Country of Origin Information

August 2022

Syria: Socio-economic
situation in
Damascus citySyria: Socio-economic situation in Damascus
cityCountry of Origin Information ReportAugust 2022

Manuscript completed in August 2022
Neither the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) nor any person acting on behalf of the
EUAA is responsible for the use that might be made of the information contained within thispublication.
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2022
PDF

ISBN 978-92-9400-452-9 doi: 10.2847/322808 BZ-07-22-810-EN-N© European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), 2022
Cover photo/illustration: Ancient bazar in old city Damascus, Mohammad Ali Bazzi, 2019.
© iStock.com, ID:1146935238, url
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. For any use or reproductionof photos or other material that is not under the EUAA copyright, permission must be sought
directly from the copyright holders.

SYRIA: SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN DAMASCUS CITY – COI REPORT

Acknowledgements
This report was co-drafted by the European Union Agency for Asylum COI Sector and theAustrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation (ACCORD).

The following departments and organisations have reviewed the report:•

Belgium, Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons,
Cedoca (Centre for Documentation and Research)•

Denmark, Danish Immigration Service

It must be noted that the review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts ororganisations contributes to the overall quality of the report, but does not necessarily imply
their formal endorsement of the final report, which is the full responsibility of the EUAA.

5

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMContents
Acknowledgements............................................................................................................ 5Contents ............................................................................................................................ 6
Disclaimer .......................................................................................................................... 8
Glossary and abbreviations ................................................................................................ 9
Introduction ......................................................................................................................10
Methodology.............................................................................................................................................. 10
Defining the terms of reference ..................................................................................... 10
Collecting information........................................................................................................ 10
Quality control ........................................................................................................................11
Sources ..........................................................................................................................................................11
Structure and use of the report.............................................................................................................11
Map of the Syrian Arab Republic ....................................................................................... 12
1.

City overview ......................................................................................................... 13
1.1. Demographics, ethno-religious composition .........................................................................14

2.

Internal mobility .....................................................................................................162.1. Airports and flights connections .................................................................................................162.2. Freedom of movement................................................................................................................... 17
2.3. Travel by road and through checkpoints ................................................................................192.3.1. Number and location of checkpoints ................................................................192.3.2. Procedures at checkpoints ...................................................................................21
2.3.3. Treatment at checkpoints.....................................................................................222.3.4. Factors influencing scrutiny at checkpoints...................................................23
2.3.5. Damascus International Airport and Damascus-Beirut roads .................24
2.4. Restrictions on access and return to certain areas in Damascus..................................25
2.4.1. Al-Qaboun..................................................................................................................25
2.4.2. Yarmouk......................................................................................................................26
2.4.3. Jobar ............................................................................................................................28
2.5. Settling in Damascus .....................................................................................................................29
2.6. Civil documentation required for travel and access to services ................................... 30

3.

Key socio-economic indicators .............................................................................. 34

6

SYRIA: SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN DAMASCUS CITY – COI REPORT

3.1. Economic overview ........................................................................................................................34
3.1.1. Economic situation ..................................................................................................34
3.1.2. Impact of economic sanctions ............................................................................38
3.1.3. Impact of Covid-19...................................................................................................39
3.2. Employment ......................................................................................................................................39
3.2.1. Employment and unemployment.......................................................................39
3.2.2. Means of basic subsistence ............................................................................... 40
3.3. Poverty................................................................................................................................................423.4. Food Security....................................................................................................................................43
3.4.1. Availability of food...................................................................................................43
3.4.2. Food security levels................................................................................................45
3.5. Housing, water, and sanitation...................................................................................................46
3.5.1. Availability of housing............................................................................................46
3.5.2. Reconstruction projects ........................................................................................48
3.5.3. Legal issues affecting the housing situation .................................................49
3.5.4. Availability of water and sanitation .................................................................. 50
3.6. Health care .........................................................................................................................................51
3.6.1. Availability and access to treatment and medicines ...................................51
3.6.2. Healthcare facilities capacity and quality .......................................................52
3.6.3. Impact of Covid-19...................................................................................................53
3.7. Education ...........................................................................................................................................55
3.7.1. Legal background ...................................................................................................55
3.7.2. Availability of education........................................................................................55
3.7.3. Access to education ............................................................................................... 57
3.8. Humanitarian situation and assistance....................................................................................59
Annex 1: Bibliography........................................................................................................61
Oral sources, including anonymous sources ..................................................................................61
Public sources ............................................................................................................................................61
Annex 2: Terms of Reference ........................................................................................... 87

7

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Disclaimer
This report was written according to the EUAA COI Report Methodology (2019). The report isbased on carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced.
The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed withutmost care. However, this document does not claim to be exhaustive. If a particular event,person or organisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has
not taken place or that the person or organisation does not exist.
Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particularapplication for international protection. Terminology used should not be regarded asindicative of a particular legal position.
‘Refugee’, ‘risk’ and similar terminology are used as generic terminology and not in the legal
sense as applied in the EU Asylum Acquis, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.
Neither the EUAA, nor any person acting on its behalf, may be held responsible for the use
which may be made of the information contained in this report.
On 19 January 2022, the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) became the European
Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA). All references to EASO, EASO products and bodies should
be understood as references to the EUAA.
The drafting of this report was finalised on 23 August 2022. Any event taking place after thisdate is not included in this report. More information on the reference period for this report canbe found in the methodology section of the Introduction.

8

SYRIA: SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN DAMASCUS CITY – COI REPORTGlossary and abbreviations
Term

Definition

DAM

International airport code for Damascus International Airport

GoS

Government of Syria

HLP

Housing, Land and Property

HNO

Humanitarian Needs Overview

IDP

Internally Displaced Person

INGO

International Non-Governmental Organisation

MoEFT

Ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade

MoF

Ministry of Financemukhtar

Mayor or chief of a village/neighbourhood

NCC

National Coordination Committee

PHC

Public Health Centre

PRS

Palestinian Refugees from Syria

SNHR

Syrian Network for Human Rights

SYP

Syrian Pound

UNOCHA

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

Yarmouk camp

Main refugee camp for Palestinians; located in Damascus city9EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Introduction
The purpose of this report is to provide relevant information for the assessment ofinternational protection status determination, including refugee status and subsidiary
protection.
The report covers the period of April 2021 - July 2022, and it is an update of the EUAA COI
Report: Syria - Socio-economic situation: Damascus City, published in April 2021. It provides
relevant information regarding the socio-economic situation in the city of Damascus, including
information about internal mobility and freedom of movement. This will inform the update of
the chapter on Internal Protection Alternative within the EUAA Country Guidance on Syria
2022.

Methodology
This report was jointly drafted by EUAA and ACCORD, and reviewed by EUAA and national
COI departments in EU+ countries1 mentioned in the Acknowledgements section.
This report is produced in line with the EUAA COI Report Methodology (2019)2 and the EUAA
COI Writing and Referencing Guide (2019).3

Defining the terms of reference
The terms of reference (ToR) of this report were defined by the EUAA based on discussions
held and input received from COI experts in the EUAA COI specialist network on Syria andfrom policy experts in EU+ countries4 within the framework of a Country Guidancedevelopment on Syria.
The ToR for this report can be found in the Annex II: Terms of Reference.

Collecting information
The information gathered is a result of research using public, specialised paper -based andelectronic sources until 20 July 2022. Some additional information was added during thefinalisation of this report in response to feedback received from the peer review and quality
control process, up until 23 August 2022.
Value of Syrian currency
During the reference period for this report Syria has witnessed multiple large-scale
fluctuations in the exchange rate between the Syrian pound (SYP) and US dollar. Throughout
1

EU Member States plus Norway and Switzerland.
EUAA, EUAA Country of Origin Information (COI) Report Methodology, June 2019, url
3
EUAA, Writing and Referencing Guide for EUAA Country of Origin Information (COI) Reports, June 2019, url
4
All EU Member States plus Norway and Switzerland
2

10

SYRIA: SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN DAMASCUS CITY – COI REPORT

this document, Syrian currency was converted to US dollars according to the informal
exchange rate valid in Damascus at the time each respective source was published. This wasdone to provide information as close to reality as possible on the actual purchasing power of
the Syrian pound at the respective time of writing. Information on applicable exchange rates
was taken from the United Nations World Food Programme’s (WFP) monthly Market Price
Watch Bulletins (see url), which include a table indicating the informal exchange rates valid ineach governorate in the respective month, since these rates slightly vary per governorate andmonth. In case a source has already made its own conversion into USD, the figures weretaken from the respective source and the conversion based on the informal exchange rate
was indicated in a footnote. However, due to the rapidly fluctuating exchange rate, converted
currency data presented in the document is not guaranteed to be completely
current/accurate.

Quality control
To ensure that the authors respected the EUAA COI Report Methodology and that the Termsof Reference were comprehensively addressed, a review was carried out by COI specialists
from the countries and organisations listed as reviewers in the Acknowledgements section. Allcomments made by the reviewers were taken into consideration and almost all of them were
implemented in the final draft of this report, which was finalised on 23 August 2022. EUAA
also performed the final quality review and editing of the text.

SourcesThis report largely relied on open-source information available through online desk-based
research, including from local media sources in Arabic. Among others, the report draws fromthe United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA)
Humanitarian Needs Overview on Syria published in February 2022.
In addition to the paper-based and electronic sources that were consulted, drafters conducted
an extensive interview in English with a Syrian academic from Damascus, who has rare accessto state military and security actors as well as employees at various government institutions in
the capital. The source preferred anonymity for security reasons and to ensure the safety of
his contacts.

Structure and use of the report
The report is structured in line with the Terms of Reference. The first chapter provides a brief
overview of the city of Damascus; the second chapter covers issues related to freedom of
movement and settling in the city, and the third chapter provides an overview of key socioeconomic indicators for Damascus.

11EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Map of the Syrian Arab Republic

Map 1: Syrian Arab Republic, © United Nations55

Syrian Arab Republic, Map No. 4204 Rev. 3, April 2012, United Nations, url

12

SYRIA: SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN DAMASCUS CITY – COI REPORT

1.

City overview

Damascus is the capital of the Syrian Arab Republic, located in the south-west of the country.
It is surrounded by the territories of the Governorate of Rural Damascus (or Rif Dimashq). 6 The
city and the governorate of Damascus cover the same area and are divided into 16 main
administrative districts: Barzeh, Qaboun, Jobar, Al-Shaghour, Al-Midan, Al-Qadam, Kafr Sousa,
Dummar, Al-Mazzeh, Rukn Al-Din, Al-Salihiyah, Al- Mouhajireen, Saroujah, Al-Qanawat, Old
Damascus, and Yarmouk camp.7 The administrative boundaries between the city of Damascus
and Rural Damascus have been disputed and boundaries may vary according to different
sources.8

Map 2: Damascus governorate, © MapAction96

Abdin, Y., The Fragility of Community Security in Damascus and its Environs, International Review of the Red
Cross, (IRRC No. 906), April 2019, url, pp. 901-902
7
Abdin, Y., The Fragility of Community Security in Damascus and its Environs, International Review of the Red
Cross, (IRRC No. 906), April 2019, url, p. 901
8Ezzi, M., On the Edge of the Capital: Social Engineering in North-Eastern Damascus, EUI, 5 November 2021, url, p.
89Mapaction, Syria 2013-2015, Rural Damascus Governorate [map], last updated:29 July 2016, url

13

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

1.1.

Demographics, ethno-religious composition

The latest obtainable official figures released by the Syrian Central Bureau of Statistics
estimated the population of the Governorate of Damascus at 2 103 405 as of 2021.10 The US
government’s CIA World Factbook gave an estimate of 2 503 000 million as of 202211, while
UNOCHA estimated the population to be of be 1 828 845.12
Accurate and updated information on the ethno-religious composition of Damascus could not
be found. In its report on religious freedoms in Syria for 2021, the US Department of State(USDOS) reported on the presence of Sunni Arabs, Alawites, Twelver Shia, and Christians in
Damascus, without specifying the size of the communities. 13
A Syrian academic from Damascus, who has access to state military and security actors aswell as employees at various government institutions in the capital, explained that the various
neighbourhoods of Damascus generally have a mixed ethno-religious make up. However,there are certain areas of the city where a specific ethnic, religious, or sect compose themajority of its residents.14 The area of Rukn al-Din for instance is known for its Kurdish
population and residents of Circassian origin. 15 While Kurds live in all areas of Damascus, they
considered the neighbourhood of Rukn al-Din as their ‘capital’, next to the neighbourhood of
Zorava (Wadi Al-Mashari’).16 The area of Bab Touma is the historic Christian neighbourhood ofDamascus. Christians, including Christian IDPs, are further known to live in Jaramana andDwel'a, where many live in poverty.17 Alawites make up the majority of residents inneighbourhoods such as Mazzeh 8618, Nahr Aisha,19 Ish al-Warwar 20 and the Baathneighbourhood of the Tishreen settlement,21 among others. The past ten years of war havecaused demographic shifts in the ethno-religious composition of Damascus.22
Sources allege that the Government of Syria (GoS) has been influencing demographic change
in Damascus 23 with the aim to reduce the Sunnis’ majority share of the population. Eviction
10

Syria, Central Bureau of Statistics, Estimate of the Population in Syria by Governorates, Chapter 2, Table 4/2, n.d.,url
11US, CIA, The World Factbook, Middle East: Syria, people and society, last updated 24 June 2022, url
12
UNOCHA, 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 23
13
USDOS, 2021 Report on International Religious Freedom: Syria, 2 June 2022, url, pp. 3-4
14
A Syrian academic from Damascus, interview, 3 March 2022
15
COAR, Left Behind: Family Separation and Its Impacts in Three Damascus Neighbourhoods, 26 January 2 022, url,
p. 5
16
Raseef22, ‫ عاصمة أكراد دمشق‬...‫[ ركن الدين‬Rukn al-Din… Capital of the Kurds of Damascus], 13 August 2021, url
17
ACN, Syria: The Christian Hope Centre in Damascus, 12 August 2 021, url
18
Syria Report (The), Alternative Housing for Owners of Properties at Risk of Collapse in Informal Settlement
Mazzeh 86, 21 December 2021, url
19
COAR, Left Behind: Family Separation and Its Impacts in Three Damascus Neighbourhoods, 26 January 2022, url,p. 5
20Ezzi, M., On the Edge of the Capital: Social Engineering in North-Eastern Damascus, EUI, 5 November 2021, url,p. 17
21
Ezzi, M., On the Edge of the Capital: Social Engineering in North-Eastern Damascus, EUI, 5 November 2021, url,p. 15
22
Syrian academic from Damascus, interview, 3 March 2022
23
Alma, The Ousting of the Sunni Mufti of Syria, 5 December 2021, url; Ezzi, M., On the Edge of the Capital: Social
Engineering in North-Eastern Damascus, EUI, 5 November 2021, url, pp. 10-11, 14-15; New Arab (The), ‫تغيير ديموغرافي‬‫ النظام يوسع نطاق االستيالء على العقارات‬:‫[ لدمشق‬Demographic change for Damascus: Regime expands real estate

14

SYRIA: SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN DAMASCUS CITY – COI REPORTand expropriation procedures occured in tightly occupied areas on the peripheries of large
cities, such as Damascus. Less affluent Sunnis moved to the cities’ outskirts from thecountryside prior to the start of the war. Over time, areas such as Ghouta, east of Damascus,
became strongholds against the GoS. Since the areas were recaptured by the GoS, it has
started dispensing real estate among its followers. The [Exceptional Planning and
Urbanization] Law No. 10, issued in April 2018, provides GoS’ authorities the ability toappropriate property, if home owners do not submit ownership documents to the Syrian
authority within one year 24 making it particularly difficult for refugees to assert ownership
claims.25 One area where expropriation was allegedly happening is the area of Al-Qaboun [innorthern Damascus]26 (For additional information see subsection 2.4.Restrictions on accessand return to certain areas in Damascus. The GoS has reportedly used Law No. 10 and thereorganisation of northern Damascus as a way to empty all of the areas that played an
important role in the revolution and to replace the population with supporters of Bashar AlAssad.27 For further information on Law No. 10, see section 3.6 of the EUAA COI Report: Syria Socio-economic situation: Damascus City (February 2020).
Noon Post, a website specialised in reports and analyses on the Arab world, reported that Iran
had been buying real estate in Damascus’ old neighbourhoods, including in Al-Amara, AlAmin, Al-Shaghour and Al-Jura, with an Iranian housing project set up in the neighbourhood of
Al-Mazzeh, and encouraged Iranian companies and citizens to buy property in Damascus. 28

takeover], 26 September 2021, url; Buchen, S. and Tadmory, S., Mass expropriation in Syria, How Assad ispreventing the return of refugees, 31 March 2021, url
24
Initially the law stipulated a period of one month for submission of ownership documents. The Day After, Realityof Housing, Land, and Property Rights in Syria, December 2020, url, p. 90
25
Buchen, S. and Tadmory, S., Mass expropriation in Syria, How Assad is preventing the return of refugees, 31
March 2021, url
In theory, the law allows an owner’s relatives (up to 4th degree relatives) to submit documents on behalf of theowner, although sources have been sceptical about the applicability. (see: The Day After, Reality of Housing, Land,
and Property Rights in Syria, December 2020, url, p. 90)
26
Ezzi, M., On the Edge of the Capital: Social Engineering in North-Eastern Damascus, EUI, 5 November 2021, url,p. 11
27
New Arab (The), ‫ النظام يوسع نطاق االستيالء على العقارات‬:‫[ تغيير ديموغرافي لدمشق‬Demographic change for Damascus:
Regime expands real estate takeover], 26 September 2021, url
28
Noon Post, ‫ عائالت عناصر الميليشيات الشيعية يستوطنون بيوت المهجّرين‬:‫[ سوريا‬Syria: families of shiite militiamen settle inhomes for displaced people], 23 December 2021, url; EPC, Dealing with Iran’s Demographic and Soft-Power
Programs in Syria, 8 February 2022, url

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

2.

Internal mobility

2.1.

Airports and flights connections

Damascus International Airport (DAM) is located 30 km south-east of downtown Damascus;
about 30 minutes by car.29 The Air Force Intelligence Service is responsible for all mattersconcerning aviation. Air Force Intelligence personnel are stationed at all civilian and military
airports in Syria. The service falls under the Ministry of Defence and is connected to the
National Security Bureau.30 According to a confidential source cited by the Netherlands
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Air Force Intelligence Service is known for arrests and for
conducting torture.31
Several security incidents occurred near the airport during the reporting period. Sites inside
and around Damascus International Airport were targeted by Israeli air strikes on different
occasions in 2021 32 and 2022.33 The airport is situated in the vicinity of Iranian militias’
ammunition sites 34 and Lebanese Hezbollah bases.35 News articles stated that Iran is believed
to transfer arms through Damascus International Airport. 36
On 10 June 2022 Israeli airstrikes hit Damascus International Airport, injuring one civilian andcausing damage to runways. The following day, the airport suspended all flights. 37 Israeli
media claimed the attack sought to target arms depots belonging to Iranian-backed armed
groups.38 Syrian authorities announced the reopening of the airport and resumption of flights
on 23 June 2022.39

29

Damascus International airport, Maps of Damascus Airport, n.d., url
Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of origin information report Syria, June 2021, url, p. 16
31
Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of origin information report Syria, June 2021, url, p. 16
32
Asharq Al-Awsat, US Report Confirms Israel's Targeting of Damascus Int'l Airport Runway, 19 December 2021, url;
Al Jazeera, ‫[ النظام السوري يعلن تصديه لهجوم صاروخي إسرائيلي في محيط دمشق‬The Syrian regime announces its response toan Israeli missile attack in the vicinity of Damascus], 3 September 2021, url; Jerusalem Post (The), 4 Syrian soldiersinjured in alleged Israeli airstrikes on Damascus, 8 April 2021, url
33
Reuters, Iran says Israel will pay for Syria attack that killed 2 Revolutionary Guards, 9 March 2022, url; Al Jazeera,
Syria: Two civilians killed in Israeli attack near Damascus, 7 March 2022 , url
34France24, Israeli strike kills three Syrian soldiers near Damascus, Syrian ministry, 22 July 2022, url; Jerusalem
Post (The), 4 Syrian soldiers injured in alleged Israeli airstrikes on Damascus, 8 April 2021, url; Arab Weekly (The),
Israeli missiles target Iranian militia sites near Damascus, 17 March 2021, url
35
Syria TV, ‫[ أنشطة لحزب هللا غربي مطار دمشق وإسرائيل تتتبع الطائرات اإليرانية‬Hezbollah activities west of Damascus airportand Israel tracks Iranian planes], 8 April 2021, url
36
Times of Israel (The), Israel said to target army base near Damascus used by Iranian forces, 17 February 2022, url;
Enab Baladi, Iran’s network of influence increasing at eastern Aleppo country’s airports, 6 October 2021, url
37
Al Jazeera, ‘Heavy’ damage to Damascus airport confirmed after Israeli attack, 11 June 2022, url; Syria’s
Damascus airport flights suspended after Israeli attack, 10 June 2022, url; Washington Post (The), Syria says
Damascus airport operations suspended after Israeli strikes, 14 June 2022, url; UNOCHA, United Nations Resident
Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator in Syria, Imran Riza statement on the closure of Damascus Airport[EN/AR], 13 June 2022, url
38
Times of Israel, Flights resume at Damascus airport nearly 2 weeks after strike attributed to Israel, 24 June 2022,
url
39
Reuters, Syria's Damascus airport to resume operations on June 23 -state media, 22 June 2022, url; Asharq AlAwsat, Damascus Airport Resumes Operations, 23 June 2022, url
30

16

SYRIA: SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN DAMASCUS CITY – COI REPORTThe Damascus Airport Website shows flights arriving from Iran (Mashhad, Tehran), Iraq (AlNajaf, Baghdad, Basra, Erbil), Kuwait, Lebanon (Beirut), Oman (Muscat), Pakistan (Karachi),
Qatar (Doha), Russia (Moscow), Sudan (Khartoum) and UAE (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah).40
According to different sources, Jordan agreed to resume flights to Damascus as of 3 October
2021.41 Asharq Al-Awsat reported that Iran resumed flights for pilgrimage purposes toDamascus as of 2 January 2022.42
The flight tracker FlightConnections which provides information about flights for the current
month, indicated that as of August 2022 international flight routes from Damascus were being
operated to Dubai, Erbil, Baghdad, Al-Najaf, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Basra, Doha, Karachi, andKhartoum. Airlines flying to Damascus include Fly Baghdad, Syrian Air, Pakistan and Badr
Airlines. No internal flights were operated from Damascus.43
With regards to restrictions related to the COVID-19 pandemic, as of 30 June 2022 fully
vaccinated travellers to the country are exempt from providing a negative PCR test result, aslong as they can provide an official certification proving that they were fully vaccinated aminimum of 7 days before departure. Passengers younger than 12 years of age are also
exempt from having to provide a PCR test.44 Unvaccinated travellers continue to have to test
negative for COVID-19 with sources disagreeing on the time frame; either not more than 96
hours before arrival,45 or a maximum of 96 hours before departure from their first embarkation
point. In addition, a completed passenger locator form must be presented upon arrival. 46
For information on access to Damascus airport see section 2.3.5 Damascus International
Airport and Damascus-Beirut roads.

2.2.

Freedom of movement

The Syrian Constitution provides for freedom of movement of citizens unless ‘prevented by adecision from the competent court or the public prosecution office or in accordance with thelaws of public health and safety’.47 However, according to Freedom House, freedom of
movement in Syria in 2021 was ‘severely restricted’ due to ongoing combat and ‘proliferationof regime and militia checkpoints’.48 The US Department of State (USDOS) noted that the GoS‘expanded security checkpoints into civilian areas to monitor and limit movement’. 49 According
to a Bertelsmann Stiftung report from 2022, restrictions of movement were influenced byperceived political affiliation. Communities perceived as disloyal were restricted more severely

40

Damascus international airport, Damascus airport timetable, n. d., accessed on 23 February 2022, url; Damascus
international airport, Destinations, n.d., accessed on 5 April 2022, url
41
MEMO, Jordan to resume flights to Damascus, 28 September 2021, url; Crisis24, Jordan: Authorities to resume
flights to Damascus, Syria, from Oct. 3 /update 76, 29 September 2021, url
42Asharq Al-Awsat, Iran Resumes Religious Flights to Damascus, 3 January 2022, url
43FlightConnections, Direct flights to Damascus (DAM), last updated 23 August 2022, url
44
ICAO, Status of Airports Operability and Restriction Information – Mid Region, 30 June 2022, url, p. 7
45
Crisis24, Syria: Authorities maintain precautionary COVID-19 measures as of Aug. 1 /update 22, 31 July 2022, url
46
ICAO, Status of Airports Operability and Restriction Information – Mid Region, 30 June 2022, url, p. 7
47
Syria, Constitution of the Syrian Arab Republic, 2012, url, art. 38/3
48
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2022: Syria, 28 February 2022, url
49
USDOS, 2021 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Syria, 12 April 2022 , url, p. 49

17

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

than those in areas perceived as loyal. 50 The Independent International Commission of Inquiry
on the Syrian Arab Republic reported that the GoS imposed restrictions on freedom of
movement51 and deprived individuals of their property in areas previously held by the
opposition.52 According to confidential sources interviewed by the Netherlands Ministry ofForeign Affairs in February and March 2022, in practice persons could not travel freely
between GoS-controlled territory and territories under the control of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham(HTS) or the Syrian National Army (SNA). Travel between GoS-controlled territory and areas
under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) was possible for those residing in thecities of Hasaka and Qamishli, where GoS retains some presence and control.53
A lack of civil documentation, especially for IDPs, prevented people from moving throughcheckpoints, thereby inhibiting their freedom to move, and to seek essential services. 54 About
33 % of the returnees in GoS areas 55 interviewed by Voices for Displaced Syrians (VDSF) and(Operations & Policy Centre (OPC) 56 field teams during September 2021 reported that they
considered military checkpoints the main reason for restricted movement. Additional reasons
included the absence of rule of law (more than 13 %), general concerns about safety (almost
11 %), active conflict (about 10 %) and kidnapping (about 8,5 %).57
Information on COVID-19 related measures restricting the freedom of movement of residents
in Damascus during the reporting period was scarce. As of December 2021, people who were
not vaccinated against COVID-19 were not allowed to enter certain public premises inDamascus, such as the General Administration of Immigration and Passports building. 58 The
ministers of education and culture also announced limited access for certain groups ofunvaccinated people into their buildings and to certain events.59

50

Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2022 Country Report — Syria, 2022, url, p. 32
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic [A/HRC/48/70], 13 August 2021, url, paras 20-21, 28
52
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic [A/HRC/48/70], 13 August 2021, url, paras 38, 42; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent
International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022 , url, paras 45, 50
53
Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Algemeen ambtsbericht Syrië [Country report Syria], May 2022, url,
p. 16
54
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 58
55
Interviewees in GoS-controlled areas were interviewed in Damascus and Jaramana, with a sample of 300
respondents, divided equally between residents, IDPs and returnees included. (See: VDSF and OPC, Is Syria Safe
for Return? Returnees’ Perspective, November 2021, url, p. 13)
56
Operations and Policy Center (OPC, formerly Orient Policy Center) is a Syrian-led and owned ‘independent thinktank and service provider. Established in 2014, OPC conducts original research and provides consulting services toenhance policymaking, development programs, and humanitarian response projects’ .
The report was conducted together with Voices for Displaced Syrians Forum (VDSF), which ‘ gathers 40+ Syrian civilsociety organizations operating in Syria and refugee-hosting countries, including Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, andIraq. Established in 2019, the VDSF advocates for the achievement of durable solutions to protect, respond to, andimprove the quality of life of displaced Syrians inside Syria and abroad’ . (See: VDSF and OPC, Is Syria Safe for
Return? Returnees’ Perspective, November 2021, url, p. 2)
57
VDSF and OPC, Is Syria Safe for Return? Returnees’ Perspective, November 2021, url, pp. 38-39
58
Tayyar, ‫ وزارة الداخلية تصدر تعميما يمنع دخول المراجعين غير المطعمين ضد كورونا إلى دوائرها‬.. ‫[ سوريا‬Syria.. Ministry ofInterior issues circular prohibiting people unvaccinated against corona from entering its buildings], (Source: SANA),
23 December 2021, url; Enab Baladi, ‫ الهجرة والجوازات تشترط تلقي لقاح “كورونا” للدخول إلى مراكزها‬..‫[ سوريا‬Syria..
Immigration and Passports agencies require corona vaccine to enter their centres], 23 December 2021, url
59
Enab Baladi, ‫ الهجرة والجوازات تشترط تلقي لقاح “كورونا” للدخول إلى مراكزها‬..‫[ سوريا‬Syria.. Immigration and Passports
agencies require corona vaccine to enter their centres], 23 December 2021, url
51

18

SYRIA: SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN DAMASCUS CITY – COI REPORT

Citizens were allowed to travel internationally but the GoS reportedly denied access to
passports and civil documentation based on political views, association with the opposition, or
geographical location associated with the opposition. USDOS stated that the GoS imposed
exit visa requirements and at times closed Damascus airport and border crossings. The same
source reported that the government ‘comprehensively banned international travel ofopposition members, often targeting any such individual who attempted to travel’ and citedhuman rights groups which reported that activists and their families feared being attacked at
airports and border crossings upon attempting to leave. 60 There was a nation-wide problem of
issuing passports, affecting the entire population, with citizens having to pay bribes to bookappointments to apply for a passport and having to wait for months to receive a new
passport.61

2.3.

Travel by road and through checkpoints

2.3.1.

Number and location of checkpoints

Information on the number and location of checkpoints was difficult to find and corroborate
during the reference period of this report.
There were checkpoints located on all roads going to Damascus, 62 on the main highways fromand to Dar’a, Homs and Beirut, at the entry of Damascus,63 as well as within the city.64 Inside
Damascus there were checkpoints near the security branches and on the way to thepresidential palace.65 As explained by a Syrian academic interviewed for this report, themajority of checkpoints within the city of Damascus today are mobile checkpoints, which aremainly staffed by the military police. It is their main aim to find young men, eligible for military
service. For this reason, mobile checkpoints are often positioned in areas, where it is known
that young men will gather.66 A driver interviewed by the New Arab 67 explained that it waspossible in some parts of Damascus to use side roads to avoid checkpoints, but there werestill major areas within Damascus, which were impossible to pass through without going
through checkpoints.68

60

USDOS, 2021 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Syria, 12 April 2022 , url, p. 50
COAR, Syria’s Passport Crisis Continues as ‘Reforms’ Create New Platform for Corruption, 28 February 2022, url
62
Denmark, DIS, Syria: Palestinians in Damascus and rural Damascus governorates [Source: Musaab Balchi,
Palestinian consultant, MENA real-time information analyst and former journalist based in Washington D.C.],
October 2021, url, p. 67
63
Syrian academic from Damascus, interview, 3 March 202264
Denmark, DIS, Syria: Palestinians in Damascus and rural Damascus governorates [Source: Musaab Balchi,
Palestinian consultant, MENA real-time information analyst and former journalist based in Washington D.C.],
October 2021, url, p. 67
65
Syrian academic from Damascus, interview, 3 March 2022
66
Syrian academic from Damascus, interview, 3 March 2022
67
The New Arab is a pan-Arab media outlet headquartered in London.
68
New Arab (The), ‫[ إتاوات حواجز النظام ترهق السوريين‬The royalties of the regime's barriers exhaust Syrians], 18 March
2021, url
61

19

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

According to the Syrian media platform 7al69, several checkpoints in Damascus have beengrouped and merged to form big checkpoints located around and at the entrances ofDamascus. These include the checkpoints of:
•
•
•
•
•

Centre (southern entrance of Damascus, controlled by the military security branch 227,
the general intelligence department and state security branch 251),
Najha (south-eastern entrance, controlled by the air force intelligence and the Palestinebranch),Sumariyya (western entrance, controlled by the air force intelligence and the military
security branch 215),
Baghdad Bridge (northern entrance, controlled by the air force intelligence) andYafour (eastern entrance, controlled by the 4th division security office). 70

In March 2022, Syria TV, a Istanbul-based television network, reported on the removal of oneof the biggest checkpoints of Damascus on the outskirts of Midan neighbourhood.71
The news network SY24 documented checkpoints in the following areas of Damascus city in
2021 and 2022: ‘Tropicana’ checkpoint in the area of Al-Adawi,72 a checkpoint in Bab AlJabiya,73 a checkpoint in the neighbourhood of Bab Sharqi 74 and a checkpoint on the roadleading from the area of Al-Adawi to Barzeh.75 Residents described widespread patrols androadblocks in the area of Dwel’a.76 In December 2021, government forces set up a temporary
checkpoint in the neighbourhood of Al-Shaghour, with several arrests recorded at thecheckpoint in less than an hour.77 A further checkpoint was located at the entrances of
Yarmouk Camp.78
According to SY24, a temporary checkpoint close to the Al-Nofra Café in Al-Qaymariya
neighbourhood was set up in September 2021.79 In December 2021, army personnel was
stationed next to the Al-Nofra Café in Al-Qaymariya neighbourhood, searching citizens who

69

7al is a Syrian news source that covers the local, regional and international news. 7al states that it is anindependent news source with no stated political agenda and it describes its purpose as providing non-biased
news and objective analyses. It is financed by Syrian Expatriates.
70
7al, ‫ هل ستقوم الحكومة السورية بإزالة حواجزها بعد “النصر”؟‬:‫[ الحواجز األمنية في دمشق‬Security barriers in Damascus: Will the
Syrian government remove its barriers after "victory"?], 18 January 2022, url
71
Syria TV, ‫[ النظام السوري يزيل أحد أكبر حواجزه األمنية في العاصمة دمشق‬Syrian regime removes one of its largest security
barriers in Damascus], 23 March 2022, url
72
SY24, ‫[ ! طابور جديد من السيارات في دمشق‬A new queue of cars in Damascus], 21 February 2022, url
73
SY24, ‫[ رصد أحد الحواجز العسكرية في حي باب الجابية بدمشق‬Monitoring one of the military checkpoints in Bab al-Jabiya
neighborhood in Damascus], 1 February2022, url
74
SY24, ‫ والذي يقوم بإخضاع جميع المارة لعمليات تفتيش‬،‫عدسة مراسلنا ترصد الحاجز العسكري للنظام في حي باب شرقي بمدينة دمشق‬‫”يصفها السكان بـ “المهينة‬. [Our correspondent's lens monitors the regime's military checkpoint in the bab sharqi
neighborhood of damascus, which subjects all passers-by to searches that residents describe as "degrading."], 31
December 2021, url
75
SY24, ‫ حاجز أمني بدمشق يضيق الخناق على أبناء الغوطة الشرقية‬..‫[ سيئ الصيت‬Notorious. Security checkpoint in Samascus
tightens the noose on the young men of Eastern Ghouta], 4 November 2021, url
76
SY24, ‫ هل باتت مناطق النظام وكراً للمافيات؟‬..‫ عملية خطف جديدة لطفل في دمشق‬, [New kidnapping of a child in Damascus.
Have the regime's areas become a mafia den?], 22 February 2022, url
77
SY24, ‫[ حملة جديدة للنظام في مدينة دمشق‬A new regime campaign in Damascus], 31 December 2021, url
78
Denmark, DIS, Syria: Palestinians in Damascus and rural Damascus governorates [Source: Musaab Balchi,
Palestinian consultant, MENA real-time information analyst and former journalist based in Washington D.C.],
October 2021, url, p. 67
79
SY24, ‫[ أمن النظام يالحق الشبان والدراجات النارية في دمشق وريفها‬Regime security pursues young men and motorcycles inDamascus and its countryside], 27 September 2021, url

20

SYRIA: SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN DAMASCUS CITY – COI REPORT

passed through the area, including women and the elderly. Furthermore, a bus carrying
military personnel from the security branch was stationed for several days in the Baramka
area, opposite the entrance of Damascus University. Students were randomly stopped andtheir IDs checked.80 Security checks were intensified at military checkpoints in February 2022.
Patrols increased and temporary checkpoints were set up in neighbourhoods of Damascus aswell as in the suburbs of the city.81

2.3.2.

Procedures at checkpoints

The procedure conducted at checkpoints depends on the location of the checkpoint, as wellas the personnel staffing it, as explained by the Syrian academic interviewed for this report. It
is generally mandatory to show an ID and men of military age should have their military
booklet on them. At checkpoints within the city borders, procedures are less strict than at the
major checkpoints surrounding the city. The checkpoints surrounding the city check names ofpeople passing through the checkpoint against a database of wanted persons by the four
major security branches of the government (military security, air force intelligence, state
security, and political security). This security check is known as ‘the quadruple’ security check.
Searches would not only result in information on the particular individual, but also on theirfamily members. Smaller checkpoints would generally not be able to conduct this ‘quadruple’
check, but rather a security check on one or some of the existing wanted lists. 82 Every
intelligence branch maintains their own wanted lists. In order for checkpoint security officers
to be able to search for a person’s name against their database, checkpoints are equippedwith computers. If a person’s name appears in the wanted list, the person gets arrested. 83
Interviewees told Human Rights Watch that in GoS-controlled areas people must show their ID
cards and might be asked to provide their reconciliation card (for those from retaken areas)
and telephone, for their caller history to be checked. 84
The specific procedure conducted at a checkpoint on the road leading from al-Adawi
neighbourhood to Barzeh in November 2021 was described by SY24 as follows: all passers-by
were checked, including university and school students. Checkpoint personnel requested tosee IDs, deferral cards and renewed settlement cards. In addition, mobile phones weresearched. After the search, the youths were photographed without known reason. According
to SY24, a student at Damascus University was arrested, due to his university postponementcard having expired two days earlier.85

SY24, ‫ إجراءات أمنية مكثفة في دمشق‬..‫[ حصار جديد‬A new siege. Intensive security measures in Damascus], 1 December
2021, url
81
SY24, ‫[ ! طابور جديد من السيارات في دمشق‬A new queue of cars in Damascus], 21 February 2022, url
82
Syrian academic from Damascus, interview, 3 March 2022
83
HRW, “Our Lives Are Like Death” [Source: Suhail al -Ghazi, researcher, Center for Middle Eastern Studies,
Istanbul], 20 October 2021, url, p. 50
84
HRW, “Our Lives Are Like Death”, 20 October 2021, url, p. 30
85
SY24, ‫ حاجز أمني بدمشق يضيق الخناق على أبناء الغوطة الشرقية‬..‫[ سيئ الصيت‬Notorious. Security checkpoint in Damascus
tightens the noose on the young men of Eastern Ghouta], 4 November 2021, url
80

21

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

2.3.3.

Treatment at checkpoints

The Syrian Human Rights Committee (SHRC)86 and the Syrian Network for Human Rights(SNHR) 87 reported that in 2021 most arrests in Syria were carried out while individuals werepassing through GoS checkpoints or during raids. 88 SNHR documented the arrests of a Sheikh
from the Druze sect as well as the arrest of Bassam Safar, editor at the North Press Agency
and member of the National Coordination Committee’s 89 executive office, at checkpoints inDamascus city in June 2021.90 Further arrests at checkpoints in Damascus suburbs throughout
2021 were reported of individuals who had settled their security status 91, of citizens who did
not participate in the presidential elections, 92 and of young men wanted for compulsory
military service or reserve service.93 Arrests at checkpoints in Damascus were also reported in
2022.94
Feelings of unease when passing through checkpoints were particularly reported by men
residing in GoS-controlled areas, including Damascus city, who were interviewed by Refugee
Protection Watch (RPW).95 Interviewees described being worried about being detained at
checkpoints because of military service.96 Interviewees further spoke about threats andprovocations at checkpoints.97 They had to deal with ‘unpredictable mood’ and patronizing
attitude of soldiers at checkpoints, as well as long waiting times. 98
SY24 quoted residents describing searches at a checkpoint in the Bab Sharqi neighbourhoodof Damascus as ‘degrading’.99 The checkpoint on the road leading from Al-Adawi
neighbourhood to Barzeh was described to be one of the most ‘notorious’ checkpoints in
86

The SHRC is a London-based human rights organisation concerned with defending the general liberties andhuman rights of the Syrian people.
87
The SNHR is, according to its website, ‘an independent, non-profit and non-governmental organization’. It
documents human rights violations in Syria.
88
SHRC, The 20th Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syria, 9 January 2022, url, p. 46; SNHR, At Least
2,218 Arbitrary Arrests/ Detentions Documented in Syria in 2021, 242 of Them in December, 2 January 2022, url,p. 2
89
The National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change (NCC) is a Syrian bloc consisting of left-wing
political parties and independent political and youth activists. It is considered and opposition body in Syria.
90
SNHR, At Least 2,218 Arbitrary Arrests/ Detentions Documented in Syria in 2021, 242 of Them in December, 2January 2022, url, p. 18
91
SNHR, Eleventh Annual Report, 21 January 2022, url, p. 24
92
SNHR, At Least 2,218 Arbitrary Arrests/ Detentions Documented in Syria in 2021, 242 of Them in December, 2January 2022, url, p. 5
93
Al-Arabiya, ‫ ادفع وإال‬..ً‫[ حواجز النظام في سوريا دجاجات تبيض ذهبا‬The regime’s checkpoints in Syria are are chickens thatlay golden eggs…pay or else], 6 March 2021, url
94
SNHR, At Least 227 Arbitrary Arrests/Detentions Documented in Syr ia in July 2022, Including 16 Children andNine Women, 2 August 2022, url, p. 15
95
Refugee Protection Watch (RPW) is a coalition formed in 2019 by the Lebanese, Syrian and European
organisations ALEF – Act for Human Rights, Basmeh and Zeitooneh, PAX, Upinion and 11.11.11. ‘Since 2019, RPW has
conducted research and advocacy on protection issues facing Syrian refugees in Lebanon, as well as on theconditions for safe, voluntary, informed and dignified return to Syria’ . (see: RPW, About, n.d., url)
96
SACD, Is Damascus really safe as the Assad regime claims?, 10 January 2022, url; RPW, “I have not known thetaste of safety for ten years”, November 2021, url, pp. 46-47
97
RPW, “I have not known the taste of safety for ten years”, November 2021, url, p. 47
98
RPW, “I have not known the taste of safety for ten years”, November 2021, url, p. 46
99
SY24, ‫ والذي يقوم بإخضاع جميع المارة لعمليات تفتيش‬،‫عدسة مراسلنا ترصد الحاجز العسكري للنظام في حي باب شرقي بمدينة دمشق‬‫”يصفها السكان بـ “المهينة‬. [Our correspondent's lens monitors the regime's military checkpoint in the Bab Sharqi
neighborhood of Damascus, which subjects all passers-by to searches that residents describe as "degrading."], 31
December 2021, url

22

SYRIA: SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN DAMASCUS CITY – COI REPORT

Damascus, due to the conduct of its personnel. 100 In February 2022, SY24 correspondents
observed a tightening of security measures at the ‘Tropicana’ checkpoint in the area of AlAdawi. Cars were stopped and searched, in addition to security checks conducted on all
passers-by. Civilians were allegedly insulted during their search. 101
Amnesty International reported the harassment of a 17-year-old girl at a checkpoint inDamascus. The soldier allegedly told the mother that he wanted her daughter and that heintended to ‘take’ her ‘by force’.102
Sources reported difficulties transporting goods and paying bribes for passage throughcheckpoints.103 According to a 49-year-old man from Damascus interviewed by Human Rights
Watch in March 2021, security officers at checkpoints would generally ask for bribes to pass.
Bribes would be between 1 000 and 2 000 Syrian pounds, which added up when forced totravel through a high number of checkpoints.104

2.3.4.

Factors influencing scrutiny at checkpoints

According to the Syrian academic from Damascus interviewed for this report, young men of
military age are generally questioned the most at checkpoints, as they are wanted for military
service.105
Residents of Damascus city interviewed by RWP explained that treatment at checkpoints
varied according to the person conducting the inspection. People who had visible signs of
belonging to a less affluent part of society and people who were from areas with a history ofanti-government movements were generally treated worse than others.106 The region of originof the person passing through was considered to be an influential factor when it came to
scrutiny at checkpoints. People from a different province, where the security situation isvolatile, were likely to have to answer questions regarding their address in Damascus, work,and their intended destination.107 SY24 reported that GoS security forces subjected residentsof Eastern Ghouta (a region perceived by the GoS as pro-opposition) to thorough searches,insults and arrest on a daily basis, when crossing the checkpoint for entering Damascus city.108
Additional scrutiny or harassment by checkpoint personnel was further likely, if a family
member was wanted for a criminal or security reason, 109 or if a person had the same or similarnames as a person on a wanted list. Interviewees told the New Arab of mistreatment at thehands of security personnel as well as the necessity to pay bribes, as a result of their names.
SY24, ‫ حاجز أمني بدمشق يضيق الخناق على أبناء الغوطة الشرقية‬..‫[ سيئ الصيت‬Notorious. Security checkpoint in Damascus
tightens the noose on the young men of Eastern Ghouta], 4 November 2021, url
101
SY24, ‫[ ! طابور جديد من السيارات في دمشق‬A new queue of cars in Damascus], 21 February 2022, url
102
AI, “You’re going to your death”, 7 September 2021, url, p. 25
103
New Arab (The), ‫[ إتاوات حواجز النظام ترهق السوريين‬The royalties of the regime's barriers exhaust Syrians], 18 March
2021, url; RPW, “I have not known the taste of safety for ten years”, November 2021, url, p. 47
104
HRW, “Our Lives Are Like Death”, 20 October 2021, url, pp. 60-61
105
Syrian academic from Damascus, interview, 3 March 2022
106
RPW, “I have not known the taste of safety for ten years”, November 2021, url, p. 47
107
Syrian academic from Damascus, interview, 3 March 2022
108
SY24, ‫[ حواجز النظام تضيق على أبناء الغوطة في دمشق‬Regime barriers narrow in on Ghouta residents in Damascus], 13
December 2021, url
109
Syrian academic from Damascus, interview, 3 March 2022
100

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Some felt pressured to leave the country, as they felt incapable to solve the problem in adifferent way.110
Human Rights Watch and the Lebanese LGBT organization Helem described a particular risk
for members of the LGBT community when passing checkpoints. Men who dressed differently
from the norm, such as wearing tight trousers, perfume or arranging their hair, were verballyand sexually harassed and abused for looking ‘soft’. 111
Men reportedly experienced more interference at checkpoints than women on a daily basis 112,
however, according to SNHR, women were also arrested by GoS forces while passing throughcheckpoints.113 One in five households interviewed by UNOCHA nationwide for its
Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) 2022 indicated that girls and women felt unsafe whencrossing checkpoints in their area of residence.114

2.3.5.

Damascus International Airport and Damascus-Beirut roads

Checkpoints are located at Damascus International Airport for passengers departing fromDamascus, as well as arriving in Damascus.115 Employees at the airport were said to ask forbribes, threatening disruption or security problems, in case of no payment. 116 In the case ofpassengers arriving in Damascus, the Syrian academic interviewed for this report explainedthat checkpoints at the airport perform the described quadruple security check, in order tofind out if a person arriving is on a wanted list. 117 Other sources have also reported that
persons passing through checkpoints, including at the airport, are checked by the security
forces against databases containing wanted lists.118
Checkpoints are further located at most entrances to cities and on major highways, such as
highways to and from Lebanon, to and from Damascus International Airport and on the M5Motorway.119
Sources report the presence of checkpoints on the highway connecting Damascus and Beirut,
without specifying the number and precise location. 120 According to the interviewed academic,

New Arab (The), ‫ رعب يالحق السوريين عند حواجز النظام‬...‫[ تشابه األسماء‬Similar names... Terror haunts Syrians at regime
checkpoints], 3 March 2021, url
111
HRW and Helem, They Treated Us in Monstrous Ways: Sexual Violence Against Men, Boys, and Transgender
Women in the Syrian Conflict, July 2020, url, p. 27
112
Syrian academic from Damascus, interview, 3 March 2022
113
SNHR, International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women, 25 November 2021, url, p. 16
114
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 29
115
Syrian Today, ‫ مصيدة يصعب الخروج منها دون أضرار‬.. ‫ مطار دمشق الدولي‬: ‫[ سوريون‬Syrians: Damascus international
airport a trap that's hard to get out of without damage], 29 August 2021, url
116
Syrian Today, ‫ مصيدة يصعب الخروج منها دون أضرار‬.. ‫ مطار دمشق الدولي‬: ‫[ سوريون‬Syrians: Damascus international
airport a trap that's hard to get out of without damage], 29 August 2021, url
117
Syrian academic from Damascus, interview, 3 March 2022
118
HRW, “Our Lives Are Like Death” [Source: Suhail al -Ghazi, researcher, Center for Middle Eastern Studies,
Istanbul], 20 October 2021, url, p. 50; EIP, Refugee Return to Syria, September 2021, private document held on
file, p. 25
119
HRW, “Our Lives Are Like Death”, 20 October 2021, url, p. 30
120
Canada, Syria Travel Advice, last updated 28 June 2022, url; OCCRP, People Smugglers in Syria Take to TikTok,
23 June 2021, url
110

24

SYRIA: SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN DAMASCUS CITY – COI REPORT

the number of checkpoints on the Damascus-Beirut roads is unclear and constantly change.
They are generally staffed by the Fourth Division.121

2.4.

Restrictions on access and return to certain areas
in Damascus

For background information on the evolution of the conflict in Damascus see section 2.10 of
the EUAA COI report: Syria – Security situation (May 2020).
Sources indicated that access and return to certain neighbourhoods in Damascus was
restricted.122 Developments which took place during the reference period of the report arecovered in the sections below.

2.4.1.

Al-Qaboun

Al-Qaboun had been under the control of anti-GoS armed groups between 2013-2017. The
use of high explosive during the GoS offensive for its recapture had left the area with few
habitable buildings.123 Syrian researcher and journalist Mazen Ezzi stated that extensive
demolition of the Al-Qaboun area took place up until October 2018. The Damascus
Governorate prevented people from returning to their homes, and properties weredemolished before property rights could be established. In August 2019, the Damascus
Governorate prepared a new zoning plan for the residential area of Al-Qaboun (No. 105),
under the Planning and Urban Development Law No. 23 of 2015, which allows authorities toseize up to 40 % of private property. Objections to the zoning plan had to be handed in within
one month. Only those with valid title deeds and present in person or represented by a legal
representative could submit an objection. However, most property owners were forcibly
displaced. By November 2021, the plan was still under review and awaiting ratification. 124
In September 2021, President Bashar Al-Assad issued Decree No. 237, which created ‘new“zoning” restrictions’ in northern Damascus,125 extending from Harasta to the Panorama Circle
in Al-Qaboun.126 According to The Syria Report, a website specialised on covering economic
information on Syria, the decree was based on Law No. 10 of 2018 and approved in June
2019.127 Law No. 10 allows the state to confiscate property of owners who fail to prove

121

The Fourth Division is an elite military unit with strong Iranian support, which controls various territories of thecountry and is led by Maher Al-Assad, the brother of Bashar Al-Assad. (See: MEI, The Fourth Division: Syria’s
parallel army, 24 September 2021, url); Syrian academic from Damascus, interview, 3 March 2022
122
EUAA, COI Report: Syria - Socio-economic situation: Damascus City, April 2021, url, section 2.3.6
123
Ezzi, M., On the Edge of the Capital: Social Engineering in North-Eastern Damascus, EUI, 5 November 2021, url,
pp. 10-11
124Ezzi, M., On the Edge of the Capital: Social Engineering in North-Eastern Damascus, EUI, 5 November 2021, url,
p. 11
125
STJ, Syria: Qaboun and Harasta Zoning Decree No. 237 Hails New Series of Property Confiscations near
Damascus, November 2021, url, p. 3
126
STJ, Syria: Qaboun and Harasta Zoning Decree No. 237 Hails New Series of Property Confiscations near
Damascus, November 2021, url, p. 4; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/49/77], 8 February 2022 , url, para 49
127
Syria Report (The), Law No. 10 Goes into Effect at the Northern Entrance to Damascus, 18 January 2022, url

25

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

ownership within a specified time period.128 According to Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ),
an independent NGO documenting human rights violations in Syria, property owners had 30
days to submit property declarations.129 As many previous residents were displaced and/orlack access to title deeds, they were unable to submit declarations in time and were at risk of
having their properties confiscated.130 The Syria Report reported that Damascus governorate
granted rights holders one year, commencing October 2021, to prove ownership to the
Directorate for Implementation of Decree No. 66. 131
Al-Qaboun was also reported to be uninhabitable due to the prevalence of mines and the highlevel of destruction.132 According to a report by the European University Institute, in July 2021
previous inhabitants were allowed to return to Al-Balad in Al-Qaboun, if they could provide asecurity clearance from the Air Force Intelligence as well as a report from a ‘specialised
technical committee’ confirming that their property is habitable. Few were however able toreturn in practice.133 As of January 2022, GoS forces were allowing former residents to enter
the area to inspect their property, but not to live there, on the condition of obtaining security
clearance and upon providing identification papers. 134

2.4.2.

Yarmouk

Yarmouk is an ‘unofficial’ refugee camp for Palestinians refugees.135 According to Palestinian
consultant Musaab Balchi, interviewed by the Danish Immigration Service (DIS) in 2021, every
person entering and exiting Yarmouk Camp had to pass through a checkpoint controlled by
the Syrian military, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command(PFLP-GC) and a few other smaller Palestinian factions, such as the Free Palestine
Movement.136
It was possible for Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS) to enter and reside in Yarmouk Camp,subject to conditions. In order to visit the camp, a person had to provide proof of ownership(or water or electricity payments that prove an attachment to the camp), as well as an ID card.
They further needed to complete a security check. According to Balchi, the security check was
conducted directly at the checkpoint in front of the camp. People whose names were found

128

COAR, ‘Northern Gate’ Project Slams a Door in the Face of Displaced Damascenes, 27 September 2021, url
STJ, Syria: Qaboun and Harasta Zoning Decree No. 237 Hails New Series of Property Confiscations near
Damascus, November 2021, url, p. 4
130
STJ, Syria: Qaboun and Harasta Zoning Decree No. 237 Hails New Series of Property Confiscations near
Damascus, November 2021, url, p. 5
131
Syria Report (The), Law No. 10 Goes into Effect at the Northern Entrance to Damascus, 18 January 2022, url
132
NPA, ‫[ عقبات تمنع نازحي حي القابون في دمشق من العودة لمنازلهم‬Obstacles prevent displaced people in al-Qabounneighborhood in Damascus from returning home], 4 January 2022, url
133
Ezzi, M., On the Edge of the Capital: Social Engineering in North-Eastern Damascus, EUI, 5 November 2021, url,
p. 12
134
NPA, ‫[ عقبات تمنع نازحي حي القابون في دمشق من العودة لمنازلهم‬Obstacles prevent displaced people in al-Qabounneighborhood in Damascus from returning home], 4 January 2022, url
135
UNRWA, Yarmouk (unofficial camp), n.d., url
136
Denmark, DIS, Syria: Palestinians in Damascus and rural Damascus governorates [Source: Musaab Balchi,
Palestinian consultant, MENA real-time information analyst and former journalist based in Washington D.C.],
October 2021, url, p. 68
129

26

SYRIA: SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN DAMASCUS CITY – COI REPORT

on wanted lists faced detention, while relatives of wanted individuals were denied access tothe camp, with some also being subject to arbitrary arrests. 137
People who wished to return to live in Yarmouk Camp needed to be able to prove ownershipin the camp, provide security clearance, the family book and IDs for every family member
above 14 years of age. It was further required that the house was not at risk of collapsing.
Deeds to prove ownership were only recognised if issued by the GoS, but records ofownership had been destroyed inside the camps, which made it impossible to have a deedreissued. Many individuals who had fled Yarmouk Camp were missing ownership documents
and/or were afraid of approaching the authorities to receive security clearance, therefore
hampering their return.138 These requirements were reported to be in place as of the
beginning of 2022, with the security clearance reportedly taking place at the checkpoint or at
Yarmouk municipality office, rather than at a security branch.139
In June 2021, Quds Press, a UK-based media agency focused on Palestinian issues, reported
that the Damascus Provincial Council issued a resolution to allow residents of Yarmouk camp
to return to their homes. The new resolution was intended to include more families, but was
still based on the necessity to obtain security clearance as well as an application process as
part of which title deeds need to be provided. 140 The Syrian official news agency SANA
reported in July 2021 that thousands of displaced had returned to Yarmouk camp. According
to the secretary-general of the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front cited by SANA, returning
families needed to submit property deeds so that the restoration of their homes could start,
following the outcome of the safety inspection. He added that the infrastructure in the camp
was being rehabilitated.141 While the government continued to publicly promote the return of
residents, Mahmoud Zaghmut, a member of the Action Group for Palestinians of Syria (AGPS),a London-based human rights organisation that monitors the situation of Palestinian refugees
in Syria, explained that in practice it was impossible for a large proportion of the previous
residents of Yarmouk to return to their homes, as the government did not allow any family,
whose members are accused of belonging to the opposition, or of participating in therevolutionary movement – often including families of detainees and missing persons – toreturn. Eligible families were also required to provide ownership papers and pay for electricity,water and the telephone line. More than 80 % of housing and infrastructure was reportedly
destroyed, with residents of uninhabitable homes not allowed to return. Those who were137

Denmark, DIS, Syria: Palestinians in Damascus and rural Damascus governorates [Source: Musaab Balchi,
Palestinian consultant, MENA real-time information analyst and former journalist based in Washington D.C.],
October 2021, url, p. 69
138
Denmark, DIS, Syria: Palestinians in Damascus and rural Damascus governorates [Source: Musaab Balchi,
Palestinian consultant, MENA real-time information analyst and former journalist based in Washington D.C.],
October 2021, url, pp. 69-70
139
Palestinian Refugees Portal, ‫ وبلدية اليرموك تستقبل طلبات العودة‬..َ‫[ الموافقة األمنية لدخول مخيّم اليرموك لم تلغ‬Security approvalto enter Yarmouk camp has not been revoked. Yarmouk municipality receives requests for return], 15 December
2021, url; Palestinian Press Agency, ‫[ استئناف تقديم طلبات العودة لمخيم اليرموك‬Applications for return to Yarmouk camp
resume], 3 January 2022, url
140
Quds Press, ‫[ ما حقيقة السماح بعودة أهالي مخيم اليرموك إلى منازلهم؟‬What is the reality of allowing Yarmouk residents toreturn to their homes?], 14 June 2021, url
141
SANA, ‫[ عودة مئات العائالت المهجرة إلى منازلها في منطقة اليرموك بدمشق‬Hundreds of displaced families return to theirhomes in Yarmouk area of Damascus], 18 July 2021, url

27

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

allowed to access to rebuild their homes face a lack of electricity, water and sanitation in thearea.142
In September 2021, residents were allowed to access the area during daytime only to remove
debris from their houses. As reported by Asharq Al-Awsat,143 they were obliged to gather at
the security checkpoint daily to obtain security approval to enter the area. The majority had to
wait for hours to be individually checked, being questioned about their family members, workand other affiliations. Only few were granted access. Some allegedly received permission toenter after paying a bribe.144
According to the pro-opposition newspaper Enab Baladi, permanent return was further
complicated by the fact that forms of real estate ownership vary in the area. While some wereregistered under the general authority of the Palestinian Arab Refugees Foundation, otherproperties were registered with judicial agencies, under judicial decision, through contracts ofsale of agricultural land or on the land registry. The overlap of real estate ownership of thecamp increases the complexity for owners to prove ownership. 145
Al Jazeera reported in February 2022 that the GoS was further complicating the return of
residents to Yarmouk camp by requesting family members living abroad who were wanted formilitary service to obtain a power of attorney from the Syrian representation abroad before
their families are provided with the required paperwork to be able to return. Many of such
requests were reportedly rejected, although in some exceptional cases, refugees were able toobtain the document.146
UNOCHA reported in February 2022 that since the end of 2020, around 2 000 government
approvals have been granted to Palestinians to return to Yarmouk camp. By mid-2021
UNOCHA recorded that 480 vulnerable Palestine refugee families had returned to Yarmouk,
while noting that the camp lacked basic infrastructure and services.147

2.4.3.

Jobar

According to the New Arab, residents of Jobar were still prevented from returning to theirhomes as of December 2021, due to government measures to organise the neighbourhoodand demolish destroyed property. Many of the previous residents were lacking papers toprove ownership. The government further required security approval for those wishing toapply for new ownership papers, but many were afraid to approach the security branch, incase they got arrested. Brokers were able to collect the required paperwork needed for a sale

Orient, ‫[ مخيم اليرموك للواجهة مجدداً وناشط فلسطيني يكذب آخر ادعاءات النظام‬Yarmouk camp is on the front page again anda Palestinian activist exposes the lies of the regime], 12 September 2021, url
143
Asharq Al-Awsat is pan-Arab international newspaper headquartered in London.
144
Asharq Al-Awsat, ‫[ » نازحون من مخيم اليرموك يشكون عرقلة «حق العودة‬Displaced people from Yarmouk camp complainof obstruction of the "right of return"], 30 September 2021, url
145
Enab Baladi, ‫ من المساحة وموافقات أمنية‬%60 ‫[ العودة إلى “اليرموك” يع طّلها مخطط يأكل‬Returning to “Yarmouk” is disrupted
by a plan that consumes 60% of the area and security approvals], 31 October 2021, url
146
Al Jazeera, ‫ النظام يحرم أسر المتخلفين عن الخدمة العسكرية من منازلهم بمخيم اليرموك‬..‫[ سوريا‬Syria.. regime deprives familiesof those who failed to serve of their homes in Yarmouk camp], 8 February 2022, url
147
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22 Febr uary 2022, url, p. 45
142

28

SYRIA: SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN DAMASCUS CITY – COI REPORTfor ‘exorbitant’ amounts.148 As of July 2022, the Syria Report noted that Jobar was empty andthat former residents have not been allowed to return or check their properties. 149

2.5.

Settling in Damascus

All procedures related to property were subject to security approval. Security approvals wererequired when selling and leasing real estate, including in the case of a person being absent
or abroad. According to Enab Baladi, applications for security approval took approximately
three months to be processed and professionals working in real estate estimated that 60 %were rejected, in many cases because the owner of the property was abroad or had anunresolved security issue, such as being wanted by a security branch.150
An application for security clearance is required when wanting to settle in any area ofDamascus. As explained by the Syrian academic interviewed for this report, the security checkconducted on IDPs moving into Damascus is stricter than the one for residents of Damascus
moving between different houses or areas. The profile of the applicant, where they come fromand their actions during the past ten years, will have an effect on the outcome of the security
clearance. Normally a mukhtar, or mayor, is involved in the security check. In some areas, thelease and other documents need to be presented to the mukhtar first, who then forwards
them to the responsible security service. In other areas, there are small kiosks in which amember of a security service handles the documents and asks the applicant to come back in
10-15 days.151
Since November 2018, a lease signed by a tenant and a landlord in a GoS area should be
registered at a citizen service centre. The centre then sends two copies of the contract to thepolice station of the area to check the legal status of the tenant and whether they wererequired to take actions against the tenant for security reasons. Prior to this change, tenants
had gone to the nearest police station to submit an application to obtain approval for
housing.152
An international organisation explained to DIS on the example of Palestinian residents living incamps that security clearance was ‘specific to each rented accommodation, and thus one
security clearance does not cover all camps or gatherings’, meaning that even in the case ofmoving to the neighbouring apartment, a new security clearance would have to be obtained.
In order to apply for security clearance, a person had to submit proof of the landlord’s nameand a copy of his/her ID, the name of the tenant and a copy of his/her ID, as well as proof ofthe landlord’s ownership of the house, including a power of attorney in case the landlord was

New Arab (The), ‫[ أهالي حي جوبر في دمشق ممنوعون من العودة لمنازلهم‬Residents of Jobar neighborhood in Damascus
are prevented from returning home], 27 December 2021, url
149
Syria Report (The), Zoning Plan Draws New Borders to the Jobar Neighbourhood of Damascus, 12 July 2022, url
150
Enab Baladi, ‫ أداة جديدة للسيطرة على ممتلكات السوريين‬..‫[ الموافقة األمنية لوكالة الغائب والمفقود‬Security approval of the absent
and missing agency. A new tool to control Syrian property], 4 October 2021, url
151
Syrian academic from Damascus, interview, 3 March 2022
152
Enab Baladi, “‫"[ محافظة دمشق” توقف تسجيل عقود اإليجار في عدة مراكز خدمية‬Damascus governorate" suspends
registration of leases in several service centers], 5 May 2021, url
148

29

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

absent.153 In the case of Palestinian refugees who wished to settle outside of a camp, Mus aab
Balchi explained that there were areas in Damascus, such as downtown Damascus, where it
was more difficult for Palestinian refugees to be granted permission to reside, due to thesectarian make-up of the city. Many areas of Damascus were dominated by a particular sect
and the relevant security branch might refuse to provide security clearance to a person
belonging to a different sectarian group. According to Balchi, Palestinians were likely to havea request for security clearance to live in Alawi-majority areas, such as Mazzeh 86, rejected.154
Returnees have to approach the Ministry of Interior for security approval and will generally
have to prove ownership of property to settle in their area of origin. 155 VDSF and OPC reported
that nearly one in four (24 %) of the 100 returnees interviewed in Damascus and Jaramana(Rural Damascus governorate) had been unable to reclaim their property. In 55 % of the cases,
the house had been destroyed or was deemed uninhabitable. In 15 % of the cases it wasreported that the house had been appropriated by an armed group, which prevented theowners from reclaiming it. The remaining interviewees did not wish to provide details. Of
those who were able to reclaim their properties 65 % were worried that they might lose theirhome in the future.156
For further information on administrative requirements for settling in individual areas ofDamascus, see section 2.4.Restrictions on access and return to certain areas in Damascus.

2.6.

Civil documentation required for travel and accessto services

A confidential source interviewed by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that
Syrian citizens are legally required to identify themselves, including when obtaining services
from the government. The main documents to prove identification include the identity card,
passport, family booklet and driving licence. Due to the crisis situation, authorities are said tohave started recognising other documents, such as military ID cards, civil registry extracts andthe military booklet as a proof of identity.157 Identifying documents are required when travellingthrough checkpoints, as well as to obtain services from government institutions, such as
schools, courts, land registries and municipalities, 158 when conducting trade or real estatetransactions, as well as for accessing healthcare and humanitarian aid. 159
The national ID card is issued by the civil registrar, which is affiliated with the Ministry ofInterior. It must be obtained in person and can only be obtained in Syria. Citizens must be

153

Denmark, DIS, Syria: Palestinians in Damascus and rural Damascus governorates [Sour ce: internationalorganisation], October 2021, url, p. 62
154
Denmark, DIS, Syria: Palestinians in Damascus and rural Damascus governorates [Source: Musaab Balchi,
Palestinian consultant, MENA real-time information analyst and former journalist based in Washington D.C.],
October 2021, url, p. 71
155
Syrian academic from Damascus, interview, 3 March 2022
156
VDSF and OPC, Is Syria Safe for Return? Returnees’ Perspective, November 2021, url, p. 46
157
Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of origin information report Syria, June 2021, url, p. 46
158
Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of origin information report Syria, June 2021, url, p. 46
159
Sosnowski, M. and Hamadeh, N., "The Right to Have Rights", GIGA, October 2021, url, pp. 1, 6

30

SYRIA: SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN DAMASCUS CITY – COI REPORT

recorded in a family booklet before applying for an identity card. 160 Any other document,
including the passport,161 may also be applied for by another person holding a power ofattorney for that purpose.162 All Syrians are required to hold an identity card from the age of15163 and must apply in time to receive the ID card within one year from turning 15.164 The family
booklet records all members of a family. A newly married couple moves from their parents’booklet to their own. This involves the transmission of the wife’s records from the registry of
her area of residence to that of the husband. A copy of the marriage cer tificate, ID cards,
photographs and the military service booklet are required for an application. 165 Non-citizens
residing in Syria, such as Ajanib Kurds, Maktum Kurds and Palestinians are provided withalternative identity documents.166
The Syrian academic interviewed for this report stated that when applying for a new passport,
the person’s name would be submitted for a security check. If an ID card is lost, the person
would be interrogated by the police before having a new ID card issued. 167 According to the
Syrian Ministry of Interior website, a police file has to be opened in the event of a lost ID. 168
In March 2021, the Syrian parliament amended the Civil Status Law. Article 54 stipulates that
ID cards remain valid for 10 years, and that they must be replaced no less than 30 days and no
more than six months prior to their expiry.169 A confidential source interviewed by the
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs in March 2022 stated that the Syrian authorities havesubsequently announced that the 10 year validity would not enter into force due to lack ofsufficient resources, and that the ID card will not have an expiry date. 170
Syrian law requires that all changes of personal status such as birth, death, marriage anddivorce, must be registered with the Civil Affairs Directorate (Nofous) within three months (ornine months if residing abroad) of their occurrence. 171 Reportedly, it could take months for thedata to be processed if Syrians register changes in personal or family status through adiplomatic mission.172 Registration of personal or family status events and obtaining of civil
documents can occur at any civil registry centre in the country. 173 If the ID is obtained for the
first time, this has to be done at the registry office where the person is registered.174 Syrians
who do not have a national identity number (al-raqm al-watani) because they were born in an

160

ISI and NRC, Syrian Documents, 15 October 2021, url
Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of origin information report Syria, June 2021, url, p. 47
162
Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of origin information report Syria, June 2021, url, p. 46
163
Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of origin information report Syria, June 2021, url, p. 48
164
Syria, Ministry of Interior, ‫[ الخدمات التي تقدمها الشؤون المدنية‬Services provided by Civil Affairs], n.d., url
165
ISI and NRC, Syrian Documents, 15 October 2021, url
166
ISI and NRC, Syrian Documents, 15 October 2021, url
167
Syrian academic from Damascus, interview, 3 March 2022
168
Syria, Ministry of Interior, ‫[ الخدمات التي تقدمها الشؤون المدنية‬Services provided by Civil Affairs], n.d., url
169
COAR, New Civil Status Law Raises Concerns Over Identity Cards and HLP Rights, 8 March 2021, url
170
Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Algemeen ambtsbericht Syrië [Country report Syria], May 2022, url,
p. 36
171
Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of origin information report Syria, June 2021 , url, p. 48;
NRC and UNHCR, Legal Identity and Housing, December 2021, url, p. 7
172
Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of origin information report Syria, June 2021, url, p. 49
173
NRC and UNHCR, Legal Identity and Housing, December 2021, url, p. 8
174
Syria, Ministry of Interior, ‫[ الخدمات التي تقدمها الشؤون المدنية‬Services provided by Civil Affairs], n.d., url
161

31

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

opposition area can obtain one at a later date, as long as they are entered in the civil register.
Without a birth registration, it can be problematic to obtain Syrian nationality.175
Many administrative acts require a declaration of residence ( sanad iqama) or a written
declaration from a mukhtar stating where the person lives.176
Civil documentation is further required to enrol in formal education and to register for national
exams. In order to register a child for school, parents or a legal guardian must submit a copyof the family booklet and the parents’ ID cards. 177
Parents who do not have proof of their marriage often face difficulties in r egistering theirchildren’s births.178 The GoS reportedly does not accept non-state –issued documentation.
This may result in children born and marriages conducted outside the government-controlledareas being considered as undocumented or invalid. 179 Female-headed households are
particularly vulnerable to the effects of missing documentation, as a woman’s legal identity in
Syria is linked to that of her husband or father. It follows that the absence of an official
marriage registration or death certificate for the husband affects women’s abilities to exercise
parental, inheritance and property rights. As explained by a former Syrian mayor, if a father
dies before he and his wife formally registered their marriage, the mother is unable to register
her children, due to the inability to register the marriage after the father’s death. If children are
not documented, they are unable to access education, healthcare, travel documents, property
rights, work opportunities and possibly citizenship. 180
A further barrier to accessing or applying for documents may be a reluctance or unwillingness
to approach the Syrian authorities, because of concerns related to compulsory military
conscription, detention or being perceived as being affiliated with the opposition. 181 In
interviews conducted by OPC field teams, some returnees in GoS areas declared that missing
official documentation restricted them in their freedom of movement, prevented students fromstudying, made it impossible to prove identity and ownership of property, as well as provided
difficulties in case of legal liability and prevented them from receiving aid. 182
Access to documentation is critical to assert land, housing, and property rights. In Syria,
physical records were often not supported by an electronic land registry. Damage to land
registries, courts and notary records might therefore complicate the possibility of reissuing
documents, if lost. Furthermore, in the case of informal settlements, alternative papers were
often used in the absence of a title deed (tabou) to demonstrate ownership. This might further
complicate the possibility of asserting property claims. 183 It is often men who are the registeredowners of property. Women, whose husbands were killed, displaced or disappeared, risk
losing their property, if they lack identity documents or a formal marriage certificate. In
175

Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of origin information report Syria, June 2021, url, p. 52
Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of origin information report Syria, June 2021, url, p. 52
177
NRC, Documentation for education, March 2021, url, p. 4
178
NRC and UNHCR, Legal Identity and Housing, December 2021, url, p. 13
179
Sosnowski, M. and Hamadeh, N., "The Right to Have Rights", GIGA, October 2021, url, p. 7
180
Sosnowski, M. and Hamadeh, N., "The Right to Have Rights", GIGA, October 2021, url, p. 4; UNOCHA,
Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 56
181
NRC and UNHCR, Legal Identity and Housing, December 2021, url, p. 13
182
VDSF and OPC, Is Syria Safe for Return? Returnees’ Perspective, November 2021, url, p. 50
183
NRC and UNHCR, Legal Identity and Housing, December 2021, url, p. 19
176

32

SYRIA: SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN DAMASCUS CITY – COI REPORT

addition, security clearances are required for many property sales under the Syrian
government. Security clearances are withheld from those living outside of government
controlled areas, forcing many property sales to be conducted informally. 184 For further
information on challenges in accessing property, see section 2.4.Restrictions on access andreturn to certain areas in Damascus and section 2.5.Settling in Damascus.

184

Sosnowski, M. and Hamadeh, N., "The Right to Have Rights", GIGA, October 2021, url, p. 5

33

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

3.

Key socio-economic indicators

3.1.

Economic overview

3.1.1.

Economic situation

Middle East Eye (MEE) reported in December 2021 that government spending had been cut by
more than 40 % over the past two years,185 while the UN special envoy for Syria stated that thecountry’s economy had ‘collapsed’.186
The value of the Syrian pound (SYP) continued to decline during the reference period. In a
June 2022 report the World Bank stated that the exchange rate of the SYP against the USD
weakened by 26 % in 2021, after depreciating by 224 % in 2020.187 In April 2021, the governorof the central bank was dismissed, and the central bank devalued the currency to bring it
closer to the black-market exchange rate. The Syrian pound was now officially valued at SYP
2 512 to the US dollar from around SYP 1 250 beforehand, while at the beginning of theconflict in March 2011, the exchange rate had been SYP 47 to one US-Dollar.188 This was thethird currency devaluation since November 2019. 189 Overall, as of early 2022, the Syrian
pound had lost about 70 % of its value since 2011, with a sharp depreciation in 2019, after the
beginning of the Lebanese financial crisis. US economic sanctions implemented in June 2020
further added to the decline, and the Syrian pound lost at least 36 % of its value since
September 2020 alone.190
In comparison, the average informal USD exchange rate in April 2021 was SYP 3 146, buthigher in Damascus governorate, with SYP 3 175.191 While the official exchange rate remained
stable until February 2022, the average informal exchange rate rose to SYP 3 634 to the US
dollar.192 The highest informal exchange rate in April 2022 was again 193 reported in Damascus
Governorate with SYP 3 916 to the US dollar, which constituted a 19 % loss of value comparedwith one year prior.194
The discrepancy between official and informal exchange rates was used by the Syrian
government to profit from foreign aid money sent to Syria. Banks used by UN and otherinternational aid agencies to transfer money for aid operations to Syria were required tocharge these agencies the official exchange rate, which was considerably lower than the
185

MEE, Syria approves $5.3bn budget for 2022 as economic crisis hits finances, 15 December 2021, url
UN Special envoy for Syria Geir O. Pedersen: Briefing to the security council on Syria, 26 January 2022, url, p. 1
187
World Bank, Syria Economic Monitor, Spring 2022 : Lost Generation of Syrians, 14 June 2022, url, p. xi
188
Arab Weekly (The), Syria devalues its currency after sacking central bank governor, 16 April 2021, url
189
WFP Syria, Market Price Watch Bulletin, April 2021, Issue 77, 31 May 2021, url, p. 4
190
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 12191
WFP Syria, Market Price Watch Bulletin, April 2021, Issue 77, 31 May 2021, url, p. 4192
WFP Syria, Market Price Watch Bulletin, February 2022, Issue 87, 16 March 2022, url, p. 5
193
See, for example: WFP Syria, Market Price Watch Bulletin, May 2021, Issue 78, 31 May 2021, url, p. 4; WFP Syria,
Market Price Watch Bulletin, July 2021, Issue 80, 31 July 2021, url, p. 4; WFP Syria, Market Price Watch Bulletin,
September 2021, Issue 82, 21 October 2021, url, p. 4; WFP Syria, Market Price Watch Bulletin, February 2022, Issue
87, 16 March 2022, url, p. 5
194
WFP Syria, Market Price Watch Bulletin, April 2022, Issue 89, 13 June 2022, url, p. 5
186

34

SYRIA: SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN DAMASCUS CITY – COI REPORT

exchange rate on the black market. The same banks were subsequently required to sell 50 %of their foreign currency to the Central Bank. Thereby the GoS retained roughly half of theinternational aid money coming to Syria in 2020, according to Central for Strategic andInternational Studies 195 researchers estimates.196
US government sources stated that ‘the Russian invasion of Ukraine exacerbated direeconomic and humanitarian conditions’ in Syria. The disruption in the supply of wheat (ofwhich Syria is heavily dependent on imports) and other food staples led to increased foodprices and higher costs for humanitarian organizations in Syria.197(a)Fuel and Energy

In August 2021, Damascus governorate set specific opening and closing times for allcommercial markets, shops, restaurants, and various economic activities in the governorate
with the aim of saving energy and providing it to the governorate’s residential users. 198
Fuel prices continued to increase due to ongoing fuel shortages, reportedly leading somepublic transport drivers to discontinue their services and to sell their subsidised fuel supply in
the informal markets instead.199 Prices for subsidised and unsubsidised oil derivative products
such as gas oil (mazut), Octane 90 diesel oil and fuel oil have continually increased since
October 2020.200 The increase in diesel oil prices in July 2021 led to transport fees rising by
up to 200-300 %. For example, the monthly transport costs for taxis and other services for afamily of three in Damascus rose by about 138 %, from approximately SYP 42 000 (about USD
16.7) 201 to 100 000 per month (USD 39.8).202 The high transport costs also reportedly led somepublic employees to resign from their jobs as transport fees to reach their workplace would
take up a too large share of their salaries. 203 In some cases, public transport drivers reportedly
were accused of charging higher tariffs than the official fees, while drivers claimed that theofficial fees would not suffice to make a living.204 In a report of February 2022, MEE quoted ataxi driver in Damascus saying that he spent most of his time ‘either queuing up for petrol,
cooking gas and diesel, or arguing with customers over fares’. In an attempt to regulate taxi
fares, Damascus governorate set an hourly rate of SYP 5 000 (roughly USD 1.4) in January

195

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is a US non-profit policy research organization.
Hall, N. et al., How the Assad Regime Systematically Diverts Tens of Millions in Aid, CSIS, 20 October 2021, url
197
USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve I Quarterly Report to the United States
Congress I January 1, 2022 – March 31, 2022, 3 May 2022, url, Message from the Lead Inspector General, p. 79
198
WFP, Syrian Arab Republic, mVAM Bulletin Issue no. 58: August 2021, 21 September 2021, url, p. 1
199
WFP Syria, Market Price Watch Bulletin, October 2021, Issue 83, 31 October 202 1, url, p. 2; Daher, J., Policy Brief:
Cuts to Oil Derivative Subsidies: Consequences for Syria, EUI, Issue 2021/45, October 2021, 12 November 2021, url,
p. 6
200
Daher, J., Policy Brief: Cuts to Oil Derivative Subsidies: Consequences for Syria, EUI, Issue 2021/45 , October
2021, 12 November 2021, url, pp. 3-4
201
USD 12.9, if calculated with the informal exchange rate valid in Damascus in October 2021.
202
USD 30.6, if calculated with the informal exchange rate valid in Damascus in October 2021.
203
Daher, J., Policy Brief: Cuts to Oil Derivative Subsidies: Consequences for Syria, EUI, Issue 2021/45, October
2021, 12 November 2021, url, pp. 3, 6
204
New Arab (The), ‫تعرفة النقل تثير نزاعات في دمشق‬: ‫[ سورية‬Syria: Transport tariff sparks disputes in Damascus], 12 August
2021, url
196

35

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

2022, which, however, reportedly was often the minimum amount passengers had to pay foreven the shortest trips.205
The amount of subsidised oil derivatives allocated to individual consumers via thegovernment’s subsidy programme – the so-called smart card system - has steadily gone
down. Even those having managed to register for a smart card received less than the officiallyallocated amount, or received it only with delay, forcing them to buy these products at muchhigher prices on the black market.206 The smart card system was first established in 2014 by
the Ministry of Oil and Mineral Resources to distribute fuel for government agencies, and later
expanded to regulate the distribution of subsidised oil derivatives and heating oil to citizens.
In 2020, it was further expanded to include food items, such as tea, rice, and sugar,207 as wellas bread.208
Moreover, in order to register for the smart card system in the first place, individuals needed
to meet certain requirements such as providing a social security number or documentation
showing they were registered at their place of residence, thus excluding large groups of IDPs
and others not living at their official place of residence, 209 as well as children of Palestinian
refugees, who receive temporary residency only at the age of fourteen. Divorced andwidowed women were reportedly also excluded.210
Electricity shortages and rationing were common across the country, including due to damage
to the electricity infrastructure and fuel shortages. 211 As of early 2022, per capita consumptionof state electricity in Syria was 15 % of what it had been in 2010.212 Returnees in Damascus city
reported that access to electricity had deteriorated since March 2021; while it had beenintermittently available for up to 12 hours per day until then, availability had dropped to 2 to 5
hours per day in August 2021.213 Similarly, UNOCHA noted that in the first half of 2021,
Damascus had five hours of power cut for every hour of electricity, while Aleppo had ten hoursof rationing for every hour or half an hour of power. 214
In January 2022, energy and fuel shortages became so acute that President Assadannounced a five-day public holiday to save energy for household consumption. 215 MEE
reported on families in Damascus who were unable to heat their homes due to the limited
amounts of subsidised diesel available and the high costs on the free market. While 50 litresof subsidised diesel were reportedly sold for SYP 37 000 (about USD 10), the same amount
205

MEE, ‘Life is unbearable’: Syrians endure nightmarish winter amid economic collapse, 10 February 2022, url
Daher, J., Policy Brief: Cuts to Oil Derivative Subsidies: Consequences for Syria, EUI, Issue 2021/45, October
2021, 12 November 2021, url, pp. 3-4
207
WFP Syria, Market Price Watch Bulletin, February 2020, Issue 63, n.d., url, p. 2; Szakola, A., Asma al-Assad’s
cousin owns firm running Syria’s Smart Card system, 17 April 2020, url
208
Syria Direct, Anger and confusion erupt over the Syrian government’s decision to ration bread through the smart
card, 21 April 2020, url209
Al Shami, I., Facing Syria’s Food Crisis, WINEP, 14 February 2022, url
210
NPA, Smart card deprives single and divorced women of supplies in Syria’s Damascus, 7 April 2021, url
211
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 19; Enab Baladi,‘Damascus Electricity’ unable to meet total power needs amid frequent outages, 28 February 2022, url
212
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 19
213
RPW, “I have not known the taste of safety for ten years”, November 2021, url, p. 51
214
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 19
215
New Arab (The), Syria regime announces government holiday amid snowfall, lack of heating, 23 January 2022,
url
206

36

SYRIA: SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN DAMASCUS CITY – COI REPORT

would cost ten times more on the free market, with the average monthly salary being roughly
SYP 70 000 (roughly USD 20).216(b)

Price-wage spiral

In July 2021, the GoS increased the prices per litre of Octane 95 gasoline from SYP 2 500 to
3 000 (USD 0.77 to 0.90) and of subsidised diesel from SYP 187 (USD 0.06) to SYP 500 (USD0.15). Moreover, the GoS increased the prices for bread (doubling from SYP 100 (USD 0.03) toSYP 200 (USD 0.06) 217, as well as for sugar, rice, medicines, and public transport fees. 218
Likewise, in July 2021, the GoS announced a 50 % increase of salaries for workers in the
public sector and raised pensions for retirees by 40 %, effective as of August 2021.219
Moreover, it increased the minimum wage from SYP 47 000 (USD 37) 220 to SYP 71 515 permonth (USD 57) 221.222 However, UNOCHA noted that hyperinflation and the devaluation of the
SYP undermined the real value of salaries and significantly reduced households’ purchasepower.223 Similarly, the Center for Operational Analysis and Research (COAR) noted that due
to inflation and currency depreciation, salaries were effectively shrinking. Whereas theminimum salary for a person holding a PhD was SYP 86 243 (about USD 26.4) per month inJuly 2021, it had been almost twice as much (about USD 50) in July 2016. COAR noted thatshrinking salaries, economic deterioration, and loss of opportunities in Syria bore the risk ofever more Syrians leaving the country or engaging in war economy such as narcotraffic orbeing recruited by armed groups.224
A second increase in salaries and pensions, by 30 % and 25 %, respectively, as well as a riseof the general minimum wage for the private sector to SYP 92 970 (about USD 26) per monthin December 2021, was again announced by the government shortly after it had increased
prices for subsidised fuel, food and non-food items.225
The economist and director of the Syrian Economic Taskforce 226, Dr. Aussama al-Qadi, noted
in an interview with Enab Baladi that the government’s economic plans were basically toequally increase prices and salaries. Raising wages would, however, not solve the problem
but rather make it worse as, eventually, inflation levels would rise, causing an even higher
increase of consumer goods’ prices.227

216

MEE, ‘Life is unbearable’: Syrians endure nightmarish winter amid economic collapse, 10 February 2022, url
WFP, Syrian Arab Republic, mVAM Bulletin Issue no. 5 7: July 2021, 16 August 2021, url, p. 1
218
Enab Baladi, Syrians wrestling with ever declining living conditions: Any solutions?, 8 August 2021, url
219
WFP, Syrian Arab Republic, mVAM Bulletin Issue no. 57: July 2021, 16 August 2021, url, p. 1
220
USD 14.4, if calculated with the informal exchange rate valid in Damascus in July 202 1.
221
USD 21.9, if calculated with the informal exchange rate valid in Damascus in July 2021.
222
MEMO, Syria: Assad regime raises public sector salaries by 50%, 11 July 2021, url
223
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 21
224
COAR, Spotlight on Aid Sector Wages as Damascus Increases Salaries, 19 July 2021, url
225
WFP, Syrian Arab Republic, mVAM Bulletin Issue no. 62: December 2021, 31 December 2021, url, p. 1
226
The Syrian Economic Taskforce is an independent economic advisory group cooperating with the International
Working Group on Economic Recovery and Development (co-chaired by UAE and Germany) of the ‘Friends of the
Syrian People’. The Taskforce aims to represent the Syrian side in planning Syria’s economy and reconstruction
after a change of government and envisions the implementation of a ‘Syrian Marshall Plan’. See url
227
Enab Baladi, Syrians wrestling with ever declining living conditions: Any solutions?, 8 August 2021, url
217

37

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Enab Baladi quoted Syrian economist Dr. Firas Shaabo by saying that the increase of salaries
would not improve people’s living conditions, as government-affiliated figures estimated thatan average family needed a monthly income of about SYP 400 000 to 500 000 (about USD
110.5 to 138.2) to cover costs of living.228
The difficult economic and humanitarian situation intensified the desire to emigrate. In a study
conducted among 600 Damascus residents in late 2020 and early 2021, more than two thirds
said they wanted to leave Syria, 60 % of them naming the difficult living conditions as the main
reason for their desire.229 In September 2021, several media reported on the emigration of
thousands of industrialists (manufacturers) from Damascus and Aleppo,230 although COAR
noted that some reports were ‘exaggerated’. 231

3.1.2.

Impact of economic sanctions

UNOCHA stated in a February 2022 report that US economic sanctions imposed in June
2020 ‘added to depreciation pressure’ of the SYP.232 On the other hand, researchers Wael
Alalwani and Karam Shaar argued in a report of August 2021 that sanctions were not the only
reason for the economic crisis, since some sanctions such as the Caesar Act came into force
only after years of institutional corruption, mismanagement, aid diversion and war economy.233
Similarly, the news magazine Foreign Policy (FP) stated that Syria’s economic downfall wascaused by war, ‘decades-long corruption’ by the government of president Assad and thecollapse of the Lebanese banking sector. Western sanctions, however, had exacerbated the
populations dire situation and erased any chance of recovery, according to Foreign Policy.234
With regard to humanitarian work, sanctions did have an impact on Syrian NGOs operating
inside or outside of Syria. Many NGOs saw access to their bank accounts closed or were notallowed to perform any financial transactions, often with no or vague justification, and often
attributed to over-compliance. Syrians living abroad were reportedly similarly affected.235
With Lebanon’s decision to freeze deposits and block transfers abroad due to its own
economic crisis, including those of many Syrians who had left their money in Lebanese banks
due to the economic sanctions on Syria, reportedly not only individuals lost their private
savings, but also businesspeople who operated via Lebanon. Moreover, many companies,
including shipping companies, stopped doing business with Syria for fear of being affected by

228

Enab Baladi, In Syria, price hikes precede salary raises diminishing their impact and increasing inflation, 3January 2022, url
229
Jalabi, S., Attitudes Toward Emigration in the Syrian Capital of Damascus, OPC, 5 May 2021, url, pp. 8-9
230
NPA, Closure of facilities, immigration of industrialists, Syrian government keeps silent, 6 October 2021, url; Sawt
Al-Asima, “‫ ألف صناعي سوري هاجروا في أسبوعين‬50 ‫”نحو‬.. ‫‘[ فقدنا األمل‬We lost hope’. About 50 000 Syrian industrialists
migrated in two weeks], 25 September 2021, url, Enab Baladi, ‫هجرة غير مسبوقة لصناعيين وحرفيين سوريين‬. [Anunprecedented migration of Syrian industrialists and craftsmen], 26 September 2021, url
231
COAR, Damascus Puts Destroyed Factories on the Auction Block, 4 October 2021, url
232
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 12
233
Alalwani, W. and Shaar, K., A Comprehensive Review of the Effectiveness of US and EU Sanctions on Syria, MEI,
6 August 2021, url
234
FP, The Pointlessness of America’s Syria Sanctions, 11 January 2022, url
235
Daher, J., Invisible Sanctions: How Over-Compliance Limits Humanitarian Work on Syria, IMPACT-Civil Society
Research and Development, 2020, url, pp. 27-30

38

SYRIA: SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN DAMASCUS CITY – COI REPORT

the sanctions, or charged higher prices for deliveries of goods, including food, even thoughfood was not included in the sanctions.236

3.1.3.

Impact of Covid-19

For information on this topic up until April 2021 see subsection 3.1.3 of the EUAA COI report:
Syria - Socio-economic situation: Damascus city (April 2021). No further information could befound.

3.2.

Employment

3.2.1.

Employment and unemployment

According to RPW’s report of November 2021, the overall unemployment rate in Syria was
50 %, with more than 300 000 jobs being lost since the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic.
With reference to data by the Humanitarian Needs Assessment Programme (HNAP) of
September 2021, RPW noted that unemployment among women of 18 to 64 years of age waseven higher, at 81 %.237 A report by the Arab Reform Initiative 238 and the Brookings Doha
Center estimated the youth unemployment rate in Syria at 78 % in 2020 (prior to the Covid-19
pandemic).239
Syrian media reports indicated overall unemployment rates beyond 50 to 60 %,240 or even up
to 82 %.241 However, according to World Bank calculations,242 unemployment rates in 2021
stood at 4% for males and 37% for females.243
In 2019, the last year the Central Bureau of Statistics published labour-related data, 257 214
people of 15 years and above were without work in Damascus, including 145 702 people who
had never worked before and 111 512 who did have a job previously.244 Damascus’ total
population at that time was estimated to be around 2.1 million people.245

236Heller, S., Syrians Are Going Hungry. Will the West Act?, TCF, 7 June 2021, url, Daher, J., Invisible Sanctions:
How Over-Compliance Limits Humanitarian Work on Syria, IMPACT-Civil Society Research and Development, 2020,
url, p. 16
237
RPW, “I have not known the taste of safety for ten years”, November 2021, 17 November 2021, url, p. 48
238
The Arab Reform Initiative is a Paris-based think tank providing research on the Middle East and North Africa
region.
239
Arab Reform Initiative and Brookings Doha Center, Youth Employment and Livelihood in Syria, July 2021, 9August 2021, url, p. 2
240
Enab Baladi, ‫هجرة غير مسبوقة لصناعيين وحرفيين سوريين‬. [An unprecedented migration of Syrian industrialists andcraftsmen], 26 September 2021, url
241
New Arab (The), 2021 ‫صور قاتمة لألوضاع المعيشية في‬: ‫[ سورية‬Syria: Bleak images of living conditions in 2021], 31
December 2021, url
242
World Bank data is based on Labor Force Survey 2010 and HNAP household survey data (Summer 2021) . See
World Bank, Syria Economic Monitor, Spring 2022: Lost Generation of Syrians, 14 June 2022, url, p. 35 Figure 32
243
World Bank, Syria Economic Monitor, Spring 2022: Lost Generation of Syrians, 14 June 2022, url, p. 35
244
Syria, Central Bureau of Statistics, Distribution of Unemployed (15 years & over) by sex & Governorate 2019,
Chapter 3, Table 11/3, n.d., url
245
Syria, Central Bureau of Statistics, Estimate of the Population in Syria by Governorates in Mid Years 2016 -2019(000), Chapter 2, Table 4/2, n.d., url. More detailed data on the 2019 size of the population aged 15 and above, orof 0-15 years of age was not available.

39EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

More recent figures on employment / unemployment rates for Damascus city could not befound.

3.2.2.

Means of basic subsistence

According to a statement by UN representatives in Syria on the occasion of World Food Day,
years of conflict, displacement, the economic crisis, and prices that had risen‘stratospherically’ contributed to growing levels of poverty among the population, forcing
families to rely on measures such as reducing food consumption or sending children to workin order to survive.246
Based on data collected by UNOCHA for its 2022 HNO on Syria,247 as of August 2021,
average household expenses were exceeding income by 50 %. Given the fact that at thesame time 64.1 % of households reported to have at least one person working, UNOCHA
noted a growing number of ‘working poor’ among the population as well as an increase innegative coping mechanisms, including child labour, child marriage, or the sale of productive
assets, i.e., any kind of asset able to generate income, thus further increasing households’
economic vulnerability.248 One in four households reported to have sold such assets. 249
Moreover, more than two thirds of households (69 %) reported increasing debts, including due
to borrowing money to cover basic needs. At the same time, debt repayment accounted forabout 6 % of household expenditures, further reducing the amount available to cover basic
needs.250 In RPW’s study on the situation of returnees, 41 % of respondents said they were notable to cover their basic needs, 33 % could somewhat cover them and only 29 % said they
were able to cover basic needs with their income. 251
Joseph Daher, a professor and analyst at the European University Institute, noted in a reportof October 2021 that average living costs for a family of five in Damascus almost doubled in
the period July to September 2021, from SYP 1 240 000 (USD 494) 252 to SYP 1 847 200 (USD735) 253, while the monthly minimum wage remained SYP 72 000 (USD 28.7) 254 .255 By the endof 2021, costs had further risen to slightly over two million Syrian pounds (SYP 2 026 976,
about USD 807) 256, while the minimum wage was SYP 92 970 (about USD 37) 257 – an amountthat would cover only about 4.5 % of the average cost of living, as Daher noted. 258

246

UN Syria, Joint Statement occasion of World Food Day and the Syr ia Crisis [sic], 16 October 2021, url
The report covers the period January 2021 to February 2022 and is based on secondary data review as well as
on primary data collected across the country in the framework of the Multisectoral Needs Assessment (MSNA),
including interviews with over 33 170 households in August and September 2021, and of other complementary
sectoral assessments. UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 89
248
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 8
249
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 25
250
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 28
251
RPW, “I have not known the taste of safety for ten years”, November 2021, 17 November 2021, url, p. 50
252
USD 353.7, if calculated with the informal exchange rate valid in Damascus in October 2021.
253
USD 526.9, if calculated with the informal exchange rate valid in Damascus in October 2021.
254
USD 20.5, if calculated with the informal exchange rate valid in Damascus in October 2021.
255
Daher, J., Policy Brief: Cuts to Oil Derivative Subsidies: Consequences for Syria, EUI, Issue 2021/45, October
2021, 12 November 2021, url, p. 7
256
USD 553,6, if calculated with the informal exchange rate valid in Damascus in February 2022.
257
USD 25.4, if calculated with the informal exchange rate valid in Damascus in February 2022.
258
Daher, J., Expelled from the Support System: Austerity Deepens in Syria, EUI [Blog], 15 February 2022, url
247

40

SYRIA: SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN DAMASCUS CITY – COI REPORT

Currency devaluation contributed to the loss of purchasing power: an employee who had amonthly income of about USD 500 before the war, would only earn the equivalent of about
USD 20 in 2021, according to a report by the Arab Reform Initiative and the Brookings Doha
Center.259 In February 2022, the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) noted in asurvey among 961 respondents across 13 governorates (except Idlib) that 27 % of theinterviewed households had reportedly lost one or more sources of income over the previous
month, Damascus being above the average with 34 % of the interviewed households. For
Damascus, the numbers marked 10 % points increase compared to the previous month.260
In a survey conducted in late December 2020 and early January 2021, coordinated byresearchers Orwa Khalifa and Karam Shaar of the Operations and Policy Centre (OPC) 261
among 600 participants in three neighbourhoods of Damascus, 262 43.7 % of respondents
considered their standard of living to be ‘low’, although the average full-time working week of
respondents was 52.2 hours, and 24.4 % of respondents reported to work even more than 60hours per week.263 More than two thirds of respondents (67.1 %) of age 18 and above reported
to have one or more jobs.264 Salon Syria265, an online media platform, quoted several persons,
including a ministry employee working in Damascus, a teacher and others, who all worked in
more than one job to earn enough for a living. Additional jobs such as driving a taxi, working ina restaurant or giving private lessons after school, helped supplement the income, althougheven then earnings were not always enough to cover all costs, apart from the health risks th e
population faced by having to work for up to 15 hours per day to secure their livelihood. 266
The Syrian economist Youssef Ammar estimated in a report of August 2021 that about 70 % offamilies in government-controlled regions were living of remittances sent from abroad. Most ofthese remittances were relatively small sums of up to a maximum of 200 Euros, and were sent
through informal channels, due to the large difference between the official and the informal
exchange rate of about 20 % [in August 2021], as reported by the Syrian media portal Arab
Hashtag.267 According to UNOCHA’s 2022 HNO of February 2022, almost half of the overall
population relied on remittances, an increase of 10 % compared to mid-2020.268 This
percentage was even higher among IDP households outside of sites/camps (62 %), andespecially in government-controlled areas with more than 70 % of IDP households relying on

259

Arab Reform Initiative and Brookings Doha Center, Youth Employment and Livelihood i n Syria, July 2021, 9August 2021, url, p. 2
260
WFP, Syrian Arab Republic, mVAM Bulletin Issue no. 64: February 2022, 29 March 2022, url, pp. 4-5
261
The Operations and Policy Centre (formerly Orient Policy Centre) is a Syrian-led and owned, independent thinktank and service provider, established in 2014 and based in Gaziantep, Turkey.
262
The three neighbourhoods were Nahr Aisha, considered an area with a low living standard, Al -Zahirah (averageliving standard), and the residential area between Rukn al -Din and Al-Mazra'a neighbourhoods (relatively high living
standard). url, p. 5
263
Khalifa, O. and Shaar, K., Living in Damascus After a Decade of War: Employment, Income, and Consumption,
OPC, 22 June 2021, url, pp. 8-9
264
Khalifa, O. and Shaar, K., Living in Damascus After a Decade of War: Employment, Income, and Consumption,
OPC, 22 June 2021, url, p. 11
265
Salon Syria is an online media platform, that offers articles, reports, and news bulletins, as well as trainings forjournalists. Its editorial board is composed of journalists, designers, and administrators inside and outside of Syria.
266
Salon Syria, ‫[ السوري ومعركة العيش‬The Syrian and the battle of living], 7 January 2022, url
267
Arab Hashtag, ) ‫[ أرقام هائلة للحواالت الخارجية التي يتعايش عليها السوريين بمناطق النظام (صورة‬Huge figures for the externaltransfers on which Syrians coexist in regime areas (photo)], 23 August 2021, url; Osoul Financial Trading[Facebook], Percentage of Syrians living on foreign remittances, posted on: 21 August 2021, url
268
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 28

41

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

money sent from abroad. Nine in ten returnees reported that they relied on borrowing money
to cover basic needs, followed by remittances and the spending of savings and over two
thirds reported that their debts had increased in 2021. 269

3.3.

Poverty

Specific information on poverty levels in Damascus city could not be found during thereporting period.
Over 90 % of the Syrian population were currently living below the poverty line, as the UN
Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator stated ina briefing to the Security Council in October 2021. 270 This figure was again confirmed in a June
2022 briefing delivered by the UN Syria Commission Chair.271
According to the 2022 UNOCHA HNO’s findings, about 14.6 million Syrians (of an overall
population of 21.7 million) were assessed to be in need of humanitarian assistance in 2022,
including 9.2 million of the resident population, 3.3 million IDPs living outside camps and 2
million living in camps, as well as about 56 700 returnees. Of the overall population of 21.7
million, UNOCHA estimated 44.4 % to be in severe272, 22.5 % in extreme and 0.3 % in
catastrophic need of humanitarian assistance in 2022. 273 As of the beginning of 2022, about
half of Damascus’ population of 1.8 million (as estimated by UNOCHA) was in need ofhumanitarian assistance, with about 40 000 in extreme or catastrophic need.274
Based on primary data collected in mid-2021 for UNOCHA’s 2022 HNO report, more than
three out of four households (76 %) in Syria reportedly were insufficiently or not at all able tomeet basic needs, and an average household income covered only 51 % of expenses.275 Morethan two thirds of households (69 %) reported that their debts had increased since mid-2020,
and about one third of households stated that their child dropped out of school because it had
to work and contribute to the family income.276 UNOCHA noted that some population
segments which so far had not been in humanitarian need were now in need of assistancedue to currency devaluation and high prices, loss of livelihoods and growing household debts.

269

UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, pp. 39, 41
UNOCHA, Under-Secretary-General For Humanitarian Affairs And Emergency Relief Coordinator, Martin Griffiths:
Briefing to the Security Council on the humanitarian situation in Syria, New York, 27 October 2021, url
271
UN Human Rights Council, Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic Statement by UN Syria Commission Chair Paulo Pinheiro, Chair at 50th Session of the United Nations Human
Rights Council, 29 June 2022, url
272
Factors indicating severe, extreme, and catastrophic need include the percentage of communities reportingchild labour, the percentage of household groups reporting signs of psychological distress, the percentage ofhousehold members lacking valid civil documentation, the percentage of households having access to a sufficientquantity of water and their ability to meet basic needs, as well as other indicators. For detailed information on therelevant indicators for each category, see UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22
February 2022, url, p. 95
273
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, pp. 3, 7
274
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 48
275
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 26
276
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, pp. 6, 28
270

42

SYRIA: SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN DAMASCUS CITY – COI REPORT

Only 10 % of households earned more than the cost of the minimum expenditure basket277,
although in more than two thirds (64.1 % of households) at least one member was working.278
In Damascus city, 63 % of households reported an insufficient ability to meet the basic needsof all household members, 29 % said it was adequate, and 8 % indicated they were completely
unable to meet basic needs.279
In a report from Damascus, Reuters mentioned a woman living in Damascus who was granted
a monthly allowance of 30 000 SYP in 2013 (then worth around USD 150); in February 2022
that same amount was worth about USD 6. A journalist and a state employee working in
Damascus interviewed for the same report, stated that their salaries would not cover theirmonthly expenses.280
According to UNOCHA’s 2022 HNO, nationwide, over 70 % of the IDP population living inresidential areas indicated that they were unable to meet the basic needs of all household
members, with the largest parts of their income needed to pay for food, rent and clothing. In
Damascus city, income insufficiency among IDP households was ‘alarmingly increasing’ by
125 %, as UNOCHA noted.281 Damascus had among the country’s highest number of IDPs, with33 % of the overall population of 1 828 845 (as estimated by UNOCHA) being either IDPs
(609,682) or returnees (599).282

3.4.

Food Security

3.4.1.

Availability of foodWFP noted in December 2021 that food security continued to deteriorate in 2021 due to theongoing economic decline, protracted conflict, hyperinflation, and fuel shortages. 283 Moreover,in 2021, the harvestable area of cereals was significantly diminished due to insufficient anderratic rainfall, several heatwaves, lack of irrigation water and the high cost of input as well as
high costs of fuel for pumping.284 According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation(FAO), wheat production in 2021 was estimated to yield around 1.05 million tonnes, less thanhalf of the amount produced in 2020 (2.8 million tonnes) and only a quarter of the pre-war
production of an average of 4.1 million tonnes in the period 2002 to 2011.285 FAO expectedthat continued shortfall of rain as well as farmers’ limited financial resources and increasing
production costs - such as high prices for fertilizers, diesel, and wheat seeds on the freemarket and lack of subsidised products -, would also limit the 2022 wheat production.286 The
277

A minimum expenditure basket is what a household needs to cover basic or essential needs and its overall
costs. It is a monetary threshold and includes only those essential needs (items and services) that households cancover through the market and that are accessible in adequate quality. See: url
278
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 8
279
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 27
280
Reuters, Hardship deepens amidst Syria's frozen conflict, 13 February 2022, url
281
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 38
282
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 16
283
WFP, Syrian Arab Republic, mVAM Bulletin Issue no. 62: December 2021, 31 December 2021, url, p. 2
284
FAO, GIEWS Country Brief, The Syrian Arab Republic, 21 December 2021, url, p. 2
285
FAO, GIEWS Country Brief, The Syrian Arab Republic, 21 December 2021, url, p. 2
286
FAO, GIEWS Country Brief, The Syrian Arab Republic, 21 December 2021, url, pp. 1-2
6

43

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

rising diesel prices affected transport costs for agricultural products as well as farmers’ ability
to irrigate their land, causing many small farmers to cease production. Reportedly, thecultivation of fruits and vegetables in 2021 declined by between 60 % and 70 % due to highproduction costs.287 Moreover, farmers sold part of their herd to gain funds for feeding theremaining animals, leading to a reduction of meat prices, while prices for eggs and dairy
products increased, as they became less available. 288
At the same time, imports of essential goods such as wheat needed for bread and fueldeclined. The lack of fuel further limited food supply and drove up prices.289 In August 2021,
the Ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade (MoEFT) introduced a six-month ban on the importof specific commodities (including items such as cell phones, residential air conditioners,
construction materials like tiles and stone, some vehicles, and different kinds of food items
such as cheddar cheese, almonds, raisins and walnuts, as well as physiotherapy equipment) 290
in order to reduce import expenditures and save foreign reserves for the import of essential
goods such as wheat flour.291 In December 2021, Syria reportedly reached an agreement with
Russia to import one million tons of wheat.292 In February 2022, the GoS decided to ration
reserves of several basic goods, including wheat, to prepare for supply shortages following
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Likewise, the government announced it would limit public
spending to prepare for increasing wheat prices given the impact of the invasion on global
markets. Syria was highly dependent on wheat imports, with imports from Russia reportedly
accounting for the largest part of the 1.5 million tons of wheat imported in 2021. 293
Shortage of wheat and, subsequently, of flour and bread led to long lines of people queuingfor hours to buy bread at public bakeries, as residents and visitors in Damascus reported inspring 2021.294 Moreover, wheat shortages also affected the quality of bread, as bakeries had
to use more local hard durum wheat instead of softer wheat, usually imported from Russia. 295
The situation was exacerbated by the fact that many families have taken to replace other,more costly food items with bread, thus increasing consumption and demand. 296
Subsidised bread allocations through the smart card system decreased in amount and weightsince late October 2020.297 As of December 2021, in GoS-held areas each person was entitledto one bundle of bread every two days while a family of three was entitled to 30 bundles per
287

Daher, J., Policy Brief: Cuts to Oil Derivative Subsidies: Consequences for Syria, EUI, Issue 2021/45, October
2021, 12 November 2021, url, p. 5
288
FAO, 2021 FAO crop and food supply assessment mission to the Syrian Arab Republic, December 2021, 14
December 2021, url, p. 69
289
Heller, S., Syrians Are Going Hungry. Will the West Act?, TCF, 7 June 2021, url
290
COAR, Import Ban Aims to Curb Reserve Losses as Syrians Protest, 23 August 2021, url
291
WFP, Syrian Arab Republic, mVAM Bulletin Issue no. 58: August 2021, 21 September 2021, url, p. 1
292
COAR, Syria’s Wheat Crisis Foreshadows Famine, 10 January 2022, url
293
New Arab (The), Syria to ration wheat, basic goods in response to Ukraine crisis, 25 February 2022, url; Oxfam,‘Before we feared dying of war, now we fear dying of hunger’: Ukraine crisis propelling hunger in Syria, 1 5 March
2022, url
294
Heller, S., Syrians Are Going Hungry. Will the West Act?, TCF, 7 June 2021, url
295Heller, S., Syrians Are Going Hungry. Will the West Act?, TCF, 7 June 2021, url; Enab Baladi, Syria’s wheat crisis
foreshadows a famine, 30 December 2021, url
296
ORSAM Center for Middle Eastern Studies, The wheat and bread crisis in Syr ia and its impact on the population,
Policy Brief 179, July 2021, 13 July 2021, url, pp. 8-9
297
WFP Syria, Market Price Watch Bulletin, August 2021, Issue 81, 31 August 2021, url, p. 2; FAO, GIEWS Country
Brief, The Syrian Arab Republic, 22 December 2020, url, p. 2

44

SYRIA: SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN DAMASCUS CITY – COI REPORT

month, but not more than two per day,298 with one bundle containing seven loaves of bread, atotal of 1.1 kg per bundle.299 Subsidised bread had to be bought at preselected bakeries andno bread was distributed on Fridays.300 As of September 2021, state-controlled bread
distributors were allowed to take a commission of SYP 50 (USD 0.014), raising the price perbundle of subsidised bread in Damascus to SYP 250 (USD 0.07).301
In November 2021, the government announced that it would exclude around 500 000 families
from its subsidies programme, mainly individuals belonging to middle and high-income groupsof society. In February 2022, however, the GoS expanded the list to exclude also state
employees, retirees, military staff, owners of small shops and other groups. Exclusion was
based on criteria such as owning certain kinds of cars, a commercial licence or having a family
member abroad. European University Institute professor and analyst Joseph Daher estimatedthat the decision would affect roughly 15 % of all smart card holders, thus further raising costsof living.302 A government speaker reportedly noted that the entire family would be excluded if
the family member abroad was the ‘head of the family’, while otherwise only the subsidies of
the absent family member would be cut.303 Card holders would be informed about the reason
for their exclusion from the subsidy programme on a specific website, where they would also
be offered the possibility to submit an objection. 304 Later the government reconsidered somedisqualifications and announced that permanent or temporary state employees, military staff
and retired civilian or military employees would not be excluded because of their ownership ofa car; also owners of small shops with only one employee would be re-included in thesubsidiary programme.305
As of February 2022, 39 % of households interviewed by WFP in Syria reported difficulties inreaching markets, mainly due to ‘diminished purchasing power vis-à-vis commodity andtransportation prices’. In Damascus, 28 % of households reportedly faced challenges toaccess markets during the previous six months. 306

3.4.2.

Food security levels

According to WFP, as of early 2021, 12.4 million people in Syria were food insecure and 81 700
children between 6 and 59 months were suffering from chronic malnutrition.307 By mid-2021,
Syria ranked amongst the ten most food-insecure countries globally.308

298

Enab Baladi, Syria’s wheat crisis foreshadows a famine, 30 December 2021, url
Al Shami, I., Facing Syria’s Food Crisis, WINEP, 14 February 2022, url
300
WFP Syria, Market Price Watch Bulletin, August 2021, Issue 81, 31 August 2021, url, p. 2; COAR, Import Ban Aims
to Curb Reserve Losses as Syrians Protest, 23 August 2021, url
301
Enab Baladi, Syria’s wheat crisis foreshadows a famine, 30 December 2021, url
302
Daher, J., Expelled from the Support System: Austerity Deepens in Syria, EUI [Blog], 15 February 2022, url
303
MEE, Syria: Protests mount amid anger over ‘unfair’ cuts to government subsidies, 12 February 2022, url
304
Qasioun News, ‫ ليرة لغير المدعومين‬1300 ‫[ النظام يرفع سعر كيلو الخبز إلى‬The system raises the price of a kilo of bread to1300 lira for the unsupported], 1 February 2022, url; Syria TV, ‫ ألف شخص من الدعم‬600 ‫[ النظام السوري يستبعد نحو‬The Syrian
regime excludes about 600,000 people from support], 2 February 2022, url
305
Daher, J., Expelled from the Support System: Austerity Deepens in Syria, EUI [Blog], 15 February 2022, url
306
WFP, Syrian Arab Republic, mVAM Bulletin Issue no. 64: February 2022, 29 March 2022, url, p. 4
307
WFP, WFP Syria - Country Brief, November 2021, 22 December 2021, url, p. 1
308
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 8299

45

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMIn April 2022, food prices were reported by WFP to be 59 % higher than six months prior and
84 % higher than in April 2021. The increase was mainly attributed to ‘the ongoing fuelshortage countrywide, as well as to an increase in global food prices, inflation and the Ukraine
crisis’.309 By June 2022, the price of the average reference food basket increased by 45 %since the start of the year to SYP 318 726 (USD 80.14). In Damascus, the price for thereference basket was slightly above average, with SYP 330 058 (USD 82.99), whichconstituted an increase of 90 % compared with one year prior.310 Notable price increase on
food items between February and June 2022 were recorded for vegetable oil (up 55 %),wheat flour (up 38 %), sugar (up 32 %) and rice (up 23 %).311
While the average monthly income in Syria amounted to roughly SYP 70 000 (about USD 20)
at the end of December 2021, a family in Damascus needed the equivalent of about USD 275
to survive, according to local residents.312
In February 2022, more than half the households (52 %) of overall 961 respondents
interviewed by WFP by phone and across the country (except Idlib), reported poor orborderline food consumption. In Damascus, about 42 % of households reported inadequate
food consumption. Nationwide, poor or food consumption was more frequently reported by
IDPs and returnees (58 % and 54 %, respectively) than by residents (47 %).313 90 % ofinterviewed households said they applied at least one food-based coping mechanism. 72 % of
all interviewed households reported having bought food on credit in the last month. 314

3.5.

Housing, water, and sanitation

3.5.1.

Availability of housing

Housing shortage continued to exist across the country, and especially in urban centres,
noted UNOCHA in its 2022 report on humanitarian needs in Syria.315 Over a third of thecountry’s population lived in substandard, damaged and / or inadequate shelters, including
almost half (3.37 million people) of the estimated 6.92 million IDPs across Syria. 316
The chair of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
observed in a statement to the UN Human Rights Council that‘[a]cross the country, and acutely in Government controlled areas, civilians
continuously face deprivation of housing, land and property rights. Government
security forces have destroyed houses in recently retaken areas for monetary gain.
Vacated properties of thousands of displaced civilians have been auctioned without
the involvement of their owners. In and around Damascus, large numbers of309

WFP, WFP Syria Situation Report #5, May 2022, url, p. 1
WFP Syria, Market Price Watch Bulletin, April 2022, Issue 90, 1 August 2022, url, p. 1
311
WFP Syria, Market Price Watch Bulletin, April 2022, Issue 90, 1 August 2022, url, p. 1
312
MEE, Syria: Protests mount amid anger over 'unfair' cuts to government subsidies, 12 February 2022, url
313
WFP, Syrian Arab Republic, mVAM Bulletin Issue no. 6 4: February 2022, 29 March 2022, url, pp. 1-2
314
WFP, Syrian Arab Republic, mVAM Bulletin Issue no. 6 4: February 2022, 29 March 2022, url, pp. 1, 3
315
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 12
316
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 27
310

46

SYRIA: SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN DAMASCUS CITY – COI REPORT

individuals are still being prevented from accessing their homes, withoutcompensation.’317
Soaring rents have further aggravated the population’s living conditions. According to theowner of a real estate office quoted by Al Jazeera, monthly rents in low-income areas such as
Dwel’a, Al-Tadamon, Daff Al-Shouk, and Daff Al-Sakhr ranged between SYP 200 000 and SYP
300 000 (USD 75 to 85) 318 and up to SYP 500 000 (USD 143)319, depending on the state andsize of the apartment and its location. Rents for one room in the Old Damascus area, inneighbourhoods such as Bab Touma, Bab Sharqi, and Al-Qaymariya ranged from SYP
250 000 to SYP 350 000 (USD 71 to 100)320, noting that such numbers were ‘four and fivetimes an employee’s salary’.321 According to report by Sawt Al-Asima, a pro-opposition media
outlet that covers Damascus and Rural Damascus, rents in areas with better infrastructure andcloser to the city centre, such as Al-Mazzeh, reportedly ranged from SYP 400 000 to SYP 1
million (USD 124.4 to 311.8),322 but could go as high as SYP 1.5 million (roughly USD 468) andabove in rich neighbourhoods.323
The GoS’ decision in February 2022 to exclude about 600 000 families from its subsidiary‘smart card’ programme further aggravated the situation on an already tense housing market.
The New Arab reported on an increase in rents in Damascus, as house owners who weredeprived of access to subsidised goods searched for other ways to generate an additional
income. An IDP living in the southern outskirts of Damascus saw his rent doubled from SYP
75 000 to 150 000 (USD 20.5 to 41), an amount that corresponded to his monthly salary. A
real estate broker observed that many families might move to slum areas on the city’s
outskirts because of the rising rents or might move to rural areas despite poor communal andtransportation services.324
In Damascus, in some cases, residents were reportedly put under pressure to sell theirproperty to members of Hezbollah and Iranian militias. Other reported violations of HLP rights
included the destruction of civil registries and property documents. In some cases, persons
living in areas outside GoS control reportedly faced problems in reaching their properties orcivil registries, because checkpoint staff would not let them pass, or would confiscate property
or identification documents, including marriage certificates. The latter was particularly
317

UN Human Rights Council, Statement by Paulo Pinheiro, Chair of the Independent International Commission ofInquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, to the 47th Session of the United Nations Human Rights Council, 6 July 2021,
url
318
USD 56 to 84, if calculated with the informal exchange rate valid in Damascus in December 2021.
319
USD 140, if calculated with the informal exchange rate valid in Damascus in December 2021.
320
USD 70 to 98, if calculated with the informal exchange rate valid in Damascus in December 2021.
321
Al Jazeera, ‫مالذ السوريين لمواجهة ارتفاع اإليجارات في دمشق وريفها‬.. ‫[ أقبية ومحال تجارية وبيوت غير جاهزة‬Basements, shops andhouses that are not ready. Syrians' haven to cope with rising rents in Damascus and its countryside], 26 December
2021, url
322
Sawt Al-Asima, ‫في دمشق ومحيطها‬% 20 ‫[ قانون البيوع العقارية يرفع إيجار المنازل بنسبة‬Al-baywa real estate law increases houserent by 20% in Damascus and its surroundings], 13 June 2021, url; Syria TV, ‫ارتفاع كبير في إيجارات المنازل بمدينة دمشق وريفها‬[A significant increase in house rents in Damascus and its countryside], 29 August 2021, url; Al Jazeera, ‫أقبية ومحال‬‫مالذ السوريين لمواجهة ارتفاع اإليجارات في دمشق وريفها‬.. ‫[ تجارية وبيوت غير جاهزة‬Basements, shops and houses that are not ready.
Syrians' haven to cope with rising rents in Damascus and its countryside], 26 December 2021, url
323
Sawt Al-Asima, ‫في دمشق ومحيطها‬% 20 ‫[ قانون البيوع العقارية يرفع إيجار المنازل بنسبة‬Al-baywa real estate law increases houserent by 20% in Damascus and its surroundings], 13 June 2021, url; Salon Syria, ‫[ استئجار شقة بدمشق …حلم مستحيل‬Rent anapartment in Damascus… impossible dream], 17 December 2021, url
324
New Arab (The), ‫إلغاء الدعم يرفع إيجارات المساكن في دمشق‬: ‫[ سورية‬Syria: Elimination of subsidies raises housing rents inDamascus], 15 February 2022, url

47

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

problematic for women, as it would put them at threat of losing access to properties registeredunder their husband’s name.325

3.5.2.

Reconstruction projects

The Arab Reform Initiative described that within Damascus city multiple parts of the city havebeen designated for reconstruction, most of them areas that include informal housing. The
most prominent districts include Al-Qaboun, Yarmouk, Jobar and Barzeh. More areas withinformal settlements are expected to follow. The parts of the city which were prioritised,
including Al-Qaboun and Yarmouk, were strongholds of the opposition and witnessed severe
destruction.326
Researchers Suhail al-Ghazi and Noor Hamadeh noted that laws on urban redevelopment
such as Decree 66 (2012) and its amended version, Law No. 10 (2018), were used by the GoS
to confiscate or destroy property, mainly in pro-opposition informal settlements. Decree 66
initially authorised the GoS to redevelop areas of informal settlements in Damascus, while Law
No. 10 was extended to apply to the whole of Syria. Moreover, the sources alleged that suchurban development projects often served to change the demographic composition of theaffected neighbourhoods. For example, Marota City, an urban development project underDecree 66, would extend over the former pro-opposition neighbourhood of Basateen Al-Razi.
About 50 000 residents had to give up their homes since they lacked formal property
documents and were not able to prove ownership of their properties. Moreover, many
residents who were displaced abroad were unable to return to Syria to claim ownership andconsequently lost their property, too. At the same time, many of the businesses involved in the
project were owned by wealthy elites who were closely connected to the government and
who were presumably likely to stay in the neighbourhood after the project’s completion. 327
The Basilia City project328, another urban development project based on Decree 66, would besituated in the neighbourhoods of Al-Mazzeh, Kafr Sousa, Qanawat Basteen, Daraya, and AlQadam –areas that were predominantly inhabited by government opponents who fled or were
expelled during the war. The same situation applied to development projects under Law No.
10, including the mostly informal Tadamon neighbourhood in Al-Midan district - only about
10 % of residents held formal ownership of their properties, and Yarmouk. Yarmouk was 329
home to the largest PRS community in Syria and largely destroyed during the war. 330 For
further information on Decree 66 and Law No. 10, see subsection 3.5.3 of the EUAA COI
Report: Syria - Socio-economic situation: Damascus city (April 2021).
Researcher Mazen Ezzi assessed that zoning plans and reconstruction projects in Al-Qaboun
district, including the residential area Qaboun Al-Balad, the Al-Qaboun Industrial Zone and the325

Al-Ghazi, S. and Hamadeh, N., Part 1: Violations in Government-Held Areas, TIMEP, 2 April 2021, url
Arab Reform Initiative, Informal Settlements in Syria: What approach after the conflict?, 28 October 2021, url, pp.
12-14
327
Al-Ghazi, S. and Hamadeh, N., Part 1: Violations in Government-Held Areas, TIMEP, 2 April 2021, url
328
In June 2021, the government announced the beginning of the construction work of Basilia City, according to
the Syrian Observer quoting an article by pro-government website Hashtag Syria. See: url
329
Until 2011, about 160 000 Palestinian refugees were living in Yarmouk, however, the majority fled during theyears of war. As of early 2021, a few hundred families have returned to live in the camp. See: url330
Al-Ghazi, S. and Hamadeh, N., Part 1: Violations in Government-Held Areas, TIMEP, 2 April 2021, url
326

48

SYRIA: SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN DAMASCUS CITY – COI REPORT

Tishreen informal settlement, constituted ‘social engineering’. In Al-Qaboun and parts ofTishreen, residents had supported the opposition, and informal settlements in these districts
had been largely destroyed during the war. 331

3.5.3.

Legal issues affecting the housing situation

For information on Decree 66 and Law No. 10, see subsection 3.5.3 of the EUAA COI Report:
Syria - Socio-economic situation: Damascus city (April 2021).
In 2021, the GoS adopted several laws and regulatory measures related to real estate andproperty. These laws and measures, according to The Syria Report, would increase thegovernment’s control over the real estate market and further reduce access to housing forsome population groups. In March 2021, the government adopted Law No. 15 of 2021, which
regulated the mechanism for calculating property sales taxes. According to the new law, taxes
that were due at any kind of transfer of real estate ownership, would henceforth be calculated
based on the property’s market price, instead of on the price agreed upon between seller andbuyer. The respective property’s market price would be estimated by specialised committees
formed by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) and established at local, governorate and centrallevel.332 Article 10 of Law No. 15/2021 was deemed particularly problematic as it prohibited theofficial registration of any sale before the parties involved received financial clearance fromtheir governorate’s financial directorate. This, in turn, required the payment of all outstanding
taxes and bills – even those unrelated to the transaction – to the state authorities within 30
days after the transaction.333
The Syria Report estimated that residents in informal settlement areas were particularly
affected by the law, as many of them had only sales contracts to prove ownership, or court
rulings and agricultural deeds, but did not have them officially recorded in the real estateregistry. In informal settlements, many houses lacked water or electricity meters. To obtain
official registration, any potential buyer would therefore have to request the installation ofsuch meters and subsequently pay local administrative fees or a lump sum to receive thenecessary financial clearance.334
The law did not extend to public institutions or real estate development projects, allowing
these institutions to buy or expropriate real estate without paying owners the current market
value.335 Moreover, obtaining financial clearance also required a security approval.
Consequently, anyone with a record of government opposition might face difficulties in buying
or selling property.336
Other property-related legislation included Law No. 17, stipulating that also fees for cadastral
services had to be calculated according to the market value of properties, or Decree No. 28
331

Ezzi, M., On the edge of the capital: Social Engineering in North-Eastern Damascus, EUI, 5 November 2021, url,
pp. 7, 16332
Syria Report (The), Explained: New Real Estate Tax Law Raises New HLP Rights Concerns, 17 March 2021, url;
Syria Report (The), The Exclusionary Measures of the Damascus Real Estate Market, 29 September 2021, url
333
Syria Report (The), Explained: New Real Estate Tax Law Raises New HLP Rights Concerns, 17 March 2021, url
334
Syria Report (The), Explained: New Real Estate Tax Law Raises New HLP Rights Concerns, 17 March 2021, url
335
Syria Report (The), Explained: New Real Estate Tax Law Raises New HLP Rights Concerns, 17 March 2021, url
336
Syria Report (The), The Exclusionary Measures of the Damascus Real Estate Market, 29 September 2021, url

49EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

requiring sellers to have defined amounts of funds on their bank accounts before the sale
could be registered: at least SYP 1 million (USD 288) for the sale of land and at least SYP 5
million (USD 1 440.5) for the sale of a residential or commercial property. 337
The Syria Report estimated that following the enactment of the aforementioned laws, proopposition IDPs and refugees, who owned property in development zones of Damascus were
those most likely to sell their properties in the near future, out of fear that they might notreceive security clearance or might be expropriated. 338 No further information on theimplementation of these laws was found.

3.5.4.

Availability of water and sanitation

After ten years of war, only about half of Syria’s water and sanitation systems functioned
properly, according to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), due to damages
to the infrastructure, lack of maintenance, and loss of more than a third of technical staff, whoeither retired or emigrated. Water supply was further affected by the lack of electricity, as thecountry’s power generation capacity was down by 60 % to 70 %. ICRC also pointed toenvironmental damages as a consequence of the war, giving the Damascus city wastewater
treatment plant as an example. Since it was left inoperable in 2012, wastewater entered theenvironment untreated, leading to groundwater contamination and increased risks to publichealth.339
UNOCHA estimated that about 70 % of sewage was released untreated and at least half ofsewerage systems across Syria were not functional. Consequently, waterborne diseases wereon the rise.340
According to a Syrian academic interviewed for this report, water cuts in Damascus city varied
according to the area. In the past, there had been water cuts for up to 24 hours in some areas.
Although tap water was potable, people would buy bottled water to have provisioning at
home in case of water cuts or water shortages. Due to water and electricity shortages, doing
the laundry could take up to three days, as electric washing machines worked only when bothwater and electricity were available.341
In December 2021, the Damascus Water Supply and Sewerage Authority published a watersupply programme for the city, according to which water was supplied for periods of 6 to 9
hours per night or day, depending on the neighbourhood. In some areas, supply was available
for up to 12 hours per day.342 In February 2022, the office stated that there was a significant
improvement in the water flow of Al-Fijeh spring – the main source of drinking water for the337

Syria Report (The), The Exclusionary Measures of the Damascus Real Estate Market, 29 September 2021, url
Syria Report (The), The Exclusionary Measures of the Damascus Real Estate Market, 29 September 2021, url
339
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Syria water crisis: Up to 40% less drinking water after 10 yearsof war, 1 October 2021, url
340
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 9
341
Syrian academic from Damascus, interview, 3 March 2022
342
D.A.W.S.S.A, 2021-12-19 ‫[ برنامج تزويد المياه في مناطق مدينة دمشق اعتبارا من‬The water supply program in the areas of thecity of Damascus starting 12/19-2021], undated, url
338

50

SYRIA: SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN DAMASCUS CITY – COI REPORT

population residing in the capital. Consequently, Damascus and the surrounding areas fed by
the spring would likely witness an easing or lifting of the rationing measures. 343

3.6.

Health care

3.6.1.

Availability and access to treatment and medicines

The World Health Organisation (WHO) estimated that 12.2 million people would be in need ofhealth services in 2022 in Syria, among them 4.4 million IDPs and 1.33 million children under
the age of five years.344
UNOCHA stated that countrywide people’s access to basic services continued to decline, due
to damaged infrastructure, lack of critical supplies, and lack of financial means as well as
restrictions on free and safe movement. Particularly serious was the lack of technicalpersonnel needed for delivery and maintenance of basic health services and to operate
potable water supply systems. Shortage of technical staff was due to displacement during thewar, death or impairment, but also due to a lack of technical training.345 The ratio of healthcare
workers to population had crossed emergency thresholds in more than half of the country’s
subdistricts (a third-level administrative unit) as of 2022.346 Moreover, all across Syria at least
3 364 health care personnel were still detained or forcibly disappeared, including 744 healthworkers in Damascus.347
The health care sector reportedly suffered not only from shortage of personnel due to highemigration and retirement rates, but also limited availability of medicines and low-quality ofavailable products.348
In December 2021, WFP reported that almost 23 % of interviewed households349 across Syria
had difficulties in accessing medical care facilities, 48 % struggled with purchasing necessary
medicines, mainly because they lacked financial means (55 %), but also due to shortages inpharmacies (17 %).350
Based on the latest WHO data available of December 2020, Damascus had 15 public
hospitals, 12 of which were classified as ‘accessible’, while 3 were ‘hard to access’.351 Of 61
public health centres, 53 were ‘accessible’ and 2 ‘hard to access’. 352

343

Al-Baath Newspaper, ‫إلغاء تقنين المياه عن دمشق ومحيطها‬. . ‫[ قريبا‬coming soon. abolition of water rationing for Damascus
and its surroundings], 27 February 2022, url
344
WHO, Syrian Arab Republic, Emergency Appeal 2022, 27 December 2021, url, p. 1
345
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 20 22, url, pp.8-9
346
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 20
347
SNHR, At least 3 364 health care personnel still arrested / forcibly disappeared, 98 % by the Syrian regime, 27
February 2021, url, p. 7
348
NPA, Syria’s poor healthcare system claims victims, 12 July 2021, url
349
WFP interviewed 1 081 households by phone in December 2021 in 13 governorates (except Idlib).
350
WFP, Syrian Arab Republic, mVAM Bulletin Issue no. 62: December 2021, 31 December 2021, url, p. 4
351
WHO, HeRAMS Annual Report, January – December 2020, Public Hospitals in the Syrian Arab Republic, 2020,
url, p. 14
352
WHO, HeRAMS Annual Report, January – December 2020, Public Health Centres in the Syrian Arab Republic,
2020, url, p. 14

51

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

According to a Syrian academic interviewed for this report, as of March 2022 public healthcare was generally available in Damascus city, however, people often would have to wait longto get treatment. Treatment and stay in a public hospital were free, however, people would
have to pay for all medical products needed for treatment, like for example, a catheter needed
for heart surgery, which would cost about SYP 1.5 million to 2.5 million (USD 414.6 to 691). The
same operation would cost about SYP 4-5 million (USD 1 106 to 1 382) in a private hospital,
including the stay and the doctor’s fee. There was, however, a general shortage of doctors, asmany had emigrated.353
According to a March 2022 DIS report, specialised medical treatment and medicines areavailable in Damascus for the following chronic diseases: cancer, cardiac complications,diabetes type I and II, haematological diseases, kidney diseases, rheumatic dis eases andchronic obstructive lung diseases.354
Civilians perceived to be opposed to the government claimed to have been denied access totreatment in Damascus, according to a report by the Human Rights Institute of the
Georgetown University Law Institute. One woman reported that she had been pressed to signa reconciliation agreement with the government before receiving medical care for her father,which she refused.355
No specific information on the situation of IDPs with regard to access to treatment andmedicines could be found.

3.6.2.

Healthcare facilities capacity and quality

According to the latest WHO data available, as of December 2020, Damascus had 15 public
hospitals, 11 of which were classified as ‘fully functioning’ and 4 as ‘partially functioning’. 356
Two hospitals were ‘partially damaged’, nevertheless, one of them (Damascus kidney hospital)
was reported to be fully functioning.357
Inpatient capacity In Damascus’ public hospitals has increased from originally (that is, pre-war)
2 840 to 3 246 beds, which signifies a 114 % increase in available beds, probably due to theincreased demand for medical treatment related to the Covid-19 pandemic. Bed availability
per 10 000 population amounted to 18 in Damascus’ public hospitals. 358 With regard to public
hospitals offering Comprehensive Emergency Obstetric and Newborn Care (CEmONC)
services, Damascus was below the benchmark of one hospital per 500 000 people providing
these services, with mathematically only half a hospital for half a million people, or, conversely,
353

Syrian academic from Damascus, interview, 3 March 2022
Denmark, DIS, Health care services availability and accessibility in Damascus, Rural Damascus, Tartous and
Latakia, March 2022, url, pp. 28-45
355
HRI, No choice: Attacks on health as a driver of forced displacement in Syria, May 2021, url, p. 36. HRI’s report isbased on 39 interviews conducted in the academic year 2020-2021 with Syrians who were either living outside at
the time of the interview or were living in opposition-held areas and had previously spoken publicly against the
government. For details on the methodology used, see pp. 4-5.
356
WHO, HeRAMS Annual Report, January – December 2020, Public Hospitals in the Syrian Arab Republic, 2020,
url, p. 10
357
WHO, HeRAMS Annual Report, January – December 2020, Public Hospitals in the Syrian Arab Republic, 2020,
url, pp. 16-17
358
WHO, HeRAMS Annual Report, January – December 2020, Public Hospitals in the Syrian Arab Republic, 2020,
url, pp. 19-20
354

52

SYRIA: SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN DAMASCUS CITY – COI REPORT

one hospital for a population of one million.359 As of the third quarter of 2021, that number had
slightly changed to one hospital providing CEmONC services for statistically 833 333
people.360
As of December 2020, the total number of medical doctors working at public hospitals in
Damascus amounted to 3 849, including 43 orthopaedic surgery, 47 general surgery, 19
neurological surgery, 772 other specialists, 15 emergency physicians, 2 874 resident doctors,
and 79 dentists. Other medical staff included 3 752 nurses, 391 laboratory staff, 154 midwives,
83 pharmacists, 505 health workers with university degree, 1 326 technicians and 2 890 otherstaff. There were no general practitioners.361
According to WHO data of the period July to September 2021, health staff in all of Damascus’
medical facilities (hospitals, PHCs, and others) included 25 doctors (general practitioners,
specialists, emergency physicians, resident doctors, and dentists), 23 nurses and one midwife
per 10 000 people.362
During December 2020, Damascus’ public hospitals carried out 3 078 elective surgeries and1 039 emergency surgeries. 981 patients were treated at intensive care units (IC Us), and 287
children with severe diseases received treatment at public hospitals. Moreover, 2 358 patientswere treated for cancer, and 1 650 patients received cardiovascular treatment. Damascus has
two cardiovascular specialised hospitals. Damascus public hospitals reported 19 psychiatricinpatients in December 2020.363
The salary of a resident doctor – a medical graduate who was doing his specialisation training
in a hospital - was reportedly about SYP 50 000 (about USD 12) for a working week of up to
96 hours. This amount would often not even pay for rent and food, leading many to take up asecond job or leave the country.364 Similarly, the monthly salary of a doctor at a public hospital
was reportedly SYP 100 000 (about USD 30)365 at best. An anaesthesiologist in Damascus wasquoted that due to emigration of doctors and medical graduates only four anaesthesiologists
under the age of 30 years were left in government-controlled areas.366

3.6.3.

Impact of Covid-19

As of 5 July 2022, Syria had officially recorded 55 940 confirmed cases of Covid-19, including
1 712 health workers, and 3 150 deaths, among them 44 health workers. The city of Damascus
359

WHO, HeRAMS Annual Report, January – December 2020, Public Hospitals in the Syrian Arab Republic, 2020,
url, p. 43
360
Calculation based on data provided by WHO. See: WHO, Health Cluster Whole of Syria, Syrian Arab Republic,
Snapshot on WoS Health Resources and Services Availability Monitoring System (HeRAMS), 2021 Q 3: Jul -Sep, 13
January 2022, url, p. 1
361
WHO, HeRAMS Annual Report, January – December 2020, Public Hospitals in the Syrian Arab Republic, 2020,
url, pp. 24-25
362
WHO, Health Cluster Whole of Syria, Syrian Arab Republic, Snapshot on WoS Health Resources and Services
Availability Monitoring System (HeRAMS), 2021 Q 3: Jul-Sep, 13 January 2022, url, p. 2
363
WHO, HeRAMS Annual Report, January – December 2020, Public Hospitals in the Syrian Arab Republic, 2020,
url, pp. 38, 40, 46, 49, 53
364
NPA, Low salaries force doctors to moonlight in Syria’s Damascus, 15 March 2021, url
365
USD 28.8, if calculated with the informal exchange rate valid in Damascus in September 2021.
366
NPA, Only 4 anesthesiologists [sic] under 30 left in Syrian government areas: health official, 14 September 2021,
url

53

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

had officially recorded a total number of 10 744 confirmed cases of Covid-19, including 612
health workers. Up to that date, 901 deaths were officially recorded, including the death of 22
health workers. Damascus had 22 treatment (isolation) hospitals with a total number of 527
beds, including 367 treatment (isolation) beds and 160 ICU beds, as well as 130 ventilators
available for the treatment of Covid-19.367
A Syrian academic interviewed for this report noted that the actual numbers of Covid-19 cases
were uncertain. An overall debilitated health care system as well as limited testing capacity(e.g., shortage of Covid-19 testing kits) had hidden the scale of the Covid-19 outbreak in Syria.
Besides, the high cost of the test had prevented many people taking it. 368 Similarly, WHOreported that the percentage of samples testing positive for Covid-29 had decreased by
58.9 % in January 2022 compared to December 2021 due to a shortage of lab supplies inareas under GoS control. Incident rates all across Syria were underestimated due to low
tested numbers.369
According to the GoS, 10.4 % of the population had received at least one dose of a Covid-19
vaccine by the end of January 2022, including 5.3 % percent, who were fully vaccinated.370 In
February 2022, the head of the Damascus health department was quoted that 140 747 people
had been fully vaccinated in Damascus up to that date, while 239 118 people had received atleast one dose, and 791 had received a third (booster) dose. 371
In GoS-controlled areas, a fourth wave of Covid-19 infections peaked in October 2021 but
declined until the end of the year.372 By the end of September 2021, bed occupancy of ICU
beds in Damascus had reached 100 % with suspected and confirmed Covid-19 patients, as agovernment official reportedly confirmed. Several patients had to be transferred to hospitals inother governorates to receive intensive care, 373 including to far-away cities such as Homs andHama, 140km and 180km, respectively, from Damascus.374
Relatives of Covid-19 patients reported that a private hospital in Damascus required them to
pay SYP 4 million (roughly USD 1 225),375 or, in another case, SYP 7 million (roughly USD 2 017)
per day during their stay in an ICU or an isolation centre. Moreover, patients were reportedly
required to pay SYP 10 million (USD 2 881) in advance to be accepted into an isolation centre
at a private hospital.376

367

WHO Syrian Arab Republic, COVID-19 Dashboard, 5 July 2022, url, pp. 1, 4, 12
Syrian academic from Damascus, interview, 3 March 2022
369
WHO Syrian Arab Republic, Monthly COVID-19 Bulletin, January 2022, 15 February 2022, url, pp. 4-5
370
WHO Syrian Arab Republic, Monthly COVID-19 Bulletin, January 2022, 15 February 2022, url, p. 6
371
SANA, Nearly 140,000 persons completely received Corona vaccine in Damascus, 6 February 2022, url
372
WHO Syrian Arab Republic, Monthly COVID-19 Bulletin, January 2022, 15 February 2022, url, p. 2
373
Syrian Observer (The), 100% ICU Bed Occupancy for COVID-19 Patients in Damascus [source: Al-Baathnewspaper], 22 September 2021, url
374
Reuters, Syrians face common enemy across frontlines: surging COVID-19, 30 September 2021, url
375
NPA, Syria’s poor healthcare system claims victims, 12 July 2021, url
376
Sawt Al-Asima, 7 ‫المشافي الخاصة ترفع تكاليف اإلقامة في مراكز العزل بدمشق‬. . ‫ماليين ليرة لليلة الواحدة‬[7 million liras per night. private hospitals raise the cost of accommodation in isolation centres in Damascus],
26 September 2021, url
368

54SYRIA: SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN DAMASCUS CITY – COI REPORT

Medical equipment such as oxygen tanks were reportedly in short supply at some medical
facilities, and some people resorted to buying oxygen tanks through social media channels oron the black market to treat sick family members at home. 377
In order to increase the vaccination rate, the GoS introduced mandatory Covid-19 vaccinationin many public sectors in December 2021.378 Following this decision, some people reportedly
paid up to SYP 200 000 (USD 55.3) for a fraudulent vaccination certificate, as they wererequired to obtain it to access their workplace or a government department but had little
confidence in the vaccine and were reluctant to get it. 379

3.7.

Education

3.7.1.

Legal background

Article 29 of the Constitution of the Syrian Arab Republic stipulates that education is ‘a rightguaranteed by the state, and it is free at all levels’, with the exception of cases where the law
regulates fees at university level and at government institutes adding that ‘education shall becompulsory until the end of basic education state’. 380 Education is compulsory between theage of 6 and 15, which comprises primary education and lower secondary education. 381 The
Syrian official news agency SANA reported in January 2022 that more than 3.6 million pupils
and students were receiving free education in the Education Ministry’s schools and institutes,
spreading over 13 660 kindergartens, public schools and colleges across all provinces. 382 The
Syrian Ministry of Education is responsible for the supervision of basic and secondary
education, both in the public and private sectors, and is in charge of the curriculum and the
distribution of learning materials, provided for free for the first nine grades. While progovernment agencies stated that students in grades one to four receive new books, with thepercentage decreasing for higher grades, North Press Agency (NPA), a Kurdish news agency,
reported that parents in Damascus were forced to buy new books, as the books provided tothe children were so worn-out, they could not be used.383

3.7.2.

Availability of education

According to the Syrian Central Bureau of Statistics there were 520 ‘basic education schools(1st & 2nd cycle)’ in Damascus in 2019, 402 of which were public, 97 private and 21 run by377

Syria Direct, With healthcare out of reach, Syrians turn to the black market for oxygen, 15 March 2021, url
WHO Syrian Arab Republic, Monthly COVID-19 Bulletin, December 2021, n.d., url, p. 7
379
Syrian Observer (The), Syria: Fraud in Vaccine Centres, Cards Sold in Damascus, 19 January 2022, url
380
Syria, Constitution of the Syrian Arab Republic, 2012, url, art.29
381
Nuffic, Facts: Syria and education, n.d., url
382
SANA, More than 3,6 million students receive free education, 30 January 2022, url
383
NPA, Schools in Syria’s Damascus: overcrowding, worn-out books, 14 September 2021, url
378

55

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMUNRWA.384 In the same year, there were 107 secondary schools in Damascus, 78 of whichwere public and 29 were private.385
According to the Director of Education in Damascus, Suleiman Al-Younis, the number ofschools in Damascus had decreased to merely 610 from 1 075 pre-war because of ‘acts ofterrorism’ carried out during the conflict. The small number of schools, in addition to students
from neighbouring provinces enrolling in schools in the city, has led to a high student density
in classrooms.386 The Director of Education in Damascus stated in December 2021 that 85
additional schools would be needed in Damascus to end the operation of shift schools in thecapital. The existing 85 schools in densely populated areas were operating in two shifts toaccommodate all students. The schooling situation was reported to differ acrossneighbourhoods of Damascus.387
Schools in Syria generally suffer from overcrowded classrooms and buildings lacking sufficientelectricity, heating, ventilation, water and sanitation. According to SHRC, the problems weremore prevalent in areas which accommodate a larger number of IDPs, such as Damascus. 388
Pupils in Damascus reported to suffer as a result of the rationing and shortage of fuel, which
has led to a lack of heating in schools.389 A director of education in Damascus reportedly
asked residents to contribute to the maintenance of local schools. 390
According to UNOCHA, the formal education system is unable to accommodate all school age
children. In Damascus there was one operational classroom for every 101 school-aged
children. Nationally over a third of schools operated in shifts. Existing services were said to beunable to meet the various learning needs. 391 A parent from the area of Al-Mazzeh inDamascus reported that his children, who were in grade six and seven, shared a classroom
with over 60 other pupils.392 According to a teacher from a public school in the neighbourhoodof Al-Midan in Damascus, crowdedness was a particular problem in the classroom, with 40 to
50 students having to study in the same classroom. There was a lack of teachers, which
resulted in some courses being suspended or course materials being taught by unspecialised
staff.393
As a consequence of war and corruption, teaching in GoS-controlled areas is poor, as
reported by the New Arab. Course units were removed from the curriculum during the384

Syria, Central Bureau of Statistics, Number of basic education schools (1 st & 2 nd cycle) by ownership of school &sex of pupils, Chapter 11, Table 1/11, n.d., url
385
Syria, Central Bureau of Statistics, Number of secondary schools by ownership of school & sex of students,
Chapter 11, Table 5/11, n.d., url
386
Syria Scope, ‫ فقط والكثافة الطالبية ال تتناسب مع العدد‬610 ‫ عدد المدارس انخفض إلى‬:‫[ مدير تربية دمشق لسكوب‬Director ofDamascus Education to Scope: The number of schools is only 610, and the student density is not commensuratewith the number], 23 September 2021, url
387
Al-Baath Newspaper, ‫ مدرسة جديدة لالنتهاء من معضلة الدوام النصفي‬85 ‫[ دمشق بحاجة إلى‬Damascus needs 85 new schools
to end shift dilemma], 21 December 2021, url
388
SHRC, The 20th Annual Report of the Human Rights Situation in Syria, 9 Ja nuary 2022, url, p. 37
389
Syrian Observer (The), Education in the Cold; Damascus Schools Without Fuel [Source: Syria TV], 21 December
2021, url
390
NPA, ‫ على السكان أن يكونوا شركاء في صيانة المدارس‬:‫[ مديرية التربية في دمشق‬Directorate of Education in Damascus:
Residents must be partners in school maintenance], 13 September 2021, url
391
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 68
392
NPA, Schools in Syria’s Damascus: overcrowding, worn-out books, 14 September 2021, url
393
Enab Baladi, Left behind: public schools in Syrian regime control areas, 17 April 2021, url

56

SYRIA: SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN DAMASCUS CITY – COI REPORT

2020/2021 school year and parents complained about children’s educational level dropping.
Some resorted to private lessons, already at primary school level, to make up for the loss.
Parents told about teachers not being present at school and the level of school exams being
downgraded, so that pupils were able to receive good marks, despite limited knowledge on
the subject matter. According to the director of a private tutoring centre, there were pupils in
grade six or eight, who had difficulties reading and writing. 394
Private schools were an expensive alternative for families. According to Syria TV, private
schools raised their fees between 100 and 150 % for the school year 2021/2022. This meant
an increase at primary school level from SYP 300 000-450 000 (USD 88-132) to SYP 800 000
to SYP one million (USD 234-293), while the fees of middle and secondary schools increased
to between SYP 1 500 000 and over SYP 2 000 000 (USD 440-over 586) depending on theschool, its name and location, without including any other services such as school uniform,books or transportation.395 According to the Syrian news platform Damas2day, fees for private
schools reach more than one million SYP per school year on average 396, with some private
schools having fees of two million SYP per year, according to Enab Baladi.397
The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
(UNRWA) provided education services to Palestinian refugee students from grade 1 to 9, withapproximately 51 000 Palestine refugee pupils attending 102 UNRWA schools located inDamascus, Rural Damascus, Aleppo, Hama, Homs, Latakia and Dar’a. The majority of UNRWA
schools were located within the Palestinian refugee camps. Some UNRWA schools wereseverely damaged and destroyed, among others in Yarmouk camp in Damascus. 398 The
Palestinian Refugees Portal, an independent media organization whose aim it is to draw
attention to the situation of the Palestinians and their humanitarian situation and everyday
experiences, wrote about the situation of previous residents of Yarmouk camp who continued
to have their children enrolled in UNRWA schools in the camp, despite living in different partsof Damascus. A father living in this situation talked about the struggle of high cost oftransportation to send his children to school and asked UNRWA for assistance. 399

3.7.3.

Access to education

Education in Damascus is generally accessible, as explained by the Syrian academic
interviewed for this report. Children are able to attend school in their own neighbourhood aswell as in a neighbourhood different from their place of residence. It is possible for IDPs toregister their children at school in the same way as original residents of the area, providingthat they have identification documents, including the family booklet. The number of pupils inindividual schools is problematic, which might lead to some schools not accepting children

New Arab (The), ‫[ سوريون يشكون من تردّي التعليم المدرسي‬Syrians complain of poor schooling], 6 March 2021, url
Syria TV, ‫[ مدارس خاصة في دمشق تلزم األهالي بأقساط مليونية‬Private schools in damascus commit parents to millions ininstallments], 11 August 2021, url
396
Damas2day, ‫خلبية على الورق وفلكية في الواقع‬..‫!!أقساط المدارس الخاصة‬.. [private school fees. It's on paper andastronomical], 10 June 2021, url
397
Enab Baladi, Left behind: public schools in Syrian regime contr ol areas, 17 April 2021, url
398
UNRWA, Education in Syria, n.d. url
399
Palestinian Refugees Portal, ‫[ مطالب لـ "أونروا" بتوفير بدل نقل لطالب مخيّم اليرموك النازحين‬Demand for UNRWA transport
allowance for displaced Yarmouk camp students], 6 December 2021, url
394

395

57

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

from outside the area, due to lack of capacity. Wealthy families tend to choose private
education or home education over public schools. 400
Even though compulsory state schooling in Syria is for free, school uniforms and required
stationery was reported to be so expensive that families were either forced to take out loans
to pay for school supplies or decided not to send their children to school at all, as they could
not afford the necessary supplies, particularly in the case of displaced families.401 In addition,
the need to travel to school was named as a possible limitation to access education.
Damascus was the governorate with the highest rate of students (49 %) travelling longer than
20 minutes to school.402(a)Enrolment rates

According to the UNOCHA, as of 2022 an estimated 6.6 million people, 97 % of whomchildren, are in need of education services nationwide. In Damascus city, the need wasconsidered by UNOCHA to be on severity level 3 403 out of 5.404 At a national level there was aself-reported attendance level of 82 %.405 No enrolment rates for Damascus city could befound during the reporting period. The interviewed Syrian academic noted that when it comesto enrolment numbers it has to be considered that some children are enrolled in school but
are nevertheless not attending due to having to work to financially support their families.406
There were also no official numbers on drop-out rates.407 NPA stated in an article on theschooling situation in Damascus that drop-out rates were rising, due to poverty and insecurity
in light of the collapse of the Syrian Pound and the deterioration of living conditions. 408
According to UNOCHA, nationwide there was a steep increase in drop-outs from the age of 11,
impacting boys more than girls.409 Half of the children who were out of school had never beenenrolled.410(b)Impact of COVID-19

At the beginning of April 2021, schools in the GoS-controlled parts of Syria closed to limit the
spread of COVID-19. At the end of April, students from grade five to high school started totake their end of year exams a month earlier than scheduled, as schools intended to close

400

Syrian academic from Damascus, interview, 3 March 2022
Rozana Radio, ‫[ المستلزمات المدرسية كابوس يؤ ّر ق أيام السوريين‬School supplies are a nightmare that haunts the days of
Syrians.], 13 August 2021, url
402
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 68
403
The education severity scale developed by UNOCHA was ‘informed by the JIAF [Joint Intersectoral Analysis
Framework] indicators and past indicators framed wound the No Lost Generation framework and lessons learned
from past processes. The scale has six weighted indicators that cover access to, and quality of, education services,displacement, returns and the intensity of the conflict.’ (see: UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab
Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 69)
404
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 67
405
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 67
406
Syrian academic from Damascus, interview, 3 March 2022
407
Syrian academic from Damascus, interview, 3 March 2022
408
NPA, ‫ على السكان أن يكونوا شركاء في صيانة المدارس‬:‫[ مديرية التربية في دمشق‬Directorate of Education in Damascus:
Residents must be partners in school maintenance], 13 September 2021, url
409
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 68
410
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 67
401

58

SYRIA: SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN DAMASCUS CITY – COI REPORT

early due to the pandemic.411 No reports of school closures in Damascus due to the COVID-19
pandemic could be found for the school year 2021/2022.

3.8.

Humanitarian situation and assistanceAccording to the UNOCHA humanitarian needs overview, 900 000 million people are in needin Damascus city,412 40 000 of whom are said to be in extreme and catastrophic need. 413
600 000 of the overall population of 1.8 million in the city (as estimated by UNOCHA) are
IDPs.414 UNOCHA considered that 8 % of households in Damascus city were completely
unable to meet the basic needs of all members, 63 % suffered from insufficient ability to meetbasic needs and 29 % were able to adequately meet their needs.415 Over 40 % of IDP
households in Damascus city reported safety and security concerns related to discrimination,
considerably more than the average of 27 % across all of Syria.416 IDPs in Damascus city were
further reported to suffer particularly from loss of income and income insufficiency.417 Of thehouseholds interviewed by UNOCHA in Damascus, only 15 % received assistance in the threemonths prior to the assessment in August 2021. From the households who did not receive aid,
merely 7 % on average stated that they did not require assistance, with the main reason for
not receiving aid being lack of information. Of those who received assistance, 100 % in
Damascus reported that the aid received was not enough or of bad quality. 418 To demonstrate
the level of need within the population, a confidential source told the Netherlands Ministry ofForeign Affairs that small children, young people and entire families could be seen inDamascus city searching through rubbish containers for waste to use. The source did notknow of such incidents prior or during the war. 419
According to UNOCHA, 52 of its partner organisations implemented humanitarian activities inDamascus in the first half of 2021, of which 7 were UN organisations, 28 NNGOs (National
Non-Governmental Organizations), 9 INGOs (International Non-Governmental Organizations),
7 GoS as well as the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC). 24 of these organisations implemented
programs related to health, 20 related to protection, 9 to education, 9 to nutrition, 7 to ER&L, 7
to food and agriculture, 6 to NFIs and 4 related to WASH. 420 A complete list of organisations
by name can be found on UNOCHA’s website.
The Syrian academic interviewed for this report explained that in Damascus, there are local
charities who work independently from the government and provided support within their own
neighbourhoods. These charities were often funded by merchants and other residents of thearea they were operating in and mainly focus on supporting people with medical needs as
411

AP, Syria schools begin final exams weeks early because of virus, 25 April 2021, url
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 3
413
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 48
414
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 23
415
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 27
416
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22February 2022, url, p. 39
417
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 47
418
UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Syrian Arab Republic, 22 February 2022, url, p. 50
419
Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of origin information report Syria, June 2021, url, p. 10
420
UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic, Organizations implementing humanitarian activities based within Syria, January– July 2021, 7 September 2021, url
412

59

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

well as women and children. Their work had proven vital in assisting IDPs to get off the streets(especially in the period between 2015-2017), providing support to access food, clothing,
medications and rent support. Local support varied according to the neighbourhood, the funds
available and the network available to an individual. 421
The smart card system was run by the GoS to support residents in need422, although it wasreportedly not accessible to all who require assistance.423 More information on the smart card
system can be found in subsections Economic situation and Availability of food.
It was reported that the GoS used international aid to finance itself, while directing assistanceonly to those areas it deemed loyal.424 A former Damascus-based aid worker told the Atlantic
Council that aid was denied by the GoS to areas which were formerly under the rule ofopposition forces. Areas in Damascus city, among others, had become ‘wastelands’, without
electricity, water, health facilities and other services, despite people living in the areas,
allegedly because of the GoS viewing them as ‘enemies’ or ‘terrorists’.425 According to VDSF
and OPC, returnees within GoS controlled areas, particularly in Damascus city, reported thatthey experienced discrimination in accessing basic services as well as humanitarianassistance, followed by perceived discrimination in accessing work and livelihood
opportunities.426
No information about eligibility criteria and ways to apply for assistance programmes could befound.

421

Syrian academic from Damascus, interview, 3 March 2022
Al Shami, I., Facing Syria’s Food Crisis, WINEP, 14 February 2022, url
423
Al Shami, I., Facing Syria’s Food Crisis, WINEP, 14 February 2022, url; MEE, Syria: Protests mount amid anger
over 'unfair' cuts to government subsidies, 12 February 2022, url; Hall, N. et al., How the Assad Regime
Systematically Diverts Tens of Millions in Aid, CSIS, 20 October 2021, url
424
Hall, N. et al., How the Assad Regime Systematically Diverts Tens of Millions in Aid, CSIS, 20 October 2021, url
425
Atlantic Council, Syrian Lives in Peril, June 2021, url, p. 10426
VDSF and OPC, Is Syria Safe for Return? Returnees’ Perspective, November 2021, url, p. 41
422

60

SYRIA: SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN DAMASCUS CITY – COI REPORT

Annex 1: Bibliography
Oral sources, including anonymous sources
Syrian academic from Damascus, interview, 3 March 2022. The source, who has rare accessto state military and security actors as well as employees at various government institutions in
the capital, preferred anonymity for security reasons and to ensure the safety of his contacts.

Public sources
7al, ‫ هل ستقوم الحكومة السورية بإزالة حواجزها بعد “النرص”؟‬:‫[ الحواجز األمنية يف دمشق‬Security barriers inDamascus: Will the Syrian government remove its barriers after "victory"?], 18 January 2022,
https://7al.net/2022/01/18/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%82/jalal-s/reports-and-investigations/, accessed 6 April 2022
Abdin, Y., The Fragility of Community Security in Damascus and its Environs, International
Review of the Red Cross, (IRRC No. 906), April 2019, https://internationalreview.icrc.org/sites/default/files/906_4.pdf, accessed 21 February 2022
ACN (Aid to the Church in Need), Syria: The Christian Hope Centre in Damascus, 12 August
2021, https://acn-canada.org/syria-the-christian-hope-centre-in-damascus/, accessed 25
February 2022
AI (Amnesty International), “You’re going to your death”, Violations against Syrian Refugees
returning to Syria, 7 September 2021, https://www.amnesty.org/en/wpcontent/uploads/2021/09/MDE2445832021ENGLISH.pdf, accessed 4 March 2022
Al Jazeera, Syria: Two civilians killed in Israeli attack near Damascus, 7 March 2022,
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its response to an Israeli missile attack in the vicinity of Damascus], 3 September 2021,
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61

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%87%D9%84%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AE%D9%8A-2, accessed 23 February 2022
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62

SYRIA: SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN DAMASCUS CITY – COI REPORT

ً
Al-Baath Newspaper, ‫قريبا‬.. ‫تقني المياه عن دمشق ومحيطها‬‫[ إلغاء ر‬coming soon.. abolition of water
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63

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

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64

SYRIA: SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN DAMASCUS CITY – COI REPORTCOAR (Center for Operational Analysis and Research), Damascus Puts Destroyed Factories on
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65

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM

Daher, J., Invisible Sanctions: How Over-Compliance Limits Humanitarian Work on Syria,
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ocio_economic_situation_Damascus_city.pdf, accessed 13 April 2022

66

SYRIA: SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN DAMASCUS CITY – COI REPORTEnab Baladi, ‘Damascus Electricity’ unable to meet total power needs amid frequent outages,
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exemption for personal belongings of returnees to Syria], 16 May 2021,
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industrialists and craftsmen], 26 September 2021,
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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUMّEnab Baladi, ‫ من المساحة وموافقات أمنية‬%60 ‫“اليموك” يعطلها مخطط يأكل‬‫[ العودة إىل ر‬Returning to“Yarmouk” is disrupted by a plan that consumes 60% of the area and security approvals], 31
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Syria, 8 February 2022, https://epc.ae/en/details/brief/dealing-with-iran-s-demographic-andsoft-power-programs-in-syria, accessed 5 April 2022
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ً
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79

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80

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Annex 2: Terms of ReferenceThis report should focus on Damascus city. The report should address the following key
socioeconomic indicators: housing, food security, water and sanitation, health care, education,
livelihood opportunities such as employment. Internal mobility issues relating to accessibility(travel and admittance) are also to be included.
City overview▪
▪

Demographics
Ethno-religious composition

Internal mobility▪

Airports and flights connections▪

Freedom of movement, including impact of ethnic/religious background, gender,
place of origin, age, (perceived) affiliation with opposition groups and being on
wanted lists, and Covid-19▪

Travel by road and through checkpoints▪

Information on accessibility from Damascus airport to the city▪

Restrictions on access and return to certain areas in Damascus▪

Administrative requirements for settling in Damascus▪

Civil documentation required for travel and access to services

Socio-economic overview▪

Economic overview▪

Employment▪

Poverty▪

Food security▪

Housing, water, and sanitation▪

Health care▪

Education▪

Humanitarian situation and assistance87