European Asylum Support Office

EASO Country of
Origin Information
ReportPakistan
Security Situation

August 2017SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION

European Asylum Support Office

EASO Country of Origin
Information Report
Pakistan
Security Situation

August 2017

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Cover photo: © PPI-Images, by Getty Images from iStock, photo ID 598170484
Karachi, Pakistan - September 01, 2016: Activists of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F) are protesting
against Sindh Government and demanding to refer the murder case of Dr. Khalid Soomro to
military court, during demonstration at M.A Jinnah Road in Karachi Rashid Khalid Mahmood
Soomro, the successor of Dr. Khalid Soomro led the demonstration.
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EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 3

Acknowledgements
EASO would like to acknowledge the following national asylum and migration department as
the author of this report:
Belgium, Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons,
Cedoca (Centre for Documentation and Research)
The following departments reviewed the contents of this report, together with EASO:The Norwegian Country of Origin Information Centre, Landinfo;
Asylum Research Consultancy – a consulting group that provides case-specific,
country specific and thematic COI research, publishes commentaries on COI reports,
and undertakes research consultancy, project management and training for theasylum and human rights sector both in the UK and internationally.
It must be noted that the review carried out by the departments, experts or organisations
mentioned does not necessarily lead to an endorsement or approval of the content of thereport, which is the full responsibility of EASO. The review is a contribution to the quality of
the report.

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EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATIONEASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 5

Contents
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................... 3Contents .................................................................................................................................... 5
Disclaimer .................................................................................................................................. 6
Glossary and Abbreviations ....................................................................................................... 8
Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 11
Map.......................................................................................................................................... 13
1. General description of the security situation in Pakistan ................................................... 14
1.1. Overview of recent conflicts in Pakistan ...................................................................... 14
1.1.1. Political violence ................................................................................................... 14
1.1.2. Ethnic and sectarian violence ............................................................................... 17
1.1.3. International disputes ........................................................................................... 18
1.2. Actors in the conflict .................................................................................................... 18
1.2.1. State armed forces................................................................................................ 18
1.2.2. Armed Groups ....................................................................................................... 21
1.3. Recent security trends and armed confrontations ...................................................... 30
1.3.1. Security operations and armed clashes ................................................................ 31
1.3.2. Terrorist attacks .................................................................................................... 33
1.3.3. Sectarian related violence .................................................................................... 35
1.3.4. Ethnic and political violence ................................................................................. 35
1.3.5. Border attacks ....................................................................................................... 36
1.3.6. Drone strikes ......................................................................................................... 37
1.4. Impact of the violence on the civilian population ....................................................... 37
1.4.1. Figures on civilian fatalities................................................................................... 37
1.4.2. Socio-economic life ............................................................................................... 43
1.4.3. Children ................................................................................................................. 43
1.4.4. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees ................................................ 44
1.5. State ability to secure law and order ........................................................................... 45
1.5.1. State protection, security forces and justice ........................................................ 45
1.5.2. Anti-Terrorism Acts ............................................................................................... 47
1.5.3. Detention and death penalty ................................................................................ 49
2. Security situation per region ............................................................................................... 51
2.1. Geographical overview of the violence 2016 – May 2017 ........................................... 51
2.1.1. Trends in regional violence ................................................................................... 51
2.1.2. Regional comparison of violence related fatalities .............................................. 52
2.2. Security trends per geographic subdivision ................................................................. 54
2.2.1. Punjab ................................................................................................................... 55
2.2.2. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa ............................................................................................ 58
2.2.3. Balochistan............................................................................................................ 62
2.2.4. Sindh ..................................................................................................................... 66
2.2.5. Federally Administered Tribal Areas..................................................................... 70
2.2.6. Islamabad Capital Territory .................................................................................. 79
2.2.7. Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan......................................................................... 80
Annex 1: Bibliography.............................................................................................................. 82
Public sources...................................................................................................................... 82
Anonymous and non-public sources ................................................................................. 110
Annex 2: Terms of Reference ................................................................................................ 111

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EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION

Disclaimer
This report was written according to the EASO COI Report Methodology (2012) (1). The reportis based on carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced. As muchas possible and unless otherwise stated, all information presented, except for undisputed or
obvious facts, has been cross-checked.
The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed withutmost care. However, this document does not claim to be exhaustive. If a particular event,person or organisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has
not taken place or that such person or organisation does not exist.
Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particular
claim to refugee status or asylum. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative of aparticular legal position.
‘Refugee’, ‘risk’ and similar terminology are used as generic terminology and not as legallydefined in the EU Aslum Acquis and the 1951 Refugee Convention.
Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which
may be made of the information contained in this report.
Reproduction is authorised, provided that the source is acknowledged.
The target users are asylum caseworkers, COI researchers, policymakers and decision-making
authorities.
The drafting of this report was finalised in June 2017. More information on the reference
period of this report can be found in the methodology section of the introduction.

(1) The EASO methodology is largely based on the Common EU Guidelines for processing Country of Origin
Information (COI), 2008, and can be downloaded from the EASO website:
https://coi.easo.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/EASO_COI_Report_Methodology.pdf.

EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 7

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EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION

Glossary and Abbreviations
ACLED

Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project

Ah-le Sunnat Wal Jama’at

Political Sunni Deobandi organisation (2)AI

Amnesty International

AJK

Azad Jammu and Kashmir

ANP

Awami National Party

Bazar
BLA

Enclosed marketplace or street where goods andservices are exchanged or sold
Balochistan Liberation Army

BLF

Baloch Liberation Front

BRA

Baloch Republican Army

CPEC

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

CRSS

Centre for Research and Security Studies

CTD

Counterterrorism Department

Deobandi

Puritan Islamic school influenced by Wahabism thatoriginated in a madrassa in the town of Deoband (3)FATA

Federally Administered Tribal Areas

FC

Frontier Corps

FRC

FATA Research Center

GB

Gilgit-Baltistan

Haqqani network

Armed insurgent movement led by Sirajuddin
Haqqani. This movement is affiliated to the Taliban.
Their headquarters are in North Waziristan (FATA)
and in South East Afghanistan (4)HazaraEthnic group living in Balochistan province ofPakistan (migrated from Afghanistan)

HRCP

Human Rights Commission of Pakistan

HRW

Human Rights Watch

ICJ

International Commission of Jurists

ICT

Islamabad Capital Territory

IDMC

Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre

IDP

Internally Displaced Person(2) Fair, C.C., ‘Explaining Support for Sectarian Terrorism in Pakistan: Piety, Maslak and Sharia’, 2015, p. 1141.
(3) Combatting Terrorism Center, The Past and Future of Deobandi Islam, 3 November 2009.
(4) Express Tribune (The), Jalaluddin Haqqani died last year after ‘prolonged illness’: Taliban confirm, 31 July 2015;
BBC, Afghan militant leader Jalaluddin Haqqani 'has died', 31 July 2015.

EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 9

IEDImprovised Explosive Device

IJU

Islamic Jihad Union

IMU

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

IS

Islamic StateISIInter-Services Intelligence

ISPR

Inter-Services Public Relations

Jamaat-ul-Ahrar

Splinter faction of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan

JeM

Jaish-e-Muhammad (Muhammad’s Army)

Jundullah

Soldiers of Allah, a group linked to TTP and IS (5)JuA

Jamaat-ul-Ahrar

Khasadar

Pashtun tribal militia, institutionalised by the British.
In recent times, they are made responsible forsecurity in Pashtun areas, and given an allowance by
the Pakistani authorities (6)KP

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

Lashkars

Pashtun tribal armies or militias that can bemobilisedvia
traditional
tribaldecisionmechanisms (7)LeJ

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (Jhangvi’s Army)

LJA

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al-Alawi, Faction of Lashkar-eJhangvi (Jhangvi’s Army)

LeT

Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure)LI

Lashkar-e-Islam (Army of Islam)

LoC

Line of Control, disputed border line between India
and Pakistan in the regions of Jammu and Kashmir

Madrassa

Islamic school

MQM

Muttahadi Qaumi Movement

NACTA

National Counter Terrorism Authority

NADRA

National Database & Registration Authority

NAP

National Action Plan to eliminate terrorism

NWFP

North West Frontier Province, the former name for
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

PICSS

Pakistani Institute for Conflict and Security Studies(5) Daily Mail, Pakistan Taliban splinter group vows allegiance to Islamic State, 18 November 2014.
(6) Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), Khasadar force personnel deprived of salaries, 28
May 2016.
(7) Dawn, Death by lashkar: The forgotten protectors of Adezai village, 9 May 2016; Chaudhry, S., A., Civil Militia in
FATA & Its Impact on Society, 9 October 2015.

10 —EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATIONPILDAT

Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development
And Transparency

PIPS

Pakistani Institute for Peace Studies

PoR

Proof of Registration Card. Administrative document
issued to registered Afghan refugees in Pakistan (8)PPO

Protection of Pakistan Ordinance

PPP

Pakistan People’s Party

PTI

Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf

Radd-ul-Fasaad

Code name for a military operation launched by the
Pakistan Army on 22 February 2017 (9)Razakar

Pro government tribal militias (10)SATPSouth Asia Terrorism Portal

SMP

Sipah-e-Mohammed Pakistan (Shia militant group)

SSP

Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (Army of the Prophet
Followers, a former Deobandi political party)

TBIJ

The Bureau of Investigative Journalism

TTP

Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (Pakistan Movement of
Taliban)

UBA

United Baloch Army

USDoS

US Department of State

Zarb-e-Azb

Code name for a military operation launched by the
Pakistan Army on 15 June 2014 (11)(8) Al Jazeera, Afghan refugees' status extended until end of year, 7 February 2017.
(9) Dawn, Pakistan Army launches 'Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad' across the country, 22 February 2017.
(10) PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report, 2016, February 2017, p. 8.
(11) Dawn, Zarb-e-Azb operation: 120 suspected militants killed in N Waziristan, 16 June 2014. See also BBC,Pakistan army North Waziristan offensive: thousands flee, 19 June 2014; Reuters, Pakistan army in for long haul inoffensive against Taliban, 17 June 2014.

EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 11

Introduction
This report was drafted by a Country of Origin Information (COI) specialist from Cedoca, theBelgian COI unit, as referred to in the Acknowledgements section of this report.
The report aims to provide information on the security situation in Pakistan, which is relevant
for international protection status determination (PSD; refugee status and subsidiary
protection). The terms of reference can be found in Annex 2.

Methodology
This report is an update of the July 2016 EASO COI Report Pakistan Security Situation (12) andis based on information available from 1 April 2016 to 31 May 2017. The information in thisreport results from desk research of public specialised paper-based and electronic sources,
which were consulted within the timeframe and the scope of the research. As part of a factfinding mission conducted in April 2017 in Pakistan (Islamabad and Lahore) carried out by the
Belgian COI unit and funded by the European Commission’s Asylum, Migration and Integration
Fund (AMIF), specialised information concerning the security situation was added in thisreport. The Cedoca researcher, a specialist on Pakistan, conducted extensive interviews withthe following experts:








Abdullah Khan, Managing Director of the Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security
Studies. Interview Islamabad, 5 April 2017;
Cyril Almeida, Journalist. Interview Islamabad 11 April 2017;
Imtiaz Gul, Executive Director of the Center for Research and Security Studies(CRSS). Interview Islamabad, 6 April 2017;
Michael Kugelman, Asia Program Deputy Director and Senior Associate for South
Asia at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (United States).
Interview Islamabad, 5 April 2017;
Mohammed Amir Rana, Security and Political Analyst and Director of the Pakistani
Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS). Interview Islamabad, 6 April 2017;
Saifullah Mehsud, President of the FATA Research Centre (FRC). Interview
Islamabad, 5 April 2017.

In order to ensure that the authors respected the EASO COI Report Methodology, a review
was carried out by COI specialists from the countries and organisations listed as reviewers in
the Acknowledgements section. All comments made by the reviewers were taken into
consideration and most of them were implemented in the final draft of this report.

(12) EASO, COI Report Pakistan Security Situation, July 2016.

12 —EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION

Structure and use of this report
This report provides information on elements and indicators that may help in assessing theneed for protection. In the first part a general description is given on the security situation in
Pakistan. This is then explained per province in more detail in the second part. A generaldescription of the province contains information on the geography and population, on the
background of the conflict, including the actors active in the province. This is followed by adescription of recent trends in the security situation, including the nature of the violence,
frequency, targets, locations and victims. Finally, a separate chapter is dedicated todisplacements.
Both the general and regional descriptions provide information from various sources on therelevant elements and indicators. Information on an indicator as such should never be taken
as conclusive, but as indicative for the assessment of protection needs, to be read in
conjunction with other indicators and information on the region.

EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 13

Map

Map 1: Administrative Map of Pakistan(13) UN OCHA, Overview Pakistan [map], 25 February 2016.

© UN OCHA (13)14 —EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION

1. General description of the security situation in Pakistan
The general security situation will be described in this report using the following
administrative divisions:• The four provinces: Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), Balochistan and Sindh;• The two territories: the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Islamabad
Capital Territory (ICT);• The two administrative regions: Azad Kashmir (AK) and Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) (14).
Michael Kugelman, Asia Program Deputy Director at the Woodrow Wilson Center (US), whomonitors the situation in Pakistan very closely, stated in April 2017 that (15):‘In general the security situation has improved significantly over the last three years inPakistan. Ever since the Pakistani military launched a counterterrorism offensive inNorth Waziristan in June 2014, terrorist violence has been reduced. Today, theenvironment continues to be volatile; there are still mass casualty attacks but not as
many as before.’
Muhammad Amir Rana, Security and Political Analyst and Director of the Pakistani Institutefor Peace Studies (PIPS), stated during his interview on 6 April 2017 that currently theobjective of militant groups is to carry out attacks in major urban centres which can have ahuge impact in the country and with a large number of victims (16).

1.1. Overview of recent conflicts in Pakistan
The security situation in Pakistan is complex and influenced by internal factors such aspolitical, ethnic conflicts and sectarian violence. Besides this, the security situation is also
influenced by international disputes with India and Afghanistan that occasionally result in theeruption of violence (17).

1.1.1. Political violence
Since the beginning of the 21st century, the politically motivated violence in Pakistan is mainly
caused by the instability in the north-west of the country resulting from the 2001 toppling of
the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Many Afghan Taliban settled in the FATA and in the North
Western Frontier Province (NWFP, currently Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), having fled theinternational coalition invasion led by the US in Afghanistan. Under their influence, several
Pakistani groups with a similar ideology continued working together in what developed into afederation of armed groups. This resulted in the so-called Talibanisation of the region. Their(14) See Map 1: the two regions are situated in the north of Pakistan. On Map 1, they are indicated in the grey areain the north of Pakistan.
(15) Kugelman, M., Interview Islamabad, 5 April 2017.
(16) Rana, M., A., Interview Islamabad, 6 April 2017.
(17) USIP, The Current Situation in Pakistan, 9 January 2017.

EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 15

policies included a strict application of conservative Islamic principles and resulted in violenceagainst civilians and eventually the Pakistani authorities (18). Since 2007, the Pakistani Armyhas carried out military operations in the FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa aimed at breaking
the power of the Pakistani Taliban and affiliated organisations (19). Especially from 2009,
operations against the Taliban have been a source of insecurity, causing a massive
displacement from the region (20). In spite of repeated peace agreements and statements by
the Pakistani Army, violence has continued in recent years. Since 2004 the US Army has
conducted drone attacks against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in the region (21) though according
to an April 2017 article by Reuters, such drone attacks inside Pakistan have ‘become rare overthe past few years’ (22).
After his election in June 2013, Prime Minister Sharif initially negotiated with the Pakistani
Taliban which was, according to the Washington Post, a difficult and complex task (23). The
talks started in the beginning of February 2014 in Islamabad (24), but soon stalled after the
Mohmand wing of the Taliban executed 23 soldiers from the Frontier Corps, whom they had
held since 2010 (25). In an effort to restart negotiations, the Taliban announced a month-longceasefire on 1 March 2014 (26), which eventually ended on 17 April 2014 (27). What was left ofthe peace talks finally collapsed after the terrorist attack on the Mohammad Ali Jinnah Airport
in Karachi on 8 June 2014. Although the attack was carried out by some Uzbeks and militantsof the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed
responsibility (28).
On 15 June 2014, the Pakistani Army launched an offensive in order to eradicate ‘foreign andlocal terrorists’. The main targets were militant strongholds in the North Waziristan tribal
region where insurgents enjoyed sanctuary. The operation was codenamed Zarb-e-Azb (seeSection 1.3.1. Security operations and armed clashes) (29). The fighting continued in 2014
without, however, giving the Army a decisive victory over the Taliban and its allies in the
FATA (30). The militants struck back with terrorist attacks: on 2 November 2014 a suicide(18) AI, As if hell fell on me, the human rights crisis in northwest Pakistan, 10 June 2010, pp. 10-11; Rashid, A.,
Descent into Chaos, 2008, pp. 265-270.
(19) Critical Threats, Pakistani Military Operation in North Waziristan: Knowing the Battlefield, 16 June 2014; ICG,
Pakistan: Countering Militancy in FATA, Asia Report N°178, 21 October 2009; Thomson Reuters Foundation,
Pakistan Violence, 11 April 2013; World Politics Review, FATA: The Never-Ending War on Pakistan’s Periphery, 6
January 2015.
(20) AI, As if hell fell on me, the human rights crisis in northwest Pakistan, 10 June 2010, p. 7; ICG, Pakistan: The
Worsening IDP Crisis, Asia Briefing N°111, 16 September 2010.
(21) HRW, World Report 2015 – Pakistan, January 2015; ICG, Drones: Myths And Reality In Pakistan, Asia Report
N°247, 21 May 2013.
(22) Reuters, Suspected U.S. drone strike targets Pakistani Taliban militants: sources, 28 April 2017.
(23) Washington Post (The), Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s effort to seek peace with Pakistani Taliban off to rocky
start, 19 September 2013.
(24) BBC, Pakistan enters peace talks with Taliban, 6 February 2014.
(25) Reuters, Peace Talks between Pakistan and Taliban collapse after killings, 17 February 2014.
(26) Dawn, Pakistani Taliban announce a month-long ceasefire, 2 March 2014; Guardian (The), Pakistan Taliban
announce one-month ceasefire to aid peace talks, 1 March 2014.
(27) Dawn, TTP ends ceasefire, says talks option open, 17 April 2014.
(28) AP, Pakistani forces repel attack near Karachi airport, 10 June 2014; Dawn, TTP claims attack on Karachi airport,
9 June 2014.
(29) Dawn, Zarb-e-Azb operation: 120 suspected militants killed in N Waziristan, 16 June 2014. See also BBC,Pakistan army North Waziristan offensive: thousands flee, 19 June 2014; Reuters, Pakistan army in for long haul inoffensive against Taliban, 17 June 2014.
(30) Jane’s 360, Uncertain Victory – Pakistan’s North Waziristan Offensive, 28 December 2014.

16 —EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION

bombing claimed 60 lives at the Wagah border crossing near Lahore, a symbolic and sensitive
area (31). On 16 December 2014, seven to nine gunmen, apparently affiliated with the TTP,
entered an Army public school in Peshawar. They opened fire on school staff and children,
killing 145 people, including 132 minors, mostly children of Army staff. It was the deadliest
terrorist attack ever conducted in Pakistan (32). The Army Chief of Staff urged the Government
to take strong action against the Taliban (33).
On 25 December 2014, after consultation with different political parties, Prime Minister Sharifannounced a 20-point comprehensive plan of action, the National Action Plan (NAP), in order
to confront the terrorist threat. Special courts would be established for the speedy trial of
terrorist suspects and a moratorium on capital punishment was extended, after being
reinstated earlier the same month. Furthermore a 5 000-strong counter terrorism force would
be deployed across the country. No armed militias would be allowed to function in the country
and their funding would be ‘choked’. Hate speech would be ‘countered’. The Pakistan Army
confirmed that military operations in the tribal areas would continue (34). However, humanrights organisations criticised the speedy trial of terrorist suspects and cautioned that
hundreds of non-terrorists risked execution without being subjected to proper legal
procedures (35) (see also 1.5.1. State protection, security forces and justice).
In 2015 and 2016, the military Operation Zarb-e-Azb continued (36). The Pakistani Army wasactively present in the tribal areas, targeting a wide array of militant groups (37). Besides
military operations, the Pakistani Army was called upon to provide security backup to the
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) (38). The Government’s NAP, which was establishedin January 2015 to reduce terrorism, seems to have achieved some reduction in violence but
critics have highlighted that the Government had ‘failed to take some effective steps to reduce
appeal of religious extremism and violence ideologies that feed terrorism’ (see Section 1.5.2.
Anti-Terrorism Acts) (39). On 22 February 2017, the Government announced a country wide
military operation codenamed Radd-Ul-Fasaad (see Section 1.3.1. Security operations andarmed clashes), which is regarded as a continuation of the NAP. This announcement cameafter the country witnessed an increase in major attacks in the first months of 2017 in several
provinces, most of them claimed by Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA) (40).

(31) Dawn, TTP splinter groups claim Wagah attack: 60 dead, 3 November 2014; Guardian (The), Dozens killed atsuicide attack at Pakistan-India border post, 2 November 2014.
(32) CNN, In Pakistan school attack, Taliban terrorists kill 145, mostly children, 17 December 2014; New York Times(The), Taliban Besiege Pakistan School, Leaving 145 Dead, 16 December 2014.
(33) Economist (The), The man with the plan: Pakistan after the school massacre, 24 January 2015.
(34) Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), Fight against terrorism: Defining moment, 25
December 2014.
(35) BBC, Justice at risk as Pakistan rushes convicts to the gallows, 25 December 2014.
(36) Nation (The), Operation Zarb-e-Azb: Two years of success, 6 September 2016.
(37) Foreign Policy, Actually, Pakistan Is Winning Its War on Terror, 10 December 2015.
(38) Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), Pakistan Army leaving no stone unturned to protect
Chinese investment, 8 February 2016.
(39) PIPS, Executive Summary of comprehensive package of NAP, 14 December 2015.
(40) Dawn, Pakistan Army launches 'Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad' across the country, 22 February 2017.

EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 17

1.1.2. Ethnic and sectarian violence
Simultaneously, the nationalist insurgency in Balochistan caused bloodshed in recent years,
despite the victory of a number of nationalist parties in provincial elections in May 2013.
Balochi activists claimed that between 2013 and 2015 the Pakistani Army and intelligenceagencies continued to target them, with reports of human rights organisations and news
reports documenting disappearances and extrajudicial killings (41). In 2016, the Pakistan Armyclaimed that the insurgency in Balochistan has been under control and only ‘isolated activity’is reported from along the Pak-Afghan border in Balochistan (see Section 2.2.3
Baluchistan) (42).
Sectarian violence across Pakistan continues to be a threat to the security situation in Pakistan
and the broader region, according to The Diplomat (43). Shias, but also Sunnis (including
Barelvi and Sufis), Ahmadis, Christians and Hindus are victims of religiously motivatedviolence, especially carried out by radical militant groups (44). Most of the victims of sectarian
violence are members of the Shia branch of Islam, who comprise approximately 25 % of the
population in Pakistan (45). Various Deobandi militant groups, such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ),
Jundullah and factions of the TTP, target the Shia community (46). According to one source,
the violence that was originally limited to Shias now extends to moderate Sunnis as well, if
they are seen as not being sufficiently orthodox (47). Also the Christian community in Pakistan
is a frequent target of sectarian violence (48), whilst Ahmadis continue to be targeted bymilitant extremists (49). They are often the victims of legal, institutional and social
discrimination, according to USCIRF (50).
Interethnic violence has been a problem in the province of Sindh in recent years. Tensions
between Mohajir and the Pashtun population in Karachi have increased; especially the power
struggle between both groups led to numerous political murders of members of the
Muttahadi Qaumi Movement (MQM), Awami National Party (ANP), Pakistan People’s Party(PPP) and Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) (51).

(41) AHCR, Balochistan; 160 persons extra judicially killed, 510 disappeared and 50 decomposed bodies were foundduring 2013, 8 January 2014; Al Jazeera, From rallies to armed resistance in Balochistan, 6 May 2014; DW, Pakistaniarmy involved in Baloch kidnappings, 6 December 2013; IBT, Balochistan: ‘Hundreds of people abducted andmurdered by Pakistan army’ activists say, 11 March 2015.
(42) Nation (The), Baloch insurgency brought under control: Army, 7 September 2016.
(43) Diplomat (The), US-Pakistan Counterterrorism Needs a New Focus, 4 April 2017.
(44) Netherlands (The), Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Thematisch ambtsbericht positie van Ahmadi’s en
Christenen in Pakistan 2016-2017, 24 April 2017, pp. 19-20.
(45) USCIRF, USCIRF Annual Report 2017 - Tier 1: USCIRF-recommended Countries of Particular Concern (CPC) Pakistan, 26 April 2017, p. 61; Clarion Project, 100,000 Christians Flee Persecution in Pakistan, 15 July 2015.
(46) DW, Examining Pakistan’s growing sectarian violence, 18 February 2015.
(47) Mahadevan, P., ‘Sectarianism in Pakistan’, March 2017, p. 3.
(48) New York Times (The), AP Explains: Violence Against Christians in Pakistan, 28 March 2016.
(49) Jinnah Institute, State of Religious Freedom in Pakistan, March 2016, p. 24.
(50) USCIRF, USCIRF Annual Report 2017 - Tier 1: USCIRF-recommended Countries of Particular Concern (CPC) Pakistan, 26 April 2017, p. 63.
(51) DNA, Pakistan: nearly 3,000 killed in Karachi violence in 2014, 7 January 2015; HRW, World Report 2016 –Pakistan, January 2017; USIP, Conflict dynamics in Karachi, 19 October 2012.

18 —EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION

1.1.3. International disputes
Pakistan's relations with neighbouring countries also have an impact on the security situation.
The situation at the border with Afghanistan became more volatile with several cross-borderattacks in 2017. Both countries accused each other of providing militants with ‘safe zones’ tocarry out attacks across the border (52). Experts quoted by Deutsche Welle stated that themain reason behind an increased hostility between the two countries is that now Afghanistan
has better relations with India (53). Relations between Pakistan and India deteriorated in 2016
and at the start of 2017, owing to the situation at the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir (54).
Iranian-Pakistani relations have shown a sharp rise in hostility. Just like Afghanistan and India,
Iran disapproves of Pakistan’s support to Sunni militant groups and is also concerned about
growing Pakistan-Saudi Arabia ties (55).

1.2. Actors in the conflict
1.2.1. State armed forces
Pakistan Armed Forces
The Pakistan Armed Forces are the sixth largest army in strength in the world (56). The Pakistan
Armed Forces have around 620 000 active personnel at their disposal, with an active reserve
personnel of 515 000, according to reporting in January 2017 (57). Operational control rests
with the National Command Authority (NCA). Pakistan’s nuclear and conventional forces havetraditionally been oriented and structured against a prospective threat from India. Since 2008,
however, a priority for the Army has been counter-insurgency operations, mainly against
Islamist groups for which forces have been redeployed from the Indian border (58).
The military has gradually gained control of a large part of the country’s economic resources.
It is entrenched in the country’s corporate sector and controls some of Pakistan’s largest
companies and significant tracts of real estate. This has enabled its members to become
something of an independent class (59). The Pakistan Army has thus developed a very strong‘esprit de corps’ (60).
As Professor Anatol Lieven observed in his book in 2011: ‘The Pakistan military, more eventhan most militaries, sees itself as a breed apart, and devotes great effort to inculcating in new
recruits the feeling that they belong to a military family different from (and vastly superior to)
Pakistani civil society’ (61).
(52) DW, Worst border clashes in years: Are Afghanistan and Pakistan at war?, 7 May 2017.
(53) DW, Worst border clashes in years: Are Afghanistan and Pakistan at war?, 7 May 2017.
(54) Dawn, India will retaliate to soldiers' mutilation at time and place of choosing: Indian vice-COAS, 3 May 2017.
(55) DW, Unhappy neighbors - Afghanistan, India, Iran wary of Pakistan's 'jihadist support', 9 May 2017.
(56) Wire (The), India, Pakistan and a Tale of Two Army Chiefs, 7 January 2017.
(57) Global Fire Power, Pakistan Military Strength, last updated: 2017.
(58) IISS, The Military Balance 2015, 2015.
(59) Globalsecurity, Pakistan Army, n.d.; Lieven, A., Pakistan, a hard country, 2011, pp. 169-170.
(60) Lieven, A., Pakistan, a hard country, 2011, p. 163.
(61) Lieven, A., Pakistan, a hard country, 2011, p. 163.

EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 19

The unity of the Army is scrupulously guarded. Islamist conspiracies by junior officers against
their superiors have been infiltrated and smashed by military intelligence. The efficient
reputation of the Army means that the institution is admired by large parts of the general
populace; in the past every military coup in Pakistan so far has been popular with mostPakistanis (62).
At the end of November 2016, General Qamar Javed Bajwa succeeded General Raheel Sharif
who stepped down after completing his three-year term, as new Army chief (63). No
immediate shift in the military policy under General Bawja is to be expected (64).
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)The ISI is Pakistan’s intelligence service tasked with coordinating intelligence between the
branches of the military, collecting foreign and domestic intelligence and conducting covert
offensive operations (65). In December 2016, Naveed Mukhtar was chosen as the new head of
the ISI, replacing Rizwan Akhtar (66). The ISI reportedly has close ties with a number ofextremist Islamist groups (67). In the 1990s, close relationships were established with outfits
such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and JeM to put pressure on India, with whom Pakistan has
already been for decades embroiled on the issue of Kashmir (68). Besides this, the ISI has
supported the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani Network and Pakistani jihadist groups allied with
al Qaeda, according to Bill Roggio, Managing Editor of The Long War Journal (69).
The Frontier Corps (FC)The Frontier Corps (FC) is an auxiliary military force, formally under the authority of theInterior Ministry, but commanded by Army officers. There are two major subdivisions, one
stationed in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa/FATA and one stationed in Balochistan. The FC helps local
law enforcement maintain law and order, border control and fight organised crime. The
strength of the FC in KP and Balochistan in April 2016 was 90 138 (70). In Balochistan the FC
are said to be involved in extrajudicial killings and disappearances (71).

(62) Lieven, A., Pakistan, a hard country, 2011, pp. 163-164; Siddiqa, S., Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's Military
Economy, May 2007, p. 108.
(63) Al Jazeera, Pakistan's new army chief takes command, 29 November 2016.
(64) Reuters, Pakistan's new army chief brings no change in policy: defense minister, 27 November 2016.
(65) EASO, Pakistan: Country Overview, August 2015, pp. 28, 49.
(66) RFE/RL, Pakistan Names New ISI Head, 12 December 2016.
(67) Kiessling, H., Faith, Unity, Discipline The Inter-Service-Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan, October 2016, pp. 1-11.
(68) Kiessling, H., Faith, Unity, Discipline The Inter-Service-Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan, October 2016, pp. 1-11.
(69) Roggio, B., Pakistan is ‘very cooperative and very engaged in the fight against terrorism,’ Secretary Kerry tells
Congress, 25 February 2016; Roggio, B., Pakistan: Friend or Foe in the Fight Against Terrorism?, 12 July 2016.
(70) Jaffrelot, C., Pakistan at the Crossroads Domestic Dynamics and External Pressures, April 2016, pp. 140-141.
(71) Balochwarna News, Balochistan: Pakistani forces kill five abducted Baloch in fake encounter, 28 April 2017; UN
CAT, Concluding observations on the initial report of Pakistan, 12 May 2017, p. 3.

20 —EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATIONThe Rangers
The Rangers are a paramilitary force under the authority of the Interior Ministry. There are
two major subdivisions, the Punjabi Rangers headquartered in Lahore and the Sindh Rangers
headquartered in Karachi. The Rangers help local law enforcement, provide border security
and fight smuggling. Their total strength is about 19 475 in Punjab and 24 630 in Sindh,according to an April 2016 publication (72). In April 2017, the Government decided to extend‘the special policing powers’ of the Rangers in Sindh, extending their deployment andmandate to carry out 'operations against militant wings, extortionists, hitmen and militants'
in Karachi by another 90 days (73).
The Pakistani Police
The Pakistani Police (see also 1.5.1. State protection, security forces and justice) has
manpower of approximately 391 364 personnel, according to the National Police Bureau,
cited by the newspaper Dawn in April 2017. Of those, only 5 731 are women (74). The Police
are generally understood to be underfunded and are facing a difficult task fighting rising
amounts of crime and, in certain regions, activity of militants and insurgents (75). The Overseas
Security Advisory Council (OSAC) states that ‘police services are below Western standards andare non-existent in some areas of the country’ (76).
According to a report by Human Rights Watch (HRW) in September 2016:‘… the Police are one of the most widely feared, complained against, and least trusted
government institutions in Pakistan, lacking a clear system of accountability andplagued by corruption at the highest levels[…] There are numerous reported cases ofpolice extrajudicial killings of criminal suspects, torture of detainees to obtain
confessions, and harassment and extortion of individuals who seek to file criminalcases, especially against members of the security forces.’ (77) (see also 1.5.1. State
protection, security forces and justice)Lashkars
In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and in the FATA, Pakistani Army and Police sometimes use irregularpeace militia (so-called Lashkars) to control territory. They are often called ‘Government
Taliban’, according to the newspaper Dawn. They have reportedly used indiscriminate andpunitive force, engaging in the destruction of houses belonging to suspected Taliban and theirfamilies, arbitrary arrest and unlawful killings. The provincial government decided to
discontinue their financing. Due to the NAP, the Lashkars are being dissolved (78).

(72) Jaffrelot, C., Pakistan at the Crossroads Domestic Dynamics and External Pressures, April 2016, pp. 140-141.
(73) Dawn, Rangers’ policing powers in Karachi extended for 90 days, 23 April 2017.
(74) Dawn, Women make up less than 2pc of country’s police force: report, 26 April 2017.
(75) USIP, A Counterterrorism Role for Pakistan’s Police Stations, 18 August 2014, pp. 3-4.
(76) OSAC, Pakistan 2017 Crime & Safety Report: Islamabad, 31 January 2017.
(77) HRW, "This Crooked System" - Police Abuse and Reform in Pakistan, 25 September 2016.
(78) Dawn, Death by lashkar: The forgotten protectors of Adezai village, 9 May 2016; Chaudhry, S., A., Civil Militia
in FATA & Its Impact on Society, 9 October 2015.

EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 21

1.2.2. Armed Groups
Two interviewees interviewed for this report have stated that armed groups in Pakistan canbe divided into four major groups:The anti-state militant groups such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP);
The India and Afghan-centric groups;
The sectarian orientated militant groups;
The secular nationalist groups such as the Baloch militants (79).

Some of the main different armed groups in Pakistan are described below.

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)The TTP, also known as the Pakistani Taliban, is the largest banned militant group active inPakistan. It was founded in 2007 as a loose formation of Deobandi groupings chiefly operatingin the Pakistani border area with Afghanistan. The initial objectives of the organisation were
the implementation of sharia law and the ousting of coalition forces from Afghanistan (80). The
group is banned by the Pakistan Government (81). It was published in January 2016 that the
TTP consist of 35 000 core volunteer and conscript fighters. These militants are mostly
Pashtun originating from the border zone between Pakistan and Afghanistan (82). The TTP
mostly operates from provinces of Kunar, Nuristan, Paktika, Gardaiz, Nangarhar and Paktia in
Afghanistan to launch cross-border attacks inside Pakistan (83). The TTP finances its activities
through extortion and smuggling (84). The TTP has strong ties with sectarian Deobandi
organisations such as LeJ and Ah-le Sunnat Wal Jama’at (85). Arif Jamal, a US-based scholar on
Islamic extremist groups states that links between the TTP and the Pakistan Army are
confirmed through the TTP’s recent decision to focus on Kashmir and Jammu, which ‘showsthat the Pakistan Army is again activating the TTP and other Deobandi groups in Kashmir andIndia for jihad’ (86). On 1 November 2013, the official TTP leader Hakimullah Mehsud was
killed by a drone-attack in North Waziristan (87). The nomination of hardliner Mullah Fazlullah
as his successor was considered a rejection of possible peace talks with the Pakistaniauthorities (88). Under the strain of military operations in North Waziristan in 2014, the rise of
the Islamic State (IS) and tensions within the group over the leadership of Fazlullah, the TTP
split into different factions (89). Bill Roggio, Managing Editor of The Long War Journal, reported
that the TTP has attempted to reunite the various factions. In March 2015, JuA rejoined the
TTP but operates with a degree of autonomy. In the same month Lashkar-e-Islam (LI) merged(79) Almeida, C., Interview Islamabad, 11 April 2017; Khan, A., Interview Islamabad, 5 April 2017.
(80) Al Jazeera, Breaking down the Tehreek-e-Taliban, 18 September 2015.
(81) Al Jazeera, Breaking down the Tehreek-e-Taliban, 18 September 2015.
(82) Mackenzie Institute (The), Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), last updated 22 January 2016.
(83) ISSI, Issue Brief Pak-Afghan Relations After the Devastating Terror Attacks in Pakistan, 23 February 2017, p. 4.
(84) Norway, LandInfo, Pakistan: Sikkerhetsrelaterte forhold i Khyber Pakhtunkwa (KPK) og Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA), 8 November 2013.
(85) Fair, C.C., ‘Explaining Support for Sectarian Terrorism in Pakistan: Piety, Maslak and Sharia’, 2015, p. 1141.
(86) DNA, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan to join jihad in Kashmir; gives fresh call to attack Indian security forces, 29
September 2016.
(87) Monde (Le), Hakimullah Mehsud enterré, les Talibans choisissent un successeur, 2 November 2013.
(88) Guardian (The), Pakistani Taliban select hardliner Mullah Fazlullah as new leader, 8 November 2013.
(89) Jaffrelot, C., The Pakistan Paradox: Instability and Resilience, April 2015, p. 212.

22 —EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION

with the TTP. In May 2015, three groups under the leadership of al-Qaeda leader Matiur
Rehman merged with the TTP. In February 2017, the Mehsud division rejoined the TTP, after
it split from it in 2014 (90).
In December 2014, the TTP claimed responsibility for the Peshawar school attack which killed
145 people. A spokesman said it was in retaliation for the ongoing army campaign in North
Waziristan (91).
In 2016, according to the Pakistani Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), the TTP was responsiblefor 106 terrorist attacks (92), compared to 2012 in 2015 (93). The terrorist attacks remained
concentrated in the FATA, KP and Karachi in 2016 (94). In comparison, the Pakistani Institutefor Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS) reported that the group:‘claimed that during the year it has conducted 117 attacks against Pakistani security
forces, which include five suicide bombings, 24 IED attacks 39 targeted attacks and 12
ambushes. However, when PICSS counter checked its claims, many were disputed andclaimed by other militant groups as well. (…) If one believes TTP’s own annual ‘progress
report’, the group failed to carry out even a single attack in Punjab, Federal Capital,
Azad Kashmir or Gilgit-Baltistan. It remained mainly focused on KPK with some attacks
in Balochistan and few in Sindh. About half of its ‘claimed’ attacks took place in KPK’ (95)
The same report concluded that ‘[d]espite its weakness and depleted operational capabilities,
the group still poses significant threat to Pakistan’ (96).
Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA)
The JuA is a faction of the TTP but operates with a degree of autonomy (97). In the summer of2014, the JuA split from the TTP (98). In March 2015, the group rejoined the TTP but releases
its own statements on attacks, according to Bill Roggio (99). Sources stated that the group isbased in the tribal areas but also has a presence in the province of Punjab (100). The leadershipof JuA has close ties to al-Qaeda and its emir, Ayman al Zawahiri (101). Sources mention that(90) Roggio, B., Mehsud faction rejoins the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, 4 February 2017.
(91) Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), TTP claim responsibility for Peshawar school attack,16 December 2014.
(92) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 67.
(93) PIPS, 2015, Pakistan Security Report, 2016, pp. 10-12.
(94) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 67.
(95) PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report, 2016, p. 26.
(96) PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report, 2016, p. 26.
(97) Roggio, B., Mehsud faction rejoins the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, 4 February 2017; PGI Intelligence,
Pakistan: Recent Attacks Expose Limits of Counter-Terrorism, Threaten CPEC Projects, 28 February 2017.
(98) Roggio, B., Taliban splinter group Jamaat-ul-Ahrar forms in northwestern Pakistan, 26 august 2014; Nation(The), Ex-TTP spokesman surrender a major breakthrough, 18 April 2017.
(99) Roggio, B., Weiss, C., Pakistani Taliban faction showcases training camp, suicide attacks, 2 February 2017;
Reuters, Pakistani splinter group rejoins Taliban amid fears of isolation, 12 March 2015.
(100) Roggio, B., Weiss, C., Pakistani Taliban faction showcases training camp, suicide attacks, 2 February 2017;
PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 68.
(101) Roggio B., Weiss C., Pakistani Taliban faction showcases training camp, suicide attacks, 2 February 2017; DNA,
Jamaat ul Ahrar: Pakistan’s latest headache, 24 February 2017.

EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 23

JuA is led by Omar Khalid al Khurasani, a Taliban commander from Mohmand Agency (102). In
August 2016, the US Department of State (USDoS) added the JuA to its list of global terrorists’organisations (103).
PIPS documented that in 2016, the JuA was responsible for 66 terrorist attacks compared to
22 in 2015 (104). The group was responsible for some major attacks in 2016 such as the attack
on Easter in Lahore (more than 70 people killed), the attack on the Charsadda university(nearly 17 killed) and attacks on the courts in Mardan (13 people killed) (105). PICSS reported
that:‘[d]uring 2016, highest number of people killed by any single group can be attributed to
JuA. 340 people were killed and 421 were injured in attacks claimed by JuA. More thanhalf of the suicide attacks (9 out of 17) were carried out by the group. The groupexhibited unmatched capability of conducting high profile attacks in the country. Except
one, all of the suicide attacks carried out by the group were high profile, some of themdeadliest ever suicide attacks in Pakistan such as attack on Lawyers in Quetta or Gulshan
Park attack in Lahore. It was observed that the group specifically targeted legal
fraternity in the country’ (106).
The main targets of the group are minorities, lawyers and education centres (107). In
April 2017, a key figure of the JuA and former spokesperson of the TTP surrendered to thesecurity forces (108).
The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)The IMU has been active in the Pakistani tribal region since late 2001, where it regrouped after
sustaining heavy losses fighting alongside the Taliban during the US invasion of Afghanistan.
Under the leadership of Toher Yuldashev the group targeted the Pakistani security forces fromits bases in North and South Waziristan. From 2007, the IMU formed an alliance with the TTP
and fought alongside them. In 2009, Yuldashev was killed in a drone attack while Pakistani
military operations forced the IMU to North Waziristan where it started to cooperate with the
Haqqani Network. Osman Odil became the new leader of the organisation. A radical splintergroup of IMU, the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), is trying to export terrorism from its Pakistanbase (109). On 8 June 2014, IMU militants staged a bloody attack on Karachi Airport (110). The
Pakistan Army made it a priority to eradicate the group. Most of the militants of IMU fled to
Afghanistan (111). At the end of March 2015 the IMU reportedly pledged allegiance to the(102) Roggio B., Weiss C., Pakistani Taliban faction showcases training camp, suicide attacks, 2 February 2017;
Jamestown Foundation, Pakistan's Jamaat-ul-Ahrar: A Violent Domestic Threat, 16 September 2016.
(103) USDoS, State Department Terrorist Designations of Jamaat-ul-Ahrar and Mohamed Abrini, 3 august 2016.
(104) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 68.
(105) Jamestown Foundation (The), ‘Pakistan's Jamaat-ul-Ahrar: A Violent Domestic Threat’, 16 September 2016.
(106) PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report, 2016, p. 28.
(107) Jamestown Foundation (The), ‘Pakistan's Jamaat-ul-Ahrar: A Violent Domestic Threat’, 16 September 2016.
(108) Nation (The), Ex-TTP spokesman surrender a major breakthrough, 18 April 2017.
(109) ISW, Uzbek militancy in Pakistan’s tribal region, 27 January 2011.
(110) Associated Press, Pakistani forces repel attack near Karachi airport, 10 June 2014; BBC, Karachi airport: Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan claims attack, 11 June 2014.
(111) RFE/RFL, The Islamic Movement Of Uzbekistan Comes Unraveled, 28 November 2015.

24 —EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION

Islamic State (IS) (112). In August 2016, it was reported that a new faction of the IMU wasformed. This faction split after the IMU pledged its alliance with IS and wants to operate
independently from IS. This faction has no new name and also calls itself the IMU. They did
not officially name a new leader (113).
Al-Qaeda
Following the US invasion of Afghanistan, many al-Qaeda operatives withdrew to the Pakistani
tribal regions. By 2008, they were so deeply entrenched in Waziristan that, according toAmerican intelligence officials, the area had become al-Qaeda’s ‘international operations
hub’ (114). Among their ranks were Arabs, Uzbeks, Chechens and Chinese Muslims (115). In the
FATA, al-Qaeda has aligned itself with several militant groups, offering support withmanpower, training and propaganda. It also attacks the Pakistani Government, which isviewed as apostate for allying itself with the US-led war on terrorism. Al-Qaeda in Waziristan
has developed privileged relations with the IJU (116). Operation Zarb-e-Azb has pushed many
al-Qaeda allied groups into Afghanistan (117). In December 2014, al-Qaeda lost two top
commanders: the Pakistani Army killed Adnan el Shukrijuma in South Waziristan (118), while a
US drone eliminated Umar Farooq in North Waziristan (119). In July 2015, a leader of al-Qaeda
known as Abdali was killed in a raid in Lahore (120). In February 2016, the Rangers arrested 97
al-Qaeda militants in Karachi, including Farooq Bhatti, deputy chief of al-Qaeda (121). In
March 2017, the US announced that Qari Yasin, the man behind the Marriott Hotel bombing
in 2008, was killed in a drone strike in Afghanistan (122). A drone strike in April 2017 in North
Waziristan killed a ‘key’ (Iraqi) al-Qaeda commander together with seven other jihadists (123).
According to PIPS, al-Qaeda was not involved in any major attack in Pakistan in 2016 (124).
The Punjabi Taliban
The Punjabi Taliban is a network consisting of a loose conglomeration of members of banned
militant outfits of Punjabi origin, mostly sectarian and previously Kashmir insurgency focused,
who have developed strong links with the TTP. The major factions of this network include
operatives from Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Sipahe Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and Jayesh-eMuhammad (JeM) and their splinter groups (125). (for details on these groups, see their(112) Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), Too long a wait: Uzbek militants group joins IS, 2
April 2015.
(113) Roggio, B., Weiss C., Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan faction emerges after group’s collapse, 14 June 2016.
(114) Guardian (The), Waziristan: the hub of al-Qaida operations, 7 January 2008; Rashid, A., Descent into Chaos,
2008, pp. 268-269.
(115) Reuters Alertnet, Analysis - The ties that kill: Pakistan militant groups uniting, 30 May 2010.
(116) CSIS, Religion and militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan, June 2012.
(117) McNally, L., Weinbaum, M., G., ‘A Resilient Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan’, 1 August 2016, p. 11.
(118) Dawn, Top Al Qaeda leader killed in South Waziristan, 6 December 2014.
(119) Dawn, Al Qaeda leader Umar Farooq killed in N Waziristan drone strike, 7 December 2014.
(120) Dawn, Al Qaeda Pakistan chief killed in Lahore raid: Punjab home minister, 1 July 2015.
(121) Reuters, Pakistan arrests 97 al-Qaeda and other militants; foils jailbreak plan, 12 February 2016.
(122) CNN, US drone strike kills man behind Marriott Hotel bombing, Pentagon says, 26 March 2017.
(123) Roggio, B., Iraqi al Qaeda leader reportedly killed in drone strike in Pakistan, 3 May 2017.
(124) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 75.
125 Abbas, Hassan, Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network, 15 April 2009; TNS, Who are Punjabi Taliban, 24 April
2016; Express Tribune (The), Watershed event: Punjabi Taliban renounce violence, 14 September 2014.

EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 25

separate sections in this chapter) The most influential group of the Punjabi Taliban is led by
Maulana Asmatullah Muawiya. In 2014, the Punjabi Taliban claimed responsibility for only two
terrorist attacks. In September 2014, Muawiya first intended to shift his militant activities
from Pakistan to Afghanistan (126), then some days later announced he would give up thearmed struggle in Pakistan entirely and use peaceful means instead (127). By April 2016, it wasreported that the Punjabi Taliban was considered weakened and scattered (128).
Islamic State (IS)The first reports about IS (also called ISIS, ISIL or Daesh) appearing in Pakistan date back to thebeginning of 2015 (129). A report by the Royal United Services Institute stated in February 2016that IS has an estimated 2 000 to 3 000 members in Pakistan, including fighters and support
elements (130). Different militant groups such as Tehrik-e-Khilafat Pakistan, the Shahidullah
Shahid Group of TTP, Jundullah and IMU have pledged allegiance to the leader of IS, alBaghdadi (131). Farhan Zahid, a terrorism expert on Pakistan, stated that IS has managed toincrease its influence by forming ‘tactical alliances’ with similar local militant groups. IS asserts
its dominance through local affiliates in urban centres of Pakistan (132). Different sources
reported that IS has recruitment networks in several major urban regions such as Peshawar
and Karachi (133). The Pakistani authorities deny the presence of IS in the country, but the
security forces claim to make successful gains against the group (134). In 2016, IS claimed
responsibility of three terrorist attacks in Pakistan (135). PIPS documented that groups such as
JuA, factions of the TTP and LeJ Al-Alami have an operational coordination with IS (136). In
April 2017, IS claimed an attack on an Afghan Taliban leader in Peshawar (137).
Haqqani Network
The Haqqani Network is an insurgent network that operates alongside the TTP, but initially it
was not home-grown. It was founded by Afghan warlord Jalaluddin Haqqani. Due to his oldage, he handed over leadership to his son Sirajuddin Haqqani in 2007. Media reports in 2015
claimed that Jalaluddin Haqqani had died in 2014 (138), but his family and the Afghan Taliban(126) PIPS, 2014, Pakistan Security Report, 2015.
(127) Dawn, Punjabi Taliban call off armed struggle in Pakistan, 13 September 2014.
(128) TNS, Who are Punjabi Taliban?, 24 April 2016.
(129) USIP, The Islamic State in Pakistan, September 2016(130) Giustozzi A., The Islamic State in ‘Khorasan’: A Nuanced View, 5 February 2016.
(131) Jamestown Foundation (The), ‘Growing Evidence of Islamic State in Pakistan’, 4 February 2016; Diplomat (The),
The Islamic State Threat Is Real in Pakistan, 18 February 2016.
(132) Zahid, F., ‘IS Footprint in Pakistan: Nature of Presence, Method of Recruitment, and Future Outlook’, 5 May
2017, p. 10.
(133) IRIN, Islamic State ramps up recruitment in Pakistan, 11 January 2017; Jamestown Foundation (The), ‘Growing
Evidence of Islamic State in Pakistan’, 4 February 2016; Wall Street Journal (The), Pakistan Frets Over Potential
Appeal of Islamic State, 23 February 2016; Voice of America (VOA), Islamic State Takes Root, Grows Along AfghanPakistan Border, 1 March 2017.
(134) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 74.
(135) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 75.
(136) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 75.
(137) Dawn, Afghan Taliban leader shot dead by IS in Peshawar, 30 April 2017.
(138) Express Tribune (The), Jalaluddin Haqqani died last year after ‘prolonged illness’: Taliban confirm, 31 July 2015;
BBC, Afghan militant leader Jalaluddin Haqqani 'has died', 31 July 2015.

26 —EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION

denied these claims (139). Sirajuddin Haqqani was appointed as a deputy leader of the Taliban
in May 2016 (140). Originating from Loya Paktya (Khost, Paktia and Paktika provinces in
Afghanistan) they now mainly operate in North Waziristan in the FATA. Though their main
objective is attacking international forces in Afghanistan, they closely cooperate with the TTP.
The Haqqani Network also has a long-standing relationship with the Pakistani Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI) which had led to frictions between Pakistan and the US (141). The vast majorityof the Haqqani fighters belong to the Zadran tribe but there are also non-Pashtun militants,
including Arabs, Chechens and Uzbeks (142). The Haqqani network was believed to have ties
with al-Qaeda and the ISI (143). American sources stated in November 2014 that ongoing
Pakistani military operations in North Waziristan have ‘disrupted’ the military capabilities ofthe Haqqani (144). The Haqqani Network relocated in 2016 from North Waziristan to Kurram
Agency under the pressure of military operations (145). In March 2016 the US advised Pakistan
to take strong measures against the network (146).
Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)
SSP is a former Deobandi political party founded in the early 1980s by Sunni cleric Maulana
Haq Nawaz Jhangvi in Jhang, Punjab. Its principal aim is to fight Shia influence in Pakistan.
Jhangvi was assassinated in 1990 and was replaced by Maulana Azam Tariq. Tariq was, in turn,killed in 2003 when gunmen fired bullets into the vehicle he was travelling in. Tariq was
succeeded by Maulana Ali Sher Hyderi. The organisation is understood to have close ties with
the Jihadi organisation Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) and the TTP, and to be a part of the Punjabi
Taliban network. Numerous reports have labelled SSP as a violent group. At the beginning of
the century it was responsible for the murder of Shia militants, ordinary Shia citizens andattacks on Shia mosques. Although the group denies involvement in violence, former
President Musharraf banned it in 2002, and in 2005, the US listed SSP as a terrorist
organisation (147). Part of SSP resurfaced in more recent years under the name Ah-le Sunnat
Wal Jama’at, which under the leadership of Maulana Muhammad Ahmed Ludhianvi contested
elections in 2014 (148). Other members left SSP to form an apparently even more radical outfit
under the name Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ). Other extremist splinter groups of SSP are the Jhangvi(139) AFP, Taliban deny reports of Haqqani network founder's death, 1 August 2015; Reuters, Reports of Haqqani
network founder's death, but family denies, 31 July 2015.
(140) Reuters, Afghan Taliban appoint a new leader, Kabul urges peace, 25 May 2016.
(141) Asia Times, Haqqani network sours Pakistan-US ties, 20 September 2011; Economist (The), The Haqqani
Network. Snake Country. The Pakistan army’s complex relationship with jihadists, 1 October 2011; Foreign Policy,
Dealing with the Haqqani Network, 23 September 2011; Rashid, A., Descent into Chaos, 2008, p. 221; Weinbaum,
M.G., Babbar, M., ‘The Tenacious, Toxic Haqqani Network’, 7 September 2016, pp. 5-6.
(142) Gopal, A., Mahsud, M., K., and Fishman, B., The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in North Waziristan,2010.
(143) CSIS, Religion and militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan, June 2012, p. 63.
(144) Dawn, Operation Zarb-e-Azb disrupted Haqqani network; US general, 6 November 2014.
(145) Roggio, B., US drones target jihadist ‘hideouts’ in Pakistan’s tribal areas, 22 February 2016.
(146) Dawn, Restricting military aid to Pakistan will hurt critical US interests, 11 March 2016.
(147) Dawn, 2009: Southern Punjab extremism battle between haves and have-nots, 21 May 2011; NOREF, Sectarian
violence: Pakistan’s greatest security threat?, 9 August 2012; Rashid, A., Descent into Chaos, 2008, pp. 227-228;
Jamestown Foundation (The), ‘Sipah-e-Sahaba: Fomenting Sectarian Violence in Pakistan’, 5 May 2005; Abbas,
Hassan, Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network, 15 April 2009.
(148) New York Times (The), Banned Group’s Leader Given Pakistani Parliament Seat After Vote Dispute, 10 April
2010.

EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 27

Tigers, Al-Haq Tigers, Tanzeem-ul-Haq, Al-Farooq and the Al-Badra Foundation (149). The coreof SSP supporters is made up of Sunni peasantry in the rural Jhang and merchant and traderclasses in the urban centres. The madrassas are also a major recruiting ground for SSP. SSP
cadres have been known to get jihadi training in Afghanistan. To fund its organisation andactivities, SSP has relied on contributions from its supporters in the form of zakat (religiousalms). Sunni business people contribute as well. It is also widely understood that SSP thrives
on considerable financial and logistic backing from Saudi donors wanting to curb Iran’s
influence over the Shia population in Pakistan (150). SSP is reportedly not only a militant groupwith about 3 000 to 6 000 members and a party with one million members, but it also has a
student wing, an insurance company, many offices and a nation-wide network (151).
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)
LeJ is a Deobandi terrorist group founded in 1996, when a number of militants led by Riaz
Basra, Akram Lahori and Malik Ishaq broke away from Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan. LeJ is not apolitical party but a purely paramilitary organisation. Some claim that its creation wasprompted by the 1994 establishment of Sipah-e-Mohammed Pakistan (SMP), a Shia militantgroup that targeted leaders of SSP. Some sources claim that LeJ was formed as the militantwing of SSP to attack the Shia community and that it became independent when it gained
more proficiency. In the following years LeJ became a strong terrorist organisation,
responsible for 350 violent attacks prior to 2001. In later years there were bombings on Shia
mosques. Just like SSP, LeJ has cordial relations with JeM (152). LeJ was once openly supported
by ISI, who used the group as a proxy in Afghanistan and India as well as to counter Shia
militant groups (153). LeJ was placed on the US terrorist list in 2003 and was banned byPresident Musharraf in 2001 (154). Its underground violent activities continued unabated,
especially against members of the Hazara community in Quetta (155). Although most of theviolence of LeJ targets Shias, the organisation also cultivates a radical stance against
Christians, Ahmadi and Sufi Muslims (156). A substantial number of the leadership of LeJ haseither been killed in 2015, including Malik Ishaq (157), or captured in 2016, including Naeem
Bukhari (158). On 19 January 2017, LeJ’s commander Asif Chuto was killed in an encounter by(149) CSIS, Religion and militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan, June 2012, p. 39.
(150) CSIS, Religion and militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan, June 2012, p. 39.
(151) SATP, Pakistan: Extremist Group: Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, n.d; Hussain Zahid, Frontline Pakistan, The struggle
with militant Islam, 2007, p. 92.
(152) CSIS, Religion and militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan, June 2012, pp. 40-42; Dawn, Pakistan bans 25 militantorganizations, 6 August 2009; Intellibriefs, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi: Sectarian Violence in Pakistan and Ties toInternational Terrorism, 3 June 2005.
(153) Reuters, Special Report: Pakistan's threat within - the Sunni-Shia divide, 24 October 2012; National (The),
Pakistan arrests 97 Al Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi militants, 12 February 2016; Guardian (The), Pakistan military
intelligence under fire for failing to prevent Quetta bombing, 18 February 2013.
(154) BBC, Pakistani group joins US terror list, 30 January 2003.
(155) Dawn, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi claims responsibility: 13 lives lost in brutal attack on shia pilgrims, 28 June 2012; HRW,
We Are The Walking Dead. Killings of Shia Hazara in Balochistan, Pakistan, 30 June 2014.
(156) Roggio, B., State designates leader of Lashkar-e-Jhanghvi as global terrorist, 6 February 2014.
(157) Roggio, B., Lashkar-e-Jhangvi emir killed in shootout with Pakistani police, 29 July 2015.
(158) Daily Times (The), LeJ leads international terrorist organisations in Pakistan, 10 March 2017.

28 —EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION

law enforcement agencies (159). According to PIPS, LeJ was responsible in 2016 for 17 terrorist
attacks in Pakistan, compared to 33 in 2015 (160).
LeJ Al-Alami (LJA)
LeJ splintered and broke up in different factions as a result of the efforts of the Pakistan
State (161). One of those emerging factions is called LeJ Al-Alami (LJA) (162), designated by
Pakistan as a terrorist organisation in November 2016 (163). PIPS mentions that LeJ Al-Alami is‘a rebirth of LeJ with a new global outlook’ (164). Main difference between LeJ and LJA is thatthe first one was only targeting minority groups whilst LJA also carries out attacks on lawenforcement agencies and government installations (165). Sources stated that the group is led
by Yousaf Mansoor Khurasani and a shura (consultation), comprising six members (166). The
leadership is based in Southern Afghanistan, in the province of Zabul (167). According to PIPS,
in 2016 LJA was responsible for six major terrorist attacks, mostly carried out in Balochistan
and Karachi (168). In January 2017, LJA claimed responsibility for the bomb attack on avegetable market in Parachinar (169).
Lashkar-e-Islam (LI)
LI is a small outfit active in the Khyber Agency of the FATA. LI was banned in June 2008 by the
Pakistan Government (170). Pakistani military operations in 2014 seem to have crippled thegroup’s operational capabilities in Khyber Agency. As a result, members of LI relocated to
Afghanistan (171). Many LI commanders have been killed by US drone strikes in the tribal areas.
In 2015, LI announced its merger into the TTP (172). It has been reported that the leader of LI,
Mangal Bagh, was killed by a drone attack in Afghanistan in the summer of 2016 (173). But
according to Abdullah Khan, Managing Director of PICSS, it is not clear whether Mangal Baghwas killed in that drone attack. He mentioned that many militants of LI fled to(159) Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), Sheikhupura raid: LeJ chief Asif Chotu, three aides
killed in gunfight, 19 January 2017.
(160) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 69.
(161) Gandhara/RFE/RL, Pakistani Extremists Carve A Sanctuary In Southern Afghanistan, 23 January 2017.
(162) Jamestown Foundation (The), ‘Lashkar-e-Jhangvi al-Alami: A Pakistani Partner for Islamic State’, 27 January
2017.
(163) PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report, 2016, February 2017, p. 30.
(164) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 69.
(165) Jamestown Foundation (The), ‘Lashkar-e-Jhangvi al-Alami: A Pakistani Partner for Islamic State’, 27 January
2017.
(166) Jamestown Foundation (The), ‘Lashkar-e-Jhangvi al-Alami: A Pakistani Partner for Islamic State’, 27 January
2017; PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 69.
(167) Gandhara/RFE/RL, Pakistani Extremists Carve A Sanctuary In Southern Afghanistan, 23 January 2017.
(168) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 69.
(169) Reuters, Blast kills at least 21 in Pakistan vegetable market, says official, 21 January 2017.
(170) Dawn, Pakistan bans 25 militant organisations, 6 August 2009; Express Tribune (The)/ International New YorkTimes (The), List of banned organisations in Pakistan, 24 October 2012.
(171) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 68.
(172) Roggio, B., 3 jihadist groups merge with Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, 6 May 2015.
(173) Nation (The), Mangal Bagh ‘is dead’, 25 July 2016.

EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 29

Afghanistan (174). In 2016, LI carried out 18 terrorist attacks in Khyber Agency and the areas
surrounding Peshawar (175).
Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP)
SMP is a Shia militant group whose aim is to protect the Shia community and target hostile
Sunni Deobandi organisations such as SSP and LeJ. SMP is a radical offshoot of a mainstream
Shia political party, the Tehrik-e-Jaferia Pakistan (176). The origins are unclear but it wasprobably founded around 1993 by Maulana Mureed Abbas Yazdani. The organisation claims
to have some 30 000 activists [figures from 2015] (177). SMP was outlawed in Pakistan inAugust 2001 (178). In 2016, Karachi and Balochistan were the two major areas where SMP
carried out most of its attacks, with eight and two attacks respectively (179).
The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA)
The BLA is a Baloch nationalist guerrilla organisation. Its objective is an independent
Balochistan, free of Pakistani and Iranian rule. Due to violence, including bomb attacks, it was
outlawed in Pakistan in April 2006 (180). According to PICSS the leader of BLA is Harbyar
Murre (181). The BLA runs 25 camps in Balochistan and consists of numerous units that carryout guerrilla attacks in the province (182). In 2016, the BLA claimed to have carried out 55
terrorist attacks (183), though this could not be verified by independent sources, according to
PICSS. BLA have stated it is targeting Chinese working on CPEC: ‘It is clear that CPEC related
projects, Chinese workers and other related people and entities would be prime targets of
BLA in 2017.’ (184)
The Baloch Liberation Front (BLF)
The BLF is another insurgent group, led by Dr Allah Nazar Baloch. This group operates across
Balochistan, but is primarily active in the southern coastal Makran belt (185). BLF was outlawed
in September 2010 (186). In 2016, this group was responsible for 27 terrorist attacks (187).
(174) Khan, A., Interview Islamabad, 5 April 2017.
(175) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 68.
(176) Dawn, Pakistan bans 25 militant organisations, 6 August 2009; Jamestown Foundation (The), ‘Sipah-e-Sahaba:
Fomenting Sectarian Violence in Pakistan’, 5 May 2005; UK Home Office, Country of Origin Information (COI) Report
Pakistan, 9 August 2013.
(177) SATP, Sipah-e-Mohammed Pakistan, Terrorist Group of Pakistan, 2015.
(178) Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), List of banned organisations in Pakistan, 24
October 2012.
(179) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 71.
(180) Dawn, Pakistan bans 25 militant organisations, 6 August 2009; Express Tribune (The)/ International New YorkTimes (The), List of banned organisations in Pakistan, 24 October 2012; ICG, Policing Urban Violence in Pakistan,
Asia Report N°255, 23 January 2014.
(181) PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2016, p. 32.
(182) OFPRA, Les acteurs du conflit armé au Baloutchistan, 8 September 2015.
(183) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 71.
(184) PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2016, pp. 30-31.
(185) USIP, Mapping conflict trends in Pakistan, 7 February 2014, p. 16.
(186) Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), List of banned organisations in Pakistan, 24
October 2012.
(187) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 72.

30 —EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION

According to the PICSS, ‘BLF remained more focused on targets related to CPEC and it is also
clearly announced by its leader Allah Nazer in his interview to Reuters. The group also targets
any kind of foreigners in the province’ (188).
The Baloch Republican Army (BRA)
The banned BRA is the militant wing of the separatist Baloch Republican Party (BRP) (189) andis headed by Brahmdagh Bugti, the grandson of former Balochistan Chief Minister (190). The
most prominent BRA attack was in January 2015 against the electricity network of Pakistan,which caused a blackout in 80 % of Pakistan (191). BRA carried out 24 attacks in 2016 (192). It
was involved in attacks against Chinese targets and infrastructure related to CPEC (193).
United Baloch Army (UBA)The UBA is another nationalist insurgent group in Balochistan and also a splinter group of the
BLA (194). The UBA is led by Mehran Marri, the youngest son of Khair Bux Marri (195). According
to PIPS, the UBA carried out three attacks in Balochistan in 2016 (196).

1.3. Recent security trends and armed confrontations
The overall security situation improved in 2016 compared to previous years, according tosources systematically collecting information on terrorist and anti-state violence in Pakistan.
The nature of the violence in 2016 and in the first quarter of 2017 is diverse and is describedin detail in the following sections.
The 2016 report of the Pakistani Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS) (197)
recorded 1 624 overall incidents of anti-state violence by militants and counter-insurgency
operations by the Pakistani Government, in which 1 858 people were killed including 986
militants, 514 civilians, 336 security forces personnel and 22 pro-government armed militias,
while 1 962 were injured including 1 340 civilians, 558 security forces personnel, 57 militants
and seven pro-government armed militias (198). Compared to 2015, there has been a 15 %decrease in the number of incidents, but an almost 11 % increase in the number of thoseinjured, according to PICSS (199).

(188) PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2016, pp. 32-33.
(189) Daily Times, BLA commander among eight killed in Sibi, 10 March 2016; DNA India, Pakistan's FIA urges Interpol
to arrest Baloch leaders Brahamdagh Bugti and Sher Muhammad, 28 February 2017.
(190) PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2016, p. 32.
(191) Diplomat (The), Understanding Pakistan’s Baloch Insurgency, 24 June 2015.
(192) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 72.
(193) PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report 2016, p. 32.
(194) Diplomat (The), Understanding Pakistan’s Baloch Insurgency, 24 June 2015.
(195) Dawn, Situationer: Who’s who of Baloch insurgency, 1 June 2015.
(196) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 72.
(197) For an explanation of this source, see section 1.4.1. Figures on civilian fatalities.
(198) PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report, 2016, February 2017, p. 12.
(199) PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report, 2016, February 2017, p. 12.

EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 31

The Pakistani Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) (200) reported 749 incidents of violence,
resulting in 1 887 deaths and 1 956 injured in 2016 (201). Compared to 2015, the number ofviolent incidents decreased by 32 % (202). More than half of the number of incidents ofviolence were terrorist attacks (441 terrorist attacks in 2016), according to PIPS (203).
Figure 1 presents a breakdown of the nature of violent incidents and the number of fatalities
recorded by PIPS in 2016:
Nature of violence incidents
2016

No of
incidents

No of deaths

No of injured

Terrorist attacks

441

908

1627

Political/ethnic violence

12

14

30

Clashes sec. forces & militants

105

348

60

Border clashes/attacks

74

81

173

Operational attacks sec. forces

95

492

49

Drone attacks

3

12

6

Inter-militant clashes/attacks

5

5

1

Clashes sec. forces & criminal
gangs

13

25

9

Communal violence

1

2

1

Total 2016

749

1887

1956

Total 2015

1097

3503

2617

Figure 1: Overall incidents of violence (PIPS) (204)1.3.1. Security operations and armed clashes
PIPS states that in 2016, security operations and armed clashes were reported in all four
provinces of Pakistan and in the FATA. The security forces carried out 95 operational strikes
and raids against militants in 2016, compared to 143 attacks in 2015. Most of these
operational strikes were carried out in Balochistan (38), FATA (24), Karachi (15), Punjab (13)and in KP (five). According to PIPS, 492 people were killed, including 481 militants (comparedto 1 545 in 2015), seven security forces personnel and four civilians (205). Besides these
operational attacks, security forces engaged in 105 armed clashes with militants in 2016, a
decrease of 31 % compared to 2015 (206). These clashes claimed 348 lives in 2016, including
328 militants, 19 security forces personnel and one civilian (207).

(200) For an explanation of this source, see section 1.4.1. Figures on civilian fatalities.
(201) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 154.
(202) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 154.
(203) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 15.
(204) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 15.
(205) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 18.
(206) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 18.
(207) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, pp. 18-19.

32 —EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION

For further information on the varying numbers of civilian fatalities and the various
methodologies used by research institutions that monitor these figures, see Section 1.4.1
Figures on civilian fatalities.
In the period of review, Operation Zarb-e-Azb (Arabic for Strike of Azb) entered its final phase.
In February 2017, the Pakistan Army launched Operation Radd-Ul-Fasaad (Arabic for
eradication of mischief) to try to eliminate terrorism in all areas of the country.
Operation Zarb-e-Azb
Operation Zarb-e-Azb was launched on 15 June 2014 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and in the FATA.
The purpose of the operation was to target the militants in North Waziristan (208). The
operation continued during 2015 (209). Zarb-e-Azb reduced the level of violence and most of
the areas were cleared of militants, except a few pockets and sleeper cells, while the State
has to some extent regained public trust (210). Critics of the operation claim it did not destroy
the TTP, who were able to relocate to Afghanistan to carry out attacks from there. Secondly,that intolerance and extremism have increased. Thirdly, the operation did not gain as muchregional and international recognition as expected, owing to poor strategic communicationand ‘dull diplomacy’ (211). One source states, in May 2017, that despite Zarb-e-Azb, Taliban
militants are returning to the FATA (212). Reports of 37 civilian casualties as a result of airstrikes
during the operation have been denied by the Pakistani military (213). As media access to thearea was restricted, the extent of the impact on the civilian population is unclear (214).
Displacement figures of 800 000 resulting from the operation were confirmed by the Fata
Disaster Management Authority (FDMA), as of 8 July 2014 (215).
Operation Radd-Ul-Fasaad
Operation Radd-Ul-Fasaad was launched on 22 February 2017, after a series of attacks
conducted by JuA in the country in the beginning of 2017. This operation is not confined to
one area, but is carried out across the whole of Pakistan (216). The operation is aimed ateliminating the threat of terrorism and at consolidating the gains of Operation Zarb-e-Azb. It
is further aimed at ensuring the security of Pakistan's borders. The operation includes theinvolvement of the Pakistan Air Force, Pakistan Navy, Pakistan Police and other civil armed
forces (217). The Rangers were given special powers to operate in Lahore and different parts(208) Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), 2,763 terrorists killed in Operation Zarb-e-Azb, 14
June 2015.
(209) Jamestown Foundation (The), ‘The Successes and Failures of Pakistan’s Operation Zarb-e-Azb’, 10 July 2015.
(210) Diplomat (The), Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Operation: Myth vs. Reality, 27 June 2016.
(211) Diplomat (The), Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Operation: Myth vs. Reality, 27 June 2016; See also PICSS, Annual
Security Assessment Report, 2016, February 2017, p. 64.
(212) Nation (The), Reversals in FATA, 27 May 2017.
(213) Dawn, No civilian deaths in Shawal air strikes: Safron, 22 July 2014; AFP, Civilian Casualties Fuel Outrage OverZarb-e-Azb, 22 July 2014.
(214) TNS, Reporting from North Waziristan, 22 June 2014; BBC, Journalists gain rare access to North Waziristan
ghost town, 10 July 2014.
(215) Dawn, North Waziristan IDPs figure reaches 800,000, 8 July 2014.
(216) Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), Army launches Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad against
terrorists across the country, 22 February 2017.
(217) Dawn, Pakistan Army launches 'Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad' across the country, 22 February 2017.

EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 33of the province of Punjab (218). Radd-Ul-Fasaad is focusing on ‘coordinated raids’ conductedby the paramilitary Punjab Rangers and civilian law enforcement. At the beginning ofApril 2017, those raids led to the arrest of 1 300 persons and the seizure of caches of
ammunition, weapons, computers and IEDs (219). This military operation has led to criticism
that some ethnic groups such as Pashtuns and Afghans have been indiscriminately
targeted (220). According to Imtiaz Gul, Director of CRSS, operation Radd-Ul-Fasaad is thelegacy of the new Army chief, just as the previous operation was the legacy of the former
General Sharif (221).

1.3.2. Terrorist attacks
PIPS defines terrorist attacks as follows: ‘terrorist attacks include militant, nationalist,
insurgent and sectarian attacks’. These terrorist attacks can be carried out through different
methods (suicide attacks, beheadings and destruction of educational institutions, CD/video
shops, etc.) (222). Militant groups continued to conduct terrorist attacks in 2016. Tactics used
are targeted killings, IEDs of different types, suicide attacks, grenade blasts, rocket attacks,
and sabotage and mortar attacks. One source mentions that different militants groups
reached an alliance with other groups. Those alliances meant that such groups were capableof expanding their targets from sectarian to non-sectarian (223).
Below is a description of the number of terrorist attacks and the most common methods usedby militants in 2016.
Number of terrorist attacks
According to the PIPS 2016 report, 441 terrorist attacks were carried out by militant,nationalist, insurgent and violent sectarian groups in Pakistan in 2016. This is a decrease of
28 % compared to 2015. PIPS mentioned that in 2016 those terrorist attacks killed 908 people
and injured 1 672 (224), and concluded that ‘the fact that a 28 percent decline in attacks
resulted in only a 12 percent decrease in fatalities indicates that militants carried out somemajor attacks during the year’ (225). Those killed in terrorist attacks in Pakistan in 2016
included 545 civilians, 302 security forces personnel and 61 militants, whilst those injured
included 1 157 civilians, 469 security forces and one militant (226).

(218) AI, Pakistan: Wave of violence shows a horrific disregard for human life, 23 February 2017.
(219) Stratfor, Tackling Terrorism in Pakistan's Heartland, 12 April 2017.
(220) Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad: ‘Punjab police focus
on Pakhtuns and Afghans’, 4 March 2017.
(221) Gul, I., Interview Islamabad, 6 April 2017.
(222) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 6.
(223) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 72.
(224) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 13.
(225) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 13.
(226) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 13.

34 —EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION

Suicide bombings
PICSS reported that ‘militant [sic] used various types of attacks to achieve their targets but thehighest number of victims were from suicide attacks. PICSS Militancy Database shows that in
17 suicide attacks, 326 people were killed and 881 injured’ – Balochistan and KPK witnessed
five suicide bombings each, whilst FATA witnessed four suicide attacks, Punjab two and Sindh
one (227).
Bomb explosions and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)
PIPS mentioned that militants used IEDs of various types in 172 terrorist attacks (228).
According to PIPS this means that IEDs will remain ‘a big challenge for law enforcement
agencies’ (229). CRSS (230) stated in its yearly report for 2016 that the number of IED explosions
were fewer than in 2015, but caused 25 % more fatalities in 2016 compared to 2015 (231).
PICSS reported that
‘Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) remained as usual most frequently used type of
militant attacks however, the significant decline has been observed in lethality of IEDs,
which suggests that quality of IED making has suffered due to consistent pressure fromsecurity forces. In 2016, militants carried out 173 IEDs in which 153 people were killed
and 460 were injured’ (232).
The highest number of IEDs was recorded in FATA followed by Balochistan (233).
Targeted killings
According to PIPS, about 50 % of the terrorist attacks (218) in 2016 were targeted killings or
shootings (234). PICSS reported that most of the targeted killings took place in Balochistan
province, followed by the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh. Besides this, PICSS
stated that militant groups, especially the TTP and JuA targeted lone security forces
personnel. Police personnel were the main victims of targeted killings by militants in 2016,
according to PICSS (235).
Of the total reported terrorist attacks, 211 attacks were against personnel, convoys and checkposts of the security forces and law enforcement agencies across Pakistan. Most of these
attacks targeted the Police. Civilians were the apparent targets of 89 attacks (20 %). A total of
34 attacks (8 %) had sectarian targets, mainly members of the Shia and Sunni communities
and worship places including mosques and shrines. Forty-one attacks were aimed at politicalleaders and workers while 27 attacks targeted tribal elders. Other targets hit by terrorists(227) PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report, 2016, pp. 17, 18 and 19.
(228) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 13.
(229) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 73.
(230) For an explanation of this source, see section 1.4.1 Figures on civilian fatalities.
(231) CRSS, Pakistan Conflict Tracker Report/Annual Security Report 2016, March 2017, p. 26.
(232) PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report, 2016, p. 17(233) PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report, 2016, pp. 20-21.
(234) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 12.
(235) PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report, 2016, pp. 23-24.

EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 35

during the previous year included state installations such as gas pipelines, power pylons andrailways, government officials (65 attacks), polio health workers (four attacks), educational
institutions (six attacks), journalists and media (two attacks), non-Baloch settlers/workers(two attacks) and members of the Christian community (five attacks) (236).
Kidnappings
PICSS reported that‘[a] significant decline has been observed in kidnapping during 2016. The number ofkidnapping incidents dropped by 47 percent. Overall, 17 such incidents were recorded
during last year while in 2015 the number was 32. Kidnapping was one of the major
source of income for militants. However, Operation Zarb-e-Azb and intelligence based
operations in urban areas dismantled kidnapping for ransom networks largely. 34
people were kidnapped in 2016 by militants’ (237).

1.3.3. Sectarian related violence
PIPS stated that there is a decline in the number of sectarian related violent incidents. The
numbers decreased by 41 % in 2016 compared to 2015. The number of people killed also
decreased by about 62 % in 2016. Most victims of sectarian related violence were in Khuzdar(Balochistan) and in Karachi (Sindh) (238). Also, CRSS documented a decline of 19 % in sectarian
related violence. According to CRSS, ‘the number of people injured from sectarian violence
went higher than those recorded in 2015 because of the forms of violence used in carryingout such attacks’. Over half of the casualties were from five suicide bombings, including theone in Gulshan-i-Iqbal park in Lahore on Easter Sunday, the bombing at the Sufi shrine Shah
Noorani in Balochistan, and an attack on a mosque in Mohmand Agency (239). CRSS states thatfatalities from sectarian related violence increased in the provinces of Punjab, Balochistan andin the FATA (240).

1.3.4. Ethnic and political violence
According to PIPS, there was a sharp decline in ethnic and political violence in 2016, during
which there were twelve incidents compared to 63 in 2015. These incidents took place in
Sindh (particularly in Karachi), in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, in Azad Kashmir and in Punjab (241).

(236) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 13.
(237) PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report, 2016, p. 24.
(238) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 16.
(239) CRSS, Pakistan Conflict Tracker Report/Annual Security Report 2016, March 2017, p. 63; Dawn, At least 72
killed in suicide blast as terror revisits Lahore, 29 March 2016; Al Jazeera, Attack on Shah Noorani shrine in Pakistan
kills dozens, 12 November 2016; Dawn, Mohmand suicide bombing toll rises to 36, 18 September 2016.
(240) CRSS, Pakistan Conflict Tracker Report/Annual Security Report 2016, March 2017, p. 63.
(241) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 17.

36 —EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION

1.3.5. Border attacks
In 2016, PIPS counted 18 cross-border attacks from Afghanistan. Most of these attacks took
place in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan. The main targets were security forces and their
check-posts (242). In the first months of 2017, clashes at the Pakistan-Afghanistan borderintensified. In February 2017, all border crossings with Afghanistan were closed for a monthdue to a ‘wave of attacks’ in Pakistan (243). This left hundreds of thousands of people andlorries carrying goods stranded on each side of the border. A temporary opening of the borderfor two days allowed valid visa holders on both sides to return home (244). At the border with
Afghanistan, frequent cross-border attacks were documented (245). In May 2017, the Pakistan
Army claimed that it had killed more than 50 Afghan soldiers at the Chaman bordercrossing (246). According to Pakistani sources, at least nine civilians died and more than 40
were injured during a clash involving a government census team in early May 2017 (247).
Another source reports that ‘scores of civilians’ were killed and hundreds of villagers had fled
during the border clashes in May (248).
The situation at the Line of Control (LoC) and the de-facto border between the Indian andPakistani controlled parts of Kashmir became tense during and after September 2016 due tothe Uri incident, in which four militants killed 17 Indian soldiers in the Uri camp. India accused
Pakistan that the militants infiltrated from across Pakistan. Pakistan denied (249). Since then,cross-border attacks are regularly reported. In 2016, PIPS counted 51 cross-border attacks
from India (250). Cross-border attacks were also reported in the first months of 2017 (251).
There have been a number of reports of civilian casualties on both sides from October 2016
to May 2017 (252).
In 2016, Iranian border security forces carried out five cross-border attacks in the Panjgur
district of Balochistan, resulting in no injuries or damaged property (253). In May 2017, tension
between the two nations intensified because of mortar shelling of Pakistani territory, killing
one civilian (254).

(242) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 57.
(243) Al Jazeera, Pakistan-Afghanistan crossing closed after border clash, 6 May 2017.
(244) Al Jazeera, Pakistan PM orders reopening of Afghanistan border, 20 March 2017.
(245) Al Jazeera, Pakistan-Afghanistan crossing closed after border clash, 6 May 2017.
(246) DW, Worst border clashes in years: Are Afghanistan and Pakistan at war?, 7 May 2017.
(247) VoA, Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Clashes Leave Many Dead, 5 May 2017.
(248) DW, Worst border clashes in years: Are Afghanistan and Pakistan at war?, 7 May 2017.
(249) BBC, Militants attack Indian army base in Kashmir 'killing 17', 18 September 2016.
(250) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, pp. 59-62.
(251) Guardian (The), Kashmir attacks: Indian soldiers mutilated and police shot dead, 2 May 2017; Nation (The),
Army rubbishes Indian claim of attacking Pak posts, 24 May 2017.
(252) See for instance: Economic Times (The), BSF jawan, child killed after shelling by Pakistan in J&K, 25 October
2016; CNN, 13 civilians killed by cross-border shelling in Kashmir, say India, Pakistan, 1 November 2016; VoA,
Pakistan: Cross-Border Indian Fire Kills 11 Civilians, 3 Troops, 23 November 2016; Al Jazeera, Kashmir: Civilians
killed as India, Pakistan trade fire, 11 May 2017.
(253) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 62; Independent (The), Iran causes panic after firing three mortarshells into Pakistan, 30 September 2016.
(254) Dawn, Pakistani man killed as Iranian border guards fire mortar shell into Balochistan, 29 May 2017

EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 37

1.3.6. Drone strikes
The first US drone strike in Pakistan took place in 2004 in the Waziristan region. The numberof drone strikes since 2004 and up to 2014, and of those killed or injured by them, varies
according to the source consulted (255). Most of the US drone strikes in Pakistan have takenplace in the semi-autonomous tribal regions of North West Pakistan, where the US military
believed al-Qaeda, Taliban and other terrorist groups sought refuge (256).
The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ) compiled its own data on drone strikes. In 2016,
TBIJ recorded three strikes. These US drone strikes killed between eleven and twelve people
and injured between three and six (257). Whether the fatalities belonged to armed groups orcivilians is not specified in the reporting (258).
In the first quarter of 2017, TBIJ counted three US drone strikes, as of 24 May 2017 (259). On
2 March 2017, a US drone strike in Kurram Agency killed two militants (260). This was the firstdrone strike after a break of nine months in the drone war of the US in Pakistan and was thefirst under the presidency of Donald Trump (261). On 26 April 2017, a US drone strike killed atleast seven militants in North Waziristan (262). It is reported that on 24 May 2017 a third US
drone strike killed three militants in North Waziristan (263).
In September 2015, for the first time, the Pakistani Army launched a Pakistani-made drone, a‘Burraq Drone’, to strike at terrorists in Shawal Valley in the FATA (264).

1.4. Impact of the violence on the civilian population
1.4.1. Figures on civilian fatalities
Sources
Varying figures on civilian fatalities are provided by four different research institutes based on
different definitions and variables. It is difficult to interpret these figures since not all of these
institutes outline clear methodologies.
The four research institutes that present figures about the situation in 2016 are the Pakistani
Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), the Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), the(255) Watson Institute for International Studies, Costs of War: War-related Death, Injury, and Displacement in
Afghanistan and Pakistan 2001-2014, 22 May 2015, p. 11.
(256) TBIJ, CIA drone strikes in Pakistan, 2004 to present, n.d.
(257) TBIJ, CIA drone strikes in Pakistan, 2004 to present, n.d.
(258) TBIJ, Pakistan: Reported US strikes 2017, 15 February 2017.
(259) TBIJ, CIA drone strikes in Pakistan, 2004 to present, n.d.
(260) Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), Drone strike kills two in Kurram Agency, 2 March
2017.
(261) VoA, Will Trump Administration Increase Drone Strikes in Pakistan?, 27 March 2017.
(262) Reuters, Suspected U.S. drone strike targets Pakistani Taliban militants: sources, 28 April 2017; TBIJ, CIA drone
strikes in Pakistan, 2004 to present, n.d.
(263) Nation (The), US drone kills 3 militants in NWA, 25 May 2017.
(264) Diplomat (The), Pakistan Uses Indigenous Drone to Strike Terrorists, 8 September 2015.

38 —EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATIONSouth Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) and the Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies(PICSS).
The Pakistani Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), established in Islamabad, was founded in2006 by its Director, Muhammad Amir Rana, an expert on Pakistani security issues (265). The
basic sources for the year report of PIPS are the PIPS conflict/security database and archives.
PIPS uses information from sources such as newspapers, magazines, journals, television news
channels (266). PIPS divides ‘attacks’ into five categories:‘(i) terrorist attacks, including militant attacks, nationalist insurgent attacks andsectarian-related attacks;(ii) incidents of ethno-political violence;(iii) cross-border attacks;(iv) drone attacks; and(v) operational attacks by security forces against militants’ (267).
PIPS defines ‘casualties’ as follows: ‘casualties include both the number of people killed andinjured’ (268).
The Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) is a Pakistani research institute thatanalyses politics in the country. Established in 2008, it is based in Islamabad and headed by
Imtiaz Gul, a journalist and author of several books on Pakistan (269). CRSS published a reporton security in Pakistan in March 2017, written by senior research associate Mohammad
Nafees. Violence as defined by CRSS includes terrorism, militant attacks, sectarian violence,
crime targeted killings, security operations and drone strikes (270). CRSS uses open sources
such as national print and electronic media (271).
The South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) is a website run by the Institute for Conflict
Management, a non-profit organisation set up in 1997 in New Delhi. Headed by its founder
K.P.S. Gill, former Director General of Indian Punjab Police, it is committed to the continuous
evaluation and resolution of problems of internal security in South Asia. SATP has established‘a comprehensive, searchable and continuously updated database on all available information
relating to terrorism, low intensity warfare and ethnic/communal/sectarian strife in South
Asia’ (272).
The Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS) is an independent researchthink-tank based in Islamabad. This institution collects statistical data regarding Pakistanspecific anti-state violence. PICSS integrated the data of the Conflict Monitoring Center in its
institute (273). PICSS published an annual security report in February 2017. PICSS divided(265) PIPS, PIPS Team, n.d.; Gunaratna, R. and Iqbal, K., Pakistan, terrorism ground zero, 2011; Telepgraph (The),
Pakistani children are victims of their leaders’ mistakes, 16 December 2014.
(266) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 2.
(267) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, pp. 3-4.
(268) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 3.
(269) Imtiaz Gul Official Website, Biography, n.d.
(270) CRSS, Annual Security Report January-December 2016, 22 March 2017, pp. 3, 26 and 63.
(271) CRSS, Annual Security Report January-December 2016, 22 March 2017, p. 3.
(272) SATP, Institute for Conflict Management, An Introduction, n.d.
(273) PICSS, About PICSS, n.d.

EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 39

incidents of violence mainly in two categories: ‘violent militant activities and security forces
actions’. PICSS is focused on anti-state violence and related responses. Sectarian violence,
general crimes, ethnic or language-based violence are not mentioned in the annual
report (274). The data collected by PICSS is based on open sources such as newspapers,
government sources and own correspondents (275).
Civilian casualties
As the four sources cited above use different definitions of violent attacks and of victims, it is
impossible to give one overview of the impact of the violence on the population. Therefore,
the following paragraphs present data from the different sources separately to allow
comparison and clearer understanding of the situation.
In 2016, PIPS recorded 749 attacks, resulting in 1 887 deaths and 1 956 injured (including
deaths from terrorism): 619 civilians, 921 militants and 347 security personnel(Police/FC/Army/Levies/Rangers) were killed (276). Compared to 2015, the number of violent
incidents decreased by 32 %, from 1 097 in 2015 to 749 in 2016. The number of people killedin overall incidents of violence in Pakistan decreased by 46 %, from 3 503 in 2015 to 1 887 in
2016. This trend included the deaths of 921 militants in 2016, compared to 2 340 in 2015, a
decrease of 61 %. In addition, the PIPS data show that terrorist attacks (441) accounted fornearly 59 % of all violent incidents. Both the number of people killed and injured in terrorist
attacks in 2016 decreased by 12 % compared to 2015. Operational strikes killed 492 people in2016 including 481 militants (compared to 1 545 in 2015) (277).
SATP recorded 1 803 fatalities in ‘terrorist violence’ in 2016 (612 civilians, 293 security forces
personnel, 898 terrorists/insurgents). Compared to 2015 (3 682 deaths), this number isconsiderably lower, due to a decrease in the number of killed terrorists/insurgents (278). SATP
also provides figures for the first five months of 2017. As of 21 May 2017, SATP recorded in
total 608 fatalities. Of these were 259 civilians, 77 security forces personnel and 272
terrorists/insurgents (279). In comparison with the first five months of 2016 (875 fatalities), thisis a decline in fatalities of almost 30 % (280).
Data provided by CRSS shows 2 613 fatalities and 1 714 injured from violence in 2016: 1 003
civilians, 1 222 militants, and 388 security officials (see Figure 2). Compared to fatalities in
2015, the number of victims of violence decreased by roughly 45 % (281). CRSS is the only
institute that conducted research on the professions of the victims. It observed that, among
the fatalities of civilians, the identifiable people were found to have a link with
political/religious parties (primarily in Sindh) or belonging to professions such as shop owners,
judicature, education or health (282). According to CRSS, a slight reduction in violence-related(274) PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report, 2016, February 2017, pp. 1-2.
(275) PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report, 2016, February 2017, p. 6.
(276) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, pp. 14-17.
(277) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, pp. 11, 14 and 16.
(278) SATP, Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2003-2017, 21 May 2017.
(279) SATP, Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2003-2017, 21 May 2017.
(280) SATP, Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2003-2017, 21 May 2017.
(281) CRSS, Annual Security Report January-December 2016, 22 March 2017, pp. 6 and 9.
(282) CRSS, Annual Security Report January-December 2016, 22 March 2017, pp. 12-19.

40 —EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION

fatalities was observed for security personnel (283). ‘Security personnel’, according to CRSS,
includes: the Police, the Army, FC personnel, Pakistan Air Force, Levies, Khasadars andothers (284). The category ‘militants’ includes insurgents and criminals.

Figure 2: Victims of violence-related fatalities 2016

© CRSS (285)

PICSS recorded 1 624 incidents of violence by militants and counter-insurgency operations by
the state in 2016. In total 1 858 people were killed: 986 militants, 514 civilians, 336 security
forces personnel and 22 pro-government Razakars (a paramilitary force created by the
Pakistani Army) (286). PICSS reported 1 962 injured: 1 340 civilians, 558 security forces
personnel, 57 militants, and seven pro-government Razakars. Compared to 2015, a 15 %decrease in the overall number of incidents is noted, with a 45 % decline in deaths and an
11 % increase in injured people (287).
Figure 3 gives a comparison of the persons killed in 2015 and in 2016 between the four sources(based on the definitions described above).

(283) CRSS, Annual Security Report January-December 2016, 22 March 2017, p. 18.
(284) CRSS, Annual Security Report January-December 2016, 22 March 2017, p. 18.
(285) CRSS, Annual Security Report January-December 2016, 22 March 2017, p. 9.
(286) PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report, 2016, February 2017, p. 12.
(287) PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report, 2016, February 2017, p. 12.

EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 41

2015 by source
PIPS (288)
SATP (289)
CRSS (290)

Total
killed
3503
3682
4654

PICSS (291)2016 by source

Civilians killed
778
940
1392
(civilians+security)

Militantskilled
2340
2403
2892
(incl. criminals)

3368

641

2312

Civilians killed

PIPS (292)
SATP (293)
CRSS (294)Total
killed
1887
1803
2613

619
612
1003

Militantskilled
921
898
1222

PICSS (295)

1858

514

986

Security
forces killed
385
339
421
(incl.
government
officials)
415(incl.progovernment
Razakars)
Security
forces killed
347
293
388
(incl.
government
officials)
358(incl.progovernment)

Figure 3: Comparison of the number of fatalities in 2015 and 2016 (PIPS, SATP, CRSS, PICSS) (296)Patterns in fatalities in 2016 and the first quarter of 2017 per month
In this section the data compiled by CRSS, PICSS and SATP are compared, because they havecollected data throughout 2016 and the first quarter of 2017.
Data compiled by CRSS shows a decline in fatalities throughout most of the year 2016 (seeFigure 3). Most fatalities occurred in January and March 2016. December 2016, witnessed theleast fatalities of the year (297).

(288) PIPS, 2015, Pakistan Security Report, 2016, p. 8.
(289) SATP, Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2003-2016, 3 April 2016.
(290) CRSS, Pakistan Conflict Tracker Report/Annual Security Report 2015, 2016, pp. 10-11.
(291) PICSS, Annual Security Report, 2015, 16 February 2016, pp. 7-8.
(292) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 14.
(293) SATP, Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2003-2017, 21 May 2017.
(294) CRSS, Annual Security Report January-December 2016, 22 March 2017, pp. 8-9.
(295) PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report, 2016, February 2017, p. 12.
(296) PICSS, Annual Security Report, 2015, 16 February 2016, pp. 7-8; PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report,
2016, February 2017, p. 12; PIPS, 2015, Pakistan Security Report, 2016, p. 8; PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report,
2017, p. 14; CRSS, Pakistan Conflict Tracker Report/Annual Security Report 2015, 2016, pp. 10-11; CRSS, Annual
Security Report January-December 2016, 22 March 2017, p. 8-9; SATP, Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan
2003-2016, 3 April 2016; SATP, Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2003-2017, 21 April 2017.
(297) CRSS, Annual Security Report January-December 2016, 22 March 2017, p. 7.

42 —EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATIONThe same trend is visible in monthly data recorded by SATP as well, although the figures differ
slightly. In January 2016, SATP counted 213 fatalities and 48 in December 2016. The lastquarter of 2016 shows a significant decline in fatalities compared to the first nine months of2016 (298). SATP also observed a slight increase in fatalities in the period from August to
October 2016 (299).
Data compiled by PICSS shows the highest number of fatalities was in January, February,
March, August and October 2016. PICSS states that there is a visible decline in the numbers offatalities in December 2016 (300).

Figure 4: Violence-Related Deaths in 2016 per month© CRSS (301)

According to data by SATP, the number of fatalities is still decreasing in the first four monthsof 2017. In January 2017, 61 fatalities were mentioned, which is a decline of more than 70 %compared to January 2016 (302). In February, March, April and May 2017, SATP counted 262,
107, 107 and 88 fatalities, which is an increase compared to January 2017, especially in themonth of February 2017 (303). For the first five months of 2017 as at 21 May 2017, SATP
counted 608 fatalities, a decline of almost 50 % compared to 2016 (304).
According to data in the first quarter analysis report of 2017 conducted by CRSS, 1 129
casualties (594 deaths, 535 injured) were counted, an increase of almost 7 % compared to thelast quarter of 2016. Most fatalities in the first quarter occurred in February 2017 (305).

(298) SATP, Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2003-2017, 21 May 2017.
(299) SATP, Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2003-2017, 21 May 2017.
(300) PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report, 2016, February 2017, p. 13.
(301) CRSS, Annual Security Report January-December 2016, 22 March 2017, p. 8.
(302) SATP, Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2003-2017, 21 May 2017.
(303) SATP, Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2003-2017, 21 May 2017.
(304) SATP, Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2003-2017, 21 May 2017.
(305) CRSS, CRSS Security Report – Q1, 2017, 10 May 2017, pp. 3 and 5.

EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 43

1.4.2. Socio-economic life
Pakistan’s June 2016 Multidimensional Poverty Index documented that the socio-economic
landscape in the country is divided and uneven. This report showed that the east of thecountry is more developed than the west of the country. The provinces of Punjab and Sindh
have a higher rate of literacy, education, more access to water, an advanced rate of
employment and a modern health system. Contrastingly, the FATA and the provinces ofBaluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have more poverty, a crumbling infrastructure,
decaying education and health systems, high levels of unemployment, no industrialisation andhigh levels of insecurity. In all provinces, poverty in rural areas is higher than in urban
areas (306).
UNESCO stated in April 2017 that the conflict and the violence in the north-east of Pakistan
have affected local infrastructure such as health centres, roads, schools and watersupplies (307).

1.4.3. Children
The annual report issued by HRCP covering 2015/2016 stated that there are over 24 million
out of school children in Pakistan (308).
Human Rights Watch stated in a report dated March 2017 that attacks carried out by militantgroups have ‘a devastating impact on education’ in Pakistan (309). According to the briefing
report by HRW, from January 2007 to October 2016 attacks by militants have destroyed
school buildings, targeted teachers and students and threatened parents into keeping theirchildren out of school. These attacks have often been directed at female students, theirteachers and schools, thus blocking girls' access to education (310). Especially in the FATA, there
is a lack of schools. Recent battles between Pakistan’s military and Islamist insurgents havedestroyed many more schools and other buildings (311). During the year 2016, PIPS reported
six attacks on educational institutions in the FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, causing 66
civilian casualties (26 deaths and 40 injured) (312). Government forces have also usededucational institutions, including both schools and college hostels, as military bases orbarracks (313).
According to the Society for the Protection of the Rights of the Child (SPARC), exact figures ofchild casualties are not available, but children are affected by both sectarian violence and(306) Government of Pakistan, Multidimensional poverty in Pakistan, June 2016, pp. 16-17.
(307) UNESCO, Helping promote inclusive education in remote areas of Pakistan, 5 April 2017.
(308) HRCP, State of Human Rights in 2016, May 2016, p. 200.
(309) HRW, Pakistan: Attacks on Schools Devastate Education, 27 March 2017.
(310) HRW, Pakistan: Attacks on Schools Devastate Education, 27 March 2017.
(311) IRIN, Can $10 billion and political reforms bring peace to Pakistan's restive frontier?, 5 April 2017.
(312) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, pp. 177-178.
(313) HRW, "Dreams Turned into Nightmares" - Attacks on Students, Teachers, and Schools in Pakistan, 27 March
2017, p. 2.

44 —EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION

indiscriminate attacks. Suicide bombs and IEDs put children in danger in several areas,
especially in the provinces of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (314).

1.4.4. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees
Internal displacements
Since 2008, approximately 5.3 million people have been displaced by insurgency, counterinsurgency and other related violence in Pakistan (315). In 2016, significant progress was madein the return of displaced people. About 700 000 people returned to their homes (316). In total
4.8 million people returned since 2008 (317). According to UN OCHA, IDPs will continue to needhumanitarian support, but the focus of activities will shift to the return areas where the socialand physical infrastructure has been heavily damaged due to prolonged displacement andinsecurity (318). On 5 January 2017, the Government of Pakistan announced that it will
deregister IDP families that refuse to return to areas that are no longer considered conflictzones, including North and South Waziristan, Khyber Agency and Kurram Agency (319). As of
11 May 2017, 27 421 families returned to the FATA in 2017 and 47 259 families remain
displaced according to UN OCHA (320).
In the second part of this report, internal displacements are explained in greater detail and bygeographic division (see Section 2. Security situation per region).
Afghan refugees
Pakistan is also host to of one of the world’s largest refugee communities, housing 1.4 million
registered Afghan refugees and an estimated one million undocumented Afghan
migrants (321). In the second half of 2016, Pakistan pushed back approximately 365 000
registered Afghan refugees, as well as just over 200 000 of the estimated one million
undocumented Afghans in Pakistan, according to HRW (322). UNHCR reported more than
370 000 registered Afghan refugees returned home from Pakistan in 2016 (323). IOM reported
the return of around 250 000 undocumented Afghans from Pakistan in 2016 (324).
The Pakistani Government has extended its Proof of Registration cards (PoR) issued by NADRA(the National Database & Registration Authority), in principle, until the end of 2017 (325). In
April 2017, Pakistan resumed the repatriation of Afghan refugees, following a winter(314) SPARC, The State of Pakistan’s Children 2016, May 2016, p. 58.
(315) UN OCHA, Pakistan: IDP/Returnee Survey of Humanitarian Needs in KP/FATA (29 Dec. 2016), 10 January 2017.
(316) UN OCHA, Pakistan: 2016 FATA Returns Snapshot (January to December 2016), 9 January 2017.
(317) UN OCHA, Pakistan: IDP/Returnee Survey of Humanitarian Needs in KP/FATA (29 Dec. 2016), 10 January 2017.
(318) UN OCHA, Pakistan: 2016 FATA Returns Snapshot (January to December 2016), 9 January 2017.
(319) Dawn, IDPs unwilling to return will be deregistered, 6 January 2017.
(320) UN OCHA, Pakistan: FATA Return Weekly (from 05 May to 11 May 2017) - Humanitarian Snapshot, 17 May
2017.
(321) Al Jazeera, Afghan refugees return home amid Pakistan crackdown, 26 February 2017.
(322) HRW, Pakistan: Mass Forced Returns of Afghan Refugees, 13 February 2017.
(323) UNHCR, Tough choices for Afghan refugees returning home after years in exile, 3 February 2017.
(324) IOM, Return of undocumented Afghans, weekly situation report, 8-14 January 2017.
(325) Al Jazeera, Afghan refugees' status extended until end of year, 7 February 2017.

EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 45

break (326). As of 17 May 2017, UN OCHA reported that from 1 January to 13 May 2017, 20 908
registered Afghans returned to Afghanistan. In the same period 55 421 undocumented
Afghans returned (327).

1.5. State ability to secure law and order
1.5.1. State protection, security forces and justice
For a detailed description of the state’s ability to secure law and order and the human rights
violations committed by the Pakistani security forces, see the EASO Country Overview reporton Pakistan (August 2015) (328).
Rule of law
Pakistan has an elected civilian government. The constitution provides that the politicalauthority is divided between the legislative, the executive and the judiciary. The military has
a substantial influence on national security, foreign policy and economic policy, according to
Freedom House (329). Freedom House further states that corruption, lack of accountability andlack of transparency are pervasive problems at all levels of government, in politics, and in the
military (330).
According to the World Justice Project’s 2016 Rule of Law Index, Pakistan ranked 106 in a listof 113 countries in the world on overall rule-of-law scores, which included very low scores,
amongst others, in the categories ‘right to life and security’, ‘due process of law’, ‘sanctions
for official misconduct’, ‘effective investigations’, and ‘no improper government influence’ inthe criminal justice system. This index was composed based on a set of questionnaires sent toexperts (on average more than 300 per country) and to the general public (331). According to
USDoS there is a ‘weak criminal justice system’ in Pakistan, but the effectiveness of the Police
varies by district, ranging from ‘good to ineffective’ (332). The Pakistan Institute of Legislative
Development And Transparency (PILDAT) observes that the Pakistani Police lacks operational
capacity and professionalism (333).
PIPS finds that‘[t]here is no denying the fact that police need to be equipped with new technologies
and resources, but utilising the available resources also needs to be assessed. Likewise,
the operational build-up of the Police; IT technical support and capacity building are(326) VOA, Pakistan Resumes Repatriation of Afghan Refugees, 3 April 2017.
(327) UN OCHA, Pakistan: Afghan Refugees and Undocumented Afghans Repatriation (07 to 13 May 2017), 17 May
2017.
(328) EASO, Pakistan Country overview, August 2015.
(329) Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2017 - Pakistan, 19 May 2017.
(330) Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2017 - Pakistan, 19 May 2017.
(331) World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2016, 10 January 2017, pp. 16, 122.
(332) USDoS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2016 - Pakistan, 3 March 2017, p. 11.
(333) PILDAT, Policy Brief: Policy Recommendations for Reforms in Police, January 2016, p. 7.

46 —EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION

also areas needing attention. (…) At the same time, the NAP should prioritize thedepoliticization of police, so as to shape it into a professional force’ (334).
Security forces
Amnesty International (AI) states in its 2017 annual report, covering events in 2016, thatenforced disappearances by security forces continued (335). Extrajudicial killings, violence andharassment, arbitrary arrest and detention, torture and abuse of detainees and other humanrights abuses by security forces were reported by USDoS in its annual report covering
2016 (336). Extrajudicial killings were reported in Punjab, Balochistan, FATA, Sindh, and KP,
committed during operations against militant groups. Extrajudicial killings during security
operations and arbitrary arrests during protests were reported by members of Karachi-based
political party MQM. There were also reports of arbitrary detainment of individuals by police
in order to extort bribes or to provoke wanted individuals to surrender (337).
In May 2017, the United Nations Committee against Torture (CAT) expressed its concerns
about the ‘widespread practice’ of torture by the Police, the military and intelligence agencies
in Pakistan (338). The report stated further its concern over: ‘reports that members of the State
party’s military forces; intelligence forces, such as the Inter-Service Intelligence agency; andparamilitary forces, such as the Frontier Corps and the Pakistan Rangers, have been implicatedin a significant number of cases of extra-judicial executions involving torture and enforced
disappearances.’ (339)
Justice
The formal court system, as established by the Constitution, consists of the Supreme Court, aHigh Court for the four provinces and Islamabad and a Federal Shariat Court (340). However,
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the High Courts does not extend to areas such as
AJK or GB that operate under separate judicial systems (341).
USDoS states in March 2017:‘The law provides for an independent judiciary, but the judiciary often was subjected toexternal influences, such as fear of reprisal from extremist elements in terrorism or
blasphemy cases and public politicization of high-profile cases. The media and the
public generally considered the high courts and the Supreme Court credible.
[...](334) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 22.
(335) AI, Amnesty International Report 2016/17 - Pakistan, 22 February 2017.
(336) USDoS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2016 - Pakistan, 3 March 2017.
(337) USDoS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2016 - Pakistan, 3 March 2017, pp. 2, 4, 10, 13, 20.
(338) United Nations Committee against Torture, Concluding observations on the initial report of Pakistan, 12 May
2017, pp. 1-2.
(339) UN CAT, Concluding observations on the initial report of Pakistan, 12 May 2017, p. 3.
(340) Hussain F., The Judicial system of Pakistan, May 2015.
(341) USDoS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2016 - Pakistan, 3 March 2017, p. 15.

EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 47

Many lower courts remained corrupt, inefficient, and subject to pressure from wealthy
persons and influential religious and/or political figures.
[...]
Informal justice systems lacking institutionalized legal protections continued, especiallyin rural areas, and often resulted in human rights abuses’ (342).
On 6 January 2015, President Nawaz Sharif signed the 21st Constitutional Amendment Bill of2015 and the Pakistan Army Amendment Act 1952. Those amendments gave military courts
the jurisdiction until February 2017 to convict civilians for terrorism-related offences (343). In
August 2015, the Supreme Court upheld the parliamentary amendments (344). The military
courts disbanded on 7 January 2017 after the legal provision expired. In March 2017,
Parliament, the Senate and the President passed legislation to reinstate the military
courts (345). Many criticised the establishment of the military courts and warned that thosecourts could be used as a mechanism against political dissidents or groups that had disturbed
the military in the past (346).

1.5.2. Anti-Terrorism Acts
On 24 February 2014, the Government announced an internal policy for a five-year period,
the so-called Security Policy. It mainly focused on securing urban centres and kept largely
silent on the situation in the FATA and Balochistan. It referred to dialogue with all stakeholders
for madrassa reforms, militants’ rehabilitation and deradicalisation (347). According to HRW,
few steps were taken by the Government to regulate the madrassas (348). A prime target of
the Security Policy was isolating terrorists. The National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA)
was supposed to streamline the fight against terrorism and carry out tasks ranging fromcounterterrorism to political and operational interventions. In February 2014 the Government
was still engaged in peace talks with the Taliban, and the Security Policy proved insufficient
once the military operation in North Waziristan started, and the country fell victim toretaliatory attacks by the militants (349). The December 2014 terrorist attack on the Peshawar
Army Public School served as a catalyst for the political consensus when Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif convened an all parties’ conference the day after the attack (350).

(342) USDoS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2016 - Pakistan, 3 March 2017, pp. 15-16.
(343) ICG, Revisiting Counter-terrorism Strategies in Pakistan: Opportunities and Pitfalls n°271, 22 July 2015, pp. 13.
(344) DW, Pakistan’s military courts - a solution or a problem?, 7 August 2015.
(345) BBC, Pakistan to reinstate secret military courts despite criticism, 22 March 2017; Dawn, Military courts given
legal cover by Senate, 28 March 2017; Military courts resume in Pakistan, 31 March 2017.
(346) DW, Pakistan’s military courts - a solution or a problem?, 7 August 2015; AI, Pakistan: Don't Reinstate Secret
Military Courts, 20 March 2017; ICJ, Pakistan: ICJ denounces the revival of military trials of civilians, 28 March 2017;
PILDAT, Policy Brief Revival of Military Courts in Pakistan, March 2017.
(347) PIPS, 2014, Pakistan Security Report, 2015, p. 42.
(348) HRW, World Report 2016 - Pakistan, 27 January 2016.
(349) PIPS, 2014, Pakistan Security Report, 2015, p. 42.
(350) Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), Fight against terrorism: Defining moment, 25
December 2014.

48 —EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATIONThis led, in the same month, in consultation with all political parties, to the establishment of
a National Action Plan (NAP) to eliminate terrorism from Pakistan. Key features were:














Establishment of speedy military trial courts for two years;
Commitment to ensure that no armed militias were allowed to function in the country;
Countering hate speech and extremist material;
Choking financing for terrorists;
Establishing and deploying a dedicated counterterrorism force;Strengthening and restructuring of NACTA;
Registration and regulation of madrassas;
Administrative and development reforms in the FATA with immediate focus on return of
IDPs;
Zero tolerance for militancy in Punjab;
Taking the ongoing operation in Karachi to its logical conclusion;
Empowering Balochistan government for political reconciliation with complete
ownership by all stakeholders;
Formulation of a comprehensive policy to deal with the issue of Afghan refugees,
beginning with registration of all unregistered Afghans staying unlawfully in Pakistan;
Revamping and reforming the criminal justice system to strengthen counterterrorism
departments including authorising the provincial Criminal Investigation Departments tointercept terrorist communications (351).

Later in December 2014 Nawaz Sharif announced the formation of a federal counterterrorism
force with immediate effect. An operation was to be launched against terrorism in the major
cities. The Prime Minister also confirmed that Operation Zarb-e-Azb in the tribal areas would
continue (352).
Following the Peshawar school attack in December 2014, the political and security
establishment set up temporary military courts to try terrorism-related offences instead of
pursuing the cases via an independent judiciary [see information above included under
Justice] (353). The Government also introduced a series of amendments in counterterrorism
laws and introduced the Protection of Pakistan Ordinance (PPO) (354).
Figures of the results of NAP for the past two years are difficult to ascertain. According by dataof the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) cited in a newspaper article in
January 2017, 1 808 terrorists have been killed and 5 611 arrested. Around 1 893 cases werefiled against clerics and so far 271 have been convicted (355).
After two years of NAP, Muhammad Amir Rana from PIPS finds that ‘[w]hatever Pakistan has
accomplished in its war against terrorism is largely due to extensive operations launchedagainst militants by security and law enforcement agencies across the country … However, a(351) Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), Fight against terrorism: Defining moment, 25
December 2014; Washington Post (The), Pakistan announces a national plan to fight terrorism, says terrorists’ days
are numbered, 24 December 2014.
(352) Dawn, Nawaz constitutes special committee to implement national Action Plan, 26 December 2014.
(353) Dawn, Military Courts part of National Action Plan: PM Nawaz, 30 December 2014; Economist (The),The manwith the plan: Pakistan after the school massacre, 24 January 2015.
(354) Dawn, Protection of Pakistan Bill 2014 approved in NA, 2 July 2014.
(355) Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), What has NAP achieved so far?, 30 January 2016

EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 49

slow implementation of National Action Plan (NAP) measures failed to complement thesegains’ (356). Sources stated that NAP is not a ‘plan’ but rather a political tool. The main issues
according to the sources are that there is a lack of a central mechanism and the plan does not
mention how and in which timeframe its main goals have to be achieved (357).

1.5.3. Detention and death penalty
Detention
USDoS reports that harsh and sometimes life-threatening conditions and abuse in someprisons and detention centres occur. Furthermore, inadequate food and water, and poor
sanitation facilities were common. Overcrowding in the prisons is a serious problem due tolack of facilities (358). In December 2016, the newspaper Dawn made similar observations.
According to Dawn, prisons are overcrowded and a number of prisoners under trial arehoused in prisons, which points to the ‘ineffectiveness of the justice system’. According to an
editorial piece in Pakistan’s leading newspaper Dawn, radicalisation within the prisons inPakistan is also a concern (359).
Arbitrary arrest and detention were a problem in 2016, according to USDoS. ‘The law prohibits
arbitrary arrest and detention, but authorities did not always comply’ (360).
Human Rights Commission Pakistan (HRCP) reported that Pakistan counts a prison populationof 84 315 as per its May 2016 publication, and further noted that ‘[a]s in yesteryears [sic],
overcrowding in prisons, lengthy court trials, corruption and impunity for security officials
who transgressed their duties as law enforcers marred the justice system in 2016 as well […]torture remained the foremost instrument of evidence collection in the criminal justicesystem of Pakistan’ (361).
Death penalty
In December 2014, in the aftermath of the attack on a school in Peshawar, the Pakistan
authorities partially lifted a moratorium on the death penalty that had been in place since2008. On 10 March 2015, the Pakistani Government declared that executions would resume
for all capital crimes (362).
According to figures of the HRCP, 471 people were executed since 2014, as at
25 May 2017 (363). In 2016, Pakistan executed 87 people and as at 14 June 2017, Pakistan had(356) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 9 (foreword).
(357) Diplomat (The), Is Pakistan's National Action Plan Actually Working?,24 December 2016; PIPS, 2016, Pakistan
Security Report, 2017, pp. 85-100.
(358) USDoS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2016 - Pakistan, 3 March 2017, p. 7.
(359) Dawn, Prison conditions, 24 September 2016.
(360) USDoS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2016 - Pakistan, 3 March 2017, p. 10.
(361) HRCP, State of Human Rights in 2016, May 2016, pp. 57-58, 60, 63.
(362) Diplomat (The), Pakistan and the Death Penalty, 21 April 2016; Economist (The), The man with the plan:
Pakistan after the school massacre, 24 January 2015.
(363) HRCP, Death penalty Pakistan, n.d.

50 —EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION

executed 44 people since January 2017 (364). According to AI, executions in 2016 in Pakistan
fell significantly compared to 2015 (365). AI mentions that in 2015, 326 executions werereported. In 2016, 87 executions were carried out (366).

(364) HRCP, Death penalty Pakistan, n.d.
(365) AI, Death sentences and executions report 2016, 11 April 2017, p. 18.
(366) AI, Death sentences and executions report 2016, 11 April 2017, p. 24.

EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 51

2. Security situation per region
2.1. Geographical overview of the violence 2016 – May 2017
2.1.1. Trends in regional violence
The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) (367) reported that the violencein Pakistan in 2016 was concentrated in different geographical areas. ACLED describes theviolence in Pakistan by type of event: battles, remote violence, violence against civilians andriots/protests (368).
In Figure 5, an overview of the violence in Pakistan by actor is shown on a map by ACLED (369):

Figure 5: Regional violence in Pakistan Event Type and Location, 2016

© ACLED (370)

According to ACLED data, in the provinces of Punjab and Sindh, fewer armed, organised
instances of violence occurred in general, but a higher number of riots and protests took place.
The big cities, especially Karachi, Lahore, Islamabad and Rawalpindi, are periodically targeted(367) The figures of ACLED were not used in other sections because of the fact that this source used a different
methodology to describe ‘violence’.
(368) ACLED, Regional Violence in Pakistan, 7 February 2017.
(369) ACLED, Regional Violence in Pakistan, 7 February 2017.
(370) ACLED, Regional Violence in Pakistan, 7 February 2017.

52 —EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION

by groups such as the TTP, al-Qaeda, or their affiliates in what ACLED describes as ‘masscasualty attacks’ (see Figure 5) (371). Balochistan sees a relatively large number of battles,
incidents of remote violence (bombings) and violence against civilians, but also riots andprotests over various issues. The FATA experiences the highest rate of battles, bombings andviolence against civilians, with drone strikes predominantly clustered in North and South
Waziristan. KP sees considerable violence in Peshawar. This city is the site of many attacks onpolice and military personnel, as well as bombings of markets and shops. Overall, ACLED
documented that‘[t]ogether Operation Zarb-e-Azb and the National Action Plan are the main drivers of
the significant decrease in both fatalities and events in FATA over the course of 2015
and 2016.
[…]
This trend of decreasing violence was also mirrored to some extent in Pakistan’s mostpopulous regions, Punjab and Sindh, although periodic mass-casualty attacks in bothprovinces over 2015 and 2016, are reminders that soft targets remain vulnerable
despite the success of offensives in the Tribal Areas. This to some extent has also beenrecorded in Balochistan … although other dynamics are also at play in that region whichsuggests more is going on under the surface’ (372).

2.1.2. Regional comparison of violence related fatalities
In this section, figures of fatalities and attacks at regional level are given, according to the four
sources as described in Section 1.4.1 Figures on civilian fatalities. It is impossible to present
the figures in one comparative table, as the four main sources about the security situation use
different parameters and definitions.
PIPS only gives regional details for terrorist attacks, which make up about 58 % of all violent
incidents (373). PIPS focuses on the number of terrorist attacks (and consequent fatalities perprovince, and indicates percentage changes in 2016 compared to 2015 (see Figure 6).
Compared to 2015, PIPS observed a decrease in terrorist incidents (28 % overall). The numberof deaths also decreased but the number of injured increased. Balochistan and Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa were most affected by terrorist attacks in 2016. FATA occupied the third
position (see Figure 6) (374).

(371) ACLED, Regional Violence in Pakistan, 7 February 2017.
(372) ACLED, Regional Violence in Pakistan, 7 February 2017.
(373) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 15.
(374) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 15.

EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 53

Region% change

No ofkilled% change

No ofinjured% change

Balochistan

No ofterrorist
incidents
151

29 % ↘

412

63% ↗

702

116% ↗

FATA

99

32% ↘

163

38%

↘

221

40%

Islamabad3

No Change

1

75% ↘

4

20% ↘

Karachi

47

44% ↘

60

60% ↘

75

6% ↘

KP

127

2% ↗

189

5% ↗

355

63% ↗

Punjab

7

69% ↘

80

4% ↘

241

1% ↗

Sindh (excl.
Karachi)
Total

54

59% ↘

63

97% ↘

104

78% ↘

441

28% ↘

908

12% ↘

1627

18% ↗

↘

Figure 6: Terrorist attacks by region - 2016 vs. 2015 (PIPS) (375)

SATP gives data for fatalities per province in 2016, subdivided into civilians, security forces
and terrorists/militants. The total number of fatalities in 2016, according to SATP, was 1 803.
Balochistan was the region most affected, with 633 fatalities respectively. The FATA and
Punjab occupied the second and third position with 430 and 271 fatalities (376).
CRSS recorded most of the fatalities in Balochistan, followed by Sind and the FATA. Overall,
the decrease in fatalities can be largely attributed to a sharp decrease in violence-related
fatalities in the FATA and Sindh. A very slight increase in terms of fatalities, in comparison with2015, occurred in the province of Punjab (377).
Generally, the overall trend is similar between the research conducted by SATP and CRSS, withhighest fatalities in Balochistan, followed by Sindh and the FATA. The overall number offatalities for 2016, observed by SATP, is a little less than CRSS. This is mainly due to differing
fatalities from Sindh: SATP mentions 271 fatalities (378) in 2016 whereas the figure is 520
according to CRSS (379). These discrepancies may also be due to different definitions andparameters used by the two institutes.
Figure 7 presents a comparative regional analysis by CRSS of violence–related fatalities inPakistan in 2016 (380).

(375) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 15.
(376) SATP, Fatalities in Pakistan Region Wise: 2016, 31 December 2016.
(377) CRSS, Annual Security Report January-December 2016, 22 March 2017, p. 6.
(378) SATP, Fatalities in Pakistan Region Wise: 2016, 31 December 2016.
(379) CRSS, Annual Security Report January-December 2016, 22 March 2017, p. 7.
(380) CRSS, Annual Security Report January-December 2016, 22 March 2017, p. 7.

54 —EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION

Figure 7: Comparative Regional Analysis 2016

© CRSS (381)

PICSS only gives regional details for militant attacks. In 2016, 1 624 militant attacks wereobserved. 1 858 people were killed and 1 962 others injured. According to PICSS, mostfatalities of militant attacks were reported in the provinces of Balochistan, Sindh and KP (382).

2.2. Security trends per geographic subdivision
In the following sections, security trends are explained in greater detail, per geographic
subdivision. In each provincial section a general description of the province contains
information on the geography and population, on the background of the conflict, including
the actors of the conflict in the province. The subsections describe recent trends in the
security situation, including the nature of the violence, frequency, targets, locations, andvictims within a timeframe from 1 April 2016 until 31 May 2017. Finally, a separate part isdedicated to displacements. Under the subsections several incidents are described. Theseshould be read as illustrations of trends in the security situation and not as an exhaustive listof incidents.

(381) CRSS, Annual Security Report January-December 2016, 22 March 2017, p. 7.
(382) PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report, 2016, February 2017, p. 12.

EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 55

2.2.1. Punjab
General description of the province
Punjab province (see Map 1) is situated in the east of Pakistan. It borders the Indian state of
Jammu and Kashmir in the north-east, the Indian States of Punjab and Rajasthan in the east,
the province of Sindh in the south, Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces in thewest, Islamabad federal capital area and Azad Kashmir in the north (383). The provincial capitalof Punjab is Lahore. Lahore is the second biggest city of Pakistan, after Karachi (Sindh
province). Lahore is the economic and cultural heart of the province (384). The population in
the province is estimated at 91 million (385). The people of Punjab are descendants of the
Iranians, Turks, Afghans and Arabs (386). Punjab is one of the most industrialised
provinces (387). A report by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), published in
March 2016 states that the pressure on the economic development and unemployment are
seen as major causes of social tension in the poorest southern districts. There is also a growing
disconnect and socio-economic inequality between north and south Punjab (388).
Background of the violence and actors in the Punjab
According to a report by the ICG in May 2016, militant networks and extremists are present
in the south of the province. In this region militants can train, recruit, plan and conductattacks. ICG states that: ‘Their ability to operate freely is largely the result of the state’s policy
choices, particularly long reliance on jihadist proxies to promote perceived national security
interests’ (389). Many madrassas are located in South Punjab. According to the newspaper The
Diplomat, due to the hesitance of the Punjab government to close down the madrassas in thesouth, the central and northern areas of Punjab have also become radicalised (390). After theattack on 27 March 2016 in Lahore, the Government launched a coordinated security
operation in the province in April 2016. The Pakistan Army, the Rangers, the Police, andpersonnel of the Counterterrorism Department (CTD) of Punjab were deployed (391).
According to PICSS, during the year 2016 as many as 179 security operations were carried out
against militants (392).
The TTP, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar and an IS affiliated group (393) are the main actors carrying out
terrorist attacks in Punjab in 2016, with motives ranging from sectarian targeted killings totargeting security institutions, according to PIPS (394). SATP also mentioned the presence ofradical Deobandi-groups such as LeJ and JeM in the province (395). In June 2016, The News(383) Encyclopædia Britannica, Punjab, n.d.
(384) Global Security, Lahore Cantonment, n.d.
(385) World Population, Punjab Population 2017, 20 November 2017.
(386) Government of the Punjab, People, n.d(387) UNICEF, Context Analysis Summary: Pakistan, UNICEF, 21 March 2016.
(388) UNICEF, Context Analysis Summary: Pakistan, UNICEF, 21 March 2016.
(389) ICG, Pakistan’s Jihadist Heartland: Southern Punjab, 30 May 2016.
(390) Diplomat (The), Militancy in Punjab, 12 April 2016.
(391) Diplomat (The), The Pakistan Army’s Curious Punjab Operation, 2 May 2016.
(392) PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report, 2016, February 2017, p. 58.
(393) This group was unnamed by PIPS.
(394) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 42.
(395) SATP, Punjab Assesment-2017, n.d.

56 —EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION

reported that security forces claimed to have eliminated the entire leadership of LeJ in theprovince (396).
As part of Operation Radd-Ul-Fasaad, security operations were launched in the bigger cities
and the urban areas of the province (397).
Description of the violence
In 2016, PIPS counted seven terrorist attacks compared to 24 terrorist attacks in 2015, a
decrease of 69 % (398). CRSS mentioned that in 2016 in the province the number of security
operations were slightly higher than in 2015. Other types of violence mentioned by CRSS were
militant attacks, terrorist attacks, targeted killings and robberies, reportedly staying at thesame level as the previous years (399). PICSS stated that there was a decline of 44 % in thenumber of militant attacks in 2016 compared to 2015 (400).
In the beginning of 2017, the provincial capital Lahore was again the scene of some major
security incidents: On 13 February 2017, a suicide bombing targeted a pharmacists’ protest at
the provincial assembly in Lahore, killing at least 13 persons and injuring 83 (401). On
5 April 2017, six people were killed and 18 injuring when a suicide bombing targeted a census
team in Lahore (402).
Impact of the violence
CRSS counted 425 fatalities in Punjab in 2016, an increase of 30% compared to 2015 (403). CRSS
reports that the highest number of fatalities in Punjab was because of security operations (404).
According to different sources, most casualties were militants and civilians, followed by
security forces and others (405). SATP recorded in 2016, 244 fatalities (84 civilians, 21 security
force personnel and 139 terrorists) (406).
CRSS states that in 2016, violent incidents were recorded in 34 out of 38 districts of theprovince of Punjab. Lahore was the city most affected by the violence, followed by Rajanpur
and Sheikhupura in 2016 (see Figure 8) (407). The number of fatalities in Rajanpur is due tosecurity operations in this area (408).

(396) News (The), LeJ’s entire leadership eliminated in Punjab, 20 June 2016.
(397) Nation (The), Security forces dig deeper into Punjab, 5 April 2017.
(398) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 42.
(399) CRSS, Annual Security Report January-December 2016, 22 March 2017, p. 49.
(400) PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report, 2016, February 2017, p. 58.
(401) Guardian (The), Lahore blast: several killed as 'suicide bomb' hits Pakistan rally, 13 February 2017.
(402) Al Jazeera, Deadly bomb blast targets census team in Lahore, 5 April 2017.
(403) CRSS, Annual Security Report January-December 2016, 22 March 2017, p. 47.
(404) CRSS, Annual Security Report January-December 2016, 22 March 2017, p. 49.
(405) CRSS, Annual Security Report January-December 2016, 22 March 2017, p. 50; PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security
Report, 2017, p. 43; PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report, 2016, February 2017, p. 58.
(406) SATP, Fatalities in Pakistan Region Wise: 2016, 31 December 2016.
(407) CRSS, Annual Security Report January-December 2016, 22 March 2017, p. 48.
(408) CRSS, Annual Security Report January-December 2016, 22 March 2017, p. 48.

EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 57

Figure 8: Violence-related Fatalities in Punjab by district 2016

© CRSS (409)Michael Kugelman states that militants target Lahore because of the fact that the militant’s
hideouts are based close to Lahore. He mentions that ‘everyone wants to target Lahore
because it is a bastion of the Government and the birthplace of high ranked military officials.
It is strategically located, and the attacks in Lahore spook the Government’ (410).
According to data in the first quarter analysis report of 2017 conducted by CRSS, 224 casualties(113 dead, 111 injured) were counted, a decline of almost 30 % compared to the first quarterof 2016. Most fatalities in the first quarter occurred in February 2017 (411). The number ofcivilian victims was reduced while fatalities among security officials and criminals and militants
increased in the first quarter of 2017, according to CRSS (412).
In the first five months of 2017, SATP counted 102 deaths. Among those deaths, SATP
observed 12 civilians, 16 security forces personnel and 74 militants (413).
Displacement
UN OCHA did not report any conflict-induced displacement from areas in Punjab in 2016 (414).
Punjab is only identified as a hosting area (415). The province hosts some IDPs from the FATA
and also Afghan refugees (416). In February 2017, HRCP expressed its concerns about ‘racial(409) CRSS, Annual Security Report January-December 2016, 22 March 2017, p. 49.
(410) Kugelman, M., Interview Islamabad, 5 April 2017.
(411) CRSS, CRSS Security Report – Q1, 2017, 10 May 2017, p. 24.
(412) CRSS, CRSS Security Report – Q1, 2017, 10 May 2017, p. 26.
(413) SATP, Fatalities in Pakistan Region Wise: 2017, 28 May 2017.
(414) Websites consulted: http://www.unocha.org/pakistan;
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/pakistan; http://reliefweb.int/country/pak.
(415) UN OCHA, Pakistan: KP and FATA - Areas of Displacement, Hosting and Returns as of 28 February 2017, 7
March 2017.
(416) Dawn, ANP asks PM to probe racial profiling of Pakhtuns in Punjab, 14 March 2017.

58 —EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION

profiling’ of Pashtuns from the FATA and Afghanistan in the province after some terrorist
attacks occurred in the province in the beginning of 2017 (417).

2.2.2. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
General description of the province
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (see Map 1) is situated in the north of Pakistan and borders Afghanistan
in the west and FATA in the north, acting as a buffer zone between Afghanistan and KP, Azad
Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan in the east and north-east, Punjab province in the southeast, andBalochistan province in the southwest. The provincial capital is Peshawar and is the largest
city in the province. The population is estimated at 26.7 million, according to 2015 estimates.
The majority of the population speaks Pashtu, followed by the local language Hindko and then
the national language Urdu. The province is well known for its natural resources such as oil,marble, gem stones and wood (418).
Background of the conflict and actors in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
In 2009, the Pakistani Army engaged in a series of military operations against the TTP in Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa. This offensive was marked by human rights violations and arbitrary arrests (419).
These hostilities caused a large wave of displacements (420). The local Taliban in the province
went underground and continued its activity in large parts through terrorist attacks andtargeted killings (421). According to Radio Pakistan in December 2016, operation Zarb-e-Azb(see 1.3.1 Security operations and armed clashes) contributed to more security in theprovince (422). The Army retains tight control as the threat from militants remains, according
to a report by IRIN (423).
PIPS stated that the TTP carried out most of the terrorist attacks in the province of Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa, followed by the local Taliban and JuA. The TTP attempts to re-establish its
network in the area of Swat (424). PIPS mentions a slight increase in attacks carried out by the
local Taliban in the province. According to PIPS this indicates ‘a growing level of radicalism andrecruitment, as such groups manage these attacks on their own’ (425). There are reports thatmembers of IS are hiding among the general population in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Members of(417) Dawn, HRCP condemns 'racial profiling' of Pashtuns by Punjab govt officials, 27 February 2017.
(418) Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Quick view of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, n.d; Times of Islamabad (The), KP
Government launches first population policy, 30 December 2016; Express Tribune (The), Keeping it alive:
Conference calls for promotion of Hindko, 21 December 2014.
(419) Dawn, Swat: an unquiet calm, 21 September 2014.
(420) ICG, Pakistan: Countering Militancy In FATA, Asia Report N°178, 21 October 2009, p. 8.
(421) ICG, Pakistan: Countering Militancy in PATA, Asia Report N° 242, 15 January 2013; Norway, LandInfo, Pakistan:
Sikkerhetsrelaterte forhold i Khyber Pakhtunkwa (KPK) og Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), 8 November
2013.
(422) Radio Pakistan, Peace restored in KP as result of Operation Zarb-e-Azb: Khattak, 24 December 2016.
(423) IRIN, Fancy a holiday in a former Taliban stronghold?, 1 June 2016.
(424) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, pp. 68-69.
(425) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 68.

EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 59

IS operate in Peshawar and are present in the settled areas of the province. They try to recruit
people from various TTP factions (426).

Description of the violence
PIPS documented a total of 154 incidents of violence in the province, including 127 terrorist
attacks in 2016, an increase of 2 % compared to 2015 (427). In addition three incidents of ethnic
and political violence, five operational strikes, 15 armed clashes between law enforcement
and militants, one cross-border attack and one clash between militants and tribesmen wereobserved by PIPS (428). PICSS documented a decrease of 10 % in the number of overall attacks
compared to 2015 (429).
PIPS observed that militants in 2016 used suicide bombings, fire arms, IEDs, hand grenades
and rockets (430).
In 2016, sources stated that militants attacked educational institutions, government officials
and institutions and policemen (431). For example, in January 2016, Bacha Khan University inCharsadda was attacked when militants stormed into the university. At least 20 people were
killed (432). On 7 March 2016, a court in Charsadda was attacked (433). On 16 March 2016, a
blast on a bus carrying government officials in Peshawar killed 15 people (434). On
19 April 2016, a blast occurred at a tax office in Mardan (435). On 2 September 2016, a suicide
blast was carried out on a court in Mardan (436). At the end of October 2016, a police officer
and a polio worker were killed in Peshawar and Jamrud (437). In November 2016, personnel ofthe Frontier Corps were killed in Peshawar in an IED attack (438).
The same trend persevered at the beginning of 2017. In February 2017, a convoy of the
Frontier Corps was targeted in Charsadda (439). On 15 February 2017, a suicide attack targetedjudges in Peshawar (440). At the end of February 2017, a court was attacked in Charsadda. Fivecivilians were killed and 15 injured (441). On 8 May 2017 an explosion damaged a school gate(426) Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), Islamic State members hide among public in K-P,
2 March 2017; Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), How strong is Islamic State in Pakistan?,
9 March 2017.
(427) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 27.
(428) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 28.
(429) PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report, 2016, February 2017, p. 52.
(430) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 27.
(431) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 27; PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report, 2016, February
2017, p. 53; CRSS, Annual Security Report January-December 2016, 22 March 2017, p. 43.
(432) Reuters, Militants storm Pakistan university, kill at least 20, 20 January 2016(433) Reuters, Pakistani militants say blast at court that kills 10 was revenge, 7 March 2016(434) Dawn, 15 killed as bomb rips through bus carrying govt employees in Peshawar, 16 March 2016.
(435) News (The), Suicide bomber hits Mardan Excise and Taxation office, 20 April 2016.
(436) BBC, Pakistan blast at court leaves several dead in Mardan, 2 September 2016.
(437) Dawn, Police officer killed as polio team targeted in Peshawar IED blast, 25 October 2016; Express Tribune(The)/ International New York Times (The), Polio vaccinator gunned down in Khyber Agency, 26 October 2016.
(438) Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), Three FC men killed in TTP-JA blast at funeral in
Peshawar, 22 November 2016.
(439) Dawn, Three FC men, six civilians injured in blast, 1 February 2017.
(440) Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), One killed in suicide attack on Peshawar judges,
15 February 2017.
(441) Dawn, 3 bombers killed during attack on Charsadda court: officials, 21 February 2017.

60 —EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION

in Urmar, and subsequently two policemen got injured by a roadside bomb believed to beconnected to the first explosion (442). On 21 May 2017, six policemen were killed in two
separate attacks near Peshawar (443).

Impact of the violence
According to PIPS, the number of deaths from violent incidents show a slight upwards trend
in 2016 compared to 2015 (444). According to PIPS and PICSS, the number of injured increased
significatly in 2016 (445). On the other hand, CRSS documented a 20 % decline in fatalities fromviolence, down from 441 in 2015 to 357 in 2016 (446).
CRSS reports a decrease in the number of fatalities among civilians, militants and security
forces in 2016 compared to 2015 (447). SATP recorded 213 fatalities in 2016, including 123
civilians, 50 security forces personnel and 40 militants, a slight decrease compared to2015 (448). According to PICSS, 174 people were killed, including 80 civilians, and at least 386
were injured, of which 291 were civilians (449). OSAC mentions that ‘targeted attacks against
government officials, property, military, law enforcement, judicial, and other soft targets(educational facilities) are common’ and that:‘[t]he critical terrorist threat […] touches all aspects of life in northwest Pakistan anddominates the overall security environment. Street robbery, burglary, extortion,
revenge/honor killings, political violence, terrorist attacks, kidnapping, sectariankillings, targeted killing of security personnel, military actions, and civil disturbances arecommon events in Peshawar and northwest Pakistan’ (450).
In 2016, Peshawar was the most affected part of the province, just as in 2015. PIPS recorded
48 terrorist attacks in Peshawar. Swat was the second most targeted area of the province interms of terrorist attacks, followed by Bannu and Charsadda, according to PIPS (451). CRSS
reports that the fatalities from violence in Peshawar slightly declined in 2016 compared to2015. Charsadda was the second district in terms of fatalities, followed by Mardan and D.I.
Khan (see Figure 9) (452).

(442) Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), Two security personnel injured as roadside bomb
targets CTD vehicle in Peshawar, 8 May 2017.
(443) RFE/RL, Six Pakistani Police Killed In Attacks Claimed By Extremist Groups, 22 May 2017.
(444) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 27.
(445) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 27; PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report, 2016, February
2017, p. 52.
(446) CRSS, Annual Security Report January-December 2016, 22 March 2017, pp. 41-42.
(447) CRSS, Annual Security Report January-December 2016, 22 March 2017, p. 44.
(448) SATP, Fatalities in Pakistan Region Wise: 2016, 31 December 2016; SATP, Fatalities in Pakistan Region Wise:
2015, n.d.
(449) PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report, 2016, February 2017, p. 52.
(450) OSAC, Pakistan 2017 Crime & Safety Report: Peshawar, 21 February 2017.
(451) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, pp. 27-28.
(452) CRSS, Annual Security Report January-December 2016, 22 March 2017, p. 41.

EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 61

Figure 9: Violence-related fatalities in KP by district in 2016

© CRSS (453)

According to data in the first quarter analysis report of 2017 conducted by CRSS, 148 fatalities(81 deaths, 67 injured) were counted, a decline of almost 40 % compared to the first quarterof 2016. Most fatalities in the first quarter occurred in March 2017. Almost half of the fatalities
were civilians (454).
In the first five months of 2017, 68 fatalities (mostly militants) were counted by SATP (455). An
almost 50 % decrease in the number of fatalities is observed, compared to the first fivemonths of 2016 (115 fatalities).
Displacement
In February 2017, UN OCHA did not report any conflict-induced displacement from areas in
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which is only identified as a hosting area (456). The government of
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa faced a lot of criticism in the past for the lack of facilities for the hostingof IDPs (457). For instance, Dawn reported, in March 2017, that in the Jalozai camp in Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa a lack of health centres, education, ration, tents and other facilities wasobserved (458).

(453) CRSS, Annual Security Report January-December 2016, 22 March 2017, p. 42.
(454) CRSS, CRSS Security Report – Q1, 2017, 10 May 2017, pp. 19-22.
(455) SATP, Fatalities in Pakistan Region Wise: 2017, 28 May 2017.
(456) UN OCHA, Pakistan: KP and FATA - Areas of Displacement, Hosting and Returns as of 28 February 2017, 7
March 2017.
(457) Nation (The), Most of our fellow IDPs from South Waziristan continue to face countless problems and are
reluctant to go back, 24 March 2017.
(458) Dawn, Displaced families of Fata face an uncertain fate in Jalozai camp, 4 March 2017.

62 —EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION

2.2.3. Balochistan
General description of the province
Balochistan (see Map 1) is located in the west of Pakistan. It borders Iran in the west,
Afghanistan in the north-west, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province in the north-east, Punjab
province in the east, Sindh province in the south-east, and the Arabian Sea in the south (459).
Balochistan is the largest province of Pakistan but the smallest in terms of population. The
majority of the people are Baloch, but the second largest group is Pashtun (40 %). The
provincial capital Quetta is also the home of a large part of the Hazara community in
Pakistan (460). The province is of strategic importance to the Pakistan Government due to the
CPEC project. The CPEC project includes a 3 000 km network of roads, railway and pipelines
running from Balochistan’s Gwadar Port to the Xinjiang region in China (461).
Background of the conflict and actors in Balochistan
According to an USIP report dated June 2016, Balochistan struggles with multiple problems
such as major ‘conflicts between the state and nationalists (the military and armed militantgroups); inter- and intra-tribal feuds and clashes; and ethnic and sectarian conflicts’. These
conflicts are further complicated by the involvement of several foreign states, such as China,
with an economic or political stake in the province (462).
The nationalist conflict in the province started in 2006 with the death of nationalist
frontrunner and tribal head Nawab Akbar Bugti. Since then, nationalist groups, such as the
Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and the Baloch Liberation Front (BLF), have staged attacks on
government targets and on Punjabi settlers (463). In 2016, different Baloch groups carried out
124 terrorist attacks, a decrease of 36 % compared to 2015 (464). The fighting in Balochistan isusually referred to as ‘a low-level insurgency’ (465). The authorities have reacted strongly.
During recent years, the Frontier Corps have abducted, tortured and killed hundreds of
Balochi sympathisers. Human rights violations are frequently cited (466). In April 2017, Dawn
reported that 434 nationalists from different groups such as BLA, BRA and others surrendered
to the authorities as part of a political reconciliation (467).
Apart from the nationalist uprising, Balochistan has in recent years also been plagued bysectarian violence. Members of the local Shia community, mostly Hazara, have fallen victim
of violent attacks (468), resulting in some relocating abroad or to Pakistan’s other cities (469).
(459) Encyclopædia Britannica, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, n.d.
(460) AAN, The Crowded-Out Conflict: Pakistan’s Balochistan in its fifth round of insurgency, 16 November 2015.
(461) BBC, China's Xi Jinping agrees $46bn superhighway to Pakistan, 20 April 2015.
(462) USIP, Pakistan: Balochistan: Caught in the Fragility Trap, 27 June 2016, p. 2.
(463) ICG, Policing Urban Violence in Pakistan, Asia Report N°255, 23 January 2014; AAN, The Crowded-Out Conflict:
Pakistan’s Balochistan in its fifth round of insurgency, 16 November 2015.
(464) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, pp. 33, 36.
(465) Dawn, 434 militants surrender in Balochistan, 21 April 2017.
(466) AI, Amnesty International Report 2016/17 - The State of the World’s Human Rights - Pakistan, 22 February
2017; HRW, World Report 2016 - Pakistan, 22 January 2017; BBC, Pakistan’s battle against Balochistan separatists
sparks anger and suspicion, 6 October 2015.
(467) Dawn, 434 militants surrender in Balochistan, 21 April 2017.
(468) Siddiqi, F., Sectarian Violence in Balochistan, 18 June 2015; HRW, We Are The Walking Dead. Killings of Shia
Hazara in Balochistan, Pakistan, 30 June 2014.
(469) Gandhara, Pakistan's Invisible Baluch Displacement Crisis, 24 February 2016.

EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 63

Militant groups present in Balochistan are mainly the TTP, JuA, LeJ and Sipah-eMohammad (470). The PIPS report of 2016 stated that ‘changing dynamics’ are at work in
Balochistan. This means that the security forces face a much larger threat from various Islamic
militants than from Baluchi nationalist insurgents, according to PIPS. The nationalists havecontinued ‘low-intensity’ attacks, but groups such as LeJ and Taliban militants have been
carrying out major attacks in the region (471). Also The Diplomat reported in January 2017 that
religious extremism is on the rise in the province (472).
Another factor contributing to the conflict in Balochistan in recent years is the international
involvement in Pakistan’s efforts to build the Gwadar Port in collaboration with China. To
protect the CPEC project, Pakistan intends to increase its military presence in the region (473).
Pakistan accused India and other countries of interfering and supporting the Balochseparatists (474). AHRC stated that security forces intensified their presence in the province
since the beginning of 2016. According to sources such as AHRC and The Diplomat, theGovernment uses the CPEC-project as an excuse to target Baloch insurgents (475).
Description of the violence
PIPS documented 234 incidents of various types of violence in 2016 in the province: 151
terrorist attacks, 38 operational attacks by security forces, 37 armed clashes and encounters,
six cross-border attacks, one drone strike and one inter-militant clash (476). Compared to 2015(306 incidents), the overall number of incidents of violence dropped. Terrorist attacks
declined by 29 % compared to 2015 (477).
Examples of major security incidents in the province of Balochistan in 2016 include: On 8
August 2016, militants of JuA attacked a hospital in Quetta, killing 56 and injuring 100
lawyers (478). On 24 October 2016, at least 59 cadets and recruits were killed and over hundredinjured after LeJ and IS militants had stormed a police training centre in Quetta (479). On
12 November 2016, there was an explosion at the shrine of Shah Norani in Khuzdar District
and dozens of people were killed or injured (480).
Examples of major security incidents in the first five months of 2017 in the province include:on 2 January 2017 a blast in Quetta's Western Bypass injured four security personnel and two
civilians (481). An IED blast in Quetta on 13 February 2017 killed two security personnel (482).
(470) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, pp. 33, 36.
(471) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 21.
(472) Diplomat (The), The Rise of Religious Extremism in Balochistan, 9 January 2017.
(473) Diplomat (The), Is the US Trying to Sabotage the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor?, 29 September 2016.
(474) CACI, The China-Pakistan economic corridor and Baluchistan’s insurgency, 16 January 2016; AHRC, Militaryintensifies operation in Balochistan, 20 April 2016.
(475) AHRC, Military intensifies operation in Balochistan, 20 April 2016; Diplomat (The), Balochistan: The Troubled
Heart of the CPEC, 23 August 2016.
(476) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 34.
(477) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 33; PIPS, 2015, Pakistan Security Report, 2016, p. 19.
(478) IRIN, Restive Pakistani city in legal limbo since bombing killed, injured 150 lawyers, 24 February 2017.
(479) BBC, Quetta attack: Militants kill dozens at Balochistan Police College, 25 October 2016.
(480) Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), At least 45 dead, over 100 injured in Khuzdar's
Shah Noorani shrine explosion, 12 November 2016.
(481) Dawn, 6 injured in roadside blast near FC vehicle in Quetta, 2 January 2017(482) Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), Two killed in Quetta IED blast, 13 February 2017.

64 —EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATIONOn 23 April 2017, four FC personnel were killed by a roadside bomb in the district of Kech (483).
On 12 May 2017, a bomb attack targeted a convoy of the deputy leader of the Pakistani
Senate, Abdul Ghafoor Haideri. More than 25 persons were killed and at least 30 injured (484).
In May 2017, two Chinese nationals were kidnapped at Quetta (485). In the middle of
May 2017, gunmen of the BLA killed ten labourers in Gwadar (486). An IED injured four FC
personnel on 15 May 2017 in Mastung (487).
Impact of the violence
According to the different sources such as PIPS, CRSS and PICSS there was a decline of security
incidents in the province but fatalities of those incidents were higher in 2016 than in the year
before (488). PIPS reported that 681 people were killed and 744 injured in 2016, compared to
550 deaths and 395 injured in 2015 (489). CRSS counted 805 fatalities in 2016, compared to719 in 2015 (490). PICSS recorded an increase of 26 % in casualties and a 120 % increase of
injured compared to 2015 (491). According to CRSS more than 45 % of the casualties in
Balochistan were civilians and the majority of these were common people, followed bypolitical and religious party activists (492). According to PICSS, out of 449 killed in 2016, 247
were civilians, and out of 734 injured, 451 were civilians (493).
CRSS documented that in 2016 the capital, Quetta, lost the highest number of lives to violence(288 in 2016 versus 106 in 2015), an increase of over 171 %. Other districts that sufferedhigher fatalities from violence were Khuzdar, Kech, Kalat, Nasirabad, Sibi and Awaran (seeFigure 10) (494). The high fatalities in Quetta and Khuzdar can be explained with reference tothe terrorist attacks there in January, February, August and November 2016 (495).

(483) Nation (The), Four FC men killed in roadside blast, 23 April 2017.
(484) Washington Post (The), The Latest: Pakistani PM condemns bombing in Baluchistan, 12 May 2017.
(485) Dawn, Two Chinese nationals kidnapped from Quetta, 24 May 2017.
(486) Al Jazeera, Gunmen kill 10 labourers in Balochistan's Gwadar, 13 May 2017.
(487) Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), Four FC personnel injured in Mastung IED blast,
15 May 2017.
(488) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 15; CRSS, Annual Security Report January-December 2016, 22
March 2017, p. 30; PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report, 2016, February 2017, p. 44.
(489) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 34; PIPS, 2015, Pakistan Security Report, 2016, p. 19.
(490) CRSS, Annual Security Report January-December 2016, 22 March 2017, p. 30.
(491) PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report, 2016, February 2017, p. 44.
(492) CRSS, Annual Security Report January-December 2016, 22 March 2017, p. 32.
(493) PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report, 2016, February 2017, p. 44.
(494) CRSS, Annual Security Report January-December 2016, 22 March 2017, p. 30.
(495) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 34.

EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 65

Figure 10: Violence-related fatalities in Balochistan by district in 2016

© CRSS (496)The first quarter analysis report of 2017 by CRSS documented 110 casualties (67 fatalities, 43
injured), a decline of almost 60 % in fatalities compared to the first quarter of 2016. While thenumber of civilian fatalities dropped for the first quarter 2017 compared to the first quarter
2016, from 50 in 2016 to 29 in 2017, the overall percentage of the total number of fatalities
went up from 28 % to 42 %. Most fatalities in the first quarter occurred in January 2017 (497).
For the first five months of 2017, SATP counted 112 casualties, of which the majority were
civilians (498).
Displacement
In February 2016, RFE/RL stated that an estimated 250 000 people have been displaced byviolence from Balochistan since 2006. A part of this number of Baloch IDPs fled to
Afghanistan (499). Reportedly, in recent years more than one million Baloch have fled theprovince due to terrorism. People from Dera Bugti, Kohlu, Makran, Jalawan, Naseerabad, andBolan have migrated mainly to the border areas of Sindh and Punjab, according to The
Diplomat (500).

(496) CRSS, Annual Security Report January-December 2016, 22 March 2017, p. 31.
(497) CRSS, CRSS Security Report – Q1, 2017, 10 May 2017, pp. 9-12.
(498) SATP, Fatalities in Pakistan Region Wise: 2017, 28 May 2017.
(499) Gandhara/RFE/RL, Pakistan’s Invisible Baluch Displacement Crisis, 24 February 2016.
(500) Diplomat (The), Pakistan’s Census: A Baloch Perspective, 3 February 2017.

66 —EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION

2.2.4. Sindh
General description of the province
The province of Sindh (see Map 1) is situated in the south-east of Pakistan. It borders theprovince of Balochistan in the north and in the west, the province of Punjab in the north-east
and the Arabian Sea in the south. The population is estimated at 36 million (501). Sindh
population is made up of Muhajir and Pashtun, Punjabi, Sindhi and Baloch speaking
people (502). The provincial capital, Karachi, is the largest city in Pakistan and is divided in six
districts, South, East, Central, West, Korangi and Malir and six cantonments (503). Karachi is thepart of Sindh where significant sectarian, ethnic and political violence occurs (504). Karachi
attracts migration from every major ethnic and linguistic group in Pakistan owing to to its
economic potential. Karachi is also inhabited by IDPs from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the FATA,
Afghan refugees and illegal migrants (505).
Background of the conflict and actors in Sindh
Since September 2013, a security operation is ongoing in the province, mainly focusing on thecapital Karachi. The purpose of this operation is to tackle four categories of violent groups
involved in violence in the city: Taliban, sectarian outfits, armed wings of ethno-politicalviolence, and criminal gangs (506). Search operations and raids are carried out by the Rangers.
Dawn reported that in 2016, 1 992 search operations were conducted in which more than
2 847 suspected criminals were apprehended (507). HRCP and AHRC expressed their concerns
about human rights violations such as extrajudicial killings and torture and the growing roleof the Rangers in the political affairs of Karachi (508).
According to the Jamestown Foundation, Karachi is perceived as a ‘safe haven and a source offunding’ by Islamist militants (509). In Sindh province, different militant groups are present suchas multiple factions of the TTP and al-Qaeda (510). According to sources, traces of the IslamicState (IS) can be found in the province (511). In February 2017, IS claimed responsibility for theattack on the shrine of Lal Shahbaz Qalandar in Sehwan (512). One source states that as a resultof the search operations in 2016 and the beginning of 2017, these groups changed their
hideouts from Pashtun-dominated suburban areas to other parts of Karachi, as well as
splitting up into smaller cells, some then joining up with other banned groups (513). According(501) Encyclopædia Britannica, Sindh, n.d.
(502) ICG, Pakistan: Stoking the Fire in Karachi, Asia Report N°284, 15 February 2017, p. 2.
(503) ICG, Pakistan: Stoking the Fire in Karachi, Asia Report N°284, 15 February 2017, p. 2.
(504) Aikins, M., Gangs of Karachi, September 2015.
(505) ICG, Pakistan: Stoking the Fire in Karachi, Asia Report N°284, 15 February 2017, p. 3.
(506) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 111.
(507) Dawn, Rangers apprehended 446 ‘target killers’ in Karachi this year: report, 29 December 2016.
(508) HRCP, HRCP concerns grow over rights situation in Karachi, 1 October 2016; AHRC, Pakistan: Disappearancesand extra judicial killings of Sindhi nationalists continue, 13 December 2016.
(509) Jamestown Foundation (The), ‘Karachi’s Security Crackdown a Boost for Pakistan’s Islamists’, 11 November
2016.
(510) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 111.
(511) News (The), Daish network exists in Sindh, 14 October 2015; Jamestown Foundation (The), ‘Growing Evidenceof Islamic State in Pakistan’, 4 February 2016.
(512) Dawn, CTD report terms Sindh ‘fertile growth area’ for IS, 21 February 2017.
(513) News (The), Militant groups finding new ways to evade crackdown, 27 April 2017.

EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 67

to PIPS, most terrorist attacks (28 out of 54) in the province in 2016 were carried out byfactions of the TTP and other militant groups with similar anti-state objectives as the TTP (514).
Also sectarian violent groups have their roots in Sindh. Groups such as Sipah-e-Sahaba, LeJ,
Jundallah and Sipah-e-Muhammed operate in the province (515). PIPS counted 19 sectarianrelated attacks in Sindh, 18 of those were carried out in Karachi and one in Shikarpur (516). LeJ
was responsible for ten attacks in Karachi (517).
A significant dynamic in the province and especially in Karachi is the power struggle between
the political parties of the main demographic groups, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement(MQM, Mohajir), the Awami National Party (ANP, Pashtun) and the Pakistan People’s Party(PPP, Sindhi) (518). Apart from this political violence, Karachi is the base for more than 200
heavily armed criminal gangs. Sometimes these carry out attacks for the armed wings of thepolitical parties (519). The operations of the Rangers in 2016 weakened MQM’s armed wing
and were also successful in weakening gang networks (520).
Description of the violence
Sources stated that in 2016 the overall law and order situation in the province improved.
Casualties from political violence and gang wars declined. However, sectarian groups are still
active in the region (521).
In 2016, PIPS recorded 54 terrorist attacks across the province, 47 attacks took place in
Karachi. This is a decrease of 47 % compared to 2015 (522). In interior Sindh, seven terrorist
attacks were counted, compared to 17 in the previous year (523). Among those terrorist
attacks, there were both sectarian related and nationalist inspired attacks (524).
In terms of types of attacks, PICSS pointed out a pattern of attacks on security forces personnel(particularly target killings) in Sindh (525). CRSS details different types of security incidents inthe province of Sindh. The number of targeted killings, lynching and militant attacks dropped
significantly (526). Grenade attacks, IEDs, other types of explosive devices, physical attacks andtargeted killings were the methods of violence used in Sindh during the last year (527).
In 2016, the provincial capital Karachi faced the highest number of attacks. Security forceswere the victims of targeted killings or victims of IEDs (528). A high profile target killing occurred(514) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 39.
(515) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, pp. 112-113.
(516) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 39.
(517) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 69.
(518) ICG, Pakistan: Stoking the Fire in Karachi, Asia Report N°284, 15 February 2017, pp. 8-11.
(519) USIP, Conflict dynamics in Karachi, 19 October 2012; Guardian (The), Karachi vice: inside the city torn apart bykillings, extortion and terrorism, 21 October 2015.
(520) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, pp. 113-114.
(521) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 111; Jamestown Foundation (The), ‘Karachi’s Security Crackdown
a Boost for Pakistan’s Islamists’, 11 November 2016.
(522) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 39.
(523) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 41.
(524) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 39.
(525) PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report, 2016, February 2017, p. 55.
(526) CRSS, Annual Security Report January-December 2016, 22 March 2017, p. 55.
(527) PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report, 2016, February 2017, p. 57.
(528) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 40.

68 —EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION

in June 2016 when famous Sufi-singer Amjad Sabri was killed in Karachi by TTP-militants (529).
In September 2016, a suicide bomber targeted an Imambargha in Shikarpur, injuring at leastten people (530). On 29 October 2016, four people were killed when they attended a religious
gathering in Karachi (531). In February 2017, a worker of Samaa TV was killed in a gun attackby militants of the TTP (532). IS claimed responsibility for the attack on the shrine of Lal Shahbaz
Qalandar in Sehwan on 16 February 2017 (533).
Impact of the violence
The fatalities from violence-related incidents dropped significantly in the province in 2016,
according to the sources. PIPS recorded a 75 % decrease of fatalities in 2016 compared to2015 (534). Also CRSS marked a decline of 57 % in fatalities (535). The highest number offatalities reported in Sindh this year were of militants and criminals (275), followed by civilians(206) and security officials (39) (536).
CRSS reported that Karachi was the most affected part of Sindh in terms of fatalities in 2016,
just as the previous year. However, there was over a 50 % reduction in the number of fatalities
in 2016 (474) compared to 2015 (1 040). In the districts of Sukkur, Hyderabad and Shikarpur
respectively, 14, nine and five fatalities were recorded by CRSS (also see Figure 11) (537).
According to OSAC, militants targeted police and security forces in Karachi (538).

(529) Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), Amjad Sabri shot dead in Karachi, 22 June 2016.
(530) Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), Eid day attack injures 10 in Shikarpur Imambargah,
13 September 2016.
(531) Dawn, Four killed in firing at religious gathering in Karachi's Nazimabad, 29 October 2016.
(532) Dawn, Samaa TV DSNG van attacked in Karachi, one dead, 13 February 2017.
(533) Dawn, CTD report terms Sindh ‘fertile growth area’ for IS, 21 February 2017.
(534) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 39.
(535) CRSS, Annual Security Report January-December 2016, 22 March 2017, p. 53; The numbers of fatalities candiffer among the main sources used because of their different methodologies.
(536) CRSS, Annual Security Report January-December 2016, 22 March 2017, pp. 56-57.
(537) CRSS, Annual Security Report January-December 2016, 22 March 2017, pp. 53-54.
(538) OSAC, Pakistan 2017 Crime & Safety Report: Karachi, 1 February 2017.

EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 69

Figure 11: Violence-related fatalities in Sindh by district in 2016

© CRSS (539)

In the first five months of 2017, SATP recorded 171 deaths (540) in the province compared to
146 in the first five months of 2016 (541).
CRSS counted in the first quarter of 2017, 409 casualties from violence (184 dead, 224 injured).
Just as SATP reported, the highest number of fatalities occurred in the month of February (542).
This was due to a suicide attack on 16 February 2017 on a shrine of Lal Shahbaz Qalandar in
Sehwan, which killed at least 70 people and injured more than 150 (543).
Displacement
UN OCHA did not report any conflict-induced displacement from areas in Sindh in 2016 (544).

(539) CRSS, Annual Security Report January-December 2016, 22 March 2017, p. 54.
(540) SATP, Fatalities in Pakistan Region Wise: 2017, 31 May 2017.
(541) SATP, Fatalities in Pakistan Region Wise: 2016, 31 December 2016.
(542) CRSS, CRSS Security Report – Q1, 2017, 10 May 2017, p. 29.
(543) Dawn, At least 70 dead as bomb rips through Lal Shahbaz shrine in Sehwan, Sindh, 17 February 2017.
(544) Websites consulted: http://www.unocha.org/pakistan;
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/pakistan; http://reliefweb.int/country/pak.

70 —EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION

2.2.5. Federally Administered Tribal Areas
General description of the province
The FATA (see Map 1) are situated on the Pakistan‐Afghanistan border between the provinceof Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Afghanistan, and border Balochistan in the south. The FATA
comprises seven agencies and six frontier regions. The seven agencies are the following:
Bajaur Agency, Mohmand Agency, Khyber Agency, Orakzai Agency, Kurram Agency, North andSouth Waziristan (545). The six frontier regions are: FR Peshawar, FR Bannu, FR Kohat, FR Lakki,
FR Tank and FR D.I. Khan (546). The FATA have a strong tribal structure and a diverse ethnicity
and cultural heritage (547). The terrain is mountainous with small valleys, surrounded bysettlements and agricultural fields (548). The total population in the FATA is estimated to bearound 4.45 million (549). The Government of Pakistan has plans to reform the FATA and merge
the region into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa within five years (550).

Background of the conflict and actors in the FATA
Since 2004, the Pakistani Army has conducted military operations in the FATA. As in Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa this led to a series of human rights violations and consecutive waves ofdisplacement (551). These military operations had a major impact on socio-economic life in theregion. Educational institutions were destroyed and agricultural output suffered (552).
Due to the military Operation Zarb-e-Azb the situation in the FATA improved, according tomilitary sources. In June 2016, the military stated that ‘militant strongholds, communications
infrastructure and sanctuaries were cleared on a large scale in the FATA, including North
Waziristan and Khyber agencies’ (553). According to a report by IRIN, militant groups such as
al-Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban have left the area. Many militants were killed, but others
have fled to Afghanistan. Despite this, the region is not free of conflict (554).
Because many militants fled to Afghanistan, they changed their operational tactics in the areain the past year. They tried to cause as much damage as they could through planting IEDs andcarrying out targeted operations, according to FATA Research Centre (555). Militant groups
carrying out attacks in the region are the TTP and different factions of the TTP, JuA and LI (556).

(545) FRC, FATA Annual Security Report 2016, 24 January 2017, p. 1.
(546) Government of FATA, FATA, n.d.
(547) Government of FATA, Tribal and Ethnic Diversity, n.d.
(548) Government of FATA, Physical Features and Climate, n.d.
(549) FRC, FATA Annual Security Report 2016, 24 January 2017, p. 1.
(550) RFE/RL, Reform Of Colonial-Era Laws Aims To Bring Pakistan's 'Black Hole' Into The Light, 2 May 2017(551) AI, ‘As if hell fell on me’, the human rights crisis in northwest Pakistan, 10 June 2010; ICG, Pakistan: The
Worsening IDP Crisis, Asia Briefing N°111, 16 September 2010.
(552) Daily Times, Waking up to FATA, 20 January 2016.
(553) Dawn, Nearly 350 military men killed in Zarb-i-Azb: ISPR, 15 June 2016.
(554) IRIN, Can $10 billion and political reforms bring peace to Pakistan's restive frontier?, 5 April 2017.
(555) FRC, FATA Annual Security Report 2016, 24 January 2017, p. 23.
(556) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 28.

EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 71

Description of the violenceFirstly, the violence is described in general for the FATA and secondly the violence is describedat the agency level. This is done to give an overall picture of the FATA but also an agency
specific picture of the violence.
GeneralAccording to PICSS, the overall security situation improved in 2016 as a result of military
actions in North Waziristan and Khyber Agencies. The number of militant attacks decreased.
PICSS counted 119 militant attacks in 2016, compared to 170 in 2015 (557). According to PIPS,
99 terrorist attacks were carried out, a decline of 32 % compared to 2015 (558). PIPS statedthat no sectarian attacks took place in 2016 (559).
Fata Research Center (FRC) states in its annual report of 2016 that violent incidents in FATA
decreased by 25 % in 2016 compared to 2015, counting 219 incidents of violence in 2016. Of
these, 52 were attacks on civilians, and 17 were cross-border attacks by militants on civilians
and the military (560).
Figure 12 (see below) gives an overview of the nature of the violence for the FATA per agency,
in 2016. Table 4 shows that the nature of the attacks is diverse. Methods used by militants
included IEDs, terrorist attacks, cross-border attacks, clashes between militants groups andmilitant ambushes on security personnel. These are observed in all seven agencies. Pakistanisecurity forces reacted in 2016 with air strikes, ground and search operations (561).
In its quarterly analysis of the first months of 2017, FRC states that there was a significant risein militant attacks and anti-militant operations in FATA compared to the last quarter of 2016.
FRC counted 119 security incidents in the first quarter of 2017, of which 31 were attacks on
civilians (562). According to FRC, every agency in the FATA, except North Waziristan Agency,
experienced more militant activity (563). Especially in the first quarter of 2017 there is an
upscale in attacks noticeable in South Waziristan according to Saifullah Mahsud, president of
FATA Research Centre (564). FRC stated that this increase of violence is due to the fact thatmilitant groups are regaining their operational strength for carrying out their activities acrossthe FATA and that there are sleeper cells present (565).

(557) PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report, 2016, February 2017, p. 48.
(558) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 28.
(559) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 28.
(560) FRC, FATA Annual Security Report 2016, 24 January 2017, p. 5.
(561) FRC, FATA Annual Security Report 2016, 24 January 2017, p. 4.
(562) FRC, FATA Security Report – First Quarter 2017, 19 April 2017, p. 1.
(563) FRC, FATA Security Report – First Quarter 2017, 19 April 2017, p. 22.
(564) Mahsud, S., Interview Islamabad, 5 April 2017.
(565) FRC, FATA Security Report – First Quarter 2017, 19 April 2017, pp. 22-23.

72 —EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION
Security Overview 2016
Bajaurincidents

Nature of Attacks

Terrorist
Attacks

Mohmand

Khyber

KurramOrakzai

NWA

SWA

Total

K

I

K

I

K

I

K

I

K

I

K

I

K

I

K

I

[On]
Civilians

52

4

9

49

56

9

6

3

4

0

4

8

9

10

18

83

106

[On]
Military

56

11

10

41

29

28

56

16

61

1

0

6

9

4

14

107

179

[On]
Peace
Lashkar

5

2

1

0

0

7

4

0

0

0

0

0

0

4

0

13

5

Shelling

5

0

0

4

0

0

0

12

8

0

0

0

0

0

0

16

8

Guerilla
activities

12

0

2

9

2

1

16

1

4

0

0

0

0

0

0

11

24

Clashes Between
Militant Groups

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

0

Military
operations

Searchoperations

64

0

0

3

0

1

3

0

0

0

0

22

4

7

0

33

7

Areal
Strikes

18

0

0

7

0

127

25

0

0

0

0

133

5

0

0

247

30

Artillery
Shelling

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Curfews

4

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Drones attack

2

0

0

0

0

0

0

3

1

0

0

6

0

0

0

9

1

Lashkar Operation

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

TOTAL

219

17

22

113

87

153

110

37

78

1

4

175

27

25

32

521

360

Crossborderattacks

Figure 12: Security Overview 2016-Nature of Attacks (FRC) (566)Legend: K = Killed, I = Injured

Below is a description of the violence in 2016 and in the first quarter of 2017, given per agency
in the FATA.
Bajaur Agency
Bajaur Agency is located in the north of the FATA and is the smallest agency in the FATA.
Because it shares most of its border with Afghanistan, this agency is particularly vulnerable tocross-border attacks (567).
FRC describes the security situation in Bajaur in 2016 as ‘quite disturbed’ (568). The third
quarter of 2016 showed nine incidents. In the last quarter of 2016 incidents of violence
declined a little bit (569). FRC counted 29 security incidents in 2016, in which 17 people were
killed and 22 injured (See Table 4) (570).
PIPS states that 15 terrorist attacks took place in Bajaur in the first quarter of 2017, in whichnine people were killed and 14 injured (571). According to one source, IED attacks and(567) FRC, FATA Annual Security Report 2016, 24 January 2017, p. 2.
(568) FRC, FATA Annual Security Report 2016, 24 January 2017, p. 24.
(569) FRC, FATA Annual Security Report 2016, 24 January 2017, pp. 11-12.
(570) FRC, FATA Annual Security Report 2016, 24 January 2017, p. 11.
(571) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, pp. 28-29.

EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 73

ambushes on civilians and security forces were the dominant trends of militancy in Bajaur
Agency (572).
In the first three months of 2017, FRC counted 15 terrorist attacks. The security forces also
conducted twelve search operations against the militants during the first quarter of 2017. 13
people were killed and 19 injured, of which nine deaths and 13 injured were civilian (573).
Compared to the first quarter of 2016, Bajaur Agency saw an increase of 250 % in violent
incidents in the first quarter of 2017 (574).
Khyber Agency
Khyber Agency borders Afghanistan to the West, Orakzai Agency to the south, Kurram Agency
to the south-west and Peshawar in the east. This agency is divided into three administrative
units: Bara, Jamrud and LandiKotal (575).
In the recent past, Khyber Agency underwent different security operations. In October 2014,
the military Operation Khyber 1 started to target militants who fled Operation Zarb-e-Azb inNorth Waziristan and took shelter in Khyber Agency (576). In the spring of 2015 Operation
Khyber 2 was launched, lasting until June 2015. The military took control over most of thestrategic areas in the agency and militant groups fled to Afghanistan (577). In August 2016,
operation Khyber 3 started. This operation aimed to clear the area beyond Tirah Valley, righton the Pak-Afghan border (578).
According to FRC, Khyber Agency was the third most volatile region of the FATA after North
Waziristan and Mohmand in 2016 (579). 56 incidents of violence occurred, killing 153 people
and leaving 110 injured (see Table 4). The third and fourth quarter of 2016 were especiallyvolatile, due to the start of operation Khyber 3 and clashes at the border with Afghanistan (580).
PIPS recorded 19 terrorist attacks in 2016. In those attacks 37 people were killed and 74
injured (581).
In the first three months of 2017, FRC documented 42 security incidents. Compared to thesame period in 2016 there was a serious increase in 2017 (582).
Kurram Agency
Kurram Agency shares its border largely with Afghanistan. In the east this agency borders
Orakzai Agency and Khyber Agency, and North Waziristan Agency in the south. It is divided
into three administrative units: Lower Kurram, Upper Kurram and Central Kurram. Parachinar(572) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, pp. 28-29;(573) FRC, FATA Security Report – First Quarter 2017, 19 April 2017, p. 6.
(574) FRC, FATA Security Report – First Quarter 2017, 19 April 2017, p. 7.
(575) FRC, FATA Annual Security Report 2016, 24 January 2017, p. 2.
(576) Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), Army chief vows ‘terror-free’ Pakistan, 20 June
2015.
(577) Dawn, Military operation in Khyber ends successfully, 3 July 2015.
(578) Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), Army mounts Khyber-III to secure Pak-Afghanborder, 17 August 2016.
(579) FRC, FATA Annual Security Report 2016, 24 January 2017, pp. 23-24.
(580) FRC, FATA Annual Security Report 2016, 24 January 2017, pp. 15-17.
(581) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 29.
(582) FRC, FATA Security Report – First Quarter 2017, 19 April 2017, p. 12.

74 —EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION

is the main town. Kurram is the only agency in the FATA with a significant Shia population.
Kurram Agency has a history of sectarian violence between Sunni and Shia (583).
FRC noticed an increase in casualties but not in the number of incidents during the second
quarter of 2016. In the third quarter the violence declined whilst in the fourth quarter thenumber of incidents increased again. Overall, 19 incidents took place, killing 36 and injuring
79. Of these, two of the fatalities and eight of the injured were civilians (584). PIPS counted six
terrorist attacks in 2016, killing 15 and injuring six (585).
FRC mentions that the situation in Kurram Agency remained ‘disturbed’ in the first quarter of
2017. In total 16 violent incidents occurred, killing 69 and injuring 143 people. Most casualties
were civilians (586).
In the beginning of 2017, there were some major incidents in the agency: An IED exploded ata market in Parachinar on 20 January 2017, killing at least 25 persons (587). On 31 March 2017,a suicide bomber targeted a Shia mosque near Parachinar, killing 23 persons and injuring morethan 100 (588). On 25 April 2017, a roadside blast targeted a passengers van killing at least
14 (589). This agency also witnessed one drone attack in the first quarter of 2017 (590).
Orakzai Agency
Orakzai shares its borders with Khyber Agency in the north, FR Kohat in the east, the districtsof Kohat and Hangu in the south, and Kurram Agency in the west. Administratively, it is divided
into Upper and Lower Orakzai (591).
Four incidents of violence were counted by FRC during 2016 and most of the attacks occurredin the last quarter of 2016. In total one person was killed and four injured (see Table 4) (592).
According to FRC, Orakzai Agency was ‘the most peaceful’ agency in the FATA in 2016 (593).
PIPS counted three terrorist attacks in 2016 in Orakzai (594).
In the first quarter of 2017, FRC documented five violent incidents, resulting in 23 casualties.
These incidents were due to terrorist attacks and security operations (595).

(583) FRC, FATA Annual Security Report 2016, 24 January 2017, p. 2; AA, Specter of sectarianism revisits northwest
Pakistan, 21 April 2017; Chandran, D. Suba, Terror revisits Parachinar: Kurram Agency’s Ten Year Sectarian Itch,
January 2017.
(584) FRC, FATA Annual Security Report 2016, 24 January 2017, p. 17.
(585) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 29.
(586) FRC, FATA Security Report – First Quarter 2017, 19 April 2017, p. 13(587) Dawn, 'Terrorists will fail in their attempt to regain lost relevance,' army chief says, 22 January 2017.
(588) Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), 23 killed, over 100 injured as blast rocks
Parachinar, 31 March 2017.
(589) Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), 14 killed as passenger van hits landmine in Kurram
Agency, 25 April 2017.
(590) Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), Drone strike kills two in Kurram Agency, 2 March
2017.
(591) FRC, FATA Annual Security Report 2016, 24 January 2017, p. 3.
(592) FRC, FATA Annual Security Report 2016, 24 January 2017, p. 19.
(593) FRC, FATA Annual Security Report 2016, 24 January 2017, p. 24.
(594) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 29.
(595) FRC, FATA Security Report – First Quarter 2017, 19 April 2017, pp. 16-17.

EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 75

Mohmand Agency
Mohmand Agency borders Bajaur Agency in the north and Khyber Agency in the south. In theeast it borders Malakand and Charsadda districts and Peshawar District in the southeast (596).
PIPS mentioned 36 terrorist attacks in 2016, in which 79 people were killed and 76 injured.
PIPS states that JuA was responsible for most of these attacks, and that the main targets were
pro-government tribesmen (597). On 16 September 2016, they claimed responsibility for an
attack on a mosque in Payee Khan (598). According to FRC the number of attacks in this agency
is higher than in other agencies because it borders the provinces of Kunar and Nangharar in
Afghanistan, which are ‘safe havens’ for groups such as the TTP and JuA. These groups
infiltrate from there into Mohmand Agency and carry out attacks in the agency (599). FRC
counted 59 attacks during 2016, killing 113 people and injuring 87 (see Table 4) (600). FRC
noted a significant rise in terms of casualties in 2016 compared to 2015 (601).
In the first quarter of 2017 the security situation remained ‘volatile’, according to FRC. FRC
documented twelve incidents of violence, in which 48 people were killed and 18 were
injured (602).
North Waziristan Agency
North Waziristan borders Kurram Agency and Hangu in the north and Karak and Bannu
districts in the east, South Waziristan Agency in the south and Afghanistan in the west (603).
Since June 2014, North Waziristan has been affected by Operation Zarb-e-Azb (see Section
1.3.1 Security opertations and armed clashes).
In 2016, Operation Zarb-e-Azb was in its clearing phase in this agency and most of the militants
were forced to flee to Afghanistan. Due to this, militants changed tactics and used IEDs andcarried out targeted operations (604). Sources mention the presence of TTP and a splinterfaction of the TTP, Sajna Group, in this agency (605). FRC documented 25 incidents, including
militant attacks, military operations and airstrikes, in which 175 people were killed and 27
injured (606). PIPS counted eight terrorist attacks, in which eleven people were killed and 23
injured (607).
In the first months of 2017, FRC states that six violent incidents have taken place. According
to FRC this is a decrease of 40 % compared to the same period in 2016 (608). At present, North(596) FRC, FATA Annual Security Report 2016, 24 January 2017, p. 2.
(597) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, pp. 29, 36.
(598) Reuters, Suicide bomber kills at least 25 in Pakistani mosque, 16 September 2016.
(599) FRC, FATA Annual Security Report 2016, 24 January 2017, p. 23.
(600) FRC, FATA Annual Security Report 2016, 24 January 2017, p. 13.
(601) FRC, FATA Annual Security Report 2016, 24 January 2017, p. 8.
(602) FRC, FATA Security Report – First Quarter 2017, 19 April 2017, p. 8.
(603) FRC, FATA Annual Security Report 2016, 24 January 2017, p. 3.
(604) FRC, FATA Annual Security Report 2016, 24 January 2017, p. 23.
(605) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 29; FRC, FATA Annual Security Report 2016, 24 January 2017, p.
23.
(606) FRC, FATA Annual Security Report 2016, 24 January 2017, p. 20.
(607) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 29; The numbers of violence differ among the main sources
because of the use of a different methodology of the sources.
(608) FRC, FATA Security Report – First Quarter 2017, 19 April 2017, p. 19.

76 —EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION

Waziristan is reportedly cleared of militants. The Pakistan Army states that over two years the
Army lost 872 soldiers and killed more than 2 000 militants (609).
South Waziristan Agency
South Waziristan shares its border in the north with North Waziristan, and borders Bannu andLakki Marwat districts in the north-east, the tribal area adjoining Tank district and Dera Ismail
Khan district in the east, Zhob District of Balochistan Province and Dera Ismail Khan district inthe south, and Afghanistan in the west (610).
FRC mentions that most militants are cleared from this agency but that they still carry out
some ‘sporadic attacks’ (611). PIPS counted 12 terrorist attacks in this agency, which killed 10
people and injured 24 (612). About 50 % of these terrorist attacks were attacks on security orlaw enforcement personnel (613). FRC recorded 28 incidents in 2016, which killed 25 people
and injured 32 (614).
In the first months of 2017, FRC states that 10 violent incidents have taken place. According
to FRC this is a decrease of 23 % compared to the same period in 2016 (615) but FRC still
describes the security situation as ‘disturbed’ (616).
Impact of the violence
FRC observed 881 casualties (521 deaths and 360 injured) in the FATA in 2016. This is a declineof 60 % in terms of casualties compared to 2015 (617). A predominant part of these fatalities
were militants (462 casualties). According to FRC, this is due to the effectiveness of intensive
air strikes, intelligence based operations, drone strikes and ground offences by the Pakistan
Army (618).
CRSS counted 495 fatalities (619) in 2016, compared to 1 917 fatalities in 2015. The mostaffected regions of the FATA were North Waziristan, Khyber Agency and Mohmand Agency(see Figure 13) (620).

(609) BBC, North Waziristan: What happened after militants lost the battle?, 8 March 2017.
(610) FRC, FATA Annual Security Report 2016, 24 January 2017, p. 3.
(611) FRC FATA Annual Security Report 2016, 24 January 2017, p. 24.
(612) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 29.
(613) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 29.
(614) FRC, FATA Annual Security Report 2016, 24 January 2017, p. 21.
(615) FRC, FATA Security Report – First Quarter 2017, 19 April 2017, p. 21.
(616) FRC, FATA Security Report – First Quarter 2017, 19 April 2017, p. 20.
(617) FRC, FATA Annual Security Report 2016, 24 January 2017, p. 5.
(618) FRC, FATA Annual Security Report 2016, 24 January 2017, p. 6.
(619) Fatalities according to CRSS are persons killed, see CRSS, Annual Security Report January-December 2016, 22
March 2017, p. 37.
(620) CRSS, Annual Security Report January-December 2016, 22 March 2017, p. 37.

EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 77

Figure 13: violence-related fatalities in the FATA by agency© CRSS (621)

In the first five months of 2017, SATP recorded 191 fatalities in the FATA (622). A high numberof fatalities was observed in the months of February and March (623).
CRSS counted 231 victims of violence (144 dead, 87 injured) in the first quarter of 2017. Just
as SATP mentioned, the highest number of fatalities occurred in the month of February,
according to CRSS (624).
For the first quarter of 2017, FRC documented 119 terrorism and counterterrorism incidents,
resulting in 281 dead and 210 injured. Of these, 31 attacks targeted civilians, resulting in 72
dead and 164 injured (625).
Displacement
Displacement of persons in the FATA is due to conflict, such as military operations andsectarian violence (626). In the following paragraph, a short overview is given of the numbersof IDPs from 2014 onwards. In 2014 Operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan caused a waveof displacement within the FATA (627). Figures of IDPs in the FATA vary depending on the
consulted sources. UNHCR states that approximately half a million IDPs fled the North(621) CRSS, Annual Security Report January-December 2016, 22 March 2017, p. 38.
(622) SATP, Fatalities in Pakistan Region Wise: 2017, 28 May 2017.
(623) SATP, Fatalities in Pakistan Region Wise: 2017, 28 May 2017.
(624) CRSS, CRSS Security Report – Q1, 2017, 10 May 2017, p. 14.
(625) FRC, FATA Security Report – First Quarter 2017, 19 April 2017, pp. 1-3.
(626) UNHCR, Protection Cluster, Protection Cluster Report August 2016, 8 August 2016, p. 5.
(627) European Commission, Pakistan, Echo factsheet, March 2016.

78 —EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION

Waziristan fighting as of August 2014 (628). However IDMC reports in 2015 that the number of
IDPs is often underestimated, and says that more than 900 000 IDPs may have fled owing to
the violence in the FATA (629). As of 12 May 2017, UN OCHA counted 47 896 registered families
still displaced. The highest numbers of displaced people are from North Waziristan, where
20 585 people remained displaced (630).
The majority of the IDPs from the FATA do not live in IDP camps, but settle in host communities
in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or in spontaneous settlements such as in Bannu (631). Some of the
IDPs have moved to Afghanistan (632).
In March 2015 the Pakistani Government announced a five-phase plan (March 2015 until
December 2016) for IDPs to gradually return to areas declared as safe (633). Between Marchand June 2016, thousands of IDPs from Orakzai Agency, Khyber Agency, Kurram Agency, Northand South Waziristan were expected to return to their homes (634). Due to the extreme cold
weather at the end of 2016, the Government of Pakistan decided to postpone the completionof the repatriation process until June 2017 (635). As of 12 May 2017, UN OCHA reported that
26 784 registered families had returned in 2017 till then (636). From January to May 2017,14 817 registered families returned to North Waziristan, followed by 9 642 to South
Waziristan and 2 099 to Khyber Agency (637). According to the Pakistan Army a total of 94 % of
the IDPs in the FATA have returned to their agencies. The return of the displaced to theprovince of Khost in Afghanistan will start after Eid 2017 (638). Additional repatriation isunderway, but according to governmental sources it is hindered by ‘security and logisticalchallenges’ (639).
At the start of 2016, the Pakistani Government took further initiatives to restore and improvedaily live in the FATA. For instance, besides the Government announcing the return ofdisplaced people in the FATA, shopkeepers can resume their work in the bazaars, and schools
damaged by the Pakistani Taliban are being repaired to reopen soon (640). However, in
May 2017, returnees feared that the infrastructure was not repaired yet and that theinsurgents would return (641). According to Saifullah Mahsud, President of FATA ResearchCentre, the rebuilding of homes and repatriation process is a slow and difficult one (642).
(628) UNHCR, 2015 UNHCR country operations profile - Pakistan, n.d.
(629) IDMC, Pakistan IDP Figures Analysis, 31 July 2015.
(630) UN OCHA, Pakistan: FATA Return Weekly (from 27 April to 4 May 2017) - Humanitarian Snapshot, 12 May
2017.
(631) UNHCR, Protection Cluster, Protection Cluster Report August 2016, 8 August 2016, pp. 5-6.
(632) FRC, FATA Annual Security Report 2016, 24 January 2017, p. 26.
(633) Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), IDPs returning as areas get denotified, 8 October
2015.
(634) Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), Clouded in uncertainty: IDPs to ‘stay away fromhome beyond 2016’, 21 February 2016.
(635) Tribal News Network, Repatriation of FATA IDPs remains incomplete at 2016 end, 30 December 2016.
(636) UN OCHA, Pakistan: FATA Return Weekly (from 27 April to 4 May 2017) - Humanitarian Snapshot, 12 May
2017.
(637) UN OCHA, Pakistan: FATA Return Weekly (from 27 April to 4 May 2017) - Humanitarian Snapshot, 12 May
2017.
(638) Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), Pakistan Army ‘has satellite proof’ of Afghan
involvement in cross-border terrorism, 19 May 2017.
(639) VoA, Tribesmen Displaced in Pakistan's Anti-militant Operations Demand Repatriation, 13 May 2017.
(640) IPS, The New Normal in Fata, 11 February 2016.
(641) VoA, Tribesmen Displaced in Pakistan's Anti-militant Operations Demand Repatriation, 13 May 2017.
(642) Mahsud, S., Interview Islamabad, 5 April 2017.

EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 79

2.2.6. Islamabad Capital Territory
General description of the province
Islamabad Capital Territory (see Map 1) is situated in the north of Pakistan between theprovinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab and includes the capital of Pakistan, Islamabad.
The Federal Government of Pakistan controls the area. Islamabad Capital Territory is one of
the two federal Territories of Pakistan (the other is FATA). The population is estimated at
600 000 (643).
Background of the conflict and actors in Islamabad Capital Territory
According to a report by OSAC, the level of security in Islamabad is higher than in otherregions. Still, the presence of Pakistani Government buildings, government officials andforeigners make the region a ‘high profile target for terrorist attacks’ (644).
In 2016, PIPS mentioned that the terrorist attacks in the region were carried out by IS andunidentified gunmen (645).

Description of the violence
The PIPS report of 2016 mentions three terrorist attacks in this region in 2016. This is the same
number of terrorist attacks as in 2015 (646). One of these attacks was aimed at a news
building (647).
Impact of the violence
In 2016, the annual security report of CRSS reported one fatality from violence in Islamabad
Capital Territory in which two militants were shot by security forces (648). In comparison with2015 this is a significant decline, according to CRSS. In 2015, 10 fatalities from violence werecounted by CRSS (649).
In the first five months of 2017, SATP did not observe any fatalities from violence in thisregion (650). CRSS, on the other hand, reported three fatalities in the first quarter of 2017 (651).

(643) Encyclopædia Britannica, Islamabad, n.d.
(644) OSAC, Pakistan 2017 Crime & Safety Report: Islamabad, 31 January 2017.
(645) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 44.
(646) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 44.
(647) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 44.
(648) CRSS, Annual Security Report January-December 2016, 22 March 2017, p. 61.
(649) CRSS, Annual Security Report January-December 2016, 22 March 2017, p. 61.
(650) SATP, Fatalities in Pakistan Region Wise: 2017, 28 May 2017.
(651) CRSS, CRSS Security Report – Q1, 2017, 10 May 2017, p. 35.

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Displacement
UN OCHA did not report any conflict-induced displacement from Islamabad in 2016 (652).

2.2.7. Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan
General description of the province
The Pakistan-controlled territory of Kashmir consists of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (commonly
called Azad Kashmir, AK or AJK) and Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) (see Map 1), previously named theNorthern Territories. Both regions have a partially autonomous administration (653). However,
the influence of the Pakistani Government and Army is far-reaching, especially in AK (654). AK
has a population of about 4.5 million (655). GB has approximately around 1.8 or 2 million
inhabitants (656).
Background of the conflict and actors in Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan
During 2016, the situation at the Line of Control that divides Kashmir intensified. After theattack on the Uri Army base, India conducted more cross-border attacks into AK (657). At theend of 2016, exchanges of gunfire along the Line of Control have been ongoing, despite aceasefire agreement signed in 2003 (658).
Gilgit-Baltistan saw mass protests against CPEC in 2016. A ‘crackdown’ in August 2016 by the
Police resulted in the arrest of over 500 locals, including political activist Baba Jan (659). A fact
finding report by HRCP in March 2017 documented human rights violations by intelligenceand law enforcement agencies in Gilgit-Baltistan (660).
Description of the violence
In 2016, no terrorist attack was reported in GB or in AK, according to PIPS (661). PICSS describes
the situation in 2016 in GB and AK as ‘stable’, with only one militant attack reported from AK.
Security forces conducted three operations in AK and one operation in GB, according to
PICSS (662).

(652) Websites consulted: http://www.unocha.org/pakistan;
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/pakistan; http://reliefweb.int/country/pak.
(653) German Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt), Staatsaufbau und Innenpolitik, May 2017.
(654) ICG, Pakistan's Relations with India: Beyond Kashmir?, Asia Report N°224, 3 May 2012. pp. 19-20.
(655) BBC, Kashmir territories - full profile, 1 March 2017.
(656) HRCP, Aspirations for identity, integration and autonomy. Report of an HRCP's fact finding mission to Gilgit
Baltistan, 28 February 2017, p. 8.
(657) Telegraph (The), Pakistan fury after India conducts military strikes on Kashmir border, 29 September 2016.
(658) New York Times (The), Fighting Intensifies Between India and Pakistan on Kashmir Line of Control, 23
November 2016.
(659) Ramachandran, S., Unrest in Gilgit-Baltistan and the China-Pakistan economic corridor, 29 September 2016.
(660) HRCP, Aspirations for identity, integration and autonomy. Report of an HRCP's fact finding mission to Gilgit
Baltistan, 28 February 2017.
(661) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 13.
(662) PICSS, Annual Security Assessment Report, 2016, February 2017, p. 59.

EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 81

The situation at the Line of Control remained volatile, especially in the last four months of2016. PIPS counted 51 cross-border attacks from the border with India (663).
Impact of the violence
In the first quarter of 2017, CRSS reported no fatalities in GB. In AK, CRSS documented two
fatalities (664). According to SATP, there were no fatalities from terrorist violence documented
in AK and GB in the first five months of 2017 (665).
Displacement
In November 2016, Dawn reported that as a result of Indian shelling, approximately 11 000
families, most from Kotli and Bhimber, have left their homes to safer areas (666).

(663) PIPS, 2016, Pakistan Security Report, 2017, p. 17.
(664) CRSS, CRSS Security Report – Q1, 2017, 10 May 2017, p. 35.
(665) SATP, Fatalities in Pakistan Region Wise: 2017, 28 May 2017.
(666) Dawn, Indian shelling kills four civilians, Pakistan Army’s retaliatory fire kills six troops: ISPR, 21 November
2016.

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EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION

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Anonymous and non-public sources
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EASO COI REPORT ON PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 111

Annex 2: Terms of Reference
The reporting period for incidents and events illustrating the general trends of the conflict, is
1 April 2016 until 31 May 2017. The content of the report should contain information on thefollowing topics:
General description of the security situation• Background of the conflict
Overview of recent conflicts• Actors in/Parties to the conflict• Recent security trends and security trends• Impact of the violence
Civilian population: casualties, IDP’s, refugees
State ability to secure Law and Order: security forces, justice, detention
Geographical overview of the security situation
Regional description of the security situation• Punjab• Khyber Pakhtunkhwa• Islamabad• Federally Administrated Tribal Areas• Balochistan• Sindh• Azad Kashmir
For each region, a short description of the region (terrain, urban areas,
population) should be included, followed by information on:
General description of the region
Background of insecurity in the region: actors, type of violence
Recent security trends (focus on 2016 and first quarter 2017) according
to the four main sources (number of incidents, example of the kind ofviolence, effects of the violence)
Displacement/return

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BZ-04-17-693-EN-N
ISBN 978-92-9494-615-7
doi: 10.2847/502130