European Asylum Support Office

Venezuela
Country Focus

Country of Origin Information ReportAugust 2020
SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION

European Asylum Support Office

Venezuela
Country Focus

Country of Origin Information ReportAugust 2020

More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu).
PDF ISBN: 978-92-9485-642-5 doi: 10.2847/222503 BZ-02-20-557-EN-N© European Asylum Support Office (EASO) 2020
Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged, unless otherwise stated.
For third-party materials reproduced in this publication, reference is made to the copyrights
statements of the respective third parties.
Cover photo: © Tomer Urwicz/UNFPA. Large numbers of people are bypassing immigration
controls as they exit Venezuela, in: UNFPA, Dignity and strength: Venezuelan refugees andmigrants in Colombia, 5 June 2019, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS— 3

Acknowledgements
This report was drafted by James Restrepo. Mr. Restrepo is an independent expert on Country of
Origin Information (COI), particularly for Latin America, having worked 9 years in the Research
Directorate of the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) of Canada and with over 12 years of combined
experience researching migration issues in the region in both academic and institutional roles. Mr.
Restrepo has led COI research missions to Colombia, Honduras, Guatemala, Mexico, and El Salvador,
as well as numerous COI capacity-development projects in the Americas.
This COI report is a joint initiative of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) and the Secretariatof the Intergovernmental Consultations on Migration, Asylum and Refugees (IGC) 1. It builds on thefirst joint COI workshop between EASO and IGC, which covered Colombia and Venezuela and was heldin Geneva in September 2019.
The following national asylum and migration departments contributed by reviewing this report:
Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) of Canada, and Immigration, Refugees andCitizenship Canada (IRCC)
Norway: Norwegian Country of Origin Information Centre, Landinfo
Switzerland: State Secretariat for Migration (SEM), Division Analysis (Länderanalyse SEM)
United States: Refugee Asylum and International Operations (RAIO), US Citizenship andImmigration Services (USCIS)
In addition, EASO and IGC reviewed this report.
It must be noted that the review carried out by the mentioned departments contributes to the overall
quality of the report, but does not necessarily imply their formal endorsement of the final report,
which is the full responsibility of EASO.

1 IGC participating states are: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, New

Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States.

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Contents
Acknowledgements................................................................................................................................. 3Contents .................................................................................................................................................. 4
Disclaimer................................................................................................................................................ 7
Glossary and Abbreviations .................................................................................................................... 8
Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 12
Methodology .................................................................................................................................... 12
Defining the terms of reference ................................................................................................... 12
Collecting information.................................................................................................................. 13
Quality control.............................................................................................................................. 14
Structure and use of the report ........................................................................................................ 14
Maps ..................................................................................................................................................... 16
1. Overview ........................................................................................................................................... 18
1.1 Economy ..................................................................................................................................... 18
1.2 Security situation ........................................................................................................................ 20
1.3 Institutional duality..................................................................................................................... 21
1.3.1 Executive branch ................................................................................................................. 23
1.3.2 Legislative branch ................................................................................................................ 24
1.3.3 Judicial branch ..................................................................................................................... 26
1.3.4 Security forces ..................................................................................................................... 26
1.4 Demonstrations .......................................................................................................................... 28
1.5 Abuses and monitoring by security forces ................................................................................. 30
1.5.1 Arbitrary detentions ............................................................................................................ 30
1.5.2 Extrajudicial executions....................................................................................................... 32
1.5.3 Monitoring........................................................................................................................... 34
1.6 Effects of the coronavirus pandemic on the Venezuelan crisis .................................................. 38
1.7 Absence of statistical information .............................................................................................. 40
2. Humanitarian situation ..................................................................................................................... 41
2.1 Migration .................................................................................................................................... 41
2.2 Health ......................................................................................................................................... 44
2.2.1 Medical treatment .............................................................................................................. 45
2.2.2 Infrastructure ...................................................................................................................... 46
2.3 Food security .............................................................................................................................. 47

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2.4 Basic services .............................................................................................................................. 48
3. Targeted profiles ............................................................................................................................... 50
3.1 Political opposition ..................................................................................................................... 52
3.2 Human rights advocates and social activists .............................................................................. 54
3.3 Protesters ................................................................................................................................... 56
3.4 State employees and union leaders ........................................................................................... 58
3.5 Scholars and educators............................................................................................................... 59
3.6 Military personnel ...................................................................................................................... 59
3.6.1 Recruitment and reserves ................................................................................................... 62
3.7 Journalists and the media ........................................................................................................... 62
3.8 Indigenous peoples ..................................................................................................................... 64
3.9 Activity on social media .............................................................................................................. 65
3.10 Health care workers.................................................................................................................. 66
3.11 State response and protection ................................................................................................. 66
3.11.1 Justice system.................................................................................................................... 66
3.11.2 Prison conditions and treatment in prison ....................................................................... 69
3.11.3 State protection for victims and witnesses ....................................................................... 70
3.11.4 Investigations into complaints .......................................................................................... 71
3.11.5 'Law Against Hate' ............................................................................................................. 72
3.11.6 Relocation.......................................................................................................................... 74
4. Situation at the border with Colombia ............................................................................................. 76
4.1 Armed groups ............................................................................................................................. 78
4.1.1.Guerrilla Groups .................................................................................................................. 80
4.1.2 Colombian paramilitary successor groups, transnational criminal organisations .............. 84
4.1.3 Cartel of the Suns (Cartel de los Soles) ................................................................................ 87
4.1.4 Domestic criminal bands ..................................................................................................... 87
4.2 Main human rights violations ..................................................................................................... 89
4.3 State response to border security .............................................................................................. 92
5. Colectivos .......................................................................................................................................... 95
5.1 Types of colectivos and activities................................................................................................ 96
5.2 Structure ..................................................................................................................................... 98
5.3 Recruitment ................................................................................................................................ 99
5.4 Areas of operation ...................................................................................................................... 99
5.5 Profiles of targeted individuals ................................................................................................. 101
5.6 Modus operandi ....................................................................................................................... 102
5.7 Financing and support .............................................................................................................. 104

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5.8 Relationship with security forces ............................................................................................. 105
5.9 State response to colectivos ..................................................................................................... 105
6. Identity documents ......................................................................................................................... 107
6.1 Identity Cards............................................................................................................................ 107
6.2 Passports................................................................................................................................... 108
6.2.1 Within Venezuela .............................................................................................................. 108
6.2.2 From abroad ...................................................................................................................... 108
6.2.3 Extension of the validity of expired passports .................................................................. 109
6.3 Access to documents ................................................................................................................ 109
6.3.1 Birth certificates (Acta de Nacimiento or Partida de Nacimiento) ................................... 109
6.3.2 National identity cards (Cédula de identidad)................................................................... 110
6.3.3 Passports ........................................................................................................................... 110
6.3.4 The use of 'agents' ('gestores') .......................................................................................... 111
6.4 Fraudulent documents ............................................................................................................. 112
6.5 Carnet de la Patria .................................................................................................................... 113
6.6 Court summonses (citatorios) .................................................................................................. 115
6.7 Arrest warrants (orden de arresto) ........................................................................................... 115
7. Entry and exit .................................................................................................................................. 117
7.1 Irregular border crossings......................................................................................................... 117
7.2 Entry into Colombia .................................................................................................................. 118
7.3 Treatment upon entry and exit of particular targeted profiles ................................................ 118
7.4 Return to the Homeland Plan (Plan Vuelta a la Patria)............................................................ 120
7.5 Internal movement ................................................................................................................... 120
8. Situation of LGBT persons ............................................................................................................... 122
8.1 Legislation ................................................................................................................................. 122
8.2 Discrimination and violence ..................................................................................................... 123
8.3 Situation of LGBT advocacy organisations................................................................................ 126
8.4 State protection ........................................................................................................................ 127
Annex 1: Bibliography ......................................................................................................................... 129
Annex 2: Terms of Reference .............................................................................................................. 153

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Disclaimer
This report was written according to the EASO COI Report Methodology (2019) 2. The report is basedon carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced.
The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed with utmost
care. However, this document does not claim to be exhaustive. If a particular event, person ororganisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has not taken place orthat the person or organisation does not exist.
Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particularapplication for international protection. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative of aparticular legal position.
‘Refugee’, ‘risk’, ‘persecution’, and similar terminology are used as generic terminology and not in thelegal sense as applied in the EU Asylum Acquis, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol
relating to the Status of Refugees.
Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may bemade of the information contained in this report.
The drafting of this report was finalised on 20 July 2020. Any event taking place after this date is notincluded in this report. More information on the reference period for this report can be found in themethodology section of the Introduction.

2 The EASO methodology is largely based on the Common EU Guidelines for processing Country of Origin Information (COI),

2008, and can be downloaded from the EASO website: http://www.easo.europa.eu.

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Glossary and Abbreviations
ACFIMAN

Academia Nacional de Ciencias Físicas, Matemáticas y Naturales (Academyof Physic, Mathematic and Natural Sciences)

AGC

Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (Gaitanist Self-Defence Forces ofColombia). Also known as Clan del Golfo (Gulf Clan) or Los Urabeños

ANC

Asamblea Nacional Constituyente (National Constituent Assembly)

Asamblea Nacional

National Assembly. Venezuela’s national legislature

ASFADDES

Asociación de Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos (Association ofRelatives of the Detained and Disappeared)

BCV

Banco Central de Venezuela (Central Bank of Venezuela)

Boliches

A nickname for members of the FPLN

Carnet de la Patria

Homeland Card, also called Fatherland Card

Cartel de los Soles

Cartel of the Suns

CDJ

Centro para los Defensores y la Justicia (Centre for Rights and Justice)

CECODAP

Centros Comunitarios de Aprendizaje (Learning Community Centres)

CEPAZ

Centro de Justicia y Paz (Justice and Peace Centre)

CICPC

Cuerpo de Investigaciones Científicas, Penales y Criminalísticas (Corps of
Scientific, Penal and Criminalistic Investigations)

Clan del Golfo

Gulf Clan. Also known as the AGC or Los Urabeños.

CLAP

Comités Locales de Abastecimiento y Producción (Local Committees for
Supply and Production)

COCE

Comando Central (Central Command), ELN's central command

COFAVIC

Comité de Familiares de Víctimas de los Sucesos de Febrero-Marzo de 1989
(Committee for the Families of Victims of February-March 1989)

Colectivos

Organisations that are variously described as being involved in community
work and promotion of government social programs, while others described
them as armed groups operating as pro-government militias.

CONAPRO

Coordinación Nacional para la Protección de las Víctimas, Testigos y demás
Sujetos Procesales (National Coordination for the Protection of Victims,
Witnesses and other Persons Participating in a Judicial Process)

DGCIM

Dirección General de Contrainteligencia Militar (Directorate General of
Military Counterintelligence)

ELN

Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army)

ENCOVI

Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida (National Survey on Standards of
Living)

EPL

Ejército Popular de Liberación (Popular Liberation Army)EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS— 9

Estados de excepción

States of Emergency which permit the Executive discretionary powers 3

FAES

Fuerzas de Acciones Especiales (Special Action Forces)

FANB

Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana (Bolivarian National Armed Forces),
which consists of the National Army (Ejército Nacional), the Navy (Armada
Nacional), Military Air Force (Aviación Militar) and the GNB. Two other'secondary' bodies include the Bolivarian National Militia (Milicia Nacional
Bolivariana) and the Presidential Guard (Guardia de Honor Presidencial) 4

FARC-EP

Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - Ejército del Pueblo(Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - People's Army)

FARC dissidents

Former members of the FARC-EP who did not demobilise in 2016 and someof whom still operate on the borders between Colombia and Venezuela 5

FBL

Bolivarian Liberation Front (FBL, Fuerzas Bolivarianas de Liberación)

FPLN

Fuerzas Patrióticas de Liberación Nacional (Patriotic Forces of National
Liberation). Also called 'boliches' 6, the FPLN is a splinter of the now inactive
Bolivarian Liberation Front (FBL, Fuerzas Bolivarianas de Liberación),
supports the Venezuelan government, and has reportedly worked alongside
local authorities and security forces 7

Fundaciones

Foundations. Parallel entities created by the government to replace the local
governments run by the opposition. 8 Also known as protectorados('protectorates') 9

Gestores'Agents' who operate, usually within corruption rings, to obtain national
identity cards or passports for a fee. 10 The practice is known as 'gestoría'.

GNB

Guardia National Bolivariana (National Bolivarian Guard)

IACHR

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights

ICC

International Criminal Court

IMF

International Monetary FundINCB

UN International Narcotics Control Board

INE

Instituto Nacional de Estadística (Statistics National Institute)

INMLCF

Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses (National Instituteof Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences) [Colombia]

IOM

International Organization for Migration

JRS

Jesuit Refugee Service

LACSO

Laboratorio de Ciencias Sociales (Social Sciences Laboratory)LGBT

Lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons

3 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 31
4 Venezuela, Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Defensa, Fuerza Armada, n.d., url
5 InSight Crime, FARC, 3 March 2017, url

6 InSight Crime, FBL/FPLN, 15 July 2019, url

7 HRW, "The Guerrillas Are the Police", January 2020, url, p. 56; Infobae, Así entrena el chavismo a civiles en el manejo dearmas, 9 June 2019, url
8 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020
9 Amaya, videoconference, 29 May 2020
10 CECODAP, Violación del derecho a la identidad, July 2019, url, p. 25-26

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Lista Tascón

Tascón List. A database of over 3 million people who supported areferendum to revoke the presidential mandate of Hugo Chávez in 20032004 11

Los Rastrojos

A Colombian drug trafficking organisation with paramilitary origins
operating on the border with Colombia. 12

Los Urabeños

A Colombian irregular armed group with paramilitary origins also known as
the AGC and Clan del Golfo 13

Megabandas

Domestic criminal organisations dedicated to drug trafficking, extortion andkidnapping 14

MUD

Mesa de la Unidad Democrática (Democratic Unity Roundtable)

MVR

Movimineto V República (Movement for a Fifth Republic)NGO

Non-governmental organisation

OAS

Organization of American States

OMCTWorld Organisation Against Torture

OVCS

Observatorio Venezolano de Conflictividad Social (Venezuelan Observatoryof Social Conflict)

OVV

Observatorio Venezolano de Violencia (Venezuelan Observatory of Violence)PAS

Puntos de Asistencia Social (Social Assistance Points)

PASI

Puntos de Asistencia Social Integral (Comprehensive Social Assistance
Points)PDVSA

Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A.

PEP

Permiso Especial de Permanencia (Sojourn Special Permit)

PNB

Policía Nacional Bolivariana (National Bolivarian Police)

PranesTransnational criminal organisations with ties to the prison system 15

PROVEA

Programa Venezolano de Educación y Acción en Derechos Humanos(Venezuelan Program for Education and Action on Human Rights)

PSUV

Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (United Socialist Party of Venezuela)

R4V

Regional Inter-Agency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants
from Venezuela

RAAS

Red de Articulación y Acción Sociopolítica (Articulation and Socio-Political
Action Networks)

RNV

Radio Nacional de Venezuela (National Radio of Venezuela)

SAIME

Servicio Administrativo de Identificación, Migración y Extranjería(Administrative Service of Identification, Migration and Foreigners)

11 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 30, Footnote 23
12 InSight Crime, Rastrojos, 16 February 2017, url
13 InSight Crime, Urabeños, 14 March 2018, url

14 International Crisis Group, A Glut of Arms, 20 February 2020, url, p. 13; Transparencia Venezuela, Crimen organizado ycorrupción en Venezuela: Un problema de Estado, July 2020, url, p. 8
15 International Crisis Group, A Glut of Arms, 20 February 2020, url, p. 13; Transparencia Venezuela, Crimen organizado ycorrupción en Venezuela: Un problema de Estado, July 2020, url, p. 16

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— 11

SAREN

Servicio Autónomo de Registros y Notarías (Autonomous Service ofRegistries and Notaries)

SEBIN

Servicio Bolivariano de Inteligencia Nacional (Bolivarian National
Intelligence Service)

SENIAT

Servicio Nacional Integrado de Administración Aduanera y Tributaria(National Integrated Service for the Administration of Customs Duties andTaxes)

Sindicatos

Domestic criminal groups operating on the border with Colombia andinvolved in illegal mining, among other criminal activities 16

TSJ

Tribunal Supremo de Justicia (Supreme Court of Justice)

UBCh

Unidades de Batalla Hugo Chávez (Hugo Chávez Battle Units)

UCAB

Universidad Católica Andrés Bello (Catholic University Andrés Bello)

UCV

Universidad Central de Venezuela (Central University of Venezuela)

UN

United Nations

UNHCR

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF

United Nations International Children's Fund

UN OHCHR

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

WFP

UN World Food Programme

16 International Crisis Group, A Glut of Arms, 20 February 2020, url, p. 14

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Introduction
As of June 2020, over 5 million Venezuelans have fled or been displaced outside their borders.17 The
Venezuela migration crisis, prompted by political upheaval, socio-economic collapse, andhumanitarian crises, has led to Latin America’s largest external displacement in recent history. 18
According to the Brookings Institution, 'the Venezuelan refugee crisis is one of the largest in modern
history [...], far outpacing the speed of displacement seen in Syria' if current trends continue. 19 Most
Venezuelans who have left the country migrated to other countries in the region, mainly to Colombia,
Peru, Chile, Ecuador, and Brazil. 20
In the EU+ 21 in 2019, Venezuelan applications for international protection were the third highest
nationality, after Syria and Afghanistan. Venezuelans launched twice as many international protection
applications, over 45 000, as they had in 2018. 22 However, following the COVID-19 pandemic, there
was a sharp decline in applications from Venezuela. 23
The purpose of this report is to provide relevant information for the assessment of international
protection status, including the determination of refugee status and subsidiary protection.
This is the first EASO COI report on Venezuela and the first EASO COI product resulting from thecooperation between EASO and the Secretariat of the Intergovernmental Consultations on Migration,
Asylum and Refugees (IGC), as explained in the Acknowledgements section.

Methodology
Defining the terms of reference
The Terms of reference for this report were based on a survey of information needs on Venezuela
gathered from the national asylum authorities of EU+ and participating IGC countries. 24 The Terms ofReference were derived from the results of this survey, and jointly developed by the expert with EASO
and IGC. They aim to address the main topics and questions requested by asylum and international
protection authorities, decision-makers, and COI researchers. Due to the large volume of requested
topics, the most common themes were chosen to be included to meet the widest needs. In addition,
during the course of the research, other topics that were not identified during the consultation period
such as the use of the Law Against Hate against critics of the government, were included in the report
given their importance in the current context of Venezuela.
As agreed with EU+ and IGC participating states, EASO, and the IGC Secretariat, the reference period
for this report was 1 June 2019 to 18 June 2020 but includes information on background trends andcontext as needed. The review of the report took place between 19 and 30 June 2020, and theimplementation of comments provided by reviewers took place between 2 and 20 July 2020.

17 UNHCR/IOM, R4V Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela, Refugees and Migrants from

Venezuela, n.d., url
18 IOM, Venezuelan Refugee and Migrant Crisis, n.d., url
19 Brookings Institution, Venezuela refugee crisis to become the largest and most underfunded in modern history, 9
December 2019, url
20 IOM, Venezuelan Refugee and Migrant Crisis, n.d., url
21 EU Members States plus Norway and Switzerland
22 EASO, Latest Asylum Trends – 2019 Overview, 26 February 2020, url
23 EASO, Latest Asylum Trends – April 2020, url
24 IGC participating states are: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS— 13

The Terms of reference for this report can be found in Annex 2.

Collecting information
Public sources
The information gathered is a result of research using public, specialised paper-based and electronicsources, as well as oral source interviews from 3 April 2020 until 18 June 2020, with some backgroundinformation collected starting on 10 March 2020. Some additional information was added during thefinalisation of this report in response to feedback received during the quality control process, until 19
July 2020.
This report has relied upon mainly Spanish-language sources in order to provide added value to theavailable COI. The expert wrote this report in English using Spanish sources. All legislation quoted has
been informally translated from Spanish into English by the expert, except for quotations from theConstitution. Interviews were conducted in Spanish and one in English. Due to the volume of Spanish
sources used, for the citation of all these non-English sources, this report does not follow the EASO
Writing and Referencing Guide signalling in the citation each time a source is translated. This is for
maximal readability and efficiency.
In accordance with EASO COI methodology, a range of different published documentary sources havebeen consulted on relevant topics for this report. These include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

COI reports by governments;
Information from civil society, advocacy groups, and NGOs;
Human rights reports by governments and NGOs;
Reports produced by various bodies of the United Nations;
Venezuelan government publications, including public statements, laws, policies, media
outlets, and reports to the UN;
Venezuela-based media and social media;
English, French, Portuguese, and Spanish-language media sources in the region, particularly
those based in Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador and Brazil;
Academic publications and think tank reports; andReports of organisations specialised in armed and criminal groups.

Available information from these sources was consulted within time constraints. Sources wereassessed based on the EASO COI Methodology, however, Venezuela is a challenging research
environment, as explained below.
Oral sources
In addition to using publicly available documentary sources, 47 oral sources were contacted for thisreport. The types of oral sources contacted include: scholars, journalists, civil society organisations,international organisations, diplomatic missions, lawyers, regional analysts, researchers, unions, andprofessional associations. Of those contacted, 21 were interviewed between April and June 2020, and
14 of the interviews were included in the report, including one that was included in the report during
the implementation of the feedback provided by reviewers. In addition, one source submitted theanswers to questions by email which were included. Some sources who were interviewed did not want
to be included in the report for security reasons and other sources wished to remain anonymous. All
sources were assessed for their background, publication history, reputability, seriousness of theirresearch, and recognition of their credentials by peers, the media, and international bodies. Oralsources are described in the bibliography.

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Challenges in collecting information and research limitations
Freedom of expression is limited, and accessing information in Venezuela, especially about mattersrelated to human rights issues, is difficult. Even though some topics are widely covered, others remainsensitive and with limited coverage. As reported by sources, the government has increased thetargeting of journalists and people reporting on Venezuelan issues in the context of the COVID-19(SARS-CoV-2) pandemic which has limited the ability to report on the development of the impact ofthe pandemic and wider issues in general.
The research environment in Venezuela is challenging. Source and information assessment took place
in a highly polarised and politicised context. Bias was mitigated to the extent possible throughmethodological techniques such as crosschecking, corroborating, contrasting and comparing theinformation.
The government does not publish comprehensive official statistics and civil society largely fulfils thisfunction with different methodological approaches that were included in footnotes.

Quality control
This report is produced in line with the EASO COI Report Methodology (2019) 25 and the EASO COI
Writing and Referencing Style Guide (2019). 26
To ensure that this report is aligned with EASO COI Methodology, this report was peer-reviewed by
COI specialists from Canada, Norway, Switzerland, and the United States as well as IGC and EASO. Allcomments from the reviewers were taken into consideration by the author, in line with the peer
review rules of the EASO Methodology. Peer reviewers able to read Spanish source-checked the
Spanish language sources during the quality review to ensure accuracy to the sources.

Structure and use of the report
This report is organised into the following chapters:
Chapter 1 provides an overview of recent developments in the economy, security situation, theimplications of institutional duality, demonstrations, abuses by authorities and monitoring, and theeffects of the COVID-19 pandemic. This chapter covers succinctly themes as security forces and theeconomy as they were not part of the terms of reference, but that were important to include to givea more contextual background for the themes in the report. This chapter also includes a brief mention
about the lack of statistical information provided by the government.
Chapter 2 gives a brief summary on recent developments on the humanitarian situation and its impact
on migration flows, health care, food security and access and availability of basic services such as
electricity, gas, and water.
Chapter 3 discusses the most recurring targeted profiles by the government and its security forces.
Chapter 4 describes the security situation at the border with Colombia. It only covers that border as it
was one of the themes identified by members states during the consultation period. Nevertheless,the border with Colombia is the most dynamic border Venezuela has with another country and it isthrough this border that most Venezuelans leave the country. The chapter provides information on
the main armed actors present at the border, main criminal activities, and state protection for victims
of crime in that area of the country.
25 EASO, EASO Country of Origin Information (COI) Report Methodology, June 2019, url

26 EASO, Writing and Referencing Guide for EASO Country of Origin Information (COI) Reports, June 2019, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS— 15

Chapter 5 reports on the colectivos, including types, activities, recruitment, areas of operation,
targeted profiles, modus operandi, financing and support from the government, relationship withsecurity forces and state response for victims of colectivos.
Chapter 6 provides information on two sets of documents: documents related to identification, andthose related to courts and criminal proceedings. The first part provides information on therequirements and procedures to obtain birth certificates, national identity cards and passports, as wellas the Carnet de la Patria (Homeland Card), complemented with information on the availability offraudulent documents. The second part, on court documents, provides information on some aspectsof their usage.
Chapter 7 gives information on entry and exit procedures. Information on the actual procedures was
scarce among the sources consulted. Available information included in the report centres on irregularborder crossings, the treatment upon entry and exit of critics of the government, and the situation of
returnees.
Chapter 8 discusses the situation of lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans (LGBT) persons, including legislation,
discrimination and violence, the situation of LGBT organisations, and state recourse.
Chapters and themes within chapters have a high degree of cross linkage with other parts of thereport.

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Maps

Map 1: Administrative map of Venezuela @CIA. 27

27 Venezuela Administrative [map], in: US, CIA, Venezuela Administrative, 2007, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS— 17

Map 2: Political map of Venezuela @US SEC 28

28 Venezuela, Mapa Político de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela [map], in: US, Securities and Exchange Commission(SEC), EX-99.D 2 d255060dex99d.htm EXHIBIT D, 30 September 2016, url. The US SEC website indicates that 'Information
presented on www.sec.gov is considered public information and may be copied or further distributed by users of the web
site' (US, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Web Site Privacy and Security Policy, n.d., url).

18 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS

1. Overview
The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (República Bolivariana de Venezuela) or Venezuela, is a federalpresidential republic that consists of 23 states (estados), one capital district (distrito capital), and one
federal dependency (dependencia federal). The population estimate for July 2020 is 28 644 603, andits major urban areas are Caracas (2.94 million), Maracaibo (2.26 million), Valencia (1.91 million),
Barquisimeto (1.21 million), and Maracay (1.2 million). 29
Between 1958 and 1999, the 'peaceful transfer of power from government to opposition was anestablished practice' in Venezuela 30, a dynamic known as puntofijismo. 31 In 1998, Hugo Chávez won
the presidential elections 32 and in 2006 Chávez created the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV,Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela), a single political party that incorporated his own party, theMovement for a Fifth Republic (MVR, Movimineto V República), which sought to 'establish the fifth
era of politics in Venezuela since the country's birth in 1811', and about 20 other political parties. 33
The International Crisis Group indicated that until 2015, his movement, chavismo, won 16 elections
and lost two, and for over 20 years the political struggle in Venezuela has featured chavismo and the
opposition in a 'battle for power, popularity and international support'. In 2013, Nicolás Maduro waselected president after Chávez died earlier that year, and the economy, 'which had enjoyed an
unprecedented, decade-long boom thanks to record prices for oil, on which Venezuela relied almost
exclusively for its foreign earnings, tipped into recession almost as soon as Maduro took office'. 34

1.1 Economy
Venezuela is highly dependent on revenue from oil exports, which account for almost half of thegovernment's revenue. 35 According to the government, 95 % of foreign currency that enters
Venezuela results from oil exports. 36 Venezuela is in the midst of a deep economic recession causedin part by heavy regulations on the economy and the private sector37 and 'gross mismanagement offiscal monetary, budgetary and foreign exchange policies. 38 In 2018 and 2019, the economic crisis
deteriorated further as the economy continued to contract. 39 According to the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), the projected Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for 2020 is -15 %. 40 Despite the strict currency
exchange and price controls, in 2019 the government relaxed economic controls to mitigate theimpact of the drop in oil production'. Venezuela is heavily reliant on imports to meet basic food andconsumer goods needs. 41

29 US, CIA, The World Factbook: Venezuela, 4 August 2020, url

30 International Crisis Group, Imagining a Resolution of Venezuela's Crisis, 11 March 2020, url, p. 2
31 CFR, Venezuela's Chavez Era, n.d., url

32 International Crisis Group, Imagining a Resolution of Venezuela's Crisis, 11 March 2020, url, p. 2; CFR, Venezuela's Chavez

Era, n.d., url
33 CFR, Venezuela's Chavez Era, n.d., url
34 International Crisis Group, Imagining a Resolution of Venezuela's Crisis, 11 March 2020, url, pp. 1-2
35 US, CIA, The World Factbook: Venezuela, 4 August 2020, url
36 Venezuela, Report by the United Nations High Commissioner of Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela: Comments by the State, 5 July 2019, url, para. 38
37 OAS, Informe del Grupo de Trabajo de la OEA, June 2019, url, p. 18
38 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2020 Country Report: Venezuela, 2020, url, p. 3
39 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 10
40 IMF, República Bolivariana de Venezuela, n.d., url
41 US, CIA, The World Factbook: Venezuela, 4 August 2020, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS— 19

Venezuela experiences hyperinflation 42, or 'chronic' inflation for the past year, with episodes ofhyperinflation43, affecting the purchasing power of the population44 and making it difficult to accessfood, medicines, and basic goods. 45 UNICEF indicated that hyperinflation has also impacted
households' incomes, and investment in infrastructure and public services. 46 Inflation figures vary
among sources: on 4 February 2020, the Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV, Banco Central de Venezuela)
indicated that the inflation rate for 2019 was 9 585.5 % 47, while the Finance Commission (Comisión de
Finanzas) of the National Assembly (Asamblea Nacional) indicated that the inflation rate for the same
year was 7 374.4 %.48 The same Commission indicated that the inflation rate between January and
April 2020 was 341.61 %, with the price of basic goods increasing 80 % in the month of April. The
Commission further indicated that inflation rates for the month of April 2020 of basic goods andservices included food (53 %), transportation (108 %), housing (112 %), alcoholic beverages (132 %),and health care (162 %). 49 According to a report by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights (UN OHCHR) on the human rights situation in Venezuela 50, 'despite several increasesof the minimum wage by the Government, its purchasing power has decreased to the extent that it
can no longer be considered a living wage'.51 Sources indicated that Venezuela repealed currency
exchange restrictions 52 in 2018 53, leading to a de facto dollarisation and the liberation of foreign
currency, with the Colombian peso being prevalent in the border states with Colombia and theBrazilian real in the states bordering Brazil. 54
On 17 October 2019, Chilean newspaper La Tercera reported that, after 'years' without providing
official figures, the Statistics National Institute (INE, Instituto Nacional de Estadística) of Venezuela
indicated that the poverty rate decreased from 20.4 % in 2014 to 17.3 % in 2018, while extreme
poverty decreased from 5.4 % to 4.3 %. The INE also indicated that in 2018, 1.4 million households
were in poverty while other 351 379 were in extreme poverty. 55 However, the National Survey on

42 UN, UNICEF, Humanitarian Situation Report, January 2020, url, p. 2; OAS, Informe del Grupo de Trabajo de la OEA, June

2019, url, p. 36
43 International Organisation A, telephone interview, 12 June 2020
44 UN, UNICEF, Humanitarian Situation Report, January 2020, url, p. 2; OAS, Informe del Grupo de Trabajo de la OEA, June
2019, url, p. 36
45 OAS, Informe del Grupo de Trabajo de la OEA, June 2019, url, p. 36
46 UN, UNICEF, Humanitarian Situation Report, December 2019, url, p. 2
47 Agencia EFE, La inflación venezolana superó el 9.500 % en 2019, según el Banco Central, 5 February 2020, url
48 Venezuela, Asamblea Nacional, Angel Alvarado: “La inflación en Venezuela cerro en más de 7.374% en 2019” 13 January
2020, url
49 Venezuela, Asamblea Nacional, Inflación se ubica en 80% y la acumulada en 341,61, 11 May 2020, url
50 OHCHR visited Venezuela between 11 and 22 March 2019 and met with a 'wide range of state and other stakeholders' inseveral cities. It also conducted nine visits to several countries including Colombia, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, and Spain tointerview Venezuelan migrants. In addition, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Micelle Bachelet, visited Venezuela
between 19 and 21 June 2019. OHCHR conducted 558 interviews with victims and witnesses of human rights violations, andother sources including lawyers, health care professionals, media representatives, human rights advocates, and ex-militaryand security forces. In addition, the High Commissioner met with president Maduro, the Vice-president, high-level officials
from 17 ministries, members of the National Assembly and the National Constituent Assembly (ANC, Asamblea Nacional
Constituyente), the Attorney General, the Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ, Tribunal Supremo de Justicia), members of the
opposition and the Catholic Church (UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url,paras. 3-6).
51 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 11
52 International Organisation A, telephone interview, 12 June 2020; DW, La ANC de Venezuela deroga el régimen de ilícitos
cambiarios, 2 August 2018, url
53 International Organisation A, telephone interview, 12 June 2020
54 International Organisation A, telephone interview, 12 June 2020
55 La Tercera, Según el INE de Maduro, la tasa de pobreza cae en Venezuela, 17 October 2019, url20 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS

Standards of Living (ENCOVI, Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida) 56 for 2019-2020 pointed that
96 % of households experience poverty and 79 % extreme poverty. 57
The unemployment rate also varies among sources. President Nicolás Maduro indicated in January
2020 that the unemployment rate was 6 %, while the IMF assessed it to be 35.5 % for 2020. 58 The
ENCOVI survey indicated that the unemployment rate for people over 15 years of age is 44 %. 59

1.2 Security situation
Venezuela has one of the highest homicide rates in Latin America. 60 The Venezuelan Observatory ofViolence (OVV, Observatorio Venezolano de Violencia 61) indicated that 16 506 violent deaths occurredin the country in 2019, with a rate of 60.3 deaths per 100 000 inhabitants 62, while for 2018 the rate
was 81.4. 63 For 2019, the violent death rate consisted of 6 588 homicides (rate of 24), 5 286 deaths for'resisting authority' (rate of 19), and 4 632 'non-determined' deaths which also include homicides (rateof 17). 64
Sources indicated that the reduction in the homicide rate is not an indicator that violence has
decreased in Venezuela. 65 Armed structures in Venezuela have managed to exert effective territorial
control in their areas of influence, creating 'micro-states' within the country that have led to adecrease of conflict among them. 66 According to OVV, the decrease in the murder rates is also due to,among others, increasing poverty, bankruptcy of local companies, and emigration. 67
However, crimes such as extortion68, drug trafficking, and domestic violence have increased. 69 In avideoconference for this report, the OVV indicated that the most common crime in Venezuela is theft,
followed by homicide, and bodily injuries, although there are no reliable statistics. 70 Kidnappings havedecreased due to the difficulty in paying ransoms due to hyperinflation, 'express kidnappings' havepractically disappeared due to restrictions imposed by banks on the withdrawals of funds from teller
machines 71, and bank robberies seldom take place due to shortages of cash. 72 Extortion has increased,
although there are no reliable statistics, and affect mainly commercial, transportation, and industrial
56 The ENCOVI is an annual national survey by the Catholic University Andrés Bello (UCAB, Universidad Católica Andrés Bello),
the Central University of Venezuela (UCV, Universidad Central de Venezuela, and the Simón Bolívar University (USB,
Universidad Simón Bolívar) to obtain data on standards of living in Venezuela due to the lack of public data made available
by the government (UCAB et al., ¿Qué es la ENCOVI?, n.d. url). The 2019-2020 survey was carried out between November
2019 and March 2020. The initial sample was 16 920 households but due to the pandemic, the number of households
interviewed was 9 932 (UCAB, encovi 2019, 2020, url).
57 UCAB, Encuesta Nacional De Condiciones De Vida 2019-2020, 2020, url
58 VOA, El "gran confinamiento" desata ola de desempleo en Venezuela, 18 May 2020, url
59 UCAB, Encuesta Nacional De Condiciones De Vida 2019-2020, 2020, url
60 InSight Crime, Capital Murder: 2019 Homicide Rates in Latin America’s Capital Cities, 5 March 2020, url
61 The OVV is a Venezuelan organisation that collects and generates statistical reports on criminality in the country. OVV haseight observatories in the country collaborating with local universities, and with the coordination of the Social Sciences
Laboratory (LACSO, Laboratorio de Ciencias Sociales) (OVV, Historia, n.d., url). LACSO is an 'academic and non-governmentalorganization founded in 1993, with the mission of deepening and improving the knowledge of Venezuelan society throughscientific research and the training of researchers' (UNOCHA, Laboratorio de Ciencias Sociales (LACSO), 2 December 2019,url).
62 OVV, Informe Anual de Violencia 2019, 27 December 2019, url, p. 2
63 OVV, 2018 – La violencia presenta nuevos rostros en el paìs, 30 December 2018, url
64 OVV, Informe Anual de Violencia 2019, 27 December 2019, url, p. 2
65 Mármol, videoconference, 1 May 2020; OVV, videoconference, 4 May 2020
66 Mármol, videoconference, 1 May 2020; FundaRedes, videoconference, 6 May 2020; Transparencia Venezuela, Crimen
organizado y corrupción en Venezuela: Un problema de Estado, July 2020, url, p. 7
67 OVV, Informe Anual de Violencia 2019, 27 December 2019, url, p. 3
68 OVV, videoconference, 4 May 2020; Mármol, videoconference, 1 May 2020
69 Mármol, videoconference, 1 May 2020
70 OVV, videoconference, 4 May 2020
71 OVV, videoconference, 4 May 2020
72 The Washington Post, How bad is Venezuela’s economy? Even the criminals are struggling to get by., 8 March 2019, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS— 21

sectors, with amounts that are often 'unpayable', forcing the target to close the business and leave
the country. 73
The Venezuelan government's reply to the UN OHCHR report of 5 July 2019 indicated that 'there is nopresence of any armed foreign group in the country'. 74 However, sources indicated that armed groups,
both domestic and foreign, operate in Venezuela. 75 The political and economic crisis has empowered
armed groups 76 and fomented corruption. 77 According to the International Crisis Group, 'armed groups
operating in Venezuela have distinct objectives, modus operandi, political loyalties and relations withthe state. As political conflict has intensified, they have increasingly preyed on the state’s absence,
fissures or weakness, providing them with the sort of power and economic stakes that they will noteasily forsake and which directly threaten the country’s long-term stability'. 78 Similarly, Argentinian
news website Infobae reported that political instability and the inaction of security forces has led to
an increase of irregular armed actors, including guerrillas, armed colectivos and paramilitary successor
groups 79. 80
Armed groups operating in Venezuela include Colombia's National Liberation Army (ELN, Ejército de
Liberación Nacional) 81, paramilitary successor groups 82, dissidents of the Revolutionary Armed Forcesof Colombia – People's Army (FARC-EP, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército delPueblo) 83, and dissidents of the Popular Liberation Army (EPL, Ejército Popular de Liberación) 84, andVenezuela's Patriotic Forces of National Liberation (FPLN, Fuerzas Patrióticas de Liberación
Nacional) 85, armed colectivos 86, megabandas 87, pranes 88, and sindicatos. 89
For information on the security situation at the border with Colombia, see Chapter 4.

1.3 Institutional duality
In a videoconference for this report, a professor of political science and socio-political conflict basedin Venezuela, who specialises in political conflict and social movements, indicated that theinstitutional duality is the consequence of the polarisation between the government and the
opposition that has permeated Venezuelan society, where the political adversary is seen as an 'enemy'
and not as a rival, and the non-recognition of the other's institutions has brought about a 'deinstitutionalisation' in the country. In the context of polarisation and institutional duality, thegovernment has sought to disband and disqualify democratically elected institutions by ignoring these73 OVV, videoconference, 4 May 2020

74 Venezuela, Report by the United Nations High Commissioner of Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela: Comments by the State, 5 July 2019, url, para. 61
75 International Crisis Group, A Glut of Arms, 20 February 2020, url, i; Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, pp. 8, 39
76 International Crisis Group, A Glut of Arms, 20 February 2020, url, p. 2; WOLA, Beyond the Narcostate Narrative, March
2020, url, p.4
77 WOLA, Beyond the Narcostate Narrative, March 2020, url, p. 4; InSight Crime, ELN in Venezuela, 28 Jan. 2020, url
78 International Crisis Group, A Glut of Arms, 20 February 2020, url, p. 16
79 Note: The term 'paramilitaries' has been redefined under different names, including Criminal Bands (BACRIM, Bandas
Criminales), Organised Armed Groups (GAO, Grupos Armados Organizados), 'neo-paramilitaries' ('neoparamilitares'),'paramiltary successor groups' ('grupos sucesores paramilitares'), 'paracos', and so on. For consistency, this paper uses theterm 'paramilitary successor groups'.
80 Infobae, Surgió un grupo paramilitar venezolano, 17 June 2019, url
81 Mármol, videoconference, 1 May 2020; Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 27
82 Mármol, videoconference, 1 May 2020; Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 44
83 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 58; HRW, "The Guerrillas Are the Police", January 2020, url, p. 47
84 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 22
85 Mármol, videoconference, 1 May 2020
86 Mármol, videoconference, 1 May 2020; Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 22
87 OVV, videoconference, 4 May 2020; International Crisis Group, A Glut of Arms, 20 February 2020, url, pp. 12-13
88 International Crisis Group, A Glut of Arms, 20 February 2020, url, pp. 12-13
89 International Crisis Group, A Glut of Arms, 20 February 2020, url, pp. 12-13; OVV, videoconference, 4 May 2020

22 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS

institutions' acts, suspending rights and privileges of those who are part of these institutions, andfacilitating 'persecution' and imprisonment, which is becoming more frequent. 90
As a consequence of this duality and parallel structures of power, Venezuela has two presidents, threelegislative bodies, two supreme courts (one in Caracas and one in exile), and two Attorney Generals(one in Caracas and one in exile). 91 Since January 2019, Venezuela has two competing presidencies. 92
According to the Professor of political science, institutional duality has also extended to state andmunicipal governments with the creation, by the government, of 'foundations' (fundaciones) [or'protectors' (protectores) 93] in those states and city halls that are held by the opposition. These'foundations' are parallel entities created to replace local governments held by the opposition, andare assigned the resources that were destined to the original ones. 94 In a videoconference for thisreport, journalist Víctor Amaya 95 indicated that in the states held by the opposition (Táchira, Nueva
Esparta, Anzoátegui and Mérida) the government created protectores who replaced governors andare the ones that have the relationship with the national government in areas such as health care,
official media, and the distribution of food, water, and gas. Also, the city hall of Caracas was eliminatedfrom the Constitution by the ANC since it was held by the opposition since 2008, and replaced it withthe 'government of the Capital District", which is not in the Constitution. The government structureof the parishes (Parroquias) was also eliminated by 2013 as these were held by the opposition, andwere replaced by the communal councils, whose members are not democratically elected but
appointed by the government. Some communal councils, in order to obtain the renewal by the
Ministry for Communes (Ministerio del Poder Popular para las Comunas y los Movimientos Sociales),have changed their political alignment with that of the government. 96
According to the Professor of political science, the creation of these parallel institutions not only
brought about duplicity of functions in these jurisdictions and polarising conflicts among the two, butalso encouraged ideological patronage from the PSUV and the government. Although constitutionally
Venezuela is a decentralised country, since Chávez, there has been a move towards centralisation withan increasing delegation of power to the president who has been governing through decrees, enabling
laws, and 'states of emergency'. 97
The political polarisation between the 'liberal opposition' (the opposition) and the 'socialism of the
21st century' (the government) is 'antagonistic and exclusive', in the sense that the implementation of
public policy by the government privileges the poor while excluding the middle and upper classes, asthese are seen by the government and its supporters as the 'other' (el otro), the 'enemy' (el enemigo),
the '"traitor to the homeland"' (el traidor a la patria). 98‘The Venezuela as "narcostate" narrative is often invoked by the hardliners to depict the Maduro
government as not just authoritarian, but motivated by illicit profits and therefore unable to negotiate
and perhaps impossible to respond to without the use of force'. 99 The government, in turn, blames
sanctions imposed on Venezuela and limitations on banking transactions which 'hinders the State's
ability to import food and medicines'. 100

90 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020
91 Amaya, videoconference, 29 May 2020

92 International Crisis Group, Imagining a Resolution of Venezuela's Crisis, 11 March 2020, url, p. i
93 Amaya, videoconference, 29 May 2020

94 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020

95 Amaya is editor-in-chief of the economy and politics unit of Venezuelan newspaper TalCual. He is also editor of Espaja.com,

a fack-checking website supported by Transparencia Venezuela and the European Union, and foreign correspondent of RadioFrance Internationale and La Razón (Spain).
96 Amaya, videoconference, 29 May 2020
97 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020
98 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020
99 WOLA, Beyond the Narcostate Narrative, March 2020, url, p. 4
100 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 26

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS— 23

According to the International Crisis Group,'efforts to reach a peaceful resolution have so far proved fitful and largely fruitless. Several
rounds of negotiations have taken place since 2014 but all were marred by mutual suspicion,with the opposition convinced that the government misled it. Over the last year [2019], both
camps have flirted with a negotiated solution but have also banked on gaining the upper handover their rival through the passage of time and the assistance of powerful foreign allies. The
opposition felt that tightening sanctions and the government’s increased international
isolation would trigger a rupture within chavista ranks, notably among the military or,
alternatively, that the U.S. might forcefully step in; the government hoped that the longer it
resisted sanctions with the help of Russia, China and others, the more opposition credibility
and unity would erode, the more public support for the opposition would dissipate, and themore Guaidó’s external allies would lose interest'. 101
Venezuela does not have independent government institutions that act as a check on the executive
power. 102

1.3.1 Executive branch
The executive branch consists of the president, Nicolás Maduro, the vice-president, Delcy Rodríguez
Gómez, and the cabinet of ministers who are appointed by the president. 'The president is both chiefof state and head of government'. 103 President Maduro was elected in 2013 104, and exercises de facto
power and control over most government institutions. 105 Additionally, the 'states of emergency'(estados de excepción), which have been renewed every 60 days since 13 May 2016, have granted'wide, vague and discretionary powers to the Executive with the declared purpose of, inter alia,preserving the internal order'. 106
On 20 May 2018, Venezuela held presidential elections that reportedly presented 'irregularities' suchas low turnout and the prohibition for some parties and candidates from running for office. 107 On 23
January 2019, Juan Guiadó, member of the opposition and president of the opposition-controlled
National Assembly, 'self-proclaimed "interim president of Venezuela"' 108 in order to 'end theusurpation [by Maduro], create a transition government, and call for free elections'. 109 According to
the International Crisis Group, what the opposition considered as the 'restoration of democracy', thegovernment regarded as a 'foreign-backed coup'. 110 Guaidó was recognised as 'interim president' by
13 countries in the Americas, including the US, Canada, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador, in
addition to the Organization of American States (OAS). 111 As of April 2020, over 60 countries haverecognised Guaidó as 'interim president'. 112

101 International Crisis Group, Imagining a Resolution of Venezuela's Crisis, 11 March 2020, url, p. i
102 HRW, World Report 2020, 2020, url, p. 625; FundaRedes, videoconference, 6 May 2020
103 US, CIA, The World Factbook: Venezuela, 4 August 2020, url

104 International Crisis Group, Imagining a Resolution of Venezuela's Crisis, 11 March 2020, url, pp. 1-2

105 International Crisis Group, Imagining a Resolution of Venezuela's Crisis, 11 March 2020, url, p. I; US, CIA, The World

Factbook: Venezuela, 4 August 2020, url
106 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 31
107 CEPAZ, 2019 Encrucijada política en Venezuela, 16 July 2019, url, p. 5; Transparencia Venezuela, Las irregularidades delproceso electoral convocado por la Constituyente, 16 September 2018, url, pp. 2,4
108 Agencia EFE, Acorralan a Nicolás Maduro, 24 January 2019, url; BBC, Juan Guiadó, president de la Asamblea Nacional deVenezuela, se juramenta como "president encargado" del país, 23 January 2019, url
109 BBC, Juan Guiadó, president de la Asamblea Nacional de Venezuela, se juramenta como "president encargado" del país,
23 January 2019, url
110 International Crisis Group, Imagining a Resolution of Venezuela's Crisis, 11 March 2020, url, p. i
111 Agencia EFE, Acorralan a Nicolás Maduro, 24 January 2019, url
112 AP, Sources: Guaido Allies Take Slice of First Venezuela Budget, 23 April 2020, url

24 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS

The Professor of political science indicated that the opposition has created a parallel system that
includes representatives at the Inter-American Development Bank, PDVSA, a supreme court and an
Attorney General (Fiscal General) of the Public Ministry (Ministerio Público). 113 Spanish news agency
Agencia EFE reported that Guaidó has also appointed 'ambassadors' to several countries, including
Argentina, US, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Brazil, Peru; 'diplomatic envoys' tocountries including Spain, Germany, France, Portugal, Malta, Sweden, and Belgium; and 'special
envoys' to countries such as Morocco. 114 The UN Protocol and Liaison Service's list of 'Heads of State'considers Nicolás Maduro as 'President' of Venezuela. 115

1.3.2 Legislative branch
The legislative branch consists of a unicameral National Assembly of 167 seats, of which about 108
are from the opposition 116, 55 from the PSUV, and 3 indigenous peoples 117, since the last elections in
December 2015. 118
As the opposition won most of the seats in December 2015 119, they had the constitutional powers tolimit Maduro's government. 120 As a response, president Maduro used his control of the remaining
branches of the state, particularly the Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ, Tribunal Supremo de Justicia), tonullify the powers of the National Assembly. 121 On 11 January 2016, the TSJ declared the National
Assembly 'in contempt' due to 'irregularities' in the election of three candidates in the state of
Amazonas, and declared that all future acts emerging from that institution will be 'invalid'. 122 In March
2017, the TSJ issued Rulings 155 and 156 which granted the executive branch the power to legislate
without the National Assembly. 123 The reaction from civil society led to protests against the
government of Maduro. 124
The Justice and Peace Centre (CEPAZ, Centro de Justicia y Paz 125) indicated that, in reaction to the
opposition winning control of the National Assembly, the government decreed the election of analternative to the constitutional National Assembly: the National Constituent Assembly (ANC,
Asamblea Nacional Constituyente). On 1 May 2017, the government called for elections for an ANC 126,
which took place on 30 July 2017. 127 The ANC started to operate on 4 August 2017. 128 The call forelections was made through a government decree instead of a public referendum, as required by the
113 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020

114 Agencia EFE, Guaidó designa nuevos enviados diplomáticos de Venezuela ante Grecia e Israel, 21 August 2019, url

115 UN, Protocol and Liaison Service, Heads of State, Heads of Government, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 16 June 2020, url, p.

64

116 AS/COA, The Pressure on Venezuela's National Assembly, 15 January 2020, url; US, CIA, The World Factbook: Venezuela,

4 August 2020, url
117 US, CIA, The World Factbook: Venezuela, 4 August 2020, url
118 International Crisis Group, Imagining a Resolution of Venezuela's Crisis, 11 March 2020, url, p. 1; CEPAZ, 2019 Encrucijada
política en Venezuela, 16 July 2019, url, p. 5
119 International Crisis Group, Imagining a Resolution of Venezuela's Crisis, 11 March 2020, url, p. 1; CEPAZ, 2019 Encrucijada
política en Venezuela, 16 July 2019, url, p. 5
120 International Crisis Group, Imagining a Resolution of Venezuela's Crisis, 11 March 2020, url, p. 1
121 International Crisis Group, Imagining a Resolution of Venezuela's Crisis, 11 March 2020, url, p. 1; Professor of politicalscience, videoconference, 14 May 2020
122 CEPAZ, 2019 Encrucijada política en Venezuela, 16 July 2019, url, p. 5; BBC, Tribunal Supremo de Venezuela declara "endesacato" a la Asamblea Nacional de mayoría opositora, 11 January 2016, url
123 Efecto Cocuyo, Con sentencias 155 y 156, TSJ habilita al president Maduro a legislar y bloquea a la AN, 30 March 2017,url
124 CEPAZ, 2019 Encrucijada política en Venezuela, 16 July 2019, url, p. 5
125 CEPAZ is a Venezuelan NGO that advocates for the defense of human rights and democracy (CEPAZ, Sobre Cepaz, n.d.,url).
126 CEPAZ, 2019 Encrucijada política en Venezuela, 16 July 2019, url, p. 5
127 The Washington Post, With low turnout, Venezuela’s election will create what opponents call ‘puppet congress’, 31 July
2017, url
128 CEPAZ, 2019 Encrucijada política en Venezuela, 16 July 2019, url, p. 5

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS— 25

Constitution. 129 BBC reported that the opposition refused to participate in these elections, andSmartmatic, the company that managed the electronic vote for these elections, indicated that 'there
was manipulation with the data'. 130 The ANC is made up of government supporters 131 and took overthe constitutional role of the National Assembly of promulgating laws. 132 To date, the ANC has notissued an article or a proposal on the content of the new proposed Constitution. 133 The ANC is notrecognised by several countries, including Colombia, Brazil, Spain, Switzerland, and the US, as well as
the OAS and the European Parliament. 134
The professor of political science indicated that the stagnation of the National Assembly by thegovernment has led to the suspension of the rights and privileges of its deputies, including the loss of
their immunity and exposure to prosecution. 135 According to CEPAZ, the TSJ issued 28 rulings against
the National Assembly in 2019, 12 in 2018, 34 in 2017, 44 in 2016, and one in 2015. Among the 2019
rulings are the declaration as 'void' of several resolutions passed by the National Assembly, thecharging of several National Assembly deputies for 'treason', and requesting the ANC to lift theirparliamentary immunity. 136 A report by the National Assembly similarly indicated that the rulings of
the TSJ have effectively brought about the invalidation of that body's decisions, the withdrawal of its
funding, the illegal appropriation of its spaces and assets by the ANC, physical intimidation by progovernment armed groups under the auspices of the Bolivarian National Guard (GNB, Guardia
Nacional Bolivariana), and the suspension of salaries for its deputies. 137 Since some of the deputies are
in exile and unable to take their seats, in December 2019 the National Assembly passed a motion toallow deputies who cannot attend sessions in person to vote virtually. 138 Some of the TSJ rulings in2019 have declared as 'constitutional' several prorogations of 'states of emergency' (estados deexcepción). 139 According to the Professor of political science, the constant renewal of 'states of
emergency' has led to forms of authoritarianism where government institutions adhere to thegovernment line, and constitutional attributions of other institutions such as the National Assemblyare delegated by the government to the TSJ or the ANC. 140
On 15 June 2020, the TSJ suspended the boards of directors of the political parties Justice First(Primero Justicia) and Democratic Action (Acción Democrática), and ordered their takeover 141 by two
deputies who were former members of these parties and are associated with president Maduro. 142
Efecto Cocuyo reported that since 2012, the board of directors of eight political parties have beenchanged by TSJ decisions. 143

Split of the National Assembly
On 5 January 2020, the National Assembly was set to elect its new leader. While many opposition
members, press agencies and foreign diplomats were blocked from entering the National Assembly 144,
129 HRW, World Report 2020, 2020, url, p. 629

130 BBC, Smartmatic, la empresa a cargo del sistema de votación en Venezuela, 2 August 2017, url
131 HRW, World Report 2020, 2020, url, p. 629
132 OVV, videoconference, 4 May 2020

133 Amaya, videoconference, 29 May 2020

134 BBC, ¿Qué implica que grandes países desconozcan la Constituyente de Maduro en Venezuela?, 31 July 2017, url
135 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020

136 CEPAZ, Sentencias del Tribunal Supremo de Justicia que afectan a la Asamblea Nacional, 2019, url, pp. 1, 10-13

137 Venezuela, Asamblea Nacional, Informe especial sobre la situación de parlamentarios venezolanos, 14 August 2019, url,

p. 35
138 AS/COA, The Pressure on Venezuela's National Assembly, 15 January 2020, url
139 CEPAZ, Sentencias del Tribunal Supremo de Justicia que afectan a la Asamblea Nacional, 2019, url, pp. 10-13
140 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020
141 BBC, Venezuela's top court ousts leaders of two opposition parties, 17 June 2020, url; PBS, Venezuela Supreme Court
orders takeover of 2 major political parties, 16 June 2020, url
142 BBC, Venezuela's top court ousts leaders of two opposition parties, 17 June 2020, url
143 Efecto Cocuyo, El TSJ ha cambiado la directiva de siete partidos de oposición, 16 June 2020, url
144 International Crisis Group, Seizure of Parliament Plunges Venezuela into Deeper Turmoil, 7 January 2020, url

26 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS

pro-government National Assembly deputies took to the chamber and elected Luis Parra as president
despite not having the quorum of 84. 145 Guaidó eventually entered the National Assembly on the same
day and was reappointed president of the National Assembly 146 by opposition deputies at the El
Nacional newspaper headquarters, with the diplomatic corps. 147 According to the International Crisis
Group, 'the resulting split between a government-controlled assembly of dubious origin and alegitimate parliament stripped of its physical home and legal status is another escalation of
Venezuela’s long-running political conflict'. 148

1.3.3 Judicial branch
The judicial branch consists of the TSJ, which is made up of 32 judges organised into constitutional,
political-administrative, electoral, civil appeals, criminal appeals, and social chambers. Judges areappointed by the National Assembly and serve a non-renewable 12-year term. 149 The judicial branchalso consists of Superior or Appeals Courts (Tribunales Superiores), District Tribunals (Tribunales deDistrito), Courts of First Instance (Tribunales de Primera Instancia), Parish Courts (Tribunales deParroquia), and Justices of the Peace. 150
According to sources, the justice system in Venezuela is considered an 'appendice of thegovernment'. 151 For more information on the functioning of the justice system, see Chapter 3.11.

1.3.4 Security forces
According to a Bertelsmann Stiftung 2020 country report on Venezuela, 'law enforcement is the stateadministration’s Achilles heel. Several agencies at the national, regional and local levels operate in an
uncoordinated fashion and sometimes contravene each other'. At the national level, there are the
GNB, the Corps of Scientific, Penal and Criminalistic Investigations (CICPC, Cuerpo de Investigaciones
Científicas, Penales y Criminalísticas), the Bolivarian National Police (PNB, Policía Nacional
Bolivariana), and the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (SEBIN, Servicio Bolivariano deInteligencia Nacional), which is part of the Ministry of the Interior, Justice and Peace (Ministerio delPoder Popular para Relaciones Interiores, Justicia y Paz) 152 and has around 2 800 employees, including
administrative personnel. 153 Twenty-three state police departments comprise 50 000 officers, and 114
municipal police departments about 20 000. Altogether, there are some 115 000 police officers. 154
The GNB is one of the branches of the armed forces and is responsible for the 'preservation of order
within the country, [cooperation] in the development of military operations to safeguard the defenseof the nation, engage in activities related to policing and penal investigation according to the law, andactively participate in the national development'. 155 Other responsibilities include border security;

145 AS/COA, The Pressure on Venezuela's National Assembly, 15 January 2020, url; France24, “El único respaldo quenecesitamos es el que está aquí", Luis Parra en France 24, 10 January 2020, url
146 France24, “El único respaldo que necesitamos es el que está aquí", Luis Parra en France 24, 10 January 2020, url;
International Crisis Group, Seizure of Parliament Plunges Venezuela into Deeper Turmoil, 7 January 2020, url
147 VPItv, EN VIVO - Elección de la nueva directiva de la Asamblea Nacional 2020, 5 January 2020, url, 6:57:00
148 International Crisis Group, Seizure of Parliament Plunges Venezuela into Deeper Turmoil, 7 January 2020, url
149 Venezuela, TSJ, La Institución, url
150 US, CIA, The World Factbook: Venezuela, 4 August 2020, url
151 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020; CIJ, El Tribunal Supremo de Justicia de Venezuela: un
instrumento del Poder Ejecutivo, July 2017, url, p. 5
152 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2020 Country Report: Venezuela, 2020, url, p. 24
153 BBC, Crisis en Venezuela: qué está pasando en el Sebin, el temido servicio de inteligencia al que señalan de conspirar
contra Nicolás Maduro, 6 May 2019, url
154 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2020 Country Report: Venezuela, 2020, url, p. 24
155 Venezuela, GNB, Misión, n.d., url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS— 27

migration control; prevention, investigation and apprehensions in crimes related to 'humantrafficking, forced prostitution and sexual enslavement'. 156 The GNB has 35 000 agents. 157
The CICPC is an agency of the Ministry of Interior, Justice and Peace, and is responsible for the scientificinvestigation of crimes in support of the administration of justice. Its functions include theinvestigation of crimes; the seizure of evidence involved in the commission of a crime; collaboration
with other security agencies for crime prevention initiatives and in the administration of crime
databases to share information related to drug trafficking, international terrorism, organised crime,
among others; and the production of statistics on crime. 158 The CICPC is also responsible for the
execution of judicial decisions that involve the location, search, and prehension of wanted persons,and undertaking judicial inspections and raids. 159 The CICPC has about 8 000 agents. 160
The PNB was created in December 2009 in order to establish a police body at the national level, in
addition to the existing police bodies at the state and municipal levels. The PNB is under the Ministryof Interior, Justice and Peace, and is responsible for policing in areas such as customs, penitentiaries,
organised crime, community police, land transportation and highways, migration, borders, and antikidnapping. It also collaborates with foreign police bodies, provides protection to VIP and diplomatic
missions in the country, and provides assistance to victims of crime. 161 The PNB has about 4 000
agents. 162 The Special Action Force (FAES, Fuerzas de Acciones Especiales) is a special police force thatis part of the PNB. 163
The Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB, Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana) consist of the
National Army (Ejército Nacional), the Navy (Armada Nacional), Military Air Force (Aviación Militar)and the GNB. Two other 'secondary' bodies include the Bolivarian National Militia (Milicia Nacional
Bolivariana) and the Presidential Guard (Guardia de Honor Presidencial). 164 According to Maduro, theBolivarian National Militia is 'the people integrated in a civil-military union according to its
constitutional responsibilities to prepare for the defense' of the homeland. According to Maduro, in
December 2019 the Bolivarian National Militia had over 3.3 million militias with a goal of 4 million by
April 2020. 165 In a telephone interview for this report, a journalist based in Venezuela who has been
covering the armed forces for over 20 years indicated that members of the Bolivarian National Militia
include older adults and public servants. 166 The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Factbook on
Venezuela indicated that the estimated size in 2019 of the Venezuelan military is about 125 000 'active
personnel', with 62 000 in the Army, 25 000 in the Navy, 11 000 in the Air Force, and 27 000 in the
GNB. 167 The Directorate General of Military Counterintelligence (DGCIM, Dirección General deContrainteligencia Militar) is the military counter-intelligence agency. 168
International Crisis Group indicated that the armed forces also present divisions and tensions between
those who regard themselves as the sole legitimate body with the monopoly of force in the country,
the ultimate arbiter of law, order and sovereignty, with the responsibility to impose order in the
156 Éxodo A.C., Consulta a organizaciones de la sociedad civil, 1 June 2019, url, p. 31
157 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2020 Country Report: Venezuela, 2020, url, p. 8
158 Venezuela, CICPC, ¿Quiénes somos?, n.d., url

159 Éxodo A.C., Consulta a organizaciones de la sociedad civil, 1 June 2019, url, p. 31
160 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2020 Country Report: Venezuela, 2020, url, p. 8

161 Venezuela, Ministerio del Poder Popular para las Relaciones Interiores, Justicia y Paz, Reseña, n.d., url
162 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2020 Country Report: Venezuela, 2020, url, p. 8

163 VTV, Presidente Maduro rechaza campaña de descrédito contra FAES y PNB dirigida desde EE.UU., 20 December 2019,url

164 Venezuela, Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Defensa, Fuerza Armada, n.d., url

165 VTV, Presidente Maduro rechaza campaña de descrédito contra FAES y PNB dirigida desde EE.UU., 20 December 2019,url

166 Journalist, telephone interview, 8 June 2020

167 US, CIA, The World Factbook: Venezuela, 4 August 2020, url

168 Foro Penal and Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights, Enforced Disappearance as a Tool of Political Repression in Venezuela,

2020, url

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country, a more statist, militaristic strand, and those with a more dispersed ideological vision of
popular armed defense of the revolution. According to the same source, the former are 'disturbed' by
the level of penetration of non-state armed groups inside the government; the later rely on these nonstate armed groups for the defense of the nation backed by the doctrines of warfare instituted underchavismo that allows for the possibility of asymmetric warfare. These two seem irreconcilable. 169

1.4 Demonstrations
Demonstrations have taken place to protest the Venezuelan government, the economic situation andliving standards, while pro-government supporters protest against 'the United States of America forits declaration of Venezuela as a "national security threat" and for imposing sanctions against State
officials over alleged human rights abuses'. 170
According to the Venezuelan Observatory of Social Conflict (OVCS, Observatorio Venezolano de
Conflictividad Social) 171, 16 739 demonstrations took place in 2019, while 12 715 occurred in 2018 and
9 787 in 2017. 172 In 2019, 42 % of the demonstrations were related to demands for political and civilrights, while 58 % of the protests were related to 'economic, social, cultural and environmental rights',
including demands for better economic conditions and salaries; access to food and basic services suchas gas, electricity and water; health care conditions; cuts in education and poor infrastructure of
educational institutions; shortage of gasoline; and the situation of indigenous peoples. 173 The rights
most protested included political participation (6 310 protests), housing and access to basic services(5 375), labour (4 756), food (984), education (925), and health care (700). 174 Most protests of workers
during 2019 were on education (3 714 demonstrations), health care (474), and transportation (290). 175
The most common demonstration methods included rallies (6 493), closing of streets (3 706), strikes(1 613), marches (1 455), and exhibiting placards (1 331). 176
Demonstrations in 2019, by state 177
State
Amazonas
Anzoátegui
Apure
AraguaBarinasBolívarCarabobo
Cojedes
Delta Amacuro
Capital District
FalcónGuáricoNumber
149
977
262
668
288
1 054
726
318
173
1 290
547
571

State
Lara
MéridaMirandaMonagas
Nueva Esparta
Portuguesa
Sucre
TáchiraTrujillo
VargasYaracuy
Zulia

Number
996
1 255
1 355
720
428
508
735
1 128
1 032
185
385
989

169 International Crisis Group, telephone interview, 30 April 2020

170 ICC, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2019, 5 December 2019, url; para. 64

171 OVCS is a Venezuelan NGO that promotes and advocates the defense of human rights (OVCS, ¿Quiénes comos?, n.d., url).

The OVCS carries out research on conflict trends based on information provided by the media, governmental organisations
and other NGOs (OVCS, Conflictividad social 2019, 24 January 2019, url, p. 32).
172 OVCS, Conflictividad social 2019, 24 January 2019, url, p. 3
173 OVCS, Conflictividad social 2019, 24 January 2019, url, pp. 3, 8, 12
174 OVCS, Conflictividad social 2019, 24 January 2019, url, p. 12
175 OVCS, Conflictividad social 2019, 24 January 2019, url, p. 22
176 OVCS, Conflictividad social 2019, 24 January 2019, url, p. 5
177 OVCS, Conflictividad social 2019, 24 January 2019, url, p. 7

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An UN OHCHR update on the 5 July 2019 report indicated that between October and December 2019,
4 433 protests were recorded by the OVCS, most of them led by professionals engaged in education,
health care, and industry, 'protesting poor working conditions and the lack of supplies and basic
equipment in schools and hospitals'. 178
An International Criminal Court (ICC) report indicated that it has been reported that 'some groups ofprotestors resorted to violent means, resulting in some members of security forces being injured or
killed. 179 The government indicated in its reply to the UN OHCHR report that 'at least' nine officials
died and 1 263 were wounded as a result of violence during the 2017 and 2019 protests carried out
by the opposition. 180
Sources indicated, however, that the demonstrations that took place in 2014 and 2017 are different
in nature from the ones that occurred in 2019 onwards. 181 In a videoconference for this report, JeanBaptiste Mouttet, an independent journalist who covered Venezuela between 2010 and 2019,
explained that demonstrations that took place in 2014 were mostly driven by middle and upper classyouth from Voluntad Popular who supported the Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD, Mesa de la
Unidad Democrática). In 2017, with the economic crisis, residents in poorer areas started to rally inthe neighbourhoods to demand better living standards and not against Maduro, and to avoid
repression, rallies took place in the evening. Even though political demonstrations were taking placearound the same time, people from poorer neighbourhoods did not participate in these protests. 182
In 2019, however, the protest movement emerged in low-income neighbourhoods. On 21 January
2019, 'hundreds' of residents from poorer neighbourhoods supported the members of the GNB whowere deserting, and they were also present during the rallies that supported Guaidó on his selfproclamation as 'interim president' on 23 January 2019, giving way for the unification of the agendasof the political opposition and the demands from the communities. The union did not last, however. 183
The Professor of political science similarly indicated that the political and ideological protests thattook place before the first months of 2019 started to decrease and gave way to more targeted
demonstrations that protested the deterioration of living standards and the humanitarian situation.
These new protests were led by physicians, nurses, trade unions, people affected by the lack ofpotable water, and so on, and during the coronavirus pandemic, demonstrations have focused on thelack of food and living conditions, although these are seldom reported due to government efforts toblock their reporting, with some of these protests met with strong police repression. The
criminalisation of demonstrations has created a sense of fear among the population that refrain fromcriticising the government in public or on the media.184 The OVCS reported that in May 2020, 1 075
protests took place in Venezuela, an average of 36 per day, with the majority of demands related tothe collapse of basic services such as electricity (in 501 protests), drinking water (396), and residentialgas (150). 185
For information on the treatment of protesters, see Chapter 3.3.

178 UN OHCHR, Venezuela: Commissioner Bachelet details plans for new human rights assistance, 18 December 2019, url
179 ICC, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2019, 5 December 2019, url; para. 74

180 Venezuela, Report by the United Nations High Commissioner of Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the

Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela: Comments by the State, 5 July 2019, url, para. 49
181 Mouttet, videoconference, 8 May 2020; Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020
182 Mouttet, videoconference, 8 May 2020
183 Mouttet, videoconference, 8 May 2020
184 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020
185 OVCS, Escasez de gasolina y colapso de servicios básicos: Conflictividad social – Venezuela, Mayo 2020, 11 June 2020, url30 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS

1.5 Abuses and monitoring by security forces
1.5.1 Arbitrary detentions
The Constitution of Venezuela indicates the following regarding arbitrary detentions and forced
disappearances:‘ARTICLE 44
Personal liberty is inviolable, therefore:
1. No person shall be arrested or detained except by virtue of a court order, unless such person
is caught in fraganti. In the latter case, such person must be brought before a judge within
forty-eight hours of his or her arrest. He or she shall remain free during trial, except for reasons
determined by law and assessed by the judge on a case-by case basis.
The bail as required by law for the release of a detainee shall not be subject to tax of any kind.
2. Any person under arrest has the right to communicate immediately with members of his or
her family, an attorney or any other person in whom he or she reposes trust, and such persons
in turn have the right to be informed where the detainee is being held, to be notified
immediately of the reasons for the arrest and to have a written record inserted into the casefile concerning the physical or mental condition of the detainee, either by himself or herself,
or with the aid of specialists. The competent authorities shall keep a public record of every
arrest made, including the identity of the person arrested, the place, time, circumstances andthe officers who made the arrest.
In the case of the arrest of foreign nationals, (male or female), applicable provisions ofinternational treaties concerning consular notification shall also be observed.
3. The penalty shall not extend beyond the person of the convicted individual. No one shall besentenced to perpetual or humiliating penalties. Penalties consisting of deprivation of liberty
shall not exceed 30 years.
4. Any authority taking measures involving the deprivation of liberty must identify himself or
herself.
5. No person shall remain under arrest after a release order has been issued by the competentauthority or such person’s sentence has been served.
ARTICLE 45
The public authorities, whether military, civilian or of any other kind, even during a state of
emergency, exception or restriction or guarantees, are prohibited from effecting, permitting
or tolerating the forced disappearance of persons. An officer receiving an order or instruction
to carry it out, has the obligation not to obey, and to report the order or instruction to thecompetent authorities. The intellectual and physical perpetrators accomplices and concealersof the crimes of forced disappearance of a person, as well as any attempt to commit suchoffense, shall be punished in accordance with law.’ 186
The UN OHCHR mission report indicated that'in most cases [of arbitrary detentions], women and men were subjected to one or more formsof torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, including electric shocks,
suffocation with plastic bags, water boarding, beatings, sexual violence, water and food
186 Venezuela, Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 1999 (Amended), 2009, Translated by William S. Hein &Co., Inc., url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS— 31

deprivation, stress positions and exposure to extreme temperatures. Security forces andintelligence services, particularly SEBIN and DGCIM, routinely resort to such practices toextract information and confessions, intimidate, and punish the detainees'. 187
A case documented by Human Rights Watch indicated that security agents 'used electric shocks on adetainee, beat and kicked him, and covered his head with a plastic bag in which they had sprayed achemical substance that made his face and throat itch and swell. […] The agents believed the man had
stolen a motorcycle belonging to a [FAES] commander's wife'. 188
Sources indicated that authorities allegedly engage in forced disappearances 189, including for politicalreasons. 190 According to Foro Penal 191, the temporary or permanent forced disappearance is a'common' practice in Venezuela to impede the defence of the person while the detention is carriedout. Security agencies, particularly the DGCIM, the SEBIN, and the PNB and its FAES, 'in many cases
disappear persons to subject them to illegal interrogations that include tortures or ill and inhumantreatment, in some cases resorting to filming or recording the detainee incriminating other persons'. 192
Sources similarly indicated that detainees are taken clandestinely to 'safe houses' to carry out
interrogations 193 and sometimes are held for over 48 hours. 194 During 2019, Foro Penal documented
526 people who were 'forcibly disappeared' in the country. 195 In some instances, authorities refused
to provide information on their whereabouts.196 The Venezuelan Program for Education and Action on
Human Rights (PROVEA, Programa Venezolano de Educación y Acción en Derechos Humanos197)
reported that between 4 March and 7 April 2020, the first month of the COVID-19 pandemic, 34
arbitrary detentions occurred, including 10 journalists, 5 health care professionals, 5 members of
Guaidó's team, 2 human rights advocates, and one former member of the GNB. Of the 34 detained,
12 were freed, another 12 were freed with charges, and 10 were imprisoned. 198
On 8 February 2018, the ICC opened a 'preliminary examination' for alleged crimes against humanity
against actual or perceived opponents of the government in the context of demonstrations and'related political unrest' since April 2017, including as a period of reference events that occurred since
February 2014. 199 The ICC assessment was expected to be finalised in 'early 2020'. 200 Additional
information on the status of the case could not be found among the sources consulted within the time
constraints of this report.

187 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 43
188 HRW, Venezuela: Extrajudicial Killings in Poor Areas, 18 September 2019, url

189 ICC, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2019, 5 December 2019, url; para. 83; Foro Penal, Reporte sobre la

represión en Venezuela: Reporte anual año 2019, 23 January 2020, url, p. 13
190 Foro Penal, Reporte sobre la represión en Venezuela: Reporte anual año 2019, 23 January 2020, url, p. 13
191 Foro Penal is a Venezuelan human rights organisation that provides legal assistance for people without financial resources
who are victims of arbitrary detentions, violations of due process, or are 'linked to human rights violations, torture, crueltreatment and mistreatment', while in detention. Foro Penal is composed of 'more than 100 well-known lawyers and a groupof over 5.000 human rights activists. Foro Penal also helps victims and families of people killed or attacked during peacefuldemonstrations.' (Foro Penal, What is Foro Penal?, n.d., url).
192 Foro Penal, Reporte sobre la represión en Venezuela: Reporte anual año 2019, 23 January 2020, url, p. 13-14
193 InSight Crime, Venezuelan Government Turned Drug Dens into 'Torture Houses', 26 March 2019, url; Mármol,
videoconference, 1 May 2020
194 Mármol, videoconference, 1 May 2020
195 Foro Penal, Reporte sobre la represión en Venezuela: Reporte anual año 2019, 23 January 2020, url, p. 13
196 ICC, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2019, 5 December 2019, url; para. 77
197 PROVEA is a Venezuelan NGO that provides education and legal support to vulnerable populations who have been victims
or potential victims of human rights violations. It also produces research on the situation of human rights in the country(PROVEA, Nuestra historia, n.d., url).
198 PROVEA, Primer mes Estado de Alarma, 13 April 2020, url
199 ICC, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2019, 5 December 2019, url; paras. 58, 59, 73
200 ICC, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2019, 5 December 2019, url; para. 83

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1.5.2 Extrajudicial executions
OVV indicated that the aggression, intimidation and killings by security forces is 'systematic', and crime
is addressed through extrajudicial executions rather than the courts. 201 Amnesty International
indicated that targeted victims were young males who were critical, or perceived to be critical, of thegovernment; live in low-income communities; and were visible in protests. 202 Most cases ofextrajudicial executions involve young males from low-income neighbourhoods. A considerable
number of cases involve persons with criminal background, repeat offenders, or people who were in
jail and were released. According to their monitoring, however, there are cases of people who arereleased from prisons to work as 'peons' for bands run by members of security forces and when the
person is no longer needed, they are executed. 203 Corroborating information could not be foundamong the sources consulted within time constraints.
The Professor of political science indicated that 'repression' by security forces in low-income
communities is very 'strong'. 204 Human Rights Watch also indicated that Venezuelan security forces
are 'resorting to egregious abuses in low-income communities that no longer support the Maduro
regime'. 205 PROVEA also indicated that repression of protests in popular sectors that have been
considered 'bastions of chavismo' is more violent and the presence of armed civilians is morecommon. 206
Mouttet indicated that since victims of these killings include social and political activists that were indemonstrations, it is difficult to know who was a dissident and was not as, according to his experience
reporting in communities, people are afraid of speaking about these acts. 207 OVV indicated that theextrajudicial killings, which oscillate between 5 000 and 7 000 per year, also have the objective thepolitical control of low-income neighbourhoods. 208
Security forces involved in extrajudicial executions include the FAES209 and the CICPC.210 The FAES
conducted these operations in their black uniforms and in several cases, wearing ski masks, arrivingin black pickup trucks without license plates, and bursting into the houses of the victims.211 In somecases, the FAES agents took family members outside the house before killing the victims, and in otherinstances, FAES agents stole their belongings. 212 The FAES in low-income communities are seen as a'death squad'. 213 During raids, state security forces reportedly engage, in addition to extrajudicial
killings, in mass arbitrary detentions, mistreatment of detainees, forced evictions, destruction ofhomes, and arbitrary deportations. 214 There are allegations that security forces tampered with crime

201 OVV, videoconference, 4 May 2020

202 AI, Annual Report 2019, February 2020, url, p. 87
203 OVV, videoconference, 4 May 2020

204 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020

205 HRW, Venezuela: Extrajudicial Killings in Poor Areas, 18 September 2019, url
206 Efecto Cocuyo, Así funcionan las "cuadrillas de paz", 7 April 2019, url
207 Mouttet, videoconference, 8 May 2020
208 OVV, videoconference, 4 May 2020

209 HRW, Venezuela: Extrajudicial Killings in Poor Areas, 18 September 2019, url; UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian

Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 32
210 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 32
211 HRW, Venezuela: Extrajudicial Killings in Poor Areas, 18 September 2019, url; UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 48
212 HRW, Venezuela: Extrajudicial Killings in Poor Areas, 18 September 2019, url; UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 48
213 Mouttet, videoconference, 8 May 2020; Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020
214 HRW, Venezuela: Extrajudicial Killings in Poor Areas, 18 September 2019, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS— 33

scenes 215, planted evidence such as arms and drugs 216, fired their weapons against the wall or the air
to suggest a confrontation, or transported victims to hospitals when they were already dead. 217
A report produced by the World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT), the International Federationfor Human Rights (FIDH), the Committee for the Families of Victims of February-March 1989 (COFAVIC,
Comité de Familiares de Víctimas de los Sucesos de Febrero-Marzo de 1989 218), the Centre for Rights
and Justice (CDJ, Centro para los Defensores y la Justicia 219), and the Vicar Office for Human Rights of
the Archdiocese of Caracas (Vicaría de Derechos Humanos de la Arquidiócesis de Caracas 220), indicatedthat impunity with regards to extrajudicial executions is 'widespread and generalised'. 221 The UN
OHCHR update to the 5 July 2019 mission report indicated that between August and December 2019,
UN OHCHR continued documenting cases of alleged extrajudicial executions, mostly young men, by
the FAES in the context of security operations carried out in low-income neighbourhoods. 222 The UN
OHCHR mission report indicated that, based on the information compiled by the mission, 'many ofthese killings may constitute extrajudicial executions'. 223 Authorities claim that these deaths occurred
during clashes with the police and the persons were 'resisting authority'. 224
According to COFAVIC, 10 971 cases of extrajudicial executions were reported by COFAVIC between
2012 and 2019.225 Between 2016 and September 2019, about 18 000 people were killed in the country
in instances of 'resisting authority', though it is not clear how many of these victims wereextrajudicially executed. 226 The OVV indicated that in 2019, 5 286 deaths were labelled as 'resisting
authority', representing a rate of 19 deaths per 100 000 inhabitants. 227 Sources reported that Guaidó's'Presidential Commission for Human Rights' reported that between 1 January and 31 March 2020, 'atleast' 158 people died in alleged instances of extrajudicial executions by the FAES. 228 Some instancesof extrajudicial executions as reported by sources, include:•

Without providing further information on the locations and the names of the persons involved for
security reasons, Human Rights Watch reported that in January 2019, FAES officers broke into thehouse of a lady who was living with her son, her daughter and her daughter's two children. FAES

215 AI, Annual Report 2019, February 2020, url, p. 87; UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5

July 2019, url, para. 49
216 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 49; Mouttet, videoconference,
8 May 2020
217 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 49
218 COFAVIC is a Venezuelan NGO that documents human rights violations in the country since 1989 (COFAVIC, Qué es
Cofavic, n.d., url).
219 CDJ is a Venezuelan NGO that promotes the rights and protection of human rights advocates, and monitors the justicesystem and democratic institutions in the country (OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, pp. 80-81).
220 The Vicaría de Derechos Humanos de la Arquidiócesis de Caracas was created in 1989 that promotes and defends humanrights. Since 2002, it has participated in over 20 hearings at the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights and UN bodies
on the human rights situation in the country (OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, p. 80). The
report, which was financed by the European Union, and with the support of the governments of France and Switzerland,
provides an analysis of the situation of human rights advocates, social leaders, journalists, humanitarian workers, and NGOs
in Venezuela, a situation that that, according to the report, has been 'insufficiently documented and visualisedinternationally'. The methodology consists of research with primary and secondary sources, as well as information compiled
during a fact finding mission conducted by the OMCT in July 2019 with interlocutors that included civil society organisations,human rights advocates, and diplomatic missions accredited in Venezuela (OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos",March 2020, url, pp. 24-25).
221 OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, p. 66
222 UN OHCHR, Venezuela: Commissioner Bachelet details plans for new human rights assistance, 18 December 2019, url
223 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 50
224 AI, Annual Report 2019, February 2020, url, p. 87; UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5
July 2019, url, para. 50
225 OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, p. 7
226 HRW, Venezuela: Extrajudicial Killings in Poor Areas, 18 September 2019, url
227 OVV, Informe Anual de Violencia 2019, 27 December 2019, url, p. 2
228 Efecto Cocuyo, Atribuyen más de 158 ejecuciones extrajudiciales a las Faes, 19 May 2020, url; El Pitazo, Faes mató a 158
personas de enero a marzo de 2020 en Venezuela, 19 May 2020, url

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•

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officers reportedly showed her the photo of a group of young men, including her son, and asked
their whereabouts. When she told them her son was inside, FAES ordered her to leave the housewith her daughter and her children to a neighbour's as they were going to take a 'statement' fromhim. Once at the neighbour's house, FAES told the lady that her son was wanted on 20 drugtrafficking charges. Six shots were heard and a photo of her son's body beside a gun was publishedin media reports, calling him 'a criminal'. Up to September 2019, she has not been contacted totestify about the case. 229
Monitor de Víctimas (Victims Monitor 230) reported that on 28 February 2020, the CICPC broke intoa house in Barquisimeto and killed a 20-year-old man in the presence of his 16-years-old brotherand younger cousins. The CICPC was reportedly in pursuit of a members of a gang in the sameneighbourhood and mistook the 20-year-old man for a member of the gang. The victim wasreportedly interrogated inside the house and forced the other ones to lay facing to the floor before
being shot in the thorax. The CICPC reportedly simulated a confrontation to justify the killing. 231

1.5.3 Monitoring
The UN OHCHR indicated that the 'Tascón List' (Lista Tascón) was 'an early marker of discriminationand persecution on political grounds', which consisted of a database of over 3 million people who
supported a referendum to revoke the presidential mandate of Hugo Chávez in 2003-2004, but waslater used to 'massively dismiss civil servants'. 232 In a videoconference for this report, a representativeof FundaRedes 233 indicated that through this list, the government 'persecuted' not only on
employment grounds, but also in the access to financial credits, health care, and other government
services. Later came the 'Maisanta List' (Lista Maisanta) [also called 'Maisanta program' or 'Maisantadatabase'], which contained information on political participation of members of the opposition suchas their workplaces and positions. 234 The journalist indicated that these lists were very popular during
the Chávez era, but during the Maduro government the monitoring and discrimination tool most usedis the Carnet de la Patria (Homeland Card). 235 Amaya indicated that these lists are inactive as theelectorate that was included in those lists has changed. However, the principle of using lists formonitoring still applies today, mostly through the monitoring in social media, and if the person has ahistory of supporting the opposition, he or she 'simply will not be hired' by the government. 236
Venezuela has established a complex system to eavesdrop, harass, and digitally and physically monitor
the population. 237 Security agencies reportedly eavesdrop on their targets without a judicial order 238.
They also monitor social media platforms and hack email accounts. 239 Extracted information fromprivate communications is later manipulated and used to stigmatise and discredit their work, and229 HRW, Venezuela: Extrajudicial Killings in Poor Areas, 18 September 2019, url

230 Monitor de Víctimas is a collaborative digital platform that compiles news reports on homicides in Caracas and the stateof Bolívar. It is supported by seven news outlets, including El Pitazo, Crónica Uno, El Nacional, Projiuris, Correo del Caroníand Runrun.es. Monitor de Víctimas also visits on a daily basis the morgue of Caracas to obtain information about the victims,
including relatives of the victims and police officials, and it also visits crime scenes to obtain further information (Monitor de
Víctimas, ¿Quiénes somos?, n.d., url).
231 Monitor de Víctimas, Denuncian ejecuciones del Cicpc en El Junquito y Caricuao, 3 March 2020, url
232 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 30, Footnote 23
233 FundaRedes is a Venezuelan NGO that monitors violence and irregular armed groups in Venezuela, with special focus on
the border states with Colombia. It has six observatories on human rights violations in border states. FundaRedes publishes
monthly rsituation reports on violence and educational institutions. The methodology followed by FundaRedes consists ofthe follow up of news, field documentation with victims of crime, and sources at security forces (FundaRedes,
videoconference, 6 May 2020).
234 FundaRedes, videoconference, 6 May 2020
235 Journalist, telephone interview, 8 June 2020
236 Amaya, videoconference, 29 May 2020
237 OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, pp. 47-48; Mármol, videoconference, 1 May 2020
238 Mármol, videoconference, 1 May 2020; OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, p. 61
239 FundaRedes, videoconference, 6 May 2020

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turning the person into a target of verbal insults and physical aggressions in public places. 240 In avideoconference, Fermín Mármol, a criminal lawyer, professor, and director of the Institute of Penal
Sciences, Criminalistics and Criminology (Instituto de Ciencias Penales, Criminalística y Criminología)
of Santa María University, indicated that persons who are the target of security forces are surveilled
electronically without a judicial order, and the same occurs with private financial institutions that canbe forced by security agencies to provide financial information on a client, including without judicial
orders. 241 The journalist indicated that there have been reports of telecommunication eavesdropping,hacking of email accounts, and the gathering of financial, migration, background police and telephonerecords on dissidents and activists. 242
FundaRedes indicated that other way of monitoring is through permits, which are required for mostthings in Venezuela. FundaRedes provided the example of the gasoline card which is required to buy
fuel for vehicles and the card contains information such as dates of purchase and locations, which canbe used to track the movement of people. 243
According to International Crisis Group, even though technological sophistication to monitor could be
limited, all capacity seems to be at the moment on the individual threat posed by the person and theunrest in a given community. 244 Mármol explained that for high profile targets like members of the
opposition, entrepreneurs and scholars, security forces collect information on their relatives,properties, and entries and exits from the country. On the political opposition, in particular, security
forces collect information on their sources of financing and monitor their communications. Regarding
low profile targets, monitoring is carried out by armed colectivos and 'boliches'. 245 In avideoconference for this report, Alejandro Velasco, an associate professor at New York University
whose research focuses on social movements in Latin America, urban culture and democratisation,
indicated that access to government databases by colectivos 'takes place sui generis rather thanofficially'. Some government institutions have lists of dissidents, but it is not clear if they are sharedwith members of the colectivos. 246 The journalist considered that surveillance 'is not constant against
a particular subject, although it depends on the dynamics and the situation', and that surveillanceagainst activists is 'constant'. 247
The UN OHCHR mission report indicated that Maduro activated in 2017 the 'Plan Zamora, a civilmilitary strategic security plan for the joint operation of armed forces, [Bolivarian National] militias
and civilians' to increase the militarisation of state institutions. 248 The use of civilians in intelligencegathering is done through communal councils (consejos comunales), the Articulation and Sociopolitical Action Networks (RAAS, Red de Articulación y Acción Sociopolítica), the Hugo Chávez Battle
Units (UBCh, Unidades de Batalla Hugo Chávez) 249, and armed colectivos (see Chapter 5). These
organisations are financed by the Venezuelan government and facilitate the control of the state overthe population. 250

240 OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, p. 61
241 Mármol, videoconference, 1 May 2020

242 Journalist, telephone interview, 8 June 2020
243 FundaRedes, videoconference, 6 May 2020

244 International Crisis Group, telephone interview, 30 April 2020
245 Mármol, videoconference, 1 May 2020
246 Velasco, videoconference, 1 May 2020

247 Journalist, telephone interview, 8 June 2020

248 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 31

249 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 31; OMCT et al., Venezuela"Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, pp. 47-48
250 OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, pp. 47-48

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Local Committees for Supply and Production and the Homeland Card (Carnet de la Patria)
The Local Committees for Supply and Production (CLAP, Comités Locales de Abastecimiento y
Producción) emerged in 2016 as a way to deal with shortages of food251 and it was supposed to be atemporary measure of three months. 252 The CLAP are responsible for the delivery of food and othergovernment aid to the communities 253 The Ministry for the Communes registers and certifies all CLAPs.
The CLAP keeps a census of the number of families and family members that live in their territory thatis used to calculate the number of food boxes to be requested to the Ministry for Food. The food boxes
are distributed by the CLAP upon payment via electronic transfer with the Carnet de la Patria. 254 The
delivery of the CLAP food boxes is inconsistent 255 and discretionary. 256
The UN OHCHR report indicated that the CLAP food boxes do not meet the basic nutritional needs. 257
Transparencia Venezuela indicated that as of June 2019, CLAP food boxes included six to eight kilos offood such as flour, rice, pasta, milk, and tuna, for an average family of four. The price in the market ofthe products included in the CLAP is about 20 USD while the minimum salary and bonuses offered by
the government is about 10 USD per month. 258
According to the Venezuelan government, beneficiaries under the Carnet de la Patria are determinedby government institutions responsible for their programs, and include, 'without discrimination, every
person who fulfils the requirements for said programs'. 259 The same source indicated that 24 million
people belonging to 6 million households receive provisions under the CLAP system, and that there
has been a 400 % increase in the level of distribution since the creation of the CLAP system. 260 The
Carnet de la Patria covers more than 80 % of the population. 261 For more information on Carnet de la
Patria, see Chapter 6.5.
Sources indicated, however, that monitoring of the population also takes place through the CLAP 262
and the Carnet de la Patria. 263 The CLAP is also used as a tool to discriminate and harass those who
oppose the government or are involved in human rights advocacy. 264
The UN OHCHR mission report indicated that the list of beneficiaries of the programs distributed
through the Carnet de la Patria are managed by the governing party and not government institutions
and, according to testimonies, members of CLAP local structures monitor beneficiaries' politicalactivity. 265 Amaya explained that these subsidised food boxes are delivered by the spokespersons of
the communal councils, who are in turn appointed by the government based on their affiliation to the
PSUV or their support to the government. 266 The OMCT et al. report indicated that members of the
CLAP possess personal information on each family unit. 267 Amaya indicated that communal councils'

251 Transparencia Venezuela, El carnet de la Patria, [2019], url, p. 3
252 Amaya, videoconference, 29 May 2020

253 OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, p. 48

254 Transparencia Venezuela, 4 años de CLAP: Coacción, corrupción y hambre, April 2020, url, pp. 3-5
255 Transparencia Venezuela, El carnet de la Patria, [2019], url, p. 3

256 OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, p. 49

257 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 13
258 Transparencia Venezuela, El carnet de la Patria, [2019], url, p. 3

259 Venezuela, Report by the United Nations High Commissioner of Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the

Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela: Comments by the State, 5 July 2019, url, para. 33
260 Venezuela, Report by the United Nations High Commissioner of Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela: Comments by the State, 5 July 2019, url, paras. 31-32
261 Venezuela, Report by the United Nations High Commissioner of Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela: Comments by the State, 5 July 2019, url, footnote 7
262 Mouttet, videoconference, 8 May 2020; OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, p. 48
263 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 23
264 OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, p. 49; Amaya, videoconference, 29 May 2020
265 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 23
266 Amaya, videoconference, 29 May 2020
267 OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, p. 48

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spokespersons possess a list of neighbours with their telephone numbers and WhatsApp accounts
and, in some places, they have a WhatsApp group of beneficiaries. 268 Amaya indicated that recipientsare notified on WhatsApp when and where the CLAP food boxes can be collected. Communal councils,
however, use that information to surveil the behaviour of residents on social media and, in someplaces, those who run the CLAP are also the same pro-government people who solicit voters during
elections. 269
The UN OHCHR mission report indicated that there were testimonies of people who despite not having
adequate access to food, were excluded from the list of CLAP beneficiaries because they were notgovernment supporters. 270 Mouttet indicated that it might not be the policy of the government to
exclude non-supporters of the government from the food boxes, but those who distribute it in theneighbourhoods have a degree of discretion that allows them to determine who receives the benefits.
In this context, there is an implicit social control that encourages reporting on people by those whowant to obtain benefits, and reporting on someone is very common locally. 271 Amaya explained that,in some cases, WhatsApp chain messages may be redirected by local residents to authorities or
intelligence agencies to take action. 272
The Professor of political science indicated that the distribution of the CLAP food boxes is determinedby patronage, and it depends on PSUV militants and other pro-government associations. In large
urban areas, dissidents may still be able to receive the food boxes, but in remote locations, dissidents
can be excluded. Maracaibo, for example, is being particularly affected by the lack of delivery of CLAP
food boxes as it is one of the cities where opposition support is strong. 273

RAAS
The Articulation and Socio-political Action Networks (RAAS, Red de Articulación y Acción Sociopolítica)
is a PSUV initiative defined as a 'model for unity and ultimate organisation for the comprehensive
defense of the nation […] in the areas of ideology, culture, political, society, economy, electoral, andmilitarily', and it was created 'in order to face with more efficacy the constant threat of the UnitedStates'. 274 The RAAS were created in 2018 275, although they started to be mentioned in public speeches
by officials in 2017. 276 Amaya describes it as a network of information based on 'popular intelligence'.
They were legally established and are managed by the Ministry of the Interior, Justice and Peace andthe Ministry for the Communes. 277 The RAAS' operational strategy consists of a 'clear' mapping of thecommunities that are located within the areas of influence of each UBCh, as well as the streets in each
community, and deploy 'street by street, house by house to make a socio-political characterisation of
inhabitants and have full knowledge of the territory'. 278 Without providing further information, thegovernment's National Radio of Venezuela (RNV, Radio Nacional de Venezuela) claimed on 14 January
2020 that the RAAS have 14 181 UBCh, and is present in 48 376 communities and 279 460 streets. 279

268 Amaya, videoconference, 29 May 2020
269 Amaya, videoconference, 29 May 2020

270 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 22
271 Mouttet, videoconference, 8 May 2020
272 Amaya, videoconference, 29 May 2020

273 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020

274 PSUV, RAAS: Modelo de unidad superior para la defensa de la nación, 27 March 2018, url
275 La Prensa de Lara, Las RAAS: Nuevo mecanismo de control social, 11 November 2019, url

276 Crónica Uno, RAAS: Las nuevas piezas en la maquinaria de persecusión del Gobierno, 12 November 2018, url
277 Amaya, videoconference, 29 May 2020

278 PSUV, RAAS: Modelo de unidad superior para la defensa de la nación, 27 March 2018, url

279 RNV, Red de Articulación y Acción Sociopolítica (RAAS) del Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV), 14 January 2020,

url, 0:12

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Sources categorise the RAAS as a state surveillance mechanism. 280 According to OVCS, the RAAS
facilitate the expansion and deepening of social control, political discrimination and repression ofdemonstrations, through a 'social and community network' where its members are 'guardians of therevolution' and the community at large is turned into 'vigilantes, monitors, and accusers of private
and public activities of people'. 281
The RAAS executes tasks of surveillance and security through 'cooperative patriots' ('patriotas
cooperantes') 282, a 'role that was created to infiltrate non-governmental organisations to obtain
sensitive information or to identify potential enemies of the State, facilitating intelligence agencies
the necessary information that could be used to target the person or group perceived as a threat'. The
identity of patriotas cooperantes is not known. 283 El Nuevo Herald defined the patriotas cooperantes
as 'informers tied to chavismo who have been recruited to provide information to colectivos andcommunal groups on the activities carry out by their neighbours'. 284 Amaya explained that the patriota
cooperante has been used as a source of information on the private and public affairs of people, andin some instances their declarations, which are anonymous, have been used to open judicial files on
someone. According to Amaya, a considerable part of the information used by the president of the
ANC, Diosdado Cabello, in his television program Con el Mazo Dando 285 (Hitting with the WoodenClub), originates from patriotas cooperantes who inform on the activities and private affairs ofmembers of the opposition, journalists, human rights advocates, and those considered 'a problem' forthe government.286 Con el Mazo Dando, according to Mouttet, is a platform to threaten people, and'practically every week there are new victims mentioned in the program'. 287

1.6 Effects of the coronavirus pandemic on the Venezuelan crisis
On 17 March 2020, Maduro decreed a quarantine in all the states in Venezuela to deal with the
expansion of the coronavirus. 288 An April 2020 report by UNICEF indicated that other preventive
measures to curb the spread of the coronavirus included mandatory confinement, ban on publicgatherings, health checks at international border crossings, suspension of most international flights,
the mandatory use of masks in streets and other public spaces, and school closures, with the school
year 2019-2020 to be carried out online. 289
The UNICEF report indicated that challenges facing the government to deal with the coronavirus
pandemic include the lack of reliable access to water; power outages that affect health care facilities
and telecommunications, including online learning activities; shortages of fuel that impact the ability
280 Amaya, videoconference, 29 May 2020; OVCS, Aumenta el control social, discriminación y represión en Venezuela, 29
March 2018, url
281 OVCS, Aumenta el control social, discriminación y represión en Venezuela, 29 March 2018, url
282 Amaya, videoconference, 29 May 2020; OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, pp. 48-49
283 OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, pp. 48-49
284 El Nuevo Herald, ¿Pretende Maduro expropiar las miles de viviendas vacías que dejó el éxodo venezolano?, 26 September
2019, url
285 Note from the author: The name comes from the saying 'A Dios rogando y con el mazo dando', which translates as 'God
helps those who help themselves' or 'Strike with thy rod while thou beg to thy God'. The original meaning of the saying,according to the Cervantes Virtual Centre, is that 'when someone wishes for something, it is good to pray to God, but doing
everything possible in order to achieve it' (Centro Virtual Cervantes, A Dios rogando y con el mazo dando, n.d., url). However,
the implicit meaning of the saying used in the televised program is the use of the rod to 'crush imperialism'. The program's
host is the president of the ANC, Diosdado Cabello, and it resembles a talk-show, featuring on the set, among other things,
a wooden club on the desk, a banner of the Twitter hashtag '#AquíNoSeHablaMalDeChávez' (Here we do not speak badly ofChávez), and a mural-size portrait of Chávez. Each episode includes a section where Cabello reads out news articles snippets
and Twitter messages from persons and entities posted on a board, and on occasions commenting on the author of these
posts. The program running time ranges between 3.5 and 5 hours every Wednesday.
286 Amaya, videoconference, 29 May 2020
287 Mouttet, videoconference, 8 May 2020
288 Agencia EFE, Maduro ordena una "cuarentena total" en Venezuela para frenar el coronavirus, 17 March 2020, url
289 UN, UNICEF, Situation Report, April 2020, url, p. 2

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS— 39

of health care professionals reaching their workplace; and food security for children who depend on
the school feeding program and cannot attend due to the confinement. 290
Due to the economic and social constraints facing Venezuelan migrants in neighbouring countries in
the context of the coronavirus pandemic, some of them are returning to Venezuela. 291 International
Organisation A indicated that after mid-June 2020, the government is opening the borders with
Colombia on Monday, Wednesday and Friday, allowing the cross per day of up to 300 people throughthe Simón Bolívar International Bridge connecting Norte de Santander and Táchira, and up to 100
people through both the José Antonio Páez International Bridge connecting Arauca and Apure, andthe Santa Elena de Uairén border crossing connecting Pacaraima and Bolívar. The same source
indicated, however, that the numbers vary, and the limit allowed by the government is 'often'
exceeded. Even though the borders are closed due to COVID-19, the only exception Venezuelan
authorities make is for people who cross to Colombia to obtain medicines and access medical
treatment for terminally-ill or gravely-ill patients. 292
El Tiempo reported that, according to Colombian authorities, over 74 000 Venezuelans have returned
to Venezuela between March and June 2020. 293 However, International Organisation A indicated that,
according to sources it consulted, it is estimated that between 85 000 and 120 000 Venezuelans havereturned to Venezuela between March and June 2020, including through regular and irregular bordercrossings. Of the Venezuelans who have entered the country and placed in quarantine, 46 % enteredthrough Táchira, 29 % through Apure, 20 % through Zulia, and 5 % through Bolívar. 294 They have alsoarrived via humanitarian flights arriving in Caracas. 295 BBC reported that the armed forces are deployed
alongside the border to prevent entry into the country through the irregular border crossings. 296
The government screens migrants at the border; those who test positive are sent to designated healthcare facilities and those who test negative are placed in quarantine for two weeks, usually at schoolbuildings. 297 A confidential source contacted for this report indicated that'to respond to the continuous influx of returnees, the Venezuelan government has activatedthe Social Assistance Points (PAS, Puntos de Asistencia Social), where medical examinations
and COVID-19 tests are carried out, as well as Comprehensive Social Assistance Points (PASI,
Puntos de Asistencia Social Integral), where those who do not test positive must comply withthe mandatory quarantine. Positive cases are transferred directly to health centres for
isolation'. 298
The same source indicated that PASIs consist of hotels with proper structures and facilities, makeshift
locations, schools, universities, churches, and sports arenas and, by the end of May 2020, 'there weremore than 100 active PASIs in the country, but the number varies very frequently. The main activities
in these spaces are related to the implementation of health protocols, distribution of household
goods, supply of drinking water and hygiene supplies, supply of energy, food, and dissemination of
key messages on the prevention of contagion'. 299 They also undergo a police background check. 300
Once the quarantine is completed, Bolivarian missions (Misiones Bolivarianas 301) accompany the
290 UN, UNICEF, Situation Report, April 2020, url, p. 2

291 UN, UNICEF, Situation Report, April 2020, url, p. 2; International Organisation A, telephone interview, 12 June 2020
292 International Organisation A, telephone interview, 12 June 2020

293 El Tiempo, Regresar a su país, el nuevo drama de los venezolanos, 15 June 2020, url
294 International Organisation A, telephone interview, 12 June 2020
295 Confidential source, Correspondence, June 2020

296 BBC, Coronavirus en Colombia y Venezuela | "Crucé todo un país a pie para nada", 10 June 2020, url
297 UN, UNICEF, Situation Report, April 2020, url, p. 2
298 Confidential source, Correspondence, June 2020
299 Confidential source, Correspondence, June 2020

300 International Organisation A, telephone interview, 12 June 2020

301 The Bolivarian missions are social programs created by president Chávez to 'fight' poverty and extreme poverty, and carryout educational, literacy, cultural, scientific and political programs. They also offer free medical services and access to40 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS

returnee to their place of origin inside the country and meet with the returnee's neighbours to makeassurances that the person already underwent quarantine to prevent stigmatisation. 302 For additional
information on the treatment of returnees in the context of the pandemic, see Chapter 7.
Sources indicated that social control has intensified during the pandemic. 303 OVV indicated that people
most 'persecuted' during the pandemic include journalists, physicians, nurses, and community leaders
who are being intimidated by security forces, particularly the FAES, the DGCIM, and the SEBIN, forreporting issues related to the impact of the pandemic. OVV explained that physicians are being
silenced because some of them have denounced that there are no medical supplies to combat the
pandemic, journalists have been intimidated so others do not report on the same topic, andcommunity activists are intimidated so they do not convert a social protest into a political one. 304 For
more information on targeted profiles, see Chapter 3. Amaya indicated that the government has been
the only provider of information on the pandemic in the country, and the press is not allowed toformulate questions nor investigate on government data. There have been reported cases ofjournalists who have been targeted and intimidated for questioning official numbers. 305

1.7 Absence of statistical information
The UN OHCHR mission report indicated that the government does not publish comprehensive
statistics on public health, which is 'essential for the development and implementation of an adequate
response to the health crisis'. 306 Venezuelan authorities do not release reliable data on crime
statistics 307. IPYS indicated that the government does not release indicators on the economy, security,
education, health, and nutrition. 308 The same source indicated that Venezuela does not have a lawthat allows citizens to file petitions for access to information, contrary to Article 143 of theConstitution309, which states that:'Citizens have the right to be informed by Public Administration, in a timely and truthful manner,of the status of proceedings in which they have a direct interest, and to be apprised of any final
decisions adopted in the matter. Likewise, they have access to administrative files and records,
without prejudice to the limits acceptable in a democratic society in matters relating to internaland external security, criminal, investigation and the intimacy of private life, in accordance withlaw regulating the matter of classification of documents with contents which are confidential
or secret. No censorship of public officials reporting on matters for which they are responsible
shall be permitted'. 310

subsidised credits to access housing (VTV, Presidente Maduro reafirmó labor de Misiones y Grandes Misiones para el pueblo
venezolano, 19 January 2020, url).
302 International Organisation A, telephone interview, 12 June 2020
303 International Organisation A, telephone interview, 12 June 2020; OVV, videoconference, 4 May 2020; Amaya,
videoconference, 29 May 2020
304 OVV, videoconference, 4 May 2020
305 Amaya, videoconference, 29 May 2020
306 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 20
307 HRW, "The Guerrillas Are the Police", January 2020, url, p. 10; UN OHCHR, Venezuela: Commissioner Bachelet details
plans for new human rights assistance, 18 December 2019, url
308 IPYS, Voces en el paredón: Reporte Annual IPYSve 2019, February 2020, url, p. 11309 IPYS, Voces en el paredón: Reporte Annual IPYSve 2019, February 2020, url, p. 11
310 Venezuela, Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 1999 (Amended), 2009, Translated by William S. Hein &Co., Inc., url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS— 41

2. Humanitarian situation
According to the state response to the UN OHCHR report, Venezuelan authorities do not recognise‘the existence of a "humanitarian crisis" in Venezuela, as the conditions required for it in internationallaw have not been met'. 311 However, sources indicated that the impact of the economic crisis has beenmagnified by the collapse of public infrastructure and services 312, producing a 'complex humanitarian
emergency'. 313 Venezuela has descended into a socioeconomic and violent crisis, resulting inwidespread poverty, collapse of basic services and displacement of 4 million people across theregion. 314 According to Human Rights Watch, 'severe shortages of medicines, medical supplies, andfood leave many Venezuelans unable to feed their families adequately or access essential
healthcare'. 315 Low salaries coupled with deficiencies in the provision of basic services has led people,
including professional in health care and education, to work several jobs 'in order to make ends meet,
deepening informality and the failure to fulfil their responsibilities at their jobs'. 316 In 2019, the OVCS
documented 373 lootings or looting attempts of food and goods, medicines, and goods that could be'consumed, exchanged or sold'. 317
An assessment carried out by the UN World Food Programme (WFP) in Venezuela between July and
September 2019 indicated that 59 % of households have insufficient income to buy food and 65 % areunable to buy essential items such as hygiene products and clothes. 318 The ENCOVI survey for 20192020 indicated that 79.3 % of Venezuelans have insufficient income to buy food. 319 The UN OHCHR
report indicated that, according to interlocutors it interviewed, the monthly salary is 'insufficient' tocover basic needs, covering about four days of food per month. 320 The OVCS indicated that for a worker
earning the minimum wage, it is 'impossible' to access US dollars to protect against inflation, andprovided the example that a wage of 5 USD could depreciate to 3 USD within a week. Even with the
supplemental income through bonuses, the purchasing power of the salary is 'insufficient to meetbasic needs'. 321

2.1 Migration
The mass emigration of Venezuelans constitute one of the largest in recent Latin American history. 322
In regards to recent refugee flows, the OAS noted that while the number of Syrians who left theircountry reached 6.5 million in seven years (2011-2017), the number of Venezuelans who left theircountry reached 4 million in four years (2015-June 2019). 323 The Regional Inter-Agency Coordination
Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela (R4V), a platform by the IOM (International
Organization for Migration) and the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees),
providing information on the situation of Venezuelan migrants and refugees, indicated that, as of 5
311 Venezuela, Report by the United Nations High Commissioner of Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the

Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela: Comments by the State, 5 July 2019, url, para. 14
312 IMC, Venezuela & Colombia: Complex Emergency Situation Report #9, 24 February 2020, url, p. 1
313 Adrián, Para dejar de ser fantasmas, December 2019, url, p. 8; CECODAP, Informe especial de peligros y vulneraciones alos derechos humanos de niños, niñas y adolescentes, 18 November 2019, url, p. 2
314 HelpAge, Older People in Venezuela: Factsheet, November 2019, url
315 HRW, World Report 2020, 2020, url, p. 625
316 OVCS, Conflictividad social 2019, 24 January 2019, url, p. 20
317 OVCS, Conflictividad social 2019, 24 January 2019, url, p. 23
318 UN, WFP, Venezuela Food Security Assessment, 23 February 2020, url, p. 2
319 UCAB, Encuesta Nacional De Condiciones De Vida 2019-2020, 2020, url
320 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 11
321 OVCS, Conflictividad social 2019, 24 January 2019, url, p. 21
322 IMC, Venezuela & Colombia: Complex Emergency Situation Report #9, 24 February 2020, url, p. 1; HRW, World Report
2020, 2020, url, p. 625
323 OAS, Informe del Grupo de Trabajo de la OEA, June 2019, url, p. 18

42 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS

June 2020, there were 5 082 170 refugees and migrants reported by host governments, with theactual number likely to be higher as it does not take into account for Venezuelan migrants without aregular status. 324
Among the causes for emigration are the inability to meet basic living standards 325, the collapse ofbasic services 326, criminality 327, lack of access to health care 328, hyperinflation, shortages of food andmedicines 329, the deterioration of the education system, lack of access to pre-and post-natal care,insufficient protection mechanisms in cases of domestic violence 330, and 'repression' by thegovernment and security forces. 331
The Venezuelan migration has mainly affected South American countries. Since 2014, Colombia has
been the main recipient of Venezuelan migrants. 332 The government of Colombia 'has adopted a seriesof measures to provide arriving Venezuelans access to health care for urgent needs and to enrol
Venezuelan children in schools'. 333 The Colombian government has also extended the Sojourn Special
Permit (Permiso Especial de Permanencia, PEP) which is valid for two years and grants Venezuelan
citizens who entered Colombia through official border crossings, access to education, employment
and financial services. Although the PEPs' validity has been continuously renewed by the Colombian
government, it does not lead to Colombian citizenship. Additionally, Colombian citizenship is being
granted to children born in Colombia from 1 January 2015 to Venezuelan parents, benefiting over
44 966 children. 334 Venezuelans who are irregularly in Colombia can have access to health care and for
Venezuelan children, access to schooling. 335 Brazil has mainly been used as a transit country toArgentina and Chile, or to obtain food supplies and medicines for consumption in Venezuela. 336
About 260 000 Venezuelans are in Brazil, with over 500 Venezuelans crossing per day into Brazil. 337
Venezuelans in Brazil who possess proof of identity and without criminal records, can obtain refugee
status without the need for an interview, allowing them to reside in the country and have access toemployment, health care, education and other services in the same conditions as Brazilians, and after
four years, they can apply for citizenship. It is estimated that about 21 000 Venezuelans have been
granted refugee status under this system. 338
In August 2019, Ecuador started to request that Venezuelans have a 'humanitarian visa' in order toenter the country. According to humanitarian organisations, the 'humanitarian visa' prevents many
Venezuelan migrants from entering the country given the difficulties in obtaining the necessary
324 UNHCR/IOM, R4V Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela, Situation Response for Venezuelans,n.d., url
325 Éxodo A.C., Consulta a organizaciones de la sociedad civil, 1 June 2019, url, p. 25; OAS, Informe del Grupo de Trabajo dela OEA, June 2019, url, p. 7
326 Éxodo A.C., Consulta a organizaciones de la sociedad civil, 1 June 2019, url, p. 25; UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 70
327 Éxodo A.C., Consulta a organizaciones de la sociedad civil, 1 June 2019, url, p. 25; OAS, Informe del Grupo de Trabajo dela OEA, June 2019, url, p. 7
328 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 70; OAS, Informe del Grupo deTrabajo de la OEA, June 2019, url, p. 7
329 Éxodo A.C., Consulta a organizaciones de la sociedad civil, 1 June 2019, url, p. 25; OAS, Informe del Grupo de Trabajo dela OEA, June 2019, url, p. 7
330 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 70
331 Éxodo A.C., Consulta a organizaciones de la sociedad civil, 1 June 2019, url, p. 25; HRW, World Report 2020, 2020, url, p.
625
332 MPI, An Uneven Welcome: Latin American and Caribbean Responses to Venezuelan and Nicaraguan Migration, February
2020, url, pp. 1, 3
333 HRW, "The Guerrillas Are the Police", January 2020, url, p. 33; MPI, An Uneven Welcome: Latin American and Caribbean
Responses to Venezuelan and Nicaraguan Migration, February 2020, url, pp. 35, 39
334 International Organisation B, telephone interview, 13 May 2020
335 International Organisation B, telephone interview, 13 May 2020
336 The Conversation, Brazil’s humane refugee policies: Good ideas can travel north, 11 February 2020, url
337 The Conversation, Brazil’s humane refugee policies: Good ideas can travel north, 11 February 2020, url
338 The Conversation, Brazil’s humane refugee policies: Good ideas can travel north, 11 February 2020, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS— 43

documents for the visa, and that they would face penalties if they overstay their tourist visas. 339 As ofJanuary 2020, around 10 000 humanitarian visas were issued to Venezuelans within Ecuador, and
3 000 at Ecuadorian consulates abroad. 340

Map 3: Migratory routes followed by Venezuelans in the region, 18 September 2018  OCHA-ROLAC 341

339 US, USAID, Crisis regional por la situación en Venezuela, 12 February 2020, url, p. 5

340 US, USAID, Crisis regional por la situación en Venezuela, 12 February 2020, url, p. 5

341 Latin America and the Caribbean: Migratory Routes of Venezuelan Population [map], in: UNOCHA, Latin America and the

Caribbean: Migratory Routes of Venezuelan Population, 18 September 2018, url44 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS

According to International Organisation A, since October 2019, a trend of returning Venezuelan
migrants to Venezuela started to increase, as well as the number of Venezuelans who are registeringin consulates abroad to request repatriation. There has been a 'considerable effort by the government
to showcase the idea of an economic recovery' with the suppression of restrictions to currency
exchanges and the liberalisation of foreign currency. The return is also due to inability of some
Venezuelans to economically integrate in the economies of receiving countries as many were
employed in informal jobs. 342 El Tiempo reported that, according to Colombian authorities, in January
and February 2020, 14 % of Venezuelans who were in Colombia, approximately 70 000, returned toVenezuela. 343

2.2 Health
According to Amnesty International, 'it is impossible to know the full scale of the challenges inaccessing health care, as the authorities have failed to publish health data in a timely manner. For
example, no epidemiological data had been published by authorities since 2017'. 344 The population
face severe shortages of medicines and medical supplies 345; hospital infrastructure is 'deficient'; andhealth care workers are low remunerated and fear for their safety at their workplace. 346 Health care
professionals are leaving the country 347 due to the humanitarian situation and the shortages of
medicines and equipment. 348 According to a 2019 survey on hospitals carried out between November
2018 and December 2019 by Médicos por la Salud (Physicians for Health) 349, an average of 10 % ofphysicians and 24 % of nurses quit their work every year. 350
Outbreaks of vaccine-controllable diseases that had been eliminated in the country 'routinely' occur
again, with 'more than' 9 300 cases of measles reported since June 2017 and 'more than' 2 500
suspected cases of diphtheria, with 'more than' 1 500 confirmed, since July 2016. 351 A measles
outbreak that begun in July 2017 was declared 'under control' on 30 January 2020. 352 As a consequenceof a vaccination campaign, the number of deaths related to measles decreased 96 % in 2019 compared
to 2018. 353
International organisations have contributed with medical supplies. The International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) imported in 2019 320 tons of medical supplies for 71 health care centres, 110
diagnosis equipment for 5 hospitals, and 9 power generators. 354 UNICEF contributed in programs suchas the equipment of 10 hospitals with personal protective equipment; supporting the Ministry of
Health with the transportation of vaccines and medical supplies; supporting nutritional screening
342 International Organisation A, telephone interview, 12 June 2020

343 El Tiempo, Cientos de venezolanos regresan a casa en medio de la pandemic, 4 April 2020, url
344 AI, Annual Report 2019, February 2020, url, p. 91

345 AI, Annual Report 2019, February 2020, url, p. 86; IMC, Venezuela & Colombia: Complex Emergency Situation Report #9,

24 February 2020, url, p. 1
346 OVCS, Conflictividad social 2019, 24 January 2019, url, p. 25
347 AI, Annual Report 2019, February 2020, url, p. 91; IMC, Venezuela & Colombia: Complex Emergency Situation Report #9,
24 February 2020, url, p. 1
348 IMC, Venezuela & Colombia: Complex Emergency Situation Report #9, 24 February 2020, url, p. 1
349 Médicos por la Salud is a network of Venezuelan physicians created in 2014 to carry out statistics on the number of injured
during the protests that were occurring at that time. The network currently documents the situation at 104 hospitals in 22
states and has produced 5 surveys since 2014. The network is supported by the Venezuelan Cancer Society (Sociedad
Venezolana de Cancerología), the National Academy of Medicine (Academia Nacional de Medicina), the National Assembly,
and the Venezuelan Society of Infectious Diseases (Sociedad Venezolana de Infectología). Médicos por la Salud, Nosotros,n.d., url
350 Médicos por la Salud, Encuesta nacional de hospitales – ENH19: Balance final 2019 – Parte 1, December 2019, url, p. 8351 HRW, Venezuela’s Humanitarian Emergency: Large-Scale UN Response Needed to Address Health and Food Crises, 4 April
2019, url
352 PAHO, Measles outbreak in Venezuela is under control, 30 January 2020, url
353 US, USAID, Crisis regional por la situación en Venezuela, 12 February 2020, url, p. 1
354 ICRC, Caracas Regional Delegation, Informe operacional: Actividades 2019, January 2020, url, pp. 5-6

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS— 45

activities for pregnant women and children; supporting the Ministry of Education in expanding the
distance learning program and the school feeding program; the provision of mental health andpsychological support for children, parents and caregivers; and the donation of over 90 tons ofsupplies to 189 health care centres to respond to the coronavirus pandemic. 355

2.2.1 Medical treatment
In February 2019, AFP reported that the shortages of medicines were estimated at about 85 %. 356
Médicos por la Salud indicated that the average shortage of medicines between November 2018 andDecember 2019 was 49 % at emergency rooms and 35.6 % at hospital wards 357 The Médicos por la
Salud survey indicated that medicines experiencing most shortages at emergency rooms are morphine(55.76 % total shortage and 27.52 % occasional shortage), antihypertensives (50.61 % total shortage
and 33.32 % occasional shortage), antiasthma drugs (44.16 % total shortage and 35.55 % occasional
shortage), and insulin (41.67 % total shortage and 33.63 % occasional shortage). 358 The survey further
indicated that the shortages of medicines was 71 % at state hospitals, 63 % at Ministry of Healthhospitals, 42 % at military hospitals, and 27.1 % at hospitals run by the Venezuelan Social Security
Institute (IVSS, Instituto Venezolano de Seguros Sociales). 359 Many medicines available for sale arecounterfeited. 360 Several hospitals, including the main paediatric hospital in Caracas, J.M. de Los Ríos,
suspended elective surgeries due to the lack of anaesthesia.361 The UN OHCHR mission report
indicated that in some cases, families have to provide medical supplies such as water, gloves, andsyringes in order to treat their infirmed relatives. 362 According to NGOs, 70 % of people with HIV are
affected by shortages of antiretrovirals. 363
Shortages also include contraceptives and medicine prescribed for women, including for pregnancy,
which has an effect on the rate of maternal mortality. 364 Shortages of contraceptives are also
reported. 365 The UN OHCHR mission report indicated that 'due to restrictive legislation on abortion,some women and girls must resort to unsafe abortions' and that the 'lack of skilled birth attendants,
medical supplies and hospital conditions has driven many women to give birth abroad'. 366 For example,
young Venezuelan girls from the state of Zulia leave Venezuela to give birth in Colombia as hospitals
in that state are unable to conduct caesarean-style deliveries and charge patients in US dollars to cover
the expense of medical supplies such as surgical gloves, gauze pads, and anaesthetic. 367
The New York Times reported that, according to 16 Cuban doctors 368 who defected from Venezuela,
Maduro and the supporters of the government use medical supplies such as oxygen to coerce patients
355 UN, UNICEF, Situation Report, April 2020, url, pp. 2-6

356 AFP, Así son las "farmacias" callejeras en la frontera entre Colombia y Venezuela, 9 February 2019, url

357 Médicos por la Salud, Encuesta nacional de hospitales – ENH19: Balance final 2019 – Parte 2, December 2019, url, pp. 2-

3

358 Médicos por la Salud, Encuesta nacional de hospitales – ENH19: Balance final 2019 – Parte 2, December 2019, url, p. 5

359 Médicos por la Salud, Encuesta nacional de hospitales – ENH19: Balance final 2019 – Parte 2, December 2019, url, pp. 7-

8360 AFP, Así son las "farmacias" callejeras en la frontera entre Colombia y Venezuela, 9 February 2019, url
361 CEPAZ, 2019 Encrucijada política en Venezuela, 16 July 2019, url, p. 12

362 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 16
363 AI, Annual Report 2019, February 2020, url, p. 91

364 Éxodo A.C., Consulta a organizaciones de la sociedad civil, 1 June 2019, url, p. 25

365 COVITE, A.C., Escasez de medicamentos en Venezuela ronda entre 48% y 79% para el mes de octubre, 11 November 2019,url

366 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 18

367 International Crisis Group, Under a Merciless Sun: Venezuelans Stranded Across the Colombian Border, 25 February 2020,

url

368 Venezuela and Cuba subscribed an agreement in 2003 whereby Cuban 'medical missions', teams of Cuban medical

professionals that operate since 1963 and are deployed by the Cuban government to countries that request their service,would operate in Venezuela in exchange for oil. In March 2019, 28 729 Cuban health care professionals are present in 59
countries, including Saudi Arabia, Congo, China, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Dominican Republic, South Africa, Turkey, and46 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS

to vote for the government in elections, and deny the access of medical treatment to supporters of
the opposition, including terminally-ill patients. 369 According to the Cuban doctors, the PSUV sent
doctors door to door offering medicines and vitamins to pressure residents to vote for thegovernment, and government officials also wore medical uniforms while visiting communities to offer
medicines in exchange of votes. 370 A country report produced by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA) in June 2020 indicated that, according to confidential sources, the provision of medicines
is more problematic without presenting the Carnet de la Patria.371 For additional information on Carnetde la Patria, see Chapter 6.5.
People with chronic conditions have difficulty accessing medicines. 372 The OAS report indicated thatthe program for organ donation and transplantation is suspended since June 2017, affecting over
50 000 people who were placed in waitlists. Treatments such as dialysis are carried out beyond therecommended time limit of six months, causing cardiovascular damage that would affect an eventualorgan transplantation operation. 373 In indigenous communities, the lack of medicines and health care
professionals has forced indigenous peoples to travel several kilometres from their communities toseek medical assistance. 374

2.2.2 Infrastructure
The UN OHCHR mission report indicated that 'healthcare infrastructure has been declining foryears'.375 The survey by Médicos por la Salud for 2019 provided the following results:
•
•
•
•
•
•

78 % of hospitals reported problems with the supply of water, with 70 % experiencing access onceor twice per week, 20 % with no supply during the week, and 9 % with regular supply. 376
63 % of hospitals reported problems with the supply of electricity, with an average of 342 hours
without electricity reported by hospitals per month. Between November 2018 and December
2019, there were 164 deaths of patients that were attributed to power cuts. 377
An average of 23.15 physicians per hospital are assigned to emergency rooms. For every 10
physicians on duty, 4.7 are emergency physicians, 3.5 specialists, and 1.7 medical students. 378
Between 65 and 70 % of intensive therapy units were operating normally, between 10 and 15 %with intermittent service due to power cuts, and between 10 and 20 % remained closed. 379
The average number of surgery rooms per hospital was 9.4, of which 4.85 were active, whichtranslates into 51 % of surgery rooms not operating.
The average number of surgery beds rose from 35.2 in November 2018 to 46.7 in December 2019.
However, the average number of hospital beds declined from 392 in November 2018 to 219 in

Venezuela. During the coronavirus pandemic, Cuba deployed health care professionals to countries such as Italy, Andorra,
Jamaica and Barbados. There are about 20 000 Cuban health professionals in Venezuela. (DW, "Misiones médicas" cubanas:¿cuántas, dónde y por qué?, 7 April 2020, url
369 New York Times (The), Nicolás Maduro usó a médicos cubanos y a los servicios de salud para presionar a los votantes, 16
March 2019, url
370 New York Times (The), Nicolás Maduro usó a médicos cubanos y a los servicios de salud para presionar a los votantes, 16
March 2019, url
371 Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Algemeen Ambtsbericht Venezuela 2020 (Country Report Venezuela 2020), June
2020, url, p. 20
372 AFP, Así son las "farmacias" callejeras en la frontera entre Colombia y Venezuela, 9 February 2019, url
373 OAS, Informe del Grupo de Trabajo de la OEA, June 2019, url, p. 25
374 Foro Penal, Situación actual de los pueblos y comunidades indígenas ante la pandemic del COVID 19, April 2020, url, pp.
4-5
375 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 16
376 Médicos por la Salud, Encuesta nacional de hospitales – ENH19: Balance final 2019 – Parte 1, December 2019, url, p. 3
377 Médicos por la Salud, Encuesta nacional de hospitales – ENH19: Balance final 2019 – Parte 1, December 2019, url, pp. 46, 13
378 Médicos por la Salud, Encuesta nacional de hospitales – ENH19: Balance final 2019 – Parte 1, December 2019, url, p. 6
379 Médicos por la Salud, Encuesta nacional de hospitales – ENH19: Balance final 2019 – Parte 1, December 2019, url, p. 8

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS

•

— 47

December 2019. According to the survey, hospital beds are being transferred to emergency rooms
and intensive therapy. 380
An average of 58 % of X-ray rooms were not in operation, while the percentage for laboratories
was 53.5 %, and tomographic and magnetic resonance equipment was 84.4 %. 381

Without providing further details, the government indicated that 'the immense majority of thecountry's hospital [sic] had backup power generators. In the health care centres that had no backup
generators or that had backup failures, a contingency plan was successfully activated'. 382

2.3 Food security
According to the government, the right to food is met, in addition to the CLAP, through otherprograms, including the School Feeding Program, providing food to 4 million children in the school
system; Food Centres, providing two meals a day to 750 000 people in a situation of 'social
vulnerability'; Care Plan for Nutritional Vulnerability, providing the distribution on a monthly basis offood supplements to 1.63 million people with nutritional vulnerability, including children, pregnant
women, and seniors. 383 The government spends about 2.826 billion USD every year in food to be
distributed through the CLAP. 384
The population face severe shortages of food. 385 The WFP assessment indicated that 2.3 million people(7.9 % of the population) is 'severely food insecure' and 7 million (24.4 %) 'moderately food insecure'.
The states with highest rates of 'severe food insecurity 386' were Bolívar (11 % of the population), Zulia(11 %), Falcon (13 %), Amazonas (15 %), and Delta Amacuro (21 %). 387 The UN OHCHR report indicatedthat interviewees 'consistently reported a lack of access to food' and that some reported eating onceor at most twice per day. 388 According to a HelpAge survey of 903 seniors in Bolívar, Lara and Miranda,
3 out of 5 seniors go to bed hungry and their pension is the equivalent to 2 USD per month when basic
food necessities in the country can reach 122 USD per month. 389
UNICEF indicated that based on December 2019 indicators and January 2020 estimates, moderateacute malnutrition stands at 4.7 %, severe acute malnutrition at 1.6 %, and stunting among children
under five years-old at 26.4 %. The same source indicated that 34.2 % of pregnant women were
underweight and 22.5 % overweight. 390

380 Médicos por la Salud, Encuesta nacional de hospitales – ENH19: Balance final 2019 – Parte 1, December 2019, url, pp. 10,12381 Médicos por la Salud, Encuesta nacional de hospitales – ENH19: Balance final 2019 – Parte 2, December 2019, url, pp. 10-11382 Venezuela, Report by the United Nations High Commissioner of Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the

Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela: Comments by the State, 5 July 2019, url, para. 28
383 Venezuela, Report by the United Nations High Commissioner of Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela: Comments by the State, 5 July 2019, url, para. 17
384 Venezuela, Report by the United Nations High Commissioner of Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela: Comments by the State, 5 July 2019, url, para. 19
385 AI, Annual Report 2019, February 2020, url, p. 86
386 The WPF report defines 'severe food insecurity' as someone who 'has extreme food consumption gaps, or has extreme
loss of livelihood assets that will lead to food consumption gaps, or worse' (UN, WFP, Venezuela Food Security Assessment,
23 February 2020, url, p. 2)
387 UN, WFP, Venezuela Food Security Assessment, 23 February 2020, url, p. 1
388 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 14
389 HelpAge, Older People in Venezuela: Factsheet, November 2019, url
390 UN, UNICEF, Humanitarian Situation Report, January 2020, url, p. 2

48 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS

2.4 Basic services
The population face severe shortages of water and electricity. 391 The frequency of power cuts hascaused 'irreparable damage to health services and infrastructure', including health institutions,morgues, among others. 392 In 2019, four major national blackouts left the majority of the population
without electricity for several days. 393 One blackout occurred on 7 March 2019 affecting all the country
without power for over 100 hours, and another on 25 March 2019 that affected 90 % of the country. 394
According to the OVCS, the rationing of electricity and the creation of special schedules for school andwork activities became permanent, and that the power cut schedule is not followed by authorities
with cuts lasting 'hours, even days', affecting other services such as the pumping of water andtelecommunications. 395
UNICEF indicated that 'access to safe drinking water for children remains a challenge, translating into
a protracted situation of diarrheal infections leading to severe dehydration in the most affected
communities'. 396 Cuts to water supply sometimes last 'days, weeks, even months', forcing families torely on trucks that deliver water or move to other areas of the country, and affecting the provision ofhealth care services. 397 According to NGOs, on average, people have access to drinking water for 48
hours per week, particularly in low-income neighbourhoods. 398 In some indigenous communities thelack of water is nearly 100 %. 399
UNICEF indicated that cooking gas shortages have been reported in several states. 400 Due to 'constantfailures' in the supply of gas and its 'high' cost, some communities are resorting to wood in order tocook. 401
The OVCS indicated that the 'high' cost and shortages of auto parts have put out of service some public
transportation vehicles, with some drivers overcharging for ticket rides to cover the maintenancecosts of vehicles. Bus stops experience long queues, with some people opting for long walks due tothe high cost of transportation. 402 In the state of Bolívar health care workers cut the number of working
days from five to three in order to reduce the amount of salary spent on transportation. 403
Shortages of gasoline are also occurring in the country. 404 This shortage has led to the creation, insome places, of schedules to buy gasoline according to the last digit of the national identity card, whilein other areas people spend 'days' in queues in order to buy gasoline. Members of security forces
reportedly extorted clients in order to let them buy gasoline. 405 In Bolívar, for example, fuel shortages
have increased public transportation fares, impacting school attendance and the understaffing of
hospitals of health care professionals. 406 Amaya indicated that most gas stations are surveilled or
managed by members of security forces who bar journalists from reporting on the premises. 407 On 27
391 AI, Annual Report 2019, February 2020, url, p. 86
392 AI, Annual Report 2019, February 2020, url, p. 91

393 IMC, Venezuela & Colombia: Complex Emergency Situation Report #9, 24 February 2020, url, p. 1

394 Foro Penal, Reporte sobre la represión en Venezuela: Reporte anual año 2019, 23 January 2020, url, p. 4
395 OVCS, Conflictividad social 2019, 24 January 2019, url, p. 15

396 UN, UNICEF, Humanitarian Situation Report, December 2019, url, p. 2
397 OVCS, Conflictividad social 2019, 24 January 2019, url, p. 16
398 AI, Annual Report 2019, February 2020, url, p. 91

399 Foro Penal, Situación actual de los pueblos y comunidades indígenas ante la pandemic del COVID 19, April 2020, url, pp.

4-5
400 UN, UNICEF, Humanitarian Situation Report, December 2019, url, p. 2
401 OVCS, Conflictividad social 2019, 24 January 2019, url, p. 16
402 OVCS, Conflictividad social 2019, 24 January 2019, url, p. 18
403 UN, UNICEF, Humanitarian Situation Report, January 2020, url, p. 2
404 Amaya, videoconference, 29 May 2020; OVCS, Conflictividad social 2019, 24 January 2019, url, p. 18
405 OVCS, Conflictividad social 2019, 24 January 2019, url, p. 18
406 UN, UNICEF, Humanitarian Situation Report, January 2020, url, p. 2
407 Amaya, videoconference, 29 May 2020

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS— 49

May 2020, however, Deutsche Welle (DW) reported that a flotilla of five oil tankers sent by Iran started
to arrive in Venezuela to supply the country with gasoline and ease the shortages of fuel. 408

408 DW, Iran tankers come to the rescue of oil-starved Venezuela, 27 May 2020, url

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3. Targeted profiles
Sources indicated that there is a systematic and widespread policy of repression in Venezuela for those
who are critical of the government. 409 Targeted profiles include members of the opposition, scholars,
journalists, union leaders and members, civil society organisations perceived as being from the
opposition, political and community activists, community leaders, social media activists andinfluencers 410, opposition sympathisers who start to have public prominence, especially on social
media 411, indigenous leaders, humanitarian actors, advocates who denounce conditions of precarityand humanitarian emergency in the country 412, members of security forces considered dissidents 413,
and students. 414 Former supporters of Chávez who are perceived as opponents or dissidents are also
targeted. 415 The UN OHCHR mission report indicated that 'the targeted repression of opposition
members and social leaders instils fear by demonstrating the possible consequences of opposing or
merely criticizing the Government or expressing dissent'. 416 The government also uses military courts
to try civilians critical of the government 417 with charges such as treason or rebellion. 418
According to the OMCT et al. report, under the 'National Security Doctrine', targeted profiles havebeen categorised as a 'threat', and those who request, defend or promote human rights are regarded
as 'enemies that must be neutralised'. 419 The UN OHCHR mission report indicated that critics of thegovernment are frequently the targets of policies and public rhetoric, including from high-levelauthorities, that categorise them as 'traitors' and 'destabilizing agents' on public media. 420 One of themedia channels used to threaten critics of the government is the weekly television program Con el
Mazo Dando. 421 During the Chávez presidency threats were more targeted, but with Maduro threats
are more widespread and systematic. 422
PROVEA indicated that Venezuela experiences a transit from the 'political enemy' to the 'military
enemy', where the militarisation of the political life, public security, the economy, and the control
over the justice system and other institutions are geared towards the combat of 'internal enemies',that is, those critical of the government, that 'need to be defeated', including through the violation of
constitutional rights and guarantees. 423 A 21 February 2020 joint communiqué signed by 156
Venezuelan civil society organisations, 6 international organisations, and 14 individuals including
independent researchers, professors, and human rights advocates, indicated that, under the thesis of
the existence of 'internal enemies that seek to destabilise peace', the government uses legislation to409 AI, Urgent Action: Prisoner of conscience's life at grave risk, 27 January 2020, url; International Crisis Group, telephoneinterview, 30 April 2020
410 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020; OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020,
url, p. 9
411 Amaya, videoconference, 29 May 2020
412 OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, p. 9413 International Crisis Group, telephone interview, 30 April 2020; UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic ofVenezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 36
414 ICC, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2019, 5 December 2019, url, para. 74
415 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 36; Professor of political science,
videoconference, 14 May 2020
416 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 36
417 AI, Urgent Action: Prisoner of conscience's life at grave risk, 27 January 2020, url; HRW, World Report 2020, 2020, url, p.
625
418 AI, Urgent Action: Prisoner of conscience's life at grave risk, 27 January 2020, url
419 OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, p. 9420 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 34
421 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 34; Mouttet, videoconference,
8 May 2020
422 Mouttet, videoconference, 8 May 2020
423 PROVEA, Todo enemigo se presume culpable, 2019, url, p. 30-31

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launch judicial processes against them, an conducts activities of 'surveillance, monitoring, aggression,
digital attacks, persecution, arbitrary raids, arbitrary detention, the criminalisation of cooperation,
seizure of materials, among others'. 424 The OMCT et al. report added that the narrative of the 'internal
enemy' is consolidated through verbal aggressions that include 'expressions of hate and violence, fromthe use of offensive words, images or manipulated communiqués, to the discrediting of their work'. 425
The government and its supporters refer to members of the opposition as 'scrawny' (escuálidos),'traitor of the homeland' ('traidor a la patria'), 'capitalists who sack the poor' ('capitalista que roba ala población pobre') 426, and 'pitiyanqui' 427. 428 Other epithets used against members of the opposition,
demonstrators, business persons, social leaders, and members of unions and NGOs include 'enemiesof the lower class' ('enemigos de clase'), 'bourgeois' ('burgueses'), 'fascists' ('fascistas'), 'far-right'('ultraderechistas'), 'haters of the homeland' ('apátridas'), 'oligarchs' ('oligarcas'), 'parasites'('parásitos'), 'snobs' ('sifrinos'), 'big-shots' or 'rich people' ('pelucones'), 'stupids' ('estúpidos'),'imbeciles' ('imbéciles'), 'hypocrites' ('hipócritas'), 'demons' ('demonios'), and so on. 429
The ICC preliminary examination report indicated that security forces and, in some occasions, armed
colectivos, 'have perpetrated a number of violent acts against demonstrators, actual or perceived
opposition members and activists, elected officials and students' and that 'Venezuelan authorities
implemented measures aimed at suppressing and punishing the expression of dissenting views, andtargeted victims by reason of their actual or perceived political opposition to the Government'. 430
Another common method of reprisal is not giving the person the CLAP food boxes. 431 If the person is
mentioned on national television or the media by high-ranking government officials, that person could
face intimidation and physical aggression by pro-government militants. 432 There are also instances of
persons expressing dissent towards the government and later being detained. 433 Intimidation also
takes place when the person is expelled, including by colectivos, from the neighbourhood and, forthose who resist, they can end up being detained or dead. 434 Some targeted people have experienced
stoning of their vehicles and their properties painted with graffities. 435
The UN OHCHR mission report indicated that 'women, in particular human rights defenders, nurses,
teachers and civil servants, have faced gendered attacks such as sexist comments, online genderbased violence, and public intimidation'. 436 According to testimonies received by the UN OHCHR, there
have been cases of detained women who were subjected to abuses such as dragging by the hair,
inappropriate touching, threats of rape, forced nudity and sexist insults by agencies such as SEBIN,DGCIM and the GNB in order to humiliate them and extract confessions. 437 The ICC preliminary
examination report indicated that 'information available suggests that incidents of alleged rape andother forms of sexual violence in the context of detention may be underreported due to social stigma
for victims and other societal or cultural factors'. 438

424 CEPAZ et al., Exigimos el fín de la política sistemática de criminalización, 21 February 2020, url
425 OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, pp. 59-60
426 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020

427 Word created from 'petit' and 'yanqui', used to label someone who 'lost their identity' in pursuit of the 'US life style' but'without achieving being an authentic yanqui' (Correo del Orinoco, Tal día como hoy nació Marío Briceño Iragorry, 15
September 2019, url).
428 VTV, Jefe de Estado destacó el profundo carácter nacionalista de Briceño Iragorry, 15 September 2019, url
429 PROVEA, Todo enemigo se presume culpable, 2019, url, p. 30
430 ICC, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2019, 5 December 2019, url; paras. 74, 80
431 Mouttet, videoconference, 8 May 2020; Mármol, videoconference, 1 May 2020
432 Mouttet, videoconference, 8 May 2020; OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, p. 61
433 Mouttet, videoconference, 8 May 2020
434 Mármol, videoconference, 1 May 2020
435 FundaRedes, videoconference, 6 May 2020
436 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 36
437 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 44
438 ICC, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2019, 5 December 2019, url; para. 79

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Velasco indicated that dissent in low-income communities is not expressed openly for fear of reprisals.
In areas where the presence of colectivos is significant, colectivos understand that inhabitants are
frustrated by the economic situation and dissent may be expressed. However, that dissent 'must be
expressed very carefully: not against the government, but against the government and economic
sanctions, against the government and the opposition, that is, against other factors external to thegovernment that do not allow a direct call out on the government'. 439
FundaRedes explained that high-profile activists have some degree of protection due to their visibility,
but low-profile activist are more vulnerable and end up being affected even more due to their low
visibility on public media, particularly at the neighbourhood level where government supporters
constantly harass them. Nevertheless, regardless of the profile, activists have seen their houses raided
by security forces and their equipment stolen or seized. 440 According to the Professor of politicalscience, in some cases security forces plant evidence, particularly in cases involving low-profile
activists, to open judicial processes against them. 441 The OVV indicated that the risk for low-profile
activists sometimes consists of the association that the activist has with high-profile ones that are
more difficult to target and, as a way to 'send a message', the perpetrator act against the low-profile
individual. 442
According to Mármol, entrepreneurs and landowners face expropriation of their assets if these assets
are considered 'strategic' for the government. Expropriations, which often take place withoutcompensation, are also used as a tool to target political enemies, and it can be exacted by national,
state, or municipal authorities. Many entrepreneurs and landowners had to leave the country after
they were expropriated of their lands and assets as they could not find legal recourse. 443 Mouttet
indicated that expropriations are carried out as a form of punishment. 444
Sources indicated that there have been reported cases of supporters of the opposition engaging in
attacks, frequently verbal, against members of the government and its supporters 445, although theextent of these events have been decreasing over time. 446 Violence has also occurred in the context
of demonstrations and rallies. 447
Mouttet indicated that even though some members of the opposition are banned from leaving thecountry, including due to a judicial process against them or a court order, the government hasreportedly given the option, in certain cases, of going to prison or remain in detention, or leaving thecountry. 448 Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted within thetime constraints of this report.
Many victims chose to reduce their activities, go into hiding or leave the country. 449

3.1 Political opposition
Deputies of the National Assembly have been subjected to 'strong repression' and threats on public
media. 450 Amnesty International indicated that the government continues to 'intimidate, harass,physically abuse, arbitrarily detain and forcibly disappear National Assembly representatives and staff
439 Velasco, videoconference, 1 May 2020 [emphasis in original]
440 FundaRedes, videoconference, 6 May 2020

441 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020
442 OVV, videoconference, 4 May 2020

443 Mármol, videoconference, 1 May 2020

444 Mouttet, videoconference, 8 May 2020

445 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020; OVV, videoconference, 4 May 2020
446 OVV, videoconference, 4 May 2020

447 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020
448 Mouttet, videoconference, 8 May 2020

449 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 36
450 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020

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in an attempt to silence political dissent'. 451 The International Crisis Group similarly indicated that 'thegovernment is stepping up, rather than scaling back, its resort to security forces, para-police units
including the colectivos and judiciary to intimidate the opposition into silence'. 452
According to CEPAZ, members of the National Assembly have been subjected to, among others,
prohibition from running for public office for terms that reach 15 years, cancellation of their passports
and the refusal to issue diplomatic passports, prohibition to leave the country, stripping ofparliamentary immunity, targeting of family members, arbitrary detention, instigation to violence byofficials on the media, illegal raids of their property by state security agencies, and opening of judicial
processes that violate due process. 453 About 36 deputies are either in exile, taken refuge at an embassyin Caracas, or detained. 454 According to the Professor of political science, political leaders of the
opposition, particularly young activists who do not have extensive experience or a comprehensive
background, and live in low-income neighbourhoods or in other areas and have a high profile and arevery active, are targets of repression by the government. 455
During 2019, 2 219 persons were arbitrarily detained for political reasons, of which 243 remained
detained in December 2019, including 240 formally charged and 3 on temporary detention.456 Most
detentions occurred between January and May (2 100 detentions), and the states with the highest
number were Zulia (306), Capital District (292), Aragua (200), Bolívar (190), and Carabobo (175). 457 The
main government security agencies involved in the detentions were the GNB (1 108 detentions), statepolice agencies (284), municipal police agencies (175), PNB (140), DGCIM (101), GNB/SEBIN/statepolice agencies (72), SEBIN (68), and FAES (62). 458 In addition, the UN OHCHR mission report indicatedthat the intelligence agencies of SEBIN and DGCIM have been responsible for arbitrary detentions, illtreatment and torture of political opponents and their relatives. 459 On 31 December 2019, there were
388 political prisoners (18 women and 370 men), including 118 military personnel. 460
Family members of the opposition also face intimidation and harassment by the government,
including unlawful detention and raids of their properties. 461 Guaidó's uncle, Juan José Márquez, was'arbitrarily detained' on 11 February 2020 upon his arrival at Maiquetía's airport from Lisbon, accusedof smuggling explosives into the country, in what Amnesty International considers a 'continuation ofa worrying pattern of the targeting of the families and staff of opposition lawmakers'. 462
The following are some of the cases of actions against members of the political opposition as reported
by sources:•

Juan Requesens, was detained in August 2018 463 accused of planning the assassination of
Maduro. 464 Requesens was reportedly held incommunicado since 5 February 2020 and, as ofMarch 2020, he remained in detention. 465 Requesens has been reportedly subjected to torture
while in detention and the judicial case presents 'severe irregularities'. 466 He was reportedly

451 AI, Urgent Action: Opposition members face ongoing threats, 2 March 2020, url

452 International Crisis Group, Imagining a Resolution of Venezuela's Crisis, 11 March 2020, url, p. 5
453 CEPAZ, La formula perfecta para apuntalar la dictadura, January 2020, url, pp. 20-33
454 AS/COA, The Pressure on Venezuela's National Assembly, 15 January 2020, url
455 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020

456 Foro Penal, Reporte sobre la represión en Venezuela: Reporte anual año 2019, 23 January 2020, url, p. 9457 Foro Penal, Reporte sobre la represión en Venezuela: Reporte anual año 2019, 23 January 2020, url, p. 10458 Foro Penal, Reporte sobre la represión en Venezuela: Reporte anual año 2019, 23 January 2020, url, p. 11
459 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 32

460 Foro Penal, Reporte sobre la represión en Venezuela: Reporte anual año 2019, 23 January 2020, url, p. 12
461 Mármol, videoconference, 1 May 2020

462 AI, Urgent Action: Opposition members face ongoing threats, 2 March 2020, url
463 AS/COA, The Pressure on Venezuela's National Assembly, 15 January 2020, url

464 Agencia EFE, Requesens tilda de pantomima al juicio en su contra, 9 January 2020, url
465 AI, Urgent Action: Opposition members face ongoing threats, 2 March 2020, url

466 AI, Urgent Action: Opposition members face ongoing threats, 2 March 2020, url; Agencia EFE, Requesens tilda depantomima al juicio en su contra, 9 January 2020, url

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detained without a court order, his parliamentary immunity lifted, and reportedly admitted onvideo, while in detention, his participation in the assassination attempt. The video is not part of
the judicial file. 467
Gilber Caro, close advisor to Guiadó, was detained for a third time in December 2019. 468 Caro, who
is protected by parliamentary immunity, was taken by the FAES and charged with 'terrorism'
without the presence of a lawyer. 469 As of March 2020, he remained in detention. 470
Roberto Marrero, Guaidó's chief of staff, was detained by the SEBIN in March 2019 accused of'planning to carry out terrorist attacks'. 471 On April 2020, Marrero remained in detention. 472
On 25 May 2020, Agencia EFE reported that the Attorney General requested the TSJ to declare
the political party Voluntad Popular, where Guaidó was a member until January 2020, a 'criminalorganisation with terrorist motives' for its alleged role in an armed incursion earlier that year, andof 'appropriating several Venezuelan companies "with the support of the United States" and ofmoney in bank accounts abroad that belongs to the country'. 473

3.2 Human rights advocates and social activists
The UN OHCHR mission report indicated that human rights defenders 'were victims of defamation
campaigns in pro-government media, and subjected to surveillance, intimidation, harassment, threats
and arbitrary detention'. 474 The joint communiqué indicated that, since 2002, the Venezuelan state
has been carrying out 'a policy that criminalises the advocacy for human rights', through a 'discourseof hate and smear campaigns on the media and official communications to discredit […] andstigmatise' them. The signing organisations also indicated that community and student activists andactivists that advocate for the rights of victims, face threats due to their work. 475 According to theProfessor of political science, the risk of activists being targeted by the government is increasing, andthe more influence the activist has inside communities and the higher the profile, the higher the risk. 476
High-ranking government officials routinely stigmatise human rights advocates and social activists. 477
Stigmatisation takes place via mass communication platforms, and is done through defamation 478 andfalse accusations about the person and their work; the discrediting and disqualification of the person
through media campaigns with a 'high content of violence' to damage their reputation or credibility;or the ‘categorisation of the person as an "enemy", "terrorist", "destabilising agent", "thief", [or]"scammer"'. 479
Human rights advocates are targeted by security forces and other groups that act with theacquiescence of the government. 480 The OMCT et al. report indicated that they documented 121'aggressions' (37 in 2018 and 84 in 2019) against human rights advocates in Venezuela, including '60
467 AI, Urgent Action: Representative's right to fair trial ignored, 3 December 2019, url
468 AS/COA, The Pressure on Venezuela's National Assembly, 15 January 2020, url

469 Reuters, Disappeared Venezuelan legislator being held in state detention: lawyer, 21 January 2020, url
470 AI, Urgent Action: Opposition members face ongoing threats, 2 March 2020, url

471 AS/COA, The Pressure on Venezuela's National Assembly, 15 January 2020, url; Guardian (The), Juan Guidó's chief of staff

arrested by Venezuelan agents, 21 March 2019, url
472 Caraota Digital, Roberto Marrero cumplió 400 días preso por el régimen de Maduro, 24 April 2020, url
473 Agencia EFE, La Fiscalía de Venezuela pide al Supremo declarar organización criminal al partido Voluntad Popular, 25 May
2020, url
474 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 36
475 CEPAZ et al., Exigimos el fín de la política sistemática de criminalización, 21 February 2020, url
476 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020
477 AI, Annual Report 2019, February 2020, url, p. 88; UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5
July 2019, url, para. 36
478 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 30; OMCT et al., Venezuela"Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, p. 61
479 OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, p. 61
480 OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, p. 24

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acts of defamation, 44 acts of harassment and intimidation, and 8 cases of arbitrary detentions', while
noting that the real number of these actions would far exceed the ones reported. 481 According to thesame source, the government is largely responsible for these actions, including through publicbroadcastings (60 %) and government security agencies (14 %). 482 The OMCT et al. report provided theexample of a social leader in Petare, state of Miranda, who advocated for the rights to food and accessto basic services and has been the target of 'attacks, illegal raids, threats, and harassment' since 2018
by the FAES, including the killing of her brother in July 2018 after the FAES conducted a raid without
a warrant in her apartment building; the mistreatment of her relatives, including the stripping of theclothes of female relatives, during another raid conducted without warrant in April 2019; and thedetention of two of her nephews during another raid without warrant in May 2019. 483
Human rights and humanitarian organisations indicated that they have been facing barriers in
obtaining legal status in the country after the Ministry of Interior, Justice and Peace reportedly issued'express instructions to impede their registration'.484 The OMCT et al. report similarly indicated thatpublic authorities, including the Autonomous Service of Registries and Notaries (SAREN, Servicio
Autónomo de Registros y Notarías), refuse NGOs issuing registration documents or the update ofcurrent registrations, which exposes them to investigation for operating outside the law. 485 The UN
OHCHR update similarly indicated that NGOs face 'significant delays in the process of registeringorganizations' incorporating documents, due to exhaustive review of documentation by theauthorities'. 486
The UN OHCHR mission report indicated that women, including local leaders, have been 'targeted dueto their activism, threatened by community leaders and pro-government civilian groups (armed"colectivos"), and excluded from social programmes. Women reported not exercising their rights,
including not speaking out against the Government, for fear of reprisals'. 487
According to the Professor of political science, 'the risk of persecution on occasions is transferred totheir families by linking them to the activities of the activist, or using them as a 'decoy' so the activist
shows up and can be apprehended'. 488 The same has also occurred with family members and friendsof military personnel or those considered to be involved in acts of rebellion. 489 For additional
information on the treatment of military personnel and their family members, see Chapter 3.6.
Some cases of treatment of protesters, as reported by sources, include:•

On 4 May 2020, Maduro accused PROVEA on national television of 'receiving money from the U.S.
Central Intelligence Agency and of defending the rights of accused "terrorists" and "mercenaries"',referring to people who were detained the previous day in a failed attack from the sea were eightpeople were killed and 23 were detained, including two US citizens. 490 After Maduro's comments,
PROVEA indicated that the human rights of those detained be respected 491, after which 'several
politicians reacted in the press, on national television and on social networks, accusing Provea of
promoting terrorism, claiming the incursion of mercenaries, justifying and supporting violent

481 OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, pp. 6, 28, 29
482 OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, p. 31
483 OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, p. 23
484 AI, Annual Report 2019, February 2020, url, p. 90

485 OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, p. 42

486 UN OHCHR, Venezuela: Commissioner Bachelet details plans for new human rights assistance, 18 December 2019, url
487 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 24
488 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020

489 Foro Penal, Reporte sobre la represión en Venezuela: Reporte anual año 2019, 23 January 2020, url, p. 13; HRW, World

Report 2020, 2020, url, p. 626
490 HRW, Venezuelan Human Rights Group Under Attack, 8 May 2020, url
491 HRW, Venezuelan Human Rights Group Under Attack, 8 May 2020, url; FIDH, Venezuela: Acts of harassment anddefamation against Provea, 7 May 2020, url

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actions against the Constitution, or of being an organisation financed by U.S. intelligence
services'. 492
On 31 March 2020, a lawyer and human rights advocate who is a member of several human rights
organisations, including PROVEA, was detained by security forces after he filmed a protest thatwas taking place in Barquisimeto at a local gas station. The lawyer was reportedly advocating for
health care workers and persons who are undergoing dialysis treatment to be prioritised in the
distribution of fuel, and seeing that authorities were not reacting, he started to film the protest.
Security forces requested his phone and when he refused, he was detained and beaten, and ahigh-ranking officer reportedly accused him of 'working for an NGO that goes against the interests
of Venezuela'. The lawyer was charged with 'resisting arrest' and 'public instigation to violence'. 493

3.3 Protesters
On 24 April 2014 the TSJ issued Ruling No. 276 which makes mandatory for people who want toexercise their right to 'peaceful demonstrations and public meetings' to obtain an authorisation from'relevant authorities', which is contrary to the Constitution; and it also allows security forces todisperse manifestations 494 using the 'proper' means to do so. 495 Ruling No. 276 of the TSJ's
Constitutional Chamber indicates the following:'any concentration, demonstration or public meeting that does not have the priorauthorization by the respective competent authority, may result in the police and security
bodies in the control of public order to ensure the right to free transit and other constitutionalrights (such as, for example, the right of access to a health care provider, the right to life andphysical integrity), to act by dispersing these concentrations with the use of the mostappropriate mechanisms, within the framework of the provisions of the Constitution and thelegal order'. 496
Security forces, representatives of the Public Ministry, and court judges have interpreted the TSJ rulingas a 'license to strengthen the measures for the criminalisation of protests and the repression of
pacific demonstrations'. 497
The Professor of political science indicated that when the opposition calls for a demonstration, acommon practice is the deployment of shock forces, usually armed colectivos, and the convocation by
the government to its supporters to rally in the same public spaces where the opposition is set todemonstrate 'in order to block them and to contribute to the ensuing confusion and chaos'. 498
Additionally, the government installs barricades and parks military trucks to prevent the opposition
from reaching public institutions. 499
Sources indicated that armed groups use violence against protesters 500 and that repression of protests
as a government policy worsened in 2019 with the use of the FAES, PNB, GNB and colectivos. 501 The
government engaged in repressive acts against demonstrators who gathered spontaneously toprotest the blackouts, with some of these demonstrators being reportedly arbitrarily detained. 502
Participants at non-violent demonstrations have been criminalised, judicialised and repressed by the
492 FIDH, Venezuela: Acts of harassment and defamation against Provea, 7 May 2020, url

493 AI, Henderson Maldonado, detenido por acompañar y documentar una protesta, 1 April 2020, url

494 OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, p. 17; UCAB, Licencia para protestar, June 2014, url, p. 4
495 UCAB, Licencia para protestar, June 2014, url, p. 4

496 Venezuela, TSJ, Sentencia No. 276, 24 April 2014, url
497 UCAB, Licencia para protestar, June 2014, url, p. 5

498 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020
499 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020

500 AI, Annual Report 2019, February 2020, url, p. 89; OVCS, Conflictividad social 2019, 24 January 2019, url, p. 8
501 OVCS, Conflictividad social 2019, 24 January 2019, url, p. 8

502 Foro Penal, Reporte sobre la represión en Venezuela: Reporte anual año 2019, 23 January 2020, url, p. 4

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS— 57

government. 503 The UN OHCHR mission report indicated that even though security forces did notresort to excessive use of force in all demonstrations in 2019, in some demonstrations security
agencies such as the GNB, PNB, FAES, municipal police bodies, and armed colectivos reportedly usedexcessive force to 'instil fear and discourage further demonstrations'. 504 Other agencies that engage
in the excessive use of force against demonstrators include the CICPC, the SEBIN, and the DGCIM. 505
Additionally, members of RAAS in the communities 'provide information to security forces and armed
colectivos on the location and identity of demonstrators, persons critical of the government, anddissidents'. 506 Al Jazeera reported that on 23 February 2019, security forces reportedly withdrew fromthe Venezuelan border side in San Antonio when they could not stop around 600 government
opponents who were trying to introduce the humanitarian aid into Venezuela, and gave way tocolectivos to openly confront them. 507
Foro Penal indicated in its 2019 report that, between January and May 2019, over 50 people were
killed with gunshot wounds during protests organised by the opposition, and that one demonstrator
reportedly died while being tortured in detention. 508 According to the OVCS, in 2019 67 people were
killed in the context of demonstrations, including 61 at the demonstrations and 6 days later after
having being detained at their homes by members of security forces. 509 States with the highest numberof persons killed in the context of demonstrations in 2019 were Bolívar (15 killed), Capital District (11),
Lara (4) and Portuguesa (4). 510 The ICC preliminary examination report indicated that more than 15 000
persons were detained in protests between 2014 and 2019, and that at least 5 000 were allegedly
detained for periods exceeding two weeks. 511
The ICC preliminary examination report indicated that, according to information it received, security
forces allegedly subjected persons who participated in protests to 'serious abuse and ill-treatment'
while in detention in order to punish them, force confessions, or incriminating others.512 Mouttet
indicated that after the protests of January and February 2019, 'repression shifted from the streets to[low-income] neighbourhoods,' with police presence increasing in these areas, and the use of the FAES
to target, inside the neighbourhoods, social and political leaders who had participated indemonstrations. 513
Some cases of treatment of protesters, as reported by sources, include:••

On 20 May 2020, the FAES carried out searches at several houses in a Barquisimeto
neighbourhood after inhabitants from that neighbourhood had been protesting the constant cutsof electricity, and the lack of residential gas and fuel by banging pans (cacerolas) for three days.
The FAES reportedly fired their guns at the air the previous day and during the searches, 'at least'
six people were detained.514 Additional information could not be found among the sources
consulted for this report.
On 23 April 2020, Venezuelan newspaper El Estímulo reported that during the past three days,
inhabitants at Upata, Bolívar, were protesting the lack of food and that according to social media
accounts, between one and three people died and seven were injured in the riots and the looting

503 OVCS, Conflictividad social 2019, 24 January 2019, url, p. 26; OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020,

url, p. 15
504 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 39
505 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 32
506 OVCS, Conflictividad social 2019, 24 January 2019, url, p. 27
507 Al Jazeera, Venezuela: Who are the colectivos?, 9 May 2019, url
508 Foro Penal, Reporte sobre la represión en Venezuela: Reporte anual año 2019, 23 January 2020, url, p. 4, 6
509 OVCS, Conflictividad social 2019, 24 January 2019, url, p. 27
510 OVCS, Conflictividad social 2019, 24 January 2019, url, p. 27
511 ICC, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2019, 5 December 2019, url; para. 77
512 ICC, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2019, 5 December 2019, url; paras. 69, 78
513 Mouttet, videoconference, 8 May 2020
514 Efecto Cocuyo, Faes allanan residencias de la urbanización Sucre en Barquisimeto tras protestas por fallas de servicios, 20
May 2020, url

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that ensued. Security forces and members of the army threw tear gas at demonstrators andmembers of armed colectivos are reportedly accused of the unconfirmed deaths. 515

3.4 State employees and union leadersState employees who are actually or perceived to be critical of the government have been targetedby the government. 516 Sources indicated that attendance to government rallies are usually 'obligatory'
for public sector employees. 517 In some occasions, public sector employees are provided with a progovernment t-shirt or beret to go to the rally. 518 Usually, employees cannot refuse because thepressure is such that by refusing to attend, the person might lose their employment.519 Amaya
indicated that many people who attend government rallies are public servants. Government
institutions call employees during their shift to attend the rallies and they check lists of those who
attended. Those who refuse to go risk being investigated for 'insubordination', as they refused to'work during working hours', or being dismissed. In this context, government employees facecensorship, 'repression' and surveillance if they express a political opinion contrary to that of thegovernment. 520 Similarly, FundaRedes indicated that criminalisation of dissent within government
institutions is 'generalised' and employees do not speak out for fear of reprisals. 521 Some public
servants who do not agree with the government end up leaving their jobs or migrating. 522 The
Bertelsmann Stiftung report on Venezuela similarly indicated that 'there is severe discrimination
based on political preferences. Open dissent turns citizens into "traitors" who are denied employment
in the public sector and even access to services'. 523 Amaya indicated, however, that in the past there
was a societal narrative that categorised public servants who quit their jobs as 'traitors', but thatnarrative dissipated with the increase in 'mass emigration'. 524
According to Amaya, public servants are allowed to quit their jobs. 'Many migrants are public
employees and in some cases, they request a leave of absence to leave the country.' Public agencies
have benefited from these requests in the sense that it became an excuse to not hire people since thepositions are occupied but without salary, which lowers economic pressure on institutions. Also, it isa CLAP food box less to account for as it is one of the benefits granted to public servants. 525
Union leaders are subjected to 'persecution, detention, threats and aggression' 526 and have been
subjected to dismissal or detention for protesting for decent salaries and working conditions. 527 Unions
have been dismantled by the government, and it is the government that unilaterally decides thesalary. 528 OVCS indicated that, according to the International Labour Organisation, Rubén González,Secretary General of Ferrominera, was sentenced to five years and nine months in prison for leading
demonstrations to advocate for the rights of workers. 529 Amnesty International indicated that
515 El Estímulo, Fuertes disturbios en Upata, al sur de Venezuela, por falta de comida, 23 April 2020, url

516 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 36; Amaya, videoconference, 29

May 2020
517 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020; Espacio Público, Lo público es privado – Persecución atrabajadores públicos, 2 May 2019, url
518 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020
519 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020; Espacio Público, Lo público es privado – Persecución atrabajadores públicos, 2 May 2019, url
520 Amaya, videoconference, 29 May 2020
521 FundaRedes, videoconference, 6 May 2020
522 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020
523 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2020 Country Report: Venezuela, 2020, url, p. 24
524 Amaya, videoconference, 29 May 2020
525 Amaya, videoconference, 29 May 2020
526 CEPAZ et al., Exigimos el fín de la política sistemática de criminalización, 21 February 2020, url
527 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 36
528 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020
529 OVCS, Conflictividad social 2019, 24 January 2019, url, p. 21

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS— 59

González was advocating for the right to collective bargaining at the state-owned company
Ferrominera del Orinoco and also participate in demonstrations critical to the labour policies of thegovernment since the Chávez era. He has been arbitrarily detained and subjected to several trials in
the past, and in November 2018, he was detained by the DGCIM 'on the allegation of having attacked
a military officer who tried to arrest him violently'. He was tried by a military court without right todue process. 530

3.5 Scholars and educators
Universities, particularly autonomous and private, are considered as 'enemies' of the state and arerefused the financing established by law in order to curtail scholarly activities and impact the salary ofprofessors. 531 The UN OHCHR mission report indicated that 'university staff critical of the government
was threatened with non-payment of their salaries, prevented from accessing their workplace andtraveling abroad, and arbitrarily detained'. 532 According to the Professor of political science, themonthly salary of a high-ranking professor is about 10 USD, which is basically the same as the salaryof any university worker. 533 Scholars are insecure about publishing professional opinions or the resultsof studies of their research, particularly if the findings question political or social aspects ofVenezuela. 534 The journalist indicated that school teachers have been targeted for the content theyteach in the classroom, and there have been instances of being directed on what to teach and what
not to teach. 535 According to the journalist, teachers usually can resign without being considered'deserters', although there may be instances where that was not the case. 536
In May 2020, sources reported that Cabello indicated in the televised program Con el Mazo Dandothat security forces 'should visit' the Academy of Physic, Mathematic and Natural Sciences (ACFIMAN,
Academia Nacional de Ciencias Físicas, Matemáticas y Naturales) after ACFIMAN posted the firstscientific report on coronavirus cases in the country. 537
Workers in the education sector who participated in demonstrations faced threats, sanctions,dismissal, and replacement with non-qualified personnel hired through the Work Program for Youth
Plan (Plan Chamba Juvenil 538). 539 Some scholars had to leave the country for threats against theirlives. 540 According to the Democratic Union of the Education Sector (Unidad Democrática del Sector
Educativo), a movement of teachers from across the country, over 200 000 teachers have left
Venezuela. 541

3.6 Military personnel
The Military Justice Organic Code (Código Orgánico de Justicia Militar) indicates the following:

530 AI, Urgent Action: Prisoner of conscience's life at grave risk, 27 January 2020, url
531 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020

532 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 36
533 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020

534 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020; Journalist, telephone interview, 8 June 2020
535 Journalist, telephone interview, 8 June 2020
536 Journalist, telephone interview, 8 June 2020

537 ABC, Diosdado Cabello ordena perseguir a los académicos venezolanos por revelar las cifras del Covid-19, 15 May 2020,

url; Agencia EFE, El primer reporte científico del COVID-19 en Venezuela crea cisma con el chavismo, 14 May 2020, url
538 The Plan Chamba Juvenil is a work program for people between 15 and 35 years old, who are unemployed university
students, youth with no formal education, single mothers or young people head of households. They must have the Carnetde la Patria in order to access the program (Venezuela, Vicepresidencia de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, Plan
Chamba Juvenil mantiene activo nuevo registro para jóvenes entre 15 y 35 años, n.d., url).
539 OVCS, Conflictividad social 2019, 24 January 2019, url, p. 22
540 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020
541 Infobae, Colectivos chavistas también atacaron a los maestros que protestaban en Caracas, 16 January 2020, url

60 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS‘Article 523
A soldier who illegally separates from active service commits the crime of desertion; and forits determination it will be sufficient that the acts reflect the intention of committing thiscrime.
Article 524
In the absence of the circumstances referred to in the preceding article, in time of peace,desertion is presumed, unless justified, when officers:
1st. Do not present themselves to occupy their position within six days after the deadline set
by superiors.
2nd. Are absent for more than six consecutive days from the place of residence assigned
superiors.
3rd. Who in the fulfilment of actions related to their service do not present themselves totheir superiors within six days following the date indicated in the itinerary.
4th. Do not present themselves to occupy their position six days after the expiration of an
authorised period of leave or after having knowledge of its expiration.
5th. When in situation of availability or reserve, do not attend the call to service six days after
notification.
Article 525
Those who incur in any of the crimes provided for in the preceding article, will be sentenced
between two to four years imprisonment and separation from the Armed Forces.’ 542
The journalist indicated that during the last two years, the number of requests to be discharged fromservice have increased and that most requests have been rejected by the military. The journalist addedthat since 'there are generally no appeals because even the files are returned' to the requester,
military personnel end up deserting the military. Even though reliable statistics on these requests are
not available as the government does not publish them, members of the air force reportedly have
filed the most requests.543 A 5 May 2020 edict published by the Ministry of Defence's Air Force inCorreo del Orinoco, the official newspaper of the Venezuelan government, summoned 47 officials
including a mayor, captains, first lieutenants, and lieutenants, for investigation for 'unauthorized andunjustified stay outside the [assigned] military unit, establishment, or facility'. The officials were given
ten working-days to present themselves at the General Command of the Air Force with a lawyer andin uniform, and if the official is not able to pay for his or her own lawyer, the government would assign
a public defender. 544
Dissidents from the military are investigated by Investigative Councils (Consejos de Investigación). 545
These Councils reportedly carry out a disciplinary and administrative investigation on the deserter toremove him or her from the armed forces. In some cases, these Councils accuse deserters of engaging
in conspiration against the government. The journalist also indicated that there are cases of military
personnel who are sent home with pay after having expressed dissent. 546

542 Venezuela, Código Orgánico de Justicia Militar, 1998, url
543 Journalist, telephone interview, 8 June 2020

544 Venezuela, República Bolivariana de Venezuela, Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Defensa, Aviación Militar Bolivariana,

Comando General, Oficina de los Consejos de Investigación, Notificación, 5 May 2020, published in Correo del Orinoco, 13
May, 2020, url
545 Venezuela, República Bolivariana de Venezuela, Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Defensa, Aviación Militar Bolivariana,
Comando General, Oficina de los Consejos de Investigación, Notificación, 5 May 2020, published in Correo del Orinoco, 13
May, 2020, url; Journalist, telephone interview, 8 June 2020
546 Journalist, telephone interview, 8 June 2020

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The journalist indicated that, according to deserters the journalist interviewed, they abandoned thearmed forces for reasons including the political situation, the state of affairs of the armed forces, andthe lack of income. Other deserters interviewed indicated as the reason the surveillance that they
were subjected to and the targeting against their family members that consisted of raiding theirhomes and intimidation by the military. The journalist indicated that although targeting of personnel
who left the military is not a generalised practice, and considering that it is difficult to know the extent
of this practice, 'there is a considerable percentage' that has been targeted, although it also depends
on the rank. 547 The journalist indicated that, according to some high-ranking officials who deserted,
they were waiting to be promoted to a higher rank in order to secure a better pension in theeventuality that they return to Venezuela, and also to have their family abroad before deserting inorder to expose them to targeting by the government. According to military deserters, before leaving
Venezuela they had to get their families out of the country first through contacts in other countries. 548
International Crisis Group indicated, however, that military personnel who deserted and fled to
Colombia have been facing a 'difficult situation' as they have not received the protection they
expected from Colombia, and the material support they were receiving from Guaidó's parallel
government has been limited over time. 549
The journalist indicated that there is an 'important' part of the armed forces that question the policiesof the government but are afraid of expressing it in public or even among their peers. The majority of
those who dissent hold the ranks of colonel and below, including majors, lieutenants, and captains.
However, according to military personnel interviewed by the journalist, the DGCIM actively monitor
those who make comments about military policies, including by eavesdropping on theircommunications and physical surveillance. The journalist indicated that military personnel 'are very
careful when expressing an opinion and with whom they communicate' as there have been instancesof manipulation of private communication statements that later put them at risk of persecution. 550
The UN OHCHR report indicated that military dissidents and those who are perceived as critical of thegovernment have been targeted by the government. 551 International Crisis Group indicated thatdeserters staying in Venezuela are accused of sedition and conspiracy and face a 'dark future', whichis the reason why there have not been more soldiers rebelling against the state. 552 Military personnel
accused of plotting against the government are detained and tortured by security forces.553 According
to the family members of detained military officers who were interviewed by Infobae, authorities
violate the law and the rights of the detained family member, block the access to the judicial files, anddismiss the requests to allow visits by family members and legal representatives. 554 Family members
and friends of military personnel or those considered to be involved in acts of rebellion are 'forcibly
disappeared' by security and intelligence agencies to pressure the surrender of the person in question,or to interrogate them on the whereabouts of the person being sought. 555 Infobae reported that thepartner of major general Miguel Rodríguez Tórres, who has been detained by the DGCIM since March
2018, was also detained and tortured. 556 OVV indicated that some military personnel have been
tortured and killed so other military personnel do not desert or question the government. 557 The
547 Journalist, telephone interview, 8 June 2020

548 Journalist, telephone interview, 8 June 2020

549 International Crisis Group, telephone interview, 30 April 2020
550 Journalist, telephone interview, 8 June 2020

551 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 36
552 International Crisis Group, telephone interview, 30 April 2020
553 HRW, World Report 2020, 2020, url, p. 626

554 Infobae, Así torturan a los militares detenidos por causas políticas en el centro de Inteligencia del régimen venezolano,

14 June 2020, url
555 Foro Penal, Reporte sobre la represión en Venezuela: Reporte anual año 2019, 23 January 2020, url, p. 13; HRW, World
Report 2020, 2020, url, p. 626
556 Infobae, Así torturan a los militares detenidos por causas políticas en el centro de Inteligencia del régimen venezolano,
14 June 2020, url
557 OVV, videoconference, 4 May 2020

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journalist similarly indicated that punishment is used by the government as an example to dissuade
others from deserting. The journalist added that the government has the will to track down deserters
but lacks the means to do so. 558
International Organisation A indicated that since the military has considerable control of a wide rangeof public sector agencies, its members, particularly high-ranking officials, would not encounter
problems obtaining or renewing their passports. However, for low-ranking officers obtaining a
passport would be more difficult. It would also depend on whether the member of the armed forces
is being surveilled by counterintelligence as it has considerable power in the country. The same source
also indicated that it also depends on 'connections and personal relations' in order to obtain apassport.559 The journalist indicated that to its knowledge, there have been no known cases ofpassports of military officials being seized by authorities, although it is very probable that they will
face problems when they go to renew their passport. 560 While indicating that he is not an expert on
the issue of military forces leaving the country, Mouttet indicated that he has knowledge of militaryforces who left the country without difficulties. 561

3.6.1 Recruitment and reserves
Military conscription in Venezuela is forbiden. 562 Citizens between 18 and 60 years old are, however,still required to register for military service 563 both male and female. 564 According to the journalist, itis necessary to register for military service as the military identification card (libreta militar) is requiredin Venezuela to carry out administrative procedures such as obtaining the diploma. 565
Voluntary military recruitment is carried out every March, September and December 566 and they serve
between 24 and 30 months. 567 Once they complete the service, they become reservists.568 Article 25of the Military Conscription Law (Ley de Conscripción y Alistamiento Militar) indicates the following:‘Article 25. Those who are in a reserve situation may be called when the President of the
Republic and the Commander-in-Chief of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces so request, forperiods of retraining or military training.’ 569

3.7 Journalists and the media
In a February 2019 interview with La Sexta, a Spanish television channel, Maduro indicated that in
Venezuela 'there are no, and there has not been, detention of journalists', and that instead there are'provocations and set ups' to present 'control checks' as 'persecution of journalists by the regime'. 570
However, sources indicated that the government and security forces target journalists to silence on
what is occurring in the country and block media outlets to report on human rights violations 571,

558 Journalist, telephone interview, 8 June 2020

559 International Organisation A, telephone interview, 12 June 2020
560 Journalist, telephone interview, 8 June 2020
561 Mouttet, videoconference, 8 May 2020

562 Journalist, telephone interview, 8 June 2020; US, CIA, The World Factbook: Venezuela, 4 August 2020, url
563 Journalist, telephone interview, 8 June 2020; US, CIA, The World Factbook: Venezuela, 4 August 2020, url
564 Journalist, telephone interview, 8 June 2020
565 Journalist, telephone interview, 8 June 2020
566 Journalist, telephone interview, 8 June 2020

567 US, CIA, The World Factbook: Venezuela, 4 August 2020, url
568 Journalist, telephone interview, 8 June 2020

569 Venezuela, Ley de Conscripción y Alistamiento Militar, 2009, url

570 In 24horas.cl, Nicolás Maduro: "Aquí no ha habido detención de periodistas", 4 February 2019, url, 1:07

571 IPYS, Voces en el paredón: Reporte Annual IPYSve 2019, February 2020, url, p. 5; Mármol, videoconference, 1 May 2020;

FundaRedes, videoconference, 6 May 2020; OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, p. 33

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS— 63

particularly those related to demonstrations. 572 The CDJ reported an increase in 'attacks andaggressions' against journalists and the media, which have experienced theft of equipment, smear
campaigns by the government on public media, closure of media outlets, and physical intimidation,
particularly in cases related to the covering of human rights abuses. 573 The Institute for Press andSociety (IPYS, Instituto de Prensa y Sociedad574) similarly indicated that security and intelligence forces
reportedly intimidated journalists and confiscated their equipment. 575 The UN OHCHR update
indicated that the demonstrations carried out by the opposition on 16 November 2019 were'preceded by acts of intimidation on social media against some journalists', and that three days later,
the DGCIM raided the headquarters of an online media outlet, briefly detained three journalists andtheir drivers who were covering the raid, and the operations manager who was held incommunicado
for ten days. As of December 2019, the operations manager was still being detained. 576
The government has refused to renew broadcasting permits for media outlets and impeded thedelivery of printing paper to newspapers that are critical of the government, leading to the closure ofmost print newspapers in the country. 577 The UN OHCHR mission report indicated that 'dozens ofmedia closed and the Government shut down radio stations and banned television channels', with theinternet and social media becoming the main means of communication. 578 IPYS indicated in its 2019
report on Venezuela that the Telecommunications National Commission (Conatel, Comisión Nacionalde Telecomunicaciones) reportedly suspended in February 2019 six foreign television channels,
including National Geographic (US), Antena 3 (Spain), Radio Caracol (Colombia) and 24 Horas (Chile),
for reportedly transmitting content related to Guaidó's attempt to introduce humanitarian aid into
Venezuela on the same month. 579 Conatel also suspended nine radio and television opinion programs
and nine radio stations, and blocked Colombian newspaper El Tiempo. 580 The government has also
blocked independent news websites and regularly block the main social media platforms. 581 The IPYS
similarly indicated that Conatel intermittently blocked sites such as YouTube, Microsoft Bing, andFacebook. 582
Amnesty International indicated that 'several media outlets critical of the government were thetargets of censorship and cyberattacks, as were the websites of human rights organisations. NGOs
reported that news sites such as El Pitazo and Efecto Cocuyo were blocked 975 times between January
and November' 2019. 583 According to IPYS, 534 cases of violation of freedom of the press were
documented during 2019, including 'attacks' against journalists and media outlets (326 cases),
limitation to access to public information (81), censorship (70), legal action (21), self-censorship (15),
impunity (4), and 'indirect' censorship (3). Perpetrators included security forces (146 cases), internet
providers (104), ministries and government agencies (68), Conatel (36), government supporters (34),and organised crime groups (16). The IPYS also indicated that 76 journalists, including 48 Venezuelans
and 28 foreign correspondents, were arbitrarily detained in 2019 while they were coveringdevelopments related to the political opposition, humanitarian aid, and demonstrations. 584

572 IPYS, Voces en el paredón: Reporte Annual IPYSve 2019, February 2020, url, p. 5; OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigosinternos", March 2020, url, p. 33
573 OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, p. 33
574 IPYS is a civil society organisation based in Lima, Peru, that promotes investigative journalism, freedom of expression andaccess to public information in Latin America (IPYS, Quiénes somos, n.d., url).
575 IPYS, Voces en el paredón: Reporte Annual IPYSve 2019, February 2020, url, p. 3
576 UN OHCHR, Venezuela: Commissioner Bachelet details plans for new human rights assistance, 18 December 2019, url
577 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020
578 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 28
579 IPYS, Voces en el paredón: Reporte Annual IPYSve 2019, February 2020, url, pp. 5-6
580 IPYS, Voces en el paredón: Reporte Annual IPYSve 2019, February 2020, url, pp. 5-6
581 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 28
582 IPYS, Voces en el paredón: Reporte Annual IPYSve 2019, February 2020, url, pp. 5-6
583 AI, Annual Report 2019, February 2020, url, p. 89
584 IPYS, Voces en el paredón: Reporte Annual IPYSve 2019, February 2020, url, pp. 2, 3, 7

64 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS

Cases reported by sources, include:••

In a public statement, AT&T announced that, as of 19 May 2020, DIRECTV would cease operations
in Venezuela as US economic sanctions prohibited the broadcast of Globovisión and PDVSA'schannel, 'both of which are required under DIRECTV’s license to provide pay TV service inVenezuela'. 585 On 9 June 2020, the TSJ's website indicated that a Caracas court ordered thedetention of 'three citizens' 586 under the charges of 'aggravated fraud', 'boycott', 'destabilisationof the economy', and 'association to commit crimes' under Organic Law against Organized Crimeand Financing of Terrorism (Ley Orgánica contra la Delincuencia Organizada y Financiamiento al
Terrorismo). 587
Espacio Público 588 reported that on 5 June 2020, a VPItv team of four journalists was detained by
the GNB in Chuao, Caracas, while they were conducting interviews at a local gas station to people
who were lining up to buy fuel. The journalists were reportedly detained for an hour and theiridentity documents seized. 589

3.8 Indigenous peoples
A confidential source contacted for this report indicated that mining in the Orinoco Mining Arc (ArcoMinero del Orinoco) [also called Orinoco Mining Belt] in the states of Bolívar and Amazonas takes placein indigenous communities' lands, exposing them to protection and environmental risks.590 Indigenous
peoples who live in or around the mining projects in the Orinoco Mining Arc, as well as those who livein the border areas, have been engaging in demonstrations to protest the occupation of theirterritories, the lack of access to basic necessities, and repression by the GNB; these protests have been
'severely' repressed. 591 Government security agencies and irregular armed groups reportedly usedexcessive force and disproportionate attacks against indigenous communities in border areas. 592
Between 22 and 28 February 2019, security forces engaged in repressive acts against indigenous
peoples from the Pemón indigenous community in the state of Bolívar who opposed the transit of amilitary convoy that was heading to the border with Brazil to impede the access of humanitarian aid. 593
Seven people, including four indigenous persons, were killed; 57 people were injured, 22 of whichwere indigenous persons; and 62 people were 'arbitrarily' detained, including 23 indigenous
persons. 594
Environmental advocates and advocates for the rights of indigenous peoples face retaliation andharassment for reporting on the abuses committed in the context of mineral exploitation in mines of
Orinoco and other parts of the country.595 Foro Penal documented cases of deaths in indigenous
communities in Amazonas, Bolívar and Delta Amacuro, from the poisoning with mercury of sources ofwater in their territories due to mining, including by irregular armed groups and sindicatos which

585 AT&T, AT&T Announces Closing of DIRECTV Latin America Operations in Venezuela, 19 May 2020, url

586 The 'three citizens' in question are three DIRECTV executives (VICE, Jailed DirecTV Execs Accused of Destabilizing the

Economy in Venezuela, 10 June 2020, url)
587 Venezuela, TSJ, Tribunal de Caracas privó de libertad a tres cuidadanos por estafa en DIRECTV, 9 June 2020, url
588 Espacio Público is an independent civil society organisation that advocates and promotes human rights, the freedom ofspeech, access to information, and social responsibility in reporting in the media (Espacio Público, ¿Quiénes somos?, n.d.,url)
589 Espacio Público, Detienen al equipo de VPI TV por hacer encuestas en una gasolinera, 6 June 2020, url
590 Confidential source, Correspondence, June 2020
591 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020
592 Foro Penal, Reporte sobre la represión en Venezuela: Reporte anual año 2019, 23 January 2020, url, p. 4
593 Foro Penal, Reporte sobre la represión en Venezuela: Reporte anual año 2019, 23 January 2020, url, p. 7
594 Foro Penal, Reporte sobre la represión en Venezuela: Reporte anual año 2019, 23 January 2020, url, p. 7
595 CEPAZ et al., Exigimos el fín de la política sistemática de criminalización, 21 February 2020, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS— 65

engage in targeted killings, forced disappearance, kidnapping and threats. 596 For additional
information on sindicatos, see Chapter 4.1.4.3.
A confidential source contacted for this report indicated that the 'deterioration of the socioeconomic
situation in the country has directly impacted the dynamics of the country's indigenous communities'
as activities such as fishing and grazing were abandoned to carry out other more profitable activities
that can expose people to risks. In addition, 'Venezuelan indigenous peoples have historically had a
low birth registration rate since deliveries are mostly out-of-hospital and civil registry offices are far
from their places of residence. This situation creates difficulties in granting nationality and even risks
statelessness, especially in a context of mobility, resulting in obstacles to accessing rights such as
education, health, and physical and legal protection'. 597

3.9 Activity on social media
People who are active on social media, including the so-called 'influencers', have been threatened andcriminalised for posting criticism against the government. 598 They do not necessarily support the
opposition, while some of them used to support the Maduro government. 599 Amnesty International
indicated that 193 people were detained by October 2015 'for posting opinions or complaints on social
media or in the press'. 600 Pedro Jaimes, who had been detained by the SEBIN for a year-and-a-half for
posting on his Twitter account publicly available information on the route of the president's plane,
was released with charges on 17 October 2019. 601 ABC reported on 15 May 2020 that about 50 people
have been detained for posting criticism on social media or 'just comments' on the coronavirus. 602 The
Professor of political science indicated that in order to monitor political life in Venezuela it is necessary
to monitor social media as the government has been closing the spaces available for independent
media to work. 603
The 2020 Netherlands MFA country report indicated that, according to confidential sources, the mostcommon instant messaging applications used in Venezuela are WhatsApp and, to a lesser extent,
Signal. These sources do not know to what extent the authorities are able to monitor the content ofthese applications. Another confidential source indicated that individuals questioned by authorities'must not only provide the passwords of their Facebook and Twitter accounts, but also provide accessto their phones'. 604 Additional and corroborating information could not be found among the sources
consulted within the time constraints of this report.
Amaya indicated that since the time of Chávez, in Venezuelan social media, there is a 'structure' called#latropa which consists of Twitter accounts, some of them financed by the government, dedicated tothe creation of trends, content and state propaganda. This 'structure' operates to respond, reportedly
under the direction of a government official, to create 'hundreds' of Twitter accounts to harass andintimidate people on social media. 605 Additional and corroborating information could not be foundamong the sources consulted within the time constraints of this report.

596 Foro Penal, Situación actual de los pueblos y comunidades indígenas ante la pandemic del COVID 19, April 2020, url, pp.

4-5
597 Confidential source, Correspondence, June 2020
598 FundaRedes, videoconference, 6 May 2020; Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020
599 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020
600 AI, Annual Report 2019, February 2020, url, p. 90
601 AI, Annual Report 2019, February 2020, url, p. 90
602 ABC, Diosdado Cabello ordena perseguir a los académicos venezolanos por revelar las cifras del Covid-19, 15 May 2020,
url
603 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020
604 Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Algemeen Ambtsbericht Venezuela 2020 (Country Report Venezuela 2020), June
2020, url, p. 63
605 Amaya, videoconference, 29 May 2020

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3.10 Health care workers
Health care workers who denounce the state of health care are unjustifiably dismissed 606, threatenedby superiors 607, reprimanded608, arbitrarily detained 609, their homes raided arbitrarily, and subjected
to aggression, and are considered by the government as 'agents that promote a militaryintervention'. 610 Some of them had to leave the country because of anonymous threats against theirlives. 611
Health care centres are militarised as a form of intimidation against health care professionals 612, andthe media is barred from entering these health care centres.613 Taking photographs or filming inside
health care centres is not allowed. 614 Attacks against health care workers and patients are reportedly
carried out by police officers and members of armed colectivos. 615 For more information on colectivos,
see Chapter 5. The Médicos por la Salud survey indicated that 13 out of 40 hospitals reported a totalof 164 acts of violence committed by state security forces against health care professionals, and 12
out of 40 hospitals reported 158 events of violence committed by paramilitary and other illegal
groups; most acts were committed in Nueva Esparta and Caracas. 616 The OMCT et al. report indicatedthat the president of the College of Professionals in Nursing of the Capital District (Colegio deProfesionales de la Enfermería del Distrito Capital) has faced hostility and intimidation by armed
colectivos and colleagues who support the government for her advocacy work on labour rights andaccess to health care. Government officials associate her with opposition parties in order todelegitimise her work, and according to the report, the Venezuelan Institute of Social Security (IVSS,
Instituto Venezolano de los Seguros Sociales) routinely threatens and unjustifiably dismisses healthcare professionals who complain about their working conditions. 617

3.11 State response and protection
3.11.1 Justice system
The UN OHCHR mission report indicated that 'the Government and government-controlled
institutions enforced laws and policies that have accelerated the erosion of the rule of law'. 618 The
country lacks an impartial, transparent, and functional justice system 619 and tribunals are politicised. 620
According to Amnesty International, 'the justice system in Venezuela constantly fails to comply withprocedural time limits and the right to a fair trial without undue delays. Judges regularly postpone
hearings without any valid excuse like when officers refuse to transfer defendants to their hearings,
or because prosecutors do not show up before the court'. 621 OVV indicated that there are instances ofpeople being held for 'months, even years' without being formally accused and the recourse of habeas
606 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 36
607 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 36

608 CEPAZ et al., Exigimos el fín de la política sistemática de criminalización, 21 February 2020, url; Amaya, videoconference,

29 May 2020
609 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020; FundaRedes, videoconference, 6 May 2020
610 CEPAZ et al., Exigimos el fín de la política sistemática de criminalización, 21 February 2020, url
611 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020
612 CEPAZ, 2019 Encrucijada política en Venezuela, 16 July 2019, url, p. 12
613 CEPAZ, 2019 Encrucijada política en Venezuela, 16 July 2019, url, p. 12; Amaya, videoconference, 29 May 2020
614 Amaya, videoconference, 29 May 2020
615 CEPAZ, 2019 Encrucijada política en Venezuela, 16 July 2019, url, p. 15
616 Médicos por la Salud, Encuesta nacional de hospitales – ENH19: Balance final 2019 – Parte 1, December 2019, url, p. 15
617 OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, pp. 21-22
618 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 30
619 WOLA, Beyond the Narcostate Narrative, March 2020, url, p. 2; OVV, videoconference, 4 May 2020
620 OVV, videoconference, 4 May 2020
621 AI, Urgent Action: Representative's right to fair trial ignored, 3 December 2019, url

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corpus is not applied in the country. 622 The UN OHCHR indicated that 'judicial authorities have often
reversed the burden of proof refusing to open investigations if the victims did not identify
perpetrators'. 623 Human rights advocates and members of civil society organisations are prosecuted
under both the criminal justice system and the military penal jurisdiction, as an 'exemplary
punishment' to block the work of other human rights organisations. 624 In some cases of political
opponents, persons are denied judgement by civil judges and are sent to military tribunals. 625
According to the Professor of political science, the 'states of emergency' have been used to suspend
the rights of activists and criminalise them. 626 These measures, which in some cases are illegal, haveallowed the government to imprison activists and dissidents without fulfilling the necessary judicial
protocols. 627 The Bertelsmann Stiftung 2020 Country Report on Venezuela indicated that 'the regime’s
massive civil rights abuses are not prosecuted. Victims cannot seek redress against domestic
violations; in a number of cases, proceedings were instituted in response to international instances.
However, these systematic civil rights violations are exclusively politically motivated: there is nopreferential treatment or discrimination based on gender, sexual orientation, religion, ethnicity or
race'. 628
OVV indicated that in Venezuela, there is a tendency to give priority to the prosecution of politicaldissidence over ordinary crimes. 629 The justice system is often used to criminalise and prosecute those
who are perceived as critical of the government 630 with 'fabricated' accusations of 'terrorism','destabilising enemies', 'instigators of hate', and 'perpetrators of actions that disrupt public order andpeace'. 631 According to the Professor of political science, in some cases security forces plant evidence,
particularly in cases involving low-profile activists, to open judicial processes against them.
Sometimes, they are given the option of being placed under house arrest and are banned fromspeaking about the judicial process or if they experienced torture in detention. Restrictions, inprinciple, are not to be extended beyond the duration of the investigation; however, judicial processes
are postponed repeatedly with some of them lasting 'years'. Social media activists are the ones who
lately are being particularly subjected to this dynamic. 632
Mármol indicated that the government starts judicial processes against critics of the government thatare later released with charges and the imposition of conditions such as periodic reporting withauthorities, ban on leaving the country, and seizure of the passport. 633 Other sources similarly
indicated that when the government wants to intimidate or threaten someone, it opens a criminal
investigation and charge the person, but then the person is found neither guilty nor innocent. 634 As
the person cannot be imprisoned, they remain in a judicial 'limbo' where their file can be reactivatedat any time for something which does not relate to the original charge. 635 This strategy is used to
intimidate critics of the government and force them to remain silent. 636 According to OVV, most

622 OVV, videoconference, 4 May 2020

623 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 43
624 OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, p. 34
625 Mármol, videoconference, 1 May 2020

626 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020
627 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020

628 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2020 Country Report: Venezuela, 2020, url, p. 13
629 OVV, videoconference, 4 May 2020

630 HRW, Venezuela: Extrajudicial Killings in Poor Areas, 18 September 2019, url; OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos",March 2020, url, p. 34; UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 30
631 OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, p. 34
632 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020
633 Mármol, videoconference, 1 May 2020
634 OVV, videoconference, 4 May 2020
635 OVV, videoconference, 4 May 2020; Amaya, videoconference, 29 May 2020
636 Infobae, El régimen de Nicolás Maduro utiliza la Ley del Odio para perseguir a quienes critiquen al gobierno o protesten
contra los malos servicios públicos, 17 April 2020, url; Amaya, videoconference, 29 May 2020

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investigations in Venezuela end up in the person accepting charges, even though he or she is innocent,or having the case go inactive. 637 Example cases, as reported by sources, include the following:••

Sources report the case of journalist Luis Carlos Díaz who was detained at the SEBIN for over 24hours in March 2019 638 days after he was accused on public television by Cabello of being part ofa 'blackout operation' and a 'fascist influencer'. 639 During the raid, security forces reportedly
threatened his wife 640 and confiscated his equipment. 641 Upon his release, he was charged with'instigation to commit crimes'642 and was imposed a travel ban, a requirement to report toauthorities every eight days, and a prohibition 'on making public statements' about the case. 643
The OMCT et al. report provided the example of the Community Ambassadors Foundation(Fundación Embajadores Comunitarios), an NGO that provides education and training to at-riskyouth, whose two representatives were detained in January 2018 by the SEBIN without an arrest
warrant, criminalised and harassed on public television, and after these events, the number of thefoundation's volunteers dropped from 160 to 20, and were recently evicted from their office by
the owner who feared being associated with their work. 644

The OMCT et al. report indicated that accessing justice in Venezuela requires the assistance of 'law
professionals who have technical expertise to assist victims and their families' as the judicial systempresents 'mechanisms that not only do not guarantee human rights, but on the contrary, harm theserights'. 645 According to the OMCT et al. report, 'often, in Venezuela, access to tribunals andadministrative services exposes the person to irregular and illegal processes' as justice is'instrumentalised' to protect the interests of the government and not of the victims.646 The 2012
amendment of Articles 121 and 122 of the Penal Process Organic Code (Código Orgánico Procesal
Penal), for example, eliminated the possibility for civil society organisations to provide assistance orrepresent victims of human right violations in penal processes. In some cases, these victims are
assigned public attorneys who, for the most part being aligned with government policy, end up not
representing the victim and harming the victim's interests. 647 The same source indicated that there
have been documented instances of legal representatives being manipulated and deceived byauthorities to distance them from the persons they represent or accompany, and that police andintelligence agencies provide legal representatives with false information on the whereabouts of theirclients. 648
The government appoints court judges who reportedly lack independence.649 Most judges holdtemporary appointments 650 and there is a high rotation of judges, clerks and bailiffs in the court system
which creates major interruptions of judicial processes. 651 OVV indicated that most judges in
Venezuela are 'finger appointees' by the government and those judges who contradicted thegovernment in their rulings were punished, so that other judges do not rule against government

637 OVV, videoconference, 4 May 2020

638 AI, Annual Report 2019, February 2020, url, p. 89; IPYS, Voces en el paredón: Reporte Annual IPYSve 2019, February 2020,

url, p. 4639 IPYS, Voces en el paredón: Reporte Annual IPYSve 2019, February 2020, url, p. 4
640 AI, Annual Report 2019, February 2020, url, p. 89
641 IPYS, Voces en el paredón: Reporte Annual IPYSve 2019, February 2020, url, p. 4
642 IPYS, Voces en el paredón: Reporte Annual IPYSve 2019, February 2020, url, p. 4
643 AI, Annual Report 2019, February 2020, url, p. 89; IPYS, Voces en el paredón: Reporte Annual IPYSve 2019, February 2020,
url, p. 4
644 OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, p. 35
645 OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, p. 43
646 OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, p. 44
647 OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, pp. 42-44
648 OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, p. 46
649 HRW, World Report 2020, 2020, url, p. 625
650 Mármol, videoconference, 1 May 2020; OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, p. 8
651 OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, p. 45

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS— 69

dictates. 652 The same source estimated that between 4 and 7 % of judges in the country are career
judges or appointed through competition, that they are 'easily dismissed', and that, under thesecircumstances, 'courts and judges are completely subjected to the government and politicaldecisions'. 653 Prison release orders were frequently disregarded by authorities. 654
The OMCT et al. report added that the government has created a legal framework that creates a'hostile environment' for human rights advocates, by modifying or creating laws to limit their work. 655
Some of these laws pertain to efforts to pass legislation that would prevent civil society organisations
from receiving foreign funding, including:••

Law for the Defense of Political Sovereignty and National Self-determination (Ley de la Defensa dela Soberanía Política y la Autodeterminación Nacional) of 2012, which established sanctions toorganisations that receive donations from foreign entities in an effort to 'economically asphyxiate'
them, and the expelling from the country of persons who 'provide opinions that offend state
institutions and high-ranking authorities'.
Law Against Organised Crime and Financing of Terrorism (Ley contra la Delincuencia Organizada
y Financiamiento al Terrorismo) of 2005 and amended in 2012, which has allowed security
agencies threaten human rights advocates and organisations with charging them with 'terrorism',financing terrorism' and 'organised crime'. 656

The same source indicated that, additionally, the president of the ANC threatened to pass legislationthat restricts the ability of civil society organisations from receiving foreign funding on 14 August 2019
and 19 February 2020. 657
Persons suspected of committing crimes under international law and human rights violations 'enjoyedalmost total impunity'. 658 Prosecutors are reluctant to receive complaints for abuses committed by the
FAES, and the families of those killed during the 2017 protests have been facing 'pervasive obstacles'
to access justice, and most investigations into these deaths have not advanced. 659 Some family
members have faced threats and harassment by intelligence agencies, and some have been forced toleave the country. 660 The UN OHCHR mission report indicated that'the Government has recognized that a problem exists regarding access to justice for all people
and has asked OHCHR to help them resolve this issue. According to the Government, as ofJune 2019, 44 persons are detained, and 33 arrest warrants have been issued against persons
for their alleged responsibility for killings during demonstrations in 2017 and 2019. Fivemembers of FAES have been convicted of attempted murder, misuse of a weapon, andsimulation of a punishable act, for events that occurred in 2018. Additionally, 388 FAES
members are under investigation for murder, cruel treatment, and illegal house raids
committed between 2017 and 2019'. 661

3.11.2 Prison conditions and treatment in prison
Human Rights Watch indicated that prisons in Venezuela experience 'corruption, weak security,
deteriorating infrastructure, […] and poorly trained guards', with 63 % of detainees in pretrial
652 OVV, videoconference, 4 May 2020
653 OVV, videoconference, 4 May 2020

654 AI, Annual Report 2019, February 2020, url, p. 87; OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, p. 35;

OVV, videoconference, 4 May 2020
655 OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, p. 9, 11
656 OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, pp. 7-9, 39-41
657 OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, pp. 40-41
658 AI, Annual Report 2019, February 2020, url, p. 86
659 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 55
660 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 55
661 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 53

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detention, which contributes to overcrowding. 662 The Venezuelan Observatory of Prisons (OVP,
Observatorio Venezolano de Prisiones) indicated that the Los Llanos prison in Guanare, state ofPortuguesa, for example, has a capacity of 750 prisoners but it currently holds 2 500. 663 The same
source indicated that detention centres at police stations hold persons in detention for 'years' when,according to the law, these persons can be detained at these centres for 48 hours. The capacity ofthese centres is about 20 prisoners and currently hold over 100. 664 During 2019, 104 prisoners died inprisons, of which 63.46 % died due to malnutrition and tuberculosis, and health issues such as chronic
conditions, stomach bacteria, malaria, among others, are 'progressively increasing'. 665 The
government of Venezuela indicated to the UN OHCHR that the number of cases of malnutrition in2019 was 1 328. 666 Access to food for prisoners is limited, with family members having to send food totheir imprisoned relatives through authorities, which in some instances is stolen by prison guards. 667
According to the government, 'difficulties related to health and clean water, among others, wererelated to the impact of sanctions'. 668
The UN OHCHR reported that Venezuelan navy captain Rafael Acosta, died on 29 June 2019 fromalleged acts of 'torture'. He had been detained on 21 June 2019 for his alleged plotting to assassinate
Maduro. Acosta was brought before a military tribunal by the DGCIM on 28 June 2019 and according
to his lawyer, he was on a wheelchair, 'was unable to speak, and showed clear signs of having been
tortured'. He was sent to the hospital the same day and died on 29 June. 669 BBC reported that a postmortem examination leaked to the press revealed that he died of 'severe swelling of the brain causedby acute lack of oxygen' and that his body 'showed signs of having been subjected to extreme force
and had suffered severe beatings and electrocutions'. His body was buried by authorities without theconsent of his family. 670
Sources reported that, according to a video leaked to Agencia Carabobeña de Noticias (ACN), 'at least'
82 prisoners were beaten by prison guards at the Police Coordination Centre (Centro de Coordinaciónde la Policía) in Anaco for more than two hours, forcing them to lay down against the floor, nude, andputting fighting cocks on their backs, for reportedly declaring a strike for the lack of food, clean waterand medicines. 671

3.11.3 State protection for victims and witnesses
The National Coordination for the Protection of Victims, Witnesses and other Persons Participating in
a Judicial Process (CONAPRO, Coordinación Nacional para la Protección de las Víctimas, Testigos ydemás Sujetos Procesales) is the government agency that provides protection to persons who areparticipating in a judicial process 672, which was created under Law for the Protection of Victims,
Witnesses, and Other Persons Intervening in a Judicial Process (Ley de Protección de Víctimas, Testigos
662 HRW, Dozens Killed, Injured in Venezuela Prison Uprising, 4 May 2020, url

663 OVP, 47 muertos y 75 heridos es la cifra extraoficial de víctimas por un motín en Cepella, 2 May 2020, url
664 OVP, La violencia ganó territorio en los calabozos policiales durante 2019, 10 June 2020, url

665 OVP, Desnutrición y tuberculosis fueron las principales causas de muerte en las cárceles durante 2019, 22 May 2020, url

666 UN OHCHR, Outcomes of the investigation into allegations of possible human right violations of the human rights to life,

liberty and physical and moral integrity in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 1 July 2020, url, para. 56
667 UN OHCHR, Outcomes of the investigation into allegations of possible human right violations of the human rights to life,
liberty and physical and moral integrity in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 1 July 2020, url, paras. 56, 67; InSight Crime,
Venezuela Prison Implodes Under Additional Strain From Coronavirus, 12 May 2020, url
668 UN OHCHR, Outcomes of the investigation into allegations of possible human right violations of the human rights to life,
liberty and physical and moral integrity in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 1 July 2020, url, para. 56
669 UN OHCHR, Bachelet deeply concerned by death in custody of Captain Acosta Arévalo in Venezuela, 1 July 2019, url
670 BBC, 'Tortured' Venezuela captain buried without wife's consent, 11 July 2019, url
671 Perfil, Un video filtrado revela cómo la policía de Venezuela tortura a los presos, 4 October 2019, url; Infobae, El
impactante video que muestra cómo torturan a los presos en una comisaría venezolana, 4 October 2019, url
672 Éxodo A.C., Consulta a organizaciones de la sociedad civil, 1 June 2019, url, p. 35; Venezuela, Embajada en Austria, Informe
de Venezuela sobre la Resolución 6/2, 7 June 2017, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS— 71

y demás Sujetos Procesales) of 2012. 673 CONAPRO consists of a multi-disciplinary team of lawyers,
psychologists, social workers and sociologists, and it works with the 27 victims' assistance units in the
country. 674
Without providing further information, the government of Venezuela indicated that CONAPRO has
provided legal and psychosocial assistance to 128 537 persons, and that protection measuresapplications 'were processed for those who needed it'. 675
The UN OHCHR mission report indicated that the Office of the Ombudsperson (Defensoría del Pueblo)'has remained silent vis-à-vis human right violations' and that neither the Public Ministry, the Officeof the Ombudsperson, the government nor the police provided protection to victims or witnesses ofhuman rights violations. 676 According to Velasco, if someone is from the opposition or a dissident, theperson either leaves the neighbourhood, or manages by themselves to remain safe in order to notdepend on the government or the colectivos. This is however becoming increasingly difficult because
if the person does not have access to USD or the CLAP food boxes, the person could face a 'very
difficult situation'. 677 Similarly, OVV indicated that there is no protection available for victims as mostinvestigations evolve around political interests. 678
PROVEA reported on 9 April 2020 that a Bolívar-based journalist who had been threatened forreporting on the working conditions at Bauxilum 679, filed a complaint with the Public Ministry in
Caracas and requested protection measures from CONAPRO, which could not implement protection
measures due to 'lack of budget'. The Public Ministry ordered tribunals in Bolívar to provide protection
measures, which decreed the granting of 'change of residence and labour reinsertion'. PROVEA
reported that the protection measures lasted 'a few days' and the journalist is currently living at an
undisclosed location among homeless people without food nor access to health care. 680
The government does not implement protection measures issued by the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights (IACHR) as Venezuela ceased to be a member of the OAS in 2013, which limits theability of human rights advocates and organisations to seek protection in the inter-American system. 681

3.11.4 Investigations into complaints
Authorities seldom investigate complaints into human rights violations and crimes. 682 The Public
Ministry, the Office of the Ombudsperson and the courts 'usually do not conduct prompt, effective,
thorough, independent, impartial and transparent investigations into human rights violations andother crimes committed by State actors, bring perpetrators to justice, and protect victims andwitnesses'. 683 OMCT et al. indicated that, according to COFAVIC, 'the practice of not initiating
investigations into human rights violations is systematic and, even in those cases that are initiated,
the process is plagued with faults and inaction by authorities is missing'. 684

673 Venezuela, Embajada en Austria, Informe de Venezuela sobre la Resolución 6/2, 7 June 2017, url, p. 2
674 Venezuela, Embajada en Austria, Informe de Venezuela sobre la Resolución 6/2, 7 June 2017, url, p. 3
675 Venezuela, Embajada en Austria, Informe de Venezuela sobre la Resolución 6/2, 7 June 2017, url, p. 3
676 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 57
677 Velasco, videoconference, 1 May 2020
678 OVV, videoconference, 4 May 2020

679 Bauxilum is a state-owned enterprise based in Los Pijiguaos, Bolívar, that produces babauxite and alumina (Argus,

Venezuela’s degraded bauxite, alumina ops halted, 29 October 2019, url).

680 PROVEA, Exigimos justicia con caso de reportero perseguido y amenazado de Bolívar, 9 April 2020, url
681 OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, p. 36

682 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 54; OMCT et al., Venezuela"Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, p. 66
683 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 33
684 OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, p. 66

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On 23 October 2019, Efecto Cocuyo reported that, according to the Attorney General Tarek William
Saab, during the two preceding years authorities investigated 5 157 cases of kidnapping and extortion,
leading to 3 878 people accused and 2 159 imprisoned. Saab also indicated that 559 police officers
and military troops were involved in these cases, of which 372 are imprisoned. 685 An update to the UN
OHCHR mission report indicated that, according to the Public Ministry, between August 2017 andDecember 2019, 770 officials have been accused of human rights violations, with 509 charged, 393
detained, and 131 convicted. Of those convicted, 55 officers, including 14 from the PNB, were charged
with homicide in relation to 68 victims. 686
There is a lack of trust in the justice system. 687 The institutional crisis and the lack of legitimacy of the
TSJ and the National Assembly has exacerbated the lack of trust in the judiciary. 688 Victims do not filecomplaints for fear of reprisals. 689 Social leaders mistrust government institutions and are afraid of
being identified as the complainant. 690 OVV indicated that connivance between criminal gangs andmembers of security forces is in some cases 'blatant'. According to OVV, there are criminal 'circles'
made up of police officers and in some cases, military troops, with an adequate level of organisation
to commit criminal acts. 691 There are allegations that authorities taking complaints disregard victims
and do not open investigations. 692 Mármol explained that in cases of theft, for example, complaints
are filed in most cases as a 'formality' in order to provide documentation to insurance companies.
Complaints against an individual that require an active investigation from authorities are seldom filed
due to the mistrust in authorities, the cost and time involved, the tediousness of the process, and therisk or reprisals 693, particularly against irregular armed groups. 694 Complaints against state institutions
are usually made before an international organisation and not domestically due to mistrust in thejustice system. 695 OVV indicated that it is estimated that, overall, between 63 and 64 % of crimes in
Venezuela are not reported; in some years, this figure reaches up to 67 %. 696
The OMCT et al. provided the example of Prepara Familia, a Venezuelan NGO that advocates for therights of children and adolescents at children hospitals. When Prepara Familia's director tried to file acomplaint with authorities after food supplies were stolen from the NGO, she was refused and told tolodge the complaint with another police authority. The officer in charge took photos of the scene andasked her if the organisation had ties with the opposition. On 14 January 2020, the same assailants
returned to the NGO with the PNB, which tried to execute a raid without a warrant. The raid was notcompleted as several NGOs put pressure on authorities to cease the search. 697

3.11.5 'Law Against Hate'
The Constitutional Law Against Hate, for Peaceful Coexistence and Tolerance (Ley Constitucional
contra el Odio, por la Convivencia Pacífica y la Tolerancia), passed by the ANC in 2017, indicates thefollowing:
685 Efecto Cocuyo, Tarek William Saab: 559 funcionarios vinculados a extorsión y secuestros, 23 October 2019, url

686 UN OHCHR, Venezuela: Commissioner Bachelet details plans for new human rights assistance, 18 December 2019, url

687 AI, Annual Report 2019, February 2020, url, p. 86; UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5

July 2019, url, para. 54
688 AI, Annual Report 2019, February 2020, url, p. 88
689 OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, p. 6; UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republicof Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 54
690 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020
691 OVV, videoconference, 4 May 2020
692 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020; AC Venezuela Igualitaria, videoconference, 30 April 2020
693 Mármol, videoconference, 1 May 2020
694 FundaRedes, videoconference, 6 May 2020; Mármol, videoconference, 1 May 2020
695 FundaRedes, videoconference, 6 May 2020; Mármol, videoconference, 1 May 2020; Professor of political science,
videoconference, 14 May 2020
696 OVV, videoconference, 4 May 2020
697 OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, pp. 32-33

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS— 73‘Of the Responsibilities, Offenses and Sanctions
Crime of promotion or incitement to hatred
Article 20. Whoever publicly or through any means suitable for public dissemination, fosters,
promotes or incites hatred, discrimination or violence against a person or group of persons,by reason of their real or presumed membership in a certain social, ethnic, religious, andpolitical group, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression or any otherdiscriminatory motive, will be punished with imprisonment for ten to twenty years, without
prejudice to civil and disciplinary responsibility for the damages caused.
Aggravated by reasons of hatred and intolerance
Article 21. It will be considered as an aggravating circumstance of any punishable act that is
executed or increased due to the victim's, real or presumed, membership in a certain racial,ethnic, religious or political group, as well as for reasons of gender, sexual orientation, gender
identity, gender expression or any other discriminatory motive. In these cases, the applicablesanction will be the maximum limit of the penalty established for the corresponding
punishable act.
Penalty for spreading messages in favour of hatred and war
Article 22. The radio or television service provider that broadcasts messages that constitutepropaganda in favour of war or apology to national, racial, religious, political or any otherhatred will be sanctioned with the revocation of the concession, in accordance with theprocedure established in the Law of Social Responsibility in Radio, Television and Electronic
Media.
In the case of social networks and electronic media, if the dissemination of the messages
referred to in this article is not withdrawn within six hours of its publication, the entity's legal
person will be fined from fifty thousand to one hundred thousand tax units. Likewise, it willlead to the blocking of the portals, without prejudice to the criminal and civil liability that may
arise.
The radio or television service provider during the broadcast of live and direct messages will
only be responsible for the infractions provided for in this Law or its continuation, when the
Administration demonstrates in the procedure that it did not act diligently.’ 698
Sources indicated that the 'Law Against Hate' has been used to 'persecute' people who are against the
government 699 and charge people who criticise the government. 700 OVV indicated that this law seems
to be created to 'selectively target people to exemplarily shut them off and punish them'. 701 There
have also been cases of persons who have been charged under the 'Law Against Hate' for protesting
against the lack of gasoline. 702 Efecto Cocuyo reported that, according to the director of Espacio
Público, during the electricity crisis [of 2019], the government detained people for sharing WhatsApp
messages denouncing the situation and charged them under the Law Against Hate and for 'instigating
crime'. During the coronavirus pandemic, the pattern of charging people for posting messages criticalof the government on social media has 'intensified'. 703
The following are some cases, as reported by sources, on the application of this law:

698 Venezuela, Ley Constitucional contra el Odio, por la Convivencia Pacífica y la Tolerancia, 2017, url

699 FundaRedes, videoconference, 6 May 2020; Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela, videoconference, 24 April 2020

700 Mármol, videoconference, 1 May 2020; Mouttet, videoconference, 8 May 2020; FundaRedes, videoconference, 6 May

2020; Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela, videoconference, 24 April 2020
701 OVV, videoconference, 4 May 2020
702 Mármol, videoconference, 1 May 2020
703 Efecto Cocuyo, Instigación al odio y asociación para delinquir, 15 April 2020, url

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On 15 April 2020, a gynaecologist at Pastor Oropeza Riera de Carora hospital in the state of Lara
was detained by the DGCIM for posting in WhatsApp a criticism against a government official andin Instagram a note about the 'frustration' of 'seeing people die' due to the lack of medical
supplies. The doctor was released the following day with the charge of 'instigation to hate'. 704
On 21 March 2020, journalist Darvinson Rojas was detained along with his parents by the FAES attheir home in Caracas after Rojas published Tweets with information on COVID-19 infection casesin Miranda. The FAES went into their house alleging that they were investigating a presumed
COVID-19 case, but later acknowledged that he was detained because of the Tweets he published,according to Rojas statement. 705 His parents were released after 'several hours'706 and Rojas was
released 12 days later with charges of 'advocacy of hatred' and 'instigation to commit crimes'. 707
On 18 July 2019, the CICPC detained journalist Wilmer Quintana in Guárico state for posting on
his Facebook account criticism for alleged acts of corruption in the delivery of residential gas andthe CLAP food boxes in the same state. 708 Quintana reportedly suffered a heart attack while indetention 709 and was given house arrest on 19 August 2019 with the charge of 'promotion or
instigation to hate'. 710

3.11.6 Relocation
Mouttet indicated that wealthier Venezuelans have more possibilities to relocate in other areas of thecountry or moving abroad. 711 Amaya indicated that the possibility to relocate depends on the 'actor
who is carrying out the intimidation' as some of them have a national presence and influence. 712
According to Velasco, victims of colectivos who decide to move to another area do so to other cities
and not within the same neighbourhood. However, if the person continues being politically active in
the new place of residence, he or she can be the subject of further targeting by the local colectivos.
When a person moves to a neighbourhood controlled by a colectivo, that colectivo tries to determine
who the person is, where the person is coming from, and the political affiliation. 713 Mármol expressed
the opinion that a colectivo is not going to seek a person in another state as these groups are very
territorialised and 'primitive' in their modus operandi and mostly seek to intimidate and exert social
control. They can, however, pass information to the FAES so the person is arbitrarily detained. 714 For
additional information on colectivos, see Chapter 5.
Those who relocate can face being targeted through the limitation to the assistance provided by thegovernment such as the CLAP food boxes. 715 FundaRedes indicated that even when someone who had
been targeted in one area and moves to another, even if the risk of 'persecution is not high', that
person might not have the same living standards and it can be worse, as they could be refused the704 Infobae, El régimen de Nicolás Maduro utiliza la Ley del Odio para perseguir a quienes critiquen al gobierno o protesten

contra los malos servicios públicos, 17 April 2020, url
705 IFEX, IFEX-ALC condemns arrest of journalist Darvinson Rojas, calls for his release, 27 March 2020, url
706 IFEX, IFEX-ALC condemns arrest of journalist Darvinson Rojas, calls for his release, 27 March 2020, url
707 IFEX, IFEX-ALC condemns arrest of journalist Darvinson Rojas, calls for his release, 27 March 2020, url; AI, Darvinson Rojas
released on bail, 29 May 2020, url
708 CPJ, Las autoridades venezolanas aplican ley contra el odio al periodista Wilmer Quintana por publicar mensajes en
Facebook y lo detienen, 13 August 2019, url
709 CPJ, Las autoridades venezolanas aplican ley contra el odio al periodista Wilmer Quintana por publicar mensajes en
Facebook y lo detienen, 13 August 2019, url; Espacio Público, Otorgan medida de casa por carcel al periodista Wilmer
Quintana, 20 August 2019, url
710 Espacio Público, Otorgan medida de casa por carcel al periodista Wilmer Quintana, 20 August 2019, url
711 Mouttet, videoconference, 8 May 2020
712 Amaya, videoconference, 29 May 2020
713 Velasco, videoconference, 1 May 2020
714 Mármol, videoconference, 1 May 2020
715 Velasco, videoconference, 1 May 2020; FundaRedes, videoconference, 6 May 2020

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CLAP food boxes. 716 Most people in these situations prefer to remain silent 717, 'which is what colectivos
seek through intimidation'. 718

716 FundaRedes, videoconference, 6 May 2020

717 Amaya, videoconference, 29 May 2020; Velasco, videoconference, 1 May 2020
718 Velasco, videoconference, 1 May 2020

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4. Situation at the border with Colombia
The border between Venezuela and Colombia is about 2 219 kilometres, and includes the states of
Zulia, Táchira, Apure and Amazonas, on the Venezuelan side, and on the Colombian side, thedepartments of La Guajira, Cesar, Norte de Santander, Boyacá, Arauca, Vichada and Guainía. 719
According to the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS), an international Catholic organisation with presence inover 50 countries that promotes and advocates for the rights of refugees, displaced persons andvictims of human trafficking,'the border region shared by Colombia and Venezuela is a geographical area that has strong
characteristics that give it a certain particularity with respect to the territories of the interiorof each country and also with respect to other borders: populations with very close economic,
cultural and social historical ties; levels of social and economic development below national
averages; presence of a plethora of illegal armed groups fighting for control of illegal
economies; an extensive porous territory that is mostly rural or jungle and where hundreds ofirregular crossings or "trochas" are used for contraband, drug trafficking, trafficking inweapons, minerals and people; and public authorities with limited financial, human andtechnological capacities to have sufficient coverage and quality to respond to the challenges
it faces in the territory'. 720
The homicide rate in Venezuelan border states for 2019 were as follows: Zulia (60 deaths per 100 000
inhabitants), Táchira (46), Apure (37), Amazonas (58), and Bolívar (84). 721 FundaRedes indicated that,
according to research it conducted based on news reports in 2019, 1 850 people were killed in thestates of Amazonas, Bolívar, Táchira, Falcón, Zulia and Apure, including 692 who died in 484 armed
clashes, and 91 people were kidnapped or disappeared. 722 The victims included 1 703 men, 73 women,
and 74 children. 723 The Peace and Reconciliation Foundation (Pares, Fundación Paz y Reconciliación 724)
indicated that, on the Colombian side, Pares indicates that between 2012 and 2019, 4 911 people havebeen killed, 71 children and adolescents forcibly recruited by irregular armed groups, 71 561 persons
displaced, and 203 kidnapped. 725 FundaRedes indicated that Zulia is one of the states where criminality
has been more serious, particularly forced displacement of landowners by armed groups. 726
International Crisis Group indicated that the border with Colombia has become a 'very sensitive issue'
and a matter of national security for the Venezuelan government over the last year as it has been used
as a means to weaken the government through efforts in the introduction of humanitarian aid, and asa pretext for foreign military intervention from accusations of the Colombian government that
Venezuela shelters 'terrorist groups' such as the FARC dissidents and the ELN. 727

719 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 6

720 JRS, Informe de contexto: Frontera Colombo-venezolana, April 2019, url, pp. 3, 37

721 OVV, Presentación Informe Anual de Violencia 2019, 27 December 2019, url, p. 23

722 FundaRedes, Curva de la violencia en seis estados fronterizos de Venezuela, 2019, url, pp. 2, 3, 12
723 FundaRedes, Curva de la violencia en seis estados fronterizos de Venezuela, 2019, url, p. 12

724 Pares is a Colombian NGO that produces analysis and research on public safety, internal armed conflict, criminality,

governance and human rights (Pares, Sobre nosotros, n.d., url)
725 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 6.
726 FundaRedes, videoconference, 6 May 2020
727 International Crisis Group, telephone interview, 30 April 2020

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Map 4: Presence of armed groups on the Venezuela-Colombia border in 2018, May 2018 ©InSight Crime CC BY-NC 3.0 728

728 Presence of Armed Groups on the Colombia-Venezuela Border [map], in: InSight Crime, Venezuela: A Mafia State?, [2018],
url, p. 53

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4.1 Armed groups
Irregular armed groups with presence along the border include the Colombian guerrilla groups of the
ELN and FARC dissidents, Colombian paramilitary successor groups, and organised criminal groups 729,
as well as colectivos. 730 According to Pares, alongside the border there are 28 irregular armed groups
including the ELN; groups of regional reach such as the EPL, Los Rastrojos, Clan del Golfo, anddissidents of the FARC; and transnational criminal organisations such as pranes and the Sinaloa
cartel. 731 In addition, there are also a variety of local criminal gangs 732 that operate by outsourcing forlarger irregular armed groups. 733 According to FundaRedes, as of May 2019, 28 branches of Colombian
irregular armed groups operate in Venezuela, including eight ELN fronts, six FARC dissident groups,
four EPL fronts, and around 10 paramilitary successor groups.734 According to the Ideas for Peace
Foundation (FIP, Fundación Ideas para la Paz), a Colombian think tank that produces research on
conflict in Colombia, indicated that even though the presence of the ELN and FARC dissidents in
Venezuela point to the unification of a common political with the Maduro regime, these actors are
benefiting 'for now' from the 'chaos' in Venezuela which has allow them to expand and articulate theiractions in the context of illegal economies, and the control over the population and resources. 735
The absence of national authorities at the border between Venezuela and Colombia have empowered
irregular armed groups 736, replacing these authorities 737, and acting as de facto forces that exert social
control and set extortion amounts locally known as 'taxes' ('impuestos') [the term is also locally known
as 'vacunas']. 738 The Colombian Office of the Ombudsperson indicates, for example, that Los Rastrojos
have replaced local authorities and carry out security operations and the 'administration of justice' inthe border municipality of Puerto de Santander. 739 Human Rights Watch indicates that due to theabsence of the state in the border, people ‘go to the armed groups to have their problems“resolved”’.740
Irregular armed groups engage in constant disputes over the income from the several illicit economies
that are present on both sides of the border, 741 and engage in homicides, 742 trafficking of drugs 743 and729 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 7; International Crisis Group, A Glut of Arms, 20 February 2020, url, pp. 4,

11, 12730 Reuters, EXCLUSIVA-Grupos armados colombianos seducen a venezolanos desesperados, 20 June 2019, url; Caracol,
Nuevo grupo ilegal hace presencia en la zona de frontera, 19 June 2019, url
731 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 7
732 El Universal, Tras cierre de frontera, grupos criminales lucran con venezolanos que cruzan a Colombia, 19 March 2019,
url; Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 42
733 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 42
734 FundaRedes, Más de 28 frentes de grupos irregulares armados colombianos operan en Venezuela, 13 May 2019, url
735 FIP, ¿Qué hacer con el ELN?, January 2020, url, p. 30
736 International Crisis Group, A Glut of Arms, 20 February 2020, url, p. 2; El Espectador, Masacre en la frontera con
Venezuela, 8 March 2020, url; Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 8
737 International Crisis Group, A Glut of Arms, 20 February 2020, url, p. 2; FundaRedes, Grupos armados irregulars explotan
a niños y adolescentes venezolanos en la frontera, 16 December 2019, url
738 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 8
739 Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana No. 037-19, 12 September 2019, url, p. 9740 HRW, "The Guerrillas Are the Police", January 2020, url, p. 49
741 International Crisis Group, A Glut of Arms, 20 February 2020, url, p. 6; Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 8;
Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana No. 037-19, 12 September 2019, url, p. 2
742 HRW, "The Guerrillas Are the Police", January 2020, url, p. 1; Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana No. 03919, 16 September 2019, url, p.6
743 International Crisis Group, A Glut of Arms, 20 February 2020, url, p. 5; Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 8

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS— 79

weapons 744, human trafficking 745, kidnapping 746, extortion747, forced labour, forced recruitment 748,
forced displacement 749, sexual violence 750, cattle theft 751, contraband 752 of gasoline and cattle from
Venezuela into Colombia, 753 pillaging of farms that produce meat and dairy products 754, the control ofillegal border crossings, 755 and illegal mining. 756 The International Crisis Group report indicates that,
according to sources close to Colombian guerrilla groups present in Venezuela, the illegal mining ofgold and other minerals both in Colombia and Venezuela is the main source of revenue for Colombian
guerrillas. 757 The border between Venezuela and Colombia has serious security issues due to constantdisputes over territorial influence by armed groups. 758 Venezuela is also a transit country for cocaine
originating in Colombia to countries in the Caribbean, the US and Europe. 759
Irregular armed groups establish informal alliances to dispute territories and distribute themanagement of revenue coming from illicit activities. 760 International Crisis Group indicated thatprofit-seeking alliances are also made between irregular armed groups and Venezuelan security
officials and politicians. 761 For example, Pares indicates that the ELN established an alliance with
Venezuelan colectivos to dispute territory with the EPL, and the EPL established an alliance with Clandel Golfo and local organisations in the region to combat the ELN. 762 The EPL established an alliancewith Los Rastrojos to pact a non-aggression agreement and the division of revenue from extortions tobusinesses, transportation companies, rice harvesters, smugglers of gasoline, and migrants crossing
informal border crossings. 763 The International Crisis Group report indicates that Colombian guerrillagroups subcontract, either by force or by offering 'job opportunities' and food, local gangs to control
miners working at illegal mining operations in Venezuela. 764 Conflict dynamics, however, are fluid andalliances can be broken at any time to dispute territory and revenue from illegal activities. 765

744 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 8; Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana No. 039-19, 16

September 2019, url, p. 6
745 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 8; AFP, Ocho personas muertas por massacre en frontera, 8 March 2020,
url
746 HRW, "The Guerrillas Are the Police", January 2020, url, p. 1; Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana No. 03919, 16 September 2019, url, p. 5
747 HRW, "The Guerrillas Are the Police", January 2020, url, p. 27; Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana No. 03919, 16 September 2019, url, p. 5
748 HRW, "The Guerrillas Are the Police", January 2020, url, p. 1
749 Caracol, Desplazamiento en Venezuela por grupos armados en frontera, 25 May 2019, url; HRW, "The Guerrillas Are the
Police", January 2020, url, p. 20
750 HRW, "The Guerrillas Are the Police", January 2020, url, p. 12; Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana No. 03919, 16 September 2019, url, p. 6
751 OVV, Informe Anual de Violencia 2019, 27 December 2019, url, p. 9752 International Crisis Group, A Glut of Arms, 20 February 2020, url, p. 5; AFP, Ocho personas muertas por massacre en
frontera, 8 March 2020, url; Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana No. 039-19, 16 September 2019, url, p. 6
753 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, pp. 8, 22
754 OVV, Informe Anual de Violencia 2019, 27 December 2019, url, p. 9755 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 8; Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana No. 039-19, 16
September 2019, url, p.5
756 International Crisis Group, A Glut of Arms, 20 February 2020, url, p. 5; UN OHCHR, Venezuela: Commissioner Bachelet
details plans for new human rights assistance, 18 December 2019, url
757 International Crisis Group, A Glut of Arms, 20 February 2020, url, p. 5
758 Infobae, Ocho personas muertas por masacre en frontera de Colombia y Venezuela, 10 March 2020, url
759 UN, INCB, Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2019, url, para. 308
760 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, pp. 8, 11; Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana No. 037-19, 12
September 2019, url, pp. 3-4
761 International Crisis Group, telephone interview, 30 April 2020
762 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 8
763 Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana No. 037-19, 12 September 2019, url, p. 3
764 International Crisis Group, A Glut of Arms, 20 February 2020, url, p. 6
765 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, pp. 9, 23

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Sources report that armed combat among irregular armed groups and between these groups andauthorities take place on both sides of the border. 766 The ELN and Los Rastrojos engaged in armed
confrontations in the municipality of Catatumbo, state of Zulia, extending to Boca de Grita. 767 Infobae
reported that during an armed confrontation on 18 February 2020, these groups used gas cylinders asbombs and that Los Rastrojos displaced local farmers to plant antipersonnel mines while retreatingfrom armed clashes with the ELN. 768 Armed confrontations also occur between Los Rastrojos and Clandel Golfo in Ureña, San Antonio, Rubio, and Capacho, in the state of Táchira. 769 Civilians have beencaught in the middle of armed confrontations among irregular armed groups. 770
Sources indicated that, in order to assert and maintain control, irregular armed groups operating on
both sides of the border impose their own rules, and enforce compliance through threats andpunishment with fines, forced labour, displacement or death. 771 Groups like Los Rastrojos dictatesocial norms to be observed by inhabitants and people transiting through their territories 772 andgroups in Arauca and Apure impose curfews and prohibit wearing helmets while riding motorcycles
so members of irregular armed groups can identify them. 773 Armed groups such as the ELN and FARC
dissidents summon persons in Colombia to camps on the Venezuelan side to pay extortion amounts
and, in some cases, for 'unstated reasons' that usually turns out to be to threaten the person. 774
Sources reported that irregular armed groups, including Los Rastrojos, threaten through pamphlets
and WhatsApp chain messages with 'social cleansing' 775 of drug and marijuana consumers, sex
workers, LGBT persons, human rights advocates 776, and those accused of collaborating with rival
groups. 777

4.1.1.Guerrilla Groups
4.1.1.1 ELN
The ELN is a Colombian guerrilla group created in 1964 with a Marxist-Leninist ideology, but that later
became involved in kidnapping, extortion and attacks on the economic infrastructure. 778 The ELN is
the largest armed group in Colombia. 779 Estimates of the number of combatants range between
2 400 780, 3 000 781, and 4 000. 782 According to the Ministry of Defence of Colombia, out of the 2 400
combatants of the ELN, 43 % are located in Venezuela. 783 The ELN's leadership consists of fivecommanders known as the Central Command (COCE, Comando Central), and its regional commanders
have high levels of operational autonomy. 784 The ELN, like the FARC dissidents, uses Venezuela as a

766 Europa Press, Colombia.- Violentos combates entre el ELN y Los Rastrojos, 16 February 2020, url; El Espectador, Masacreen la frontera con Venezuela, 8 March 2020, url
767 Inforbae, El ELN y paramilitares de Los Rastrojos combaten en Venezuela, 19 February 2020, url
768 Inforbae, El ELN y paramilitares de Los Rastrojos combaten en Venezuela, 19 February 2020, url
769 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 25
770 NTN24, Al menos 20 personas asesinadas por grupos irregulares en la frontera, 31 July 2019, url
771 HRW, "The Guerrillas Are the Police", January 2020, url, pp. 1, 12, 24
772 Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana No. 037-19, 12 September 2019, url, p. 9773 HRW, "The Guerrillas Are the Police", January 2020, url, pp. 26-27
774 HRW, "The Guerrillas Are the Police", January 2020, url, pp. 25-26
775 HRW, "The Guerrillas Are the Police", January 2020, url, pp. 16, 25-26; Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana
No. 037-19, 12 September 2019, url, p. 6
776 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 22
777 Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana No. 037-19, 12 September 2019, url, p. 6
778 InSight Crime, ELN, 16 October 2018, url
779 FIP, ¿Qué hacer con el ELN?, January 2020, url, p. 5
780 Semana, Gobierno asegura que el 43% del ELN está en Venezuela, 9 November 2019, url
781 CNN, Así es el ELN, 30 August 2019, url
782 FIP, ¿Qué hacer con el ELN?, January 2020, url, p. 5
783 Semana, Gobierno asegura que el 43% del ELN está en Venezuela, 9 November 2019, url
784 InSight Crime, ELN in Venezuela, 28 Jan. 2020, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS— 81

safe haven785, including its leaders who are reportedly located in Venezuela. 786 The ELN also uses
Venezuela as a source of revenue from illicit activities present at the border. 787
The ELN is established strategically alongside the border 788, with corridors connecting the Colombianside with camps on the Venezuelan side.789 The ELN has presence in 'at least' 13 out of the 24 statesin Venezuela 790, particularly in the states of Apure, Táchira, Bolívar and Amazonas. 791 The group is also
reportedly establishing bases in the states of Barinas, Guárico, Lara and Falcón. 792 The ELN has
reported presence in Guarero (Zulia) and Ureña (Táchira), where its Urban Front Carlos Germán
Velasco has reported conflicts with local colectivos. 793 According to the Ministry of Defence ofColombia, the Front Norte of the ELN has 10 camps in Zulia; the Front Oriental has 20 in Apure, Bolívar
and Amazonas; and Front Nororiental has 20 in Táchira. 794 According to FundaRedes, the following
ELN fronts operate in Venezuela: Commission Juan Velazco, and Fronts Nororiental, Luis Enrique León
Guerra, Germán Velazco Villamizar, Parmelio Cuella, Carlos Alirio Buitrago, Camilo Cienfuegos andDomingo Lain Sanz. 795 According to the Ministry of Defence of Colombia, the ELN has stationed 1 400
combatants in the states of Táchira, Barinas and Apure, and established 10 support networks and 36
camps on the Venezuelan side of the border. 796
The ELN controls several illegal border crossings and engages in drug trafficking, arms trafficking,smuggling 797 of gasoline 798, and forced recruitment of children, adolescents and indigenous peoples. 799
They also engage in extortion, 800 including of locals, landowners 801 and Venezuelan migrants who crossthe border irregularly. 802 The ELN also controls illegal mining operations in southern Venezuela and isextending operations to eastern Venezuela, with reported disputes with local mining mafias(sindicatos) in the state of Bolívar, the EPL in Catatumbo and Zulia, and Los Rastrojos in Zulia. 803 The
ELN exerts significant social control in the areas where they operate 804, including of Venezuelan
migrants crossing into Colombia. 805 According to InSight Crime, 'it acts as a de facto State power in its
strongholds in Táchira, Apure and Amazonas'. 806
Sources indicated that the ELN has alleged ties with Venezuelan authorities. 807 According to InSight
Crime, the ELN's ties with security forces and local authorities in some parts of Venezuela's border785 International Crisis Group, A Glut of Arms, 20 February 2020, url. p. 5; FIP, ¿Qué hacer con el ELN?, January 2020, url, p.

9786 FIP, ¿Qué hacer con el ELN?, January 2020, url, p. 30; InSight Crime, ELN in Venezuela, 28 Jan. 2020, url

787 International Crisis Group, A Glut of Arms, 20 February 2020, url. p. 5; InSight Crime, ELN in Venezuela, 28 Jan. 2020, url
788 Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana No. 039-19, 16 September 2019, url, p. 6
789 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 37.

790 International Crisis Group, A Glut of Arms, 20 February 2020, url. p. 5.

791 International Crisis Group, A Glut of Arms, 20 February 2020, url. p. 5; InSight Crime, ELN in Venezuela, 28 Jan. 2020, url
792 InSight Crime, ELN in Venezuela, 28 Jan. 2020, url

793 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, pp. 13, 27.

794 Semana, Gobierno asegura que el 43% del ELN está en Venezuela, 9 November 2019, url

795 FundaRedes, Más de 28 frentes de grupos irregulares armados colombianos operan en Venezuela, 13 May 2019, url
796 VOA, El 44% de las tropas del ELN ya residen en Venezuela, 8 November 2019, url

797 International Crisis Group, A Glut of Arms, 20 February 2020, url. p. 5; Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, pp. 27.
798 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, pp. 27.

799 Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana No. 039-19, 16 September 2019, url, p. 6

800 International Crisis Group, A Glut of Arms, 20 February 2020, url. p. 5; Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, pp. 13,

27.

Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana No. 039-19, 16 September 2019, url, p. 6; FundaRedes,
videoconference, 6 May 2020
802 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 27.
803 InSight Crime, ELN in Venezuela, 28 Jan. 2020, url
804 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 16; InSight Crime, ELN in Venezuela, 28 Jan. 2020, url
805 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 16.
806 InSight Crime, ELN in Venezuela, 28 Jan. 2020, url
807 FIP, ¿Qué hacer con el ELN?, January 2020, url, p. 30; Semana, Gobierno asegura que el 43% del ELN está en Venezuela,
9 November 2019, url; InSight Crime, ELN in Venezuela, 28 Jan. 2020, url
801

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region, and in the Orinoco mining arc, has allowed it to operate with 'near-total impunity'. 808 The ELN
has also established alliances with local armed colectivos. 809 According to FundaRedes, the ELN is a
strategic ally for the Venezuelan government in the sense that the ELN's military capacity canrepresent a defense force for the government. 810 The ELN has also established an alliance with thepranes in Venezuela to transport drugs to the Caribbean coast of Venezuela. 811

4.1.1.2 FARC dissidents
FARC dissidents consist of former FARC-EP leaders and combatants who refused to demobilise in 2016.
Up to its demobilisation, the FARC-EP was considered the largest, oldest and most important guerrillagroup in the Western hemisphere. 812 Pares indicated that, alongside the Venezuela-Colombia border,
FARC dissidents are grouping in three structures with regional reach: one under the leadership of
Gentil Duarte, consisting of 11 dissident groups; another under Iván Márquez and Jesús Santrich,consisting of 4 dissident groups; and a third that consists of 'independent' structures dedicated to drugtrafficking and are in the process of dissolution. 813 Sources indicated that FARC dissidents have camps
in the state of Apure 814, and former FARC-EP leaders who are leading dissident groups are reportedly
operating from Venezuela. 815 Some ex-members of the FARC-EP are currently influential members ofcolectivos, particularly Colectivo de Seguridad Fronteriza (Colectivo Border Security). 816
The structure led by Gentil Duarte unified FARC dissident groups in the area of Catatumbo under Front
33, with about 300 members, many of them Venezuelan citizens. 817 Another front of Gentil Duarte
operates in the Amazonas state trafficking with drugs and arms from Colombia, Mexico and Brazil. 818
Human Rights Watch indicates that the Front Martín Villa, a group of FARC dissidents, operate in Apureand Arauca, and it seeks to regain the former territories on both sides of the border left by the FARCEP after its demobilisation. 819 The group, which has about 300 fighters, has recruited Colombians andVenezuelans and operates in areas where the ELN is also present. 820 FARC dissidents also operate on
the rivers that connect with Venezuela to traffic drugs. 821 FARC dissident groups in Venezuela also
engage in illegal mining in the states of Bolívar and Amazonas. 822
The FARC dissident groups and the ELN established a non-aggression pact to coordinate illicit
activities. 823 Some FARC dissident groups have alliances with Brazil's Red Command (Comando
Vermelho) and Family of the North (FDN, Família do Norte), and the Sinaloa cartel. 824

808 InSight Crime, ELN in Venezuela, 28 Jan. 2020, url

809 Semana, Gobierno asegura que el 43% del ELN está en Venezuela, 9 November 2019, url
810 FundaRedes, videoconference, 6 May 2020

811 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 39.
812 InSight Crime, FARC, 3 March 2017, url

813 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 8.

814 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 58; HRW, "The Guerrillas Are the Police", January 2020, url, p. 47.
815 FIP, ¿Qué hacer con el ELN?, January 2020, url, p. 30; InSight Crime, FARC en Venezuela, 13 April 2020, url
816 InSight Crime, FARC en Venezuela, 13 April 2020, url

817 InSight Crime, FARC en Venezuela, 13 April 2020, url
818 InSight Crime, FARC en Venezuela, 13 April 2020, url

819 HRW, "The Guerrillas Are the Police", January 2020, url, p. 55.

820 HRW, "The Guerrillas Are the Police", January 2020, url, p. 55; InSight Crime, FARC en Venezuela, 13 April 2020, url
821 El Colombiano, Las disidencias de las Farc se adueñan de los ríos, 14 November 2019, url
822 InSight Crime, FARC en Venezuela, 13 April 2020, url
823 InSight Crime, FARC en Venezuela, 13 April 2020, url
824 InSight Crime, FARC en Venezuela, 13 April 2020, url

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Map 5: Presence of the FARC dissidents in Venezuela, September 2019 ©InSight Crime CC BY-NC 3.0 825

4.1.1.3 FPLNThe FPLN [also known as 'Boliches' 826] is an armed group that originated in Apure in the 1990s. 827 It
currently operates in the states of Apure, Barinas, Táchira 828, and Guárico. 829 The group has between

825 Ex-FARC Mafia Presence in Venezuela [map], in: InSight Crime, Ex-FARC Mafia: Colombia’s Criminal Army Settling Down
in Venezuela, 4 September 2019, url
826 InSight Crime, FBL/FPLN, 15 July 2019, url
827 HRW, "The Guerrillas Are the Police", January 2020, url, p. 56-57.
828 InSight Crime, FBL/FPLN, 15 July 2019, url; HRW, "The Guerrillas Are the Police", January 2020, url, p. 56-57
829 HRW, "The Guerrillas Are the Police", January 2020, url, p. 56-57.

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1 000 and 4 000 members 830, some of them coming from colectivos and pro-government politicalgrassroots groups. 831
The FPLN is a splinter of the Bolivarian Liberation Front (FBL, Fuerzas Bolivarianas de Liberación),
supports the Venezuelan government, and has reportedly worked alongside local authorities andsecurity forces. 832 The FBL is reportedly 'relatively inactive'. 833 According to InSight Crime, criminal
activities carried out by the FPLN have 'been facilitated by its ties with security forces and public
officials in Apure'. 834 The FPLN reportedly has close ties with FARC dissidents and is no longer in conflictwith the ELN. 835 The FPLN reportedly control the local town halls of Páez de Guasdualito and Biruaca(state of Apure). 836
The FPLN's main source of revenue comes from the extortion of local landowners, cattle ranchers, andmigrants crossing into Colombia. 837

4.1.1.4 EPL dissidents
EPL dissidents emerged after the demobilisation in 1991 of the EPL, a Maoist Colombian guerrillagroup created in 1967 as the armed wing of the Colombian Communist Party. EPL dissidents, also
known as Los Pelusos, are considered an organised criminal organisation dedicated mainly to drugtrafficking. 838 In Venezuela, the EPL's Front Fronteras, in alliance with Los Rastrojos, has presence inthe municipalities of Boca de Grita, La Fría, Orope, and Coloncito, in the state of Táchira. In Colombia,
the EPL is present in the department of Norte de Santander with three fronts: Front Fronteras(Cúcuta), Front Libardo Mora Toro (Catatumbo), and Front Elisenio Torres, which extended its
presence in 2018 to the department of Cesar. 839
Alongside the border, the objective of the EPL is to 'terrorize and exercise [social] control through fear'and engage in activities, including homicides, massacres, forced recruitment, forced disappearance,
trafficking of weapons, contraband of gasoline and auto parts, and extortion of persons crossing illegal
border crossings, including Venezuelan migrants and informal transporters. 840 On the Colombian side,and in collaboration with Los Rastrojos, the EPL threatens through pamphlets with the 'social
cleansing' of drug and marijuana consumers, sex workers, human rights advocates 841, and LGBT
persons. 842

4.1.2 Colombian paramilitary successor groups, transnational criminalorganisations
Activities of Colombian paramilitary successor groups in Venezuela include homicides, forced
disappearances, threats, 843 extortion, 844 harassment, and kidnapping of peasants and landowners, and
830 InSight Crime, FBL/FPLN, 15 July 2019, url

831 HRW, "The Guerrillas Are the Police", January 2020, url, p. 56.

832 HRW, "The Guerrillas Are the Police", January 2020, url, p. 56; Infobae, Así entrena el chavismo a civiles en el manejo dearmas, 9 June 2019, url
833 InSight Crime, FBL/FPLN, 15 July 2019, url
834 InSight Crime, FBL/FPLN, 15 July 2019, url
835 HRW, "The Guerrillas Are the Police", January 2020, url, p. 59.
836 Infobae, Así entrena el chavismo a civiles en el manejo de armas, 9 June 2019, url
837 InSight Crime, FBL/FPLN, 15 July 2019, url
838 InSight Crime, EPL, 14 March 2018, url
839 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, pp. 21-22.
840 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 22.
841 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 22
842 Fundación Reflejos de Venezuela, videoconference, 5 May 2020
843 Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana No. 037-19, 12 September 2019, url, p. 4
844 Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana No. 037-19, 12 September 2019, url, p. 4; International Crisis Group,
A Glut of Arms, 20 February 2020, url, p. 11

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chavista loyalists and leaders. 845 FundaRedes indicated that paramilitary successor groups operatingin Venezuela include Los Urabeños, Los Rastrojos, Las Águilas Negras 846, and Los Botas de Caucho. 847
The Gulf Clan (Clan del Golfo), also known Gaitanist Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AGC,
Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia) and as Los Urabeños, is a Colombian drug trafficking
organisation with paramilitary origins. 848 It is considered the strongest paramilitary successor group
operating in Colombia with approximately 2 500 combatants. 849 In the border with Venezuela, Clandel Golfo operates in the departments of Cesar, Norte de Santander, and La Guajira in alliance withlocal criminal groups for the purpose of drug trafficking. 850
Los Rastrojos is a Colombian drug trafficking organisation with paramilitary origins 851 that operates inseveral areas of the border, both on the Colombian and Venezuelan sides. 852 Los Rastrojos control
many aspects of the criminal activity at the border, including drug trafficking 853, human trafficking andsmuggling. 854 In Venezuela, Los Rastrojos operate with the support of Los Evander [also known as El
Evander], a Venezuelan 'paramilitary' group 855 that protects the networks and activities of Los
Rastrojos in the country. 856 Los Rastrojos also have a strong presence and control over illegal bordercrossings 857 between the Venezuelan states of Zulia, Táchira and Apure, and the Colombian
department of Norte de Santander. 858 El Espectador reports that Los Rastrojos has had a base ofoperations in Boca de Grita since 2018 to coordinate the smuggling of gasoline with the collaborationof members of the GNB. It also has an alliance with Los Pelusos to traffic drugs and arms, and carryout smuggling operations and extortions. 859 Los Rastrojos also extort in the municipalities of Boca deGrita, La Fría, Orope, Coloncito and Ureña, threaten those who file complaints with authorities, andkill Venezuelan migrants who do not pay the imposed fees' for crossing through one of the illegal
border crossings that they control. 860 Los Rastrojos have reportedly built wooden structures to crossthe border between Venezuela and Norte de Santander, and charge monthly fees to residents to crossto either side of the border. They also reportedly pay bribes to FANB commanders in the area to allow
the free transport of drugs and people. 861

845 International Crisis Group, A Glut of Arms, 20 February 2020, url, p. 11

846 Note: Águilas Negras (Black Eagles) was a paramilitary group that was dismantled around 2009 (Infobae, Quiénes son lasÁguilas Negras, el fantasma que aterroriza a Colombia, 30 June 2019, url). The group as such does not exist, according tosources (Infobae, Quiénes son las Águilas Negras, el fantasma que aterroriza a Colombia, 30 June 2019, url; Pares, ¿Qué sonlas Águilas Negras?, 29 December 2018, url). However, the name 'Águilas Negras' is used as a façade by criminal groups,
state agents, business persons, politicians or citizens to threaten, intimidate or kill and to deviate investigations (Pares, ¿Qué
son las Águilas Negras?, 29 December 2018, url).
847 FundaRedes, Más de 28 frentes de grupos irregulares armados colombianos operan en Venezuela, 13 May 2019, url
848 InSight Crime, Urabeños, 14 March 2018, url
849 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 41
850 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 13
851 InSight Crime, Rastrojos, 16 February 2017, url
852 Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana No. 037-19, 12 September 2019, url, p. 5; Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10
February 2020, url, p. 23
853 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 23
854 InSight Crime, Los Rastrojos enfrentan dos poderosos enemigos en frontera colombo-venezolana, 31 March 2020, url
855 Caraota Digital, El Evander, el brazo paramilitar de los Rastrojos que domina el oriente del país, 17 June 2019, url; Pares,
Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 23
856 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 23; infobae, Surgió un grupo paramilitar venezolano, 17 June 2019, url
857 El Universal, Tras cierre de frontera, grupos criminales lucran con venezolanos que cruzan a Colombia, 19 March 2019,
url; Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 23
858 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 23
859 El Espectador, Masacre en la frontera con Venezuela, 8 March 2020, url
860 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 24
861 InSight Crime, ¿Por qué Juan Guaidó pasó de Venezuela a Colombia con Los Rastrojos?, 19 September 2019, url

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La Línea, a criminal group that splintered from Clan del Golfo in 2013 and is based in Cúcuta 862,
operates illegal border crossings between San Antonio and Ureña (Táchira), and Cúcuta. 863 At theseborder crossings, La Línea has reportedly engaged in the extortion and forced recruitment ofVenezuelan migrants crossing into Colombia, contraband, homicides, massacres, and torture. 864
According to the Progress Foundation (Fundación Progresar865), La Línea, which has recruited
Venezuelan citizens into its ranks, is the most violent group present in the region. 866
The Sinaloa cartel, under the protection of the EPL and Los Rastrojos, use illegal border crossings at
Boca de Grita (Táchira) and Casigua El Cubo (Zulia) to transport drugs from Colombia into Venezuela. 867
The Sinaloa cartel reportedly operates with the ELN in the state of Zulia to fit cattle fields as illegal
landing strips. 868 Drug cartels reportedly force cattle ranchers and landowners in border states toconsent to the use of their lands as landing fields to traffic with drugs under the threat of spurious
legal prosecution accusations for drug trafficking 869, death or forced displacement. 870 The Jalisco New
Generation (Jalisco Nueva Generación) cartel also operates at the border transporting drugs from El
Tarra (Norte de Santander) into Venezuela. 871
La Zona and Los Chacones are two pranes that originated in Venezuelan jails, and in alliances withother criminal groups, they engage in killings by contract, street-level drug dealing, trafficking of
weapons, and the contraband of cattle and gasoline from Venezuela into Colombia. They also extort
Venezuelan migrants crossing into Colombia at illegal border crossings. 872 La Zona engages in theextortion of people who informally transport goods across the border goods. The Colombian Office of
the Ombudsperson also indicates the presence of Los Mercenarios, a criminal gang that operates on
the border, and is involved in kidnappings, robberies and homicides. 873
El Tren de Aragua is a transnational criminal band based in Táchira with presence in Colombia, Brazil,
and Peru. 874 It engages in the trafficking of women for sexual exploitation from Venezuela into
Colombia by offering false job opportunities, 875 and controls irregular border crossings with theColombian municipality of Villa del Rosario (Norte de Santander). 876 El Tren de Aragua made inroads
into Colombia with the support of Clan del Golfo, 877 although it also cooperates with Los Rastrojos forthe commission of crimes. 878

862 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 30

863 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 30; El Espectador, Los desaparecidos que nadie busca en la frontera con

Venezuela, 3 August 2019, url
864 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 30
865 Fundación Progresar is a Colombian NGO that promotes the protection of human rights in nort-eastern Colombia andalongside the Colombian border with Venezuela. The NGO has an observatory of human rights and produces reports onviolence, democracy, vulnerable communities, among others (Fundación Progresar, ¿Quiénes somos?, n.d., url).
866 El Espectador, Los desaparecidos que nadie busca en la frontera con Venezuela, 3 August 2019, url
867 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 29
868 InSight Crime, Sinaloa: Un visitante que llegó para quedarse en Venezuela, 3 April 2020, url
869 InSight Crime, Sinaloa: Un visitante que llegó para quedarse en Venezuela, 3 April 2020, url; El Pitazo, El narcotráfico
construye pistas clandestinas en fincas zulianas, 12 January 2020, url
870 El Pitazo, El narcotráfico construye pistas clandestinas en fincas zulianas, 12 January 2020, url
871 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 29
872 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 13, 39
873 Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana No. 039-19, 16 September 2019, url, p. 6
874 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 29
875 Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana No. 037-19, 12 September 2019, url, pp. 7-8; Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10
February 2020, url, p. 29
876 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 29
877 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 29
878 Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana No. 037-19, 12 September 2019, url, p. 7

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4.1.3 Cartel of the Suns (Cartel de los Soles)
The UN International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) indicated that the Cartel of the Suns is an
informal network of government security officials that have been infiltrated by irregular armed groups
in Venezuela to facilitate the transit of drugs into and out of the country. 879 Similarly, Colombia Reports
indicated that the Cartel of the Suns is a loosely organised group of members of the Venezuelan armed
forces that engages in drug trafficking, human trafficking and smuggling at the border. 880 This group is
not considered a 'cartel' in the traditional sense of the word; rather, it is a conglomeration of factions
within the armed forces that function as drug trafficking organisations. 881 Drug trafficking networks
reportedly bribe members of the Venezuelan military to transport drugs from Colombia through to
Margarita Island. 882

4.1.4 Domestic criminal bands
4.1.4.1 Pranes
Pranes are gang leaders that operate from Venezuelan prisons. 883 Activities include drug trafficking,extortion 884, kidnapping and killings by contract 885, and inside the prisons they are engaged in the
selling of alcohol, drugs and food, and the operation of prostitution rings. 886 They also control illegal
border crossings with the department of La Guajira, and they have influence in the municipality ofMaicao. 887 They are expanding and strengthening social and territorial control in the Colombian side. 888
The firepower of pranes usually consist of assault rifles, hand guns and grenades that are smuggled
into the prisons with the complicity of the GNB and security guards at the perimeter. 889
Transparencia Venezuela provided the following structure of a pran gang:••••

Pran: Leader
Carro [translated as 'car']: Gang members that accompany the leader
Luceros [translated as 'stars']: Second in the hierarchy and are considered as the 'colonels' of thegang
Soldados [translated as 'soldiers']: The other members of the gang, and are dedicated to charging
prisoners with the 'causa' or the 'fee' that prisoners must pay to gang, or acting as 'gariteros'[translated as 'sentries'] to oversee the strategic sites in the prison or as hit-men against those
who challenge the gang. 890

879 UN, INCB, Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2019, url, para. 578

880 Colombia Reports, The Group that could sink Colombia's dispute with Venezuela into utter chaos, 9 March 2019, url

881 InSight Crime, Cartel of the Suns, 31 October 2016, url; Colombia Reports, The Group that could sink Colombia's disputewith Venezuela into utter chaos, 9 March 2019, url
882 InSight Crime, Narcotráfico usa la isla de Margarita, 4 December 2019, url
883 International Crisis Group, A Glut of Arms, 20 February 2020, url, p. 13; Transparencia Venezuela, Crimen organizado ycorrupción en Venezuela: Un problema de Estado, July 2020, url, p. 16
884 International Crisis Group, A Glut of Arms, 20 February 2020, url, p. 13; Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana
No. 039-19, 16 September 2019, url, p. 5
885 Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana No. 039-19, 16 September 2019, url, p.5
886 Transparencia Venezuela, Crimen organizado y corrupción en Venezuela: Un problema de Estado, July 2020, url, p. 17
887 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 13; Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana No. 039-19, 16
September 2019, url, p. 17
888 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 13; Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana No. 039-19, 16
September 2019, url, p. 17
889 Transparencia Venezuela, Crimen organizado y corrupción en Venezuela: Un problema de Estado, July 2020, url, p. 17
890 Transparencia Venezuela, Crimen organizado y corrupción en Venezuela: Un problema de Estado, July 2020, url, p. 17

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4.1.4.2 Megabandas
Megabandas are criminal organisations dedicated to drug trafficking, extortion and kidnapping. 891
These groups do not have a political ideology and control a defined territory, either rural or urban. 892
According to OVV, megabandas have links with regional governments and control de distribution of
CLAP food boxes in low-income neighbourhoods in the areas that they control. 893 They operate
throughout the country 894, mainly in the states of Miranda, Guárico, Carabobo, Aragua, Zulia, Bolívar,Táchira and in the capital Caracas, and exert control over much of the country's underworld. 895 These
organisations have been extending to other countries, like Tren de Aragua which has reported
presence in Colombia and Peru. 896
According to InSight Crime, as of May 2018, there were between 12 and 16 megabandas with about
300 members. 897 Transparencia Venezuela indicated that by 2017 there were 19 megabandas, but thatthe number has increased since then.898 According to sources, megabandas work in collaboration withpranes to carry out illegal activities. 899
Megabandas consist of 50 to 60 members, although some consist of 'hundreds', and their line ofcommand is very hierarchical. The structure of megabandas, according to Transparencia Venezuela
consists of the following:••••

Cabecilla or principal [translated as 'leader']: The name of the megabanda is usually the nicknameof the leader.
Lugartenientes or luceros [translated as 'deputies' or 'stars']: One to three individuals who
accompany the leader.
Soldados [translated as 'soldiers']: Lower hierarchy members.
Gatilleros [translated as 'hit-men']: Usually consist of young people, including minors, who surveil
the entrances of the territory controlled by the megabanda. 900

4.1.4.3 Sindicatos 901
Sindicatos are criminal groups that originated in the construction industry but that since the economiccrisis, they have been engaged with illegal mining and other criminal activities, competing with othercriminal organisations such as the ELN. 902 According to the Colombian Office of the Ombudsperson,
members of Venezuelan gangs have been migrating to Colombia, including in municipalities at theborder area, and carry out drug and arms trafficking, killings-by-contract, and extortion of Venezuelan
migrants. 903 The same source indicates that armed civilian groups from Venezuela have recently

891 International Crisis Group, A Glut of Arms, 20 February 2020, url, p. 13; Transparencia Venezuela, Crimen organizado ycorrupción en Venezuela: Un problema de Estado, July 2020, url, p. 8
892 Transparencia Venezuela, Crimen organizado y corrupción en Venezuela: Un problema de Estado, July 2020, url, p. 8
893 OVV, videoconference, 4 May 2020
894 International Crisis Group, A Glut of Arms, 20 February 2020, url, p. 13; InSight Crime, Venezuela: A Mafia State?, [2018],
url, p. 8
895 InSight Crime, Venezuela: A Mafia State?, [2018], url, pp. 5-6, 8
896 Transparencia Venezuela, Crimen organizado y corrupción en Venezuela: Un problema de Estado, July 2020, url, p. 10897 InSight Crime, Venezuela: A Mafia State?, [2018], url, p. 8
898 Transparencia Venezuela, Crimen organizado y corrupción en Venezuela: Un problema de Estado, July 2020, url, p. 8
899 InSight Crime, Venezuela: A Mafia State?, [2018], url, p. 8; International Crisis Group, A Glut of Arms, 20 February 2020,
url, p. 13
900 Transparencia Venezuela, Crimen organizado y corrupción en Venezuela: Un problema de Estado, July 2020, url, p. 9
901 Note: The sindicatos [which translates as 'labour unions'] criminal groups are not associated in any way or form withlabour unions (Transparencia Venezuela, Crimen organizado y corrupción en Venezuela: Un problema de Estado, July 2020,
url, p. 11).
902 International Crisis Group, A Glut of Arms, 20 February 2020, url, p. 14
903 Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana No. 039-19, 16 September 2019, url, p.5

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS— 89

performed 'de facto functions of security, intelligence gathering and repression' on Venezuelan
citizens on the Colombian side of the border, particularly in Maicao (La Guajira). 904
Transparencia Venezuela pointed to the existence of construction and oil industry sindicatos that
extort both workers to 'help' them obtain jobs, and managers at construction sites and oil refineries
to hire the workers and to buy industrial material from companies imposed by the sindicatos. There
have been reported cases of construction workers and managers at construction sites being killed bysindicatos for not paying the extortion. Sindicatos in the mining industry control several illegal mining
fields, determine who works in these fields and established their own rules and regulations. Between
2016 and 2019, over 40 massacres have taken place in the mining fields of Bolívar. 905

4.2 Main human rights violations
Human rights violations most reported in the border area include forced displacement, threats,
massacres, dismembering of victims, homicides, and sexual violence, and forced labour. 906
Between 2017 and 2019, 378 Venezuelan migrants have been killed on the Colombian side of theborder with Venezuela. 907 According to a preliminary report by the National Institute of Legal Medicine
and Forensic Sciences (INMLCF, Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses) of Colombia,
in 2019, 261 Venezuelans were killed in the Colombian departments that border with Venezuela, withthe highest numbers in Norte de Santander (142 victims), Arauca (48), and La Guajira (45). 908
Sources report instances of people killed on the Venezuelan side of the border and their bodies later
dropped on the Colombian side. 909 Human Rights Watch indicated that, according to human rights
officials in Arauca, some victims are summoned to irregular armed groups' camps on the Venezuelanside to kill them before they drop their bodies in Arauca. 910 On 8 March 2020, sources reported thateight people were killed in the municipality of La Fría (Táchira) in a dispute of the ELN and colectivos
with Los Rastrojos, and later dropped in Cúcuta. 911 According to the Colombian Office of the
Ombudsperson, due to an incident of infighting within Los Rastrojos, members who seek the controlof the group, summoned to the border area between Puert Santander (Colombia) and Boca de Grita(Venezuela) the wives and partners of several members of that organisation around 18 June 2019 andsexually abused, tortured, killed, and forcibly disappeared them. 912
Venezuelan migrants, particularly women and children, are trafficked for sexual exploitation, forced
labour, and forced recruitment by armed groups at the border. 913 Irregular armed groups that forcibly
recruit women for sexual exploitation include the EPL 914, Los Rastrojos, and Tren de Aragua. 915 Sourcesindicated that Venezuelan women are trafficked into sexual exploitation in the border with Venezuela

904 Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana No. 039-19, 16 September 2019, url, p.5

905 Transparencia Venezuela, Crimen organizado y corrupción en Venezuela: Un problema de Estado, July 2020, url, pp. 11-

12906 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 31
907 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 6.

908 Colombia, INMLCF, Lesiones fatales de ciudadanos venezolanos en Colombia, 2020, url

909 HRW, "The Guerrillas Are the Police", January 2020, url, p. 15; AFP, Ocho personas muertas por massacre en frontera, 8

March 2020, url; Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana No. 037-19, 12 September 2019, url, p. 7
910 HRW, "The Guerrillas Are the Police", January 2020, url, p. 15
911 AFP, Ocho personas muertas por massacre en frontera, 8 March 2020, url; El Espectador, Masacre en la frontera con
Venezuela, 8 March 2020, url
912 Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana No. 037-19, 12 September 2019, url, p. 8
913 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, pp. 22-23; UN OHCHR, Oral Update on the Human Rights Situation in the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 9 September 2019, url; HRW, "The Guerrillas Are the Police", January 2020, url, p. 12.
914 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, pp. 23, 29
915 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, pp. 23, 29; Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana No. 037-19, 12
September 2019, url, pp. 7-8

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by offering false employment opportunities 916 or forcing them to sell sex. 917 There are instances inwhich their identity documents are withheld 918, subjected to 'multiple abuses' 919, and forced to pay
with their work the clothing, food and 'housing' they receive, which in some cases the debt incurred
is so exorbitant that women are never able to pay off. 920 In some cases, exploited women are usedamong irregular armed groups as 'currency' in their dealings. 921
InSight Crime indicated that cases of sexual exploitation of Venezuelan migrant minors are 'morefrequent', and that these cases have expanded not only alongside the border but in other departmentsof Colombia. 922 On 7 October 2019, Colombian news magazine Semana reported that authorities inthe department of La Guajira dismantled a network made up of eight Colombians and two
Venezuelans that drugged Venezuelan minors between the ages of 14 and 17 to sexually exploit them.
The same source quotes authorities in Colombia as indicating that the network used to take advantageof the economic situation of the minors to recruit them in exchange for money, food and housing. 923
Sources indicated that forced disappearances occur at the border with Colombia 924, and it takes place
both at official and informal border crossings. 925 Most of the victims are young people, includingchildren 926, and Venezuelan migrants 927, particularly women. 928 Colombian newspaper El Espectador
cited the Association of Relatives of the Detained and Disappeared (ASFADDES, Asociación de
Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos 929) as indicating that forced disappearance of Venezuelan
citizens is mostly related with cases of human trafficking of women and girls for sexual exploitation,and forced recruitment of men by irregular armed groups. 930
Most executions and forced disappearances occur at the border since, due to the absence of migration
controls and the lack of cooperation between the authorities of both countries, investigations and thesearch and recovery of bodies is difficult. 931 Also, complaints are not filed in cases of forced
disappearances out of fear of reprisals. 932 According to Fundación Progresar, mass graves with people
who were presumably disappeared have been located on both sides of the border, and that according
to local residents in Norte de Santander at the border with Venezuela, forced disappearances occur
with the knowledge of Colombian and Venezuelan authorities that remain silent and refuse to act. 933
The exact number of cases is difficult to determine, and although there are 'many' unreported cases,

916 Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana No. 037-19, 12 September 2019, url, pp. 7-8; HRW, "The Guerrillas Are

the Police", January 2020, url, p. 35
917 HRW, "The Guerrillas Are the Police", January 2020, url, p. 35
918 HRW, "The Guerrillas Are the Police", January 2020, url, p. 35; Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana No. 03719, 12 September 2019, url, pp. 7-8
919 Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana No. 037-19, 12 September 2019, url, p. 8
920 HRW, "The Guerrillas Are the Police", January 2020, url, p. 35; El Poder, Huir hacia el infierno - Parte II: trata de personasen frontera con Venezuela, 12 March 2020, url, 9:30
921 El Poder, Huir hacia el infierno - Parte II: trata de personas en frontera con Venezuela, 12 March 2020, url, 9:30
922 InSight Crime, Migración aumenta casos de explotación sexual infantil en Colombia, 16 October 2019, url
923 Semana, Aberrante: banda drogaba y disfrazaba niños venezolanos para venderlos sexualmente, 7 October 2019, url
924 Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana No. 037-19, 12 September 2019, url, pp. 8-9; Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10
February 2020, url, p. 31
925 Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana No. 037-19, 12 September 2019, url, p. 8
926 Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana No. 037-19, 12 September 2019, url, pp. 8-9
927 Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana No. 037-19, 12 September 2019, url, p. 9; Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10
February 2020, url, p. 31
928 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 31
929 ASFADDES is a Colombian NGO that advocates for justice in cases of persons who have been forcibly disappeared. The
organisation provides accompaniment to families of victims in their search for their relatives, including psychological andlegal assistance, and in cases where the victims is found dead, assistance in their identification and restitution of remains(ASFADDES, Objetivos Institucionales, 2 May 2018, url).
930 El Espectador, Los desaparecidos que nadie busca en la frontera con Venezuela, 3 August 2019, url
931 Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana No. 037-19, 12 September 2019, url, pp. 8-9
932 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 31
933 El Espectador, Los desaparecidos que nadie busca en la frontera con Venezuela, 3 August 2019, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS— 91

between January and September 2019 up to six people have been reported as 'disappeared'. 934
El Espectador reported that, according to Fundación Progresar, 32 Venezuelan citizens have beenreported as 'disappeared' in Norte de Santander in 2018. 935
Irregular armed groups engage in forced displacement of local populations in order to expand
territorial control and influence. 936 Sources indicated that armed groups in Apure kidnap farmers totake over their land. 937 FundaRedes indicated that, in Zulia, about 28 landowners have been forced by
the ELN to leave their lands in order to expand their territorial footing.938 An oral update on the humanrights situation in Venezuela by the UN OHCHR indicates that between 22 and 23 November 2019,
eight people were killed in a Pemón indigenous community, state of Bolívar, by an illegal armed groupthat seeks the seizure of land in that territory for illegal mining activities. 939
Displacement also takes place in the context of armed confrontations among irregular armed
groups. 940 Europa Press reported that an armed confrontation between the ELN and Los Rastrojos in
Boca de Grita led to the displacement of between 300 and 500 people to Puerto Santander (Norte deSantander), on the Colombian side. 941 On 22 June 2019, around 1 000 people from Boca de Grita, stateof Táchira, crossed the border into Colombia after rumours were spreading that armed confrontations
among irregular armed groups were going to take place in the area. Families reportedly returned to
Boca de Grita out of fear that confrontations would spill over the Colombian side. Armed
confrontations had reportedly taken place on 18 June 2019 in Boca de Grita, leaving at least 12 deadand 15 wounded, including members of Los Rastrojos who fled to Colombia to seek medical assistance
before being captured. 942
Irregular armed groups recruit Venezuelan migrants crossing into Colombia through informal bordercrossings. 943 According to Colombian military officers, some irregular armed groups on the border haveup to 30 % combatants of Venezuelan origin, with some of them killed during security operations
carried out by the Colombian military in border areas. 944 According to FundaRedes, in 2018 there wereabout 15 000 Venezuelans working directly or indirectly for irregular armed groups. 945Sourcesindicated that irregular armed groups recruit children on both sides of the border 946, including guerrillagroups that train them in camps on the Venezuelan side. 947 Recruitment of minors takes place throughthe organisation of soccer games 948, or through the offerings of money, drugs and power. 949
Recruitment is facilitated due to the humanitarian situation in Venezuela where young migrants
become vulnerable to irregular armed groups 950 to the point that many join voluntarily. 951

934 Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana No. 037-19, 12 September 2019, url, p. 8

935 El Espectador, Los desaparecidos que nadie busca en la frontera con Venezuela, 3 August 2019, url
936 FundaRedes, videoconference, 6 May 2020; Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 71

937 HRW, "The Guerrillas Are the Police", January 2020, url, p. 20; FundaRedes, videoconference, 6 May 2020
938 FundaRedes, videoconference, 6 May 2020

939 UN OHCHR, Venezuela: Commissioner Bachelet details plans for new human rights assistance, 18 December 2019, url
940 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 21

941 Europa Press, Colombia.- Violentos combates entre el ELN y Los Rastrojos, 16 February 2020, url
942 Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana No. 037-19, 12 September 2019, url, pp. 5-6

943 Reuters, EXCLUSIVA-Grupos armados colombianos seducen a venezolanos desesperados, 20 June 2019, url; FundaRedes,

videoconference, 6 May 2020
944 Reuters, EXCLUSIVA-Grupos armados colombianos seducen a venezolanos desesperados, 20 June 2019, url
945 FundaRedes, Grupos armados irregulars explotan a niños y adolescentes venezolanos en la frontera, 16 December 2019,url
946 FundaRedes, Grupos armados irregulars explotan a niños y adolescentes venezolanos en la frontera, 16 December 2019,
url; HRW, "The Guerrillas Are the Police", January 2020, url, p. 17
947 HRW, "The Guerrillas Are the Police", January 2020, url, p. 17; FundaRedes, videoconference, 6 May 2020
948 HRW, "The Guerrillas Are the Police", January 2020, url, p. 18
949 FundaRedes, videoconference, 6 May 2020
950 VOA, El 44% de las tropas del ELN ya residen en Venezuela, 8 November 2019, url
951 FundaRedes, videoconference, 6 May 2020

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FundaRedes reported that, according to field research conducted in Zulia, Táchira and Apure, local
teachers indicated that in 2019 the dropout rates from school reached 78 %. Most children who
dropped out are boys between 8 and 12 years-old, who, due to the economic crisis and lack of food,join irregular armed groups, including the ELN, EPL, FPLN and FARC dissidents, that pay about US 16
per day. Children are reportedly recruited to carry out activities such as the smuggling of gasoline
across the border, drug trafficking and extortion. 952
According to accounts provided in a Human Rights Watch report, FARC dissidents in Arauca engage inkidnapping of local residents and then smuggled into Venezuela, passing through checkpoints of the
GNB without being stopped. Other accounts noted that FARC dissidents summoned a 31-year-old
Venezuelan man to their camp in Apure and forced him to work without pay as a cook for two months
before making a scape, and a Colombian man who after having an altercation with a member of the
ELN in a bar in Arauca, was taken by the ELN to a camp in Apure and forced to work for seven months
on a farm before being released. 953

4.3 State response to border security
Actions by security forces against irregular armed groups, as reported by sources, included:
•

•
•
•

On 7 April 2020, the government indicated that two people were killed by the FANB during anarmed clash with Los Rastrojos around the municipality of Boca del Grita, state of Táchira.
According to the national government political representative in the state of Táchira, authorities
are 'battling' the incursion of COVID-19 and paramilitary successor groups into the country inparallel. 954
On 26 March 2020, nine members of Tren de Aragua were killed in an operation conducted by
security forces including the CICPC and the FAES, in Maracay, state of Aragua. 955
On 8 February 2020, the Venezuelan army killed six members of Los Rastrojos in the municipalityof Ayacucho, state of Táchira. 956
On 15 November 2019, El Nacional reported a joint operation between the GNB and the CICPC led
to the killing of two members of Tren de Aragua in the state of Miranda. 957

Members of security forces, including at the border areas with Colombia, have been increasingly
involved in organised crime. 958 Venezuelan security forces have tolerated and colluded with irregular
armed groups 959 due to the weakening of its operational power and territorial presence. 960 Similarly,
the UN OHCHR indicates that 'migrants who are leaving or re-entering Venezuela are often victims ofextortion and requisitions, especially at the hands of the GNB'. 961 The International Crisis Group report
indicates that guerrillas rely on the cooperation of state security forces to transport and export gold,
who in turn 'take sizeable cuts of revenues'. 962 Human Rights Watch indicates that, according to victims

952 FundaRedes, Grupos armados irregulars explotan a niños y adolescentes venezolanos en la frontera, 16 December 2019,url

953 HRW, "The Guerrillas Are the Police", January 2020, url, pp. 22-23

954 La Prensa de Lara, Abatidos dos paramilitares en la frontera con Colombia, 7 April 2020, url
955 El Pitazo, Cicpc y Faes matan a nueve miembros del Tren de Aragua, 26 March 2020, url

956 El Colombiano, Muertos seis presuntos integrantes de los "rastrojos" en frontera venezolana, 10 February 2020, url
957 El Nacional, Muertos dos integrantes de la banda Tren de Aragua, 15 November 2019., url
958 WOLA, Beyond the Narcostate Narrative, March 2020, url, p.7

959 International Crisis Group, A Glut of Arms, 20 February 2020, url, p. 2; HRW, "The Guerrillas Are the Police", January 2020,

url, p. 47
960 International Crisis Group, A Glut of Arms, 20 February 2020, url, pp. 2-3
961 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 73.
962 International Crisis Group, A Glut of Arms, 20 February 2020, url, p. 6.

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS— 93

and human rights officials it consulted, the GNB work with irregular armed groups to extort people
taking goods across the border with Colombia. 963
Security forces have carried out 'massive' raids against megabandas, perpetrating widespread humanrights violations in the process. These efforts, however, have failed to reduce megabandas' power. In
an effort to pacify Caracas and demobilise these structures, the government has 'favoured' thecreation of 'peace zones' (zonas de paz) and non-aggression pacts between state security forces andcriminal groups. 964 In some low-income areas of the country with high crime rates, the government
established these agreements with local criminal gangs to perform the tasks of community safety due
to the absence of the government, and these groups exert control over these communities. 965
According to OVV, these 'peace zones' represent a 'formal surrender of state sovereignty to criminalgroups and colectivos where they exercise complete territorial control and carry out the functions of
the state'. 966 The Professor of Political Science indicated that these 'peace zones' are mostly located in
Caracas, in the neighbourhoods José Félix Ribas, 23 de Enero, and La Cota 905, among others. 967

Map 6: Peace zones in Venezuela in 2018 ©InSight Crime CC BY-NC 3.0 968

963 HRW, "The Guerrillas Are the Police", January 2020, url, pp. 47-48.

964 International Crisis Group, A Glut of Arms, 20 February 2020, url, pp. 13-14.
965 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020
966 OVV, videoconference, 4 May 2020

967 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020

968 Peace Zones in Venezuela [map], in: InSight Crime, Venezuela: A Mafia State?, [2018], url, p. 9

94 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS

Sources pointed out the lack of access to justice in border areas where criminal groups exert territorial
control'. 969 FundaRedes indicated that the Office of the Ombudsperson often refuses to investigate
and sends the complainant to the Public Ministry, which does not conduct proper investigations. 970
According to Human Rights Watch, 'accountability for abuses by armed groups in Apure may beminimal, if not absent altogether' due to the lack of judicial independence, the non-reporting of crimes
out of fear of retaliation, and, in the case of Apure, the difficulty of accessing the justice system as it
is concentrated in the municipalities of Guasdualito and San Fernando. 971 According to the Colombian
Office of the Ombudsperson, these activities 'consolidate a tacit law of silence' whereby people do
not file complaints out of fear of reprisals. 972 More generally, the UN OHCHR reported that 'theAttorney's General Office, the courts and the Ombudsperson, usually do not conduct prompt,
effective, thorough, independent, impartial and transparent investigations into human rights
violations and other crimes committed by State actors, bring perpetrators to justice, and protect
victims and witnesses'. 973
Sources noted that Venezuelan migrants on the Colombian side do not report crimes committed
against them out of fear of being deported974 or facing reprisals. 975 The UN OHCHR further reported
that 'corruption, impunity, and lack of adequate care services' prevent migrants from filingcomplaints. 976 Human Rights Watch indicated that the Colombian some police have reportedly
physically abused Venezuelans in Arauca and 'failed to protect' when local residents attacked
Venezuelans. 977

969 Mármol, videoconference, 1 May 2020; FundaRedes, videoconference, 6 May 2020
970 FundaRedes, videoconference, 6 May 2020

971 HRW, "The Guerrillas Are the Police", January 2020, url, p. 48

972 Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, Alerta Temprana No. 037-19, 12 September 2019, url, pp. 6-7
973 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 33

974 HRW, "The Guerrillas Are the Police", January 2020, url, pp. 40-41; UN OHCHR, Oral Update on the Human Rights Situationin the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 9 September 2019, url
975 UN OHCHR, Oral Update on the Human Rights Situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 9 September 2019, url
976 UN OHCHR, Oral Update on the Human Rights Situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 9 September 2019, url
977 HRW, "The Guerrillas Are the Police", January 2020, url, p. 43

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5. Colectivos
Opinions on what colectivos currently represent in Venezuela differ markedly. 978 On one hand, thegovernment considers colectivos as 'angels of socialism', 'organisations created for the good of thecommunity [that] work for society, for the sick, for peace, and against crime' 979, 'front line organisers
for his socialist revolution' 980, and as 'agricultural workers'. 981 Maduro has defended colectivos on
public broadcast 982 and has requested them 'to take to the streets "to every corner to defend the
Revolution"'. 983 They are also called 'peace crews' ['cuadrillas de paz']. 984 On the other hand, colectivos
are described by sources as 'paramilitary groups'985; 'vigilante groups'; 'pro-government militias';'brutal para-police enforcers' 986; groups that are 'part motorcycle club, part death squad' 987; and an'unofficial' police force 988. Mouttet similarly indicated that the term 'colectivos' is, for the opposition,
any chavista group in arms. 989
However, colectivos are not homogeneous 990 and not all of them act as 'paramilitary' forces. 991 Thereare colectivos that do community work and promote government social programs 992 such as theoperation of community radio stations, the organisation of sport activities for at-risk youth, thedistribution of cash bonuses and the CLAPs that are sent by the government, and the organisation of
local staple markets at lower prices. 993 A group of women, for example, can be dedicated to the
advocacy of women rights and be considered a colectivo without resorting to violence or taking up
arms. In this sense, the term cannot be assigned a sole definition as it is not concretely determined. 994
According to Mouttet, it would be more useful to refer to colectivos as 'armed groups' 995 rather thancolectivos. 996
According to Velasco, 'the term "colectivo" has been used for an 'infinite variety' of purposes to thepoint of losing its descriptive substance'. The idea of the colectivo has taken a very powerful force inthe social imagery for what it actually is. 997 The International Crisis Group also indicated that 'bothcolectivos’ opponents and their defenders tend to attribute almost mythical dimensions to theirimportance'. 998

978 International Crisis Group, A Glut of Arms, 20 February 2020, url, p. 7; NIUS, Así son los colectivos 'chavistas' al servicio

de Maduro, 22 February 2020, url
979 Al Jazeera, Venezuela: Who are the colectivos?, 9 May 2019, url
980 CNN, The Venezuelan radio host leading an armed 'colectivo', 24 May 2019, url
981 Clarín, “Brazo armado” Venezuela, 5 April 2019, url
982 InSight Crime, Maduro Relies on 'Colectivos' to Stand Firm in Venezuela, 18 March 2019, url; Al Jazeera, Venezuela: Who
are the colectivos?, 9 May 2019, url
983 Al Jazeera, Venezuela: Who are the colectivos?, 9 May 2019, url
984 Clarín, “Brazo armado” Venezuela, 5 April 2019, url; Efecto Cocuyo, Así funcionan las "cuadrillas de paz", 7 April 2019, url
985 Infobae, Radiografía de los colectivos chavistas, 11 January 2020, url; PROVEA, Colectivos se fortalecen con la anuenciadel Estado, 2 April 2019, url
986 International Crisis Group, A Glut of Arms, 20 February 2020, url, pp. Principal Findings, i, 7
987 CNN, The Venezuelan radio host leading an armed 'colectivo', 24 May 2019, url
988 Al Jazeera, Venezuela: Who are the colectivos?, 9 May 2019, url; VICE, How Venezuela's Fearsome "Colectivos" Help Keep
Maduro in Power, 7 July 2019, url
989 Mouttet, videoconference, 8 May 2020
990 OVV, videoconference, 4 May 2020
991 Al Jazeera, Venezuela: Who are the colectivos?, 9 May 2019, url
992 Al Jazeera, Venezuela: Who are the colectivos?, 9 May 2019, url; Mouttet, videoconference, 8 May 2020
993 NIUS, Así son los colectivos 'chavistas' al servicio de Maduro, 22 February 2020, url
994 Mouttet, videoconference, 8 May 2020
995 Given the variety of types of colectivos, this report is focused on 'armed colectivos' and tries, to the extent possible, referto these groups as such.
996 Mouttet, videoconference, 8 May 2020
997 Velasco, videoconference, 1 May 2020
998 International Crisis Group, A Glut of Arms, 20 February 2020, url, p. 7

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The International Crisis Group indicated that colectivos 'have gained prominence as Venezuela's
political conflict has intensified'. 999 Colectivos exert political and social control in neighbourhoods 1000in the name of the 'Bolivarian revolution'. 1001 They have become instrumental in the use of coercive
control over protests 1002 through the use of violence and often in coordination with security forces. 1003
According to InSight Crime, the use of colectivos to attack the political opposition diverts responsibility
for human rights violations away from the government, at the time that they have grown increasingly
armed throughout the years and are prone to engage in criminal activities. 1004 The colectivos, alongside
the FAES and the Bolivarian militia, are considered the 'armed wing' of Maduro's government. 1005 They
have also been linked to organised criminal activities 1006 and some reportedly have alliances with the
ELN in the border area with Colombia. 1007 International Crisis Group indicated that the rise of colectivos
and the ELN at the border is an expression of a 'certain distrust by the Venezuelan government of its
own security forces, their loyalty, and integrity of some parts of these forces'. 1008 Velasco similarly
indicated that Maduro's reliance on colectivos is due to his mistrust in the military forces to carry out
repression of demonstrators and inside low-income communities. 1009 International Crisis Group also
pointed that 'the greater the geopolitical pressure against Venezuela, and the greater the threat of amilitary intervention; the more Venezuela feels alone and beleaguered, and the more it will resort toa wider array of armed groups in an effort to defend the regime'. 1010

5.1 Types of colectivos and activities
Velasco identifies three types of colectivos. The first type emerged in the 1980s and had ideologicalties with guerrilla groups that had been operating since the 1960s. These colectivos were ideologicallyand politically independent and had military training and the double purpose of 'cleansing thecommunities' from criminals and drug addicts and establishing political and ideological ties with theyouth. When Chávez took office in 1999, a second type of colectivos emerged that were closely
identified with Chávez's government, while keeping ties with the first colectivos. These colectivos were
not as independent as their predecessors, and were considered by the government as an important
tool to reach out to low-income communities to deliver government programs and services. They
received financing from the government, and the more the government grew, the more powerfulcolectivos became, including in the participation in the monopoly of violence. 1011 Chávez legitimised
colectivos and provided them with resources to gain their loyalty. 1012 However, when Chávez died,their loyalty extended to Maduro. 1013 Given the economic crisis that started to affect Venezuela andthe lower amount of resources that colectivos started to receive from the government, a third type of

999 International Crisis Group, A Glut of Arms, 20 February 2020, url, p. 71000 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 32; Al Jazeera, Venezuela: Who

are the colectivos?, 9 May 2019, url
1001 Infobae, Radiografía de los colectivos chavistas, 11 January 2020, url; Al Jazeera, Venezuela: Who are the colectivos?, 9
May 2019, url
1002 International Crisis Group, A Glut of Arms, 20 February 2020, url, p. 7; UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republicof Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 32
1003 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5 July 2019, url, para. 39
1004 InSight Crime, The Armed Groups Propping Up Venezuela's Government, 1 March 2019, url
1005 Clarín, “Brazo armado” Venezuela, 5 April 2019, url
1006 International Crisis Group, A Glut of Arms, 20 February 2020, url, p. 81007 Blue Radio, Ocho personas muertas por masacre en frontera, 8 March 2020, url; Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020,
url, p. 81008 International Crisis Group, telephone interview, 30 April 2020
1009 Velasco, videoconference, 1 May 2020
1010 International Crisis Group, telephone interview, 30 April 2020
1011 Velasco, videoconference, 1 May 2020
1012 VICE, How Venezuela's Fearsome "Colectivos" Help Keep Maduro in Power, 7 July 2019, url
1013 Velasco, videoconference, 1 May 2020; VICE, How Venezuela's Fearsome "Colectivos" Help Keep Maduro in Power, 7July 2019, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS— 97

colectivos emerged with an increasing role in security tasks. These colectivos became a source of
security for the government, a 'shock force', faced with increasing social conflict anddemonstrations.1014 Mouttet pointed out that the first wave of colectivos were more involved in social
work inside the neighbourhoods, and the second wave, with Chávez in power, became more involvedin the 'Bolivarian revolution', while the third wave include security forces disguised as colectivos tocarry out security operations. 1015
The International Crisis Group identifies three categories of colectivos: The first consist of groups thatemerged in the 1970s and 1980s with a left-wing ideology committed to the improvement ofcommunity life through public policy, cultural activities and against police repression, but that later
became more close to Maduro to defend against 'imperialist forces'. An example is the Coordinadora
Simón Bolívar in the 23 de Enero neighbourhood in Caracas. The second category are 'opportunists
and criminals who use their supposed affiliation with chavismo to gain legitimacy and act with
impunity'. The Frente 5 de Marzo is an example of this category. These colectivos have links to security
forces and the political elite, although they also engage in activities such as extortion. They also engage
in some community work to win support, and although they are at 'loggerheads' with politicallyoriented colectivos, both come together 'in moments of crisis' to 'defend the "revolution" and follow
government dictates"'. The third category consists of 'paramilitary' and 'para-police' units that are'directly related to the state and are often the creations of politicians or senior government officials,
which use them as private shock forces'. These colectivos 'do not always have a territorial base andusually coexist with the other two types at state-organised events and initiatives', and colectivos ofthis sort like Tres Raíces in the 23 de Enero neighbourhood, have allegedly executed joint operations
with the FAES. 1016
According to PROVEA, Tres Raíces, one of the most powerful colectivos in terms of weaponry, has
about 180 members and owns a textile company and a radio station in the neighbourhood 23 de
Enero. This colectivo reportedly possessed a list of CLAP beneficiaries, surveilled the community,
controlled the sales of local businesses, extorted, kidnapped and, according to some residents,
committed homicides of rival gangs that sought entrance in the neighbourhood. 1017 Al Jazeera
indicated that La Piedrita is Caracas' largest and most powerful colectivo. 1018 Colectivos like the Alexis
Vive, which is also present in the 23 de Enero neighbourhood in Caracas controlling most of thatneighbourhood, uses 'a mixture of intimidation and indoctrination', surveilling the neighbourhood
through CCTV, and operating a radio station to disseminate pro-government messages. 1019 Colectivos
are reportedly involved in drug trafficking, extortion 1020, extrajudicial killings, kidnapping, smuggling
gasoline across the border with Colombia 1021, small scale drug dealing, robbery, hired killings,
trespassing on private property 1022, forced displacement 1023, and controlling of the distribution of CLAP
food boxes. 1024 They are also accused of firing live rounds to intimidate opposition protests. 1025 OVV
indicated that during protests carried out by banging pans and pots at balconies (cacerolazos) in low-

1014 Velasco, videoconference, 1 May 2020

1015 Mouttet, videoconference, 8 May 2020

1016 International Crisis Group, A Glut of Arms, 20 February 2020, url, pp. 8-91017 PROVEA, Colectivos se fortalecen con la anuencia del Estado, 2 April 2019, url
1018 Al Jazeera, Venezuela: Who are the colectivos?, 9 May 2019, url

1019 VICE, How Venezuela's Fearsome "Colectivos" Help Keep Maduro in Power, 7 July 2019, url

1020 Infobae, Radiografía de los colectivos chavistas, 11 January 2020, url; Al Jazeera, Venezuela: Who are the colectivos?, 9

May 2019, url
1021 Al Jazeera, Venezuela: Who are the colectivos?, 9 May 2019, url
1022 La Opinión, ¿Quiénes son los colectivos?, 27 February 2019, url
1023 Caracol, Desplazamiento en Venezuela por grupos armados en frontera, 25 May 2019, url
1024 OVV, videoconference, 4 May 2020
1025 Al Jazeera, Venezuela: Who are the colectivos?, 9 May 2019, url

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income neighbourhoods, armed colectivos have fired live rounds at their residences or going to theirresidences and intimidate them by prohibiting from engaging in these protests. 1026
The International Crisis Group indicated that the recent stifling of protests in low-income
neighbourhoods and acts of repression against the opposition show a shift from the traditional
colectivo discourse related to the defense of communities, carrying out grassroots mobilisation, andchecking the implementation of government policies in the ground, to an instrumental use of theseforces by the government in its rhetoric of the 'fight against the empire', 'resistance', and 'sovereignty',
in which colectivos respond to the political demands of leading figures in central government. 1027

5.2 Structure
Colectivos do not have a homogeneous structure 1028 and disputes over interests and territory canemerge among them.1029 Whether different colectivos are unified under a hierarchy varies amongsources. Some sources indicated that colectivos do not report to a single chain of command1030 as they
operate as autonomous, independent cells, and when they take the role of 'shock forces', they operatecompletely autonomously. 1031 Mármol indicated, however, that there is a national secretariat of thecolectivos in Caracas. 1032 Information on colectivos acting together is scarce, with the exception of theevents in 2019 when the opposition tried to introduce humanitarian aid into Venezuela wherecolectivos from Caracas and Maracaibo were present during the clashes that occurred at theborder. 1033
The number of members of colectivos is uncertain as there are also informal offshoots of colectivos. 1034
In addition to the colectivos themselves, 'there are concentric circles made up by close supporters
such as members of communal councils, family members, and persons who, not being members ofcolectivos themselves, sympathise with these groups'. 1035 Other sources indicate that numbers range
from 5 000 to 100 000. 1036
Members of colectivos include civilians, members of security forces 1037, and government
employees. 1038 Many members of colectivos are, in turn, members of the government's Bolivarian
militia, which is part of the armed forces 1039, and the FAES. 1040 Most members of colectivos depend on
the benefits that these groups provide, in the context of an economic crisis that hinders their ability
to provide support for their families. 1041 Among the benefits are access to motorcycle parts that are
not readily available in the country or are very expensive, as many members of colectivos depend on
their income as moto-taxi drivers. 1042
1026 OVV, videoconference, 4 May 2020

1027 International Crisis Group, telephone interview, 30 April 2020

1028 Mouttet, videoconference, 8 May 2020; Infobae, Radiografía de los colectivos chavistas, 11 January 2020, url
1029 Infobae, Radiografía de los colectivos chavistas, 11 January 2020, url; Velasco, videoconference, 1 May 2020
1030 Al Jazeera, Venezuela: Who are the colectivos?, 9 May 2019, url; Mouttet, videoconference, 8 May 2020
1031 Velasco, videoconference, 1 May 2020

1032 Mármol, videoconference, 1 May 20201033 Velasco, videoconference, 1 May 20201034 CNN, The Venezuelan radio host leading an armed 'colectivo', 24 May 2019, url; Velasco, videoconference, 1 May 2020
1035 Velasco, videoconference, 1 May 2020

1036 GlobalPost, Maduro turns to violent ‘mercenary’ colectivos to maintain order, 25 April 2019, url

1037 InSight Crime, The Armed Groups Propping Up Venezuela's Government, 1 March 2019, url; Mármol, videoconference,

1 May 2020
1038 Infobae, Radiografía de los colectivos chavistas, 11 January 2020, url; InSight Crime, The Armed Groups Propping Up
Venezuela's Government, 1 March 2019, url
1039 International Crisis Group, A Glut of Arms, 20 February 2020, url, p. 81040 Reuters, Escuadrón de élite de la policía infunde el terror, 14 Novermber 2019, url; Mouttet, videoconference, 8 May
20201041 NIUS, Así son los colectivos 'chavistas' al servicio de Maduro, 22 February 2020, url
1042 NIUS, Así son los colectivos 'chavistas' al servicio de Maduro, 22 February 2020, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS— 99

Sources indicated that colectivos communicate among themselves 1043, usually among their leaders
through social media such as WhatsApp. 1044 They used to hold assemblies where they sent
representatives, but that has ceased for the 'last several' months. 1045

5.3 Recruitment
According to Velasco, recruitment often starts at the age between 15 and 17 years-old by expressing
interest in joining the colectivo. 'At the beginning, new recruits perform tasks such as providing
logistical support, distributing resources, among others. The more experienced the person is, the more
involvement the person has in security-related tasks such as night rounds to protect their territory
from criminal activities'. Recruitment is not forced, it is voluntary, as colectivos seek the trust of theperson. 1046 According to InSight Crime, many members of colectivos fear reprisals if they abandon thegovernment's 'revolution'. 1047 However, Velasco indicated that members of colectivos can leave thegroup without reprisals, and that there are even members who have emigrated due to the lack ofstable incomes. 1048 Additional and corroborating information could not be found among the sources
consulted within the time constraints for this report.

5.4 Areas of operation
Colectivos are not present throughout the entire country but are mostly present in large urban
areas. 1049 In May 2018, InSight Crime indicated that colectivos were reportedly operating in at least 16
states, including Miranda, Aragua, Carabobo, Lara, Mérida, Táchira, Zulia, and Bolívar. 1050 Mármol
indicated that colectivos are present in about 30 % of parishes. 1051
Velasco indicated that few colectivos operate beyond their areas of influence as they are 'very hyperlocalised with a very hyper-localised local control, in the sense that a colectivo does not exert control
over entire neighbourhoods, but over a few streets'. 1052 Mármol similarly indicated that colectivos arevery 'autochthonous' to their territories and respect the territories of other colectivos. 1053 According
to Velasco, only two colectivos have a wider presence: the colectivo Coordinating Committee Simón
Bolívar (Coordinadora Simón Bolívar) in western Venezuela, and colectivo Tupamaros. Conflicts amongcolectivos occur for two reasons: one is the ideological side where colectivos heavily dependent on
the government are considered by other colectivos as having 'abandoned the revolution'. This type of
conflict occurs mostly among older colectivos. 1054
Map 7, by Efecto Cucoyo/ Ideografiko indicates the presence of the 'peace crews' or colectivos in
Venezuela. Table 1 procides

1043 Mouttet, videoconference, 8 May 2020; Velasco, videoconference, 1 May 2020
1044 Velasco, videoconference, 1 May 2020
1045 Velasco, videoconference, 1 May 2020
1046 Velasco, videoconference, 1 May 2020

1047 InSight Crime, The Armed Groups Propping Up Venezuela's Government, 1 March 2019, url
1048 Velasco, videoconference, 1 May 2020

1049 Velasco, videoconference, 1 May 2020; OVV, videoconference, 4 May 2020
1050 InSight Crime, The Devolution of State Power, 18 May 2018, url
1051 Mármol, videoconference, 1 May 2020
1052 Velasco, videoconference, 1 May 2020

1053 Mármol, videoconference, 1 May 2020
1054 Velasco, videoconference, 1 May 2020

100 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS

Map 7: Presence of the 'peace crews' or cuadrillas de paz, otherwise known as colectivos, in Venezuela, 7 April 2019 ©
Efecto Cocuyo/Ideografiko 1055

StateGroupsPolitical links

Apure

Federación Regional de Motorizados delestado de Apure

Governorate

AraguaNon-identified

Governorate and Municipal
Council

BarinasTupamaros

Non-identified

BolívarMersuv
Others non-identified

Legislative Council

Capital District

Frente Motorizado Bolivariano
Colectivo 5 de Marzo
Colectivo Pioneros de Mi Patria
Frente Simón Bolívar
Frente Socialista Nicolás Maduro
Colectivo Alexis Vives
Colectivo La Piedrita
Others non-identified

Libertador City Hall, ANC, andthe National Institute of land
Transportation (INTT, Instituto
Nacional de Transporte
Terrestre)

1055 Mapa de la militancia armada de Maduro [map], in: Efecto Cocuyo, Así funcionan las “cuadrillas de paz”, colectivos
armados de Nicolás Maduro, 7 April 2019, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS

— 101

Lara

Tupamaros
Alí Primera
Others non-identified

Governorate and the legislative
CouncilMéridaTupamaros
Others non-identified

State police and the GNB

MirandaFrente Motorizado Bolivariano

Legislative Council

TáchiraFrente Motorizado Bolivariano
Others non-identified

Non-identified

Trujillo

Non-identified

Valera City Hall

VargasNon-identified

Governorate and the SEBIN

Zulia

Non-identified

Governorate, CLAP, andChamba Juvenil

Figure 1: Presence of the 'peace crews' or cuadrillas de paz, otherwise known as colectivos, in Venezuela, 7 April 2019 ©
Efecto Cocuyo 1056

The government of Peru indicated that members of Venezuelan colectivos operate in the country
threatening Venezuelan activists who advocate for the rights of migrants, and handing out pamphlets
accusing Venezuelan migrants of being 'traitors'. 1057 They are also present on the border with Colombia
where they control some of the irregular border crossings extorting those who crossed through them,including Venezuelan migrants. 1058 For example, Colombian news magazine Semana reported that
irregular armed groups, including armed colectivos, are present in the border town of La Parada, Nortede Santander, a 15-minutes' drive from Cúcuta that sees the movement of about 40 000 people perday, where they engage in extortion of migrants. 1059

5.5 Profiles of targeted individuals
Armed colectivos reportedly perpetrate violent acts against demonstrators, actual or perceived
members and activists of the opposition1060, elected officials, students 1061, journalists 1062, and healthcare professionals. 1063 Velasco also indicated that people who express dissent in a 'non-encompassing
way, that is, without including in the list of the causes of the crisis in Venezuela statements such as"empire", "economic sanctions", and "opposition" is often considered a person that needs to be
surveilled'. 1064 Also, security forces pass along information to colectivos on targeted individuals who
had been allegedly involved in actions such as participating in a demonstration in order to surveil theminside the communities. 1065 It is likely that colectivos can have access to government databases as1056 Table 1 created by the author based on: Mapa de la militancia armada de Maduro [map], in: Efecto Cocuyo, Así funcionan

las “cuadrillas de paz”, colectivos armados de Nicolás Maduro, 7 April 2019, url

1057 Diario Las Américas, Gobierno de Perú denuncia envío de colectivos por parte del régimen de Nicolás Maduro, 2 February

2020, url

1058 Reuters, EXCLUSIVA-Grupos armados colombianos seducen a venezolanos desesperados, 20 June 2019, url; Caracol,

Nuevo grupo ilegal hace presencia en la zona de frontera, 19 June 2019, url
1059 Semana, La Parada, el barrio donde gobierna el caos, 9 November 2019, url
1060 Velasco, videoconference, 1 May 2020; ICC, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2019, 5 December 2019, url,para. 74
1061 ICC, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2019, 5 December 2019, url, para. 74
1062 FundaRedes, Curva de la violencia en seis estados fronterizos de Venezuela, 2019, url, p. 91063 OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, p. 22; CEPAZ, Encrucijada política en Venezuela, 22 July
2019, url, p. 151064 Velasco, videoconference, 1 May 2020
1065 Velasco, videoconference, 1 May 2020

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some of their members are also members of security forces 1066 or have alliances with security
forces. 1067 According to Mármol, 'it is feasible, by making a logical analysis, that when colectivos as astructure require more targeted information on someone, that member of the colectivo, who is alsoa member of the security forces, can have access to the required information from government
databases'. 1068
According to Velasco, the profile of the person does not necessarily need to be high in order to betargeted, 'on the contrary, persons with low profile tend to be seen by the colectivos as "destabilising
agents" that can later become difficult to address'. Velasco explained that high profile persons are
more difficult to control because the higher the profile, the more difficult it is to harass and repress. 1069
For further information on the role of colectivos in the targeting of particular groups, see Chapter 3.

5.6 Modus operandi
Velasco indicated that colectivos operate in two ways. On one hand, since colectivos have access toboth the government and communities, they have a certain degree of legitimacy in communities. In
this sense, they exert control within communities and communal councils to the extent that meetings
carried out by councils often take place in spaces controlled by colectivos, and also act as justices ofthe peace to settle local disputes. They also control the distribution of CLAP food boxes, which often
takes place based on the ideological affiliation of the person. On the other hand, colectivos act as a'shock force' that engages in 'repression'. 1070 Mármol similarly commented that colectivos settle local
disputes such as domestic violence, and debts, and control food distribution networks, which allows
them to exert social control inside the communities, identify who is pro-government and who is not,who is a 'passive' and who is an 'active supporter' of the opposition, and act accordingly. It is a social
control exerted through 'reward and punishment, through the distribution of food'. 1071 OVV noted thatcolectivos have contributed to the pacification of neighbourhoods by controlling crime and drugtrafficking inside these areas, for example. 1072 It is not clear whether colectivos obey orders from thenational government, however, high-ranking officials, including the president, make ambiguous
statements on national television that can give way to several interpretations, as it occurred in March
2019 when president Maduro called the colectivos to do 'active resistance'. 1073
In the context of protests, members of colectivos seldom cover their faces. 1074 When they do, they use
ski masks or bandanas, and wear clothes featuring communist imagery as well as hip packs or tacticalbags to conceal weapons. 1075 They reportedly use tear gas 1076, which is only available to security
forces. 1077 Colectivos reportedly possess weapons licenses issued by security forces 1078, with the mostcommon being automatic pistols, submachine guns, and AR-15 and AK-47 long rifles. 1079 They carryradio equipment to communicate with each other and security forces, and use motorcycles and pick-

1066 Mármol, videoconference, 1 May 2020; FundaRedes, videoconference, 6 May 2020
1067 International Crisis Group, telephone interview, 30 April 2020
1068 Mármol, videoconference, 1 May 2020
1069 Velasco, videoconference, 1 May 2020
1070 Velasco, videoconference, 1 May 2020

1071 Mármol, videoconference, 1 May 2020
1072 OVV, videoconference, 4 May 20201073 Mouttet, videoconference, 8 May 20201074 Al Jazeera, Venezuela: Who are the colectivos?, 9 May 2019, url
1075 La Opinión, ¿Quiénes son los colectivos?, 27 February 2019, url

1076 La Opinión, ¿Quiénes son los colectivos?, 27 February 2019, url; Al Jazeera, Venezuela: Who are the colectivos?, 9 May

2019, url
1077 Al Jazeera, Venezuela: Who are the colectivos?, 9 May 2019, url
1078 Al Jazeera, Venezuela: Who are the colectivos?, 9 May 2019, url; Mármol, videoconference, 1 May 2020
1079 La Opinión, ¿Quiénes son los colectivos?, 27 February 2019, url

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up trucks for transportation. 1080 In some instances, they carry official credentials from security forces
to evade checkpoints. 1081 Members of colectivos are reportedly provided with identity cards signed by
Maduro that identify them as such and give them permission to carry weapons, "in concordance with
the Organic Law for Communes and Social Movements". 1082
Sources observed that colectivos constantly monitor the opposition's call for protests and mobilise
accordingly. 1083 Spain-based news website NIUS quoted a member of the colectivo National Federationof Motorcycles (Federación Nacional de Motorizados), also known as Motorised Forces (Fuerzas
Motorizadas), based in Caracas, as indicating that their task is to carry out 'security rounds' on theirmotorcycles to 'keep order, maintain the status quo, and control the Venezuelan opposition during
the days they call for protests'. 1084 According to a member of the same colectivo interviewed by VICE,
they sent one or two members to gather information during the onset of the protests and when thesituation 'gets hectic, the entire Caracas chapter activates. That means 2 000-3 000 motorcyclists out
in the streets'. 1085 The OVV similarly indicated that when the opposition organises a rally, the colectivos
rapidly organise to send over 50 individuals on motorcycles to intimidate protesters. 1086 Velasco
remarked, however, that colectivos that emerged in 2016-2017 have more coordination and mobility
and move to areas where protests occur. 1087 Mármol also said that some colectivos can organise a
rapid mobilisation of motorised members. 1088
A report produced by Efecto Cocuyo, based on interviews with residents and human rights
organisations in the states where colectivos are reportedly operating, indicated that in the states of
Zulia, Aragua and Lara, where no colectivo 'with a structure and hierarchy has been identified', it arepolitical activists close to Maduro who mobilise workers from the governorates, town halls and local
councils. Public officials and government supporters reportedly make threats in communities todissuade protests. The first confrontation with protesters usually consists of verbal threats and thetaking of photographs of attendees. Once the demonstration turns violent, colectivos use firearms,
stones and hard objects to disperse it. Government security forces reportedly support colectivos
during protests and, according to PROVEA, security forces and colectivos conduct joint arrests ofprotesters. 1089 On 15 January 2020, for example, teachers who were protesting in Caracas demanding
better wages were met by colectivos who threw at the teachers 'bombs' with eggs, faeces andurine. 1090 Journalists who were covering the protest were also targeted with faeces, urine, stones,
sticks and live rounds. 1091
Colectivos use graffiti to threaten political, social and student activists. 1092 On 10 May 2019, theproperties of several opponents of Maduro were painted with graffiti signed by colectivos. 1093 Most
graffiti in 10 states reportedly read 'we are coming for you' or 'now we are coming for you' or 'your1080 La Opinión, ¿Quiénes son los colectivos?, 27 February 2019, url
1081 Mármol, videoconference, 1 May 20201082 Clarín, “Brazo armado” Venezuela, 5 April 2019, url

1083 Efecto Cocuyo, Así funcionan las "cuadrillas de paz", 7 April 2019, url; NIUS, Así son los colectivos 'chavistas' al servicio

de Maduro, 22 February 2020, url
1084 NIUS, Así son los colectivos 'chavistas' al servicio de Maduro, 22 February 2020, url
1085 VICE, How Venezuela's Fearsome "Colectivos" Help Keep Maduro in Power, 7 July 2019, url
1086 OVV, videoconference, 4 May 2020
1087 Velasco, videoconference, 1 May 2020
1088 Mármol, videoconference, 1 May 20201089 Efecto Cocuyo, Así funcionan las “cuadrillas de paz”, colectivos armados de Nicolás Maduro, 7 April 2019, url
1090 Efecto Cocuyo, 'Por protestar con un lápiz y una pancarta fuimos brutalmente agredidos por colectivos', 15 January 2020,
url
1091 El Nacional, Colectivos chavistas lanzan orina y heces a periodistas, 15 January 2020, url
1092 InSight Crime, Graffiti Death Threats, 22 May 2019, url; OAS, CIDH condena el recrudecimiento de ataques, 14 May 2019,url
1093 InSight Crime, Graffiti Death Threats, 22 May 2019, url; CEPAZ, La formula perfecta para apuntalar la dictadura, January
2020, url; pp. 25-26

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time has come', the name of the person threatened, and the name of the local colectivo. 1094 On 29
March 2020, the website of the National Assembly indicated that National Assembly deputies' houses
and businesses from the states of Táchira, Lara, Apure, Bolívar, Trujillo, Anzoátegui, Monagas, andDelta Amacuro were painted by colectivos with graffiti such as 'Bolivarian fury' and 'We have you
located, colectivo Frontera', in what AN deputies say are acts of intimidation and threats. 1095 According
to Velasco, colectivos seldom go to the areas influenced by the opposition, 'except in moments of highsocial tension when colectivos go to these areas to harass and intimidate them, usually by passing by
on their motorcycles which in Venezuela is an image of intimidation. Sometimes members ofcolectivos contact older relatives of targeted individuals to persuade them to dissuade the targeted
person from continuing engaging in opposition activities. 1096
Velasco noted that colectivos also fire at the houses of targeted persons in order to force them out of
the neighbourhood where that colectivo operates. 1097 A colectivo called Colectivos in Defense of the
Border and the Bolivarian Revolution (Colectivos en Defensa de la Frontera y la Revolución Bolivariana)
in San Antonio and Ureña, state of Táchira, reportedly transited through the streets on 15 November
2019 in motorcycles with long rifles, detonating stun grenades and painting graffiti alluding to the'defense of the revolution' and 'popular organization' to face Colombian paramilitary successor
groups. The same colectivo has also set up checkpoints in Ureña to check on vehicles and occupants.
Authorities reportedly did not intervene. 1098
According to Velasco, colectivos infringe the access to health care for members of the opposition andother targeted individuals through the medical missions in low-income neighbourhoods. Since manymembers of colectivos have close relationship with doctors from these missions, and provide themwith protection, assistance and support, targeted individuals by colectivos often do not seek medical
assistance from these missions as they consider these doctors, whether in fact or a perception, as an'appendice' of the colectivos. 1099 Velasco also indicated that colectivos can represent an obstacle fortargeted individuals for obtaining identity documents and passports. 1100 For more information, see
Chapter 6.

5.7 Financing and support
Colectivos have financing from both licit and illicit activities. Licit financing comes from thegovernment in the form of direct payments 1101, which have been decreasing over time; contracts they
have with the government to distribute the CLAP food boxes in the communities, which is becoming
more lucrative; the selling of medicine at exorbitant prices; and businesses that they own and run. 1102
Velasco indicated that even though financial support has been decreasing over the years, tasks suchas the distribution of the CLAP food boxes represent a powerful tool to control the community. 1103
Among the illicit activities are the sale and distribution of drugs, extortion and illegal gambling. 1104 As
cash payments from the government decrease, colectivos are increasingly involved in drug trafficking
and extortion. 1105 Velasco indicated that colectivos receive non-material support in the form of judicial

1094 InSight Crime, Graffiti Death Threats, 22 May 2019, url

1095 Venezuela, AN, Diputados de la AN están siendo amedrentados, 29 March 2020, url
1096 Velasco, videoconference, 1 May 20201097 Velasco, videoconference, 1 May 20201098 El Colombiano, Noches de terror en la frontera, 20 November 2019, url
1099 Velasco, videoconference, 1 May 2020
1100 Velasco, videoconference, 1 May 2020

1101 OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, p. 48; InSight Crime, Venezuela: A Mafia State?, [2018],

url, p. 52
1102 InSight Crime, Venezuela: A Mafia State?, [2018], url, p. 52
1103 Velasco, videoconference, 1 May 20201104 InSight Crime, Venezuela: A Mafia State?, [2018], url, p. 52
1105 InSight Crime, GameChangers 2019, 18 January 2020, url

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS— 105

protection from the government to shield them from prosecution, and these groups are also backed
by the president and the vice-president who mention colectivos in televised broadcastings. 1106 The
OVV similarly indicated that the government provides both material and non-material support suchas financing of community radios, closed circuit television systems, activities and for the acquisitionof firearms, as well as implicit power and discretion to act. 1107

5.8 Relationship with security forces
According to Infobae, the relationship between the colectivos and the government and its security
forces 'depend on the prevailing circumstances at a given place and moment in time, and the position
that that colectivo occupies in the power board and the ease that they have to act in theirterritories'. 1108 According to Velasco, colectivos are not subordinated to security forces; however, giventhat colectivos have close relationship with members of security forces, colectivos can communicate
with officials from nearby security agencies before executing an action. Nevertheless, Maduro
established a close relationship between the FAES and colectivos in an effort to give the later a more'formal role' within the state apparatus. Velasco also indicated that 'it is an obscure form of mutual
dependency' as 'the more access colectivos have to the government, the more dependent the
government becomes of colectivos'. 1109 Some members of colectivos are also members of security
forces. 1110
The International Crisis Group indicated that 'colectivos are not necessarily passive recipients ofgovernment orders. Different factions within the Venezuelan government control separate colectivos,
and as a result the groups’ interests do not always coincide. On several occasions, security forces have
openly clashed with the colectivos, forcing the government into hard choices as to which side tofavour'. In 2014, for example, interior minister Miguel Rodríguez Tórres was dismissed by Maduro
after five group leaders of colectivo 5 de Marzo died in confrontations with the police. Rodríguez
Tórres was arrested under charges of 'espionage' and remained in detention in February 2020. On theother hand, while the minister of defense, Vladimir Padrino López, has stated that the armed forces
are constitutionally responsible for providing security and that they are 'obliged to combat all armed
groups present in the country', the backing of colectivos by Maduro 'restrains the armed forces in any
action against them'. 1111

5.9 State response to colectivos
According to Velasco, regarding state protection, 'legal recourses do not exist' for victims ofcolectivos. 1112 International Crisis Group similarly indicated that the state is 'wholly unable to protect'from colectivos as all agencies and bodies of the state are being turned for the past few years into
'political partisan tools' and there is no real independent body acting on behalf of civilians. 1113
Colectivos have been allowed to act with impunity due to the support they provide the government
in confronting anti-government demonstrations and intimidating opponents. 1114

1106 Velasco, videoconference, 1 May 20201107 OVV, videoconference, 4 May 20201108 Infobae, Radiografía de los colectivos chavistas, 11 January 2020, url
1109 Velasco, videoconference, 1 May 2020

1110 InSight Crime, The Armed Groups Propping Up Venezuela's Government, 1 March 2019, url; Mármol, videoconference,

1 May 2020
1111 International Crisis Group, A Glut of Arms, 20 February 2020, url, pp. 10-111112 Velasco, videoconference, 1 May 20201113 International Crisis Group, telephone interview, 30 April 20201114 InSight Crime, Maduro Relies on 'Colectivos' to Stand Firm in Venezuela, 18 March 2019, url; CEPAZ, La formula perfecta
para apuntalar la dictadura, January 2020, url; p. 5

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According to a survey by CEPAZ among parliamentarians of the National Assembly, 73.1 % of them
indicated that they have been 'intimidated' or 'attacked' by colectivos. Without providing further
details, the survey indicates that 65.4 % of those who were victims of actions by colectivos filed acomplaint with authorities, and 88.5 % of these complaints did not move forward in the justicesystem. 1115
Authorities seldom detain members of colectivos. 1116 The leader of La Piedrita colectivo, Valentín
Santana, remains free despite three arrest warrants for murder and attempted murder issued against
him. The police director of operations who had commanded an operation to confront armed colectivos
that were firing live arounds at demonstrators from a government building in the opposition
stronghold of Altamira, Caracas, on 1 May 2019, was 'summarily dismissed for interfering with thegunmen'. 1117 Sources reported that on 1 May 2019, the Lara state police received orders from'superiors', reportedly from the Secretary of Safety and Public Order of governorate of Lara, to set
free six of seven men members of a colectivo who had been detained two hours before for robbing
people in the midst of the protests, attacking protestors, and for shooting a police officer during thedetention process. The men were reportedly travelling in a pick-up truck without license plates andhad the sign 'Revolutionary Bolivarian Government' [Gobierno Bolivariano Revolucionario]. According
to police officers at the police station, the person who remained detained reportedly was the one who
did not have police records and would be charged with unlawful possession of a firearm. 1118 On 15
June 2020, the leader of colectivo Tupamaros, José Tomás Pinto Marrero, was detained by the CICPCfor his alleged participation in the death of a 16-year-old young man. 1119 Additional information on thedetention could not be found among the sources consulted within the time constraints for this report.
For information on colectivos and internal relocation, see Chapter 3.11.6.

1115 CEPAZ, La formula perfecta para apuntalar la dictadura, January 2020, url; pp. 31-33
1116 Infobae, Radiografía de los colectivos chavistas, 11 January 2020, url
1117 Al Jazeera, Venezuela: Who are the colectivos?, 9 May 2019, url

1118 Crónica Uno, Seis de siete colectivos detenidos por Polilara fueron liberados, 3 May 2019, url; La Prensa de Lara, Policías

indignados por la liberación de colectivos, 3 May 2019, url
1119 El Pitazo, PERFIL | José Pinto: el líder Tupamaro señalado por homicidio, 15 June 2020, url

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6. Identity documents
6.1 Identity Cards
The Venezuelan national identity card (Cédula de identidad) is the identification document used within
Venezuela, and it is required in order to obtain a passport. 1120 The national identity card can only be
issued and renewed at the offices of the Administrative Service of Identification, Migration andForeigners (SAIME, Servicio Administrativo de Identificación, Migración y Extranjería) in Venezuela. 1121
In order to obtain the national identity card, persons over 18-years old must provide the original anda certified copy of the birth certificate (Acta de Nacimiento or Partida de Nacimiento), which must be
included in the Civil Birth Registry (Registro Civil). The birth certificate must meet the requirements ofArticle 81 of the Organic Law of Civil Registry (Ley Orgánica de Registro Civil). 1122 Article 81 of theOrganic Law of Civil Registry indicates the following:'Article 81. All [birth certificates] must contain the following characteristics:
1. Number of the [birth certificate].
2. Identification of the official who authorized it, must contain, among others, names,
surnames, number of the national identity card, position and the administrative regulation
under which he or she is acting, indicating the number of the resolution, means of publicationand date.
3. Day, month and year of the creation of the [birth certificate] or when the event or fact that
occurred is registered.
4. Time, day, month and year in which the event or fact being recorded occurred or was held.
5. Place where the event occurred, as well as the circumstances in which it took place.
6. Names, surnames, number of the national identity card, nationality, age, profession andplace of residence of the people listed in the [birth certificate], whatever their character.
7. Determination and enunciation of the collections presented.
8. Specific characteristics and special circumstances of each act.
9. Fingerprints.
10. Signatures of those who intervene in the acts and facts subject to registration. If they do
not know or cannot write, two signatories will do so, recording this situation.
11. Identification of the indigenous, town or community to which the person belongs and of
the people that appear during the registration'. 1123
Minors between 9 and 18 years-old are also issued a national identity card, following the samerequirements. The national identity card is issued free of charge and is valid for ten years for both
adults and minors. 1124 The national identity card is delivered within 21 working-days. 1125
Without providing additional information, the SAIME website indicated that the renewal of thenational identity card is free of charge, and renewals can be made when the card is expired, lost,1120 Venezuela, Embajada en Canadá, ¿Por qué es necesaria la Cédula de Identidad?, n.d., url

1121 Venezuela, Consulado de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela en Bilbao, Preguntas frecuentes, n.d., url
1122 Venezuela, SAIME, Cedulación – Documento de identidad por primera vez, n.d., url
1123 Venezuela, Ley Orgánica de Registro Civil, 2009, url

1124 Venezuela, SAIME, Cedulación – Documento de identidad por primera vez, n.d., url

1125 El Pitazo, Claves: Cómo tramitar la cédula de identidad por primera vez, 13 February 2020, url

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stolen, damaged, when there is a change in the marital status, or when any information in the card isbeing modified. 1126 According to TalCual, the only requirement to renew the national identity card isto provide its number at the SAIME office, and the processing time is 15 working-days. 1127

6.2 Passports
In order to obtain a passport, applicants must request an appointment on the SAIME website. 1128 The
application fee is paid online during the request for the appointment.1129 The fee amount to obtain
the passport is tied to the Petro, a cryptocurrency managed by the Venezuelan state, and is set at3.35908 petros [approximately US 197.75 1130] for a new passport, and 1.67954316 petros[approximately US 98.87 1131] for an extension of validity. 1132

6.2.1 Within Venezuela
In Venezuela, applications are filed with the SAIME, and adults over the age of 18 must present theserial number of the appointment. Minors under the age of 18 must provide, in addition, a copy ofthe birth certificate, and be present with at least one of the parents. Non-Venezuelan parents must
provide their passport. If one of the parents is deceased, the other parent must provide the original
copy of the death certificate, and if both parents are deceased or lost child custody, the legal guardianmust be duly accredited as such by the Tribunal for the Protection of Children and Adolescents(Tribunal de Protección de Niños, Niñas y Adolescentes). Additionally, children between 9 and 18 years
old must be in possession of their national identity card. 1133 Once the passport is ready for pick up at
the SAIME, the applicant will receive a notification in this regard. 1134

6.2.2 From abroad
The website of the consulate of Venezuela in Bilbao indicated that, in order to obtain a passport inthat consulate, applicants must provide two copies of the passport application from the SAIME
website; a copy and original of the national identity card and birth certificate; original and copy of theprevious passport, or police compliant if it was lost or stolen; application form from the consulate;copy of registration with the consulate; official registration with local authorities that the applicant
has been living for at least three months in the jurisdiction of the consulate; and payment of consularfees. 1135 Minors must provide two copies of the passport application from the SAIME website; a copy
and original of the birth certificate; original and copy of the previous passport, or police compliant if
it was lost or stolen; copy of the registration with the consulate; copies of the national identity cardof both parents; authorisation from the absent parent, if only one can go to the consulate; andpayment of consular fees. 1136

1126 Venezuela, SAIME, Cedulación, n.d., url

1127 TalCual, Para renovar la cédula el único requisito es saber el número del documento, 30 October 2019, url
1128 Venezuela, SAIME, Pasaporte, n.d., url

1129 Venezuela, Consulado de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela en Bilbao, Expedición / renovación de pasaportes para

menores de edad, n.d., url
1130 Venezuela, Petro, El Petro, n.d., url
1131 Venezuela, Petro, El Petro, n.d., url
1132 VTV, Costo de trámite de pasaporte y prórroga, 9 January 2020, url
1133 Venezuela, SAIME, Pasaporte – Pasaporte ordinario, n.d., url
1134 Confidential source, Correspondence, June 20201135 Venezuela, Consulado de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela en Bilbao, Solicitud de cita para renovar pasaporte paramayores de edad, n.d., url
1136 Venezuela, Consulado de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela en Bilbao, Expedición / renovación de pasaportes para
menores de edad, n.d., url

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6.2.3 Extension of the validity of expired passports
On 8 October 2017, the government of Venezuela issued Decree No. 3 097 by which expired
Venezuelan passports, or to be expired within six months, can be extended for two additional years.
The extension of validity consists of a sticker placed in the passport with the photograph of the holder,personal data, and security features such as hidden images, microtexts, and serial numbers that canbe read under fluorescent light. The extension of validity only applies to biometric passports that are
in good condition and must have at least two blank sheets or four blank pages. 1137
In order to apply for an extension of validity, the holder must apply on the SAIME website, fill out theonline form, pay the fee on the same website, and print the receipt. Without providing further
information, the website of the Venezuelan consulate in Bilbao indicated that its website posts thenational identity card numbers of applicants whose extension of validity has been approved by SAIME
and ready to be placed in the passport. In order to obtain the extension of validity, applicants must
provide at the consulate the original and a copy of the passport, original and copy of the national
identity card, and evidence of registration with the consulate. Applicants under the age of 18 must be
accompanied by both parents. If one of the parents is not present, the accompanying parent must
present an authorisation from the absent parent, certified by the Council for the Protection of Children
and Adolescents (Consejo de Protección del Niño, Niña y Adolescente), or with an apostille 1138
(apostilla) if the parent is outside Venezuela. In addition, minor applicants over the age of 9 years-old
must provide the original of his or her national identity card. 1139

6.3 Access to documents
According to the JRS, to obtain or renew identity documents in Venezuela such as birth certificates,
passports and identity cards, is a 'long and arduous process', and even though for minors the process
is 'easier', applicants must spend many hours and stand in long queues in order to apply for these
documents. 1140 Mouttet indicated that it is difficult to obtain documents because Venezuela is aheavily bureaucratised country, and the long waiting times is due to 'bureaucratic disorder' and'operational inability'.1141 A study produced by the Learning Community Centres (CECODAP, Centros
Comunitarios de Aprendizaje), a Venezuelan NGO that advocates for the rights of children andadolescents, indicated that about one out of five Venezuelans leave the country without proper
documentation due to the difficulty in obtaining in Venezuela documents such as identity cards,
passports, police background check reports, and apostilles. 1142 Venezuelan institutions do not work
properly, and they either cannot or are not willing to issue or renew identity documents. 1143

6.3.1 Birth certificates (Acta de Nacimiento or Partida de Nacimiento)
The JRS indicated that not all births are properly registered in the country due to the lack of material
such as paper, ink and printers, leaving many children without official registration. 1144 According to a
study by Angeyeimar Gil, professor at the Central University of Venezuela, and cited by Crónica Uno,
1137 Venezuela, Consulado de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela en Bilbao, Prórroga de pasaportes, n.d., url

1138 An apostille 'authenticates the seals and signatures of officials on public documents such as birth certificates, court
orders, or any other document issued by a public authority so that they can be recognized in foreign countries that are
members of the 1961 Hague Convention Treaty' (US, Department of State, Apostille Requirements, n.d., url).
1139 Venezuela, Consulado de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela en Bilbao, Prórroga de pasaportes, n.d., url
1140 JRS, Informe de contexto: Frontera Colombo-venezolana, April 2019, url, p. 421141 Mouttet, videoconference, 8 May 2020
1142 CECODAP, Informe especial de peligros y vulneraciones a los derechos humanos de niños, niñas y adolescentes, 18
November 2019, url, p. 121143 OAS, Informe del Grupo de Trabajo de la OEA, June 2019, url, p. 431144 JRS, Informe de contexto: Frontera Colombo-venezolana, April 2019, url, p. 42

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between April and October 2018, about 32 110 children out of the 45 090 children who were born in
Caracas in 2018 were not issued the live birth certificate (certificado de Nacimiento) due to shortagesof security paper in hospitals. 1145 The live birth certificate is a requirement in order to apply for thebirth certificate within 90 days of the birth of the child, after which the child will have to be registered'extemporaneously' before the Council for the Protection of Children to 'legalize' the child. According
to Crónica Uno, councils do not use the same template, and registration forms are inaccurately filled
out by officials in charge.1146 According to two confidential sources cited in the 2020 Netherlands MFA
country report, the lack of the correct paper to issue birth certificates has created barriers for people
to access other documents such as passports since a certified copy of the birth certificate is required
for the application of a passport. 1147

6.3.2 National identity cards (Cédula de identidad)
El Pitazo reported that all SAIME offices must issue the national identity card, however, people areoften sent to other SAIME office to obtain the document due to the lack of supplies or problems with
network connection. 1148 Transparencia Venezuela reported that some applicants have been waitingfor over a year-and-a-half for their national identity card. The same source provides the example ofan applicant who has been waiting for about 20 months in order to obtain his national identity card,and that he has been using the Carnet de la Patria and the discharge order from the military as ameans of identification. 1149

6.3.3 Passports
Transparencia Venezuela quotes the director of SAIME as indicating that services provided by SAIME
are 'fast and simple', adding that, during the first semester of 2019, SAIME issued 479 000
passports. 1150
However, sources reported that Venezuelan passports are difficult to obtain. 1151 International
Organisation A indicated that problems in the issuance of passports started in 2016 with failures inthe system and lack of supplies. 1152 According to the OAS report, passports are available to the most'privileged', those who have the 'connections, time and money' to obtain it. 1153 Sources reported thatthe processing of passport applications can several months 1154, a year 1155, even 'years'. 1156 Without
providing further information, the confidential source contacted for this report indicated that delivery
times ranges from region to region. The same source indicated that one of the challenges facing SAIME
is the 'lack of operability' in the country due to the lack of resources, supplies, and personnel. 1157

1145 Crónica Uno, Al menos 32.119 niños nacidos en Caracas en 2018 no tuvieron acceso al certificado de nacimiento, 15 July
2019, url
1146 Crónica Uno, Al menos 32.119 niños nacidos en Caracas en 2018 no tuvieron acceso al certificado de nacimiento, 15 July
2019, url
1147 Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Algemeen Ambtsbericht Venezuela 2020 (Country Report Venezuela 2020), June
2020, url, p. 27
1148 El Pitazo, Claves: Cómo tramitar la cédula de identidad por primera vez, 13 February 2020, url
1149 Transparencia Venezuela, Transparencia recibió 27 denuncias contra el Saime, 1 August 2019, url
1150 Transparencia Venezuela, Transparencia recibió 27 denuncias contra el Saime, 1 August 2019, url
1151 OAS, Informe del Grupo de Trabajo de la OEA, June 2019, url, p. 43; El Pitazo, Falta de aprobación de huella dactilar deja
a venezolanos sin pasaporte, 15 March 2020, url
1152 International Organisation A, telephone interview, 12 June 2020
1153 OAS, Informe del Grupo de Trabajo de la OEA, June 2019, url, p. 431154 Confidential source, Correspondence, June 2020
1155 OAS, Informe del Grupo de Trabajo de la OEA, June 2019, url, p. 43; Transparencia Venezuela, Transparencia recibió 27
denuncias contra el Saime, 1 August 2019, url
1156 El Diario de Caracas, Corrupción, burocracia y dólares, 2 July 2019, url
1157 Confidential source, Correspondence, June 2020

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Sources indicated that some applicants resort to corruption networks within SAIME in order to
expedite the processing of their passport application. 1158 The expedited processing of passports
applications offered by SAIME known as 'pasaporte express', which would be completed within aweek, has experienced delays. 1159 Transparencia Venezuela cited one example of an applicant for an
express passport who has been waiting for over a year and that the application does not appear in the
SAIME application website. 1160
On 15 March 2020, El Pitazo reported that some applicants cannot obtain a passport as theirfingerprints are rejected by the SAIME system due to, among others, 'errors' while capturing theapplicant's fingerprints for the first time or that the applicant obtained the national identity card forthe first time during a massive regional campaign to issue the document. Affected persons must go to
the SAIME office in Caracas and 'speak directly with the manager of SAIME', and some have beenreportedly waiting for 'months, even years' to obtain the passport. 1161 Other 'irregularities' at SAIME
reported by sources include the notification of the delivery of the extension of validity of the passport
when it was not received by the applicant, the inability to schedule appointments on the SAIME
website 1162, the elimination of the passport application from the system 1163, and the payment of fees
online and not receiving any notification. 1164

6.3.4 The use of 'agents' ('gestores')According to CECODAP, the hiring of 'agents' [in Venezuela, the practice is known as 'gestoría', andthe 'agent' is known as 'gestor'] is a'corruption and speculation mechanism that made the access to identity documents insomething confidential and very costly […] It emerged as a result from deficiencies inmanagement and a system that delays the timely access and acquisition of identity
documents. This occurs at SAREN and SAIME, that is, the agencies responsible for issuing birthcertificates, national identity cards and passports'. 1165
El Diario de Caracas reported that given the delays in obtaining documents in Venezuela, 'agents' havetaken an 'important role' as they offer the expediting of any application process through social media
while the government 'turns a blind eye' and has not done much to deal with this situation. 1166
Police background check certificates (Certificado de Antecedentes Penales or Certificación de
Antecedents Penales), which are free of charge at the Ministry of Interior, Justice and Peace and takeup to six months when they used to take two days, can be obtained through 'agents' for 80 USD. 1167
'Agents' can charge for the apostille, which takes around four months when it used to take three days,
between 20 and 350 USD, depending on the number of documents to be apostilled, up to 180 USD forthe apostille of a single document. 1168 Birth certificates obtained through 'agents' can cost between
250 and 2 000 USD. 1169 A national identity card can be obtained 'within minutes' through a network
1158 Transparencia Venezuela, El Saime da un tiro de gracias a derechos a la identidad, 21 November 2019, url; OAS, Informedel Grupo de Trabajo de la OEA, June 2019, url, p. 431159 El Diario de Caracas, Corrupción, burocracia y dólares, 2 July 2019, url
1160 Transparencia Venezuela, Transparencia recibió 27 denuncias contra el Saime, 1 August 2019, url
1161 El Pitazo, Falta de aprobación de huella dactilar deja a venezolanos sin pasaporte, 15 March 2020, url
1162 Transparencia Venezuela, El Saime da un tiro de gracias a derechos a la identidad, 21 November 2019, url
1163 El Diario de Caracas, Corrupción, burocracia y dólares, 2 July 2019, url; Transparencia Venezuela, El Saime da un tiro degracias a derechos a la identidad, 21 November 2019, url
1164 El Diario de Caracas, Corrupción, burocracia y dólares, 2 July 2019, url
1165 CECODAP, Violación del derecho a la identidad, July 2019, url, p. 25-26
1166 El Diario de Caracas, Corrupción, burocracia y dólares, 2 July 2019, url
1167 El Diario de Caracas, Corrupción, burocracia y dólares, 2 July 2019, url
1168 El Diario de Caracas, Corrupción, burocracia y dólares, 2 July 2019, url
1169 Crónica Uno, Al menos 32.119 niños nacidos en Caracas en 2018 no tuvieron acceso al certificado de nacimiento, 15 July
2019, url

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of gestores involving SAIME employees for 30 USD 1170, including for those who do not want to spendlong line-ups to obtain the document. 1171 The charges for passports obtained through 'agents' vary
among sources, ranging between 300 and 3 000 USD 1172, between 1 000 and 6 000 USD 1173, or
between 2 000 and 5 000 USD. 1174
El Diario de Caracas quoted a SAIME employee anonymously as indicating that a passport in the black
market can be obtained within 15 days for 5 000 USD, and that the high fee is because the 'agent'
network consists of several people, including the contact person, the officer that registers theapplication, and the officer that prints the passport, each one of them receiving an amount that canreach upwards 4 000 USD per month. 1175 Analítica reported that people have to resort to 'agents' inorder to obtain a document from SAIME as their credit cards do not have the necessary limit to pay
the fees. 1176
Sources reported that SAIME detained 'several' of its employees for being part of networks that issued
passports. 1177 According to the director of SAIME, 126 employees at SAIME have been involved incases of corruption, and that 65 have been apprehended. 1178 The government reply to the UN OHCHR
mission report indicated that the Public Ministry registered 85 cases of corruption within the SAIME
between 2017 and 2019, involving 196 officials investigated, 87 accused and 34 convicted. 1179
Velasco indicated that targeted individuals by colectivos often face obstacles obtaining identity cards
and passports. Velasco explained that since some members of colectivos have ties to government
entities and institutions such as the SAIME, city halls, schools, universities, and ministries, if the person
is labelled as a member or sympathiser of the opposition and needs to obtain an identity document,that person would encounter 'unsurmountable' requirements by officials to make it impossible for the
person to obtain the needed documents. Velasco provided the example that during the past two years
this has happened during the special sessions carried out by SAIME in marginalised neighbourhoods
to issue the national identity card, which is becoming an essential document that allows the person
to migrate. 1180

6.4 Fraudulent documents
International Organisation A indicated that in Venezuela there are networks dedicated to thefalsification of national identity cards, as well as corruption networks involving public employees that
operate to fraudulently obtain genuine Venezuelan national identity cards. 1181
On 20 November 2018, Extra reported that Colombian authorities detained a Venezuelan woman who
was in possession of a fraudulent Colombian migration card which was reportedly obtained throughan 'intermediary' in the Colombian city of Tunja. The 'intermediary' reportedly offered the sale of fake1170 Analítica, Hasta dos meses por una cédula esperan quienes no pagan "gestores verdes" en el Saime, 28 July 2019, url
1171 International Organisation A, telephone interview, 12 June 2020

1172 Transparencia Venezuela, Transparencia recibió 27 denuncias contra el Saime, 1 August 2019, url
1173 OAS, Informe del Grupo de Trabajo de la OEA, June 2019, url, p. 43

1174 El Diario de Caracas, Corrupción, burocracia y dólares, 2 July 2019, url
1175 El Diario de Caracas, Corrupción, burocracia y dólares, 2 July 2019, url

1176 Analítica, Hasta dos meses por una cédula esperan quienes no pagan "gestores verdes" en el Saime, 28 July 2019, url

1177 El Diario de Caracas, Corrupción, burocracia y dólares, 2 July 2019, url; Transparencia Venezuela, Transparencia recibió

27 denuncias contra el Saime, 1 August 2019, url
1178 Transparencia Venezuela, Transparencia recibió 27 denuncias contra el Saime, 1 August 2019, url
1179 Venezuela, Report by the United Nations High Commissioner of Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela: Comments by the State, 5 July 2019, url, para. 66
1180 Velasco, videoconference, 1 May 2020
1181 International Organisation A, telephone interview, 12 June 2020

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documents through a Facebook page and charged between 50 000 and 80 000 Colombian pesos[approximately between EUR 11.87 and 19]. 1182
On 23 March 2019, Noticiero Venevisión reported that the PNB dismantled two networks dedicatedto the falsification of documents in Caracas. The confiscated material included printers, rubber stamps
from different state agencies, civil registry certificates, travel authorisations for minors, and birthcertificates. 1183
On 9 October 2019, ACN reported that authorities detained a person in Carlos Arvelo (state of
Carabobo) that had an illegal shop dedicated to the 'restoration of identity cards'. 1184
In March 2020, sources reported that the CICPC detained two brothers in Barquisimeto, state of Lara,
who were accused of forging identity documents and selling them to persons with 'legal problems' 1185
'who needed to leave the country'. 1186 La Prensa de Lara reported that one of the detainees used social
media networks to 'offer his services'. 1187
On 6 February 2020, sources reported that Colombian authorities disbanded a network of 13 persons
who forged documents such as bank statements and income tax statements in order to obtain genuine
residence permits, transit permits, Colombian passports and Colombian nationality. The network
consisted of employees at the National Civil Registry, notaries, and an employee at Migración
Colombia who legalized the immigration status of irregular migrants so they could obtain these
documents. Nationals of Venezuela, China, Cuba, Mexico and Ecuador were reportedly among thepeople who obtained these documents which cost up to 30 million pesos [approximately
EUR 7 115]. 1188

6.5 Carnet de la Patria
The Carnet de la Patria (Homeland Card) was created in January 2017 as a mechanism to access the
CLAP food boxes and other benefits provided by the government 1189 such as bonuses, 1190 the ability
to save in Petros and pay bills 1191, and send and receive remittances from abroad in cryptocurrency. 1192
The Carnet de la Patria is not only a physical 'card', but a digital platform that captures information
about the person for the purposes of accessing the Carnet de la Patria's benefits. 1193 This digitalplatform is the Patria Platform (Sistema Patria or Plataforma Patria), where the person must be
registered in order to access the Carnet de la Patria. 1194 The platform stores information about
applicants, such as personal, socioeconomic and family ties, and contains a registry of beneficiaries
and participants of public services and social programs. In addition, the platform offers a 'virtual

1182 Extra, Viajó a Sogamoso con documentos falsos, 20 November 2018, url

1183 Noticiero Venevisión, PNB desmanteló dos bandas delictivas por falsificación de documentos y sellos públicos, 23 March
2019, url
1184 ACN, Presas dos mujeres por venta de droga y falsificación de documentos, 9 October 2019, url
1185 El Carabobeño, Capturado dos presuntos falsificadores de cédulas en Lara, 9 March 2020, url; La Prensa de Lara,
Detenidos por comercializar documentos falsos, 10 March 2020, url
1186 La Prensa de Lara, Detenidos por comercializar documentos falsos, 10 March 2020, url
1187 La Prensa de Lara, Detenidos por comercializar documentos falsos, 10 March 2020, url
1188 El Colombiano, Esta banda cobraba 30 millones de pesos por un pasaporte colombiano, 6 February 2020, url; El Heraldo,
Capturan a 13 personas señaladas de tramitar documentos falsos, 6 February 2020, url
1189 Transparencia Venezuela, El carnet de la Patria, [2019], url, p. 1-2; Professor of political science, videoconference, 14
May 2020
1190 ACN, Cómo solicitar el Carnet de la Patria, 13 February 2020, url; El Pitazo, Claves: Conozca cómo se cobran los bonos,
28 April 2020, url
1191 ACN, Cómo solicitar el Carnet de la Patria, 13 February 2020, url
1192 Venezuela, Patria, Manual del Sistema de Remesas a Venezuela de la Plataforma Patria, n.d., url
1193 Transparencia Venezuela, El carnet de la Patria, [2019], url, p. 21194 ACN, Cómo solicitar el Carnet de la Patria, 13 February 2020, url

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wallet' (Monedero Virtual) to make money transfers and payments, and an electronic card with a QR
code also used to make payments and have access to public goods and services. 1195
Sources define the Carnet de la Patria as an identity document 1196 or an 'ideological identity document'that substitutes the official national identity card. 1197 The Professor of political science explained that'the Carnet de la Patria is supposedly for people who support the government; however, there aremany people in marginalised communities who do not support the government but are compelled toobtain the Carnet de la Patria in order to access much needed food and other economic assistance'.
People depend on the assistance from the government and are afraid that if they do not support the
government, if they do not 'behave', they could be excluded from receiving food and basic
necessities. 1198
The Carnet de la Patria is considered by sources as a mechanism of social control through the use offood for partisan benefits. 1199 Critics of the government, for example, are discriminated against in the
distribution of CLAP food boxes. 1200 During elections people are required to register with their Carnetde la Patria at PSUV kiosks placed nearby polling stations after the vote as a way to control andpressure voters. 1201 The UN OHCHR indicated that it received accounts from people who said were
threatened during the elections of May 2018 by CLAP members that 'they would stop receiving CLAP
boxes if they did not vote for the PSUV or because they had allegedly participated in anti-government
protests'. 1202
In order to access the bonuses offered by the government, the person must scan the QR Code printed
on the back of the card with a cell phone. If the person does not have a cell phone, the person must
send the QR code to system's email address, along with his or her telephone number in order to"normalize the status" and receive the bonuses. 1203 Being registered in the Patria System, however, is
not a guarantee that the person will receive the bonuses as they are assigned "randomly". Bonuses
are deposited in the personal account of the Patria System and from there the person can transfer thefunds to a personal bank account. 1204
In cases of lost or forgotten log in information, the person must register his or her phone number on
the Bank of Venezuela's website and reset the log in credentials. 1205
On 23 March 2020, the website of the Patria System indicated that private companies are required to
upload and update in the Patria System their human resources information, so employees receive
bonuses to complement regular payroll. 1206
According to Transparencia Venezuela, the Carnet de la Patria is a political tool used to influencepolitically and electorally by providing 'stimulus/reward to its supporters, enrolling those who areafraid or the "pragmatically extreme", and disincentive/absenteeism of adversaries'. 1207 According toTransparencia Venezuela, there are testimonies that the Carnet de la Patria is reportedly being

1195 Transparencia Venezuela, El carnet de la Patria, [2019], url, p. 11196 ACN, Cómo solicitar el Carnet de la Patria, 13 February 2020, url

1197 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020; Journalist, telephone interview, 8 June 2020
1198 Professor of political science, videoconference, 14 May 2020

1199 OVCS, Conflictividad social 2019, 24 January 2019, url, p. 23; OAS, Informe del Grupo de Trabajo de la OEA, June 2019,url, p. 31
1200 HRW, World Report 2020, 2020, url, p. 631
1201 OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, p. 49
1202 UN OHCHR, Human rights violations in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela: a downward spiral with no end in sight, June
2018, url, p. 51
1203 ACN, Cómo solicitar el Carnet de la Patria, 13 February 2020, url
1204 El Pitazo, Claves: Conozca cómo se cobran los bonos, 28 April 2020, url
1205 ACN, Cómo solicitar el Carnet de la Patria, 13 February 2020, url
1206 Venezuela, Patria, 'Actualización de la información del personal que labora en instituciones privadas', 23 March 2020,
url
1207 Transparencia Venezuela, El carnet de la Patria, [2019], url, p. 7

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requested to access health services, some medicine outlets, and obtain and renew the national
identity card or the passport. 1208

6.6 Court summonses (citatorios)
Information on court summonses was scarce among the sources consulted within the time constraints
for this report.
According to the OMCT et al. report, victims acting in judicial processes and their legal representatives
are often barred from accessing court documents of their cases, and in some instances, judges
sanction legal representatives for taking notes or pictures from the court document, or when trying
to make copies after request had been authorised. 1209
OMCT et al. indicated that court documents are illegally manipulated by eliminating or adding pages
irregularly. 1210
Additional information could not be found among the sources consulted within the time constraints
for this report.

6.7 Arrest warrants (orden de arresto)
Information on arrest warrants was scarce among the sources consulted within the time constraints
for this report.
Article 236 of the Organic Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Orgánico Procesal Penal) indicates thefollowing:'Article 236. The Control Judge [Juez de Control], at the request of the Public Ministry, may
order the preventive deprivation of liberty of the accused as long as there is the existence of:
1. A punishable act that deserves custodial sentence and whose criminal action is not clearlyprescribed.
2. Founded elements of conviction to consider that the accused or accused has been theauthor or author, or participant in the commission of a punishable act.
3. A reasonable presumption, according to an assessment of the circumstances of theparticular case, of danger of flight or of obstruction in the search for the truth regarding a
specific act of investigation.
Within twenty-four hours after the request by the prosecutor, the Control Judge will decideon the request. If the Control Judge considers that the requirements set forth in this article
for the preventive judicial deprivation of liberty are met, the Control Judge must issue anarrest warrant for the accused against whom the measure was requested.
Within forty-eight hours after their arrest, the accused will be brought before the Judge, forthe presentation hearing, with the presence of the parties, and the victim if present and will
decide on maintaining the measure imposed or replace it with a less burdensome one.
If the Judge agrees to maintain the preventive judicial deprivation of liberty measure during
the preparatory phase, the Prosecutor must present the accusation, request the dismissal or,
where appropriate, file the proceedings, within forty-five days following the court decision.

1208 Transparencia Venezuela, El carnet de la Patria, [2019], url, p. 61209 OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, p. 46
1210 OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, p. 46

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Once this period has expired without the Prosecutor having presented the accusation, thedetainee will be released, by decision of the Control Judge, who may impose a substituteprecautionary measure.
In any case, the Trial Judge at the request of the Public Ministry shall order the preventive
judicial deprivation of liberty of the accused when there is a substantiated reason to believethat he or she will not comply with the acts of the process, in accordance with the procedure
established in this Article.
In exceptional cases of extreme necessity and urgency, and whenever the assumptions
provided for in this article concur, the Control Judge, at the request of the Public Ministry, will
authorize by any suitable means, the apprehension of the investigated. Such authorizationmust be ratified by a notification within the twelve hours following the apprehension, and in
the other cases the procedure provided in this article will be followed'. 1211
Additional information could not be found among the sources consulted within the time constraints
for this report.

1211 Venezuela, Código Orgánico Procesal Penal, 2012, url

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7. Entry and exit
Venezuela has six official land border crossings 1212, including five with Colombia. 1213 There are no
official border crossings with Guyana. 1214 International Organisation A indicated that Venezuela's
official land border crossings are the following:
Border Checkpoint

Place

Simón Bolívar International Bridge

Táchira – Norte de Santander (Colombia)

General Francisco
International Bridge

de

Paula

Santander Táchira – Norte de Santander (Colombia)

Puente Unión International Bridge

Táchira – Norte de Santander (Colombia)

La Raya – Paraguachón

Zulia – Guajira (Colombia)

General José Antonio Páez International Bridge

Apure – Arauca (Colombia)

Santa Elena de Uairén – Pacaraima

Bolívar – Pacaraima (Brazil)

In addition, International Organisation A noted that Venezuela has maritime routes connecting Aruba,
Bonaire and Curacao, and Trinidad and Tobago. 1215
International Organisation A indicated that in order to leave or enter the country, persons go throughimmigration and also through an inspection of their luggage for the detection of drugs and for security
reasons. Control upon entry and exit is 'usually rigorous' due to the political situation, and all citizens
go through a 'rigorous scrutiny' upon return. Agencies that are present at border controls include the
SAIME, the Migration Police, the SEBIN, the PNB, and the GNB. As in most countries, authorities
photograph and take the fingerprint of passengers. 1216 Additional information could not be foundamong the sources consulted within the time constraints for this report.

7.1 Irregular border crossings
Sources indicated that irregular border crossings (trochas) are common at the Venezuelan landborders.1217 International Organisation A indicated that in Táchira, for example, there are 126 known
irregular border crossings, with 'many others' in the states of Zulia and Apure. The border with Brazil,
which is 'denser' due to the jungle and less inhabited, there are also 'numerous' irregular bordercrossings; whereas with Guyana, since there are no official border crossings, all crossings are
irregular. 1218
The lack of documents exposes migrants, particularly women, to 'abuse of authority, the requirementof paying bribes, including of a sexual nature, or the hiking of prices for not having documents or
simply due to discrimination'. 1219 Irregular armed groups at the Venezuela-Colombia border use
1212 International Organisation A, telephone interview, 12 June 20201213 Colombia, Pasos de frontera, 17 June 2020, url

1214 International Organisation A, telephone interview, 12 June 2020
1215 International Organisation A, telephone interview, 12 June 2020

1216 International Organisation A, telephone interview, 12 June 2020

1217 International Organisation A, telephone interview, 12 June 2020; Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 50
1218 International Organisation A, telephone interview, 12 June 2020

1219 Éxodo A.C., Consulta a organizaciones de la sociedad civil, 1 June 2019, url, p. 26

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irregular border crossings to extort people crossing them. 1220 El Universal reported that each of theseirregular border crossings are managed by a given irregular armed group. 1221 Sources reported that
migrants pay to cross trochas with fees ranging from 1 000 Colombian pesos [approximately EUR
0.23]1222 to 100 000 Colombian pesos [approximately EUR 23.2].1223 Sources indicated that
irregular armed groups at the border steal identity documents from Venezuelan migrants
when they are crossing into Colombia1224 and 'many' women and children are forced to have sex withmembers of irregular armed groups as a form of payment to cross into Colombia.1225 Extortion of
Venezuelan migrants has also been reported at the border between Colombia and Ecuador.1226

7.2 Entry into Colombia
In order to enter Colombia, Venezuelan nationals can enter with a valid Venezuelan passport and/or
one expired within the last five years, as long as it is issued after 2015. They can also enter with theirnational identity card. If the Venezuelan citizen enters Colombia as a tourist, the duration of stay isfor up to 90 days, extendable for another 90 days, after which the person needs a visa to remainbeyond that period. Venezuelan migrants who enter Colombia through an irregular border crossing
and have a formal employment offer, the government of Colombia established the Special Permit for
the Promotion of Regularisation (PEPFF, Permiso Especial para el Fomento de la Formalización) [inFebruary 2020], which is valid between six months and two years. The PEPFF can be requested by apotential employer at the Colombian Ministry of Labour. 1227

7.3 Treatment upon entry and exit of particular targeted profiles
This subsection covers information on the treatment upon entry and exit of particular targeted
profiles as information on all profiles could not be addressed due to time constraints.
According to the OMCT et al. report, human rights defenders, particularly those who cooperate withinternational human rights organisations, have been harassed and intimidated when leaving or
entering the country, particularly by the SAIME and the National Integrated Service for the
Administration of Customs Duties and Taxes (SENIAT, Servicio Nacional Integrado de Administración
Aduanera y Tributaria). Members of civil society organisations have been subjected to surveillanceupon their arrival at the airport; threatened while passing through immigration, including the threatthat their passports and other identity documents would be cancelled, irregular interrogations
focusing, upon exit, on the purpose of the trip and occupation, and upon entry, on the activities thatthe person did while abroad; faced arbitrary searches of their luggage; and photographed. 1228
OMCT et al. noted that there are reported instances of photographs of civil society members generally
taken by intelligence officials in plainclothes at the airport and then appearing in the media 'in theframework of a stigmatising narrative', edited with a red circle to point out the person being
intimidated. There have been also instances where the itinerary of the person is posted on the media,
1220 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 14; El Universal, Tras cierre de frontera, grupos criminales lucran con

venezolanos que cruzan a Colombia, 19 March 2019, url
1221 El Universal, Tras cierre de frontera, grupos criminales lucran con venezolanos que cruzan a Colombia, 19 March 2019,url
1222 Pares, Sin dios ni ley, 10 February 2020, url, p. 14.
1223 El Tiempo, Grupos criminales cobran hasta $ 100.000 por dar paso en la frontera, 18 March 2020, url
1224 El Poder, Huir hacia el infierno - Parte II: trata de personas en frontera con Venezuela, 12 March 2020, url, 9:55
1225 El Poder, Huir hacia el infierno - Parte II: trata de personas en frontera con Venezuela, 12 March 2020, url, 1:10; El Diario,
Explotación sexual y tráfico de personas, la realidad de cientos de venezolanos, 24 September 2019, url
1226 International Organisation B, telephone interview, 13 May 2020; La Silla Vacía, Al riesgo del Covid se suman amenazas y
extorsiones a retornados venezolanos, 9 June 2020, url
1227 International Organisation B, telephone interview, 13 May 2020
1228 OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, p. 63

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which exposes them to harassment and intimidation by third parties. The CDJ has documented casesof members of civil society organisations who have been forced to deplane after boarding the planein order to go through a 'last minute search of their luggage', even when it had already been searched
multiple times. 1229 In a videoconference for this report, a representative of Fundación Reflejos deVenezuela 1230 indicated that when she was travelling for a meeting with the OAS, she was deplaned
before departure to go through a second inspection of her luggage. When she returned to Venezuela,
she was questioned on her activities abroad and taken pictures of her. 1231 In a videoconference forthis report, a representative of Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela, a Venezuela-based civil society
organisation that promotes the human rights of LGBT persons 1232, indicated that when they are going
to leave the country, they are photographed by security forces. 1233 The same source indicated that, ingeneral, intimidation and harassment depend on the prevailing circumstances in the country, andusually peak when they are going to assist to international meetings abroad, such as with the
IACHR. 1234 FundaRedes similarly indicated that activists are also monitored when they leave and enter
the country. Those who attend meetings at the IACHR are particularly targeted. According toFundaRedes, as a safety precaution, most activists do not reveal their travel itineraries or the natureof their participation abroad before they have returned to the country. 1235
International Organisation A indicated that persons considered dissidents are subjected to more
scrutiny and, in some instances, detention; and people with an open judicial process, if detected, aregenerally detained. Members of the military who try to enter the country are sent to a military court.
According to International Organisation A, there have been reported cases of at least 75 former
military personnel who had deserted and were detained upon entry. 1236 For more information on
members of the military, see Chapter 3.6. The 2020 Netherlands MFA country report indicated that,
according to confidential sources, one of them a former 'high' level official of the Venezuelan
government, there are lists of wanted persons managed by the SAIME that are used to screen
passengers, and that the SEBIN, DGCIM, CICPC, FAES, and GNB have access to these lists.1237 Additionaland corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted within the time
constraints of this report.
International Organisation A reported regarding the treatment of failed asylum seekers upon returnto Venezuela that the recognition of Venezuelan citizens as 'refugees' abroad is a 'highly sensitive
issue' that the government refuses to accept as for the government there are no 'Venezuelan refugees'
but 'Venezuelan migrants'. 1238
Sources indicate that there are instances of people returning in the context of the pandemic that arereportedly monitored by the government, registered in the Patria System 1239, and asked where they
were while outside Venezuela, the destination in Venezuela, and the purpose of their stay in
Venezuela. 1240 Returnees are also reportedly being registered in social media channels run by officials
in order to surveil on them. 1241 International Organisation A indicated that there have been reports of1229 OMCT et al., Venezuela "Enemigos internos", March 2020, url, p. 63

1230 Fundación Reflejos de Venezuela is a Venezuelan human rights organisation created in 2004 that advocates for theeradication of discrimination, mistreatment and inequality towards 'vulnerable groups' (Fundación Reflejos de Venezuela,
Directorio, n.d., url).
1231 Fundación Reflejos de Venezuela, videoconference, 5 May 20201232 Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela, ¿Quiénes somos?, n.d., url
1233 Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela, videoconference, 24 April 20201234 Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela, videoconference, 24 April 20201235 FundaRedes, videoconference, 6 May 20201236 International Organisation A, telephone interview, 12 June 2020
1237 Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Algemeen Ambtsbericht Venezuela 2020 (Country Report Venezuela 2020), June
2020, url, p. 141238 International Organisation A, telephone interview, 12 June 2020
1239 FundaRedes, videoconference, 6 May 2020; Fundación Reflejos de Venezuela, videoconference, 5 May 2020
1240 Fundación Reflejos de Venezuela, videoconference, 5 May 2020
1241 Fundación Reflejos de Venezuela, videoconference, 5 May 2020

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stigmatisation of returnees in the context of the pandemic. In the state of Táchira, for example, there
are reported instances of locals attacking the buses transporting returnees with stones and welding
some schools' entrances to prevent their use as reception centres. Returnees also face stigmatisation
after they are settled in their places of origin by Venezuelan missions, even after assurances that thereturnee is free from COVID-19. 1242 Additional information could not be found among the sources
consulted within the time constraints for this report.
International Organisation A also noted that political polarisation in Venezuela also impacts thetreatment towards Venezuelans who return to the country in the sense that they can be either
considered 'pro-government' or opposition 'traitors', with no middle ground, and that there arereported cases where migrants returning to a neighbourhood with pro-government majority arelabelled as 'traitors'. The same occurs in pro-opposition neighbourhoods where they are labelled as'chavistas', 'infiltrators' and 'government supporters', who 'underwent brain-washing', for having
received government assistance to return. The same source further indicated that, to its knowledge,
there is no evidence of cases of physical aggression towards returnees once they have returned totheir communities of origin. 1243 Additional and corroborating information could not be found among
the sources consulted within the time constraints of this report.

7.4 Return to the Homeland Plan (Plan Vuelta a la Patria)
The website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Return to the Homeland Plan is a government
initiative created in August 2018 to provide assistance to Venezuelans who wish to return toVenezuela. The Plan consists of the creation of air and land corridors for the voluntary return ofVenezuelans abroad and their families who lack the necessary resources to finance their return. 1244
In order to apply for the program, the requirement is to be a Venezuelan national. Registration takes
place at Venezuelan diplomatic missions abroad and applicants must provide 'updated and truthful
information on the situation of the national abroad' and attend 'check-up meetings' as scheduled by
the diplomatic mission where the Venezuelan is registered. 1245 El Pitazo reported that the information
requested consists of the address in Venezuela and abroad, telephone number, and an email
address. 1246 Once in Venezuela, Venezuelan missions 'will do a follow-up on the returnee or the family
unit to facilitate their effective and speedy incorporation into society'. 1247
A report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated that, as of 10 February 2020, 17 522 Venezuelans
have been repatriated under the Plan, with the highest numbers coming from Brazil (7 285
Venezuelans), Peru (4 259), Ecuador (3 242), Chile (1 136), and Colombia (764). The same report
indicated that 69 % of returns took place over land and 31 % by air. The report also indicated that
100 426 Venezuelans have registered for repatriation. 1248

7.5 Internal movement
International Organisation A indicated that security forces' checkpoints within Venezuela are common
throughout the country due to what the government considers the 'threat to its territorial security'. 1249
1242 International Organisation A, telephone interview, 12 June 20201243 International Organisation A, telephone interview, 12 June 20201244 Venezuela, Ministerio del Poder Popular para Relaciones Exteriores, Plan Vuelta a la Patria, n.d., url

1245 Venezuela, Ministerio del Poder Popular para Relaciones Exteriores, Plan Vuelta a la Patria sigue en marcha con casi 16

mil repatriados hasta la fecha, 21 September 2019, url

1246 El Pitazo, Cómo registrarse en el Plan Vuelta a la Patria para regresar a Venezuela, 8 May 2020, url

1247 Venezuela, Ministerio del Poder Popular para Relaciones Exteriores, Plan Vuelta a la Patria sigue en marcha con casi 16

mil repatriados hasta la fecha, 21 September 2019, url

1248 Venezuela, Ministerio del Poder Popular para Relaciones Exteriores, Plan Vuelta a la Patria, February 2020, url
1249 International Organisation A, telephone interview, 12 June 2020

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Mouttet pointed out that moving across states can represent a risk due to checkpoints by security
forces, including the GNB and the local police. Mouttet explained that controls at checkpoints areinconsistent on who is allowed to go through, and since there are no clear orders, controls depend on
the officer in charge. Additionally, given that in Venezuela there many requirements and permits thatinvolve the operation of a vehicle, for example, if authorities want to detain someone, they can do so
by finding the missing permit or requirement. 1250 A confidential source cited in the 2020 Netherlands
MFA country report indicated that it was able to pass through security forces' checkpoints without
papers by paying bribes, while two other confidential sources indicated having travelled throughVenezuela with the identity papers of someone else without encountering any problem. 1251

1250 Mouttet, videoconference, 8 May 2020

1251 Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Algemeen Ambtsbericht Venezuela 2020 (Country Report Venezuela 2020), June

2020, url, p. 13

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8. Situation of LGBT persons
8.1 Legislation
Article 21 of the Constitution indicates that:'All persons are equal before the law, and, consequently:
1. No discrimination based on race, sex, creed or social standing shall be permitted, nor, ingeneral, any discrimination with the intent or effect of nullifying or encroaching upon therecognition, enjoyment or exercise, on equal terms, of the rights and liberties of every
individual.
2. The law shall guarantee legal and administrative conditions such as to make equality before
the law real and effective manner; shall adopt affirmative measures for the benefit of anygroup that is discriminated against, marginalized or vulnerable; shall protect in particular
those persons who, because of any of the aforementioned circumstances, are in a manifestly
weak position; and shall punish those who abuse or mistreat such persons. […]'. 1252
The Constitutional Chamber of the TSJ in its Ruling No. 190 of 2008 indicated that
'Article 21 of the Constitution is not, in any way, a restrictive norm, rather, it recognizes theright to equality and not to be discriminated against by any arbitrary factor that could nullify
or impair the recognition, enjoyment, or exercise of the rights of every person on equal terms,
that is, that the Constitution prohibits unequal treatment with respect to those who are inanalogous or similar situations, regardless of whether the discriminatory motive is one ofthose that were included in that constitutional provision'. 1253
In a videoconference for this report, AC Venezuela Igualitaria, a civil society organisation that provides
training and awareness campaigns on sexual orientation and gender identity 1254 indicated that eventhough civil society organisations that advocate for the rights of LGBT persons have been using Ruling
No. 190 in potential cases of discrimination or violations of the rights of LGBT persons, it is 'very
difficult to use this ruling because there are no procedures in place to execute the ruling and because
public officials are not trained in this regard'. 1255
Same-sex relationships are not penalised by law, but they are penalised in practice. 1256 Additionally,
persons in the military who engage in same-sex relationships are punished under Article 565 of theMilitary Justice Organic Code. 1257 Article 565 of the Military Justice Organic Code indicates thefollowing:'The officer who commits acts that affront or demean his/her dignity or allows such acts,
without trying to prevent it by the means authorized by law, will be punished with one tothree years in prison and separation from the Armed Forces.
The same penalty will be applied to any military person who commits sexual acts against
nature'. 1258

1252 Venezuela, Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 1999 (Amended), 2009, Translated by William S. Hein &Co., Inc., url

1253 Venezuela, TSJ, Sentencia No. 190, 28 February 2008, url
1254 AC Venezuela Igualitaria, Quiénes somos?, n.d., url

1255 AC Venezuela Igualitaria, videoconference, 30 April 2020

1256 Fundación Reflejos de Venezuela, videoconference, 5 May 2020

1257 ILGA, State-sponsored Homophobia, December 2019, url, p. 36; AC Venezuela Igualitaria, videoconference, 30 April 2020
1258 Venezuela, Código Orgánico de Justicia Militar, 1998, url

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Article 565 was the object of a lawsuit by AC Venezuela Igualitaria in 2016, but as of April 2020 there
has not been any ruling in this regard. 1259 Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela indicated that it has
documented cases that this article is applied mostly to men and persons with HIV, and while they are
investigated under this article, their role in the armed forces is 'gradually limited' such as by sending
them home, or assigning them to desk jobs, until they are finally dismissed. 1260
Venezuela does not recognise same-sex marriages or civil unions. 1261 A proposed law that had been
submitted to the National Assembly in 2014 to recognise same-sex marriages has not advanced, anda suit filed in 2015 with the TSJ regarding same-sex marriages has not been ruled upon. 1262
The law does not allow to change the gender in identity documents. 1263 A suit filed in 2016 with the
TSJ to allow the preference of gender identity in identity documents has not been ruled upon. 1264 In
2010, the national registry law was modified to allow trans persons to the change their name, but todate, no trans person has been able to do so. 1265
The Organic Labour Act includes sexual orientation as one of the prohibition grounds of employment
discrimination. 1266 Other laws that have incorporated articles to protect sexual orientation include theDecree with Range, Value and Force of Law for Institutions in the Banking System (Decreto con Rango,
Valor y Fuerza de Ley de Instituciones del Sector Bancario) in Article 172 1267, and Law for the
Regularisation and Control of Housing Rentals (Ley para la Regularización y Control de losArrendamientos de Vivienda) in Article 5. 1268
The Constitutional Law Against Hate, for Peaceful Coexistence and Tolerance contains provisions thatcriminalise hate on the grounds of sexual orientation. However, the law has not been applied in casesof discrimination against LGBT persons. 1269 However, discriminatory language has been used in publicby high-ranking officials, political parties, the media, and others, without consequences. 1270

8.2 Discrimination and violence
A survey carried out by Tamara Adrián1271 on the socioeconomic conditions of LGBT persons in
Venezuela and abroad1272 indicated that discrimination against LGBT persons in Venezuela is due to1259 AC Venezuela Igualitaria, videoconference, 30 April 2020

1260 Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela, videoconference, 24 April 2020

1261 ILGA, State-sponsored Homophobia, December 2019, url, 530; Fundación Reflejos de Venezuela, videoconference, 5 May

20201262 AC Venezuela Igualitaria, videoconference, 30 April 20201263 Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela, videoconference, 24 April 2020; AC Venezuela Igualitaria, videoconference, 30 April 20201264 AC Venezuela Igualitaria, videoconference, 30 April 20201265 Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela, videoconference, 24 April 20201266 Venezuela, Ley Orgánica del Trabajo, los Trabajadores y las Trabajadoras, 2012, url, Art. 211267 Venezuela, Decreto con Rango, Valor y Fuerza de Ley de Instituciones del Sector Bancario, 2014, url
1268 Venezuela, Ley para la Regularización y Control de los Arrendamientos de Vivienda, 2011, url
1269 Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela, videoconference, 24 April 2020; AC Venezuela Igualitaria, videoconference, 30 April 2020
1270 AC Venezuela Igualitaria, videoconference, 30 April 2020
1271 Tamara Adrián is a professor at the UCV and the Metropolitan University (Universidad Metropolitana) (Adrián, Para dejar
de ser fantasmas, December 2019, url, p. 1). Adrián has been a Venezuelan deputy at the National Assembly since 2016,
president for the Committee of the International Day Against Homophobia and Transphobia, president of the Board of
Directors of GATE: Global Action for Trans Equality, and member of the Scientific Committee for the Chair Human Rights andSexuality of the UNESCO. Adrián was the World Trans Secretary of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex
Association (ILGA) from 2010 to 2013 (Vital Voices, Tamara Adrián, url).
1272 The survey was carried out online between 14 and 28 August 2019, and invitation to complete the survey was made onsocial media platforms, including Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram. It consisted of two questionnaires, one for LGBT persons
in Venezuela, with a sample of 306 responses, and another for LGBT persons abroad, with a sample of 302. The total numberof questionnaires activated was 4 803, however, only 686 were considered for the study as completion was one of therequirements. The final report does not include the situation of intersex people as only one person completed the survey'inconsistently' in Venezuela, and only two intersex completed the survey from abroad. According to Adrian, the survey is124 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS

the lack of public policies that promote equality and against discrimination and violence, particularly
at the school, workplace, household and public spaces. The Adrián survey provided the following
overall percentages of LGBT persons experiencing discrimination and verbal harassment: gay men(72 %), lesbians (68 %), bisexuals (55 %), trans women (75 %), and trans men (93 %). 1273 Unión
Afirmativa de Venezuela pointed out during the interview that discrimination by society revolves
around an age divide where people younger than 35 years-old are more open to sexual diversity thanolder generations. The rejection of trans persons is more prevalent than for other LGB persons, andmen with HIV are 'automatically assumed as being gays'. 1274 The Adrián survey indicated that 70 % of
lesbians, 69 % of gays, 52 % of bisexuals, 100 % of trans women, and 86 % of trans men experienced
discrimination in public spaces. 1275
They also face restrictions in accessing the CLAP food boxes as persons in charge of delivering them
have discretion on who gets the food boxes. 1276 In Caracas there is a governmental LGBT office thatprovides the food boxes in exchange of obtaining the Carnet de la Patria and participating in progovernment rallies. In addition to the food boxes, the bonuses offered by the government are notdistributed to same-sex unions because they are not recognised by the state, and trans persons do
not receive the CLAP because their gender does not match the one indicated in their identity cards. 1277
The Adrián survey indicated that 17 % of lesbians, 6 % of gays, and 3 % bisexuals are not provided withthe food boxes because they are in a same-sex union, and that 20 % of trans women and 43 % of transmen do not received the food boxes because of their gender identity. 1278
Regarding discrimination in employment, sources indicated that it depends on the physicalappearance of the LGBT person. 1279 AC Venezuela Igualitaria indicated that 'if the person is amasculinised gay or feminised lesbian, chances are that the person will not encounter problems
obtaining employment. If the employer or colleagues find out but the person still "continues tobehave", the person would not encounter problems'. 1280 Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela similarly
indicated that 'for lesbian women and gay men, whose masculinity or femininity is not visible, there
is not so much problem. The problem is when that masculinity in lesbians and femininity in gays
becomes visible, that's when rejection arises'. Rejection is materialised at the workplace throughjokes, comments, and not being assigned tasks for consider them as 'incapable'. 1281 LGBT persons
whose physical appearance is different from their biological sex usually find informal, low-paid
employment as street vendors, security agents, call centres and beauty shops.1282 The Adrián survey
provided the following percentages of LGBT experiencing discrimination and verbal harassment at theworkplace: gays (29 % discrimination, 20 % verbal harassment), lesbians (32 %, 20 %), bisexuals (16 %,23 %), trans women (57 %, 67 %), and trans men (57 %, 50 %). 1283
LGBT persons often do not indicate their sexual orientation to health care professionals out of fear of
being ridiculed. AC Venezuela Igualitaria has documented cases of LGBT persons who have died in
hospitals because health care professionals did not know how to treat a person whose gender in theidentity document did not coincide with the physical appearance. 1284 Sources indicated that'the first one to shed light on different types of violence' committed against LGBT in Venezuela. The standard deviation was
3.5 %. (Adrián, Para dejar de ser fantasmas, December 2019, url, pp. 15-16)
1273 Adrián, Para dejar de ser fantasmas, December 2019, url, pp. 47-49
1274 Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela, videoconference, 24 April 2020
1275 Adrián, Para dejar de ser fantasmas, December 2019, url, pp. 76,
1276 AC Venezuela Igualitaria, videoconference, 30 April 2020
1277 Fundación Reflejos de Venezuela, videoconference, 5 May 2020
1278 Adrián, Para dejar de ser fantasmas, December 2019, url, pp. 323, 325
1279 Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela, videoconference, 24 April 2020; AC Venezuela Igualitaria, videoconference, 30 April 2020
1280 AC Venezuela Igualitaria, videoconference, 30 April 2020
1281 Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela, videoconference, 24 April 2020
1282 AC Venezuela Igualitaria, videoconference, 30 April 2020
1283 Adrián, Para dejar de ser fantasmas, December 2019, url, pp. 65, 68, 70
1284 AC Venezuela Igualitaria, videoconference, 30 April 2020

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transgender persons are refused medical treatment 1285, are sent from hospital to hospital, and are
mistreated during physical examinations. 1286 Transgender persons also face difficulty accessing
hormonal treatment and due to health care infrastructure in the country, most resort to selfmedication or leave the country to access proper health care.1287 Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela
indicated that same-sex couples cannot register their partner as beneficiary in health care plans. 1288
The Adrián survey indicated that 83 % of lesbians, gays and bisexuals 'always' get the medicines andhormonal treatment they need, while 13 % indicated that 'almost always'. In the case of trans women,
33 % get them 'always', 17 % 'almost always', 17 % 'sometimes', and 35 % 'rarely'. Trans men indicatedthat 67 % of them get them 'always' and 20 % 'almost always'. 1289
Regarding access to housing, even though there is a law that prohibits discrimination based on gender
identity and sexual orientation when accessing housing, it is difficult to appeal decisions as landlords
have large discretion to let properties. 1290 Same-sex couples face also difficulties and they have to hide
their relationship in order to access housing. 1291
Fundación Reflejos de Venezuela indicated that social acceptance in the urban/rural divide depends
on several factors such as the geographic area and religious beliefs. Discrimination also takes place inthe household; between 75 and 80 % of discrimination occurs at home due to social, cultural andreligious practices. 1292 The Adrián survey provided the following percentages of LGBT experiencing
discrimination and verbal harassment at their households: lesbians (60 % discrimination, 58 % verbal
harassment), gays (51 %, 40 %), bisexuals (65 %, 58 %), trans women (50 %, 50 %), and trans men(86 %, 71 %). The same survey indicated that 100 % of Venezuelan trans women living abroad
indicated that they were expelled from their home while in Venezuela, while the percentage for
Venezuelan trans men abroad was 33 %. 1293
It is difficult to know the situation of LGBT persons in Venezuela, including targeted violence, because
there are no reliable statistics, unless they are reported by the media 1294, but these outlets often do
not disaggregate aggressions by gender and report that the victim was an 'homosexual'. Also, family
members often oppose the release of information on a violent crime committed against the LGBT
relative out of shame. 1295
According to sources, 'the most vulnerable populations' to violence are trans persons 1296, persons withintersex conditions 1297, and 'feminised gays'. 1298 According to Fundación Reflejos de Venezuela,
lesbians have been subjected to 'corrective rape' in neighbourhoods. 1299 Transgender persons havebeen victims of human trafficking rings for sexual exploitation. 1300 The survey by Adrián indicated that,
overall, 38 % of trans women, 22 % of gays, 21 % of trans men, 5 % of bisexuals, and 4 % of lesbians in
Venezuela have experienced physical violence for being LGBT. According to the survey, 2 % of lesbians,
1285 Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela, videoconference, 24 April 2020; Fundación Reflejos de Venezuela, videoconference, 5May 2020

1286 Fundación Reflejos de Venezuela, videoconference, 5 May 2020
1287 Fundación Reflejos de Venezuela, videoconference, 5 May 2020
1288 Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela, videoconference, 24 April 2020

1289 Adrián, Para dejar de ser fantasmas, December 2019, url, p. 354
1290 AC Venezuela Igualitaria, videoconference, 30 April 2020

1291 Fundación Reflejos de Venezuela, videoconference, 5 May 2020
1292 Fundación Reflejos de Venezuela, videoconference, 5 May 2020

1293 Adrián, Para dejar de ser fantasmas, December 2019, url, pp. 86, 90, 95-96

1294 Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela, videoconference, 24 April 2020; AC Venezuela Igualitaria, videoconference, 30 April 2020
1295 AC Venezuela Igualitaria, videoconference, 30 April 2020

1296 Fundación Reflejos de Venezuela, videoconference, 5 May 2020; AC Venezuela Igualitaria, videoconference, 30 April

2020
1297 Fundación Reflejos de Venezuela, videoconference, 5 May 2020
1298 AC Venezuela Igualitaria, videoconference, 30 April 2020
1299 Fundación Reflejos de Venezuela, videoconference, 5 May 2020
1300 Fundación Reflejos de Venezuela, videoconference, 5 May 2020; El Diario, Explotación sexual y tráfico de personas, larealidad de cientos de venezolanos, 24 September 2019, url126 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS

7 % of gays, and 33 % of trans women filed a complaint with authorities, while bisexuals and transmen did not, and in all of the complaints the aggressor was not penalised. 1301

8.3 Situation of LGBT advocacy organisations
The division among LGBT organisations has been increasing in the context of the political polarisationin the country. 1302 Within the LGBT community, LGBT organisations that are perceived as chavistas
feel stigmatised, and those who are perceived as being from the opposition, feel they could be'persecuted' by the government. 1303
Emigration has been devastating for the LGBT movement in Venezuela as many have dissolved due tothe emigration of its members. 1304 Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela indicated that, 'in many cases, one
or two activists are the frontrunners of the organisations and when they leave the country theseorganisations disappear'. 1305 About 75 % of LGBT activists have left the country. 1306 Unión Afirmativa
de Venezuela indicated that in 2017 there were 12 organisations, in 2018 they decreased to six, andin 2019 there were 12. 1307 The Adrián survey indicated that the reasons for leaving Venezuela included
economic (73 %), political (57 %), employment (39 %), and discrimination (27 %). 1308 The lack ofresources is the main challenge as organisations do not receive funding form the government orinternational organisations 1309, in spite of the increasing number of requests for assistance, including
intra-family cases of violence. 1310
According to the AC Venezuela Igualitaria representative, LGBT organisations 'do not encounterchallenges in their work. In the last years, they have become more visible in the media. When they set
up demonstrations at the National Assembly or the TSJ, the GNB has treated them well'. The same
source indicated that violence against members of LGBT organisations 'occur more in particular cases
rather than in a generalised way', including to low-profile activists. 1311 However, according to Unión
Afirmativa de Venezuela, there is a duality among LGBT organisations in the sense that progovernment organisations are the ones that have more visibility, and there are other organisations
that are 'persecuted' not by the government but by government employees. 1312 LGBT organisations
have been attacked, including by pro-government groups. Some examples of harm faced by LGBT
organisations include intimidation of its members, aggressions at demonstrations, harassment 1313,
their webpages hacked, and accused of being 'anti-imperialists' ('antiimperialistas'), 'peons of the US
government' ('peones del gobierno estadounidense'), and 'fascists' ('fascistas'). 1314 Fundación Reflejosde Venezuela indicated that the Foundation has ceased its political activism to focus on the prevention
against discrimination. According to the same source, many aggressions against LGBT organisations
come from colectivos of LGBT activists, and when LGBT activists become politically active, including
by participating in demonstrations, are mistreated by authorities, with some of these activists deciding
to leave the country as a result. Furthermore, government officials have intimidated LGBT
1301 Adrián, Para dejar de ser fantasmas, December 2019, url, pp. 133-134, 189-192

1302 Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela, videoconference, 24 April 2020; AC Venezuela Igualitaria, videoconference, 30 April 2020
1303 AC Venezuela Igualitaria, videoconference, 30 April 2020

1304 AC Venezuela Igualitaria, videoconference, 30 April 2020; Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela, videoconference, 24 April 2020
1305 Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela, videoconference, 24 April 2020

1306 Fundación Reflejos de Venezuela, videoconference, 5 May 2020
1307 Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela, videoconference, 24 April 2020
1308 Adrián, Para dejar de ser fantasmas, December 2019, url, p. 38

1309 Fundación Reflejos de Venezuela, videoconference, 5 May 2020; AC Venezuela Igualitaria, videoconference, 30 April
2020; Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela, videoconference, 24 April 2020
1310 Fundación Reflejos de Venezuela, videoconference, 5 May 2020
1311 AC Venezuela Igualitaria, videoconference, 30 April 20201312 Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela, videoconference, 24 April 20201313 Fundación Reflejos de Venezuela, videoconference, 5 May 2020; Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela, videoconference, 24
April 20201314 Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela, videoconference, 24 April 2020

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organisations that provide psychological assistance pro-bono by indicating that 'these programs are
already offered by the government'. The same source indicated that when an organisation is wellknown, it can bring problems to its volunteers as they could be exposed to harassment and job
dismissal. While they file a complaint with the Public Ministry for actions committed against them,
they have to file a complaint at the international bodies in order to seek protection. 1315
Fundación Reflejos de Venezuela indicated that there are no zonas rosas in Caracas, but bars called
lugares de ambiente ('places of ambience'). 1316 Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela indicated that LGBT
persons are open but in very specific spaces such as beauty salons and in the celebration of LGBT
special events. Pride is celebrated in Venezuela, with a parade conducted every year financed by thegovernment since the year 2000, including the social, political and cultural acts associated with theevent. The Pride parade is organised by pro-government LGBT organisations; however, otherorganisations also attend the event. 1317

8.4 State protection
Unión Afirmativa indicated LGBT persons can file complaints for discrimination and violence
committed against them with the Public Ministry, the Office of the Ombudsperson or the police. 1318
However, LGBT persons usually do not report cases of violations of their rights or violence committed
against them. 1319 LGBT persons deal with 'fear, guilt and shame' when deciding whether or not to filea police complaint 1320, and are frequently revictimised. 1321 There have been cases of ridicule, not being
taken seriously 1322 and mistreatment by authorities. 1323 Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela indicated thatin most cases the burden of the proof lies in the LGBT person, and when they try to file a complaint,
they are sent from government institution to government institution until the victims desists. The
same source indicated that in cases of complaints against a government official or a government
agency, these complaints are delayed by authorities until the term of the statute of limitations expires
so these authorities do not rule against the government. 1324
Fundación Reflejos de Venezuela indicated that there is no consistency in the registration ofcomplaints across institutions, and when LGBT persons and organisations file a police report, they look
for a particular official who they know is sympathetic to LGBT person. The Foundation provides
awareness training to local police officers, but the training is lost because they are frequently rotated.
There are also instances that the LGBT person must demonstrate the commission of other crimes not
related to sexual orientation for authorities to investigate. Most police complaints filed with the Public
Ministry by LGBT persons are from activists. Most victims do not file complaints, and when they do,they do not follow up out of fear or because they left the country. 1325 The Adrián survey indicated that
94 % of lesbians, 91 % of gays, 94 % of bisexuals, 67 % of trans women, and 100 % of trans men in
Venezuela did not file police complaints for acts of discrimination and verbal harassment. 1326

1315 Fundación Reflejos de Venezuela, videoconference, 5 May 20201316 Fundación Reflejos de Venezuela, videoconference, 5 May 20201317 Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela, videoconference, 24 April 2020
1318 Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela, videoconference, 24 April 2020

1319 Fundación Reflejos de Venezuela, videoconference, 5 May 2020; AC Venezuela Igualitaria, videoconference, 30 April
2020; Adrián, Para dejar de ser fantasmas, December 2019, url, p. 118
1320 AC Venezuela Igualitaria, videoconference, 30 April 2020
1321 Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela, videoconference, 24 April 20201322 AC Venezuela Igualitaria, videoconference, 30 April 20201323 Fundación Reflejos de Venezuela, videoconference, 5 May 20201324 Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela, videoconference, 24 April 20201325 Fundación Reflejos de Venezuela, videoconference, 5 May 20201326 Adrián, Para dejar de ser fantasmas, December 2019, url, pp. 118-120

128 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS

There are no LGBT-specific protocols to investigate sexual orientation and gender identity-related
crimes. 1327 Institutions seldom investigate cases of discrimination or violation of the rights of LGBT
persons 1328 because LGBT persons are considered a 'minority', particularly LGBT persons with little
economic or political influence. 1329 Crimes committed against LGBT persons are deemed by authorities
as 'crimes of passion' (crímenes pasionales) 1330, the result of 'settling of scores' (ajustes de cuentas) 1331,
or that the LGBT persons 'had it coming'. 1332 Complaints made before the Office of the Ombudsperson
do not advance. It is more effective to make complaints on social media. 1333
In Venezuela there are no specialised institutions that provide assistance to LGBT persons victims of
discrimination or violence, with LGBT civil society organisations providing support 1334 such as
psychological and legal assistance. 1335 There is a legal clinic run by the Catholic University Andrés Bello(UCAB, Universidad Católica Andrés Bello) and another by Central University of Venezuela (UCV,
Universidad Central de Venezuela), but these services are very limited.1336 There was a shelter in
Caracas that provided assistance to homeless LGBT persons, but it was closed in 2017 1337 or 2014. 1338
Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela indicated that there is also an office within the Ministry of Womenand Gender Equality for LGBT persons, but the activities and assistance that it provides are 'unknown'.
Obtaining some form of protection of their rights is more feasible in urban centres than in remoteareas as in these areas there not many LGBT organisations and 'little' is known on the situation ofLGBT persons. 1339

1327 Fundación Reflejos de Venezuela, videoconference, 5 May 20201328 Fundación Reflejos de Venezuela, videoconference, 5 May 2020; AC Venezuela Igualitaria, videoconference, 30 April
2020; Adrián, Para dejar de ser fantasmas, December 2019, url, p. 118
1329 AC Venezuela Igualitaria, videoconference, 30 April 2020
1330 Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela, videoconference, 24 April 2020; AC Venezuela Igualitaria, videoconference, 30 April 2020
1331 Fundación Reflejos de Venezuela, videoconference, 5 May 2020
1332 AC Venezuela Igualitaria, videoconference, 30 April 2020
1333 AC Venezuela Igualitaria, videoconference, 30 April 2020
1334 AC Venezuela Igualitaria, videoconference, 30 April 2020; Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela, videoconference, 24 April 2020
1335 Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela, videoconference, 24 April 2020
1336 Fundación Reflejos de Venezuela, videoconference, 5 May 2020
1337 Fundación Reflejos de Venezuela, videoconference, 5 May 2020
1338 Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela, videoconference, 24 April 2020
1339 Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela, videoconference, 24 April 2020

EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS— 129

Annex 1: Bibliography
Oral sources, including anonymous sources
Amaya, Víctor, videoconference, 29 May 2020. Amaya is editor-in-chief of the economy and politics
unit of Venezuelan newspaper TalCual. He is also editor of Espaja.com, a fact-checking website
supported by Transparencia Venezuela and the European Union, and foreign correspondent of RadioFrance Internationale and La Razón (Spain).
Confidential source, correspondence, June 2020.
Fundación Reflejos de Venezuela, videoconference, 5 May 2020. Fundación Reflejos de Venezuela isa Venezuelan human rights organisation created in 2004 that advocates for the eradication of
discrimination, mistreatment and inequality towards 'vulnerable groups'. Fundación Reflejos deVenezuela provides awareness training at health care centres, government institutions, universities,
among others.
FundaRedes, videoconference, 6 May 2020. FundaRedes is a Venezuelan NGO that monitors violence
and irregular armed groups in Venezuela, with special focus on the border states with Colombia. It has
six observatories on human rights violations in border states. FundaRedes publishes monthly situation
reports on violence and educational institutions. The methodology followed by FundaRedes consistsof the tracking media and news, interviewing sources, and field documentation of victims of crime.
International Crisis Group, telephone interview, 30 April 2020
International Organisation A, telephone interview, 12 June 2020.
International Organisation B, telephone interview, 13 May 2020.
Journalist, telephone interview, 8 June 2020. The journalist is based in Venezuela and has been
covering the armed forces for over 20 years.
Mármol, F., videoconference, 1 May 2020. Fermín Mármol is a criminal lawyer, professor, and directorof the Institute of Penal Sciences, Criminalistics and Criminology (Instituto de Ciencias Penales,
Criminalística y Criminología) of Santa María University.
Mouttet, J-B., videoconference, 8 May 2020. Jean-Baptiste Mouttet is an independent journalist who
has been reporting on South America for over ten years. He is a former correspondent in Venezuela
for the French daily La Croix between 2010 and 2012 and was a contributor for the site Mediapartuntil December 2019, where he reported on elections in Venezuela. The themes he reported in
Venezuela included the situation in low-income neighbourhoods, the economic crisis, and mining
exploitation in the Arco Minero (Bolivian State).
OVV (Observatorio Venezolano de Violencia), videoconference, 4 May 2020. The OVV is a Venezuelanorganisation that collects and generates statistical reports on criminality in the country. OVV has eightobservatories in the country collaborating with local universities, and with the coordination of theSocial Sciences Laboratory (LACSO, Laboratorio de Ciencias Sociales).
Professor of political science, 14 May 2020. A professor of political science and sociopolitical conflict
who specialises in political conflict and social movements in Venezuela. The source has a prolificbackground in the publication of essays on Venezuelan democracy, social development andgovernance.
Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela, videoconference, 24 April 2020. Unión Afirmativa de Venezuela is a
Venezuelan civil society organisation created in the year 2000 that promotes the human rights of LGBT
persons and advocates for the recognition of their legal and social rights.

130 —EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS

Velasco, A., videoconference, 1 May 2020. Alejandro Velasco is a historian of modern Latin America
whose research and teaching interests are in the areas of social movements, urban culture anddemocratization. Velasco has taught courses on human rights, cultural studies, and urban social
movements.
AC Venezuela Igualitaria, videoconference, 30 April 2020. AC Venezuela Igualitaria is a Venezuelan
civil society organisation that provides training and awareness on sexual orientation and gender
identity and undertakes campaigns for the promotion of human rights of LGBT persons.
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Agencia EFE, La Fiscalía de Venezuela pide al Supremo declarar organización criminal al partido
Voluntad Popular, 25 May 2020, https://www.efe.com/efe/america/politica/la-fiscalia-de-EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT - VENEZUELA: COUNTRY FOCUS— 131

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protesta, 1 April 2020, https://www.amnistia.org/ve/blog/2020/04/14258/henderson-maldonadodetenido-por-acompanar-y-documentar-una-protesta, accessed 19 June 2020
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https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AMR5318792020ENGLISH.pdf, accessed 24 March
2020
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June 2020
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2019, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AMR5315132019ENGLISH.pdf, accessed24
March 2020
Analítica, Hasta dos meses por una cédula esperan quienes no pagan "gestores verdes" en el Saime,
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VTV (Venezolana de Televisión), Presidente Maduro rechaza campaña de descrédito contra FAES y
PNB dirigida desde EE.UU., 20 December 2019, https://www.vtv.gob.ve/maduro-denuncia-eeuucampana-descredito-faes-pnb-final/, accessed 22 May 2020
Washington Post (The), How bad is Venezuela’s economy? Even the criminals are struggling to getby., 8 March 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/how-bad-is-venezuelas-economy-eventhe-criminals-are-struggling-to-get-by/2019/03/07/1ccb653e-3c75-11e9-b10bf05a22e75865_story.html, accessed 7 July 2020
Washington Post (The), With low turnout, Venezuela’s election will create what opponents call
‘puppet congress’, 31 July 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/defyinginternational-calls-venezuela-holds-contentious-election/2017/07/30/be3cd614-7089-11e7-8c17533c52b2f014_story.html, accessed 7 July 2020
WOLA (Washington Office on Latin America), Beyond the Narcostate Narrative: What U.S. Drug
Monitoring Data Says About Venezuela, March 2020, https://www.wola.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/04/Narcostate-memo-EDITED.pdf, accessed 22 May 2020

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Annex 2: Terms of Reference
1. Political and humanitarian situation•

Recent developments on the human rights and humanitarian situation (since June 2019)-

Treatment of members of the opposition and its supporters.

-

Information on migration, food insecurity, malnutrition, and access to food, basic
medicines, medical treatment, and the impact of the coronavirus on the health system.

2. Security situation at the borders•

Presence of Colombian armed groups in Venezuela, including organised criminal groups,
paramilitaries, and guerrillas; information on areas of operation, activities and relationshipwith the Venezuelan government.

•

Threatening/targeting of Venezuelans (in Venezuela and border areas inside Colombia) by
Colombian criminal groups.

•

Venezuelan state response to armed groups' activities at border areas, including operational
control and protection available for victims.

3. Colectivos•

Information on colectivos, including types, structure, areas and means of operation,communications, activities, and relationship with the government.

•

Profiles of targeted individuals.
-

Whether colectivos have access to government databases, such as police/intelligencedatabases, to target individuals.

-

Capacity of colectivos to track down individuals who fled an area where they operate
and moved to another part of the country.

•

The role of colectivos during protests; whether colectivos operate in tandem with security
forces.

•State response to members of colectivos and other non-state actors who have committed
crimes.

4. Situation of current and former state employees•

Treatment of current and former government employees who support the opposition,
including members of the security forces; reprisals for not participating in government
events and/or activities; monitoring by the state.

•

Treatment of state employees, including public servants, teachers and members of the
security forces, who leave the government; whether they are perceived to be "dissidents" by
the state.

•

Ability of members of security forces who desert their posts to obtain a travel document andleave the country.

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Ability of former government employees to obtain proof of employment after departure,including procedures and whether the reason for leaving is stated in the document.

•

Treatment of whistleblowers.

5. Identity documents and court documents•

Requirements and procedures to obtain and renew identity documents, including passports
and national identity cards, within the country and from abroad.

•

Court summonses and arrest warrants, including issuing authority and issuance procedures;
description of the documents, including security features; whether copies can be obtained
from outside the country or by a third party.

•

Prevalence and availability of fraudulent documents, including identity documents and court
documents.

•

The homeland card (carnet de la patria), including issuance procedures, usage, and physicalcharacteristics; whether benefits are linked to an individual’s political views and/or politicalparty affiliation.

6. Entry and exit procedures•

Exit and entry procedures at airports, land and fluvial crossings.

•

Information on illegal border crossings.

•

Information on restrictions on who can or cannot leave the country, including members of
the opposition and supporters, and persons wanted by the government.

•

Treatment of returnees from abroad, including critics of the government, persons who
engaged in anti-government social-media activities while abroad, persons previously
detained in Venezuela, and failed asylum seekers.

7. Situation of LGBT persons•

Situation of LGBT persons, including legislation, treatment by authorities and society, state
protection and support services.

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doi: 10.2847/222503