European Asylum Support OfficeAfghanistan
Anti-Government
Elements (AGEs)
Country of Origin Information ReportAugust 2020
SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION

European Asylum Support OfficeAfghanistan
Anti-Government Elements(AGEs)Country of Origin Information ReportAugust 2020

More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu).

PDF ISBN: 978-92-9485-648-7 doi: 10.2847/14756

BZ0220563ENN© European Asylum Support Office (EASO) 2020
Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged, unless otherwise stated.
For third-party materials reproduced in this publication, reference is made to the copyrightstatements of the respective third parties.
Cover photo: © ResoluteSupportMedia/Major James Crawford, Kandahar, Afghanistan
11 April 2011 url CC BY 2.0
Taliban fighters met with Government of the Republic of Afghanistan officials in Kandahar City,
11 April 2011, and peacefully surrendered their arms as part of the government's peace andreintegration process.

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AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT

Acknowledgements
This report was drafted by the European Asylum Support Office Country of Origin Information (COI)
Sector.
The following national asylum and migration departments and organisations contributed by reviewing
this report:

Denmark, Danish Immigration Service
The Netherlands, Office for Country Information and Language Analysis, Ministry of Justice
ACCORD, the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation

It must be noted that the review carried out by the mentioned departments and organisations
contributes to the overall quality of the report, but it does not necessarily imply their formal
endorsement of the final report, which is the full responsibility of EASO.

AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 5

Contents
Acknowledgements..................................................................................................................4
Contents .................................................................................................................................5
Disclaimer ...............................................................................................................................7
Glossary and abbreviations .......................................................................................................8
Introduction ............................................................................................................................9
Terms of Reference..............................................................................................................9
Methodology .......................................................................................................................9
Structure and use of the report.............................................................................................9
Map ...................................................................................................................................... 10
1. General overview ............................................................................................................... 11
1.1 Anti-Government Elements (AGEs) ................................................................................ 11
1.2 Negotiations on the Doha Agreement with the Taliban ................................................... 12
1.2.1 Motivations and targeting patterns since the Doha Agreement ................................. 13
2. The Taliban ........................................................................................................................ 16
2.1 Structure and leadership ............................................................................................... 16
2.2 Strength, presence, territorial control, and capacity ....................................................... 19
2.3 Objectives .................................................................................................................... 20
2.4 Recruitment strategies ................................................................................................. 21
2.4.1 Child recruitment ................................................................................................... 21
2.5 Human rights violations and abuses............................................................................... 21
2.6 Targeted individuals ..................................................................................................... 22
2.6.1 Members of the Afghan security forces and pro-government militias ........................ 22
2.6.2 Government officials and those perceived as supporting the government ................. 24
3. Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP)................................................................................. 29
3.1 Structure and leadership ............................................................................................... 29
3.2 Strength, presence, territorial control, capacity .............................................................. 30
3.3 Objectives .................................................................................................................... 32
3.4 Recruitment strategies ................................................................................................. 33
3.5 Human rights violations and abuses............................................................................... 34
3.6 Targeted individuals and recent attacks ......................................................................... 34
3.6.1 Hazara Shia ............................................................................................................ 34
3.6.2 Sikhs ...................................................................................................................... 34
3.6.3 Other examples of treatment of opponents, including perceived ‘infidels’, ‘apostates’,
spies or other insurgents ................................................................................................. 35

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AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT

4. Other AGEs ........................................................................................................................ 36
4.1 Haqqani network.......................................................................................................... 36
4.2 Al Qaeda and affiliates .................................................................................................. 37
4.3 Foreign AGEs and fighters ............................................................................................. 38
Annex I: Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 40
Annex II: Terms of Reference .................................................................................................. 52

AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 7

Disclaimer
This report was written according to the EASO COI Report Methodology (2019). 1 The report is basedon carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced.
The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed with utmost
care. However, this document does not claim to be exhaustive. If a particular event, person ororganisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has not taken place orthat the person or organisation does not exist.
Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particular application
for international protection. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative of a particular legal
position.
‘Refugee’, ‘risk’ and similar terminology are used as generic terminology and not in the legal sense as
applied in the EU Asylum Acquis, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the
Status of Refugees.
Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may bemade of the information contained in this report.
The drafting of this report was finalised 18 June 2020. Any event taking place after this date is notincluded in this report. More information on the reference period for this report can be found in themethodology section of the Introduction.

1 The EASO methodology is largely based on the Common EU Guidelines for processing Country of Origin Information (COI),

2008, and can be downloaded from the EASO website: http://www.easo.europa.eu.

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AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORTGlossary and abbreviations
AAN

Afghanistan Analysts Network

AGE

Anti-Government Element

AIHRC

Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission

Apostasy

The act of leaving Islam; a hudud crime punishable by death undershariaEmir

Arabic word used for a commander

fatwa

A ruling or opinion given by the head of a religious community in
Islam

HazaraAn ethnic group who are mainly Shia

Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan

The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan was the state in Afghanistan from1996 to 2001 under the Taliban ruling government. The Taliban stilluses this name to refer to itself.

ISKP

Islamic State in Khorasan Province; affiliates of ISIL based in Pakistan
and Afghanistan. Also called ISK.

Jihad

Islamic ‘holy war’

Kafir, kufr, kofaar

An ‘unbeliever’ in Islam; label those deemed anti-Islamic; ‘foreign
infidels’Kangaroo court

A tribunal outside statutory judicial authorities that does not follow
official legal procedures

LayehaTaliban’s code of conduct

Local Uprising Forces

Government-supported local militia groups that fight against the
Taliban and ISKP

MullahIslamic cleric (teachers and preachers) who studied in a madrasa. In
Afghanistan they are very prevalent outside the cities and usually thesingle religious authority in a village. They can often read Arabic and
the Koran2

Quetta Shura

A concept describing the most senior group of Taliban leaders

ShariaThe religious law of Islam; Islamic canonical law

Shura

A decision-making community council; often formed for non-state
dispute settlement; made up of a group of people with community
authority (elders) to discuss and find solutions to a problem3

TarjomanInterpreters

2 Encyclopædia Britannica, inc., Mullah, 2 April 2014, url
3 ALEP, Stanford Law School, Introduction to the Criminal Law of Afghanistan, 2012, url, p. 76

AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 9

Introduction
The purpose of this report is to provide relevant information for the assessment of international
protection status determination, including refugee status and subsidiary protection. This report ismeant to be read in conjunction with other 2020 EASO COI reports on Afghanistan, which provide
relevant information regarding topics such as state structure and security forces, customary justiceand informal dispute resolution, targeted violence, security situation and armed conflict
developments, key socio-economic indicators.
The report provides an overview of the main Anti-Government Elements (AGEs) in Afghanistan,
primarily the Taliban and Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), with a focus on describing the modus
operandi, structure and activities of these groups with respect to targeted killings and attacks onparticular profiles.

Terms of Reference
The terms of reference (ToR) of this report were defined by EASO based on discussions held with andinput received from COI experts in the EASO COI specialist network on Afghanistan and from policy
experts in EU+ countries4 within the framework of a country guidance development on Afghanistan.
Terms of reference for this report can be found in Annex II.

Methodology
This report is produced in line with the EASO COI Report Methodology (2019) 5 and the EASO COI
Writing and Referencing Style Guide (2019).6
The information gathered is a result of research using public, specialised paper-based and electronicsources until 18 June 2020. Minor clarifications and some minor additional information were added
during the finalisation of this report in response to feedback received during the quality control
process, until 27 July 2020. Some additional information was also added as a result of input received
from co-director at the Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN), Kate Clark, during an online interview
held with EASO on 27 July 2020.
Sources in Pashto and Dari used in this report were duly assessed and informally translated by a native
speaker within EASO.

Structure and use of the report
The report is divided into four sections: Section 1 provides a general overview of the situation relating
to armed conflict and AGEs, as well as recent developments on the Doha agreement with the US
government and the Taliban; Section 2 provides information on the main points of the structure andmodus operandi of the Taliban and main targeted profiles related to this group; Section 3 provides
information on the ISKP and main targeted profiles; Section 4 provides an overview of other AGEs
operating in Afghanistan, such as Al Qaeda, Haqqani Network and Foreign AGEs.

4

EU Member States plus Norway and Switzerland

5 EASO, EASO Country of Origin Information (COI) Report Methodology, June 2019, url
6 EASO, Writing and Referencing Guide for EASO Country of Origin Information (COI) Reports, June 2019, url10 —AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT

Map

Map 1: Afghanistan - administrative divisions, source: UNOCHA7

7 UNOCHA, Afghanistan - administrative divisions, January 2014, url

AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 11

1. General overview
1.1 Anti-Government Elements (AGEs)
According to the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict Project (RULAC) 8, there are multiple overlapping noninternational armed conflicts happening in Afghanistan between government forces and AGEs, mainly
against the Taliban (and associated Haqqani Network) and Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP),
among others.9 The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) defines AGEs asparties to the conflict, describing them as follows:‘Anti-Government elements include members of the “Taliban” as well as other non-State
organized armed groups taking a direct part in hostilities against Pro-Government Forces
including the Haqqani Network, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Islamic Jihad Union, Lashkari
Tayyiba, Jaysh Muhammed, groups identifying themselves as Islamic State/“Daesh” and othermilitia and armed groups pursuing political, ideological or economic objectives including
armed criminal groups directly engaged in hostile acts on behalf of other Anti-Government
Elements.’10
In 2019, AGEs were the continuing cause of the majority of civilian casualties through indiscriminate
and deliberate targeting of civilians, in violation of international humanitarian law. In its annual reporton civilian protection, UNAMA documented 10 392 civilian casualties in 201911; of those, 6 447 civilian
casualties (1 668 killed and 4 779 injured) were attributed to AGEs12, in particular 76 % to the Taliban,
19 % to ISIL-KP, and 5 % to undetermined AGEs.13
A key development impacting this report are the ‘efforts made to establish a peace process initiallythrough talks’ between the Taliban and the US government in February 2020. 14 The Doha Agreement
signed on 29 February 2020 has been described as a ‘negotiated political settlement’ rather than acomprehensive peace deal.15 SIGAR quoted NATO Resolute Support (RS) mission stating that ‘enemyinitiated attacks’16 by insurgents considerably increased in late 2019, in the run up to talks with the
US.17 UNAMA also noted the increase in violence prior to talks, and reported that during the third
quarter of 2019, it recorded the highest ever number of civilian casualties since ‘systematic
documentation’ began, mainly due to indiscriminate Taliban attacks on civilians and elections. 18
Civilian casualties dropped in the first quarter of 2020 (compared to 2019’s first quarter, and they werethe lowest since 2012): UNAMA documented 1 293 civilian casualties (533 killed), with the continuing
trend that AGEs remained responsible for most of them (55 %), the majority of which were attributed

8 RULAC project is a legal reference source produced by the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human

Rights that qualifies situations of armed violence in accordance with the definitions under applicable international law.
RULAC, About RULAC, Last updated 5 March 2019, url
9 RULAC, Non-international armed conflicts in Afghanistan, Last updated 30 April 2019, url
10 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2019, 22 February 2020, url, p. 84
11 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict 2019, 22 February 2020, url, pp. 5-6
12
UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict 2019, 22 February 2020, url, p. 32
13 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict 2019, 22 February 2020, url, p. 33
14 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, p. 3
15
US, CRS, Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief, 1 May 2020, url, p. 3; see also for further details on the deal’s
provisions: Ruttig, T., From Doha to Peace? Obstacles rising in the way of intra-Afghan talks, AAN, 3 March 2020, url
16 SIGAR defines ‘Enemy-initiated attacks’ as “all attacks (direct -re, indirect -re, surface-to-air -re, IED, and mine explosions,etc.) initiated by insurgents that the ANDSF and RS consider to be [signicant activities] (SIGACTs).” SIGAR, Quarterly report to
the United States Congress, 30 January 2020, available at url, p. 68
17 SIGAR, Quarterly report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2020, available at url, p. 68
18 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2019, 22 February 2020, url, p. 33

12 —AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORTto the Taliban (39 %) and ISKP (13 %).19 Overall, in the first quarter of 2020, casualties initially rose,then dropped during the ‘Reduction in Violence’ (RiV) period (an 8-day period in February 2020 prior
to talks between the US and Taliban), and increased again after the Doha deal was signed (seeSection 1.2 Negotiations on the Doha Agreement with the Taliban).20 The Afghanistan Analysts
Network (AAN) noted that the casualty figures could be blurred as there is a ‘practical lack of distinction
between fighters and civilians’ in the conflict.21 UNAMA stated in April 2020 that it was ‘gravely
concerned’ by the acceleration of violence in March, following the RiV, mainly by Taliban forces against
ANSF.22
The Taliban still retained close relations with affiliated groups, such as the Haqqani Network and AlQaeda ‘based on friendship, a history of shared struggle, ideological sympathy and intermarriage’. Al
Qaeda’s senior leadership in Afghanistan remained intact with hundreds of fighters.23 In addition totheir handling of any threat posed by Al-Qaeda, ‘the Taliban’s credibility as a counter-terrorism partner
for the international community will rest on their success in countering the threat from ISIL-K.’ 24
Other foreign terrorist fighters and groups are also present in Afghanistan, including up to 6 500
Pakistanis.25 There are roughly 20 militant groups active in Afghanistan, including ‘Pakistani extremistgroups like the Pakistani Taliban, Lashkar-e Jhangvi, Lashkar-e Taiba, Jaish-e Muhammad, and Central
Asian militant groups including the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Islamic Jihad Union,
and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, a militant group fighting for Uyghur independence in China’some of which operate under the Taliban umbrella.26 However, the Taliban denied the presence of any
foreign fighters in Afghanistan as of June 2020.27

1.2 Negotiations on the Doha Agreement with the Taliban
After 18 years of war between the US and the Taliban, on 29 February 2020, they signed an agreement
in Doha28 to withdraw US troops in exchange for the Taliban agreeing not to work with Al Qaeda andto enter talks with the Afghan government.29 However, the Afghan government was not involved in
the deal, with the Taliban later refusing to engage with the Afghan government’s negotiating team,leading to questions about the viability of the agreement and likelihood it will lead to peace.30 A week
before signing the deal, an 8-day long ‘reduction in violence’ (RiV) period successfully saw a significant
drop in security incidents. However, after the RiV ended with the signature of the deal, the Taliban
stated that ‘the war would continue’ not against foreign troops, but the Afghan government. 31 The

19 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict – First Quarter Report: 1 January – 31 March 2020, 27 April

2020, url, pp. 1-2
20 See the graphic ‘Civilian Casualties Timeline by Party to the Conflict’ on page 2: UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civiliansin Armed Conflict – First Quarter Report: 1 January – 31 March 2020, 27 April 2020, url, pp. 1-2
21
Kazemi, R., Disputed Casualties in Kushk: The cost of blurring lines between fighters and civilians, 24 February 2020, url
22 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict – First Quarter Report: 1 January – 31 March 2020, 27 April
2020, url, p. 3
23 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, p. 3
24 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, p. 4
25 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, p. 3
26 RFE/RL, The Taliban, The Government, and Islamic State: Who Controls What in Afghanistan, 31 May 2020, url
27 Roggio, B., Analysis: Taliban again denies presence of foreign fighters in Afghanistan, LWJ, 8 June 2020, url
28 For a detailed explanation of the Doha Agreement and stipulations, see UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support
and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501 (2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May
2020, url
29 BBC, Afghan conflict: US and Taliban sign deal to end 18-year war, 29 February 2020, url
30 US, CRS, Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief, 1 May 2020, url, p. 3; see also for further details on the deal’s
provisions: Ruttig, T., From Doha to Peace? Obstacles rising in the way of intra-Afghan talks, AAN, 3 March 2020, url
31 AAN, Voices from the Districts, the Violence Mapped (1): What has happened since the reduction in violence ended? 21
March 2020, url

AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 13

Taliban’s Military Commission (described in Section 2. The Taliban) has also reportedly sought
assurances from the main Taliban leadership that fighting will continue regardless of the agreement.32
The two main components of the deal are that there are guarantees to remove all foreign militaryforces from Afghanistan through a phased approach over 135 days; while in exchange, there shouldbe mechanisms to prevent Afghanistan from being used by groups (specifically the Taliban and Al
Qaeda) or individuals posing security threats to the US and its allies. It also stipulated that intra-Afghan
negotiations toward ‘real peace talks’ would take place in March 2020, leading to a permanent andsustainable ceasefire and agreement on Afghanistan’s political future. However, AAN observed in
March 2020 that there are ‘few obligations’ placed on the Taliban under the deal.33 Taliban prisoner
release deals also led to concerns of a return to violence.34
In tandem with the Doha Agreement, the US signed a ‘joint declaration’ with the Government of
Afghanistan, to enable political settlement and a permanent ceasefire between the Afghan
government and the Taliban, while also affirming continued support to the Afghan security forces andrefraining from intervention in domestic affairs.35 In mid-June 2020, the Taliban and the Afghan
government finally agreed on Doha as the venue for their first session of high-level ‘intra-Afghan
dialogue’ but held off confirmation pending disagreements over prisoner releases. 36

1.2.1 Motivations and targeting patterns since the Doha Agreement
According to the US, the Taliban have not launched any attacks on international forces since the deal
was made in February; however, they have increased their attacks on Afghan government forces.37 In
a report on violence patterns in the four weeks since the 8 days of RiV agreed under the US-Talibandeal, AAN concluded that ‘the only civilians to have benefitted from the US-Taleban deal appear to be
those living in Taleban-controlled areas’ where the US and Afghan forces took a ‘defensive stance’ andstopped air strikes and night raids; however, in contested areas, the report found that many civilians
said the Taliban were renewing attacks, and there was fear of ‘possible intensifying conflict’. 38 Violence
resumed immediately after the RiV ended.39 The Taliban continued their attacks against the ANSF (over76 attacks in 24 provinces within a week of signing the agreement) despite the deal. 40 The US also
resumed airstrikes41, the first of which came 5 days after the deal.42
AFP stated that since the US-Taliban agreement, Taliban attacks have been less frequent in cities but
have continued to target Afghan government forces in rural areas; for example, a Taliban attack killed
11 pro-government militiamen in June 2020.43 After a brief ceasefire for Eid at the end of May 2020,
sources cited by the Long War Journal (LWJ)44 indicated that the Taliban increased their attacks again
in June 2020, stepping up assaults on government forces.45 In mid-June 2020, the Ministry of Interior

32 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501

(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, para. 4
33 Ruttig, T., From Doha to Peace? Obstacles rising in the way of intra-Afghan talks, AAN, 3 March 2020, url
34 Afghanistan Times, More violence feared as freed Taliban inmates may return to the battlefield, 14 June 2020, url
35 Ruttig, T., From Doha to Peace? Obstacles rising in the way of intra-Afghan talks, AAN, 3 March 2020, url
36 Reuters, Afghan government, Taliban agree to Doha as venue for first peace talks, 15 June 2020, url
37 Reuters, Taliban Militants Kill Afghan Regional Police Chief in Latest Attack, 8 May 2020, url
38 Clark, K., Voices from the Districts, the Violence Mapped (2): Assessing the conflict a month after the US-Taleban
agreement, AAN, 8 April 2020, url
39
Ruttig, T., From Doha to Peace? Obstacles rising in the way of intra-Afghan talks, AAN, 3 March 2020, url
40 New York Times (The), Taliban ramp up attacks on Afghans after Trump says “no violence”, 6 March 2020, url; Reuters, U.S.
Forces conduct airstrikes on Taliban in Afghanistan, 5 June 2020, url
41 Military Times, US resumes airstrikes against Taliban to halt attack on Afghan forces, 4 March 2020, url; Reuters, U.S. Forces
conduct airstrikes on Taliban in Afghanistan, 5 June 2020, url
42 Military Times, US resumes airstrikes against Taliban to halt attack on Afghan forces, 4 March 2020, url
43 AFP, Bomb Blamed on Taliban Kills 11 Pro-govt Afghan Militiamen, 6 June 2020, url; See also: AFP, Attack blamed on Taliban
kills seven Afghan policemen, 14 June 2020, url
44
LWJ is a project of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, and is dedicated to providing original analysis and reporting
about the Global War on Terror. It is a non-profit organization, for more info see: LWJ, About, n.d. url
45 Roggio, B., Taliban ramps up attacks after ending unilateral ceasefire, LWJ, 16 June 2020, url14 —AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT

claimed that the Taliban carried out over 200 attacks killing or wounding more than 400 security
personnel in the beginning of June.46 Meanwhile, the New York Times reported that in June 2020, 322
pro-government security personnel and 159 civilians were killed.47
When looking at targeting patterns in 2019 and the first quarter of 2020, AGEs continued to carry out
targeted killings, disappearances, and attacks on those who oppose them or spoke out against them. 48
After ground engagements, the main source of civilian casualties were targeted/deliberate killings at
26 % of casualties in 2020.49 AGEs, mainly the Taliban, continued to carry out the vast majority oftargeted conflict-related abductions of civilians, with UNAMA documenting 218 cases, affecting over
1 000 civilians and killing 50, during 2019.50 UNAMA reported that compared to the first quarter of
2019, in the first quarter of 2020, there was a ‘disturbing increase’ in targeted killings and summary
executions, mainly carried out by the Taliban. Targeted killing was the main cause of civilian death,ahead of ground engagements, in the first quarter of 2020. Most of those affected were in Kabul,
Balkh, and Faryab.51 In its latest report published in July 2020, UNAMA attributed 43 % of civilian
casualties to the Taliban during the first six months of 2020. 52 The Taliban have repeatedly formallyrejected UN reporting as biased, denying the attribution of civilian casualties by UNAMA to the group,53
while they regularly report on civilian casualties54 caused by enemy shelling,55 night raids and airstrikes,
which they state to be the main cause of civilian casualties instead.56
Since the agreement, a number of violent attacks killing civilians have also remained unclaimed, or,
the perpetrators are suspected by officials to have been ISKP, Taliban, or Haqqani, without any grouptaking responsibility.57 Some Afghan officials have accused the Haqqani network of being behind some
attacks claimed by ISKP (See Section 3. Islamic State Khorasan Province). An Afghan government
security assessment from May 2020 described in the media said that unclaimed attacks by the Taliban
or Haqqani allow the blame to be shifted to ISKP which saves the Taliban from criticism orrepercussions.58 Other examples of unattributed targeted killings include:••

A string of unclaimed killings and attacks in Afghanistan on 13 June 2020 by unknown
perpetrators left 17 dead, including 8 in Khost, such as Abdul Wali Ekhlas, a candidate in 2019
parliamentary elections who did not win a seat59, and a pro-government cleric in Kabul, as wellas members of security forces.60
On 30 March 2020, a female general, head of NDS’s Gender Department was killed in atargeted car bomb in Kabul City.61 No group claimed responsibility.62

46 AFP, Over 400 Afghan security men killed or hurt in past week, 15 June 2020, url
47 New York Times (The), Afghan War Casualty Report, 4 June 2020, url
48 USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2019 – Afghanistan, March 2019, url, p. 2; UNAMA, Afghanistan

Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict – First Quarter Report: 1 January – 31 March 2020, 27 April 2020, url, p. 3
49 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict – First Quarter Report: 1 January – 31 March 2020, 27 April
2020, url, p. 4
50
UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2019, 22 February 2020, url, pp. 46-47
51 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict – First Quarter Report: 1 January – 31 March 2020, 27 April
2020, url, pp. 3-4
52 UNAMA, Protection of civilians in armed conflict, midyear report: 1 January – 30 June 2020, 27 July 2020, url, p. 8
53 Voice of Jihad, Remarks by spokesman of Islamic Emirate concerning civilian casualty report by UNAMA, 27 July 2020 url;
Voice of Jihad, Reaction of spokesman of Islamic Emirate concerning civilian casualty report by UNAMA, 27 April 2020, url;
Voice of Jihad, First Quarterly (January, February, March) Civilian Casualty Report for 2020, 3 May 2020, url
54 Voice of Jihad, Why are war crimes ignored?, 5 July 2020, url
55
Voice of Jihad, Video Report: Enemy shelling of civilian homes in Baghlan, 13 July 2020, url
56 Voice of Jihad, Remarks by spokesman of Islamic Emirate concerning civilian casualty report by UNAMA, 27 July 2020 url
57 RFE/RL/Radio Free Afghanistan, Afghan Mosque Attacks Kill 13 Worshippers Breaking Fast, 20 May 2020, url; Khaama Press,
Civilians suffer casualties in an explosion in Jalalabad city of Afghanistan, 14 June 2020, url; RFE/RL, At Least 17 Killed in
Attacks Across Afghanistan, 13 June 2020, url
58 TSG, Taliban, Haqqani, LeT, Jaish plan to target high profile Kabul entities, 24 May 2020, url
59 AP, 18 people killed in separate attacks in Afghanistan, 13 June 2020, url; RFE/RL, At Least 17 Killed in Attacks AcrossAfghanistan, 13 June 2020, url
60
RFE/RL, At Least 17 Killed in Attacks Across Afghanistan, 13 June 2020, url
61 New York Times (The), Afghan War Casualty Report: April 2020, 30 April 2020, url
62 Khaama Press, US Embassy reacts to death of senior female Afghan intelligence official in Kabul, 1 April 2020, url

AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 15•

On 10 April 2020, the Imam of Hazrat Ali mosque in Farah Province was shot and killed byunidentified gunmen.63

Referring to a spike in targeted killings in Herat from October 2019 to January 2020, AAN also describeddynamics such as ‘complex rivalries’ among local and provincial elites, some of whom may be
implicated in targeted killings and attacks to settle scores between rivals through the politicising of
criminal/security incidents, while these killings may be obscured by the prevalence of the Taliban’s
targeting patterns.64
In conversation with EASO during the finalisation of this report, on 27 July 2020, AAN’s co-director Kate
Clark gave some insights into changes in tactics by the Taliban and the series of unclaimed attacks
which occurred after the US-Taliban agreement. She noted:‘We have a Taliban spring offensive in all but name. The leadership is encouraging fighters tofight as hard as possible. That’s being taken up enthusiastically by some commanders, but notall. In some areas, there appears to be a ‘go slow’ response to the ‘jihad’, with weak responses
to calls to muster for operations. Some field commanders have also expressed a wish that theirleadership was seriously pursuing peace with the government.
For the Taliban leadership, the main aim is getting the US out, so a lot of their strategy thisyear can be explained as them carrying on with the war without antagonising the Americans
too much. After the 29 February agreement was signed, the US reminded the Taliban that they
had agreed verbally to reduce violence by 80 %. The Taliban replied that they had only agreed
not to attack US forces, not to attacks the big cities, not to attack bases, but they were free toattack everything else. So, they appear to be fighting without crossing certain red lines which
would antagonise the US military and risk drawing it back into the conflict. So tactics are
somehow different this year: we see an increase in the use IEDs, targeted killings andabductions and harassing road users, including taxing them. There have also been a numberof very strange unclaimed attacks; mostly nasty urban attacks. These could have been carriedout by ISKP, although it would be surprising since they usually claim everything they do. Or it
could be the Taliban. Such attacks are banned under the Taliban’s oral agreement with the US,
but the Taliban might want to carry them out without claiming responsibility: they dosuccessfully terrorise civilians in government-held urban areas and might, also, satisfy
demands from Taliban’s donors, who want for example, sectarian attacks on Hazaras.’65

63

Pajhwok, Religious scholar gun down in Farah, 10 April 2020, url

64 Kazemi, R., Herat City’s Reported Spike in Insecurity: What a sober reading of events reveals, 21 April 2020, url
65 Clark K., AAN, online video interview with EASO, 27 July 2020

16 —AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT

2. The Taliban
The Taliban is an AGE that has been active in Afghanistan for decades. The Taliban leadership ruled
Afghanistan between 1996 and 2001 when it was removed from power by US/international forces; it
has continued to conduct an insurgency following its removal.66 Since 2001, the group has preservedsome key principles including a strict interpretation of sharia law in areas under its control.67

2.1 Structure and leadership
The Taliban position themselves as the shadow government of Afghanistan, and their commission andgoverning bodies replicate the administrative offices and duties of a typical government. 68 The Taliban
have become an ‘organized political movement operating a parallel administration in large swaths of
Afghanistan’69 and has evolved to become a ‘local governance actor’ in the country by gaining andholding territory and thereby undertaking ‘some responsibility for the well-being of local
communities’.70 Regarding militant operations, it is a networked insurgency, with strong leadership at
the top and decentralised local commanders who can mobilise resources at the district level. 71
The Quetta Shura or Taliban Leadership Council [also known as Rahbari Shura72] refers to the group of
the 20 most senior leaders of the Taliban.73 The main official political office of the Taliban is located in
Qatar.74 Much of the leadership is also located in Pakistan and connected through the Peshawar Shura
Network.75 The present supreme leader of the movement is Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada, who is thehead of the Leadership Council, Judiciary, and Executive Commissions and ‘other administrative
organs’.76 His deputy leaders are First Deputy Sirajuddin Jallaloudine Haqqani (leader of the Haqqani
network) and two others: Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob[Mullah Mohammad Yaqub Omari]77 and Mullah
Abdul Ghani Baradar Abdul Ahmad Turk.78 Amid June 2020 reports that Akhundzada and Jallaloudine
Haqqani, and other senior Taliban leaders had contracted COVID-19, and that some may have even
died, it was reported by Foreign Policy magazine that Yaqoob was running Taliban and Haqqani
operations. The Taliban denied these reports.79
66 BBC, Who are

the Taliban, 27 February 2020, url; See also: Giustozzi, A. and Ibrahimi, N., Thirty Years of Conflict: Driversof Anti-Government Mobilisation in Afghanistan, 1978-2011, AREU, January 2012, url
67 RFE/RL, Taliban Constitution offers glimpse into militant group’s vision for Afghanistan, 27 April 2020, url
68 New York Times (The), How the Taliban Outlasted a Superpower: Tenacity and Carnage, 26 May 2020, url; UNSC, Eleventh
report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501 (2019) concerning
the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, para. 12
69 USIP, Insurgent Bureaucracy: How the Taliban Makes Policy, Peaceworks No. 153, November 2019, url, p. 6
70 USIP, Service Delivery in Taliban-Influenced Areas of Afghanistan, Special Reports No. 465, 30 April 2020, url, p. 3
71
New York Times (The), How the Taliban Outlasted a Superpower: Tenacity and Carnage, 26 May 2020, url
72 Taliban’s supreme consultative organ. It provides political, military and economic advice to the supreme leader of the
movement Amir-ul-Momeneen or commander of the believers.
73 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, p. 6 (footnote 5), Annex B, p. 25
74 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, Annex, para. 2
75 New York Times (The), How the Taliban Outlasted a Superpower: Tenacity and Carnage, 26 May 2020, url; UNSC, Eleventh
report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501 (2019) concerning
the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, Annex, p. 26, p. 6
76 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, Annex, para. A
77
Yaqub is the son of the Taliban’s founder, Mullah Omar. He is not popular in the movement and is reportedly seeking toshore up his position in advance of shuras upcoming this year. FP, Factional Struggles Emerge in Virus-Afflicted Taliban Top
Ranks, 9 June 2020, url
78 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, Annex, para. A
79 FP, Factional Struggles Emerge in Virus-Afflicted Taliban Top Ranks, 9 June 2020, url; RFE/RL, Taliban Officials Deny ReportThat Top Leader Died From Coronavirus, 2 June 2020, url

AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 17

The Government of Afghanistan provided a list in the UN’s 27 May report of named and known
members of the Taliban shadow administration and their respective areas of responsibility/commission.80
The following commissions are identified by the UN81 and also described in a Taliban booklet publishedin 2020 and available on their website:82
1. The Military Commission83 [Nizami Kamission]: supervises appointed shadow governors anddeputies for all 34 provinces, and group/field commanders and squad leaders at the districtlevel.84 The Military Commission is divided across regional areas to distribute fighters andorganise missions and operations.85 The UN reported in May that it was headed by Mullah
Ibrahim Sadar86, however other sources in May 2020 stated that Mohammad Yaqub had been
appointed head.87
2. The Political Commission [Siasi Kamission]: Based in Doha, Qatar, it leads the political affairsof the Taliban movement.88
3. Intelligence Commission89
4. Commission for Financial Affairs (including customs, mining, and properties) 90
5. Judicial Commission91: Mahkama or the court system, is composed of Ebtedaya (primary
courts), Morafea (appeal courts) and Tamiz (supreme court). Courts are ruled under the Sharia
law. Courts and judges are mobile and static in areas where insurgents maintain a significant
presence.92
6. Media Commission93 [Farhangi Kamission]: also called the Cultural Commission runs culturaland media-related issues of the movement, including six websites in five languages, six online
magazines (which are also distributed in printed formats in rural areas): Srak ‫( څرک‬Trace),
Shahamat ‫( شهامت‬Courage), Morchal ‫( مورچل‬Stronghold), Haqiqat ‫( حقیقت‬Truth), Al-Samood‫( الصمود‬Resistance), and Shariat ‫( رشیعت‬Islamic law). Farhangi Kamission also publishes books,
and Layeha (Codes of Conduct).94

80

The full list and detailed explanation of the structure of the Taliban is available in: UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical
Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501 (2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415,
27 May 2020, url, Annex
81 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, Annex, pp. 25-26
82 Voice of Jihad, ‫‘[ پوښتن او ځوابونه‬Questions and answers’ Booklet], url, 26 March 2020, p. 9 – 16. The Booklet titled ‘Questions
and answers’ was published in March 2020 in the magazines and books sub-section of the Taliban’s website url; The Pashto
description of the cover states: Islamic Emirate and The Jihad Process, Questions and Answers. It is the first edition of thebook, 1 000 copies have been published.
83 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, Annex, pp. 25-26
84
UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, p. 25
85 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, Annex, p. 25
86 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, Annex
87 Telegraph (The), Taliban’s founder’s son appointed military chief of insurgents, 7 May 2020, url; BBC Monitoring/Afghan
Islamic Press, 13 May 2020, Afghan Taliban founder’s son appointed as military chief, (Factiva)
88
Voice of Jihad, ‫‘[ پوښتن او ځوابونه‬Questions and answers’], url, 26 March 2020, p. 12-13
89 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, Annex, pp. 25-26
90 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, Annex, pp. 25-26
91 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, Annex, pp. 25-26
92 Voice of Jihad, ‫‘[ پوښتن او ځوابونه‬Questions and answers’], url, 26 March 2020, p. 11
93
UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, Annex, pp. 25-26
94 Voice of Jihad, ‫‘[ پوښتن او ځوابونه‬Questions and answers’], url, 26 March 2020, p. 13

18 —AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT

7. Health Commission95 [Sehat Kamission]: provides medical assistance to the injured Taliban
fighters and its medical team organises their transportation to medical facilities. 96
8. Commission for Training, Learning and Higher Education [Talim-aw-Tarbia Kamission] or the
Education Commission is in charge of providing Islamic teachings and establishes madrasas inareas under Taliban control.97
9. Commission for Agriculture, Livestock, Ushr [religious taxes98] and Zakat [obligatory payment
for Muslims to give as alms to the poor of as tax collected by a Muslim state 99]100
10. Recruitment, Outreach and Guidance Commission101 [Da’wat, Irshad, Jalb-o-Jazb Kamission]leads the recruitment of new members for the group. The commission preaches to attract andrecruit from amongst ANDSF personnel.102 It conducts widespread preaching activities,
manages madrasas (Koranic schools), and particularly recruits amongst the local population.
The said commission publishes lists of ANSDF personnel who allegedly joined the Taliban
movement.103
11. Prisoner’s Commission104 [De Bandiaan Kamission] is in charge of monitoring the living
conditions of prisoners/detainees across the country, including captured Taliban fighters by
the Afghan Government.105
12. Commission for NGOs106 [Mosesaato Kamission] or the Organisations (NGOs) Commission is incharge of monitoring humanitarian NGOs in zones under the Taliban’s control. The Taliban
website states that the Mosesaat Kamission reportedly provides for a safe environment only
for organisations and NGOs that are independent from the government and are notconsidered as pro-government or spying agencies.107
13. Commission for the Prevention of Civilian Casualties and Complaints 108: The Taliban website
lists this commission as falling under the Military Commission and dealing with civilian mattersrelated to casualties.109
14. Antiquities Commission110
15. Border Control Commission111
16. Organ for Martyrs and Persons with Disabilities112

95 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501

(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, Annex, pp. 25-26
96 Voice of Jihad, ‫‘[ پوښتن او ځوابونه‬Questions and answers’], url, 26 March 2020, p. 15-16
97 Voice of Jihad, ‫‘[ پوښتن او ځوابونه‬Questions and answers’], url, 26 March 2020, p. 14
98 USIP, Service Delivery in Taliban-Influenced Areas of Afghanistan, 30 April 2020, url, p. 18
99 USIP, Service Delivery in Taliban-Influenced Areas of Afghanistan, 30 April 2020, url, p. 18
100 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, Annex, pp. 25-26
101 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, Annex, pp. 25-26
102 Voice of Jihad, ‫ جلب چذب کمیسیون‬،‫‘[ د دعوت ارشاد‬Outreach, Guidance and recruitment commission’], n.d., url
103 Voice of Jihad, ‫‘[ پوښتن او ځوابونه‬Questions and answers’], url, 26 March 2020, p. 13-14
104 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, Annex, pp. 25-26
105 Voice of Jihad, ‫‘[ پوښتن او ځوابونه‬Questions and answers’], url, 26 March 2020, p. 16
106 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, Annex, pp. 25-26
107
Voice of Jihad, ‫‘[ پوښتن او ځوابونه‬Questions and answers’], url, 26 March 2020, p. 14-15
108 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, Annex, pp. 25-26
109 Voice of Jihad, ‫‘[ د سمع شکاياتو او ملک تلفاتو د مخنیوي کمېسیون‬Complaints and preventing civilian casualties commission’], n.d.,‫ي‬url
110 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, Annex, pp. 25-26
111 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, Annex, pp. 25-26
112 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, Annex, pp. 25-26

AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 19

In February 2020, the Taliban announced on their website that they had introduced a new mixed
Commission of Central Dar-ul-Fatwa (an institution competent in issuing Islamic verdicts): theAssembly of Islamic Jurisprudence and ‘Specialists’ (Islamic law jurists). The said commission was
created in April 2019; it may serve as legislative body of the movement. 113 Further information could
not be found.
Leadership divisions
Throughout the US-Taliban negotiations, and despite reshuffling of its provincial appointments prior
to the 2020 fighting season, the Taliban leadership has been able to maintain unity within the rank andfile, though there are deepening divisions around cutting ties with Al Qaeda.114 For the most part, theleadership has been united in favour of pursuing the US talks, edging out dissidents who oppose thedeal.115
One new splinter group of Senior Taliban dissidents has emerged, as of May 2020, known as Hizb-e
Vulayet Islami or Hezb-e Walayat-e Islami (Islamic Governorate Party or Islamic Guardianship Party).116
The group opposes the US deal and has links to Iran, marking possible leadership divisions. 117 A
leadership split on the implementation of the US-Taliban deal and power struggles within theorganisation could impact the potential peace process.118
The Rasoul Shura, a minority breakaway group from the Taliban that split in 2015 119 led by Mullah
Mohammad Rasool, out of western Afghanistan, declared that they did not support the talks with the
US.120 Foreign Policy reported that they lost power in the face of this.121 Clashes between the main
Taliban and Rasoul faction have caused deaths and assassinations between the groups as
confrontations between the two have occurred. The possibility of divisions over the deal could pose athreat to the deal itself.122

2.2 Strength, presence, territorial control, and capacity
The Taliban control large parts of Afghanistan.123 Interlocutors reported in the UN Security Council’s
May 2020 report that 50-60 % of Afghan territory is contested between the Taliban and government,with 21 districts reportedly under full Taliban control, a decrease from 25-30 in 2019.124 However, on
its Voice of Jihad website citing its 2019 ‘annual report’, the Taliban itself claimed to control 28 125
113 Voice of Jihad, ‫فقه مجالسو اوتخصصاتو کمېسیون ته لنډه کتنه‬، ‫‘[ د مرکزي دا راالفتاء‬A brief look at the central institution of verdicts,‫ي‬council of jurisprudence and specialities (on Sharia) commission’], 17 February 2020, url
114 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, paras. 18-20
115 FP, Factional Struggles Emerge in Virus-Afflicted Taliban Top Ranks, 9 June 2020, url
116 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, para. 20; RFE/RL, Iranian Links: New Taliban Splinter Group
Emerges That Opposes U.S. Deal, 9 June 2020, url
117 RFE/RL, Iranian Links: New Taliban Splinter Group Emerges That Opposes U.S. Deal, 9 June 2020, url
118 FP, Factional Struggles Emerge in Virus-Afflicted Taliban Top Ranks, 9 June 2020, url
119 Stars and Stripes, Airstrike in western Afghanistan kills leader of Taliban splinter group, may have killed civilians, 9 January
2020, url
120 Asia Times, Factors affecting divisions among Afghan Taliban, 22 May 2020, url
121 FP, Factional Struggles Emerge in Virus-Afflicted Taliban Top Ranks, 9 June 2020, url
122
FP, Factional Struggles Emerge in Virus-Afflicted Taliban Top Ranks, 9 June 2020, url; Asia Times, Factors affecting divisions
among Afghan Taliban, 22 May 2020, url
123 USIP, Insurgent Bureaucracy: How the Taliban Makes Policy, Peaceworks No. 153, November 2019, url, p. 6; BBC, Who are
the Taliban, 27 February 2020, url
124
UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, para. 29
125 Arghandab: Daychop an and Mizan; Badakhshan: Arghanj Khwa and Keran wa Manjan Districts; Badghis: Murghab District;Baghlan: Guzargahi Nur District; Balkh: Zari District; Farah: Anar Dara and Bala Buluk Districts; Faryab: Qurghan and Qarmaqo lDistricts; Ghazni: Giro District; Ghor: Charsada District; Jowzjan: Qush Tepa and Darzab Districts; Kandahar: Maruf District;
Kunduz: Dasht-e-Aarchi, Khan Abaad and Qala Zaal Districts; Paktia: Khoshmand District; Samangan: Darah Sof District;Takhar: Khwaja Ghar, Cha Ab, Darqad and Bahar Districts; Uruzgan: Char-Chine District; Zabul: Naw Bahar Districts

20 —AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT

district capitals.126 However, in a May 2020 article citing their mapping Taliban control, LWJ stated that
the Taliban controlled 75 districts (19 %) and contested 189 (47 %).127
Estimates of the Taliban’s active fighters range from 40 000 to 80 000128 or 55 000 to 85 000 withadditional ‘facilitators and non-combatants’ bringing this number as high as 100 000. This shows that
the Taliban has no shortage of recruits, funds, or weapons.129
According to the Security Council, reporting in May 2020,‘the Taliban remain internally disciplined enough to be a formidable fighting force, there aredivisions within the group, which make compromise with its adversaries difficult, and its
messaging remains hard-line. The group also appears well prepared for the 2020 fighting
season and raising the tempo of its attacks on Afghan government targets while trying to avoid
provoking the United States. Differences in interpretation of the agreement could lead toperiodic crises in its implementation. Hard-line Taliban believe that they can and will stillachieve their aims by force.’130

2.3 Objectives
Sources reported that despite agreement with the US, the Taliban leadership and commanders
informed the population that the Afghan government would be toppled. 131 Bill Roggio of the LWJ also
stated that as of June 2020, the Taliban continued posting propaganda on their website, putting
forward a ‘message of scorn and disdain’ for the US and Afghan governments, despite the agreement.
According to Roggio, the ‘jihadist group has been very clear over the past two decades that the only
acceptable form of government in Afghanistan is an “Islamic system” that is to be ruled by the Taliban’s
government’, an announcement it made through a fatwa released just days after signing theagreement.132 According to sources, the fatwa states that the withdrawal of US forces will not end its
armed jihad or insurgency, but that it will continue to fight for an Islamic government ruled by anemir.133 The UN Security Council also remarked that the Taliban increased their attacks while
simultaneously negotiating with the US.134 The UN remarked that the group remained confident thatthey could retake power by force.135 Despite the deal with the US, through continuous fighting seasons,

126 Voice of Jihad, ‫‘[ د تېکال فتوحاتو ته ځغلنده کتنه‬A quick look at last year’s victories’], 31 December 2019, url
127 RFE/RL, The Taliban, The Government, and Islamic State: Who Controls What in Afghanistan, 31 May 2020, url
128 New York Times (The), Fact-checking Trump’s Statements on Increased Military Strikes in Afghanistan, 12 September 2019,

url
129

UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, para. 28; See also: New York Times (The), How the Taliban
Outlasted a Superpower: Tenacity and Carnage, 26 May 2020, url
130 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, p. 3
131 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, para. 8
132 Roggio, B., Taliban denounces ‘ deviant beliefs,’ including ‘satanic western and disbelieving ideologies’, LWJ, 10 June 2020,
url; See also: Roggio, B., Taliban religious decree calls for its emir to rule ‘Islamic government’ in Afghanistan, LWJ, 8 March
2020, url
133 Roggio, B., Taliban religious decree calls for its emir to rule ‘Islamic government’ in Afghanistan, LWJ, 8 March 2020, url;
VOA, Taliban Defends Its Chief As ‘Legal’ Ruler of Afghanistan, 7 March 2020, url; See also: New York Times (The), How the
Taliban Outlasted a Superpower: Tenacity and Carnage, 26 May 2020, url; see also: UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical
Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501 (2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415,
27 May 2020, url, paras. 8-12
134 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, para. 14
135 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, para. 12

AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 21

the Taliban’s continued goal has been to capture and hold provincial capitals; though this is still difficult
for the group due to the continued presence of international forces.136
LWJ reported that in a propaganda video released in June 2020, the Taliban narrator stated that ‘theDeviants are those who are trained in the poisonous deviant beliefs of atheism, communism,
secularism, democracy, and other satanic western and disbelieving ideologies in order to mislead theMuslims with their deviant ideologies.’137

2.4 Recruitment strategies
The Taliban typically recruit young males from rural communities who are unemployed, edu cated inmadrasas and ethnically Pashtun, according to independent Afghanistan expert, Borhan Osman. 138
Recruitment usually occurs through the group’s Military Commission and outreach in mosques, as wellas through personal networks and families of fighters, many of whom are motivated by ‘deep loathing
for the Western institutions and values the Afghan government has taken up from its allies’. Rather
than paying salaries, the Taliban cover expenses; while the movement has become entrenched incrime and narcotics as fighters keep the spoils of these activities. 139

2.4.1 Child recruitment
Taliban also recruit children. For instance, in 2019, UNAMA documented 58 cases in which boys
(children) were recruited by the Taliban and used to plant IEDs, carry explosives, collect intelligence,
conduct suicide attacks and engage in hostilities.140 USDOS indicated that Taliban used children as
suicide bombers, tricking them, manipulating them with money or false religious justifications or‘forcing them’ to become suicide bombers. In southern provinces, the Taliban used children not only
as suicide bombers but also as human shields, or to plant IEDS. 141 In exchange, Taliban payed cash
money to some families and provided protection to others who sent their children to Taliban’s schools(madrasas) for military and religious brainwash. Most of the children who were exposed to such risks
came from poor families or rural areas.142 BBC also reported on teenagers who were recruited into the
Taliban via video propaganda and through madrasas to plant IEDs.143

2.5 Human rights violations and abuses
The Taliban continued to be accused of targeted killings in 2020 144; they have been involved in the
deliberate targeting of civilians in both indiscriminate and targeted attacks and against civilian
objects.145 The Taliban continued to operate parallel justice mechanisms leading to executions byshadow courts and punishments deemed by UNAMA to be cruel, inhumane, and degrading
punishments146, (for more information on Taliban’s parallel justice system, see EASO COI Report,
Afghanistan Criminal law, customary justice and informal dispute resolution, July 2020). The Directorof Ghor’s Women’s affairs department and the AIHRC in Ghor complained in a news article about the
136 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501

(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, para. 29
137 Roggio, B., Taliban denounces ‘ deviant beliefs,’ including ‘satanic western and disbelieving ideologies’, LWJ, 10 June 2020,
url
138
Osman, B., Bourgeois Jihad: Why Young, Middle-Class Afghans Join the Islamic State, USIP, Peaceworks No. 162, 1 June
2020, url, p. 2
139 New York Times (The), How the Taliban Outlasted a Superpower: Tenacity and Carnage, 26 May 2020, url
140 UNAMA, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2019, 22 February 2020, url, p. 24
141
USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2019 - Afghanistan, March 2020, url, pp. 16-17
142 USDOS, 2019 Trafficking in Persons Report: Afghanistan, 19 June 2019, url
143 BBC, Afghanistan: The detention centre for teenage Taliban members, 21 April 2020, url
144 Arab News, Motorbikes banned in Kabul following spike in crime, targeted killings as virus lockdown continues, 15 April
2020, url; New York Times (The), How the Taliban Outlasted a Superpower: Tenacity and Carnage, 26 May 2020, url
145 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict 2019, 22 February 2020, url, p. 7
146 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2019, 22 February 2020, url, p. 50

22 —AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT

brutality of the Taliban’s ‘kangaroo courts’ and violations of victims’ rights.147 The Taliban has also beenreported to use torture against detainees, including ANSF personnel.148

2.6 Targeted individuals
2.6.1 Members of the Afghan security forces and pro-government militias
Targeting and killing of ANSDF is mentioned in the Taliban’s Layeha (code of conduct), which isavailable on their website. The Layeha, in its first chapter, provides Taliban with instructions to make
ANDSF surrender/join the group. Article 10 of the said code delegates Ta’ziri (punishment) authority
to the Imam, deputy Imam, provincial judge or in their absence to the provincial governor to order the
execution of an allegedly guilty ANDSF detainee or any other employee/official of the Governmentarrested by the group.149 On their website, the Taliban continued to use the term ‘puppets’ orGoodagyian (‫ ګوډاګيان‬in Pashto language), for ANDSF personnel. As of 31 December 2019, the Taliban
published a report in which they mentioned the number of ANDSF and government officials that thegroup has targeted in 2019. The report included the exact dates and locations of the incidents, as wellas the names of the alleged ANDSF personnel killed by the group.150
In June 2020, a spokesperson for the interior ministry stated that 422 members of the Afghan security
force were killed and wounded by the Taliban in a week. According to the figures cited by the Afghan
official, 222 attacks were carried out by the Taliban during the second week of June 2020 in 29
provinces.151 Tolonews reported that 171 security forces personnel were killed, 250 others were
wounded in the clashes.152 Examples of recent general attacks on Afghan government/progovernment forces include:
•
•
•

•
•
•

On 8 June 2019, the Taliban attacked security outposts in Poshta Noor village in Dawlatyar
district of Ghor, killing fifteen members of the public uprising forces and civilians, andwounding a tribal elder and two others.153
On 4 July 2019, one civilian was killed, and another was wounded when the Taliban attacked
the office of the local pro-government militia in Dawlatyar District of Ghor Province.154
In May 2020, Taliban fighters detonated a car bomb targeting Afghan intelligence agency
National Security (NDS) forces in Ghazni, at least seven people were killed and 40 wounded asa result of this attack.155
On 6 June 2020, Taliban roadside bombing killed 11 pro-government militiamen on their way
through Badakshan to support ANSDF.156
On 11 June 2020, a district police chief was killed and 4 officers wounded in Taliban clashes in
Paktika.157
On 14 June 2020, 7 police officers were killed at a checkpoint in Pasaband (Ghor) in an attack
attributed to the Taliban by local officials.158

147 Salaam Times, Taliban brutally take centre stage with couple’s execution in Ghor, 28 April 2020, url
148 Salaam Times, Rescued Afghan soldiers speak of appalling torture, brutality in Taliban prison, 31 January 2020, url
149 Voice of Jihad, ‫‘[ الیحه‬code of conduct’], n.d., url; Referring to an English translation of the Layeha (2010 version) made by

the Afghanistan Analysts Network, Clark, K., The Layha: Calling the Taleban to Account, AAN, 4 July 2011, url
150
Voice of Jihad, ‫ مېالدي کال مهمو پېښو ته ځغلنده کتنه‬2019 ‫‘[ د‬A quick look at the 2019 important incidents’], 31 December 2019,url
151 Tolonews, 171 Govt Forces Killed in a Week in Taliban Attacks: Officials, 14 June, 2020, url; Al Jazeera, Taliban killed,wounded over 400 Afghan forces in one week: Gov't, 14 June, 2020, url
152
Tolonews, 171 Govt Forces Killed in a Week in Taliban Attacks: Officials, 14 June, 2020, url
153 Tolonews, Several killed in Taliban attack in Ghor: Officials, 8 June 2019, url
154 New York Times (The), Afghan War Casualty Report: June 28-4 July, 4 July 2019, url
155 Reuters, Taliban blast near Afghan intelligence base kills seven, injures 40, 18 May 2020, url
156
RFE/RL/Gandhara, Bomb Blamed on Taliban Kills 11 Pro-govt Afghan Militiamen, 6 June 2020, url
157 Xinhua, District police chief killed in Taliban attack in E. Afghanistan, 11 June 2020, url
158 AFP, Attack blamed on Taliban kills seven Afghan policemen, 14 June 2020, url

AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 23•

Also in June 2020, 9 separate attacks on security posts were launched in Ghazni, killing 15
insurgents. The source did not mention whether security force members were hurt inclashes.159

Recent examples of targeted killings of security force members also include:
•
•

•
•
•
•

On 27 September 2019, a pro-government militia member and his father were killed after the
Taliban attacked their house in Laman village of Qala-e-Naw City in Badghis Province.160
On 11 October 2019, in Badakhsan Province, two nephews of a local police commander killed
their uncle in the Abjin area of Wardoj District, they took the commander’s weapon and joined
the Taliban.161
On 24 October 2019, the Taliban targeted and killed the Badghis chief police in Kabul while hewas on holidays.162
On 7 May 2020, the Taliban targeted and killed the Khost police chief and two of his personnel
in a roadside bomb.163 The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack on their website.164
A senior provincial police officer on his way to work was shot dead in Kandahar by the Taliban
in June 2020.165
7 June 2020, 3 policemen were assassinated at a checkpoint by the Taliban in Gozra district,
Kabul.166

2.6.1.1 Women in the ANSF
On 30 April 2020, SIGAR reported that there were 5 270 female personnel within the ANDSF (including
433 civilians). There were 3 535 female personnel serving within the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and1 735 within the Ministry of Defence (MoD).167 In March 2020, Tolonews reported that the number offemale police officers was 2 800.168 In December 2019, United States Department of States (USDOD)
indicated that the number of registered female ANP was 3 077 for 8 898 Tashkil (planned numbers).169
In Afghanistan, the participation of women in the ANDSF remained a taboo in society.170 In October
2019, a news article about female Afghan police reported that the Taliban ‘often threatens female
soldiers’, quoting an Afghan National Army (ANA) female soldier who said the Taliban threaten womenwith torture and cutting their nose and ears if they continued to serve the Afghan government. She
stated that the Taliban sent her death threats (via a letter) accusing her of working for foreigners andnegatively influencing women in the society. 171
Recent examples of targeting of female ANDSF personnel include:•

On 28 August 2019, two female police officers working in Arghandab District of Kandahar
Province were shot and killed by armed men on a motorcycle in PD1 of Kandahar City. 172
Xinhua News stated that the attack was carried out by suspected Taliban. 173

159 Xinhua, 24 including 4 policemen killed in fresh clashes in Afghanistan, 11 June 2020, url
160 New York Times (The), Afghan War Casualty Report: October 2019, 31 October 2019, url
161 New York Times (The), Afghan War Casualty Report: October 2019, 31 October 2019, url
162 Ariana News, Badghis police chief assassinated in Kabul, 24 October 2019, url
163 Reuters, Taliban militant kills regional police chief in a latest attack, 8 May 2020, url
164

Voice of Jihad [English], Police chief along [with] his deputy, 4 more killed, 8 May 2020, url; Reuters, Taliban militant kills
regional police chief in a latest attack, 8 May 2020, url
165 Xinhua, 24 including 4 policemen killed in fresh clashes in Afghanistan, 11 June 2020, url
166 Bakhtar News, Policemen Martyred by Taliban Attack in Kabul, 7 June 2020, url
167
SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 April 2020, url, p. 82
168 Tolonews, Female officer calls for increased women’s presence in ANSF, 5 March 2020, url
169 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2019, 23 January 2020, url, p. 75
170 ZORA, Female Afghan soldiers face a battle on all fronts, 2 October 2019, url
171
ZORA, Female Afghan soldiers face a battle on all fronts, 2 October 2019, url
172 New York Times (The), Afghan War Casualty Report: August: 23 – 29, 29 August 2019, url
173 Xinhua, Two female officers killed in S. Afghanistan, 28 August 2019, url24 —AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT

2.6.1.2 Family members of ANSF personnel
In July 2019, the New York Times reported that the Taliban continued to target families of Afghansoldiers to seek revenge. According to the report, Taliban also burned several of their houses while
they were away from home.174
Recent attacks against the families of ANDSF include:
•

•

•
•

On 3 May 2019, a Taliban fighter killed the wife and 13-year-old son of an ANA soldier in
Ahmadkhel District. The perpetrator was the nephew of the victim, who had secretly jointed
the Taliban to take revenge.175
On 6 August 2019, in Badghis Province, the Taliban shot and killed a woman in the Laman
village of Qala-e Naw, the provincial capital. According to the source, the woman was
engaged/married to an Afghan soldier. The woman was killed in front of people in an
improvised Taliban court.176
On 7 August 2019, a taxi driver whose brother was an Afghan special forces commander was
killed by the Taliban in the Khwaja Pesta area of Khanabad District of Kunduz Province. 177
On 19 September 2019, one security force member and two of his relatives were killed by the
Taliban, and another person was kidnapped by the group after they stopped a territorial army
vehicle in the Zarshi area of Pashton Kot District of Faryab Province.178

2.6.2 Government officials and those perceived as supporting the government
2.6.2.1 Government officials
Although Taliban officials claim that Taliban forces are ordered to protect civilians, civilian government
employees are excluded from this category, which is a ‘violation of the laws of war’.179
Recent attacks on government officials include:
•
•

•

•

On 25 June 2019, the Taliban killed two engineers of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affaire
in an ambush in the Porak area of Pol-e Alam City of Logar Province. According to the source,‘the engineers were working on the construction of a school in the provincial capital.’180
On 18 August 2019, the Taliban detained and later killed a village elder, who was working forthe government, in the Chehldokhtaran village of Koshk-e Robatsangi District in Herat
Province.181
On 20 August 2019, in Baghlan Province, the Taliban kidnapped and killed the deputy of the
Population Registration Department while he was travelling to Baghlan-e Markazi District from
Pul-i-Khumri.182 In the same Province, on 25 August 2019, the Taliban abducted and later killed
a provincial council member of Samangan Province in the Cheshma-e Sher area on the roadbetween Balkh and Kabul.183
On 27 August 2019, the Taliban shot and killed a government official, who was on his way
home from work, in Ahmad Abad District of Paktia Province.184

174 New York Times (The), Seeking revenge, Taliban target Afghan soldiers’ families, 10 July 2019, url
175

New York Times (The), Seeking revenge, Taliban target Afghan soldiers’ families, 10 July 2019, url

176 New York Times (The), Afghan War Casualty Report: August 2-8, 8 August 2019, url; Ariana News, Taliban insurgents shootwoman in Badghis, 6 August 2019, url
177 New York Times (The), Afghan War Casualty Report: August 2-8, 8 August 2019, url
178
New York Times (The), Afghan War Casualty Report: September 2019, 26 September 2019, url
179 HRW, Taliban Linked to Murder of Afghan Rights Defender, 6 September 2019, url
180 New York Times (The), Afghan War Casualty Report: June 21-27, 27 June 2019, url
181 New York Times (The), Afghan War Casualty Report: August 16-22, 22 August 2019, url
182
New York Times (The), Afghan War Casualty Report: August 16-22, 22 August 2019, url
183 New York Times (The), Afghan War Casualty Report: August 23-29, 29 August 2019, url
184 New York Times (The), Afghan War Casualty Report: August 23-29, 29 August 2019, url

AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 25

•

•
•

•

•

•
•
•

On 22 September 2019, Taliban killed a teacher in the village of Barengi in Dulina District inGhor Province and threatened to kill other teachers and government officials if they do notleave their jobs.185
On 8 October 2019, an election commission official was killed by the Taliban in the village ofBashi of Samangan Province. According to the source, the Taliban kidnapped the victim while
he was travelling from Sancharak District to Sar-e Pul City and the day after he was killed.186
On 7 November 2019, the Taliban killed four judges in an ambush when they were travellingfrom Paktia to Kabul, in Mohammad Agha District of Logar Province. 187 Another source
reported that three judges were killed in the incident.188
On 2 December 2019, the brother and the son of the governor of Sayyad District of Samangan
Province were killed, and two police officers were wounded when Taliban fighters attacked
the governor’s house.189
In February 2020, Taliban militants were believed to be responsible for shooting to death
Abdul Rahim, a primary court judge in Herat’s Injil district, in a recent trend of targeted killingsof judges by the group.190 Abdul Rahim, the only court judge in Injil District, was shot and killed
by unknown gunmen on motorcycles while he was returning home from prayer. 191
Five employees of a state-owned bank were abducted and shot by Taliban militants in Heraton 10 April 2020.192
In June 2020, a former Senator, Wali Ahamadzai, was abducted and killed by the Taliban in
Logar.193
Unknown gunmen opened fire on a car belonging to the Attorney General’s Office in June
2020, killing five people, including two state prosecutors. The Taliban denied involvement. 194

2.6.2.2 People seen to be supporting the government or spying
Article 17 [informal translation] of Taliban’s Layeha (code of conduct) targets an alleged spy (Jasoos‫ جاسوس‬in Pashto language). The provisions of the mentioned article delegates Ta’ziri (punishment)
power to the Imam, deputy Imam, provincial judge or in their absence to the provincial governor toorder the execution of an alleged spy. Article 18 of the Layeha code provides criteria based on which
an individual can be considered as a spy: (1) based on self-confession without the usage of force, (2)based on the declaration of two witnesses, who shall convince the judge, (3) based on material
proofs.195
Some examples of targeted people include:•

In March 2019, a pregnant woman in Sancharak District in Sar-e Pol province was sentenced
to death by the Taliban and instantly killed along with her unborn child for reportedly criticising
the Taliban by calling their war against the government 'illegitimate'.196

185 New York Times (The), Afghan War Casualty Report: September 2019, 26 September 2019, url
186 New York Times (The), Afghan War Casualty Report: October 2019, 31 October 2019, url
187 Tolonews, Four judges killed in an ambush in Logar: Police, 7 November 2019, url
188 Reuters, Three judges killed at the Taliban checkpoint in Afghanistan, official say, 7 November 2019, url
189 New York Times (The), Afghan War Casualty Report: December 2019, 30 December 2019, url
190

Kazemi, R., Herat City’s Reported Spike in Insecurity: What a sober reading of events reveals, 21 April 2020, url; Xinhua,
Militants kill judge in E. Afghanistan, 18 February 2020, url; New York Times (The), Afghan War Casualty Report: February
2020, 27 February 2020, url
191 New York Times (The), Afghan War Casualty Report: February 2020, 27 February 2020, url
192
RFE/RL/Gandhara, Taliban Kills Five Bank Employees in Western Afghan Province, 10 April 2020, url
193 Ariana News, Taliban kill former Afghan senator in Logar: local officials, 9 June 2020, url
194 AP, Gunmen kill 5, including 2 prosecutors, in Afghan capital, 22 June 2020, url
195 Voice of Jihad, ‫‘[ الیحه‬code of conduct’], n.d., url; Referring to an English translation of the Layeha (2010 version) made by
the Afghanistan Analysts Network: Clark, K., The Layha: Calling the Taleban to Account, AAN, 4 July 2011, url
196 Salaam Times, Taliban murder pregnant woman, unborn child in Sar-e-Pul, 25 March 2019, url; USDOS, Country Report on
Human Rights Practices 2019 – Afghanistan, March 2020, url, pp. 10-11

26 —AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT

•

•
•

•

•
•

•

In June 2020, unidentified gunmen reportedly killed a tribal elder and his wife and children in
Maidan Wardak; they reportedly previously killed another son for cooperating with local
Afghan police.197
On 4 August 2019, the Taliban reportedly killed a civilian in the village of Ghaib in Shuhada
District of Badakhshan Province, accusing him of spying for the government. 198
In Ghor Province, on 17 September 2019, the Taliban killed three civilian brothers, one thevillage manager, one a teacher, and the third a student. The victims were accused by the
Taliban of having links with the government.199
In September 2019, the head of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC)
in Ghor province was abducted, shot and killed by the Taliban. 200 In June 2020, two AIHRC staff
were assassinated in Kabul through a bomb attack. 201
On 11 November 2019, Taliban killed two civilians accused of supporting the government. The
victims were kidnapped earlier by the group in Firozkoh District of Ghor Province.202
On 29 January 2020, in the Sarjangel village of Morghab District, in Ghor province, a civilian
who was returning home from prayer was shot dead by the Taliban claiming the man was agovernment spy.203 In a similar incident, in March 2020, a man accused by Taliban of spying
for the government was shot dead by the group in the village of Qarchaghay in Qadis District,in Badghis province.204
In January 2020, Afghan officials accused the Taliban of executing at least six members of thesame family, including an infant girl, in a remote village in Faryab province, reportedly forprostitution.205 According to Afghan officials, the Taliban sentenced the family to death for‘immoral acts’, accusing them of working in prostitution. However, according to Andkhoy
district chief, locals claimed that the real reason behind this execution was the fact that afamily member was a former Taliban militant who recently took part to the peace process. 206

2.6.2.3 People working for foreign military forces or perceived as supporting them, includinginterpreters
In August 2018, a Taliban statement published on their Voice of Jihad website in Pashto/Dari indicatedthat the killing of foreign troops in Afghanistan remained a top priority for the group. The groupconsidered commandos of the Defence Ministry, NDS Special Forces and Khost Protection Forces, aswell as interpreters, contractors and spies as the closest supporters of foreign troops and consideredthem responsible for the killing of the Afghan population during night raids. The statement called on
Taliban fighters to include the mentioned profiles in their priority targets and kill them. 207
Article 11 of Taliban’s Layeha orders the execution of individuals working for Kofaar (foreign infidels)
including Tarjoman (interpreters) and delegates the authority to Taliban provincial shadow judges orin their absence to Taliban’s provincial governor to practice such punishments. 208 In August 2018,
Taliban issued a statement calling upon its fighters to identify specific profiles such as interpreters and
197 BBC Monitoring, Tribal elder, family shot dead in Central Afghan province, 12 June 2020 (Factiva)
198 New York Times (The), Afghan War Casualty Report: August 2-8, 8 August 2019, url
199 New York Times (The), Afghan War Casualty Report: September 2019, 26 September 2019, url
200 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2019, 22 February 2020, url, p. 34; HRW, Taliban Linked to

Murder of Afghan Rights Defender, 6 September 2019, url; AIHRC, On the martyr of the Acting Head of Ghor Provincial Officeof the AIHRC, 5 September 2019, url
201
RFE/RL/Gandhara, Afghan Human Rights Body Staff Killed in Kabul Bomb Attack, 27 June 2020, url
202 New York Times (The), Afghan War Casualty Report: November 2019, 2 December 2019, url
203 New York Times (The), Afghan War Casualty Report: January 2020, 2 January 2020 (updated 30 January 2020), url
204 New York Times (The), Afghan War Casualty Report: March 2020, 5 March 2020 (updated 26 March 2020), url
205
Reporterly, Six Family Members Shot Killed by Taliban in Faryab, 19 January 2020, url
206 AP, Afghan officials say Taliban kill 6 members of same family, 19 January 2020, url
207 Voice of Jihad, ‫وپېنو او هدف ی وګرځوو‬‫وحش ځواکونه باید ر‬‫ر‬‫‘[ د دښمن‬Enemy’s savage troops must be identified and targeted’], 9‫ي‬‫ي‬August 2018, url
208
Voice of Jihad, ‫[ الیحه‬informal translation: ‘code of conduct’], n.d., url; Referring to an English translation of the Layeha(2010 version) made by the Afghanistan Analysts Network: Clark, K., The Layha: Calling the Taleban to Account, AAN, 4 July
2011, url

AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 27

kill them. The statement defined interpreters as criminals who actively participate in night raids
alongside American troops killing Afghan population. The statement further states that interpreters
shall be excluded from the Afghan society as they are infidels and savages. 209
The 2020 Doha agreement between the US and the Taliban has created fears among Afghaninterpreters working for the US.210
Some recent incidents of targeted attacks against interpreters include:•••

In April 2018, Taliban claimed on their website that during the night an ‘invader’s’ interpreter,
Abdul Karim, was killed in an ambush in front of Maiwand Bank in Sarafa Market area of Police
District 1 of Kandahar City.211
On 29 September 2019, a young man was killed, and his elderly father was wounded in a
Taliban attack. The victims were accused of cooperating with NATO forces and were kidnappedin Barra Khanah village of Firozkoh of Ghor Province.212
In March 2020, an Afghan interpreter who served the New Zealand forces in Bamyan Province
as a volunteer interpreter stated that he and his family felt they were targets of the Taliban.213

2.6.2.4 Religious leaders
In February 2020, Salaam Times, a newspaper funded by the US military, reported that over 100
religious scholars declared their support to the ANDSF in Herat Province where they visited the ANA
207th Zafar Corps in Guzara District. 214 The New York Times reported that for years the Taliban
continued to target individuals with religious influence who would question the legitimacy of thegroup.215
In 2019, UNAMA documented several incidents of attacks on places of worship, religious leaders, andworshippers, both by the ISKP and Taliban.216 They also documented 17 civilian casualties (10 killed)from the targeted shootings of religious leaders and worshippers. 217 Interior ministry spokesperson,
Tareq Arian, stated during a press conference in June 2020 that Taliban groups have targeted religious
scholars in 2020, in an attempt to put ‘psychological pressure on the Afghan government’. 218
Some recent incidents of targeted attacks against religious scholars include:••

On 24 May 2019, Samiullah Rayhan, a popular religious scholar, was killed in an explosion thattargeted Al-Taqwa mosque in Kabul. He was preaching in support of ANDSF.219 The Taliban was
blamed for the remote IED blown up where a crowd of 700 people gathered to hear Friday
prayers of the well-known religious leader and critic of AGEs in Afghanistan. The explosion
killed him and two others and injured 34 civilians.220
On 11 September 2019, Mullah Mohammad Agha, a religious scholar who owned a madrasa
in the Bakhto-Tangi village of Shawalikot District in Kandahar Province, was killed by the
Taliban.221

209 Voice of Jihad, ‫وپېنو او هدف ی وګرځوو‬‫وحش ځواکونه باید ر‬‫ر‬‫[ د دښمن‬informal translation: ‘Enemy’s savage troops must be identified‫ي‬‫ي‬and targeted’], 9 August 2018, url
210 NPR, Afghan Interpreters Worry A US Withdrawal Will Leave Them Behind, 2 March 2020, url; AP, As violence soars, timerunning out for Afghan interpreters, 9 January 2020, (Factiva)
211 Voice of Jihad, 6 killed and wounded in Kandahar bombings, 4 April 2018, url
212 New York Times (The), Afghan War Casualty Report: October 2019, 31 October 2019, url
213
Stuff, Second Afghan interpreter left “to die” in Afghanistan, 1 March 2020, url
214 Salaam Times, Herat religious scholars stand behind Afghan forces amid partial truce, 25 February 2020, url
215 New York Times (The), Bombing at mosque kills popular religious scholar, 24 May 2019, url
216 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2019, 22 February 2020, url, pp. 46-47
217
UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2019, 22 February 2020, url, p. 47
218 Al Jazeera, Taliban killed, wounded over 400 Afghan forces in one week: Gov't, 14 June, 2020, url
219 New York Times (The), Bombing at mosque kills popular religious scholar, 24 May 2019, url; Tolonews, Well-known
religious scholar killed in Kabul explosion, 24 May 2019, url; UNAMA, Protection of civilians in armed conflict, 2019, 22
February 2020, url, p. 47
220 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2019, 22 February 2020, url, p. 47
221 New York Times (The), Afghan War Casualty Report: September 2019, 26 September 2019, url

28 —AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT••On 21 October 2019, an Imam of a mosque in the village of Naw Abad in Adraskan District ofHerat Province was kidnapped and later killed by the Taliban.222
On 5 March 2020, religious scholar Maulvi Noor Pacha Hammad was killed in PD5 of Kabul
City.223

222 New York Times (The), Afghan War Casualty Report: October 2019, 31 October 2019, url
223 Pajhwok, Religious scholar shot dead in Kabul, 21 March 2020, url

AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 29

3. Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP)The ISKP is a UN-designated terrorist organisation in Afghanistan224 with operational ties with localgroups.225 It is a Salafi-Jihadist organisation that believes it is reviving a pure form of Islam maintainingthat this can only be achieved by an armed jihad that will replace existing governments with atransnational Islamic caliphate, and which permits as legitimate in its aims mass-casualty attacks
against non-combatants.226 According to an assessment by US officials as of November 2019, ISKP had
between 4 000 to 5 000 fighters, most of whom withdrew to Kunar and the north following US
operations during that month aimed at pushing them out of their usual territory in Nangarhar.227
According to reporting on their website, the Taliban have conducted successful operations against
ISKP, claiming, for instance, to have defeated Daesh in Nangarhar and Kunar provinces.228

3.1 Structure and leadership
In April 2019, Islamic State’s core leadership in Iraq and Syria (known as IS, ISIL, ISIS) directly replaced
ISKP’s leader with Mawlawi Aslam Farooqi (formerly running IS/ISKP’s Pakistan operations), which‘underscored’ ISKP’s relations with ISIL core.229 In 2019, it continued to lose its traditional territory andexperienced high attrition of senior leaders.230 Marking further blows to the group, numerous seniorleaders, including Aslam Farooqi, were captured by Afghan forces in 2019 231 and in 2020. 232 Seniorleaders have also gone further into the mountains, gone into hiding, fled to northern Kunar, or crossed
into Pakistan.233 As of May 2020 reporting, ISKP in Kunar is directed by the ISKP-Deputy leader, Sheikh
Matiullah Kamahwal, though it is unclear who is now the leader of ISKP nationally following Farooqi’s
capture.234
A 2019 study published in the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) Sentinel used open source reports
on ISKP militants killed or captured by coalition forces to code a database and build a picture of ISKP
leadership. This ‘coding’ of the leadership revealed the following structure: The heads of ISKP’s
leadership are emirs (Arabic word used for a commander). On the second level in the hierarchy are
spokesmen, provincial level commanders/deputy commanders, chiefs/deputy chiefs of ISKP wings
224 UN Security Council, Letter to the Chair of the Security Council Committee - concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant(Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, S/2020/53, 20 January 2020, url
225 Jadoon, A. and Mines, A., Taking aim: Islamic State Khorasan’s leadership losses, CTC Sentinel, 10 September 2019, url, pp.
1 and 16 ; Al Jazeera, Weakened ISIL's sectarian agenda exacts heavy toll in Afghanistan, 2 April 2020, url
226 Osman, B., Bourgeois Jihad: Why Young, Middle-Class Afghans Join the Islamic State, USIP, Peaceworks No. 162, 1 June
2020, url, p. 4
227 Al Jazeera reported in December 2019 that about half of the group’s 4 000 fighters were still active in Afghanistan.
228 Voice of Jihad, Daesh crawls back into the hole it came from!!, 21 November 2019, url; Voice of Jihad, Daesh militias face
major defeat in Kunar as entire province rescued from its evil, 14 March 2020 url
229 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, para. 59-60
230 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, para. 59-60
231 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, para. 67; Khaama Press, ISIS Khurasan leader and many other
top ISIS commanders arrested in Afghanistan, 4 April 2020, url; Jadoon, A. and Mines, A., Taking aim: Islamic State Khorasan’s
leadership losses, CTC Sentinel, 10 September 2019, url, pp. 1 and 16 ;232 Tolonews, “Key” Daesh leaders arrested in Kabul: NDS, 11 May 2020, url; Pajhwok, Afghan forces arrest ISIS leader forSouth and Far East Asia, 2 senior ISIS leaders, 11 May 2020, url; BBC, IS regional leader Sheikh Khorasani “arrested in
Afghanistan”, 11 May 2020, url; RFE/RL/Radio Free Afghanistan, Afghan Forces Capture Key Figures from Islamic State’s South
Asia Branch, 12 May 2020, url
233 Stars and Stripes, ISIS in Afghanistan was ‘obliterated’ but fighters who escaped could stage resurgence, 10 February 2020,
url; Al Jazeera, Weakened ISIL's sectarian agenda exacts heavy toll in Afghanistan, 2 April 2020, url; Ali, O., Hit from Many
Sides 1: Unpicking the recent victory against the ISKP in Nangarhar, 1 March 2020, url
234 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, para. 71

30 —AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT(responsible for military, intelligence or logistics) and Shura council members. Third in the hierarchy
are district level commanders/chief commanders, or other ‘critical leaders’ including those describedas ‘prominent’ or ‘notorious’. Fourth in the hierarchy are local leaders including ISKP members
operating on sub-district levels, for instance as recruiters, financiers, explosives experts, judges, etc. 235

3.2 Strength, presence, territorial control, capacity
Between September and November 2019, ISKP faced an ‘existential threat’ as it was forced out of its
traditional territory in Nangarhar through campaigns by Afghan and US forces, as well as from attacks
against it by the Taliban as they sought to retake smuggling routes lost to ISKP in previous years.236
Local resentment was also a factor as residents set up Local Uprising Forces which also contributed topressure on the group.237 ISKP used to have a presence spread over seven districts in Nangarhar,
however the May 2020 UN Security Council report states that ‘interlocutors of the Monitoring Team
maintained that ISIL-K has no permanent organized presence in the north of Afghanistan, although theTeam has received reports of small groups of foreign fighters believed to be members of ISIL-K
operating in Taliban-controlled areas of the north.’238
During the aforementioned period (Sept-Nov 2019), its 22-man leadership council and 1 750 fighters
were reduced to less than 200 fighters. By the end of February, over 1 400 fighters and their families
surrendered after the collapse of Nangarhar.239 Much of the ISKP’s fighting force reportedly fled theprovince while others surrendered with their families.240 Prior to its retreat from Nangarhar, ISKP wasseen as the ‘most resilient and successful affiliate’ of ISIL outside its core; however by spring 2020, key
security officials described the ‘complete reversal’ of the situation in Nangarhar, and a ‘turning point’
in dismantling ISKP. 241
Estimates on ISKP’s numbers vary. The US military estimated, ‘with low confidence, that ISIS-K “lost up
to half its force” … possibly decreasing to fewer than 1 000 fighters in Afghanistan this quarter”’ due
to ISKP surrenders and to the strikes by the coalition and Afghan forces and Taliban ground operations
against the group.242 However, the May 2020 UN Security Council report stated that varying numbers
were given but the UN sanctions Monitoring Team assessed their strength at approximately 2 200
armed fighters, mostly in Kunar (Tsowkey district), following the later campaigns against them.243
Sources report on ISKP cells being present ‘throughout Afghanistan’244, including in: Kunar, Herat andKabul City245, and their presence was also locally reported in Nuristan (2019).246 Smaller groups of
235 Jadoon, A. and Mines, A., Taking aim: Islamic State Khorasan’s leadership losses, CTC Sentinel, 10 September 2019, url, pp.

1 and 16236 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, para. 60
237Ali, O., Hit from Many Sides 1: Unpicking the recent victory against the ISKP in Nangarhar, 1 March 2020, url
238 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, para. 72
239 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, para. 62-63
240 OFS, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, 1 October – 31 December 2019, 5 February 2020, url,
pp. 4, 13
241 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, para. 65
242 OFS, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, 1 October – 31 December 2019, 5 February 2020, url,
pp. 5, 13
243 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, para. 69
244 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, para. 72
245 RFE/RL and LWJ, The Taliban, The Government, And Islamic State: Who Controls What In Afghanistan, 31 May 2020, url
246
Ariana News Agency, ‫افزایش نگرای ها از عسکرگېی داعشیان در نورستان‬, [Rising concerns on the recruitment of fighters by Daesh
in Nooristan], 24 August 2019, url; OFS, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, 1 October – 31
December 2019, 5 February 2020, url, pp. 5, 13

AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 31

supporters were said to be in locations such as Helmand247, Kapisa, Baghlan248, and Faryab.249 In March
2020, AAN reported that some small groups of 15-20 ISKP fighters were still operating in remote
districts of Nangarhar (Deh Bala, Pachir wa Agam, Khogyani) in villages with a dominant ISKP
mindset.250
Other reporting on ISKP presence relates to reported clearance and arrest operations. On
14 March 2020, the Taliban claimed that their Mujahidin (fighters) cleared several villages in Mungai
District of Kunar Province.251 Afghan forces have also conducted anti-ISKP operations and claimed tohave made ‘hundreds’ of arrests in Jalalabad and Kabul, as of May 2020. 252 Following the ISKP defeatsin Helmand and Nangarhar Provinces, local media also quoted the Badakshan Governor in April 2020
saying that the group tied its links with Al-Qaeda (composed of foreign fighters) to build a new‘caliphate’ based in Dara-e-Khustak, Jurm District of Badakhsan Province. Local officials claimed in local
media that there were 600 Daesh and Al-Qaeda families (some from Asian countries) settled in Darae Khustak. In addition to Jurm District, in Warduj and Raghistan Districts of Badakhshan Province, otherinsurgent groups including Ansarullah network, the eastern Turkestan group, and the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan are ‘working directly’ with ISKP and Al-Qaeda.253
According to AAN analyst Ali Obaid, as of March 2020, the government controlled most of the lowlying areas of Nangarhar, while the Taliban expanded their controls over the remote areas where ISKP
had remaining bases.254 Regarding the ISKP:‘it remains capable of mounting attacks in various parts of the country, including Kabul, butsome of those claimed may have arisen wholly or partly from a tactical accommodation with
the Haqqani Network. The main risk of ISIL-K resurgence in the context of the Afghan peace
process may lie in its ability to present itself as the only defiant terror group in the country andattract new recruits and funding accordingly.’255
The UN remarked that, according to its information, ‘debate continues’ about the extent to which ISKP
can carry out high profile attacks, especially complex operations in Kabul, noting that there is alleged
involvement and assistance from the Haqqani Network. Attacks ISKP claims for itself may have been
carried out by Haqqani Network. ISKP’s strategic capability is described as limited in Afghanistan. 256
The UN stated that ISKP has carried out four attacks in Kabul in 2020, compared to four such attacks
during all of 2019, with no clear reason for the increase.257 Senior Afghan security officials havereportedly drawn the conclusion about ISKP’s operations that ‘all the attacks claimed by ISKP
depended on the same supply and logistics chain used for supplying attacks by the Taliban’ including
the Haqqani network, outsourced to a ‘single criminal-terrorist network’ with a monopoly likely
supported by corrupt officials. Afghan officials also refuted several ISKP-claimed attacks attributing
them to Taliban or Haqqani actors.258
247

SWN, Daesh regrouping and recruiting in Helmand, 25 August 2019, url

248 OFS, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, 1 October – 31 December 2019, 5 February 2020, url,

p. 5
249 UN Security Council, Letter to the Chair of the Security Council Committee - concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant(Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, 20 January 2020, url, para. 53
250 Ali, O., Hit from Many Sides 1: Unpicking the recent victory against the ISKP in Nangarhar, 1 March 2020, url
251 Voice of Jihad, Daesh militants face major defeat in Kunar as entire province rescued from its evil, 14 March 2020, url
252 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, para. 72
253 Ariana News, Daesh, Al-Qaeda to establish Caliphate in Badakhshan, 21 April 2020, url
254 Ali, O., Hit from Many Sides 1: Unpicking the recent victory against the ISKP in Nangarhar, AAN, 1 March 2020, url
255 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, p. 4
256 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, para. 73, 76
257 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, para. 75
258 Osman, B., Bourgeois Jihad: Why Young, Middle-Class Afghans Join the Islamic State, USIP, Peaceworks No. 162, 1 June
2020, url, pp. 9-10

32 —AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORTIn the UN Security Council report of May 2020, Afghan officials ‘cautioned’ that ISKP ‘still retained cells
throughout Afghanistan for the purpose of carrying out high profile attacks’. 259
On 6 May 2020, NDS carried out three attacks against ISKP hideouts in Kabul (two in PD11) and one in
Shakar Dara District (outside of Kabul City), in which eight insurgents were arrested (including two
children) and five killed (including three women). The group was composed of members of ISKP and
Haqqani Network led by those involved in several attacks including the attack on a Sikh temple in
Kabul.260 AAN reported also that some Afghan officials pointed to Haqqani Network and Indian officials
have said the Pakistani Lashkar-e Taiba were the perpetrators.261

3.3 Objectives
ISKP’s ideology calls for the establishment of a global ‘caliphate’ attained through global warfare that‘would kill or enslave all those who do not adhere to an extremist interpretation of Islam’.262 According
to Borhan Osman, ISKP has as a stated aim to declare jihad against ‘any tribe or political group that
defied its rules’ and to restore a ’pristine’ Islam, targeting those it deems to be to blame for corrupting
Islam, which includes Shias and Sufis, for example.263
According to UN reporting, attacks ‘most likely carried out by [ISKP] are those against soft targets’ suchas Shia Hazara communities.264 The AAN265 and Crisis Group report similarly. The International Crisis
Group’s senior analyst on Afghanistan, stated in Al Jazeera that ISKP continued to primarily target nonSunni religious minorities in the capital Kabul, in particular non-Sunni Muslims such as Shia Hazara
Muslims, that the group consider ‘infidels’, with the aim to ‘foment sectarian divide, which is in linewith the groups’ continued objectives in Afghanistan.266 Sikhs as well as Hindus have been targeted in
2018.267
In light of the Taliban’s entry into talks with the US, ISKP continued to preach their mission as a ‘purer
form of jihad’ in contrast with the Taliban’s opening up to US talks.268 According to the UN by doing
this, ISKP is ‘setting up a narrative that places ISIL as the only defiant terror group’ in an effort to gain
recruits dissenting from the Taliban and Al Qaeda, especially those who oppose any agreement talks
with the US or Afghan governments.269
According to the UN Security Council report, ISKP ‘is willing to claim responsibility’ for attacks that kill
civilians, as this demonstrates their ‘capability and relevance’; while the Taliban is given the ability todeny civilian casualties when attacks are carried out under the ‘tactical autonomy of the Haqqani
network’.270 According to Borhan Osman, expert on Afghanistan and formerly part of the Afghanistan
259 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501

(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, para. 72
260 Tolonews, Afghan forces raid Daesh hideout north of Kabul, 6 May 2019, url; 1TV, Joint Daesh-Haqqani cell eliminated in
Kabul: NDS, 6 May 2020, url; Ariana News, At least 13 Daesh fighters killed, detained in Kabul, 6 May 2020, url
261 Foschini, F., Blood in the Abode of Peace, 1 April 2020, url
262 Stars and Stripes, ISIS in Afghanistan was ‘obliterated’ but fighters who escaped could stage resurgence, 10 February 2020,
url
263 Osman, B., Bourgeois Jihad: Why Young, Middle-Class Afghans Join the Islamic State, USIP, Peaceworks No. 162, 1 June
2020, url, p. 16
264 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, para. 62-63
265 Foschini, F., Blood in the Abode of Peace: The attacks on Kabul’s Sikhs, 1 April 2020, url; Osman, B., With an Active Cell in
Kabul, ISKP Tries to Bring sectarianism to the Afghan War, 19 Octover 2016, url
266 Al Jazeera, Weakened ISIL's sectarian agenda exacts heavy toll in Afghanistan, 2 April 2020, url;
267
VOA, Save Afghan Sikhs And Hindus From Genocide, Activists Urge, 19 April 2020, url
268 Stars and Stripes, ISIS in Afghanistan was ‘obliterated’ but fighters who escaped could stage resurgence, 10 February 2020,
url
269 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, para. 77
270 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, para. 73

AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 33

Analysts Network, in the absence of post-Doha urban attacks by the Taliban, ISKP’s recent attacks andtargeting pattern, especially in Kabul, indicate that ISKP saw the opportunity to demonstrate its
visibility by carrying out high profile attacks in 2020 to highlight its jihadi cause in contrast to the
Taliban’s ‘betrayal’ for negotiating with the US.271

3.4 Recruitment strategies
ISKP continued to recruit new members through a range of means, including:•••through ideological appeal or those seeking revenge272, the internet, and through propaganda
in madrasas and within universities in Afghanistan;273
recruiting teenagers and youth;274
through coercion and through the threat of violence, while others joined voluntarily seeking
wages and high salaries that never materialised.275

In an analysis of ISKP recruitment published in June 2020 by independent expert Borhan Osman, henotes that ISKP tends to recruit in urban centres, both men and women, from middle-classbackgrounds who are non-Pashtun university students.276 They are chiefly drawn to join ISKP by‘frustrations with the status quo’, by ‘the purity of ISKP ideology’, by egalitarianism, Salafist marriage,
and by the possibility to live in the ‘caliphate’; fundamentally he says, they are driven by thebreakdown of traditional Afghan society. Borhan Osman further noted that ISKP is not a foreign
phenomenon, and that the group recruits locally.277
ISKP ideology was also reported by interlocutors for the UN’s May report to have been ‘viewed
sympathetically by some in the north, particularly among certain local ethnic Tajik and Uzbek
populations’.278 From interviews with more than 60 ISKP recruits, Borhan Osman also found that they
were predominantly from ethnically Tajik areas, such as from Parwan (mostly from Ghorband district),Panjsher, and Kapisa (Najrab and Tagab districts).279
Recent ISKP propaganda and counter-Taliban narratives on the 2020 negotiations are aimed atrecruiting dissenters from AQ and the Taliban who oppose ‘any agreement’ with the US and Afghan
governments.280

271 Osman, B., Bourgeois Jihad: Why Young, Middle-Class Afghans Join the Islamic State, USIP, Peaceworks No. 162, 1 June

2020, url, p. 10
272 Al Jazeera, Weakened ISIL's sectarian agenda exacts heavy toll in Afghanistan, 2 April 2020, url; Osman, B., Bourgeois Jihad:
Why Young, Middle-Class Afghans Join the Islamic State, USIP, Peaceworks No. 162, 1 June 2020, url, pp. 15-16
273 UN Security Council, Letter to the Chair of the Security Council Committee - concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant(Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, S/2020/53, 20 January 2020, url, p. 16;
UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, para. 76; BBC, Afghanistan: The detention centre for teenage
Taliban members, 21 April 2020, url; Osman, B., Bourgeois Jihad: Why Young, Middle-Class Afghans Join the Islamic State,
USIP, Peaceworks No. 162, 1 June 2020, url; FP, In Afghanistan, the Islamic State Threatens Long-Term Peace, 4 June 2020,
url
274 BBC, Afghanistan: The detention centre for teenage Taliban members, 21 April 2020, url
275 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, para. 64
276 Osman, B., Bourgeois Jihad: Why Young, Middle-Class Afghans Join the Islamic State, USIP, Peaceworks No. 162, 1 June
2020, url, p. 2
277 Osman, B., Bourgeois Jihad: Why Young, Middle-Class Afghans Join the Islamic State, USIP, Peaceworks No. 162, 1 June
2020, url, p. 2
278 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, para. 66
279 Osman, B., Bourgeois Jihad: Why Young, Middle-Class Afghans Join the Islamic State, USIP, Peaceworks No. 162, 1 June
2020, url, p. 12
280 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, para. 77

34 —AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT

3.5 Human rights violations and abuses
According to AAN, local resentment against ISKP grew in 2015 when it began to ‘behave more brutally’toward the local population, including carrying out beheadings on accusations of spying for thegovernment or Taliban.281 In April 2020, Human Rights Watch called on the Afghan government toprosecute captured ISKP leader Aslam Farooqi for war crimes due to his alleged role in organising
recent deliberate attacks against civilians since becoming leader in 2019.282 From 2016 to 2018,
insurgent groups have ‘sharply escalated’ their attacks in Kabul and urban areas, killing and injuring
thousands of civilians, including a number of suicide attacks by ISKP.283 UNAMA has indicated that
ISKP’s attacks on Shia minorities during 2019 are serious violations of international law, potentiallyamounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity. 284

3.6 Targeted individuals and recent attacks
3.6.1 Hazara Shia
ISKP continues to make sectarian attacks mainly against Shia minorities, who are mostly Hazara, noting
7 of 10 such attacks were by ISKP in 2019, which led to 112 dead and 361 injured civilians.285 ISKP has
claimed recent attacks on Shia Hazara, including the following:•••

An explosive device targeting a mainly Hazara area in Herat City on 5 August 2019;286
A suicide attack on a wedding in Kabul on 17 August 2019287 that killed 63 and wounded morethan 180 people in a mainly Shia area;288
A double suicide attack on a memorial ceremony for a prominent Hazara leader on
6 March 2020.289 Armed men also opened fire on the crowd of about 1 000 people gatheredin Mazari Square area of Kabul, along with numerous high profile attendees, including former
President Karzai.290 Pajhwok reported that the attack killed at least 32 and injured more than
80 people.291

3.6.2 Sikhs
ISKP has claimed the following recent attacks on Sikhs:•

A ‘complex attack’ on a Sikh temple in Kabul on 25 March 2020292; the temple was full of up to
200 worshippers, with at least 25 people killed, including women and children in the attack
using grenades and indiscriminate shooting.293

281 Ali O., Hit from Many Sides 1: Unpicking the recent victory against the ISKP in Nangarhar, 1 March 2020, url
282 HRW, Afghanistan: Prosecute Head of ISIS-linked Group, 6 April 2020, url
283 HRW, “No Safe Place”: Insurgent Attacks on Civilians in Afghanistan, May 2018, url, pp. 1-2, 27-34; Stars and Stripes, ISISin Afghanistan was ‘obliterated’ but fighters who escaped could stage resurgence, 10 February 2020, url
284 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2019, 22 February 2020, url, pp. 48
285 UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2019, 22 February 2020, url, pp. 47-48
286 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, para. 74
287 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, para. 74
288 BBC, Afghanistan: Bomb kills 63 at wedding in Kabul, 18 August 2019, url
289
UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, para. 74
290 UNAMA, United Nations Condemns Attack Targeting Civilians at Commemoration Event, 6 March 2020, url
291 Pajhwok, Daesh claims deadly attack on Mazari memorial, 7 March 2020, url
292
UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, para. 74
293 Guardian (The), Afghanistan: dozens killed in attack on Kabul Sikh temple, 25 March 2020, url

AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 35

3.6.3 Other examples of treatment of opponents, including perceived ‘infidels’, ‘apostates’,
spies or other insurgents
•
•

•
•

•

294

In June 2019, a religious scholar acting as head of the religious affairs department in Jalalabad
city was shot and killed by ISKP militants.294
In May 2020, the US blamed ISKP for a large-scale attack complex on an MSF-run Kabul hospitalmaternity ward in a largely Shia area which left 24 people dead. MSF stated that the gunmensystematically targeted the maternity ward, shooting women in their beds. The Afghan
government disputed the US claim, stating that the Taliban and affiliate Haqqani were
responsible, using ISKP to deflect their involvement; a claim which the Taliban denied. Nogroup claimed responsibility.295
On 12 May 2020, ISKP carried out a suicide bombing on a funeral in Nangarhar, which thegroup claimed targeted a ‘gathering of Afghan security forces and militiamen’296, killing an
estimated 19297 to up to 32 people, with nearly 70 others wounded.298
In Kabul, Islamic State claimed responsibility for a 2 June 2020 bomb attack on a mosque inthe capital that killed two people, including a religious leader, and injured 8 civilians. On an ISaffiliated website the group stated that the prayer leader was targeted as ‘an apostate and evil
propagating loyalty to the apostate Afghan government’.299 The mosque was among the mostheavily guarded in the country in a central district of Kabul and the bombing occurred in the
midst of a three day ‘ceasefire’ with the Taliban, during which attacks continued.300
Also in June 2020, the group claimed responsibility for an attack on a local TV station’s bus,which killed two employees and injured four; ISKP stated that they were killed for their supportof the ‘apostate’ government.301

UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2019, 22 February 2020, url, p. 47

295 VOA, Islamic State Plotted Afghan Hospital Raid, US Says, 15 May 2020, url; Reuters, Afghans say Taliban behind bloodshed,reject U.S. blame of Islamic State, 15 May 2020, url
296 VOA, Afghan Funeral Bombing, Hospital Raid Kill Dozens, 12 May 2020, url
297
UNAMA, Rising Civilian Casualty Numbers Highlight Urgent Need to Halt Fighting and Re-focus on Peace Negotiations, 19
May 2020, url
298 Tolonews, Nangarhar Funeral Bombing Death Toll Rises to 32, 13 May 2020, url
299 AP, IS Claims Kabul Mosque Attack That Killed Prayer Leader, 5 June 2020, url
300
Reuters, Afghans Condemn Killing of Prominent Cleric in Mosque Blast, 4 June 2020, url
301 AP, IS Claims Kabul Mosque Attack That Killed Prayer Leader, 5 June 2020, url; AP, IS claims Afghan bus attack; civilians
killed in new clashes, 31 May 2020, url36 —AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT

4. Other AGEs
4.1 Haqqani network
Haqqani network is a UN-designated terrorist organisation (Entry number TAe.012).302 As previously
mentioned in this report (See Chapter 2. The Taliban) Haqqani maintains close ties with the Taliban
and the head of the Haqqani network is the Deputy head of the Taliban, Sirajuddin Haqqani, a UN
sanctioned/listed individual.303 It is described as a powerful faction of the Taliban.304 According to
USDOD, the Haqqani Network continued to be integral part of Taliban’s attacks against the Afghan
Government in Kabul and eastern Afghanistan for instance the Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive
Device (VBIED) attack on a convoy in Kabul on 5 September 2019 that killed a US service member.
Since Sirajuddin Haqqani became the Deputy Leader of the Taliban in 2015, the Haqqani Network’s‘influence has increased in areas outside of Haqqani’s normal operating region: Paktika, Paktiya, andKhost Provinces in eastern Afghanistan.’305
Haqqani reportedly collaborates and keeps close contact with Al Qaeda despite the US-deal.306 The UN
stated in May 2020 that there were indications that senior figures in Haqqani network and Al Qaeda
were planning to create a joint unit of 2 000 fighters split into two divisions, one in Loya Paktiya (Khost,
Logar, Paktiya, Paktika) and the other in Kunar and Nuristan.307
Haqqani and ISKP are reported to work together, according to Afghan officials, including a rocket attackon the Afghanistan Presidential inauguration and an assault on a Sikh temple in March 2020 that killed
25 people.308 Afghan intelligence officials stated in June 2020 that they busted a joint Haqqani-ISKP
cell outside Kabul.309
In its quarterly report of 30 January 2020, SIGAR reported that Resolute Support attributed 91 % of thecivilian casualties to AGEs including 4 % to Haqqani Network.310 However, it is difficult to distinguishHaqqani attacks from Taliban attacks. According to UNAMA, Haqqani ‘undertook attacks while
maintaining a degree of operational independence’.311 It is believed to be responsible for complex
attacks on both government and international targets in heavily populated areas of Kabul.312 For
example, on 14 May 2020, 5 people were killed when a truck bomb exploded outside a military court
in Gardez, Paktia, injuring dozens. The spokesman for the Afghan Interior Ministry blamed Haqqani
and its ties to the Taliban, but the Taliban denied being involved.313

302 UNSC, United Nations Security Council Consolidated List – Generated on: 18 July 2020, 18 July 2020, url, p. 150; For an

narrative description of the group, see: UNSC, Haqqani Network, n.d., url
303
UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, Annex, para. A; UNSC, Haqqani Network, n.d., url
304 RFE/RL/Gandhara, Afghan Spy Agency Says ‘IS-Haqqani’ Cell Busted in Kabul, 6 May 2020, url
305 USDOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2019, 23 January 2020, url, p. 25
306 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, p. 3; RFE/RL, UN Monitors: Taliban Maintains ‘Close’’ Ties With
Al-Qaeda Despite U.S. Peace Deal, 2 June 2020, url
307 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, para. 38
308 RFE/RL/Gandhara Afghanistan, Afghan Spy Agency Says ‘IS-Haqqani’ Cell Busted in Kabul, 6 May 2020, url
309 RFE/RL/Gandhara, Afghan Spy Agency Says ‘IS-Haqqani’ Cell Busted in Kabul, 6 May 2020, url
310 SIGAR, Quarterly report to the United States Congress, 30 January 2020, url, p. 70
311
UNAMA clarifies that ‘since 2017, UNAMA has attributed attacks believed to be committed by the Haqqani Network to
the Taliban as the distinction could no longer be reliably established according to UNAMA’s methodology for verifying andattributing civilian casualties’. UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict 2019, 22 February 2020, url, p.
85
312
UNAMA, Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict 2019, 22 February 2020, url, p. 85
313 RFE/RL/Gandhara, Taliban Truck Bomb Kills At Least Five In Eastern Afghanistan, 14 May 2020, url; Diplomat (The), The
Taliban and al-Qaeda: Enduring Partnership or Liability?, 16 June 2020, url

AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 37

According to an Iranian news source, the Haqqani Network counts around 4 000 fighters, who are
actively based in Paktia, Khost, Kandahar, Helmand and eastern provinces, and carries out attacks in
Kabul. The group is part of the Quetta Shura in Quetta city of Pakistan.314

4.2 Al Qaeda and affiliates
Al Qaeda is a transnational extremist Salafist jihadist organisation and UN-designated terrorist group,(QDe.004) as are its affiliate branches.315
Sources indicate that Al Qaeda maintains relations with the Taliban316 and a limited presence inAfghanistan, carrying out its activities mostly under the umbrella of other AGEs, particularly the
Taliban.317 According to the Security Council, Al Qaeda and other foreign terrorists that are ‘aligned
under the protection and influence of the Taliban’ poses a ‘long-term global threat’.318 However, theTaliban denied having links to Al Qaeda and in the wake of the US agreement, in June 2020, it went so
far as to deny that Al Qaeda even existed in Afghanistan.319 Michael Semple, former UN advisor quoted
by Foreign Policy magazine, stated that the Taliban has intensified its connections to Al Qaeda sincesigning the Doha agreement in February 2020.320 The UN also reported in May 2020 that some
reporting indicated that the Taliban retained strong links with Al Qaeda, who embed advisors withthem; the Taliban and Al Qaeda and continued to hold meetings and make reassurances about theirrelationship through 2019.321 In opposition to ISKP, Al Qaeda has sought to promote the Taliban’s Emiras the ‘more theologically correct’ leader for Afghan Muslims.322
According to the May 2020 report by the UN, Al Qaeda is ‘covertly active’ in 12 provinces with 400600 armed operatives: Badakhshan, Ghazni, Helmand, Khost, Kunar, Kunduz, Logar, Nangarhar,
Nimruz, Nuristan, Paktiya and Zabul.323
On 23 September 2019, Asim Omar, the leader of Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent was killed in ajoint operation in Musa Qala District of Helmand Province during an attack against a joint Taliban-Al
Qaeda meeting.324 On 11 May 2020, Tolonews quoted security officials claiming that Al Qaeda andJaish-Mohammad group (based in Pakistan) fight alongside the Taliban against ANDSF in eastern
provinces of Afghanistan including Nangarhar, Kunar and Nuristan Provinces. The Taliban denied theclaim.325 In what the UN calls an ‘unusual move’, Al Qaeda released on its media site Thabat, a summaryof attacks it claimed to have carried out in March 2020, which shows ‘hundreds of alleged attacks
carried out in Afghanistan’ leading to ANSF casualties. The UN stated that the statistics appeared to be
exaggerated.326
314 ANA, ‫شبکه حقانی؛ تروریستهایی با مدیریت چندگانه‬‫‘[ آشنایی با‬Understanding the Haqqani Network, terrorists with a different
administration’], 19 November 2019, url
315 UNSC, United Nations Security Council Consolidated List – Generated on: 18 July 2020, 18 July 2020, url, p. 139
316
UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, para. 32 and 41
317 UNAMA, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2019, 22 February 2020, url, p. 85-86
318 UN Security Council, Letter to the Chair of the Security Council Committee - concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant(Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, S/2020/53, 20 January 2020, url, para. 8
319 Roggio, B., Taliban falsely claims Al Qaeda doesn’t exist in Afghanistan, 16 June 2020, LWJ, url; Roggio, B., Analysis: Taliban
is caught in a lie by denying Al Aqda’s presence in Afghanistan, LWJ, 17 June 2020, url
320 FP, Factional Struggles Emerge in Virus-Afflicted Taliban Top Ranks, 9 June 2020, url
321
UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, para. 33
322 Diplomat (The), The Taliban and al-Qaeda: Enduring Partnership or Liability?, 16 June 2020, url
323 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, para. 33-34
324 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, para. 36; Reuters, Afghanistan says Al Qaeda leader killed in
September wedding party clash, 9 October 2019, url
325
Tolonews, Al Qaeda, Jaish-Mohammad aligned with Taliban in the East: officials, 11 May 2020, url
326 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, para. 43

38 —AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT

4.3 Foreign AGEs and fighters
The UN Security Council report from May 2020 stated that there are a number of ‘foreign terroristgroups’ that pose a ‘security threat’ in Afghanistan due to their operations, activities and ‘permanent
presence’. While these groups may continue to pose a security threat to Afghanistan, according to the
UN Security Council report, others were not a threat alone, but relied on affiliations with other groups
to operate.327 These groups appear on the UN-designated sanctions list for terrorism.328
The main groups listed by the UN Security Council report that pose a security threat are:•••Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan with 500 fighters in Kunar and 180 in Nangarhar. This group also
includes a number of loose splinter groups: Jamaat ul-Ahrar (JuA); Lashkar-e Islam; Hafiz Gul
Bahadur Group; Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan-Hafeez Ullah Kochwan; Tehrik-e Taliban PakistanSajna; Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan-Punjab; Tariq Gidar Group (QDe.160); and Majlis-e Ahrargroup;Jaish-eMohammed with 200 fighters;
Lashkar-e Tayyiba with 800 fighters.

These groups are mainly located in the eastern provinces of Kunar, Nangarhar and Nuristan, ‘where
they operate under the umbrella of the Afghan Taliban’ and facilitate the transit of fighters. They havealso been involved in ‘targeted assassinations against government officials and others’.329 In April 2020,
a key ISKP leader was arrested; he had been responsible for coordination and contact with othergroups such as Lashkar-e Tayyiba, Sepa-i Sahaba, Jamiat-e Ulema-e Islam and the Peshawar Council of
Taliban.330
There are also several central Asian and Uigher foreign terrorist and militant groups that present a‘significant threat’ in northern areas of Afghanistan, with Uzbek, Tajik and Turkmen ethnicity andlanguage which they have in common with countries in the region:
•
•
•
•
•

Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (also known as Jundullah)
Jamaat Ansarullah Tajikistan
Lashkar-e Islam
The Salafist Group331

Regarding the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the UN Security Council reported in 2020 that
the IMU has ‘lost its independent status’ and is part of the Taliban forces carrying their activities in
Faryab and Zabul Provinces. The group is currently led by Mohammad Yuldas, who is based in Almar
District of Faryab Province. Since the group suffered material losses, its members engaged in criminal
activities such as smuggling drugs via the northern route.332 A local media source observed that in April
2020, two members of the IMU were arrested in Takhar province by the ANSF. Reportedly, they wereplanning to carry out an attack against the ANSF in Takhar.333

327 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501

(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, para. 78
328 UNSC, United Nations Security Council Consolidated List – Generated on: 18 July 2020, 18 July 2020, url, p. 172 (Qde. 132– TTP), 153 (QDe.019 – Jaish-i-Mohammed), 159 (Qde. 118 – Lashkar-e-Tayyiba)
329 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, para. 79
330 Khaama Press, Key ISIS leader having links with Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e Taiba arrested in Afghanistan, 22 April 2020,url
331 UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, para. 83-84
332 UN Security Council, Letter to the Chair of the Security Council Committee - concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant(Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, S/2020/53, 20 January 2020, url, para. 61
333 TKG, ‫‘ [ بازداشت دو عضو حرکت اسالیم ازبکستان در تخار‬two members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan arrested in Takhar’],12 April 2020, url

AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 39

The Eastern Turkistan Movement is largely located in Badakshan, Kunduz, and Takhar provinces, with
500 fighters mainly concentrated in Raghistan and Warduj districts of Badakshan. 334
The Uzbek jihadist group Katibat Imam al-Bukhari (KIB) is also active in Afghanistan, operating in Faryab
and Jowzjan, where Uzbeks are a large proportion of the population. The group has openly identified
itself as part of the Taliban since 2018. In July 2020, the group released photos of several progovernment militia members whom it claimed to have captured in a joint attack with the Taliban.335

334

UNSC, Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501
(2019) concerning the Taliban, S/2020/415, 27 May 2020, url, para. 88
335 LWJ, Uzbek jihadist group claims capture of Afghan militiamen, 7 July 2020, url40 —AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT

Annex I: Bibliography
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AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 41

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2020

42 —

AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT

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AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 45

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46 —AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT

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AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 47

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52 —AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT

Annex II: Terms of Reference
Anti-Government Elements-

Overview
Doha Agreement and recent developments

The Taliban-

Structure and leadership
Strength, presence, territorial control, capacity
Objectives and targeting
Recruitment, including of children
Human rights violations
Targeted individuals
o Members of the Afghan security forces and pro-government militiaso Women in the ANSF
o Family members of the ANSF
o Government officials and those perceived as supporting the government, including
officials, those seen as spies or government supporterso People working for foreign militaries, such as interpreters
o Certain religious leaders

Islamic State Khorasan Province-

Structure and leadership
Strength, presence, territorial control, capacity
Capacity for attacks
Objectives and targeting
Recruitment, including of children
Human rights violations
Targeted individualso Shia Hazarao Sikhso Other opponents such as perceived infidels

Other AGEsooo

Haqqani Network
Al Qaeda
Foreign AGEs

AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 53

54 —AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT

doi: 10.2847/14756