsrael

Libya
Egypt

Kyrgyzstan

Turkmenistan
Tajikistan
China

Syria
Iraq
Jordan
2 000

KuwaitSaudi
Arabia
2 500

Qatar

Pakistan

UAE
India

Sudan
Maldives

Number of foreign fighters
flown into Syria and Iraq

Cambodia

Somalia

6 000

Foreign fighters joining the fights in both Syria, Iraq and Libya originate from a wide range of countries - of which Tunisia and Saudi Arabia are themost significant in terms of absolute numbers, but also including former soviet republics, Jordan and France as the top five countries of origin,reaching as far as Central and Southeast Asia and covering over a hundred countries.

2 000
500
10 or lessCountry of origin
Country of destination
Source: The Soufan Group, December 2015

Indonesia

Foreign fighters often return to their countries following periods of fighting in Syria/Iraq. Terrorist suspects subsequently cannot be identified
through means of race, nationality or religion. Strengthening information, analysis and investigative capacity, along with accelerated sharing
mechanisms of intelligence, are vital for prevention and early intervention. Nonetheless, the mass migrations and refugee streams to Europe,
including expansions of networks of traffickers, smugglers and forged document suppliers along these streams, also facilitate movements ofindividual criminals - including terrorist suspects.
RHIPTO 2017105

Foreign fighters to Syria, Iraq and Libya
And their routes out of the fight

CANADA
UNITED STATES

1-NETHERANDS
2-BELGIUM
3-GERMANY

DENMARKUK
FRANCESPAIN
MOROCCOFINLANDNORWAYRUSSIASWEDEN

1

2

3
KAZAKHSTANAUSTRIAITALY
BOSNIAKOSOVO
MACEDONIAALBANIAUZBEKISTANTURKEYSYRIALIBYA 4 000
6 000 EGYPTTAJIKISTANAZERBAIJANTO EUROPE

ALGERIA TUNISIA

CHINA

IRAQ

27 00031 000

MAURITANIAGUINEA-BISSAUBRAZILMALAYSIAMALISAUDI ARABIAINDONESIASUDANNIGERIA

CHAD

SOUTH
SUDAN

ETHIOPIASOMALIA

Concentration of foreign fighters(estimate, 2015/2016)
Country of origin
Country where they fightTransit for return
Main country of return

Routes and fluxes
6 000
2 400
750
150
Fighters moving out fromthe battlegroundUnknown numbers

106

Sources: RHIPTO, Norwegian Centre for Global Analyses; The
Soufan Group, FOREIGN FIGHTERS - An Updated Assessmentof the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq, 2015; CNN
and The Independent press review; Global Security.org
RHIPTO 2017

Foreign fighters going back home from Syria and Iraq

CANADA
UNITED STATESFINLAND
1-NETHERANDS
2-BELGIUMNORWAYSWEDENDENMARKUK
2

1
GERMANYFRANCE

AUSTRIA
SWITZERLAND
BOSNIA

SPAIN

ITALY
MOROCCOWESTERN
BALKANSUZBEKISTANGUINEABISSAUTAJIKISTANGEORGIAKOSOVOTURKEYTUNISIAISRAEL

ALGERIAAZERBAIJAN

EGYPT

INDIA
SAUDI
ARABIA

MALICHAD

AFGHANISTANPAKISTANIRAQJORDAN
LIBYA

CHINA

KYRGYZSTANSYRIAMAURITANIACENTRALASIAKAZAKHSTANRUSSIAMALAYSIAINDONESIASUDANNIGERIA
SOUTH
SUDAN

ETHIOPIASOMALIA

AUSTRALIACountry of origin
Country where they fightTransit for return
Main country of return

Return routes and fluxes
Major route
Other important route

Estimated fighters
returned from Iraq or Syria
900 (Turkey)
250
50
10

Sources: RHIPTO, Norwegian Centre for Global Analyses;
The Soufan Group, BEYOND THE CALIPHATE: Foreign
Fighters and the Threat of Returnees, October 2017

107

RHIPTO 2017

COLOMBIA – A counter-narcotics police officer takes cover as ahelicopter lands on a coca field in Tumaco, southern Colombia,
Wednesday, April 18, 2018.
© AP Photo / Fernando Vergara

108

10 Drugs & threat finance109

AFGHANISTAN – May 27, 2016: members of a breakaway factionof the Taliban fighters during a gathering, in Shindand districtof Herat province, Afghanistan. Mullah Abdul Manan Niazi said
Sunday.
© AP Photo / Allauddin Khan

110

Drugs and threat
finance28%of the income of the largest
armed groups is derived fromproduction, trafficking andtaxation of drugs

The Taliban – opium and heroin
According to the US military and the Afghan government, in late 2017 insurgents were in ‘control’of 2.2% of the population and ‘influenced’ another
9.2%, which, combined, means some 3.7 million
Afghans. A further 24.9%, or 8.1 million people,
live in contested areas. As of August 2017, 13% of
Afghanistan’s municipal districts were either controlled or influenced by insurgents, the highest rate
in at least two years.
In late 2017, the Taliban claimed to control 34 outof 400 districts, and to contest a further 167 districts (claiming a 40–97% presence in the latter). In
practice, the Taliban contest half the country. The
group claims to control most of the provinces ofHelmand, Nimruz, Urozgan, Ghazni and Zabul, andhalf of Kandahar.
The Taliban’s size has been estimated to be morethan 200 000, with a fighting strength of 150 000,of whom about 60 000 constitute a full-time force.
Accounting for rotation for leave, and other reasonsfor absence, the fighting force present in Afghanistan would not exceed, at any one time, 40 000.104
The full-timers are highly mobile and rely on safe
havens, particularly in Pakistan, but also in Iran,when they are not operating in Afghanistan (accounting for a third of the time spent outside thecountry on rest and recreation). This compares toabout 11 000 US troops in present in the country,
and well over 300 000 Afghan government security
forces (numbers recently classified).105
There has been recent fighting between the Taliban
and Islamic State in the north-western provincesof Jawzjan and Faryab, and at least one case of111

collaboration between the two in the attacks andkilling of over 50 Shias in the Sayyad District of Sare-Pol Province in August 2017, probably attributable to family or tribal affiliation rather than strategiccooperation.
The Taliban carried out eight large attacks in 2017,
killing Afghan security forces and civilians, with
between 15 and 150 fatalities per attack. Both themagnitude of such attacks and the increase in insurgent control over the population undermine thecredibility of the Afghan security forces and thegovernment.
Opium production in 2017 in Afghanistan was 9000 metric tonnes (up by 87% from 2016) from anarea of 328 000 hectares (up 63% from 2016) –equivalent to a total farm-gate value of US$1.4
billion, according to UNODC. The largest increase
was in Helmand Province, followed by Kandahar,
Badghis and Faryab.
UNODC estimates that non-state armed groups in
Afghanistan raised about US$150 million in 2016
from taxing opium production. The UN Security
Council Committee in 2011/12 cited an Afghan
government estimate that reckoned that a quarterof the Taliban’s income was derived from opium-related activity, in other words US$100 million out of a
total income of US$400 million. In 2010 the CIA estimated that the group was predominantly fundedby non-drug-related taxation, and donations from
Pakistan and Persian Gulf countries. As these examples show, agencies with different perspectives
and priorities have debated this issue throughout
the Afghanistan war.106

The entire 2017 poppy crop was 9 000 metrictonnes. The price varies between regions, and has
been cited as between US$52107 and US$155108 per
kilogram for fresh opium, and US$182 for cooked
opium.109 The fresh farm-gate price then gives a
price range for the crop value of about US$468 million to US$1.4 billion. If the Taliban tax three-quarters of the area they control – and there is someevidence they are effectively taxing the rural partsof districts that are supposedly in government control, so about a quarter of those – then this balances out the equivalent of 100% taxation of 60% of
the land.
Prices vary by season, year and even by district,
not to mention by region. Empirical data is notavailable to cover these variations (and will probably never be available). In the meantime, by extrapolating from their Helmand tax rate of 1.125 kg
per hectare,110 with a 60% tax coverage, the Taliban earn an estimated 221.4 tonnes of opium fromthe entire crop, worth a total of US$11.5 million to
US$34.3 million.111 In addition to this there is taxation of transportation at checkpoints, but this isvery hard to quantify without specific intelligence,since the transported goods do not pass throughjust a few ports, as is the case in Somalia with charcoal, for example (see Chapter 3).
In the two districts Nad-e-Ali and Marjah, closely
studied by David Mansfield in 2016, 66% of the Taliban’s income came from tax on opium (US$2.46
million); 8.2% (US$305 000) was land tax, and 25%(US$935 000) was wheat tax.112 In the case of the
Bakwa District, in Farah Province, also in 2016, taxation was based on an altogether different method: the number of tube wells, and totalled US$287
000–US$766 000.113
In the two districts in Helmand cited above, twothirds of the Taliban’s funding came from opium,whereas in the district cited above in Farah, none ofit did. Their funding from Pakistan is also very well
documented, although precise figures are difficult
to come by.114 Given the expenses incurred by maintaining a permanent force of 40 000, with another
20 000 out of the country, and ambitions to makesavings towards future governance expenditure, it
is likely that the group’s annual funding would need
to be in the US$50 million to US$100 million range(and probably closer to US$100 million), where onethird comes from opium, giving an annual fundingof US$75–95 million from all sources.

Opium poppy field© Shutterstock / Zoran Orcik

112

Turkistan

Drug routes, Taliban and ISIS presencein Afghanistan
Urgentch

QaratauArys

K AZAKHSTANUZBEKISTAN

IskandarTashkent

AngrenGuliston
Kattaqorgon

JizzaxSamarqand

Kogon

Turkmenabat

Shahrisabz

Dushanbe

Guzar

Kulob
KhorughTermizAndkhvoy
Sheberghan

MashhadNeyshabur

Meymaneh

KarokhTaloqanKunduzMazar-e Sharif
Aybak Baghlan

Balkh

BamianChaghcharan

Herat

FeyzabadPol-e Khomri

Qal eh-ye

Torbat-e Jam

Mahmud-E
Eraqi
Charikar
Mehtar Asadabad
Mayda Kabul Lam
Shahr
Jalalabad

GardizGhazniYazdanBirjand

Taliban and ISIS presence
Taliban control zone
Taliban support zone
ISIS control zone
ISIS support zone

Smuggling routes

Qalat

ZaranjSargodha

Dera Ismail Khan

LahoreLashkar Gah
Zabol

Islamabad

Peshawar

Kohat

KundianFarah
Kandahar

Parachinar

Bannu

Zareh SharanTarin Kowt

Saidu
MardanBaraki Barak

AFGHANISTAN

CapitalDistrict capital
Other city or town
Main road
Secondary roadOsh
Fargona

TA JIKISTAN

Kuybyshevskiy

Tejen

QuchanKashmar

Denow

Atamyrat

Mary
BojnurdDerbent

Qoqon
Konibodom

Kok Yangak

AndijonLeninobod

QarshiKaka

Olmaliq
KhujandTash Komur

Namangan

Uroteppa

Urgut

Ashgabat

Zhob

Jhang

Faisalabad

ChamanIRAN

Multan

QuettaDera Ghazi
Khan

Zahedan

PAKISTAN

Bam
Dalbandin

Taliban drug routes

Rahimyar Khan
Sadiqabad

Source: Norwegian Center for Global Analyses;
Long War Journal; Institute for the Study of War;Larkana

SukkurINDIA
Nawabshah
TurbatMirput Khas
RHIPTO 2017

ChabaharGwadar

Kara Balta

Talas
Toktogul

Zarafshon

BukharaQulan Oytal

Shymkent

Navoi

TURKMENISTAN

Taraz

Pasni

Hyderabad

Karachi 113

AFGHANISTAN – farmers harvest raw opium at a poppy field in
the Zhari district of Kandahar province, Afghanistan.
© AP Photo / Allauddin Khan

114

115

AFGHANISTAN – Helicopters in Afghanistan.
© iStock / Mie Ahmt

116

117

AFGHANISTAN – Special Forces vehicles on mission.
© iStock / Analisa Hegyesi

118

Drug routes and threat finance to Eastern European organized crime

SwedenNorwayGermany

UK
Western andNorthern Europe

RussianFederation

UkraineFranceAustria

Kazakhstan

Romania
1

Caucasus

Spain

Italy

Balkans

Bulgaria
TurkeyOrganized crime

Syria

Organized crime hub

Afghanistan
Iraq

Main criminal organization
1. Chechen mafia
2. Dagestan criminal groups

Heroin2

IranTaliban

Libya

Trafficking route
Country of origin
Main flow

Weapons
Trafficking route
Country of origin

Sudan
Eritrea

Source: UNODC, 2010; Norwegian Center for Global Analyses, 2015

119

Country or region of destination

Ethiopia

COLOMBIA – Military forces of Colombia supervise territories
where guerrillas of FARC still act.Soldiers patrol the mountain
river in November 6, 2012 in La Macarenia,Colombia.
© Shutterstock

120

121

COLOMBIA – Soldiers keep guard over workers uprooting cocaplantations as part of a government counter-narcotics programin San Francisco Antioquia province May 11, 2009.
© Reuters / Fredy Amariles

122

FARC – cocaine and illicit mining
The Colombian revolutionary insurgent movement,
FARC, who had been at war with the Colombian
government since 1964, disarmed itself and transitioned into a political party in June 2017. In the
1980s, FARC were funded by primary commodities,
like cattle and other agricultural products, and by
oil and gold. They also engaged in smuggling inborder areas.115 Until 1981 they had considered cocaine and marijuana counter-revolutionary, but forfear of alienating local farmers, and seeing obvious
financial advantages, FARC changed their policy
on drugs. Initially their taxation came from gramaje, which is a farm tax. Later this was upscaled toboth systematic taxation of coca cultivation, as
well as any infrastructure or transportation routes
associated with the logistics of moving the product.
The Colombian government assessed in 1998 thatillegal paramilitaries, including guerrilla movements like FARC, made US$551 million a year in
drug trafficking, US$311 million from extortion andUS$236 million from kidnapping for ransom.116
During the last few years of their insurgency, FARC
guerrillas moved out of the mountainous areas andestablished a number of camps in the Colombian
Amazon, including areas north of the Brazilian border to the far east of the country, outside drug-producing areas. In recent years, they gained about
20% of their income from illegal mining of gold.
The organization’s 34th Front allegedly made over
US$1 million a month from extorting miners.117
When the peace process took place, FARC declared
their wealth in an inventory as US$332 million, including assets such as US$147 million worth ofproperty, US$10.5 million in cattle, US$70 million in
weaponry and US$10.7 million in gold. However, InSight Crime calculated in 2015/2016 that FARC atthat time had assets worth US$580 million, mostly
income from drugs and illegal mining.118
The peace process was honoured by about 10 000
FARC members, but several thousand rejected it

123

or did not participate in it, led by the dissident 1st
Front. About 2 500 of these dissidents are thought
to have formed an ex-FARC mafia, some of whom
call themselves the Eastern Bloc, who have become big players in the cocaine trade. They operate a relatively flat business-oriented structure,and have taken control of key choke points bordering Venezuela and Brazil.119
A significant degree of corruption in the chain ofcommand, as well as thousands of FARC members
or their part-time support cadre leaving or ignoring
the peace process, or simply going rogue and joining criminal groups, could explain some of the discrepancy. In addition, assets kept abroad are notincluded in the inventory.120
FARC controlled about 60% to 70% of the coca-producing areas, and were the biggest single player.
Their income largely came from taxing – varying
between US$35 and US$150 per kilogram of cocabase.121 They were also to some extent involved in
production, and widely taxing of labs and transportation.122 In 2016 the coca crop – over 188 000 hectares, with an average production 7 kg of cocaine
per hectare – could have produced a max crop of
1 200 tonnes, according to InSight Crime. The actual cocaine production for 2015 was about 646
000 kg, according to UNODC.123 The price of cocabase was US$621 per kilogram in 2016, and US$1
633 for cocaine.124 The total cocaine value for theentire crop would be US$1.05 billion, given UNODC
production numbers. InSight Crime has calculated
FARC’s earnings from the cocaine trade alone to
be in the region of US$267 million, where US$67.9
million was from cocaine base taxation, US$169.5
million from cocaine production and US$30 million from other taxes. Other earnings came fromheroin (US$5 million), marijuana (US$30 million),cattle taxation (US$4.5 million), extortion of businesses (US$76.8 million a year) and illegal mining(US$200 million), giving a total of US$580 million
in 2015, of which about US$200 million was taken
by corrupt commanders.125

COLOMBIA – Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas listen
during a “class” on the peace process between the Colombian
government and their force, at a camp in the Colombian
mountains on February 18, 2016.
© AP Photo / Luis Acosta

124

125

Drug trafficking routes from colombia

CANADA
VancouverEuropeLIBYA

OttawaChicagoUNITED
STATES

Los Angeles
Tijuana

Mexicali
Nogales
El Paso
MEXICO
LaredoCuliacán
McAllenMazatlánPuerto Vallarta
Mexico City
Acapulco

Boston
New York
Washington, D.C.

MOROCCOALGERIA NIGER

MALI
Miami

TampicoMéridaVeracruz

SENEGAL

CancúnNIGERIAGUINEAThe Caribbean

SIERRA LEONELIBERIABarranquilla
Cartagena
Cali

Southern
AfricaMedellín
BogotaCOLOMBIA

BRAZIL
FARC presence
Coca crops

PERU
BOLIVIAVENEZUELA

COLOMBIA
Main drug trafficking routefor Colombian drugs
ECUADOR

Colombia, main drug producing country
Other drug producing country
Main transit country
Main drug market

BRAZIL

PERU
Sources: STRATFOR, UNODC, European Monitoring Center
for Drugs and Drugs Addiction; Colombia Reports

126

COLOMBIA – A soldier stands next to packages containing
marijuana at an army base in Cali, Colombia, Friday, Aug. 22,
2008. According to the Colombian army, 6.7 tons of marijuana
were seized from rebels of the Revolutionary Armed Forces ofColombia, FARC, near Cali.
© AP Photo / Christian Escobar Mora127

LIBYA – Libyan rebels travel to a battle line where they will fightColonel Muammar Gaddafi’s army. Ajdabiya, Libya, April 7, 2011.
© Shutterstock / Rosen Ivanov Iliev

128

The new ‘jihadist drugs’
Since 2015 there has been an increasing numberof intelligence reports regarding extensive smuggling and use by jihadist fighters, especially Islamic State, of tramadol, an opioid pain reliever, as
well as Captagon, a psychostimulant for increased
alertness. Both often called ‘jihadist pills’ or ‘courage pills’. Captagon is a brand name for the drug
fenethylline, a combination of amphetamine andtheophylline, which increases alertness. Tramadol
provides pain relief and can also allegedly reducefear and stress during battle by in some cases releasing serotonins, creating a feeling of wellbeingor happiness. Captagon stimulates alertness andreduces exhaustion, and the need for sleep.
This kind of drug use is predominantly seen in the
Middle East, is very prevalent in Syria and Iraq, including by Chechen fighters, but is also becoming
increasingly common in the Trans-Sahara, including Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Chad and Libya. IslamicState has been directly involved in the smuggling
and sale of jihadist drugs, and not only to their own
fighters. Pills are entering the region from Greece
and Tobruk, Libya, as well as via Lomé (Togo), Cotonou (Benin) and Nigeria. Most originates from India. The rising use of this drug by jihadist fightersin the Trans-Sahara, Libya and Nigeria most likely
points to increased smuggling activity by IslamicState and related jihadist groups.

129

LIBYA – Libyan rebels in Tripoli, 21 Aug 2011.
© Lightroom Photos / Fyson Lathbury

130Tramadol smuggling into jihadist combat areas
Country of origin
Country of transit
Country of destination
Smuggling route
Main smuggling port

ArcticOcean

UK
2Atlantic
Ocean

1

GREECE

Piraeus
SYRIA
TobrukIRAQJORDAN

INDIA

LIBYA
Nhava Sheva
MALI
NIGER

TOGO

NIGERIA

Piraeus

Lome

Indian
Ocean

Sources: RHIPTO, Norwegian Centre for Global Analyses; 2018
RHIPTO 2018131

DRC – New recruits in the FDLR rebel group begin training in
the mountainous region of DR Congo, North Kivu Province. Chai,
North Kivu, DRC- March 29, 2014.
© iStock / Jon Brown

132

11 Terrorist & rebel financeTaxation, drugs, counterfeits, natural
resources and migrants

133

DRC – Artesanal gold mine in a river in Mwenga, in South Kivu,
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
© Riccardo Pravettoni

134

Terrorist and rebel
finance: Taxation,
drugs, counterfeits,natural resources
and migrants
Incomes to seven armed
groups + groups in DRC
US$ millions

%

Drugs

330

28

Charcoal

151Antiquities

15

1

Kidnapping for ransom

363External funding and donations

36

3

Confiscations and looting

99

9

Taxation and extortion (not drugs)

197

17

Illegal mining

203

17

Oil and gas

230

20

Total

1 160

100

For the seven main terrorist/rebel groups thatcomprise a mix of insurgents and terrorists – alShabaab, Boko Haram, FARC, HTS, JNIM, IslamicState and the Taliban – as well as a number ofgroups operating in the eastern DRC, the combined funding is about US$1 billion–US$1.39
billion a year. Taxation of natural resources anddrugs is the most important, commonly available
and accessible source of income. This ranges
from taxation of transport at vehicle checkpoints,
to agricultural produce, protection money targeting commercial activity and religious taxes.
The numbers given here represent updates ona body of work accumulated over the last few
years featuring best estimates based on official
reports, academic assessments and criminal intelligence.126 Insurgent groups primarily financetheir activities by illegal taxation of the populace,illicit commercial activity, whether in drugs, minerals, gold, charcoal, timber, or through taxationof migrants. If they do not exert territorial control,
135

which is typical for terrorist groups, incomes more
typically involve mobility, such as kidnapping for
ransom, or smuggling of high-value goods, likedrugs.
The seven major non-state armed groups here
all feature elements of insurgency and terrorism.
None is either a pure terrorist or pure insurgent
group, but the motivational characteristics of terrorism or insurgency can be plotted on a continuum between the two. They are insurgents,127 inthat they seek political change over a ruling regime, and hold or aspire to hold territory. These
dimensions apply particularly to FARC and the
Taliban, but also in considerable measure to alShabaab and Islamic State as well. They are all
terrorists128 too, in that they use fear generating
violence and coercion without legal or moral restraint against civilians, for its effect on various
audiences. This applies particularly to JNIM, HTS,
Boko Haram and Islamic State, but also to the Taliban and, to some extent, FARC.

Islamic State remains the most serious threat be-cause of the organization’s international reach andsuspected financial reserves. As of May 2017, thegroup was making up to US$10 million a month inrevenues. In mid-2018, its funding in Iraq and Syria
is likely to be a tenth of that – a total of US$6 million
to US$24 million a year. A large, unknown amount,but possibly over US$100 million, has been funnelled out of Iraq and Syria, and some of this has
been laundered in investments in Iraq, Syria andneighbouring countries. The group’s estimatedstrength is currently around 15 600 including 5 600
returned foreign fighters, with a remaining force inSyria and Iraq of 5 000 active fighters – and probably at least a similar amount laying low.

HTS is a merger of what used to be al-Qaeda

groups, which for a time took the name ‘Jabhatal-Nusra’ in Syria. Their relationship with the al-Qaeda central command is currently under much debate, but should not be underestimated. They areabout 10 000 strong, funded by taxation, donations
and kidnap for ransom, but are underfunded atabout US$8 million a year. With expenses of US$19
million, they are dependent on expat finance fromorganizations to the tune of about US$11 million.

JNIM is the al-Qaeda central merger in the Sahelof the former AQIM Sahara branch, Katibat Macina, and Ansar Dine and Al-Mourabitoun. They havebeen very active recently, attacking UN forces in
Mali from neighbouring countries. JNIM are funded by revenue from cigarette smuggling, drugs andother taxation forms, extortion, possibly migrant
taxation and kidnapping for ransom. Their income
range is likely to be in the range of US$18 million
to US$35 million. Kidnapping for ransom provides
the major chunk of their funding, at US$8 million
in 2017 alone. Their strength is estimated to be atabout 3 500 to 4 500 fighters.

SUDAN – Men working in gold mine north Sudan, 1,December 2007.
© iStock / Maciej Jawornicki

136

The Taliban’s roughly 40 000 full-time members
control or influence at least 13% of districts in Afghanistan (see Chapter 10). Their funding sources
are highly disputed but are believed to include taxation of the biggest cash crop in the country, opium.
The 2017 poppy crop was 9 000 metric tonnes. The
Taliban are able to tax 60% of this crop at rate of
1.125 kg per hectare and US$52–US$155 per kilogram for an estimated 221.4 tonnes of opium fromthe entire crop, worth a total of between US$11.5
million and US$34.3 million. In addition, they are
funded by taxation of transportation at checkpoints, but this is very hard to quantify without
specific intelligence. Their funding from Pakistan
is also very well documented, although precise figures are difficult to come by.129 Given the expenses
incurred by maintaining a permanent force of 40000, with another 20 000 out of the country, andambitions to make savings towards governance infuture, it is likely that the group’s annual funding
would need to be in the US$50 million to US$100
million range (and probably closer to US$100 million), where one-third comes from opium, amounting to a total annual funding of US$75–95 million.

Boko Haram has suffered serious setbacks following Nigerian military offensives supported bya joint task force from neighbouring countries.
Their fighting strength has dwindled to about 4000, which is further weakened by their split into
two factions in 2016, one led by Abubakar Shekau
and the other by Abu Musab al-Barnawi. Shekau ison the run and is striking back against civilian targets using suicide bombers, increasingly children.
Barnawi is based around Lake Chad and is slowly
building up military capacity and attacking military
targets. Barnawi remains loyal to Boko Haram’s
allegiance to Islamic State. The group’s income
is reckoned to be no more than US$5–10 million
a year, mainly from extortion, donations made byindividuals, charities and groups like AQIM, kidnapping for ransom and bank robberies, as well as taxing migrants and human traffickers.

Al Shabaab remain a significant threat in Somalia,

with their most violent attack to date happening in
Mogadishu in October 2017, which killed over 300.
They were responsible for killing over 4 500 people
in 2017. Their current strength (as of 2018) is about
5 000 fighters, compared with about 250 Islamic State
combatants in Somalia. Their estimated revenue fromcharcoal is currently about US$10 million per year, but
this is down dramatically from 2012 when they weremaking US$38–56 million.130 Al-Shabaab for various
reasons imposed their own ban on the trade in charcoal in their own area, but after about a year they returned to charcoal as a revenue source. The shift backwas possibly due to their having found that alternative
income sources proved both resource-intensive tocollect and less fruitful. In addition to their charcoal
income, al-Shabaab probably make another US$10
million from other forms of illicit taxation. Just over
40% of their income is spent on salaries, and the restfor other costs, including transportation, ammunition,
food, training camps, religious education and bribes.

FARC, now officially disbanded, numbered about
8 000 at the time they disarmed and became a political movement, but also had a very large numberof part-time supporters in various functions. Today,
about 10 000 of them have accepted the peace process, whereas about 2 500 did not or went rogue andjoined various criminal activities, including an exFARC mafia network running drugs. Their income, calculated in 2015, but likely to be similar in 2017 at thetime of the disbandment, was made up as follows:
about US$267 million a year from the cocaine trade,heroin (US$5 million), marijuana (US$30 million),cattle taxation (US$4.5 million), extortion of businesses (US$76.8 million a year) and illegal mining(US$200 million), giving a total of US$580 million in2015, of which about US$200 million was taken bycorrupt commanders. At the time of their disbandment, the group had declared assets of US$332 million, believed by some to be as high as US$580 million
if one includes drugs and illegal mining. This figure
excludes the group’s overseas assets.

137

SOMALIA – Amisom troops prepare for battle.
© United Nations / Flickr138

Finances

Organized crime and insurgent groups' finances

Averaged full time members, 2015-2018

Million dollars
0

580

5

10

15

20

8 000

FARC

Total Income toorganized crime in andaround conflict areas
Million USD

31 539290

1 160

17 900ISIS

620Part of the income that
4% goes to insurgent andterrorist groups

75
40 000
Taxation and extortion(excluding drugs)

95

Drugs

197

External funding
and donations

330
Oil and gas

Illegalmining

18

36
35

203
Antiquities

Confiscations
and looting

230
99

15
15

K

Charcoal

d
a

i
n
p

36

Kidnapping
for ransom

TALIBAN

4 000

NUSRAT AL-ISLAM / JAMA'A NUSRATUL-ISLAM WA AL-MUSLIMIN' (JNIM)

5 000
20

AL-SHABAAB

Origin of the incomes for selected
insurgent and terrorist groups
Million USD

13,4

MILITIAS IN DRC

10 000

6
10RHIPTO 2018

8 000

HAI’YAT TAHRIR AL-SHAM (HTS)

5

4 000

10

139 BOKO HARAM

Maximum estimate
Minimum estimate

JORDAN – A syrian refugee child in front of his tent in Zaatarirefugee camp.
© Shutterstock / Melih Cevdet Teksen14012 Conclusion
The cost of war

environmental crime surges as threat
finance for war profiteers

141

GHANA – Fevered by hopes of striking it rich, illegal miners claw
sacks of “money stone”—gold ore—from the Pra River in Ghana.
Their toil feeds the world’s hunger for gold, and leaves a ruined
landscape in its wake.
© National Geographic / Randy Olson

142

Conclusion: The costof war – environmental crime surges asthreat finance for war
profiteers
If one looks beyond groups designated as terrorist
organizations to include regular organized crimethat occurs in and around conflict, the scale ofcriminal economies is in the range of US$24 billion
to US$39 billion by turnover, although profits are
far lower. Threat finance revenue to terrorism andmajor insurgencies represents only about 4% of thetotal illicit finance in or near areas of conflict.131 Despite their high profile, such armed groups operate
within an environment where exponentially higher
incomes go to transnational organized crime. The
armed groups take part in these activities, andfeed off the income streams, but they are not thedominant financial players.
Powerful elites engaged in organized crime gainfrom sustaining conflicts and fund non-statearmed groups, which undermines the rule of law
and good governance. This, in turn, enables criminal elites to benefit from instability, violence andlack of enforcement and, hence, subsequent exploitation of illicit flows during conflict.
Strengthening information and analysis is essential to be able to prevent, disrupt and defeat, before
it is too late, both violent armed groups and the organized-criminal actors that provide these armed
groups (and themselves) with an environment of
impunity and instability.
In order to ensure early prevention and intervention in conflict, it is therefore imperative to forcefully address the role of organized crime and illicit
flows in benefiting non-state armed groups and thepowerful elites engaged in criminal activity.

143

BRAZIL – A boy plays with a kite in front of logs cut illegally fromthe Amazon rainforest at a sawmill in the city of Morais Almeida,Para state, June 27, 2013.
© Reuters / Nacho Doce

144

Children living in conflict

RussiaGermany

Belgium

UkraineFranceTurkeyLebanonIsraelAlgeria

Libya

Iraq

Mali

Niger

Sudan

Burkina Faso
Colombia

Cote d’Ivoire

Yemen

Ethiopia

Cameroon
UgandaD.R. Congo

MyanmarPhilippines

Thailand

Tanzania

Congo
Peru

Bangladesh

Somalia

S. SudanNigeria

Pakistan

India

S. Arabia

Chad

Honduras

Iran

JordanEgypt

MexicoAfghanistan

Syria

BurundiAngolaMozambique

South Africa

Number of children living
in conflict zones
Thousands, by country, 2016

Conflict and disasters impact 535 million
children and a total of over 2 billion people

50 000
10 000
3 000
1 000
500

One in four children in the world live in countries affected byconflict or disaster, often without access to medical care,quality education, proper nutrition and protection

Sources : PRIO, The War on Children: Time to End Grave Violations against Children
in Conflict, 2018, UNICEF, World Bank, 2018

RHIPTO 2018145

Footnotes
1

2

3

Taxation of migration is not included here because theempirical basis is too thin to be able to accurately calculate what portion it forms of the seven big groups’ funding.
Other armed groups, particularly in Libya, are making verylarge incomes from this, but that is largely outside therealm of the seven.
EUROPOL/SOCTA, ‘European Union Serious and Organised
Crime Threat Assessment 2017’ (2017). Available at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/
european-union-serious-and-organised-crime-threat-assessment-2017 accessed 25 June 2018.
RHIPTO Threat Network Assessment, ‘Update on IslamicState financial situation in Syria-Iraq’ (27 May 2017).

4

RHIPTO Threat Network Assessment, ‘Islamic State funding and implications’ (18 September 2014).

5

UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, ‘S/2017/924
Report on Somalia’ (2 November 2017), para 200.

6

UNEP-MONUSCO-OSESG, ‘Experts’ background report on
illegal exploitation and trade in natural resources benefitting organized criminal groups and recommendations on
MONUSCO’s role in fostering stability and peace in eastern DR Congo’, 15 April 2015, p 4. Available at https://
postconflict.unep.ch/publications/UNEP_DRCongo_MONUSCO_OSESG_final_report.pdf accessed 25 June 2018.

7

Ibid.

8

RHIPTO Threat Network Assessment, ‘Strategic value,routes and incomes to armed groups in Libya from 143,000– 343,000 migrants’ (18 January 2018).

9

10

11

12

Percentage average of US$993 million–1 372 million compared with US$38–51 billion.
UNICEF, ‘Press release: Nearly a quarter of the world’s children live in conflict or disaster-stricken countries: UNICEF.’(9 December 2016). Available at https://www.unicef.org/
media/media_93863.html accessed 25 June 2018.
UNHCR UK, ‘Figures at a glance’, (19 June 2018). Available
at http://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html accessed
25 June 2018.
RHIPTO estimate based on multiple source reporting, including ACLED, media reports, official estimates and othersfrom Afghanistan, Iraq, Mexico, Syria, Myanmar, Philippines,
Ethiopia, DRC, Somalia, Nigeria, Algeria, Burkina Faso, Libya, Mali, Niger, Tunisia, Sudan, Cameroon, Chad, Yemen,
Egypt, South Sudan, Mozambique and CAR.

13

World Bank, ‘Fragility, Conflict & Violence’ (2 April 2018).
Available at http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/overview accessed 25 June 2018.

14

Max Roser and Esteban Ortiz-Ospina, Global Extreme Poverty,(2013, revised 27 March 2017). Available at https://ourworldindata.org/extreme-poverty accessed 25 June 2018.

15

World Bank, ‘Fragility, Conflict & Violence’.

16

UNEP-INTERPOL, ‘The Rise of Environmental Crime – A
Growing Threat to Natural Resources Peace, Development
And Security. A UNEP-INTERPOL Rapid Response Assessment.’ (2016). Available at http://wedocs.unep.org/handle/20.500.11822/7662 accessed 25 June 2018.

17

18

19

UNODC, ‘Transnational Trafficking and the rule of law inWest Africa: a threat assessment’, (July 2009), pp 1926. Available at https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/West_Africa_Report_2009.pdf accessed 25 June 2018.
Christina Katsouris and Aaron Sayne, ‘Nigeria’s Criminal
Crude: International Options to Combat the Export of Stolen
Oil’, Chatham House (September 2013), p 18. Available athttps://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/
Research/Africa/0913pr_nigeriaoil.pdf accessed 25 June
2018.
Ian M. Ralby, ‘Downstream Oil Theft: Global modalities,
Trends, and Remedies.’ Atlantic Council: Global Energy Center. (January 2017), p 15. Available at http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Downstream_Oil_Theft_
web_0327.pdf accessed 25 June 2018.

20

Economist: Baobab, ‘Oil theft in Nigeria: A murky business’(3 October 2013). Available at https://www.economist.
com/baobab/2013/10/03/a-murky-business accessed 25
June 2018.

21

Terry Hallmark, ‘The Murky Underworld of Oil Theft and Diversion’, (26 May 2017). Available at https://www.forbes.
com/sites/uhenergy/2017/05/26/the-murky-underworld-of-oil-theft-and-diversion/#d774fa06886e accessed 25
June 2018.

22

Ian M. Ralby, ‘Downstream Oil Theft’, p 7.

23

Ibid. p 9–10.

24

Ibid. p 30.

25

Ibid. p 38.

26

0.91 USD/litre × (100 or 130 tankers) × (25 000 litres or 40
000 litres) × 365 days.

27

Reuters, ‘Update 2 – Angola oil production seen steady in2018 – Sonangol’ (28 February 2018) Available at https://www.reuters.com/article/angola-sonangol/update-2-angola-oil-production-seen-steady-in-2018-sonangol-idUSL8N1QI2W7 accessed 25 June 2018.

28

Given Brent crude average price from 2017 of US$54.25 perbarrel.

29

CNN, ‘The billion-dollar question: Where is Angola’s oil money?’ (29 November 2012), Available at http://edition.cnn.
com/2012/11/28/business/angola-oil-revenues/index.
html accessed 25 June 2018.

146

30

(1.63m bpd × US$54.25 per barrel average in 2017 × 365
days × 0,05 or × 0.15).

31

Bloomberg, ‘Libya Oil Chief says fuel smuggling costing$750 Million a Year’, (18 April 2018). Available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-18/libya-oilchief-says-fuel-smuggling-costing-750-million-a-year
accessed 25 June 2018.

32

The Guardian, ‘Malta ‘fuelling Libya instability’ by failing totackle oil smuggling.’ (9 May 2018) Available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/09/malta-fuel-oilsmuggling-libya-daphne-project accessed 25 June 2018.

33

Ian M. Ralby, ‘Downstream Oil Theft,’ p 67.

34

The National, ‘As economy booms, demand for black market fuel soars in Turkey’ (23 September 2011). Available athttps://www.thenational.ae/world/europe/as-economy-booms-demand-for-black-market-fuel-soars-in-turkey-1.439347 accessed 25 June 2018. Cited in Ian M. Ralby,‘Downstream Oil Theft’ p 66.

35

Ian M. Ralby, ‘Downstream Oil Theft’.

36

See separate section on Islamic State.

37

The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisationand political violence, ‘Caliphate in Decline: An Estimateof Islamic State’s Financial Fortunes.’ (2017). Available at
http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/ICSR-Report-Caliphate-in-Decline-An-Estimate-of-Islamic-States-Financial-Fortunes.pdf accessed 25 June 2018.

38

RHIPTO Threat Network Assessment, ‘Islamic State funding and implications’ (18 September 2014).

39

RHIPTO Threat Network Assessment, ‘IS funding update’(30 January 2015).

40

RHIPTO Threat Network Assessment, ‘Islamic State in
Iraq-Syria financial situation’ (27 February 2016).

41

RHIPTO Threat Network Assessment, ‘Update on IslamicState financial situation in Syria-Iraq’ (07 June 2017).

42

Jihadology.net, ‘The Archivist: Unseen Islamic State Financial Accounts for Deir az-Zor Province’ (5 October 2015).
Available at: http://jihadology.net/2015/10/05/the-archivist-unseen-islamic-state-financial-accounts-for-deir-azzor-province/ accessed 25 June 2018.

43

Since 2008, listed terrorists, including al Qaeda, IslamicState and affiliates and allies of both groups, have generated well over US$220 million in ransoms, equivalent toaround US$22 million distributed on the three groups. UN
Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, ‘Reporton ISIL, Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities S/2017/573.’ (30 June 2017), para 85.
Available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2017/573 accessed 25 June 2018.

44

UNEP-INTERPOL, ‘The Environmental Crime Crisis – Threats
to sustainable development from illegal exploitation andtrade in wildlife and forest resources. A UNEP-INTERPOL
Rapid Response Assessment.’ (2014), p 8. Available athttps://wedocs.unep.org/handle/20.500.11822/9120 accessed 25 June 2018.

45

UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, ‘S/2013/413.
Report on the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2060 (2012): Somalia.’(12 July 2013), Annex 9.1. Available at http://www.un.org/
ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/413 accessed
25 June 2018.

46

UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea,‘S/2017/924. Report on Somalia of the Monitoring Groupon Somalia and Eritrea,’ para 206. Available at https://www.securitycouncilrepor t.org/atf/cf/%7b65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7d/s_2017_924.pdf
accessed 25 June 2018.

56

57

Seventeen out of 19 merchant vessels exported out of Kismayo, the other two from Barawe. Al-Shabaab had reduced
activity from Barawe, but most activity out of Kismayo. See
Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, ‘S/2014/726 Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2111 (2013),’ (10 October 2014), para 139. Available at http://www.un.org/ga/
search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/726 accessed 25
June 2018.
Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, ‘S/2016/919
Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea
pursuant to Security Council resolution 2244 (2015)’ (7 October 2016), pp 40-43. Available at http://www.un.org/ga/
search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/919 accessed 25
June 2018.

58

S/2016/919 pp 70, 132.

59

S/2016/919 p 131.

47

S/2017/924 para 209.

60

S/2017/924 p 46.

48

Reuters, ‘Islamic State’s footprint spreading in northern
Somalia: U.N.’ (8 November 2017). Available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-islamic-state/islamic-states-footprint-spreading-in-northern-somalia-u-nidUSKBN1D828Z accessed 25 June 2018.

61

In 2014 the Monitoring Group of Experts assessed the trade
to be worth US$250m, and in 2017 only US$150m. See
S/2014/726 and S/2017/924 p 47.

62

S/2016/919 p 42.

Africa Center for Strategic Studies, ‘Africa’s Active Militant
Islamists Groups.’ Available at https://reliefweb.int/sites/
reliefweb.int/files/resources/Africas-Active-Militant-Islamist-Groups-Jan-2018.pdf accessed 25 June 2018.

63

S/2017/924, p 46.

64

S/2017/924 pp 62, 63.

65

S/2017/924 p 64.

66

Tom Maguire and Cathy Haenlein, ‘An Illusion of Complicity:
Terrorism and Illegal Ivory Trade in East Africa,’ RUSI (September 2015). Available at https://rusi.org/sites/default/
files/201509_an_illusion_of_complicity_0.pdf accessed 25
June 2018.

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

RHIPTO Threat network assessment, ‘Major Terrorist finance and risk assessment’ (30 November 2017).
Jordan Indermuehle, ‘Al Shabaab Area of Operations in
Somalia: October 2017.’ Criticalthreats.org. Available athttps://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/al-shabaab-areaof-operations-october-2017 accessed 25 June 2018.
Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, ‘S/2011/433 Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 1916 (2010),’ (18 July2011), para 63. Available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/
view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/433 accessed 25 June
2018.
UNEP-INTERPOL, ‘The Environmental Crime Crisis’ p 8.
Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, ‘S/2012/544 Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2002 (2011)’ (27 June2012), pp 147-154. Available at http://www.un.org/ga/
search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/544 accessed 25
June 2018.
S/2013/413 Annex 9.1.

67

Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, ‘S/2015/801
Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea
pursuant to Security Council resolution 2182 (2014),’ (9October 2014), p 203. Available at http://www.un.org/ga/
search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/801 accessed 25
June 2018.

68

UNEP-INTERPOL, ‘The Environmental Crime Crisis’ p 8.

69

Ibid.

70

At 30% profit.

71

UNEP-MONUSCO-OSESG, ‘Experts’ background report on
illegal exploitation and trade,’ p 3-4.

72

Ibid.

73

UNEP-INTERPOL, ‘The Environmental Crime Crisis’ p 8.

147

74

Peter Blombäck, Peter Poschen, Mattias Lövgren, ‘Employment Trends and Prospects in the European Forest Sector.’(2003) UN FAO. Available at https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/timber/docs/efsos/03-sept/dp-29.pdf accessed
25 June 2018.

75(£) Statista, ‘Distribution of paper production worldwide in2016 by region.’ (2016) Available at https://www.statista.
com/statistics/595787/paper-production-worldwide-distribution-by-region/ accessed 25 June 2018.

76

C.R. Thouless, et al., ‘African Elephant Status Report 2016’(2016) IUCN African Elephant Database Accessible athttps://www.iucn.org/ssc-groups/mammals/african-elephant-specialist-group/african-elephant-databaseaccessed 25 June 2018.

77

Fiona Maisels et al., ‘Devastating Decline of Forest Elephants in Central Africa.’ Plos One 8, no. 3 (04 March2013). Available at http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0059469 accessed 25 June
2018.

78

UN Environment, ‘Press release: World Marches to Demand
an End to Illegal Trade in Wildlife.’ (4 October 2014). Available at https://www.unenvironment.org/news-and-stories/
press-release/world-marches-demand-end-illegal-tradewildlife accessed 25 June 2018.

79

National Geographic, ‘More than 1,000 Rhinos Killed by
Poachers in South Africa Last Year, (25 January 2018). Available at https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2018/01/
wildlife-watch-rhino-poaching-crisis-continues-south-africa/ accessed 25 June 2018.

80

UNEP-INTERPOL, ‘The Environmental Crime Crisis’ p 8.

81

Ibid.

82

Daniel Ingram et al. ‘Assessing Africa-Wide Pangolin Exploitation by Scaling Local Data’, Conservation Letters (March/
April 2018). Available at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/
doi/epdf/10.1111/conl.12389 accessed 25 June 2018.

83

Environmental Investigation Agency, ‘Illegal trade seizures:
Pangolins mapping the crimes’ (no date). Available athttps://eia-international.org/illegal-trade-seizures-pangolins accessed 25 June 2018.

84

UNEP-INTERPOL, ‘The Rise of Environmental Crime’.

85

Environmental Investigation Agency, ‘Illegal trade seizures:
Pangolins mapping the crimes’.

86

Baldé, C.P., Wang, F., Kuehr, R., Huisman, J., ‘The global
e-waste monitor – 2014’, (2015) United Nations University,
IAS – SCYCLE. Available at https://i.unu.edu/media/unu.
edu/news/52624/UNU-1stGlobal-E-Waste-Monitor-2014small.pdf accessed 25 June 2018.

87

88

89

90

91

92

UNEP, ‘Waste Crime – Waste Risks: Gaps in meeting the
global waste challenge: A Rapid Response Assessment.’(2015), p 7. Available at http://web.unep.org/ourplanet/
september-2015/unep-publications/waste-crime-wasterisks-gaps-meeting-global-waste-challenge-rapid accessed
25 June 2018.
Dirk Zeller, et. al., ‘Global marine fisheries discards: A synthesis of reconstructed data’ (26 June 2017). Available athttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/faf.12233
accessed 25 June 2018.
Doumbouya A et. al. ‘Assessing the Effectiveness of Monitoring Control and Surveillance of Illegal Fishing: The Caseof West Africa’. (2017) Front. Mar. Sci. 4:50. Available at
h t t p s : / / w w w. f r o n t i e r s i n . o r g / a r t i c l e s / 1 0 . 3 3 8 9 /fmars.2017.00050/full accessed 25 June 2018.
University of Rhodes Island and Transafrica Consultancy
Services/Adeso, ‘Illegal Unreported and Unregulated Fishing in the Territorial Waters of Somalia’ (April 2015), p 10.
Available at http://www.crc.uri.edu/download/SOM14_finalreport.pdf accessed 25 June 2018.

100

UNODC, ‘The Globalization of Crime’, p 66.

113

Ibid., p 40.

101

RHIPTO Threat Network Assessment, ‘Strategic value,routes and incomes’.

114

Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Little America: The War within the
War for Afghanistan (2012), p. 63. London: Bloomsbury.

102

BBC News, ‘IS foreign fighters: 5,600 fighters have returned
home – report’ (24 October 2017) Available at https://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-41734069 accessed 25
June 2018.

115

103

UNSC Counter-terrorism committee executive directorate, ‘The challenge of returning and relocating foreign
terrorist fighters: research perspectives,’ (March 2018), p
10. Available at https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/wp-content/
uploads/2018/04/CTED-Trends-Report-March-2018.pdf
accessed 25 June 2018.

Angel Rabasa, Peter Chalk, “Colombian Labyrinth: The
synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and its Implications for
Regional Stability,” RAND, pp 25-26. Available at https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1339.html
accessed 26 June 2018.

116

Ibid. p 40.

117

Global Initiative against Organized Crime, ‘Organized
Crime and Illegally Mined Gold in Latin America’ (April2016). Available at http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/
uploads/2016/03/Organized-Crime-and-Illegally-MinedGold-in-Latin-America.pdf accessed 26 June 2018 accessed 26 June 2018.

118

Mimi Yagoub, ‘The FARC’s Riches: List of Assets Fails to
Reveal Guerrillas’ Total Wealth’ (29 August 2017), InSight
Crime. Available at https://www.insightcrime.org/news/
analysis/the-farc-riches-list-assets-fails-reveal-totalwealth/ accessed 26 June 2018.

119

InSight Crime, ‘Ex-FARC Mafia: The New Player in Colombian Organized Crime’ (9 March 2018). Available at https://www.insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/
ex-farc-mafia-new-player-colombian-organized-crime/ accessed 26 June 2018.

120

Mimi Yagoub, ‘The FARC’s Riches’.

121

Jeremy McDermott, ‘The FARC’s Riches: Up to $580 Million
in Annual Income’ (6 September 2017). Available at https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/farc-riches-yearly-income-up-to-580-million/ accessed 26 June 2018.

122

Mimi Yagoub, ‘The FARC’s Riches: Millions Apparently Lost
to Dissidents’ (4 September 2017) Available at https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/the-farc-riches-millions-apparently-lost-dissidents/ accessed 26 June 2018.

123

UNODC, ‘Colombia: Monitoreo de territories afectados por
cultivos ilicitos 2015’ (July 2016). Available at https://www.
unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Colombia/Monitoreo_Cultivos_ilicitos_2015.pdf accessed 26 June 2018.

124

Jeremy McDermott, ‘Record Cocaine Production in Colombia Fuels new Criminal Generation’ (17 July 2017),
InSight Crime. Available at https://www.insightcrime.
org/news/analysis/record-cocaine-production-colombia-fuels-new-criminal-generation/accessed 26 June
2018.

125

Jeremy McDermott, ‘The FARC’s Riches.’

126

UNEP-MONUSCO-OSESG, ‘Experts’ background report on
illegal exploitation and trade’; RHIPTO Threat network assessment, ‘Major Terrorist finance and risk assessment’ (30November 2017).

104

Antonio Giustozzi for Landinfo, ‘Afghanistan: Taliban’s organization and structure’ (23 August 2017), p 12. Available
at https://landinfo.no/asset/3589/1/3589_1.pdf accessed
25 June 2018.

105

RHIPTO Threat network assessment, ‘Major Terrorist finance and risk assessment’ (30 November 2017).

Alfonso Daniels et al., ‘Western Africa’s missing fish: The
impacts of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing andunder-reporting catches by foreign fleets.’ (June 2016), p
11. Available at https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/
resource-documents/10665.pdf accessed 25 June 2018.

106

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction,‘Counternarcotics: Lessons from the U.S. Experience inAfghanistan (June 2018), pp 34-35. Available at https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/lessonslearned/SIGAR-18-52-LL.pdf accessed 25 June 2018.

RHIPTO Threat network assessment, ‘Rising smugglingof Tramadol and Captagon smuggling for use for fighters
as a stimulant in the Trans-Sahara and Nigeria.’ (06 March2018).

10793

10-30% of 450-765m number above.

94

5% of the same numbers.

95

RHIPTO Threat Network Assessment, ‘Strategic value,routes and incomes to armed groups in Libya from 143,000– 343,000 migrants’ (18 January 2018).

96

UNEP-INTERPOL, ‘The Rise of Environmental Crime’.

97

Europol-INTERPOL, ‘Migrant Smuggling Networks: Executive Summary’ (May 2016). Available at https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/europol-and-interpol-issue-comprehensive-review-of-migrant-smuggling-networks
accessed 25 June 2018.

98

RHIPTO Briefing note, ‘Migrant trafficking patterns and incomes to organized crime’ (22 January 2016).

99

UNODC, ‘The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment’, (2010). Available at
http://www.unodc.org/res/cld/bibliography/the-globalization-of-crime-a-transnational-organized-crime-threat-assessment_html/TOCTA_Report_2010_low_res.pdf accessed 25
June 2018.

108

Average of David Mansfield’s price range for fresh opium of
US$40–65. See David Mansfield, ‘Bombing Heroin Labs in
Afghanistan: The Latest Act in the Theatre of Counternarcotics, (January 2018) LSE International Drug Policy Unit,
49n p 19. Available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/united-states/
Assets/Documents/Heroin-Labs-in-Afghanistan-Mansfield.
pdf accessed 25 June 2018.
UNODC/ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Counter Narcotics, ‘Afghan Opium Survey 2017: Cultivation and
Production’ (November 2017), p 45. Available at https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghan_opium_survey_2017_cult_prod_web.pdf
accessed 25 June 2018.

109

Average of David Mansfield’s price range for cooked opiumof US$164–200 in David Mansfield, ‘Bombing Heroin Labs’
50n p 19.

110

David Mansfield, ‘Understanding Control and Influence:
What opium poppy and tax reveal about the writ of the Afghanstate’ (August 2017), AREU, p 37, available at https://areu.
org.af/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/1724E-Understanding-Control-and-Influence1.pdf accessed 26 June 2018.

111

This equals a tax rate of about 4%, somewhat higher thanthe 2.5% cited by David Mansfield, which is also the zakat
tax rate.

112

David Mansfield, ‘Understanding Control and Influence’, p 38.

148

Bibliography
127

NATO defines insurgency as including at least the following three elements: (1) actions or activities by anorganized group, (2) a goal of some form of politicalchange over a ruling regime; and (3) the use of violenceor subversive activity. See NATO, ‘Counterinsurgency: A
generic reference curriculum’ (no date), p 8. Available athttps://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/
pdf_2017_09/20170904_1709-counterinsurgency-rc.pdf
accessed 26 June 2018.
CIA specifies further that what distinguishes insurgency
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128

Alex Scmid defines terrorism as, on the one hand a doctrine
about the presumed effectiveness of a special form of tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on theother hand, a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraint,targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed
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129

Chandrasekaran, Little America, p. 63.

130

S/2017/924 p 46; UNEP-INTERPOL, ‘The Environmental
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131

US$1.16 billion total income to 7 + 1 armed groups constitutes 3.7% (rounded to 4) of the total income to organizedcrime in or near conflict areas, which is US$31.54 billion.

-

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