EASO
Iraq
Security situation

Country of Origin Information Report
October 2020

More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu)
ISBN 978-92-9485-643-2

doi: 10.2847/554901

BZ-02-20-558-EN-N© European Asylum Support Office, 2020
Cover photo, © David Roberto (iStock), 1174351698, Baghdad, Iraq - June 29, 2019: Symbol of war on thestreet, 15 September 2019
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. For any use or reproduction of photos orother material that is not under the EASO copyright, permission must be sought directly from the copyrightholders.

EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Acknowledgements
EASO would like to acknowledge the following national asylum department as co-drafter of thisreport, together with EASO:
Belgium, Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, Cedoca(Centre for Documentation and Research)
EASO would also like to acknowledge ARC, the Asylum Research Centre, as co-drafter of this report.
The following departments and organisations have reviewed respective parts of this report:
Denmark, Ministry of Immigration and Integration, The Danish Immigration Service
Finland, Finnish Immigration Service
France, Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA), Information,
Documentation and Research Division
ACCORD, the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation,
andARC, the Asylum Research Centre.
All parts of this report have been reviewed by at least one reviewer. ARC, who acted as co-drafter andas reviewer, reviewed parts drafted by other co-drafters.
The review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts or organisations contributes to theoverall quality of the report, but does not necessarily imply their formal endorsement of the final
report, which is the full responsibility of EASO.

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Contents
Acknowledgements................................................................................................................................. 3Contents .................................................................................................................................................. 4
Disclaimer................................................................................................................................................ 8
Glossary and Abbreviations .................................................................................................................... 8
Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 11
Methodology .................................................................................................................................... 11
Sources ............................................................................................................................................. 11
Structure and use of the report ........................................................................................................ 12
Map ....................................................................................................................................................... 13
1. General description of the security situation in Iraq ........................................................................ 14
1.1 Overview of recent conflicts in Iraq............................................................................................ 14
1.1.1 Conflict with ISIL .................................................................................................................. 14
1.1.2 Internal tensions ................................................................................................................. 16
1.1.3 Turkish and Iranian incursions ............................................................................................ 18
1.1.4 Conflict in Iraq between Iran and the US ............................................................................ 19
1.2 Armed actors .............................................................................................................................. 20
1.2.1 The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) ............................................................................................. 20
1.2.2 Kurdistan Regional Government forces (Peshmerga) ......................................................... 20
1.2.3 Forces supporting the Iraqi government (Popular Mobilization Units – PMU – Hashd alShai’bi) .......................................................................................................................................... 20
1.2.4 US-led Coalition forces ........................................................................................................ 24
1.2.5 Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) ........................................................................... 24
1.3 Recent security trends and armed confrontations..................................................................... 30
1.3.1 Geographical overview of the security situation ................................................................ 30
1.3.2 Nature of the security incidents .......................................................................................... 32
1.4 State ability to secure law and order.......................................................................................... 37
1.4.1 Road security ....................................................................................................................... 38
1.5 Impact of the violence on the civilian population ...................................................................... 39
1.5.1 Civilian casualties ................................................................................................................ 39
1.5.2 Infrastructural damage and explosive remnants of war ..................................................... 42
1.5.3 Displacement and return .................................................................................................... 42
2. Northwestern and central governorates: Anbar, Babil, Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewa, Salah al-Din.............................................................................................................................................................. 44
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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

2.1 Anbar .......................................................................................................................................... 45
2.1.1 General description of the governorate.............................................................................. 45
2.1.2 Conflict background and armed actors in the governorate ................................................ 47
2.1.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ........................................... 52
2.2 Babil ............................................................................................................................................ 61
2.2.1 General description of the governorate.............................................................................. 61
2.2.2 Conflict background and armed actors ............................................................................... 62
2.2.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ........................................... 63
2.3 Baghdad ...................................................................................................................................... 68
2.3.1 General description of the governorate.............................................................................. 68
2.3.2 Conflict background and armed actors in the governorate ................................................ 70
2.3.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ........................................... 75
2.4 Diyala .......................................................................................................................................... 84
2.4.1 General description of the governorate.............................................................................. 84
2.4.2 Conflict background and armed actors ............................................................................... 86
2.4.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ........................................... 91
2.5 Kirkuk ........................................................................................................................................ 103
2.5.1 General description of the governorate............................................................................ 103
2.5.2 Conflict background and armed actors ............................................................................. 104
2.5.3 Recent security trends and the impact on the civilian population ................................... 108
2.6 Ninewa ...................................................................................................................................... 118
2.6.1 General description of the governorate............................................................................ 118
2.6.2 Background conflict dynamics and armed actors ............................................................. 120
2.6.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ......................................... 127
2.7 Salah al-Din ............................................................................................................................... 138
2.7.1 General description of the governorate............................................................................ 138
2.7.2 Conflict background and armed actors in the governorate .............................................. 141
2.7.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ......................................... 146
3. Kurdistan Region of Iraq (Dohuk, Erbil, Sulaymaniyah) .................................................................. 154
3.1 Dohuk........................................................................................................................................ 156
3.1.1 General description of the governorate............................................................................ 156
3.1.2 Conflict background and armed actors in the governorate .............................................. 157
3.1.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ......................................... 160
3.2 Erbil ........................................................................................................................................... 167
3.2.1 General description of the governorate............................................................................ 167
3.2.2 Conflict background and armed actors ............................................................................. 169
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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

3.2.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ......................................... 171
3.3 Sulaymaniyah ............................................................................................................................ 180
3.3.1 General description of the governorate............................................................................ 180
3.3.2 Conflict background and armed actors in the governorate .............................................. 182
3.3.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ......................................... 185
4. The southern governorates (Basrah, Kerbala, Missan, Muthanna, Najaf, Qadissiya, Thi-Qar, Wassit)............................................................................................................................................................ 193
4.1 Basrah ....................................................................................................................................... 194
4.1.1 General description of the governorate............................................................................ 194
4.1.2 Conflict background and armed actors in the governorate .............................................. 195
4.1.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ......................................... 197
4.2. Kerbala ..................................................................................................................................... 202
4.2.1 General description of the governorate............................................................................ 202
4.2.2 Conflict background and armed actors in the governorate .............................................. 203
4.2.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ......................................... 204
4.3 Missan....................................................................................................................................... 209
4.3.1 General description of the governorate............................................................................ 209
4.3.2 Conflict background and armed actors in the governorate .............................................. 210
4.3.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ......................................... 211
4.4 Muthanna ................................................................................................................................. 215
4.4.1 General description of the governorate............................................................................ 215
4.4.2 Conflict background and armed actors in the governorate .............................................. 216
4.4.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ......................................... 217
4.5 Najaf.......................................................................................................................................... 220
4.5.1 General description of the governorate............................................................................ 220
4.5.2 Conflict background and armed actors in the governorate .............................................. 221
4.5.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ......................................... 222
4.6 Qadissiya ................................................................................................................................... 226
4.6.1 General description of the governorate............................................................................ 226
4.6.2 Conflict background and armed actors in the governorate .............................................. 227
4.6.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ......................................... 229
4.7 Thi-Qar ...................................................................................................................................... 233
4.7.1 General description of the governorate............................................................................ 233
4.7.2 Conflict background and armed actors in the governorate .............................................. 234
4.7.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ......................................... 235
4.8 Wassit ....................................................................................................................................... 240

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

4.8.1 General description of the governorate............................................................................ 240
4.8.2 Conflict background and armed actors in the governorate .............................................. 241
4.8.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ......................................... 242
Annex 1: Bibliography ......................................................................................................................... 246
Annex 2: Terms of Reference .............................................................................................................. 323

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Disclaimer
This report was written according to the EASO COI Report Methodology (2019).1 The report is basedon carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced.
The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed with utmost
care. However, this document does not claim to be exhaustive. If a particular event, person ororganisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has not taken place orthat the person or organisation does not exist.
Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particularapplication for international protection. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative of aparticular legal position.
‘Refugee’, ‘risk’ and similar terminology are used as generic terminology and not in the legal sense as
applied in the EU Asylum Acquis, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the
Status of Refugees.
Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may bemade of the information contained in this report.
The drafting of this report was finalised on 31 July 2020. Some additional information was added
during the finalisation of this report in response to feedback received during the quality control
process, until 14 September 2020. More information on the reference period for this report can befound in the methodology section of the Introduction.

1 The EASO methodology is largely based on the Common EU Guidelines for processing Country of Origin Information (COI),

2008, and can be downloaded from the EASO website: url.

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Glossary and Abbreviations
AAI

Ansar Al-Islam, meaning ‘supporters of Islam’; Al Qaeda/ISIL affiliate
group

AAH

Asa’ib Ahl al‐Haq (The League of the Righteous);

ACLED

Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project. A provider of datasetson conflict incidents

AK

Assault rifle, type “Avtomat Kalashnikova”

al-Hashd al-Asha’iri

Sunni tribal militia units composed mainly of Sunni tribes; someaffiliated with the Popular Mobilization Units

al-Hashd al Shaabi

Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) or Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)

AsayishIntelligence services of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq

Babil/Babylon

Babil is sometimes spelled Babel, Babylon, Babil

Badr Organization

Iranian-backed Shia militia that is part of the Popular Mobilization Units,
one of the biggest of the PMUs

CJTF-OIR

Coalition Joint Task Force-Operation inherent Resolve; the international
military coalition fighting ISILCTSCounter-Terrorism Service; also called ISOF (Iraqi Special Operations
Forces); elite-trained special forces.

Daesh

Arabic abbreviation for ISIL, ad-Dawlah al-Islamiyah fi ‘I-‘Iraq wa-shSham

DIA

Defence Intelligence Agency

Dohuk

Dohuk is sometimes spelled Dahuk

EPIC/ISHM

Education for Peace in Iraq Center / Iraq Security and Humanitarian
Monitor

FP

Federal Police

Grand Ayatollah al The highest Shia cleric in Iraq
SistaniIA

Iraqi Army

IBC

Iraq Body Count

IED

Improvised Explosive Device

IRGC

Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps

ISCI

Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq

ISF

Iraqi Security Forces

ISIL

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant; also known as Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria (ISIS), the Islamic State (IS), or Daesh.

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

ISW

Institute for the Study of War

KDP

Kurdish Democratic Party

KDPI

Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran, also known as PDKI – Democratic
Party of Iranian Kurdistan, an Iranian Kurdish opposition group
operating from Iraq

KH

Kataib Hezbollah (Battalions of the Party of God); Iranian-backed Shia
militia that is part of the Popular Mobilization Units.

KRG

Kurdistan Regional Government

KRI

Kurdistan Region of Iraq

MukhtarLocal community leader

PAK

Kurdistan Freedom Party – in Kurdish Partiya Azadiya Kurdistane, an
Iranian Kurdish opposition group operating from Iraq

Peshmerga

Military forces of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq

PJAK

Kurdistan Free Life Party – in Kurdish Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistanê,
PKK’s Iranian offshoot

PKK

Kurdistan Workers’ Party. The PKK is on the European Union’s list ofdesignated groups which have been involved in terrorism2, as well as
being listed as a terrorist organisation by Turkey3, the United States4,
and Australia.5

PMC

Popular Mobilisation Committee

PMF or PMU

Popular Mobilization Forces or Popular Mobilization Units, also called
al-Hashd al Shaabi in Arabic.

PUK

Patriotic Union of Kurdistan

RULAC

Rule of Law in Armed Conflict Project

SVEST

Suicide vest

SVIED

Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device

Thi-QarThi-Qar is sometimes spelled Dhi Qar

USUnited States

USDOD

US Department of Defense

USDOS

US Department of State

VBIED

Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device

YBS

Sinjar Resistance Unit; Yezidi militia considered part of the PKK

2 EU, Council of the European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/1341 of 8 August 2019 updating the list of persons,groups and entities subject to Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specificmeasures to combat terrorism, and repealing Decision (CFSP) 2019/25, 8 August 2019, url
3 Euronews, Turkey slams Belgium court ruling that PKK is not a 'terrorist' organization, 31 January 2020, url
4 US, Bureau of Counterterrorism, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, , url; Euronews, Turkey slams Belgium court ruling that
PKK is not a 'terrorist' organization, 31 January 2020, url
5 Australia, Australian National Security, Listed terrorist organisations, n.d., url; Euronews, Turkey slams Belgium court
ruling that PKK is not a 'terrorist' organization, 31 January 2020, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Introduction
This report was drafted by Country of Origin Information (COI) specialists from COI units listed underthe Acknowledgements section, together with the EASO COI sector.
The purpose of this security situation report is to provide relevant information for the assessment ofinternational protection status determination (refugee status and subsidiary protection), and inparticular for use in EASO’s country guidance development on Iraq.

Methodology
This report is produced in line with the EASO COI Report Methodology (2019)6 and the EASO COI
Writing and Referencing Style Guide (2019).7
The terms of reference (ToR) of this report focus on criteria for the assessment of the application ofarticle 15(c) of the Qualification Directive on a serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person
by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict. The ToR
were defined by EASO based on discussions held and input received from COI experts in the EASO COI
specialist network on Iraq and from policy experts in EU+ countries8 within the framework of a Country
Guidance development on Iraq. The ToR can be found in Annex 2 of this report.
This report is an update of the EASO COI report on Iraq, security situation, published in March 2019.
The information is a result of desk research of public, specialised paper-based and electronic sources
until 31 July 2020. Some additional information was added during the finalisation of this report in
response to feedback received during the quality control process, until 14 September 2020.

Sources
The two main sources on civilian casualties and civilians killed in Iraq used in this report are the UN
Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) and the organisation Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project(ACLED).
For data on violent incidents, publicly available curated datasets from ACLED have been used. ACLED
is a project collecting, analysing and mapping information on crisis and conflict in Africa, south andsouth-east Asia and Middle East and provides datasets on conflict incidents. ACLED collects data on
violent incidents in Iraq, coding each incident with the time and place, type of violent incident, theparties involved and the number of fatalities. The information is collected in a database that is openly
accessible, searchable and kept continuously up to date. The data primarily come from secondary
sources such as media reports.
Security incident numbers and associated graphs/maps at country and governorate level are based ona publicly available ACLED curated dataset for Middle East (updated until 31 July 2020). Additionalsources have been researched to the extent possible to corroborate the ACLED findings.
UNAMI figures/data on casualties (killed and injured) were received from UNAMI- HRO (Human rights
Office) upon request. UNAMI no longer provides publicly available casualty figures for Iraq. The
number of incidents provided by UNAMI-HRO were only those armed conflict-related incidents, which
had directly impacted on civilians (causing civilian casualties) and on the civilian nature of property

6 EASO, EASO Country of Origin Information (COI) Report Methodology, June 2019, url
7 EASO, Writing and Referencing Guide for EASO Country of Origin Information (COI) Reports, June 2019, url
8 EU Member States plus Norway and Switzerland

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situationand protected areas (such as, civilian houses, cropland, schools, health facilities and mosque).9
UNAMI-HRO verifies every single incident with at least three independent sources of information.
These sources include victims, family members of victims, witnesses, local tribal elders and Sheikhs,
local journalists, local civilian authorities (including mayors and district administrators), local healthfacilities and health professionals and security officials (primarily local police) who witnessed or haveknowledge of the incident.10

Structure and use of the report
The report is divided in two chapters. The first chapter focuses on the general security situation in Iraq
by providing first a general background of recent conflicts in Iraq, the current political situation, andinformation on the main armed actors in Iraq and Kurdistan Region of Iraq and their territorialpresence and role. A general overview of the current security situation in the reference period, as it
relates to the nature of the violence and civilian impacts then follows.
The second chapter provides a governorate-level description of the security situation. Eachgovernorate chapter includes a map, brief description of the governorate, background conflict
dynamics and armed actors present in the area, 2019-2020 security trends, including information on
civilian deaths, security incidents and trends, armed confrontations (etc.), and information on
displacement and return, and civilian infrastructure impacted such as road security. It was decided tomake a single chapter for the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), and for eight southern governorates.
For organisational purposes only, this report groups together several governorates under threechapters:•••

The northwestern and central governorates: Anbar, Babil, Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewa,
Salah al-Din),
Kurdistan Region of Iraq (Dohuk, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah),
The southern governorates (Basrah, Kerbala, Missan, Muthanna, Najaf, Qadissiya, Thi-Qar andWassit).

9 UNAMI, email to EASO, 31 August 2020
10 UNAMI, email to EASO, 24 August 2020

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Map

Map 1: Iraq, © United Nations.11

11 United Nations, Iraq, Map No. 3835 Rev.6, July 2014, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

1. General description of the security
situation in Iraq
1.1 Overview of recent conflicts in Iraq
1.1.1 Conflict with ISIL
The Iraqi government, supported by Kurdish Peshmerga forces and various militia groups is involvedin a non-international armed conflict against the Islamic State group (ISIL) and associated groups,
according to the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict Project (RULAC). The government is also supported byan international coalition led by the United States (US), which has been carrying out air strikes against
ISIL.12 The air strikes continued through the second quarter of 2020.13
By the end of 2017, ISIL had become militarily defeated.14 During the ensuing period, signs that ISIL
has begun to recover have been reported.15 When the last remnants of ISIL’s caliphate in Syria
collapsed in 201916, ISIL relocated key people and equipment to Iraq on a large scale, Iraq security
experts Michael Knights and Alex Almeida noted. Following a steep decline in ISIL attacks in Iraq in
2018, attacks continued to drop in the beginning of 2019. Then, from the second half of 2019 into
2020, the activity started to grow again, showing a ‘strong and steady’ resurgence. Attacks nearly
doubled from the beginning of 2019 to the beginning of 2020. Knights and Almeida assessed that thegroup was under way of re-establishing itself in its traditional strongholds in the rural central parts of
Iraq.17 Husham al-Hashimi stated that terrorist incidents and violence had spread in areas near cities
retaken from ISIL in the northern and eastern parts of the country during the first half of 2020.18
In the winter of 2020, the US Department of Defense (USDOD) reported that ISIL continued to be
regrouping, expecting it to be seeking to re-establish territorial governance in northern and western
Iraq. USDOD still considered ISIL to be unable to gain control over the local population there.19
ISIL has in no large measure returned to its former practices of carrying out urban mass attacks. Nor
has it taken back any territorial control, but in all the areas which it previously held, ISIL has shiftedback to former insurgency tactics, Knights and Almeida observed. At the same time, as the UnitedStates is drawing down its force commitment in Iraq it has become engaged in exchanges of strikes
and counter strikes with Iran-backed Iraqi militias. These developments have disrupted Coalition
support to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and the ISF has been left with less capacity to contain ISIL.
Benefitting from this, ISIL is accelerating its recovery.20 Further straining ISF capacity, these forces have
12 RULAC, Non-international armed conflicts in Iraq [Last updated: 16 January 2020], n.d., url; RULAC is an online portalthat identifies and classifies situations of armed conflict based on an independent assessment of open source information;
it is based at the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, url
13 US, USDOD, Press release 20 June 2020, url
14 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her
mission to Iraq, 14 to 23 November 2017 (A/HRC/38/44/Add.1), 5 June 2018, url, p. 1; US, USCIRF, Annual Report 2018 –Iraq, April 2018, url, p. 1
15 Knights, M. & Almeida, A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020, May
2020, url, p. 12
16 Al-Jazeera, ISIL defeated in final Syria victory: SDF, 23 March 2019, url
17 Knights, M. & Almeida, A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020, May
2020, url, pp. 12, 14, 25
18 Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: “Smoking the Fox out of its Den” Strategy, July 14, 2020, url
19 USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve Report to the United States Congress, January, 1 – March
31, 1 May 2020, url, p. 22
20 Knights, M. & Almeida, A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020,
May 2020, url, p. 25

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

to some measure been redeployed to larger cities to enforce measures to contain the spread of thecoronavirus, and to focus on controlling the public protests.21
In late 2019, the Iraqi government placed restrictions on Coalition air movement. These measures
were introduced after air strikes suspected to have been conducted by Israeli warplanes, had been
carried out against Iran-backed militia groups in Iraq.22 The restrictions were eased shortly after.23
In July 2020, USDOD announced that the coalition forces would be transformed from combat forces
into an advisory group, whose role will be to advise Iraqi security staff and leaders.24
Figure 1 shows the proportion of the Coalition’s engagement with ISIL, Iran and Popular Mobilization
Unit (PMU) militias, and with other armed actors between January 2019 and June 2020.

Figure 1: US/Coalition activity in Iraq, January 2019 – June 2020 © 2018 ACLED25

21 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, October 1, 2019 –December 31, 2019, 4 February 2020, url, p. 19; Knights, M. & Almeida, A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery ofIslamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020, May 2020, url, p. 25
22 Military Times, How Israel airstrikes targeting Iranian militias in Iraq hurt the US-led anti-ISIS mission, 20 November
2019, url. Military Times is an independent source for news and information aiming to reach US military personnel.
23 US, USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve Report to the United States Congress, October 1,
2019 – December 31, 2019, 4 February 2020, url, p. 23
24 US, USDOD, Coalition Task Force-Iraq transitions to Military Advisor Group, 4 July 2020, url
25 Pavlik, M. et al., A sudden surfacing of strength: evaluating the possibilities for a resurgence of IS in Syria and Iraq, 24
July 2020, Figure 7, url © 2020 ACLED

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

1.1.2 Internal tensions
There may be signs that the sectarian conflict lines dating back to 2003 have increasingly becomechallenged by the emergence of new conflict lines.26 Experts point out that the public protest
movement that has been growing in recent years, is non-sectarian in its nature and aims to have theestablished political elite as well as the current political order replaced.27 The public protests haveplayed out mainly in the south and in Baghdad. They have been driven by frustration over corruption,
poor public services, and lack of jobs. The government has been facing a widespread lack of publictrust.28
In October 2019, the public protests escalated sharply and were violently cracked down on by security
forces. Between then and January 2020, over 600 civilian protesters and activists were killed.
Intimidation, arrests and torture of protesters followed.29
The protests forced Prime Minister Adel Abdul al-Mahdi to step down in November 2019.30 At thatpoint Iraq was unable to form a new government. Until April 2020, three successive candidates to thepremiership failed to get approval.31 After five months without a functioning government, Mustafa alKadhimi was approved by the parliament as Prime Minister in May 2020.32
In December 2019, a new electoral law was passed. It replaced proportional representation between
sects and ethnic groups with an individual candidacy system. The intention was to accommodate theprotest movement’s demands for an overhaul of Iraq’s political system.33
As the coronavirus pandemic hit in the winter/spring of 2020, protests largely closed down for somemonths, but resumed in May 2020 in various cities.34 Further protests were reported in southern cities
and Baghdad in June and July 2020.35 Figure 2 below shows how the protests spiked at the end of 2019
and the beginning of 2020.

26 Hasan, H., Iraq protests: A new social movement is challenging sectarian power, Middle East Eye, 4 November 2019, url.

Harith Hasan is a Senior Scholar at Carnegie Middle East Center and a SFM Fellow at the Central European University.
27 Hasan, H., Iraq protests: A new social movement is challenging sectarian power, Middle East Eye, 4 November 2019, url;
Dodge, T. et al, Sectarianism in the Longue Duree, 24 November 2019, url; SEPAD – Sectarianism, Proxies and Desectarianisation; Halawa, H., Iraq’s protests: durability and sustainability, Middle East Institute, 31 January 2020, url. Toby
Dodge is professor at the London School of Economics.
28 Al-Jazeera, Oil price crash compounds problems facing Iraq's new government, 7 May 2020, url
29 AI, Iraq: Protest death toll surges as security forces resume brutal repression, 23 January 2020, url
30 BBC News, Iraq Profile: timeline, n.d., url
31 US, USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve – Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,
January, 1 – March, 31, 13 May 2020, url, p. 38
32 New York Times (The), Iraq Chooses New Prime Minister, an Ex-Intelligence Chief Backed by US, url
33 Al-Jazeera, Iraq parliament approves new electoral law as deadlock persists, 24 December 2019, url
34 Middle East Eye, “Today is a message”: Anti-government protests resume in Iraq, 10 May 2020, url; Middle East Eye,Coronavirus fears leave Iraq's anti-government protesters divided, 15 May 2020, url
35 Garda World, Iraq: Anti-government protests reported nationwide June 7 /update 128, 7 June 2020, url; Al-Jazeera, Iraq:
At least two killed in renewed anti-government protests, 27 July 2020, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Figure 2: Protests and violent demonstrations, January 2016 – June 2020 © 2018 ACLED.36

Falling global oil prices caused Iraq’s oil revenue to decline by close to 42 % from 2019 to 2020, asetback with ‘dire’ implications for Iraq’s economy. The reduced oil income impacted GDP by 35 %.37
Oil accounts for 67 % of Iraq’s economy, and the government’s budgets are 90 % funded by income
from Iraq’s oil. The World Bank was cited that Iraq’s economy could contract by 9.7 % in 2020.38 Also
the KRI’s economy remained fragile in 2020.39 As it had recovered from a sharp downturn in 2014 andwas growing, it again became hit hard by the drop in oil prices. As the revenue dropped by half in
2020, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) became unable to fulfil its obligations under therevenue sharing agreement with the central government in Baghdad closed the preceding year. The
budget transfers from Baghdad became frozen40, but an agreement was reached later.41
Relations between Baghdad and the KRI remained complicated. Even though the Kurdish Region is aconstitutionally recognised part of Iraq, the KRG must constantly negotiate with the central

36 Pavlik, M. et al., A sudden surfacing of strength: evaluating the possibilities for a resurgence of IS in Syria and Iraq, 24

July 2020, Figure 7, url © 2020 ACLED
37 Hirmis, A. K., Will crashing oil prices mean the collapse of Iraq’s economy? No. Will the Iraqi economy (and people)
suffer? Yes, a great deal…, Iraq Business News, 4 May 2020, url, p. 1. Hirmis is Principal at the UK based consultancy CapitalBusiness Strategies Ltd.
38 Al-Jazeera, Oil price crash compounds problems facing Iraq's new government, 7 May 2020, url
39 Saeed, Y., Without Diversifying its Rentier Economy, Pessimism Among Kurdish Youth Will Increase, 25 September 2019,url
40 Aziz, B., Emerging Risks and Reforms: The KRG’s Challenges in Building a Post-Coronavirus Economy, 7 May 2020, url
41 Berdikeeva, S., Relations between Erbil and Baghdad to be tested by regional tensions, 20 January 2020, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

government in various aspects of governance, such as budget and a share in government.42 The two
governments have so far not created a joint security system.43
In the KRI itself, the traditional balance of power between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and
the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the two dominating political parties has shifted from‘dominant’ to ‘hegemonic’ in favour of the KDP, Sardar Aziz noted. The PUK has remained internallydivided, and become contested by the KDP in zones of former PUK dominance.44 In February 2019,
Gorran, an opposition party, signed an agreement with the KDP that admitted it into the regional
government then being formed.45 Later in the spring the KDP signed a similar agreement with thePUK.46In Sunni areas in central and northern Iraq where the fighting against ISIL took place, public anger iswidespread. Little recovery from the destruction has been seen in these areas.47

1.1.3 Turkish and Iranian incursions
There is an ongoing international armed conflict between Iraq and Turkey, according to RULAC.48
Turkish air strikes are taking place in northern Iraq without the consent of the Iraqi government.49 The
air strikes are an extension of an internal conflict in Turkey between Turkish armed and security forces
and the opposition group PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party), targeting PKK fighters in Iraq. 50 The PKK ison the European Union’s list of designated groups which have been involved in terrorism51, as well as
being listed as a terrorist organisation by Turkey52, the United States53, and Australia.54
On 14 June 2020, Turkey targeted suspected PKK in the Qandil mountains near the Iranian-Turkish
border, and also further into Iraq at locations such as Sinjar and Makhmour districts. Civilian casualties
were reported in some locations.55 Turkish ground forces were deployed to Haftanin in Dohuk
governorate.56 Between 14 and 16 June 2020, Turkey launched joint air and ground operations against
Kurdish militants across the border in northern Iraq, targeting suspected PKK positions at an‘unprecedented scale and scope’.57

42 Aziz, S., Sooner Rather Than Later: The Demand for Decentralization in Iraqi Kurdistan, 2 June 2020, url. Sardar Aziz is asenior adviser in the Kurdish parliament as well as a researcher and writer.
43 Berdikeeva, S., Relations between Erbil and Baghdad to be tested by regional tensions, 20 January 2020, url
44 Aziz, S., Sooner Rather Than Later: The Demand for Decentralization in Iraqi Kurdistan, 2 June 2020, url
45 Kurdistan 24, KDP, Gorran ink deal on gov. formation as PUK boycotts return to Parliament, 18 February 2019, url
46 Rudaw, KDP strikes new government deals with Gorran and PUK, 5 May 2019, url
47 Cordesman, A., Strategic Dialogue: Shaping a US Strategy for the “Ghosts” of Iraq, Working Draft: 3 rd Major Revision,
CSIS, 26 May 2020, url, p. 21. Anthony Cordesman is an analyst and Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic
International Studies, Washington DC.
48 RULAC, Non-international armed conflicts in Iraq [Last updated: 8 June 2020], n.d., url
49 Al-Monitor, Turkey continues bombing Iraqi Kurdistan amid Iraq’s strong objection, 2 July 2019, url; Al-Jazeera, Turkey
says it hit more than 500 PKK targets in northern Iraq, 18 June 2020, url; RULAC, Non-international armed conflicts in Iraq
[last updated: 8 June 2020], n.d., url
50 RULAC, Non-international armed conflicts in Iraq [last updated: 8 June 2020], n.d., url
51 EU, Council of the European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/1341 of 8 August 2019 updating the list of persons,groups and entities subject to Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specificmeasures to combat terrorism, and repealing Decision (CFSP) 2019/25, 8 August 2019, url
52 Euronews, Turkey slams Belgium court ruling that PKK is not a 'terrorist' organization, 31 January 2020, url
53 US, Bureau of Counterterrorism, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, , url; Euronews, Turkey slams Belgium court ruling that
PKK is not a 'terrorist' organization, 31 January 2020, url
54 Australia, Australian National Security, Listed terrorist organisations, n.d., url; Euronews, Turkey slams Belgium court
ruling that PKK is not a 'terrorist' organization, 31 January 2020, url
55 Middle East Eye, Fear and anger greets Turkish air strikes in northern Iraq, 23 June 2020, url
56 Al-Jazeera, Turkey sends special forces into northern Iraq, 17 June 2020, url
57 US, USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve – Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,
April 1, 2020 – June 30, 2020, 4 August 2020, url, p. 33; Guardian (The), Turkey launches major attack on Kurdish militantsin Iraq, 17 June 2020, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Also, in June 2020, Iranian artillery was reported to have fired at PKK positions in the Hajji Omaran
border district, damaging property in villages.58

1.1.4 Conflict in Iraq between Iran and the US
A conflict between Iran and the US has developed on Iraqi territory, with exchanges of missile strikes
taking place.59 The USDOD stated in 2020 that Iran was funding, training, and directing Shia militia
groups in Iraq to wage what it termed ‘a proxy war’ against the US.60 Tensions between the US and
Iran over Iraq rose through the reference period.61 Sources considered the tensions to be harming the
US-Iraqi security relationship.62
On the last day of 2019, members and supporters of Iran-aligned militias demonstrated outside the
US Embassy compound in Baghdad, attacked it and set fire to the reception area.63 At the start of2020, a US drone attacked and killed Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Iranian Revolutionary
Guards Corps (IRGC), and leader of the Iraqi Kataib Hezbollah militia Abu Maidi al-Muhandis in a strikenear Baghdad International Airport.64 Some days later, Iran retaliated by launching missiles at two
Iraqi military bases housing US forces.65 In a non-binding vote in response to the US attack on
Soleimani and al-Muhandis, the Iraqi parliament voted shortly after to evict US and Coalition forcesfrom the country. The vote was non-binding.66 The decision was not ratified.67
US Secretary of Defence Mark Esper stated that the US would not withdraw from Iraq.68 The USDOD
Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) stated that the US forces ‘paused’ their antiISIL operations, shifting focus to protecting its own forces against escalating attacks by Iraqi militias
backed by Iran. In the same report, the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) and Defence Intelligence
Agency (DIA) were cited as identifying Iran’s main objective as to disrupt and harass US forces topressure the US to leave Iraq.69
Further into the first quarter of 2020, the US froze the movement of all its troops overseas, including
Iraq, for 60 days due the coronavirus pandemic. Several Coalition members temporarily withdrew
some of their forces to their home countries.70 In the second quarter of 2020, US forces began torestart their support to the ISF.71

58 Rudaw, Turkish airstrikes, Iranian artillery simultaneously pound Kurdistan Region border area, 16 June 2020, url;

Kurdistan 24, Iranian artillery bombs border areas within Kurdistan Region: source, 16 June 2020, url; Kurdistan 24, Iranshells Kurdistan Region for second day in row, forcing locals to flee, 17 June 2020, url
59 Felbab-Brown, V., Stuck in the middle: Iraq and the enduring conflict between United States and Iran, 29 January 2020,
url
60 US, USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve - Report to the United States Congress, October 1,
2019 – December 31, 2019, 4 February 2020, url, p. 24
61 Katulis, B., & Juell, P., Putting Diplomacy First, 12 March 2020, url
62 US, USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve - Report to the United States Congress, January, 1 –March, 31, 13 May 2020, url, p. 14; Katulis, B., & Juell, P., Putting Diplomacy First, 12 March 2020, url
63 AP, Protesters attack US Embassy in Baghdad after airstrikes, 1 January 2020, url
64 BBC, Qasem Soleimani: US kills top Iranian general in Baghdad air strike, 3 January 2020, url
65 NBC News, Iran retaliates for Gen. Soleimani's killing by firing missiles at US forces in Iraq, 8 January 2020, url
66 DW, Iraqi parliament votes to expel US troops — awaits government approval, 5 January 2020,url
67 The National, Rocket hits Baghdad airport in latest attack on US forces, 9 June 2020, url
68 Voice of America, Esper: US Forces not Withdrawing from Iraq, 7 January 2020, url
69 US, USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve - Report to the United States Congress, October 1,
2019 – December 31, 2019, 4 February 2020, url, pp. 23-24
70 US, USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve - Report to the United States Congress, January 1,
2020 – March 31, 2020, 13 May 2020, url, p. 12
71 US, USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve - Report to the United States Congress, January 1,
2020 – March 31, 2020, 13 May 2020, p. 14; New York Times (The), US Military Resumes Joint Operations With Iraq, 15January 2020, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Protection of US personnel in Iraq became reinforced during 2020, as the threat from Iran-backed
militias in Iraq was seen to continue.72 On various occasions during 2020, the US has responded with
air strikes on Iran-backed militias.73 USDOD reported a higher frequency and lethality of the violent
confrontations between Iran-backed and US forces during the second quarter of 2020 than in thepreceding quarter.74 According to Iranian analyst Abas Aslani, long-term Iranian regional policies
continue uninterrupted by the assassination of Soleimani. Iran will not be inclined to avoid frictions
with, or to become forced into negotiations with the US under unfavourable terms.75 The Institute for
the Study of War (ISW) noted that under Soleimani’s leadership, escalation and de-escalation of
attacks carried out by the Iran-backed militias was closely calibrated to fit with Iran’s regional strategy.
Tangible objectives such as obtaining relief of the sanctions and pressing the US out of Iraq and the
Middle East were being pursued also by these means.76
At the regional level, tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia escalated during 2019, Baynafsheh
Keynoush, writing for the Atlantic Council observed, pointing to the two countries as competing for
spheres of influence in Iraq. Iraq and other countries have sought to mediate between the US and
Iran, and between US ally Saudi Arabia and Iran.77
Information about the security actors and on dimension of these conflicts is described in further
sections of this report, as well in the governorate-level chapters.

1.2 Armed actors
This section provides information on the main armed actors in Iraq and KRI and their territorialpresence and capacity. Please see Section 1.3. of the EASO-COI Report – Iraq: Security Situation (2019)and for an overview of these. Where new information has been found about their presence andcapacities, it has been added below.
Detailed information on state actors of protection and their capacity to protect, including integrity
issues such as alleged abuses, is available in the EASO COI Report – Iraq: Actors of Protection (2018).

1.2.1 The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
For information, please see Section 1.3.1.1. of the EASO-COI Report – Iraq: Security Situation (2019)

1.2.2 Kurdistan Regional Government forces (Peshmerga)
For information, please see Section 1.3.1.3. of the EASO-COI Report – Iraq: Security Situation (2019)

1.2.3 Forces supporting the Iraqi government (Popular Mobilization Units –PMU – Hashd al-Shai’bi)
Renad Mansour et al. term the PMU a ‘hybrid actor’ that are neither state actors, non-state actors nor
purely foreign proxies. They sometimes operate in concert with the state, sometimes they competewith it. While depending on sponsorship both by host state and foreign backers, they are at the sametime in a position flexible enough to enable them to keep their own military capability and generate

72 Times of Israel, US moves missile defense systems to Iraq after attacks by Iran-backed insurgents, 11 April 2020, url
73 BBC, Iraq base attack: US in retaliatory strikes on Iran-backed fighters, 13 March 2020, url
74 US, USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve - Report to the United States Congress, January, 1 –March, 31, 13 May 2020, url, p. 34
75 Tehran Times, Iran after Soleimani, 16 February 2020, url
76 ISW, Iran’s proxies accelerate Soleimani’s campaign to compel U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, 2 April 2020, url
77 Keynoush, B., Why mediation between Saudi Arabia and Iran keeps failing, 27 January 2020, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

their own revenue.78 According to Knights et al, the PMU have no defined core competencies,
functions, roles, or missions. Lacking such, the PMU were claiming various roles and missions, such asprotecting ISIL-threatened communities, or playing a role in the public sphere by engaging in civic
activities. The authors further stated that many Iraqi Shia political leaders were viewing the PMU as
committed to protecting the political order that developed in Iraq from 2003.79
In 2020, the authors estimated the actual number of PMU (Hashd) fighters, spread over a variety of
militias that includes Shia militias, Sunni and other minority-based armed forces in Iraq, at 159 000.
Of these 24 000 were unregistered, serving without regular pay or contracts. The PMU are composedof 66 predominantly Shia sub-units, 43 Sunni tribal forces, and ‘a dozen ethnically based minority
units’. 121 sub-units were identified as PMU formations, with registered PMU personnel. Many of thetribal forces and Baghdad-based auxiliary units were not recognised by the PMU Commission, thecentral leadership body of the PMU.80

Integrity of PMU
In an order issued by the prime minister on 1 July 2019 intended to strengthen state control over thePMUs, all registered PMU units including the Sunni tribal units were set to become integrated into thesame organisational structure. All registered units were then to respond to the same military code of
conduct.81
In its 2019 annual report on Iraq, AI reported that anyone criticising the conduct of security forces
including units of PMU, could become targeted by them, as they were running an ‘intimidation
campaign’ against protesters, activists, lawyers representing protesters, medics giving treatment toprotesters, and journalists covering the protests. AI pointed at PMU forces using excessive force
against protester, having killed up to 500 during the protests. Also, ‘thousands’ of men and boys werereported as having disappeared at the hands of PMU and other security forces when fleeing ISIL-heldareas.82
Analyst Seth Frantzmann, writing for Foreign Policy, remarked in June 2020 that local militia groups’
power remained to be curtailed by the government, which was still lacking a formal hierarchy toorganize them under state authority.83 In response to the killing of a protester during an antigovernment demonstration, ISF raided an office in Basra in May 2020 belonging to Thaar Allah, an
Iran-backed militia, and arrested five militia members in a move mentioned as ‘rare’.84
Sources reported about PMU engaging in illicit economic activities such as extortion, levying fees,
fraud and theft.85 By levying fees at their checkpoints, PMU militias generate significant illicit income,the risk analysis group Global Risk Insights noted. Strong militias, supported by state forces and police
as well as Sunni tribal militias, generate a ‘vital’ source of income by taxing oil and other commodities
transports on road. The complicity of state actors in such activities has created a system of mutual

78 Mansour, R. et al., These Iraqi militias are attacking protesters and getting away with it. Here’s why, 18 November 2019,url
79 Knights, M. et al., Honored, not contained. The future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, March 2020, url, pp. 137-139
80 Knights, M. et al., Honored, not contained. The future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, March 2020, url, pp. 61, 125
81 Iraq, Prime Minister’s media office, Diwani Order No. 237 1 July 2019, [Twitter @IraqiPMO], 1 July 2019, url; Rudolf, I.,
The Sunnis of Iraq’s “Shia” Paramilitary Powerhouse, 13 February 2020, url; Knights, M. et al., Honored, not contained. The
future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, March 2020, url, p. 12
82 AI, Iraq 2019, n.d., url
83 Frantzmann, S., Iraq’s New Prime Minister Needs to Take Control of His Security Forces, 16 June 2020, url
84 RFE/RL, Iraq Targets Iran-Aligned Militia Over Shooting Death Of Protester, 11 May 2020, url
85 ICG, Iraq: Fixing security in Kirkuk, 15 June 2020, url, p. 14; Smyth, P., Making sense of Iraq’s PMF arrests, 26 April 2019,
url; Al-Arabiya, Secret documents may be reason behind Iraqi activist al-Hashimi’s assassination, 20 August 2020, url; AlArabiya, Unpublished work by slain Iraqi activist al-Hashimi shows PMU’s corruption in Nineveh, 21 July 2020, url; Global
Risks Insight, Iraq: The political economy of corruption, 8 December 2019, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

economic and political benefits for state and the state-affiliated actors, the latter gaining from thepatronage links to the state that thus have become established.86
PMU militias were also reported as having engaged in providing social and medical services to local
populations. The PMU Medical Department coordinated with the Iraqi Health Ministry in agovernment-run campaign to contain the spread of the coronavirus, contributing with advocacy,sanitation and medical assistance.87

Shia PMU forces
These forces have a separate chain of command than the state armed forces. This enables the Shia
PMU to decide themselves whether they will implement orders issued by the Prime Minister, or by
the ISF, or whether to take a different approach. They do not respond to the Prime Minister, butcoordinate many activities with the ISF.88 Parts of some of these are incorporated into PMUs that areon the government’s payroll.89 In April 2020, the ISW reported about an apparently new Shia militia
group, Usbat al-Thairen, likely to be under direct control of the large Iran-backed militia Kataib
Hezbollah. Referring to its pattern of activity and its capacities, the ISW assumed that the launch ofthis new group might have indicated the start of a new phase of Iran-supported, increasingly lethal
militia attacks against US forces.90
In June and July 2019, the Iraqi government began to issue pronouncements about reforms intended
to strengthen state control over the PMU that Knights and Almeida considered ‘significant’. The
backdrop was escalating US-Iranian tensions, and drones having been launched into Saudi Arabia from
PMU sites in Iraq.91
In September 2019, the PMU was formally placed under the Joint Operational Command, adding it asa ‘security agency’ in the command. All these agencies were under the operational command of thePrime Minister or his alternate, a general. Knights et al. stated early in 2020 that the provisions had
not been implemented.92 In April 2020, the government announced that four PMU militias tasked withprotecting the holy shrines, would be placed directly under the Prime Minister’s Office. Reporting
about this move, analyst Shelly Kittleson commented it as an attempt to weaken Iranian and Iranlinked Kataib Hezbollah’s influence over them.93 In June 2020, the head of the PMU ordered the force
to adopt unmet reforms.94 Further information about the implementation of the reforms has not beenfound.
Experts explain that the PMU enjoy direct support both by a Shia public and a Shia political class, andthey are supported by external actors. By providing security and services, PMUs build and maintaintheir own constituencies. The PMU have thus become ‘a formidable security actor’, according toKnights et al. state, even if they lack the training, equipment and international partnership available
to the state forces, and have a weaker funding.95

86 Global Risks Insight, Iraq: The political economy of corruption, 8 December 2019, url
87 Wall Street Journal (The), Iran-backed Groups in Lebanon and Iraq Seek Public Support in Coronavirus Fight, 27 April

2020, url; Al-Monitor, Iraq’s PMU throw weight behind countering COVID-19, 8 April 2020, url
88 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, p. 30
89 Foreign Policy, A Powerful Iran-backed Militia is losing Influence in Iraq, 11 May 2020, url, p. 4
90 ISW, Iran’s proxies accelerate Soleimani’s campaign to compel US withdrawal from Iraq, 2 April 2020, url
91 Knights, M. et al., Honored, not contained. The future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, March 2020, url, pp. 12, 1415
92 Knights, M. et al., Honored, not contained. The future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, March 2020, url, p. ix
93 Foreign Policy, A Powerful Iran-backed Militia is losing Influence in Iraq, 11 May 2020, url, pp. 1-2
94 ISW, Iraq Situation Report June 3-9, 9 June 2020, url
95 Knights, M. et al., Honored, not contained. The future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, March 2020, url, p. 144;
Mansour, R. et al (Mansour, R., Cambanis, T, Hanna, M. W.), These Iraqi militias are attacking protesters and getting awaywith it. Here’s why, 18 November 2019, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

An interactive map provided by analyst Philip Smyth at the Washington Institute charts militias’
locations, movements, ties to Iran, and involvements in conflicts in Iraq up to April 2020.96
Presented in an article by Knights et al., a map provided by the CTC Sentinel (Brandon Mohr) shows
the deployment of the dominant PMU types in north/central Iraq as per August 2019. The areas where
the PMU were dominant, are marked in green. Beige areas are those where responsibility was shared
between the PMU and units of the Iraqi army or police. Brown areas are dominated by Badr militiacontrolled units of the Iraqi army. All eight southern provinces (covered by the beige area) should beconsidered areas of shared control between the Iraqi army or police, and the PMU, until the army andthe police are redeployed to these governorates.97

Map 2: Main areas of operation for Iran-backed militias in Iraq, annotated with PMF brigade numbers @ Brandon Mohr98‘Fake Hashd’ groups‘Fake Hashd’ is a phenomenon in which various kinds of actors seek to exploit the popularity of the
PMU to set up an irregular group by attracting people believing it is a regular PMU. Such ‘fake Hashd’groups have been found to engage in criminal activities, such as setting up false checkpoints for the
purpose of extorting money from travellers.99 In 2019, the government as well as the PMU
Commission began to increase their efforts to abolish the ‘fake Hashds’. In May 2019, the security
96 Smyth, P., The Shia Militia Mapping Project (Presentation), 19 April 2029, url; Smyth P., The Shia Militia Mapping Project(Interactive Map), May 2019, url
97 Knights, M. et al., Honored, not contained – the future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, March 2020, url, pp. 128129
98 Map @ Brandon Mohr, in Michael Knights, Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, August 2019,url, p. 3
99 Rise Foundation, Mosul and Tel Afar Context Analysis, December 2017, url, p. 21

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

directorate of the PMU Commission claimed that it had closed more than 320 facilities belonging toillegal groups.100

Sunni tribal militias or Tribal Mobilisation Forces (TMF) - al-Hashd al-Asha’iri
Security analyst Husham al-Hashimi, cited by Knights and Almeida estimated that out of 121 sub-units
identified as PMU formations with registered PMU personnel, 43 are Sunni tribal forces.101 A sourcein 2017, estimated a unit size at 50 - 200 personnel, while others may have counted fewer than 700.102
Newer estimates have not been found. Knights et al cited Iraqi security analyst Husham al-Hashimi
that even though tribal forces under the PMU have been provided entire brigade equipment by theUS, their offensive capabilities remained ‘negligible’.103
In the summer of 2019, the Iraqi government ordered the tribal forces and other PMU forces that had
taken part in fighting ISIL, to move their camps and depots out of the towns where they were located,considering extended presence illegal.104 No information has been found about how the order was
followed up.

Minority group militias
The various minority group militias are explored further down in this report in the relevant
governorate chapters. More information is also available in the EASO COI Report – Iraq: Actors ofProtection (2018). For more information about the sub-categories of the PMU, please also see theMarch 2019 EASO-COI Report Iraq: Security Situation, Section 1.3.

1.2.4 US-led Coalition forces
In March 2020, Coalition forces withdrew from the al-Qaim base on the border to Syria as part of aplanned drawdown. Withdrawal from other bases across Iraq followed shortly thereafter.105 Also in
March 2020, the Coalition announced the ‘repositioning’ of its forces in Iraq from fewer and smaller
bases, with fewer people, as a response both to success in the fight against ISIL and in order to protect
its personnel against the spread of the coronavirus.106
In July 2020, USDOD announced that the Coalition forces would be transformed from combat forces
into a Military Advisor Group put together by the Coalition member states. The role of this group will
be to provide specialised expert advice to Iraqi security staff and leaders.107

1.2.5 Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)
Targets, activity, and tactics
As a general trend of ISIL attack types in the reference period, Al-Hashimi mentioned targeting of belt
areas surrounding cities and large villages.108
Knights & Almeida mentioned attacks on ISF and PMU posts and checkpoints with IEDs and grenade
launchers, and booby-trapping houses. Civilian targets would typically be preachers, Mukhtars and
100 Fanack, Iraqi Prime Minister Issues New Decrees to Reign In, Depoliticize Militias, 22 July 2019, url
101 Knights, M. et al., Honored, not contained. The future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, March 2020, url, p. 125
102 Gaston, Erica, “Sunni Tribal Forces,” GPPI (Global Public Policy Institute), August 30, 2017,url, p. 6.
103 Knights, M. et al., Honored, not contained. The future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, March 2020, url, pp. 70, 133
104 Iraqi National Security Council Directive, 15 August 2019, cited in: Knights, M. et al., Honored, not contained. The futureof Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, March 2020, url, p. 198.
105 Military times, US-led coalition troops pull out of base in western Iraq, March 2020, url
106 US, USDOD, CJTF-OIR Statement on repositioning of forces, March 2020, url
107 US, USDOD, Coalition Task Force-Iraq transitions to Military Advisor Group, 4 July 2020, url
108 Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: From Abandoned Villages to the Cities, 5 May 2020, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

other community leaders, tribal leaders, villages inhabited by minority groups, mosques, markets,
rural tribes, and shepherds. Civilians would be targeted by means of IEDs, mass casualty attacks, andsometimes by snipers. Attacks could occasionally occur in cities as well, sometimes as mass casualty
attacks. Targeted attacks on civilians declined sharply from 2018 to 2019, from 167 to 79. Attacks
intended to create mass casualties declined likewise in this period, from 141 to 59. Attempted mass
attacks went down from eight to five in this period, and then further down to three in the first quarterof 2020. The lethality of those attacks also declined into the beginning of 2020. In the same period,
the use of roadside bombs, and attacks on military targets, increased. The frequency of attacks per
governorate changed between the two most attacked governorates, Kirkuk and Diyala. In 2018, Kirkuk
and Diyala experienced 370 and 340 attacks respectively. In 2019, Diyala had 550 attacks and Kirkuk
228. Attacks in Kirkuk recorded by Knights and Almeida then dropped to 46 in the first quarter of2020.109
During the second quarter of 2020, sources began to report about an increase in ISIL activity.110 ISIL
was attacking villages and Sunni tribes in a mode described as ‘low-cost, low-tech, rural, but lethal’.111
Knights and Almeida and Husham Al-Hashimi mentioned ISIL shelling villages, burning farms, carryingout assassinations and kidnappings.112 The attacks in 2020 were targeting the Iraqi state, local
government, the ISF, tribes and tribal resistance, Knights and Almeida reported. As a tactic to keeppeople out of areas with sanctuaries, ISIL would kill livestock, burn crops and kill shepherds. In Diyala,
ISIL would pursue ethnic/sectarian cleansing of Shia, Kurdish and Kakai villages, and it would extort
and intimidate civilians.113
Over the years ISIL has sought to incite sectarian violence and to disrupt the relationship between thecivilian population and state forces, according to ACLED. The group has also engaged state forces
directly, seeking to weaken them. In 2020, ISIL appeared to be pursuing similar strategies, aiming at
shaping its operational environment to its advantage, and gain space for it to grow. To avoid Sunni
communities turning against them, ISIL sought to stay present and spread fear in such communities,
committing several attacks on hostile Sunni communal leaders. ACLED noted a notable increase in theshare of incidents that involved state forces, from 59 % in 2017 to 75 % in 2019 and 73 % in the firsthalf of 2020. The corresponding rate of attacks on civilians were 17 % (2017), 15 % (2019) and 13 %(January – June 2020).
ACLED noted that corresponding in time with the Corona pandemic, an increased attack rate during
the first four months of 2020 suggested that the group had been made able to exploit gaps in thepresence of security forces that the pandemic has opened for.114

109 Knights, M. & Almeida, A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020, May

2020, url, pp. 4-10, 2-3
110 New York Times (The), ISIS Attacks Surge in Iraq Amid Debate on US Troop Levels, 10 June 2020, url; Knights, M. & Almeida,A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020, May 2020, url, p. 12; Lister, C.,
ISIS’ dramatic escalation in Syria and Iraq, 4 May 2020, url
111 New York Times (The), ISIS Attacks Surge in Iraq Amid Debate on US Troop Levels, 10 June 2020, url
112 Knights, M. & Almeida, A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020, May
2020, url, p. 19 ; Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: From Abandoned Villages to the Cities, 5 May 2020, url
113 Knights, M. & Almeida, A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020, May
2020, url, p.2
114 ACLED, A sudden resurfacing of strength: evaluating the possibility of an IS resurfacing in Iraq and Syria, 24 July 2020, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Figure 3: ISIL activity over time in Iraq, January 2019 – June 2020 @2020 ACLED.115
Analyst Sam Heller at the International Crisis Group (ICG) observed that during the spring of 2020, ISIL
for the first time since it was officially defeated in 2017 began to stage complex attacks against ISF. In
April 2020 a shift in timing and the selection of targets could be noted, such as an attempted suicide
attack on an intelligence headquarters in Kirkuk and a number of coordinated attacks in Salah al-Dinthat took place month.116
According to ACLED, the shift indicates growing capability and strength, since the new attack types
require advanced equipment and competence, and access to intelligence. The modus operandi that
ISIL has displayed in 2020 indicates a shift from staging low-cost, simple remote explosions andviolence, to engaging mainly state forces in complex armed confrontations.117

Presence and capacities
Knights and Almeida estimated that in less than one and a half years from the end of 2018, the numberof areas with active ISIL attack cells had nearly doubled from 27 to 47. As outlined by the authors by
March 2020, these 47 areas were located in:“Anbar: Akashat; the al-Qaim/Abu Kamal border area; Wadi Horan/Rutbah; Nukhayb; the RawahAnah-Haditha corridor; Hit; Ramadi and Lake Razazah; Karmah and southern Thar; andFallujah/Amiriyat al-Fallujah
Salah al-Din: Eastern Thar Thar/Balad; southern Jallam Desert/Mutaibijah; Udhaim, northeastern Thar
Thar/Tikrit; Baiji/Siniyah/Makhul; northern Jallam Desert/Hamrin; Tuz/Pulkhana; and Zarga

115 Pavlik, M. et al., A sudden surfacing of strength: evaluating the possibilities for a resurgence of IS in Syria and Iraq, 24 July

2020, Figure 7, url © 2020 ACLED. All rights reserved. Used with permission from ACLED.
116 ICG, When Measuring ISIS’s “Resurgence”, Use the Right Standard, 13 May 2020, url, p. 3
117 ACLED, A sudden resurfacing of strength: evaluating the possibility of an IS resurfacing in Iraq and Syria, 24 July 2020, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Baghdad: Tarmiyah; Taji/Saab al-Bour; Abu Ghraib/Zaidon; the Latifiyah/ Yusufiyah/ Mahmudiyah
triangle; Jurf al-Sakhr; and Jisr Diyala/Madain
Diyala: Buhriz/Kani Ban Saad; western Baquba; Mukhisa/Abu Sayda; Sherween/ Muqdadiyah;
Jalula/Sa’adiyah; Qara Tapa/Hamrin; Khanaqin and Nida/Mandali;
Kirkuk: Zab/Abbasi; the Mamah-Gharra / Batawi ridge; Riyadh; Rashad/Jawwalah Daquq/Ghayda;
Dibis and the Qani Domlan; and Kirkuk city
Ninewa: East Mosul; Ash Shura/Hammam al-Alil; Qayyarah; Sharqat; Jurn triangle; the Hatra/IraqTurkey Pipeline corridor southwest of Mosul; Badush/Atashana/west Mosul; Tal Afar/Muhallabiyah;
Tal Afar/Ayadhiyah; Sinjar/Baaj; and Lake Sunnislah/Jazeera.”118
ISIL has gained more freedom to operate during 2020, as state forces were diverted to enforce
measures to control the spread of the Corona virus.119 According to Husham al-Hashimi, ISIL has been
seeking to establish itself in places where conventional military operations were challenging, such as
valleys, mountains and deserts across northern and central Iraq. There they can settle in abandoned
villages, hide in caves and tunnels they dig, and set up camps. Al-Hashimi noted that by 2020, ISIL had
become able to patrol rural areas located in Salah al-Din, Kirkuk, Diyala, and northern Baghdad.120
Media sources reported that ISIL had resurfaced in Sunni majority governorates and in Kirkuk, stronger
and increasing its attacks.121 The New York Times pointed specifically to Salah al-Din, Anbar, Diyala,
Kirkuk, Ninewa governorates.122 Analyst Husham al-Hashimi noted that raids on PMU and tribal
mobilisation forces’ barracks, as well as surprise attacks, increased between April and July 2020.123 An
article by al-Hashimi published in August 2020 contains a map showing locations of ISIL attacks during
the spring and summer of 2020. It shows the densest concentration of attacks around Baquba, thecapital of Diyala governorate. The other locations are spread out over Diyala, southern Erbil, Kirkuk,
Salah al-Din and Ninewa governorates, Baghdad city, as well as locations in Anbar governorate
adjacent to Baghdad. The strategic aim of these attacks were to cut off road traffic, disrupt
reconciliation between local population groups, and to blockade cities economically as well as to gain
control of open terrain.124
Knights and Almeida noted in May 2020 that ISIL had ‘spread out across many more areas’ in Iraq
during the preceding 18 months.125 In these areas ISIL was operating almost only in rural
environments, where it was seeking to wear out the ISF, according to experts.126 According to Husham
Al-Hashimi, these are rural areas located in Anbar, Salah al-Din, Diyala, Ninewa, Kirkuk, and Baghdad
governorates. More precisely, ISIL had been active at the following locations:Anbar: southwest Anbar desert, Horan valley to al-Abiach valley to al-Kadef valley, and the northernpart of Rawa
Ninewa: the southern part of the Ninewa desert, Baaj

118 Knights, M. & Almeida, A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020, May

2020, url, p. 23
119 New York Times (The), ISIS Attacks Surge in Iraq Amid Debate on US Troop Levels, 10 June 2020, url
120 Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: From Abandoned Villages to the Cities, 5 May 2020, url
121 NPR, Laid Off By US Contractor, Iraqi Interpreters Fear ISIS Retaliation, 19 June 2020, url; New York Times (The), ISIS
Attacks Surge in Iraq Amid Debate on US Troop Levels, 10 June 2020, url; BBC, Isis in Iraq: Militants “getting stronger again”,
23 December 2019 url; New York Times (The), ISIS Is Regaining Strength in Iraq and Syria, 19 August 2019, url; Atlantic (The),
The Inconvenient Truth About ISIS, 14 February 2020, url
122 New York Times (The), ISIS Attacks Surge in Iraq Amid Debate on US Troop Levels, 10 June 2020, url
123 Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: “Smoking the Fox out of its Den” Strategy, July 14, 2020, url
124 Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS thrives in Iraq’s “money and death triangle”, 11 August 2020, url
125 Knights, M. & Almeida, A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020, May
2020, url, p. 2
126 Knights, M. & Almeida, A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020, May
2020, url, p. 12; Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: From Abandoned Villages to the Cities, 5 May 2020, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Erbil: Makhmour
Baghdad: the Belts
Diyala: the north-eastern areas
Kirkuk: south of Kirkuk, Hawija, Zab, and Abbasi
Salah al-Din: Shirqat, Khanuqa, Hamrin mountains, east of Lake Tharthar.127
In recent years, ISIL has been seen to some degree to have shifted its activity southwards from Kirkuk
towards Salah al-Din and Diyala governorates, where it has been increasing its activity. It has thus
been moving in the direction of Baghdad. Resembling its earlier strategy of seeking control of larger
cities’ rural surroundings, ISIL has carried out ‘at least half a dozen complex, coordinated attacks” inthe outskirts of the capital during the first half of 2020, according to ACLED.128 Figure 3 shows thisgradual shift in concentration of activity from the start of 2016 onwards.

Map 3: Concentration of ISIL activity in Iraq, January 2016 – June 2020 © 2020 ACLED.129
Knights and Almeida reported about a steady increase in attacks carried out by ISIL from 132 permonth in the second quarter of 2019 to about 188 per month in the first quarter of 2020. Between
the first quarter of 2019 and the first quarter of 2020 the number of attacks nearly doubled, from 292
to 566. Citing a UN source, the authors pointed to the increase as showing a ‘strong and steadyrecovery’.130
ISIL continued to carry out occasional mass casualty attacks. On one day in May 2020, a string of five
IED incidents in the Baghdad area killed and wounded civilians.131 Also in the spring of 2020, Knights
127 Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: From Abandoned Villages to the Cities, 5 May 2020, url
128 Pavlik, M. et al, A sudden surfacing of strength: evaluating the possibilities for a resurgence of IS in Syria and Iraq, 24 July

2020, url
129 Pavlik, M., et al., A sudden surfacing of strength: evaluating the possibilities for a resurgence of IS in Syria and Iraq, 24
July 2020, url, Figure 4, © 2020 ACLED. . All rights reserved. Used with permission from ACLED.
130 Knights, M. & Almeida, A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020, May
2020, url, pp. 2, 10-11, 2-3
131 EPIC, ISHM: May 7- May 14, 2020, 14 May 2020, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

and Almeida noticed the start of a trend of suicide attacks to intimidate rural tribes, but also extending
into urban areas. The authors recorded a strong growth in ISIL attempts to overrun checkpoints andbases during 2019.132 Kurdistan 24, an Iraqi Kurdish media outlet, continued to report about suchattacks in the second quarter of 2020.133
In May 2020, Knights & Almeida indicated that ISIL’s forces in Iraq amounted to 1 300 attack cell
combatants, and 2 700 logistical, financial and other support operatives. These together made up a
core combat force of about 4 000 members. In addition, around 10 000 supporters came providing
services such as food and other supplies, safe houses, and information. Taken together this indicateda total force of around 14 000.134 In the winter and spring of 2020, USDOD as well as Husham alHashimi assessed ISIL to count 14-18 000 people in Syria and Iraq.135
At this point, analyst Aaron Zelin held the opinion that with a number of fighters at 11 000, one would
have seen a much higher level of violence than what has been reported. In his opinion, the fairly low
level of violence would mean that this number also includes non-fighting members. Speaking about a‘resurgence’ would then be an overestimation of ISIL’s capacity, Zelin contended.136
An analysis by ACLED indicated that even though ISIL’s current position has improved relative to that
immediately after its defeat in 2017, it has not regained the strength it had in the run-up to its
territorial gains in 2014. If not resurging it is patiently exploiting current favourable operational
conditions, preparing for its further evolution.137

State response to ISIL
Anti-ISIL operations in Kirkuk during most of 2019 worked to reduce ISIL activity in this governorate.138
In October and November 2019, the ISF temporarily postponed some operations against ISIL because
public protests in Baghdad and elsewhere led the Iraqi military to change its priorities.139 In 2020,
Coalition support to ISF became reduced as a consequence of Iraqi restrictions imposed on Coalition
activity, and the ISF was needed to enforce measures to contain the Corona pandemic. The
operational tempo of the ISF in fighting ISIL diminished accordingly, as well as its ability to hold terrain
it had once cleared of ISIL. Also anti-ISIL operations by the Emergency Police and the Federal Police
dropped in the first quarter of 2020.140

132 Knights, M. & Almeida, A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020, May

2020, url, pp. 10, 2, 4
133 Kurdistan 24, ISIS targets security forces in central Iraq for the second day in a row, 3 May 2020, url; Kurdistan 24,
Militiamen killed in massive, multi-pronged ISIS attack in central Iraq, 2 May 2020, url
134 Knights, M. & Almeida, A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020, May
2020, url, p. 12
135 US, USDOS, 23 January 2020, Special Representative for Syria Engagement and Special Envoy for the Global Coalition to
Defeat ISIS James Jeffrey, Special Briefing, url; Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: From Abandoned Villages to the Cities, 5 May 2020,
url
136 Zelin, A., A Year Since Baghuz, the Islamic State Is Neither Defeated nor Resurging (Yet), 25 March 2020, url
137 ACLED, A sudden surfacing of strength: evaluating the possibilities for a resurgence of IS in Syria and Iraq, 24 July 2020,
url
138 Knights, M. & Almeida, A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020, May
2020, url, pp. 7-8
139 USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, October 1, 2019 –December 31, 2019, 4 February 2020, url, p. 19
140 Knights, M. & Almeida, A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020, May
2020, url, pp. 14-20

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

1.3 Recent security trends and armed confrontations
1.3.1 Geographical overview of the security situation
This section provides a brief explanation of different security issues in different geographical areas in
the reference period. Different areas have specific security dynamics, trends and patterns, which arebriefly described below. These contextual issues are further elaborated in the governorate level
chapters.

Kurdistan Region of Iraq (Erbil, Dohuk and Sulaymaniyah)
Through the reference period, the most extensive armed activity in the KRI took place in the areas
bordering Turkey. Turkish air strikes and battles between Turkish militants and Turkish forces took
place in the districts of Zahko and Amedi (Dohuk), Soran (Erbil), and Turkish air strikes in Pishdar andSulaymaniyah districts (Sulaymaniyah).141 Turkish military operations in northern Iraq against the PKK
intensified between January and May 2020. Turkish officials that were cited mentioned that around
150 suspected PKK positions had been targeted in the operations.142
Also Iranian Kurdish militant groups have used the region to launch attacks against Iran across theborder.143 Iran, for its part, targeted such groups inside the KRI.144 In July 2019, Iran officially statedthat the IRGC had attacked training camps and other sites in the KRI used by Iranian opposition groups
with drones, missiles and artillery.145 Iran continued to keep up its pressure on these groups in 2020.146
For more information about Turkish incursions in the KRI, please see the 2019 EASO-COI report Iraq:
Security Situation, Sections 1.4. and 2.7, and in this report under Chapter 3.

The disputed territories
The disputed territories of northern Iraq are areas defined in accordance with Article 140 of the Iraqi
constitution. The territories are predominately inhabited by non-Arab groups, notably Kurds, Christian(Assyrians), Turkmens, Yazidis and Shabak. The areas include parts of the governorates of Ninewa,
Salah al-Din, Diyala and Kirkuk, which the Kurds claim are theirs. Kurdish forces took over much of the
disputed territories after ISIL seizure of the city of Mosul in 2014. The Iraqi Government regained
control of the disputed areas in October 2017, following the Kurdish referendum for independence,subsequently forcing the Kurdish forces to back within the boundaries of what is defined as the Iraqi
Kurdistan (Erbil, Sulaymaniyah [and Halabja], Dohuk).147
USDOD stated in December 2019 that ISIL was exploiting territory being claimed both by Iraqi Arabs
and Kurds to its own advantage.148 Since the Kurdish forces withdrew in late 2017, the disputed areas
had remained largely ungoverned. The ISF and Peshmerga, sharing responsibility for the security,
lacked operational coordination. These state forces, on their part, wanted to ‘avoid clashes with eachother within disputed territory’, USDOD quoted a source.149 The ICG identified deployment gaps
141 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, ACLED Power BI Report, url
142 Guardian (The), Turkey launches major attack on Kurdish militants in Iraq, 17 May 2020, url
143 Al Monitor, IRGC masses troops on Iraq border amid rising tensions with Kurdish groups, 16 October 2018_, url
144 Garda World, Iraq: Iranian forces carry out attacks against Kurdish targets in Kurdistan region, 18 June 2020, url;

Defence Post, Iran strikes Kurdish militants in Iraqi Kurdistan, 12 July 2019, url
145 Defence Post, Iran strikes Kurdish militants in Iraqi Kurdistan, 12 July 2019, url. The Defense Post is a US based
independent media outlet dedicated to defence-related news.
146 Voice of America, Activists: Iraq’s Kurdish Region Becomes Less Safe for Iranian Dissidents, 13 May 2020, url
147 ISW, 19 October 2017, url; US, CRS, Iraq: Issues in the 115th Congress, 4 October 2018, url, pp. 1-2, 10-11
148 USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve - Report to the United States Congress, October 1, 2019
– December 31, 2019, 4 February 2020, url, p. 17
149 USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve - Report to the United States Congress, January, 1 –March 31, 1 May 2020, url, p. 25

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

between ISF and Peshmerga forces up to 5 km apart in Hawija, Dibis and Daquq (Kirkuk governorate),
Makhmour (Erbil governorate), and in Salah ad Din and Diyala governorates.150 In sanctuaries that ISIL
has developed in areas such as these, it has built an infrastructure of viable underground sheltersstocked with food, water, generators, parts and explosives, and relocated some of its ‘most active
attack cells’ there.151

The north-western and central governorates: Anbar, Babil, Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk,
Ninewa, Salah al-Din
Two analysts stated in 2020 that ISIL was active in the Kirkuk, Baghdad, Ninewa, and Anbar regions.152
Aron Zelin, stated in March 2020 that ISIL cells had conducted 11 to 15 attacks per month in theseareas, and that the group’s command and control system thus appeared intact. Zelin named Diyala
ISIL’s ‘epicentre’ of attacks in Iraq.153 Husham al-Hashimi stated that ISIL through 2020 also had
operations in Salah al-Din and northern Baghdad. In the mentioned parts of the country ISIL sought togain foothold in areas surrounding larger cities, possibly for turning them into staging grounds for
operations at the cities themselves. ISIL’s attacks were targeting Sunni tribes who cooperated withthe government against ISIL as well as Sunnis perceived to be collaborators, Mukhtars, Sheikhs, andtribal leaders, for instance by means of kidnappings and assassinations.154 The ICG reported that ISIL
attacks in these areas had escalated in April 2020. They had also become more assertive, targeting ISF
directly and increasingly during daytime.155
Hafsa Halawa, an independent consultant writing for the Middle East Institute, stated that ISIL had
active sleeper cells in Diyala and Kirkuk governorates, where it carried out daily attacks against mainly
ISF and community leaders. Areas around the wider district around Hawija city, such as Abbasi andZab, remained insecure. Security forces would disappear from such places at night time out of fear of
being attacked by ISIL. The presence of active ISIS sleeper cells in Kirkuk and Diyala was hindering
reconstruction efforts. Attacks took place daily, forcing Mullahs and other community leaders in
Hawija city to periodically flee to Kirkuk City. Areas like Jalawla remained impossible to reach. Larger
cities were becoming increasingly insecure, Halawa stated, pointing to Khanaqin or Baqubah as
examples.156
The ISW raised concerns that the US troop consolidations undertaken in March 2020 would decrease
the US pressure on ISIL, thus benefitting the group.157

Confrontations between Iran-backed militias and US forces
The ISW assumed that the Iran-backed militias in Iraq would continue to escalate their pressure on
the US presence in Iraq. Iranian missile attacks against US targets in the first quarter of 2020 took
place mainly in Baghdad and at locations in its vicinity (Balad, Taji, Basmayah) but also in Erbil, western
Anbar, and Kirkuk.158 The USDOD was cited that Iran-backed militia targets had been attacked ‘acrossthe country’ mentioning specifically Babil and Kerbala governorates.159

150 ICG, Iraq: Fixing security in Kirkuk, 15 June 2020, url, p. 15
151 Knights, M. & Almeida, A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020,

May 2020, url, pp. 10-11
152 Zelin, A., A Year Since Baghuz, the Islamic State Is Neither Defeated nor Resurging (Yet), 25 March 2020, url
153 Zelin, A., A Year Since Baghuz, the Islamic State Is Neither Defeated nor Resurging (Yet), 25 March 2020, url
154 Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: From Abandoned Villages to the Cities, 5 May 2020, url
155 ICG, Iraq: Fixing Security in Kirkuk, 15 June 2020, url, p. 15
156 Halawa, H., The forgotten Iraq, 16 March 2020, url, p. 1
157 ISW, Iran’s proxies accelerate Soleimani’s campaign to compel US withdrawal from Iraq, 2 April 2020, url
158 ISW, Iran’s proxies accelerate Soleimani’s campaign to compel US withdrawal from Iraq, 2 April 2020, url
159 BBC, Iraq base attack: US in retaliatory strikes on Iran-backed fighters, 13 March 2020, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Southern Iraq
The security void resulting from the deployment of security forces in 2014 to fight ISIL insurgency incentral and northern Iraq left the southern region open to tribal clashes, criminal activity and politicalviolence.160
Analyst Benedict Robin reported in July 2019 that the public protests being held across the southernpart of the country, at that point had been more subdued than a year before and that they had taken
more place in peripheral towns than in major urban centres like Basra.161
Demonstrations, occasionally violent, again broke out in October 2019, and were met with harsher
reactions than before.162 Protesters set fire to the headquarters of political parties, damaged
government buildings and engaged in revenge killings. Several demonstrators have been killed andinjured by government forces and supporting militias opening fire and attacking them. During theremaining months of 2019 the violence connected to protests and riots escalated.163 In November
2019, protesters attacked and set fire to the Iranian consulate in Najaf, in what was reported as an
outburst of anti-Iranian sentiment among the population.164
Also tribal leaders in the south have reacted against the crackdown on protesters and what theyreportedly have seen as Iran playing a role in, occasionally turning against the security forces andjoining the protests.165 In Nasiriyah tribal fighters cut off roads in order to prevent state forces fromreaching the city.166 Some ‘tribal elements’ in Basrah, Thi Qar, and Missan had reportedly even taken
a lead in protest activities.167
Tensions escalated again in January 2020 when some protesters forcibly prevented students andteachers from accessing state educational institutions. The protests continued through February
2020.168 Partly due to the lockdown imposed by the government to counter the spread of thecoronavirus, the protests wound down during the winter and spring months of 2020. In May 2020,
protests resumed again in cities in the south. The number of protesters who turned out were lower
than in December 2019, though.169
Rising tribal violence in the south was reported in the summer of 2020.170

1.3.2 Nature of the security incidents
The ACLED collects data on violent incidents in Iraq, coding each incident with the time and place, typeof violent incident, the parties involved and the number of fatalities. The information is collected in a
database that is openly accessible, searchable and kept continuously up to date. The data primarily
comes from secondary sources such as media reports.171
ACLED codes security incidents as follows:

160 Reuters, Tribal clashes, political void threaten oil installations in Iraq’s south, 11 September 2017, url
161 Robin, B., South Iraq security and protest dynamics report: July 2019, Monthly interactive maps, 1 August 2019, url
162 O’ Driscoll, D., Tensions on Iraqi soil likely to overshadow anti-government protest demands, [Blog], 9 January 2020, url
163 New York Times (The), Iraq Protesters Burn Down Iran Consulate in Night of Anger, 28 November 2019, url
164 Guardian (The), Iraq risks breakup as tribes take on Iran’s militias in ‘blood feud’, 30 November 2019, url; New YorkTimes (The), Iraq Protesters Burn Down Iran Consulate in Night of Anger, 27 November 2019, url
165 Guardian (The), 30 November 2019, Iraq risks breakup as tribes take on Iran’s militias in ‘blood feud’, 30 November
2019, url; New York Times (The), Iraq Protesters Burn Down Iran Consulate in Night of Anger, 28 November 2019, url
166 Gulf News, As Iraqis protest, tribes make comeback, 10 December 2019, url
167 Smyth, P., Iran is Losing Iraq’s Tribes, 4 Dec 2019, url
168 UN Security Council, Implementation of Resolution 2470 (2019) – Report of the Secretary-General, 21 February 2020,
url, para. 16
169 Middle East Eye, 'Today is a message': Anti-government protests resume in Iraq, 15 May 2020, url
170 Iraq Oil Report, Tribal violence escalates in Iraq’s oil heartland, 2 July 2020, url
171 ACLED, Methodology overview, 10 April 2019, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Battles: violent clashes between at least two armed groups. Battles can occur between armed andorganised state, non-state, and external groups, and in any combination therein. Sub-events of battles
are armed clashes, government regains territory and non-state actor overtakes territory.
Violence against civilians: violent events where an organised armed group deliberately inflicts
violence upon unarmed non-combatants. It includes violent attacks on unarmed civilians such as
sexual violence, attacks, abduction/forced disappearance.
Explosions/remote violence: events where an explosion, bomb or other explosive device was used toengage in conflict. They include one-sided violent events in which the tool for engaging in conflictcreates asymmetry by taking away the ability of the target to engage or defend themselves and theirlocation. They include air/drone strikes, suicide bombs, shelling/artillery/missile attack, remote
explosive/landmine/IED, grenade, chemical weapon.
Riots: are a violent demonstration, often involving a spontaneous action by unorganised, unaffiliatedmembers of society. They include violent demonstration, mob violence.
Protests: public demonstration in which the participants do not engage in violence, though violence
may be used against them. It includes peaceful protests, protest with intervention, excessive force
against protesters.
Strategic developments: information regarding the activities of violent groups that is not itself
recorded as political violence, yet may trigger future events or contribute to political dynamics within
and across states. It includes agreements, change to group/activity, non-violent transfer of territory,arrests.172
For the purpose of this report only the following type of events were included in the analysis: battles,
explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians. A country overview of the data on riots andprotests is also provided separately (see the EASO-COI Report – Iraq: The protest movement andtreatment of protesters and activists).
EASO used the publicly available ACLED Power BI Report dataset for Iraq (31 July 2020) for security
incidents figures, graphs and maps.173 According to this dataset, in all of 2019 and 1 January –31 July 2020, there were 3 768 security incidents recorded in Iraq: 1 189 were coded as battles, 2 164
as explosions/remote violence, and 415 as violence against civilians. Most security incidents wererecorded in Dohuk (751), Diyala (630), Erbil (613) and Salah al-Din (327) governorates. The lowest
number of security incidents was recorded in Najaf and Qadissiyah (12 each), and Muthanna (3)governorates.174

172 ACLED, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Codebook, October 2017, url, pp. 7-14
173 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url
174 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Figure 4: Evolution of security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in 2019, basedon ACLED data175

Map 4: Heatmap of security events (coded battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians) occurrences in
2019, based on ACLED data176

Improvised explosive devices and suicide bombing attacks / suicide vest
Explosions/remote violence, which includes explosive devices, artillery fire and air strikes, is thecategory with the highest number of individual incidents with 2 164 incidents recorded by ACLED in
the reference period. The largest number of explosions/remote violence was registered in Dohuk(620), Erbil (438), Diyala (260) and Baghdad (163) governorates. The lowest numbers were recorded
in Najaf and Qadissiyah (5 each) and Muthanna (2).
The figures varied from month to month, and peaked in April 2019 (125) most of which occurred in
Dohuk’s Amedi District (30) and in July 2020 (176), also most of which took place in Dohuk’s Zahko
District (37).177 Both districts are located along the border to Turkey.178 Lower levels were recorded in
March 2019 (82) and March 2020 (100).179

175 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url
176 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url
177 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url
178 NCCI, Dohuk District Map, December 2015, url
179 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Figure 5: Evolution of ‘explosions/remote violence’ events 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020 based on ACLED data180

Armed clashes, assaults and ground engagements
Battles (armed clashes) is the category with the second most registered incidents; 1189 were recorded
between 1 January 2019 and 31 July 2020. Most battles were recorded in Diyala (280), Erbil (162) andSalah al-Din (155). The lowest number of battles in the reference period took place in Kerbala (4),Najaf (2) and Muthanna (1). All the battles that were recorded in Erbil (123) took place in SoranDistrict, which is bordering Turkey.
Most battles in 2019 took place in October (71) the majority of which affected Diyala governorate(188). The highest number in 2020 was in July (80), the majority of these (39) taking place in Dohuk
governorate. All of these took place in Zahko District.
The months with the lowest number of battles were January 2020 (45) with the most being recordedin Kirkuk governorate (9); and in March 2020 with the most being recorded in Diyala (10).181

Figure 6: Evolution of ‘battles’ events 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, based on ACLED data182

ACLED recorded several incidents of tribal clashes, notably in Diyala, Ninewa, and in Basrah, Thi-Qar
and other southern governorates. Clashes between ISIL or unnamed militants, and state forces andPMU occurred notably in Diyala, Salah al-Din, Kirkuk, Anbar, and Babil governorates. Incidents ofclashes between Turkish militants and Turkish forces occurred mainly in the areas in Erbil and Dohuk
bordering Turkey.183

180 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url
181 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url
182 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url
183 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url

35

EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Targeted attacks, abductions, killings
ACLED recorded a total 415 incidents of targeted attacks, abductions and killings across Iraq during
the reference period. Diyala and Baghdad governorates had the highest numbers, 90 and 81
respectively.184 The highest number of attacks in the reference period took place in January 2020 (56),the majority taking place in Baghdad (16), and the second highest number in the southern Thi-Qar
governorate (8).

Figure 7: Evolution of ‘battles’ events 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, based on ACLED data185

ACLED ascribed 113 targeted attacks on civilians to ISIL during the reference period. The highest
number (41) took place in Diyala. The highest number at district level (18) in this governorate occurredin Khanaqin.
273 targeted attacks across Iraq during the reference period, including a small number of abductions
and some cases of targeting of protesters, were ascribed to unidentified armed men. Among civilians
targeted under a variety of circumstances were protesters and activists. The highest number (37)occurred in Baghdad, including Sadr City. Second was Basrah with 25 such incidents.
Two civilians were deliberately killed by ISF, one in Erbil and one in Diyala. Two civilians were
kidnapped by PKK fighters in Dohuk and Erbil.
One abduction, one sexual assault, one shooting at a group of civilians, and a hold-up of a deputy
governor’s convoy, were attributed to PMU or suspected PMU men.
Four instances of Turkish forces directing gunfire at civilians were reported.
Six cases of police violence against civilians, among them, two against journalists and one abduction,
were reported.186
Knights and Almeida recorded 102 targeted killings in all of 2019 and in the first quarter of 2020. The
authors also reported about attempts to overrun ISF checkpoints and outposts, and person-specifictargeted attacks. Targeted killings of Mukhtars and tribal chiefs declined in 2020.187
Experts indicated that ISIL was directing targeted attacks against members of the ISF, and government
allied forces as well as civilians.188 Kidnappings of local inhabitants carried out by ISIL or suspected ISIL
members, were reported in rural areas in Kirkuk and Diyala.189

184 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url
185 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url
186 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url
187 Knights, M. & Almeida, A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020, CTC

Sentinel Volume 13, Issue 5, May 2020, url, pp. 2-4, 8, 10
188 Al-Hashimi, H., 5 May 2020, ISIS in Iraq: From Abandoned Villages to the Cities, url; Knights et al, Remaining andExpanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020, CTC Sentinel Volume 13, Issue 5, May 2020, url,
p. 1
189 CIVIC, “We just want someone to protect us”. Civilian protection challenges in Kirkuk, 19 December 2019, url, p. 14;
EPIC, ISHM: May 7- May 14, 2020, 14 May 2020, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Air strikes and shelling
According to USDOD, between August 2014 and the end of December 2019, the US-led Coalition
carried out 34 763 air strikes in Syria and Iraq between August 2014 and December 2019,
unintentionally killing 1 370 civilians in both countries.190 This counts for 231 civilian casualties
between the end of November 2018 and the end of December 2019, and for 3 357 air strikes in thesame period. Please see the EASO-COI Report – Iraq: Security Situation 2019, Section 1.4
In late 2019 the Iraqi government placed restrictions on Coalition air movement after they suspected
Israel had conducted air strikes against Iraqi militias tied to Iran, according to USDOD. Air strikes
continued to be carried out in 2020 by the Iraqi and the Coalition air forces.191 The Iraqi air force
conducted air activity against ISIL mostly in Anbar, Salah al-Din, Kirkuk, and Diyala governorates.192 In
2019 and 2020, US warplanes carried out attacks on Iran-backed militias, in retaliation for attacks on
US personnel and installations.193
Increased Turkish air strike activity was reported in the KRI and in Sinjar.194
ISIL was reported as having shelled civilians in their villages in 2019 and 2020.195

Missile attacks
The Coalition stated that in 2019 Iran-backed militias escalated their missile attacks on Iraqi militarybases where US forces were stationed, triggering counterattacks by the US forces. Multiple attacks on
US forces were carried out from early October to the end of December 2019.196 In January 2020, Iran’s
military fired missiles at US bases in retaliation for the killing of Qassem Soleimani.197 In March 2020,
Joel Wing reported that these attacks and US counter attacks continued.198

1.4 State ability to secure law and orderMore information on the capacities of the Iraqi forces and the forces under the KRG as actors ofprotection, including the ability to secure law and order, as well as information on the integrity ofarmed forces, please see the report EASO COI Report – Iraq: Actors of Protection (2018).
Crime and lawlessness remained a serious threat throughout the country, the US State Department
stated in 2020 in an advice to US citizens travelling to Iraq.199 Analyst Philip Smyth indicated that the
militia groups central to running the PMU were involved in ‘widespread criminality’. In order to stay
reputable, the PMU itself had arrested militia members, which the state then in some cases convicted
to prison sentences. Such crackdowns still did not include the large Iran-backed militias. Leaders of

190 US, USDOD, CJTF-OIR, Monthly Civilian Casualty Report, 13 February 2020, url
191 BNO News, US-led airstrike destroys ISIS cave complex in Iraq, 30 April 2020, url; Garda World, Iraq: Coalition airstrikes

kill 19 IS militants south of Makhmour (Erbil governorate) June 3, 5 June 2020, url
192 US, USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve - Report to the United States Congress, October 1,
2019 – December 31, 2019, 4 February 2020, url, pp. 23, 19
193 CNN, US strikes 5 facilities in Iraq and Syria linked to Iranian-backed militia, 30 December 2019, url; Guardian (The), US
launched airstrikes in Iraq in retaliation for rocket attack, Pentagon confirms, 13 March 2020, url
194 Guardian (The), Turkey launches major attack on Kurdish militants in Iraq, 17 June 2020, url
195 CIVIC, “We just want someone to protect us”. Civilian protection challenges in Kirkuk, 19 December 2019, url, pp. 13,
48; Al-Hashimi, H., 5 May 2020, ISIS in Iraq: From Abandoned Villages to the Cities, url
196 US, USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, October 1, 2019
– December 31, 2019, 4 February 2020, url, pp. 23, 2
197 CNN, Trump says “Iran appears to be standing down” following its retaliatory attacks against Iraqi bases housing US
troops, 8 January 2020, url
198 Wing, J., Tit For Tat Between US and Pro-Iran Hashd Continues, 15 March 20120, url
199 US, USDOS, OSAC, Iraq 2020 Crime & Safety Report: Baghdad, 5 May 2020, url

37

EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation‘core’ Iran-backed militias remained out of reach for the state, even if these militias were heavily
involved in organised crime, according to Smyth.200
In the wake of the wave of public protests that began in October 2019, reports emerged about
participants in public protests who had disappeared and who were unaccounted for, and about limited
efforts taken by the government to assist in finding them and in bringing state authorities
accountable.201 Sources also reported about protesters having been killed during demonstrations.202
For more information about the protests and the treatment of protesters, please see the EASO-COI
report EASO-COI Report – Iraq: The protest movement and treatment of protesters and activists.
Both in 2019 and 2020, it was reported about Iraqi state forces not being fully able or willing to protect
civilians in areas where ISIL was active. State forces could be reluctant to respond, or they could
withdraw from contested places at nightfall.203 Kurdistan 24 cited KRG President Nechirvan Barzanithat more coordination was needed between ISF and the Peshmerga to protect the local populationin areas between Erbil and Baghdad.204 It has also been reported about state forces rescuing civilians
kidnapped by armed groups.205
For further information, please also see the EASO-COI Report Iraq – Security Situation 2019, Section
1.4

1.4.1 Road security
According to analysts, ISIL kept targeting highways serving civilian traffic, transportation of oil, gas andcommodities in the western, eastern and northern governorates.206 By such means ISIL was seeking to
avoid those areas becoming penetrated and visible to others, such as the ISF.207 Civilians from Daquq
in eastern Kirkuk, told in 2019 the Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC), an NGO, that ISIL fighters
were infiltrating their villages at night for the purpose of extorting them. Armed men would block theroads to villages and threaten the inhabitants if they did comply with their demands.208
ICG reported in 2020 about PMU units running false checkpoints, illicitly levying fees from truck drivers
crossing them.209
Hafsa Halawa stated that when a checkpoint closed for the night, local inhabitants could become stuck
inside or outside the adjacent city.210
Media reported about protesters having blocked roads and highways in Baghdad and various locations
in southern Iraq, such as Najaf, Thi Qar, Diwaniyah, Nasiriyah, Wassit, and Basrah, in late 2019 and

200 Smyth, P., Making sense of Iraq’s PMF arrests, 26 April 2019, url
201 UNAMI, 23 May 2020, Abductions, torture and enforced disappearances in the context of ongoing demonstrations in

Iraq, url, pp. 2, 4-5; HRW, Iraq: State Appears Complicit in Massacre of Protesters, 16 December 2019, url; HRW, Iraq:
Abductions Linked to Baghdad Protests, 2 December 2019, url
202 Arab News, Iraq activist shot dead as anti-government protesters block roads, 22 January 2020, url; AP, 13 dead in 1 of
the “worst” days of protests in southern Iraq, 24 November 2029, url; HRW, Iraq: Lethal Force Used Against Protesters, url
203 CIVIC, “We just want someone to protect us”. Civilian protection challenges in Kirkuk, 19 December 2019, url, p. 18;
Halawa, H., The Forgotten Iraq, March 2020, url, p. 1
204 Kurdistan 24, Kurdistan Region President warns of escalating 'terrorist attacks' in Iraq, because of 'security vacuum', 16June 2020, url
205 Kurdistan 24, Kurdistan security frees 3 abductees chained underground for 11 days, 17 February 2020, url
206 Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: From Abandoned Villages to the Cities, 5 May 2020, url; Knights, M., & Almeida, A.,
Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020, May 2020, url, p. 11
207 Knights, M., & Almeida, A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020,
May 2020, url, p. 11
208 CIVIC, “We just want someone to protect us”. Civilian protection challenges in Kirkuk, 19 December 2019, url, pp. 14-15
209 ICG, Iraq: Fixing security in Kirkuk, 15 June 2020, url, p. 14
210 Halawa, H., The Forgotten Iraq, March 2020, url, p. 1

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

early 2020.211 For the first time in several years, a truck convoy carrying military supplies was attacked
by armed men in the south of Iraq, on the highway between Diwaniyah and Qadissiyah.212
More information on road security is provided in the governorate level chapters.

1.5 Impact of the violence on the civilian population
1.5.1 Civilian casualties
At EASO’s request, the UN Assistance Mission to Iraq (UNAMI) compiled data on civilian casualties in
the reference period.
Year

Number of incidents

KilledInjuredTotal

2019 (Jan – Dec)

400

341

566

907

2020 (Jan – Jul)

213

121

184

305

Grand total

613

462

750

1212

Table 1: Overall casualty figures, 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020213

Broken down by gender, age and police, 323 men and 20 women, 45 children and 74 police were
killed. Segregation for boys and girls was not available. Iraqi police were included due to their civilianfunctions related to law enforcement at the time of the incident and were considered as civilians (notdirectly taking part in hostilities – DPiH).
Year

Women
casualties

Childrencasualties

Police casualties

Men casualties

KilledInjuredKilledInjuredKilledInjuredKilledInjured2019
14(Jan –
Dec)

21

39

65

50

69

238

411

907

2020
6
(Jan –
Jul)

12

6

21

24

41

85

110

305

Total

33

45

86

74

110

323

521

1 212

20

Total

Table 2: Casualty figures by gender, age and police, 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020214

UNAMI’s breakdown by incident type uses a different categorisation of incidents than ACLED. As
shown by UNAMI’s categorisation in the table below, the incidents causing the highest numbers offatalities are IEDs (including roadside IEDs (465 casualties), small arms fires by pistols and or AKs 215(350), vehicle-borne IED (VBIED - 131 casualties). Air strikes caused 58 civilian casualties.

211 Al-Jazeera, Iraqi protesters block roads, shutting offices and schools, 3 November 2019, url; Al-Jazeera, 20 January 2020,

Iraq protesters block roads as they step up calls for reform, 20 January 2020, url; BBC, Iraq protesters: Demonstrators blockroads in Najaf, 1 February 2020, url; Arab News, Iraq activist shot dead as anti-government protesters block roads, 22
January 2020, url
212 EPIC, ISHM: July 9-16, 2020, 16 July 2020, url
213 UNAMI, Email to EASO, 24 August 2020
214 UNAMI, Email to EASO, 24 August 2020
215 Encyclopaedia Britannica, AK-47 Soviet firearm, n.d., url

39

EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Incidents’ type2019

2019 total
casualties#ofincidents

Killed

112

103

280

383

Vehicle-borne IED(VBIED)

12

18

106

124

Suicide VBIED(SVIED)

2

1

7

8

Body-borne IED(BBIED)

1

4

1

5

136

153

74

227

Indirect Fire
(mortars androckets) – IDF

12

15

28

43

Air
attack/artistries

25

7

28

35

Explosive
Remnant of War
(ERW)

22

8

19

27

IED (including
roadside IEDs)

SAF (small arms
fires by pistols andor AKs)Injured(killed andinjured)

2020

2020
total
casualties#ofincidents

Killed

45

24

58

82

3

0

7

7

0

0

0

0

1

0

6

6

60

63

60

123

15

2

30

32

66

15

8

23

7

2

9

0

0

0

0

5

7

0

7

4

2

13

15

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

7

1

0

1

0

0

0

0

Injured(killedinjured)7

Unexploded
Ordinances(UXOs)

4

2

3

5

Execution-Style

14

25

2

27

Hand grenade
(HG)

13

1

12

13

Farmland related
fires

18

3

4

7

Stabbing/Assault

5

0

2

2

Armed
attack/groundengagement

1

0

0

0

Abduction

17

0

0

0

Empty building
destructions (by
IEDs)

5

0

0

0

…Other…

1

1

0

1

0

0

0

0

Total

400

341

566

907

213

121

184

305

Grand total (killed
and injured) for2019 & 2020

and

1 212
(907 +305)

40

EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Table 3: Civilian casualties by incident type216

Ninewa had the highest numbers of casualties (264 casualties, of which 82 were fatalities) followed
by Kirkuk (258 casualties, of which 81 were fatalities), Diyala (224 casualties, 93 fatalities), Anbar (120casualties, 50 fatalities), and Baghdad (58 casualties, 40 fatalities). The lowest numbers appeared in
Wassit (2 casualties, 1 fatality), Thi-Qar (3 casualties, 1 fatality), Qadissyia (4 casualties, 0 fatalities).
Basra had 12 casualties of which 9 were fatalities. No casualties were recorded in Missan.
The table below shows the figures broken down by governorate. Data for districts were not available.
Governorate

2019 (Jan – Dec)#ofincidents

KilledInjured

Anbar

30

43

62

Babil

13

1

Baghdad42

Basra2019 total
casualties

2020 (Jan – Jul)#ofincidents

Killed

105

4

7

8

15

31

32

1

0

0

0

37

13

50

4

3

5

8

17

6

3

9

2

3

0

3

Diyala

55

47

64

111

48

46

67

113

Dohuk

19

6

30

36

59

10

2

12

Erbil

16

5

12

17

12

4

1

5

Karbala

8

13

4

17

8

1

0

1

Kirkuk

73

68

156

224

17

13

21

34

Muthanna

4

1

1

2

2

2

0

2

Najaf

10

4

15

19

1

0

0

0

Ninewa

62

68

106

174

27

14

33

47

Qadisiyyah

10

0

0

0

4

0

4

4

Salahadin

31

39

58

97

12

16

33

49

Sulaymaniyah

3

3

11

14

2

0

7

7

Thi-Qar

3

0

0

0

3

1

2

3

Wasit

4

0

0

0

6

1

1

2

Maysan

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

Total

400

341

566

907

213

121

184

305

(killed andinjured)Grand total(killedandinjured) for2019 & 2020
Table 4: Civilian casualties by governorate217

216 UNAMI, Email to EASO, 24 August 2020
217 UNAMI, Email to EASO, 24 August 2020

41

Injured2020 total
casualties(killed andinjured)

1 212(907+305)

EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

1.5.2 Infrastructural damage and explosive remnants of war
The military effort to retake Iraqi cities from ISIL resulted in ‘significant explosive hazard
contamination’, according to the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS). Additional hazard is created by
IEDs that ISIL intentionally left behind. Working to address the problem, UNMAS focused through allof 2019 on Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewa and Salah al-Din governorates. National and international
stakeholders have acknowledged that clearance must come before reconstruction of key
infrastructure and residential buildings can start, UNMAS stated, and deemed the clearance of
explosive hazard as ‘critical’ to enabling people who have fled to return safely to the affected areas.218
In January 2019, iMMAP recorded highly contaminated areas mainly in the governorates of Ninewa,
Kirkuk (around Kirkuk city and Daquq), in Salah al-Din (along the Tigris basin), in Anbar (between
Fallujah and Ramadi), in Dohuk and Erbil (along the Turkish border), and in Sulaymaniyah (along theborder with Iran).219
Most incidents mapped in all of 2019 were in the areas liberated from ISIL in Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk,
Ninewa and Salah al-Din governorates, as well as in Baghdad governorate.220 In all of 2019, iMMAP
recorded 310 explosive hazard incidents in these governorates plus Baghdad governorate. Between
1 January and 8 July 2020, iMMAP recorded 212 incidents in these governorates.221

1.5.3 Displacement and return
By 30 June 2020, IOM recorded 1 382 332 IDPs across Iraq. The top five governorates hosting IDPs
were Ninewa (324 078), Dohuk (319 062), Erbil (236 496), Sulaymaniyah (139 860), and Kirkuk(100 026).222
The volume of returns has diminished over the years, with 8 % occurring since January 2018, according
to UNOCHA – HNO 2020. During the first half of 2019, the number of IDPs who had returned homewas 140 000, 3 % of all historic returns. Those who continued to stay in protracted displacement, didso for reasons such as fear and trauma, or new sources of instability.223 Human rights organisations
reported in 2019 about Iraqi authorities forcing IDPs to return to severely damaged places of origin inareas retaken from ISIL.224 According to Husham al-Hashimi, the Iraqi government saw increasing
instability in the northern and eastern parts of Iraq developing during 2020 as hindering the return of
IDPs.225
In June 2020, IOM recorded 330 000 IDPs living in camps, 114 000 in critical shelters, 936 000 in private
settings, and 1 000 in unknown accommodation.226
The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) in Iraq, reported
that extensive closures and consolidation of camps in the second half of 2019 had caused secondary
displacement for more than 16 000 displaced households.227

218 UNMAS, 31 December 2019, Where We Work, Iraq, url
219 iMMAP-IHF, Humanitrian Access Response Monthly Security Incidents Situation Report, January 2019, url, pp. 5-6
220 iMMAP-IHF, Humanitrian Access Response, Explosive Hazard Incidents in Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewa andSalah al-Din Governorates from January to December 2019, 12 January 2020, url
221 iMMAP Explosive Incident Hazards Dashboard, Explosive Hazard 1 January 2020 – 8 July 2020, updated 8 July 2020, url
222 IOM, DTM, Iraq Master List Report 116, May-June 2020, 16 July 2020, url, p. 1
223 UNOCHA, Iraq HNO 2020, url, p. 13
224 AI, Iraq: stop forced returns of hundreds of internally displaced people, 29 August 2019, url; HRW, Iraq: Camps expel
over 2,000 people seen as ISIS-linked, 4 September 2019, url
225 Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: “Smoking the Fox out of its Den” Strategy, July 14, 2020, url
226 IOM, Iraq DTM Dashboard, Master List, Displacement Timeline, chart 4, url
227 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview, Programme Cycle 2020, 19 November 2019, url, p. 13

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

By the end of June 2020, over 4.7 million persons had returned to their areas of origin.228 This is anincrease in the numbers of returnees from 2018, when over 4.1 million persons had returned to areasof origin as of 31 December 2018.229 IOM ranked the five top governorates of return in 2020 as follows:
Ninewa (1 807 170 returnees), followed by Anbar (1 503 468 returnees), Salah al-Din (692 142
returnees), Kirkuk (341 106 returnees) and Diyala (230 244 returnees).230
Returns decreased overall through the second quarter of 2020, partly due to movement restrictions
imposed to counter the spread of the coronavirus. In districts that had an increase in returns, this waslargely due to improved security, services, jobs, and reconstruction. Around 95 % returned to a
habitual residence in a good condition and two percent are living in private settings, like host families
or rented accommodation. The remaining three percent were living in critical shelters.231 The same
percentages were reported for 2018, in the EASO – COI Report: Iraq – Security Situation 2019, Section
1.5.
Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported in 2019 that the KRG had blocked the return of ‘thousands’ ofSunni Arabs, only allowing Kurds and Arabs with ties to the KRI to return to their places of origin.232
For more information on the impact of the conflict on the civilian population, see the governorate
level chapters of this report. Additionally, information on aspects of this topic is also addressed in the2020 EASO COI Report Iraq: Key socio-economic indicators for (Baghdad, Basrah, Erbil and the 2019
EASO COI Report Iraq: Internal mobility.

228 IOM, DTM, Iraq Master List Report 116, May-June 2020, 16 July 2020, url, p. 1
229 IOM, Iraq: DTM Round 107, December 2018, url, p. 1; UNOCHA, 2018 Humanitarian Response Plan – Advance Executive

Summary, February 2018, url, p. 15
230 IOM, DTM, Iraq Master List Report 116, May-June 2020, 16 July 2020, url, p. 5
231 IOM, DTM, Iraq Master List Report 116, May-June 2020, 16 July 2020, url, p. 6
232 HRW, KRI – Arabs not allowed to return, 6 September 2019, url

43

EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

2. Northwestern and central governorates:
Anbar, Babil, Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk,
Ninewa, Salah al-Din

Map 5: The northwestern and central governorates with district borders, district capitals and main roads, © United
Nations233

This subsection covers the ‘northwestern and central’ governorates which include for the purpose ofthis report: Anbar, Babil, Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewa, and Sahal al-Din.

233 UN JAU, Iraq District Map, January 2014, url

44

EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

2.1 Anbar

Map 6: Anbar governorate with district borders, district capitals and main roads, © United Nations234

2.1.1 General description of the governorate
Basic geography
Anbar is the largest governorate in Iraq and makes up about one third of Iraq’s total area. Despite its
size, and given its vast desert terrain, Anbar is also one of the most sparsely populated regions in
Iraq.235 The governorate has seven districts: Ana, Fallujah, Haditha, Heet, al-Qaim, Ramadi and alRutba.236 The capital of Anbar is Ramadi.237 Anbar governorate borders with three countries, including
Syria to the west and north-west, Jordan to the west and Saudi Arabia to the south-west.238

234 UN JAU, Iraq District Map, January 2014, url
235 UN Interagency Information and Analysis Unit, Anbar Governorate Profile, November 2010, url, p. 1; NCCI, NCCI

Governorate Profile: Anbar, 31 March 2004, url, p. 2
236 UNOCHA, IRAQ Anbar Governorate profile and monthly humanitarian response January - August 2019, 30 September
2019, url
237 UN Interagency Information and Analysis Unit, Anbar Governorate Profile, November 2010, url, p. 1
238 UNOCHA, Al-Anbar Governorate Reference Map 2020, 5 May 2020, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Population
For 2019, the Iraqi CSO (Central Statistical Organization) estimated239 the governorate’s population
at 1 818 318.240 The governorate’s capital Ramadi had an estimated population of 148 598 inhabitantsin 2007.241

Ethnicity
The governorate is predominately inhabited by Sunni Arabs, but also hosts a small Christianminority.242 The socio-political fabric of Anbar traditionally revolves around local hierarchies and has
a strong tribal structure, where tribal leaders and Sunni clerics maintain a high level of authority inlocal affairs.243 Many of the elder leaders of the tribes -Sheikhs- fled the country after the fall of
Saddam Hussein in 2003. This opened up opportunities for new Sheikhs to gain power and prestige by‘aligning with coalition forces and garnering reconstruction projects and employment for theirtribes’.244

Road security
Various military groups and security actors maintained security within Anbar governorate, including
the ISF, police, local and non-local PMUs, including Shia militias and Sunni tribal militias.245 According
to Al-Monitor, ‘a plethora of checkpoints manned by several different security forces are scatteredthroughout Anbar province, slowing movement and creating confusion regarding authorizations due
to ineffective communication between the officers in charge.’246 Occasional attacks staged byinsurgent groups, including ISIL, continued to be reported on roads and checkpoints in Anbar
governorate in 2019 and 2020.247 According to iMMAP in June 2020, risks of explosive hazards onroads in Anbar governorate were reported in and around Rutbah, Fallujah, Ramadi, Heet and on theroad linking Qaim with the border crossing.248
Two of three official border crossings between Iraq and Syria are located in Anbar governorate, theQaim-Bukamal crossing and the Tanf-Walid crossing further south, which remained closed, according
to a report from March 2020.249 The Iraq-Syria border crossing in Qaim was opened by the Iraqi
government on 30 September 2019, which came under Border Police control, however various PMUs

239 It should be noted that the last comprehensive Population and Housing Census for Iraq was conducted in 1987; UNFPA,

Newsletter 2020 Census, December 2019, url, p. 1
240 Iraq, CSO, 2019 ‫[ قديرات سكان العراق حسب المحافظة والبيئة والجنس لسنة‬Demographic and population indicators, Estimates forthe population of Iraq by governorate, environment and gender for the year 2019] (table), n.d., url
241 UN Interagency Information and Analysis Unit, Anbar Governorate Profile, November 2010, url, p. 1
242 Ali, A., Security, Religion and Gender in Al-Anbar Province, Iraq: A focus group-based conflict analysis, May 2014, url, p.
2
243 IOM, Integrated Location Assessment II, October 2017, url, p. 2; NCCI, NCCI Governorate Profile: Anbar, 31 March 2004,
url, p. 2
244 Asfura-Heim, P., CNA-Anaysis & Solutions. No Security Without US: Tribes and Tribalism in al-Anbar Province Iraq, June
2014, url, p. 7
245 Niqash, Red Lines In The Sand: In The Deserts of Anbar, US And Pro-Iran Forces Jostle, 13 September 2019, url; Niqash,
Extremists At The Intersections: As Security Forces Multiply In Anbar, So Does Danger, 21 December 2018, url
246 Al-Monitor, Anbar governor wants police boosted and military back on bases, 6 September 2018, url
247 For examples of roadside bombs, IEDs and other attacks on roads and checkpoints in Anbar governorate, see illustrative
security incidents below.
248 iMMAP, Humanitarian Access Response: Explosive Hazards Risk Level on Roads in Anbar Governorate 01-30 June 2020,
5 July 2020, url. For an overview of explosive hazards risk level on roads in Anbar governorate since 2019, see iMMAP’smonthly updated maps.
249 Carnegie Middle East Centre, The Transformation of the Iraqi-Syrian Border: From a National to a Regional Frontier, 31
March 2020, url, p. 20

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

maintained presence around the main checkpoint.250 The Turaybil-Karameh border crossing with
Jordan as well as the Arar border crossing with Saudi Arabia are also located in Anbar governorate.
According to media reports, Turaybil-Karameh border crossing was operational in 2019,251 while Ararcrossing remained closed252 with plans to reopen in October 2020.253 Arar border crossing and thenearby town of Al-Nukhaib were controlled by PMUs, including the Iraqi Hezbollah Brigades, AlNajaba, Khorasani and Imam Ali.254
According to the USDOS’ 2020 report, ‘[b]order security remained a critical capability gap, as the ISF
has limited capability to fully secure Iraq’s borders with Syria and Iran.’255 The border with Syria southof the KRI remained porous and prone to ISIL and other terrorist networks’ activities, and smuggling
and other criminal enterprises.256 Iran-backed PMUs maintained a presence at Iraq’s major bordercrossings.257 According to 2019 reports, Kataib Hezbollah units operated along the border, maintaining
checkpoints on the border road (Highway 20).258 According to the same source, Kataib Hezbollah also
controlled the Husseibah Point of Entry and the Akashat border crossings were coordinated via a
Kataib Hezbollah base at the H-3 airfield, near Rutbah.259

EconomyAgriculture provided employment to around a quarter of Anbar governorate’s population prior to
ISIL.260 According to the Carnegie Endowment’s report from March 2020, Kataib Hezbollah has turneda large swath of agricultural land containing about 1 600 farms in the Masharii area, on the southernside of Qaim, into a military zone, refusing to allow local farmers to use it. Members of Qaim’s local
council have complained about economic losses for the community, particularly as about 40 % of thelocal population depends on agriculture for its livelihood.261

2.1.2 Conflict background and armed actors in the governorate
Conflict background
From shortly after the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 until 2006, Anbar governorate was described as
the centre of an entrenched Sunni insurgency against US forces. Towards the end of 2006, Sunni tribesin Ramadi formed a movement, the Anbar Awakening, to partner with US forces against Al-Qaeda anddefeated the insurgent group in Ramadi by mid-2007. The Awakening spread to the rest of the

250 US, USDOS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2019: Iraq, 24 June 2020, url; Carnegie Middle East Centre, The

Transformation of the Iraqi-Syrian Border: From a National to a Regional Frontier, 31 March 2020, url, p. 3; Al-Monitor,
Dangers persist as Iraqi border crossing opens and IDPs return, 31 October 2019, url
251 Arab News, Jordan receives first Iraqi oil for 5 years, 4 September 2019, url
252 The New Arab, Car bomb explosion ends two-year calm on Iraq-Saudi border, 16 January 2020, url
253 Gulf News, Saudi-Iraq border crossing to officially reopen in October, 16 July 2020, url
254 The New Arab, Car bomb explosion ends two-year calm on Iraq-Saudi border, 16 January 2020, url
255 US, USDOS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2019: Iraq, 24 June 2020, url
256 US, USDOS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2019: Iraq, 24 June 2020, url. See also: Carnegie Middle East Centre, The
Transformation of the Iraqi-Syrian Border: From a National to a Regional Frontier, 31 March 2020, url, pp. 13-14
257 US, USDOS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2019: Iraq, 24 June 2020, url; Foreign Policy, A Powerful Iran-Backed Militia Is
Losing Influence in Iraq, 22 May 2020, url; Al-Monitor, Dangers persist as Iraqi border crossing opens and IDPs return, 31
October 2019, url
258 Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, August 2019, url, p. 4
259 Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, August 2019, url, p. 4
260 UN Interagency Information and Analysis Unit, Anbar Governorate Profile, November 2010, url, p. 1
261 Carnegie Middle East Centre, The Transformation of the Iraqi-Syrian Border: From a National to a Regional Frontier, 31
March 2020, url, p. 14

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

governorate and to other parts of Iraq, which led to a drop in violence and a period of comparative
calm and stability in Anbar.262
With the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq in late 2011, ISIL started to emerge in Ramadi, Fallujah andvarious towns in Anbar governorate. By December 2013, clashes between Sunni tribal militias and the
Iraqi army escalated after the arrest of Ahmed al-Alwani, a politician from Anbar. On 1 January 2014,
ISIL seized control of the governorate’s cities and the ISF largely fled and abandoned their positions.263
Without a united opposition, ISIL overran police checkpoints and stations throughout Anbar
governorate and took control of large parts of it, including Rutba, Qaim, Heet, and the capital, Ramadi.
US military operations resumed following ISIL’s sweep into Mosul in June 2014, with US forces
returning to Anbar’s al-Asad air base in late 2014.264
Following a series of protracted battles with US military support, between December 2015 and June
2016, the Iraqi government recaptured Fallujah and Ramadi with ISIL having been weakened
significantly.265 The military offensive to retake ISIL territory was formally concluded in November
2017, with the retaking of Rawa, the last town remaining under ISIL control.266
ISIL’s rule and military operations to regain control of Anbar, left civilian areas devasted with‘widespread destruction of public and private property’267 and led to successive waves of mass
displacement.268 Nearly half a million people fled ISIL’s advance between January and May 2014, while
a second major wave of displacement took place in 2015/2016 during the military campaign torecapture territory from ISIL. As of June 2020, over 1.5 million people have returned to Anbar
governorate,269 where tensions exist between those who fled during the initial advance of ISIL andthose who initially remained and fled later on, according to IOM.270
As of November 2018, 24 other mass graves have been discovered in Anbar governorate with many
containing the remains of civilians and ISF personnel.271 In December 2019, a mass grave was foundnear the city of Fallujah containing the bodies of 643 Sunni Arab civilians and are believed to be of the
Al Muhamdah tribe who disappeared in 2016 after their areas were taken over by Shia militants
fighting under the banner of the PMU.272 An investigation was reportedly undertaken by the Iraqi
authorities.273

262 Foreign Affairs, Anbar’s Illusions - The Failure of Iraq’s Success Story, 24 June 2017, url
263 Foreign Affairs, Anbar’s Illusions - The Failure of Iraq’s Success Story, 24 June 2017, url
264 NRC et al., The Long Road Home: Achieving Durable Solutions to Displacement in Iraq: Lessons from Returns in Iraq,

February 2018, url, p. 7; Foreign Affairs, Anbar’s Illusions - The Failure of Iraq’s Success Story, 24 June 2017, url
265 Foreign Affairs, Anbar’s Illusions - The Failure of Iraq’s Success Story, 24 June 2017, url
266 NRC et al., The Long Road Home: Achieving Durable Solutions to Displacement in Iraq: Lessons from Returns in Iraq,
February 2018, url, p. 7
267 NRC et al., The Long Road Home: Achieving Durable Solutions to Displacement in Iraq: Lessons from Returns in Iraq,
February 2018, url, p. 7
268 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Iraq 2020, 17 November 2019, url, p. 32
269 IOM, Iraq Master List Report 116, May - June 2020 – Iraq, July 2020, url, p. 5
270 IOM, Managing Return in Anbar; Community Responses to the Return of IDPs with Perceived Affiliation, March 2020,
url, p. 4.
271 UNAMI/OHCHR, “Unearthing Atrocities: Mass Graves in territory formerly controlled by ISIL”, 6 November 2018, url, p.
9272 The New Arab, The Iraq Report: Mass graves of Sunnis found as mass protests rage on, 20 December 2019, url
273 Diyaruna, Iraq investigates mass grave near Fallujah, 18 December 2019, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Armed actors
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and aligned forces
The ISF have the overall responsibility of the security within the governorate through the regional
operation commands.274 According to a 2017 ISW report on the Iraqi Order of Battle, regional
operation commands in Iraq were reported to act as operational-level headquarters commanding andsupervising different ISF units within a geographical area of responsibility.275 Anbar governorate wassplit between the Anbar Operations Command (AOC), covering Ramadi and Fallujah and thesurrounding desert areas,276 and the Jazeera and Badia Operations Command (JBOC) covering most ofAnbar governorate, west of Ramadi, including the western Euphrates River Valley, the far western
district of Rutba, the Amman-Baghdad highway, and much of the Jazeera and Badia Deserts. The JBOC
was reportedly understaffed and therefore relied heavily on the support of local Jughaifi tribal
fighters, who laid claim on the Haditha district.277 In addition to the AOC and JBOC, the ISF deployedother Operations Command detachments across the country to Anbar.278
However, some parts of Anbar governorate, particularly along the Syrian and Iraqi border with vast
desert areas, are ‘considered hard to control’.279 The ISF predominately consists of units from thearmy, federal police280 and the mobile Emergency Response Division.281 According to media reports
from 2018/2019, plans were underway to gradually hand over security control from the ISF to local
and federal police forces, including in Anbar governorate.282 Border Guard Units were reported to be
deployed in Anbar governorate along the border crossings with Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.283
United States (US) and International Forces
As of March 2020, US forces reportedly continue to hold two military bases in Anbar governorate near
the Iraqi-Syrian border, one at Tanf-Walid in Ar-Rutbah district and the other at Ain al-Asad, near
Baghdadi district.284 Additionally, US forces were earlier based near the old railway station in Qaim
during the campaign against ISIL, but redeployed to a different base in Kirkuk since mid-March 2020.285
Qaim base has been taken over by the ISF since the end of March 2020.286

274 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, p. 14
275 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, p. 12
276 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, p. 14277 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, pp. 18-19
278 Detailed information on the detachments redeployed to Anbar is described in ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular

Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, pp. 14-24. The report further includes a chart over Iraqi Army
Divisions and their areas of operation (Appendix D: Iraqi Security forced Commanders). See pp. 61-62
279 Al-Monitor, Impacts of US withdrawal from Qaim base in Iraqi border with Syria, 24 March 2020, url
280 For more details on the units and detachments deployed to Anbar as at May 2016, see: ISW, Iraqi Security Forces andPopular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, pp. 25-26
281 For more details on the units and detachments deployed to Anbar as at May 2016, see: ISW, Iraqi Security Forces andPopular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, pp. 26-27
282 Al-Monitor, As Iraqi army retreats to borders, local police controls cities' security, 1 February 2019, url; Al-Monitor,
Anbar governor wants police boosted and military back on bases, 6 September 2018, url
283 Carnegie Middle East Centre, The Transformation of the Iraqi-Syrian Border: From a National to a Regional Frontier, 31
March 2020, url, p.12; ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, pp.
27-28
284 Carnegie Middle East Centre, The Transformation of the Iraqi-Syrian Border: From a National to a Regional Frontier, 31
March 2020, url, p. 16; Niqash, Red Lines In The Sand: In The Deserts of Anbar, US And Pro-Iran Forces Jostle, 13
September 2019, url
285 Carnegie Middle East Centre, The Transformation of the Iraqi-Syrian Border: From a National to a Regional Frontier, 31
March 2020, url, p. 17; Al-Monitor, Impacts of US withdrawal from Qaim base in Iraqi border with Syria, 24 March 2020, url
286 Xinhua, Iraqi forces assume full control of military base in Anbar province, 20 March 2020, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Popular Mobilisation Units (PMUs)
Many government-incorporated PMUs as well as militias with closer links to Iran, operate near Qaim
close to the Syrian-Iraqi border.287 According to Michael Knights’ 2019 report, the Akashat sub-sector
is garrisoned by brigades Allah al-Tawfiya (PMU Brigade 19), Liwa al-Tafuf (PMU Brigade 13), andSaraya Talia al-Khurasani (PMU Brigade 18).288 The Husseibah/Qaim sub-sector was garrisoned mainly
by Liwa al-Tafuf (PMU Brigade 13).289 The commander of Liwa al-Tafuf, Qasim Muslih, also headed the
PMU Western Anbar Axis, which was the sector headquarters for all PMU operations along the borderand in Rutbah. Liwa al-Tafuf and Kataib Hezbollah jointly controlled all smuggling and commercial
activities across the border.290
Michael Knights further reported that the Euphrates River Valley leading down to eastern Anbar
governorate was predominantly controlled by ISF and Liwa al-Muntadher (PMU Brigade 7) and Kataib
Ansar al-Hujja (PMU Brigade 29).291 The same 2019 source reported that at the eastern end of thisarea was the Husseibah border crossing on the Euphrates, facing the Albu Kamal areas in Syria, where
PMUs such as Kataib Hezbollah (PMU Brigade 45), Kataib Al-Imam Ali (PMU Brigade 40), and Harakat
al-Abdal (PMU Brigade 39) maintained combat forces.292 Kataib Hezbollah (PMU Brigade 45)
controlled the road between Qaim and Akashat to its southwest.293 Qassim Musleh is the head of the
PMUs for western Anbar and thus for the Kataib Hezbollah brigades.294 Some Kataib Hezbollah units
have been formally incorporated into the government-salaried PMUs, however, most units are notunder state control.295
Reports describe that the many security actors, and particularly PMUs operating in western Anbar
governorate, often lack coordination among one another,296 ‘lead to confusion’,297 do not pursue a
unified security strategy,298 and thus raise concerns and distrust among the civilian population.299
According to media reports, ‘[t]he presence, quantity and relative influence of the various security
forces — both those answering to the central government and those answering to others — have long
been difficult to clearly establish’300, and further, ‘[c]ivilians have repeatedly complained to Al-Monitor
during several visits to the area since its liberation from Islamic State control in November 2017 about

287 Al-Monitor, Impacts of US withdrawal from Qaim base in Iraqi border with Syria, 24 March 2020, url; Niqash, Red Lines

In The Sand: In The Deserts of Anbar, US And Pro-Iran Forces Jostle, 13 September 2019, url; Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding
Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, August 2019, url, pp. 3-4
288 Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, August 2019, url, p. 3
289 Carnegie Middle East Centre, The Transformation of the Iraqi-Syrian Border: From a National to a Regional Frontier, 31
March 2020, url, p. 12; Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, August 2019, url, p. 4
290 Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, August 2019, url, p. 4
291 Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, August 2019, url, p. 4. See also, Carnegie
Middle East Centre, The Transformation of the Iraqi-Syrian Border: From a National to a Regional Frontier, 31 March 2020,
url, p. 12
292 Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, August 2019, url, p. 3. See also, Al-Monitor,
Dangers persist as Iraqi border crossing opens and IDPs return, 31 October 2019, url; Al-Monitor, Iraq's Qaim border open
to nonlocal PMU fighting in Syria, 25 April 2019, url
293 Carnegie Middle East Centre, The Transformation of the Iraqi-Syrian Border: From a National to a Regional Frontier, 31
March 2020, url, p. 12
294 Al-Monitor, Qaim residents fearful following conflict between US, Iran-backed militias, 27 January 2020, url
295 Al-Monitor, Impacts of US withdrawal from Qaim base in Iraqi border with Syria, 24 March 2020, url
296 Niqash, Extremists At The Intersections: As Security Forces Multiply In Anbar, So Does Danger, 21 December 2018, url
297 Al-Monitor, Anbar governor wants police boosted and military back on bases, 6 September 2018, url
298 Niqash, Extremists At The Intersections: As Security Forces Multiply In Anbar, So Does Danger, 21 December 2018, url
299 Al-Monitor, PMU decree unlikely to shift power balance in Iraq's Qaim, 20 July 2019, url
300 Al-Monitor, Qaim residents fearful following conflict between US, Iran-backed militias, 27 January 2020, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

the dizzying array of security forces, some of whom do not wear insignia of any sort but carryweapons.’301
Sunni Tribal Militias
Sunni tribal forces have been mobilised since 2014 in the wake of the fight against ISIS in Iraq and havebeen incorporated into the PMU. The initiative was partially US-sponsored and the forces are known
as the Tribal Mobilization Force (TMF), or tribal hashd in Anbar and Ninewa governorates, which aimed
at tribal forces to play a role as local ‘hold’ forces in their areas once retaken from ISIL.302
As of June 2019, an estimated 10 000 salaried members of the TMF were based in Anbar governorate,according to Anbar tribal forces leader Sheikh Qatari Samarmad al-Obeidi.303 And further, some 7 500
fighters were enlisted in eastern Anbar governorate, including Ramadi and Fallujah, while 2 500
fighters were based in the western districts of the governorate such as Heet, Haditha and Qaim.304 Of
these, one major group is reported to be the Hamza Brigade, led by Rabah al-Mahallawi and made up
of members of the Bou Mahal tribe, who have been deployed near Husseibah.305 The other one is theUpper Euphrates Brigade, linked to the Karbuli tribe and led by Musa al-Karbuli and Assif Ibrahim alKarbuli. This brigade is reported to have been deployed in Karabla and near the Akkas gas field.306
According to Anbar tribal forces leader Sheikh Qatari Samarmad al-Obeidi, as of June 2019, an
additional 4 000 forces in Anbar governorate were previously receiving military training and held
administrative orders designating them as official fighters, however, they were not part of the official
TMF and did not receive any salaries. These fighters were planned to be incorporated into the TMF
and receive salaries from the Iraqi government.307
ISIL
According to the UN Security Council in February 2020, ‘[w]hile the overall level of violence related to
ISIL has decreased, the group remains a significant threat and has shifted to insurgent tactics, with
attacks continuing in different parts of the country.’308 Security vacuums caused by re-deployments of
ISF to anti-government protests, the COVID-19 lockdown, as well as the withdrawal of most US forcesfrom Iraq, have reportedly been exploited by ISIL to gain strength and regroup in parts of Iraq,
including in Anbar governorate.309 In remote areas of Iraq, ISIL is reported to continue to mountattacks on official checkpoints, infrastructure and officials.310 ISIL operations in the first half of 2020

301 Al-Monitor, PMU decree unlikely to shift power balance in Iraq's Qaim, 20 July 2019, url
302 Derzsi-Horvath, A. et al., Iraq after ISIL: Who’s Who: Quick Facts About Local and Sub-State Forces, GPPi, 16 August

2017, url
303 Diyaruna, Iraq to beef up ranks of tribal forces in Anbar, 19 June 2019, url
304 Diyaruna, Iraq to beef up ranks of tribal forces in Anbar, 19 June 2019, url
305 Carnegie Middle East Centre, The Transformation of the Iraqi-Syrian Border: From a National to a Regional Frontier, 31
March 2020, url, p. 12
306 Carnegie Middle East Centre, The Transformation of the Iraqi-Syrian Border: From a National to a Regional Frontier, 31
March 2020, url, p. 13
307 Diyaruna, Iraq to beef up ranks of tribal forces in Anbar, 19 June 2019, url
308 UN Security Council, Tenth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peaceand security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat [S/2020/95], 4
February 2020, url, para. 4309 New York Times (The), ISIS Attacks Surge in Iraq Amid Debate on U.S. Troop Levels, 10 June 2020, url; SIPRI, The
resurgence of the Islamic State in Iraq: Political and military responses, 9 June 2020, url; Al-Monitor, Impacts of US
withdrawal from Qaim base in Iraqi border with Syria, 24 March 2020, url
310 UN Security Council, Tenth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peaceand security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat [S/2020/95], 4
February 2020, url, para. 4

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

have been described as an ‘assassination campaign’ by the late Husham al-Hashimi, a leading Iraqi
security analyst.311 The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute reports in June 2020 that
ISIL’s geographical reach and activities have almost doubled since late December 2018 across thegovernorates of Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewa and Salah al-Din.312 The ICG further assesses
that the militant group’s attacks have become ‘more assertive’ in spring 2020 and have been primarily
focused on a rural belt reaching across Iraq’s centre north, in Kirkuk, Salah al-Din and Diyala
governorates as well as the western edge of Anbar governorate, along the Jordanian and Saudi
Arabian borders.313
According to analysis by Husham al-Hashimi, as of December 2019, ISIL had around 350 to 400 active
fighters supported by 400 inactive fighters or ‘sleeper cells’ who mainly deal with logistics in each of
their ‘sectors’, including the Anbar ‘sector’.314 Small patrols of nine to 11 men operated in various
places and carried out attacks. 315 According to the ICG, many of these active ISIL fighters are Iraqis
and local to their respective areas of operation, however, most of the 200 to 300 remaining foreign
fighters in Iraq were based in Anbar, according to estimates by Husham al-Hashimi.316 ISIL fighters
were able to exploit Anbar’s remote desert terrain, which is difficult to patrol.317 ISIL fighters usedburied containers as subterranean bases, with some militants reportedly traversing open expanses
disguised as shepherds.318
Knights and Almeida observed in May 2020 that ISIL maintain active attack cells in the following areas
in Anbar governorate: Akashat; the al-Qaim/Abu Kamal border area; Wadi Horan/Rutbah; Nukhayb;
the Rawah-Anah-Haditha corridor; Hit; Ramadi and Lake Razazah; Karmah and southern Thar; andFallujah/Amiriyat al-Fallujah.319

2.1.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population
Developments 2019-2020
In an escalation of hostilities between the US and Iran, a series of attacks took place between
December 2019 and January 2020 in Iraq, including in Anbar governorate. On 29 December 2019, theUS military launched airstrikes against five Kataib Hezbollah positions near the Iraqi-Syrian border(three in Anbar governorate and two in Syria), killing over 25 PMU fighters and injuring dozens.320 This
strike further escalated tensions between the US and Iranian-backed groups and the Iraqi government
and led to an attack by demonstrators affiliated with the PMU on the US Embassy in Baghdad on 31
December 2019. In response, the US administration ordered a drone attack on 3 January 2020, which
killed Kataib Hezbollah commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis and Iranian Major General Qassem
Soleimani, the leader of the IRGC’s Quds Force, at Baghdad International Airport. On 7 January 2020,
311 Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: From Abandoned Villages to the Cities, CGP, 5 May 2020, url
312 SIPRI, The resurgence of the Islamic State in Iraq: Political and military responses, 9 June 2020, url
313 ICG, When Measuring ISIS’s “Resurgence”, Use the Right Standard, 13 May 2020, url, p. 3
314 Remnants of ISIL in Iraq have reportedly established 11 sectors in what it calls its Wilayat (Province of) Iraq inaccordance with its organizational structure. See map of 11 ‘sectors’: Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: From Abandoned Villages
to the Cities, CGP, 5 May 2020, url
315 Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: From Abandoned Villages to the Cities, CGP, 5 May 2020, url
316 IGC, Averting an ISIS Resurgence in Iraq and Syria, Middle East Report N°207, 11 October 2019, url, p. 5
317 Al-Monitor, Impacts of US withdrawal from Qaim base in Iraqi border with Syria, 24 March 2020, url
318 IGC, Averting an ISIS Resurgence in Iraq and Syria, Middle East Report N°207, 11 October 2019, url, p. 3
319 Knights, M. and Almeida, A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020,
CTC, Vol. 13, Issue 5, May 2020, url, p. 23.
320 Carnegie Middle East Centre, The Transformation of the Iraqi-Syrian Border: From a National to a Regional Frontier, 31
March 2020, url, p. 18; Al-Monitor, Fighters in Iraq's Anbar wary of US-Iran conflict as Denmark pulls forces, 15 January
2020, url52

EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

in a revenge attack, 22 Iranian ballistic missiles targeted US troops based at the Ain al-Asad base inwestern Anbar and a base near Erbil where US troops are also stationed, leading to 34 injuries among
US troops and considerable damage at Ain al-Assad base. Subsequently, both sides sought todeescalate the crisis.321
Successive UN Security Council reports from 2019 and the first half of 2020 reported that ISIL remnants
frequently carried out asymmetric attacks against the Iraqi people and security forces, especially inAnbar, Baghdad, Diyala, Erbil, Kirkuk, Ninewa and Salah al-Din governorates.322 According to analysis
by Knights and Almeida from May 2020, Anbar governorate displayed the fewest attacks among thesurveyed governorates323 throughout 2018 and 2019, with an average of 7.0 ISIL attacks per month in2018, and 8.7 per month in 2019. However, after April 2019, Anbar saw the return of attempted masscasualty attacks, including on cities like Ramadi and Hit, as well as increased intimidation of rural tribes
with terror tactics such as attempted suicide bombings targeting markets, mosques, andshepherds. Larger and newer-looking weapons caches were found in the Hit to Ramadi corridor,
staged within striking distance of Hit, Ramadi, Fallujah, and Baghdad.324
According to analysis by Joel Wing of Musings of Iraq, throughout 2019, ISIL has been focusing on
moving in fighters and material from Syria into Iraq via Anbar and Ninewa governorates.325
During the first quarter in 2020, monthly average attacks jumped to 27.6 in Anbar, triple the averageof 2019. Roadside bombings became used more frequently mostly targeting soft-skinned civilian
vehicles of the PMUs on the desert highway system between Qaim and Rutbah, which are attacked
from the high plateau of Wadi Horan. Larger-scale tactical operations at platoon strength of 30 ormore men armed with rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and mortars were reported for the same
period, as well as more sniper attacks targeting village mukhtars.326
Analysis by Joel of Wing of Musings on Iraq shows that ISIL launched a ‘spring campaign’ across Iraq
as the months of April and May 2020 saw a significant surge in violence, which largely subsided byJune 2020.327 Anbar governorate has reported ten incidents in April, 17 incidents in May and four
incidents in June 2020, representing a rare spike in security incidents in the governorate,328 andpointing to ‘Anbar no longer being a center for the insurgency like it used to be.’329

321 Carnegie Middle East Centre, The Transformation of the Iraqi-Syrian Border: From a National to a Regional Frontier, 31

March 2020, url, p. 18; Al-Monitor, Pentagon: 34 US troops injured in Iranian strike, 24 January 2020, url; Al-Monitor,
Fighters in Iraq's Anbar wary of US-Iran conflict as Denmark pulls forces, 15 January 2020, url
322 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2020/363], 6 May
2020, url, para. 24; UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2020/140], 21 February 2020, url, para. 24; UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019), Report of
the Secretary-General [S/2019/903], 22 November 2019, url, para. 29; UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution
2470 (2019), Report of the Secretary-General [S/2019/660], 5 August 2019, url, para. 19. See also: UN Security Council,
Implementation of resolution 2421 (2018), Report of the Secretary-General [S/2019/365], 2 May 2019, url, para. 18
323 Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewa, and Salah al-Din governorates were assessed; Knights, M. and Almeida, A.,
Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020, CTC, Vol. 13, Issue 5, May 2020,
url, pp. 12-13.
324 Knights, M. and Almeida, A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020,
CTC, Vol. 13, Issue 5, May 2020, url, p. 15.
325 Wing, J., Islamic State’s Spring Offensive In Iraq Ends In June, 6 July 2020, url
326 Knights, M. and Almeida, A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020,
CTC, Vol. 13, Issue 5, May 2020, url, p. 15.
327 Wing, J., Islamic State’s Spring Offensive In Iraq Ends In June, 6 July 2020, url
328 Wing, J., Islamic State’s Spring Offensive In Iraq Ends In June, 6 July 2020, url
329 Wing, J., Islamic State Offensive In Iraq Takes Off In May, 3 June 2020, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Anti-ISIL security sweeps and military operations of varying scales reportedly continue in Anbar
governorate, particularly in western Anbar, throughout 2019 and 2020.330 In February 2020, ISF havelaunched a major operation, Heroes of Iraq, targeting ISIL’s sleeper cells in areas of Anbar governorate
bordering Syria and Jordan due to the recent uptick in insurgent activity, such as bombings, ambushes,
kidnapping, extortion, and arson. The operation involved several branches of the ISF, including Border
Patrol Units, Anbar Operation Command, Baghdad Operation Command, and Al-Jazeera Operation
Command, with support from the Iraqi Air Force.331 In May 2020, another major military campaign,
Desert Lions Operation, was launched to clear areas of ISIL remnants, focusing on the north of Anbar
governorate, the south of Ninewa governorate and the west of Salah al-Din governorate.332 June 2020
saw a total of ten security sweeps in Anbar governorate, ‘focusing upon interdicting IS’s movement
across the Syrian border and the province into other parts of Iraq.’333 Anti-ISIL operations are reported
to have limited effects against clearing ISIL from Anbar governorate.334

Illustrative security incidents•

On 11 January 2019, a car bomb exploded in a market in Qaim killing two civilians and injuring
25 others.335•

Between January and March 2019, ISIL fighters have been ‘kidnapping and, in some cases,
executing Iraqi truffle hunters, mostly in the deserts of western Anbar Province. The ISF
confirmed the kidnapping of 44 truffle hunters this year, and more have probably gone
unreported.’336 ISF confirmed the kidnapping of 44 truffle hunters in the first quarter of 2019,and more are likely to have gone unreported.337 On 13 March 2019, an ISIL member killed aresident who had been kidnapped while picking desert truffles in the desert. On 15 February
2019, eight civilians were abducted while picking truffles in two separate incidents. Five
persons were abducted in Rawa district and three in Haditha district in western Anbar.338 On
28 January 2019, ISIL militants killed two Iraqi farmers and kidnapped another in Haditha
district who were gathering desert truffles.339•

On 6 May 2019, unidentified people bombed a house owned by the family of an ISIL memberin the center of Heet city in Anbar governorate in a seeming revenge attack.340

330 The Arab Weekly, Baghdad launches military campaign to counter ISIS resurgence, 18 May 2020, url; Jerusalem Post,

Iranian-backed militias playing key role in Anbar against ISIS, 26 April 2020, url; Rudaw, Iraqi army launches new anti-ISIS
op – without coalition or PMF backing, 12 February 2020, url; Al-Monitor, Has the Islamic State returned to western
Anbar?, 20 March 2019, url
331 Rudaw, Iraqi army launches new anti-ISIS op – without coalition or PMF backing, 12 February 2020, url
332 The Arab Weekly, Baghdad launches military campaign to counter ISIS resurgence, 18 May 2020, url
333 Wing, J., Islamic State’s Spring Offensive In Iraq Ends In June, 6 July 2020, url
334 Wing, J., Iraq Launches Security Op In Response To New Islamic State Offensive, 20 May 2020, url; Al-Monitor, Has theIslamic State returned to western Anbar?, 20 March 2019, url; Al-Monitor, Local intelligence key to Anbar anti-IS
operations, 12 March 2019, url
335 US, USDOS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2019: Iraq, 24 June 2020, url
336 The New York Times, They Go to the Desert to Hunt for Truffles. But ISIS Is Hunting Them., 19 March 2019, url. See also:
GQ Middle East, The Truffle Hunters Of Iraq, 5 January 2020, url; Al-Monitor, Has the Islamic State returned to western
Anbar?, 20 March 2019, url
337 The New York Times, They Go to the Desert to Hunt for Truffles. But ISIS Is Hunting Them., 19 March 2019, url
338 Kurdistan 24, ISIS kidnaps 8 more Iraqis picking truffles in Anbar, 16 February 2019, url
339 Iraqi News, Islamic State kills two Iraqis, kidnaps another in Iraq’s Anbar, 28 January 2019, url
340 Al-Monitor, Iraqi tribes seek to heal enduring wounds of IS legacy, 22 May 2019, url

54

EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation•

On 29 August 2019, unidentified gunmen shot dead four Iraqi soldiers and wounded sevenmore at a military checkpoint in Anbar governorate.341•

In January 2020, one Iraqi officer was killed and five others wounded in a car bomb explosion
carried out by ISIL in the border town of Al-Nukhaib, located around 20 kms from the borderwith Saudi Arabia.342•

In early February 2020, PMUs repelled two attacks the same week by ISIL militants on PMU
manned checkpoints in western Anbar.343•

On 21 March 2020, two Iraqi soldiers were killed in a double bomb attack in the town of Rutba
in western Anbar. While no group had claimed responsibility for the attack, such attacks arereportedly commonly carried out by ISIL militants in the area.344•

On 5 April 2020, four Iraqi soldiers were killed in an ISIL attack on a checkpoint west of Rutba
town in western Anbar.345•

On 25 July 2020, a motorcycle bomb exploded near Kubaisa in Anbar governorate, killing one
soldier and wounding another.346

Number of civilian casualties
The number of armed conflict related incidents and civilian casualties in the governorate recorded
by UNAMI for the period 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, is shown in the table below.
Gover-

2019 (Jan – Dec)

norate#of Killed
incidents

Injured

30

62

Anbar

43

2019 total 2020 (Jan – Jul)casualties#of Killed(killed and incidents
injured)Injured

105

8

4

7

2020 total
casualties(killed andinjured)
15

Table 5: Number of armed conflict related incidents and civilian casualties 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, Anbar
governorate.347

Number of security incidents
In the reference period ACLED reported 124 battles, 100 incidents of remote violence/explosions, 16cases of violence against civilians, 0 incidents of riots, accounting for a total of 240 security incidentsof these types in Anbar governorate, the majority taking place in Ar-Rutba district. 16 protests werealso reported in Anbar governorate during the reference period. 348 The evolution of all the types of
security events through the reference period is shown in the figure below.

341 Al Arabiya, Gunmen kill 4 Iraqi soldiers at checkpoint in Anbar province, 29 August 2019, url
342 The New Arab, Car bomb explosion ends two-year calm on Iraq-Saudi border, 16 January 2020, url
343 Shafaq News, Within a week, ISIS step up and launch two attacks in western Iraq, 4 February 2020, url
344 Anadolu Agency, Bomb attack kills 2 soldiers in Iraq's Anbar, 21 March 2020, url
345 Anadolu Agency, Daesh/ISIS terrorists kill 4 Iraqi soldiers in Anbar, 5 April 2020, url
346 NINA, Killing and wounding two soldiers with a motorcycle bomb explosion in Anbar, 25 July 2020, url
347 UNAMI, Email to EASO, 24 July 2020
348 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Figure 8: Evolution of security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence, violence against civilians, riots and protests
in Anbar governorate 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, based on ACLED data.349

State ability to secure law and orderMore information on the capacities of the Iraqi forces and the forces under the KRG as actors ofprotection, including the ability to secure law and order, as well as information on the integrity ofarmed forces, please see the report EASO COI Report – Iraq: Actors of Protection (2018).
According to a 2018 media article, state authority was reported to be weak in Anbar governorate,‘[w]ith so many different forces in Iraq, the [Anbar] governor lamented that he does not have thepower to investigate some issues in his own province.’350 In Qaim in particular, given the continued
reported presence of a plethora of local and non-local PMU, not all militia groups answered and were
accountable to the central Iraqi government,351 and some even operated with complete independence
from the Iraqi government.352 And further, the reported lack of coordination between different
security actors undermined functioning security.353 According to a report by the Carnegie Middle East
Centre with regards to the multiplicity of military forces based in Qaim, ‘the tensions caused by thepresence of militias and the weakness of official security forces have made it difficult to fully secureborder towns and direct resources toward reconstruction and long-term stabilization.’354

349 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url
350 Al-Monitor, Anbar governor wants police boosted and military back on bases, 6 September 2018, url
351 Al-Monitor, Qaim residents fearful following conflict between US, Iran-backed militias, 27 January 2020, url
352 Foreign Policy, A Powerful Iran-Backed Militia Is Losing Influence in Iraq, 22 May 2020, url; Niqash, Red Lines In The

Sand: In The Deserts of Anbar, US And Pro-Iran Forces Jostle, 13 September 2019, url
353 Niqash, Red Lines In The Sand: In The Deserts of Anbar, US And Pro-Iran Forces Jostle, 13 September 2019, url; Niqash,
Extremists At The Intersections: As Security Forces Multiply In Anbar, So Does Danger, 21 December 2018, url
354 Carnegie Middle East Centre, The Transformation of the Iraqi-Syrian Border: From a National to a Regional Frontier, 31
March 2020, url, p. 13

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

The mostly Sunni Arab residents reportedly resented the continued dominance of the predominantly
Shia PMUs who continued controlling and patrolling large areas in Anbar.355 PMUs have committed
gross and widespread human rights violations, including extrajudicial executions and other unlawful
killings in Anbar governorate during the military operations against ISIL between 2016 and 2017. 356
According to Michael Knights, the lack of trust and the fear of the local population of the security
forces deter many locals from cooperating with these security actors.357 According to the head sheikh
of one of the largest tribes in the area, Sheikh Rabah al-Karbouly, ‘the local population is still unhappy
about alleged seizure of land in the area by the PMU, the balance of power in their sharing ofcheckpoints with other Iraqi security forces and ongoing smuggling.’358 Civilians complained to themedia ‘about the dizzying array of security forces, some of whom do not wear insignia of any sort but
carry weapons.’359 And further, the diverse range of PMU is also reported to prioritise their own
interests rather than facilitating the return of refugees or reconstruction, thereby ignoring the needsof the local population.360
According to observers, some PMU factions with security functions were implicated in criminal
activities, including smuggling, extortion and illegal taxation, further undermining livelihoods andeconomic development.361 In Qaim in particular, militias have harmed the local economy bymonopolising black market activities, mainly in relation to the smuggling of fuel and other goods from
Syria across the border, reportedly both before and since the official reopening of the border crossingon 1 October 2019.362 A member of an official Iraqi security body was quoted in the Carnegie Middle
East Centre report as saying ‘that state institutions could not effectively monitor areas controlled by
IRGC-backed militias near the Qa’im border zone.’363 And further, most militia forces and even somesecurity forces were reported to have directly engaged in extortion, according to the Carnegie Middle
East Center in March 2020. For example, ‘[l]ocal residents have reported that some tribal fighters,
now deprived of the patronage they previously enjoyed from the U.S. military or the Iraqi government,
have sought to make up for this shortfall by regularly blackmailing business owners or shopkeepers’.364

355 Foreign Policy, A Powerful Iran-Backed Militia Is Losing Influence in Iraq, 22 May 2020, url; Carnegie Middle East Centre,

The Transformation of the Iraqi-Syrian Border: From a National to a Regional Frontier, 31 March 2020, url, p. 13; AlMonitor, Impacts of US withdrawal from Qaim base in Iraqi border with Syria, 24 March 2020, url; Al-Monitor, PMU decreeunlikely to shift power balance in Iraq's Qaim, 20 July 2019, url
356 AI, Iraq: Turning a Blind Eye, The Arming of the Popular Mobilization Units, 5 January 2017, url, pp. 18-19
357 Atlantic (The), ISIS never went away in Iraq, 31 August 2018, url
358 Al-Monitor, Impacts of US withdrawal from Qaim base in Iraqi border with Syria, 24 March 2020, url
359 Al-Monitor, PMU decree unlikely to shift power balance in Iraq's Qaim, 20 July 2019, url
360 Carnegie Middle East Centre, The Transformation of the Iraqi-Syrian Border: From a National to a Regional Frontier, 31
March 2020, url, p. 14; Niqash, Red Lines In The Sand: In The Deserts of Anbar, US And Pro-Iran Forces Jostle, 13
September 2019, url
361 Foreign Policy, A Powerful Iran-Backed Militia Is Losing Influence in Iraq, 22 May 2020, url; Carnegie Middle East Centre,
The Transformation of the Iraqi-Syrian Border: From a National to a Regional Frontier, 31 March 2020, url, p. 14; AlMonitor, Impacts of US withdrawal from Qaim base in Iraqi border with Syria, 24 March 2020, url; Al-Monitor, Iraq's Qaim
border open to nonlocal PMU fighting in Syria, 25 April 2019, url
362 Carnegie Middle East Centre, The Transformation of the Iraqi-Syrian Border: From a National to a Regional Frontier, 31
March 2020, url, p. 14; Wing, J., Kataib Hezbollah’s Role Along The Iraq-Syrian Border: Security Profits Supporting Iran, 31
December 2019, url
363 Carnegie Middle East Centre, The Transformation of the Iraqi-Syrian Border: From a National to a Regional Frontier, 31
March 2020, url, p. 14
364 Carnegie Middle East Centre, The Transformation of the Iraqi-Syrian Border: From a National to a Regional Frontier, 31
March 2020, url, p. 14

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Infrastructure damage and explosive remnants of war
According to a 2018 study, conducted by the Iraqi government in collaboration with the World Bank,365
Anbar is one of the governorates with high scores of critical infrastructure damage as a result ofconflict.366 This relates in particular to damage to housing,367 to the agricultural sector,368 to essential
municipal services,369 as well as the industry and commerce productive sectors.370 And further, thetotal housing damage surveyed in the seven most conflict affected governorates in Iraq, 19 % wasfound in Anbar governorate.371 A total of 29 000 houses were completely destroyed in Anbar
governorate during the conflict with ISIL.372 Access to public electricity networks has been ‘significantly
diminished’ as a result of the conflict.373 For example, in Fallujah city in Anbar governorate, ‘anassessment of damages to the public power grid concluded that 85 percent of the city’s public
electricity infrastructure sustained damages during the period of ISIS occupation.’374 According to theWorld Bank, agricultural output experienced a significant decline due to conflict and the resultant
displaced populations, looting and theft, and fatalities.375 However, the DNA noted some
improvements in relation to a limited number of agricultural subsectors as of September 2017,
especially through repairs to water infrastructure along the Euphrates River.376 Anbar governorate
was further assessed as having been the hardest hit by far in relation to damages to the industry andcommerce productive sectors, including major damage to phosphate and concrete facilities, with a
total estimated cost to reconstruct of IQD 3.3 trillion.377
Reconstruction and rehabilitation projects continued in Anbar governorate throughout 2019 and 2020
with almost 19 991 houses having been completed and 5 726 being either in planning or ongoing,
while funding was still being sought for 2 200 houses, according to the Shelter Cluster Iraq as at 5365 ‘The Iraq Damage and Needs Assessment (DNA) is an assessment unprecedented in both its sectoral and geographic

scope, covering damages, losses, and needs across 19 sectors in all conflict affected governorates in Iraq’, including Anbar,
Babel, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninawa, Salah Al-Deen, and Baghdad. Damage data were assessed up to early December 2017; WorldBank Group, Iraq Reconstruction and Investment – Part 2 Damage and Needs Assessment of Affected Governorates,
January 2018, url, pp. I-III
366 ‘The Iraq Damage and Needs Assessment (DNA) is an assessment unprecedented in both its sectoral and geographic
scope, covering damages, losses, and needs across 19 sectors in all conflict affected governorates in Iraq’, including Anbar,
Babel, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewa, Salah al-Din, and Baghdad. Damage data were assessed up to early December 2017; WorldBank Group, Iraq Reconstruction and Investment – Part 2 Damage and Needs Assessment of Affected Governorates,
January 2018, url, pp. I-III
367 World Bank Group, Iraq Reconstruction and Investment – Part 2 Damage and Needs Assessment of Affected
Governorates, January 2018, url, p. 15
368 World Bank Group, Iraq Reconstruction and Investment – Part 2 Damage and Needs Assessment of Affected
Governorates, January 2018, url, p. 47
369 World Bank Group, Iraq Reconstruction and Investment – Part 2 Damage and Needs Assessment of Affected
Governorates, January 2018, url, p. XXIV
370 World Bank Group, Iraq Reconstruction and Investment – Part 2 Damage and Needs Assessment of Affected
Governorates, January 2018, url, pp. 57, 59
371 World Bank Group, Iraq Reconstruction and Investment – Part 2 Damage and Needs Assessment of Affected
Governorates, January 2018, url, p. 15
372 UN Habitat, To Improve Urban Recovery and Resilience in Post Conflict Areas in Anbar/Iraq UN-Habitat Handed OverThree New Urban Settlements of Durable Core Houses To Vulnerable Returnees, 28 March 2019, url, p. 1
373 World Bank Group, Iraq Reconstruction and Investment – Part 2 Damage and Needs Assessment of Affected
Governorates, January 2018, url, p. 70
374 World Bank Group, Iraq Reconstruction and Investment – Part 2 Damage and Needs Assessment of Affected
Governorates, January 2018, url, p. 72
375 World Bank Group, Iraq Reconstruction and Investment – Part 2 Damage and Needs Assessment of Affected
Governorates, January 2018, url, p. 47
376 World Bank Group, Iraq Reconstruction and Investment – Part 2 Damage and Needs Assessment of Affected
Governorates, January 2018, url, p. 47
377 World Bank Group, Iraq Reconstruction and Investment – Part 2 Damage and Needs Assessment of Affected
Governorates, January 2018, url, pp. 57, 59

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

August 2020.378 However, Amnesty International reported that reconstruction in governorates badly
affected by the conflict, including Anbar, was still slow throughout 2019.379
Explosive ordnance contamination is reported to pose an obstacle to safe returns of IDPs as well as tothe provision of humanitarian activities in more than one third of districts assessed in Anbar, Baghdad,
Kirkuk, Ninewa and Salah al-Din governorates by the Humanitarian Country Team in Iraq.380

Displacement and return
As of 30 June 2020, 10 % of the total IDP population in Iraq originates from Anbar governorate, withthe main districts of origin being Ramadi (67 266), Falluja (48 594) and Qaim (11 956).381 At the sametime, Anbar governorate hosts a total number of 36 162 IDPs, the eighth highest number of IDPs of all
18 governorates of displacement.382 Furthermore, 74 % of IDPs in Anbar have been displaced within
the governorate, while 24 % originate from Babil governorate.383 The same source reports that 44 %of IDPs in Anbar governorate are assessed to be living in ‘critical shelters’, making Anbar thegovernorate with the highest proportion of IDPs living in ‘critical shelters’ in Iraq.384 During 2019, many
IDPs were reportedly forced into secondary displacement due to ‘forced and premature returns andforced or coerced departures from camps and informal settlements in Ninewa, Salah Al-Din, Al-Anbar,
Kirkuk and Diyala governorates.’385
Returns to Anbar governorate outpace displacement and Anbar governorate continues to have thesecond highest number of returnees, with a total of 1 503 468 returnees recorded as at 30 June
2020.386 The three main districts of return are Ramadi with 593 250 returnees; Falluja with 552 138
returnees and Heet with 176 034 returnees.387 IOM assesses Anbar governorate to host the third
highest number of returnees (122 256 individuals) living in ‘severe conditions’ (indicating a lack of
livelihoods, services, social cohesion and security).388 In areas of return, including in Anbar,
employment opportunities remain limited389 and food insecurity high.390 35 637 returnees to Anbar
governorate are assessed as being food insecure, representing the third highest figure per

378 Shelter Cluster Iraq, Iraq War Damaged Shelter Rehabilitation Dashboard, 5 August 2020, url
379 AI, Human rights in the Middle East and North Africa: Review of 2019, 18 February 2020, url
380 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Iraq 2020, 17 November 2019, url, p. 54
381 IOM, Iraq Master List Report 116, May - June 2020 – Iraq, July 2020, url, p. 4
382 IOM, Iraq Master List Report 116, May - June 2020 – Iraq, July 2020, url, p. 2
383 IOM, Iraq Master List Report 116, May - June 2020 – Iraq, July 2020, url, p. 2
384 ‘Critical shelters include informal settlements, religious buildings, schools and unfinished or abandoned buildings. For

returnees, it also includes habitual residences that are severely damaged or destroyed and for IDPs, long-term rental
accommodations that are unfit for habitation (having characteristics of unfinished or severely damaged buildings).’ IOM,
Iraq Master List Report 116, May - June 2020 – Iraq, July 2020, url, pp. 4, 8
385 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Iraq 2020, 17 November 2019, url, p. 5. See also pp. 14, 17 of the same report.
See also: UN Human Rights Council, Visit to Iraq: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of InternallyDisplaced Persons* (A/HRC/44/41/Add.1), 13 May 2020, url, para. 27; UNHCR, UNHCR Iraq Protection Update - August
2019, 14 October 2019, url, pp. 1, 2, 3; UNOCHA, Humanitarian Bulletin Iraq October 2019, 30 October 2019, url, p. 1;
Niqash, Case Closed? Trading One Problem For Two, As Anbar Displaced Camps Close, 27 September 2019, url
386 IOM, Iraq Master List Report 116, May - June 2020 – Iraq, July 2020, url, p. 5
387 IOM, Iraq Master List Report 116, May - June 2020 – Iraq, July 2020, url, p. 5
388 IOM, Return Index Findings Round Nine – Iraq July 2020, 9 July 2020, url, p. 2. See also, See also, UNOCHA, Response
Plan Humanitarian Monitoring Report January-May 2019, 27 August 2019, url, pp. 8, 10
389 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Iraq 2020, 17 December, url, p. 45
390 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Iraq 2020, 17 December, url, pp. 45, 47

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

governorate in Iraq.391 IOM assessed two areas in Anbar governorate to which no returns took place
as of April 2020, mostly due to lack of security and blocked returns.392

391 ‘Governorates with the highest number of food insecure returnees are Ninewa (224,434), Salah Al-Din (93,450), Al-

Anbar (35,637) and Diyala (29,112).’ Humanitarian Needs Overview Iraq 2020, 17 December, url, p. 47
392 IOM, Areas of origin having witnessed no return – April 2020, June 2020, url, p. 1

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

2.2 Babil

Map 7: Babil governorate with district borders, district capitals and main roads, © United Nations.393

2.2.1 General description of the governorate
Basic geography
Babil governorate is located in the central part of Iraq, south of Baghdad governorate and has borders
with Baghdad, Anbar, Kerbala, Qadissiya, and Wassit governorates. Babil governorate is divided into
the following districts: Al Musayab, Al Mahaweel, Al Hilla, and Al Hashimiya. The governorate’s capitalis Hilla.394

Population
For 2019, the Iraqi CSO (Central Statistical Organization) estimated395 the governorate’s population
at 2 119 403.396

393 UN JAU, Iraq District Map, January 2014, url
394 UN JAU, Iraq District Map, January 2014, url
395 It should be noted that the last comprehensive Population and Housing Census for Iraq was conducted in 1987; UNFPA,

Newsletter 2020 Census, December 2019, url, p. 1
396 Iraq, CSO, Population indicators and population estimates, n.d., url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Ethnicity
The majority of the governorate’s population is Shia Arab, with a Sunni minority.397

Road security
Babil governorate forms part of the Baghdad Belts that stretch from southern Fallujah throughAmariyat al Fallujah and Jurf al-Sakhr town, in the north of Babil.398 Babil is of strategic importance as
it is situated along a main highway used by Shiite pilgrims from northern and central Iraq into Karbala
and Najaf.399

EconomyAgriculture is the most important sector for Babil governorate’s economy.400

2.2.2 Conflict background and armed actors
Conflict backgroundIn 2014, ISIL seized control of Jurf al Sakhr town in Babil and declared an official base of operations inNorthern Babil.401 The area of Jurf al Sakhr was heavily used by ISIL during the period when it took
over large parts of Iraq.402 From there, ISIL was able to gain a foothold and launch attacks against theShiite holy cities of Karbala and Najaf. ISIL was driven out of Jurf al-Sakhr town in 2014 and Shiite
militias were accused of targeting Sunnis, displacing and driving out families, destroying homes, andpreventing returns.403

Armed actors
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
The ISW reported in 2017 that the Iraqi military’s Babil Operations Command (BabOC) was responsiblefor Babil governorate and the Southern Baghdad Belts. The BabOC, which includes the 8th Iraqi Army
Division, had the majority of its detachments in Anbar. It also included areas of responsibility in Jurf
al-Sakhr, as well as Kerbala and Najaf.404 In February 2019, Al-Monitor reported on plans by thegovernment to transfer security duties from the army to the police in several governorates, including
Babil, however further details were not provided in the source.405 Further information on security
forces developments in the governorate could not be found within the time constraints of this report.
Popular Mobilisation Units (PMUs)
Michael Knights reported in August 2019,‘Kata’ib Hezbollah has carved out an exclusive principality in Jurf as-Sakr, 40 kilometers
southwest of Baghdad. This area was liberated in late 2014, when it was celebrated as thefirst major liberation undertaken by the PMF. Since then, KH has strongly consolidated a “no397 NCCI, Babil Governorate Profile, July 2015, url, p. 2
398 ISW ,ISIS Re-Establishes Historical Sanctuary in Iraq, 7 March 2019, url
399 Wing, J., Details on Collective Punishment Meted Out by Hashd Upon Jurf al-Sakhr, 21 November 2019, url
400 NCCI, Babil Governorate Profile, July 2015, url, p. 2
401 ISW, ISIS Re-Establishes Historical Sanctuary in Iraq, 7 March 2019, url
402 New York Times (The), Bus Bomb Kills 12 Iraqis Near Major Pilgrimage Site, 21 September 2019, url
403 Intercept (The)/New York Times (The), A Spy Complex Revealed, 18 November 2019, url
404 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, pp. 14, 19
405 Al-Monitor, As Iraqi army retreats to borders, local police controls cities’ security, 1 February 2019, url

62

EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situationgo” zone in which displaced Sunni residents cannot return and where only KH forces operate,complete with private prisons (holding well over 1,000 illegal detainees).’406
The Washington Institute’s Shia Mapping Project reported that there were Shia militias present in Jurf
al-Sakhr and in Hillah towns as of its May 2019 map.407 Al-Monitor reported in December 2019408 andFP reported in May 2020 that Kataib Hezbollah still controls Jurf al-Sakhr.409
ISIL
In 2019, ISW reported that ISIL had started to use a support zone in Amariyat al Fallujah to ‘project
force south’ towards Jurf al Sakr and Babil governorate in December 2018.410 The UN also wrote in
May 2019 that ISIL reorganised cells and increased their operations and attacks in Babil, as well as
Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninawa and Salah al-Din governorates.411

2.2.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population
Developments 2019-2020
According to an FP article written in May 2020, the town of Jurf al-Sakhr was renamed Jurf al Nasr
(victory) after the defeat of ISIL, though residents continue to call it the former name. It further
indicated that as of May 2020 Kataib Hezbollah, a major Iran-linked PMU, is continuing to occupy thewhole town of Jurf al-Sakr, in Babil, where it claims to be protecting nearby Shia holy sites in Karbala.412
In 2019, sources wrote that Sunni residents who were expelled following the ISIL defeat have not been
allowed back.413 The FP article similarly stated in May 2020 that Kataib Hezbollah ‘continues to prevent
its Sunni residents from returning – and allegedly anyone else, including government officials, fromentering Jurf al Sakr.’414
Jurf al-Sakhr area is the target of ISIL threats and attacks from time to time, according to the Deputy
Governor of Babil governorate, speaking to the local media in June 2020.415 Furthermore, Kataib
Hezbollah in Babil governorate is described by Iraq blogger Joel Wing as a ‘common target’ of ISIL.416
Writing in October 2019, Iraq analyst Joel Wing stated about that Babil had one IED attack upon the
Hashd in the Jurf al-Sakhr district in the northeast, and then no other activity during that month. He
wrote that ‘again, Babil has not been a priority for the insurgency in years. When it does strike, there
it is almost always in Jurf al-Sakhr which is empty of civilians and has been converted into a major basefor Kataib Hezbollah.’ In August 2019, he recorded eight attacks, the highest number he had recorded
since June 2018.417 According to the same source, there were seven attacks in Babil during May 2020,
the most in the governorate since August 2019, and all attacks took place in Jurf al-Sakhr district,which has been ‘emptied of civilians by the security forces and then turned into a large base for Kataib

406 Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq, CTC Sentinel, August 2019, url, p. 4407 See the map: Smyth P., The Shia Militia Mapping Project (Interactive Map), May 2019, url
408 Al-Monitor, Iranian consulates torched in Najaf and Karbala, 4 December 2019, url
409 FP, A powerful Iran-backed militia is losing influence in Iraq, 11 May 2020, url
410 ISW, ISIS Re-Establishes Historical Sanctuary in Iraq, 7 March 2019, url
411 UNSC, Implementation of resolution 2421 (2018) (S/2019/365), 2 May 2019, url, para. 18
412 FP, A powerful Iran-backed militia is losing influence in Iraq, 11 May 2020, url
413 New York Times (The), Bus Bomb Kills 12 Iraqis Near Major Pilgrimage Site, 21 September 2019, url; Al-Monitor, Iranianconsulates torched in Najaf and Karbala, 4 December 2019, url
414 FP, A powerful Iran-backed militia is losing influence in Iraq, 11 May 2020, urlSee also: Al Monitor,‫بي ر‬
415 Al Maalomah, ‫فتة وأخرى مهاجمة جرف النرص‬‫ داعش يحاول ن‬:‫[ نائب عن بابل‬Deputy for Babel: ISIS is trying from time to time toattack], 2 June 2020, url
416 Wing, J., Islamic State’s Spring Offensive in Iraq Ends in June, 6 July 2020, url
417 Wing, J., Islamic State not Following Their Uual Pattern in Attacks In Iraq, 16 October 2019, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Hezbollah’, making it a frequent ISIL target.418 Joel Wing stated that the incidents were part of a
campaign by ISIL against the area, targeting PMUs noting that ‘almost every attack is in Jurf al-Sakhr
because it is a Hashd base providing plenty of targets’.419 He stated in May 2020 that ISIL ‘usually
carried out at least one operation in Babil every week’ to harass the PMUs.420 He also estimated thatabout three incidents per month have been carried out in Jurf al-Sakhr district by ISIL since thebeginning of 2019. He noted that ‘outside of the annual spring-summer offensive however the
militants have tended to leave the governorate alone.’421
Babil has been the site of protests against the government occurring, for example, in March 2019 422
and in October 2019.423 Protesters also converged on the university in Babil in December 2019, forcing
it to close and preventing students and staff from entering.424 the Iraqi Human Rights Commission
reported that 123 people were wounded and 1 killed during the demonstrations in the first week ofOctober 2019 in Babil; a further 105 were detained and later released.425 Protests also occurred on 25
October 2019, centred on several locations across the south of Iraq, including Babil, where the UN
reported that it received information about the use of live ammunition against protesters by private
militias to stop them entering political and government buildings.426 The same report noted that on
26 October, in Babil governorate, ‘a militia group opened fire with live ammunition on a group ofdemonstrators trying to enter their building, killing seven and injuring 12.’ 427 Dozens of arrests acrossthe south were also reported in the late October protests, though less than those that took place
during 1-9 October 2019.428 There were some reports that anti-terrorism legislation was used against
demonstrators including in Babil, though most were processed under criminal law. Further detail was
not given.429 Protests were also reported in July 2020 in Babil.430

Illustrative security incidents•

In January 2019, the PMF’s 46th Brigade, a branch of Kataib Hezbollah, ‘thwarted an ISISSVBIED in Jurf al-Sakhar in Northern Babil. The target of this attack remains unclear but itmarked the first such incident since the PMF cleared ISIL from Jurf al-Sakhar in October 2014.
ISIL likely staged the SVBIED from its support zone south of Fallujah in Anbar Province’.431•

On 19 February 2019, ‘Babil Police arrested an ISIS fighter at a checkpoint in Iskandariya
between Baghdad and Karbala on February 19. The 47th Branch, also of KH, ‘later clashed with

418 Wing, J., Islamic State Offensive In Iraq Takes Off in May, 3 June 2020, url
419 Wing, J., Security In Iraq, May 22-28 2020, 1 June 2020, url
420 Wing, J., Security in Iraq, May 15-21 2020, 25 May 2020, url
421 Wing, J., Spike in Violence In April 2020 But Can It Be Sustained? 1 May 2020, url
422 Baghdad Post (The), Citizens protest in Babil, demand services provision, 14 March 2019, url
423 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Bulletin – Iraq, October 2019, url, p. 3; UNSC, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019)(S/2019/903), 22 November 2019, url, para. 11; UNAMI, Human Rights Special Report: Demonstrations in Iraq (1-9 October2019), October 2019, url, p. 4424 Baghdad Post (The), Protesters close a university and an activist survives an assassination attack, 16 December 2019, url
425 Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor, Iraqi Protests: An Audacity to Kill and Absent Justice, December 2019, url, p. 19
426 UNAMI, Human Rights Special Report: Demonstrations in Iraq: update (25 October-4 November 2019), November 2019,url, pp. 2-3
427 UNAMI, Human Rights Special Report: Demonstrations in Iraq: update (25 October-4 November 2019), November 2019,url, pp. 2-3
428 UNAMI, Human Rights Special Report: Demonstrations in Iraq: update (25 October-4 November 2019), November 2019,url, p. 5
429 UNAMI, Human Rights Special Report: Demonstrations in Iraq: update (25 October-4 November 2019), November 2019,url, p. 6
430 Wing, J., National Protests Start in Iraq During the Weekend – UPDATED, 27 July 2020, url
431 ISW, ISIS Resurgence Update – April 2019, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

ISIS during an attempted clearing operation in Jurf al-Sakhar on April 9. ISIS temporarily
withdrew from the area but Kata’ib Hezbollah did not properly clear the terrain.’ 432•

On 3 February 2019, an IED targeting a PMU patrol between Jurf al-Sakhr and Razzaza in North
Babil exploded and wounded a PMU fighter.433•

On 15 June 2019, ‘two members of the Popular Mobilization Forces PMF were injured in a carbomb explosion northwest of Hilla city in Babil province.’434•

On 22 August 2019, ‘[a] motorcycle bomb attack on a market place in the city of al-Musayib
in Babil province (about 60km south of Baghdad) wounded almost 40 people. Another report
said that there were four deaths and 30 injured people.’435•

On 26 October 2019, seven demonstrators were killed and 12 injured when a militia group
opened fire on protesters.436•

In June 2020, 5 people were injured in a tribal dispute over land in Hilla.437•

On 29 June 2020, five people were killed and 13 people were injured over a land dispute in
Hillah in an exchange of fire with light weapons; the police settled the conflict and made anumber of arrests.438•

In July 2020, unknown gunmen opened fire on the house belonging to Babil’s Director of
Water Resources which was damaged, but no one was injured.439

Number of civilian casualties
The number of armed conflict related incidents and civilian casualties in the governorate recorded
by UNAMI for the period 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, is shown in the table below.
Gover- 2019 (Jan – Dec)
norate2019 total 2020 (Jan – Jul)
2020 total
casualties
casualties#of Killed Injured#of Killed Injured(killed and incidents(killed andincidents
injured)injured)

Babil

1

1

31

32

1

0

0

0

Table 6: Number of armed conflict related incidents and civilian casualties 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, Babilgovernorate.440

432 ISW, ISIS Resurgence Update – April 2019, url
433 EPIC, ISHM: January 30-February 6 2020, 6 February 2020, url
434 Germany, BAMF, Information Centre Asylum and Migration, Briefing Notes, 17 June 2019, url, p. 3
435 Germany, BAMF, Information Centre Asylum and Migration, Briefing Notes, 26 August 2019, url, p. 2; See also:

Kurdistan24, Nearly 40 injured in motorcycle bombing in Iraq’s Babil, url
436 UNAMI, Human Rights Special Report: Demonstrations in Iraq: update (25 October-4 November 2019), November 2019,url, p. 3
437 NINA, Five People Injured In A Tribal Dispute In Southern Hilla, Babylon Governorate, 25 June 2020, url
438 NINA, People Killed and Injured in a Dispute Over Agricultural Land North of Hilla, Babylon, 29 June 2020, url
439 NINA, Armed Men Attack The House Of The Director Of Water Resources in Babylon, 22 July 2020, url
440 UNAMI, Email to EASO 24 July 2020

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Number of security incidents
In the reference period, ACLED reported 11 battles, 25 incidents of remote violence/explosions, 7cases of violence against civilians, 8 incidents of riots, accounting for a total of 51 security incidents ofthese types in Babil governorate, the majority taking place in Al-Mahawil district. 49 protests werealso reported in Babil governorate during the reference period. 441 The evolution of all the types of
security events through the reference period is shown in the figure below.

Figure 9: Evolution of security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence, violence against civilians, riots and protests
in Babil governorate 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, based on ACLED data.442

State ability to secure law and orderSpecific information on the state’s ability to secure law and order in Babil could not be found in thetime constraints of this report. Please refer to the actors and incidents sections above.
More information on the capacities of the Iraqi forces and the forces under the KRG as actors ofprotection, including the ability to secure law and order, as well as information on the integrity ofarmed forces, please see the report EASO COI Report – Iraq: Actors of Protection (2018).

Infrastructure damage and explosive remnants of war
Information on infrastructure damage and explosive remnants of war in Babil governorate were notfound in the time constraints of this report.
A 2018 Damage Needs Assessment by the World Bank covering 7 governorates directly affected by
the conflict indicated that Babil represented 1 % of reported damage to housing assets across thesurveyed governorates.443

441 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url
442 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url
443 WB, Damage and Needs Assessment of Affected Governorates – Part 2, January 2018, url, p. 15

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Displacement and return
As of 30 June 2020, there were 17 004 IDPs in Babil governorate, according to IOM’s DTM matrix.
Musayib district has the most IDPs (14 826), followed by Hilla district (1 512) and Al Mahawil district(372).444 According to UNOCHA’s 2020 humanitarian needs overview, there are about 10 000 people
in need of humanitarian assistance living in Babil. Babil does not have IDPs living in camps; however,it has a population living outside camps.445
According to IOM’s Return Index for July 2020, a map showing ‘hotspots’ in returnee population
density and severity of return conditions indicated that Babil had no returns, or very low returns tosome parts of the north.446
USDOS reported that in 2018, PMU militias prevented Arab Sunni IDPs from returning to their placesof origin in Babil and Diyala governorates.447 Specifically, Joel Wing reported in December 2018 thatboth Jurf al-Sakhr and Musayib had been cleared out of their residents and that the provincial
government had banned anyone from returning to these two districts,448 and in December 2019 heremarked that the government showed no signs of changing this policy.449 UNHCR’s July 2019
protection update also remarked that ‘[i]n Babil Governorate, approximately 530 IDP families in AlAskandaria (north of Babil), originally from Jurf Al-Sakhar, Al-Buhairat, and AlKhudhir areas are being
prevented from returning to their areas of origin due to tribal and political reasons. IDP families, manyheaded by women, expressed their willingness to return but claimed they are unable to do so due totribal disputes and missing civil documentation.’450
IOM reported in April 2020 that blocked returns were the reason some areas of Babil did not havereturnees.451 The areas listed by IOM as having no returns in Babil were in the sub-districts of Al
Iskandaria (in Al Musayib district): Abo Shamsy, Al-Haweja, Al-Qadiriya, Al-Sheeha, Om Hayaia; andJurf al Sakhr, in the locations: Al-Bahbahani, Al-Baj Al-Jnoobi, Al-Baj Al-Shimali, Al-Farsia, Al-Hujair, AlJazrieavillage, Ruwaiaa, Snedeej.452
Further information on developments in 2020 could not be found within the time constraints of thisreport.

444 IOM, Iraq Master List Report 116, May - June 2020 – Iraq, July 2020, url, p. 3
445 See map on page 6 and table Scope of Analysis Matrix on page 16 in: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2020 – Iraq,

November 2019, url, pp. 6, 16
446 IOM, Return Index – Findings Round Nine- Iraq, July 2020, url, p. 2
447 US, USDOS, International Religious Freedom Report 2018 – Iraq, url
448 Wing, J., Permanently Displaced in Iraq’s Babil Province, 6 December 2018, url
449 Wing, J., Number of Displaced Returning In Iraq Takes Another Large Drop, 4 December 2019, url
450 UNHCR, Iraq Protection Update – July 2019, July 2019, url, p. 1
451 IOM, Areas of Origin Having Witnessed No Returns, April 2020, url, p. 1
452 IOM, Areas of Origin Having Witnessed No Returns, April 2020, url, p. 2

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

2.3 Baghdad

Map 8: Baghdad governorate with district borders, district capitals and main roads, © United Nations.453

2.3.1 General description of the governorate
Basic geography
The capital of Iraq, Baghdad city, is located in Baghdad governorate.454 Baghdad is situated in the Tigris
valley in the centre of Iraq and is the smallest governorate in terms of overall surface area
(4 555 km2).455 It is the main economic hub of the country and hosts the heavily protected Green
Zone456 which ‘houses the US embassy and Iraqi government offices’457.
Baghdad city is made up of the districts: Adhamiyah, Karkh, Karada, Khadimiyah, Mansour, Sadr City,Al Rashid, Rusafa and 9 Nissan (‘new Baghdad’). The rest of Baghdad governorate is comprised of the
districts of Al Madain, Taji, Tarmiyah, Mahmudiyah, and Abu Ghraib.458 Outlying areas of Baghdad that

453 UN JAU, Iraq District Map, January 2014, url
454 NCCI, Baghdad Governorate Profile, updated December 2015, url, pp. 1-2
455 NCCI, Baghdad Governorate Profile, updated December 2015, url, pp. 1-2
456 NCCI, Baghdad Governorate Profile, updated December 2015, url, pp. 1-2
457 Guardian (The), Baghdad's Green Zone reopens to public after 16 years, 4 June 2019, url
458 NCCI, Baghdad Governorate Profile, updated December 2015, url, pp. 1-2

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

share a border with Diyala, Anbar, Salah al-Din, and Babil governorates are referred to as the ‘Baghdad
belts’.459

Population
For 2019, the Iraqi CSO (Central Statistical Organization) estimated460 the governorate’s population
at 8 340 711, of which 1 043 279 were residing in rural areas and 7 297 432 in urban areas. 461 The CIA
estimated the population of Baghdad at 7 144 000 in 2020.462 Despite being the smallest governorate
in Iraq, it has the highest population of all governorates, with 87 % being urban.463 Baghdad has thehighest population density in Iraq.464

Ethnicity
According to sources, Baghdad governorate and city has a mixed population of Shia and Sunni
Muslims, with a ‘number of smaller Christian communities’.465 Baghdad was one of the main
‘battlegrounds’ between groups involved in the 2006-2007 sectarian violence466 that followed the USled invasion of Iraq in 2003, when bombings and killings impacted many areas of Baghdad and caused
inhabitants to resettle along more sectarian lines, with the involvement of Shia militias forcing Sunnis
out of some areas at that time.467 Landinfo also observed in 2015 that ‘[w]hile most Baghdad
neighbourhoods used to be inhabited by a mix of Sunni and Shia in the past, the violent sectariancleansing in the 2000’s resulted in the city now appearing as much more segregated and Shia
dominated’.468

EconomyAccording to Encyclopaedia Britannica, ‘[m]ost of Iraq’s manufacturing, finance, and commerce isconcentrated in and around Baghdad. This includes at least half of the large-scale industry of Iraq.469
The oil field to the east of Baghdad is 65 kilometres long and 11 kilometres wide and has a reserve of
8 million barrels of oil.470. Moreover, Baghdad is well connected to the rest of the country and has oneof the most important airports in Iraq, Baghdad International Airport.471

Road security
The Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) observed the existence of ‘improvised checkpoints’ in
addition to ‘the numerous government security checkpoints’ across the city of Baghdad. OSAC also
observed that measures restricting access to the International Zone were eased in December 2018.
459 IBC, Another year of relentless violence in Iraq, 2016, url
460 It should be noted that the last comprehensive Population and Housing Census for Iraq was conducted in 1987; UNFPA,

Newsletter 2020 Census, December 2019, url, p. 1
461 Iraq, CSO, 2019 ‫[ قديرات سكان العراق حسب المحافظة والبيئة والجنس لسنة‬Demographic and population indicators, Estimates forthe population of Iraq by province, environment and gender for the year 2019] (table), n.d., url
462 CIA, World Factbook, People and Society, 12 August 2020, url
463 NCCI, Baghdad Governorate Profile, updated December 2015, url, pp. 1-2
464 UN, Iraq Population Density [Map], 23 July 2014, url
465 NCCI, Baghdad Governorate Profile, updated December 2015, url, pp. 1-2
466 According to IBC data, the years 2006-2007 were among the years with the highest levels of violent deaths of civilians in
Baghdad. See: IBC, Documented civilian deaths from violence, n.d., url
467 NCCI, Baghdad Governorate Profile, updated December 2015, url, pp. 1-2; New York Times (The), District by District,
Shiites Make Baghdad Their Own, 23 December 2006, url
468 Norway, Landinfo, Temanotat, Irak: Bagdad - sikkerhetssituasjon per februar 2015 [Baghdad – Security situation], 13
February 2015, url, p. 3
469 Encyclopaedia Britannica, Baghdad, Economy, n. d., url
470 Iraq Business News, Oil and Gas Fields: East Baghdad, n. d., url
471 NCCI, Baghdad Governorate Profile, December 2015, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

However, in October 2019, access to the International Zone became more restricted in the wake ofthe protests that swept the city. Reportedly, ‘[a]ccess procedures to the IZ can change quickly as the
security situation ebbs and flows … [which has] directly affected diplomatic missions, the private
sector, and residences.’472 Iraq Humanitarian Fund and iMMAP published a map indicating the
explosive hazards risk level on roads in Baghdad governorate between 1 and 30 April 2020. That map
showed primary risk roads in Tarmiyah, Abu Ghraib, and Mahmoudiya. Secondary risk roads wereindicated in the above-mentioned areas as well as in Mada’in, and in scattered neighbourhoods in
Baghdad City.473

2.3.2 Conflict background and armed actors in the governorate
Conflict backgroundIn 2013, ISIL increased the number of terrorist attacks in Baghdad drastically. Particularly Shia targets
in the city were hit by VBIEDs. With this strategy, ISIL tried to demonstrate the incapacity of the Iraqi
authorities and the ISF, and to provoke the resurgence of Shia militias.474 These waves of VBIEDs
continued in 2014.475 The fear that ISIL could overrun Baghdad during summer 2014 did notmaterialise, however, there was fighting between ISIL militants and the Iraqi Army in Zaidan and Abu
Ghraib in the west of the governorate (in about 20 km distance to the city centre).476 Also in the townsof al-Mahmudiya and Latifiya south of the city gunfights with ISIL were reported.477 In addition, theShia districts of Baghdad continued to be targeted by regular terrorist attacks on public places in
2014.478 The ISIL raids in June 2014 led to the mobilisation of Shia militias in Bagdad.479 While the Iraqi
army was primarily maintaining the security in the centre of Baghdad, these militias were mainlypresent in the suburbs.480 The visible reappearance of these militias recalled memories within theSunni minority of the civil war of 2006-2007 in the city, when Shia militias carried out sectariancleansing against the Sunni population of Baghdad.481 During 2014, there were reports of sectariankillings by Shia militias and murders of Sunni civilians have been attributed to members of different
militias.482 However, the large-scale sectarian killings of 2006-2007 did not reoccur in Baghdad in 2014or later.483

472 OSAC, Iraq 2020 Crime & Safety Report: Baghdad, 12 May 2020, url
473 Iraq Humanitarian Fund and iMMAP, Explosive Hazards Risk Level on Roads in Baghdad Governorate 01-30 April 2020, 6

May 2020, url
474 ISW, Al-Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent, The Breaking the Walls Campaign, Part I, Middle East Security Report 14, September
2013, url, p. 18
475 ISW, Warning Intelligence Update: Baghdad, 23 July 2014, url
476 ISW, The Battle for Baghdad: Scenarios, 13 June 2014, url
477 US, CRS, Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights, 02 July 2014, url, p. 19; ISW, Iraq Situation Report: July 24, 2014,24 July 2014, url; ISW, "ISIS in Iraq: Battle Plan for Baghdad" - Coming Soon! 27 June 2014, url; ISW, Iraq Situation Report:
June 15, 2014, 15 June 2014, url
478 Reuters, Dozens killed in car bombs across Baghdad, 08 June 2014, url; Reuters, Suicide bomber kills 16 people in
Baghdad's Shi'ite Sadr City, 11 June 2014, url; ISW, Iraq Situation Report: June 17, 2014, 17 June 2014, url; ISW, Iraq
Situation Report: June 26, 2014, 26 June 2014, url; ISW, Iraq Situation Report: July 14, 2014, 14 July 2014, url; ISW, Iraq
Situation Report: July 19, 2014, 19 July 2014, url
479 Washington Institute, Iranian Proxies Step Up Their Role in Iraq, 13 June 2014, url, p. 18
480 Netherlands, Ambtsbericht Veiligheidssituatie in Irak, 19 September 2014, url, pp. 45, 18
481 Daily Beast (The), Torched Baghdad Neighborhood Could Be Just the Beginning, 15 May 2015, url
482 New York Times (The), As Sunnis Die in Iraq, a Cycle Is Restarting, 17 June 2014, url; Washington Post (The), Sectariankillings return to Baghdad as war rages elsewhere, 29 June 2014, url; ISW, Iraq Situation Report: July 16, 2014, 16 July 2014,
url; HRW, Iraq: Pro-Government Militias’ Trail of Death, 31 July 2014, url; BBC News, Iraq: Shia militias 'killing Sunnis inreprisal attacks', 14 October 2014, url
483 Haddad, F., Comment made during the review of the 2019 EASO report, 18 January 2019, in: EASO, COI Report: Iraq Security situation, March 2019, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

According to ISW, ISIL stopped using VBIED/SVEST attacks on Baghdad for a few months in 2016, but
returned to using these tactics to attack Baghdad in April and May 2016. According to ISW, ISF had
successfully been blocking VBIEDs but due to political upheaval and overstretched security, theresurgence of ISIL’s successful use of VBIED/SVESTs in Baghdad facilitated 23 attacks by ISIL in themonth of 4 April to 11 May 2016, the attacks mainly targeting security forces and checkpoints, butalso markets, funerals, and pilgrims for example.484 Civilians and Shia pilgrims were targeted by ISIL,
leading to numbers of civilians being killed and wounded in Baghdad bombings in April 2016.485 In May
2016, ISIL detonated a large bomb in the Shia area, Sadr City, killing 52 people and injuring dozens ofpeople; Baquba, which is in Diyala, but also on the outskirts of the Baghdad belts was targeted by abomb that killed 10.486 ISIL carried out three simultaneous attacks in Baghdad on 11 May 2016, killing
93 civilians and injuring many others.487 In July 2016, 324 people were killed in the Karrada suicidebombing in Baghdad when ISIL blew up a truck bomb outside a shopping mall.488 According to Iraq
expert Joel Wing, using his own data in August 2017, ISIL continued to launch attacks from the rural
areas surrounding Baghdad, but incidents dropped from 12 daily incidents down to three.489 In 2017,
there were large numbers of attempted mass casualty incidents against markets and shops by ISIL in
Baghdad.490 For example, 35 people were killed in a car bomb attack on the Shia area of Sadr City in
January 2017; a car bomb outside the Al-Kindi hospital in Baghdad killed three people; and two suicidebombings in a market in Baghdad targeted Shia and left 28 people dead the same month.491 Mass
casualty attacks by ISIL dropped off significantly after the first quarter of 2018.492

Armed actors
Iraqi army, police
According to a report published by ISW in 2017, the units of the Iraqi Army in Baghdad were under
the lead of the Baghdad Operations Command (BOC), which is divided in two areas, the Karkh Area
Command and the Rusafa Area Command. The Prime Minister’s Special Forces Division (SFD) is
responsible for security in the International Zone and for protecting the Prime Minister. The SFD
answers to the Ministry of Defence through the BOC and the Joint Operations Command (JOC), andto the PM. They also have some responsibilities for securing areas of Baghdad, especially during Shia
pilgrimages.493
The Iraqi army presence in Baghdad is organised by the Rusafa (Eastern Baghdad) and Karkh (Western
Baghdad) areas of the BOC:

484 ISW, ISIS's Explosive Attacks in the Greater Baghdad Area: April 4-May 11, 2016, 11 May 2016, url
485 UNAMI, SRSG Kubiš Condemns Baghdad Suburb Terrorist Bombing: “A premeditated and Wanton Aggression” against

Civilians, 30 April 2016, url; UNAMI, SRSG Kubiš on Saydiyah Bombing: Iraqis should in one loud voice condemn targeting ofcivilians, particularly pilgrims, 03 May 2016, url
486 New Arab (The), Dozens killed in IS attack on Iraq's Sadr City, 11 May 2016, url
487 UN Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Terrorist Attacks in Baghdad, 12 May 2016, url
488 IBC, Another year of relentless violence in Iraq, 2016, url; New York Times (The), Major Islamic State Attacks in Baghdad,
15 October 2016, url
489 Wing, J., 1,459 Killed, 636 Wounded In Iraq July 2017, 03 August 2017, url; Wing, J., October 2018: Islamic State
Expanding Operations In Iraq, 2 November 2018, url
490 Chatelard, G. Email to EASO, 27 January 2019 in: EASO, COI Report: Iraq - Security situation, March 2019, url
491 BBC News, IS Conflict: Baghdad suicide car bomb blast kills 35, 2 January 2017, url
492 Chatelard, G. Email to EASO, 27 January 2019 in: EASO, COI Report: Iraq - Security situation, March 2019, url
493 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017 url, pp. 11-12, 14-16. The
information provided by this source is not fully updated, the localization of some of the units dates back to 2015, 2016 and
2017.

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation•

Karkh Area Command: 6th Iraqi Army Division, one of the units securing the western Baghdad
Belts. The 22nd, 24th and 54th Brigade are stationed north and north-west of the capital, the54th also in Mansour, central Baghdad. The 59th Brigade is situated north of Baghdad, inGarma, near Falluja, and also south of the capital. Unattributed units are active in the southwest of Baghdad, in Anbar governorate and in Kadhimiyah, north-west of the capital.494•

Rusafa Area Command: 9th Iraqi Army Armoured Division. This is the only armoured divisionof the Iraqi Army, therefore, it has a functional rather than a geographical area of
responsibility. The 9th IA Division is not stationed in Baghdad.495

On 7 April 2020, Rudaw reported that ‘Iraqi forces today took back control of the [Abu Ghraib] campinside the headquarters of the 6th Division of Iraqi forces in the capital Baghdad, which were used byInternational Coalition Forces (French) advisors’. The source added that ‘Abu Ghraib’s handover is thelatest in a quick succession of transfers of base control to the Iraqi armed forces in recent weeks’.496
The Federal Police (FP) under the Ministry of Interior are present in Baghdad through the 1 st FP
Division, securing the south-west, west, south-east, Canal Zone (east of the capital) of Baghdad;497 the
2nd FP Division, the only mechanised FP division for Baghdad security, occupied mostly by counterterrorism operations in Baghdad and the belts, securing pilgrimage routes, and law enforcement.498
The 4th FP Division covers southern Baghdad and areas south of the capital such as Karkh prison. 499
The 3rd brigade of the Emergency Response Division (ERD) is stationed west of Baghdad.500
Baghdad city and the suburbs are generally under the control of the authorities; however, in practice,authorities share defence and law enforcement roles with the Shia-dominated PMUs, leading to‘incomplete’ or overlapping control with these militias.501 ISW wrote in its December 2017 report on
Iraq’s battle orders:‘The BOC is responsible for security in both Baghdad and much of the Baghdad Belts thatsurround the capital. The BOC’s area of responsibility is a merger of the former Karkh andRusafa Operations Commands’ areas of responsibility. Iraqi Shi’a militias, including lethal
proxy militias and Sadrist loyalists, operate outside the BOC’s command and control. They
have conducted crimes and kidnappings with impunity, established bases and unilateralcontrol zones in northeastern and southern Baghdad, and even clashed with the ISF on rareoccasions. Meanwhile, the Prime Minister’s SFD, attached to the JOC [Joint Operations
Command], maintains security in the Green Zone and for critical infrastructure around
Baghdad. The BOC is nevertheless ordinarily one of the best-resourced of the ISF’s operationscommands. It is assessed to have the most frontline on-duty strength of all the operationscommands given its role in securing the capital.’502
The information about the Iraqi army and police above is as of 2017, and no more recent information
could be found.

494 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, pp. 14-16
495 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular MobilizationForces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, pp. 15-16
496 Rudaw, US-led coalition withdraws from sixth Iraqi military base, 7 April 2020, url
497 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular MobilizationForces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, pp. 15-16
498 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular MobilizationForces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, p. 25
499 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular MobilizationForces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, p. 25
500 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular MobilizationForces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, p. 27
501 Norway, Landinfo, Respons Irak: Militser i Bagdad [Militias in Baghdad], 15 September 2017, url, p. 1
502 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, p. 14

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Popular Mobilisation Units (PMUs)
Michael Knights observed that formally, the PMUs have no operational headquarters in Baghdad
governorate, however, in practice there are ‘substantial bases’ in Baghdad’s belts. Reportedly, Kataib
Hezbollah ‘has carved out an exclusive principality in Jurf as-Sakr, 40 kilometers southwest of
Baghdad’; Kataib Al-Imam Ali attempts to establish a base in southeastern Baghdad belts; and Asa’ib
Ahl Al-Haq is dominant in northern Baghdad belts. With regard to the city itself, the source stated that
PMUs ‘maintain local offices in numerous parts of Iraq for fundraising and recruitment’ with thehighest concentration of those offices being in Baghdad city. Additionally, the PMU militias in Baghdad
city ‘carved out zones of dominance: Palestine Street for Kata’ib Hezbollah, Sadr City for Saraya Salamand Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Badr and Kata’ib Al-Imam Ali for Karradah and Jadiriyah’ where those militias
tax business enterprises and real estate transactions.503 In a report published by Knights et al. in March
2020, the late Husham al-Hashimi stated that the PMU ‘comprises sixty-six predominantly Shia
subunits, forty-three Sunni tribal forces, and a dozen ethnically based minority units. Of those 121
subunits identified as Hashd formations, with registered Hashd personnel, fewer than sixty have been
allocated a unique numerical designator (i.e., a “brigade” number).’504
The independent news outlet, Iran Wire, published a map updated on 8 May 2020, which indicatedthat the following PMU groups maintained a presence in Baghdad city, and provided the total numberof fighters in Iraq and Syria for each group:•

Al-Khorasani Brigades – 3 000 fighters – Gherai'at, Al-Bayda’a, and Bo'aitha – Headquarter isin Karada.

•

Al-Salam Brigades – 7 000 fighters registered under the PMU and 20 000 fighters under Jaysh
Al-Mahdi (Mahdi Army) – headquarter is in Sadr City.

•

Al-Tayyar Al-Risali – 2 000 fighters – A502 and 9 Nissan in Baghdad.

•

Liwa Abu Fadl Al-Abbas – 2 500 fighters (mixed elements from Lebanese Hezbollah and Asa’ib
Ahl Al-Haq) – Safaraat and Al-Saadoon Park.

•

Kata’eb Al-Imam Ali – Al-Mutanabi.

•

Faylaq Badr (Badr Organisation) – 10 000 fighters – Mansour, Suwaib and Al-Rasheed.

•

Saraya Ashoura’a – 6 000 fighters – Abu Nuwas.

•

Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq – 15 000 fighters – Diyala River and Bab Al-Sham.

•

Kata’ib Jund Al-Imam – composed of several Brigades including 4 and 6 – Base Falcon.505

According to a Chatham House research paper published in September 2019, in Baghdad governorate,
the following PMU groups were present, alongside the ISF Tigris and Baghdad Operations Commands:
Brigades 1, 2, 4, 20, 22, 23, 24, 26, 28, 47, and 110.506 The International Institute for Strategic Studies(IISS) observed that ‘Iran-backed militias maintain at least some forces in predominantly Shia areas,

503 Michael Knights, Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, August 2019, url
504 Knights, M. et al., Honored, not contained, The future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, March 2020, url, p. 125
505 Iran Wire, ‫[ خريطة انتشار الميليشيات اإليرانية ف سوريا والعراق‬Map of Iran-backed Militias in Syria and Iraq], 8 May 2020, url‫ي‬

506 Chatham House, Between Order and Chaos: A New Approach to Stalled State Transformations in Iraq and Yemen,

September 2019, url, p. 8

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

especially in Baghdad, that could deploy quickly in the event of a crisis’. Reportedly, PMUs stockpiled
weapons in several areas, including in Baghdad.507
A report by Knights et al. from March 2020 noted that ‘another type of Hashd emerged in the 2014
period separate from al-Hashd al-Shabi: the Defense Hashd, which consisted of multiple minor groups
deploying primarily in the Baghdad belt areas and nominally affiliated with the Ministry of Defense’.508
According to the authors, the Defense Hashd provided ‘fifty-six platoonsize checkpoint units under
the operational control of the Defense Ministry–run Baghdad Operations Command, while receiving
training support from the ministry’s Baghdad Fighting School at Taji’. Moreover, supporters of the
PMU denigrated the Defense Hashd and the PMU Commission did not recognize it.509
On 17 July 2020, Congressional Research Service stated that a new group called Usbat Al-Tha’irien(League of the Revolutionaries) emerged in March 2020. According to the source, the new group ‘hasclaimed responsibility for actual and attempted attacks against U.S. targets, posting aerial surveillance
footage of key U.S. installations in Iraq’. According to Husham Al-Hashimi, the group seeks ‘to provoke
these [U.S.] troops into an uncalculated retaliation that causes killing of Iraqi security or military forces
or civilians. This way they can create public resentment against the foreign presence.’510
ISIL
Several sources reported on an increased ISIL activity in Baghdad in 2019-2020. A BBC article dated 23
December 2019 indicated that ISIL ‘is re-organising in Iraq, two years after losing the last of its territory
in the country’. The BBC quoted a top Kurdish counter-terrorism official who warned that ISIL ‘would
be nourished by the current unrest in the Iraqi capital, Baghdad, and would exploit the sense ofalienation among their fellow Sunni Muslims - a minority community.’511 Business Insider noted thatsince mid-2019, ISIL has been operating in rural areas including east and north of Baghdad.512 Musingson Iraq observed that in 2019, ISIL intended to return to the city and was even able to orchestrate
several bomb attacks, but then shifted its focus on the countryside.513
In May 2020, Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) stated that ISIL active attack cells existed in thefollowing areas of Baghdad governorate: Tarmiyah; Taji/Saab al-Bour; Abu Ghraib/Zaidon; theLatifiyah/ Yusufiyah/ Mahmudiyah triangle; Jurf al-Sakhr; and Jisr Diyala/Madain. The source addedthat the increase in ISIL activities around Baghdad ‘has manifested primarily in the northern andwestern’, with the northern belts falling under the group’s Shamal Al-Baghdad Wilayat. Reportedly,
this area ‘is a vital thoroughfare connecting a range of other geographic sub-sectors of the insurgency’and ‘seems to serve as hub for fighters and materiel flowing down the Euphrates River Valley (ERV)from Syria and pooling in the triangle between Hit, Fallujah/Karma, and the southern shores of Lake
Thar Thar.’514

507 IISS, Iran’s Networks of Influence - Chapter Four: Iraq, November 2019, url
508 Knights, M. et al., Honored, not contained, The future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, March 2020, url, p. 4
509 Knights, M. et al., Honored, not contained, The future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, March 2020, url, p. 125
510 Congressional Research Service, Iraq: Issues in the 116th Congress, 17 July 2020, url, p. 14
511 BBC, Isis in Iraq: Militants 'getting stronger again', 23 December 2019, url
512 Business Insider, ISIS is making a comeback, and Iraq's government may not be able to handle it, 7 June 2020, url
513 Wing, J., Islamic State’s Spring Offensive In Iraq Ends In June, 6 July 2020, url
514 Combating Terrorism Center, Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020,

20 May 2020, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

US-led Coalition forces
According to an Aljazeera article published on 8 January 2020, the US had 5 200 soldiers deployed invarious bases across Iraq. Two of those bases were in Baghdad, namely Taji to the north and Victory,
which is situated inside Baghdad International Airport. The latter, according to Aljazeera is used as acommand centre and for intelligence and control purposes.515 According to an article published on 6
July 2020 by Military Times, the US-led Coalition in Iraq is ‘adjusting their operating model as Iraqi
security forces step up their fight against ISIS’. Reportedly, Task Force Iraq, ‘a one-star subordinate
command of Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve’ is being transformed to the
Military Advisor Group which will have a central location in Baghdad.516 Al-Arab newspaper stated on
17 July 2020 that the US does not intend to leave Iraq; however, the reduction of the number of US
troops in Iraq is possible and is subject to consultations with Baghdad.517

2.3.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population
Developments 2019-2020
Iran-US tensions
One of the major security developments in Iraq in 2019 and 2020 was the rising tension between Iranand the US. On 29 December 2019, the New York Times reported on US airstrikes that targeted several
positions held by Kataib Hezbollah across Iraq in retaliation for an attack that killed one American
national.518 On 2 January 2020, Qassim Suleimani, the Commander of Al-Quds Forces of the Iranian
Republican Guard Corps (IRGC), and a number of Iran-backed militia officials, notably the Popular
Mobilisation Committee (PMC) Chief of Staff Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis, were killed in a US drone attackin Baghdad Airport.519 Reportedly, shortly after the attack, the Iraqi Council of Representatives voted‘to expel American forces from the country’.520 On 8 January 2020, the New York Times reported that
Iran retaliated by launching ‘more than 20 ballistic missiles at military bases in Iraq where American
troops are based’. None of those military bases were reported to be in Baghdad province.521 RadioFree Europe reported that on 24 January, thousands of Iraqis took to the streets of Baghdad andchanted slogans against the US in response to a call by the Shiite leader Muqtada Al-Sadr. Reportedly,
the demonstration was protected by Saraya As-Salam and other PMUs.522 According to ISW, on 29
February 2020, Kataib Hezbollah issued a ‘final warning’ to all Iraqis collaborating with the US,
including companies and governmental bodies.523 Moreover, on 13 March 2020, the New Arab
reported on the deployment of ISF in the Green Zone and the evacuation of militia bases in theneighbourhoods of Jadiriya, Karrada, Arsat, and Palestine Street in the wake of US airstrikes thattargeted PMU bases in Jurf Al-Sakhr in Babil governorate.524 The same source reported on 14 March

515 Al-Jazeera, ‫ خريطة انتشار القواعد العسكرية األميكية بالعراق‬..‫ جندي‬5200 ‫[ تضم‬Including 5 200 Soldiers.. Map of Locations of US‫ر‬
Military Bases in Iraq], 8 January 2020, url
516 Military Times, Anti-ISIS coalition — saying Iraqi security forces now effective — reducing personnel, shifting mission
focus, 6 July 2020, url
517 Al-Arab, ‫[ الواليات المتحدة تؤكد عدم نيتها سحب قواتها من العراق‬The US Reiterates Its Unwillingness to Withdraw Its Troops from
Iraq], 17 July 2020, url
518 New York Times (The), U.S. Launches Airstrikes on Iranian-Backed Forces in Iraq and Syria, 29 December 2019, url
519 New York Times (The), U.S. Strike in Iraq Kills Qassim Suleimani, Commander of Iranian Forces, 2 January 2020, url
520 New York Times (The), As U.S.-Iran Tensions Flare, Iraq Is Caught in the Middle, 10 January 2020, url
521 New York Times (The), Maps: How the Confrontation Between the U.S. and Iran Escalated, 8 January 2020, url
522 Radio Free Europe, Thousands Rally In Baghdad Against U.S. Military Presence, 24 January 2020, url
523 ISW, Iraq Situation Report: February 26 - March 3, 2020, 6 March 2020, url
524 New Arab (The), ‫[ انتشار أمن كثيف ف بغداد ومليشيات تخل مقراتها بعد ضبات أميكية‬Heavy Deployment of Security Forces in
‫ر‬
‫ي‬
‫ي‬
‫ي‬
Baghdad and Militias Evacuate Their Bases after US Airstrikes], 13 March 2020, url

75

EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situationthat 14 ‘Katyusha rockets’ hit Al-Taji military base to the north of Baghdad525, which resulted in threecasualties among US troops, two of which were in critical condition526. On 17 March 2020, a new group
designated Usbat Al-Tha’irien (League of the Revolutionaries) claimed responsibility for the 14 Marchattack, and two other attacks, on Al-Taji camp.527 This escalation saw about a one-month pause during
April 2020, before Iran-backed militias resumed their attacks and targeted US Army positions near
Baghdad Airport on 6 May 2020.528 The attacks continued in July 2020, and according to EPIC, threerockets hit Al-Taji military base on 27 July529 and two rockets struck Baghdad International Airport on
30 July 2020.530
In addition to the attacks mentioned above, ISW documented seven attacks that targeted the Green
Zone and some other neighbourhoods in Baghdad City between 8 January and 17 March 2020.
According to ISW, some of the rockets were launched from neighbourhoods in Baghdad such as AlAmanah, Zafaraniyah, and Arab Jabour. In the seven attacks, only one American national waswounded when three mortars hit the US embassy on 26 January 2020.531 Moreover, EPIC reported
that three rocket attacks targeted Baghdad’s Green Zone in June and July 2020, in one of which, achild was injured.532
The Washington Institute stated that on 3 June 2020, the Chairman of the Hashd Commission in thePrime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi’s office issued a memo signaling the ‘recommencement of “Hashd
reform”’. The changes proposed in the memo included the closure of some of the PMU offices in thecities and removing unit nomenclatures. However, according to the Washington Institute, the PMU
Commission is headquartered in Baghdad, and the new memo will help larger militias, including Kataib
Hezbollah to intimidate the government by ‘posting tactical units in sensitive locations (e.g., adjacentto the prime minister’s office, or even within the Republican Palace complex, a key site for government
meetings)’.533 Finally, on 25 June 2020, the Iraqi Prime Minister authorised a CTS operation into Kataib
Hezbollah’s building in Dora area, southern Baghdad, which led to the arrest of 14 of the group’s
members and the seizing of rockets. The 14 members were released later after Kataib Hezbollah
reportedly exercised pressure on the Prime Minister.534

Protest movement
Another development that took place in Iraq in 2019-2020 was large-scale demonstrations in several
cities, particularly Baghdad. A UN Security Council report dated 22 November 2019 stated that on 1
October 2019, protestors gathered in Tahrir Square in Baghdad calling for reforms. The demonstration
turned violent when the protestors attempted to cross to the International Zone. Reportedly, theprotests continued in Baghdad for the subsequent days before they spread to other governorates.535

ً
‫ر ر‬
‫ي‬
Troops Were Present Was Targeted with 14 Katyusha Rockets], 14 March 2020, url
526 New Arab (The), ‫ اثنان حالتهما حرجة‬...‫ جنود أميكيي بالهجوم عل التاج‬3 ‫[ البنتاغون يعلن إصابة‬The Pentagon Announced that Three
‫ر ر‬
‫ي‬
US Soldiers Were wounded in the Attack on Al-Taji Base, of Whom Two were in Critical Condition], 14 March 2020, url
527 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019), S/2020/363, 6 May 2020, url, para. 29
528 ISW, Iraq Situation Report: May 6-12, 2020, 15 May 2020, url
529 EPIC, ISHM: July 23 - July 30, 2020, 30 July 2020, url
530 EPIC, ISHM: July 30 - August 6, 2020, 6 August 2020, url
531 ISW, Iran’s Proxy Militias Continue to Escalate Against U.S. Personnel: January 3 – March 17, 2020, 20 March 2020, url
532 EPIC, ISHM: June 11 – June 18, 2020, 18 June 2020, url; EPIC, ISHM: July 2 - July 9, 2020, 9 July 2020, url; EPIC, ISHM: July
16 - July 23, 2020, 23 July 2020, url
533 Washington Institute, Hashd Reforms in Iraq Conceal More Than They Reveal, 9 June 2020, url
534 Aljazeera, ‫[ عناض حزب هللا العراف المفرج عنهم يستعرضون قوتهم ف بغداد‬Released Iraqi Hezbollah Members Display Power in‫ي‬‫ي‬
Baghdad], 30 June 2020, url; Warsaw Institute, Iraq: Security Sector Reform regarding paramilitary units, 9 July 2020, url
535 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019), S/2019/903, 22 November 2019, url, p. 1
525 New Arab (The), ‫ صاروخ كاتيوشا‬14‫ استهداف معسكر التاج الذي يضم جنودا أميكيي بـ‬:‫[ العراق‬Iraq: Al-Taji Military Camp in Which US

76

EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

An open-ended curfew was imposed by the Iraqi government on 3 October 2019.536 On 7 October
2019, Reuters reported on clashes between protestors and the ISF in Al-Sadr city that resulted in thedeath of 15 people. According to Reuters, ‘[t]he spread of the violence into Sadr City on Sunday nightposes a new security challenge for authorities dealing with the worst violence in the country since theIslamic State group was defeated nearly two years ago.’537 By the end of October 2019, the demandsof the protestors were expanded to include ‘political accountability for the loss of life, the resignationof the Government and electoral and constitutional reforms’.538 The HRW World report of 2019 statedthat ‘[c]lashes with security forces left at least 350 protesters dead in protests in Baghdad and Iraq’s
southern cities from early October to December’. Reportedly, security forces fired tear gas cartridges
and live munition directly at protestors in some cases.539 Amnesty International published a report on
23 January 2020 according to which, more than 600 protestors were killed since October 2019. The
report quoted activists who reported on the intentional use of live munition and ‘military-grade’ teargas to kill protestors.540 ISW stated that between 5 and 8 March 2020, three protestors were killed
and 44 wounded by ‘unidentified security forces’ in central Baghdad.541 Moreover, the UN Security
Council report published on 6 May 2020 indicated a decrease in the numbers of deaths and injuries
among protestors, partially due to the COVID-19 situation. The report added that during the reporting
period, 21 February – May 2020, ten protestors died and 367 injured in Baghdad .542 With regard to
the official reaction, former Iraqi Prime Minister Abdul Mahdi sent the CTS in late October 2019 to put
an end to the protests.543 Later, the PMU command issued firm instructions to its units on 7 December
2019 that all military tasks of the PMU should be under the Joint Operations Command and that nounits should be present in the vicinity of protest sites.544 On 26 May 2020, the new Iraqi Prime
Minister, Al-Kadhimi, pledged to investigate into reports of violence against protestors.545
A UNAMI report dated 23 May 2020 stated that there were cases of ‘abduction’ among people who
participated in demonstrations or provided support to demonstrators.546 According to the report, theincidents happened in the vicinity of the demonstration sites or on the route from/to home or work.
Moreover, the ‘abductees’ reported being blindfolded and brought to places of detention orinterrogation where they faced ‘allegations of support from/to foreign states, particularly the UnitedStates’. Additionally, the report observed that all male respondents ‘described being subjected tovarious acts amounting to torture and/or ill-treatment’ while female respondents ‘described being
beaten, threatened with rape and touched in ‘private areas’. In all but one case, those abducted
received no medical treatment during their abduction’.547

ISIL insurgency
Regarding ISIL, a UN Security Council report published in November 2019 observed that ‘[r]emnantsof Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) continued to launch frequent asymmetrical attacks against
the Iraqi people and security forces, particularly in Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninawa, and Salah
536 BBC, Iraq protests: Shots fired as demonstrators defy Baghdad curfew, 3 October 2019, url
537 Reuters, Death toll climbs as Iraq unrest hits Baghdad's volatile Sadr City, 7 October 2019, url
538 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019), S/2019/903, 22 November 2019, url, para. 11539 HRW, World Report 2019 – Iraq, 14 January 2020, url
540 AI, Iraq: Protest death toll surges as security forces resume brutal repression, 23 January 2020, url
541 ISW, Iraq Situation Report: March 4 - 10, 2020, 14 March 2020, url
542 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019) [S/2020/363], 6 May 2020, url, para. 58
543 Radio Free Europe, Iraqi PM Sends Counter-Terror Force To Put Down Street Protests, 27 October 2019, url
544 Sky News Arabic, ‫ تعليمات صارمة لميليشيات الحشد الشعن‬.."‫[ بعد "مجزرة بغداد‬Following the “Baghdad Massacre”.. Firm

‫ي‬
Instructions to PMU Militias], 7 December 2019, url
545 ISW, Iraq Situation Report: May 20 - 26, 2020, 30 May 2020, url
546 UNAMI, Demonstrations in Iraq: 3rd update, 23 May 2020, url, p. 3
547 UNAMI, Demonstrations in Iraq: 3rd update, 23 May 2020, url, p. 4

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

al-Din Governorates’.548 Musings on Iraq observed ‘a large surge in violence’ in April and May 2020.
The source added that preserving fighters has been ISIL’s priority since its defeat in Syria until April
when it ‘unleashed a slew of attacks which only grew in the following month eventually reaching 2018
levels’. With regard to Baghdad, the source stated that in 2019, ISIL intended to return to the city andwas even able to orchestrate several bomb attacks. However, the group seemed to have shifted its
focus to the countryside again as the number of attacks in Baghdad dropped significantly. According
to the source, ISIL conducted seven attacks in March 2020, zero in April 2020, 14 during its spring
campaign, and the number dropped to two in June 2020.549 Moreover, ISW observed that ISIL wasbuilding and expanding its support zone in the northern and southwestern Baghdad Belts.550
Combating Terrorism Center observed that ‘[i]n the first half of 2019, attacks [by ISIL] averaged 11.3
per month, in the second half 24.3 per month, and in Q1 2020, the average reached 35.3 per month’.
According to the source, ‘there has undoubtedly been a partial recovery of attack metrics in rural
Baghdad’, and ISIL’s primary focus in 2020 is ‘on security force targets as opposed to civilians’.551 The
Lead Inspector General of Operation Inherent Resolve reported that between 1 January and 31 March
2020, ‘Baghdad province experienced slightly more than 20 attacks … however many of these attacks
were unclaimed and resulted in few casualties’.552
On 8 February 2020, ISW stated that ISIL was likely responsible for five IED explosions that targeted
public areas in Baghdad.553 On 12 March 2020, ISW reported that ISIL was likely behind six IED attacks
that targeted areas in eastern, southern, and northern Baghdad and injured seven civilians.554 In areport published on 6 May 2020, the UN Security Council observed that ‘[r]emnants of ISIL continued
to launch frequent asymmetric attacks against the Iraqi people and security forces’ in several
provinces including Baghdad.555 According to Musings on Iraq, on 2 July 2020, the Iraqi Army launched
an anti-ISIL operation in Al-Tarmiya, to the north of Baghdad, where ISIL cells still exist.556 Asharq AlAwsat cited Mohammad Al-Karbouli, Iraqi MP and member of the parliamentary security and defense
committee, who denounced ‘the arbitrary arrest campaigns north of Baghdad’ and revealed that
‘more than 50 young men were seized in a humiliating way in front of their families’ alluding topossible sectarian dimensions.557 Finally, the National reported on the same operation, and observedthat it came in the aftermath of the increase in ISIL attacks in 2020.558
ISW reported that due to COVID-19 pandemic, European members of the US-led anti-ISIL Coalition
began to withdraw their troops from Iraq between 25 and 31 March 2020. Reportedly, France, theCzech Republic and Portugal announced complete withdrawals from Iraq, while the UK, theNetherlands, Spain, Italy and Germany announced partial withdrawals only. Moreover, on 25 March
2020, the USDOS ordered all US government employees in Iraq and the KRI to depart from Iraq due
to ‘poor security conditions and restricted travel options as a result of COVID-19’. Additionally, theIraqi Joint Operations Command deployed 40 military vehicles in Al-Sadr City to enforce the curfew559
548 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019), S/2019/903, 22 November 2019, url, p. 5
549 Wing, J., Islamic State’s Spring Offensive In Iraq Ends In June, 6 July 2020, url
550 ISW, ISIS Re-Establishes Iraqi Sanctuary, March 7, 2019, url
551 Combating Terrorism Center, Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020,

20 May 2020, url
552 USDOD (Department of Defense), Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve – Quarterly Report to theUnited States Congress – January 1, 2020-March 31, 2020, 3 May 2020, url, p. 23
553 ISW, Iraq Situation Report: February 7 - 12, 2020, 21 February 2020, url
554 ISW, Iraq Situation Report: March 11 - 17, 2020, 20 March 2020, url
555 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019) [S/2020/363], 6 May 2020, url, para. 24
556 Wing, J., Security In Iraq Jul 1-7, 2020, 9 July 2020, url
557 Asharq Al-Awsat, Iraq Finds Underground ISIS Training Camp, 4 July 2020, url
558 National (The), Iraqi military moves against ISIS north of Baghdad, 2 July 2020, url
559 ISW, Iraq Situation Report: March 25 - 31, 2020, 3 April 2020, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

imposed by the Iraqi government on 17 March 2020 in Baghdad.560 Furthermore, the UN Security
Council report of 6 May 2020 observed that protests were staged in Baghdad and several otherlocations against the economic impact of the measures imposed by the government to limit the spreadof the virus. Reportedly, 27 000 arrests for breaching the curfew were reported by the Baghdad
Operations Command.561

Illustrative security incidents•

On 10 May 2019, Radio Free Europe cited Iraqi security officials who stated that a suicidebomb attack took place in Sadr City in Baghdad and resulted in at least eight deaths and 15
injuries. The attack was claimed by ISIL.562•

According to the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees of Germany (BAMF), a suicide
attack targeted a liquor store in Baghdad on 13 June 2019. Reportedly, two civilians were
injured in the attack.563•

On 12 August 2019, a large explosion took place in the southern outskirts of Baghdad thattargeted ammunition depot of the PMU. Reportedly, the shrapnel caused by the explosion
damaged civilian housing nearby.564•

Radio Free Europe reported on 7 September 2019 that four bomb attacks targetedcommercial districts in the east, south, west, and centre of Baghdad and 14 people were
wounded.565•

On 26 November 2019, two motorcycle bombings and one IED hit the neighbourhoods of AlSha’ab, Bayaa, and Baladiyyat. At least, six people were killed in the unclaimed attacks.566•

On 20 January 2020, three French nationals and an Iraqi, who worked in a Christian charity,
were kidnapped in Baghdad. They were released on 27 March 2020.567•

ISW reported that on 8 February 2020, five IEDs exploded in public areas in Baghdad, including
Baghdad Jadida, Bayaa, Jokuk, Hurriya, and Qahira. According to the report, the attacks werelikely carried out by ISIL.568•

On 14 February 2020, six protestors were killed in Tahrir Square, one person in Yarmouk, andone body was found in Nahrawan.569•

According to ISW, on 22 February 2020, seven IED attacks, likely carried out by ISIL, wounded
13 people in Baghdad. The explosions took place in Al-Maalaf, Al-Shaab, Al-Habibi, Al-Mashtal,
Al-Zafaraniya and Al-Shula neighbourhoods.570

560 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019), S/2020/363, url, p. 2
561 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019), S/2020/363, 6 May 2020, url, p. 9
562 Radio Free Europe, At Least Eight People Killed In Suicide Bomb Attack On Baghdad Market, 10 May 2019, url
563 Germany, BAMF, Briefing Notes, 17 June 2019, url, p. 3
564 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019), S/2019/903, 22 November 2019, url, p. 6
565 Radio Free Europe, Baghdad Rocked By Explosions, 14 Wounded, 7 September 2019, url
566 Arab Week, ‫ قتل وجرج ف ثالثة انفجارات تهز بغداد‬:‫[ العراق‬Iraq: Deaths and Injuries in Three Explosions That Hit Baghdad], 27‫ي‬November 2019, url
567 BBC, French Christian charity workers kidnapped in Iraq are freed, 27 March 2020, url; Radio Free Europe, Four Workers
Of French Christian Charity Missing In Iraq, 25 January 2020, url
568 ISW, IRAQ SITUATION REPORT: FEBRUARY 7 - 12, 2020, 21 February 2020, url
569 IBC, Recent Events, n. d., url
570 ISW, Iraq Situation Report: February 20 - 25, 2020, 2 March 2020, url

79

EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation•

On 11 April 2020, two burned bodies were found in Karrada.571•

On 30 April 2020, ISIL militants targeted high voltage towers in the east of Baghdad and southof Baquba. According to EPIC, ‘[t]he attacks put 1,500 megawatts of power out of service,causing a drop in power supplied to six provinces’.572•

On 12 May 2020, three family members were killed in an armed attack that targeted a housein Abu Ghraib.573•

On 15 May 2020, the body of a young man who was previously kidnapped by ISIL was foundstabbed. On 14 May 2020, the body of a girl was found, bearing signs of torture and one
woman was stabbed in New Baghdad.574•

According to IBC, on 19 May 2020, one person was killed in an IED explosion in a minibus in
Mada’in and one body was found in Tigris, allegedly with marks of torture and shooting.575•

On 9 June 2020, two women were killed in a drive-by shooting in Al-Binak.576•

Two women were killed by gunmen in Baghdad on 9 June 2020, according to IBC.577•

According to IBC, on 17 June 2020, one person was killed in Ur, one person was stabbed in
Sadr City, and three bodies were found in unspecified locations in Baghdad.578•

IBC stated that a woman was killed by gunmen in Baghdad, on 24 June 2020.579•

On 6 July 2020, masked gunmen on motorcycles assassinated Husham al-Hashimi, the Iraqi
security analyst and advisor to the Iraqi President and Prime minister, in front of his house in
the Ziyouna neighbourhood in Baghdad. According to ISW, Kataib Hezbollah was likely
responsible.580•

On 24 July 2020, Al-Monitor reported that a German national who was abducted in Baghdad
was freed in an ISF operation.581

Number of civilian casualties
The number of armed conflict related incidents and civilian casualties in the governorate recorded
by UNAMI for the period 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, is shown in the table below.

571 IBC, Recent Events, n. d., url
572 EPIC, ISHM for April 23 - April 30, 2020, 30 April 2020, url
573 IBC, Recent Events, n. d., url
574 IBC, Recent Events, n. d., url
575 IBC, Recent Events, n. d., url
576 IBC, Recent Events, n. d., url
577 IBC, Recent Events, n. d., url
578 IBC, Recent Events, n. d., url
579 IBC, Recent Events, n. d., url
580 ISW, Iraq Situation Report: July 1 - 7, 2020, 10 July 2020, url; Warsaw Institute, Iraq: Security Sector Reform regarding

paramilitary units, 9 July 2020, url; Radio Free Europe, Prominent Iraqi Analyst Shot Dead After Pro-Iran Militia Threats, 7
July 2020, url
581 Al-Monitor, German woman kidnapped in Baghdad freed in Iraqi operation, 24 July 2020, url

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Governorate

2019 (Jan – Dec)

2019 total 2020 (Jan – Jul)
2020 total
casualties
casualties#of Killed Injured#of Killed Injured(killed and incidents(killed andincidents
injured)injured)Baghdad 42

37

13

50

4

3

5

8

Table 7: Number of armed conflict related incidents and civilian casualties 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, Baghdad
governorate.582

Number of security incidents
In the reference period, ACLED reported 42 battles, 163 incidents of remote violence/explosions, 81
cases of violence against civilians, 107 incidents of riots, accounting for a total of 393 security incidentsof these types in Baghdad governorate, the majority taking place in the capital Baghdad City. 130
protests were also reported in Baghdad governorate during the reference period. 583 The evolution of
all the types of security events through the reference period is shown in the figure below.

Figure 10: Evolution of security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence, violence against civilians, riots and protests
in Baghdad governorate 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, based on ACLED data.584

State ability to secure law and orderMore information on the capacities of the Iraqi forces and the forces under the KRG as actors ofprotection, including the ability to secure law and order, as well as information on the integrity ofarmed forces, please see the report EASO COI Report – Iraq: Actors of Protection (2018).

582 UNAMI, Email to EASO, 24 July 2020
583 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url
584 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

The Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) observed that in Baghdad, ‘organized crime,
uncontrolled militia activity, and corruption remain formidable obstacles to free enterprise andbusiness’. The report made reference to the threat Shia Militia Groups posed to US nationals, but also
to Iraqi civilians. It also maintained that those militia groups ‘use low-yield and crude IEDs in Baghdad
city to intimidate and extort small business owners in protection rackets’. With regard to ISIL, OSAC
stated that USDOS ‘has assessed Baghdad as being a CRITICAL-threat location for terrorism directed
at or affecting official U.S. government interests’. Furthermore, militias and criminal groups in
Baghdad engaged in kidnapping of individuals for political or monetary gain.585
With regard to the ISF’s ability to secure order, OSAC stated that when protestors attempted to crossthe Sinak Bridge to the International Zone, the ISF managed to push them back to the eastern side of
the Tigris. 586 AP reported on 7 October 2019 that following violent clashes between the Iraqi Armyand protestors in Sadr City, the Iraqi Prime Minister ordered the Iraqi Police to replace the army inorder to de-escalate the situation.587 Furthermore, OSAC noted that the ISF had ‘a limited ability torespond to security incidents, terrorist attacks, and criminal activities’. There are numerous
permanent checkpoints as well as temporary ones across the city.588

Infrastructure damage and explosive remnants of war
The US Central Command reported on the discovery and destruction of ISIL ammunition caches indifferent areas in Iraq, including Baghdad governorate. A weapon cache was discovered in AlMikaitimat area, Al-Yusifiya sub-district on 28 June 2020.589 Moreover, Counter IED Report stated thaton 26 July 2020, a weapon depot belonging to the Iraqi FP, and located in the southern outskirts of
Baghdad, exploded due to heat. Reportedly, one person was killed and 29 injured.590 Additionally, on
22 July 2020, the ISF ‘located a cache of ammunition containing a number of mortar rounds’ in thewest of Baghdad and on 28 July, explosive devices were located in Al-Nabai’i desert to the north of
Baghdad.591
IOM stated in 2017 that ‘Infrastructure damage is consistent with the country average in all sectors
except roads, which appear to have suffered the greatest damage (roads were destroyed in locations
hosting 7% of the IDP and resident population and are not efficient for 53% of the population), in
particular in the districts of Abu Ghraib and Mahmoudiya.’ Moreover, electricity and tap water
networks were destroyed or not properly functioning ‘for over half of the IDPs and returnees.592
According to Reuters, power outages were however commonplace.593 The damage to the housing
stock in the governorate of Baghdad was estimated to amount to IQD 337.5 billion(EUR 239.3 million).594 Significant residential damage was mainly reported in Abu Ghraib (3 %) andMahmoudiya (7 %) areas.595 IOM also noted that in Baghdad, 13 994 households returned to non-

585 OSAC, Iraq 2020 Crime & Safety Report: Baghdad, 12 May 2020, url
586 OSAC, Iraq 2020 Crime & Safety Report: Baghdad, 12 May 2020, url
587 AP, Iraqi police replacing army in volatile Baghdad neighborhood, 7 October 2019, url
588 OSAC, Iraq 2020 Crime & Safety Report: Baghdad, 12 May 2020, url
589 US, CJTF-OIR, Defeating Daesh Highlights of the Week, 1 July 2020, url
590 Counter IED Report, Explosion hits southern Baghdad weapons depot, blamed on heat, 26 July 2020, url
591 US, CJTF-OIR, Defeating Daesh Highlights of the Week, July 29, 2020, url
592 IOM, Iraq Displacement Tracking Matrix, Integrated Location Assessment II, Governorate Profiles, October 2017, url, p.

6
593 Reuters, As Baghdad life improves, some still seek refuge in its past, url
594 World Bank, Iraq reconstruction & investment part 2 Damage and Needs Assessment of Affected Governorates, January

2018, url, p. 16
595 IOM, Iraq Displacement Tracking Matrix, Integrated Location Assessment II, Governorate Profiles, October 2017, url, p.
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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

critical shelters compared to 1 044 who returned to critical shelters, i.e. uninhabitable buildings,
informal settlements, and abandoned, religious or school buildings.596
During the preparation of this report, no information on explosive remnants of war or unexploded
ordnance, pertinent to Baghdad governorate, was found.

Displacement and return
According to IOM’s DTM, as of 30 June 2020, there were 35 034 IDPs in Baghdad, originating from
Anbar (18 102), Babil (4 812), Baghdad (348), Diyala (858), Kirkuk (108), Ninewa (7 992), and Salah alDin (2 814) governorates.597 The DTM stated that there were 38 766 IDPs in Iraq who originated from
Baghdad governorate, of which 348 were displaced within the governorate.598 The three main districtsof displacement were Karkh (10 284), Abu Ghraib (6 846), and Mahmoudiya (4 944).599 An IOM reportpublished in February 2020, and covering the period March 2018 – December 2019, identified 292
locations in Iraq in which secondary displacement occurred, of which 18 were in Baghdad.600
Furthermore, 161 households in Mahmoudiya and 150 in Abu Ghraib were re-displaced.601
With regard to returns, DTM recorded the return of 90 228 IDPs to Baghdad, while 38 766 were still
displaced.602 Of those, 49 116 returned from Mahmoudiya, 23 112 from Abu Ghraib, 10 236 from
Tarmia, and 7 764 from Kadhimiya.603
UNHCR observed that as of November 2019, persons from areas recaptured from ISIL, particularly
Sunni Arabs, did not need a sponsor to enter Baghdad. However, to obtain residency in Baghdad, such
persons were required to have two sponsors from the neighborhood in which they intended to stayin addition to a letter from the Mukhtar.604

596 IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Iraq: Returnees Master List – Round 115, 12 June 2020, url, Tab ‘Shelter Type by

Gov of Return’
597 IOM Iraq, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Displacement Overview, 15 June 2020, url
598 IOM Iraq, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Displacement Timeline, 15 June 2020, url
599 IOM Iraq, Displacement Tracking Matrix, IRAQ MASTER LIST REPORT 116: May – June 2020, 16 July 2020, url, p. 3
600 IOM Iraq, RE-DISPLACED: AN EXPLORATION OF DISPLACEMENT AFTER ATTEMPTED RETURN IN IRAQ, February 2020, url,
p. 5
601 IOM Iraq, RE-DISPLACED: AN EXPLORATION OF DISPLACEMENT AFTER ATTEMPTED RETURN IN IRAQ, February 2020, url,
p. 7
602 IOM Iraq, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Return Overview, 15 June 2020, url
603 IOM Iraq, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Returnees by Governorate and District, 15 June 2020, url
604 UNHCR, Iraq: Country of Origin Information on Access and Residency Requirements in Iraq (Update I), November 2019,url, p. 2
doi:

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2.4 Diyala

Map 9: Diyala governorate with district borders, district capitals and main roads, © United Nations.605

2.4.1 General description of the governorate
Basic geography
Diyala province is located in the central-eastern part of Iraq and has borders with Sulaymaniyah, Salah
al-Din, Baghdad and Wassit provinces and an international border with Iran. The governorate isdivided into six districts: Baquba, Baladrooz, Khalis, Khanaqin, Kifri and Muqdadiya. Baqubah city is
the capital of the governorate.606 The district of the disputed Khaniqin (also written as Khaniqin)
includes the sub-districts of Jalawla, Saadiya and Qara Tapa.607

Population
Diyala governorate has an estimated population of 1 680 328 inhabitants as of 2019.608

605 UN JAU, Iraq District Map, January 2014, url
606 UNOCHA, Diyala Governorate Profile, March 2009, url, p. 1
607 ICG, Reviving UN Mediation on Iraq’s Disputed Internal Boundaries, 14 December 2018, url, p. 14
608 Iraq, CSO, Population indicators and population estimates, n.d., url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Ethnicity
Diyala has a diverse ethnic and religious population. Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmens make up the majorityof the population, each including the Sunni and Shi’a sects of Islam. Other ethnic and religious groups
residing in the governorate include Christians, Yezidis and Ahl al-Haqq (a religious group with roots in
Shi’a Islam). Among the Kurdish population is also the community of Faili (also written as Feili, Fayli oror Feily) Kurds, who are predominantly Shi’a Muslims.609
The Juburi and the Tamimi tribes are the biggest and most influential tribes in the governorate. 610
Other important tribes in Diyala are the al-Assadi, the Atighi and the Salhi.611 The (Pro-KRG) Shia Kurds
constitute the largest portion of the population in the city of Khanaqin.612

Road security
The districts in Diyala which are disputed by the KRG and the central government are Khanaqin, Kifri
and the sub-district Mandali, situated in Baladrooz district.613
The highways Baghdad–Tehran and Baghdad–Kirkuk–Erbil–Mosul pass through Diyala. Diyala has
particularly good connections with Baghdad, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah.614 Whilst the road network ofDiyala is in bad condition and suffered further damage in the context of the battle against ISIL, themain road Baghdad–Baquba did not sustain any major damage and is in good condition.615
During the first half of 2020 iMMAP designates stretches of the road from Baquba to Khanaqin as a
primary risk road, other parts of the same road have qualified as a secondary risk road. Stretches of
the road leading from Khanaqin to Kalar have also been designated as primary and secondary riskroads. Parts of the road leading from Baquba to Baladrooz have been designated as primary risk road,as have parts of the road leading from Khalis to Kifri at times.616 In 2019, the same roads were
designated as primary risk roads.617 Between January and December 2019, a number of explosive
hazard incidents were reported In Diyala, especially on the road from Baquba to Khanaqin.618 In

609 NCCI, Diyala Governorate Profile, January 2016, url, p. 2; Minority Rights Group International, Iraq, Faili Kurds,

November 2017, url
610 US Army, Tamimi, Jibouri tribes uphold reconciliation in Diyala, 29 October 2007, url; New York Times (The), Wary tribal
alliances, born of necessity, offer hope in Iraq, 6 October 2014, url; LADP, Provincial response plan Diyala governorate,
February 2018, url, p. 27
611 LADP, Provincial response plan Diyala governorate, February 2018, url, p. 27
612 Saleem, Z.et al., Security and Governance in the Disputed Territories Under a Fractured GOI, November 2018, url
613 Kane, S., Iraq’s disputed territories: a view of the political horizon and implications for U.S. policy, United States Instituteof Peace, 2011, url, p. 35; EPIC, ISHM, ISHM reference guide, last revision: May 2020, url
614 LADP, Provincial response plan Diyala governorate, February 2018, url, p. 15
615 LADP, Provincial response plan Diyala governorate, February 2018, url, p. 61
616 iMMAP, iMMAP-IHF, Humanitarian Access Response: Explosive Hazards Risk Level on Roads in Diyala Governorate 01-30
June 2020, 5 July 2020, url; iMMAP, iMMAP-IHF, Humanitarian Access Response: Explosive Hazards Risk Level on Roads inDiyala Governorate (01-31 May 2020), 7 June 2020, url; iMMAP, iMMAP-IHF, Humanitarian Access Response: Explosive
Hazards Risk Level on Roads in Diyala Governorate 01-30 April 2020, 6 May 2020, url; iMMAP, iMMAP-IHF, HumanitarianAccess Response: Explosive Hazards Risk Level on Roads in Diyala Governorate 01-31 March 2020, 6 April 2020, url;
iMMAP, iMMAP-IHF, Humanitarian Access Response: Explosive Hazards Risk Level on Roads in Diyala Governorate 01-29
February 2020, 4 March 2020, url; iMMAP, iMMAP-IHF, Humanitarian Access Response: Explosive Hazards Risk Level on
Roads in Diyala Governorate 01-31 January 2020, 5 February 2020, url
617 iMMAP, iMMAP-IHF, Humanitarian Access Response: Explosive Hazards Risk Level on Roads in Diyala Governorate fromJanuary to December 2019, 12 January 2020, url
618 iMMAP, iMMAP-IHF Humanitarian Access Response: Explosive Hazard Incidents in Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala, Erbil, Kirkuk,
Ninewa and Salah Al-Din Governorates from January to December 2019’, 12 January 2020, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Jalawla, Khanaqin district, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) operates checkpoints on commercially strategic
roads and imposes taxes on passing vehicles.619

EconomyDiyala province is a key gateway for Iranian-Iraqi trade.620 Khanaqin district, rich in oil, deploys an oil
field and an oil refinery.621 It is ‘strategically important for commercial, security and political reasons’and produces major oil revenues via two border crossings with Iran, the Mounzariah and Paruezkhan
crossings.622

2.4.2 Conflict background and armed actors
Conflict background
Diyala has been described as an ‘ethno-sectarian microcosm for security dynamics’ for the whole of
Iraq.623 Its mixed ethnic-religious population and proximity to Baghdad and Iran made it ‘a crucial prizein the sectarian struggle engulfing Iraq’ and it ‘became a battleground of Shia and Sunni factions who
vied for power’.624 The governorate is known to have hosted extremist insurgents in Iraq since 2004.625
The governorate’s proximity to Baghdad as well as to the Iranian border made it a priority for the Iraqi
government and the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilisation Units (PMU) to control the region.626
Diyala is one of Iraq’s governorates most affected by the 2013-2014 ISIL invasion.627 ISIL’s advances inDiyala in 2014 prompted many tribal leaders, such as from the Aza, Obeidi and Juburi tribes, angered
and humiliated by the atrocities committed by ISIL, to broker ad hoc allegiances to support the ISF in
the fight against ISIL.628 The Karawi ( or Kerwi /Kerwei), a large Arab tribe in the area of Jalawla,
pledged loyalty to ISIL.629 ISIL managed to occupy large areas in the north of the governorate including
Saadiyah and Jalawla during its offensive.630
Diyala was declared entirely freed of Islamic State control in January 2015, after an occupation of
approximately six months that led to thousands of its inhabitants being displaced.631 The Combined
Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR), cited by USDOD, reported that ‘Diyala, which
has one of the largest concentrations of Iranian aligned militias, is also the largest focus of attacks by
ISIS within Iraq.’632 USDOD added that ‘Since the fall of ISIS’s territorial caliphate in March 2019, Diyala

619 Saleem, A.Z. et al., Security and governance in the disputed territories under a fractured GOI, 6 December 2018, url
620 ICG, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018, url, p. 15
621 LADP, Provincial response plan Diyala governorate, February 2018, url, p. 43
622 Skelton, M. & Saleem, Z., Iraq’s disputed internal boundaries after ISIS, February 2019, url, p. 11
623 Flood, D., From Caliphates to Caves: The Islamic State’s Asymmetric War in Northern Iraq, September 2018, url, p. 36
624 LADP, Provincial response plan Diyala governorate, February 2018, url, p. 22
625 Niqash, New frenemies: Extremists return to Diyala, to reunite with old allies, Al Qaeda, 27 April 2017, url
626 Flood, D., From Caliphates to Caves: The Islamic State’s Asymmetric War in Northern Iraq, September 2018, url, p. 32
627 LADP, Provincial response plan Diyala governorate, February 2018, url, p. 23
628 New York Times (The), Wary tribal alliances, born of necessity, offer hope in Iraq, 6 October 2014, url
629 BBC News, Islamic State Crisis: How Jalawla became a changed town, 15 December 2014, url

Knights, M., Losing Mosul, Regenerating in Diyala: How the Islamic State Could Exploit Iraq’s Sectarian Tinderbox, October
2016, url, p.4
630 NCCI, Diyala Governorate Profile, January 2016, url, pp. 3-4
631 Flood, D., From Caliphates to Caves: The Islamic State’s Asymmetric War in Northern Iraq, September 2018, url, p. 32;
NCCI, Diyala Governorate Profile, January 2016, url, p. 4.
632 USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve – Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 1,
2019-October 25, 2019, 19 November 2019, url; USDOD, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress – January 1, 2020March 31, 2020, 13 May 2020, url, p. 26

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province northeast of Baghdad has consistently seen the highest concentration of ISIS attacks in the
OIR [Operation Inherent Resolve] battlespace’. 633
An international NGO working in Iraq interviewed in April 2018 by the Danish Immigration Service(DIS)/Landinfo characterized Diyala’s security situation as ‘a real hodgepodge: ‘you have armed groups
whose dynamics predate 2014 because ISIL never controlled the area long enough to influence theunderlying trends. You also have protracted communal conflicts that are geographical, ethnic, andsectarian. Lastly, you have PMU competition over access to resources and rents.’634

Armed actors
Iraqi Security Forces
Dijla Operations Command (DOC)
Diyala governorate falls under the Dijla Operations Command (DOC), which includes all of Diyala
governorate635, eastern Salah al-Din and its ethnically mixed town of Tuz Khurmatu, as well as the
Hamrin Mountains. Diyala is ‘a vital military and economic entry point for Iran into Iraq’, and a priority
area for Iran and the brigades of Badr Organisation. In 2017, ISW reported that the 5th Army Divisionin Diyala was more responsive to Badr Organisation than to the Iraqi government and operated as anextension of the organisation.636
The ISF struggle to maintain territorial control in regions where ISIL continues to be supported by the
local population. In addition, the ISF's operations in Diyala are being restricted due to the proximity ofthe border with Iran. 637 The 5th Iraqi Army Division remains present in Diyala638, its soldiers continue
to be a target of ISIL attacks.639
Border Guards Command
In 2017, the Border Guards Command in Diyala operated under the 3rd border region which covers the
Diyala –Wassit border with Iran. 640 In August 2019, the Iraqi authorities in Diyala closed the Iran-Iraq
border crossing at Mandali, as drugs and weapons were being smuggled into the country via thisroute.641 The border was opened in December 2019, after the border staff had been provided with‘the necessary equipment to prevent the violations that had been taking place before’.642 The border633USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve –Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 1,2020 – June 30, 2020, url, p. 24
634 Denmark, DIS (Danish Immigration Service)/Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internallydisplaced persons (IDPs) in the disputed areas, incl. possibility to enter and access the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), 5
November 2018, url, p. 43
635 Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: from abandoned villages to the cities, 5 May 2020, url
636 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, p. 17
637USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve – Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 1,
2019-October 25, 2019, 19 November 2019, url, p.10
638 Al-Monitor, Islamic State conducts attacks near Iraq’s Syrian and Iranian borders, 28 April 2020, url
639 Rudaw, ISIS militants kill 5 Iraqi soldiers in Diyala attacks, 16 December 2019, url; EPIC, ISHM: April 16-April 23, 2020, 23
April 2020, url; EPIC, ISHM: December 12 – December 19, 2019, 19 December 2019, url; BBC News, IS militants step up
attacks on Iraqi security forces, 5 May 2020, url; Kurdistan 24, ISIS launches attacks on Iraqi army, PMF basis in Iraq’s
Diyala: security, 10 March 2020, url; Middle East Monitor, Iraq soldier killed, 5 wounded in Daesh attack in Diyala, 21 April
2020, url; Iraqi News, Two Iraqi soldiers killed in armed attack on army checkpoint Diyala, 27 August 2019, url
640 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, p. 27
641 Hasan, H., Boundary disputes, 26 September 2019, url. See also OXFAM, Protection Landscapes in Diyala and Kirkuk,
Iraq, March 2020, url, p. 20
642 Kurdistan24, Iraq reopens a border crossing with Iran after five-months closure, 23 December 2019, url

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with Iran was temporarily closed again on 20 February 2020, due to a COVID-19 outbreak.643 The
border was opened again on 27 July 2020.644

PMU forces
The Popular Mobilisation Units (PMU or PMF) Diyala Operations Command is led by Talib al-Musawi,
a commander of the Badr Organisation.645 Based at Camp Ashraf, it exercises operational control over
PMF Brigades 4, 23, 24, and 110 (all Badr formations)—plus Liwa al-Taff (Brigade 20).646 Particularly insouthern Diyala, the Badr Organisation remains the dominant Shia militia, the ‘first among equals’.
PMU brigades 4, 20, 23, and 24 are all under Badr Organisation leader al-Ameri’s command and arealmost all focused on southern Diyala and the adjacent Jallam Desert.647 Hashd Brigade 110 and Liwa
al-Taff (Brigade 20) are mainly based in the Khanaqin area.648 PMU-brigade 110 belongs to Badr
Organisation and consists of Faili Kurds.649 Liwa al-Taff (Brigade 20) is led by Hashim Ahmad al-Tamimi.
It is an independent militia that split off from the al-Abbas Combat Division and its fighters are said tobe Sistani loyalists.650 Northern Diyala has increasingly become an area of operations for Asa’ib Ahl alHaq (AAH).651 AAH forces operating in northern Diyala do not seem to be under the operational controlof the PMU Diyala Operations Command.652 In northeastern Diyala AAH is present in Jalawla,
constructing local Sunni-manned militias from the Kerwi (or Karawi653) tribe.654 In Abu Sayda, AAH
militiamen have unsuccessfully contested Badr’s control of the town.655
Activists of the Kaka’i minority in Diyala reported harassment and discrimination by the PMU.656
PMUs are reportedly particularly strong in Diyala. The Badr Organisation, which has control over theprovincial council, is considered to be the main security actor.657 An Iraq analyst interviewed during
the April 2018 DIS/Landinfo FFM to KRI noted that PMUs were still present in areas liberated from
ISIL, including Diyala. The same source further stated that Kataib Hezbollah (KH, one of the Iran-backed
PMUs) ‘operates in secret ways in Diyala and in Southern Iraq, including Basra’. 658
In a May 2020 report Husham Al-Hashimi noted the presence of PMUs in the Al-Udhaym area ofnortheast Al-Saadiya, areas Khanaqin, Mansuriya, Diyala, Muqdadiyah, Khana, Mountain and Naft,
Mandali, Hamrin, East Diyala as of December 2019.659 USDOD, In its Lead Inspector General Reportcovering the second quarter of 2020, reported that the PMU has ‘outsized influence relative to the

643 Garda, Iraq: Border crossings with Iran temporarily closed amid COVID-19 outbreak February 20 update 1, 20 February

2020, url
644 Iran, Iraq resume trade via Mandali border, 27 July 2020, url
645 Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, 13 August 2019, url, p. 5
646 Knights, M., et al., Honored, not contained, The future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, March 2020, url, p. 41
647 Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, 13 August 2019, url, p. 5
648 Knights, M., et al., Honored, not contained, The future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, March 2020, url, p. 42
649 Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, 13 August 2019, url, p. 5
650 Knights, M., et al., Honored, not contained, The future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, March 2020, url, p. 205
651 Knights, M., et al., Honored, not contained, The future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, March 2020, url, p. 131
652 Knights, M., et al., Honored, not contained, The future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, March 2020, url, p. 42
653 Saleem, Z. et al., Security and Governance in the Disputed Territories Under a Fractured GOI, November 2018, url
654 Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, 13 August 2019, url, p. 5
655 Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, 13 August 2019, url, p. 5
656 US, USDOS, 2019 Report on International Religious Freedom: Iraq, 10 June 2020, url
657 ICG, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, July 2018, url, pp. 15, 17
658 Denmark, DIS/Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in thedisputed areas, incl. possibility to enter and access the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), 5 November 2018, url, pp. 45, 48
659 Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: from abandoned villages to the cities, 5 May 2020, url

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ISF’.660 The source further described that PMUs conduct counter-ISIL operations, drone surveillance,
raids, clearing operations and man checkpoints, but also engage in extortion, detaining Sunnis on falsechanges and weapon smuggling from Iran, ‘exacerbating sectarian tensions’. 661
However, in May 2020, it was reported that KH is losing influence in Iraq, five months after the deathof its leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. The Iraqi government has undertaken steps to ‘more fully
integrate some Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) factions into government chains of command andstructures that existed prior to 2014.’ In April 2020, it was announced that four ‘shrine units’ loyal toGrand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani (amongst others, Liwa Ali al-Akbar) would be placed directly under the
PM’s control, in a bid to reduce Iranian and KH’s influence on Iraq’s security situation.662

Tribal Mobilization Forces (TMF, Hashd al-Asha’iri)
The Hashd al-Asha’iri (or Ashayari) are an Arab Sunni militia, backed and armed by the Ministry of
Defense; it was created in 2014 to defend and secure the northern Diyala area.663 In a March 2019
interview Abdul Khaliq Al-Azzawi, a member of the Defense Committee in the Iraqi parliament from
Diyala, stated that tribal mobilization forces are better organised in Kirkuk, Salah al-Din and Anbar
than in Diyala. In Diyala they number 3 500 armed men, serving without pay.664 Tribal Mobilization
Forces are involved in direct confrontations with ISIL. On 3 May 2020, for instance, five Tribal
Mobilization fighters were killed in clashes with ISIL militants in the village of Umm al-Karami, in northwestern Diyala.665

Kurdistan Regional Government Security Forces
In October 2017, after the Kurdish withdrawal, the Iraqi forces took control of the district of Khanaqin
and the subdistrict of Jalawla, some of the disputed territories of Diyala province.666 In December
2019, Kurdish Peshmerga forces reportedly carried out large-scale combing and reconnaissance
operations in villages and lands in Khanaqin, al-Saadiya, Jalawla and Qara Tapa.667 In a May 2020
report, Husham Al-Hashimi noted the presence of ‘PKK and affiliates’ in the Jalawla area.668 In June
2020, Peshmerga Forces participated in the military campaign Operation Heroes of Iraq, targeting ISIL
cells in Kirkuk, Diyala and Salah al-Din. In July 2020, phase four of Operation Heroes of Iraq was
launched in Diyala. ISF and Peshmerga forces together reportedly searched at least 53 villages overthe first three days.669 This cooperation is not without tensions, however, as the Peshmerga are‘fearing Baghdad’s forces’ intentions’. The PUK remains in control in Kifri.670 The Paruezkhan (Parvis
Khan) border crossing has been under KRG control for a long time.671

660 USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve – Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April

1, 2020 – June 30, 2020, url, p.23
661 USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve – Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April
1, 2020 – June 30, 2020, url, p.25
662 Foreign Policy, A Powerful Iran-Backed Militia Is Losing Influence in Iraq, 11 May 2020, url
663 Iraqi Center for Policy Analysis and Research, Sunni Arabs’ grievances in post-ISIS Iraq, 30 March 2019, url
664 Iraqi Center for Policy Analysis and Research, Sunni Arabs’ grievances in post-ISIS Iraq, 30 March 2019, url
665 BBC News, IS militants step up attacks on Iraqi security forces, 5 May 2020, url
666 BBC News, Iraq takes disputed areas as Kurds ‘withdraw to 2014 lines’, 18 October 2017, url
667 Diyaruna, Peshmerga forces crack down on ISIS in central Iraq, 17 December 2019, url
668 Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: from abandoned villages to the cities, 5 May 2020, url
669 ISW, Iraq situation report: July 8-14, 2020, 17 July 2020, url; Kirkuk Now, Iraqi forces and Peshmerga set up 10 military
outposts in disputed areas, 15 July 2020, url
670 Kirkuk Now, Peshmerga in Kifri: Iraqi forces have bad intentions and we will take a stance, 14 July 2020, url
671 Saleem, A.Z. et al., Security and governance in the disputed territories under a fractured GOI, 6 December 2018, url

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ISIL
Security forces pushed ISIL back from Diyala in 2015, but after the group’s defeat in central Iraq in
2017, many ISIL fighters reportedly re-established contacts with former allies inside the Diyala
governorate.672 In 2019 and early 2020, Diyala has become ISIL’s most active wilayat (province).673
Operating from its rural bastions along the Diyala River Valley, the Iranian border, and the provincial
border with Salah al-Din674 ISIL wages its insurgency through roadside bombings, attacks on security
forces checkpoints and sniping attacks.675 Targeting Kurds, Shia, and uncooperative Sunni tribes, ISIL
uses ‘ethnic or sectarian cleansing activities’ on a scale not seen in other provinces. Mortar shells are
regularly fired on Shia, Kurdish, and Kaka’i676 villages, houses and crops are burned, machinery is
destroyed, electricity lines are dropped, and livestock is slaughtered, resulting in the evacuation ofvillages in the Mukhisa, Abu Saida, Muqdadiyah, Khanaqin, and Mutabijah areas.677
In a March 2019 interview Abdul Khaliq Al-Azzawi, a member of the Defense Committee in the Iraqi
parliament from Diyala, stated ISIL is operating in rural areas like Nada Plain (south of Khanaqin), Zore
(between Al-Muqdadiya and the Hamrin Mountains), the Hamrin Mountains and Auzem.
ISIL attack cells are active in Buhriz/Kani Ban Saad, western Baquba, Mukhisa/Abu Sayda, Sherween/
Muqdadiyah, Jalula/Sa’adiyah, Qara Tapa/Hamrin, Khanaqin and Nida/Mandali.678 Zaghaniyah,
Qubbah, Mukhisa and Abou Karmah villages, situated in the Diyala river valley, are reported to benatural bastions for ISIL.679 In Diyala governorate, ISIL is most active in the northern area; and the
Makhmour, Makhul, Palkhana, and Hamrin mountains, spanning several northern governorates. 680
ISIL is also expanding its field of operations to the south of the city of Baquba, according to ISW.681 In
the Hamrin Mountains, ISIL has built a permanent infrastructure consisting of hideouts, training camps
and its own courts. Local officials confirmed in January 2019 to ISW that several villages near
Muqdadiyah were de facto under ISIL control. Frequent clearing operations by local security forces in
the area had little effect.682 ISIL has also built a tunnel network in the Hamrin Mountains, and has
weapons arsenals there.683 ISIL sleeper cells remained active and as of March 2020 ISIL daily claimed
attacks in Diyala, mainly targeting the ISF and community leaders.684

672 Niqash, New frenemies: Extremists return to Diyala, to reunite with old allies, Al Qaeda, 27 April 2017, url
673 Knights, M., Almeida, A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020, May

2020, url, p. 12, p. 15
674 Knights, M., Almeida, A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020, May
2020, url, p. 21
675 Knights, M., Almeida, A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020, May
2020, url, p. 20
676 ‘The Kakais are an ethnically Kurdish minority group that have been targeted by ISIS since 2014 for their religious
beliefs.’ EPIC, ISHM, June 11 - June 18, 2020, 18 July 2020, url
677 Knights, M., Almeida, A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020, May
2020, url, p. 21
678 Knights, M., Almeida, A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020, May
2020, url, pp. 21, 23
679 Bouvier, E., Le gouvernorat irakien de Diyala : un point d’appui historique et récurrent pour les groupes terroristes.
Partie 2 [The Iraqi governorate of Diyala: a historical and recurring point of support for terrorist groups. Part 2], 4 March
2020, url
680 USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve – Quarterly Report to the United States Congress –January 1, 2020-March 31, 2020, 13 May 2020, url, p. 24
681 ISW, ISIS re-establishes historical sanctuary in Iraq, 7 March 2019, url
682 ISW, ISIS re-establishes historical sanctuary in Iraq, 7 March 2019, url
683 ISW, ISIS’ second come-back: assessing the next ISIS insurgency, 30 June 2019, url, p. 21
684 USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve – Quarterly Report to the United States Congress –January 1, 2020-March 31, 2020, 13 May 2020, url, p. 25

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

ISIL carries out attacks on ISF checkpoints and kills pro-government village and tribal leaders, thus
undermining the limited state authority in the region.685 Its operations are financed throughkidnappings, extortion, car-jackings and robberies.686 According to Joel Wing of Musings on Iraq, ISIL
has access to all the rural parts of Diyala.687 Aaron Y. Zelin, a fellow at the Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, explains that Diyala’s status as the epicenter of ISIL attacks in Iraq is partly due toterrain. The area is studded with mountains, canals, groves, and other features that make hiding out
and ambushes easier and conducting effective counter-insurgency operations more difficult.688

Ansar al Islam (AAI)689
Ansar al-Islam, formerly known as Jund al-Islam, is a terrorist group operating in northeastern Iraq
with close links to and support from Al-Qaida. In 2014, part of the group pledged allegiance to ISIL. In
October 2019, AAI carried out its first attack in Iraq in five years, by exploding two IEDs in Diyala
province.690

2.4.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population
Developments 2019-2020
The Middle East Institute analysed the situation in Diyala governorate as follows:‘In Diyala, the situation is even more precarious as ISIS remains far more active, impeding any
attempt at a return to normal life. Daily attacks can number anywhere from four to a dozen,
according to security experts monitoring the situation. Areas like Jalawla remain impossible toreach, while larger cities such as Khanaqin or Baqubah are becoming increasingly insecure thelonger the situation is ignored.’691
According to USDOD, the areas around Baqubah and Khanaqin experienced the deadliest attacks.692
Airstrikes on suspected ISIL hideouts in and around the Hamrin mountains by international coalition
forces and/or Iraqi warplanes were reported throughout 2019 and the first half of 2020.693 For
example, on 8 July 2019, Iraqi forces launched a four-day operation called Will of Victory against ISIL
sleeper cells in northern Iraq, including Diyala governorate. ‘Iraqi armed forces, paramilitary units ofthe Hashed al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilization Units), tribal groups and U.S.-led Coalition warplanes’
participated in the operation. ISIL sleeper cells continue to perform hit-and-run attacks against
government checkpoints, structures and officials. The aim of the operation was to destroy ISIL ‘bases,

685 Rudaw, ISIS threat unabated in Diyala province’s ‘security vacuum’: Kurdish officials, 12 February 2020, url
686 SIPRI, Governing ‘the ungoverned’: Suppressing the Islamic State’s insurgency in Iraq, 12 April 2019, url
687 Wing, J., Islamic State Might Be Coming Out Of Its Winter Hibernation In Iraq, 4 March 2019, url
688 Zelin, A.Y., A year since Baghuz, the Islamic State is neither defeated nor resurging (yet), 25 March 2020, url
689 Ansar al-Islam, formerly known as Jund al-Islam, is a terrorist group operating in northeastern Iraq with close links toand support from Al-Qaida.
690 US, USDOS, Country Report on Terrorism 2019 - Chapter 1 - Iraq, 24 June 2020, url
691 MEI, The forgotten Iraq, policy paper 2020-7, March 2020, url
692 USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve – Quarterly Report to the United States Congress –January 1, 2020-March 31, 2020, 13 May 2020, url, p. 23
693 EPIC, ISHM June 25 – July 2, 2020, 2 July 2020, url; Kurdistan 24, Iraqi warplanes shell ISIS hideout in Diyala’s Hamrinarea, kill all occupants, 21 December 2019, url; Iraqi News, Air raid kills two Islamic State militants in Iraq’s Diyala, 9October 2019, url; Iraqi News, Iraqi airstrikes kill four Islamic State militants in Diyala, 16 February 2019, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

training camps, depots and tunnels’.694 On 29 December 2019, the 8th stage of Operation Will ofVictory was launched.695
On 11 July 2020, ISF, in cooperation with PUK’s Counter-Terrorism units and air support from theInternational Coalition, launched an operation against remnants of ISIL in Khanaqin District.696
In the autumn of 2019, protest demonstrations also took place in Diyala, albeit on a smaller scale thanin Baghdad and in the south of Iraq.697

ISIL operations
In the period January-March 2019, USDOD noted that ISIL continued to strengthen its network inDiyala province, primarily along the northern Diyala River Valley. Fighters and equipment moved from
Kirkuk to the Hamrin Mountains.698
ISIL’s offensive Revenge of the Levant, launched in April 2019, peaked in May 2019 in Diyala. 35
security incidents were registered in May alone, mainly situated in the Khanaqin-Jalawla area.699
In August 2019, the number of ISIL attacks in Diyala rose to 41.700 Twenty villages near Khanaqin were
evacuated because of ISIL bombardments.701
In October 2019, only 13 ISIL attacks were reported in Diyala. As demonstrations engulfed Baghdad
and the southern provinces, ISIL held off on attacks.702 According to USDOD, in this period ISIL’s lowlevel attacks, mainly in Diyala and Kirkuk provinces, continued. In a number of villages intimidation by
ISIL members became so intense that residents temporarily left their homes.703
In December 2019, the number of security incidents in Diyala rose to 42. ISIL changed its focus fromthe Jalawla-Khanaqin districts in the northeast especially to the Muqdadiya district. Partly this was
because the government launched a security sweep through Khanaqin.704
As ISIL began its annual spring-summer offensive in April 2020, the number of security incidents roseto 42 in April 2020 and 71 in May 2020. Most of these ISIL attacks took place in Khanaqin andMuqdadiya.705
ISIL was particularly active in Diyala governorate in June 2020. The group ‘claimed in its weekly
propaganda newsletter, al-Naba, that its militants had carried out 52 attacks in Iraq between June 11
and 17 alone – almost half of them in Diyala province’.706

694 Defense Post (The), Iraq launches ‘Will of Victory’ operation against ISIS sleeper cells near Syrian border, 8 July 2019, url
695 Kurdistan24, Iraq begins eighth phase of anti-ISIS ‘Will of Victory’ operation, 29 December 2019, url
696 Kirkuk Now, Iraqi forces and PUK’s Counter-Terrorism units launch operation against ISIS in Diyala Province, 12 July

2020, url
697 Reuters, Iraq declares curfew as gunfights rage and protests spread nationwide, 2 October 2019, url; ISW, Iraq Situation
report November 1-4, 2019, 6 November 2019, url
698 USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,
January 1, 2019-March 31, 2019, 7 May 2019, url, p. 46
699 Wing, J., Islamic State’s offensive could be winding down, 5 August 2019, url
700 Wing, J., Islamic State’s new game plan in Iraq, 9 September 2019, url
701 Basnews, IS bombardments kill one, injure another near Khanaqin, 9 August 2019, url
702 Wing, J., Islamic State waits out the protests in Iraq, 2 December 2019, url
703 USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve – Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,
October 1, 2019-December 31, 2019, 4 February 2020, url, pp. 4, 19
704 Wing, J., Islamic State Makes Its Return In December 2019, 6 January 2020, url
705 Wing, J., Islamic State offensive in Iraq takes off in May, 3 June 2020, url
706 Rudaw, Erbil and Baghdad kick talks to fill security vacuum in disputed areas into high gear, 25 June 2020, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

ISIL tactics and targets
Armed attacks by ISIL usually take place at night, targeting security forces or civilians, Oxfam reported
in March 2020. Direct attacks on civilians – such as assassinations of mukhtars, civil authorities or tribal
members – ‘seem to be conducted to exert psychological pressure on the population and erode thesocial fabric of communities’.707 For instance, in April 2019, ISIL militants published a video depicting
the execution of Sunni militiamen and village chiefs in eastern Diyala, accused of being informers togovernment forces. Amongst the nine executed persons was the mukhtar of the village of Bahiza al
Kabira.708 On 14 May 2020, ISIL snipers injured the mukhtar of Mubarak near Kahnaqin and set fire tocrops in nearby farms.709
ISIL continues to target ISF710 and PMU members in the governorate.711 For example, on 19 May 2019,seven PMU militia members were killed in a roadside explosion near the city of Balad Ruz. 26 others
were injured.712
Abductions and kidnappings are tactics by ISIL used to acquire money for ransom, to finance its
operations.713 For instance, in late January 2020, suspected ISIL gunmen set up a mock security
checkpoint and abducted seven civilians to the west of Khanaqin. A couple of days later two more
people were kidnapped in a similar incident in the same area.714 On 4 June 2020, ISIL militants
kidnapped a local farmer and his three sons near Jalawla. The three sons were executed but there wasconflicting information about the fate of their father.715
Michael Knights and Alex Almeida documented ‘numerous village evacuations in the Mukhisa-Abu
Saida-Muqdadiyah, Khanaqin, and Mutabijah areas’. They considered that the aim of the attacks
witnessed in the area appears to be ‘not only to intimidate and extort, but even to depopulate’.716 In
August 2019, twenty villages near Khanaqin were evacuated because of ISIL bombardments.717
Likewise, early 2019, a number of Kurdish and Sunni Arab villages around Khanaqin and Jalawla were
evacuated due to increased ISIL activities.718 Evacuations of Kurdish villages near Khanaqin werereported as early as July 2018.719

707 OXFAM, Protection Landscapes in Diyala and Kirkuk, Iraq , March 2020, url, p. 14
708 Rudaw, ISIS militants execute Iraqi mukhtars, militiamen in new video, 14 April 2019, url
709 EPIC, ISHM, May 14 – May 21, 2020, 21 May 2020, url
710 EPIC, ISHM March 22-28, 2019, 28 March 2019, url; EPIC, ISHM: August 1 – August 8, 2019, 8 August 2019, url; EPIC,

ISHM November 7- November 14, 2019, 14 November 2019, url; EPIC, ISHM January 23 – January 30, 2020, 30 January
2020, url; Iraqi News, Two Iraqi soldiers killed in armed attack on army checkpoint in Diyala, 27 August 2019, url
711 EPIC, ISHM February 27- March 5, 5 March 2020, url; EPIC, ISHM: July 11 – July 18, 2019, 18 July 2019, url; Iraqi News,
Bomb explosion kills seven PMF personnel in Diyala, 19 May 2019, url; EPIC, ISHM: July 11 – July 18, 2019, 18 July 2019, url;
EPIC, ISHM: September 19 – September 26, 2019, 26 September 2019, url; Middle East Monitor, Iraq: Daesh kills 5 security
personnel, 3 civilians in Diyala, Saladin, 13 May 2020, url; Kurdistan 24, Casualties on both sides in ISIS, Iraqi militia clashes
in disputed Diyala, 28 October 2019, url
712 Iraqi News, Bomb explosion kills seven PMF personnel in Diyala, 19 May 2019, url
713 OXFAM, Protection Landscapes in Diyala and Kirkuk, Iraq , March 2020, url, p. 15; Zelin, A.Y., A year since Baghuz, theIslamic State is neither defeated nor resurging (yet), 25 March 2020, url
714 Kurdistan 24, ISIS attack on religious minority in disputed Khanaqin leaves 2 dead, 10 injured, 13 February 2020, url
715 EPIC, ISHM: May 28 - June 4, 2020, 4 June 2020, url
716 Knights, M., Almeida, A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020, May
2020, url, p. 21
717 Basnews, IS bombardments kill one, injure another near Khanaqin, 9 August 2019, url
718 Kurdistan24, Villagers around Iraq’s Khanaqin, Jalawla evacuate as ISIS attacks increase, 18 January 2019, url; Basnews,
Khanaqin: Many Kurdish Villages Evacuated Due to IS Threats, 4 March 2019, url
719 ISW, ISIS re-establishes historical sanctuary in Iraq, 07 March 2019, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Widespread crop fires – ignited by ISIL but allegedly also by Shia militias – flared up in spring 2019 inseveral agricultural areas in Diyala, in particular in the district of Khanaqin.720 The arsonists were
allegedly aiming at starting an economic war or as a tactic to drive the Kurdish population out of theregion (ISIL)721 or (Shi’a militias) to target alleged supporters of ISIL.722 In May 2020, crop fires werereported at the beginning of harvesting season in wheat farms near Qara Tapa, northeast of Baquba.723
ISIL claimed responsibility for crop fires taking place in Khanaqin district in April, May and June 2020.724
Reporting on the second quarter of 2020, USDOD reported that ‘While most ISIS attacks in Diyala were
small and resulted only in injuries, many resulted in deaths, and attacks occurred almost daily
throughout the quarter. Many of the targets were farmers and other civilians, who were often killed
or kidnapped for ransom’.725

Khanaqin District
In a March 2019 analysis, the International Review noted:‘Since this past summer [2018], a campaign of bombings, assassinations, and skirmishes
against local security forces have escalated as IS cells have established themselves in the
countryside between Jalawla and Khanaqin, as well as the mountains around Tuz Khurma andSulayman Bek. This insurgency has continued into January, and has intensified even further inDiyala, where the security vacuum continues to be a significant issue. The countryside of
Khanaqin has become a haven for IS cells, who have dug in and have a firm grip on themountains due to the lack of security personnel. While the effects of these attacks are limited
and cause relatively few casualties, the rate at which incidents are occurring is rising.’726
The security situation in the ‘mixed Kurdish and Sunni Arab’ city of Jalawla is dominated by AAH.727
Whilst local Sunni Arabs made an alliance with AAH, the Kurdish population is marginalised.728 In theSunni majority town Sadiyah, Badr Organisation is in control of the security.729 In Kifri, the PUK was incontrol.730
The lack of coordination between Baghdad-controlled Iraq and the Kurdish region in Diyala’s disputed
territories allowed ISIL to exploit these ‘unguarded spaces’.731 Increased ISIL activity in rural areas anda lack of government protection caused displacement of people from central and northeast Diyala,such as in Ramadan and Islah, in October and November 2019.732

720 Reuters, After years of war and draught, Iraq’s bumper crop is burning, 20 June 2019, url; Bellingcat, Torching And

Extortion: OSINT Analysis Of Burning Agriculture In Iraq, 03 June 2019, url
721 Kurdistan 24, In Iraq’s Diyala, 400 acres of Kurdish crops burned, 18 May 2019, url
Rudaw, Senior Peshmerga officer warns of PMF excesses in Diyala, 25 May 2019, url
722 Reuters, After years of war and draught, Iraq’s bumper crop is burning, 20 June 2019, url
723 EPIC, ISHM: May 21 – May 28, 2020, url
724 Kurdistan 24, Fires destroy hundreds of acres in Iraq’s disputed Kirkuk, 16 May 2020, url; Rudaw, Iraqi forces launch
third phase of ‘Heroes of Iraq’ anti-ISIS operation, 22 June 2020, url
725 USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve – Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April
1, 2020 – June 30, 2020, url, p. 23
726 International Review, Iraq’s Diyala faces a new insurgency, 22 March 2019, url
727 Skelton, M. & Saleem, Z., Iraq’s disputed internal boundaries after ISIS, February 2019, url, p. 14
728 Saleem, A.Z. et al., Security and governance in the disputed territories under a fractured GOI, 6 December 2018, url
729 Skelton, M. & Saleem, Z., Iraq’s disputed internal boundaries after ISIS, February 2019, url, p. 14
730 Denmark, DIS/Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in thedisputed areas, incl. possibility to enter and access the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), 5 November 2018, url, p. 43
731 ICG, Averting an ISIS Resurgence in Iraq and Syria, 11 October 2019, pp. 6-7, url
732 Wing, J., Islamic State forcing people out of rural Diyala, 25 November 2019, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

In April 2019, the ISW described that ‘Khanaqin ISIL retains both a support and attack zone along the
Iraqi-Iranian Border stretching into Halabja Province in Iraqi Kurdistan.’ The source further consideredthat it was likely that ISIL uses mountain routes in Northern Khanaqin district to cross between Iraq
and Iran, prompting multiple PMU deployments in the region.733

Illustrative incidents
There were many security incidents in the districts of Khanaqin, Baquba and Muqdadiyah in particular.
Most of these caused no more than injuries or one or two fatalities. Below are listed several incidents
that caused more than 2 fatalities in which civilians were concerned.
•

On 14 April 2019, ISIL militants published a video depicting the execution of nine Sunni
militiamen and village chiefs, amongst whom was the Mukhtar of the village of Bahiza al
Kabira. They had been accused of informing security forces of militant activities.734•

On 12 May 2019, ISIL militants attacked the village of Habib Abdalla in Khanaqin and killed
two members of the Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party (KSDP).735•

On 30 May 2019, an unidentified IED explosion, followed by an armed attack, in Abu Saida
killed 6 civilians and injured 4.736•

On 1 June 2019, unidentified gunmen killed 3 civilians in a village near the town of Abu
Saida.737•

On 28 September 2019, Iraqi forces shot and killed 3 Kurdish civilians near Mukhaysah village
in Muqdadiyah district.738•

On 10 October 2019, ISIL snipers shot and killed 3 civilians and injured 4 of their relatives in avillage in Khanaqin district. ISF, called upon this incident, were hit by a roadside bomb
exploding near one of their vehicles, killing two police officers, injuring three others.739•

On 24 October 2019, suspected ISIL militants shot dead the head of Abu Saida town council,
his son and a civilian accompanying them in the town's center.740•

On 20 January 2020, a protester was killed and three injured in Baquba during a confrontation
between demonstrators and riot police over the closure of a bridge.741•

On 6 February 2020, ISIL sniper fire in Ali Saadoun village in Khanaqin district killed 2 civilians
and seriously injured one person.742

733 ISW, ISIS Resurgence update, 19 April 2019, url
734 Rudaw, ISIS militants execute Iraqi mukhtars, militiamen in new video, 14 April 2019, url
735 NRT TV, Update: ISIS kills 2 Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party members in Khanaqin, 13 May 2019, url
736 ACLED, Data Export tool, 01-01-2019 to 31-07-2020, url
737 ACLED, Data Export tool, 01-01-2019 to 31-07-2020, url
738 ACLED, Data Export tool, 01-01-2019 to 31-07-2020, url
739 Xinhua Net, 5 killed, 7 wounded in IS attack in eastern Iraq, 10 October 2019, url
740 ACLED, Data Export tool, 01-01-2019 to 31-07-2020, url
741 EPIC, ISHM: January 16 – January 23, 2020, ISHM, 23 January 2020, url; EPIC, Enhance Understanding, ISHM January 16– January 23, 2020, ISHM, 2 January 2020, url
742 ACLED, Data Export tool, 01-01-2019 to 31-07-2020, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation•

On 22 April 2020, seven ISIL militants were reportedly killed in an airstrike targeting their
hideouts near Khanaqin.743•

On 15 May 2020, three PMU fighters were killed and two injured in an IED explosion, allegedly
by ISIL targeting Brigade 23, in the Hawi al-Udheim region.744•

On 12 May 2020, ISIL fighters killed two Kaka’i farmers and burnt their fields.745•

On 4 June 2020, ISIL militants attacked an agricultural orchard on the outskirts of Islah village
northeast Baquba. Three farmers were killed and one other relative injured from the samefamily.746•

On 6 June 2020, ISIL militants attacked a farmer in the Shaykh Bawa village in Diyala province,
and after he was injured his 3 sons tried to defend their father but were killed.747•

On 13 June 2020, ISIL gunmen attacked Kaka’i villages, killing six people and wounding six
others, including Iraqi security force members.748

Number of civilian casualties
The number of armed conflict related incidents and civilian casualties in the governorate recorded
by UNAMI for the period 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, is shown in the table below.
Governorate

Diyala2019 (Jan – Dec)#of Killed
incidents

Injured

55

64

47

2019 total 2020 (Jan – Jul)casualties#of Killed(killedincidents
andinjured)
111

48

46

Injured2020 total
casualties(killedandinjured)

67

113

Table 8: Number of armed conflict related incidents and civilian casualties 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, Diyala
governorate.749

Number of security incidents
According to Joel Wing, in early 2019, ISIL committed on average roughly one incident per day inDiyala, in particular Khanaqin district, by employing terror tactics ranging from shootings, to attacks
on checkpoints and villages, shelling and IEDs.750
A May 2020 analysis on ISIL published by Michael Knights and Alex Almeida noted a surge in its attack
activities in the second half of 2019 (on average 59.8 attacks per month) and the first quarter of 2020

743 EPIC, ISHM April 16 – April 23, 2020, 23 April 2020, url
744 EPIC, ISHM: May 14 – May 21, 2020, 21 May 2020, url
745 Kirkuk Now, ‘Islamic State militants’ kill two Kakai farmers and burn their grain fields, 12 May 2020, url
746 ACLED, Data Export tool, 01-01-2019 to 31-07-2020, url
747 ACLED, Data Export tool, 01-01-2019 to 31-07-2020, url
748 EPIC, ISHM: June 4 – June 11, Enhance Understanding, 11 June 2020, url; EPIC, ISHM: June 11 - June 18, 2020, ISIS

Attacks Minorities In Diyala, 18 June 2020 url
749 UNAMI, Email to EASO, 24 July 2020
750 Wing, J., Islamic State Might Be Coming Out Of Its Winter Hibernation In Iraq, 4 March 2019, url; New York Times (The),
ISIS, weakened, finds news bombers: cows wearing explosive vests, 4 September 2019, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation(decreasing to 45.8 attacks per month).751 Between January 2019 and the first quarter of 2020, Diyala
has experienced 690 attacks, which is the highest number at governorate levels.752
According to open sources data from ACLED, EPIC and Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency database, ISIL
conducted around 80 attacks in Diyala governorate in the first quarter of 2020.753
In the reference period, ACLED reported 280 battles, 260 incidents of remote violence/explosions, 90
cases of violence against civilians, 0 incidents of riots, accounting for a total of 630 security incidentsof these types in Diyala governorate, the majority taking place in the Muqdadiyah district. 58 protests
were also reported in Diyala governorate during the reference period.754 The evolution of all the typesof security events through the reference period is shown in the figure below.

Figure 11 : Evolution of security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence, violence against civilians, riots and protests
in Diyala governorate 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, based on ACLED data.755

State ability to secure law and orderMore information on the capacities of the Iraqi forces and the forces under the KRG as actors ofprotection, including the ability to secure law and order, as well as information on the integrity ofarmed forces, please see the report EASO COI Report – Iraq: Actors of Protection (2018).

751 Knights, M., Almeida, A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020, May

2020, url, pp. 12, 20
752 Knights, M., Almeida, A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020, May
2020, url, p. 15
753 USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 1
January 2020 – 31 March 2020, 13 May 2020, url, p. 24
754 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url
755 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

ISIL militants withdrawing from the areas between Diyala to Ninewa in the period 2015-2017, left thevillages and homes booby-trapped, so that IDPs could not return. ISF is not properly trained in highrisk removal of explosives. While government forces were busy clearing IEDs, ISIL took the opportunity
to deploy insurgent tactics in Diyala.756 Joint forces from the army, federal police and the PMU carriedout security sweeps in the governorate.757
In July 2019, the second phase of the ‘Will to victory’ military campaign was launched, focusing on
Diyala. Iraqi forces cleared 25 villages. Then-Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi stated the Iraqi army
encountered little ‘real resistance’.758 According to analysts, ISIL is used to shutting down its
operations during ISF campaigns and moving elsewhere.759 In June 2020, the Iraqi government
launched the military campaign Operation Heroes of Iraq, targeting ISIL cells in Kirkuk, Diyala and Salah
al-Din. In July 2020, phase four of Operation Heroes of Iraq was launched in Diyala. Collaborating with
Peshmerga forces the ISF allegedly searched at least 53 villages over the first three days.760
The ISF reportedly struggle to maintain territorial control in regions where ISIL continues to besupported by the local population.761 Especially in rural and desert areas, where the ISF have a limited
presence and where ISIL previously exercised territorial control, ISIL retains freedom of movement.
The group is primarily active at night, carrying out assassinations and abductions of local leaders andattacks with IEDs on military and civilian targets.762
Following the retreat of ISIL in 2017, the elite Iraqi units that had fought them were replaced by poorly
trained and thinly spread forces, according to The Intercept. The Iraqi army and police are too
understaffed and unprepared to definitively defeat ISIL in Diyala. They also lack local knowledge andtrust of communities to overcome ‘the militants whose recent, brutal rule has so terrified civilians thatthey don’t dare to resist’.763 The ISF are, according to Knights and Almeida, neither trained nor
equipped to conduct counterinsurgency’.764
The PMU are also distrusted by the local population. This is why many local, ‘impromptu’ militias areactive in this province, according to the International Review.765

756 Flood, D., From Caliphate to Caves: The Islamic State’s Asymmetric War in Northern Iraq, September 2018, url, p. 32
757 Intercept (The), The underground Caliphate, 16 September 2018, url; National (The), ISIS attacks resurgent on Iraq’s’Highway of Death’, 7 July 2018, url; Kurdistan24, Iraqi security in ongoing operation against Islamic State in Diyala: Local
politician, 25 June 2018, url; Iraqi News, Paramilitary forces seize IS hideouts & drone underground in Diyala, 21 September
2019, url; Iraqi News, Joint operation destroys 5 Islamic State hotbeds in Iraq’s Diyala, 17 September 2019, url; Iraqi News,
Iraq security operation launched to clear Diyala region from IS, 12 July 2019, url; Iraqi News, Four senior IS leaders killedduring security operations in Iraq’s Diyala, 23 April 2019, url
758 Hassan, H., ISIS in Iraq and Syria: Rightsizing the Current ‘Comeback’, 12 May 2020, url
759 Wing, J., Islamic State Makes Its Return In December 2019, 6 January 2020, url; Intercept (The), The undergroundCaliphate, 16 September 2018, url
760 ISW, Iraq situation report: July 8-14, 2020, 17 July 2020, url
761 USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve - Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 1,
2019-October 25, 2019, 19 November 2019, url, p. 10
762 Knights, M., The Islamic State Inside Iraq: Losing Power or Preserving Strength?, December 2018, url, pp. 2, 8; UN
Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General [S/2019/101], 1 February 2019, url, p. 6; UN Security Council, Report of
the Secretary-General [S/2020/363], 6 May 2020, url, p. 4; ISW, ISIS resurgence update, 19 April 2019, url; ISW, ISIS’
Second resurgence, 2 October 2018, url
763 Intercept (The), The underground Caliphate, 16 September 2018, url; Wing, J., Islamic State’s new game plan in Iraq, 9September 2019, url
764 Knights, M. & Almeida, A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020,
May 2020, url, p. 25
765 International Review, Iraq’s Diyala faces a new insurgency, 22 March 2019, url

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On 11 July 2020, ISF, in cooperation with PUK’s Counter-Terrorism units and air support from theInternational Coalition, launched an operation against remnants of ISIL in Khanaqin District.766
The USDOD, in a report covering the second quarter of 2020 analysed that:‘Diyala features a complex environment where political, sectarian, and geographic fault lines
converge, making it difficult to assess a single or dominant factor that has enabled ISIS to
operate at such a high tempo. […] Moreover, dominant authority in the province is held by
Iranian-backed forces, mainly the Badr Organization, who combat ISIS, but also exacerbate
sectarian tensions. These PMF groups lack coordination with local tribal forces, thePeshmerga, and Coalition forces, and are mainly concerned with using Diyala’s strategic
location to smuggle arms and other assistance from Iran. Iraq analysts state that Diyala is likely
to remain the most consistent site of ISIS attacks if present conditions continue’.767

Infrastructure damage and explosive remnants of war
Although the share of Diyala’s territory invaded and occupied by ISIL was relatively small, thegovernorate suffers from significant infrastructure and housing damage. Diyala is one of thegovernorates with particularly high scores of infrastructure damage.768
The humanitarian crisis after the defeat of ISIL has contributed to high levels of unemployment andpoverty, according to IOM.769 In November 2019, UNOCHA’s 2020 Humanitarian Needs Overview
showed that Diyala had 210 605 people in need of humanitarian assistance.770
According to a January 2018 World Bank report concentrated on the seven governorates directly
affected by ISIL’s territorial ambitions (Anbar, Babil, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninawa, Salah Al-Din, and Baghdad)
the total damage to the housing sector in Iraq is estimated at IQD 18.7 trillion, around 138 051
residential buildings were affected. 7 % of these damages are situated in Diyala.771 Damages to thepower sector, one of the worst damaged sectors, amount to IQD 8.2 trillion (USD 7 billion), of which
IQD 38.5 billion are situated in Diyala.772 The damage to water resources assets, ranging from dams
and barrages, irrigation canals, and irrigation pumping stations, is around IQD 134 billion (USD 115
million), 3.8 % of which is located in Diyala.773 Total damage to the industry and commerce facilities
was IQD 6.0 trillion, of which IQD 51 billion is situated in Diyala.774
The total damages to the agricultural sector in Diyala are estimated to amount to 557 billion Iraqi
Dinar, about 478 million dollar.775 The livestock sector declined by 50 percent since 2003.776 Damage
to municipal assets in Diyala amounts to an estimated cost of IQD 1.5 billion (USD 1.3 million).777

766 Kirkuk Now, Iraqi forces and PUK’s Counter-Terrorism units launch operation against ISIS in Diyala Province, 12 July

2020, url
767 USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve – Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April
1, 2020 – June 30, 2020, url, p. 24
768 LADP, Provincial response plan Diyala governorate, February 2018, url, pp. 11, 24
769 IOM, Iraq, Crisis Funding Appeal 2018, 31 January 2018, url, p. 6
770 UNOCHA, 2020 Humanitarian Needs Overview, Iraq, 17 December 2019, url, p. 6
771 World Bank Group, Iraq, Reconstruction & Investment, Part 2, January 2018, url, p. 15
772 World Bank Group, Iraq, Reconstruction & Investment, Part 2, January 2018, url, pp. 70-72
773 World Bank Group, Iraq, Reconstruction & Investment, Part 2, January 2018, url, pp. 51-53
774 World Bank Group, Iraq, Reconstruction & Investment, Part 2, January 2018, url, p. 59
775 World Bank Group, Iraq, Reconstruction & Investment, Part 2, January 2018, url, pp. XVIII-XIX
776 World Bank Group, Iraq, Reconstruction & Investment, Part 2, January 2018, url, p. 47
777 World Bank Group, Iraq, Reconstruction & Investment, Part 2, January 2018, url, pp. XXIV, 103

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Total damages to the health sector is estimated to be approximately IQD 2.7 trillion, of which IQD
190.6 billion are situated in Diyala.778 Damages to the education sector in Diyala amount to IQD 165.9
billion.779 Across Diyala, an estimated more than 60 schools have been totally destroyed, and another181 partially destroyed in the context of the battle against ISIL.780
Damages to cultural heritage, contemporary religious buildings and tourism in Diyala amount to IQD
42 billion.781 The total damage costs in the transport sector, consisting of roads, airports, bridges, andrailways is IQD 3.3 trillion (USD 2.8 billion), IQD 129.9 billion of which is situated in Diyala.782 The costof damage to the WASH (Water, Sanitation and Hygiene) sector is estimated to be IQD 1.6 trillion (USD 1.4 billion), 21 % of which (IQD 329.1 billion) is situated in Diyala.783 Total damage to governmentbuildings is equivalent to IQD 868 billion ( USD 745 million), IQD 71.6 billion of which is situated in
Diyala.784
According to Crisis Group, the Iraqi government has made only minimal progress rebuilding post-ISIL
areas and reviving their local economies.785 Oxfam noted some progress in rehabilitating key
infrastructure – notably through UNDP’s Funding Facility for Stabilization as well as other stabilisation
projects – but ‘major gaps remain, especially in Diyala and in camps’.786 In Khanaqin district, different
areas face different challenges. Whilst Khanaqin city is largely in good condition and provides residents
and IDPs with a range of services, damages reported in Jalawla are more extensive, with damaged
power, water and sewer lines and the hospital failing to meet demand.787
According to the Shelter Cluster’s data on Iraq, reconstruction and rehabilitation of damaged houses
has been largely completed, except for Khanaqin. In Khalis district, 982 houses been targeted and all
rehabilitated, in Muqdadiya district 275 house rehabilitations were completed and in Khanaqin 275
houses had been targeted of which 200 had been rehabilitated and the other 75 planned.788
Between January and December 2019, several explosive hazard incidents were reported in Diyala,especially on the road from Baquba to Khanaqin.789 Between January and June 2020, the explosive
hazards risk level on roads in Diyala governorate was elevated most frequently in and around
Khanaqin district.790 Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor noted in 2018 four confirmed hazardous
areas (CHA) in Diyala province, and six suspected hazardous area (SHA), contaminated by IED’s.791

778 World Bank Group, Iraq, Reconstruction & Investment, Part 2, January 2018, url, pp. 21-22
779 World Bank Group, Iraq, Reconstruction & Investment, Part 2, January 2018, url, p. 27
780 LADP, Provincial response plan Diyala governorate, February 2018, url, p. 75
781 World Bank Group, Iraq, Reconstruction & Investment, Part 2, January 2018, url, p. 41
782 World Bank Group, Iraq, Reconstruction & Investment, Part 2, January 2018, url, pp. 88-90
783 World Bank Group, Iraq, Reconstruction & Investment, Part 2, January 2018, url, pp. 94-97
784 World Bank Group, Iraq, Reconstruction & Investment, Part 2, January 2018, url, p. 108
785 ICG, Averting an ISIS Resurgence in Iraq and Syria, 11 October 2019, url, p. 18
786 OXFAM, Protection Landscapes in Diyala and Kirkuk, Iraq , March 2020, url, p. 31
787 IOM, Labour market opportunities and challenges – Khanaqin district, Diyala Governorate, April 2019, url, p. 5
788 Global Shelter Cluster, UN Habitat Iraq war damaged shelter rehabilitation dashboard, updated 31 August 2020, url
789 iMMAP, iMMAP-IHF Humanitarian Access Response: Explosive Hazard Incidents in Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala, Erbil, Kirkuk,

Ninewa and Salah Al-Din Governorates from January to December 2019’, 12/01/2020, url
790 iMMAP, iMMAP-IHF, Humanitarian Access Response: Explosive Hazards Risk Level on Roads in Diyala Governorate (0131 May 2020), 7 June 2020, url; iMMAP, iMMAP-IHF, Humanitarian Access Response: Explosive Hazards Risk Level on
Roads in Diyala Governorate 01-30 April 2020, 6 May 2020, url; iMMAP, iMMAP-IHF, Humanitarian Access Response:
Explosive Hazards Risk Level on Roads in Diyala Governorate 01-31 March 2020, 6 April 2020, url; iMMAP, iMMAP-IHF,
Humanitarian Access Response: Explosive Hazards Risk Level on Roads in Diyala Governorate 01-29 February 2020, 4
March 2020, url; iMMAP, iMMAP-IHF, Humanitarian Access Response: Explosive Hazards Risk Level on Roads in Diyala
Governorate 01-31 January 2020, 5 February 2020, url
791 Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor, Iraq Mine action, last updated 16 November 2018, url

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Mines and explosive leftovers from the 1980 to 1988 Iraq-Iran war are reportedly still threatening thesecurity in sixty locations in Khanaqin district along the Iraq-Iran border.792

Displacement and return
As of June 2020, 53 688 IDPs were registered in Diyala, the majority of which were displaced within
the governorate.793 By the same date, 230 244 returnees have been registered in Diyala, of whichalmost half returned to Khanaqin district.794 The majority of the returnees (79 %) were formerly
displaced within the governorate.795
The pace of return to Diyala has slowed compared to the May 2017–May 2018 period. Between May
2018 and June 2019 the number of returnees increased by 3876.796 The rate of return797 to Diyala, asof June 2019, was 73 %, representing 5% of all returns.798 According to IOM’s Return Index, fromMarch 2020, a total of 43 728 returnees to Diyala face high severity return conditions.799
As of March-April 2020, 10 % of Diyala’s returnee population were living in critical shelters.800
According to IOM’s Return Index, regarding caseloads facing so-called severity conditions, in Diyala
44 454 returnees face so-called low severity conditions, 140 910 face medium severity conditions and
43 728 face high severity conditions.801
In April 2020, Diyala counted a number of areas of origin where no returns have been witnessed. In
Al-Khalis district three such locations are cited, in Muqdadiya district two, whilst Khanaqin district
counts 38 locations where no returns have been registered. Lack of security, tribal tensions, lack of
job opportunities and destroyed houses are the reasons for no return in these areas.802
In its 2019 report on International Religious Freedom, USDOS cited a warning by MP Raad al-Dahlaki
on intimidation and forced displacement of Sunnis in Diyala by ‘government-affiliated Shia militia
groups’. According to the MP, this resulted in ‘a systematic demographic change along the border with
Iran’.803 USDOS also noted that alleged ISIL sympathisers and/or their relatives were being evictedfrom their homes in Diyala, faced movement restrictions and discrimination.804
In December 2019, UNOCHA noted ‘forced and premature returns and forced or coerced departuresfrom camps and informal settlements’ took place in Nineveh, Salah Al Din, Anbar, Kirkuk and Diyala
governorates, causing secondary displacement.805 Research by Oxfam in the April-May 2019 period
showed that individuals and groups with perceived affiliation to extremist groups in Kirkuk and Diyala

792 Kurdistan 24, Land mine remnants, explosive leftovers remain threat in disputed Khanaqin district, 21 January 2020, url
793 IOM Iraq, DTM, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Iraq Master List Report 115, 25 June 2020, url, p. 2
794 IOM Iraq, DTM, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Iraq Master List Report 115, 25 June 2020, url, p. 5795 IOM Iraq, DTM, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Iraq Master List Report 115, 25 June 2020, url, p. 5796 IOM, Iraq, Integrated location assessment IV, 03/02/2020, url, p. 12797 IOM defines the rate of return as the proportion of returnees originally from a governorate/district to the sum of

returnees and IDPs originally from the same governorate/district
798 IOM Iraq, Integrated location assessment IV, 30 March 2020, url, p. 12799 IOM’s Return Index correlates all data available on returnee population numbers with indicators on (a) livelihoods andbasic services and (b) social cohesion and safety perceptions to create a score at location level (i.e., individual village, town
or neighbourhood) that measures the severity of conditions or quality of return. See IOM Iraq, Return Index Findings round8- Iraq, March 2020, url, p. 1
800 IOM Iraq, DTM, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Iraq Master List Report 115, 25 June 2020, url, p. 6
801 IOM Iraq, Return Index Findings round 8- Iraq, March 2020, url, p. 1
802 RWG Iraq/IOM, Areas of origin having witnessed no return, last update April 2020, url
803 US, USDOS, 2019 Report on International Religious Freedom: Iraq, 10 June 2020, url
804 US, USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2019 - Iraq, 11 March 2020, url
805 UNOCHA, 2020 Humanitarian Needs Overview, Iraq, 17 December 2019, url, p. 5

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were prevented from returning, and faced harassment and abuse at checkpoints.806 In November
2018, UNOCHA noted that ‘many returnees— in Anbar, Salah al-Din, Kirkuk, Diyala and Ninewa—whoare alleged to be affiliated with extremists have been forcibly evicted from their homes upon return,resulting in their secondary displacement, with their properties destroyed or confiscated.’807
Respondents in Oxfam’s spring 2019 survey indicated that ‘the return procedures established by thegovernment are unclear, flawed and take a long time’. Sunni IDPs from Diyala’s southern districts who
were unwilling to return have cited abuse, arbitrary arrests and forced transfer of ownership of landby armed actors as reasons for remaining in displacement.808 As for IDPs in Khanaqin district, Oxfam
noted, ‘return to their area of origin continues to be prevented. In addition to movement restrictions
and denial of security clearance, destruction and seizure of property are used as a means to prevent
return.’ This was reported in particular by respondents displaced from Saadiya and Muqdadiya
areas.809
Families with (real or perceived) ISIL affiliation experience difficulties to return to their originalcommunities in Diyala, due to ‘local “decrees” and threats of violence’.810 According to al-Hashimi,
suspicions that such families could facilitate new ISIL attacks ‘likely contributed to their forced
displacement’ and made reintegration more difficult. He added: ‘Moreover, Diyala’s Command of
Operations and PMF have submitted a proposal advising to refuse the return of ISIS families until ISIS’s“vengeance” operations stop.’811

806 OXFAM, Protection Landscapes in Diyala and Kirkuk, Iraq, March 2020, url, pp. 6-7
807 UNOCHA, 2019 Humanitarian Needs Overview, Iraq, 16 December 2018, url, p. 32
808 OXFAM, Protection Landscapes in Diyala and Kirkuk, Iraq, March 2020, url, p. 17
809 OXFAM, Protection Landscapes in Diyala and Kirkuk, Iraq , March 2020, url, p. 17
810 UNAMI/OHCHR, The right to education, Part one: The legacy of ISIL territorial control on access to education, February

2020, url, p. 12
811 Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: The Challenge of Reintegrating ‘ISIS Families’, 7 July 2020, url

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2.5 Kirkuk

Map 10: Kirkuk governorate with district borders, district capitals and main roads, © United Nations. 812

2.5.1 General description of the governorate
Basic geography
Kirkuk (previously called al-Tamim) is a governorate in northern Iraq. It comprises four districts,
namely Kirkuk, where Kirkuk city is located, Dibis, Hawija (Al-Hawiga) and Daquq.813

Population
For 2019, the Iraqi CSO (Central Statistical Organization) estimated814 the governorate’s population
at 1 639 953.815

Ethnicity
Described as a ‘microcosm of Iraq’, Kirkuk has a diverse and mixed population with a variety of ethnic
and religious groups, including (Sunni) Arabs, (Sunni) Kurds, but also Turkmen (Shia and Sunni), and a

812 UN JAU, Iraq District Map, January 2014, url
813 IOM, Kirkuk Governorate profile, 1 July 2015, url, p. 1
814 It should be noted that the last comprehensive Population and Housing Census for Iraq was conducted in 1987; UNFPA,

Newsletter 2020 Census, December 2019, url, p. 1
815 Iraq, CSO, 2019 ‫[ قديرات سكان العراق حسب المحافظة والبيئة والجنس لسنة‬Demographic and population indicators, Estimates forthe population of Iraq by province, environment and gender for the year 2019] (table), n.d., url

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small community of Chaldo-Assyrian Christians.816 The predominant religious group in the governorate
are Sunni Muslims.817

Road security
In 2019, iMMAP showed that stretches of the main roads in Hawija, Kirkuk, Dibis and Daquq districts
were classified as primary and secondary risk roads regarding explosive hazard risk level.818 As of July
2020, only stretches of the main roads in Hawija and Kirkuk districts were still classified as primaryand secondary risk roads regarding the explosive hazard risk level.819 The Baghdad-Kirkuk highway,
which links Baghdad to Kirkuk and other northern parts of Iraq, was reportedly manned by acheckpoint that closes at 5pm in the portion passing through Kirkuk governorate, obstructing travel.820
ISIL attacks on civilians821 and security forces822 along the main roads of the governorate were reported
in 2019 and 2020.

EconomyAbundant oil reserves make Kirkuk a governorate of strategic importance, but also a source fortensions and a longstanding territorial dispute between the Iraqi central government and the KRG.823

2.5.2 Conflict background and armed actors
Conflict backgroundIn late 2018, ICG described Kirkuk as one of the areas of the disputed territories that has experienced‘the worst turbulence’ in recent years.824 When ISIL launched its 2014 offensive in northern Iraq, theIraqi army collapsed, and ISIL took over the region around Hawija City, in south-western Kirkuk
governorate,825 with a local population of about 100 000 who lived under ISIL control.826 ISIL took over
and administered areas of Hawija district from June 2014, controlling the countryside and rural areasof Kirkuk until it was pushed out in October 2017.827 From Hawija district, ISIL carried out attacks
against other areas in Kirkuk governorate from 2014.828
In the wake of the Iraqi army’s collapse fighting ISIL in Kirkuk in 2014, Kurdish Peshmergas moved in
and replaced the federal forces, with Kirkuk city remaining for three years under the rule of PUK, thesecond largest party in the KRI and the KRG taking control of the oil fields.829 For three years,
816 ICG, Reviving UN Mediation on Iraq’s Disputed Internal Boundaries, 14 December 2018, url, p. 1; ICG, Iraq: Fixing

Security in Kirkuk, 15 June 2020, url, p. 1
817 US, USDOS, 2019 Report on International Religious Freedom: Iraq, 10 June 2020, url
818 iMMAP, Humanitarian Access Response: Explosive Hazards Risk Level on Roads in Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala, Erbil, Kirkuk,
Ninewa and Salah Al-Din Governorates from January to December 2019, 12 January 2020, url
819 iMMAP, Humanitarian Access Response: Explosive Hazards Risk Level on Roads in Kirkuk Governorate 01-30 June 2020,
5 July 2020, url
820 Halawa, H., The Forgotten Iraq, 16 March 2020, url
821 Basnews, IS Temporarily Seizes Control of Kirkuk-Baghdad Road, 15 September 2019, url
822 Kurdistan24, ISIS sleeper cells attack Iraqi army in disputed Kirkuk, kill 2 soldiers, 30 January 2020, url
823 Jamestown Foundation: Operation Iraqi Heroes in Kirkuk; Terrorism Monitor Volume: 18 Issue: 12, 17 June 2020, url;
ICG, Reviving UN Mediation on Iraq’s Disputed Internal Boundaries, 14 December 2018, url, p. 1
824 ICG, Reviving UN Mediation on Iraq’s Disputed Internal Boundaries, 14 December 2018, url, p. 4
825 ICG, Reviving UN Mediation on Iraq’s Disputed Internal Boundaries, 14 December 2018, url, p. 8
826 Monde (Le), Kirkouk, la guerre d'après [Kirkuk, the war after], 10 February 2017, url
827 Flood, D., CTC, The Hawija Offensive: A liberation exposes faultlines, CTC Sentinel, Volume 10, Issue 9, 18 November
2017, url, p. 24; Knights, M., The Islamic State Inside Iraq: Losing Power or Preserving Strength?, CTC, Vol. 11, Issue 11,
December 2018, url, p. 6
828 Monde (Le), Kirkouk, la guerre d'après [Kirkuk, the war after], 10 February 2017, url
829 ICG, Reviving UN Mediation on Iraq’s Disputed Internal Boundaries, 14 December 2018, url, p. 8

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Peshmergas and ISIL were at a standoff in Kirkuk, with ‘repeated clashes’ along the frontlines south
and west of the city, though the city itself was ‘tightly controlled’.830 AI reported on the deliberate
destruction of over 40 villages and Arab properties by Kurdish Peshmergas after ISIL confrontations in
Kirkuk.831
In October 2017, several control changes occurred in Kirkuk. In early October 2017, the Iraqi
government announced that ISIL had been driven out from the city of Hawija, its final significant
remaining stronghold in Iraq. According to security analyst Derek Flood, this also marked a point intime eliminating the main unifying cause [fighting ISIL] between the Kurdish Peshmerga and the Iraqi
military. In the Hawija campaign which began on 21 September 2017, the Iraqi army, the Emergency
Response Division, CTS, Federal Police and the pro-Iranian PMUs led an offensive to push ISIL out of
Hawija district.832 On 5 October 2017, the Iraqi Prime minister announced the liberation of Hawija
from ISIL’s occupation833, though some villages east of the town reportedly were still believed to beunder ISIL control at that time.834 The Hawija military campaign resulted in the displacement of 47 000
people in September 2017, with 11 000 who were still displaced at the end of the next month andunwilling to return; 62 000 returns were recorded across Kirkuk.835 IOM reported that civilians
displaced from Hawija during operations mainly left Hawija for the districts of Daquq (Kirkuk
governorate), Tirkrit, Al Daur, Al Shirqat (Salah ad-Din governorate), and Makhmur.836 In November
2017, outside Hawija town, 400 bodies of people wearing civilian clothes were found in mass graves;they were thought to have been prisoners killed by ISIL.837
In retaliation for the KRG’s decision to hold an independence referendum in September 2017,
including in Kirkuk, and which was opposed and rejected by the Iraqi government838, Baghdad moved
into the disputed areas with the Iraqi army, the Counter-terrorism Forces, the Federal Police and thePMUs, made up of the Badr Organization’s Turkmen Brigade (16th PMU brigade) and Asa’ib Ahl al‐
Haq (the 41st, 42nd and 43rd PMU brigades). It launched an offensive from 15 to 21 October 2017
against Kurdish security forces and regained control of most of Kirkuk governorate. The Peshmerga
affiliated to the PUK largely withdrew and were subsequently accused by the KDP of collusion withthe federal government.839 The forces of the federal government retook the city of Kirkuk from theKurds within hours, followed by the majority of other disputed areas.840

Armed actors
As of June 2020, a wide range of security actors are reported to operate in Kirkuk governorate,
including the Iraqi army, the CTS, an array of PMUs, federal and local police and various intelligence

830 ICG, Reviving UN Mediation on Iraq’s Disputed Internal Boundaries, 14 December 2018, url, p. 8
831 AI, Banished and dispossessed: Forced displacement and deliberate destruction in Northern Iraq”, 15 January 2016, url,

p. 31
832 Flood, D., CTC, The Hawija Offensive: A liberation exposes faultlines, CTC Sentinel, Volume 10, Issue 9, 18 November
2017, url, p. 24
833 BBC News, Iraq forces retake town of Hawija from IS, 5 October 2017, url; Flood, D., CTC, The Hawija Offensive: A
liberation exposes faultlines, CTC Sentinel, Volume 10, Issue 9, 18 November 2017, url, p. 24
834 BBC News, Iraq forces retake town of Hawija from IS, 5 October 2017, url
835 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Bulletin Iraq - October 2017, 2 November 2017, url, p. 3
836 IOM, Iraq displacement crisis 2014-2017, 8 November 2018, url, based on the map on p. 37
837 Independent (The), Mass graves discovered in Iraqi town recaptured from Isis, 13 November 2017, url
838 Independent (The), Iraq seizes Kirkuk from Kurds leaving two US allies locked in conflict and bringing end to move forindependence, 16 October 2017, url; ISW, The "War after ISIS" begins in Iraq, 15 November 2017, url
839 ISW, The "War after ISIS" begins in Iraq, 15 November 2017, url; Al Jazeera, Iraq forces in full control of Kirkuk province,
21 October 2017, url
840 Quesnay, Arthur, Email to DIDR (OFPRA), 10 December 2018, in EASO, COI Report: Iraq - Security situation, March 2019,url, pp. 99-100

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services. Each actor had its own mandate, structure and political affiliation. ICG assessed that the highnumber of security actors was possibly undermining the stability of the governorate instead ofcontributing to it.841
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
In a May 2020 report, prominent Iraqi security expert Husham al-Hashimi noted the presence of the
ISF - the CT (Second Operation command) center of Kirkuk, Federal Police sub-District around centercity of Kirkuk and Hawija, two Brigades of the Iraqi Army stationed at the south and west andSouthwest Kirkuk as of December 2019.842
The predominantly Shiite Federal Police’s 5th, 6th and 14th divisions were responsible for the security
in the rural areas, checkpoints on major roads and along the borders of the governorate.843 According
to the Center for Civilians in Conflict, the Iraqi Federal Police, was as of December 2019, the main
security force in the governorate.844
The elite CTS, which is linked to the PM of Iraq and supervised by the National Security Council, hasbeen deployed in Kirkuk in 2017 to fight ISIL. After the ousting of Kurdish forces from the area in
October 2017, following the failed independence referendum, the CTS assumed overall command of
the federal forces in Kirkuk.845
Units of the Iraqi Army were also reported to have been present in the governorate. After the Kurdishreferendum of September 2017, the 5th and 20th divisions of the Iraqi Army were deployed to takecontrol of Kirkuk City, which was subsequently transferred to the Federal Police. The 61st Brigade of
the Special Operations division of the Iraqi Army was deployed in the governorate in February 2019,as was the 14th division which took positions in Zab sub-district of Hawija district and some parts ofDibis district.846
Kurdish Peshmerga forces
Kurdish Peshmerga forces withdrew from Kirkuk city and most of the governorate in October 2017847,
following the fallout of the Kurdish referendum and intervention by ISF and PMU forces in thegovernorate.848
In June 2019, a joint Iraqi Army-Peshmerga coordination security mechanism was agreed upon by Iraqi
and Kurdish authorities but no agreement was reached on whether the Kurdish forces would takepositions inside Kirkuk governorate or just outside its northern and eastern borders. The Iraqi
government has since set up a joint operations command in Kirkuk comprising only of federal forces,
without Kurdish involvement.849 The Altun Kopri checkpoint located on the road between Kirkuk andErbil was reported to be the only one jointly run by Iraqi federal and Kurdish forces.850

841 ICG, Iraq: Fixing Security in Kirkuk, 15 June 2020, url, pp. 11-12
842 Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: from abandoned villages to the cities, 5 May 2020, url
843 ICG, Iraq: Fixing Security in Kirkuk, 15 June 2020, url, pp. 11-12
844 CIVIC, "We Just Want Someone To Protect Us"; Civilian Protection Challenges in Kirkuk, 19 December 2019, url, p. 2
845 ICG, Iraq: Fixing Security in Kirkuk, 15 June 2020, url, pp. 11-12
846 CIVIC, "We Just Want Someone To Protect Us"; Civilian Protection Challenges in Kirkuk, 19 December 2019, url, pp. 8-9,

footnote 26
847 CIVIC, "We Just Want Someone To Protect Us"; Civilian Protection Challenges in Kirkuk, 19 December 2019, url, p. 8; US
CRS, Iraq: Issues in the 116th Congress, 10 January 2020, url, pp. 5
848 CIVIC, "We Just Want Someone To Protect Us"; Civilian Protection Challenges in Kirkuk, 19 December 2019, url, p. 8
849 ICG, Iraq: Fixing Security in Kirkuk, 15 June 2020, url, p. ii
850 ICG, Iraq: Fixing Security in Kirkuk, 15 June 2020, url, p. 13

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

In June 2020, a joint military operation ‘Iraqi Heroes’ against ISIL remnants in south-western Kirkuk
involved Iraqi forces including the Iraqi Army, CTS, and PMUs, forces of the anti-ISIL coalition as wellas Kurdish Peshmerga forces.851 However, Iraqi authorities pointed out in July 2020 that the Kurdish
Peshmerga have not returned to Kirkuk and that only intelligence and military cooperation in thedisputed territories was being discussed between the two parties.852
US-led Coalition forces
At the end of March 2020, the US-led coalition against ISIL transferred the responsibility of the K1 Iraqi
Airbase in Kirkuk governorate to the ISF.853
PMU
Local PMU groups were responsible mainly for the non-urban areas in the governorate’s western andsouthern parts where ISIL insurgents were still active. These local PMUs included:•

The predominantly Shiite Turkmen 16th and 52nd Hashd brigades affiliated with the Badr
Organisation. They were reported to mainly operate in Daquq and areas south of Kirkuk citythat border Hawija district.854 Other sources place the 16th Brigade in Tuz Khormatu and Kirkuk
areas which are dubbed the ’northern axis’.855•

The Sunni Arab comprised 56th brigade of the tribal Hashd in Hawija.856

While local PMUs were responsible for the security roles described above, their political organisations
which included the Badr Organisation, Asa’ib Ahl al‐Haq, Kataeb Jund al-Imam and Kataib Hezbollah,
were also reported to maintain offices or a small armed presence in some towns in the governorate.857
In Hawija City, ISF and PMU militias were reported to be present and to have divided up the city andwider district among themselves, each exerting control over the territory assigned to them.858
ISIL
While ISIL was not controlling territory in the governorate, as of December 2019 it is reported to be
active and resorting to a ‘hit and run insurgency’ strategy.859 According to Iraq analyst Hafsa Halawa
writing for the Middle East Institute in March 2020, ISIL ‘sleeper cells’ remain active in Kirkuk andDiyala provinces in particular.860
ISIL activity was reported in the rural areas of Hawija and Daquq districts in a December 2019 report.861
A local security official interviewed by ICG in March 2019, assessed that ISIL concentrated its activity
in the rural parts of Hawija, especially the areas bordering the districts of Dibis and Daquq.862 For theperiod covering January to March 2020, the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) assessed Hawija

851 Jamestown Foundation, Operation Iraqi Heroes in Kirkuk; Terrorism Monitor Volume: 18 Issue: 12, 17 June 2020, url
852 Basnews, Peshmerga Hasn’t Returned to Kirkuk: Iraqi Army, 7 July 2020, url
853 US< USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve – Quarterly Report to the United States Congress. 1

January 2020 – 31 March 2020, 13 May 2020, url, p. 15
854 ICG, Iraq: Fixing Security in Kirkuk, 15 June 2020, url, pp. 11-12
855 Knights, M. et. all, Honored not Contained. The Future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, url, pp. 205, 207
856 ICG, Iraq: Fixing Security in Kirkuk, 15 June 2020, url, pp. 11-12
857 ICG, Iraq: Fixing Security in Kirkuk, 15 June 2020, url, pp. 11-12
858 Halawa, H., The Forgotten Iraq, 16 March 2020, url
859 CIVIC, "We Just Want Someone To Protect Us"; Civilian Protection Challenges in Kirkuk, 19 December 2019, url, p. 2
860 Halawa, H., The Forgotten Iraq, 16 March 2020, url
861 CIVIC, "We Just Want Someone To Protect Us"; Civilian Protection Challenges in Kirkuk, 19 December 2019, url, p. 2
862 ICG, Iraq: Fixing Security in Kirkuk, 15 June 2020, url, p. 15-16

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

district as being the district in Kirkuk province where ISIL remained most active.863 According to a
March 2020 analysis, ISIL activity persisted in the Kirkuk provincial towns of Abassi and Zab (both in
Hawija district), where a highway checkpoint manned by the ISF closes at 5 pm. As night falls, security
forces, fearing ISIL attacks, leave the post.864 In May 2020, sources reported that local tribesmen joinedor supported the ISF and PMUs fighting ISIL in Hawija district where ISIL was particularly active.865
Hawija district was described by the ICG as the ‘most vulnerable area’ to ISIL activity due to its
proximity to the mountain ranges used by ISIL as safe havens and bases for staging attacks. The
difficult terrain further complicates effective coordination between the security forces operating inneighbouring Salah al-Din and Diyala governorates.866
Husham al-Hashimi identified Kirkuk as a governorate with concentrated ISIL operations in 2020. He
assessed that ISIL was able to operate in many rural areas in Kirkuk and had some 350-400 active
fighters supported by some 400 inactive fighters that were focused on logistics.867 In a report covering
the period 1 April – 30 June 2020, the CJTF-OIR (Combined Joint Task Force-OIR) assessed that ISIL
‘operated mostly as small, cohesive cells of 5 to 15 fighters in Iraq, usually living in austere conditions
in outlying desert, mountainous, or rural areas in Diyala, Kirkuk, Salah ad Din, and Anbar provinces—largely Sunni areas that stretch across northern Iraq’.868
In a May 2020 analysis, Michael Knights assessed that the number of areas with active ISIL attack cells
in Iraq have almost doubled from 27 areas in December 2018 to 47 areas in May 2020. As of May
2020, in Kirkuk governorate these areas were: Zab/Abbasi; the Mamah-Gharra/Batawi ridge; Riyadh;
Rashad/Jawwalah Daquq/Ghayda; Dibis and the Qani Domlan; and Kirkuk city.869

2.5.3 Recent security trends and the impact on the civilian population
Developments 2019-2020
The UN Security Council reported frequent asymmetric attacks by ISIL against security forces andcivilians in several provinces including Kirkuk during 2019870 and in 2020.871
According to a May 2020 analysis by Michael Knights, in Kirkuk governorate ISIL carried out 30.8
attacks per month in 2018 (the most of any governorate), 11.2 attacks per month in 2019 (the third
most of any governorate) and 15.3 attacks per month for the first quarter of 2020 (the fifth highest
number among all governorate). The number of high-quality attacks (in the analyst’s classification
high-quality attacks include effective roadside bombings, attempts to overrun Iraqi security force

863 USDOD. Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve- Report to the United States Congress, 1 January 2020 –31 March 2020, 13 May 2020, url, p. 24
864 Halawa, H., The Forgotten Iraq, 16 March 2020, url
865 Al Monitor, Kirkuk tribesmen rally as IS launch new wave of attacks, 27 May 2020, url; Rudaw, Hawija tribes launch
campaign against ISIS, 12 May 2020, url
866 ICG, Iraq: Fixing Security in Kirkuk, 15 June 2020, url, p. 15-16
867 Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: From Abandoned Villages to the Cities, CG Policy, 5 May 2020, url
868 USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve - Report to the United States Congress. 1 April 2020 –30 June 2020, 4 August 2020, url, p. 23
869 Knights, M. and Almeida, A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020,
CTC, May 2020, url
870 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2019/660], 5 August
2019, url, p. 4; UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2421 (2018); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2019/365], 2 May 2019, url, p. 4
871 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2020/363], 6 May
2020, url, p. 4; UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2020/140], 21 February 2020, url, p. 4

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

checkpoints or outposts, person-specific targeted attacks, and attempted mass-casualty attacks)
carried out by ISIL declined in the province between 2018 and the first quarter of 2020 (from 15.1
high-quality attacks/month in 2018 to 3.2 in the second half of 2019 and 3.6 in the first quarter of2020).872
Despite this decline, the same source pointed out that in 2019, ISIL managed to carry out IED bombings
against civilians in Kirkuk city, harassment campaigns against the Kaka’i minority living around the
Kirkuk to Baghdad highway, assassinations of community leaders, kidnappings for ransom of farmers,
and extortion of civilians.873 In 2019, ISIL was also reported to carry out sniper attacks, ambushes,
kidnapping, and assassinations against security forces and community leaders. ISIL also targeted
civilian infrastructure such as water and electricity installations in Kirkuk.874
A security official interviewed by ICG in March 2019, indicated that in areas of Hawija district bordering
Dibis and Daquq districts, ISIL used roadside bombs to target security forces and occasionally fire
mortars at villages and towns.875 A December 2019 report by the Center for Civilians in Conflict wrotethat ISIL remnants were active in the rural areas of Daquq and Hawija, where they intimidated civilians
perceived to cooperate with the government, carried out kidnappings and attacks on mukhtars andtribal leaders, stole food and supplies and burned crops.876
Regular attacks by armed actors, including ISIL, were reported in 2019 in Daquq district, where villages
such as Ali Saray, Heftagar, Dara, and Zanqir were targeted.877
According to Michael Knights’ analysis on ISIL activity in Iraq, in 2019, ISIL demonstrated some of themost sophisticated roadside bombing techniques in Kirkuk such as IEDs set at mortar launch locations,bombs and explosive booby-trapping of bodies.878
According to open sources data from ACLED, EPIC and Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency database citedby USDOD, ISIL conducted between 30 and 40 attacks in Kirkuk governorate from January to March
2020.879 A March 2020 analysis published by the Middle East Institute revealed that ISIL-claimed
attacks in Kirkuk mainly targeted ISF and community leaders. ISIL activity persisted in the Kirkuk
provincial towns of Abassi and Zab (Hawija district). Mullahs and other community leaders continued
to periodically flee from Hawija City to Kirkuk City as they have become popular targets for ISIL.880
For the period comprised between 1 April and 30 June 2020, USDOD recorded 70 ISIL-claimed orsuspected attacks in Kirkuk, the second highest number out of all provinces during the reporting
period.881 In a May 2020 analysis, ICG cited a tribal sheik from the Kirkuk area who assessed ISIL’spresence stating that ‘it’s not in cities or urban areas. It’s out in the [rural] districts and subdistricts; in

872 Knights, M. and Almeida, A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020,

CTC, May 2020, url
873 Knights, M. and Almeida, A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020,
CTC, May 2020, url
874 US, USDOS, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2019 - Iraq, 11 March 2020, url
875 ICG, Iraq: Fixing Security in Kirkuk, 15 June 2020, url, p. 15
876 CIVIC, "We Just Want Someone To Protect Us"; Civilian Protection Challenges in Kirkuk, 19 December 2019, url, p. 2
877 CIVIC, "We Just Want Someone To Protect Us"; Civilian Protection Challenges in Kirkuk, 19 December 2019, url, p. 14
878 Knights, M. and Almeida, A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020,
CTC, May 2020, url
879 US< USDOD, Lead Inspector General Operation Inherent Resolve - Report to the United States Congress, 1 January 2020
– 31 March 2020, 13 May 2020, url, p. 24
880 Halawa, H., The Forgotten Iraq, 16 March 2020, url
881 USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve - Report to the United States Congress, 1 April 2020 –30 June 2020, 4 August 2020, url, p. 23

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

the bush, or in ravines and mountains’.882 In May 2020, two additional federal police brigades were
deployed to Dibis and Hawija districts, where ISIL sleeper cells have been particularly active.883
For the reference period 1 January to 30 March 2020, the US Combined Joint Task Force-OIR reported
that more than 20 military operations and one major clearance operation against ISIL were conductedin Kirkuk governorate by ISF with international coalition intelligence and fire support.884 A June 2020
military operation dubbed ‘Iraqi Heroes’ and aimed at clearing ISIL remnants in south-western Kirkuk
using a joint force comprising of ISF, PMUs, Kurdish Peshmerga and anti-ISIL coalition, was declared asuccess by the authorities with weapons caches, resources and hideouts of ISIL being seized.885
A significant security incident took place in late December 2019, when a rocket attack attributed to
KH on the US-controlled K-1 military base near Kirkuk in northern Iraq killed a US contractor andwounded several US soldiers.886 In March 2020, US Coalition forces transferred control of four Iraqi
military bases in the area including the K-1 base near Kirkuk city to the ISF.887 The base had hosted
coalition forces and was used since 2017 to launch operations against ISIL.888 ISF and CTS units used
the base to conduct security operations against ISIL in the Hamrin and Mamah Gorah mountains
areas.889
During the course of 2019, a number of protest demonstrations took place in Kirkuk, albeit on a muchsmaller scale than in other parts of Iraq.890 The protests continued in 2020.891
A non-exhaustive list of security incidents that were reported to have taken place in Kirkuk
governorate in 2019 and the first seven months of 2020 included the following:

Illustrative security incidents•

On 15 and 16 May 2019, seven members of the ISF were killed in Kirkuk in two hit-and-run
attacks by ISIL fighters.892•

On 30 May 2019, five people were killed and 18 were injured in various bombings with IEDs
in Kirkuk city.893 The attacks were attributed to ISIL.894•

On 24 August 2019, an apparent ISIL mortar attack killed six civilians and wounded nine others
in a soccer field situated near a Shiite shrine in Daquq.895

882 ICG, When Measuring ISIS’s “Resurgence”, Use the Right Standard, 13 May 2020, url
883 Al-Monitor, Kirkuk tribesmen rally as IS launch new wave of attacks, 27 May 2020, url
884 USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve - Report to the United States Congress, 1 January 2020

– 31 March 2020, 13 May 2020, url, p. 27
885 Jamestown Foundation, Operation Iraqi Heroes in Kirkuk; Terrorism Monitor Volume: 18 Issue: 12, 17 June 2020, url
886 Jamestown Foundation, The Leadership and Future of Kata’ib Hezbollah; Terrorism Monitor Volume: 18 Issue: 7, 6 April
2020, url
887 USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve - Report to the United States Congress, 1 January 2020
– 31 March 2020, 13 May 2020, url, pp. 3, 15
888 AP News, US-led forces pull out of 3rd Iraqi base this month, 29 March 2020, url
889 USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve - Report to the United States Congress, 1 January 2020
– 31 March 2020, 13 May 2020, url, p. 17
890 Al-Monitor, Sunnis support protests in Iraq, yet fear involvement, 15 October 2019, url; Al Jazeera, Several killed as Iraq
protests escalate, spread nationwide, 2 October 2019, url; Kurdistan24, Protests in Iraq spread to disputed province of
Kirkuk, 2 October 2019, url
891 Al-Monitor, Iraqi protesters set sights on local governors, 24 June 2020, url
892 EPIC, 16 May 2019, ISHM: May 10 – May 16, 2019, url
893 Al-Monitor, Islamic State in Iraq is not over yet, 8 June 2019, url
894 ISW, ISIS Second Comeback. Assessing the Next ISIS Insurgency, June 2019, url, p. 46
895 Arab Weekly (The), ISIS mortar attack on soccer field kills 6 in Iraq, 25 August 2019, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation•

On 27 December 2019, an attack attributed to Kata’ib Hezbollah on an Iraqi military basehousing US forces near Kirkuk killed a US contractor and wounded two US service members.896•

On 28 December 2019, a family of five were killed at a fake checkpoint set up by ISIL in the
sub-district of Rashad, in the district of Hawija.897•

On 15 January 2020, ISIL killed two farmers in the Zughaytun Valley, located south of Kirkuk
province.898•

On 4 February 2020, ISIL kidnapped two sheep herders from al-Hawija district.899•

On 18 February 2020, suspected ISIL militants attacked a gathering of youths in the village of
Chakhmakha, northwest of Kirkuk.900•

On 9 March 2020, two members of an elite unit of the U.S. Marines involved in a clearing
operation of a large cave complex were killed near Kirkuk City by ISIL fighters.901•

On 9 April 2020, two members of the ISF were wounded by ISIL militants in an attack south of
Kirkuk. On the same day, two PMU fighters were killed in a clash with ISIL south of Kirkuk.902•

On 28 April 2020, a lone ISIL attacker attempted a suicide attack on an intelligence service
headquarters in Kirkuk city. The attacker detonated his explosives before reaching thebuilding. Several men were wounded but none killed.903•

On 10 May 2020, ISIL stormed a village near Rashad and kidnapped the son of a tribal leader.904•

On 16 May 2020, ISIL attacked a security control point in southern Kirkuk, killing one police
officer.905•

On 7 July 2020, ten mortar shells hit a village in Buhriz district injuring 5 civilians.906•

On 16 July 2020, an IED exploded in central Kirkuk, damaging a shop and vehicle and a further
IED near Mussalla area in central Kirkuk wounded one civilian and damaged several
vehicles.907

Number of civilian casualties
The number of armed conflict related incidents and civilian casualties in the governorate recorded
by UNAMI for the period 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, is shown in the table below.

896 USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve - Report to the United States Congress, 1 October 2019

– 31 December 2019, 13 May 2020, url, pp. 14, 18
897 Kurdistan 24, ISIS kills 5 family members at fake checkpoint in Kirkuk: security sources, 28 December 2019, url
898 iMMAP - IHF Humanitarian, 15 January 2020, url
899 EPIC, Enhance Understanding, ISHM January 30 – February 6, 2020, ISHM, url
900 EPIC, Enhance Understanding, ISHM February 13 – February 20, 2020, ISHM, url
901 USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve - Report to the United States Congress, 1 October 2019
– 31 December 2019, 13 May 2020, url, p. 28; New York Times (The), U.S. Military Reviewing Iraq Operations After 2 Troops
Die Fighting ISIS, 9 March 2020, url
902 EPIC, ISHM: April 9 - April 16, 2020, 16 April 2020, url
903 ICG, When Measuring ISIS’s “Resurgence”, Use the Right Standard, 13 May 2020, url
904 EPIC, Enhance Understanding, ISHM May 7 – May 14, 2020, ISHM, url
905 AA, Daesh/ISIS terror attack kills police in Kirkuk, Iraq, 16 May 2020, url
906 EPIC, Enhance Understanding, ISHM July 2 – July 9, 2020, ISHM, url
907 EPIC, Enhance Understanding, ISHM July 16 – July 23, 2020, ISHM, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Gover- 2019 (Jan – Dec)
norate2019 total 2020 (Jan – Jul)
2020 total
casualties
casualties#of Killed Injured#of Killed Injured(killed and incidents(killed andincidents
injured)injured)Kirkuk

73

68

156

224

17

13

21

34

Table 9: Number of armed conflict related incidents and civilian casualties 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, Kirkuk
governorate.908

Number of security incidents
In the reference period, ACLED reported 141 battles, 153 incidents of remote violence/explosions, 30
cases of violence against civilians, 0 incidents of riots, accounting for a total of 324 security incidentsof these types in Kirkuk governorate, the majority taking place in the capital Kirkuk City. 24 protests
were also reported in Kirkuk governorate during the reference period. 909 The evolution of all the typesof security events through the reference period is shown in the figure below.

Figure 12: Evolution of security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence, violence against civilians, riots and protestsin Kirkuk governorate 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, based on ACLED data.910

State ability to secure law and orderMore information on the capacities of the Iraqi forces and the forces under the KRG as actors ofprotection, including the ability to secure law and order, as well as information on the integrity ofarmed forces, please see the report EASO COI Report – Iraq: Actors of Protection (2018).

908 UNAMI, Email to EASO, 24 July 2020
909 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url
910 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

The ousting of the Kurdish security forces from Kirkuk governorate following the Kurdish
independence referendum in October 2017, created a security vacuum that was only partially filledby the ISF.911 Security gaps in governorate have been identified by several sources912, especially inparts of Daquq and Dibis district as a result of the removal of Kurdish Peshmerga forces from thegovernorate and the distance between deployed forces ranging from 1 to 5 km.913 The US Combined
Joint Task Force-OIR reported that the ISF and Kurdish Peshmerga lack strong cooperation creating‘operational seams’ which ISIL exploits and that they operate from ‘ungoverned’ territory across partsof Kirkuk.914 The difficult terrain in Kirkuk and the wider Hamrin basin which included mountains,valleys, tunnels and caves, added to the challenge of securing the area.915
The security set-up in Kirkuk was assessed by ICG to be potentially dangerous to public safety. This is
attributed in part to the fact that the security actors are competing with each other rather thancooperating, while the lack of an overall command structure and coordination has allowed somesecurity actors to become involved in profitable criminal activities.916 The proliferation of security
forces is confusing to civilians as to which force has responsibility for what, not helped by forces
blaming each other for misconduct.917 Security actors, including the CTS, have been involved in oil
smuggling in tandem with local gangs, while PMUs have been accused of setting up illegal checkpoints
and charging fees, and extorting shop owners for protection money.918
The behaviour of some ISF and PMUs has been assessed to contribute to the instability in the area.
The Federal Police was reported to occupy civilian houses in Kirkuk, thus preventing the return of IDPs.
Sunni Arabs in Hawija have complained about being discriminated by the Federal Police who harasses
them for having lived in previously ISIL-controlled territory and/or being supporters of ISIL.919
Extortion of civilians and harassment of women at checkpoints by security actors has also beenreported.920
As reported by representatives of CTS, local police and federal police officials interviewed by ICG in
March and July 2019, tensions among security actors such as the CTS, Federal Police and PMUs led toalmost weekly incidents between them, which can include exchanges of fire and casualties.921 Attacks
on security forces by unknown perpetrators, usually attributed by the federal forces to Kurdish armed
gangs who do not approve of the federal forces’ presence in Kirkuk, have also been reported. An
Asayish representative interviewed by ICG in September 2019, acknowledged that he would retaliate
with ‘non-lethal attacks’ on federal forces harassing the Kurdish residents.922
The predominantly Arab and Shiite composition of the security forces in the multi-ethnic andpredominantly Sunni Kirkuk has led to mistrust from segments of the civilian population. Kurdish
residents are reported to be fearful of the Arab federal forces due to their treatment under the911 Schoenborn, T., Iraq’s Diyala Faces a New Insurgency, International Review, 22 March 2019, url
912 Rudaw, ISIS insurgents move freely in disputed Kirkuk: locals, 21 May 2019, url; CIVIC, "We Just Want Someone To

Protect Us"; Civilian Protection Challenges in Kirkuk, 19 December 2019, url, p. 3; ICG, Iraq: Fixing Security in Kirkuk, 15June 2020, url, p. 15
913 ICG, Iraq: Fixing Security in Kirkuk, 15 June 2020, url, p. 15
914 USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve - Report to the United States Congress, 1 January 2020
– 31 March 2020, 13 May 2020, url, p. 25
915 Jamestown Foundation, Operation Iraqi Heroes in Kirkuk; Terrorism Monitor Volume: 18 Issue: 12, 17 June 2020, url
916 ICG, Iraq: Fixing Security in Kirkuk, 15 June 2020, url, p. 12
917 ICG, Iraq: Fixing Security in Kirkuk, 15 June 2020, url, p. 12
918 ICG, Iraq: Fixing Security in Kirkuk, 15 June 2020, url, p. 14
919 CIVIC, "We Just Want Someone To Protect Us"; Civilian Protection Challenges in Kirkuk, 19 December 2019, url, p. 2
920 CIVIC, "We Just Want Someone To Protect Us"; Civilian Protection Challenges in Kirkuk, 19 December 2019, url, p. 2
921 ICG, Iraq: Fixing Security in Kirkuk, 15 June 2020, url, p. 13
922 ICG, Iraq: Fixing Security in Kirkuk, 15 June 2020, url, p. 13

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

previous regime. The predominantly Sunni population of the governorate reportedly fears the Shiite
dominated security forces such as the federal police and the PMUs.923 In Hawija district, the relations
between the largely Shia security actors and Sunni civilian population remained weak and was marked
by ethnic tensions. This was further enhanced by the fact that the Federal Police generally withdrew
from the population centres as early as 2pm for fear of ISIL attacks, leaving the civilian population
unprotected.924 Earlier anecdotal reporting from December 2018, suggests that the Federal Police is‘failing to protect civilians’, in part due to remaining at their security bases at night, arriving late toassist villages under attack and detaining or disarming the wrong people.925
The ISF in Kirkuk and the Kirkuk Operations Command lacked protocols to track incidents of civilian
harm caused by the security forces and there were no designated community outreach officers toresolve any civilian protection concerns. They were also reportedly slow in responding due to concerns
about being ambushed, and lack patrolling and surveillance capabilities.926
According to USDOS reporting on 2019, since the Iraqi government regained control of Kirkuk in 2017,
ISF and PMUs have committed abuses including violence and forced displacement of Kurds, Turkmens,
Kaka’i and Christians in the province.927
In May 2019, ethnic tensions between Kurds and Arabs in the province were heightened after Kurdish
residents claimed that Arab armed actors set hundreds of acres of Kurdish wheat and barley crops on
fire ‘in an attempt to drive Kurds out of their lands’. There were claims that either ISIL or paramilitaryforces such as the PMUs were responsible for the arson.928
In April 2019, the peace organisation PAX surveyed the population in all four districts of Kirkuk
governorate for their opinions on the security situation in the region. The majority of respondents(52 %) indicated that the security situation had improved over the past year but just over half of the
respondents reported feeling safe in their communities. At the same time, about 48 % of the
respondents expected that it was likely they will become a victim of violence in the near future.
Especially in the districts of Hawija (57 % of respondents) and Daquq (50 % of respondents), there wasfear of indiscriminate violence. Respondents from the largely Kurdish district of Dibis feared violence
because of their ethnicity or religious identity (80 % of respondents).929
Asked from which side they fear violence, 45 % responded that it was criminal violence while 27 %said they feared ISIL violence, a considerable drop from 2017 when 69 % of respondents identified ISIL
as the most feared actor of violence. In the district of Hawija however, 71 % of respondents expected
the perpetrator of violence to be ISIL.930
An Oxfam study on communities’ perceptions of the main protection risks in Kirkuk published in March
2020, revealed that attacks by armed groups were the biggest protection threat as perceived by 21 %923 ICG, Iraq: Fixing Security in Kirkuk, 15 June 2020, url, p. 13
924 Building Peaceful Futures, Conflict Analysis Sinjar and Hawija, Iraq, 2019, url, p. 29
925 Knights, M., The Islamic State Inside Iraq: Losing Power or Preserving Strength?, CTC, Vol. 11, Issue 11, December 2018,

url, pp. 6-7
926 CIVIC, "We Just Want Someone To Protect Us"; Civilian Protection Challenges in Kirkuk, 19 December 2019, url, p. 13
927 US, USDOS, 2019 Report on International Religious Freedom: Iraq, 10 June 2020, url
928 Saeed, Y., After Arson in Kirkuk Against Kurdish Farmers, Kurdish Parties Remain Divided, 31 May 2019, url
929 Based on 613 interviews conducted in all four districts of Kirkuk governorate. PAX, Human Security Survey Kirkuk, Iraq 2019, 19 December 2019, url, pp. 2-3
930 Based on 613 interviews conducted in all four districts of Kirkuk governorate. PAX, Human Security Survey Kirkuk, Iraq 2019, 19 December 2019, url, p. 3

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situationof household survey respondents, followed by kidnapping of civilians as indicated by 12 % of
respondents.931

Infrastructural damage and remnants of war
Around 7 % of houses in Kirkuk governorate were assessed by a World Bank 2018 study to be either‘partially damaged’ or ‘completely destroyed’. Furthermore, 7.1 % of water resources and 27 % of the
WASH infrastructure in the province were also damaged.932
In 2019, an area of 32 750 084 square meters was reported to be contaminated by mines and IEDs as
per the end of 2018.933 Unexploded mines and bombs, as well as ‘huge volumes of debris’ werereported in the reference period as preventing the return of IDPs to their places of residence in Kirkuk
governorates.934 Mines and other unexploded ordnance often mix with rubble to be cleared, causing
additional hazard.935
Between 1 January and 31 December 2019, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) removed
around 862 explosive remnants of war (ERW), 423 IED, 135 IED main charges, and 40 suicide belts in
Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Salah al-Din and Ninewa governorates. No specific details on the situation of
ERW in Kirkuk were provided.936

Displacement and return
As of 30 June 2020, IOM recorded 100 026 IDPs and 341 106 returnees in Kirkuk governorate.937 Morethan half of the IDPs recorded in Kirkuk were displaced within the governorate while the rest camemainly from Salah al-Din and Ninewa governorates. Around 81 000 IDPs were located in Kirkuk districtalone as of June 2020.938 As of December 2019, Kirkuk city hosted around 73 000 IDPs, the majority ofwhom have been displaced for more than three years.939
IOM noted that the rate of return940 to Kirkuk, as of June 2019, stood at 76 %, representing 8 % of all
returns.941 The pace of return to Kirkuk has slowed compared to the May 2017–May 2018 period.942
Between May 2018 and June 2019 the number of returnees increased by 37 548.943
According to IOM’s Return Index, from March 2020, a total of 348 returnees to Kirkuk faced ‘highseverity’ return conditions in four locations, 90 354 face ‘medium severity’ conditions in 74 locations
and 248 364 face ‘low severity’ conditions in 125 locations.944 The sub-district of Al-Riyad was cited as

931 The research was conducted 13 locations in Kirkuk where data was collected from 147 households, in Kirkuk), 27 focus

group discussions and 27 Key informant interviews. OXFAM, Protection Landscapes in Diyala and Kirkuk, Iraq, March 2020,
url, p. 15
932 World Bank, Damage and Needs Assessment of Affected Governorates, January 2018, url, pp. 15, 53, 96
933 HALO trust (The), Mine Advisory Group, Norwegian People’s Aid, Clearing the Mines 2019, 1 October 2019, url, p. 129
934 Middle East Monitor, 70 % of unexploded ordnances remain under rubble in Iraq, 10 June 2019, url; UNEP, As conflict
abates, Iraqi villages begin to tackle “huge” problem of rubble, 19 June 2020, url
935 UNEP, As conflict abates, Iraqi villages begin to tackle “huge” problem of rubble, 19 June 2020, url
936 UNMAS, Iraq, 31 December 2019, url
937 IOM, Iraq DTM, 15 June 2020, url
938 IOM, Iraq DTM Dashboard, 15 June 2020, url
939 IOM DTM, Urban Displacement in Iraq: A Preliminary Analysis, 2020, url, p. 11
940 IOM defines the rate of return as the proportion of returnees originally from a governorate/district to the sum of
returnees and IDPs originally from the same governorate/district
941 IOM Iraq, Integrated location assessment IV, 03 February 2020, url, p. 12
942 IOM Iraq, Integrated location assessment IV, 03 February 2020, url, p. 12
943 IOM Iraq, Integrated location assessment IV, 03 February 2020, url, p. 12
944 IOM’s Return Index correlates all data available on returnee population numbers with indicators on (a) livelihoods andbasic services and (b) social cohesion and safety perceptions to create a score at location level (i.e., individual village, town

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situationa ‘hotspot’, meaning they score highly in terms of severity on at least one of the two scales (either
livelihoods and basic services, or safety and social cohesion) or if they score medium in terms ofseverity but also host relatively large numbers of returnees.945
The vast majority of the returnees registered in Kirkuk governorate were located in the districts of
Hawija (around 162 000) and Kirkuk (around 153 000).946 Between March 2018 and December 2019,
IOM DTM identified 21 locations in Kirkuk governorate where all families had re-displaced after having
returned.947 Most households re-displaced were recorded in Hawija and Kirkuk. 948
As of April 2020, IOM identified 13 locations recording no returns in Kirkuk, all situated in the districtsof Hawija (Al-Riyad sub-district) and Kirkuk (Al-Multaqa sub-district). The main reasons for the lack of
returns were linked to destroyed buildings, lack of services, presence of mines and IEDs, security
problems, and the presence of ISIL.949
Research by Oxfam in the April-May 2019 period showed that individuals and groups with perceived
affiliation to extremist groups in Kirkuk and Diyala are prevented from returning, and face harassment
and abuse at checkpoints.950 Moreover ‘most displaced families mentioned that they do not have thesecurity clearance needed to travel to their area of origin to apply to the Civil Status Directorate tohave their identity document issued’ and ‘lack of identity documents causes severe restrictions on
movement, as families cannot or are afraid to pass through checkpoints, and it compounds other preexisting problems and vulnerabilities’.951
The return process to a governorate and districts inside it varies, depending on the context and local
dynamics. In the case of IDPs who wish to return to Kirkuk governorate from other districts within thegovernorate or from other governorates, they must:‘fill a return form obtained from the Mayor’s office with information that include names offamily members, number of the HH [household] individuals, area of displacement, history of
displacement, and so on. They are also required to provide copies of personal documents ofevery returning HH member (mainly the Iraqi ID or Jinsiyah), the residence card of the headof HH and the camp departure letter (if displaced in a formal camp) or a letter from the
Mukhtar (if displaced out of camps), before submitting the documents to the security
committee for vetting’.952
The application usually takes two weeks to be processed and upon receiving security approval is sent
to the Mayor for final approval.953
Regarding the situation of families of ISIL fighters, the governor of Kirkuk stated that he supported
their return, as did Arab Sunni tribes, Sunni Turkmen and Kurds in the governorate. The main obstacle
to their returns was, according to the governor, the opposition of PMUs and Shiite Turkmen to thereturns, despite the families having security clearance. They have blocked previous attempts toor neighbourhood) that measures the severity of conditions or quality of return. See IOM Iraq, Return Index Findings round8- Iraq, March 2020, url, p. 1
945 IOM Iraq, Return Index Findings round 8- Iraq, March 2020, url, p. 2
946 IOM, Iraq DTM Dashboard, 15 June 2020, url
947 IOM, Re-Displaced: An Exploration of Displacement after Attempted Return in Iraq, February 2020, url, p. 2
948 IOM, Re-Displaced: An Exploration of Displacement after Attempted Return in Iraq, February 2020, url, p. 7
949 IOM DTM, Iraq RWG, Areas of origin having witnessed no return, April 2020, url, pp. 1-2
950 OXFAM, Protection Landscapes in Diyala and Kirkuk, Iraq, March 2020, url, pp. 6-7
951 OXFAM, Protection Landscapes in Diyala and Kirkuk, Iraq, March 2020, url, pp. 17-18
952 IOM DTM, Iraq RWG, Return Process: Hawiga, Kirkuk, July 2020, url, p. 2
953 IOM DTM, Iraq RWG, Return Process: Hawiga, Kirkuk, July 2020, url, p. 2

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

resettle families in, Daquq, Bashir, Dibis, and Amerli, Sulaiman Bek and Tuz Khurmatu (the last threelocated in Salah al-Din governorate). In Hawija, the Jubour and Shammar tribes together with the
PMUs forced families of ISIL fighters that had not surrendered to leave the area, under the suspicionof collaborating with ISIL on recent attacks.954
For 2020, UNOCHA assessed that 282 458 persons were in need of humanitarian assistance in
Kirkuk.955 Forced and coerced movements from camps and informal settlements in Kirkuk
governorate, made some populations vulnerable to secondary displacement.956

954 Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: The Challenge of Reintegrating ‘ISIS Families’, CG Policy, 7 July 2020, url
955 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Iraq, November 2019, url, p. 6
956 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview: Iraq, November 2019, url, p. 22

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2.6 Ninewa

Map 11: Ninewa governorate with district borders, district capitals and main roads, © United Nations. 957

2.6.1 General description of the governorate
Basic geography
The governorate of Ninewa (or Nineveh) is located in north and north-west Iraq. It borders to Syria
and the Iraqi governorates Dohuk, Erbil (both part of KRI), Salah al-Din and Anbar.958 Ninewa is thethird largest governorate at 37 323 km2 (8.6 % the total size of Iraq). The capital is Mosul City, locatedin the north-east.959
The governorate is divided into nine districts: Mosul, Tel Kayf, Sheikhan, Akre, Tal Afar, Sinjar, Ba’aj,
al-Hatra, and Hamdaniya. Akre and Sheikhan districts have been administered by the KRG since theestablishment of the Green Line by the ceasefire between Saddam and the Kurds in 1991.960

957 UN JAU, Iraq District Map, January 2014, url
958 NCCI, Ninewa NCCI Governorate Profile, December 2010, url, p. 2
959 CIA, the World Factbook, Iraq, 21 July 2020, url
960 Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa: Preventing an ISIS Resurgence in Northern Iraq, 7 May 2018, url, p. 5

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Population
Mosul governorate had a population estimated at 3 828 197 inhabitants in 2019.961 The estimatedpopulation of Mosul was 1.630 million in 2019.962 The second largest city is Tal Afar, north-west of
Mosul. Other major towns are Sinjar to the west and Qayara in the south.963

Ethnicity
Ninewa is one of the most ethnically diverse governorates of Iraq. Sunni Arabs constitute the majority,
but other groups also share power and influence: the Kurds are dominant in Akre and Sheikhan
districts. The Ninewa Plains, east and north-east of Mosul, are the territory where the majority of thegovernorate’s Christian and Shabak population lives (this area contains also major oil fields). In Tal
Afar, the Turkmen (both Sunni and Shia) are prominent, while in Sinjar, the Yezidis are the majority,
as well as in their holy city of Lalish in Sheikhan district.964

EconomyMosul is an important regional traffic hub: It has direct road connections with Baghdad, Kirkuk, Erbil,
Dohuk, and also to Syria and Turkey, through Tal Afar and the Syrian border at Rabia in the north, andtowards Sinjar and Syria in the west.965
An IOM report on the Legacies of the Conflict on rural economies and communities in Sinjar and the
Ninewa Plains from November 2019 shows that the recovery of the economy in these rural areas issuffering from the legacy of ISIL: the damage to the agricultural infrastructure and livestock has been
large, for instance in the Sinjar district.966 Unemployment due to failed agricultural reconstruction runs
high in these districts, and 70% of returning IDPs are economically inactive.967 Some agriculturalactivities have restarted in Sinjar, but not to pre-conflict levels, when the region heavily relied on
agriculture.968

Road security
According to Deutsche Welle, the Shia militia in Ninewa were still manning checkpoints in cities inAugust 2019, and this source reported of problems in many places. In the summer of 2019, the 30th
PMU Brigade blocked a highway east of Mosul and it came to armed confrontation with the Iraqi army
which tried to take over its checkpoints.969
According to iMMAP, the explosive hazard risk level on the roads in Ninewa Governorate fromFebruary until the end of June 2020 show different stretches of the main roads from Mosul to Sinjar,
Tal Afar (and the Syrian border), to Dahuk, to Erbil, to Makhmur district and to Sahlah al-Din

961 Iraq, CSO, 2019 ‫[ قديرات سكان العراق حسب المحافظة والبيئة والجنس لسنة‬Demographic and population indicators, Estimates forthe population of Iraq by province, environment and gender for the year 2019] (table), n.d., url
962 CIA, the World Factbook, Iraq, 21 July 2020, url
963 NCCI, Ninewa NCCI Governorate Profile, December 2010, url, p. 2; Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa:
Preventing an ISIS Resurgence in Northern Iraq, 7 May 2018, url, p. 6
964 Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa: Preventing an ISIS Resurgence in Northern Iraq, 7 May 2018, url, p. 6
965 ABC News, Why the Battle for Mosul Is Important, 16 October 2016, url; Ahn, J., et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa:
Preventing an ISIS Resurgence in Northern Iraq, 7 May 2018, url, p. 5
966 IOM Iraq, Rural Areas in Ninewa – Legacies of Conflict on Rural Economies and Communities in Sinjar and Ninewa Plains,
28 November 2019, url, pp. 17-18
967 IOM Iraq, Rural Areas in Ninewa – Legacies of Conflict on Rural Economies and Communities in Sinjar and Ninewa Plains,
28 November 2019, url, p. 23
968 IOM Iraq, Rural Areas in Ninewa – Legacies of Conflict on Rural Economies and Communities in Sinjar and Ninewa Plains,
28 November 2019, url, p. 23
969 Deutsche Welle, Iraq: Caught between militias and 'Islamic State', 7 August 2019, url

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governorate being indicated as primary risk roads in the governorate. The Mosul-Sinjar road stands
out with more recurrent high risk stretches during this period than the other main roads.970

2.6.2 Background conflict dynamics and armed actors
Background conflict
In Ninewa the ISIL occupation was preceded by ‘years of overlapping violent extremism and organizedcrime by militia groups, some of which were IS progenitors and/or rivals’.971 Located within Iraq’s
disputed territories and having a diverse ethnic composition, Ninewa is considered to be a ‘longtime
center of Sunni Arab nationalism in Iraq’ and was once the ‘center of gravity for al-Qaeda in Iraq’. 972
Mosul was taken over and occupied by ISIL in June 2014. ISIL attacks on Sinjar, Zummar and the
Ninewa Plains in August 2014 displaced nearly 1 million people within weeks.973 The fall of Mosul inJune 2014 and the withdrawal of the Kurdish Forces from large parts of the governorate in August
2014 led to widespread targeting of Iraq’s minority communities by ISIL: Turkmen, Christians, Yezidis,
Shabak, Kaka’i and other groups974 who were subjected to torture, public executions, crucifixions,kidnappings, and sexual slavery.975
The battle for Mosul lasted more than nine months976, and the victory over ISIL was not officiallyannounced until the beginning of July 2017.977 The battle, and especially its second part with thecapturing of the historic town of western Mosul was the hardest confrontation between ISIL and the
Iraqi government forces during the whole conflict from 2014 until present.978 Mosul - the second cityof Iraq – sustained heavy damage, a high number of civilians was killed during the hostilities with theestimates of civilian casualties ranging from 4 194 killed and wounded979 up to 9 000-11 000 killed980,
and one source indicated that over 40 000 civilians could have been killed as a result of the massive
firepower used against the city by the ISF, the International Coalition and ISIL.981
Minority communities responded to the threat by ISIL and the fact that the Iraqi Army and thePeshmerga abandoned their posts during the ISIL offensive of 2014 by developing many of the local
militias and their allegiances.982

970 iMMAP-IHF, Explosive Hazards Risk Level on Roads in Ninewa Governorate 01-29 February 2020, 4 March 2020, url;

iMMAP-IHF, Explosive Hazards Risk Level on Roads in Ninewa Governorate 01-31 March 2020, 6 April 2020, url; iMMAPIHF, Explosive Hazards Risk Level on Roads in Ninewa Governorate 01-30 April 2020, 6 May 2020, url; iMMAP-IHF, Explosive
Hazards Risk Level on Roads in Ninewa Governorate 01-31 May 2020, 7 June 2020, url; iMMAP-IHF, Explosive Hazards Risk
Level on Roads in Ninewa Governorate 01-30 June 2020, 6 April 2020, 5 July 2020, url; iMMAP-IHF, Explosive Hazards Risk
Level on Roads in Ninewa Governorate, 01-31 July 2020, 9 August 2020, url
971 Rise Foundation, Mosul and Tel Afar Context Analysis, December 2017, url, p. 6.
972 Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa: Preventing an ISIS Resurgence in Northern Iraq, 7 May 2018, url, p. 6
973 UNOCHA, Iraq: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, November 2018, url, p. 14974 HRW, Iraq: ISIS Abducting, Killing, Expelling Minorities, 19 July 2014, url
975 Gaston, E., Derzi-Horváth, A., GPPI, Iraq After ISIL, March 2018, url, p. 17
976 Al-Jazeera, More than 9,000 killed in battle for Mosul: AP, 20 December 2017, url
977 Huffington Post, Iraq Declares A Brilliant Victory In Mosul: What Are The Lessons? 10 July 2017, url
978 BBC News, Major General: Battle for Mosul is 'toughest since WWII', 26 June 2017, url; PBS, Frontline, “The Toughest
Battle I’ve Ever Covered”: A Q&A With “Mosul” Director Olivier Sarbil, 18 October 2017, url; Defense One, Watson, B.,
What the Largest Battle of the Decade Says About the Future of War, 28 June 2017, url
979 UNAMI, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the context of the Ninewa Operations and the retaking of Mosul City, 17
October 2016 – 10 July 2017, 2 November 2017, url, p. 9
980 AP News, Mosul is a graveyard: Final IS battle kills 9,000 civilians. 21 December 2017, url
981 Independent (The), The massacre of Mosul: 40,000 feared dead in battle to take back city from Isis as scale of civilian
casualties revealed. 19 July 2017, url
982 Gaston, E. and Derzsi-Horváth, A., GPPI, Fracturing of the State. Recent Historical Events Contributing to theProliferation of Local, Hybrid, and Sub-State Forces, 24 August 2017, url

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Insurgent violence after the ISIL collapse remained high in Ninewa in 2017.983 After the loss of its
territorial control in the province, ISIL continued to carry out asymmetric attacks against ISF in Ninewa,
amongst other governorates in north-central Iraq and in the central region.984

Armed actors
As of July 2020, the majority of the governorate of Ninewa was under the control of the Iraqi
government. The KRG was in control of the Akre and Sheikhan districts, a wedge between Dohuk andthe Syrian border, and a band between the Line of Control of 2003 and Bashiqa.985
The main security actors operating in Ninewa can be classified in the following main categories:•

Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)•

Popular Mobilization Units (PMU)•

Kurdish Security Forces•

militias aligned with the KRG•

non-aligned militias•

foreign forces986

Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
The formal ISF in Ninewa fall under the authority of the Ninewa Operations Command (NOC), with the
exception of the Counterterrorism Service (CTS), which reports directly to the Iraqi government. The
NOC is located in east Mosul.987 As of December 2019, ISF presence and activity was reported in theeastern and western part of Mosul and the Ninewa Plains, Tal Afar, Baaj as well as in Hadar, Kairouan
and all the western areas of the province to the borders with Syria and in the south-west towards
Anbar.988
Counterterrorism Service (CTS, jihaz mukafahat al-irhab)
CTS presence was reported in Ninewa governorate989 and in 2020, CTS units conducted anti-terror
operations in the Hatra desert990 and Makhmur mountains.991

983 Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa: Preventing an ISIS Resurgence in Northern Iraq, 7 May 2018, url, p. 2
984 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2421 (2018) Report of the Secretary-General [S/2018/975], 31

October 2018, url, pp. 9-10; UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution
2367 (2017) [S/2018/359], 17 April 2018, url, p. 4985 Based on reading of Figure 1. Iraq: Areas of Influence and Operation, US CRS, Iraq: Issues in the 116th Congress, 17 July
2020, Figure 1. Iraq: Areas of Influence and Operation, As of July 8, 2020, url, p. 2
986 Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa: Preventing an ISIS Resurgence in Northern Iraq, 7 May 2018, url, pp. 14,
33; USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve - Report to the United States Congress, 1 January 2020
– 31 March 2020, 13 May 2020, url, p. 3; UN Security Council: Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019); Report of theSecretary-General [S/2020/363], 6 May 2020, url, p. 5
987 Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa: Preventing an ISIS Resurgence in Northern Iraq., 7 May 2018, url, p. 14
988 Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: From Abandoned Villages to the Cities, CG Policy, 5 May 2020, url
989 Arab Weekly (The), As ISIS rears its head in Iraq, new anti-terror chief pledges to “root out” extremist group, 15 June
2020, url
990 Diyaruna, Iraq's CTS hunts down ISIS remnants in mountainous areas, 29 June 2020, url
991 US, CJTF-OIR, Defeating Daesh Highlights of the Week July 1, 2020, 1 July 2020, url

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Iraqi Army (IA, Jayish)
The Iraqi Army maintains a large presence in Ninewa, the 15th and 16th Infantry Divisions have servedin the governorate since the liberation of Mosul.992 In June 2019, the commander of the Ninewa
Operations Command (NOC), Major General Najm Abdullah al-Jubouri, was replaced by Major General
Nuam Abdul al-Zubai, who changed over from leading the Salah al-Din Operations Command.993 In
September 2020, Maj. Gen. Ismail Shihab al-Mahlawi was in charge of the NOC.994
Iraqi Police Service (IPS, Local Police)
The IPS is the local police force operating within the governorate. Less militarised than the Federal
Police, the IPS often patrols in non-armoured vehicles and carries only light firearms. The Ninewa
Province Police (shurta muhafiza Ninewa) is responsible for the day-to-day security duties and istheoretically closest to the local population. Their officers are the first responders and the first line ofdefence against terrorism and criminality. Because of this, they are exposed to the ‘greatest risk ofbeing targeted by insurgent attacks’. They are locally recruited, but this also means that they and theirfamilies are easier targets for kidnapping or assassination.995
National Security Service (NSS, jihaz al-amn al-watni)
The NSS is the primary intelligence service within the governorate, but it is often present at
checkpoints throughout the governorate to identify individuals, and they also conduct raids, arrestsand interrogations. Their activities has led them to clash with other security forces, such as IA and
ISOF units operating in Mosul.996
Iraqi Border Guards (haras hadud alIraq)
The Iraqi Border Guards operate primarily on the Syrian border in western Ninewa, especially in theborder town of Rabia. The Border Guards are also responsible for preventing ISIL fighters fromentering Ninewa from Syria, but they receive assistance from the PMU in securing remote borderregions.997

Popular Mobilization Units (PMU)
Michael Knights asserted in an August 2019 analysis that the western desert is under the influence ofpro-Iranian militia under control of the Badr Organization, but that the areas around Tal Afar, Sinjar
and the Nineveh Plains are under shared control of the Iraqi army and Badr Organisation.998 The
multitude of smaller brigades in Ninewa are nominally answering to the PMF Nineveh Operations
Command under Ali Kadhim al-Musawi, but – as Michael Knights pointed out – Ninewa is an area
where local and outsider militias are acting in their own interests.999

992 Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa: Preventing an ISIS Resurgence in Northern Iraq., 7 May 2018, url, p. 15;

US, CJTF-OIR, Defeating Daesh Highlights of the Week, 27 November 2019, url, pp. 2-3; The Meir Amit Intelligence andTerrorism Information Center, Spotlight on Global Jihad (January 23-29, 2020), 30 January 2020, url
993 Knights, M., Almeida, A., Reshuffling Iraqi Generals: Who Benefits? 6 June 2019, url
994 Knights, M., Almeida, A., Khadimi’s Rolling Reshuffle (Part 1): Military Command Changes, 14 September 2020, url
995 Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa: Preventing an ISIS Resurgence in Northern Iraq., 7 May 2018, url, p. 17
996 Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa: Preventing an ISIS Resurgence in Northern Iraq., 7 May 2018, url, p. 17;
FP, Goodbye, Islamic State - Hello, Anarchy, 24 March 2017, url
997 Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa: Preventing an ISIS Resurgence in Northern Iraq., 7 May 2018, url, p. 17
998 Knights, M. Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, August 2019, url , pp. 3-4
999 Knights, M. Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, August 2019, url , p. 4

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As of December 2019, PMU forces were reported to be present and active in a wide range of areas
inside Ninewa, including Tal Safuk, Mosul, west-Ninewa (Al-Qayrawan), Zummar, Rabia, Al-Sakar, Tel
Afar city and region, Ninewa Plains, and in the area around Sinjar.1000
In the Ninewa Plains and eastern Mosul city, two local militias supported by the central Hashd
command have repeatedly refused orders from the Iraqi government to leave Christian areas. One is
Liwa al-Shabak/Quwat Sahl Nineveh (Brigade 30), and the other is the Babylon Brigade (Brigade 50).
Liwa al-Shabak (Brigade 30) is recruiting within the local Shia Shabak community, while the Babylon
Brigade (Brigade 50) is supposedly Christian, but according to Michael Knights, many of its fighters are
non-Christians from Sadr City (Baghdad), Muthanna and Thi Qar.1001 Another source noted that
although it is led by a Christian, the Babylon Brigade (Brigade 50) rank and file members consist
primarily of Shia Arabs and Shabaks.1002 The groups have been accused of harassing civilians at
checkpoints, looting, intimidating the local population and preventing the return of IDPs.1003
Other local groups include:•

Ninewa Plains Protection Units (NPU): a predominantly Christian militia. Despite its nominal
affiliation to the PMU, it operates independently of PMU leadership and reports directly to
the NSS. The NPU was the only Assyrian force authorised to participate in anti-ISIL operations,and it received training and some support from the US-led Joint Task Force – Operation
Inherent Resolve.1004 Following the liberation of the Nineveh Plains, the NPU became thedominant factor in Bartella, but the competition of the PMU brigade 30 (see also below)
acquired more size and influence due to the backing of the Badr Organization. The NPU
became outnumbered by its competitor and according to the Assyrian Policy Institute, citing
an article by AP, it controlled only two checkpoints in Bartella in February 2019.1005•

Other PMU’s, including the Shia Turkmen Al-Hashd al-Turkmani1006, the Yezidi Lalish regiment(36th Brigade)1007 and the Sunni Ninewa Guards (Haras Ninewa)1008 were reported in previous
years to be present in the province.

Non-local groups included:•

Badr Organization, Asa’ib Ahl al‐Haq and Kataeb Hezbollah: These large non-local PMUs arepresent in Ninewa and have significant influence over many of the smaller local groups, but
their limited presence prevents them from directly controlling territory. These Iranian proxygroups are the main link between the national PMU umbrella and the local Shia Hashd groups.
Their attempts to recruit among the local Sunni population have proven largely ineffective.
Despite their lack of overt presence, they still were seen as major players in thegovernorate.1009 According to Michael Knights, Badr Organisation asserts control over the1000 Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: From Abandoned Villages to the Cities, CG Policy, 5 May 2020, url
1001 Knights, M., Normalizing Security in the Nineveh Plains, 5 July 2019, url
1002 Assyrian Policy Institute, Contested Control: The Future of Security in Iraq’s Nineveh Plain, 1 June 2020, url, p. 36
1003 Knights, M., Normalizing Security in the Nineveh Plains, 5 July 2019, url; Assyrian Policy Institute, Contested Control:

The Future of Security in Iraq’s Nineveh Plain, 1 June 2020, url, p. 37
1004 Assyrian Policy Institute, Contested Control: The Future of Security in Iraq’s Nineveh Plain, 1 June 2020, url, p. 31
1005 Assyrian Policy Institute, Contested Control: The Future of Security in Iraq’s Nineveh Plain, 1 June 2020, url, p. 35; AP,
Abuelgasim, F., Iraqi Christians fear returning home, wary of Shiite militia, 13 February 2019, url
1006 Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa: Preventing an ISIS Resurgence in Northern Iraq, 7 May 2018, url, p. 20;
Jawad Al-Tamimi, A., Hashd Brigade Numbers Index, 31 October 2017, url
1007 Jawad Al-Tamimi, A., Hashd Brigade Numbers Index, 31 October 2017, url; Ahn, J., et. al, The Politics of Security in
Ninewa: Preventing an ISIS Resurgence in Northern Iraq, 7 May 2018, url, p. 19; International Review, Koontz K., Sinjar’s
Yezidi Militias, 18 June 2020, url
1008 Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa: Preventing an ISIS Resurgence in Northern Iraq, 7 May 2018, url, pp. 20,
24; ICG, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenge of Rebuilding a Functioning State, 30 July 2018, url, p. 171009 Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa: Preventing an ISIS Resurgence in Northern Iraq, 7 May 2018, url, p. 20

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smaller groups in the western desert, through the brigades 28, 29 and 35.1010 The names ofthese brigades are Saraya Ansar al-Aqeeda (brigade 28), Kata’ib Ansar al-Hujja (brigade 29)
and Quwat al-Shaheed al-Sadr (brigade 35).1011•

Saraya Ashura (Brigade 8): Affiliated with Ammar al-Hakim, who used to lead the Islamic
Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI).1012•

Liwa Ali al-Akbar (Brigade 11): This is a unit loyal to Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, it has a significant
presence in western Ninewa (Tal Afar and the Jazeera Desert).1013•

Quwat al-Shahid al-Sadr (Brigades 15, 25, 35): This unit is affiliated with the Shia Dawa
party.1014•

Firqat al-Abbas al-Qitaliyah (Brigade 26): Affiliated with the Abbas Shrine in Karbala and the
Iraqi Ministry of Defence.1015•

Liwa al-Shabab al-Risali/Quwat Wa'ad Allah (Brigade 33): Linked to the Sadrist trend. Active
in several places between Mosul and the western border.1016•

Kata'ib al-Imam Ali (Brigade 40): affiliated with the Islamic Movement of Iraq, pro-Iranian.1017•

Liwa Ansar al-Marjiyah (Brigade 44): led by a representative of Ayatollah Sistani.1018•

Liwa al Hussein (Brigade 53): Active in the Tal Afar area, affiliated with Badr Organisation.1019

Tribal Mobilization Forces (TMF, Hashd al-Asha’ari)
According to a single source from August 2019, the Sunni Tribal Mobilization Forces in Ninewa are‘deployed in regions and villages inside Mosul, including Tal Afar and Sinjar’.1020 According to Inna
Rudolf in a contribution for the Century Foundation in February 2020, approximately 18 000 tribal
elements are registered under the Ninewa PMU.1021

1010 Knights, M. Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, August 2019, url
1011 Knights, M., Malik, H., Jawad Al-Tamimi, A., Honored, not Contained, the Future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces,

March 2020, url, p. 206
1012 Knights, M., Malik, H., Jawad Al-Tamimi, A., Honored, not Contained, the Future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces,
March 2020, url, p. 204; Smyth P., The Shia Militia Mapping Project (Interactive Map), May 2019, url
1013 Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa: Preventing an ISIS Resurgence in Northern Iraq, 7 May 2018, url, p. 21;
Knights, M., Malik, H., Jawad Al-Tamimi, A., Honored, not Contained, the Future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces,
March 2020, url, p. 204
1014 Knights, M., Malik, H., Jawad Al-Tamimi, A., Honored, not Contained, the Future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces,
March 2020, url, pp. 205-206; Smyth P., The Shia Militia Mapping Project (Interactive Map), May 2019, url
1015 Knights, M., Malik, H., Jawad Al-Tamimi, A., Honored, not Contained, the Future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces,
March 2020, url, p. 206; Smyth P., The Shia Militia Mapping Project (Interactive Map), May 2019, url
1016 Knights, M., Malik, H., Jawad Al-Tamimi, A., Honored, not Contained, the Future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces,
March 2020, url, p. 206; Smyth P., The Shia Militia Mapping Project (Interactive Map), May 2019, url
1017 Knights, M., Malik, H., Jawad Al-Tamimi, A., Honored, not Contained, the Future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces,
March 2020, url, pp. 207; Smyth P., The Shia Militia Mapping Project (Interactive Map), May 2019, url
1018 Knights, M., Malik, H., Jawad Al-Tamimi, A., Honored, not Contained, the Future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces,
March 2020, url, p. 207; Smyth P., The Shia Militia Mapping Project (Interactive Map), May 2019, url
1019 Knights, M., Malik, H., Jawad Al-Tamimi, A., Honored, not Contained, the Future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces,
March 2020, url, pp. 130, 207; Smyth P., The Shia Militia Mapping Project (Interactive Map), May 2019, url
1020 Rasanah, International Institute for Iranian Studies, Firas, E., The Nineveh Plains Military Zones in Iran’s Regional
Strategy, 28 August 2019, url
1021 Century Foundation, (The), Rudolf, I. The Sunnis of Iraq’s “Shia” Paramilitary Powerhouse, 13 February 2020, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Kurdistan Regional Government Security Forces
KDP Peshmerga
The US Congressional Research Service stated that by 8 July 2020, the KRG was in control of the Akreand Sheikhan districts, a wedge between Dohuk and the Syrian border, and a band between the Lineof Control of 2003 and Bashiqa.1022 As of December 2019, Peshmerga forces were present in the
Nawran and Bashiqa area, as well as in the Zertik Mountain and Faidah sub-district.1023
A number of militias aligned with the KRG which operated in Ninewa, including:•Ezidikhan Defense Force (Hêza Parastina Ezidkhane, HPE): Sources interviewed during theApril 2018 DIS/Landinfo FFM to KRI identified Ezidkhan Protection Force (HPE) and the Sinjar
Resistance Unit (YBS) [seen as PKK affiliated] as the two security actors that control most of
Sinjar district. The HPE ‘seems to work within the quite open PMU system’.1024 According to aJune 2020 report by Kayla Koontz, ‘the HPE openly coordinates with the Iraqi military’.1025•

Rojava Peshmerga: according to an article in the Jerusalem Post from 31 August 2019, theRojava Peshmerga was present on the roads near Sinjar.1026•

Ninewa Plains Guard Force (NPGF): According to the Assyrian Policy Institute in June 2020,
this force plays only a minor security role limited to Tel Eskof, and most of its men are not in
active duty.1027

Non-Aligned Militias
Sinjar Protection Units (Yekîneyên Berxwedana Şengalê, YBS)
The YBS is a Yezidi PKK affiliate group in Sinjar.1028 The Yezidi forces are predominantly located in the
Sinjar area. They have had the same pattern of affiliation as the other minority forces, mainly to the
KDP, PMU, and also to the PKK.1029 The YBS capitalised on the KRG withdrawal after the Kurdishreferendum, and aligned itself with the Iraqi military and the PMUs in the region. The YBS forces havegrown since the Peshmerga’s retreat and include now about 5 000 to 6 000 soldiers. According to areport by Kayla Koontz for the International Review, the YBS operates in coordination with the Iraqi
Army which operates primarily in rural areas of Sinjar, while the Iraqi police and YBS carry out security
operations inside cities. Likewise, the Iraqi police and YBS work together at checkpoints and provide
internal security.1030 Tensions between YBS and the Iraqi military over PKK smuggling activities andillegal border crossings caused a clash between the Iraqi army and YBS units in March 2019.1031 The
conflict was soon defused through a meeting between YBS and Iraqi army officials.1032

1022 US CRS, Iraq: Issues in the 116th Congress, 17 July 2020, Figure 1. Iraq: Areas of Influence and Operation, As of July 8,

2020, url, p. 21023 Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: From Abandoned Villages to the Cities, CG Policy, 5 May 2020, url
1024 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in thedisputed areas, incl. possibility to enter and access the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), 5 November 2018, url, p. 171025 International Review, Koontz K., Sinjar’s Yezidi Militias, 18 June 2020, url
1026 Jerusalem Post (The), Frantzmann, S., After ISIS: The Sinjar area remains key to securing Iraq, 31 August 2019, url
1027 Assyrian Policy Institute, Contested Control: The Future of Security in Iraq’s Nineveh Plain, 1 June 2020, url, p. 38
1028 USCIRF, Wilting in the Kurdish Sun: The Hopes and Fears of Religious Minorities In Northern Iraq, May 2017, url, p. 29;
Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa: Preventing an ISIS Resurgence in Northern Iraq, 7 May 2018, url, p. 23;
Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in thedisputed areas, incl. possibility to enter and access the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), 5 November 2018, url, p. 171029 Gaston, E., Derzsi-Horváth, A., The Global public Policy Institute, Iraq After ISIL, March 2018, url, p. 281030 International Review, Koontz K., Sinjar’s Yezidi Militias, 18 June 2020, url
1031 Kurdistan24, Kosar N., Iraqi forces, Yezidi PKK-affiliated militia clash near Syrian border, 18 March 2019, url
1032 International Review, Koontz K., Sinjar’s Yezidi Militias, 18 June 2020, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, PKK)
According to a June 2020 report, the PKK forms still alliances with the YBS and political parties like theYezidi Freedom and Democracy Party (BADI), and during protests against Turkish airstrikes, PKK andÖcalan flags and banners are displayed in Sinjar. However, according to the same source, the YBS units
do not show the PKK flags above their bases since their incorporation into the Iraqi military.1033 In a
December 2019 conflict map PKK presence was reported around Kocho village, south of Sinjar.1034 The
PKK is on the European Union’s list of designated groups which have been involved in terrorism1035, as
well as being listed as a terrorist organisation by Turkey1036, the United States1037, and Australia.1038

Foreign Security Services
The three primary foreign actors involved in Ninewa are Iran, Turkey and the International Coalition
to Defeat ISIL. Iran is involved through its Quds Force, a division of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard
Corps, which is typically embedded with some of the main Shia PMU units in an advising and assisting
capacity. Turkey has a presence through the Turkish Armed Forces TSK, which run a camp near Bashiqa(the town is under ISF control).1039 Turkey conducted airstrikes in Sinjar on different occasions in
20191040 and 2020.1041
On 19 March 2020, the U.S.-led coalition and the Iraqi Joint Operations Command announced thehandover al-Qayyarah Camp south of Ninewa and Ninewa Operations Command Camp (amongst
others in other governorates). According to the Center for Global Policy, the withdrawal had been
agreed between the coalition against ISIL and the Iraqi authorities already months before, and not
because of the recent rocket attacks against these bases. The threat of COVID-19 made troops fromthe US and other coalition member states interrupting their training and advisory missions andplanning a return to their own countries.1042

ISIL presence and activity
Depite not having territorial control in the governorate, ISIL continued to carry out asymmetric attacks
against ISF and civilians in Ninewa in 2019 and 2020.1043
According to a Center for Global Policy analysis from May 2020, ISIL came under pressure by theoperation “Will of Victory” of the ISF with the U.S.-led coalition from 7 July 2019 until the end of theyear in Ninewa and neighbouring provinces.1044 However, the increasing tension between the US and
Iran together with COVID-19 created new opportunities for the terrorist group: the removal of U.S.

1033 International Review, Koontz K., Sinjar’s Yezidi Militias, 18 June 2020, url
1034 Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: From Abandoned Villages to the Cities, CG Policy, 5 May 2020, url
1035 EU, Council of the European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/1341 of 8 August 2019 updating the list of persons,groups and entities subject to Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specificmeasures to combat terrorism, and repealing Decision (CFSP) 2019/25, 8 August 2019, url
1036 Euronews, Turkey slams Belgium court ruling that PKK is not a 'terrorist' organization, 31 January 2020, url
1037 US, Bureau of Counterterrorism, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, , url; Euronews, Turkey slams Belgium court rulingthat PKK is not a 'terrorist' organization, 31 January 2020, url
1038 Australia, Australian National Security, Listed terrorist organisations, n.d., url; Euronews, Turkey slams Belgium court
ruling that PKK is not a 'terrorist' organization, 31 January 2020, url
1039 Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security in Ninewa: Preventing an ISIS Resurgence in Northern Iraq, 7 May 2018, url, p. 241040 NRTTV, Turkish Aircraft Bomb Amedi’s Kurazhar Mountain and Sinjar’s Khanasur, 4 November 2019, url
1041 Rudaw, Wali Z.Z., Turkey launches air offensive targeting suspected PKK locations in northern Iraq, 15 June 2020, url
1042 Al-Hashimi, H. , The Coalition Withdrawal from Iraq: Fact and Fiction, 0 April 2020, url
1043 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2019/903], 22November 2019, url, p. 5; UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2020/363], 6 May 2020, url, p. 41044 Hassan, H., ISIS in Iraq and Syria: Rightsizing the Current ‘Comeback’, 12 May 2020, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

advisors from frontline headquarters hampered the coordination of the coalition intelligence and air
support with the Iraqi forces.1045
In Ninewa, ISIL uses sparsely populated areas to hide and attack from, but according toKnights/Almeida, it tries to build relatively strong bases in the rural belts of major cities and towns, inorder to return to mass-casualty attacks, as the authors suspect.1046 Husham Al-Hashimi also
considered in May 2020 that ISIL is trying to gain foothold in rural areas surrounding cities, amongst
other in Tal Afar and Qayara.1047 Al-Hashimi saw ISIL focussing on ’settling deserted villages acrossnorthern and central Iraq where natural geographic barriers and terrain – such as valleys, mountains,deserts, and rural areas – make conventional military operations challenging’.1048 According to AlHashimi, ISIL had some 350-400 active fighters each sector it operated , including Ninewa governorate,
which were supported by some 400 inactive fighters who focused on logistics.1049
According to the ICG writing in October 2019, ISIL was mainly active within the southern and southwestern part of Ninewa (together with other areas in different provinces).1050 Husham Al-Hashimi
assessed in a December 2019 conflict map that ISIL retained a presence in Baaj, south of Ninewa
desert.1051 The DIA stated in March 2020 that Rutbah district, the Hadr desert and Ba’aj in western
Ninewa are the areas of the governorate where ISIL remained most active.1052
In an article published in May 2020, Knights/Almeida identified eleven specific areas of ISIL activity in
Ninewa (in contrast to six in 2018) including: East Mosul; Ash Shura/Hammam al-Alil; Qayyarah;
Sharqat; Jurn triangle; the Hatra/Iraq-Turkey Pipeline corridor southwest of Mosul;
Badush/Atashana/west Mosul; Tal Afar/Muhallabiyah; Tal Afar/Ayadhiyah; Sinjar/Ba’aj; Lake
Sunnislah/Jazeera.1053

2.6.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population
Developments 2019-2020
Security incidents occurred throughout the province during 2019: in addition to air attacks by the Iraqi
Air Force and the international coalition on presumed ISIL hideouts, there were military ground
operations by the ISF and PMF against ISIL1054, as well as attacks by ISIL on the ISF, and also on
civilians.1055 The Turkish Air Force attacked positions of the Kurdish/Yezidi YBS in Sinjar.1056 There were1045 Knights, M., Almeida, A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020, CTC,

Vol. 13, Issue 5, May 2020, url, p. 25
1046 Knights, M., Almeida, A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020, CTC,
Vol. 13, Issue 5, May 2020, url, p. 25
1047 Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: From Abandoned Villages to the Cities, 5 May 2020, url; Al-Hashimi was assassinated in
Baghdad on 6 July 2020. See Al-Monitor, Prominent Iraqi analyst and advisor shot dead in Baghdad, 6 July 2020, url
1048 Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: From Abandoned Villages to the Cities, 5 May 2020, url
1049 Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: From Abandoned Villages to the Cities, 5 May 2020, url
1050 ICG, Averting an ISIS Resurgence in Iraq and Syria, 11 October 2019, url
1051 Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: From Abandoned Villages to the Cities, CG Policy, 5 May 2020, url
1052 USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve - Report to the United States Congress, 15 May 2020,
url, p. 24
1053 Knights, M., Almeida, A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020, CTC,
Vol. 13, Issue 5, May 2020, url, p. 171054 Iraqi News, Ebraheem, M. U.S. airstrike kills two terrorists inside Nineveh tunnel, 16 July 2019, url; AP, Iraq hunts IS
remnants spreading fear in former ‘caliphate’, 13 May 2019, url; ISW, Cafarella, J., Wallace, B., Zhou, J., ISIS’s Second
Comeback, Assessing the Next ISIS Insurgency, url, p. 39
1055 ISW, Cafarella, J., Wallace, B., Zhou, J., ISIS’s Second Comeback, Assessing the Next ISIS Insurgency, url, p. 39
1056 Kirkuk Now, Sinjar and Makhmour bombed for three hours by Turkish aircraft, 15 June 2020, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

also demonstrations protesting corruption by the deposed governor1057, and protests by members ofa PMF brigade against the order given them to leave Mosul and the Ninewa Plains.1058
Michael Knights and Alex Almeida assessed the insurgency of ISIL in Ninewa in 2018 as “patchy andreasonably weak”, but they noticed a sudden uptick in attacks in the 2nd half of 2019 that amounted
to about the double of the previous year and according to them, this rate of attacks was sustained
during the first quarter of 2020. However, the same authors stressed the large difference in thenumber of attacks between their peak in 2013 and the present. In 2013, Ninewa counted 278 attacks
per month, three quarters of them in Mosul city, against only 31 attacks in March 2020. The attacks
became more sophisticated from the second half of 2019 and into 2020. According to Knights/Almeida
the nocturnal raids to kill mukhtars that terrorised the Tigris river valley in 2018, became less frequent.
The authors assess that ISIL has a wider range of attack cells in the governorate than a year before,
and with attack groups operational in eleven areas in the first quarter of 2020, versus only six by theend of 2018.1059
The number of incidents during 2019 and 2020 recorded by Joel Wing remained within the same
margin between 9 and 25 monthly attacks1060, but according to Knights/Almeida, the rate of attacks
was already steadily increasing by the end of 2018, and this changed to a more sudden uptick in thesecond half of 2019, with 34.1 attacks per month, about doubling the 2018 levels. The same source
stated that this rate of insurgent attacks was sustained in the first quarter of 2020, and the authors
assessed it as a fairly stable new level of attacks (32.3 ISIL attacks per month during the first quarterof 2020).1061 USDOD recorded between 25 and 30 ISIL attacks in Ninewa for the period between
January and April 20201062 and 24 between April June 2020.1063
According to Joel Wing, in February, March, April and May 2020, Ninewa was a secondary front for
the insurgents.1064 Michael Knights and Alex Almeida stated in their analysis of 2019 and the firstquarter of 2020, that the surge of attacks by ISIL in Ninewa since the summer of 2019 and thesustained level in 2020 was primarily due to an increase in the number and quality of roadsidebombings. The same analysts saw a gradual proliferation of more advanced tactics in the use of IEDs,
like chains of multiple IEDs to enlarge impact zones, booby-trapping of houses to kill security forces
and using attacks as a bait to draw forces onto roadside bombs.1065 The majority of casualties fromroadside bombings are members of the security forces, as the reporting of incidents by ACLED andJoel Wing indicate. However, there are also civilian casualties.1066

1057 Guardian (The), Ghaith A., ‘I've seen death in this city, but nothing as sad as this’: how a ferry disaster exposed thecorruption devastating Iraq, 5 December 2019, url
1058 New Arab (The), Iran-linked militia ignores Iraq army demand for handover of positions, 5 August 2019, url
1059 Knights, M., Almeida, A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020, CTC,
Vol. 13, Issue 5, May 2020, url, p. 171060 Wing, J., Islamic State Offensive In Iraq Takes Off In May, 3 June 2020, url
1061 Knights, M., Almeida, A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020, CTC,
Vol. 13, Issue 5, May 2020, url, p. 171062 USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve - Report to the United States Congress, 1 January 2020
– 31 March 2020, 13 May 2020, url, p. 24
1063 USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve - Report to the United States Congress, 1 April 2020 –30 June 2020, 4 August 2020, url, p. 231064 Wing, J., Violence Largely Unchanged In Iraq In February 2020, 5 March 2020, url; Wing, J., Violence Drops In Iraq In
March 2020, 2 April 2020, url; Wing, J., Spike In Violence In April 2020 But Can It Be Sustained?, 1 May 2020, url; Wing, J.,
Security In Iraq, May 1-7, 2020, 12 May 2020, url
1065 Knights, M., Almeida, A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020, CTC,
Vol. 13, Issue 5, May 2020, url, p. 171066 ACLED, Real Time Data, Iraq, 1 February – 22 June 2020, url; Wing, J., Violence Largely Unchanged In Iraq In February
2020, 5 March 2020, url; Wing, J., Violence Drops In Iraq In March 2020, 2 April 2020, url; Wing, J., Spike In Violence In April
2020 But Can It Be Sustained?, 1 May 2020, url; Wing, J., Violence Largely Unchanged In Iraq In February 2020, 5 March
2020, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

The geographical pattern of the insurgent attacks in 2019 indicates that all districts of Ninewa wereaffected, with the exception of the north-eastern parts under Kurdish control.1067 Typical hotspots for
ISIL activity were the Tigris River Valley areas south of Mosul, and in general rural areas within striking
distance of the areas of ISIL activity as pointed out in the chapter ‘ISIL insurgents’ above.1068
The following map shows the places where ACLED registered incidents in the period from 1 January
until 19 June 2020. The map does not reflect all the incidents in the governorate, only the geographic
areas affected. ACLED registered 66 incidents during this period. The incidents recorded in Akre in thenortheast corner of Ninewa governorate were Turkish airstrikes:

Map 12: Incidents recorded by ACLED and EPIC from 1 January until 26 June 2020, compilation by Cedoca on Google Maps 1069

The different types of incidents during the first half of 2020 included regular armed clashes between
the security forces and ISIL insurgents, including shootings or attacks with explosives, security
operations against insurgent hideouts in rural and remote areas, but also near or in populated
places.1070 For instance, there was an insurgent attack on the power grid near Qayyarah in May 2020,
where three high voltage towers were hit.1071
ISIL is using different tactics like planting IEDs next to roads where the security forces are patrolling or
firing mortar or small arms rounds into populated areas.1072 Another tactic used by the insurgents is1067 ACLED, Real Time Data, 1 February 2019 – 31 January 2020, url; Belgium, Cedoca (CGVS/CGRA), COI Focus Iraq Security

Situation in Central and Southern Iraq, 20 March 2020, url, p. 76
1068 Knights, M., Almeida, A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020, CTC,
Vol. 13, Issue 5, May 2020, url, p. 171069 ACLED, Real Time Data, Iraq, 1 February – 22 June 2020, url, map compiled by Belgium, Cedoca, 26 June 2020, url
1070 NINA, 70 IEDs, 5 Tunnels Found, Vehicle Destroyed In Nineveh And Salah Al-Din, 4 May 2020, url; ACLED, Real TimeData, Iraq, 1 February – 22 June 2020, url
1071 NINA, ISIS Detonate 3 Electricity Towers, South Of Mosul, 7 May 2020, url
1072 NINA, ‫مدنيي ثالثة اصابة‬‫ن‬‫اموصل جنوب هاون قذيفة سقوط جراء بجروح‬, (Three civilians were wounded by a mortar shell south of
Mosul), 10 May 2020, url; ACLED, Real Time Data, Iraq, 1 February – 22 June 2020, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

the attacking and killing of village mukhtars. Although less frequent than in former years, as pointed
out by Knights/Almeida, this form of violence still occurs in 2020.1073
Mass graves of victims of the conflict with ISIL between 2014 and 2017 are still found in 2020, thebiggest such grave was found in Tal Afar region in February 2020.1074 On 17 May 2020, the new Prime
Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi gave instruction to use all available resources to uncover the fate of
kidnapped and forcibly disappeared Iraqis. Most reports of missing people are from Ninewa.1075
Airstrikes against ISIL positions were conducted by the Iraqi Air Force and the International
coalition1076, while the Turkish Air Force has attacked positions of Kurdish and Yezidi militia with ties
to the PKK in Sinjar and Akre districts in 2019 and 2020.1077 Turkish airstrikes have resulted in civilian
casualties.1078

Illustrative security incidents
A non-exhaustive list of security incidents that were reported to have taken place in Ninewa
governorate between 1 January 2019 and 31 July 2020 included the following:
ISIL attacks on mukhtars:•

On 9 May 2019, the mukhtar of al-Lazaka village in the Hammam al-Alil district was killed
together with four members of his family by ISIL miltants. Two other family members were
wounded in the attack.1079•

On 18 November 2019, the mukhtar of the village of Ahlila was killed in East Mosul.1080•

On 26 February 2020, ISIL militants attacked the home of a mukhtar in Al Muhallabiyah, westof Mosul leaving the mukhtar killed and his son injured.1081

Armed attacks by ISIL:•

On 22 December 2019, ISIl attacked the village of Al-Rusif in the district of Shoura (South
Mosul), killing two civilians and injuring another.1082•

On 10 May 2020, unidentified armed men using a mortar shelled a civilian home in al
Qayyarah south of Mosul, leaving three members of the household injured.1083

IEDs by ISIL or unidentified perpetrators:

1073 NINA ‫( استشهاد مختار واصابة نجله نف هجوم لداعش غرب الموصل‬Mukhtar killed and his son wounded in an ISIL attack west of‫ي‬
Mosul), 26 February 2020, url; NINA, 3 Soldiers Injured By IED South Of Mosul, 20 February 2020, url
1074 Rudaw, Wali, Z.Z., Sinkhole containing 1,000 ISIS victims uncovered in Iraq’s Tal Afar, 19 February 2020, url; NINA, A
Cemetery Found West Of Mosul, Containing The Remains Of 32 Victims Killed By ISIS, 17 February 2020, url
1075 EPIC, ISHM: May 14 – May 21, 2020, 21 May 2020, url‫ارهابيي ن‬
1076 NINA, ‫برصبة جوية للتحالف الدول نف نينوى‬‫ن‬
7 ‫مقتل‬, (7 terrorists killed by air strike by international coalition in Nineveh),‫ي ي‬
15 May 2020, url
1077 Jerusalem Post (The), Frantzmann S.J., Turkey bombs Sinjar villages in Iraq where genocide survivors live, 6 November
2019, url; Washington Kurdish Institute, Kurdistan’s Weekly Brief January 28, 2020, 28 January 2020, url; Rudaw, Wali Z.Z.,
Turkey launches air offensive targeting suspected PKK locations in northern Iraq, 15 June 2020, url
1078 CIVIC, Turkish Airstrikes Kill Five Civilians and Hinder Recovery in Northern Iraq after ISIS, 24 June 2020, url; Middle East
Eye, Fear and anger greets Turkish air strikes in northern Iraq, 23 June 2020, url
1079 Rudaw, Gunmen kill 5, wound 2 including Mukhtar in unstable Mosul, 9 May 2019, url
1080 iMMAP-IHF, Humanitarian Access Response, Weekly Explosive Incidents Flash News, 14 to 20 November 2019, 21
November 2019, url
1081 NINA ‫( استشهاد مختار واصابة نجله نف هجوم لداعش غرب الموصل‬Mukhtar killed and his son wounded in an ISIL attack west of‫ي‬
Mosul), , 26 February 2020, url
1082 iMMAP-IHF, Humanitarian Access Response, Weekly Explosive Incidents Flash News, 19-25 Dec 2019), 25 December
2019, url
1083 NINA, ‫مدنيي ثالثة اصابة‬‫ن‬‫اموصل جنوب هاون قذيفة سقوط جراء بجروح‬, (Three civilians were wounded by a mortar shell south of
Mosul), , 10 May 2020, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation•

On 22 May 2019, a civilian was killed when an IED exploded in al-Shoura district in Mosul.1084•

On 9 November 2019, an IED exploded on a transport vehicle in the village of Qaraj, southwestof Mosul, three civilians were injured by the explosion.1085•

On February 12, 2020, a civilian was killed and 10 others injured by the explosion of an ISIL
IED in al-Rashidiyah area, north of Mosul.1086•

On 3 March 2020, an unidentified planted IED exploded in Tel Kayf, Ninewa province, injuring
two civilians.1087•

On 7 May 2020, an unidentified IED planted near Ghuzayl village, south of Mosul exploded,
leaving two electricity department employees injured.1088

Clashes with security forces:•

On 8 November 2019, unknown attackers fired four rockets at the military base of Qayyara.
The security services retaliated and killed three attackers.1089•

On 24 March 2020, Iraqi forces killed three ISIL militants wearing explosive belts in a village
near Qayyarah.1090

Airstrikes:•

On 20 August 2019, the media cell of the security forces reported the death of six ISIL militants
inside a tunnel in an airstrike conducted by Coalition Forces in the Atshana Mountains westof Mosul.1091•

On 4 November 2019, the Turkish Air Force bombed Khanasur in Sinjar. Two YBS fighters were
wounded.1092•

On 15 May 2020, an airstrike by the International Coalition Forces against ISIL in a desert area
southwest of Hatra targeted an ISIL cave, leaving seven militants killed.1093•

On 15 June 2020, Turkey launched airstrikes against multiple targets in Iraq, also against
positions of the Yezidi Resistance Units (YBS) in Sinjar District. According to Yezidi sources, atleast three members of the YBS were wounded.1094

1084 Iraqi News, Bomb blast kills Iraqi civilian in Mosul city, 22 May 2019, url
1085 iMMAP - IHF Humanitarian, Access Response, , Weekly Explosive Incidents Flash News, 1 to 13 November 2019, url
1086 iMMAP-IHF, Humanitarian Access Response, Weekly Explosive Incidents Flash News (6-12 FEB 2020), 12 February 2020,

url

1087 NINA, ‫مدني بانفجار عبوة ناسفة نف تلكيف بنينوى‬‫ن‬‫( اصابة‬Civilians injured by an explosive device in Tel Kayf, Ninewa), 3 March,

url

‫ي‬

1088 NINA, ‫موظفي بالكهرباء بانفجار عبوة ناسفة جنوب الموصل‬‫ن‬‫اصابة‬, Electricity employees were injured by an explosive device,

south of Mosul, 7 May 2020, url
1089 iMMAP-IHF, Humanitarian Access Response, Weekly Explosive Incidents Flash News, 1 to 13 November 2019, 13
November 2019, url‫ن‬‫ن‬
1090 BAS News, Rezan, A., ‫انتحاريي جنوب الموصل‬‫ارهابيي‬3 ‫( مقتل‬3 suicide bombers were killed south of Mosul), 24 March 2020,url‫ قوة ر‬،‫بناء ًعىل معلومات استخبارية‬‫ بالفرقة ر‬٢٢ ‫ واللواء‬٦٦ ‫مشتكة من اللواء‬‫ن‬1091 ‫األمن‬‫( خلية اإلعالم‬Security Media Cell), ‫ تشتبك مع عنارص‬،‫العشين‬
‫ي‬
‫ن‬
‫ن‬
‫ حيث تمت‬،‫ وقد حاولوا الهروب واالختباء يف إحدى اإلنفاق يف المنطقة أعاله‬،‫ عنارص من داعش‬٦ ‫ حيث تم محارصة‬،‫إرهابية ن يف سلسلة جبال عطشانة‬‫ن‬‫اإلرهابيي الذين كانوا بداخله‬‫ مما أسفر عن تدمت النفق وقتل‬،‫الدول‬‫معالجتهم وفقا لمعلومات من قيادة عمليات نينوى بواسطة طتان التحالف‬.
‫ي‬٢٠١٩ ‫ اب‬٢٠ , Facebook, 20 August 2019, url
1092 NRTTV, Turkish Aircraft Bomb Amedi’s Kurazhar Mountain and Sinjar’s Khanasur, 4 November 2019, url‫ارهابيي ن‬
1093 NINA, ‫برصبة جوية للتحالف الدول نف نينوى‬‫ن‬
7 ‫( مقتل‬7 terrorists killed by air strike by international coalition in Nineveh),‫ي ي‬
15 May 2020, url
1094 Rudaw, Wali Z.Z., Turkey launches air offensive targeting suspected PKK locations in northern Iraq, 15 June 2020, url

131

EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Number of civilian casualties
The number of armed conflict related incidents and civilian casualties in the governorate recorded
by UNAMI for the period 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, is shown in the table below.
Governorate 2019 (Jan – Dec)#of Killed
incidents

Injured2019
total
casualties

2020 (Jan – Jul)#of Killed
incidents

Injured(killedandinjured)Ninewa

62

68

106

174

2020
total
casualties(killedandinjured)

27

14

33

47

Table 10: Number of armed conflict related incidents and civilian casualties 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, Ninewa
governorate. Data from UNAMI.1095

Number of security incidents
In the reference period, ACLED reported 92 battles, 150 incidents of remote violence/explosions, 46
cases of violence against civilians, 4 incidents of riots, accounting for a total of 292 security incidentsof these types in Ninewa governorate, the majority taking place in the Mosul District. 21 protests werealso reported in Ninewa governorate during the reference period. 1096 The evolution of all the types of
security events through the reference period is shown in the figure below.

Figure 13: Evolution of security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence, violence against civilians, riots and protestsin Ninewa governorate 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, based on ACLED data1097

1095 UNAMI, Email to EASO 24 July 20201096 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url
1097 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url

132

EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

State ability to secure law and orderMore information on the capacities of the Iraqi forces and the forces under the KRG as actors ofprotection, including the ability to secure law and order, as well as information on the integrity ofarmed forces, please see the report EASO COI Report – Iraq: Actors of Protection (2018).
ISF and PMUs controlling Ninewa are accused of using their power for gaining revenue through illegal
activities which in turn weakens their combat capabilities and creates uncertainty in the local
community.1098
In September 2019, in a high-profile case members of the 30th PMF Brigade (Liwa al-Shabak) stopped
the motorcade of the deputy governor of Ninewa and a member of parliament at a checkpoint outside
Mosul. Four bodyguards were injured and arrested. This was one of several incidents involving thisbrigade which had already been ordered by the central authorities to leave Ninewa in August 2018
and again in July 2019. This Shabak militia was accused of expelling Christians, confiscating property,
denying access to aid organisations, and extorting money at their manned checkpoints. Its members
were also accused of committing kidnapping and rape. In July 2019, the same group protested for twodays against its removal, blocking the connecting road between Mosul and Erbil.1099 The 50th Brigade,(Kata'ib Babilyun, Babylon Brigade), a self-declared Christian militia, was also condemned for similaractions. The leaders of both militias have been issued with sanctions by the US government.1100
According to the Education for Peace in Iraq Center (EPIC), there was a demonstration by dozens of
inhabitants of the Ninewa Plains on 6 February 2020, against the presence of PMF and affiliated militia
in the towns of the region. The protesters of different communities (Arabs, Kurds, Shabaks, Yezidis,
Christians and Turkmen, many of them IDPs) accused the militias of perpetuating the displacement of
the IDPs and imposing illegal taxation on road traffic through the plains. They called on the federal
government to expel the militia and restore order in the region.1101
On 21 May 2020, Shafaaq reported that the Ninewa crisis cell was closing the entrances to thegovernorate to all arrivals (with the exception of food and fuel transport, as well as health and service
personnel), due to the heightened COVID-19 risk.1102 On 24 June 2020, the governor Najm Al-Jubouri
announced a 3-day curfew for the governorate starting from 25 June.1103
On 29 May 2020, a Ninewa representative said that the province’s international and internal borders
were not in complete control of the security forces. He denounced the smuggling of grainand that onsome routes between Ninewa and Kirkuk and Salah al-Din, illegal fees were imposed at somecheckpoints. The representative urged the security forces to investigate the matter.1104

Infrastructure damage and explosive remnants of war
The program director for Mosul at the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) declared that the
explosives contamination in Mosul is ‘of a previously unseen magnitude’.1105 UN and Iraq joint
assessments estimated that the destruction in Mosul created around eight million tons of rubble. The

1098 Jamestown Foundation, Conditions in Mosul Ripen for Return of Islamic State; Terrorism Monitor Volume: 17 Issue: 1,

11 January 2019, url
1099 Wing, J. Hashd’s 30th Brigade In Ninewa Assaults Dep Governor and MP, 16 September 2019, url; Kurdistan24, Mylroie,
L., US sanctions Nineveh Plain’s militia leaders for terrorizing population, blocking IDPs’ return, and corruption 19 July
2019, url
1100 Kurdistan24, Mylroie, L., US sanctions Nineveh Plain’s militia leaders for terrorizing population, blocking IDPs’ return,and corruption 19 July 2019, url
1101 EPIC, ISHM: January 30 – February 6, 2020, 6 February 2020, url
1102 Shafaaq News, Nineveh closes its entrances to arrivals, 19 May 2020, url
1103 Shafaaq News, 241 recoveries in Dhi Qar.. and a total curfew in Nineveh, 24 June 2020, url
1104 EPIC, ISHM: May 28 – June 4, 2020, 4 June 2020, url
1105 New Arab (The), Explosives contamination in Mosul is 'of previously unseen magnitude', 06 December 2017, url; EPIC,
ISHM: January 19 – 25, 2018, 25 January 2018, url

133

EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

debris is heavily contaminated with explosive devices of different kinds which includes unexploded
ordnance and booby-traps.1106
According to articles in Medialine, Al-Jazeera and France24, the reconstruction of the destroyedneighbourhoods of Mosul is only advancing at a slow pace, due to the extent of the damage and thelack of funding by the Iraqi state.1107 According to governor Najm Al-Jubouri in an interview with AlJazeera, the startling bureaucracy has hindered the pace of reconstruction. The funding is not
sufficient, but moreover, some of the funding has ’returned to state coffers because of
bureaucracy‘.1108 According to both sources, the level of discontent within the population is veryhigh.1109
The lack of access to basic services (water, electricity, education) is a challenge to the rural areas of
the Ninewa Plains and Sinjar.1110 In 2019, IOM estimated that it would take years of reconstruction
efforts to achieve previous levels of economic activity in these regions. Returning residents of theseareas found that a large proportion of their belongings, including their livestock had been destroyed
or stolen. Farmers in these regions find it difficult to bring their holdings back to pre-war levels. Around
85 % of settlements in Sinjar depend on agriculture.1111
The head of Tal Afar municipality indicated in an interview with Kirkuk Now in May 2019, that the war
with ISIL left about 35 % or 5 000 of the houses in the Tal Afar district damaged, while about 600 werecompletely destroyed.1112 In an article by the Turkish news agency TRT World, the mayor of Tal Afarestimated in August 2019 that about 20 percent of the buildings in Tal Afar City have suffered damage
or destruction during the conflict, and that only little repair work had been effectuated in the first two
years following the liberation from ISIL.1113
In the Christian settlements in the Ninewa Plains, about 54% of the destroyed and damaged properties
have been restored, according to data from 6 April 2020. While only 90 of 1 200 damaged houses inTel Kayf have been restored, 545 of 580 of the damaged houses in Bashiqa are already restored.1114 In
July 2019, the US treasury Department accused Liwa al-Shabak fighters of taking over property in
Bashiqa, looting houses and intimidating locals. Michael Knights noted that this ‘has prevented
resettlement by Christians and Arabs’.1115
UNMAS recorded in February 2020 that ‘Over the past two years, UNMAS teams have found andremoved over 62 000 explosive hazards in Mosul and the surrounding areas.’1116 The district of Sinjar
is also suffering from an intense contamination with unexploded ammunition and IEDs deliberately
left by ISIL.1117

1106 UNEP, Rising from the rubble: Iraq’s Mosul takes steps to deal with war debris, 26 March 2018, url
1107 Medialine (The), Slow Pace of Rebuilding Mosul Angers Residents, 30 October 2019, url; Al-Jazeera, Two years after ISIL

defeat, Mosul still in ruins, YouTube Video, 9 December 2019, url; France 24, Three years after IS, slim funds keep Mosul inruins, 10 July 2020, url
1108 Al-Jazeera, Two years after ISIL defeat, Mosul still in ruins, YouTube Video, 9 December 2019, url
1109 Medialine (The), Slow Pace of Rebuilding Mosul Angers Residents, 30 October 2019, url; Al-Jazeera, Two years after ISIL
defeat, Mosul still in ruins, YouTube Video, 9 December 2019, url
1110 IOM Iraq, Rural Areas in Ninewa – Legacies of Conflict on Rural Economies and Communities in Sinjar and Ninewa
Plains, 28 November 2019, url, p. 24
1111 IOM Iraq, Rural Areas in Ninewa – Legacies of Conflict on Rural Economies and Communities in Sinjar and Ninewa
Plains, 28 November 2019, url, p. 231112 Kirkuk Now, Talafari, J., Talafar lies in ruins amid Iraqi government negligence, 30 May 2019, url
1113 TRT World, Porter, L., The difficulty of normality in Tal Afar, the former Daesh stronghold, 27 August 2019, url
1114 Nineveh Reconstruction Committee (NRC), Nineveh Plains Reconstruction Process, 6 April 2020, url; Nineveh
Reconstruction Committee (NRC), Telekef Restoration Process and Returnees, 6 April 2020, url; Nineveh Reconstruction
Committee (NRC), Bashiqua Restoration Process and Returnees, 6 April 2020, url
1115 Kurdistan24, US sanctions Nineveh Plain’s militia leaders for terrorizing population, blocking IDPs’ return, andcorruption, 19 July 2019, url
1116 UNMAS Newsletter Iraq, February 2020, url
1117 Mines Advisory Group, MAG phone calls help Yazidi families returning to mine-ridden Sinjar, 3 August 2020, url

134

EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Displacement and return
As of 30 June 2020, 324 078 individuals from Ninewa remained displaced , out of which 319 128 weredisplaced inside the governorate.1118 According to IOM June 2020 data, Ninewa governorate ranks firstamongst the top governorates of return with 1 807 170.1119 UNOCHA’s 2020 Humanitarian Needs
Overview noted that ‘Considerable secondary displacement has been caused by forced and premature
returns and forced or coerced departures from camps and informal settlements in Ninewa, Salah alDin, Anbar, Kirkuk and Diyala governorates’, and ‘Beginning in August 2019, a wave of governmentinitiated security screenings, camp closures and consolidations, in several instances using forced or
coercive measures, led to new population movements, with significant reductions in particularly of
the in-camp populations Ninewa populations and returnees.’1120
HRW noted in its annual 2019 report, published in January 2020 that security forces in Ninewa
launched screenings across IDP camps to determine origins and possible links to ISIL of the inhabitants.
In August and September 2019, the authorities in Ninewa and Salah al-Din expelled hundreds of IDPs,
in some cases transporting them to their home communities despite security concerns.1121
HRW also noted in July 2020, that the KRG authorities blocked Arabs from returning to five villages
northeast of Rabia in the area under Kurdish control. According to locals, about 1 200 Arab families
have been prevented to return to these villages.1122 In a statement reacting to the HRW report, theKRG authorities denied that only Arabs were prevented to return, and asserted that those villages
were mostly destroyed during the conflict with ISIL in 2016 and 2017. Moreover, the locals wereunable to return ‘due to fears of unnamed armed groups, ISIS sleeper cells, Turkish airstrikes, thepresence of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and restrictions on movement due to theCoronavirus.’1123
The highest number of returns over time are towards Mosul District, followed by Tal Afar, and AlHamdaniya districts. Mosul has by far the most returnees with 1 034 430. The most returns happen
within the governorate, followed by people coming back from displacement in the KRG-administered
governorates Erbil and Dohuk.1124 Returns from the de facto KRG-administered district of Sheikhan
and Akre are counted as intra-governorate.1125
In a report by The Assyrian Policy Institute (API) from June 2020, the numbers of returnees into
Christian areas in the Nineveh Plains are compared against the dominant local security actors, and API
states that for the Christian IDPs, the single most important factor regarding a return remains the
security situation. API points out that the return rates to areas secured by the Christian NPU are far
higher than the return rates in towns outside NPU control.1126 According to the Administrator for the
Middle East Bureau at USAID in September 2019, the return rates are higher in Qaraqosh, because of1118 IOM Iraq, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Displacement Master List, Displacement Dashboard, 30 June 2020, url, pp. 1

of 5, 3 of 5 (select Ninewa Governorate)
1119 IOM Iraq, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Return Master List, Returns Dashboard, Return Timeline, 15 June 2020, url,
pp. 4-51120 UNOCHA, Iraq: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2020, November 2019, url, pp. 5,171121 HRW, World Report 2020 - Iraq, 14 January 2020, url, pp. 297, 299
1122 HRW, Kurdistan Region of Iraq: Arabs Blocked From Returning, 19 July 2020, url
1123 Kurdistan 24, KRG responds to HRW report accusing Kurdistan Region of 'blocking' Arabs from returning to theirvillages, 20 July 2020, url
1124 IOM Iraq, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Return Master List, Returns Dashboard, 15 June 2020, url, pp. 2, 3 of 51125 IOM Iraq, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Return Master List, Returns Dashboard, 15 June 2020, url, p. 4 of 51126 Assyrian Policy Institute, Contested Control: The Future of Security in Iraq’s Nineveh Plain, 1 June 2020, url, p. 41

135

EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation‘comparatively good security’.1127 In the same testimony, the Administrator of USAID said that because
of security reasons, the returns to Sinjar and Batnaya were blocked.1128
The same source stated on 26 September 2019 that:‘Lack of security remains the primary barrier to returns. In Sinjar the Kurdistan Workers’ Party(PKK) runs unchecked, conscripting young Yezidi boys into its forces. Elsewhere in Ninewa thelargest threat comes from Iranian-backed elements of the Popular Mobilization Forces which
continue to occupy swathes of the Ninewa Plains long after ISIS’s defeat. Militias such as the
30th and 50th Brigades have become part local mafia, part Iranian proxy. They terrorize thosefamilies brave enough to have returned, extort local businesses, and openly pledge allegianceto Iran. According to Chaldean representatives, Christian returns to towns like Batanaya andTelkaif have reached only one to two percent because of persecution by these militias. In
Bartela, the Christian community is under siege by the 30th Brigade that routinely resorts toantiChristian rhetoric and puts up placards of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameni at
entrances [of] the town.’1129
IOM stated in a report from April 2020, that between September and December 2019, almost 49 000
individuals left IDP camps to live in non-camp settings in Ninewa due to the closure of the camps. 85 %of them returned to their districts of origin, but the rest moved to new displacement outside of camps.
The districts of Al-Ba’aj and Hatra host two thirds of these new arrivals.1130 In Hatra, most new arrivals
returned to their areas of origin, and only few experienced a new displacement. In Al-Ba’aj however,about half of the recently returned moved into their areas of origin, the other half became new noncamp IDPs in Markaz Ba’aj, the district capital.1131 According to IOM, the most important problems forthe returnees in Markaz Al-Ba’aj are related to the security situation: Next to the fear of new ISIL
attacks and ethno religious tensions, the returnees have concerns about the excessive number of
security actors in the area.1132
The same security concerns are the main issue for the returnees to Qaeyrrawan subdistrict of Sinjar
district and Markaz Tal Afar, the capital of Tal Afar district.1133 In Zummar, the returnees complain
about the absence of a reconciliation process as an important problem. IOM considers this issue
together with blocked returns to this district and fear for violence as the main drivers for the
degradation of the social cohesion in this district.1134 Blocked returns are not limited to Zummar. In
Markaz Al-Ba’aj and Markaz Tal Afar, reports of blocked returns together with the illegal occupationof private properties add to the severity of the living conditions for the returnees in these locations.1135
Husham al-Hashimi noted in July 2020, that the PMF in Tal Afar, ‘has made the return of these ISIS
families contingent on the government’s provision of services to victims’ families.’1136 According to thesame source, the victim’s families are upset because of the delays of justice and compensations,confronting the authorities with the double problem of appeasing the victim’s families and welcomingback the families of the perpetrators at the same time.1137

1127 Ferguson, H., Testimony before the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, hearing on “Religious

Minorities’ Fight to Remain in Iraq.” 26 September 2019 [Video], url (from 20:45)
1128 Ferguson, H., Testimony before the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, hearing on “Religious
Minorities’ Fight to Remain in Iraq.” 26 September 2019, [Video], url (from 20:45)
1129 Ferguson, H., Testimony before the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, hearing on “Religious
Minorities’ Fight to Remain in Iraq.” 26 September 2019, written statement, url
1130 IOM Iraq, Return Dynamics in Ninewa Governorate, April 2020, url, p. 11131 IOM Iraq, Return Dynamics in Ninewa Governorate, April 2020, url, p. 51132 IOM Iraq, Return Dynamics in Ninewa Governorate, April 2020, url, p. 81133 IOM Iraq, Return Dynamics in Ninewa Governorate, April 2020, url, p. 81134 IOM Iraq, Return Dynamics in Ninewa Governorate, April 2020, url, p. 91135 IOM Iraq, Return Dynamics in Ninewa Governorate, April 2020, url, pp. 8-91136 Al-Hashimi, Husham, ISIS in Iraq: The Challenge of Reintegrating ‘ISIS Families’, 7 July 2020, url
1137 Al-Hashimi, Husham, ISIS in Iraq: The Challenge of Reintegrating ‘ISIS Families’, 7 July 2020, url

136

EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

According to UNOCHA writing in November 2019, the highest number of people in need are in Ninewa
governorate with 1 358 908.1138 This is a significant reduction from a year before, when UNOCHA
estimated a 2 168 222 people in need in Ninewa.1139 Looking at the ‘scale 2 severity’ handled by IOM
to evaluate the severity of the living conditions for the returnees1140, the whole Sinjar district scoreshigh, together with the subdistricts Markaz al-Ba’aj (Al-Ba’aj), Hamam al-Aleel (Mosul District),
Ayadiya, Markaz Tal Afar and Zummar subdistricts (Tal Afar).1141
According to Kirkuk Now, the Yezidi started to return to Sinjar in bigger numbers in June 2020.
According to official data of the local administration cited by Kirkuk Now, more than 250 families
moved back from IDP camps in Duhok to Sinjar district within ten days.1142 The Turkish airstrikes
against Sinjar in June 2020 hampered the return of the Yezidi. According to a leading official for the
Iraqi administration for migration and displacement in Duhok, the return of the IDPs to Sinjar has
halted because of two reasons: ‘the Turkish airstrikes and the deployment of the Turkish commando
forces to Haftanin area in Zakho district’ (Duhok).1143

1138 UNOCHA, Iraq: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2020, November 2019, url, p. 06
1139 UNOCHA, Iraq: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, November 2018, url, p. 21140 Community reconciliation, multiple security actors, blocked returns, checkpoints controlled by other security actors,

illegal occupation of private residences, mines and sources of violence. Scale 1 is on livelihoods and basic services. IOM
Iraq, Return Dynamics in Ninewa Governorate, April 2020, url, p. 1
1141 IOM Iraq, Return Dynamics in Ninewa Governorate, April 2020, url, p. 101142 Kirkuk Now, Aziz A., Ezidis return home after six years of displacement, 15 June 2020, url
1143 Kirkuk Now, Aziz A., Turkish airstrikes hinder Ezidi return to Sinjar, 20 June 2020, url

137

EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

2.7 Salah al-Din

Map 13: Salah al-Din with district borders, district capitals and main roads, © United Nations.1144

2.7.1 General description of the governorate
Basic geography
The governorate is divided into nine districts: al-Dour, al-Shirqat, Balad, Baiji, Fares, Samarra, Thethar,Tuz, and Tikrit.1145 Tikrit city, the governorate’s capital, and its surrounding areas, had an estimatedpre-ISIL population of 200 000 inhabitants.1146 It was also Saddam Hussein’s place of birth and has
been viewed as an important power centre of the Sunni Arabs.1147 The only district of the governorate
to come under the ‘Disputed Internal Boundaries’ as per Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution was Tuz(Khurmatu).1148

1144 UN JAU, Iraq District Map, January 2014, url
1145 UNOCHA, Iraq: Salah Al-Din Governorate profile and monthly humanitarian response (January - December 2019), 5

February 2020, url.
1146 Gaston, E. and Derzsi-Horvath, A., Iraq after ISIL: Iraq After ISIL, Sub-State Actors, Local Forces, and the Micro-Politics ofControl, GPPi, March 2018, url, p. 45
1147 Gaston, E. and Derzsi-Horvath, A., Iraq after ISIL: Iraq After ISIL, Sub-State Actors, Local Forces, and the Micro-Politics ofControl, GPPi, March 2018, url, p. 45
1148 PAX, Human Security Survey Salahaddin, Iraq - 2019, Summary of Key Findings, 2019, url, p. 1

138

EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Population
For 2019, the Iraqi CSO (Central Statistical Organization) estimated1149 the governorate’s population
at 1 637 232.1150 The majority of Salah al-Din governorate’s population was reported to be residing inrural areas.1151

Ethnicity
Salah al-Din governorate is predominantly inhabited by Sunni Arabs, but also hosts a Shia Arabminority, as well as Turkmen and Kurdish minority groups.1152 The population in Tuz district isparticularly multi-ethnic and is reported to be ‘split almost evenly among Sunni Arabs, Kurds, andTurkmen (Shi’a and Sunni).’1153 The governorate was also home to the Shiite al-Askari Shrine in
Samarra, one of the holiest sites in Shia Islam, which was the target of an attack by Al-Qaeda in 2006
and prompted widespread sectarian violence.1154
Salah al-Din governorate is home to several Iraqi tribal confederations.1155 The confederation, which
is based in and around Tikrit ‘unites a number of prominent tribes, perhaps the most notable being
the Albu Nasir, which is the tribe of the former dictator Saddam Hussein and many of his closest
associates.’1156 According to a 2003 report the governorate also hosted other prominent tribes, suchas the Jubur (al-Shirqat), Obeid (al-Alam), al-‘Azza (Balad), Luhayb (al-Shirqat) and Harb (al-Dour).1157

Road security
Tuz is a ‘northern transportation hub’ on the Baghdad-Kirkuk highway.1158 Attacks staged by insurgent
groups, including ISIL, continue to be reported on roads in Salah al-Din governorate throughout 2019and 2020.1159 Checkpoints in the governorate were also reported to be targeted during the same
period.1160 iMMAP assessed that between January and December 2019 there were large stretches of‘primary risk’ and ‘secondary risk’ roads in Salah al-Din.1161 According to iMMAP in June 2020, risks of1149 It should be noted that the last comprehensive Population and Housing Census for Iraq was conducted in 1987; UNFPA,

Newsletter 2020 Census, December 2019, url, p. 11150 Iraq, CSO, 2019 ‫[ قديرات سكان العراق حسب المحافظة والبيئة والجنس لسنة‬Demographic and population indicators, Estimates forthe population of Iraq by province, environment and gender for the year 2019] (table), n.d., url
1151 PAX, Human Security Survey Salahaddin, Iraq - 2019, Summary of Key Findings, 2019, url, p. 1
1152 IOM, Kirkuk, Ninewa & Salah al-Din, governorate profile, June 2008, url, p. 31153 Gaston, E. and Derzsi-Horvath, A., Iraq after ISIL: Iraq After ISIL, Sub-State Actors, Local Forces, and the Micro-Politics ofControl, GPPi, March 2018, url, p. 52. See also, ICG, Reviving UN Mediation on Iraq’s Disputed Internal Boundaries - Middle
East Report N°194, 14 December 2018, url, pp. 15-16
1154 Time, How the Fate of One Holy Site Could Plunge Iraq Back into Civil War, 26 June 2014, url; The New York Times,
Blast destroys shrine in Iraq, setting off sectarian fury, 22 February 2006, url
1155 Haddad, F., Comment made during the review of the 2019 EASO report, 18 January 2019, in: EASO, COI Report: Iraq Security situation, March 2019, url
1156 Gospodinov, I., Leiden University, The Sunni Tribes of Iraq: Tribal consolidation, through turbulent years 2003-2009,2015, url, p. 181157 Baram, A., The Iraqi Tribes and the Post-Sadam Tribal System, Brookings Institution, 8 July 2003, url
1158 ICG, Reviving UN Mediation on Iraq’s Disputed Internal Boundaries - Middle East Report N°194, 14 December 2018, url,
p. 151159 For examples of roadside bombs, IEDs and other attacks on roads in Salah al-Din governorate, see: The Baghdad Post, 3
truck drivers killed and a fourth wounded by gunmen in Salah al-Din, 17 December 2019, url; Bas News, IS Temporarily
Seizes Control of Kirkuk-Baghdad Road, 15 September 2019, url; Talos, IED attack against Baiji Police Chief on Highway 1 inSalah al-Din Province, 2 May 2019, url; Iraqi News, Back-to-back blasts kill 3, wound 11 in Iraq’s Salahuddin, 27 January
2019, url; The National, ISIS attacks resurgent on Iraq’s ‘Highway of Death’, 7 July 2018, url
1160 Bas News, IS Attacks Checkpoint, Kills and Wounds Six Iraqi Policemen, 31 May 2020, url; VOA, Islamic State Attack Kills
2 Security Forces Near Northern Iraqi Oil Fields, 21 October 2019, url
1161 iMMAP, Humanitarian Access Response: Explosive Hazards Risk Level on Roads in Salah Al-Din Governorate fromJanuary to December 2019, 12 January 2020 url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

explosive hazards on roads in Salah al-Din governorate were reported on the highway linking the cities
Baghdad and Baiji, as well as on the road linking the towns Tikrit and Tuz Khurmatu.1162

EconomySalah al-Din governorate hosts Alas and Ajil oilfields in Tikrit district and Baiji refinery in Baiji district.
Baiji refinery was considered integral to the Iraqi economy as the country’s largest oil refinery alongwith its auxiliary industries, such as a fertilizer factory and a power plant.1163 Baiji refinery was thescene of considerable levels of conflict and violence after ISIL took over control in June 2014.1164
According to a 2017 report by GPPi, significant parts of Baiji district were under PMU control, including
the refinery, although prolonged clashes between ISIL and pro-government forces as well as looting
by the PMUs have left the refinery and the wider district ‘decimated’ and only minimal returns havetaken place to the district.1165 On 30 July 2020, anti-explosives control department were able todismantle an anti-tank mine on the road adjacent to the oil pipeline in Baiji district in Salah al-Din
governorate. The mine was suspected to have been planted by ISIL militants in an effort to target the‘oil wealth’, according to local Iraqi news reports.1166
Alas oilfield was used by ISIL as a major source of revenue between 2014 and 2017.1167 In 2019, theoilfield was reported to have been the continued target of ISIL attacks.1168 For example, in March 2019,
ISIL fighters attacked police forces at the oilfield during which the group sustained an unknown
number of casualties, according to a media report.1169 In May and July 2019, ISF repelled three
separate attacks by ISIL on security forces stationed at the Alas oilfield.1170 In October 2019, ISIL
fighters staged an attack on security forces at a checkpoint near the oilfield, in an attempt todestabilise security efforts by targeting a ‘symbolic or economically vital target’, according to an
analyst of the ISW.1171 Two members of the security forces were killed, while three were wounded.1172
Iraqi authorities repaired Ajil oilfield in October 2018, after it had been set on fire by ISIL in 2015,
according to media reports.1173 The oilfield was reported to have resumed oil production sincethen.1174

1162 iMMAP, Humanitarian Access Response: Explosive Hazards Risk Level on Roads in Salah Al-Din Governorate 01-30 June

2020, 5 July 2020, url. For an overview of explosive hazards risk level on roads in Salah Al-Din Governorate since 2019, see
iMMAP’s monthly updated maps.
1163 Derzsi-Horváth, A. et al., Iraq after ISIL: Baiji, 13 September 2017, GPPi, url
1164 Derzsi-Horváth, A. et al., Iraq after ISIL: Baiji, 13 September 2017, GPPi, url. See also, Iraq Oil Report, Once fixable, Baiji
refinery plundered beyond repair, 28 January 2016, url
1165 Derzsi-Horváth, A. et al., Iraq after ISIL: Baiji, 13 September 2017, GPPi, url. See also, World Bank Group, Iraq
Reconstruction and Investment – Part 2 Damage and Needs Assessment of Affected Governorates, January 2018, url, p. 7677
1166 NINA, Anti- Explosives Force Defuses A Mine Planted To Target An Oil Pipeline In Salah al-Din, 30 July 2020, url
1167 Business Insider, ISIS is staging attacks in symbolically important places to send a message: We’re back, 24 October
2019, url
1168 Business Insider, ISIS is staging attacks in symbolically important places to send a message: We’re back, 24 October
2019, url
1169 ANF News, ISIS attacked Alas oil field near Kirkuk, 25 March 2019, url
1170 Kurdistan 24, Iraqi forces repel third ISIS attack in 2019 on oilfields in Salahuddin, 29 July 2019, url
1171 Business Insider, ISIS is staging attacks in symbolically important places to send a message: We’re back, 24 October
2019, url
1172 Reuters, ISIS attack kills two security forces near northern Iraqi oilfields, 22 October 2019, url
1173 Reuters, Iraq repairs Ajil oilfield torched by Islamic State: minister, 9 October 2018, url; Xinhua Net, Iraq rehabilitates
Ajil oilfield destroyed by IS militants, 9 October 2018, url
1174 Reuters, Iraq repairs Ajil oilfield torched by Islamic State: minister, 9 October 2018, url; Xinhua Net, Iraq rehabilitates
Ajil oilfield destroyed by IS militants, 9 October 2018, url

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2.7.2 Conflict background and armed actors in the governorate
Conflict backgroundAs part of ISIL’s rapid expansion across large swathes of Iraq in the summer of 2014, ISIL forces
captured parts of Salah al-Din governorate, including Tuz district, the oil town of Baiji and thegovernorate’s capital Tikrit as well as al-Shirqat.1175 The towns of Samarra and Amerli were reported
to have been successfully defended against ISIL forces by PMUs and the areas remained
unconquered.1176
Salah al-Din governorate was among the first to be liberated as part of the Iraqi forces’ led offensive
against ISIL having retaken most of the key population centres from ISIL’s control by mid-2015. Salah
al-Din was also one of the first governorates to witness large-scale return of IDPs, with 130 000 IDPs
having returned by July 2015 and 360 000 by December 2016, mostly Sunni Arabs. Despite ISIL’s
ousting, however, the governorate experienced ‘much higher rates of abduction, killing, forced
evictions, unlawful detentions, and property destruction than other governorates’, especially against
families and tribes accused of affiliation with ISIL. This development is largely attributed to thedominant role that PMUs played in the governorate, which influenced existing political divisions.1177
Since ISIL’s expulsion from Salah al-Din governorate in 2015, Tuz district has been under split control
between Kurdish Security Forces holding the northern part of the district and different PMU factions
dominating the remaining parts of the district.1178 The district’s capital, Tuz Khurmatu, was also divided
between Kurdish Security Forces and PMUs and remained a hotbed for clashes between those groups
as well as ‘tit-for-tat retaliation against civilians.’1179 Following the 2017 Kurdish independence
referendum, Tuz district became caught up in high levels of violence during the military stand-off
between the Iraqi government forces, including PMUs, and Kurdish forces over the disputed
territories.’1180
In October 2017, violence escalated in the ethnically mixed city of Tuz Khurmatu in significant clashes
between Kurdish Security Forces and ISF, supported by PMUs.1181 These clashes and ensuing sporadic
violence over the following two months, led to civilian casualties, displacement, destruction of civilian
property and infrastructure along ethnic lines.1182 Tuz district was reported to have ‘suffered more

1175 PAX, Human Security Survey Salahaddin, Iraq - 2019, Summary of Key Findings, 2019, url, p. 1; Norway, Landinfo, Irak:

Salah al-Din provins - sikkerhetssituasjonen i perioden juli - september 2018 [Salah al Din Governorate – Security situation
July-September 2018], 6 November 2018, url, p. 2; Gaston, E. and Derzsi-Horvath, A., Iraq after ISIL: Iraq After ISIL, SubState Actors, Local Forces, and the Micro-Politics of Control, GPPi, March 2018, url, p. 171176 Gaston, E. and Derzsi-Horvath, A., Iraq after ISIL: Iraq After ISIL, Sub-State Actors, Local Forces, and the Micro-Politics ofControl, GPPi, March 2018, url, p. 171177 Gaston, E. and Derzsi-Horvath, A., Iraq after ISIL: Iraq After ISIL, Sub-State Actors, Local Forces, and the Micro-Politics ofControl, GPPi, March 2018, url, p. 43
1178 Gaston, E. and Derzsi-Horvath, A., Iraq after ISIL: Iraq After ISIL, Sub-State Actors, Local Forces, and the Micro-Politics ofControl, GPPi, March 2018, url, p. 44; Al-Monitor, Why Tuz Khormato clashes were more than just local skirmishes, 5 April
2016, url
1179 Gaston, E. and Derzsi-Horvath, A., Iraq after ISIL: Iraq After ISIL, Sub-State Actors, Local Forces, and the Micro-Politics ofControl, GPPi, March 2018, url, p. 44; Al-Monitor, Why Tuz Khormato clashes were more than just local skirmishes, 5 April
2016, url
1180 ICG, Reviving UN Mediation on Iraq’s Disputed Internal Boundaries - Middle East Report N°194, 14 December 2018, url,
pp. 15, 17; UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, p. 4; AI, Iraq: Freshevidence that tens of thousands forced to flee Tuz Khurmatu amid indiscriminate attacks, lootings and arson, 24 November
2017, url
1181 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, p. 4; AI, Iraq: Fresh evidence
that tens of thousands forced to flee Tuz Khurmatu amid indiscriminate attacks, lootings and arson, 24 November 2017, url
1182 UNAMI/OHCHR, Report on Human Rights in Iraq – July to December 2017, 8 July 2018, url, p. 4; Al Shahid, Security andstability has returned to Tuz Khurmatu after months of clashes, 24 January 2018, url; OHCHR, Press briefing notes on Iraq
executions, Iraq: Tuz Khurmatu clashes and El Salvador, 15 December 2017, url; AI, Iraq: Fresh evidence that tens of141

EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

violence than other disputed areas in the immediate aftermath of the October 2017 takeover by the
Iraqi army and Hashd [PMU].’1183
Following the withdrawal of Kurdish Security Forces from the disputed areas, Sunni PMUs took fullcontrol of Tuz district’s rural areas, while Tuz Khurmatu was controlled by local ISF and police, whowere reported to be mostly of the Shia sect, according to the ICG.1184 According to media reports, thecentral government’s Rapid Response Forces were deployed to Tuz Khurmatu in January 2018.1185
According to reports, one of the Badr Organization’s longstanding top commanders establishedhimself as the ‘strongman’ in Tuz Khurmatu, along with his ‘personal militia’ that he formed with local
Shia Turkmen, who were reported to be involved in looting and arms- and drugs trafficking.1186 The
ICG’s assessment in December 2018 was that ‘security dominance by a single group – a minority inthe district and even more so in the governorate – is a recipe for continued violent conflict.’1187
The UN reported that between 23 and 27 November 2017, ISF conducted the last military offensive incentral northern Iraq, aimed at clearing remnants of ISIL from the Jazirah desert expanse, which spans
across the governorates of Anbar, Salah al-Din and Ninawa.1188 14 000 km2 and 175 villages in the
Jazirah and upper Euphrates areas were cleared.1189 Following this operation, the Prime Minister of
Iraq at the time, Haider al-Abadi, declared final victory over ISIL on 9 December 2017.1190 However,despite this declaration, ISIL continued carrying out asymmetric attacks targeting security forces andcivilians and causing civilian casualties throughout 2018, including in Salah al-Din governorate.1191 ISIL
was also reported in late 2017 to roam the countryside, attacking villages at night. 1192 The security
vacuum in rural parts of Salah al-Din governorate has enabled ISIL militants to operate and control
limited amounts of territory, which has led to an increase in the number of attacks from 2017 to 2018
in the governorate.1193

thousands forced to flee Tuz Khurmatu amid indiscriminate attacks, lootings and arson, 24 November 2017, url; HRW, Iraq:
Fighting in Disputed Territories Kills Civilians, 20 November 2017, url
1183 ICG, Reviving UN Mediation on Iraq’s Disputed Internal Boundaries - Middle East Report N°194, 14 December 2018, url,
p. 151184 ICG, Reviving UN Mediation on Iraq’s Disputed Internal Boundaries - Middle East Report N°194, 14 December 2018, url,
p. 181185 Rudaw, Iraq’s Rapid Response Force deployed to Tuz Khurmatu, 13 January 2018, url
1186 Quesnay, A. and Beaumont, R., The Return of the State and Inter-Militia Competition in Northern Iraq, Noria, 14 June
2018, url, p. 31187 ICG, Reviving UN Mediation on Iraq’s Disputed Internal Boundaries - Middle East Report N°194, 14 December 2018, url,
p. 181188 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 2367 (2017) [S/2018/42],
17 January 2018, url, para. 25
1189 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 2367 (2017) [S/2018/42],
17 January 2018, url, para. 25
1190 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 2367 (2017) [S/2018/42],
17 January 2018, url, para. 1
1191 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 2421 (2018) [S/2019/101],
1 February 2019, url, paras 14, 35
UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 2421 (2018) [S/2018/975], 31
October 2018, url, paras 22, 43, 44; UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council
resolution 2367 (2017) [S/2018/677], 9 July 2018, url, para. 20. See also, Flood, D., From Caliphate to Caves: The IslamicState’s Asymmetric War in Northern Iraq, CTC Volume 11, Issue 8, September 2018, url, p. 33; The Washington Post, ISIS ismaking a comeback in Iraq just months after Baghdad declared victory, 17 July 2018, url
1192 ICG, Reviving UN Mediation on Iraq’s Disputed Internal Boundaries - Middle East Report N°194, 14 December 2018, url,
p. 17
1193 Markusen, M., The Islamic State and the Persistent Threat of Extremism in Iraq, CSIS, November 2018, url, pp. 4, 6

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Armed actors
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
The ISF have the overall responsibility of the security within the governorate and predominantly
consist of units from the Iraqi army, federal police and to some extent special forces.1194 In many of
the rural areas the ISF are reportedly sparsely present, particularly since many have been redeployed
to contain anti-government protests.1195 According to the US-led Combined Joint Task ForceOperation Inherent Resolve, the ISF do not have a large enough force to control large desert areas,
have also been unable to retain control of territory cleared of ISIL in Salah al-Din governorate, andhave limited access to ISIL support zones in both Salah al-Din and Diyala governorates.1196 In a May
2020 report Husham Al-Hashimi noted the presence of ISF in Samarra, Smarra island and Dhuluiya,
Dujail, Ishaqi, Balad, Al-Dour, Tikrit, Al Alam, Baijji, Sharqat, Makhoul, Siniya, Salah al-Din Desert, andthe areas around Tuz Khurmatu as of December 2019.1197
Regional operation commands in Iraq are reported to act as operational-level headquarters
commanding and supervising different ISF units within a geographical area of responsibility.1198 Salah
al-Din governorate is split between the Salah al-Din Operations Command (SDOC), covering thenorthern part of the governorate, including Tikrit, Baiji and al-Shiriqat,1199 the Samarra Operations
Command (SOC) covering Samarra, large parts of the Jazeera desert west of Samarra and southern
Salah al-Din governorate,1200 as well as the Dijla Operations Command (DOC), covering all of Diyala
governorate, eastern Salah al-Din governorate and Tuz Khurmatu town, the Alas and Ajil oilfields, andthe Hamrin Mountain Range.1201 According to the ISW, the SDOC and SOC did not exist in 2013 andwere likely created to support forward operations in the fight against ISIL.1202 During 2019 and 2020,
several sources reported on units operating under the SDOC and SOC having been involved in anti-ISIL
military operations of various scales throughout Salah al-Din governorate.1203
Popular Mobilization Units (PMU)
PMUs played a significant role in the liberation of areas of Salah al-Din governorate from ISIL, leadingor accompanying ISF in the recapturing of Tuz, Tikrit, al-Dour, al-Alam, Baiji, and parts of al-Shirqat
districts.1204 Present in large numbers across the governorate, Shia PMUs exerted control overstrategic locations and even areas beyond their official responsibility.1205 Shia PMUs also developed
their own auxiliary forces, by mobilising a local Turkmen PMU that controlled half of Tuz and1194 Landinfo, Irak: Salah al-Din provins-sikkerhetssituasjonen i perioden juli-september 2018 (Salah al-Din Governorate -Security Situation July-September 2018), 6 November 2018, url, p. 71195 Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: From Abandoned Villages to the Cities, CGP, 5 May 2020, url; Landinfo, Irak: Salah al-Din
provins-sikkerhetssituasjonen i perioden juli-september 2018 (Salah al-Din Governorate - Security Situation July-September2018), 6 November 2018, url, p. 71196 USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve - Report to the United States Congress, July 1, 2019 –October 25, 2019, 19 November 2019, url, p. 101197 Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: from abandoned villages to the cities, CGP, 5 May 2020, url
1198 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, p. 121199 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, p. 221200 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, p. 231201 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, p. 171202 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, p. 121203 NINA, Salah Al-Din Operations Command carries out a broad military operation, 27 July 2020, url; The Baghdad Post,
Combined force arrests 2 terrorists, finds den in Salah al-Din, 8 May 2020, url; CJTF-OIR, 27 November 2019, url, pp. 1, 31204 Gaston, E. and Derzsi-Horvath, A., Iraq after ISIL: Iraq After ISIL, Sub-State Actors, Local Forces, and the Micro-Politics ofControl, GPPi, March 2018, url, p. 431205 Gaston, E. and Derzsi-Horvath, A., Iraq after ISIL: Iraq After ISIL, Sub-State Actors, Local Forces, and the Micro-Politics ofControl, GPPi, March 2018, url, p. 44

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

establishing a number of Sunni tribal PMUs in Tikrit and surrounding areas, as well as in Baiji and
Shirqat.1206
According to a 2017 ISW report on the Iraqi Order of Battle, different factions of PMUs operated freely
throughout Salah al-Din governorate, including in areas nominally under the Salah al-Din Operations
Command (SDOC), Dijla Operations Command (DOC) and the Samarra Operations Command (SOC),
with limited or even without any coordination with the respective regional operations command.1207
Sources stated to DIS/Landinfo during their April 2018 FFM to KRI that there was ‘a substantive
proliferation of militias and armed groups that are not under government control’ in Salah al-Din.1208
According to analysts Michael Knights1209 and Phillip Smyth in 2019,1210 the PMU militia Asa’ib Ahl alHaq was the dominant security, economic and political actor in the northern Baghdad belts as well as
in southern Salah al-Din governorate, including Taji, Dujail, and Balad. Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq was reported
to engage in extortion, intimidation and looting in their areas of control, including demanding‘protection payments’ from local business owners.1211 Moqtada al-Sadr’s militia, Saraya Salam, wasreported to exclusively control the shrine city of Samarra, while Camp Speicher, a large and unused
military base west of Tikrit, was reported to have been dominated by Kata’ib Hezbollah, Kata’ib AlImam Ali, and Kata’ib Jund Al-Imam (PMU Brigade 6).1212 Kata’ib al-Tayyar al-Risali (PMU Brigade 31)
exercised control and were most active in Baiji district. Alas oilfield in Tikrit district was controlled bymilitias, who engaged in diverting oil for trucking to Iran (and the Gulf ports) via the KRI.1213 The Badr
forces reportedly control all areas east of the Tigris River in Diyala, the Jallam desert east of Samarra
and Tuz district, as well as Kirkuk.1214
According to reports, militia recruits in Tuz Khurmatu were primarily drawn from the Shia Turkmen
community in response to ISIL anti-Shia violence in 2014/2015.1215 Iraqi security expert Michael
Knights wrote in a 2019 research paper on Iraqi militias that Tuz Khurmatu and Kirkuk were controlled
by the Turkmen PMU Northern Axis led by Abu Ridha Yilmaz al-Najjar.1216 The same source reported
in 2019 that local Turkmen militia groups operating in Tuz Khurmatu were implicated in illicit oil
extraction and smuggling to Iran.1217 According to a study by GPPi from 2017, ‘Turkmen PMF were at
the forefront of many of the significant human rights abuses while they held territory or engaged inoperations with Shi’a PMF, including summary executions, kidnappings, arbitrary detention, torture,looting, and the mass destruction of houses.’1218

1206 Gaston, E. and Derzsi-Horvath, A., Iraq after ISIL: Iraq After ISIL, Sub-State Actors, Local Forces, and the Micro-Politics ofControl, GPPi, March 2018, url, p. 44
1207 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, pp. 17, 22, 231208 Denmark, DIS, Norway, Landinfo, Iraq: Security situation and the situation for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in thedisputed areas, incl. possibility to enter and access the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), 5 November 2018, [source: an Iraqi
analyst], url, p. 181209 Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, August 2019, url, p. 41210 Smyth P., The Shia Militia Mapping Project (Interactive Map), May 2019, url
1211 Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, August 2019, url, p. 4; Diyaruna, Iranbacked militias in Iraq demand 'protection money', 2 May 2019, url
1212 Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, August 2019, url, p. 4; The Atlantic, Nation
Building at Gunpoint, Can Samarra, a Sunni-majority city run by Shia militias, be a test case for fixing a broken Iraq?, 10
May 2019, url; PAX, Human Security Survey Salahaddin, Iraq - 2019, Summary of Key Findings, 2019url, p. 61213 Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, August 2019, url, p. 4; Smyth P., The Shia
Militia Mapping Project (Interactive Map), May 2019, url
1214 Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, August 2019, url, pp. 4-5
1215 IISS, Iran’s Networks of Influence in the Middle East - Chapter Four: Iraq, November 2019, url; Derzsi-Horvath, A., Iraq
after ISIL: Tuz, GPPi, 16 August 2017, url
1216 Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, August 2019, url, p. 5
1217 Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, August 2019, url, p. 5
1218 Gaston, E. and Derzsi-Horvath, A., Iraq after ISIL: Iraq After ISIL, Sub-State Actors, Local Forces, and the Micro-Politics ofControl, GPPi, March 2018, url, p. 26.

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In a May 2020 report Husham al-Hashimi noted the presence of PMUs in Dujail, Tuz Khurmatu, Amirili,
east and west Salah-al Din, Tikrit and areas east of Tikrit, Salah al-Din – Baghdad Road, Samarra, Balad,
Mutubijaha northeast Ishaqi, Makhould Mountains, Therthar Lake, Shaiat, Baiji, al-Alam, al-Dour,
Makhoul and Khanuqa Mountains (South Tikrit), Zawiyah as of December 2019.1219
Sunni Tribal Militias
Few Sunni tribal groups have mobilised their support to the PMU forces within the governorate. An
estimated 2 000 to 3 000 fighters have been recruited by PMUs, primarily by the Badr Brigades andthe Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, in Salah al-Din governorate, which is relatively few, in comparison to Ninewa
governorate where an estimated 18 000 have been recruited into a Sunni Tribal Mobilization Force.1220
The low number of Sunni recruits in Salah al-Din governorate are mainly attributed to the deep
mistrust Sunni tribal leaders feel towards the Shia dominated PMUs.1221
For example, a major Sunni tribal militia was reported to be Liwa Salahaddin (51st Brigade), which was
based in northern Salah al-Din governorate, mostly in Shirqat, Tikrit and Baiji districts.1222 It wasreportedly led by Yazan al-Jabouri, the son of Iraqi MP and former Ba’athist insurgent leader Mishan
al-Jabouri. The 51st Brigade was said to collaborate with Iranian-affiliated Shia PMUs and claimed tohave received weapons and intelligence support from Iran.1223 According to a GPPi 2017 study, the51st Brigade enjoyed backing from the PMU when it engaged in illegal activities, such as when ‘there
were significant allegations of misconduct against the 51st Brigade, including looting (notably in Tikrit),robbery, abductions, and revenge killings, as well as smuggling goods to ISIL fighters.’1224 However, attimes, the 51st Brigade was also called on to carry out activities at the behest of the PMU, including
conducting inspection tours and house searches on behalf of the Shia PMU.1225
ISIL
According to the UN Security Council, ‘[w]hile the overall level of violence related to ISIL has
decreased, the group remains a significant threat and has shifted to insurgent tactics, with attacks
continuing in different parts of the country.’1226 Security vacuums caused by re-deployments of ISF toanti-government protests, the COVID-19 lockdown, as well as the withdrawal of most US forces from
Iraq, have reportedly been exploited by ISIL to gain strength and regroup in parts of Iraq, including inSalah al-Din governorate in 2020.1227 In remote areas of Iraq, ISIL is reported to continue to mountattacks on official checkpoints, infrastructure and against officials.1228 ISIL operations in many rural
areas in Salah al-Din governorate in 2020 have been described as an ‘assassination campaign’ by the1219 Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: from abandoned villages to the cities, CGP, 5 May 2020, url
1220 Gaston, E., Sunni Tribal Forces, GPPi, 30 August 2017, url
1221 Gaston, E. and Derzsi-Horvath, A., Iraq after ISIL: Iraq After ISIL, Sub-State Actors, Local Forces, and the Micro-Politics ofControl, GPPi, March 2018, url, p. 25.
1222 Gaston, E. and Derzsi-Horvath, A., Iraq after ISIL: Iraq After ISIL, Sub-State Actors, Local Forces, and the Micro-Politics ofControl, GPPi, March 2018, url, pp. 48-49.
1223 IISS, Iran’s Networks of Influence in the Middle East - Chapter Four: Iraq, November 2019, url
1224 Gaston, E. and Derzsi-Horvath, A., Iraq after ISIL: Iraq After ISIL, Sub-State Actors, Local Forces, and the Micro-Politics ofControl, GPPi, March 2018, url, p. 49.
1225 Gaston, E. and Derzsi-Horvath, A., Iraq after ISIL: Iraq After ISIL, Sub-State Actors, Local Forces, and the Micro-Politics ofControl, GPPi, March 2018, url, p. 49.
1226 UN Security Council, Tenth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peaceand security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat [S/2020/95], 4
February 2020, url, para. 41227 The New York Times, ISIS Attacks Surge in Iraq Amid Debate on U.S. Troop Levels, 10 June 2020, url; SIPRI, The
resurgence of the Islamic State in Iraq: Political and military responses, 9 June 2020, url; Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: From
Abandoned Villages to the Cities, CGP, 5 May 2020, url; CNBC, America is ignoring Iraq’s turbulent protests at its peril,
security experts say, 14 November 2019, url
1228 UN Security Council, Tenth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peaceand security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat [S/2020/95], 4
February 2020, url, para. 4

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situationlate security analyst Husham al-Hashimi.1229 The ICG further assessed in May 2020 that the militantgroup’s attacks have become ‘more assertive’ and have been primarily focused on a ‘rural beltreaching across Iraq’s centre north, in Kirkuk, Salahuddin and Diyala provinces.’1230 It is also reported
that ISIL has demonstrated its adaptability in the first half of 2020 by gradually having moved from‘hiding in remote areas to alarmingly establishing a foothold in rural and suburban areas.’1231
Michael Knights and Alex Almeida have observed a pattern of rising levels of recovery, activity andattacks associated with ISIL since 2019 in Salah al-Din governorate and identified the strongest ISIL
operating environment in Salah al-Din government to be the Jallam Desert, from where the group hasaccess to a range of target areas, including Samarra,1232 the Alas oilfield, Tuz Khurmatu, and thegovernorate borders with southern Kirkuk and western Diyala.1233 They have moreover identified thefollowing areas in Salah al-Din governorate as housing active ISIL attack cells: Eastern Thar Thar in
Balad district, southern Jallam Desert in Mutaibijah district, Udhaim and northeastern Thar Thar in
Tikrit district, Baiji, Siniyah, Makhul, and northern Jallam Desert in Hamrin district, Tuz, Pulkhana, andZarga.1234 The ISW identified the Hamrin Mountains as a favourable support zone for ISIL allowing forlinks with other support zones in Salah al-Din and Diyala governorates.1235 ISIL stored weapons andother supplies in tunnel systems in this area, and its leaders used the area to regroup. The Hamrin
Mountains provide for opportunities to launch attacks in areas around Tuz Khurmatu.1236
According to Husham al-Hashimi, as of December 2019, ISIL had around 350 to 400 active fighters in
the Salah al-Din ‘sector’, who are supported by 400 inactive fighters or ‘sleeper cells’ and mainly deal
with logistics.1237 Small patrols of nine to 11 men operated in various places and carried out attacks.
In March 2020, ISIL adopted a new approach by activating autonomous sleeper cells to carry out
attacks in rural areas south of Samarra and north of Baghdad.1238 According to the ICG, many of these
active ISIL fighters are Iraqis and local to their respective areas of operation.1239

2.7.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population
Developments 2019-2020
Successive UN Security Council reports from 2019 and the first half of 2020 continue to report that
ISIL remnants frequently carry out asymmetric attacks against the Iraqi people and security forces,
especially in Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala, Erbil, Kirkuk, Ninawa and Salah al-Din Governorates.1240
1229 Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: From Abandoned Villages to the Cities, CGP, 5 May 2020, url
1230 ICG, When Measuring ISIS’s “Resurgence”, Use the Right Standard, 13 May 2020, url
1231 Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: From Abandoned Villages to the Cities, CGP, 5 May 2020, url
1232 ‘ISIS’s encroachment on Samarra city aims to force Salah al-Din province to further rely on PMF divisions, which ISIS

hopes will worsen Sunni-Shiite tensions.’ Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: From Abandoned Villages to the Cities, CGP, 5 May
2020, url
1233 Knights, M. and Almeida, A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020,
CTC, Vol. 13, Issue 5, May 2020, url, p. 16. See also, Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: From Abandoned Villages to the Cities, CGP,
5 May 2020, url
1234 Knights, M. and Almeida, A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020,
CTC, Vol. 13, Issue 5, May 2020, url, p. 23. See also, Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: From Abandoned Villages to the Cities, CGP,
5 May 2020, url; ISW, ISIS Resurgence Update - April 2019, 19 April 2019, url
1235 ISW, ISIS’s second comeback assessing the next ISIS insurgency, 23 July 2019, url, p. 211236 ISW, ISIS’s second comeback assessing the next ISIS insurgency, 23 July 2019, url, p. 211237 Remnants of ISIL in Iraq have reportedly established 11 sectors in what it calls its Wilayat (Province of) Iraq inaccordance with its organizational structure. See map of 11 ‘sectors’: Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: From Abandoned Villages
to the Cities, CGP, 5 May 2020, url
1238 Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: From Abandoned Villages to the Cities, CGP, 5 May 2020, url
1239 IGC, Averting an ISIS Resurgence in Iraq and Syria, Middle East Report N°207, 11 October 2019, url, p. 51240 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2020/363], 6 May
2020, url, para. 24; UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2020/140], 21 February 2020, url, para. 23; UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019), Report of
the Secretary-General [S/2019/903], 22 November 2019, url, para. 29; UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

According Michael Knights’ and Alex Almeida’s report from May 2020, Salah al-Din governorate has
consistently been ranked the lowest or second lowest of the six governorates suffering from the ISIL
insurgency in terms of attacks throughout 2019 and early 2020, but has still seen signs of ISIL
recovery.1241 The analysis on Salah al-Din governorate further shows that ‘[a]ttacks per month rosefrom 13 in Q1 2019 to 24.6 in Q3 and 35 per month in Q4, and then stayed close to this level in Q1
2020. For comparison, this is still far lower than the 116 monthly attacks in 2013 or the 84 monthly
attacks in 2017, but higher than 2012 levels of 19 attacks per month.’1242 The same report notes an
emerging trend of bomb-making and roadside bomb emplacement capability in the third quarter of
2019, as well as a focus on attacking isolated checkpoints in stand-up fights involving platoon-sized
ISIL units.1243 The targeting of ISIL-opposed Sunni preachers and Tribal Mobilization Force officers wasreported to have been on the increase.1244 Moreover, ISIL ‘continued to assassinate village leaders andothers accused of cooperating with the military while kidnapping farmers and demanding cuts of theirprofits’, including in rural villages in Salah al-Din.1245
According to open sources data from ACLED, EPIC and Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency database, ISIL
conducted around 30 attacks in Salah al-Din governorate from January to March 2020.1246
Analysis by Joel Wing of Musings on Iraq shows that ISIL launched a ‘spring campaign’ across Iraq as
the months of April and May 2020 saw a significant surge in violence, which largely subsided by June
2020.1247 Salah al-Din governorate has seen 11 incidents in April, 45 incidents in May and 13 incidents
in June 2020, illustrating that the governorate ‘has turned into a secondary front for IS where its mainpriority is to rebuild.’1248
Following continued and heightened activity of ISIL, including in parts of Salah al-Din governorate in
2019/2020, the ISF have launched several major coordinated anti-ISIL military operations in
response.1249 In 2019, the Iraqi government launched Operation Will of Victory, which was aimed at
expelling ISIL fighters from remote areas, including in Salah al-Din governorate.1250 In February 2020,2470 (2019), Report of the Secretary-General [S/2019/660], 5 August 2019, url, para 19; UN Security Council,
Implementation of resolution 2421 (2018), Report of the Secretary-General [S/2019/365], 2 May 2019, url, para. 18
1241 In 2019, the following numbers of ISIL attacks were recorded in the top six governorates in Iraq: Diyala (550), Nineveh(293), Kirkuk (228), Baghdad (214), Salah al-Din (142), and Anbar (105); Knights, M. and Almeida, A., Remaining andExpanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020, CTC, Vol. 13, Issue 5, May 2020, url, p. 14, 16
1242 Knights, M. and Almeida, A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020,
CTC, Vol. 13, Issue 5, May 2020, url, p. 161243 Knights, M. and Almeida, A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020,
CTC, Vol. 13, Issue 5, May 2020, url, p. 161244 Knights, M. and Almeida, A., Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq in 2019-2020,
CTC, Vol. 13, Issue 5, May 2020, url, p. 161245 USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve - Report to the United States Congress, January 1, 2019
- March 31, 2019, 7 May 2019, url, p. 46
1246 USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve - Report to the United States Congress, January 1, 2020
– March 31, 2020, 13 May 2020, url, p. 24
1247 Wing, J., Islamic State’s Spring Offensive In Iraq Ends In June, 6 July 2020, url
1248 Wing, J., Islamic State’s Spring Offensive In Iraq Ends In June, 6 July 2020, url
1249 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2020/363], 6 May
2020, url, para. 24; UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019); Report of the Secretary-General[S/2020/140], 21 February 2020, url, para. 23; UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019), Report of
the Secretary-General [S/2019/903], 22 November 2019, url, para. 29; UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution
2470 (2019), Report of the Secretary-General [S/2019/660], 5 August 2019, url, para 19; UN Security Council,
Implementation of resolution 2421 (2018), Report of the Secretary-General [S/2019/365], 2 May 2019, url, paras. 18, 191250 UN Security Council, Tenth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peaceand security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat [S/2020/95], 4
February 2020, url, para. 5. See also, UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019), Report of theSecretary-General [S/2020/140], 21 February 2020, url, para. 23; UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470
(2019), Report of the Secretary-General [S/2019/903], 22 November 2019, url, para. 29

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the ISF launched a new military operation against ISIL entitled ‘Heroes of Iraq’.1251 The first phase of
the operations took place in May 2020 and focused on Anbar, Ninewa and Salah al-Din
governorates.1252 The second phase was announced on 2 June 2020 and focused on ISIL holdouts on
the fringes of Salah al-Din and Kirkuk governorates and the third phase was launched on 22 June 2020
in order to clear areas of Salah al-Din, Diyala, Samarra, and Kirkuk governorates from ISIL remnants.1253
According to the US-led Combined Joint Task Force thousands of ISF members, consisting of the Iraqi
Army, ‘Qwat al-Khasah’ Special Forces Brigade, Iraqi Air Force, Emergency Response Divisions, federal
police, PMUs, and Iraqi security and intelligence agencies, cleared over 4,800 km2 searching for ISIL
hideouts during the third phase of ‘Heroes of Iraq’ in Salah ad-Din governorate between 22 and 24
June 2020.1254 Phase four, launched in mid-July 2020 focused on Diyala governorate mainly.1255
According to Joel Wing, Iraq’s extensive military efforts to clear areas of ISIL presence, have slowed
ISIL’s activity, but not eliminated it.1256

Illustrative security incidents•

On 8 January 2019, an ISIL Suicide Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (SVBIED)
detonated at a checkpoint in Tikrit, Salah ad-Din governorate.1257•

In early February 2019, ISIL militants killed three brothers after abducting them in the norther
part of Salah al-Din governorate, where they were picking truffles on Makhoul Mountain.1258•

On 22 May 2019, ISIL militants staged an attack on a checkpoint near Alas oilfield in Salah alDin governorate during which one police officer was killed and four others were injured.1259•

In early August 2019, armed men who had claimed allegiance to ISIL, publicly beheaded a
police officer in a rural village south of the city of Samarra in Salah al-Din governorate.1260•

On 7 September 2019, a civilian was killed by a bomb that exploded inside his car in an area
west of Samarra city in Salah al-Din governorate.1261•

On 9 February 2020, three civilians were injured by an ISIL IED explosion in Al-Mahzam village
in Tikrit district.1262•

On 24 February 2020, suspected ISIL militants killed three civilians and injured a fourth in an
attack on a soccer field and a coffee shop in the town of Balad.1263•

On 16 March 2020, suspected ISIL militants detonated a motorcycle-borne IED at a market in
Tuz injuring 6 people.1264

1251 USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve - Report to the United States Congress, January 1, 2020

– March 31, 2020, 13 May 2020, url, p. 271252 Rudaw, Iraqi forces launch third phase of ‘Heroes of Iraq’ anti-ISIS operation, 22 June 2020, url
1253 Rudaw, Iraqi forces launch third phase of ‘Heroes of Iraq’ anti-ISIS operation, 22 June 2020, url
1254 CJTF-OIR, Iraqi Security Forces demolish Daesh safe havens during “Heroes of Iraq III”, 27 June 2020, url
1255 Rudaw, Iraq continues fourth phase of anti-ISIS operation in Diyala, 26 July 2020, url; Diyaruna, Iraqi forces kick off 4thphase of 'Heroes of Iraq' campaign, 13 July 2020, url
1256 Wing, J., Islamic State’s Spring Offensive In Iraq Ends In June, 6 July 2020, url. See also, ICG, When Measuring ISIS’s“Resurgence”, Use the Right Standard, 13 May 2020, url, p. 3; Los Angeles Times, Iraq’s new war against Islamic State:
Halting the group’s budding rural resurgence, 8 March 2019, url
1257 ISW, ISIS’s second comeback assessing the next ISIS insurgency, 23 July 2019, url, p. 50
1258 Kurdistan 24, ISIS executes three brothers after kidnapping in Iraq’s Salahuddin, 8 February 2019, url
1259 Anadolu Agency, 2 Iraqi policemen killed in attacks in Saladin, Diyala, 23 May 2019, url
1260 The New York Times, ISIS Is Regaining Strength in Iraq and Syria, 19 August 2019, url
1261 Reuters, Four killed, including a civilian, across Iraq in day of militant attacks, 7 September 2019, url
1262 iMMAP, Humanitarian Access Response, Weekly Explosive Incidents Flash News (6-12 FEB 2020), 12 February 2020, url
1263 EPIC/ ISHM: 20 February – February 27, 2020, 27 February 2020, url
1264 ISW, Iraq Situation Report: March 11 - 17, 2020, 17 March 2020 url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation•

According to the ICG, on 1 May 2020, ISIL launched a complex operation described as ‘one ofits most ambitious operations in Iraq in recent memory’1265, suggesting that the operation was
well planned.1266 Several ISIL units attacked Iraqi PMUs and secured a rural section of Salah
al-Din governorate near the city of Samarra. Ten PMU fighters were killed during hours-long
clashes.1267•

On 15 May 2020, an armed group stormed and set fire to a house killing all residents anddestroyed two vehicles and their wheat field in Al-Jalam, north of Samarra district.1268•

On 13 June 2020, ISIL attacked the home of Salah ad-Din deputy governor Ismail al-Halloub in
the Ishaqi subdistrict in southeastern Salah al-Din and clashes injured one ISF member andone other person.1269•

On 2 July 2020, an IED targeted a PUM patrol west of Baji, killing two intelligence officers from
PMU brigade 35.1270•

On 15 July 2020, a US convoy was targeted with a series of explosions in Makeshifa area in
Samarra district.1271•

On 17 July 2020, an IED killed two civilians and injured three near Al-Namil village and AlShirqat district.1272•

On 25 July 2020, ISIL militants attacked the village of Sumoum, located northwest of killing
five civilians, including the village mukhtar.1273•

On 27 July 2020, a roadside bomb in Shirqat district hit a civilian vehicle and killed a father andhis daughter, while his wife and two other children sustained serious injuries.1274

Number of civilian casualties
The number of armed conflict related incidents and civilian casualties in the governorate recorded by
UNAMI for the period 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, is shown in the table below.
GoverNorate

2019 (Jan – Dec)

2019 total 2020 (Jan – Jul)
2020 total
casualties
casualties#of Killed Injured#of Killed Injured(killed and incidents(killed andincidents
injured)injured)Salahadin 31

39

58

97

12

16

33

49

Table 11: Number of armed conflict related incidents and civilian casualties 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, Salah ad Din
governorate.1275

1265 ICG, When Measuring ISIS’s “Resurgence”, Use the Right Standard, 13 May 2020, url, p. 1
1266 ICG, When Measuring ISIS’s “Resurgence”, Use the Right Standard, 13 May 2020, url, p. 2
1267 SIPRI, The resurgence of the Islamic State in Iraq: Political and military responses, 9 June 2020, url; ICG, When

Measuring ISIS’s “Resurgence”, Use the Right Standard, 13 May 2020, url, p. 1; BBC, Islamic State militants kill ten Iraqis in'fierce clashes', 2 May 2020, url
1268 iMMAP-Humanitarian Access Respond, Weekly Explosive Hazard Incidents Flash News- 14-20 May 2020, 20 May 2020,
url
1269 EPIC, ISHM: June 11 – June 18, 2020, 18 June 2020, url
1270 EPIC, ISHM: July 2 – July 9, 2020, 30 July 2020, url
1271 NINA, News About Targeting An American Convoy Makeshifa Area In Samarra, 15 July 2020, url
1272 iMMAP, Weekly Explosive Hazard Incidents Flash News- 16-22 July 2020, url
1273 EPIC, ISHM: July 23 – July 30, 2020, 30 July 2020, url
1274 Shafaq News, Two victims in an explosion in Saladin, 17 July 2020, url
1275 UNAMI, Email to EASO, 24 July 2020

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Number of security incidents
In the reference period, ACLED reported 155 battles, 151 incidents of remote violence/explosions, 21
cases of violence against civilians, 0 incidents of riots, accounting for a total of 327 security incidentsof these types in Salah ad Din governorate, the majority taking place in Daur district. 3 protests werealso reported in Salah ad Din governorate during the reference period. 1276 The evolution of all thetypes of security events through the reference period is shown in the figure below.

Figure 14: Evolution of security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence, violence against civilians, riots and protests
in Salah ad Din governorate 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, based on ACLED data. 1277

State ability to secure law and orderMore information on the capacities of the Iraqi forces and the forces under the KRG as actors ofprotection, including the ability to secure law and order, as well as information on the integrity ofarmed forces, please see the report EASO COI Report – Iraq: Actors of Protection (2018).
The resurgence of ISIL and heightened level of attacks carried out in spring 2020, in particular, havetaken place mostly in the ‘rural belt reaching across Iraq’s centre north, in Kirkuk, Salah al-Din andDiyala provinces.’1278 ISIL fighters have taken shelter in especially rugged terrain in these areas
following their territorial defeat in 2017.1279 These areas are reportedly difficult for Iraqi security actors
to control, despite continuous anti-ISIL military operations, which are reported to be limited in their

1276 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url
1277 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url
1278 ICG, When Measuring ISIS’s “Resurgence”, Use the Right Standard, 13 May 2020, url, p. 3. See also: Wing, J., IslamicState’s Spring Offensive In Iraq Ends In June, 6 July 2020, url
1279 ICG, When Measuring ISIS’s “Resurgence”, Use the Right Standard, 13 May 2020, url, p. 3

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effects.1280 According to the USDOD’s report to US Congress from May 2019, corruption was describedas rampant in Iraq’s security institutions and government, which also affected counter-ISIL efforts.1281
In addition, ISIL is reported to be exploiting the stretches of ‘no-man’s land’ in the disputed areas
separating federal Iraqi and Kurdish security forces, as well as failures of coordination between
them.1282 The US Combined Joint Task Force-OIR similarly reported that the ISF and Kurdish Peshmergalack strong cooperation creating ‘operational seams’ which ISIL exploits and that ISIL operates from alargely ‘ungoverned’ swath of territory including across parts of Salah al-Din.1283 According toobservers, the recent spike in ISIL attacks has also shown a shift in ISIL’s targets by more frequently
and directly taking aim at the ISF and affiliated pro-government forces, thereby weakening thesesecurity actors’ ability to provide protection to civilians.1284
According to the ICG, the so-called ‘resurgence’ of ISIL cannot be compared with the group’s
capabilities in the wake of declaring its ‘caliphate’ in Iraq in 2014, ‘[b]ut for Iraqis – particularly in therural areas most vulnerable to the group’s attacks – that sort of resurgent ISIS would again be terrifying
and lethal.’1285
PMUs reportedly enjoy freedom of movement and are in de facto control of much of Salah al-Din
governorate, while the ISF and police force nominally exercise control.1286 According to the DefenseIntelligence Agency, PMUs are engaged in supporting the counter-ISIL fight, including conducting
clearing operations and supporting ISF mostly in Diyala and Salah al-Din governorates, however, those
PMUs are reported to also engage in criminal actions, including extortion and smuggling, which, ‘may
distract from and diminish their security obligations.’1287 For example, in July 2020, seven PMU
members who were working at a checkpoint in Amerli sub-district in Tuz Khurmatu district, werearrested for unlawfully levying tolls on transport trucks.1288
Reports of serious human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killing, detention, or abuse of civilians,
property destruction, looting, and the blocking of IDPs’ returns perpetrated by PMUs have declined
since 2017. However, GPPi reported in February 2019 that many IDPs, including from Salah al-Din
governorate, particularly Sunni Arab families who are perceived as ISIL affiliates, fear the continued
presence of PMUs as security actors in their home areas and see this as a major obstacle to returning
home. GPPi reported that Baiji district has seen particularly low numbers of returnees for thisreason.1289

1280 Wing, J., Islamic State’s Spring Offensive In Iraq Ends In June, 6 July 2020, url; ICG, When Measuring ISIS’s“Resurgence”, Use the Right Standard, 13 May 2020, url, p. 3; Los Angeles Times, Iraq’s new war against Islamic State:
Halting the group’s budding rural resurgence, 8 March 2019, url
1281 USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve - Report to the United States Congress, January 1, 2019
- March 31, 2019, 7 May 2019, url, p. 48
1282 ICG, When Measuring ISIS’s “Resurgence”, Use the Right Standard, 13 May 2020, url, p. 3; Flood, D., From Caliphates toCaves: The Islamic State’s Asymmetric War in Northern Iraq, CTC, September 2018, Volume 11, issue 8, url, p. 30. See also
additional information about ISIL as an armed actor above.
1283 USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve - Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,
January 1, 2020 – March 31, 2020, 13 May 2020, url, p. 25
1284 Wing, J., Islamic State’s Spring Offensive In Iraq Ends In June, 6 July 2020, url; ICG, When Measuring ISIS’s“Resurgence”, Use the Right Standard, 13 May 2020, url, p. 21285 ICG, When Measuring ISIS’s “Resurgence”, Use the Right Standard, 13 May 2020, url, p. 61286 See additional information on the PMU and ISF as armed actors above.
1287 USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,
January 1, 2019 - March 31, 2019, 7 May 2019, url, p. 52
1288 Kirkuk Now, Seven PMU members working at a checkpoint arrested, 27 July 2020, url
1289 Gaston, E., and Domisse, M., At the Tip of the Spear: Armed Groups’ Impact on Displacement and Return in Post-ISIL
Iraq, GPPi, 18 February 2019, url

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Infrastructure damage and explosive remnants of war
Salah al-Din is also one of the governorates with particular high scores of infrastructure damage as aresult of conflict, particularly in relation to damage to housing,1290 to the agricultural sector,1291 and to
the water, sanitation and hygiene sector.1292 According to a 2018 study conducted by the Iraqi
government in collaboration with the World Bank, damages to the housing sector in Salah al-Din
governorate amounted to 20 % of the share of total damage. The governorate sustained the highest
percentage of destruction to rural housing assets across the seven governorates affected by conflict,which were assessed.1293
Amnesty International reported that reconstruction in governorates badly affected by the conflict,including Salah al-Din, was slow throughout 2019.1294
Explosive ordnance contamination is reported to pose an obstacle to safe returns of IDPs as well as tothe implementation of humanitarian activities in more than one third of districts assessed in Anbar,
Baghdad, Kirkuk, Ninewa and Salah al-Din governorates by the Humanitarian Country Team in Iraq.1295
For example, on 9 February 2020, an explosive remnant of war thought to be left behind by ISIL
detonated at a quarry in the village of al-Mihzin injuring three quarry workers.1296

Displacement and return
As of 30 June 2020, 11 % of the total IDP population in Iraq originated from Salah al-Din governorate,with the main districts of origin being Tuz Khurmatu (40 194 individuals), Balad (28 632) and Baiji(27 804).1297 At the same time, Salah al-Din governorate hosted a total number of 68 700 IDPs, thesixth highest number of IDPs of all 18 governorates of displacement.1298 Furthermore, 29 % of IDPs in
Salah al-Din governorate were assessed to be living in ‘critical shelters’.1299 During 2019, many IDPs
were forced into secondary displacement due to ‘forced and premature returns and forced or coerced
departures from camps and informal settlements in Ninewa, Salah Al-Din, Al-Anbar, Kirkuk and Diyala
governorates.’1300
Returns to Salah al-Din governorate outpace displacement and Salah al-Din governorate continues torank third amongst the top governorates of return, with a total of 692 142 returnees recorded as of1290 World Bank Group, Iraq Reconstruction and Investment – Part 2 Damage and Needs Assessment of Affected

Governorates, January 2018, url, p. 151291 World Bank Group, Iraq Reconstruction and Investment – Part 2 Damage and Needs Assessment of Affected
Governorates, January 2018, url, pp. XVIII-XIX
1292 World Bank Group, Iraq Reconstruction and Investment – Part 2 Damage and Needs Assessment of Affected
Governorates, January 2018, url, p. 94
1293 World Bank Group, Iraq Reconstruction and Investment – Part 2 Damage and Needs Assessment of Affected
Governorates, January 2018, url, p. 151294 AI, Human rights in the Middle East and North Africa: Review of 2019, 18 February 2020, url
1295 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Iraq 2020, 17 November 2019, url, p. 54
1296 EPIC, ISHM: February 6 – February 13, 2020, 13 February 2020, url
1297 IOM, Iraq Master List Report 116, May - June 2020 – Iraq, July 2020, url, p. 41298 IOM, Iraq Master List Report 116, May - June 2020 – Iraq, July 2020, url, p. 21299 ‘Critical shelters include informal settlements, religious buildings, schools and unfinished or abandoned buildings. For
returnees, it also includes habitual residences that are severely damaged or destroyed and for IDPs, long-term rental
accommodations that are unfit for habitation (having characteristics of unfinished or severely damaged buildings).’ IOM,
Iraq Master List Report 116, May - June 2020 – Iraq, July 2020, url, pp. 4, 81300 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview Iraq 2020, 17 November 2019, url, p. 5. See also, UN Human Rights Council,
Visit to Iraq: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of Internally Displaced Persons* (A/HRC/44/41/Add.1),
13 May 2020, url, para. 27; UNHCR, UNHCR Iraq Protection Update - August 2019, 14 October 2019, url, pp. 1, 3; UNOCHA,
Humanitarian Bulletin Iraq October 2019, 30 October 2019, url, p. 1

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30 June 2020.1301 The three main districts of return were Tikrit with 175 236 returnees; Al-Shirqat with
159 060 returnees and Baiji with 112 908 returnees.1302
According to IOM, Salah al-Din governorate hosted the highest number of returnees (273 036
individuals) living in severe conditions (indicating a lack of livelihoods, services, social cohesion andsecurity) as well as the governorate with the highest proportion of returnees, namely 25 %, living insevere conditions.1303 Between March 2018 and December 2019, IOM DTM identified 18 locations inSalah al-Din governorate where families had re-displaced after having returned.1304 Most of thesewere in the districts of Tikrit, followed by Balad, Al-Shirqat and Baiji.1305 IOM identified 38 locations inSalah al-Din governorate to which no returns had taken place as of April 2020, due to ‘[b]locked
returns, lack of security, tribal/ethnoreligious tensions, presence of [unexploded ordnance], anddamaged infrastructure.’1306

1301 IOM, Iraq Master List Report 116, May - June 2020 – Iraq, July 2020, url, p. 51302 IOM, Iraq Master List Report 116, May - June 2020 – Iraq, July 2020, url, p. 51303 IOM, Return Index Findings Round Nine – Iraq July 2020, 9 July 2020, url, p. 1. See also, UNOCHA, Response Plan

Humanitarian Monitoring Report January-May 2019, 27 August 2019, url, pp. 8, 101304 IOM, Re-Displaced: An Exploration of Displacement after Attempted Return in Iraq, February 2020, url, p. 21305 IOM, Re-Displaced: An Exploration of Displacement after Attempted Return in Iraq, February 2020, url, p. 71306 IOM, Areas of origin having witnessed no return – April 2020, June 2020, url, p. 1

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

3. Kurdistan Region of Iraq (Dohuk, Erbil,
Sulaymaniyah)

Map 14: Governorates of Kurdistan Region with district borders, district capitals and main roads, © United Nations 1307

The Iraqi Constitution recognises the Kurdistan Region as a federal region, along with its ‘existing
authorities’.1308 The Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) is based in Erbil, the capital of the Kurdistan
Region.1309 As of September 2020, the KRG informed that it administers the governorates of Erbil,
Sulaymaniyah, Dohuk, and Halabja.1310 The central Iraqi government recognised Halabja as agovernorate in 2016, but ‘routine fails’ to recognise its status as a governorate.1311
The Garmiyan Administration is a disputed territory between Baghdad and Erbil, located within
Sulaymaniyah governorate, and an unofficial governorate in the KRI that includes the three districtsof Kalar, Kifri, and Chamchamal.1312
The KDP exercise its power over Dohuk and Erbil governorates, while Sulaymaniyah governorate iscontested between the PUK and Gorran.1313

1307 UN JAU, Iraq District Map, January 2014, url
1308 Constitute Project (The), Iraq’s Constitution of 2005, Article 117, url
1309 Kurdish Regional Government, Kurdish Regional Government, 4 September 2020, url
1310 Kurdish Regional Government, Kurdish Regional Government, 4 September 2020, url
1311 WKI, Kurdistan Weekly Brief September 24, 2019, url, 24 September 20191312 Kurdistan 24, ISIS kidnaps 7 civilians at fake checkpoint in Kurdistan’s Garmiyan region, 31 January 2020, url; Rudaw,‘Peshmerga blood on his hands’: ISIS emir arrested in Garmiyan, 3 April 2020, url
1313 Wahab, B., Iraqi Kurdistan’s new government, 11 July 2019, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

For 2019, the Iraqi CSO (Central Statistical Organization) estimated1314 the population in Erbil, Dohuik
and Sulaymaniyah together, at 5 449 364.1315 The ethnic composition of the KRI governorates iscovered under the individual governorate chapters.

1314 It should be noted that the last comprehensive Population and Housing Census for Iraq was conducted in 1987; UNFPA,

Newsletter 2020 Census, December 2019, url, p. 11315 Iraq, CSO, 2019 ‫[ قديرات سكان العراق حسب المحافظة والبيئة والجنس لسنة‬Demographic and population indicators, Estimates forthe population of Iraq by governorate, environment and gender for the year 2019] (table), n.d., url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

3.1 Dohuk

Map 15: Dahuk governorate with district borders, district capitals and main roads, © United Nations1316

3.1.1 General description of the governorate
Basic geography
Dohuk governorate is part of the KRI and is Iraq’s northernmost governorate. It is located in the northwest of Iraq and shares an international border with Turkey and Syria.1317 Internally, Dohuk hasborders with the governorates of Ninawa and Erbil.1318 The area of the governorate is 6 553 km21319,
its capital is Dohuk1320, and it has four districts: Amedi, Dohuk, Sumel and Zakho.1321 Moreover,according to the Dohuk General Directorate of Tourism, the governorate is divided into six territories‘managerially’: Dohuk, Semeal, Zakho, Amedeye, Sheikhan, and Akri.1322 Akri (Akre) and Sheikhan
districts are parts of Ninewa governorate but have been administered by the KRG since theestablishment of the Green Line by the ceasefire between the Iraqi government and the Kurds in1991.1323
The administrative centre of the KRI lies formally in Erbil, but the control of the region is divided
between KRI’s two main dominant political parties. The KDP exercises its power over Dohuk and Erbilgovernorates and the PUK controls Sulaymaniyah governorate.1324

1316 UN JAU, Iraq District Map, January 2014, url
1317 NCCI, Dohuk Governorate Profile, December 2015, url, p. 2; UNOCHA, Iraq: Duhok Governorate Reference Map 2020, 5

May 2020, url
1318 UNOCHA, Iraq: Duhok Governorate Reference Map 2020, 5 May 2020, url
1319 NCCI, Dohuk Governorate Profile, December 2015, url, p. 11320 NCCI, Dohuk Governorate Profile, December 2015, url, p. 1
1321 IOM, Dahuk, Erbil & Sulaymaniyah: governorate profiles, June 2008, url, p. 21322 Iraq, KRI, General Directorate of Tourism: Duhok, n. d., url
1323 Ahn, J. et al., The Politics of Security inn Ninewa: Preventing an ISIS Resurgence in Northern Iraq, 7 May 2018, pp.5-6,
url1324 Bakawan, Adel, Email to DIDR (OFPRA), 10 December 2018; Adel Bakawan is a French Kurdish sociologist andresearcher with the Kurdistan Centre for Sociology at Soran University. He is also an Associate Research Fellow with theInstitut Francais des Relations Internationales (IFRI). OFPRA invited him as a guest speaker in December and the source
confirmed the notes via email.

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Population
For 2019, the Iraqi CSO (Central Statistical Organization) estimated1325 the governorate’s population
at 1 326 562.1326

Ethnicity
According to USCIRF, most of the KRI’s inhabitants are Sunni Kurds, in addition to Sunni Arabs,
Christians, Circassians, Fayli Kurds, Shabaks, Shia and Sunni Turkmen, Yarsan (including Kaka’i), as wellas Yezidis.1327 The main ethnic group in Dohuk governorate are Kurds, with smaller minorities of
Turkmen and Arabs.1328 According to the Dohuk Governorate website, the city of Dohuk has apopulation of 340 000, the majority of which are Kurds, but a significant Assyrian community lives in
the city as well. Additionally, Assyrian and Yazidi IDPs moved to the city in the aftermath of the 2014
ISIL invasion of their home areas.1329 IOM stated that 50 % of IDPs in Dohuk were Sunni and Shia Kurds,
35 % Yazidis, 9 % Sunni Muslim Arabs, 4 % minorities (Christians, Kaka’i, Shabaks) and 1% Turkmen(Sunni and Shia Muslims).1330

EconomyInformation about the governorate’s economy covering the reference period, has not been found. An
assessment by the NCCI published in December 2015, described the economy as sustained by foreign
investment, bilateral trade with Turkey, tourism, construction, some agriculture and some oil
exploration.1331

Road security
Scarce information about road security and checkpoints in Dohuk governorate was found during thedrafting of this report. Local sources reported that in early September 2019, the rehabilitation of themain road linking the cities of Mosul and Dohuk had started. Reportedly, the road suffered greatdamage during the military operations against ISIL.1332 Furthermore, UNDP stated that in 2018-2019,
it implemented 12 projects to rehabilitate infrastructure in Dohuk governorate, including roads.1333

3.1.2 Conflict background and armed actors in the governorate
Conflict background
Following the US-brokered agreement that put an end to the Kurdish civil war in 1998, Dohuk cameunder the control of the KDP, together with Erbil.1334 ICG stated that Iraq’s 2005 Constitution‘demarcated Iraq’s internal boundaries, establishing a federal Kurdistan region in Erbil, Dohuk andSuleimaniya governorates’.1335 According to NCCI, in 2015, Dohuk governorate was not affected by the1325 It should be noted that the last comprehensive Population and Housing Census for Iraq was conducted in 1987; UNFPA,

Newsletter 2020 Census, December 2019, url, p. 11326 Iraq, CSO, 2019 ‫[ قديرات سكان العراق حسب المحافظة والبيئة والجنس لسنة‬Demographic and population indicators, Estimates forthe population of Iraq by governorate, environment and gender for the year 2019] (table), n.d., url
1327 USCIRF, Wilting in the Kurdish Sun: The hopes and fears of religious minorities in Northern Iraq, May 2017, url, p. 131328 NCCI, Dohuk Governorate Profile, December 2015, url, p. 21329 Iraq, Duhok Province, Demographics, n. d., url
1330 IOM, Integrated Location Assessment IV, 30 March 2020, url, p. 62
1331 NCCI, Dohuk Governorate Profile, December 2015, url, pp. 2-3‫ر‬1332 Basnews, ‫المباشة بتأهيل طريق الموصل – دهوك‬[The Beginning of the Mosul-Dohuk Road Rehabilitation], 2 September 2019,
pp. 2-3 url; Al-Naeem News, ‫[ بدء تأهيل طريق موصل–دهوك بعد خروجه عن الخدمة‬The Beginning of the Rehabilitation of MosulDohuk Road after it Being Put out of Service], 4 September 2019, url
1333 UNDP, ‫[ التمكي االقتصادي وإعادة تأهيل الخدمات األساسية يبنيان االستقرار ف دهوك‬Economic Empowerment and Rehabilitation of‫ر‬‫ي‬
Basic Services Secure Stability in Dohuk], 22 May 2019, url
1334 Hassan, F., PUK–KDP Conflict: Future Kurdish Status in Kirkuk, May 2018, url, p. 31335 ICG, Iraq: Fixing Security in Kirkuk, 15 June 2020, url, p. 1

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

ISIL conflict, however, ‘criminality, civil unrest and cross-border smuggling … pose[d] a limited but
persistent security threat.’1336 IOM observed in October 2017 that Dohuk, as well as the rest of the
KRI, have enjoyed a ‘stable security situation’ since the beginning of the 2014 ISIL conflict, despite theTurkish and PKK activities in the governorate1337, which according to Al-Monitor have been taking
place since the 1990s.1338 Additionally, ACCORD’s compilation of ACLED data for 2019 showed that
Dohuk governorate came third in terms of the number of conflict incidents (390) following Diyala andErbil. According to the report, incidents affected the following locations among others: Amadiya,
Barwari, Cemanke, Chiya-e Gara, Dahuk, Dereluk, Gulkah, Haftanin, Kani Masi, Khantur Mountain,
Metin, Metina, Sheladiz, Shiladiza, Sigiri, Uzmana, Zakho.1339 According to the UN Inter-Agency
Information and Analysis Unit (IAU), some issues remained unresolved between the governorates of
Dohuk and Ninawa ‘regarding the administrative status of Al-Shikhan, Telafar, Tilkaif, Akre and Sinjar
districts’.1340

Armed actors
KRG-commanded Peshmerga
Security forces of the KRI are the Peshmerga, having 14 infantry brigades and 2 support brigades, and
the Asayish intelligence services, in addition to KPD and PUK-controlled militias.1341 Most of theseforces’ members are politically divided between the KDP and the PUK, to which they answer
directly.1342 According to the Defense Post, ‘there are 14 Peshmerga brigades roughly evenly divided
between the KDP in Dohuk and Erbil in the north of the region and the PUK in Sulaymaniyah, in thesouth.’1343
Historically, Peshmerga fighters have been divided in allegiance between the KDP and PUK, and there
have been several attempts to unify all Peshmerga fighters. The Ministry for Peshmerga Affairs was
re-established in 2006. Currently, there are 14 Regional Guard Brigades (RGBs) comprising 40 000 KDP
and PUK fighters, however, the command structure of those RGBs remain divided along politicalaffiliations.1344 Rudaw also stated that the Peshmerga was not ‘a fully integrated national force’, butrather divided between the two KRI ruling parties, with a smaller number of independent Peshmerga
fighters operating under the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs. The source added that ‘both the KDP and
PUK have their security and intelligence apparatus in the areas of Kurdistan Region under their control’
and that Dohuk governorate is under the control of the KDP.1345 In addition to Peshmerga, each of thetwo parties maintained separate Asayish (internal security) forces and intelligence services.1346
The Center for Global Policy’s map showed that the Peshmerga were active in Faysh Khabur and Zakho
District as of 3 December 2019.1347
On 9 July 2020, the Kurdish media outlet, Rudaw, reported that the KRG’s Ministry of Interior‘deployed Zeravani Peshmerga to Duhok's Mount Matin […] amid intensified Turkish bombing against

1336 NCCI, Dohuk Governorate Profile, December 2015, url
1337 IOM, Integrated Location Assessment Part II – Governorate Profiles, October 2017, url, pp. 13, 37, 55
1338 Al-Monitor, Baghdad's row with Ankara could benefit each side, 8 July 2020, url
1339 ACCORD, Iraq, Year 2019: Update on incidents according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED),

23 June 2020, url, pp. 4, 51340 UN-IAU, Dahuk Governorate Profile, July 2020, url
1341 US, USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights for 2017 – Iraq, 20 April 2018, url, pp. 11-12
1342 ICG, Arming Iraq’s Kurds: Fighting IS, inviting conflict, 12 May 2015, url, pp. 8-11
1343 Defense Post (The), Coalition drives to build Iraqi Kurdistan’s Peshmerga into a self-sustaining force, 27 November
2019, url
1344 MERI, Institutionalisation of the Peshmerga: tipping the balance of Iraq’s stability, 17 July 2019, url
1345 Rudaw, PUK Peshmerga’s death in custody raises tensions with KDP, 21 January 2020, url
1346 US, USDOS, Iraq 2019 Human Rights Report, 11 March 2020, url, p.2
1347 Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: From Abandoned Villages to the Cities, 5 May 2020, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situationsuspected PKK positions in the region’.1348 According to Global Security, the Zeravani forces are partof the Peshmerga and constitute paramilitary police. It is in charge of border security, protection ofvital infrastructure, as well as other security duties.1349 The Iraqi news agency, Gilgamesh, cited a
Kurdish official who stated that the Zeravani forces report to the Ministry of Interior of the KRG and
are affiliated with the KDP.1350
Turkish forces
In recent years, Turkey has set up about 13 military bases in key areas such as Dohuk, Erbil,
Sulaymaniyah and Zakho.1351 In July 2020, the Turkish Consul General announced that Turkish army
military operations would continue in the KRI until the end of the presence of the PKK.1352 Following
the June 2020 launch of the military operations Operation Claw-Eagle and Operation Claw-Tiger,
additional military bases were erected to target PKK strongholds in northern Iraq and the KRI,
particularly in Sinjar (Ninewa governorate), Qandil (Iran-Iraq border), Karacak, Zap, Avasin-Basyan and
Hakurk (Dohuk governorate).1353 According to Rudaw, the Turkish Presidency confirmed in July 2020
the existence of 37 Turkish military points across the KRI, including two inside the cities of Dohuk andZakho.1354 Other military points had already previously been erected in the towns and villages of Kuna
Masi, Sheladiz, Amedi, and Zakho Valley in Dohuk governorate.1355 A Liveuamaps map dated
8 July 2020 corroborates the existence of several military bases across Dohuk governorate.1356
Iraqi forces
According to Rudaw, in July 2020, the Iraqi Border Guard Force 1 established bases in five strategic
points in Zakho District to de-escalate the situation between Turkey and the PKK and to prevent lossesof civilian lives.1357 The deployment of the Iraqi Border Guard took place on 1 July 2020 and wascoordinated with the Kurdish Peshmerga forces.1358
PKK
The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) is a Marxist-Leninist group that was founded in the 1970s,
launching an armed struggle against the Turkish government in 1984 and calling for an independent
Kurdish state in Turkey.1359 The PKK is on the European Union’s list of designated groups which havebeen involved in terrorism1360, as well as being listed as a terrorist organisation by Turkey1361, the1348 Rudaw, New Iraqi border force bases stopping PKK-Turkey clash spill into populated areas: commander, 9 July 2020, url
1349 Global Security, Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Guard Forces (peshmerga), 10 September 2019, url
1350 Gilgamesh Press, ‫ يحق ألي مواطن عرب التطوع بصفوف قواتنا‬:‫[ امي عام البيشمركة‬Peshmerga Commander: Any Arab Citizen Has‫ر‬‫ي‬
the Right to Volunteer in Our Ranks], 27 July 2019, url
1351 Shafaaq, American report: Turkey has set up 13 military bases in Kurdistan region, 12 September 2019, url
1352 Nina News, Operations Until The End Of The PKK, 20 July 2020, url
1353 See: Anadolu Agency (AA), Turkey launches operation Claw-Eagle, 15 June 2020, url; TRT World, Turkey begins freshanti-terror Operation Claw-Tiger in northern Iraq, 16 June 2020, url; Ahval, Turkish offensive in north Iraq extends beyond
usual anti-PKK campaign – analysis, 22 July 2020, url
1354 Rudaw, Ankara has built nearly 40 ‘military points’ in Kurdistan Region: Turkish presidency, 7 July 2020, url
1355 BBC, ‫[ القواعد العسكرية اليكية ف إقليم كردستان العراق وأهدافها‬The Turkish Military Bases in the KRI and Their Purposes], 29‫ي‬January 2019, url
1356 Liveuamaps, Iraq, 8 July 2020, url
1357 Rudaw, Iraqi border guards set up bases in five 'strategic' positions in Zakho: commander, 2 July 2020, url
1358 Rudaw, Iraqi border guards set up bases in five 'strategic' positions in Zakho: commander, 2 July 2020, url
1359 BBC News, Who are Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) rebels?, 4 November 2016, url
1360 EU, Council of the European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/1341 of 8 August 2019 updating the list of persons,groups and entities subject to Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specificmeasures to combat terrorism, and repealing Decision (CFSP) 2019/25, 8 August 2019, url
1361 Euronews, Turkey slams Belgium court ruling that PKK is not a 'terrorist' organization, 31 January 2020, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

United States1362, and Australia.1363 The PKK has developed its territorial presence and control overmountainous areas in the KRI including in the Zab Mountains, in Dohuk governorate along the Turkish
border. Its PKK bases and populations are located there.1364 Local officials interviewed by Rudaw in2016 estimated on their part that as many as 650 communities might live under the PKK in the KRI,
although some of the villages have been evacuated due to the conflict.1365 From these areas, the PKK
has launched cross-border attacks in Turkey, to which the Turkish Air force has retaliated with regularraids.1366 According to one analyst in September 2019, the PKK is ‘considered as a major new actor
within the Iraqi geopolitical scene’.1367
Kurdish insurgent groups and Kurdish-Iranian opposition groups
Scarce relevant information specific to Dohuk governorate was found during the drafting of thisreport.
In 2017, it was reported that armed groups active in the KRI’s mountainous areas include Kurdish
insurgent groups and Kurdish-Iranian opposition groups.1368 These comprise the PKK’s Iranian
offshoot, the Kurdistan Free Life Party (Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistanê, PJAK), as well as the Kurdistan
Democratic Party of Iran (PDKI, or in Kurdish: Hîzbî Dêmukratî Kurdistanî Êran) and its splinter group
the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP-I, or in Kurdish: Hizba Dêmokrata Kurdistanê-Îran)1369, Society of
Revolutionary Toilers (Komala), and the Kurdistan Free Party (PAK).1370

3.1.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population
Security developments 2019-2020
As observed in the previous EASO security report of March 2019, the conflict between Turkey and the
PKK continued to scale up further.1371 Various sources reported on Turkish military operations in
Dohuk governorate in 2019 and 2020. On 8 July 2020, Al-Monitor reported that ‘according to Kurdish
sources, the Turkish forces have pushed forward 50 kilometers (30 miles) inside Iraqi Kurdistan,setting up 12 new bases and checkpoints.’ Al-Monitor added that the Turkish military campaign‘significantly affected civilian areas’ and cited the secretary-general of the KRG who stated that ‘nearly
100 villages have been evacuated over the past month in the Zakho and Amedi region alone’.1372
According to the independent platform, Irfaa Sawtak (Raise Your Voice), Turkish air strikes targeted
the villages of Sheladiz, Batifa and Kane Mase, and the region of Berwari on 23 June 2020. In aninterview with the platform, a resident of Berwari region claimed that in the air strikes, one person

1362 US, Bureau of Counterterrorism, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, , url; Euronews, Turkey slams Belgium court rulingthat PKK is not a 'terrorist' organization, 31 January 2020, url
1363 Australia, Australian National Security, Listed terrorist organisations, n.d., url; Euronews, Turkey slams Belgium court
ruling that PKK is not a 'terrorist' organization, 31 January 2020, url
1364 Quesnay, A. and Beaumont, R., The Return of the State and Inter-Militia Competition in Northern Iraq, Noria, 14 June
2018, url
1365 Rudaw, PKK bases in border areas provoke Turkish airstrikes, local mayors say, 14 April 2016, url
1366 Wing, J., Large Drop In Violence In Iraq November 2018, [Weblog Musings on Iraq], 3 December 2018, url; Wing, J.,
Islamic State Returns To Baghdad While Overall Security In Iraq Remains Steady, [Weblog Musings on Iraq], 6 October
2018, url; Wing, J., Violence Slightly Down In Iraq July 2018, [Weblog Musings on Iraq], 2 August 2018, url; Wing, J., 649
Deaths, 275 Wounded Feb 2018 In Iraq, [Weblog Musings on Iraq], 3 March 2018, url
1367 1001 Iraqi Thoughts, The PKK in Iraq: A Geopolitical Reading, 9 September 2019, url
1368 CPT, Civilian impacts of renewed Turkish and Iranian cross-border bombardments in Iraqi Kurdistan (2015-2017), 17
October 2017, url
1369 Al-Monitor, IRGC masses troops on Iraq border amid rising tensions with Kurdish groups, 16 October 2018, url;
Kurdistan24, Iranian bombardment in Kurdistan: 14 dead, 40 wounded, two more missing, 9 September 2018, url
1370 CPT, Civilian impacts of renewed Turkish and Iranian cross-border bombardments in Iraqi Kurdistan (2015-2017), 17
October 2017, url
1371 EASO, Country of Origin Information Report, Iraq, Security situation, url, p. 153
1372 Al-Monitor, Baghdad's row with Ankara could benefit each side, 8 July 2020, url

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was killed and that substantial material damage was incurred.1373 Shafaq News reported on
4 July 2020 that Turkish air strikes and shelling have been heavily targeting border areas in the KRI
where PKK elements were allegedly present. The source cited the prefects of Kane Mase and Darkar
who confirmed ground-based attacks and air strikes on a village and different locations in theirprefectures.1374 On 24 August 2019, the news outlet Kurdistan 24 announced that the Turkish Armylaunched ‘Operation Claw 3’ in Dohuk governorate. The aim of the operation was ‘to destroy theterrorists and their caves and shelters in the Sinat-Haftanin region’ as stated by the Turkish Defense
Ministry.1375 The UN Security Council stated that on 23 August 2019, Turkey launched phase III of
Operation Claw, with a focus on the Sinat-Haftanin area, located to the north of Dohuk governorate.
The Turkish Ministry of National Defence, cited in the same UN Security Council report, announced
that 417 PKK elements had been killed since 27 May 2019, without specifying the number of thosekilled in Dohuk governorate.1376 Moreover, on 26 January 2019, protesters stormed a Turkish militarybase in Sheladiz in the wake of Turkish air strikes that caused civilian casualties on 24 January 2019.
Reportedly, two protesters were killed, and on 27 January 2019, the Asayish arrested several
protesters, activists and journalists.1377
On 5 July 2020, the Arab Weekly, citing Iraqi security officials, stated that the Iraqi army started‘enforcing positions along the border with Turkey to prevent Turkish forces from advancing deeper
into Iraqi territory’.1378 This deployment of the Iraqi Border Guard, according to Rudaw, wascoordinated with Turkey. The source quoted the Commander of the Iraqi 1st Border Guard Unit, who
said ‘Turkey has asked to build cooperation with us in order to secure the areas on the Iraqi-Turkish
border.’1379 Reportedly, this deployment of the Iraqi Border Guard unit ‘has reassured locals under
threat from Turkish airstrikes’.1380 Alongside the deployment of the Iraqi Border Guard, Peshmerga
forces were deployed as well. On 9 July 2020, the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs announced thedeployment of Peshmerga units in the district of Amedi, at the border area to the north of Dohuk
governorate. Reportedly, the purpose of this move was to protect the residents of the region and toprevent any displacement that might occur due to the volatile security situation.1381

Illustrative security incidents•

According to the BBC, on 26 January 2019, Kurdish protestors stormed a Turkish military basein Dohuk and burnt two tanks and other military equipment. The same article stated that two
protestors were killed when they entered the Turkish military base in Sheladiz.1382•

On 14 May 2020, Rudaw reported that PKK fighters attacked a Turkish military point in Kane
Mase sub-district. Reportedly, a clash lasted for one hour and was followed by a power outage
in the area.1383•

A report published by the UN Security Council stated that on 27 May 2019, the Turkish armed
forces ‘continued to launch regular air strikes against positions held by the Kurdistan Workers’
Party (PKK) in Dahuk, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah Governorates’. According to the Turkish Ministry1373 Irfaa Sawtak, ‫ خسائر كردستان ف "مخلب النمر" باألرقام‬..‫[ قتل ونازحون وحرائق‬Deaths, Displaced, and Fires... Losses of Kurdistan‫ي‬during ‘Tiger’s Claw] in Numbers, 23 June 2020, url
1374 Shafaq News, ‫[ المدفعية اليكية تقصف قرية ف دهوك‬Turkish Artillery Targets a Village in Dohuk], 4 July 2020, url‫ي‬1375 Kurdistan 24, Turkey begins 'Operation Claw 3' against PKK in Kurdistan’s Duhok province, 24 August 2019, url
1376 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019), 22 November 2019, url, p. 61377 AI, Iraq 2019, n.d., url
1378 New Arab (The), Iraq enforces border positions to prevent Turkish advance, 5 July 2020, url
1379 Rudaw, Iraqi border forces to cooperate with Turkey to 'secure' border areas, 6 July 2020, url
1380 Rudaw, Zakho locals relieved as Iraq increases military presence amid Turkish offensive, 7 July 2020, url‫[ وزارة البيشمركة ر‬Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs Deploys Forces in the Matin
1381 Al-Taakhi Press, ‫تنش قوات ف جبل متي شمال دهوك‬‫ر‬‫ي‬
Mountain to the North of Dohuk], 9 July 2020, url
1382 BBC, ‫[ القواعد العسكرية اليكية ف إقليم كردستان العراق وأهدافها‬The Turkish Military Bases in the KRI and Their Purposes], 29‫ي‬January 2019, url
1383 Rudaw, Fresh PKK-Turkey clashes cause power outage in Duhok province: official, 14 May 2020, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situationof Defence, between 27 May and 10 June 2019, 43 PKK fighters were captured or killed. No
civilian casualties or damage to civilian infrastructure were reported by the source.1384•

On 30 May 2020, a father and a son were killed in a Turkish air strike.1385 According to Xeber
24, the incident took place in the village of Etit in the region of Dayralok to the north of Dohukcity.1386•

On 17 June 2020, the Turkish News Agency (Anadolu) reported on the launching of Operation
Claw-Tiger against the PKK in Dohuk governorate. The source added that ‘Turkish commandos
supported by the Air Force, ATAK helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) andunmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) have entered the region in an air attack
operation.’1387 Air raids and shelling that targeted several villages and areas in the region werereported1388, and fear and anger were expressed by the locals of Keshani village in thegovernorate.1389•

Iraq Body Count (IBC) documented the death of six people in a Turkish air strike in Dohuk, on
19 June 2020.1390 Irfaa Sawtak reported that on the same day, three people were killed in avillage in Sheladiz when their car was hit in a Turkish air strike.1391 Rudaw reported on at least
four deaths in this air strike, three of which occurred in Sheladiz and one in Kane Mase.1392•

On 20 June 2020, Rudaw reported on a demonstration that turned violent as protestors
attempted to storm Turkish observation points in Sheladiz following air strikes that caused
several deaths. Reportedly, security forces used tear gas and two protestors and four
policemen were injured.1393•

On 2 July 2020, Turkish warplanes targeted locations in the Amedi District and caused damage
to farms in the region.1394•

On 15 July 2020, Rudaw reported that Turkish air force ‘heavily bombarded three villages’ inthe Batifa sub-district of Zakho. According to the source, there were no casualties, but anumber of villages were abandoned due to the military operations in the region.1395

Number of civilian casualties
The number of armed conflict related incidents and civilian casualties in the governorate recorded by
UNAMI for the period 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, is shown in the table below.

1384 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019), S/2019/660, url, p. 51385 IBC, Recent Events, n. d., url
1386 Xeber 24, Turkish state planes once again target the villages of North “Dohuk”, 30 May 2020, url
1387 AA, Turkey launches Operation Claw-Tiger in northern Iraq, 17 June 2020, url
1388 ANHA, Turkish occupation bombs villages of Dohuk governorate, 18 June 2020, url
1389 Republic World, Kurdish Civilians Scared Over Turkey's Shelling, 19 June 2020, url
1390 IBC, Recent Events, n. d., url
1391 Irfaa Sawtak, ‫ خسائر كردستان ف "مخلب النمر" باألرقام‬..‫[ قتل ونازحون وحرائق‬Deaths, Displaced, and Fires... Losses of Kurdistan‫ي‬during ‘Tiger’s Claw] in Numbers, 23 June 2020, url
1392 Rudaw, Four civilians killed amid Turkish airstrikes near Duhok: local officials, 19 June 2020, url
1393 Rudaw, Two protesters wounded in demonstration against Turkish airstrikes in Duhok province, 20 June 2020, url
1394 Kurdiu, Turkish warplanes bombed Amedi area of Dohuk Governorate, 2 July 2020, url
1395 Rudaw, Heavy Turkish aerial bombardment reported in three Zakho villages: local officials, 15 July 2020, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Gover- 2019 (Jan – Dec)
norateDohuk# ofincidents

Killed Injured

19

62019 total
casualties(killed andinjured)30

362020 (Jan – Jul)# ofincidents

Killed Injured

59

102020 total
casualties(killed andinjured)2

12

Table 12: Number of armed conflict related incidents and civilian casualties 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, Dohuk
governorate1396

Number of security incidents
In the reference period, ACLED reported 127 battles, 620 incidents of remote violence/explosions, 4cases of violence against civilians, 0 incidents of riots, accounting for a total of 751 security incidentsof these types in Dohuk governorate, the majority taking place in Amedi District. 8 protests were also
reported in Dohuk governorate during the reference period.1397 The evolution of all the types of
security events through the reference period is shown in the figure below.1398

Figure 15: Evolution of security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence, violence against civilians, riots andprotests in Dohuk governorate 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, based on ACLED data1399

1396 UNAMI, Email to EASO 24 July 20201397 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url
1398 Bamene is a subddistrict under Amedi district: IOM, Dohuk, Erbil & Sulaymaniyah Governorate Profiles, Post-February

2006 IDPs Needs Assessment, December 2007, url, p. 81399 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

State ability to secure law and orderMore information on the capacities of the Iraqi forces and the forces under the KRG as actors ofprotection, including the ability to secure law and order, as well as information on the integrity ofarmed forces, please see the report EASO COI Report – Iraq: Actors of Protection (2018).
On 11 April 2020, Rudaw reported that during the curfew imposed in Dohuk to limit the spread of
COVID-19, Kurdish security forces and the Zeravani Forces patrolled the closed markets and registeredno incidents of theft during March 2020.1400
In its 2019 human rights report, the US Department of State (USDOS), stated that human rights
organisations reported that security forces in Iraq, including Asayish and Peshmerga, ‘frequently’
ignored the law and engaged in a range of human rights violations, including ‘arbitrary arrest’,‘abductions’, ‘physical abuse’, and torture.1401

Infrastructure damage and explosive remnants of war
The Turkish military operations against the PKK in Dohuk have impacted the lives of villagers in theareas targeted by air strikes. In an interview conducted in June 2020 with the independent platform,
Irfaa Sawtak, the Prefect of Kane Mase stated in July 2020 that there have been enormous economic
losses as farmers were not able to cultivate their crops due to the air strikes that targeted their farms.
He added that 20 villages in his prefecture were inaccessible, which caused shortage in services.1402
Moreover, the Assyrian Policy Institute stated in the period 2-6 October 2019, that Turkish air strikes
targeted Assyrian villages in the Nahla region of Dohuk governorate, which resulted in extensive
damage to farmlands, property, and infrastructure. No more details were provided by the source.1403
With regard to mines, the KRI recorded mine contamination of 181 km2 at the end of 2018, 14 % lessthan at the end of 2017.1404 Mine Action Review stated that at the end of 2018, an area of
20 793 723 m2 was contaminated with mines specifically in Dohuk governorate.1405 According to thereport, 203 265 m2 of land was cleared of mines in 2018, in 16 areas in Dohuk governorate.1406
This data did not include areas on the Turkish border, which have never been surveyed owing tocontinued fighting and air strikes, reported Mine Action Review.1407

Displacement and return
OCHA’s Humanitarian Response Plan, published in January 2020, reported that more than 40% of all
IDPs displaced during the 2014-2017 conflict sought safety in the KRI – a figure which OCHA describedas holding ‘steady or even declined’ in 2019.1408
On 20 July 2020, the Ministry of Interior of the KRI issued the latest Humanitarian Situation report
indicating the IDP movement within the three governorates. According to the report, Dohuk had
208 530 IDPs and 87 330 refugees. The report added that 154 307 IDPs and 58 259 refugees wereresiding in camps. Regarding displacement and return movement during July, the report stated thatno refugees or IDPs entered Dohuk governorate, while 5 208 IDPs and 1 850 refugees left the

1400 Rudaw, ‫ عدم تسجيل أي حوادث شقة عل مدى شهر‬:‫[ رشطة دهوك‬Dohuk Police: No Incidents of Theft were registered during amonth], 11 April 2020, url
1401 US, USDOS, Iraq 2019 Human Rights Report, 11 March 2020, url, pp.12, 13, and 221402 Irfaa Sawtak, ‫ خسائر كردستان ف "مخلب النمر" باألرقام‬..‫[ قتل ونازحون وحرائق‬Deaths, Displaced, and Fires... Losses of Kurdistan‫ي‬during ‘Tiger’s Claw] in Numbers, 23 June 2020, url
1403 Assyrian Policy Institute, Turkish airstrikes in Assyrian villages in northern Iraq continue, 6 October 2019, url
1404 Mine Action Review, Clearing the Mines 2019, 1 October 2019, url, p. 130
1405 Mine Action Review, Clearing the Mines 2019, 1 October 2019, url, p. 130
1406 Mine Action Review, Clearing the Mines 2019, 1 October 2019, url, p. 136
1407 Mine Action Review, Clearing the Mines 2019, 1 October 2019, url, p. 130
1408 OCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan Iraq, January 2020, url, p. 31

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governorate. Finally, the report indicated that in Dohuk governorate there were 16 IDP and fiverefugee camps.1409
IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix indicated in its Master List Report 116 that as of 30 June 2020,
Dohuk governorate had 319 062 IDPs, the second highest number in Iraq, residing in three main
districts: Sumel (176 652), Zakho (104 106) and Dohuk (31 368). According to the report, 99 % of those
IDPs originated from Ninawa governorate, while 1 % originated from Salah Al-Din, Anbar, Kirkuk, andBaghdad.1410 In its previous Master List Report 115 IOM noted that 11 % of IDPs in Dohuk governorate
were assessed to be living in critical shelters.1411
Between 18 June and 1 August 2019, REACH conducted an intentions survey in three IDP camps in
Dohuk governorate and interviewed 188 households. REACH found that 98 % of IDPs intended toremain in displacement for the three months following the survey, and 90 % for the 12 months
following the survey. According to the report, the reasons behind the IDPs’ intention to remain in
displacement were lack of security forces in the areas of origin (47 %), unavailability of services in theareas of origin (34 %), and fear and trauma associated with the areas of origin (34 %). Moreover, 83 %of the interviewed households considered their areas of origin to be unsafe.1412 With regard to Dohuk
city, IOM stated that ‘the high levels of safety and security in Dahuk city, with few security incidents
excluding petty crime taking place, appear to be key reasons for delaying relocation back to areas oforigin for many IDPs.’ Reportedly, ‘coexistence with the host community is peaceful overall.’1413
With regard to returnees, IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix report of May and June 2020 observedthat as of 30 June 2020, 768 IDPs returned to their area of origin, which was Zakho. According to thereport, all the returnees were displaced in Dohuk District.1414 Furthermore, USAID reported on
30 September 2019 that on 27 August 2019, 90 Iraqi refugees returned from Turkey to Iraq via Dohuk
governorate through the voluntary return program of the Iraqi Ministry of Migration and
Displacement.1415 The final destinations of the returnees were not specified in the report.
The Turkish military operations in the region have caused displacement as residents of several villages
have fled their homes to seek safety, according to sources. On 23 August 2019, the media outlet
Kurdistan 24 reported that the local authorities of Dohuk governorate stated that ‘over 18 villages
have been evacuated lately due to the threat of Turkish warplanes.’ The Mayor of Sheikhan town,
cited by Kurdistan 24, stated that ‘in addition to significant damage to agricultural lands, theenvironment, and villages’ infrastructure, the air strikes have triggered an exodus of people, fromvillages to urban areas.’1416 Displacement due to the Turkish military operations in Dohuk governorate
continued in 2020. AP reported on 22 June 2020 that dozens of the residents of Keshani village left
their homes in the wake of the Turkish military operations in their area.1417 On 27 June 2020, Rudaw
stated that ‘a ban has now been put in place to prevent people from travelling to affected villages,
putting 50 villages under essential lockdown.’1418 This trend continued as on 10 July 2020, theresidents of another village in Dohuk, namely Avla, abandoned their village.1419 On 14 July 2020,
Rudaw stated that several villages in the sub-district of Kane Mase have been emptied as the area wastargeted on several occasions, ‘with locals left “terrified” after a strike in the village of Dargale Musa1409 Iraq, KRI, Ministry of Interior, Humanitarian Situational Report (SitRep): No. (2-20) for February 2020, 24 February

2020, url
1410 IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Iraq Master List Report 116: May-June 2020, 16 July 2020, url, p. 21411 IOM, Iraq Master List Report 115, March - April 2020 – Iraq, 18 May 2020, url, p. 41412 REACH, Intentions Survey, August 2019, url, p.
1413 IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Urban Displacement in Iraq: A Preliminary Analysis, 30 April 2020, url, p. 221414 IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Iraq Master List Report 116: May-June 2020, 16 July 2020, url, p. 51415 USAID, IRAQ - COMPLEX EMERGENCY, 30 September 2019, url, p. 21416 Kurdistan 24, Evacuation of villages continues in Kurdistan as Turkish shellings intensify against PKK, 23 August 2019,url
1417 AP, Iraqis flee border areas as Turkey strikes Kurdish militants, 22 June 2020, url
1418 Rudaw, Zakho villagers flee Turkish airstrikes, 27 June 2020, url
1419 Rudaw, Zakho Kurds vacate another village as Turkey deploys more troops: officials, 10 July 2020, url

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Bag’ on May 18 [2020]’.1420 With regard to minority villages, the Mayor of Zakho District told Kurdistan
24 on 1 July 2020 that ‘out of 11 Christian villages in the area, nine of them have been completely
evacuated’ since the beginning of the recent Turkish military operations in northern Iraq.1421 According
to Al-Monitor, those evacuations and the casualties incurred by the Turkish military operations ‘haveturned up pressure on the KRG, while the reactions of the Baghdad government, in which the Kurds
are represented, have been tougher than Ankara expected’. The Government of Iraq summoned theTurkish ambassador twice and threatened to take the issue to The Arab League, the Organisation ofIslamic Cooperation or the UN Security Council and to impose economic sanctions against Turkey.1422

1420 Rudaw, Turkish airstrikes empty villages in Kani Masi, 14 July 2020, url
1421 Kurdistan 24, Over 10 Christian villages evacuate as PKK-Turkey clashes intensify, 1 July 2020, url
1422 Al-Monitor, Baghdad's row with Ankara could benefit each side, 8 July 2020, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

3.2 Erbil

Map 16 Erbil governorate with district borders, district capitals and main roads, © United Nations 1423

3.2.1 General description of the governorate
Basic geography
Erbil governorate is 15 074 km2 (3.5 % of Iraq) and its capital has the same name, Erbil, which is also
the capital of the KRI.1424
The governorate is part of the KRI and located in the north-eastern part of Iraq and has internalborders with Dohuk, Ninewa, Salah al-Din, Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah governorates and international
borders with Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran.1425 Erbil governorate is divided into the following
districts: Choman, Erbil (the capital of the KRI), Koisnjaq, Makhmur, Mergasur, Shaqlawa, andSoran.1426
Makhmur District has been part of Erbil governorate since 1932, though the district has been
administered by the Ninewa governorate since 1991 and is therefore ‘generally considered outside
those districts administered by the KRG (Kurdistan Regional Government) as of 19 March 2003’.1427
There has not been an official decree transferring it to Ninewa thus its administrative status remains

1423 UN JAU, Iraq District Map, January 2014, url
1424 IAU, Erbil Governorate Profile, August 2020, url
1425 IAU, Erbil Governorate Profile, August 2020, url
1426 IOM, Dahuk, Erbil & Sulaymaniyah: Governorate Profiles, June 2008, url, p. 21427 Sweden, Lifos, Irak – Makhmour, June 4 2018, url, p. 4

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

to be determined.1428 According to Lifos’s 2018 report, Makhmur remains ‘among the least developed
districts of Iraq’.1429 For more information, see the chapter on Ninewa.

Population
For 2019, the Iraqi CSO (Central Statistical Organization) estimated1430 the governorate’s population
at 1 903 608.1431 Over half of Erbil governorate’s population lives in the city of Erbil.1432

Ethnicity
The main ethnic group in Erbil governorate are Kurds.1433 Other groups present include Assyrian, Araband Turkmen minorities.1434 Most of the inhabitants of Erbil governorate are Sunni Muslims.1435
Additional religious minorities include Christians (Chaldeans, Assyrians and Armenians), Yezidis andKakai’s.1436

EconomyScarce information about how the economy is affecting the security situation or vice versa in Erbilgovernorate was found during the drafting of this report.
Erbil is the ‘commercial and administrative centre’ of the KRI.1437 A stable security situation attracted
foreign investment, cross-border trade with Turkey and tourism, until the invasion of ISIL to northwestern Iraq.1438 However, the governorate has been affected by unemployment, inflation and lack ofmodern infrastructure and equipment.1439
According to IAU reporting in August 2020 ‘although few of Erbil’s residents are among Iraq’s poorest,
the governorate performs relatively poorly according to humanitarian and developmental
indicators.’1440

Road security
For the year 2019 iMMAP-IHF documented the Explosive Hazards Risk Level on Roads in Erbilgovernorate and found that the main road leading from Ninewa governorate over Erbil governorate
into Sulaymaniayh governorate was categorised on certain road sections as a ‘Primary Risk Road’,
whilst roads around Makhmur were considered ‘Secondary Risk’ roads:1441
In July 2019, the 30th PMU Brigade (Liwa al-Shabak) blocked the connecting road between Mosul and
Erbil for two days.1442

1428 Sweden, Lifos, Irak – Makhmour, June 4 2018, url, p. 4; IAU, Erbil Governorate Profile, August 2020, url
1429 Sweden, Lifos, Irak – Makhmour, June 4 2018, url, p. 41430 It should be noted that the last comprehensive Population and Housing Census for Iraq was conducted in 1987; UNFPA,

Newsletter 2020 Census, December 2019, url, p. 1
1431 Iraq, CSO, 2019 ‫[ قديرات سكان العراق حسب المحافظة والبيئة والجنس لسنة‬Demographic and population indicators, Estimates forthe population of Iraq by governorate, environment and gender for the year 2019] (table), n.d., url
1432 NCCI, Erbil Governorate Profile, Updated December 2015, url, p. 2
1433 NCCI, Erbil Governorate Profile, Updated December 2015, url, p. 2
1434 NCCI, Erbil Governorate Profile, Updated December 2015, url, p. 21435 NCCI, Erbil Governorate Profile, Updated December 2015, url, p. 21436 NCCI, Erbil Governorate Profile, Updated December 2015, url, p. 2
1437 NCCI, Erbil Governorate Profile, Updated December 2015, url, p. 2
1438 NCCI, Erbil Governorate Profile, Updated December 2015, url, p. 2
1439 NCCI, Erbil Governorate Profile, Updated December 2015, url, p. 21440 IAU) Erbil Governorate Profile, August 2020, url
1441 iMMAP-IHF, Humanitarian Access Response: Explosive Hazards Risk Level on Roads in Erbil Governorate from January
to December 2019, 12 January 2019, url
1442 Wing, J. Hashd’s 30th Brigade In Ninewa Assaults Dep Governor and MP, 16 September 2019, url

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Following the July 2019 attack in Erbil against a Turkish diplomat and two Iraqi civilians, checkpoints
were set up in the area and roads closed, including the road between Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, Erbil
and Kirkuk, and Erbil and Makhmur.1443
As part of the COVID-19 related measures, the KRI restricted internal and cross-border movement on
22 February 2020, imposed a curfew between 13 March and 23 April 2020, and closed all airports.1444
On 25 July 2020, travel restrictions were lifted to Erbil governorate; people from northern andsouthern Iraq were allowed to travel to Erbil governorate again for ‘important business’ or if they are
residents, whilst in general the KRI also eased restrictions on internal movements.1445

3.2.2 Conflict background and armed actors
Conflict background
In October 2017, IOM described Erbil’s security situation as ‘stable’ and security incidents, such as
terrorist attacks, as ‘not recurrent’.1446 The IAU described Erbil governorate’s security situation in
August 2020 as remaining ‘generally calm’, mentioning that the administrative status of Makhmur
District, which borders Ninewa governorate, had yet to be officially determined.1447
Following the US-brokered agreement that put an end to the Kurdish civil war in 1998, Erbilgovernorate had come under the control of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), together with
Dohuk, whilst Sulaymaniyah was administered by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).1448 According
to Lecturer Farhad Hassan Abdullah, since 2005 attempts have been made to unify the two Kurdish
administrations under one government based in Erbil.1449
The September 2017 KDP-led independence referendum backfired, resulting in a reaction from the
Iraqi central government, causing the loss of territorial control over most of the disputed territories
retaken by Baghdad, and as the ICG observed ‘forced the leadership of Iraqi Kurdistan’s two main
political parties to consider rebuilding their partnership and jointly re-engaging with Baghdad’.1450
National and regional parliamentary elections followed in 2018, reaffirming the KDP’s and PUK’s‘dominance’ in the KRI.1451 Despite announcing in March 2019 a four-year political agreement allowing
for the formation of the KRG cabinet and a set of joint positions on a number of issues1452, journalist
Bekir Aydoğan warned in April 2020 however of a ‘near-breakdown of cooperation’ between the KDP
and the PUK.1453
The KDP and PUK each maintain an independent security apparatus and separately control additional
Peshmerga units, Asayish forces1454 and intelligence services, the Zanyari (PUK) and the Parastin(KDP).1455

1443 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019) Report of the Secretary-General, 5 August 2019, url,para. 26
1444 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019) Report of the Secretary-General, 6 May 2020, url, para.
13
1445 Rudaw, Erbil authorities ease travel restrictions with Iraqi provinces, 25 July 2020, url
1446 IOM, Integrated Location Assessment II, Part II – Governorate Profiles, October 2017, url, pp. 13 and 14
1447 IAU, Erbil Governorate Profile, August 2020, url
1448 Hassan, F., PUK–KDP Conflict: Future Kurdish Status in Kirkuk, May 2018, url, p. 31449 Hassan, F., PUK–KDP Conflict: Future Kurdish Status in Kirkuk, May 2018, url, p. 31450 ICG, After Iraqi Kurdistan’s Thwarted Independence Bid, 27 March 2019, url
1451 ICG, After Iraqi Kurdistan’s Thwarted Independence Bid, 27 March 2019, url
1452 US, CRS, Iraq: Issues in the 116th Congress, Updated 17 July 2020, url, p. 25
1453 Knights, M. (Middle East Research Institute), Iraqi Kurdistan: Priority Issues for international mediation, 13 July 2020,
url. See also Aydoğan, B., The Iraqi Kurds’ Destructive Infighting: Causes and Consequences, 15 April 2020, url
1454 US, USDOS, 2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq, 11 March 2020, url
1455 US, USDOS, 2017 Country Report on Human Rights Practices - Iraq, 20 April 2018 url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Armed actors
Peshmerga and Asayish
The KDP maintain an independent security apparatus and separately control additional Peshmerga
units and Asayish internal security services.1456 The Peshmerga comprise a range of forces, including
traditional army forces, military and intelligence units1457, and militias of the KDP, which ‘maintainedorder’ in the KRI, according to the USDOS.1458 In 2017, the Peshmerga was estimated to have around
190 000 to 250 000 fighters.1459
In 2017 the KDP-commanded Peshmerga Division 80 had approximately 50 000 fighters and as of
3 December 2019 were active in Makhmur District and Gwer, as well as in Debaga sub-district.1460
Turkish state forces
In recent years Turkey has set up military bases in key areas including Erbil governorate.1461
PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party)
Founded in the 1970s, the PKK launched an armed struggle against the Turkish government in 1984
calling for an independent Kurdish state in Turkey, which it continued to date.1462 The PKK is on theEuropean Union’s list of designated groups which have been involved in terrorism1463, as well as being
listed as a terrorist organisation by Turkey1464, the United States1465, and Australia.1466 The PKK fought
against ISIL in Makhmur.1467 The PKK has developed its territorial presence over mountainous areas
along the border between Erbil and Sulaymaniyah governorates and Iran (Qandil Mountains) andMakhmur District.1468 Given PKK’s presence in these areas, Turkey has launched regular cross-borderattacks into the KRI targeting PKK fighters, which resulted also in civilian casualties.1469
Iranian state forces
Iranian intelligence operations took place in Erbil governorate during 2018.1470 Iran’s IRGC continued
to launch missile and drone attacks into the KRI, including Erbil governorate’s border areas, targeting
mainly Iranian Kurdish opposition groups during the timeframe for this report.1471

1456 US, USDOS, 2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq, 11 March 2020, url
1457 GPPi, Who’s Who: Quick Facts About Local and Sub-State Forces, 16 August 2017, url
1458 US, USDOS, 2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq, 13 March 2019, url
1459 GPPi, Who’s Who: Quick Facts About Local and Sub-State Forces, 16 August 2017, url
1460 Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: From Abandoned Villages to the Cities, 5 May 2020, url
1461 Shafaaq, American report: Turkey has set up 13 military bases in Kurdistan region, 12 September 2019, url
1462 BBC News, Who are Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) rebels?, 4 November 2016, url
1463 EU, Council of the European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/1341 of 8 August 2019 updating the list of persons,groups and entities subject to Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specificmeasures to combat terrorism, and repealing Decision (CFSP) 2019/25, 8 August 2019, url
1464 Euronews, Turkey slams Belgium court ruling that PKK is not a 'terrorist' organization, 31 January 2020, url
1465 US, Bureau of Counterterrorism, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, url; Euronews, Turkey slams Belgium court ruling that
PKK is not a 'terrorist' organization, 31 January 2020, url
1466 Australia, Australian National Security, Listed terrorist organisations, n.d., url; Euronews, Turkey slams Belgium court
ruling that PKK is not a 'terrorist' organization, 31 January 2020, url
1467 GPPi, Who’s Who: Quick Facts About Local and Sub-State Forces, 16 August 2017, url
1468 1001 Iraqi Thoughts, The PKK in Iraq: A Geopolitical Reading, 9 September 2019, url
1469 Reuters, Turkish air strikes 'neutralize' 15 Kurdish militants in Iraq: military, 10 November 2018, url; Kurdistan 24, PKK
main reason Turkey bombs Kurdistan’s border: KRG spokesperson, 16 November 2018, url; 1001 Iraqi Thoughts, The PKK in
Iraq: A Geopolitical Reading, 9 September 2019, url; US, USDOS, Country Reports on Terrorism 2019, 24 June 2020, url
1470 Denmark, DIS, Iranian Kurds, Consequences of political activities in Iran and KRI, February 2020 [source: journalists A
and B in KRI], url, pp. 76 and 84
1471 Rudaw, Iran launches cross-border drone strikes on Kurdish opposition groups, 12 July 2019, url; Asharq Al-Awsat, Iran
Mobilizes Forces on Border with Kurdistan, 19 August 2019, url; CPT, Turkish and Iranian Cross-border Bombings in Iraqi
Kurdistan (2017-2019), 25 September 2019, url; Forbes, Iran just struck U.S. bases in Iraq with ballistic missiles. Here’s why

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Kurdish insurgent groups and Kurdish-Iranian opposition groups
Armed groups active in the KRI’s mountainous areas in 2017 included Kurdish insurgent groups andKurdish-Iranian opposition groups.1472 It was reported in June 2020 that two border villages in Erbilwere hosting headquarters of the Iranian Kurdish KDPI and Komalah opposition groups, and that they
had been shelled by Iranian forces.1473
ISIL
ISIL threats in the KRI continued to exist in 2018, according to researcher Adel Bakawan, although the
KRI was largely untouched by ISIL violence.1474 The KRI has been largely spared ISIL attacks since 2014,
however Makhmour District, which fell close to the frontline with ISIL territory, was hit by attacks
between 2014 and 2017.1475 It was described by IOM as the only location in 2017 in Erbil governoratethat experienced terrorist attacks.1476 During the reporting period for this report ISIL was successful atrecruiting Iraqi Kurds to create a ‘new insurgent threat’ based in Erbil governorate1477, as well as
settling in the Qarachogh Mountains.1478 In June 2019 the ISW reported that ISIL was ‘asserting
control’ over the civilian population in Makhmur, from its stronghold in Mount Qarachogh. 1479
Reportedly around 1 000 ISIL members were located in Qarachogh Mountain in Makhmur District asof December 2019, who carry out attacks against Peshmerga and ISF in the disputed territory.1480 The
Center for Global Policy created a map outlining ISIL’s main presence being in Makhmur as of
3 December 2019.1481

3.2.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population
Developments 2019-2020
In its report to the US Congress covering 1 January to 31 March 2019, the Combined Joint Task ForceOperation Inherent Resolve reported that insurgent activity had ‘slightly increased’ in Erbilgovernorate without providing further detail.1482 The IAU described Erbil governorate’s security
situation in August 2020 as remaining ‘generally calm’, mentioning that the administrative status of
Makhmur District, which borders Ninewa governorate, had ‘yet to be officially determined’.1483

they’re Tehran’s favored weapon, 7 January 2020, url; UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019)
Report of the Secretary-General, 21 February 2020, url, paras. 28 and 30; Rudaw, Iran and Turkey conduct military
operations in Haji Omaran for second day straight: officials, 17 June 2020, url
1472 CPT, Civilian impacts of renewed Turkish and Iranian cross-border bombardments in Iraqi Kurdistan (2015-2017), 17
October 2017, url
1473 Eastern Herald (The), Iran pushes hard to destroy Iraqi Kurdistan movement, 24 June 2020, url
1474 Bakawan, Adel, Email to DIDR (OFPRA), 10 December 2018, in: EASO, Country of Origin Information Report, Iraq,
Security situation, March 2019, url, p. 149
1475 UNAMI, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30 September 2016, 30
December 2016, url; IOM, Integrated Location Assessment Part II – Governorate Profiles, October 2017, url, p. 141476 IOM, Integrated Location Assessment Part II – Governorate Profiles, October 2017, url, p. 141477 ISW, ISIS Re-Established Iraqi Sanctuary: March 7, 2019, March 2019, url
1478 Rudaw, Is ISIS winning hearts and minds in Iraq’s Makhmour?, 18 April 2019, url
1479 ISW, ISIS’s Second Comeback, Assessing the next ISIS insurgency, url, p. 391480 Kurdistan 24, Kurdish villagers in Iraq’s disputed Makhmour district repel ISIS attack, 19 December 2019, url. See also
Rudaw, Is ISIS winning hearts and minds in Iraq’s Makhmour?, 18 April 2019, url
1481 Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: From Abandoned Villages to the Cities, 5 May 2020, url
1482 USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,
January 1, 2019 – March 31, 2019, 7 May 2019, url, p. 44
1483 IAU, Erbil Governorate Profile, August 2020, url

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Turkey-PKK conflict
During the reporting period for this report, the UN regularly reported on the continuation of Turkish
air strikes against PKK strongholds, which inflicted mainly material damage.1484 In July 2020, theGerman Federal Office for Migration and Refugees noted that Turkey’s air strikes were ‘significantly
more intensive’ than previous Turkish military operations.1485 According to one analyst in September
2019, the PKK is ‘now considered as a major new actor within the Iraqi geopolitical scene’.1486 ACLED
reported an ‘intensification of the conflict in Iraqi Kurdistan’ and ‘increased use of air and drone strikes
by Turkish forces’ over the last three years.1487 The Center for Global Policy created a map showingthat the PKK and affiliates were active in Sidakan sub-district and Qandil Mountain in northern Erbilgovernorate as of 3 December 2019.1488
Following the targeted attack in July 2019, in Erbil against a Turkish diplomat, an increase of Turkish
air strikes in the KRI was reported.1489 The assassination of a Turkish diplomat in Erbil in July 2019 was
attributed to the PKK.1490 The ICG reported that the Turkish army conducted at least 76 cross-border
air operations between May and September 2019 against PKK hideouts and ammunition depots in the
KRI, especially in and around the Qandil mountains and in Hakurk; no civilian casualties were recordedby the ICG during that time.1491
In March 2020, Kurdistan Peshmerga Forces under the control of the KDP and the PUK respectively
stationed their military forces on the Zine Asterokan mountain range, in proximity to the towns ofWarte (Erbil governorate) and Shawre (Sulaymaniyah governorate), which reportedly resulted incross-border bombardments by the Turkish Air Force in April and May 2020.1492 CPTs documented 15
civilian casualties in the first six months of 2020 due to Turkish military operations in the KRI.1493
In June 2020, Turkey launched Operation Claw-Eagle and Operation Claw-Tiger, air and groundoffensives as well as establishing military bases, against PKK targets in northern Iraq and the KRI,
particularly against bases in Sinjar (Ninewa governorate), Qandil (Iran-Iraq border), Karacak, Zap,
Avasin-Basyan and Hakurk (Dohuk governorate).1494 In July 2020, the Turkish Consul Generalannounced that Turkish army military operations would continue in the KRI until the end of thepresence of the PKK.1495 By 6 July 2020, Turkish forces had set up 37 ‘military points’ in border areasof the KRI, notably along the Iraq-Turkey and Iraq-Iran borders, and including four in Erbil, Duhok,
Soran and Zakho cities.1496 CPTs documented on 21 July 2020 that since the launch of these military

1484 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2421 (2018) Report of the Secretary-General, 2 May 2019, url, para.

26; UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019) Report of the Secretary-General, 5 August 2019, url,para. 25; UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019) Report of the Secretary-General, 22 November
2019, url, para. 35; UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019) Report of the Secretary-General, 21
February 2020, url, para. 35; UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019) Report of the SecretaryGeneral, 6 May 2020, url, para. 35
1485 Germany, Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, Briefing Notes, Group 62 – Information Centre for Asylum andMigration, 27 July 2020, url, p. 41486 1001 Iraqi Thoughts, The PKK in Iraq: A Geopolitical Reading, 9 September 2019, url
1487 ACLED, Turkey – PKK Conflict: Summer 2020, 26 June 2020, url
1488 Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: From Abandoned Villages to the Cities, 5 May 2020, url
1489 WFP, WFP Iraq, Situation Report #65, July 2019, url, p. 1
1490 1001 Iraqi Thoughts, The PKK in Iraq: A Geopolitical Reading, 9 September 2019, url; US, USDOS, Country Reports on
Terrorism 2019, 24 June 2020, url
1491 ICG, Assessing the Fatalities in Turkey’s PKK Conflict, 22 October 2019, url
1492 CPT, Civilian impacts of the New military Bases on Zine Asterokan, 18 June 2020, url
1493 CPT, Response to Turkish Consul General’s claim that Turkish military operations in Iraqi Kurdistan did not target
civilians, 21 July 2020, url
1494 AA, Turkey launches operation Claw-Eagle, 15 June 2020, url; TRT World, Turkey begins fresh anti-terror Operation
Claw-Tiger in northern Iraq, 16 June 2020, url; Ahval, Turkish offensive in north Iraq extends beyond usual anti-PKK
campaign – analysis, 22 July 2020, url
1495 Nina News, Operations Until The End Of The PKK, 20 July 2020, url
1496 Rudaw, Ankara has built nearly 40 ‘military points’ in Kurdistan Region: Turkish presidency, 6 July 2020, url

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operations on 15 June 2020 at least 6 civilians had been killed and at least 4 civilians wounded,
including in Erbil governorate, whilst agricultural lands, orchards and livestock were burned.1497 The
ISW reported in June 2020 that Iran and Turkey were coordinating their military operations against
Iraqi Kurdish targets near the north-eastern Iraqi border in Erbil governorate.1498
Turkish military operations in Sidakan District have caused displacement as residents of several
villages have fled their homes to seek safety according to sources, though the scale of displacement
has not been provided.1499

Iranian activity
In June 2019, ‘heavy’ Iranian shelling in Sidakan District resulted in the displacement of ‘numerous’
families reported Christian Peacemaker Teams.1500 Following the death of the Commander of the
Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, General Qasem Soleimani in a January 2020 US air strike,
Iran launched missiles at the US airbase in Erbil governorate, with no reported casualties.1501
In June 2020, Rudaw reported that Iran’s IRGC joined forces with Turkey to fight what they called‘Kurdistan Region-based cross-border “terrorism”’.1502 Iranian forces shelled the Iranian-Kurdish
opposition party, Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI) in areas inside the KRI, including
surroundings of the Makhmour refugee camp and the Qandil mountains.1503 According to IRGCaffiliated ISWNEWS and as recorded by Rudaw, the IRGC shelled PJAK positions near the border areaof Haji Omaran.1504 According to reports, Iranian military operations in June 2020 have prompted
residents to flee their homes.1505

ISIL activity
According to the UN Secretary-General, between 23 November 2019 and 6 May 2020, remnants of
ISIL ‘continued to launch frequent asymmetric attacks’ against Iraqi civilians and security forces,
including in Erbil governorate.1506 According to the sources listed below most of ISIL’s attacks andactivities focused on Makhmour District. A May 2019 news report highlighted that ISIL had returnedto ‘earlier insurgency tactics’ through the ambush of security forces, the use of ‘kidnapping andexecutions of suspected informants, as well as the extortion of money from vulnerable rural
civilians’.1507 It was reported in May 2019 that ISIL torched a number of crop fields at the base of
Mount Qarachogh Mountains of Makhmur, as farmers refused to pay them taxes.1508 In September
1497 CPT, Response to Turkish Consul General’s claim that Turkish military operations in Iraqi Kurdistan did not target

civilians, 21 July 2020, url
1498 ISW, Iraq Situation Report: June 17 – 23, 2020, 20 June 2020, url. See also ISW), Iraq Situation Report: June 10 – 16,
2020, 20 June 2020, url
1499 Rudaw, Bombed by both neighbours: Kurdistan Region border areas deserted in fear, 7 June 2020, url; Rudaw, Bradost
beekeeping takes a hit in ongoing PKK-Turkey clashes, 9 June 2020, url; Rudaw, Iran and Turkey conduct military operationsin Haji Omaran for second day straight: officials, 17 June 2020, url
1500 CPT, Turkish and Iranian Cross-border Bombings in Iraqi Kurdistan (2017-2019), 25 September 2019, url
1501 Forbes, Iran just struck U.S. bases in Iraq with ballistic missiles. Here’s why they’re Tehran’s favored weapon, 7 January
2020, url; UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019) Report of the Secretary-General, 21 February
2020, url, paras. 28 and 30
1502 Rudaw, Iran and Turkey conduct military operations in Haji Omaran for second day straight: officials, 17 June 2020, url
1503 Kurdistan 24, Iran targeted PDKI bases in two-day shelling of Kurdistan Region: statement, 18 June 2020, url
1504 Rudaw, Iran and Turkey conduct military operations in Haji Omaran for second day straight: officials, 17 June 2020, url
1505 Rudaw, Bombed by both neighbours: Kurdistan Region border areas deserted in fear, 7 June 2020, url; Kurdistan 24,
Iran shells Kurdistan Region for second day in row, forcing locals to flee, 17 June 2020, url; Kurdistan 24, Iran targeted PDKI
bases in two-day shelling of Kurdistan Region: statement, 18 June 2020, url
1506 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019) Report of the Secretary-General, 21 February 2020, url,para. 23; UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019) Report of the Secretary-General, 6 May 2020, url,para. 241507 Rudaw, ISIS burns crop fields in Makhmour after farmers refuse to pay tax, 14 May 2019, url
1508 Rudaw, ISIS burns crop fields in Makhmour after farmers refuse to pay tax, 14 May 2019, url; Bellingcat, Torching andExtortion: OSINT Analysis Of Burning Agriculture In Iraq, 3 June 2019, url

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2019, the US-led coalition, together with the Peshmerga killed ten ISIL fighters in Qarachogh Mountainin Makhmur District.1509 In December 2019, residents of the village of Ali-Rash, located in Baqrte subdisctrict, Makhmur District, forced back an attack by ISIL.1510
In March 2020, following a joint air assault by US Marine Raiders and Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service(CTS) soldiers on an ISIL cave complex in Qarachogh Mountain in Makhmur District, two marines were
killed and four soldiers were wounded.1511 In June 2020, military operations by the Iraqi CTS, some ofwhich were supported by the international coalition, included 59 air raids on ISIL hideouts in the
Qarachogh mountains near Makhmur, 89 searches of villages for ammunition and fighters, and thekilling of twelve ISIL members.1512
According to open source data from ACLED, EPIC and Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency database, ISIL
conducted around 12 attacks in Erbil governorate from January to March 2020.1513

Illustrative security incidents•

On 27 April 2019, ISIL ambushed a group of Kurds whilst they were hunting for truffles near
Makhmur, including an off-duty Asayesh officer. Upon learning his identity ISIL kidnapped andlater executed the man.1514•

On 15 May 2019, a 50-year-old man died because of a Turkish air strike in the Barzan
region.1515•

On 5 June 2019, a Turkish air strike on Xakurke in the Qandil mountains injured four civilians,
one of them seriously.1516•

On 10 July 2019, Iranian or Turkish artillery bombardment killed an 18-year-old woman in
Barbezin area, sub-district of Sidakan (Bradost), District of Soran.1517•

On 10 July 2019, Iranian forced shelled KDP sites in Choman District, killing 3 civilians including
a 14-year-old girl.1518•

On 17 July 2019, shooters attacked a restaurant in Erbil, killing a Turkish diplomat and two
Iraqi civilians.1519•

In February 2020, ISIL members stole livestock from the village of Azikand, which resulted ina ‘clash’ between ISIL and members of the ‘protection forces’ of nearby Makhmur refugee
camp who came to the villagers’ help.1520

1509 Germany, Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, Briefing Notes, Group 62 – Information Centre for Asylum andMigration, 16 September 2019, url, p. 41510 Kurdistan 24, Kurdish villagers in iraq’s disputed Makhmour district repel ISIS attack, 19 December 2019, url
1511 ISW, Iraq Situation Report: March 4 – 10, 2020, 20 March 2020, url
1512 Germany, Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, Briefing Notes, Group 62 – Information Centre for Asylum andMigration, 29 June 2020, url, p. 41513 USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve - Report to the United States Congress, 1 January 2020
– 31 March 2020, 13 May 2020, url, p. 24
1514 Antiwar.com, ISIS Executes Kurdish Intelligence Agent; Three Killed in Iraq, 2 May 2019, url; Rudaw, ISIS burns crop
fields in Makhmour after farmers refuse to pay tax, 14 May 2019, url
1515 Airwars, Civilian Casualties, TI021a, 15 May 2019, url
1516 Airwars, Civilian Casualties, TI022a, 5 June 2019, url
1517 Airwars, Civilian Casualties, TI024a, IRI003, 10 July 2019, url; CPT, “What hope is there for us”, 17 December 2019, url
1518 EPIC, Iraq Security and Humanitarian Monitor (ISHM): July 4 – July 11, 2019, 11 July 2019, url
1519 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019) Report of the Secretary-General, 5 August 2019, url,para. 26
1520 Iraqi National News Agency, ISIS Launched An Attack On A Refugee Camp In Makhmour, 2 February, 2020, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation•

On 15 April 2020, Turkish air raids killed between two and three female civilians from the
Makhmur refugee camp.1521•

On 28 April 2020, Turkish air strikes in Xakurke area killed two civilians and severely injured
one man.1522•

On 10-11 May 2020, ISIL members torched farms in south-west Erbil.1523•

Between 10 and 16 June 2020, Iran reportedly shelled the Choman region, but no information
as to target and/or casualties was recorded.1524•

On 17 June 2020, a Turkish air strike killed a nomadic shepherd in Khnera heights in the subdistrict of Sidakan (Bradost), district of Soran.1525•

On 12 July 2020, Turkish bombing resulted in a five-day forest fire, which caused economic
damage.1526

Number of civilian casualties
The number of armed conflict related incidents and civilian casualties in the governorate recorded by
UNAMI for the period 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, is shown in the table below.
Governorate 2019 (Jan – Dec)

Erbil

# of
incidents

Killed Injured

16

52019 total
casualties(killed andinjured)12

172020 (Jan – Jul)# ofincidents

Killed Injured

1242020 total
casualties(killed andinjured)1

5

Table 13: Number of armed conflict related incidents and civilian casualties 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, Erbilgovernorate1527

Number of security incidents
In the reference period, ACLED reported 162 battles, 438 incidents of remote violence/explosions, 13cases of violence against civilians, 0 incidents of riots, accounting for a total of 613 security incidentsof these types in Erbil governorate, the majority taking place in Soran District. 56 protests were also
reported in Erbil governorate during the reference period.1528 The evolution of all the types of security
events through the reference period is shown in the table below.

1521 Germany, Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, Briefing Notes, Group 62 – Information Centre for Asylum andMigration, 20 April 2020, url, p. 6; UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019) Report of the SecretaryGeneral, 6 May 2020, url, para. 35
1522 Airwars, Civilian Casualties, TI035, 28 April 2020, url
1523 EPIC, Iraq Security and Humanitarian Monitor (ISHM): May 7 – May 14, 2020, 14 May 2020, url
1524 ISW, Iraq Situation Report: June 10 – 16, 2020, 20 June 2020, url
1525 CPT, Response to Turkish Consul General’s claim that Turkish military operations in Iraqi Kurdistan did not target
civilians, 21 July 2020, url
1526 Germany, Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, Briefing Notes, Group 62 – Information Centre for Asylum andMigration, 27 July 2020, url, p. 41527 UNAMI, Email to EASO, 24 July 2020
1528 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Figure 16: Evolution of security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence, violence against civilians, riots andprotests in Erbil governorate 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, based on ACLED data1529

State ability to secure law and orderMore information on the capacities of the Iraqi forces and the forces under the KRG as actors ofprotection, including the ability to secure law and order, as well as information on the integrity ofarmed forces, please see the report EASO COI Report – Iraq: Actors of Protection (2018).
The KRG maintains its own internal security force, but the KDP, also maintains its own controlled
security apparatus, additional Peshmerga units, Asayish forces1530 and intelligence services, theParastin.1531 Freedom House reported that KRG suffers from corruption similar to the rest of Iraq1532,
other sources also report on corruption, nepotism1533, and patronage in the KRG administration1534.
The US Overseas Security Advisory Council’s (OSAC) Crime & Safety Report for the KRI of May 2020
described KRI’s crime statistics and crime reporting mechanisms as ‘unreliable’, but reported on the
KRI’s police capacity to quickly response to security incidents, including terrorist attacks, and criminal
activities, and further noted that the police and security services are equipped with ‘modern weaponsand security equipment’, without specifying whether they do so in practice.1535 DFAT noted that:‘Although the KRI is generally regarded as a more benign security environment, its borders are
insecure. Violent crime is common, and kidnappings, murders and robberies occur frequently.’.1536

1529 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url
1530 US, USDOS, 2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq, 11 March 2020, url
1531 US, USDOS, 2017 Country Report on Human Rights Practices - Iraq, 20 April 2018 url

1532

Freedom House, Freedom in the world 2019 – Iraq, 4 February 2019, url, accessed 15 July 2020
Rudaw, 16 April 2019, KRG’s corruption probe slowed by lack of staff, resources: Commission, url, accessed 15 July
2020
1534
Bali, A.O., The roots of clientelism in Iraqi Kurdistan and the efforts to fight it, p. 99, url, accessed 15 July 2020
1535 US, OSAC, Iraq 2020 Crime & Safety Report: Erbil, 12 May 2020, url. Note that despite the name of the source implyingthat it focuses on either Erbil city or Erbil governorate, the information contained in the report refers almost exclusively to
the whole of the KRI.
1536 Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report Iraq, 17 August 2020, url, para. 2.58
1533

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Following an ambush by ISIL fighters against paramilitias in Makhmur, the deputy speaker of the Iraqi
parliament ‘slammed “lax” security that allowed the ambush to happen’ and questioned the absenceof intelligence efforts.1537
Commentators noted that the severe oil price crash, which began in March 2020 and which they
foresee will extend through 2021, ‘imposes yet more strain’ on the KRI’s security forces ‘in terms of
maintaining civil order in cities’.1538

Infrastructure damage and explosive remnants of war
IOM found that as of June 2019 around 5 % of returnees had critical access to infrastructure, services
and land – defined as incorporating electricity, water, schools, health clinics and hospital, waste
collection and latrines, market, office for the replacement of civil documentation and legal services
for Housing, Land and Property issues - in particular in the district of Makhmur.1539
The January 2019 iMMAP-IHF published a map showing the ‘legacy contamination by landmines and
ERW and the new contamination of explosive hazards, including IED) in areas liberated from ISIS since2014’, which illustrated that the district of Choman, followed by southern parts of Soran District, were
the highest contaminated areas in Erbil governorate.1540 iMMAP-IHF also produced a map
documenting the ‘Explosive Hazard Incidents Risk Level’ in Erbil governorate from January to
December 2019, which depicted low to moderate risk levels in the district of Makhmur.1541
The KRI recorded mine contamination of 181 km2 at the end of 2018, 14 % less than at the end of
2017.1542 Of these, roughly 49 km2 have been surveyed in Erbil governorate.1543 This data did notinclude areas on the Turkish border, which have never been surveyed owing to continued fighting andair strikes, reported Mine Action Review.1544
The US OSCA’s Crime & Safety Report for Erbil of May 2020 noted that whilst roadside IEDs are ‘notcommon’ in the KRI, smaller handheld explosives and unexploded ordnance (UXO) ‘are present,
especially in areas previously under ISIS control’.1545
In August 2020, iMMAP-IHF monitored the risk level of four categories of incidents: ‘Armed clash,
Explosive Hazard, Airstrike & Others’ in seven governorates, including Makhmur District, from June2019 to July 2020, which can be viewed in detail here.1546

Displacement and return
According to IOM, Erbil governorate has been a ‘common’ destination for the displaced since the startof the conflict [2014] and as of October 2017 hosted 15 % of Iraqi IDPs (over 310 000 individuals),
hosting the second largest displaced population after Salah al-Din.1547 In October 2017, over 90 % of
Erbil’s IDPs originated from Ninewa and Anbar governorates, whilst Makhmur was the only district of

1537 Rudaw, ISIS attack Hashd in deadly ambush near Makhmour killing 6, 7 March 2019, url
1538 Knights, M. and Almeida, A. (CTC Sentinel), Remaining and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State Operations in Iraq

in 2019-2020, May 2020, url, p. 25
1539 IOM, Integrated Location Assessment IV, 30 March 2020, url, p. 231540 iMMAP-IHF, Humanitarian Access Response: Monthly security incidents situation report, January 2019, url, p. 61541 iMMAP-IHF, Humanitarian Access Response: Explosive Hazards Incidents Risk level in Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala, Erbil,
Kirkuk, Ninewa and Salah Al-Din Governorates from December to January 2019, 12 January 2020, url [Note that the title ofthe map is slightly misleading as the source also states that the ‘Explosive Hazard data’ is “From Jan to Dec 2019’]
1542 Mine Action Review, Clearing the Mines 2019, 1 October 2019, url, p. 130
1543 Mine Action Review, Clearing the Mines 2019, 1 October 2019, url, p. 1301544 Mine Action Review, Clearing the Mines 2019, 1 October 2019, url, p. 130
1545 US, OSAC, Iraq 2020 Crime & Safety Report: Erbil, 12 May 2020, url
1546 iMMAP, Humanitarian Access Response: Risk level monitoring maps of the 4 categories of Incident “Armed clash,
Explosive Hazard, Airstrike & Others” for the 7 Governorates Jun. 2019 – Jul. 2020, 9 August 2020, url
1547 IOM, Integrated Location Assessment II, Part II – Governorate Profiles, October 2017, url, p. 13

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displacement in Erbil.1548 Over 40 % of all IDPs displaced during the 2014-2017 ISIL conflict sought
safety in the KRI – a figure which OCHA described as having held ‘steady or even declined’ in 2019.1549
As of 30 June 2020, Erbil governorate had 236 496 IDPs residing in three main districts: Erbil (215 472),
Makhmur (9 984) and Shaqlawa (5 154).1550 47 % of those IDPs originated from Ninewa, 29 % from
Anbar, 10 % from Salah al-Din, and 14 % from elsewhere.1551 During May and June 2020, 7 IDPs werere-displaced following their return to their areas of origin ‘due to security concerns’, whilst IOM
highlighted that movements between governorates were ‘limited’ due to COVID-19 related
restrictions imposed since March 2020.1552 OCHA estimated that by January 2020, 15 981 IDPs lived informal camps and 170 000 IDPs lived out-of-camp or in informal settlements.1553
OCHA reported in January 2020 that 38 500 displaced people in Makhmur District presented unmet‘high or very high severity of needs’.1554 As a comparison, in February 2019, OCHA estimated this figure
to be 56 000 people.1555
REACH conducted an intentions survey in three IDP camps in Erbil governorate between 18 June and1 August 2019, interviewing a total of 197 households.1556 REACH found that 89 % of IDP households
intended to remain in displacement for the three months following the survey, and 67 % for the 12months following the survey.1557 According to the report, the reasons behind the IDPs’ intention toremain in displacement for the 12 months following the survey, were lack of security forces in theareas of origin (46 %), fear and trauma associated with the areas of origin (40 %), and homes damaged
or destroyed in the areas of origin (37 %).1558 Of those who considered their areas of origin to not besafe at the time of the survey, 46 % feared extremist groups, 36 % armed security actors, and 35 %explosive hazards.1559 In its report covering the period from 5 August to 22 November 2019, the UN
reported on the closure of vital services in the field of gender-based violence, due to lack of funding,for IDPs, returnees and host communities, amongst others in Erbil governorate, whilst ‘serious’
gender-based violence incidents were reported in both camps and informal settlements perpetrated
by armed actors.1560 Following her visit to Iraq, including to Erbil governorate, in February 2020, theUN Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons found that in the KRI local
integration was ‘rejected by authorities in hosting areas’ fearing changes in their demographics.1561
An April 2020 IOM assessment found that there were 124 614 out-of-camp IDPs in Erbil city – thelargest recipient of IDPs.1562 The assessment noted that amongst IDPs settled in Erbil city, 38 % werewilling to return in the short term while 57 % were willing to return in the long term.1563 The relatively
low willingness to return was attributed to the perceived worsening of living conditions and livelihood

1548 IOM, Integrated Location Assessment II, Part II – Governorate Profiles, October 2017, url, p. 131549 OCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan Iraq, January 2020, url, p. 31
1550 IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Iraq Master List Report 116: May-June 2020, 16 July 2020, url, pp. 1 and 21551 IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Iraq Master List Report 116: May-June 2020, 16 July 2020, url, p. 21552 IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Iraq Master List Report 116: May-June 2020, 16 July 2020, url, p. 41553 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan Iraq, January 2020, url, p. 31
1554 UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan Iraq, January 2020, url, p. 31
1555 UNOCHA, 2019 Humanitarian Response Plan, January-December 2019, February 2019, url, p. 34
1556 REACH, Intentions Survey, August 2019, url, Erbil p. 1
1557 REACH, Intentions Survey, August 2019, url, Erbil p. 1
1558 REACH, Intentions Survey, August 2019, url, Erbil p. 1
1559 REACH, Intentions Survey, August 2019, url, Erbil p. 2
1560 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019) Report of the Secretary-General, 22 November 2019,url, para. 74
1561 UN General Assembly, Human Rights Council, Visit to Iraq, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights ofinternally displaced persons, 13 May 2020, url, para. 141562 IOM, Urban displacement in Iraq: a preliminary analysis, 30 April 2020, url, p. 51563 IOM, Urban displacement in Iraq: a preliminary analysis, 30 April 2020, url, p. 6

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opportunities in their areas of origin.1564 In about ‘10 % of locations, IDPs reported fear as a result of
the changed ethno-religious composition at origin’ as a reason not to return to their areas of origin.1565
OCHA reported in July 2020 that 60 % of respondents in camps reported a ban on entry into / exitfrom camps, but with exceptions: 37 % reported a ban on new admissions to camps; and 17 %reported that measures and regulations were applied more strictly to IDPs and/or returnees.1566 45%
of respondents in camps noted that restrictions on freedom of movement were the first main
protection concern affecting communities, 63 % noted that protection issues affecting women andgirls had significantly or very significantly increased since the beginning of the pandemic, whilst 69 %reported that protection issues affecting children had significantly or very significantly increased.1567
IOM observed that as of 30 June 2020, 53 004 IDPs returned to their area of origin, all of whom to
Makhmur.1568 73 % of these returnees were originally displaced within Erbil governorate, 15 % to
Ninewa, 11 % to Kirkuk and 1 % to Salah al-Din.1569 IOM found that as of June 2019 around 5 % of
returnees had critical access to infrastructure, services and land – defined as incorporating electricity,water, schools, health clinics and hospital, waste collection and latrines, market, office for the
replacement of civil documentation and legal services for Housing, Land and Property issues - inparticular in the district of Makhmur.1570

1564 IOM, Urban displacement in Iraq: a preliminary analysis, 30 April 2020, url, p. 61565 IOM, Urban displacement in Iraq: a preliminary analysis, 30 April 2020, url, p. 61566 UNOCHA, Protection Cluster Iraq, Protection monitoring in response to COVID-19, Summary of findings – July 2019,

July 2019, url, p. 1
1567 UNOCHA, Protection Cluster Iraq, Protection monitoring in response to COVID-19, Summary of findings – July 2019,
July 2019, url, pp. 2, 3
1568 IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Iraq Master List Report 116: May-June 2020, 16 July 2020, url, p. 51569 IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Iraq Master List Report 116: May-June 2020, 16 July 2020, url, p. 5
1570 IOM, Integrated Location Assessment IV, 30 March 2020, url, p. 23

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3.3 Sulaymaniyah

Map 17: Sulaymaniyah governorate with district borders, district capitals and main roads, © United Nations 1571

3.3.1 General description of the governorate
Basic geography
Sulaymaniyah governorate is part of the KRI and located in the north-eastern part of Iraq.1572 It has
internal borders with Erbil, Kirkuk, Salah al-Din and Diyala and it also has an international border with
the Islamic Republic of Iran to the east.1573 Sulaymaniyah governorate is divided into the following
districts: Chamchamal, Darbandihkan, Dokan, Halabja, Kalar, Penjwin, Pshdar, Rania, Sharbazher,
Sulaymaniyah.1574 The governorate borders some of the disputed areas claimed by both the KRG and
the central government in Baghdad.1575 Although Halabja was designated as a governorate by the Iraqi
government in December 2013, many ministries and institutions considered it as part of
Sulaymaniyah.1576 The Garmiyan Administration is a disputed territory between Baghdad and Erbil,

1571 UN JAU, Iraq District Map, January 2014, url
1572 NCCI, Sulaymaniyah Governorate Profile, December 2015, url, p. 2
1573 UNOCHA, Iraq: Sulaymaniyah Governorate Reference Map 2020, 5 May 2020, url
1574 IOM, Dahuk, Erbil & Sulaymaniyah: governorate profiles, June 2008, url, p. 2; IOM, Iraq Master List Report 114 January– February 2020, 29 February 2020, url, p. 71575 NCCI, Sulaymaniyah Governorate Profile, December 2015, url, p. 41576 Rudaw, Years on, Halabja still waiting for full province status, 26 June 2017, url

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located within Sulaymaniyah governorate, and an unofficial governorate in the KRI that includes thethree districts of Kalar, Kifri, and Chamchamal.1577
Sulaymaniyah governorate is 17 023 km21578 and its capital has the same name, Sulaymaniyah.1579

Population
For 2019, the Iraqi CSO (Central Statistical Organization) estimated the governorate’s population at 2
219 194.1580 Most people live in urban areas (1 880 342), with a minority living in rural areas(338 852).1581

Ethnicity
The main ethnic group in the governorate are Kurds.1582 According to the USCIRF the main ethnic
groups in the KRI are Sunni Kurds, in addition to Sunni Arabs, Christians, Circassians, Fayli Kurds,
Shabaks, Shia and Sunni Turkmen, Yarsan (including Kaka’i), as well as Yezidis.1583 Zoroastrians are alsopresent in the governorate.1584

EconomyIt was reported in 2015 that the relatively stable security situation attracted foreign investments,
tourism and a ‘construction boom’.1585 Sulaymaniyah also has large supplies of water and fertile plains
contributing to agricultural production.1586 Yet, in the same year the KRG faced a ‘severe economiccrisis’ due to ‘corruption, mismanagement, disputes’ with the Central Iraqi government, and the fights
against ISIS.1587
The January 2018 report of the UN Secretary General noted that ‘dire economic conditions’ in the KRI
led to widespread protests in the governorate of Sulaymaniyah.1588

Road security
Scarce information about road security and checkpoints in Sulaymaniyah governorate was foundduring the drafting of this report.
Following the shooting of a Turkish diplomat in Erbil in July 2019, security forces enforced checkpoints
in the area and closed roads, including the road between Erbil and Sulaymaniyah.1589 In January 2020
ISIL was reported to have set up a fake checkpoint in the disputed territory of Garmiyan andsubsequently kidnapped seven civilians.1590

1577 Kurdistan 24, ISIS kidnaps 7 civilians at fake checkpoint in Kurdistan’s Garmiyan region, 31 January 2020, url; Rudaw,‘Peshmerga blood on his hands’: ISIS emir arrested in Garmiyan, 3 April 2020, url
1578 NCCI, Sulaymaniyah Governorate Profile, December 2015, url, p. 1
1579 IOM, Dahuk, Erbil & Sulaymaniyah: governorate profiles, June 2008, url, p. 2
1580 Iraq, CSO, 2019 ‫[ قديرات سكان العراق حسب المحافظة والبيئة والجنس لسنة‬Demographic and population indicators, Estimates forthe population of Iraq by governorate, environment and gender for the year 2019] (table), n.d., url
1581 Iraq, CSO, 2019 ‫[ قديرات سكان العراق حسب المحافظة والبيئة والجنس لسنة‬Demographic and population indicators, Estimates forthe population of Iraq by governorate, environment and gender for the year 2019] (table), n.d., url
1582 NCCI, Sulaymaniyah Governorate Profile, December 2015, url, p. 2
1583 USCIRF, Wilting in the Kurdish Sun: The hopes and fears of religious minorities in Northern Iraq, May 2017, url, p. 13
1584 USCIRF, Wilting in the Kurdish Sun: The hopes and fears of religious minorities in Northern Iraq, May 2017, url, p. 19
1585 NCCI, Sulaymaniyah Governorate Profile, December 2015, url, p. 2
1586 NCCI, Sulaymaniyah Governorate Profile, December 2015, url, p. 2
1587 Carnegie Middle East Center, Kurdistan’s Politicized Society Confronts a Sultanistic System, 18 August 2015, url
1588 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 2367 (2017), 17 January 2018, url, para. 17
1589 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019) Report of the Secretary-General, 5 August 2019, url,para. 26
1590 Kurdistan 24, ISIS kidnaps 7 civilians at fake checkpoint in Kurdistan’s Garmiyan region, 31 January 2020, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

As part of the COVID-19 related measures, the KRI restricted internal and cross-border movement on
22 February 2020, imposed a curfew between 13 March and 23 April 2020, and closed all airports.1591

3.3.2 Conflict background and armed actors in the governorate
Conflict backgroundSources have described Sulaymaniyah as ‘relatively stable’ security wise since 2003.1592 On
17 July 2019, shooters attacked a restaurant in Erbil, killing a Turkish diplomat and two Iraqi
civilians.1593
Following the US-brokered agreement that put an end to the Kurdish civil war in 1998, Sulaymaniyahcame under the control of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), while Erbil and Dohuk came under
the leadership of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).1594 According to Lecturer Farhad Hassan
Abdullah, since 2005 attempts have been made to unify the two Kurdish administrations under one
government based in Erbil.1595 The September 2017 KDP-led independence referendum backfired,resulting in a reaction from the Iraqi central government, causing the loss of territorial control overmost disputed territories retaken by Baghdad, and as the ICG observed ‘forced the leadership of Iraqi
Kurdistan’s two main political parties to consider rebuilding their partnership and jointly re-engaging
with Baghdad’.1596 National and regional parliamentary elections followed in 2018, reaffirming the
KDP’s and PUK’s ‘dominance’ in the KRI.1597 Despite announcing in March 2019 a four-year politicalagreement allowing for the formation of the KRG cabinet and a set of joint positions on a number ofissues1598, journalist Bekir Aydoğan warned in April 2020 however of a ‘near-breakdown ofcooperation’ between the KDP and the PUK.1599

Armed actors
Peshmerga and Asayish
The security forces of the KRI are the Peshmerga, having 14 infantry brigades and two support
brigades, the Asayish internal security unit, in addition to KPD and PUK-controlled militias.1600 Most ofthese forces’ members are either affiliated with the KDP or with the PUK, to which they answer

1591 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019) Report of the Secretary-General, 6 May 2020, url, para.

13
1592 NCCI, Sulaymaniyah Governorate Profile, December 2015, url, p. 2; IOM, Integrated Location Assessment Part II –Governorate Profiles, October 2017, url, pp. 55, 57; IOM, Reasons to Remain (Part 2): Determinants of IDP integration into
host communities in Iraq, 18 April 2019, url, p. 121593 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019) Report of the Secretary-General, 5 August 2019, url,para. 26
1594 Hassan, F., PUK–KDP Conflict: Future Kurdish Status in Kirkuk, May 2018, url, p. 3; USCIRF, Wilting in the Kurdish Sun:
The hopes and fears of religious minorities in Northern Iraq, May 2017, url, p. 5; Century Foundation (The), Kurdish
Nationalism at an Impasse, 29 April 2019, url; Bakawan, Adel, Email to DIDR (OFPRA), 10 December 2018 cited in EASO,Country of Origin Information Report, Iraq, Security situation, March 2019, url, p. 149; LSE, The Iraqi Kurds’ Destructive
Infighting: Causes and Consequences, 15 April 2020, url
1595 Hassan, F., PUK–KDP Conflict: Future Kurdish Status in Kirkuk, May 2018, url, p. 3
1596 ICG, After Iraqi Kurdistan’s Thwarted Independence Bid, 27 March 2019, url
1597 ICG, After Iraqi Kurdistan’s Thwarted Independence Bid, 27 March 2019, url
1598 CRS, Iraq: Issues in the 116th Congress, Updated 17 July 2020, url, p. 25
1599 Knights, M. (Middle East Research Institute), Iraqi Kurdistan: Priority Issues for international mediation, 10 July 2020,
url. See also Aydoğan, B., The Iraqi Kurds’ Destructive Infighting: Causes and Consequences, 15 April 2020, url
1600 US, USDOS, 2017 Country Reports on Human Rights– Iraq, 20 April 2018, url, pp. 11-12

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directly.1601 The leadership of each brigade, however, comes from both parties ‘to decrease the unit’s
allegiance to one political party’.1602
According to the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) reporting in August 2017, there wereapproximately 48 000 PUK commanded Peshmerga fighters. PUK-affiliated units are typically divided
according to regular units (Division 70) and Deja Terror (Counter-terrorism Forces).1603 Peshmerga andAsayish forces from Sulaymaniyah governorate continued to conduct security operations to pursue
ISIS members.1604
The Peshmerga were active in Kifri and Kalar District as of 3 December 2019.1605
Iraqi state forces
The UN Secretary General reported in February 2020 that ‘Iraqi security forces continued their action
against ISIL cells’ and military operations took place in areas along the border between Diyala andSulaymaniyah governorates.1606 According to a Commander in the Peshmerga forces, frictions
between Iraqi forces and the Peshmerga forces can occur in disputed territories.1607 On 6 July 2020,
there was a gunfire exchange between Iraqi forces and the Peshmerga when Iraqi forces entered into
Kafri District in Garmyan, following a reported kidnapping.1608
Turkish state forces
In recent years, Turkey has set up military bases in key areas including Sulaymaniyah.1609 The PUK is
working on normalising its relations with Turkey, for example, by trying to close the headquarters of
the organisations affiliated to the PKK in Sulaymaniyah.1610 In July 2020, the Turkish Consul Generalannounced that Turkish army military operations will continue in the Kurdistan region until the end of
the presence of the PKK.1611
PKKFounded in the 1970s, the PKK launched an armed struggle against the Turkish government in 1984
calling for an independent Kurdish state in Turkey, which it continued to date.1612 The PKK is on the

1601 ICG, Arming Iraq’s Kurds: Fighting IS, inviting conflict, 12 May 2015, url, pp. 8-11; USDOD, Lead Inspector General for

Operation Inherent Resolve - Report to the United States Congress, April 1 2019- June 30 2019, 6 August 2019, url, p. 45
1602 USDOD, Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve - Report to the United States Congress, April 1 2019June 30 2019, 6 August 2019, url, p. 45
1603 GPPi, Who’s Who: Quick Facts About Local and Sub-State Forces, 16 August 2017, url
1604 Shafaaq, A joint operation starts between Peshmerga forces and the international coalition to pursue ISIS, 5 March
2020, url; Shafaaq, Peshmerga reinforcements between Diyala and Kurdistan, 22 June 2020, url; Shafaaq, The Antiterrorism forces arrests two ISIS members, 23 July 2020, url; ISW, Iraq Situation Report: July 8-14, 2020, url
1605 Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: From Abandoned Villages to the Cities, 5 May 2020, url
1606 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019) Report of the Secretary-General, 21 February 2020, url,para. 231607 Shafaaq, A clash between Peshmerga and an Iraqi force near Garmyan, 6 July 2020, url
1608 Shafaaq, A clash between Peshmerga and an Iraqi force near Garmyan, 6 July 2020, url
1609 Shafaaq, American report: Turkey has set up 13 military bases in Kurdistan region, 12 September 2019,url
1610 Middle East Online, The Iraqi Kurdish parties and the PKK, 1 October 2019, url; Bas News, PKK-Affiliated Party Opens
Anonymous Offices in Sulaymaniyah, 26 March 2019, url
1611 Nina News, Operations Until The End Of The PKK, 20 July 2020, url
1612 BBC News, Who are Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) rebels?, 4 November 2016, url

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European Union’s list of designated groups which have been involved in terrorism1613, as well as being
listed as a terrorist organisation by Turkey1614, the United States1615, and Australia.1616
The PKK has developed its territorial presence and control over mountainous areas along the Turkish
and Iranian borders, including along the border between Erbil and Sulaymaniyah governorates as wellas Iran.1617 Local officials interviewed estimated in 2016 that as many as 650 communities in remotevillages might have lived under PKK control in total in KRI, although some of the villages have been
evacuated due to the conflict.1618 The reported presence of PKK fighters has also been a cause oftension with Turkey.1619 From these areas, the PKK has launched attacks on Turkish forces, to which
the Turkish Air force has retaliated with regular raids.1620
ISIL
During the ISIL conflict, Sulaymaniyah did not see any direct military operations within its
boundaries.1621 ISIL control of swaths of northern Iraq however resulted in large-scale displacement,
violence, and destruction in the governorate.1622 Internal ISIL threats in KRI continued to exist in 2018
although the KRI was largely untouched by ISIL violence.1623 ISIL has benefited from a support zone
around the Halabja Mountains close to the Iranian border.1624
Ansar Al-Islam (AAI)
Ansar Al-Islam (AAI), had previously controlled a number of villages in Sulaymaniyah and Halabja
which the Peshmergas took back in 2003 with support from US forces.1625 Since late 2016, AAI haveused the Halabja Mountains close to the Iranian borders as a base for operations into Iran.1626

1613 EU, Council of the European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/1341 of 8 August 2019 updating the list of persons,groups and entities subject to Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specificmeasures to combat terrorism, and repealing Decision (CFSP) 2019/25, 8 August 2019, url
1614 Euronews, Turkey slams Belgium court ruling that PKK is not a 'terrorist' organization, 31 January 2020, url
1615 US Bureau of Counterterrorism, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, n.d., url; Euronews, Turkey slams Belgium court rulingthat PKK is not a 'terrorist' organization, 31 January 2020, url
1616 Australia, Australian National Security, Listed terrorist organisations, n.d., url; Euronews, Turkey slams Belgium court
ruling that PKK is not a 'terrorist' organization, 31 January 2020, url
1617 Quesnay, A. and Beaumont, R., The Return of the State and Inter-Militia Competition in Northern Iraq, Noria, 14 June
2018, url
1618 Rudaw, PKK bases in border areas provoke Turkish airstrikes, local mayors say, 14 April 2016, url
1619 NCCI, Sulaymaniyah Governorate Profile, December 2015, url, p. 4; Wing, J., Large Drop In Violence In Iraq November
2018, [Weblog Musings on Iraq], 3 December 2018, url; Wing, J., Islamic State Returns To Baghdad While Overall Security
In Iraq Remains Steady, [Weblog Musings on Iraq], 6 October 2018, url; Wing, J., Violence Slightly Down In Iraq July 2018,[Weblog Musings on Iraq], 2 August 2018, url; Wing, J., 649 Deaths, 275 Wounded Feb 2018 In Iraq, [Weblog Musings on
Iraq], 3 March 2018, url; Council on Foreign Relations, Global Conflict Tracker, n.d. url
1620 Wing, J., Large Drop In Violence In Iraq November 2018, [Weblog Musings on Iraq], 3 December 2018, url; Wing, J.,
Islamic State Returns To Baghdad While Overall Security In Iraq Remains Steady, [Weblog Musings on Iraq], 6 October
2018, url; Wing, J., Violence Slightly Down In Iraq July 2018, 2 August 2018, url; Wing, J., 649 Deaths, 275 Wounded Feb
2018 In Iraq, 3 March 2018, url; Council on Foreign Relations, Global Conflict Tracker, n.d. url
1621 IOM, Reasons to Remain (Part 2): Determinants of IDP integration into host communities in Iraq, 18 April 2019, url, p.
131622 World Bank, Iraq Reconstruction and Investment, Part 2, January 2018, url, p. 81623 Bakawan, Adel, Email to DIDR (OFPRA), 10 December 2018, in: EASO, Country of Origin Information Report, Iraq,
Security situation, March 2019, url, p. 149
1624 Brandon Wallace and Jennifer Cafarella: “ISIS’s Second Resurgence”, ISW, 2. October 2018, url; Bakawan, Adel, Email to
DIDR (OFPRA), 10 December 2018 in: EASO, Country of Origin Information Report, Iraq, Security situation, March 2019, url,
p. 1491625 Bakawan, Adel, Email to DIDR (OFPRA), 10 December 2018 in: EASO, Country of Origin Information Report, Iraq,
Security situation, March 2019, url, p. 149
1626 Brandon Wallace and Jennifer Cafarella: “ISIS’s Second Resurgence”, ISW, 2. October 2018, url

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Reportedly the Iraqi branch of AAI merged with ISIL in August 2014, though in October 2019 the groupclaimed it had placed two IEDs in Diyala governorate.1627
Iranian state forces
Iran has tried to take control of the Qandil and Halgurd Mountain areas several times, noting that the
IRGC have attacked Kurdish opposition bases inside KRI several times using missiles and artillery
fire.1628 These attacks have resulted in grave material damages, and several civilian residents havebeen injured.1629
Kurdish opposition groups and Kurdish insurgents
Forces of all Kurdish parties are reported to be operating in the Qandil and Halgurd Mountains.1630 In
2017, it was reported that armed groups active in the KRI’s mountainous areas were Kurdish insurgent
groups and Kurdish-Iranian opposition groups.1631 Turkish forces have targeted PJAK members for
decades1632, who reportedly have a hideout about 40 km north-west of Kuna Masi.1633
Other: Self-Defense ForceIn June 2019, a new group called the Self-Defense Forces from the Qandil Mountains was establishedwith the aim of targeting Turkish army bases inside the KRI in response to ongoing Turkish air
strikes.1634

3.3.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population
Developments 2019-2020
Turkey-PKK conflict
Various sources noted that the Turkish air force continued to launch regular air strikes against
positions held by the PKK in Sulaymaniyah governorate as well as in Dohuk and Erbil in 2019 and 2020,
causing mainly damage to agriculture and farmland, as well as forcing villagers to evacuate.1635 The
violence is directed at Dohuk, Erbil and to a lesser degree Sulaymaniyah.1636

1627 Mapping Militants Organizations. “Ansar al-Islam.” Stanford University. Last modified December 2018. url; U.S. Country

Reports on Terrorism 2019, 24 June 2020, url
1628 Denmark, DIS, Iranian Kurds Consequences of political activities in Iran and KRI, February 2020 [source: journalist in
KRI], url, p. 18
1629 Denmark, DIS, Iranian Kurds Consequences of political activities in Iran and KRI, February 2020 [source: journalist in
KRI], url, p. 181630 Denmark, DIS, Iranian Kurds Consequences of political activities in Iran and KRI, February 2020 [source: journalist in
KRI], url, p. 181631 CPT, Civilian impacts of renewed Turkish and Iranian cross-border bombardments in Iraqi Kurdistan (2015-2017), 17
October 2017, url
1632 EPIC, ISHM: July 13 – 19, 19 July 2018, url; HRW, Iraq: Turkish Airstrike Disregards Civilian Loss, 22 July 2020, url; Al
Monitor, Turkey, Iran, Iraq in shaky alignment against Iraqi Kurdistan, 29 September 2017, url,
1633 HRW, Iraq: Turkish Airstrike Disregards Civilian Loss, 22 July 2020, url
1634 Al Monitor, Turkey continues bombing Iraqi Kurdistan amid Iraq's strong objection, 2 July 2019, url
1635 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019) Report of the Secretary-General, 22 November 2019,url, para. 35; UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019) Report of the Secretary-General, 5 August
2019, url, para. 25, Al Jazeera, One killed by Turkish strike on northern Iraq: Local official, 26 June 2020, url; UN Security
Council, Implementation of resolution 2421 (2018) Report of the Secretary-General, 2 May 2019, url, para. 26; ACLED,
Turkey’s Air War in Iraq, 2 May 2018, url
1636 ACLED, Turkey’s Air War in Iraq, 2 May 2018, url; Al Monitor, Turkey conducts rare strike in Iraq's Sulaimaniyahprovince against PKK, 27 May 2020, url

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According to one analyst in September 2019, the PKK is ‘now considered as a major new actor within
the Iraqi geopolitical scene’.1637 Over the past three years, the ACLED reported an ‘intensification of
the conflict in Iraqi Kurdistan’ and ‘increased use of air and drone strikes by Turkish forces’.1638 On
30 June 2019, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey stated that cross-border operations against
terrorists in Iraq would continue.1639
On 26 June 2019, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iraq condemned recent air strikes in Sulaymaniyah
governorate, which, it claimed, killed four civilians and wounded four others.1640 On 29 June 2019,
Turkish air forces bombed areas around the city of Sulaymaniyah, killing four and wounding four.1641
In March 2020, Kurdistan Peshmerga Forces respectively under the control of the KDP and the PUK
stationed their military forces on the Zine Asterokan mountain range, in proximity to the towns ofWarte (Erbil governorate) and Shawre (Sulaymaniyah governorate), which reportedly resulted incross-border bombardments by the Turkish Air Forced in April and May 2020.1642 Turkish air raids
targeted PKK militants in northern Sulaymaniyah governorate on 27 May 20201643 and a Turkish strike
hit a pickup truck on 25 June 2020 in a rural area north of the city of Sulaymaniyah, killing one andwounding six.1644 The news report did not specify whether those killed and wounded were civilians orfighters. CPTs documented 15 civilian casualties in the first six months of 2020 due to Turkish military
operations in the KRI.1645
In June 2020, Turkey launched Operation Claw-Tiger and Operation Claw-Eagle, which sought to target
the PKK and other terrorist organisations based in northern Iraq, particularly in Sinjar (Ninewa
governorate), Qandil (Iran-Iraq border), Karacak, Zap, Avasin-Basyan and Hakurk (Dohuk
governorate).1646 In July 2020, the Turkish Consul General in Erbil, Hakan Karacay announced that the
military operations of the Turkish army would continue until the end of the presence of the PKK in the
KRI, including Sulaymaniyah.1647 CPT documented on 21 July 2020 that since the launch of thesemilitary operations on 15 June 2020, at least 4 civilians have been wounded following a drone attackin Kuna Masi.1648

1637 1001 Iraqi Thoughts, The PKK in Iraq: A Geopolitical Reading, 9 September 2019, url
1638 ACLED, Turkey – PKK Conflict: Summer 2020, 26 June 2020, url
1639 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019) Report of the Secretary-General, 5 August 2019, url,para. 251640 UN Security Council, Implementation of resolution 2470 (2019) Report of the Secretary-General, 5 August 2019, url,para. 251641 Al Monitor, Turkey continues bombing Iraqi Kurdistan amid Iraq's strong objection, 2 July 2019, url
1642 CPT, Civilian impacts of the New military Bases on Zine Asterokan, 18 June 2020, url
1643 ICG, Global Overview May 2020, n.d., url; Al Monitor, Turkey conducts rare strike in Iraq's Sulaimaniyah province
against PKK, 27 May 2020, url
1644 Al Jazeera, One killed by Turkish strike on northern Iraq: Local official, 26 June 2020, url
1645 CPT, Response to Turkish Consul General’s claim that Turkish military operations in Iraqi Kurdistan did not target
civilians, 21 July 2020, url
1646 AA, Turkey launches operation Claw-Eagle, 15 June 2020, url; ACLED, Regional Overview: Middle East 14-20 June 2020,
24 June 2020, url; Daily Sabah, Counterterrorism ops against PKK in N Iraq lawful, Ankara says, 6 July 2020, url; ACLED,
Regional Overview: Middle East 21 – 27 June 2020, 1 July 2020, url; 1001 Iraqi Thoughts, “Operation Claw”: Turkey’s
simmering military campaign in Northern Iraq, 6 February 2020, url; ACLED, Regional Overview – Middle East, 9 July 2019,
9 July 2019, url; Kurdistan 24, Kurdistan parliament condemns deadly Turkish strikes inside Kurdistan Region, 6 July 2019,
url; Rudaw, Turkish drone strike 'killed PJAK fighters' – not PKK, 29 May 2020, url
1647 Al Monitor, Turkey mulls permanent military presence in northern Iraq, 26 June 2019, url; Nina News, Operations Until
The End Of The PKK, 20 July 2020, url
1648 CPT, Response to Turkish Consul General’s claim that Turkish military operations in Iraqi Kurdistan did not target
civilians, 21 July 2020, url

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ISIL activity
In February 2019, Kurdish security forces arrested three ISIL members in Garmiyan.1649 According toGarmiyan regional security forces ISIL militants ‘have secretly come into Kurdistan Region territories
and settled in the Darbandikhan, Sarqalla and Sayda village’.1650
ISW noted in April 2019 that ISIL was expanding its networks in Iraqi Kurdistan and in the first quarterof 2019, Asayish Internal Security Forces claimed to detain three separate cells of Arab ISIL members
in Sulaymaniyah governorate, including in Sulaymaniyah city, Chamchamal and Kalar.1651 Asayish alsoarrested an ISIL militant in the southern part of Sulaymaniyah governorate in April 2019 for allegedlytransiting fighters in Kirkuk governorate.1652 Several Asayish members and Peshmerga fighters were
killed by ISIL militants in the period December 2019 to April 2020.1653

Protests
In June 2020, following the introduction of a lockdown to contain the coronavirus, demonstrations
broke out in Sulaymaniyah to protest the lack of work and poor economic conditions.1654 Protests
turned into riots and KRI security forces dispersed demonstrators by shooting live bullets in the air.1655

Illustrative security incidents•

On 29 June 2019, Turkish air forces bombed areas around the city of Sulaymaniyah, killing fourand wounding four civilians.1656•

On 15 October 2019, a bomb explosion killed two Arab people in the Azmar mountain area.1657•

In January 2020, ISIL kidnapped seven civilians at a fake checkpoint in the disputed territoryof Garmiyan.1658•

On 12 April 2020, two shepherds were killed by ISIL.1659•

On 25 June 2020, at least one PKK member was killed and six civilians injured by a Turkish air
strike in Sulaymaniyah governorate. The strike targeted a car boarded by a member of the
PKK in Kuna Masi.1660

Number of civilian casualties
The number of armed conflict related incidents and civilian casualties in the governorate recorded by
UNAMI for the period 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, is shown in the table below.

1649 Rudaw, Kurdish security forces arrest “three ISIS members” in Garmiyan, 4 February 2020, url
1650 Rudaw, Kurdish security forces arrest “three ISIS members” in Garmiyan, 4 February 2020, url
1651 ISW, ISIS Resurgence Update - April 2019, 19 April 2019, url
1652 ISW, ISIS Resurgence Update - April 2019, 19 April 2019, url
1653 Kurdistan 24, After ISIS attacks, Kurdistan Region deploys more Peshmerga to Garmiyan, 7 December 2019, url;

Shafaaq, Barzani about ISIS attack in Garmiyan: clear evidence of ISIS reorganization, 8 April 2020, url; Shafaaq, Explosion
targets Peshmerga and Asaish force in Garmiyan, 8 April 2020, url
1654 ISW, Iraq Situation Report: May 27 - June 2, 2020, 5 June 2020, url
1655 Middle East Eye, Anger at 'politicisation' of coronavirus provokes unrest in Iraq's Kurdish region, 9 June 2020, url
1656 Al Monitor, Turkey continues bombing Iraqi Kurdistan amid Iraq's strong objection, 2 July 2019, url
1657 The Baghdad Post, Bomb Blast Kills Two Arabs in Sulaimaniya, 16 October 2019, url
1658 Kurdistan 24, ISIS kidnaps 7 civilians at fake checkpoint in Kurdistan’s Garmiyan region, 31 January 2020, url
1659 Iraq Body Count, Recent Events, n.d., url. Note that as the weeks progress this link does not remain static.
1660 Rudaw, PJAK says one fighter killed in Kuna Masi airstrike, 26 June 2020, url; HRW, Iraq: Turkish Airstrike Disregards
Civilian Loss, 22 July 2020, url; AP, Iraq sets up border posts to try to prevent Turkish advance, 3 July 2020, url; Shafaaq,
Seven victims in a bombing in Al-Sulaymaniyah, 25 June 2020, url; EPIC, ISHM: JUNE 25 – JULY 2, 2020, 2 July 2020, url; The
National, Civilians killed and wounded in Turkish strike in north Iraq, 25 June 2020, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Governorate 2019 (Jan – Dec)
# ofincidents

Killed Injured

3

32019 total
casualties(killed andinjured)2020 (Jan – Jul)# ofincidents

Killed Injured

202020 total
casualties(killed andinjured)

Sulayma
11

14

7

7

niyah
Table 14: Number of armed conflict related incidents and civilian casualties 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, Sulaymaniyah
governorate1661

Number of security incidents
In the reference period, ACLED reported 7 battles, 16 incidents of remote violence/explosions, 12cases of violence against civilians, 4 incidents of riots, accounting for a total of 39 security incidents ofthese types in Sulaymaniyah governorate, the majority taking place in the capital Sulaymaniyah city.
114 protests were also reported in Sulaymaniyah governorate during the reference period.1662 The
evolution of all the types of security events through the reference period is shown in the table below.

1661 UNAMI, Email to EASO 24 July 2020
1662 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Figure 17: Evolution of security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence, violence against civilians, riots andprotests in Sulaymaniyah governorate 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, based on ACLED data1663

State ability to secure law and orderMore information on the capacities of the Iraqi forces and the forces under the KRG as actors ofprotection, including the ability to secure law and order, as well as information on the integrity ofarmed forces, please see the report EASO COI Report – Iraq: Actors of Protection (2018).
The KRG maintains its own internal security force. The KDP and PUK each maintain an independent
security apparatus and separately control additional Peshmerga units, Asayish forces1664 andintelligence services, the Zanyari (PUK) and the Parastin (KDP).1665
Freedom House reported that KRG suffers from corruption similar to the rest of Iraq1666, other sources
also report on corruption, nepotism1667, and patronage in the KRG administration1668.

1663 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url
1664 US, USDOS, 2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq, 11 March 2020, url
1665 US, USDOS, 2017 Country Report on Human Rights Practices - Iraq, 20 April 2018 url

1666

Freedom House, Freedom in the world 2019 – Iraq, 4 February 2019, url, accessed 15 July 2020
Rudaw, 16 April 2019, KRG’s corruption probe slowed by lack of staff, resources: Commission, url, accessed 15 July
2020
1668
Bali, A.O., The roots of clientelism in Iraqi Kurdistan and the efforts to fight it, p. 99, url, accessed 15 July 2020
1667

189

EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation.1669 The US Overseas Security Advisory Council’s (OSAC) Crime & Safety Report for the KRI of May
2020 described KRI’s crime statistics and crime reporting mechanisms as ‘unreliable’, but reported on
the KRI’s police capacity to quickly respond to security incidents, including terrorist attacks, andcriminal activities, and further noted that the police and security services are equipped with ‘modern
weapons and security equipment’, without specifying whether they do so in practice.1670 DFAT noted
that: ‘Although the KRI is generally regarded as a more benign security environment, its borders are
insecure. Violent crime is common, and kidnappings, murders and robberies occur frequently.’1671 In
the disputed territory of Garmiyan it was reported in December 2019 that Kurdish officials warned ofa security vacuum in the area.1672 Reportedly the vacuum has been ‘created by the lack of coordination
between the two forces [which] offers Islamic State sleeper cells the opportunity to regroup and stage
attacks in nearby populated areas’.1673

Infrastructure damage and explosive remnants of war
In 2015, NCCI found that ‘Sulaymaniyah is still littered with minefields and unexploded ordnance.’1674
The KRI recorded mine contamination of 181 km2 at the end of 2018, 14 % less than at the end of
2017.1675 Of the 181 km2 recorded mine contamination, roughly 12 km2 were surveyed in Halabja and100 km2 surveyed in Sulaymaniyah.1676 This data did not include areas on the Turkish border whichhave never been surveyed owing to fighting.1677
In 2018, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) cleared 11 areas in Sulaymaniyah covering an area of
125 385 m2.1678 415 mines were destroyed and 40 UXOs were destroyed.1679 Also in 2018, the Swiss
Foundation for Mine Action cleared two areas in Sulaymaniyah governorate covering an area of
76 624 m2.1680 Two mines were destroyed at 91 UXOs were destroyed.1681
The January 2019, iMMAP-IHF published a map showing the ‘legacy contamination by landmines and
ERW and the new contamination of explosive hazards, including IEDs in areas liberated from ISIL since2014’ and illustrated that affected districts in Sulaymaniyah included Pshdar, Sharbazher, Penjwin andHalabja.1682
In 2020, Rudaw reported that following the Iran-Iraq war, there are ‘tens of millions’ of
unexploded landmines and explosive ordnance across the KRI’s borders with Iran.1683
In March 2020, the WFP published a map illustrating explosive hazards contamination in Iraq.1684 It
shows that the eastern part of the governorate and in particular the south-eastern area is heavily
contaminated with levels there ranging between 12.1 % and 43 %.1685

1669 UNHCR, International Protection Considerations with Regard To People Fleeing the Republic Of Iraq, May 2019, url, pp.

45, 461670 US, OSAC, Iraq 2020 Crime & Safety Report: Erbil, 12 May 2020, url. Note that despite the name of the source implyingthat it focuses on either Erbil city or Erbil governorate, the information contained in the report refers almost exclusively to
the whole of the KRI.
1671 Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report Iraq, 17 August 2020, url, para. 2.58
1672 Kurdistan 24, After ISIS attacks, villagers in Kurdistan Region call for security outpost, 18 December 2019, url
1673 Kurdistan 24, After ISIS attacks, villagers in Kurdistan Region call for security outpost, 18 December 2019, url
1674 NCCI, Sulaymaniyah Governorate Profile, December 2015, url, p. 41675 Mine Action Review, Clearing the Mines 2019, 1 October 2019, url, p. 130
1676 Mine Action Review, Clearing the Mines 2019, 1 October 2019, url, p. 130
1677 Mine Action Review, Clearing the Mines 2019, 1 October 2019, url, p. 130
1678 Mine Action Review, Clearing the Mines 2019, 1 October 2019, url, p. 136
1679 Mine Action Review, Clearing the Mines 2019, 1 October 2019, url, p. 136
1680 Mine Action Review, Clearing the Mines 2019, 1 October 2019, url, p. 136
1681 Mine Action Review, Clearing the Mines 2019, 1 October 2019, url, p. 136
1682 iMMAP-IHF, Humanitarian Access Response: Monthly security incidents situation report, January 2019, url, p. 61683 Rudaw, Man dies after stepping on landmine near Iranian border, 20 March 2020, url
1684 WFP, Iraq Socio-Economic Atlas 2019, 30 March 2020, url, p. 37
1685 WFP, Iraq Socio-Economic Atlas 2019, 30 March 2020, url, p. 37

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Displacement and returns
Historically, a significant proportion of the 1.4 million people displaced in Iraq have sought refuge in
one of the three governorates of the KRI.1686 According to a January 2020 UNOCHA report, more than
40% of all IDPs displaced during the 2014-2017 conflict sought safety in the KRI – a figure which OCHA
described as having stayed ‘steady or even declined’ in 2019.1687
As of 30 June 2020 Sulaymaniyah governorate had 139 860 IDPs residing in mainly three districts:
Sulaymaniyah (88 602), Kalar (21 702) and Chamchamal (9 786).1688 26 % of those IDPs originated from
Salah al-Din governorate, 18 % from Diyala, 17 % from Anbar, 17 % from Baghdad while the remaining
22 % originated from Ninewa, Babylon and Kirkuk.1689
IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix noted that as of 30 June 2020, despite the overall decrease in the
total caseload of IDPs across the country, ‘666 individuals were recorded as displaced from their areaof origin for the first time, mainly to Sulaymaniyah Governorate.’1690 IOM reported that most of themfled from Baghdad, Salah Al-Din and Ninewa owing to the worsening security situation, lack ofservices, and a lack of employment opportunities.1691
IOM noted in a January 2019 assessment that ‘involuntary stay’ amongst IDPs is prevalent in
Sulaymaniyah.1692 The assessment found that in as many as 86 % of locations in Sulaymaniyah, IDPs
have no other choice but to stay.1693 IOM noted in a June 2019 report that ‘the presence of militias
and/or a change in the ethnoreligious composition at the location of origin is among the top threereasons to stay for over half of IDPs willing to resettle in Diyala, Salah al-Din and Sulaymaniyah.’1694
REACH conducted an intentions survey in three IDP camps in Sulaymaniyah governorate between
18 June 2019 and 1 August 2019 interviewing a total of 189 households.1695 REACH found that 71 % of
IDPs intended to remain in displacement for the three months following the survey, and 54 % for the
12 months following the survey.1696 The reasons behind the IDPs’ intention to remain in displacement
were fear and trauma associated with the area of origin (52 %), lack of security forces in the areas oforigin (47 %), and fear of discrimination in the area of origin (42 %).1697 Moreover, 69 % of theinterviewed households considered their areas of origin to be unsafe.1698 Of those who considered
their area of origin to not be safe, the top three reasons for perceived lack of safety in the area oforigin were close to conflict (44 %), armed security actors (32 %) and extremist groups (29 %).1699
Among the 99 % of households that reported owning a shelter in their areas of origin, 54 % reported
that the level of shelter damage was completely destroyed.1700
An April 2020 IOM assessment found that there were 59 880 out-of-camp IDPs in Sulaymaniyahcity.1701 The assessment noted that amongst IDPs settled in there, no one was willing to return in the
short term (0 %) while 66 % were willing to return in the long term, the lack of willingness driven by
the perceived lack of security in the area of origin (for example, militias or changed ethno-religious

1686 OCHA, Iraq: Humanitarian Dashboard for KRI (January to December 2019), 5 February 2020, url
1687 OCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan Iraq, January 2020, url, p. 31
1688 IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Iraq Master List Report 116: May-June 2020, 16 July 2020, url, p. 21689 IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Iraq Master List Report 116: May-June 2020, 16 July 2020, url, p. 21690 IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Iraq Master List Report 116: May-June 2020, 16 July 2020, url, p. 41691 IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Iraq Master List Report 116: May-June 2020, 16 July 2020, url, p. 41692 IOM, Integrated Location Assessment III, 3 January 2019, url ,p p. 6, 25
1693 IOM, Integrated Location Assessment III, 3 January 2019, url, p. 231694 IOM, Integrated Location Assessment Part 4, June 2019, url, p. 71695 REACH, Intentions Survey, August 2019, url, Al-Sulaymaniyah, p. Al-Sulaymaniyah 1
1696 REACH, Intentions Survey, August 2019, url, Al-Sulaymaniyah, p. Al-Sulaymaniyah 1
1697 REACH, Intentions Survey, August 2019, url, Al-Sulaymaniyah, p. Al-Sulaymaniyah 1
1698 REACH, Intentions Survey, August 2019, url, Al-Sulaymaniyah, p. Al-Sulaymaniyah 21699 REACH, Intentions Survey, August 2019, url, Al-Sulaymaniyah, p. Al-Sulaymaniyah 21700 REACH, Intentions Survey, August 2019, url, Al-Sulaymaniyah, p. Al-Sulaymaniyah 21701 IOM, Urban displacement in Iraq: a preliminary analysis, 30 April 2020, url, p. 14

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composition).1702 Another commonly reported obstacle for those willing to return was lack of security
and home destruction.1703 Conversely, security was the main reason for remaining in Sulaymaniyah
city and IDPs felt ‘relatively safe and secure in all locations’.1704
IOM further noted in February 2020 that militia presence and/or changes in the ethno-religious
composition at the area of origin were among the top three reasons to stay for over half of IDPs willing
to resettle in Sulaymaniyah governorate.1705
IOM observed that as of 30 June 2020 there were no returnee areas in Sulaymaniyah governorate.1706

1702 IOM, Urban displacement in Iraq: a preliminary analysis, 30 April 2020, url, p. 151703 IOM, Urban displacement in Iraq: a preliminary analysis, 30 April 2020, url, p. 151704 IOM, Urban displacement in Iraq: a preliminary analysis, 30 April 2020, url, p. 161705 IOM, Integrated Location Assessment IV, 5 February 2020, url, p. 181706 IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Iraq Master List Report 116: May-June 2020, 16 July 2020, url, p. 7

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4. The southern governorates (Basrah,
Kerbala, Missan, Muthanna, Najaf, Qadissiya,
Thi-Qar, Wassit)

Map 18: The southern governorates with district borders, district capitals and main roads, © United Nations 1707

This subsection covers the ‘southern’ governorates organised for the report for this purpose toinclude: Basrah, Kerbala, Missan, Muthnana, Najaf, Thi-Qar, Qadissiya, and Wassit.
Information on the general situation of the governorates in the area is provided, with more specificinformation provided under each governorate chapter.

1707 UN JAU, Iraq District Map, January 2014, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

4.1 Basrah

Map 19: Basrah governorate with district borders, district capitals and main roads, © United Nations1708

4.1.1 General description of the governorate
Basic geography
Basrah is Iraq’s southernmost governorate and has internal borders with Muthanna, Thi-Qar andMissan governorates. It is situated along the Shatt al-Arab waterway, which connects to the Persian
Gulf. Basrah has international borders with Iran to the east and Kuwait to the south.1709 The capital of
the governorate is Basrah City.1710 The governorate is divided into seven districts: Abu Al-Khaseeb, AlMidaina, Al-Qurna, Al-Zubair, Basrah, Fao, and Shatt Al-Arab.1711

Population
For 2019, the Iraqi CSO (Central Statistical Office) estimated the governorate’s population at
2 985 073.1712 However, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) estimated the population of Basrah
governorate to be about 4.5 million in a September 2018 report.1713

1708 UN JAU, Iraq District Map, January 2014, url
1709 UN Iraq Joint Analysis Unit, Iraq District Map, January 2014, url
1710 EPIC Reference Guide, last revision May 2020, url
1711 NCCI, Basrah governorate profile, December 2015, url, p. 2
1712 Iraq, CSO, 2019 ‫[ قديرات سكان العراق حسب المحافظة والبيئة والجنس لسنة‬Demographic and population indicators, Estimates forthe population of Iraq by governorate, environment and gender for the year 2019] (table), n.d., url
1713 Norwegian Refugee Council, Basrah fact finding mission report #1, 9 September 2018, url, p. 2

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Ethnicity
Shia Arabs constitute the majority of the governorate’s population, but there is also a significant Sunni
minority, as well as small Chaldean and Assyrian Christian communities and Sabean Mandeans.1714

Road security
In November 2019, demonstrators blocked the entrances to Iraq’s only port town Umm Qasr south of
Basrah.1715 In the same month, protesters blocked roads and bridges in Basrah city, the governorate’s
capital.1716 On 22 November 2019, the ISF reopened the port of Umm Qasr, near Basrah, the entranceof which was previously blocked by protesters.1717 On 22 December 2019, protesters blocked theroads leading to the Rumaila oilfield, according to the Iraq Security and Humanitarian Monitor.1718

EconomyBasrah governorate contains a significant proportion of Iraq’s oil reserves, including the largest oilfieldin Iraq, Rumaila.1719 The port of Basrah and the port of Um Qasr, Iraq’s only deep water port, are both
located in the governorate, making Basrah a centre for trade, transportation and storage.1720 In spiteof being rich in resources, Basrah suffers ‘from chronic unemployment and poverty, as well as poor
public services and decaying infrastructure…’1721 According to a 2018 article by the Guardian, themajority of Iraqis were not benefiting from the oil economy, with the latter being subject to corruption
by local government officials, as well as local tribal and militia leaders.1722

4.1.2 Conflict background and armed actors in the governorate
Conflict background
In an interview with EASO in January 2019, a Senior Researcher on Iraq for HRW stated that there
were few security incidents in the south. Many incidents involved tribes, PMUs, gangs, or a
combination of all of the above.1723 Besides human rights and sectarian abuses, political repression
and manipulation PMUs engaged in ‘mafia-like economic practices’.1724 Some piers at Basrah’s Umm
Qasr port and the Shalamcheh land border crossing to Iran were ‘militia-controlled smuggling routes
for Iraqi crude oil gathered by militias from oilfields such as Qayyarah and Alas,’ Michael Knights
remarked in August 2019.1725 At Shalamcheh border crossing, the Badr organisation and KH reportedly
have a strong presence.1726
Reporting on Basrah’s mounting drug problem, the New York Times stated that the fact that big
traffickers either never get caught or escape from prison soon after capture added to suspicions of1714 NCCI, Basrah governorate profile, December 2015, url, p. 21715 Al-Jazeera, Iraqi protesters block major port near Basrah as unrest continues, 2 November 2019, url
1716 Al-Arabiya, Protesters block roads, bridges in Iraq’s Basrah, announce general strike, 17 November 2019, url
1717 AA (Anadolu Agency), Iraqi security forces reopen Umm Qasr port, 22 November 2019, url
1718 EPIC/ ISHM: December 20, 2019 – January 2, 2020, 2 January 2020, url
1719 EPIC/ ISHM, ISHM reference guide, last revision: May 2020, url
1720 NCCI, Basrah governorate profile, December 2015, url, p. 2
1721 Norwegian Refugee Council, Basrah fact finding mission report #1, 9 September 2018, url, p. 21722 Guardian (The), ‘Iraq is dying’: oil flows freely but corruption fuels growing anger, 27 August 2018, url
1723 Human Rights Watch, EASO interview with Senior Iraq Researcher, 19 January 2019 in: EASO, COI Report: Iraq -Security situation, March 2019, url
1724 Felbab-Brown, V., Pitfalls of the paramilitary paradigm: the Iraqi state, geopolitics and Al-Hashd al-Shaabi, Brookings,
June 2019, url, p. 50
1725 Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, 13 August 2019, Combating terrorism
center (CTC), url, p. 61726 Hasan, H., Boundary disputes, Carnegie Middle East Centre, 26 September 2019, url

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PMU involvement in the drug trade.1727 A Basrah police chief informed Reuters that 80 % of drugs
entering Basrah came from Iran.1728

Armed actors
The ISW reported in December 2017 that the Basrah Operations Command (BasOC) was responsible
for ensuring security in the governorate of Basrah.1729 However, the BasOC has not been able to assert
command over the governorate due to lack of manpower.1730 As of December 2019, the ISF in Basrah
governorate consist of Basrah Operations Command, a Counter Terrorism (CT) regiment, aCommandos brigade, emergency regiments, Rapid Reaction Forces, local police, a brigade of thefederal police and a battalion from the 9th Armored Division.1731In July 2020 the Iraqi Joint Operations
Command announced that BasOC would control the Shalamcheh border crossing with Iran and the
Safwan crossing with Kuwait.1732 According to February 2020 article, Basrah was one of thegovernorates where security would be managed by the Joint Operations Command.1733
According to Michael Knights’ analysis from August 2019, PMUs maintained two operationalcommands in southern Iraq: the PMU Rafidain Operations Command (in Missan and Thi-Qar) and the
PMU Basrah Operations Command, both led by Badr organisation commanders.1734 The PMU
administrative head in Basrah also belongs to the Badr organisation.1735 In September 2019, Chatham
House reported that PMU Brigades 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 21, 22, 26 were present in the governorates Missan,
Thi-Qar and Basrah.1736
A Senior Researcher on Iraq for HRW stated in January 2019, that although PMUs were present in
Basrah they have not been redeployed there in large numbers and were not manning checkpoints in
Basrah City like in Baghdad, Anbar, Salah al-Din or Diyala governorates.1737 In a June 2019 Brookings
report, analyst Vanda Felbab-Brown observed that both pro-Iran PMUs and pro-Sadr groups were‘strong’ in Basrah.1738

1727 New York Times (The), Iraq faces a new adversary: crystal meth, 14 September 2019, url
1728 Reuters, Crystal meth and crowded jails: problems mount in Iraqi oil city, 9 April 2019, url
1729 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, p. 16
1730 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, p. 16
1731 Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: from abandoned villages to the cities, 5 May 2020, url
1732 MEMO (Middle East Monitor), Iraq army to control border crossings with Iran, Kuwait, 16 July 2020, url
1733 MEMO (Middle East Monitoring), Iraq: Army hands security duties over to police in Wassit, 14 February 2020, url
1734 Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, 13 August 2019, Combating terrorism

center (CTC), url, pp. 5-6
1735 Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, 13 August 2019, Combating terrorism
center (CTC), url, p. 71736 Mansour, R. and Salisbury, P., Between Order and Chaos; A New Approach to Stalled State Transformations in Iraq and
Yemen, Chatham House, September 2019, url, p. 81737 Human Rights Watch, EASO interview with Senior Iraq Researcher, 19 January 2019 in: EASO, COI Report: Iraq Security situation, March 2019, url
1738 Felbab-Brown, V., Pitfalls of the paramilitary paradigm: the Iraqi state, geopolitics and Al-Hashd al-Shaabi, Brookings,
June 2019, url, p. 5,

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4.1.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population
Developments 2019-2020
In 2019 and 2020 mass protests erupted in Iraq’s southern governorates.1739 In Basrah most protests
were reported in Basrah city and in the vicinity of the oilfields and the ports.1740 UNAMI stated that
‘abduction and disappearances occurred amid numerous incidents of additional violations and abuses
targeting activists and protestors, including […] excessive and unlawful use of force at demonstrationsites.’1741
Between 1 October and 15 December 2019, 33 protester deaths and 1079 injuries were reported in
Basrah.1742 According to the ICG, Iran-backed PMUs were primarily responsible for the use of violenceagainst demonstrators.1743
In Baghdad, Basrah, Thi-Qar, and Missan, tribal groups have taken the lead in crafting protest tactics,
shutting down roads, and even retaliating against Iranian-backed groups.1744 A couple of days later
they tried to break into the West Qurna-1 oilfield, while others shut down the Maqal port, situated on
the Shatt al-Arab waterway.1745
According to HRW, protesters reported on 20 January 2020 that masked armed men arrested fiveprotesters near Bahrya Square and that on 21 January the police attacked the protesters with wooden
sticks and arrested at least 10 protesters. The same source noted that on 25 January 2020 a convoyof military and security forces’ vehicles arrived in Bahrya Square and, according to the protesters,‘men with weapons’ assaulted and in some cases detained protesters and raided the protesters’
camp.1746
Security incidents in Iraq’s southern governorates result mainly from (intra-)tribal disputes and/or
criminal activity.1747 An Iraqi security source, quoted by Al-Sumariyah News, stated that between
January and September 2019, 113 individuals were killed and 440 were wounded in tribal conflicts in
Basrah.1748
In a January 2019 interview Benedict Robin D’Cruz, a PhD student at the University of Edinburgh who
specialises in Iraq and Shia politics, observed that ‘tribal fighting, militia-related violence and general

1739 UNAMI (UN Assistance Mission for Iraq), Demonstrations in Iraq; 1-9 October 2019, October 2019, url;UNAMI (UNAssistance Mission for Iraq), Demonstraitons in Iraq: update; 25 October - 4 November 2019, November 2019, url,;UNAMI(UN Assistance Mission for Iraq), Demonstrations in Iraq: 2nd update; 5 November - 9 December 2019, 11 December 2019,
url;UNAMI (UN Assistance Mission for Iraq), Human Rights Special Report - Demonstrations in Iraq: 3rd update, 23 May
2020: Abductions, torture and enforced disappearances in the context of ongoing demonstrations in Iraq , 23 May 2020,
url
1740 Reuters, Protesters block Iraq port as strikes take hold, 18 November 2019, url
BBC News, Iraq protests: security forces open fire on protesters, 24 November 2019, url
Oil Price, Iraq’s largest oil fields threatened by anti-government protests, 18 November 2019, url
Al Jazeera, Iraq: Basrah protesters call for resignation of local governor, 11 May 2020, url
1741 UNAMI (UN Assistance Mission for Iraq), Human Rights Special Report - Demonstrations in Iraq: 3rd update, 23 May
2020: Abductions, torture and enforced disappearances in the context of ongoing demonstrations in Iraq , 23 May 2020,
url, p. 2
1742 Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor, Iraqi Protests: An Audacity to Kill and Absent Justice - A report
documenting violations against peaceful protesters in Iraq, December 2019, url, pp. 19-210
1743 ICG, Rescuing Iraq from the Iran-U.S. Crossfire, 1 January2020, url
1744 Smyth, P., Iran is losing Iraq’s tribes, 4 December 2019, url
1745 EPIC/ ISHM: December 20, 2019 – January 2, 2020, 2 January 2020, url
1746 HRW (Human Rights Watch), Iraq: Authorities Violently Remove Protesters, 31 January 2020, url; DW (Deutsche Welle),
Iraqi police kill demonstrators in crackdown on protest camps, 25 January 2020, url
1747 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Algemeen Ambtsbericht Irak, 20 December 2019, url, p. 21
1748 Basnews, Basrah: Over 550 People Killed, Injured in Tribal Fights This Year, 23 September 2019, url

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criminality were reaching alarming levels, particularly in Basrah.’1749 He explained that the worst
violence was normally due to tribal feuding, which could turn to armed street battles with civilian
injuries and fatalities. Such tribal violence often had ‘an economic component, for example,
competition over oil smuggling’.1750 According to the same source, militias ‘tend to be more disciplined
and targeted in their use of violence’.
While some of this violence has a clear economic motive, militias are also involved in politicalviolence.1751 According to DFAT, writing in October 2018, ‘violence between different Shi’a armed
groups occurs in southern Iraq and is mostly related to control of land and oil revenues. Local sourcessuggest that intra-Shia violence predominantly affects those who are actively involved in a militia or
tribal group.’1752 On September 2019, the Ministry of Interior announced ongoing security
enforcement operations in Basrah and the arrest of ‘tribal conflict rioters’.1753
On 16 March 2020, a one-week curfew was announced in Basrah as a precaution against COVID-19
infections.1754 On 22 April 2020, the curfew was tightened in Basrah as confirmed cases of the diseaserose alarmingly in the districts of Shatt al-Arab and al-Midaina.1755 On 13 June 2020, ‘a complete
lockdown’ was announced in Basrah, after the governorate witnessed a significant increase in thenumber of COVID-19 cases.1756

Illustrative security incidents•

On 9 March 2019, at least three people were killed and seven more wounded in a firefightthat broke out between the tribes of Albu Hamdan and al-Batut in the area of ‘Karma Ali,’
north of Basrah.1757 In April 2019, serious fighting between both tribes continued. Fighting
resulted in multiple casualties and fatalities as the two sides clashed using medium and heavy
weapons, mortars and other explosives.1758•

In late August 2019, tribal clashes were reported in the northern districts of Basrah
governorate. The use of small and medium weapons resulted in multiple casualties, prompting
an intervention by the Emergency Response Division.1759•

On 6 October 2019, unknown gunmen assassinated the head of the municipal council and alocal mukhtar in the Bahar area, south of Basrah.1760•

On 14 January 2020, unidentified gunmen riding on motorcycles shot and killed two civilians
in central Basrah.1761

1749 EPIC (The Education for Peace in Iraq Center), Violence in southern Iraq & Shia politics: interview with Benedict Robin

D’Cruz – Part 1, 25 January 2019, url
1750 EPIC (The Education for Peace in Iraq Center), Violence in southern Iraq & Shia politics: interview with Benedict Robin
D’Cruz – Part 1, 25 January 2019, url
1751 EPIC (The Education for Peace in Iraq Center), Violence in southern Iraq & Shia politics: interview with Benedict Robin
D’Cruz – Part 1, 25 January 2019, url
1752 Australia, DFAT (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade), Country Information Report – Iraq, 9 October 2018, url, p.
291753 Iraq News, Interior Ministry : Continuing Security operations in Basrah, 1 September 2019, url
1754 Shafaq News, Basrah announces curfew and announces exceptions, 16 March 2020, url
1755 Kurdistan 24, Basrah tightens curfew as virus cases rise, other Iraqi governorates ease restrictions, 22 April 2020, url
1756 Basnews, Iraq’s Basrah Announces Complete Lockdown as Coronavirus Infections Soar, 13 June 2020, url
1757 Kurdistan 24, WATCH: Clashes between Basrah tribes kill, injure ten people, 12 March 2019, url
1758 Iraq After Occupation, South Iraq security report: April 2019, 1 May 2019, url
1759 EPIC/ ISHM: August 22 – August 29, 29 August 2020, url1760 EPIC/ ISHM: October 3 – October 10, 2019, 10 October 2019, url
1761 EPIC/ ISHM: January 9 – January 16, 2020, 16 January 2020, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation•

On 25 January 2020 protestors were hit with weapons and in some cases were arbitrarily
detained by masked men, some of whom had hunting rifles. 130 tens were also destroyed.1762•

On 6 February 2020, unidentified gunmen assassinated Sheikh Hazim al-Halfi, a senior Sadrist,
in Basrah city.1763•

On 7 March 2020, unidentified gunmen using silenced weapons assassinated a tribal leader
from the Tamimi tribe in the Abu Al-Khaseeb district in Basrah governorate.1764•

On 9 March 2020, the residence of former governor of Basrah, Muhammad Musbih Al-Waeli,
was attacked in central Basrah with an IED, injuring two of his family members.1765•

On 17 July 2020 activist Khaled al-Samer was shot in central Basrah. On the same day, an
explosive device exploded on a bicycle in Abu al-Khaseeb District, south of Basrah killing a
two-year-old child and injuring her father.1766

Number of civilian casualties
The number of armed conflict related incidents and civilian casualties in the governorate recorded by
UNAMI for the period 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, is shown in the table below.
Governorate 2019 (Jan – Dec)

Basrah# ofincidents

Killed Injured

1762019 total
casualties(killed andinjured)3

92020 (Jan – Jul)# ofincidents

Killed Injured

2

32020 total
casualties(killed andinjured)03

Table 15: Number of armed conflict related incidents and civilian casualties 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, Basrah
governorate. Data from UNAMI1767

Number of security incidents
In the reference period, ACLED reported 12 battles, 33 incidents of remote violence/explosions, 37
cases of violence against civilians, 74 incidents of riots, accounting for a total of 156 security incidentsof these types in Basrah governorate, the majority taking place in the capital Basrah city. 329 protests
were also reported in Basrah governorate during the reference period.1768 The evolution of all thetypes of security events through the reference period is shown in the figure below.

1762 HRW, Iraq: Authorities Violently Remove Protesters, 31 January 2020, url
1763 EPIC/ ISHM: January 30 – February 6, 2020, 6 February 2020, url
1764 EPIC/ ISHM: March 5 – March 12, 2020, 12 March 2020, url
1765 EPIC/ ISHM: March 5 – March 12, 2020, 12 March 2020, url
1766 EPIC/ ISHM: July 16-July 23, 2020, 23 July 2020, url
1767 UNAMI, Email to EASO 24 July 2020
1768 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url

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Figure 18: Evolution of security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence, violence against civilians, riots andprotests in Basrah governorate 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, based on ACLED data1769

State ability to secure law and order
A Brookings 2019 report noted that there was increasing resentment towards the practices of the of
the Hashd groups, such as extortion, coercion and market monopolisation. Particularly in Basrah
where such practices were ‘pervasive and the public goods collapsed’.1770
Following a clash on March 2019 between tribes in Basrah which resulted in at least 3 fatalities and 7
injuries, a news agency reported that ‘it is not easy for Iraq's security forces to intervene in clan
disputes. On multiple occasions, Iraqi authorities have failed to disarm tribes who regularly resort tosuch measures to resolve disagreements when their form of diplomacy fails.’1771
On 11 May 2020, security forces raided the office of the Iran-aligned Thaar Allah party in Basrah. A
number of militiamen who had fired on demonstrators, killing one and injuring several others, werereportedly arrested.1772

Infrastructure damage and explosive remnants of war
Mine Action Review, a research team funded by the Norwegian government, reported in 2019 that
Basrah was among those southern governorates most affected by remnants of cluster munitions
dating back to the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 invasion. The size of the area that was classified as‘confirmed hazardous’ was set at 27 851 470 m2.1773

1769 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url
1770 Felbab-Brown, V., Pitfalls of the paramilitary paradigm: the Iraqi state, geopolitics and Al-Hashd al-Shaabi, Brookings,

url, p. 2
1771 Kurdistan 24, WATCH: Clashes between Basrah tribes kill, injure ten people, 12 March 2019, url
1772 RFE/RL (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty), Iraq Targets Iran-Aligned Militia Over Shooting Death Of Protester, 11 May
2020, url
1773 Mine Action Review, Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2019: Iraq, 2019. n.d., url , p. 53

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Displacement and return
According to IOM, as of 15 June 2020, 6 528 IDPs were registered in Basrah. No IDPs originating from
Basrah were registered elsewhere in the country.1774 IOM noted that the three main districts ofdisplacement were Basrah (2 910 IDPs), Al-Zubair (1 368) and Abu Al-Khaseeb (1 224). The
governorates of origin for the IDPs in Basrah were Salah al-Din (33 %), Ninewa (30 %), Anbar (19 %),Kirkuk (10 %) and others - including Diyala, Babylon and Baghdad - (8 %).1775
IDMC reported around 34 000 people were estimated to be displaced in January 2019 from the four
governorates of Basrah, Missan, Muthanna and Thi-Qar because of water shortages.1776
Basrah was not listed among the governorates with a presence of returnees.1777

1774 IOM Iraq, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Displacement Master List, Displacement Dashboard, Displacement overview,

15 June 2020, url, p. 1 of 51775 IOM, Iraq Master List Report 116, May - June 2020 – Iraq, July 2020, url , p. 3
1776 IDMC (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre), Global Report on Internal Displacement 2020 - Middle East andNorth Africa, April 2020, url, p. 33
1777 IOM, Iraq Master List Report 116, May - June 2020 – Iraq, July 2020, url, pp. 5, 7

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4.2. Kerbala

Map 20: Kerbala governorate, Iraq with district borders, district capitals and main roads, © United Nations 1778

4.2.1 General description of the governorate
Basic geography
Kerbala governorate is located in the central part of Iraq and has borders with Anbar, Najaf, Babilgovernorates. Kerbala governorate is divided into the following districts: Ain Al-Tamur, Al-Hindiya,
Kerbala. The provincial capital is Kerbala.1779 The governorate is very arid and has been going throughconsiderable water shortages and droughts, leading to displacements.1780

Population
Population estimate for Kerbala in 2019 was 1 250 806.1781 However, accurate population figuresacross Iraq are currently unavailable. The figure provided is based on projections by the Central
Statistical Organization of Iraq and it is unclear if these estimates take into account demographic
changes related to ongoing displacement and returns of Iraqis. According to UNFPA, the lastcomprehensive Population and Housing Census for Iraq was conducted in 1987.1782

1778 UN JAU, Iraq District Map, January 2014, url
1779 NCC Iraq (NGO Coordination Committee for Iraq), Kerbala Governorate Profile, updated December 2015, url, p. 1
1780 IOM, Assessing water shortage-induced displacement in Qadissiya, Najaf, Babylon, Wassit and Kerbala, 10 April 2019,url, pp. 1, 12-13
1781 Iraq, CSO, Population indicators and population estimates, n.d., url
1782 UNFPA, Newsletter 2020 Census, Issue 1, December 2019, url, p. 1

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Ethnicity
The southern governorates in general, including Kerbala, have a predominantly Shia Arab Muslim
population, although a small community of Sunni Arabs also reside in the governorate.1783 Kerbala city
is considered one of the holy Shiite cities in Iraq, housing the Imam Hussain shrine.1784

Road security
Most of the checkpoints along the main road from Kerbala to the border with Saudi Arabia arecontrolled by the Shi’a militia Al-Abbas Combat Division.1785 In July 2020, protesters against thedeteriorated electricity supply blocked several roads1786 and barred a power plant in the Al-Jammaliya
area.1787 Also, checkpoints were targeted in bomb attacks or car bombs on roads, such as on 20
September 2019.1788

EconomyKerbala governorate’s economy is mainly based on agriculture (fruit, vegetables) and religious tourism
as millions of Shiite pilgrims visit the shrine of Imam Hussain every year. According to a 2015 country
profile, religious tourism was negatively affected by insecurity and attacks on pilgrims in the past.1789
The coronavirus has brought the religious tourism industry to a halt in Kerbala, where the holy shrinesof Imam Hussein and Imam Abbas were disinfected and closed.1790

4.2.2 Conflict background and armed actors in the governorate
Conflict background
Insecurity in Kerbala was in the past years mainly connected to religious uprisings, demonstrations
and protests of the Shiite population against the Iraqi government. Kerbala was one of the centres ofthe so-called Shia uprisings, which swept through southern Iraq in 1991.1791 More recently, between
July and September 2018, a wave of anti-government protests erupted in southern Iraq, including in
Kerbala governorate, which claimed fatalities and casualties.1792 While ISIL never held territory in
Kerbala between 2014 and 2017, it staged attacks on Shiite targets in the governorate causing civilian
casualties.1793

1783 NCC Iraq (NGO Coordination Committee for Iraq), Kerbala Governorate Profile, updated December 2015, url, p. 2
1784 NCC Iraq (NGO Coordination Committee for Iraq), Kerbala Governorate Profile, updated December 2015, url
1785 Al-Monitor, Abbas Combat Division, an example of Iran-independent faction, 24 August 2019, url
1786 NINA, Demonstrators in Kerbala cut a number of streets to protest against the deterioration of electricity, 27 July 2020,

url
1787 AA, Iraqis protest power outage in Kerbala, 19 July 2020, url
1788 Al Jazeera, Multiple casualties after bomb goes off on bus outside Kerbala, 20 September 2019, url
1789 NCC Iraq (NGO Coordination Committee for Iraq), Kerbala Governorate Profile, updated December 2015, url, p. 2
1790 France24, Virus strikes another blow at religious tourism in Iraq, 27 February 2020, url
1791 Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), Remembering the Iraqi Uprising Twenty-Five Years Ago, 5 March 2016, url; EPIC/

ISHM, ISHM reference guide, last revision: May 2020, url
1792 International Peace Institute (IPI), Protests in Southern Iraq Intensify, Is Instability to Follow?, 24 July 2018, url; The
National, Over 800 killed, wounded since south Iraq protests began, 23 July 2018, url; Reuters, Protesters storm provincial
government building in Iraqi city of Kerbala: local sources, 14 July 2018, url
1793 EPIC/ ISHM, ISHM reference guide, last revision: May 2020, url; see examples: Independent (The), Kerbala suicidebombing: 30 killed in Iraq terror attack, 9 June 2017, url; Deutsche Welle (DW), Eight killed in rare suicide attacks in Iraq's
Kerbala region, 14 November 2016, url; Xinhua, 15 killed in suicide attack on wedding in Iraq's Kerbala, 29 August 2016, url;
Al Jazeera, Deadly car bombings hit Iraq's Kerbala, 20 October 2014, url

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Armed actors
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
The ISW reported in 2017 that the Iraqi military’s Mid-Euphrates Operations Command (MEOC) was
responsible for the holy cities of Najaf and Kerbala, as well as the southern Anbar district of Nukhaib.
MEOC is chiefly responsible for ensuring the security of Shia pilgrims and securing Iraq’s southerngovernorates.1794 ISF in Kerbala also include the battalion of the 9th Armored Division, commandosbrigade, emergency regiments, local and federal police.1795
Popular Mobilisation Units (PMUs)
The ISW reported in 2017 that large numbers of Iraqi Shia militias supplemented security in the MEOC,
with many having kept headquarters in Kerbala, lending them legitimacy and popular support by
securing pilgrimage routes.1796 The PMUs’ operations command in Kerbala was reportedly formed by
the Shia militias Liwa Ali al-Akbar (Brigade 11) and the Al-Abbas Combat Division (Brigade 26).1797 The
Al-Abbas Combat Division is ‘funded and politically backed by the custodian of the shrine of Imam AlAbbas’ in Kerbala, and controls most of the checkpoints along the main road from Kerbala to theborder with Saudi Arabia.1798 In September 2019, Chatham House reported that PMU Brigades 13, 14,
19, 26, 27, 31, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 74, 513, Haditha, al-Furat, Ameriyat al-Samoud and Karma were
present in the south-west of Iraq, including in Kerbala.1799
There are training camps for several militias in Kerbala governorate.1800

4.2.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population
Developments 2019-2020
On 1 October 2019, the security forces discovered a bag with 750 kg of explosives, allegedly planned
to be used for an ISIL attack on pilgrims, on their way to Kerbala for the annual religious Shi’a Arbaeen
ceremony. This ceremony attracts about three million people each year and begins on 19 October.
ISIL has earlier performed attacks on the Shi’a pilgrims.1801
On 1 October 2019 and the following days, large-scale anti-government protests took place in
Baghdad, Kerbala and other governorates in southern Iraq. The spiralling violence and deployment ofa variety of heavily armed ISF led to hundreds of arrests, 157 deaths and 5 494 injuries during the firstweek of October 2019, according to UNAMI.1802
A second wave of protests followed on 25 October 2019 until 4 November 2019 mainly in Baghdad
and southern/central governorates Babil, Basrah, Thi-Qar, Kerbala, Missan, Muthanna, Najaf,
Qadisiyah and Wassit. UNAMI noted with concern, ‘numerous human rights violations and abuses
were committed, including the use of lethal force against demonstrators, the unnecessary,
disproportionate and/or improper use of tear gas and stun grenades, continued efforts to limit media
coverage of demonstrations, abductions and multiple arrests.’ By 4 November 2019, 97 deaths and1794 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, p. 19;March 2019, url1795 Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: from abandoned villages to the cities, 5 May 2020, url
1796 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, p. 19
1797 Knights, M., et al., Honored, not contained, the future of Iraq’s popular mobilization forces, March 2020, url, p. 41;

Smyth P., The Shia Militia Mapping Project (Interactive Map), May 2019, url1798 Al-Monitor, Abbas Combat Division, an example of Iran-independent faction, 24 August 2019, url1799 Mansour, R. and Salisbury, P., Between Order and Chaos; A New Approach to Stalled State Transformations in Iraq and
Yemen, Chatham House, September 2019, url, p. 8, accessed 7 July 2020
1800 Knights, M. et al., Honored, not contained, the future of Iraq’s popular mobilization forces, March 2020, url, p. 68;
1801 Kurdistan24, Iraqi forces foil suspected ISIS attack on Shia pilgrims south of Baghdad, 1 October 2019, url
1802 UNAMI, Demonstrations in Iraq, 1-9 October 2019, 22 October 2019, url, pp. 3-4

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thousands of injured people, including members of the ISF, had to be added to the earlier number ofcasualties.1803
Specifically in Kerbala, UNAMI reported on ‘police forces wearing black uniforms, using live
ammunition against demonstrators’, in the night of 28-29 October 2019, ‘which credible reports
indicate may have killed 18 people and injured 143’. UNAMI concluded that there ‘are allegations that
security forces reportedly used unlawful lethal force against demonstrators in Kerbala governorate
and Baghdad’.1804 AI also reported that the army resorted to ‘excessive and unlawful lethal force’against protesters to disperse them.1805
Also in November and December 2019, demonstrations, ‘driven by protestors’ frustration at limited
economic, social and political prospects’, occurred in Kerbala and other governorates. Most of thesedemonstrations were peaceful.1806 In Kerbala, Shi’ites protested against Iran’s interference with Iraq
policies.1807 On 4 December 2019, the Iranian embassy in Kerbala city was set on fire.1808

Illustrative security incidents•

On 4 February 2019, the Iraqi novelist and intellectual Alaa Mashthoub was killed by unknown
gunmen outside his home in Kerbala city. Motive for the killing is unknown.1809•

On 28 July 2019, a car bomb killed one and injured three persons in Kerbala. Actors were notmentioned.1810•

On 20 September 2019, an ISIL bomb on a bus in Kerbala killed 12 persons. This was, according
to Al Jazeera, ‘one of the worst attacks targeting civilians since the declaration of the group's
defeat in Iraq in 2017’.1811•

On 9 December 2019, a ‘prominent activist’ who participated in several demonstrations, waskilled by unknown gunmen.1812 Also in 2020, killings of civilians were reported by gunmen,
often on motorcycles. Motive and identity of the killers was not known.1813•

On 13 March 2020, the US launched a series of air strikes on weapon depots of an Iran-backed
Shi’ite militia group, Kataib Hezbollah, that earlier had reportedly attacked a US camp, killingand injuring British and American soldiers. One of the US missiles hit an airport underconstruction outside Kerbala city, killing one civilian and five military staff.1814

1803 UNAMI (UN Assistance Mission for Iraq), Demonstrations in Iraq: update; 25 October - 4 November 2019, November

2019, url, p. 2; AA, Iraq imposes curfew in Kerbala amid anti-gov't protests, 28 October 2019, url
1804 UNAMI (UN Assistance Mission for Iraq), Demonstrations in Iraq: update; 25 October - 4 November 2019, November
2019, url, pp. 3, 7; see also AI, Iraq: Horrific scenes as security forces resort to lethal force to disperse Kerbala protests, 29
October 2019, url
1805 AI, Iraq: Horrific scenes as security forces resort to lethal force to disperse Kerbala protests, 29 October 2019, url
1806 UNAMI (UN Assistance Mission for Iraq), Demonstrations in Iraq: 2nd update; 5 November - 9 December 2019, 11
December 2019, url, pp. 2-3. See also VOA News, Clashes in Southern Iraqi City of Kerbala Kill 2 Protesters, 6 November
2019, url; NBC News, 18 killed in attack on protesters in Iraq's Kerbala, 28 October 2019, url1807 France24, In Shiite holy city of Kerbala, Iraqis protest against Iranian ‘meddling’, 14 November 2019, url
1808 Al Jazeera, Three killed as Iraq protesters attack Iran consulate in Kerbala, 4 November 2019, url; Al-Monitor, Iranianconsulates torched in Najaf and Kerbala, 4 December 2019, url
1809 Iraqi News, U.S. embassy mourns Iraqi novelist gunned down in Kerbala, 4 February 2019, url
1810 Iraqi News, Car bomb blast kills Iraqi citizen, wounds 3 others in Kerbala, 298 July 2019, url; XinhuaNet, Civilian killed inbomb explosion near Iraq's Kerbala, 28 July 2019, url
1811 AL Jazeera, ISIL claims bus bombing in Iraq's Kerbala that killed 12, 21 September 2019, url
1812 Japan Times (The), Prominent activist gunned down in Iraq shrine city Kerbala, 9 December 2019, url1813 NINA, Gunmen Assassinate A Citizen In Kerbala With A Silencer, 9 July 2020, url; NINA, A civilian was killed in an armed
attack in Kerbala, 31 May 2020, url;1814 AP, US general says retaliatory airstrikes in Iraq destroyed 5 weapons depots — but many similar sites remain, 13
March 2020, url

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In July 2020, an old clan conflict flared up in Al-Hindiya District, resulting in two deaths, two
injured and several arrests.1815 Another armed conflict between two clans in the district of Ain
al-Tamr resulted in 14 injured persons.1816

Number of civilian casualties
The number of armed conflict related incidents and civilian casualties in the governorate recorded by
UNAMI for the period 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, is shown in the table below.
Governorate

Kerbala2019 (Jan – Dec)

2019 total
casualties

2020 (Jan – Jul)

# of
Killed Injured(killed andincidents
injured)# ofKilled Injured(killed andincidents
injured)

8

17

8

13

4

1

2020 total
casualties

01

Table 16: Number of armed conflict related incidents and civilian casualties 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, Kerbala
governorate. Data from UNAMI1817

Number of security incidents
In the reference period, ACLED reported 4 battles, 8 incidents of remote violence/explosions, 11 casesof violence against civilians, 34 incidents of riots, accounting for a total of 57 security incidents of thesetypes in Kerbala governorate, the majority taking place in the capital Kerbala City. 58 protests werealso reported in Kerbala governorate during the reference period.1818 The evolution of all the types of
security events through the reference period is shown in the figure below.

1815 NINA, Kerbala police take control of a tribal conflict that killed two people and wounded others, 14 July 2020, url
1816 NINA, Armed conflict between two clans in Kerbala causing 14 injuries, 24 July 2020, url
1817 UNAMI, Email to EASO 24 July 2020
1818 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Figure 19: Evolution of security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence, violence against civilians, riots andprotests in Kerbala governorate 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, based on ACLED data1819

State ability to secure law and order
The security void resulting from the deployment of security forces in 2014 to fight ISIL insurgency incentral and northern Iraq left the southern region open to tribal clashes, criminal activity and politicalviolence.1820 Knights et al. indicated in March 2020 that they consider Kerbala – and other southerngovernorates – as ‘areas of shared responsibility between the Iraqi army or police services and theHashd [Brigades]’.1821 In February 2020, the army forces stated that security in Kerbala governorate,‘which is considered as a sensitive spot’, would be managed by the Joint Operations Command (thearmy). In other areas, security would be handed over to the police.1822 As mentioned before, many
checkpoints along the main road from Kerbala to the border with Saudi Arabia are controlled by the
Al-Abbas Combat Division.1823
On 6 February 2020, protesters in Kerbala city were attacked with a variety of weapons by ‘armed
men affiliated to Muqtada al-Sadr’, injuring several protesters and one police officer. According to the
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘the Iraqi army was reportedly present but did not intervene
and Riot Police were called.’1824 In earlier occasions, such as the above mentioned protests in October
2019, the Iraqi army resorted to ‘excessive and unlawful lethal force’ against protesters to disperse
them.1825

1819 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url
1820 Reuters, Tribal clashes, political void threaten oil installations in Iraq’s south, 11 September 2017, url
1821 Knights, M. et al., Honored, not contained – the future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, March 2020, url, pp. 128-

129
1822 MEMO (Middle East Monitor), Iraq: Army hands security duties over to police in Wassit, 14 February 2020, url
1823 Al-Monitor, Abbas Combat Division, an example of Iran-independent faction, 24 August 2019, url
1824 UN HRC, Press briefing note on Iraq, 7 February 2020, url
1825 AI, Iraq: Horrific scenes as security forces resort to lethal force to disperse Kerbala protests, 29 October 2019, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Infrastructure damage and explosive remnants of war
There are no recent reports on infrastructure damage due to the violence and conflicts in Kerbala
governorate, apart from the US strike on an airport under construction outside Kerbala city (seeabove).1826

Displacement and return
Kerbala displacement figures as of 30 June 2020 amount to 15 558 individuals. Of these IDPs, 86 %originated from Ninewa, 8 % from Babylon, and 6 % from other governorates, such as Anbar, Kirkuk,
Diyala, Salah al-Din and Baghdad.1827
Subdivided per district, the IOM gave the following numbers of IDPs from the mentioned
governorates:•

Kerbala district 13 494•

Al-Hindiya 1 866•

Ain Al-Tamur 1981828

No returns were recorded. During the COVID-19 period (March-May 2020), movements between
governorates were restricted by the authorities.1829

1826 AP, US general says retaliatory airstrikes in Iraq destroyed 5 weapons depots — but many similar sites remain, 13

March 2020, url1827 IOM, Iraq Master List Report 116, May - June 2020 – Iraq, July 2020, url, p. 3
1828 IOM, Iraq Master List Report 116, May - June 2020 – Iraq, July 2020, url, p. 3
1829 IOM, Iraq Master List Report 116, May - June 2020 – Iraq, July 2020, url, p. 4

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4.3 Missan

Map 21: Missan governorate, Iraq with district borders, district capitals and main roads, © United Nations1830

4.3.1 General description of the governorate
Basic geography
Missan governorate is located in south-east Iraq and borders with Wassit, Basrah and Thi-Qar
governorates and with Iran to the east.1831
The governorate is divided in into six districts: Ali Al-Gharbi, Al-Mejar Al-Kabir, Al-Maimouna, Al-Kahla,
Amarah and Qal’at Saleh. The capital is Amarah.1832

Population
For 2019, the Iraqi CSO (Central Statistical Organization) estimated the governorate’s population at
1 141 966.1833

1830 UN JAU, Iraq District Map, January 2014, url
1831 UN Iraq Joint Analysis Unit, Iraq District Map, January 2014, url
1832 NCCI, Governorate profile Missan, December 2015, url1833 Iraq, CSO, 2019 ‫[ قديرات سكان العراق حسب المحافظة والبيئة والجنس لسنة‬Demographic and population indicators, Estimates forthe population of Iraq by governorate, environment and gender for the year 2019] (table), n.d., url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Ethnicity
The majority of Missan’s inhabitants are Shia Muslims. The governorate also hosts a Sunni minority
and small communities of Christians and Mandeans, who live in the city of Amarah. A small group of
Failli Kurds also lives in Missan.1834

Road security
According to Phillip Smyth’s analysis from December 2019, in Missan, as in Baghdad, Basrah and ThiQar, tribal groups have ‘taken the lead in crafting protest tactics, shutting down roads, and evenretaliating against Iranian-backed groups’.1835

EconomyThe marshlands which once covered two thirds of the governorate, shrunk drastically following thewetlands draining campaign of the 1990s. Much of the drained landscape has turned into desert. 1836
The agricultural sector has suffered greatly from the destruction of the marshlands1837, making Missan
one of the poorest governorates in the country.1838 IDMC reported that around 34 000 people were
estimated to be displaced in January 2019 from the four governorates of Basrah, Missan, Muthanna
and Thi-Qar because of water shortages.1839 Halfaya is Missan’s largest oilfield.1840

4.3.2 Conflict background and armed actors in the governorate
Conflict backgroundThe 2014 takeover of large parts of Iraq by ISIL left Missan untouched.1841 Rafidain Operations
Command (ROC) oversaw military security in Missan as of ISW’s Order of Battle for Iraq published in2017.1842 As the majority of ISF based in the ROC area were deployed to protect Baghdad or to combat
ISIL, security forces in the area were stretched thin. In 2016 intra-Shia violence escalated in Iraq’s
southern governorates, prompting a military intervention and tribal reconciliation efforts.1843

Armed actors
As of December 2019, the ISF units mentioned in Missan consisted of Al-Rafidain Operations
Command, Commandos brigade, emergency regiments, local police and a brigade of the federal
police.1844
As many destitute youths joined the Popular Mobilization Forces in 2014, Missan’s capital Amarah,
became a recruiting ground for Shia militias.1845 The PMF Commission maintains administrative offices
in each Iraqi governorate outside Kurdistan, including Missan, providing ‘a necessary link to woundedfighters and families, as well as a recruitment hub and contact point for off-duty members’.1846 In a

1834 NCCI, Governorate profile Missan, December 2015, url
1835 Smyth, P., Iran is losing Iraq’s tribes, 4 December 2019, url
1836 NCCI, Governorate profile Missan, December 2015, url
1837 NCCI, Governorate profile Missan, December 2015, url
1838 EPIC, ISHM reference guide, last revision: May 2020, url1839 IDMC, Global Report on Internal Displacement 2020 - Middle East and North Africa, April 2020, url, p. 33
1840 Reuters, Iraq lifts oil production at Halfaya oilfield to 370,000 BPD, 12 December 2018, url1841 NCCI, Governorate profile Missan, December 2015, url
1842 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, p. 23
1843 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, p. 23
1844 See Iraq Conflict Map Areas of Control [map] in Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: from abandoned villages to the cities, 5 May

2020, url
1845 ICG, Fight or Flight: The Desperate Plight of Iraq's "Generation 2000", 8 August 2016, url, p. 16
1846 Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, 13 August 2019, CTC, url, p. 5

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

September 2019 report Chatham House noted that PMU Brigades 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 21, 22, 26 were present
in the governorates of Missan, Thi-Qar and Basrah.1847
Security incidents in Iraq’s southern governorates result mainly from (intra-)tribal disputes and/or
criminal activity.1848 Whilst southern Iraq is ‘more secure’ than other parts of the country, problemsof criminality, drug abuse, and violence between Shia armed groups involved in militia and tribalgroups occur.1849 DFAT further observes in October 2018 that ‘violence between different Shi’a armed
groups occurs in southern Iraq and is mostly related to control of land and oil revenues. Local sourcessuggest that intra-Shia violence predominantly affects those who are actively involved in a militia or
tribal group.’1850 Another cause of tribal conflict in Iraq’s southern governorates is the water scarcity
affecting the region.1851 Writing for the online platform, Iraq in Context, in December 2019, a platform
for analysis of Iraq's economy, security situation and society, Iraq analyst Robert Tollast reported that
Missan’s tribes span ‘a patchwork of political allegiances and in many cases could split apart in theevent of conflict’.1852

4.3.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population
Developments 2019-2020
In 2019 and 2020, mass protests erupted in Iraq’s southern governorates.1853 In Missan most protests
took place in its capital Amarah.1854 Excessive force by the ISF in repressing these protests caused
numerous deaths and injuries.1855 In the 1 October to 15 December 2019 period, 25 protester deaths
and 243 injuries were reported in Missan.1856 According to ICG, Iran-backed PMF's are primarily
responsible for the disproportionate use of violence against demonstrators.1857 Tribal leaders insouthern Iraq have turned on security forces and hold pro-Iranian militia leaders responsible for theviolent repression of the protests.1858 On 25 October 2019, protesters were reportedly shot and killed
in Amarah while trying to storm AAH offices in the city.1859 UNAMI reported that 12 persons were shotand killed during the incident, while at least 110 persons were injured. Later, demonstrators beat todeath an armed element commander and his brother.1860

1847 Mansour, R. and Salisbury, P., Between Order and Chaos; A New Approach to Stalled State Transformations in Iraq and

Yemen, Chatham House, September 2019, url, p. 8
1848 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Algemeen Ambtsbericht Irak, 20 December 2019, url, p. 21
1849 Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report – Iraq, 9 October 2018, url, p. 29
1850 Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report – Iraq, 9 October 2018, url, p. 29
1851 Al-Monitor, Tribal disputes flare in southern Iraq over water scarcity,15 February 2018, url1852 Tollast, R., A witch’s brew of instability: Iraq’s tribe-militia nexus, Iraq in context, 17 December 2019, url1853 UNAMI, Demonstrations in Iraq; 1-9 October 2019, October 2019, url; UNAMI, Demonstrations in Iraq: update; 25
October - 4 November 2019, November 2019, url; UNAMI, Demonstrations in Iraq: 2nd update; 5 November - 9 December
2019, 11 December 2019, url; UNAMI, Human Rights Special Report - Demonstrations in Iraq: 3rd update, 23 May 2020:
Abductions, torture and enforced disappearances in the context of ongoing demonstrations in Iraq , 23 May 2020, url
1854 Middle East Eye, Scores of demonstrators dead as protests resume in Iraq, 25 October 2019, url; BBC News, Iraq
protests: death toll nears 100 as unrest enters fifth day, 5 October 2019, url
1855 UNAMI, Human Rights Special Report - Demonstrations in Iraq: 3rd update, 23 May 2020: Abductions, torture andenforced disappearances in the context of ongoing demonstrations in Iraq , 23 May 2020, url, p. 2; HRW, Iraq: Lethal Force
Used Against Protesters, 10 October 2019, url
1856 Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor, Iraqi Protests: An Audacity to Kill and Absent Justice - A report
documenting violations against peaceful protesters in Iraq, December 2019, url, pp. 19-21
1857 ICG, Rescuing Iraq from the Iran-U.S. Crossfire, 1 January 2020, url1858 Guardian (The), Iraq risks breakup as tribes take on Iran’s militias in ‘blood feud’, 30 November 2019, url
Tollast, R., A witch’s brew of instability: Iraq’s tribe-militia nexus, Iraq in context, 17 December 2019, url1859 Middle East Eye, Scores of demonstrators dead as protests resume in Iraq, 25 October 2019, url
1860 UNAMI, Demonstrations in Iraq: update; 25 October - 4 November 2019, November 2019, url, p. 3

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Illustrative security incidents•

On 1 May 2019, security forces dismantled an IED planted at the Halfaya oilfield, located eastof Amarah.1861•

On 29 July 2019, two members of ISIL were arrested in Missan.1862•

On 10 December 2019, there were reports of four bomb attacks in Amarah, three of themtargeting AAH property.1863•

On 4 February 2020, an assassination attempt took place in the Rammaneh neighbourhood of
Amarah on a prominent supporter of Moqtada al-Sadr. The man died the next day from his
injuries.1864•

On 10 March 2020, unidentified gunmen killed activist Abdul-Qudous Qasim and lawyer
Karrar Adel in Amarah.1865•

Also in March 2020, protesters reportedly set on fire the AAH headquarters in Missan after
protesters were angry over the killing of two activists by unknown gunmen.1866•

On 23 May 2020, protesters in Amarah set fire to the provincial headquarters of AAH.1867•

On 15 June 2020, an IED exploded next to a house in al-Kahla District killing a woman andinjuring three others.1868•

In July 2020, an official at Missan health department was shot at by unknown gunmen in an
attempted assassination.1869

Number of civilian casualties
The number of armed conflict related incidents and civilian casualties in the governorate recorded by
UNAMI for the period 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, is shown in the table below.

Governorate 2019 (Jan – Dec)

Missan# ofincidents

Killed Injured002019 total
casualties(killed andinjured)002020 (Jan – Jul)# ofincidents

Killed Injured

102020 total
casualties(killed andinjured)00

Table 17: Number of armed conflict related incidents and civilian casualties 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, Missan
governorate. Data from UNAMI1870

1861 Iraqi News, Security forces dismantle IED in Halfaya oilfield in Missan, 1 May 2019, url
1862 Iraqi News, Iraq arrests two Islamic State jihadists in Missan governorate, 29 July 2019, url
1863 Tollast, R., A witch’s brew of instability: Iraq’s tribe-militia nexus, Iraq in context, 17 December 2019, url
1864 EPIC, ISHM: January 30 – February 6, 2020, 6 February 2020, url
1865 EPIC, ISHM: March 5 – March 12, 2020, 12 March 2020, url
1866 BBC Monitoring, Iraqi protesters reportedly set pro-Iran militia quarters ablaze, 12 March 2020, Factiva
1867 ISW, Iraq Situation Report: May 20 - 26, 2020, url; Al Araby, Gunmen set fire to Iraqi paramilitary group’s headquarters

amid rising anti-Iran sentiment, 25 May 2020, url
1868 EPIC, ISHM: June 11 – June 18, 2020, 18 June 2020, url
1869 Shafaq News, A Official of Missan Health Directorate Injured in an Assassination Attempt, 29 July 2020, url
1870 UNAMI, Email to EASO 24 July 2020

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Number of security incidents
In the reference period, ACLED reported 6 battles, 11 incidents of remote violence/explosions, 15cases of violence against civilians, 15 incidents of riots, accounting for a total of 47 security incidentsof these types in Missan governorate, the majority taking place in the capital Amara. 43 protests werealso reported in Missan governorate during the reference period.1871 The evolution of all the types of
security events through the reference period is shown in the figure below.

Figure 20: Evolution of security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence, violence against civilians, riots andprotests in Missan governorate 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, based on ACLED data1872

State ability to secure law and order
Information about the state’s ability to secure law and order in the governorate covering the reference
period, has not been found.

Infrastructure damage and explosive remnants of war
Information about infrastructural damage and remnants of war in the governorate covering thereference period, has not been found.

Displacement and return
According to IOM, as of 15 June 2020, 2 226 IDPs were registered in Missan. No IDPs originating from
Missan were registered elsewhere in the country.1873 In their July DTM matrix, IOM lists that for the
2 226 IDPS in Missan, they are distributed between Amara District (1 818), Al Amejar Al Kabir (168)and Qal’at Saleh (114). Most of them have come from Ninewa, Kirkuk, and Salah al Din.1874

1871 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url
1872 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url
1873 IOM Iraq, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Displacement Master List, Displacement Dashboard, Displacement overview,

15 June 2020, url, p. 1 of 51874 IOM, Iraq Master List Report 116, May - June 2020 – Iraq, July 2020, url, p. 4

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Missan was not listed among the governorates with a presence of returnees.1875

1875 IOM, Iraq Master List Report 116, May - June 2020 – Iraq, July 2020, url, pp. 5, 7

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4.4 Muthanna

Map 22: Muthanna governorate with district borders, district capitals and main roads, © United Nations 1876

4.4.1 General description of the governorate
Basic geography
Muthanna governorate is located in south-western Iraq and borders with Najaf, Qadissiya, Thi-Qar
and Basrah governorates and an international border with Saudi-Arabia.1877 The governorate is divided
into four districts: Al-Samawa, Al-Khidhir, Al-Rumaitha and Al-Salman.1878 The capital of thegovernorate is Al-Samawa.1879

Population
The governorate has an estimated population of 835 797.1880 The population is concentrated along
the Euphrates River in the north of the governorate, while the southern desert districts are only
sparsely populated.1881

1876 UN JAU, Iraq District Map, January 2014, url1877 UN Iraq Joint Analysis Unit, Iraq District Map, January 2014, url
1878 NCCI, Muthanna Governorate profile, December 2015, url,
1879 UN Iraq Joint Analysis Unit, Iraq District Map, January 2014, url
1880 Iraq, ‫[ المثن‬informal translation: ‘Muthanna’] CSO, Population indicators and population estimates, n.d., url
1881 NCCI, Muthanna Governorate profile, December 2015, url,

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Ethnicity
The majority of Muthanna’s inhabitants are Shia Arabs1882, while an estimated 2 % of thegovernorate’s population is Sunni Muslims.1883 In the sub-district of Busaya, close to the border with
Saudi Arabia, three quarters of the population are Sunni Muslims.1884

Road security
Information about road security in the governorate covering the reference period, has not been found.

EconomyEconomic development of the governorate has been neglected by the Ba’ath regime since the 1980s
and hindered further by the UN sanctions and the 2003 invasion.1885 Muthanna is an important centre
for the production of cement and other construction materials. Since 2005, the governorate has hadan oil refinery, processing crude oil from the Kifl oilfield.1886 Competition for jobs in the governorate
was a source of tribal conflict, according to a Niqash report.1887

4.4.2 Conflict background and armed actors in the governorate
Conflict background
Ayatollah Sisitani’s June 2014 appeal to take up arms against ISIL proved highly ‘successful’ in Iraq’s
southern governorates.1888 Many Shia Arabs joined Popular Mobilisation Units (PMUs), including in
Muthanna.1889 Having been spared the onslaught of ISIL’s 2014 offensive, Muthanna governorate wasassessed by the NCCI as one of the safest governorates of Iraq.1890
In October 2018, DFAT stated ‘violence between different Shi’a armed groups occurred in southern
Iraq and was mostly related to control of land and oil revenues. Local sources suggested that intraShia violence predominantly affected those who were actively involved in a militia or tribal group.’1891
Problems of criminality, drug abuse, and violence between Shia armed groups involved in militia andtribal groups occurred.1892 Another cause of tribal conflict in Iraq’s southern governorates was thewater scarcity affecting the region.1893

Armed actors
According to the ISW, in 2017, Rafidain Operations Command (ROC) was in charge of overseeing
security in Muthanna.1894 As the majority of ISF based in the ROC were deployed to fight ISIL or protect
Baghdad after ISIL’s June 2014 offensive the manpower of the ROC in Muthanna was reduced.1895 As
of December 2019, the ISF in Muthanna governorate consisted of Al-Rafadin Operations Command,

1882 NCCI, Muthanna Governorate profile, December 2015, url,
1883 SIGIR, Interactive map of Iraq, 2010, url
1884 Niqash, Why an Iraqi town, in the middle of the desert, has no cafés, 9 August 2017, url
1885 NCCI, Muthanna Governorate profile, December 2015, url
1886 NCCI, Muthanna Governorate profile, December 2015, url
1887 Niqash, Provincial borders: Tensions Rise As Southern Iraqi Tribes Fight For Oil Jobs And Land, 27 September 2016, url
1888 Cigar, N., Iraq’s Shia warlords and their militias: political and security challenges and options, Strategic Studies Institute,June 2015, url, pp. 5-6
1889 Cigar, N., Iraq’s Shia warlords and their militias: political and security challenges and options, Strategic Studies Institute,June 2015, url, p. 71890 NCCI, Muthanna Governorate profile, December 2015, url
1891 Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report – Iraq, 9 October 2018, url, p. 29
1892 Australia, DFAT, Country Information Report – Iraq, 9 October 2018, url, p. 29
1893 Al-Monitor, Tribal disputes flare in southern Iraq over water scarcity, 15 February 2018, url1894 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, p. 23
1895 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, p. 23

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9th Iraqi army Armored Division, a Commandos brigade, emergency regiments, local police and abrigade of the federal police.1896
The PMU Commission maintains administrative offices in Muthanna1897, ‘providing a link to woundedfighters and families, as well as a recruitment hub and contact point for off-duty members’.1898 The
administrative head of the PMU in Muthanna belongs to the Badr organisation.1899 In September 2019,
Chatham House reported that PMU Brigades 13, 14, 19, 26, 27, 31, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 74, 513,
Haditha, al-Furat, Ameriyat al-Samoud and Karma were present in the south-west of Iraq, including in
Muthanna.1900

4.4.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population
Developments 2019-2020
In 2019 and 2020, mass protests erupted in Iraq’s southern governorates.1901 In Muthanna mostprotests were reported to have taken place in its capital Samawa.1902 Excessive force by the ISF in
repressing these protests caused numerous deaths and injuries.1903 During the period of 1 October to
15 December 2019, one protester was reported dead and 324 injured in Muthanna.1904 According to
ICG, Iran-backed PMUs are primarily responsible for the disproportionate use of violence against
demonstrators.1905 On 25 October 2019, protesters in Samawa set fire to the offices of AAH and theHikma movement.1906
Security incidents in Iraq’s southern governorates result mainly from (intra-)tribal disputes and/or
criminal activity, according to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.1907 In December 2019, Swedish
immigration authorities indicated that the security situation in Iraq’s southern governorates was
relatively good and the existing violence had a relatively low risk of affecting the civilian population.
Although authorities found it difficult to curtail armed tribal and militia groups, the number of civilian
deaths was low and occurred mainly in the event of protests or tribal and/or militia violence.1908
Between May and June 2019 crop fires were reported in the southern governorates of Babylon,
Missan, Wassit, Qadissiya, Muthanna and Najaf. The Iraqi Directorate of Civil Defence hinted these
1896 Al-Hashimi, H., CGP, ISIS in Iraq: from abandoned villages to the cities, 5 May 2020, url
1897 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, p. 36
1898 Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, 13 August 2019, CTC, url, p. 51899 Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, 13 August 2019, Combating terrorism

center (CTC), url, p. 71900 Mansour, R. and Salisbury, P., Between Order and Chaos; A New Approach to Stalled State Transformations in Iraq and
Yemen, Chatham House, September 2019, url, p. 81901 UNAMI, Demonstrations in Iraq; 1-9 October 2019, 22 October 2019, url; UNAMI, Demonstrations in Iraq: update; 25
October - 4 November 2019, 5 November 2019, url; UNAMI (UN Assistance Mission for Iraq), Demonstrations in Iraq: 2nd
update; 5 November - 9 December 2019, 11 December 2019, url; UNAMI, Human Rights Special Report - Demonstrations in
Iraq: 3rd update, 23 May 2020: Abductions, torture and enforced disappearances in the context of ongoing demonstrations
in Iraq , 23 May 2020, url
1902 Reuters, Iraqi protesters set fire to political party offices in Muthanna governorate, 25 October 2019, url; Al Jazeera,
Several killed as Iraq protests escalate, spread nationwide, 2 October 2019, url; EPIC, ISHM: January 9 – January 16, 2020,
16 January 2020, url
1903 UNAMI, Human Rights Special Report - Demonstrations in Iraq: 3rd update, 23 May 2020: Abductions, torture andenforced disappearances in the context of ongoing demonstrations in Iraq , 23 May 2020, url, p. 2; HRW (Human Rights
Watch), Iraq, Lethal Force Used Against Protesters, 10 October 2019, url
1904 Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor, Iraqi Protests: An Audacity to Kill and Absent Justice - A report
documenting violations against peaceful protesters in Iraq, December 2019, url, pp. 19-21
1905 ICG, Rescuing Iraq from the Iran-U.S. Crossfire, 1 January 2020, url,
1906 Reuters, Iraqi protesters set fire to political party offices in Muthanna governorate, 25 October 2019, url1907 The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Algemeen Ambtsbericht Irak, 20 December 2019, url, p. 21
1908 Sweden, Migrationsverket – Swedish Migration Agency, Rättsligt ställningstagande angående prövningen av
ansökningar om internationellt skydd m.m. för medborgare i Irak, [informal translation : ‘Legal position concerning theexamination of applications for international protection etc. for Iraqi citizens’], 17 December 2019, url, p. 17

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fires were caused by cigarettes or harvest machines.1909 While others designated these incidents as‘subversive’, then Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi played down these narratives as ‘media hype’.1910

Illustrative security incidents•

In July 2019, three mass graves were discovered in Muthanna, containing the remains ofhundreds of victims, mostly Kurdish women and children killed in the 1980s by Saddam’s
regime.1911•

On 5 July 2019, journalist Haidar Al-Hamdani received threats in Samawa. Al-Hamdani had
spoken out about corruption and the poor quality of public services in Muthanna on
Facebook.1912•

On 18 August 2019, dozens of people in the Suwei sub-district of Muthanna demonstrated
demanding basic services. They called for officials in charge of electricity to be sacked.1913•

On 25 October 2019, 19 persons died after being trapped in burning buildings in Muthanna,Thi-Qar and Qadisiyah governorates. The building was set on fire by the protesters during
demonstrations.1914

Number of civilian casualties
The number of armed conflict related incidents and civilian casualties in the governorate recorded by
UNAMI for the period 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, is shown in the table below.
Governorate 2019 (Jan – Dec)
# ofincidents

KilledInjured2019
total
casualties

2020 (Jan – Jul)# ofincidents

KilledInjured(killedandinjured)Muthanna

4

1

1

2

2020
total
casualties(killedandinjured)

2

2

0

2

Table 17: Number of armed conflict related incidents and civilian casualties 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, Muthanna
governorate. Data from UNAMI1915

Number of security incidents
In the reference period, ACLED reported 0 battles, 2 incidents of remote violence/explosions, 0 casesof violence against civilians, 24 incidents of riots, accounting for a total of 26 security incidents of thesetypes in Muthanna governorate, the majority mainly taking place in the capital As-Samawah. 226
protests were also reported in Muthanna governorate during the reference period also mainly taking
place in the capital.1916 The evolution of all the types of security events through the reference period
is shown in the figure below.

1909 EPIC, ISHM: June 27 – July 4, 2019, 4 July 2019, url
1910 Kurdistan 24, Iraq releases latest crop fire figures; disputed territories worst hit, 30 June 2019, url
1911 EPIC, ISHM: July 18 – July 25, 2019, url1912 RSF, Another Iraqi journalist threatened, 9 July 2019, url1913 EPIC, ISHM: August 15 – August 22, 2019, 22 August 2019, url
1914 UNAMI, Demonstrations in Iraq: update; 25 October - 4 November 2019, November 2019, url, p. 41915 UNAMI, Email to EASO 24 July 2020
1916 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Figure 21: Evolution of security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence, violence against civilians, riots andprotests in Muthanna governorate 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, based on ACLED data1917

State ability to secure law and order
Information about the state’s ability to secure law and order in the governorate covering the reference
period, has not been found.

Infrastructure damage and explosive remnants of war
Mine Action Review, a research team funded by the Norwegian government, reported in 2019 that
Muthanna was among those southern governorates most affected by remnants of cluster munitions
dating back to the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 invasion. The size of the area that was classified as‘confirmed hazardous’ was set at 101 647 074 m2.1918

Displacement and return
According to IOM, as of 15 June 2020, 996 IDPs were registered in Muthanna. No IDPs originating from
Muthanna were registered elsewhere in the country.1919 IDMC reported that around 34 000 people
were estimated to be displaced in January 2019 from four governorates including Basrah, Missan,
Muthanna and Thi-Qar due to water shortages.1920
Muthanna was not listed among the governorates with a presence of returnees.1921

1917 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url
1918 Mine Action Review, Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2019: Iraq, 2019. n.d., url , p. 53
1919 IOM Iraq, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Displacement Master List, Displacement Dashboard, Displacement overview,

15 June 2020, url, p. 1 of 51920 IDMC, Global Report on Internal Displacement 2020 - Middle East and North Africa, April 2020, url, p. 33
1921 IOM, Iraq Master List Report 116, May - June 2020 – Iraq, July 2020, url, pp. 5, 7

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

4.5 Najaf

Map 23: Najaf governorate with district borders, district capitals and main roads, © United Nations1922

4.5.1 General description of the governorate
Basic geography
Najaf governorate is located in the south-western part of Iraq. It borders Anbar, Babil, Qadissiya andMuthanna governorates, and shares an international border with Saudi Arabia to the south. The
governorate is divided into three sub-districts: Najaf, Kufah and Al-Manathera. The capital is Najaf
City.1923

Population
For 2019, the Iraqi CSO (Central Statistical Office) estimated the governorate’s population at
1 510 338.1924

Ethnicity
The majority population is Shia Arab.1925

1922 UN JAU, Iraq District Map, January 2014, url
1923 EPIC Reference Guide, May 2020, url
1924 Iraq, CSO, Demographic and population indicators, Estimates for the population of Iraq by governorate, environmentand gender for the year 2019 (table), n.d., url
1925 EPIC Reference Guide, May 2020, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Road security
Roads in Najaf city have occasionally been blocked by protesters.1926

EconomyHoly sites in Najaf City and Kufah, as well as the Wadi al-Salam (Valley of Peace) draw pilgrims andreligious tourists to the governorate, making the tourism sector one of the most importantcomponents of the governorate’s economy.1927

4.5.2 Conflict background and armed actors in the governorate
Conflict backgroundIn the wake of the 2003 invasion, the governorate became a stronghold for the influential Shia clericMuqtada al-Sadr and his Jaysh al-Mahdi militia.1928 Battles were fought between the militia andcoalition forces in 2004.1929 A ceasefire ended the conflict, and security incidents became more
infrequent.1930 However, a security void resulted from the deployment of security forces in 2014 tofight ISIL insurgency in central and northern Iraq and left the southern region open to tribal clashes,
criminal activity and political violence.1931 ISIL has occasionally been staging attacks in the governorate
causing civilian casualties.1932 Public protests took place across the governorate in the reporting
period.1933 In November 2019, the protests escalated when protesters stormed the Iranian consulate
and set fire to it.1934

Armed actors
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
The ISW reported in 2017 that the Iraqi military’s Mid-Euphrates Operations Command (MEOC) was
responsible for the holy cities of Najaf and Kerbala, as well as the southern Anbar District of Nukhaib.
MEOC was mainly responsible for ensuring the security of Shia pilgrims and securing Iraq’s southerngovernorates.1935 ISF in Najaf governorate also included the commandos brigade, emergency
regiments, local and federal police.1936 In February 2020, the Iraqi army handed over the responsibility
for security in the governorate to the police, according to media reports.1937 Knights et al. assessed in

1926 Al-Shafaaq News, Protest against the nomination of Suhail…Protesters block the roads in Diwaniyah and Najaf, 22

December 2019, url; BBC, Iraq protesters: demonstrators block roads in Najaf, 1 February 2020, url; Radio Free Europe /Radio Liberty, Iraqi protesters clash with Sadr backers in deadly Najaf standoff, 6 February 2020, url
1927 EPIC Reference Guide, May 2020, url
1928 EPIC Reference Guide, May 2020, url
1929 EPIC Reference Guide, May 2020, url
1930 EPIC Reference Guide, May 2020, url
1931 Reuters, Tribal clashes, political void threaten oil installations in Iraq’s south, 11 September 2017, url
1932 Al-Jazeera, ISIL attacks Iraqi police near Najaf, kills seven, 1 January 2017, url; BBC, Iraq: Blasts kill 14 Shia pilgrims in
Kerbala and Najaf, 8 November 2010, url; National (The), Iraq fears ISIS resurgence after killing of fishermen, 24 February
2019, url
1933 Arab Reform Initiative, The Rising Tide of Change in Iraq: An assessment of the 2018 and 2019 Protests, 25 November
2019, url (PDF version not downloadable at the time of retrieval); Peoples Dispatch, Fresh protests in Iraq demand
elections, justice for those killed by security forces, 11 May 2020, url
1934 Al-Jazeera, Iraq condemns attack on Iranian consulate in Najaf, 28 November 2019, url
1935 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, p. 19
1936 Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: from abandoned villages to the cities, 5 May 2020, url
1937 Middle East Monitor, Iraq: Army hands security duties over to police in Wassit, 14 February 2020, url

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2020 that all eight southern governorates should be considered areas of shared control between the
Iraqi army or police, and the PMU.1938
Popular Mobilisation Units (PMUs)
The ISW reported in 2017 that large numbers of Iraqi Shia militias supplemented security in the
MEOC.1939 According to Knights et al. all eight southern governorates should be considered areas ofshared control between the Iraqi army and police, and the PMUs. Hashd Brigade 11 (Liwa Ali al-Akbar)
and Brigade 26 (Al-Abbas Combat Division) were reportedly deployed to Najaf governorate asprotective units designated to the shrines. The PMU commander in the governorate belongs toBrigade 2 (Imam Ali Brigades).1940 In September 2019, Chatham House reported that PMU Brigades
13, 14, 19, 26, 27, 31, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 74, 513, Haditha, al-Furat, Ameriyat al-Samoud and Karma
were present in the south-west of Iraq, including in Najaf governorate.1941

4.5.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population
Developments 2019-2020
By mid-2019, the public protests being held across the southern part of the country, had become moresubdued than they were the previous year.1942 The protests have been directed mainly against
corruption, unemployment and poor public services.1943
Demonstrations, occasionally violent, again broke out on 1 October 2020, and were met with harsher
reactions than before.1944 Protesters set fire to the headquarters of political parties, damaged
government buildings and engaged in revenge killings. Several demonstrators have been killed andinjured by government forces and supporting militias opening fire and attacking them. Protests werereported during the first week of October and again from 25 October in Najaf and other southerngovernorates.1945 In November 2019, protesters attacked and set fire to the Iranian consulate in Najaf
City, in what was reported as an outburst of anti-Iranian sentiment among the population.1946
Tensions escalated again in January 2020 when some protesters forcibly prevented students andteachers from accessing state educational institutions. The protests continued through February
2020.1947 The protests then wound down during the winter and spring months. In May, protests
resumed again in cities in the south. The number of protesters who turned out were lower than in
December, though.1948

1938 Knights, M. et al., (Knights, M., Malik, H. and Al-Tamimi, J.) Honored, not contained – the future of Iraq’s Popular

Mobilization Forces, March 2020, pp. 128-129, 37, url
1939 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, p. 19
1940 Knights, M. et al., (Knights, M., Malik, H. and Al-Tamimi, J.) Honored, not contained – the future of Iraq’s Popular
Mobilization Forces, March 2020, pp. 128-129, 37, url
1941 Mansour, R. and Salisbury, P., Between Order and Chaos; A New Approach to Stalled State Transformations in Iraq and
Yemen, Chatham House, September 2019, url, p. 81942 Robin, B., 1 August 2019, South Iraq security and protest dynamics report: July 2019, url, Monthly interactive maps
1943 BBC, Iraq unrest: Protesters set fire to Iranian consulate in Najaf, 28 November 2019, url
1944 O’ Driscoll, D., 9 January 2020, Tensions on Iraqi soil likely to overshadow anti-government protest demands, [blog], url1945 UNAMI, Demonstrations in Iraq: update 25 October – 4 November 2019, url, p. 4
1946 Guardian (The), 30 November 2019, Iraq risks breakup as tribes take on Iran’s militias in ‘blood feud’, 30 November
2019, url; New York Times (The), Iraq Protesters Burn Down Iran Consulate in Night of Anger, 27 November 2019, url
1947 UN Security Council, Implementation of Resolution 2470 (2019) – Report of the Secretary-General, 21 February 2020,
url, para. 16
1948 Middle East Eye, 'Today is a message': Anti-government protests resume in Iraq, 15 May 2020, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Illustrative security incidents•

Five fishermen were killed in a suspected ISIS attack in Najaf governorate. Their bodies were
found near Lake Tharthar in Najaf's Abbasid District.1949•

45 protesters were killed by security forces in Najaf and Nasiriyah on 28 November 2019. It
was not mentioned how many of the incidents that took place in Najaf, or if they took place
in Najaf City only.1950•

Protesters burned the entrance to a shrine in Najaf City on 30 November 2019.1951•

On 28 November 2019, state forces killed 12 protesters in Najaf City in connection withprotesters storming and setting fire to the Iranian consulate.1952•

In February 2020, two activists were kidnapped in Najaf and Baghdad.1953 It was not
mentioned whether the kidnapping took place in Najaf City or elsewhere in the governorate.

•

On 6 February 2020, Al-Arabiya reported that 11 protesters were killed and 120 wounded
when militant Sadrists attacked protesters in Najaf City.1954

Number of civilian casualties
The number of armed conflict related incidents and civilian casualties in the governorate recorded by
UNAMI for the period 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, is shown in the table below.

Governorate 2019 (Jan – Dec)
# ofincidents

KilledInjured2019
total
casualties

2020 (Jan – Jul)# ofincidents

KilledInjured(killedandinjured)
Najaf

10

4

15

19

2020
total
casualties(killedandinjured)

1

0

0

0

Table 18: Number of armed conflict related incidents and civilian casualties 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, Najaf
governorate. Data from UNAMI1955

Number of security incidents
In the reference period, ACLED reported 2 battles, 5 incidents of remote violence/explosions, 5 casesof violence against civilians, 30 incidents of riots, accounting for a total of 42 security incidents ofthese types in Najaf governorate. 67 protests were also reported in Najaf governorate during thereference period, the majority taking place in the capital Najaf City.1956 The evolution of all the typesof security events through the reference period is shown in the figure below.

1949 National (The), Iraq fears ISIS resurgence after killing of fishermen, 24 February 2019, url
1950 EPIC, ISHM, November 21 – December 5, 2019, url
1951 Reuters, Iraqi protesters burn shrine entrance in holy city, PM quitting “not enough”, 30 November 2019, url
1952 EPIC, ISHM:, 21 November, 2019 – 5 December, 2019, 5 December 2019, url
1953 EPIC, ISHM: February 6 –February 13, 2020, 13 February 2020, url
1954 Al-Arabiya, Iraq: Death toll of assault on Najaf protesters hit 11, 6 February 2020, url
1955 UNAMI, Email to EASO 24 July 2020
1956 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Figure 22: Evolution of security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence, violence against civilians, riots andprotests in Najaf governorate 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, based on ACLED data1957

State ability to secure law and order
HRW reported that the Iraqi prime minister had issued orders to the state forces not to use live
ammunition against protesters, but that protesters continued to get killed by them.1958 In December
2019, courts in southern Iraq issued arrest warrants against officers in Najaf for excessive use of force
and issuing orders that led to the killing of protesters. In the same report, the HRW asserted that thestate seemed ‘complicit’ in the killings, but also that police and military commanders would beprosecuted for killing protesters.1959
Knights et al. stated that the PMU was operating its own command and control system to the extent
that its leadership was able to act as a ’parallel state’. Accordingly, the authors asserted, PMU units
could refuse legal orders issued by the state commander in chief, the prime minister, which it’constantly’ did.1960
State security units supposedly linked to Iran-backed PMU militias were insufficiently held
accountable for killing protesters in Najaf and other governorates, the New York Times cited a memberof Iraq’s High Commission on Human Rights as saying. As a reaction to the killing of protesters in
October 2019, Najaf’s police commander was fired and publicly named and shamed.1961

Infrastructure damage and explosive remnants of war
Najaf, together with Basrah and Muthanna governorates, accounted for 98 % of the prevalence ofcluster munition contaminating the southern governorates, Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor
1957 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url
1958 HRW, Iraq: New protester death despite order not to fire, 4 December 2019, url
1959 HRW, Iraq: State Appears Complicit in Massacre of Protesters, 16 December 2019, url
1960 Knights, M. et al., Honored, not contained. The future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, March 2020, url, p. ix
1961 The New York Times, Iraq will Prosecute Military and Police Leaders Over Protest Shootings, October 2019, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

reported in November 2018, not specifying exact locations.1962 One incident with such war remnants
was reported in December 2018, when six shepherds were wounded by a cluster bomb in a desert
area in the governorate.1963 Newer information has not been found.

Displacement and return
As of 30 June 2020, Najaf governorate hosted a total number of 12 546 IDPs with main districts ofdisplacement being, Najaf (9 972), Kufah (2 178), and Al-Manathera (396).1964 Of these IDPs, 99%
originated from Ninewa governorate, while 1% originated from other governorates, including Diyala,
Salah al-Din, Anbar and Kirkuk.1965 IOM recorded no returns to Najaf governorate. During the COVID19 period (March-May 2020), movements were limited between governorates.1966

1962 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, Iraq Mine Action, 16 November 2018, url
1963 Iraqi News, Cluster bomb wounds six people in Iraq’s Najaf governorate, 14 December 2018, url
1964 IOM, DTM (IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix), Iraq Master List Report 116, May-June 2020, 16 July 2020, url, p. 3
1965 IOM, DTM (IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix), Iraq Master List Report 116, May-June 2020, 16 July 2020, url, p. 3
1966 IOM, DTM (IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix), Iraq Master List Report 116, May-June 2020, 16 July 2020, url, p. 3

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4.6 Qadissiya

Map 24: Qadissiya governorate with district borders, district capitals and main roads, © United Nations1967

4.6.1 General description of the governorate
Basic geography
Saddam Hussein renamed Al-Diwaniya governorate ‘Qadissiya’ in 1976 and the name was reverted in2008.1968 Qadissiya governorate is located in southern central Iraq and borders with Babil, Wassit, ThiQar, Muthanna and Anbar governorates.1969 The governorate is divided into the following districts:
Diwaniya, Afak, Al-Shamiya and al Al-Hamza.1970 The capital city of the governorate is Diwaniya.1971

Population
For 2019, the Iraqi CSO (Central Statistical Office) estimated the governorate’s population at
1 325 031.1972

1967 UN JAU, Iraq District Map, January 2014, url
1968 EPIC, ISHM Reference Guide, n. d., url
1969 UN Iraq JAU (Joint Analysis Unit), Iraq District Map, January 2014, url
1970 NCCI, Qadissiya governorate profile, December 2015, url
1971 EPIC, ISHM Reference Guide, n. d., url
1972 Iraq, CSO, Demographic and population indicators, Estimates for the population of Iraq by governorate, environmentand gender for the year 2019 (table), n.d., url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Ethnicity
The majority of Qadissiya’s inhabitants are Shia Arabs.1973 In October 2015, Niqash stated that acommunity of Roma lived in Fawar, about 20 km south-east of the city of Diwaniya.1974 However,European Network in Statelessness (ENS) and Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion (ISI) stated in
November 2019 that many of the Iraqi Dom people left Iraq after 2003, and that those who remainedin Iraq are found in the outskirts if Baghdad, Mosul and Basrah.1975 Additionally, an unknown numberof Bidoon reside in the governorate.1976

Road security
Information about road security in the governorate covering the reference period, has not been found.

EconomyThe spokesperson of the Iraqi Ministry of Planning, cited by Al-Sumaria on 16 February 2020, statedthat poverty rates in Qadissiya reached 48 % based on the poverty survey conducted in 2018.1977 Oil
resources in the area remain unexplored.1978 The governorate‘s economy is largely agricultural1979 andis known for its marshy fields where farmers grow aromatic ambar rice.1980 According to IOM,
Qadissiya governorate had ‘the largest number of locations affected by water shortage, with 23
affected locations’. And further, the population in the affected locations relied on agriculture andlivestock for livelihood, and were not ‘able to access water due to the remoteness of their locations
from rivers and irrigation canals’. Moreover, water shortage compelled the government to ban
growing rice in parts of Al-Shamiya District due to the large quantities of water required to grow thiscrop.1981

4.6.2 Conflict background and armed actors in the governorate
Conflict backgroundThe governorate largely escaped the onslaught of the 2014 ISIL conquest across large parts of northwestern Iraq.1982 In 2016, intra-Shia violence escalated in Iraq’s southern governorates, prompting a
military intervention and tribal reconciliation efforts.1983
DFAT assessed the situation in southern Iraq in 2018 as ‘more secure’ than other parts of the country,
although problems of criminality, drug abuse, and violence between Shia armed groups involved inmilitia and tribal groups occurred.1984 According to DFAT, writing in October 2018, ‘violence between
different Shia armed groups occurs in southern Iraq and is mostly related to control of land and oil
1973 NCCI Qadissiya governorate profile, December 2015, url
1974 Niqash, Purveyors of immorality and crime? Iraq’s gypsies, blockaded by police, harassed by authorities, 1 October

2015, url
1975 ENS, ISI, Statelessness in Iraq; Country Position Paper, November 2019, url, pp. 13, 14
1976 ENS, ISI, Statelessness in Iraq; Country Position Paper, November 2019, url, p. 13
1977 Al-Sumaria, ‫[ تعرف عل نسبة الفقر ف المحافظات العراقية‬Get Familiar with the Poverty Rates in Iraqi Governorates], 16‫ي‬February 2020, url; EPIC/ ISHM: May 23 – May 30, 2019, 30 May 2019, url
1978 Niqash, Iraq’s poorest governorate: where locals sell their children to make ends meet, 10 December 2015, url
1979 IAU, Qadissiya Governorate Profile, November 2010, url, p. 1
NCCI, Qadissiya governorate profile, December 2015, url
1980 New York Times (The), Shiite rivalries slash at once calm Iraqi city, 21 June 2007, url
1981 IOM, Assessing Water Shortage-induced Displacement in Qadissiya, Najaf, Babylon, Wassit and Kerbala, 10 April 2019,url, p. 4
1982 EPIC/ ISHM, ISHM reference guide, last revision: May 2020, url; NCCI, Qadissiya governorate profile, December 2015,url
1983 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, p. 23
1984 Australia, DFAT (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade), Country Information Report – Iraq, 9 October 2018, url, p.
29

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

revenues. Local sources suggest that intra-Shia violence predominantly affects those who are actively
involved in a militia or tribal group.’1985 According to Al-Monitor reporting in 2019, another cause oftribal conflict in Iraq’s southern governorates was the water scarcity affecting the region.1986

Armed actors
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
As of December 2019, the ISF in Qadissiya governorate consisted of the Middle Euphrates Operation
Command (MEOC), a Commandos brigade, emergency regiments, local police and a brigade of thefederal police.1987 Rafidain Operations Command (ROC) oversaw military security in Qadissiya
previously.1988 As the majority of ISF based in the ROC area were deployed to protect Baghdad or tocombat ISIL, security forces in the area were stretched thin following ISIL’s June 2014 offensive.1989 In
January 2019, the Qadissiya provincial police announced that it had started taking over security from
the MEOC, according to media reports.1990 This transfer of responsibilities was presented as a resultof the stabilisation of the security situation across Iraq’s cities.1991 On 14 February 2020, Middle East
Monitor stated that Qadissiya was one of the five governorates in which ‘the police took over the
security file.’1992

Popular Mobilisation Units (PMUs)
As many destitute youths joined the PMUs in 2014, Diwaniya city became a recruiting ground for Shia
militias.1993 According to Michael Knights’ report from August 2019, the PMU Commission maintained
administrative offices in each Iraqi governorate outside the KRI, including in Qadissiya governorate,‘providing a necessary link to wounded fighters and families, as well as a recruitment hub and contact
point for off-duty members’.1994 PMU administrative heads in Basrah, Thi-Qar, Qadissiya, Kirkuk,
Muthanna, and Wassit governorates were reportedly provided by the Badr organisation.1995 In
September 2019, Chatham House reported that PMU Brigades 13, 14, 19, 26, 27, 31, 41, 42, 44, 45,
46, 47, 74, 513, Haditha, al-Furat, Ameriyat al-Samoud and Karma were present in the south-west of
Iraq, including in Qadissiya.1996

1985 Australia, DFAT (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade), Country Information Report – Iraq, 9 October 2018, url, p.

291986 Al-Monitor, Tribal disputes flare in southern Iraq over water scarcity,15 February 2018, url
1987 Al-Hashimi, H., ISIS in Iraq: from abandoned villages to the cities, 5 May 2020, url
1988 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, p. 23
1989 ISW, Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Orders of Battle, December 2017, url, p. 23
1990 Al-Monitor, As Iraqi army retreats to borders, local police controls cities’ security, 1 February 2019, url
1991 Al-Monitor, As Iraqi army retreats to borders, local police controls cities’ security, 1 February 2019, url
1992 Middle East Monitor, Iraq: Army hands security duties over to police in Wassit, 14 February 2020, url
1993 ICG, Fight or Flight: The Desperate Plight of Iraq's "Generation 2000", 8 August 2016, url, p. 16
1994 Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, 13 August 2019, Combating terrorism

center (CTC), url, p. 5
1995 Knights, M., Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups, 13 August 2019, Combating terrorism
center (CTC), url, p. 7
1996 Mansour, R. and Salisbury, P., Between Order and Chaos; A New Approach to Stalled State Transformations in Iraq and
Yemen, Chatham House, September 2019, url, p. 8

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

4.6.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population
Developments 2019-2020
In 2019 and 2020, mass protests erupted in Iraq’s southern governorates.1997 In Qadissiya mostprotests were reported to have taken place in its capital Diwaniya.1998 UNAMI observed that excessive
force by the ISF in repressing these protests caused numerous deaths and injuries.1999 Between
1 October and 15 December 2019, 23 protesters were reportedly killed and 421 injured in
Qadissiya.2000 According to the ICG, ‘the main perpetrators of the violence are Iran-backed paramilitarygroups part of a larger assembly of “popular mobilisation” forces (al-Hashd al-Shaabi) that legally areintegrated into the state apparatus but in reality answer to their own separate command
structures.’2001 Tribal leaders in southern Iraq have turned on security forces and held pro-Iranian
militia leaders responsible for the violent repression of the protests.2002 On 20 December 2019,
protesters in Diwaniya torched the office of Katai’b al-Imam Ali, a PMU militia faction.2003 On
25 October 2019, twelve protesters died in Diwaniya after being trapped in a burning building. 2004
According to reports, the building, which was housing the local offices of the Badr organisation, wastorched by protesters who were unaware that others were inside.2005
According to the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, security incidents in Iraq’s southerngovernorates result mainly from (intra-)tribal disputes and/or criminal activity.2006
Between June and May 2019, crop fires were reported in the southern governorates of Babil, Missan,
Wassit, Qadissiya, Muthanna and Najaf.2007 The Iraqi Directorate of Civil Defense stated that thesefires were caused by cigarettes or harvest machines.2008 However, according to UNOCHA’s report fromMay 2019 ‘many [of the crop fires] are presumed to be intentionally lit’, and ‘ISIL has claimed
responsibility for some of the arson attacks.’2009

Illustrative security incidents•

On 3 July 2019, a tribal dispute erupted between two families in Diwaniya. One woman died,and three persons were wounded.2010•

The Independent Arabic reported on 2 October 2019 that hundreds of Diwaniya residents
protested in the city centre and were attacked by the security forces. According to the source,

1997 UNAMI, Human Rights Special Report - Demonstrations in Iraq: 3rd update, 23 May 2020: Abductions, torture andenforced disappearances in the context of ongoing demonstrations in Iraq , 23 May 2020, url; UNAMI, Demonstrations in
Iraq: 2nd update; 5 November - 9 December 2019, 11 December 2019, url; UNAMI, Demonstrations in Iraq: update; 25
October - 4 November 2019, November 2019, url; UNAMI, Demonstrations in Iraq; 1-9 October 2019, October 2019, url
1998 ICG, Widespread protests point to Iraq’s cycle of social crisis, 10 October 2019, url, p. 1
BBC News, Iraq protests: death toll nears 100 as unrest enters fifth day, 5 October 2019, url
1999 UNAMI), Human Rights Special Report - Demonstrations in Iraq: 3rd update, 23 May 2020: Abductions, torture andenforced disappearances in the context of ongoing demonstrations in Iraq , 23 May 2020, url, p. 2; HRW, Iraq: Lethal Force
Used Against Protesters, 10 October 2019, url
2000 Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor, Iraqi Protests: An Audacity to Kill and Absent Justice - A report
documenting violations against peaceful protesters in Iraq, December 2019, url, pp. 19-21
2001 ICG, Rescuing Iraq from the Iran-U.S. Crossfire, 1 January2020, url
2002 Guardian (The), Iraq risks breakup as tribes take on Iran’s militias in ‘blood feud’, 30 November 2019, url
Tollast, R., A witch’s brew of instability: Iraq’s tribe-militia nexus, Iraq in context, 17 December 2019, url
2003 EPIC/ ISHM: December 19, 2019 – January 2, 2020, 2 January 2020, url
2004 Reuters, At least 40 killed as protests engulf Iraq, 25 October 2020, url
2005 Reuters, At least 40 killed as protests engulf Iraq, 25 October 2020, url
2006 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Algemeen Ambtsbericht Irak, 20 December 2019, url, p. 21
2007 EPIC/ ISHM: June 27 – July 4, 2019, 4 July 2019, url
2008 EPIC/ ISHM: June 27 – July 4, 2019, 4 July 2019, url
2009 UNOCHA, Iraq: Humanitarian Snapshot, 10 June 2019, url
2010 Iraqi News, Tribal clashes kill woman, wound three in Iraq’s Qadisiyyah, 3 July 2019, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

the Iraqi Special Forces (known as SWAT) used tear gas and batons to disperse the protesters.
Reportedly, eight protesters and 11 security forces members suffered from suffocation.2011•

Al-Hurra reported on 25 December 2019 that the Explosive Disposal Unit in Qadissiya
governorate rescued a man whose hands and legs were tied with an IED attached to his back.
According to Iraqi media sources cited by Al-Hurra, the man was previously kidnapped by anunidentified group in Refat neighbourhood in the centre of the governorate.2012•

On 27 January 2020, unidentified gunmen killed a civilian in Zaytoun, east of Diwaniya.2013•

On 28 February 2020, unknown assailants stabbed and killed activist Abdel Azim al-Rubaie
outside his home in Ghamas neighbourhood, west of Diwaniya. According to a police
statement the killing was related to a personal dispute, and was not politically motivated.2014

Number of civilian casualties
The number of armed conflict related incidents and civilian casualties in the governorate recorded by
UNAMI for the period 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, is shown in the table below.
Governorate 2019 (Jan – Dec)

Qadisiyyah# ofincidents

Killed Injured

1002019 total
casualties(killed andinjured)002020 (Jan – Jul)# ofincidents

Killed Injured

402020 total
casualties(killed andinjured)4

4

Table 19: Number of armed conflict related incidents and civilian casualties 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, Qadissiya
governorate. Data from UNAMI2015

Number of security incidents
In the reference period, ACLED reported 5 battles, 5 incidents of remote violence/explosions, 2 casesof violence against civilians, 52 incidents of riots, accounting for a total of 64 security incidents of thesetypes in Qadissiya governorate, the majority taking place in the capital Diwaniyah. 207 protests werealso reported in Qadissiya governorate during the reference period.2016 The evolution of all the typesof security events through the reference period is shown in the figure below.

2011 Independent Arabic, ‫ ازدياد أعداد المتظاهرين وقوى األمن "تتفي" ف طرق القمع‬...‫[ الديوانية‬Diwaniya… Increase in the numbers of‫ي‬protesters and the security forces use various methods to crack down], 2 October 2019, urlّ ‫[ عبوة ناسفة عل ظهر مواطن‬IED on the back of a tied citizen in Diwaniya], 25 December 2019, url
2012 Al-Hurra, ‫مقيد ف الديوانية‬‫ي‬2013 EPIC/ ISHM: January 23 – January 30, 2020, 31 January 2020, url
2014 EPIC/ ISHM: February 27 – March 5, 2020, 5 March 2020, url
2015 UNAMI, Email to EASO 24 July 20202016 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Figure 23: Evolution of security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence, violence against civilians, riots andprotests in Qadissiya governorate 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, based on ACLED data2017

State ability to secure law and order
No information about the state’s ability to secure law and order in Qadissiya was found during thedrafting of this report.

Infrastructure damage and explosive remnants of war
Scarce information specific to Qadissiya governorate was found during the drafting of this report.
According to a report by the WASH Cluster published on 13 April 2020, Iraq’s southern governorates,
including Qadissiya, ‘have high severity of WASH needs, mainly due to reliance on small rivers as water
sources, which are frequently contaminated and are vulnerable to shifts in the declining surface andground water levels’.2018
Regarding explosive remnants of war and unexploded ordnances, the Iraqi news website Al-Mirbad
reported that on 18 July 2020 the Diwaniya police found nine mines, five 105 mm and 155 mm
rockets, and 3 kg of C4 substance in Al-Muntadhar neighbourhoods, Afak District.2019

Displacement and return
According to IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), as of 30 June 2020, Qadissiya had 3 888 IDPs
residing in the districts of Diwaniya (2 478), Afak (834), and Al-Shamiya (402).2020 No IDPs originatingfrom Qadissiya were registered elsewhere in the country.2021

2017 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url
2018 WASH Cluster, Strategic Operational Framework (SOF), 13 April 2020, url, p. 6
2019 Al-Mirbad, ‫ كغم‬3 ‫ العثور عل ألغام وصواري ــخ و‬:‫ الديوانية‬C4 ‫[ ف قضاء عفك‬Al-Diwaniya: Mines, rockets and 3 Kilograms of C4‫ي‬found in Afak district], 18 July 2020, url
2020 IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), IRAQ MASTER LIST REPORT 116: MAY – JUNE 2020, 16 July 2020, url, p. 32021 IOM Iraq, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Displacement Master List, Displacement Dashboard, Displacement overview,
15 June 2020, url, p. 1 of 5

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Qadissiya was not listed among the governorates with a presence of returnees.2022

2022 IOM, Iraq Master List Report 116, May - June 2020 – Iraq, July 2020, url, pp. 5, 7

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

4.7 Thi-Qar

Map 25: Thi-Qar governorate with district borders, district capitals and main roads, © United Nations 2023

4.7.1 General description of the governorate
Basic geography
The governorate borders Wassit to the north, Missan to the east, Basrah to the east and south, andMuthanna, Samawah and Qadissiya to the west. The capital is Nasiriyah.2024 The governorate is divided
into five districts: Al-Chibayish, Nasiriya, Al-Shatra, Al-Suq al-Shoyokh, and Al-Rifai.2025

Ethnicity
The majority of Thi-Qar’s population is Shia Arab. There is also a Sunni Arab minority, and smaller
communities of Assyrian and Chaldean Christians as well as Mandeans.2026

Population
For 2019, the Iraqi CSO (Central Statistical Office) estimated the governorate’s population at
2 150 338.2027

2023 UN JAU, Iraq District Map, January 2014, url
2024 IOM, Thi-Qar governorate profile Sept 2009, url
2025 NCCI, Thi-Qar governorate profile, December 2015, url
2026 EPIC, ISHM Reference Guide, May 2020, url
2027 Iraq, CSO, Demographic and population indicators, Estimates for the population of Iraq by governorate, environmentand gender for the year 2019 (table), n.d., url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Road security
In January 2020, demonstrators blocked the main bridges in the capital to create leverage for theirdemands2028, and blocked roads in order to restrain militias during mourning gatherings for theassassinated military leader Soleimani and militia leader al-Muhandis.2029 A truck convoy carrying
military equipment was attacked with roadside bombs in July 2020.2030

EconomyThe economy is largely rural. The food rationing Public Distribution Program has made the productionof staple crops unprofitable. Drainage of the marshes carried out by the Saddam regime has
devastated traditional fishing and farming in the marshlands. A number of oil refineries are located in
the governorate.2031 Badra oilfield, estimated to hold 3 billion barrels of oil, started production in
2013.2032

4.7.2 Conflict background and armed actors in the governorate
Conflict background
Following the 2003 invasion, the governorate became contested between various Shia factions andmilitias, causing clashes. From 2008 the governorate has been largely peaceful, following a settlement
between militias and the Iraqi government. Thi-Qar did not became occupied by ISIL.2033 The security
void that opened in the southern governorates when the security forces were redeployed in 2014 tofight ISIL insurgency in central and northern Iraq, left the southern region open to tribal clashes,
criminal activity and political violence.2034
Public mass protests were reported to have been taking place during the first week of October andagain from 25 October 2019 in Thi-Qar and other southern governorates.2035

Armed actors
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
The ISW reported in 2017 that the Iraqi Army’s Joint Operations Command (JOC) is responsible for the
security in the governorate.2036 The JOC coordinates joint operations of the Iraqi army and Kurdish
Peshmerga.2037 Knights et al. assessed in 2020 that all eight southern governorates should beconsidered areas of shared control between the Iraqi army or police, and the PMU.2038

2028 Association of Muslim Scholars in Iraq (homepage), Demonstrators in Thi-Qar governorate, southern Iraq, have blocked

the main bridges in the City of Nasiriyah, to confirm their general strike and sit-in until their demands are met, 30 January
2020, url
2029 Liveaumap, Thi-Qar: The protesters in Nasiriyah announce a curfew on the militias in the city by cutting off roads after
the attacks on peaceful demonstrators at funerals of Soleimani and the "Engineer", 5 January 2020, url
2030 Saleh, I., Iraq: Twin bombings target support convoy for US forces, 22 July 2020, url
2031 NCCI, Thi-Qar Governorate Profile, December 2015, url
2032 Hydrocarbons Technology, Badra oil field, Wassit governorate, December 2013, url, n.d.
2033 NCCI, Thi-Qar Governorate Profile, December 2015, url
2034 Reuters, Tribal clashes, political void threaten oil installations in Iraq’s south, 11 September 2017, url
2035 UNAMI, Demonstrations in Iraq: update 25 October – 4 November, url, p. 22036 Middle East Monitor, Iraq: Army hands security duties over to police in Wassit, 14 February 2020, url
2037 Kurdistan 24, 20 July 2020, Security talks resume between Peshmerga and Iraqi army in Erbil, url
2038 Knights, M. et al., (Knights, M., Malik, H. and Al-Tamimi, J.) Honored, not contained – the future of Iraq’s Popular
Mobilization Forces, March 2020, pp. 128-129, 37, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Popular Mobilisation Units (PMUs)
The Shia Militia Mapping Project, published by the Washington Institute in May 2019, provides aninteractive map with all Iranian-backed Shia militias active in the Middle East, including Iraq. For ThiQar, the project mentioned two militias, one of them is Kataib Sayeed al-Shuhada (Brigade 14), an
Iran-aligned militia. The other one is Saraya al-Jihad (Brigade 17), an armed wing of the Jihad andDevelopment Movement which splintered from ISCI (the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, a politicalparty).2039 In September 2019, Chatham House reported that PMU Brigades 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 21, 22, 26
were present in the governorates Missan, Thi-Qar and Basrah.2040 The PMU commander in Thi-Qar
belongs to the Badr militia, according to Knights et al.2041

4.7.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population
Developments 2019-2020
Public protests took place in the governorate during the reference period.2042 Sources reported about
security forces as well as unidentified masked men in pickup trucks killing activists taking part in theprotests2043, as well as when being shot at by police using live ammunition.2044 Assassinations andtargeted killings of prominent protest activists have also been reported2045, as well as protesters
blocking roads and bridges.2046 An attack by protesters on a police station in Nasiriyah in December
2019 was reported as prompted by police intercepting and shooting to death an activist the day
before.2047 The Gulf Center for Human Rights, an NGO based in Lebanon, documented a number oftargeted lethal attacks on activists in early January 2020.2048 At that time, PMU forces were reported
as having fired at protesters with live ammunition.2049 In February 2020, the governorate was reported
as having become ‘the hub’, or ‘the capital’, of the protests.2050
In July 2020, Shafaaq News cited a parliamentarian from the governorate who asserted that security
was in a state of ‘unprecedented’ deterioration. The parliamentarian referred to tribal conflicts, gangwarfare and gang rule playing out as well as terrorist attacks, albeit not specifying the nature of theterrorist attacks nor the actors behind. The incidents were reported to be taking place in areas wheresecurity services were short.2051

2039 Smyth P., The Shia Militia Mapping Project (Interactive Map), May 2019, url; Knights, M., Malik, H., Al-Tamimi, A.J.,

Honored, not contained, the future of iraq’s popular mobilization forces, March 2020, url, p. 205
2040 Mansour, R. and Salisbury, P., Between Order and Chaos; A New Approach to Stalled State Transformations in Iraq and
Yemen, Chatham House, September 2019, url, p. 82041 Knights, M. et al., (Knights, M., Malik, H. and Al-Tamimi, J.) Honored, not contained – the future of Iraq’s Popular
Mobilization Forces, March 2020, url, pp. 128-129, 37
2042 Arab Reform Initiative, The Rising Tide of Change in Iraq: An assessment of the 2018 and 2019 Protests, 25 November
2019, url (PDF version not downloadable at the time of retrieval); Peoples Dispatch, Fresh protests in Iraq demand
elections, justice for those killed by security forces, 11 May 2020, url
2043 Al-Jazeera, “Bloodbath”: Dozens of protesters killed as army deployed south, 29 November 2019, url; Gulf Centre for
Human Rights (GCHR), Iraq: Authorities and armed groups continue to target protesters and activists, 9 January 2020, url
2044 Kurdistan 24, Assassins kill activist in Nassiriyah, as protesters torch gov. parties, offices, 21 December 2019, url; HRW,
10 October 2019, Iraq: Lethal Force Used Against Protesters, url
2045 Kurdistan 24, Assassins kill activist in Nassiriyah, as protesters torch gov. parties, offices, 21 December 2019, url;
Asharq al-Awsat, Activist’s assassination reignites tensions in Iraq’s Nassiriyah, 6 April 2020, url
2046 Al-Arabiya, Iraqi officials: one protester killed amid ongoing clashes, 26 November 2019, url; The Baghdad Post,
Protesters block roads, bridges in Iraq’s Dhi War governorate, 9 February 2020, url
2047 Kurdistan 24, Assassins kill activist in Nassiriyah, as protesters torch gov. parties, offices, 21 December 2019, url
2048 Gulf Centre for Human Rights (GCHR), Iraq: Authorities and armed groups continue to target protesters and activists, 9January 2020, url
2049 Saadoun, M., Are Iraq’s PMU planning to put an end to protests?, 6 January 2020, url
2050 Al- Sahly, S., Di Qar, the southern governorate at the heart of Iraq’s uprising, 2 February 2020, url; Al-Monitor,
Nasiriyah becomes the Iraqi protest capital, url
2051 Shafaaq News, Thi-Qar: Unprecedented deteriorating security situation, 21 July 2020, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Illustrative security incidents
Incidents reported in 2019 and 2020 include:•

Unidentified men broke into a government building in Thi-Qar and set fire to it in October
2019.2052•

In November 2019, state forces killed seven people during four days of demonstrations,Xinhua reported.2053•

In November 2019, protesters blocked a road leading to an oilfield.2054•

Protesters set fire to the residence of a military commander in December 2019.2055•

In January 2020, government forces fired live bullets, pellet guns and tear gas at protesters
during a crackdown in Basrah and Thi-Qar. Citing the Iraqi High Commission for Human Rights,
EPIC reported that over two days, 12 protesters were killed and 230 were injured.2056•

A tribal leader was shot and killed by unknown gunmen in February 2020.2057•

In February 2020, protesters closed a bridge and cut access to local government buildings in
Nasiriyah, the incident resulting in 27 injured protesters.2058•

A lawyer representing detained protesters was wounded in an attempted assassination in
Nasiriyah in February 2020.2059

Number of civilian casualties
The number of armed conflict related incidents and civilian casualties in the governorate recorded by
UNAMI for the period 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, is shown in the table below.

2052 Al-Shafaaq News, Local government building in Thi-Qar burnt, headquarters of “Asaib” group attacked in Missan, 25

October 2019, url
2053 Xinhua, 11 protesters killed in anti-gov’t demonstrations over 4 past days in Iraq: statement, 25 November 2029, url
2054 EPIC, ISHM: 21 November – 5 December, 2019, 5 December 2019, url
2055 Middle East Monitor, Iraqi protesters torch house of Thi-Qar commander, 1 December 2019, url
2056 EPIC, ISHM: January 23 – January 30, 2020, 30 January 2020, url
2057 Middle East Monitor, Unknown assassin kills prominent tribal leader in Iraq, 24 February 2020, url
2058 EPIC, ISHM: February 6 – February 13, 2020, 13 February 2020, url
2059 EPIC, ISHM: February 6 – February 13, 2020, 13 February 2020, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Governorate

2019 (Jan – Dec)
# of
Killedincidents

Thi-Qar30

Injured0

20192020 (Jan – Jul)
total
# of
Killedcasualties
incidents(killedandinjured)0

31Injured2020
total
casualties(killedandinjured)2

3

Table 20: Number of armed conflict related incidents and civilian casualties 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, Thi-Qar
governorate. Data from UNAMI2060

Number of security incidents
In the reporting period, ACLED reported 12 battles, 23 incidents of remote violence/explosions, 24
cases of violence against civilians, 150 incidents of riots, riots, accounting for a total of 209 security
incidents of these types in Thi-Qar governorate. 217 protests were also reported in the governorate
during the reference period, the majority taking place in the capital Nasiriyah.2061 The evolution of all
the types of security events through the reference period is shown in the figure below.

2060 UNAMI, Email to EASO 24 July 2020
2061 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url

237

EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Figure 24: Evolution of security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence, violence against civilians, riots andprotests in Thi-Qar governorate 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, based on ACLED data2062

State ability to secure law and order
HRW reported that the Iraqi prime minister had issued orders to the state forces not to use live
ammunition against protesters, but that protesters continued to get killed by them.2063 In December
2019 courts in southern Iraq issued arrest warrants against officers in Najaf for excessive use of force
and issuing orders that led to the killing of protesters.2064 HRW reported that the state seemed‘complicit’ in the killings, but also that police and military commanders would be prosecuted for killing
protesters.2065
Knights et al. stated that the PMU is operating its own command and control system to the extent
that its leadership is able to act as a ’parallel state’. Accordingly, the authors asserted, PMU units canrefuse legal orders issued by the state commander in chief, the prime minister, which it ’constantly’
does.2066
HRW reported that southern courts in Iraq have issued arrest warrants against officers in Najaf andThi-Qar for excessive force and issuing orders that led to the killing of protesters.2067 Police and militarycommanders were reported to be prosecuted for killing protesters.2068 On 29 November 2019, theSupreme Judicial Council, the supreme administration of the Iraqi Judiciary2069, announced theformation of a body to investigate deaths of protesters in Nasiriyah.2070 In December 2019, Al-Arabiya

2062 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url
2063 HRW, Iraq: New protester death despite order not to fire, 4 December 2019, url
2064 HRW, Iraq: State Appears Complicit in Massacre of Protesters, 16 December 2019, url
2065 The New York Times, Iraq will Prosecute Military and Police Leaders Over Protest Shootings, October 2019, url
2066 Knights, M. et al., Honored, not contained. The future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, March 2020, url, p. ix
2067 HRW, Iraq: State Appears Complicit in Massacre of Protesters, 16 December 2019, url
2068 The New York Times, Iraq will Prosecute Military and Police Leaders Over Protest Shootings, October 2019, url
2069 Iraq, Supreme Judicial Council homepage, n.d., url
2070 Al-Arabiya, Iraq protests continue after judiciary opens investigation into deaths, 29 November 2019, url

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reported that the investigations were yet to be completed.2071 More recent information about theproceedings has not been found.
State security units supposedly linked to Iran-backed PMU militias were insufficiently held
accountable for killing protesters in Thi-Qar and other governorates, the New York Times cited amember of Iraq’s High Commission on Human Rights as saying. As a reaction to the killing of protesters
in October 2019, Thi-Qar’s police commander was fired and publicly named and shamed.2072
Analyst Philip Smyth at the Washington institute, stated that some ‘tribal elements’ in Thi-Qar andother southern governorates had taken a lead in some protest activities.2073 Tribal leaders were also
reported to have intervened in confrontations between protesters and police.2074

Infrastructure damage and explosive remnants of war
Infrastructure blocked by explosive remnants of war (ERW) was estimated at 1 %. Also access to roads
blocked by ERW was estimated at 1 %, according to the Iraqi Directorate of Mine Action in 2018.2075
More recent information has not been found.

Displacement and return
As of 16 July 2020, Thi-Qar hosted a total number of 3 396 IDPs with main districts of displacement
being Nasiriyah (1 920), Al-Rifai (756), and Suq al-Shoyokh (546). Of these IDPs, 60 % originated from
Ninewa, 17 % from Anbar, 14 % from Kirkuk, and 9 % from other governorates. IOM recorded no
returns to Thi-Qar governorate. During the COVID-19 period (March-May 2020), movements werelimited between governorates.2076

2071 Al-Arabiya, Investigations into violence against protesters in Thi-Qar still underway, 17 December 2019, url
2072 The New York Times, Iraq will Prosecute Military and Police Leaders Over Protest Shootings, October 2019, url
2073 Smyth, P., Iran is Losing Iraq’s Tribes, 4 Dec 2019, url
2074 Al- Sahly, S., Di Qar, the southern governorate at the heart of Iraq’s uprising, 2 February 2020, url; Al-Monitor,

Nasiriyah becomes the Iraqi protest capital, url
2075 Iraqi Directorate of Mine Action, 12-13 June 2018, url, p. 62076 IOM, DTM (IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix), Iraq Master List Report 116, May-June 2020, 16 July 2020, url, p. 3

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4.8 Wassit

Map 26: Wassit governorate with district borders, district capitals and main roads, © United Nations2077

4.8.1 General description of the governorate
Basic geography
The governorate shares an international border with Iran in the east. It borders Diyala and Baghdad
governorates to the north; Babil and Qadissiya to the west; and Thi-Qar, and Missan governorates tothe south.2078 The governorate is divided into six districts: Al-Azezia, Badra, Kut, Al-Suwaira, AlNamaniya, and al-Hai. 2079 The capital is Kut.2080

Population
For 2019, the Iraqi CSO (Central Statistical Office) estimated the governorate’s population at
1 415 034.2081

Ethnicity
The majority of the population in Wassit governorate are Shia Arabs and communities of Fayli Kurds
also reside in the governorate.2082

2077 UN JAU, Iraq District Map, January 2014, url
2078 BBC, Iraqi governorates, n.d., url
2079 NCCI, Wassit governorate profile, December 2015, url
2080 EPIC, ISHM, Reference Guide, May 2020, url
2081 Iraq, CSO, Demographic and population indicators, Estimates for the population of Iraq by governorate, environmentand gender for the year 2019 (table), n.d., url
2082 EPIC, ISHM, Reference Guide, May 2020, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Road security
Road security has been affected by protesters blocking roads.2083

EconomyWassit is a hub for trade in commodities, connecting north to south, and for cross-border trade with
Iran. Agriculture and industry are important sectors.

4.8.2 Conflict background and armed actors in the governorate
Conflict background
The NCCI mentioned that following the Iraq/Iran war in the 1980s, Shiia Fayli Kurds were forcibly
displaced to Iran, and have been slow to return. Heavy fighting took place between US forces and Iraqi
Republican Guard forces during the US-led invasion in 2003. Sadrist leader Muqtada al Sadr started a
revolt against the occupying forces in 2004, which continued for some years. During the 2010s a
number of bomb attacks targeted civilians in markets and schools, according to the NCCI.2084 A reportby the UN noted that ISIL’s predecessor ISI (Islamic State in Iraq) ‘originally’ operated in parts of
Wassit, not specifying exact time, activities and locations.2085 Wassit was never occupied by ISIL.2086
Since security forces were redeployed in 2014 to the north and west to fight ISIL and a security void
opened in the south, fighting between rival Shia tribes over farmland, state construction contracts,
and land ownership gradually undermined the stability of the region.2087
Public protests began across the governorate in the summer of 2018.2088
The governorate ’recently’ experienced bombings by Sunni insurgents targeting Shia civilians, EPIC
reported in May 2020.2089 Corroborating information has not been found.

Armed actors
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
The ISW reported in 2017 that the Iraqi army’s Rafidain Operations Command was overseeing security
in Wassit governorate.2090 In February 2020, the Iraqi army handed over the responsibility for security
in the governorate to the local police, according to media reports.2091 The governorate’s police chief
thereby also took the command of the Rafidain Operations Command, while the Federal Police
remained outside the police chief’s command.2092

2083 The Baghdad Post, Amid gov't negligence, corruption, lack of service control situation in Wassit, 27 January 2019, url;

Shafaaq News, Iraq protesters block a road leading to a border crossing with Iran, url; Xinhua, 11 protesters killed in antigov't demonstrations over past 4 days in Iraq: statement, 25 November 2019, url
2084 NCCI, Wassit governorate Profile, December 2015, url
2085 UNAMI, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq, 6 July – 10 September 2014, url, p. 1,
footnote 32086 EPIC Reference Guide, May 2020, url
2087 Reuters, Tribal clashes, political void threaten oil installations in Iraq’s south, 11 September 2017, url
2088 Arab Reform Initiative, The Rising Tide of Change in Iraq: An assessment of the 2018 and 2019 Protests, 25 November
2019, url (PDF version not downloadable at the time of retrieval); Peoples Dispatch, Fresh protests in Iraq demand
elections, justice for those killed by security forces, 11 May 2020, url
2089 EPIC Reference Guide, May 2020, url
2090 ISW, Iraqi security forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: Order of Battle, December 2017, url, p. 23
2091 Middle East Monitor, Iraq: Army hands security duties over to police in Wassit, 14 February 2020, url
2092 Middle East Monitor, Iraq: Army hands security duties over to police in Wassit, 14 February 2020, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Popular Mobilisation Units (PMUs)
Knights et al. consider all eight southern governorates as areas of shared control between the Iraqi
army or police, and the PMU. The Iran-backed Kataib al-Imam Ali militia has its appropriated militarybase in the north. The PMU commander in the governorate belongs to the Badr militia.2093
Both state forces and the PMU take part in handling the public protests in Wassit and other southerngovernorates.2094 According to HRW, the PMU use tactics that are often lethal, such as shooting
protesters in the head with military-grade tear gas ammunition, and using snipers who shoot to killprotesters.2095 The HRW reported that protesters have been killed and abused also by state forces.2096

4.8.3 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population
Developments 2019-2020
Protests against the government, sometimes violent and with fatalities, have occurred across thegovernorate since 2018.2097 Protesters have set fire to a number of militia headquarters andpoliticians’ offices in Wassit and other southern governorates.2098 In its second update of its report on
demonstrations in Iraq, UNAMI noted that mass protests broke out early in October 2019, and again,
in a second wave in the end of the month in Wassit and other southern governorates.2099 Numberspresented by ACLED for the reference period show spikes in the protest activity in the months ofNovember 2019, and then in January, February, May and July 2020. Other types of security incidents
such as battles, explosions and targeted violence against civilians occurred only in low numbers.2100

Illustrative security incidents•

Between 15 and 19 September, unknown militants shot and killed six civilians in Wassit andother governorates.2101•

In January 2019, protesters clashed violently with state security forces outside the university
campus in the capital Kut.

•

Clashes were reported between students and riot police in Kut in January 2020.2102•

In January 2020, security forces injured ‘at least 20’ protesters.2103•

In April 2020, unidentified armed men attacked the governor’s private residence.2104

2093 Knights, M. et al., (Knights, M., Malik, H. and Al-Tamimi, J.) Honored, not contained – the future of Iraq’s Popular

Mobilization Forces, March 2020, url, pp. 128-129, 131, 37
2094 The New York Times, Iraq will Prosecute Military and Police Leaders Over Protest Shootings, October 2019, url
2095 HRW, Iraq: New Protester Deaths Despite Order Not to Fire, 4 December 2019, url; Mansour, R. et al (Mansour, R.,
Cambanis, T, Hanna, M. W.), These Iraqi militias are attacking protesters and getting away with it. Here’s why, 18
November 2019, url
2096 HRW, Iraq: New Protester Deaths Despite Order Not to Fire, 4 December 2019, url
2097 Arab Reform Initiative, The Rising Tide of Change in Iraq: An assessment of the 2018 and 2019 Protests, 25 November
2019, url (PDF version not downloadable at the time of retrieval); Peoples Dispatch, Fresh protests in Iraq demand
elections, justice for those killed by security forces, 11 May 2020, url
2098 Al-Rubaie, A., Protests in Iraq: Against Domestic Corruption and Iranian Influence, 29 October 2019, url
2099 UNAMI, Demonstrations in Iraq: update 25 October – 4 November 2019, url, p. 2
2100 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url
2101 EPIC, ISHM, 12 September – 19 September 2019, 19 September 2019, url
2102 Middle East Monitor, Over 50 injured in Iraq protests, 13 January 2020, url
2103 EPIC, ISHM, 23 January – 30 January, 2020, 30 January 2020, url
2104 Basnews, Iraq: Armed Men Attack Wassit Governor’s House, 15 April 2020, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation•

In May 2020, protesters blocked roads in Kut, demanding protesters to be released fromarrest.2105•

On 27 June [2020], gunmen killed a senior police officer in Wassit.2106•

In May 2020, security forces attacked protesters at a protest camp at an oilfield and burned
their tents and damaged their cars.2107

Number of civilian casualties
Casualty figures and number of incidents in Wassit governorate reported by UNAMI through thereference period, are shown in the table below.2108
Governorate

2019 (Jan – Dec)
# of
Killedincidents

Wassit40Injured0

20192020 (Jan – Jul)
total
# of
Killedcasualties
incidents(killedandinjured)0

61Injured2020
total
casualties(killedandinjured)1

2

Table 21. Number of armed conflict related incidents and casualties 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, Wassit governorate.
Data from UNAMI2109

Number of security incidents
In the reporting period, ACLED reported 1 battle, 1 incident of remote violence/explosions, 1 case ofviolence against civilians, 38 incidents of riots, accounting for a total of 41 security incidents of thesetypes in Wassit governorate. 124 protests were also reported in Wassit governorate during thereference period, the majority taking place in the capital Kut.2110 The evolution of all the types of
security events through the reference period is shown in the figure below.

2105 EPIC, ISHM, 14 May – 21 May, 2020, 21 May 2020, url
2106 EPIC, ISHM: June 25 – July 2, 2020, 2 July 2020, url
2107 Al-Monitor, Iraq protests resume as new government support for reform, 21 May 2020, url
2108 UNAMI, Email to EASO, 24 July 2020
2109 UNAMI, Email to EASO 24 July 2020
2110 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Figure 25: Evolution of security events coded battles, explosions/remote violence, violence against civilians, riots andprotests in Wassit governorate 1 January 2019 – 31 July 2020, based on ACLED data2111

State ability to secure law and orderAccording to a media report from 2017, the security vacuum in the southern region of Iraq weakened
the state’s ability to provide security.2112 Civilian protesters are reported to have been killed by state
forces.2113 Protesters have demanded better public services such as electricity, drinking water, jobs,
and an end to corruption.2114 The killing of protesters by state forces prompted a court trial in which
two officers were convicted, one of them to death, by the criminal court in Wassit in late 2019.2115
Knights et al. stated that the PMU is extensively operating its own command and control system. PMU
units ‘constantly’ refuse legal orders issued by the state commander in chief (the prime minister).2116
The New York Times cited a member of Iraq’s High Commission on Human Rights saying that state
security units supposedly linked to Iran-backed PMU militias were insufficiently held accountable forkilling protesters in Wassit and other governorates.. As a reaction to the killing of protesters in October
2019, Wassit’s police commander was fired and publicly named and shamed.2117

2111 EASO analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East (1 August 2020), url
2112 Reuters, Tribal clashes, political void threaten oil installations in Iraq’s south, 11 September 2017, url
2113 Arab Reform Initiative, The Rising Tide of Change in Iraq: An assessment of the 2018 and 2019 Protests, 25 November

2019, url; UN News, Iraq: Solutions needed ‘urgently’ to quell ongoing violence, break political deadlock, 30 January 2020,
url
2114 The Baghdad Post, Amid gov't negligence, corruption, lack of service control situation in Wassit, 27 January 2019, url
2115 The Baghdad Post, Iraqi court sentences commando to death for killing protesters, 1 December 2019, url
2116 Knights, M. et al., Honored, not contained. The future of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, March 2020, url, p. ix
2117 The New York Times, Iraq will Prosecute Military and Police Leaders Over Protest Shootings, October 2019, url

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Infrastructure damage and explosive remnants of war
NCCI noted in 2015 that unexploded ordnances and mines dating from past wars remained a ‘lingering
threat’ in the governorate. No details were given about their exact locations.2118 In August 2019, alandmine believed to be a remnant of the 1980s Iraq-Iran war exploded in Zurbatya District near the
Iranian border, severely injuring four civilians, EPIC reported.2119

Displacement and return
As of 30 June 2020, Wassit governorate hosted a total of 6 084 IDPs with main districts ofdisplacement being Kut (4 074), Al-Azezia (582), and Al-Na’maniya (432). Of these IDPs, 76% originatedfrom Ninewa, 10% from Kirkuk, and 14% from other governorates (Diyala, Salah ad Din, Anbar). No
returns were recorded. During the COVID-19 period (March-May 2020), movements were limited
between governorates.2120

2118 NGO Coordination Committee for Iraq (NCCI), Wassit Governorate Profile, December 2015, url
2119 EPIC, ISHM: 8 August – 15 August, 2019, 15 August 2019, url
2120 IOM, DTM (IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix), Iraq Master List Report 116, May-June 2020, 16 July 2020, url, p. 3

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Annex 1: Bibliography
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invited him as a guest speaker in December 2018 and the source confirmed the notes via email.
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Bakawan, Adel, Email to DIDR (OFPRA), 10 December 2018, in: EASO, Country of Origin Information
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Haddad, F., Comment made during the review of the 2019 EASO report, 18 January 2019, in: EASO,COI Report: Iraq - Security situation, March 2019,https://coi.easo.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/Iraq_security_situation.pdf
UNAMI (UN Assistance Mission for Iraq), Email to EASO, 24 July 2020
UNAMI (UN Assistance Mission for Iraq), Email to EASO, 24 August 2020

Public sources
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258

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298

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299

EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

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‫ن‬
NINA (National Iraqi News Agency), ‫مدنيي بجروح جراء سقوط قذيفة هاون جنوب اموصل‬‫اصابة ثالثة‬, (Threecivilians were wounded by a mortar shell south of Mosul), 10 May 2020,
https://ninanews.com/Website/News/Details?key=814406, accessed 25 July 2020
‫ن‬
NINA (National Iraqi News Agency), ‫مدني بانفجار عبوة ناسفة ن يف تلكيف بنينوى‬‫( اصابة‬Civilians injured by an
explosive device in Tel Kayf, Ninewa), 3 March 2020,
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‫ن‬
NINA (National Iraqi News Agency), ‫موظفي بالكهرباء بانفجار عبوة ناسفة جنوب الموصل‬‫اصابة‬, Electricity
employees were injured by an explosive device, south of Mosul, 7 May 2020,
https://ninanews.com/Website/News/Details?key=830418 , accessed 25 June 2020‫ارهابيي ن‬‫ن‬
NINA (National Iraqi News Agency), 7, (‫الدول ن يف نينوى‬‫برصبة جوية للتحالف‬7 ‫ مقتل‬terrorists killed by‫ي‬
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300

EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

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301

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302

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303

EASO Country of Origin Information Report | Iraq: Security situation

Reuters, Iraq lifts oil production at Halfaya oilfield to 370,000 BPD, 12 December 2018,https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-oil-halfaya/iraq-lifts-oil-production-at-halfaya-oilfield-to370000-bpd-idUSKBN1OB0PX, accessed 18 July 2020
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305

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306

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‫ن‬Iraq, Media Office of the Prime Minister, ‫ألمن‬‫بناء ًعىل‬‫( خلية اإلعالم ا ي‬Security Media Cell), ‫معلومات‬
‫ن‬
‫ر‬
‫ر‬
‫ حيث تم‬،‫ تشتبك مع عنارص إرهابية يف سلسلة جبال عطشانة‬،‫ بالفرقة العشين‬٢٢ ‫ واللواء‬٦٦ ‫ قوة مشتكة من اللواء‬،‫استخبارية‬‫ حيث تمت معالجتهم وفقا‬،‫ وقد حاولوا الهروب واالختباء ن يف إحدى اإلنفاق ن يف المنطقة أعاله‬،‫ عنارص من داعش‬٦ ‫محارصة‬‫ن‬‫اإلرهابيي الذين كانوا‬‫ مما أسفر عن تدمت النفق وقتل‬،‫الدول‬‫لمعلومات من قيادة عمليات نينوى بواسطة طتان التحالف‬‫ي‬٢٠١٩ ‫ اب‬٢٠. ‫[ بداخله‬Facebook] , posted on 20 August 2019 ,https://www.facebook.com/SecMedCell/posts/470189760430103?__xts__%5b0%5d=68.ARASIs80u
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Annex 2: Terms of Reference
In order to assess Article 15(c) QD: serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason
of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict, the security
situation report should examine the following indicators of indiscriminate violence:oIs an armed conflict taking place?
▪ Who are the armed groups?
▪ Are there confrontations?
▪ What are their areas of control?
▪ What are the areas where confrontations take place? Have there been
offensives taking place?

oWhat is the nature/extent of the violence?
▪ Where? Geographical scope / intensity of armed conflict in different areas▪ Presence of actors / conflict in different areas of the territory▪ Number of incidents over a specified reference period? Frequency of security
incidents / trends?
▪ Nature and methods/tactics used – are they likely to cause (intended and/or
unintended) civilian casualties? What are the main causes of civilian
casualties?
▪ Are civilian targets attacked? (hospitals, schools, etc.) Number of civilian
casualties? Patterns over time?

oWhat is the impact of the violence? Displacement:▪ How many civilians have been displaced by the conflict?
▪ Is there secondary displacement? (forced return, evictions, etc.)

Research should aim to cover:
1. General description of the security situation
a. Short overview of main conflict context (2019-2020)
b. Overview of current conflict actors, key conflict dynamics/trends, andpolitical context (2019-2020)
2. Security situation and conflict impact on civilians by regiona. Northwestern and central governorates (with separate chapters forgovernorates: Anbar, Babil, Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewa, Salah al-Din)
b. Kurdistan Region of Iraq
c. Southern governorates

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doi: 10.2847/554901

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