European Asylum Support Office

EASO
Country of Origin
Information Report
Nigeria
Security Situation

November 2018SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION

European Asylum Support Office

EASO
Country of Origin
Information Report
Nigeria
Security Situation

November 2018

More information on the European Union is available on the Internet: http://europa.eu.

ISBN: 978-92-9476-033-3
doi: 10.2847/773880© European Asylum Support Office 2018
Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged, unless otherwise stated.
For third-party materials reproduced in this publication, reference is made to the copyrights
statements of the respective third parties.

Cover photo: © US Army/ Angelica Gardner
Nigerian Snipers lay in the prone position conducting an operation “Silent Kill” demonstration
during African Land Force Summit in Abuja, Nigeria, Apr. 17, 2018
Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which
may be made of the information contained herein.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATION—3

Acknowledgements
EASO would like to acknowledge The Netherlands, Immigration and Naturalisation Service,
Office for Country Information and Language Analysis (OCILA) as the drafter of this report.
The following national asylum and migration department reviewed this report:
Czech Republic, Department for Asylum and Migration Policy, International andEuropean Affairs Unit
The following external expert reviewed this report:
Nnamdi Obasi, Senior Advisor on Nigeria, International Crisis GroupIt must be noted that the review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts ororganisations contributes to the overall quality of the report, but does not necessarily imply
their formal endorsement of the final report, which is the full responsibility of EASO.

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Contents

Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................... 3Contents .................................................................................................................................... 4
Disclaimer .................................................................................................................................. 7
Glossary and Abbreviations ....................................................................................................... 8
Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 11
Methodology ....................................................................................................................... 11
Defining the terms of reference ..................................................................................... 11
Collecting information .................................................................................................... 12
Quality control (peer and external review) .................................................................... 13
Content of the report .......................................................................................................... 13
Map.......................................................................................................................................... 14
1. General introduction to Nigeria .......................................................................................... 15
2. General description of the security situation ...................................................................... 17
2.1 Overview of current conflicts in Nigeria ....................................................................... 17
2.2 Armed confrontations in the territory of Nigeria ......................................................... 18
2.2.1 Military operations ................................................................................................ 19
2.2.2 Impact of the violence on the population ............................................................. 22
2.3 Actors in the conflicts.................................................................................................... 25
2.3.1 Nigerian armed forces ........................................................................................... 25
2.3.2 Nigeria Police Force ............................................................................................... 27
2.3.3 National Intelligence .............................................................................................. 29
2.3.4 Multi-National Joint Task Force ............................................................................. 30
2.3.5 Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps............................................................. 30
2.3.6 Civilian Joint Task Force ......................................................................................... 31
2.3.7 Boko Haram, ISIS-WA and JAS ............................................................................... 31
2.3.8 Niger Delta Avengers ............................................................................................. 33
2.3.9 Farmer-herder conflicts ......................................................................................... 34
3. Security situation per zone or region .................................................................................. 36
3.1 North East Zone............................................................................................................. 36
3.1.1 General description of the region.......................................................................... 36
3.1.2 Background to the conflict..................................................................................... 38
3.1.3 Actors in the conflict .............................................................................................. 39

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATION—5

3.1.4 Recent security trends ........................................................................................... 39
3.1.5 Tactics and targets ................................................................................................. 42
3.1.6 Impact of violence on state ability to secure law and order ................................. 44
3.1.7 Conflict-induced internal displacement ................................................................ 44
3.1.8 Further impact of the violence on the civilian population .................................... 45
3.2 North Central Zone (including Kaduna) ........................................................................ 47
3.2.1 General description of the region.......................................................................... 47
3.2.2 Background to the pastoralist-herders conflict ..................................................... 48
3.2.3 Actors in the conflict .............................................................................................. 50
3.2.4 Recent security trends ........................................................................................... 51
3.2.5 Tactics and targets ................................................................................................. 53
3.2.6 Impact of violence on state ability to secure law and order ................................. 53
3.2.7 Conflict-induced internal displacement ................................................................ 54
3.2.8 Further impact of the violence on the civilian population .................................... 55
3.3 Niger Delta .................................................................................................................... 56
3.3.1 General description of the region.......................................................................... 56
3.3.2 Background to the conflict..................................................................................... 56
3.3.3 Actors in the conflict .............................................................................................. 57
3.3.4 Recent security trends ........................................................................................... 57
3.3.5 Tactics and targets ................................................................................................. 59
3.3.6 Impact of violence on state ability to secure law and order ................................. 59
3.3.7 Conflict-induced internal displacement ................................................................ 60
3.4 Zamfara State ................................................................................................................ 60
3.4.1 General description of the region.......................................................................... 60
3.4.2 Background to the conflict..................................................................................... 60
3.4.3 Actors in the conflict .............................................................................................. 61
3.4.4 Recent security trends ........................................................................................... 62
3.4.5 Tactics and targets ................................................................................................. 63
3.4.6 Impact of the violence on state ability to secure law and order ........................... 63
3.4.7 Conflict-induced internal displacement ................................................................ 64
3.4.8 Further impact of the violence on the population ................................................ 64
3.5. Other manifestations of violence................................................................................. 64
3.5.1 Kaduna State: IMN ................................................................................................. 64
3.5.2 South East Nigeria: Biafra ...................................................................................... 65
3.5.3 Violent crime.......................................................................................................... 66
Annex 1 Incidents and fatalities 1 October 2017 - 30 September 2018 ................................. 67

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Annex 2: Bibliography.............................................................................................................. 69
Annex 3: Terms of Reference .................................................................................................. 93

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATION—7Disclaimer
This report was written according to the EASO COI Report Methodology (2012).1 The report isbased on carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced. To theextent possible and unless otherwise stated, all information presented, except for undisputedor obvious facts, has been cross-checked.
The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed withutmost care. However, this document does not claim to be exhaustive. If a particular event,person or organisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has
not taken place or that the person or organisation does not exist.
Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particular
claim to refugee status or asylum. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative ofa particular legal position.
‘Refugee’, ‘risk’ and similar terminology are used as a generic terminology and not as legallydefined in the EU Asylum Acquis and the Geneva Convention.
Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which
may be made of the information contained in this report.
The target users are asylum caseworkers, COI researchers, policymakers, and decision-making
authorities.
The drafting process (including reviewing) for this report was finalised on 17 October 2018.
Any event taking place after this period is not included in this report. More information on thereference period for this report can be found in the Methodology section of the introduction.

1 The EASO methodology is largely based on the Common EU Guidelines for processing Country of Origin

Information (COI), 2008, and can be downloaded from the EASO website: url

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Glossary and Abbreviations
ABA

Adaka Boro Avengers

ACCORD

Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research andDocumentation

ACLED

Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project

AIG

Assistant Inspector General

COI

Country of Origin Information

COAS

Chief of Army Staff

CJTF

Civilian Joint Task Force

CNC

Central Naval Command

CSW

Christian Solidarity Worldwide

CTU

Counter Terrorism Unit

DFAT

Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

DIA

Defence Intelligence Agency

DSS

Department of State Services (also known as SSS)

DW

Deutsche Welle

Eid el Kabir

Islamic holiday commemorating the willingness of Ibrahim to follow Allah’scommand to sacrifice his son

ENC

Eastern Naval Command

FCT

Federal Capital Territory

FOC

Flag Officers Commanding

GTI

Global Terrorism Index

IDPInternally Displaced Person

IED

Improvised Explosive Device

IGP

Inspector General of Police

IMN

Islamic Movement in Nigeria

IOM

International Organization for Migration

IPOB

Indigenous People of Biafra

ISIS-WA

Islamic State-West Africa

ISS

Institute for Security Studies

JAS

Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad

JTF

Joint Task Force

LGA

Local Government Area

LOG COMD

Logistics Command

MNJTF

Multinational Joint Task ForceEASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATION

MEND

Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta

MAFO

Movement Against Fulani Occupation

MOPOL

Mobile Police: a paramilitary police force

NAF

Nigerian Air Force

NAN

News Agency of Nigeria

NASOC

Nigerian Army Special Operations Command

NAVTRAC

Naval Training Command

NBS

National Bureau of Statistics

NDA

Niger Delta Avengers

NDAC

Naval Doctrine and Assessment Centre

NDGJM

Niger Delta Greenland Justice Mandate

NDPVP

Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force

NDSF

Niger Delta Strike ForceNIA

National Intelligence Agency

NN

Nigerian Navy

NND

Nigerian Naval Dockyard

NNHL

Nigerian Navy Holdings Limited

NNPC

Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation

NNSY

Nigerian Naval Shipyard

NOD

Naval Ordnance Depot

NSCDC

Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps

NPF

National Police ForceNSO

National Security Organization

OECD

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

OCHA(United Nations) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

OPWS

Operation Whirl Stroke

PANDEFPan Niger Delta Forum

PAP

Presidential Amnesty Programme

PMF

Police Mobile Force

PSC

Police Service Commission

PSD

Protection Status Determination

QD

Qualification Directive

RIVNESCARivers State Neighbourhood Safety Corps Agency

SEMA

State Emergency Management Agency

SPU

Special Protection Unit

SSSState Security Service (also known as DSS)

—9

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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATIONTRADOC

Training and Doctrine Command

UNFPA

United Nations Population Fund

UNHCR

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF

United Nations Children's Fund

USCIRFUS Commission on International Religious Freedom

WISPI

World Internal Security and Police Index International

WNC

Western Naval Command

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATION— 11

Introduction
This report was drafted by Country of Origin Information (COI) specialists from the COI unit
listed under the Acknowledgements section.
The report aims to provide information on the security situation in Nigeria, which is relevant
for international protection status determination, refugee status and subsidiary protection.
The terms of reference can be found in Annex 3.

Methodology
Defining the terms of reference
For the assessment of the need for refugee protection and subsidiary protection, especiallytaking into account Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive (QD), the following are key
elements:






a real risk of serious harm;
an internal or international armed conflict;indiscriminate violence;
the term civilian; anda serious and individual threat to life or person.

Based on various sources consulted by EASO2, these key elements can be broken down into
topics and/or indicators. Examples include: parties to the conflict; intensity level of theviolence; nature of the violence; regional spreading of the violence; targets of the violence;risk of collateral damage; use of arms and tactics; possibility to reach areas – security oftransport (roads and airports); and indirect effects of the violence/conflict.
Based upon a study of all the mentioned sources, a list of elements and indicators was drafted,
which served as a basis for the terms of reference (see Annex 3). In order to make a wellinformed assessment of the fear of persecution or risk of serious harm, information is neededon these security-related elements and indicators on a regional, zonal or state level.
Members of the EASO COI Specialist Network on West Africa and of the EASO Country
Guidance Network gave input on the terms of reference that were finalised during apreparatory meeting in March 2018 taking all the inputs into account.
The reference period for the security events from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data
Project (ACLED) database is from 1 October 2017 to 30 September 2018. This period is mostly
followed when presenting examples of the incidents in the regional chapters, except wherevery significant events or developments outside the reference period occurred. As a result of
the quality control process (see below) some additional information was included in response
to feedback received during the respective reviews, until 17 October 2018.

2 The elements, topics and indicators were identified by various sources that have a different position in the legal

hierarchy and provide different levels of detail: The Qualification Directive (Recitals and articles); Case law fromthe Court of Justice of the EU in Luxembourg; National State Practice (National legislation; National case law;
National policy and first instance decision practice); Case law from the European Court of Human Rights in
Strasbourg; Opinions of experts, academics and specialised organisations; See the following EASO publications:
EASO, Article 15(c) Qualification Directive (2011/95/EU) A judicial analysis, December 2014, url; The
Implementation of Article 15(c) QD in EU Member States, July 2015, url.

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Collecting information
The information is a result of desk research of public, specialised paper-based and electronicsources until 30 September2018.
For data on violent incidents, the datasets from the organisation Armed Conflict Location andEvent Data Project (ACLED) have been used. ACLED collects information about incidents ofviolence and protests in developing states, including Nigeria. In a database, ACLED indicatesthe kind of violence, the actors, the location, the course of events and the number of fatalities(deaths). ACLED collects its information from local media sources such as Sahara Reporters,
Vanguard, Premium Times, This Day, as well as from international media sources such as
Agence France Presse (AFP) and Associated Press (AP). The database is publicly available andis continuously updated.3 Additional sources have been researched to the extent possible tocorroborate the ACLED findings.
It should be borne in mind that ACLED data may not always be accurate. In Boko Haram areas
or frontline areas inaccessible to regular media reporting, there may be underreporting ofincidents, whereas, in areas with large media coverage and presence of NGOs and nationalarmed forces, overreporting may occur.
According to ACLED’s codebook (in which their methodology is explained), for incidents where
the original source has reported that several or many were killed, ACLED codes the number offatalities as 10.4 This method has a significant impact on overall numbers of fatalities reported.
ACLED registers civilian deaths under the category ‘violence against civilians’, defined asfollows:‘deliberate violent acts perpetrated by an organized political group such as a rebel,
militia or government force against unarmed non-combatants. These conflict events
harm or kill civilians, and are the sole act in which civilians are an actor (…). “Violenceagainst civilians” also includes inflicting significant harm (e.g. bombing, shooting,torture, rape, mutilation etc) or accosting victims (e.g. kidnapping anddisappearances). It does not include incidents in which people are not physicallyharmed (e.g. looting or burning, destruction of sacred spaces, and forced
displacement).’5
Fatalities are counted only once. For example, in ACLED’s Codebook it is stated:‘If summarized fatalities are reported, but events occur across several days or in
multiple locations simultaneously, the total number is divided and that fraction isrecorded for each day of the event (if over 1). If an odd number, the proportion of
fatalities is divided by assigning the first day the additional fatality and distributed as
evenly as possible. No information for number of harmed people is recorded in any
other space besides the notes column, if available.’6
In this report, the ACLED data are regarded merely as estimates and indications of trends inviolence.
In Annex 1, an overview of violent incidents and the corresponding fatalities is presented in
the period 1 October 2017 until 30 September 2018. In addition, the table presents two
subsets of data: on violent incidents and fatalities that are the results of violence categorised
3 Raleigh, Clionadh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre and Joakim Karlsen. 2010. Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict

Location and Event Data, Journal of Peace Research 47(5), pp. 651-660; ACLED, Realtime Data (2017-2018), n.d.
url
4 ACLED, Codebook, 2017 url, p. 20
5 ACLED, Codebook, 2017 url, p. 20
6 ACLED, Codebook, 2017 url, p. 20

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATION— 13

by ACLED as ‘violence against civilians’, and on incidents and fatalities that are the result of‘remote violence’ (violence in which the actor is not present, such as car bombs, improvised
explosive devices (IEDs)).

Quality control (peer and external review)
In order to ensure that the authors respected the EASO COI Report Methodology, a review
was carried out by COI specialists from the countries and organisations listed as reviewers in
the Acknowledgements section. In addition, a review of the report was carried out by Nnamdi
Obasi, Senior Advisor on Nigeria with International Crisis Group. All comments made by thereviewers were taken into consideration and most of them were implemented in the final
draft of this report. EASO performed the final quality review and editing of the text.

Content of the report
This report provides information on elements and indicators that may help in assessing theneed for international protection of Nigerian applicants.
The first chapter gives a general description of the security situation in Nigeria, armed
confrontations and military operations and an overview of actors in the various conflicts. Thisis then elaborated for the main conflicts in more detail in the second chapter. A generaldescription at the level of the geopolitical zone contains information on the geography andpopulation, and on the background of the conflict, including the actors active in the conflict.
This is followed by a description of recent trends in the security situation, with regard to theabove-mentioned indicators: the nature of the violence, frequency, tactics and targets,
locations and number of fatalities. Also the impact of the violence on the state’s ability tosecure law and order, and the impact on the population are discussed.
Simultaneously to this report on the security situation in Nigeria, EASO also published reports
on Actors of Protection, Targeting of individuals, and Key Socio-economic Indicators in Nigeria.
All reports were published in November 2018 and publicly available on the EASO COI portal.7
Where relevant, in this report reference to these reports have been included for further
reading and more detailed information.

7 EASO, COI report Nigeria, Actors of Protection, November 2018, url; EASO, COI report Nigeria, Key-socio-

economic indicators, November 2018, url; EASO, COI report Nigeria, Targeting of individuals, November 2018, url

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Map

Map 1: © United Nations8

8 UN, Map No 4228, August 2014, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATION— 15

1. General introduction to Nigeria
Nigeria is a federal presidential republic. It is divided into 36 states, and Abuja, which has thestatus of Federal Capital Territory (FCT).9 The 36 states and the FCT are grouped into six
geopolitical zones (see map below):







North Central (7 states): Niger, Kogi, Benue, Plateau, Na(s)sarawa, Kwara and FCTNorth East (6 states): Bauchi, Borno, Taraba, Adamawa, Gombe and Yobe
North West (7 states): Zamfara, Sokoto, Kaduna, Kebbi, Katsina, Kano and Jigawa
South East (5 states): Enugu, Imo, Ebonyi, Abia and Anambra
South South (6 states): Bayelsa, Akwa Ibom, Edo, Rivers, Cross River and Delta
South West (6 states): Oyo, Ekiti, Osun, Ondo, Lagos and Ogun

Map 2: @DFAT 201810

9 CIA, The World Factbook – Nigeria, last updated 18 September 2018, url
10 Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report Nigeria, 9 March 2018, url, p. 2

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Nigeria is the most populated country in Africa, with an estimated population of 193 million
people (data 2016).11 The country has a population growth rate of 2.61%. The total area is923,768 km2, and the population density is 212/km2.12
Nigeria is a highly diverse country with regards to ethnic groups and languages. There are
more than 250 ethnic groups of which the largest groups are: Hausa/Fulani 29 %, Yoruba 21 %,Igbo (Ibo) 18 %, Ijaw 10 %, Kanuri 4 %, Ibibio 3.5 %, Tiv 2.5 %13, Edo/Bini 2 %14.
The main languages (of the 519 living languages in the country) spoken include English, PidginEnglish, Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo, Fulani, Ijaw.15
In the north, the main ethnic groups are Hausa and Fulani, and several other groups such as
Kanuri (in the north-east). The Middle Belt has many smaller, different but related groups.
Nigeria’s south is divided into a Yoruba-speaking area in the west and an Igbo-speaking areain the east. The main group in the Niger Delta are the Ijaw although there are several othersmaller ethnic groups.16 See the map above with the six zones and the main ethnic groups.
The religious adherence of the population is nearly equally divided between Christians and(Sunni) Muslims. According to a 2010 survey, the percentages of Muslims and Christians were
48.8 % respectively 49.3 % of the population, while 1.9 % was mainly composed of ‘either
practitioners of indigenous religions or no affiliations’17.
The economy largely relies on agriculture, trade, and oil production.18

11 Nigeria, NBS, Population of Nigeria 2016, available at: url
12 World Population Review, Nigeria population 2018 (estimate), n.d., url
13 CIA Factbook – Nigeria, last updated 18 September 2018, url; Worldatlas, Largest Ethnic Groups in Nigeria, 25

April 2017, url
14 Encyclopaedia Britannica, Edo People, 29 August 2018, url
15 Ethnologue, Nigeria, Languages, url
16 Minority Rights Group International, Nigeria, updated January 2018, url
17 Pew Research Centre, Global Religious Futures Projects – Nigeria, 2010, url. The CIA Factbook gives thefollowing percentages: Muslim 50 %, Christian 40 %, indigenous beliefs 10 %. CIA Factbook – Nigeria, last
updated 18 September 2018, url
18 CIA Factbook – Nigeria, last updated 18 September 2018, url. For more information, see EASO, COI report
Nigeria, Key-socio-economic indicators, November 2018, url

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2. General description of the security situation
There are several indicators for the security situation in Nigeria. In the Global Terrorism Index(GTI) 2017, Nigeria is ranked the 3rd country in the world according to number of deaths fromterrorist attacks, although the country saw a reduction in deaths with 3 100 less killed byterrorism in 2016 than in 2015. This was mainly due to an 80 % reduction in the number ofpeople killed by the radical Islamist group, Boko Haram. The decrease in number of fatalities
can be attributed to the sustained operations by the Nigerian military, supported byinterventions by the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)19 in the Lake Chad region, as wellas the split within Boko Haram itself. In the Global Peace Index 2017, Nigeria did not make any
progress; like the previous year, it still ranked 149th out of 163 countries.20
Another important indicator is the Fragile States Index 2017. Although Nigeria remained in
the 13th place in comparison with the previous year, the country was among the top 20 (13th)
most improved countries in 2017.21 Also, a report produced by Nigeria Watch confirms thatfatal violence has declined in the north-east since 2015.22
In spite of the noted improvements, the situation is still regarded as alarming; in particular
the escalating violence between pastoralists and farmers. International Crisis Group (in short:
Crisis Group) assesses: ‘Since September 2017, at least 1,500 people have been killed, over
1,300 of them from January to June 2018, roughly six times the number of civilians killed by
Boko Haram over the same period.’23
Another big concern is the inadequate capacity of security forces. In July 2017, the Speaker ofHouse of Representatives, Yakubu Dogara, stated that Nigeria is effectively permanently in astate of emergency, as its armed forces are deployed in more than 28 states of the federation.
According to him, the armed forces have virtually taken over the routine police work in peacetime.24 In November 2017, the World Internal Security and Police Index International (WISPI)
rated the Nigeria police force as the ‘worst’, in terms of its ability to handle internal security
challenges, out of 127 countries assessed.25 Crisis Group assesses that the government’s
deployment of more police and soldiers to states affected by conflicts other than Boko Haraminsurgency, like the escalating farmer-herder violence, will further stretch resources that
could otherwise have been concentrated on countering the aforementioned insurgency.26

2.1 Overview of current conflicts in Nigeria
The security situation in Nigeria is affected by the following long-standing major conflicts:
1. The Boko Haram conflict in the North East zone27;
2. The conflict between pastoralist and farmers in the North Central zone or so-called
Middle Belt;
3. The oil-related conflict in the Niger Delta; and19 IEP, Global Terrorism Index 2017, 15 November 2017, url , pp. 3, 4, 17
20 IEP Global Peace Index, 1 June 2017, url, p. 11
21 FFP, Fragile State Index, 10 May 2017, url, pp. 10, 35
22 Nigeria Watch, 10 Myths about violence in Nigeria, 2018, url, p. 4
23 International Crisis Group, Stopping Nigeria’s Spiraling Farmer-Herder Violence, 26 July 2018, url, p. 1
24 This Day, Nigeria in State of Emergency, Says Dogara, 4 July 2017, url
25 IPSA, World Internal Security and Police Index 2016; url
26 International Crisis Group, Stopping Nigeria’s Spiraling Farmer-Herder Violence, 26 July 2018, url, p. 18
27 Nigeria is officially divided into six geopolitical zones, created during the regime of General Sani Abacha in

1996. For an overview of these six zones see EASO, EASO COI Report – Nigeria Country Focus, 5 June 2017,url, p.
15

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EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATION

4. The escalating violence in Zamfara State related to cattle rustling and banditry.
These conflicts, which have significant impact on the population in the area, will be discussed
in detail in respectively Sections 3.1, 3.2., 3.3 and 3.4.
Besides these major conflicts, there are other manifestations of violence that create insecurity
in the country:
1. The tension between the military and the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) in
Kaduna State;
2. The tension between the government and Igbo groups for an independent Biafra.
These tensions will be briefly discussed at the end of this report in Section 3.5.

2.2 Armed confrontations in the territory of Nigeria
Although the Nigerian government announced several times since December 2015 that BokoHaram had been ‘technically defeated’ and no longer hold any territory28, reports show thatsome areas are still under control by different factions of the group. Residents in some partsof Borno and Yobe, cited by Deutsche Welle (DW), claim that the Boko Haram faction led by
Abu Mus’ab al Barnawi, ISIS-WA, (for a description of the different factions of Boko Haram see
Section 2.3.7), still holds a territory ‘spanning an estimated 100 miles (160 kilometres)’.29 A
map produced by the US development agency in February 2018 shows that ISIS-WA territory
extends more than 100 miles into Nigeria’s north-eastern states of Borno and Yobe.30 The BBC
reported that it is unclear which of the two factions is dominant within Boko Haram, but both
operate across the Lake Chad Basin region. Whereas the faction led by Abubakar Shekau, JAS,
seems to be most active in the north-east towards Cameroon, ISIS-WA’s area of operation
seems to be closer to the border with Niger.31
The map below, published in a report by Institute for Security Studies (ISS), highlighting thelocations of attacks by violent extremist groups in Lake Chad Basin from August 2016 toApril 2018, shows that ISIS-WA is more active near the border with Niger, further south toareas north and west of Damboa and in Yobe State around Buni Yadi. JAS is more active near
the border with Cameroon and is present in south and central Borno State, particularly aroundthe Sambisa Forest.32

28CBS News, Boko Haram is crushed, Nigeria's president declares, 24 December 216, url; Daily Trust, Boko Haram

Kills 1,100 since being ‘technically defeated’, 3 December 2017, url; DW, Boko Haram Islamists still control partsof northeastern Nigeria, 19 may 2018 ; url; Vanguard, Boko Haram no longer holds our territory, Nigeria tells UN,
8 May 2018, url
29 DW, Boko Haram Islamists still control parts of northeastern Nigeria, 19 May 2018, url
30 Reuters, Islamic State ally stakes out territory around Lake Chad, 29 April 2018, url
31 BBC, Islamic State and the kidnap of Nigerian schoolgirls from Dapchi, 29 March 2018, url
32 Mahmood, O.S. & Ani, N.C., Factional Dynamics within Boko Haram, 6 July 2018, url, pp. 22-23

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATION— 19

Map 3: @ISS. Location of attacks by violent extremist groups in Lake Chad Basin: August 2016-April 201833

In the first half year of 2018, the Nigerian armed forces, supported by the Multinational Joint
Task Force (MNJTF), pushed Boko Haram out of several areas of the north-east.34

2.2.1 Military operations
In 2017 and 2018, several security operations were launched, while others already underway
were continued by Nigerian security forces. Below is a short overview of the main operations
that are relevant within the scope of this report.
Operation Safe Haven
Operation Safe Haven was established in 2010 and is continuing in Plateau, Kogi, Benue,
Nasarawa, Kaduna, Bauchi and Kwara States. The main objective of the operation is tomaintain peace and security in the region by tackling pastoralist/farmers clashes, cattle
rustling, and other criminal activities.35
Operation Lafiya Dole
Operation Lafiya Dole, which means ‘peace by all means’ in the Hausa language, wasannounced in July 2015 and replaced Operation Zaman Lamiya. The operation was set up to

33 Mahmood, O.S. & Ani, N.C., Factional Dynamics within Boko Haram, 6 July 2018, url, pp. 22-23
34 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the United Nations Office for West

Africa and the Sahel, (S/2018/649), 29 June 2018 url, p. 5
35 Sahara Reporters, Soldiers Arrest 21 'Involved' In Plateau Killings And Reprisals, 3 July 2018, url; This Day, With
10 Major Security Operations Across the Country, Military Stretched Too Thin, 11 September 2016, url;
Vanguard, Accessing military operations around Nigeria, 1 December 2017, url20 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATION

counter the insurgency in the north-eastern part of the country.36 Since 2015, the operation
has been expanded to specialised operations, such as:Operation Crackdown’ to clear remnants of Boko Haram from Sambisa Forest;
Operation Gama Aiki to clear remnants of Boko Haram from the northern part of Borno
State;
Operation Safe Corridor to de-radicalise and rehabilitate repentant Boko Haramfighters;37
Operation Last Hold to clear Boko Haram from the area around Lake Chad and facilitate
the return of IDPs to their ancestral homes. The operation has been working in
conjunction with The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and is still ongoing.38

Operation Delta Safe
Operation Delta Safe was launched in the Niger Delta in June 2016, replacing Operation Pulo
Shield. Its objective is to improve security in the region, safeguard oil facilities, and crush
militancy and pipeline vandalism in the Niger Delta.39 Early May 2018, the Operation
confirmed the killings of four high-profile militants from the region.40
Operation Chikin Gudu
The little-known Operation Chikin Gudu was conducted in July 2017 in Marte LGA, Borno
State. It was a clearance operation against militants.41
Operation Python Dance II
As a follow up of Operation Python Dance I, which was conducted by the Nigerian army from27 November till 27 December 2016, Operation Python Dance II was intended to check illegal
bunkering, armed robbery, kidnapping, banditry, communal clashes, amongst other forms ofcriminal activities in the south-east states of Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu and Imo. The
exercise started on 15 September 2017 and ended on 14 October 2017.42 According to the
Nigerian army, 106 suspected armed robbers, kidnappers and cult members were arrested
during the operation. A total of 26 assorted guns were also recovered during the exercise.43
Operation Crocodile Smile II
Operation Crocodile Smile II was conducted by the Nigerian army from 7 till
28 October 201744, in the South West and Niger Delta states: Akwa Ibom, Lagos, Ondo, Edo,
Delta, Bayelsa, Rivers, and Cross River. The operation was held in cooperation with othersecurity agencies such as the Nigerian Police and the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps(NSCDC), to curtail prevailing security challenges like illegal oil bunkering, pipeline vandalism,

36 Pulse.ng, Army boss launches 'Operation Lafiya Dole', 20 July 2015, url; Vanguard, Army chief in Maiduguri;changes code to Operation Lafiya Dole, 21 July 2015, url
37 This Day, With 10 Major Security Operations Across the Country, Military Stretched Too Thin, 11 September
2016, url; Vanguard, Accessing military operations around Nigeria, 1 December 2017, url
38 The Guardian, Troops kill five terrorists, arrest alleged fuel suppliers in Borno, Yobe, 16 July 2018, url;
Vanguard, Army chief in Maiduguri; changes code to Operation Lafiya Dole, 21 July 2015, url
39 This Day, Militancy: Operation Delta Safe Finally Kicks off, 30 June 2016, url; This Day, With 10 Major Security
Operations Across the Country, Military Stretched Too Thin, 11 September 2016, url
40 Sahara Reporters, Troops ‘Kill’ Four Top Niger Delta Militants, 3 May 2018, url
41 Mahmood, O.S. et al., Responses to Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Region, July 2018, url, p. 13
42 Vanguard, Operation python dance II: Abia govt slams 3-day curfew, soldiers apologise, 13 September
2017,url; Vanguard, Operation Python Dance II: One week after, 23 September 2017, url
43 Punch, 106 criminals arrested, 26 guns recovered in ‘Python Dance’ –Army, 17 October 2017, url
44 Daily Posts, Operation Crocodile Smile II: Army lists successes as exercise ends, 8 November 2017, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATION— 21

cultism, kidnapping and militancy.45 Operation Crocodile II was a follow-up of Operation
Crocodile I, which was conducted in August 2016.46
Operation Last HoldOn 1 May 2018, the Nigerian army launched a four-month-long operation in Borno North
District called Operation Last Hold. The operation was conducted as part of the Operation
Lafiya Dole. It was intended to ensure the destruction of Boko Haram camps and strong points
in the Nigerian side of Lake Chad Basin and enable the rescue of hostages still held by the
insurgents.47
The operation also aimed to facilitate the return of IDPs to their communities and to restore
fishing, farming and other socio-economic activities in the Lake Chad Basin.48 To this aim, it
facilitated the clearance of seaweeds and other obstacles obstructing the movement of boats
and people across Lake Chad waterways.49
Operation Ruwan Wuta I, II, III and IV
The first Operation Ruwan Wuta was launched in September 201750, followed by Operation
Ruwan Wuta II in October 201751, Operation Ruwan Wuta III in December 201752, and finally
Operation Ruwan Wuta IV in February 2018.53 All the operations were executed by the
Nigerian air force in order to repel remnants of Boko Haram out of Sambisa Forest and theLake Chad region.54
Operation Deep Punch II
Operation Deep Punch II was launched in October 2017 as successor of Operation Deep Punch
I. The operation has been conducted in south-central Borno to clear remnants of Boko Haramout of Sambisa Forest.55 In this operation Nigerian and Cameroonian troops were working
together.56 According to the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Lt Gen Tukur Buratai, the operation
led to the fall of Sambisa Forest.57

45 Daily Trust, Operations Crocodile Smile II successful – Buratai, 31 October 2017, url; Premium Times, Nigerian

Army commences “Exercise Crocodile Smile II” in Niger Delta-Official, 10 October 2017, url
46 Jamestown Foundation, Nigeria Expands Its 'War on Terrorism' to the Niger Delta, Terrorism Monitor, 16
September 2016, url
47 Press Briefing by the Chief of Army Staff, Lt Gen T. Y. Buratai on the Planned Conduct of Operation Last Holdfrom 1 May – 31 August 2018, Abuja, 21 April 2018, url
48 Mahmood, O.S. et al., Responses to Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Region, July 2018, url, p. 14; The Guardian,
Operation Last Hold: Dikko charges troops to brace up for task ahead, 1 June 2018, url; This Day, Nigeria: Military
Launches Operation Last Hold in Final Push Against Boko Haram, 16 May 2018, url
49 Press Briefing by the Chief of Army Staff, Lt Gen T. Y. Buratai on the Planned Conduct of Operation Last Holdfrom 1 May – 31 August 2018, Abuja, 21 April 2018, url
50 The Guardian, NAF commences operation Ruwan Wuta in Northeast, 9 September 2017, url
51 Daily Trust, Air Force launch Operation Ruwan Wuta II, 25 October 2017, url
52 The Guardian, NAF commences operation Ruwan Wuta III, bombs Boko Haram hideouts, 16 December 2017,url
53 Vanguard, NAF launches Operation ‘RUWAN WUTA IV’ against Boko Haram insurgents, 14 February 2018, url
54 Mahmood, O.S. et al., Responses to Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Region, July 2018, url, pp. 12-13; Vanguard,
NAF launches Operation ‘RUWAN WUTA IV’ against Boko Haram insurgents, 14 February 2018, url
55 Mahmood, O.S. et al., Responses to Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Region, July 2018, url, pp. 12-13
56 Gsell, A. & Nowak, M., Handmade and Deadly: Craft Production of Small Arms in Nigeria, Small Arms Survey,
June 2018, url, p. 3
57 The Guardian, ‘Operation Deep Punch 2’ led to the fall of Sambisa forest, says Buratai, 18 March 2018, url

22 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATION

Operation Cat Race
Operation Cat Race, also called Operation Ayem Akpatuma in the Tiv language58, ran from15 February to 31 March 2018.59 The operation was conceived as a training exercise which
was then to tackle armed banditry, kidnapping and cattle rustling in the states of Benue,
Taraba, Nasarawa, Kaduna, Kaduna, Niger and Kogi. The operation was conducted inconjunction with other security agencies such as the Department of State Services, the Nigeria
Police Force, Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps.60 The operation was extended in Benue,
Taraba and Kogi and ended on 14 May 2018.61
Operation Whirl Stroke I and II
On 8 May 2018 the military launched Operation Whirl Stroke 1, as follow-up to Operation Cat
Race, to curb the violence between armed herdsmen and militia groups in Benue, Nasarawa
and Taraba States.62 The operation consists of all the military services, police and Departmentof State Services (DSS).63 A similar operation, called Operation Whirl Stroke 2 is deployed in
Zamfara and Kaduna States.64

2.2.2 Impact of the violence on the population
A general overview of the number of violent incidents and fatalities in the period 1 October
2017 till 30 September 2018 is presented in Annex 1. A comparison in these figures between
the various regions discussed in thius report can be found in Section 3.6.
The population of the north-east of Nigeria has suffered from the violence, leading to mass
displacement, tens of thousands deaths, destruction of many villages, schools, hospitals andother infrastructure.65 Boko Haram is responsible for the death of approximately 17 000
people since May 2011. Another 14 645 persons have died as a result of clashes between BokoHaram and Nigerian military and other state actors.66 However, in the first half of 2018, thenumber of fatalities related to Boko Haram was estimated at ‘over 200’.67 After losing muchof their territory Boko Haram changed their tactics from organised, large-scale attacks to more
sporadic attacks such as suicide bombings.68
In 2017 and 2018, many incidents of violence were reported involving herders and farming
communities in the Middle Belt states (for more detailed information, see Section 3.2.1) as
well as in the southern states of Edo, Ebonyi and Kogi. These incidents resulted in numerous
casualties, population displacement and destruction of property, particularly between
January and June 2018.69

58 Leadership, Army Launches Operation ‘Cat Race’ In Benue Valley, 8 February 2018, url
59 International Crisis Group, Stopping Nigeria’s Spiralling Farmer-Herder Violence, 26 July 2018, url, p. 21
60Leadership, Army Launches Operation ‘Cat Race’ In Benue Valley, 8 February 2018, url
61 Pulse.ng, Army ends Exercise Ayem Akpatuma in Benue, Taraba, Kogi, 15 May 2018, url
62 International Crisis Group, Stopping Nigeria’s Spiralling Farmer-Herder Violence, 26 July 2018, url, p. 21
63 The Nation, Army starts `Whirl Stroke’ against armed herdsmen, militia groups, 19 May 2018, url
64 International Crisis Group, Stopping Nigeria’s Spiralling Farmer-Herder Violence, 26 July 2018, url, p. 21
65 ACAPS, Humanitarian Overview: An Analysis of Key Crisis into 2018, 30 November 2017, url, pp. 30-31;

Premium Times, Boko Haram destroyed one million houses, 5,000 classrooms, N1.9 trillion properties in Borno –Official, 8 August 2017, url
66 CFR, Nigeria Security Tracker, 30 April 2018, url. For more information, see EASO, COI report Nigeria, Actors ofProtection, November 2018, url
67 International Crisis Group, Stopping Nigeria’s Spiralling Farmer-Herder Violence, 26 July 2018, url, p. 1
68 ACAPS, Humanitarian Overview: An Analysis of Key Crisis into 2018, 30 November 2017, url, p. 30
69 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the United Nations Office for West
Africa and the Sahel, (S/2018/649), 29 June 2018 url, p.4

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATION— 23

Crisis Group notes that since the violence escalated in January 2018, about 300 000 people
fled their homes and more than 1 300 people have been killed. The farmer-herder conflict has
claimed ‘more than 6 times more civilian lives than the Boko Haram insurgency.’70
In contrast with the two other regions, the level of armed violence in the Niger Delta remained
low, largely due to the continuing amnesty programme.71 The number of violent incidents
even decreased in the period 1 January 2018 to 30 September 2018.72 Although the Niger
Delta Avengers (NDA) ended the ceasefire in November 201773, and in January 2018
announced they were starting a fresh round of attacks on the country’s oil installations74, nomajor incidents against civilians between January 2018 and June 2018 were found in thesources consulted.
Regarding the number of fatalities per 100 000 people in 2017, according to data recorded by
ACLED, Borno was by far the most dangerous of Nigeria’s 36 states, followed by Taraba, Cross
River, Plateau and Adamawa.75
A series of maps made by ACCORD on the basis of ACLED data shows the trends in numbersof incidents and fatalities over the year 2017 and the first two quarters of 2018:

Maps 4, 5: Nigeria January-December 2017:
Nr of incidents (at least 1 fatality)

Nr of reported fatalities76

70 International Crisis Group, Stopping Nigeria’s Spiralling Farmer-Herder Violence, 26 July 2018, url, p. 1
71 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the United Nations Office for West

Africa and the Sahel (S/2017/1104), 26 December 2017, url, p. 4
72 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the United Nations Office for West
Africa and the Sahel, (S/2018/649), 29 June 2018, url, p.4
73 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Niger Delta militants end their ceasefire, 6 November 2017, url
74 Sahara Reporters, Niger Delta Avengers To Resume Massive Attack Oil Facilities, Demand Restructuring, 17
January 2018, url
75 ACLED, Real Time data (1 July 2017- 30 June 2018), url
76 ACCORD, Update on conflict-related incidents according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project(covering 2017), 18 June 2018, url

24 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATION

Maps 6, 7: Nigeria 1st Quarter 2018:
Nr of incidents (at least 1 fatality)

Nr of reported fatalities77

Maps 8, 9: Nigeria 2nd Quarter 2018:
Nr of incidents (at least 1 fatality)

Nr of reported fatalities78

The below graph gives an overview of the numbers of incidents and fatalities all over Nigeria
over the period 1 July 2017 to April 2018.79 The fluctuation in the number of fatalities is strong
whereas the number of incidents is fairly stable.

77 ACCORD, Update on conflict-related incidents according to ACLED (covering 1st quarter 2018), url
78 ACCORD, Nigeria, Second Quarter 2018: Update on incidents according to ACLED, 5 September 2018, url
79 ACCORD, Nigeria, Second Quarter 2018: Update on incidents according to ACLED, 5 September 2018, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATION— 25

Graph 1: no of incidents and fatalities July 2017 till April 201880

Road security
Roads in the north-east are often subject to kidnapping and robbery, mainly by Boko Haram.81
In March 2018, the UN suspended road travels in Maiduguri LGA (Borno) and Damaturu LGA(Yobe), due to threats of abduction by Boko Haram.82 The Nigerian army announced inJune 2018 that four roads in Borno State had been cleared and reopened for the public.83 See
further 2.1.8.
Not only the north-eastern region is insecure to travel by road, the Birnin-Gwari Kaduna
highway is a notorious road in Kaduna State where several violent incidents took place suchas kidnapping.84 See further 2.2.8.
In general, travelling by road is not without danger in Nigeria. In January 2018, the Federal
Road Safety Corps (FRSC) reported 4 410 deaths by road accidents in 2017.85 From
October 2017 to March 2018, at least 2 598 Nigerians died in road accidents, according to the
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS).86

2.3 Actors in the conflicts
In this report, the actors in the main conflicts are discussed briefly.
More detailed information on the military and police and other state actors is provided in
EASO COI report Nigeria, State Actors of Protection, November 2018.
More information on actors, including organisational structure, modus operandi, humanrights violations, and profiles of persons targeted by these actors is provided in EASO COI
report Nigeria, Targeting individuals, November 2018.

2.3.1 Nigerian armed forces
The Nigerian armed forces comprise three branches: Nigerian army, Nigerian navy, andNigerian air force.87 In October 2013, the website DefenceWeb reported the total force
strength of the Nigerian Armed Forces as 210 000 (army 100 000, air force 13 000, navy 15 000
80 ACCORD, Nigeria, Second Quarter 2018: Update on incidents according to ACLED, 5 September 2018, url
81 Sahara Reporters, Boko Haram Terrorists Carry Out Fresh Abduction Of Dozens Of Travelers On Maiduguri-

Damboa Road, 17 February 2018, url
82 UNHCR, Nigeria – Situation Update, March 2018, url
83 Two female bombers die in Borno military market blasts, 22 June 2018, url
84 Reuters, At least 100 people kidnapped along road in northern Nigeria, 15 May 2018, url
85 The Nation, Road accidents: FRSC records 4,410 deaths in 2017, 22 January 2018, url
86 Premium Times, Nigeria records 2,598 deaths from road accidents in six months, 23 May 2018, url
87 Martin, G., Kruger, A., Nigerian Armed Forces, DefenceWeb, 7 October 2013, url

26 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATION

and paramilitary 82 000)88 as of October 2013.89 In 2016, the World Bank Group assessed thetotal armed forces personnel at 200 000.90 More recent information is provided by Global
Firepower, which reports the total military personnel as 181 000 (124 000 are qualified as
active personnel and 57 000 as reserve personnel).91
The OECD reported that ‘despite its continued military operations against Boko Haram,
Nigeria’s military expenditures fell in 2017 for the fourth consecutive year.’ Nevertheless, thecountry is the fourth largest military spender in Sub-Saharan Africa after Sudan, South Africa
and Angola, and by far the biggest military power in West Africa. The total expenditures in2017 was 1 621 million US dollars.92 Nigeria is also the 3rd largest weapons importer in Africa,
the top one in Sub-Saharan Africa, and its arms import grew by 42 % between 2008-2012 and2013-2017, according to SIPRI.93
The three services are administered and coordinated by a Defence Headquarters. The Defence
Headquarters is headed by a Chief of Defence Staff, who is the country’s apex military
officer.94
The Nigerian army is the land branch of the armed forces and by far the largest of the threebranches.95 Hierarchically, the army is organised into the army headquarters, divisions,brigades, battalions, regiments, companies, platoons and sections. A division consists of 7 000- 22 000 troops and is commanded by a major general.96 In total, there are eight divisions:97









1 Mechanized Division, headquarters is located in Kaduna, Kaduna State;
2 Mechanized Division, headquarters is located in Ibadan, Oyo State;
3 Armoured Division, headquarters is located in Jos, Plateau State;
6 Amphibious Division, headquarters is located in Port Harcourt, Rivers State;
7 Infantry Division, headquarters is located in Maiduguri, Borno State;
8 Division, headquarters is located in Sokoto, Sokoto State;
81 Division, headquarters is located in Lagos, Lagos State;
82 Composite Division, headquarters in Enugu, Enugu State.

In addition, there are also the Guards Brigade, the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
and the Nigerian Army Special Operations Command (NASOC).98
The Nigerian army has repeatedly been accused of human rights violations in its counterinsurgency operations.99 Other notable incidents involving serious human rights violations
were the crackdowns on members of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) in
December 2015 (in which more than 350 men, women and children were killed, and on
members of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) for which fatalities remain unknown.100

88 The source does not specify which services can be considered as paramilitary.
89 Martin, G., Kruger, A., Nigerian Armed Forces, DefenceWeb, 7 October 2013, url
90 World Bank, Armed forces personnel, total, n.d., World Bank, url
91 The source does not specify who exactely can be considered as reserve personel. Global Fire Power, 2018

Nigeria Military Strength, n.d, url
92 OECD/SWAC, Maps & Facts: Military Expenditures in West Africa 2017, Newsletter N°. 71, July 2018, url
93 SIPRI, Trends in International Arms Transfers, March 2018, url, p. 7
94 Nigeria, Defence Headquarters, Office of the Chief of Defence Staff, n.d., url
95 Martin, G., Kruger, A., Nigerian Armed Forces, DefenceWeb, 7 October 2013, url
96 Global Security, Nigerian Army Order of Battle, n.d., url
97 Nigerian Army, Formations, n.d., url
98 Nigerian Army, Formations, n.d., url; Global Security, Nigerian Army Order of Battle, n.d., url
99 See, for instance, Amnesty International, Stars on their Shoulders, Blood on their Hands: War Crimes
Committed by the Nigerian Military, 2 June 2015, url
100 AI, Nigeria: Unearthing the truth: Unlawful killings and mass cover-up in Zaria, 22 April 2016 url; AI, Nigeria: At
least 150 peaceful pro-Biafra activists killed in chilling crackdown, 24 November 2016 url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATION— 27

The second branch of the armed forces is the Nigerian Navy (NN). According to its website,
the Naval Headquarters is the administrative and policy-making organ of the Nigerian Navyand commanded by the Chief of the Naval Staff (CNS). The CNS has eight staff branches: Policy
and Plans, Training and Operations, Administration, Naval Engineering, Logistics, Accounts
and Budget, Naval Safety and Standards, and the Office of the Navy Secretary. There are fivecommands headed by Flag Officers Commanding (FOCs) and five autonomous units. There arethree operational commands: ‘Western, Eastern and Central Naval Commands (WNC, ENC andCNC) which are responsible for the protection and policing of the nation’s maritime
environment; as well as a Naval Training Command (NAVTRAC) and Logistics Command (LOG
COMD). The autonomous units are the Nigerian Naval Dockyard (NND), Nigerian Naval
Shipyard (NNSY), the Naval Ordnance Depot (NOD), Nigerian Navy Holdings Limited (NNHL)
and Naval Doctrine and Assessment Centre (NDAC).’101
The naval command is top-heavy. The Navy is described by Global Security as ‘the mostcorrupt of the services’, with ‘six times as many general officers and flag officers’ in the
Nigerian Navy as there are operational ships.102
The third branch of the armed forces is the Nigerian Air Force (NAF). The Air Force
Headquarters is commanded by the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS). It has six operationalcommands (Logistics Command, Ground Training Command, Air Training Command, Mobility
Command, Special Operation Command, and Tactical Air Command) and ten staff branches:
Medical Service, Accounts and Budget, Communication Information Systems, Training andOperations, Air Secretary, Standards and Evaluation, Administration, Logistics, Aircraft
Engineering, and Policy and Plan. Furthermore, there are several direct reporting units.103

2.3.2 Nigeria Police ForceThe Nigeria Police Force (NPF) is the principal law enforcement agency in the country. The
Nigerian constitution prohibits state and local governments from forming their own forces.104
State governors may request federal police for local emergency actions105, but state police
commissioners take directives for major operations from the Inspector General of Police inAbuja. According to Interpol, the strength of the NPF is more than 350 000 men and women.106
Another source reported 371 800 officers107, while the Inspector General of Police (IGP)
himself, Mr Ibrahim Idris, mentioned the number of 300 000 while addressing commandersof Police Mobile Force (PMF), Special Protection Unit (SPU) and Counter Terrorism Unit (CTU)
at a meeting in Abuja in March 2018.108 The same IGP had earlier revealed that the NPF wasoverstretched and far below the United Nations’ 1:400 police-population ratio.109
According to the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), ‘the NPF suffersfrom low capacity and insufficient training. In addition, the centrally controlled nature of the
NPF ensures resources and changes in operating procedures are slow to reach all corners of
the country.’110

101 Nigerian Navy, Structure, n.d., url
102 Global Security, Nigerian Navy, n.d., url
103 Nigerian Air Force, Organsiation, n.d., url
104 Australia, DFAT Country Information Report Nigeria, 9 March 2018, url, p. 29
105 ACAPS, Nigeria Country Profile – Security Forces, 2 May 2018, url
106 Interpol, the Nigeria Police Force, n.d., url
107 Australia, DFAT Country Information Report Nigeria, 9 March 2018, url, p. 29
108 Sahara Reporters, Police IGPs And The Politics Of Withdrawal Of Police Personnel From VIPs, Politicians, 20

March 2018, url
109 Daily Trust, Despite Buhari’s order, police still attached to dignitaries, 23 April 2017, url
110 Australia, DFAT Country Information Report Nigeria, 9 March 2018, url, p. 29

28 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATIONThe NPF was initially overseen by three government agencies: the Nigerian Police Council, thePolice Service Commission (PSC), and the Ministry of Police Affairs.111 However, the latter was
scrapped, following the Buhari adminstration’s reorganisation of the federal executive in
2015.112
Within the Police Force, three different structures can be identified: Command (Authority)
Structure, Administration Structure and Organisation Structure.113
Command (Authority) structure
In accordance with Section 215 of the 1999 Constitution and Section 6 of the Police Act 1990,
the Police Force is commanded by an Inspector General of Police who is directly appointed by
the president. Following the IGP are three tiers of command, namely the Deputy Inspector
General, Assistant Inspector General and Commissioner of Police. Though not speciallymentioned in the constitution, Section 7(1) of the Police Act provides that the Deputy
Inspector General of Police is the second in Command of the Force and shall so act for him in
the Inspector-General’s absence.114 Third in line is the Office of the Assistant InspectorGeneral and he shall act for the Inspector-General of Police in the event of the absence of theInspector-General of Police and Deputy Inspector-General of Police. Fourth in command is a
Commissioner of Police who is in charge of contingents of the Police Force stationed in astate.115
Apart from the top four ranks mentioned above, the NPF has 11 other ranks which,hierarchically, are as follows: Deputy Commissioner of Police, Asstistant Commissioner of
Police, Chief Superintendent of Police, Superintendent of Police, Deputy Superintendent of
Police, Asstistant Superintendent of Police, Inspector of Police, Sergeant Major, Sergeant,Corporal and Constable.116
Administrative structure
The Nigeria Police is administratively structured and divided into nine departments with eachdepartment charged with specific duties. The departments are as follows: Finance andAdministration, Operations, Logistics and Supply, Investigation, Training, Research andPlanning; Information and Communication, Force Intelligence Bureau and Force Secretary.117
Organisational structure
The police force is structured in line with the geopolitical structure of the country, with
provisions for supervisory formations. From the top down, the organisational structure of thepolice force comprises the following: Force Headquarters, Zonal Headquarters, State
Command Headquarters, Divisional Police Headquarters, Police Station, Police Post andVillage Police Post.118
There are 12 Zonal Commands across the country, each headed by an Assistant Inspector
General (AIG) of Police. The 12 Zonal Commands are as follows:119

111 Australia, DFAT Country Information Report Nigeria, 9 March 2018, p. 30 url
112 The Eagle Online, Buhari to name 25 substantive ministers, scrap five ministries, 10 November 2015, url
113 Nigeria Police Force, The Structure of the Nigeria Police Force, n.d., url
114 Nigeria Police Force, The Structure of the Nigeria Police Force, n.d., url; Federal Republic of Nigeria,

Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, url
115 Nigeria Police Force, The Structure of the Nigeria Police Force, n.d., url
116 Nigeria Police Force, The Structure of the Nigeria Police Force, n.d., url
117 Nigeria Police Force, The Structure of the Nigeria Police Force, n.d., url
118 Nigeria Police Force, The Structure of the Nigeria Police Force, n.d., url
119 Nigeria Police Force, Zone, n.d., url; Open Society Institute, Criminal Force: Torture, Abuse and Extrajudicial
Killings by the Nigeria Police Force, May 2010 url, p. 39

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATION— 29

Zone 1:

Kano, Katsina, and Jigawa States, with headquarters in Kano

Zone 2:

Lagos and Ogun States, with headquarters in Lagos

Zone 3:

Adamawa, Gombe, and Taraba States with headquarters in Yola (Adamawa
State)

Zone 4:

Benue, Nasarawa, and Plateau States, with headquarters in Makurdi (Benue
State)

Zone 5:Bayelsa, Delta, and Edo States, with headquarters in Benin (Edo State)

Zone 6:

Cross River, Ebonyi, Rivers, and Akwa Ibom States, with headquarters in
Calabar (Cross River State)

Zone 7:Federal Capital Territory, Kaduna, and Niger States, with headquarters in
Abuja (Federal Capital Territory)

Zone 8:Ekiti, Kogi, and Kwara States, with headquarters in Lokoja (Kogi State)

Zone 9:Abia, Anambra, Enugu, and Imo States, with headquarters in Umuahia(Umuahia)

Zone 10:

Kebbi, Sokoto, and Zamfara States, with headquarters in Sokoto (Sokoto
State)

Zone 11:Ondo, Osun, and Oyo States, with headquarters in Oshogbo (Osun State)

Zone 12:

Bauchi, Borno, and Yobe States, with headquarters in Bauchi (Bauchi State)

The NPF has several specialised units, such as the Border Patrol, Bombs Disposal Squad, Ports
Authority Police, and the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS).120
One particular unit, known as Nigerian Mobile Force (MOPOL), sometimes called anti-riot
police, was established not only to counter civil disturbances but sometimes to act as aparamilitary strike force.121 There are presently 12 MOPOL commands and 52 police squads,
which are spread amongst 36 state commands and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT).122

2.3.3 National Intelligence
In June 1986, then President Ibrahim Babangida, through Decree Number 19, dissolved the
National Security Organization (NSO) and re-structured Nigeria's security services into three
separate entities under the Office of the Co-ordinator of National Security. These new entities
were the Department of State Services (DSS), National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and DefenceIntelligence Agency (DIA).123
The Department of State Services
The Department of State Services (DSS), also known and addressed as the Department of State
Security as well as State Security services (SSS)124, is Nigeria’s domestic intelligence agency,
primarily responsible for gathering intelligence within the country and for the protection ofsenior government officials, particularly the President and state governors. Headed by a

120 Criminal Force: Torture, Abuse and Extrajudicial Killings by the Nigeria Police Force, May 2010 url, p.40
121 Nigeria Police Force, The Structure of the Nigeria Police Force, n.d., url; Open Society Institute, Criminal Force:

Torture, Abuse and Extrajudicial Killings by the Nigeria Police Force, May 2010, url, pp. 39-40; Omeni, A.,
Counter-Insurgency in Nigeria: The Military and Operations against Boko Haram, 2011-2017, 2018
122 Africa Research, Analysis towards Effective Policing in Nigeria, n.d., url
123 Ministry of Defence, Defence Intelligence Agency, n.d, url
124 Premium Times, FACT-CHECK: How Nigeria’s secret police, SSS, is violating the law and illegally parading itself
as DSS, 26 August 2016, url30 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATION

director general under the control of the National Security Adviser, the DSS operates as adepartment within the Presidency.125
The National Intelligence Agency
The NIA focuses on external threats to national interests. In other words, the agency is
responsible for foreign intelligence. It is also involved in counterintelligence operations.126
The Defence Intelligence Agency
The goal of the DIA is to provide an efficient system of obtaining military intelligence for the
Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defence.127 As distinct from the NIA, its Intelligencegathering and operations are more military-focused.128

2.3.4 Multi-National Joint Task ForceThe Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) was first formed in 1994 by the administration ofGeneral Sani Abacha to deal with the rebels from Nigeria’s northern borders. In 1998, MNJTF
became multinational by incorporating military units from Chad and Niger in 1998, and wasfurther upgraded in 2012 to deal solely with the Boko Haram. In 2015 the MNJTF was
expanded by including Benin. Around that time, the total number of troops was 8 700.129
Nigeria and Chad respectively contributed 3 250 and 3 000 men, including a Chadian Special
Forces unit. 950 men came from Cameroon, 750 from Niger and the remaining 750 from
Benin.130 More recently, several sources estimate the total number of troops to be roughly
10 000. All troops are nominally under the command of a Nigerian general.131
MNTJF is organised into four sectors: Sector 1, with the command located in Mora
(Cameroon); Sector 2, located in the town of Baga-Sola (Chad); Sector 3, based in Baga
(Nigeria); and Sector 4, based in the town of Diffa (south-east of Niger).132

2.3.5 Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps
Nigeria Security and Civil Defence corps (NSCDC) is a paramilitary institution that wasestablished in 1967 by the federal government. The main goal of this agency is to protect the
population against threats and any form of attack or disaster.133 In April 2017, the Ministry ofInterior announced that 3 000 people will be drawn from officers and men of the NSCDC in
the process of establishing a new Corps to be known as Agro Rangers, who will protect farmers
and secure farm investments throughout the country.134 The NSCDC has also deployed 5 000
people to protect the Internally Displaced Persons’ (IDPs) camps in the north-east.135

125 Lagos State Security Fund, State Security Fund, n.d., url
126 Encyclopedia.com, Nigeria, Intelligence and Security, n.d.; Ministry of Defence, Defence Intelligence Agency,

n.d., url
127 DIA, Defence Intelligence Agency, n.d, url
128. Ministry of Defence, Defence Intelligence Agency, n.d., url
129 Albert, I.O., ‘Rethinking the Functionality of the Multinational Joint Task Force in Managing the Boko Haram
Crisis in the Lake Chad Basin’, url, pp. 123-125
130 BBC, Boko Haram: Can regional force beat Nigeria's militant Islamists?, 3 March 2015, url
131 Africa Center for Strategic Studies, The G5 Sahel Joint Force Gains Traction, 9 February 2018, url; VOA,
Regional Task Force Battles Boko Haram, 14 March 2017, url
132 ISS, West Africa Report - Assessing the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram, September 2016,
url, p. 3
133 Website NSCDC, n.d., url
134 AgroNigeria, Farmers’ security: FG to deploy 3,000 Agro Rangers Corps to farms and ranches, 27 April 2017,
url; Ministry of Interior, Agro-rangers to Protect Agric Investments – Dambazau (Press Release) , 11 April 2017,url
135 Premium Times, FACTSHEET: What the Buhari administration has achieved in two years – Presidency, 30 May
2017, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATION— 31

2.3.6 Civilian Joint Task ForceThe Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) or the so-called yan gora (‘youth with sticks’) was set up
in 2013 to identify and apprehend Boko Haram insurgents. The CJTF comprises
predominately young male civilians who were not given arms initially, but armed
themselves with sticks and machetes.136 However, after realising the potential of the CJTF,
the Nigerian army supported some members of CJTF by providing the arms and basic
military training.137
CJTF has its own internal hierarchy in which each community CTJF unit reports to a
district command. However, CTJF is geographically modelled on the military; districts
correspond to the army’s zonal commands. As a result, checkpoints throughout the region
are often jointly managed with the military.138
It is difficult to get reliable numbers of CJTF troops due to irregular recruitment
and demobilisation139, but Crisis Group reports that CTJF claims to number about 26 000 in
Borno State alone.140 A similar figure was mentioned by The Economist.141 Currently,
they are present in 22 out of the 27 local government areas in Borno State.142

2.3.7 Boko Haram, ISIS-WA and JAS
Boko Haram at its founding, around 2002, was largely a non-violent religious sect. Although
it had clashed with security forces in 2003 and 2004, it was only after the extra-judicial
killing of the sect’s founding leader, Mohamed Yusuf, in July 2009 that Boko Haram began tocarry out more violent attacks, including targeted killings and suicide bombings, under the
regime of a more radical leader, Abubakar Shekau.143
As a result of the brutal tactics, in particular the group’s indiscriminate killing ofMuslim civilians, a group calling itself Jama’at Ansar al Muslimin fi balad al Sudan(Group of Supporters for Muslims in Black Lands), commonly known as Ansaru, brokeaway in early 2012.144 Ansaru is closely aligned with al-Qaeda and one of its leaders,
Khalid al-Barnawi, is believed to have previously trained with al-Qaeda’s regional affiliate, Al
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).145 Mamman Nur, who is believed to be the key leaderof the group, also has links to AQIM.146 For a discussion on the alleged links of Boko Haramwith Al Qaeda, see the next section.
Although initially Boko Haram expressed support for Al Qaida in 2010, Abubakar
Shekau pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in March 2015.147 One
and
half
136
Hassan, I., & Pieri, Z., The Rise and Risks of Nigeria’s Civilian Joint Task Force, May 2018, url, pp. 74-78
137 Cropley, E., ‘On Boko Haram front line, Nigerian vigilantes amass victories and power’, Reuters, 15 June 2017,

url; International Crisis Group, Watchmen of Lake Chad: Vigilante Groups Fighting Boko Haram, Crisis Group
Africa Report N°244, 23 February 2017, url
138 IRIN, Nigeria wakes up to its growing vigilante problem, 9 May 2017, url
139 International Crisis Group, Double-edged Sword: Vigilantes in African Counter-insurgencies, 7 September
2017, Africa Report N°251, url, p. 19
140 International Crisis Group, Watchmen of Lake Chad: Vigilante Groups Fighting Boko Haram 23 February 2017,
Africa Report N°252,, url, p. ii
141 The Economist, The volunteers who helped beat back Boko Haram are becoming a problem, 29 September
2016, url
142 Mahmood, O.S. et al., Responses to Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Region, July 2018, url, p. 18
143 Afeno, S.O., Killings by the security forces in Nigeria: Mapping and trend analysis (2006-2014), 2014, url, p. 22;
Critical Threats, Backgrounder: Boko Haram in Nigeria, 16 November 2017, url, p. 2
144 Critical Threats, Backgrounder: Boko Haram in Nigeria, 16 November 2017, url, p. 2
145 Counter Extremism project, Boko Haram, n.d., url, p. 3; Critical Threats, Backgrounder: Boko Haram in Nigeria,
16 November 2017, url, p. 2-3,
146 International Business Times, Could Ansaru leader Mamman Nur be the man behind Boko Haram split?, 12
August 2016, url
147 Onuoha, F.C. & Oyewole, S., Anatomy of Boko Haram: The Rise and Decline of a Violent Group in Nigeria, Al
Jazeera Centre for Studies, 22 April 2018, url, p. 3

32 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATION

year later, after Shekau had pledged allegiance to the ISIS leader, a major schism emerged inAugust 2016, when ISIS acknowledged Abu Mus’ab al-Barnawi, 22-year-old son of BokoHaram founder Yusuf, as the new leader. As a result, the group split up in two factions: one
loyal to Shekau, the other to Barnawi.148 The faction loyal to Shekau is known as Jama’atu
Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS), while the one loyal to Barnawi is known as the IslamicState in West Africa (ISIS-WA).149
On 21 August 2018, the ‘factional leader of the Boko Haram loyal to Islamic State in West
Africa (ISWA) Mamman Nur has been killed by his fighters who rebelled against him.’ Nur isdescribed as ‘the brain behind the ties between Boko Haram and the Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi
led Islamic State’ who had led the rebellion against Shekau in 2014. Abu Musab al-Barnawi is,
according to sources to the Daily Trust, a mere ‘shadow leader because of his father’.
According to one source, ‘the commanders became disenchanted with Nur’s style ofleadership; they saw him as not as rough as Shekau. The breakaway faction which moved toshores of Lake Chad region in Northern Borno was later recognised by Al-Baghdadi.’150
Sources say that ISIS-WA is less extreme than JAS.151 While ISIS-WA is trying to ‘win the hearts
and minds’ of the local population, JAS has a stricter attitude towards the local (muslim)
population. Anyone who is not willing to support JAS is viewed as a government collaborator,and should therefore be attacked.152
It is unclear which of the two factions is dominant within Boko Haram, as there is very little
information on their relative strengths and weaknesses. Reuters reports that the strength of
ISWA is estimated at 3 500-5 000 fighters, double that of Shekau’s faction.153 However,another source says Shekau’s faction is still believed to be the larger one.154
At the peak of the insurgency in early January 2015, Boko Haram controlled about 20 000
square miles of territory in Nigeria - an area the size of Belgium. After the group starting losing
control of their territory, their large-scale attacks were diminishing as well.155
Boko Haram as perpetrator alone has been responsible for the death of approximately 17 000
people since May 2011. Another 14 645 died as a result of clashes between Boko Haram andstate actors.156 The GTI ranked Boko Haram the world’s deadliest terrorist group in 2014. Inthat year, Boko Haram’s attacks were responsible for 6 644 deaths against the 6 073 deaths
attributed to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria in that particular year.157 In 2017, the GTI
ranked Boko Haram the world’s third deadliest terrorist group.158

148 Counter Extremism project, Boko Haram, n.d., url, p. 3; Critical Threats, Backgrounder: Boko Haram in Nigeria,

16 November 2017, url, p. 4
149 Mahmood, O.S., Despite its divisions, Boko Haram is no weaker, 5 June 2018, url
150 Daily Trust, Factional Boko Haram leader Mamman Nur killed by own fighters, 14 September 2018, url
151 Reuters, Islamic State ally stakes out territory around Lake Chad, 29 April 2018, url ; VOA, Dapchi Girls' Release
Could Stir Up Religious Tensions in Nigeria, 24 March 2018, url
152 Mahmood, O.S. & Ani, N.C., Factional Dynamics within Boko Haram, 6 July 2018, url, pp. 3, 28
153 Reuters, Islamic State ally stakes out territory around Lake Chad, 29 April 2018, url
154 VOA, Dapchi Girls' Release Could Stir Up Religious Tensions in Nigeria, 24 March 2018, url; BBC News, IslamicState and the kidnap of Nigerian schoolgirls from Dapchi, 29 March 2018, url
155 Onuoha, F.C. & Oyewole, S., Anatomy of Boko Haram: The Rise and Decline of a Violent Group in Nigeria, Al
Jazeera Centre for Studies, 22 April 2018, url, p. 5
156 CFR, Nigeria Security Tracker, 30 April 2018, url
157 IEP, Global Terrorism Index 2015, 17 November 2015, url, p. 4.
158 IEP, Global Terrorism Index 2017, 15 November 2017, url, p. 16

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATION— 33

Boko Haram financing and links with Al-Qaeda
While some sources state that substancial funding and arms comes from international
extremist groups like Al Qaeda and AQIM,159 Alex Thurston recently stated that de-classified
documents produced by the CIA uncovered one single transfer of € 200,000 from AQIM to
Boko Haram, in early 2010; the researcher adds that, despite significant, this sum does not
explain the whole financing of Boko Haram and indicates that the group’s financing comes
rather from a mix of activities, including including bank robberies, kidnappings for ransom(namely outside Nigeria, in Cameroon), and extorsion.160
Among scholars and observers of Boko Haram, there has been skepticism regarding how‘deep’ Boko Haram’s alliance with al Qaeda and the Islamic State actually go. While Jacob Zenn
has argued that there are tight links between these groups, others, including Adam Higazi,
Brandon Kendhammer, Kyari Mohammed, Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, and Alex
Thurston, have challenged this. They contrarily argue that Boko Haram is not ‘a mereextension of the global jihadist movement’, but actually influenced by ‘local political factors,
security force abuses, and the internal logics of insurgencies’.161
The scholars, in an article titled ‘A Response to Jacob Zenn on Boko Haram and al-Qa‘ida’stress that ‘the narrative that Boko Haram was a close collaborator of al-Qa‘ida has dangerous
implications for policymaking’ and ‘are not suitable for responding to Boko Haram’. Further,
they add that ‘treating Boko Haram largely through the lens of counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency could hurt many more innocent people and exacerbate a grievous humanitarian
emergency’.162

2.3.8 Niger Delta Avengers
Although there are many militant groups in the Niger Delta, including remnants of thepreviously highly active Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)163, one
group, the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA), was notably active in 2017 and early 2018. A coalitionof militant groups, the Joint Revolutionary Council, threatened in May 2018 to resume
hostilities if the federal government failed to address the problems in the region.164 However,the ACLED database does not record significant incidents between January and
September 2018. See Section 3.3.4.
Early 2016, violence erupted again when a new group called The Niger Delta Avengers (NDA)
started a wave of attacks on oil producing facilities.165 The group distanced itself from theaforementioned MEND. According to NDA, commanders of MEND had never cared about the
Niger Delta and grown rich from amnesty payments without distributing the money to footsoldiers of the rebellion. Nevertheless, there are several indications that the NDA is composed

159 Independent, Paying for terrorism: Where does Boko Haram gets its money from?, 6 June 2014, url; Counter

Extremism Project, Boko Haram, [2017], url; Global Financial Integrity, Stopping Boko Haram by Curtailing Illicit
Finance, 11 June 2014, url; FATF, Terrorist Financing In West And Central Africa, October 2016, url, pp. 10-18
160 CSIS, Boko Haram: The History of an African Jihadist Movement, A discussion with the author, Dr. Alexander
Thurston, 14 February 2018, url
161 Higazi, Adam, et al., A Response to Jacob Zenn on Boko Haram and al-Qa‘ida, June 2018, url
162 Higazi, Adam, et al., A Response to Jacob Zenn on Boko Haram and al-Qa‘ida, June 2018, url
163 See for a more detailed overview of groups active in the Niger Delta, EASO COI report Nigeria, Targeting ofindividuals, November 2018, url
164 The Guardian, Niger Delta militants threaten fresh hostilities, accuse FG of neglect, 30 May 2018, url
165 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report Nigeria, 7 December 2017, url, p. 22

34 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATION

of many former MEND fighters.166 NDA is active in the following states: Rivers, Ondo, Delta,
Bayelsa, Cross River and Akwa Ibom.167
In 2016 the group took credit for at least 45 attacks168, which reduced Nigeria's crude output
by 700 000 barrels per day, to the lowest level in almost three decades. In August 2016, NDA
announced a ceasefire and there has been no major attack by any group in the region since
January 2017. In November 2017, the group announced an immediate end to their ceasefire,saying the federal government had not been sincere with its peace talks and promises.169 On
17 January 2018 the group announced a fresh round of attacks on the country’s oil
installations and facilities.170 A few hours after the announcement was published on theirwebsite, militants abducted five oil workers near the Ajoki community, which borders Edo andDelta States.171 Since then, no other major incidents have been found in the consulted
sources.
For more information on incidents in the Niger Delta, see Section 3.3.4.

2.3.9 Farmer-herder conflicts
In 2015, the Institute for Economics and Peace in its Global Terrorism Index (GTI) ranked‘Fulani extremists’172 as the 4th most deadly militant group in the world. The violence
committed by these militants is the product of conflicts with local farmers, other ethnic
militias and criminal organisations such as cattle-rustling gangs. According to the GTI report
2017, ‘there are 33 known groups on either side of the farmer-pastoralist conflict in Nigeria.’
The report mentions ‘the Fulani as the largest single identity group’.173 However, this is
criticised by Crisis Group which notes that the Fulani are an ethnic group of whom some aremembers of militia.174 The GTI report also notes that the number of Fulani extremists is just‘a small subset [who], engage in attacks.’ The report further remarks that ‘there is confusion
as to whether there is any communication or coordination between attackers’.175 No
information could be found in the consulted sources on the structure and numbers of Fulani
militias.
The Fulani have been in conflict with the Tiv of Benue state.176 Furthermore, there are militias
or so-called community vigilantes among ethnic groups like the Tarok in Plateau state, theEggon in Nasarawa State and the Junkun in Taraba State.177 In the latter state, also a relatively
unknown militia called the Nyandan is active.178 In Plateau State also violence has beenreported with militia from the Irigwe ethnic group.179 Another local militia composed of the
Bachama is active in Adamawa State.180

166 Jamestown Foundation, ‘The Niger Delta: Will Restarting Amnesty Payments Ease the Conflict?’, 14 October

2016, Terrorism Monitor, Volume 14, Issue 20, url
167 Pulse.ng, Why militant group just promised Nigeria a "doomed year", 18 January 2018, url
168 Pulse.ng, Why militant group just promised Nigeria a "doomed year", 18 January 2018, url
169 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report Nigeria, 7 December 2017, url, p. 22
170 NDA, Happy Doomed Year Nigeria; Get Ready for Operation Bringing Down FPSO, 17 January 2018, url ;Sahara Reporters, Niger Delta Avengers To Resume Massive Attack Oil Facilities, Demand Restructuring, 17
January 2018, url
171 The Sun, Militants abduct 5 oil workers in Niger Delta, 20 January 2018, url
172 IEP, Global Terrorism Index 2017, 15 November 2017, url, p. 24
173 IEP, Global Terrorism Index report 2015, 17 November 2015, url, p. 39
174 International Crisis Group, Stopping Nigeria’s Spiralling Farmer-Herder Violence, 26 July 2018, url
175 IEP, Global Terrorism Index report 2015, 17 November 2015, url, pp. 24, 76
176 ACLED, Conflict Trends (No. 63) - Real-Time Analysis of African Political Violence, November 2017, p. 7, url
177 Nwanza, C., The resurgence of pastoral conflicts in Plateau State, 15 November 2017, url
178 Daily Trust, Gunmen kill 14 in Fulani villages in Taraba, 6 July 2018, url
179 ACLED, Conflict Trends (No. 63) - Real-Time Analysis of African Political Violence, November 2017, p. 7, url
180 SBM Intelligence, It is getting worse: The deepening pastoral conflict, 27 November 2017, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATION— 35

Most militia, like those of the Fulani and Tarok ethnic groups have access to military grade
weaponry.181 There are several collaborations among different militias to carry out attacks on
Fulani communities. Tarok militias have collaborated with the Junkun militia in Taraba State182
and with Eggon militia in Nasarawa State.183
Farmer-pastoralist violence continues and, with almost daily reports of killings in the reporting
period of 1 October 2017-30 September 2018, has shown no signs of lower intensity.184
ACLED reported in June 2018 that 988 civilians have been killed by Fulani militia since thebeginning of the year.185 Crisis group mentions more than 1 300 deaths in the first half of2018.186 According to the Christian organisation CSW, Fulani militia were responsible of atleast 106 attacks on communities in central Nigeria in the first quarter of 2018, claiming 1061
lives in Adamawa, Benue, southern Kaduna, Kogi, Nasarawa, Plateau and Taraba.187
Crisis Group notes in August 2018: ‘Herder-farmer attacks decreased amid sustained military
deployment, but violence continued.’188

181 SBM Intelligence, The Pastoral Conflict takes a deadlier turn, 5 January 2018, url
182 SBM Intelligence, A critical look at the Southern Kaduna crisis, 7 February 2017, url, p. 9
183 Nwanza, C., The resurgence of pastoral conflicts in Plateau State, 15 November 2017, url
184 International Crisis Group, Stopping Nigeria’s Spiralling Farmer-Herder Violence, 26 July 2018, url
185 ACLED, The Fulani Crisis & the Threat to Civilians, 5 June 2018, url
186 International Crisis Group, Stopping Nigeria’s Spiralling Farmer-Herder Violence, 26 July 2018, url
187 CSW, Nigeria sees 106 attacks by Herder Militia in Central states, 25 June 2018, url
188 International Crisis Group, Latest updates, August 2018, url36 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATION

3. Security situation per zone or region
In this chapter, the security situation is described during the reporting period of
1 October 2017-30 September 2018. This includes:the nature of violent incidents,
the actors involved,
the areas of control (or influence)
the impact on the local population, including access to food.

In this chapter the situation in the North East zone, the North Central zone, the Niger Delta,
and Zamfara State will be described. In the last section, a summary of several othermanifestations of violence is discussed.

3.1 North East Zone
3.1.1 General description of the region
The North East Zone compromises six states (Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba andYobe) and covers close to one third (280 419 km2) of Nigeria’s land area (909 890 km2). Thezone shares international borders with Chad, Cameroon and Niger.189 According to the
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) the population of the North East Zone is estimated at
26.3 million people which is 13.6 % of Nigeria’s total population (estimated at 193 million
people (data 2016).190 The region counts 205 ethnic minorities, of which the Kanuri and theHausa-Fulani are the main groups.191 The zone can be considered as predominately Muslim192,
but there is a substantial Christian minority.193

189 Abdul-Aziz M. Nyako. "Concept Note North East Development Commission”, May 2015, url, p. 3
190 NBS, Population of Nigeria 2016, available at: url
191 ACAPS, Nigeria Country Profile – Ethnic or tribal Groups, latest update 2 May 2018, url ; Kwaja, C., “Nigeria’s

Pernicious Drivers of Ethno-religious Conflict’, July 2011, url, p. 3
192 Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, Tolerance and Tension: Islam and Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa, April
2010, url, p. ii
193 International Crisis Group, Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict, Africa Report N° 168, 20 December 2010,
url, p.i

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATION— 37

Map 10: Nigeria: North-East states. Map provided courtesy of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement
or acceptance by the United Nations194

194 UN OCHA, map Nigeria: North-East states – Reference map, 28 January 2016, url38 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATION

3.1.2 Background to the conflict
The rise of the Boko Haram conflict dates back to the early 2000s when a small group
appeared in North East Nigeria, initially referred to as the Nigerian Taliban or Yusufiyya (after
its radical founder and leader Muhammed Yusuf), rejecting all secular authority and seeking
to create a strict Islamic state, which it believes would address the ills of society, including‘unbelief’, corruption and ‘bad governance’.195 The group turned increasingly violent after the
extra judicial killing by the police of Mohamed Yusuf, in July 2009, which brought it under the
regime of Yusuf’s successor, the more radical leader, Abubabakar Shekau.196 Under his rule,the organisation is held responsible for the killing of more than 20 000 people since May 2011.
Furthermore, the conflict created an estimated 2.3 million displaced people in the Lake ChadBasin, including an estimated 208 509 Nigerian refugees in neighbouring countries of
Cameroon, Chad and Niger.197
In April 2014, Boko Haram drew worldwide attention when it abducted around 270 schoolgirls
from a government secondary school in the town of Chibok in Borno State. Although 60 girls
escaped soon afterwards and others have been released after mediation, around 100 werereportedly still in captivity as of May 2018.198 Almost four years after the Chibok abduction,
another 110 schoolgirls were abducted in the town of Dapchi in Yobe state on
19 February 2018. Within five weeks almost all the girls were released except five who didn’t
survive the ordeal and one other - a Christian who refused to convert to Islam - is still being
held.199At the peak of the insurgency in early January 2015, Boko Haram controlled 11 of the 27 local
government areas (LGAs) of Borno state, with a total area of about 20 000 square miles - anarea the size of Belgium. More than 20 towns, including Baga, Gwoza and Bama, were undercontrol of the group, with a total population exceeding 1.7 million people, according to theofficial 2006 census.200
In August 2016, ISIS recognised Abu Musab al-Barnawi, the 22-year-old son of Boko Haramfounder Mohamed Yusuf, as the new leader. As a result, the group split up in two warring
factions due to the fact that Abubakar Shekau refused to surrender his leadership. The faction
led by Barnawi is called Islamic State-West Africa (ISIS-WA), while the faction led by Shekau iscalled Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS).201 The latter faction can be translated
as ‘People Committed to the Prophet’s Teaching and Jihad’.202
More information on Boko Haram’s objectives and structure, modus operandi, human rights
violations and situation of persons targeted by BH is provided in EASO COI report Nigeria,
Targeting individuals, November 2018.

195 International Crisis Group, Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict, 20 December 2010, url; and International

Crisis Group, Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency, Africa Report N°216, 3 April 2014, url
196 Mahmood, O.S. & Ani, N.C., Factional Dynamics within Boko Haram, 6 July 2018, url , p.6
197 CFR, Global Conflict Tracker, 11 April 2018, url
198 Independent, Why the Chibok girls returned by Boko Haram are still not entirely free, 1 May 2018, url
199 BBC, Nigeria Dapchi abductions: Schoolgirls finally home, 25 March 2018, url; Africanews.com, Nigeria's
military rescues 76 schoolgirls, says parents, gov't officials, 21 March 2018, url
200 Onuoha, F.C. & Oyewole, S., Anatomy of Boko Haram: The Rise and Decline of a Violent Group in Nigeria, Al
Jazeera Centre for Studies, 22 April 2018, url, p. 5; The Telegraph, Nigerian army retakes control of key BokoHaram town, 16 November 2014, url
The Telegraph, Boko Haram is now a mini-Islamic State, with its own territory, 10 January 2015, url
201 Mahmood, O.S. & Ani, N.C., Factional Dynamics within Boko Haram, 6 July 2018, url, p. 3. Unfortunately mostsources do not make a distinction between those two factions. In that case the group will be referred as BokoHaram as umbrella term.
202 BBC, Who are Nigeria's Boko Haram Islamist group?, 24 November 2016, url; TRAC, Boko Haram (Jama'atu
Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad - JAS), n.d., url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATION— 39

3.1.3 Actors in the conflict
The main actors in the North East Zone are the Nigerian army, the Multi-National Joint Task
Force (MNJTF), the Civilian Joint Task Force, and Boko Haram and aligned factions.

3.1.4 Recent security trends
During the period 1 October 2017-30 September 2018, ACLED203 registered around 546
security incidents in the six states, which resulted in approximately 3 315 fatalities.204 It should
be noted that several incidents with an unknown number of fatalities (often referred to as‘scores’, ‘several’, ‘many’, or ‘large number’) were registered, and as explained in the
Introduction, such incidents are counted as 10 fatalities.205 Table 1 presents the number of
security incidents per state and the number of estimated deaths. The table also gives thenumber of incidents and fatalities of incidents categorised as ‘violence against civilians’.
Table 1. Incidents of violence and fatalities by state, North East zone,
October 2017 – 30 September 2018
TotalsViolence against civilians

STATE
Nr Incidents

Nr Fatalities

Nr incidents

Nr Fatalities

90
7
351
4
73
21

522
4
2422
2
301
64

54
1
70
2
51

351
0
512
1
259
7

546

3315

Adamawa
Bauchi
Borno
Gombe
TarabaYobe
Totals

5
183

1130

Source: ACLED206

According to this table, Borno State counts by far the highest number of registered incidents
and fatalities. In contrast, very few incidents in Bauchi and Gombe were registered. Out of the
546 incidents, there were 183 security incidents which can be classified as ‘violence against
civilians’, resulting in 1 130 fatalities. Most of these incidents and fatalities occurred in Borno
State, where 70 incidents were recorded as violence against civilians, resulting in 512
fatalities. The incidents classified otherwise mainly concerned clashes between Boko Haramand military forces.207
According to Nigeria Watch, the fatalities in Taraba State were mainly the result of intercommunal clashes.208

203 For more explanation about this source of information, refer to the Introduction of this report.
204 ACLED, Real Time data (1 October 2017- 30 September 2018), url
205 ACLED, Codebook, 2017, url, p. 20
206 ACLED, Real Time data (1 October 2017- 30 September 2018), url
207 ACLED, Real Time data (1 October 2017- 30 September 2018), url
208 Nigeria Watch, Seventh Report on Violence in, n.d., url, p. 13

40 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATION

An overview of major incidents
On 27 July 2017, more than 50 people, including 15 members of the CJTF, were killed in a BokoHaram ambush on a convoy of specialists from the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation(NNPC) in the Magumeri area of Borno State.209
On 15 August 2017, at least 27 people were killed and 83 people injured by a multiple bomb
attack. A woman bomber blew herself up at a market in Konduga town near Maiduguri, while
two other suicide bombers also blew themselves up at the gates to a nearby IDP camp.210
On 1 September 2017, the air force ‘neutralised hundreds’ of Boko Haram fighters in Sambisa
forest. It was believed that Boko Haram fighters in the targeted location were planning to
disrupt Eid el Kabir211 celebrations.212
On 19 October 2017, in another airstrike on the Durwawa settlement, near Urga in the
Konduga area of Borno State, one of the wives of Boko Haram factional leader Abubakar
Shekau was alleged to have been killed. 213
Two days later, the air force again carried out attacks. During these operations, 350 BokoHaram members were killed in remote areas of northern Borno State. Another 61 Boko Haramfighters were also killed by the army.214
On 20 November 2017, at least 30 people, mostly women and children, were killed when
farmers from the Bachama ethnic group stormed four settlements of Fulani herders, Kikan,
Kodomun, Shafaran and Ketowal, in Numan LGA.215
On 21 November 2017, at least 50 people were killed when a suicide bomber blew himself up
during early morning prayers in a mosque in Mubi, Adamawa State. The attack was blamedon Boko Haram.216
On 2 December 2017, alleged Boko Haram suicide bombers killed 13 people in an attack on amarket in a place called Biu, Borno State. During the attack, 53 people were also injured andtwo bombers killed.217
On 4 December 2017, the Nigerian air force responded to an attack on eight villages in
Adamawa State by armed herdsmen. The attack was retaliation for the massacre in Kikan on
20 November 2017 (see above). Amnesty International counted in total 86 fatalities, but could
not establish how much of the death was either a direct result of the air attacks or the attackby herdsmen.218
In December 2017, approximately 50 people were killed in villages around Mafa, Borno State,when Boko Haram fighters laid ambushes at various locations.219

209 Al-Jazeera, Boko Haram attack on Nigeria oil team killed over 50, 28 July 2017, url; DW, Boko Haram attack in

Nigeria leaves dozens dead, 28 July 2018, url
210 Vanguard, Suicide bombers kill 27, wound 83 in Borno refugee camp, 15 August 2017, url
211 Islamic holiday commemorating the willingness of Ibrahim to follow Allah’s command to sacrifice his son.
212 The Guardian, Air Force jets kill Boko Haram terrorists in Sambisa, 3 September 2017, url; Vanguard, War on
terror: Airforce neutralises hundreds of Boko Haram fighters in Sambisa forest, 3 September 2017, url
213 Vanguard, We may have killed Shekau’s wife in air raid —NAF, 26 October 2017, url; Sahara Reporters, Wife of
Boko Haram Leader, Shekau, Killed In Military Strike, 25 October 2017, url
214 Daily Trust, 411 Boko Haram insurgents, 9 soldiers killed in Borno, 23 October 2017, url
215 The Guardian, At least 30 killed in herdsmen clash, 22 November 2017, url; USCRIF, Annual report on religious
freedom - Nigeria, April 2018, url, p. 55
216 Premium Times, UPDATED: Mubi attack: Death toll rises to 50, 21 November 2017, url
217 Reuters, Suspected Boko Haram suicide bombers kill at least 13 in Nigeria: officials, 2 December 2017, url
218 AI, Nigeria: Analysis of the air force raid in Adamawa state, 30 January 2018, url, p. 1
219 Daily Trust, Scores killed in Boko Haram attacks in Borno, Yobe, 31 December 2017, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATION— 41

Early January 2018, Nigerian troops conducting Operation Deep Punch in the north-east of
Borno State, killed at least 107 Boko Haram fighters in various encounters. About 57 of themwere killed in Metele, Borno State.220
On 16 January 2018, suspected Boko Haram suicide bombers killed 12 people at a market in
the Muna Garage area on the outskirts of Maiduguri. Muna Garage is the site of a camp for
IDPs. Besides the 12 victims, 48 others were injured.221
Early February 2018, the Nigerian army reported that its troops killed 186 Boko Haram fightersand rescued 3 475 people from captivity.222
On 16 February 2018, at least 21 people (18 civilians and 3 suicide bombers) were killed when
multiple Boko Haram bombers attacked a crowded fish market in Konduga LGA of Borno
State.223
On 19 February 2018, 110 schoolgirls were kidnapped by militants in the town of Dapchi, Yobe
State. One month later, almost all the girls were released.224
On 1 May 2018, explosions in and around a mosque killed 86 people in Mubi, Adamawa
State.225
On 5 June 2018, the Nigerian army, supported by the CTJF in Operation Lafiya Dole, rescued
148 people kept captive in some parts of Borno State and used by Boko Haram as forced
labourers and sex slaves. They comprised 15 men, 58 women and 75 children.226
On 16 June 2018, two suicide attackers blew themselves up in Damboa, Borno State, whilepeople were celebrating the Eid al-Fitr holiday, marking the end of Ramadan. Shortly after theincident, rockets were fired at the sites of the attacks where helpers and onlookers had
gathered. Residents reported that at least 31 people died in the attack attributed to BokoHaram. Official sources say that at least 20 people lost their lives in the assault.227
On 7 August 2018, Boko Haram fighters attacked Munduri village, 13km north of Maiduguri,
Borno.Seven civilians, amongst whom the village chief and his wife, were caught and executed(beheaded). Subsequently, the village was set on fire. According to the Vanguard,‘Boko Haram has intensified its armed campaign in recent weeks, including against
military targets in which dozens of troops are believed to have been either killed or
missing. The rebels have split into two groups, and it was not immediately clear which
was behind the latest attack. A faction loyal to Abubakar Shekau is notorious forindiscriminate killings of civilians while the Abu Mus’ab Al-Barnawi faction — which isaffiliated to the so-called Islamic State — largely focuses on attacking the military.’228
On 19 August 2018, Boko Haram attacked the Mailari village in Guzamala, Borno, and killed(at least) 19 people. According to Reuters, ‘The strike is the latest blow to Nigeria’s efforts to
defeat insurgencies by the Nigerian Islamist Boko Haram group and Islamic State in West

220 Premium Times, Nigerian troops kill 107 Boko Haram terrorists — Army, 9 January 2018, url
221 Reuters, Suspected Boko Haram suicide bombers kill 12, injure 48, 17 January 2018, url
222 Vanguard, Troops kill 186 insurgents, rescue 3,745 people in North-East – official, 14 February 2018 url
223 Sahara Reporters, 21 Killed, 70 Wounded As Boko Haram Suicide Bombers Attack Fish Market In Borno, 17

February 2018, url
224 BBC News, Nigeria Dapchi abductions: Schoolgirls finally home, 25 March 2018, url
225 Al-Jazeera, Nigeria mosque attack death toll rises to 86, 2 May 2018, url; Reuters, Mosque blasts kill at least
27 in northeast Nigeria, 1 May 2018, url
226 This Day, Troops Rescue 148 Hostages Used as Boko Haram Sex Slaves, Labourers, 5 June 2018, url
227 Punch, Boko Haram attacks Damboa, kills 31, injures 48, 18 June 2018, url
228 Vanguard, Boko Haram kills seven villagers in Borno, 7 August 2018, url42 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATION

Africa (ISWA). In recent months, the military has suffered its heaviest defeats in years,
commanders have been repeatedly replaced, and special forces soldiers have mutinied.’229
On 14 September 2018, Boko Haram fighters attacked a military base in Damasak, Borno
State, resulting in heavy gunfire and ‘many’ militants killed. The Nigerian Air Force had
deployed jet fighters and helicopter gunships to ‘pound the terrorists’. The army did notdisclose reports of fatalities amongst its troops. The army commander added: ‘Consequently,
the Nigerian army wishes to state that the fight against Boko Haram terrorists in the Northeastern parts of the country is yielding positive result. The Nigerian army therefore advised
members of the public, particularly residents of the affected areas, to go about theirlegitimate businesses.’230
On 20 September 2018, Boko Haram fighters raided and burnt two villages Kalari Abdiye andAmarwa, 20 km from Maiduguri, Borno State. Nine people were killed and nine injured.231

3.1.5 Tactics and targets
After losing control of territory (see Section 2.3.7), Boko Haram changed their tactics fromorganised, large-scale attacks to less predictable attacks such as suicide bombings.232
First, it should be noted that there is a difference between tactics used by JAS which prefersa more indiscriminate attack profile, and those by ISIS-WA which prefers to engage security
forces directly.233 While JAS subscribes to a particularly brutal brand of violence that pays little
or no attention to building relationships with civilian populations234, ISIS-WA is trying to get
local backing and protecting locals from JAS.235 Another difference is that ISIS-WA’s leaders
are low-profile and do not appear in videos, nor do they claim responsibility for attacks like
Shekau does.236 ISIS-WA is also believed to avoid using Muslim girls to carry out suicide
attacks, while JAS has become notorious for doing so.237
An analysis by ISS, of where and how the attacks took place, suggests that JAS was responsible
for most of the 2017 attacks. On the other hand, attacks executed by JAS are less deadly incomparison to the less frequent attacks from ISIS-WA.238 Another difference between theShekau-led JAS and ISIS-WA is on use of child suicide bombers. Whereas the Shekau groupdoes not hesitate to use children, ISIS-WA opposes such operations.239
In August 2017, a United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) report expressed
grave concern about a sharp increase in the use of women and children as human bombs. The
report showed that since the beginning of that year, four times more children had alreadybeen used in attacks than in 2016. Of the 83 children, 55 were girls, most often under 15 years
old; 27 were boys, and one was a baby strapped to a girl.240 USCIRF also reported an increaseof suicide bombings carried out by women and children in 2017,241 an indicator that Boko

229 Reuters, At least 19 killed by Islamists in northeast Nigeria – survivor, 20 August 2018, url
230 This Day, Damasak Attack: NAF Fighter Jets in Overnight Bombardment of Boko Haram’s Locations, 14

September 2018, url
231 Vanguard, Boko Haram kills nine, burns villages in Borno, 20 September 2018, url
232 ACAPS, Humanitarian Overview: An Analysis of Key Crisis into 2018, 30 November 2017, url, p. 30
233 Mahmood, O.S., Boko Haram in 2016: a highly adaptable foe, 7 February 2017, url
234 ISS, Policy Brief 109 - How Boko Haram specifically targets displaced people, November 2017, p.4, url
235 Reuters, Islamic State ally stakes out territory around Lake Chad, 29 April 2018, url; Vanguard, Boko Haramkills seven villagers in Borno, 7 August 2018, url
236 VOA, Dapchi Girls' Release Could Stir Up Religious Tensions in Nigeria, 24 March 2018, url
237 VOA, Dapchi Girls' Release Could Stir Up Religious Tensions in Nigeria, 24 March 2018, url
238 Mahmood, O.S., Despite its divisions, Boko Haram is no weaker, 5 June 2018, url
239 BBC News, Islamic State and the kidnap of Nigerian schoolgirls from Dapchi, 29 March 2018, url
240 UNICEF, Use of children as ‘human bombs’ rising in northeast Nigeria, 22 August 2017, url
241 USCRIF, Annual report on religious freedom - Nigeria, April 2018, url, p. 55

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATION— 43

Haram are becoming increasingly indiscriminate.242 A UN Security Council report concluded
that Boko Haram was still forcing civilians, including children, to undertake suicide attacks. For
the whole of 2017, there were 146 documented cases of children used as carriers of personborne improvised explosive devices.243
Another tactic used by Boko Haram is the kidnapping of people, especially children. The
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) also reported that since 2013, Boko Haram had
kidnapped more than 1 000 children, including the 276 girls seized at Chibok in 2014.244
The Nigerian military responded mainly by operations like Deep Punch, Chikin Gudu, Ruwan
Wuta, and Last Hold. Ground forces have been a major aspect of these operations, but theuse of air power has also been an important aspect. For example, the series of operations
called Ruwan Wuta, which means Rain of Fire.245
On 8 May 2018, the Nigerian army announced that, after a week-long battle with Boko Haramin which 50 militants were killed, 1000 hostages were freed in Borno State. Those people held
captive were ‘mainly women and children, as well as some young men who had been forced
to become Boko Haram fighters’.246
The armed conflict in the north-east also led to conflict-related sexual violence, such as rape,
sexual slavery, and forced marriage. Especially women and girls in IDP camps who survived
are very vulnerable. In May 2018, an Amnesty International report stated that both womenand girls were being sexually exploited by members of the Nigerian army and CTJF. In orderto obtain enough food to survive and keep their families alive, women and girls become the‘girlfriend’ or ‘wife’ of the soldiers or members of CTJF. 247 The military responded by denying
the allegations and led some journalists to the IDP camps. During the visit, no cases of sexual
harassment were discovered.248
Boko Haram continues to carry out small-scale suicide bombings against predominately
civilian targets in rural villages and IDP camps in Borno State.249
Data published by the Institute of Security Studies (ISS) shows a significant rise in attacks ondisplaced people, including IDPs and refugees; there were four attacks in 2015, ten in 2016
and 15 in the first nine months of 2017.250
In April 2018, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
reported that in the previous months many civilians and military personnel were killed andwounded by improvised explosive devices buried on roads, paths and farmlands in Borno andYobe states.251

242 ACAPS, Humanitarian Overview: An Analysis of Key Crisis into 2018, 30 November 2017, url, p. 31
243 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict,(A/72/865–S/2018/465),

16 May 2018, url, pp. 2, 31
244 UNICEF, More than 1,000 children in northeastern Nigeria abducted by Boko Haram since 2013, 13 April 2018,url,
245 Mahmood, O.S. et al., Responses to Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Region, July 2018, url
246 CNN, Nigerian army says it has freed 1,000 Boko Haram captives, 8 May 2018, url
247 AI, ‘They Betrayed us’: Women Who Survived Boko Haram, Starved and Detained in Nigeria, 24 May 2018, url,
p.55
248 Sahara Reporters, 'Raped' Female IDPs Narrate How Soldiers Forced Them To Tell The Media 'Everything is
Fine', 5 June 2018, url
249 ACLED, Conflict Trends (No. 63) - Real-Time Analysis of African Political Violence, November 2017, p. 4,7
250 ISS, Policy Brief 109 - How Boko Haram specifically targets displaced people, November 2017251 UN OCHA, West and Central Africa: Weekly Regional Humanitarian Snapshot (13 - 19 March 2018), 19 March
2018, url44 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATION

3.1.6 Impact of violence on state ability to secure law and order
In Borno State, about 700 public buildings were destroyed by the conflict. The vast majorityof public servants have not yet returned to conflict-affected areas.252 Furthermore, Deutsche
Welle reported, in February 2018, that Nigeria's government was not able to protect schools
from Boko Haram's attacks after the kidnapping of 110 schoolgirls in Dapchi (seeSection 3.1.3). An International Crisis Group report on 12 April 2018 noted that the
government had not implemented the Safe Schools Initiative seriously and also lacked
sufficient police, military and other security personnel to safeguard civilian communities.253
Besides the fact that the police is basically under-staffed, ‘almost half of the number available
are protecting VIPs such as politicians, businessmen and other wealthy individuals.’254 The gap
in state presence has made the reliance on vigilantes necessary, almost inevitable.255
On the other hand, in areas which are under control of ISIS-WA, residents claim that thefaction led by Barnawi mount roadblocks and conduct stop-and-search processes like themilitary does. They also collect taxes in return for protection.256

3.1.7 Conflict-induced internal displacement
Boko Haram’s indiscriminate attacks forced millions of people to flee within Nigeria or acrossits northern and eastern borders into neighbouring Niger, Cameroon and Chad.257
International Organization for Migration (IOM) data show a total of 1 926 748 displaced
individuals in the six states most affected by the conflict in North East Nigeria as of 24 August
2018. This implies an increase by 8 240 IDPs compared to the situation in June 2018:258
Table 2: Number of IDPs in North East Nigeria as of 24 August 2018
State

Number of IDP
individuals

Change comparedto June 2018

ADAMAWA

183 570

4 593

BAUCHI62 687

1 422

BORNO

1 441 635

1 682

GOMBE

34 057-483

TARABA

67 211

100

YOBE

137 588

926

Total

1 926 748

8 240

Source: IOM259

The largest IDP populations are located in Borno (about 1.4 million, constituting 75% of all
IDPs), Adamawa (about 9 %) and Yobe (about 7 %). The increase in IDP numbers is due to

252 UN OCHA, 2018 Humanitarian Needs Overview - Nigeria, November 2017, p. 4, url
253 International Crisis Group, Preventing Boko Haram Abductions of Schoolchildren in Nigeria, 12 April 2018, url
254 DW, Nigeria fails to protect schools from Boko Haram's attacks, 25 February 2018, url
255 Mahmood, O.S. et al., Responses to Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Region, July 2018, url, p. 3
256 DW, Boko Haram Islamists still control parts of northeastern Nigeria, 19 may 2018, url
257 IDMC/NRC, City of Challenge and Opportunity: Employment and livelihoods for internally displaced people in

Maiduguri, Borno State, February 2018, p.2 url
258 IOM, Nigeria — Displacement Report 24 (August 2018), 5 September 2018, url
259 IOM, Nigeria — Displacement Report 24 (August 2018), 5 September 2018, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATION— 45

arrivals of people from inaccessible locations, fleeing military operations as well as refugees
returning from Cameroon.260
About 94 % of the displacements were due to insurgency, followed by community clashes(6 %). 79 % of the IDPs are women and children. 54 % are female, 46 % are male. 27% of the
IDP population are children under 5 years. 60 % of IDPs live in host communities and 40 % incamps, with the exception of Borno, which has an almost equal share of IDPs living in camps
and host communities.261
As of 24 August 2018, IOM reported that a total of 1 580 093 returnees (nearly all former IDPs)
were recorded in the three states Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. This is an increase by more than
30 000 or 2% since June 2018.262
The number of displacements is still increasing, mostly due to ongoing military operations andfear of attacks by armed groups in several localities in Nigeria’s north-east. For example,
between 21 and 27 May 2018, about 4 500 people were displaced due to military operations
in Borno State. As a result, more people have joined the IDP camps of Bama, Gwoza andNgala.263
Early July 2018, the News Agency of Nigeria (NAN) reported that over 35 000 IDPs, mainly
farmers, returned to their ancestral homes from various camps in Borno North in the previous
two weeks. The return was facilitated by the army as part of ‘Operation Last Hold’ to provide
security during the planting season.264
Some of the large-scale displacements have resulted in family separations and an acute lackof access to basic services.265 A study conducted by IDMC/NRC shows that the access toemployment is one of the main challenges for IDPs in Maiduguri.266

3.1.8 Further impact of the violence on the civilian population‘The conflict in the northeast has significantly damaged or destroyed key infrastructure,
particularly education and health facilities.’267 About 1 million houses and public structures
were destroyed.268
In September 2017, UNICEF reported that since the conflict started in north-eastern Nigeria,
nearly seven years ago, at least 2 295 teachers had been killed and more than 1 400 schools
destroyed in the north-east. Most of these schools have not reopened because of extensive
damage or ongoing insecurity. In Borno State, less than half of schools opened for the 20172018 academic year.269 In August 2017, a Borno State government official said Boko Haramdestroyed over 5 000 classrooms in Borno State.270

260 IOM, Nigeria — Displacement Report 24 (August 2018), 5 September 2018, url
261 IOM, Nigeria — Displacement Report 24 (August 2018), 5 September 2018, url
262 IOM, Nigeria — Displacement Report 24 (August 2018), 5 September 2018, url
263 UN OCHA, Afrique de l’Ouest et du Centre: Aperçu humanitaire hebdomadaire (29 mai – 4 juin 2018), 4 June

2018, url
264 Premium Times, Over 35,000 IDPs return to communities in Borno North – Buratai, 8 July 2018, url
265 UN OCHA, North-East Nigeria: Humanitarian Security Update, April 2018, 19 May 2018, url, p. 5
266 IDMC/NRC, City of Challenge and Opportunity: Employment and livelihoods for internally displaced people in
Maiduguri, Borno State, February 2018, url, p.2
267 ACAPS, Humanitarian Overview: An Analysis of Key Crisis into 2018, 30 November 2017, url, p. 31
268 Premium Times, Boko Haram destroyed one million houses, 5,000 classrooms, N1.9 trillion properties in
Borno – Official, 8 August 2017, url
269 UNICEF, More than 1,000 children in northeastern Nigeria abducted by Boko Haram since 2013, 13 April 2018,url
270 Premium Times, Boko Haram destroyed one million houses, 5,000 classrooms, 8 August 2017, url

46 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATION

The health sector has also been affected by the conflict. The UNFPA reported in August 2017that more than 40 % of health facilities were either destroyed or badly damaged, and many
doctors and nurses were forced to flee North East Nigeria.271 In January 2018, half of the 755
health facilities in Borno State were reported functional; an improvement from the 288
reported to be functioning in September 2017.272
Furthermore, in Borno fighting destroyed 30 % of houses, water sources, roads and bridges in
the area, and badly affected the agriculture sector and other economic activities.273
Insurgency has also had economic effects. For example, due to counterinsurgency operations‘farmers are only allowed to work land within a certain distance of their villages, and are only
allowed to plant low-lying crops to prevent insurgents from hiding in them.’274
In 2013, a state of emergency was proclaimed in Yobe, Adamawa and Borno, which includes
restrictions on movements and curfews.275 These restrictions affect trade and livelihoods bymeans of banning local trades like cattle and fish, and restrictions on movement of certain
items, like foodstuff, fertilizers and fuel, as well as transportation by motorcycle.276 In
August 2017 OCHA reported that the military lifted the three-year-long interdiction forfishermen in the region.277 Recently, the transportation of charcoal into Maiduguri has also
been banned, on the assumption that Boko Haram benefits from the trade. This latest ban
affects many civilians directly, due to the fact that fetching firewood and making charcoal arecommon income-generating activities in the region.278
Market activity is affected by Boko Haram’s activities and the military’s counter-insurgency
operations. One of the main conclusions of a paper published by OECD was that ‘there is adirect, observable relationship between the timing of Boko Haram activities and market
activity decline.’279 Although the conclusion in the paper was based on market activities
examined in the period from late 2014 through end of 2016, several markets has been
attacked by Boko Haram in 2017 and 2018 (see Section 3.1.4 for incidents).
According to UNICEF, Boko Haram destroyed 75 % of the water and sanitation infrastructure,and some 3.6 million people have no access to safe water in North East Nigeria.280
However, not all the destruction was the work of Boko Haram. According to US DoS, ‘press
reporting indicated that the army was responsible for burning villages in areas where BokoHaram was suspected to have been operational and possibly supported by the local
population.’281

271 UNFPA, Alarming shortage of health personnel in conflict-affected Nigeria, 29 August 2017, url
272 Health Sector Nigeria, Health Sector Dashboard (Jan -Aug 2017), 25 September 2017, url; UNICEF,

Humanitarian Action for Children – Nigeria 2018, url
273 International Crisis Group, Instruments of Pain (IV): The Food Crisis in NorthEast Nigeria, 18 May 2017url, p. 4
274 IDMC/NRC, City of Challenge and Opportunity: Employment and livelihoods for internally displaced people in
Maiduguri, Borno State, February 2018, url, p. 2
275 Mahmood, O.S. et al, Responses to Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Region, July 2018, url, p. 16
276 International Crisis Group, Instruments of Pain (IV): The Food Crisis in NorthEast Nigeria, 18 May 2017, p. 4
url; Mahmood, O.S. et al., Responses to Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Region, July 2018, url, p. 16
277 UN OCHA, West and Central Africa: Weekly Regional Humanitarian Snapshot (1 - 7 August 2017), 8 August
2018, url
278 Mahmood, O.S. et al., Responses to Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Region, July 2018, url p. 17
279 Van Den Hoek, J. Agricultural market activity and Boko Haram attacks in northeastern Nigeria, September
2017, url
280 Vanguard, Boko Haram destroyed 75% water, sanitation infrastructure in Northeast – UNICEF, 30 August
2017, url
281 US DoS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Nigeria, 22 April 2018, p. 16, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATION— 47

AI reported in January 2018 that during air raids and the attack by armed herdsmen early
December 2017, some 3 000 homes were destroyed across the five villages in Adamawa
State.282
The conflict has also had a significant impact on food security.283 As already mentioned earlier
this paragraph, agricultural and market activities are limited by the conflict. In February 2018,
OCHA reported that because of the ongoing violence and insecurity, about 3.7 million people
were food insecure and 448 000 children under the age of five were severely malnourished in
Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states.284
Besides malnourishment, children are still vulnerable to be recruited by either Boko Haram or
CTJF. Although the total number of verified cases decreased by almost 50 % in 2017, incomparison to the previous year, Boko Haram still recruited 1 051 children, while CTJF
recruited 41 children for support roles.285
Road security
As mentioned in Section 2.2.2, kidnapping and robbery often occur, making the roads in thenorth-east unsafe. For example, on 17 February 2018, Boko Haram not only kidnapped dozensof travellers on the Maiduguri-Damboa Road, but also took at least six trucks loaded with fooditems.286 In March 2018, the UN suspended road travels in Maiduguri LGA (Borno) and
Damaturu LGA (Yobe), after Boko Haram threatened to abduct UN personnel.287
In June 2018, the military announced that following improvements in security, four roads in
Borno State, covering a total distance of 534 kilometres, had been cleared by troops, while
another road, the 54-kilometer Dikwa-Gambouru/Ngala border road, was yet to be cleared.288
Earlier, on 24 March 2018, the Nigerian army had reopened the Maiduguri-Bama-Banki road,after four years of its closure due to insecurity.289 Nevertheless, Boko Haram remains capableof setting up ambushes and staging attacks along the re-opened routes.290

3.2 North Central Zone (including Kaduna)
3.2.1 General description of the region
The North Central Zone compromises six states (Niger, Kogi, Plateau, Benue, Kwara, andNasawara) and the Federal Capital Territory (FTC). The zone is sometimes also referred as theMiddle Belt.291 There is a wide ethnic diversity in the North Central region, with significant

282 AI, Nigeria: Analysis of the air force raid in Adamawa state, 30 January 2018, url, p. 1
283 ACAPS, Humanitarian Overview: An Analysis of Key Crisis into 2018, 30 November 2017, url, p. 31
284 UN OCHA, West and Central Africa: Weekly Regional Humanitarian Snapshot (6 - 12 February 2018), 12

February 2018, url
285 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict,(A/72/865–S/2018/465),
16 May 2018, url, p. 31
286 Sahara Reporters, Boko Haram Terrorists Carry Out Fresh Abduction Of Dozens Of Travelers On MaiduguriDamboa Road, 17 February 2018, url
287 UNHCR, Nigeria – Situation Update, March 2018, url
288 Two female bombers die in Borno military market blasts, 22 June 2018, url
289 IOM, Nigeria Flash Report - Reopening of Maiduguri-Bama-Banki Road, 3 April 2018, url
290 Mahmood, O.S. et al., Responses to Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Region, July 2018, url, p. 12
291 The ‘Middle Belt’ is the geographical belt of the South of Northern Nigeria and the North of Southern Nigeria.
Besides the six states of the North-Central and FCT, Adamawa, Taraba and the southern parts of Kaduna andBauchi, are also considered as part of the ‘Middle Belt’. It should be noted that depending on the source thedefinition of the Middle Belt can vary. For more detailed information on the ‘Middle Belt’ see Emmanual, J.C, &Tari, V.A., ‘The Myth and Reality of Middle Belt Geo-Politics in Nigeria: A Discourse’, in: Journal of Culture, Society
and Development 10, 2015, url

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concentrations of Hausa-Fulani.292 The region can be considered as predominately Christian,with sizeable Muslim minorities.293
Due to the fact that the security trend of Kaduna State is similar to the states in the North
Central Zone, the former will also be included in this section. The population for Kaduna State
alone is 8.3 million294, and is made up of many ethnic groups.295
According to the National Bureau of Statistics the population of the North Central Zone(including Kaduna) is estimated at 29.3 million people which is 15.1 % of Nigeria’s total
population (estimated at 193 million (data 2016).296

3.2.2 Background to the pastoralist-herders conflict
Historically, relations between pastoralist and farming communities had been generally
harmonious. Both groups used to live in a symbiotic relationship: pastoralist cattle would
fertilise famers’ land in exchange for grazing rights. But ecological factors like climate change
and desertification, rapid population growth, encroachment of designated grazing reserves,
blockage of grazing routes, changes in both crop farming and pastoralism, created tensions
over recent decades.297
In 2015, the GTI ranked the ‘Fulani extremists’298 as the 4th deadly militant group in theworld.299 However, as noted above, the GTI report also remarks that the number of Fulani
extremists is just ‘a small subset [who], engage in attacks’.300 The Global Terrorism Index 2017
reported that ‘Fulani extremists undertook more attacks and were responsible for moredeaths than Boko Haram in 2016.301
Crisis Group notes that since the violence escalated in January 2018, about 300 000 people
fled their homes and more than 1 300 people have been killed. The farmer-herder conflict has
claimed ‘more than 6 times more civilian lives than the Boko Haram insurgency.’302 According
to Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW), the militants killed more men, women and children
in 2015, 2016 and 2017 than Boko Haram.303
According to Dr Roudabeh Kishi, Director of the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data
Project (ACLED), three dimensions of the conflict can be distinguished: ethnic (Fulani vs other
Nigerian ethnicities), religious (Muslim herders vs Christian south), and cultural (nomadic vssedentary).304
As most pastoralists are Fulani Muslims and many farming communities are largely Christian,the conflict has acquired ethnic and religious ramifications. The actual core of the conflict is
292 Kwaja, C., “Nigeria’s Pernicious Drivers of Ethno-religious Conflict’, July 2011, url; p. 3
293 Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, Tolerance and Tension: Islam and Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa, April

2010, url, p. ii
294 National Bureau of Statitics, Population of Nigeria, 2016, url
295 Oyewole, A., Historical dictionary of Nigeria, 2000, p. 288
296 NBS, Population of Nigeria 2016, available at: url
297 International Crisis Group, Herders against Farmers: Nigeria’s Expanding Deadly Conflict, 19 September 2017,
url, p.i, ; Vanguard, Nigerian herdsmen crisis: what’s at stake?, 11 January 2018, url
298 This characterisation of ‘Fulani extremists’ as a single group is critisised by Crisis Group, as there is noevidence that Fulani assailants act as a single group. Furthermore, not all killings can be attributed to Fulani
assailants. International Crisis Group, Stopping Nigeria’s Spiralling Farmer-Herder Violence, 26 July 2018, url
299 IEP, Global Terrorism Index 2015, 17 November 2016, url, p. 38
300 International Crisis Group, Stopping Nigeria’s Spiralling Farmer-Herder Violence, 26 July 2018, url. The GTI
report also notes that ‘there is confusion as to whether there is any communication or coordination between
attackers.‘ IEP, Global Terrorism Index 2017, 15 November 2017, url, pp. 24, 76
301 IEP, Global Terrorism Index 2017, url, p. 24
302 International Crisis Group, Stopping Nigeria’s Spiralling Farmer-Herder Violence, 26 July 2018, url, p. 1
303 CSW, Nigeria sees 106 attacks by Herder Militia in Central states, 25 June 2018, url
304 ISS/Allison, S., Herdsmen crisis underscores Nigeria’s complex security threats, 28 May 2018, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATION— 49

the access to economic resources.305 Nevertheless, a report published by Christian interest
groups World Watch and Open Doors, alleges that the violence executed by Fulani herdsmen
against Christians in Benue is religiously motivated.306 Furthermore, the ethnic and religious
tensions can also be traced back to the divide between indigenes and settlers.307
A complicating factor is, as an article in the New York Times explains, that Fulani herders areoften used as a ‘scapegoat’. According to the police, at least some of the attacks attributed topastoralists have been carried out by ‘criminals and militias’ armed with AK-47s, adding that
‘herders have not traditionally carried such weapons’.308
In the first half of 2018, the violence was concentrated in Plateau, Benue and Nasarawa statesin the North Central zone, and in Adamawa and Taraba states in the North East zone.309
However, some incidents were also reported in other states, including Delta, Edo, Ekiti,
Kaduna and Kogi states.310
As the Boko Haram insurgency has receded, the conflict between nomadic herders andsedentary agrarian communities increased in frequency, intensity, complexity and geographic
scope.311 As mentioned above, the conflict caused 1300 death in the first six months of 2018,
six times the number of people killed by Boko Haram. According to Crisis Group, three factors
are responsible for the escalation: the poor government’s poor response to distress calls andfailure to punish past perpetrators; the rise of ethnic militias emboldened by the climate of
impunity; and aggravated tensions in herder-farmer relations following new laws banning
open grazing in Benue and Taraba states.312
The conflicts between farmers and herders have affected more than 20 states across thecountry, but in particular Adamawa, Plateau and Taraba313, Nasarawa and Benue.314 See map
by SBM Intelligence below.

305 New York Times, Nigeria’s Farmers and Herders Fight a Deadly Battle for Scarce Resources, 25 June 2018,

url;
Quartz Africa, A widening conflict between herdsmen and farmers is redefining Nigeria’s geopolitics, 12 February
2018, url
306 World Watch/Open Doors, Nigeria: Benue State under the shadow of “herdsmen terrorism” (2014 – 2016)(with update: 1 January – 31 August 2017), url, p. 42
307 ARC, Nigeria: The situation of Indigenes and Settlers, 19 January 2018, p.24, url. See also EASO COI report
Nigeria, Targeting of individuals, November 2018, url
308 New York Times, Nigeria’s farmers and herders Fight a Deadly Battle for Scarce Resources, 25 June 2018, url
309 International Crisis Group, Stopping Nigeria’s Spiralling Farmer-Herder Violence, 26 July 2018, url, p. 1
310 Vanguard, FG rolls out 6-point plan to solve farmers-herders crisis, 20 June 2018, url
311 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the United Nations Office for West
Africa and the Sahel, (S/2018/649), 29 June 2018, url, p. 1
312 International Crisis Group, Stopping Nigeria’s Spiralling Farmer-Herder Violence, 26 July 2018, url, p. 4
313 Nigeria Watch, Seventh report on violence in Nigeria, 2017, url, p. 3
314 Olayoku, Philip A., Trends and patterns of cattle grazing and rural violence in Nigeria (2006-2014), IFRA-Nigeria
working papers series, n°3, 28 November 2014, url, p. 4

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Map 11: © SBM Intel, The situation of the Pastoral Conflict in Nigeria as at the end of 2017 315

Seeking to stop the conflict, the federal government, in January 2018, announced a new plan
to establish ‘cattle colonies’ across the countries, secured by agro rangers.316 That plan wasstrongly opposed by many state governments and citizens groups in the south and Middle
Belt, who viewed it as only benefitting the predominantly Fulani herders at the detriment of
all others.317
In June 2018, the federal government again presented a six-point plan to permanently end
the conflict. The plan is named ‘The National Livestock Transformation Plan’ and built on six
key pillars: economic investment, conflict resolution, law and order, humanitarian relief,
information education and strategic communication; and cross-cutting issues. It aims at aphased transition from open grazing to ranching over the ten-year period 2018 – 2027.318

3.2.3 Actors in the conflict
The main actors in the conflicts in the region are the Nigerian army and several other groups
including herders, farmers, ethnic militias, cattle rustling gangs and other criminalorganisations, see Section 2.3.9.

315 SBM Intelligence, The Pastoral Conflict takes a deadlier turn, 5 January 2018, url
316 Daily Trust, “Cattle colonies: How FG plans to end farmers-herders clash”, 28 January 2018, url; International

Crisis Group, Stopping Nigeria’s Spiralling Farmer-Herder Violence, 26 July 2018, url, p. 23
317 The Punch, “Cattle colonies: Southern states shun FG’s request for land”, 23 January 2018, url; The Guardian,“Southern, Middle Belt groups meet in Enugu, reject cattle colonies”, 25 Janury 2018, url
318 Quartz Africa, A widening conflict between herdsmen and farmers is redefining Nigeria’s geopolitics, 12
February 2018, url; International Crisis Group, Stopping Nigeria’s Spiralling Farmer-Herder Violence, 26 July 2018,
url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATION— 51

3.2.4 Recent security trends
During the period of 1 October 2017 to 30 September 2018, ACLED registered around 632
violent incidents, which resulted in approximately 1860 people killed. It should be noted thatseveral incidents with an unknown number of fatalities (often referred to as ‘scores’, ‘several’,‘many’, or ‘large number’) were registered, and as explained in the Introduction, such
incidents are counted as 10 fatalities. Table 3 presents the number of security incidents perstate and the number of deaths. The table also gives the number of incidents and fatalities ofincidents categorised as ‘violence against civilians’.319
Table 3. Incidents of violence and fatalities by state, North Central zone,
October 2017 – 30 September 2018
TotalsViolence against civilians

STATE
Nr Incidents

Nr Fatalities

Nr incidents

Nr Fatalities

Abuja (Fed. Cap.
Terr.)

129

14

2

1

Benue
Kogi
Kwara
KadunaNasarawa
Niger

145
34
23
77
80
7

611
116
7
222
301
6

92
22
4
35
57
2

499
102
3
181
251
3

Plateau

137

583

109

502

Totals

632

1860

323

1542

Source: ACLED320

According to this table, Benue recorded the highest number of fatalities, and Plateau thesecond highest. FCT has also a high number of incidents, but counted only 14 fatalities. ACLED
data show that 121 out 129 incidents in FCT can be classified as riots/protests, which arenormally less lethal than other incidents.321
Out of the total 632 incidents with 1 860 fatalities, the North Central Zone (including Kaduna)counted 323 security incidents which can be classified as ‘violence against civilians’, resulting
in 1542 fatalities. The states with the highest number of such violent incidents are Plateau andBenue, with respectively 502 and 499 fatalities.322
Overview of major incidents
On 17 July 2017, Fulani youths attacked a Kadara village of Ungwan Uka, in retaliation for thevigilante killing of a suspected Fulani criminal in Banono a week earlier. Five deaths werereported. In turn, Kadara youths mobilized the following day and attacked a Fulani settlement
twice, killing 22.323

319 ACLED, Real Time data (1 October 2017- 30 September 2018), url
320 ACLED, Real Time data (1 October 2017- 30 September 2018), url
321 ACLED, Real Time data (1 October 2017- 30 September 2018), url
322 ACLED, Real Time data (1 October 2017- 30 September 2018), url
323 This Day, 37 Reportedly Killed in Fresh Farmers, Herdsmen Clash in Kaduna, 19 July 2017, url

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According to Stephanos Foundation, no fewer than 75 people were killed while 23 others were
injured following attacks by suspected Fulani herdsmen in Irigwe Kingdom, Bassa Local
Government Area of Plateau State, between 8 September and 17 October 2017.324
On 15 October 2017, 29 people were massacred in a classroom that was supposed to be under
military watch at Miango in Bassa LGA of Plateau State.325
On 5 March 2018, 24 people were killed in a Fulani attack in an Idoma-speaking village,
Omusu, in Okpokwu LGA, Benue State. Among the fatalities were 14 women and twochildren.326
Between 13 and 15 March 2018, Fulani herdsmen attacked several communities in Dekina
and Omala LGAs in Kogi State, killing 50 people.327
On 11 April 2018, in total 67 people were killed during attacks by suspected herdsmen in
military uniform in Ukum LGA, Benue State.328
On 24 April 2018, suspected herdsmen stormed St. Ignatius Catholic Church, Ukpor-Mbalom
Parish, Gwer East LGA, Benue State, killing 19 people - two priests and 17 congregants. The
assailants also set ablaze over 80 houses and destroyed foodstuff.329
On the same day, armed herdsmen launched a coordinated attack on three communities inGuma LGA, Benue State, killing at least 39 persons, injuring scores and razing over 160 houses,
huts and farmlands.330
On 5 May 2018, Fulani militants attacked Gwaska village in Birnin Gwari LGA of Kaduna State,killing 71 people and razing the entire village.331
On 19 May 2018, 35 Fulani herdsmen were killed by troops of ‘Operation Whirl Stroke’(OPWS). One soldier lost his life and two others were wounded during the operation.332
On 23 and 24 June 2018, between 100 and 200 people were killed by suspected herdsmen inseveral villages in Plateau State.333 The Christian aid and advocacy group, Stefanos
Foundation, reported 233 killed and more than 11 000 displaced.334
On 10 August 2018, gunmen killed nine people in the Tse-Ujoh community in Ikyurav-Tiev,
Katsina-Ala LGA, Benue State. According to a witness, ‘the attackers stormed the community
in a commando manner, shooting indiscriminately’, some entering houses and killing
people.335

324 Sahara Reporters, Herdsmen Attacks: 75 Killed, 13726 Displaced In Plateau, 27 October 2017, url
325 Sahara Reporters, Herdsmen Attacks: 75 Killed, 13726 Displaced In Plateau, 27 October 2017, url
326 Daily Trust, 24 killed in fresh Benue violence, 7 March 2018, url
327 Sahara Reporters, Suspected Herdsmen Invade Kogi Communities, Kill 25, 15 March 2018, url; The Guardian,

Kogi attack: Natives square up to herdsmen, 17 March 2018, url
328 The Guardian, Benue attack: Death toll rises to 67, 14 April 2018, url
329 The Guardian, Suspected herdsmen kill two Catholic priests, 17 others, 25 April 2018, url
330 Vanguard, Again, herdsmen launch coordinated attacks on Benue communities, kill 39, 25 April 2018, url
331 ACLED, Regional Overview – Africa, 14 May 2018, url
332 Vanguard, Troops kill 35 herdsmen in Benue, 21 May 2018, url
333 Sahara Reporters, ‘We Lost 300 Cows’ — Miyetti Allah Confirms Plateau Killings Were Retaliatory, 25 June
2018, url. The local leader of the cattle breeder association had been erroneously quoted by Premium Times thatthe attacks were a retaliation of the hundreds of cows being killed. Premium Times: Nigeria: The Untold Killings
That May Have Triggered Plateau Massacre, 25 June 2018, url. The leader vehemently denied this statement in
Premium Times, We did not describe Plateau killings as retaliatory – Miyetti Allah, 29 June 2018, url, leading to
the sacking of the reporter who wrote the first article.
333 Punch, Plateau attacks: IDP figure hits 11,515, death toll 233 – Report, 9 July 2018, url
334 Punch, Plateau attacks: IDP figure hits 11,515, death toll 233 – Report, 9 July 2018, url
335 Punch, Gunmen kill nine people in Benue, Police, Ortom say, 10 August 2018, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATION— 53

On 2 September 2018, gunmen attacked Lopandet Dwei in Du district of Jos South, resulting
in 11 confirmed fatalities. The source did not provide information on the identity of theperpetrators.336
On 21 September 2018, gunmen, suspected members of the militia group Terwase Akwaza,
also known as Gana, strangled five men to death during an attack on Tse Vue in Ukum LGA,
Benue State. No further information is available.337
On 27 September 2018, armed men attacked the city of Jos, firing at civilians indiscriminately.
Nine people were killed and several others were injured.338

3.2.5 Tactics and targets
The nature of the violence – by militias at both sides of the conflict - has evolved fromspontaneous responses to trespasses and provocations, to pre-meditated and well-organised
scorched earth attacks, often taking communities by surprise at night and burning down farms
and villages. Killings have become more indiscriminate targeting entire communities, andassault weapons are increasingly in use and sometimes the assailants attack dressed inmilitary uniforms. Also the attacking groups are mobilising in larger numbers and aresometimes now challenging security forces, obstructing them from intervening to stop
violence and in some cases kill police and troops.339
Christian interest groups like World Watch/Open Doors believe that the violence executed by
Fulani herdsmen against Christians in Benue is religiously motivated. In their report onviolence in Benue State, it was concluded that the killing of Christians, the destruction of theirproperties, the burning of churches, and gender-based atrocities against Christian women andchildren is a planned persecution by Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen.340 In its annual report
2018, the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) also mentioned that‘there were increased reports of concerns of an ethnic cleansing campaign against Christiancommunities, with various media sources and organizations characterizing the perpetrators
as coming from a single Fulani militant group.’341

3.2.6 Impact of violence on state ability to secure law and order
Due to the limited capacity of the NPF, it has inadequate ability to control communal or otherinter-group violence in the Middle Belt states.342 As a result, the government has had to deploy
the military, in operations such as ‘Operation Safe Haven’, ‘Operation Cat Race’ and‘Operation Whirl Strike’, to restore order.343
The violence has also impact on local security arrangements. The insufficient state ability toprovide security has prompted communities and ethnic groups to increasingly resort to selfhelp groups, either in the form of vigilantes and militias or ethnic pressure groups. For
instance, in March 2016, the indigenous groups in Benue State founded the Movement, Police confirm killing of 11 in Jos, 3 September 2018, url

336 Vanguard

337 Punch, Gunmen kill five in Benue, 22 September 2018, url
338 Xinhua, Gunmen kill at least 9 in central Nigeria attack, 29 September 2018, url
339 International Crisis Group, Stopping Nigeria’s Spiralling Farmer-Herder Violence, 26 July 2018, url, p. 5
340 World Watch/Open Doors, Nigeria: Benue State under the shadow of “herdsmen terrorism” (2014 – 2016)(with update: 1 January – 31 August 2017), url, p. 42
341 USCRIF, Annual report on religious freedom - Nigeria, April 2018, url , pp. 54-55
342 Australia, DFAT Country Information Report Nigeria, 9 March 2018, url, p. 29
343 USCIRF, Annual report on religious freedom - Nigeria, April 2018, url, p. 55

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Against Fulani Occupation (MAFO)344 to address the conflict, following suspicions that thefederal government had sided with the Hausa-Fulani Muslim herdsmen.345
USCIRF reported that all parties in the conflict, including Christians and Muslims, did not feel
protected by security services. Impunity for attackers and the absence of police action are themain frustrations.346
In order to curb the violence, in 2017 Benue passed a law which makes open grazing byherders a crime. The displacement of some herder communities, particularly as a result of theanti-grazing law in Benue State increased pressure on grazing resources at their destinations
and also increased trespasses and damage to farms, resulting in greater friction and violencewith farming communities.347 For example, the displacement of thousands of herders from
Benue State to Nasarawa State, where they could not find enough fodder for their herds, led
to an increase in violence in parts of the state.348

3.2.7 Conflict-induced internal displacement
The number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) has increased: between January 2015 andFebruary 2017, at least 62 000 people were displaced in Kaduna, Benue and Plateau states.349
According to the Stephanos Foundation, about 13 726 persons were displaced from the two
communities in Irigwe Kingdom, Bassa Local Government Area of Plateau State, after
attackers burnt 489 houses between 8 September 2017 and 17 October 2017.350
On 15 January 2018, OCHA reported that since 1 January 2018, 80 000 people had been
displaced in Benue State, as a result of violence arising from herder-farmer disputes.351 On
15 February 2018, it further reported that at least 130 000 people had been displaced in
Benue, Nasarawa, Kaduna and Taraba states.352 According to Human Rights Watch inJune 2018, 169 922 people have been displaced by the conflict in Benue State, of whom
102 000 children ‘have been forced out of school’.353
Besides those displaced by herder-farmer violence, Benue State also registered 3 105
refugees from Cameroon as of end of April 2018.354 For more on Cameroonian refugees see
Section 3.3.7.
In early July 2018, the Plateau State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) reported that38 051 people displaced by the attacks on villages and reprisal violence on 23 and24 June 2018 (see Section 3.2.4). The IDPs were camped at 31 locations in Barkin Ladi, Riyom,
Mangu, Bokkos and Jos South LGAs.355

344 MAFO is an organization formed by two major ethnic groups in Benue state (Tiv and Idoma) to challenge‘Fulani occupation’ of the state. In 2016, MAFO took the Federal government of Nigeria to the ECOWAS court,
demanding compensation for the losses suffered by communities impacted by herder-farmer violence. For more
information see: Vanguard, Benue killings: ECOWAS Court adjourn case till Nov. 9, 10 Oktober 2016, url
345 World Watch/Open Doors, Nigeria: Benue State under the shadow of “herdsmen terrorism” (2014 – 2016)(with update: 1 January – 31 August 2017), p. 81, url
346 USCRIF, Annual report on religious freedom - Nigeria, April 2018, url, p. 54
347 USCRIF, Annual report on religious freedom - Nigeria, April 2018, url, p. 55
348 International Crisis Group, Stopping Nigeria’s Spiralling Farmer-Herder Violence, 26 July 2018, url, p. 13
349 International Crisis Group, Herders against Farmers: Nigeria’s Expanding Deadly Conflict, Africa Report No.
252, 19 September 2017, url, p. 7
350 Sahara Reporters, Herdsmen Attacks: 75 Killed, 13726 Displaced In Plateau, 27 October 2017, url
351 UN OCHA, West and Central Africa: Weekly Regional Humanitarian Snapshot (9 - 15 January 2018), 15 January
2018, url
352 UN OCHA, West and Central Africa: Weekly Regional Humanitarian Snapshot (30 January - 5 February 2018), 5
February2018, url
353 HRW, Nigeria: Rising Toll of Middle-Belt Violence, 28 June 2018, url
354 UNHCR, Cameroon situation (NIGERIA) – Flash Updates, 23 April – 4 May 2018, url
355 Premium Times, Killings: Over 38,000 IDPs in 31 camps in Plateau — SEMA, 9 July 2018, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATION— 55

3.2.8 Further impact of the violence on the civilian population
In early February 2018, OCHA reported that 10 000 children could not access schools due toattacks on villages in parts of Benue State. Some schools were also closed as their premises
were being used as shelter for the IDPs.356
In March 2018, the executive secretary of National Commission for Nomadic Education(NCNE) reported that 12 out of 24 nomadic schools357 in Benue State alone have shut down
and moved to Nasarawa because of violence related to disputes between herders and farming
communities.358
In April 2018, OCHA reported that due to violence involving herders and farmers, around
300 000 children had been forced out of schools in Benue State. Several primary schools had
either been burnt or were occupied by armed herders. It also noted that in some localities,
schools were being used as IDP camps.359
The spike in herder-farmer violence in 2018, particularly in Benue, also resulted in thedestruction of vast amounts of crops and rural livelihoods.360 There were fears that thedestruction of farm lands and crops could lead to poor crop production, possibly resulting tohunger and starvation for those who depend largely on agricultural produce from the affected
communities.361
On 7 June 2018, the authorities in Benue State announced that at least 35 primary schools
had been closed in Obi Local Government Area due to attacks on Tiv communities, which had
resulted in the destruction of some schools.362
Due to large-scale displacement and insecurity in parts of Adamawa, Benue, Nasarawa,
Plateau and Taraba states, people are hindered to farm or herd. As a result, food prices arerising. The large-scale displacement also resulted in overcrowded IDP camps, lacking safe
drinking water and sanitation facilities. As a result, IDPs, especially women and children, werevulnerable to several diseases.363
Road security
The Birnin-Gwari Kaduna highway in Kaduna State is subject to frequent violent incidents,
mainly ambushes, combined with abduction and kidnapping for ransom.364 In May 2018, atleast 100 people have reportedly been kidnapped along this road.365

356 UN OCHA, West and Central Africa: Weekly Regional Humanitarian Snapshot (17- 23 April 2018), 23 April

2018, url
357 Nomadic schools are especially developed to provide education to the nomadic pastoralists, migrant fisher
folks and migrant farmers. For more detailed information see: National Commission for Nomadic Education(NCNE), [website], n.d., url
358 Punch, Farmers/herdsmen clashes forced Benue to shut 12 schools – NCNE, 7 March 2018, url
359 UN OCHA, West and Central Africa: Weekly Regional Humanitarian Snapshot (17- 23 April 2018), 23 April
2018, url
360 Australia, DFAT Country Information Report Nigeria, 9 March 2018, url, p. 13
361 Ezeogu, U.A. & Ichaba, A.A., An Eye for an Eye Vis-À-Vis the Fulani Herdsmen and Farmers’ Vendetta in
Nigeria: A Case for Social Reconciliation, February 2018, url, p. 3
362 This Day, 35 Primary Schools Shut in Nasarawa over Herdsmen Attacks, 8 June 2018, url
363 International Crisis Group, Stopping Nigeria’s Spiralling Farmer-Herder Violence, 26 July 2018, url, p. i
364 New Telegraph, Birnin Gwari: Nigeria’s deadliest road, 22 June 2018, url
365 Reuters, At least 100 people kidnapped along road in northern Nigeria, 15 May 2018, url

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3.3 Niger Delta
3.3.1 General description of the region
The Niger Delta comprises six states from the South South Zone (Rivers, Bayelsa, Delta, Akwa
Ibom, Edo and Cross River) plus Abia, Imo (South East Zone) and Ondo (South West Zone).
South South is the heart of Nigeria’s oil industry, accounting for 80 % of the nation’s oil
production.366 Together all the nine states are referred to, administratively, as the Niger Delta.
Ethnically, the region is highly heterogeneous with over 40 groups that speak more than 100
languages and dialects.367 According to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), the populationof the Niger Delta (including Abia, Imo and Ondo states) is estimated at 42.6 million people,
which is 22 % of Nigeria’s total population (estimated at 193 million people (data 2016).368
The region is predominately Christian.369

3.3.2 Background to the conflict
The roots of the current conflict in the Niger Delta can be traced to the region’s history of
economic exploitation, environmental pollution and political marginalization that left the local
population hardly benefitting from the region’s immense petroleum resources. In the 2000s,
the region saw the emergence of several armed groups like the Movement for the
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) andNiger Delta Strike Force (NDSF), which mobilised to fight for the region’s rights, but were also
involved in criminal activities like ransom kidnapping and oil bunkering. The activities of these
armed groups caused a lot of unrest in the region, seriously disrupting oil and gas industry
operations.370 In order to curb the violence, the federal government deployed a military Joint
Task Force (JTF) to the region in 2003. The JTF, which is still operational by the time of writing
this report371, is led by the army but also includes units and assets from the navy, theparamilitary mobile police (MOPOL), and the regular police force.372 In the years 2008-2009,
it conducted massive military operations against militant groups in Rivers, Bayelsa and Delta
states.373
The year 2009 was a turning point in the conflict as the federal government initiated thePresidential Amnesty Programme (PAP). Under this programme, militants who surrendered
their arms were to be granted unconditional amnesty, and subsequently compensatedfinancially or rehabilitated through higher formal education and by technical skills training.374
Around 30 000 people enrolled in the PAP as ex-militants, and surrendered about 2700
weapons. For their upkeep, pending rehabilitation, the ex-militants received a stipend of
65 000 Naira, equivalent to about 180 US dollars, per month. The programme was initiallyplanned for five years, but was as of March 2018 still in effect.375

366 AOAV, The Violent Road, 12 December 2013, url, p. 73
367 PIND Foundation, Analysis of Conflict Trends in the Niger Delta, n.d., url
368 NBS, Population of Nigeria 2016, available at: url
369 Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, Tolerance and Tension: Islam and Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa, April

2010, url, p. ii
370 Asunji, J.B., Understanding the Armed Groups in the Niger Delta, 2009, url, p. 3
371 Nigerian Tribune, Navy, JTF are part of illegal bunkering, oil theft in Niger Delta ―IYC, 2 June 2018, url
372 Hazen, J.M. & Horner, J., Small arms, armed violence and insecurity in Nigeria, 2007, url, p. 28
373 IRIN, Thousands flee violence, hundreds suspected dead, 22 May 2009, url
374 AOAV, The Violent Road, 12 December 2013, url, p. 75
375 Golden-Timsar, R., Amnesty And New Violence In The Niger Delta, Forbes, 20 March 2018, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATION— 57

For years the programme was quite successful in calming the region376, but violence erupted
again in early 2016, when new groups like the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA), Red Scorpions,
Joint Niger Delta Liberation Force (JNDLF), Niger Delta Red Squad (NDRS), Adaka Boro
Avengers (ABA) and Niger Delta Greenland Justice Mandate (NDGJM) emerged.377 These
groups consist partly of ex-militants who were no longer satisfied with their stipends under
the amnesty programme, and also by others who had become convinced that the only way to
attract government’s attention and concessions was by a resort to armed violence.378
After negotiations with the federal government and the announcement of the resumption ofamnesty payments, the NDA announced a ceasefire on 20 August 2016.379 Nevertheless, thegroup carried out some attacks in October and November 2016.380 Since November 2016,
when the government accepted a 16-point catalogue of demands presented by the Pan Niger
Delta Forum (PANDEF), militant groups have repeatedly threatened to launch attacks but
there has been no major attack by NDA or any other group in the Niger Delta.381 There arecontinuing reports of armed groups kidnapping expatriates, such as the five oil workers
abducted in Ajoki community, Delta State, on 17 January 2018.382

3.3.3 Actors in the conflict
The main actors in the region are the Joint Task Force (JTF)383, Nigeria Police Force (NPF), andthe Niger Delta Avengers (NDA).

3.3.4 Recent security trends
During the reporting period of 1 October 2017-30 September 2018, ACLED registered around
350 security incidents, which resulted in approximately 332 persons killed.384 It should be
noted that several incidents with an unknown number of fatalities (often referred to as‘scores’, ‘several’, ‘many’, or ‘large number’) were registered, and as explained in the
Introduction, such incidents are counted as 10 fatalities. Table 4 presents the number of
security incidents and number of deaths per state. The table also gives the number ofincidents and fatalities of incidents categorised as ‘violence against civilians’.

376 Leadership, Army Launches Operation ‘Cat Race’ In Benue Valley, 8 February 2018, url; Sahara Reporters,

Army Puts An End To Its 'Cat Race' In Benue, Taraba, Kogi, 15 May 2018, url
377 Premium Times, 18 new armed groups spring up in Nigeria, 18 October 2016, url
378 ACCORD, Towards ending conflict and insecurity in the Niger Delta region: A collective non-violent approach,17 September 2017, url; Golden-Timsar, R., Amnesty And New Violence In The Niger Delta, Forbes, 20 March
2018, url; Jamestown Foundation, The Niger Delta: Will restarting Amnesty payments Ease the conflict?; October
2016, url, p. 14
379 Jamestown Foundation., ‘The Niger Delta: Will Restarting Amnesty Payments Ease the Conflict?’, in: Terrorism
Monitor 14 (20), 14 October 2016 url
380 Reuters, Nigeria's 'Delta Avengers' militants end oil hub ceasefire, 3 November 2017, url
381 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Niger Delta militants end their ceasefire, 6 November 2017, url
382 Sun, Militants abduct 5 oil workers in Niger Delta, 20 January 2018, url
383 A special force which was founded in 2003 is the so-called Joint Task Force (JTF). Originally planned as aninterim measure to create order in the Niger Delta, the JTF is still present in the region. The JTF is led by thearmy, but also includes officers from the navy, the paramilitary mobile police (MOPOL), and the regular police
force. The main responsibility of the JTF is to maintain the security in the region, including responding to
kidnappings. Jamestown Foundation, Nigeria Expands Its 'War on Terrorism' to the Niger Delta, 16 September
2016, Terrorism Monitor, Volume 14, Issue 18, url
384 ACLED, Real Time data (1 July 2017- 30 June 2018), url

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Table 4. Incidents of violence and fatalities by state, Niger Delta,
October 2017 – 30 September 2018
TotalsViolence against civilians

STATE
Abia
Akwa Ibom
Bayelsa
Cross River
Delta
Edo
Imo
Ondo
RiversTotalsNr Incidents

Nr Fatalities

Nr incidents

Nr Fatalities

17
24
37
41
72
41
21
54
43

38
50
39
52
54
21
6
14
58

5
9
16
12
28
13
4
16

17
16
20
26
30
14
3
9
52

350

332

13
116

187

Source: ACLED 385

According to this table, Rivers State recorded the highest number of fatalities from violent
incidents, although Delta State had the most incidents. Furthermore, the region counted 116
security incidents that could be classified as violence against civilians, resulting in 187
fatalities, the highest number occurring in Rivers.386
An overview of the major incidents
Although not within the scope of the reporting period of 1 October 2017-30 September 2018,
it is worth mentioning a series of major clashes between 27 and 29 June 2017 over the use of
farmland, between the Wanikade and Wanihem communities in Yala LGA of Cross River State.
These clashes resulted in about 150 people killed, 14 000 people displaced and 1 233 houses
destroyed.387
On 27 July 2017, 18 people were reportedly killed in a clash over a long-running land dispute
between Ogbe-Ijoh and Aladja communities in Delta State.388
On 9 October 2017, between 10 and 15 people were reported dead after unidentified gunmen
opened fire on a group of traders at a market in Obio/Akpor LGA, Rivers State.389
On 1 January 2018, 21 people were killed after attending a church service in Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni Local Government Area (ONELGA), River State. The Director-General of the Nigerian
Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) blamed the incident on the fight forsupremacy among rival cult groups in the area.390

385 ACLED, Real Time data (1 October 2017- 30 September 2018), url
386 ACLED, Real Time data (1 October 2017- 30 September 2018), url
387 Daily Trust, 150 killed in 3-day communal clash in C/River — SEMA, 4 July 2017, url; Premium Times, Osinbajo

orders security reinforcement in Cross River communities where 150 were killed in violence, 7 July 2017, url
388 The Guardian, Many injured, six houses razed as communities clash in Delta, 28 July 2017, url
389 This Day, Gunmen Kill 15 in Rivers Community, 10 October 2017, url; Vanguard, Just in: Gunmen invade Port
Harcourt market, kill 10, 9 October 2017, url
390 Premium Times, New Year tragedy: Gunmen kill ‘21’ Rivers residents returning from church, 1 January 2018,
url

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On 18 April 2018, a communal clash between the Isu community in Arochukwu LGA of Abia
State and their neighbours from Utuma in Biase LGA of Cross River left at least 10 people
reported dead.391
On 3 May 2018, 30 fishermen were killed in a communal clash between Oku Iboku community
in Itu LGA of Akwa Ibom State and a community in Cross River State.392
On 3 May 2018, JTF confirmed the killings of four high-profile militants from the Niger Delta
states.393
On 26 July 2018, unknown gunmen killed the chairman of the APC chairman in Ideato LGA,
Imo state. There were no more violent incidents against civilians, resulting in fatalities,
recorded between 1 July and 30 September 2018.394

3.3.5 Tactics and targets
The sources consulted in this chapter do not show clear trends in tactics used by the several
groups which are involved in the conflicts in the Niger Delta.

3.3.6 Impact of violence on state ability to secure law and order
As mentioned in Section 2.3.2, and also reported by Human Rights Watch in the past395, a large
proportion of the police officers deployed to the region are hired as personal guards by thewealthy and privileged, undermining their capacity to ensure public safety and respond tosecurity incidents. Oil companies in the region continually rely heavily on MOPOLs to secure
their (private) operations.396 While the national police headquarters in Abuja repeatedly
announced that police officers would be withdrawn from their ‘additional jobs’397 toconcentrate on their core mandate, it is not clear these announcements have been effected
as significant numbers of police personnel are still visibly serving private security interests.
According to an Assistant Inspector-General of Police (AIG), based in Zone 5 (Bayelsa, Deltaand Edo states), only 20 % of policemen are engaged in protecting lives and ensuring peace,
while ‘the remaining 80 per cent just busy providing personal security to some “prominent
people” on guard duties.’398
Similar to the other two regions law enforcement agencies in the Niger Delta were unable toprevent communal violence.399 As a result, military forces continued to operate as part of joint
security operations and exercises, notably under Operation Crocodile Smile and Operation
Python Dance. The recruitment and training of 10 000 youths from Niger Delta as surveillanceand security personnel for surveillance of oil pipelines in the region400, provides further
indication that the police force was not able to perform its task adequately in the region. In
Rivers State, in early 2018, the government established a Rivers State Neighbourhood Safety

391 Vanguard, 10 feared dead in Abia, Cross River communal clash, 25 April 2018, url
392 Independent, 30 Fishermen Feared Killed In A/Ibom, C/River Communities’ Clash, 3 May 2018, url
393 Sahara Reporters, Troops ‘Kill’ Four Top Niger Delta Militants, 3 May 2018, url
394 ACLED, Real Time data (1 October 2017- 30 September 2018), url
395 HRW, “Everyone’s in on the Game”: Corruption and Human Rights Abuses by the Nigeria Police Force, 17

August 2010, url, pp. 2-3
396 Kimani, H., Security for the highest bidder, 31 October 2009, url
397 Channels Television, Police Withdraws Mobile Security Aides To Individuals, 25 June 2016, url; Sahara
Reporters, Police IGPs And The Politics Of Withdrawal Of Police Personnel From VIPs, Politicians, 20 March 2018,url
398 Premium Times, 80% of Nigerian police officers provide personal security for ‘prominent people’, AIG laments,
8 February 2018, url
399 US DoS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 – Nigeria, 22 April 2018, url, p. 10
400 Daily Trust, FG trains 10,000 youths on pipeline surveillance, 25 October 2017, url

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Corps Agency (RIVNESCA) ‘to encourage and consolidate an effective security synergy
between the security agencies and communities.’401

3.3.7 Conflict-induced internal displacement
Although the Niger Delta does not have a significant number of IDPs in comparison with theother two regions (see Sections 3.1.7 and 3.2.7), the region has also recorded a few incidents
resulting in significant displacements. As described before, 14 000 people were displaced bycommunal clashes in Yala LGA, Cross River State.402
Besides the IDPs generated by communal clashes, some states also saw an influx of refugees
from Cameroon. These were Anglophone Cameroonians who began fleeing their country
since October 2017 due to the unrest in their area. In March 2018, UNHCR reported that over
20 000 refugees, four-fifth of them women and children had crossed into Nigeria.403 In earlyMay 2018, it was reported that 17 003 Cameroonian refugees had been registered in Cross
River State and 179 in Akwa Ibom State.404

3.4 Zamfara State
3.4.1 General description of the region
Zamfara State in the North West Zone has an estimated 4.5 million people, which is 2.3 % of
Nigeria’s total population (estimated at 193 million people (data 2016).405 The largest
population groups are Hausa and Fulani (together about 29 %)406, and smaller local ethnic
groups such as Dakarkari, Kambari, Gungawa, Dandawa, Dukkawa, Kaje, Kataf, Gwari. The
region is predominantly Muslim with small pockets of Christians.407

3.4.2 Background to the conflict
While in the 1980s to 2000s (after the introduction of Sharia criminal law) several ethnoreligious conflicts between Muslims and Christians were fought, mainly in Kano, Sokoto andKaduna408, the current conflict is different, according to Crisis Group. In the Zamfara State,occasionally spilling over to neighbouring Sokoto and Katsina states, an increasingly deadly
conflict evolves between cattle rustlers and other bandits on one hand, and communities,
vigilantes and government forces on the other.409
This conflict is, according to human rights organisations, separate from the herder-farmer
violence in the Middle Belt, because it is largely driven by cattle rustling and banditry as purely
criminal activities, not a dispute for resources by two legitimate groups. The violence ‘isfundamentally about the government’s abdication of its responsibility to protect its citizens’,

401 Daily Trust, Wike inaugurates Rivers State Neighbourhood Safety Corps Agency, 17 April 2018. url. Also see

RIVNESCA, Welcome, n.d., url
402 Daily Trust, 150 killed in 3-day communal clash in C/River — SEMA, 4 July 2017, url
403 UN News, Cameroonians pour into Nigeria, stretching scant resources – UN refugee agency, 20 March 2018url
404 UNHCR, Cameroon situation (NIGERIA) – Flash Updates, 23 April – 4 May 2018, url
405 NBS, Population of Nigeria 2016, available at: url
406 According to the Worldatlas, the Hausa form 25.1 % of the Nigerian population, while the Fulani are 3.9 % of
the total population, together they represent 29% of the entire Nigerian population. Worldatlas, Largest Ethnic
Groups in Nigeria, 25 April 2017, url
407 Sulaiman Khalid, Ethno-religious conflicts in North-Western Nigeria; myth and reality, 2000, url; AOAV/NWGAW, The Violent Road: Nigeria’s North West, 12 December 2013, url
408 AOAV/ NWGAW, Action on Armed Violence/ National Working Group on Armed Violence, The Violent Road:
Nigeria’s North West, 12 December 2013, url; Sulaiman Khalid, Ethno-religious conflicts in North-Western
Nigeria; myth and reality, 2000, url
409 IRIN, Zamfara: Nigeria’s wild northwest, 13 September 2018. url

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and the long-standing lawlessness, according to the independent news agency IRIN. The
north-western zone has a long history of banditry with so little control by police that bandits
can impose their authority by ‘fast justice’ without appeal.410 Moreover, the violence takes
place within an almost all-Muslim context, so the Christian-Muslim divide is practicallyabsent.411
The conflict started as a result of ‘unresolved clashes’ between Hausa farmers and Fulani
herders over access to land and water. Gradually, it evolved into a ‘lucrative illicit economy ofbanditry and cattle-rustling’ and kidnapping for ransom.412
Although the conflict has precolonial roots413, the first major attack after independence
happened in Yar Galadima in 2014, killing 200 people. In two years ‘hundreds’ of people were
killed and thousands displaced, and between January and July 2018, there were 371 deaths,
according to AI.414
Sources describe a pattern of ‘bandits’ calling villagers, warning them to pay large sums ofmoney (such as USD 1 400) or else they will be kidnapped or killed. Relatives are called to
extract money while the kidnapped persons are being tortured.415 The attacks take placemainly in the rural areas and prevent the villagers from going farming. AI blames the state
government’s failure to protect the population against bandits, even after the population
received warning letters ahead of attacks.416
Cattle rustling is ‘an entrenched and thriving business’ and makes a lot of quick money, as thedemand for beef in the southern cities is still growing. The stolen cattle is hidden in the forests
at Zamfara’s border regions with Kaduna and Niger until it is sold for slaughter.417
The violence is spreading towards other states which is, according to an Al Jazeera article,
related to weak and understaffed security forces, ‘Nigeria's law enforcement agencies areunderstaffed and with its army stretched thin by other conflicts, the cattle-rustler crisis has
continued unabated mostly in Zamfara but also Kaduna, Katsina, Niger and, recently, Sokoto
states.’418

3.4.3 Actors in the conflict
The violence is perpetrated by bandits targeting rural village communities for ransom and tosteal their cattle. According to IRIN, several bandits started as local vigilantes, deployed by theauthorities in order to step in where the federal police failed. In Zamfara, these vigilantes were
given ‘motorbikes, uniforms, and locally made single-shot hunting rifles, but little othersupport to meet the rising tide of banditry.’ As payment often was delayed and ammunition
was lacking, ‘part of the vigilante became part of the bandits’.419
However, the identity and ethnic or geographical origin of the bandits is not exactly known.
The cattle rustlers were initially Fulani, then Hausa and nowadays, according to an IRIN

410 IRIN, Zamfara: Nigeria’s wild northwest, 13 September 2018, url
411 AI, Nigeria: Thousands living in fear as Zamfara armed bandits ramp up attacks, 31 July 2018, url; Aljazeera,

Deadly cattle raids in Zamfara: Nigeria’s ‘Ignored’ Crisis, 20 August 2018, url
412 IRIN, Zamfara: Nigeria’s wild northwest, 13 September 2018, url
413 IRIN, Zamfara: Nigeria’s wild northwest, 13 September 2018, url
414 AI, Nigeria: Thousands living in fear as Zamfara armed bandits ramp up attacks, 31 July 2018, url
415 IRIN, Zamfara: Nigeria’s wild northwest, 13 September 2018, url; AI, Nigeria: Thousands living in fear as
Zamfara armed bandits ramp up attacks, 31 July 2018, url
416 AI, Nigeria: Thousands living in fear as Zamfara armed bandits ramp up attacks, 31 July 2018, url
417 IRIN, Zamfara: Nigeria’s wild northwest, 13 September 2018, url
418 Aljazeera, Deadly cattle raids in Zamfara: Nigeria’s ‘Ignored’ Crisis, 20 August 2018, url
419 IRIN, Zamfara: Nigeria’s wild northwest, 13 September 2018, url

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interlocutor, ‘every criminal in Nigeria has come to Zamfara’.420 Another source reports theassailants come from Niger.421

3.4.4 Recent security trends
According to ACLED data, in the reporting period 1 October 2017-30 September 2018, 52
incidents were reported in Zamfara State, resulting in 412 fatalities. It should be noted thatseveral incidents with an unknown number of fatalities (often referred to as ‘scores’, ‘several’,‘many’, or ‘large number’) were registered, and as explained in the Introduction, such
incidents are counted as 10 fatalities. Table 5 presents the number of security incidents perstate and the number of deaths. The table also gives the number of incidents and fatalities ofincidents categorised as ‘violence against civilians’.422
Between 1 October 2017 and 15 February 2018, only one incident was recorded with in total
five fatalities. The most violent incidents, with high numbers of fatalities, recorded in the
database took place between 15 February 2018 and 1 September 2018.423
Table 5. Incidents of violence and fatalities in Zamfara, October 2017 – 30 September 2018
TotalsState
ZAMFARA

Violence against civilians

Nr Incidents

Nr Fatalities

52

412

Nr incidents
27

Nr Fatalities
308

Source: ACLED424

Overview of major incidents
On 28 March 2018, more than 30 people had been killed in attacks by gunmen in Bawan Daji,Anka LGA.425
On 5 April 2018, the army killed 21 'bandits' in Tungan Daji in Anka LGA. Two soldiers were
killed as well. ACLED adds that it ‘is not known if the perpetrators were of the same group that
attacked civilians in Bawon-Daji on 28 March 2018.’426 This last incident is categorised as‘Battle-No change of territory’ by ‘Military forces’. After the attack on Bawon-Daji, theNigerian Air Force deployed Special Forces in Zamfara State on 4 April 2018.427
The other major incidents below are categorised by ACLED as ‘Violence against civilians’ by‘unidentified armed group’.
On 15 February 2018, gunmen, described only as ‘bandits’ killed about 41 persons at Birane
village, Zurmi LGA (Zamfara State), ‘after intercepting a vehicle conveying bridesmaids andtraders to the community market.’ They killed all on board and then went on to the market,
where they fired indiscriminately. According to an eye-witness, 41 were dead in total.428

420 IRIN, Zamfara: Nigeria’s wild northwest, 13 September 2018, url
421 Aljazeera, Deadly cattle raids in Zamfara: Nigeria’s ‘Ignored’ Crisis, 20 August 2018, url
422 ACLED, Real Time data (1 October 2017- 30 September 2018), url
423 ACLED, Real Time data (1 July 2017- 30 June 2018), url
424 ACLED, Real Time data (1 October 2017- 30 September 2018), url
425 Daily Trust, Army kills 21 bandits in Zamfara, 6 April 2018, url
426 Daily Trust, Army kills 21 bandits in Zamfara, 6 April 2018, url; ACLED, Real Time data (1 July 2017- 30 June2018), url
427 AI, Nigeria: Thousands living in fear as Zamfara armed bandits ramp up attacks, 31 July 2018, url
428 Vanguard, Gunmen kill 41 traders, bridesmaid in Zamfara, 16 February 2018, url

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On 27 and 28 March 2018, 63 civilians were reportedly killed over two days of attacks bygunmen ‘believed to be cattle rustlers’ in Bawon-Daji, Anka LGA.429
On 11 April 2018, gunmen attacked Kuru-kuru and Jarkuka village in Anka LGA. 26 people
were killed.430
On 19 or 20 April, ‘suspected cattle thieves’ attacked Kabaro and Danmani villages, killing27.431 According to a resident of Kabaro, the shooting occurred after villagers had caught andexecuted one of the bandits earlier. The gunmen got angry and came back to lay siege on andkill the community.432
Between 1 and 2 May 2018, local militia from Fankashi village and cattle thieves fought a gun
battle in Fankashi in Maru LGA. 13 people were reportedly killed over two days.433
In June 2018, bandits ‘took over’ three districts in Zurmi LGA, in total 18 villages and towns.434
On 27 July 2018, 18 villages in Zumi LGA, Zamfara State, were attacked, killing at least 42
people. The next day, 15 people were kidnapped in another LGA. That day, a thousand troops
were deployed to Zamfara to provide security. According to AI’s interlocutors, this was thethird time since November 2017 that military troops were deployed in response to attacks but
this has not led to more protection of remote communities.435
On 12 September 2018, an armed group attacked a village hall in the village of Badarawa,
north-western Zamfara state, where people were watching a movie. Eleven people were killed
and more than 20 injured. It is not clear why the village was attacked.436

3.4.5 Tactics and targets
The main tactics used in the violence are attacking remote villages and killing villagers, stealing
cattle, kidnapping villagers for ransom.

3.4.6 Impact of the violence on state ability to secure law and orderAccording to several sources, the state is generally unable to protect the population and toarrest and prosecute the assailants. It only managed to kill a notorious cattle rustling andkidnapping gang leader, Buharin Daji of Fulani origin. This happened in March 2018 but hasreportedly not contributed to peace to the region.437
Throughout the first half of 2018, insecurity related to incidents of cattle rustling and rural
banditry continued in the north-west, although intensified military operations killed many‘bandits’.438

429 ACLED, Real Time data (1 July 2017- 30 June 2018), url; This Day, Gunmen Kill 69 in Zamfara, Southern Kaduna,

30 March 2018, url
430 ACLED, Real Time data (1 July 2017- 30 June 2018), url; International Crisis Group, Latest updates, April 2018,
url
431 ACLED, Real Time data (1 July 2017- 30 June 2018), url; International Crisis Group, Latest updates, April 2018,
url; Daily Trust, How Zamfara lost 138 lives to banditry in 3 months, 22 April 2018, url
432 Daily Trust, How Zamfara lost 138 lives to banditry in 3 months, 22 April 2018, url
433 Vanguard, Breaking: 13 killed as cattle rustlers attack Zamfara village, 3 May 2018, url
434 IRIN, Zamfara: Nigeria’s wild northwest, 13 September 2018, url
435 AI, Nigeria: Thousands living in fear as Zamfara armed bandits ramp up attacks, 31 July 2018, url
436 BBC, Nigeria gunmen kill cinema-goers in Zamfara, 13 September 2018, url
437 IRIN, Zamfara: Nigeria’s wild northwest, 13 September 2018, url; Al Jazeera, Deadly cattle raids in Zamfara:
Nigeria’s ‘Ignored’ Crisis, 20 August 2018, url
438 International Crisis Group, Latest updates, August 2018, url

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3.4.7 Conflict-induced internal displacement
According to Amnesty International, ‘thousands of people have been displaced’ by the
conflict. After the above mentioned attack on 27 July 2018 on 18 villages in Zurmi LGA, ‘atleast 18,000 residents of the affected villages who were displaced over the weekend are now
taking refuge at various locations in the local government headquarters.’439

3.4.8 Further impact of the violence on the population
From January 2018 until 31 July 2018, at least 371 persons have been killed in the violence in
Zamfara State, according to Amnesty International.440
The ongoing banditry in Zamfara has reportedly claimed over 3 000 lives since 2011, thedestruction of over 2 000 homes and 500 cars, and the kidnapping of more than 500 people
for ransom. The Zamfara State government said it spent some 17 billion Naira in that period
on fighting the problem.441

3.5. Other manifestations of violence
3.5.1 Kaduna State: IMN
In Kaduna State, North West Zone, tension is amounting between the military and the Islamic
Movement in Nigeria (IMN), a Shia Muslim group in predominantly Sunni northern Nigeria. Its
leader, Sheikh Ibraheem Zakzaky, called for an ‘Islamic revolution’ in the 1980s. After its
members blocked the army chief, Lt Gen Tukur Buratai, from using a public road in thenorthern city of Zaria in Kaduna State in December 2015, soldiers opened fire on protesters
and supporters of IMN. Over the following two days more than 350 civilians and one soldier
were killed.442 An official inquiry into the Nigerian Army's response to the above-mentioned
clashes between 12 and 14 December 2015 has concluded that the army’s response was"disproportionate". The report of the Kaduna State Judicial Commission of Inquiry, releasedon 31July 2016, found that ‘349 members of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) were
killed during the clashes’. Human Rights Watch writes that this confirms their earlier findingsthat ‘more than 300 IMN members were killed by soldiers in a heavy-handed, unjustifiable
use of lethal force.’443
After the December 2015 clashes, the government detained the group’s injured leader, Sheikh
Ibraheem Zakzaky and his wife Malama Zeenah Ibrahim, sparking protests from followers in
Abuja and some other cities in the north of the country.444 Both were held in detention by the
Department of State Services (DSS) without charges for over two years, despite an order fromthe Federal High Court in Abuja ruling their release within 45 days of 2 December 2016.445
On 15 May 2018, the Kaduna State government arraigned El-Zakzaky and his wife at the
Kaduna State high court, charging them on eight counts including unlawful assembly, criminal
conspiracy and culpable homicide (causing the death of a soldier) which is punishable by

439 AI, Nigeria: Thousands living in fear as Zamfara armed bandits ramp up attacks, 31 July 2018, url
440 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the United Nations Office for West

Africa and the Sahel, (S/2018/649), 29 June 2018, url, p. 5; AI, Nigeria: Thousands living in fear as Zamfara armed
bandits ramp up attacks, 31 July 2018, url
441 Daily Trust, 3,000 killed, N17bn lost to bandits in Zamfara, 19 August 2018, url
442 For more information on IMN, see EASO, Country of Origin Information Report –Nigeria, 5 June 2017, url;
International Crisis Group, New Risks in Nigeria’s Shiite Fault Line, 16 December 2015, url
443 HRW, Dispatches: Nigerian Military Used Excessive Force Against Shia Group, 1 August 2016, url
444 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the United Nations Office for West
Africa and the Sahel, (S/2018/649), 29 June 2018 url, p. 4
445 Sahara Reporters, Falana Urges Shiites To Keep Protesting Until El-Zakzaky Regains Freedom, 16 April 2018,
url; USCIRF, Annual Report 2018, April 2018, url, p. 54

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death.446 Throughout the reporting period of 1 October 2017-30 September 2018, members
and supporters staged protests in Abuja, Kaduna, and some other cities, demanding theirrelease.447 Deaths were recorded in clashes between police and protesters448 and many
protesters are still held in detention. The Kaduna State government declared IMN unlawful
already in October 2016.449

3.5.2 South East Nigeria: Biafra
Another notable escalating tension is manifest in South East Nigeria with increasing violence
between the government and Igbo groups agitating for an independent republic of Biafra (theterritory of which would mainly be the Igbo-populated states Ebonyi, Enugu, Anambra, Imo,
Abia450). Since 1970, the Igbo have been striving for an independent republic of Biafra, andincreasingly so since the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra(MASSOB) was founded in 1999451 and banned in 2001.452 Another, very active secessionist
group grew out of MASSOB: the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB).453 IPOB was founded in
2014.454
Between August 2015 and August 2016, Nigerian security forces led by the army conducted a
repressive campaign, extrajudicially killing at least 150 pro-Biafra agitators.455 In
September 2017, security forces cracked down on and arrested over 100 IPOB members in
Abia State.456 About 15 people were reportedly killed in this security operation, while the army
invaded the home of the IPOB leader – who disappeared in the turmoil.457
After this action, the military declared IPOB a terrorist organisation.458 This decision wasendorsed by the Nigerian government but rejected by many Nigerians and international
observers.459 On 20 September 2017, the Federal High Court in Abuja gave legal backing by
granting an order filed by the Attorney-General of the Federation (AGF) and declared the

446 Premium Times, Shiite leader El-Zakzaky brought to court, charged with murder, 15 May 2018, url
447 Sahara Reporters, Shiite Members Vow To Continue Massive 'Free El-Zakzaky' Protest, 5 April 2018, url;

USCIRF, Annual Report 2018, April 2018, url, p. 54
448 Sahara Reporters, At Least Three Shi’tes, One Policeman Killed As Kaduna Court Continues Trial Of El-Zakzaky,
Wife, 21 June 2018, url
449 IBT, Kaduna state in Nigeria bans Shia organisation IMN calling it unlawful society, 8 October 2016, url
450 International Crisis Group, Nigeria’s Biafra Separatist Upsurge, 4 December 2015, url
451 Canada: IRB, Nigeria: Situation and treatment of members of the MASSOB, (2013-July 2016), 20 July
2016, NGA105577.E, url. For background, see International Crisis Group, Nigeria’s Biafra Separatist Upsurge, 4December 2015, url; and African Arguments, Nigeria: How to solve a problem like Biafra, 29 May 2017, url
452 Canada: IRB, Nigeria: Treatment of members of the MASSOB; (June 2002-July 2004), 13 July 2004,
NGA42750.FE, available at: url
453 Tayo, S., Mbah, F., Calls for Biafran Independence Return to South East Nigeria, 9 November 2017, url; seealso Canada: IRB, Nigeria: Situation and treatment of members of the MASSOB, (2013-July 2016), 20 July
2016, NGA105577.E, url, and Canada, IRB, Nigeria: The Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), (2014-October 2016),
NGA105658.E, 10 November 2016, url
454 BBC, Biafran leader Nnamdi Kanu: The man behind Nigeria’s separatists, 5 May 2017, url
455 AI, Nigeria: At least 150 peaceful pro-Biafra activists killed in chilling crackdown, 24 November 2016, url
456 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the United Nations Office for West
Africa and the Sahel (S/2017/1104), 26 December 2017, url, p .4. For detailed information on MASSOB and IPOB,
see EASO COI report Nigeria, Targeting of individuals, November 2018, url. For IPOB organisation and treatmentof members, see Canada, IRB, Nigeria: The Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), (2014-October 2016),
NGA105658.E, 10 November 2016, url
457 The Guardian, Many feared killed as soldiers lay siege to Nnamdi Kanu’s home, 13 September 2017, url
458 Daily Trust, Military declares ipob terrorist organization, 16 September 2017, url; Sahara Reporters,
BREAKING: Nigerian Military Declares IPOB Terrorist Organization, 15 September 2017, url
459 Chatham House, Calls for Biafran Independence Return to South East Nigeria, 9 November 2017, url

66 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATION

activities of IPOB as ‘acts of terrorism and illegality’.460 Many IPOB and MASSOB members are
in detention.461
According to ACLED data, in the reporting period 1 October 2017-30 September 2018, 52
incidents were reported in South East zone, resulting in 412 fatalities. It should be noted thatseveral incidents with an unknown number of fatalities (often referred to as ‘scores’, ‘several’,‘many’, or ‘large number’) were registered, and as explained in the Introduction, such
incidents are counted as 10 fatalities. Table 6 presents the number of security incidents perstate and the number of deaths. The table also gives the number of incidents and fatalities ofincidents categorised as ‘violence against civilians’. In Enugu state the highest number ofviolent incidents took place.462
Table 6. Incidents of violence and fatalities in South East Nigeria, ‘Biafra’,
1 October 2017 – 30 September 2018
TotalsViolence against civilians

Zone
Nr Incidents

Nr Fatalities

Nr incidents

Nr Fatalities

Abia

17

38

5

17

Anambra

35

8

8

5

Ebonyi

23

42

7

15

Enugu

44

16

13

14

Imo

21

6

3

Total

140

110

4
37

54

Source: ACLED463

The topics of IMN and Biafra are discussed in more detail in EASO COI report Nigeria, Targeting
individuals, November 2018.

3.5.3 Violent crime
Apart from the above mentioned regional conflicts, an increasing level of violence andfirearms proliferation is noted across the country, particularly manifesting in ransom
kidnapping along highways, armed robbery and other forms of violent crime.464 This violence
constitutes serious security and public safety concerns in Nigeria.465

460 Sahara Reporters, Nigerian Court Proscribes IPOB, Declares It Terrorist Organization, 20 September 2017 url
461 Daily Post, “Biafra: IPOB leader, Ezeanachukwu demands release of detained members, offers self”, 25

February 2018, url; Premium Times, “Biafra: Why we arrested peaceful MASSOB protesters – Police”, 23 May
2018, url
462 ACLED, Real Time data (1 October 2017- 30 September 2018), url
463 ACLED, Real Time data (1 October 2017- 30 September 2018), url
464 US DoS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2017 – Nigeria, url
465 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the United Nations Office for West
Africa and the Sahel, (S/2018/649), 29 June 2018 url, p. 4; US DoS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices2017 – Nigeria, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATION— 67

Annex 1 Incidents and fatalities 1 October 2017 - 30 September
2018
The table below shows the number of incidents and the number of fatalities per state (basedon ACLED data466) in the period 1 October 2017 until 30 September 2018, compared to thetotal population (data 2016467). The table shows three sets of data:
1) Total number of violent incidents and fatalities.
Of these totals, two sub-sets are presented:2) Incidents that are categorised as ‘violence against civilians’ and the fatalities
3) Remote violence (e.g. car bombs, IEDs)
Table 7. Comparison of incidents of violence and fatalities by state,
1 October 2017 – 30 September 2018
Total violent
incidents
STATE

Violence against
civilians

Remote violence

Population
Nr
Incidents

Nr
Fatalities

Nr
incidents

Nr
Fatalities

Nr
Incidents

Nr
Fatalities

Abia

3,727,347

17

38

5

17

2

0

Adamawa

4,248,436

90

522

54

351

8

50

Akwa Ibom

5,482,177

24

50

9

16

0

0

Anambra5,527,809

35

8

8

5

0

0

Bauchi

6,537,314

7

4

1

0

0

0

Bayelsa

2,277,961

37

39

16

20

0

0

Benue

5,741,815

145

611

92

499

0

0

Borno

5,860,183

351

2422

70

512

46

721

Cross River

3,866,269

41

52

12

26

0

0

Delta

5,663,362

72

54

28

30

0

0

Ebonyi

2,880,383

23

42

7

15

0

0

Edo

4,235,595

41

21

13

14

0

0

Ekiti

3,270,798

52

16

16

13

0

0

Enugu

4,411,119

44

16

13

14

3

0

Abuja (Fed.
Cap.Terr.)

3,564,126

129

14

2

1

0

0

Gombe

3,256,962

4

2

2

1

0

0

Imo

5,408,756

21

6

4

3

0

0

466 ACLED, Real Time data (1 October 2017- 30 September 2018), url
467 Nigeria, NBS (National Bureau of Statistics), Population of Nigeria 2016, available at: url

68 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATION

Jigawa5,828,163

5

3

2

1

0

0

Kaduna8,252,366

77

222

35

181

0

0

Kano

13,076,892

13

4

1

1

0

0

Katsina

7,831,319

6

4

3

4

1

0

Kebbi

4,440,050

9

14

3

3

0

0

Kogi

4,473,490

34

116

22

102

0

0

Kwara

3,192,893

23

7

4

3

0

0

Lagos

12,550,598

77

23

7

4

0

0

Nasarawa

2,523,395

80

301

57

251

0

0

Niger

5,556,247

7

6

2

3

0

0

Ogun

5,217,716

26

11

5

5

0

0

Ondo

4,671,695

54

14

16

9

0

0

Osun

4,705,589

21

0

4

0

0

0

Oyo

7,840,864

46

15

6

7

0

0

Plateau

4,200,442

137

583

109

502

0

0

Rivers7,303,924

43

58

13

52

1

0

Sokoto4,998,090

15

36

12

24

0

0

Taraba3,066,834

73

301

51

259

0

0

Yobe

3,294,137

21

64

5

7

2

20

Zamfara4,515,427

52

412

27

308

7

40

Total

193,500,543

1952

6111

736

3263

70

831

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATION— 69

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2018

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Annex 3: Terms of Reference
Introduction on Nigeria
Administrative division: the 6 geopolitical zones and general informaiton

Security situation
1. General description of the security situation since June 2017
1.1. Overview of current conflicts in Nigeria
1.1.1.Background to the current/most recent conflicts (before June 2017)
1.2. Armed confrontations in the territory of Nigeria
PartiesGeographical scope (which areas does the conflict affect, including roadsecurity)
Security trends (quantitative (e.g. number of incidents and casualties) andqualitative (methods and tactics used))
1.3. Actors in the conflict
1.3.1.State’s armed forces
Army
Police (only if they are actors in the conflict)
National intelligenceSpecial forces/counter-terrorism
Structure and command
Tasks in relation to the conflicts
Methods and tactics (in relation to engagement in the conflict)
Presence/control (geographical) and capacity
Attributed civilian casualties
1.3.2.Boko Haram
1.3.3. Militias in Niger Delta
1.3.4. Inter- and intra-ethnic conflicts (incl. Indigenes-settlers/farmers-herders)

2. Description of the security situation per zone (where applicable; only zones where aconflict is)
The general reference period is 1 July 2017 – 30 June 2018. (this period was later changed
into: 1 October 2017-30 September 2018). If relevant, background information and significant
incidents which predate this period may also be included.

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For the more detailed description of the security situation per zone, the following aspects
need to be addressed:
2.1. General description of the region (terrain, urban areas, population)
2.2. Actors in the conflict active in the region and areas of control
2.3. Recent security trends
Number and kind of incidents
Number of civilian casualties (deaths and injured)
2.4. Tactics used (such as:
Bombings by air, artillery and mortars, air raids
Massive bombings, explosives, suicide attacks, IED, RCIED, VOIED, VBIED,BBIED, mines
Landmines and booby traps
Shootings, direct confrontations/ground battles, snipers
Death squads and executions
Guerrilla attacks/asymmetric warfare/multiple and complex attacks
Surprise attacks/sweeps/raids
Siege, terre brûlée
Sexual violence as a war strategy
Lootings
Criminal activities related to the conflict (e.g. in case of breakdown of law andorder)
Expulsion, forced stay/civilian shields
2.5. Targets - If info available - such as:
Civilian targets and population, military targets, government infrastructure,humanitarian organisations – impact on urban areas and dwellings,
crowded/public places, markets/shops, schools, places of worship, places ofrecreation, hospitals, cultural property, roads and transport systems, airfields
NB: targets can also be discussed under tactics 2.4.
2.6. Impact of violence on state ability to secure law & order (incl state failure) (this isabout presence of gov.institutions in conflict areas)
2.6.1.General criminality
2.6.2.Government institutions
2.6.3.Judiciary very brief, crosslink to State actors of protection
Detention (prison conditions) very brief, crosslink to State actors of protection
2.7. Conflict-induced internal displacement
IDPs and migration from the area
IDPs and returnees to the area
2.8. Other impact of the violence on the civilian population (general) if needed – in theconflict areas
Freedom of movement
Impact on available infrastructureEASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT: NIGERIA - SECURITY SITUATION— 95

Children/women (if there is specific impact, other than sexual violence as atactic in armed conflict)
Access to health care
Access to (basic) education (link to Boko Haram in Targeted Profiles)

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doi: 10.2847/773880