Somalia
Targeted profiles
Country of Origin
Information Report
September 2021

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu)
PDF

ISBN

978-92-9465-526-4

doi: 10.2847/13745

BZ-06-21-061-EN-N© European Asylum Support Office, 2021
Cover photo, Minibus after roadside bomb – Mogadishu (Somalia), © Abdurrahman Warsameh andInternational Relations and Security Network, 3 February 2008 (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. For any use or reproduction ofphotos or other material that is not under the EASO copyright, permission must be sought directlyfrom the copyright holders.

2Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Acknowledgements
EASO would like to acknowledge ACCORD as the drafter of this report.
The following departments and external experts have reviewed the report, together with EASO:▪
▪

Norway, Landinfo, Norwegian Country of Origin Information Centre
Joakim Gundel, scholar, author, and Somalia expert

It must be noted that the drafting and review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts ororganisations contributes to the overall quality of the report, but does not necessarily imply theirformal endorsement of the final report, which is the full responsibility of EASO.

3

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Contents

Acknowledgements................................................................................................................................. 3Contents .................................................................................................................................................. 4
Disclaimer................................................................................................................................................ 6
Glossary and Abbreviations .................................................................................................................... 7
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 8
Methodology ...................................................................................................................................... 8
Defining the terms of reference ..................................................................................................... 8
Collecting information.................................................................................................................... 8
Quality control................................................................................................................................ 9
Sources ............................................................................................................................................... 9
Structure and use of the report .......................................................................................................... 9
Maps of Somalia.................................................................................................................................... 11Federal Member States .................................................................................................................... 12
Approximate Territorial Control ....................................................................................................... 13
Clan Maps ......................................................................................................................................... 14
Map by Lewis................................................................................................................................ 15
Map by Abikar .............................................................................................................................. 16
1. Recruitment by Al-Shabaab and repercussions for deserters .......................................................... 17
1.1 Patterns of recruitment .............................................................................................................. 17
1.2 Repercussions for deserters from Al-Shabaab ........................................................................... 26
2. Women and girls ............................................................................................................................... 29
2.1 The position of women in society............................................................................................... 29
2.2 Sexual and gender-based violence ............................................................................................. 31
2.3 Child, Early and Forced Marriage (CEFM) ................................................................................... 36
2.4 FGM/C ......................................................................................................................................... 39
2.5 Women without a support network ........................................................................................... 42
3. Individuals perceived as contravening Islamic laws/tenets .............................................................. 46
3.1 Individuals contravening Islamic laws in Al-Shabaab controlled areas ...................................... 46
3.2 Individuals contravening Islamic and customary tenets elsewhere in Somalia ......................... 52
4. Minorities and non-minority clans.................................................................................................... 56
4.1 Low status occupational minorities ............................................................................................ 614

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

4.2 Ethnic minorities ......................................................................................................................... 66
4.3 Groups specialised in religious services...................................................................................... 69
4.4 Non-minority clans: Rahanweyn/Digil-Mirifle (Saab) and ‘in between’ groups ......................... 72
4.5 Mixed-marriages ......................................................................................................................... 75
5. Individuals involved in blood feuds/clan disputes and other clan issues ......................................... 76
5.1 Clan revenge in clan conflicts ..................................................................................................... 77
5.2 Clan revenge in clan conflicts for women................................................................................... 83
6. Individuals supporting or perceived as supporting the government, the international actors, and/or
as opposing Al-Shabaab ........................................................................................................................ 85
6.1 Attacks on Federal Government and FMS officials .................................................................... 88
6.2 Attacks on army officers ............................................................................................................. 91
6.3 Treatment of persons accused by AS of collaborating with or spying for the government orinternational actors .......................................................................................................................... 92
6.4 Treatment of other individuals opposing or perceived as opposing Al-Shabaab....................... 95
7. Journalists ......................................................................................................................................... 97
8. LGBTIQ............................................................................................................................................. 103
Annex 1: Bibliography ......................................................................................................................... 107
Annex 2: Terms of Reference .............................................................................................................. 143

5

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Disclaimer
This report was written according to the EASO COI Report Methodology (2019)1. The report is basedon carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced.
The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed with utmost
care. However, this document does not claim to be exhaustive. If a particular event, person ororganisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has not taken place orthat the person or organisation does not exist.
Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particularapplication for international protection. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative of aparticular legal position.
‘Refugee’, ‘risk’ and similar terminology are used as generic terminology and not in the legal sense as
applied in the EU Asylum Acquis, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the
Status of Refugees.
Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may bemade of the information contained in this report.
The drafting of this report was finalised on 20 August 2021, while the reference period of the reportcovers January 2020 – 30 June 2021. Any event taking place after 30 June is not included in this report.
More information on the reference period for this report can be found in the Methodology section of
the Introduction.

1 The 2019 EASO COI Report Methodology can be downloaded from the EASO COI Portal url

6

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Glossary and Abbreviations
4.5 power-sharing
formulaA power-sharing formula under which key positions in the state andparliamentary seats are allocated on a proportional basis across the 4
major clans and 0.5 to minorities

AMISOM

African Union Mission in Somalia

AFRICOM

The United States Africa Command

Amniyat

Al-Shabaab’s intelligence wing

AS (Al-Shabaab)

Al-Shabaab; militant Islamist organisation in Somalia

Casualty

A person who is killed, wounded or incapacitated

Diya

Payment of compensation (see also mag or jilib)

FFM

Fact-Finding Mission

FGS

Federal Government of Somalia

FMS

Federal Member States

Hanbali

MadhabOne of the two main Sharia schools (madhab) present in Somalia
Crimes that are ‘against the rights of God’ under Islamic religious law(plural huduud)
Islamic State in Somalia, or ISS; a Somalia-based affiliate of the
Iraq/Syria-based IS (also called the Islamic State of Iraq in theLevant/Syria (ISIS), or Daesh)
Sharia school

Mag

Payment of compensation (see also diya)

PISA

Puntland Intelligence and Security Agency

Qisas

Retaliation under Sharia law

Sab

Minority group, occupational caste

Saab

Name for the Rahanweyn/Digil-Mirifle clan family (after theirancestor Saabe)

SamaaleSomali ancestor for Somali clans (Dir, Isaaq, Darood, Hawiye)

Shafi’i (Shafi’s)

One of the two main Sharia schools (madhab) present in Somalia

Sharia (Shari‘a’,Sharia’ah)

The Islamic law

Takfir/Takfiir

Declaring other Muslims as infidels because they do not adhere tocertain behaviour. Al-Shabaab is described as following takfiri
ideology.

Xeer

Customary (clan) law

Zakat

Religious tax under Islamic law

Hadd crimes
ISIS-Somalia

7

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Introduction
The purpose of this report is to provide relevant context information in view of the assessment ofinternational protection status determination, including refugee status and subsidiary protection.
Among others, the report is intended to inform the development of EASO’s country guidancedevelopment on Somalia (2022).
The report provides background information and details on selected potentially targeted profiles inSomalia. The report builds upon the preceding EASO COI report on Somalia: Actors (July 2021) andbelongs to the same Somalia COI project along with the EASO COI report on Somalia: Key socioeconomic indicators (September 2021) and the Somalia: Security situation (September 2021).
This report provides in-depth information about following potentially targeted profiles in Somalia:
people recruited by and deserters from Al-Shabaab; women and girls; individual perceived ascontravening religious laws/tenets; minorities and non-minority clans; individuals involved in blood
feuds/clan disputes; individuals supporting or perceived as supporting the government, theinternational community, and/or as opposing Al-Shabaab; journalists; LGBTIQ.

Methodology
The reference period is from 1 January 2020 to 30 June 2021. The information gathered is a result ofresearch using public, specialised paper-based and electronic sources until 30 July 2021. Some limited
additional information was added during the finalisation of this report in response to feedback
received during the quality control process, until 20 August 2021.
This report is produced in line with the EASO COI Report Methodology (2019)2 and the EASO COI
Writing and Referencing Style Guide (2019).3

Defining the terms of reference
The terms of reference of this report build on the input received from country of origin information(COI) and policy experts from EU+ countries4 within the context of country guidance development on
Somalia. Terms of reference for this report can be found in Annex 2.

Collecting information
The information gathered results from two main sets of sources: extensive desk research using
predominantly public, specialised paper-based, and electronic sources until 20 August 2021; and anumber of interviews with oral sources and experts conducted by ACCORD for the purposes of thereport between 14 June and 18 August 2021. All these sources, including when restricted or nonpublic information has been used to cover specific details, were duly referenced and described.
The sources used are referenced in the Bibliography. Wherever information could not be found within
the timeframes for drafting this report after carefully consulting a range of sources, this is stated in
the report. The main sources consulted are included in the bibliography.

2 EASO, EASO Country of Origin Information (COI) Report Methodology, June 2019, url
3 EASO, Writing and Referencing Guide for EASO Country of Origin Information (COI) Reports, June 2019, url
4 EU Member States plus Norway and Switzerland

8

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Quality control
To ensure that the authors respected the EASO COI Report Methodology and the Terms of Reference
were comprehensively addressed, a review was carried out by COI specialists from the countries andorganisations listed as reviewers in the Acknowledgements section. All comments made by thereviewers were taken into consideration and almost all of them were implemented in the final draftof this report, which was finalised on 20 August 2021. EASO also performed the final quality review
and editing of the text.

Sources
In accordance with EASO COI methodology, a range of different published documentary sources havebeen consulted on relevant topics for this report. These include: COI reports by governments; national
and international think tank reports and specialised sources covering Somalia; information from civilsociety, humanitarian organisations, and NGOs; international and NGO human rights reports; reports
produced by various bodies of the United Nations; Somali and regionally-based media; academic
publications and books.
At the same time the report relies extensively on experts interviews that were carried out for the
purpose of the report between 14 June and 18 August 2021 (see the Bibliography for additional
details).
Information on targeted profiles’ treatment has been complemented with a list of security incidents,
relevant for the reference period. Such lists are not exhaustive. Lack of reporting, under-reporting or
inaccessibility of non-public sources about security incidents, clan clashes, or other human rights
violations are long-standing issues in the Somali context, which is severely affected, among others, bymedia freedom concerns.5

Structure and use of the report
The report is divided into 8 chapters, each one of them addressing specifically the forms of targetingof selected profiles: people recruited by and deserters from Al-Shabaab; women and girls; individual
perceived as contravening religious laws/tenets; minorities and non-minority clans; individuals
involved in blood feuds/clan disputes; individuals supporting or perceived as supporting thegovernment, the international community, and/or as opposing Al-Shabaab; journalists; LGBTIQs.
Within each profile, information is provided on describing the profile, those involved in perpetratingharm (where available), types of treatment documented among sources consulted, and potential legal
protection mechanisms, including effectiveness.
This report should be read in conjunction with other 2021 EASO COI reports on Somalia, such as EASO
COI report on Somalia: Actors (July 2021), the EASO COI report on Somalia: Key socio-economic
indicators (September 2021), and the Somalia: Security situation (September 2021). These reports
provide relevant information regarding topics such as the main armed actors, socio-economic
situation in key Somali towns, targeted violence, and armed conflict developments in the country forthe purpose of developing country guidance on Somalia.

Note on Transliteration
A national orthography for the Somali language was codified relatively late by adopting a Latin script(21 October 1972). Nevertheless, even today, Somali lacks a commonly applied and binding
orthography.

5 Ifex, Culture of impunity in Somalia continues to grow, 27 October 2020, url; New York City Bar, Letter Urging Somali

Government to Protect Free Speech and End Violence Against Journalists, 22 April 2020, url

9Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

In this report, Somali places, clans and personal names usually follow Somali orthography: ‘longvowels are indicated by doubling them’, as in Darood or Abbaan, ‘the Latin ‘c’ stands for a sound close
to the Arabic ‫( ع‬ayn), while ‘x’ denotes the strongly aspirated ‫( ح‬ha)’.6 However, given the fact that
other sources adopt different conventions, the reader will sometimes find other forms of places, clans,
and personal names in the text, including where direct citations are used or in references.
Somalis, notably Somali men, are frequently better known by their nicknames than by their formalnames. The same applies to public figures and politicians mentioned in the text, whose nickname isprovided in quotation marks, such as in ‘better known’ or ‘also known’ as ‘Qoor Qoor’.

6 Hoehne M., Between Somaliland and Puntland, 2015, url, p. 7

10

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Maps of Somalia
See next pages.

11Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Federal Member States

Figure 1 Somalia: States and Regions, © ISPI, 2021, url7

7 ISPI, Somalia: States and Regions, May 2021, url, non-public source

12Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Approximate Territorial Control

Figure 2. Political Geography Now, Somalia - Approximate Territorial Control as of 30 June 2021 (www.polgeonow.com)8
Please note: This map was produced by Political Geography Now. The depictions on this map do not imply any opinion
whatsoever on the part of EASO concerning legal status or effective control over any country, territory, city, or area. Everyeffort is made to ensure this map is free of errors, but there is no guarantee that the map or its features are either spatiallyor temporally accurate or fit for a particular use. This map is provided without any warranty of any kind whatsoever, either
express or implied.

8 Political Geography Now, Somalia – Approximate Territorial Control as of 30 June 2021, n.d., non public source

13

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Clan Maps
Below two maps showing clan distribution at a detail level (mostly sub-clan). Originally, they are based
respectively on: (1) the map by the British anthropologist and expert in Somali clans, Ioan M. Lewis,
attached to his 1955 book Peoples of the Horn of Africa: Somali, Afar and Saho;9 and (2) the map byAbdulqaadir Abikar (1999).10 Both maps are published below in an edited version, as reworked by SEM
Laenderanalyse, to make them more readable and more clearly laid-out than the original.
Please note: the nomadic lifestyle of many Somalis, the extensive migration movements since 1991
and the disagreements regarding clan genealogies and clan distribution make it virtually impossible
to produce a precise map. These discrepancies are clearly visible when comparing the two maps
below, for example the distribution of the Hawiye in Southern Somalia. Contrary to what the maps
show, for the most part there are no exact and clearly defined borders between clan territories.
As already noted in the Note on Transliteration, it is equally important to notice that the spelling ofclan names may vary. In the maps below, the spellings used by the original authors have been
reproduced verbatim. The spelling variations between the two authors are reflected in the maps (e.g.
Gelimes by Lewis 1955 vs Gilmays by Abikar 1999).
Although there is a long time-span between the publication of these maps (1955 and 1999
respectively), the differences between the maps should not be understood as changes in the Somaliclan distribution within this timeframe.

9 Lewis, I.M., Peoples of the Horn of Africa: Somali, Afar and Saho, International African Institute, 1955
10 Abikar, A., Clan Distribution of the Somalis in Horn of Africa, 1999, as in: ACCORD, Clans in Somalia. Report on a Lecture

by Joakim Gundel, December 2009, url, p. 30

14Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Map by Lewis
Please see user guide in the previous page Clan Maps

Figure 3. Clan Distribution by Lewis (1955).11

11 Lewis, I.M., Peoples of the Horn of Africa: Somali, Afar and Saho, International African Institute, 1955

15

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Map by Abikar
Please see user guide in the previous page Clan Maps

Figure 4. Clan Distribution by Abikar (1999).12

12 Abikar, A., Clan Distribution of the Somalis in Horn of Africa, 1999, as in: ACCORD, Clans in Somalia. Report on a Lecture

by Joakim Gundel, December 2009, url, p. 30

16

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

1. Recruitment by Al-Shabaab andrepercussions for deserters
1.1 Patterns of recruitment
Al-Shabaab is an Islamist Sunni Salafi jihadist13 armed group based in Somalia formed in the early 2000s
that seeks to establish an Islamic caliphate state in the country.14 For further details see EASO’s COI
report Somalia: Actors, published in July 2021.15
Recruitment, in the combat-related sense of the term, may be understood as referring to ‘the process
whereby civilians temporarily—or indefinitely—leave their everyday lives to join an armed group’.16 A2020 article by political scientist J. Tochukwu Omenma and others conceptualises recruitment more
specifically as ‘the process and strategy employed to enlist fighters, supporters, sympathizers andfinanciers’ into an organization.17 Recruitment into Al-Shabaab (AS) can occur in a variety of forms andsettings. It is a complex process that can vary ‘based on location, the individual, and the needs of AlShabaab at a particular time.’18
This section will elaborate on this complex process by first describing the prevalence of recruitment,
referring to local aspects of recruitment, numbers of fighters and the type of persons that arerecruited, i.e. Al-Shabaab’s composition of fighters and sources. Apart from information regarding
fighters and actual members of Al-Shabaab, the issue of informants and ad hoc assistance to the groupis also referred to. The second part of this section takes into account the perspectives of those
recruited and deals with reasons for joining Al-Shabaab, while the third part tries to shed light on AlShabaab’s conduct in this regard and deals with the organisation’s recruitment strategies. In thiscontext, the complex issue of forced versus voluntary recruitment is discussed. At the end of thesection, information on the recruitment of youth and children and on the recruitment of women ishighlighted.
Prevalence of recruitment and Al-Shabaab fighters composition/sources
A 2018 report by the Hiraal Institute, a think tank based in Mogadishu, notes that in its early years, AlShabaab – which was at that time an urban phenomenon19 – used to recruit from among the
population of Mogadishu and other urban centres. However, since the group lost territory in the urban
centres between 2012 and 2015, it has recruited most of its new members in rural areas under its
control, including the densely populated Bay and Bakool regions, with children forming the majorityof the new recruits.20 As noted by Landinfo, the most important target groups for recruitment havebeen boys and young men between the age of 12 and 24. 21 Botha and Abdile, who interviewed 88
former Al-Shabaab fighters for their 2014 study, stressed that among their interviewees, 40 % had

13 International Crisis Group, Somalia: Al-Shabaab – It Will Be a Long War, Africa Briefing no. 99, 26 June 2014, url, p. 7
14 CFR, Al-Shabaab – Backgrounder, 19 May 2021, url
15 EASO, Somalia: Actors, July 2021, url, Chapter 4: Al-Shabaab
16 Omenma, J. T. et al., al-Shabaab and Boko Haram: Recruitment Strategies, 2020, url, p. 5
17 Omenma, J. T. et al., al-Shabaab and Boko Haram: Recruitment Strategies, 2020, url, p. 5
18 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia: Almost Everyone wants them despite their Dangers, 2020, url, p.

121
19 Hansen, S. J., Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 2005-2012, 2013, p. 89
20 Hiraal Institute, Al-Shabab's Military Machine, December 2018, url, p. 1; Landinfo points to the fact that in the Somali
context, puberty, not age, is the decisive criterion whether a person is considered an adult. (Norway, Landinfo, Query
response, Somalia: Date of birth, age and calendar, 17 February 2021, url, p. 2)
21 Norway, Landinfo, Somalia: Respons: Rekruttering til al-Shabaab, 26 January 2018, url, p. 3

17

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

joined the group between the age of 15 and 19 and 46 % were in their twenties. Only 5 % wereyounger than 15, and only 9 % were older than 29.22
In a 2018 report, Marchal estimated that nearly 40 % of AS’s rank-and-file members are recruited from
Bay and Bakool.23 According to a security expert interviewed for this report, ‘the Mirifle clan groupconstitutes the main source of foot soldiers for AS’.24 In Middle Shabelle region, the majority of AS’sfoot soldiers (except those from the Digil-Mirifle clan) were recruited from low-status groups such as
the Bantu/Jareer.25 It has been reported that AS ‘recruits more easily in multi-clan locations because
conflicts there are likely’.26
Al-Shabaab not only recruits members locally within Somalia but also in adjacent countries such as
Kenya27 as well as in Europe, (North) America28 and Australia, South Asia and the Middle East29.
According to a 2020 report by Vanda Felbab-Brown, senior fellow in the Brookings Institution’s Foreign
Policy programme, AS has an estimated strength of 5 000 to 7 000 active fighters30, having significantly
increased its force from about 2 000 to 3 000 active fighters in 2017. The author notes that theorganisation has stepped up recruitment efforts among unemployed young men since 2017.31 For
more information see EASO’s COI report Somalia: Actors, published in July 2021.32
As mentioned above, young men are the main target for recruitment. However, AS recruits personsof all age groups including women, with ‘variables such as age, gender, educational background, orprior professions influenc[ing] for what purpose one is recruited.’33 Besides being used for armed
combat, individuals may also be recruited for work as mechanics, logistics personnel,34 drivers,
porters, cleaners, cooks, judges, administrative staff, teachers or health workers,35 for example. In
many cases, persons in areas not in Al-Shabaab’s hands are used as informants because of theirknowledge of their local area.36 It has been reported that recruitment of informants – who are notnecessarily members of AS37 – may occur through bribery, intimidation, threats and the use of

22 Botha, A. and Abdile, M., Radicalisation and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia, September 2014, url, p. 2
23 Marchal, R., Une lecture de la radicalisation djihadiste en Somalie, 2018, url, p. 107
24 Interview with Somali security expert II, 21 June 2021. Expert II is a leading Somali security expert, author, and scholar

based in Somalia, with extensive academic and international consulting experience. Security expert II prefers to remain
anonymous for security reasons.
25 Ingiriis, M. H., The anthropology of Al-Shabaab: the salient factors for the insurgency movement’s recruitment project,
2020, url, p. 370
26 Marchal, R., Motivations and drivers of Al-Shabaab, 2018, p. 314
27 Badurdeen, F. A., Why we did it: the Kenyan women and girls who joined Al-Shabaab, 21 February 2021, url; Reuters,
Spreading the net: Somali Islamists now target Kenyan recruits, 17 May 2019, url; DW, A farewell to arms – leaving a life of
terrorism behind in Kenya, 3 May 2019, url
28 Ingiriis, M. H., Building peace from the margins in Somalia: The case for political settlement with Al-Shabaab, 2018, p. 520;
Omenma, J. T. et al., al-Shabaab and Boko Haram: Recruitment Strategies, 2020, url, pp. 2, 14, 15
29 Omenma, J. T. et al., al-Shabaab and Boko Haram: Recruitment Strategies, 2020, url, pp. 14, 15
30 Hoehne notes that the group acts in an area of approximately 300.000 square kilometres with a limited number of armed
fighters, therefore it cannot be present everywhere and rules by ‘exemplary violence’. (ACCORD, Somalia: Al-Schabaab undSicherheitslage; Lage von Binnenvertriebenen und Rückkehrer·innen; Schutz durch staatliche und nicht-staatliche Akteure[Seminar with experts Markus Hoehne and Jutta Bakonyi], 31 May 2021, url, p. 8)
31 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia: Almost Everyone wants them despite their Dangers, 2020, url, p.
120
32 EASO, Somalia: Actors, July 2021, url, sections: 4 Al-Shabaab, and especially 4.2.1 The Jabahaat
33 Denmark, DIS and DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation, al-Shabaab Presence, and Target Groups, January
2017, url, p. 14
34 Denmark, DIS, South and Central Somalia - Security situation, forced recruitment, and conditions for returnees [source:
Mary Harper and a representative of an international organisation], July 2020, url, p. 14
35 Harper, M., Everything You Have Told Me is True: The Many Faces of Al-Shabaab, London, 2019, p. 33
36 Denmark, DIS, South and Central Somalia - Security situation, forced recruitment, and conditions for returnees [sources:
Mary Harper and a representative of an international organisation], July 2020, url, p. 14
37 Norway, Landinfo, Respons, Somalia: Massearrestasjoner og reaksjoner mot personer som mistenkes for å være alShabaab-medlemmer, 5 June 2015, url, pp. 4-5

18

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

violence, e.g. local employees of international organisations were pressured to cooperate with AS in
this regard.38
According to one AS official, some recruits work for the organisation on a part-time basis, alongside
their farms or business work. Harper points out that people can have ‘multiple identities, someconnected with the movement, some not’, and that there is also the question of what constitutes
collaboration or involvement with AS, for example in the case of people who pay taxes to the groupor otherwise ‘keep on the good side’ of AS out of fear of reprisals or who travel to AS-controlled areas
in order to use the more efficient legal services provided by the group.39
According to the UK-based academic Mohamed Haji Ingiriis, recruitment into AS can be viewed as ‘apull-and-push phenomenon’ where recruiters seek out recruits, but potential recruits also look forrecruiters. 40 These two aspects of recruitment, the reasons for joining Al-Shabaab and the group’s
recruitment strategies are further elaborated in the following paragraphs.
Reasons for joining Al-Shabaab
A 2020 report by Ingiriis that presents findings from interviews he conducted with former AS members
in Mogadishu and the town of Afgooye states that many young men joined the ranks of AS ‘for theirown individual reasons’, including personal gain, better economic prospects and grievances against
the government.41 Referring to data gathered from UN officials, Somali analysts and other sources in
2017, Felbab-Brown notes that about two-thirds of AS members have joined ‘either for economic
reasons or as a result of grievances against clan discrimination or abuses and corruption of local
authorities’.42 Many young men believe that AS defends Islam against ‘infidel’ invaders seeking to split
their people and nation to advance their own interests43. Botha and Abdile found that 98% of the 88
former Al-Shabaab fighters they interviewed in 2014 believed that Islam was under threat.44
A 2017 study conducted by ISS researcher Anneli Botha among former AS members (both rank-andfile members and persons in leadership positions) in Baidoa showed that more than half of the leaders(52 %) said that they joined AS for religious reasons, while 15 % of rank-and-file members cited religion
as a driver that led them to join.45 Meanwhile, Ingiriis points out that it is hardly possible to distinguish‘recruits driven by jihadi ideology [...] from those who are motivated by profit or looking for power,
because almost all justify joining Al-Shabaab for religious reasons while suppressing other reasons’.46
While religion may not be the primary point of recruitment, it is reported to underpin people’s
engagement for the jihadist goals propagated by the organisation.47
Personal grievances arising from unequal power and resource distribution by the government andclans have also been exploited by AS to attract ‘young, dispossessed men’ in the past, notably in areas

38 Norway, Landinfo, Query response, Somalia: Al-Shabaab and local employees of AMISOM, the UN and other internationalorganisations, June 2015, url, p. 5
39 Harper, M., Everything You Have Told Me is True: The Many Faces of Al-Shabaab, London, 2019, pp. 33-34
40 Ingiriis, M. H., The anthropology of Al-Shabaab: the salient factors for the insurgency movement’s recruitment project,
2020, url, pp. 364, 369
41 Ingiriis, M. H., The anthropology of Al-Shabaab: the salient factors for the insurgency movement’s recruitment project,
2020, url, p. 364
42 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia: Almost Everyone wants them despite their Dangers, 2020, url, pp.
120-12143 Ingiriis, M. H., The anthropology of Al-Shabaab: the salient factors for the insurgency movement’s recruitment project,
2020, url, pp. 364-365
44 Botha, A. and Abdile, M., Radicalisation and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia, September 2014, url, p. 6
45 Botha, A., Reasons for joining and staying in al-Shabaab in Somalia, 2019, url, p. 1; see also Botha, A. and Abdile, M.,
Radicalisation and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia, September 2014, url, p. 5
46 Ingiriis, M. H., The anthropology of Al-Shabaab: the salient factors for the insurgency movement’s recruitment project,
2020, url, p. 365
47 Marchal, R., Une lecture de la radicalisation djihadiste en Somalie, 2018, url, pp. 105-106

19

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

around Mogadishu.48 It has also been reported that ‘the desire of some young men to lead anadventurous life also plays a role’ in AS’s recruitment efforts and that many young men in Mogadishu
contemplate changing their status quo through acts of violence.49 Indeed, the idea of taking revenge
for acts of humiliation or crime has been reported to be a key motive for joining the ranks of AS. The
group, in its messaging, has consistently emphasised the damage caused by the opposite side (or evenfabricated such ‘facts’ where evidence was scarce), and many former AS members who have defectedto the government claimed that they had joined AS because they wished to take revenge for a close
relative.50 Such a person may have died at the hands of government forces attacking them at acheckpoint51 or in a drone attack carried out by international forces.52 Thus, the desire to take revenge
may be directed against the police, local warlords or members of other clans. However, four persons
who were interviewed in 2015 while living in a government rehabilitation centre have even claimed
that their motivation to join AS had been to gain vengeance against other AS members, seeing
membership in the group as something that would better enable them to do so.53
According to international sources interviewed by the Finnish Immigration Service, young unemployed
men living in poverty and lacking in prospects, with limited understanding of the teachings of Islam,are prone to join the ranks of AS when offered a small financial reward.54 Young men have also been
driven by their families expecting them to earn a living.55
A 2017 survey conducted among 32 former AS fighters in Baidoa found that 12 % of interviewees
claimed that they had been forced to join AS.56 According to the 2014 report by Botha and Abdile that
presents the findings of a survey of former AS members in Mogadishu, 13 % of the interviewees
reported that they had been recruited by force, while another 4 % indicated that both religious
reasons and force played a role in their recruitment.57 According to another survey, conducted in
November 2015 among former AS members at the Serendi rehabilitation centre (Mogadishu), about
one-third of the interviewees said that their recruitment had resulted in part from actual or implicit
threats made by AS. The survey authors note, however, that ‘respondents may potentially overstate
the extent to which they were coerced into involvement, aiming to reduce their culpability’.58 Similar
concerns have been raised by Ingiriis more recently.59 Please also see the discussion on aspects offorced versus voluntary recruitment below.
For more information on Al-Shabaab’s armed forces and modus operandi see EASO’s COI report
Somalia: Actors, published in July 2021.60

48 Ingiriis, M. H., The anthropology of Al-Shabaab: the salient factors for the insurgency movement’s recruitment project,

2020, url, p. 365; see also Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia: Almost Everyone wants them despite theirDangers, 2020, url, p. 120
49 Ingiriis, M. H., The anthropology of Al-Shabaab: the salient factors for the insurgency movement’s recruitment project,
2020, url, p. 366; see also Khalil, J. et al., Deradicalisation and Disengagement in Somalia, January 2019, url, p. 15
50 Marchal, R., Une lecture de la radicalisation djihadiste en Somalie, 2018, url, p. 106
51 Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020; Security situation and humanitarian conditions in
Mogadishu, 7 August 2020, url, p. 17
52 AI, Somalia: Zero accountability as civilian deaths mount from US air strikes, 1 April 2020, url; see also Al Jazeera, A family
mourns as US drone attacks in Somalia continue, 1 April 2020, url; Nation (The), Inside the Secretive US Air Campaign In
Somalia, 7 February 2019, url
53 Khalil, J. et al., Deradicalisation and Disengagement in Somalia, January 2019, url, p. 15
54 Finland, Finnish Immigration Service, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020; Security situation andhumanitarian conditions in Mogadishu [sources: international security organisation; international NGO], 7 August 2020, url,
p. 17
55 El-Bushra, J., Gardner, J. and Abokor, A., Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Young Somali Men Today, 2018, p. 281
56 Taylor, C. et al., The Cost of Defection: The Consequences of Quitting Al-Shabaab, 2019, url, p. 7
57 Botha, A. and Abdile, M., Radicalisation and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia, September 2014, url, p. 5
58 Khalil, J. et al., Deradicalisation and Disengagement in Somalia, January 2019, url, p. 14
59 Ingiriis, M. H., The anthropology of Al-Shabaab: the salient factors for the insurgency movement’s recruitment project,
2020, url, p. 364
60 EASO, Somalia: Actors, July 2021, url, sections: 4.2 Armed forces, the Amniyat, and modus operandi

20Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Al-Shabaab recruitment strategies
This section deals not only with the recruitment of fighters or members of the organisation, but alsowith situations where Al-Shabaab recruits civilians to provide information or assistance, sometimes
on an ad hoc basis, which does not necessarily mean that these civilians become members of AlShabaab.
The tactics AS employs to recruit civilians include ‘the promise of martyrdom’ (indoctrination),
financial incentive and conscription by force.61 Those who are disgruntled with the government or
hold grudges against AMISOM (a strategy used both inside and outside territories controlled by AS)
are approached and convinced to join62 as well as those who have personal grievances arising fromclan discrimination63 or against members of other clans64. Baadiyow notes that AS recruitment cantake place in many different ways: money, clan networks, ideology, interests or the use of threats orforce.65 For more information see EASO’s COI report Somalia: Actors, published in July 2021.66
Although AS predominantly recruits from territories under its own control, there have been reportsof recruitment from government-controlled areas, especially Mogadishu.67 Roland Marchal, a social
scientist at Sciences Po (France) with research focus on economies and conflicts in the Horn of Africa,
states that AS has a permanent presence in Mogadishu and recruitment is ongoing there. Although
the group’s presence is not very visible, they are present clandestinely and people know about this.
Thanks to its strong intelligence network, AS is able to engage in cautious recruitment activity in thecity, targeting those who express disappointment or anger at AMISOM or the Somali government. The
group engages these people in discussion, and they are turned around gradually, until AS makes them
an official offer (e.g. to join AS’s secret police/Amniyat in the city).68 This has also been confirmed by
Abdurahman Abdullahi Baadiyow, a Somali civil society activist and Islamic studies scholar, who statesthat AS can rely on a very strong intelligence network in Mogadishu (Amniyat), whose informants canbe ordinary students, people in offices, in the security forces etc.69 For more information see EASO’s
COI report Somalia: Actors, published in July 2021.70
AS frequently uses financial rewards as an incentive to attract new recruits or make people provide
them with information or in other ways assist them.71 Harper is quoted as saying that AS pays out
wages more regularly and in higher amounts than the government, but financial promises are rarely
kept, at least in terms of the amount paid.72 Based on information from oral sources consulted in 2018
61 Omenma, J. T. et al., al-Shabaab and Boko Haram: Recruitment Strategies, 2020, url, pp. 11-14; see also Denmark, DIS,South and Central Somalia - Security situation, forced recruitment, and conditions for returnees, July 2020, url, p. 13
62 Baadiyow, A. A., telephone interview, 26 June 2021. Abdurahman Abdullahi Baadiyow is a Somali civil society activist andscholar who has published extensively on Somalia. He holds a PhD in Islamic Studies from McGill University (Canada).
63 Ingiriis, M. H., The anthropology of Al-Shabaab: the salient factors for the insurgency movement’s recruitment project,
2020, url, p. 365; see also Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia: Almost Everyone wants them despite theirDangers, 2020, url, p. 120
64 Khalil, J. et al., Deradicalisation and Disengagement in Somalia, January 2019, url, p. 15; Botha, A. and Abdile, M.,
Radicalisation and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia, September 2014, url, p. 6
65 Baadiyow, A. A., telephone interview, 26 June 2021; see also Botha, A. and Abdile, M., Radicalisation and al-Shabaab
recruitment in Somalia, September 2014, url
66 EASO, Somalia: Actors, July 2021, url, section: 3.5 Clans and Al-Shabaab
67 Denmark, DIS, South and Central Somalia - Security situation, forced recruitment, and conditions for returnees [sources:
Mary Harper and Landinfo], July 2020, url p. 13
68 Marchal, R., telephone interview, 26 June 2021
69 Baadiyow, A. A., telephone interview, 26 June 2021
70 EASO, Somalia: Actors, July 2021, url, section: 4.2.2 Amniyat
71 See, for example: Denmark, DIS, South and Central Somalia - Security situation, forced recruitment, and conditions for
returnees [source: Mary Harper], July 2020, url, p. 13; Omenma, J. T. et al., al-Shabaab and Boko Haram: Recruitment
Strategies, 2020, url, p. 12
72 Denmark, DIS, South and Central Somalia - Security situation, forced recruitment, and conditions for returnees [source:
Mary Harper], July 2020, url, p. 13; see also ACCORD, Somalia: Al-Schabaab und Sicherheitslage; Lage vonBinnenvertriebenen und Rückkehrer·innen; Schutz durch staatliche und nicht-staatliche Akteure [Seminar with experts
Markus Hoehne and Jutta Bakonyi], 31 May 2021, url, p. 36

21

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

by the Finnish Immigration Service, the organisation was able to pay its fighters between 50 and 200
USD per month.73
Some members of AS are reported to recruit from among their kin by persuading family and relatives
to take part in the Islamic jihad and by promising monetary rewards.74 Beyond their own kinshipnetwork, the AS members may identify potential recruits through the use of existing ties to clan
leaders, as well as in educational facilities, prisons, mosques, prayer circles, football grounds, sports
clubs, playgrounds, dormitories, online chatrooms,75 and among children and unemployed men in IDP
camps76. In areas under its control, AS has set up schools where children are indoctrinated toparticipate in armed combat, besides receiving other education.77 For more information see EASO’s
COI report Somalia: Actors, published in July 2021.78 The group has utilised existing cultural elementsof jihadism and martyrdom in its recruitment efforts.79
It has also been reported that AS provides its combatants with some sort of insurance, with thepromise that their families will be looked after in the event of the combatant’s death.80 AS also uses
the prospect of marriage as a lure to recruit fighters, arranging forced marriages between its fightersand young girls.81 Particularly, women or girls from the Bantu/Jareer minorities are not only forced
into marriage under the threat of death but also the marriage resembles rather a temporary sexualenslavement, meaning that they typically remain in their families of origin’s household and thatchildren resulting from the union are ignored by the father.82 Ingiriis notes that in Middle Shabelle
region foot soldiers were recruited from low-status groups such as the Bantu/Jareer who cannot
intermarry with members of the Somali clans.83 According to a former AS member, the organisation
has empowered those people to marry women from traditionally powerful Somali clans such as the
Hawiye and Darood.84
Aspects of forced versus voluntary recruitment
Data on the recruitment process to al-Shabaab is limited. Multiple sources corroborated that
recruitment should be regarded as a continuum of voluntary, induced, and forced, ‘with combinationsof incentives and propaganda in-between.’85 AS recruitment is described by sources as a complex

73

Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding Mission to Mogadishu and Nairobi, January 2018 [sources: Somali expert on
administration and security circumstances; international development organisation], 5 October 2018, url, p. 13
74 Ingiriis, M. H., The anthropology of Al-Shabaab: the salient factors for the insurgency movement’s recruitment project,
2020, url, pp. 364, 369
75 Omenma, J. T. et al., al-Shabaab and Boko Haram: Recruitment Strategies, 2020, url, p. 976 SIPRI, Climate-related Security Risks and Peacebuilding in Somalia, October 2019, url, p. 21
77 Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020; Security situation and humanitarian conditions in
Mogadishu [source: Somali researcher], 7 August 2020, url, p. 18
78 EASO, Somalia: Actors, July 2021, url, sections: 4 Al-Shabaab, and especially 4.3.1 Governance and services
79 Omenma, J. T. et al., al-Shabaab and Boko Haram: Recruitment Strategies, 2020, url, p. 11
80 Finland, FIS, Somalia: Fact-finding Mission to Mogadishu and Nairobi, January 2018 [sources: Somali expert on
administration and security circumstances; international development organisation], 5 October 2018, url, p. 13
81 USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 34; see also Omenma, J. T. etal., al-Shabaab and Boko Haram: Recruitment Strategies, 2020, url, p. 12
82 Benstead, L. J. and Van Lehman, D., Two Classes of “Marriage”: Race and Sexual Slavery in Al-Shabaab-Controlled Somalia,
18 June 2021, url, pp. 10-11, 17
83 Ingiriis, M. H., The anthropology of Al-Shabaab: the salient factors for the insurgency movement’s recruitment project,
2020, url, p. 370; see also Benstead and Van Lehman, Two Classes of “Marriage”: Race and Sexual Slavery in Al-ShabaabControlled Somalia, 18 June 2021, url, pp. 3, 10
84 Ingiriis, M. H., The anthropology of Al-Shabaab: the salient factors for the insurgency movement’s recruitment project,
2020, url, p. 370
85 Denmark, DIS and DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation, al-Shabaab Presence, and Target Groups, January
2017, url, p. 20, 52 [induced]

22

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

process86 that ‘varies based on location, the individual, and the needs of al-Shabaab at a particulartime.’87
Sources provided varying characterisations of the continuum of recruitment: most recruitment ofyoung men to AS occurs due to the lack of economic opportunities to earn a living,88 or due to othergrievances against issues such as clan discrimination89 or state corruption.90 Felbab-Brown maintains
that ‘forcible recruitment’ (e.g. forcible abduction, Islamic school recruitment, removal of children,clan quotas via elders) and clan-negotiated recruitment play a ‘significant role’ in AS’s recruitment
efforts,91 while other sources indicated that the use of force is situational and ‘does not always
constitute the primary form of recruitment’,92 or even that direct force ‘happens rarely’ in practice93.
Other forms of recruitment include: use of Islamic institutes and education of children in AS schools
with the aim of creating young recruits with a ‘Jihadi worldview’,94 as well as clan arrangements toprovide recruits which can escalate to use of force.95
Regarding ‘forced’ recruitment, AS has been characterised by Hoehne as an organisation that acts ina ‘highly situational manner’96, which includes coercive strategies to recruit new members.97
According to Hoehne, force may be used in situations where the group needs to refill its ranks, forexample after suffering major losses in battle or in places where it is in need of a continuous supplyof new recruits.98 As noted by Ingiriis, forced recruitment has been used when AS’s leadership felt
‘increasingly threatened by external forces, such as [during] the 2011 retreat from Mogadishu.’99
Three sources indicated to DIS that forced recruitment ‘does take place in areas fully controlled by alShabaab but it will most often be in relation to big operations or during and after attacks when alShabaab is in need of people for logistics or to replace lost fighters.’100 According to Mary Harper, a
BBC Africa editor and author specialising in Somalia, recruitment outside AS’s own territory frequently

86 Denmark, DIS and DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation, al-Shabaab Presence, and Target Groups, January

2017, url, p. 20; Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia: Almost Everyone wants them despite their Dangers,
2020, url, p. 120
87 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia: Almost Everyone wants them despite their Dangers, 2020, url, p.
120
88 Denmark, DIS and DRC, South and Central Somalia Security Situation, al-Shabaab Presence, and Target Groups, January
2017, url, p. 20; Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia: Almost Everyone wants them despite their Dangers,
2020, url, p. 120; Ingiriis, M. H., The anthropology of Al-Shabaab: the salient factors for the insurgency movement’s
recruitment project, 2020, url, p. 365
89 Ingiriis, M. H., The anthropology of Al-Shabaab: the salient factors for the insurgency movement’s recruitment project,
2020, url, p. 369; Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia: Almost Everyone wants them despite their Dangers,
2020, url, p. 120
90 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia: Almost Everyone wants them despite their Dangers, 2020, url, p.
120
91 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia: Almost Everyone wants them despite their Dangers, 2020, url, pp.
120-12192 ACCORD, Somalia: Al-Schabaab und Sicherheitslage; Lage von Binnenvertriebenen und Rückkehrer·innen; Schutz durch
staatliche und nicht-staatliche Akteure [Seminar with experts Markus Hoehne and Jutta Bakonyi], 31 May 2021, url, p. 36
93 Ingiriis, M. H., The anthropology of Al-Shabaab: the salient factors for the insurgency movement’s recruitment project,
2020, url, p. 364
94 Hiraal Institute, The Fighters Factory: Inside Al-Shabab's Education System, 15 May 2018, url, p. 3
95 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia: Almost Everyone wants them despite their Dangers, 2020, url, pp.
120-12196 ACCORD, Somalia: Al-Schabaab und Sicherheitslage; Lage von Binnenvertriebenen und Rückkehrer·innen; Schutz durch
staatliche und nicht-staatliche Akteure [Seminar with experts Markus Hoehne and Jutta Bakonyi], 31 May 2021, url, p. 36
97 Marchal, R., Une lecture de la radicalisation djihadiste en Somalie, 2018, url, p. 92
98 ACCORD, Somalia: Al-Schabaab und Sicherheitslage; Lage von Binnenvertriebenen und Rückkehrer·innen; Schutz durch
staatliche und nicht-staatliche Akteure [Seminar with experts Markus Hoehne and Jutta Bakonyi], 31 May 2021, url, pp. 36,
40
99 Ingiriis, M. H., The anthropology of Al-Shabaab: the salient factors for the insurgency movement’s recruitment project,
2020, url, p. 364
100 Denmark, DIS, South and Central Somalia - Security situation, forced recruitment, and conditions for returnees [sources:
Mary Harper; representative of an international organisation], July 2020, url, p. 21

23

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

involves aspects of coercion,101 although forced recruitment has also been reported to be common inSouth-West State102 which is widely controlled by the group.103
According to a 2018 report by Marchal, forced recruitment (and brainwashing) is not strategically usedby AS. It is rather practised in limited ways or in particular situations.104 Forced recruitment has beenreported to be ‘almost non-existent’ in Mogadishu, though it occurs in other parts of the country.105
As an example for coercive strategies in urban settings not directly under the control of AS it was
described that the group may request an office worker in Mogadishu to act as its informant, promising
him a financial reward in exchange for crucial information (e.g. on the whereabouts of a high-ranking
official), while at the same time threatening to do harm to their children in case of non-compliance.106
As reported by the Danish Immigration Service (DIS), AS often requests local community members tojoin or provide younger members of their families to the organisation. People who refused such
requests have been ‘threatened and labelled as infidels who reject Islam and the Sharia law’ and insome cases even killed to set a warning to others in the community.107 When AS takes control of anarea, it requests local clan elders to provide several dozens or even hundreds of young people. The
elders, unable to refuse, designate young members of their communities to fight alongside AS and/or
take up functions as local ‘police’ to demonstrate their courageousness and loyalty before being sent
away to other areas to take up a role within AS proper.108 It has also been reported that families who
are unable to pay (religious) taxes to AS are often coerced into giving up their children to the group.109
Further aspects of forced recruitment of youth and children and of women are elaborated below. For
more information also see EASO’s COI report Somalia: Actors, published in July 2021.110
Recruitment of youth and children
Ingiriis, in his 2020 report, states that AS has resorted to recruiting local children due to decreasing
numbers of non-Somali fighters, for example from USA, Europe, Afghanistan,111 joining its ranks.112
According to a 2018 Hiraal Institute report, most persons recruited by AS since 2011 have beenchildren ‘who have gone through the AS education system, which greatly increases their loyalty to thegroup.’113
The United Nations reported that between January and June 2020, 535 children were recruited, someof them as young as 13, with Al-Shabaab being responsible for 402 (or over 75 %) of the cases. The

101 Denmark, DIS, South and Central Somalia - Security situation, forced recruitment, and conditions for returnees [sources:

Mary Harper and Landinfo], July 2020, url, p. 14
102 Sweden, Swedish Migration Agency, Somalia Säkerhetssituationen 2020 (version 1.2) [source: an internationalorganisation in Nairobi that works on Somalia], 12 May 2021, url, pp. 19-20
103 Reuters, Blackwater founder's FSG signs security deal with Somali region, 22 June 2017, url; ACLED, A turbulent run-up toelections in Somalia, 7 April 2021, url
104 Marchal, R., Une lecture de la radicalisation djihadiste en Somalie, 2018, url, p. 92
105 Finland, Finnish Immigration Service, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020; Security situation andhumanitarian conditions in Mogadishu [source: international security organisation], 7 August 2020, url, p. 17
106 Finland, Finnish Immigration Service, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March 2020; Security situation andhumanitarian conditions in Mogadishu [source: Somalia researcher], 7 August 2020, url, p. 18
107 Denmark, DIS, South and Central Somalia - Security situation, forced recruitment, and conditions for returnees [sources:
Mary Harper; representative of an international organisation], July 2020, url, p. 13
108 Marchal, R., Une lecture de la radicalisation djihadiste en Somalie, 2018, url, p. 105
109 Denmark, DIS, South and Central Somalia - Security situation, forced recruitment, and conditions for returnees [source: a
representative of an international organisation], July 2020, url, p. 13; Sweden, Swedish Migration Agency, Somalia
Säkerhetssituationen 2020 (version 1.2) [source: an international organisation in Somalia], 12 May 2021, url, p. 20
110 EASO, Somalia: Actors, July 2021, url, sections: 3.5 Clans and Al-Shabaab, and especially 3.5.1 Clans within Al-Shabaaband 4.3.2 Taxation
111 Baadiyow, A. A., telephone interview, 26 June 2021
112 Ingiriis, M. H., The anthropology of Al-Shabaab: the salient factors for the insurgency movement’s recruitment project,
2020, url, p. 368
113 Hiraal Institute, Al-Shabab's Military Machine, December 2018, url, p. 1; see alsoHiraal Institute, The Fighters Factory:
Inside Al-Shabab's Education System, 15 May 2018, url

24

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

largest numbers of such incidents were documented in Middle Jubba (121), Lower Shabelle (98) andBay (87).114 As indicated in the UN Secretary-General’s reports on the situation in Somalia, 3 898 ‘grave
violations’ against children were verified between early February 2020 and early May 2021, of which
between 58.6 % and 74.3 % were attributed to AS. The instances of ‘grave violations’ against children
included the recruitment and use of 1 615 children.115 Children recruited by AS have been used incombat, including as human shields116 and suicide bombers, or to plant explosive devices, as well as
in auxiliary roles, ‘such as carrying ammunition, water, and food; removing injured and dead militants;
gathering intelligence; and serving as guards.’117 For further details see EASO’s COI report Somalia:
Actors, published in July 2021.118
An October 2018 article by the journalist Hassan Ghedi Santur stated that due to territorial losses inrecent years, AS, has turned to the abduction and forcible recruitment of children, although ‘accurate
numbers are difficult to come by’.119 As reported by Human Rights Watch in 2018, ‘since late
September 2017, Al-Shabab has ordered elders, teachers in Islamic religious schools, and communities
in rural areas to provide hundreds of children as young as 8.’120 AS continued to forcibly recruitchildren during the year 2020121 and retaliated against communities which refused to give up children
to the organisation122, including by attacks, arrests of community elders and forced displacement.123
Reports received by the United Nations Panel of Experts on Somalia suggest that AS child recruitment
campaigns were ‘targeting communities perceived to be aligned to the government.’124 It has beenreported that AS sometimes takes children directly from their families.125 Another source, drawing on
information from 2018, reports that certain families in Baidoa force their sons to fight for AS. 126 AS’s
recruitment efforts have also targeted orphaned children.127
It has been reported that since 2015, AS has set up a number of large madrasas in areas under theircontrol, reinforced indoctrination including by bringing in younger children, and ‘pressured teachers
to retrain and teach Al-Shabab’s curriculum in schools.’128 33 boys were reportedly rescued by security
forces from an AS-operated madrasa in Lower Shabelle in August 2020.129 According to reports, atleast another 250 children who had been abducted or recruited by AS from various villages in Lower

114 UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, S/2020/949, 28 September 2020, url, para. 137
115 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2021/485, 19 May 2021, url, para. 50; UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2021/154, 17 February

2021, url, para. 50; UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2020/1113, 13 November 2020, url, para. 45; UNSG, Situation in Somalia,
S/2020/798, 13 August 2020, url, para. 55-56; UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2020/398, 13 May 2020, url, para. 52-53
116 No further recent information could be found on the issue of using children as human shields. USDOS uses this sentencein each of their annual human rights report since 2012, however the only source actually reporting on this is Human Rights
Watch in 2012, see HRW, No Place for Children: Child Recruitment, Forced Marriage, and Attacks on Schools in Somalia,
Februar 2012, url, pp. 30-31
117 USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, pp. 14-15
118 EASO, Somalia: Actors, July 2021, url, section: 4.5 Overview of Abuses
119 Santur, H. G., Reporter’s Diary: Heal Somalia’s former child soldiers, heal a nation, 22 October 2018, url
120 HRW, Somalia: Al-Shabab Demanding Children, 14 January 2018, url
121 HRW, World Report 2021: Somalia, 13 January 2021, url; USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices:
Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, pp. 14-15; UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, 28 September 2020,
url, para. 137
122 HRW, World Report 2021: Somalia, 13 January 2021, url
123 UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, S/2020/949, 28 September 2020, url, p. 79
124 UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, S/2020/949, 28 September 2020, url, para. 139
125 Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia: Almost Everyone wants them despite their Dangers, 2020, url,
pp. 120-121; see also HRW, Somalia: Al-Shabab Demanding Children, 14 January 2018, url
126 Sweden, Swedish Migration Agency, Somalia Säkerhetssituationen 2020 (version 1.2) [source: an internationalorganisation in Nairobi that works on Somalia], 12 May 2021, url, pp. 19-20
127 Ingiriis, M. H., The anthropology of Al-Shabaab: the salient factors for the insurgency movement’s recruitment project,
2020, url, p. 368
128 HRW, Somalia: Al-Shabab Demanding Children, 14 January 2018, url
129 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2020/1113, 13 November 2020, url, para. 46

25

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Shabelle (over an unspecified period) were kept by AS in a madrasa located in Towfiiq (Mudug
region).130
Recruitment of women
AS also recruits women. According to a June 2019 International Crisis Group’s report, ‘marriage is themost common path along which Somali women become affiliated with Al-Shabaab’. The organisation
uses marriage as a ‘tool for recruitment’ of men, including from minority clans (see above), and to‘advance relations and procure loyalties across a wide patchwork of clans’.131 The same report notesthat ‘in areas where militants dominate or exert influence’, marriage ‘can be a matter of survival’.132
Some women are coerced into offering themselves to AS.133 Many who marry AS members arereportedly still young girls. However, ‘some women members do express strong support for the
movement and its goals and regard themselves as full-fledged members’.134 The group has also used
women to propel its recruitment, indoctrination and [community] outreach efforts.135 AS also takes‘advantage of the lax security that is applied to women’, using them ‘to support intelligence gathering’.
Some also act as suicide bombers.136 It has been reported that women’s marriage to AS fighters cancome with certain privileges, such as being allowed to use smartphones or being granted certain
degree of freedom of movement.137 One expert noted that some women who have grown up inenvironments beset with insecurity and gender-based violence may see marriage into AS, and theprotection that comes with it, as a better alternative to being raped by a militiaman.138 At the sametime, especially in the case of Bantu girls and women, ‘marriage’ to AS fighters has been described as‘sexual and domestic slavery’.139

1.2 Repercussions for deserters from Al-Shabaab
Treatment of deserters by government authorities
An October 2018 article by journalist Hassan Ghedi Santur states that former AS members aresupposed to be scrutinised by the National Intelligence Security Agency (NISA), which hands overthose considered to be of ‘higher risk’ to the Justice Ministry for potential prosecution. 140 Former
members being deemed ‘low-risk’ can be rehabilitated and/or integrated into SFG's security forces.141
Meanwhile, the government operates a number of rehabilitation centres that accommodate adults142
deemed to be of ‘lower risk’, while various NGO-run approved centres accommodate children,

130 UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, S/2020/949, 28 September 2020, url, p. 81
131 International Crisis Group, Women and Al-Shabaab’s Insurgency, 27 June 2019, url, pp. 7-8
132 International Crisis Group, Women and Al-Shabaab’s Insurgency, 27 June 2019, url, p. 2
133 ACCORD, Somalia: Al-Schabaab und Sicherheitslage; Lage von Binnenvertriebenen und Rückkehrer·innen; Schutz durch

staatliche und nicht-staatliche Akteure [Seminar with experts Markus Hoehne and Jutta Bakonyi], 31 May 2021, url, p. 36
134 International Crisis Group, Women and Al-Shabaab’s Insurgency, 27 June 2019, url, p. 2
135 International Crisis Group, Women and Al-Shabaab’s Insurgency, 27 June 2019, url, p. 10; see also Marchal, R., Rivals in
Governance: Civil Activities of Al-Shabaab, 2018, p. 353
136 Baadiyow, A. A., telephone interview, 26 June 2021
137 Khadija and Harley, S., Women in Al-Shabaab, 2018, p. 252
138 ACCORD, Somalia: Al-Schabaab und Sicherheitslage; Lage von Binnenvertriebenen und Rückkehrer·innen; Schutz durch
staatliche und nicht-staatliche Akteure [Seminar with experts Markus Hoehne and Jutta Bakonyi], 31 May 2021, url, pp. 3637
139 Benstead and Van Lehman, Two Classes of “Marriage”: Race and Sexual Slavery in Al-Shabaab-Controlled Somalia, 18 June
2021, url, p. 2
140 Santur, H. G., Reporter’s Diary: Heal Somalia’s former child soldiers, heal a nation, 22 October 2018, url; Landinfo,
Temanotat Somalia: Reaksjoner mot al-Shabaab-avhoppere, 5 August 2015, url, p. 7
141 Norway, Landinfo, Temanotat Somalia: Reaksjoner mot al-Shabaab-avhoppere, 5 August 2015, url, p. 7
142 Landinfo points to the fact that in the Somali context, puberty, not age, is the decisive criterion whether a person isconsidered an adult. (Norway, Landinfo, Query response, Somalia: Date of birth, age and calendar, 17 February 2021, url, p.
2)26

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

providing them education and vocational training.143 It has been noted that the government is actively
encouraging defection from AS.144 According to Landifo, clan affiliation can influence the way
defectors are treated by the authorities. Nevertheless, the majority of defectors are categorized as
low-risk, including defectors who have killed for AS.145 At times, SFG authorities granted amnesty for
low risk AS defectors.146 On the other hand, if not sentenced to death, high risk defectors risked being
imprisoned indefinitely due to limited capacity of the SFG for rehabilitation.147
Reactions to deserting by AS
Somali officials are quoted as saying that desertion from AS is irrevocable as defectors are imprisoned
or executed by AS.148 The BBC, in a coverage by Mary Harper featuring three AS defectors whose real
names were replaced with pseudonyms, states that any AS recruit who is caught while attempting toleave the organisation would be executed, with a former AS member quoted as saying that theorganisation told him that this punishment applies not only to combatants but to anyone who leaves
AS without permission. Executions of defectors would be carried out in public.149 It has been reported
that in several cases, people who attempted to leave AS have been killed, or the Amniyat has targeted
their families.150 A former AS member claimed in a November 2015 interview that he was blindfolded
and beaten after telling a commander about his desire to leave the organisation.151 In this context AlShabaab’s strategy of ‘exemplary violence’ may have to be taken into account. As the group lacks thecapacity to exert control all the time and everywhere, punishments are carried out in an exemplarymanner to instill fear in the population.152
The BBC further quotes the former AS member as saying that he would never return to his native
village in AS territory, he would spend the rest of his life trying to hide in Mogadishu, fearing that
otherwise AS would find him and put him to death. Harper remarks that the threats made against
former AS members were so serious that at the rehabilitation centre in Mogadishu that was housing
the three interviewees, ‘there were 80 guards for 84 defectors’.153
A 2017 survey conducted among 32 defectors from AS at a government-run rehabilitation centre in
Baidoa found that there was a shared concern among interviewees that, while security was provided
at the centre itself, they lacked personal security outside of its premises. 70 % of these former fighters
indicated that they had received death threats from AS, with many referring to themselves as being‘hunted’. Some reported that their families had been subjected to threats as well. Several
interviewees who did not receive any threats had changed their phone numbers or discarded theirprevious mobile phone. As the authors note, there is no plan to ensure the security of the AS defectors
once they leave the rehabilitation centre, making it difficult for the disengaged combatants to reunitewith their families without risking their own and their family’s lives, or to set up a business. Moreover,

143 Santur, H. G., Reporter’s Diary: Heal Somalia’s former child soldiers, heal a nation, 22 October 2018, url
144 BBC News, Life after al-Shabab: Driving a school bus instead of an armed pickup truck, 23 November 2020, url
145 Landinfo, Temanotat Somalia: Reaksjoner mot al-Shabaab-avhoppere, 5 August 2015, url, p. 7
146 Landinfo, Temanotat Somalia: Reaksjoner mot al-Shabaab-avhoppere, 5 August 2015, url, p. 8; Felbab-Brown, V., The

Limits of Punishment: Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism - Somalia Case Study, May 2018, url, pp. 4, 13
147 Landinfo, Temanotat Somalia: Reaksjoner mot al-Shabaab-avhoppere, 5 August 2015, url, p. 9
148 Reuters, Exclusive: Somalia lures defectors in new push against insurgents, 18 January 2018, url
149 BBC News, Life after al-Shabab: Driving a school bus instead of an armed pickup truck, 23 November 2020, url
150 Gjelsvik, I. M., Disengaging from violent extremism: The case of al-Shabaab in Somalia, 2019, url; Hansen, S. J., Al-Shabaab
in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 2005-2012, 2013, p. 74
151 Khalil, J. et al., Deradicalisation and Disengagement in Somalia, January 2019, url, p. 17
152 ACCORD, Somalia: Al-Schabaab und Sicherheitslage; Lage von Binnenvertriebenen und Rückkehrer·innen; Schutz durch
staatliche und nicht-staatliche Akteure [Seminar with experts Markus Hoehne and Jutta Bakonyi], 31 May 2021, url, pp. 8-9;
see also Norway, Landinfo, Query response, Somalia: Violence in Mogadishu and developments since 2012, 30 October 2020,
url, pp. 5-6
153 BBC News, Life after al-Shabab: Driving a school bus instead of an armed pickup truck, 23 November 2020, url

27

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

their prospects of relocating to another area or going into hiding are limited due to Somali societal
structure, allowing people to identify a person based on their clan relations.154
Santur mentions an unofficial centre housing about 120 underage AS defectors. Neither the centre’s
location nor the real name of the man who runs it are disclosed. As the author explains, if details about
this centre became known to the public, it ‘would be vulnerable to attack by serving al-Shabab
operatives.’155
Hoehne notes that a low-profile person who has deserted from the ranks of AS is unlikely to be
pursued over large distances. However, there can always be situations where an individual’s identity
is checked. In such a situation, it can happen that AS actors, through extensive networks of people,
become aware that this is the person who acted in an undesirable way a few months back, whichmight lead to reprisals by the organisation. In fact, there is a high level of social control in Somalia andpeople can remember a great amount of information. However, certain things may also be
purposefully ignored, for instance in order to protect one’s own family.156
Marchal mentioned that whether AS will chase defectors from the countryside who fled to Mogadishu
depends on how much clan support the defecting person has. He mentioned that if someone defects
who is from a clan or lineage which is not strongly involved in AS, the defecting person may have achance to hide – if the extended family has a sizable presence in Mogadishu. Specifically, hementioned that a Hawiye/Habar Gedir person who defects AS could find shelter with relatives in
Mogadishu and be reasonably safe. But a person from a clan that is strongly represented in AS, like
Rahanweyn, and whose extended family does not have a strong presence in Mogadishu, cannot findshelter in Mogadishu. He/she will be easily found and targeted. Marchal stated that AS would seek topunish those defectors it can reach in order to provide a shocking example for others who might becontemplating defection. AS generally does not accept leaving; being a jihadi movement, the logic is:once you are in, you cannot resign.157
Attitudes of AS members toward defection are reported to vary based on their position within AS. It
has been reported that AS members occupying middle or higher positions within the organisation,
while often secretly harbouring negative personal views about Al-Shabaab’s policy, rarely defectbecause, unlike rank-and-file members, they ‘would be killed in areas controlled by a government
unable to protect its own officials, let alone AS defectors.’ Meanwhile, many low-ranking members
reluctant to fight and fearing aerial attacks have deserted and fled to their clans or homes. According
to an AS commander interviewed by Hiraal Institute, only few have defected to the government due
to fabricated stories circulated by Al-Shabaab’s intelligence wing, the Amniyat, about abuse theywould face at the hands of the authorities,158 most AS members being unaware of the existence ofgovernment amnesty and rehabilitation centres.159
Regarding female defectors, a former wife of an AS member is quoted as saying that ‘when a woman
defects, she’s not only defecting from the movement, but also has a broken marriage’. Also, militants’former wives are reported to ‘face acute stigma when re-entering society outside the group’s fold.’160
Wives of AS fighter who did not join AS themselves or remain unidentified in their community
sometimes live a normal live claiming to not know that their husbands are part of AS. When knowledge
154 Taylor, C. et al., The Cost of Defection: The Consequences of Quitting Al-Shabaab, 2019, url, pp. 9, 11
155 Santur, H. G., Reporter’s Diary: Heal Somalia’s former child soldiers, heal a nation, 22 October 2018, url
156 ACCORD, Somalia: Al-Schabaab und Sicherheitslage; Lage von Binnenvertriebenen und Rückkehrer·innen; Schutz durch

staatliche und nicht-staatliche Akteure [Seminar with experts Markus Hoehne and Jutta Bakonyi], 31 May 2021, url, p. 40;
compare also Norway, Landinfo, Temanotat, Somalia: Reaksjoner mot al-Shabaabavhoppere, 5 August 2015, url, p. 11
157 Marchal, R., telephone interview, 26 June 2021
158 Hiraal Institute, Al-Shabab's Military Machine, December 2018, url, p. 2; see also Ingiriis, M. H., The anthropology of AlShabaab: the salient factors for the insurgency movement’s recruitment project, 2020, url, p. 372 and BBC News, Life after
al-Shabab: Driving a school bus instead of an armed pickup truck, 23 November 2020, url
159 BBC News, Life after al-Shabab: Driving a school bus instead of an armed pickup truck, 23 November 2020, url
160 International Crisis Group, Women and Al-Shabaab’s Insurgency, 27 June 2019, url, p. 928

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

about their husbands’ involvement spread, they face stigma to different extents. The other way
around, when women themselves leave AS, they can again be affected by stigmatization to a various
extent. Some female defectors also face danger to be recaptured by AS after deserting.161
There are no numbers available on how common it is to defect. Although, officials told Vanda FelbabBrown in December 2017 that about ‘2 000 defectors have gone through various iterations of the
program for low-risk defectors since 2012.’ Not included in this number were those recruited to
become informants or members of Somali intelligence services upon surrender or high-risk defectors
sent to detention and military courts.162
A BBC article by Mary Harper states that persons who defected from AS were frightened that they willbe tracked down by the Amniyat. Defectors at a rehabilitation centre are quoted as saying that the
only way they could be safe from AS would be to move to another country.163
At the same time, Hoehne notes that it is not unusual for injured Al-Shabaab fighters to be allowed toreturn to their families to be treated or cared for ‘under cover‘. Once they are fine again, some ofthese fighters return to their units. The source adds that it is an open secret in some locations that afamily currently hosts their child who has been injured while fighting for Al-Shabaab. This means: noteveryone leaving AS leaves for good. Sometimes absences are akin to ‘sick-leaves’. Moreover, somefighters are‚ part-time‘ jihadists164 (on the issue of part-time involvement with AS, see above).

2. Women and girls
2.1 The position of women in society
Somalia is described as a ‘patriarchal clan-based society’ where lineage is traced through male lines
and one’s clan connections build networks and community.165 The Somali Institute for Development
Research and Analysis (SIDRA) remarked that ‘Somalia is one of the most gender unequal countries in
the world.’166 Girls and women face numerous challenges such as high rates of maternal/infantmortality, child marriage, FGM, domestic violence, sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) as well
as low literacy and school attendance rates.167 In 2020, USDOS observed that ‘women did not havethe same rights as men and experienced systematic subordination to men, despite provisions in thelaw prohibiting such discrimination’168 with the ‘exclusion of women being more pronounced’ in AlShabaab areas. Furthermore, as noted by USDOS in 2020, there was a pattern in which girls wereforced into marriage, often including rape, by non-state armed groups; as well as rape by state security
forces, militias, and clans.169 The UNFPA noted in its March 2021 assessment of SGBV in Somalia that
SGBV ‘continues to be an issue of major concern in Federal Members States Galmudug, South West

161 Stern, O. M., The Invisible Women of Al-Shabaab, September 2019, url, pp. 27-28, 37
162 Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment: Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism - Somalia Case Study, May 2018,

url, p. 14
163 BBC News, Somalia's frightening network of Islamist spies, 27 May 2019, url
164 Hoehne, M. V., communication, 17 June 2021. Dr. Markus Hoehne [Höhne] is a scholar at the Institute of Ethnology at the
University of Leipzig. He has been working on Somalia since 2001 and has spent several years in the country. He speaks
Somali fluently.
165 CMI, Excluding women: the clanization of Somali political institutions, July 2020, url pp. 2-3
166 SIDRA, Breaking the Silence, May 2021, url, p. 8
167 UNFPA, Funding for gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls in Humanitarian programming, June 2020,
url, p. 6
168 USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 32
169 USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 32

29

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

State, Jubaland, Hirashebelle Puntland and in Somaliland’170, while ‘recent spikes in Intimate Partner
Violence, rape, sexual exploitation, sexual harassment and abuse have multiplied GVB risks for womenand girls.’171
Women’s participation in the political system is limited by discrimination and hostility in practice,172
and women are underrepresented in leadership positions in clans and politics.173 Under Somalia’s clansystem, Somali women are ‘considered transient members who belong to neither their father’s’ nor
the husband’s clan. Clan elders continue to play an important role and, in the past lobbied against
women’s participation in politics. While in July 2020, a 30 % gender quota was introduced by the lower
house, it is awaiting approval by the upper house and the president. Similarly, in Somaliland, a 20 %gender quota was initiated by the cabinet and is awaiting approval from the upper house. In Puntland
women represent 1.5 % of the political candidates elected.174 This had not occurred as of 2021.
Women held 24 % of seats in the two chambers of parliament in 2020.175
With regards to women’s economic and social position in 2020, discrimination limited girls’ access toschooling. Girls had lower school attendance rates due to the conflict situation and practices such as
early marriage and FGM; this is particularly true for girls in farming, rural, remote, disabled, displaced,and nomadic communities.176 Access to education is even harder for nomadic women; out of these,
84 % received no education.177 Although women’s earnings represent 70 % of a family’s’ income, they
face under-representation and barriers to employment.178 Under-representation of women also exists
in the judiciary in positions as lawyers, judges and prosecutors.179 According to the UN,‘women’s rights in Somalia continue to suffer due to a lack of an adequate legal
framework and the absence of strong law and order and justice institutions. Conflictrelated factors, such as displacement, rapes committed by youth gangs and unidentified
men in uniform, traditional practices such as forced marriages of young girls and female
genital mutilation, have compounded the violations of women’s rights in Somalia.‘180
Although certain laws grant women some rights, in practice women are often disadvantaged: sharia
law is often steered by men’s interest, blood compensation for women is half of that of a man, women
inherit less than their brothers and women’s property ownership is limited legally and socially.181
UNOCHA in 2021, stated that Somali women face stigma and ‘inequalities due to gender and culturalbeliefs, which leave them facing increased health and protection concerns.’182 Women face severe
obstacles accessing justice due to the male-dominated systems, influenced by traditional culture,religion, political structures, and dependency on male relatives. Women generally require a male
relative to support court cases, represent them, or accompany them, and frequently women lackliteracy and legal knowledge. In customary and formal legal systems, implementation of the law is

170 UNFPA, Overview of Gender Based Violence in Somalia, 5 March 2021, url, p. 5
171 UNFPA, Overview of Gender Based Violence in Somalia, 5 March 2021, url, p. 5
172 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2021 - Somalia, March 2021, url
173 SIDRA, Breaking the Silence, May 2021, url, p. 8
174 CMI, Excluding women: the clanization of Somali political institutions, July 2020, url pp. 2-3
175 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2021 - Somalia, March 2021, url
176 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia, (14 September

to 2 October 2020), 24 August 2020, url, para. 62
177 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia, (14 September
to 2 October 2020), 24 August 2020, url, para. 62
178 Somalia, MoP, Somalia National Development Plan 2020 to 2024, December 2019, url, p. 87
179 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia, (14 September
to 2 October 2020), 24 August 2020, url, para. 54
180 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia, (10 to 28
September 2018), 19 July 2018, url, para. 58
181 USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, pp. 32-33
182 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan Somalia, February 2021, url, p. 1830

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

inconsistent, particularly for women. Women’s status, education, and clan membership are
significant, and those who are from minority clans or IDPs are worse off when accessing justicemechanisms.183
For additional details see EASO’s COI report Somalia: Actors, published in July 2021, section ‘2.3 Accessto justice through formal and informal systems’, and section ‘3.3 Traditional customary law – Xeer’.184

2.2 Sexual and gender-based violence
Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) is defined by the UNHCR as‘harmful acts directed at an individual based on their gender [...] rooted in genderinequality, the abuse of power […] gender-based violence can include sexual, physical,
mental and economic harm inflicted in public or in private. It also includes threats ofviolence, coercion and manipulation. This can take many forms such as intimate partner
violence, sexual violence, child marriage, female genital mutilation.’185
Statistically, rape and sexual violence against women and girls in Somalia is ‘underreported’186 due toa ‘climate of impunity’ as well as survivors’ fear and stigma.187 In 2019, there were 744 reported rapes,
241 of which were conflict-related.188 However, sexual violence against women and girls is describedby sources as ‘pervasive’ in the country189 and as ‘widespread’190 especially in the South-Central andPuntland areas of Somalia.191 Rape and attempted rape were the most commonly reported forms ofsexual violence in Somalia, according to UN reporting in March 2021.192 Sexual violence was describedas having reached ‘epidemic proportions’ in Puntland.193 Somali women continue to experiencewidespread sexual harassment at workplaces.194 Domestic violence is described as ‘rampant’ inSomalia.195
In 2020, 95 % of SGBV incidents reported concerned women and female children.196 Women fromdisplaced communities were more likely to experience SGBV.197 Girls and women with disabilities
faced a heightened risk of SGBV.198 According to sources in a 2019 report on the situation of women
without a network in Mogadishu by the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB), displaced
women and girls were described as particularly at risk of SGBV due to lack of social protection andclan connections.199 According to UNFPA 2021 reporting, in total, 75 % of the SGBV reported cases

183 USAID, Pathways and Institutions for Resolving Land Disputes in Mogadishu, January 2020, url, pp. 25-26
184 EASO, Somalia: Actors, July 2021, url, pp. 26-36, pp. 51-52
185 UNHCR, Gender-Based Violence, n.d., url
186 New Humanitarian (The), In Somalia, New Law Could Finally Give Rape Survivors a Voice, 27 April 2017, url; HRW, Heinous

Act Overshadowed Women’s Day in Puntland, 13 May 2019, url
187 HRW, Heinous Act Overshadowed Women’s Day in Puntland, 13 May 2019, url
188 VoA, UN Urges End to Sexual Violence in Conflict Areas, 19 June 2020, url
189 USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 2
190 SIDRA, Rape: A Rising Crisis and Reality for the Women in Somalia, June 2019, url, p. 2; AI, Amnesty International Report
2020/2021, 7 April 2021, url, p. 324; UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan Somalia, February 2021, url, p. 5
191 AI, Amnesty International Report 2020/2021, 7 April 2021, url, p. 324
192 UNSG, Conflict-related sexual violence, S/2021/312, 30 March 2021, url, para. 44
193 SIDRA, Breaking the Silence, May 2021, url, p. 8
194 USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 32
195 BTI, Somalia Country Report 2020, 2020, url
196 UNFPA, Overview of Gender Based Violence in Somalia, 5 March 2021, url, p. 3-11
197 USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 22
198 USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 35
199 Canada, IRB, Somalia: Situation of women without a support network in Mogadishu, including access to employment andhousing; treatment by society and authorities; support services available to female-headed households (2017-March 2019),
25 March 2019, url

31

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

affected IDP women: IDP women ‘strive to meet basic survival needs as they travel long distancesfrom their camps in search of casual jobs’ to generate a family income. On the other hand ‘fear of rapeand sexual harassment impacts on the mobility of women.’200 Women were raped in IDP camps ‘byarmed men, including government soldiers and militia members.’ In exchange for food and services,
girls were forced to have sex with gatekeepers.201
While government security forces committed acts of SGBV202, the UN describes Al-Shabaab’s
involvement with regards to SBGV as following‘in 2019, sexual violence continued to be employed by Al-Shabaab as a strategy of social
control in the communities under their influence. Women and girls were systematicallyabducted and forced to marry combatants as a reward for fighters and an incentive for
new recruits […] many women and girls who managed to escape were subjected tothreats and, in some cases, sexual exploitation.’203
Moreover, the Somalia National Development Plan 2020-2024 notes that ‘insecurity and lawlessness
contributes directly to the high incidence of violence against women.‘204 The UN reported in March
2021, that ‘protracted conflict, structural gender inequality and successive humanitarian crises have
exposed Somali women and girls to heightened levels of conflict-related sexual violence’ 205 (CRSV).
United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) attributed incidents of CRSV to Al-Shabaab, as
well as clan militias, largely, ‘while the Somali Police Force was implicated in 16 cases, another 25
incidents involved the Somali National Army. The Jubbaland security forces and Puntland forces bore
responsibility for nine and five of the recorded cases, respectively. The remaining cases were
attributed to unknown armed actors.’206 In June 2020, the UN released a report focusing on conflictrelated sexual violence in which it underlines that the ‘de facto control of certain areas by Al-Shabaaband entrenched gender-based inequality […] heightened the risk of sexual violence.’207
In 2019, 744 rape cases were reported, out of these 241 were Conflict Related Sexual Violence (CRSV)
cases.208 The total true figure is believed to be much higher.209 In the last years, incidents of rapeincreased in Puntland.210 UNSOM noted that CRSV was prevalent in Somalia, ‘with dominant patterns
being abductions of women and girls for forced marriage and rape, perpetrated primarily by non-statearmed groups, and incidents of rape and gang rape committed by State agents, clan militias andunidentified armed men.’211
COVID-19
Since the Covid-19 pandemic, cases of SGBV increased, exceedingly affecting girls and women,212 andthe pandemic exacerbated the already ‘pervasive’ problem of sexual and gender-based violence.213

200 UNFPA, Overview of Gender Based Violence in Somalia, 5 March 2021, url, p. 3-11
201 USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 22
202 USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 13
203 UNSG, Conflict-related sexual violence (S/2021/312), 3 June 2020, url, para. 43
204 Somalia, MoP, Somalia National Development Plan 2020 to 2024, December 2019, url, p. 158
205 UNSG, Conflict-related sexual violence, S/2021/312, 30 March 2021, url, para. 44
206 UNSG, Conflict-related sexual violence, S/2021/312, 30 March 2021, url, para. 44
207 UNSG, Report on Conflict-related sexual violence (S/2021/312), 3 June 2020, url, para. 43
208 UN, UN calls for more action to eliminate conflict-related sexual violence in Somalia, 19 June 2020, url
209 USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 31
210 SIDRA, Breaking the Silence, May 2021, url, p. 5
211 UNSOM and UNOHCHR, Protection of civilians report, 31 December 2019, url p. 4
212 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia, (14 September

to 2 October 2020), 24 August 2020, url, para. 18
213 USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 2

32

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

From 2019 to 2020, the Gender Based Violence Information Management System (GBVIMS)214 data
found an increase in violence against women since the COVID pandemic, with physical assault
increased by 61 %, followed by ‘intimate partner violence’ which increased by 55 %. Various factors
contributed to an increase in SGBV incidents in 2020. UNFPA explains that while measures to curb
Covid-19 infections leading to isolation, loss of income due to closure of businesses, restrictedmovement, and school closures, previously existing conditions such as armed and communal conflicts,
and natural disasters also played a role in rising SGBV occurrences.215
Legislation and state protection
There are no federal laws against spousal violence, including rape.’216 Rape is punishable with 5 to 15
years imprisonment217 under the 1962 Penal Code.218 Somalia also has ‘no statutory rape law or
minimum age for consensual sex.’219 Sexual violence is treated under the law ‘as an “offense againstmodesty and sexual honor,” rather than a violation of bodily integrity’.220
Sexual Offences Bill (2018) and Sexual Intercourse Related Crimes Bill (2020)
In 2018, a Sexual Offences Bill was initiated, aiming to provide a legal framework to ‘to address sexualand gender-based violence in Somalia.’221 The 2018 Sexual Offence Bill provided for sentencing of
perpetrators including aggravating factors such as the age of the victim, the involvement of force
including weapons, and repeated offences.222 The Bill represented a comprehensive Act which would‘ensure stronger protection of women and girls as well as ensuring [that] all victims of sexual
harassment and violence can seek justice.’223 However, the federal government has, by 2021, notpassed the bill. Somaliland passed a sexual offences bill in 2018 but this was not implemented.224 In
2016, Puntland authorities ‘launched the first-ever Sexual Offences Law criminalizing all sexual
offences in the region. The law criminalizes various sexual crimes including gang rape, sexual
exploitation and abuse, sexual harassment, sexual offences involving the Internet and indecent
exposure of genital organs in public places’. However, the bill is not applied in practice.225
In 2020, ‘legislators developed a new draft law on crimes relating to sexual intercourse as analternative to the 2018 draft sexual offences bill. In August, UNSOM led a joint analysis of this bill,which found that it omitted numerous substantive offences, contained weak procedural provisions,and allowed for the marriage of minors upon physical maturation.’226 The 2020 Sexual Intercourse
Related Crimes Bill ‘reclassifies rape as a misdemeanour and removes punishment for other serious
sexual offences.’227 The international community reacted over the 2020 Sexual Intercourse Related
Crimes Bill, calling it a major setback for victims of SGBV in Somalia.228 Although the Somali Penal Codeunder Article 401 criminalizes abduction for marriage or lust229, no law exists that prohibits acts of

214 GBVIMS is an inter-agency partnership between UNFPA, IRC, and UNHCR based database for humanitarian actors who

provide services to survivors of violence to track and report incidents of sexual and gender-based violence. GBVIMS,
Overview of the Gender Based Violence Information Management System (GBVIMS), n.d. url
215 UNFPA, Overview of Gender Based Violence in Somalia, 5 March 2021, url, p. 3
216 USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, pp. 29-30
217 USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, pp. 29-30
218 SIDRA, Rape: A Rising Crisis and Reality for the Women in Somalia, June 2019, url, p. 7
219 USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 34
220 USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 36
221 Legal Action Worldwide, Sexual Offences Bill, n.d., url
222 Plan International, Concern over bill normalising violence against girls and women in Somalia, 13 August 2020, url
223 Plan International, Concern over bill normalising violence against girls and women in Somalia, 13 August 2020, url
224 Plan International, Concern over bill normalising violence against girls and women in Somalia, 13 August 2020, url
225 UNFPA, Enforcing the Sexual Offences Law in Puntland, 28 September 2020, url
226 UNSG, Conflict-related sexual violence, 30 March 2021, url, para. 45
227 Plan International, Concern over bill normalising violence against girls and women in Somalia, 13 August 2020, url
228 UN News, Somalia: Draft law a ‘major setback’ for victims of sexual violence, 11 August 2020, url
229 Somalia, Legislative Decree No. 5 of 16 December 1962: Penal Code, 16 December 1962, available at url

33

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

sexual terrorism ‘as perpetrated by Al-Shabaab.’230 As SGBV is culturally accepted, this makes it ‘harder
to ensure that sexual terrorism inflicted by Al-Shabaab does not remain unpunished.’231 For an
overview about access to justice in Somalia in general and for women in particular see the EASO COI
Report Somalia: Actors, published in July 2021.232
SGBV remains under-reported.233 The majority of SGBV victims do not bring cases forward to formal
judicial remedies due to the perception that formal judicial procedures lack trust and fairness.234 SGBV
perpetrators often go unpunished and ‘impunity was the norm’.235 Amnesty International also
reported that sexual violence occurred in a ‘climate of impunity,’ as well as the stigma and fearassociated with the crime, which prevented many survivors from seeking justice’.236 Regarding rape,‘the government did not effectively enforce the law.237 SGBV survivors were often requested toinvestigate their own cases as police officers were reluctant to do so.238 The UN similarly indicatedthat ‘those responsible for violations [against women] have seldom been held accountable, nor havethe victims been awarded appropriate remedies, reparations or rehabilitation support.’239 SGBV
survivors reporting cases to the courts learnt that these were closed due to Covid-19, leading to delays‘in dispensing justice for [S]GBV survivors who pursued prosecution of perpetrators.’240 Additionally,
police officers’ low capacity further reduces the application of laws to protect women.241 Moreover,being a woman and belonging to a minority clan makes it more difficult ‘to demand their rights andcompensation from dominant clans and elevates their vulnerability by classifying crimes anddiscrimination against them as a lesser offense.’242 SIDRA also outlines the issue of fear of reprisal andstigma when victims consider reporting crimes. Therefore, SGBV survivors face ‘“double
victimization”- first the rape or sexual violence itself, then failure of the authorities to provide effective
justice or medical and social support.’243 For women to access justice, ‘the rights of the survivor might
not be upheld in this system as women’s rights are not respected.’244
Stigmatization is common and rape victims ‘face harsh treatment from the community’ andsometimes from their families too.245 A lack of trust in the justice system, gender-biased officers, lackof knowledge of one’s own rights, limited financial means, fear for humiliation and security concerns
further act as barriers to prosecution.246 In UNOCHA’s view, justice for victims of SGBV is particularly
limited. Instead, they are often referred to traditional mechanisms which further discriminate
women.247 SGBV victims are encouraged to ‘refer cases to xeer courts.’ However, xeer law does not
230 de Brouwer, A-M. et al., Prosecuting the Nexus between Terrorism, Conflict-Related Sexual Violence and Trafficking in

Human Beings Before National Legal Mechanisms: Case Studies of Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab, 30 March 2020, url, p. 14
231 de Brouwer, A-M. et al., Prosecuting the Nexus between Terrorism, Conflict-Related Sexual Violence and Trafficking in
Human Beings Before National Legal Mechanisms: Case Studies of Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab, 30 March 2020, url, p. 16
232 EASO, Somalia: Actors, July 2021, url, section: 2.3 Access to justice through formal and informal systems
233 Australia, DFAT, Somalia: Women - separated women - divorce, 3 March 2020, url, p. 34; AI, Amnesty International Report
2020/2021, 7 April 2021, url, p. 324
234 USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, pp. 12, 30
235 USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, pp. 12, 30
236 AI, Amnesty International Report 2020/2021, 7 April 2021, url, p. 324
237 USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, pp. 29-30
238 USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 31
239 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia, (14 September
to 2 October 2020), 24 August 2020, url, para. 31
240 UNFPA, Overview of Gender Based Violence in Somalia, 5 March 2021, url, p. 7
241 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia, (14 September
to 2 October 2020), 24 August 2020, url, para. 51
242 Luedke, A., Women do not belong under the acacia tree, June 2018, url, p. 28
243 SIDRA, Breaking the Silence, May 2021, url, p. 8
244 Saferworld, The missing link, August 2020, url, p. 6
245 SIDRA, Breaking the Silence, May 2021, url, p. 12
246 De Brouwer, A-M. et al., Prosecuting the Nexus between Terrorism, Conflict-Related Sexual Violence and Trafficking in
Human Beings Before National Legal Mechanisms: Case Studies of Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab, 30 March 2020, url, pp. 1617
247 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan Somalia, February 2021, url, p. 13

34

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

consider women as an independent legal person but rather she remains under the responsibility ofothers: her husband, father, or paternal uncle.248 The UN points out that referring to xeer ‘may welldelay access to justice for women, girls and minorities given that the traditional courts apply
discriminatory norms and practices.’ Here, redress often is provided not to the victim but to thevictim’s male family member ‘or the perpetrator could also be requested “to marry the victim”
according to xeer.’249 The way the Somalia law is currently applied, it often results in further
victimization of women and girls.’250 USDOS further notes that ‘survivors faced considerable
challenges accessing necessary services […] [and] in several cases survivors and providers of services
for gender-based violence survivors were directly threatened by authorities when such abuses wereperpetrated by men in uniform.’251
Services available to victims
According to UN reporting, in Somalia, ‘some 3,000 victims and survivors of sexual assault and genderbased violence, including CRSV, received medical and health assistance last year, and some 5,700
received psychological assistance.’ 252
UNFPA reported in March 2021 that ‘GBV service provision remains low as compared to the need andgeographical landscape in Somalia.’ 253 USDOS observed that about a dozen women’s groups, NGOs,
and health workers provided some services in Lower Shabelle such as ‘counselling, community
coordination, and training on gender-based violence’ in the absence of a functional judiciary.254
Nonetheless, Covid-19 contributed to the closure of some of the already limited services, while open
shelters were hesitant to take new admissions for SGBV victims due to fear of COVID-19. Out of thealready limited support centres, very few provide specialised services such as psycho-social support.
Further challenges existed with regards to access to quality services for SGBV survivors from remotelocations.255 UNFPA points out that ‘vulnerable pregnant mothers and women at reproductive age incommunities for IDPs and hard-to-reach locations continue to experience restrictions in accessing […]services.’256 Somalia does not have security provision that would respond to women needs.257 Somalia
lack protective housing for victims, which often forces SGBV victims to remain in unsafe environmentswith the risk repeated SGBV exposure; leaving little or no room for recovery, healing andreintegration.258 For SGBV survivors, abortion after rape is often no option, as it is only allowed to savea mother-to-be’s life, additionally ‘emergency contraception is not or rarely available’ neither.259 Only
25 % of health centres, mainly only found in larger towns, have drugs to treat sexually transmitted
infections and even less have capacity to test for HIV - ‘both integral components of the treatment ofsexual assault survivors.’260

248 FAO, Gender and Land Rights Database, Somalia Customary norms, religious beliefs and social practices that influence

gender-differentiated land rights, n.d., url
249 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia, (14 September
to 2 October 2020), 24 August 2020, url, para. 37; 57; 78
250 UNSOM and UNOHCHR, Protection of civilians report, 31 December 2019, url p. iii
251 USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 31
252 UN, UN calls for more action to eliminate conflict-related sexual violence in Somalia, 19 June 2020, url
253 UNFPA, Overview of Gender Based Violence in Somalia, 5 March 2021, url, pp. 3-5
254 USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 30
255 UNFPA, Overview of Gender Based Violence in Somalia, 5 March 2021, url, pp. 3-5
256 UNFPA, Overview of Gender Based Violence in Somalia, 5 March 2021, url, p. 5
257 Saferworld, The missing link, August 2020, url, p. 3
258 UNFPA, Overview of Gender Based Violence in Somalia, 5 March 2021, url, p. 8
259 SIDRA, Breaking the Silence, May 2021, url, p. 5
260 UNFPA, Gender Based Violence in Somalia, 2020, url, pp. 5

35

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

2.3 Child, Early and Forced Marriage (CEFM)
The term forced marriages applies to instances ‘where one or both persons do not or cannot give theirfull and free consent to marriage, it is used to refer to young people below the legal consent-giving
age who are forced into marriage.’ Rationales behind are often of cultural, religious and economic
nature.261 When one or both of the spouses is younger than 18 years old, UNICEF refers to the termchild marriage.262 The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) defines a child as ‘human being
below the age of eighteen years.’263 Aligned with the CRC, the Somali Provisional Constitution under
Article 29, holds the same maturity definition.264 According to a source interviewed by Landinfo
response for a 2021 query response, in Somalia one’s date of birth is not considered a decisive
criterion for when a person is considered an adult, and most people relate to Sharia and traditionallaws on this, where puberty is considered to be the marker of adulthood.265 In 2021, UNFPA in its
Overview of Gender Based Violence in Somalia report outlines a link between forced marriage and
FGM/C and indicates, that due to a cultural expectation, daughters are being married off.266 UNFPA
describes the situation as following‘[the practice of early marriage] continue[s] to be pervasive in Somalia especially within
the context of prevailing poverty and the perceptions around the value of girls versus
boys […] girls are usually married at early age because of the need for families to ensuresocial and economic security. Women are traditionally valued according to their ability toprocreate. Marriage provides the platform for women and young girls to demonstrate
this value to society […] Early marriage is perceived to be both a cultural and a religious
requirement.’267
Adolescent girls get married off before reaching puberty to avoid children born out of wedlock - a‘disgrace to the entire family.’268 Furthermore, 16 % of Somali girls are married by the age of 15 and
34 % percent are married by the age of 18 according to the Somali Health and Demographic Survey
published in 2020.269 UN Women’s data differs; with 8.4 % of women married before the age of 15
and 45.3% of women married before the age of 18.270 Women get married earlier than men.271 Due todeeply-rooted gender-inequality, child marriage rates are higher for girls.272 Motherhood andmarriage are closely connected and nomadic and rural women until the age of 20 have higher
childbearing rates than their urban counterparts.273 Since 2019, during the Covid-19 pandemic, Save
the Children reported that according to its case workers, cases of child marriage increased inSomalia.274
In Somalia, the distinction between forced and arranged marriage can be subtle.275 may also be‘exchanged between neighbouring clans’ to build alliances, seal peace agreements and gain access

261 Otieno, M., Al-Shabaab and Forced Marriage in Somalia, June 2019, url, p. 72
262 UNICEF, Child marriage, n.d., url
263 UNCRC, United Nation Convention on the Rights of the Child of the year 1989, 1990, url
264 Somalia, Provisional Constitution, 1 August 2012, url
265 Norway, Landinfo, Somalia: Fødselsdato, alder og tidsregning, 17 Febuary 2021,

url

266 UNFPA, Overview of Gender Based Violence in Somalia, 2021, url, p. 9
267 UNFPA, Overview of Gender Based Violence in Somalia, 2021, url, p. 12
268 Finland, Finnish Immigration Service, Report from Finnish Immigration Service’s Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu andNairobi, 5 October 2018, url, p. 27
269 Somalia, The Somali Health and Demographic Survey, 2020, url, p. 70
270 UNWOMEN, Somalia, n.d., url
271 Somalia, The Somali Health and Demographic Survey, 2020, url, p. 87-88
272 UNICEF, Child marriage, n.d., url
273 Somalia, The Somali Health and Demographic Survey, 2020, url, pp. 74-75
274 Save the Children, Covid-19: School closures put decades of gains for Somali children at risk, 13 July 2020, url
275 Otieno, M., Al-Shabaab and Forced Marriage in Somalia, June 2019, url, p. 76

36

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

grazing zones.276 Another issue raised by the UN and M. Otieno is, that according to them, ‘victims ofrape [were] forced to marry their perpetrators as part of the remedial practices of the traditional
justice system.’277 If a woman refuses, she ‘may face severe consequences’ such as in nomadic
communities, where they may be banished from the community or denied child custody orproperty.278 In 2020, USDOS reports that among persons with disabilities, forced marriage is alsoprevalent.279
Marriage to Al-Shabaab fighters
According to the International Crisis Group, marriage is the most frequent way that women become
affiliated with Al-Shabaab.280 On this point, International Crisis Group noted that: ‘though reports offorced marriages exist, most unions with Al-Shabaab members appear to be voluntary, though
admittedly women’s choices are taken in the shadow of powerful parental pressure and clan
expectations’.281 In addition, several sources indicate that Al-Shabaab is also responsible for forced
marriages.282 USDOS indicates that ‘in al-Shabaab-controlled areas […] child, early, and forced
marriages frequently occurred.’ Al-Shabaab apparently forced girls aged 14 to 20 to marry fighters’,during which families ‘generally had little choice but to acquiesce or face violence.’ In areas under AlShabaab’s influence, the organisation ‘used the lure of marriage as a recruitment tool for its
soldiers.’283 ICG writes that ‘in the past, Al-Shabaab tried to attract foreign men to Somalia bypromising a wife upon arrival.’284
According to the International Crisis Group, ‘many instances of forced marriage between militants andwomen and girls exist.’285 As with many marriages in Somalia in general, clans sometimes pressure
women to marry Al-Shabaab fighters as such marriages often offer better financial stability. Althoughsome marriages to Al-Shabaab members might appear to be voluntary, women are often left with nochoices due to family and clan pressure.286 Furthermore, wife inheritance287 remains common andwidows of Al-Shabaab husbands can be married off to any Al-Shabaab member.288
Al-Shabaab has distorted the traditional practice of wife inheritance whereby whenever a fighter iskilled or defects, another member of the group can ‘inherit’ his wife. Women are allowed threemonths before remarriage but are then kept within the group by marriage to others.289 ICG believes
that ‘Militant s’ widows face strong pressure to remarry within the movement [Al-Shabaab]; […] toavoid widows, […] from sharing intelligence with the government.’290

276 Otieno, M., Al-Shabaab and Forced Marriage in Somalia, June 2019, url, p. 76
277 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences (9to 16 December 2011), 14 May 2012, url, para. 22
278 Otieno, M., Al-Shabaab and Forced Marriage in Somalia, June 2019, url, p. 73
279 USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 31
280 International Crisis Group, Women and Al-Shabaab’s Insurgency, 27 June 2019, url, p. 8
281 International Crisis Group, Women and Al-Shabaab’s Insurgency, 27 June 2019, url, p. 8282 Journal of International Criminal Justice, Prosecuting the Nexus between terrorism, 29 June 2020, url, p. 13; USDOS,
Somalia 2020 Human Rights Report, 2020, url, p. 14; de Brouwer, A-M. et al., Prosecuting the Nexus between Terrorism,
Conflict-Related Sexual Violence and Trafficking in Human Beings Before National Legal Mechanisms: Case Studies of BokoHaram and Al-Shabaab, 30 March 2020, url, p. 16
283 USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 31; for further backgrounddetail, see also: Norway, Landinfo, Somalia: Al-Shabaab and forced marriages, 21 July 2011, url
284 International Crisis Group, Women and Al-Shabaab’s Insurgency, 27 June 2019, url, p. 9285 International Crisis Group, Women and Al-Shabaab’s Insurgency, 27 June 2019, url, p. 9286 International Crisis Group, Women and Al-Shabaab’s Insurgency, 27 June 2019, url, pp. 8-9
287 Also referred to as ‘Dumaal’ in Somali language. Norway, Landinfo, Somalia: Marriage and divorce, url, p. 12288 Stern, O., Married in the Shadows: The Wives of al-Shabaab, 2020, url, p. 19
289 Stern, O., Married in the Shadows: The Wives of al-Shabaab, 2020, url, p. 19
290 International Crisis Group, Women and Al-Shabaab’s Insurgency, 27 June 2019, url, p. 937

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

While in the past Al-Shabaab tried to attract foreign men to Somalia, it was ‘feared [that] children
from such unions [foreign men fighting for Al-Shabaab and Somali women] would face stigma […] theirchildren […] have often struggled to integrate.’291
Legislation and state protection
USDOS reported that ‘there were no known efforts by the government […] to prevent [CEFM].’ 292
Rights mentioned in the CRC referring to health, education, protection from abuse, violence, andexploitation are violated by child marriage. While the CEDAW in Article 16 stipulates that ‘the marriage
of a child shall have no legal effect.’293 Somalia ratified the CRC in 2015,294 but did not ratify CEDAW.295
Somaliland has signed but not ratified the CRC.296 With regards to national legislation both partners
have to reach maturity age and give their consent in order to be able to marry.297 Article 28 (5) of theSomalia Constitution stipulates that ‘no marriage shall be legal without the free consent of both the
man and the woman, or if one or both of them have not reached the age of maturity.’298 The
constitution however does not define the age of maturity.299 Additionally, Somalia’s Family Code from1975, which is still applicable both in Somaliland and in Somalia, provides for girls to be married at age
16.300 In practice, no consensus was reached by governmental and religious leaders as to whenchildren reach maturity.301 In most areas, Sharia and customary laws are used to address family
matters. Officially the Family Law also still applies in Somaliland while sharia law is commonly
applied.302 Al-Shabaab applies a ‘strict interpretation of Sharia’ law.303
Rape is often ‘resolved’ by forced marriage; the victim has to marry the perpetrator.304 There is noprovision in the Penal Code with regards to forced marriage after rape, instead the law stipulates that‘customary law may be applied in such cases to exonerate an abductor or rapist if marrying the victim
preserves honour.’305 Strategies to erase child marriage were included in the Somali National Gender
Policy 2016 and were ‘approved by the Federal Council of Ministers.’306 Reversely, the newly initiated2020 ‘Sexual Intercourse Related Crimes Bill’ would allow to marry off children once they reachpuberty, which could be as young as 10 years old. Child marriage would then be allowed if parents
give their consent. The UN has called this bill a major setback.307 Internationally there has been
widespread criticism.308 The UN human rights chief Michelle Bachelet announced that the new‘legislation drafted by parliamentarians in Somalia risks legitimizing child marriage […] and must be
prevented from passing into law. [It] constitute[s] serious breaches of international human rights
norms […] I strongly urge the Somali authorities to swiftly adopt the 2018 Sexual Offenses Bill.’309 In
291 International Crisis Group, Women and Al-Shabaab’s Insurgency, 27 June 2019, url, p. 9292 USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, pp. 29-35
293 UNOHCHR, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women New York of the year of 1979,

18 December 1979, url
294 UN News, UN lauds Somalia as country ratifies landmark children’s rights treaty, 20 January 2015, url
295 Legal Action Worldwide, CEDAW, n.d., url
296 28 Too Many, Somaliland The Law and FGM, July 2018, url, p. 10
297 USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 34
298 Somalia, Provisional Constitution, 1 August 2012, url
299 Somalia, Provisional Constitution, 1 August 2012, url
300 Girls not Brides, Somalia, n.d., url
301 UNFPA, Overview of Gender Based Violence in Somalia, 2021, url, p. 12
302 Somaliland, Somaliland Family & Personal Law, n.d., url
303 de Brouwer, A-M. et al., Prosecuting the Nexus between Terrorism, Conflict-Related Sexual Violence and Trafficking in
Human Beings Before National Legal Mechanisms: Case Studies of Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab, 30 March 2020, url, p. 16
304 UNFPA, Somalia Gender Justice & the law, 2018, url, p. 10305 UNFPA, Somalia Gender Justice & the law, 2018, url, p. 9
306 AMISIOM, Gender Policy, 2013, url, p. 11
307 UN News, Somalia: Draft law a ‘major setback’ for victims of sexual violence, 11 August 2020, url
308 Legal Action Worldwide, Condensed Sexual Offences Bill, 2014, url. This link refers to the original bill of 2014, while a newone was initiated in August 2020, under which child marriage would be legalised in Somalia.
309 UNOHCHR, Comment by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet on draft Sexual Intercourse Related
Crimes Law in Somalia, 10 August 2020, url; Otieno M., Al-Shabaab and Forced Marriage in Somalia, June 2019, url, p. 73

38

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

general, girls and women who have been forcefully married ‘rarely come forward to get help due tofear of social stigma and punishment.’310

2.4 FGM/C
In Somalia, Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C) is ‘almost universally practiced throughout thecountry.’311 FGM/C is considered a form of SGBV by the UN.312 According to the WHO, ‘FGM[/C]comprises all procedures involving partial or total removal of the external female genitalia or otherinjury to the female genital organs for non-medical reasons.’313
The practice of FGM/C holds strong social acceptance in Somalia, it is not seen as a human rights
violation but in the contrary, it is seen as a measure to protect girls. According to the UN, ‘FGM[/C][…] has remained pervasive and a strong social norm because of its requirement for marriage for girls.’
FGM/C is seen as a way for families to gain social acceptance and to ensure their daughters can get
married off before getting pregnant,314 while many families believe that the practice of FGM/C has areligious basis.315
In Somalia, FGM/C is commonly performed by traditional circumcisers,316 a ‘local woman, with the useof knives, scissors or razor blades […] while female relatives hold the girl down.’317 The ‘ritual’ is often
continued from one generation to the next by women.318 In urban areas, FGM/C is often conductedwhen schools are closed and in rural areas during the rainy season.319 Being a traditional circumciser
provides a source of income to the person performing FGM/C.320
Forms of FGM/C
The Federal Government of the Republic of Somalia in its 2020 Somali Health and Demographic Survey
describes three different forms of FGM/C that are conducted in Somalia:•

a. Excision of the clitoral hood (prepuce), with or without excision of part or all of the clitoris([also referred to as] Sunni321);•

b. Excision of the clitoris with partial or total excision of the labia minora (Intermediate);•c. Excision of part or all of the external genitalia and stitching/narrowing of the vaginal opening;or all other procedures that involve pricking, piercing, stretching; or incising of the clitoris and/or
labia; introduction of corrosive substances into the vagina to narrow it (Pharaonic).’ Pharaonic
FGM/C322 is described as the ‘worst’ type by the Somali HDS.323

310 Otieno, M., Al-Shabaab and Forced Marriage in Somalia, June 2019, url, p. 73
311 USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 32
312 UNFPA, Overview of Gender-Based-Violence in Somalia, 5 March 2021, url, p. 12
313 WHO, Types of female genital mutilation, n.d., url
314 UNFPA, Overview of Gender Based Violence in Somalia, 5 March 2021, url, p. 12
315 Reuters, Somaliland issues fatwa banning female genital mutilation, 7 February 2018, url
316 28 Too Many, Somalia The Law and FGM, July 2018, url, p. 2
317 Islamic Relief, Women in Somalia warn against the dangers of female genital mutilation, n.d., url
318 Islamic Relief, Women in Somalia warn against the dangers of female genital mutilation, n.d., url
319 Plan International, Girls in Somalia subjected to door-to-door FGM, 18 May 2020, url
320 UNOHCHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes, and consequences, (9 to 16 December2011), 14 May 2012, url, para. 28-29
321 FGM/C Sunni type also referred to as Sunna type or type 1. Somalia, The Somali Health and Demographic Survey, 2020
url, p. 287
322 Pharaonic FGM/C is equivalent to Type III FGM/C under the World Health Organization’s definitions which refers to ‘sewn
closed’ circumcision, or ‘infibulation’. 28 too many, Somalia The Law and FGM, July 2018, url, p. 1; Denmark, DIS, Somalia:
Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), February 2021, url, p. 5; 28 Too Many, Somalia: The Law and FGM, July 2018, url, p. 1;
Denmark, DIS, Somalia: Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), February 2021, url, p. 5
323 Somalia, The Somali Health and Demographic Survey, 2020, url, p. 212-213

39

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

The WHO classifies FGM/C into four major categories, creating subcategories with the aim to indicate
and differentiate further the amount of tissue cut off or damaged, hence leading to various level ofseverity for the girl affected.324 The WHO’s four types of FGM/C are classified as following:•‘Type I. Partial or total removal of the clitoral glans […] and/or the prepuce/clitoral hood […] thefollowing subdivisions are used: Type Ia. Removal of the prepuce/clitoral hood only. Type Ib.
Removal of the clitoral glans with the prepuce/clitoral hood.

•

Type II. Partial or total removal of the clitoral glans and the labia minora […] with or without
removal of the labia majora […] the following subdivisions are used: Type IIa. Removal of thelabia minora only. Type IIb. Partial or total removal of the clitoral glans and the labia minora[…].
Type IIc. Partial or total removal of the clitoral glans, the labia minora and the labia majora […].

•

Type III. [… infibulation]. Narrowing of the vaginal opening with the creation of a covering seal.
The seal is formed by cutting and repositioning the labia minora, or labia majora. The covering of
the vaginal opening is done with or without removal of the clitoral prepuce/clitoral hood andglans (Type I FGM[/C]) […] the following subdivisions are used: Type IIIa. Removal andrepositioning of the labia minora. Type IIIb. Removal and repositioning of the labia majora.

•

Type IV. All other harmful procedures to the female genitalia for non-medical purposes, forexample pricking, piercing, incising, scraping and cauterization.’325

When type 3/ infibulation FGM/C is performed, only a residual opening to pass menstrual blood andurine is left open, therefore, infibulation aggravates childbirth and can lead to distress or death of theunborn baby.326 In reference to FGM/C type 3, the WHO explains that women who have been
infibulated, must undergo a practice called deinfibulation in order to have sexual intercourses andgive birth. Deinfibulation involves ‘cutting open the sealed vaginal opening.’ While deinfibulation issometimes practiced improving women’s health condition, it is not without risks for women to
repetitively undergo deinfibulation for example, each time she gives birth.327
Nearly all women in Somalia have undergone FGM/C. The Somali Health and Demographic survey
reports that 99 % of Somali women aged 15-49 have undergone FGM/C.328 The majority of girls (71 %)are circumcised between ages 5-9.329 For 2020, UNFPA noted that the media was reporting on‘alarming increase’ of FGM/C incidents due to government imposed measures to curb the spread of
Covid-19, which included school closures,330 during which circumcisers went from ‘door to door
offering to cut girls.’331 The Somali National Health and Demography Survey indicates that the mostcommon form of FGM/C practiced is the ‘worst type’: Pharaonic, with 64% of women surveyed
experiencing it, with similar levels across urban, rural, and nomadic demographic groups. Women oflower socio-economic status reportedly had higher levels of Pharaonic FGM/C.332 Notwithstanding
the fact that the 2020 National Health and Demographic Survey indicates a ‘shift from the extreme
type 3 Pharaonic FGM to type 1 Sunna333’, most Somalis do not perceive type 1/Sunna as FGM/C and
do not perceive it as physical or psychologically harmful.334

324 WHO, Types of female genital mutilation, n.d., url
325 WHO, Types of female genital mutilation, n.d., url
326 MSF, Essential obstetric and new-born care, n.d., url
327 WHO, Types of female genital mutilation, n.d., url
328 Somalia, The Somali Health and Demographic Survey, 2020, url, p. 213
329 Somalia, The Somali Health and Demographic Survey, 2020, url, p. 246
330 UNFPA, Overview of Gender Based Violence in Somalia, 5 March 2021, url, p. 7
331 USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 32
332 Somalia, The Somali Health and Demographic Survey, 2020, url, pp. 213-214
333 FGM/C Sunna type also referred to as Sunni type or type 1. Somalia. Somalia, The Somali Health and Demographic Survey,

2020, url, p. 287
334 28 Too Many, Somalia: The Law and FGM, July 2018, url, p. 7

40

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Legislation and state protection
There is no existing law specifically against FGM/C in Somalia that criminalises or punishes it.335
Somalia’s Provisional 2012 Constitution in Article 15 (4) stipulates that ‘circumcision of girls is a crueland degrading customary practice, and is tantamount to torture [and that] the circumcision of girls is
prohibited.’336 It is unclear in the Constitution whether ‘prohibition’ could also be applied to persons
planning FGM/C, persons not preventing FGM/C or persons aiding in order to have girls undergo
FGM/C.337 28 Too Many states that the relevant punishments under the Penal Code are: ‘Under Article
440(1) of the Penal Code, the penalty for causing hurt to another is imprisonment for three months
to three years. Where the hurt is deemed to be ‘grievous’ (2), the penalty is imprisonment for three
to seven years, rising to six to twelve years where the hurt is deemed to be ‘very grievous’.’338 The
same source wrote in 2018 that the article has never been applied.339 However, there was one caseprosecuted in 2018, the first ever such prosecution for FGM, of the parents of a 10 year old girl;however, the case was dropped due to lack of cooperation from the parents to locate the traditional
circumciser whom they had paid.340
In 2015, a bill to end FGM/C within the entire country was initiated but the bill was not finalised.341
Puntland has made more progress with regards to ending FGM/C than South Central Somalia, in thatit has a strategy to abandon the practice, unlike the national government.342 In Puntland, FGM/C
specific legislation is awaiting approval by the parliament and a fatwa against FGM/C was signed.343 In
Puntland, the Ministry of Health signed a decree against medicalised FGM/C and Puntland has theauthority to ‘shut down clinics and hospitals that continue the practice, and arrest perpetrators.’344
Furthermore, the decree allows the Puntland Government ‘to cancel the licences of medical
professionals who practice FGM[/C] […] and doctors’ associations have been asked to hold theirmembers accountable for practising FGM[/C] by revoking their memberships.’ Nonetheless, thedecree lacks both accountability and implementation plans. 28 Too Many reported that as of 2018,
there were no cases against FGM/C identified arising from the Puntland fatwa nor were there any
cases of malpractice brought against medical professionals for performing FGM/C. According to 28
too many, ‘these cases are not reported publicly.’345
In Somaliland, a fatwa346 explicitly mentioning FGM/C type 3 was issued by the Ministry of Religious
Affairs, aiming at punishing whose who perform FGM/C.347 Additionally, the Somaliland Constitution
in its Article 36 under the title ‘The Rights of Women’, states that ‘the Government shall encourage,
and shall legislate for, the right of women to be free of practices which are contrary to Sharia andwhich are injurious to their person and dignity. [nonetheless, according to 28 Too Many], there iscurrently no legislation in Somaliland that expressly criminalises and punishes the practice of
FGM[/C].’348 The source 28 Too Many notes that, no court cases were reported, and no perpetrators
were prosecuted applying the Penal Code, which would be the only legal instrument that could be
335 UNFPA, Overview of Gender Based Violence in Somalia, 5 March 2021, url, p. 12; 28 Too Many,

Somalia: The law andFGM, July 2018, url, p. 4
336 Somalia, Provisional Constitution, 1 August 2012, url
337 28 Too Many, Somalia: The Law and FGM, July 2018, url, p. 4
338 28 Too Many, Somalia: The Law and FGM, July 2018, url, p. 4
339 28 Too Many, Somalia: The Law and FGM, July 2018, url, p. 5
340 Reuters, Somalia’s first FGM prosecution ‘hampered’ by victim’s parents, 23 August 2018, url
341 28 Too Many, Somalia: The Law and FGM, July 2018, url, p. 4; Goobjoog News, Somalia will soon ban FGM, Human Rights
Minister says, 17 August 2015, url; Abdirahman, A., Somalia to introduce law prohibiting Female Genital Mutilation, 3 August
2015, url
342 28 Too Many, Somalia: The Law and FGM, July 2018, url, p. 2
343 28 Too Many, Somalia: The Law and FGM, July 2018, url, pp. 3-4
344 28 Too Many, Somalia: The Law and FGM, July 2018, url, p. 4
345 28 Too Many, Somalia: The Law and FGM, July 2018, url, pp. 4-5
346 A fatwa refers to a religious edict.
347 Reuters, Somaliland issues fatwa banning female genital mutilation, 7 February 2018, url
348 28 Too Many, Somaliland: The Law and FGM, July 2018, url, p. 4

41

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

applied with regards to FGM/C. In cases where girls have bled to death after they underwent FGM/C,
the issue seems to have been dealt with privately; between the family and the circumciser.349
According to sources cited by the Danish Immigration Service, there is limited capacity of the state to
uphold the law, and people rely on their clan and immediate family for protection. Furthermore, ‘noneof the consulted sources knew of any protection or support measures by neither NGOs nor clanauthorities for people that fear FGM[/C].’ There were no consequences for those who carried out thetradition.350 Women’s access to justice is affected as ‘the first barrier to women’s access to customary
justice [xeer] or mediation lies with their ability to physically access the institution. Traditionally,
women can only bring their cases to elders with a male intermediary.’ Although Alternative Dispute
Resolution (ADR) initiatives exist in Somalia, these are often built rather on consensus than on
judgement. While ADR efforts are often based on traditional xeer, this favours males, often to
women’s disadvantage.351 For details on Somalia’s traditional justice mechanisms, see section ‘2.3
Access to justice through formal and informal systems’ of the EASO COI Report on Somalia: Actors(July 2021).352

2.5 Women without a support network
About one third of all households in Somalia are headed by women (33 % in both rural and urban
settings, and 28 % in nomadic households).353 It is rare for a Somali to be totally unconnected to any
family or relatives; however kin solidarity can also be influenced by the level of maintenance of
personal and kin relationships.354 According to Charlotte Bonnet, a consultant on forced displacement
for Tanya Copenhagen Kenya Limited, Somalia’s society is patriarchally organised and a family headedby the men represents ‘the fundamental social unit’ within the society.355 A Somali gender advisor
interviewed by IRB, reported that protection for Somali women ‘is linked to their father, husband,
family network, extended family network and clan’ and that ‘in Somali society, it is seen as being
against the culture and the religion for a woman to live alone.’ UNICEF’s Chief of Child Protection said
that family ties are strong in Somalia and women who have lost husbands or fathers are taken in by
their communities if they have not broken customary laws or norms.356 Women are treated as andcared for as members of their own paternal family, even after marriage. For a woman to be ‘very
unprotected’ it would be in situations where she is in a weak or non-influential clan or moves away toan area where she has no relatives.357 The IRB wrote that women who have broken social norms may
be ostracized if they are from a minority clan in the area, divorced, or rape victims, or are IDP women
without a social network.358 The DRC notes that ‘the security situation is particularly dire for single

349 28 Too Many, Somalia The Law and FGM, July 2018, url, p. 5
350 Denmark, DIS, Somalia: Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), February 2021, url, p. 16
351 USAID, Alternative Dispute Resolution Initiatives in Somalia, June 2020, url, pp. 23-28
352 EASO, Somalia: Actors, July 2021, url, pp. 26-36
353 Somalia, The Somali Health and Demographic Survey, 2020, url, p. 22354 Hohne, M., Bakonyi, J. and ACCORD, Somalia: Al-Schabaab und Sicherheitslage; Lage von Binnenvertriebenen undRückkehrer·innen; Schutz durch staatliche und nicht-staatliche Akteure; Dokumentation zum COI-Webinar [Documentationof a webinar on Somalia: Al-Shabaab, Security situation, IDPs/returnees, State and non-state protection], 5 May 2021, url,
pp. 39-40
355 Bonnet, C., et al., Inclusive shelter provision in Mogadishu, Environment and Urbanization, Vol. 32, No. 2, October 2020,
url, p. 447
356 Canada, IRB, Somalia: Situation of women without a support network in Mogadishu, including access to employment andhousing; treatment by society and authorities; support services available to female-headed households, 25 March 2019, url
357 Hohne, M., Bakonyi, J. and ACCORD, Somalia: Al-Schabaab und Sicherheitslage; Lage von Binnenvertriebenen undRückkehrer·innen; Schutz durch staatliche und nicht-staatliche Akteure; Dokumentation zum COI-Webinar [Documentationof a webinar on Somalia: Al-Shabaab, Security situation, IDPs/returnees, State and non-state protection], 5 May 2021, url, p.
37
358 Canada, IRB, Somalia: Situation of women without a support network in Mogadishu, including access to employment andhousing; treatment by society and authorities; support services available to female-headed households, 25 March 2019, url

42Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

women without a clan network and women who are internally displaced’ as a clan can offer protection
to its individual members.359 In case of a dispute, the argument might be referred to the xeer.360 In
xeer initiatives, a male intermediates to negotiate for a women.361 UNFPA described that ‘since land
and family assets are controlled by husbands or male relatives, with limitations on women’s
inheritance rights as well as limited access to skill training and markets, widows and female-headedhouseholds are particularly vulnerable.’362 The Finnish Migration Service in 2018, reported that in
Somaliland there is an increase in the number of single mothers due to divorces.363
Single women in IDP settings
Women residing in camps and/or belonging to a weak clan face higher risks of SGBV.364 Human Rights
Watch notes that IDP women and girls ‘remain at particular risk of sexual and gender-based
violence by armed men, including government soldiers and militia members, and civilians.’365 Tana
Copenhagen Kenya Limited believes that among IDPs, single, divorced, and widowed women areespecially vulnerable, and finding shelter is more challenging for female-headed households.366 The
Canadian Presbyterian World Service & Development explains the situation of single mothers incamps, ‘for single mothers living in internally displaced persons camps […], life is a balancing act.
Often, time is split between caring for their infants and tireless efforts to find work, in order to afford
necessities like food. A profound lack of resources and rising food prices due to COVID-19 have meantthat many simply cannot access what is needed to sustain their own health and that of theirchildren.’367 The struggle for single mothers to find sufficient food to feed their children is alsomentioned by International Relief Team.368
Divorced women
The concept of honour in the Somali marriage context is important, and women are seen as having a
duty to behave in ways that uphold family honour.369 Through marriage women and men gain accessto resources, however the same source notes that, ‘urbanization appears to have significantly
undermined traditional, nomadic ways of life, which were more conductive to upholding the idealized
gender roles in Somali society where women gained access to resources through marriage and bride
wealth and men worked outside the household and sustained familial and communal camels andlivestock.’370 Sources indicate that divorce is not uncommon in the country.371 In general, divorce ismore accepted now than it was in the past. Although there is no immediate stigma around getting
divorced, the attitudes of local communities towards divorced women may differ. Whilst men are,according to Islam, allowed to have four wives, provided that they can support them, women are
expected to accept this situation. For men it is easier to get divorced than for women. A man who
wants to get divorced has to express this three times orally while a woman must provide ‘rational
359 DRC, South and central Somalia security situation, March 2017, url, p. 9
360 Xeer refers to Somalia’s customary law. Somalia has a mix of three types of laws: customary law (called ‘xeer’), civil law

and Islamic law. For additional details see EASO’s COI report Somalia: Actors, published in July 2021.
361 USAID, Alternative Dispute Resolution Initiatives in Somalia, June 2020, url, p. 23; Sweden, Lifos, Somalia: the position of
women in the clan system, 27 April 2018, url, p. 5
362 UNFPA, Funding for gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls in Humanitarian programming, June 2020,
url, p. 29
363 Finland, FIS, Report from Finnish Immigration Service’s Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu and Nairobi, 5 October 2018,
url, p. 28
364 The Netherlands, Country of Origin Information Report on South and Central Somalia, March 2019, url, p. 44
365 HRW, Somalia Events of 2018, 2018, url
366 Bonnet, C., et al., Inclusive shelter provision in Mogadishu, Environment and Urbanization, Vol. 32, No. 2, October 2020,
url, p. 460
367 Presbyterian World Service & Development, Hope for Single Mothers in Somalia, 4 August 2020, url
368 IRT, A Somali Mother's Struggle to Feed Her Family, 1 March 2019, url
369 Sweden, Lifos, Women in Somalia - Pregnancies and Children out of Wedlock, 1 June 2017, url, p. 8
370 Luedke, A., Women do not belong under the acacia tree, June 2018, url, p. 11
371 Finland, Finnish Immigration Service, Report from Finnish Immigration Service’s Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu andNairobi, 5 October 2018, url, p. 29; Norway, Landinfo, Somalia: Marriage and divorce, 14 June 2018, url, p. 18

43

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

grounds,’ for example if the man is not bearing appropriate family responsibilities. The woman mustobtain her own clan’s consent for a divorce.372 Landinfo also writes that women have difficulty getting
divorced and must cite reasons under Islamic law such as lack of support, mental illness, or impotenceof the husband, and they must apply through a sharia court.373
Regarding child custody and divorce, the Finnish report quotes one source as indicating that ‘in Somali
culture, children always remain in the custody of the mother in a divorce’ and that the woman usually
moves back to the vicinity of her own family members.374 However, in contrast, in his review of thisreport, Joakim Gundel stated that:‘this may still be different in the pastoral rural areas, where the clan is safeguarding its
numbers, and would not allow the woman to have custody of the children in case of divorce
if it means she is moving back to her own family being from another clan. In such cases, they
may try to forcefully take the children from the mother if she refuses, and let them grow up
with the fathers family instead.’375
Furthermore, Landinfo observed that under Muslim jurisprudence and Somali tradition, the father isthe guardian of the children and after a divorce he retains his rights, but the mother is granted dailycare of the children for seven years, up which boys move with their father, while girls remain with themother until puberty.376
Remarriage after divorce is common. Before they can remarry, women are required to wait until the‘iddah’ waiting period is complete.377
Children born out of wedlock
In general, pre-marital pregnancies are hidden and denied to the extent that the woman sometimes
risks reproductive health problems; discovery of an unmarried woman becoming pregnant would be
regarded by the family and society as a ‘betrayal’ of family honour.378 In 2017, Puntland’s Minister for
Women Development and Family Affairs described that ‘a woman who has a child out of wedlock will
be stigmatized. She will be talked about and people will possibly even attack her physically.’379 Whenchildren are born out of wedlock and it becomes known, it is considered a‘ disgrace to the entire
family.’380 Both, the mother and the child face a complicated life ahead. As a consequence, theextended family might abandon the mother and child.381 Additionally, a clan might disown her and nolonger provide her with protection.382 A sourced interviewed by Lifos in 2017, mentioned that some
women with children born out of wedlock might be pushed to live in the area of local sex workers. 383
The Finnish report states that children who have lost one parent are ‘more vulnerable.’ This in turnoften forces them to work in order to earn a living. Furthermore, the Finnish report writes that ‘A childborn due to an extramarital relationship and its mother have a difficult life. In the worst case, a childborn out of wedlock and the mother are abandoned by the rest of the extended family. Some mothers

372 Finland, Finnish Immigration Service, Report from Finnish Immigration Service’s Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu andNairobi, 5 October 2018, url, p. 27
373 Norway, Landinfo, Somalia: Marriage and divorce, 14 June 2018, url, p. 19
374 Finland, FIS, Report from Finnish Immigration Service’s Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu and Nairobi, 5 October 2018,
url, p. 29
375 Gundel, J., Comment received during the peer review of this report, 3 August 2021
376 Norway, Landinfo, Somalia: Marriage and divorce, 14 June 2018, url, p. 19
377 Norway, Landinfo, Somalia: Marriage and divorce, 14 June 2018, url, p. 19
378 Sweden, Lifos, Women in Somalia - Pregnancies and Children out of Wedlock, 1 June 2017, url, p. 14
379 Sweden, Lifos, Women in Somalia - Pregnancies and Children out of Wedlock, 1 June 2017, url, p. 14
380 Finland, FIS, Report from Finnish Immigration Service’s Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu and Nairobi, 5 October 2018,
url, p. 27
381 Finland, FIS, Report from Finnish Immigration Service’s Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu and Nairobi, 5 October 2018,
url, pp. 27-34
382 Sweden, Lifos, Women in Somalia - Pregnancies and Children out of Wedlock, 1 June 2017, url, p. 13
383 Sweden, Lifos, Women in Somalia - Pregnancies and Children out of Wedlock, 1 June 2017, url, pp. 13-14

44

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

give away a child born out of wedlock, but some such children end up on the street as orphans’.384
Sweden stated that several sources reported that a child born out of wedlock ‘would facediscrimination and stigma’.385
Availability and access to support
Somalia does not have ‘structured social welfare systems [nor are there] formal government social
protection programs.’ In the absence of state assistance, support is rather clan-based. IRB reports that‘the state does not provide specific support services to female-headed households in Mogadishu toassist with housing and shelter.’386 According to Charlotte Bonnet, who worked on an article on shelter
provisions, ‘a charitable neighbour is more likely to offer help to a single, widowed or divorced woman
than to a man, especially if she has children.‘387
Somalia does not have a public welfare system in place and support is sometimes provided by theclan, NGOs, Islamic charities, or family members.388 Although in some cases close family members may
choose to support a woman who is pregnant out of wedlock, this will never ensure the same level ofprotection which one could receive from a clan.389
According to information obtained during Finland’s Fact-Finding mission, to women social networks
are particularly important as they are more vulnerable than men, while‘families headed by an unaccompanied female are more exposed to malnutrition […][and] an unaccompanied woman is unlikely to return to Somalia without a support
network […]. A network is necessary for managing practical matters, and life without one
is difficult for an unaccompanied woman […] it is hard for a woman to rent, sell or buy a[…] residence by herself. […] An unaccompanied female tenant can be regarded as aprostitute, making it difficult to find a home. An unaccompanied woman living without ahusband is exposed to sexual violence because she is deemed to be “fair game”.’390

384 The orphanage based in Mogadishu, in South-Central Somalia, is considered to be only admitting children from killed

soldiers. Finland, FIS, Report from Finnish Immigration Service’s Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu and Nairobi, 5 October
2018, url, p. 34
385 Sweden, Lifos, Women in Somalia - Pregnancies and Children out of Wedlock, 1 June 2017, url, p. 15
386 Canada, IRB, Somalia: Situation of women without a support network in Mogadishu, including access to employment andhousing; treatment by society and authorities; support services available to female-headed households, 25 March 2019, url
387 Bonnet, C., et al., Inclusive shelter provision in Mogadishu, Environment and Urbanization, Vol. 32, No. 2, October 2020,
url, p. 460. Charlotte Bonnet is a consultant on forced displacement for Tanya Copenhagen Kenya Limited, which is a Danish
consultancy firm providing information on Mogadishu’s housing situation. Tana Copenhagen Kenya Limited specialises instabilisation, governance, and private sector development.
388 Australia, Women - separated women - divorce, 3 March 2020, url, p. 8
389 Sweden, Lifos, Women in Somalia - Pregnancies and Children out of Wedlock, 1 June 2017, url, p. 14
390 Finland, FIS, Report from Finnish Immigration Service’s Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu and Nairobi, 5 October 2018,
url, p. 23

45

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

3. Individuals perceived as contravening
Islamic laws/tenets
3.1 Individuals contravening Islamic laws in Al-Shabaab controlled
areas
For an overview of Al-Shabaab’s approximate territorial control see the map at the beginning of thisreport. For further details about AS presence and territorial control, as distinct from areas of influenceand outreach, see the EASO COI Report Somalia: Actors, published in July 2021.391
Al-Shabaab’s sharia-based governanceAccording to the estimates from the Somali government, more than 99 % of Somalia’s population isof Sunni Muslim faith.392 Most Sunnis (perhaps 70 % of the general population) are identified as
Salafists of various orientations. The Sunni population also comprises a minority of Sufis who
previously formed the overwhelming majority of the country’s population.393 Thus, as one expert
observed, there is a notable ‘absence of considerable religious minorities which might pose an
obstacle to the adoption of the Islamic Sharia. Indeed, the ‘overwhelming majority of the Somali
people [...] do not disagree’ with the idea of Islam (and sharia) playing a role in the state and society.394
Sharia therefore has a long history in the country. During the early Islamic era, the colonial period,
and also after independence, sharia was ‘accepted and implemented to varying degrees’. Before thecivil war began in 1991, a large part of the population practiced a version of Sunni Islam that wasstrongly influenced by the Sufi orders Qadiriyya, Ahmadiyya and Salihiyya. Although a movement
promulgating the Wahhabist form of ‘Salafism’ which sought to ‘eliminate what they considered unIslamic cultural practices’ already emerged in South Central Somalia in the first half of the 20th century,
it was met with a degree of resistance from local populations at the time.395 However, the collapse ofstate institutions (which had previously repressed dissenting religious leaders–including nonSalafists396) and the ensuing civil war enabled all Islamist groups to ‘freely promote [...] their various
ideologies, including the most extreme forms of Takfiir and Jihadism’.397
Al-Shabaab (AS), ‘a handful of unpopular hardcore militants’ in 2005398, was established formally inAugust 2006399 and acted as the military arm of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) formed in early 2006
in Mogadishu.400 While the UIC incorporated various brands of Sunni Islam, AS soon used coercion andviolence against those considered not to be ‘pious’ enough.401 When an Ethiopian military intervention

391 EASO, Somalia: Actors, July 2021, url, section: 4.1 Presence, territorial control, areas of influence, and outreach
392 USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report 2020 - Somalia, 12 May 2021, url, p. 2
393 Hoehne, M. V., email, 14 October 2020
394 Abdullahi, A. M., The Islamic Movement in Somalia: A Historical Evolution with a Case Study of the Islah Movement (1950-

2000), May 2011, url, p. 26; see also Norway, Landinfo, Temanotat, Somalia: Praktiske og sikkerhetsmessige forhold på reisei Sør-Somalia, 28 June 2019, url, p. 11
395 EAJ, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, pp. 9-10
396 EAJ, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, p. 11
397 Abdullahi, A. M., The Islamic Movement in Somalia: A Historical Evolution with a Case Study of the Islah Movement (19502000), May 2011, url, p. 26
398 Hoehne, M. V., Counter-terrorism in Somalia, or: how external interferences helped to produce militant Islamism,
published online on 17 December 2009, url, p. 2
399 Hansen, S. J., Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 2005-2012, 2013, p. 36
400 Hoehne, M. V., Al-Shabaab in Somalia: Von einer Terrorzelle zu einem regierungsähnlichen Akteur, 2011, pp. 132-137;
see also Barnes, C., and Hassan, H., The Rise and Fall of Mogadishu's Islamic Courts, 2007, url, pp. 151-152
401 Hoehne, M. V., Counter-terrorism in Somalia, or: how external interferences helped to produce militant Islamism,
published online on 17 December 2009, url, pp. 11-18

46

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profilesin December 2006 led to the overthrow of the UIC, 402 AS remained and turned into an independent
Islamist force. They took up their fight against the Somali government and the foreign intervention
forces and soon emerged as a most powerful Somali political actor.403 AS governs according to a strict
interpretation of Islam and attacks or casts out perceived rivals (including clerics) holding views thatchallenge its version of Islam.404 This reflects the group’s declared notion that they, and no-one else,are ‘the true bearers of Islam’.405 At the same time, given AS’s lack of members who are sufficiently
educated in religious matters, local compromises with Muslim clerics adhering to more traditional andmoderate currents remain possible, despite the group’s promotion of strict tenets of the Hanbalischool of thought.406
Essentially following Hanbali precepts, AS imposes a strict version of Sharia,407 banning television,
cinemas, music, the use of the internet and watching sports, smoking, the sale of khat, the shaving ofbeards and other behaviour it considers ‘un-Islamic’.408 The group has also enforced a ‘moreconservative Islamic dress code’409 that reportedly requires women to be fully veiled410 and imposed
specific ways of praying and reciting the Quran411. However, a Somalia expert notes, ‘it appears that
not all bans are imposed uniformly by Al-Shabaab, perhaps reflecting the decentralised nature of thegroup, with militants in control of one area enforcing different rules from those in another’. For
instance, an activity like playing football may be completely prohibited in one area while being allowedin others, albeit with certain restrictions (such as bans on wearing shorts, playing during prayer times
or insulting other players).412 Al-Shabaab has a permanent presence primarily in towns and larger
villages where it implements their strict interpretation of Sharia.413 As long as local residents ‘respectthese prohibitions, they, in theory, have nothing to fear from Al-Shabaab’.414 Hoehne is quoted assaying that a person who repeatedly infringes on the laws of Islam is at risk of being punished by AS
or by another group of religious zealots who may target this person, especially if he or she does not
enjoy strong family support.415 Michael Skjelderup, a PhD candidate at the Norwegian University ofLife Sciences who is specialised in Somalia, notes that ‘most kinds of corporal punishment for “unIslamic” behaviour are typically handed out on the spot or after a short procedure in local courts (andtend to receive quite limited media attention)’, adding that ‘it is likely that such kinds of punishments
take place now and then’.416
The US government reported that AS ‘imposed harsh punishment on persons in areas under its
control’ during the year 2020. The source points to detentions of individuals, with ‘those detained [...]
incarcerated under inhuman conditions for relatively minor offenses, such as smoking, having illicit

402 International Crisis Group, Somalia: To Move Beyond The Failed State, Africa Report N°147, 23 December 2008, url
403 Hoehne, M. V., Al-Shabaab in Somalia: Von einer Terrorzelle zu einem regierungsähnlichen Akteur, 2011, pp. 144-152
404 Abbink, J., Religion and Violence in the Horn of Africa: Trajectories of Mimetic Rivalry and Escalation between ‘Political

Islam’ and the State, 2020, url, p. 203
405 Taarnby, M., and Lars Hallundbaek, Al-Shabaab: The Internationalization of Militant Islamism in Somalia and the
Implications for Radicalisation Processes in Europe, 26 February 2010, p. 14; see also Marchal, R., Motivations and drivers of
Al-Shabaab, 2018, p. 313
406 Marchal, R., Une lecture de la radicalisation djihadiste en Somalie [Lecture on jihadist radicalisation in Somalia], 2018, url,
p. 103407 EAJ, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, pp. 13-14
408 USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report 2020 - Somalia, 12 May 2021, url, p. 7
409 EAJ, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, p. 14
410 USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report 2020 - Somalia, 12 May 2021, url, p. 7
411 Marchal, R., Une lecture de la radicalisation djihadiste en Somalie [Lecture on jihadist radicalisation in Somalia], 2018, url,
p. 103412 Harper, M., Everything You Have Told Me is True: The Many Faces of Al-Shabaab, 2019, pp. 118-119
413 Norway, Landinfo, Query response, Somalia: Al-Shabaab areas in Southern Somalia, 21 May 2019, url, p. 3
414 Marchal, R., Rivals in Governance: Civil Activities of Al-Shabaab, 2018, p. 354; see also Norway, Landinfo, Temanotat,
Somalia: Praktiske og sikkerhetsmessige forhold på reise i Sør-Somalia, 28 June 2019, url, p. 10
415 ACCORD, Anfragebeantwortung zu Somalia: Umgang mit psychisch kranken Personen; Zugang zu Behandlung vonpsychischen Erkrankungen; Umgang mit alkoholabhängigen Personen und Gefährdung, 19 April 2020, url
416 Skjelderup, M., email, 1 July 2021

47

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

content on cell phones, listening to music, watching or playing soccer, wearing a brassiere, or not
wearing a hijab.’417 The same source further notes that ‘Al-Shabaab continued to threaten parents,
teachers, and communities who failed to adhere to Al-Shabaab’s precepts’.418 With regard toreturnees from abroad who have acquired types of behaviour that may be viewed as ‘Western’,Hoehne is quoted as saying that returnees going back to an AS-controlled area (because this is where
their family or clan happens to live) must act cautiously and need to ‘change their ways of life
fundamentally’ in order to adapt to the rules imposed by AS.419
Spreading fear is not Al-Shabaab’s only means of securing their influence. Among the population ofSouthern Somalia the perception that al-Shabaab is less corrupt than the government is widespread.
Even people in Mogadishu and other towns under government control bring on their cases of disputeto Al-Shabaab courts outside these areas.420
Hadd (plural: huduud) crimes
This section should be read in conjunction with EASO’s COI report Somalia: Actors, published in July
2021.421
In areas under its control, AS has established its own courts and ‘follows its own quite strict
interpretation of a particular Salafi version of Shariah law’422, although sharia as such ‘pervades all
forms of adjudication in Somalia’, including state and customary justice423. Indeed, Islamic law is‘widely seen as being incontestable’, whereas the same cannot be said with regard to statutory or
customary law (xeer).424 Moreover, an expert pointed out that ‘quite a few aspects of Somali xeer are
in accordance with Sharia’ and that ‘there is no strong divide between Shari’s and xeer in many
everyday matters’.425 Marchal explains that AS court – reported by some Somalis (who otherwise do
not support Al-Shabaab’s agenda) to be less corrupt and more efficient than the official judiciary426 –‘addressed many problems of the population it controlled (such as inheritance, divorce and land title
disputes) and provided solutions it was able to enforce’.427
However, unlike the more traditional and moderate interpretations of Islam which predominated until
recently in Somalia, and in contrast to xeer-based regulations428, AS’s interpretation of Sharia law
includes severe huduud punishments429 (i.e. punishments that are seen as being as ‘mandated anddetermined by God’430) such as public executions of adulterers, amputations of limbs in cases of theftand public flogging.431 These punishments have been meted out in a swift manner.432 It has been

417 USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, pp. 5, 7
418 USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report 2020 - Somalia, 12 May 2021, url, p. 6
419 Denmark, DIS, South and Central Somalia - Security situation, forced recruitment, and conditions for returnees [source:

Markus Hoehne], July 2020, url, p. 17; Sources interviewed by Landinfo point out that many people share a critical attitude
towards Western behaviour and influence independent from AS’s beliefs, see Norway, Landinfo, Temanotat, Somalia:
Praktiske og sikkerhetsmessige forhold på reise i Sør-Somalia, 28 June 2019, url, p. 11
420 Norway, Landinfo, Query response, Somalia: Al-Shabaab areas in Southern Somalia, 21 May 2019, url, p. 3
421 EASO, Somalia: Actors, July 2021, url, sections: 2.3.3 Sharia Law; 4.4. Access to justice under Al-Shabaab
422 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2020 Country Report – Somalia, 2020, url, p. 17
423 EAJ, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, p. 20
424 Marchal, R., Rival in Governance: Civil Activities of Al-Shabaab, 2018, p. 354
425 Hoehne, M. V., communication, 25 June 2021
426 Harper, M., Everything You Have Told me is True: The Many Faces of Al-Shabaab, 2019, p. 107; see also Kluijver, R., AlShabaab Governance, 10 July 2019, url
427 Marchal, R., Motivations and drivers of Al-Shabaab, 2018, p. 313
428 Hoehne, M. V., communication, 25 June 2021
429 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2020 Country Report – Somalia, 2020, url, p. 17
430 Marchal, R., Motivations and drivers of Al-Shabaab, 2018, p. 312
431 ACCORD, Somalia: Al-Schabaab und Sicherheitslage; Lage von Binnenvertriebenen und Rückkehrer·innen; Schutz durch
staatliche und nicht-staatliche Akteure [Seminar with experts Markus Hoehne and Jutta Bakonyi], 31 May 2021, url, p. 9; seealso, for example, Council on Foreign Relations, Al-Shabab, 19 May 2021, url; Skjelderup, M., Ḥudūd Punishments in the
Forefront: Application of Islamic Criminal Law by Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahideen, 2014, pp. 318, 323-325
432 EAJ, The Shari’ah in Somalia, March 2020, url, p. 14

48

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

reported that AS carried out arbitrary arrests on the basis of questionable or false accusations,433 thatcourts set up by AS did not permit legal representation or appeals434 and that the group administeredjustice without consulting the victims or taking into account the broader circumstances of an
offence435. According to a 2014 article by Michael Skjelderup, a scholar specialised in Somali religious
issues, ‘the Al-Shabaab courts tend to overlook many of the strict requirements regarding evidence
and procedure’ of classical Islamic doctrine436 when adjudicating hadd cases. Skjelderup holds that AS
judges in many ways resemble judges in Saudi Arabia who enjoy greater discretion in criminal cases,
including huduud cases, than what has been prescribed in classical doctrine. As the author explains,cases he examined suggest that AS courts widely use circumstantial evidence in huduud cases and thatin some cases, judges ‘simply announce that the accused has confessed to the crime, thereby refusing
him the opportunity to defend his case.’437 In a July 2021 email response, Skjelderup assessed thatthese claims are still valid, although the ‘need or willingness’ to impose huduud punishments has
decreased438 (see below for further details).
While AS has declared that no-one (not even wealthy people or AS commanders) could escape God’s
justice, Marchal noted that ‘over time and space’, the group came to show greater flexibility,
particularly in cases of violation of sharia by its own members: rather than receiving harsh corporalpunishment, some were relocated to other areas. The degree of implementation reportedly also
varies depending on the AS members in charge and the local situation. In areas where Al-Shabaab’s
control is undisputed, the group has been able to ‘show greater tolerance’. Also, some powerful AS
governors have used their ‘political capital’ to rein in harsh punishments where this was deemednecessary to secure significant popular support (due to quickly evolving frontlines).439 As noted byLandinfo, there may be some room for negotiation with al-Shabaab for strong clans.440 Most recently,
Skjelderup shared his general impression that ‘most local communities currently are more attuned to
AS rule than in 2010-2011’ while at the same time, ‘the eagerness of the administration to hand out
theses kinds of punishments is reduced’ as ‘the various governing institutions under AS rule havedeveloped, matured and formalized’.441
Several executions (by stoning) for alleged adultery or sexual intercourse outside of marriage havebeen reported in the recent past.442 One such incident reportedly occurred in July 2020, when AS
stoned to death a man for soliciting the services of a prostitute and flogged the prostitute woman in
Tiyeglow (Bakol region).443 In June 2021, according to AS’s own media outlet Radio Andalus members

433 Bakonyi, J., Der Alltag des Krieges. Herrschaftserfahrungen in Somalia [The war everyday: experiencing authority in

Somalia], 2018, url, p. 65
434 Reuters, Somalia's Al-Shabaab stones to death woman accused of having multiple husbands, 9 May 2018, url
435 Bakonyi, J., Der Alltag des Krieges. Herrschaftserfahrungen in Somalia [The war everyday: experiencing authority in
Somalia], 2018, url, p. 64
436 Skjelderup, M., Ḥudūd Punishments in the Forefront: Application of Islamic Criminal Law by Harakat Al-Shabaab AlMujahideen, 2014, p. 317; see also Bakonyi, J., Der Alltag des Krieges. Herrschaftserfahrungen in Somalia [The war everyday:
experiencing authority in Somalia], 2018, url, p. 64
437 Skjelderup, M., Ḥudūd Punishments in the Forefront: Application of Islamic Criminal Law by Harakat Al-Shabaab AlMujahideen, 2014, pp. 319, 323, 325
438 Skjelderup, M., email, 1 July 2021
439 Marchal, R., Motivations and drivers of Al-Shabaab, 2018, p. 312; Sources interviewed by Landinfo also note that reactions
depend on the degree of power AS has in a certain ares. See Norway, Landinfo, Report, Somalia: Practical issues and security
challenges associated with travels in Southern Somalia, 4 April 2016, url, pp. 11-12
440 Norway, Landinfo, Query response, Somalia: Al-Shabaab areas in Southern Somalia, 21 May 2019, url, p. 3
441 Skjelderup, M., email, 1 July 2021
442 See, for example: UNSOM and UNOHCHR, Protection of Civilians Report, 2 October 2020, url, pp. 12-13; VOA, Al-Shabab
Kills 18 in Surge of Executions, 8 July 2019, url; ANSA, Somalia: donna lapidata da Al-Shabaab [Somalia: Woman stoned todeath by al-Shabaab], 9 May 2018, url; BBC News, Somali woman 'with 11 husbands' stoned to death by al-Shabab, 9 May
2018, url; Reuters, Somalia's Al-Shabaab stones woman to death for cheating on husband, 26 October 2017, url; BBC News,
Somalia's al-Shabab stones man to death for adultery, 29 May 2017, url
443 ACLED, Somalia, SOM31509, as of 30 June 2021, url

49

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profilesof the group publicly flogged a man who was accused of raping a girl in the same town.444 The
circumstances of this case could not be verified.
Meanwhile, AS has imposed amputations of limbs on persons accused of theft (including in cases ofpetty theft445). Media sources, including some showing a pro-AS stance, reported that AS publicly cut
off the right hands of alleged thieves in El Buur in Galguduud region in March 2021446 and June 2020447,
near Qoryooley town in Lower Shabelle region, also in June 2020.448
Marchal notes that when AS conquers a town or village, ‘usually, several huduud [punishments] aremeted out in the first months in front of the local population that is obliged to gather to witness theexecution or the amputation of limbs’. This is to demonstrate that AS’s implementation of Sharia is
without compromise and nobody can escape it.449 Hoehne argues that these punishments are part ofwhat he calls AS’s strategy of ‘exemplary violence’, through which the group asserts control overcitizens. Besides visible acts of punishment and violence, ‘exemplary violence’ may include thespreading of rumours about AS forces being present nearby, for instance. Testimonies from southern
Somalia show that, at first, AS issues warnings and threats to everyday low-profile individuals who
may have acted in opposition to AS, e.g. by presenting views in a mosque that run counter to AS’sideology. These warnings and threats may be issued once, twice or three times before AS will strikewith force, killing, injuring or abducting people or even wiping out entire nuclear families. However
AS does not carry out these acts all the time and everywhere as it lacks the capacity to do so. Rather,
they would be carried out in an exemplary manner, [informal translation] ‘just as frequently andintensely as is necessary to instill fear in the local population and to ensure that most people come toterms with AS rule, whether they like it or not’.450 Sources interviewed by Landinfo agree that ‘alShabaab also has influence in areas where they do not have a permanent presence’, but they ‘are notconcerned with “everything and everyone” in such areas’.451
Apostasy, blasphemy, and religious minorities
AS has targeted followers of less conservative strands of Islam as ‘apostates’452, including those whopractice Sufism.453 It has been reported that AS’s ideology condemns the innovation and rituals
associated with Sufism (such as praying beside a past Sufi scholar revered in a shrine) that run counterto the group’s ‘much more austere and literal interpretation’ of Islam.454 (For information on theprevalence of Sufism and various Sharia schools, also see EASO’s COI report Somalia: Actors, publishedin July 2021455). As reported in March 2018, Sufi practitioners ‘cannot freely practice their religion in
Al-Shabaab-controlled districts and localities’ and ‘people living in such areas may be attacked,

444 Radio Andalus, Al-Shabab flogs man accused of rape in south-west Somalia, 7 June 2021, translated by: BBC Monitoring,available by subscription at: url
445 Bakonyi, J., Der Alltag des Krieges. Herrschaftserfahrungen in Somalia [The war everyday: experiencing authority in
Somalia], 2018, url, p. 64
446 Somali Memo, Somali militants cut off man's hand over theft, 1 March 2021. Somali Memo is described as affiliated to AS
by Small Wars Journal, Al-Shabaab: Information Operations Strategy Overview, 29 August 2019, url
447 Somali Memo, Somali militants chop off two men's hands for theft, 25 June 2020. Somali Memo is described as affiliatedto AS by Small Wars Journal, Al-Shabaab: Information Operations Strategy Overview, 29 August 2019, url
448 Nairobi News, Man's hand chopped off in Somalia for stealing from shop, 3 June 2020, url
449 Marchal, R., Rivals in Governance: Civil Activities of Al-Shabaab, 2018, p. 354
450 ACCORD, Somalia: Al-Schabaab und Sicherheitslage; Lage von Binnenvertriebenen und Rückkehrer·innen; Schutz durch
staatliche und nicht-staatliche Akteure [Seminar with experts Markus Hoehne and Jutta Bakonyi], 31 May 2021, url, pp. 8-9
451 Norway, Landinfo, Query response, Somalia: Al-Shabaab areas in Southern Somalia, 21 May 2019, url, p. 3; see also
Norway, Landinfo, Query response, Somalia: Violence in Mogadishu and developments since 2012, 30 October 2020, url, pp.
5-6
452 Germany, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development and Federal Foreign Office, 2. Bericht der
Bundesregierung zur weltweiten Lage der Religionsfreiheit (Berichtszeitraum 2018 bis 2019), October 2020, url, p. 270
453 Al Jazeera, Somalia: About 5,000 Sufi fighters join army, 19 September 2019, url
454 Taarnby, M. and Hallundbaek, L., Al-Shabaab: The Internationalization of Militant Islamism in Somalia and the Implications
for Radicalisation Processes in Europe, 26 February 2010, p. 16
455 EASO, Somalia: Actors, July 2021, url, section: 2.3.3 Sharia Law

50

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

punished or even killed, if they are found conducting the Sufi worship’.456 In 2009, Sufi groups eventook up arms against AS after being targeted and discriminated against.457
USDOS, quoting World Atlas, indicates that, apart from the overwhelming majority of Sunni Muslim(about 99 per cent), ‘members of other religious groups combined constitute less than 1 percent of
the population’ in Somalia. These include a small Christian community of approximately 1,000 and an
unknown number of Shia Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, Jews, and those not affiliated with any
religion.458
USDOS claims that during the year 2020, AS ‘continued threatening to execute anyone suspected ofconverting to Christianity’.459 Conversion of Muslims is officially forbidden in some areas and generally
unacceptable to Somali families in line with Islamic traditions.460 While killings and executions ofsuspected converts have been reported in past years,461 no such reports could be found from 2020 or
the first half of 2021.
AS has also reportedly ‘continued to harass secular and faith-based humanitarian aid organizations,threatening the lives of their personnel and accusing them of seeking to convert individuals to
Christianity’.462 For more information on the treatment of humanitarian workers by AS, please see
section 6.3 Treatment of persons accused by AS of collaborating with or spying for the government orinternational .
With regard to utterances perceived as acts of blasphemy, a report by Humanists International, a UKbased NGO that advocates secularism, states that in AS-controlled areas, there is ‘a high risk’ thatcriticism of Islam and statements or acts deemed to be ‘blasphemous’ will result in persons being
executed by the group.463 Hoehne states that making blasphemous statements is something that is‘extremely dangerous’ in all parts of Somalia, although he has rarely heard of people being executedfor blasphemy, even in areas under the control of AS.464 No such reports could be found from 2020 or
the first half of 2021 (Media reported in 2015 that AS executed a man in Lower Jubba on allegationsof insulting the Prophet Muhammad.465)
It has been reported that AS ‘continued its practice of conducting public executions’ of persons
accused of ‘sorcery’.466 Media sources (including media associated with AS), reported about
executions of alleged sorcerers in the town of Jilib (Middle Jubba region) in September 2020467 and in
Qoryoley town (Lower Shabelle region) in May 2020.468

456 Canada, IRB, Somalia: Situation of practitioners of Sufism, including treatment by Al-Shabaab [al-Shabab], and role of Ahlu

Sunnah Wal Jamaa [Ahlu Sunna Wal-Jamea, Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama'a, Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a, Ahl al-Sunnah Wal-Jamaa,
Ahlu Sunna Waljma'a] (ASWJ); availability of state protection (2016-March 2018) [source: political advisor], SOM106055.E,
27 March 2018, url
457 ISN, Somalia's new religious war, 31 July 2009, url
458 USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report 2020 - Somalia, 12 May 2021, url, p. 2
459 USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report 2020 - Somalia, 12 May 2021, url, p. 7
460 USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report 2020 - Somalia, 12 May 2021, url, pp. 2-3
461 See, for example: Morning Star News, Islamic Extremists in Somalia Kill Secret Christian, Her Son, Wound Husband,
Sources Say, 6 March 2017, url; Morning Star News, As More Christians Are Killed in Somalia, Number of Orphans Grows, 6
March 2018, url; Morning Star News, husbands' stoned to death s, 14 March 2014, url
462 USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report 2020 - Somalia, 12 May 2021, url, p. 7
463 Humanists International, Freedom of Thought Report – Somalia, last updated 28 August 2020, url; see also End Blasphemy
Laws, Somalia, last updated 18 June 2020, url
464 Hoehne, M. V., communication, 25 June 2021
465 VOA, Somali Islamist Militants Execute Man for Blasphemy, 24 April 2015, url; BBC News, Somalia's al-Shabab kills manfor 'insulting prophet', 24 April 2015, url
466 USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report 2020 - Somalia, 12 May 2021, url, p. 1
467 Halbeeg, Al-Shabaab militant executes an alleged sorcerer, 24 September 2020, url
468 Calamada, Al-Shabab executes sorcerer in southern Somalia, 30 May 202051

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

3.2 Individuals contravening Islamic and customary tenets
elsewhere in Somalia
General legal framework
This section should be read in conjunction with EASO’s COI report Somalia: Actors, published in July
2021.469
The Provisional Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia, adopted in 2012, stipulates that ‘Islamis the religion of the State’ (Article 2, Section 1) and that ‘No religion other than Islam can bepropagated in the country’ (Article 2, Section 2, reiterated in Article 17, Section 2). With regard to thecountry’s legislation, Section 3 of Article 2 regulates that ‘no law can be enacted that is not compliant
with the general principles and objectives of Sharia.’470 The Provisional Constitution prohibits
discrimination by the state on the basis of religion (Article 11, Section 3),471 and grants that ‘every
person is free to practice his or her religion’ (Article 17, Section 1).472 As specified in Article 40, Section
2, a court, when interpreting the fundamental rights granted under the provisional Constitution, ‘mayconsider the Sharia, international law, and decisions of courts in other countries, though it is notbound to follow these decisions.’473
Similarly, the Constitution of Somaliland, adopted in 2000, grants freedom of belief (Article 33, Section
1) while at the same time identifying Islam as the state religion, prohibiting the promotion of otherreligions than Islam (Article 5, Section 1), and stipulating that all laws ‘shall be grounded on and shallnot be contrary to Islamic Sharia’ (Article 5, Section 2).474 Puntland475 and other parts of Somalia such
as Galmudug, Hirshabelle, Jubbaland, and the South West State also have constitutions that specify
that Islam is the official religion and that laws must conform to the principles of sharia; laws with
provisions on religious freedom do not exist in the FMS Galmudug, Hirshabelle and South West
State.476
Generally, administration of justice in Somalia relies on traditional and customary law (xeer), sharia
law and the Penal Code.477 State law is more likely to be implemented in urban settings, while in rural
areas it has virtually no relevance, with cases adjudicated solely on the basis of customary law or
sharia. However, these legal traditions are important even in large cities, with many issues dealt withon the basis of these alternative forms of law, rather than state law.478 It has been noted that there isa considerable variety in legal frameworks with regard to religious freedom ‘because each community
individually regulates and enforces’ these matters, often in ways that are inconsistent.479 (Also see
EASO’s COI report Somalia: Actors, published in July 2021.480) A source mentions families and clans
which have applied vigilante justice in cases of ‘apostasy’. Al-Shabaab seeks to impose its strict
interpretation of Islam even outside the territories under its control, using threats and intimidation.481

469 EASO, Somalia: Actors, July 2021, url, section: 2.3.1 Nature and limits of the formal justice system (statutory law)
470 Somalia, Provisional Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia, 1 August 2012, url, Article 2
471 Somalia, Provisional Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia, 1 August 2012, available at: url, Article 11, Section 3
472 Somalia, Provisional Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia, 1 August 2012, available at: url, Article 17, Section 1
473 Somalia, Provisional Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia, 1 August 2012, available at: url, Article 40, Section 2
474 Republic of Somaliland, Constitution of the Republic of Somaliland, Translated by Ibrahim Hashi Jama, 2000, available at:url, Article 5, Sections 1-2; Article 33, Section 1
475 Puntland State of Somalia, Constitution of Puntland State of Somalia, December 2009, available at: url, Article 9
476 USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report 2020 - Somalia, 12 May 2021, url, p. 3
477 Humanists International, Freedom of Thought Report – Somalia, last updated 28 August 2020, url
478 ACCORD, Somalia: Al-Schabaab und Sicherheitslage; Lage von Binnenvertriebenen und Rückkehrer·innen; Schutz durch
staatliche und nicht-staatliche Akteure [Seminar with experts Markus Hoehne and Jutta Bakonyi], 31 May 2021, url, p. 36
479 Humanists International, Freedom of Thought Report – Somalia, last updated 28 August 2020, url
480 EASO, Somalia: Actors, July 2021, url, section: 2.3 Access to justice through formal and informal systems
481 Germany, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development and Federal Foreign Office, 2. Bericht der
Bundesregierung zur weltweiten Lage der Religionsfreiheit (Berichtszeitraum 2018 bis 2019), October 2020, url, pp. 269-270

52

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Conversion from Islam, proselytization and religious minorities
Neither the Provisional Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia482 nor the country’s Penal
Code483 (which is nominally valid in all parts of the country484) specifically forbid conversion from Islam
to other religions. However, sharia has been interpreted to prohibit conversions for Muslims.485
Indeed, at the regional level, the Constitution of Somaliland stipulates that ‘Islamic Sharia does not
accept that a Muslim person can renounce his beliefs’ (Article 33, Section 1)486, thus effectively
banning conversions from Islam to other religions487. A provision prohibiting Muslims from renouncing
their faith can also be found in the Constitution of Puntland.488
According to Hoehne, Somalia’s authorities and population generally show no tolerance towards
converts from Islam, or only if they remain invisible to the public eye. Moreover, being accused ofproselytising Muslims is something that is ‘extremely dangerous’ in all parts of in Somalia, and faithbased humanitarian organisations, for instance, may even be harassed in areas like Somaliland, that
otherwise are considered to be non-extremist.489
In January 2021, authorities in Somaliland arrested a couple and two other women (one of them an
Ethiopian) on allegations of propagating Christianity.490 After charging the couple, as well as four other
Christian converts, with apostasy in April, the court dismissed all charges and released them in August2021.491
In February 2021, it was reported that several Christians belonging to the Ethiopian community werearrested in Hargeisa (Somaliland).492 In early October 2020, the Somali Dispatch news website andother local media reported that police in Hargeisa arrested two male Christian converts for alleged
missionary activity.493
In September 2020, media reported that authorities in Somaliland arrested a married couple forpropagating Christianity.494 Some senior clerics reportedly demanded that the two Christian converts
should be charged with apostasy under sharia law.495 In November 2020, the couple were released496
and deported to Mogadishu, as the husband originated from South-Central Somalia.497

482 Somalia, Provisional Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia, 1 August 2012, available at: url
483 Somalia, Legislative Decree No. 5 of 16 December 1962: Penal Code, 16 December 1962, available at: url
484 Hoehne, M. V., telephone interview, 1 July 2021 [The source emphasised that ‘nominally’ points to the fact that it is notapplied in AS areas.]; see also USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report 2020 - Somalia, 12 May 2021, url, p. 3;
Germany, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development and Federal Foreign Office, 2. Bericht der
Bundesregierung zur weltweiten Lage der Religionsfreiheit (Berichtszeitraum 2018 bis 2019), October 2020, url, p. 269
485 USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report 2020 - Somalia, 12 May 2021, url, p. 3; see also Humanists International,
Freedom of Thought Report – Somalia, last updated 28 August 2020, url
486 Republic of Somaliland, Constitution of the Republic of Somaliland, Translated by Ibrahim Hashi Jama, 2000, available at:url, Article 33, Section 1
487 USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report 2020 - Somalia, 12 May 2021, url, p. 3
488 Puntland State of Somalia, Constitution of Puntland State of Somalia, December 2009, available at: url, Article 13, Section
1
489 Hoehne, M. V., communication, 18 August 2021
490 Somaliland Standard, 4 Christians arrested on charges of “spreading the faith” in Somaliland, 16 February 2021, url
491 Barnabas Fund, Somaliland Christians released after offences-against-Islam charges dismissed, 6 August 2021, url
492 Somaliland Sun (The), Somaliland: Religious Persecution or Law Enforcement? The Saga of Christians Tribulations inHargeisa, 17 February 2021, url
493 Somali Dispatch, Somaliland: Two Christian Preachers Arrested, 6 October 2020, url; see also Geeska Africa, Somaliland:
Spreading the Christian religion Is a Crime? Police arrest two men, 5 October 2020, url; Radio Risala, Somaliland police arrest
two for preaching Christianity, 5 October 2020, translated by: BBC Monitoring, available by subscription at: url
494 Somali Dispatch, Somaliland deports couple spreading Christianity to Mogadishu, 19 November 2020, url
495 USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report 2020 - Somalia, 12 May 2021, url, p. 5
496 Barnabas Fund, Christian couple released and deported from Somaliland, 17 November 2020, url; Middle East Concern,
Somaliland: Christian couple released and deported, 13 November 2020, url
497 Somali Dispatch, Somaliland deports couple spreading Christianity to Mogadishu, 19 November 2020, url; see also USDOS,
International Religious Freedom Report 2020 - Somalia, 12 May 2021, url, p. 5

53

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

At the societal level, conversion from Islam is unacceptable in all parts of Somalia, and persons
believed to be converts, as well as their families, have reportedly been harassed in their local
communities.498 In October 2020, three Muslim teenagers assaulted and severely beat a seven-year
old Christian boy in Dhobley, a town next to the Kenyan border in Lower Jubba, as he came from a
Bible study he had attended with other secret Christians. The injured boy’s father is quoted as sayingthat ‘it is not possible to get justice in this part of Somalia where almost everyone is a Muslim’ andthat they ‘are being hunted down like wild animals’ due to their Christian faith.499 As reported by a
US-based Christian news website in August 2019, a woman in Somaliland, who had reportedly secretly
converted to Christianity years ago, was divorced by her husband and beaten and denied food by her
brothers after they found out that she owned a Bible, which she had brought with her from a trip to
Nairobi.500 In 2020, Christians and other religious minorities were reported as saying that they wereunable to practise their faith in an open manner and that the country’s small Christian community was
keeping a low profile.501
Regarding the situation of Sufis, Hoehne noted that non-militant Salafists and Sufis are able to co-exist
peacefully, with Sufis living in a place like Mogadishu being able to freely go about their daily lives andpractise their religion without being bothered by the Salafist majority. According to the source, there
is a risk of AS carrying out attacks targeting Sufi rituals that are practised very visibly in public, inparticular the reverence of long-dead Sufi sheikhs.502 In November 2018, AS fighters killed at least 15
people, including a Sufi leader and his followers, in an attack on a religious centre in Galkayo (Mudug
region), a town that was reportedly not under the control of AS.503 According to VOA, AS had
previously accused the cleric of committing blasphemy and threatened to kill him after he posted
controversial videos that showed him pointing to what has been believed to be a picture of theProphet Muhammad. He was also criticized for including music in his worship services.504
Hadd (plural: huduud) crimes
Adultery constitutes a crime punishable under statutory law. Article 426, Section 1 of the Penal Codestipulates that ‘whoever, being bound by a marriage having civil effects [...], has carnal intercourse[...] with a person other than his or her spouse, shall be punished with imprisonment [...] up to two
years.’505
No reports dating from 2020 or the first half of 2021 could be found on the implementation of huduud
crimes in areas of Somalia that are not directly controlled by AS. Michael Skjelderup, in an email
response from June 2021, commented that he is not aware of any cases of punishment during 20202021 related to huduud crimes in areas not under direct control of AS.506
Blasphemy
The Penal Code punishes anyone with up to two years in prison who ‘publicly brings the religion ofIslam into contempt’ (Article 313, Section 1) or ‘publicly insults the religion of Islam by bringing into
contempt persons professing it or places or objects dedicated to worship’ (Article 313, Section 2). The
Penal Code also provides that persons who publicly commit blasphemy, ‘with invectives or insulting
words’, against ‘the Deity or the symbols of the person venented [sic] in the religion of the State’ must

498 USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report 2020 - Somalia, 12 May 2021, url, p. 8
499 Morning Star News, Muslim Boys in Somalia Beat Christian’s 7-Year-Old Son, 30 October 2020, url
500 Morning Star News, Christian Mother in Somalia Divorced, Beaten, 16 August 2019, url
501 USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report 2020 - Somalia, 12 May 2021, url, p.8; see also RNS, Christian workers in

Somalia worship in secret, fear al-Shabab, 7 January 2019, url
502 Hoehne, M. V., email, 14 October 2020
503 Al Jazeera, Somalia: Sufi scholar, followers killed in al-Shabab attack, 26 November 2018, url
504 VOA, Militant Attacks Kills 22 in Somalia, 26 November 2018, url
505 Somalia, Legislative Decree No. 5 of 16 December 1962: Penal Code, 16 December 1962, available at: url, Article 426,
Section 1
506 Skjelderup, M., email, 1 July 2021

54

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

pay a fine (Article 559, Section 1). 507 Hoehne notes that making blasphemous statements is ‘extremely
dangerous’ in all parts of Somalia, and that in this regard, AS’s interpretation of Islam is ‘very close’ tothe views prevailing among the country’s general population.508
In August 2021, Al-Shabaab militants killed an 83-year-old man in Hindhere (Galmadug state) for
blasphemy after he allegedly insulted Prophet Mohamed.509 In January 2021, Al-Shabaab spokesman
Ali Dhere called on people of Galkayo to execute Abdiladif Muuse Nur, governor of Mudug, forblasphemy regarding his expression of irritation about muezzins’ call to prayer.510
In March 2019, Mahmoud Jama Ahmed-Hamdi, a professor at the University of Hargeisa, was arrested
after publishing a Facebook post in which he questioned whether praying for water was an expedientstrategy in dealing with drought, arguing that the authorities should have dealt with the problem in amore scientific way. This post was widely perceived to be blasphemous, and Ahmed-Hamdi received
death threats prior to his arrest. In late April 2019, a court sentenced him to two and a half years inprison on charges of blasphemy. Prosecutors then appealed the verdict, requesting a death sentence.
However, this was overruled by the Court of Appeal, which upheld the original sentence. In January
2020, he received a presidential pardon on the condition that he does not engage in clerical activity,and he was also suspended from university for five years. However, once released, it was reported
that Ahmed-Hamdi continued to receive death threats, despite the fact that he had shut down his
blog and Facebook page and stayed away from any public activity. In February 2020, a well-known
local imam called for Ahmed-Hamdi to be killed, arguing that he was an apostate.511
Please note that the actual number of incidents may be higher than the number of reported incidents.
‘Westernized’ behaviour
Reports of specific incidents targeting individuals and returnees for ‘westernised behaviour’ were
scarce amongst the sources consulted. Although there were ‘no official restrictions on attending
cultural events, playing music, or going to the cinema’ outside the territories controlled by AS,512
returnees to Somalia often come back with habits which are unfamiliar to Somali society and areviewed as morally transgressing in Islamic or Somali culture.513 Individuals who behave in ‘odd’ ways,
for example because they are drunk or have been taking drugs, ‘run a high risk’ of losing the supportof their families, and may be subjected to lasting societal pressure and stigma.514 Several sources arequoted in a DIS report as saying that the treatment these returnees will receive from their families orclans depends on the extent to which a returnee is willing to renounce this unfamiliar behaviour,
although the report refers to Hoehne as explaining that it rarely happens that a returnee will be ousted
altogether. The same report quotes Mary Harper as referring to some cases of returnees with ‘bad
habits’ who were expelled from their networks and ‘ended up in mental hospital’, with another source
indicating that societal pressure can lead to substance abuse and subsequent confinement in religious

507 Somalia, Legislative Decree No. 5 of 16 December 1962: Penal Code, 16 December 1962, available at: url, Article 313,

Sections 1-2; Article 559, Section 1
508 Hoehne, M. V., communication, 25 June 2021
509 Garow Online, Al-Shabaab executes elder in Somalia for allegedly insulting Prophet Mohamed, 8 August 2021, url
510 Puntland Post, Al-Shabaab Spokesman Orders ‘Assassination of Mudug Governor’, 11 January 2021, url
511 Humanists International, Protect Mahmoud, the Somali professor accused of blasphemy for a Facebook post, 6 March
2020, url; see also HRWF, Somalia: Prof. Mahmoud Ahmed-Hamdi, a humanist, is now in hiding outside of Somalia, 25 June
2020, url; IIRF, Somali Prof. Ahmed, a victim of blasphemy laws, urgently needs a humanitarian visa, 11 September 2020, url
512 USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 19
513 Denmark, DIS, South and Central Somalia - Security situation, forced recruitment, and conditions for returnees [source:
Markus Hoehne], July 2020, url, p. 17
514 ACCORD, Somalia: Al-Schabaab und Sicherheitslage; Lage von Binnenvertriebenen und Rückkehrer·innen; Schutz durch
staatliche und nicht-staatliche Akteure [Seminar with experts Markus Hoehne and Jutta Bakonyi], 31 May 2021, url, p. 38

55

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

rehabilitation centres, where persons are subjected to physical and psychological abuse as part of thetreatment.’515

4. Minorities and non-minority clans
Somalia is culturally and socially more diverse than often depicted.516 The majority groups in Somalia
are those whose members belong to pastoralist (nomadic) clans. Adhering to the ‘ideology’ ofpatrilineal descent, these clans and sub-clans, which include the Dir (including Isaaq), Hawiye andDarood,517 have been dominating Somali politics for the past century and a half.518 The Rahanweyn(Digil and Mirifle) are also considered a majority group, although some members of the abovementioned majority groups consider them as ‘low status’.519
In addition, there are minority groups which include occupational minorities, mostly urban-basedminorities along the Benadir coast, and the agricultural ethnic minorities who mostly are descendants
of slaves imported from east Africa in the past, known as Wagosha, Jareer or Bantus.520
This chapter is organized along the following lines: in section 4.1, low status occupational minorities
are described, among them the Gabooye (and their subgroups Madhibaan and Muse Diriye), the Yibir,
the Galgale, the Tumal, the Gahayle, the Yahar and the Ugaadhyahan/Ugaaryahan, Eyle, Hawle andHawrasame. In section 4.2, ethnic minorities, comprising the Bantu and Bajuni who are generally
described as agricultural ethnic minorities,521 are discussed. As a third group, the Benadiri, comprisingmostly urban-based minorities along the Benadir coast who are mainly of Arabic descent, are includedin this section. It has to be emphasized that the Benadiri are generally not seen as a homogenous
ethnic minority group and that their status in Somali society is fundamentally different from the status
of Bantu and Bajuni. For pragmatic reasons, they are also discussed under the title ‘ethnic minorities’.
Section 4.3 deals with groups that were traditionally specialised in religious services, namely the
Ashraf and the Sheikhal. Finally, in section 4.4, non-minority clans, i.e. the Rahanweyn/Digil-Mirifle(Saab) and the Tunni, Begedi and Geledi are introduced. It is important to note that their status isrelative and depends on the local context (e.g. an Isaaq being a ‘minority’ in Mogadishu, but a majority
in Hargeisa). In section 4.5, information on mixed marriages between groups concludes this chapter.522
Before elaborating on the groups, some general introductory issues, like the significance of ancestry
and origin in Somali society, the distinction between majority and minority groups, language, and theissue of treatment, discrimination and protection of minority groups are discussed below.
Meaning of ancestry and origin in Somali society
Somali society is generally represented as being patrilineal, clan-based, which means that Somalis
identify their lineage with their father’s ancestors, whose names are used to identify their overall clan
515 Denmark, DIS, South and Central Somalia - Security situation, forced recruitment, and conditions for returnees [source:

Mary Harper, a representative of an international organisation], July 2020, url, p. 17
516 Osman, A., Cultural Diversity and the Somali Conflict: Myth or Reality?, 2007, url
517 Lewis, I. M., A Pastoral Democracy. A Study of Pastoralism and Politics among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa,
1961, p. 5
518 EASO, Somalia: Actors, July 2021, url, Chapter 3: Clans
519 Helander, B., Clanship, kinship and community among the Rahanweyn: A model for other Somalis?, 1997, pp. 140-142
520 Menkhaus, K., Bantu ethnic identities in Somalia, 2003, pp. 325-328; Gundel, J., The predicament of the ‘Oday’ – The roleof traditional structures in security, rights, law and development in Somalia, 2006, url, p. 4, 28
521 Gundel, J., The predicament of the ‘Oday’ – The role of traditional structures in security, rights, law and development in
Somalia, 2006, url, p. 4, 28
522 The organisation of the information in this way reflects the input received by Joakim Gundel during the peer-review ofthis report, 3 August 2021.

56

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

family belonging and their sub-clan lineages.523 Somalia’s nomadic clans with northern origins –primarily the Dir, Darood, Hawiye, and Isaaq – trace their ancestry to Samaal as their common
ancestor, whilst the southern and sedentary Rahanweyn/Digil Mirifle look to Saab. Clans bear thename of their ancestor when grouped. The coexistence of common roots and internal divisions
renders the clan unifying as an organisational principle but also creates an array of potential fault lines
for conflict.524
Thus, in general, society in Somalia is culturally and even ethnically more diverse than most observers
and even many Somalis would have recognised until recently.525 Moreover, Somali society in generalis simultaneously egalitarian and stratified.526 On the one hand, there is a strong ethos of equality
among Somali (pastoralist) men,527 and – subordinate to patriarchal overrule – also among Somali(pastoralist) women.528 On the other hand, differences in group size, i.e. ‘man power’ (at the collective
level)529, and wealth, knowledge and skills (at the individual level) play a role.530 Additionally (again at
the collective level), the question of (constructed) ‘origin’531 is important.532 In particular because
belonging to a strong clan matters in terms of access to resources, political influence, justice, andsecurity, while minorities and women tend to be excluded from the same.533
Distinction between majority and minority groups
This section should be read in conjunction with EASO’s COI report Somalia: Actors, published in July
2021.534
Somali society is divided in majority groups and minority groups. The latter received little attention in
the scholarly works in the 20th century.535 Kirk, who described mainly the situation in northern Somalia
at around 1900, mentioned the basic distinction between gob (gentry) and sab (lowborn; outcast).536
The term sab must not be confused with Saab, which is a name for the Rahanweyn/Digil-Mirifle (seebelow).537 Those belonging to the sab-groups were ‘scattered people of no fixed home, who often
attach themselves in small groups or families […] as servants, to the various Somali tribes all over thecountry.’538 Kirk reported that these groups were not recognised as Somali by other Somalis, and that

523 Lewis, I. M., A Pastoral Democracy. A Study of Pastoralism and Politics among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa,

1961, pp. 1-5
524 Mydlak, R., The Clan System and Customary Justice in Somalia: A Brief Introduction, 2019525 Hoehne, M. V., telephone interview, 1 July 2021; see also Mydlak, R., The Clan System and Customary Justice in Somalia:
A Brief Introduction, 2019; Gundel, J., The predicament of the ‘Oday’ – The role of traditional structures in security, rights,
law and development in Somalia, 2006, url, p. 4
526 Osman, A., Cultural Diversity and the Somali Conflict: Myth or Reality?, 2007, url; Gundel, J., The predicament of the‘Oday’ – The role of traditional structures in security, rights, law and development in Somalia, 2006, url, pp. 15-16
527 Schlee, G., Cutomary Law and the Joys of Statlessness: Somali realities beyond libertarian fantasies, 2017, p. 219
528 Hoehne, M. V., telephone interview, 1 July 2021
529 Schlee, G., Cutomary Law and the Joys of Statlessness: Somali realities beyond libertarian fantasies, 2017, p. 220
530 Lewis, I. M., A Pastoral Democracy. A Study of Pastoralism and Politics among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa,
1961, pp. 196-197
531 Jenkins, R., Social Identity, 1996, p. 17; Schlee, G., Taking sides and constructing identities: reflections on conflict theory,
2004, p. 148
532 Lewis, I. M., Visible and Invisible Differences: The Somali Paradox, 2004, p. 490
533 Menkhaus, K., Elite Bargains and Political Deals Project: Somalia Case Study, Stabilisation Unit, February 2018, url; seealso Webersik, C., Hansen, S. J., and Egal, A., Somalia: A Political Economy Analysis, 2018, url, p. 4
534 EASO, Somalia: Actors, July 2021, url, sections: 3.1.1 Major clans; 3.1.2 Minor clans, casted communities and non-Somaligroups535 Luling, V., The other Somali: Minority groups in traditional Somali society, 1984, p. 52; Hill, M., No redress: Somalia’s
forgotten minorities, 2010, url
536 Kirk, J. W. C., The Yibirs and Midgaans of Somaliland — Their traditions and dialects, 1904, p. 91
537 See also EASO, Somalia: Actors, July 2021, url, sections: 3.1.1 Major clans; 3.1.2 Minor clans, casted communities andnon-Somali groups.
538 Kirk, J. W. C., The Yibirs and Midgaans of Somaliland — Their traditions and dialects, 1904, p. 91

57

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Somalis would not eat or intermarry with them. They formed endogamous groups attached to others
as clients.539
Lewis wrote that, in general, and in contrast the outcast or occupational groups ‘have no recognized
genealogy of their own’ and their rights (under customary law) and political representation weremediated through their patrons (who belonged to majority clan groups).540 The so-called ‘outcasts’often were relegated to perform what was considered ‘dirty’ and partly dangerous work (asblacksmiths, shoemakers or game hunters).541 In his study of the written sources (in English, French,
Italian and German) on the Somali clans, published in 1955, Lewis added that in southern Somalia,
particularly among the Digil and Mirifle (together forming the Rahanweyn group), the outcasts were
known as boon; the nobles were called bilis.542 Information regarding these groups can be found insection 4.1 below.
Somali Bantu/Jareer (the latter is a derogative term referring to the ‘hard hair’ of these people), who
are also known as Gosha543, and others constitute another group of so-called544 minorities in Somalia,
who are – at least in the view of most other Somalis – originally foreigners belonging to another ethnic
group. In the case of Somali Bantu, their ancestors mostly have been sold as slaves to plantation
owners in southern Somalia in the 19th century.545 Anthropologist Catherine Besteman describes that‘slaves were the embodiment of kinless beings, divorced from the responsibilities that relations ofkinship entail.’546 Information regarding these groups can be found in section 4.2 below.
The Benadiri, who are urban dwellers along the Benadir coast (from Mogadishu to Kismayo) originate,according to their own perception and the perception of most other Somalis, at least partly fromtraders from Yemen, Persia or Portugal who came to Mogadishu in the early middle ages.547 The
members of the various Benadiri minority groups ‘are joined by legal alliance but do not claim
common descent.’ 548 Information regarding these groups can also be found in section 4.2 below.
In addition to the above minorities, Lewis mentions several groups that were specialised in religious
services. He outlined that ‘in clan genealogies, religious groups may sometimes appear as lineages
incorporated into the clan structure of the tribe. Names like Sheikhal [Sheekhaal], Ashraf, Faki, Fogi,
etc., words denoting religious men or priests, indicate priestly sections when they occur in tribal
genealogies.’549 In Lewis’ view, these groups denoted ‘extraneous aggregates’ which originally weredependants of majority groups ‘into which they were admitted as clients (arifa, shegat [sheegad])through the grant of land made to them.’550 Intermarriage between them and their patrons was

539 Kirk, J. W. C., The Yibirs and Midgaans of Somaliland — Their traditions and dialects, 1904, p. 92
540 Lewis, I. M., Peoples of the Horn of Africa: Somali, Afar, and Saho, 1998 [1955], p. 52
541 Ashur, K. D., telephone interview, 29 June 2021. Kemal Dahir Ashur is a minority group rights activists in the European

diaspora.
542 Lewis, I. M., Peoples of the Horn of Africa: Somali, Afar, and Saho, 1998 [1955], p. 51; Hoehne, M. V., Somali ethnography,
2010, p. 703
543 The term Bantu did not come into use until after the civil-war of 1991/1992. Until then, the common terms used was
Wagosha (the people of the forested river banks), see Kapteins, L, Clan Cleansing in Somalia: The Ruinous Legacy of 1991,
2013, p. 280
544 Locally, in the regions where they live, they are often majorities in terms of numbers, but are marginalised in terms of
power, see Denmark, DIS, Report on minority groups in Somalia, Joint British, Danish and Dutch fact-finding mission to
Nairobi, Kenya [source: Bantu elders], 2000, url, p. 31
545 Besteman, C., Unraveling Somalia: Race, Violence and the Legacy of Slavery, 1999, pp. 49-69; Gundel mentions that some
Bantu may even have been traded by the Arabs before that time. Gundel, J., The predicament of the ‘Oday’ – The role oftraditional structures in security, rights, law and development in Somalia, 2006, url, p. 39
546 Besteman, C., Unraveling Somalia: Race, Violence and the Legacy of Slavery, 1999, p. 53
547 Switzerland, SEM, Focus Somalia: Clans und Minderheiten, 31 May 2017, url, p. 13; Adam, A. S., Benadiri People of Somalia
with Particular Reference to the Reer Hamar of Mogadishu, 2011, pp. 51-90
548 Luling, V., Somali Sultanate: the Geledi City-State Over 150 Years, 2002, p. 80
549 Lewis, I. M., Peoples of the Horn of Africa: Somali, Afar, and Saho, 1998 [1955], p. 149
550 Lewis, I. M., Peoples of the Horn of Africa: Somali, Afar, and Saho, 1998 [1955], p. 149; italics in the original.

58

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

permitted and even esteemed, since the members of the religious groups were considered especially‘blessed’.551 Information regarding these groups can be found in section 4.3 below.
Groups that belong to majority clans can be in a local minority situation where they face specificvulnerabilities.552 Information regarding these groups can be found in section 4.4 below.
In this context, the concept of sheegad, mentioned by Lewis, is worth noting; it can be translated as‘adoption’ and comes from the Somali verb sheegasho, for ‘claiming’ and refers to the act of claiming
other people’s ancestors as one’s own.553 In the agro-pastoral setting in the southwest of Somalia, in
the regions Bay and Bakool, co-residence and adoption constitute the foundation for complex
relationships and alliances within and between composite clans, as anthropologist Bernhard Helander
observed.554 Rahanweyn did not exhibit a ‘pure’ patrilineal descent line, but integrated people fromdifferent other groups through adoption. This created a network of relationships in which factual
descent cross-cut with sheegad relationships, both of which created demands for loyalty.555
Meaning of languages and dialects in society
In addition to the differences in origin, many members of minority groups speak a language or dialect
different from ‘standard’ Somali, which is known as Af-Maxaa. Many Rahanweyn speak Af-Maay,
which is the common language in the inter-riverine areas. The Somali Bantu partly speak Af-Maay, butalso have their own languages,556 which go back to a language spoken by their ancestors in Tanzania
or elsewhere in East Africa (e.g. Ki-Zigula).557
Treatment, discrimination and protection of minority groups
Between 1991 and the early 2000s, Somalia was in a situation of state-collapse.558 Since 2004, several
governments of Somalia have been established. Nevertheless, no Somali government has overcome
the internal divisions and managed to expand its rule much beyond Mogadishu.559 Therefore, in mostparts of Somalia, people still have to rely on self-help to defend themselves and their property. Selfhelp is organized primarily among close patrilineal relatives.560 Until today, most Somalis still rely on
support from patrilineal clan relatives for protection, gaining access to resources, jobs or justice, hencegroup (clan) belonging remains important in Somalia.561
Against the backdrop of decades of state failure, primary solidarity lies with patrilineal relatives intheir sub-clans (including those constructed through sheegad). Lineage and clan elders mediate
conflicts and distribute compensations or mobilise for defense. This privileges strong groups and thosefeaturing ‘long’ genealogies (which mostly means groups with many living members today). It
underprivileges those who give little weight to patrilineal genealogies and/or do not have such anelaborate genealogical tree (meaning: minority groups).562 Alternatively, in Al-Shabaab controlled

551 Hoehne, M. V., telephone interview, 1 July 2021
552 Gundel, J., Comment received during the peer review of this report, 3 August 2021
553 Hashi, A. A. and Hashi, A. A., Fiqi’s Somali English Dictionary, 1998, p. 424
554 Helander, B., Clanship, kinship and community among the Rahanweyn: A model for other Somalis?, 1997, pp. 134-35,

139; see also EAJ, Pathways and Institutions for Resolving Land Disputes in Mogadishu, January 2020, url, pp. 11-12555 Helander, B., Clanship, kinship and community among the Rahanweyn: A model for other Somalis?, 1997, pp. 140-42
556 Eno, M. A., The Bantu - Jareer Somalis: Unearthing Apartheid in the Horn of Africa, April 2008, url
557 Hoehne, M. V., Continuities and changes regarding minorities in Somalia, 2015, p. 797; Declich, F., Can Boundaries not
Border on One Another?, 2010, pp. 171-172
558 Menkhaus, K., State Collapse in Somalia: Second Thoughts, September, 2003, p. 407
559 ACCORD, Somalia: Al-Schabaab und Sicherheitslage; Lage von Binnenvertriebenen und Rückkehrer·innen; Schutz durch
staatliche und nicht-staatliche Akteure [Seminar with experts Markus Hoehne and Jutta Bakonyi], 31 May 2021, url, p. 29
560 ACCORD, Somalia: Al-Schabaab und Sicherheitslage; Lage von Binnenvertriebenen und Rückkehrer·innen; Schutz durch
staatliche und nicht-staatliche Akteure [Seminar with experts Markus Hoehne and Jutta Bakonyi], 31 May 2021, url, pp. 3132
561 Hoehne, M. V., telephone interview, 1 July 2021; see also EAJ, Pathways and Institutions for Resolving Land Disputes in
Mogadishu, January 2020, url, p. v
562 Hoehne, M. V., telephone interview, 1 July 2021

59

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

areas, the extremists may offer their version of justice and protection (to those loyal to the Islamist
cause and to those who want to avoid corrupt government courts).563
Regarding the current situation of minority group members, the US Department of State noted that‘minority groups, often lacking armed militias, continued to be disproportionately subjected to killings,
torture, rape, kidnapping for ransom, and looting of land and property with impunity by faction
militias and majority clan members, often with the acquiescence of federal and local authorities’. The
source emphasises ‘deep poverty’ and ‘numerous forms of discrimination and exclusion’ which many
minority communities still face. It is believed that resentment over abuses made minority clans more
vulnerable to recruitment by al-Shabaab.564
Throughout the 20th century, minority group members suffered discrimination in varying degrees(some were accepted by other clans as marriage partners, like Ashraf/Asharaf, while others werecompletely excluded, like most Gabooye in the north or the Bantu in the south). Under the military
dictatorship (1969-1991) the social differences between the various Somali groups were officiallydenied (while still, rule lay mostly in the hands of majority clan members). In everyday practice,
marginalisation often continued.565 Dictator Mohamed Siyad Barre ‘deliberately promoted certain
members of minority groups such as Midgaan and Tumal into high political and military positions.
Beneath the surface, however, the exclusion from economic and political resources continued, andparticularly Gosha/Jareer were treated as secondclass citizens.’566 When the civil war broke out in the
1990s, ‘weak minority groups were subjected to the worst levels of looting, assault, rape, and forcedlabor at the hands of the militia of more powerful Somali clans.’567
While minority group members in Mogadishu and elsewhere are not systematically targeted any more
(as was the case in the early 1990s568), members of minority groups continue to experiencemarginalisation in many regards (access to education, political and economic resources, justice andsecurity).569 They also hardly have any representation in the security forces (particularly the Somali
National Army). The army is a collection of former clan militias. In Mogadishu and surroundings, themajority of the soldiers belong to various Hawiye clans. In other areas, the soldiers belong to otherdominant clans – if the army has a presence at all.570 For further details see also EASO’s COI report
Somalia: Actors, published in July 2021.571 A source in Mogadishu explained that if a soldier who
belongs to a large clan kills someone, he enjoys the protection of his clan. But if a soldier belonging toa minority group kills someone, he is going to have a problem.572
Particularly women belonging to minority groups are extremely vulnerable. Minority women findthemselves with little protection either from customary clan-based justice systems or formal legal
procedures. If they are violated by a member of majority group, the perpetrator rarely gets

563 Samatar, A. S., Al-Shabaab has created a perfect storm in Somalia, 14 October 2020, url; EAJ, Pathways and Institutions

for Resolving Land Disputes in Mogadishu, January 2020, url, p. v, p. 14, pp. 17-18
564 USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 36
565 Besteman, C., Unraveling Somalia: Race, Violence and the Legacy of Slavery, 1999, pp. 113-129
566 Hoehne, M. V., Continuities and changes regarding minorities in Somalia, 2015, p. 797
567 Menkhaus, K., Bantu ethnic identities in Somalia, 2003, p. 325; see also Eno, M. A., The Bantu - Jareer Somalis: Unearthing
Apartheid in the Horn of Africa, April 2008, url
568 Cassanelli, L., Victims and vulnerable groups in southern Somalia, May 1995, url
569 Switzerland, SEM, Focus Somalia: Clans und Minderheiten, 31 May 2017, url, p. 5; Ashur, K. D., telephone interview, 29
June 2021
570 Austria, BFA Staatendokumentation (Austrian Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum, COI unit), Fact Finding Mission
Report Somalia; Sicherheitslage in Somalia; Bericht zur österreichisch-schweizerischen FFM, August 2017, url, p. 14
571 EASO, Somalia: Actors, July 2021, url, section: 2.4.1 SNA
572 Austria, BFA Staatendokumentation (Austrian Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum, COI unit), Fact Finding Mission
Report Somalia; Sicherheitslage in Somalia; Bericht zur österreichisch-schweizerischen FFM, August 2017, url, p. 14

60

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

punished.573 Abuses of women and children (and sometimes men trying to defend them) on the handsof majority group members all over Somalia were documented by SOMRAF in 2010.574
With regard to political participation of minorities, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands
cites a confidential source according to whom, ‘minorities may “participate” but are “not represented”
as a group.’ 575

4.1 Low status occupational minorities
Gabooye: terminological issues, delineation from other groups, historical position
A recent term used for certain occupational minorities in northwestern Somalia/Somaliland is‘Gaboye/Gabooye’. The term comes from Somali gabooye, meaning quiver.576 In the literature, there
is confusion about which groups exactly can be subsumed under this umbrella term. Hoehne mentions
that this confusion can be overcome if one realises that in the past, both Madhibaan and Muuse Diriye
were collectively referred to as ‘Midgan’. The latter term was more recently replaced by ‘Gabooye’.577
The term was introduced during the Barre era578 to replace the derogative term ‘Midgaan’. According
to anthropologist Elia Vitturini, an expert on Gabooye groups and other marginalised minorities, today
Gabooye is used as collective term for the two groups Madhibaan and Muse Diriye.579 Also Eno andKusow, two Somali scholars and minority rights activists, quote a local mentioning that ‘the Gaboyegroup, or those who were formerly called Midgaan, consist of two ethnic sections: Madhibaan andMuse Dheri. Neither the Tumal nor the Yibir outcast communities belong to this group’.580 In theliterature, there is disagreement whether the term Gabooye refers also to Yibir and Tumal.581 Yet, also
Vitturini insists that the term does not include these groups.582 Gabooye mainly reside in northern
Somalia (Somaliland and Puntland), but also have a presence in the Somali region of Ethiopia and, inthe second half of the 20th century, have moved to urban centers in southern Somalia (mainly
Mogadishu).583
For more information see EASO’s COI report Somalia: Actors, published in July 2021.584
The Gabooye (i.e. Madhibaan and Muse Diriye) were in the past (until the 1990s) attached todominant clans in the northwest/Somaliand, such as Isaaq or Darood clans, as clients and servants.
Historian Lee Cassanelli mentioned that, in the second half of the 20th century, Gabooye families havemigrated to the cities, where they have been employed by politicians in more powerful clans asdrivers, bodyguards and spies. For example, dictator Siyad Barre elevated several occupational
minority group members (Gabooye and others) to important positions in the ministries of defence
and education. With no independent clan base or status of their own, such appointees could be

573 UNOCHA, Somalia: Humanitarian Response Plan 2021, February 2021, url, p. 21; IDLO, Accessing Justice: Somalia's

Alternative Dispute Resolution Centers, Dezember 2020, url, p. 10, fn 31; MRG, Looma Ooyaan – No One Cries for Them: The
Predicament Facing Somalia’s Minority Women, January 2015, url, pp. 22-23
574 SOMRAF, Report on human rights violations against the Somali marginalized minority groups, 2010, url
575 Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of Origin Information Report on South and Central Somalia, March 2019,url, p. 42
576 Zorc, D. R., Osman, M. M. and Luling, V., Somali-English Dictionary, 1993, p. 149
577 Hoehne, M. V., telephone interview, 1 July 2021
578 Norway, Landinfo, Query response, Somalia: Low status groups, 12 December 2016, url
579 Vitturini, E., telephone interview, 30 June 2021
580 Eno, M. A. and Kusow, A. M., Racial and Caste Prejudice in Somalia, 2014, p. 104
581 Ekman, A.-B., A Critical Theory Approach to Inequality in Somali Society: Rethinking Class and Identity for the Gabooye
Collective in Somaliland, 2021, p. 169
582 Vitturini, E., The Gaboye of Somaliland: transformations and historical continuities of the labour exploitation andmarginalisation of hereditary groups of occupational specialists, 2020, p. 474
583 Ashur, K. D., telephone interview, 29 June 2021
584 EASO, Somalia: Actors, July 2021, url, section: 3.1.2 Minor cans, casted communities and non-Somali groups

61

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

trusted to carry out orders.585 However, when Siyad Barre was ousted from Mogadishu by clan militias
in January 1991, the Gabooye and similar groups, such as Yibir and Tumal, were vulnerable toretaliation.586
Gabooye were until recently often insulted as scavengers (Somali: bakhti-cune). There were and still
are numerous negative stereotypes about Gabooye: ‘they are unclean’, ‘their women are prostitutes’,‘they are not real Muslims’.587 One activist recounted: ‘We grew up with hatred, socialized understratification and inferiorized to the bottom.’588 During fieldwork in Erigabo, in Sanaag region, Hoehne
met an old Muse Diriye woman called Awrala Gurhan Guleed (d. 2006). She was known as herbalist
and also as someone performing female circumcision and infibulation (Somali: gudniinka fircooniga),
which is a typical work for Gabooye women. She outlined that Madhibaan and Muse Diriye professsomewhat abbreviated genealogies, which suggested, however, that these groups were initially partof the Hawiye clan family (a majority group). According to the legend of the brothers Mohamed
Gorgarte and Mahamoud Gorgarte, they split, which explains why Gabooye (Madhibaan and Muse
Diriye) are considered ‘unclean’ by dominant clans and experience discrimination as a consequence.589
Situation of Gabooye subgroups Madhibaan and Muse Diriye
Madhibaan are together with Muse Diriye the most numerous occupational minority in northwestern
Somalia/Somaliland. They also live, in smaller numbers, in Ethiopia, northeastern Somalia/Puntlandand southern Somalia.590 Amboroso outlined in 2002 that around 20 000 Gabooye individuals lived inSomaliland in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In Hargeisa and its surrounding areas, with 1 182
households and more than 7 000 individuals the largest number of Gabooye resided.591
Traditionally, Madhibaan and Muse Diriye were hunters, shoemakers, tanners, well diggers and water
carriers for their hosts.592 Muse Diriye also traditionally worked as basket makers.593 Vitturini addedthat Madhibaan and Muse Diriye were ‘attached to genealogical units and sometimes also toindividuals who held a higher degree of prestige and political influence. They were reported as being
associated with certain occupational tasks which the members of the majority clans despised: hunting
wild animals, producing leather and shoes, cutting hair, making pottery (for women), “traditional”
healing and midwifery.’594
Until today, members of the Gabooye enjoy limited protection throughout Somalia. They can beharassed and bullied with impunity, especially in Somaliland and southern Somalia.595 Only in
Puntland, occupational minorities such as Gabooye and particularly Tumal, enjoy more rights and arein a slightly better position vis-a-vis majority group members than in the rest of Somalia or in
Somaliland.596 (For further details see the EASO COI report on Somalia: Key socio-economic

585 Cassanelli, L., Victims and vulnerable groups in southern Somalia, May 1995, url
586 Ashur, K. D., telephone interview, 29 June 2021
587 Hoehne, M. V., telephone interview, 1 July 2021
588 Eno, M. A. and Kusow, A. M., Racial and Caste Prejudice in Somalia, 2014, p. 105
589 Hoehne, M. V., telephone interview, 1 July 2021
590 Ashur, K. D., telephone interview, 29 June 2021
591 UNHCR, Pastoral Society And Transnational Refugees: Population Movements In Somaliland And Eastern Ethiopia 1988 –

2000, UNHCR Working Paper No. 65, August 2002, url, p. 32
592 Kirk, J. W. C., The Yibirs and Midgaans of Somaliland — Their traditions and dialects, 1904, pp. 95-99;
593 Switzerland, SEM, Focus Somalia: Clans und Minderheiten, 31 May 2017, url, p. 13; Adam, A. S., Benadiri People of Somalia
with Particular Reference to the Reer Hamar of Mogadishu, 2011, p. 17
594 Vitturini, E., The Gaboye of Somaliland: transformations and historical continuities of the labour exploitation andmarginalisation of hereditary groups of occupational specialists, 2020, p. 474; Switzerland, SEM, Focus Somalia: Clans und
Minderheiten, 31 May 2017, url, p. 13; Adam, A. S., Benadiri People of Somalia with Particular Reference to the Reer Hamarof Mogadishu, 2011, p. 17
595 Ashur, K. D., telephone interview, 29 June 2021
596 Mire, M. A., telephone interview, 11 July 2021. Muse Abdirisaq Mire is a local businessman in Garowe and a former civilsociety activist (in the Puntland youth organisation).

62

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

indicators.597) In conflicts with majority group members, however, Gabooye are in a weaker position
everywhere in Somalia.598 State institutions, which are dominanted by majority group members, do
not offer protection to Gabooye for injustices and violations they experienced (including sexual
violence, looting or physical assaults).599 At a structural level, injustice prevails as Gabooye lack accessto formal education (except Islamic learning), to economic resources and are largely politically
excluded. Intermarriage between them and members of majority groups are shunned. Gabooye livein certain marginal neighbourhoods, particularly of northern Somali cities (e.g. in Hargeisa, theGabooye quarter is called Dami).600
Madhibaan and Muse Diriye are ‘excluded from the main political forums, such as adult men’s
councils, and from exchanges of blood compensation (diya or mag in Somali)’ regulating conflict. They
can neither receive nor contribute to blood compensation like the majority groups. 601 Even thehighest authorities of Madhibaan and Muse Diriye – their religious and traditional leaders - have noinfluence outside of their own community. ‘Furthermore, there are no cases of Gaboye businessmen
with significant concentrations of wealth and business activities outside their “traditional”
occupations being capable of employing other members of their group.’602
Yibir
The Yibir or Anaas, whom colonial time accounts described as wandering sorcerers and leather
workers, reside mainly in northwestern Somalia/Somaliland and in the Somali region of Ethiopia. A
few are also living in central and southern Somalia. They also have a reputation as ‘fortune tellers’.603
In his review of this report, Joakim Gundel indicated that there are an estimated Yibir 2000 individuals
in Borama (Haya Yaabe neighborhood, ‘one of the last places where Yibir still own land’), 500 in
Bossasso, 300 in Burco, 300 in Hargeysa, 2-5 families in Berbera, 50 families in Las Anod, 100 families
in Garowe, very few in Galkayo and about 50 families in Mogadishu, while most Yibir are in Ethiopia.604
Kirk already mentioned the Yibir around 1900 and mentioned that they derived their main income
from a toll called samanyo, ‘which consists usually of about two or three rupees, and is levied upon
Somalis on the occasion of a birth of a child or a marriage.’605 In exchange, the Yibir would give a charmto the newly born child or the couple. They would curse those refusing to pay. This custom goes backto the legend of Bu’ur Bayr (Bu’ur means fertile), also known as Mohmed Hanif. He was a powerfulspiritual leader and ancestor of the Yibir. He was challenged by a Muslim scholar among the Isaaq
called Sharif Yusuf Awbarkhadle (also known as Aw Barkhadlke).606 In a spiritual contest, Sheikh Aw
Barkhadle killed Mohamed Hanif. As compensation, the Yibir demanded that every time a male childwas born to Isaaq (or another majority group in the north of Somalia), they would receive a small
portion of the compensation. This portion was called samanyo.607

597 EASO, Somalia: Key socio-economic indicators, September 2021, url, section: 2.4.1 Clan based protection
598 Ashur, K. D., telephone interview, 29 June 2021
599 SFH, Somalia: Die Minderheitengruppe der Gabooye/Midgan, 5 Juli 2018, url, pp. 4-7
600 Vitturini, E., The Gaboye of Somaliland: transformations and historical continuities of the labour exploitation andmarginalisation of hereditary groups of occupational specialists, 2020, p. 474
601 Vitturini, E., The Gaboye of Somaliland: transformations and historical continuities of the labour exploitation andmarginalisation of hereditary groups of occupational specialists, 2020, p. 474
602 Vitturini, E., The Gaboye of Somaliland: transformations and historical continuities of the labour exploitation andmarginalisation of hereditary groups of occupational specialists, 2020, p. 485
603 Vitturini, E., The Gaboye of Somaliland: transformations and historical continuities of the labour exploitation andmarginalisation of hereditary groups of occupational specialists, 2020, pp. 474-475; Ashur, K. D., telephone interview, 29
June 2021
604 Gundel, J., Comment received during the peer review of this report, 3 August 2021
605 Kirk, J. W. C., The Yibirs and Midgaans of Somaliland — Their traditions and dialects, 1904, p. 95
606 Lewis, I. M., Saints and Somalis, Popular Islam in a clan-based society, 1998, pp. 93-95
607 Kirk, J. W. C., The Yibirs and Midgaans of Somaliland — Their traditions and dialects, 1904, p. 97

63

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

The Yibir claim origin from the Dushan of Arabia.608 The legend of Maxamed Hanif provided the basis
for the hypothesis that the Yibir resided in northern Somalia before the Somali ‘proper’ arrived andwere then conquered and subjugated by the latter. Some Yibir and other Somalis even argued that
Yibir were actually related to the Hebrews of the Middle East.609 The rumor about the Hebrew originof the Yibir is still existing.610
The treatment of the Yibir during the time of Mohamed Siyad Barre’s rule (1969-1991) and afterwards
was similar to the fate of the Gabooye groups. They enjoyed some more freedom and rights in the
1970s and 1980s, but they may have been targeted ‘with impunity’ during the civil war.611 Until today,
the Yibir face discrimination along the same lines as Madhibaan and Muse Diriye.612 The most striking
example occurred in the 1990s, when Abgal militiamen of the USC (United Somali Congress) executed
several Yibir who had formerly been their clients. In its waning days the Barre regime reportedly armed
many Yibir and sent them into the local market to kill Abgal clansmen in retaliation for Abgal rebellion
against the government. After Abgal forces succeeded in helping oust Siyad Barre, they turned on theirformer Yibir clients and massacred them. Having broken with their former patrons, the Yibir had noone to turn to for protection.613 A source from 2013, dealing specifically with the Yibir stated that
‘While some Yibir succeeded in finding manual work in urban centers, a significant minority havebecome full-time beggars.’ The same source referred to the Somali Minority Rights & Aid Forum, thatmentioned that the Yibir were among the ‘Most socially excluded groups in Somalia.’ Throughout
Somalia, Yibir have limited to no access to social services, including education and health care. In rural
areas, Yibir often are exposed to abuse, exploitation and suffer from extreme poverty.614 Like otherminority group members, they lack protection by state or non-state authorities.615
The Yibir - Anaas community in Borama, Haya Yaabe district, in Somaliland held a press conference on
15 June 2021, complaining about land grabbing by the mayor, who has been grabbing land from overthe past two years illegally. 616
GalgaleGundel mentioned that they were traditionally woodcarvers from Middle Shabelle.617 Virginia Luling,an experienced Somalia researcher (d. 2013) in her expert evidence given in 2006 during theproceedings in a case before the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal in the UK, testified that Galgale
were a small low status group performing work such as slaughtering animals or carving wood. Afterthe collapse of the Somali government they had suffered from violent attacks.618 This is still the mostrecent source that could be found within the time constraints of this report that is dealing specificallywith the situation of Galgale. A UN report dated 2002 indicated that Galgale ‘suffered brutal reprisals’
from the Abgal (Hawiye) at the beginning of the Somali civil war, when they had been manipulated
into defending the dictator and were later punished by Hawiye militias for that.619

608 Kirk, J. W. C., The Yibirs and Midgaans of Somaliland — Their traditions and dialects, 1904, p. 102
609 Helander, B., Vulnerable minorities in Somalia and Somaliland, 1995, p. 21
610 Switzerland, SEM, Focus Somalia: Clans und Minderheiten, 31 May 2017, url, p. 13; Adam, A. S., Benadiri People of Somalia

with Particular Reference to the Reer Hamar of Mogadishu, 2011, p. 17
611 Cassanelli, L., Victims and vulnerable groups in southern Somalia, May 1995, url
612 Ashur, K. D., telephone interview, 29 June 2021
613 Cassanelli, L., Victims and vulnerable groups in southern Somalia, May 1995, url
614 Omer, I. M., Ethiopian Jews in Somalia: Tracing remnants of the Yibir, 3 September 2013, url
615 EASO, Information on the Somali caste of Madhibans, 29 January 2019, url, p. 6
616 Awdal Awdal, Borama:Shacabka hayayaabe oo cabasho kamuujiyey ciidamo laduldhigay, video published on Facebook,
15 June 2021, url
617 Gundel, J., The predicament of the ‘Oday’ – The role of traditional structures in security, rights, law and development in
Somalia, 2006, url, p. 45, pp. 56-57
618 United Kingdom, Asylum and Immigration Tribunal / Immigration Appellate Authority, MA (Galgale - Sab Clan) Somalia v.
Secretary of State for the Home Department, 17 July 2006, url, para. 16
619 UNOCHA, A study on minorities in Somalia, 2002, url

64Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Tumal
The Tumal (from Somalia tumo – to hammer) were traditionally blacksmiths and carpenters. 620 They
live throughout Somalia, from north to south.621 The former Prime Minister and Minister of Defenceof Somalia (in the 1980s), General Mohamed Ali Samater, was from the Tumal clan. Some Tumal
enjoyed freedom and support under the military dictatorship (1969-1991). The Tumal claim that they
are originated from Arab, some of Tumal sub-clans claim to be associated with Darood and otherclans.622 The Tumal may have been targeted ‘with impunity’ during the civil war,623 and today still facediscrimination along the same lines as Madhibaan and Muse Diriye.624 They are restricted fromintermarrying with majority group members, they are confined to dirty and dangerous work as
blacksmith or work in garages. State officials belonging to majority groups do not support them. They
have limited access to education and political participation.625 Only in Puntland, Tumal are in asomewhat stronger position, but still they are not considered as equal to the locally dominant
members of the Majeerteen clan.626
GahayleGahayle are either part of or, as clients, related to the Majeerteen/Siwaqroon clan.627 Today theymostly reside in Sanaag region (between Somaliland and Puntland). They live in the towns of Laasa
Surad, Erigabo and Midhisho.While they were traditionally involved in frankincencse production, it isunclear if they constitute a caste group or a lineage of the Siwaqroon clan.628
No further information was found on this group.
Yahar
A small occupational group that mainly inhabits north-eastern, central and southern Somalia is called
Yahar. They claim origin from Yemen.629 Another source states that Yahar is just another name for
Yibir – as used in central and southern Somalia.630 One source noted in 2010 that ‘occupational groups
are also known by different names in different localities, such as Yahar or Gabyo in Hiraan region,
while some have become identified with their affiliated clans.’631
No further information was found on this group.
Ugaadhyahan/Ugaaryahan, Eyle, Hawle, Hawrasame
Besides the above mentioned groups, other occupational groups or the same ones under different
names can be found, among them Ugaadhyahan/Ugaaryahan (meaning: those who know wild
animals, i.e., hunters) and Eyle (meaning: those with dogs).632 The latter ‘were given the name Eylebecause they use dogs [Somali: ey] for hunting purposes.’ Traditionally, Eyle lived around the hill Bur

620 Vitturini, E., The Gaboye of Somaliland: transformations and historical continuities of the labour exploitation andmarginalisation of hereditary groups of occupational specialists, 2020, pp. 474-475; Adam, A. S., Benadiri People of Somalia
with Particular Reference to the Reer Hamar of Mogadishu, 2011, p. 8621 Switzerland, SEM, Focus Somalia: Clans und Minderheiten, 31 May 2017, url, p. 17; Adam, A. S., Benadiri People of Somalia
with Particular Reference to the Reer Hamar of Mogadishu, 2011, p. 17
622 SOMRAF, Situation and Rights of Somali minorities: ‘No one will weep for you’ – exclusion and discrimination, December
2009, p. 13
623 Cassanelli, L., Victims and vulnerable groups in southern Somalia, May 1995, url
624 Ashur, K. D., telephone interview, 29 June 2021
625 Ashur, K. D., telephone interview, 29 June 2021
626 Mire, M. A., telephone interview, 11 July 2021; Ashur, K. D., telephone interview, 19 August 2021
627 Austria, BAA, Die Parias Somalias: Ständische Berufskasten als Basis sozialer Diskriminierung, December 2010, url, p. 28
628Hoehne, M. V., telephone interview, 1 July 2021
629 SOMRAF, Situation and Rights of Somali minorities: ‘No one will weep for you’ – exclusion and discrimination, December
2009, p. 13 Switzerland, SEM, Focus Somalia: Clans und Minderheiten, 31 May 2017, url, p. 13
630 Canada, IRB, Somalia: Information on the Yahar sub-clan, 1 December 1991, url
631 Hill, M., No redress: Somalia’s forgotten minorities, 2010, url, p. 34 (fn 50)
632 Adam, A. S., Benadiri People of Somalia with Particular Reference to the Reer Hamar of Mogadishu, 2011, p. 8

65

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Eyle close to Bur Hakaba (Bay region). ‘They believe themselves to be of Falasha (or Jewish) origin
before they were islamised. They were treated by the main Somali clans as religious outcasts.’633 In
the past, the Eyle associated themselves with the Rahanweyn but were not fully accepted by them.
Eyle live between Mogadishu and Merca in southern Somalia.634 Other occupational groups working
mainly as barbers, hairdressers or circumcisors for children are Hawle and Hawrasame whose
members live predominantly in Puntland and eastern Ethiopia. What all these smaller occupationalgroups have in common is that they are marginalised, get harassed (e.g., insulted or side-lined whencompeting for jobs; bullied out of their properties) by majority group members and lack protection.635
No further information was found on these groups.

4.2 Ethnic minorities
This section deals with Bantu and Bajuni, who are generally described as (agricultural) ethnic
minorities. As a third group, the Benadiri, comprising mostly urban-based minorities along the Benadir
coastal region, are mainly of Arabic descent, and are included in this section. It has to be emphasizedthat the Benadiri are generally not seen as a homogenous ethnic minority group and that their status
in Somali society is fundamentally different from the status of Bantu and Bajuni.636
Somali Bantu
Van Lehmann and McKee mention that Somali Bantu people reside in the southernmost nine ofSomalia’s 18 regions. They add that Somali Bantu can be divided into two groups. The first aredescendants of people who migrated to Somalia thousands of years ago; they are considered as ‘theremnants of a pre-Somali population’. Over the past centuries they ‘survived as a maroon community
among the nomadic majority clans’. The second group ‘are the descendants of the nineteenth-century
East African slave trade. Regardless of their heritage, both groups suffer similar prejudice in Somali
society.’637
Somali Bantu reside mainly along the two banks of the Jubba river as well as along lower Shabelle,
they reside almost exclusively in towns and villages along the river, never in pastoral areas. Other
Somali clans, however, can and do reside in predominantly Bantu villages along the river.638 Locally, inthe regions where they live, the Bantu are often majorities in terms of numbers,639 but they are
marginalised in terms of power (see below).
Somali Bantu live in areas with a concentration of agriculture and, depending on the location, are
known by different names such as Gosha, Makane, Shiidle, Reer Shabelle, or Mushungli. It is notedthat the ‘noble’ nomadic clans aim to exploit them for the cultivation of land, without assimilating
them, which leads to impunity when they are attacked. However, Bantu groups started to organise
and arm themselves and, in some locations, have gained strength and are able to fend for633 Denmark, DIS, Report on minority groups in Somalia, Joint British, Danish and Dutch fact-finding mission to Nairobi, Kenya[source: a representative of the Eyle (Eile) community in Nairobi], 2000, url, p. 47
634 Canada, IRB, Somalia: The Eyle clan, 1 June 1998, url
635 Ashur, K. D., telephone interview, 29 June 2021
636 The organisation of the information in this way reflects the input received by Joakim Gundel during the peer-review ofthis report, 3 August 2021.
637 Van Lehmann, D. J. and McKee, E. M., Removals to Somalia in light of the convention against torture: Recent evidence
from Somali Bantu deportees, 2019, url, p. 361; see also Besteman, C., The invention of Gosha: Slavery, colonialism andstigma in Somali history, 1995 pp. 43-62; Besteman, C., Unraveling Somalia: Race, Violence and the Legacy of Slavery, 1999,
pp. 49-69; Helander, B., Vulnerable minorities in Somalia and Somaliland, 1995, pp. 21-23
638 Menkhaus, K., Middle Jubba Region, December 1999; Van Lehmann, D. J. and McKee, E. M., Removals to Somalia in lightof the convention against torture: Recent evidence from Somali Bantu deportees, 2019, url, p. 361
639 Denmark, DIS, Report on minority groups in Somalia, Joint British, Danish and Dutch fact-finding mission to Nairobi, Kenya[source: Bantu elders], 2000, url, p. 31

66

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

themselves.640 The struggle for land and domination and control of the fertile river banks and interriverine areas by the nomadic clans from the 1990s onwards included the domination of the farming
peoples of the Juba and Shabelle valleys, among them the Somali Bantu.641
Van Lehmann and McKee report that in Lower Jubba, in and around Kismayo, Somali Bantu are facing
repression by the majority clan militias working as Jubbaland security forces. Also in the Al-Shabaab
controlled areas not far from Kismayo they face extortion by the extremist milita. Moroever, some
Bantu persons deported from the USA in 2018 were abducted, held for ransom, sometimes tortured
and killed back in Somalia ‘by uniformed Somali police or armed groups that the Somali Government
was unwilling or unable to control’.642
Particularly the descendants of former slaves sometimes still speak Bantu languages, like Ki-Zigua or
Ki-Swahili. Others speak Af-Maay. Physically, the Somali Bantu exhibit features that indicate relations
to the wider East-African population, but differentiate them from other Somalis.643 This is the reason
for several derogatory terms used for them by other Somalis. They are known as jareer, referring totheir ‘hard’ (meaning: curly) hair (while most other Somalis would have rather soft hair). Bantu arealso frequently stigmatized as ‘Africans’ by other Somalis. Until today, members of majority clans
sometimes call Somali Bantu ‘adoon’ (‘slave’ in Somali). 644 Majority clan members refuse tointermarry with Somali Bantu and thus, the members of this group remain isolated. In colonial time
Bantu often were forced to work. In post-colonial Somalia they remained without access to power or
education.645 Jobs which they are allowed to do by majority group members are crop farming,
construction work, mechanics and other difficult manual labor.646
United Nations Somalia mentioned in 2020 regarding minority groups in general and Bantu inparticular that ‘these groups are considered inferior, which results in systematic exclusion, stigma,
social segregation, denial of rights, and low social, economic and political status.’ They have no accessto influential positions and little chance to get access to justice in case of conflict over land or property
and are generally ‘disproportionately vulnerable to conflict-driven displacement.’647
Hill mentioned that Somali Bantu are among the most segregated and discriminated minorities inSomalia. This ‘is encapsulated in the well-known Somali sayings, “No-one will weep for you” (loomaooyaan in Somali) and “No-one will avenge your death” (looma-aaran), indicating that minorities
cannot expect redress if their rights are violated.’648 Even before the outbreak of the civil war, female
Bantu could be raped with impunity by members of majority groups. This worsened during the timesof civil war from 1991 onward. Bantu fell victim to looting, rape, enslavement and killing on a very
high scale; they were among the main victims of the violence in southern Somalia. From October 1992
onward, Jareer/Bantu were fleeing en masse to Kenya; most continued to live in Dadab refugee

640 ACCORD, Clans in Somalia – Report on a lecture by Joakim Gundel, COI Workshop Vienna, 15 May 2009 (Revised Edition),

2009, url, p. 16
641 EAJ, Pathways and Institutions for Resolving Land Disputes in Mogadishu, January 2020, url, pp. 4-5
642 Van Lehmann, D. J. and McKee, E. M., Removals to Somalia in light of the convention against torture: Recent evidence
from Somali Bantu deportees, 2019, url, pp. 359, 369
643 Van Lehmann, D. J. and McKee, E. M., Removals to Somalia in light of the convention against torture: Recent evidence
from Somali Bantu deportees, 2019, url, p. 361
644 Ashur, K. D., telephone interview, 29 June 2021
645 Besteman, C., The Somali Bantu in a state of refuge, Bildhaan Vol. 12, 2012; Besteman, C., Unraveling Somalia: Race,
Violence and the Legacy of Slavery, 1999, pp. 113-122
646 Van Lehmann, D. J. and McKee, E. M., Removals to Somalia in light of the convention against torture: Recent evidence
from Somali Bantu deportees, 2019, url, p. 362
647 UN Somalia, Common Country Analysis 2020, 2020, url, p. 49
648 Hill, M., No redress: Somalia’s forgotten minorities, 2010, url, p. 967

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

camp.649 Even more recently, the situation of Jareer/Somali Bantu/Gosha was worse in comparison to
all other Somali minority groups.650
No recent information on concrete incidents regarding the treatment of Somali Bantu could be found,apart from a report referring to a Jareerweyne teacher in Middle Shabelle who was a mediator in local
disputes and was detained for eight months without trial, as reported by his family in a press
conference in August 2020.651
BajuniDerek Nurse, a linguist and long-term researcher on Bajuni, describes the Bajuni/Baajuun as being
mainly sailors and fisherman. They live in small communities along the coast south of Kismayu and on
islands between Kismayu and Mombasa in Kenya. They are of mixed Arabic, Bantu, Somali and possibly
Malay ancestry, their principal language is Ki-Bajuni, a dialect of Ki-Swahili. The source noted that ‘the
Bajuni are, or were, a cross-border community. A combination of factors suggests Bajuni communities
have been in situ along the coast of Somalia and Kenya since at least AD 1400, maybe longer’. Although
they are fishers, they were depending on ‘agricultural areas on the adjacent mainland to supplement
their diet’. Bajuni from the mainland had to flee to the islands after being attacked ‘by hostile adjacentgroups (Somali or Orma)’. According to Nurse, ‘the balance between them and the neighbours was
fragile but stable. Bajuni stuck mostly to the islands, ethnic Somalis remained on the mainland.
Relationships with ethnic Somalis were poor. With the exception of a few fishermen, businessmen,
and political leaders, Bajuni did not and do not speak Somali.’652
The Bajuni population is distributed in the following locations, running south from Kismayo to theborder with Kenya: Kismayo (mainly in the Majengo district of the city); Nchoni, a coastal settlement;
Istanbul, a coastal settlement; Kamboni, a settlement just at the border with Kenya. Additionally they
live on the following islands (all together forming the Bajuni islands): Chula/Jula, Kuday, Madoga,
Satarani, Bungabo, Dudey, Koyoma and Jovay, with Chula/Jula being the most populated island.653
A 2010 Landinfo report on the Bajuni islands suggested that besides Bajuni, also other Somalis live on
the islands and, even though there are instances of marriages between Somali men and Bajuni womenon the islands, it has been claimed that the local Bajuni population is being exploited by Somali
businessmen.654
United Nations Somalia mentioned in 2020 regarding minority groups in general and (Bantu and)Bajuni in particular, that ‘these groups are considered inferior, which results in systematic exclusion,
stigma, social segregation, denial of rights, and low social, economic and political status.’ They haveno access to influential positions and little chance to get access to justice in case of conflict over landor property and are generally ‘disproportionately vulnerable to conflict-driven displacement.’655
Benadiri, including Reer Hamar
Benadiri is an umbrella term for several mostly urban minorities residing along the Benadir coast ofsouthern Somalia extending actually also south of Somalia, into Kenya. The name Benadiri/Benaadir

649 Hill, M., No redress: Somalia’s forgotten minorities, 2010, url, pp. 9-10; Van Lehman, D. and Eno, O., The Somali Bantu:

Their history and culture, Center for Applied Linguistics, Washington, 2003, url, p. 10
650 Hill, M., No redress: Somalia’s forgotten minorities, 2010, url; Helander, B., Vulnerable minorities in Somalia andSomaliland, 1995; Hoehne, M. V., Continuities and changes regarding minorities in Somalia, 2015; MRG, World Directory of
Minorities and Indigenous Peoples - Somalia: Bantu, March 2018, url
651 Dhanaane Media, Hada laan dheer tahay hadawanin video waxa Nagula gumadaayo waa inaan jareer nahay, 23 August
2020, url
652 Nurse, D., Documenting language shift and loss: Bajuni in Somalia, 2018, p. 124
653 SOMRAF, Situation and Rights of Somali minorities: ‘No one will weep for you’ – exclusion and discrimination, December
2009, p. 16; ACCORD, Anfragebeantwortung zu Somalia: Allgemeine Informationen zum Clan der Bajuni, 12 July 2016, url
654 Norway, Landinfo, Somalia: Bajuni-øyene [Somalia: Bajuni islands], 16 February 2010, url, p. 6
655 UN Somalia, Common Country Analysis 2020, 2020, url, p. 49

68

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

is derived from the Arabic bandar, plural banādir for ‘port’ or ‘sea-city’.656 Hamar is the local name forthe old town quarters of Mogadishu, and Reer Hamar refers to the old city population.657 Most
Benadiri live in Mogadishu, Merka and Barawa. Traditionally, they are craftspeople and traders. The
different groups trace their origins to a mixture of Somali and either Arab, Persian, Indian or evenPortuguese descent.658 Nonetheless, Benadiri life is described as clan-based659 with each group tracing
its origins to a single male ancestor, at least in theory.660
The Benadiri groups suffered considerably during the first years of the civil war at the hands ofmajority group militias. Being unarmed and politically weak, they were subjected to looting,occupation of property, physical violence, abduction for forced labour and conscription to clan-based
militias, extortion, and economic exclusion.661
Many fled abroad in the early 1990s and the remaining Banadiri/Reer Hamar population is estimatedto be very small; one representative of the Reer Hamar talking to Landinfo estimated those in
Mogadishu to be around 10 000.662 For those who remained in Somalia, their situation remained
difficult in more recent years. In 2012 it is reported that Benadiri were forced to pay bribes and were
subjected to extortion by majority clan members.663 Reer Hamar representatives talking to Landinfo
in 2019 explained that they did not face direct security threats, but stressed that they constitute a
minority.664 In June 2021, the Benadiri community in Mogadishu held a press conference to complain
about manipulation of their political rights, as the current Minister of Petroleum tried to encroach on
their reserved seats in parliament.665

4.3 Groups specialised in religious services
Ashraf/Asharaf
Ashraf is the plural of ‘Sharif’, which is an honorable title coming from an Arabic word meaning ‘noble’or ‘respected’.666 The Ashraf trace their origins back to Fatima, the daughter of Prophet Mohammad.
It is important to note that they are divided into the lines of Hussein and Hassan.667 Both Ashraf
categories share their (assumed) origin and their traditional religious position. However, the Husseinline, living as part of the Benadir population, can be characterised as a minority (outside the Somaliclan system, i.e. neither in a client-patron relationship nor ‘adopted’), while the Hassan line is part of
the Somali clan system (e.g. the Sarman sub-group is affiliated with a Rahanweyn clan).668

656 Adam, A. S., Benadiri People of Somalia with Particular Reference to the Reer Hamar of Mogadishu, 2011, p. 9; Adam

stressed: ‘Arab geographers applied the term Banaadir to the East African coast of southern Somalia in the same way thatthey applied sawahil (“coastal”) to the East African coast further south (from today’s Kenya to northern Mozambique).’
657 Adam, A. S., Benadiri People of Somalia with Particular Reference to the Reer Hamar of Mogadishu, 2011, p. 17
658 Switzerland, SEM, Focus Somalia: Clans und Minderheiten, 31 May 2017, url, p. 13; Norway, Landinfo, Somalia: Reer
Hamar, 17 December 2009, url, p. 2
659 Gundel notes that the Benadiri have been forced by ‘to act as a clan’ since 1990, see Gundel, J., The predicament of the‘Oday’ – The role of traditional structures in security, rights, law and development in Somalia, 2006, url, p. 38
660 Denmark, DIS, Report on minority groups in Somalia, Joint British, Danish and Dutch fact-finding mission to Nairobi, Kenya,
2000, url, p. 39
661 Adam, A. S., Benadiri People of Somalia with Particular Reference to the Reer Hamar of Mogadishu, 2011, url, p. 250
662 Norway, Landinfo, Respons, Somalia: Somalia Rer Hamar-befolkningen i Mogadishu, 21 May 2019, url, p. 3
663 Canada, IRB, Somalia: The Reer Hamar and/or Benadiri, including the location of their traditional homeland, affiliatedclans and risks they face from other clans [source: UK-based independent researcher who lived in Somalia for 25 years andcompleted her doctoral thesis on the Reer Hamar/Benadiri people], 3 December 2012, url
664 Norway, Landinfo, Respons, Somalia: Somalia Rer Hamar-befolkningen i Mogadishu, 21 May 2019, url, p. 3
665 Caasimada, Daawo: Beelaha Banaadiriga oo ka digay qorshe socda oo lagu boobayo kuraastooda, 15 June 1921, url
666 Norway, Landinfo, Query Response Somalia: Ashraf, 10 August 2018, url, pp. 2-3
667 Denmark, DIS, Report on minority groups in Somalia, Joint British, Danish and Dutch fact-finding mission to Nairobi, Kenya,
2000, url, pp. 40-41
668 Norway, Landinfo, Query Response Somalia: Ashraf, 10 August 2018, url, pp. 2-4

69

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Ashraf were well-respected in the time of Siyad Barre’s rule. They normally live integrated with thepeople they have settled with, i.e. Digil-Mirifle or Benadiri, and are usually ‘protected by the people
they live with as far as they are seen as being related to the Prophet’.669 However, Ashraf were notclosely connected to other groups and marriage took place almost exclusively within the community
itself; they were preferentially endogamous.670
But women from Ashraf could be married by members of majority groups, due to the highly
appreciated religious prestige attached to Ashraf in the eyes of other Somalis, which was alreadydescribed by Lewis. He mentioned that back in the 1950s, intermarriage between Ashraf women andmen from majority clans was possible due to the high esteem Ashraf enjoyed as descendants of thefamily of the Prophet. Still, as a rule, Ashraf were endogamous.671
Ashraf inhabit the southern Somali coast from Mogadishu to Kismayo.672 Elders interviewed by theDanish Immigration Service in 2000 indicated that within Somalia Ashraf live in Bay and Gedo regions,as well as in the towns Mogadishu, Kismayo, Marka, Huddur, Jowhar and Jalalaqsi.673 In her ‘Note on
the Ashraf’674 Luling outlined that Ashraf/Hussein mostly live in coastal towns such as Merka andMogadishu. Ashraf/Hassan mainly reside in the interior of the country; however, some members have
moved to Mogadishu over the course of the 20th century. In her note she also clarifies that the Sarman
group of Ashraf/Hassan originally was not considered to belong to the Benadiri groups, but that they
were later incorporated into these groups. The origin in the Bakool region is the reason that themembers of the Sarman sub-sub-clan of Ashraf are considered to be dark skinned (Somali: gibil
madow), in comparison with the other Ashraf, who are originally part of the Benadiri population andperceived as ‘lighter skinned’ (Somali: gibil cad). Members of the Sarman subgroup can be found in
the city of Baydhabo in the Bay region. Luling’s account is corroborated in all relevant details by othersources.675
Ashraf speak various local dialects, e.g. in Mogadishu they speak ‘Af Reer Hamar’,676 which means‘language of people from Hamar [Mogadishu]’, the local dialect of Af-Maxaa/standard Somali spoken
in the old parts of Mogadishui.677Referring to the linguist Lambertis (1986), Landinfo notes that there
is a distinctive dialect, Af-Ashraf. However this dialect is not spoken by all Ashraf and is also used bymembers of other groups. Furthermore, the Ashraf residing in southwest Somalia (especially in Bakool
region) speak the local Af-Maay dialect.678
Regarding occupations it is mentioned that Ashraf frequently are business people - tailors, weavers,
and so forth, and that the women sell snacks and handicrafts on the market. The Ashraf are considered
to be religious people.679 Lewis referred to Ashraf as a group of religious specialists. He mentionedthat in the past, many Ashraf/Sharaf (and Sheikhal) were religious men and Quran teachers. As such,
669 ACCORD, Clans in Somalia – Report on a lecture by Joakim Gundel, COI Workshop Vienna, 15 May 2009 (Revised Edition),

2009, url, p. 20
670 Denmark, DIS, Report on minority groups in Somalia, Joint British, Danish and Dutch fact-finding mission to Nairobi, Kenya,
2000, url, p. 43
671 Lewis, I. M., Peoples of the Horn of Africa: Somali, Afar, and Saho, 1998 [1955], p. 149
672 Denmark, DIS, Report on minority groups in Somalia, Joint British, Danish and Dutch fact-finding mission to Nairobi, Kenya,
2000, url, pp. 38-40
673 Denmark, DIS, Report on minority groups in Somalia, Joint British, Danish and Dutch fact-finding mission to Nairobi, Kenya,
2000, url, p. 41
674 Luling, V., Note on the Ashraf, n.d.; unpublished text of five pages
675 Luling, V., Note on the Ashraf, n.d.; ACCORD, Clans in Somalia – Report on a lecture by Joakim Gundel, COI Workshop
Vienna, 15 May 2009 (Revised Edition), 2009, url, pp. 19-20; Norway, Landinfo, Query Response Somalia: Ashraf, 10 August
2018, url, pp. 1-4
676 Denmark, DIS, Report on minority groups in Somalia, Joint British, Danish and Dutch fact-finding mission to Nairobi, Kenya,
2000, url, p. 42
677 Hoehne, M. V., telephone interview, 18 August 2021
678 Norway, Landinfo, Query Response Somalia: Ashraf, 10 August 2018, url, p. 5
679 Denmark, DIS, Report on minority groups in Somalia, Joint British, Danish and Dutch fact-finding mission to Nairobi, Kenya,
2000, url, pp. 42-43

70

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

they worked for and were tolerated by majority groups ‘into which they were admitted as clients(arifa, shegat [sheegad]) through the grant of land made to them’.680 Ashraf elders explained that theircommunity was to some degree considered to be ‘strangers’ in Somalia, since Ashraf claim to be of
Arab origin. This was given as one reason for their persecution by other Somalis in the 1990s.
Furthermore, it was reported that Ashraf were considered to be weak since they did not have theirown militia.681
During the civil war, from 1991 onward, Ashraf in Somalia were targeted by militias of majority groups.
Particularly in southern Somalia, Ashraf were looted, raped and/or killed.682 Later, under President
Sheikh Sharif (2008-2012), Ashraf received some influential position in the Somali government.
Gundel reports that they also faced attacks by Al-Shabaab around 2008 and 2009.683 Like otherminority groups, the current situation of Ashraf is still characterized by their structural marginalisation
as a minority group in southern Somalia. While not all minority groups are treated the same, and someare weaker than others, Ashraf are still vulnerable to abuse. They do not have any militia defending
them. Members of majority clans take advantage of them and rarely have to face serious
consequences.684 Ashraf living in and around Baidoa have a slightly more protected position.685
Sheikhal/Sheekhaal
Luling in her ‘Report on the Shiikhal’ (2009)686 mentioned that Sheikhal are not one ‘but several
groups, with different cultures and dialects. The word is simply the local plural of “sheikh”, andsignifies a lineage who have an inherited religious status.’ As main Sheikhal branches she indicates the
Jasira and the Gendershe which she connects to the ‘light skinned’ Benadiri population, the Loboge(which are adopted into the Herab section of the Hawiye), and the Aw Qutub who can be found innorth-western Somalia (today’s Somaliland) and Ethiopia.687 The Immigration and Refugee Board of
Canada refers to a chapter by Mansur who states that the sub-groups of Qutub, Loboge andGendarshe have a common Arab ancestor called Figi Cumar, but that ‘each subclan has a different
genealogy for the same ancestor’.688
The Sheikhal are ‘scattered in different districts and regions of the country.’ Accordingly, they residein Mogadishu, Belet Weyne, Jowhar, Middle and Lower Juba and Gedo. Some Sheikhal also live inRegion 5 of Ethiopia.689
While some Sheikhal groups are politically strong, others are marginalised. According to Hoehne, theGendershe and Jasira groups have the position of marginalised minority groups, whose members
predominantly reside in Mogadishu and south of the city, and who have been marginalised andoppressed by majority group militias after the outbreak of the civil war 1991. In contrast, the subclans Loboge and Aw Qutub have a more ambiguous position.690 The Loboge have been allies of some

680 Lewis, I. M., Peoples of the Horn of Africa: Somali, Afar, and Saho, 1998 [1955], p. 149.
681 Denmark, DIS, Report on minority groups in Somalia, Joint British, Danish and Dutch fact-finding mission to Nairobi, Kenya,

2000, url, pp. 43-44
682 Hoehne, M. V., telephone interview, 1 July 2021
683 ACCORD, Clans in Somalia – Report on a lecture by Joakim Gundel, COI Workshop Vienna, 15 May 2009 (Revised Edition),
2009, url, p. 20
684 Hoehne, M. V., telephone interview, 1 July 2021
685 Gundel, J., Comment received during the peer review of this report, 3 August 2021
686 Luling, V., Report on the Shiikhal, 15 December 2009. Unpublished paper of 3 pages. The paper was sent to ACCORD by
the author in 2009 and was partly cited in ACCORD, Clans in Somalia – Report on a lecture by Joakim Gundel, COI Workshop
Vienna, 15 May 2009 (Revised Edition), 2009, url, p. 19
687 Luling, V., Report on the Shiikhal, 15 December 2009, pp. 1-2
688 Mansur, A. O., The Nature of the Somali Clan System, 1995, pp. 117-118; Canada, IRB, Somalia: Information on the Shekal,
1 June 1997, url
689 Denmark, DIS, Report on minority groups in Somalia, Joint British, Danish and Dutch fact-finding mission to Nairobi, Kenya,
2000, url, p. 54
690 Hoehne, M. V., telephone interview, 1 July 2021; compare Denmark, DIS, Report on minority groups in Somalia, Joint
British, Danish and Dutch fact-finding mission to Nairobi, Kenya, 2000, url, pp. 54-55

71

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Hawiye, had their own militia in the early 1990s and they engaged in fighting.691 In the Somali
parliament, among the 33 seats reserved for members of the Haiwye clan-family, three are reservedfor Sheikhal.692 Still, they do not feature at the same level as majority groups.693 Luling mentioned that
Sheekhaal/Looboge are also known as Martiile ‘the guests’ among Hawiye.694 They were at one point
allied with General Aideed during the first years of civil war in southern Somalia.695 The Aw Qutub‘have suffered some discrimination or harassment in Somaliland from the dominant Isaq clan, being
suspected of disloyalty to the Somaliland state’ after 1991.696

4.4 Non-minority clans: Rahanweyn/Digil-Mirifle (Saab) and ‘inbetween’ groups
In this section, groups that are seen as majority under one aspect and as minority under anotheraspect are described. They may sometimes fall ‘between’ the concepts of majority and minority group.
This can be related to different perceptions by others or by the groups or sub-groups themselves, orit can be due to local circumstances and power structures that they appear as a minority in certain
areas and are not in a minority position in other areas.697
Rahanweyn/Digil-Mirifle (Saab)
The Rahanweyn (also spelled Reewin) mainly reside in the regions Bay, Bakool and Gedo, in between
the rivers Shabelle and Jubba. The important urban centers inhabited mostly by Rahanweyn are
Baidoa and Huddur.698 The Rahanweyn are divided into two major clans, the Digil and the Mirifle. The
Digil mainly live in the regions Benadir, Juba, and Shabelle, while the Mirifle live in the central andwestern parts of the country.699 All Rahanweyn speak Af-Maay, other languages spoken by them are
Af-Jiddu, Af-Tunni, and Af-Dabarre.700 They understand ‘standard’ Somali (called Af-Maxaa), but
contra wise, most Af-Maxaa speakers would not understand Af-Maay.701
The Rahanweyn are mostly agro-pastoralists, living from farming and also animal herding. Externally,
Rahanweyn were seen partially as low status group by members of majority groups. They pursued
agriculture, which pure pastoral nomads saw as low status work. Their genealogies were not pure.702
At the same time, they are a populous clan family and members of the Hawiye or Darood clan families
in the south could intermarry with Rahanweyn.703
Although partly being considered as a low status group by members of other major clans, Rahanweyn
are counted among the majority groups. Through establishing their own militia and their own regional

691 Canada, IRB, Somalia: current information on the relationship between the Sheikhal (Shekal) and the Hawiye under theleadership of General Aidid, 1 September 1996, url
692 Jijeele Unity Council [Facebook], posted on: 4 October 2020, url
693 Hoehne, M. V., telephone interview, 1 July 2021
694 Luling, V., Report on the Shiikhal, 15 December 2009
695 Canada, IRB, Somalia: current information on the relationship between the Sheikhal (Shekal) and the Hawiye under theleadership of General Aidid, 1 September 1996, url
696 Luling, V., Report on the Shiikhal, 15 December 2009
697 The organisation of the information in this way reflects the input received by Joakim Gundel during the peer-review ofthis report, 3 August 2021
698 Canada, IRB, The Biyomal [Biimaal, Biyocordmaal, Biymaal, Biyamal] clan, including work, history, religious affiliation,
location within the country, particularly Nus Dunya; the Rahanweyn [Rahanwen] clan, including location in the country;
treatment of the Biyomal clan by the Rahanwen clan, 2 October 2015, url; Ashur, K. D., telephone interview, 29 June 2021
699 Mukhtar, M. H., Historical Dictionary of Somalia, 2003, p. 188
700 Mukhtar, M. H., Historical Dictionary of Somalia, 2003, p. 189
701 Ashur, K. D., telephone interview, 29 June 2021; Helander, B., Clanship, kinship and community among the Rahanweyn:
A model for other Somalis?, 1997, pp. 134-35; Menkhaus, K., Middle Jubba Region, December 1999
702 Helander, B., The Slaughtered Camel: Coping with Fictitious Descent among the Hubeer of Southern Somalia, 2003, p. 16
703 Ashur, K. D., telephone interview, 29 June 2021

72

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

administration, they gained respect among other majority groups. They were included in the 4.5formula of power sharing704 which underpins Somali politics since the conference for Somalia in Kenya
2002-2004. Since the early 2000s, Rahanweyn hold influential positions in the Somali government.705
At the beginning of the civil war in southern Somalia, the Rahanweyn were unarmed.706 Hawiye andDarood militias devastated their land while fighting each other. The cities of Baidoa and Huddur wereconquered by warlord militias and largely destroyed. Rahanweyn men were enslaved or killed andwomen raped; the storages and the harvest were lotted.707 In the famine in southern Somalia during
1991-1992, thousands of Rahanweyn died.708 As a large but weak group, the Rahanweyn had to adopt
a strategy of accommodation with more powerful neighbours. This has led to splits within the
Rahanweyn over relations with the Hawiye and Marehan clans.709 In the mid-1990s, Rahanweyn began
to organize themselves and eventually formed their own milita, the Rahanweyn Resistance Army
(RRA). In 1999 they defeated the Hawiye militias controlling their areas and formed their own
administration under RRA leadership.710
Genealogically, they are considered as belonging mostly to the Saab group. Yet, Helander, a Swedish
anthropologist with extensive research experience in southern Somalia, stressed that within the
Rahanweyn clan family, some clans such as the Hubeer, trace their origin via a majority group to
Samaale. Rahanweyn clans may include adopted members; even whole lineages can be adopted.711
Adoption, however, does not mean that ‘original’ differences with regard to descent are forgotten.
Helander emphasised that Rahanweyn distinguish between adopted members (dhaqan, literally
meaning ‘culture’, ‘tradition’) and members ‘by birth’ (dhalad). Dhalad comprises the core lineage.712
He added that one can be adopted into a Rahanweyn clan either through formal agreement (dhulul,
literally ‘charcoal’) or via marriage.713
Menkhaus, who has been studying society and politics in southern Somalia since the 1980s, found that
this practice of a man marrying into a new clan is unique to the Rahanweyn in Somalia and does notoccur in other majority groups.714 The frequent adoptions create some hierarchy within Rahanweyn.
Within the group, bilis (nobles) who claim a purer patrilineal descent distinguish themselves from boon
(commoners), who have an adopted descent.715 Although friendship can exist between them, boon
are subject to much prejudice, social exclusion and some exploitation as a cheap labour force by bilis– within the clan family.716

704

The transitional Somali Parliament has 275 'representatives’. Each of the four major clans (namely the Hawiye,
Rahanweyn, Dir – including Isaaq clan – and Daarood) has an equal number of seats (61), hence four equivalents. The
remaining cluster of minority clans comprise a 0.5 equivalent. (Develoment Initiatives, Towards an improved understandingof vulnerability and resilience in Somalia, June 2019, url, p. 37 (fn 31))705 Ashur, K. D., telephone interview, 29 June 2021
706 Hill, M., No redress: Somalia’s forgotten minorities, 2010, url, p. 33 (fn 18)707 Bakonyi, J., Land ohne Staat: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft im Krieg am Beispiel Somalias, 2011, p. 252; Finland, Finnish
Immigration Service, Somalia / Background and situation of the Geledi clan in Afgoye, Mogadishu and Kismayo, 24 April 2020,
url; see also Kapteins, L, Clan Cleansing in Somalia: The Ruinous Legacy of 1991, 2013708 HRW, World Report 1993 – Somalia, 1 January 1993, url
709 Menkhaus, K., Middle Jubba Region, December 1999
710 Canada, IRB, The Biyomal [Biimaal, Biyomaal, Biymaal, Biyamal] clan, including work, history, religious affiliation, location
within the country, particularly Nus Dunya; the Rahanweyn [Rahanwen] clan, including location in the country; treatment of
the Biyomal clan by the Rahanwen clan, 2 October 2015, url
711 Helander, B., The Slaughtered Camel: Coping with Fictitious Descent among the Hubeer of Southern Somalia, 2003, pp.
11-12n712 Helander, B., The Slaughtered Camel: Coping with Fictitious Descent among the Hubeer of Southern Somalia, 2003, p. 45
713 Helander, B., Clanship, kinship and community among the Rahanweyn: A model for other Somalis?, 1997, p. 136
714 Menkhaus, K., Middle Jubba Region, December 1999, Appendix C
715 Helander, B., The Slaughtered Camel: Coping with Fictitious Descent among the Hubeer of Southern Somalia, 2003, p. 17
716 Helander, B., The Slaughtered Camel: Coping with Fictitious Descent among the Hubeer of Southern Somalia, 2003, pp.
155-6973

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Scholars of the Conflict Research Programme of the London School of Economics reported that, among
others, the Rahanweyn are ‘often subject to discrimination and exploitation by more powerful groups
when they have been displaced into other clan-based areas. The vulnerability of the riverine and interriverine populations to famine in 1991 and in 2011 was a direct consequence of their politicalmarginalization.’717 Many inhabitants fled to Baidoa or Mogadishu as a consequence of politicalinsecurity in the early 1990s and droughts in 2010-2012 and 2017. The Danish Demining Group foundin 2017 that roughly half of the around 369 000 IDPs in Mogadishu were Rahanweyn or Bantu.718
Today, members of various Rahanweyn lineages are part of Al-Shabaab, their fighters being motivatedmostly by economic incentives.719
Tunni, Begedi and Geledi: ‘in-between’ groups
Three groups are often subsumed under the Rahanweyn clan Digil - the Tunni, the Begedi, and theGeledi.720 Parts of these groups are described as having a weak position, partly due to ambiguous
reception of their belonging or due to local circumstances (see below).
Most sources agree that the Tunni belong to the Digil,721 one source interviewed by the IRB in 2014,
however, claims that Tunnis are not part of the Digil-Mirifle/Rahanweyn clan “in a formal sense” [ofcalling on them for clan protection] but the Tunni have a "negotiated relationship" with the Digilrelated to sharing access to land and resources’.722 Linguistic differences between urban Tunni, wholive mainly in Brava and speak Bravanese Chimini, and rural Tunni who speak the Tunni language are
noted, it is added that the urban Tunni culturally resemble their Benadiri neighbours e.g in Brava,723
Bravanese and Tunni were commercially orientated or worked as craftsmen.724
Also the Geledi and Begedi clans are considered to belong to the Rahanweyn/Digil clan, and are at thesame time associated with Benadiri collection of minority groups. Luling writes about the Geledi and
Begedi that ‘like the Benadiri of the coast they trace their ancestry to Arabia or elsewhere in theIslamic world, but by a more recent immigration’. She describes them as farmers and traders (unlike
the coastal communities) and ‘seem to have been so from their first arrival’ and as ‘generally
endogamous’. They have the same language and general culture as their Gibil Madow neighbours, but‘they have their own specific traditions’.725
After the outbreak of the civil war in 1991, Begedi and Geledi suffered at the hands of militias,
particularly from Hawiye/Habar Gedir.726 No recent information on their situation is available.

717 Jaspars, S. et al., Food and Power in Somalia: Business as Usual? A scoping study on the political economy of food following

shifts in food assistance and in governance, 21 January 2020, url, p. 6
718 DDG, Dadaab Returnee Conflict Assessment, August 2017, url, p. 30
719 Menkhaus, K., e-mail, 17 August 2021
720 The organisation of the information in this way reflects the input received by Joakim Gundel during the peer-review ofthis report, 3 August 2021
721 ACCORD, Clans in Somalia – Report on a lecture by Joakim Gundel, COI Workshop Vienna, 15 May 2009 (Revised Edition),
2009, url, p. 20; see also sources in ACCORD, Anfragebeantwortung zu Somalia: Informationen zum Clan der Tunni [Query
response on Somalia: Information on the Tunni clan], url
722 Canada, IRB, The Tunni ethnic group, including regions where its members reside; treatment by society, authorities and
Al-Shabaab; relationship with other clans, 22 December 2014, url
723 Hill, M., No redress: Somalia’s forgotten minorities, 2010, url, p. 11
724 Denmark, DIS, Report on minority groups in Somalia, Joint British, Danish and Dutch fact-finding mission to Nairobi, Kenya,
2000, url, p. 43
725 Luling, V., Farmers from Arabia: the role of ‘Gibil Cad’ groups in the interior of southern Somalia, 2010, p. 302
726 Luling, V., Farmers from Arabia: the role of ‘Gibil Cad’ groups in the interior of southern Somalia, 2010, pp. 303-304, 314;
see also Finland, FIS, Somalia / Background and situation of the Geledi clan in Afgoye, Mogadishu and Kismayo, 24 April 2020,url

74

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

4.5 Mixed-marriages
According to a Somali minority group rights activist in the European diaspora,intermarriage between
majority clans and Madhibaan, Muuse Deriye, Tumal, Yibir, Yahar, Eyle, and particularly Bantu aretaboo; if they happen, they often provoke violent conflict.727 Intermarriage between majority groups
and Ashraf or Sheikhal is possible and does normally not produce resistance among majority groupmembers. The reason is that despite their political and economic weakness, Ashraf and Sheikhal enjoy
religious prestige, as descendants from the family of Prophet Mohammad. Rahanweyn and membersof other majority groups do intermarry.728 Benadiri also enjoy some prestige and occasionally, majority
group members in Mogadishu and surroundings marry especially women from Benadiri groups.729
The Swiss State Secretariat for Migration (SEM) emphasised that it is most problematic if a man
belonging to a minority group marries a woman from a majority group. According to the patrilineal
logic of belonging, the children from this marriage would then belong to the minority group – which
the relatives of the mother would see as a ‘downgrade’. Referring to another source, the SEM
mentioned, however, that in the biggest cities of Somalia, Mogadishu and Kismayo, which are most
cosmopolitan (compared to other Somali towns), intermarriages between majority clans andmembers of occupational minority groups are seen as less problematic.730 This does not apply withregard to intermarriage with Bantu, as an incident in 2018 shows, when a Bantu man who had married
a young woman from a majority clan was ‘stabbed and burnt to death in Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu,
by mobs suspected to be connected to the girl’s parents.’731 SEM confirmed that especially in thenorth, in Somaliland, where the ‘purity’ of patrilineal descent is an important social value, marriages
between occupational minorities and majority groups are happening rarely, especially if the man isfrom a minority group.732 Hoehne confirms that in Somaliland, if a man from a minority clan marries agirl from a majority group, the couple normally has to ‘run away’ and live somewhere else, e.g., in the
non-Somali part of Ethiopia. Normally, the woman is then disowned by her family. The family of thehusband would also disencourage such a relationship, because they would fear revenge by relativesof the woman.733. Majeerteen and Gabooye (especially Madhibaan) do not normally intermarry in
Puntland.734
The marriage between majority group members who are part of Al-Shabaab and Bantu women insouthern Somalia constitutes a special case. Benstead and Van Lehmann recently found that Bantu
girls are married by Al-Shabaab fighters, but these relationships actually do not constitute normal
marriages but forms of sexual and domestic slavery. They found that Al-Shabaab fighters ‘marry’ Bantu
girls at even a younger age than marriage normally would take place (marriage below 18 years is very
common in Somalia; often girls are 16-18 when they marry; the case outlined by Benstead and Van
Lehman is that Bantu girls in relations with Al-Shabaab fighters are even younger than that). They
continue that ‘because marriage between majority clans and the Bantu is not allowed in Somali
society, the Al-Shabaab fighters ignore the children of the Bantu girls and women, whom they despiseas racially distinct minority with low social status.’735 In other contexts (not involving Al-Shabaab
fighters), Benstead and Van Lehman emphasise that a marriage between a men of a majority group

727 Ashur, K. D., telephone interview, 29 June 2021
728 Ashur, K. D., telephone interview, 29 June 2021; on Rahanweyn see also Switzerland, SEM, Focus Somalia: Clans und

Minderheiten, 31 May 2017, url, p. 45
729 ACCORD, Clans in Somalia – Report on a lecture by Joakim Gundel, COI Workshop Vienna, 15 May 2009 (Revised Edition),
2009, url, p. 18
730 Switzerland, SEM, Focus Somalia: Clans und Minderheiten, 31 May 2017, url, pp. 44-45
731 Discoverafricannews, Somali man burnt alive over nephew’s love saga, 24 September 2018, url
732 Switzerland, SEM, Focus Somalia: Clans und Minderheiten, 31 May 2017, url, pp. 45
733 Hoehne, M. V., telephone interview, 18 August 2021
734 Mire, M. A., telephone interview, 11 July 2021
735 Benstead, L.J. and Van Lehman, D., Two classes of ‘marriage’: Race and sexual slavery in Al-Shabaab-controlled Somalia,
Journal of Middle East and Africa, 2021, p. 3

75

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

and a Bantu woman (or the other way around) could lead to the murder of one or both partners or
the relatives involved.736

5. Individuals involved in blood feuds/clan
disputes and other clan issues
Among pastoralist groups, traditionally two strategies of processing conflicts are dominant in theSomali society: first, violent self-help and blood revenge (Somali: aano or aarsasho), which frequently
escalate in long-standing feuds; and second, discussions (also in the form of poetic combats),
negotiations and payment of compensation. Among agro-pastoralists or other sedentary groups,
however, blood revenge is less prevalent.737 Lewis, who did research among pastoralist groups inNorthern Somalia, stated with regard to the northern Somali pastoral nomads that the idea that 'might
is right' has 'overwhelming authority' and thus he stated that ‘personal rights, rights in livestock, andrights in access to grazing and water, even if they are not always obtained by force, can only be
defended against usurpation by force of arms’.738
In his chapter on force and feud, Lewis argued that ‘feud and war […] are the chief means by which
the relations between groups are regulated’. However, among the pastoral nomads ‘the aim of
aggression is not so much to subjugate enemies completely as to establish political ascendency’. Lewis
explained that ‘the ease with which individuals and groups resort to violence within the Muslim
community and contrary to the principles of Islam has to be viewed in the ecological context of acutecompetition for sparse resources, and in the abrogation of individual responsibility through group
loyalties’.739 Additionally, a certain ‘warrior ethos’ and, related to it, the fame and honour which canbe gained through blood revenge are factors contributing to the violent escalation of conflicts.740 The
escalation of violence basically follows the pattern of segmentary opposition. Consequently, conflicts
between individuals quickly lead to conflicts between their immediate kin; if the adversaries belong
to different larger groups, the latter confront each other. Conversely, enemies can leave their enmity
aside quickly and unite in the face of a common enemy.741 These dynamics of segmentary ‘fusion’ and‘fission’ along lines of patrilineal descent are expressed in the proverb: ‘Me against my brother; meand my brother against my family; me and my family against my clan; me and my clan against theworld’.742
If peace is sought after a phase of violent conflict, the adversaries send envoys who call for the
cessation of hostilities and propose some initial steps for conflict settlement (e.g. where and how tomeet). If the parties to the conflict agree, peace is negotiated at a shir (council, meeting), which, is the736 Benstead, L.J. and Van Lehman, D., Two classes of ‘marriage’: Race and sexual slavery in Al-Shabaab-controlled Somalia,

Journal of Middle East and Africa, 2021, p. 11
737 Hoehne, M. V., telephone interview, 18 August 2021
738 Lewis, I. M., A Pastoral Democracy. A Study of Pastoralism and Politics among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa,
1961, p. 3
739 Lewis, I. M., A Pastoral Democracy. A Study of Pastoralism and Politics among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa,
1961, p. 242
740 Lewis, I. M., A Pastoral Democracy. A Study of Pastoralism and Politics among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa,
1961, pp. 198, 244
741 Lewis, I. M., A Pastoral Democracy. A Study of Pastoralism and Politics among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa,
1961, p. 243; Hoehne, M. V., telephone interview, 15 June 2021
742 Peterson, S., Me Against My Brother: At War in Somalia, Sudan and Rwanda, 2000

76

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

most important institution of decision-taking in Somali society.743 The official participants are men;
women play a role behind the scenes.744 However, even if a conflict is settled and compensation ispaid, tensions often continue. When the opportunity arises to gain something from ‘cooking up’ oldenmity, revenge can be taken or claims can be made despite an earlier settlement. 745 Lewis argued
that ‘in the prevailing struggle for survival there is a vicious circle of dispute, negotiation, conciliation
or feud, and further dissention’.746
For negotiating conflicts and preventing or ending feuds, social relations between groups and respect
for Somali and Islamic traditions (under xeer and sharia) are most important. Yet, Hoehne emphasisedthat the excessive violence in Somalia since the collapse of the state in January 1991 has destroyed
much of the social fabric and with it the respect for traditional relations that, at times, could help tomediate conflict and prevent or at least stop the escalation of violence. According to the source, atpresent, all of Somalia is rife with inter-clan (and inter-lineage) strife and often, external actors get
involved and seek to instrumentalise local conflicts for their own interests. This often prolongs conflictcycles.747
For more information see EASO’s COI report Somalia: Actors, published in July 2021.748

5.1 Clan revenge in clan conflicts
According to Dr. Hoehne, in general, most of those directly involved in clan (or lineage, or family)
conflicts are men between around 15 and around 40. The reasons for triggering conflicts can bevarious, but frequently they are connected to access to resources (water, pasture) or land, access tojobs and markets (e.g., the local qaad market), access to or protection of women, insults, accidents,
or political interests including administrative/political positions. Men between 15 and 25, roughly,
would typically be mobilised by elders to form lineage or clan militias, engage in attacks or put up
defence positions.749
Perceived acts of humiliation can result in revenge killings and usually target the perceived
perpetrator, however, if the clan refuses to hand over the perpetrator, another member of the clan
may be targeted.750 Historically, Somali clans and sub-clans have formed diya groups, meaning thatmembers are bound to pay or receive damage compensation collectively as a form of social insurance.
In the case of a murder, the diya group of the perpetrator must pay compensation to the diya groupof the murder victim. In case this compensation is not paid, the victim’s kin can exact blood revenge
on the murderer, but also on members of the murderer’s lineage.751 Men of almost any age except,
normally, those in the sacrosanct category of biri ma geydo (literally meaning ‘spared from the spear’)would be targets of revenge killers.752 Such killings are normally carefully planned. Targets are selectedaccording to the ‘worth’ of a person. If the person initially killed in a conflict was, e.g., a wealthybusinessman, then the target for revenge killing also must be a person who has a great value for his

743 Lewis, I. M., A Pastoral Democracy. A Study of Pastoralism and Politics among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa,

1961, pp. 176, 198-199
744 Gardner, J. with Warsame, A. M., Women, Clan Identity and Peace-building, 2004, url, p. 155
745 Hoehne, M. V., telephone interview, 15 June 2021
746 Lewis, I. M., A Pastoral Democracy. A Study of Pastoralism and Politics among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa,
1961, p. 247
747 Hoehne, M. V., telephone interview, 15 June 2021
748 EASO, Somalia: Actors, July 2021, url, sections: 2.3 Access to justice through formal and informal systems, and especially2.3.2 Customary justice - Xeer and Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
749 Hoehne, M. V., telephone interview, 18 August 2021
750 ACCORD, Clans in Somalia – Report on a lecture by Joakim Gundel, COI Workshop Vienna, 15 May 2009 (Revised Edition),
2009, url, p. 21
751 Hesse, B. J., Introduction: The myth of ‘Somalia’, 2010, url, p. 251
752 Hoehne, M. V., telephone interview, 18 August 2021

77

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

close patrilineal kin. If a young educated diaspora returnee was killed, then the revenge will be taken
against someone in a similar position. This concerns at least planned revenge operations.753 In mostcases of inter-group feuds, those who are ‘prime targets’ would know (of course the immediate
patrilineal kin of a person who killed another person are prime targets; but depending on the social
standing of the killed person, also others from the patrilineal kin-group of the killer, who hold asimilarly high social status – e.g., as traditional authority or politician – can become prime targets).754
Of course, occasionally, revenge takes place spontaneously, when someone whose family has
outstanding grievances comes across a member of the enemy group by chance, e.g. in a hotel, anddecides to settle an old score. Revenge killings can go on for a long while; even after a break of someyears, they can suddenly be taken up again. Firm settlements can be reached through the negotiationof elders and the payment of compensation. However, especially in politicized conflicts, nearsettlements are often spoiled by external interferences of those who may have an interest incontinued insecurity in an area or who feel one of the parties has taken the wrong political stance.755
The capacity of a clan to seek revenge is very important in order to induce other clans to seek conflictsettlement through customary law. Therefore, weak and powerless clans such as minority clans, who
do not have the capacity to exact revenge, often do not receive protection through enforced
customary law and have to seek protection through a more powerful clan.756
Nevertheless, as documented in the following, certain traditional rules of conflict settlement are stillin place. First, often traditional authorities who serve as lineage or clan leaders are involved in conflictsettlement. Moreover, despite the sometimes extreme violence in inter-clan conflicts, rarely women,children and the elderly are directly targeted.757 However, members of these groups, who would betraditionally ‘sacrosanct’ (Somali: biri ma geydo), can get hurt by chance, e.g., through stray bullets.
Moreover, younger militiamen often do not respect traditional rules of conflict and target women,children and elders or use violence indiscriminately.758
Somaliland
This section should be read in conjunction with EASO’s COI report Somalia: Actors, published in July
2021,759 and with EASO’s COI report Somalia: Security situation (September 2021).760
Certain clan conflicts in Somaliland have been ongoing for many years, even decades. Particularly inthe eastern regions of Somaliland, which are contested between Somaliland and Puntland, local
conflicts between clans are often escalated through interferences from the political centres – or in
relation to politics at the ‘national’ level.761
One such long standing conflict concerned the clash between the Habar Yonis/Sa’ad Yonis lineage andHabar Je’lo/Bi’ide lineage in El Afweyne in the Sanaag region of Somaliland.762 Both are part of the753 Hoehne, M. V., Political Orientations and Repertoires of Identification: State and Identity Formation in Northern Somalia,

2011, url, pp. 102-104
754 Hoehne, M. V., telephone interview, 15 June 2021
755 Hoehne, M. V., telephone interview, 15 June 2021
756 Menkhaus, K., State Collapse in Somalia: Second Thoughts, September, 2003, p. 412
757 ICRC, Spared from the Spear: Traditional Somali Behaviour in warfare, February 1998, url, pp. 29-44; Hoehne, M. V.,
telephone interview, 15 June 2021
758 Hoehne, M. V., telephone interview, 15 June 2021; see also Howard-Hunt, B., Forced Migration: The Experiences of Somali
Women Living in the United Kingdiom, April 2013, url, p. 79
759 EASO, Somalia: Actors, July 2021, url, sections: 7.7 Somaliland, and especially 7.7.1 Relevant dynamics, territorial control,and governance
760 EASO, Somalia: Security situation, September 2021, url, sections: 2.7.1 Awdal, 2.7.2 Wogooyi Galbeed, 2.7.3 Togdheer,
2.7.4 Sool, 2.7.5 Sanaag
761 Hoehne, M. V., Between Somaliland and Puntland: Marginalization, militarization and conflicting political visions, 2015,
pp. 38, 97
762 Mahmood, O. S., Overlapping claims by Somaliland and Puntland: The case of Sool and Sanaag, 2019, url, pp. 10, 26 (note
54).

78

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

larger Isaaq clan family.763 The conflict, which initially started as a dispute over pastoral land and water
access in 2015, began to see a solution after severe clashes had occurred,764 and by late December
2019, a government-backed committee could facilitate a deal between the warring lineages in El
Afweyne.765 Colonel Said Awil Jama (Aarre) who had escalated the conflict in 2018 by defecting fromthe Somaliland army,766 agreed to end his campaign in January 2020.767 Following an agreement
negotiated by traditional and religious leaders under the auspices of the Somaliland government, afirst exchange of compensations between Habar Yonis/Sa’ad Yonis and Habar Je’lo began on 10 March
2020.768
In 2019, a dispute broke out in Togdheer Region of Somaliland, which also crossed the border into
Region 5 of Ethiopia. The conflict was related to a historical conflict between the communities in andaround Buuhoodle, in this case the Reer Hagar, and the communities of Widhwidh (a village northeast
of Buuhoodle), in this case the Hayaag sub-clan.769 The conflict was triggered by a dispute over thesettlement of a place a little southeast of Buuhoodle, which is in the Region 5 of Ethiopia (people cancross the uncontrolled state border any time and without documents). This dispute resulted in thefirst killing of a Hayaag man at the hands of Reer Haggar, followed by a cycle of revenge. In less thana year, 27 men were killed on both sides (11 Reer Hagar and 16 Hayaag). Local elders tried to stop thebloodshed but they did not succeed. In early 2020, the highest Garaad (leader) of the Dhulbahanteclan, Garaad Jaama Garad Ali was asked for help. A dispute settlement process began under hischairmanship in June 2020, leading to an agreement between the conflicting parties in September
2020. It was agreed that the bloodshed should stop, that those displaced by the conflict could returnto their homes, and that compensation770 should be paid for the men killed.771 Due to the late start of
the rainy season, the payments have been postponed to July 2021.772
More recently, on 16 and 17 April 2021, massive fighting erupted between two Dhulbahante sub-clans(Jama Siyaad and Ugaadhyahan/Naaleeye Ahmed) in Sool region. The fighting happened in DhabarDalol area in the district of Hudun. The bone of contention was a well. 773 The fighting left 18 men
dead, including 15 from the Ugaadhyahan sub-clan and 3 from the Jaama Siyaad.774 The fighting was
stopped by the intervention of the governor of Sool on behalf of the Somaliland government and by
the intervention of traditional leaders from various Dhulbahante sub-clans,775 but also from otherclans (including Warsangeli, Majeerteen and Isaaq clans). Peace negotiations are ongoing (as of June2021).776

763 International Crisis Group, Averting War in Northern Somalia, 27 June 2018, url, p. 3764 Hoehne, M. V., telephone interview, 15 June 2021
765 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2020/121, 13 February 2020, url, para. 24
766 Mahmood, O. S., Overlapping claims by Somaliland and Puntland: The case of Sool and Sanaag, 2019, url, pp. 12-13
767 Somaliland, Aarre Rebels in Sanaag Region agree on peace accord, 3 January 2020, url
768 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2020/398, 13 May 2020, url, para. 33
769 Ali, A. M., telephone interview, 14 June 2021. Abdirisak Mahamoud Ali is a security expert in Bur’o.
770 Compensation payments are based on Islamic law, expanded to include Somali traditional law. In the specific case, 120

camels were agreed as payment for one man killed. Since the dead are set off against each other in the event of a feud, apayment was made to Hayaag for those killed ‘in excess’ by Reer Hagar.
771 ACCORD, Expertenauskunft zu Somalia: Region Buhoodle: Konflikte zwischen Stämmen Hayaag und Reer Hagar (beide
Dhulbahante) im August 2019 (Autor: Markus Höhne) [a-11550], 9 April 2021, url; details added by Ali, A. M., telephoneinterview, 14 June 2021
772 Ali, A. M., telephone interview, 14 June 2021
773 Somali Affairs, Somalia: Casualties in clan clashes in Sool, 16 April 2021, url; Ali, A. M., telephone interview, 14 June 2021
774 Ali, A. M., telephone interview, 14 June 2021
775 Qorilugud News 24, What Is The Situation In Dhabar-Dalol Area Of Sool Region Today? [embedded video by SLNTV], 17
April 2021, url
776 Ali, A. M., telephone interview, 14 June 2021

79

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Also near Qorulugud, southeast of Bur’o on the way to Buuhoodle, members of several Dhulbahante
and Habar Je’lo lineages clashed in early April 2021. As of June 2021, four men (two Dhulbahante andtwo Habar Je’lo) were killed.777
PuntlandThis section should be read in conjunction with EASO’s COI report Somalia: Actors, published in July
2021,778 and with EASO’s COI report Somalia: Security situation (September 2021).779
Regarding clan clashes, there was relative peace and stability in Puntland for the past year and a halfsince January 2020. In early 2020 a small clan-conflict happened in the Karkaar region, between
Majeerteen/Osman Mohamud and Majeerteen/Ugaadh Saleban. After intervention of Puntland
forces and negotiations by the traditional clan elders, the conflict was successfully settled.780
Afterwards, in August 2020, the government of Puntland promulgated a new land law, regulating that
it was not allowed to establish new settlements in Puntland without previously consulting thegovernment.781
In May 2020, members of Darood/Leelkase and Hawiye/Habar Gedir/Sa’ad clans clashed in northwestof Gaalkayo. Subsequently a peace conference took place in June in Bandiiradley and an agreement
was signed to promote peace in west Mudug. The second phase of the reconciliation conference wasconcluded on 5 July in Galdogob, resulting in exchange of compensation and the signing of acooperation agreement between the clans.782
South-Central Somalia
Please note that the various clan conflicts listed below are illustrative examples and do not serve as
an exhaustive list of all ongoing clan conflicts in the region.
Galmudug: This section should be read in conjunction with EASO’s COI report Somalia: Actors,
published in July 2021,783 and with EASO’s COI report Somalia: Security situation (September 2021).784
In Galmudug state, intensive fighting erupted between two sub-clans residing in Af Barwaaqo andTowfiiq, Mudug region, on 5 December 2019. It resulted in dozens of casualties on both sides. The
Somali National Army was deployed to quell the fighting. From 22 to 28 December 2019, the Ministryof the Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation in Mogadishu facilitated a dialogue between the twoclans, ‘resulting in the formation of a joint peace committee, including women and young people, anda joint security committee.’785
In addition, on 6 April 2020, an inter-clan conflict erupted between the Marehan/Wagarda’ and theHabar Gedir/Saleeban ‘in the villages of Balli-Cad and Foronta-Fora, Galgaduud’. Security forceswere deployed on 7 April to stop the fighting and the Galmudug authorities initiated reconciliation
efforts.786
A drive-by assassination of two people occurred in October 2020 in Abudwaq town, Galgudud
region, where the attackers escaped from the scene. According to local news, the attack was linked
to an ongoing clan dispute in the area.787

777 Ali, A. M., telephone interview, 14 June 2021
778 EASO, Somalia: Actors, July 2021, url, section: 7.6 Puntland
779 EASO, Somalia: Security situation, September 2021, url, sections: 2.6.1 Nugal, 2.6.2 Bari, 2.6.3 Sool, 2.6.4 Sanaag
780 Mire, M. A., email, 15 June 2021
781 Puntland State of Somalia, Xeerka Maaraynta Dhulka magaalooyinka Dawladda Puntland [], 25 August 2020, url, Article

5(2)782 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2020/798, 13 August 2020, url, para. 38
783 EASO, Somalia: Actors, July 2021, url, section: 7.5 Galmudug
784 EASO, Somalia: Security situation, September 2021, url, sections: 2.5.1 Galgaduud, 2.5.2 Mudug
785 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2020/121, 13 February 2020, url, para. 39
786 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2020/398, 13 May 2020, url, para. 35
787 Radio Dalsan, Dowladda oo Ciidan farabadan u dirtay Degmo lagu dilay dad shacab ah [], 28 October 2020, url

80Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

On 12 November 2020, two clan militias clashed around Huldooyaale in southern Mudug Region.788
After a week of fighting, Al-Shabaab stepped in to start negotiations. The reconciliation was
supposed to follow Sharia rules.789
On 9 December 2020, members of the Somali military were ambushed near the town of Guri’el in
Galgudud region. Four soldiers were killed and three others wounded in the attack, which wasreportedly linked to ongoing clan disputes.790
In early January, five people traveling in a car were abducted not far from Guriel in Galgudud region.
They were released on 11 January 2021, as a result of negotiations involving traditional authorities.
The abduction had been part of long-standing clan feuds in the region.791
On 13 February 2021, the Ministry of the Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation ‘facilitated apreliminary ceasefire agreement between the Ayr and Saleeban sub-clans in Hananbure, Galgaduud
Region.’ On 10 March, talks between the two sub-clans were held in Dhuusamarreeb, in Gaalgudud
region, to address the root causes of the conflict.792
As of mid-2021, there are still numerous violent clan conflicts active in Galmudug state of Somalia.
Interpeace, an international NGO concerned with peace building, lists in a recent report:‘Active conflicts concern eight current hotspots, namely: 1. Omar Mohamud (Majerten) vs Sa’ad(Habargadir) at Galkayo; 2. Wagardhac (Marehan) vs Sa’ad at Gelinsoor (Mudug); 3. Wagardhac vs
Saleban at Gelinsoor (Mudug); 4. Ayanle (Ayr, Habargadir) vs Reer kooshin (Marehan) at Balanballe(Galgadud); 5. Saleban (Habargadir) vs Yabar-Dhowra kec (Ayr) at Qalanqale (Galgadud); 6. Marehan
vs Ogaden at the Somalia-Ethiopia border; 7. Sa’ad vs Leelkase (Mudug); 8. Habar-aji (Ayr, Habargadir)vs Ali Madaxweyne (Hawaadle) (Hiiraan)’.793
Some other conflicts are latent and currently suppressed by Al-Shabaab. However, Interpeace notedthat ‘these conflicts could resurface if the rule of al-Shabab were to end.’ 794
Hirshabelle: This section should be read in conjunction with EASO’s COI report Somalia: Actors,
published in July 2021,795 and with EASO’s COI report Somalia: Security situation (September 2021).796
Hiiraan region experienced massive tensions between clan militias and regional security forces aroundthe election of the new regional president Ali Abdullahi Hussein ‘Gudlawe’ on 11 November 2020.
Many armed men from the Gaalja’el clans supported General Abukar Haji Warsame (General
Xuud/Hut), who belongs to the Hawadle clan, whose members supported him as well to a large
degree. The supporters of General Xuud/Hut positioned themselves against the newly elected
Hirshabelle administration under Ali Gudlawe.797 The latter belongs to the Abgal clan798 that
dominates in the Middle Shabelle region.799
Ali Geedi, former prime-minister of Somalia (2004-2007) and political analyst explained that in Hiiraan
region, Hawadle, Gaalja’el and Gugundabe are the dominant clans. While all of these belong to the788 Radio Dalsan, Dagaal khasaare badan dhaliyay oo ka socda Gobolka Mudug [], 12 November 2020, url
789 Radioalfurqaan, Wilaayada Mudug Oo Heshiis Dhex dhigtay Jufo katirsan Beesha Cayr [], 23 November 2020, url
790 Radio Dalsan, Saraakiil ka tirsan Ciidanka Xoogga oo lagu dilay G/Galgaduud [], 9 December 2020, url
791 Muqdishu Online, Beelo degan Guriceel oo sheegay inay lacag ku bixiyeen siidenyta dad afdub loga haystay [], 11 January

2021, url
792 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2021/485, 19 May 2021, url, para. 31
793 Interpeace, Galmudug Reconciliation: Processes, Challenges, and Opportunities Ahead, February 2021, url, pp. 26-27
794 Interpeace, Galmudug Reconciliation: Processes, Challenges, and Opportunities Ahead, February 2021, url, p. 27
795 EASO, Somalia: Actors, July 2021, url, section: 7.4. Hirshabelle
796 EASO, Somalia: Security situation, September 2021, url, sections: 2.4.1 Hiraan, 2.4.2 Middle Shabelle
797 Hiiraan Online, Ciidamo ka tirsan Beesha Gaaljecel oo ku biiray la dagaalanka Hirshabeelle iyo Janaraal Xuud oo ku
dhawaaqay arin cusub [], 30 November 2020, url; Geedi, A., telephone interview, 15 June 2021. Ali Geedi is from Middle
Shabelle; he was Prime Minister of Somalia 2004-2007
798 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2021/154, 17 February 2021, url, para. 7
799 TNH, Fear of more clashes in Middle Shabelle, 18 June 2002, url

81Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Hawiye clan-family, they compete among each other.800 The politicization of clan-conflicts became
visible in 2020, when Ali Gudlawe, an Abgal, was elected to the leadership position over a candidatefrom Hawadle. In Reaction ‘General Xuud’s militia (mainly Hawadle, but also some Gaaljeel801) clashedwith local security forces near Beledweyne and Ceel Gaal, with Al-Shabaab militants taking advantageof the situation to make new advances’.802 The conflict escalated further and in December 2020, local
clan militias loyal to General Xuud clashed with Somali government forces.803 The oppositionpresidential candidates accused the federal government of dividing the clans in Hirshabelle state toadvance its political agenda.804 According to the UN Secretary General’s May 2021 report, ‘the dispute
between Hawadle clan members and the newly elected Hirshabelle administration remainedunresolved.’805
In May 2021, members of the Jejele and Makane clans clashed in the outskirts of Beledweyne,806
resulting in displacement of inhabitants.807 Shortly afterwards, on 17 May 2021, clan fighters burned
villages north of Beledweyne, where clan clashes have been raging on for some time. The affectedvillages include Ba'ad Buko, the scene of recent fighting between two rival clan militias.808
South-West State: This section should be read in conjunction with EASO’s COI report Somalia: Actors,
published in July 2021,809 and with EASO’s COI report Somalia: Security situation (September 2021).810
Generally, there are long-standing clan conflicts in Lower Shabelle around natural ‘resources, such as
land tenure, grazing rights, water, farmlands, livestock, and the distribution of humanitarian aid’.811
In April 2020, a clan conflict erupted in the town of Wanlaweyn, Lower Shabelle, resulting in over 25
fatalities. The President of South-West State, Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed ‘Laftagaren’, constituted anintervention committee to de-escalate the conflict. The UN Secretary General noted that ‘on 24 April,a reconciliation conference involving the clans, the regional administration and the Somali National
Army began in the affected district.’ 812
On 5 July 2020, ‘a South-West State ministerial delegation secured an agreement on the cessation of
hostilities between the Shanta-Alemod and Galjel sub-clans of the Digil and Hawiye clans, respectively,
in Wanlaweyn district’ which would allow ‘displaced people to return, and the recruitment from bothcommunities of a 250-member special police force, working closely with Somali National Armyunits.’813 However, on 29 September, the conflict resurfaced when two people were killed in a clan
revenge attack in the village of Yaqbariweyne in Lower Shabelle region. The village is in Wanleweyn
district. The perpetrators fled the scene.814
In October 2020, Al-Shabaab used clan conflicts in the Bakool region, to broker peace between rivalclans. On 6 October 2020, a ceremony was held in Burdho town, Bakol region, in which the groups in
conflict, the Galj'el and Gelidle clans, exchanged livestock as blood compensation.815

800 Geedi, A., telephone interview, 15 June 2021
801 Hoehne, M. V., telephone interview, 18 August 2021
802 ACLED, A Turbulent Run-up to Elections in Somalia, 7 April 2021, url
803 Somali Affairs, Somali interior minister travels to central town amid political tension, 3 December 2020, url
804 Radio Kulmiye, Midowga musharaxiinta oo war ka soo saaray xaaladda gobolka Hiiraan, 7 December 2020, url
805 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2021/485, 19 May 2021, url, para. 32
806 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2021/485, 19 May 2021, url, para. 32
807 Multi-Cluster Rapid Assessment on Clan Conflict and Flood in Beletweyne 25 – 27 May 2021, url, p. 6
808 Radio Kulmiye, Maleeshiyaad hubeysan oo xalay gubay tuulo ku taala Hiiraan, 17 May 2021, url
809 EASO, Somalia: Actors, July 2021, url, section: 7.2 South-West
810 EASO, Somalia: Security situation, September 2021, url, sections: 2.2.1 Bakool, 2.2.2 Bay, 2.2.3 Lower Shabelle
811 Axiom, Final Report Seed II: Exploring The Agricultural Initiatives’ Influence On Stability In Somalia, url, p. 17
812 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2020/398, 13 May 2020, url, para. 35
813 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2020/798, 13 August 2020, url, para 39.
814 Universal TV, Two killed in southern Somalia clan feud, 29 September 2020
815 Somali Memo, Boqolaal Neef Geel ah oo diyo ahaan loogu kala wareejiyay Beelo ku dagaallamay Soomaaliya, 6 October

2020, url82

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

BRA or Mogadishu: This section should be read in conjunction with EASO’s COI report Somalia: Actors,
published in July 2021,816 and with EASO’s COI report Somalia: Security situation (September 2021).817
Protests in Mogadishu, called by opposition groups over the Federal Government’s management of
the upcoming elections (planned for February 2021, but then postponed until late summer 2021)818,
led to violence on 15 and 25 December 2020. The Somali Police Force stepped in and several civilians
were injured. Clan-affiliated militias took part in the clashes.819It has to be noted that President
Farmajo’s opponents in the capital are largely members of the Hawiye.820 On 25 April 2021
government and opposition-aligned security forces clashed in Mogadishu.821 Forces on both sides,
even the official government forces, were largely made up of clan-based militia with loyalties lying
principally with their respective clan.822 The Hawiye, Abgaal, Habar Gedir and Murusade clans werementioned as being involved in the conflict and gathering their fighters, some of them members ofpolice and army forces.823 Early May 2021 an agreement between the Federal Government andopposition was reached.824
Jubbaland. This section should be read in conjunction with EASO’s COI report Somalia: Actors,
published in July 2021,825 and with EASO’s COI report Somalia: Security situation (September 2021).826
Further south, in Jubbaland, elders from the Majerteen and Awramale clans agreed to a ceasefire on
11 April 2020. Intermittent clashes followed resulting in more than 50 fatalities between 2 Februaryand 2 April.827

5.2 Clan revenge in clan conflicts for womenThis section should be read in conjunction with Chapter 2. Women and girls of the present report.
Women in Somalia are subject to a strictly patriarchal order – supported by Somali traditions and by
Islamic provision.828 Traditionally, women and other weak groups or messengers (children and oldpeople, religious and traditional authorities, peace delegates, guests, those living under the protectionof a group, etc.) are in Somali called biri ma geydo.829 This means: ‘they shall not be harmed’ in conflictsituations.
‘the term [biri ma geydo] has its origins in the practice of abstaining from felling certain
trees on account of their shade, fruit, rarity or religious associations. It was also used inreference to certain animals whose slaughtering was disapproved of such as burden
camels, lactating and pregnant animals, etc. Later it came to be applied to those
816 EASO, Somalia: Actors, July 2021, url, section: 7.3 Benadir and Mogadishu
817 EASO, Somalia: Security situation, September 2021, url, section: 2.3 Benadir and Mogadishu
818 Geedi, A., telephone interview, 15 June 2021
819 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2021/154, 17 February 2021, url, para. 4
820 AFP, Five things to know about Somalia's political crisis, 30 April 2021, url; see also Robinson, Colin D., Somalia Must

Replace Its Military and Security Chiefs, 18 June 2021
https://www.thedefensepost.com/2021/06/18/somalia-must-replace-military-chiefs/
821 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2021/485, 19 May 2021, url, para. 21
822 Norway, Landinfo, Respons, Somalia: Kampene i Mogadishu den 25. april 2021 og sikkerhetssituasjonen i byen etter dette,
15 June 2021, url, p. 2
823 Robinson, Colin D., Somalia Must Replace Its Military and Security Chiefs, 18 June 2021, url
824 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2021/485, 19 May 2021, url, para. 21
825 EASO, Somalia: Actors, July 2021, url, section: 7.1 Jubbaland
826 EASO, Somalia: Security situation, September 2021, url, sections: 2.1.1 Gedo, 2.1.2 Middle Juba, 2.1.3 Lower Juba
827 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2020/398, 13 May 2020, url, para. 35
828 Ingiriis, M. H. and Hoehne, M. V., The impact of civil war and state collapse on the roles of Somali women: a blessing in
disguise, 2013, p. 317; Sweden, Swedish Migration Agency, Lifos Report, Somalia: the position of women in the clan system,
27 April 2018, url, p. 4
829 ICRC, Spared from the Spear: Traditional Somali Behaviour in warfare, February 1998, url, pp. 29-47; see also Center for
Civilians in Conflict, The People's Perspectives: Civilian Involvement in Armed Conflict, 11 May 2015, url, pp. 82-83

83

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

categories of persons who were to be spared from violence at all times because of fearof disgrace or divine retribution or because of other practical considerations.’830
During (civil) war, however, women often experience constant fear of violence. A recent research by
Ibrahim Bangura, a senior lecturer in the Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, Fourah Bay
College, University of Sierra Leone, found that
‘Out of 295 women and girls who participated in the survey, 251 indicated that they live
in constant fear of losing their lives or being raped or tortured by fighting forces,
criminals, or family members. Similarly, of the ninety-six women and girls who
participated in FGDs, seventy-three indicated that they live in constant fear of losing theirlives or being raped or tortured by fighting forces, criminals, or family members. Whilethe experience is psychologically damaging, some women bear severe and longer-term
physical trauma such as vesico-vaginal fistula (VVF).’831
The UN secretary general reported in 2021 that ‘protracted conflict, structural gender inequality andsuccessive humanitarian crises have exposed Somali women and girls to heightened levels of conflictrelated sexual violence.’ The UN reported that there were 400 girls, 12 women and 7 boys who werevictimised in the course of 2020, with most sexual violence in Somalia perpetrated by Al-Shabaab andclan militias, with some cases involving the Somali National Army (25) or the Somali Police Force (16).
Also regional forces, e.g. in Puntland or Jubbaland, committed a few acts of sexual violence. The rest
were by unknown perpetrators. The Secretary General added that ‘reports of sexual violence
increased significantly compared with the previous reporting period, fuelled by intensified clashes
among clans related to land-based disputes and the fragile security situation in settlements forinternally displaced persons.’ 832
Another source, however, noted that specifically in clan conflicts, which are not related to politicalfighting – e.g. involving national forces, Al-Shabaab or regional state militias - women are still often
considered sacrosanct. At least they are not directly targeted in such normally very local conflicts thatrevolve around access to water, grazing or land. 833 If, however, majority groups clash with minority
groups over the just mentioned resources, it is more likely that women are harmed by majority clan
militias, as a display of ‘superiority’ by the majority group.834 While generally women do not enjoy
equal rights with men in Somalia, women from minority groups are additionally vulnerable. They ‘areoften subjected to assault from a variety of groups, including armed groups, security forces, AMISOM,
clan members from majority clans and clan members from minority groups.’ In case of a conflict withmajority clan members, women from minority groups do hardly find even minimal protection under
xeer.835
Women can play a very specific role in peace-making between lineages of clans. In order to stabilise apeace agreement between groups, sometimes one or several unmarried girls from the family of thekiller(s) is given by the elders for marriage to the injured group, on top of the compensation in livestockor the equivalent in money. This tradition is called godob reeb, which translates as ‘extinguishinghatred/resentment’; elsewhere it is called ‘godobtiir’ (accounting for resentment).836 The logic is thatafter conflict, marriage ties between former enemies are forged, and the loss of life of the one groupis ‘replaced’ by the child/children born to the girl(s) from the former enemy group. Hoehne notes that
830 ICRC, Spared from the Spear: Traditional Somali Behaviour in warfare, February 1998, url, p. 29
831 Bangura, I., Trapped in Violence and Uncertainty: Patriarchy, Women, and the Conflict in Somalia, 2021, p. 90
832 UNSG, Conflict-related sexual violence, S/2021/312, 30 March 2021, url, para. 40
833 Ali, A. M., telephone interview, 14 June 2021
834 Hoehne, M. V., telephone interview, 15 June 2021
835 Sweden, Swedish Migration Agency, Lifos Report, Somalia: the position of women in the clan system, 27 April 2018, url,

p. 17
836 Sweden, Swedish Migration Agency, Lifos Report, Somalia: the position of women in the clan system, 27 April 2018, url,
p. 16; see also ACCORD, Anfragebeantwortung zu Somalia: Informationen zu Zwangsheirat (Zwangsheirat zur Konfliktlösung
oder Entschädigung zwischen Clans) [a-9810], 19 August 2016, url

84

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

this tradition is still practised in the north in specially complicated conflict cases with the consent of
the girl(s) ‘presented’ as godob reeb. A young woman can also refuse this kind of arrangement.837
Regarding the treatment of female defectors from AS see also section 1.2 on repercussions fordeserters from Al-Shabaab.

6. Individuals supporting or perceived as
supporting the government, theinternational actors, and/or as opposing AlShabaabThis section should be read in conjunction with EASO’s COI report Somalia: Security situation(September 2021).838
During the period covered in this report, Al-Shabaab (AS) has carried out a number of attacks andassassinations on Somali government or Somali National Army (SNA) officials and other individuals‘perceived to have links with the government’.839 As outlined below, these attacks have occurred in avariety of settings and locations (though most attacks have been reported in urban areas of South
Central Somalia and Puntland), with those targeted having a variety of profiles in terms of rank,function, profession and age.
Although this section will focus on the profiles of persons attacked by Al-Shabaab, it should also be
noted that Islamic State’s Somali branch, which maintains a presence around Bosasso (Puntland), has‘carried out sporadic attacks in Puntland and Mogadishu’.840 It reportedly staged an attack in
Mogadishu in October 2020.841 However, in recent times, its attacks in the city have been reported tobe less frequent than before 2020. The group’s modus operandi also involves ‘assassination of security
or government figures with gunfire or, occasionally, explosive devices’.842 For more information on
ISIS-Somalia, see EASO’s COI report Somalia: Actors, published in July 2021.843

837 Hoehne, M. V., The rupture of territoriality and the diminishing relevance of cross-cutting ties in Somalia after 1990, 2016,

pp. 1389-1390; details added by Hoehne, M. V., telephone interview, 18 August 2021
838 EASO, Somalia: Security situation, September 2021, url
839 AI, Amnesty International Report 2020/21, 7 April 2021, url, p. 323; see also UN Security Council, Report of the Panel ofExperts on Somalia, S/2020/949, 28 September 2020, url, para. 133; Norway, Landinfo, Respons, Somalia: Det generelle
voldsbildet og al-Shabaabs aktivitet i ulike deler av landet, 3 June 2021, url
840 UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, S/2020/949, 28 September 2020, url, para. 68; a recent
Landinfo query response lists nine attacks carried out by IS that were registered by ACLED for 2020, most of them in Bariregion and some in Mogadishu, see Norway, Landinfo, Respons, Somalia: Det generelle voldsbildet og al-Shabaabs aktivitet
i ulike deler av landet, 3 June 2021, url, p. 5,
841 RocketChat, IS claims gun attack on soldiers in Somali capital Mogadishu, 25 October 2020
842 International Crisis Group, Blunting Al-Shabaab’s Impact on Somalia’s Elections, 31 December 2020, url, pp. 6-7
843 EASO, Somalia: Actors, July 2021, url, section: 6 Islamic State in Somalia (ISIS-Somalia)

85

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Scope of attacks and ideology behind justification of attacks
When referring to Somali federal or local government officials and those allied with the state,
Al-Shabaab uses the terms non-Muslims, apostates (murtad844)845 or infidels (kafir).846 In a 2009
statement outlining its religious doctrine to the group’s supporters, an AS official declared the Somali
government to be illegitimate and acting outside the boundaries of Islamic law, denouncing those who
follow the country’s [provisional] Constitution – or, for that matter, any party opposing the group – as‘infidels’,847 which reflects the group’s predominant ‘takfiri ideology that justifies the killing of other
Muslims’.848
AS has been reported to threaten persons ‘who are in any way associated with the Somali government[or] the military [...], no matter where they live.’849 As Mary Harper writes, civilians can be ‘punished,even killed, for serving food to a civil servant or washing a soldier’s uniform’. People have been
threatened for repairing computers in government buildings or selling tea to members of the armed
forces. In one case, she writes, a man was shot dead after he ignored the group’s warnings. Others
were forced to give up their livelihoods. It has also been reported that AS frequently targets family
members of persons it wants to punish.850 According to local sources in Somalia talking to Landinfo in2020 and information Landinfo obtained in previous years, low-ranking government officials are nota priority target for al-Shabaab; one source mentioned that such officials live all over Mogadishu, evenin the Afgoye area outside Mogadishu, from where they commute to and from work.851
AS has also targeted elders for their alleged links to the government,852 including those who haverepresented their communities in elections853 (see section 6.3 below).
AS has carried out what has been reported as ‘indiscriminate attacks targeting civilians and civilian
infrastructure, including restaurants and hotels’.854 These facilities have sometimes been referred toas ‘soft targets’855. Meanwhile, it has been noted that AS views certain hotels856 as legitimate targets,warning civilians not to get close to them. An AS member is quoted as saying that the group considers‘five, six or seven hotels in Mogadishu as prime targets’ as they are known to host government
officials, certain members of the Somali diaspora, foreigners and others seen as ‘infidels’. Harper notesthat some hotels do indeed serve as homes and workplaces of senior government officials. According
to a member of AS’s department for communications, the group considers ‘every person who visits orworks at such hotels’, including hotel owners (who allow ‘members of government to live and visit
their hotels’), cleaners, guards, cooks and other staff as enemies. Elaborating on this logic, the AS
source is quoted as saying that the group considers such hotels to be ‘government buildings, notcivilian buildings‘. It has been reported that the group sometimes justified their attacks on these
844 Menkhaus, K., Al-Shabaab and Social Media: A Double-Edged Sword, 2014, url, p. 315
845 USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report 2020 - Somalia, 12 May 2021, url, p. 6; see also Taarnby, M. andHallundbaek, L., Al-Shabaab: The Internationalization of Militant Islamism in Somalia and the Implications for Radicalisation
Processes in Europe, 26 February 2010, p. 14846 Hoehne, M. V., communication, 8 July 2021
847 Taarnby, M. and Hallundbaek, L., Al-Shabaab: The Internationalization of Militant Islamism in Somalia and the Implications
for Radicalisation Processes in Europe, 26 February 2010, p. 14
848 Bryden, M., The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice or Necessity?, February 2014, url, pp. 1-2
849 Harper, M., Everything You Have Told Me Is True: The Many Faces of Al-Shabaab, 2019, p. 130
850 Harper, M., Everything You Have Told Me Is True: The Many Faces of Al-Shabaab, 2019, pp. 130-133
851 Norway, Landinfo, Query response, Somalia: Violence in Mogadishu and developments since 2012, 30 October 2020, url,
pp. 5-6852 Hiraal Institute, Semi-annual Somalia Security Report, 16 July 2020, url, p. 9; Garowe Online, Al-Shabaab publicly executes
elder by firing squad in central Somalia, 30 September 2020, url
853 International Crisis Group, Blunting Al-Shabaab’s Impact on Somalia’s Elections, 31 December 2020, url, pp. 3-4
854 AI, Amnesty International Report 2020/21, 7 April 2021, url, p. 323; see also Norway, Landinfo, Query response, Somalia:
Violence, fatalities, perpetrators and victims in Mogadishu, 27 February 2017, url, pp. 7-9
855 USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report 2020 - Somalia, 12 May 2021, url, p. 6856 See for example Norway, Landinfo, Query response, Somalia: Violence in Mogadishu and developments since 2012, 30
October 2020, url, p. 6

86

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

facilities by referring to them as military bases.857 Thus, another expert explains, in large-scale attacks
carried out by AS, civilians are not killed or injured as accidental ‘bystanders’ or ‘collateral damage’,
but as deliberate targets.858 However, an analysis by Landinfo concludes that the civilian populationin general is not the target of attacks, even though sources agreed that the group pays little attention
to ‘random passers-by’ when attacking.859
Although it was noted that the primary targets of AS were the Somali National Army (SNA) and theforces of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and its ‘second priority’ were the police
force and those working for the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and the Federal Member States(FMS),860 the rationale outlined above shows a broad range of profiles of individuals that may become
potential targets of attacks. After discussing the capacity of AS to carry out attacks, the following
sections will focus on four of these profiles: officials of the federal government or the FMS
governments, army officers, persons accused of cooperating with or spying for these institutions, andany other individuals seen as opposing the group.
Al-Shabaab’s capacity to carry out attacks
AS has carried out targeted attacks on forces and buildings linked to the government and otherfacilities in areas controlled by the government, often using improvised explosive devices (IED)861,
including IEDs attached to vehicles of civil servants, police and lone army officers 862, or assassinatingsuch persons with targeted shots.863 For more information see EASO’s COI report Somalia: Actors,
published in July 2021.864
According to a May 2021 United Nations report, AS has ‘maintained the capability to infiltrate
Mogadishu and carry out high-profile attacks’.865 As one expert estimated, AS probably has thecapacity to assassinate a ‘judge, military officer, government secretary, minister or member ofparliament through targeted attacks, if they really want them dead.866 Targeted killings may be carriedout in government-controlled areas like Mogadishu ‘in plain daylight’, by persons who might normallynot be suspected of being affiliated with an ‘Islamist’ group. Mohamed Haji Ingiriis observed that
‘Mogadishu residents mention how the Amniyat swiftly carries out killings and assassinations against
alleged collaborators of the government for their hit squad operations.’867 A resident of Mogadishu
whose brother, a federal government official, was killed by AS, is quoted as saying that ‘Al-Shabaab iseverywhere’.868 In this context, AS’s strategy of ‘exemplary violence’ may have to be taken into

857 Harper, M., Everything You Have Told Me is True: The Many Faces of Al-Shabaab, 2019, pp. 95-96, 98-99
858 ACCORD, Somalia: Al-Schabaab und Sicherheitslage; Lage von Binnenvertriebenen und Rückkehrer·innen; Schutz durch

staatliche und nicht-staatliche Akteure [Seminar with experts Markus Hoehne and Jutta Bakonyi], 31 May 2021, url, pp. 1112
859 Norway, Landinfo, Respons, Somalia: Det generelle voldsbildet og al-Shabaabs aktivitet i ulike deler av landet, 3 June
2021, url, pp. 6-7
860 Hiraal Institute, Semi-annual Somalia Security Report, 16 July 2020, url, p. 9
861 USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report 2020 - Somalia, 12 May 2021, url, p. 6862 Hiraal Institute, Semi-annual Somalia Security Report, 16 July 2020, url, p. 9
863 ACCORD, Somalia: Al-Schabaab und Sicherheitslage; Lage von Binnenvertriebenen und Rückkehrer·innen; Schutz durch
staatliche und nicht-staatliche Akteure [Seminar with experts Markus Hoehne and Jutta Bakonyi], 31 May 2021, url, p. 12;
Hiraal Institute, Semi-annual Somalia Security Report, 16 July 2020, url, p. 9864 EASO, Somalia: Actors, July 2021, url, section: 4.2.3 Modus operandi and tactics
865 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2021/485, 19 May 2021, url, para. 15
866 ACCORD, Somalia: Al-Schabaab und Sicherheitslage; Lage von Binnenvertriebenen und Rückkehrer·innen; Schutz durch
staatliche und nicht-staatliche Akteure [Seminar with experts Markus Hoehne and Jutta Bakonyi], 31 May 2021, url, p. 12867 Ingiriis M. H., Insurgency and international extraversion in Somalia: the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA)
and Al-Shabaab's Amniyat, 2020, url, p. 129
868 Harper, M., Everything You Have Told Me is True: The Many Faces of Al-Shabaab, 2019, p. 34

87

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

account. As the group lacks the capacity to exert control all the time and everywhere, punishments
are carried out in an exemplary manner to instil fear in the population.869
According to Marchal, one reason AS can operate so effectively in Mogadishu is that it has infiltrated
the security forces, including the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA).870 Another expert
said that people working as informants for AS’s Amniyat can be ‘ordinary students, people in offices,in the security forces etc. who collect information’ for the organisation.871 For more information see
EASO’s COI report Somalia: Actors, published in July 2021.872

6.1 Attacks on Federal Government and FMS officials
According to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), AS has ‘increased its
operational tempo since August 2020, and the beginning of 2021 has seen a new peak in the numberof attacks targeting government officials’.873 Please note that the reported incidents below are notexhaustive.874
High-ranking Federal and FMS government officials
AS has carried out a number of targeted killings and assassination attempts on high-profile FGS
officials, including the attempted assassination of the director of the Immigration and Naturalization
Department in Mogadishu in October 2020, of the acting Minister for Education in August 2020875 andof the Minister for Internal Security of the Federal Government of Somalia in July 2020876.
At the FMS level, in Puntland, where AS has steadily become stronger,877 they carried out attacks killing
the Governor of Mudug region in Galkayo878 and the governor of Nugaal in Garowe879.
The group also assassinated two state ministers in Jowhar (the capital of Hirshabelle FMS) and thechairman of the Jubbaland Chamber of Commerce in Kismayo.880
Moreover, senior government officials also have been targeted in several large-scale attacks that also
affected multiple civilians. Most recently, in April 2021, AS carried out a suicide bombing in a
restaurant in Baidoa (the capital of South-West-State) that targeted the Governor of the Bay region(who survived the attack, while several other people were reportedly killed).881 Some AS attacks havetargeted senior officials in places where large crowds were present. A December 2020 suicide attack
outside a stadium in (south) Galkayo in December 2020 killed at least 30 people, including high-ranking

869 ACCORD, Somalia: Al-Schabaab und Sicherheitslage; Lage von Binnenvertriebenen und Rückkehrer·innen; Schutz durch

staatliche und nicht-staatliche Akteure [Seminar with experts Markus Hoehne and Jutta Bakonyi], 31 May 2021, url, pp. 8-9;
see also Norway, Landinfo, Query response, Somalia: Violence in Mogadishu and developments since 2012, 30 October 2020,
url, pp. 5-6
870 Marchal, R., telephone interview, 26 June 2021
871 Baadiyow, A. A., telephone interview, 26 June 2021
872 EASO, Somalia: Actors, July 2021, url, sections: 4.2.2 Amniyat; 4.3.3 Infiltration
873 UNSOM, UNSOM Newsletter, Issue 18 (Quarterly), March 2021, url, p. 2
874 Incidents of targeting of government and FMS officials are periodically reported by Sahan, The Somali Wire, Issues JanJune 2021, n.d., source requiring registration
875 Radio Dalsan, Somali MP reportedly wounded in south-west Somalia blast, 16 August 2020
876 UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, S/2020/949, 28 September 2020, url, para. 133
877 Jamestown Foundation, Somaliland Elections Disrupt al-Shabaab’s Regional Expansion, Terrorism Monitor, Volume
19(12), 18 June 2021, url
UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, S/2020/949, 28 September 2020, url, para. 133; see also
UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2020/798, 13 August 2020, url, para. 22
879 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2020/798, 13 August 2020, url, para. 22; UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts
on Somalia, S/2020/949, 28 September 2020, url, para. 133
880 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2020/1113, 13 November 2020, url, para. 14; Radio Mustaqbal, Somali regional state official
killed in suicide bomb, 11 September 2020
881 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2021/485, 19 May 2021, url, para. 18

88Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

government officials and army commanders as well as civilians. This attack took place while a rally for
the Somali Prime Minister was ongoing.882 Earlier in 2020, AS attacked a Mogadishu stadium during a
ceremony attended by Somalia’s President Mohamed Farmaajo (no casualties documented).883
Police officers
Media sources reported that AS killed or injured a number of police officers in suicide attacks on police
facilities (such as police stations) in the Mogadishu area884 and other parts of South Central Somalia,
including the Bakool region885. Moreover, in November 2020, AS claimed a suicide bombing on a(crowded) restaurant near the police academy in Mogadishu left six police officers dead and fourothers injured.886
Government Intelligence officials
According to local media (including pro-AS outlets), AS carried out several targeted assassinations of
NISA officials, both uniformed and in plain-clothes, in Mogadishu and its surroundings.887 For example,
in Mogadishu’s Waberi district, in an area described by Somali Memo as being ‘frequented bygovernment spy agents’, a bombing claimed by AS killed a senior intelligence official with the rank ofcolonel.888 Outside the capital area, attacks targeted senior NISA officials in Galgaduud region889 and
FMS intelligence officials in Puntland (Galkayo)890 and Jubbaland (Kismayo)891. For information on the
Puntland Intelligence and Security Agency (PISA), see section 7.6.2 FMS armed forces of EASO’s COI
report Somalia: Actors, published in July 2021, for Jubbaland Intelligence and Security Agency (JISA)
see 7.1.2 FMS armed forces of the same report.892
Tax collectors
Media sources (including outlets associated with AS) reported on several AS assassinations ofgovernment tax collectors, including in Mogadishu893 and in Benadir region’s Dharkenley district[which includes the westernmost neighbourhoods of Mogadishu]894. On 4 July 2020, a suicide carbombing that was later claimed by AS895 targeted a tax collection centre in Mogadishu, injuring six
people,896 while on the same day, the group carried out an attack on a restaurant in Baidoa where tax
collectors were holding a meeting, reportedly killing six people897.

882 Radio Kulmiye, At least 30 killed in central Somalia suicide bomb attack, 18 December 2020; Somali Memo, Al-Shabab

takes credit for deadly bombing in central Somalia, 18 December 2020
883 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2020/798, 13 August 2020, url, para. 19
884 Reuters, Suicide bombing by Somalia's Al-Shabaab group kills six, 10 May 2021, url; Somali Memo, Al-Shabab claims
suicide bomb attack in Somali capital, translated by: BBC Monitoring, available by subscription at: url, 28 April 2021; BBC
Monitoring, Militants 'kill' Somali police officers in suicide attack, 17 November 2020
885 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2021/485, 19 May 2021, url, para. 18
886 BBC Monitoring, Militants 'kill' Somali police officers in suicide attack, 17 November 2020; see also UNSG, Situation in
Somalia, S/2021/154, 17 February 2021, url, para. 14
887 Somali Memo, Al-Shabab says killed two Somali intelligence officials in south, 1 June 2021; Radio Kulmiye, Al-Shabab kills
three Somali intelligence agents in capital, 28 February 2021; Calamada, Somali militants 'kill spy' in southern Afgoye town,
23 February 2021; Somali Memo, Al-Shabab kills four intelligence officers in Somali capital, 28 December 2020. Amongothers, Somali Memo, Radio Al Furqaan and Bogga Calamada are described as affiliated to AS by Small Wars Journal, AlShabaab: Information Operations Strategy Overview, 29 August 2019, url
888 Somali Memo, Al-Shabab claims killing Somali spy agency official, 13 August 2020
889 Garowe Online, Explosion kills 12 soldiers in central Somalia, 7 February 2021; Garowe Online, Somali intelligence official
survives bomb attack, 9 August 2020, url
890 Somali Memo, Al-Shabab 'kills' Somali security official in Puntland, 1 April 2021
891 Somali Memo, Al-Shabab kills security official in southern Somalia, 10 April 2021
892 EASO, Somalia: Actors, July 2021, url, sections: 7.6.2 FMS armed forces; 7.1.2 FMS armed forces
893 Somali Memo, Al-Shabab claims attacks in Somalia's capital, 23 January 2021
894 Somali Memo, Al-Shabab kills revenue officer in Somali capital, 24 February 2021
895 BBC News, Somalia restaurant attack: Six killed by al-Shabab, 4 July 2020, url
896 New York Times (The), Attacks in Somalia Leave at Least 5 Dead, 4 July 2020, url
897 BBC News, Somalia restaurant attack: Six killed by al-Shabab, 4 July 2020, url

89Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Other government officials
Local media (including pro AS media) reported about several attacks on suspected officials of FMS
regional administrations. In Puntland, AS assassinated members of the Puntland administration in
Galkayo898 and Bosaso (an employee with the state’s ministry of finance)899 and reportedly also carriedout attacks on government officials (and other civilians) in Bari region900.
There have also been cases of executions of suspected FMS officials. In early 2020, AS publicly
executed a man suspected of being a member of both the South-West State administration and theFederal government in the Lower Shabelle region.901 In August 2020, also in the Lower Jubba region,
AS reportedly ambushed and killed a former village chief who allegedly worked as an official of the
Jubbaland administration and collaborated with the Kenyan armed forces, and captured his
bodyguard, according to a pro-AS source.902
Local government officials have been targeted in a number of instances, including in AS attacks thatkilled ward administrators in Mogadishu,903 as well as in Hiiraan region (killing the head of a local
government department),904 Bay region (the commissioner of Qansaxdheere district survived an IED
attack)905, and Gedo region (killing three local government department heads)906.
With regard to Somaliland, Landinfo refers to Markus Hoehne and other sources as saying that there
have been ‘rumors’ of AS being behind assassinations of government officials in Somaliland including
the town of Las Anod/Laascaanood in Sool (a region disputed between Somaliland and Puntland907).
However, this authorship has not been verified and the organisation has not claimed responsibility,with Hoehne quoted as saying that AS has limited capacity to carry out attacks in Somaliland because
it only has a small presence and not necessarily the support of the local population.908
Government officials with other or unspecified profiles
AS has also targeted government officials with other or non-specified profiles, both in targetedassassinations and ‘indiscriminate’ attacks. The group caused multiple deaths and injuries in several
large-scale attacks on venues frequented by (mostly unspecified) government and security officials,
including on the Mogadishu Elite Hotel (August 2020)909 and Afrik Hotel (31 January 2021),910 an ice

898 Radio Andalus, Al-Shabab kills Puntland state official in central Somalia, 5 November 2020
899 Shabelle Media Network, Somalia: Gunmen Carry Out an Attack in Bosaso City, 17 March 2020, available at: url
900 Universal Somali TV, Somalia's Puntland denies al-Shabab seizing Sanaag villages, 25 October 2020
901 Calamada, Somali militants execute four men 'for spying', 12 January 2020
902 Somali Memo, Al-Shabab kills former village chief in southern Somalia, 5 August 2020
903 Somali Memo, Al-Shabab claims killing official outside Somali capital, 23 March 2021; Calamada, Al-Shabab claims killing

prison warder in Somali capital, 18 February 2021; Al Arabiya, Five killed in suspected al-Shabaab attack in Somalia’s capital,
27 October 2020, url
904 Calamada, Al-Shabab kills local official in central Somalia, 16 November 2020
905 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2020/1113, 13 November 2020, url, para. 14
906 Somali Memo, Al-Shabab reportedly kills three Somali district officials, 25 February 2020
907 ISS, The various layers to the Somaliland-Puntland discord, 9 December 2019, url
908 Norway, Landinfo, Somalia: Sikkerhetssituasjoneni Nordvest-Somalia (Somaliland), 7 April 2020, url, p. 6; see also the mapwith the local distribution of Al-Shabaab incidents by Norway, Landinfo, Respons, Somalia: Det generelle voldsbildet og alShabaabs aktivitet i ulike deler av landet, 3 June 2021, url, p. 9909 UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, S/2020/949, 28 September 2020, url, para. 48; USDOS,
2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 13; AI, Amnesty International Report
2020/21, 7 April 2021, url, p. 323; BBC News, Mogadishu attack: Somali troops end deadly siege at Elite Hotel, 17 August
2020, url
910 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2021/154, 17 February 2021, url, para. 14; CNN, Five dead in Mogadishu hotel car bomb
attack, 1 February 2021, url; BBC News, Somalia al-Shabab militants attack Afrik hotel in Mogadishu, 1 February 2021, url;Radio Andalus, Somalia's al-Shabab claims 23 killed in hotel raid, 1 February 2021, translated by: BBC Monitoring, available
by subscription at: url; Somali Memo, Al-Shabab says top general was target of Somali hotel attack, 1 February 2021

90

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

cream parlour911, and restaurants912. Local media have also reported that AS killed a man in Hawle
Wadag district (Mogadishu) who was working as a photographer for a prison commander913 and adriver of a high-ranking federal government official914.
Apart from assassinations and attacks, it has been reported that AS carried out executions of persons
it accused to be government employees, including two alleged local administration officials in Lower
Shabelle region in January 2020.915
Lawmakers
Besides government officials, AS has carried out attacks on lawmakers (members of legislative bodies),
including a member of the Federal Parliament who has reportedly close ties to the President (inBeledweyne, Hiiraan region, he survived)916 and local council MPs for Hirshabelle FMS (in Mogadishu,
killed)917 and Puntland (killed)918. In July 2020, a regional lawmaker (for the Hirshabelle parliament919)
was abducted and killed by AS near the town of Balcad (Middle Shabelle region).920

6.2 Attacks on army officers
This section will focus on targeted attacks and assassinations of individual SNA officers and soldiers;
combat-related attacks on or involving the SNA are not being addressed. Please note that the reported
incidents below are not exhaustive.921
Sources have reported on a number of AS-claimed attacks on members of the SNA. The group hastargeted high-ranking army officials, including the Chief of the Somali Armed Forces in March922 andJuly 2020923. In late January 2021, AS attacked Hotel Afrik in Mogadishu, killing General Mohamed Nur
Galal (the proclaimed ‘key target’ of the attack) whom the group had accused of being involved in thedeath an AS leader in a US airstrike in 2008.924 AS reportedly killed an SNA colonel near Balcad (Middle
Shabelle region)925 as well as military officers of lower926 or unspecified rank927 and regular soldiers928
in the Mogadishu area. It has also been reported that AS occasionally carried out targeted killings and911 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2021/154, 17 February 2021, url, para. 14
912 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2021/485, 19 May 2021, url, para. 15; DW, Somalia: Deadly blast hits Mogadishu restaurant,

6 March 2021, url; Calamada, Al-Shabab claims responsibility for bombing in Somali capital, 27 November 2020
913 Radio Dalsan, Gunmen reportedly kill photographer in Somali capital, 17 February 2021; see also Calamada, Al-Shabab
claims killing prison warder in Somali capital, 18 February 2021
914 Calamada, Al-Shabab claims killing Somali army official in Mogadishu, 8 June 2021
915 UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, S/2020/949, 28 September 2020, url, para. 134; see also
Calamada, Somali militants execute four men 'for spying', 12 January 2020
916 Calamada, Pro-government Somali MP escapes al-Shabab attack, 27 November 2020
917 Radio Banaadir, Programme summary of Somalia's Radio Banadir news, 21 April 2021
918 Shabelle Media Network, Local MP Killed in Puntland, 23 March 2020, available at: url
919 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2020/798, 13 August 2020, url
920 VOA, Al-Shabab Militants Abduct, Kill Somali Lawmaker, 5 July 2020, url
921 Targeting of Somali army officers is reported periodically by Sahan, The Somali Wire, Issues Jan-June 2021, n.d., source
requiring registration
922 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2020/398, 13 May 2020, url, para. 19
923 UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, S/2020/949, 28 September 2020, url, para. 133; UNSG,
Situation in Somalia, S/2020/798, 13 August 2020, url, para. 20; USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices:
Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 13; Reuters, Head of Somalia's military unhurt, civilian killed in suicide car bomb on convoy,
13 July 2020, url
924 Somali Memo, Al-Shabab says top general was target of Somali hotel attack, 1 February 2021
925 Somali Memo, Al-Shabab kill senior army official in southern Somalia, 17 April 2021
926 Calamada, Al-Shabab 'kills' military officer in Somali capital, 19 February 2021; Somali Memo, Al-Shabab kills military
official in Somali capital, 24 October 2020
927 BBC Monitoring, Civilian killed in blast targeting Somali official [sources: Radio Risala and Garowe Online], 13 March 2021;
Calamada, Al-Shabab kills military official in Somali capital, 28 October 2020
928 Somali Memo, Gunmen kill Somali soldier in Mogadishu, 24 April 2021; Calamada, Al-Shabab claims killing soldier outside
Somali capital, 6 February 2021

91

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

attacks on security officials in Puntland.929 Islamic State group reportedly claimed that its fightersassassinated three army soldiers in Mogadishu in October 2020.930
Apart from targeted killings and attacks, Al-Shabaab also carried out executions of persons accused ofspying for the Somali armed forces, including two purported SNA soldiers in Lower Shabelle region in
January 2020.931

6.3 Treatment of persons accused by AS of collaborating with or
spying for the government or international actors
The following incidents focus on civilians accused by al-Shabaab of spying for different actors. For
other forms of collaboration, please see the remarks under chapter 6 above. Please note that thereported incidents below are not exhaustive.932
Individuals perceived to be spying for the government
It has been reported that AS carried out ‘religiously and politically motivated killings that targeted
civilians affiliated with the government’.933 The organisation considers ‘spying’ for the government (orforeign powers) as a crime punishable by death.934 Indeed, AS has referred to espionage as the main
reason for its executions.935 Mary Harper quotes an official of the organisation as saying that ‘If you
are a spy, there is only one punishment [...]. You will be killed whether you are a man or a woman.’Once a person has been found guilty by a ‘special court’, he or she will ‘face the firing squad in a public
place, never in a secret location’, as ‘everyone must witness the killing of the spy’.936 Michael
Skjelderup estimates that in cases of alleged spying, ‘the level of proof before executions is probablyquite low’.937 Executions by firing squad or instant killings of persons within the movement accused ofspying have been reported,938 while the accused are never allowed access to lawyers939. As observedin a United Nations report, their intention is ‘to intimidate populations under [AS] control and to senda clear message of what would happen to anyone not complying with their rules’.940 Thus local
residents are compelled to attend and watch them being carried out.941
While intercessions by clan elders have been reported to be successful under certain circumstances,
this is not the case ‘when people are arrested for rebellion or alleged spying’.942

929 Radio Dalsan, Somalia's Puntland state sentences eight militants to death, 23 April 2021
930 RocketChat, IS claims gun attack on soldiers in Somali capital Mogadishu, 25 October 2020
931 UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, S/2020/949, 28 September 2020, url, para. 134; see also

Calamada, Somali militants execute four men 'for spying', 12 January 2020
932 Incidents of targeting of ‘collaborators’ are periodically reported by Sahan, The Somali Wire, Issues Jan-June 2021, n.d.,source requiring registration
933 USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url,
934 Harper, M., Everything You Have Told Me Is True: The Many Faces of Al-Shabaab, 2019, p. 109
935 UNSOM and UNOHCHR, Protection of Civilians Report, 2 October 2020, url; this has also been noted by Skjelderup, M.,email, 1 July 2021
936 Harper, M., Everything You Have Told Me Is True: The Many Faces of Al-Shabaab, 2019, p. 109
937 Skjelderup, email, 1 July 2021
938 Ingiriis M. H., Insurgency and international extraversion in Somalia: the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA)
and Al-Shabaab's Amniyat, 2020, url, p. 129
939 FTL, Al-Shabaab Execute Two Men for Spying for HirShabelle Administration, 26 September 2020, url
940 UNSOM and UNOHCHR, Protection of Civilians Report, 2 October 2020, url, p. 12
941 UNSOM and UNOHCHR, Protection of Civilians Report, 2 October 2020, url, p. 12; AA, Somalia: Al-Shabaab executes 5
people for spying, 2 March 2021, url; Radio Dalsan, Alshabaab Executes 3 On Spying Claims, 27 January 2020
942 Hiraal Institute, Taming the Clans: Al-Shabab's Clan Politics, 31 May 2018, url, p. 3

92

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

The United Nations documented that ‘between January and July 2020, at least 17 men were publicly
executed by Al-Shabaab’ after being accused of espionage, including for the Somali government.943 In
the Middle Jubba region (a part of Somalia reportedly under full AS control), in March 2021, AS publicly
executed by firing squad five persons it accused of spying, including for Somali intelligence944, while
two alleged collaborators of Somali intelligence were executed in September 2020945. For thetreatment of persons accused by Al-Shabaab of being actual members of the Somali federal or FMS
administrations or the SNA, please see sections 6.1 and 6.2.
AS has also punished its own members for allegedly spying for the group’s enemies. According to
Mohamed Ingiriis, AS’s Amniyat, which ‘handles internal justice’ within the organisation, ‘often acts
outside the Al-Shabaab justice system to punish alleged spies within the movement’.946 For example,
in August 2020, the group publicly executed three of its members who were suspected of spying forSomali and foreign intelligence agencies.947 For more information see EASO’s COI report Somalia:
Actors, published in July 2021.948
Individuals perceived to be spying for AMISOM or other international actors
Apart from alleged intelligence activities on behalf of the Somali government, AS views ‘spying’ for
AMISOM or Western countries as a crime punishable by death.949 As Mary Harper writes, AS ‘usuallymarch straight back’ into towns previously occupied by AMISOM (or the Somali army), ‘killing thosethey accuse of acting as informants for the enemy’.950 Amongst others, it has been reported that AS
has executed alleged informants for international forces ‘in connection with air strikes against thegroup's fighters’.951
As in previous years, AS ‘continued its practice of conducting public executions’ of individuals whom
it suspected of spying for foreign powers.952 Most recently, in late June 2021, a pro-AS media source
reported that the group reportedly executed 16 people after accusing them of spying for foreign
government entities, including the US intelligence agencies CIA and FBI and the United Kingdom’s MI6.
These executions reportedly took place in southern and southwestern Somalia, including in the AS
towns of Jilib (Middle Jubba region) and Bula Fulay (Bay region).953 These executions came shortly
after the Puntland authorities executed 21 alleged AS members.954
In March 2021, Anadolu Agency (AA) reported that five civilians were publicly executed in the town of
Jilib in Middle Jubba region after being convicted by an AS court of spying, including for US
intelligence.955
Regarding the reported execution of 17 people mentioned above, it was mentioned that theaccusation also included spying for the international forces.956 In January 2020, local media reported
about the executions two men in the town of Kamsuma (Lower Jubba region) who had been convicted
943 UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, S/2020/949, 28 September 2020, url, para. 134; for specificincidents, see, for example: Somali Memo, Al-Shabab execute six for 'spying for US, Kenya and Somalia', 31 March 2020;
Hiiraan Online, Al-Shabab publicly 'executes' three in central Somalia, 4 January 2020
944 AA, Somalia: Al-Shabaab executes 5 people for spying, 2 March 2021, url
945 Shabelle Media Network, Al-Shabab executes 4 alleged spies, 5 September 2020, available at: url
946 Ingiriis M. H., Insurgency and international extraversion in Somalia: the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA)
and Al-Shabaab's Amniyat, 2020, url, p. 129
947 Shabelle Media Network, Somalia: Al-Shabaab Publicly Executes 4 in Somalia for Alleged Spying, 23 August 2020, available
at: url
948 EASO, Somalia: Actors, July 2021, url, section: 4.2.2 Amniyat
949 Harper, M., Everything You Have Told Me Is True: The Many Faces of Al-Shabaab, 2019, p. 109
950 Harper, M., Everything You Have Told Me is True: The Many Faces of Al-Shabaab, 2019, pp. 33-34
951 Radio Al-Furqaan, Somali militants 'execute' three men accused of spying for US, 28 April 2020
952 USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report 2020 - Somalia, 12 May 2021, url, p. 6
953 Calamada, Al-Shabab kills ten accused of 'spying' in southern Somalia, 28 June 2021
954 BBC News, Somalia's Puntland region executes 21 al-Shabab fighters, 27 June 2021, url
955 AA, Somalia: Al-Shabaab executes 5 people for spying, 2 March 2021, url
956 UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, S/2020/949, 28 September 2020, url, para. 134

93

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

by an AS court of collaborating with foreign forces. One of the men was accused of being a memberof the US-trained Bankroft militia, while the other allegedly collaborated with the Kenyan military.957
In April 2020, AS executed three men accused of spying on behalf of the US Africa Command in El Buur
district of Galgadud region.958
In March 2020, a pro-AS media source reported that the organisation had publicly executed six people
in the town of Buale (Middle Jubba region) on allegations of espionage, amongst others for the US and
Kenya.959 Likewise, in September 2020, also in Middle Jubba, AS announced that it had executed two
men in their fifties for alleged collaboration with US and Kenyan intelligence agencies.960
There have also been reports that AS has executed some of its own members for alleged espionage
for foreign countries. In April 2020, in Galgadud region’s El Buur district (described at the time as oneof the group’s main strongholds in the region), AS publicly executed three of its members it accusedof spying for Western intelligence agencies.961 Similarly, in August 2020, the group publicly executed
three of its members for alleged espionage in Gedo region, including on behalf of US and Ethiopian
intelligence agencies.962
Individuals perceived to be spying for FMS regional forces or administrations
Local media reported that several people were executed for allegedly spying for FMS
administrations.963 In September 2020, local media reported that in Hiiraan region, which is part of
Hirshabelle state, AS executed a soldier who was serving in the Hirshabelle army and a man accusedof spying on behalf of Hirshabelle regional intelligence. These executions reportedly took place intown of Buq Aqable, which at that time of reporting was described as an AS stronghold within
Hirshabelle FMS.964
During the first half of 2020, in the Lower Jubba region, sources associated with AS reported that thegroup publicly executed two men it accused of spying for South-West State and a man suspected ofspying for the Jubbaland administration965 as well as an alleged member of the Jubbaland regional
forces966.

957 Somali Memo, Somalia's al-Shabab kills three 'soldiers' in public, 26 January 2020; see also Dalsan Radio, Alshabaab

Executes 3 On Spying Claims, 27 January 2020
958 Radio Al-Furqaan, Somali militants 'execute' three men accused of spying for US, 28 April 2020; El-Buur is under AS control,
see EASO, Somalia: Actors, July 2021, url, section 7.5.1 Relevant dynamics, territorial control, and governance (see also
Norway, Landinfo, Respons, Somalia: Det generelle voldsbildet og al-Shabaabs aktivitet i ulike deler av landet, 3 June 2021,
url, p. 8 for district capitals held by al-Shabaab)
959 Somali Memo, Al-Shabab execute six for 'spying for US, Kenya and Somalia', 31 March 2020
960 Shabelle Media Network, Al-Shabab executes 4 alleged spies, 5 September 2020, available at: url
961 VOA, Somalia’s al-Shabab Publicly Executes 3 for Spying, 29 April 2020, url
962 Shabelle Media Network, Somalia: Al-Shabaab Publicly Executes 4 in Somalia for Alleged Spying, 23 August 2020, url
963 Garowe Online, Al-Shabab says it executes spy agent and soldier in Somalia, 26 September 2020, url; see also FTL, AlShabaab Execute Two Men for Spying for HirShabelle Administration, 26 September 2020, url
964 Garowe Online, Al-Shabab says it executes spy agent and soldier in Somalia, 26 September 2020, url; see also FTL, AlShabaab Execute Two Men for Spying for HirShabelle Administration, 26 September 2020, url
965 Radio Al-Furqaan, Al-Shabab executes six for 'spying for Somalia', 15 April 2020. Al-Furqaan is described as “Al-Shabaab
owned” by Dalsan Radio, Somalia: Airstrike Destroys Al-Shabaab Radio Station in Lower Shabelle Region, 2 January 2021, url;
see also Small Wars Journal, Al-Shabaab: Information Operations Strategy Overview, 29 August 2019, url
966 Somali Memo, Somalia's al-Shabab kills three 'soldiers' in public, 26 January 2020; see also Dalsan Radio, Alshabaab
Executes 3 On Spying Claims, 27 January 202094

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

6.4 Treatment of other individuals opposing or perceived as
opposing Al-Shabaab
Please note that the reported incidents below are not exhaustive.967
Humanitarian workers
AS has carried out attacks on employees of humanitarian NGOs and United Nations agencies as wellas individual activists, clan elders, community leaders, and their families. The group ‘committed
religiously and politically motivated killings’ and justified attacks on civilians by labelling the targets as
false prophets, enemies of Allah, or aligned with AS’ enemies. 968
According to the United Nations, AS ‘continues to threaten and directly target humanitarian workers
when their community support activities are not acceptable to the group’.969 Moreover, it has also
been noted that agents of AS’s Amniyat ‘consider the international agencies and their local Somali
partners as ‘“spy-friendly”’ and that they have ‘specifically suspected international NGOs operating intheir areas of conducting the intelligence gathering that helped track down one of its principal
leaders’.970
During the year 2020, the United Nations recorded 56 incidents involving ‘violence against
humanitarian workers, assets and facilities’. The majority of those incidents occurred in Benadir
region/Mogadishu (10), South-West State (13) and Jubbaland (11). ‘Overall, 15 aid workers were
killed, 12 were injured, 24 abducted and 14 were temporarily detained. [...] Incidents involving thekilling and abduction of humanitarian personnel were mostly concentrated in Hirshabelle (16),Southwest State (12) and Jubaland (7).’ The report notes that all but one cases of abductions were
attributed to Al Shabab, however it does not identify the numbers of killed and injured attributed toAS.971Amongst others, in May 2020, AS claimed responsibility for killing a local women’s leader and NGO
worker in a targeted IED attack in the town of Dinsor in Bay region. It was reported that ‘the victim,
who worked closely with the Dinsor district council, 50 per cent of which is constituted by women,
had previously received death threats from Al-Shabaab to force her to abandon her advocacy insupport of women.’972 In another incident that also occurred in May 2020 (in which AS denied any
involvement), ‘seven medical staff from an NGO-supported maternal and child health centre and alocal pharmacist were abducted and killed by five armed men in Gololey, Middle Shabelle’ (Hirshabelle
FMS).973 In July 2020, ‘a World Health Organization contractor was injured in a hand grenade attack at
a restaurant [...] in Kismaayo’.974 In December 2020, a pro-AS media source reported that AS hadclaimed that it carried out an attack in which a logistical officer working for the United Nations was
killed in one of the districts in Banaadir Region [Mogadishu]’.975
Besides attacks, AS reportedly carried out abductions of humanitarian workers ‘to exert its control
over outreach programmes and extort money from humanitarian organizations’. In kidnapping casesthat were documented in the countryside of Lower Jubba, Bay and Gedo regions in 2020, victims later

967 Incidents of targeting of AS opponents are periodically reported by Sahan, The Somali Wire, Issues Jan-June 2021, n.d.,source requiring registration
968 USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 13
969 UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, S/2020/949, 28 September 2020, url, para. 137
970 Ingiriis M. H., Insurgency and international extraversion in Somalia: the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA)
and Al-Shabaab's Amniyat, 2020, url, p. 136
971 UNOCHA, Somalia; 2020 Humanitarian Access Overview, April 2021, url, p. 2; compare numbers in UNSG, Situation in
Somalia, S/2021/154, 17 February 2021, url, para. 58
972 UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, S/2020/949, 28 September 2020, url, para. 127
973 UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, S/2020/949, 28 September 2020, url, para. 128-129
974 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2020/798, 13 August 2020, url, para. 23
975 Somali Memo, Al-Shabab claims killing UN 'officer' in Somali capital, 24 December 202095

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

reported to the United Nations that they were brought before an AS court where they were required
to give personal details and information about the activities of their organisation. Members of AS
subsequently demanded ransom payments (between 500 and 14 000 USD per person) to be made in
exchange for the abductee’s release. Negotiations then usually took place between AS andrepresentatives of the abducted person’s community.976
UNOCHA reported that all 24 humanitarian workers abducted in 2020 were Somali nationals and that‘with the exception of the abduction and murder of the 7 health personnel in Hirshabelle, all of theother abductions verified [...] were attributed to Al Shabab‘, adding that all but one abductee ‘werereleased following engagement by community or clan leaders and families’.977
According to humanitarian groups quoted by the US government, ‘al-Shabaab continued to harass
secular and faith-based humanitarian aid organizations, threatening the lives of their personnel andaccusing them of seeking to convert individuals to Christianity.’978
Lawyers
According to DefendDefenders, a Uganda-based NGO, lawyers in Somaliland ‘face a number ofsignificant challenges’, including ‘societal attitudes, political interferences, and a limited space that is
in part due to Somaliland’s use of three different, co-existing, and often overlapping justice systems.’
Meanwhile, in South Central Somalia, lawyers face, ‘first and foremost, security challenges’, asmembers of AS conduct attacks against state institutions and practices that are viewed by the groupas ‘un-Islamic’. The source states that ‘lawyers are mostly restricted to cities, and they do not haveaccess to large parts of Somalia’s territory, which are under the control of Al-Shabaab’.979
Electoral delegates
AS has targeted electoral delegates [elders who select members of the federal and state legislatures
on behalf of their communities in indirect elections] and their family members.980 As reported bysources associated with AS, in autumn and early winter 2020, in the Mogadishu area, AS killed
delegates who had been involved with the Federal Parliament of Somalia981 as well as theHirshabelle982, South-West State983 and Jubbaland984 legislatures. In the context of parliamentary andpresidential elections (which were originally scheduled to be held in 2020985), AS reportedly ‘issued
private warnings’ to elders who might potentially take part in the polls as delegates, with one elder
quoted as saying that in 2019, AS summoned him and other elders to a meeting where they were
granted amnesties for having taken part in elections in 2016-2017 but also told that they should not
expect forgiveness if they participated in the forthcoming elections. The International Crisis Group
states that AS, with its threats against potential delegates, appears to be taking the ‘unambiguous
position’ that participation in any election constitutes a crime against Islam, rather than seeking tomanipulate the vote in its favour (and thus acting to achieve changes within the existing politicalsystem).986

976 UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, S/2020/949, 28 September 2020, url, para. 125
977 UNOCHA, Somalia; 2020 Humanitarian Access Overview, April 2021, url, p. 2
978 USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report 2020 - Somalia, 12 May 2021, url, p. 7
979 Defend Defenders, Navigating Justice: Lawyers as Human Rights Defenders in Ethiopia and Somalia/Somaliland, December

2019, url, p. 37
980 USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 13; see also International Crisis
Group, Blunting Al-Shabaab’s Impact on Somalia’s Elections, 31 December 2020, url, p. 4
981 Calamada, Al-Shabab kills electoral delegate in Somali capital, 26 December 2020
982 Calamada, Planned Al-Shabab operations "kill" two in Somali capital, 24 November 2020
983 Somali Memo, Somali militants kill intelligence agent and poll delegate, 21 October 2020
984 Somali Memo, Al-Shabab kills electoral delegate in Somali capital, 13 October 2020
985 VOA, Somalia Leaders Agree to Hold Election Within 60 Days, 27 May 2021, 27 May 2021, url
986 International Crisis Group, Blunting Al-Shabaab’s Impact on Somalia’s Elections, 31 December 2020, url, pp. 3-4

96

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Individuals refusing to pay taxes or protection money to AS, or who defend their property
It has been reported that throughout South Central Somalia, AS ‘extorted zakat (an Islamic annualcompulsory giving of a set amount, typically 2.5 percent of one’s wealth, to benefit the poor) andsadaqa (a normally voluntary charitable contribution paid by Muslims)’ from residents.987 For more
information on AS taxation, see EASO’s COI report Somalia: Actors, published in July 2021.988 People
who did not comply with demands for zakat or donations have reportedly ‘faced credible threats ofviolence’989, with one expert noting that ‘[m]any people living in government-controlled areas pay
taxes and other fees to As Shabaab as well as to the local authorities, terrified of the consequences of
not doing so’.990 According to the Hiraal Institute, ‘individuals refusing to pay AS are forced to shut
down their business, change their contact information, or flee the country’.991 There have been
allegations that AS tortured local residents for offences including failure to pay taxes.992 The Hiraal
Institute reported that ‘[i]n extreme cases, when the taxpayers blatantly refuse to pay what AS decides
is owed to it, it carries out targeted killings’. The same source notes that there are even somegovernment officials who give part of their salary to AS to avoid being targeted by the group.993
In September 2020, media reported that 30 people died in clashes between AS and villagers in
Shabeelow village in Mudug region (Galmudug FMS) as villagers chose to fight the militants to defend
their livestock animals after facing what a local elder called ‘brutality’ and intimidation from AS
members who had been pressuring residents in Shabeelow to force them to hand over their arms andlivestock.994 AS claimed responsibility for attacking the village, describing it as a ‘military base’, a claim
residents denied.995
AS’s system of tax collection has also been spreading into government-controlled Mogadishu in recent
years.996 In 2019 it was reported that a hotel owner who ‘openly expressed his views against paying’taxes to the group suffered bombings or attacks on his hotel ‘every year since 2013’.997

7. Journalists
General situation
The Somali Journalists Syndicate (SJS) describes Somalia as ‘one of the most dangerous countries topractice journalism globally’ while Amnesty International (AI) refers to the working environment forjournalists in Somalia as ‘increasingly repressive’.998 Sources mention state and federal government

987 USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report 2020 - Somalia, 12 May 2021, url, p. 6
988 EASO, Somalia: Actors, July 2021, url, section: 4.3.2 Taxation
989 USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report 2020 - Somalia, 12 May 2021, url, p. 6
990 Harper, M., Everything You Have Told Me is True: The Many Faces of Al-Shabaab, 2019, p. 33
991 Hiraal Institute, A Losing Game: Countering Al-Shabab’s Financial System, October 2020, url , p. 6
992 USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 5
993 Hiraal Institute, A Losing Game: Countering Al-Shabab’s Financial System, October 2020, url, p. 6
994 DPA, At least 30 dead after locals fight off al-Shabaab in Somalia, 5 September 2020, url
995 VOA, At Least 10 Killed in Somalia After Fighting Between Al-Shabab, Residents, 12 August 2020, url
996 Hiraal Institute, A Losing Game, Countering Al-Shabaab Financial System, October 2020, url, pp. 2, 5; UN Security Council,

Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, S/2020/949, 28 September 2020, url, para. 11-13; see also EASO, Somalia: Actors,
July 2021, url, section: 4.3.2 Taxation
997 Washington Post, ‘If I don’t pay, they kill me’: Al-Shabab tightens grip on Somalia with growing tax racket, 30 August 2019,url
998 SJS, State of Press Freedom in Somalia in 2020, 3 February 2021, url, p. 2; AI, East and Southern Africa: Media freedoms
curtailed as COVID-19 regional crises expose urgent need for access to information, 3 May 2021, url

97Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

authorities999 as well as Al-Shabaab militants1000 as potential sources of threats and attacks. Private
individuals are also mentioned as perpetrators of verbal or physical violence.1001 The types of violence
reportedly carried out against journalists in the reporting period ranged from harassment andintimidation, arbitrary arrest and detention to physical attacks and killings.1002
Various reports indicate harassment and intimidation of journalists to be prevalent in Somalia.1003 The
National Union of Somali Journalists (NUSOJ) recorded 113 cases of intimidation against journalist
across Somalia in 2020, such as threats in order to silence reporting. 81 % of these cases werereportedly carried out by individuals (such as politicians) who wield power over the security forces.1004
Security forces, Al-Shabaab and other actors used intimidation and harassment in order to silence
journalists and push them to self-censor.1005 This environment characterised by fear as well as vague
criminal provisions concerning the dissemination of information have pushed some journalists not topublish their reporting,1006 others have used pseudonyms in order to protect their identity1007.
Moreover, at least 71 government-influenced layoffs of journalists were reported between May 2020
and May 2021.1008 In some cases, media houses were shut down by authorities and journalists wereordered to leave, either without any reason being given or for having failed to broadcast content
desired by the government.1009 In other cases, journalists were fired from government-funded media
because they had publicly voiced criticism of the government.1010 Among the issues that incurred
government reprisals such as arrests were journalists not reporting on political events in a way
deemed favourable by the authorities, posting criticism of security forces on social media or trying tocover anti-government rallies or opposition events.1011 Al-Shabaab threatened with death or evenkilled journalists reporting critically on the group and its activities.1012
In his quarterly reports on the situation in Somalia, the UN Secretary-General frequently mentioned
arrests and detentions of journalists taking place in South-Central Somalia, Puntland as well as
Somaliland. Over the course of six reports, together covering the period of 5 November 2019 until
7 May 2021, 65 cases of arrests of journalists were documented (12 of which in Puntland and 16 of
999 SJS, State of Press Freedom in Somalia in 2020, 3 February 2021, url, p. 2; UN Human Rights Council, Situation of Human

Rights in Somalia, 24 August 2020, url, para. 43; FESOJ, Murders, Physical Assaults & Online Harassment: Silencing Journalism
in Somalia, 3 May 2021, url, p. 1; AI, East and Southern Africa: Media freedoms curtailed as COVID-19 regional crises expose
urgent need for access to information, 3 May 2021, url
1000 SJS, State of Press Freedom in Somalia in 2020, 3 February 2021, url, p. 2; UN Human Rights Council, Situation of Human
Rights in Somalia, 24 August 2020, url, para. 43
1001 SJS, State of Press Freedom in Somalia in 2020, 3 February 2021, url, p. 2; Norway, Landinfo, Somalia: Media og
journalistikk [Somalia: Media and Journalism], 13 April 2018, url, p.14
1002 UN Human Rights Council, Situation of Human Rights in Somalia, 24 August 2020, url, para. 43; AI, East and Southern
Africa: Media freedoms curtailed as COVID-19 regional crises expose urgent need for access to information, 3 May 2021, url;
FESOJ, Murders, Physical Assaults & Online Harassment: Silencing Journalism in Somalia, 3 May 2021, url, p.3
1003 UN Human Rights Council, Situation of Human Rights in Somalia, 24 August 2020, url, para. 43; SJS, State of Press Freedom
in Somalia in 2020, 3 February 2021, url, p. 1; NUSOJ, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Journalists in Peril in Somalia, 3 May
2021, url, p. 12; FESOJ, Murders, Physical Assaults & Online Harassment: Silencing Journalism in Somalia, 3 May 2021, url, p.
11004 NUSOJ, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Journalists in Peril in Somalia, 3 May 2021, url, pp. 12-13
1005 UN Human Rights Council, Compilation on Somalia, 26 February 2021, url, para. 37; see also SJS, State of Press Freedom
in Somalia in 2020, 3 February 2021, url, p. 21006 CPJ, Journalists harassed, arrested throughout Somalia, 27 April 2021, url; HRW, Joint Letter Re: Concerns andRecommendations on Somalia’s New Media Law, 5 October 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/10/05/joint-letter-reconcerns-and-recommendations-somalias-new-media-law, accessed 12 August 2021
1007 Norway, Landinfo, Somalia: Media og journalistikk [Somalia: Media and Journalism], 13 April 2018, url, pp.13-14
1008 FESOJ, Murders, Physical Assaults & Online Harassment: Silencing Journalism in Somalia, 3 May 2021, url, p.1
1009 SJS, State of Press Freedom in Somalia in 2020, 3 February 2021, url, pp. 20-21
1010 AI, "We live in perpetual fear": Violations and Abuses of Freedom of Expression in Somalia [AFR 52/1442/2020], 13
February 2020, url, p. 40
1011 CPJ, Journalists harassed, arrested throughout Somalia, 27 April 2021, url; see also AI, "We live in perpetual fear":
Violations and Abuses of Freedom of Expression in Somalia [AFR 52/1442/2020], 13 February 2020, url, p. 71012 AI, Facebook: Friend or foe to Somalia’s press freedom, 3 May 2020, url; CPJ, Jamal Farah Adan, n.d., url

98Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

which in Somaliland.1013 In its annual report, SJS chronologically lists all recorded cases of arrests ofjournalists across the country throughout the year 2020, which totalled 41 cases affecting 56 media
personnel. In most of the recorded cases, the journalists were released without charge, either on thesame day or the next, in Somaliland longer detention periods of up to twelve days were reported.1014
However, the Federation of Somali Journalists (FESOJ) noted with concern that the duration ofarbitrary detention of journalists is becoming lengthier.1015 Cases that involved notably longer
detention periods as well as convictions are described in further detail below. The judiciary reportedly
played a key role in violations of rights of journalists, convicting journalists in 99 % of cases based on
bogus charges and authorising the detention of journalists following complaints made by people inpower.1016 Moreover, despite the competence of civilian courts, journalists are often subjected tomilitary tribunals.1017
For 2020, ACLED lists three incidents in which journalists were injured, including the abduction of areporter by Al-Shabaab, as well as two incidents in which respectively one journalist was shot andinjured by a government soldier.1018 For the same period, SJS mentions a number of four injured
journalists.1019 ACLED recorded three incidents of government police or security forces attacking or
assaulting several journalists between January and the end of June 2021.1020
In the 2020 Global Impunity Index released by the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), Somalia isranked first as country with the most cases of journalists killed and no perpetrators held to account(26 unsolved cases since 1992).1021 In the first half of 2021, one killing of a journalist was reported.1022
Two journalists were killed in 20201023, for the year 2019 three killings of journalists were
documented.1024
Journalists frequently faced charges under the Somali Penal Code throughout the year 2020.1025 The
Penal Code of 1962 is applicable across Somalia.1026 The majority of charges brought forth againstjournalists were ‘spreading false news’, a charge punishable with imprisonment of up to six months
under the Penal Code.1027 In May 2020, Somalia’s president Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed ‘Farmaajo’
announced that he would take charge of reforming the Penal Code to end the criminalisation of1013 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2021/485, 19 May 2021, url, para. 48, 53; UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2021/154, 17

February 2021, url, para. 46; UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2020/1113, 13 November 2020, url, para. 40; UNSG, Situation in
Somalia, S/2020/798, 13 August 2020, url, para. 50; UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2020/398, 13 May 2020, url, para. 46;
UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2020/121, 13 February 2020, url, para. 50
1014 SJS, State of Press Freedom in Somalia in 2020, 3 February 2021, url, pp. 2; 7-18
1015 FESOJ, Murders, Physical Assaults & Online Harassment: Silencing Journalism in Somalia, 3 May 2021, url, p.3
1016 NUSOJ, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Journalists in Peril in Somalia, 3 May 2021, url, pp. 12-13
1017 FESOJ, Murders, Physical Assaults & Online Harassment: Silencing Journalism in Somalia, 3 May 2021, url, p.3; see also
RSF, Somalia, Need to end the bloodshed, n.d., url; CPJ, Somalia military court sentences journalist Kilwe Adan Farah toprison, 4 March 2021, url
1018 ACLED, Somalia, SOM30570; SOM31460; SOM32129, as of 30 June 2021, url
1019 SJS, State of Press Freedom in Somalia in 2020, 3 February 2021, url, pp. 5-61020 ACLED, Somalia, SOM33270; SOM33733; SOM33853, as of 30 June 2021, url
1021 CPJ, Getting Away with Murder, 28 October 2020, url; see also NUSOJ, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Journalists in
Peril in Somalia, 3 May 2021, url, pp. 16-17
1022 CPJ, Jamal Farah Adan, n.d., url; MAP, MAP vehemently condemns the murder of veteran Journalists Jamal Farah Adan,
2 March 2021, url; UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 19 May 2021, url, para. 48; ACLED, Somalia, SOM33354, as of 30 June 2021,
url
1023 SJS, State of Press Freedom in Somalia in 2020, 3 February 2021, url, p. 2; NUSOJ, Between a Rock and a Hard Place:
Journalists in Peril in Somalia, 3 May 2021, url, p. 6; ACLED Somalia, SOM30510; SOM31093, as of 30 June 2021, url
1024 UNESCO, UNESCO observatory of killed journalists – Somalia, n.d., url
1025 HRW, World Report 2021 - Somalia, 13 January 2021, url; AI, Somalia 2020, 7 April 2021, url
1026 Somalia, Legislative Decree No. 5 of 16 December 1962: Penal Code, 16 December 1962, available at: url and url;
Somalilandlaw.com, Somaliland Criminal Laws, Penal Code & other Special Criminal Laws, last updated September 2020, url;
Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment of Children: Corporal punishment of children in Somalia, last updated March
2021, url
1027 UN Human Rights Council, Situation of Human Rights in Somalia, 24 August 2020, url, para. 43

99

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

journalistic activities, however prosecutions of journalists under the ‘overly broad and outdated’1028
Somali penal code continued.1029 In August 2020, amendments to the 2016 Federal Media Law wereapproved by Somalia’s president.1030 The amended law, while containing provisions on the right tofreedom of expression, still criminalises the reporting on many issues.1031 The law prohibits thereporting on issues conflicting with ‘national interest’, ‘false information’, ‘incitement to violence andclannism’ and ‘dissemination of propaganda’ and contains penalties that are vaguely worded and canbe widely interpreted or abused.1032
The amendments to the federal media law have been repeatedly cited as ineffective in protecting
journalists and their work.1033 In general, assaults against journalists are described as challenging toreport to the police, as it is often the security forces themselves that exert violence against andpressure on journalists. In this respect, the offenders are often drawn from the same system
responsible for investigating the incidents. According to the National Union of Somali Journalists(NUSOJ), the security personnel’s attitude towards journalists also suggests a high level of trust in thepolitical authorities’ and political leadership’s approval of such abusive behaviour.1034 In a February2020 report, AI explained that apart from the general violence journalists are confronted with, female
journalists are exposed to additional risks such as gender-based violence and face social and cultural
restrictions. Several female journalists interviewed for the report said that ‘they no longer go to coverattack scenes because they fear being targeted for being women’.1035
South-Central Somalia
NUSOJ in its May 2021 report on media freedom describes the southern regions of Somalia as
particularly dangerous for journalists, with danger emanating from state actors and non-state actors
alike.1036
In May 2021, two police officers attacked a female reporter covering a protest in Mogadishu, pushing
her to the ground and uttering death threats.1037
In January 2021, police in South-West State raided the office of Radio Barawe, detained a journalist
and ordered the station to close after a programme critical of government services had aired.1038
In October 2020, a radio journalist was arbitrarily detained and held incommunicado for five days by
the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) in Mogadishu after interviewing a businessman
critical of the government. He was subsequently released on condition of withdrawing theinterview.1039

1028 AI, Somalia: Authorities must end arbitrary arrests and persecution of journalists in Puntland, 9 March 2021, url
1029 AI, Somalia 2020, 7 April 2021, url; UN Human Rights Council, Situation of Human Rights in Somalia, 24 August 2020, url,para. 421030 AI, Somalia 2020, 7 April 2021, url; RSF, Somalia’s new media law ignores calls for journalists to be protected, 28 August
2020, url
1031 AI, Somalia 2020, 7 April 2021, url; HRW, World Report 2021 - Somalia, 13 January 2021, url
1032 AI et al., Re: Concerns and recommendations on Somalia's new media law [AFR 52/3164/2020], 5 October 2020, url
1033 IFJ, Somalia: New Media Law fails to comply with international standards on press freedom, 26 august 2020, url; RSF,
Somalia’s new media law ignores calls for journalists to be protected, 28 August 2020, url
1034 NUSOJ, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Journalists in Peril in Somalia, 3 May 2021, url, p. 131035 AI, "We live in perpetual fear": Violations and Abuses of Freedom of Expression in Somalia [AFR 52/1442/2020], 13
February 2020, url, p. 131036 NUSOJ, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Journalists in Peril in Somalia, 3 May 2021, url, p. 51037 CPJ, Police officers assault, threaten journalist Fardowso Mohamud Sahal in Somalia, 26 May 2021, url; see also SJS,
Police and NISA officers attack journalists covering protest, beat female reporter and confiscate equipment in Mogadishu,
16 May 2021, url
1038 SJS, South West State police raid Radio Barawe and detain its journalist, 5 January 2021, url
1039 SOMA, Radio Kulmiye journalist held incommunicado for five days freed, 22 October 2020, url; see also USDOS, 2020
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 9

100

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

In May 2020, a journalist on a Covid-19 assignment in Mogadishu was physically assaulted by a police
officer.1040
On 4 May 2020, TV journalist Saif Yusuf Ali was stabbed to death on a street in Mogadishu andaccording to his family no investigation was launched into the killing.1041 According to AI, the attackers
were suspected to be Al-Shabaab militants and the Independent Expert on the situation of humanrights in Somalia reported that he might have been targeted for his coverage of political issues.1042
In April 2020, Abdiaziz Ahmed Gurbiye of Goobjoog Media Group was arrested by Somali police for a
critical comment he posted concerning the president on social media.1043 While first released on bail,he was sentenced to a jail term of six months in July 2020, but was freed on the same day after paying
a fine.1044
A notable case of arrest occurred in March 2020, when Mohamed Abdiwahab Nuur of Radio Hiigsi wasarrested shortly following a first arbitrary arrest a week prior, was held incommunicado and about
three months later appeared before a military court.1045 He was then transferred to Mogadishu Central
Prison, where he stayed another two months before being finally acquitted of all charges by the
military court. According to his family he was detained for criticising the conduct of security forces in
Mogadishu.1046
In an incident in March 2020, ‘soldiers of the Somali National Army allegedly assaulted a radio
journalist in Hodan district and confiscated his equipment’.1047
On 16 February journalist Abdiwali Ali Hassan was shot by unidentified gunmen near his home in
Afgoye.1048 He had reportedly received threats previously.1049 While the UN reported an investigation
being launched1050, according to his wife no investigation took place.1051
PuntlandPuntland’s Media Law was amended in 2016, strengthening the protection for media freedom, limiting
censorship, and granting the Media Council the power to accredit journalists (previously a function of
the Ministry of Information).1052 In 2019, Puntland’s Information Minister again ordered all journalists
and all independent media to register with the ministry. The order was condemned as another act ofharassment against journalists and severe infringement of freedom of expression.1053

1040 SJS, Somali police officer assaults TV journalist during Covid-19 assignment in Mogadishu, 21 May 2020, url
1041 SJS, State of Press Freedom in Somalia in 2020, 3 February 2021, url, p. 41042 AI, Somalia 2020, 7 April 2021, url; UN Human Rights Council, Situation of Human Rights in Somalia, 24 August 2020, url,para. 441043 ARTICLE 19, Somalia: End politically motivated attacks on journalists, and dangerous internet shut-downs, 30 July 2020,
url; SJS, State of Press Freedom in Somalia in 2020, 3 February 2021 url, p. 101044 SJS, State of Press Freedom in Somalia in 2020, 3 February 2021 url, p. 10; see also Somalia 2020, 7 April 2021, url
1045 AI, Somalia 2020, 7 April 2021, url; ARTICLE 19, Somalia: End politically motivated attacks on journalists, and dangerous
internet shut-downs, 30 July 2020, url
1046 AI, Somalia 2020, 7 April 2021, url
1047 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2021/485, 19 May 2021, url, para.48
1048 CPJ, Abdiwali Ali Hassan, n.d., url; SJS, State of Press Freedom in Somalia in 2020, 3 February 2021, url, p. 41049 UN Human Rights Council, Situation of Human Rights in Somalia, 24 August 2020, url, para. 44; CPJ, Abdiwali Ali Hassan,n.d., url
1050 UN Human Rights Council, Situation of Human Rights in Somalia, 24 August 2020, url, para. 44
1051 Horn Observer, Hopes dashed for families of murdered Somali journalists, 9 July 2020, url
1052 UNSOM, The precarious enjoyment of freedom of expression in Somalia, September 2018, url, para. 28; MAP, Puntland:Media law reform – Parliament approves bill to repeal the ‘’Draconian Provisions’’ in the Puntland Media Law, 12 December
2016, url
1053 Shabelle Media Network, Somalia: Puntland Imposes Severely Restrictive Directive On Journalists and Media Houses, 23
September 2019, available at: url; MAP, Puntland: MAP calls out the Puntland’s Minister of Information for violating theMedia Law, 23 September 2019, url; see also USDOS, 2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 11 March
2020, url, p. 16

101

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Amnesty International (AI) in March 2021 reported an increasing ‘crackdown’ on media freedom in
Puntland ahead of presidential and parliamentary elections, listing intimidation, harassment andarbitrary arrests as means to silence reporting. Since the beginning of the year 2021, AI registered four
arbitrary arrests of journalists in Garowe and Bosaso.1054 According to NUSOJ, courts in Puntland
showed a lack of willingness to investigate cases brought before them and instead made hasty
judgements based on unsubstantiated grounds with frequent convictions in cases involving
journalists.1055
Several sources reported the killing of a journalist by unidentified armed men in Galkayo on 1 March
2021.1056 According to CPJ, the journalist had previously received threats from Al-Shabaab and thegroup claimed responsibility for the killing.1057
In March 2021, a female journalist was detained by police after criticising the Puntland police for theirhandling of rape cases in Garowe and was released on the same day without being charged.1058
A widely reported case was that of freelance journalist Kilwe Adan Farah, who was arrested in
December 2020 and subsequently detained after covering protests in Garowe.1059 In March 2021, he
was sentenced twice by a military court, first to three months in jail1060, then to three years.1061 During
the trials no evidence was brought forth against Kilwe, after being sentenced he received a pardon by
Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni on 22 March 2021 and was released after having spent 84 daysin detention.1062
Somaliland
The primary law regulating the media in Somaliland is the 2004 Press Law (Law No. 27/2004).1063 In
2018, it was reported that amendments to the law were being prepared with the support of a steeringcommittee including key media and human rights actors.1064 As of July 2021, the much anticipatedmodifications, expected to decriminalise many media-related offenses, remained in draft.1065 BBCNews reported in May 2021 that the government of Somaliland has increasingly adopted a toughstance towards the media, harassing and arresting journalists and closing media houses.1066
According to NUSOJ, courts in Somaliland showed a lack of willingness to investigate cases brought
before them and instead made hasty judgements based on unsubstantiated grounds with frequentconvictions in cases involving journalists.1067 USDOS reported ‘widespread interference in the judicial
process’ and noted that government officials frequently intervened in order to influence cases
involving journalists.1068 Journalists were sentenced to prison terms ranging from a few days to several

1054 AI, Somalia: Authorities must end arbitrary arrests and persecution of journalists in Puntland, 9 March 2021, url
1055 NUSOJ, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Journalists in Peril in Somalia, , 3 May 2021, url, p. 51056 CPJ, Jamal Farah Adan, n.d., url; MAP, MAP vehemently condemns the murder of veteran Journalists Jamal Farah Adan,

2 March 2021, url; UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 19 May 2021, url, para. 48
1057 CPJ, Jamal Farah Adan, n.d., url
1058 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, 19 May 2021, url, para. 54
1059 AI, Somalia: Authorities must end arbitrary arrests and persecution of journalists in Puntland, 9 March 2021, url; SJS,State of Press Freedom in Somalia in 2020, 3 February 2021 url , p. 191060 AI, Somalia: Authorities must end arbitrary arrests and persecution of journalists in Puntland, 9 March 2021, url
1061 NUSOJ, Puntland Frees Independent Journalist after Presidential Pardon, 22 March 2021, url
1062 SJS, Journalist Kilwe finally free after 84 days in prison on spurious allegation, 22 March 2021, url; MAP, #Puntland: MAP
celebrates the release of its member Journalist Kilwe, calls for a speedy investigation into murder of journalists’ cases, 23
March 2021, url
1063 Republic of Somaliland, Press Law, Translated by Deqa Gelle Hidig, Ali Gulaid, and Ibrahim Hashi Jama, 2004, available
at: url
1064 SOLJA, Brief on Somaliland Press Law 27/2004 Amendment Process, 15 August 2018, url
1065 United Kingdom, Foreign, Commonnwelath & Development Office, Human Rights and Democracy: 2020 Foreign,
Commonwealth & Development Office report, 8 July 2021, url
1066 BBC News, Somaliland elections: Could polls help gain recognition?, 31 May 2021, url
1067 NUSOJ, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Journalists in Peril in Somalia, 3 May 2021, url, p. 51068 USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 10

102

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

months as well as fines, with prison terms handed down in cases involving investigations into
corruption or other topics deemed sensitive by the state authorities.1069
Throughout 2020, the government of Somaliland used arbitrary detention in order to suppress certain
reporting by journalists, especially concerning topics related to unification with Somalia or disputed
territories with Puntland.1070
A notable case concerned the CEO of a television station who was detained in July 2020 and sentenced
to a prison term of five years as well as a fine of the equivalent of 200 Euros in November 2020. He
was accused of collaborating with the Somali intelligence service and other charges, however, noevidence was brought forth.1071 He was subsequently released on 10 December 2020 for unclear
reasons1072, possibly involving a presidential pardon.1073 In September 2020 a radio journalist was
detained by Somaliland police after calling for the release of the CEO on social media.1074
Please note that the actual number of incidents may be higher than the number of reported incidents.

8. LGBTIQ
Somalia, including the non-recognized Republic of Somaliland and the autonomous regional state of
Puntland, is described as a dangerous place for homosexuals.1075 However, reporting on the situationof LGBTIQ individuals was scarce due to the subject being taboo and a societal stigma preventing
LGBTIQ individuals from openly speaking about their sexual orientation or gender identity.1076 The
reporting was mostly based on a few individual cases being picked up by the media.1077
There is not one overall legal framework impacting on the situation of LGBTIQ individuals as Somalia
is characterized by legal pluralism. The administration of justice is based on three separate legal
orders: Islamic Sharia law, customary law (Somali: xeer) and state law.1078 Sharia is largely integrated
into customary law.1079 It also has a strong influence on formal justice. Somalia’s Provisional
Constitution, adopted 2012, confirms in Article 2 that Islam is the state religion and sharia is thesupreme law of the country. Article 2(3) stresses that ‘no law can be enacted that is not compliant
with the general principles and objectives of Shari’ah.’ The constitution does not, however, provide
any guidance as to how the compliance of a given law with Sharia principles is determined.1080 Given

1069 USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 171070 USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 9; The Somaliland Journalists

Association (SOLJA) in its Media Freedom Report of December 2020 chronologically lists all cases of detention of journalists
as well as closures of media houses in Somaliland during the year 2020, the report can be accessed here: SOLJA, Media
Freedom Report 2020, 10 December 2020, url
1071 RSF, Somaliland court closes TV channel, jails owner for five years, 5 November 2020, url
1072 USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 91073 UNSG, Situation in Somalia, S/2021/154, 17 February 2021, url, para. 47
1074 USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 17; SJS, Radio journalist
detained in Hargeisa, Somali Parliament officials threaten media over controversial sexual bill coverage, 15 September 2020,
url
1075 Straits Times, The worst countries in the world to be LGBT+, 2 April 2019, url; Spartacus, Gay Travel Index, 11 Mach 2020,
url
1076 USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 37; Norway, Landinfo, Somalia:
Forhold for homofile [Somalia: Conditions for Homosexuals], 16 June 2021, url, pp. 1-2
1077 Norway, Landinfo, Somalia: Forhold for homofile [Somalia: Conditions for Homosexuals], 16 June 2021, url, p. 2
1078 EAJ, The Sharia in Somalia, March 2020, url, p. 20
1079 Gundel, J., The predicament of the ‘Oday’: The role of traditional structures in security, rights, law and development in
Somalia, 2006, url, p. 91080 Somalia, Provisional Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia, 1 August 2012, url, Article 2

103

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

the continued weakness of the Somali government, Sharia courts, in particular, ‘enjoy much higher
rates of approval, trust, and perceived efficiency among Somali civilians.’1081
Somaliland, while having declared itself independent, still generally applies the Penal Code,1082 but the
courts also enforce Islamic Sharia.1083 The Puntland region has its own courts and enforces a
combination of Islamic Sharia and the Penal code while the southern region of Somalia is dominatedby Islamic courts that can impose sentences for same-sex relationships reaching from flogging to thedeath penalty.1084
For more information on the formal and informal justice systems in Somalia, please refer to section
2.3 and 3.3 of EASO’s COI report Somalia: Actors, published in July 2021.1085
State law
The Somali Penal Code, that was enacted in 1962 and entered into force in 1964, states thathomosexuality is illegal. Article 409 of the Penal Code provides that ‘whoever has carnal intercoursewith a person of the same sex shall be punished, where the act does not constitute a more serious
crime’ the penalty being ‘imprisonment from three months to three years. Where, the act committed
is an act of lust different from carnal intercourse, the punishment imposed shall be reduced by onethird.’1086 Somali legislation on homosexuality has not changed in the last couple of years. Recent
reports state that same-sex sexual contact is punishable by imprisonment for three months to three
years.1087 However, there is no information with regard to the application of criminal law in such cases.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands mentioned that it was not known whether theSomali government actively prosecuted LGBTQ people during the reporting period (2019). 1088
According to Somali state laws, discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity is notprohibited. Furthermore, there are no hate crime laws which protect LGBTQ individuals fromviolence/intimidation/discrimination.1089
Sharia law
Under Sharia, the term referring to unlawful sexual intercourse is called zina. It comprises adultery
and fornication. Islamic law regards only heterosexual relations sanctioned through marriage as
lawful. Homosexual relations are considered illegal by default. Sharia explicitly refers to liwat (usuallyconsidered the equivalent of ‘sodomy’) and sihaq (sometimes translated as ‘lesbianism’).1090 Usually
the Quranic text is interpreted as denouncing homosexuality as a sin and condemning it in thestrongest terms. .1091
Although the death penalty for homosexuality is not foreseen under Somali criminal law, a strict
interpretation of Sharia law can legitimize its use.1092 This is the case in areas under Al-Shabaab control(see below).

1081Burke, R., Somalia and legal pluralism: Advancing gender justice through rule of law programming in times of transition,

2020, pp. 193, 197, 203; ILGA World, State-Sponsored Homophobia 2020: Global Legislation Overview Update, 15 December
2020, url, p. 75; see also Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2020 Country Report – Somalia, 2020, url, pp. 16-17
1082 Sida, The Rights of LGBTI People in Somalia, November 2014, url, accessed 16 August 2021, p. 1
1083 BBC News, ‘Don’t come back, they’ll kill you for being gay’, 28 July 2020, url
1084 Sida, The Rights of LGBTI People in Somalia, November 2014, url, accessed 16 August 2021, p. 11085 EASO, Somalia: Actors, July 2021, url, pp. 26-36, pp. 51-52
1086 Somalia, Legislative Decree No. 5 of 16 December 1962: Penal Code, 16 December 1962, available at: url, Article 409
1087 USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, p. 36
1088 Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of Origin Information Report on South and Central Somalia, March
2019, url, p. 46
1089 USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, pp. 36-37
1090 ILGA World, State-Sponsored Homophobia 2020: Global Legislation Overview Update, 15 December 2020, url, p. 37
1091 Hunt, S. L. et al., Somali American Female Refugees Discuss Their Attitudes toward Homosexuality and the Gay andLesbian Community, 2018, url, p. 21092 ILGA World (International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association), State-Sponsored Homophobia 2020:
Global Legislation Overview Update, 15 December 2020, url, p. 76

104

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Areas under control of Al-Shabaab
According to the Bertelsmann Foundation, ‘Al-Shabaab has established courts in its area of control
and follows its own quite strict interpretation of [...] Shariah law. These include enforcement of strict
punishments (huduud), including amputation of limbs, stoning and executions.’1093 Al-Shabaab courts
have issued death sentences for homosexuals in the past. In early 2017, Al-Shabaab reportedly
executed two Somali men who had been accused of being gay.1094 Already in 2013, it was reported
within the (diaspora-based) Somali Gay Community that ‘18-year-old Mohamed Ali Baashi was stoned
to death for sodomy by Al-Shabaab’.1095 These cases were also reported by the International Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA).1096 Al-Shabaab’s own radio station, Radio
Andalus, reported in November 2018 that the organization had executed a young man in Hiraan
province on charges of homosexuality.1097 It was reported that men suspected of homosexuality havebeen punished by rape in addition to the death penalty. However, this information was difficult toverify. In general, the number of people convicted of homosexuality is thought to be higher; most
likely, case reporting is limited by fear.1098
Societal attitudes towards LGBTIQ individuals
The current societal attitude toward LGBTQ persons is documented by the United States Departmentof State. It reported that there ‘were no known lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex(LGBTI) organizations and no reports of events.’ The source added that there ‘remains a pervasive
social stigma against same-sex relationships’. This stigma is the main reason why LGBTIQ individuals
try to hide their sexual orientation or gender identity. Therefore, societal violence or discrimination
based on sexual orientation or gender identity is rarely reported in the public domain. ‘Anecdotal
information indicated that some families sent children they suspected of being homosexual to reform
schools in the country, but reporting on this practice largely stayed out of the public sphere.’1099
According to Hoehne, the denial of LGBTIQ rights is not just prevalent among militant Islamists and it
is not a new phenomenon. Rather, it is extremely widespread in Somali society and has been existing
for a long time. The source has encountered very strong rejection of homosexuality among numerous
ordinary people while doing fieldwork in Somaliland and Puntland already in 2003 and 2004.1100 This
rejection was also observed in interviews with LGBTIQ Somalis in the diaspora (in a master thesis
published in 2021), who said that they resorted to hiding their sexual orientation from their families
out of fear of being disowned or excluded from the family.1101 In 2020 the BBC reported on the caseof a young man from Somaliland who was threatened with death by his family for being gay and sent
to a rehabilitation centre to correct his ways. In the centre he was then drugged and subjected torape. 1102

1093 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2020 Country Report Somalia, 2020, url, p. 171094 MambaOnline, 15 and 20-year-old youths executed in Somalia for homosexuality, 11 January 2017, url; APNews, Al-

Shabab says it kills teenage boy, man over homosexuality, 10 January 2017, url; Reuters, Somali Islamists kill man andteenager for gay sex, another man for spying, 10 January 2017, url
1095 Stewart, C., Report: Somalia too risky for LGBT people, 16 February 2016, url
1096 ILGA World (International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association), State-Sponsored Homophobia 2020:
Global Legislation Overview Update, 15 December 2020, url, p. 80
1097 Finland, Finnish Immigration Service, Somalia / Seksuaali- ja sukupuolivähemmistöjen asema Somaliassa, päivitys Somalia[Status of sexual and gender minorities in Somalia, update], 24 February 2021, url, p. 31098 Finland, Finnish Immigration Service, Somalia / Seksuaali- ja sukupuolivähemmistöjen asema Somaliassa, päivitys Somalia[Status of sexual and gender minorities in Somalia, update], 24 February 2021, url, p. 31099 USDOS, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia, 30 March 2021, url, pp. 36-37; see also BC News,‘Don’t come back, they’ll kill you for being gay’, 28 July 2020, url
1100 Hoehne, M. V., telephone interview, 1 July 2021
1101 Ahmed, M., You have to choose between habaar or duco -A case study of Swedish Muslim Gay Men of Somali Origin,
2021, url, p. 37
1102 BBC News, ‘Don’t come back, they’ll kill you for being gay’, 28 July 2020, url

105

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

A diaspora-based activist group stressed already in 2012 with regard to all Somali regions, including
Somaliland and Puntland, that gay and lesbian Somalians ‘have no official recognition and live undera constant cloud of fear’. As it is impossible to live openly gay, some people live double lives. Families
tend to know or suspect if their children are homosexual, the problem usually starts when the son ordaughter admits to his/her sexuality.1103
A 2012 survey by Voice of America, a news outlet that is widely consumed in Somalia, found that 87 %of Somali interviewees agreed strongly with the statement: ‘Sharia is the foundation of Somalia andshould be applied as a civil and criminal code throughout Somalia’. Only 5 % strongly disagreed, and‘support for Sharia was strong among men and women, across age groups and geographic
location.’1104 Many Somalis consider homosexuality to be a moral sin.1105
Information on lesbian women in Somalia is scarce. A 2016 media report mentions a London-based
women’s rights activist who stated that there are many lesbian Somali women, ‘but they will nevercome out. They don’t even come out to their own families.’1106 Another source from 2016 refers to alesbian couple which had been sentenced to death by a court in Puntland in 2001. It is unclear whether
the sentence was implemented.1107

1103 GlobalGayz, Gay Life in Somaliland and Somalia, 18 February 2012, url
1104 VOA, Survey Shows Somalis Have Mostly Shared Vision for Future, 20 June 2012, url
1105 Sida, The Rights of LGBTI People in Somalia, November 2014, url, accessed 16 August 2021, p.1
1106 Independent (The), Young Somali activist sentenced to death for being a lesbian, 31 January 2016, url
1107 Stewart, C., Report: Somalia too risky for LGBT people, 16 February 2016, url

106Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Annex 1: Bibliography
Oral sources[ACCORD contacted and interviewed the oral sources below, exception made for Expert II who wasinterviewed by EASO]
Ali, A. M., telephone interview, 14 June 2021. Abdirisak Mahamoud Ali is a security expert in Bur’o.
Originally from Buhoodle he has worked for various international NGOs between 2015 and today. His
area of expertise includes conflict dynamics in the area between Buhoodle (Togdheer region) andTaleeh (Sool region).
Ashur, K. D., telephone interview, 29 June 2021. Kemal Dahir Ashur is a minority group rights activists
in the European diaspora. He is well-connected with other minority rights activists and traditional
authorities within Gabooye, but also among other Somali minority groups inside and outside ofSomalia.
Baadiyow, A. A., telephone interview, 26 June 2021. Abdurahman Abdullahi Baadiyow is a Somali civilsociety activist and scholar who has published extensively on Somalia. He holds a PhD in Islamic
Studies from McGill University (Canada).
Expert II is a leading Somali security expert, author, and scholar based in Somalia, with extensive
academic and international consulting experience. Expert II prefers to remain anonymous for safety
reasons. EASO interviewed Somali security expert II on 21 June 2021.
Geedi, A., telephone interview, 15 June 2021. Ali Geedi is from Middle Shabelle; he was Prime Ministerof Somalia 2004-2007. He was consulted on clan conflicts in Hirshabelle.
Hoehne, M. V., communication via Microsoft Teams, 25 June 2021. Dr. Markus Hoehne [Höhne] is ascholar at the Institute of Ethnology at the University of Leipzig. He has been working on Somalia since2001 and has spent several years in the country. He speaks Somali fluently.
Hoehne, M. V., communication via Teams, 17 June 2021
Hoehne, M. V., communication via Teams, 8 July 2021
Hoehne, M. V., email, 14 October 2020
Hoehne, M. V., telephone interview, 1 July 2021
Hoehne, M. V., telephone interview, 15 June 2021
Hoehne, M. V., telephone interview, 18 August 2021
Marchal, R., telephone interview, 26 June 2021. Roland Marchal is a sociologist at Sciences Po (France)
specialising in analysing civil wars in Africa.
Menkhaus, K., e-mail, 17 August 2021. Kenneth Menkhaus is a political scientist teaching at Davidson
College, North Carolina. He has extensively pulished, among others on governance and terrorism inSomalia.
Mire, M. A., email, 15 June 2021. Muse Abdirisaq Mire is a local businessman in Garowe and a former
civil society activist (in the Puntland youth organisation).
Mire, M. A., telephone interview, 11 July 2021.
Skjelderup, M., email, 1 July 2021. Michael W. Skjelderup is a PhD candidate at the Norwegian
University of Life Sciences who is specialised in Somalia, especially in conflict studies and statebuilding, with specific interest in non-state armed groups, rebel governance and civilian agency.

107

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Vitturini, E., Telephone interview, 30 June 2021. Elia Vitturini is an anthropologist with expertise on
Gabooye groups and other marginalised minorities in Somaliland.

Non-public sources
ISPI (Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale), Somalia: States and Regions (map), May 2021,
https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/somalia-states-and-regions-30387, non-public source

Written sources
28 Too Many, Somalia The Law and FGM, July 2018,https://www.28toomany.org/static/media/uploads/Law%20Reports/somalia_law_report_(july_2018).pdf, accessed 5 April 2021
28 Too Many, Somaliland The Law and FGM, July 2018,https://www.28toomany.org/static/media/uploads/Law%20Reports/somaliland_law_report_(augus
t_2018).pdf, accessed 5 April 2021
AA (Anadolu Agency), Somalia: Al-Shabaab executes 5 people for spying, 2 March 2021,
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/somalia-al-shabaab-executes-5-people-for-spying/2162149,
accessed 8 July 2021
Abbink, J., Religion and Violence in the Horn of Africa: Trajectories of Mimetic Rivalry and Escalation
between ‘Political Islam’ and the State, in: Politics, Religion & Ideology, Vol. 21.2, 2020,
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/21567689.2020.1754206?needAccess=true,
pp. 194-215, accessed 1 July 2021
Abdirahman, A., Somalia to introduce law prohibiting Female Genital Mutilation, Horseed media,
3 August 2015, https://horseedmedia.net/2015/08/03/somalia-to-introduce-law-prohibiting-femalegenital-mutilation/, accessed 5 April 2021
Abdullahi, A.M., The Islamic Movement in Somalia: A Historical Evolution with a Case Study of the
Islah Movement (1950-2000), May 2011, https://central.bac-lac.gc.ca/.item?id=TC-QMM103487&op=pdf&app=Library&oclc_number=742342437, accessed 1 July 2021
ACCORD (Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation),
Anfragebeantwortung zu Somalia: Informationen zum Clan der Tunni [Query response on Somalia:
Information on the Tunni clan], https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/1023826.html, accessed
12 August 2021
ACCORD (Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation),
Anfragebeantwortung zu Somalia: Umgang mit psychisch kranken Personen; Zugang zu Behandlung
von psychischen Erkrankungen; Umgang mit alkoholabhängigen Personen und Gefährdung [Query
response on Somalia: dealing with mentally ill persons; Access to treatment for mental illness;
Dealing with alcohol-dependent people and exposure], 19 April 2020,
https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/2050497.html, accessed 12 August 2021
ACCORD (Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation), Somalia:
Al-Schabaab und Sicherheitslage; Lage von Binnenvertriebenen und Rückkehrer·innen; Schutz durch
staatliche und nicht-staatliche Akteure; Dokumentation zum COI-Webinar mit Markus Höhne undJutta Bakonyi am 5. Mai 2021 [Documentation of a webinar on Somalia Al-Shabaab and security
situation; IDPs and returnees; state and non-state protection], 31 May 2021,
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2052555/20210531_COIWebinar+Somalia_ACCORD_Mai+2021.pdf, accessed 14 June 2021

108

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

ACCORD (Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation), Clans in
Somalia – Report on a lecture by Joakim Gundel, COI Workshop Vienna, 15 May 2009 (Revised
Edition), 15 December 2009, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1193130/90_1261130976_accordreport-clans-in-somalia-revised-edition-20091215.pdf, accessed 8 July 2021
ACCORD (Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation),
Anfragebeantwortung zu Somalia: Allgemeine Informationen zum Clan der Bajuni [Query response
on Somalia: General information on the Bajuni people], 12 July 2016,
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/1255124.html, accessed 8 July 2021
ACCORD (Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation),
Themendossier zu Somalia: Sicherheitslage [Brief compilation on the security situation in Somalia],
31 October 2018, https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/1448378.html, accessed 8 July 2021
ACCORD (Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation),
Expertenauskunft zu Somalia: Region Buhoodle: Konflikte zwischen Stämmen Hayaag und Reer
Hagar (beide Dhulbahante) im August 2019 (Autor: Markus Höhne) [a-11550] [Expert response on
Somalia: Conflicts between the Reer Hagar and the Hayaag tribe in Buhoodle, author: Markus
Hoehne], 9 April 2021, https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2049714.html, accessed 8 July 2021
ACCORD, (Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation)
Anfragebeantwortung zu Somalia: Informationen zu Zwangsheirat (Zwangsheirat zur Konfliktlösung
oder Entschädigung zwischen Clans) [a-9810] [Query response on Somalia: Information on forced
marriage (forced marriage as conflict resolution mechanism or as compensation between clans)], 19
August 2016, https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/1140330.html, accessed 12 August 2021
ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project), A Turbulent Run-up to Elections in Somalia,
7 April 2021, https://acleddata.com/2021/04/07/a-turbulent-run-up-to-elections-in-somalia/,
accessed 8 July 2021
ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project), Somalia, as of 30 June 2021,
https://acleddata.com/data-export-tool/
Adam, A. S., Benadiri People of Somalia with Particular Reference to the Reer Hamar of Mogadishu,
unpublished dissertation, School of Oriental & African Studies, 2011,
http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?did=1&uin=uk.bl.ethos.539700, accessed 8 July 2021
AFP, Five things to know about Somalia's political crisis, 30 April 2021, https://news.yahoo.com/fivethings-know-somalias-political-135656427.html, accessed 12 August 2021
Ahmed, M., You have to choose between habaar or duco -A case study of Swedish Muslim Gay Menof Somali Origin, Lund University, 2021, http://lup.lub.lu.se/studentpapers/record/9040498/file/9040499.pdf, accessed 16 August 2021
AI (Amnesty International) Amnesty International Report 2020/2021, 7 April 2021,
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/POL1032022021ENGLISH.PDF, accessed 5 April
2021
AI (Amnesty International) and CPJ (Committee to Protect Journalists) and HRW (Human Rights
Watch), Re: Concerns and recommendations on Somalia's new media law [AFR 52/3164/2020],
5 October 2020, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR5231642020ENGLISH.PDF,
accessed 11 June 2021
AI (Amnesty International), "We live in perpetual fear": Violations and Abuses of Freedom ofExpression in Somalia [AFR 52/1442/2020], 13 February 2020,
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR5214422020ENGLISH.PDF, accessed 29 June
2021

109

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

AI (Amnesty International), Amnesty International Report 2020/21, 7 April 2021,
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/POL1032022021ENGLISH.PDF, accessed 8 July2021
AI (Amnesty International), East and Southern Africa: Media freedoms curtailed as COVID-19
regional crises expose urgent need for access to information, 3 May 2021,
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/05/east-and-southern-africa-media-freedomscurtailed-as-covid19-regional-crises-expose-urgent-need-for-access-to-information/, accessed
10 June 2021
AI (Amnesty International), Facebook: Friend or foe to Somalia’s press freedom, 3 May 2020,
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/05/facebook-friend-or-foe-to-somalia-pressfreedom/, accessed 12 August 2021
AI (Amnesty International), Somalia 2020, 7 April 2021,
https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/africa/somalia/report-somalia/, accessed 10 June 2021
AI (Amnesty International), Somalia: Authorities must end arbitrary arrests and persecution ofjournalists in Puntland, 9 March 2021, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/03/somaliaauthorities-must-end-arbitrary-arrests-and-persecution-of-journalists-in-puntland/, accessed
10 June 2021
AI (Amnesty International), Somalia: Zero accountability as civilian deaths mount from US air strikes,
1 April 2020, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/04/somalia-zero-accountability-ascivilian-deaths-mount-from-us-air-strikes, accessed 14 June 2021
Al Arabiya, Five killed in suspected al-Shabaab attack in Somalia’s capital, 27 October 2020,
https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2020/10/27/Five-killed-in-suspected-al-Shabaabattack-in-Somalia-s-capital, accessed 8 July 2021
Al Jazeera, A family mourns as US drone attacks in Somalia continue, 1 April 2020,
https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2020/4/1/a-family-mourns-as-us-drone-attacks-in-somaliacontinue, accessed 14 June 2021
Al Jazeera, Gay Somali refugees face death threats: Gay, lesbian and HIV-infected refugees fear
violent persecution should they return home, 7 July 2013,https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2013/7/7/gay-somali-refugees-face-death-threats, accessed
8 July 2021
Al Jazeera, Somalia: About 5,000 Sufi fighters join army, 19 September 2019,https://www.aljazeera.com/videos/2019/9/19/somalia-about-5000-sufi-fighters-join-army, accessed
1 July 2021
Al Jazeera, Somalia: Sufi scholar, followers killed in al-Shabab attack, 26 November 2018,https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/11/26/somalia-sufi-scholar-followers-killed-in-al-shababattack, accessed 1 July 2021
AMISON (African Union Mission to Somalia), Gender Policy, 2013, https://amisom-au.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/08/EASY-TO-READ-GUIDE-GENDER-POLICY.pdf, accessed 5 April 2021
ANSA (Agenzia Nazionale Stampa Associata), Somalia: donna lapidata da Al-Shabaab [Somalia:
Woman stoned to death by al-Shabaab], 9 May 2018,https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/mondo/2018/05/09/somalia-donna-lapidata-da-alshabaab_97c07e6d-e53d-4611-ac4a-0833f531176e.html, accessed 1 July 2021
APNews, Al-Shabab says it kills teenage boy, man over homosexuality, 10 January 2017,https://apnews.com/article/4695371512e84cc59997304ec1fe3244, accessed 8 July 2021

110

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

ARTICLE 19, Somalia: End politically motivated attacks on journalists, and dangerous internet shutdowns, 30 July 2020, https://www.article19.org/resources/somalia-end-politically-motivatedattacks-on-journalists-and-dangerous-internet-shut-downs/, accessed 10 June 2021
Australia, Department of Home Affairs, Somalia: Women - separated women - divorce, 3 March
2020, https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/foi/files/2020/fa-201000234-document-released.pdf,
accessed 6 April 2021
Austria, BAA (Bundes Asyl Amt), Die Parias Somalias: Ständische Berufskasten als Basis sozialer
Diskriminierung, December 2010,https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1333632/4543_1436947943_n8-laenderinfo-somalia.pdf,
accessed 8 July 2021
Austria, BFA Staatendokumentation (Austrian Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum, COI unit),
Fact Finding Mission Report Somalia; Sicherheitslage in Somalia; Bericht zur österreichischschweizerischen FFM, August 2017,https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1406268/5209_1502195321_ffm-report-somaliasicherheitslage-onlineversion-2017-08-ke.pdf
Awdal, Borama: Shacabka hayayaabe oo cabasho kamuujiyey ciidamo laduldhigay [Borama: Hayaabe
residents complain of targeted troops], video published on Facebook, 15 June 2021,
https://www.facebook.com/awdal.awdal.33/videos/406458127819616/?sfnsn=wa, accessed
12 August 2021
Axiom, Final Report Seed II: Exploring The Agricultural Initiatives’ Influence On Stability In Somalia,
http://iati.dfid.gov.uk/iati_documents/5279913.pdf, accessed 21 July 2021
Badurdeen, F. A., Why we did it: the Kenyan women and girls who joined Al-Shabaab, 21 February
2021, https://theconversation.com/why-we-did-it-the-kenyan-women-and-girls-who-joined-alshabaab-151592, accessed 14 June 2021
Bakonyi, J., Der Alltag des Krieges. Herrschaftserfahrungen in Somalia [The war everyday:
experiencing authority in Somalia], in: Mittelweg 36, Vol. 27 (2), 2018,https://dro.dur.ac.uk/27344/1/27344.pdf?DDD35+mspq66+mspq66+d700tmt+d700tmt+d700tmt,
pp. 45-70, accessed 1 July 2021
Bakonyi, J., Land ohne Staat: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft im Krieg am Beispiel Somalias, 2011
Bangura, I., Trapped in Violence and Uncertainty: Patriarchy, Women, and the Conflict in Somalia, in:African Conflict & Peacebuilding Review, Volume 11, Number 1, Spring 2021, pp. 80-103
Barnabas Fund, Christian couple released and deported from Somaliland, 17 November 2020,
https://barnabasfund.org/news/christian-couple-released-and-deported-from-somaliland/,accessed 1 July 2021
Barnabas Fund, Somaliland Christians released after offences-against-Islam charges dismissed, 6
August 2021, https://barnabasfund.org/news/somaliland-christians-released-after-offences-againstislam-charges-dism/, accessed 12 August 2021
Barnes, C., and Hassan, H., The Rise and Fall of Mogadishu's Islamic Courts, in: Journal of Eastern
African Studies, 1:2, 2007, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17531050701452382, pp.
151-160, accessed 12 August 2021
BBC Monitoring, Civilian killed in blast targeting Somali official [sources: Radio Risala and Garowe
Online], 13 March 2021, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 8 July
2021
BBC Monitoring, Militants 'kill' Somali police officers in suicide attack, 17 November 2020, available
by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 8 July 2021

111

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

BBC News, ‘Don’t come back, they’ll kill you for being gay’, 28 July 2020,
https://www.bbc.com/news/stories-53438112, accessed 8 July 2021
BBC News, Life after al-Shabab: Driving a school bus instead of an armed pickup truck, 23 November
2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/stories-55016792, accessed 14 June 2021
BBC News, Mogadishu attack: Somali troops end deadly siege at Elite Hotel, 17 August 2020,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53798834, accessed 8 July 2021
BBC News, Somali woman 'with 11 husbands' stoned to death by al-Shabab, 9 May 2018,https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44055536, accessed 1 July 2021, accessed 8 July 2021
BBC News, Somalia al-Shabab militants attack Afrik hotel in Mogadishu, 1 February 2021,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-55879679, accessed 8 July 2021
BBC News, Somalia restaurant attack: Six killed by al-Shabab, 4 July 2020,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53289992, accessed 8 July 2021
BBC News, Somalia's al-Shabab kills man for 'insulting prophet', 24 April 2015,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32452284, accessed 1 July 2021
BBC News, Somalia's al-Shabab stones man to death for adultery, 29 May 2017,https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-40083361, accessed 1 July 2021
BBC News, Somalia's frightening network of Islamist spies, 27 May 2019,https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48390166, accessed 14 June 2021
BBC News, Somalia's Puntland region executes 21 al-Shabab fighters, 27 June 2021,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57630144, accessed 8 July 2021
BBC News, Somaliland elections: Could polls help gain recognition?, 31 May 2021,
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-57255602, accessed 10 June 2021
BBC, This is what it's like to pee after female genital mutilation, 24 April 2016,
https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-36101342, accessed 6 April 2021
Benstead, L. J. and Van Lehman, D., Two Classes of “Marriage”: Race and Sexual Slavery in AlShabaab-Controlled Somalia, in: The Journal of the Middle East and Africa, 2021,
https://doi.org/10.1080/21520844.2021.1923998, accessed 6 April 2021
Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2020 Country Report – Somalia (reporting period 1 February 2017 to
31 January 2019), 2020, https://www.btiproject.org/content/en/downloads/reports/country_report_2020_SOM.pdf, accessed 1 July 2021
Besteman, C., The invention of Gosha: Slavery, colonialism and stigma in Somali history, in: Cali
Jimale Ahmed (ed.), The Invention of Somalia, Red Sea Press, Lawrenceville, 1995
Besteman, C., The Somali Bantu in a state of refuge, Bildhaan Vol. 12, 2012,https://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1136&context=bildhaan,accessed 16 June 2021
Besteman, C., Unraveling Somalia: Race, Violence and the Legacy of Slavery, University ofPennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1999
Bonnet, C. Bryld, E., Kamau, C., Mohamud, M. and Farah, F., Inclusive shelter provision in
Mogadishu, Environment and Urbanization, Vol. 32, No. 2, October 2020, in SAGE OPEN,
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0956247820942086, accessed 6 April 2021
Botha, A. and Abdile, M., Radicalisation and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia, ISS Paper 266,
September 2014, https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper266.pdf, accessed 14 June
2021

112

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Botha, A., Reasons for joining and staying in al-Shabaab in Somalia, SIGLA (Security Institute forGovernance and Leadership in Africa, Stellenbosch University), Research Brief 5/2019,https://www.sun.ac.za/english/faculty/milscience/sigla/Documents/Navy%20News%202019/SIGLA%20Brief%205%202019.pdf, accessed 14 June 2021
Bryden, M., The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice or Necessity?, CSIS (Center for
Strategic & International Studies), February 2014, https://csis-websiteprod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/legacy_files/files/publication/140221_Bryden_ReinventionOfAlShabaab_Web.pdf, accessed
8 July 2021
BTI, Somalia Country Report 2020, 2020, https://www.bti-project.org/en/reports/country-reportSOM-2020.html#pos5, accessed 12 August 2021
Burke, R., Somalia and legal pluralism: Advancing gender justice through rule of law programming intimes of transition, in: Chicago International Law Review, 16(2), 2020, pp. 177-214
Caasimada, Daawo: Beelaha Banaadiriga oo ka digay qorshe socda oo lagu boobayo kuraastooda, 15June 1921, https://www.caasimada.net/daawo-beelaha-banaadiriga-oo-ka-digay-qorshe-socda-oolagu-boobayo-kuraastooda/, accessed 12 August 2021
Calamada, Al-Shabab claims killing prison warder in Somali capital, 18 February 2021, translated by:
BBC Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 8 July 2021
Calamada, Al-Shabab claims killing soldier outside Somali capital, 6 February 2021, translated by:
BBC Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 8 July 2021
Calamada, Al-Shabab claims killing Somali army official in Mogadishu, 8 June 2021, translated by:
BBC Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 8 July 2021
Calamada, Al-Shabab claims responsibility for bombing in Somali capital, 27 November 2020,
translated by: BBC Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed
8 July 2021
Calamada, Al-Shabab executes sorcerer in southern Somalia, 30 May 2020, translated by: BBC
Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 8 July 2021
Calamada, Al-Shabab kills electoral delegate in Somali capital, 26 December 2020, translated by: BBC
Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 8 July 2021
Calamada, Al-Shabab kills local official in central Somalia, 16 November 2020, translated by: BBC
Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 8 July 2021
Calamada, Al-Shabab 'kills' military officer in Somali capital, 19 February 2021, translated by: BBC
Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 8 July 2021
Calamada, Al-Shabab kills military official in Somali capital, 28 October 2020, translated by: BBC
Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 8 July 2021
Calamada, Al-Shabab kills ten accused of 'spying' in southern Somalia, 28 June 2021, translated by:
BBC Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 8 July 2021
Calamada, Planned Al-Shabab operations "kill" two in Somali capital, 24 November 2020, translated
by: BBC Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 8 July 2021
Calamada, Pro-government Somali MP escapes al-Shabab attack, 27 November 2020, translated by:
BBC Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 8 July 2021
Calamada, Somali militants execute four men 'for spying', 12 January 2020, translated by: BBC
Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 8 July 2021

113

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Calamada, Somali militants 'kill spy' in southern Afgoye town, 23 February 2021, translated by: BBC
Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 8 July 2021
Canada, IRB (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada), Somalia: Situation of women without asupport network in Mogadishu, including access to employment and housing; treatment by society
and authorities; support services available to female-headed households (2017-March 2019),
SOM106253.E, 25 March 2019, https://irb.gc.ca/en/countryinformation/rir/Pages/index.aspx?doc=457758&pls=1, accessed 20 August 2021
Canada, IRB (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada), Somalia: Situation of practitioners of
Sufism, including treatment by Al-Shabaab [al-Shabab], and role of Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamaa [Ahlu
Sunna Wal-Jamea, Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama'a, Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a, Ahl al-Sunnah Wal-Jamaa, Ahlu
Sunna Waljma'a] (ASWJ); availability of state protection (2016-March 2018), SOM106055.E,
27 March 2018, https://irb.gc.ca/en/country-information/rir/Pages/index.aspx?doc=457435,
accessed 1 July 2021
Canada, IRB (Immigration and Refugee Board, Canada, Research Directorate), Somalia: Informationon the Yahar sub-clan, SOM9847, 1 December 1991,
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ac3730.html, accessed 8 July 2021
Canada, IRB (Immigration and Refugee Board, Canada, Research Directorate), Somalia: The Eyle clan,
SOM29580.E, 1 June 1998, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ab211b.html, accessed 8 July 2021
Canada, IRB (Immigration and Refugee Board, Canada, Research Directorate), Somalia: Informationon the Shekal, SOM26940.E, 1 June 1997, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6abba0.html,
accessed 8 July 2021
Canada, IRB (Immigration and Refugee Board, Canada, Research Directorate), Somalia: current
information on the relationship between the Sheikhal (Shekal) and the Hawiye under the leadershipof General Aidid, SOM24408.E, 1 September 1996,
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ad122c.html, accessed 8 July 2021
Canada, IRB (Immigration and Refugee Board, Canada, Research Directorate), Somalia: The Reer
Hamar and/or Benadiri, including the location of their traditional homeland, affiliated clans and risks
they face from other clans, SOM104241.E, 3 December 2012,https://www.refworld.org/docid/51e4facb4.html, accessed 8 July 2021
Canada, IRB (Immigration and Refugee Board, Canada, Research Directorate), The Biyomal [Biimaal,
Biyomaal, Biymaal, Biyamal] clan, including work, history, religious affiliation, location within the
country, particularly Nus Dunya; the Rahanweyn [Rahanwen] clan, including location in the country;
treatment of the Biyomal clan by the Rahanwen clan, SOM105305.E, 2 October 2015,
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/1107621.html, accessed 8 July 2021
Canada, IRB (Immigration and Refugee Board, Canada, Research Directorate), The Tunni ethnic
group, including regions where its members reside; treatment by society, authorities and AlShabaab; relationship with other clans, SOM105011.E, 22 December 2014,
https://www.refworld.org/docid/551d08124.html, accessed 8 July 2021
Cassanelli, L., Speculations on the historical Origins of the ‘Total Somali Genealogy, 2010, in: Hoehne,
M. V., & Luling, V. (Eds.), Peace and Milk, Drought and War: Somali Culture, Society and Politics Essays in Honour of I.M. Lewis, pp. 53-66, Hurst & Company, London, 2010
Cassanelli, L., Victims and vulnerable groups in southern Somalia. Issue Paper, Immigration andRefugee Board of Canada, May 1995, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a8092.html, accessed
8 July 2021

114

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Center for Civilians in Conflict, The People's Perspectives: Civilian Involvement in Armed Conflict,
11 May 2015, https://civiliansinconflict.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/09/Peoples_Perspectives_Somalia.pdf, accessed 12 August 2021
CFR (Council on Foreign Relations), Al-Shabab, 19 May 2021, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/alshabab, accessed 1 July 2021
CMI (Chr. Michelsen Institute), Excluding women: the clanization of Somali political institutions, July
2020, https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/7277-excluding-women-the-clanization-of-somalipolitical-institutions.pdf, accessed 5 April 2021
CNN, Five dead in Mogadishu hotel car bomb attack, 1 February 2021,
https://edition.cnn.com/2021/02/01/africa/death-toll-somalia-hotel-attack-intl/index.html,
accessed 8 July 2021
Conversation (The), Friday essay: The Qur’an, the Bible and homosexuality in Islam, 16 June 2016,
https://theconversation.com/friday-essay-the-quran-the-bible-and-homosexuality-in-islam-61012,
accessed 21 July 2021
CPJ (Committee to Protect Journalists), Abdiwali Ali Hassan, n.d.,
https://cpj.org/data/people/abdiwali-ali-hassan/ , accessed 10 June 2021
CPJ (Committee to Protect Journalists), Getting Away with Murder, 28 October 2020,
https://cpj.org/reports/2020/10/global-impunity-index-journalist-murders/, accessed 10 June 2021
CPJ (Committee to Protect Journalists), Jamal Farah Adan, n.d., https://cpj.org/data/people/jamalfarah-adan/, accessed 10 June 2021
CPJ (Committee to Protect Journalists), Journalists harassed, arrested throughout Somalia, 27 April
2021, https://cpj.org/2021/04/journalists-harassed-arrested-throughout-somalia/, accessed 12
August 2021
CPJ (Committee to Protect Journalists), Police officers assault, threaten journalist Fardowso
Mohamud Sahal in Somalia, 26 May 2021, https://cpj.org/2021/05/police-officers-assault-threatenjournalist-fardowso-mohamud-sahal-in-somalia/, accessed 11 June 2021
CPJ (Committee to Protect Journalists), Somalia military court sentences journalist Kilwe Adan Farah
to prison, 4 March 2021, https://cpj.org/2021/03/somalia-military-court-sentences-journalist-kilweadan-farah-to-prison/, accessed 21 July 2021
DDG (Danish Demining Group), Dadaab Returnee Conflict Assessment, August 2017,https://danishdemininggroup.dk/media/3802547/dadaab-returnee-conflict-assessment-ddg2017.pdf, accessed 8 July 2021
de Brouwer, A-M., de Volder, E. and Paulussen, C., Prosecuting the Nexus between Terrorism,
Conflict-related Sexual Violence and Trafficking in Human Beings before National Legal Mechanisms,
Journal of International Criminal Justice, Volume 18, Issue 2, March 2020, available at:https://academic.oup.com/jicj/article-abstract/18/2/499/5864753?redirectedFrom=fulltext,
accessed 6 April 2021
Declich, F., Can Boundaries not Border on One Another?, in: Feyissa, D. and Hoehne, M. V. (eds.):
Borders and borderlands as Resources in the Horn of Africa, James Currey, London, 2010, pp. 169186
Defend Defenders, Navigating Justice: Lawyers as Human Rights Defenders in Ethiopia andSomalia/Somaliland, December 2019, https://defenddefenders.org/navigating-justice-lawyers-ashuman-rights-defenders-in-ethiopia-and-somalia-somaliland/, accessed 8 July 2021
Defense Post (The), Somalia Must Replace Its Military and Security Chiefs, 18 June 2021

115

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Denmark, DIS (Danish Immigration Service) and DRC (Danish Refugee Council), South and Central
Somalia Security Situation, al-Shabaab Presence, and Target Groups, January 2017,https://www.ft.dk/samling/20161/almdel/uui/bilag/140/1730460.pdf, accessed 8 July 2021
Denmark, DIS (Danish Immigration Service), Report on minority groups in Somalia, Joint British,
Danish and Dutch fact-finding mission to Nairobi, Kenya, 17 – 24 September 2000, 2000,
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1412772/470_1161683683_somalianov2000.pdf, accessed 8 July
2021
Denmark, DIS (Danish Immigration Service), Somalia: Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), February
2021, available at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2046605/COI_notat_somalia_FGM_feb.pdf,
accessed 20 August 2021
Denmark, DIS (Danish Immigration Service), South and Central Somalia - Security situation, forced
recruitment, and conditions for returnees, July 2020, https://www.nyidanmark.dk//media/Files/US/Landenotater/South-and-Central-Somalia--Security-Situation-Forced-Recruitmentand-Conditions-for-Returnees.pdf?la=da&hash=40C768AC5F2EF82AC0DD7158B3D9CFD28DBE9615,
accessed 14 June 2021
Develoment Initiatives, Towards an improved understanding of vulnerability and resilience inSomalia, June 2019, https://devinit.org/documents/66/Towards-an-improved-understanding-ofvulnerability-and-resilience-in-Somalia.pdf, accessed 8 July 2021
Dhanaane Media, Hada laan dheer tahay hadawanin video waxa Nagula gumadaayo waa inaan
jareer nahay, 23 August 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1SuGBE1JRt4, accessed
12 August 2021
Discoverafricannews, Somali man burnt alive over nephew’s love saga, 24 September 2018,https://discoverafricanews.com/somali-man-burnt-alive-over-nephews-love-saga/, accessed 27 July
2021
DPA, At least 30 dead after locals fight off al-Shabaab in Somalia, 5 September 2020,
https://www.dpa-international.com/topic/least-30-dead-locals-fight-al-shabaab-somaliaurn%3Anewsml%3Adpa.com%3A20090101%3A200905-99-443127, accessed 8 July 2021
DW (Deutsche Welle), A farewell to arms – leaving a life of terrorism behind in Kenya, 3 May 2019,https://www.dw.com/en/a-farewell-to-arms-leaving-a-life-of-terrorism-behind-in-kenya/av48583342, accessed 14 June 2021
DW (Deutsche Welle), Somalia: Deadly blast hits Mogadishu restaurant, 6 March 2021,
https://www.dw.com/en/somalia-deadly-blast-hits-mogadishu-restaurant/a-56790510, accessed
8 July 2021
EAJ (Expanding Access to Justice Program in Somalia), Pathways and Institutions for Resolving Land
Disputes in Mogadishu, January 2020,
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/Access-to-land-rights-in-Somaliaresearch-report-March-20.pdf, accessed 12 August 2021
EAJ (Expanding Access to Justice Program in Somalia), The Sharia in Somalia, March 2020,
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/Shariah-in-Somalia.pdf, accessed 8 July
2021
EASO (European Asylum Support Office), COI Query, Q19-2019, 23 July 2019,https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2013242/2019_07_23_EASO_COI_QUERY_Somalia_FGM_Q19.p
df, accessed 5 April 2021
EASO (European Asylum Support Office), Country of Origin Information Report on Somalia: Actors,
July 2021,

116

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

https://coi.easo.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2021_07_EASO_COI_Report_Somalia_Actors.
pdf, accessed 13 August 2021
EASO (European Asylum Support Office), Somalia: Security situation, September 2021,
https://coi.easo.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2021_09_EASO_COI_Report_Somalia_Security_situation.pdf, accessed 8 September 2021
EASO, Country of Origin Information Report on Somalia: Key socio-economic indicators, September
2021,
https://coi.easo.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2021_09_EASO_COI_Report_Somalia_Key_soc
io_economic_indicators.pdf, accessed 8 September 2021
EASO (European Asylum Support Office), Information on the Somali caste of Madhibans, 29 January
2019, url https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/2002652.html, accessed 27 July 2021
EduCare, What is the difference between a forced marriage and an arranged marriage, 22 January
2020, https://www.educare.co.uk/news/what-is-the-difference-between-a-forced-marriage-and-anarranged-marriage, accessed 31 March 2021
Ekman, A.-B., A Critical Theory Approach to Inequality in Somali Society: Rethinking Class and
Identity for the Gabooye Collective in Somaliland, PhD-thesis, University College London, 2021
El-Bushra, J., Gardner, J. and Abokor, A., Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Young Somali Men
Today, in: Keating M. and Waldman, M. (eds.), War and Peace in Somalia – National Grievances,
Local Conflict and Al-Shabaab, Hurst and Company London, 2018, pp. 274-284
End Blasphemy Laws, Somalia, last updated 18 June 2020, https://end-blasphemylaws.org/countries/africa-sub-saharan/somalia/, accessed 1 July 2021
Eno, M. A. and Kusow, A. M., Racial and Caste Prejudice in Somalia, in: Journal of Somali Studies,
Volume 1, Issue 2, 2014, pp. 91-118
Eno, M. A., The Bantu - Jareer Somalis: Unearthing Apartheid in the Horn of Africa, April 2008,https://www.researchgate.net/publication/286927475_The_Bantu_Jareer_Somalis_Unearthing_Ap
artheid_in_the_Horn_of_Africa/link/56703c2a08ae0d8b0cc0de29/download, accessed 12 August
2021
European Parliament, Forced marriage from a gender perspective, 2016,
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/556926/IPOL_STU(2016)556926_EN.
pdf, accessed 12 May 2021
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization), Gender and Land Rights Database, Somalia Customarynorms, religious beliefs and social practices that influence gender-differentiated land rights, n.d.,
http://www.fao.org/gender-landrights-database/country-profiles/countries-list/customarylaw/customary-norms-religious-beliefs-and-social-practices-that-influence-gender-differentiatedland-rights/en/?country_iso3=SOM, accessed 5 April 2021
Felbab-Brown, V., The Limits of Punishment: Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism - Somalia
Case Study, May 2018, https://i.unu.edu/media/cpr.unu.edu/attachment/3129/4-LoP-Somaliafinal.pdf, accessed 12 August 2021
Felbab-Brown, V., The Problem with Militias in Somalia: Almost Everyone wants them despite theirDangers, in: Day, A. (ed.), Hybrid Conflict, Hybrid Peace: How militias and paramilitary groups shapepost-conflict transitions, 2020,
https://i.unu.edu/media/cpr.unu.edu/post/3895/HybridConflictSomaliaWeb.pdf, pp. 112-156,
accessed 14 June 2021
FESOJ (Federation of Somali Journalists), Murders, Physical Assaults & Online Harassment: Silencing
Journalism in Somalia, 3 May 2021, https://fesoj.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/FESOJ_2020-117

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

2021_Murders-Physical-Assaults-and-Online-Harassment-Silencing-Journalism-in-Somalia.pdf,
accessed 11 June 2021
Finland, (FIS) Finnish Immigration Service, Security Situation in Somalia, 4 May 2016,
https://migri.fi/documents/5202425/5914056/68429_Somalia_security_situation_April_2016.pdf/fe
8cdfda-447b-40ed-8bc3-6658369d13c8/68429_Somalia_security_situation_April_2016.pdf
Finland, (FIS) Finnish Immigration Service, Somalia / Background and situation of the Geledi clan in
Afgoye, Mogadishu and Kismayo, 24 April 2020,
https://coi.easo.europa.eu/administration/finland/PLib/Tutkimus_44069_vastattu.rtf, accessed
8 July 2021
Finland, (FIS) Finnish Immigration Service, Somalia: Fact-finding Mission to Mogadishu and Nairobi,
January 2018, 5 October 2018,https://migri.fi/documents/5202425/5914056/Somalia_Fact_Finding+Mission+to+Mogadishu+and+
Nairobi+January+2018.pdf, accessed 14 June 2021
Finland, (FIS) Finnish Immigration Service, Somalia: Fact-finding mission to Mogadishu in March
2020; Security situation and humanitarian conditions in Mogadishu, 7 August 2020,
https://migri.fi/documents/5202425/5914056/Somalia+FactFinding+Mission+to+Mogadishu+in+March+2020.pdf, accessed 14 June 2021
Finland,(FIS) Finnish Immigration Service, Somalia / Seksuaali- ja sukupuolivähemmistöjen asema
Somaliassa, päivitys Somalia [Status of sexual and gender minorities in Somalia, update], 24 February
2021, https://coi.easo.europa.eu/administration/finland/PLib/SeksuaalijasukupuolivhemmistjenasemaSomaliassa.docx, accessed 8 July 2021
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2021 - Somalia, March 2021,
https://freedomhouse.org/country/somalia/freedom-world/2021, accessed 6 April 2021
FTL (Facility for Talo and Leadership), Al-Shabaab Execute Two Men for Spying for HirShabelle
Administration, 26 September 2020, https://www.ftlsomalia.com/al-shabaab-execute-two-men-forspying-for-hirshabelle-administration/, accessed 8 July 2021
Gardner, J. with Warsame, A. M., Women, Clan Identity and Peace-building, in: Gardner, J. and El
Bushra, J., “Somalia The Untold Story: The War Through the Eyes of Somali Women, 2004,
https://www.academia.edu/28379303/_Judith_Gardner_Judy_El_Bushra_Somalia_The_Unt_BookZZ_org_pdf, pp. 153-165, accessed 12 August 2021
Garow Online, Al-Shabaab executes elder in Somalia for allegedly insulting Prophet Mohamed, 8
August 2021, https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/al-shabaab-executes-elder-insomalia-for-allegedly-insulting-prophet-mohamed, accessed 12 August 2021
Garowe Online, Al-Shabaab publicly executes elder by firing squad in central Somalia, 30 September
2020, https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/al-shabaab-publicly-executes-elder-byfiring-squad-in-central-somalia, accessed 8 July 2021
Garowe Online, Al-Shabab says it executes spy agent and soldier in Somalia, 26 September 2020,
https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/al-shabab-says-it-executes-spyagent-and-soldierin-somalia, accessed 8 July 2021
Garowe Online, Explosion kills 12 soldiers in central Somalia, 7 February 2021, translated by: BBC
Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 8 July 2021
Garowe Online, Somali intelligence official survives bomb attack, 9 August 2020,
https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/somali-intelligence-official-survives-bomb-attack,accessed 8 July 2021

118

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Geeska Africa, Somaliland: Spreading the Christian religion Is a Crime? Police arrest two men,
5 October 2020, https://www.geeskaafrika.com/spreading-the-christian-religion/, accessed 1 July
2021
Germany, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development and Federal Foreign Office,2. Bericht der Bundesregierung zur weltweiten Lage der Religionsfreiheit (Berichtszeitraum 2018 bis2019), October 2020, https://religionsfreiheit.bmz.de/de/der-bericht/ZweiterReligionsfreiheitsbericht.pdf, accessed 1 July 2021
Girls not Brides, Somalia, n.d., https://www.girlsnotbrides.org/child-marriage/somalia/, accessed
13 May 2021
Gjelsvik, I. M., Disengaging from violent extremism: The case of al-Shabaab in Somalia, in: Conflict
Trends 2019/1, 2019, https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/disengaging-from-violentextremism/, accessed 14 June 2021
Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment of Children: Corporal punishment of children in
Somalia, last updated March 2021, http://www.endcorporalpunishment.org/wpcontent/uploads/country-reports/Somalia.pdf, accessed 11 June 2021
GlobalGayz, Gay Life in Somaliland and Somalia, 18 February 2012, http://www.globalgayz.com/gaylife-in-somaliland-and-somalia/, accessed 8 July 2021
Gluckman, M., Custom and Conflict in Africa, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1965 [1956]
Goobjoog News, Somalia will soon ban FGM, Human Rights Minister says, 17 August 2015,
http://goobjoog.com/english/somalia-will-soon-ban-fgm-human-rights-minister-says/, accessed
13 May 2021
Guardian (The), A race against time the new law putting Somalia's children at risk of marriage,
3 September 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/sep/03/a-raceagainst-time-the-new-law-putting-somalias-children-at-risk-of-marriage, accessed 5 April 2021
Guardian (The), Female genital mutilation mothers need to say no, 7 September 2013,https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2013/sep/07/female-genital-mutilation-traditionsomalia, accessed 16 April 2021
Guardian (The), Most of the men are your enemies, 9 April 2020,
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/apr/09/most-of-the-men-are-yourenemies-one-womans-crusade-in-somalia, accessed 6 April 2021
Gundel, J., The predicament of the ‘Oday’ – The role of traditional structures in security, rights, law
and development in Somalia, 2006,
https://www.academia.edu/17361544/The_Predicament_of_the_Oday_The_role_of_traditional_str
uctures_in_Somalia, accessed 8 July 2021
Halbeeg, Al-Shabaab militant executes an alleged sorcerer, 24 September 2020,
https://en.halbeeg.com/2020/09/24/al-shabaab-militant-executes-an-alleged-sorcerer/, accessed
1 July 2021
Hansen, S. J., Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 20052012, 2013
Harper, M., Everything You Have Told Me is True: The Many Faces of Al-Shabaab, Hurst andCompany, London, 2019
Hashi, A. A. and Hashi, A. A., Fiqi’s Somali English Dictionary, 1998

119Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Helander, B., Clanship, kinship and community among the Rahanweyn: A model for other Somalis?’,in: Adam H. M. and Ford, R. (eds.), Mending Rips in the Sky: Options for Somali Communities in the
21st Century, Red Sea Press, Lawrenceville, 1997, pp. 131-143
Helander, B., The Slaughtered Camel: Coping with Fictitious Descent among the Hubeer of Southern
Somalia, 2003
Helander, B., Vulnerable minorities in Somalia and Somaliland. Indigenous Affairs No. 2, 1995,
pp. 21-23
Hesse, B. J., Introduction: The myth of ‘Somalia’, in: Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Vol.
28, 2010, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02589001.2010.499232, accessed 20
August 2021
Hiiraan Online, Al-Shabab publicly 'executes' three in central Somalia, 4 January 2020, translated by:
BBC Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 8 July 2021
Hiiraan Online, Ciidamo ka tirsan Beesha Gaaljecel oo ku biiray la dagaalanka Hirshabeelle iyo
Janaraal Xuud oo ku dhawaaqay arin cusub, 30 November 2020,
https://www.hiiraan.com/news/2020/nov/wararka_maanta30-175880.htm, accessed 8 July 2021
Hill, M., No redress: Somalia’s forgotten minorities, MRG (Minority Rights Group International),
2010, https://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/old-site-downloads/download-912-Click-hereto-download-full-report.pdf, accessed 8 July 2021
Hiraal Institute, A Losing Game: Countering Al-Shabab’s Financial System, October 2020,
https://hiraalinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/A-Losing-Game.pdf, accessed 8 July 2021
Hiraal Institute, Al-Shabab's Military Machine, December 2018, https://hiraalinstitute.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/12/The-Al-Shabab-Military.pdf, accessed 14 June 2021
Hiraal Institute, Semi-annual Somalia Security Report, 16 July 2020, https://hiraalinstitute.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/07/Semiannual-Somalia-Security-Report.pdf, accessed 8 July 2021
Hiraal Institute, Taming the Clans: Al-Shabab's Clan Politics, 31 May 2018,https://hiraalinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/AS-Clan-Politics.pdf, accessed 8 July 2021
Hiraal Institute, The Fighters Factory: Inside Al-Shabab's Education System, 15 May 2018,https://hiraalinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Education-in-Al-Shabab.pdf, accessed
1 July 2021
Hoehne, M. V., Al-Shabaab in Somalia: Von einer Terrorzelle zu einem regierungsähnlichen Akteur,in: Walter Feichtinger und Gerald Hainzl (eds.), Somalia: Optionen - Chancen – Stolpersteine.
Frankfurt/M, Weimar: Böhlau, 2011, pp. 121-157
Hoehne, M. V., Between Somaliland and Puntland: Marginalization, militarization and conflicting
political visions, RVI, London, 2015
Hoehne, M. V., Continuities and changes regarding minorities in Somalia. Journal of Ethnic and Racial
Studies 38(5), 2015, pp. 792-807
Hoehne, M. V., Counter-terrorism in Somalia, or: how external interferences helped to produce
militant Islamism, published online on 17 December 2009,https://webarchive.ssrc.org/Somalia_Hoehne_v10.pdf, accessed 1 July 2021
Hoehne, M. V., Political Orientations and Repertoires of Identification: State and Identity Formationin Northern Somalia. PhD Dissertation Martin-Luther Universität Halle-Wittenberg, 2011,https://www.researchgate.net/publication/296964922_Political_Orientations_and_Repertoires_of_I
dentification_State_and_Identity_Formation_in_Northern_Somalia, accessed 8 July 2021

120

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Hoehne, M. V., Somali ethnography, in: Uhlig, S. (ed.), Encyclopaedia Aethiopica Vol. 4 O-X,
Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 2010, pp. 702-705
Hoehne, M. V., The rupture of territoriality and the diminishing relevance of cross-cutting ties inSomalia after 1990, in: Development and Change 47(6), 2016, pp. 1379-1411
Hohne, M., Bakonyi, J. and ACCORD, Somalia: Al-Schabaab und Sicherheitslage; Lage vonBinnenvertriebenen und Rückkehrer·innen; Schutz durch staatliche und nicht-staatliche Akteure;
Dokumentation zum COI-Webinar [Documentation of a webinar on Somalia: Al-Shabaab, Security
situation, IDPs/returnees, State and non-state protection], 5 May 2021,
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2052555/20210531_COIWebinar+Somalia_ACCORD_Mai+2021.pdf, accessed 20 August 2021
Horn Observer, Hopes dashed for families of murdered Somali journalists, 9 July 2020,
https://hornobserver.com/articles/507/Hopes-dashed-for-families-of-murdered-Somali-journalists,
accessed 10 June 2021
Howard-Hunt, B., Forced Migration: The Experiences of Somali Women Living in the United
Kingdiom., PhD dissertation, Birmingham City University, April 2013, http://www.openaccess.bcu.ac.uk/4881/1/2013_Howard%20Hunt_581449.pdf, accessed 8 July 2021
HRW (Human Right Watch), Heinous Act Overshadowed Women’s Day in Puntland, 13 May 2019,https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/03/13/heinous-act-overshadowed-womens-day-puntland
HRW (Human Right Watch), Somalia: Al-Shabab Demanding Children, 14 January 2018,https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/01/15/somalia-al-shabab-demanding-children, accessed 14 June2021
HRW (Human Rights Watch), Joint Letter Re: Concerns and Recommendations on Somalia’s New
Media Law, 5 October 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/10/05/joint-letter-re-concerns-andrecommendations-somalias-new-media-law, accessed 12 August 2021
HRW (Human Rights Watch), No Place for Children: Child Recruitment, Forced Marriage, and Attacks
on Schools in Somalia, Februar 2012, availale at:https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1182816/2016_1330009031_somalia0212forupload.pdf,
accessed 12 August 2021
HRW (Human Rights Watch), Somalia Events of 2018, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/worldreport/2019/country-chapters/somalia#d30335, accessed 13 May 2021
HRW (Human Rights Watch), World Report 1993 – Somalia, 1 January 1993,https://www.refworld.org/docid/467fca601e.html, accessed 8 July 2021
HRW (Human Rights Watch), World Report 2021 - Somalia, 13 January 2021,
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/somalia, accessed 11 June 2021
HRWF (Human Rights Without Frontiers), Somalia: Prof. Mahmoud Ahmed-Hamdi, a humanist, is
now in hiding outside of Somalia, 25 June 2020, https://hrwf.eu/somalia-prof-mahmoud-ahmedhamdi-a-humanist-is-now-in-hiding-outside-of-somalia/, accessed 1 July 2021
Humanists International, Freedom of Thought Report – Somalia, last updated 28 August 2020,
https://fot.humanists.international/countries/africa-eastern-africa/somalia/?print=print, accessed
1 July 2021
Humanists International, Protect Mahmoud, the Somali professor accused of blasphemy for a
Facebook post, 6 March 2020, https://humanists.international/2020/03/protect-mahmoud-thesomali-professor-accused-of-blasphemy-for-a-facebook-post/, accessed 1 July 2021
Hunt, S. L., Connor, J. J., Ciesinski, A., Abdi, C., Robinson, B. E., Somali American Female Refugees
Discuss Their Attitudes toward Homosexuality and the Gay and Lesbian Community, 2018,121

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/62581/Hunt_Somali_2018.pdf;jsessionid=A6753
0BB610ECE85EFA9BB8333D79433?sequence=1, accessed 8 July 2021
ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross), Spared from the Spear: Traditional Somali
Behaviour in warfare, February 1998, https://blogs.icrc.org/somalia/wpcontent/uploads/sites/99/2015/09/Spared-from-the-spear-EN.pdf, accessed 8 July 2021
IDLO (International Development Law Organization), Accessing Justice: Somalia's Alternative Dispute
Resolution Centers, Dezember 2020,
https://www.idlo.int/sites/default/files/pdfs/publications/report-somalia-adr_centers-4.pdf,
accessed 12 August 2021
Ifex, Culture of impunity in Somalia continues to grow, 27 October 2020, https://ifex.org/culture-ofimpunity-in-somalia-continues-growing/, accessed 20 August 2021
IFJ (International Federation of Journalists), Somalia: New Media Law fails to comply withinternational standards on press freedom, 26 august 2020, https://www.ifj.org/mediacentre/news/detail/category/press-releases/article/somalia-new-media-law-fails-to-comply-withinternational-standards-on-press-freedom.html, accessed 21 July 2021
IIRF (International Institute for Religious Freedom), Somali Prof. Ahmed, a victim of blasphemy laws,
urgently needs a humanitarian visa, 11 September 2020, https://www.iirf.eu/news/othernews/somali-prof-ahmed-a-victim-of-blasphemy-laws-urgently-needs-a-humanitarian-visa/,
accessed 1 July 2021
ILGA World (International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association), State-Sponsored
Homophobia 2020: Global Legislation Overview Update), 15 December 2020,
https://ilga.org/downloads/ILGA_World_State_Sponsored_Homophobia_report_global_legislation_
overview_update_December_2020.pdf, accessed 8 July 2021
Independent (The), Young Somali activist sentenced to death for being a lesbian, 31 January 2016,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/young-somali-activist-sentenced-to-death-forbeing-a-lesbian-a6844216.html, accessed 8 July 2021
Ingiriis M. H., Insurgency and international extraversion in Somalia: the National Intelligence andSecurity Agency (NISA) and Al-Shabaab's Amniyat, in: African Security Review, vol. 29, no. 2, 2020,
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10246029.2020.1740752, pp. 125-151, accessed
8 July 2021
Ingiriis, M. H. and Hoehne, M. V., The impact of civil war and state collapse on the roles of Somali
women: a blessing in disguise, in: Journal of Eastern African Studies 7(2), 2013, pp. 314-333
Ingiriis, M. H., Building peace from the margins in Somalia: The case for political settlement with AlShabaab, in: Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 39:4, 2018, pp. 512-536
Ingiriis, M. H., The anthropology of Al-Shabaab: the salient factors for the insurgency movement’s
recruitment project, in: Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 31/2, 2020, pp. 359-380, available bysubscription at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09592318.2020.1713548, accessed
14 June 2021
International Crisis Group, Averting War in Northern Somalia, Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°141,
27 June 2018, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/b141-averting-war-in-northern-somalia.pdf,
accessed 8 July 2021
International Crisis Group, Blunting Al-Shabaab’s Impact on Somalia’s Elections, Crisis Group Africa
Briefing N°165, 31 December 2020, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/b165-somaliaelections_0.pdf, accessed 8 July 2021

122

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

International Crisis Group, Somalia: To Move Beyond The Failed State, Africa Report N°147, 23
December 2008, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/147-somalia-to-move-beyond-the-failedstate.pdf, accessed 12 August 2021
International Crisis Group, Women and Al-Shabaab’s Insurgency, 27 June 2019,https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/b145-women-and-al-shabaab_0.pdf, accessed 5 April 2021
Interpeace, Galmudug Reconciliation: Processes, Challenges, and Opportunities Ahead, February
2021, https://www.interpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/2021-Galmudug_Report.pdf,
accessed 8 July 2021
IPI (International Press Institute), Somalia: Press freedom deteriorating at rapid pace, 6 May 2020,
https://ipi.media/somalia-press-freedom-deteriorating-at-rapid-pace/, accessed 12 August 2021
IRT (International Relief Teams), A Somali Mother's Struggle to Feed Her Family, 1 March 2019,https://www.irteams.org/post/a-somali-mothers-struggle-to-feed-her-family, accessed 15 May 2021
Islamic Relief, Women in Somalia warn against the dangers of female genital mutilation, n.d.,
https://www.islamic-relief.org/women-in-somalia-warn-against-the-dangers-of-female-genitalmutilation-cutting/, accessed 16 May 2021
Islamicstudies.Info, Towards Understanding the Quran, n.d.,
https://www.islamicstudies.info/tafheem.php?sura=4&verse=15&to=16, accessed 21 July 2021
ISN (International Relations and Security Network), Somalia's new religious war, 31 July 2009,https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/somalias-new-religious-war, accessed 12 August 2021
ISPI, Somalia: States and Regions, May 2021, https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/somaliastates-and-regions-30387, non public source
ISS, The various layers to the Somaliland-Puntland discord, 9 December 2019,https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-various-layers-to-the-somaliland-puntland-discord, accessed
8 July 2021
Jamestown Foundation, Somaliland Elections Disrupt al-Shabaab’s Regional Expansion, Terrorism
Monitor, vol. 19, no. 12, 18 June 2021, https://jamestown.org/program/somaliland-electionsdisrupt-al-shabaabs-regional-expansion/, accessed 8 July 2021
Jaspars, S., Adan, G. M. and Majid, N., Food and Power in Somalia: Business as Usual? A scoping
study on the political economy of food following shifts in food assistance and in governance,
21 January 2020,
https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/103138/7/Food_and_Power_in_Somalia_business_as_usual_v5.pdf,
accessed 8 July 2021
Jenkins, R., Social Identity, Routledge, London, 1996
Jijeele Unity Council [Facebook], posted on: 4 October 2020,
https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?id=103837408034856&story_fbid=170870334664896,
accessed 21 July 2021
Journal of Adolescence, Adolescent-led marriage in Somaliland and Puntland: A surprisinginteraction of agency and social norms, Vol. 72, April 2019, available at:https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140197119300405, accessed 16 May 2021
Journal of International Criminal Justice, Prosecuting the nexus between terrorism, conflict-related
sexual violence and trafficking in human beings before national legal mechanisms, Vol. 18, Issue 2,
29 June 2020, available at: https://academic.oup.com/jicj/articleabstract/18/2/499/5864753?redirectedFrom=fulltext, accessed 4 May 2021
Kapteins, L, Clan Cleansing in Somalia: The Ruinous Legacy of 1991, 2013123

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Khadija and Harley, S., Women in Al-Shabaab, in: Keating M. and Waldman, M. (eds.), War andPeace in Somalia – National Grievances, Local Conflict and Al-Shabaab, Hurst and Company London,
2018, pp. 251-256
Khalil, J., Brown, R., Chant, C., Olowo, P. and Wood, N., Deradicalisation and Disengagement in
Somalia – Evidence from a Rehabilitation Programme for Former Members of Al-Shabaab, RUSI
(Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies) Whitehall Report 4-18, January
2019, https://static.rusi.org/20190104_whr_418_deradicalisation_and_disengagement_in_somalia_web.pdf, accessed 14 June 2021
Kirk, J. W. C., The Yibirs and Midgaans of Somaliland — Their traditions and dialects, in: Journal of
the Royal African Society, Vol. 4, No 13, Oxford, 1904, pp. 91–108
Kluijver, R., Al-Shabaab Governance, 10 July 2019,https://www.zomiacenter.org/posts/2019/4/19/al-shabaab-governance, accessed 8 July 2021
Legal Action Worldwide, CEDAW, n.d., http://www.legalactionworldwide.org/somalia-2/cedaw/,
accessed 5 May 2021
Legal Action Worldwide, Condensed Sexual Offences Bill, 2014,
http://www.legalactionworldwide.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Condensed-Sexual-OffencesBill.pdf, accessed 19 May 2021
Legal Action Worldwide, Sexual Offences Bill, n.d., http://www.legalactionworldwide.org/somalia2/sexual-offences-bill/, accessed 6 April 2021
Lewis, I. M., A Pastoral Democracy. A Study of Pastoralism and Politics among the Northern Somaliof the Horn of Africa, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1961
Lewis, I. M., Peoples of the Horn of Africa: Somali, Afar, and Saho, 1998 [1955]
Lewis, I. M., Saints and Somalis: Popular Islam in a clan-based society, Red Sea Press, Lawrenceville,
1998
Lewis, I. M., Visible and Invisible Differences: The Somali Paradox, Africa vol. 74, no. 4, 2004, pp. 489515
Luling, V., Farmers from Arabia: the role of ‘Gibil Cad’ groups in the interior of southern Somalia, in
Hoehne, M. and Luling, V. (eds.), Milk and peace, drought and war: Somali culture, society andpolitics, 2010, pp. 301-317
Luling, V., Note on the Ashraf, n.d.; unpublished text of five pages
Luling, V., Report on the Shiikhal, 15 December 2009, unpublished paper. The paper was sent to
ACCORD by the author in 2009 and was cited in ACCORD, Clans in Somalia – Report on a lecture by
Joakim Gundel, COI Workshop Vienna, 15 May 2009 (Revised Edition), 15 December 2009.
Luling, V., Somali Sultanate: the Geledi City-State Over 150 Years, London, 2002
Luling, V., The other Somali: Minority groups in traditional Somali society, in Thomas Labahn (ed.),Proceedings of the Second International Congress of Somali Studies, Vol. IV (Studies in Humanities
and Natural Sciences), Buske, Hamburg, 1984, pp. 39-55
Mahmood, O. S., Overlapping claims by Somaliland and Puntland: The case of Sool and Sanaag, ISS(Institute for Security Studies) East Africa Report 27, 2019,https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/ear27.pdf, accessed 8 July 2021
Mamba Online, 15 and 20-year-old youths executed in Somalia for homosexuality, 11 January 2017,https://www.mambaonline.com/2017/01/11/15-20-year-old-youths-executed-somaliahomosexuality/, accessed 8 July 2021

124

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Mansur, A. O., The Nature of the Somali Clan System, in: Ahmed, A. A. (ed.), The Invention ofSomalia, Red Sea Press, Lawrenceville, 1995, pp. 117-134
MAP (Media Association of Puntland), MAP vehemently condemns the murder of veteran Journalists
Jamal Farah Adan, 2 March 2021, https://madmimi.com/p/2508021?pact=44942-16224779210103382956-6e36ab4ac1150f50c9c094f5b3be6c505426e9af, accessed 10 June 2021
MAP (Media Association of Puntland), Puntland: MAP calls out the Puntland’s Minister ofInformation for violating the Media Law, 23 September 2019, http://mediapuntland.org/2644-2/,
accessed 21 July 2021
MAP (Media Association of Puntland), Puntland: MAP celebrates the release of its member
Journalist Kilwe, calls for a speedy investigation into murder of journalists’ cases, 23 March 2021,
http://mediapuntland.org/puntland-map-celebrates-the-release-of-its-member-kilwe-calls-for-aspeedy-investigation-into-murder-of-journalists-cases/, accessed 11 June 2021
MAP (Media Association of Puntland), Puntland: Media law reform – Parliament approves bill torepeal the ‘’Draconian Provisions’’ in the Puntland Media Law, 12 December 2016,
http://mediapuntland.org/1154-2/, accessed 21 July 2021
Marchal, R., Motivations and drivers of Al-Shabaab, in: Keating M. and Waldman, M. (eds.), War andPeace in Somalia – National Grievances, Local Conflict and Al-Shabaab, Hurst and Company London,
2018, pp. 309-317
Marchal, R., Rivals in Governance: Civil Activities of Al-Shabaab, in: Keating M. and Waldman, M.
(eds.), War and Peace in Somalia – National Grievances, Local Conflict and Al-Shabaab, Hurst andCompany London, 2018, pp. 349-357
Marchal, R., Une lecture de la radicalisation djihadiste en Somalie [Lecture on jihadist radicalisation
in Somalia], in: Politique Africaine, Vol. 2018/1 (no. 149), 2018, https://www.cairn.info/revuepolitique-africaine-2018-1-page-89.htm, pp. 89-111, accessed 14 June 2021
Menkhaus, K., Al-Shabaab and Social Media: A Double-Edged Sword, in: The Brown Journal of World
Affairs, vol. 20, no. 2, 2014,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/24590990.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A4a8e0e71e59f575e6f555590
5f12aaf2, pp. 309-327, accessed 8 July 2021
Menkhaus, K., Bantu ethnic identities in Somalia, in: Annales d'Ethiopie, Volume 19, 2003, pp. 323339
Menkhaus, K., Elite Bargains and Political Deals Project: Somalia Case Study, Stabilisation Unit,
February 2018,https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/766049/Somalia_case_study.pdf, accessed 12 August 2021
Menkhaus, K., Middle Jubba Region, United Nations Development Office for Somalia, “Studies on
Governance” Series no. 6., December 1999
Menkhaus, K., State Collapse in Somalia: Second Thoughts, Review of African Political Economy ,Sep., 2003, Vol. 30, No. 97, pp. 405-422
Middle East Concern, Somaliland: Christian couple released and deported, 13 November 2020,
https://www.meconcern.org/2020/11/13/somaliland-christian-couple-released-and-deported/,
accessed 1 July 2021
Morning Star News, As More Christians Are Killed in Somalia, Number of Orphans Grows, 6 March
2018, https://morningstarnews.org/2018/03/christians-killed-somalia-number-orphans-grows/,
accessed 1 July 2021

125

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Morning Star News, Christian Mother in Somalia Divorced, Beaten, 16 August 2019,https://morningstarnews.org/2019/08/christian-mother-in-somalia-divorced-beaten/, accessed
1 July 2021
Morning Star News, Islamic Extremists in Somalia Behead Two Christians, 14 March 2014,
https://morningstarnews.org/2014/03/islamic-extremists-in-somalia-behead-two-christians/,
accessed 1 July 2021
Morning Star News, Islamic Extremists in Somalia Kill Secret Christian, Her Son, Wound Husband,
Sources Say, 6 March 2017, https://morningstarnews.org/2017/03/islamic-extremists-somalia-killsecret-christian-son-wound-husband-sources-say/, accessed 1 July 2021
Morning Star News, Muslim Boys in Somalia Beat Christian’s 7-Year-Old Son, 30 October 2020,
https://morningstarnews.org/2020/10/muslim-boys-in-somalia-beat-christians-7-year-old-son/,accessed 1 July 2021
MRG (Minority Rights Group International), Looma Ooyaan – No One Cries for Them: The
Predicament Facing Somalia’s Minority Women, January 2015, https://minorityrights.org/wpcontent/uploads/old-site-downloads/mrg_report_somalia_jan2015.pdf#page=1&zoom=auto,158,842, accessed 8 July 2021
MRG (Minority Rights Group International), World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples Somalia: Bantu, March 2018, https://minorityrights.org/minorities/bantu/, accessed 8 July 2021
MSF (Médecins sans Frontières), Essential obstetric and new-born care, n.d.,
https://medicalguidelines.msf.org/viewport/ONC/english/5-10-deinfibulation-51417091.html,
accessed 6 May 2021
Mukhtar, M. H., Historical Dictionary of Somalia, 2003
Multi-Cluster Rapid Assessment on Clan Conflict and Flood in Beletweyne 25 – 27 May 2021,
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/multi-cluster_rapid_assessment_in_beletweyne_-_may_2021.pdf, accessed 12 August 2021
Muqdishu Online, Beelo degan Guriceel oo sheegay inay lacag ku bixiyeen siidenyta dad afdub loga
haystay, 11 January 2021, https://muqdisho.online/beelo-degan-guriceel-oo-sheegay-inay-lacag-kubixiyeen-siidenyta-dad-afduub-loga-heysaty/, accessed 8 July 2021
Mydlak, R., The Clan System and Customary Justice in Somalia: A Brief Introduction, 2019
Nairobi News, Man's hand chopped off in Somalia for stealing from shop, 3 June 2020,
https://nairobinews.nation.co.ke/news/mans-hand-chopped-off-in-somalia-for-stealing-from-shop,
accessed 1 July 2021
Nation (The), Inside the Secretive US Air Campaign In Somalia, 7 February 2019,https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/somalia-secret-air-campaign, accessed 8 July 2021
Netherlands (The), Country of Origin Information Cluster (DAF/CAB), Country of Origin Information
Report on South and Central Somalia, March 2019, available at:https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2010322/COISomaliaMarch2019.pdf, accessed 27 April2021
Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of Origin Information Report on South and Central
Somalia, March 2019,https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/binaries/rijksoverheid/documenten/ambtsberichten/2019/03/19/alge
meen-ambtsbericht-zuid--en-centraal-somalie-2019/Algemeen+ambtsbericht+Zuid-+en+Centraal+Somalie++maart+2019+%28Engels%29.pdf, accessed 8 July 2021
New Humanitarian (The), In Somalia, New Law Could Finally Give Rape Survivors a Voice, 27 April
2017 https://deeply.thenewhumanitarian.org/womenandgirls/articles/2017/04/27/in-somalia-newlaw-could-finally-give-rape-survivors-a-voice, accessed 20 August 2021
126Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

New York City Bar, Letter Urging Somali Government to Protect Free Speech and End Violence
Against Journalists, 22 April 2020, https://www.nycbar.org/member-and-careerservices/committees/reports-listing/reports/detail/media-freedom-in-somalia-protectingjournalists, accessed 20 August 2021
New York Times, (The), Attacks in Somalia Leave at Least 5 Dead, 4 July 2020,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/04/world/africa/somalia-bombing-mogadishu.html, accessed
8 July 2021
Norway, Landinfo, Query response Somalia: Ashraf, 10 August 2018, https://landinfo.no/wpcontent/uploads/2018/11/Query-response-The-Ashraf-10082018.pdf, accessed 8 July 2021
Norway, Landinfo, Query response, Somalia: Al-Shabaab and local employees of AMISOM,the UN
and other international organisations, June 2015, https://landinfo.no/wpcontent/uploads/2018/03/Somalia-Query-respons-Al-Shabaab-and-local-employees-of-AMISOMthe-UN-and-other-international-organisations-June-2015.pdf, accessed 12 August 2021
Norway, Landinfo, Query response, Somalia: Al-Shabaab areas in Southern Somalia, 21 May 2019,https://landinfo.no/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Query-response-Somalia-Al-Shabaab-areas-inSouthern-Somalia-21052019-final.pdf, accessed 12 August 2021
Norway, Landinfo, Query response, Somalia: Date of birth, age and calendar, 17 February 2021,
https://landinfo.no/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Query-response-Somalia-Date-of-birth-age-andcalendar-17032021.pdf, accessed 12 August 2021
Norway, Landinfo, Query response, Somalia: Low status groups, 12 December 2016,
https://landinfo.no/asset/3514/1/3514_1.pdf, accessed 12 August 2021
Norway, Landinfo, Query Response, Somalia: Reer Hamar, 17 December 2009,https://landinfo.no/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Somalia-response-Reer-Hamar-.pdf, accessed
8 July 2021
Norway, Landinfo, Query response, Somalia: Violence in Mogadishu and developments since 2012,
30 October 2020, https://landinfo.no/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Query-response-SomaliaViolence-in-Mogadishu-and-developments-since-2012-30102020.pdf, accessed 12 August 2021
Norway, Landinfo, Query response, Somalia: Violence, fatalities, perpetrators and victims in
Mogadishu, 27 February 2017, https://landinfo.no/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Somalia-queryresponse-Violence-fatalities-perpetrators-and-victims-in-Mogadishu-27022017-final.pdf, accessed
12 August 2021
Norway, Landinfo, Report, Somalia: Marriage and divorce, https://landinfo.no/wpcontent/uploads/2018/09/Report-Somalia-Marriage-and-divorce-14062018-2.pdf, accessed 6 May
2021
Norway, Landinfo, Report, Somalia: Practical issues and security challenges associated with travels inSouthern Somalia, 4 April 2016, https://landinfo.no/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Report-SomaliaPractical-issues-and-security-challenges-associated-with-travels-in-Southern-Somalia-4-April2016.pdf, accessed 12 August 2021
Norway, Landinfo, Respons, Somalia: Bajuni-øyene [Somalia: Bajuni islands], 16 February 2010,https://www.landinfo.no/asset/1147/1/1147_1.pdf, accessed 8 July 2021
Norway, Landinfo, Respons, Somalia: Det generelle voldsbildet og al-Shabaabs aktivitet i ulike deler
av landet [The general picture of violence and al-Shabaab's activity in different parts of the country],
3 June 2021, https://landinfo.no/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Respons-Somalia-Det-generellevoldsbildet-og-al-Shabaabs-aktivitet-i-ulike-deler-av-landet-030621.pdf, accessed 12 August 2021

127

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Norway, Landinfo, Respons, Somalia: Forhold for homofile [Somalia: Conditions for Homosexuals],
16 June 2021, https://landinfo.no/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Respons-Somalia-Forhold-forhomofile-16062021.pdf, accessed 12 August 2021
Norway, Landinfo, Respons, Somalia: Kampene i Mogadishu den 25. april 2021 og
sikkerhetssituasjonen i byen etter dette [The fighting in Mogadishu on April 25, 2021 and the
security situation in the city afterwards], 15 June 2021, https://landinfo.no/wpcontent/uploads/2021/06/Respons-Somalia-Kampene-i-Mogadishu-den-25.-april-2021-ogsikkerhetssituasjonen-i-byen-etter-dette-15062021.pdf, accessed 20 August 2021
Norway, Landinfo, Respons, Somalia: Massearrestasjoner og reaksjoner mot personer som
mistenkes for å være al-Shabaab-medlemmer [Mass arrests and reactions against people suspectedof being al-Shabaab members], 5 June 2015, https://landinfo.no/wpcontent/uploads/2018/03/Somalia-respons-Massearrestasjoner-og-reaksjoner-mot-personer-sommistenkes-for-%C3%A5-v%C3%A6re-al-Shabaab-medlemmer-05062015.pdf, accessed 12 August2021
Norway, Landinfo, Respons, Somalia: Rekruttering til al-Shabaab [Recruitment to al-Shabaab], 26January 2018, https://landinfo.no/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Somalia-respons-Rekruttering-tilal-Shabaab-26012018.pdf, accessed 12 August 2021
Norway, Landinfo, Respons, Somalia: Sikkerhetssituasjonen i Nordvest-Somalia (Somaliland)[Security situation in northwest Somalia (Somaliland)], 7 April 2020, https://landinfo.no/wpcontent/uploads/2020/04/Respons-om-Sikkerhetssituasjonen-i-Nordvest-Somalia-Somaliland07042020-endelig-versjon-1.pdf, accessed 8 July 2021
Norway, Landinfo, Respons, Somalia: Somalia Rer Hamar-befolkningen i Mogadishu [Reer Hamar
population in Mogadishu], 21 May 2019, https://landinfo.no/wpcontent/uploads/2019/05/Respons-Somalia-Rer-Hamar-befolkningen-i-Mogadishu-21052019.pdf,
accessed 12 August 2021
Norway, Landinfo, Somalia: Fødselsdato, alder og tidsregning, 17 Febuary 2021,
https://landinfo.no/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Respons-Somalia-Fodselsdato-alder-ogtidsregning-17022021.pdf, accessed 20 August 2021
Norway, Landinfo, Somalia: Marriage and divorce, 14 June 2018, https://landinfo.no/wpcontent/uploads/2018/09/Report-Somalia-Marriage-and-divorce-14062018-2.pdf, accessed 20
August 2021
Norway, Landinfo, Temanotat, Somalia: Media og journalistikk [Somalia: Media and Journalism], 13
April 2018, https://landinfo.no/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Somalia-temanotat-Media-ogjournalistikk-13042018.pdf, accessed 12 August 2021
Norway, Landinfo, Temanotat, Somalia: Praktiske og sikkerhetsmessige forhold på reise i SørSomalia [Practical and safety conditions when traveling in southern Somalia], 28 June 2019,https://landinfo.no/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Somalia-temanotat-Praktiske-ogsikkerhetsmessige-forhold-p%C3%A5-reise-i-S%C3%B8r-Somalia-28062019.pdf, accessed 12 August2021
Norway, Landinfo, Temanotat, Somalia: Reaksjoner mot al-Shabaabavhoppere [Reactions to alShabaaba defectors], 5 August 2015, https://landinfo.no/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Somaliatemanotat-Reaksjoner-mot-al-Shabaab-avhoppere-05082015.pdf, accessed 12 August 2021
Nurse, D., Documenting language shift and loss: Bajuni in Somalia, in Austin, P. K. and Gawne, L.
(eds.), Language Documentation and Description, 2018, pp. 123-150
NUSOJ (National Union of Somali Journalists), Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Journalists in Perilin Somalia, State of Media Freedom Report – 2021, 3 May 2021, https://www.nusoj.org/wp128

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

content/uploads/2021/05/STATE-OF-MEDIA-FREEDOM-REPORT-%E2%80%93-3-May-2021-.pdf,
accessed 10 June 2021
NUSOJ (National Union of Somali Journalists), Puntland Frees Independent Journalist after
Presidential Pardon, 22 March 2021, https://www.nusoj.org/puntland-frees-independent-journalistafter-presidential-pardon/, accessed 11 June 2021
Omenma, J. T., Hendricks, C., and Ajaebili, N.C., al-Shabaab and Boko Haram: Recruitment Strategies,
in: Peace and Conflict Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1, Article 2, 2020,
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1460&context=pcs, accessed 14 June 2021
Omer, I. M., Ethiopian Jews in Somalia: Tracing remnants of the Yibir, Genetic Literacy Project, 3September 2013, https://geneticliteracyproject.org/2013/09/03/ethiopian-jews-in-somalia-tracingremnants-of-the-yibir/, accessed 27 July 2021
Osman, A., Cultural Diversity and the Somali Conflict: Myth or Reality?, in: AJCR Volume 7, Number
2, 2007, https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/cultural-diversity-and-the-somali-conflict/, accessed
8 July 2021
Otieno M., Al-Shabaab and Forced Marriage in Somalia: Beliefs, Practices and Interventions, Vol. 2
Issue: 1, June 2019, available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334731397_AlShabaab_and_Forced_Marriage_in_Somalia_Beliefs_Practices_and_Interventions, accessed 5 April
2021
Peterson, S., Me Against My Brother: At War in Somalia, Sudan and Rwanda, Routledge, London,
2000
Plan International, Concern over bill normalising violence against girls and women in Somalia,
13 August 2020, https://plan-international.org/news/2020-08-13-concern-bill-normalises-violenceagainst-girls-women-somalia, accessed 6 May 2021https://plan-international.org/news/2020-08-13concern-bill-normalises-violence-against-girls-women-somalia
Plan International, Girls in Somalia subjected to door-to-door FGM, 18 May 2020, https://planinternational.org/news/2020-05-18-girls-somalia-subjected-door-door-fgm, accessed 6 May 2021
Presbyterian World Service & Development, Hope for Single Mothers in Somalia, 4 August 2020,
https://presbyterian.ca/pwsd/2020/08/04/hope-in-somalia/, accessed 7 May 2021
Puntland Post, Al-Shabaab Spokesman Orders ‘Assassination of Mudug Governor’, 11 January 2021,
https://puntlandpost.net/2021/01/11/al-shabaab-spokesman-orders-assassination-of-muduggovernor/, accessed 12 August 2021
Puntland State of Somalia, Constitution of Puntland State of Somalia, December 2009, available at:
http://citizenshiprightsafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Somalia-Puntland-ConstitutionDec2009.pdf, accessed 1 July 2021
Puntland State of Somalia, Xeerka Maaraynta Dhulka magaalooyinka Dawladda Puntland, 25 August
2020, http://puntlandparliament.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Xeerka-Maaraynta-DhulkaMagaalooyinka-Dowladda-PL-2020.pdf, accessed 8 July 2021
Qorilugud News 24, What Is The Situation In Dhabar-Dalol Area Of Sool Region Today?, 17 April
2021, https://qorilugudnews24.com/2021/04/17/what-is-the-situation-in-dhabar-dalol-area-of%E2%80%8B%E2%80%8Bsool-region/, accessed 8 July 2021
Radio Al-Furqaan, Al-Shabab executes six for 'spying for Somalia', 15 April 2020, translated by: BBC
Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 8 July 2021
Radio Al-Furqaan, Somali militants 'execute' three men accused of spying for US, 28 April 2020,
translated by: BBC Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed
8 July 2021
129

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Radio Andalus, Al-Shabab flogs man accused of rape in south-west Somalia, 7 June 2021, translated
by: BBC Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 1 July 2021
Radio Andalus, Al-Shabab kills Puntland state official in central Somalia, 5 November 2020,
translated by: BBC Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed
8 July 2021
Radio Andalus, Somalia's al-Shabab claims 23 killed in hotel raid, 1 February 2021, translated by: BBC
Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 8 July 2021
Radio Banaadir, Programme summary of Somalia's Radio Banadir news, 21 April 2021, translated by:
BBC Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 8 July 2021
Radio Dalsan, Alshabaab Executes 3 On Spying Claims, 27 January 2020, translated by: BBC
Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 8 July 2021
Radio Dalsan, Dagaal khasaare badan dhaliyay oo ka socda Gobolka Mudug, 12 November 2020,
https://www.radiodalsan.com/dagaal-khasaare-badan-dhaliyay-oo-ka-socda-gobolka-mudug/,
accessed 8 July 2021
Radio Dalsan, Dowladda oo Ciidan farabadan u dirtay Degmo lagu dilay dad shacab ah, 28 October
2020, https://www.radiodalsan.com/dowladda-oo-ciidan-farabadan-u-dirtay-degmo-lagu-dilay-dadshacab-ah/, accessed 8 July 2021
Radio Dalsan, Gunmen reportedly kill photographer in Somali capital, 17 February 2021, translated
by: BBC Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 8 July 2021
Radio Dalsan, Saraakiil ka tirsan Ciidanka Xoogga oo lagu dilay G/Galgaduud, 9 December 2020,
https://www.radiodalsan.com/faah-faahin-saraakiil-ka-tirsan-ciidanka-xoogga-oo-lagu-dilay-ggalgaduud/, accessed 8 July 2021
Radio Dalsan, Somali MP reportedly wounded in south-west Somalia blast, 16 August 2020,
translated by: BBC Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed
8 July 2021
Radio Dalsan, Somalia: Airstrike Destroys Al-Shabaab Radio Station in Lower Shabelle Region, 2January 2021, https://allafrica.com/stories/202101020259.html, accessed 20 August 2021
Radio Dalsan, Somalia's Puntland state sentences eight militants to death, 23 April 2021, translated
by: BBC Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 8 July 2021
Radio Kulmiye, Al-Shabab kills three Somali intelligence agents in capital, 28 February 2021,
translated by: BBC Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed
8 July 2021
Radio Kulmiye, At least 30 killed in central Somalia suicide bomb attack, 18 December 2020,
translated by: BBC Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed
8 July 2021
Radio Kulmiye, Dagaal khasaaro geystay oo ka dhacay Galbeedka Beledweyne, 5 May 2021,
https://radiokulmiye.net/2021/05/05/dagaal-khasaaro-geystay-oo-ka-dhacay-galbeedkabeledweyne/, accessed 8 July 2021
Radio Kulmiye, Dib u dhac markale ku yimid safar uu Cali Guudlaawe ku tagi lahaa Beledweyne,
25 November 2020, https://radiokulmiye.net/2020/11/25/dib-u-dhac-markale-ku-yimid-safar-uucali-guudlaawe-ku-tagi-lahaa-beledweyne/, accessed 8 July 2021
Radio Kulmiye, Maleeshiyaad hubeysan oo xalay gubay tuulo ku taala Hiiraan, 17 May 2021,
https://radiokulmiye.net/2021/05/17/maleeshiyaad-hubeysan-oo-xalay-gubay-tuulo-ku-taalahiiraan/, accessed 8 July 2021

130

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Radio Kulmiye, Midowga musharaxiinta oo war ka soo saaray xaaladda gobolka Hiiraan, 7 December
2020, https://radiokulmiye.net/2020/12/07/akhriso-midowga-musharaxiinta-oo-war-ka-soo-saarayxaaladda-gobolka-hiiraan/, accessed 8 July 2021
Radio Mustaqbal, Somali regional state official killed in suicide bomb, 11 September 2020, translated
by: BBC Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 8 July 2021
Radio Risala, Somaliland police arrest two for preaching Christianity, 5 October 2020, translated by:
BBC Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 8 July 2021
Radioalfurqaan, Wilaayada Mudug Oo Heshiis Dhex dhigtay Jufo katirsan Beesha Cayr, 23 November
2020, https://radioalfurqaan.com/2020/11/wilaayada-mudug-oo-heshiis-dhex-dhigtay-jufo-katirsanbeesha-ceyr/, accessed 8 July 2021
Republic of Somaliland, Constitution of the Republic of Somaliland, Translated by Ibrahim Hashi
Jama, 2000, http://www.somalilandlaw.com/Somaliland_Constitution_Text_only_Eng_IJSLL.pdf,
accessed 1 July 2021
Republic of Somaliland, Press Law, Translated by Deqa Gelle Hidig, Ali Gulaid, and Ibrahim Hashi
Jama, 2004, available at: http://www.somalilandlaw.com/press___media__law.htm, accessed
21 July 2021
Reuters, Blackwater founder's FSG signs security deal with Somali region, 22 June 2017,https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-somalia-frontier-service-idUKKBN19D1BC, accessed 8 July 2021
Reuters, Exclusive: Somalia lures defectors in new push against insurgents, 18 January 2018,https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-defections-exclusive-idUSKBN1FD0KO, accessed 8 July
2021
Reuters, Head of Somalia's military unhurt, civilian killed in suicide car bomb on convoy, 13 July
2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-blast-idUSKCN24E1VT, accessed 8 July 2021
Reuters, Somali Islamists kill man and teenager for gay sex, another man for spying, 10 January 2017,https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-execution-idUSKBN14U27G, accessed 8 July 2021
Reuters, Somalia’s first FGM prosecution ‘hampered’ by victim’s parents, 23 August 2018,https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-fgm-prosecution-idUSKCN1L824R, accessed 20 August
2021
Reuters, Somalia's Al-Shabaab stones to death woman accused of having multiple husbands, 9 May
2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/somalia-violence-idINKBN1IA1Z5, accessed 1 July 2021
Reuters, Somalia's Al-Shabaab stones woman to death for cheating on husband, 26 October 2017,https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-violence-idUSKBN1CV302, accessed 8 July 2021
Reuters, Somaliland issues fatwa banning female genital mutilation, 7 February 2018,https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-fgm-fatwa-idUSKBN1FR2RA
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-fgm-fatwa-idUSKBN1FR2RA, accessed 7 May 2021
Reuters, Spreading the net: Somali Islamists now target Kenyan recruits, 17 May 2019,https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-militants-idUSKCN1SN0OV, accessed 14 June 2021
Reuters, Suicide bombing by Somalia's Al-Shabaab group kills six, 10 May 2021,
https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/suicide-bomber-kills-six-police-officers-somali-capital-police2021-05-10/, accessed 8 July 2021
Reuters, Villages destroyed as rival Somali clans battle, 12 September 1999,
https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/villages-destroyed-rival-somali-clans-battle, accessed 8 July
2021

131

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

RNS (Religious News Service), Christian workers in Somalia worship in secret, fear al-Shabab,
7 January 2019, https://religionnews.com/2019/01/07/christian-workers-in-somalia-worship-insecret-fear-al-shabab/, accessed 1 July 2021
Robinson, Colin D., Somalia Must Replace Its Military and Security Chiefs, in: The Defense Post, 18
June 2021, https://www.thedefensepost.com/2021/06/18/somalia-must-replace-military-chiefs/
accessed 20 August 2021
RocketChat, IS claims gun attack on soldiers in Somali capital Mogadishu, 25 October 2020,
translated by: BBC Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed
8 July 2021
RSF (Reporters Sans Frontières), Somalia, Need to end the bloodshed, n.d.,
https://rsf.org/en/somalia, accessed 21 July 2021
RSF (Reporters Sans Frontières), Somalia’s new media law ignores calls for journalists to beprotected, 28 August 2020, https://rsf.org/en/news/somalias-new-media-law-ignores-callsjournalists-be-protected, accessed 11 June 2021
RSF (Reporters Sans Frontières), Somaliland court closes TV channel, jails owner for five years,
5 November 2020, https://rsf.org/en/news/somaliland-court-closes-tv-channel-jails-owner-fiveyears, accessed 11 June 2021
Saferworld, The missing link, access to Justice in Somaliland, 21 November 2018,https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/news-and-analysis/post/805-the-missing-link-improvingaccess-to-justice-in-somaliland, accessed 5 April 2021
Saferworld, The missing link: Access to justice and community security in Somalia, August 2020,
https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/1270-the-missing-link-access-to-justice-andcommunity-security-in-somalia, accessed 5 April 2021
Sahan, The Somali Wire, Issues January-June 2021, n.d., source requiring registration. Sahan is athink tank dedicated to promoting peace, stability, and development. With offices in Somalia, Kenya,and the UK, its primary focus is the Horn of Africa, East Africa and the Middle East, where its teampossesses decades of experience in political analysis, security dynamics, peace building, andgovernance, http://sahan.global/
Samatar, A. I., Al-Shabaab has created a perfect storm in Somalia, TRT World, 14 October 2020,
https://www.trtworld.com/opinion/al-shabaab-has-created-a-perfect-storm-in-somalia-40575,
accessed 8 July 2021
Santur, H. G., Reporter’s Diary: Heal Somalia’s former child soldiers, heal a nation, The New
Humanitarian, 22 October 2018, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2018/10/22/healsomalia-former-child-soldiers-heal-nation-al-shabab, accessed 14 June 2021
Save the Children, Covid-19: School closures put decades of gains for Somali children at risk, 13 July
2020, https://www.savethechildren.net/blog/covid-19-school-closures-put-decades-gains-somalichildren-risk, accessed 20 August 2021
Save the Children, Early Child Marriage in Somalia, September 2017,https://somalia.savethechildren.net/sites/somalia.savethechildren.net/files/library/FS07_Child_Mar
riage.pdf, accessed 13 April 2021
Schlee, G., Cutomary Law and the Joys of Statlessness: Somali realities beyond libertarian fantasies,
in: Turner, B. and Schlee, G. (eds.), On retaliation, Berghahn, Oxford, 2017, pp. 208-235
Schlee, G., How Enemies Are Made: Towards a Theory of Ethnic and Religious Conflict, 2008,
Berghahn, Oxford

132

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Schlee, G., Taking sides and constructing identities: reflections on conflict theory, in: Journal of theRoyal Anthropological Institute, vol. 10, no. 1, 2004, pp. 135-156
SFH (Schweizerische Flüchtlingshilfe), Somalia: Die Minderheitengruppe der Gabooye/Midgan, 5 Juli
2018, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2018035/180702-som-gabooye.pdf, accessed 21 July 2021
Shabelle Media Network, Al-Shabab executes 4 alleged spies, 5 September 2020, available at:https://web.archive.org/web/20200906005515/https://radioshabelle.com/al-shabab-executes-4alleged-spies/, accessed 8 July 2021
Shabelle Media Network, Local MP Killed in Puntland, 23 March 2020, available at:https://allafrica.com/stories/202003230965.html, accessed 8 July 2021
Shabelle Media Network, Somalia: Al-Shabaab Publicly Executes 4 in Somalia for Alleged Spying,
23 August 2020, available at: https://allafrica.com/stories/202008240502.html, accessed 8 July 2021
Shabelle Media Network, Somalia: Gunmen Carry Out an Attack in Bosaso City, 17 March 2020,
available at: https://allafrica.com/stories/202003180431.html, accessed 8 July 2021
Shabelle Media Network, Somalia: Puntland Imposes Severely Restrictive Directive On Journalists
and Media Houses, 23 September 2019, available at:https://allafrica.com/stories/201909230542.html, accessed 21 July 2021
Sida (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency), The Rights of LGBTI People inSomalia, November 2014,
https://publikationer.sida.se/contentassets/89da6ee09a8547a7b876ce8c02e49aee/18254.pdf,
accessed 16 August 2021
SIDRA (The Somali Institute for Development Research & Analysis), Breaking the Silence, May 2021,
https://sidrainstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Research-Report_Breaking-theSilence_SIDRA-SGJ_Blue-2-1.pdf, accessed 20 April 2021
SIDRA (The Somali Institute for Development Research & Analysis), Rape: A Rising Crisis and Reality
for the Women in Somalia, June 2019, https://media.africaportal.org/documents/Sidra_Abuse.pdf,
accessed 6 April 2021
SIHA (Strategic Initiative for women in the Horn of Africa), Women do not belong under the acacia
tree, June 2018, available at: http://bandhige.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/SomalilandRevised-Paper-FINAL-3_Received-from-Kafia1.pdf, accessed 11 April 2021
SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), Climate-related Security Risks andPeacebuilding in Somalia, SIPRI Policy Paper 53, October 2019,https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-10/sipripp53_2.pdf, accessed 14 June 2021
SJS (Somali Journalists Syndicate), Journalist Kilwe finally free after 84 days in prison on spurious
allegation, 22 March 2021, https://sjsyndicate.org/2021/03/22/after-84-days-in-jail-and-underperpetual-judicial-harassment-journalist-kilwe-is-freed/, accessed 11 June 2021
SJS (Somali Journalists Syndicate), Radio journalist detained in Hargeisa, Somali Parliament officials
threaten media over controversial sexual bill coverage, 15 September 2020,
https://sjsyndicate.org/2020/09/15/radio-journalist-detained-in-hargeisa-somali-parliamentofficials-threaten-media-over-controversial-sexual-bill/, accessed 11 June 2021
SJS (Somali Journalists Syndicate), Somali police officer assaults TV journalist during Covid-19
assignment in Mogadishu, 21 May 2020, https://sjsyndicate.org/2020/05/21/somali-police-officerassaults-tv-journalist-during-covid-19-assignment-in-mogadishu/, accessed 11 June 2021
SJS (Somali Journalists Syndicate), State of Press Freedom in Somalia in 2020: Threats and Violence
Against Journalists on the Rise With Total Impunity, 3 February 2021 https://sjsyndicate.org/wp-

133

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

content/uploads/2021/02/SJS-2020-ANNUAL-REPORT-State-of-Press-Freedom-in-Somalia-in2020.pdf, accessed 10 June 2021
SJS (Somalia Journalists Syndicate), Police and NISA officers attack journalists covering protest, beatfemale reporter and confiscate equipment in Mogadishu, 16 May 2021,
https://sjsyndicate.org/2021/05/16/police-and-nisa-officers-attack-journalists-beat-femalereporter-and-confiscate-equipment-in-mogadishu/, accessed 11 June 2021
SJS (Somalia Journalists Syndicate), South West State police raid Radio Barawe and detain its
journalist, 5 January 2021, https://sjsyndicate.org/2021/01/05/south-west-state-police-raid-radiobarawe-and-detain-its-journalist/, accessed 11 June 2021
Skjelderup, M., Ḥudūd Punishments in the Forefront: Application of Islamic Criminal Law by Harakat
Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahideen, in: Journal of Law and Religion, Vol. 29(2), 2014, pp. 317-329
Small Wars Journal, Al-Shabaab: Information Operations Strategy Overview, 29 August 2019,https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/al-shabaab-information-operations-strategy-overview,
accessed 20 August 2021
SOLJA (Somaliland Journalists Association), Brief on Somaliland Press Law 27/2004 Amendment
Process, 15 August 2018, https://soljaorg.com/?p=2459, accessed 21 July 2021
SOLJA (Somaliland Journalists Association), Media Freedom Report 2020, 10 December 2020,
https://soljaorg.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Final-Draft-Media-Freedom-Report-2020.pdf,
accessed 11 June 2021
SOMA (Somali Media Association), Radio Kulmiye journalist held incommunicado for five days freed,
22 October 2020, https://soma.org.so/radio-kulmiye-journalist-held-incommunicado-for-five-daysfreed/, accessed 11 June 2021
Somali Affairs, Somali interior minister travels to central town amid political tension, 3 December
2020, https://www.somaliaffairs.com/news/somali-interior-minister-travels-to-central-town-amidpolitical-tension/, accessed 8 July 2021
Somali Affairs, Somalia: Casualties in clan clashes in Sool, 16 April 2021,
https://www.somaliaffairs.com/news/somalia-casualties-in-clan-clashes-in-sool/, accessed 8 July
2021
Somali Dispatch, Somaliland deports couple spreading Christianity to Mogadishu, 19 November
2020, https://www.somalidispatch.com/latest-news/somaliland-deports-couple-spreadingchristianity-to-mogadishu/, accessed 1 July 2021
Somali Dispatch, Somaliland: Two Christian Preachers Arrested, 6 October 2020,
https://www.somalidispatch.com/latest-news/somaliland-two-christian-preachers-arrested/,
accessed 1 July 2021
Somali Memo, Al-Shabab claims attacks in Somalia's capital, 23 January 2021, translated by: BBC
Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 8 July 2021
Somali Memo, Al-Shabab claims killing official outside Somali capital, 23 March 2021, translated by:
BBC Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 8 July 2021
Somali Memo, Al-Shabab claims killing Somali spy agency official, 13 August 2020, translated by: BBC
Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 8 July 2021
Somali Memo, Al-Shabab claims killing UN 'officer' in Somali capital, 24 December 2020, translated
by: BBC Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 8 July 2021
Somali Memo, Al-Shabab claims suicide bomb attack in Somali capital, 28 April 2021, translated by:
BBC Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 8 July 2021

134

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Somali Memo, Al-Shabab execute six for 'spying for US, Kenya and Somalia', 31 March 2020,
translated by: BBC Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed
8 July 2021
Somali Memo, Al-Shabab kill senior army official in southern Somalia, 17 April 2021, translated by:
BBC Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 8 July 2021
Somali Memo, Al-Shabab kills electoral delegate in Somali capital, 13 October 2020, translated by:
BBC Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 8 July 2021
Somali Memo, Al-Shabab kills former village chief in southern Somalia, 5 August 2020, translated by:
BBC Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 8 July 2021
Somali Memo, Al-Shabab kills four intelligence officers in Somali capital, 28 December 2020,
translated by: BBC Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed
8 July 2021
Somali Memo, Al-Shabab kills military official in Somali capital, 24 October 2020, translated by: BBC
Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 8 July 2021
Somali Memo, Al-Shabab kills revenue officer in Somali capital, 24 February 2021, translated by: BBC
Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 8 July 2021
Somali Memo, Al-Shabab kills security official in southern Somalia, 10 April 2021, translated by: BBC
Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 8 July 2021
Somali Memo, Al-Shabab 'kills' Somali security official in Puntland, 1 April 2021, translated by: BBC
Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 8 July 2021
Somali Memo, Al-Shabab reportedly kills three Somali district officials, 25 February 2020, translated
by: BBC Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 8 July 2021
Somali Memo, Al-Shabab says killed two Somali intelligence officials in south, 1 June 2021,
translated by: BBC Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed
8 July 2021
Somali Memo, Al-Shabab says top general was target of Somali hotel attack, 1 February 2021,
translated by: BBC Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed
8 July 2021
Somali Memo, Al-Shabab takes credit for deadly bombing in central Somalia, 18 December 2020,
translated by: BBC Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed
8 July 2021
Somali Memo, Boqolaal Neef Geel ah oo diyo ahaan loogu kala wareejiyay Beelo ku dagaallamay
Soomaaliya, 6 October 2020, https://somalimemo.info/articles/13729/Sawirro-Boqolaal-Neef-Geelah-oo-diyo-ahaan-loogu-kala-wareejiyay-Beelo-ku-dagaallamay-Soomaaliya, accessed 8 July 2021
Somali Memo, Gunmen kill Somali soldier in Mogadishu, 24 April 2021, translated by: BBC
Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 8 July 2021
Somali Memo, Somali militants chop off two men's hands for theft, 25 June 2020, translated by: BBC
Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 1 July 2021
Somali Memo, Somali militants cut off man's hand over theft, 1 March 2021, translated by: BBC
Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 1 July 2021
Somali Memo, Somali militants kill intelligence agent and poll delegate, 21 October 2020, translated
by: BBC Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 8 July 2021

135

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Somali Memo, Somalia's al-Shabab kills three 'soldiers' in public, 26 January 2020, translated by: BBC
Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 8 July 2021
Somalia, Legislative Decree No. 5 of 16 December 1962: Penal Code, 16 December 1962, available at:https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/88090/100622/F535012683/SOM88090%20ENG.pdf and http://www.somalilandlaw.com/Penal_Code_English.pdf, accessed 1 July 2021
Somalia, MoP (The Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development), Somalia National
Development Plan 2020 to 2024, December 2019, https://mop.gov.so/wpcontent/uploads/2019/12/NDP-9-2020-2024.pdf, accessed 5 April 2021
Somalia, National GBV Strategy, 2018-2020, GBV Sub Cluster Somalia, 2020, available at:https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Somalia%20%20National%20GBV%20strategy%202018-2020.pdf, accessed 5 April 2021
Somalia, Provisional Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia, 1 August 2012,https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/94693/111147/F1279445166/Somalia_Provision
al-Constitution_2012_ENGLISH.pdf, accessed 1 July 2021
Somalia, The Somali Health and Demographic Survey, 2020, available at:https://somalia.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pubpdf/FINAL%20SHDS%20Report%202020_V7_0.pdf, accessed 6 April 2021
Somaliland Standard, 4 Christians arrested on charges of “spreading the faith” in Somaliland,
16 February 2021, https://somalilandstandard.com/4-christians-arrested-on-charges-of-spreadingthe-faith-in-somaliland/, accessed 1 July 2021
Somaliland Standard, A senior officer defects from Somaliland military, 11 August 2018,https://somalilandstandard.com/a-senior-officer-defects-from-somaliland-military/, accessed 8 July
2021
Somaliland Standard, Somaliland Army clashes with Rebel Group, 27 July 2019,https://somalilandstandard.com/somaliland-army-clashes-with-rebel-group/, accessed 8 July 2021
Somaliland Sun (The), Somaliland: Religious Persecution or Law Enforcement? The Saga of Christians
Tribulations in Hargeisa, 17 February 2021, https://www.somalilandsun.com/somaliland-religiouspersecution-or-law-enforcement-the-saga-of-christians-tribulations-in-hargeisa/, accessed 1 July
2021
Somaliland, Aarre Rebels in Sanaag Region agree on peace accord, 3 January 2020,
https://www.somaliland.com/news/somaliland/aarre-rebels-in-sanaag-region-agree-on-peaceaccord/, accessed 8 July 2021
Somaliland, Somaliland army fights off rebel forces, 27 July 2019,https://www.somaliland.com/news/somaliland/somaliland-army-aarre-rebels-near-erigavocasualties-reported/, accessed 8 July 2021
Somaliland, Somaliland Family & Personal Law, 1975,
http://www.somalilandlaw.com/family___personal_law.html, accessed 26 April 2021
Somaliland, Somaliland president announced a deal with defected Colonel Aarre, 25 July 2019,https://www.somaliland.com/news/somaliland/somaliland-president-announced-a-deal-withdefected-colonel-aarre/, accessed 8 July 2021
Somalilandlaw.com, Somaliland Criminal Laws, Penal Code & other Special Criminal Laws, last
updated September 2020, http://www.somalilandlaw.com/criminal_law.html, accessed 11 June
2021
SOMRAF (Somali Minority Rights and Aid Forum), Report on human rights violations against theSomali marginalized minority groups, 2010,136

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

https://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session11/SO/SOMRAF_SomaliMinorityRightsAidF
orum-eng.pdf, accessed 8 July 2021
SOMRAF (Somali Minority Rights and Aid Forum), Situation and Rights of Somali minorities: “No one
will weep for you’ – exclusion and discrimination”, December 2009
Spartacus, Gay Travel Index, 11 Mach 2020, https://spartacus.gayguide.travel/gaytravelindex.pdf,
accessed 8 July 2021
Stern, O. M., The Invisible Women of Al-Shabaab, September 2019, http://www.orlystern.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/The-Invisible-Women-of-al-Shabaab-.pdf, accessed 12 August 2021
Stern, O., Married in the Shadows: The Wives of al-Shabaab, 2020, available at:
http://www.orlystern.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Wives-of-al-Shabaab-final.pdf, accessed
5 April 2021. The original source website, Married in the Shadows, is no longer accessible.
Stewart, C., Report: Somalia too risky for LGBT people, 16 February 2016,
https://76crimes.com/2016/02/16/report-somalia-too-risky-for-lgbt-people/, accessed 8 July 2021
Straits Times, The worst countries in the world to be LGBT+, 2 April 2019,https://www.straitstimes.com/world/the-worst-countries-in-the-world-to-be-lgbt, accessed 8 July
2021
Sweden, Swedish Migration Agency (Migrationsverket), Lifos Report, Somalia: the position of womenin the clan system, 27 April 2018,https://lifos.migrationsverket.se/dokument?documentAttachmentId=45863, accessed 8 July 2021
Sweden, Swedish Migration Agency (Migrationsverket), Lifos Report, Women in Somalia Pregnancies and Children out of Wedlock, 1 June 2017,https://lifos.migrationsverket.se/dokument?documentSummaryId=39585, accessed 6 April 2021
Sweden, Swedish Migration Agency (Migrationsverket), Somalia Säkerhetssituationen 2020 (version
1.2) [Security situation in Somalia], 12 May 2021,
https://lifos.migrationsverket.se/dokument?documentAttachmentId=48435, accessed 14 June 2021
Switzerland, SEM (Staatssekretariat für Migration), Focus Somalia: Clans und Minderheiten, 31 May
2017,
https://www.sem.admin.ch/dam/data/sem/internationales/herkunftslaender/afrika/som/SOMclans-d.pdf, accessed 8 July 2021
Taarnby, M., and Hallundbaek, L., Al-Shabaab: The Internationalization of Militant Islamism inSomalia and the Implications for Radicalisation Processes in Europe, 26 February 2010
Taylor, C. et al., The Cost of Defection: The Consequences of Quitting Al-Shabaab, in: International
Journal of Conflict and Violence, Vol. 13/2019, 2019,https://www.ijcv.org/index.php/ijcv/article/view/3122/pdf, pp. 1-13, accessed 14 June 2021
TNH (The New Humanitarian), Fear of more clashes in Middle Shabelle, 18 June 2002,
https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/fr/node/201278, accessed 20 August 2021
UN (United Nations) News, Somalia: Draft law a ‘major setback’ for victims of sexual violence,
11 August 2020, https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/08/1070022, accessed 12 April 2021
UN (United Nations) News, UN lauds Somalia as country ratifies landmark children’s rights treaty,
20 January 2015, https://news.un.org/en/story/2015/01/488692-un-lauds-somalia-country-ratifieslandmark-childrens-rights-treaty, accessed 5 April 2021
UN (United Nations) Somalia, Common Country Analysis 2020, 2020,
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2052858/UN+Somalia+Common+Country+Analysis+2020_3.pdf,
accessed 8 July 2021

137

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

UN (United Nations), Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against WomenNew York of the year of 1979, 18 December 1979, available at:https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cedaw.aspx, accessed 6 April 2021
UN (United Nations), What is domestic abuse, n.d., https://www.un.org/en/coronavirus/what-isdomestic-abuse, accessed 28 April 2021
UN Human Rights Council, Compilation on Somalia; Report of the Office of the United Nations HighCommissioner for Human Rights [A/HRC/WG.6/38/SOM/2], 26 February 2021,
https://undocs.org/en/A/HRC/WG.6/38/SOM/2, accessed 11 June 2021
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in
Somalia, (10 to 28 September 2018), 19 July 2018, A/HRC/39/72,
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/G1822955.pdf, accessed 8 July 2021
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes
and consequences (9 to 16 December 2011), A/HRC/20/16/Add.3, 14 May 2012,https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session20/A-HRC-20-16Add3_en.pdf, accessed 6 April 2021
UN Human Rights Council, Situation of Human Rights in Somalia, 24 August 2020, http://daccessods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=A/HRC/45/52&Lang=E, accessed 8 July 2021
UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, S/2020/949, 28 September 2020,
https://www.undocs.org/S/2020/949, accessed 14 June 2021
UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization), UNESCO observatory of
killed journalists – Somalia, n.d., https://fr.unesco.org/themes/safetyjournalists/observatory/country/223812, accessed 11 June 2021
UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund), Child marriage - Frequently Asked Questions, January
2020, https://www.unfpa.org/child-marriage, accessed 5 April 2021
UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund), Enforcing the Sexual Offences Law in Puntland,
28 September 2020, https://somalia.unfpa.org/en/news/enforcing-sexual-offences-law-puntland,
accessed 6 April 2021
UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund), Funding for gender equality and the empowerment of
women and girls in Humanitarian programming, June 2020,
https://www.unfpa.org/resources/somalia-funding-gender-equality-and-empowerment-womenand-girls-humanitarian-programming, accessed 5 April 2021
UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund), Gender Based Violence in Somalia, April 2020,
https://somalia.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/GenderBased%20Violence%20in%20Somalia%20-%20V3%20-%20Digital.pdf, accessed 5 April 2021
UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund), IRC (International Rescue Committee), UNHCR (United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Overview of the Gender Based Violence
Information Management System, n.d. http://gbvims.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/Overview-ofthe-GBVIMS2.pdf, accessed 6 April 2021
UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund), Overview of Gender Based Violence in Somalia, 5 March
2021, https://somalia.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/resourcepdf/somalia_gbv_advocacy_brief_05march21.pdf, accessed 20 March 2021
UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund), Somalia Gender Justice & the law, 2018,https://arabstates.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/Somalia%20Country%20Assessment%20%20English.pdf, accessed 5 April 2021

138

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Gender-Based Violence, n.d.,
https://www.unhcr.org/gender-based-violence.html, accessed 29 March 2021
UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Pastoral Society And Transnational
Refugees: Population Movements In Somaliland And Eastern Ethiopia 1988 – 2000, UNHCR Working
Paper No. 65, August 2002, https://www.unhcr.org/research/working/3d5d0f3a4/pastoral-societytransnational-refugees-population-movements-somaliland.html, accessed 8 July 2021
UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Position Paper Defining a Common
Definition of Vulnerability: Marginalized and Minority Groups, Protection Cluster, March 2021,
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/position_paper_defining_a_common_definition_of_vulnerability_marginalized_and_minority_gr
oups_march_2021.pdf, accessed 12 August 2021
UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund), Child marriage, April 2020, https://www.unfpa.org/childmarriage, accessed 31 March 2021
UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund), Child marriage, n.d.,
https://www.unicef.org/protection/child-marriage, accessed 31 March 2021
UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund), Child Marriage: Latest trends and future prospects, July
2018, https://data.unicef.org/resources/child-marriage-latest-trends-and-future-prospects/,
accessed 26 April 2021
UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund), Early Marriage, 2005, available at:
http://www.factsforlife.org/pdf/Early_Marriage_12.lo.pdf, accessed 26 April 2021
United Kingdom, Asylum and Immigration Tribunal / Immigration Appellate Authority, MA (Galgale Sab Clan) Somalia v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, CG [2006] UKIAT 00073, 17 July
2006, https://www.refworld.org/cases,GBR_AIT,467f8d9c2.html, accessed 8 July 2021
United Kingdom, Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, Human Rights and Democracy:2020 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office report, 8 July 2021,
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/human-rights-and-democracy-report-2020/humanrights-and-democracy-2020-foreign-commonwealth-development-office-report, accessed 21 July
2021
Universal Somali TV, Somalia's Puntland denies al-Shabab seizing Sanaag villages, 25 October 2020,
translated by: BBC Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed
8 July 2021
Universal Somali TV, Two killed in southern Somalia clan feud 29 September 2020, translated by:
BBC Monitoring, available by subscription at: https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/, accessed 8 July 2021
UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), Humanitarian
Response Plan Somalia, February 2021, available athttps://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2045778/HRP_2021-Somalia.pdf, accessed 5 April 2021
UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), A study on minorities
in Somalia, 2002, https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/study-minorities-somalia, accessed 8 July
2021
UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), Somalia; 2020
Humanitarian Access Overview, April 2021,
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/fil
es/access_snapshot_2020_v4.pdf, accessed 8 July 2021
UNOHCHR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights), Comment by UN
High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet on draft Sexual Intercourse Related Crimes

139

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Law in Somalia, 10 August 2020,
https://www.ohchr.org/SP/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26160&LangID=E,
accessed 6 May 2021
UNOHCHR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights), Report of the
Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia, (9 to 27 September 2019),
A/HRC/42/62, 16 September 2019,https://undocs.org/en/A/HRC/42/62https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/A_HRC_42_62_AEV.pdf, accessed 5 April 2021
UNOHCHR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights), Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women New York of the year of 1979, 1979,
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cedaw.aspx, accessed 20 April 2021
UNOHCHR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights), United Nation
Convention on the Rights of the Child of the year 1989, 44/25, 1990,
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Professional·interest/Pages/CRC.aspx, accessed 5 May 2021
UNSG (United Nations Secretary-General), Conflict-related sexual violence, S/2021/312, 30 March
2021, https://undocs.org/S/2021/312, accessed 8 July 2021
UNSG (United Nations Secretary-General), Situation in Somalia, S/2021/154, 17 February 2021,
https://undocs.org/S/2021/154, accessed 14 June 2021
UNSG (United Nations Secretary-General), Situation in Somalia, S/2020/1113, 13 November 2020,
https://undocs.org/S/2020/1113, accessed 14 June 2021
UNSG (United Nations Secretary-General), Situation in Somalia, S/2020/798, 13 August 2020,
https://undocs.org/S/2020/798, accessed 14 June 2021
UNSG (United Nations Secretary-General), Situation in Somalia, S/2020/398, 13 May 2020,
https://undocs.org/S/2020/398, accessed 14 June 2021
UNSG (United Nations Secretary-General), Situation in Somalia, S/2020/121, 13 February 2020,
https://undocs.org/S/2020/121, accessed 8 July 2021
UNSG (United Nations Secretary-General), Situation in Somalia, S/2021/485, 19 May 2021,
https://undocs.org/S/2021/485, accessed 14 June 2021
UNSOM (United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia) and UNOHCHR (Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights), Protection of Civilians Report; Building the Foundation for
Peace, Security and Human Rights in Somalia, 2 October 2020,
https://unsom.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/protection_of_civilians_report.pdf, accessed 1 July
2021
UNSOM (United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia), The precarious enjoyment of freedom of
expression in Somalia, September 2018,https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/SO/UNSOM_Report_September2018.pdf, accessed
21 July 2021
UNSOM (United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia), UN calls for more action to eliminate
conflict-related sexual violence in Somalia, 19 June 2020, https://unsom.unmissions.org/un-callsmore-action-eliminate-conflict-related-sexual-violence-somalia, accessed 12 April 2021
UNSOM (United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia), UNSOM Newsletter, Issue 18 (Quarterly),
March 2021,
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2052835/unsom_quarterly_newsletter_mar_2021.pdf, accessed
8 July 2021

140

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

UNWOMEN (United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women), Somalia,
n.d., https://data.unwomen.org/country/somalia, accessed 31 March 2021
UNWOMEN, Somalia, n.d., https://data.unwomen.org/country/somalia, accessed 6 April 2021
USAID (The United States Agency for International Development), Somalia – Complex Emergency,
8 January 2021, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/01.08.21_-_USAIDBHA_Somalia_Complex_Emergency_Fact_Sheet_1.pdf, accessed 5 April 2021
USAID (The United States Agency for International Development), Somalia overview, 10 March 2020,
https://www.usaid.gov/somalia/fact-sheets/somalia-overview, accessed 5 April 2021
USAID (United States Agency for International Development), Alternative Dispute Resolution
Initiatives in Somalia 2020, June 2020,
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/ADRReport.pdf, accessed 5 April 2021
USDOS (US Department of State), 2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia,
11 March 2020, https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-country-reports-on-human-rightspractices/somalia/, accessed 21 July 2021
USDOS (US Department of State), 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia,
30 March 2021, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/SOMALIA-2020-HUMANRIGHTS-REPORT.pdf, accessed 17 June 2021
USDOS (US Department of State), Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 - Somalia,
2016, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Somalia-1.pdf, accessed 6 April 2021
USDOS (US Department of State), International Religious Freedom Report 2020 - Somalia, 12 May
2021, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/240282-SOMALIA-2020INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS-FREEDOM-REPORT.pdf, accessed 1 July 2021
Van Lehman, D. and Eno, O., The Somali Bantu: Their history and culture, Center for Applied
Linguistics, Washington, 2003, http://hartfordinfo.org/issues/wsd/immigrants/somali_bantu.pdf,
accessed 8 July 2021
Van Lehmann, D. J. and McKee, E. M., Removals to Somalia in light of the convention against torture:
Recent evidence from Somali Bantu deportees, in: Georgetown Immigration Law Journal, Vol. 33 No.
3, 2019, https://www.law.georgetown.edu/immigration-law-journal/wpcontent/uploads/sites/19/2019/08/GT-GILJ190032.pdf, pp. 357-397, accessed 8 July 2021
Vitturini, E., The Gaboye of Somaliland: transformations and historical continuities of the labour
exploitation and marginalization of hereditary groups of occupational specialists, in: Journal of
Eastern African Studies, 14:3, 2020, pp. 473-491
VOA (Voice of America), Al-Shabab Kills 18 in Surge of Executions, 8 July 2019,https://www.voanews.com/africa/al-shabab-kills-18-surge-executions, accessed 1 July 2021
VOA (Voice of America), Al-Shabab Militants Abduct, Kill Somali Lawmaker, 5 July 2020,
https://www.voanews.com/africa/al-shabab-militants-abduct-kill-somali-lawmaker, accessed
12 August 2021
VOA (Voice of America), At Least 10 Killed in Somalia After Fighting Between Al-Shabab, Residents,
12 August 2020, https://www.voanews.com/africa/least-10-killed-somalia-after-fighting-betweenal-shabab-residents, accessed 8 July 2021
VOA (Voice of America), Militant Attacks Kills 22 in Somalia, 26 November 2018,https://www.voanews.com/africa/militant-attacks-kills-22-somalia, accessed 1 July 2021

141

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

VOA (Voice of America), Somali Islamist Militants Execute Man for Blasphemy, 24 April 2015,
https://www.voanews.com/africa/somali-islamist-militants-execute-man-blasphemy, accessed
1 July 2021
VOA (Voice of America), Somalia Leaders Agree to Hold Election Within 60 Days, 27 May 2021,
27 May 2021, https://www.voanews.com/africa/somalia-leaders-agree-hold-election-within-60days, accessed 8 July 2021
VOA (Voice of America), Somalia’s al-Shabab Publicly Executes 3 for Spying, 29 April 2020,
https://www.voanews.com/africa/somalias-al-shabab-publicly-executes-3-spying, accessed 8 July2021
VOA (Voice of America), Survey Shows Somalis Have Mostly Shared Vision for Future, 20 June 2012,https://www.voanews.com/africa/survey-shows-somalis-have-mostly-shared-vision-future,accessed 8 July 2021
VOA, UN Urges End to Sexual Violence in Conflict Areas, 19 June 2020,
https://www.voanews.com/africa/un-urges-end-sexual-violence-conflict-areas, accessed 20 August
2021
Washington Post, ‘If I don’t pay, they kill me’: Al-Shabab tightens grip on Somalia with growing tax
racket, 30 August 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/if-i-dont-pay-they-kill-meal-shabab-tightens-its-grip-on-somalia-with-growing-tax-racket/2019/08/30/81472b38-beac-11e9a8b0-7ed8a0d5dc5d_story.html, accessed 8 July 2021
Webersik, C., Hansen, S. J., and Egal, A., Somalia: A Political Economy Analysis, 2018,https://nmbu.brage.unit.no/nmbuxmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/2503735/NUPI_rapport_Somalia_Webersik_Hansen_Egal.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y&fbclid=IwAR1YL9oSMINSL1iIP6oP8W3Si1UNZMs7oVE8R7dqrDWPVnb4ML9jLoekzo, accessed 12 August 2021
WHO (World Health Organization), Female Genital mutilation, 3 February 2020,
https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/female-genital-mutilation, accessed 27 April
2021
WHO (World Health Organization), Understanding and addressing violence against women, 2012,
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/77432/WHO_RHR_12.36_eng.pdf;jsessionid=56B3
B6A1B24937765FFC59DE315375B6?sequence=1, accessed 31 March 2021
World Bank (The), To end child marriage, Somali mindsets must change, [Blogs], 25 June 2020,
https://blogs.worldbank.org/youth-transforming-africa/end-child-marriage-somali-mindsets-mustchange, accessed 25 April 2021
Zorc, D. R., Osman, M. M. and Luling, V., Somali-English Dictionary, Dunwoody Press, 1993

142

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

Annex 2: Terms of Reference[Selected] Profiles
1. Recruitment by Al-Shabaab
1.1. Men, youth, and child recruitment by Al-Shabaab (including forms, distribution, changes
across controlled and non-controlled areas, etc.)
1.2. Repercussions for deserters from Al-Shabaab (including information on forms of targeting,executions, rehabilitation centres and their targeting, etc.)
2. Women and girls
2.1. GBV and situation of women in the Somali society (including domestic violence and sexual
violence; access to justice for victims, etc.)
2.2. Forced and child marriage (in Al-Shabaab controlled areas and elsewhere)
2.3. FGM (including breakdown on methods used: FGM WHO type I-III, their share, social
acceptance (does society consider girls with type I as sufficiently circumcised? Where?);including insights about (extended) family’s role)
2.4. The situation of single women (including women in IDP camps, single mothers, e.g. widows,
divorced mothers, and children born out of wedlock)
3. Individuals perceived as contravening religious (and customary) laws/tenets
3.1. Individuals contravening religious laws in Al-Shabaab controlled areas (e.g. the issues of
blasphemy and apostasy, extramarital relationships, individuals perceived as westernised,etc.)
3.2. Individuals contravening religious (and customary) tenets elsewhere in Somalia (e.g., theissues of blasphemy and apostasy, religious minorities, etc.)
4. Minorities
4.1. Low Status Occupational Minorities
4.2. Minority Clans
4.3. Ethnic Minorities
4.4. Mixed-marriages
5. Individuals involved in blood feuds/clan disputes and other clan issues
5.1. Clan revenge and vulnerability in clan conflicts (including for women)
6. Individual supporting or perceived as supporting the FGS/the International Community,
and/or as opposing Al-Shabaab
6.1. Government and Army Officials
6.2. Pro- AMISOM, FMS forces and the like
6.3. Other individuals opposing or perceived as opposing Al-Shabaab (including human rights
defenders, humanitarian/NGO personnel, those refusing to pay taxes/protection money,etc.)
7. Journalists
8. LGBTIQ

143

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

144

Country of origin information report | Somalia: Targeted profiles

doi: 10.2847/13745

145